Digitized by tine Internet Archive in 2010 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/statepaperscorreOOunit ni Congress, \ HOUSE OF KEriiESENTATlVES. i Document M Session. f "( No. 431. STATE PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE BEARING UPON TUE WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIgE, 1903. HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. By Mr. Gaines. , Resolved hy the House of Representatives {the Senate concurring)^ That there be published and bound 6,000 copies of the State papers and all correspondence bearing- upon the purchase of the territory of Louisiana by the United States, including the treaty of purchase, 4,000 for the use of the House of Representatives and 2,000 for the use of the Senate. Passed the House May 10, 1902. Concurred in by the Senate May 13, 1902. STATE PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE BEARING UPON THE PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, March W, 1801. Dear Sir: In contirniation of the rumor.s of the day, Carnofs aii.swcr to Bailleul, published during the exile of the former, .states the project which has been discussed in the Directory, to obtain from Spain a cession of Louisiana and the Floridas. A reference to that perform- ance, copies of which I at the time sent to the Department of State, will show the manner in which it was expected to obtain the consent of Spain, as well as afford a clue to the view^s of France in seeking- this establishment. What was then meditated, has, in all prol)a1iility, since been executed. The cession of Tuscan}^ to the Infant, Duke of Parma, by the treat}' between France and Austria, forms a more compact and valuable compensation to this branch of the House of Spain than was formerh" thought of, and adds ver}" great credit to the opinion which, at this time, prevails both at Paris and London, that Spain has in return actually ceded Louisiana and the Floridas to France. There is reason to know that it is the opinion of certain influential persons in France, that nature has marked a line of separation between the people of the United States living upon the two sides of the range of mountains which divides their territory. Without discussing the considerations which are suggested in support of this opinion, or the false conse- quences, as I wish to believe them, deduced from it, I am apprehen- sive that this cession is intended to have, and may actually produce, I effects injurious to the Union and consequent happiness of the people 'of the United States. Louisiana and the Floridas may be given to the French emigrants, as England once thought of giving them to the American tories; or, they may constitute the reward of some of the armies which can be spared at the end of the war. I learn that General Collot, who was a few years ago in America, and a traveler in the western country, and who, for some time, has been in disgrace and continement in France, has been lately set at liberty; and that he, with a considerable number of disaffected and exiled P]nglishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen, is soon to proceed from France to the United States. Whether their voyage has any relation to the 3 4 PUECHASE OF THE TEERITOEY OF LOUISIANA. cession of Louisiana is a matter of mere conjecture; but having heard of it in connection with that project I think proper to mention it to you. What effect a plain and judicious representation upon this subject, made to the French Government by a minister of talents and entitled to confidence, would be likely to have, is quite beyond any means of judging- which 1 possess; but on this account, as well as others of importance, it is a subject of regret that we have not such a character at Paris at this time. With perfect respect and esteem, 1 have the honor to be, dear sir, your obedient and faithful servant, RuFus King. [Extract.] Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, June i, 1801. On this occasion, among other topics of conversation, His Lordship (Hawkesbury) introduced the subject of Louisiana. He had, from different quarters, received information of its cession to France, and very unreservedly expressed the reluctance with which they should be led to acquiesce in a measure that might be followed by the inost important consequences. The acquisition might enable France to extend her influence and perhaps her dominion up the Mississippi; and through the Lakes even to Canada. This would be realizing the plan, to prevent the accomplishment of which, the seven yeai's' war took place; besides, the vicinity of the Floridas to the West Indies, rand the facility with which the trade of the latter might be inter- ! rupted, and the islands even invaded should the transfer be made, were i strong reason why England must be unwilling that the territory should pass under the dominion of France. As I could not mistake his Lordship's object in speaking to me on the subject, I had no diffi- culty or reserve in expressing my private sentiments respecting it; / taking for my text the observation of Montesquieu, " That it is happy for trading Powers that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in the world, since of all nations they are the most proper to possess a great empire with insignificance. " The purport of what I said was, that we are contented that the Floridas remain in the hands of Spain, but should not be willing to see them transferred except to ourselves. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient and faithful servant, EuFus King. PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 5 [Extract.] Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Charles Pinckney. Department of State, Washington^ June 0, 1801. On different occasions, since the commencement of the French Revo- kition, opinions and reports have prevailed that some part of the Spanish possessions, including New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi, had been or was to l)e transferred to France. Of late, information has been received through several channels, making it probable that some arrangement for that purpose has been concerted. Neither the extent of the cession, however, nor the consideration on whi(.'h it is made, is yet reduced to certaint}" and precision. The whole subject will deserve and engage your early and vigilant inquiries, and may require a verv delicate and circumspect management. What the motives of Spain in this transaction may be, is not so obvious. The policy of France in it, so far, at least, as relates to the United States, can not l)e mistaken. While she remained on the footing of confi- dence and affection with the United States, which originated during our Revolution and was strengthened during the earl}' stages of her own, it may be presumed that she adhered to the policy which, in the treaty of 1778, renounced the acquisition of continental territory in North America, and was more disposed to shun the collisions threat- ened ])y possessions in that quarter, coterminous with ours, than to pursue objects to which the commanding position at the mouth of the Mississippi might be made subservient. Circumstances are not now the same. Although the two countries are again brought together by stipulations of amity and commerce, the conffdence and cordiality which formerly subsisted have had a deep wound from the occurrences of late years. Jealousies proliabl}^ still remain, that the Atlantic States have a par- tiality for Great Britain, which may, in future, throw their weight into the scale of that rival. It is more than possible, also, that, under the influence of those jealousies, and of the alarms which have at times prevailed, of a projected operation for wresting the mouth of the Mississippi into the hands of Great Britain, she may have concluded a preoccupancy of it b}' herself to be a necessary safeguard against an event from which that nation would derive the double advantage of strengthening her hold on the United States, and of adding to her com- merce a monopoly of the immense and fertile region communicating with the sea through a single outlet. This view of the subject, which suggests the difficulty which ma}' be found in diverting France from the object, points, at the same time, to the means that may most tend to induce a voluntary relinquishment of it. She must infer, from our conduct and our conununications, that the Atlantic States are not dis- 6 PUEOHASE OF THE TEREITOEY OF LOUISIANA. f posed to enter, nor are in danger of being drawn, into partialities 'toward Great Britain unjust or injurious to France; that our political and commercial interests afford a sufficient guarant}'^ against such a state of things; that without the cooperation of the United States, Great Britain is not likely to acquire any part of the Spanish posses- sions on the Mississippi; and that the United States never have favored nor, so long as the}^ are guided b}^ the clearest policy, ever can favor, such a project. She must be led to see again, and with a desire to shun, the danger of collisions between the two Republics from the contact of their territories; and from the conflicts in their regulations of a commerce involving the peculiarities which distinguish that of the Mississippi. Such are the general observations which the President has thought it proper should be communicated to j'ou, that, knowing the light in which the subject is viewed by him, j^ou may be less in danger of presenting it in any other. It is not expected that you will have occasion to make any positive use of them in relation to the councils of the French Republic, the Minister to which will be charged with that task. In relation to the Spanish Government, although the chief difficulty is not supposed to lie there, the President wishes you to cultivate a favorable disposition by every proper demonstration of the preference given by the United States to the neighborhood of that of every other nation. This may be the more important, as it is not improbable that her councils also may have been afl'ected by rumors of proceedings in this countrj^ connected with schemes of Great Britain for getting possession of New Orleans. [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France. Department of State, September 28, 1801. You have been already informed of the intention of the President that your departure from France should be hastened, and that 3^ou would be furnished with a passage in the Boston frigate, which, after landing you in Bordeaux, is to proceed to the Mediterranean. From different sources information has been received that, by some transaction concluded or contemplated between France and Spain, the mouth of the Mississippi, with certain portions of adjacent terri- tory, is to pass from the hands of the latter to the former nation. Such a change of our neighbors in that quarter is of too momentous concern not to have engaged the most serious attention of the Execu- tive. It was accordingly made one of the subjects of instruction to Mr. Charles Pinckney, our Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Spain. You will find an extract of the passage hereto annexed, PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 7 No. 1. A paragraph connected with the same .subject, in a letter to Mr. King-, i.s also extracted and annexed. No. 2. In these extracts you will see the ideas entertained by the Executive, and the general considerations which, it is presumed, will have most tendency to isd- suade the parties from adhering to their object. As soon as \'Ou shall have prepared the way by the necessary inquiries at Paris, it will be proper for you to break the sul^ject to the French Government, and to make the use of these considerntions most likely to give them their full weight. You will probably find it advantageous to press, in a particular manner, the anxiet}'^ of the United States to maintain har- mony and confidence with the French Republic, the danger to which these will be exposed by collisions, more or less inseparable from a neighborhood under such circumstances, and the security which Franco ought to feel that it can not be the interest of this country to favor anj^ voluntary or compulsive transfer of the possessions in question from Spain to France. Among other topics to be emploj^ed on the occasion, you may, per- haps, find it eligible to remark on the frequent recurrence of war between France and Great Britain, the danger to which the Western settlements of the United States would be subject, of being embroiled by military expeditions between Canada and Louisiana, the inquietudes which would be excited in the Southern States, whose numerous slaves have been taught to regard the Frencii as the patrons of their cause, and the tendency of a French neighborhood, on this and other accounts, to inspire jealousies and apprehensions which maj^ turn the thoughts of our citizens toward a closer connection with her rival, and possibl}^ produce a crisis in which a very valuable part of her dominions would be exposed to the joint operation of a naval and territorial power. Suggestions of these kinds must be managed with much delicacy, or rather the expedienc}^ of hazarding them at all, as well as the manner of doing it, must be left to 3'our own information and discretion. Should it be found that the cession from Spain to France has irre- vocably taken place, or certainly will take place, sound polic}^ will require in that state of things, that nothing be said or done which will unnecessarily irritate our future neighbors, or check the liljerality which they may be disposed to exercise in relation to the trade and navigation through the mouth of the Mississippi; everything ])eing equally avoided at the same time, which may compromit the rights of the United States beyond those stipulated in the treatv between them and Spain. It will be proper, on the contrar}'^, to patronize the inter- ests of our \^"estern fellow-citizens )>y cherishing in France every just and liberal disposition toward their commerce. In^the next place, it will deserve to be tried whether France can not be induced to make over to the United States the Floridas, if included in the cession to her from Spain, or at least West Florida, through which several of 8 PURCHASE OF THE TEERITOEY OF LOUISIANA. our rivers (particularly the important river Mobile) empty them- selves into the sea. Such a proof on the part of France, of good will toward the United States, would contribute to reconcile the latter to an arrangement in itself much disrelished by them and to strengthen the returning friendship between the two countries; and by affording a fund for indemnifying and soothing our fellow-citizens who have suf- fered from her wrongs, would, in that view also, be a measure founded not less in an enlarged policy than in solid justice. The great impor- tance of West Florida to the United States recommends to 3^our patriotism the prudent use of every fair consideration which may favor the attainment of the object. These ideas suppose that the cession to the United States is to be obtained from the single will of France. But it may happen that the Floridas are so far suspended, on unfinished negotiations between her and Spain, as to admit or require the concurrence of both in gratifying the wishes of the United States. In this state of things, France may yield to the considerations suggested with less of concession and reluctance; and as Spain, too, must feel an interest in the good will of the United States, and is responsible, in justice, for very considerable depredations on their commerce, there may be the greater possibility of her joining in the measure. Should the Floridas neither have been ceded to France, nor be an acquisition contemplated hj her, still it will be material, considering her intimate and influential relations to Spain, to dispose her to favor experiments on the part of the United States, for obtaining from Spain the cession in view. The interest which the latter has in cultivating our friendly dispositions, and the obligation she is under to satisfy our claims for spoliations, for doing which no other mode ma}^ be so con- venient to her, are motives to which an appeal may be made with no inconsiderable force. Mr. Pinckney is accordingly to avail himself of the most auspicious occasions for sounding and exciting the disposi- tions of the Spanish Government on this subject; and your efforts at Paris can not be too attentively combined with his at Madrid, as well on the last supposition that Spain alone is to make the cession, as on the former, that France is to have a direct share in the transaction. Mr. Pinckney 's instructions will relate to each alternative, and you will be sensible of the advantages of such a correspondence between you as will give the proper concert to your operations. Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, November W^ 1801. Sir: If the annexed copy of the treaty between France and Spain, respecting the establishment of the Prince of Parma in Tuscany, be PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 9 genuine, of which 1 have no reason to doubt, you will perceive the value which these Powers seem to have placed upon Louisiana; the cession whereof to France is confirmed by the seventh article of this treaty. I am in hopes that I shall be able to obtain and send 3'ou a copy of the treaty cedino- Louisiana to France: this would enable us to deter- mine whether it includes New Orleans and the Floridas. There is, doubtless, an understanding- between England and France in respect to the expedition now nearl}" ready to proceed to Saint Domingo, and I think I am not mistaken in the l)elief, whatever may be the intentions of France in respect to the occupation of Louisiana, that no part of the forces now collecting and which are going to Saint Domingo, will be employed for this purpose. It is not a little extraordinary that during the whole negotiation between France and England not a word was mentioned on either side respecting Louisiana, though this Government was not ignorant of the views of France in this quarter. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient and faithful servant, RuFus King. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, December 10^ ISOl. 1 found, from a variety" of sources here, and some I think I can depend on, the business of Louisiana has been concluded, and it was understood it had been given in exchange for the Spanish port of St. Domingo, to be restored to its old master. Several circumstances concurred to induce me to believe this report was not void of truth. I therefore took the earliest opportunity to touch upon that subject with the Minister, and to hint at the reason of polic}" (as it respected the French Government as well as ourselves) that made the object interesting to us. He seemed at first inclined to waive the sul)ject; but when he found I pressed more closely he admitted that it had been a subject of conversation, Init nothing had been concluded or even resolved on, in that aft'air, I left him with a hint that perhaps both France and Spain might find a mutual interest in ceding the Floridas to the United States. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, Decemher 12, 1801. In addition to what I wrote yesteraay, I have only to mention that I am more and more confirmed, notwithstanding what I there say of 10 PUECHASE OF THE TEREITOBY OF LOUISIANA. the Minister's assurance, that Louisiana is a favorite object, and that they will be unwilling- to part with it on the condition I mentioned. Speaking of the means of paying their debts to one of their Ministers, yesterda}^, I hinted at this. His answer was, " None but spendthrifts satisfy their debts b}^ selling their lands;" adding, however, after a short pause, "but it is not ours to give." [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to Mr. King, Minister to England. Paris, December 30, 1801. Among the objects that would most naturally engage ni}^ attention on my arrival was the state of the negotiation between France and Spain regarding Louisiana; with a view, if it had not been concluded on, to throw obstacles in the waj'^, so far as it could be advantageously done; or, if it had been effected, to make some such arrangements as would lessen the inconveniences which might result from it to our Western territory. I have, however, reason to think the whole busi- ness had been settled before my arrival. 1 took occasion, on my first private audience of the Minister of Exterior Relations, to press him directlj'^ upon the subject, taking the common reports as a foundation for ni}" inquir}^. He explicitly denied that anything had been con- cluded, but admitted that it had been a subject of conversation. I know, however, from a variety of channels, that it is not a mere matter of conversation, but that the exchange has actually been agreed upon; that the armament destined, in the first instance, for Hispaniola, is to proceed to Louisiana, provided Toussaint makes no opposition. Gen- eral Collot, whom you may have seen in America, was originally intended for Governor of the province, but he is at present out of favor. I think it probable the Minister will justify his concealment to me, by its not having been definitely closed with Spain, as this, though determined between the two Governments, may form an article in the general treaty. His absence (being at Lyons) prevents my coming to something more explicit with him. That Spain has made this cession (which contravenes all her former maxims of policy) can not be doubted, but she is no longer a free agent. I wish to know from you in what light this is seen by England. It will certainl}^, in its consequences, be extremely dangerous to her, as it will give an almost unbounded power to her rival. It puts Spain in a perpetual state of pupilage, since she must always tremble for the safet}' of her colonies in case of rupture. To avoid this evil, she must grant ever}^ commercial and j)olitical advantage to France. Her manufactures will find their way, through this channel, into every part of the Spanish territory, to the exclusion of those of PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 11 Britain. Our AVestern territory may })o rondored so dependent upon them as to promote their political views, while the interest they have always nurtured with the Indians, and the national character of the peasantry of Canada, may render the possessions of Britain very pre- carious, to say nothino- of the danger which must threaten her islands in case a respectable establishment should be made by France in Louisiana, which will not fail to be the case, as the territory is uncom- monly tine, and produces sugar and every article now culti^'ated in the islands. I suggest these hints, that they, Avith many others which may occur to you, may be made use of with the British Ministr}- to induce them to thi'ow all the obstacles in their power in the way of a tinal settle- ment of this business, if it is not alread}' too late. You know, how- ever, the importance of not appearing yourself or permitting me to appear much opposed to it, if you tind the thing concluded, since it might bo made use of to embroil us with France, and Britain will have sufficient address to endeavor to keep up a mutual jealousy, if possible, between us. [Extraot.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, Becemhcr 31, 1801. The business of Louisiana is very disagreeable to Spain, as far as I can learn. If it should be equally so to Britain, perhaps it ma}" meet with some obstacles. It is a very favorite measure here. Mar])ois told me yesterda}^ it was considered important to have an outlet for their turbulent spirits; yet w^ould not explicitly acknowledge that the business had been concluded. [Exlnict.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, Jan nan/ IS, 1802. My former letters left you little doubt on the subject of the cession of Louisiana. I\y the inclosed copy of the late treaty ])etween France, and Spain you will tind that it is a transaction of pretty long standing. The absence of the Minister prevents my applying to him for the former treaty, whii-li he will hardly know how^ to give me after aliso- lutely denying that any had been formed on the subject. By the secrec}^ and duplicity practiced relative to this object, it is clear to me that they apprehend some opposition on the part of America to their plans. 1 have, however, upon all occasions, declared that, as long- as France conforms to the existing treaty between us and Spain, the 12 PUECHASE OF THE TEREITORY OF LOUISIANA. Government of the United States does not consider herself as having any interest in opposing the exchange. The evil our country has suffered by their rupture with France is not to be calculated. We have become an object of jealousy both to the Government and people. The reluctance we have shown to a renewal of the Treaty of 1778 has created many suspicions. Among other absurd ones, they believe seriously that we have an eye to a conquest of their islands. The busi- ness of Louisiana also originated in that; and they saj^ expressly that they could have no pretense, so far as related to the Floridas, to make this exchange, had the treaty been renewed, since by the sixth article they were expressly prohibited from touching the Floridas. I own I have always considered this article and the guaranty of our independ- ence as more important to us than the guaranty of the islands was to France; and the sacrifices we have made of an immense claim to get rid of it at a dead loss. We must calculate upon every effort from every maritime Power in Europe to diminish our commerce. France has already excluded us from her African colonies. Her premiums will exclude our oil; and her heavy duties upon tobacco in foreign bottoms will prevent our carrying that article for ourselves. She refuses to naturalize our ships, so that a large capital in that article will sink in our hands. The American Government have it in their power to counteract these measures; but they must do it instantly and decidedly, so as to show that measures of hostility to her commerce will not produce the effect contemplated by the nations of Europe. Let the United States impose a duty upon special articles, of her own produce, exported in foreign bottoms, equivalent to the difference of duty paid in Europe on such articles when imported in American or national vessels. This will secure to us the carriage of our own arti- cles; first, because we can carry cheaper; and, second, because this duty being paid in advance imposes a greater burden than one that is paid out of the sale of the produce. [Extract.] Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, January 15, 1802. Sir: I have before mentioned to you that the cession of Louisiana (of which it seems to me we can have no doubt, notwithstanding what may be said to amuse us) was not only a topic of inquiry or discussion in the negotiation of the preliminaries: and for the same reason that it was not heard of on that occasion. Lord Hawkesburj^ has recently informed me that it had not been and would not be, mentioned at Amiens. It is impossible for me to suspect collusion in this affair, and my persuasion, after most careful attention, is, that England PUECHASE OF THE TEEEITORY OF LOUISIANA. 13 abstains from mixing herself in it, precisely from those considera- tions which have led her to acqiiiesce in others of great importance to the balance of Europe, as well as her own repose, and upon which she has been altogether silent. KuFUS King. [Extract.] Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, Fehruary 5, 1802. Sir: I have seen a letter, dated Paris, February 26, which says, it is definitively settled to send a colony to Louisiana and Florida. Gen- eral Bernadotte is to have the direction and command of it: prepara- tions are making for the first expedition, whose departure will perhaps depend upon the accounts expected from St. Domingo. It is asserted that the Indian nations, adjoining to Florida, have agents, now here, for the purpose of making treaties with this country to unite themselves with the troops and settlers that may be sent hence. The establish- ment of this colony is a darling object, and will be pursued with ardor "and upon a great scale, unless affairs of St. Domingo shall, for the moment, derange the plan. Louisiana, Guiana, and the desert islands of Tristan de Cunha, are each spoken of as places to which the rebel- lious and untractable negroes and people of color may be sent from St. Domingo and the other French colonies. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, sir, 3'our obedient and faithful servant, KuFus King. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, Fdiruaiiyi26, 1802. On the subject of Louisiana, I have nothing new. The establish- ment is disapproved bj^^ every statesman here as one that will occasion a great waste of men and money, excite enmities with us, and produce no possible advantage to the nation. But it is a scheme to which the First Consul is extremely attached; and it must, of course, be supported. You will find, b}^ the enclosed note, that I have pressed an explanation on the subject, but I have received no answer. I have it, however, through a friend, from the First Consul, that it is by no means their intention to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi, or violate our Treaty with Spain. General Bernadotte is understood to be designed for the command, and to have asked 10,000 troops. 14 PURCHASE OF THE TERKITOKY OF LOUISIANA. Mr. Livingston to the Minister of Exterior Relations. VA.ms, Fehruary 20, 1802. The undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of tlie United States, has seen, witli some concern, the reserve of the French Government, with respect to the cession they liave received from Spain of Louisiana. He had hoped that they would have found a propriety in making such frank and open communications to him as would have enabled him to satisfy the Government of the United States that neither their boundary, nor the navigation of the Mississippi, secured by their treaties with Spain, would be, in any way, affected by the measure. It would also have been very satisfactory to him to have taken such arrangements with the Minister of Exterior Relations as would have had a tendency to dissipate the alarms the people of the Western ter- ritory of the United States will not fail to feel on the arrival of a large body of French troops in their vicinity; alarms which will proba- bly be increased by the exertions of those Powers that are interested in keeping the two Republics from cementing their connection. The policy of the former Government of France led it to avoid all ground of controversy with the United States, not onh^ by declining to possess any territory in their neighborhood, but by stipulating never to hold any. The undersigned does not, by this reference to the Treaty of 1778, mean to reclaim any rights under it, since, by the convention of Paris, 30th September, 1800, it is understood to be revoked; but merel}^ to lead the French Gov^ernment to reflect how far a regard to the same policj^ might render it conducive to the mutual interests of both nations to cover, by a natural bo.rrier, their possessions in America, as France has invariably sought to do in Europe. The undersigned prays the Minister of Exterior Relations (if the request is not inconsistent with the views of the Government) to inform him whether East and West Florida, or either of them, are included in the treaty made between France and Spain; and to afford him such assurances, with respect to the limits of their territory and the navi- gation of the Mississippi, heretofore agreed on between Spain and the United States, as may prove satisfactory to the latter. If the territories of East and West Florida should be included within the limits of the cession obtained by France, the undersigned desires to be informed how far it would be practicable to make such arrange- ments between their respective Governments as would, at the same time, aid the financial operations of France, and remove, by a strong natural boundarj^, all future causes of discontent between her and the United States. The undersigned embraces this opportunity of renew- ing to the Minister of Exterior Relations his, etc. PURCHASE OF THE TEKRITOKY OF LOUISIANA. 15 [Hxli-iK-l.J Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, Fehrmry ^7, 1802. Sir: From all 1 can rather upon the sul)j(>ct we may consider the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas as an affair decided. Without doubt, you are fully aware of its various and extensive consequences. Has it occurred to you that the French Government will probably send thither a large body of people from France, and that it may add to them all the refractory and discontented blacks and persons of color of their West India colonies? With perfect respect and esteem, etc. , RuFus King. Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, March 15, 1802. Sii; vfter closing ni}^ packet, I received the note of which the within is a cop3\ It amounts to nothing, but nmst servo to keep mc quite a few da3's longer, till they see what turn the business takes at Amiens, wdiich becomes more and more doubtful. The bad news from St. Domingo also renders it necessary to keep us in suspense. I have already expressed m}" fear that American property in the island will not be very safe; and the passage in Leclerc's letter relative to the powder and arms may serve as an apology. I am, sir, etc., R. R. L. Paris, March 13, year 10. Sir: I have received the different notes which you have done me the honor to address to me, relating to the debts, and to the American captures; and I have made them the subject of a report to the First Consul. As soon as his decision shall be made, 1 shall hasten to inform you of the result. Do you doubt, sir, that the questions ^yhich concern the United States, the determination of which may affect their relations with France, will be examined with equal interest and attention? Accept, sir, the assurances of m}^ high consideration. Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. President Jefferson to Mr. Livingston. Washington, AjjrU IS, 1802. The cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France, works most sorely on the United States. On this subject the Secretary of 16 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. "^ State has written to you fully, yet I cannot forbear recurring- to it personally, so deep is the impression it makes on my mind. It com- pletel}^ reverses all the political relations of the United States, and will form a new epoch in our political course. Of all nations of any consideration, France is the one which, hitherto, has offered the few- est points on which we could have any conflict of right, and the most points of a communion of interests. From these causes, we have ever looked to her as our natural friend^ as one with which we never could have an occasion of difference. Her growth, therefore, we viewed ]as our own, her misfortunes ours. There is on the globe one single [spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eighths of our ter- ritory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce, and contain more than half of our inhabitants. France, placing herself in that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us, and it would not, perhaps, be very long before some circumstance might arise, which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands of France: the impetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character, placed in a point of eternal friction with us, and our character, which, though quiet and loving- peace andthe pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, despising wealth in competition with insult or injury, enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth; these circumstances render it impossible that France and the United States can continue long friends, when they meet in so irritable a position. They, as well as we, must be blind if the}^ do not see this; and we must be very improvident if we do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans, fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment, we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high ground; and having formed and connected together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the United British and American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us as necessarily, as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on" its PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. l7 necessary etfcct. It is not from a fear of France that we deprecate this measure proposed by her. For however greater her force is than ours, compared in the abstract, it is nothing- in comparison of ours, when to be exerted on our soil. But it is from a sincere love of peace, and a tirm persuasion, that bound to France by the interests and the strong sympathies still existing in the minds of our citizens, and hold- ing relative positions which insure their continuance, we are secure of a long course of peace. Whereas, the change of friends, which will l)e rendered necessarj- if France changes that position, embarks us necessaril}' as a belligerent power in the first war of Europe. In that case, France will have held possession of New Orleans during the interval of a peace, long or short, at the end of which it will be wrested from her. Will this short-lived possession have been an e(|uivalent to her for the transfer of such a weight into the scale of her enemv? Will not the amalgamation of a 3'oung, thriving nation, continue to that enemy the health and force which are at present so evidently on the decline? And will a few years' possession of New Orleans add equally to the strength of France? She may say she needs Louisiana for the suppl}' of her West Indies. She does not need it in time of peace, and in war she could not depend on them, because thev would be so easil}' intercepted. I should suppose that all these considerations might, in some proper form, be brought into view of the Government of France. Though stated by us, it ought not to give ofl'ence; because we do not bring them forward as a men- ace, but as consequences not controllable l)y us, but inevitable from the course of things. We mention them, not as things Avhich we desire by any means, but as things we deprecate; and we beseech a friend to look forward and to prevent them for our common interest. If France considers Louisiana, however, as indispensable for her views, she might perhaps be willing to look about for arrangements which might reconcile it to our interests. If auA'thing could do this, it would be the ceding to us the island of New Orleans and the Flori- das. This would certainly, in a great degree, remove the causes of jarring and irritation between us, and perhaps for such a length of time, as might produce other means of making the measure perma- nently conciliatory to our interests and friendships. It would, at an}" rate, I'elieve us from the necessity of taking immediate measures for countervailing such an operation by arrangements in.another quarter. But still we should consider New Orleans and the Floridas as no equivalent for the risk of a quarrel wifch France, produced by her vicinage. I have no doubt you have urged these considerations, on every proper occasion, with the government where you are. They are such as must have effect, if 3"ou can find means of producing thorough reflection on them b}^ that government. The idea here is, that the H. Doc. 431 2 18 PUECHASE OF THE TEBEITOEY OF LOUISIANA. troops sent to St. Domingo, were to proceed to Louisiana after finish- ing their work in that island. If this were the arrangement, it will give you time to return again and again to the charge. For the con- quest of St. Domingo will not be a short work. It will take consider- able time, and wear down a great number of soldiers. Every eye in the United States is now fixed on the affairs of Louisiana. Perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war, has produced more uneasy sensa- tions through the bod}^ of the nation. Notwithstanding temporary bickerings have taken place with France, she has still a strong hold on the affections of our citizens generally. I have thought it not amiss, by way of supplement to the letters of the Secretary of State, to write you this private one, to impress you with the importance we affix to this transaction. I pray you to cherish Dupont. He has the best disposition for the continuance of friendship between the two nations, and perhaps you may be able to make a good use of him. President Jefferson to M. Dupont de Nemours. Washington, A2)ril ^<5, 180'2. Dear Sir, — The week being now closed, during which you had given me a hope of seeing you here, I think it safe to enclose you my letters for Paris, lest they should fail of the benefit of so desirable a convey- ance. They are addressed to Kosciugha, Madame de Corney, Mrs. Short, and Chancellor Livingston. You will perceive the unlimited confidence I repose in your good faith, and in your cordial dispositions to serve both countries, when you observe that I leave the letters for Chancellor Livingston open for your perusal. The first page respects a cypher, as do the loose sheets folded with the letter. These are interesting to him and myself only, and therefore are not for your perusal. It is the second, third, and fourth pages which I wish you to read to possess yourself of completel}^, and then seal the letter with wafers stuck under the flying seal, that it may be seen b}^ nobody else if any accident should happen to you. I wish you to be possessed of the subject, because you may be able to impress on the government of France the inevitable consequences of their taking possession of Louisiana; and though, as I here mention, the cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to us would be a palliation, yet I believe it would be no more, and that this measure will cost France, and perhaps not very long hence, a war which will annihilate her on the ocean, and place that element under the despotism of two nations, which I am not reconciled to the more because my own would be one of them. Add to this the exclusive appropriation of both continents of America as a consequence. I wish the present order of things to continue, and with a view to this I value highly a state of friendship between France and us. You know too well PUKCHASE OF TBE TEREITORY OF LOUISIANA. 19 how sincere I have ever been in these dispositions to dou})t them. You know, too, how much I value peace, and how unwillingly I should see any event take place which would render war a neces- sary resource; and that all our movements should change their char- acter and object. I am thus open with you, because 1 trust that you will have it in 3'our power to impress on that government considera- tions, in the scale against which the possession of Louisiana is nothing. In Europe, nothing l)ut Europe is seen, or supposed to have any right in the affairs of nations; but this little event, of France's possessing herself of Louisiana, which is thrown in as nothing, as a mere make- weight in the general settlement of accounts, — this speck which now appears as an almost invisible point in the horizon, is the embryo of a tornado which will burst on the countries on both sides of the Atlan- tic, and involve in its effects their highest destinies. That it may yet be avoided is my sincere prayer; and if you can be the means of informing the wisdom of Bonaparte of all its consequences, you have deserved well of both countries. Peace and abstinence from Euro- pean interferences are our objects, and so will continue while the pres- ent order of things in America remain uninterrupted. There is another service you can render. I am told that Talleja-and is person- ally hostile to us. This, I suppose, has been occasioned by the X Y Z history. But he should consider that that was the artifice of a party, willing to sacrifice him to the consolidation of their power. This nation has done him justice by dismissing them; that those in power are precisely those who disbelieved that story, and saw in it nothing but an attempt to deceive our countr}^; that we entertain towards him personall}^ the most friendly dispositions; that as to the government of France, we know too little of the state of things there to mider- stand what it is, and have no inclination to meddle in their settlement. Whatever government the}- establish, we wish to be well with it. One more request, — that you deliver the letter to Chancellor Livings- ton with your own hands, and, moreover, that you charge Madam Dupont, if an3^ accident happen to you, that she deliver the letter with lier own hands. If it passes only through her's and your's, I shall have perfect confidence in its safety. Present her my most sincere respects, and accept yourself assurances of my constant affection, and my praj'ers, that a genial sky and propitious gales may place you, after a pleasant voyage, in the midst of your friends. [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to R. E. Livingston, Minister to France. Department of State, ALarch. 16^ 1S02. The subject of your letter to Mr. King, of the 30th of December, is regarded by the President as not less delicate than you have supposed. 20 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITOKY OF LOUISIANA. Considering the particular views which Great Britain may mingle with ours, and the danger that a confidential resort to her may be abused, for the purpose of sowing jealousies in France, and thereby thwart our object, you and Mr. King will both be sensible that too much circumspection cannot be employed. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, Marcli H, ^802. On the business of Louisiana, they have, as yet, not thought it proper to give me any explanations, though I have omitted no opportunity to press the subject in conversation, and ultimatel}^, by the note sent you on the 25th of February, (a duplicate of which was forwarded on the 28th), with a copy of another note enforcing the above, to which I have, as yet, received no answer. The fact is, they believe us to be certainly hostile to this measure, and they mean to take possession of it as early as possible, and with as little notice to us as the}^ can. They are made to believe this is one of the most fertile and impor- tant countries in the world; that they have a much greater interest with the Indians than anj^ other people; that New Orleans must com- mand the trade of our whole Western country; and, of course, that the}^ will have a leading interest in its politics. It is a darling object with the First Consul, who sees in it a mean to gratify his friends, and to dispose of his armies. There is a man here, who calls himself a Frenchman, by the name of Francis Tatergem, who pretends to have great interest with the Creek nations. He has been advanced to the rank of General of Division. He persuades them that the Indians are extremely attached to France, and hate the Americans; that they can raise 20,000 warriors; that the country is a paradise, etc. I believe him to be a mere adventurer; but he is listened to, and was first taken up by the old Directors. I can not help thinking that it would be advisable for the present Congress to take measures for establishing the Natchez, or some other port, and giving it such advantages as would bring our vessels to it without touching at Orleans. On this subject, however, you will form ^a better judgment than I can. I have but one hope left as to defeat- ) ing this cession: it consists in alarming Spain and England. The Spanish Minister is now absent; but I have not failed to show, in the strongest light, to the Minister of Britain, the danger that will result to them from the extension of the French possessions into Mexico, and the probable loss of Canada, if they are suffered to possess it. I have requested Mr. King to press this subject, also a^ opportunity PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 21 offers. I enclose a copy of my last letter to him. If the treaty does not close soon, I think it would be advisable for us to meet at Amiens, and have according-ly proposed it to him. I believe, such is the state of things here and such the desire for peace, that Britain may force them to relinquish Louisiana; particu- larly as the people here are far from desiring the establishment of any foreign colony which they consider as a weak point and drain for the population and wealth. [Extrat'l.] Mr. Livingston to Mr. King, Minister at London. Paris, March 10, 1802. If Louisiana goes into the hands of France without any explana- tions on the part of her Government to us, (and this I have not yet been able to bring it to, though 1 have pointedl}' pressed it, both verball}' and by note,) on the subject either of her boundary or the navigation of the Mississippi, it is impossible to see the extent of the power she will have in and over America. As part of the territory of Spain, Louisiana has no precise boundary ; so that it is easy to foresee the fate of Mexico, especially when it is considered that General Bernadotte, who is marked for this expedition, has demanded, it is said, a large body of men. Britain will judge how far she is able to contend with France, enriched by the treasures of Spain. The boundary between Canada and Louisiana is alike unsettled. The dispositions of a great part of the natives of that country are friendly to France; her influ- ence over the Indian tribes has always been, and will again be, much greater than that of the British, both from the disposition and manners of her people, aTid from the whole body of carriers in the Indian trade being native Canadians, and nmch the greater part of them mongrel French. It is impossible to say what their influence may be upon our Western country, in case of a controvers}" with Great Britain, particu- larly if they keep the keys of it hs possessing the mouth of the Mississippi or invite their aid in the plunder of Mexico. That the possession of that country, aided by the power of France in Europe, will draw after it that of all the islands, is easily foreseen. I mention these circumstances to you (though I know the}^ could hardlv escape you) as hints that you may use with advantage to introduce this busi- ness at Amiens. You well know how to give them additional weight. Nor is the right of Britain to interfere unfounded. By the sixth article of the treaty with us of 1778, they absolutely renounce all right to take, under any circumstances, any part of the country possessed then or before by Great Britain on that continent. Though we have relinquished all advantages deducible from that treat}', 3'et, so far as 22 PUKCHASE OF THE TEKRITOKY OF LOUISIANA. other nations were interested in it, at the close of the last war, they have a ri^ht to enforce it. And surely it was a very important guar- anty to Britain of her colonies; and it might, for aught we know, have had great influence upon the terms of the then peace. [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. Pinckney. Department of State, March 30, 1802. We are anxious to hear from you on the several subjects with which you have been charged; particularly on that of Louisiana. By a treaty entered into between Spain and France, in March, 1801, and lately published in the Paris newspapers, it appears that in an antecedent treaty the cession of that country had been stipulated b}^ Spain. Still it is possible that the cession may have been since annulled; and that such was, or was to be the case, has been stated in verbal accounts from Madrid. At Paris Mr. Livingston has been given to understand, by? the French Government, that the cession has never been more than a subject of conversation between the two Governments. No informa- tion, however, has been received from him subsequent to the publica- tion of the Treaty of March, 1801, which must have led to some more decisive explanations. The copies herewith enclosed of a memorial of sundry inhabitants living on waters running from the United States through Florida into the Gulf of Mexico, and of a letter from the late Mr. Hunter, repre- sentative in Congress of the Mississippi Territory, will present to your attention a subject of some importance at this time, and of very great importance in a future view. The Treaty Avith Spain having, as these documents observe, omitted to provide for the use of the Mobile, Chatahoochee, and other rivers running from our territory through that of Spain, by the citizens of the United States, in like manner with the use of the Mississippi, it will be proper to make early efforts to supply the defect. Should a cession, indeed, including the Spanish territorj^ eastward of the Mississippi, have finally taken place, it can answer no purpose to seek from the Spanish Government this supple- mental arrangement. On a contrary supposition j^ou will avail your- self of the most favorable moment and manner of calling its attention to the object. In support of our claim you will be able to use the arguments which enforced that to the navigation of the Mississippi. If it should be observed that a greater proportion of these rivers than of the Mississippi run through the exclusive territory of Spain, it may be a set-off that the upper parts of the rivers run, exclusively, through the territory of the United States, and do not merely divide it, like the Mississippi, from that of Spain. PUECHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 28 But neither the one nor the other cireunistance can essiMitially affect our natural rights. Should the Spanish (Jovernnient l>e fav()ral)ly disposed, it will be proper for you to pave the way for a formal con- vention on the subject, endeavoring- to obtain, in the meantime, such regulations from its authority, and such instructions to its otticers, as will answer the purposes of our citizens. Among other hardships, of which they now complain, and for which a regulation is particularh' wanted, one 1 understand, is, that the article, cotton, which is act[uir- ing rapid importance in that quarter, must, after it has been conveyed to Mol)ile, be shipped to New Orleans and pay a duty of about twelve and one-half per cent, before it can be exported. [Extraft.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, Ajrril 2^, 1802. The business most interesting to us, that of Louisiana, still remains in the state it was. The Minister will give no answer to any inquiries I make on that sul)ject. He will not say what their boundaries are, what are their intentions, and when they are to take possession. And what appears very extraordinary to me, is, that b}" a letter I have just received from Mr. Pinckney, I tind that he still supposes that the Flor- idas are not included in the cession:, and he writes me that he has made a proposition to purchase them, which lies before the Minister, with whom he is to have a conference on the subject. You may, however, be fully assured that the Floridas are given to France; that they are at this moment fitting out an armament from here to take possession. This will be conmianded by General Bernadotte. The number of troops designed for this object is between five and seven thousand. They will shortlj^ sail for New Orleans, unless the state of afi'airs in St. Domingo should change their destination. You may act upon this information with absolute certainty, since I have no doubt of the chan- nel through which I have received it. It would be wise immediately to take measures to enable the Natchez to rival Orleans. I have sug- gested the means: and I hope they will not be neglected by the Congress now sitting. That you may judge of the light in which this country is viewed by some here, I send j^ou the extract of a paper that now lies before the Minister. If Congress makes the Natchez a free port, and if the state of affairs in St. Domingo should employ the troops designed for Louisiana, time will still be left for gold to operate here. But it must be plentifully and liberally bestowed, not barel}^ in the assuiup- tion of debts, but in active capital, afforded in supplies, to aid their armaments in the islands. Give me your instructions as to the utmost amount, if, as you will be better able to judge than I can, the affairs of St. Domingo are likely to be protracted. 24 PURCHASE 01^ THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA* [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to Robert R. Livingston. Department of State, WasMngtoji, 3£ay 1, 1802. The conduct of the French Government, in paying so little attention to its obligations under the treaty; in neglecting its debts to our citi- zens; in giving no answer to your complaints and expostulations, which you say is the case with those of other foreign Ministers also; and particularly in its reserve as to Louisiana, which tacitly contra- dicts the language first held to you bj- the Minister of Foreign Relations — gives tokens as little auspicious to the true interests of France herself, as to the rights and just objects of the United States. The cession of Louisiana to France becomes daily more and more a source of painful apprehensions. Notwithstanding the Treaty of March, 1801, and notwithstanding the general belief in France on the subject, and the accounts from St. Domingo that part of the armament sent to that island was eventually destined for Louisiana, a hope was still drawn, from your early conversations with M. Talleyrand, that the French Government did not mean to pursue the object. Since the receipt of your last communication, no hope remains, but, from the accumulating difficulties of going through with the undertaking, and from the conviction jou may be able to impress, that it must have an instant and powerful effect in changing the relations between France and the United States. The change is obvious: and the more it can be developed in candid and friendly appeals to the reflections of the French Government, the more it will urge it to revise and abandon the project. A mere neighhorJiood could not be friendly to the harmony which both countries have so much an interest in cherishing; but if a possession of the mouth of the Mississippi is to be added to other causes of discord, the worst events are to be apprehended. You will consequently spare no efforts, that will consist with prudence and dig- nity, to lead the councils of France to proper views of this subject, and to an abandonment of her present purpose. You will also pur- sue, by prudent means, the inquiry into the extent of the cession — particularly whether it includes the Floridas as well as New Orleans — and endeavor to ascertain the price at which these, if included in the cession, would be yielded to the United States. I cannot, in the present state of things, be more particular on this head than to observe that, in every view, it would be a most precious acquisition, and that, as far as the terms could be satisfied by charging on the acquisition itself the restitution and other debts to American citizens, great liber- ality would doubtless be indulged by this Government. The President wishes you to devote every attention to this object, and to be frequent and particular in your communications relating to it. t>URCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 25 [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, Minister to England. DErARTMKNT OF StATE, J\l((l/ i, ISV^i. We are fulh^ aware of the tendency of the reported ces.sion of Louisiana to plant in our neighborhood troubles of different kinds, and to prepare the way for very serious events. It has accordingly been a primary object with the President to obviate such an event. Mr. King to the Secretary of State. London, May 7, 1802. Sir: Among the few great principles of national policy worthy of fixing the attention of our statesmen, I am willing to hope there is not one concerning which there is greater unanimity, in opinion, than in that w^hich enjoins upon us all to do our utmost in every way, and upon all occasions, to maintain and perpetuate the union of our countr3\ With this persuasion, though the subject may not be thought to be included among the duties of my mission, 1 have not been able to remain inattentive or indiff'ei'ent to the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas to France, because I have viewed it as a measure calculated and possibly intended to weaken and divide us. I have ah-eady com- municated to 3"ou w4iat passed between me and the Minister of this country in relation to this cession, during the negotiation of peace; but as these communications were merely verbal, and as it aj^peared to me to be of some importance that they should be distinctly and formally confirmed, as well as that we should be ascertained of the sentiments of this Government in respect to this cession, 1 prepared and sent to Lord Hawkesbury a confidential letter upon the subject, a copy whereof, together with a copy of his answer, is annexed. 1 will only add that I have I'eason to be satisfied that the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas is considered b}^ all the late Ministry, as well as all other men of influence in this country, as a measure of the greatest conse- quence, and Avhich must have an unavoidable influence upon the dura- tion of peace. With perfect respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient and faithful servant, Rupus King. Mr. King to Lord Hawkesbury. London, Ajyril 21, 1802. My Lord: By the Treaty of Alliance concluded at Paris, in 1778, between the United States of America and France, the latter renounced 26 PUKCHASE OF THE TEKEITORY OF LOUISIANA. forever the possession of every part of the continent of America lying to the east of the course of the river Mississippi. This renunciation, confirming that which had been previous!}^ made in the treaty of 1763, between Great Britain and France, authorized the expectation that France, content with her widely spread dominions, would abstain from seeking an extension of them in this part of the American continent; an expectation that appeared the more reasonable, inasmuch as the motives to such extension could not be satisfactorily reconciled with a just regard to the rights and security of those Powers between which this portion of America is divided, and by which the same is at present possessed. Contrary, nevertheless, to expectations which have been entertained on this subject, if credit be due to uniform and uncontradicted reports, the Government of France has prevailed upon His Catholic Majesty to cede to France both the provinces of Louisiana and the Floridas, and having thus acquired a station at the mouth, and on the sides of the Mississippi, maybe inclined to interfere with and interrupt the open navigation of the same. By the Treaty of Peace concluded at Paris, in 1783, between the United States of America and Great Britain, it is mutually stipulated that "the navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States." Without enlarging upon the great and peculiar importance of this navigation to the United States, a large and increasing proportion of whose people can conveniently communicate with each other, and with foreign countries, by no other route, I take the libert}^, through your Lordship, to request that the British Government will, in confidence, explain itself upon this subject, and especially that it will explicitly declare whether any communication has been received by it from the Government of France or Spain respecting the said cession; or whether His Britannic Majesty has, in any manner, acquiesced in or sanctioned the same, so as to impair or affect the stipulation above referred to concerning the free navigation of the Mississippi. In a word, I entreat your Lordship to open yourself on this occasion with that freedom which, in matters of weighty concern, is due from one friendly nation to another, and which, in the present instance, will have the effect to do away all those misconceptions that may otherwise prevail in respect to the privity of Great Britain to the cession in question. With the highest consideration, 1 have the honor to be, KuFus King. PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 27 Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. King. DowNiN(i Street, May 7, 1802. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 21.st ultimo. It is inipossil)le that so important an event as the cession of Louisi- ana by Spain to France should be regarded b}' the King in any other light than as highly interesting to His Majesty, and to the United States; and should render it more necessary than ever that there should subsist between the two Governments that spirit of confidence which is become so essential to the security of their respective territories and possessions. With regard to the free navigation of the Mississippi, I conceive that it is perfectlj" clear, according to the law of nations, that, in the event of the district of Louisiana being ceded to France, that countrj" would come into possession of it subject to all the engagements which appertained to it at the time of cession; and that the French Govern- ment could, consequently, allege no colorable pretext for excluding His Majesty's subjects, or the citizens of the United States, from the navigation of the river Mississippi. With regard to the second question in j^our letter, I can have no difficulty in informing you that no communication whatever has been received by His Majesty from the Government of France or Spain, relative to an 3^ convention or treaty for the cession of Louisiana or the Floridas; and I can, at the same time, most truly assure you that His Majesty has not in any manner, directly or indirectly, acquiesced in or sanctioned this cession. In making this communication to you, for the information of the Government of the United States, I think it right to acquaint you that His Majesty will be anxious to learn their sentiments on ever}' part of this subject, and the line of policy which ih&y will be inclined to adopt in the event of this arrangement being carried into effect. 1 have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient, humble servant, Hawkesbury. James Madison, Secretary of State, to Charles Pinckney, Minister of Spain. Department of State, May 11., 1802. We are still without a line from you since your arrival at Madrid, and feel an increasing solicitude to hear from 3'ou oil the subject of Louisiana. The latest information from Paris has confirmed the fact that it was ceded by a treaty prior to that of March, 1801; and, not- withstanding the virtual denial of the cession in the early conver.sa- tions between Mr, Livingston and the Minister of Foreiofn Relations, a 28 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. refusal of any explanations at present seems to admit that the cession has taken place. Still there are chances of obtaining a reversal of the transaction. The repugnance of the United States to it is, and will be, pressed in a manner that can not be without some effect: it is known that most of the French statesmen best informed on the sub- ject, disapproved of it; the pecuniary difficulties of the French Gov- ernment must, also, be felt as a check ; whilst the prospect of a protracted and expensive war in St. Domingo; must form a very powerful obstacle to the execution of the project. The councils of England appear to have been torpid on this occasion. Whether it proceeded from an unwillingness to risk a fresh altercation with France, or from a hope that such a neighborhood between France and the United States would lead to collisions which might be turned to her advantage, is more than I can decide. The latter consideration might justly have great weight with her; but as her eyes may be more readily turned to the immediate and certain purposes to be answered to her rival, it is to be presumed that the policy of England will contribute to thwart the acquisition. What the intentions of Spain may be, ■s^'e wait to learn from 3^ou. Verbal information from inofficial sources, has led us to infer that she disowns the instrument of cession, and will rigorously oppose it. Should the cession actually fail from this, or any other cause, and Spain retain New Orleans and the Floridas, I repeat to j^ou the wish of the President, that every effort and address be employed to obtain the arrangement by which the territory on the east side of the Mississippi, including New Orleans, may be ceded to the United States, and the Mississippi made a common boundary, with a common use of its navigation for them and Spain, The inducements to be held out to Spain were intimated in your original instructions on this point. I am charged by the President now to add, that you may not only receive and transmit a proposition of guaranty of her territory be3^ond the Mississippi, as a condition of her ceding to the United States the territory, including New Orleans, on this side, but, in case it may be necessary, may make the proposition yourself, in the forms required by our constitution. You will infer from this enlargement of your authority, how much importance is attached to the object in question, as securing a precious acquisition to the United States, as well as a natural and quiet boundary with Spain; and will derive from this con- sideration additional motives to discharge, with a prudent zeal, the task committed to you. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State, Paris, May W, 1802. The same conduct was held (by the Minister of Exterior Relations) with respect to Louisiana. He would not acknowledge that the Gov- PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 29 ernment had yet formed any specific plan with respect to it, or that an}^ troops were going out; but assured me, in general terms, that noth- ing should be done that should give us any ground of complaint; on the contrary, their vicinity would promote our friendship. I will not trouble you with the answers that obviously presented to this reasoning. It terminated, however, as all my conversations on the subject have done, in nothing. I shall wait a few daj's in hopes of hearing from you, after having received a cop}^ of my first note, when I shall act agreeably to your instructions, or, if you aft'ord me none, send in a second, in which 1 shall press for a communication of the treaty with Spain, which, however, I am in hopes you may receive through Mr. Pinckncy. I believe that, for the present, the armament designed for Louisiana will be sent to Hispaniola, about which, I find, that much anxiety is entertained here. Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, May 28, 1802. Sir: Since ni}^ last I have acquired information which I can depend on, relative to the intentions of this Government with respect to Loui- siana. Bernadotte is, as I told you, to command: Collot second in com- mand. Adet is to be prefect: but the expedition is delayed till about September, on account (asTalle^^rand expressed himself to Bernadotte) of some difiiculty which he did not explain; but which, I have no doubt, has arisen from the different apprehensions of France and Spain rela- tive to the meaning of tlie term Lousiana, which has been understood by France to include the Floridas, but probably ])y Spain to have been confined to the strict meaning of the term. This explains why 1 could never get an answer to my questions relati^'e to the extent of the ces- sions; and upon which the French Government had probably no doubt till we started it. Believing, if this conjecture as to the cause of delay of the expedition was right, that no time should be lost in throwing obstructions in the way of its conclusion, I wrote the note of which the inclosed is a copy, with the double purpose of alarming Spain, and furnishing with arguments, arising from the good faith they owed us, against giving their cession the construction France would wish. I consider this as the more important, because 1 believe that ever}^ nego- tiation for this object will be carried on here. I shall, however, give the earliest and fullest information I can on this subject to Mr. Piuck- ney, who will enforce at Madrid the arguments 1 may use here to excite the alarm of the Court of Spain. I wait impatiently some further instructions from you; those 1 have in some sort prohibiting such measures as may show any dissatisfac- 30 PURCHASE OF THE TEREITORY OF LOUISIANA. tion on the subject, of which, however, I doubt the polic3^ The sub- ject is so interesting as to induce us to risk something to defeat it. If I do not hear from you soon I shall present a pointed memorial to this Government stating fully and candidly our objections to their taking possession of the Floridas, and demanding security for the rights we had originally, and by treaty with Spain. I am, sir, etc., R. R. L. Mr. Livingston, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, to His Excellency Chevalier d'Azara, Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty. Paris, May 28, 1802. Sir: The powerful interests that our respective Governments have, that the sincerest friendship and harmony should subsist between their territories in America, naturally leads to mutual confidence between their Ministers, and a full exposition of their sentiments upon subjects which may have a tendency to interrupt that union. I think it my dut}^, therefore, to open m3^self to you with freedom on one which is very important as it regards the good faith which, I trust, both 3^our Government and mine will consider as the first of obligations, as it respects the great territorial interests of both Spain and the United States; and I flatter myself, sir, that with these objects in view, I shall meet with equal frankness and confidence on your part. It is generall}^ understood that Spain has made a cession of Louisiana to France; and it might have been expected, considering the situation of this territory, and the friendly connection between both countries and the United States, that a communication would have been made of this treaty to their Government. Passing over this circumstance, probably owing rather to inattention than to a want of confidence, I proceed to make some observations on the treat}^ now in force between the Court of Madrid and the United States, and to inquire how far Spain has pro- vided for the stipulations contained in that treaty, and secured thereby to the United States. The boundary between our respective Govern- ments having been established, it is not to be doubted that the cession has confined itself to the same limits. But, sir, bjj^ the fourth article of that treaty, it is agreed that the midchannel of the Mississippi, where it divides the territories of Spain from those of the United States, shall be the boundary, and that the navigation of this river shall be confined to the subjects of Spain and the citizens of the United States, unless it shall be extended to others by special convention. I am solicitous to know, sir, in what manner the rights of the citizens of the United States in this river are preserved by the terms of the cession. Where the river runs wholly within the territor}^ of Spain, the PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 31 United States have, I)}' the treaty, a qualiliecl ricrht of navigation of which they can not be divested. They have also the assurance of Spain tliat no other nation shall share this right unless by convention; by which I understand that Spain binds herself not to grant this right without some previous agreement on the subject with the United States: and this is rendered more evident from the words of the article not being confined to the river below the thirty-tirst degree of north latitude, but extending to the whole of the Mississippi, as well above as below: whereas, half the river above that boundary belonging to the United States, it could not have been intended that either of the contracting parties should have a right to grant, without the consent of the other, a right that was held in common. The word convention must, therefore, be intended to mean a convention between Spain and the United States; nor can an}^ cession of the territor}^ carry with it a right to admit other Powers to a participation of the advantages of the navigation of the Mississippi, unless by convention previously entered into between His Catholic Majesty and the United States. It is to be presumed that, in the cession which Spain has made, the Floridas are not included, because of the evident interest that she has in retaining them as security for her territories in South America, if unfortunate events should hereafter produce a rupture between France and Spain. In this case, the Floridas, b}^ lying in the rear of the French colonies, would serve as an effectual check as well to them as to those turbulent spirits in the adjoining States who might, in spite of the efforts of their Government, incline to associate in the enterprises of France. Upon this subject, sir, however, I pra}^ to have more explicit informa- tion,.because you will observe that, b}^ the existing treaty between our respective nations, there are special stipulations mutually agreed upon, and which the United States have a right to expect some security for, in any cession that Spain ma}' make of that countr3\ By the fifth article it is agreed that Spain will restrain by force all hostilities on the part of the Indian nations living within their bound- ar}'^, either on the citizens of the United States, or the Indians within their territor}'^, &c. You will easily see, sir, that as this is a national obligation, it may be doubtful whether it will pass with the territory, and yet is of such a nature as to entitle the United States to look for its performance from the good faith of Spain, who can not, without the consent of the United States, place herself in a situation to render it of no effect. By the twentj^-second article of the same treat}', Spain stipulates to permit the citizens of the United States to deposit their goods at New Orleans, and to export from thence free of duty; or, in case of withdrawing this permission, to assign them an establishment for this purpose on another part of the banks of the Mississippi. I take the liberty to ask, sir, (if the Floridas are included in the cession to France,) what stipulations the cession contains insuring to the 32 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. United States this important privilege, which they considered them- selves entitled to by the best of all guaranties, the good faith of His Catholic Majesty? You will easily see, sir, that if a naked cession has been made to France, without attention to these articles, how much reason the United States will have to complain of the measure: and I trust, sir, that you will see the propriety of their forming one of the parties to any treaty in which their rights may be so materially affected. I know, sir, that observations might, and I doubt not will be made officially to your Court by the Minister of the United States at Madrid; but, in the meantime, sir, as it is my intention to address myself upon this subject to the Government of France, I wish to receive from you every information which might throw light upon the subject, and the rather as knowing the confidence that His Catholic Majesty reposed in your talents and patriotism; and seeing, at the same time, that in everything that related to this object our respective nations had a joint interest. 1 have believed that you will receive with pleasure this unofficial note as a mark of my confidence, and afford me your aid in giving efficacy to a treaty which has served as a basis of friendship between our respective nations. R. R. L. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, June 8, 1802. Enclosed is the answer of the Spanish Ambassador to my letter, a copy of which was forwarded on the 28th ult. It accords with the conclusions I drew from the delay of the expedition, and the conduct of the Minister of Exterior Relations. I have had a conversation with Collot and Adet, separately. I find that, though they both consider their going in official characters to Louisiana as settled, yet that they have neither seen the treaty, nor know precisely the boundary of the territory acquired. Pensacola and Mobile, they say, are expressly given: as to the rest, or whether it includes West Florida, they can not say. That France intended that it should, 1 have no doubt; and I still think it probable that she will make it yield to her intentions: for in Europe she does what she will, and it will require firmness and exer- tion to prevent her doing so in America. The Chevalier d'Azara, Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty, near the French Republic, to Mr. Livingston, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States. Paris, June 2, 1802. Sir: I pray you to excuse my not having been able to see you when you were so good as to call at my dwelling; the ill state of my health for the last ten days has deprived me of that honor. PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 33 I return you thanks for the frankness disclosed in your unoliicial note of the 28th May; and, in adopting the same friendship and ecjual frankness, I have the honor to inform you that the affair concernintr which 3'ou have addressed me, not having- passed througli my haiids, 1 am unable to give 3'ou all the information which you have desired. It appears certain, however, that a treaty ceding- Louisiana has been con- cluded; but I am of opinion that the Floridas are not comprised in the cession. As the Minister of the United States at Madrid will Ije required, (agrceal)ly to what 3'Ou have had the goodness to inform me), to demand explanation of my Court concerning the treaty in (juestion, your Ciov- ernment will receive, through him, all the information which may ])e proper. Nevertheless, I will write to my Court, and will not fail to communicate all that I may learn, for the purpose, as far as depends on me, of removing your doubts and dispelling your inquietude. J. NicoLAY d'Azaka. James Madison, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, Minister to England. Depaktment of State, July ^J, 180%^ The subject of }-our letter of Ma}^ 7th, namel}% your correspondence Avith Lord Kawkesbury on the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas to France will receive from the President all the consideration which it** great importance demands; and as soon as an answer can be founded on the result of his reflections no time will be lost in transmitting it. [Extniut.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to C. Pinckney, Minister to Spain. Department of State, Jultj M^ 180?i. The information from Paris renders it certain that the cession of Louisiana to France has actually been concluded, and that the cession comprehends the two Floridas. In this state of the business, it seems unnecessar}' to decide on the price which Spain might be led to expect for a cession of the Floridas, including New Orleans, to the United States; and the more so, as it would ])e of use for us previously to know the value she places on the guaranty proposed in my letter to 3^ou of the 25th of September last. For the present, the cession wished by the United States must be an object of negotiation with the French Government. It will, notwithstanding, continue to be proper for you to cultivate the good dispositions of Spain in relation to it, both as they maj^ not be entirely disregarded by France, and as, in H. Doc. 431 3 34 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITOKY OF LOUISIAISIA. the turn of events, Spain ma}^ possibly be extricated from her engage- ments to France, and again have the disposal of the territories in question. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, July 30, 1802. I have received your dispatches and the President's by M. Dupont de Nemours. I shall reply more particularly to theui at the next opportunity, as I am now very much engaged in preparing a lengthy memoir on the subject of the mutual interests of France and the United States, relative to Louisiana, b}^ which I hope to convince them that, both in a commercial and a political view, the posession of it would be disadvantageous to France. In my last, I hinted to you my suspicions that France and Spain did not understand each other on the subject of Louisiana, and communicated to you my letters to the Spanish Ambas- sador, calculated to sound this business, and interpose some difficulty to its execution. His answer confirmed my opinion. I have since received, verbally, his explicit assurance that the Floridas are not included in the cession; and I have been applied to, b}^ one of the Ministers here, to know what we understand, in America, by Louisi- ana. You can easily conceive my answer. I have just received a let- ter from Mr. Graham, in which he communicates the Spanish Minister's answer to Mr. Pinckney's application upon the same subject, in these words: "If the King should think proper to cede Louisiana, he will take care that the interest of the United States shall not be affected by it." It appears also, by the fifth article of the Treaty of Madrid, March 21st, 1801, that the cession had been made of Louisiana generall3\ The French, 3"ou know, have always extended it to South Carolina and all the country on the Ohio. Since the possession of the Floridas by Britain, and the Treaty of 1763, 1 think there can be no doubt as to the precise meaning of the term. I find a certain degree of raideur in the Spanish Ambassador, on that subject, which it will be our interest to cherish at the Court of Spain unless we should have a prospect of purchasing the Floridas. In the present state of things, until the point is settled, I think it probable the expedition to Louisiana will be postponed. In the meantime, all that can be done here will be to endeavor to obtain a cession of New Orleans, either by purchase, or by offering to make it a port of entry to France, on such terms as shall promise advantages to her commerce, and give her hopes of introducing her manufactures and wines into our western country. An arrangement of this sort, if they listen to it, would certainly be beneficial to both countries and only hurtful to PURCHASE OF THE TEKRITUKY OF LOUISIANA. 35 Britain. If to this we could add a stipulation that she shall never ])os- sess the Floridas. l)ut, on the contrary, in case of a rupture with Spain, and a conquest of them, cede them to lis, our atiairs in that ((uarter would stand as well as I would wish; and the colonies that France might attempt to establish on the west side of the Mississippi would be too feeble to injur(> us. I find them very anxious to huve the ports of Fensacola and St. Augustine, as they dread our having- command of the Gulf. I confess this appeal's to me no very important object; and if they would be con- tent with these, and give us West Florida and New Orleans, even at a large price, we should not hesitate. I am sorr}^ that you have not com- municated to me what are precisely the utmost limits of the sum I may venture to offer in cash, or in our own demands. As the Minister has been absent some time, and has but just returned, I can not state precisely to you what we may hope on this subject; but be persuaded that I am fully impressed with the importance of the subject, and that nothing will be left undone which I can do to effectuate your wishes. I saw him last night, and was very cordiall}" received. His health is so much amended by the waters, that 1 hope he will be able to go through busi- ness more speedily than he has done. [Extnict.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. Paris, AtKjust 10, 1802. Our own affairs have advanced but little, since the whole attention of those in power are turned to objects nearer holne. 1 have had sev- eral conferences on the subject of Louisiana, but can get nothing more from them than I have already communicated. I have thought it best, b\ conversation and bj^ writing, to pave the way, prior to anj^ direct application, till I know better to what object to point. For this pur- pose, I haA'e written the enclosed essay, which I have had translated, and struck off twent}^ copies; I have just got them finished; I have placed some of them in such hands as I think will best serve our pur- poses. Talleyrand has promised me to give it an attentive i)erusal; after which, when I find how it works, I will come forward with some proposition. I am very much, however, at a loss, as to what terms 3"ou would consider it as allowable to offer, if they can be brought to a sale of the Floridas, either with or without New Orleans: which last place will be of little consequence, if we possess the Floridas, because a nuich better passage ma}" be formed on the east side of the river. I may, perhaps, carry my estimate of them too high; but when I con- sider, first, the expense it will save us in guards and garrisons, the risk of war, the value of duties, and what may be raised by the sale of 56 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. lands, I should think them a cheap purchase. I trust, however, that you will give me some directions on this head, and not leave the respon- sibilit}^ of offering too much or too little, entirely at my door. I speak, in all this business, as if the affair of the Floridas was arranged with Spain; which, I believe, is not yet the case. But I took occasion to touch on the subject three daj^s ago, with the Spanish Ambassador, with whom I was dining, and think he appeared to have somewhat relaxed on that ground, but would say nothing decisive; nor were the time and place proper to press him. Memoir, referred to in the preceding dispatch. Whether it will be advantageous to France to take possession of Louisiana ? This question presents itself in two points of view: First, as it affects the commerce and manufactures of France. Second, as it affects her positive or relative strength. Colonies are never cherished for themselves, but on account of the influence they may have upon the general prosperity of the nation. And as one man at home, contributes more to this than two at a dis- tance, no wise nation colonizes but when it has a superfluous popula- tion, or when it has a superfluous capital that can not otherwise be rendered productive. The population of France, though very considerable, has by no means attained the point which renders it necessary to colonize. The soil, climate, and local situation, give it advantages as a commercial and more particularly as a manufacturing, nation, over every other part of Europe. The ingenuit}^, taste, and industry of the inhabit- ants have placed them in the highest rank; but these advantages are very much restricted by the want of a sufficient capital to bring them into operation. A rival nation, inferior in all the circumstances I have mentioned, by the single effect of a large capital, has attained a superi- ority both in commerce and manufactures which, in return, those cir- cumstances enable it to maintain by continually adding to that national wealth. Capital increases manufactures by the introduction of machines, by the regular payment of workmen, by reducing the interest of money, and, above all, by forcing new markets. The wealthy mechanic alone can afford those expensive and slow opera- tions which, in many cases, give perfection to a fabric. And the rich merchant, alone, can afford to make long voyages, from which he has slow returns; or give such extensive credits as will tempt those of for- eign countries to purchase his commodities in preference to such as are offered b}^ nations who expect more speedy payment. Such is the want of capital in France, that no manufacturer has any quantity of PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 37 ^oods on hand to answer an immediate demand; and, of course, no for- eign merchant can rely upon the certaint}' of obtaining such an assort- ment of goods from the French consignee of liis cargo, as will answer his purpose, without either detaining his vessel, or being compelled to take a considerable proportion in articles of ver}' inferior value, picked up from difi'crent manufactories; so that if frauds are com- mirted, no one can be charged with them; a circumstance that renders character of little importance to the French mechanic. To this cause is owing that when a foreign ship, particidarly one from a distant nation, disposes of her cargo in France, she has orders to take wines and brandies in return, because these are the onl)'^ artich's tliat the owner can depend upon having, in time, of the quan- tity he orders. On the contraiy, any species of goods is obtained in England at an hour's warning from a single manufacturer, whose character is at stake if they should not prove equal to the sample. This circumstance will always induce a foreign merchant to prefer dealing for goods of the same natui'e with a British, rather than with a French factor: and accordingly ^ye find cargoes sold in France, and the monej'' remitted to England to purchase articles that France might furnish, were her manufacturers sufficientl}^ rich to supply them, at a short notice, without compelling the buyer to seek them at diU'erent deposits. This evil can only be remedied by an increase of capital in the hands of manufacturers. To show how this capital might be ol)tained, would lead me too far out of ni}' present subj(>ct. But it must be obviously diminished either where a navy is raised at the expense of the manufacturer, or where the capital of the nation is employed in distant countries. The operation of capital in oj^ening new markets is obvious; for nothing is more evident than that mer- chants of foreign countries, not possessing large capitals, are content to be agents of those who can furnish them goods upon credit. And it is by this means that Britain has found no loss of market in America, in consequence of their having become independent; their immense capital having created a moneyed dependence which has supplied, in a commercial point of view, that which the}" before derived from the supremacy of her Government. The increase of American capital is now freeing her, in some sort, from that dependence, and enabling her to extend her commercial operations, and even to afford a capital to other nations, who shall know how to estimate the value of the market she ati'ords to the manufactures and luxuries of Europe. It will readily be aduiitted that transmarine colonies add nothing to the strength of a nation. They are, on the contrary, weak points, that are guarded at great expense of men and money; more particularly where the}^ are placed in warm and unhealthy climates. The simple question, then, is — Has France such a superfluity of capital or people as will justify the establishment of new colonies "i 38 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. Those that France already possesses in the West Indies and at Cayenne are more than sufficient to supply all the demands of France, and indeed, the demands of all Europe, were they fully cultivated, for those commodities that constitute their staples. But how are they to be cultivated ? Experience has proved that the inhabitants of warm cli- mates are never led by their necessities to labor. Force alone can supply those taskmasters (cold and hunger) which nature has placed under northern skies. Hence the necessity of slaves in rendering the West Indies productive. These are only to be procured at a ver}'^ con- siderable expense. The Spanish port of St. Domingo was almost uncultivated for want of slaves. It is now in the hands of France; and to render it productive, an immense capital in slaves, in buildings, and in improvements of uncultivated lands, will be necessary. Great capital will also be required to supply the losses that the French part of the island has sustained, to say nothing of the other islands. From whence is this capital to be drawn? Persons that settle in remote and unhealthy climates seldom possess much. It must, then, be drawn either from France, or some other country that possesses superfluous capital. If drawn from France, it must, to a certain degree, injure the manufactures of France at home. It maj", however, where the territory is so extremely productive as the French islands are, where the lands are already in a state of cultivation, and the capital advanced will produce an immediate interest, be found advantageous, in a national point of view, to encourage the application of French capital to this object. But while the interest of money is liigh in France, while the interior of the Republic afl'ords a variety of profitable speculations to the capitalist, and while few persons are found possessed of superfluous wealth, it will be difficult to induce many to vest their capital in a distant country, subject to risk from the dishonesty of their agents, and those others which recent transactions will teach them to dread. Foreign capital was once drawn from the United Provinces. The state, however, of the Batavian colonies, and the losses sustained by the war, preclude all hope that much of this will now be applied to ameliorate the French islands. The United States possess an extensive capital in money, and in products necessary for the reestablishment of the islands. Money will not be lent, in large quantities, upon the credit of the planters; but with proper encouragement, there is little doubt that products for which money must otherwise be paid, might be obtained. And the mercantile speculations of the United States will embrace the French islands, when the private and public credit of France shall be reestablished, and experience shall have taught her the futility of attempting to raise a revenue upon foreign commerce, while in fact she is throwing it upon her own citizens. In St. Domingo 20 per cent is paid on articles introduced by foreign- ers. This is, indeed, collected from the foreigners; and owing to the PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 39 misnmnag-ement and frauds which generally prevail in custom-houses at a distance, is a source of very considerable yexation to the trader. But the money is paid by the planter: for it is always added to the price, and eyen an interest or profit charged upon the dut}' itself, and a compensation for all the yexations the merchant suffers. What, then, is the effect of this operation but to deduct, at least, one-(|uarter from the money which the planter has with difficult}' drawn from France or elsewhere, and so far to impede the reestablishment of the capital that can aloiu^ render the island ultimately productiye to France? I say ultimately, for it will be idle to expect that they should compen- sate the actual expenses of the French Goyernment till years have elapsed, Na}', I will yenture to saj', that, unless the ports of St. Domingo are thrown open to all vessels bringing necessaries, unless the inhabitants are permitted to bu}" cheap and to sell dear, bj?^ encour- aging a competition among bu3'ers and sellers, unless every species of vexation is removed, and every possible assurance given that foreign capitals entrusted to the islands will be perf ectl}^ safe, ages will elapse before St. Domingo will cease to drain the wealth and strength of France without offering an equivalent return. It is obvious, then, that if France possessed no other transmarine property than her islands in the West Indies, she would ffnd room to place all the capital she can now, or probably will be able to spare in a long course of years. But, if, in connection with this, we look to her immense territory in the Brazils, to its productions, and the capital it will require to give it the value it is susceptible of; if we add to this the establishments it may be necessar}^ to make in the East Indies in order to enable the French ports to possess all that variet}- of commodities which in\'ite exchanges and give activity to commerce; we shall find a centurj^, at least, will elapse before France needs such new establishments. But as she, like ever}"^ other country, possesses a limited capital, the sole ol)ject of inquiry should be, where can this capital be best placed? At home? In the islands? At Cayenne? In the East Indies? Or in Louisiana? For it is obvious, that whatever is placed in one is taken from the other. It is equalh" obvious that the national expense must be increased by the increase of its establishments, and the points of attack and defense be multiplied in the same proportion in case of war. Many able statesmen have doubted whether, to a countr}^ situated as France, any colonies were of use; but it is not my design to enter into those theories. France possesses colonies. She has urged her citizens to remove themselves, and invest their property therein, and she is bound in good faith to retain and protect them. But she is not bound to create new colonies, to multiply her points of defense, and to waste a capital which she needs both at home and abroad. In what view would the possession of Louisiana be useful to France? First, like every other warm climate, it must be cultivated by slaves. The capi- 40 PUECHASE OF THE TEEEITORY OF LOUISIANA. tal employed in purchasing these slaves, or the slaves themselves,would be carried to the islands, if a new market was not open for them. The competition will enhance the price to the planters in the islands, and so far obstruct their speedy reestablishment. When the slaves arrive in Louisiana, they must be employed in the unproductive labor of clear- ing the immense forests with which that countrj^ is covered; a labor ill calculated for slaves, since it requires long habit in the use of the ax, and a strength and activity seldom found in slaves. At all events, they must be maintained, clothed, and fed for years before any profit will result from their labor: how long, may be determined, in some sort, from this fact. When new lands are put out to lease in the Northern or Middle States of America the usual terms are ten years free of rent, and, after that, twelve bushels of wheat per hundred acres forever. It is obvious, then, that the first ten years are considered as years of expense, during which the landlord asks nothing; but, in the Southern States, land can not even be put out on these terms, because there the white inhabitants place a higher value upon their labor, and the clearing lands by slaves involves too great an expense for any man who is not absolute owner of the soil. Who, then, will cultivate Loui- siana with slaves? Who among the French citizens will vest a large capital in so precarious a property, with the hope of a distant return? There are, also, circumstances in the situation of Louisiana which ren- der it more diflicult. Louisiana is bounded by an immense wilderness. Slaves, emploj^ed in the clearing of forests, will form acquaintances with the natives; and they will, upon every occasion, escape from labor to the indolence of a savage life. It may be asked, why does this not happen in the Southern States of America? First, because none are so far south as to be free from the rigors of winter, which make it diflicult for the inhabitants of a warm climate to endure a savage life; and, next, be- cause the Southern States are, in a great measure, surrounded by the sea, and b}^ the mountains which onl}' know a white population, and intercept the communication of the slaves with the waste forests in their rear. But supposing all these difficulties surmounted, what advantage would result to France, in a commercial point of view, from the establishment of this colony; so far as its productions are similar to those of their islands, nothing would be gained, because the islands, well cultivated, are equal to every demand of France, and, indeed, of Europe. The introduction of those from Louisiana would only reduce the price, without adding to the value; and France would find herself compelled, in order to prevent the ruin of those who had vested their capital in the colonies, to imitate the Dutch, who destro}^ their spices and teas when they find that the quantity debases the value. Commodi- ties not raised in the islands, and which might be found in Louisiana, are only wood, and, perhaps, rice; but it is certain that these produc- PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 41 tions, when attoiidcd with the expense of procuring them in a warm and unhealthy climate, will not compensate the expense, or, at least, furnisli the same profit to labor that might he obtained, were it em- ployed as in the islands, in raising- more valuable commodities; a proof of which will be found in the United States. It is not from (xeorgia oi' South Carolina that the West India islands are supplied with Avood, but principally from the Northern States, though wood lands are much scarcer and more valuable w^ith them than to the Southward, The reason is, that the furnishing, lumber, the preparing it for the market, the mills necessary for that purpose, all require the labor of free hands content to work for a small profit. Though it ma}" seem paradoxical, I will venture to sa}" that it is not the interest of France to supply herself with wood, even if she could do it from Louisiana: and that, for two reasons. The lumber supplied to her islands hj the Northern States is paid for in molasses, and a small quantity of taffia. The first costs nothing to the planter, being an otherwise useless product of his sugar; and the second a trifling expense in the distillation. If these were not consumed in America, the molasses would absolutely be thrown away, (as it was when the United States were British colonies.) because the commerce of France offers no other market for it. The islands may then be trul}" said to have their lumber from the United States for nothing. If, on the contrary, an establishment was made in Louisiana for the purpose of furnishing lumber, all the expense of such an establish- ment to the nation, together with all the labor emplo^^ed in cutting the wood, preparing- and sending it to market, would be actual loss to the nation, even supposing the woodcutter content to be paid in molasses and rum, because his labor produces nothing to the nation. But it is certain that Louisiana would afford no market for either molasses or rum. The consumption of those is found onlv in the Northern States of America: the Southern prefer spirits made from grain, apples, and peaches, to that distilled from molasses. The planters, then, sup- posing their supph" of kmiber to l)e exclusive!}" furnished by a French colony in Louisiana, would be compelled to pay for it in money, or in some article of real value. If it was not exclusively furnished, it would not be furnished at all; because the woodcutter in a southern climate could never work so cheap as to compete with the hardy sons of the North. It may be thought that the molasses would find a market in the Northern States, even if not given in return for lum])er: l)ut this is not the fact. The only inducement with them to take it is that they get it in return for another commodity for which they have little other mai'ket. Let the islands refuse to take the wood of the Northern States, and they will instantly substitute spirits distilled from grains and apples, for that drawn from molasses: (because, in this case, the price of rum must necessarily rise,) and all commerce between 42 PURCHASE OF THE TEREITORY OP LOUISIANA. the islands will stop, except for articles of provision, in return for which they will only take money, or what will produce money at a foreign market. The second reason why France should not, were it even in her power, seek her supply of lumber from a colony in Louisiana, is, that, in case of a war, supposing Britain to maintain her naval superiority, those supplies would be rendered extremely pre- carious. Nor would the want of them be easily supplied from the United States; for having, during peace, given up that branch of com- merce, (and the persons emploj^ed in it having turned their attention to other objects, and the mills created for sawing the lumber having gone to decay,) it would not be easil}^ reestablished on the breaking out of a war;, the calamities of which would by this means fall doubly hard upon the islands. In a commercial point of view, then, it is obvious that the coloniza- tion of Louisiana would be injurious t^ France; because it would divert a capital that might be more usefally emplo^^ed in her other colonies; because that capital would be unproductive for many years; and because, when it became productive to the individual, it would add nothing to the mass of national wealth, but merely lower the price of commodities supplied b}" the West Indies, and lessen the profits of labor. It may, however, be supposed that the possession of Louisiana would afford an additional market to French manufactures, and so far compensate the nation for the expense of the establishment. This question is worthy of examination: and the supply or consumption of French fabrics must have a reference either to the free population, or to that of the slaves. If the free population is to be supplied by emigration from France, it will consist of that class of people who could not onl}^ maintain themselves in France, but add something to its.wealth by their labor; for France is not overstocked with inhab- itahts; and, of course, none can emigrate without leaving a void some- where oi"^\,some useful labor unperformed. The actual emigrant, then, takes something from the general stock of productive labor in the parent State. He also carries with him a part of the capital, (for he can not go empty-handed,) and he must remain, as I have stated, ten years before he renders his new establishment more than suificient to support himself. In the meantime, he must live with the utmost economy; for having nothing to give in exchange, he can furnish little from the parent country; and, indeed, the nature of a Southern climate exacts very few of those articles which are necessaries in Europe. There can be no question, then, that, so far as relates to the actual emigrant, the few articles he will require from French looms will not compensate the nation for the loss of his labor: nay, that he will consume so much less in America than he would have done in France, that, besides his labor, the manufacturer that supplied in both countries will be an actual loser by his removal. Black popu- PURCHASE OF THE TERRITOKY OK LOUISIANA. 43 lation will contribute still less to aid the maiuifactures of France, ))ecause their consumption is extremely small in tin; article of clothing-. Even in South Carolina it does not amount to more than forty francs a year for each ])lack. In Louisiana, as the winter is less severe, it will be proportionably less. It will consist of cotton, much of it made at home, and much more of it obtained from the United States b}^ an illicit commerce. But if even the whole were brought from France, after deducting- the value of the raw material Avhich France must purchase, the whole protit of the French manufacturer and mer- chant would not exceed thirty livres a head for each slave. Now, ever}' slave sent to Louisiana will cost the nation one thousand francs; and as this capital should produce at least ten per cent, em- ploj^ed in any species of commerce or manufacture, the whole differ- ence between one hundred francs, the product in France, and thirty francs, drawn from the advantage of clothing him, will be an actual loss to France, for the first ten years, at least, in which the}' can, (as I have before proved,) at the utmost, do no more than support them- selves. As numbers will die in the seasoning, and many will elope, the actual loss to France on every slave imported and employed in Louisiana will be 160 francs per annum. But if the profit resulting- from the labor of the same slave, who might have been carried to one of the islands, instead of Louisiana, is added to the account, (and cer- tain it is that all carried to Louisiana are taken from the islands,) it will be found that the actual loss to the nation, in the mis-employment of his labor, will amount to upwards of 600 francs a year, so that the first loss to the nation, on the introduction of one thousand slaves into Louisiana, beyond the first cost of the slaves, will ])e six hundred thousand francs. It is true, that if peace continues, and the colony, contrai'v to ever}^ reasonable expectation, should fiourish, the wealthy planters would consume more French fabrics, but the consumption of the slaves will alwavs be trifling, and their labor absolutely unprofit- able; because, as I have before observed, being employed in raising articles that can be better raised in quantities equal to the demand in the islands, and for which the market is limited, they will onlv, b}' adding to the quantity, lower the price of those commodities which it is the interest of France, who possesses such productive islands, to keep up. 1 know an idea prevails that the connnodities of France can, by means of the Mississippi, find their way into the western part of the United States. Nothing could give birth to this idea but the most perfect ignorance of the navigation of that river; and of the wants of the inhabitants. It is certain that the wines of France are ill calculated for so warm a climate as they must pass through to arrixe in the Western States, and worse suited to the palates or purses of the inhabitants; both of which are better adapted to their own liquors, cider, beer, whisky, 44 PUECHASE OF THE TERBITOEY OF LOUISIANA. and peach brandy; the last of which, with age, is superior to the best brand}^ of France. Instead, then, of receiving- these articles from France, through Louisiana, they will more probably supply the colony with them. Glass, or earthenware, as they have all the materials on hand, they make for themselves, in all the back countries of America. The consumption of china is exceedingly small, and, were it greater, the French china is too dear to enter into competition with that of the Ea-st Indies. Bulky articles in iron are also made among themselves; and the hardware of England has such an acknowledged superiority over that of France, that none of the latter could be vended, were the market open to both. The only articles, then, that could be possibly introduced, would be silks, cambrics, and other light articles of luxmy. These, however, will never pass by the wa}^ of the Mississippi. The dangerous navigation of the Gulf, the slow and expensive passage up the river against the current, the large capital of the American and British merchants at Philadelphia, and the great improvements that are daily making in the inland canals and roads, will always carry these by land to the Ohio and other rivers, from which they can be trans- ported to every other settlement on cheap and eas}" terms. It is a well-known fact that dry goods have been carried from Philadelphia to New Orleans by this route, in preference to going thither direct^ by water. It is chimerical, therefore, to expect to vend the commodi- ties of France, through that channel, when even England, with all her enterprise, her right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the prejudice of Americans in favor of her fabrics, has never ventured to send her commodities by that channel, well knowing that through Baltimore and Philadelphia they will find an easier entrance. But should France wish to introduce more bulky articles by this channel, and habituate the inhabitants of the Western States to her wines and to her fabrics, it can only be done by putting New Orleans into their hands, stipulating, at the same time, that it shall ever remain a free port of entry to French ships and French fabrics, subject to no greater duties than those paid by American ships. This will, at once, interest the American merchants settled in New Orleans, in their com- merce, turn their capital from England to France, and give the latter all the advantages of the island, without the expense of maintaining it; and the money acquired by the activity of America from the Span- ish Government would center in France, because England, not having the same facilities, and paying higher duties, could not supply them upon the same terms. Should France, on the other hand, determine to keep the island, a great part of the commercial capital now in Orleans (which is principally American and British) will, in that case, be moved to such other place as the United States shall fix upon, and this being naturally placed in a state of rivalry to New Orleans, and freed from the vexations that never fail to attend a military Govern- rUKCHASE OV THE TERKITOKY OF LOUISIANA. 45 mentat a distance from the e^^e of the sovereic^n, will, iiotwithstand- ing any disadvanta^'e in point of situation, draw after it the coniinerec that now centers thei'c. The limits settled between Spain and the United States, and lately between the latter and Britain, preclude the inhabitants of Louisiana from any share of the fur trade, which, indeed, never could have been considerable, as the southern furs are of little value; the few deer skins the}' receive are an object of no moment in a commercial view, as will be found from a vieM' of the exports of New Orleans, even now that the United States Mississippi territory transports through that channel. In these reflections I have not taken into account the hardships, expenses, and loss of lives, that result from the establishment of new colonies in a marsh}^ countrj^and warm climate, the inroads of savages, the insurrection of slaves, the insubordination of troops, and the abuses of officers when far removed from the superintending eye of the Sov- ereign; any or all of which may defeat the object, and ruin the estab- lishment. There is, however, one consideration, and that a very important one, that ought to have some weight. Man}'^ who carry their families and their capital into Louisiana, iinding that land is equally' cheap on the American side of the line, will, sometimes from a preference for their form of government, sometimes from caprice, some- times from pique, or to get rid of the oppression of a military govern- ment, (for such that of Louisiana must necessarily be,) remove to the territory of the United States, even in time of peace. In case of a war between France and Spain, this desire will be general; because, sup- posing Britain to maintain her naval superiorit}', (which I have upon a former occasion shown that she will, unless the commercial svstem of France shall be much more liberal than it now is.) the mouth of the Mississippi will 1)C blocked up and the planters of the French Colony be reduced to the utmost distress, while those of the United States will acquire advantages from the war. In this case, a great proportion of the capital that France shall place in Louisiana will be transferred to the United States, where farms read}' cleared may be purchased at half the price at Avhich a French planter can clear his, owing to the dexterity of American woodsmen, who have been educated to the use of the ax, and acquired that strength in the muscles of the ai'm, which is unattainable by men who have been brought up to other employments. Past experience has evinced the truth of these obser- vations. Louisiana, though settled near a century, has flourished neither in the hands of Spain nor of France; and, at this moment, at least half the trade of Orleans is carried on upon the capital of citi- zens of the United States, under the faith of their treaty with Spain. When France shall establish a rival colony there, this will l)e removed to such other place on the Mississippi as it shall be the policy of the United States to eucouraffe. 46 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. If, in a commercial view, the settlement of Louisiana shall not be advantag-eous to France, but, on the contrarj^ really injurious, b}?- diverting her capital from more important objects; in a political one, it will be found still more inconsistent with her interests. To France, considered either as a maritime or a commercial nation, the' United States are of the last importance. On the first subject, I have, upon a former occasion, expressed my sentiments full3^ On the latter, there can be no doubt that an agricultural nation, whose industry enables them to purchase with the product of their raw materials the luxuries and fabrics of Europe, and whose habits and pursuits prevent them from manufacturing for themselves, must offer an important market to the inhabitants of the Old World. In this view the trade of the United States is considered as extremel v valuable to Britain. But France, when her manufactures shall attain the perfection of which they are susceptible, and her trade be placed upon the proper founda- tion, presents a much greater variety of subjects for the 'sup^6«:'t of this commerce than Britain. From the last, America receives only the product of her looms and her forges. From the first, she will not only take these, but aid her agriculture b}^ the purchase of her wines, her oils, and her brandies; while, on the other hand, France affords a better market than Britain to many of the products of the United States. These circumstances, and the relative position of France, which precludes all idea of danger or rivalship, either by sea or by land, between her and the United States, has made them view her as a natural all}^, and consider the measure of her power as an additional pledge for the safety of their commerce and their future tranquillity. They have done homage to the wisdom of those statesmen who, at the end of a successful war, conceived it more advantageous to France to insure the lasting friendship of the United States, than to acquire a territory which might excite their jealousy, and throw them back into the hands of the nation from whom they had but just aided to liberate them. I am aware of the delicacy of touching upon the political evils that may result to France and to the United States from the fornier pos- sessing itself of New Orleans and the Floridas, lest, on the one hand, I should leave unsaid what truth requires to be spoken, and, on the other, give umbrage by freedom which haughty spirits may construe into menace. Feeling mj^self , however, a citizen of one of these States, and warmly attached to the other, I trust that those into whose hands this shall be placed, will duly appreciate m}" motives in endeavoring to remove all ground of controversy between nations formed to aid each other; and, while they believe me sufficiently acquainted with the resources of my own countr}-, not to dread the power of an}^ European nation, they will think me equally incapable of so ridiculous an idea as that of menacing a Government before whose power united Europe rUKCHASE OF THE TERKITURY\OF LOUISIANA. 47 litis bowed. I have observed that France and the I'nited States are so happily placed with respect to each other, as to have no point of colli- sion. The}' can mutually aid, without havinu- the smallest temptation to injure, each other. And as there is no nation at present on the globe Avhose consumption otters such encouragement to foreign manu- factures as that of the United States; as this consumption is rapidly increasing; as they have the means of establishing a navy whenever their situation shall render it necessary, how strong, how powerful, should the inducement be that compels France to lose these advan- tages, and convert a natural and warm ally into a jealous and suspi- cious neighbor, and, perhaps, in the progress of events, into an open enemy Experience has evinced that no two nations can border ui)on each other, without having the spirit of rivalr}- excited; and if this is true with respect to neighboring nations, it will be found to apply more forcibly to the Colony, of a great and powerful nation placed at a dis- tance from home, and a Sovereign adjoining such nation. The reason is obvious. Where two nations join each other, everything passes under the eye of the Sovereign; and ditt'erences mav be accommodated as soon as they arise; but when the Governor of a Colony, relying for protection from home, is guilty of an act of hostility, the wound festers before the physician can be called in. The oft'ended Sovereign, too, will presume that the ofiicer will mett with support, the greater as his nation is more powerful; will endeavor to anticipate the hostilities it dreads; it will recriminate; and the nations will be plunged into a Avar before explanations can take place. If there is a situation in the world that would lead to these melancholy consequences, it would be that of France in possession of New Orleans. It blocks up the great outlet to a great number of the American States, and to a very exten- sive and growing population. On this island a military government will be established. The commander and his troops, justly elated with the glory of their nation, will look down upon surrounding people. Commerce will be despised, and those who practice it ))e subjected to the despotism of men who will seek a compensation for their priva- tions in being sent to a distant country and unhealth}" climate, in the acquisition of wealth. The Colony itself att'ords no legitimate sources for this, but those which arise graduall}- from commerce and agricul- ture, equally ill suited to the military character. No vigilance on the part of the parent country can control the oppressions that will be practiced by men at such a distance; nor will the ardent spirits of the new settlers in States that border on the Mississippi, in many cases, be sufliciently controlled, (even by their own Governraent,) to prevent their endeavors to avenge themselves, rather than to wait the tard}- justice that they may hope for from diplomatic representations. The resentments of the people w^ill be sharpened against each other; the 48 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. ties of friendship will be broken, and the Government of the United States, which always partakes of the feelings of the people, will find itself unavoidably placed in such a situation as to change its connexion, and to guard against the supposed hostilit}^ of its old alh^, by forming cautionary connexions with Britain, who will court their alliance and stimulate their resentments against France; because by this connexion she will hope to retain the commerce of America, which she almost exclusively possesses, give security to her Colonies, and, in case of war, facilitate her attempts to conquer the French islands; and, above all, prevent that commercial and maritime union between France and the United States, on which alone France can hope to engraft a naval superiority. It may be asked why these jealousies, that 1 appear so greatl}^ to apprehend with respect to France, do not prevail with respect to Britain in possession of Canada. First, because Britain has, very prudently, separated her territory by a natural boundry, which keeps the inhabitants of the respective nations from coming into contact. While she held posts on the south side of the lakes, the United States viewed her with jealousv, and there is no sort of doubt that hostilities and national hatred would have been the consequences of her retaining them, when the American population in their neighborhood had increased; symptoms of which had frequently been exhibited before they were relinquished. Second, because the natural export of the United States being by their own rivers, there is no communication of any moment between them and Canada; but, thirdl}^, because Upper Canada is principall}- settled bj^ emigrants from the United States, who, in case of a rupture, would probably join them if the spirit of the American Government did not prohibit an exten- sion of their limits. And, after all, what advantages, political or commercial, can France obtain by the possession of New Orleans and the east side of the Mis- sissippi, that can compensate for the losses she will sustain in both respects, by placing herself in a state of rivalry with the United States? The Floridas are a narrow slip of very barren lands, absolutely inde- fensible in case of a rupture, and which will require more than they are worth in guards, garrisons, and Indian subsidies; and however val- uable New Orleans may be to the United States, it will be of little value to France, when the foreign capital shall be withdrawn from it, or a rival city established by the United States. I find, upon the most careful inquiry, that one-third of the mercantile houses now employed "^in New Orleans belongs to the citizens of the United States. No sooner shall a military government be established there, than these houses, with all the capital that gives activity to the commerce of New Orleans, will be removed either to such other place as the United States shall receive agreeably to the terms of their treatj^ with Spain, or to the Natchez, to which any vessel that may enter at New Orleans PURCHASE OF THE TEKKITOKY OF LOUISIANA. 49 t'iin l)e rt'coived, Lurgc vessels have ;il ready ' allege ignorance, 1 order it to be pub- PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 55 lishod ill tho usual places, copies to })o posted up in the public sitioefi; and that the necessary iiotic(> l)e oiven of it to the ofHcers of finance, the aduiinistrator of rents, and otlierwise, as ma}' be necessary. The present being given under my hand, and countersigned h\ the undei'written notary of finance pro ii'nii><>i'<\ in thi^ oflice of Intendancy of New Oi-leans, October It'., 1S()2. Juan Ventura Morales. By ord(M" of the Intendant: PkDUC ) 1*K1)KSCLAUX. Governor Claiborne to the Secretary of State. Near Natchez, Octolx'r IS, 1802. Sir: 1 have the honor to enclose you a letter which I last cn^ening received from ]\Ir. William E. Hulings, together with a translation of an extract from a ])ublication made hy Juan Ventura Morales, Intend- ant of the Province of Louisiana, etc., dated Octol)er K), 1802. These dispatches announce that the port of New Orleans is shut against for- eign commerce, and also the American deposit. Not understanding from the Intendant's proclamation whether or not another place on the banks of the Mississippi had ])een assigned by His C-atholic Majesty, (in conformity with our treaty with Spain,) for '*an equivalent establishment," 1 have, l)y letter, (a copy of which is inclosed), re(j[uested information upon this point, from the Governor- General of the Province of Louisiana: when his answer is received it shall be forwarded to 3'ou. The late act of the Spanish Government at New Orleans has excited considerable agitation at Natchez and its vicinity. It has inflicted a severe wound on the agricultural and commercial interests of this Territory, and will prove no less injurious to all the Western country. There bt>ing at present an interruption in the post between this Territory and Tennessee, and supposing it of importance that the Gov- ermnent should be early apprized of the late event at New Orleans, I have forwarded this letter ])y express to Nashville, where it will be deposited in the mail. I am, sir, etc., Wm. V. C. CLATliORNE. Hon. Secretary ok State, U. S. Mr, Hulings to Governor Claiborne. New Orleans, Octoher 18, 1802. Sir: I have to announce to you that this day the port is shut against foreign commerce, and not against foreign commerce only, but against 56 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. the American deposit in this city. In the decree posted up in the pub- lic places, no mention is made of an}^ other place appointed for a deposit. You will use this information as you may think proper. I am, with great respect, etc., Wm. E. Hulings. Wm. C. C. Claiborne, Governoi' Mississippi Territory. Governor Claiborne to the Governor-General of Louisiana. Natchez, October 'B8, 1802. Sir: 1 was this day informed that, in a proclamation issued on the 16th instant b}^ the Intendant of the Province of Louisiana, it was announced, "That the citizens of the United States should no long-er be permitted to deposit their merchandises and effects in the port of New Orleans." Information of an event so immediately interesting to the citizens of the United States led me to peruse attentively "the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation between the United States of America and the King of Spain," and, upon adverting to the twenty- second article, I found it expressly declared that, ' ' His Catholic Majest}^ will permit the citizens of the United States, for the space of three 3^ ears from this time, to deposit their merchandises and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export theili from thence, without pa3dng any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores; and His Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds, during that time, that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or, if he should not agree to continue it, then he will assign to them, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment." I have here quoted the words of the treaty, and find them too explicit to reqire comment, or to admit of a doubtful construction. If, therefore. His Catholic Majesty has discontinued his permission to the citizens of the United States to deposit their merchandises and effects at the port of New Orleans, will your Excellency" be good enough to inform me whether anj", and what, other place on the banks of the Mississippi has been assigned (in conformity to the treaty) for "an equivalent establishment ?" The subject of this inquiry is so interesting to the commerce of the United States and to the welfare of her citi- zens, that I must request your excellency to favor me with an early answer. Accept assurances of my great respect and high consideration. Wm. C. C. Claiborne. His Excellency Manuel de Salvado, Governor- General of Louisiana. PUECHASE OF THE TERRlTOKY OF LOUISIANA. 57 The Governor of Kentucky to the President of the United States. State of Kentucky, FmvJi-fort, Noveiiihr SO, 1802. Sir: Two daj^s ag-o,. I roceived the enclosed letters from Dr. Jiiino.s Speed, and Meeker & Co., from New Orleans, together with a copy of a proelamatioii issued ])y Juan Ventura Morales. Intendant of tlii^ Span- ish Gov^ernment of Louisiana, and which I do myself tlie honor to enclose for your information. The citizens of this State are very much alarmed and tio'itated, as this measure of the Spanisli (xovernment will, if not altered, at one blow, cut up the present and future prosperity' of their best interests by the roots. To you, sir, the}' naturally turn their eyes, and on your attention to this important suljject their best hopes are tixcd. Permit me to request you will give me information on this I)usiness as soon as you can say, with certainty, what we may rely on; and let ni}' solicitude on this occasion be my apology for this request. With sentiments of respect, etc., James (tarrard. Read in Senate February 23, 1803, by Mr. White, of Delaware. advertisement. Under date of the 16th instant (December) the Intendant-General of these provinces tells me that the citizens of the United States of America can have no commerce with His Majestv's subjects — they only having the free navigation of the river for the exportation of the fi'uits and produce of their establishments to foreign countries, and the im])ortation of what the}' may want from them. As such I charge you, so far as respects you, to be zealous and vigilant, with particular care, that the inhabitants neither purchase nor sell anything to the shipping, liat-bottomed boats, barges, or any other smaller vessels that may go along the river, destined for the American possessions, or procc^eding from them, that they shall be informed of it, for their due compliance of the same. Carlos de Grandpree. Baton Rouge, Decemlwr 22, 1S02. The foregoing is a translation of the oi-iginal, directed to me hy his Lordship Carlos de Grandpree, Colonel of the Royal Armies, and Gov^ernor of Baton Rouge. J. O. Conner, Cyndic of Fourth iJlutrict. Baton Rouge, IJecemher 27, 1802. 58 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. Mr. Livingston to the President of the United States. Paris, Octoher^S, 1802. Dear Sir: Nothing very important having- occurred for some time past, I have not thought it necessary to trouble you, particularly as I concluded that you would, for a time, have quitted the seat of Gov- ernment, and sought repose from the fatigues of politics. While the union between France and Russia subsists, the discontents which almost every nation in Europe feels at the extreme loftiness of the first will be suppressed. But as fear and not affection occasions the suppression, the.y are read^^ to break out on the first favorable moment. Many think that moment not very distant. Great changes have taken place in the Administration: Wormzoff is known to be inclined to Britain; and I find that the change occasions considerable sensation here, not only among the foreign Ministers, but among those of France. One effect of it has been to send off Andriotte, who has hitherto been retained till Lord Whitworth arrived, even though formal notice had long since been given that he was to go in eight daj's. Britain is seriously dissatisfied; and, indeed, has some reason to complain; several of her vessels which put in here, (as is said by stress of weather,'' having been detained, and Mr. Murray's representations treated with neglect. The affairs of Helvetia have also excited great uneasiness in Eng- land, where all parties seem to conciir in wishing to oppose some barriers to the power of France. The British republicans are dis- gusted with the changes which have taken place here; while the royal- ists dread the stability that the Government has assumed in the hands of the First Consul. The mercantile and manufacturing interests, who looked to peace for the renewal of the Treatj^ of Commerce, from which they derived such advantages, are sore at the severity with which their commerce is interdicted here. You will accordingh^ find, by the British papers, that both those of the majorit}^ and minority teem with abuse on France, and blow aloud the trumpet of discord. By the Treat}^ of Madrid, 3"ou recollect that the reigning Duke of Parma and Placentia was to renounce them in favor of France; in con- sideration of which, his heir was to have the kingdom of Etruria. This he has constantly refused to do, and has latel}^ died without mak- ing any renunciation. The Spanish Ambassador here has been called upon to complete the treaty. He replied that be had no powers. And General Bournonville has gone express to Spain to effect this object — the Knag of Etruria being now Duke of Parma. Whether he will prefer the Crown he now holds to his hereditary dominions I know not; but I think he must submit to what is dictated here, or risk the loss of both. The Mississippi business, though all the officers are appointed, and PTJECHASE OF THE TEERITORY OF LOUISIANA. 59 the army under orders, has met with a check. The army under orders is obstructed for the moment. Events may possibly arise, of which we may avail ourselves. I had, two days ago, a very interesting conversation with Joseph Bonaparte, having put into his hands a copy of the memoir on Louisi- ana, which I sent the Secretary of State. I took occasion to tell him that the interest he had taken in settling the differences between our respective countries had entitled him to our conhdence, and that I should take the libert}'' to ask his advice in matters that were likely to disturb the harmon}^ that subsisted between our respective Republics. He seemed pleased at the compliment, and told me that he would receive with pleasure any communication 1 could make; but as he would not w^ish to appear to interfere with the Minister, he ])egged my conmiunication might ])e informal and unsigned — exactly what I w'ished, because 1 should act with less danger of committing m3^self, and of course with more freedom. He added, you must not, however, suppose ni}' power to serve you greater than it actually is; m}^ brother is his own counsellor; but we are good brothers, he hears me with pleasure, and as I have access to him at all times, I have an oppor- tunity of turning his attention to a particular subject that might otherwise be passed over. 1 then asked him whether he had read ni}" notes on Louisiana. He told me that he had, and that he had conversed upon the subject with the First Consul, who, he found, had read them with attention; that his brother had told him that he had nothing more at heart than to be upon the best terms with the United States. 1 expressed to him my apprehensions of the jealousies that would natur- all}^ be excited from their vicinit}^, and the impossibility of prevent- ing abuses in a military government established at so great a distance from home. Wishing to know with certainty whether the Floridas were included, (which, however, I had pretty well ascertained before,) I told him that the only cause of difference that might arise between us, being the debt and Louisiana, 1 conceived that both might be happil}^ and easily removed })y making an exchange with Spain, returning them Lousiana, retaining New Orleans, and giving the latter and the Floridas for our debt. He asked me whether we should prefer the Floridas or Louisiana? I told him that there was no comparison in their value, but that we had no wish to extend our boundary across the Mississippi, or give color to the doubts that had been entertained of the moderation of our views; that all we sought was security, and not extension of territory. He replied, that he believed any new cession on the part of Spain would be extremely difficult; that Spain had parted with Trinidad and Louisiana with great reluctance. 1 have, however, reason to think that Bournonville is instructed to effect this object, not, however, with 60 PUECHASE OF THE TEERITOEY OF LOUISIAISTA. a view to my project, but with intention to procure for France some port in the Gulf, from which they think they may secure their own and annoy the British commerce; so that, if we should, contrary, to our hopes, make any bargain with them, I fear that East Florida will not be included. However, everything is yet in air; and I doubt much, considering the present state of things in Europe, whether Spain will make any exchange that will give France a command of the Gulf. Though this is a favorite object with France, she may not, in the present state of things in Europe, think it prudent to press too hard. It is time that she should acquire some character for moderation. The First Consul is gone to Rouen, and is to be back by the 18th Brumaire. The British fear he means to examine the coast. The prospect of a rupture grows more serious. I can tell you, with cer- tainty, that a remonstrance, in pretty strong terms, has been presented by her Minister, on the subject of the Consul's interference in the affairs of Helvetia. How it will be received I know not; but 1 think it would not have been made if it had not been the intention of Britain to seek a quarrel. I refer you to the Secretary of State for information on our partic- ular affairs. l^af a3^ette's situation demands the aid of our country. * * * jje was ready to sacrifice everything for us, and we owe him something- effectual, I must pray you to get Mr. Randolph, or some other leading member of Congress, to patronize him. Our gratitude will do us honor abroad, and not be unpopular at home. I have the honor to be, etc.. R. R. Livingston. Th. Jefferson, Esq., President of the United States. [Extract.] Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France, to James Madison, Secretary of State. Paris, November 2, 1802. My letter to the President, sent by the way of England, will show you that the business of Louisiana has met with a check, though I fear it will soon be resumed; and that troops will go out this Autumn, as every- thing was arranged, and they were under marching orders. Florida is not, as I before told you, included in the cession. You will see in the President's letter my conversation with Joseph Bonaparte: this I shall have a convenient opportunity to renew, as he has promised to give me a shooting party at his country house in a few days. Time may afford circumstances of which we may avail ourselves. I therefore PUKCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 61 ])niy you to be explicit in your instructions, uiul in your replies to some (|uestions that 1 have asked you relative to this subject in my former letters, since I am at present wholly unauthorized as to any offers that it would ])e proper to make; and we certainly do not expect to receive this country, or anv interest in it, as a free gift. Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France, to James Madison, Secretary of State. Paris, Novemxler 11, 1802. France has cut the knot. The difficulty relative to Parma and Placentia, that stopped the expedition to Louisiana, lias ended by their taking- possession of the first, as you see by the enclosed paper. Orders are given for the immediate embarkation of troops (two demibrigades) for Louisiana; the}" will sail in about twenty days from Holland. The Government here will give no answer to my notes on the subject. They will say nothing on that of our limits, or of our right under the Spanish Treaty. Clarke has been presented to General Victor as a merchant from Louisiana. The General did not probably conceal his views, which are nothing short of taking exactl}'' what they find con- venient. When asked what they meant to do as to our right of entre- pot, he spoke of the treaty as waste paper; and the prefect did not know that we had such right, though it had been the subject of many conversations with the Minister, and of three different notes. The sum voted for this service is two millions and a half; as to the rest, they expect to compel the people to support the expenses of the Gov- ernment, which will be very heavy, as the number of the officers, civil and militaiy, with their suits, is great; and thej^ are empowered to draw: so that the first act of the new Government will bo the oppres- sion of their people and our commerce. 1 believe you may add to this an early attempt to corrupt our people, and, if I ma}^ judge b}" the temper that the General will carry with him, an early attempt upon the Nachez, which they consider as the rival of New Orleans. If you look back to some of my letters on this subject, 3^ou will see my opinion of the necessity of strengthening ourselves hj force and ships at home, and by alliance abroad. No prudence will, I fear, prevent hostilities ere long; and perhaps the sooner their plans develop themselves the bettei'. Li a letter to the President, sent b}" wa}'^ of England, I men- tion a conversation with Joseph Bonaparte, from which I derive some small hopes; but they are of no avail now that the expedition is deter- mined upon. I had 3^esterday written j'ou a long letter upon the general state of our affairs, but, having no one to copy it, and being anxious to give you this intelligence as early as possible, I confine m3\self to this single object, lest I should miss the ship which is about to sail from Havre. 62 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. I am, dear sir, with the most respectful consideration, j^our most obedient servant, R. R. Livingston. James Madison, Secretary of State. Eobert R. Livingston, Minister to France, to James Madison, Secretary of State. . Paris, Novemher 11, 1802. Sir: After writing mine of this date, I called on the Minister and insisted on some positive answer to m}^ notes. He told me that he was expressly instructed hy the First Consul to give me the most positive assurances that the treaties we had entered into with Spain or them, relative to Louisiana, should be strictly observed. When I expressed my surprise that their officers should not be informed on that head, though on the eve of departing, he assured me that they would be fur- nished with copies of the treaties, and directed to conform strictly to them. I asked why these assurances were not given to me in the usual form, by replying to m.j notes? He said that he hoped that there would be no difficulty on that head, when the Consul should arrive (he is now absent). I have stated this that you might, by comparing this conversation with the contents of the letter, and the information derived from Clarke's conversation with the General, draw your own inferences. I shall endeavor to-daj^to see J. Bonaparte, though he has all along assured me that it was the Consul's intention to cultivate our friendship, and by no means to do anything that would endanger it. It will, however, be well to be on our guard, and, above all, to re-enforce the Natchez, and to give it every possible commercial advan- tage. If we can put ourselves in the situation to prevent the danger of hostility, I think we may hope that the dissatisfaction of inhabitants, the disappointment of officers, and the drain of money which the establishment will occasion, will facilitate our views after a very short time. I am, dear sir, with the most respectful consideration, your most obedient servant, Robert R. Livingston. Hon. James Madison, Secretary of State. P. S. — In my letter to the President, I informed him that General Bournonville had gone post to Spain, and that I had reason to think he had it in charge to obtain the Floridas. I know that he went with the greatest speed; accordingly, on his very first conference, he proposed to Spain to relinquish Parma and Placentia for the Flori- PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. ()3 das. * * * But 8i)ain may be forced to give thonu thouoh she should not like the exeliange. You sec l)y this how much it is a favorite object with the First Consul, and judge from thence of our prospects. What effect the news from St. Domingo may have I know not. The armj'^ there is reduced to 1,200 effectives. Other particulars you will have more correctly than we have here. The Consul is still absent, lait daih' expected. Lord Whitwortli is on his way from Calais, and will be here to-morrow. Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France, to James Madison, Secretary of State. Paris, Noveinhcv U, 1802. In addition to my last, (duplicates enclosed,) I have ol)tained accurate information of the offer to Spain. It is either to sell them Parma for forty -eight millions of livres, or to exchange it for Florida. You see by this the value they put on Florida. I fear Spain will accede to their proposition. Lord Whitworth has arrived. The affairs of Switz- erland are in a train to be settled as France thinks proiper; the Diet being dissolved and deputies appointed to come to Paris. Sweden has made a peace with Tripoli, for which sjae pays one hundred and iifty thousand dollars. The Emperor is not 3^et satisfied with the indemni- ties, and there are many sj-mptoms of change in the politics of Kussia. Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Charles Pinckney, Minister to Spain. Department of State, Xovamljer 27., 1802. A letter from a contidential citizen at New Orleans, a copy of which is enclosed, has just informed us that the Intendant, at that place, b}^ a proclamation,. from which an extract is also enclosed, had prohibited the deposit of American effects stipulated by the Treatj^ of 1795; and, as the letter is interpreted, that the river was also shut against the external commerce of the United States from that port. Whether it be the fact or not that this latter prohibition has also taken place, it is evident that the useful navigation of the Mississippi so essentially depends on a suitable depository for the articles of commerce, that a privation of the latter is equivalent to a privation of both. This proceeding is so direct and palpable a violation of the Treat}^ of 1796, that, in candor, it is to be imputed rather to the Intendant solel}^ than to instructions of his Government. The Spanish Minister takes pains to impress this belief, and it is favored by private accounts from New Orleans, mentioning that the Governor did not concur with the Intendant. But, from whatever source the measure may have pro- ceeded, the President expects that the Spanish Government will neither 64 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. lose a moment in countermanding- it, nor hesitate to repair every dam- age which ma}^ result from it. You are aware of the sensibility of our Western citizens to such an occurrence. This sensibility is justified by the interest the}^ have at stake. The Mississippi is to them every- thing. It is the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac, and all the navi- gable rivers of the Atlantic States, formed into one stream. The produce exported through that channel last jesir amounted to one mil- lion six hundred and twenty-two thousand six hundred and seventy- two dollars from the districts of Kentucky and Mississippi onlj"-, and will probabl}^ be fifty per cent, more this yea,Y, (from the whole AVestern country. Kentucky alone has exported, for the first half of this year, five hundred and ninety -one thousand four hundred and thirty-two dollars in value,) a great part of which is now, or shortly will be, afloat for New Orleans, and consequentl}^ exposed to the effects of this extraordinary exercise of power. Whilst 3^ou presume, therefore, in your representations to the Spanish Government that the conduct of its officer is no less contrar}^ to its intentions than it is to its good faith, you will take care to express the strongest confidence that the breach of the treaty will be repaired in ever}^ way which justice and a regard for a f riendl}^ neighborhood may require. 1 have communicated the information received from New Orleans to the Chevalier d'Yrujo, with a view to obtain his immediate interpo- sition, as 3^ou will find by the enclosed copy of a letter to him. He readily undertakes to use it with all the effect he can give it b}^ writ- ing immediately on the subject to the local authority at New Orleans. I shall write at the same time to Mr. Hulings, who will enforce, as far as he may have an opportunity, the motives for recalling the unwar- rantable prohibitions. It is to be hoped that the Intendant will be led to see the error which he has committed, and to correct it before a ver}" great share of its mischief will have happened. Should he prove as obstinate as he has been ignorant or wicked, nothing can temper the irritation and indignation of the Western countr}^ but a persuasion that the energy of their own Government will obtain from the justice of that of Spain the most ample redress. It has long been manifest that, whilst the injuries to the United States, so frequently occurring from the colonial officers scattered over our hemisphere, and in our neighborhood, can only be repaired by a resort to their respective Sovereigns in Europe, that it will be impossible to guard against most serious inconveniences. The instance before us strikes with peculiar force, and presents an occasion on which you may advantageously suggest to the Spanish Government the expediency of placing in their Minister on the spot, an authority to control or correct the mischievous proceedings of their colonial offi- cers towards our citizens; without which any one of fifteen or twent}^ individuals, not always among either the wisest or best of men, may, PURCHASE OF THE TERKITORV OF LOUISIANA. 65 at any time, thi-eaten the good understanding- of the two countries. The distance between the United States and the old continent, and the mortitying dela^^s of exphmations and negotiations across the Atlantic on emergencies in our neighborhood, render such a provision indis- pensable, and it can not be long before all the Governments of Europe, having American colonies, must see the policy of making it. Extract from the Message of the President of the United States to Congress. December 15, 1802. The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the late Avar, will, if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations, which will doubtless have just weight in any deliberations of the Legislature connected with that subject. Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France, to James Madison, Secretary of State. Paris, Bccemher W, 180^. Sir: I have received vour favor by Mde. Broniau, and had, as you will find, anticipated your wishes in finding another manual to the First Consul. The consequence of which is, that I have, at this moment, a very strong memorial under his eye, and some projects which appear to be well received. But the subject is too delicate to treat here; when a safe conveyance offers I shall write to you more at large. The Minister has changed his conduct much for the better, either because of our late difference, or because he suspects that I have another passage to the First Consul. France has not yet got Florida; but there is not much doubt that her negotiations on this subject will succeed, as Parma is a favorite object with Spain. Pray be explicit in the amoiuit of what I may offer, and consider the value of the country— its importance to peace — the expensive establishment it will save, and its intrinsic worth, from the price of the land and actual revenue. I do not, however, mean that you should infer from this that my prospects of obtaining the object are great, because I find, as Mr. Talleyrand told me yesterday, the First Consul entete with this project. But I have made so many converts, that I would wish, in case favorable circumstances should arise, to know how to act. If left to myself I may go beyond the mark. General politics you will collect from the papers I send. I have mentioned that the storm in England will blow over for the present; and the peace will not be lasting. The armament for Louisiana has not yet sailed; the civil officers are yet here, if 1 am rightly informed by the Minister from whom I had it yesterday. H. Doc. i31 5 66 PUKCHASE OF THE TEERITORY OF LOUISIANA. The necessity of my sending this immediately prevents my adding anything but the assurance of the highest esteem. 1 have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant, KoBERT R. Livingston. P. S. December 23. — The armament has not yet sailed; Florida not ceded; more hesitation and doubt on the subject than I have 3'et observed. I have, in a private memoir under the Consul's eye, touched a string that has alarmed them. I can not now explain. The Minister knows nothing of this. Set on foot negotiation fixing our bound with Britain, but by no means conclude until you hear from me that all. hope here is lost. It is an important card in my hands, and must, for the present, at least, be somewhat under my control. Do not absolutely despair, though jou may have no great reason to hope should New Orleans be possessed by a small force. This letter goes by the way of England by Mr. Murray, who has not allowed me time to give it you in any better dress. I must wait for some more direct conveyance to write fully to you. James Madison, Secretary of State, to Robert E,. Livingston, Minister to France. Department of State, December 23, 1802. Sir: In the latter end of last month we received information from New Orleans of the interdiction of the deposit there for our merchan- dise, stipulated by the treaty with Spain, without an equivalent estab- lishment being assigned. A copy of the Intendant's proclamation to that effect is enclosed. Private accounts render it probable that the Governor of the province openly dissented from that act; but private letters, of so late a date as the 29th of October, inform us that it is still enforced. The Legislature of Kentucky have voted a memorial to Con - gress complaining of it, and they will, probably, be followed by other portions of the Western people. Should it not be revoked before the time for the descent of the boats in the Spring, both the injury and irri- tation proceeding from it will be greatly increased. The House of Representatives passed a resolution on the 17th of this month, calling for information upon this subject, a copy of which, if it should be printed earl}^ enough, will be enclosed. The result of their delibera- tions can not be anticipated; but I may hazard the remark that, whilst we have no clear foundation on which to impute this infraction to orders from the Spanish Government, it would be contrary to the duty, policy, and character of our own to resort for redress in the first instance to the use of force. PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 67 January 3, 1803. The delay in the sailing of the British packet, ])y which this is for- warded, gives an opportunity of adding that, since the date of the above, a letter has been received from Governor Claiborne, of the Mississippi Teiritory, inclosing one from the Governor of Louisiana, which says that the suspension of the deposit by the Intendant was without orders from the Spanish Government, and that the measure did not accord with his judgment. He observes, also, that he had connnunicated the proceeding to the Governor of the Havana, who has some kind of super- intendence over the authorities at New Orleans. This information strengthens the liope that the irregularity ma}' be corrected before it can have w^'ought extensive injury to our Mississippi connnerce. The occurrence has drawn forth the clearest indications, not only of the sensiljility of the Western country with respect to the navigation of the Mississippi, but of the sympatlw of their Atlantic fellow-citizens on the subject. I have the honor to be, etc., James Madison. Robert R. Livingston, Esq. James Madison, Secretary of State, to Charles Pinckney, Minister to Spain. Department of State, Janaanj 10^ 180 J. Sir: Since my letter of November 27th, on the subject of what had taken place at New Orleans, a letter has been received from the Gov- ernor of Louisiana to Goxcrnor Claiborne, in w'hich it is stated that the measure of the Intendant was without instructions from his Gov- ernment, and admitted that his own judgment did not concur with that of the Intendant. You will lind, by the printed documents herewith transmitted, that the subject engaged the earlj^ and earnest attention of the House of Representatives; and that all the information relating to it possessed ))y the Executive prior to the receipt of that letter, was reported, in consequence of a call for it. The letter itself has been added to that report; l)ut being confidentially connnunicated, it does not appear in print; a translation of it, however, is herewith enclosed. You will find, also, that the House has passed a resolution explicitly declaring that th(> stipulated rights of the ITnitcd States on the Missis- sippi will be inviolably maintained. The disposition of many members was to give to the resolution a tone and complexion still stronger. To these proofs of the sensation which has been produced, it is to be added, that representations, expressing the peculiar sensibility of the AVestern countiy, are on the wa}^ from every quarter of it to tlie Government. There is, in fact, but one sentiment throughout the Union with respect to the dutv of maintaining our rights of navigation and boundary. The only existing difierence relates to the degree of patience which ought to be exercised during the appeal to friendly modes of redress. 68 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIAT^A. In this state of things, it is to be presumed that the Spanish Govern- ment will accelerate, hy every possible means, its interposition for that purpose; and the President charges you to urge the necessity of so doing with as much amicable decision as you can emplo3^ We are not without hopes that the Intendant will yield to the demands which have been made on him: and to the advice which he will have received from the Spanish Minister here. But it will be expected from the justice and good faith of the Spanish Government, that its precise orders to that effect will be forwarded by the quickest convej^ance possible. The President wishes, also, that the expedient suggested in the letter above referred to, for preventing similar occurrences and delays, may also be dul}^ pressed on that Government. I have the honor to be, etc., James Madison. Charles Pinckney, Esq. President Jefferson to Mr. Monroe. Washington, January IS, 1803. Dear Sir, — I dropped you a lino on the 10th, informing 3^ou of a nomination I had made of you to the Senate, and yesterday I enclosed you their approbation, not then having time to write. The agitation of the public mind on occasion of the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Orleans is extreme. In the western country it is natural, and grounded on honest motives. In the seaports it proceeds from a desire for war, which increases the mercantile lottery: in the federalists, generall}^, and especially those of Congress, the object is to force us into war if possible, in order to derange our finances, or if this cannot be done, to attach the western country to them, as their best friend, and thus get again into power. Remonstrances, memorials, &c., are now circulating through the whole of the western country, and signed by the body of the people. The measures we have been pur- suing, being invisible, do not satisfy their minds. Something sensible, therefore, has become necessary; and indeed our object of purchasing New Orleans and the Floridas is a measure liable to assume so many shapes, that no instructions could be squared to fit them. It was essential then, to send a minister extraordinary, to be joined with the ordinary one, with discretionary powers; first, however, well impressed with all our views, and therefore qualified to meet and modify to these every form of proposition which could come from the other party. This could be done only in full and frequent oral communications. Having determined on this, there could not be two opinions among the republicans as to the person. You possessed the unlimited confi- dence of the administration and of the western people; and generally of the republicans everywhere; and were you to refuse to go, no other man can be found who does this. The measure has already silenced PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 69 the federalists here. Congress will no longer l)c agitated by them; and the country will become calm fast as the infoi-mation extends over it. All eyes, ail hopes are now fixed on 3'ou; and Avereyou to decline, the chagrin would be universal, and would shake under your feet the high ground on which you stand with the public. Indeed, I know nothing which would produce such a shock. For on the event of this mission depend the future destinies of this republic. If we cannot by a purchase of the country, insure to ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, then as war cannot ])e distant, it behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course, without, however, hastening it; and it may be necessar}' (on your failure on the continent) to cross the channel. We shall get entangled in Euro- pean politics, and iiguring more, be nuich less happy and prosperous. This can only be prevented ]\v a successful issue to your present mission. 1 am sensi))le after the measures you have taken forgetting into a different line of business, that it will be a great sacriiice on 3^our part, and presents from the season and other circumstances serious difficulties. But some men are born for the public. Nature by titting them for the service of the human race on a broad scale, has stamped them with the evidences of her destination and their duty. James Madison, Secretary of State,, to Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France. Department of State, January 18^ 1803. Sir: Mj letters of December 28d and Januar}^ 8d, conununicated the information which had been received at those dates, relating to the violation, at New Orleans, of our treaty with Spain; together with what had then passed between the House of Representatives and the Execu- tive on the subject. I now enclose a subsequent resolution of that branch of the Legislature. Such of the debates connected with it as took place with open doors will l)e seen in the newspapers; which it is expected will ])e forwarded l),y the Collector at New York l)y the pre- sent opportunity. In these debates, as well as in indications from the press, you will perceive, as you would readily suppose, that the ces- sion of Louisiana to France has been associated as a ground of much solicitude with the affair at New Orleans. Such, indeed, has been the impulse given to the public mind b}^ these events, that every branch of the Government has felt the obligation of taking the measures most likely, not only to re-esta])lish our present rights, but to promote arrangements hj which they may be enlarged, and more effectually secured. In deliberating on this subject, it has appeared to the Presi- dent that the importance of the crisis called for the experiment of an 70 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. extraordinary nnssion; carrjdng- Avith it the weig-ht attached to such a measure, as well as the advantage of a more thorough knoAvledge of the views of the Government, and the sensibility of the people than could be otherwise conveyed. He has, accordingly, selected for this service, with the approbation of the Senate, Mr. Monroe, formerly our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, and lately Governor of the State of Virginia; who will be joined with yourself in commission extraordinaiy to treat with the French Republic; and with Mr. Pinckney in a like commission to treat, if necessar}^ with the Spanish Government. The President has been careful, on this occasion, to guard effectually against an}'^ possible mis- constructions in relation to yourself, by expressing, in his Message to the Senate, his undiminished confidence in the ordinary representation of the United States, and by referring the advantages of the addi- tional mission to considerations perfectly consistent therewith. Mr. Monroe will be the bearer of the instructions under which you are jointl}^ to negotiate. The object of them will be to procure a ces- sion of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States; and con- sequently the establishment of the Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana. In order to draw the French Gov- ernment into the measure, a sum of money will mark part of our propositions; to which will be added, such regulations of the commerce of that river, and of the others entering the Gulf of Mexico, as oug'ht to be satisfactory to France. From a letter, received by the President from the respectable person alluded to in ni}' last, it is inferred, with probability, that the French Government is not averse to treat on those grounds. And such a disposition must be strengthened by the circumstances of the present moment. I have thought it proper to communicate thus much to you, without waiting for the departure of Mr. Monroe, who will not be able to sail for two weeks, or perhaps more. I need not suggest to you that, in disclosing this diplomatic arrangement to the French Government, and preparing the way for the ol^ject of it, the utmost care is to be used in repressing extravagant anticipations of the terms to be offered by the United States, particularl}' the sum of money to be thrown into the transaction. The ultimatum on this point will be settled before the departure of Mr. Monroe, and will be communicated by him. The sum hinted at in the letter to the President above referred to, is — livres. If less will not do, we are prepared to meet it; but it is hoped that less will do, and the prospect of accommodation will concur with other motives in postponing the expedition to Louisiana. For the present I barely remark, that a proposition made to Congress with closed doors is under consideration, which, if agreed to, will authorize the payment of about ten millions of livres, under arrangement of time and place that may be so convenient to the French Government I PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 71 as to invite a prompt as well as favorable decision of tiie case. The sum to whicii the proposition is limited, and wliich will prol)ably not be effectually concealed, may, at the same time, assist in keeping down the pecuniary expectations of the French Cabinet. I have the honor to be, etc. James Madison. (The following- is one of the memoirs, or essays, referred to in the preceding- letter from Mr. Li\ingston to the President, dated March 12, and in Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Livingston of May 25, 1803.) Thoughts on the relative situation of France, Britain, and America, as commercial and maritime nations. The power of France having reached a height that leaves her nothing to wish or to fear from the continental sovereignties of Europe, she might be considered as invulnerable if she could either divide the empire of the sea, or place it in so many hands as to conmiand, by her influence, or the advantages of her commerce, such a portion of it as would, with her own maritime exertion, reduce her rival to terms of equality. It is certain that, for the last century, she has not been able to effect this; although she has generall}^ had the aid of Spain, and sometimes that of Holland. Spain and Holland are diminishing in naval impor- tance. Holland, by the shallowness of her harbors, which do not, with- out great difliculty, admit ships of the great size which are every day found more necessar}^ in battle; by the ruin of her colonies; b}^ the cession of the island of Ceylon; b}- the derangement of the affairs of her connuercial companies; and, alwve all, by thv great comparative advantages enjoyed by Britain in the East Indies: add to these cir- cumstances the loss of seamen which she has sustained b}- the war, and the disaffection which has led many of them into foreign service, together with the accunuilated debt of the nation, and it will appear that little aid can be expected from her in case of a maritime war. It nuist, at least, be doubtful, if she quits that system of neutrality so congenial to her own situation, whether she will take part with Britain or France. The neigh])orhood and force of France must, indeed, make her tremble for her possessions in Europe; but still she ma}' find resources against them in the aid of the neighboring nations. But where is she to look for support against the power of Britain, who, in the very commencement of a war, will strip her of every foreign possession, and cut off all her resources? Spain is uuich in the same situation; her wealth and credit depend upon her colonies. One of the most valual)le of these (part of His- paniola) has been ceded to France; and the possession of Trinidad, 72 PIJECHASE OF THE TERKITOEY OF LOUISIANA. which the great capital of England will soon render verj^ important, will afford her such a point of support, in America, as must render the situation of the remaining islands very precarious, and always keep Spain in pain for her colonies; this will lead her to seek for safety, as far as possible, in neutrality. But at all events, the mari- time power of Spain must diminish by the circumstances I have men - tioned, and by the illicit trade which the possession of the Mosquito shore, the bay of Honduras, and the island of Trinidad, will enable the British to carry on in spite of the vigilance of Spain — a vigilance, too, which will be, in some sort, relaxed from the apprehension of provoking a war bv too much rigor. The naval power of Britain has, on the other hand, acquired an immense accession, during the last war, by that maritime superiorit}^ which gave protection to her commerce in every part of the world; by her conquests in the East Indies; and b}^ the cession of Trinidad. But, besides the extent of her colonies; she has, in her peculiar posi- tion, an advantage unattaina))le by France. The fuel for all the great cities of England and Scotland is coal. Not less than three thousand and six hundred ships enter the port of London 3^early, charged with this article alone. This, together with similar exports to other cities, and the situation of the capitals of England and Ireland, is a great nursery for seamen, which France wants; and makes a coasting trade, which is more than four-fold of all the coasting trade of France taken tog*ether, and is not less than the whole colonial trade of Britain, including the East Indies. It also has this peculiar advantage, that, in time of war, all the seamen emplo3^ed in this commerce may be engaged in the navy with very little inconvenience, only by permitting (which is not done in peace) the coal to be brought to London by inland navigation. It becomes, then, a serious question with France, how she is to counterbalance the advantages enjoj^ed b}^ her rival. Shall she estab- lish foreign colonies? Unless she has a naval force capable of protecting them, these col- onies must soon change their masters; and the whole expense employed in their support redound to the benefit of her rival. But admit that they could be secured by land forces. How trifling will all the sea- men afforded by the commerce of those colonies be, compared to the number produced by the colonies of Britain in the East and West Indies, America, Africa, and the Southern Ocean. But supposing them equal, still the seamen Britain derives froni her coasting trade alone more than equal those drawn from all these sources. Will France create a marine by becoming the carrier of other nations? This is impossible. Except Britain, there is no nation in Europe which can not navigate their ships as cheap as France. The materials for shipbuilding, and more especially naval stores and pro- PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 73 visions, arc dearer in France than in the Northern States, and labor is equally high. Will she be her own carrier;! If she will it must be by restrictions on the trade of other nations, who will certainly not submit to them without imposino- similar restrictions on France. Suppose, for instance, she should say (as indeed she has said) that tobacco brought to France in foreign yc^ssels shall i)ay an extra duty. How easy will it )>e for the country which grows tol)acco to say that that article, exported in French ships, shall pay a similar duty? And what will ])e the end of this commercial warfare. ])ut that every nation shall carry its own pro- duce, and let their ships return home empty, if the partial duties are liiglr^ Thus, if France imposes a high duty on tobacco, and America a hii>h duty on Avines and other articles of France in foreign bottoms, the tobacco must lie brought in French ships, and charged Avith a double expense of freight, because they can carry out no cargo to pa}'^ the expense and insurance of the ships on their outwai'd-])ound \oyage. Of course, this expense must fall on the consumer of tobacco; and for what? Why, in oi'der that ten French seamen ma}^ be employed rather than ten foreigners. A ship of three hundred tons must make, in order to clear herself, seventy thousand francs a 3^ear. The whole of this, with insurance out and home, must be charged on the tobacco Imported, in the case I mention; whereas only the one-half would be [)aid if she could take out a cargo. Thus, then, the consumer of tol)acco in France, pays, annually, to the maintenance of ten seamen, thirty five thousand francs, or three thousand five hundred for every seaman; and this, too, without being of the smallest advantage to that class of people whose wages are not therebj" at all increased. This is purchasing sailors at such a rate as I believe no nation in the world Avould oxcv long submit to. But should the same reasoning he applied to the manufactures and wines of France, and she, by attempting to be her own carrier, charge them with a double freight, it must necessarily follow that, with respect to every article which other nations can suppl}' , she Avould soon lose the carriage by losing the sale; for if a foreign ship can carry out a cargo to Lisbon, and take l>ack one from thence, charged with no extra duty, the wine and oil of Lisbon will be preferred, though of inferior quality, to those of France. Thus, whatever she giv^es to her seamen liy discouraging a free trade, she takes from her agriculture and manufactures: and yet her agriculture and manufactures can alone form the basis of her commerce. In time of war, unless this operation can really create a naval power, sufficient to protect her commerce, (of which there is not the smallest prospect,) foreigners having been driven from her ports by this operation, she must cease to trade alto- gether. Thus the sources of her wealth will be cut off at the moment she most needs them. What, the* is to be done? Is France to abandon her colonies as 74 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIATSTA. weak points in her system, which she can not maintain? Is she to suffer a tyranny to be established upon the ocean, which shall forever hold her in check ? Is she to allow such an accumulation of wealth as will forever enable her rival to interfere in the affairs of the Conti- nent and provoke new combinations against her^ I answer these questions by returning to my first position. She must place the empire of the sea in more hands, without attempt- ing to grasp it alone. She must make it the interest of those who aid her in the attainment of a considerable portion of it to maintain her superiority. Spain and Holland are not to be neglected; though, as I have stated, they will, in the situation in which their colonies are now placed, incline to neutrality; and if otherwise, their aid would be insufficient during a war. The United States have physical advan- tages which, like those of Britain, must necessarily lead them to be a considerable maritime nation. The mass of their population lies upon the ocean, and upon large rivers that are navigable for sea ves- sels to the intenor of the country, which is generall}" rough and hilly between the rivers. Hence it happens that there is little land carriage in America. If merchandises are to be transported from one State to another, it is by water; and that not solely b}^ rivers or canals, but b}'^ descending one river, passing out into the ocean, and ascending another. This circumstance, together with the variance between the productions of the Southei'n and Northern States, which promotes much inter- course, must give to them a nursery of seamen in their coasting trade, equal to that which Britain enjoys in her coal trade: to which a grow- ing coal trade, from mines found in the banks of the James river, and in other places, will be added, when wood diminishes, or when the policy of the country shall charge the importation of British coal with heavier duties. Our large cities consume, even now, very consid- erable quantities of this article. The advantage also that the United States enjoy in the cheapness of the articles for building, and, above all, for victualling their ships, more than counterbalances the high price given to their seamen. Their situation relative to the cod and whale fisheries also calls numbers to a maritime life. The islands, to whomsoever they may belong, from the various incidents to which they are liable, and the difficulty of supplj'ing them from Europe, must receive their provision and timber from the United States; and, if they choose, they can compel them to receive only in American bottoms. Were the Powers of Europe, therefore, to lay the severest restrictions on her commerce, the United States would still be a very important commercial nation. But who is interested in preventing their rapid rise to the height to which their position and their destinies lead them? No nation upon earth; unless Britain should one day fear them more as rivals than she will value them as customers. While thev confine themselves to the PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 75 prodaction of niw niatoriiils, they must prove the l)e.st market for such nations as can afford them maiuifactures, wine, oil, and fruit, in return. Weak, indeed, would that nation be who should treat them with neglect, or drive them, by ill-judg-ed laws, from their harbors. Britain is so sensible of this, that she has never attempted to prevent, by partial duties, the American vessels from carr3Mng' their own prod- uce to them, or their fabrics back in return. She well knows that every such UH'asure would have a tendency to drive them from her harbors, to which she so much Avishes to invite them, that she even grants them a right, l)y treaty, to enter all her ports in the East Indies. While Britain refuses to naturalize American ships she never will be able to navigate (because she can not build, tit, oi- victual) her ships so cheap as those of America. It must follow, therefore, that the trade of Britain to and from the United States will be chiefly carried on by American ships; and, as her articles are very bulk}-, a great number will l)e employed. There exists, indeed, at this moment a circumstance Avhich will give them considerable advantages, unless France should instantly step in and prevent its operation. The advanced price of living in Britain, owing to the debt con- tracted by the war, has naturall}^ raised the price of labor; w^hile the peace, which gives more activity to her commerce, will make this operate upon seauien's wages, and thus give some check to her carrj^- ing trade. On the other hand, this diminution of the trade of the United States will throw at least twentj^-fivc thousand seamen out of emplo3^ These will, from their habits and mamiers, naturally pass into the service of Britain, and thus enable her to keep down wages and maintain her advantages. It is ol)vious that it is much the interest of France to prevent this; and more particularly'" when it is considered that all these men are skillful mariners, and many of them experienced fishermen; who ma}^ transplant the wdiale tisher}' to Britain, and thus add a new^ source to her naval power. The efforts of France to establish a tishery \\\\\ be of little avail against this; nor will it ever be found practicable to render this a flourishing branch of business, except b}- the aid of American fishermen; and even then ])y a charge upon a material useful in their manufactures more than equivalent to the value of the tishery. I shall be asked how long it will take to make the United States a naval Power etjual to (jreat Britain? I answer, that a country which possesses tim])er, naval stores, provisions, and men accustomed, by an active commerce, to a sea life; a country whose credit is unblemished, and who has no debt but what she can instantly discharge; is certainl}^ so far ecjual as her muiibers are equal to one who has no advantages over her in any of these circumstances, and is inferior in others. It 76 . PUKCHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. will be allowed, too, that, according to every rational probability, tbeir numbers will be equal to those of the British isles in twenty years, and their wealth not inferior. But it is by no means necessary to carry the navy of America to the extent of that of Britain, in order to ren- der her a useful ally, or a respectable enemy. The trade of Britain with her islands, and the Indies, must approach the coast of America. Her privateers could, even Avithout protection from a navy, destroy a great proportion of this. With a navy of thirty ships of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates, which need never be more than one week's sail from their own shores, such protection would be given to smaller vessels as would enable them to capture a great part of their trade, unless protected by large fleets. For this purpose one-half of the British navy must be kept at a vast expense, at a great distance from home, and in an unhealthy climate; while all the expenditures of the American navy would be made in their own ports. It will cer- tainl}^ admit of little doubt, that a nation who has no frontier to defend, who has six hundred thousand armed men at home, and who has no debts, need only will it to have a fleet of the size I mention. And it is ver}^ certain that such a fleet by acting alwa3^s together, would com- pel any European nation greatly to weaken her naval force in her own seas. No convoy could be less than the whole of the American fleet; nor could a smaller force be left in the islands; so that thirty ships in America, would demand for convo3^s, out and in, and the stations in the islands, not less than ninety ships of equal force. What power could Britain oppose to this f Dree, combined with an equal number of French ships, with the advantage of all the harbors of the United States? What refuge would she have against storms and accidental separation when on the coast of America? And how, under these dis- advantages, would she maintain her superiority in Europe? I infer, from this reasoning, that it is the true interest of France to promote the commerce and maritime force of America; and, at the same time, to interest her in the extension of the commerce of France? I do not mean to say that this force will always operate directly in favor of France. This will depend upon a variety of political circumstances that can not be foreseen or controlled. The first interest of America will doubtless lead her to a state of neutrality. But such has always been the overbearing spirit of Britain at sea, that it is highly probable occurrences will arise, which may compel America, when she feels her strength, to enter into a war to preserve her commercial rights from violation. But should she maintain her neutrality, she will indirectly serve France if the plan I suggest is adopted: 1st. By carrying on her commerce for her during a war; 2d. By emplojnng a great number of seamen who would otherwise go into the service of Britain; 3d. By seizing upon many branches of trade from whicb Britain derives her wealth, and which, when once 1 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 77 divoitcd, limy never return. But my pliin embraces not only an extension of the American maritime force, ])ut that of France, by an easy and natural operation, without imposin»i- a ]ni)-den upon, ])ut in fact giving' the highest encouragement to, her manufactures and agri- culture. It consists in a treaty of commerce which .shall put the trade and shipping of ])oth countries on the most perfect equality. That is to say, the ships of France shall be admitted into the ports of America, paying a duty of six per cent, ad valorem only on all articles, and the same tonnage duty as the American .ships l)ay. The American ships shall be admitted into all the ports of France and her colonies upon the same terms, provided that the}' should never carry to the colonies anything ])ut the produce of their own country or of France; that the colonial products in American ships should be subject to every regu- lation as to their being landed in France, as they are in French ships. The tirst advantage of this treaty would be, if immediately entered into, the saving to America of twenty-five thousand seamen, who will, without this encouragement go into the British service; and thus increase not only her relative but her actual force: 2d. The sale of a num- ber of her ships to France, which will now become a dead capital in her hands: 3d. The preserving to the United States their fi.sh- eries, which may be otherwise greatly afl'ected by the removal of their seamen to Britain. In these objects France has a mutual advantage; and I will venture to say, that she never acts more inconsistently with her own interest, or more conformably with that of Britain, than when, under the idea of raising a fishery at home, while she has not seamen or shipping for her other branches of commerce, she endeavors to dis- courage the fisheries of America, which, from a variety of physical causes, can alone keep them from falling into the hands of the English. France should l>ear in mind, that, were her colonies as extensive as tho.se of Britain; were her trade in P^uropeand America equal to hers; yet, from the reasons I have mentioned, arising from the geographical and physical situation of England and Ireland, .she would not possess more than two-thirds of the number of seamen, these circiuiistances alone producing nearly as many as all the other trade of Britain. France can only incrca.se her relative strength l)v diminishing that of her rival, and keeping her from drawing from other sources new means of power. France may inj.ure, and perhaps ruin, the whale fishery in America; but England only will profit by it. The fir.st Avar will break up her establishments; and the Americans in her ser\4ce will return with their wealth into their own country. The interest that France will have in this treat}' will be much more extensive: 1st, The raising up a new marine Power; 2d, Giving that Power such an interest in her prosperity, as must not only keep it from being inimical to, but, on the contrary, frequently connected 78 PUKCHASE OF THE TEREITORY OF LOUISIANA. with her in hostile operations; 3d, The transfer of ships to France; 4th, The increase of French seamen: for, as tlie wages of seamen are lower in France than in America, and must continue to be so, on account of the demand for men in a new countr}^, while, on the other hand, ships, and the provisions for their outfit, are cheaper in America, French merchants, by fitting- many of these vessels, and navigating them with French seamen, will be able to sail cheaper than the Americans themselves, and thus increase the number of their sea- men. These seamen in case, of a war, will be drawn into the navy; while their places will be supplied, during the war, at somewhat more expense, by Americans, without injuring their commerce. In the cod fishery, France will derive clear and obvious advantages from the American ports for her outfits, &c. But even these advantages will be inferior to that derived from the increase of the commerce of exchange, by that removal of restrictions; an operation which, I will venture to say, will at least double the whole commerce and number of seamen employed by France, and quadruple it with respect to her navigation with America. It should also be considered that this works doubly in favor of France, 1st, So far as it is a direct advantage to her maritime power; 2nd, So far as it subtracts from the navigation of Fngland. The benefits that will result to the manufactures of- France from this operation are incalculable: 1st, The raw materials will be pur- chased on easy terms to the manufacturer; 2nd, The intercourse that this system will establish between the two nations will make their fabrics known, and render them fashionable in America; will draw off their custom from England, whose fabrics will continue to be charged with a heavy duty, unless, receding from her navigation act, she pur- chases an exemption. • Useful as this act may have been in its conunencement, when the Dutch were the general carriers and rivals of Britain, and while Ihe nations of Europe were ignorant of commercial principles, very enlightened statesmen now see many inconveniences in it to the gen- eral commerce of England; nor is there anything necessary to its entire overthrow, but for other nations to pass similar laws, so far as respect Britain, while their trade is put upon a liberal footing with regard to other nations. This, by promoting their own commerce of exchange, while that of Britain is restricted, will place her flag under such disadvantages, that her own merchants will seek a foreign bottom ^■\lKn they have an operation that requires a circuitous voyage. This nnist ultimately, in spite of all her prejudices, compel her to repeal this selfish law, after having some time suffered under it. But while the navigation act exists in Britain, it will, under the circumstances of the treaty 1 suggest, operate as a bounty on the navigation and fabrics of France; because it is obvious that the freight and charge on any spe- PUECHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 79 citic article carried in a ship that iiuiv iiiak(» a circuitous voyage, is much less than they would be if part of the voyage was made in bal- last. Thus, a French ship carrying- a cargo of wine to America, tak- ing in a load of tobacco, and returning from thence to Bordeaux, could take the wine on a much smaller freight than if the duties imposed in America on the importation of Avine in a French ship should be equivalent to the duties upon tobacco imported in an Ameri- can ship into France; because, in that case, the French ship would go out empty for the tobacco, and the American ship empty for the wine; and the double freight and insurance must be charged on each of these articles. It should always be remembered, that whatever is saved in freight is a bounty upon agriculture and mainifactures. But even this is a small advantage compared to that derived from the increase of adventures that will be occasioned by the very circumstance of freight for the whole outward and homeward voyage, and the con- sequent consumption of the commodities of the country that encour- ages it. In this plan, Spain, (under some restrictions with regard to South America,) the Italian States, and any others who should incline to engage m it, should be associated; without, however, delaying the project between France and the United States, lest they should lose, and Britain acquire, at this critical moment, that great body of sea- men, who will, by the peace, be thrown out of emplo3anent. Were France to declare her determination to support this lilieral system, such is her advantage in point of product and manufactures, that she could not fail to command the greatest foreign commerce of any nation in the world. The wealth arising from this source would be unbounded. But while her great capital is in the center of the Republic, she never can have an extensive coasting trade; and she can only make up this defi- ciency, in a contest with Britain, by the increase of her wealth and credit; by nursing up new maritime nations; by which, if she adds little to her positive power, she adds nuich to her relative strength, in diminishing that of her rival. To cite a single instance: America can build and victual her whaling- vessels much cheaper than either France or England, and of course afford oil cheaper; but if France excludes American oil from her market, she throws such a discouragement upon this fishery as will compel the whalers to seek another place of residence. In this case, though a few may be invited to France, the great bulk of them will go to England: First, because of their language, religion, and habits; and next, because they know that a war will ruin their establishments in E" ranee, and thus it will encourage those of Britain. The very com- ])anies established in France, at great national expense, will receive their oil at sea from English fishermen. Thus fifteen thousand men 80 PURCHASE OF THE TEERITOEY OF LOUISIANA. will be thrown into the scale of Britain, to support one thousand in the vain attempt to establish a fishery in France. This, however, is a small part of the loss. By the encouragement which France might give to the fisheries of the United States, she could destroy those of Britain; and, as the French ships that brought oil, or the American that brought French goods, would not go or return empty, a greater market would be created for French wines, brandies, &c. Let the loss upon this be calculated. The additional expense upon the first price to the inhabitants of France, and the countries given, they will find that they purchase their oil at a ruinous rate. Let the difference between fifteen thousand men, added to those employed in the British fishery, and eight thousand taken from them by the encouragement given to the American fishery by France, mak- ing together the loss or gain of twenty-three thousand to Britain, be put in the scale with the comparatively few fishermen France can make, and she will form a fair estimate of the attempt, considering her as a rival power to Britain. Great as are the advantages proposed by this system to the com- merce and navigation of France, they are small compared to those which she will derive from having opened a wa}^ to the establishment of free and liberal principles, that can not fail to give room for the exertion of those talents and that industr}^ for which her citizens are distinguished. Ever^^ nation, except one, will eagerl}' embrace them; and their mutual interest will lead them to protect them against the power of any maritime despot. The advantage that the vessels of this association would have over all others, could not fail to produce such a revolution in the principles and practice of commerce and naviga- tion as would be highly interesting to humanity, honorable to the nations who should first adopt the system, and not unworthy of the enlarged views of that distinguished statesman to whom Europe is already so much indebted, and who, alone, has sufficient power to carry it into effect. [Extract.] Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. C. Pincxney, American Minister at Madrid. Department of State, January 18, 1803. [After informing Mr. Pinckney, as well as Mr. Livingston, of the reasons which had induced the mission of Mr. Monroe, the letter pro- ceeds as follows:] The President has been careful, on this occasion, to guard effectually against any misconstruction in relation to yourself, by expressing, in his Message to the Senate, his undiminished confidence in the ordinary PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 81 repi'oscntatioii of the United States, and by refcn-in.o- the advantages of the additional mifssion to eonsideratioiis perfectly coiisistcnt there- with. Mr. Monroe will l)e the bearer of instructions under whicii you are to negotiate. The ol)ject of them will be, to procure a cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States, and consequently, the establishment of the Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana. In order to draw the French Government into the measure, a sum of money will make part of our propositions; to which will be added such regulations of the commerce of that river, and of the others entering the Gulf of Mexico, as ought to be satisfac- tory to France. P'rom a letter received by the President from a respecta])le person, it is inferred, with probability, that the French Government is not averse to treat on those grounds; and such a dispo- sition must be strengthened by circumstances of the present moment. Though it is probable that this mission will be completed at Paris, if its ol)jects are at all attainable, yet it was necessary to apprize you thus far of Avhat is contempkited, both for your own satisfaction, and that you may be prepared to co-operate on the occasion, as circum- stances may demand. Mr. Monroe will not be able to sail for two weeks. Robert R. Livingston, Minister to France,' to James Madison, Secretary of State. Paris, January '^ilf., 18(1). Sir: 1 have just now heard of an opportunity from Havre. 1 am doubtful whether my letter will arrive in time for it. 1 therefore confine myself to inform you that General Bernadotte is njimed Minister to the United States, in the place of Otto, who will ])e employed here. General Bernadotte is brother-in-law to Joseph Bonaparte, is a very respectable man, and has the character of a decided republican. I have endeavored to impress upon him the necessity of making some arrangements relative to the debt previous to his departure, which he has much at heart. But neither he nor anybody else can influence the councils of the First Consul. You can hardly conceive anything more timid than all about him are; they dare not be known to have a senti- ment of their own, or to have expressed one to anybody. But I must defer writing to you more at large on this subject, as w^-ll as a full communication of a very delicate step that I have hazarded, which promised success for some time, l)ut from which I, at present, hope for no important result. The Minister informs me that the expedition to Louisiana will sail shortly. General Bernadotte will go in about three weeks. He will have full powers to settle everything. I asked the Minister, what confidence you can have in any new offer to treat, when H. Doc. 481 1) 82 PUKCHASE OF THE TERRITOKY OF LOUISIAITA. the last treat}^ is unexecuted; and if he had not better send out Gen- eral Bernadotte with a treaty in his hand, than only with powers that will be suspected; and how he can make arrangements upon the debts, which must depend upon the Legislature? He answers this by saying, they want information as to right of deposit, &c. As to the debt, I have no hope that they have any intention to pay it, or even to fund it. From the disposition which I know to be entertained b}^ some that go out with Victor, I have no doubt that they will provoke an Indian war, by pajdng them nothing; and that, in their solicitude to acquire wealth, they will act over again the tyranny of St. Domingo. It will be necessary, therefore, to take the position that will best guard you against the effects of these evils. As to myself, I am left wholly with- out any precise instruction how to act, or what to offer. Enclosed are two memoirs lately sent in, with as little effect as those that have gone before them; though I have reason to think that the Minister wishes well to my project for Louisiana, but the First Consul is immovable. I confess to you I see very little use for a Minister here, where there is but one will; and that will governed by no object but personal security and personal ambition: were it left to my discretion, I should bring matters to some positive issue, or leave them, which would be the only means of bringing them to an issue. I am, &c. , Robert R. Livingston. Hon. James Madison, &c. Mr. Livingston to . No. 4.] December 24, 1802.« Sir: I can not but feel the utmost anxietj^ to know whether my project, which you had the goodness to submit to the inspection of the First Consul, is likely to meet with his concurrence. Upon ordi- nary occasions I should consider the delay of a few weeks as of little moment; but there are circumstances which render every da}'^ impor- tant in what relates to the United States and France. In the twelve months that I have been here, I have not been so happy as to receive a conclusive answer to any one business that 1 have had to transact with the Minister. Congress are now in session; they will infer from every paper submitted to them by the President, that the French Government are disposed to show them but little attention. The obscurit}^ that covers the designs of France in Louisiana (for not the least light can I, officially, obtain on the subject) will double their apprehensions; this, added to the clamors of ruined creditors, and the extreme severity with which some of their citizens have been treated «It does not appear with, certainty by what dispatch this memoir was communicated. PURCHASE OF THE TERRIToKY OF LOUISIANA. 83 in St. Domingo, :uul the cxtruordiniirv clccisions ot" the (■ouiicil of Prizes, &c., will leave a fair tiekl for the intrig-ucs of the enemies of France, and even enlist the ])est patriots of America on their side. At this moment Britain eomes forward and pays, witii the most scrupu- lous attention, everv demand, and proposes to settle her Southwestern line with the United States. In doing this, she is anxious to come down to a navlgal)le part of the Mississippi, so as to connnunicate with Canada I)}' that channel. It is obvious that she can ha\'e no inter- est in this, hut such as looks to the future possession of the mouth of that river; a pi'oject that she would naturally form the moment she saw Louisiana ])ass into the hands of her rival. 1 am sorry to say it is one that she will find no difficulty in executing, unless prevented by the United States; for France is too far to protect a young Colony from an established one, and the numerous savages, provincial troops, and others, that Canada will afiord. While the conduct of France speaks a language so painful to the feelings of the American Government, there is too nuich reason to believe that there will be little solicitude in so forming their limits as to cover her possessions. I am anxious, sir, to know our prospects. If they should be such as I Hatter myself the mutual interests of France and the United States would lead to, I would wish to have it in my power to arrest in Mr. King's hands any conclusion on the subject of our Western bounds. In case my project should be honored with the approbation of the First Consul, it will be essential to the security of the possessions of France and the peace of that country, to remove the British boundary as high up the river as possible, so as to prevent any communication with Canada, by the rivers that fall on the one side into the lakes, and, on. the other, into the Mississippi. If this l)usiness is obstructed only by the non-conclusion of the treaty with Spain for the Floridas, one ma}' still go between us for New Orleans and the territory above the Arkansas river, with a condition annexed, in case the treaty with the Floridas should succeed agreeably to the wishes of France. Should the treaty wdth Spain fall through, every reason of policy should induce France, either to relin- quish her designs on Louisiana altogether, or to cover her frontier by a cession to the United States; since, without a single port in the Gulf, it will be impossible to protect their Colony; and all the expense incurred ])y the attempt will ultimately redound to the advantage of Britain, who will not fail to attack them with advantage both by sea and land. The treaty I propose might also form a basis for the immediate dis- charge of the debts due to our citizens; in the doing of which, advan- tageous arrangements may be made, and, at the same time, the funds of France })e considerably raised: provided such secrecy is observed in the whole of this transaction as will prevent the debts being the object of speculation. I know, sir, a distinction has been taken between 84 PURCHASE OF THE TEEEITOEY OF LOUISIANA. debts due from the former Government iind that which now happily prevails in France. But, sir, if this distinction is just, it does not apply to the demands of the United States. They are specifically assumed by the new Government, when they made the object of the treaty, and an equivalent has alread}^ been paid the present Govern- ment by that of the United States; so that they stand upon a different ground from that of the debts of other nations having demands on France; and they not onl3^have to plead their justice, and the circum- stance under which they were contracted, but the pledged faith of the existing Government. I can not, sir, but be solicitous to know that what I have hitherto taken the liberty to write to you has passed into no hands but those of the First Consul, or some other member of your own family, as I fear my communications out of the ordinary channel might be ill taken where I am solicitous to stand well. I have the honor to be, sir, with the most profound consideraiion, your most obedient servant, R. R. Livingston. Beport of committee to whom was referred a resolution providing for an additional appropriation of two million of dollars for the purpose of intercourse with foreign nations. January 12, 1803. The object of this resolution _s to enable the Executive to commence, with more effect, a negotiation with the French and Spanish Govern- ments relative to the purchase from them of the island of New Orleans, and the provinces of East and West Florida. This object is deemed highl}^ important and has received the attentive consideration of the committee. The free and unmolested navigation of the river Missis- sippi is a point to which the attention of the General Government has been directed, ever since the peace of 1783, by which our independence as a nation was finally acknowledged. The immense tract of country owned by the United States, which lies immediately on the Mississippi, or communicates with it by means of large navigable rivers rising within our boundaries, renders its free navigation an object, not only of inestimable advantage, but of the very first necessity. The Missis- sissipi forms the western boundary of the United States, from its source to the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and empties itself into the Gulf of Mexico, about the twent}^ -ninth degree of north lati- tude. It furnishes the only outlet through which the produce of the Indiana Territory, the States of Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee, and of the western parts of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and a portion of the Mississippi Territory, can be transported to a foreign market, or to ports of the Atlantic States. From the thirtj^-first degree of north lati- tude, which is the southern boundary of the United States, to the mouth PUECHASE OF THK TEKRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 85 of the river, the territory on each side has heretofore l)een in possession of the Spanish Government; the province of Louisiana lying to the West, and those of East Florida, with the island of New Orleans, to the East. Although the United States have insisted on an uncontrollable right r<) pass up and down the river, from its source to the sea, yet this right, if admitted in its most ample latitude, will not secure to them the full advantages of navigation. The strength and rapidit}' of the current of the Mississippi are known to render ascent so extremely difficult, that few vessels of burden have attempted to go as far as our boundar3% This circumstance obliges the citizens of the Western country to carry their produce down the river in boats, from which it is put on ])oard ships capable of sustaining a sea voyage. It follows, therefore, that to enjoj^ the full benefits of navigation, some place should ])e fixed which sea vessels can approach without great incon- venience, where the American produce ma}^ be deposited until it is again shipped to be carried abroad. This great point was secured to us in the year 1795, by the Spanish Government, who agreed, in the Treaty of San Lorenzo el Real, that Americans should have the right of deposit at New Orleans. This right has been used from that time till a late period; Init the conduct of the Intendant at that place shows low lial)lc the adviuitageous navigation of the ri^'er is to interruption, md strongly points out the impolic}^ of relying on a foreign nation for benefits, which our citizens have a right to expect should be secured to them by their own Government. It is hoped that the port of New Orleans ma}^ again ])e opened l)efore any xery material injuries arise; but should this l)e the case, or if, as the treaty provides, a new place of deposit should be assigned, the late occurrence shows the uncer- tainty of its continuance. Experience proves that the caprice or the interested views of a single officer may perpetually subject us to the alternative of submitting to injury, or of resorting to war. The late violation of our treaty with Spain necessarily leads to the inquiry; how far the AVestern country nnw be afi^ected in other points, not connected with New Orleans^ The Mississippi Territory extends from the confines of Georgia to the river Mississippi, and from the thii'ty-first to the thirty-fifth degree of north latitude. It is estimated to contain more than fifty millions of acres, and, from its numerous advantages, must one day or other possess an immense population. The variety, richness, and abundance of its productions, hold out to settlers the strongest inducements to resort thither, and the United States may safely calculate on drawing a considerable revenue from the sale of lands in this, as well as in other quarters of the Western country. The value of these, however, may be diminished or increased, and the sale impeded or advanctnl by the impression made on the 86 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITOEY OF LOUISIANA. public mind, by shutting the port of New Orleans, and by eventual jneasures which may be adopted to guard against similar injuries. West Florida is bounded on the north by the Mississippi Territory, from which it is separated by no natural boundary; on the east by the river Apalachicola, which divides it from East Florida; on the west by the river Mississippi, and on the south by the Gulf of Mexico. The MississippiTerritory is intersected by many large and valuable rivers, which rise within its own boundaries, and meander through it in a general direction from north to south, fmt empty themselves into the Gulf of Mexico through the province of West Florida. In fact, with the exception of that part of the Territorj^ which lies immediately on the Mississippi, the whole must depend on the Mobile and the Apa- lachicola, with their numerous branches, and on some other rivers of inferior note, for the means of sending its produce to market, and of returning to itself such foreign supplies as the necessities or conven- ience of its inhabitants may require. In these rivers, too, the eastern parts of the State of Tennessee are deeply interested, as some of the great branches of the Mobile approach very near to some of those branches of the Tennessee River, which lie above the great Muscle Shoals. Even if it should prove difficult to connect them, yet the land carriage will be shorter, and the route to the sea more direct than the river Tennessee furnishes. These rivers possess, likewise, an advan- tage which is denied to the Mississippi. As their sources are not in the mountains, and their course is through a level country, their cur- rents are gentle, and the tide flows considerably above our boundary. This circumstance, together with the depth of water which manj' of them afford, render them accessible to sea vessels, and ships of two hundred tons burden may ascend for several hundred miles into the heart of the Mississippi Territory. These rivers, however, which run almost exclusively within our own limits, and which it would seem as if nature had intended for our own benefit, we must be indebted to others f oj" the beneficial use of, so long as the province of West Florida shall continue in possession of a foreign nation. If the province of West Florida were itself an independent empire, it would be the interest of its Government to promote the freedom of trade, by lajdng open the mouths of the rivers to all nations; this having been the policy of those Powers who possess the mouths of the Rhine, the Danube, the Po, and the Tagus, with some others. But the system of colonization which has always heretofore prevailed, proves that the mother country is ever anxious to engross to itself the trade of its colonies, and affords us ever}^ reason to apprehend that Spain will not readily admit us to pass through her territory to carrj^ on a trade either with each other or with foreign nations. This right we may insist on, and perhaps it ma}'' be conceded to us; but it is possible li PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 87 that it may be denied. At all events, it may prove, the source of end- less disagreement and perpetujil hostilit}-. In this respect East Florida ma}' not perhaps be so important, but its acquisition is nevertheless deemed desirable. From its junction with the State of Georgia, at the vivev St. Mar3^s, it stretches nearly four hundred miles into the sea, forming a large peninsula, and has some very fine harbors. The southern point, Cape Florida, is not more than one hundred miles distant from the Havana, and the possession of it mav be benoticial to us in relation to our trade with the West Indies. It would likewise make our whole territory compact, would add considerably to our seacoast, and by giving us the Gulf of Mexico for our southern boundary, would render us less liable to attack, in what is now deemed the most vulnerable part of the Union. From the aforegoing view of facts, it must be seen that the pos- session of New Orleans and the Floridas will not onl}- be required for the convenience of the United States, but will be demanded by their most imperious necessities. The Mississippi and its branches, with those other rivers above referred to, drain an extent of countr}-, not less, perhaps, than one-half of our whole territory, containing at this time one-eighth of our population and progressing with a rapidity beyond the experience of any former time, or of any other nation. The Floridas and New Orleans command the only outlets to the sea, and our best interests, require that we should get possession of them. This requisition, however, arises not from a disposition to increase our territory; for neither the Floridas nor New Orleans offer any other inducements than their mere geographical relation to the United States. But if we look forward to the free use of the Mississippi, the Mobile, the Apalachicola, and the other rivers of the West, by ourselves and our posterity. New Orleans and the Floridas must become a part of the United States, either b}' purchase or l)y conquest. The great question, then, which presents itself is, shall we at this time" lay the foundation for future peace by offering a fair and equivalent consideration; or shall we hereafter incur the hazards and the horrors of war? The Government of the United States is differently organized from any other in the world. Its object is the happiness of man; its policy and its interest, to pursue right by right means. War is the great scourge of the human race, and should never be resorted to but in cases of the most imperious necessity. A wise government will avoid it, when its views can be attained by peaceful measures. Princes tight for glory, and the blood and treasure of their subjects is the price they pay. In all nations the people bear the burden of war, and in the United States the- people rule. Their Representatives are the guardians of their rights, and it is the duty of those Representatives to provide against any event which ma}^, even at a distant dav, involve the interest and the happiness of the nation. We may, indeed, have 88 PURCHASE OB^ THE TEERITORY OF LOUISIANA. our rights restored to us by treat}^, but there is a want of fortitude in applying- temporary remedies to permanent evils; thereby imposing on our posterity a burden which we ourselves ought to bear. If the pur- chase can be made, we ought not to hesitate. If the attempt shall fail, we shall have discharged an important duty. * War may l^e the result, but the Au^erican nation, satisfied with our conduct, will be animated bj^ one soul, and will unite all its energies in the contest. Foreign powers will be convinced that it is not a war of aggrandizement on our part, and will feel no unreasonable jealousies toward us. We shall have proved that our object was justice; it will be seen that our propositions were fair; and it will be acknowledged that our cause is honoi'able. Should alliances be necessary they may be advantageously formed. We shall have merited, and shall there- fore possess, general confidence. Our measvires will stand justified not onl}^ to ourselves and our country, but to the world. In another point of view, perhaps, it would be preferable to make the purchase, as it is Ijelieved that a smaller sum would be required for this subject, than would necessaril}?^ be expended, if we should attempt to take possession by force; the expenses of a war being, indeed, almost incalculable. The Committee have no information before them, to ascertain the amount for which the purchase can ])e made, but it is hoped that, with the assistance of two millions of dollars in hand, this will not 1)6 unreasonable. A similar course was pursued for the pur- pose of settling our diti'erences with the Regency of Algiers, by an appropriation of one million of dollars, prior to the commencement of the negotiation, and we have since experienced its beneficial efi^ects. Mr. Livingston to the Minister of Exterior Eelations. Sir: I have so often had occasion to mention to you the claims of American citizens upon the French Government, and, with so little effect, that I feel pain whenever I am compelled to touch upon that subject. But, sir, I never had reason to doubt, both from the tenor of your note, and conversations, that it would become a question whether these debts, just in themselves, and solemnly confirmed by a treat}^, should l)ecome the subject of liquidation. The Board of Accounts accordingly proceeded to liquidate and give certificates for about one-quarter of the whole amount. Upon the debt so liquidated the American merchant was enabled to raise the small sums necessary for his support, till arrangements were made (which they never per- mitted themselves to doubt would be finally done) for their discharge. But, sir, even of this support they are now deprived; for though the board has proceeded to liquidate more of their claims, the gentleman at the head of the Department refuses to give the usual certificates; PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 89 under what protenso I am at loss to conceive. 1 am told he considers the treat}^ asapplyino- to debts contracted dui'ino- the present Govern- ment, when, in fact, no such debts existed at the time of the treaty, nor is there a word in the treaty which authorizes such construction; the whole treaty referrino- to matters that had passed, not oidy under the Government that had preceded the present, but under tliat which preceded the Revolution. Upon what other principle has the United States, with the strictest good faith, paid tiie debt contracted under Louis XVI, and those which the existing- (Jovernment demanded under the late Convention for injuries sustained under the late Directors? It is time, sir, that matters should ])e brought to some issue; that the citizens of the United States and their Government should know how far the treaty is binding upon France, and what construction ouo-ht to be o'iven to it; for hitherto, it has only served as a means to surprise their good faith, and to involve both the Government and the people of the United States in fresh expenses. 1 have the honor to renew to vour excellency the assurances of my high consideration. R. R. LlVINtiSTON. Robert R. Livingston, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, to the Minister of Exterior Relations. Paris, January 10^ 180S. Sir: 1 have just learned through a channel, which, though not offi- cial, is such as leaves me no doubt of its authenticity, that the Governor of New Orleans has denied the citizens of the United States a right of depot there, under the pretense that the provision for that purpose in the treaty has expired. You are not ignorant, sir, of the vahie that the Western inhabitants of the United States place upon that right, nor of the spirit with which they will defend it; a spirit to which the Government must yield, even if they could themselves be indifferent to the object. It is peculiarl}^ unhappy, sir, that this circumstance should have happened at the ver}^ moment that France is about to pos- sess that country; since, taken in connexion with the silence of the French Government, as to its intention, it will (I very nuich fear) give room to jealous and suspicious persons to suppose that the Court of Spain has, in this instance, acted in concurrence with that of France; though, sir, I do too much justice to the integrit}' of France to believe that she would approve of a breach of treaty and render their first entrance into our vicinity an act of hostility; 3'et it certainly is of a nature to call the inunediate attention of France to the several matters which I had the honor to mention to you, the neglect of which has excited the liveliest sensation in the United States. I therefore avail myself of this opportunity and the permission you gave me to oli'er 90 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. you the outline of a treaty that I presume will afford the most obvious benefits to France, and strengthen the connexion which every enlight- ened American wishes to subsist between her and the United States. Presuming that the Floridas are in the hands of France, and unless they are Louisiana can never be worth her possessing, because it affords no ports for its own protection, I shall predicate what I have to offer upon that presumption. France can have but three objects in the possession of Louisiana and Florida: the first is the command of the Gulf; second, the supply of her islands; third, an outlet for her people, if (which however appears to me a very distant expectation) her European population should be too great for her territory. The first of these will be effectually secured by the possession of West Florida, which includes the bay of St. Esprit and Pensacola, together with the town and har- bor of St. Augustine. There are no other ports of the smallest importance east of the Mississippi. The second will be" better effected by confining their establishment to some reasonable limits on the sea- coast, or within a moderate distance from it, than by scattering their capital and inhabitants over an extensive territory, which will have a tendenc}^ to render them savage and independent, and compel France to keep up a ver^^ expensive establishment to protect them from the incursions of savages. This country must either be settled by foreigners, or by emigrants from France. In the first case, no nation in Europe can retain them in a state of dependence, because they will, when settled some hundred miles from the sea, be absolutely inaccessible to their power. In the second, the emigration will be such a drain to the wealth and popula- tion of France as will inflict as deep a wound to her agriculture and manufactures as that felt by her on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, or b}^ Spain, on the expulsion of the Moors; and, after all, the day on which they will be independent will arrive whenever they shall have suflicient wealth and strength no longer to need her aid. Having treated this subject more at large in a paper which you have had the goodness to read, I will not dwell upon it here, but propose what it appears to be the true polic}^ of France to adopt, as affecting all her objects, and at the same time conciliating the affections of the United States, giving permanency to her establishments, which she can in no other way hope for. First, let France cede to the United States so much of Louisiana as lays above the mouth of the river Arkansas. By this, a barrier will be placed between the colony of France and Canada, from which she may otherwise be attacked with the greatest facility, and driven out before she can derive any aid from Europe. Let her retain the country lying on the west of the Mississippi and below the Arkansas River — a country capable of sup- porting fifteen millions of inhabitants. By this, she will place a barrier I PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 91 between the United States and Mexico, if (which I hope will never be the case) they should have the wild idea of carrvino- their arms into that countr}', and at the .same time be at hand to protect the Spanish esttiblishments against the ambitious views of any European Power. Let her possess East Florida as far as the river Perdido, with all the ports on the Gulf, and cede West Florida, New Orleans, and the terri- tory on the west bank of the Mississippi, to the United States. This cession will be only valuable to the latter from its g-iving- them the mouths of the river Mobile and other small rixers which penetrate their territor}^ and in calming their apprehensions relative to the Mississippi. The land ceded (if we except a narrow strij) on the ])ank of the river) will, for the most part, consist of barren sands and sunken marshes; while that retained by France, on the west side of the Mississippi, includes the great bulk of the settlements and a rich and fertile countr3\ It ma}" be supposed that New Orleans is a place of some moment; it will be so to the United States, but not to France, because Fort Leon, on the opposite bank, affords a much more advan- tageous station; has equal advantages as a harbor; is higher, healthier, and more defensible; and, as the great bulk of the settlements must necessaril}^ be on that side, the capital must be transplanted there, even if France continued in possession of New Orleans, which is a small town, built of wood, and upon which all the expenses that France should make in public building-s, &c., would ultimately be thrown away when the capital was removed. The right of depot which the United States claim, and will never relinquish,' must ])e the source of continual disputes and animosities between the two nations, and ultimatel}' lead the United States to aid any foreign Power in the expulsion of France from that colony. Inde- pendent of this, as the present commercial capital of New Orleans is mostly American, it wnll be instantl}" removed to Natchez, to which the United States can give such advantages as to render New Orleans of little importance. Upon any other plan, sir, it needs but little foresight to predict that the whole of this establishment must pass into the hands of Great Britain, who has, at the same time, the command of the sea, and a martial colon}" containing (WQvy means of attack. While the ileets block up the seaports, she can, without the smallest difficulty, attack New Orleans from Canada with fifteen or twenty thousand men, and a host of savages. France, by grasping at a desert and insignificant town, and thereby throwing the weight of the United States into the scale of Britain, will render her mistress of the New World. By the possession of Louisiana and Trinidad, the colonies of Spain will lie at her mercy. By expel- ling France from Florida, and possessing the ports on the Gulf, she will command the islands. The East and the West Indies will pour 92 PURCHASE OF THE TEERITORY OF LOUISIANA.. their commodities into her ports; and the precious metals of Mexico, combined with the treasures of Hindostan, enable her to purchase nations whose aid she may require in confirming her power. Though it would comport with the true policy, and the magnanimity of France, gratuitously to offer these terms to the United States, yet they are not unwilling to purchase them at a price suited to their value, and to their own circumstances; in the hope that Fran(;e will at the same time satisfy her distressed citizens the debts which thej^ have a right bj^ so many titles to demand. These short hints, I flatter myself, will serve to draw your attention to the subject; in which case I am satisfied that man}" othei" reasons for the adoption of this plan will suggest themselves to your reflec- tion; reasons on which I do not, from a respect to 3"our time, think it necessary to enlarge. I would only observe that Congress aj"e now in session; that if no treaty is concluded before they rise, or if a Minister should go only with powers to treat, without being the bearer of anything conclusive, he will have to encounter unnumbered suspicions and jealousies, and when he opens the negotiation, he will have to contend with all the intrigues of the Court that is most inter- ested in preventing the completion of objects so hostile to its views. Many things are ratified when a treaty is formed, that would be obstacles to the formation of one in a popular Government. Accept, sir, the assurances of my high consideration, R. R. Livingston. James Madison, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, Minister to England. Department of State, January 29, 1803. Sir: My lotter of the 23d ult., with a postscript of the 3d of this month, communicated the information which had been received at those dates relating to the violation at New Orleans of our treat}^ with Spain, together with what had then passed between the House of Rep- resentatives and the Executive on the subject. I now enclose a subse- quent resolution of that branch of the Legislature. Such of the debates connected with it as took place with open doors will be seen in the newspapers. In those debates, as well as in indications from the press, you will perceive, as you would readily suppose, that the cession of Louisiana to France has been associated as a ground of much solicitude with the affair at New Orleans. Such, indeed, has been the impulse given to the public mind by these events that every branch of the Government has felt the obligation of taking the meas- ures most likely, not onl}" to re-establish our present rights, but to promote arrangements by which they may be enlarged and more effectually secured. In deliberating on this subject, it has appeared PURCHASE OF THP: TERRITORY OK LOUISIANA. 93 to the President that tlie importance of the erisi.s called for the experi- ment of an extraordinary mission, carrvinj>- with it the weight attached to such a measure, as well as the advantage of a more thorough knowl- edge of the views of the Government and of the sensibility of the public, than could be otherwise conveyed. He has accordingly selected for this service, with the appro})ation of the Senate, Mr. Monroe, formerly our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, and latel}' Governor of Virginia, who will ))e joined with Mr. Livingston in a connnission extraordinary to treat with the French Republic; and with Mr. Pinck- ney in a like commission to treat, if necessary, with the Spanish Government. Mr. Monroe is expected here to-morrow, and he will pr()})ably sail shortly afterwards to New York. These comnumications will enable you to meet the British Minister in conversation on the su])ject stated in your letter of May Tth, 1S02, The United States are disposed to live in amity with their neighbors, whoever they ma}' l)e, as long as their neighbors shall duly respect their rights; but it is equalh' their determination to maintain their rights against those who may not respect them; premising, where the occasion may require, the peaceable modes of obtaining satisfaction for wrongs, and endeavoring, by friendly arrangements and provident stipulations, to guard against the controversies most likely to occur. Whatever may l)e the result of the present mission extraordinaiy, nothing certainly Avill be admitted into it not consistent with our prior engagements. The United States and Great Britain have agreed, each for itself, to the free and common navigation by the other of the river Mississippi — each being left, at the same time, to a separate adjust- ment with other nations of questions between them relative to the same subject. This being the necessary meaning of our treaties with Great Britain, luid the course pursued under them, a difference of opin- ion seems to be precluded. Any such difference would be matter of real regret; for it is not only our purpose to maintain the best faith with that nation, but our desire to cherish a uuitual contideru-e and cordiality, which events may render highly important to both nations. Your successor has not yet been named, and it is now possil)le that the time you may have fixed for leaving England will arrive ))efore any arrangements for the vacancy can have their effect. Should this be the case, the President, sensi))le of the inconvenience to which you might be subjected by an unexpected detention, thinks it would not l)e reasonable to claim it of you. It may be hoped that the endeavors to prevent an interval in the legation be successful; and as it can not be more than a verj^ short one, no great evil can Avell happen from it. I have the honor, &c., James Madison. 94 PUKCHASE OF THE TEEEITOET OF LOUISIANA. President Jefferson to M. Dupont. Washington, February i, 1803. Dear Sir, — I have to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of August the 16th and October the 4th. The latter I received with peculiar satisfaction; because, while it holds up terms which cannot be entirely yielded, it proposes such as a mutual spirit of accommo- dation and sacrifice of opinion may bring to some point of union. While we were preparing on this subject such modifications of the propositions of your letter of October the 4th, as we could assent to, an event happened which obliged us to adopt measures of urgency. The suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans, ceded to us by treat}^ with Spain, threw our whole country into such a ferment as imminently threatened its peace. This, however, was believed to be the act of the Intendant, unauthorized b}^ his government. But it showed the necessity of making effectual arrangements to secure the peace of the two countries against the indiscreet acts of subordinate agents. The urgency of the case, as well as the public spirit, there- fore induced us to make a more solemn appeal to the justice and judg- ment of our neighbors, by sending a minister extraordinary to impress them with the necessity of some arrangement. Mr. Monroe has been selected. His good dispositions cannot be doubted. Multiplied con- versations with him, and views of the subject taken in all the shapes in which it can present itself, have possessed him with our estimates of everything relating to it, with a minuteness which no written com- munication to Mr. Livingston could ever have attained. These will prepare them to meet and decide on every form of proposition which can occur, without awaiting new instructions from hence, which might draw to an indefinite length a discussion where circumstances imperi- ously obliged us to a prompt decision. For the occlusion of the Mississippi is a state of things in which we cannot exist. He goes, therefore, joined with Chancellor Livingston, to aid in the issue of a crisis the most important the United States have ever met since their independence, and which is to decide their future character and career. The confidence which the government of France reposes in you, will undoubtedl}^ give great weight to your information. An equal confi- dence on our part, founded on 3^our knowledge of the subject, your just views of it, your good dispositions toward this country, and my long experience of your personal faith and friendship, assures me that you will render between us all the good offices in your power. The interests of the two countries being absolutely the same as to this matter, 3^our aid may be conscientiousl}^ given. It will often perhaps, be possible for you, having a freedom of communication, omnibus horis., which diplomatic gentlemen will be excluded from by forms, to smooth ditficulties by representations and reasonings, which would be received with more suspicion from them. You will thereby render I PURCHASE OF THP: TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 95 great good to both countries. For our circuin.stunce.stire.so imperious as to admit of no dcUi}' as to our course; and the use of the Mississippi so indispensable, that we cannot hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its maintenance. If we fail in this effort to put it ]>eyond the reach of accident, we see the destinies wo have to run, and prepare at once for them. Not but that we shall still endeavor to go on in peace and friendship Avith our neighbors as long as we can, if our rUjliU of navigation and depoii'd (I I'e reis by the treaty of April 30, 1803, and that of St. Ildefonso. The con- versation ended, as might be inferred from his letters which followed it on the 7th and 17th instant, of which copies are herewith enclosed, as are also copies of mj^ answer of — , and of his reply of — . You will see by this correspondence the footing on which a rudeness, which no Government can tolerate, has placed him with this Government, and the view of it which must be unavoidably conveyed to our Minister at Madrid. It may be of some importance, also, that it be not miscon- PUECHASE OF THE TERKITOKY OF LOUISIANA. 277 ceived where you are. But the correspondence is chiefl}^ of importance as it suggests the earnestness with whicli Spain is likely to contest our construction of the treaties of cession, and the Spanish reasoning which will be employed against it; and, consequently, as it urges the expe- diency of cultivating the disposition of the French Government to take our side of the question. To this she is bound no less by sound policy than b}^ regard to right. She is bound by the former, because the interest she has in our friendship interests her in the friendship between us and Spain, which can not be maintained with full effect, if at all, without removing the sources of collision lurking under a neighborhood marked by such circumstances; and which, considering the relation between France and Spain, can not be interrupted without endangeiing the friendly relations between the United States and France. A transfer from Spain to the United States of the territory claimed by the latter, or rather of the whole of both the Floridas, on reasonable conditions, is, in fact, nothing more than a sequel and completion of the policy which led France into her own treat}^ of cession; and her discernment and her consistency are both pledges that she will view the subject in this light. Another pledge lies in the manifest interest which France has in the peaceable transfer of these Spanish possessions to the United States, as the only effectual security against their falling into the hands of Great Britain. Such an event would be certain in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain, and would be particularly disagree- able to France, whether Great Britian should retain the acquisition for the sake of the important harbors and other advantages belonging to it, or should^make it the basis of some transaction with the United States, which, notwithstanding the good faith and fairness toward France, (which would doubtless be observed on our part,) might involve conditions too desirable to her enemy not to be disagreeable to herself. It even deserves consideration that the use which Great Britain could make of the territory in question, and the facility in seizing it, may become a casting motive with her to force Spain into war, contrary to the wishes and the policy of France. The territory ceded to the United States is described in the words following: " The colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, that it had when France possessed it, and such as it ought to be, according to the treaties subsequentlj^ passed between Spain and other States." In expounding this three-fold description the different forms used must be so understood as to give a meaning to each description, and to make the meaning of each coincide with the others. The first form of description is a reference to the extent which Louisiana now has in the hands of Spain. What is that extent, as determined by its eastern limits ? It is not denied that the Perdido 278 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. was once the eastern limit of Louisiana. It is not denied that the territory now possessed by Spain extends to the river Perdido. The river Perdido, we say, then, is the limit to the eastern extent of Loui- siana ceded to the United States. This construction gives an obvious and pertinent meaning to the term "now," and to the expression "in the hands of Spain," which can be found in no other construction. For a considerable time pre- vious to the Treaty 'of Peace in 1T83, between Great Britain and Spain, Louisiana, as in the hands of Spain, was limited eastwardly by the Mississippi, the Iberville, &c. The term "now" fixes the extent, as enlarged by that treaty, in contradistinction to the more limited extent in which Spain held it prior to that treaty. Again: the expression "in the hands or in the possession of Spain," fixes the same extent; because, the expression can not relate to the extent which Spain, by her internal regulations, may have given to a particular district under the name of Louisiana, but evidently to the extent in which it was known to other nations, particularly to the nation in treaty with her, and in which it was relatively to other nations in her hands, and not in the hands of any other nation. It would be absurd to consider the expression "in the hands of Spain," as relating not to others, but to herself and her own regulations; for the territor}'^ of Louisiana in her hands nmst be equally so, and be the same, whether formed into one or twenty districts, or by whatever name or names it ma}^ be called by herself. What may now be the extent of a provincial district under the name of Louisiana, according to the municipal arrangements of the Spanish Government, is not perfectly known. It is at least questionable, even whether these arrangements have not incorporated the portion of Louisiana acquired from Great Britain with the western portion before belonging to Spain, under the same provincial Government. But, whether such be the fact or not, the construction of the treaty will be the same. The next form of description refers to the extent which Louisiana had when possessed by France. What is this extent? It will be admitted, that for the whole period prior to the division of Louisiana between Spain and Great Britain in 1762-3, or at least from the adjustment of boundary between France and Spain in 1719, to that event, Louisiana extended, in the possession of France, to the river Perdido. Had the meaning, then, of the first description been less determinate, and had France been in possession of Louisiana at any time with less extent than to the Perdido, a reference to this primitive and long-continued extent would be more natural and probable than to any other. But it happens that France never possessed Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido; because, on the same da}^ that she ceded a part to Spain, the residue was ceded to Great Britain; and, PUECHASE OF THE TEREITOEY OF LOUISIANA. 279 consequently, as long as she possessed Louisiana at all, she possessed it entire, that is, in its extent to the Perdido. It is true, that after the cession of Western Louisiana to Spain in the year 1762-3, the actual delivery of the territory by France was delayed for several years: but it can never be supposed, that a reference could be intended to this short period of delay, during which France held that portion in the right of Spain only, not in her own right, when, in other words, she held it as the trustee of Spain; and, that a reference to such a pos- session for such a period should be intended, rather than a reference to the long possession of the whole territory in her own acknowledged right, prior to that period. In the order of the French King in 1764, to Monsieur d'Abbadie, for the delivery of Western Louisiana to Spain, it is stated that the cession by France was on the 3d of November, and the acceptance by Spain, on the 13th of that month, leaving an interval of ten days. An anxiety to find a period, during which Louisiana, as limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville, as held by France in her own right, may possibly lead the Spanish Government to seize the pretext into which this momentar}^ interval may be converted. But it will be a mere pretext. In the first place, it is probable that the treaty of cession to Spain, which is dated on the same daj^ with that to Great Britain, was, like the latter, a preliminary treaty, consummated and confirmed by a definitive treatj^ bearing the same date with the definitive treaty, including the cession to Great Britain; in which case, the time and effect of each cession would be the same, whetlier recurrence be had to the date of the preliminary or definitive treaties. In the next place, the cession b}^ France to Spain was essentially made on the 3d of November, 1762, on which day, the same with that of the cession to Great Britain, the right passed away from France. The acceptance by Spain, ten days after, if necessary at all to perfect the deed, had relation to the date of the cession b^/ France, and must have the same effect, and no other, as if Spain had signed the deed on the same day with France. This explanation, which rests on the soundest principles, nullifies the interval of ten days, so as to make the cession to Great Britain and Spain simultaneous, on the supposition that recur- rence be had to the preliminar}^ treaty, and not to the definitive treaty; and, consequently, establishes the fact that France, at no time, possessed Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido; the alienation and par- tition of the territorj^ admitting no distinction of time. In the last place, conceding even that during an interval of ten days the right of Spain was incomplete, and was in transitu only from France; or in another form of expression, that the right remained in France, subject to the eventual acceptance of Spain, is it possible to believe that a description, which must be presumed to aim at clearness and certainty, should refer for its purposes to so fugitive and equivocal state of 280 PUECHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. things, in preference to a state of things where the right and the possession of France were of long continuance, and susceptible of neither doubt nor controversy ? It is impossible. And, consequenth'', the only possible construction which can be put on the second form of description coincides with the only rational construction that can be put on the first: making Louisiana of the same extent, that is to the river Perdido, both " as in the hands of Spain " and " as France possessed it." The third and last description of Louisiana is in these words: " Such as it ought to be, according to the treaties subsequently passed between Spain and other States." This description may be considered as auxiliar}^ to the two others, and is conclusive as an argument for comprehending within the cession of Spain territory eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville, and for extending the cession to the river Perdido. The only treaties between Spain and other nations that affect the extent of Louisiana, as being subsequent to the possession of it by France, are, first, the treat}^ of 1783 between Spain and Great Britain; and, second!}", the treaty of 1795 between Spain and the United States. The last of these treaties affects the extent of Louisiana, as in the hands of Spain, by defining the northern boundary of that part of it which lies east of the Mississippi and the Iberville; and the first affects the extent of Louisiana, by including in the cession from Great Britain to Spain the territorj^ between that river and the Perdido; and by giving to Louisiana, in consequence of that reunion of the eastern and west- ern part, the same extent eastwardly in the hands of Spain as it had when France possessed it. Louisiana, then, as it ought to be, accord- ing to treaties of Spain subsequently to the possession by France, is limited by the line of demarcation settled with the United States, and forming a northern boundary, and is extended to the river Perdido as its eastern boundary. This is not onl}^ the plain and necessary construction of the words, but is the only construction that can give a meaning to them. For they are without meaning, on the supposition that Louisiana, as in the hands of Spain, is limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville, since neither the one nor the other of those treaties have any relation to Louisiana that can affect its extent, but' through their relation to the limits of that part of it which lies eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville. Including this part, therefore, as we contend, within the extent of Louisiana, and a meaning is given to both as pertinent as it is important. Exclude this part, as Spain contends, from Louisiana, and no treaties exist to which the reference is applicable. This deduction can not be evaded by pretending that the reference to subsequent treaties of Spain was meant to save the right of deposit, and other rights stipulated to the commerce of the United States by the treaty of 1795; first, because, although that may be an incidental PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 281 object of the reference to that treaty, as was signified hj His Catholic Majest}^ to the Government of the United States, yet the principal object of the reference is evidently the territorial e.Hent of Louisiana; second!}^, because the reference is to more than one treaty — to the treaty of 1783, as well as to that of 1795; and the treaty 1783 can have no modifying effect whatever, rendering it applicable, but on the sup- position that Louisiana was considered as extending eastward of the Mississippi and the Iberville, into the territory ceded by that treaty to Spain. In fine, the construction which we maintain gives to ever}^ part of the description of the territory ceded to the United States a meaning- clear in itself, and in harmony with every other part, and is no less conformable to facts than it is founded on the ordinary use and analogy of the expressions. The construction urged by Spain gives, on the contrary, a meaning to the first description which is inconsistent with the very terms of it; it prefers, in the second, a meaning that is impos- sible or absurd; and it takes from the last all meaning whatever. In confirmation of the meaning which extends Louisiana to the river Ferdido, it may be regarded as most consistent with the object of the First Consul in the cession obtained by him from Spain. Every appearance, and every circumstance, pronounces this to have been to give lustre to his Administration, and to gratify a natural pride in his nation, by re-annexing to its domain possessions which had, without any sufficient consideration, been severed from it; and which, being in the hands of Spain, it was in the power of Spain to restore. Spain, on the other side, might be the less reluctant against the cession in this extent, as she would be only replaced hj it within the original limits of her possessions; the territory east of the Perdido having been regained by her from Great Britain in the peace of 1783, and not included in the late cession. It only remains to take notice of the argument derived from a criti- cism on the term " retrocede," b}^ which the cession from Spain to France is expressed. The literal meaning of this term is said to be that Spain gives back to France what she received from France; and that as she received from France no more than the Territory west of the Mississippi and the Iberville, that, and no more, could be given back by Spain. Without denying that such a meaning, if uncontrolled by other terms, would- have been properh'^ expressed b}^ the term '"'' i-etrocede," it is sufficient, and more than sufficient, to observe, first, that with respect to France, the literal meaning is satisfied ; France receiving back what she had before alienated; secondly, that with respect to Spain, not only the greater part of Louisiana had been confessedly received by her from France, and, consequently, was literally ceded back by Spain, as well as ceded back to France; but, with respect to the part 282 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 1 in question, Spain mig-ht not unfair!}^ be considered as ceding bade to France what France had ceded to her, inasmuch as the cession of it to Great Britain was made for tlie benefit of Sj^ain, to whom, on that account, Cuba was restored. The effect was precisely the same as if France had, in form, made the cession to Spain, and Spain had assigned it over to Great Britain; and the cession may the more aptl}^ be con- sidered as passing through Spain, as Spain herself was a party to the treaty by which it was conveyed to Great Britain. In this point of view, not only France received back what she had ceded, l;)ut Spain ceded back what she had received, and the etjmiolog}^ even of the term " retrocede" is satisfied. This view of the case is the more sub- stantially jvist, as the territory in question passed from France to Great Britain, for the account of Spain, but passed from Great Britain into the hands of Spain in 1783, in consequence of a war to which Spain had contributed but little compared with France, and in termi- nating which so favorabh^ in this article for Spain, France had doubt- less a preponderating influence. Thirdly, that if a coui'se of pro- ceeding might have existed to which the term "retrocede" would be more literally applicable, it may be equally said that there is no other particular term which would be more applicable to the whole proceed- ing, as it did exist. Fourthly. Lastly, that if this were not the case, a nice criticism on the et3'^mology of a single term can be allowed no weight against a conclusion drawn from the clear meaning of everj^ other term, and from the whole context. In aid of these observations, I enclose herewith two papers, which have been drawn up with a view to trace and support our title to Louisiana in its extent to the Perdido. You will find in them, also, the grounds on which its western extent is maintainable against Spain, and its northern in relation to Great Britain. On the whole, we reckon with much confidence on the obligations and dispositions of the French Government, to favor our object with Spain, and on your prudent exertions to strengthen our hold on both; not only in reference to the true construction of thetreat}^, but to our acquisition of the Spanish territory eastward of the Perdido on con- venient and equitable conditions. You will find herewith enclosed copies of another correspondence, sufficientl}^ explaining itself, with the Marquis d'Yrujo, on the com- merce from our ports to St. Domingo; to which is added a letter on that subject from M. Pichon. The ideas of the President, as well to the part which the true interest of France recommends to her, as to the part prescribed both to her and to the United States by the law of nations, were communicated in m}^ letter of the 31st of January last. It is much to be desired that the French Government may enter into proper views on this subject. With respect to the trade in articles not for war, there can not be a PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 288 doubt that the interest of France concurs with that of the United States. With respect to articles for war, it is, probably, the interest of all nations that the}^ should l^e kept out of hands likely to make so bad a use of them. It is clear, at the same time, that the United States are bound by the law of nations to nothing further than to leave their offending citizens to the consequences of an illicit trade; and it deserves serious consideration, how far th^ir undertaking, at the instance of one Power, to enforce the law of nations, by prohibitory regulations to which thej^ are bound, may become an embarrassing precedent, and stimulate pretensions and complaints of other Powers. The French Government must be sensible, also, that prohibitions by one nation would have little effect, if others, including Great Britain, should not follow the example. It may be added, that the most which the United States could do in the case, short of prohibiting the export of contraband articles altogether, a measure doubtless beyond the expec- tations of France, would be to annex to the shipment of these articles a condition, that they should be delivered elsewhere than in St. Domingo, and that a regulation of this kind would readil}^ be frustrated by a reshipment of the article after delivery elsewhere, in the same or other vessels, in order to accomplish the forbidden destination. If, indeed, the prohibitory regulations, on the part of the United States, were the result of a stipulation, and recommended by an equivalent concession, the objection to it as an inconvenient precedent would be avoided. If, for example, France would agree to permit the trade with Santo Domingo in all other articles, on condition that we would agree to pro- hibit contraband articles, no objection of that sort would lie against the arrangement; and the arrangement would, in itseff , be so reasonable, on both sides, and so favorable, even to the people of Santo Domingo, that the President authorizes you not only to make it, if you find it not improper, the subject of a frank conference with the French Govern- ment, but to put it into the form of a conventional regulation; or, should this be objectionable, the object may be attained, perhaps, by a tacit understanding between the two Governments which may lead to the regulations on each side respectively necessary. Although a legal regulation, on our part, can not be absolutely promised, otherwise than by a positive and mutual stipulation, yet, with a candid explana- tion of this constitutional circumstance, there can be little risk in inspiring the requisite confidence that the legislative authority here would interpose its sanction. It is the more important that something should be done in the case, and done soon, as the pretext, founded upon the supposed illegality of any trade whatever with the negroes in St. Domingo, is multiplying depredations on our commerce, not only with that island, but with the West Indies generally, to a degree highly irritating, and which is laying the foundations for the extensive claims and complaints on our 284 PUKCHASE OF THE TEKRITORY OF LOUISIANA. part. You will not fail to state this fact to the French Government in its just importance; as an agreement for some such arrangement as is above suggested, or if that be disliked, as requiring such other inter- position of that Government as will put an end to the evil. It is represented that a part of the depredations are committed l)y French armed vessels without commissions, or with commissions from incompetent authorities. It appears, also, that these lawless proceed- ings are connected with Spanish ports and subjects, probabl}^ Spanish officers, also, in the West Indies, particularl}^ in the island of Cuba. So far as the responsibility of Spain may be involved, we shall not lose sight of it. An appeal, at the same time, to that of France, is as pressing as it is just; and you will please to make it in the manner best calculated to make it effectual. In one of your letters 3"ou apprehended that the interest accruing from the delay of the Commissioners at Paris may be disallowed b}^ the French Government, and wish for instructions on the subject. I am glad to find, by later communications from Mr. Skipwith, that the apparent discontent at the delay had subsided. But whatever solici- tude that Government might feel for despatch in liquidating the claims, it would be a palpable wrong to make a disappointment in that par- ticular a pretext for refusing an}^ stipulated part of the claims. In a legal point of view, the treaty could not be in force until mutually ratified; and every preparatory step taken for carr3dng it into effect, however apposite or useful, must be connected with legal questions arising under the treat}'. In other parts of your correspondence, you seem to have inferred from some passage i^i mine, that I thought the ten millions of livres in cash, over which a discretion was given, ought to have been paid rather to France than to our creditor citizens. If the inference be just, m}^ expressions must have been the more unfortunate as they so little accord with the original plan, communicated in the instructions to 3"ourself and Mr. Monroe; the more unfortunate still, as the}^ not only decide a question wrong, but a question which could never occur. The cash fund of ten millions was provided on the supposition, that, in a critical moment, and in a balance of considerations, the immediate payment of that sum, as a part of the bargain, might either tempt the French Government to enter into it, or to reduce the terms of it. If wanted for either of these purposes, it was to be paid to the French Government; if not wanted for either, it was made applicable to no other. The provision contemplated for the creditors had no reference to the fund of ten millions of livres; nor was it even contemplated that any other cash fund would be made applicable to their claims. It was supposed not unreasonable, that the ease of our Treasury and the chance and means of purchasing the territory remaining to Spain east- ward of the Mississippi, might be so far justly consulted as to put the PUECHASE OF THE TEKEITORY OF LOUISIANA. 285 indemnification of the claims against France on a like footing with that on which the indemnification of like claims against Great Britain had been put. And it was inferred, that such a modification of the pay- ments would not onl}^ have fully satisfied the expectations of the cred- itors, but would have encountered no objections on the part of the French Government, who had no interest in the question, and who were precluded by all that had passed from urging objections of any other sort. Congress adjourned on Tuesda}^ the 27th of March, to the first Monda}^ in November next. Copies of their laws will be forwarded to you as soon as they issue from the press. For the present, I enclose herewith a list of all their acts, and copies of a few of them, particu- larly of the acts providing for the government of Louisiana, and for the war in the Mediterranean. The former, it is hoped, will satisfy the French Government of the prudent and faithful regard of the Government of the United States to the interest and happiness of the people transferred into the American family. I have the honor to be, &c. , James Madison. RoBEKT E. Livingston, Esq. President's Message. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States: In execution of the act of the present session of Congress for taking possession of Louisiana, as ceded to us by France, and for the tempo- rary government thereof, Governor Claiborne of the Mississippi Territory, and General Wilkinson, were appointed Commissioners to receive possession. Thej'^ proceeded, with such regular troops as had been assembled at Fort Adams from the nearest posts, and with some militia of the Mississippi Territory, to New Orleans. To be prepared for anything unexpected which might arise out of the transaction, a respectable body of militia was ordered to be in readiness in the States of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and a part of those of Tennessee was moved on to the Natchez. No occasion, however, arose for their services. Our Commissioners, on their arrival at New Orleans, found the Province already delivered by the Commissaries of Spain to that of France, who delivered it over to them on the 20th day of December, as appears by their declaratory act accompanying this. Governor Claiborne, being duly invested with the powers heretofore exercised by the Governor and Intendant of Louisiana, assumed the government on the same da3% and, for the maintenance of law and order, immedi- ately issued the proclamation and address now communicated. On this important acquisition, so favorable to the immediate inter- ests of our Western citizens, so auspicious to the peace and security 286 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. of the nation in general, which adds to our country territories so extensive and fertile, and to our citizens new brethren to partake of the blessings of freedom and self-government, I offer to Congress and our country my sincere congratulations. January 16, ISOi. Th. Jefferson. Articles of Exchange of Possession. City of New Orleans, December W^ 1803. Sir: We have the satisfaction to announce to you that the Province of Louisiana was this day surrendered to the United States b}^ the Commissioner of France; and to add, that the flag of our country was raised in this city amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants. The enclosed is a copy of an instrument of writing, which was signed and exchanged by the Commissioners of the two Governments, and is designed as a record of this interesting transaction. Accept assurances of our respectful consideration. Wm. C. C. Claiborne. James Wilkinson. James Mauison, Secretary of State. The undersigned, William C. C. Claiborne and James Wilkinson, commissioners or agents of the United States, agreeably to the full powers they have received from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, under date of the 31st October, 1803, and twenty-eighth year of the independence of the United States of America, (8th Bru- maire, 12th year of the French Republic,) countersigned by the Secre- tar}^ of State, James Madison, and citizen Peter Clement Laussat, Colonial Prefect and Commissioner of the French Government, for the delivery, in the name of the French Republic, of the country, terri- tories, and dependencies of Louisiana, to the commissioners or agents of the United States, conformably to the powers, commission, and special mandate which he has received, in the name of the French people, from citizen Bonaparte, First Consul, under date of the 6th June, 1803, (17th Prairial, eleventh year of the French Republic,) countersigned by the Secretary of State, Hugues Maret, and by his Excellency the Minister of Marine and Colonies, Decres, do certify by these presents, that on this day, Tuesday, the 20th December, 1803, of the Christian era, (28th Frimaire, twelfth 3^ear of the French Republic,) being convened in the hall of the Hotel de Ville of Orleans, accom- panied on both sides b}^ the Chiefs and Officers of the Army and Navy, by the municipality and divers respectable citizens of their respective PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. 287 Republics, the said William C. C. Claiborne and James Wilkinson, delivered to the said citizen Laussat their aforesaid full powers, by which it evidently appears that full power and authority has been given them jointly and severally to take possession of, and to occupy the territories ceded by France to the United States by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th day of April last past, (10th Floreal,) and for that purpose to repair to the said Territory, and there to exe- cute and perform all such acts and things, touching the premises, as ma}^ be necessary for f ulliling their appointment conformably to the said treaty and the laws of the United States; and thereupon the said citizen Laussat declared that, in virtue of, and in the terms of the powers, commission, and special mandate dated at St, Cloud, 6th June, 1803, of the Christian era, (17th Prairiai, 11th j^ear of the French Republic,) he put from that moment the said Commissioners of the United States in possession of the country, territories, and depend- encies of Louisiana, conformably to the first, second, fourth, and fifth articles of the treaty and two conventions, concluded and signed the 30th April, 1803, (10th Floreal, 11th year of the French Republic,) between the French Republic and the United States of America, by citizen Barbe Marbois, Minister of the Public Treasury, and Messrs. Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe, Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States, all three furnished with full powers, of which treaty and two conventions the ratifications, made by the First Consul of the French Republic on the one part, and by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the other part, have been exchanged and mutually received at the City of Washington, the 21st October, 1803, (28th Vendemiaire, 12th jea.r of the French Republic,) by citizen Louis Andre Pichon, charge des affaires of the French Republic near the United States, on the part of France, and b}^ James Madison, Secretar}^ of State of the United States, on the part of the United States, according to the proces verhal drawn up on the same day; and the present delivery of the country is made to them, to the end that, in conformity with the object of the said treaty, the sovereignty and property of the colon}'^ or province of Louisiana may pass to the said United States, under the same clauses and conditions as it had been ceded by Spain to France, in virtue of the treaty concluded at St. lldefonso, on the 1st October, 1800, (9th Vendemiaire, 9th year,) between these two last Powers, which has since received its execution by the actual re-entrance of the French Republic into possession of the said colony or province. And the said citizen Laussat in consequence, at this present time, delivered to the said Commissioners of the United States, in this pub- lic sitting, the keys of the City of New Orleans, declaring that he dis- charges from their oaths of fidelity towards the French Republic, the citizens and inhabitants of Louisiana, who shall chose to remain under the dominion of the United States. "" — " 288 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. And tJaat it may forever appear, the undersigned have signed tbif 2yroces verbal of this important and solemn act, in the French and Eng- lish languages, and have sealed it with their seals, and have caused it to be countersigned by the secretaries of conmiission, the day, month, and 3^ear above written. Wm. C. C. Claiborne, [l. s.] James Wilkinson. [l. s.] Laussat. [l. s.] Proclamation by His Excellency, "William C. C. Claiborne, Governor of the Mississippi Territory, exercising the powers of Governor-general and Inteiidant of the Province of Louisiana. Whereas, b}^ stipulations between the Governments of France and Spain, the latter ceded to the former the colony and province of Louisiana, with the same extent which it had at the date of the above- mentioned treaty in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it ought to be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States; and whereas the Govern- ment of France has ceded the same to the United States by a treaty duly ratified, and bearing date the 30th of April in the present year, and the possession of said colonj^ and province is now in the United States, according to the tenor of the last-mentioned treaty; and whereas the Congress of the United States on the 31st day of October in the present year, 'did enact that, until the expiration of the session of Congress then sitting, (unless provisions for the temporary govern- ment of the said territories .be made by Congress,) all the military, civil, and judicial powers exercised by the then existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall !)e exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion; and the Piesident of the United States has, by his commission, bearing date the same 31st day of October, invested me with all the powers, and charged me with the several duties heretofore held and exercised b}^ the Governor-General and Intendant of the Province. I have, therefore, thought fit to issue this, my proclamation, making known the premises, and to declare, that the government heretofore exercised over the said Province of Louisiana, as well under the authority of Spain as the French Republic has ceased, and that of the United States of America is established over the same; that the inhab- itants thereof will be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, PLTECHASE OF THE TEREITORY OF LOUISIANA. 289 ^nd immunities of citizens of the United States; tliat, iu the mean- time, the}" shall be maintained and protected in the free enjo3^ment of their liberty", property, and the religion which they profess; that all laws and municipal regulations which were in existence at the cessa- tion of the late government, remain in full force; and all civil officers charged Avith their execution, except those whose powers have been specialh' vested in me, and except, also, such officers as have been intrusted with the collection of the revenue, are continued in their functions, during the pleasure of the Governor for the time being, or 'intil provision shall otherwise be made. And 1 do hereby exhort and enjoin all the inhabitants, and other jDersons within the said province, to be faithful and true in their allegi- ance to the United States, and obedient to the laws and authorities of the same, under full assurance that their just rights will be under the guardianship of the United States, and will be maintained from all force or violence from without or within. In testimonv whereof 1 have hereunto set my hand. Given at the city of New Orleans, the 20th day of December, 1803, and of the independence of the United States of America, the twent}"- eighth. Wm. C. C. Claiborne. The Governor's Address to the Citizens of Louisiana. New Orleans, Se'ptemher W, 1803. Fellow-citizens of Louisiana: On the great and interesting event now finally consummated — an event so advantageous to yourselves and so glorious to United America — I can not forbear offering yon my warmest congratulations. The wise policy of the Consul of France has, by the cession of Louisiana to the United States, secured to 3'ou a connexion beyond the reach of change, and to your posterit}^ the sure inheritance of freedom. The American people receive 3'ou as brothers, and will hasten to extend to you a participation in those inestimable rights which have formed the basis of their own unexampled pros- perit3\ Under the auspices of the American Government, 3"ou ma}^ confidently rely upon the security of your liberty, your property, and the religion of your choice. You maj^ with equal certaint}^ rest assured that 3'our commerce will be promoted and j^our agriculture cherished — in a word, that your true interests will be among the primaiy objects of our National Legislature. In return for these benefits, the United States will be amply remunerated if your growing- attachment to the Constitution of our country, and yowr veneration for the principles on which it is founded, be dul}^ proportioned to the blessings which thev will confer. Among your first duties, therefore, H. Doc. 431 19 290 PURCHASE OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA. you should cultivate with assiduity among yourselves the advancement of political information. You should guide the rising generation in the paths of republican economy and virtue. You should encourage literature; for without the advantages of education, j^our descendants will be unable to appreciate the intrinsic worth of the Government transmitted to them. As for m3^self, fellow-citizens, accept a sincere assurance, that during my continuance in the situation in which the President of the United States has been pleased to place me, every exertion will be made on my part to foster j^our intei'nal happiness, and forward 3' our general welfare; for it is only by such means that I can secure to myself the approbation of those great and just men who preside in the councils of our nation. Wm. C. C. Claiborne. I [Extrart.] Mr. Cevallos to Mr. Pinckney. Pakdo, Fi-hruary 10^ 180Jf. At the same time the Minister of His Majesty in the United States is charged to inform the American Government respecting the falsity of the rumor referred to, he has likewise orders to declare to it that His Majesty has thought tit to renounce his opposition to the aliena- tion of Louisiana made b}' France, notwithstanding the solid reasons on which it is founded; thereby giving a new proof of his benevolence and friendship toward the United States. Mr. Yrujo to Mr, Madison. Philadelphia, May IJf., 180^. Sir: The explanations which the Government of France has given to His Catholic Majesty concerning the sale of Louisiana to the United States, and the amicable dispositions on the part of the King my mas- ter toward these States, have determined him to abandon the opposi- tion which, at a prior'period, and with the most substantial motives, he had manifested against that transaction. In consequence, and by spe- cial order of His Majest}", 1 have the pleasure to communicate to you his royal intentions on an atfair so important; well persuaded that the American Government will see, in this conduct of the King ni}'' mas- ter, a new proof of his consideration for the United States, and they will correspond, with a true reciprocit}', with the sincere frie'><^>ln"p of the King, of which he has given so many proofs. God preserve you many years. M. Casa Ykho. James Madison, Esq. PUECHASE OF THE TEERITORY OV LOUISIANA. 291 Remarks on Signing the Treaty. Mr. Marbois said: As soon as the}'^ had signed they rose, shook hands, and Livingston, expressing the satisfaction of all, said: "The treaty we have, signed has not been brought about b}- pressure nor dictated by force. Equally advantageous to both the coritracting parties, it will change vast solitudes into a flourishing country. \To-da3^ the United States take their place among the Powers of the lirst rank. Moreover, if wars are inevitable, France will have in the new world a friend increasing j^^ear by year in power, which cannot fail to become puissant and respected on all the seas of the earth. These treaties will become a guarantee of peace and good will between commercial States. The instrument we have signed will cause no tears to flow. It will prepare centuries of happiness foi- innumerable generations of the human race. The Mississippi and the Missoui'i will see them prosper and increase in the midst of equality, under just laws, freed from the errors of superstition, from the scourges of bad government, and trul}' worth}" of the regard and care of Providence.'' [Extract.] Mr. Madison to Dr. J. W. Francis. MONTPELIEE, JVOV''^ 7, 1831. The friendly relations in which I stood to both Chancellor Liv- ingston and Mr. Monroe would make me a reluctant witness, if I had happened to possess an}^ knowledge of facts favoring either at the expense of the other in the negotiations which preceded the transfer of Louisiana to the United States. But my recollections throw no light on the subject bej^ond what may be derived from ofiicial papers in print, or on the files of the Department of State, and especially in the work on Louisiana by Mr. Marbois, the French negotiator. I have no doubt that each of the envoi's did everything, according to his opportunities, that could evince official zeal and anxious patriotism; at the same time that the disclosures of Mr. Marbois sufficiently shew that the real cause of success is to be found in the sudden polic}^ sug- gested to Napoleon b}^ the foreseen rupture of the peace of Amiens, and, as a consequence, the seizure of Louisiana by Great Britain, who would not onl}^ deprive France of her acquisition, but turn it, polit icall}" and commerciallj", against her, in relation to the United States or Spanish America. INDEX. A. Address by Governor Claiborne, 289. Alliance with England, Jefferson suggests, 16. Alliance with France or England, which, 52. American boats forbidden to trade, 57. American claims classified, 133. Livingston remonstrates, 88, 116. Talleyrand guarantees, 142. American territory, France renounced right to acquire, 26. Arkansas River suggested as boundary, 83, 90,. 100., 158. Articles of exchange of possession, 286. B. Bernadotte will treat on livingston basis, 100, 143. Boundaries all unsettled, 32. of Louisiana, 234, 271. of west Florida, 86. Britain would have seized New Orleans, 205. British alliance, Livingston threatens, 150. British Government notified of cession, 196. C. Canada and Mexico threatened, 21. Causes that led to cession to United States, 187, 189, 203, 221, 225, 231, 268, 291. Same — Reasons taken from Livingston Memoirs, 225. Cede, right of France to alienate, 244, Spain denies right of France to, 233, 239, 2-12, 245. Cession to France, disapproved by French statesmen, 13. denied by French minister, 9. confirmed by Livingston, 11. England's objection, 4. England's views sounded, 25. Livingston's discussion of, 89. opposed by Frenchmen, 28. reasons France wanted Louisiana, 12. reasons for, by Madison, 5. rumors of, 3, 5, 8. threatens peace witli United States, 25. Cession to United States, Livingston proposes, 121. what induced it, 187, 189, 221, 225, 229, 231, 268, 291. Claims commission named, 171, 213. 293 294 INDEX. Claims, classified, 133. Livingston binds First Consul to payment, 190 Monroe's draft of convention, 185. payments to be prorated, 272. Talleyrand guarantees payment, 142 Colonial commerce discussed, 36. officers, abuses of, 64, 136, 139. Colonies, are they useful to France, 39. Congress appropriates two millions, 84. committee report, 84. Constitutional amendment necessary, 235. limitations, by Jefferson, 237. Convention of purchase, 256. on claims, 257. D. Deposit, importance of Jight, 85. Jefferson on restoring, 182. Livington presses First Consul, 119, 148. Madison on waiving right, 181. right of, denied by Spanish officer, 53. Intendant's proclamation suspending, 54. right restored, 179. right of United States irrevocable, 149. right of, by treaty, 31. suspension, governor of Louisiana disowns, 67. Governor Claiborne's letter, 55. Livingston remonstrates, 89. Madison protests, 63. proclamation of Intendant, 54. protests pour into Washington, 67. Western indignation, 64. Discontent with treaty in France, 209, 225. Duplicity of French minister, 11. England and Spain, policy to alarm, 20. favors acquisition by United States, 156. England's interest in Louisiana, 21. England opposes cession to France, 25, 27, 102. to occupy New Orleans in case of war, 156. England's opposition to cession incited, 10. Expedition for Louisiana, 23, 29, 61, 81, 146. First Consul acknowledges memoir, 142. autocracy of, 51, 81. colloquy with British minister, 145. friendly disposition of, 62, 143. Livingston communicates with, 59, 71, 99, 115. makes proposition to sell, 161. receives Monroe, 169. INDEX. 295 Floridas, acquisition of, the first desire of United States, 126 first mention of, 9. Florida, West, Livingston advises seizure, 201. Madison discusses, 275. more valuable than New Orleans, 35. Monroe discusses, 198. negotiation with France for, 24. Spain for, 171. Spain declines to sell, 183. was it included in Louisiana? 23, 29, 33, 50, 60, 200, 212, 218, 236, 276. why not demanded of Spain, 275. lorida rivers, right to navigate, 126. Floridas, First Consul advises postponement, 230. Foreign colonies, value of, Livingston, 36. territory, L^nited States can not acquire, 235. trade, France and England compared, 37. France renounced acquisition in America, 26. French emigrants, Louisiana intended for, 8, 11. minister gives assurances, 62. to go to Washington to treat, 143. reasons for selling, copied from Livingston, 225. G. • Governor Claiborne's address, 289. letter, 55. proclamation, 288. protest, 56. Governor of Kentucky protests, 57. Government of United States, its nature, 87. H. House of Representatives, resolutions of, 67. I. Impotency of French ministers, 64. Independent Western State, 124, 141, 234, 274. Indians, attachment of to France, 20. Instructions, joint, 122. Livingston asks for, 23, 29, 35, 61, 101. Monroe bears them, 70. acquire Florida, first purpose of United States, 7. to Livingston, 16, 17, 112. to make the Mississippi the boundary, 28, 70, 122. to minister to Spain, 98. later, 175, 205. limited, Madison explains, 223. Intendant's order without authority, 67, 113. proclamation suspending deposit, 54. Jefferson's cautious instructions to Livingston, o'2 Jefferson describes alarming conditions, 68. on restoring deposit, 182. 296 INDEX. Jefferson on the joending crisis, 94. on independent Western States, 234, 274. remonstrates against cession to France, IC. seeks to interest Nemours, 18. value of purchase, 221, 261, 274. Joseph Bonaparte favors Livingston's propositions, 100. Livingston's medium with First Consul, 59, 82. L. . Livingston anticipates instructions, 220. and Monroe's joint report, 191. asks instructions, 23, 29, 35, 61, 65, 101. advises defensive measures, 62. advises negotiation with Britain as blind, 66. announces events ready for Monroe, 158. account of negotiation, 162, 173. advises seizure of Floridas, 201. begins making propositions, 51. bewails lack of instructions, 97. communicates with First Consul direct, 65, 99, 1 15. convinces Frenchmen, 50, 157. discusses right of deposit, 91. explains activity pending Monroe's arrival, 147. explains letter to Monroe, 267. first memoir, 36. gets ear of First Consul, 65. incites English opposition, 10. makes many converts, 50, 65. his medium is Joseph Bonaparte, 59. makes converts of entire court, 115, 157. midnight letter, 159. outwits French minister, 160. persistency Avith First Consul, 140. .presents another memoir, 66, 71, 82, 103, 108. remarks at signing treaty, 291. error in his commission, 221. replies to strictures on memoir, 266. recites the moving causes, 187-189. seeks to alarm England, 21. severe exijostulations of, 149. suggests Natchez as depot, 20. suggests trans-Mississippi expansion, 83. to Joseph Bonaparte, 82. to Talleyrand, 153. Louisiana, cession of whole not anticipated at Washington, 199. first proposition by Talleyrand, 157. First Consul prepares to take possession, 50. reasons why France should not possess, 16. Talleyrand offers the whole, 159. would not be profitable to France, 39. M. Madison approves purchase, 223. / criticises Livingston, 226. observations on proposed treaty, 129. INDEX. 297 Madison discusses Spain's opposition, 247. West Florida, 275. explains why instructions were limited, 223. on causes, twenty-eight years later, 291. outlines treaty, 127. protests to Spanish Government, 63. replies to Spanish minister, 244. Marbois deputed to treat, 163. Maritime powers compared, 72. Memoirs of Livingston, 36, 71, 103, 108. Merchant marine, French interest in, 37. Monroe's appointment a disadvantage, 115. Monroe and Livingston's joint report, 191. arrives in London, 227. at Havre, 159. complains of Livingston, 164. differs with Livingston, 218. interview with First Consul, 229. journal of the negotiation, 165. letter to Virginia Senators, 203. mission to Spain suspended, 241. nomination of, Livingston informed, 69. reasons for, 68, 96, 114. predicts long delay in negotiations, 138. proceeds to London, 217. and Livingston equal in rank, 222. recites incidents of negotiation, 227, 231. his participation limited, 267. to Jefferson, on situation, 136. Motive of First Consul for selling, 187, 203, 225, 231, 268, 291. N. Natchez suggested as substitute for New Orleans, 20, 23. Navigation of Florida rivers sought, 22. Mississippi, a treaty right, 27, 30. guaranteed, 26. indefeasible right to, 125. its importance, 84. treaty obligations of Spain, 31. Negotiations for the Floridas postponed, 247. with France, Livingston's account of, 172. on before Monroe is presented, 163. with Britain authorized, 180. Nemour's interest sought by Jefferson, 18. New Orleans, cession to United States suggested by Jefferson, 17. and Floridas, why United States must possess, 87. alone desired, 28, 34, 52, 70, 81, 84. Livingston advises United State to seize, 101. suggests independent State, 141. why it should be a free port, 44. New States, Jefferson oi\ admission, 236. out of new territory inadmissible, 236. Noninterference in Europe, policy of United States, 19. H. Doc. -±31 20 298 INDEX. Penal colony, Louisiana suggested for, 13, 15. Politics of Europe, Livingston on, 58. Possession, articles of exchange of, 286. of Louisiana by United States ordered, 265. Powers of United States ministers insufficient, 172. President's message to extra session, 251. on taking possession, 285. Price, eighty millions agreed on, 168. First Consul asks one hundred millions, 161. Jefferson discusses, 95. places limit on, 133. Marbois names eighty millions, 162, 166. Proclamation of Governor Claiborne, 288. Protection to American commerce, 12. Purchase not authorized by Constitution, 235. of whole not anticipated by Administration, 199. why made, 191. R. Ratification by Congress, 260. vote on, 262. French government notified, 264. Livingston urges haste, 208, 211. Reticence of French Government, 35, 61. Rivers of Florida, navigation of, 86. S. Sale determined before Monroe's arrival, 267. of territory beneath dignity of France, 103. when determination was taken, 232, 267. Secrecy and duplicity of French minister, 11. remonstrance of Livingston, 14. Separate government for Western people, 124, 141, 234, 274. Slave labor indispensable, 38, 43. Spain's guaranty of United States right to deposit, 34. Spanish Government opposes cession to United States, 233, 239, 242-243, 245. opposition, French minister replies, 249. withdrawn, 290. Talleyrand guarantees payment of claims, 142. offers Louisiana, 159. Talleyrand's hostility, attempt to placate, 19. profession of friendliness, 152. promise of satisfaction, 151. Territorial extension disavowed, 59. The garden episode, 160. Trade with Americans forbidden, 57. on Mississippi, value of, 64. Treaties forwarded to Washington, 209. INDEX. 299 Treaty, difficulties after signing, 210. of purchase, full text, 253. of 1778 cited, 26. outlined by Livingston, 90. by Madison, 127. rights of United States in Mississippi, 30. Trans-Mississippi territory not desired by United States, 28, 34, 52, 59. Troops ordered to New Orleans, 263-265. U. United States, destiny in balance, 69, 97. will maintain her rights, Jefferson, 95. V. Value of Louisiana, by Jefferson, 221, 274. by First Consul, 214. prevalent French ideas, 20. to United States, 194. W. War between France and England imminent, 146. cloud appears, 51. declared by France, 207. with United States, possession of Louisiana can alone avert, 97. with France, United States will be ready for, 88. will result from French occupation of Louisiana, 18 Western commerce affected by, 126. Western people, predilections of, 124. Western independent state, 124, 141, 234, 274. o / 4