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EEPORT THE ART OF WAR IN EUROPE 1854, 1855, AND 1856, MAJOR RICHARD DELAFIELD, ' CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FROM HIS NOTE! AND OBSERVATIONS MADE A3 A MEMBER OF A MILITARY COMMISSION TO THE THEATER OF WAR IN EUROPE." UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, SECRETARY OF WAR. WASHINGTON: GEORGE W. BOWMAN, PRINTER. 1860. ■^ ■lis- "i r»r.& e ; rom U. S. Soidier's Home Uby* Oct.28.1931 In- the Senate of the United States, June 16, 18G0. Resolved, That the Reports of Majors Dclaficld and Mordecai upon tlic Crimean War bu pniilcd, and Urn ihousand extra ropies; two thousand of which tor the use of the War Depnrlmcnt. ASBURY DICKINS, Secretary. 5776 ■m- INTRODUCTIOJN A telegram of the 3d ofi^April, 1855, from the War Department, required Major Delafield, of the Corps of Engineers, then superintending the defenses of the harbor of New York, to repair to Washington immediately and report in person to the Secretary of War. The first conveyance that oflered enabled him to do so on the morning of the 5th, wlieu, after an interview with the Hon. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, the following order was received constituting a Military Commission to the theater of war in Europe : > War Department, }Vashington, April 2, 1855. Gentlemem: You have Ijeun selected to form a commission to visit Europe, for tlie purpose of obtaining information with regard to the military service in general, and especially the practical working of the changes which have been introduced of lata years into the military systems of the principal nations of Europe. Some of the subjects to which it is peculiarly desirable to direct your attention may be indicated as follows: The organizatioit of armies and of the departments for furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, especially in field service. The manner of distributing supplies. The fitting up of vessels for transporting men and horses, and the arrangements for embarking and disembarking them. The medical and hospital arrangements, both in permanent hospitals and in the field. The kind of ambulances or other means used for transporting the sick and wounded. The kind of clothing and camp equipage used for service in the field. The kinds of arms, ammunition, and accoutcrments used in equipping troops for the various branches of service, and their adaptation to the purposes intended. In this respect, the arms and equipments of cavalry of all kinds will claim your particular attention. The practical advantages and disadvantages attending the use of the various kinds of rifle arms which have been lately introduced extensively in European warfare. The nature and efficiency of ordnance and ammunition employed for field and siege operations, and the practical eft'ect of the late changes partially made in the Fi'ench field artillery. The construction of permanent fortifications, the arrangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defenses, and the kinds of ordnance used in the armament of them — the Lancaster gun, and other rifle cannon, if any are used. The composition of trains for siege operations, the kind and quantity of ordnance, the engineering operations of a siege in all its branches, both of attack and defense. The composition of bridge trains, kinds of boats, wagons, &c. The construction of casemated forts, and the effects produced on them in attacks by land and water. The use of camels for transportation, and their adaptation to cold and mountainous countries. To accomplish the objects of your expedition most eflectually in the shortest time, it appears to be advisable that you should proceed as soon as possible to the theater of war in the Crimea, for the purpose of observing the active operations in that quarter. You will then present yourselves to the commanders of the several armies and request from them such authority and facilities as they may be pleased to grant for enabling you to make the necessary observations and inquiries. You may find it practicable to enter Sebastopol and to proceed through Russia to St. Petersburg, with the view of visiting the works and seeing the operations which may be carried on in the Baltic. Should it not be possible or advisable to enter Russia in this way, you may be able to accomplish the same object by passing through Austria and Prussia. In returning from Russia, you will have an opportunity of seeing the military establishments of Prussia, Austria, France, and England. The arrangements of your journey must be regulated in a general measure by the state of aflairs existing on your arrival in Europe and the information you may acquire there. Letters are herewith furnished to you for our M'mislers in Europe, requesting them to afford you the aid in their power in accomplishing the objects of your mission. Funds for defraying the expenses of your journey are placed in the hands of Major Mordecai, who will disburse and account for them. You ara authorized to use a portion of these funds in purchasing for this department new books, drawings, and patterns of nrms and equipments, which you may consider of sufficient ^'alue in our service to warrant the expenditure. VI INTRODUCTION. Reserving uiilil your return lo the United States a full account of your expedition and tliu information you may obtain, you will report to the Secretary of War from time to time, ns opportunity may oflcr, the progress of your journey, ond remarks on the subjects within llie scope of your instructions which you may wish to communicate. All correspondence of this kind, proceeding either from the Commission jointly or from any member of it, will be for- warded, according to military usage and regulations, through the senior officer present. (Major Delafield was the senior member of the Commission.)- It is desirable that you should return home by the 1st of November, 1855. If you should find it essential for effecting the objects of your mission in a satisfactory manner to remain longer than that time, you will report the circumstances, so as to give time for an answer, in due season. Reliance is placed on your judgment and discretion to conduct your movements in such a manner as to give no reasonable ground for suspicion or offense to the military or other government authorities with whom you may have intercourse. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JEFFERSON DAVIS, Secretary of War. Major R. Delafield, Major A. Mordec.h, Captain G. B. McClell.\x, United States Jlrmij. On the 9tli of April, tlic Secretary of War wrote to our Minister in London, informing liiin that the President had been induced to dispatch these officers to make observations on the armies and fortifications of the belligerents as to wliat is now valuable ; that application was made to the diplomatic I'eprcsentatives of Prussia, Austria, Russia, France, and England, for such letters as miglit be agreeable for them to give. Favorable and satisfactory replies were put into tlic hands of the Commission at once by all these dij^lomatic authorities but the French, the Minister of which government first desired to inquire if by the words "seat of war" the Secretary of War intended "the camp of the Allies in the Crimea, and no other place whatever?" To this inquiry the Secretary replied, that he intended by the phrase "scat of war" to include the whole field of active operations, so that useful observations might be made wherever opportunity offered ; that the first point to which the officers will be instructed to i^roceed is the camjj of the Allies at Sebastopol ; they would, of course, announce their arrival to the commanding generals, and do nothing whilst there without their consent, and when about to retire would take leave and pursue the same route by which they had approached, or some other to which no objection existed ; that the second jjoint which it was projiosed to visit is the Island of Cronstadt, and here they would observe towards the commanding general of the Russian forces the same course which had been followed in the camp of the Allies ; that if other fields should afford opportunities to imi:)rove our knowl- edge of the science of war, it was the wisli of the Secretary that they should be made available for the advancement of our own service ; that the characters of the officers selected for this duty gave him full assurance that they will in nowise forget the obligations of strict neutrality, nor depart from the path of nicest honor, or fail in military proprieties so well understood by educated soldiers. He hoped that M. Sartiges would feel that no obligation was imposed on him by his polite suggestion when last he had the pleasure of an interview with him, as then he (M. S.) only anticipated the request whicli the Secretary had previously determined to make of sending a commission to Europe. To this communication the French Minister replied : " Votre liaute recommendations et le merite personnel de Messieurs les officiers charges de cette mission vous sont un sur guaraut de I'accueil honorable que leur sera fait en France par le gouvernement de I'Empereur auquel je m'empresserai de transmettre votre lettre. N'ayant pas d'occasion d'entretenir des rapports direct avec son Excellence M. le Ministre de la Guerre, j'ai I'lionneur de vous envoyer pour etro remise a MM. D., M., ct McC, unc lettre d'introduction personnelle addressee a son Excellence M. Drouyn de L'Huys, qui pourra fournir a ces Messieurs les indications qui leur scront necessaires, ce que je regrettc de ne pas etre a m#me de faire moi-m§me." INTRODUCTION. vii Our Miuister in Paris was in like manner inlbrmecl of tlie object oi' the Commission and tlic wishes of the President. With these letters of the diplomatic functionaries, and those to the American Ministers in Europe, the Commission sailed from Boston on the 11th of April, 1855. On the 2'7th of April, through the courteous attention of our Minister at London, Mr. Buchanan, the Commission had a personal interview wuth Lord Clarendon, who, on perusing Mr. Crampton's letter of intro- duction, remarked that the object of our visit had been communicated by the last steamer, in dispatches from Mr. Crampton. The Commission stated its wishes to witness the practice of the armies now in the field, as well as the fleets engaged in the war, and desired letters from his government authorizing such facilities to be extended as would secure the object, and so far as the commanding generals in their discretion should see fit. Lord Clarendon at once replied, that, so far as he could answer, ever)- flicility would be extended to the Commission ; and tliat, although he could not speak for Lord Panmure authori- tatively, we might rely upon our wishes being acceded to ; that he would see Lord Panmure, whose business it was to give the necessary letters, at an early moment, (Lord P. being then confined to his bed by indisposition.) In the course of this interview. Lord Clarendon stated, tliat as to going from their camps to that of the enemy, he could see no objections in our case ; that the character and honor of officers of the American array was of itself sufiicient to justify Lord Raglan in acquiescing thereto. On the 29th, Lord Clarendon inclosed letters of introduction to Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, adding if in any way he could be useful to Major Delafield and his brother officers, or assist the mission with which they were charged, he begged that they would freely command his services. Introductory letters to the Admiral of the Baltic fleet and to the officers in command at Constantinople were requested, which received the like courteous attention. Changes in the ministry in France caused some delay in obtaining an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of that government, to whom the Commission could alone make known its wishes and obtain such an official recognition as would secure to it admission to their military establishments. Through our Minister, Judge Mason, we had an interview with Count Walewsky, the successor to Drouyn de L'Huys. Count Walewsky at once and promptly stated that Judge Mason had explained to him that the Commission wished to go to the Crimea ; that lie would be very happy to give letters to the Commanding General there which would procure us the necessary facilities, but that there was an imperative rule in the French military service that no foreign officer could be permitted to go into their camp and afterwards to pass into that of the enemy ; that therefore it would be necessary for the members of the Commission to give a promise to our Minister that we would not go from the French camp to any other part of the Crimea. The Commission stated distinctly such was not its purpose^ and showed him the letter of the Secretary of War, of the 5th of April, to M. Sartiges, as the best explanation of our intentions, and that the Commission had no intention of going directly from their camp to their enemy's or from the camp of the Allies into Sebastopol, but that it was quite as interesting to them to see the defense as the attack, and that they did propose, after visiting the allied camjj, to go into Russia, and after visiting the places on the Baltic they might wish after some months interval to visit Sebastopol. Count Walewsky replied that such an arrangement would not affect tlie question; that the Commission must engage not to visit the Crimea after going to the allied camp ; that no one could, as a right, ask the privilege of going to their camps ; that it might be refused and had been refused without assigning any reason ; but that the Emperor, wishing to show his good disposition towards the United States, would willingly consent to our going there on the conditions which he had mentioned ; that if the Commission chose to go first to the Russian side it was no concern of the French. Count Walewsky requested the Commission would consider the matter and inform him of their determination through Judge Mason. The Commission then stated there were many establishments and objects of interest in a VIU INTRODUCTION. military puint of view in France, wliich it would be glad to see on its jouruej' out of the country or returning to it. To which Count W. replied, that on that subject there would be no difficulty, and the permission would be accorded with pleasure. In the course of this conversation, Count Walewsky stated that the imjicrative rule established by the French government precluded going to any Eussian post or army in the Crimea at any time ai\er having visited the allied army operating in that quarter, and that the rule would ajiply to entering the Crimea after conforming with the instructions of the War Department in visiting Cronstadt. Under these circumstances the Commission determined not to. accept the favor of entering the French camp with the conditions attached to it, but confine its request for authority to visit .specified military and naval establishments in France only, for the purpose of collecting informa- tion that might prove useful to our military service. This determination was communicated to Count Walewsky through our minister. Judge Mason, with the request he would forward to the Commission by mail the authority of the French government to visit such of the enumerated estahlishments as it might be pleased to grant. On the 28th of May, tlie Commission left Paris with the determination of proceeding as fast as practicable to the Eussian camjD in the Crimea, via Prussia, directing its movements first upon Berlin to confer with the Eussian minister in that city, to whom the Eussian minister in Washington had given a letter. This letter from Baron Stoeckl to Baron de Budberg stated: " Ces officiers ont ete designes par le President pour aller en Europe, afin d'etudier les perfection- nements qui ont ete introduits recemment dans I'art militaire. Us ont Tordre de se rendre a Constantinople et de la a Sevastopol ou a Odessa, ou bien de partir directment pour St. Peters- burg en passant par Berlin. Dans ce dernier cas, je vous prie Monsieur le Baron^ de vouloir bien viser les passeports de ces officiers et de leur faciliter les moyens de continuer leur voyage." While in Berlin, through the kindness of our minister, Mr. Yroom, the Commission had an interview with Baron Manteuffel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Prussia, who, in the most prompt manner, stated that he had in some measure anticipated the wishes of the Commission and written to the Minister of War in relation to obtaining information in Prussia on the art of war as practiced by them, and, in conformity with our request, he would give us authority to visit all such places as the Commission would name on its route into Prussia on returning from St. Petersburg, it having been explained to him the intention of first going to the Crimea via Warsaw, and thereafter to St. Petersburg; and that he would give authority to visit any other of the military establishments of Prussia on making known the wish to do so, after returning to Berlin. Through Mr. Vroom, the Commission in like manner had an interview with Baron de Budberg, who informed it that he had received orders from St. Petersburg in relation to the American officers constituting this Commission, and would indorse the passports and give letters to facilitate the object of the mission. This was in answer to the expressed wish to proceed to the Crimea, via Warsaw and Kiev, on the Dniper. The same evening Baron de Budberg called upon the Commission and delivered a sealed package to M. de Krusenstein, Directeur de la Ohancellerie, &c., a Varsovie, together with the passports indorsed by him in person. On the 4th of June, immediately after arriving in Warsaw, Baron de Budberg' s commu- nication was delivered, and the following letter written to him on the Gth: " I have the honor to inclose heijewith, for the information of Marshal Prince Paskievitch, the copy of a letter from the Secretary of War of the United States to M. de Stoeckl, Charge de Afiaires of the Emperor of Russia at Washington, and also of an open letter addressed by him to Baron de Budberg, at Berlin, given to the undersigned in the United States by M. de Stoeckl, by request of the Secretary of War. " We had the pleasure of seeing Baron de Budberg, in Berlin, on the 1st instant, when the letter of M. de Stoeckl was delivered to him. He then informed us that he had previously received instructions from St. Petersburg in relation to our mission ; that he would cause our passports to be specially indorsed by order of the Emperor, and would give us letters to yourself, requesting the necessary facilities from Marshal Price Paskievitch to expedite our journey and the object of our mission. We had the honor of handing you Baron de Budberg's letter on the 4th instant, and now inclose th« within to make INTRODUCTION. IX known the fact of our constituting a Commission, under the orders of the President of the United States, for the purpose set forth in M. de Stoeckl's letter. I will also do myself the pleasure of submitting for your perusal a circular from the Secretary of State of the United States to the diplomatic and consular agents in Europe, making known to them the fact of our consti- tuting a Commission to proceed to the Crimea for the purpose of observing the military operations there and elsewhere in Europe. "MAJOR DELAFIELD, in behalf of the Commission." This called forth a statement from Baron Krusenstein to the eifect that Prince Paskievitch was then absent, would not be back in some days, and that it was not in his power to authorize the Commission to proceed to the Crimea, or see the fortifications of Warsaw and Modlin, but that he would write or see the military governor of Warsaw, and no doubt put us in the way of seeing the fortifications of Warsaw. Baron Krusenstein had informed the Commission that our constituting a Commission acting under the orders of our government did not apj)ear in any document in his possession ; that he had not been so informed by Baron de Budberg, and was ignorant of the fact until the Com- mission had so stated to him. To rectify so important an omission, that seemed in some measure to thwart the object of the mission, the letter of the 6th was written to Baron Krusenstein. This evidence of the ofiicial character of the Commission was delivered in person on the 7th of June, and appeared quite satisfactory. The letter of the Secretary of State was handed back without perusal, stating it was quite unnecessary, adding that the letter of the Commission to him stating it was acting under the orders of our government was enough. On the 9th of June, Prince Paskievitch gave authority to visit the fortifications of Warsaw and Modlin, ordering a colonel of engineers to accompany and explain anything that might be desired ; at the same time informing us that he could not give authority to go from Warsaw direct to the Crimea, and that he would recommend us to go to St. Petersburg, where all necessary authority rested and was to be obtained. It was not without surprise and disappointment the Commission found itself in Warsaw, witliout its object being proj^erly stated, and that their passports were of no more avail than those given to any travelers, thus compelled to undergo continued delay in their anxious desire of proceeding immediately to Sebastopol. The only course then left, was to proceed to St. Petersburg, and there renew our efforts to attain the object of our mission. Before leaving Warsaw the Commission had an interview, and received other polite atten- tions from the veteran hero. Marshal Paskievitch, when the business of the Commission was stated to him in person, which resulted in a renewal of what Baron Krusenstein had stated. Although much profitable information was obtained at Warsaw and Modlin, the great object of the Commission had not yet been entered upon; both France and Russia interposing unex- plained difficulties, through the meshes of diplomacj'' ; all of which could have been avoided by going, as many civilians had done and continued to do, direct to Sebastopol, via Constantinople. This course was, however, denied to the Commission, from the very fact of being in a national capacity for public purposes, which could only be recognized and sanctioned through the formula of diplomacy. The probability of witnessing a bombardment of the works of Cronstadt by tlie allied fleet, and other great military events in that quarter, together with the fiict of our instructions requiring a study and examination of these important sea-coast defenses, in some measure compensated for the disappointment exjierienced in not going direct to Sebastopol. On the 19th of June we reached St. Petersburg, and on the 25th, through the kind atten- tion of our Minister, Mr. Seymour, we had an interview with Count Nesselrode, the Prime Minister, on the subject of our mission, expressing to him our desire to see the defenses of Cronstadt and other military establishments about St. Petersburg, as also of Helsingfors, Swea- borg, and Revel, together with authority to go to Sebastopol, and leave the Crimea by such route as might be approved by the Russian authorities ; to examine all the works at Sebastopol, 2 D* X ^^^^^^KWr^'^^r INTRODUCTION. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ and visit the army in the fiehi, together with such places as we might pass through — as Odessa, Nicolaieff, and Pericop. Mucli time was passed in awaiting a final answer to this request. On the morning of the 26th, by appointment^ the Emperor desired we should he presented to him, and witness a review of some thousands of troops on the Champs de Mars. The troops being drawn up on three sides of a square, the Minister of War, Count Dalgourouki, conducted us to the center, the Emperor's station, and there presenting us, a short conversation ensued, the interesting part of which was his assent to our going to Cronstadt, and ending with a declar- ation on his part of the hope that the United States and Russia would continue always in peace and in friendship. On the afternoon of the same day Lieutenant Colonel Obrescoff, of the Guard, and Aid-de- Camp of Prince Dalgourouki, called upon us by direction of the Minister of War, to accomjiany us to the several military establishments in the vicinity that we had expressed the desire to examine, including Cronstadt. During the absence of the Minister of War, Colonel Obrescoff was directed to report to Baron Lieven, the Adjutant General, to whose care and attention our business had been confided. On the 9th of July we wrote to Baron Lieven, saying we had now seen, under the kind guidance of Colonel Obrescoff, all the establishments he was authorized to show us ; and, being unemployed, we would be much obliged by having an answer to our request concerning other places, a memorandum of wliich had been handed to him on the 2d of July; urging, at the same time, the importance of knowing as soon as possible what arrangements we should make for our departure. No answer to our request, (conveyed first through oi^r Minister to Count Nesselrode and afterwards through Baron Lieven,) except the partial one of seeing the military establish- ments in the neighborhood of St. Petersburg, had been received up to the 12th of July. Whether it was that the great and important events of the moment engrossed the time and attention of the bureau charged with our business, or a reluctance to admit, during the crisis of active opera- tions, any one to the field of action, we cannot conclude; but the vexatious annoyance of. pro- crastination could but be felt by the members of the Commission. To pass the time profitably while awaiting an answer to our request to go to Sebastopol, the Commission solicited and obtained letters from Baron Lieven to the authorities at Moscow to visit and examine the military establishments in that vicinity, including the Kremlin. On the 13th of July Baron Leiven called on us and then stated that on the subject of Sebastopol, Swea- borg, and Revel he must speak with frankness and sincerity to us, that his country had no secrets or information on military science to withhold from us, as we had seen by the manner in which their establishments here were thrown open to our examination, hut that the commanding officers of these places had requested that strangers or other persons not concerned in the opera- tions should not be permitted to visit them, as such visits occasioned them a great deal of embarrassment ; that a Prussian officer the past year and a Greek officer this year had been refused ijermission to go to Sebastopol in conformity with the rule they had made, and although the Emperor might, of course, overrule such objections, yet he felt bound to pay deference to the views and wishes of his commanders placed in such responsible positions, and therefore our request could not be granted; that as to the forts of Sebastopol, in seeing Cronstadt we would see the best works that had been constructed for harbor defense ; that the forts of Revel were of no interest, and those of Sweaborg were old Swedish works, on a system no longer followed, and that those of Sebastopol were on the same plan as those of Cronstadt, but of inferior material, being of limestone mixed with sand. Nothing could be urged in reply to the Emperor's answer. On the lith of July we attended a drill of two squadrons of cavalry, ordered expressly for our examination by the Commanding General. On the 15th, visited the camp at Crasno Cello of 50,000 men of infantry and artillery. On the 17th of July we again visited the Island of Cronstadt, being received and conducted INTRODUCTION. XI through and about all the permanent and temporary defenses by several officers of engineers and consular agents. On the 19th we proceeded to Moscow, where, under the guidance and kindness of Prince Ouroussoff, Major and Aid-de-Camp to the Governor, we found many things to note of interest connected with the military establishment of this nation ; and hastening back to St. Peter.sburg, left that city on the 2d of August and arrived at Konigsberg, in Prussia, on the 8th, where we had an opportunity of examining, under construction, the extensive system of fortifications of the Germans. Fi'om thence we proceeded to Dantzig, examining the old and new defenses of the continental engineers of that fortified city. On the 15th we arrived at the important fortress of Posen, for a very correct knowledge of which we are indebted to Spanish authors, verifying in person the knowledge of this German system, derived from continental military writers. Proceeding to the mouth of the Oder, some new sea-coast defenses were found to be under construction. The commandant not having received the authority of his government, could not permit us to examine them. A telegram from the Minister of War at Berlin to show everything connected with the defenses at that place was received in time to admit of examining these modern Prussian casemated sea-coast works. On the 23d of August, at Schwedt, we gained a very correct knowledge of every branch of the school of equitation at tliat place. On the 2oth the commission had returned to Berlin, and renewed its application through our Minister, Governor Vroom. Yet no answer was received from the Minister of War up to 4th of September, when the commission called in person upon Count Waldersee, the Minister, who then promptly acceded to our request, sending the next morning ticlcets of admission to eleven enumerated military establisliments in Berlin and Spandau. Baron Manteuffel took occasion, on the 8th of September, to respond, through Governor Vroom, to each and every request, authorizing drawings of barracks, of the arsenal at Spandau and its machinery, with books of regulations, and other matters, to be furnished on the personal application of the Commission. No reply had, to tliis period, been received from the French government in answer to the request to visit their camps in the Crimea. The siege operations about Sebastopol appearing from the published reports to be coming to a crisis, we determined to hasten to the Crimea, relying upon the letters already received for the English commanders, and trusting to the courtesy of Marshal Pelissier for the facilities we might find necessary in the French camp. When passing through Vienna, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Afiairs, Count Buol Schauenstein, on the application of our Minister, Mr. Jackson, authorized our visiting such of their military" establishments on returning from the Crimea as were opened to strangers. Hastening forward, via Dresden, Laybach, Trieste, and Smyrna, we found ourselves at last on the line of oi^erations of the allied army at Constantinople, on the 16th September. Through our Minister, Mr. Spence, we had an interview with Baron Tecas, the Sardinian Minister, who favored us with introductory letters explaining the object of our mission to General La Mar- mora, commanding the Piedmontese army in the Crimea. To the courtesy of the English naval authorities we were indebted for a passage in the first steamer that left for Balaklava, where we arrived on the morning of the 8th October. General Simpson, the successor of Lord Raglan as commander of the English army, on learning our arrival, sent two ofiicers of his stafl; to conduct us to quarters he had caused to be assigned us in the camp of the fourth division, on Cathcart's hill, a locality that overlooked a great extent of the field of operations. He caused us to be provided with rations for ourselves and servants and forage for our horses during our entire sojourn in the Crimea. Every official and personal facility and kindness was extended to us by the officers of the English army ; and to General La Marmora we were indebted for his courteous attention in detailing an officer of rank of his staff to conduct us through the Sardinian camps and outposts. During the whole period the commission remained in the Crimea an officer of the English Xll INTRODUCTION. army, under the authority of General Simpson, was our daily companion to escort us wherever there was anything of interest to be seen, accompanied on several occasions by their engineer officers. Immediately after establishing ourselves on Cathcart's hill, we made it our first duty to call upon General Pelissier, to pay our respects to the successful general of the campaign, to explain to him the orders of our government, and the fact of not having to that date received the authority of the French government to visit their camps, as anticipated from the conversations with Count Walewski, at Paris, in May. We saw on this occasion General de Martimprey, Chief of the General Staff, who informed us the marshal was engaged, and could not then see us. General Martimprey then stated to us his belief that letters had been received at their headquarters relating to our mission. On our request, he gave us a "pass" to visit the French trenches-, Sebastopol, the Malakoff, and the docks. General Simpson had given us a similar one. They ■viexe printed passes, such as were given to any visitor to the Crimea, and authorized no addi- tional facilities than such as were open to other officers of the American service then on a visit to the Crimea, (Captain Porter and Mr. Heap, of the navy, and Captain Wayne, of the army,) as well as other travelers not accredited officially to the commanders ; nor was any obligation asked or required of them. At this interview General Martimprey kindly gave us an intro- duction to the Chief Engineer, General Niel, on whom we called. Being absent at the moment, we failed to have the pleasure of an interview with this distinguished engineer. An officer of his staff was kind enough to lay before us the plan of the siege works from the commencement of the operations to the final assault on the 8th September, which served to give a comprehensive idea of operations extended over many miles, that no other means could have subserved in the time allowed for our sojourn in the Crimea; a favor that was duly appreciated. On the 15th October the Commission again culled at the headquarters of General Pelissier, to pay our respects and explain the nature of our business, and again saw General de Martim- prey, to whom we expressed our desire to see the marshal. He informed us he was then engaged, and could not see us, and that no communications had been received to that date by the marshal in relation to us. On expressing the hope we might have an opportunity of seeing him, he informed us that the marshal would appoint a time for receiving us. On the afternoon of the 2oth of October we received from the English post office at Balaklava dispatches from our Minister, Judge Mason, that had been received at the French post office at Kamiesch on the 12th of October, mailed at Constantinople on the 9th October ; and, although sending for and receiving letters from the post offices, this important official dispatch from Judge Mason did not come to hand until the 2oth, to which date we had received no intimation from General Pelissier 's headquarters of the appointed time to see us. This long looked for authorization from the French government, received with Judge Mason's dispatches, was as follows : MiNISTERE DES AfFAIRES EtRANGERES, Direction Politique, Paris, le 22 Septembre, 1855. Monsieur le Mar^chal : MM. Delafield, Mordecai, et McClellan qui auront I'honneur de vous remettre cette lettre, font partie de I'armee des Etats-Unis, et avaient ete charges par leur gouvernement d'etudier, tant en France qu'en Russie, et parliculierement en Crimee, les progres de la science militaire. Lorsque ces otEciers so presenterent ici, il y a trois niois et solicitercnt de moi une lettre d 'introduction a vous, je leur repondis que je ne pourrais la leur accorder que sous la condition qu'apres avoir ete en Crimee, ils ne se rendraient point en Russie. Se considerant comnie obliges par les instructions de leur gouvernement a visiter les elablissements militaires de cat etat, ils refuscrent de donner la promesse que j 'exegeais d'eux. Apres avoir effectue leur voyage en Russie, ils se sont de nouveau adresses a moi par I'interraediaire du Ministre des Etats- Unis qui m'a declare qu'ils s'engageaint sur I'honneur a ne se rendre ni en Russie, ni dans aucune possession Russe, apres avoir visite nos lignes el nos etablissements militaires en Crimeo. Mr. Mason d'ailleurs s'est porte garanl de cet engagement formel, des lors, je n'ai plus hesite, a leur accorder la lettre d'introduction qu'ils solicitaient. En consequence, Monsieur le Marechal, j'ai I'honneur de recommander ces officiers a votre bienveillant accueil. Agreez, &c., &c., WALEWSKY. i INTRODUCTION. Xlll Up to the day of receiving this letter of Count Walewsky to Marshal Pelissier, we had heen accompanied in all our excursions and examinations hy an officer of the English army, and having received no intimation of any time being fixed to see General Pelissier, even to the hour of leaving the Crimea, we were precluded from all opportunity of presenting ourselves to deliver the letter of Count Walewsky, commending us to his attention. It was a source of regret that we liad no opportunity of paying our respects in person to the distinguished commander of the French army, the hero of the Malakoff ; and that the terms upon which Count Walewsky was willing we should examine the French camps and army under command of the Marshal, were such as we could not accept. Although not losing any profitable information thereby, we had to regret the opportunity of conferring with so many talented and gallant officers, as would have been the case, could our intention of camping half the time with the French army not have been thwarted by these untoward formalities of diplomacy. The letter of Count Walewsky to Judge Mason, of the ITtli September, attached the condition, " a ne se rendre ni en Kussie, ni dans aucune place militaire dependant de cette puissance, apres avoir visite le camp Fran^ais." While in May his limitation was far from covering the entire Russian dominions as now exacted, a restriction that could only be accepted by us on the previous sanc- tion of our government. The result was, that the Commission confined its examination to the camps, depots, parks, workshops, &c., of the English, Sardinian, and Turkish armies, never entering the French camps in the Crimea, except on visits of courtesy. In an official letter to Judge Mason, of the 3d December, 1855, we stated, that although we were precluded the pleasure of availing ourselves of Count Walewsky's favorable intentions, we nevertheless felt ourselves under as great obligation to conform to the spirit and meaning of all that passed between us and him on the 24th of May, as though the " word of honor" particu- larly noted in the Count's letter had been given, an obligation equally obligatory in relation to the English, Sardinian, and Turkish armies, as well as their opponents the Russians, from each and all of whom facilities were cordially extended to us, without conditions of any kind being demanded. On the 2d of November, 1855, we left Balaklava in an English transport, under the authority of General Simpson. Since these occurrences, I have learned, that at the time we first applied to the French gov- ernment in April, the Emperor had then written to General Canrobert of his intention to take the field with an army, and forwarded his plan of a campaign ; and at the time we applied to the Russian government, it had received advices of the necessity of making preparations for evacuating the south side of Sebastopol. After spending some days in Constantinople and Scutari to examine the hospitals and depots of the Allies, we left there on the 13th of November, in an Austrian steamer, for the mouth of the Danube, intending to ascend that river in steamers to Vienna. Delays at Varna, as well as at the mouth of the Danube, compelled us to return to Constantinople and take the route up the Adriatic to Triest and again over the Semmering railroad to Vienna. This afforded an oppor- tunity of examining the defenses of Varna, which, in connection with Shumla, had formed barriers against the Russians in former campaigns. It also gave us additional information, in relation to the most remarkable engineering skill and extended works on the Semmering railroad of which we have any knowledge ; the plans of which have been deposited in the library of the War Office. On the IGtli of December, we had returned to Vienna. An interview with Count Buol caused us to be introduced to an officer of the general stafl", who accompanied us daily to examine the Austrian military establishments that occupy a prominent part of my report. From the Grand Dukes William and Leopold, the former as Commander of the Army and the latter as Chief Engineer, we received authority to visit their military and naval establish. XIV INTRODUCTION. nients in Venice, Verona, Mantna, and Milan, which occupied us between the 14th and 25th of January. At Venice, the Governor ordered an officer of engineers to accompany and throw oi^en to us, all matter of interest in that city and vicinity, at the same time ordering his steam yacht to convey us about the lagunes and harbor defenses. At Verona we were most kindly received by the veteran hero Marshal Radetsky, who contributed in everj^ way to the attainment of our wishes, as well as to our personal gratification. An officer of engineers was here also ordered to accompany us to the military establishments, which being recent modifications on an extensive scale, according to the present German system of fortification, ingrafted iipon the oldest bastion system, were of especial interest. To our Minister at Vienna, Mr. Jackson, we took occasion to say, that in all our intercourse with the functionaries charged with the various estab- lishments we had been authorized to visit, facilities and courteous receptions had invariably been extended to us ; and that our intercourse with the officers of the Austrian government and army has been every way agreeable, calling for an expression of our most respectful acknowledge- ments. At Genoa, through our consul, Mr. Herbemont. we received from the Governor every facility for' examining the defenses and matters of military interest in his power to throw open to us. Some difficulty, however, between Turin, the telegraph, and different authorities at Genoa, interposed to prevent our seeing some of the recent military constructions in that vicinity. On the 2d of February we arrived at Toulon, and, with the authority previously obtained from the French government, examined the military and naval defenses of that important depot. The system of conducting visitors through and about the public works we now found to be entirely different- from that of other nations. Printed tickets of admission had been sent to us from Paris, which commanded the services of a porter to conduct us through the buildings, docks^ and vessels; thus again preventing our making the acquaintance of officers of rank and talent in their marine as well as army. Much information will be found in my report in rela- tion to this naval establishment. At Marseilles we spent the Yth February, examining the details for transportation of cavalry, and arrived at the important fortified city of Lyons on the 8th, where Marshal Castillon gave us tickets of admission to visit the recent labors of the French engineers, of which I had very excellent descriptions in the writings of the continental engineers, now verified by this exami- nation, made according to the prevailing system of being shown about the localities by a non- commissioned officer. Belfort, another modern work of the French engineers, we had like authority from the French government to visit, and we had the pleasure of being shown about, and having an explanation of the combination of the labors of Vauban with those of the present French engineers, by an officer of that arm of the service, through a part of the works. At Strasbourg, on the 17th February, General Grouchy directed an officer of engineers and one of artillery to accompany us through the defenses of this extensive frontier fortress, together with its hospitals and other military buildings ; presenting, however, little of special interest, except as being one of Vauban's enlarged fields of engineering skill and talent. Eastadt, one of the frontier fortresses of the Germanic Confederation, was visited on the route to Coblentz. Having no authority to visit this extensive and modern labor of the German school, through a visit to the Commanding General we succeeded in being, conducted by an officer of his staff, in a hasty walk about the interior, confined mostly to the streets of the city. By observations from the railroad stations, along the glacis of the works that was a public promenade, added to the information possessed from continental engineers, the opportunity sufficed to ingraft upon the memory the important features of this system as given to us by the writings referred to. It will be found in my report sufficiently explained for our purposes. At Coblentz we were again disappointed in not finding the authority of the Prussian Minister of War to visit that interesting system of defenses. On the 8th of September, through our minister. Governor Vroom, we had been advised that orders had been given. A telegram to 1 INTRODUCTION. XV Count Waldersee, the Minister of. War, was promptly answered on the 21st February, which served to throw open to our examination all the works composing the defenses of the two sides of the rivers, and enabling us to comprehend the published accounts most satisfactorih^ The commandant of the place very obligingly authorized an officer of engineers to conduct us to posts of the military establishments, occupying our time fully until the return telegram, when he conducted us throughout tlie whole. It appeared, in the end, that Count Waldersee had given orders as early as the 10th of September to allow us to see all parts of these defenses. Cologne was the next point o^' military interest, but unfortunately we had no authority from any source to examine this stronghold. The published accounts, however, are very minute, and served, with the walks and rides open to all travelers, to give all the desii-ed information of another example of the new German school ingrafted upon ancient works and described in my report. The 24th and 25th of February were spent at Liege, where our time was occupied at the national foundery for artillery and another for small arms, both on more extended scales than any corresponding establishments in Europe at that time. Numerous private factories of arms exist in this city, from all of which, during the year 1854, no less than 562,000 stands of small arms had been manufactured for the European as well as other nations. On the 1st of March we had returned to Paris and at the earliest moment had an interview with Marshal Magnan, to whom we were informed we should jaresent ourselves, in the authority previously obtained by Judge Mason from Count Walewsky. The Marshal indorsed the author- ity we had previously received, informing us that would suffice and secure all necessary facilities. At Vincennes, the Commandant countersigned the authority we presented and put a sergeant at our disposal for two days to conduct us about the place. Under like circumstances we visited all other military establishments in Paris that could be thrown open to us. Matters relating to the artillery we were desirous of examining, but failed to obtain authority therefor on a personal application to Marshal Vaillant, the Minister of War. While at the same interview he gave us an order on the Engineer Bureau for jilans of their system of barracks and other military buildings. The Commission, on the 18th March, proceeded to Cherbourg, with the tickets of admission to that establishment which secured admittance to all the works both military and naval in like manner as at others in France, under the conduct of a non-commissioned officer. It will be observed that published maps and plans constitute the illustrations of my report for the public works in France as well as other countries. At Havre the new works of defense under construc- tion not having as yet been published to the world by any continental writer, I do not, in conse- quence, enter into any explanatory details thereof. On the 24th of March we left Havre, and arrived in London the same night. Our Minister (Mr. Dallas) had a personal interview with Lord Palmerston and at once obtained the concur- rence of the government to see its military and naval establishments in and about London and on the channel. Up to the 12th of April, however, from some unexplained and unaccountable cause, no such authority had been sent to us. On the 13th April Mr. Dallas received a note from the Foreign Office assuring him that orders had been issued by the War Department and Board of Admiralty for our admission to the naval and military establisliments enumerated in our request; and thereafter visited the arsenal and dock-yards at Woolwich and vessels at Ports- mouth, and the defenses near Yarmouth, on the Isle of Wight, and received every courtesy and facility we could desire from the military and naval officers at those stations in furthering the object of our visit. The last official act of the government was an invitation, through Mr. Dallas, to be present at the review of the fleet at Portsmouth ; and when at Liverpool receiving a communication from General Wetherall, dated the previous day, from the Horse Guards, stating that the Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief having learned of our Minister having made XVI INTRODUCTION. known our desire to see the military establishments of England, he had ordered that every facility should he afforded us in oiir visits on receiving an intimation of the stations we intended to visit; and understanding that we were then at Liverpool, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith, Bart., Gr. C. B., commanding at Manchester, had been directed to place a staff officer in communication with us with a view to our admission to the establishments situated in the northern and midland districts of England. An officer of the Dragoon Guards called to accom- pany us and carry into effect the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. On the ISth of April we informed Mr. Dallas that every facility had now been extended to us for attaining the object of our wishes contained in his request to Lord Palmerston of the 31st of March, and that we had greatly to regret that the receipt of those documents at that date prevented our availing ourselves of the favor, as we embarked the succeeding day for the United States. To Professor Agnel, of the United States Military Academy, I am greatly indebted for translations from Sijanish writers. Under such circumstances the information in the following report was collected in less than a year, attended -with frequent delays in having first to receive the authority of the several governments, most of which, engaged in an arduous contest occupying the time and doubtless the anxious cares of all their authorities, they could but look upon our business as but secondary in importance to the welfare of the interests at stake in the great contest then waging among them; which may in many instances have been the cause of the procrastination and delay we had to experience, and in some cases thwarting our purpose of communicating to our brother officers more matters of interest to them. KICHAED DELAFIELD, Colonel of Engineers, Superintendent of Military Academy. West Point, November 19, 1860. LETTEll TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. FoET ElCHMOND, HaRBOR OF NeW YoRK, August 11, 1856. Sir : I desire now to lay before you a general outline of the notes and observations, with other information collected by me as a member of the Military Commission to the Crimea, &c., instituted by your special order of the 2d April, 1855, with the hope you may not be disap- pointed in the expectations then formed of deriving therefrom some advantages for our military service and general welfare of the country. The contest that commenced, in 1854, between the principal military and naval powers of Europe, gave rise, during its progress, to the belief that the art of war had undergone some material changes since the days of Napoleon and Wellington, and that new principles of attack and defense had been resorted to, in the prolonged defense by the Eussians of the land and sea fronts of Sebastopol, and in the great preparations made by the allies for reducing the sea- defenses of Cronstadt and Sebastopol. On examination this change will be found mainly in the increased magnitude of the engines of war, and the perfection to which they have been brought by the unceasing application of talent and skill to their improvement, accomplished by the accuracy and rapidity of workman- ship by the machinery of the arsenals of the present day, and that few new principles have been introduced with much success in the late contest. For a long period the continental powers had been occupied in preparing large quantities of munitions of war, on which they had bestowed all the skill and intelligence that could be com- manded from the fruits of the various theoretical and practical seminaries, established in every kingdom. Like attention was given to the personal of their armies. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers, as well as the auxiliary branches of the profession, such as the medical, veterinary, transport, commissariat, ponton, topographical, engineer, and other branches of service, were, as a general rule, all provided with special schools of instruction, both theoretical and practical. To such an extent has it been carried on the continent, that the military profession is not only indispensable for the protection of tlie existing governments against each other's encroachments, but places that profession first in importance in the estima- tion of the sovereign power, taking rank and receiving honors, the highest in the gift of the monarch to bestow upon a subject. It is important we should understand this in connection with its bearing upon the welfare of our country in a political as well military point of view. The continental nations are com- pelled to keep large standing armies on foot, and great military resources prepared, from their apprehension of each other. As one power increases its military efficiency, whether by the invention of a new weapon, or by men and fortresses, the neighboring nations, as a means of self-preservation, are compelled to do likev/ise. The tendency is thus constantly to increase ; although clearly and well understood by the various governments to be impoverishing the 1 D 2 LETTER TO TUE SECEETARY OF WAR. nation, by withdrawing «o much industry from the soil, manufactures, and commerce, while it increases the expenses of the State, at the same time that it diminishes its ability to create wealth to fill its cofi'ers. We must for a long time to come look to this continued preparation in the art of war as an established fact, and study its consequences in our relations with the Eastern World. We must bear in mind, that so important is the military profession, or the art of self-defense, as it has now become, with the neighboring powers of Europe, that the youth of the nobles, as well as the princes of the reigning families, receive military educations. As a consequence, the reigning monarchs are professionally educated soldiers, with ability to judge imderstandingly of the merits of any improvements proposed in the art of war, and capable of commanding either as infantry, cavalry, or engineer officers, with a talent and skill equal to any of their generals, only surpassed by such as possess that genius with which nature alone gifts the mind. The three Emperors of the continent at the present time, to wit : of Eussia, Austria, and France, are ^unquestionably highly educated statesmen and soldiers. One of them is a writer, and inventor of military science and art. They are not mere instruments of royalty, controlled by counselors of state of superior intellect, but hold in their hands the power and resources of their respective nations, governed only by their best ji;dgments and council of ministers of state. This great preparation and resources for war exist, and must continue to exist, as a precau- tionary measure, with a tendency to increase by all that art and science can bring to its aid, directed by the minds of a few individuals, with power to apply it with all the celerity that singleness of purpose can effect, wheresoever the governing spirit may be influenced, either by interest, the blind infatuation and wickedness of the human mind, or self-defense. We should not be indifferent spectators of this perfection of the military art and its concen- tration in command of the few. The moneyed interest, as a general rule, is in the hands of the nobles and aristocracy. Their welfare and happiness is that of the monarchy. Every principle upon which that form of government exists is antagonistical to our own. Every political letter, or friendly and social one, written from our country to an European, carries information of the privileges and rights of man and property, as here rmderstood and practiced, entirely at variance with those governing the nations of Europe. The foundation of their system, and the prosperity and happiness of the wealthy classes, is constantly warred upon by our individuality of thought, and its expression in the freedom of our press. It must not then be surprising that we can have no friexds politically in the governing powers of the Eastern World, and it requires no stretch of the imagination to look forward to a combination of the powers of those antagonistic forms of government to attempt to check the growing influence that constantl}', though slowly, tends to crush the ruling principle, and with it involve the governors, nobles, aristocracy, and monarchs in ruin. Their self-preservation must always cause them to look with anxiety and a^iprehension to our growth, and ere it becomes all powerful to combine in some way to protect themselves. The peaceful arts are a counterpoise to the disturbance of amicable relations, yet they did not suffice to prevent the combination of several monarchies to restrain the growing power of one of their neighbors, and may have no stronger influence to prevent a combination against our Eepublic when its growth in like manner endangers their prosperity. Our resources are unquestionably great, and equal to several of the powers of Europe com- bined, but our preparation in material, equipment, knowledge of the art of war, and other means of defense, is as limited and ineflicient, as theirs is powerful and always ready. As a nation, other than in resources and general intelligence of our people, we are without the elements of military knowledge and efficiency for sudden emergency ; while no nation on earth can more certainly put itself in a condition to set any hostile force at defiance. We possess a nucleus of military knowledge in the country barely sufficient for the wants I if our aimy in time of peace, without facilities for practicing the arts of the several arms, or LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 3 means of forming, creating, or instructing any of the personnel than the officer. The auxiliary branches are not provided for. Our sea-coast defenses are not conducted with as much energy as an individual bestows in building a residence for his family ; the latter, in many instances, expending more in a year on his dwelling than our people will authorize to be expended in the same time for the defense of a city. It is imdeniable that of the number of guns needed for tlie defense of our sea-coast the nation does not contain, including the whole standing army, men enough that know how to fire hot and hollow shot to provide a single man for a sixth part of the guns. In this unprepared state, on our part, several of the powers of Europe have steam transports and munitions, with fleets superior to our own, ready at any moment to throw on our coast, in no longer time than is necessary to steam across the Atlantic, disciplined armies that could land in six hours after anchoring, do us injury and cripple our resources to an extent that would require a long time to restore. The late European contest has shown how rapidly the continental powers could march to the coast and embark detachments of from ten to twenty thousand disciplined troops in steam transports, accommodating a thousand men each, with supplies for a voyage equal to crossing to our shores; yet with a blind indifference, professing at the same time to be all powerful, our people neglect the many calls and statements of those they appoint to study this subject, leaving us at the mercy, in the first years of a conflict, of either of the naval and military powers of the Old World.' Viewing the subject in all its bearings, I am more impressed than ever with our comparative want of preparation and military knowledge in the country, and that the Secretary of War will do a great good service to the nation by increasing the materiel and munitions, means of defense, and the diffusion of military information in every possible way that our institutions will permit, without creating any more of a standing army than the growth of the country calls for, preparatory to that great struggle which sooner or later may be forced upon us, and to resist which, with our i^resent means, we are comparatively unprepared. With the hope that what it may be in my power to lay before you may conduce to such end, I herewith communicate the information collected by me under your instructions of the 2d April, 1855. RICHARD DEL AFIELD, Major of Engineers. Hon. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War. REPORT. The introduction of the long gun to fire shells horizontally, both for land and sea service, with a tendency to increase the calibers; and of the rifle, with various modifications for all small arms, may now be considered as the settled policy and practice of all the military powers of Europe. The belief in the superiority of these two principles was so well established, that all the powers engaged in the late great contest, as well as the neighboring neutrals, were driven to follow each other in their introduction as fast as their manufacture would permit. For want of time to provide the most approved weapons, modifications of the existing arms in the arsenals and depots were resorted to by the different powers. Field guns in like manner underwent a material change, by the adoption of the Napoleon 12-pounder as a substitute for the light pieces, with modified improvements in the shrapnell shell for these pieces and those of heavier caliber. France has already in her arsenals several hundred of this new model Napoleon 12- pounder, (the idea of the present Emperor ;) and, as a consequence, England, Austria, Saxony, Prussia, and Russia have been manufacturing and introducing them in their armies. This change in the calibers of artillery, now generally adopted in Europe, calls for action on our part, to say how far we should introduce a similar armament where at present our light 6-pounder would be of no avail, and is a particular considered worthy of attention. All needful information relating to the size of this new field piece has been collected. In the armament of sea-coast batteries, the eight and ten-inch diameter long guns may now be considered as adopted for all the harbors and water defenses of Europe, to the abandonment of all lighter ones other than the 42-pounder, which we must consider as still necessary to be retained for hot shot that can be advantageously used at ranges far beyond that of the shell or solid shot from the eight or ten-inch gun. Russia was substituting these heavy guns daily in her sea-coast defenses at Cronstadt for the 36-pounders in presence of her enemy's fleet. In the interior, at her fortresses, she was mounting similar guns on the salients and other commanding points. We may consider that an additional degree of strength and power of resistance has been gained by the introduction of these long eight and ten-inch guns in the armament of fortresses, by forcing the assailants to commence their operations at some two thousand yards from the fortress, instead of six or seven hundred, as heretofore, against the lighter armaments. One of the elements of the protracted and gallant defense of the entrenchments about Sebastopol is due to the introduction of the heavy armament of the Russian fleet in the batteries along the crest of the hills above and around the harbor of Sebastopol. They forced the allied army not only to commence their operations at more than two thousand yards from the Russian defenses, but to use guns of corresponding range, and to encamp their armies and establish their depots at greater distances, thereby consuming so much 6 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. more time to work by the slow progress of the saj) up to the Kussian entrenchments. This element is worthy the study and reflection of our artillery officers in the armament and defense of the land fronts of our sea-coast defenses, and of the Secretary of War in enabling them to practice its uses. It is not only Eussia that has introduced this heavy armament in her fortresses. The same was noticed in Prussia, the works of the Germanic Confederation, Austria, France, Sardinia, and Belgium. Its advantages should not be lost sight of, in all our land as well as water batteries, securing to the defense the means of destroying or injuring an enemy at a greatly increased distance, gaining time in the defense, while it renders the establishment of ricochet enfilading batteries on the prolongation of the lines of defense more "difficult and often impracticable. The rifle is now the common arm for the infantry of all the European armies. The carbine and pistol are being made and introduced on the same principle, and all of them for the use of what is generally called the Minie ball. The smooth bore is no longer made for military service. Its use may be considered as confined to old j)atterns that circumstances have not yet permitted to be altered. The percussion lock is universal. The Austrians seem to have adopted the most uniform system in the application of the rifle for their army. The bore and lock of their musket, carbine, and pistol are all of the same pattern, and a ball common to the three has been adopted, thus making the only difl'erence in the ammuni- tion to consist in the quantity of powder in the cartridge, while the lock and some other parts of each weapon are common, and can be repaired by substitution of parts from either. Patterns of these arms were presented by the Austrian government. None of the other powers seem to have definitively adopted the best or satisfactory shape of the ball, although all have taken the rifle principle. On the battle field of Inkerman and trenches in front of Sebastopol I picked up balls that had been fired of the ordinary spherical shape; the English Enfield rifle balls. Figs. 1 and 2; the Eussian solid conical ball, Fig. 6; their short hemispherical ball, Fig. 5; and the Minie ball of the French, Fig. 4. While all agree that great advantages are gained with the rifle^ and have adopted it, still a great contrariety of opinion exists as to the best form of ball, and principle, even, by which it is made to partake of the rifle twist of the gun barrel. 1. The tige principle, or forcing the end of the ball open, to fit the bore and rifle grooves, by driving it on a projecting spike in the bottom of the gun, attached to the breech, and rising through the charge of powder, as in Fig. A, is practiced by some, and in the French service. For loading with such balls the head of the rammer must be counter sunk to fit the head of the ball. Fig. 0. Full iizc. Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Full size. Fig. 6. Full sizt. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. - 7 2. Another principle has been adopted by the English for their Enfield rifle, which consists in forcing a cup or cone in a hollow or opening in the bottom of the ball, thus expanding it, to fit the rifle grooves. This is effected by the action of the powder. The shape of their ball, Fig. 1, differs from most others. The cup or cone of the balls used in the Crimea by the rifle brigade were of iron. They were found objectionable, sometimes cutting off a ring of lead, that was left in the gun. A substitute was afterwards adopted of solid wooden cups or cones. Others made of papier mache had also been tested. (See Fig. 3.) Fig. 2 is the section of a larger ball on the same principle, picked up in the Crimea. 3. A third principle has been adopted by the French, Russians, and others, of an open hollow base in contact with the powder, which is forced open by the blast, thus filling the bore and fitting the rifle grooves, as in Fig. 4, with three exterior grooves; and a modification of the same as in Fig. 5. 4. A fourth principle, adopted or in use by the Eussians, is a solid ball with two slight projections on the cylindrical part of the solid, made to fit two grooves cut in the bore of the gun. They also were used at Sebastopol. Fig. 6 gives its size and proportions. Full size. Fig. 8. Full size. Fi". 9. Full size. Fig. 10. Full size. Fig. 11. Full size. Fig. 13. Full size. 5. The Sardinian army used in the Crimea a modification of the preceding as shown in Figs. 7 and 8. 6. The Sardinian army retain as yet, for part of their infantry^ a smooth-bored musket, for which their army in the Crimea used a ball of the size and shape of Fig. 9. 7. The Zouaves of the French army were found using a solid cylindro-conical grooved ball, as in Fig. 10, in a tige rifle. 8. The Austrian rifle of 1856 has a ball acting upon a different principle from any of the preceding. It is a solid cylindro-conical ball, with two deep grooves cut in the cylindrical part, such that the parts between the grooves are forced together and outwards, or "upiset" by the explosion of the powder, to fill the bore and fit the rifle grooves, as in Fig. 11. 9. The Saxon army uses a rifle ball of the same principle as the Austrian, but with a single groove, of the form and dimensions of Fig. 12. , Other forms and shapes are in use, yet no one of them has secured the confidence of all. Nor, indeed, does any one power seem to be fully satisfied, or to have finally determined which is best. While at Viucennes it was ascertained that the French were still experimenting on a largo scale in ^e daily practice of firing thousands of rounds of different descriptions of balls at targets, to endeavor to find tlic best results from trial. Fig. 13. Full size. Fig. 1 1. Full si/.p. Fig. 15. Full size. Fig. ir>. Full size. Fig. 17. Full size. 8 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. They were, at the time, using a grooved cylindro-couical ball, with an iron cup or cone, having the vertex of the ball slightly truncated, of the form and size of Fig. 13. A ball of the size and shape of Fig. 14 was being jirepared at the laboratory at Vin- cennes at the same time. Other modifications of the cylindro-conical ball, with and without grooves, the latter of different shapes, without the cui), with varied thickness of the metal to be expanded to the rifle grooves, were in like manner being tested. Figs. 15 and 16 give the size and dimensions of two of these modifications that commanded most favor, so far as the exjieri- ments had gone. Another experimental ball was obtained in Prussia, made of cast-iron. Its form and size is given in Fig. 17. No information was had in relation to it. A greatly increased range, with precision of fire, is secured to the European armies by the introduction of the Minie rifle, which is decidedly better for military purposes than the old pattern, as it can be loaded with greater facility and ease. This accuracy of fire at long ranges is only to be obtained by great elevations, measured by a movable sight or hausse, without which many of its advantages would be lost. Patterns of the various modifications of the hausse were obtained from different nations, and will be made available for the examination of the officers of the army. It thus appears there is a wide field ojien for the study of our infantry officers in the form and shape of the ball best suited to the rifle for our service, and that the Secretary of War may promote the interest of this arm of our service by calling the attention of the infantry officers to this as yet unsettled desideratum, the best form and size of the rifle ball. . BKEECH-LOADING SMALL AKMS. Carbines. — Of breech-loading small arms the Emperor Napoleon has the merit of having made improvements as satisfactory (so far as tested) as his changes in field artillery of intro- ducing a light 12-pounder gun as a substitute for all the smaller calibers. The carbine in use of the Cent Garde is of his invention. It has a very small bore, is rifled, loads at the breech, and fitted with a long straight saber as a bayonet. Without a hausse it gives precision of fire to hit the size of a man at the distance of six hundred meters, and with a hausse a maximum range exceeding fifteen hundred meters. A peculiar merit of this carbine is the simplicity of the lock, composed of three pieces only. The Cent Garde is a mouated corps. Muskets. — It is a remarkable fact that notwithstanding a knowledge of breech-loading small arms for at least two centuries, and that every museum of arms in Europe has numerous specimens, no satisfactory weapon for war purposes has as yet been invented. The success of Sharp, and other inventors in tliis country in carbines, is well known, and being tested by some of the European powers for their cavalry. Prussia alone, of all the continental powers, has adopted such a system for her infantry, using therefor the needle gun; and although in use in her army for many years past, and well known in all its details, no other nation has been willing to follow her example. Celerity and rapidity of fire are the main points aimed at by the many inventors and advocates of this modi- fication of the musket. We know that with the present weapons hundreds of rounds of ammu- nition are fired without producing any efiect, and probably not one shot in a thousand rounds issued to the soldier ever does execution. The late contest, as well as all previous wars, establishes this waste of cartridges. It is steadiness and aim at the object by the soldier that must be secured, a principle at variance with rapidity and celerity. Other than Prussia, Norway is the only country that has adopted a breech-loading musket. Its construction is not such as to recommend it for our service, yet a model has been purchased that it may be understood by such as seek information on the subject. While this principle is not considered very desirable for the infantry, for cavalry it is a great desideratum to obviate ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 9 the difficulty of loading on horseback. Most of the European armies are directing their atten- tion to siich a weapon for cavalry, all preserving the Minie rifle principle. A modification of the holster pistol, seen in the Austrian arsenal, in some measure super- sedes the necessity of even the breech-loading carbine. They have manufactured a rifle pistol, loading at the muzzle with the ball Fig. 11, carried ordinarily in the holster, presenting no difficulty in loading when mounted. It is attached at pleasure to a wooden but, similar in form to that of the musket, which is carried by a sling over the shoulder. When attached to the pistol it forms a short carbine, with all the precision of fire of the rifle for distances between 100 and 150 yards ; and in close quarters can be used as an ordinary pistol, either with or without the but. This is certainly preferable to the ordinary holster pistol, and may well be considered as worthy of being substituted therefor to the entire abandonment of the present model holster cavalry pistol. Ring for shoulder belt. Fig. 18. The above figure indicates the arrangement for attaching and disengaging the but at pleasure, and the ring for slinging the latter over the shoulder.* EIFLE CANNON. An attempt is being made by several of the European powers to adapt the rifle principle to the heaviest artillery, and has been so far successful as to cause its introduction into the arma- ment of part of the expedition destined against Cronstadt in 1856. The Lancaster gun, used by the English artillery at Sebastopol, is an example of a rifle cannon of the heaviest caliber. The bore of this gun, instead of having a circle for its section, has an ellipsis of 8" and 8f" diameters. It is generated by the motion of such an ellipse, with its center always in the axis of the gun, making a revolution (i. e. the section) of about one quarter of a turn in the length of the bore, thus forming a continuous elliptical cylinder, with Fig. 19. • I find, on returning to the United States, that a similar weapon has been designed, manufactured, and in some part introduced into our service, under the direction of Colonel Davis, Secretary of War. Its introduction into the Ausli-ian service was certainly but recent. The first and only arms of this description noticed were in the Austrian arsenal of construc- tion at Vienna. I cannot pretend to say that this information is derived from Austiia. It is quite as probable that some traveler in this country interested in the Austrian military service may have seen it in our workshops, and, as myself, a stranger to its previous use, have sent it to his country. 10 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the greater axis in the vertical plane at the muzzle section gradually becoming horizontal at the breech section; or, in other words, the whole length and section of the bore is a rifle twist of one quarter of a turn in its length, (this is given as about the ratio of the twist, more definite information not being accessible,*) as in the above Fig. 19. The points a h, at the muzzle, make so much of a turn in passing to the breech as to assume the positions c d. The ball is a wroughf-ivon shell of the form and size indicated in Fig. 20, ascertained by measurement of one found in the trenches at Sebastopol. The use of these guns in the siege was by no means sati.sfactory, so far as I could ascertain, giving neither precision of fire nor extraordinary ranges; while the gun more often failed by bursting than other calibers. The principle, however, appears to meet with favor, and is still studied and being tested by the English ofiicers.t Another method of giving the rifle principle to heavy guns consists in casting a segment of a sj^here (nearly) on the side of the cylindrical part of a shot, with cor- responding grooves in the bore of 3;) shoulders are formed keeping the cheeks apart; also a roller to relieve the motion of the trail on the central piece of the chassis. Each stanchion (c) consists of two parts, between which leather is placed. To the cheeks are secured trail braces, serving to keep the trail of the carriage on the chassis should the bolt (A-) break. The carriage axles are generally of two kinds — the large or long, and the small or short, differing only in length. The wheel (222 and 224 of Fig. 34) consists of two cross-pieces or sections, (n,) forming collectively, the hub and spokes of the whole circle, felly, (p,) fastened by tenons to the cross-pieces or spokes, and of a continuous tire (q) driven on over the fellies, and of two concentric naves, (o, 224 of Fig. 34.) These concentric naves, of equal dimensions, are placed on the two faces of the cross-pieces, and riveted to them. The tire and fellies have holes through them for inserting handspikes to run the gun into battery. These iron carriages are mounted on either traversing or on stationary chassis or platforms. 14 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. • The traversing iron chassis consists of three rails, (222 and 227 of Figs. 34 and 35,) two outside ones (r r) and a middle one, (s.) Each rail consists of two iron hars. The inner bars of the outer rails have flanges, which prevent the carriage from running off the rails. At the rear ends of the outer rails are fastened pieces or chocks ()•) to stop the recoil of the piece. To the rear ends of the inner bars of the outer rails are fastened the strong thick pieces, (t,) with holes, in which fit the stanchions, (m.) On the upper ends of these stanchions are placed two iron pieces, (v,) which support the weight of the gun, when it has recoiled, and thus relieve the rails. The outer rails are connected by four cross bolts, (y, 222 of Fig. 34.) The front one has a hole in its middle for the pintle, around which the chassis traverses, (227 of Fig. 35 ;) and also, at equal distances, two holes for the stanchions (z) of the front rollers, which traverse on the iron plate, (;'.) In the center of the chassis is a reenforced hole. The middle rail rests upon the third and fourth trans^lns, (y y,) terminating at the second. The support or prop (s, 222) prevents the rail from yielding to the weight of the piece during the recoil. It may be lengthened or shortened by the arrangement w. In loading and aiming the piece, the men for these purposes staiW on the gratings, (a,) which are secured to the chassis. To ascend easily when the piece is mounted very high, the steps (/;) are secured to the chassis. The curved rail track for the hind wheels rests on the planks, (A ;) but the cast-iron plate (i) rests on the block platform, (B.) The plank, as well as the platform, rest upon the longi- tudinal beams, (C.) The upper surface of the platform (B) should be so arranged that the gun, when horizontal, should not be more than six inches above the crest of the parapet, and with the medium and low carriages, not less than eight inches above the sole of the embrasure. The upper surface of the plated planks (A) should be two inches higher than the upper surface of the platform, (B.) For carriages on traversing chassis, there are three different arrangements, viz: the high one, 222 of Fig. 34; the medium, 228; the low, 229 and 230 of Fig. 35. The high one is employed in firing over a parapet, the medium for firing through a shallow embrasure of a foot and a half deep, and the low for firing through a deep embrasure of two and a half feet. The pintle around which the chassis traverses, the wheels, stanchions, and cheeks, are made higher for the high carriage than for the medium ; but to prevent the pintle bending from the effect of the discharge, it is strengthened by the brace (p^ , 222) of bar iron. Through its upper end the pintle passes ; at the lower it is fastened to the plate, (t.) To increase the strength of the chassis of the high carriage, props (q^) are placed under the outer rails at the third transom. The low arrangement differs from the medium only in the fact of the longitudinal beams, (C, 222 and 234 of Fig. 35 a,) are sunk into the terreplein instead of resting on it, and the rear support of the middle rail is replaced by a shorter one. The table platform on which these iron carriages are sometimes placed have the form of those described in "Kezvoy's Notes on Artillery," pages 129 and 130. The traversing beam, (A, 229 of Fig. 35,) for the use of the iron carriage, is strengthened on top and on the sides by iron plates. To the axle of the carriage are attached the arms, (n, 229,) having at the lower end of each arm vertical rollers, which touch the sides of the beam, (A.) The dimensions of the parts of the table platform, and other observations, will be found in table fifty-seven of Colonel Eezvoy's work, two copies of which were purchased by the commission. A heavier gun, to give longer ranges than these carriages had been designed for, became necessary to contend with the heavy armament of the English and French fleets. For this ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 15 purpose, a new model 68-pouncler gun was cast, and were substituted in the casemates and barbette batteries at Cronstadt, wbile tlie enemy's fleet was before the place. These large guns, calculated for the longest ranges as yet obtained from any gun, were being mounted on a icrought- iron chassis and carriage of peculiar construction^ well worthy our particular attention. (See Figs. 36 and 37.) The reader will observe its extreme simplicity, consisting of the substitu- tion of plate-iron of about one half inch thick, put together with rivets, to form the carriage, as it were, of hollow boxes of the form and shape of the wooden carriage, or, in other words, introducing the ticbular system. In this carriage a device exists for traversing the gun, of such importance as to be worth introducing, for our sea-coast carriage. The horizontal traverse of the gun is eflected, in our service, by the use of handspikes. We may imagine the difficulty of obtaining a correct aim thereby, and how useless to seek precision of fire with such means only for aiming. In this Kussian carriage a tangent-screw, working the axles of the after wheels of the chassis, enables the gunner to obtain the same accuracy horizontally that the ordinary elevating screw secures in the vertical plane. This simple detail will, I doubt not, command the attention of our artillery officers. Several thousand gun carriages are necessary for our extended sea-coast. If these are all made of wood, after our present model, it is very questionable whether it be in the power of the Ordnance Department to keep them in repair. As to their renewal, in case neglect of annual repairs should call for such, it would be impracticable to do so in any reasonable period. I know of no system, that should command our attention, better adapted to our sea-coast defenses than this wrought-iron tubular one of the Faissians. Heretofore we imitated the English and French in a cas^-iron sea-coast carriage, and a wooden chassis with cas^-iron transoms. These have never received such fa\'tir as to cause their continuance ; a single shot striking the cast-iron carriage is likely to break it in many pieces, whereas the wrought-iron tubular carriage may be shot through and through in many places without destroying its efficiency, while the bolting of a plate of metal over the shot-hole restores it to usefulness with comparatively little labor. Carriages for field artillery had, in like manner, been made of wrought-iron plates, both on the tubular principle and with angle-iron riveted to plates, after the design of one of the Archdukes. They had been tested by being fired at with shot, wooden carriages being subjected to the same trial. Satisfactory results were obtained in favor of iron, so far as the experiments had been carried. But it is for our sea-coast that I most earnestly invite attention, by the introduction of a wrought-iron tubular (or box) carriage and chassis, in imitation of Eussian experience and skill. The immediate construction of one of them would be of advantage to the military profession. In connection with the carriage, I will bring to notice a detail in the construction of our casemates of much importance, introduced in foreign service, and worthy the consideration of our engineers. The details of our casemates, as latterly arranged, from the continued study of our present chief engineer, are beyond doubt better by far than those of any European power I examined. None agree in uniformity of dimensions or in details for any one caliber. The only common principle seems to be in having the gun mounted on a carriage, upon a chassis. The dimensions of the embrasure are as varied as the number of existing nations using them. While the Russian sea-coast defenses at Cronstadt are the best in masonry and carriages, they present au exterior opening of embrasure that takes much from the cover and shelter a casemate is intended to secure, and has but limited horizontal traverse. We have made experiments, and altered the material of our embrasures several times, with the view of remedying the known defects, and obtaining greater security to the gunners. At Sebastopol, the Russians sufi'ered greatly from musketry-fire through their embrasures. This was mostly owing to their having 16 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. no other carriages than the low truck carriage from their fleet. It forced their engineers to cut the sole of the embrasure down, in the parapet, to within two feet of the platform. They resorted to an ingenious device — a rope mantelet— as a partial remedy. (See Fig. 38 and Frontispiece.) The lining of the cheeks of the embrasure, of such an extraordinary height, with gabions, was another source of loss of men to them, by the facility with which these gabions were destroyed by the artillery of the Allies, and not reparable until nightfall enabled the defenders to go on the outside of their entrenchments. Here again an ingenious application of unusual expedients afforded them partial security. The water-tanks from the fleet were lor ought -iron boxes, of four to six feet square, made of about three-eighths-inch iron ; these were used to form the cheek of the embrasure, filled with earth, forming a better embrasure than any other material, the balls penetrating them doing no other injury than making holes but little larger than the diameter of the shot. In three such tanks, forming one cheek of an embrasure, I counted twelve shot-holes through which balls had penetrated the tanks and earth within, or reflected them ; and without damage to it, as a lining and substitute for gabions or facines. Both these expedients were called for by the Eussians being forced to use a truck carriage, (see Fig. 38; also, Views of the Interior of the Kedan, &c.,) and, as a consequence, a,loto emhrasure. We have sought to protect our gunners latteidy by wrought-iron throat plates and shutters for our casemate embrasures, retaining, however, the loiv carriage^ and, as a consequence, an embrasure exposing the gunners^ as well as interior of the fort, to any shot or shell entering it ; thus subjecting ourselves to the same evils caused by a low truck carriage to the Russians at Sebastopol, while we have it in our power to correct it very eifectually by raising the embrasures to adapt it to a carriage of precisely the same height as that used for the barbette battery of the same work, when every embrasure shot must pass over the heads of the men about the gun, as well as over the heads of all who may be passing across the parade. This simple detail does not seem to have commanded' the attention of the engineers, in seeking to correct the difficulties, old patterns and models being still forced upon us. That the corrective ofi'ers no obstacle in practice, may be deduced from the varied practice of ourselves and the Europeans, all differing in the height of the sole of the embrasure above the platform. In substituting the new wrought-iron carriages in their casemates at Croustadt, the Russians had to sink the platforms of the gun rooms about ten inches, thus, in effect, raising the sole of the embrasure from two feet nine inches (see Fig. 57) to three feet seven inches ; while the Austrians vary from four feet eleven inches in casemates to five feet eleven inches in barbettes, as shown in Fig. 38 a ; and the French from 3.44 feet in casemate to 6.24 feet in barbette, as shown in Figs. 26 and 27 ; and propose to raise it, in casemates, as high as 4.70 feet, as shown in Fig. 28. Such irregularity would plainly indicate that security to the gunners has not been studied in this particular, although the first principle taught us for the height of our parapets is to cover a man's head. Another detail about the casemate embrasure, the study of an English officer, noticed at Woolwich, may well command our attention. Our practice is to give the casemate chassis a horizontal traverse, by an iron tongue centered two feet from the face of the wall ; a shot striking the front of this part of the masonry is apt to disable the carriage altogether ; and we are not without exjjcrimental knowledge to prove the evil of such a construction. The plan of the officer referred to, as seen at Woolwich, was to rest the chassis on four concave truck-wheels, (one at each corner of the carriage,) two of them moving on a convex or edge rail for the hind transom, and the other two on a similar rail under the front transom, instead of plate rail under both transoms, as we universally practice. The section of the English rail is shown in the annexed figure. A carriage tra- /' •' "? \ °_ . ^ Platform. versing on such rails is found to work well, and not liable to be ^ ^" ^ thrown off the track bv the recoil of the gun. ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. ] 7 The Austrians have adopted a barbette gun carriage that confirms the practicability of the preceding arrangement for casemates, and presents some other advantages wortliy of our attention. Tlie pintle center of the chassis is on a four-wheel truck carriage, movable the entire length of the battery, on a tram rail-track near the foot of the interior slope of the parapet, as in the figure, (38 a.) This carriage, resting entirely on truck-wheels, is in common use in Austria, having my attention drawn to it in their 7ieivly-constri\cte([ sea-coast batteries at Venice, in the land defenses at Verona, s^jecially provided for by their Committee of Artillery. We have, then^ these assurances that the tongue-hole in our casemates is superfluous. Even should we be so wedded to our present model as not to dispense with it, it is worthy of consideration whether the rails and truck-wheels should not have the above suggested forms given to them, that the carriage may be serviceable, by simply disengaging the iron tongue when necessary. I consider we may greatly jjromote the jiublic interest by having some one of the casemates now being constructed modified in conformity with European experience and practice, in both carriage and embrasure, in order that we may dispense with the tongue-hole, and protect the gunners by raising the sole of the embrasure. So great are the evils to be apprehended from embrasure shot in the works at Cronstadt, that their engineers were constructing (while we were there) wooden blindages and parados, within the casemated forts, to cover the communications to the magazines and stair-cases ; and in the temj^orary batteries at both Cronstadt and Sebastopol, in the rear of every gun, was an earthen traverse. In our sea-coast casemated works not a charge of powder can leave a magazine without being exposed to an embrasure shot while crossing the parade and traversing the case- mates. A corrective for this acknowledged evil has been adopted in some new English sea-coast casemates, for the defenses of Portsmouth, by constructing an earthen j)arapet or continuous traverse in the rear of, and parallel with, the entire length of the battery. Simply raising the sole of the embrasure to the same level as that adopted for the crest of the barbette battery corrects the evil. The Austrian gun carriage shown by Fig. 38 a, presents other advantages that should not be lost sight of. By the facility with which the armament of a battery thus mounted can be moved to any part of the rampart without dismounting the gun, a concentrated fire of several pieces can be brought to bear upon a point ; in case of injury to any one gun or carriage, the adjacent ones may be substituted from the right or left ; and at any moment during a bombard- ment, the armament may be run under cover of the traverses, and returned to battery rapidly. Our joractice is to fix the gun and carriage immovably in one locality, and no other can be substituted for it without dismounting and removing guns and carriages by manual labor and mechanical contrivances. I conceive this particular to be of so much interest as to present the three figures, 38 a, giving drawings in detail of this Austrian system, in use in the sea-coast as well as garrison batteries. Fig. 38 be is a section of a casement of one of the harbor defenses now under construction. It is of interest, as giving the arrangement of a wooden rail track with iron plates for this Austrian sj'stem, as constructed at Venice; besides which it gives their peculiar drainage of the ramparts, and the use of earthen parapets instead of stone parapets, (or brick,) that I can but look upon as a serious evil in our service, not supported by any European practice at this time. It will be observed, by reference to the Austrian gun carriages in Fig. 38 a, that the same chassis and truck carriage is used for the high and low parapet or embrasure, and that the difference in height is arranged by substituting a large wooden wheel, fifty-four inches diameter with a bolster center trail (a a) in one case, or a small iron wheel, tlairty inches diameter, in the other. Fig. 38 b is the adaptation of the principal parts of the same carriages for a fixed position and permanent pintle center for barbette batteries with a horizontal traverse of 155°. In this 18 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. as in the preceding arrangement, (Fig. 38 a,) it will be seen that the substitution of thirty-inch and fiftA'-foiir-inch wheels adapts the same truck carriage for dififerent heights of parajjet, and that thirty-inch wheels are placed under the after transom of the chassis for the horizontal traverse; either for an extended horizontal traverse of 155°, or for embrasures cut in the parapet, securing the advantages of the two parapets (barbette and embrasure) for any period of the defense, by simply changing the wheels and bolster. For casemates the Austrians use the same truck carriage, as shown in Figs. 38 a and 38 b, resting on a platform, on thirty-inch wheels under the forward transom, (see Fig. 38 c,) while the hind transom rests upon and .slides on the directing or traversing trail, as a substitute for the chassis. The traversing trail is fixed, as a center of rotation, in the plane of the interior face of the scarp, and is provided with a forward transom under the axle of the truck carriage, when in battery, which rests upon spheres in a depressed rail track. The directing or traversing trail is also supported under the after transom of the truck carriage, when in battery, by truck wheels, (a.) This casemate carriage is adapted to embrasures for 46° of horizontal traverse. For flank embrasures or other localities requiring a smaller horizontal traverse, as 14°, the directing or traversing trail is used and centered under the axle of the truck carriage, when in battery, by a bolt. (See Fig. 38 d.) This Austrian system was adopted by their Committee of Artillery in 1852, and from the appearance of their storehouses and depots is being extensively carried into efiect. In bringing it into notice, the hope is entertained that, in connection with the wrought-iron system of Russia and Prussia, our officers may devise carriages for our own sea-coast defenses combining the merits and advantages of all thus far introduced in the defense of garrison and sea-coast batteries. Fortifications. The reliance upon fortifications, both for the defense of harbors and roadsteads again,st fleets^ and of depots, arsenals, and strategic points on frontiers, appears greater and their value more appreciated at the present time than ever. England, notwithstanding her preponderating naval armament, is fortifying Portsmouth by casemated works, to close the entrance at Yarmouth, by an enceinte about the dock-yard, and by a system of permanent detached forts, varying from four to nine thousand yards in advance, adapted to the range of modern artillery. The old enceinte of Havre is being demolished, and detached forts in rear, on the heights, are now being constructed. Cherbourg continues to be strengthened on the water fronts by casemated forts, and on the land with an enceinte about the dock-yards, covered by detached forts on the surrounding heights. (See Plates I and II.) At Toulon the old enceinte is being pulled down, and a new one being constructed in advance on more elevated ground, covered by detached forts on the surrounding heights. (See Plate 18.) Paris, in like manner, is inclosed by continuous bastioned fronts, and covered by detached forts on surrounding heights and other localities ; as is also the system more recently pursued at Lyons. (See Plates 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.) The Austrians are now adding to the defenses of their dock-yards at Venice and Pola by detached forts, commanding all the lagoons and passes leading thereto, these detached works having interior defensive redoubts. Peschiera has an enceinte covered by a system of new detached works. The same system prevails at the new defenses of Cologne, Coblentz, Mayence, and Eastadt, and other works of the Austrians and Germanic Confederation. Prussia is fortifying Posen and Konigsberg with continued enceintes and detached forts in advance. Ilussia_, not having had time to complete her defenses, has been compelled to cover her dock- yards, while in a state of war, in the presence of her enemy, by detached forts and entrench- ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 19 ments, so much in advance as would shelter her depots from bomhardment. At Cronstadt she ■was busily engaged constructing a line of detached works far in advance of the enceinte of the city and dock-yards, to prevent a bombardment of the latter during an attack on the former. (See Plates 9 and 10.) At Sehastopol time had not permitted her to cover the dock-yards and military depots up to the appearance of the allied army before the place. A small circular masonry tower for two tiers of musketry and five guns in barbette, called the Malakoff, not exceeding twenty-eight feet radius, and garrison not above one hundred men, was the only defensive Avork then in existence covering the rear of the dock-yards. Here her engineers were forced into the system of entrenchments, yet not so distant as effectually to cover the depots. The best the occasion would permit did not prevent the bombardment from acting injuriously upon the defenses, the city, and depots simultaneously. On her frontiers she selects strategic points and fortiiies them as depots, as at Modlen. Having no interior city to cover, her system is more concentrated, consisting of an enceinte with very salient ravelins, and an interior citadel supported by extensive bomb-proof caserns. At Warsaw the citadel becomes the depot. It is covered by detached advanced works, mutually supporting each other. On other points of her Polish frontier she has under construction other new depots fortified in like manner. The present increased caliber and long range of artillery has made it necessary to carry the defenses of any point at least 7,000 yards in advance of it. This renders detached forts most advantageous, while an interior circumscribing system of defense is generally adopted, as an additional security, and essential to guard against reaching tlie object of attack, should a single outwork fall. The cities of Antwerp and Copenhagen are about to have their old enceintes demolished, and new ones constructed in advance, on the preceding system. All the works here referred to are the labors of modern engineers in whole, or modifications of older works ; most of them are of recent construction, and some are now in progress. We derive from them the important fact that all the military science and experience of Europe coincide in opinion of the necessity for fortifications at strategic points, depots, dock-yards, and arsenals. In the defense of simply a city, not a center for great resources, a change has taken place in modern times ; or rather such cities as formerly were strategic points, and also depots, having ceased so to be, their defenses have been destroyed, no longer inviting a siege that carries with it the destruction of the city. Berlin, for example, has no fortifications ; and those of Vienna are enveloped by the growth of the modern city. St. Petersburg and Moscow have no land defenses. These facts are of interest to us mostly in arranging the defenses on the land fronts in the rear of our sea-coast defenses, the latter being with us the most important study in fortification. There is, however, one important lesson to be derived from European experience and practice in the varied traces and profiles of these works. France, for a long period, has been looked upon as the school for every principle connected with the art of war on the land. We have almost blindly adopted her ideas in fortification, while not a single nation in Europe, whose defenses I had the opportunity of examining, does so. The Metz school of fortification, the basis of our system of instruction, is not followed or ajiproved by the principal European powers ; and her own engineers have recently broken through the theoretical teachings in applying the principles to practice. At Lyons and the detached forts at Paris, the detached scarps are common ; in the modification and repairs of old works, the ramparts are thrown back, and a detached scarp thus obtained ; in like manner, some of her engineers introduce the Carnot wall in the ditches, while at Cherbourg and Toulon the solid scarp, backed by ramparts of earth and surmounted by high cavaliers in the bastions, is adhered to, and being constructed at this moment. (See Fig. 40.) Eussia, Prussia, Austria, and the Germanic Confederation, have all abandoned the Metz school, in trace and profile. It is time we, too, should no longer blindly persevere in it, but 20 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. inform ourselves of the merits of the systems of the other continental powers, and not confine our study to the Metz school alone. All modern changes in artillery tend to confirm the propriety of studying more closely continental experience and practice. Their rampart is earth, with exterior slope of earth ; it cannot be so injured by any artillery but that repairs at night can make good any damage done in the day. To guard against assault, a high counterscarp is adopted by some ; for such purpose it is as eflectual as a scarp, and cannot, by any distant fire, be injured or destroyed ; from the glacis, and by mines only, can it be overturned. To command the ditches, they in general construct a detached scarp, that cannot be seen or injured by distant artillery as readily as the ordinary full scarp ; its crest is always some feet below the crest of the counterscarp. Caponniers and flank casemates, with masonry redoubts in the gorges, are the accompaniments of these systems. While they diff'er from the Metz school in their profile, so, too, do we find they have departed from the common bastion and ravelin trace, and in the extent of the "front." The present musket-shot or rifle range, and artillery fire, have given greatly-increased lengths to their "fronts." In many cases, as at Konigsberg, Posen, and Modlen, they exceed 500 yards. Covered artillery fire, by casemates, caponniers, and Haxo batteries, are considered by all of them as indispensable. In preparing the Russian frontier fortresses for defense, her engineers were constructing casemate or Haxo batteries on the salients of the probable fronts of attack. At both Cronstadt and Sebastopol, caponniers for artillery fire were constructed, and being constructed, in the entrenchments and other temporary batteries, (in the ditches.) Artillery fire is, with the continental engineers, more relied upon than infantry. That genius in his profession, Totleben,* the engineer of Sebastopol, constructed most of his defenses to command the approaches to them by distant, as well as near artillery fire. Such, indeed, was the shape of the ground, he could avail liimsclf of but little flanking or direct musketry fire. His banquetts were pieces of board or scantling, forming steps between the embrasures, fastened to the gabions of tlie interior slope of the parapet, as in Fig. 38. The ditches of the salients of the Eedan and Malakofi" were without such defense. That of the MalakofF would not admit of flank defense by either artillery or infantry, being a segment of a circle. (See Fig. 54.) The continental engineers diff'er in their opinions as to the profile of the counterscarp. The Prussian works on the Rhine, about Coblentz, and some of the modifications of the fronts of the enceinte of Verona, have, instead of a masonry counterscarp, a long earthen slope, to facilitate sorties. (See Fig. 42.) In garrisons composed of army corps and all arms, it is an important consideration ; but with garrisons such as our sea-coast forts require, it is comparatively an unimportant particular. While such a slope certainly secures the advantage claimed for it, at the same time, as a consequence, any masonry in the ditches — as the detached scarps of the works in question, or the caponniers — is exposed to distant artillery, as no shot or shell can be thrown towards such defenses to graze the counterscarp that will not act more or less injuriously on the masonry in the ditches. This modern idea may not find advocates even to retain such a profile for the few places in which it has been introduced. (See Fig. 42 ; see, also, Plate 3.) Fig. 40 represents a profile of the continuous bastioned front surrounding the city of Paris. The scarp is about twenty-five feet high, with an earthen counterscarp exposing, in part, the scarp. The ramparts of the new works under construction at Havre, Cherbourg, and Toulon, are of this character. Fig. 41 is a profile of many parts of the detached forts about the city of Paris, and intro- duced in several other works, as in the recent constructions at Lyons, and modifications of old works. (Plates 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.) * Totlsben — pronounced Tot-la-ben ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 21 Fig. 42 is a profile of the Prussian detached scarp, independent rampart, and long slope from ditch to crest of glacis for counterscarp, as constructed in some of the works at Coblentz and Verona. Fig. 43 is a modification of the preceding, in which the detached scarp supports so much of the foot of the rampart as to give an elevated terreplein, raising the loop-hole about ten feet above the bottom of the ditch, with an ordinary counterscarp, as in some of the detached forts at Coblentz. Fig. 44 is the profile of a Russian work, having a detached scarp, independent rampart, a small wet ditch with live hedge, and earthen slope for counterscarji. This is covered by strong masonry redoubts, detached, and in advance of the main work. Fig. 45 is a general profile of the rampart, scarp, ditch, and covered way of Prussian works, as at Posen. Profiles with relieving vaults are common in the French works ; and counterscarp galleries are as common in the Prussian, as well as French. The confidence reposed by each and every nation in the officers constituting the " American Commission," giving them access, as a general rule, to all the sea-coast defenses and fortresses they desired to examine, will not justify descriptions to be given to the extent of the information gained in the various localities of the plans of the resj^ective works. So far as European profes- sional writers have obtained and published plans of the works examined by me, and as can be seen by any traveler, I feel at liberty in introducing the various systems from their labors and such observations, without, however, vouching for any more accuracy in such publications than is sufficient to explain the systems. The accompanying figures (46, 47, and 48,) and plates referred to, will suffice, with the preceding profiles, to give a general knowledge of the systems for land defenses now practiced in Europe. A more detailed description will be given of some of the localities referred to in a subsequent part of this report. In the "trace," France retains the bastioned system, with full ramparts, scarps, and counter-scarps, as at Paris, Lyons, Belfort, Toulon, Havre, &c.; but slightly modified in profile. Prussia, Austria, and the Germanic Confederation, abandon the bastion trace, and adopt the polygonal earthen ramparts, witli detached scarps, obtaining both high and low flank fire from masonry caponniers and redoubts, or bomb-proof caserns. Russia retains the bastion trace, with earthen ramparts and detached scarps, covered by very salient ravelins or detached works, with a secondary flanking fire in the ditches from the loio masonry detached scarps and caponniers. All these powers introduce casemates and bomb-proof caserns, as an indispensable requisite. Fi^. 40. Profile of the enceinte of the city of Paris. 22 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Fig. 41. Profile of parts of the detachcdTorts around the city of Paris. Fi". 42. Profile of Prussian works and some Austrian. Fisf. 43 Profile of Puissian woiks Fi";. 44. Profile of Russian works. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 23 Fifr. 45. Profile of Prussian works, as at Poscn. ^% Ditch flanked by Caponniers. / Fig. 46. Profile of modern practice of French Eii^'ineers, as at detached forts at Lyons. Fig. 47. Profile of scarp en dcchnrge. Modern practice of French Engineers, as at Lyons, &.C. \ Fig. 48. Profile of a battery a la Haxo. Modern practice of French Engineers, as at Lyons, Belfort, &c. 24 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Sea-Coast and Harbok Defenses. — On this stibject we liave less to learu from the Europeans than of any other part of the art of war. To follow their example in constructing permanent fortifications for the protection of harbors, roadsteads, and depots, is the most important part of their experience for us to imitate. Let but our Congress and people, in good time, allow the great inlets from the ocean to be protected by permanent works of defense, similar in character to those of Cronstadt, Sweaborg, Sebastopol, Cherbourg, &c., armed with ordnance and provided with munitions, such as fleets at the present time would bring against them, and cease to enter- tain such jealousy of a portion of her own citizens as prevents their learning how to use these forts and armaments ; then with our resources we may feel secure, and with other means at com- mand fit out armaments to meet our enemy on their own coasts, the most advantageous means of annoying them and adding to our own protection. The value and utility of the works now under consideration have been well tested during the late contest. Cronstadt, to the end of the war, set the enemy's fleet at defiance, saving St. Petersburg. Sweaborg resisted a bombardment, and not only prevented the entrance of the enemy's fleet into the harbor, but, from the power ^and efficiency of the sea-coast forts, set the fleet at defiance, while gun and mortar boats alone ventured to bombard the forts without power to subdue them. Sebastopol, besieged on the south side, was attacked by the combined allied fleets of England, France, and Turkey, and failed to produce any material damage to the Russian harbor defenses, the efiect of the bombardment during several hours on the masonry of their works being only to shake the arches of two embrasures, (repaired immediately afterwards,) the fleet retiring at dusk without producing any result, after sustaining considerable damage in men and ships. The injury done to the English ships, contending with but a part of the Russian works, (part only of those bearing seaward,) was considerable. The Albion received several shells close to the water line, three entering the cock-pit, and was twice set on fire. The Retribution and the London had their mainmasts shot away, and, being on fire^ were obliged to he hauled ofl". The Queen was forced to withdraw^ a red-hot shot having set her on fire. The Agamemnon lay near Fort Constantino, (see Fig. 49 and Plate 8,) and in consequence suffered severely. The French ships that attacked the forts on the south side (seaward only) sufi^ered severely. The Ville de Paris received a shell which blew away part of her poop, wounding a great number of men. Here was a successful resistance by casemated forts, contending with one of the most pow- erful fleets that ever floated, the forts being armed mostly with 36-pounders, the Russians not having had the opportunity of introducing many long-range 8-inch guns. Even after the evacu- ation of the south side of the harbor of Sebastopol by the Russians, when one large casemated fort (Paul) had been blown up by them, the quarantine water batteries, Forts Nicholas and Alexander, in possession of the allied army, and every inducement presenting itself to complete the conquest of this stronghold, the army receiving large reinforcements and making efibrts by the valley of Baidar ; a continued bombardment going on between the two sides of the harbor from French and English batteries constructed near Fort Nicholas and the western point of Artillery Bay; still this powerful combined fleet did not venture a second attack on what remained of these casemated water batteries. More encouraging examples of the value and utility of sea-coast fortifications cannot well be desired, and should serve to increase the exertions of our people in the defenses of our own harbors by similar structures. These Russian harbors, with others, (Revel, Odessa, &c.,) were closed against fleets carrying heavier armaments than ever before floated, by jjermanent fortifications, while her own fieet, less powerful than her antagonist, could only be used as hulks — a proof that dependence cannot be placed in a fleet unless stronger than your adversary and capable of keeping the sea. In the masonry of these casemated works at Sebastojjol there was no peculiar excellence; on the contrary, the material of whicli they were constructed was very indifferent and badly put together for the purpose. The plan and sections of the forts, as well as the details, were on the ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 25 same general system as those of Cronstadt, but the material and combination were very indiffer- ent. Specimens of tlie stone deposited by me, in tlie ofBce of the Chief Engineer and Cabinet of Minerals at West Point, will sliow how indifferent was the material of which the walls were built. The opportunity was had of examining the interior and exterior faces and center of the scarps of Fort Paul, then in ruins, having been blown up by the Kussians; of the Malakoff Tower, battered down by the allies ; and of the crennated wall and its casemated flanks, on the western side of the city of Sebastopol, more or less injured by the random fire of the French batteries. All these walls were built of soft stone from the same quarries, (see samples,) laid as headers and stretchers in regular courses from eight to ten inches rise and twelve inches to three and a ha],f feet on the face, on tlie interior and exterior faces : filled between with very small rubble masonry of the same material. Yet such masonry resisted the fire of the fleet ; and the crennated wall, covering the western side of the city, constituting parts of the quarantine and central bastions, resisted all the I'andom firing of tlae French batteries, during the entire siege, without breeching them, although shattered in some places to need strengthening by temporary expe- dients. With a breeching battery constructed purposely on the land, although at an extraor- dinary distance, (upwards of 2,000 yards,) tlae Malakoff Tower was destroyed at an early period of the siege, (Fig. 50, and harbor of Sebastopol, Plate 8,) all the barbette and second loop-hole tiers being battered down ; while the ships at about half the distance, on similar masonry, pro- duced no result. The stone of all these batteries is, in strength and durability, very similar to that of the Capitol and President's House at Washington. In like manner, at Bomarsund, the land batteries soon destroyed the masonry casemated towers, and breeched the gorge wall of the main work, tlius causing the suri'ender of the garri- son ; yet the fleet did not venture to come within range of the guns of the fort, here again showing the value of sea-coast batteries against ships. The masonry of the forts at Bomarsund differed altogether from that of the forts at Sebastopol. The quality of the material was very superior, and similar to that of the works at Cronstadt, (Finland granite — see samples from Cronstadt, deposited with those from Sebastopol.) The solid shot " from the French guns (16-pounders) made no impression on the blocks when they struck perpendicularly in the middle of their faces ; nor did the more powerful 32-pounder English guns split the granite when so struck. But when the blocks were hit by tlie latter near the edge or in a joint of the masonry, they were displaced, and not being backed witli solid masonry, but filled with rubble, the mass was thrown down, and a practicable breech formed." Although the quality of this stone was of the best, yet the manner of iising it was of the worst. The stones taken as delivered were cut (mostly boulders) to give the maximum face. Beds were then formed, making faces of several sides, as pentagons, &c., no regard being paid to parallel sides or horizontal beds. (See Fig. 49 a.) Thus tlie inte- rior and exterior faces were built up, without any material header or stretcher, and the filling was of small rubble. This character of masonry was noticed in other countries than Kussia, not necessary to partic- ularize. The engineers employed on such Avork told Fig. 48 a. me their effort was to introduce a header for every two face stones. After the allied army had destroyed the advanced towers, breeched the gorge, and taken the works of Bomarsund, then only did the fleet make any attempt to destroy the walls of the fort. For " experiment, the Edin- burg took a position, and commenced firing deliberately. At 1,060 yards it was unsatisfactory: 390 shot and shells were fired from a Lancaster gun, (its shell of wrought iron weighing 100 pounds;) from 68 and 32-pounder solid shot guns, and from 8 and 10-inch shell guns, with hollow shot, and with but little injury to the work. At 480 yards 250 shot and shells were fired. A small breech was then formed in the facing of the outer wall, considerable damage was done 4 D 26 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. to the embrasures and other portions of the wall, but no decisive result was obtained ; no prac- ticable breech was formed by which the work might be assaulted, taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000 pounds of metal) were fired at the scarp — first at 1,060 yards, and then at 480 yards. In these cannonades the Lancaster " rifle gun failed in precision at 480 yards, and the shells broke on striking the granite." There are none of the granite scarps of our sea-coast defenses but what are very superior to either those of Bomarsund, the Malakoff, or seaward batteries of Sebastopol ; and we have some not surpassed by those of Cronstadt. This experience, then, should encourage us in every way to persevere in our sea- board defenses. The general character of sea-coast and harbor defense is the same with all the European powers. Casemated batteries, of one or more tiers of guns, are resorted to bj^ Kussia, Prussia, Austria, France, and England, and in consequence of the expense of foundations in water or along the river shores. More extended batteries, and separate ones, would doubtless be preferred, did localities permit, to divide, instead of concentrate, an enemy's fire. As a general rule, all these defenses have earthen parapets ; those at Cronstadt and Sebastopol being exceptions, where stone parapets have been constructed. The recently-constructed casemated works at Cherbourg have earthen parapets ; and several now under construction (four on the breakwater) are, in part, so constructed, and the others designed for earth. The new casemated works (now being armed) at Yarmouth, England, have earthen parapets, as is also the case with recent constructions in Prussia, at the mouth of the Elbe. Austria, in like manner, mounts her barbette guns behind earthen parapets in the new works built, and building, for the defense of her naval depot at Venice. At Toulon and Genoa, modifications have recently been made introducing earthen parapets. This is a jiarticular we should not lose sight of, our practice being variable, though it is hoped the earthen parapets are gaining the ascendency. I will now proceed to give some more minute information of the plan of defense of particular localities, and details of casemates and other parts of the works. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, and Cherbourg, may be considered the three strongest ; and the works of the first (viz : Cronstadt) superior in execution and material, and not inferior in design, to any others in Europe. Plates 9 and 10, from a Eussian survey published by the English Admiralty, in 1853, and from other published sources of information, are sufficiently correct to give a good idea of the system adopted by the Russian engineers for this locality. The Island of Cronstadt is about midway between Oranienbaum, on the St. Petersburg shore, and Lisi-Noss, on the Finland shore ; distant about twenty-five miles from the city of St. Petersburg. On the eastern end of this island is the city of the same name, of about 15,000 inhabitants, concerned in the commercial marine of St. Petersburg. The dry-docks, depot, and navy-yard, as also the commercial docks, extend along the entire south shore of the city. Small vessels, of from seven to ten feet draught of water only, can go up the Neva to St. Petersburg ; hence, sea-going ships stop at Cronstadt, (the cargoes are lightered to and from them,) and are moored in the spacious docks on the southwest corner of the city. Adjacent to the commercial docks, are spacious man-of-war docks. Extensive dry-docks communicate with these wet-mooring docks, back of which are large, well-constructed and arranged shops and storehouses. These docks are superior, in material and workmanship, to anything of the kind seen in Europe, these at Cherbourg alone comparing with them. The dry-docks at Boston, New York, and Norfolk, for our Navy, compare favorably with those at Cronstadt. The navigable channel for ships-of-war is on the south side of the island, to the southeastern end of which only can twenty-four feet water he found. To the eastward thereof, from twenty- four feet shoaling to eighteen feet, is an extensive bay, into which the river Neva empties through intricate narrow channels, among extensive shoals. The Neva has several mouths or outlets^ formed by islands of great fertility, the summer residences of the nobles and wealthy inhabitants ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 27 of the city. Nearer the city the islands are more densely settled, and opposite become suburbs of St. Petersburg, occupied by the custom-houses, mint, military schools, public charities, and other public buildings. The great prize aimed at by the Allies, and for which such immense naval armaments were prepared, is on the south shore of the Neva, distant, as before stated, about twenty-five miles from Cronstadt, with its domes and spires in sight, by telescopes, from the anchorage of the Allied lieet. Against large ships the channel is defended by Fort Paul, of lYO guns, situated on the shoal putting out from the Oranienbaum shore, on which side there is but. one other work, the Kronslot Castle, of forty guns, under construction, and temporarily arranged with wooden parapets, altogether unimportant in its present condition, yet as good as so many guns on ship-board. On the shoals making out from the island, tlie first defensive work, on the approach, is Fort Alexander, of 140 guns ; next to which, on the same side of the channel, is Fort Peter, of 100 guns, one of the earliest constructed casemated works ; and then Fort Menchicoff, of forty- four guns, all of lOJ-inch ; from it extends, northwardly, a barbette battery of 130 guns, (?) behind a parapet inclosing the commercial docks, connecting with the permanent ramparts of the city across the island, forming its western boundary. In the spring and summer of 1855, while the enemy was in sight, a temporary line of earthen defenses was put up, crossing the island about one and a half miles in advance of the city ramparts, the south flank of which was armed with thirty-three guns ; in addition to which is a battery on the island, behind Fort Peter, of twenty-five guns, both bearing on the channel, thougli at a distance. (See Fig. 55, and Plates 9 and 10.) Between the Kronslot and Menchicoff batteries were anchored two ships-of-the-line, of 120 guns each, with their broadsides perpendicular to the channel approach. The long shoal projecting out from Oranienbaum towards Cronstadt could be crossed only with about four-feet water, yet Fort Paul could be approached in the rear with from six to twelve feet water. This shoal and rear of Fort Paul was, in a measure, guarded by dismantled two- decked ships, anchored between the island and the main, on the eastern edge of the shoal. Such were the stationary and permanent defenses on the south side of the island. On the north side, between its northeast corner and Lisi Noss on the Finland shore, is an extended and continuous shoal, through which are some intricate channels for gun and mortar steamboats, sloops-of-war, and other steam-propelled vessels drawing not more than eighteen feet water. These channels were defended by a line of dismantled two-decked ships and smaller vessels commanding the shoals, which, with some of the smaller channels, were more or less obstructed by stone, as was stated by distant though reliable authority. The north side of the city was defended by an earthen parapet, commanded and cov- T ered in rear by a crennated | wall (d la Carnot) connecting [ i defensive caserns, terminated I 1 by a fort at the northeast cor- I F ner, cooperating in part with I J the moored hulks, as in the ' ' ■ annexed figure, (51.) This wall, as well as the inter- mediate caserns, were con- structed altogether of bricks. There are three loop holes under each arch of the Carnot wall. The caserns are two stories in height, with embrasure openings in the second story, commanding the marsh and shoal water on this north side of the island in front of the earthen parapet and rampart. The lower story is for infantry fire only, through loop holes. At the time of my visit, the Russians were mounting the heavy sea-coast 68-pounder on Fig. 51. m ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the wrought-iron carriage, and chassis, (Figs. 36 and 37,) and mortars, along this northerly earthen rampart; to do which they cut the rampart as dotted in the figure 51 to give the necessary width of terreplein and heighth of parapet. The experience from Sebastopol induced them to cover the brick scarps, particularly such parts as inclosed magazines or stores, using therefor the surplus earth from the rampart, applied as at cl in the same figure. All these precautions were doubtless taken after learning the fact of numerous light-draft vessels armed with battering guns, being fitted out in France and England, some of which had arrived in the Baltic. The 68-pounder guns being mounted on this north water front were provided with pre- cisely the same carriages as those seen in the casemated forts, (Fig. 36,) but being in barbette required a different pintle center and platform. The pintle was secured to a semicircular cast iron plate, bolted to the sill timbers, imder the traverse timbers of the platform. The pintle cen- ter was set some little distance under or within the parapet recessed therefor. The an- nexed figure (52) gives this arrangement. With this ex- perience, there should no lon- ger be any doubt of the propriety of our adopting a UNIFORM MODEL for a gim car- Plan- Fig. 52. riage for barbette and casemate use at pleasure, and that they be of wrought iron. The land defenses, crossing the island and inclosing the city of Cronstadt on the west, are in part a solid rampart, surmounted with an earthen parapet, a scarp of rubble granite masonry, with wet (lunette) ditch, as in Fig. 53. ^^ Fig. 53. The scarp is arranged with circular casemated (one tier of guns) bastions, with the connect- ing curtains broken forward ; parts of the scarp on the right and left of each bastion is loop- ART OF WAR IN EUROPE, 29 lioled, the intermediate parts having solid ramijarts, the whole covered with a covert way and glacis. There was some lunette or other arrangement on part of this covert way : the general trace was as in the preceding figure, (54.) The circular bastions, and so much of the scarp on the right and left as is loop-holed, form bomb-proof caserns, between which and the town is a wide macadamised road, from whence ramps ascend to the terreplein of the rampart. The north end of the ditch is closed by a battardeau, serving as a caponnier, built of rubble granite, to flank the ditch southwardly, but solid towards the shoal water of the north side of the island. Through it a communication is kept up with the covert way that extends all across the island. The small lunettes on this covert way are flanked with carronades at the shoulder an"-les the particular arrangement of which no opportunity presented to examine. The temporary defenses constructing a mile and a half in advance of the western ramparts of the city, forming a second line of defense, were on a line from the site of the "Governor's House," on the north shore, thence to the site of the Kesel battery, passing a little in advance (when prolonged) of Fort Alexander. They consisted of four detached works armed with very heavy artillery, mostly on ship carriages, and were being covered in the rear by an infantry parapet, after the designs of General Behm, of the engineers, then stationed on the island. These four detached works were all armed with 7^ and 10-inch guns, the two center ones having caponniers in the ditches armed with howitzers. AH this part of the island is sandy and from four to ten feet above water. T-M^Ir-KC/^' ^Mrenciiment Fig. 55, and Platos 9 and 10. a. Site of Covernnr's House, indicated on the admiraltv survey. h. This redout is silualed on the side of the road to end of island, as indicated on the admiralty survey. The above is the arrangement of this line of defense, as near as can be given from a ride along it and walk through the works, and as may be seen from the tops of a ship in the channel. 30 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE, The steamboat landing is at the end of a long pier of some two or three hundred yards, at the northeast end of the island, for vessels drawing about seven feet water. Near the navy dock- yard, on the same side of the island, is a defensive casern, through which is the entrance to the city. On the north side of the commercial basin is an extensive casern, used in time of peace as a naval school, removed to St. Petersburg on account of the existing war. From the top of this building a telegraph station, 140 feet above the level of the water, (commanding a view of all the defenses, the Allied fleet, moored in the deep water north of the island and southwest of Tolboukin light-house,) communicates with the city of St. Petersburg, and the Emperor's resi- dence, near Oranienbaum. The land on which the city is built, as well as the island generally, is from six to ten feet above water, with an exception here and there, such as the summer garden in the city, where it may be thirty feet. (See Plates 9 and 10.) Numerous steamships, steam gun-boats, sailing gun-boats, and row-boats with one heavy gun, were within the docks, and anchored to the eastward of the island, ready to cooperate with the stationary defenses against an attack by the ship channel or the northern shoals. Within and along the bay, towards St. Petersburg, were anchored other two-decked dismantled ships ; and at the mouth of the several outlets of the Neva, earthen temporary batteries had been constructed, armed with 36-pounders on wrought-iron carriages, generally twelve guns in a battery.* (See Plate 10.) I now proceed to give a more minute description of some of these works, particularly as to their construction. Fort Mexchicoff is a new work, of three casemated and one barbette tier of the heaviest guns, (forty-four of 10^-inch,) all mounted, at this time, on wooden carriages. The work is remarkable lor its solidity and strength, and not surpassed by the labors of the engineers of any ' other European power. The gun is, in part, under an arched recess formed in the scarp (see Figs. 56 and 57) of only three pieces of stone. The embrasure is eight feet four inches wide on the outside, and three feet six inches in the throat. The cheek is formed of one piece of stone in height, and of three pieces from front to rear ; the sole of the embrasure is in two jjieces ; the sill and lintel, on the exterior, are each about four feet rise ; two guns are in one casemate, separated from each other by a pier of three feet ten inches, supporting the recess arch ; the casemate arch is of brick, projecting about four feet into the scarp ; the parade pier was of brick, with a stone impost, forming about fifteen inches rise of the groin of the arch of communication ; the key of the arches, on the interior face of the rampart, was also stone ; the floors are, in general, concrete, some being of brick. The trace of this battery is a right line, perpendicular to the directrix of the channel, the flanks being simply a return of the scarp to the rear, at right angles to the front, and pierced with high loop-holes. The staircases in the flanks are of cast-iion, hoarded over, to prevent the steps from being broken by carelessness in daily communication, and handling shot. Temporary parados and blindages of wood have been constructed in various places, closing up the lower part of arches, to prevent embrasure-shot reaching the communications, stairs, and magazines ; the gorge is inclosed by a wall only up to the first tier. Fig. 58 gives the arrangement of the stone (Finland granite) of the exterior of the scarp in courses for the three tiers, as well as the curved section of the base of the work washed by tlae waters of the bay ; and suffices as an illustration, also, of the scarps of Alexander and Paul ; that of Fort Peter, although very good, yet, being built at an earlier period, is not so well arranged, its character being varied in size, as well as quality and manner of laying the stone. A study of these figures (56, 57, and 58) will give a correct idea of the best constructed scarps in Europe, with stones of unprecedented size. The wharf work inclosing the commercial dock, at the southwest end of which is the Menchicofi" battery, is of wood on its southern face, and stone along the west. The trace of the •Note. — Seven batteries of twelve guns each, one of six, and one of four, that I had an opportunity of seeing ; probably, tlipre wereothers. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 31 wooden inclosure is witli 'bastioTis, having wooden jiarapets, but with an occasional gun only. The stern of one of the line-of-battle ships, moored across the channel at this place, was within pistol shot of, and perpendicular to, the flank of the Menchicoff battery ; between her and the one moored near the Kronslot battery, with broadside presented down stream, there was room for a third vessel, and no more, for which opening a new steam screw-ship was ready in the dock just below Menchicoff. "id'e'il' .?22- F'K. 56- Casemate and embrasures of Fort Menchicoff, Cron- sladt, from dimensions taken on the 5th July, 1855, by Major Delafield. Fi-. 57. a''eu£^ resence of the enemy. The quarters in this work were made bomb-proof with timber, and temporarily, time not liaving allowed that part of the fort to be finished. Tlie staircases were of cast iron, as in tlie other works, and blindaged to guard against embrasure shot. No MAGAZINE in any one of these permanent masonry works had any interior lining of wood or other material; a brick surface showed on the sides and over head. This fact is of importance to us, as in all our constructions we bestow much labor and expense in minute details for wooden linings, requiring frequent renewals, while throughout my entire journey, neither on the sea- coast nor frontiers inland, could I discover a single magazine with any other interior surface than brick ; making the subject one of jiarticular note from a knowledge of the practice in our works being so different, and as it would appear from the experience of all Europe, on the shores of the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the Atlantic, in the fortresses on the Rhine, the Vistula, and the lagoons of Venice, as unnecessary as it is destructible or perishable with time, and expensive. Fort Peter would seem to have been the first masonry work constructed for the defense of the channel, and differs essentially in plan and construction, as well as material, from the others. Its trace is two '-fronts," making an angle of about 120°. The central and most salient point is that of a tower bastion, with one tier of casemated guns, of six em- brasures on each face, surmounted by a barbette battery with stone parapet, and below its corresponding bomb-proof apartments for stores. The right and left flanks of these two fronts are smaller tower bastions for four guus on the channel faces in casemates ; arranged otherwise as the center bastion. The curtains are much lower than the bastions, having nine barbette guns on each. The masonry parapet of these curtains is about ten feet thick. The scarps have been built apparently at different periods, some of the stone being in large pieces of granite, while other parts are of small rubble and a different colored stone of small irregular dimensions ; while parts of the gorge masonry are of the character of the rubble masonry. Fig. 49 a. The commercial battery jjresents a continuous line of forty-eight guns, eleven of which were bomb cannon parallel with the front of Menchikofif, with a branch of fifteen guns from its northern extreme parallel with the channel. This work has a stone scarp rising from the water, and a stone parapet. Like the temporary wooden battery at Kronslot it is low, and could be commanded from the upper decks of a ship-of-the-line. All the masonry of these defenses is built with English Portland cement. All these casemated channel defenses are more or less open at the gorge, its scarp wall rising, in general, but to the level of the first tier of casemates. When it became apparent that the allies were building numerous steam-propeller gun-boats, mortar-boats, and iron-sheathed floating batteries drawing but little water, the channel defenses were no longer the probable line of attack, where the large ships would operate. With this light-draft floating armament, all these defenses were liable to be turned by crossing the shoals, thus subjecting them to a fire through the open and exposed gorges by the rear. Dismantling the fleet to fit the ships as ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 35 hulks, building steam-propeller gun-boats, mortar-boats, sailing gun-boats, and others propelled with oars, had then to be resorted to in great haste, to guard these shoal waters. (See Plates 9 and 10.) Between the northeast point of Cronstadt and Lisi Noss, on the Finland shore, no less than fifteen vessels of the Eussian fleet were moored, live of which were two-decked shif)s, five of them heavy frigates, one sloop-of-war ; and four smaller vessels in the shoalcst water near the Finland shore. Four large steamships, several steam brigs, numerous steam schooners, and the gun- boats were held as a movable floating force. There was nothing left of the fleet to put to sea; every vessel was necessary to cooperate in the defense of either the main channel or the approaches across the shoal. It was, in consequence, never after in the power of the Russian admirals to meet the Allies in combat in the Baltic. Such were the formidable defenses that for two years set the Allies at defiance, and protected the city of St. Petersburg. It cost the Russians great exertions and some treasure, and the Allies far greater. Russian skill and ingenuity kept pace with that of the Allies ; every new expedient on the part of the latter soon became known to the former, and her engineers, as capable in every way as those of France and England, with a ready talent to turn everything to advantage, were not long in adopting some counteracting defensive means. One of the archdukes at the head of the navy was always present in command at Cronstadt. General Bchm, (an engineer of great talent and skill,) a colonel, captain, and three other officers of the same corps, were also stationed on the Island of Cronstadt, actively engaged in adding to, and strengthening the existing works. The resources of the empire were fully equal to the crisis ; expedients were always found to surmount any difficulty. The usual supply of fuel (coal) was cut off. Kiln-dried wood was substituted in the founderies for making the largest castings, and answered the purpose. Screw engines for a line-of-battle ship had been finished at St. Petersburg, and the boilers for another were in course of construction at one foundery that was visited, while many small propeller engines were in progress at another establishment for additional gun-boats. The supposed difficulty of procuring engineers for working these engines was overcome by taking from the Moscow railroad natives who had learned their trade since 0217' Whistler and Broion, eleves of our own Military Academy, commenced and completed that same and only railroad in Russia. [The Warsaw road is in progress.] No branch of industry or mechanical skill was wanting to meet the exigencies of the moment, that native talent did not supply. The coinage of gold and silver, particularly the gold ruble, was in daily operation at the Mint, which was witnessed in person, while the credit of the State was such that the paper currency held its par value for all ordinary wants, at the same time that we never found any difficulty in obtaining gold at pleasure for the wants of the Commission. Large armies were encamped in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, well appointed and equipped, ready to concentrate and march in any direction, of well-disciplined troops, commanded by officers educated at the military schools. No less than 720 young men completed their military education at the schools of St. Petersburg, and were commissioned in the army during our visit to that city. At the termination of a review by the Emperor of all the cadets of the schools of St. Petersburg, on the occasion of granting commissions to the graduates, when about 2,500 were under arms as infantry, artillery, and cavalry, the parade being dismissed, the graduates drew round the Emperor promiscuously, when he made a short address to them. The respect mani- fested by these young men for their sovereign was remarkable, indicating an enthusiastic determination to enter upon their career in defense of their country, as well as an admiration and respect for his person that could have been called forth only by the most kind, and even parental, feelings of the monarch towards the students, during their collegiate studies. 36 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Everything indicated resources, ability, and entliusiastic determination to meet whatever crisis could come to pass. Confidence in their ability to defend the city of St. Peter.sburg was unbounded. Families not only remained in the city, and at their summer residences on the islands and shores of the hay down to Oranienbaum, but their ])leasure was jiromoted by steam- boat excursions, with bands of music, to and among their own floating defenses about Cronstadt, in sight of their enemy's fleet, every moment threatening an attach, while the Emperor and Emjiress, with their children and ladies of tlie Court, made their summer residence just within the line of sea-coast defenses, in sight of, and not to exceed twelve miles, or an hour's steaming, or three hour's march by land, of their enemy. No system of defense could command more confidence on the part of the population it was intended to defend, and certainly none ever called for greater resources and exertions, on the part of their opponents, in the efl'ort to subdue them. The permanent defenses constructed in time of jjeace were equal to their object against every combined, iicrmanent preparation of the Allies. In a resort to expedients, constructed in time of war, the combatants were on equal terms, both parties being enabled to provide with corre- sponding rapidity. Under like circumstances, with the immense resources of our own country, our ability to provide auxiliary sea-coast defenses would be as readily accomijlished as those of Russia,, provided v,'e are prepared against armaments existing at thecommencement of hostilities. Such means are then reliable against the fleets of Europe ; but when accompanied by armies, as at Sebastopol, we shall see that additional means become necessaiy to eflect the same security, which Eussia had not the time to perfect, and hence lost a city, a fleet, and dock-yards. It is in our jiower to inspire our citizens with like confidence, and our enemy with like respect for our strength and power of resistance. It is only for the people and Congress to will it in tinie. The example of Eussia is a lesson every way entitled to our study and imitation. In conclusion, I may remark that the defects of this system of sea-coast casemated batteries at Cronstadt, when compared with our own, consists in the great exterior and throat-openings of the embrasures, the limited horizontal traverse of the gun, the combination of brick with stone on the interior faces of the scarps, and in the trace of the works not concentrating as much fire from a given number of guns on a particular point or channel line. I have omitted to state that the practice of the Eussian engineers is the same as our own, in the use of bituminous asphalt or mastic, and that the best pointing they can make, like our own, is defective, from the variable contraction and expansion of the stone in such latitudes. Torpedoes, in eflect such as our Fulton used in the harbors of New London, New York, and Lynnhaven Bay, during the war of 1812-15, were also resorted to for the defense of the channel and anchorages about Cronstadt. They were the peculiar invention, as was understood, of Professor Jacobi, and will be noticed hereafter. Haebor of Sebastopol. — The defenses of tliis harbor, like those of Cronstadt and Cherbourg, are principally casemated castles of two and three tiers of guns. They are particularly important and interesting to the ofiicers of our army as a study, from the fact of their being of recent con- struction, similar, in a great measure, to the system we have adopted for our sea-coast, and from having resisted the most powerful attack that can, in the present day, be brought against them, by the combined fleets of England, France, and Turkey. (Plate 8.) The entrance into tliis harbor from the Black Sea is about one mile wide, with a depth of ten fathoms. It extends eastwardly, with not less than four fathoms water, three and a half miles, beyond wliich it gradually shoals to the mouth of the Chernaia or Black river, which enters at the extreme eastern end, and about four miles from the sea. On the south shore it branches into deep and commodious harbors ; the most eastern of which is the Careening Bay ; next westwardlj', is the Inner harbor, with a branch called Dock-yard and Arsenal harbor ; and next is Artillery Bay. Immediately outside the harbor, on tlie south sliore, is another harbor, called Quarantine Bay, that is under cover of the harbor defenses. These bays are, in most part, ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 37 surrounded by high and abrupt hills. The entrance into the harbor is commanded, on the north shore, by Fort Constantinc, of about 104 guns — twenty-eight in casemate and fourteen in barbette on the harbor face, including a part of the curved face. (Plate 11, and Figs. 50 b and 50 c.) It is a castle of two casemated and one barbette tiers of guns ; the trace presents a straight branch fronting seaward, another facing in and across the harbor, which two are connected by a curve. The gorge is inclosed only to the height of the first tier of guns, flanked by some low casemates, that rise to the height of the gorge wall ; the communication from one tier to the other is by steps (apparently) within towers. In the dimensions of its details, it resembles the forts of Cronstadt, already described. It is situated at the extreme end of the cape, on a small, low peninsula, with its foundations rising from near the water's edge. The ground back of this fort, along the sea-coast, rises gradually to about 130 feet, and thence extending north and eastwardly to the height of about 300 feet, from which heights the interior of the fort is fully commanded. Under cover of this castle, to the eastward, is a small but secure harbor for vessels drawing not more than three fathoms, mucli used during the siege. North of this castle, bearing on the anchorage on the sea-front, is a battery of eight guns, within which is the telegraph station ; and still further north, on the cliff, is a battery of about fourteen guns, with a branch facing the entrance into the harbor, and others firing seaward. Beyond this last battery, at the extreme northwestern point of the sea-shore c\\E, was erected, during the siege, a battery of about ten guns, on the sea face, and not less than 130 feet above water. It was important as forming the left flank of the north shore entrenched camp, as well as commanding an anchorage not seen by any of the permanent forts, from which the dock-yards and Russian fleet and storehouses could be shelled. Fort Catharixe, on the north shore, is the next permanent work east of Constantine. Its profile is like that of Constantine, having two casemated and one barbette tiers of guns. Its trace is a square, with the angles of the three casemated fronts rounded; one of these fronts faces the entrance into tlie harbor, another faces the Dock-yard Bay, and the third, parallel to the latter, faces the land. The gorge, like that of Constantine, is inclosed with a low wall, rising only to the floor of the second tier. It is flanked by casemated and loop-holed towers on the angles of the square, that rise to the height of the barbette battery. It mounts about fourteen guns in casemates and seven in barbette on the straight face fronting the dock-yard, and forty- two in casemate, and twenty-one in barbette, facing the entrance of the harbor. This work is commanded from the high ground in its rear. This is called by some writers Fort Sieverna, a name also given to the fort occupying the summit of this harbor slope, and key of the position on the land side. Fort Catharine is said, by French authority, to mount eighty guns. (See Figs. 50 a, 50 b, and 50 c, and Plate 11.) Fort Michael, on the north shore, is the next permanent work east of Catharine. It has masonry scarps and ditch, with high earthen ramjiarts and parapets ; its gorge inclosed by a " front of fortification." The ramparts are vaulted bomb-proof, as quarters, &c., with a parade wall pierced with looj)-holes. It has, ajiparently, a covered wa}^, with its glacis cut on the side towards the harbor entrance, with a slope of 45°. What guns were mounted in this work was not ascertained. Its position is highly advantageous for defending the line of approach into the harbor, and entrance into the Dock-yard Bay. It is said to moimt at least fifty guns, and appears to be defiled from the heights in the rear. (See Figs. 50 a and 50 e.) Intermediate and between these permanent works, batteries were erected, from time to time, during the siege, along this north shore of the harbor, at prominent and commanding points. Such were the harbor defenses on the north shore. On the south of the harbor, the perma- nent works are of the same profile and general character as Forts Constantine and Catharine. Fort Alexander, situated at the entrance of the harbor, and directly opposite Fort Constan- tine, has two casemated and a barbette tier. It mounts about seventy-lour guns, nearly all of which front the entrance into the harbor. This work is connected with the quarantine batteries, 38 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. to the westward of it, by an earthen parapet. The qxiarantine batteries cooperate most effectively with Forts Alexander and Constantine in the defense of the entrance of the harbor ; they follow the configuration of the shore with a return branch, battering Quarantine Bay, all of which are of earth, and probably constructed during the siege. Fort Nicholas is situated at the western point of the Inner and Dock-yard harbors. The general direction of its trace is perpendicular to the line of apjiroach from the sea. It has two casemated and a barbette tier throughout. The right flank of this fort, which is terminated on the Inner harbor by a curve, is three casemated tiers in height, the lower one, closed at the gorge, being probably for store-rooms. This curved part batters the entrance into the Dock- yard and Inner harbor ; from it, and following the shore of the harbor, an earthen battery was constructed, which could fire up the hill slope to the Malakofi' and Kedan, and mounted six guns in embrasures. Fort Nicholas, the largest of the casemated permanent works, mounted upwards of 192 guns, as stated by the French ; its gorge was a wall of masonry rising to the height of the first tier. (See Figs. 50 b, 50 c, and 50 d.) Fort Paul, (Fig. 50 a,) also similar in its structure to Forts Constantine, Catharine, Alex- ander, and Nicholas^ was situated on the eastern point of the Dock-yard and Inner harbor. It had two casemated and a barbette tier of guns, defending the ajiproach and entrance to the Inner and Dock-yard Bays. (Figs. 50 b, c, d, and e.) It was blown up by the Kussians on evacuating the city, after the fall of the Malakofi^, and no information was obtained of its armament. In construction, it resembled the other permanent masonry sea-coast forts. The gorge-wall about the gateway remained standing on my visit to it. From it the specimens were taken, of the stone of which all the casemated forts and other masonry defenses, as well as buildings of the city and docks, are constructed. As before stated, sets of these specimens are deposited with the War Department, and in the museum of the Military Academy, and are particularly interesting in connection with the bombardment by the fleet on the l*7th of October, and Malakofl:' Tower on the same day, as well as of the crennated wall, on tlie western side of the city, during the entii-o siege. On this south shore, as on the north side of the harbor, some additional and temporary batteries were constructed, during the siege, on prominent and commanding points ; one of which was on the western point of Careening Bay. Thus it is seen that these permanent harbor defenses were casemated castles, in principle no way differing from many of our sea-coast works. (See Plate 11, compiled by Professor Weir.) They were all located near the water's edge, and all open at the gorge from the level of the terre- pleins of the second tiers, and commanded from the hills in rear, possessing on the land side no efficient defense other than against escalade. Could the Allies have possessed themselves of the heights in rear of these forts, infantry fire alone could have driven every man from the guns. For the purpose for which they were constructed they answered every condition. The Russian engineers, fully sensible of the liability of all these sea-coast batteries being turned and com- manded in rear, had commenced and made progress in a system of land defenses that time and the resources of the empire did not permit them to perfect ; a loss of time to which in a great measure may be ascribed the loss of their fleet. Had the land defenses been finished as commenced, furnishing bomb-proof shelters for the garrison with masonry counterscarps that could not have been injured until the Allies had progressed to the glacis, it is not probable that to this hour they would have taken the place. Another omission, doubtless to be ascribed to want of time and the improbability of so pow- erful a combination ever being brought against the place, was in not closing the entrance into Balaklava Bay, the depot of the English army, and of Kamiesh and Kazach Bays, the depots of the French army. The former could liave been closed from rocky precijiices rising abru^Dtly from the water's edge at the entrance. It does not exceed 200 j'ards in width and ten fathoms in ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 39 depth ; while the latter would have required breakwaters of 1,500 yards in length and from eight to ten fathoms in depth. As neither of these liarbors are necessary for the commercial or naval uses of the empire, and closing them woiikl render an attack on the south shore forever impracticable ; had time permitted, it would doiibtlcss have been done 2)ermanently with stone dykes or some portion of the fleet that was used for a similar purpose at tlie mouth of tlie harbor of Sebastopol and to its permanent injury. The lesson is one for our consideration. For years past we have expended no greater sums on a sea-coast fort than an individual expends in the same time, in many instances, for his residence ; and more than one occasion has passed when an enemy, with a knowledge of our neglect, could have done us as great damage as Russia sustained from a similar neglect. In our case, however, it has heretofore been from apathy and indifference to the subject of national del'euse, and not the want of time or resources, as in tlie case of Russia. That this lesson may not be lost, I must state the severe test to which these casemated defenses were sub- jected in proof of their efficiency and reliability. The allied army commenced the siege or attack upon Sebastojiol on the 10th of October, 1854, on which day the English and French armies broke ground, tlie former at a distance of 750 yards from the Russian intrenchments, and the latter at the distance of 800 meters, as stated in their accounts, though, from the best information I could obtain, it was nearer the double of these distances. During the summer the campaign was on the Danube, which terminated by the Russians raising the siege of Silistria, after a long and unsuccessful attack upon the defenses of that place, defended by the Turks. It must be born in mind that the great object of the Allies was the destruction of the Russian fleet and naval depots in the Black Sea. But little inform- ation had been made public of the nature of the dei'enses of tliese depots and dock-yards, and the results would indicate that the Allies had as little useful information of wliat they were about to undertake as the militaiy profession elsewhere. The termination of the campaign on the Danube, not only by Russia raising the siege of Silistria, but withdrawing her army beyond the Pruth, placed the armies of England, France, and Turkey in a position of inactivity. It was not in the power of the allied commanders to follow the Russian army, having no means of transport suited to the occasion. Their army could rely upon supplies from their ships, but a few days' march from the coast. In this sudden change in tlie plan of the campaign, the diplo- matic authorities decided that the great object to be accomplished was the destruction of the Russian fleets and dock-yards in the Baltic and Black Sea. The season was far advanced when the allied commanders received their orders to destroy the fleets and dock-yards in the Black Sea. Their army was hastily concentrated and reembarked at Varna on the 8th of September, 1854, to the number of 58,000 men in 250 vessels. On the same day the commanding generals, admirals, and engineers,* set sail from Varna to seek information to guide them in the enterprise that diplomacy dictated. This reconnoitering party made Cape Chersonese on the morning of the 10th October, close in to the land, where they saw (see Plate 12) an extensive Russian camp. They coasted along the shore from Cape Chersonese to Cape Loukaul, near the mouth of the Alma, a distance of about twenty-seven miles. They estimated while passing that they saw not less than 30,000 troops encamped. This reconnoitering party then continued northwardly to Eupatoria. A preceding examination by sea appears to have been made, from which it had been considered advisable to efi'ect a landing in the Katcha and Alma Bays, in the vicinity of the 30,000 troops that liad been seen encamped ; but this last reconnoissance determined the allied commanders to land at Eupatoria. f Upon such scanty information, thus liastil}-^ obtained, did the allied commanders proceed to carry into efi'ect the orders and policy of the governments *Generals Canrobert, Martimprey, Thiry, and Eizot; Admiral Bouet-Willaumez; and Colonels Tiocliu and L^bceuf in the steamer Primauguet: and Generals Raglan, Burgoyne, and Brown in the Agamemnon, Admiral Lyons. fOn the 28th of May, 1854, two ships were dispatched to reconnoiter Sebastopol, but returned on the 31st, having been chased away Ijy a superior Russian fnreo. 40 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. of France, England, and Turkey. No previous thought or arrangement -would seem to have been given to the necessary suj^plies and material for a siege. Neither of the armies had a siege train. When it became apparent that the fleet could not enter Sebastopol to effect their object, and that the army could not do so without heavy guns of long range for hot shot, then it was stated in the English Parliament, by one of the Ministers, that a train o{ ticenty-nine j)ieces had been sent out. The result showed that they actually had to use and put in battery 911 (nine hundred and eleven) guns in the English trenches alone, of which 250 only were serviceable at the end of the siege. These considerations are important and interesting to a proper knowledge of the campaign and just appreciation of the commanders. Public sentiment acting upon the governments forced upon the allied generals an operation for which they were unprepared, and about which they had no knowledge of the difficulties to be encountered, and, least of all, of having to encounter the genius of a Totleben, or the persevering and undaunted courage and heroism of Gortschakoff, Menschikoff, and their gallant associates. On the 8th September, 1854, the allied army landed at Eupatoria, about sixty miles by water north of Sebastopol, and defeated the Kussians in force under Menschikoff at the Alma on the 20th September, 1854. (Plate 12.) On the 23d September, 1854, they moved forward seven miles to the Katcha, and on the 24th crossed the Balbec. From the dispatches of Lord Eaglan it appears that after deliberation with Marshal St. Arnaud, they relinquislied their communica- tion with the Katcha with the hope of establishing it by the Balbec, and they abandoned the Balbec in consequence of seeing (now for the first time) that the Eussians had established a work which commanded the entrance of the river and debarred its use for the disembarkation of troops, provisions, and materials. The result of this information caused an abandonment of the precon- ceived plan of attacking Sebastopol and destroying the fleet from the north shore of the harbor, and the determination to move upon and take possession of Balaklava and Kamiesch Bays, as convenient depots from whence to attack the city and destroy the fleet and dock-yards from the south side. On the 25th September the English army moved rapidly upon Balaklava, accompanied by the field batteries and cavalry, taking the high road by the McKenzie farm, encamping that night on the Tschernaya, from whence Lord Eaglan sent back information to the admiral of this sudden change in the plan of operations, and took possession of the little town and harbor of Balaklava on the morning of the 26th September at the same moment that the fleet entered from sea. The French army followed the English the succeeding day from the Balbec, descending the heights of the north shore by the road at McKenzie farm, a route that was soon closed by the Eussians not to be again available to the Allies, although great efforts were made to reopen it by General Pellissier after the evacuation of the city by the Eussians. No other route existed beyond the range of the Eussian defenses, to move to and from the north shore heights, excepting this by McKenzie's farm. From a point in the harbor of Sebastopol about ojDposite Careening Bay eastward, by the way of the ruins of ancient Inkermann, as far as Mangup Kale, the ascent to the hills is impracticable to troops, and mostly to individuals, at any other place than by the McKenzie farm road. On all this distance the heights are terminated by inaccessible cliffs and precipices, (Plate 12,) resembling the "palisades" of the Hudson river near New York, the foot of the slope being steep with a vertical rocky summit. The French army moved also on Balak- lava, arriving there on the 27th September, 1854, covering their rear against the Eussians by a line of redoubts crossing the Balaklava valley. Here in this valley of Balaklava a new pl.\n of operations had to be formed and information collected for carrying it into effect. From the landing at Eupatoria on the 8th September to the arrival of the allied army at Balaklava on the 26th September a plan of the campaign had been determined, a severe and sanguinary battle fought, various changes in the plan attempted, all resulting in the entire loss of so much of the season, other than in the moral effect of a victory on first meeting the Eussians; thus landing ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 41 an army of 58,000 men on the sea-shore, marching sixty miles across and through the enemy's country to meet the fleet and transports at another point on the sea-shore, to commence anew the object of tlie expedition — consec]^uences arising, as we tliink, from being forced into a campaign unprepared. Having established a new base of operations, (Plate 8,) the English army resting on Balak- lava and the French on Kamiesch Bay, on the 2v th September two divisions encamped on the plateau overlooking the city of Sebastopol. The next day the chiefs of engineers of the English and French armies reconnoitercd the scene of their proposed operations. Few localities present greater irregularities of surface, or greater facilities for observing from commanding heights the city, its defenses, dock-yards, and fleets. From an inspection and examination of the several figures to which reference has already been made, there is no room to doubt that the engineers had the opportunity of selecting the most favorable points of attack and lines of approach to attain the object, the destruction of the fleet and naval depot. It would seem that the plan of operations now to be undertaken was a combined attack by land and sea, and that on the land side the formalities of a siege were deemed indispensable. They had ascertained that the army then encamped on the plateau overlooking the city, the dock-yards, thj fleet, and most of the harbor defenses, should not attempt to carry the position by assault. The engineers could come to no other conclusion than that the enemy's^^eei could not be destroyed without heavy guns, mounted in advantageous positions, to fire hot shot and shells. Lord Kaglan, then the commander-in-chief of the allied army, (Marshal St. Arnaud having resigned on the 26th September,) writes of the undertaking as an attack on the city of Sebastopol, and that he was disembarking his siege train on the 28th of September therefor. He had the day previous to making this statement an opportunity of taking a good view of the place. From this time all idea of assault, and of the destruction of the sea-coast or harbor defenses by the fleet, were relinquished, and the boasted superiority of fleets against forts was silenced, to be, as the result proved, more definitively refuted by the entire failure of the fleet, even with the cooperation of a land attack. It is of much interest to have defined and understood the difficulties that prevented the assault of the place and driving the gunners from the open casemated forts of the harbor. (Plate 8.) From the best information I could obtain on the spot and from a Russian officer who served in the Mast bastion most of the siege, there were not more than 12,000 soldiers and sailors in Sebastopol and on board the fieet, at this moment, to resist 58,000. Menschikoff's army appears to have retreated, after the battle of the Alma, on Batkchi-Sara'i. Of permanent defenses there existed on the western side of the city two irregular "fronts," with a return on the water front, commanding the rear of Fort Alexander ; and on the extreme south terminated with a masonry tower, forming a redoubt of the Central or Tower bastion, as it was afterwards called. The bastion formed by the junction of these two fronts was called the Quarantine bastion ; from it to the harbor these defenses consisted of a masonry scarp of about thirty feet, supporting a solid earthen rampart. From the Quarantine bastion to the Tower or Central bastion the work consisted of a crennated or loop-holed scarp of about thirty feet height and five feet thick, slightly strengthened at distances of about Fig. ei. seventy-five yards by interior buttresses, arched to cover one loop- {mm m Mm^< . /fi \ mi /- • 1 1 \BMB5Wlial| ipMfifl |)[''l''Wiiii»iaMi|««iil.»P1li> hole, as m the annexed figure, (ol.) inere was an unfinished prrJ K ditch following the trace of this scarp, forming a cover to about "ayjy'tV""''' '!^' !^ Tj'yii^io" one third of the wall in height, with about forty feet width of ■>-=•«"""■•-- " '■'='"■''" »<■.« buttress. ditch. This crennated wall was in two places broken en cremalliere to make casemated flanks of two guns each. The intermediate part was in right lines without flanking defense, except appa- rently temporary earthen bastions thrown up in front of it, making this wall an iuclosure for the gorges. The exterior slope of this Central or Tower bastion was faced with cut stone in courses, piled regularly in the slope, as a pavement. The material had doubtless been prepared 6 D 42 ART OF WAR IX EUROPE. at some former period for continuing the fortifications, or may have heen from the ruins of the Tower. Whether this central bastion existed on the landing of the Allies, or was thrown up during the siege, I did not learn. SKErCH OF THE CREXXATED OR LOOP-HOLED WALL. Terreplein Kuins of barracks. The ground on this side the buildings descends rapidly Fig. 62. The crest of the parapet of the bastion was in the same plane as the crest of the crennated wall. The whole of this wall was in courses of from eight to ten inches rise, the longest stretchers measuring thirty inches, and not more than ten to twelve inches on the bed. It was a very indiiferent scarp for strength, although handsomely put together, both on interior and exterior, filled in with bad rubble-stone masonry. I incline to the belief that the wall with casemated flanks was the only part existing at the commencement, and that these earthen bastions were added after the French selected the western side of the city for their attack. There was a necessity for protecting this wall, as the counterscarp covered, not to exceed one third of its height, and could never have been calculated to resist artillery, but simply to cover this western side of tlie city against a.ssault. The tower terminating this wall I did not see^ it being in ruins and probably covered up with temporary works. Such were the permanent and only defenses on the western side of the city at the commencement of operations. From the tower at the termination of this wall, on a line following the crest of the bay slope, to the western point of Careening Bay, is a distance of about 6,500 yards. On this line, afterwards fortified by the Russians, there existed no defense of any kind whatever but the far- famed Malakoff tower, which, with its two tiers of loop holes for infantry and five guns in barbette, constituted the whole defense. The tower at the end of the crennated wall was masked from this line by the houses of the city and an intervening hill, afterwards the site of the Mast bastion. Hence we see that the only obstacle to the assault of the city, or seizing the crest of the bay or harbor slope, which would at once have led to the destruction of the fleet and fall of the south shore, was this little five-gun tower and such resistance as the buildings of the city, the hosi^ital and dock-yard barracks and storehouses, with stone walls of two feet thick and upwards, might present, together with the guns of the fleet, movable from place to jjlace, com- manding all the ravines, and the ascending slope from the harbor to the Great and Little Eedans the Malakofi", and Sapoun heights. It was this state of things that determined the Allies not to assault the place, or even to attempt the less hazardous one of the Malakofi' tower, the pos- session of which would have enabled them to drive the garrisons from the harbor forts and destroy the fleet. (See Fig. 50, and Plate 8.) Once under the walls of the Malakofi", the defenders and assailants were on equal terms. The walls afi'orded no more protection to the Russians on the inside than to the assailants on the outside. Kot a shot could be fired at or defend the foot of the scarp, doorway, or the intervening space between the loop holes. Once at the foot of the scarp, its defenders were at the mercy of the assailants, and could have been silenced and conquered, by the same artifice to which the French general resorted, at the final capture. The more slow and supposed certain means of destroying it by heavy artillery was ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 43 adopted. On the southern and western side the tower could be approached to within 200 yards under cover of the Karabelnaia ravine, and at a distance not exceeding 600 yards was the unoccu- pied Mamelon Vert, affording another covered approach, along the ridge upon which the tower is situated. The ground about the Malakoff was forty-three feet lower than the crest of this Mamelon Vert, (see Plate 8, and Figs. 54 b and 61 a, showing the relative heights and ground between these two localities.) This Mamelon Vert was not only a cover for approach, but com- manded by forty-three feet the entire site of the Malakoff, yet, strange to say, the Allies never occupied it until the next spring, and then only after the Kussians had fortified (late in February, 1855) and most gallantly defended it. It was taken on 7th June, 1855. It will now be understood that the only obstacle that prevented the Allies from occupying the crest of the hills above the harbor on the line of 6 500 yards that I refer to, was this little Mala- koff' tower. It is there'bre worthy of a more particular description on account of its importance at this moment of the operations, as well as from the general though erroneous impres ion that to it was in a great measure to be ascribed the prolonged resista^ice of the Russians. (See Figs. 53 a, 50.) In plan it wa) a circular stone wall of five feet thick, the exterio^- of whxh is described with a radius of about twenty-eight feet, and might possibly have been thirty feet. The gorge was term- inated by radii inclosing the work with about 225° of the circle. The entrance was on the conter of the gorge, the branches of which were pierced with five loop holes each. It communicated with a vaulted passage, extending right and left, of about six feet wide, and parallel with the interior face of the scarjD. This interior space was arched, the scarp wall forming one pier, the other being in the center of the tower, and same general outline as the walls of the tower. A communication existed to a second tier of the same general arrangement, by stone steps worked in this center pier, within the body of which and under the staircase was a very small hollow space sufficing for a limited supplj^ of ammunition. The superior terreplein was open to the heavens and unobstructed, mounting five guns behind a masonry parapet. In the gorge of the second tier, over the entrance, was an embrasure. The scarps and other walls were built of a soft stone, (before referred to,) in horizontal courses inside and out, and of not more than eight to ten inches rise, filled in with very indifferent rubble masonry, laid in poor mortar, though doubtless the best the country would produce. An examination of Fig. 50, exhibiting the remains of the tower in elevation after the siege, with Fig. 53 a, and the above description, will, I trust, make the defensive character of this structure suffici ntly understood. The day the allied army moved on Sebastopol from the Alma, the Russians commenced to guard the entrance into the harbor. Seven large ships, five of which were two-deckers, the other two, frigates, were sunk at the entrance into the harbor on a line of not less than TOO yards in length, leaving their "mast-heads generally" above water. AVhether seven ships on a line of that length, and in from four to ten fathoms water, formed an impassable barrier, I must leave to my nautical readers to determine. That the French and English had most able and intelligent engineers, with talent and skill equal to those of any nation, cannot be doubted. For the omission of many acts that could and should have been done, we must look to the divided councils in the allied commanders, the want of information of their enemy's strength, as well as of the ground, the want of preparation, and the orders from the governments. It may be that the chiefs of engineers who reconnoitered the place on the 27th September were not the men for tlie occasion, and that the cautious policy and formality with the attendant delay of a siege against the little Malakoff, the only obstruction on a line of 6,500 yards, emanated with them. Certain it is, their successors, both commanders and engineers, undertook many more hazardous tasks during the protracted operations that followed. 44 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. calling for more gallantry and heroism than an attempt to take possession of the hill crests over- looking the harbor. The formality of a siege being determined, the two armies commenced their arduous task, by landing guns and other munitions on the 1st October, and breaking ground on the 10th on a circuit, when completed, of not less than 11,500 yards, or about six miles, the French operating on the western and the English on the eastern part of the line, so disposing their forces, doub- less from the proximity of their respective transports and depots at Kamiesch and Balaklavabays. Fi'om this moment commenced one of the most determined, persevering, and resolutely contested combats of modern times. It cannot be said in the commencement to have been a siege, as there was nothing of a permanent defensive character on the front of attack worthy of the name. As soon as the Eussians discovered their enemy had abandoned the idea of attacking the north shore, and showed themselves in force on the south, then they commenced to occupy and fortify the crest of the hills overlooking th^-ir dock-yard and fleet. Their first labor was to throw up an entrenchment surrounding the MalakofF, which became the Korniloff bastion, and afterwards an inclosed work with a traverse across its center, arranged as a bomb-proof shelter. (Figs. 50, 54 a, 61 a, 62, and 63.) They commenced by covering the base and lower tier of the tower with an earthen parapet on a circular trace, (hence not flanked,) its crest about fourteen feet above the natural surface, with ditch about twelve feet deep,* and in many parts not over sis feet deep. From the extremes of this curve, branches retired to the rear and crest of the hill, thence on the left across a depres- sion or hollow, with a slight parapet and ditch, covered in front with trous-de-loups, connecting this Korniloff bastion with the Little Eedan ; and on the right the parapet fell rapidly down the declivity into the Karabelnaia ravine, with irregular faces, adapted to the slope, along which was the Gervaise battery, which, by a curved fire, flanked the ground in front of the circular part of the bastion. (Plate 8.) It will be observed that the location of this bastion is one of the most salient points of the Russian line of defense, and on the end of one of the spurs of land coming from the plateau on which the allies were encamped, the ravines on each side being some two hundred or more feet deep, and in places too steep to be crossed. In the rear of this bastion the ground slopes rapidly towards the dock-yard, on which slope an inclosed work was thrown up, which secured the gorge of the bastion at the same time that it gave a line of defense commanding its terreplein. This work on the slope had no flank defenses. Two of its branches were so broken as to throw a curved fire on the ground on right and left of the bastion. The branches joining the gorge traverse served also to flank the ground in front of the curtain joining the Little Eedan, and in front of the lines connecting with the Gervaise battery; making these branches in rear of the gorge as advantageous as flanks or cavaliers. It certainly was skillful engineering so to direct these branches as to conceal them from view in front by the bastion, not subject to enfilade or distant direct battery, and at the same time come into full efi'ect when the curtains were attacked. The height of the crest of the piarapet of the Kornilofi" bastion rose to cover about two feet of the second tier of looji holes in the Tower, or about fourteen feet above the natural level. The French engineer, Niel, in his official report of the capture states^ the "fort of the Malakoff" is 350 meters in length and 150 meters in width. I can only understand this to refer to the depth of the bastion and inclosed work behind the gorge, as being together 350 meters, and from right to left, as measuring 150 meters. (Figs. 54 a, and 50.) The ground in front of the circular face was mined, with galleries opening from the counter- scarp. To communicate with the bottom of the ditch and these mining galleries an underground *French writers state that tlie ditch on front of the circular part was six meters deep and seven meters wide. When I crossed it there was no such depth to be found except at the opening into a mining gallery. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 45 passage was made from the terrepleiu of the bastion, passing under the Malakoff tower and parapet into the ditch. (Fig. 54 a.) On the left of the tower and on the terreplcin of the bastion are entrances into temporary bomb-proofs, formed against the scarp of the tower and the circular parapet. The traverse closing the gorge was a continuous bomb-proof, entered from the work in rear. In the reentering formed by its two branches, the parapet was broken as a communication, the ditch being crossed by a slight wooden bridge. (Plate 8 and Figs. 50 and 54 a.) Numerous traverses between the guns existed throughout this work, some of which were constructed as bomb-proof shelters. The Great Beclan was another important site occupied by the Russians and fortified on the appearance of the allied army. Upon this work the English army directed all its energies from the commencement to the end of the siege. It was located on the end of the spur coming from the plateau on which the allies were encamped, and between the Karabelnaia and Woronsoff ravines. This work was in trace a regular bastion, the branches connected with its flanks retired to the right and left down into the ravines, from which a curved artillery fire battered the approaches on the capital of the bastion. Its faces and flanks battered the approaches on the Mast and Korniloff bastions, leaving very little fire from the work itself on the capital. The batteries on the branches descending the slope towards and into the AVoronsoff' valley were called the Barrack batteries, from being in front of the dock-yard barracks. In profile and general construction these works were the same as those of the Korniloif bastion. On the right of the Redan, and on the branch connected with its flank, is a low four-gun battery, that could fire on about half the distance over which the English advanced from their trenches to the assault; the guns could not traverse sufficiently to act on the half of this distance nearest to the salient. A second and still lower battery, armed with ship's swivel guns, mounted on posts set in the ground, (see Fig. ^1h,) flanked the near approaches to the Redan by a curved fire. On the left is a corresponding low branch armed with four guns, flanking the ground in front of the face of the bastion, hut not the ditches. On a lower branch one gun, firing through an oblique embrasure, commanded fully and directly the face of the Redan. On its left face another oblique embrasure had been cut in the parapet, giving the gun a slight bearing on tlie approaches, otherwise not a gun from the faces of this work could bear on the English approaches or assault. The ditch of the low swivel battery on the right (Fig. 57) was flanked by a caponnier. (Figs. 55 a, 58 a, 59 a, and 60 a.) The guns on the faces of the bastion (Redan) were covered by traverses from gun to gun, or for every two guns. On both sides and ends, as well as along the interior slope of the parapet on each side of the embrasure, narrow banquets were formed for infantry ; in constructing which, great use was made of wattling, instead of gabions and facines, an arrangement to give increased infantry fire and space in the gun rooms. The scarps and counterscarps were in many places walled up with loose stone, quarried from the ditches. Figures 58 a, 59 a, and 60 a, are perfect representations of the interior of the Redan at the moment it was evacuated by the Russians on tlie night of the 8th and 9th September. They show the construction, tlie armament, the material, the ammunition left about the guns after the bombardment, and the destruction, within these defenses, by the allied batteries. No language can give greater accuracy of detail than these photographic views taken on the spot. It will be observed that this Redan is a salient bastion in the line of the Russian entrenchments, battering the approaches on the Mast bastion on the right, and of the Kornilofi" bastion on the left. It was in part and mostly closed at its gorge, not however by a second line of defense fronting the allied attack, but, on the contrary, fronting towards the harbor of Sebastopol, making it, as in the case of the Korniloff' bastion, an inclosed work, the gorge, doubtless, being so arranged to prevent this important point being turned and taken in rear. The left half of the gorge inclosure was in very perfect order and condition when I examined it, showing the flanking arraugement and the ditch on the harbor side. The right half was not perfect, either from having been dis- 46 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. turbedhy mines partially filling the ditches, or never having been finished. The ground in front on the prolongation of the capital of the bastion, (Kedan,) for a distance of 250 yards, to the most advanced trench of the English, was quite level, from thence it gradually rose as it approached the allied camjJ. The Mast bastion was a third important site occupied by the Russians, and fortified on the app)earance of the allied army. Upon it the French army devoted their first labors, gradually extending them in front of the crennated wall^ and entire western side of the city, as their main and only attack; but at a later period, after the arrival from Paris of General Niel of the engi- neers, it became secondary, and the main effort was directed upon what was then first recognized as the key of the position, the site of the Korniloflf bast'on. This Mast bastion is another salient in the line of entrenchments thrown up by the Eussians. It is on a hillock, at the south end of the city, at the head of the Inner harbor, on a more extended spur coming from the south, which, unlike the others, extends the whole lenglh of the Inner harbor, and falls abruptly near Fort St. Nicholas. Upon it the eastern part of the city is built. This hillock is separated from the citj^ by a depression, making it an isolated point that called for sj)ecial ajij^lication of engineering skill to fortify it. It became a detached fort, the key of the position, and the mo.st southern and salient of all the ground occupied by the Russians. Under cover of its eastern slope the Allies could have advanced upon it, with no other opposi- tion than one gun from the Malakoff bearing obliquely on their flank, and more than 2,500 yards distant. Like the site of the Kornilofi" bastion and Redan, had it been seized by the French, and their batteries established upon it, the Russian fleet would have been in their power. But the cautious policy that dictated the formalities of a siege against literally nothing but the little Malakoft' tower, doubtless inspired the Russians with increased energy, and the determination to occupy and fortify this site in connection with the two before described. Thus they partially inclosed their position, by a line of detached forts, on the three most commanding sites that overlooked their dock-yards, and many of the harbor defenses, as well as Inner harbor, in which the fleet operated. My notes made on the ground do not suffice to give a sketch of the trace. It had a stronger profile by far than any other ])art of the Russian temporary entrenchments. It had two long faces, one fronting the city ravine, flanked by two guns in a caponnier, and the other by a flank armed with four guns. The glacis was mined. The ditch is about thirty feet wide, and cut in soil that remained nearly vertical. At the foot of the scarp, in the ditch, was a line of palisades, that remained in good condition at the end of the operations, being eflectu- ally covered by the glacis. The tliickness of the parapet is about fifteen feet on top, and not less than twenty feet in height above the natural level of the country, with ten feet depth of ditch below the same level. On the left or eastern face there is a formidable battery on the glacis, commencing at the crest of the counterscarp, with a branch commanding the salient of the two long faces, and a second branch battering the ground in front of the Redan. This Mast bastion or detached fort was closed at its gorge by a strong entrenchment mounted with artillery. Parallel to each of the long faces is a cavalier traverse, under which extensive bomb-proof shelters were formed. This structure served as a parados as well as a traverse. All the guns in the other posi- tions were separated by traverses on the sides as well as rear, forming gun rooms of from one to four guns in each. The site of this detached fort, that assumed the name of Mast bastion, was a pleasure garden on the outskirts of the city. It occupied nearly the entire surface of the hillock ; below it on the slope, descending to the Inner harbor, numerous batteries were constructed from time to time battering the approaches on the Redan and Malakoff, with one face, and the French approaches on the Mast bastion from the other. These batteiies took the name of Garden bat- teries. On leaving this detached fort I passed between the hillock upon which it is situated and tlie ridge upon which the Central or Tower bastion is located, and thence down the main street of Sebastopol to the water at the head of Artillery Bay, and remarked that all the city on the left of the road, and on my left as I turned into the Woronsofl" road, and on my right and left as I ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 47 descended that road oi" street to the water, was a total ruin. Not a habitable building was seen over the entire surface of what was once a very handsomely built city. No shelter of any kind was perceived for the troops defending the city during the siege other than the bomb-proofs in the harbor forts, and the temporary ones constructed in the traverses, &c., about the entrench- ments. The destruction of everything throughout the works of defense indicated the greatest heroism and untiring devotion to duty, as well as perseverance and indomitable fortitude and courage on the part of the defenders of the city. On other occasions, crossing the city from the crennated wall down the road to the head of the Inner harbor, along the barracks, hospitals, dry-docks, and through the Karabelnaia faubourg, an opportunity was had of seeing the entire city, presenting a scene of total demolition and entire destruction. Not a single house was discovered that was habitable, not even an outbuilding that had not been more or less destroyed. How much of the damage was done by the batteries of the Allies, and how much by the Russians, by tearing down buildings for material for bomb-proof shelters and blowing up on evacuating the place, it was not possible to discriminate. The effects of shot and shell were seen, however, in every direction. The only exceiition that came to my knowledge was, in a range of storehouses along the dock-yard harbor. Most of these, entirely beyond the range of the batteries of the Allies, remained in good condition, and were not destroyed by the Russians on retreating, as in their vaulted basement rooms had been deposited for interment the dead of the last day's contest, that time did not permit them to attend to. Not a human being remained in the city or its ruins on its being entered by the Allies. A few cats, dogs, and rats were the only living creatures found iu the place, and no property worth naming, other than munitions of war in a damaged state. Desolation and ruin were the remaining fruits of this long-contested artillery combat, or, as said at the time, "blood-stained ruins alone were left to the victors as the fruits of this siege." An examination of figures 50 a, 50 b, and 50 c will show the ruined condition of several large and handsome buildings, as well as entire streets, and particularly in the Karabelnaia faubourg. The glacis of the Mast bastion was covered with sharp spikes driven upwards through boards slightly concealed with earth, making it impossible to pass over the ground except on beaten tracks, or where they had been broken up and destroyed by the fire of the Allies. The same obstructions were placed in the bottom of the ditches. To overcome these obstacles the Allies used bags of wool and small bundles of straw, which the storming parties carried, throwing them in the ditch on top of the spikes, from the counterscarp. The men carrying these hags and the scaling ladders, slung their muskets, joining in the assault after placing the ladders and throwing the bags. Another description of spike was also used by the Russians in the bottom of the trous-de-loups and ditches. I observed them in front of the curtain connecting the Great and Little Redans. They were barbed-headed spears, with three and four points on a stem driven into plank. Some thirty or forty of these were fastened to rectangular masses of boards, and placed in the bottom of the trous-de-loiq^ts. ■■\ K M im \\ / (See annexed Fig. 56 a.) They rose about six inches above ■ \ ^'i the planks to which they were fastened, and were made of . \ \^ three sixteenths of an inch iron — probably old ramrods. In the annexed figure they are greatly enlarged in comparison with Wi&trous-de-loup, for convenience of illustration. The Allies concentrated their first efi"orts in the direc- tion of the Mast bastion and the Redan. Other points were ''^' combated only as they influenced the labors on these two. The French directed their attack on 48 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the former, and the English on the latter ; each party gradually extending their approaches to the right and left. From the 28th September to the 17th October, the Allies had been laboriously at work mounting heavy artillery behind temporary and hastily constructed earthen parapets. The French transported theirs from Kamiesch bay, over a distance varying from 7,500 to 10,000 yards; and the English from Balaklava bay, over a distance of about 15,000 yards. While the Eussians brought theirs from their dock-yard, arsenal, and fleet, over a distance varying between 1,000 and 1,500 yards. They had to resort almost entirely to ships' guns, on ships' carriages; and the Allies resorted in a great measure to the smaller vessels of their fleets for guns and munitions, and to their sailors for artillerists and labor. (See Fig. 54 b, and others.) Having succeeded in putting in battery about 126 guns, and all the needful ammunition and supplies, they considered their prejiarations sufiicient to insure the success of a combined attack by land and water. The details and construction of the besiegers' batteries is shown in Fig. 57 a. It is a perspective of the interior of Chapman's battery, embracing three guns mounted on ships' carriages, placed in blinded embrasures, exhibiting the parapets, traverses, and cheeks of embrasures, revetted with gabions and sand-bags, repaired and put in order after a bombard- ment, with the ammunition ready for another attempt. In the rear is seen the spent shot scattered about the ground from Eussian batteries. Some ofiicers and men are seen close imder cover of the parapet, awaiting orders for more active service. I may here state that, these figures of reference having been made on the ground by the photographic art, reliance can be placed in the most minute accuracy of details, as representing the condition of things at a particular moment. I can offer no language to convey to the mind a more perfect description. The Eussians had succeeded, during the same period, (28th September to 17th October, 1854,) in mounting about 156 guns, 76 of which were on the English line of approach, and 80 on the French approaches. Thus prepared, the bombardment commenced at half-past six on the morning of the 17th October, 1854, by the English and French batteries opening fire on the Eussians, who as promptly and vigorously returned it. For three hours the fire from these 282 guns continvied uninterruptedly, when, at half-past nine, the explosion of a magazine in two of the French batteries suspended their fire for the day. About three, p. M., a similar disaster occurred in the Eedan, but not to diminish its fire. At dark the firing ceased on both sides. In less than a hour from the commencement of this bombardment, (and it is even stated as within twenty minutes,) the fire of the Malakofi" tower was silenced, and by guns from the most distant English batteries, and as informed by officers who were present, not less that 2,000 yards from the tower. Such only was its strength and power of resistance. But the moment for profiting by its demolition had passed. Covering masses of earth had been thrown up in front of its basement story, forming the lines of intrenchments I have endeavored to describe, presenting new and extended lines of obstacles. The combined fleets commenced to prejjare for action with the sound of the first gun from the land batteries. Steamers were lashed to the ships-of-tlie-line, thus towing them into action. It was nearly noon before the whole fleet was under way, the French leading, the Turks following, and the English in the rear. So soon as the leading ships came within 2,000 yards of the nearest batteries, the Eussians opened fire upon them. As fast as the leading ships reached the nearest and appointed station, they anchored, when those next astern followed on the outside and anchored next ahead, thus forming from rear to the front by an inversion of the order of sailing; whereby the ships sustained no fire imtil coming to their destined position. By this arrangement the French fleet first anchored, and engaged the Quarantine batteries and Fort Alexander, the Turks took a central position in the mouth of the harbor, and the English anchored opposite Fort Constautine and the Cliff batteries, varying in distance from 600 to ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 49 1,500 yards from the forts. The order given to the captains is said to have heen to keep 1,200 yards oif. The attacking force consisted of — 1 ship of 130 guns 130 guns. 6shipsofl20 " 720 " 1 ship of 100 " 100 •' 1 " 92 " 92 "■ 1 " 91 " 91 " 5shipsof 90 " 450 " 1 ship of 84 " 84 " Sshipsof 80 " 240 " 1 ship of 78 " 78 " 1 " 70 " 70 '< 1 " 50 " 50 " 1 " 30 " 30 " 1 " 21 " 21 " Making a total of 2,156 guns in the battering ships, besides numerous frigates, steamers, and small vessels, not calculated to face a land battery. Of this number, one half, or the broadside of each ship only, couhl be brought to bear on the forts. The outer forts only, as before enume- rated, mounting collectively 261 guns, could bring theh" batteries to bear upon the ships, and of this number not to exceed 200 guns fronted towards the fleet; hence it was a contest between 1,078 guns behind wooden walls, and about 200 behind masonry and earthen parapets. Tlie cannonade commenced about one o'clock, and continued uninterruptedly until half-past six in the evening, when the fleets ceased firing and stood out to sea, having done no such injury to the forts as in any way to destroy their efficiency. Tlie face-stones of the masonry were in many places broken, and the space between two embrasures in Fort Constantino was broken tlirough, but not to injure the batteries. The fleets suffered considerably ; two of the large English ships were so damaged, that repair was impracticable without going to the dock- yards at Constantinople ; one of these sustained serious damage from plunging shot, seven of which penetrated the ship's side vmder water, and several of them were set on fire by hot shot, and had to be towed out of action by the steamers. One of the French line-of-battle ships was so damaged by the bursting of a shell in the engine-room, as to make it necessary to send her to France to repair the machinery ; and another received a plunging shot through her side tivo feet under the water line. After twenty days of unceasing labor by an army of 50,000 men, (58,000 landed and marched to the Alma,) with siege batteries mounting 126 guns, and a fleet of ships-of-the-line mounting 2,156 guns, did this combined attack by land and water, from morning to night, fail entirely in the great object for which it was undertaken : the destruction of the Russian fleet and dejjots in the Black sea. The next day the land batteries continued firing; but the fleet never after renewed its attempt to destroy or attack the harbor defenses, not even after the army had possession of all the defenses on the south side, and every effort was being made by Generals Pellissier, Simpson, and La Mamora, to take the north shore. It was arranged that the fleets should make another attack, simultaneously with the last and final assault, on the 8th September, 1855, but were prevented by one of those unforeseen contingencies to which naval armaments are peculiarly liable : a gale of wind prevented the large ships leaving tlieir anchorage on the appointed day. I can but draw the important conclusion from these facts, that jjermanent sea-coast batteries are to be relied upon for tlie defense of our harbors ; tliat they are superior to every known floating battery; and tliat the present experience of the best naval as well as military 7 D 50 ART OF WAR IN EtTROPE. authorities of Europe, now confirms tlie supremacy of land 'batteries over tliose in the fleets of the present day. The results of this combined effort proving so fruitless to the Allies, their means on the spot mostly exhausted in this first bombardment, and innumerable difiiculties presenting themselves, and still worse to be looked for during the approaching inclement season, Lord Raglan is said to have so far despaired of success as to call a council of superior officers to consider the propriety of raising the siege or persevere and winter in the Crimea. The latter counsel prevailed, and corresponding arrangements were made by all parties. After fortifying these most important points, that resisted this first bombardment, the Russians persevered in the same policy, constructing similar works at the site D, Plate 8, called by the Allies the Little Redan, and then, as time permitted, connected these salient points by entrenchments, either to the crests of the ravines or down their slopes as far as the ground was adapted to their purposes. This labor being accomplished, and their enemy still occupying unusually distant positions, selected with no other object that I could discover than the destruction of the little Malakofi" tower, which object was completely frustrated by the skill of the Russian engineers in covering their position, and arming batteries more rapidly than their enemy, they moved forward in advance of this line, and occupied the Mamelon Vert, in front of the Korniloff bastion, (the Malakoff tower within being mostly destroyed,) the Selenghinsk, Volhynia, and Sapoun redoubts on the left and in-^advance of the Little Redan, a stone quarry excavation in front of the Great Redan, and inclosed by a continuous line the ground between the quarantine shore batteries and Quarantine bastion. These advanced works flanked the besiegers' approaches and previous parallels, forcing them to increased labor in defiling various parts, and to the construction of new batteries preparatory to overcoming this second line, throivn up after the failure of their first bombardment on the lYth October. The difficulties encountered by the allies from sickness, the severity of a winter campaign without suitable shelter for men or horses, the rain, at times, flooding their trenches, at others, covered with snow, rendering the roads from Balaklava, over a rich soil, (not unlike the soil of our Western praries,) almost impassable ; the want of intrenching tools, guns, ammunition, and even forage, fuel, food, and clothing, in consequence of the late season of commencing the cam- paign and of jjrevious preparation and knowledge of the task they had undertaken, and the total failure of their first bombardment, gave time, and again inspired the Russians with renewed vigor and perseverance, inducing them to push forward once more and in advance of this second line of detached works, (though necessarily with the opening of the spring, renewed opposition, and nearer approach to the allies,) with less formidable works, confining themselves to the selec- tion of favorable sites in front of the quarries, the Mamelon, and other places, where, during a night, they would make small lunettes, covering from ten to twenty men, and in other places barely sufficient for the cover of an individual. These small works took the name of rifle pits. The smaller ones were, in some instances, piles of loose stone collected and thrown together sufficient to conceal a inan lying down, others were formed of two gabions laid end to end, forming an obtuse angle, filled with stone or earth. These rifie pits were located beyond the influence of the allied artillery, covering individuals and small parties of infantry, firing on workmen in the allied trenches, heads of saps, and unfinished batteries. Some of them were in deep ravines, under batteries into which the artillery could not be depressed. This mode of defense certainly was unusual, and only to be practiced with troops who are individually inspired with the cause of their country, a credit that must be accorded to the Russian soldiers throughout this contest. Such deeds of daring and individual courage could not be the result of military command alone. These rifle pits in front of the Mamelon were, more properly speaking, a line of advanced lunettes. So formidable were they, as to resist the attacks of the French on the loth and 17th of March, and were only taken on the 22d of March, 1855, by a powerful night attack by 12,000 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 51 French troops, when they were connected and formed part of the advanced parallel of that date. In front of the Redan the English could not advance without fir.st driving the Russians from the pits in that front, which they were not prepared to imdertake hefore the 19th of April, 1855. On the 9th of April, 1855, the second bombardment of these temjjorary earthen defenses was commenced by the Allies on the whole line, from the Quarantine battery around to the Sajioun redoubt, and continued throughout the 10th without producing any favorable result. After this unavailing and fruitless second bombardment, the Emperor Napoleon despaired of success, became dissatisfied with the plan of the campaign, proposed his own, which was sub- mitted to, discussed, and rejected hj tlie opposition to it, eventually causing the resignation of General Canrobert, the French Commander, who advocated and urged carrying into effect the Emperor's views. On the 28th of April, 1855, Napoleon wrote to Canrobert, giving a circumstantial outline of his plan of a campaign, in which he proposed to take the field in person. (See Plate 12.) Canrobert stated the difiiculties to be in the want of a great commander over the Allies ; some man of great authority, high position, and sufficiently old experience to dominate over every thing. That the want of unity begat delaj^s^ hesitations, and differences; that such had always existed, creating obstacles and delays at every moment ; throwing insurmountable difiiculties around the expedition. This language of Canrobert can be understood as applying to no other commanders than Napoleon and Lord Raglan, and most disparaging to the English commander. The proposed plan of the Emperor, as given in his letter of the 28th of April, 1855, was to stand on the defensive before Sebastopol ; take the field and operate on Simpheropol and Baktchi- Sarai", by sending into the valley of the Baidar 40,000 men, occupying it I'rom Skelea, as far as the bridges of Teule and Tchorgaum, and the four roads crossing the Tchernaya, thus threatening the Russian flank on McKenzie's heights. The active army then before Sebastopol of 40,000 men, extended into the valley of the Baidar, was to be joined by a corps d'armee under the Emperor in person, who, coming from Constanti- nople, would recounoiter the Phoros Pass. The first movement was for Napoleon's corps d'armee to proceed to Alouchta, where the beach presented a favorable landitrg, marching immediately beyond the defile of Ayen (Aien) with 3,000 men, who would, if practicable, take possession and hold this pass, when the Emperor would land the rest of his force. The 40,000 troops in the valley of the Baidar would move along the sea-shore road by Yalta. In three days he calculated to unite these two army corps at Simpheropol, and then with this force of 65,000 men advancing by way of Baktchi-Sarai on Sebas- topol, with his left on the mountains, would join Lord Raglan, who would have advanced from Baidar to Albat, on the Balbec, and thus drive the Russians into the sea. His calculation was to keep up his communication with the sea and landing of Alouchta as far as Sim2)heropol, about nine leagues from his transports. If the advance of 3,000 men found the defile of Ayen (Aien) fortified and could not be taken, then they would reeiubark and laud at Balaklava, and the diversion it was intended to make on Simpheropol would have been made by Baidar. This plan was laid before the allied commanders by Canrobert on the 1st of May, 1855. Lord Raglan decidedly disapproved of relinc[uishing all their efibrts, and losing the anticipated fruits of all their severe labors, to take up a new plan in the open field. He preferred rather to operate by Eupatoria, which Canrobert opposed, in accordance with the Emperor's views, and finally relinquished his preference. At this meeting Lord Raglan considered the road from Alouchta to Simpheropol too exposed, and that from Baidar to Baktchi-Sarai preferable, but he yielded his opinions, as Canrobert thought, rather from weariness of discussion than from con- viction. The consequence was that at each instant, and in every question of detail, the tacit opposition of his mind made itself felt without his intending it. 52 AET OF WAR IN EUROPE. Canrobert considered a general assault as terrible and doubtful, and lience favored the views of the Emperor. He even proposed to give up to Lord Eaglan the supreme command, entreating the Turkish commander, Omar Pasha, to do likewise. Eaglan, at first, astonished, refused, then hesitated, then accej^ted, and afterwards demanded that the French troops should occu^jy and defend the English trenches. This Canrobert refused, stating that the English trenches could alone be occupied by the English. From that moment they could come to no mutually favorable understanding. The first blow confirming these divided councils was Raglan's order recalling the Kertch expedition, and the refusal of Eaglan to cooperate with Canrobert in the Emperor's plan of campaign. From that moment Canrobert considered his association with Lord Eaglan as calculated to jeopardize the operations of the Allies, and, keeping his views secret, asked to be relieved, and to surrender the command of the French army to Pellissier ; he to take the latter's division, as a subordinate, ascribing his ill-health as the cause. On the 19th of May lie states that the very false position towards the English army in which Lord Eaglan had placed him, the sudden recall of the Kertch expedition, to which, he says, the English attached great importance, convinced him he should not direct as chief an immense army, whose confidence he had obtained, and from that moment considered his duty required him to use a letter^ then in his possession from the Emperor, investing Pellissier with the chief command, who received it with becoming modesty and reluctance on the morning of the 19th of May, 1855. After the bombardment of the 9th of April, 1855, the Allies were again forced to the tedious and laborious labors of the sap and construction of additional batteries. The second line of Eussian advanced works then became the point of attack. On tire 22d and 23d of May — Pellis- sier, then in command — after long-continued and obstinate combats, the French succeeded in taking the Eussian works in front of the Quarantine bastion ; and on the 24th and 25th of May, after equally hard-fought and sanguinary combats, the French took the advanced works in front of the Central bastion. On the 7tli of June, after other hard-fought battles, the English took the Eussian defenses of the quarries, and the Frencli those of the Mamelon, thus becoming masters of the second line of detached forts, which enabled them to resume their labors against the first defenses thrown up to oi^posc them. On the 17th of June, 1855, the tlitrd bombardment commenced and continued through the day on the whole line of the Eussian works. This was preparatory to storming the salient points of their line. On the 18th, at 3, a. m., the French commenced the attack on the extreme Eussian left, which finally became general, the Malakoffand Eedan being the special objects of the French and English ; but, like the previous ones, failed, and proved as unavailing and fruitless as the two preceding ones, wlien again the Allies had to resort to the slow process of the sap. Lord Eaglan died on the 29th of June. On the morning of the 5th of September, 1855, t\\Q fourth bombardment commenced by the French batteries opening fire, which the English soon after followed, on the whole line of Eussian works, (their first line,) from the Quarantine around to the Careening Bay. Tbis tremendous bombardment continued to noon on the 8th of September, when, after well-concerted arrange- ments, a successful assault was made by the French on the Malakoff or Korniloff" bastion, which they held, notwithstanding repeated and desperate efforts by the Eussians throughout the day to retake it. Although the assault was made about the same time on the Little Bedan, the Great Redan, the Mast, and Central bastions, Eussian courage and unyielding determination frustrated the most powerful efibrts of the allied generals at each of these four last-named points. The same night, unknown and unobserved by their enemies, the Eussians evacuated all their defenses on the south side of the harbor, and crossed to the northern forts over a temporary bridge of more than a mile in length, having previously carried off all that might be needed in ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 53 the northern works — a masterly retreat that does great credit to Kussian military genius and discipline. Such was the efficacy and power of temporary field fortifications, with inexhaustible supplies of the munitions of war. It must not he supposed that these extensive Russian defenses were thrown up and defended by the small garrison within Sebastopol when the Allies first appeared on the plateau before it. Doubtless General Gortschakoif had drawn the army from the Alma into the city, as well as other troops stationed in the Crimea. On the 25tli of October, 1854, eight days after the com- bined land and sea attack, the garrison was of such strength as to admit of a sortie and attack on the English depots at Balaklava by 25,900 men, under General Liprandi, and the next day another sortie from the place by 9,000 men, and on the 5th of November the Russians made another desperate attack at Inkerman, with between fifty and sixty thousand men, (as estimated by the Allies,) while, during each of these actions, the entrenchments were fully garrisoned and defended. There is a lesson to be drawn from these operations not without interest to us. "We have seen that the sea-coast defenses could be relied upon for security against the most powerful fleet that could attack them. More ships could not find room to anchor before them in a hostile attitude. At the same time we find these harbor defenses were of no value without being properly protected in the rear ; and to do so temporarily and at the spur of the moment, required a very large army, and the dismantling of a fleet, to afford the necessary armament and muni- tions. Now, ive have no such fleets, nor have we depots of munitions of war at our several sea-coast defenses from which, if we had the men, to arm temporarily constructed land defenses. And it may not be amiss to recall to recollection the fiict, that the Ordnance Depart- ment had not^ at a jjarticular moment during a late administration of the War Department, as many guns of all calibers for the entire sea-coast of the United States as were used by the Allies in this one campaign. At that time it was not in our power to have remounted with suitable artillery any of our principle sea-coast defenses. I trust that the memorable example now brought to our knowledge of what may be necessary for our own welfare, will enable us, with more certainty, to attain the object then proposed of increased attention to the sea-coast armaments. We must give due attention to these particulars in time of peace, and I must be permitted to notice the necessity of making the gorges and land defenses of our sea-coast forts sufficiently strong, the importance of which is not, I apprehend, duly appreciated. Nor must it be inferred from the labors and resolute defense of the Russians, that thei'e were any new princi- ples, in the art of war, introduced or practiced by them in this heroic struggle ; in support of which, I may bring to recollection several instances of our having resorted to temjjorary defenses precisely similar in principle, and in nearly every detail of construction, to those constructed by the Russians around Sebastopol. During our revolutionary struggle General Washington caused West Point to be fortified. Kosciusko, as the engineer, constructed at that time Fort Clinton, on the crest of the river's slope. The bastion projecting on the plain is very similar in form, shape, and general dimensions to the Redan at Sebastopol. Similar works were constructed at Yorktowu, Virginia, by Cornwallis, during the same period ; where the heights of the river's bank, location of the works between deep ravines, and commanding ground occupied by our troops, with the dimensions and general trace of the works, assimilate them to the Russian defenses. At a later period (1814) the inhab- itants of New York and Brooklyn, under General Swift and Colonel Gadsden, of the corps of engineers, fortified Brooklyn and Harlaem heights with similar temporary defenses, a part of which (Fort Green) covering the rear of the navy-yard, was in construction and character, as well as in many of its topograi)hical features and purposes, like the Mast bastion at Sebastopol. 64 ART 0? WAR IN EUROPE. And another instance that will familiarize the character of the Russian works to many of our southern friends, is that of the defenses thrown up hy General Jackson in 1814 and 1815 below New Orleans — similar in construction, though differing in having wet ditches, and on a low, flat country. And a still more recent similarity existed in the works constructed by Colonel Mans- field, of the corps of engineers, on the Rio Grande, opposite Matamoras, where the work, as in the case of the Russians, was done under fire of the enemy, and where he resorted to similar expedients to provide bomb-proof shelter for the garrison. I am induced to bring these instances in different parts of our country to notice, to make the facts more clearly understood, citing remote and recent periods to show that the art of fortification is as it teas. In making these comparisons it is well to state that the prolonged resistance of the Russians arose from the immense resources at command, securing constant supplies of ammunition and guns to replace those in battery as fast as they were disabled. In one locality I counted twelve guns that had been destroyed by the Allies in a battery mounting only four. The greatly increased size of the caliber of the guns, derived from this unprecedented source, may be added as another element in prolonging the defense. Marshal Vaillant finds an explanation for the want of foresight and due preparation of the Allies, in the energy of the defense, the great number of guns that the place put in battery, and the defect of the investment, which gave to the siege a peculiar character, permitting the Russians continually to renew and restore their provisions, &c. General Canrobert stated that the difficul- ties of the Allies were of two descriptions, the one arising from the slight covering of earth over rock, diminishing as their approaches advanced, and the other from the number and caliber of the enemy's guns on a front almost a straight line, and very extended. This latter axiom in fortifi- cation, combined with the numerous traverses introduced by the Russians in all their batteries, counteracted the effects of ricochet batteries, even where it became practicable to establish them against this fortified straight line. The Russian batteries could in consequence only be destroyed by direct fire, and as the Russians could mount guns faster than the Allies from the proximity of their depots, we can understand why such an immense number of guns became necessary to subdue them. The French engineer Niel states that, on the last day, the Allies had moimted in battery seven hundred,* and the Russians eight hundred guns ; and that the English had two hundred of the seven. From these figures we may infer the immense number neces- sary to have supplied the combatants with 1,500 at the close of the operations. I learned the fact that the English army had a total of 911 (nine hundred and eleven) guns in their artillery park during the siege, of which 250 only were serviceable at the conclusion. On account of the difficulties stated by General Canrobert, and after the formality of a siege had been determined upon, there was no other way of driving the Russians from their hastily-constructed batteries than by dismounting their guns by direct fire, and driving the garrisons from the bastions and batteries by mortars and howitzers. For this latter neither of the allied armies were prepared for want of previous knowledge of the task before them, and being unexpectedly forced by the governments to undertake it without proper supplies. As the fleet could furnish no howitzers, and but few mortars, it was late the next year before the Russians began to suffer from them. The annexed table, for which I am indebted to a highly distinguished English officer present during the whole siege, shows the immense number of projectiles fired from their batteries, mounting about 200 guns as a maximum. It is of particular interest to the artillery officer, showing the number of rounds fired from each caliber and the periods when they were brought into action. *Marslial Vaillant, the French Minister of War, states, in his report to the Emperor, that, on the day of the final assault of the Russian defenses, the armament of the artillery was composed of G20 guns. This excess of 120 guns, over General Kiel's statement, no doubt arises from the Marshal including the armament of the eight redoubts covering the depots at Kamiesch, and in the park of artillery, while General Niel's statement refers to the number in battery before the place. ART OF WAR IN KUROPE. 55 Statement of the number of rounds issued to the batteries in the English trenches each month from the commencement to the termination of the siege of Sebastopol. Months. October, 1854*.... November, 1854.. December, 1854.. January, 1855 February, 1855... March, 1855 April, 1855 May, 1855 June, 1555 July, 1855 August, 1855....'.. September, 1855.. Grand total ... Unexpended., Consumed . Mortars. 114 256 2,182 6,079 4,617 9,520 8,038 6,854 3,063 40,723 1,378 39,345 2,961 548 131 108 76 1,421 4,262 1,251 4,133 8,318 10,104 5,363 38,704.' 1,361 2,047 2,089 296 4,432 1,258 37,343 3,174 426 50 87 20 1,467 200 2,829 1,049 1,688 7,816 2,969 4,847 Guns. 207 534 2,920 1,346 2,035 1,076 14,065 3,399 1,289 6,276 12,305 15,709 16,495 2,346 833 1,945 8,118 1,112 74,662 10,382 310 1,033 223 1,172 3,176 11,473 25,761 10,564 7,262 6,327 17,827 2,610 87,936 25,020 23,191 3,716 42 6,885 4,961 719 156 360 52 50 40,953 8,746 483 1,394 5,022 29,131 58,007 34,486 41,492 27,858 18,910 16,041 39,670 5,941 7,006 64,280 62,916 33,729 462 60 302,523 49,481 402 253,042 * In addition to this consumption in October, there was the ammunition supplied by the navy for 32-pounders, 8-inch, and 68-pounders used during the first bombardment. The total of Englisli guns was 911, which fired 253,042 shot, with 2,684,804 pounds of potvder. The propriety of using such an immense number of 8 and 10-inch projectiles is very questionable. Fired horizontally into the earthen parapets, they produced no injury in a day that was not repaired at night with a few shovels, or at most wheelbarrows, full of earth ; and for dismounting the Eussian artillery an 8 or 10-inch gun was no more serviceable than the 32-pounder, while the labor of keeping these heavy guns supplied with ammunition broke down their land transport service. The French evinced no more foresight and discrimination in preparing for this contest than their allies, notwithstanding their depots were well stored. They considered it sufficient to send from the arsenal at Toulon sixty pieces of artillery. Three supplementary siege trains were after- wards forwarded from Marseilles and Toulon, the first of fifty-eight pieces, the second of forty- eight pieces, and the third of 150 pieces — all of them provided witli from 1,500 to 2,000 rounds each. From 7,000 to 8,000 war rockets, ranging from 5,000 to 7,000 meters, were forwarded with the above. Besides the preceding, General Canrobert, finding himself before an open city filled with munitions of war in the hands of skillful engineers and artillerists, drew at once from Constanti- nople 160 pieces, and called upon the fleet for an additional number and of the largest caliber, from which source no less than 605 pieces were obtained during the contest, 238 of which were in battery on the day of the last assault. All this did not suffice to subdue their heroic enemy. Before the close of the siege the Emperor Napoleon seems to have concluded that but little could be gained by firing horizontally against earthen intrenchments other than dismounting guns, to which those of the Fiench were equally liable ; and ordered 400 mortars (the English ordered 200 at the same time) to be forwarded from France provided with 1,000 rounds each, calculating to throw over the parapets and into the intrenchments of the Kussians 830 shells per hour. A part only of these mortars arrived in time to be put in battery. 66 • ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. The total quantities of artillery stores that this protracted siege and remarkable defense called for, on the part of the French, and for which sixty guns were supposed to he sufficient, amounted to 1,676 guns of all calibers, 2,083 gun carriages, 2,740 transport wagons, 2,128,000 shot and shells, and 8,800,000 pounds of powder. If to this I add the supplies of the English army^ the totals amount to 2,587 guns, 2,381,042 shot and shells, and 11,484,804 pounds of powder. The engineers of the United States, when calculating the strength to be given to our national sea-coast defenses_, are apt to take as their guide, as a basis for resistance, the naval power of the jjrincijjal European nations. The immense resources, as shown above, suddenly called into activity in tliis contest with Russia prove a facility for equipping forces beyond former precedent, and to such an extent, as should induce us to renew our study of this problem, and induce the authorities of our country to reflect well upon the consequences of wars with nations that can expend hundreds of millions, and perfect immense naval and military armaments with such remarkable rapidity. We must admit the conclusion that a European power can suddenly equip a large army, transport it on the ocean 3,000 miles, and maintain it in a hostile attitude for a year and more. We are abundantly supplied with all the elements, but in preparation much of the national strength yet remains in its elementary state, growing, it is true, in the proper direction, but very slowly. Most fortunate will it be if the procrastinating delays attending our labors shall not find us less powerful than we should be at the time of testing the value of our defensive works. The caliber of the English artillery I have given in a preceding table, showing the consump- tion of ammunition for each. From the official French reports their siege train consumed or fired — 195,600 balls, from 24-pdr. cannon, or 6.011 inches bore. 87,920 balls, from 16-pdr. cannon, or 5.264 inches bore. 166,000 howitzer shells, from 22 ct. howitzers, or 8.795 inches bore. 78,000 howitzer shells, from 16 ct. howitzers, or 5.958 inches bore. 41,000 bombs, from 12 ct. mortars, or 4,745 inches bore. 154,350 bombs, from 32 ct. mortars, or 12.799 inches bore. 13,850 bombs, from 32 ct. sea-coast mortars, or 12.799 inches bore. 202,000 bombs, from 27 ct. mortars, or 10.790 inches bore. 142,500 bombs, from 22 ct. mortars, or 8.782 inches bore. 75,000 hand grenades, or 3.189 inches bore. 3,100 rounds of canister, from 24's and 16's, or 1,159,320 projectiles used by the siege train proper. The unusual and extraordinary calibers used by the French in their siege batteries were drawn from the fleet altogether, and constitute no part of their prescribed siege train. They consisted of — 8 cannon of 50. 338 cannon of 30, No. 1. 18 cannon of 30, No. 2. 6 rifle cannon of 30. 9 howitzer cannon of 30. 71 howitzers of 80, No. 1. 17 howitzers of 80, No. 2. And 138 pieces of various calibers destroyed, and 140 Turkish guns, not enumerated. These guns from the fleet fired 968,680 shot and shells, but in what proportion per gun or caliber I have no record. It may be inferred that the use of these large guns, both by the French and English, was more a matter of necessity than preconcerted arrangement and choice. Having AKT OF WAR IN EURO T 57 little or no siege train in the beginning, ship's guns were first resorted to. Each bombardment rendered many of those in battery at the time useless ; making new calls on the fleet and other sources indispensable from time to time, and to the full extent of their means of supply. And hence this extraordinary use of large guns to dismount the Eussian batteries behind earthen parapets, and a corresponding enormous consumption]^of powder and ball. For the infantry of the French army no less than 61,606,869 musket cartridges were pro- vided, being at the rate of 607 rounds per man, of which sixty were carried by the soldier, and the residue in the train. Some idea of the labor of the troops may be formed from the extent of the trenches. The artillery of the French army alone constructed 118 batteries, requiring 800,000 sand bags, and 50,000 gabions. The manner of using these sand bags and gabions is shown in Figs. 57 a and 61. The former is an English battery, where the gabion is used to form the base of a traverse between two guns, the superior part of which is faced with sand bags, which material is also used in this instance for revetting most of the interior of the battery. In Fig. 61 is shown the interior of a French battery. The gabion is used throughout to form the base, surmounted by a row of facincs, and finished above with the sand bags. Fig. 54 b shows the manner of putting the gabion in place when under fire of the enemy. It is a cylindrical basket, open at each end, with pointed xapright sticks projecting from the ends to keep them in place and prevent slipping. Starting from some shelter (behind a hill for example) the leading man places one of these gabions in front, between himself and the enemy, immediately after, filling it with earth dug from under his feet, soon covering a place in advance of him with one of these baskets filled with earth. Some additional earth thrown on the outside of the basket j^laces him in a ditch secure from the enemy's infantry and grajje. He puts up another gabion in advance, while other men follow behind, widening and deepening the trench, throwing all the earth on the outside of the gabion, and between themselves and their enemy. It must be understood that these trenches and breastworks cannot be run directly towards the enemy. In such case no shelter would be gained. They are, as a general rule, directed obliquely towards and outside of the enemy's works. After progressing a convenient distance, the direction of the trench is turned to the outside of the other flank of the enemy, thus gradually nearing the point of attack by "zig-zag" approaches. By this slow, systematic, and gradual method did the Allies work themselves up under cover to within twenty-five yards of the Malakofi" or Kor- niloff bastion, and two hundred and twenty-five yards of the salient of the Kedan, preparatory to the final assault. Figs. 58 a, 59 a, 62 a, and 63 show the materials and formation of the Russian batteries and breastworks, similar in general to those of the Allies. In all this process a remarkable change has been introduced, during this siege, in the labor of the sapper. In former sieges, and as taught at the military schools, the leading man (and second file, who puts up the gabion, has been protected by a head-piece and breast-plate of metal, musket-proof. In front. and at the head of the sap, the practice was to roll forward, as fast as the work progressed, a large gabion, of six feet in length by four in diameter, filled with facines or other matters to make it shot-proof. These precautions were all thrown aside and abandoned from the commencement or early part of this siege. The whole operation was performed by the sapper, in the dress most convenient for labor and best adapted to the climate, without any other shelter than such as he made for himself with his pick, shovel, and gabion. This resulted, in some measure from necessity, from emulation among troops of difi'erent nations, and from the introduction of the sailor iu the trenches, a character who would naturally throw aside anything that impeded muscular effort and exertion; combined with the inclination of all to throw aside and avoid any unnecessary labor and fatigue where the troops sufl'ered the greatest privations and hardships, not only in the saps and trenches, but even when relieved and returned to camp for a respite. The engineer service of the French army constructed no less than forty-nine and three 8 D 58 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. quarter miles in length of these trenches in front of Sebastopol, and nine and a half miles in length about Kamiesch and other localities, and 1,251 running metres of mining galleries, some of which were fifty feet below the surface of the ground. This branch of the service used 80,000 gabions, 60,000 facines, and nearly 1,000,000 of sand bags, in addition to the quantity used by the artillery previously stated. The number of men to accomplish such a laborious task, and at the same time defend the works against sorties, &c., was proportionally great. The French transported to the Crimea 309,268 men, and 41,974 horses and mules; of this number they lost by sickness and the enemy's shot, 69,229. The English lost in officers alone 436, of whom 225 were of disease, and 211 killed in action, or died of wounds. As to the means of transporting all the men, horses, wagons, forage, subsistence, clothing, camp equipage, (including 2,900 portable houses for the French army,) hospital stores, cavalry equipment, and land transport train, with what has been previously enumerated, nothing now in use but the power of the steam engine could have effected the object in the twelve months during which the siege lasted. For the first time in the art of war, and during this siege, was the railroad resorted to as a means of transport in presence of an encmi/, and I feel warranted in saying that the English army could not have performed its immense labor without its use. So advantageous was it found, that even after the evacuation of the city of Sebastopol, it was being prolonged by a branch to the camp of the Sardinian army on the Tchernaya, doubtless with a view to ulterior operations against the north side of the harbor. Of the immense supplies of all kinds forwarded from England and France, we are quite safe in assuming it as a fact, that within those countries the transportation could not have been accomplished in time without the railroad. A stationary steam engine was used on the railroad from Balaklava to the English depots, at the head of an inclined plane, to overcome a steep grade. The supply of bread to the allied armies was attended with extraordinary difficulties, that called for talent and expedients to surmount and overcome. While flour could be transported with accustomed ease, hard bread was foiind to occupy such bulk as to make it impracticable to carry it from the English ports. In addition to which the scurvy, and other diseases, made freshly baked bread very necessary, and the prevalence of cholera rendered it very inexpedient to allow the soldier to make his own bread at the camp fire, even where fuel could be had. This difficulty was finally overcome by the application of steam, and in a way to make it worthy the attention of our commissary as well as quartermaster generals. Our practice is to suj^ply several of our distant posts with hard bread, transported by land and water. We make u^j the bread in round or square cakes, and pack it in water-tight casls. Preservation from damp and rain is certainly efi'ected, but great loss arises by the bread becoming pulverized after a transport of any considerable distance in wagons. No form of package could well be devised for packing square or small round cakes of bread worse calculated than the barrel or cask. The void spaces constitute a large proportion of the interior of the package, which by no method can be so filled with bread as to prevent the contents shaking and finally breaking to pieces, much of it even into dust ; and the weight of the barrel is a large proportion of total weight transported. The French army is supplied from extensive flour mills and bakeries under a branch of the military service. At Marseilles I visited one of these establishments, and noticed their system of packing. All the bread was made in flat square cakes, of a uniform size, and packed in rectan- gular boxes of such size as to receive a uniform number in width and depth. In these boxes the whole supply was carefully packed by hand, wedging with pieces any interstices that might exist from irregularity of the bread in baking. The weight of the box, when filled, is such that a man can conveniently carry it; and its length, breadth, and depth, are made to suit the transport wagon ; thus securing the greatest weight of bread in the smallest possible compass with least ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 59 Door Door Fig. 65. weight of package. The boxes were well made, and quite secure against rain and moisture with ordinary care. I can but think these considerations have not sufficiently commanded the atten- tion of the officers of our army charged with these subjects. An iron steam ship, called the Abundance, was fitted up as a bakery, in England, and sent to Balaclava. Below deck she was fitted with four ovens of eleven feet deep, and about the same width ; of the same shape and arrangements for heating and regulating as those constructed by us at Forts Hamilton, Wood, and Columbus, in the harbor of Plan. New York. These four ovens were placed two in a room, side and side, encased in iron, the arch or top of brick, and the hearths of tile. They were heated with coal from a fire-place (a) on the side of the oven door. (See annexed Fig. G5.) Each oven holds 375 loaves of bread of three pounds, or two rations the loaf. They were worked day and night, with eight men in a room maneuvring two ovens, who labor eight hours continuously, when they are relieved, and rest sixteen hours before going on duty again ; requiring twenty-four men for the two, and hence forty- eight for the four ovens in the ship; baking 18,000 pounds of bread in a day. To effect this, an eight-horsepower steam engine is put on the main deck, near the bow of the ship, arranged with tubular boiler and cylinder of eighteen-inch stroke, similar to a locomotive engine, which kneads the dough, and turns the blowers or fans for ventilating the oven rooms, and other places. The flour, yeast, water, and salt, are thrown into a trough on the main deck ; from the bottom and end of this trough the mixture passes into a "pug-mill," (Fig. 66,) immediately vmder it, on the lower or oven deck. This mill is three feet one inch diameter on top, slightly conical, and three feet six inches high. In its center is a two and three quarter inch square, upright, iron shaft, upon which is secured eight horizontal knives, or cutters, of fourteen inches long, two and a ^half inches wide, and five eighths of an inch thick on the back. These being turned by the engine mix or knead the dough, as it comes down from above through the trough (b) and passes out on the side near the bottom through a door (c) on the table, where men receive it, form it into loaves, from whence it is put into tlie ovens, after sufficient time has elapsed to allow the yeast to perform its functions. One of these mills suffices for two ovens, or one in each oven room. Each oven room, as well as mixing room, has a horizontal pipe running through it of ten inches diameter, at the end of which is a fan worked by the engine, exhausting the air from it near the deck. Through openings into this pipe from the rooms the hot or warm air passes, and is drawn out by the exhausting fan ; while the air of the room is replenished by cool atmospheric air through the hatches. Each of these pug-mills is said to hold fourteen bushels of dough. On the top of the pairs of ovens is formed a warm-water tank. The heat from the oven suffices to warm all the water required in the process, and is drawn off by faucets. Cold water is supplied in the mixing and oven rooms, through faucets at command of the attendants. The supply of coal is in bunkers of iron, forming the sides of the oven rooms, and is taken from them by a door near the floor made in each bunker. The engine uses coke, and not coal. After the bread is taken from the oven it is passed up to the main deck, where it is placed in racks, and from thence issued to the land transport corps, on the order of the deputy commis- sary general, who is charged with the whole baking establishment, receiving his requisitions from the chiefs of corps. Fig. 66. 60 ^^^^^^^^P^^ART Of'waR EUROPE. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B The ship is about COO tons burden, and has on board fifty-two hands for all and every pur- pose. The four ovens, working with perpetual fires, can bake eighteen batches per day each. The engineer of the ship suggested certain alterations as improvements — such as having a hori- zontal i3ug-mill on the main deck, thus dispensing with the mixing trough, and doing all the kneading out of and above the oven rooms. He would prefer putting the small engine for this purpose on the deck, to avoid excessive heat below in the summer time. A flour-mill was found advantageous to grind tlie wheat procured on the shores of the Black sea, and without which it would have to be sent either to French ports, on the Mediterranean, or England and returned. For this purpose the screw steamer Bruiser, of about 600 tons burden, was fitted up with a flour mill worked by the engine of the ship, disengaged from the propeller, with steam, regulated by a governor to give a power of about sixteen horses. It is arranged with four pair of burr-stones of three feet six inches diameter, under the middle hatch on the main deck, ranged fore-and-aft. The wheat is deposited in the hold of the ship as a store room, from which it is raised by the ordinary elevator to the main deck, thence horizontally in a trough by a creeper screw discharging into the hoppers over the burrs. From the burrs the flour is conveyed to the bolting cylinder, which is a fine luire vertical cylindrical seive, with an interior revolving brush, rotating with great velocity, that throws the flour to the wire surface of the cylinder, through which the finer particles pass, falling in a box below, while the bran descends to the lower end of the seive, and escapes by its gravity to the outside. The flour is taken up by an elevator and delivered in bags on the main deck, from whence it is conveyed away for use. This mill suffices to grind as much flour as the bakery ship requires from day to day. A steam ship was also fitted up for condensing steam from the sea luafer to supply the troops with fresh water. Although I did not see it, favorable representations were made of its efficacy and success. I was informed the Kussians resorted to a similar plan in Sebastopol after the supply by the aqueduct was cut off' by the Allies. The condenser was laid aside by the English at Balaklava, as, from time to time, the supply from springs proved abundant. A steam saio-mill was found necessary. It was erected on the land at Balaklava, and con- tinued to work for various purposes a month after the fall of the city and south side. This mill works three circular saws in cast-iron benches. The saws are about three feet diameter and under. They are worked by a portable steam engine, with locomotive boiler. It drives under the same shed one drilling machine, one large and one small turning lathe, two grind-stones, one hay and straiv-cutter lor the land transjjort teams. This shop is provided with three vise benches and tools, with a portable forge. A factory ship for steain machine shops was still another indispensable application of this power in forwarding the operations of this siege. The iron screw steamer Chasseur, of 400 tons burden, was fitted up and arranged for manufacturing wrought and some cast-iron work. The machinery is arranged in the hold of the ship. There are two lines of shafting slung or suspended from the main deck timbers, each carrying eight pulleys, with bands, driving counter shafting for machines or tools below. Tlie counter shafting is attached and secured to the main (iron) beams of the lower deck. The ajjparatus consists of one shaping machine, one small drilling machine from one eighth inch to one inch, one foot lathe, one slotting machine, one screw-cutting machine, one small i^laning machine, one large drill or knifing machine, one large planing machine in center of ship, (athwart,) one large gap lathe, with movable frame, one punching and shearing machine, four hand lathes, amidshii^s, arranged fore-and-aft over the keel of the ship, two screw-cutting lathes, one small self-acting lathe, one medium drilling machine, and two smiths' hearths, of two fires each, set up at the forward end of the ship, one on each side. The ijower to drive this machinery is a portable steam engine, with locomotive boiler of twelve-horse power. In addition to tlie preceding machines and tools, there are two circular saws driven by the same engine, arranged for saws from five feet down to eighteen inches diameter. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. ■ 61 One of the saw frames or beds is of iron, and on the epar deck. It will cut timber thirty feet in length, the table being adapted thereto. The works are conducted and managed by — 1 overseer or chief. . 1 master fitter. 1 master joiner. 1 master smith. 4 blacksmiths. 4 fitters. 6 joiners. 4 strikers for forges. 1 pattern maker. 1 iron moulder. 1 iron founder. 1 brass fovmder, fitter, and turner. 1 horse-shoe maker and horse-collar maker. 1 brick maker. 3 sawyers. Making a total of 31 The engineer and stokers of the ship attend to and work the engine in the workshoj^. The vises and benches are behind the machines, and against the side of the ship ; over these work- benches are shelves for stowing supplies of iron. The sliip's propelling engines are two thirty-five horse-power cylinders, working the screw shaft about sixty revolutions per minute. She was built for a collier, and altered to suit the present j^urpose. Shewas moored in the liarbor of Balaklava, near the other factory ships. On shore, adjacent to this vessel, a portable cupola-furnace is erected^ by which castings are made for such cast-iron pieces as may be wanted. The Chasseur is an appendage to the fleet, accompanies it, and is said to have been very serviceable. Still another useful and novel application was made of steam power during this siege that contributed greatly to the preservation of the lives of the sick and wounded, for wliich I can but believe the military profession is indebted to the commanding influence of that estimable and self- sacrificing lady. Miss Nightingale. The practice of armies, until lately^ has been to bestow very little study or attention to the wounded immediately after the close of an action. The surgeons of an army constitute a very small minority, and no one believes his lot will throw him in the hospitals. The consequence of which is, that the voice of the medical and surgical branches of the military service commands but little influence and support beyond that given by the few whose duty it is to heal and cure. From the time a soldier was wounded to the hour of his being restored to duty or decently interred with Christian rights and ceremonies. Miss Nightingale's influence was experienced, and resulted in numerous improvements, of which a sick and wounded transport ship or movable hospital was one that was well worthy of notice. The iron screw steamer Brandon, of 501 registered tons, or 830 tons carpenter's measure- ment, was fitted up exclusively for this purpose. She was arranged with a small ward room, quite forward, for sixteen beds, another further aft with forty-eiglit beds, behind which is the furnace and engine room, and then a third ward to the stern of the ship containing about fifty- seven beds — making in all about one hundred and twenty beds. The ward for forty-eight beds is twenty-six feet two inches wide by forty-five feet four inches long, and six feet four inches between the beams and deck. The berths are, in general, arranged 62 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. for two beds side and side. They are seventy-three inches long, fifty inches wide, with a wooden platform or bottom two feet above the floor or deck, with sides and ends six inches high to keep the bedding, &c., in place. Every two berths are separated from each other by spaces of eighteen inches in the clear. The head of the berth is placed against the side of the ship, with a shelf or seat between the pairs. Clothes-pins, about twelve inches apart, are arranged to the timbers over the heads of the berths on the ship's side. Strips of wood, forming lattice frames, are secured to the deck timbers, making a place for knapsacks over each bed. This ward, with forty-eight beds, is provided with a table in the middle of the room, a stove, a bath tub, and two long shelves against the bulkhead. The hatchway is eight feet by eight feet six inches, and must be of such size that a man on a stretcher can be safely and comfortably lowered. Each bed is provided with a man-rope fastened to the deck over the patient, long and near enough to enable the wounded or sick person, when lying down, to take hold of conveniently^ either to assist in turning himself, or for relief in a sea way. The sides of the ship are sheathed or ceiled with wood, leaving a clear space for air and ventilation of about three inches between it and the iron of the vessel. Openings of about four feet long and three inches wide are made the whole length of the ward in this wooden sheathing, about four feet six inches above the deck, that may be opened or closed at pleasure. The ward has four circular windows of five inches clear diameter through and on each side of the ship. The hatchway is provided with two step-ladders. The water-closets are on deck, to \. hich all men go who are capable ; others are provided with close stools in the ward. One sergeant and ten men are detailed as orderlies or nurses for every 100 sick or wounded. They are taken from the regiments indiscriminately. One of the ten acts as cook. No apothecary or hospital steward was provided for this ship on the short voyages between Balaklavaand the general hospital at Scutari. The general arrangement of the S''''' "f "»'= ^^'p- beds in the ward, with forty-eight beds, is, as shown in the annexed Fig. 67 ; and the same general ar- rangement existed in the others. The ship had engines rated at 175 horse power, consuming twenty tons of coal in twenty-four hours. They are upon Wolf's i^rinciple, con- sisting of two cylinders, of forty inches diameter, and three feet stroke each, working twenty-two pounds of steam expansively, driving a nine foot cog-wheel, working into a four and a half foot pinion. The steam from these two cylinders passes into two cylinders of sixty inches diameter, where it is condensed, working another nine foot wheel, which also works a four and a half foot pinion on the main shaft. These condensing cylinders are also of three feet stroke. Thus combined they make from forty to forty-two revolutions per minute, and, with the gearing, give from one hundred to one hundred and five revolutions per minute of the screw propeller. The boilers are tubular. The sick and wounded transported in this ship (a chartered vessel) are provisioned by the Navy Department, under the captain's management, or occasionally by the owners, and allowed by the government a fixed price per head for a stipulated ration. Extras and hospital supplies are provided by an army surgeon who accompanies the troops. The sick and wounded are brought alongside the vessel in boats. Such as are capable walk on board by a gang-way stairs. The others laying on a stretcher, (to be hereafter described,) a kind of hand-barrow cot, are raised by attaching slings to the four corners of the stretcher. The slings are hooked to a tackle purchase from the jib of an iron crane permanently secured to the deck of the ship, which. I Hatch. -i^S.'i ' e~ ~~^''^ — — T^ -.V '^ ^ r^ ^^r r^^^T -r^ 2 S to Side of tlie Ship. Fig. 67. Plan. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 63 overhanging the side of the ship, raises the man free from the side of the vessel, and by turning the crane on its axis, he is lowered on the same stretcher into the ward, where two men stand ready to take hold the handles of the stretcher and convey him to his bed. The whole maneuver was performed with great care and gentleness, securing the greatest comfort to the soldier. Six steamers were thus fitted as hospital ships. Here we find that the English army resorted to no less than nine special applications of steam 2)0iver to facilitate their operations in this siege ; all of which were devised and put in practice after the contest had commenced, and the absolute necessity for some extraordinary means became manifest. Knowing the advantages of such applications of steam, when the time comes we may profit by this experience, and more successfully by being better enabled to foresee and prepare any or all similar arrangements as circumstances may call for. An army can become inefiicient and paralyzed by di-afts made upon the ranks as substitutes for these several applications of steam. The lesson is of value to us, and should not be forgotten. The transjjort of artillei'y and cavalry horses on long sea voyages was brought to a remarkable degree of perfection during the Crimean campaign, in both the French and English services. The most perfect arrangements, and which I cannot recommend too favorably, are those intro- duced, and most successfully put in operation by Captain Priest, of the Eoyal Navy, as com- mander of the iron screw steamer Himalaya, of 3,500 tons burden, with 380 horsepower engine. Thi^hip was built as a passenger packet, and fitted up for the transport of hgrses for the English army. From the first of June to the middle of October, 1855, she transported 3,000 horses ; out of which number only three were lost. The voyages were from England to Balaklava, thence to Kasatch, thence to Kertch, thence to Constantinople, thence Malta, thence Genoa, and thence to Balaklava — all made in the course of four months, and in the warmest season of the year. She is arranged with stalls for 200 horses on the spar deck. 130 horses on the main deck. 50 on the orlop deck. Making a total of 380 horses carried at a trip. The forage is stowed in the after hold. On the spar deck the platforms of the stalls are raised two inches ofi" the deck, to admit of cleaning, draining, and washing. The platform is in sections for every two stalls, and may be shifted. Every eight stalls can be moved bodily by disengaging some fastenings. Every stall is numbered. The platforms or floors are made of elm plank in preference to any other. Between decks four posts of four and a half inches by five inches stuff, secured to the deck below and beams above, at the corners of the stall, form the rectangle within which the horse is placed. They are spaced six feet six inches from front to rear, and two feet three inches to two feet four inches in width. Grooves are formed by nailing battens on the faces of these uprights to admit of two-inch plank, on the sides and ends, which are padded, inclosing the stall. This padding is of cow-hide felt, wherever the horse can reach it with his mouth, and with straw in other places, it being found that the straio stuffing, although well covered by blankets or other woolen material, is discovered by the horse and certain to be eaten if within his reach. (See Fig. 67 a.) 64 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. To the head boards is hung a feed box. The other end of the stall is placed so far from the side of the ship as to admit of a passage between it and the ship, and of a person passing freely to clean that end of the stall ; two feet suffices for this passage-way. (Fig. 67 a.) Halter rings are provided in every head post, four feet above the floor, to which the horse's head is secured by a rope halter attached to a canvas head stall. It is neces- sary to have a double halter fas- tened to the halter rings on right and left, to prevent the animals interfering with each other while feeding or at rest. Sling eye-bolts are fastened to the deck over the center of each stall, by which the horse is sup- ported with a wide band (No. 3) passing under his belly, whenever his situation requires it, and never done until necessary, it being best to let the animal rest on his feet as long as possible. The size of this sling or belly band is four feet by two feet, with a strong piece of wood sewed in the canvas at each end, keeping it extended. To this attached the slinging ropes, No. 3. Bridle sUnga is Canvas sllng. ■■i X ■ of ropes. Fig. 67 a. formed as a bridle. (See No. 3.) The height from the deck to the beams of the spar deck is six feet ten inches. The head board and two side boards are about twelve inches wide ; they ship and unship at pleasure. When the horses are coming on board all these side pieces are disengaged, when the horse passes from the hatchway through this open passage to the most distant stall ; then the side plank is put in place, another horse is brought and placed alongside ; thus filling every stall to the hatch- way by an uninterrupted jjassage. They are taken out in the inverse order, commencing with those nearest the hatchway. In case a horse is sick or disabled, and it is found necessary to move him while at sea from his stall, the feed box is unhooked, the head board is unshipped, and he is taken thence into the narrow passage or gangway separating the rows of stalls and between the feed boxes of contiguous rows. Although in this ship the padded tail board was permanently fastened to the upright corner posts, it was considered advisable that it, as the other pieces inclosing the stall, should be made to ship and unship at pleasure, and that stronger stuff than two-inch plank should be used, as the animal is apt to throw his weight back and rest upon it, for which reason the upper inner corner should be well rounded and padded. The regulations of the ship, no matter what troops come on board, must be strictly observed. They require that the decks under the stalls be washed daily ; the stalls cleaned after every feed, ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 65 and especially at seven p. M. ; the men who are on duty to watch and guard the horses never to be allowed to quit their posts unless instantly replaced by a relief, the guard of the stalls send for a non-commissioned officer and farrier when necessary, never leaving to go for them ; nostrils of the horses to be sponged morning and evening ; mangers washed with vinegar and water in the morning and evening ; stalls sprinkled occasionally with solution of chloride of zinc ; feed not to exceed six pounds of corn per day, there being great danger in overfeeding ; feed and water at 6, A. M., 11, A. M., and 5^, p. m. ; all refuse feed to be reported to the non-commissioned officer and farrier: it is an indication of the health of the animal. The ration at sea is about nine pounds of hay to four or five pounds of corn, with bran at discretion. This allowance is found to be abundant on trial. Every eight stalls are provided with a scraper, brush, and shovel. The chloride of zinc is freely used throughout the between decks, as also chloride of lime. This ship was officered and manned as follows : 1 commander — an officer of the royal navy, in this instance Captain Priest, to whose kindness I am indebted for all the facts and details here given; 3 lieutenants, 1 master, 1 second master, 2 master's assistants, 1 gunner, 1 surgeon, 1 purser, 1 chief engineer, 6 assistant engineers, 4 boatswains, 1 carpenter, 20 royal marines, 40 stokers, 20 boys, and GO seamen. The organization and discipline of the service is such that a second class boy takes command of the ship before surgeons, engineers, or any civil officer or non-combattant. Ample provision is also made for the troops that accompany the horses : sixteen berths are provided in two large state rooms as a hospital exclusively; an apothecary shop, water closets, and a bath room are fitted up adjoining these state rooms. The troop deck is on the same deck as the hospital and apothecary shop, with windows or ports through the ship's side for ventila- tion. On the same deck is a commissariat provision store, a spirit room, a bread room, and slop room, (clothing.) No horses are on this deck. The commander of this admirably arranged transport does not recommend hammocks for the troops ; his experience induces him to give the preference to the troops sleeping on the deck, rolling up their blankets by day. The engine of this steamer has two cylinders of eighty-two inches diameter, in which is a trunk of thirty-two and a half inches diameter and three feet stroke, making fifty revolutions per minute. During voyages requiring four months of time she made 2,600,762 revolutions, averaging the entire j^eriod six and a half miles per hour. Condensed steam from sea-water is used in part for watering the horses. To prevent the inboard pressure of the screw, collars working against hard 'WOOD were found more advantageous than metal. The boilers of this ship are arranged along each side, with furnaces opening in a furnace room facing each other and towards the middle of the ship. They are formed of partitions of three-inch water way and three-inch fire flue, • — - — Gangway between boilers and ship's side. I . SBoilcVs a, aiJdUi •/UtftS S Betlci n iTu. ' °Iioliri anit ^uf/ifzi'e doors placed vertically, with the smoke or fire flue / coming together in the common flue a a a, (Fig. 67 b,) communicating with tlie common smoke stack or pipe rising over the center of the furnace room. This arrangement of ver- tical partitions is preferred to tubes, as they never choke with soot. From the furnace floor, up through all the decks, the space h c d e\s open for ventilating the furnace room, for which purpose Captain Priest has abandoned the ordinary wind sail as fallacious in prin- F'g- «' t. rian. ciple, and introduced a most simple and highly advantageous arrangement that fulfills all the requisites. To ventilate the furnace he forms from near the floor of the furnace room to the 9 D SS\ 'tlej fiJui 66 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Fig. 68. deck vertical spaces or compartments, separated from each other by sail cloth, such that the warm air may freely ascend one cohimn and the cold air de- 1 '3 scend the other uninterruptedly, not coming in contact with I I each other. (See Fig. 68.) For this jnirpose he simply I ;| = divides the furnace-room hatchway into three equal spaces hy fore and aft partitions of sail cloth, as in the annexed figure, where the heated air from about the furnace, ash jjit, and front of the boiler, ascends by the partition a a, while fresh atmospheric air descends by the adjacent partition h b. He has found this arrangement very satisfactory and conve- nient, working by natural causes, and not as with the wind sail, relying upon the force of the wind to drive a column of air against one that in most cases is ascending from natural causes. The simplicity and efficiency of Captain Priest's design recommends it to all parties interested in steamers navigating warm latitudes. So perfect was the discipline, ventilation, and purification by chlorides, of this sliip, throughout, that it was not possible to discover from the smell that horses had ever been transported in her. One day sufficed to take on board all the animals she could ac- commodate. The officer charged with overlooking and inspecting the horse transj^orts in England destined for the Mediterranean recommended, as the result of his experience, the following system as best calculated to land the horses at their destination sound and fit for service : Fasting for some hours before embarkation in all cases where slings are used to get them on ship-board, as the pressure of the slings on the distended belly is apt to injure the animal. When practicable, walk the horses on board by a gangway, as M'ell as from the spar to the lower deck by an inclined plane in the hatchway, which is practicable in some steamers having long hatchway openings. For hoisting on board, a canvas horse sling is preferred to the solid wooden horse box, as more expe- ditious and much less dangerous. In the former case tlie horse cannot injure himself by kicking, while in the latter he may do so against the sides of the box. A projjer sling must have a breech band and breast girth ; to the latter should be attached a band passing over the withers to prevent its slipping down below the breastbone. These parts must all be securely fastened to each other and tested by an excess of weight. The danger to guard against is slipping through the slings. When hoisting, no delay should be permitted. It should be done in the shortest time compatible with safety. At the commencement, after a certainty that all is right, it should be done rapidly, to raise the horse off his feet, and free him from surrounding objects before he has time to do any injury by kicking. A guide rope attached to his head collar, and men between decks and at the gangway, must not be omitted. The comings of the hatch as well as stanchions about it should be well padded. As an additional precaution, a head collar should be provided, with a large pad on top to prevent injury should the horse strike his head against the deck beams when lighting on his feet. A bed of straw or sawdust should be provided on the deck upon which to lower the horse ; at which moment four stout resolute men should stand by to prevent his kicking and plunging imtil the slings are removed, and the animal is safely secured in his stall. While one holds him by the head collar, another rapidly unhooks the tackle purchase, and two others let loose the breech and breast bands. At this moment the ship's head collar should be slipped on under the one used in slinging him. The horses should go on board and be placed in stalls in the same order as when in their stables, or at picket ropes on land. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 67 Every horse's shoes should be carefully examined and put in perfect order before going on ship-board, and the hind corkings removed. Hand-rubbing the legs is important for the well- being of the horse under the restraints of a sea voyage, and should be daily practiced. The ship's head collar of canvas, with two strong tarred ropes to each, with a stout throatlatch, is the only reliable halter. They should be tied short, and a supply of spare collars must always be on hand, with canvas and other material to repair them. For the first few days feed sparingly, giving bran freely. Never exceed six pounds of oats, half a peck of bran, and ten pounds of hay, with six gallons of water per day, diminishing this allowance as the judgment of the commander of the troops shall prompt. Bran may be given every other day after the horse is habituated to the sea and feeds well. Constipation is the danger to guard against. Vinegar should be freely used washing the mangers, horses' mouths, noses, and occasionally their docks, doing so daily in hot weather. Chloride of zinc, chloride of lime, and ground calcined gypsum, (plaster of Paris,) should, one or the other, be frequently used for purifying between decks. The first is the most effectual disinfecting agent, and can be applied with great facility as a solution from a sprinkling pot. Ventilation is all important, and cannot be too strictly attended to. If windsails be the only means at command, they must be constantly watched and trimmed to face the direction of the wind. Special attention should be jsaid to having the lower end near the deck to carry down cool air and displace the warm. If the end is allowed to terminate near the ceiling or timbers over head, it serves as a chimney or flue for the ascent of the highly-heated air from the ship, instead of a conduit for cool air down. The supply of water on a long voyage requires great attention. An allowance of six gallons per day can be made more than sufficient for many horses, by taking part of it to moisten or wet the hay, oats, and bran before offering them to the horse. Horse slings, or more properly hammocks, should be supplied for every horse on board, nothing contributing more to the comfort and relief of the animal, and oftentimes saving him from falling in his stall, and almost as a consequence the loss of the animal, if from weakness, by sickness, or confinement of a long voyage. They should be used in calm or moderate weather only, and never in a rough sea and stormy weather. If slung in rough weather he has no control over himself with his feet to resist any motion, and swings about from side to side, or forward and backward, to his injury. If left to himself' the horse will accommodate his motion to that of the ship, provided that he has the free use of his legs. After standing several days and nights the wearied animal then requires some artificial means of securing rest. Selecting smooth sea, and drawing the slings gently and firmly under him, without taking him off" his legs, the animal soon avails himself of this novel relief. It should be placed in the center of his belly, and there confined by the breast and breech bands. After the horse has learned the use and had the comfort of the hammock, great care must be taken when replacing it. The fastenings must then be attached and secured with great quickness before his whole weight is thrown on the canvas, and relaxation of all the muscles, when, if not supported, he falls in the stall. Nose bags should not be used on shipboard. In the confined and heated hold of a ship the animal requires all the air he can get, instead of being deprived of it by eating from nose bags. The movable feed box is a convenient and proper substitute. Previous to disembarking let every shoe be examined and secured to the horse's foot. A loose shoe may cause much injury when in the slings. For some days after landing from a long voyage, if practicable, let the horse take his own ease and comfort, giving him a good straw bed, walking him frequently, but never backing him or putting him in traces. In our service for disembarkation horses have frequently been forced and thrown overboard, and made to swim ashore. Such a practice never should be permitted. Once treated in this way he can no longer be depended on for fording or swimming streams. 68 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE, Fig. 68 a. Many arrangements were made by the Allies during this campaign about Sebastopol for moving the wounded from the field of battle to the ambulances, stationed near the columns of attack, thence to the camp or field hospitals, and finally as health permitted to the general hospitals near Constantinople. The important elements in effecting this were, first, the earliest possible attention to the wounded on or nearest to the field of battle. Next, the most expeditious means of transport with least number of animals, wagons, and attendants, combining the greatest comfort to the wounded soldier ; and then such means of transport as could be used on any battle field, whether in the bottom of a ditch, on a steep descent of a ravine, over plowed, stony, or other rough ground, still securing ease and greatest comfort to the wounded. Never before this siege was so much attention bestowed upon this branch of the military service, and I may be indulged in again referring to the virtues of that good lady, Miss Nightin- gale, as the foundation of power, from which all the new arrangements and ajipliances emanated. Not that she contrived, devised, or was aware of what machines were best suited for these pur- poses. Within sound of the hostile cannon, and even in sight at Balaklava of the battle field, having frequently under her eyes the hundreds, and even at times thousands, of men suffering from wounds of every imaginable part of the body, this lady could well see, and had the power to make known, in a voice not to be neglected, all the requirements of the medical staff. Coming from such a source, public sentiment enforced attention and compliance with her representations and requests. The ambulance stretcher is composed of (see Fig. 68 a) two wooden frames, the lower one with handles, carrying an upper one, secured at one end with a hinge (a) and rising slightly towards the other, retained in the inclined position by India rubber springs at b and c, which are encased with spiral steel cases. The bottom of the stretcher is formed of leather and stuffed at the elevated end of the wooden frame to form a pillow. Eollers are attached to the under part of the lower frame at e e, to facilitate its being shoved in the ambulance wagon from the rear. This stretcher is made to convey a wounded soldier from the spot on which he falls to the ambulance dejiot. It is there placed on the supports a (Fig. 70) in the rear of the ambulance, where it serves as an amputating table, or for simply dressing the wound, as the urgency of the occasion demands. With the soldier still reclining upon it, it is shoved into one of the four com- partments, h, c, d, e, of Fig. 69 ; or he takes a seat in another j^art of the ambulance, depending upon the wound, when the stretcher is again carried to the battle field for another hero. The carriages and conveyances for transporting the wounded from the battle field to the camp hospitals of the English army were of various patterns, all answering the jDurpose in part or in whole, and in use to test the relative advantages of each. They consisted of: First. A four-wheel wagon for ten men, drawn by four horses, with two drivers. Second. A four-wheel wagon for seven men, drawn by four horses, with two drivers. Third. A four-wheel wagon for six men, drawn by four horses, with two drivers. Fourth. A two-wheel cart for seven men, drawn by two horses, with one driver. Fifth. Litters on a mule for two men. Sixth. Chairs on a mule for two men . The ambulance for ten wounded men is arranged to carry four of them on stretchers in the body of the wagon. Six others occupy the forward part on seats, three on each side, with their backs towards each other. (See Figs. 69 and 70.) ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 69 Gan-racic, &c. /^ ^ ^ ' k ' ^ 21" Rear of the ambulance for ten men. Fig. 69. The hind t v -A^H-^vWil,'?t!\.^-»'' wI23 70. — English ambulance. The rear of the wagon opens, showing four (Fig. 69) apartments of six- teen inches rise and twenty-one inches wide each, to receive stretchers with a wounded man. The stretcher is eighty-seven inches long, including five inches at each end for handles, and twenty inches wide. Some of the ambu- lances were arranged with rollers let into the bottom of the compartments h, c, d, e, on which the stretchers were rolled or shoved forward in the wagon, while others were arranged with rollers on the stretchers, as shown in Fig. 68 a. On the top of the two upper compartments is an arm rack, on which the muskets, knapsacks, and accouterments of the ten men can be stowed. The carriage is on four wheels, the body supported by four elliptical springs wheels are four feet ten inches, and the forward ones three feet two inches diameter. The six men capable of setting up are pro- vided with cushioned, armed seats, with high backs, and leather straps to each seat to buckle in front of the man, and as an additional se- curity are provided with a foot board. Behind the ambulance at a on each side the wagon is the iron support, on which the stretcher is deiDOsited, that the wounds may receive either dressing or amputation, as the case and urgency may demand. These irons are movable on centers attached to the bottom rail of the wagon, and when not required for use are raised and strapped to the side. The whole carriage is covered with a canvas top, without painty left white to reflect the sun. Tlie sides of the stretcher compartments are closed with wire nettings to admit free ventila- tion to the four men in this contracted space. A basket is slung under the body between the hind wheels for packs and articles found necessary, and a box is formed under the six front seats for corn or oats for the horses. Second. The ambulance for seven men is arranged to carry four on stretchers, precisely as in the preceding one. The ventilation, however, is better, having the upright division between the stretchers of open slats and an iron rod, thus: The sides of these four compartments are arranged with sliding blinds, thus always having the interior space between two lower stretchers open and free for circulation of air, with the means of opening or closing one or both sides at pleasure. This was found very necessary during the winter season in the Crimea. The side blinds are eight inches high on the whole length of the compartment. The other three men are on a seat across the front of the wagon, having a foot board and security straps, and a box for forage under them. This ambulance is also on four elliptical springs, the wheels being forty-nine inches for the hind and thirty-five inches for the fore ones. The height of wheel is preferred to the larger ones on account of the increased facility of getting the wounded in and out. It, like the preceding one, has iron rests upon which to lay the stretcher, to dress or otherwise attend to the wounds before reaching the camp hospital. Every ambulance carries a spare elliptical spring lashed to the front of the carriage. Third. Another arrangement is for eight wounded men, in a wagon drawn by four horses, with two drivers, (postilions ;) two of the wounded resting on stretchers (same as Fig. 68 a) on the floor of the wagon ; three sit in front facing the horses, and three in the rear facing to the rear, with a foot board outside. This ambulance is of more recent construction than Nos. 1 and 2, 70 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. and considered an improvement. It is provided in the rear and under the tody of the wagon with a small ladder that draws out in length sufficient to reach the ground, when it serves for the men to get on the back seat. It has no arm rack, but is provided with a large square basket slung under the hind wheels for knapsacks, &c., &c. Fourth. The fourth wheeled carriage is a cart with wheels of forty-two inches diameter. The body is five feet long and only two feet four inches wide. It has a seat on each side for three men facing outwards, with a foot board outside the wheels. In the body of the cart and between the two side seats is a stretcher, slung with leather straps. Below this stretcher the body of the cart is arranged for medical supplies, instruments, &c. From the rear is an opening to a set of drawers, extending from the rear to within about a foot of the front of the cart body. These drawers are the width of the cart in the clear, there being three of them over each other, divided for bandages and such things as are indispensable on the field. From the front is an opening into a box occupying all the space in the body not taken up by the drawers, which serves for halters, &c., &c. This cart is drawn by two horses and has one driver, the horses abreast, one in shafts the other drawing by an outrigger. It can carry no forage unless the front box be used for oats or barley, which is sometimes done. In all these ambulances no arrangement is made for a supply of water, an indispensable requisite for the wounded. It is always in great demand, and especially by those who may have been left some time on the field of battle without surgical attention. The Sardinian ambulance has such a provision, in two rectangular metal boxes or tanks attached to the sides of the body of the wagon over the front axle. These metal boxes are encased in wood to keep the water cool. The water is drawn from the tanks through faucets. The Sardinian ambulance itself is but an ordinary American omnibus^ with seats on each side for six wounded men, who can sit up facing each other. In case they are so wounded as to require stretchers, then one can be placed on the floor and one on each seat. Being drawn by four horses with two postilions, it furnishes but little comfort or accommodation in proportion to the men and horses required. Improvements and modifications continued to be made from time to time during the siege, as experience pointed out defects in those in use or suggested additions and alterations. The annexed figures (71, 72, and 73) represent in detail the last modifications and arrangements for a four-wheel ambulance adopted for the English army. The stretcher is the same as those previ- ously used, and the principle is adopted of stretchers for one fourth the number of wounded who require transjiortation, or two stretchers and six seats to the ambulance. Water, a gun rack, receptacle for the soldiers' clothing, accouterments, &c., and drag shoe are provided. ENGLISH HOSPITAL WAGON, SEPTEMBER, 1855. WEIGHT COMPLETE, 12J CWT. 5^ B ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 71 Fig. 72. DESCRIPTION. This wagon is calculated to carry eight men, viz: two in a recum- bent position, three sitting on the seat in front, three in rear. The body of the wagon is suspended by Mr. Fuller's India rubber springs, fitted underneatli, with straps to check too mucli motion. The two cots are fitted with small rollers so that they can be easily run into their posi- tion. They are also fitted with India rubber springs. Each wagon carries a nine-gallon cask of water on the fore car- riage, a three-man camp kettle and water bucket slung underneath, also a grease tin and drag shoe. A wicker basket is suspended from the top of the wagon to carry the men's knapsacks, &c., and straps on the sides for the muskets; a ladder is fi.Ked to the side of the wagon to enable the men to get in and out of the front seat easily. The fore and hind wheels are of equal diameter, viz: four feet two inches, and the under carriage is in every respect similar to the land transport wagon. N. B- Some of the hospital wagons are fitted with steel springs and five-feet hind wheels, but in other respects are similar to this one. Fig. 73. There is a peculiarity in the four springs supporting the ambulance body, which here is slung or suspended by four coils of India rubber cord, as shown in Figs, c cZ of Fig. 74. It was considered a good arrangement, more reliable than a steel spring, and renewed with greater facility. Occupying but little space, several spare ones can be carried with each wagon. They are worthy of trial on some of our long prairie and western routes of march towards the Pacific. The plan with transverse and longitudinal vertical elevations (Figs. 71, 72, and 73, with the marginal notes) represent fully all the details and advantages of this last modification for a four- wheel ambulance. The wheels of this ambulance conform with all the wheels of the land transport train, an important particular in military equipments and trains ; and although studied and practiced for our artillery, has never, to my knowledge, been attended to by our Quartermaster's Department in a way to make it general and suitable for the whole country. The four-wheel ambulance drawn by four horses did not suffice during this siege; it could not approach the enemy's works within gunshot, except at periods of armistice for burying the dead, and then only on a few places where the trenches and zig-zags had not cut up the ground. Nor could it go among many of the hills and ravines where the armies were encamped. 72 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. To obviate, in some measure, these difficulties, the Eaglisli adopted what they called a Maltese cart. (See Fig. 74.) FIG. 74. MALTESE CART, FITTED AS AN AMBULANCE, TO CARRY TWO MEN. WEIGHT 5} CWT. Fig. a. Elevation ^of cart. Fig. c. India rubber spring with leather casing. '-^^ Fir. d. Tndia rubber spring with liuU' of casing removed. Fig. e. Flan of cart. -«- ^=^ m=3 Fig. f. Litter witli side folded down, as shown by dotted lines. End view of cart. Fig. g. Litter when packed for traveling. REMARKS. Two cross pieces are bolted on to the ordinary Maltese cart, one in front the other in rear. To these four iron standards are fixed, from which two boards are suspended by Mr. Fuller's India rubber rings. On these boards two of Mr. Holmes's folding litters are carried. Each litter is furnished with mattress, pillow, canvas hood, and apron. The men's muskets, knapsacks, grease tin, and water barrel for three and a half gallons, are strapped underneath the cart. This cart is fitted with an outrigger and swingletree for a second horse, in case of necessity, and a prop underneath to support the cart in case of the horac fallin". ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 73 This cart is provided simply with a grated platform suspended with India rubber springs, (c d,) upon which two stretchers are placed. There is a peculiarity in the stretcher, which has permanently-hinged sides and a hood. It requires one horse and a driver for two meia, but has the advantage of going where the four-wheeled ambulance cannot. The cart described as the fourth arrangement is capable of carrying seven men, and would seem to be a better arrangement, although these Maltese carts were being made at the last moment of operations in the Crimea. None of these ambulances were found suitable for all cases on the field of battle and its vicinity. The requisites for an ambulance should be such as to adapt it to the battle field, among the dead, wounded, and dying — in plowed fields, on hill tops, mountain slopes, in siege batteries and trenches, and a variety of places inaccessible to wheel carriages, of which woods, thick brush, and rocky ground, are frequently the localities most obstinately defended, and where most soldiers are left for the care of the surgeons. These difficulties were felt in a great degree by all the armies allied against Eussia in the siege of Sebastopol, and the consequence was that the English, French, and Sardinian armies adoj^ted finally, in part or altogether, pack mules, carrying litters or chairs. The careful and sure-footed mule can wind its way over any road or trail, among the dead, dying, and wounded, on any battle field, as well as in the trench and siege battery. It required but suitable arrangements to support the wounded from the mules or horses' back to attain the desired object, and this the allied armies finally accomplished and put in practice. The merit of the plan renders it worthy our consideration, particularly so in our Rocky Mountain and other distant expeditions. There are some diiferences in the details of construction of the litters and the chairs used by the armies in the Crimea. The English litter (Fig. T5) is made of a iurou(/Jd-iro7i frame in three lengths or parts, the cen- ter one being fastened to the jjack- saddle and the other two hinged to it, one opening towards the head and the other towards the tail of the animal. The center part is two feet three inches long, having on its inside rail two eye-bolts project- ing far enough to enter eyes on the frame of the saddle, through which a bolt extends, thus securing the litter to the pack-saddle, admitting its folding up against the animal. The part opening towards the head of the mule or horse is one foot ten inches long, with a foot-board rising six inches at the end nearest the animal's head. This foot-board is hinged to the frame, folding, when not in use, flat in the plane of the frame, or retained at any convenient elevation as a foot-board by a stop on the back of the hinge joint. The head frame is also one foot ten inches long, and hinged to the center one on the inner and outer rail. Its inclination is variable, to suit the comfort of the wounded soldier, and may be either erect as the back of a chair or inclined with any angle for a pillow. This inclination is regulated by a leather strap attached to the saddle on the inside, (o,) and by a similar strap (p) to a standard on the outside of the middle frame. The center frame has on its outside two standards (h, i) of iron rising twelve inches above the frame, one attached to each end of it. They are secured by a hinge admitting their folding towards each other. To put a man on this litter, he is brought to it on a stretcher. The two twelve-inch standards (A, i) are folded down to the rail, when he is lifted on the stretcher and placed on the sacking bottom of the litter. The standards are then raised vertically, the side straps (o, p) 10 D 74 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. attached to tlie head frame adjusted, as also straps from the saddle (r, r) to the head of each of these standards across and over the man. The whole arrangement, with mattress, oil-cloth cover to protect the soldier from rain, pack- saddle, and two litters, one for each side, weighs 142 pounds. The head frame is arranged with a canvas hood on a set of iron wires, adjusted to a common center as a gig top, to protect the man's head from the sun and weather, and sup- ports at the same time the oil-cloth cover that extends over his body and legs. When not in use the foot-board a folds down on the sacking bottom as dotted in Fig. 75. The frame b folds over on the center one, (c,) turningon the joint rf. The head frame folds in like manner on the center by the joint e. The two uprights h i fall or turn on the centers kl, in a line with the side rail, when the whole folds up against the saddle, turning on the attaching bolt ?i. The annexed section (Fig. 76) of a litter on each side of the animal shows the attachment of the iron frame of the litter to the pack saddle by the bolt n, the standards h or i, and the straps r r from these standards to the pack saddle. Another form of pack-saddle litter much used by the French army is a wrought-iron chair. It answers the jiurpose equally as well as the one previously described for all men wlio.se wounds enable them to sit up. As in the former case, there is one on each side of the animal, the men sitting face to the front. This chair is arranged to hook on to the pack-saddle, and when disengaged the saddle is perfect for any other tranisport for the medical department. This arrangement is import- ant. These chair litters maybe carried in wagons of the train, and used immediately after an action, hy horses or mules of the train not then at work. The seat (Fig. 77) is a square bottom formed of hoop iron, covered with a leather cushion. The outside arm (a a) is hinged to fold down on the seat^ and with the latter folds up against the pack saddle when not in use. It is provided with a back strap {h) from the outer arm to the inner one, and a similar strap (t) to prevent the man falling out. The inner arms form- ing the side of the chair next to the animal are terminated with hooks, by which the chair is suspended to the pack saddle. It is provided with a foot-board suspended from the front rail of the chair by leather straps which, with buckles, may be shortened or lengthened at pleasure. One hundred and sixteen chairs and litters were in use, and sufficed to transport all the wounded from the sanguinary battle field of lukermann in a very short time after the action terminated, proving very satisfactorily that they combined greater advantages than any previous arrangement. The objection to the English litters and chairs is the difficulty of lifting and placing a wounded soldier in them. He cannot, in a variety of cases, be lifted on the litter attached to the animal without subjecting him to great bodily pain. Broken bones and severe wounds called for a modification of litters permanently attached to the saddle. The Sardinians and French made such an alteration as overcame these difficulties. It consisted in making the uprights /i i (Fig. 77) of wood, extended about si.x inches below the bottom of the chair, and in like manner prolonging the iron inside frame, thus forming legs to set it on the ground, where the wounded ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 75 man is placed in it, when the whole is raised and attached hy the hooks to the pack saddle. Both the litters and chairs of the Sardinians and French were thus made, and, like the English, capahle of folding together against the side of the animal. I witnessed the transport of 196 sick and wounded French soldiers with their arms, accouter- ments, and knapsacks, on the route from the Tchernaya to Kamiesch Bay on these litters and chairs. Fifty-two of them were on twenty-six mules in the horizontal litters and 144 seated in chairs on seventy-two other mules. A driver was provided for every two mules or four wounded men. The appearances, with such an examination as I gave the whole equipment, were so favorable as to recommend it for trial in our service. To make the system l)etter understood I annex two additional figures (78 and 79) showing the animal, the equipment, and position of the soldier, for which compilation and drawing I am indebted to Professor Weir. The temporary slielter for the sick and wounded in the field did not differ materially from the hospital tent in use for our troops. The severity of the climate made it necessary to provide more durable and comfortable apartments than could be formed of canvas for the general field hospital during the winter. For this purpose the ridge of high ground immediately east of the entrance into the harbor of Balaklava, facing the sea, was selected by the English. The Sardinian hospital was on the western slope of the same hill. In the first position the English erected a line of huts for officers and men. They were inclosed with rough weather-boarding on scantling of three inches by four inches, and floored with plank, without interior ceiling of any kind, and not unlike in construc- tion, our temporary railroad shanty, except in uniformity, all of them being precisely alike. Every man was provided with a bunk of wood or iron, a mattress, sheets, blankets, and pillow. In the center of each apartment or hut was a table, on which is always to be found a supply of lint, bandages, adhesive plaster, and other dressings for wounds. The bunks are arranged on each side the hut, head to the side of the building, witli a space of about three feet between them. The doorway is inclosed with a stormbreaker, part of which is partitioned off for the orderlies in attendance night and day upon the inmates. The cooking is all done in a building at one end of the row of huts in a set of kettles. Three cooking-stoves, in addition to the large kettles, had been recently put up in the same hut on the recommendation of that artistic cook, Soyer. In an adjacent hut a brick oven and some stew- holes, formed in masonry, were being constructed. The oven was heated by a fire on the floor or hearth. The surgeons occupy adjacent huts. A Protestant and Koman Catholic clergyman were in constant attendance. The supplies are furnished on the same general system as at the general hospital at Scutari, to be hereafter described. Whenever the health of the invalid justified, he was sent on board one of the transport hos- pital ships to Scutari, or England, as his condition made necessary. It was in the extreme eastern hut at this locality that I had the pleasure of paying my respects to the lady whose influence, in a great measure, commanded these comforts for the soldier. Her apartments and building were no better than the hospital huts. They were, however, like every building over which she extended her benign influence, distinguished for perfect neatness, method, and order throughout. As an American soldier I thanked her for the beneficial influence she had awakened in behalf of the medical branch of my profession. In reply, she hoped the sufferings of the soldier had been alleviated, but disclaimed any merit for the part she had taken. The soldier of every nation can find cause to honor and respect Florence Nightingale. The transportation of medical suj^plies, surgical instruments, and hospital stores, both for the field as well as general hospital, was of equal importance, as the arrangements for moving the wounded. All the armies engaged in this war had to reorganize this branch of their service. The English organized a " brigade for hospital conveyance," which was new in personnel and materiel. Its train consisted of twenty carts, five store wagons, one forge cart, and one cart 76 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. for stores and portable forge. The carts were for two horses, one in shafts, and one attached to an outrigger ; two other horses could he attached in case of necessity. The wagons were for four horses. This organization was for two divisions of their army, composed of six regiments each. The principle aimed at was so to arrange the entire ambulance train as to accompany any arm, that wherever a gun could go a spring cart should be able to follow. The whole of this train was under the staff surgeon of the division ; none of the wagons, carts, horses, or drivers being subject to the orders of any other department, except with the authority of the general of division, who best knew when to break up or sacrifice any part of his entire means of transport. This is a provision worthy of our attention. The details and requirements of this branch of the service should not constitute a part of the general transport service of the arni}^, as heretofore has been the case in our service. No person can so well preserve the efficiency of the surgical and medical apparatus as he who best knows its uses. The conveyance cart runs on two wheels corresponding in size with those of the artillery gun carriage. It is covered with canvas, painted white, curtains of the same material all round, and an apron attached to the foot-boards before and behind. Under the front seat is a small chest containing two sets oi iron splints in boxes, a small box of surgical stores and medicines, with leather straps for convenience of handling, an oil lantern, pickets and picket ropes, a pick-ax, spade, hand-saw, a bag with hammer and nails, two brass cocks for water tanks, and four horse- shoes. It also carries ten stretchers or bearers, with appropriate slings, two ten-gallon water casks under the axle, a filter in a wicker case, and sling, capable of clarifying fifty gallons of water in twenty-four hours, (weighing eighteen pounds,) with a funnel and a pint drinking cup ; also a water bucket for the horses, and camp kettle for three men, and a box with mess furniture. Two spare springs and a spare axle are carried for every three carts in the store wagons. Ten of these carts have round tops or covers, with seafe inside for sixteen men — that is, three in front, three in rear, and ten in the middle. Ten others have flat tops, carrying two bearers on vulcanized springs, and rollers on the floor of the cart, and nine persons before and behind — making in all eleven persons. A twelfth may be slung on a bearer from the roof. Side seats on hinges are provided in case the bearers are not required. On drawing out two iron supports at the end of each cart, the front seat, which is movable, makes a table, when placed upon them, for operations or other purposes. All the carts are numbered 1 to 20, and marked "Hospital Conveyance Carts." The muskets, knapsacks, and accouterments are to be carried below the carts^ the barrels of water and stores being left at the field hospital while the carts are conveying the wounded to the depot or regimental hosi^ital. The faucets for the water tanks are provided with movable keys to i^revent waste and any other use of this indispensable comfort than for the wounded. The five store wagons are mounted on two sets of springs — one of steel and the other of vulcanized India rubber ; when not in use transporting stores, they then become useful in trans- porting the sick and wounded. When empty they weigh sixteen hundred weight each, and carry stores amounting in weight to twenty-seven hundred weight — making the wagon and load 'forty-three hundred weight for four horses. These wagons are lettered A, B, C, D, and E, and marked on the side "Hospital Store Wagons," the letters being indispensable, as each wagon is provided with its sjDecial sup2)lies, known by inventories, with which every attendant is familiar. The boxes, bales, tents, &c., in these wagons, as well as the packages in the carts, are all locked or secured, and the keys aflixed to or upon them, and the contents of each is painted or printed on the covers or lids in two places, to be seen from either side of the wagon, or wherever it may be. The personnel for this train consists of one sergeant-major, four other non-commissioned oflicers, and sixty-nine drivers^ making a total of seventy-four, which gives the smallest admis- sible number of supernumerary drivers. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE, 77 On the marcli tlie staff surgeon of tlie division has attached to him a horse or mule, with pack-saddle and two panniers, containing a case of " capital instruments " and a small supply of medicines and surgical instruments for immediate use. For regimental use, two panniers of basket work, each 13" x 15" x 26", are provided, one for medicines and the other for instruments. These are transported by mules on pack-saddles. Boxes containing regulated supplies for a detachment less than a company are also provided for contingent service, at small posts where but few men can need medical care. In other European armies, a soldier in each regiment on a march carries two small leather boxes attached to his waist belt, about the size and resembling the cartridge box. These will be described hereafter. The store wagons A, B, C, have four cases in each, adapted for transport on pack-saddles. Number 1 contains a supply of medicines and surgical apparatus. Number 2 contains nitric acid, sulphuric acid, and perchloride of iron. Number 3 contains medicines and surgical appa- ratus. Number 4 contain splints, arm slings, gutta percha sheets, straw splints, and Guthrie's Commentaries on Wounds. These same wagons A, B, C, each contain bedding, tents, air beds, cooking kettles, mess furniture, towels, bed pans, close stools, urinals, candles, matches, ax, thread, needles, sugar, tea, brandy, and other articles of like necessity. The wagon D carries marquees, officers' tents, four bales of bedding, and three bundles or thirty-six water decks, (sacks for water beds, or India-rubber sheets.) The wagon E contains the same articles as in D. Each of the five store wagons contains sets of horseshoes and nails, grease, spare washers, linchpins, India rubber springs, screw- wrench, &c. The forges have each a sack of coals and set of farrier's tools. In the United States the supplies of medicines vary with the climate, and differ materially from that for European armies. I have, in consequence, omitted giving other particulars of the contents of the different boxes in the different wagons and carts, which information can be furnishedj if desired. I did not succeed in obtaining such details of these conveyance carts and store wagons as will enable me to give any other particulars of their construction than here stated. The French hospital-stores wagon is on a model designed specially for this campaign in the Crimea, resulting from experience with others somewhat similar, used in Algeria, since 1845. Fig. 80 shows the general exterior arrangement, on a vertical plane, of the wagon body, which rests on four elliptical steel springs. Fig. 80. FRENCH HOSPITAL-STORES WAGON. 78 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Figs. 81 and 82 represent elevations of the front and rear, thrown open, showing the sub- divisions for baskets, boxes, and drawers, at the ends of the wagon. Fig. 83. Back of the wagon. Fig- 81. Front of the wagon. A.... ^( Blanhr, j^fooo^.o^i ^ ,! Ba%\,c\ No. IS j BasUct No. 16 i 1 1 1 IK'-l i Bttslct No. 7 ^-'A- -- Bashci Ko. 6 i — ^T ra ^ BamtNol b-i i; Basket 8. ....'/si ~^ Cisket 6. ...: % ....... jUJ ; / i ' V ~* Basket No.l3 : Basket No. 11. Basket No. 9. '>^ Basket 7. -| C,^.2— 'M ■-! % isi '■■ °/e3 1 1 Fig. 87. Section through E F. [^ Basket No. 4. -^K- Basket No, 3. 9^0- ^ Basket No. 5. : ^ -Oy'iS- -fiS Fig. 88 is a plan of the exterior of the top. Fig. 88. Plan of the top or exterior. 80 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. Fl". 89. MODEL OF A CAMP BEDSTEAD FOR THE AMBULANCE TRAIN. •^^ Transom with the legs folded. Transom with the legs opened. SOP llinse of tho Huh: mil. Side mil. 1°°^^:°°! "\ Fig. 90. NEW MODEL OF THE PACKING CASE. An examination of the numbers on the different figiires, which indicate the corresponding basket, box, or drawer, will sufficiently explain the whole interior arrangement, and the dimensions of each compartment will serve to give a correct idea of the size of the whole. The various compartments are designed to hold supplies for two thousand men in a European cam- paign. Five of these wagons are provided for a division of ten thousand infantry. Each apartment is packed to hold when full a regulated allowance of the following articles: Basket Nos. 1 and 2, linen lint. Basket No. 3, olive oil in tin cans, lamp oil in tin cans, alcohol in two bottles, vinegar in two bottles, liquid acetate of lead in a bottle, solidifiable mixture in a bottle, a box of sea salt, ABT OF WAR IN EUROPE. 81 assorted corks, a wrought-iron tinned saucepan, a marble mortar with boxwood pestle, a bone and strap, both in a case, a syringe, and two sucking bottles. Basket No. 4 contains a bidan, (saucepan,) candlesticks, soup spoons, soup cups or bowls, a skimmer, goblets, lantern for candles and one for oil, ptisan pitchers, a broth pail, kitchen knives, a field pot, hanger and hooks, meat forks, two wrought-iron tinned kitchen pots, and a bag of tools. Basket No. 5 contains large pieces of linen for wouads — as slieets, stuffed cushions for wounded, arm slings, trusses, carded cotton in a bag, strips of pasteboard, three bags of groceries, cord, twine ; ivire fracture apparatus for tliighs, legs, arms, and forearms ; assorted splints for fractured thighs, legs, arms, and forearms, and right-angled splints; packing needles; small pallets. Basket No. 6 contains sheets of large linen for wounds. Basket No. 7 contains linen lint, and curled horse-hair in a bag. Numbers 8 to 13 contain, each, large linen for wounds, assorted roll-bandages, small linen for wounds, bandages of assorted sizes and compresses of assorted sizes, perforated compresses, a bundle of rags, and linen lint. Box No. 14 contains sets of surgical instruments, each with rolled bandages, assorted com- presses, perforated compress, lint, syringe, box oi appareils, coverings for dressings, small square phials, cupping glass, capsules, sponge, adhesive plaster, punk, and pins ; large prepared linen for body bandages, square and T bandages, triangular bandages, slings, suspensory bandages, small linen perforated compresses, needles in a case, pins, fine sponges, sewing thread, ligature thread, and tape. Basket No. 15 contains the same as Nos. 8 to 13. Basket No. 16 contains sail-cloth bags with draw string fastenings, four of them containing rolled bandages, assorted compresses, perforated compresses, and lint. No. 17 contains the same as Nos. 8 to 13. No. 18 contains large prepared linen ; bandages for thighs, legs, arms, and forearms ; stuffed cushions for wounds of the thigh, legs, arms, and forearms ; right angle splints, and small pallets. No. 19 contains strips of pasteboard, linen lint, and two sets of surgical apparatus, the same as in No. 14. Box No. 20 contains an assortment of medicines, assorted phials, earthern pots, male catheter, stomach tube, small spatula, scales and weights, cork, (broches,) an amputating and trepanning case, a box of extra amputating knives, knives Nos. 2 and 4 each in a separate case, box of gum arabic, sugar, wax, adhesive plaster, a box of paper, quills, pencils and penknives, soap, aprons for surgeons and attendants, coarse and fine towels, inkstands, candlesticks, tinder box, lantern for candle, needles in a case, sewing thread, carded cotton, and three sets of surgical apparatus, as in No. 14. Box No. 21 contains large prepared linen for body bandages ; square, T, and triangular bandages, slings, suspensory bandages and perforated compresses, small linen, needles in a case, pins, sponges, sewing thread, ligature thread, and tape. On top of the wagon is a case containing gray blankets, sets of leather straps for litters, suspending straps, litter pole handles, a i'rame for the litter poles, an operating table with a back, a spade, an ax, a pick, a bill-hook, a hand saw, and padlock to secure the interior of the wagon. The Perforated Compress, or bandage, I understand to be a new application in surgery, and so highly prized by the French surgeons as to be worthy special description. (See annexed figure.) It is packed in cases numbered 8 to 13, 14 and 19, making it most accessible at all times, and in combination with various sets of surgical apparatus. A sample of it was obtained by me from the military hospital at Strasbourg, and I learned it was in general use in the French service. It is a bandage of soft unbleached linen, of about forty-two threads to the square 11 D 82 ART OF ^AR IX EUROPE. inch, foldeu in seven thicknesses or layers to a uni- form width of two and one eighth inches. Thus folded it is perforated through and through with holes of five thirty seconds of an inch diameter, in rows across the band- age, alternating six and seven holes in a row, so arranged that the holes in one row are opjjosite the spaces of the other, the rows being five sixteenths of an inch from each other, (center to center.) This compress was not known in the charitable hospitals of our country on my return from Europe, and not in use by the surgeons in any of our military hospitals, so 'ar as I can learn, and to whose consideration I beg leave to present it. A camp cot or bedstead is a necessary appeuda e to the ambulance train and field hosp tals. Ti.e Ei g- lish do not appear to have devised any specially for this service. Tlie extraordinary num- ber required for the field hospitals before Sebastopol, compelled both the French and English to make use of their permanent hospital bedstead. The French ambulance cot is in part shown in Fig. 88, prepared for transportation on top of the hospital store wagon. In Fig. 89 I have shown the details of its construction. The side pieces or rails are in two equal parts, jointed with an iron hinge to fold together. The head and foot transoms have openings at each end, through which the ends of the rails are passed, forming a rectangular frame. The sacking bottom, formed of strong sail-cloth, is permanently secured to both the head and foot transom, and its sides sewed with a large hem or fold admitting and firmly encasing the side rails. The transoms have iron legs, centred with a pin to admit of being opened out for use, or folded up in a line with the transom. The sacking bottom is kept extended by leather straps secured to the rails, buckling into a staple on the end of the transoms. For transportation the tranisoms are rolled xip in the sacking bottom, the side pieces are folded in half on the hinge joints when the whole is inclosed in a tarpaulin envelop. For transport on pack saddles they are arranged five in a pack, including blankets, as shown in Fig. 90. The weight of this camp bedstead is unknown. A camp cot was devised for the ofiicers of the English army that appears well suited for the above purpose. I used one of them while in camp in the Crimea, and consider they possess advantages that may make them acceptable to my brother ofiicers, and are worthy the consideration of the Surgeon General's Department. (See Figs. 91, 92.) The side pieces or rails are round, about two inches diameter, in three equal parts, united by metal socket-joints. The sacking bottom, of strong sail-cloth, is sewed at the sides with a fold, large enough for the rails to pass through and become closely encased. Three sets of cross legs, permanentlj' centred with iron pivots, have their upper ends (Fig. 92) formed witli a tennon, that enter mortises in the side rails, openings therefor being made in the sacking bottom near each end and in the middle. Cords are attached to the head of the legs at a, pass down and fasten to the foot of the other leg at b, keeping them extended, pressed into the mortises in the rails, and stretching the sacking bottom. This arrangement of a camp cot, is light, strong, and put together in a few minutes ; when apart, the two rails form six pieces of equal length, tlie three pairs of legs each fold together in a line, these are rolled up in a sacking bottom, the pillow and blanket rolled outside, and the whole encased in a painted canvas cover, secui-ed with straps sewed on the oil-cloth, or by a cord and eyelet holes in the canvas. Thus put up, it is convenient for transport either in the hospital ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 83 store wagon, or on pack mules. An India rubber sheet accompanies the bedding, preserving the latter from rain, and in case of its being occupied by a wounded officer or soldier secures increased cleanliness. The Russian hospital-stores wagon differs from that of any other army, possessing merit in its adaptation to their country and its roads. It is a nearer approach to the dispensary of the military hospitals — instead of the articles being packed in boxes or cases that must be removed from the wagons to be accessible, they are arranged in drawers and boxes, on shelves and tills, all open to view and to be at once handled for use by opening the exterior door and drawing out the cases or apartments in which they are secured for transportation. Two wagons are, however, needed in this system to contain all the articles required by the surgeon. Each wagon is mounted on four elliptical springs, and fitted with a pole for four horses corresponding with their artillery equipment. Fig. 93, Nos. 1 and 2, represent the body of one of these wagons, the articles being contained in apartments accessible by opening two doors in the rear of the wagon, one on each side, and two drawers and a door in front. The four compartments {a, h, c, d, No. 1,) are closed by a single door 3' U" inch wide by 21" high, hung on the lower edge to the rail of the wagon body, with stops to hold it in a horizontal position, when it can be used as a table. These four compartments extend half across the wagon, and the opposite side is arranged in like manner. The door closing the lower part of the rear of the wagon is hung on the upper line, (n,) with a brace to hold it in any po.sition when raised, forming a shelter from rain or sun. The upper part is formed in two large closets, one having a door from the rear, hinged and falling on its lower edge, and the other from the front hinged in like manner, behind the driver's seat — making in all eight compartments on the sides, four long drawers behind, and a closet front and rear. Fig. 93. EUSSI.AN HOSriT.'VL WAGON, No. J. 1. S;de view. -.-d >i {a DRAWER 2 trD£i:P': ^ Si .i'i . 37^':.. 2. End view. No. 2, of Fig. 93, represents the end or rear of the wagon. The closet above the four drawers is of the depth of the latter. The drawer handles are let into the face of the drawer, folding flush with its surface by a hinge. They are all placed below, the better to command the weight within. Fig. 94 (Nos. 3 to 16) represents the body of the second wagon, the contents of which are accessible by raising the top, a double door on each side, two drawers in front under the driver's seat, and a double door in rear, one half falling and the other half raising on the horizontal edges. An examination of this figure and the several numbers, three to sixteen, will sufficiently explain all the details of the interior apartments and their subdivisions. This information I procured at the arsenal 84 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. in St. Petersljurg, ty measuring the wagons. The contents for the various apartments I did not ascertain, there heing no one present connected with the medical department to refer to. Fig. 94. RUSSIAN HOSPITAL WAGON, No. II. .*?. Left side view. D/^IVEKS SHAZ ^ /SIlsr'ircA <5^ x m 1 1 J^ ^No\ 1/ SMALL. ILji I HJfJDL C C i (cZ) A. Sidt^ view ol drawjrs, c and a. DP^N ON TOP\ ^ i^ H Handle clown for use. 5. Plan of drawLT, l. 1 fj; 5 This top opens upward?;, Iirnged on the line a, h. Within ^ and under this roof cover is a Hoor over llic drawers of "ii^ loose boards, which, on being raised, opens tiie spaee down .^ to tbe bottom of tJic wagon. 7. Right side view. «^" /■^ SF6CES (3^"rSQiVr If-' DEEP ^ ^ 7-4 */fCES &'■ 22' OHAWER 8"0£EP \ OF BACK, (^y oo DRIVERS SEAT omwEH (b) OR A H CR (a) D ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 85 8. Plan of drawer a, "n I, gilt s lit'. _i.i< I C 9. DlTiwiT r, in rear. ^ ^ 57/ ■5^ \\\\^ fl OPEN oh rms \ L 1 racE to :n kaiulle dou-n. 10. Rear of the wagon. ^'..M" r. °S! b r ^ OFI 1 It 6 Oh' 5 e /'J-. <5/< c §1 11. Plan of drawer e, in rear. f is the sami', cxcrpt that Uic divisions are ail equal. /y- 1 4- 1 1 1 12. Front of the wagon. 14. FlaD of drawer 6, in rear. J3. Plan of upper half of drawer a, and of lower handle down. 15. Plan of (Irawcr ft, under tlie driver's or under part of d, In front, under Ibe drlver^s seat. / o o o 1 ^3 / -*' / Austria, Saxony, and Prussia, in like manner, have tlieir ambulance and hospital-store wagons, each possessing some peculiar merit adapting them to their respective armies. These must form a second part of this report, to be made when time is allowed me to do so. The shelters for the troops in the Crimea, during this campaign, varied with the climate, and the variable temperature gave rise to some important modifications and changes in the previously established systems. Tents and huts were the principal arrangements. Of the five nations engaged in this contest no two of them had the same form or system. We have copied, of late years, the French model; and they, from the experience in this summer and winter's campaign, on soil similar to our western prairies, having found their system to be unsuited, abandoned it, and substituted a modification of those in use by their allies. This experience is of much consequence to our army, which encamps on every variety of soil, and in a country covering all extremes of climate. 86 ART OF WAR I>f EUROPE. SARDINIAN TENT. Fig. 95. The tent of the Sardinian army I consider to be of a better imttern than either the French or Eng- lish, and in irost particulars resembles the Turkish tent. They have conical bodies, with a small seg- ment cut off on top ; with a cylindrical base of about twenty inches high at the bottom, giving room for a man's head anywhere around the tent when lying down, which, in the English and French tents, is not the case. (See Fig. 95.) The dimensions of the Sardinian tent are as in the annexed figure. It is supported by a box of 10 inclies square, closed on to;) with a circular piece of board, supporting the top of the tent. The lower end of this box stands or rests on the ground, and as any other tent pole. The advantage claimed for it is, that it serves as a box within which to pack the tent and pins for transportation or storage. This box, as a substitute, may be suitable to the climate and roads of Sardinia, but cannot be recommended for our service. The slope of the canvas is about forty-five degrees, and the base a circle of about sixteen feet diameter — the height being only seven feet six inches. The height, and wall side of twenty inches, with flat top for ventilating openings, constitute the peculiar advantages of this tent. In addition to the above, the Sardinian soldier is provided with the tent-abri, that he may at all times and under all circumstances have at command shelter against rain, and which, combined with his companions', suffice to make a good tent. This tent-abri is composed of a rectangular or square piece of canvas of five feet side, with eyelet holes worked on two sides, admitting of two, three, or more, pieces being used in forming a shelter for as many men as contribute their resjjective pieces. Sticks are used as supports for a string or cord that forms the ridge. This cord, after passing over a stick at the head and foot of the intended shelter, is extended to the ground, where it is fastened with a pin driven in the ground, and serves as a stay. Every soldier carries one of the five foot square pieces, any two, three, or four sufficing to form a shelter for the night on the march or on a scout; and in our service might prove very advantageous. It is also a substitute for blanket covering when desired. The French army is provided with the same convenient shelter. In their service the soldier carries the necessary sticks. Some of them are quite short, in two pieces, with a socket joint to unite them at pleasure. These two pieces are carried in a vertical position on the side of the knapsack, while others sling their muskets over the shoulder and use the stick as a c ne. The idea may prove advantageous to our service on many expeditions where the tent i , not available. For the health of an army some shelter at night is very important. The Turkish tent resembles the Sardinian in general form, differing mostly in the dimen- sions. It is supported by a pole (instead of a box, as the Sardinian) eight feet high. The upper part of the tent is a perfect cone, resting on a circular base of fourteen feet diameter, below which is a wall of one foot high. There are nineteen breadths of canvas, each measuring twenty-five and a half inches, forming the circuit of the base. It, like the Sardinian tent, is remarkable for the flatness of the roof slope, yet it has proved to be sufficient to shed the rain. It is deficient in ventilating arrangements, having no openings on top, although well adapted therefor at the base by raising the one foot wall. The Sardinian army, in preparing for the winter of 1855-56, without incurring any expense, was enabled to hut itself in apparently very comfortable, warm, dry, and durable huts, while their allies have, at great cost, imported materials for their huts from England and France, and bestowed much workmanship of carj^entry, as well as iron work, to form and put up temporary huts that do not possess the warmth of the Sardinian's, although more dry in ART OF WAR IN EUROPB. 87 1^ IhiO. METRES damp, wet weather, and at such times more healthy. The Sardinians excavate a half story, say two and a half feet helow the surfiice, on 4.40 meters by 2.20 meters. Over this they set rafter poles, to and about which they in- terweave horizontal poles or wattling, Ic.rm- ing a basket-work. Over this they lay about six inches in thickness of clay, tempered into a thick paste with water preparatory to put- ting it on. If dry grass, straw, or hay is mixed with the clay to form an exterior sur- face, it forms a thatch that is still more dura- ble and impervious to water. The doors all faced the south, in one of the gables, with a Fig. %. window opening or hole at the opposite end, and a fireplace on the side. (See Fig. 96.) Brush, saplings, and clay sufficed for these huts, and which the Sardinian array had at command about their camps on the Tchernaya. They were calculated for six men each. The roof was set some distance outside the excavation, which gave a surface under the eves convenient for the deposit of accouterments, &c. The roof projects over so much of the doorway as suffices to cover the steps descending to the depth excavated for the floor. The window opening is generally formed of some empty packing-box, which latter were often used sunk in the eartli on the sides of the hirt, as closets, and fortunate was the squad which could find a few additional ones as substitutes for chairs, tables, and other like articles we are apt to consider as indispensable to our comfort beyond the sphere of camp life. ENGLTSII TENT. The English tent, with the last modifications, adopted during this campaign, is similar to their former j^attern, a cone with circular base resting on the ground. The modifications shown in the above figure (97) consist in the fastening of the tent cords to each seam of the canvas about two feet six inches from the base, all below being fastened at pleasure, by loops passing over the same pins that secure tlie cords. The advantage of this arrangement is, free ventilation of the interior of the tent by raising all that part below the attachment of the tent cords. The canvas near the vertex of the cone is sewed to either leather or hide, forming the termination of the tent. This part receives the tent pole, and through it ventilators are made, 88 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. SO arranged as to guard against rain or snow, while the hide or leather gives the necessary strength for the head of the pole. The tent jiolc is in two parts, put together with a metal socket-joint. The French, in abandoning their own model as unsuited to the varied service of this cam- paign, ado2itcd the Turkisli and English models, apparently as they could procure the one or the other. No opjiortunity presented for procuring the details of their present arrangement. Such was the severity of the winter in the Crimea, tliat the troops needed more j^rotection than canvas would afford. During the winter of 1854-55, the Eussians held possession of all the wooded country. Not until the 19th of April, 1855, were they driven from Canrobert's hill, nor until the 25th of May fi'om the Tchernaya, and, as a consequence, wood could not he procured either for fuel or huts. The suffering of the allied armies was great heyond jDrecedent, which led to the necessity of importing from England and France small buildings j^repared ready to be put together on coming in possession of the troops. In 1854 and 1855, tlie French provided 2,900 of these huts, calculated for T5,000 men, and the English 1,500, (how many more I did not learn,) calculated for 30,000 men. Those of the latter were twentj'-eight feet long, sixteen feet wide, and eleven to twelve feet high under the ridge. The sides were six feet high, and, with the roof were formed of three-quarter inch boards, made in sections, convenient for handling and transportation. The frame to which these sections were attached, was two inch by four inch stuff. Tlie floor was of one inch boards, three feet in the center being left open, where the stove was placed. Some of those made the second winter of the campaign were of two thicknesses of thin boards, having felt or similar material between them. At tlie junction of the roof-sections sheet iron was in some cases introduced to make a water-tight joint. These English huts were calculated for twenty to twenty-five men. They weighed two and a half tons each. RUSSUN TENT. The Eussian tent differs from all others in its form and shape. The base is a square of fourteen feet ; five feet above the base it falls in to ten feet square, above which it terminates with a pyramid of four feet vertical height. (See Fig. 98.) It is supported by a center pole of nine feet in length, and four cords, one from each angle of the ten feet square section, (a, a.) These cords are fastened to pins in the usual way. Their practice is, at all permanent camps, to excavate the ground under the tent about two feet deep, the earth from which is thrown around the outside of the tent, slightly raising it above the natural surface, and sloping from the tent ; by which arrangement the rain water is carried off, and the excavation is kept dry ; a frustrum of a cone is left in the center of the space occupied hj the tent, on which the pole stands, and about which the arms are stacked. All these European tents, liaving but one straight pole, and that in the center, admit of the excavation of the ground within and beneath them — which is the practice in permanent camps — ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 89 leaving a small mass in the center as a rest or support for the pole. Against this mass of earth a fire can be made for warmth, to dry the tent, or for cooking in bad weather. The pole can be set out of the center, removed from the fire, as its perpendicularity is not essential. The Russians had large camps of these tents on the north shore of the harbor of Sebastopol, but none in the city or limits of the besieged district. Within that sphere there was no rest for the soldier, but in some temporary expedient as a bomb-proof. The buildings of the city, being mostly stone, were converted into bomb-proof shelters by propping and bracing the lower floors and covering them with earth. In other places exca,vations were made about six feet deep, covered with timbers from the dockyard, as well as roofs and ruins of the city structures, then facines, and over this several feet of earth. Great labor and persevering industry was bestowed on these temporary expedients for securing a night's rest undisturbed by shot and shell. In the Redan I observed a novel arrange- ment, that must have cost the occupants a great deal of time to have completed, and have been imdertaken by resolute men, who looked forward to a prolonged resistance. It consisted of seventeen apartments excavated in the solid rock, each capable of sheltering two bomb-proof shelter in the redan. men comfortably, and three with some original surface exposure. The annexed figure (99) is a section of these bomb-proofs, each of the seven- teen apartments being seven feet wide, six feet long, and three feet deep. They were in a continuous line, and separated from each other by masses of the rock about two^feet thick. At what time these sin- gular excavations were made I could not ascertain ; many of them on the end of the line were unfinished ; all the finished ones had about and within them the evidences of having been used by the defenders of the Redan as bomb-proofs, though probably designed as their last resting place. The customs of the different .continental nations as regards their food, in the variety of articles and in the manner of preparing them, difier very materially. We should not draw any information from their methods of feeding and cooking for their armies, without considering this fact; and when attempting to apply any of their arrangements for our service, to recollect that we also have our peculiarities and preferences, in difierent parts of our country, as marked as the continental neighboring nations. Although the fixtures and apparatus of the Russians are well adapted to their purposes, (some of the details of which I shall particularize as worthy of our imitation,) we could not feed our troops upon the component parts of their ration, since they are accustomed from youth to the acidulated soup and rye bread made in their own peculiar way, which would be altogether unsuited and unpalatable to our people. The wheaten bread supplied to travelers in Russia is of a very excellent and superior quality, and in Moscow it was decidedly better than any it has been my lot to eat in any other place, yet the preference of the people is for rye bread, not imfrequently spiced with anise-seed. With the continental armies generally, greater reliance is placed upon vegetable matter, studying the least consumption of animal food, at the same time adojDting every means to economize fuel ; while with us meat constitutes a princii^al element of the ration, vegetable matter being secondary, and only in such quantities as to prevent disease, and the consumption of fuel does not seem to have been a consideration in the design of our camp and mess furniture. Our practice is to provide camp kfettles, and mess pans only for squads or subdivisions of a company, these are of such form and shape together with their being the common property of the 12— D Fig. 99. 90 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. squad, tliat they must necessarily be carried in the baggage wagons, or on the mule packs — and are never at hand when the troops halt after making the day's march. The European practice, as a general rule, is to provide every man with some part of his mess furniture, appended to his knapsack ; when brought together, suflBcing for the many, at the same time that the individual can never suffer, always having the means at hand of preparing food without awaiting the arrival of baggage trains. Their system has the advantage of dispensing with some transportation, and of the soldier being ready to prepare anything that may be at hand, without being subjected to the delays of the train, which oftentimes is some hours behind the troops. Their system for economizing fuel is worthy our study in the arrangement of suitable mess furniture, in consequence of wood becoming scarce about many of our garrisons. On many routes over extended prairie districts it is not to be found, making it oftentimes necessary to rely upon Buffalo dro^jpings as a substitute. This dependence can last no longer than while these districts are frequented by the wild animals of the prairies. A knowledge then of some of the European devices for garrison and field service may be acceptable, preparatory to the introduction of some more suitable arrangement than we now have. The allied troojjs before Sebastopol suffered greatly for want of fuel ; so much so, as to resort to digging up the roots of the vineyards, after having consumed all the vines and brush found within the limits of their sentinels and outposts. I have already described the expedients of the English army for baking bread in a steam bakery shijj, and some arrangements in their hospital at Balaklava, and the economical arrangements of the French, in transporting their supply of bread from Marseilles. ' Without doubt, the most important particular as regards subsistence of troops in the field, is the recent introduction of desiccated food, which was adopted for the first time as a reliable article of the soldier's ration in this Crimean campaign, and used extensively by the Russians as well as the Allies. It requires much less fuel than the ordinary ration, and dispenses with a large pro- portion of the transjiortation requisite for the ordinary subsistence stores. From Paris, the "Commission" forwarded to the Secretary of War samples of the compressed vegetables and meats prepared by diolet. Others were brought home by the Commission, in 1856, and distributed by the Commissary General to remote posts for trial. Although they had been put up more than a year they were still sound and in good order. Their utility, however, no longer remains a matter of doubt and uncertainty such as to make further trial or experience necessary. It is only to select good articles and have them faithfully prepared to insure all the advantages claimed for the military service by their introduction as a component part of the ration. I witnessed extensive supplies in the depots of the English army, manufactured in their own country, after their peculiar method, as well as from the Paris manufactory of Cholet. The total quantity provided for their army I had no means of ascertaining. Many thousand rations of this description of food were sent out from London to the English army by private subscription of individuals, as the most acceptable offering in their power to bestow upon their troops — an evidence of the confidence they had in its superior excellence. The French army, both for the troops in the field as well as for the sick and wounded in the hospitals, were supplied with it to a great extent, altogether amounting in weight to 7,894,920 pounds avoirdupois, not including the supply for the hospital. The proportions of the different kinds furnished to the troops in the field were — Of dried vegetables 424,000 pounds. Compressed vegetables, prepared by Cholet 752,180 And of conserve of beef. 0,718,140 " 7,894,920 or a total of 3,947 tons. • ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 91 Of the preserved beef, a small part was manufactured in France by M. de Lignac and M. Apert ; all the rest was of English manufacture, of which 888,800 pounds was in powder, or finely-ground gelatine, (viande en 2Mudre.) For the hospitals other descriptions of prepared concentrated food were supplied ; the pre- ceding constituting a part of the hospital supplies as well as for the troops in the field. The whole quantity forwarded to the hospitals at Constantinople and the field hospitals in the Crimea consisted of — Concentrated milk 17,600 pounds. Concentrated essence of beef 2,200 " Beef soup, (bouilli) 7,160 " Granulated gluten 6,600 " Cholet's prepared vegetables 114,400 " Other and difi'erent prepared vegetables 55,000 " Making a total for the hospitals of 152,960 " or 76j*/5- tons. The French surgeons speak of the concentrated milk manufactured by Lignac, the essence of beef manufactured in England, and the preserved vegetables of Cholet and Masson, as per- fectly successful for the hospital service, in both warm and cold weather. The Russians also (as I was informed) resorted to the use of these jjrepared concentrated rations at Sebastopol. To them it was of even more importance than to the Allies, as the latter could draw their supplies by sea, whereas the former had to do so by a long land transport, and at certain periods, over roads almost impassable. We must conclude that they procured them from English and French factories, through neutrals. The continuous line of railroad from Paris and ports on the English Channel to Warsaw, thence by excellent macadamized roads to Kief, and thence to and through the Crimea by roads best known to themselves, put it in the power of the Russians to supply themselves uninterruptedly, although at great cost and labor. During a visit to the manufactory of M. Cholet, in Paris, in May, 1855, I observed several kinds of vegetables, then in different stages of preparation for the French army in the Crimea. It appears that the vegetables are all cut into thin slices, then partially dried by some artificial process, when they are pressed in cakes about one inch thick by very powerful machines, appa- rently hydraulic presses of many tons pressure. Potatoes, turnips, carrots, and cabbages were mixed together. Potatoes are cut in two ways — one in thin slices of one sixteenth of an inch in tiiickness, and the other in prisms of this section and size ^n , which when dried takes this form The thin slices are to mix with other vegetables in compressed cakes, and the latter, thoroughly dried for use by itself, put up in a hard dry state, without being compressed. Turnips and carrots are cut up in thin slices ; cabbage is deprived of the thick stock, retaining the leaf or flat parts. 75 rations of the dried potatoes purchased from Mr. Cholet weighed 7 lbs. 8 oz. 4 do of his Julien soup do " 4 '■ 60 do do in tablets of three rations each do 2 " 12 '•' 84 do of his spring vegetables in tablets of six rations each do 2 " 12 " Forty thousand rations of these compressed vegetables put up for transportation occupy a space of one meter cubed only, and weigh 4,000 pounds, including the packing cases. The whole are put up in tin canisters of about one cubic foot each. In our mode of packing pork for the army we transport thirty-seven and one half per cent. of unnecessary weight in the brine, salt, and wood of the barrel; and in flour about nine per 92 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Side loop. Elevation. Hatulle of ilie cover. Side loop. r=v ffS A I Side loop for tlie ' leather sirap. cent, of wood ; in liard bread, about fifty per cent. ; all of which could be saved by adopting compressed concentrated meats and vegetables. To cook this description of food, together with other kinds furnished the French army, 150 iron ranges or cooking stoves were used, of which sixty were portable. For baking bread in the field, the French have several methods of constructing the necessary ovens, depending upon the material at hand. They are sufficiently described in Laisue's Aide Memoire, pages 113 to 121. Mess Furniture. — In the Sardinian army the arrangement is to provide every man with a mess- can and a canteen, and for every sixteen men a camp kettle. Their mess-can for infantry is of the form and dimensions nan. given in the annexed figure, arranged with loops of the same ^f ^,^ j" \i metal as the can, through which to pass leather straps, one hori- zontal through a and h, the other vertical through c and d, to secure it to the knapsack. Every soldier is provided with one of these, and, in addition thereto, every sixteen men have an iron camp kettle of eleven inches diameter and twelve inches deep, slightly conical, with a strong iron bail handle and aflat cover. In a camjj of some duration these camp kettles are set in ranges, made of such materials as may be at hand. In the Sardinian camp, on the banks of the Tchernaya, they were set in clay, as in the annexed figure, all the edges of the openings of the fireplace, as well as those in which the kettles are set, being lined and guarded with iron hoops from old useless barrels or packing boxes. The saving of fuel by this arrangement, compared with an open fire, is very great; in addition to which, the provisions can be cooked in less time, more thoroughly, and with more cleanliness. It recommends itself from its simplicity and facility of construction in most places, combined with eflSciency. A water canteen, with the preceding, constitutes the entire mess furniture of the Sardinian soldier, so far as I could see, in their camp in the Crimea. The water canteen was made entirely of wood, and as in the annexed figure. Its only merit is strength ; objections may be made to it when compared with tin, as liable to absorbing impurities from the watei-, and becoming useless after being stored in a dry warehouse for some time, when, from shrinkage, the hoops are apt to fall off and the canteen fall to pieces. It is arranged with a wooden screw stopper on top and carried by a suspending cord over the shoulder. The hoops arc also of wood. It may easily be taken to pieces and cleaned within by driving off the hoops, but this requires leisure time, with some mechanical aptitude. The knapsack of the Sardinian soldier, upon which he straps his mess can, is made of leather, twelve inches by fifteen inches by three inches and a quarter, in which he carries one pair of pants, one pair of shoes, one pair of leather gaiters, one shirt, one pair of worsted drawers, and a blanket, wearing habitually his great coat. These, with a haversack of linen, lined inside with the same material, with arms and accouterments, constitute the full equipment of an infantry soldier. It is well to remark that he is furnished with a change of clothing and no more, not being required to carry on his back a wardrobe for change of seasons or prolonged .*^ection of bottom. a a a, &e., loops lor shoul- der strap. -Mi's:: ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 93 use. Every article over and above his daily wants as a soldier is provided for in the most economical way of transporting it in bulk and issued when required. By such a system troops are ready at any moment on the march for active and efficient service. The English field artillery carry mess kettles for the men of the respective guns and caissons slung under the carriages, five kettles being provided for the men of one section of a battery. This camp kettle is ten inches deep and twelve inches in diameter, fitted with a strong iron bail handle. It has a cover that serves as a frying or stew pan of twelve inches diameter and three inches deep fitting down over the kettle one and a quarter inch. The cover is provided with loops, through which leather straps are passed to secure it to the kettle when slung imder the gun or caisson on the march. In addition to the above, every man carries a mess canteen of the form and dimensions of the accompanying figures, with one flat surface of six and three quarter inches by five and a half inches that comes in contact with the surface of the knapsack to wliich it is strapped; it has a wire bail handle, so curved as, when not in use, to fit the rounded surface of the canteen. Bail handle. Inside vessel. r C 6|" scant. On the top and within to the depth of two and a half inches is fitted a tin pan, answering as a plate, serving to separate his dry food from coffee, soup, or other provisions that may be beneath it in the can. Into this latter is fitted the cover of one and a half inch deep, serving as another plate, the edges of which overlap and close the entire canteen. These three parts, on being i)ut together for the march* are encased in a leather or canvas closely-fitting pouch, upon which straps are secured wherewith to attach it to the back of the knapsack. A canteen for water is also provided for every soldier. It is made of wood, put together with hoops, of the form and dimensions of the annexed Fig. A. It is seven inches diameter, and three and three quarter inches thick, and liable to the same objections as that of the Sar- dinian army. 1L~?\ -'■^' v^ :^ D. The English infantry soldier's mess furniture is, in general arrangement, the same as that of their artillery, difi"ering in dimensions, being considerably smaller in cubic contents, and without the bail handle, which is a great convenience to the soldiers when rising it for making coffee, &c. The details are given in the above Figs. B, C, D. The cover sets flush with the top of the can, having but a small flange fitting inside the 94 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. can. Both it and the interior vessel, as well as the can, have less depth than the one for the artillery. Every fourteen men are provided with a camp kettle, of the shape and dimensions of Fig. E. It is fitted with a flush cover, somewhat countersunk, io fit the knapsack closely, to prevent wabbling. It is carried alternately by the men of the squad to which it belongs. It will be seen that its dimensions are materially smaller than the one for the artillery, and has no such cover to substitute for a stew pan or bread-baking pan. It is provided with a strong bale handle. The water canteen is the same as that for the artillery soldier. The French system difi"ers in detail very materially from that of their allies. Their troops of infantry, for example, are divided into squads of eight men each, to which is issued one gamelle, one bidon, and one marmite, and to each individual one water canteen. Such is the regulated arrangement. In the Crimea their necessities and other circumstances caused an issue of two gamelles, one hidon, and one marmite to every fourteen men. By this system the men must necessarilv come together. The annexed figures give the form and dimensions of the diflerent vessels. In them the soldier cooks fresh or salt meat, rice or beans, preserved vegetables, and coffee. The Marmite, in two parts. The Bidon. Tlie Gamcllo ^ g/q/L HANDLE _ . '"v'-i^'io'/s" e Canteen for water. The lower part of the marmite, of nine inches by ten and one half inches, furnished with an iron bail handle, serves for boiling. Its cover^ of three inches by ten and one half inches, can be used for boiling by the steam of the lower part, or may be detached and used by itself for boiling or stewing. It is arranged with a handle on the side. The bidon is a water vessel, or substitute for our pail. It may be used for boiling. One half of the top is closed, giving much additional strength. To the covered part is attached a strong wire handle, and under the covered part is a spout through which to pour water or coffee. The gamelle is a plain deep dish, which may be used as a stew pan. The last figure is the general form of their water canteen, made of tin. Its dimensions I fiiiled to obtain. It is covered with cloth to protect the water from the sun's rays, to keep it comparatively cool, and very cool if the cloth can be kept wet without incommoding the soldier. It is suspended by straps over the shoulder. The mess furniture is carried alternately by the members of the squad. This system does not admit of the soldier's carrying his day's provision, or of his having at command the means of cooking for himself independent of the sqiiad to which he belongs. The Russian soldier is equipped with a mess can not unlike the English and Sardinian. Its dimensions I failed to obtain. AET OF WAR IN EUROPE. 95 Ciivcr uf llic cup c. Cup fitting inside of the can. 8ucli was the mess furniture provided for the armies of France, England, Sardinia, and Kussia, for field service. As we have in our service to devise some systematic arrangement suitable for our troops in the field, adapted to our varied climate, face of the country, as well as varieties of food, I ofi'er the systems observed in other armies of Europe, not engaged in this Crimean campaign. The Prussian soldier's mess canteen is in principle the same as that of the English^ Sar- dinian, and Russian, and in detail and dimensions should be considered in connection when maturing a system for ourselves. It consist.^ of the tin can shown in the an- nexed figure, in which to boil or stew, provided with the cover a, that may be used as a dish, cup, or frying- pan. It is arranged for a movable handle (b) that can be used with either this cover (a) or a vessel (c) made to fit inside of the can, which latter may be used for the same purposes as the cover (re.) To make this interior vessel (c) more serviceable, it is provided with a flat cover, (d,) corrugated to give it strength. The can has a wire bail handle, which disengages and is packed with the movable handle {b) inside the canteen, the whole being strapped behind the knapsack. The cup (c) has small wire handles folding down at pleasure, whereby to lift it from the canteen. This cup is made slightly conical, to give room for the loop to which the handle (b) is attached. A haversack is also provided for each soldier. The Austrian arrangements differ from all the preceding, and adapted to squads only. I found three different sets of camp kettles in use ; a change in the existing system was about being introduced. The most general arrangement is to provide a camp kettle for every squad of twelve to fourteen men each. At the Tete de Pont, opposite Mayence, they were divided in messes of thirteen; and as a general rule, in all the garrisons, cat in their dormitories. Their mess-can appears to have been designed to answer the two purposes of garrison and field service. The cooking vessel consists of a tin frustrum of a cone, resting on three iron legs of six inches in length ; within it, passing through the bottom and rising through the cover, is another cone, serving as the furnace or fireplace. The bottom of this interior cone is arranged with a movable iron grating, upon which a charcoal fire is made. To increase the draft of the furnace another joint of conical pipe is set over the lower one, resting on the cover of the mess kettle. When not in use, or as prepared for transportation, this second conical pipe is put within the first, by removing the iron grating. The provisions being cooked, the grating upon which the fire rests is withdrawn, when the coal falls down leaving the mess-can, without fire, to be taken to the mess table in the dormitory, or to the squad wherever it may be assembled. The mess kitchens, in garrison, are arranged to suit this apparatus. In the center of the apartment are two masonry tables of about three feet wide and fifteen feet long each ; the cans are placed thereon in two rows close together, remaining there as long as 96 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the fires are burning. The fumes of the charcoal rise to the crown of an arch covering the two tables, from whence a chimney conducts them to the roof. The merit of the plan is the economy of fuel and rapidity with which food can be cooked in such a vessel, surrounding the fire. The social and good feelings kept up by the men living as one family, under the same non-commissioned officer, in their own quarters, whether in garrison or camp, and not thrown together in large bodies in mess rooms, is another advantage. All kinds of provisions must be cooked in this same can ; one of the inconveniences, as boiling only can be done with it. In the field they are transported in the baggage wagons. This may be considered its greatest disadvantage, as they are not at hand when the troops halt, and most need it ; nor does the system admit of the soldier carrying, for the day, any other than dry food in his haversack. In addition to this mess kettle, every soldier has a tin dish or small can, in which he receives his ration from the mess kettle. The annexed sketch gives an outline of its form and dimensions. The second system, I observed in the barracks of the new arsenal, at Vienna. A kitchen is there provided for every one hundred and ninety-six men, on the same floor as their quarters. The squads are provided with a plain mess kettle of eleven inches diameter on top, seven inches at the bottom, and nine and a half inches deep. These are placed on a metal tablet, heated by a furnace from beneath, the fireplace being at each end, and chimney in the center on the side. This hot table is fourteen feet six inches long by three feet wide, and two feet ten inches high above the floor. Although this method of cooking on a hot table, placing the food in plain camp kettles, appeared of recent introduction, for which the kitchens in the new barracks at the arsenal, in Vienna, were expressly built, yet I judged it was looked upon as unsatisfactorj', and that a third arrangement was then being introduced in the infantry barracks in the same city, Avhere the necessary alterations had been made to test its merits. Thie third system consisted of two camp kettles, placed back to back— thus forming the frustrum of a cone — set down in a furnace or stew-hole. Every two camp kettles have one circular opening in the top of the masonry furnace, into which they are placed and lifted out, at pleasure, by a bail handle ; each of the kettles is furnished with a cover, which answers for a dish or stew pan. /syg" A. Form of top. To increase the heating surface about the camp kettles, a space of one inch is left between them when over the fire in the furnace or stew-hole, and a demi-cone is cut from the bottom of each, open on the flat sides, which, Avlien togetlicr, make a cone of four inches circular base and ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 97 six inches high. The form of the top of these kettles is with one straight side, and the other outline curved, as in the preceding figure, (A,) in which the hase of the demi-cone is dotted. These kettles are made of cast-iron, as is also tl e cover. One of these is allowed to every thirteen infantry soldiers. For the cavalry a smaller one of the same pattern is allowed to every six men. • Its dimensions are 9" x 7" on top, 9" deep, and 8" wide on the bottom. The cover is 4" high, by 9" x 1". The system for sujiplying provisions to the Austrian troops makes the squad arrangement necessary, and has doubtless had its influence in the size and form of the cooking apparatus. The government furnishes the bread to every soldier at the rate of one and a half pound per day each, and a daily allowance of money to purchase meat and vegetables, or other articles, as the soldier may choose. Five crutzers per day for infantry, six for grenadiers, and seven to eight for special corps is put into the hands of the company commander from the military chest. A sergeant distributes it to the corporals of the mess squads; the latter, in company with two privates of the mess squad, expends the money in conformity with the wishes of their com- panions. For every brigade there is a commissary, who examines the accounts, countersigns them, and gives the order for tlie money on tlie military chest. This certified account goes into the military chest as evidence of tlie withdrawal of such an amount of money and its application. The keys of the military chest are kei)t generally by three persons, all of whom must be present when the chest is opened, who must know for what the money is taken out; nor can the chest be opened without the three keys in jiossession of the respective keepers. Although their system is not applicable to our service, yet some of its details are worthy our consideration, particularly where men mess in squads and fuel is very scarce. Transports for Troops and Supplies. France and England have constructed troop ships destined for reenforcing or relieving, from time to time, their armies in the colonies, or to dispatcli a force suddenly on any belligerent expedition. Some of these vessels are fir*t-class screw steamers. Their advantages, however^ do not compensate for the great expense attendant upon keeping a large number unoccupied in time of peace to make them their only reliance in time of war. They are looked upon as a necessary appendage to the military and naval armaments of the European powers, and not to be lost sight of by our government when looking to the hostile elements that may be brought against us. France and England have a number that can at any moment be used to transport armies, probably, of twenty thousand men. Their respective colonies give employment to them in time of peace. When, however, such armies have to be transported as took the field against Russia, then reliance had to be placed in the mercantile marine of all nations. The system of France and England is arranged accordingly. The most methodical and systematic about which I succeeded in gaining information was that of England. As we have now so frequently to transport troops by sea, both on the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the Gulf of Mexico, the details of chartering and fitting out their trans- ports may, in part, be worthy our attention. The English Admiralty have prepared sets of "Rules and Regulations to be observed in Tendering, Surveying, &c.. Ships to be employed as Transports;" "Instructions for Agents of Transports Afloat;" " Instructions for Masters on board Hired Transports/' &c.; and "Instruc- tions for Troops." These four codes, published in 1854 and 1855, regulate the whole transport service, whether of troops or munitions of war generally, and were enforced in transporting the army and supplies to the Crimea. In the first code eight articles are appropriated to tenders or ofiers to charter. 13 D 98 AET OF WAR IN EUROPE. They provide : 1. No ship to be tendered unless in port. The classification at Lloyd's and tonnage by stipulated measurement and the national flag to he stated, and according to prescribed forms. 2. Ships tendered of a class known at Lloyd's below ^ (red) for troops or ^ (black) for stores will not be accepted. 3. First-class shi])s tendered for stores of less quantity than half their tonnage, not required to be surveyed ; but all ships tendered for troops, passengers, or ammunition, must be surveyed. The owners are held accountable for the quantity of stores, &c., engaged to be received on board, and liable for expenses incurred on anything excluded. 4. Troop ships must not be less than five feet eight inches from deck to beam, tlie deck not less than two inches thick, properly laid on the beams, fitted with head jjump and lightning conductors, provided with charts of the voyage and one or more chronometers, to be inspected by an officer who musters the crew. 5. Store sliips must, when required^ receive four passengers to every one hundred tons of goods shijiped. 6. The entire jirescribed form of tender must be filled up and signed. The decision will be guided by the character, capacity, aud eligibility of the ship for the performance of the service, without reference to rate. v. Payments made according to new measurement tonnage, or as specially mentioned and agreed upon. 8. No troop shijj to be subject to port charges in the colonies. Ships carrying powder or other ammunition must stow it under two decks, aud fitted with lightning conductors previous to being surveyed. Five other articles relate to manning the ships, requiring : 1. That troop and freight ships have four men to every one hundred tons new measurement and in proportion for fractions of a hundred, with two boys to every ship. 2. Not ajiplicable to our country. 3. The crews, exclusive of the hoys, to be not less than one half of able seamen, the remainder officers and ordinary seamen who must have been to sea. 4. TroojJ and freight ships must be manned with British subjects. 5. Ships for stores only to be manned as in the merchant service. Ten articles regulate the survey of the ship : 1. Unimportant. 2. Ships which have touched the ground or performed a voyage since last survey must be examined in dry-dock or on the ways. The surveyors to decide whether ships under twelve months old, not having been to sea, aud those under class A 1 tendered for less than half tonnage of stores, are to be docked or laid on ways. 3. The holds and between decks to be clear fore and aft, the keelson, timbers, breast hooks^ and transoms clear and exposed to view, and stage erected to examine the beams fore and aft. 4. Listings not to be cut in ships of class A 1 ; below that, when required by the surveying officer, will be cut two to three inches wide between the breast hooks ; about twenty feet in length between keelson and second futtock heads; about one third the length of the ship from forward and same length from aft at the second futtock heads; about one third the length of the ship amidships, under the clamp of the hold beams ; about twenty feet from each end above the spirkitting, between decks, and other jjlaces as directed by surveying officers. 6. Not important. T. The owners to cause such bolts to be driven out and other works performed as required by surveyors, and furnish the latter with all desired information. 8. Accepted ships proceed to government dock-yards, where all the fittings are made; bulk- heads put up and other works performed, as usually required by the surveyors ; no alteration is to be permitted without the sanction of the surveying oflicer. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 99 9. All troop ships to Ccarry four boats of suitable size, one a long boat and one a life-boat, the whole supplied with all requisites ; also two life-buoys, placed ready for immediate use. 10. Unimportant. The nest twelve articles are instructions to surveying officers ; they require : 1. All regulations to be strictly adhered to, if omitted for special reasons, the same must be stated in the report of survey. Surveying officers report any neglect or deviation from regula- tions by owners, masters, brokers, or others concerned. 2. They will see that the "listings" are cut as directed, and, with stahhe7-s, examine the keelson, breast hooks, transoms, floors, timbers, ceiling, and mast steps. 3. Carefully inspect the beams, decks, knees, waterways, and comings of the hatchways. 4. Examine the spars, rigging, and sails as far as practicable, and ascertain whether the ship is properly supplied with spare rope, sails, &c. 5. Examine the riding bitts and see that the anchors and cables are proportioned to size of ship ; troop ships to have three bower anchors with three hundred fathoms of chain cable, also a kedge anchor and chain. 6. Examine the copper on ship's bottom, ascertaining whether, by rubs or wrinkles, she has been aground or strained; in which case the caulking under the copper, in several places, is to be tried. 7. The throats of the knees (and the throat bolts driven out if necessary) and the beams on the shelve pieces carefully inspected to ascertain whether the ship worked or strained on last voyage. 8. Pumps, pintles, and rudder gear to be examined. 9. Compasses to be examined, and the master's attention called to deviations from proximity to iron, &c. 10. Unimportant. 11. No works nor alterations allowed after the ship has been surveyed, without sanction of surveying officers, nor any allowed tliat will in any way inconvenience the government passengers, or be detrimental to the service on which she is to be employed. 12. Iron steam vessels must have water-tight compartments according to law. The next twenty-two articles regulate the accommodation of troops in chartered transports and freight ships. The amount of tonnage required is about 270 tons, new measurement, to each 100 men, and sufficient space must be allotted for all the troops below deck ; but the amount of accommodation will depend on the number of hammocks which can be hung up. Article 1 requires that the military officers' mess-place be under the poop. 2. The commander of the troops shall have the aftermost cabin under the poop, on the port side. 3. Corresponding cabin on starboard side for officers' wives and their families. 4. The government agent has the foremost cabin under the poop, on starboard side. 5. The master to have corresponding one on port side. 6. One cabin under the poop to be fitted up as pantry for military officers' mess. ■ 7. The remainder of space under the poop fitted for military officers' cabins. 8. Each cabin to have sleeping berths and wash hand stands. 9. Officers' cabins to be not less than thirty superficial feet for one, nor less than forty-two superficial feet for two officers. When more than two in a cabin, ten additional feet for each, independent of space for bed, which shall never be less than six feet long. 10. Mess-place of agent and master in the aftermost part of the lower deck, on starboard side. 11. Two cabins on lower deck for officers of the ship, adjoining the mess-place of master and agent. 12. Two aftermost berths on port side to be appropriated for a hospital. 100 ART OF WATS. IN EUROPE. 13. The aftermost starboard .sleeping berths to have canras screens separating them from the men, to be appropriated for soldiers' wives and children. 14. The water closets to be as follows: One for commanding officer, under the poop, on port side; one for officers' ladies and children, on starboard side; two for officers, imder forepart of poop, on port side; two for soldiers' wives, non-commissioned officers, &c., under the after part of forecastle. Kone to be allowed on the lower deck. 15. All standing bed places to be kept three inches from the ship's side, to prevent the bedding getting wet; and tho.se for women not less than six feet long and three feet wide for one woman and two children under ten years of age, or two women. IG. All troops to have sufficient si^ace below deck to sleep in hammocks, and have two blankets. 17. After providing for the officers, their families, the women and children, and the sick, the allotment of space for the troops shall be for each hammock fourteen inches in width and nine feet in length, with the clews to lock in three feet at each end, as in the annexed sketch. PLAN FOR BERTHING H.\M.MOCKS. 18. The ships to be fitted with as many air tubes from the deck and scuttles from through the sides as may be necessary to insure proper ventilation. 19. Arm racks shall be fitted between decks, before the fore hatchway. 20. The cabins numbered and appropriated as before specified, no alterations to be per- mitted, and no other use of them, unless by mutual consent of the officers embarked. 21. Arm racks to be fitted only when specially ordered. 22. When the knapsacks cannot be conveniently arranged between the beams, convenient racks must be provided elsewhere. 23. Kegulates the weight and space in cubic feet to be allowed for baggage of officers and regiments. Field officers, according to arm of service, having 18 to 27 cwt., and 90 to 135 cubic feet of space; captains, 12 to 18 cwt., and 60 to 90 cubic feet; subalterns, 6 to 12 cwt., and 30 to 60 cubic feet ; a troop of cavalry, if above fifty rank and file, 12 cwt., and 60 cubic feet ; a company of infantry, if above fifty rank and file, 18 cwt., and 90 cubic feet ; an officer's wife, including children under fourteen years of age, 6 cwt., and 30 cubic feet ; children above fourteen years of age, i cwt., and 2i cubic feet; each soldier's wife, including children, 1 cwt., and 5 cubic feet. Provision is made for bands, non-commissioned staff, farriers, &c., but the preceding suffices my present purpose of making known the system. The officers, for themselves and families, may provide their own victualing, but the troops, their women and children, are victualed by the master of the transport. The allowance to every soldier, male passenger, woman, or child, is stipulated, according to a scale for daily, weekly, and alternate days of issue, of eighteen diff'erent articles constituting the sea rations. The iveUjhts and measures for ascertaining tlie quantities are provided by the government, and paid for by the ship's owners. All children above ten years of age to be victualed as adults. Water casks and water provided by ship owners to contain a supply for six pints per day, out of the tropics, and one gallon per day, to each individual, when within the tropics, which quantities are to suffice for all purposes. ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 101 At the end of a voyage the government agent, or if none on board, then the commander of the troops, is re(|uired to make a report setting forth in detail the manner in which the regula- tions in detail have been carried into effect. Should there be any cause of complaint, relative to provisions or other stores, the commander of the troops orders a survey by officers, at which the master and mate are requested to be present. Tue report of this board may be handed to the commander of any ship of war or naval agent for such investigation as may be considered neces- sary. The time for which sliips shall bo victualed is stipulated lor various ports, proportioned to the average of very long voyages. The charter-party provides all the preceding conditions applicable to ship and owners, and in addition, that there shall be three windsails, two water hoses, scrapers, brooms, swabs, &c., for keeping ship clean ; coals, wood ; improved fire hearths, with funnels and coppers under cover to contain one quart for each person embarked ; a pint tin pot and spoon for each, and a platter for every six persons ; hen coops, candles, hammock stanchions for bedding round the waist, with painted hammock cloths ; scuttles to be cut in the 'tween decks ; the upper deck to be cut for air tubes and water closets ; sufficient ballast, screened and washed. Ships' stores are also specified, under the heads of boatswains' and carpenters' stores. Such were the means adopted to secure safe and commodious ships, and the necessary sup- plies while on board, for the troops. I now proceed to give the outline of the regulations governing the agent, or, in other words, supercargo put on board transports. These were revised and published for the English trans- port service, in March, 1854. The first regulation prohibits this agent taking his ''wife or family, or any part" of his family, to sea with him, or the wife or any relation 'of the master, or any other person not forming part of the crew. He is required to keep a journal or log-book, giving a circumstantial account of all his proceedings. Although not to interfere directly in navigating the vessel, yet, on approaching land, he must keep the hand lead constantly going, and may, on his discretion, employ a pilot, whether the master desires to do so or not. When arriving in port, he is to examine the supplies and cause the master to make good any deficiency required by the charter- party, at the same time mustering the crew and causing the complement to be perfected, if necessary. When in a foreign port, and cannot ship sailors, he may apply to a national ship of war and receive the necessary assistance. He sees that the windsails are properly attended to, that airing stoves be used between decks when necessary, that all filth and dirt be removed, and whitewashing be done whenever the transport is cleaning or refitting. At all times he is to attend to cleanliness, allowing no dogs to go on shipboard, and no poultry or pigs at any time to be kept below. In cases of sickness, he is to make frequent use of chloride of lime and airing stoves in the hold, and whitewash with lime and white copperas, in the ratio of one pound of the latter to the bushel of quicklime, using it hot. He locks and retains the keys of all unoccupied cabins, mess-rooms, &c. When embarking and disembarking troops, he orders that the boats' crews never absent themselves while waiting for troops, and sees that seamen are placed in the chains with rope in hand to throw to vessels, steam-tugs, &c., coming alongside. No woman other than the lawful wife of the soldier is to embark with the troops, and of those embarked only in the authorized numbers. The regimental allowance of baggage is stowed away under his direction, and not to incumber the decks or berths. In addition to the allowance of baggage, troops are to have, for use during the voyage, room for potatoes, at the rate of three quarters of a pound per man per diem, the time being estimated. He sees that the troops, women, and children, when embarked, are victualed agreeably to the prescribed scale, and that forage is provided for horses, at the rate of ten pounds of hay, six 102 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. pounds of oats, half a peck of bran, and six gallons of water, whicli is never to be exceeded. The master is to issue daily a small quantity of vinegar for wetting the horses' mouths and nostrils. The government furnishes the forage, wliich is delivered to the master of the vessel, who is held responsible ; any deficiency is charged to the ship owner. In case of sickness, the agent may require the master to furnish flour, rice, and oatmeal, commuting for the salt meat ration. The master is required to lay in hospital stores in such quantities as the surgeon and himself shall determine. The stipulated ration is to be printed and hung up between decks for general information. All stoppages of the spirit ration by officers of the troops, for punishment, revert to the master. Temperance men are allowed double rations of sugar, chocolate, and tea, as a substitute for each spirit ration stopped from them. The sanie commutation is made for women and children, who are never to be allowed spirits. The agent must see that no ship goes to sea without the proper supplies of provisions, stores, and medical comforts, and that they be timely demanded and put on board. He sees that the master keeps correct accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the provisions. No passenger is allowed to embark without written authority from the commander-in-chief. He, on application to the officer commanding, has a non-commissioned officer detailed to take charge of the materials of the cabins and berths, preventing their being destroyed or injured. The orderly officer of the day sees that the hammocks are hung up before setting the watch, and regularly lashed up every morning, carried on deck and stowed away, exposed to air ; the agent to afford every assistance. The bedding and hammocks remain on board when the troops disem- bark, when the agent has them cleansed and stored in some dry place on board for future use, separating new from old, none of the new to be used until all the old is issued. When used by the sick, or unfit for use from other causes, the agent applies to the commander-in-chief for a survey. Condemned parts may be thrown overboard, to be replaced as soon as possible. The agent calls attention of the commander of the troops to any neglect or inattention to cleanliness ; and when troops are disembarked he causes the bottom boards of berths to be lifted and washed, cleansing and whitewashing all other parts, the boards being piled on deck, separated for airing. On arrival in port the agent reports to the admiral or chief of the navy-yard, showing his orders and acting as directed. In the absence of navy-yard authorities he reports to and receives orders from the senior naval officer present in the port, and in the absence of any of these he communicates with the civil authorities of the navy, complying with their requisitions if not inconsistent with his orders. No military officer, however, is to interfere with the agent, and any orders giving by the civil functionaries are at once to be reported. Any circumstances retarding the voyage he communicates to the proper authorities, request- ing the necessary assistance. Private goods cannot be received on board without written orders of a superior, he being allowed, as well as the master, to take packages in his own cabin. He allows no specie belonging to individuals to come on board without orders from the admiralty or commander on any foreign station, the freight to be accounted for to the govern- ment. The stores for the agent's use are supplied annually. The agent will be appointed with a number to correspond with and be painted on both sides of the sliip at the expense of the owners. If the ship is damaged the agent uses his best endeavors to forward her repairs, and if incapable of continuing the voyage he orders her home, unless the master accepts her discharge abroad, at a sum not exceeding one month's hire. The agent is to guard against accidents from fire, allowing no spirituous liquor to be drawn off anywhere except on the upper or main deck, and by daylight only ; and when candles are required below, a careful officer is to attend with good lanterns and not allow the lights to be taken from them. Smoking in any of the cabins or between decks, or even lighting cigars or pipes, causes a mulct on the ship's freight. Fires must be extinguished as well as lights at a fixed period. The agent is not to receive any fee. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 103 gratuity, perquisite, or reward, either for brokerage, commission, execution, or non-execution of any of his duties, nor is he allowed to live at the expense of the owners or master, or have any interest or property in any transport, or any share in any ship or vessel employed as a transport, or any interest respecting the hire, pay, or profit of a transport ; nor is he to recommend any tradesman or pilot for employment unless applied to by the master in writing. Finally he is to use all possible care and good husbandly in every respect, and be guided by the master's instructions, so far as they relate to his duties as agent afloat, although not incorporated in these instructions. The allowance to every soldier for whom passage and victualing shall have been ordered to be provided, is regulated for every day in the week, and in course of twenty-eight days it amounts to 28 pounds of biscuit, 14 gills of spirits, 18|- ounces of preserved potatoes, 5^ pounds of salt beef, 34 pounds of flour, 4|- pints of peas, 10^ pounds of salt pork, 7 ounces of tea, 35 ounces of sugar, 3^ pounds of preserved meat, |- of an ounce of pepper, 18| ounces of chocolate, f of a pint of oatmeal, |^ of a pint of vinegar, IJ ounce of mustard. If necessary to issue substitutes for the above, 1 pound of biscuit, 1^ pound of soft bread, 1 pound of flour, 1 pound of rice, 1 pound of sago, and 1 pound of barley are to be considered equal to each other; | pint of wine, 1 quart of strong beer, and ^ a gill of spirits are to be con- sidered equal to each other ; 1 pound of rice, 1 pint of peas, 1 quart of oatmeal, ^ pint of split jjeas, are to be considered equal to each other ; and 1 ounce of cocoa, 1 ounce of coffee, and ^ ounce of tea, are to be considered equal to each other. Six pints of water per day is issued when out of the tropics, and one gallon per day to each individual when within the tropics, to sufiice for all purposes. The medical comforts for 100 men, on the voyage from England to the Mediterranean, con- sists of 30 pounds of sugar, 4 pounds of tea, 18 pounds of barley, 6 pounds of sago, 4 pounds of arrow root, 12 bottles of wine, 29 pounds of preserved meats, 8 pounds of preserved potatoes or rice, 60^- pints of essence of beef, T pounds of soap, 15 pounds of chloride of zinc for every 100 tons the vessel measures^ 44 to 65 pounds of lemon juice, and 44 to 65 pounds of sugar. Whenever troops are embarked, the commanding officer at the port from which the em- barkation takes place directs a medical officer to repair on board each vessel and make a minute inspection previously to the embarkation of the troops. He reports the state and condition of each ship, stating the name, number, and tonnage of the vessel ; the number of officers and men to be embarked ; the height between decks ; the supplies and state of the ship's water, provisions, medical comforts, and bedding ; the means of fumigation and ventilation ; and the state of the well and of the orlop deck, or between decks. If the bilge water be offensive, fresh water must be let in^ and care taken that the cables be properly stowed away, that no wet ones be left on the orlop or 'twixt decks. The commander of the port also orders a staff officer to make such insijcction of transports as may satisfy him that they are in every respect fitted for the accommodation of the troops and provided with proper stores for their use. Embarkations take place under the immediate direction of the commander of the port, and the troops remain under his orders after they are on board until they clear the j^ort and go to sea. In case of detention, he orders the transports to be visited and the men inspected by a staff officer ; calling for such reports from the commanders on board as will afford satisfactory informa- tion as to the state of the detachments under their orders. On arrival at the port of disembarkation, the com'manding officer at the port orders the transport to be immediately visited, the men insxiected by a stafi' and medical officer, ascertainino- what casualties have occurred, whether the ship has been jjroperly found, and the men supplied with accommodations and provisions according to regulation. On landing, the commander at the port takes care that the troops are forwarded to their destinations by the most convenient means. 104 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. The embarkation and disembarkation of brigades and divisions takes place under the super- intendence of the general officers who are attached to them, who ascertain, by visiting each transport, that all due preparation is made for the comfort of the troops, that the strictest discipline is established on board, and that the regulations are strictly observed. Prior to the embarkation, the commanding officer is to furnish the captain or master of the vessel with a list of the names of the officers and men of the detachment, and a separate list of the women and children to be embarked, in order that each person may be entered on the ship's books and no delay take place in the issue of their jjrovisions. Embarkation and disembarkation returns are made by commanding officers, showing the strength and condition of their commands, the details of which are of no special interest to us. Duties on hoard of sMp. No situation requires more urgent personal superintendence and care, or in which stricter conformity to regulations is more indispensably necessary, than that of troops on shipboard by their officers. No officer, under any pretense, is to quit his ship without the sanction of the officer commanding on board ; nor sleep out of the ship without such authority. The command on board is vested in the senior officer, to whatever branch of service he may belong, who is bound to exercise it, being responsible for any breach of discipline, whether the officers and men are of his regiment or not, or are detachments of different corps. Soldiers on board ship should be provided with and wear a coarse canvas frock. As soon as the troops are on board, and before being dismissed, the commanding officer is to see that the arms and accouterments are deposited in the racks prepared for them ; that the accouterments are placed over the men's berths. The men must be allotted to berths regularly, b}' companies, their pac'cs Icing liung up near their berths. While this arrangement is making the men are divided into messes, after which they are shown to their berths. When necessary that the troops keep their ammunition in their pouches, great caution must be observed. The quantity in the pouches should be limited by circumstances. The reserve ammunition is to be in charge of the commanding officer, and the pouches carefully secured, each man's near his own berth. With a view to health and comfort, the non-commissioned officers and men are to be divided into three watches, one of whi;h is to be constantly on deck, with at least one subaltern officer in charge of the watch. An officer of the day is detailed on board each transport. He sees that all orders are obeyed and every regulation relating to troops on board transports strictly carried into eifect. He is al.so the offic3r of the guard. A guard, in proportion to the number of soldiers, or by the sentries required, must mount every morning at nine o'clock, being exercised with arms when the weather permits, in port or at sea. In harbor the sentries upon deck mount with their arms, at sea with their bayonets only. The men of each watch are appointed to stations best calculated to assist the sailors in working the vessel. The non-commissioned officers and men not belonging to the watch are to be ordered below when required by the master of the transport, that they may not impede the working of the ship. The officer commanding the troops must make, with the master, arrangements for quarter- ing the troops in case of fire or an enemy, that every man may, in an instant, be at his station; care being taken that too many men are not on deck, those not wanted being formed as a reserve between decks. The troops must parade at , a. m., without shoes and stockings in warm climates, every man appearing as clean as his station will allow, with hands, face, and feet washed, and hair combed. They parade again at half an hour before sunset. The cooks are to appear clean on ART FO WAR IN ETJROPE. 105 parade once a day. The recruits must be drilled daily, weather permitting, one hour in the forenoon and one hour in the afternoon. In warm climates the frequent washing of every part of the body is strongly enjoined. To this end, two large tubs are to be fixed upon the forecastle ; when these cannot be obtained buckets of water poured over the body will prove an efficient substitute. The men are to wash, comb, and brush their heads every morning, to shave and put on clean shirts twice a week at least, and must be furnished with the means of changing wet clothing. Great attention must be paid to the water closets, buckets of water must be thrown down repeatedly during the day to prevent the soil from sticking to the sides of the ship. The bedding is brought on deck every morning, weather permitting, by o'clock, well aired, in conformity to agent's regulations. This regulation applies equally to married people, who are, by a partition, confined to a particular part of the ship. During the day this partition must be taken down for free ventilation. The bedding being brought up, the men sweep, scrub, and scrape the berths and decks. The upper decks are washed every morning by the morning watch previous to the bedding being brought up, but no washing hetiveen decks is to take place oftener than once a week, and then only in dry weather. The boards of the lower berths are to be removed once or twice a week to clean under them. The officer of the day is always to be present at the cleaning of the berths ; when done, he reports to the captain of the day, if any, or to the commanding officer. At dinner time the officer of the day attends to see that the men are regular at their messes. Any neglect in victualing the troops he is to observe, report to the commanding officer, and, if necessary, to the agent of transports. Wheu rum or other spirit is issued it must be mixed with at least three parts of water to one of spirit. Issues before breakfast of a part of the spirit ration is strictly prohibited. The officer of the day attends to the mixing and issuing of the spirit ration. The coppers must be carefully cleaned, both before and after use. Every precaution must be taken to prevent the men bringing liquor on board. At sunset the bedding is taken down, and any time during the day on the appearance of bad weather. At o'clock in the evening every man is to be in his berth, the officer of the day seeing to this in person. To guard against fire, a sentry is constantly posted at the caboose, or one on each side if necessary, with orders not to allow fire to be taken without permission. All lights must be extinguished at eight o'clock at night except those guarded by sentries. A report of this order being enforced is to be made at the time to the commanding officer by the officer of the day. The officers' lights must be extinguished at ten o'clock, unless otherwise authorized by the commanding officer, which he grants only in case of sickness or other emergency. No smoking is to be allowed between decks, nor any lights among the men, except in lanterns. The orderly officers and non-commissioned officer of the day are held responsible for the enforcement of these provisions. For the sake of exercise, the troops should be required to repair to quarters by the beat to arms. Those quartered to guns (if any are on board) should be frequently instructed and practiced in that exercise. Arms and accouterments must be inspected frequently. The locks and barrels must be greased to prevent rust, to which they are particularly liable at sea. The troops must be inspected in marching order once in each week, to see that their neces- saries are properly packed and packs well put on, and that the whole of their appointments are kept in serviceable order. 14 D 106 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Frequent fumigation of the ship is deemed highly material. For this purpose, mix four ounces of common salt, one ounce in powder of oxyd of manganese, one ounce (fluid) sulphuric acid, with two fluid ounces of water. The water and acid must be mixed together and poured over the other ingredients in an earthen basin placed in a vessel of hot sand. The use of windsails must be carefully attended to, especially to prevent an inexperienced or other soldier fixstcning or closing up the bottom of them — a practice not unusual on board transports. The sergeant of the watch is to be held responsible for this duty. The men are not to be permitted to sleep on deck in warm weather. The doing so is found to be productive of fevers and fluxes. Exercise being indispensably necessary to preserve health, the men should be induced to dance and wrestle ; at other times causing squads to move round the deck in double quick time, for ten or twelve minutes, taking all in succession ; practicing this for an hour in the morning and in the afternoon, when the weather permits. In port, the men should be permitted to bathe, provided there be no danger from sharks, and a boat be at hand to relieve any one in danger from any cause. Ten only to be in the water at a time, and then on the same side of the ship as the relief boat. The surgeon must examine the men at morning parade, to see whether there be any appear- ance of disease in any of them. The sick must be separated from the healthy as much as pos- sible. Upon the first appearance of any acute infectious disorder, the signal is to be made to the hospital ship, and the diseased men removed to her. The medical men must guard the troops, when they get in hot climates, against costiveness, allowing them to purchase, when arriving in port, such fruit and vegetables as the medical ofiicer on board may deem proper"?" It is the duty of the commanding ofiicer to repress by the most decided and summary measures any tendency to insubordination, to check every species of immorality and vice, and discountenance to the utmost in his power, in any individual under his command, whatever may disturb the comfort of others, or interrupt the harmony and good understanding which should subsist on board. The masters of the transports have instructions from the Admiralty to afford every assist- ance to the military officers in maintaining due discipline among the troops, to prevent drunk- enness, and to suggest to the commanding officer all measures necessary for the due observance of cleanliness and ventilation of the vessel. They are also instructed to prevent the officers of the ship from entering into any dispute or altercation with the troops, and to impress upon the minds of the officers that the troops are not on any account to be struck or punished by them, nor even to be addressed in harsh language by them. The entire charge of the discipline of the soldiers is to rest upon their own officers ; and should any complaint arise, it must be stated to the officer of the detachment, who must take such steps as the circumstances requii'e. These regulations conclude with an earnest recommendation to the commanding officer on board each transport to cause Divine service to be performed on every Sunday the weather will permit. In case no clergyman be on board, the commanding officer, or some intelligent and respectable officer, is to perform this duty. Independent of the religious view of the subject, which demands the discharge of so important and sacred a duty, the regular performance of Divine service has ever been found to produce and i^romote cleanliness and good order among the soldiery. When troops are embarked on board ships of tvar the officers and soldiers from the time of embarkation are (by law) to conform themselves strictly to the regulations established for the government and discipline of the ship in which they are embarked, and to consider themselves as under the command of the senior officer of the ship, as well as of the superior officer of the fleet {if any) to lohich such ship belongs. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE, 107 Embarkation of Horses in Transports. Regulations and instructions for cavalry officers. The horses of the cavalry require peculiar attention at the time of embarkation, and while they are on board ship every officer of the cavalry is expected to feel that he has a most important duty to perform on these occasions, on which depend, in fact, the means of his being usefully employed in the field, when he reaches his destination. The following regulations are required to be strictly observed : The horses must not be heated at the time of embarkation. With this view, avoid, if possible, a long march on the day of embarkation. In cases where this cannot be attained, at least two hours should intervene between the arrival of the horses at the place of embarkation and their being put on board. If they cannot be placed in stables, they should be so disposed as to be thoroughly dressed and cleaned. The first night on board they should have a mash with some nitre, and during the passage bran should make a large part of their daily ration. Care must be taken that they are not heated by being overfed. The dragoon should wash the fetlocks and hool's at each stable hour, and be attentive to wash the horse's face, eyes, and nostrils with a sponge. If the horse appears heated, and refuses his food, an early bleeding (?) will in general restore him. The object of all others requiring the greatest attention is that the hold be well ventilated by windsails, shifting the ends to different parts of the hold. In cases where the hold has been kept more than usually close, great advantage will be found in washing the manger with vinegar and water, and occasionally the nostrils of the horses with the same. One stall on each side of transports must remain vacant, and some spare slings should be provided, in case of illness or accident.* After disembarkation, a cooling regimen, with gentle exercise, are the best means of restoring the horses to their wonted vigor and fitness for service. Soldiers' Wives. For garrison duty, on foreign service, the lawful wives of six men in a hundred are per- mitted to embark. When embarked for India or New South Wales, twelve to one hundred are permitted to embark. But when embarked for active field service the wife of no soldier of the regiment is permitted to embark. No greater proportion of sergeants' wives is to be selected for embarkation than the sergeants' wives bear to the wives of the corporals, drummers, and privates of the battalion. Some additional notice of this code of instructions for the captain or master of the transport is necessary to explain more satisfactorily the duties and responsibilities of other functionaries on board ; otherwise it would not jiossess interest for us. The master is required to receive and obey all orders of the agent whose pennant may be hoisted on board his ship, and in his absence, of such other officer as he may be^J^ncef? under. All comj)laints of neglect of the master in victualing the troops must be attended to by the agent, who will prevent every mismanagement. If any misunderstanding arises between the master and crew, or any of the officers or troops, the master will refer the same to the agent. *Spare stalls at the end of each line of stalls enable the officers, at pleasure, to have every horse groomed, by shifting them in succession ; to which end, the stalls must be arranged with shifting padded side boards, as described in tho Himalaya transport. / 108 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. He is to give the agent every information in his jjower, with regard to the quantities of the different stores and provisions shipped for the troops, &c., observing that no part thereof is to he applied to his own use or the ship's crew, or to any other purpose than that for which they were shipped. He is frequently to examine the condition of the supplies, and report the same to the agent, who verifies his accounts of receipts and expenditures from time to time. On first fitting out the ship, provisions and other stores will be supplied by the captain superintendent at Deptford, for the service upon which the ship is destined, to the master, who charges himself with every description of stores put on board on accoimt of the public service ; and he is to see the ship does not proceed to sea with troops without the proportions of pro- visions, stores, and medical comforts for the number of troops ordered to embark. He is at all times to take care that the ship be complete in men and stores, in conformity with the charter-party. He signs receipts for the supjjlies received at Deptford or elsewhere. He is not to allow rum or other spirits to be drawn off at any time, in any place, except on the upper or main deck, and by daylight; requiring a steady officer to attend, with good lan- terns, whenever a light is needed below decks, not allowing the light to be taken out of the lantern. All provisions are to be served out by him by full imperial measures and weights, duly stamped. When troops are embarked he causes the windsails to be set and kept properly trimmed, and airing stoves used whenever necessary. He is to cause the greatest attention to be paid to cleanliness, allowing neither pigs nor poultry to be kept below, and no dogs to be kept on board. In case there should have been sickness on board, he causes the vessel to be frequently fumigated, and chloride of lime to be used when necessary, as well as airing stoves, in the hold, frequently whitewashing with lime and white copperas, as before described. Previous to troops being disembarked their bedding is to be returned to the master, who has the hammocks scrubbed and dried, the beds and blankets shaken and aired, and the whole put in a dry storeroom, kept ready for further service, separating new from old, using none of the new until all the old is first issued. Bedding used by the sick, or otherwise defective, to be surveyed, and if condemned may be thrown overboard, replacing the deficiency as soon as practicable. He is to pay particular attention to the preservation of provisions, bedding, bed cabins, horse stalls, and stores of every other description on board the ship. He is to afford every facility for removing, airing, and slinging the hammocks, under the direction of the officers commanding the troops. No more women are to be provided with victuals than the stipulated number. In case it be necessary to purchase fresh provisions or refreshments at any port put into on the voyage, the master does so, on the written authority of the agent, drawing a bill at three days' sight therefor upon the accountant general of the navy, forwarding the agent's certificate of purchase and receijit, the ship being charged with such purchases until 2iroper vouchers are produced. If there be no agent on board, immediately on anchoring the master announces his arrival and proceedings, by letter, to the Secretary of the Admiralty. He reports also to the admiral or agent of the navy-yard, naval commander, or senior naval officer, as the case may be, in the port of arrival. Other details are given of the manner in which the master shall keep his accounts and returns for victualing the troops, all of which is done on scales of stipulated allowances. Such, in genei'al, were the rules and regulations by which the English army, as Avell as a part of the French army, were transported during this Crimean campaign. It is the same which for a long series of years the English government has practiced for tran.sporting their troops to their extended dominions throughout the world, perfected by their necessities and experience in this last and greatest eftbrt. I think there is no room to doubt it is the best ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 109 system now in practice by any nation, and one from which the officers of our army may derive many useful and valuable ideas when placed in command of troojjs on board transports, or char- tering ships for this purpose. Jacobi Mines at Sebastopol, Cronstadt, &c. Torpedo mines, if I may use this name given by Fulton to self-acting mines under water, were among the novelties attempted by the Eussians in their defenses about Cronstadt, as well as at Sebastopol. Around and about the Island of Cronstadt and the anchorages that the allied fleet would probably occupy, as well as the channels of approach, and anchorages abreast of the castles defending these channels, numerous submerged mines — or, as Fulton called them, torpedoes — were placed, to explode by the contact of any vessel running against them. Their peculiar arrangement was entirely new, and, as I believe, the conception and idea of Professor Jacobi, an eminent Kussian chemist and philosopher. At Sebastopol, when examining the Mast Bastion, while the French troops were excavating in the ditch, at the foot of the palisades under the salient angle, for these very mines, one of them exploded, killing and wounding several. Very many were placed throughout the defenses, all so arranged tliat by stepping upon them explosion was instantaneous. To guard against accidents to the troops expi.-ed to this hidden danger when moving off of frequented or beaten paths, the precaution of searching for them was adopted ; this search was in progress when the explosion took place in the ditch of the Mast Bastion. I had an opportunity of seeing one of these mines, in the English engineer depot, after its explosive apparatus and material had been removed. They consisted of a box of powder of eight inches cube, (a, Fig. 101,) contained within another box, leaving a ,, y space of two inches between them, filled with pitch, rendering /V^^''-': Ji:": the powder in the inner box secure from wet and moisture, when la -'i-/^" U-^- buried under ground. The toj^ of the exterior box was placed about eight inches below the surface, and upon it rested a piece of board of six inches wide, twelve inches long, and one inch thick, resting on four legs of thin sheet iron, (o,) apparently i "^ ^i /' ^>^ pieces of old hoops, about four inches long. The top of this piece of board was near the surface of the earth covered slightly, so as not to be perceived. On any slight pressure upon the j,. ,yj board, such as a man treading upon it, the tliin iron supports yielded, when the board came in contact with a glass tube («) containing sulphuric acid, breaking it, and liberating the acid, which diffused itself within tlie box, coming in contact with chloride of potassa, causing instant combustion, and, as a consequence, explosion of the powder. Tlie preceding figure represents the arrangement of the parts. The explosive mixture was learned from uncertain data. There can be no doubt of the certain means of exploding powder by Professor Jacobi's arrangement, but the materials above stated may be doubted ; we know, however, that a mixture of chlorate of potassa and sugar on to which sulphuric acid is poured, will, without fail, create instant combustion. Tliis combination recommends itself to our atten- tion, being certain in its effects, and quite as little liable to accidental iufluences as any other, and may have been tlie one adopted by Professor Jacobi, though not at once discovered or observed in the field for want of chemical means to analyze such as were taken from the primers. Another arrangement, found at Sebastopol, was by placing the acid within a glass tube of the succeeding dimensions and form. This glass was placed within a tin tube, as in the following figure, which rested upon the powder box, on its two supports, a, b, at the ends. The tin tube opens downwards into the powder box, with a branch (c) somewhat longer than tlie supports. 2;:; cL 8" PITCH 110 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Glass tube. 18| inches long. Interior diameter Exterior diameter. 3a Tin tube. 19J inches long. Exterior diameter. vC; r£ TV 7^ D Powder box. Fig. 102. (a, b.) This, as in the case of the preceding arrangement, was buried in the ground, leaving the tin tube so near the surface that a man's foot, or other di.sturbing cause, bending it, would break the glass within, liberating the acid, which, escajDing through the ojjening of the tin into the box, came in contact with the potassa, or whatever may have been the priming, and by its combustion instantly exploded the jjowder in the box. What I call a tin tube, I incline to believe, was some more ductile metal, that would bend without breaking. For this information I am indebted to the kindness of an English officer of artillery, who loaned me one in his pos- session, and from which the measurements were made. What the arrangement was for those iTsed under water, I did not learn. While at Cronstadt, they were known but to the few Russian officers whose duty it was to apply them, and from whom, of course, no inquiry could be made. The size I judge to have been about that of a barrel, and slightly conical. They are no longer secret, as the allied fleet raised many of them from the anchorages in the Baltic. Use of Telegraphs and Electrics generally in the Crimea. The electric telegrajih was another novelty in the art of war, first used during this memorable siege. It was used for communicating the wants of the armies to their respective governments, and was so far imquestionably useful. For conveying the orders of the govern- ments to their re.spective commanders (if I attach any weight to the 02)inion of officers at the seat of war) its advantage was somewhat questionable. By it, orders were sometimes given that more circumstantial information, only to be gained in sight of the enemy, would have shown to be highly inexpedient. It was an irrcsistable temptation to exercise that "great authority, high position, and sufficiently old experience to dominate over everything" that Canrobert pointed out as necessary to success ; but which was doubtless considered as existing on each side of the channel, and not without claims in Sardinia, and even in Constantinople, as well as in France. It was successfully used between the English trenches, headquarters, and depots. The extent of the field of operations over which the allied armies were daily and nightly occupied, caused the introduction also of the ordinary semophoric telegraph to communicate information to the headquarters of the generals. Located on prominent sites the movements of the Eussians were watched and regularly reijorted. Fig. 50 represents one of these telegraphs, erected by the French on the ruins of the Mai akoff Tower after its capture ; several others of the same kind were erected in advantageous localities. After the evacuation of the south shore defenses and city of Sebastopol by the Russians, the Allies blew up the dry-docks, the storehouses on the wharf, communicating with Fort Paul, (Fig. 50 d,) Fort Nicholas, (Figs. 50 b, c, and d,) Fort Alexander, and the barracks, with con- ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Ill tiguous hospital buildings, (Fig. 64,) as also the creimated wall west of the city. (See Plate Sand Fig. 50 d.) The labor and time attending these operations were very great. Tlie English government ordered that the dry-docks should be blown up, in October, 1855, about which time the mining process was commenced. It was only on the 1st of February, 1856, that the last mine was exploded to effect the object. To the English was assigned the destruction of about half the docks, namely: three docks on the south end and one half of the side walls of the basin. These three docks were each 236' long by 95' 4" wide on top. On the bottom they were 191' feet long and 40' wide. It required, to destroy the part undertaken by the English, eleven charges of powder of 160 pounds each and two charges of 300 pounds each. The shafts were made behind the revetment walls, and thirty feet deep ; others were made along the centers and in the bottom of the docks to a depth of twelve feet. The bottoms were blown up first and then the sides. The French charges for the bottom mines were six feet deep, and those of the English, in similar places, ten feet six inches deep. The mines in Fort Nicholas, blown up by the French on the 4th of February, 1856, required 106,000 pounds of powder. All these mines were exploded by the voltaic batteries, yet not without difficulty and dis- aster to the operators. The English officers considered the process they used not reliable for military purposes. What particular voltaic battery and. fuze were used by the English engineer officers on this occasion, I have not learned. The success attending this method by other nations, as well as themselves at other places^ is sufficient to induce us to persevere in perfecting its application to our torpedo system for the defense of harbors, as well as mines generally, and blasting rocks for either civil or military purposes, under water as well as under ground. So well assured are the Austrian engineers of the advantages of electrics to mining and blasting generally, that they have prej^ared jjor table batteries as a part of their mining train. At Neustadt, near Vienna, Lieut. Col. Scholl, of the engineers, was engaged in the construction of an admirably well designed pile of buildings for the school of engineers and artillery, the whole exterior of which is built of different colored marbles obtained in the mountains of that neighborhood. Most of the quarrying of this marble is done by igniting the powder by elec- tricity, generated by a seventeen inch diameter plate of glass, collected in a Leyden jar, six and three quarter inches diameter and twelve inches high. A wire from the jar conducts the fluid to the quarry, distant about a mile up the mountain, some hundred feet above the location of the electrical apparatus; there it is united or connected with the fuze rod, that is introduced into the charge of powder, at the desired moment. Hundreds of charges have been exploded under Colonel Scholl's direction, without fail or accident, by the simple and old method practiced by Dr. Franklin of generating or exciting into activity the electric fluid. AUSTRIAN FUSE FOE ELECTRICITY. oA. WIRE C0fmVCTOR\ENCASCO IN PITCH , HORIZONTAL; PROJECTION OF EXjTERtOR "V;~£"o'7jo7>c"o?~£rt/ ic'as'cd" SECTION AtA.B^^^^. £ V/me CONDUCTOR ENCASED 'A' PITCH VEKTICAL PR0JE0TI8N OF EVTEHIOU V\i. lo:i 112 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. The success attending Colonel Scholl's labors is due to the fuze of which he is the inventor, and to whom I am indebted for one of them, from which the preceding figure (103) is sketched in full size. It is terminated by a wooden cone that is thrust into the powder to be exploded, by means of a wooden rod of such length as the case requires. Tlie cone is hollow; within the cavity and at the end nearest the base is gun-cotton, to keep which in its place and to preserve it from moisture the opening into the base of the cone is closed with a cork stopper. This cork is split at the end from the cone, to receive the end of the wooden rod, formed as a wedge, and to which it is tied by two bands of twine ; a fine brass wire, a a a, conducts the electrical charge from the Leyden jar at the distance of a mile or more, as the electrical apparatus may be located. This wire is suspended on poles as ordinary telegrajdiic wires. Near the mine it is attached to the end (a') of the wooden rod, and thence passes in a small groove (c) sunk in one side of the rod, completely encased in rosin or pitch, passing out of this groove near the base of the cone, whence it passes through the cone, at n, to the interior, and in contact with the gun-cotton; after passing thi'ough the solid part of the cone, it then passes through rosin or pitch to prevent moisture, and communicates with the gun-cotton. Between the gun-cotton and the rosin or jiitch is interposed a piece of pasteboard, through which the wire, a a a, also passes. Another wire, 0, passes from the gun-cotton, pasteboard, pitch, and cone, along the opposite side of the stick, and is put in contact with the earth at the orifice or opening into the mine. The three views of this fuze given in the preceding figure, will, with this description, suffice to make it understood. It must be observed that the ends of the wires within the mass of gun-cotton come within a short distance of each other, and that the electric spark, as it passes from one to the other, sets fire to or explodes the gun-cotton, breaking the wooden cone, and thus igniting the powder in which it is placed. Very satisfactory results have been obtained by our own engineers in the use of electrics for blasting under water, and at our Military School at A¥est Point, the cadet is practiced in its use as applied to military mining. Its importance, however, to us as a most powerful auxiliary in harbor defenses, justifies my appending the latest improvements on this subject that came into my possession in Europe. The best description of the apparatus for applying electricity to the art of war in the field, that came to ray knowledge, is that of the Spanish engineer Colonel Gregorio Verdu. I am induced to give it in his own words, as convej'ing the most satisfactorj'- information in my possession on this new element, but recently introduced in the attack and defense of fortresses, &c. To Lieutenant Piatt, of the United States Artillery, I am indebted for the translation of Colonel Verdu' s system. New Method of Setting Fiee to Mines by Electricity. Old method. Fundamental principle. If, in a metallic conductor that can communicate by its extremities with the two poles of a pile, we make a break, and interpose in it a small iron or platina wire, the ignition of this interpolated metal will, at the very instant we close the electrical circuit, be sufficient to inflame powder. This effect of dynamic electricity, when produced by the jjile, is the one it principally con- cerns us to use in order to set fire to military mines, employing for that end hydro-electric piles of a single liquid, as those of WoUaston or Munck ; or piles with a constant current, as those of Daniel or Bunsen. For a metallic conductor, ribbons of red copper are made use of, and what is better, wires of the same metal, sometimes covered with an insulating substance, but generally uncovered and not insulated. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 113 Necessity of employing powerful piles. It cau be readily conceived that the physical effect which it is desired to obtain in this case with the pile, resulting without doubt from the difference in the conductibility of the copper, of the circuit, and of the interpolated metal, must be sufficiently energetic, since a temperature of at least 500° is necessary in order to heat to incandescence the iron or platina wire. So that if we should wish by this means to inflame powder at distances not exceeding 275 yards, we should require a battery of great power, not only from the number, but at the same time from the surface of the elements ; for to produce this eifect, intensity and tension are at the same time necessary in the electric current. English pi'ocess. Lately, towards the close of 1851, a new process was tried in England which differed from the preceding in this : that in Ihe place of employing as an interpolating substance an iron or platina wire, there was substituted a small tube of gutta percha, the interior surface of which was covered with sulphuret of copper. The electro-prime mover apparatus was composed of a certain number of small piles con- structed according to the principle of Wollaston. Each of these was formed of a gutta percha case having twelve compartments, in which were introduced the same nimiber of pairs, zinc and copper, about five and a half inches square. In place of a liquid excitant, in these piles, quartz sand moistened with water acidulated with sulphuric acid was substituted. In this process, as in the preceding, the direct current of the pile is made use of; but the greater tension which it produces and the nature of the interpolated substance ought to contribute in a great degree to bring about the desired effect, namely, the ignition of powder at greater distances. Still, whether from the alteration which the sulphuret of copper may undergo, or from want of energy in the battery itself, which does not give a constant current, or from other causes in this process which have not as yet been studied, we can afBrm, in the presence of reiterated experiments which we have made with care in our school of practice, that the results have not corresponded in any degree with the proposed object. Intrtcacy and insufficiency of the old methods. Such were, until the present time, the methods tried with the most success for applying electricity to the explosion of mines. Apart from their requiring the employment of powerful batteries and often the use of two conducting wires, difficulties in a practical and military point of view were met with almost constantly ; they gave uncertain results, especially over considerable distances, and, finally, they did not permit the obtaining of simultaneous explosions of three, four, or a greater number of charges. So that the general process, apart from the advantage which it presented over the ordinary means of setting fire to powder from a given distance, left much to be desired with respect to the multitude of applications of which it was susceptible in war, and the useful and important innovations which it was naturally destined to aid in introducing in the art of defensive mines. Netv pirocess. While applying for the first time to this process the use of that which we call in physics currents of induction, and while studying, on the other hand, from numerous experiments, the effects of these currents upon difi'ercut chemical compositions, both inflammable and explosive, 15 D 114 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. we have succeeded in finding a simple and practical, and, at the same time, sure and economical method for inflaming powder at distances, so to speak, unlimited. Its description. Distinct parts of wJiich it is composed. We will now describe the nature and disposition of these means, with the details indis- pensable to their being put in use. The apparatus,, or the principal parts that are made rise of in this process, are four in number, to wit : 1. An hydro-electric pile which is reduced, in this case, to a single element of Bunsen, A. (Fig. 12, Plate 13.) 2. A multijilier of the current of induction, represented by B. 3. A metallic conductor insulated by gutta percha, C C. 4. Mine-primers which by their inflammation produce that of the powder. Let us examine successively each of these difi"erent parts. I. Electro Prime Mover Apparatus or Pile. Bunsen' s element. It is reduced, as we have said, to a single element of Bunsen, of medium size, which we have represented by A; the separate pieces of which it is corajjosed are seen in Fig. 18, Plate 13; they consist of a porcelain cup, (a,) a cylinder of amalgamated zinc, (6,) a porus earthenware cup, (c,) and a prism of charcoal, (cZ.) The porcelain cup is filled with water acidulated with from an eighth to a tenth of sulphuric acid, and in the porus cup into which is introduced the prism of charcoal, is poured the ordinary nitric acid of commerce. The cylinder of zinc and the prism of charcoal have fitted to them metallic pieces, {E and d,) with screw clamjjs for establishing the necessary communications. II. Multiplier of the Curre>-t of Induction. Nature and arrangement of the apparatus of induction. This apparatus, constructed with the greatest care by Euhmkorf, is like the one which this skillful artist used recently for making experiments upon electrical light ; but it has been suitably modified to suit the object intended. The principles upon which it is based are connected with the interesting theory of the phenomena of induction discovered by Faraday in 1831. Figs. 14 and 15. Plate 13, represent the plan and vertical projection of the apparatus reduced to one third of its natural size. Figs. 16 and 17 are two views of the same apparatus, the one from the front and the other from the rear on the part corresjjonding to the battery. Around a cylindrical bar a h, (Figs. 14 and 15,) formed by soldering together at their extremities a number of pieces of iron wire of equal lengths, is rolled a copper wire (c) about .078 of an inch (?) in diameter, insulated by silk or guralac, and which may communicate by means of the metallic piece {d) with one of the poles of the pile; after having made three hundred turns upon this iron bar, this wire terminates, running through the small column (e) at a hammer of soft wrought iron, (/,) which rests upon another column of metal r/, (Fig. Ifi.) The upper surface of this last and the lower surface of the hammer (/) are coated with thin plates of platina, which facilitate the contact. Another copper wire {i i) starts directly from the screw clamp, (/:,) which may be made to communicate with the second pole of the battery, and terminates at the lower part of the same column, (2. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 145 Fig. 122 is a vertical section through the directrix of oue of these casemates and embrasure, on which the dimensions are accurately given, as is the case with the other figures of this system. Fig. 123 is an elevation of the casemate seen from the rear, with all the dimensions of parts seen from that direction. Fig. 124 is a horizontal section of the scarp through the embrasure, with the dimensions of the scarp and embrasure, in which the curve bounding the exterior opening is more clearly defined than in other figures. Fig. 125 is an elevation of the exterior of the scarp, showing the dimensions of the embrasure on the exterior of the wall^ and the courses of stone and manner of building about the embrasure^ by which it will be seen that the arch of 4' 6" opening is formed of nine pieces of stone. The most interesting detail is that of 4' 3" for the height of the sole of the embrasure above the terreplein of the casemate, securing much more protection to the gunner and interior of the work, than our system. The examination of a model in the carriage department of Woolwich, of what was repre- sented to me, as the dimensions last adopted for their sea-coast casemates, the height of the sole of the embrasure above the terreplein is 4' 10", indicating a determination to correct the error we are constantly committing in our sea-coast casemated batteries. 19 D Fig. 1-25. rise o this course forming tlie sole llie embrasure was not ascertained 146 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. North Fort, commanding the entrance into tlie harbor of Liverpool, is another recently con- structed sea-coast battery, illustrative of the system of the English engineers. It has the defect about 18' Fig. 120. common to many of our earlier constructions of occupying a site for the defense of a city, the rapid growth and extension of which has brought the forts within the limits of the city. While the fort is just being finished, substantial masonry ware- houses, occupy sites immediately above, and within pistol shot of its batteries. The details of its construction are unlike any other I know of. It is possible that a work of more than one casemate tier was originally designed for these foundations, and that the rapid extension of the city, made it expedient to modify it as now finished. There is little room to doubt that a single broadside from a ship in the channel, would dismount the guns, and drive the gun- ners from the terreplein. So far as an examination of the surface, enabled me to judge, it is a solid mass of masonry of red sandstone of large masses^ in horizontal courses, well put together, form- ing an open embrasure battery, with stone parapets, every gun being within a deep recess of the parapet, and separated by a solid mass of masonry forming a traverse. Between each gun, and behind this traverse is a stone banquette, for infantry, communicating with tlie terreplein of the battery by a flight of stone steps. From the terreplein of the bat- tery to that of the corps-de-place the communication is also by masonry steps. Fig. 127. The trace of the battery is a right line, the scarp of which rises out of the water. The gorge is a bomb-proof barrack parallel with the battery, two stories in height, with a flat roof covered with asphalte, surrounded with a breast-height wall. These barracks are returned towards the front with a right angle, terminating the flank of the battery with a casemated tower of two tiers, each tier showing one embrasure on the water front on a line with the main battery, and in the second tier an additional embrasure, firing over and on tlie line of the battery. All the dimensions in Figures 126 and 127 of this fort must be considered approximative, and not exact, as no meas- urement was made of any part of this work. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 147 Sardinian Naval Depot at Genoa. The existing defenses of Genoa, by laud and water, have been the study of engineers since the fourteenth century. To this day it is a stronghold on the Mediterranean, now in possession of the Sardinians, and fortified as one of their naval depots. The harbor (see Plate 19, Fig. 1) is an indentation in a straight line of the coast, between the mouths of the mountain rivulets of Polcevera and Besagno, distant about four thousand yards from each other, descending from the Appenines through the ravines in parallel lines for several miles. This indentation in the coast is about one and three quarter miles wide, by one mile in depth. A shelter against all storm winds is created by artificial breakwaters, within a part only of this indentation of the coast line, inclosing a water surface by a semicircle of about half a mile diameter, the longest line being from the light-house towards the center of the city, on which line the two breakwaters or moles are constructed, projecting from the light-house on the west, and from about the center of the city front on the east, approaching each other to within 595 yards, which is left as the opening to the anchorage, commercial port, and naval depot. It is not probable that an extensive naval establishment will again be created within this small con- tracted artificial basin, from the shores of which the mountain commences to rise, terminating in the Appenines, leaving as little space on land suitable for dock-yards as in the harbor for a fleet. A dry-dock exists within the walls of the naval establishment. Although the city is susceptible, with its natural advantages, of a prolonged defense on the land side, it has none particularly adapting it to harbor defense. Its importance for the future depends on its great commercial advantages, connected as it is with the fertile valleys of the Po, botli at its mouth and towards its soui'ce, by railroads to Venice and Turin. The Sardinian government is giving its attention to the Bay of Spezzia as every way better adapted to their naval purposes ; yet, as a commercial city, destined with wise councils to attain greater prosperity than ever, its protection and defenses will doubtless con- tinue to command attention, which, in connection with the history of fortification, renders the works of some interest in a study of sea-coast defenses. The city is inclosed by an irregular continuous basfioned trace on the land side of substantial stone masonry, constructed, it is claimed by historians, as early as 132'7. On the west, north, and east these bastion fronts are as perfect and regular in trace as those at Verona, which are cited as the first invention of the bastioned system by San Micheli in 1500. A very correct out- line of this enceinte of Genoa may be found in the collection of maps published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. The city has grown long since to the utmost limit within these barriers, that now only serve as a preventive to its extension and prosperity. Should they ever become available for defense, the city would inevitably be destroyed in any effort of a besieging army to reduce them by artillery. They must yield to the wants of commerce and prosperity of man, as at Toulon, Havre, and other fortifications of past ages — a lesson it becomes us steadily to keep in view, never to allow our forts to check the growth of our cities and towns. Beyond this inclosure, however, is the real barrier and defensive works against an enemy on the land side. They consist also of an irregular continuous masonry bastioned trace of about seven miles in circuit, constructed about 1632. On the southeast they commence on the coast at the mouth of the Besagno, all of one hundred feet above the Mediterranean, running on the crest of the hill bounding the rivulet about one mile and a half, thence northerly along the crest of the same continuously ascending mountain spur to Fort I'Eperon, (Plate 19, Fig. 1,) the most northern point. On the western side of the bay these defenses commence at the light-house, following an ascending ridge, nearly parallel with the Polcevera for a mile and a quarter, wlien they deflect to the right along the crest of the same mountain spur, uniting at Fort I'Eperon. This salient 148 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. point of the enceinte is several hundred feet ahove the level of the sea. Outside of this line of ■works the country falls rajndly into dcej) valleys, too steep for the ascent of columns of infantry, and in many jjarts altogether inaccessible ; forcing an enemy's artillery across the valleys to obtain suitable sites for batteries, from whence guns can be brought to bear on the masonry scarps. On the eastern side the valley is narrow, and the opposite hills rise suddenly to such a height as to command the city, in consequence of which three detached forts have been constructed forming the key of the defenses on that side. Fort I'Eperon is on a spur that oifers advantageous ground for approaching uijonit; to guard against which, and, at the same time, to occupy a commanding site. Fort Diamante has been constructed, at the intersection of a mountain ridge descending towards the Polcevera, from that of the Besagno. This advanced enceinte is materially strengthened by some appa- rent newly-constructed masonry casemated forts, showing, in general, all their scarps^ with crennated bomb-proofs and occasional embrasures for guns. They, in some instances, occupy prominent sites within the line of the enceinte, while others, as L'Eperon, constitute a part of it. The masonry of all these works is of small indifferent rubble; and, in general, is terminated by a thin masonry loop-hole parapet. The flanks occasionally have an open gallery excavated behind the scarps to give a second tier of loop holes — small piers and arches forming the terreplein or banquette for the upper tier. At the light-house a large masonry casern is under construc- tion, the masonry of which, like that in the forts and enceinte, is small rubble, with some little attention to laying it in courses. Such, in general, are the land defenses of this stronghold, in which Massena sustained himself in 1800, with a small army, for two months against a powerful Austrian avmy under Melas, reduced finally by starvation, and not by gunpowder. At the same time, the water defenses set the English fleet under Lord Keith at defiance, rendering a knowledge of them of some importance in the study of our harbor defenses. From the mouth of the Besagno the scarps of the city enceinte follow the coast along the crest of the hill, falling nearly to the water level at their junction with the eastern mole or breakwater. Behind this scarp are some barbette batteries, and under it, along the shore, is a water battery that appeared to be of recent construction, with one tier of casemates, surmounted by a barbette battery, the branch fronting the sea having an earthen parapet, and the one perpendicular to the shore a brick parapet. This battery was armed with 8-inch guns, the construction of which was peculiar for new pieces^ consisting of a perfectly hemispherical breech and cylinder, without molding, reinforce, base ring, or other irregularity in the shape of the gun, to the trunnions. A breech ring was the only exception to this form. Officers who have given attention to the casting of heavy ordnance will doubtless see good reasons on the part of the Sardinians in departing from the long-established use of ornamental moldings, cascables, &c., &c. Guns may be mounted behind the scarps on the crest of the hill, along the water front, which would ©O'er some little opposition to a fleet entering the port ; and with the casemated fort along the shore^ would cooperate with an open barbette battery on Light-house Point, and a small battery on the eastern mole in opposing the entrance of a fleet. After entering the harbor the only resistance would be from a battery on the exterior wall of the dock-yard. The batteries along the city front, both on the crest of the hill and at the water's edge, are doubtless indispensable to prevent a fleet anchoring at pleasure and bombarding the city from the sea. These same batteries have a tendency to force a fleet ofi" shore to sustain what injury it may from the light-house battery, when attempting to enter the port. Under the most favorable circumstances for the batteries, a hostile vessel need never approach the light-house battery nearer than half a mile, when she would be three quarters of a mile from the nearest city battery. The objects of attack being within the port, there would seem to exist but little to oppose ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 149 a hostile fleet in such an undertaking. Having once passed within the moles, all the exterior hatteries become powerless, when the dock-yard fort, or bombardment of the city, or destruction of a flotilla, is at the option of the attacking party. Such is all that Admiral Keith found in his day to j^revent his more active cooperation with the Austrians in driving Massena from this city. A flotilla of gun boats, such as were constructed in France and England for attacking Cronstadt in the summer of 1856, would, in all probability, be successful from the sea in bombarding the cit}' of Genoa, to its entire demolition, or laying it under contribution, and withoiit much risk of sustaining great injury from the shore batteries. Altogether, I could find very little in this renowned stronghold as a useful study for application elsewhere, yet of great interest from the fact of these same works having sufliced at a period when artillery was less powerful, and when the admirals of the same jieriod considered them too powerful for their floating batteries ; admirals who are cited at the present day as examples of good judgment and courageous gallantry. I noticed that in the recently constructed casemated battery on the sea-shore, under the city walls, the Sardinians had introduced the stone traverse circle, the stone pintle block, and circular recesses cut in the breast height of the parapet to obtain increased horizontal traverse with the muzzle of the gun over the parapet, as is our general practice. They also cut the sides and corners of the pintle blocks to facilitate this increased traverse, tlieir gun carriage (chassis) being so constructed as to interfere with a square block of the necessary height. None of the stone traverse circles have any iron plates upon them, as is our practice. In all that this nation is now doing there is an evident study of the most minute and im- portant details in matters relating to the art of war, and hence I greatly regret that through the forms and delays of official etiquette, or some other unknown cause, the American Commissioners were prevented visiting and examining the interior of all these forts in detail, in conformity with authority obtained from the government at Turin, through telegraphic dispatches, by our worthy and excellent consul, A. Herbemont, Esq. The general commanding the division of the Pied- montesc army, of which Genoa was the headquarters, ivrote to our consul that orders had been given to all the commandants of the forts of the enceinte of Genoa, to allow us to enter and see all that might be interesting to us, after the intervention of one day. Having waited the appointed time, the Commission proceeded to the most southeastern work. Fort Guiliano, and were denied admission by the commandant, he having received no orders or authority to do so. Austrian System of Hakbor Defense. The defense of sea-ports has but recently become the study of the Austrian engineers. The results of the disasters of 1848-49 have forced this nation to build up a naval armament for the protection of her extensive possessions, separated as they now are by the Adriatic. In 1849, the small naval power of Sardinia was sufficient to hold in check the Austrian power in Italy, (by prolonging the defense of Venice,) which was entirely cut off from succor or relief from the con- centrated resources in the arsenals at Trieste and Vienna, by the little, though efiicient, fleet of Sardinia. As a consequence. Marshal Radetsky was compelled to rely upon the Italian provinces for the means of combating the insurgents in alliance with the Piedmontese. The reequipment of the extensive dock-yards at Venice, and organization of an entirely new naval depot at Pola, selected to meet all the requirements of the nation, in connection with the balance of power in Europe and her immediate defense, have been determined upon, and are now steadily and at the same time vigorously being prosecuted by the Austrian government. The extent to which Austria may carry this new element is not without interest to us as well as the statesmen of Europe. Trieste and Venice are becoming the principal commercial cities and ports. A wise policy, now in active operation, has already demonstrated the elements of increased naval strength in the rapid growth of the commerce of these cities, particularly of the former. A magnificent railroad, nearly completed, from Vienna to Trieste, unites the central valley of the Danube with 150 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the head of the Adriatic, making Trieste a convenient outlet for that fertile valley and the industry of its immense population, from Ulm to the Black Sea. Another railroad, already finished, from Milan to Venice, unites the central valley of the Po with the Adriatic, and thence to Trieste, as a common commercial center, having to compete only with the Sardinian road to Genoa. The increase in the commerce of Trieste is from 16,782 vessels, measuring 985,514 tons, in 1846, to 21,081 vessels, measuring 1,489,197 tons, in 1855. The commerce of this port at the present moment, while the railroad is only in operation to Laybach, is supported by a wagon road to the interior, in importance not unlike our national road, connecting the Ohio with the Atlantic, over the moiuitains from Cumberland to Wheeling, before railroads were opened. The extent of this influence in building up an Austrian commerce may be judged from the fact of my having met no less tlian 931 loaded wagons during the first ten hours ride on this road from Trieste to Laybach, in December, 1855, containing iron, zinc, bituminous coal, ship timber, and an infinite variety of manufactured goods — essential elements in the growth of a navy. After the completion of the railroad from Vienna to Trieste, the analogy will be equally as forcible as after the connection of the valley of the Ohio and western lakes with the Atlantic by our railroads. At this date Austria numbers 55,000 sailors, and has already a navy of six frigates, five 'corvettes, seven brigs, six schooners, sixteen steamers, and sixty-three gun-boats, and at the time of my visit to the dock-yakds at Venice, in Januarj^, 1856, there were on the stocks, in progress, three steam screw-ships, a large side-wheel steamer being fitted as a troop ship, and a sixty-gun steamship had just been launched. Two thousand men were then at work in this dock-yard, mostly under cover of the extensive building shops, rope walks, and workshops, constructed by the Venetian republic, surrounding four wet-docks, with permanent roofs, supported on exceed- ingly substantial and durable masonry columns and piers, all of which have been repaired and restored to perfect order and condition. The extent of this dock-yard is not less than two miles in circuit, and its capacity for building may be inferred from the fact (stated in the history of the time) of twelve ships, of sixty guns each, and seven frigates being on tlie stocks when the French army took possession of the city in 1796, the facilities for building wliich are now restored. English and Swedish models of the present date are adopted for the lines of the Austrian ships now building. The model of the ancient Venetian galley, j^reserved in the museum of this depot, was represented to me as corresponding with the model of screw steamers of war of this date. A naval school has also been organized, as essential to the success of this naval armament. Judging from a set of descriptive drawings, made \>y the pupils, and presented on my request, I must infer a high degree of attainment on the part of the eleves now being educated for this navy. The ability of Austria to maintain a navy must depend upon her success in fostering and promoting commerce, as without a nursery for sailors, it would be in vain to build a fleet. In November, 1855, I was at the mouth of the Danube, endeavoring, with my colleagues, to find a conveyance up the river to Vienna. Steamboats were at the time running from Galatz, near the mouth, to Vienna, and even beyond. The connection of the line was broken from the sea to Galatz by the sudden withdrawal of the vessel belonging to this part of the route. Here I had an opportunity of seeing the immense commerce of this river, and the trade that Austria is seeking to divert by railroads to the Adriatic. No less than six hundred sea-going vessels were then moored inside the bar, loading, discharging, and awaiting cargo from the up country. The difficulties of navigation are such that vessels take in but a part of their freight inside the bar, then proceed to the open anchorage outside, in the Black sea, and, by ligliters, complete their loading, at great risk and immense expense. It is the commerce indicated by this forest of masts at the mouth of a river in many respects resembling our Mississippi and its mouth at the Balize, that Austria is about to divert, by her railroads, to the Adriatic, and thus foster a nursery for seamen and her fleet. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 151 To this end, Venice and Fola have been selected as the naval depots, the former, which has already been sufficiently described for my purpose, being confined to building only, as the depth of water over the best bar is but about fifteen feet, with a rise of tide of about three feet. The latter place, Pola, is fast becoming the principal and important naval depot. Its stragetic position is as advantageous, as its harbor is said to be otherwise well adapted to the contem- plated purpose. It faces the mouth of tlie Po, and is so far in advance of Trieste and Venice as to cover and jirotect both, by any floating defenses in readiness under its fortifications. Situated at the salient point of a vast peninsula projecting from the head of the Adriatic, and at the termination of a long line of islands surrounded with rocks, behind which is the coast of Dalmatia and its hardy race of sailors ; it is, at the same time, in secure communication by land with the internal resources of the empire. The harbor communicates with the sea by a curved passage, opening to the west, with a minimum width of 750 yards. On the left of the entrance, the Island of Brioni covers the passage or straits of Fasano, which separates it from the main land, forming an extensive outer harbor; To the south is the harbor of Veruda, penetrating the peninsula, but for light-draft vessels only. The arsenal, facing the west, is at the end of the city, on an artificial site formed by cutting the adjacent declivities and filling in along shore. The quays are upwards of 1,000 yards in extent, along which are the storehouses for rigging, naval stores, and parks of artillery, arranged in the order corresponding to the fitting out or dismantling a ship. In hauling along the quay, the vessel receives successively its masts, its rigging, its artillery, its provisions, etc., and returning, deposits, by reversing the movement, in the same magazines. For the defense of these two naval depots, the Austrian engineers are now bestowing their talents in the construction of sea-coast batteries, and have, as we shall see, in some measure adopted their favorite and peculiar system practiced for their fortresses. At Pola the system of defense comprehends, first, the fortification of the two islands which rise up in the harbor — the one crossing its fire with the batteries bordering the narrows, render- ing the entrance exceedingly dangerous, if not impracticable, to an enemy. The other commands the roadstead within. It is intended to throw the fire of a besieger's batteries on the land so far off that the entire harbor shall be beyond their range. For this purpose, they have already consti'ucted at the crest of the harbor slope a chain of Maximilian towers, connected by massive earthen curtains. Independent of the great distance separating this enceinte from the vulnerable parts of the arsenal, it prevents the basin from even being seen from without, except from a great distance through the line of the narrows. The extent of this enceinte will not be less than 13,000 yards. The want of fresh water about the great enceinte of Pola is not the least of the difficulties a besieging army will have to surmount. The cost of tliese defensive works and establishments for the fleet will not be less than twelve millions of dollars. I had no other opportunity of seeing the defenses and depot of Pola than coasting along shore in a steamer ; the few facts stated are derived from different though reliable sources of information, and con- firmed by observation, so far as it was practicable to form a judgment. Venice is defended by fortifications at the diflerent inlets to prevent the passage of vessels, and by a chain of towers on the Island of Lido (see Fig. 2, Plate 19) to prevent the bombard- ment of the city from tlie sea. For the defense of one of these inlets, the Committee of Fortifications at Vienna has adopted the plan of a work consisting of a circular masonry tower in the center of a hexagonal earthen rampart for artillery. (See annexed Fig. 128.) At the foot of the exterior slope of this ram- part is a detached crennated masonry scarp of three feet thick, with small open towers at the intersections of the branches or faces for musketry. The entrance is commanded by a caponnier on the center of one of the hexagonal sides, and two other caponniers command the two gorge 152 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. faces of the work. The gorge is closed with the crennated wall only, the earthen rampart ter- minating with two short branches over and ahove half the hexigon. Through the two gorge capouniers, at the end of the earthen rampart only, can the cheniin-de-ronde be entered, to com- municate in front of the rampart by the gates c, c. This communication is closed by other gates (d, d) opening on the esplanade of the battery. It will be observed that the entrance to this work is very unlike the general arrangements for such purj^ose. It is first across the wet ditch by a bridge, with a draw at b, commanded by one of the caponniers and crennated wall forming one side of the hexagon, and thence across tlie esplanade of the gorge through the gates (a, a) PLAN ADOPTED FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE CHANNEL LEADING TO THE NAVAL DEPOT AT VENICE. Fig. 129, ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 153 by a draw-bridge, which, when raised, shows a wet ditch in front of these gates, and under the scarp of the reduit from gate to gate. The entrance to the reduit is from tlie esplanade of the battery only. The reduit is arranged with loop holes on the lower story, and with an embrasure and two loop holes in each casemate on the second tier. These embrasures are for guns of small caliber only, for the near defense of the work, and not to fire over the main battery (on shipping) simul- taneously with it. There is no barbette above this second tier, it being simply made bomb-proof by five feet of earth over the arches, as in Figs. 129 and 131. \/ V V Vj V.i Fig. 131. The scarp of this circular tower has seven feet base, including its offsets, as in Fig. 130, resting on five rows of piles of eight inches diameter, each of twelve feet long. The detached scarp (Fig. 129) is only three feet thick. The thickness of the para]iet is eighteen feet, and about eighteen feet above the level of the parade, which latter is three feet above high water. The detached scarp is ten feet above its terreplein and about twenty feet above the bottom of the ditch, which has six feet of water as a minimum. No larger vessel than a sloop-of-vs^ar can approach this work. All that part of the face of the detached scarp in the water is constructed of stone masonry, all other parts are built of brick masonry. The counterscarp has a slope of three vertical on four horizontal. The walls of the reduit are four feet thick, its casemates are eighteen feet wide, with a pier of four feet thick next to the scarp. The passage or communica- tion from room to room is by a corridor next to the interior face, and six feet wide. Asphalte is used to cover the arches, drawing the water through both the interior and exterior walls. The casemate arches are twenty inches thick, of brick, (Fig. 131,) and have a roof of masonry, on which the asphalte is laid. This masonry roof is nine inches thick over the hip of the arch. The height of the casemate to the crown of the arch is in general but ten feet. Large ventilators, say four feet long and two feet high, are made under the crown of the arch, through the scarp wall. The main ship channel into the harbor was formerly around the north end of the Island of Lido, (Plate 19, Fig. 2,) and was fortified accordingly. Although not now the best channel, the ancient defenses are still preserved, and some new works have recently been constructed by the Austrian engineers. The old works on this island and Fort St. Andrea, opposite, were in part, if not altogether, the plans and constructions of San Micheli, the same engineer that fortified Verona, and to whom the merit of originating the bastion trace is given, although I find it in the defenses of Genoa, constructed long before his time. On the north end of the Island of Lido is an extensive water battery, which, with its gorge, incloses several acres. The front on the sea side presents a very long solid rampart, with a wet 20- 154 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. FORT ST. NICOLO, ISLAND OF LIDO. Sea-shore. ditch, brick scarp about fifteen feet in height, surmounted by an earthen parapet, and an earthen counterscarp rising high enough to give a glacis crest that covers tlie masonry from the sea. The trace of this water front is en cremcdlier, as in the annexed figure, (132,) and of interest, as being com- mon at the present day in a variety of cir- cumstances, more especially for field works. The angles, it will be observed, are in a right line, increasing the width of flanking fire opposite the salients, though not concentrating it in the ditch at that point. For approaching and receding vessels these flanking batteries are well devised. Across the island, inclosing the work on the south, the trace is a bastioned front, with brick masonry scarps, having the orillon or retired flanks. The rampart of the flank is united with the curtain, and detached from the faces of the bastion. The masonry of the scarp of the faces projects beyond the angle of the curtain as in the annexed figure, (133,) forming a lower loop hole or musketry defense through the top of the scarp, the rampart behind it being lowered about six feet under the crest of the scarp, which is continued in the same horizontal plane. The principle corresponds with the flanks of the Campo Marzo Bastion, at Verona, a well authenticated production of San Micheli in 1500. It was probably built by Giovan Girolama, the kinsman and pupil of San Micheli, or by the latter in person, both of whom were in the service of the Venetian republic as military engineers. The most interesting part of these defenses is the new work built as a citadel, and but recently finished, about central on the terreplein of the defenses of the north end of the island. It is a rectangle (nearly square) with bomb-proof caponniers on the centers of the sides, parapet Fig. 133. KEEP OR CITADEL REDUIT OF FORT ST. NICOLO, LIDO. ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 155 broken into the bastion trace, throwing the curtain back of the scarp, which latter is continued on a right line on the side of the polygon to its intersection with the bomb-proof capon- nier. (See Fig. 134.) The curtain has an exterior slope of earth, as is the case with the flanks ; the scarp thus becoming detached, except along the faces of the bastions. Within these solid ramparts is a defensive barrack of two tiers of loop holes for infantry fire. Its trace is a square, with the angles rounded, with an open caponnier from the center of the faces of the square. The faces of this defensive barrack are at right angles to the diagonal of the principal work. The masonry is all of brick, laid as headers througliout on the face of the wall, the bricks being unusually large compared with our practice. They measure 2^' x 5" s 10". The second tier is j^repared for artillery, the floors separating the two tiers being of wood, the ceiling being arched bomb-proof, and without barbette or other defense above. The guns in this reduit or defensive barrack, are mounted on truck carriages, having tackle purchases attached to the side of the carriage, and thence to a ring bolt under the sole of the embrasure to haul the gun to battery, working much like a ship's gun on a marine truck carriage. The main work is surrounded with a ditch, with earthen counterscarp. On three sides its crest rises to give a glacis slope covering the scarps. On the center of each of these sides is a prolonged counter glacis, serving as a ramp, to facilitate the retreat of the garrison from any part of the exterior works from which they may be driven. On the front towards Venice the counterscarp is not so high, leaving most of the scarp exposed on that side. The ditches are dry. The communication is by a bridge, with a draw, into the small court between the flank and caponnier, and thence through the latter, under the rampart, into the main work. This may be more clearly understood by referring to Fig. 134. All the arches are covered with asphalte, yet, from subsidence of the walls or other causes, they leak considerably, '^o plastering is to be seen in any part of the work, the casemates being used as quarters, with the bare brick walls. The magazines have no lining whatever, being finished as the quarters, showing the bare brick walls only. This is a locality and climate where^ if ever interior wooden linings (as we are in the habit of using at considerable expense and frequent renewal) were necessary, they would be introduced. The moutli of tlie Mississippi could not be more damp and wet from the influence of swamps and lagunes than the neighborhood of Venice, where, as in most all other parts of Europe, our practice is considered superfluous. I have omitted to state that the scarps of this work are about twenty feet in height, as deduced from counting the stones forming the angles. The Tower of St. Erasmo is another new Austrian work, on the island of the same name, commanding one of the interior and smaller channels leading to Venice by the north. It is built of brick, with a circular trace. In it I saw guns mounted upon carriages conforming with Fig. 38 a_, and as referred to in a former jiart of this report on the subject of casemates and gun carriages. In this Tower of St. Erasmo the object is to bring the three guns of its barbette battery to fire upon a single point, which, by tlie arrangement of the pintle on a truck carriage, moving on a rail track, can readily be done, although arranged habitually at equal distances from each other and around the parapet. The dimensions of the rail in this particular instance, were as given in the annexed Fig. 135. It was stated to me that repeated experiments and tests had shown that the carriage thus mouirted had resisted all the recoil and other efiects of firing, without ever throwing it oft' the track. The most nortliern channel leading to the city of Venice is defended by Fort Tre-Porti^ about being finished by the Austrian engineers, on the southwest end of the coast of Cavallino, distant about four thousand 3'ards from tlie defenses on the Lido channel. It has a solid earthen rampart, with a brick scarp, surmounted by an earthen parapet for a barbette battery. This 156 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. rampart has three branches, (see annexed Fig. 136:) one a segment of a circle, with a right line thrown hack from each end of the segment, the ends of which are connected by a crennated wall forming the gorge. There are three caponniers connected with this solid rampart by communications passing under it, defending a wet ditcli. One of these caponniers is on the center of the circular segment. Its masonry rises from the wet ditch, and is covered by the crest of the glacis, which is in a plane three feet above the crest of the scarps. This caponnier has an embrasure to flank the ditches to the right and left. It is vaulted and covered with earth to make it bomb- proof. On each side of the communication passing under the rampart, to the caponnier, is a casern or store-room. The three caponniers stand as isolated and detached works in the ditch^ connected only by a narrow passage inclosed by a crennated wall. At the extremities of the right and left branches of the rampart are similar bomb-proof caponniers, with embrasure guns commanding the faces of the ramj^ait, and loop holes through and around the circular jsarts, as is the case with all of them. The gorge wall has an open caponnier on its center, which, with the branches, are loop-holed. The branches are prolonged beyond the ends of the solid rampart, forming one side of the flank caponniers. All the masonry scarps are about twenty-five feet high, covered by a glacis on the three solid fronts, with an earthen counterscarp from the crest to the water level, below which the j^rolongation of the slope is revetted with stone. The circular parts of the counterscarp in front of the caponniers are revetted with masonry to the crest. FORT TRE-PORTI, NEAR VENICE. The Lagune to the Adriatic. Fig. 1.%. ART OF WAR IN ETTROPE. 157 Covering part of the gorge, and on the parade, is a large homb-proof reduit, the lower floor of which is paved with stone, and its scarp pierced with loop holes. The second tier is for artillery, subdivided, as below, with piers into single-gun casemates, with a loop hole on each side of the embrasure. The floor is of wood, with a bomb-proof arch of brick, covered with asphalte and earth, surmounted by a barbette battery, with earthen parapet. The masonry of this reduit is covered by the crest of the parapet of the solid ramparts. The casemates of the second tier can only throw a curved fire over the rampart and parapet of the fort. This second tier of the reduit is arranged with embrasures and loop holes in the rear wall, which fire on the waters over the gorge wall and gorge caponnier. The communication from one tier to the other is by steps in a circular tower, constructed within the court of the reduit, on the directrix of the fort. The communication to the interior of the reduit from the terreplein of the corps-de-place is by a door at h, and from the reduit to the exterior is through an inclosed space a, across the wet ditch by a bridge and draw. While the communication to the main work is across a separate bridge, with draw (c) and gate through the crennated wall. The counterscarp of the gorge front is on a level with the terreplein of the corps-de-place, and commanded by the loop-hole fire of the gorge caponnier, as well as from the upper tier of the reduit, for which piu-pose the branch of the gorge wall through which the gates are formed, is directed on so much of the face of the reduit, as to give the fire of one casemate, to command the draw-bridges and gates, in cooperation with the musketry fire from the loop holes of the cren- nated wall. The gates and a sluice way to maneuver the water in the ditch, are covered by the crest of a glacis to a reentering place of arms, the height of which is about six feet above the level of the bridges ; it serves also to cover so much of the gorge caponnier, allowing the fire from its loop holes to pass over its crest. The draw-bridge of the corps-de-place is a rail-car passing under the gates, thus admitting of being maneuvered, whether the gates be open or shut. So much of the draw as is necessary for a counterpoise, when the car or platform is overhanging the ditch, is regulated by weights, to the extent that may be necessary over and above the weight of the draw, when resting upon the rails that project two feet beyond the face of the scarp, as in Fig. 137. It will be observed that this draw may be withdrawn, whether the gates are closed, or being closed, and may be defended by loop holes in the gates at the same time it is being drawn in or forced out by a plank banquette resting on the jambs of the gate- way, as at a. It is also susceptible of being coun- terpoised, and self-maneuvering by a weight descending in a well, attached to a chain passing over a pulley attached to the outer end of the bridge. I may be indulged with the remark, that this railroad draw and gate were proposed some years since by a member of the Board of Engineers (Major William H. Chase) for our service, and met with no favor, and now I find it approved and introduced in one of the latest constructions of the Austrian engineers, who have as much experience in details of draw-bridges as the engineers of any country, as well as by the Eussians in their new forts at Warsaw. I can but believe a better knowledge of this simple, efficient, and economical arrangement, will commend it to greater favor in our service. The draw-bridge of the reduit of this fort is in too contracted a space to admit of the same arrangement. It is maneuvered by a counterpoise of large cast-iron balls, on the end of a chain passing over a pulley, thence to the outer end of the bridge. There are three of these balls connected by a link coupling, on the right, and four on the left side of the gate. The lower ends Fig. 137. 158 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. of the series are attached by a staple (see Fig. 138) to the face of the wall, that as the bridge rises the weight is held suspended by this hook, relieving the counterpoising mass gradually ; the weight finally hanging by the hook in the well hole (a) when the draw is up. Motion is given, and force to overcome any extraneous resistance, by an endless chain passing around a drum, (a, Fig. 139,) on which is a cog wheel (h) working into a pinion, (c,) turned by one man, with a crank, {d.) This purchase is made both to lower and raise the bridge by reversing the motion of the crank. The endless chain after passing round the drum (a) from the pulley (o) descends into the well, around the pulley, (x,) and thence up, attaching itself again to the top of the weights. — I — / T -, INTERIOK r/ef I I or j'c^RP The embrasures in this work, as well as the loop holes, are in general faced throughout with large blocks of stone, (marble ;) some exceptions to the rule on less exposed localities are faced in the throat only with stone, all other parts being of brick. The drainage from the casemates of the reduit, &c., is through the front walls by gutters from the valleys. The roofs are covered with asphalte under the earth. While I was at this fort the weather was so cold as to freeze the water coming through these drainage pipes, before escaping from the wall, thus backing it up as a cistern over the casemate arch, an objection that is found to exist in our own country, as far south as Fort Monroe. It was on the north side of the reduit only that this difficulty existed. The joints of the coping are pointed with asphalte. Brick masonry, with stone under water, and at the angles, is the general character of the scarp masonry. The bricks are not very durable in this damp and wet locality, already in some instances showing evidences of decay. This work would seem to be intended to prevent an enemy occupying the site, and j)roceed- ing from island to island, finally establishing himself within bombarding distance of the city. The locality is altogether beyond the direct range of the longest guns of the present day, yet near enough to destroy the city by 24-pounders, as used by Eadetsky, in 1849. Its principle defense is directed along the sea-shore of Cavallino, (see Plate 19, Fig. 2,) offering no other resistance to a naval attack and bombardment from the channel of Tre-Porti, than that of the crennated gorge wall and second tier of the reduit, while the barbette battery over the reduit is entirely open and exposed from this direction. I must conclude that some additional defenses are contemplated to guard against this exjiosure. The main ship channel at the present time to the city of Venice is through an artificial cut, preserved in navigable condition by stone jetties, around the southern end of the Island of Lido, called the Malamocco Pass. This entrance is defended by a fort on each side, of ancient con- struction, and of no other interest than so far as is connected with the history of fortification. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 159 The fort on the south side resembles in construction those at the nortli end of Lido, already described. One of its bastions, on the land front, is inclosed at the gorge by an ancient Venitian defensive casern, of bomb-proof arches of brick, a wet ditch, very large embrasures, with deep recesses in the scarp and oblique jambs for the traverse of the gun carriage. The building is two stories high, with a continuous corridor on each story along the inner face, communicating with tlie rooms, that have looj) holes for infantry fire. On the channel side the scarps of the fort rise from the water. At the salients is an enrockment, the superior part of which is formed of large masses of stone, strongly bolted together, breaking the force of the storm waves from the Adriatic. The ditches on the land side are wet ditches, faced with masonry from the bottom to about four feet above water, on a slope of about 45°, whicli is prolonged from thence up with earth, forming the exterior slope of the rampart and parapet. Connected with the southeastern angle of this fort is an ancient sea-wall, extending some miles along the Adriatic, on a saruhj shore, made to prevent the sea breaking into the lagune. It is formed of large stone, with a slope towards the sea, in steps of six inches rise and ten feet surface, as in the annexed figure, (140.) Thus ar- ranged it has withstood the waves of the Adriatic for some ^. ,.„ o Fig. 140. hundred years. The base is an enrockment, with its superior slope and crest paved in step.s^, as above. The new jetties, at the Malamocco Pass, are enrockments under water, surmounted by a wall of three courses in height, of two feet rise each, well jointed and put together in horizontal layers. Herein we observe the difference in principle between the works of the engineers of former times and the present day, the latter securing durability of breakwaters, as here, and at Cherbourg, Genoa, and Marseilles, by superincumbent weight, composed of large masses of stone, while the former attained their object by a slope similar to the sea-shore, formed in steps of large masses of the same material. The land defenses of Venice consist principally of the works near the junction of the railroad with the main land^ called at this time Fort Hainan. It is a double enceinte on a bastioned trace, of earthen ramparts and parapets, with wet ditches, and detached demi-lunes in advance of the curtains of the outer enceinte. In the gorge of the work are two defensive caserns, built by General Chasseloup, of the French engineers, on the same general plan and arrangement as the casern closing the gorge of the bastion in the fort on the south side of the Malamocco Pass, already described. A small rivulet runs through a jiart of the ditches of the fort, where masonry has been used, otherwise there is no masonry in the work of any importance other than the brick bomb-proof caserns. The position is exceedingly strong, surrounded as it is by low, wet, marshy ground, liable to overflow by gust tides, and exceedingly unfavorable for approaches, and still more for the camps of a besieging army. It is worthy of remark, that soon after this Fort Hainan fell into the hands of the Austrians, in 1849, the city of Venice, with a commanding fleet of Sardinians in its waters, was compelled to surrender, notwithstanding the distance is more than three thousand six hundred yards to the nearest part of the city, and only to be ajjproaclied by boats or along the railroad bridge. The surrender of the city was effected by a novel expedient practiced by the Austrians. They dismounted the 24-pounder siege guns, placed the muzzle of the gun against the parapet, and the breech sunk in the ground, giving the bore of the gun an elevation of about 45°, and thus, without carriage or platform of any kind, obtained ranges of 5,330 meters with solid shot, and with the howitzer and hot shot 4,250 meters. The same expe- dient was resorted to by the Allies and Kussians at Sebastopol to obtain long ranges to annoy each others encampments. A gun that was otherwise unserviceable, by having a trunnion broken off, could be and was used in this manner. In the Crimea it was found they could not throw 160 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. shells advantageously from guns so placed, having no fuses suitable for the unusually increased range. I saw gr.ns in Chajiman's battery at Sebastopol arranged in this manner. The study of these Austrian sea-coast defenses will, I trust, be of much interest to the officers of my corps, who have a wide field for the application of many of its principles on our extended coast ; princijjles in which economy and durability is strikingly blended with efficiency. From an examination of the plans of the defenses of Venice, Pola, Verona, Peschiera, Cracow, Prezl, and other places, of which an opportunity was aiforded me during this tour, I found that the general system of Austrian defense for harhors and cities was to surround them with detached forts or redoubts, encoraiiassing a great surface, within which the city is beyond the reach of an enemy's guns, at the same time giving ample space for entrenched camps for the protection of their army, and as a center of stratagic operations. The redoubts are for garrisons of from 60 to 200 men ; and in some few instances for 1,000 men. They are generally with earthen parapets, of two faces and two flanks ; the gorge having a masonry circular reduit, the lower story covered by the ramparts, with looj) holes for infantry fire, the second story casemated for artillery, surmounted by a barbette battery with earthen parapets . In some localities masonry towers alone exist on heights, and in others the counterscarp is crennated. In the largest, the ditch is defended by caponniers at the angles, as at Venice and Verona. Detached scarps is a general and fixed princij^le, departed from only by the accidents of the ground, either preventing or rendering it in such particular case inexpedient. Tlie old enceintes are preserved as interior lines of defense in some instances, with modifica- tions upon the preceding principles, as is the case at Verona. The old or ancient wall about this city, built by San Micheli, has in some places been retained on the curtains, in front of which earthen ramparts, forming bastions, have been constructed with a detached scarp on the faces and flanks, arranged for the loop holes for infantry ; the flank of the detached scarp being covered by an orillon, formed by prolonging the faces of the detached scarp. At the salient of this detached scarp and of the bastion is a masonry casemated tower for two tiers of infantry fire. The counterscarp is eartli, with steep slopes opposite the faces of the bastions, and a long reversed glacis slope opposite the curtain. Such was the model of a front of the enceinte of Verona, seen on the 5th of January, 1856, at the Museum of the Ponton Barrack at Vienna, on wliich was written "the construction of 1835." At a subsequent date, on visiting Verona, and examining the works, such was found to be the exact arrangement. Prussian System of Harbor Defense. Prussia has no large naval depots, sea-ports, or roadsteads to call into action the science of her engineers for sea-coast defense to any great extent. Dantzig, on the Vistula, and Stettin, on the Oder, are commercial cities of very considerable trade, which have been fortified by land and water, for centuries past. Latterly the increase of trade promoted by railroads, and the growing industry and intelli- gence of lier population, has given a new impetus to the prosperity of these two cities. Tlie commerce of Stettin has felt the beneficial efi'ects of an extension of stone jetties at the mouth of tire Oder, allowing vessels of fifteen feet draft of water to come to the docks at Swine- miind, and with its connection by railroad with Berlin, and thus with the interior of the conti- nent, has made it a commercial center of importance to the Prussian government. The fortifications of both the mouth of the Oder and the Vistula have lieretofore been mostly low bastioned trace field works, with wet ditches, and without bomb-proof shelters. At this time they are being fortified anew upon the casemate system, with other details peculiar to the German school. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 161 A visit to these two places enables me to give such information as will, I trxist, sufHce to make the Prussian system sufficiently understood in all that we are interested. At the eastern outlet or mouth of the Vistula is the small Fort Neufahr, (see Fig. 141,) finished in 1848, for the defense of this pass. On the water front it consists of a circular case- mated battery, and two short branches of solid rampart, with gateway caponniers connecting with three fronts inclosing the work on the land sides, which have solid earthen ramparts and parapets, with crennated jjalisades and masonry caponniers flanking the wet ditches. The casemated water battery is inclosed in its rear to render it entirely separate from all other parts of the work by a crennated wall and draw-bridge. It is two stories in height, the lower one having loop holes only, and the second embrasures, with a barbette above the bomb- proof, covered by an earthen parapet, making two tiers of artillery fire on the water. In the details of the casemates there are some peculiarities well worthy our attention. In eac/i case- mate there is a fireplace worked in the pier about 2' wide, 2' 6" high, and 3' deep, the hearth or sole being about 20" above the floor. This will not only suffice to render the casemates comfort- able as quarters for the garrison, but may be used for heating shot. Between every pair of casemates recesses or cuts are formed in the piers of the arches of communication to introduce timbers as a barricade to cut off and separate any casemate that may be breached and in posses- sion of an enemy. The main openings and gateways are provided with similar cuts in the masonry to barricade them efiectu'ally. In some instances a double cut is formed in the masonry on each side of a gateway^ when the intermediate space may be filled suddenly with sandbags to resist artillery. These details in our service, so far as my knowledge extends, have been greatly overlooked. In Figs. 13 and 18, of Plate 23, the arrangement of the fireplaces is delin- eated ; and on Plates 22, 23, and 24 are several figures giving the barricade arrangements. These are common in the new Prussian works. I noticed them at Konigsberg, Stettin, and Posen, as well as in the casemates of this sea-coast battery atDantzig. The casemate arches of this fort (Neufahr, Fig. 141) are three bricks thick, (nearly three feet,) with five feet of earth over ROUGH SKETCH OF FORT NEUFAHR, MOUTH OF THE VISTUL.A.. Sea-front. Fig. 141. the crown ; the bricks in this work, as others in G-ermany, being much larger than any used in our country ; a practice we might introduce to great advantage as a substitute for the small brick we are in the habit of using. 21 D 1G2 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Being a new work, the dimensions of the casemate and embrasure were noted, and are given in Fig. 142, in plan. In the throat at the angle (a) the height is twenty-oue inches, and the sole is thirty-one inches above the floor of the gun room. The interior openings, at the period of my visit, were being arranged with icr ought-iron shutters, sliding to the right and left on an iron rail track, as in Fig. 143, with a hole in the plate, through wliich the gun projects. This hole ((/) is closed when the gim is from battery by a circular wrought-iron plate, (/t,) moving or hanging on a center, to admit of being opened or closed at pleasure. The shutter is a wrought-iron plate, (a, h, c, d,) of three quarters of an inch thick, placed against and closing the whole interior opening of the embrasure, (e, e, e, e.) The plate (7i) closing the opening (g) Fig. 142. Interior elt/valinn. Fi?. 143. is hung freely on the pin, ({.) The wrought-iron shutter rests upon two small wheeis, (h, Jc,) which travel upon an iron rail, (I, I.) The shutter may thus move to the right or left. That the gun may remain in battery at any angle of elevation, the Plate (a, h, c, d) is adjusted, by raising or lowering the rail track. Q, I,) which for this purpose is supported on pins, (»?, m,) passing through holes in the irons, (y,) secured in the masonry. The top of the shutter is held vertically in its place by the rod, (n.) At o are handles for the maneuver. These shutters are intended to guard the gunners against infantry fire, and possibly grape from field pieces. Another Prussian arrangement for closing a casemate embrasure is given in Plate 20, Fig. 1, which is a wrought-iron plate (E) of one inch thick, between two pieces of oak plank of one and a half inch each in thickness. This shutter (A D) is counterpoised by the weights S, S and suspended by the ropes and pulleys R R, ^ ^, a a, hanging freely, and yielding to the blow of any shot from without. The opening of the embrasure is represented by a, b, c, d. Through the shutter is a circular opening for the gun, (C, H, J.) When the gun is from battery this opening is closed by the plate K, formed of iron and wood, in the same manner as the shutter, and suspended freely by the chain L, in which position two small openings (G and K) remain open for observation and musketry fire, for which purpose the triangular opening N is made in the shutter when the gun is in battery. The merit of this arrangement is, in yielding freely to a blow from without, and not destroying or endangering the maneuvering apparatus. Figs. 2 and 3, of Plate 20, represent the Austrian arrangement for closing the embrasures, by wooden shutters sliding to the right and left on wooden ways of eight inches square, resting on irons built in the masonry. These two figures give the Austrian arrangement for centering ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 163 Crown 01' the Arch. the gun for horizontal traverse, in sonje instances being done with a ring bolt, as is shown in the elevation, (Fig. 2,) and in others with a bolt, to ship and unship at pleasure, secured by irons built in the masonry of the scarji, as in Fig. 3. The manner of forming the gi-oins of brick arches in the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian works, was not only new to me, but struck me most favorably as saving great labor and time, compared with our practice. At this casemated water battery of Fort Neufahr all the inter- sections of the arches of communication with the casemate arch were formed on this principle, which I also noticed, as the common practice, at Konigsberg, Posen, and Vienna, as well as other places. This method when known in our service I feel assured would be greatly preferred to our plan of cutting the groin. I have endeav- ored to explain it by the annexed figures, where a, b, c, d (Fig. 144) represent the pier of an arch ; a, e, the groin or intersection of another arch with the first, as a communi- cation arch between two gun rooms; o, r, the horizontal courses of brick in the casemate arch as far only as the ver- tical c, a, o. These courses^ instead of being continued on the same right lines to the groin, o e, o n, o n, &c., there cutting the brick in triangular wedge-shajjed pieces, as we practice, are made to follow the curves o s, which are described from a as a center, tangent to the respective courses, o r, o r, &c. It will be observed that every course of bricks shows the same rise on the face of the arch, being tbe same on the line of the groin a e as from r r and o o. At Konigsburg, Captain Kuntzel, of the Prussian engineers, was particularly obliging in having his masons build up with dry brick a section of a groin, according to their system, to explain it in the most satisfactory manner. The annexed figure (145) explains the arrangement. Fig. H4. in plan, as he caused the works to be constructed under his superintendence. This example was the intersection of two cylindrical arches of equal span and rise. He divided off the line of intersection of the cylinders or groin in distances equal to the rise of a course of brick, precisely the same as on the "centers," at a h. The courses o r were continued to the line a' c, in no case extending the straight courses further from the groin a p than two feet, from whence the courses were continued always at the same height, ]}, on the line of intersection or groin, and 164 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. perpendicular to the "center," around to the corresponding course x, y of the communicating arch. The right lined courses in this case would terminate, and be keyed by the courses h e and 7n n, after which there remained the space e, n, s, q, wliich was closed by parallel courses, as indicated by the dotted lines. Although apparently complicated, and not readily explained, it is, in reality, far more simple than cutting the " points of a groin'' according to our system. In other words, build up the groin witli headers, setting the brick perpendicular to the intersec- tion of the two arches, as at t, Fig. 145. In like manner, build up the right cylinders a p, a a, as at u u, then unite these with heading courses following the curves m t u. I discovered nothing in the fortifications about the cit?/ of Dantzig of any special interest. They are mostly old, commenced in 1331. The existing enceinte on the eastern side, consisting of a bastioned trace with wet ditches, appears to have been constructed between 1633 and 1637, and a similar enceinte on the west in 1571. In 1665 the hills on the west were fortified by a bastioned trace, making a double enceinte on this side ; and during the period it was held and defended by the French, from 1807 to 1814, they added high cavaliers in the bastions of the enceinte of 1571, with some advanced works. In this condition it remained at the date of my visit. A very correct plan may be found in an account of the defense of the city, in 1813, against the Russians and Prussians, written by Captain P. H. D'Artois, of the French engineers. Stettin, on the Oder, like Dantzig, has been a fortified city for a long period, and its defenses, in consequence of little interest, connected with my object. The left of the enceinte is a modifi- cation of the old works, with a combination of the present Prussian system, recently added ; enlarging the city bounds in the southwest to allow for its natural and, at present, prosperous extension. These additions have flat bastions, high earthen ramparts and parapets behind a detached scarp, with casemated traverses in the reentering places of arms, and a casemated reduit in the gorge of the bastions. Some of the flanks are also casemated. A powder maga- zine, now in course of construction, enabled me to obtain all the details of the Prussians for such a structure. Plate 20, Figs. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, gives a plan, sections and elevations, in sufficient detail to fully understand all its parts. The entrance to this harbor, or the mouth of the Oder, is some miles distant from the city, and is defended by two sea-coast batteries, one on the right bank, recently finished, and one on the left, nearly opposite, now under construction. The latter consists of a circular brick reduit, of eighty feet diameter, in the center of a pentag- SKETCH OF A FORT UNDER CONSTRUCTION ON THE LEFT B.VNK OF THE ODER, NEAR SWINEMUNDE. a is a well-liole for liuiiftii piuis, &r. IVom tier I( licr. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 1C5 onal earthen work. Tlie lower story of the reduit is arranged with loop holes for musketry, above which are two tiers, of twenty guns each, under homb-proof casemates, above which is a barbette battery of the same number of guns. The casemates of the reduit are not uniiorm and symmetrical, as the staircase is placed near the gateway, instead of in the center of the work. (See Fig. 145 a.) Outside of this reduit is a regular pentagonal rampart and parapet, the crest of which rises to the sole of the casemate embrasures. It has a wet ditch, with caponniers, supposed to be built of brick, in conformity with their system, and a glacis rising high enough to cover the palisades on the berm and masonry of the cajionniers, as in Fig. 141. The embrasures of the reduit were of the dimensions given in the annexed figure, (146.) It would appear that these embrasures are larger than those constructed in other new works, to adapt them to their new guns and carriages for casemates. The scarp and counter scarp of the ditches of this work being of a loose sand, are protected from wash by facines pinned down and placed in longitudinal lines of one each, every two feet from centers on the face of the slope, and sunk into it to the plane of its surface, as in Fig. 147. Not more than one facine was found to be necessary below the level . 67" Fig. 146. Fig. 147. of the water. Willows are in due time to be planted among these facines, which, by their roots, render the whole permanent and durable. The fort on the right bank of the river is a much larger and more imjiortant work than the latter. It is a brick casemated battery, of three faces bearing on the channel, having two case- mated tiers, and an open embrasure battery over the casemates, with hrick parapet, the only one seen exposed to a ship's battery. The gorge of this battery is also casemated, with an earthen parapet and ditch, flanked by a musketry bomb-proof caponnier. The ditch extends round the entire casemated work, the gorge being prolonged to flank two faces of the water battery. (See Fig. 148.) The right and left faces of the water front have twenty-four guns each, and the connecting face parallel with the river has fifteen guns, making a total of sixty-three. That is, two case- mated tiers of twenty-one guns each, and twenty-one guns on the rampart bearing on the water^ firing through masonry embrasures, cut in a brick parapet. The projections of the gorge, beyond the right and left faces, are casemated, with three guns in each tier bearing on the water. This battery, with its gorge, becomes a strong reduit to the main work. These projections of the gorge have no terreplein battery or parapet, being simply covered with earth to make them bomb- proof. The gorge of this reduit is curved outwards ; its earthen parapet serves as a parados to the batteries on the water front. The gorge masonry is covered in the rear and on all the laud side by an inclosed work, 166 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. with a solid eartlieu rampart and parapet; its wet ditch flanked by small low masonry capon- niers, with palisades on the berm, and a high glacis slope, but no covert way; the glacis covering the masonry of the caponniers and the palisades. The cajjonniers in the ditches are covered with earth, to make them bomb-proof. SKETCH OF A FORT ON THE EIGHT BANK OF THE OUEK, NEAR ITS MOUTH, NEAR SWINEMUND. (Ste Fig. 150.) Fig. 148. The gateway to the water batteries is through a small door (a) into the caponnier (6) on the directrix of the work, flanking the ditch of the gorge of one tier of loop holes ; turning from it through the scarp of the gorge you pass to the right and left through a line of gun case- mates, behind which are the quarters, with windows opening on the court of the reduit. This arrangement is carried all around the reduit, but with casemates for guns only on the water fronts. Ornamental masonry turretted towers form an interior facade to the entrance (c) to the terreplein of the battery from the gorge. Within these towers staircases are built communi- cating with each tier and the terreplein. Towers (e, e) ai-e also constructed at the extremities of the gorge, with steps within, communicating also with the terreplein of the ramparts. The main and only entrance to the work is through the wall connecting the reduit with the extremities of the enveloping land defenses. The termination of the branches connecting with the reduit are casemated, giving some additional flank fire to the gateway and water front gen- erally of the reduit. The casemates that have an opening or door opposite an embrasure, are arranged for double timber barricades, as is shown in Plate 23, Fig. 18. Barricades are also arranged in the arches of communication, as in Plate 23, Fig. 13, and Plate 22, Figs. 6, 10, &c. ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 1C7 29 fi;SE FROM SOLE TO cpaiNG or mcH at The embrasures of this work were of the dimensions in Fig. 149. The caponniers of the ditches are about eight feet wide inside, thirty-three feet long, four feet thickness of scarp, with three feet of masonry, and five feet of earth, on top for bomb-proof. The casemates are generally twelve feet wide, and six- teen feet deep, for gun room. The otlier part of the rampart under the prolongation of the same arch, is cut off by a partition wall for quarters. The piers are from four to five feet thick. All the angles of the piers and inside masonry generally is chamfered about three inches. Every other pier or passage of communication is worked with recesses or cuts often inches wide, from the floor to some distance above the spring of the arches for timber barricades, before referred to, as is the general jjractice in all the Prussian works. In this work the draw-bridges are counterpoised by an extension of the floor timbers behind the center of motion, into the terreplein. These are weighted at the ends, and as the bridge rises descend into a well, constructed from the axis of the bridge (or center of motion) back into the parade. This counterpoise was so nearly adjusted to the weight of the bridge that two men hauling chains passing over pulleys, and attached to the outer end of the bridge raised it with ease. This fort on the right bank of the river is in a bend, and so directed that a vessel has to come bows on to the lower front until quite near it. Its fire reaches some distance down the jetty, and cooperates with the pentagonal work, before de- scribed, on the left bank, not half a mile distant. The annexed figure (150) will give an ideaofthe loca- tion of these two works. All the bricks in these two works at the mouth of the Oder are, as a gen- eral rale, laid to show headers on the face of the scarps, arches, piers, &c. Tlie mortar is made in a mill with rakes, the lime being first slaked to a paste, and then combined with sand, in proportion of five of sand to one of lime. Until lately, English Portland cement has been used for all the masonry under water. They now manufacture an artificial hydraulic cement, at Stettin, by burning clay, found in adjacent cliffs, combining the powder with some secret substance, producing a cement which their engineers prefer to the Englisli, which has cost them, at the works, $1 25 per 100 pounds. I have now given all the information that it was in my power to collect on the subject of sea- coast and harbor defenses, leaving, indeed, but little more to be gained, excepting the labors of the Swedish engineers, who have given great attention to this branch of fortification. I am enabled to enumerate several of their works and general character of their system, trusting that some of my brother officers can, in time, give us more detailed and satisfactory information. The defenses of Carlsborg cost twenty-six millions of reals, of ten or twelve and a half cents each. They were ordered to be commenced in 1819. The principal works were finished in 1821. The general plan was casemated caponniers in front of the posterns, flanking a Carnot wall in the ditches, with spacious bastions on a trace, giving very obtuse flanked angles, with tenailles and many detached works. Three fronts of fortification witli flanks resting on the river, (or bay?) with a citadel of two tiers, serve as a fortified camp for 47,000 men. The flotilla can cooperate in the detenses of this city. At Carlscrona, the fort of Kungsholman was commenced in 1822 and finished in 1846, mounting 182 heavy guns, bearing on the channel, having loop-holed walls and galleries for Fig. 150. 168 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. musketry. It is a casemated work of several tiers, witli bomb-proofs for the garrison and its numerous artillery. The defenses of Landscrona were iinished in 1847. They cover the city only on the land side, consisting of a rampart of earth with demi-lunes, a dry ditch, and covert way. The citadel forms a redoubt of bastioned enceinte, with a wet ditch, demi-lune, and covert way, after the "old Dutch systerh." At Guttenburg, Fort Cronan is on the summit of a height, consists of an octagonal tower of three tiers of bomb-proofs. The lower tier is for storerooms, and the other two arranged for ten to sixteen pieces of artillery each. At Gulburg there is a ma3onry circular bomb-proof tower of three tiers, the two lower for artillery and the third for infantry. At Stockholm a casemated tower was constructed as early as 1549, renewed in 1724, and now remains as a part of the defenses of this city, the lower story being a casemated battery. Floating Batteries sheathed with Weought Iron. The failure of the combined fleets to produce any overpowering effects upon the harbor defenses of tlie Russians in the Black sea and the Baltic, in 1854-55, induced France and England to use their greatest exertions to devise the means of destroying the sea-coast casemated defenses of their enemy. In their efforts to do so, some new and untried arrangements were made ; and so well adapted and calculated for the purpose as to. make them of special interest to us. The time may come when we must combat similar devices ; and now, while our sea-board is being fortified, we should introduce such additional details of construction and principles as are best calculated to resist these new floating batteries. I present the accompanying notes in relation to these batteries, with the hope of making them understood, notwithstanding it is in the line of another profession than my own, and with which I cannot be expected to have much knowledge. Until now, no more efficient means have been devised to oppose sea-coast batteries than the floating batteries constructed by General D' Aryon to bombard Gibraltar, in which great ingenuity was practiced, and every art adopted calculated to protect them against the fire of the forts ; yet they failed in doing any injury to the forts, and were, in a few hours, set on fire and destroyed. Since then a preponderance in the number and caliber of the assailant's artillery, to dismount an inferior number of guns, has been the only principle justifying the attack of forts by fleets. Against the Russian defenses of Cronstadt and Sebastopol, as well as Sweaborg and Revel, there was no favorable position that would admit of bringing an overwhelming artilleryfrom ships' broadsides against the forts with any hope of dismounting the guns of the Russian batteries before the ships would be set on fire or sunk. Both the English and French naval authorities resorted to the same plan to gain their object. It was, first, the use of floating batteries, of light draught of water, with the heaviest known artillery, protecting tlie crew and vessel by sheathlug the latter with wrought-iron plates of such thickness, ^vhen hacked ivith timher, as to be shot-proof; second, mortar vessels to lay ofl' and bombard from such a distance, as would insure the accuracy of their fire, while it would be exceedingly difficult to injure such small objects as they presented from the forts ; and tliird, gun-boats, with rifled cannon, to be used in the same way. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 169 SKETCH OF FLOATING BATTERY OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH, FOR ATTACK OF RUSSIAN HARBOR DEFENSES. Longitudinal elevation of the exterior — Broadside. 17^ ' ON DECK _£JLpAFr< a Th^CK unl r '10 tisa /^ &>.-El-^.-Cl D □ E3 a" "T ^^ ■LIGHT IVA Id ENGINE [fl"«''"'^, BOILERS •' room:. Fig. 151. Propeller, Propeller. 1 T nsc Plan of the interior aubdivisions, II y IM y l?>j COAL ENGINE COAL P;' COAL COAL ^ F'ij i»H -r-r S^8 9^ S r'?i r?^! t^iji Ki 1 i-ff)^'-vt-«?^- t-^K^-rxj j^'si 1 'I >,^ Fig. 152. Cross section. 95 CH't. Fig. 153. Enlarged elevation of the exterior portion of the broadside. Gunwale. O O O Q O O O O T_ OOP ; o o o o O O o O o o o o o O '-'port '-^ lUl a IIU o o o o a o o o o o o Method of bolting the wrought-iron plate. Fig, 155. 22 D 170 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Enlarged cross section. For 10" gun of95cwt. Light water line. The details and construction of these vessels, as far as I could discover, were as follows : One of the floating batteries constructing by the English in April, 1855, was 172 feet in length on deck, (see Figs. 151, 152, 153, 154, and 155,) by 43 feet beam, and 17 feet dejith of hole, pierced with sixteen ports on a side, including the bow and stern ports. Figs. 151, 152, and 153 give a very just idea of the model and build of these batteries. The bow and stern were flatter than semicircles ; the stem, sides, and stern nearly verticle, with a perfectly flat floor from stem to stern. These conditions appear to be indispensible to support the immense weight of the iron sides. The two first figures give the general outline in plan and elevation with the interior subdi- visions for the propeller engine, furnace room, boilers, shot locker, shell room, and magazine, all below the water line, and bitts and hause holes on the gun deck. The cable passed down from the gun deck through solid timber in the bow, out through the bottom four feet below water. This secured the chain cable from the enemy's shot. An ordinary hause hole is made an a level with the port sills. The gun deck, when cleared for action, was free from stem to stern, with the exception of the smokestack, masts, and security for mooring. The engine was 200 horse power, working three distinct screws of about six feet diameter. The armament was sixteen 10-inch long guns of 95 cwt. When at sea these were divided on each side to best suit the trim of the vessel. Before an enemy's battery they were all brought to one broadside. The main or sjiar deck had 9-inch planking on beams twelve inches thick, and same distance apart the latter secured to the side by wrought-iron knees, as in Figs. 153 and 154. This thickness of timber was intended to obtain a bomb-proof over all, by covering the deck three feet deep with sandbags. It was found on trial to be impracticable, from the jiort sills being dangerously near the water level, with the armament and munitions, without any additional load. The bulwarks were but two inches thick. The wrought-iron sides (Figs. 153, 154, and 155) are i^ inches thick along the broadside, and from 3|- to 4^- inches around the curved surfaces of the bow and stern, varying in length and width to suit the openings, &c., some pieces being as much as twelve feet in length. This thick heavy iron is in five courses, (in general,) commencing on a level with the spar deck, (Fig. 155,) extending down below water to about the light water line, or 4' 6" below the port sills. The plates are bolted to the ship's side, of twenty-four inches thickness of timber and plank, with ART OF -WAR IN EUROPE. 171 bolts of If inclies diameter, flush with the outside, the heads being countersunk, with a screw and nut on the inside. The timbers forming the sides of the vessel are placed edge and edge, with 4-inch planking on the outside, making, with the inside sheathing, the 24 inches in thick- ness of timber, to wliich the 4|-inch wrought-iron is bolted. The bottom of the vessel and sides up to the light water line are sheathed with galvanized iron of one twentieth of an inch thick. All the knees are of massive wrought-iron. In the hold of the shij) a four-foot passage extends all around between the side of the vessel and the engine boilers, &c., &c. — the only unoccupied or vacant space below the gun deck. She has four boilers of five feet diameter, and two flues in each. The dimensions of the cylinders and connection with the propeller I did not ascertain. The bolts securing the wrought-iron plates to the timber are about 12 inches apart, verti- cally and horizontally around the edge of the plates, and through the middle of the wider plates, as is shown in Fig. 155. The upper row of plates extend from the level of the deck a few inches below the head of the ports, spaced as in Fig. 155. The second row extends down to the level of the port sill. The third is a narrower row. The fourth is one wide and two narrow plates alternating, and the last a continuous narrow row. These vary from 16 to 32 inches in width, bent to fit the mould of the ship, with edges and joints as accui'ately formed as could be done with timber. The officers' cabins are about the after guns, made of slight scantling, movable at pleasure. There is little or no accommodation for a crew other than on the gun deck, and still less for pro- visions and water. As a necessary consequence, other vessels always kejit in company to supply their wants. The rig of the vessel was with yards and square sails on the foremast, forward of which were the usual fore-and-aft sails to the bowsprit. The main and mizen masts were rigged with fore-and-aft sails only. All three masts were stepped on the gun deck, not to interfere with boilers, magazine, &c., below. The crew consisted of two hundred, including officers. The steering wheel was below deck, the helmsman's head only rising above, covered by a shot-proof hood. The first battery^ launched from the same yard as the one just described, had but 07ie screw propeller, which was found altogether inadequate. Objections were made to the closely-fitted joints of the thick iron plates, on the ground of their being no room or play for contraction and expansion. Although I was on board another of these vessels about twelve months after she was built, I learned of no objections on this score. The experiments that led to, and justified the construction of these batteries, were made by the English, at Portsmouth, in September and October, 1854. They are of sufficient importance to warrant mj quoting from Sir Howard Douglass. He states that a target section of a frigate, "covered with wrought-iron plates 4^" thick, was fired at with 32-pounders, and 68-pounder solid shot, and 8 and 10-inch hollow shot. At 400 yards, the 32-pounder solid shot and 8 and 10-iuch shells merely indented the target 1^, 2^, and 1 inch, respectively. But the 68-pounder solid shot being fired with 16 pounds of powder, penetrated the plates. These were always split at the bolt holes, which were about one foot apart, and it was in consequence recommended they should be bored as far apart as practicable. It was concluded that such iron was a protection against 32-pounders, solid, and 8 and 10-inch, hollow, but very little against 68-pounder solid shot at this short range." The ports of these batteries are 10 feet from center to center, and 3 feet wide, leaving only T feet of solid to 3 of open space. None of those constructed by either the English or French proved to be either good sailing or steam vessels. They would not obey the helm in heavy weather, either under canvas, steam, or towing. To obviate this difficulty, a rudder had been placed on each of one of them, nearly abreast the mizen mast. Its eft'ect I did not ascertain. The ports of the line-of-battle ship Marlborough, of 131 guns, are 12 feet rom center to center, and 3' 6" wide, leaving 8' 6" of solid to 3' 6" of open space. An examina- on and compar o n o these dimensions with those of the embrasure openings of our sea-coast 172 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. batteries^ must command miicli greater confidence than the former, in protecting the armaments from being dismounted by embrasure shot. The total weight of the wrouglit-iron plates on one of these batteries was 320 tons, requiring 100 tons of bolts to secure them to the side of the vessel — making a total of 420 tons. The last vessels of this class, built by the English, and finished late in the spring of 1856, were modified and improved in some particulars. The Thunderbolt was one of this class. She measured 2,000 tons, was 186' long, by 48' C" on deck, with 18' 6" depth of hold. Her bow had considerable rake, being shaped, somewhat, like a spoon. Her timbers were put together as in a common ship, with outside planking of 6" thick, over which was the 4" wrought-iron plates. Her sides fell inboard very much. The beams of her weather-deck were fitted edge and edge. The gun- deck was ventilated by means of air-tubes, supplied by fanners worked by a donkey engine. The engine of the battery was 200 horse-power, supplied with steam from four cylindrical boilers. The Glattan, another of these batteries, was finished in time to join the fleet in the Black sea early in 1855, though never brought into action. She proved a bad sea-boat, putting into Gibraltar, Lisbon, Corunna, and Ferral, from expediency. At Kinburn, three of the French batteries of similar construction, slightly differing in minor details, were brought into action on the 17th October, 1855. They opened fire on the fort at a distance of 800 yards, and sustained little or no injury. They bore the marks of from 40 to 50 shots each, amounting to slight indentations only. Some of the Eussian shot entered their ports, the efiects of which I could not learn. The occasion presented no satisfactory tes* of the value and efficiency of these batteries. The Eussian defenses mounted but eighty-one guns and three mortars, while the attacking power was most overwhelming. The English fleet alone mounted 831 guns, and the French force consisted of four ships-of-the-line, several steamers, gun and mortar boats, and the three floating batteries. Three hours' bombardment, combined with a land attack, sufficed to silence the Eussian artillery. Of the vessels of this description built by the French, one, constructed at Cherbourg, had a 120 horse-power screw propeller, with a crew of 280 men. One, constructed at Brest, had two screws. The one from Cherbourg was armed with sixteen long 50-pounders, (about fifty-six pounds of our weight.) These were eleven feet in length from muzzle to rear of base ring, and weighed 10,252 pounds, and had a range of 4,900 yards. She steamed in smooth water at the rate of one and a half knots per hour. The other French batteries carried but fourteen guns. Their deck timbers were four inches apart, the wooden sides being of the ordinary thickness of a ship-of-war, to which the iron plates were bolted. Although contemplated to cover the decks with sand-bags to render them bomb-proof, such was not done at Kinburn. There, the only precaution was to lower the masts on deck, as well as bulwarks, being hinged for this purpose, thus presenting a very small, low object to fire at. Such is all I saw and learned that was reliable in relation to these batteries. It suffices to prove that they can cross the Atlantic, and are proof against all artillery but the modern eight and ten-inch gun, firing solid shot, and that it is a serious error on our part to he arming any of our sea-coast luorhs ivitli guns of this caliber that can fire hollow shot only — a particular to which I have referred in a former part of this report, and which I trust is now supported by sufficient proof to prevent any contemplated extension of such a practice. ART OP AVAR IN EUROPE. 173 IRON BOMB-KETCH, OR MORTAR VESSEL, OF THE ENGLISH, FOR ATTACK OF RUSSIAN HARBOR DEFENSES. Longitudinal section. Hatch. 1 II 1 •"' -^ — ===^ p fFater line. -i^Si/ff-' ^ l/crlarffcj "•"" ' jiii.' ^ Water tine. % . u 20-\ ^T ■^ ^5; i 1 V5 i^-- ■ — Fig. 156. Plan of tlie Interior sul)divislons. Forward bulkhead seen from bow, 2c-'-- —- Water tine. fWlPW^ '1 fie nff ife.r^^, 11, ,'„li I, way Cross sections. Water tiite. Fig. 158. Fig. 159. Plan of the mortar platfonn. 9' «E %" Section of the ribs of angle iron. 1^ li'-'i'ya %" Section of side of tlie vessel. Fig. 162. 174 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Enlarged longitudinal section through the center of the mortar bed and platform. The mortar vessels constructed by tlie Allies expressly for the attack on the Russian sea- coast defenses possess sufficient novelty to make a knowledge of them desirable, particularly as they are likely to be used in future naval armaments against similar defenses elsewhere. That these vessels can do immense injury to a fort, without the chance of being injured in return, is undeniable. It is equally certain they can cross the Atlantic, requiring only suitable convoy ; and when on an enemy's coast, protected by a superior fleet to their opponents, are powerful elements in the attack of forts, cities^ and towns. It becomes us to study how to counteract their effects, and the most advantageous way of combating them in our shoal waters, bays, and roadsteads. An experimental ikon vessel of this character was first built in a private dock-yard, on the Thames, and proved so satisfactory as to induce the English government to cause many to be constructed to take part in the campaign of 1855 against Cronstadt and Sebastopol. They were about sixty-one feet long on deck by twenty feet beam, with seven feet depth of hold. Twenty feet in length in the center is cut off with iron bulkheads athwart the vessel, at about twenty- three feet ten inches from the bow, and seventeen feet two inches from the stern. This twenty feet is for the mortar, shell-room, and magazine. (See Figs. 156 and 157.) The vessel has a flat floor amidships, with wall sides, curved to join the bottom about eighteen inches up the side and under the bottom. The mortar platform is supported from the floor of the vessel (Figs. 157 and 159) by five plates of iron, dividing the center compartment into four equal parts, leaving a gangway on each side. The mortar bed and platform is within an octagonal wooden frame or box, (Figs. 15*7, 160, and 161,) formed of seven-inch timber, resting about four feet above the bottom of the vessel, on the longitudinal upright iron plates. Under the platform was a space for shells. These vessels were rigged with two masts, on hinges, to raise and lower at pleasure. The ribs were of angle iron of three eighths of an inch thick, to which the side plates, of same thickness, were bolted, as in Fig. 162. The bed on which the mortar carriage rested was supported by sixteen India rubber or gutta percha cylinders, (Figs. 160 and 161,) of seven inches diameter by three inches rise, ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 175 arranged as in Fig. 160. The mortar and its carriage traverses upon a brass circular slide, attached to the spring bed, retained in the center of this bed by a six-inch pintle bolt. The brass traversing plate is five feet interior diameter. The spring bed is of timber of about fifteen inches thick. The two masts are rigged with fore-and-aft sails. An iron crane is fixed in the deck to raise the shell from the hatch, just behind the foremast. On swinging round, or turning on its center, it brings the shell in a position to lower into the mortar. The magazine is approached from the fore hatch through the cabin by the passage or gang- way between the mortar bed and side of the vessel. The shell room has a door in the bulkhead from the forward cabin. The mortar vessels built by the French for the same destination (Cronstadt and Sebastopol) differ somewhat from those of the English. Those that I saw at Cherbourg were two-masted vessels, rigged as brigs, drawing six feet water, armed with hvo 13-inch mortars, cast upon an iron platform or bed plate, each weighing 9,4G0 pounds. They were placed side and side, in the middle of the vessel, on deck, between the masts, on solid platforms of timber built up from the keel. Tlie crew, munitions, &c., were stowed forward and aft the mortar beds. Tliey draw rather less than six feet water, without their armament. Five of these ketclies were in the docks at Cherbourg in March, 1856. They are unlike the English, being constructed entirely of wood, instead of iron. The Gira-BOAT was the third description of floating-battery fitted out by the Allies for the same destination as the iron floating-battery and iron bomb-ketch. The gun-boat system has been known to our service since the administration of President Jefi'erson, when, and up to the war with Great Britain, from 1812 to 1815, it was relied upon as a means of harbor defense; now, however, it is designed for the attach of the most powerful harbor defenses, and as a consequence, its armament has undergone a material change to adapt it to injure the forts, and more especially floating hulks, with long-range guns, without being subjected to the chances of injury. Those fitting out in a private dock-yard in England were one hundred and six feet long on deck, by twenty-two feet beam, with eight feet depth of hold, drawing seven feet water aft, and five and a half feet forward. They were being designed for two heavy guns (said to be for the Lancaster gun, which, however, about tlie same period had been found a failure) and two howit- zers, carrying sail on three masts, and provided with stream screw propellers. The beams of the decks over the boilers were of wrought iron. The bulwarks were carried up their entire height of solid timber, corresponding to the hull of the vessel, planked outside and inside on solid timber. The steam engine was said to be of twenty horse power cylinders. This class of gun-boats measured two hundred and thirty-two tons. The combined steam power of the cylinders is set down as a sixty horse power machine. Another class were three masted, with fore-and-aft sails, mounting one G8-pounder gun amidships, and one 32-pounder abaft the mainmast ; both on circular traversing carriages. Another class were one hundred feet long on deck, twenty-two feet beam, with seven feet ten inches depth of hold, of two hundred and twelve tons measurement, two engines of thirty horse power each, drawing six feet six inches water when loaded, and mounting two 68-pounders, of 95 cwt. These were lugger rig, without bowsprit. The French constructed two classes of these gun-boats. The one rigged as brigs, of one hundred and thirty feet long on deck, mounting four of the rifle cannon, described by Figs. 21 and 22, in the commencement of this report. They were mounted on the common ship carriage, elevated and depressed with the quoin, and placed on the waist of the vessel, two on each side, between the smoke-stack and the mainmast. They are pierced with four spare ports, whether for shifting these same guns, or additional armament, I did not ascertain. They draw eight feet six inches water with guns on board. They have screw propellers. The second class are rigged as hermaphrodite brigs, a little shorter and much narrower than 176 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the first class, mounting two rifle guns (of Figs. 21 and 22) between the smoke-stack and the mainmast, and, like the first class, had steam propellers. Six of the former and eight of the latter class of these steam-propeller gun-boats, armed with this new description, were in the dock-3'ards at Cherbourg, apparently ready for Cronstadt. Such are the new elements called forth during the eventful war against Eussia for the attack of sea-coast and harbor defenses, whether of stone casemated forts, earthen ramparts and parapets, or wooden hulks. It will be observed that steam-propelling power, the rifle cannon, long range and heavy caliber, in wrought-iron vessels, are the new features adopted by both France and England. It is the bounden duty of the oflicers of our army and navy to study this branch of the art of war, and be prepared to recommend to the Executive the proper means of meeting such arma- ments to the greatest advantage, whenever the time may come to oppose it. We have not only to construct forts to resist their artillery, but must devise the best floating armament to drive them from any anchorage they may take, at the same time that we look well to the shoal chan- nels leading to our cities. It is more than probable that success would have attended an attack by a flotilla of these three descriptions upon the hulks moored along the shoals from Cronstadt to Lisi Noss, (Plates 9 and 10,) when the combat would have been with a similar flotilla built by the Russians, with the cooperation of steamers of a larger class, and numerous gun-boats propelled with oars, pre- pared on the spur of the moment. It is remarkable tliat the Eussian government succeeded in building steam gun-boats to cope with this new attacking power about as fast as France and England. Theory and Practice of Modern Systems of Fortification. The defense by fortifications of inland cities and strategic points on frontiers on the continent of Europe, has of late years received increased attention from the various governments, and called forth the talents of the engineers of the continent generally, resulting in so many different ways of applying the principles of fortification, and difi"ering so much from each other as to have given rise to the distinctive appellation of the French and German schools. We are particularly interested in a full knowledge of this subject, as all the land defenses of our sea-coast and harbor fortifications must be constructed on some one or other of these systems. I had an opportunity of seeing several of the most recent works of the Eussian, Prussian, Austrian, and French engineers. Perfect plans of them would make their several systems known. These could not of course be obtained by me on visiting and examining their fortresses, and I am justified in communicating only so much as has already been published and known to the professional engineer. Fortunately European ofiicers have, during the construction of all these recent works, so watched their progress as to leave very little to be gained beyond what they have from time to time communicated through the press. My labors are in consequence greatly simplified by availing myself of those of the several authors who have described the works in question, and especially to those of a Spanish engineer officer, who, in 1854, succeeded in giving the most satisfactory account of the modern continental systems, comparing them with each other. To make the subject understood, it is necessary to commence with a review of the French system, confining myself to the more recent labors of Mezieres, Dufour, Noiset, Haxo, and Choumara, in their various modifications of Vauban and Cormantaigne. The theoretical labors of these writers of our own times do not conform so strictly with their practice as to enable us to decide what may be denominated the true modern French system. A reference will, there- fore, be made to their labors at Paris, (Plate 3,) Lyons, (Plates 4, 5, 6, and 7,) Grenoble, (Plate ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 177 21, Fig. 4,) &c., to decide this question, adding the actual state of fortification in France, explanatory of their modern system. In explanation of the German system, a description is first given of the elementary works composing it, and of an independent enceinte, combining the general principles of its organiza- tion. Examples are given from places of most importance, combining the fundamental maxims which serve as the basis and constitute the special character of this new German school. The application of this system to marshy ground, is illustrated by two noted examples. An analysis of the German "fronts of fortification " follows. Next, referring to the defects generally attributed to the German system, the cost is given, as also the details relating to casemates ; to which is added an application of the German prin- ciples to the improvement of existing fortified places. In presenting this branch of the art of war as practiced in Europe at the present period, from information previously collected by a talented Spanish engineer, who possessed and had access to most reliable sources of information, I render the best service in my power to my brother officers ; combining only so much from my own observation of such fortresses as I visited as may serve to make known some details of special interest to our country, and as an additional verifi- cation by an eye witness, with whom many of them are personally acquainted. In 1814, Dufour proposed, as his principal object, to diminish the weakness of the demi-lune in consequence of the great salient given to it by the then most approved trace of Mezieres, and which counterbalances in many respects the advantages this important work is intended to aflbrd. By means of his elevated traverse or cavalier, in the salient of the demi-lune, (see Plate 6 of his work, published at Geneva and Paris in 1822,) he proposed to protect its long branches from ricochet, and by filling its interior with stones, render a lodgment on its ruins impracti- cable. Combining the redoubt of the reentering jdace of arms with the cut of the demi-lune, he protected completely the body of the place, and removed from the bastioned system the great defect of having its bastions exposed to fire upon the besiegers gaining the crest of the glacis at the salient of the demi-lune. In 1822, Noizet, having in view the same object of correcting the bastioned system of his predecessors, formed, with the redoubts of the reentering places of arms, the cuts of the demi-lune, and the redoubt of the latter, one single covering work, (see Plate 21, Fig. 1,) and, introducing other remarkable improvements, presented a trace that may be considered as the "modern system corrected." It serves as the basis of instruction at the present time at our Military Academy, and may justly be considered as combining the principles of the science to as great an extent as any one system that can be placed before the student. In 1826, General Haxo, the director — or, as we say, the superintending engineer — of various modern French fortresses, conceiving the necessity of covered fires, made himself known by his peculiar casemates placed upon the terrepleins of the works ; (see Plate 29 ;) a caponnier analogous to that in the German system (see Fig. 2, Plate 21) serving also as a redoubt to his demi-lune. And in this system we see introduced anew, by one of the most talented French engineers of our time, the principle of covering the batteries of the flanks, and applying casemates to the bastioned system, although in a manner more or less restricted; a principle since followed on no inconsiderable scale by other engineers in fortresses recently constructed or repaired in France. It is remarkable that, although in the first bastioned traces of which we have any knowledge — those at Verona and Fort St. Andrea, at Venice, built by San Micheli, for whom is claimed the invention of this trace — we find the modern casemate, it was discontinued after Vauban and Coehorn's days;.and in the present century no work, either for land or sea-coast defense, is considered tenable without them for the protection of both munitions, garrison, and artillery. In 1837, Choumara, a successor of so many distinguished writers, discovered and pointed out ideas and principles which, if not entirely original, were presented by him as true theories 23 D 178 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. and of general apijlication to traces already known. He advocates detaching the scarp from the parapets, and introduces an interior glacis, (see Fig. 3, Plate 21,) using military buildings as a means of afibrding interior retrenchments to his fronts. This application seems excluded as a principle from the French system, as exemplified in several of their recent constructions ; nevertheless it becomes a part or element of defense, as exemplified in the detached forts of the city of Lyons, where defensive barracks constitute a material element in the defense. (See Plates 4, 5, 6, and t.) After considering the systems and opinions of the most celebrated French engineers, it remains to point out icMch represents essentially the true French system; and in what degree the modifications and ideas of others have entered into it. The study of fortified places constructed and repaired since the peace of 1815, in France, would appear to offer the most certain means of deciding this question. Yet, on the one hand, we see places, particularly Paris, (Plate 3,) which with its immense interior bastioned enceinte, and its line of detached forts, consisting of four and five-sided bastioned forts, without outworks, presents us an example of the exclusive application of this system, justifying us in considering it as the prevailing and special system of the French corps of engineers. On the other hand, Lyons (Plates 4, 5, 6, and 7) and Grenoble, (Plate 2\, Fig. 4,) places also of the first rank by their position and importance, present, on the contrary, a type of forti- fication which, although based upon the same sytem, has undergone modifications and possesses defensive elements which have always been considered as foreign and even opposed to the spirit of this system. Special circumstances, other than military, may have rendered practicable in one what might have been impracticable in the other, which would explain the apparent contradiction in plans emanating from the same Central Bureau or Committee of Fortification. We are led to conclude that the present system of fortification in France, has for its essential basis the system of Cormontaigne, modified in its application to the construction of places, according to their object and importance ; in some instances not departing from the spirit of the bastioned system> as in the case of the school of Mezieres and jSToizet, and in the other introducing covered fires and using barracks as a means of defense; the latter under special and restricted circumstances. It would appear, then, that on the one hand the bastioned system is considered as preferable and fulfilling best the requirements and objects of the defense; and that on the other, aware of its inefiiciency, other means are sought ; thus not deciding entirely in favor of its adoption. There are those who attribute this state of the science in France to the weighty consideration that the total abandonment of the bastioned system, and the substitution of any other, would entail, as a consequence, the immediate discredit of the existing fortresses, of which France possesses a greater number than any other country, and hence they exclude all improvements and alterations not in accordance with the system of existing constructions. The new enceinte now rmder construction at Toulon, as well as that at Havre, must strengthen the belief that the French Committee of Fortification are wedded to the simple bastioned system. To appreciate this system, and compare it with the German, we must examine minutely the improvements proposed from Cormontaigne's time to the present, and see which have been applied in modern French fortresses ; and I am induced to enter hpon this examination as best calculated to unfold to my readers the present state of this science, as applied by the continental nations. A comparison between places latterly constructed in France and Germany will lead us to consider the importance of fortifications in respect to size, the military resources they may command, and the protection they may afford by their stragetic position to armies in the field. It is generally conceded that places of war should be large and few in number on a national frontier, and that by this means alone can fortification recover the importance it has lost by the advance of armies through Europe, notwithstanding their existence. The cause of the decline of fortification, and the secondary part which fortresses have played in the late wars, ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 179 proceeded from the fact that they were no longer in keeping with the strength, niohility, and powerful means rapidly attained by modern armies. This condition of things is now rapidly undergoing a change by the study of engineers to fortif}^ stragetic points, protecting great resources, and securing spacious entrenched camps within the influence of their detached forts, instead of, as heretofore, fortifying a city for the protection afforded to it alone. Fortified places should be large, to compel an invading army to lay siege to them. Garri- soned with not more than six thousand men, they do not fulfill this object against invasion, since the effect is neutralized by mei-ely leaving an equal force to blockade them and secure the communications of the invading army. They should also be large, to offer a counterpoise to the attack, the first element of defense in the strength of a garrison, provided the works insure repose to the troops not under arms, and that the provisions and munitions of war be completely secured. The Russians at Sebastopol labored under this serious difficulty. They found no repose, and little or no shelter within the works to be defended, having to seek it at a distance, and beyond cannon range in the rear. The necessity for this security is fully admitted and shown in the practice of our engineers in their numerous casemates, notwithstanding the frequent objections made to them as unsuitable for barracks in time of peace. While it is admitted they cannot be made as comfortable as dwellings specially designed for residences, yet the conditions of defense for which the works are built demand the security and rest of the garrison that can be obtained in no other way. The European engineers lay down as a principle, that with a small garrison, fortifications may be secure, and able to resist a siege^ as well as unforeseen attack ; and that they may shelter and provide for an imposing force, when necessary. The Spanish officer. Colonel Clavijo, from whom I quote largely, concludes that the German fortresses are calculated to fulfill these conditions by their numerous caserns and casemates. While under the French system it is proposed to be attained by constructing retrenched camps under their protection, and hence he examines the two systems under this point of view. To make this comparison, some measure of theoretical attack has to be established. This measure in time is derived from the number of cubic yards of earth to be removed under the peculiar method and circumstances of a siege in constructing the parallels, saps, batteries, &c., from the opening of the trenches to the formation of a practicable breach. For this purpose it may be conceded that the defense of Vauban's system be fixed at nineteen days' labor, and Cormontaigne's at twenty-five days. Tliis measure is necessary to give a clear and explicit idea of the true value of the systems under consideration, as well as a sure means of appreciating the modifications and improvements which the subject has undergone up to the present time. The great step taken by Cormontaigne, in advance of Vauban, would seem to consist in having made the demi-lune fulfill an object which it did not before his time, or which it fulfilled but imperfectly. In the first bastioned systems the sole object of this work was to afford the defense a secure point on the outer side of the ditch. It was nothing more than a "teie-de- pont." At a later period it was enlarged, that it might cover the gate more effectually, and Vauban increasing its dimensions still further, covered even the shoulder angles of the bastions ; and, from its greater projection, it gave a cross fire in front of the bastion, and from its short flanks commanded the breach on the face of the bastion in reverse. He thus made the work contribute considerably to the defense of the front, whilst reenterings were formed, which the besieger had to penetrate and pass through under this fire in order to reach the counterscarp of the ditch of the place. Cormontaigne not only increased the advantages resulting in favor of tlie defense from this dhsposition, but he made of the demi-lune a work, the taking of which is indispensible in order to carry on the attack against the enceinte. Thus, although in the attack on Vauban's system it might be necessary to cannonade and silence the fire of his demi-lune, it was not equally nece.s- 180 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. sary totake it ; whilst in Cormontaigne's improvement, the taking and holding of the demi-lune, is necessary for the ulterior operations of the siege. Thus the attack on the different works became successive, and in accordance with a general principle, otherwise any multiplication of works becomes useless if not prejudicial. The redoubt of Cormontaigne's reentering places of arms is another of his great improve- ments on Vauban. Their first effect was to render any attack of the covered way by storm impracticable. Cormontaigne's demi-lune without flanks covers the front more effectually — to which the redoubts of the reentering places of arms greatly contribute — than Vauban's. The same remark may be applied to another principle of Cormontaigne, to wit: giving a small command to his scarps, without their losing the necessary height to prevent escalade, and to avoid the masonry being seen from a distance. Places before Vauban's time had this defect of exposing the masoniy, though of much less consequence on account of the state of artillery at that period, and which he allowed to exist in his designs in order to obtain greater relief. The successive improvements in artillery rendered Cormontaigne's idea necessary ; and its con- tinued improvement calls loudly for the suppression of all unnecessary masonry that can be battered by artillery. These two improvements of Cormontaigne — the redoubt in the place of arms, and suppressing the masonry exposed to view from without — do not enter into the valuation of the duration of the siege, notwithstanding they are decided improvements. Cormontaigne's conceptions may then be reduced to two points ; first, that his system has had the effect of really obliging the besiegers to execute the works and labors on which the the- oretic attack of the bastioned system is founded ; and, second, of having increased the duration of the defense by the time strictly required for the taking of the demi-lune. It devolved on Cormontaigne to elucidate the advantages of the bastioned system when applied to polygons of a great number of sides, and especially when the fronts are in a right line. But this is an advantage of site and locality. Totleben availed himself of it in a remarkable degree at Sebastopol ; so much so, indeed, as to be assigned, in Pellisser's official dispatches, as one great cause of the prolonged resistance of the Russians. Whatever may be the system upon which the sides of a polygon are fortified, the defensive value of the place will always increase in proportion as the angles become more open, and will reach its maximum when the sides form a continuous right line. In effect, the great and most powerful advantage of the attack over the defense consists in the surrounding and enveloping position of the siege works in relation to those of the place, in their greater extension, and the wide field at the disposal of the besieger, on which to mount his numerous artillery, and make it converge towards the place. The moment the fronts of the attack and the defense tend to equalize each other, this disadvantage disappears, or is transmitted to the defense. This prop- erty of the bastioned system is only a particular case of a general principle between the relations of the attack and defense. It would be more correct to say that it particularly affects the bas- tioned system or French school ; which^ by the nature of its trace, presents to the enemy the prolongations of its principal lines, affording him a sure means of destroying the uncovered artillery from a distance. The only real advantage, and one inherent in this system, secured by this principle, is the formation of deep reenterings between the demi-lunes and bastions, by which the besieger is compelled to progress slowly, viewed in front and flank by the collateral works. In order to render these reenterings really dangerous for the attack, the works forming them must preserve their artillery for the proper moment, and the very directions of the lines of these batteries are the cause of their early destruction. Here, also, we may ask whether it is in the power of the engineer, when tracing the plan of a fortification, to select the polygon he has to fortify. Will the idea often be realized of inclosing the site with a triangle or a quadrangle, on the sides of which three or more fronts may be ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 181 extended, and secure at the same time the angles, the only weak points, by sj^ecial means? In the Crown works of Belle-Croix and Moselle, at Metz, Cormontaigne has left two great examples of the application of his principles, but they by no means demonstrate how a similar result could always be attained. A judicious application to the site is what must constitute the full value of the hastioned system ; but this truth, for the very reason that it is undeniable and of equal appli- cation to any system, rather serves to leave a vague field for the defense of the system than afford a sure means of analyzing it. An incontestable result of Cormontaigne' s large demi-lune is the greater development it entails upon the siege works, in any of the attacks directed against this system, as also the material increase of siege artillery ; thus, when operating against two demi-lunes and the inter- mediate bastion, (as must be the case when the latter has been previously retrenched,) the parallels must be extended until they reach the prolongation of those faces of the collateral demi-lunes which bear upon the attack, and the taking of these demi-lunes becomes indispensible. If, on the contrary, the bastions have no retrenchments, (and to oblige the besieged to retrench two bastions at the same time the attack is directed against one front,) the works could not be less extensive, since they must embrace three demi-lunes in order to attack and take the central one, cannon- ading and silencing the two collateral ones. In Cormontaigne's time this circumstance was considered as one of the last or greatest importance, and the system that gave rise to it as infinitely superior to anything preceding. The same importance cannot be attached to it at the present day, on account of the great increase in the strength of armies, both in numerical force and materials of war. Vauban stated that his places had been constructed to resist thirty or forty pieces of artillery, the number then com- monly used in attacks ; but the besiegers bringing from eighty to one hundred guns into the field, it becomes necessary to change and increase the means of fortification in the ratio of the increase of the means of attack. We now propose to show the variations introduced in the hastioned system by the French school after Cormontaigne, and how far the defense has been strengthened thereby. This subject involves two great difiiculties. In the first place, allotting the strict valuation and nothing more to the improvements introduced by each school and each author ; and in the second place, selecting or rather discussing only those really applicable to the system and dictated by its nature and spirit. AVe will commence with the first inquiry, namely : how much has the time of the defense of the hastioned system been increased by each innovation? We cannot offer a definite opinion upon the question of how far the modern French school may be considered as having admitted these new improvements. The only approximate course will be to examine what improvements have actually been admitted in places recently constructed in France, concerning which we have the most accurate information. . This method, even, is unfortunately insufiicient, since it can be shown by a comparison between these very places that the principles adopted in some appear to be discarded in others, rendering it impossible to determine the system prevailing in France with the accuracy to which we can approximate to those prevailing in Germany. School of Mezieres, or the System of Chatillon and Duhignan, A. D. 1750. These engineers had in view a two-fold object : first, the improvement and, we may say, the perfecting of each detail in the system of Cormontaigne ; and second, the introduction of case- mates for artillery and the partial introduction of loop-holed galleries. As regards the first point, having retained the same relations between the difi'erent lines of the front, they only changed the angle of defense, which they made 90°^ as Pagan had done. To cover more efficiently the terreplein of the tenaille, they gave its parapet a short return 182 ART OF WAR IN EUnOPE, at the extremity of its wings ; and, in like manner, they gave two small flanks to the redoubts of the reentering places of arms. They gave the greatest possible salient projection to the demi-lune compatible with the condition that its branches when prolonged should intersect the faces of the bastions twenty yards from the shoulder angles, and reduced the terrepleins of its faces to a minimiim to admit of artillery, so that an enemy could not find room to establish batteries in them. The gorge of its redoubt terminated on the line of the polygon to avoid the breaching of the extremities of its flanks from the lodgment in the covert way, as also to cover its staircases — other communications of the counterscarp were covered in like manner, as also the postern of the demi-lune, the postern of its redoubt, and those of the redoubt of the reentering places of arms. The retrenchment cavalier of Cormontaigne's bastion was modified with the same care, providing loop-hole fires to command its ditches, which before were undefended. Endeavoring to make the breach in the face of the bastion (opened through the ditch) of the demi-lune less dangerous, they placed the cut of the bastion face on the isrolongation of the ditch of the demi-lune, closing it by the scarp increased to twelve feet in thickness. This ren- dered the breach more difficult to effect, and its ascent over the debris of masonry still more so, but on the other hand the face of the bastion could not defend the ditch of the demi-lune, and the ditch of the redoubt of the latter had to be defended by the tenaille and curtain. This school partially admitted casemates, which were placed in the flanks of the redoubt of the demi-lune, perfectly covered by the branches of the latter. Their fires were only vertical, either against a lodgment in the salient of the bastion covered way or against the passage of the ditch. Even admitting the slight effect of a fire from these batteries, it is not easy to account for their omis- sion by succeeding innovators seeking for like advantages. In the salient place of arms of the demi-lune they constructed a tambour, completely covered by the crest of the glacis, which con- tributed to the defense of the covered way foot by foot, and guarded it against being taken by storm. Another idea of this school, and recently introduced in many of the detached forts around Paris and Lyons, is the construction of large bomb-proof shelters, without any offensive object, as security for the garrison and munitions of war against vertical fires. (See plan and details of these bomb-proof quarters in Plate 30, 31, and 32, presented by Mar.shal Yaillant, Minister of "War, in 1856.) The opponents of casemates see in these bomb-proofs a danger to the place as soon as the enemy can open a heavy battery upon them, by firing projectiles with slight elevation. For the defense of the ditches of detached lunettes, this school proposed to close their gorge by a bastioned loop-holed wall, and to make a loop-holed gallery in the counterscarp, with communications to casemates for artillery on the most suitable localities to flank the ditches. School of Mezieres, wider Dobenheim and Lesage, or Modern System, A. D. 1808. ♦ All casemates previously introduced are rejected by these authors, including the covered tambour or masonry block-house in the salient place of arms of the demi-lunes. They endeavored to restore the bastioned system in its simplicity and purity, simply proposing to themselves to perfect the ideas of Cormontaigne, while their immediate predecessors proposed the jierfecting of each detail of his system. The trace of the front remained the same, with angles of defense of 90°. The relief of the tenaille varied, being greater at the wings, gradually increasing from the center, the better to cover the masonry of the flanks. The demi-lune covered thirty meters of the faces of the bastions from the shoulder angle, and its projection a maximum, or that of an equilateral triangle, the base of which is a line joining the.se points. The width of its rampart was twenty meters, and the ditch of its redoubt was completely commanded from the faces of the bastions. The ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 183 flanks ot this redoubt are traced so as to see and command in reverse the breach in the faces of the bastion that might be made through the ditch of the demi-lune. The gorge of the redoubt terminated on the line of the polygon, and the covering lines of the demi-lune terminate in like manner, thus an ascent to the redoubt could not be seen from the crowning of the salients of the bastions ; and those parts of terrepleins, which might be swept from either the salient of the demi-lune or bastion, are cut off or suppressed. This construction takes from the redoubts of the reentering places of arms those parts liable to be seen by the enemy, and gives a secure space for the staircases and ramps. The crest of the glacis of the reentering places of fft-ms is circular, to secure them more effectually against ricochet. The most important of their modifications is the cut in the faces of the demi-lune. This disi^osition converts the extremity of the wings of the demi-lune into what may be called a "demi-lune place of arms;" the taking of which will detain the besieger from one to two days, should he deem it expedient to take them, in order to sweep or command from them the interior of the redoubt of the reentering place of arms. Converting the stone staircases into ramps is another important modification ; this can be done without inconvenience in the gorges of the tenaille, of the redoubt, of the demi-lune, of the demi-lune places of arms, and for an ascent from the ditches to the terrepleins of the latter work, and in the reentering angles of the redoubts, of the reentering places of arms ; although want of space at most of these points compels the construction of very steep ascents. This is not the case with the large ramps proposed in the rounded salient angles of the counterscarp of the demi-lune and bastions. It is true that these ramps favor a sortie by the garrison, which is difficult with staircases ; but, on the other hand, the defenders, when retreating, might be pursued through the ditch, and thus imminently endanger the place, if during the existence of a practicable breach in the bastion. These ramps are only admissible when supported by casemated redoubts, with special com- munications independent of those conducting to the covert way, to enable the garrisons of those redoubts to act indeijendent of and not to interfere with the movements or retreat of the sortie parties. This consideration and the variety of opinions upon this point between the partisans of this system, induces us to believe that such ramps are not compatible with the spirit of the system, and are not admitted by the French school. Their importance has, however, led recently to modifications, and their introduction in some of the new works, xuith a cut intercepting the con- tinuity of the communication, which is covered temporarily with a few boards, removed at pleasure and in a few seconds. All these improvements of detail contribute, without doubt, to cover and conceal the move- ments of the garrison while reinforcing points attacked ; and they may be termed, as it were, the finishing touch to Cormontaigne's construction. We can, however, attribute no other value to them ; they may be assimilated to the improvements made in siege works since their creation by Vauban. The system is essentially the same, and there is no perceptible variation in the duration of the defense, from the point this school took hold of Cormontaigne's labors. Nothing is said concerning the reliefs, because the modifications tliey have undergone are so immaterial as not to deserve special notice. Some modern French engineers have proposed to determine, in the first place, the length of the curtain, from the sole consideration that each half should be completely swept by the opposite flank, giving to the latter the minimum relief, namely: thirty feet of scarp plus seven feet for the height of the line of fire ; the curtain thus attains a length of upwards of 130 yards. Introducing afterwards other conditions relating to the size of the curtain angle, the desired trace was determined ; but its analysis demonstrates that the proportions of its difierent lines are very far from satisfying tlie defense to the same degree as the system of Cormontaigne. The result is that part of the flanking arrangements must be sacrificed or, rather, that these are very tar from being perfect in the bastioned system. 184 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Even in case of the increase of this relief, as will frequently happen, the defect will be still greater. Kigorous flanking arrangements are then incompatible iuith the bastioned system, and even were they not, the tenaille, a work indispensably necessary^ still remains as an obstacle, since without it the curtain would be breached and there could in consequence be no interior retrenchments in the bastions. At the present moment an attempt is being made in the new enceinte under construction at Toulon, to obviate this defect of the tenaille, by dispensing with a scarp of masonry and substi- tuting a continuous exterior slope of earth, the prolongation of which is in a plane beneath the plane of musketry fire from the flanks ; a modification noticed heretofore when referring to the defenses of that naval depot. System of Dufour, A. D. 1814. The system of Dufour is distinguished by two principal ideas: 1. Preventing a besieger opening a breach in the body of the place from the crowning of the salient of the demi-lune, and consequently preserving the former intact until the moment the besieger occupies its counter- scarp. 2. To shelter the demi-lune from ricochet, by constructing in its salient angle and upon the terrepleins a mask or cavalier twelve feet thick and twenty-five feet high. Dufour is the first who has treated of closing the ditch of the demi-lune to prevent the breaching of the faces of the bastions along this ditch. For this purpose he unites the cut or place of arms of the demi-lune with the redoubt of the reentering place of arms^ the result being a single work, a tenaillon, the masonry of which is covered by a glacis made in the demi-lune ditch. Although this idea has not yet been applied, we cite it because it has been considered by those who have subsequently endeavored to remed}' this defect in the bastioned system. The first objection to this project is that the magnitude and cost of the proposed work is not in proportion to its success, and that it will scarcely increase the difficulty of the passage of the demi-lune ditch, from the circumstance of its interior face being exposed to ricochet. The demi- lune, and its redoubt being taken, the tenaillons will be abandoned if their relief has been subor- dinate to the demi-lune redoubt, and if the respective commands of these latter works are inverted, the demi-lune redoubt would become untenable, when the former are first attacked. Nothing is gained in the theoretic duration of the defense by the exterior works of this system. All that has been attained for the garrison is removing the apprehensions caused by the breaches of the bastions from the crowning of the demi-lune. The besieger is notwithstanding obliged to construct a breaching battery against the bastion, but this does not increase his labor, the construction of this battery having been included in the estimate or valuation of time of the resistance of Cormontaigne's primitive system. Nor is the object well fulfilled by the mask in the demi-lune, filled in with stones to prevent a lodgment on its ruins. Completely viewed from a distance it will soon be demolished, leaving the wings exposed to ricochet, while it has at the same time deprived the garrison of the use of this salient of the demi-lune, so important in its influence ujion the enemy's approaches upon the collateral works. The cotemporaries of Dufour feeling the same difficulties, have labored to overcome them in other ways. Bousmard and Chasseloup threw the demi-lune forward, making it entirely discon- nected through its ditches with those of the body of the place. The ideas of the latter were carried into efl'ect on a most extensive scale under the orders of Napoleon I, in the defenses at Alexandria, on the Po ; a part of which still remain perfect, most of the fortress having been blown up by conventional agreement. This original conception of Chasseloup, (his primitive construction,) is to be found in a well-executed plan in the writings of Dumas, and a theoretic description of a front in Papers of the Royal Engineers ; Maurice's Modern Fortification; or in Teliakofl'sky's Manual of Fortification, the text book on this subject of the School of Engineers at St. Petersburg. Dufour's conception for closing the ditch, in a modified form, is now taught at the Engineer School of Mctz, in Noizet's system, to be next described. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 185 System of Noizet, A. D. 1822.— (See Plate 21, Fig. 1.) The essential characteristic of tliis trace is a traverse closing the demi-lune ditch, and uniting the redoubt of the reentering places of arms with the cut or demi-lune place of arms ; and the latter being in safe and easy communication with its redoubt. These works may bo considered as f )rm;ng a continuous whole or first line of defense, having for a central point the demi-lune redoubt. The gorge of this traverse is revetted, and is a continuation of the counterscarp of the bastion; its superior slope descends like a glacis, along the demi-lune ditch, and across the latter is a single and open caponnier, establishing a communication with the redoubt of the place of arms. The extremities of the demi-lune are terminated at ten meters from the counterscarp to allow enfilading by the flank of the opposite bastion through the above-mentioned single caponnier and the ramp leading to it from the bottom of the ditch ; this ramp also giving ascent to the demi- lune cut. The ditch of the redoubt of the demi-lune is also closed by a traverse in the shape of a glacis. The gorge of the demi-lune redoubt is retired with respect to these traverses, and affords a safe communication from the caponnier, on the perpendicular, to the above-mentioned ramp. The first object of this traverse is the same as tlie one had in view by Dufoiir, namely : to prevent a breach in the bastion through the demi-lune ditch. The second object may be con- sidered of equal, if not even of greater importance. We see here for the first time an easy and protected communication between the body of the place and the exterior ; and, also, the possi- bility of reinforcing in time the covered way and its redoubts. The principle, indisputably acknowledged at present, that the means of retreat from a ivork should be independent of those provided for the retreat from the worh tvhich it is destined to protect, is here also applied. The garrison in the covered way need not pass through the interior of the redoubt ; the gorge of the latter is in communication with the covered way, and from the latter the traverse is gained. But has this traverse, or can it have the thickness and height necessary to resist effectually the counter-batteries on the demi-lune salient, and at the same time allow the bastion to flank the ditch? The difficulty involved by this idea is, in regulating these conditions properly. On the other hand, this communication is only covered by a single open caponnier, which would be easily ruined by the artillery of the demi-lune salient, causing the redoubts to be abandoned and cutting off a retreat from them. If the redoubt of the place of arms were casemated, and likewise the traverse, to which a flanking battery might then be obtained for the demi-lune ditch, the defense of the system would be greatly improved. But this would introduce elements foreign to the bastioned system which Noizet wished to preserve in its purity. The author's conception is a most luminous one, and if its execution were possible, it alone would suffice to give the system one of the most essential properties in all sound fortification, namely, rendering it susceptible of the most active defense, relative to the strength of the garrison. This difficulty in construction of preserving the flanking arrangements of the demi-lune ditch, in connection with these traverses, has been experienced by the Eussian engineers in some of their new fortresses in Poland. They liave made it a masonry traverse bomb-proof caponnier, through which the communication is kept up. A plan and elevation of this Kussian method of surmounting this difficulty, such as I saw on the Vistula, is given in Plate 27, Figs. 2 and 5, of Teliakofi'sky's Manuel of Fortification. The disposition of the gorge of Noizet's demi-lune redoubt (Plate 21, Fig. 1) is remarkable in tliis, that the staircases leading to its terrcpleins being within the extremes of the flanks, near the ends of the same, posterns have been opened in these ends to render a retreat from the demi- lune independent of a retreat from the redoulit, in conformity with tlie principle already 24 D 186 ART OF WAR IN EURORE. announced. (It will be observed that this principle of independent communications is studiously observed by the Austrians and Prussians in all their new works ; some of which I have already referred to, in the defenses of Venice, the mouth of the Oder, and the mouth of the Vistula.) These communications and the ramps of the wings of the demi-lune allow this work to be strongly defended, and likewise prevents the passage of the ditch of the redoubt. The bastioned system has gained in Noizet's hands all that it could gain, without departing from its principles ; and even admitting this, we cannot find, on subjecting it to the standard of measure of duration of defense, that it calls for or requires more time than the previously-described systems. Noizet has admitted loop-holed galleries, only for the counterscarps of the redoubts of the reentering places of arms, doubtless on account of the little depth of his ditches. We do not pretend to enter into a discussion of all the other details of his system, whicb have no essential influence. We might here terminate our glance at the bastioned system, and consider what we have denominated the " modern system corrected," as the true expression of the French school. We should thus have a fixed and very determinate basis for our comparison with the German scbool. But Noizet was siicceeded by Haxo, and by Choumara, and both have proposed new modi- fications, and introduced new works in the bastioned trace, rejected by their predecessors, who considered their defects greater than the advantages sought to be attained. Bousmard and Chasseloup also took up the bastioned system, deviating totally from its simplicity, to the extent of creating a distinct mode of defense. And although the French school has appreciated the merit of their conceptions, as it now appreciates those of Haxo and Choumara ; and although Napoleon I approved and adopted Chasseloiip's system for the fortification of Alexandria, to serve as the key to Lombardy, the principles of this system are not those of the French school, and must not enter into account in its analysis. The casemated tenaille, for example, does not belong to this school, nor do the casemated redoubts of the reentering places of arms, and the salients of the covered way of the body of the place and demi-lune, nor do the subterranean galleries leading to them, and to the detached demi- lune. Noizet's system being the basis of instruction in the science of fortification at Metz, as well as at our own military school, I have judged it of sufficient importance to append a full and complete description of its trace in all its details. (Plate 21, Fig. 1.) The exterior side A A' is 360 meters. The perpendicular B V is one sixteenth of A A'. The faces are 110m. The flanks are traced as by Vauban, and are 45m. Draw E K' parallel to and 3.50m. from A A'. The main ditch is 30m. wide at the salients. One point of the counterscarp is determined by drawing D' G through the curtain angle D' and the extreme angle G of the demi-lune. S the point where it intersects K K' is a point of the counterscarp ; through it and tangent to the arc described from A, with a radius of 30m., draw Q S, it will be the counterscarp. Demi-lune. — The salient angle is 60°. It is an equilateral triangle, the side being 190m. One side is drawn through H' and H" points on the bastion faces at 30m. from the shoulder angle. The faces are 150m. ^ and end 10m. from the exterior side or line of the polygon. Reentering Place of Arms. — The angle is to be found from the prolongation of D'S G ; and also upon the line so drawn from the covering point V, as to make the angle P O'=60°, which determines the direction of the face P 0. The face P Q is parallel to the demi-lune counter- scarp, and 25m. from it. The prolongation of V 0, drawn from the covering point V, gives the magistral of the passage 0'. Cut in the Demi-lune. — Produce P 0, giving M. Erect M N perpendicular to the scarp. Demi-lune Redoubt. — Draw a line parallel to the scarp of the demi-lune, and 30m. from it; where it intersects the capital is the salient of the redoubt. The magistral of the cut, produced 24m., gives the extremity of the face of the redoubt. The line q, drawn through the covering point of the redoubt, gives the direction of the ramp of the demi-lune place of arms. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 187 Traverses of the Covered Way. — First traverse T : Draw the line ss' parallel to and 12in. from the demi-lime counterscari], and ee' parallel to, and Gm. from ss', ee' intersects the crest of the hastion reentering place of arms at a. If ^ye draw an intermediate line at 2.50m. from n, its intersection h with the crest of reentering place of arms produced, will be a point of the inte- rior crest of this traverse. Join h with the covering point V, and draw b c perpendicular to h V, and 6 c is the interior crest of the first traverse. Its thickness is 6ra. To get the passage around it, draw d g perpendicular to the capital, and at 6m. from it ; the parallel of gr ff is the "crotchet" or passage. Second traverse : Describe an arc of 6m. radius from g and draw V r tangent to it ; it intersects the counterscarp at I. Through I draw I V perpendicular to the tangent V r. This is the direction of the crest of the second traverse. Its thickness is 4m. — draw I" J!" parallel to 1 1' and 4m. from it. Through g draw gi/ until it intersects the second parallel £ s' , than draw //' perpendicular to the capital of the demi-lune, and take the point Z"at 2.50m. distance from g f and on I" I" it should also be 6m. from//'. If it is not, draw another line g f, and go through the same construction until a point of the line V I'" is obtained, which will satisfy the condi- tion of being 2.50m. from gf and. 6m. from//', these two lines will form a part of the interior crest. Lay ofi'4m. on//', from/ to w, and then describe an arc from co of 4m. radius. Join to with 7/ and we have the two lines of the passage around the traverse, or " crotchets' ' of the passage. The fronts of Haxo and Choumara give rise to similar reflections to those upon tlie innova- tions of casemates, &c., in the French bastioned system, yet we cannot refrain from noticing them, even should we have no other object than showing how far tliey are applicable, and in what degree the idea of these two talented French engineers may be regarded as appertaining to the bastioned system, at the same time that we give the views of an officer of the French Corps of Engineers, whose peculiar views are forcing themselves into notice from their merit. System of General Haxo, A. D. 1826.— (Plate 21, Fig. 2.) The observations we are about to make are in conformity with the concise description of this system published by Maurice de Sellon, there being no fortress yet built upon Haxo's plan, although he has had the opportunity of introducing many of his details. The exterior side of the polygon is 360 meters. The perpendicular is one ninth of the side, and the length of the faces of the bastion are one sixth of the same side. The tenaille is separated from the curtain and flanks six meters, and has six casemated guns on each flank. These case- mates, like all those of the terrepleins of this system are those bearing the name of the author, and represented in Plate 29, taken from the recently constructed detached forts about Lyons, where they are in general use ; and I may here add, that I saw them also in several new works of the other continental powers. This first enceinte of Haxo's is covered by two revetted counterguards, which extend past the flanks of the tenaille, and are connected by a mask of earth covering the masonry of the tenaille. In this manner the body of the place is made to consist of two enceintes ; the first formed by the counterguards and a curtain of earth ; and the second of a bastioned front, with a tenaille. The artillery being covered by the casemates of this author, he has been able to reintroduce the bat- teries of two and three tiers, of previous plans, and free from all their defects. Thus the bastion has three tiers of guns for firing simultaneously and in union with the counterguard. This author admits in his trace the ^5n'?tcipZe of making the directions of his parapets and terrepleins independent of the scarjjs, by which his high batteries are made to serve as traverses for the lower batteries and for the curtains. The bastions are divided into two parts by a ditch ten yards in width. The communications between the body of the place and its principal ditch are efi'ected by two ramps placed at the junction of the counterguards with the eartliern works of the tenaille. We must remark that the interior of the bastion is so occupied by the triple battery as to leave room neither for the construction of a new retrenchment or space to deploy the troops des- 188 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. tined to oppose the storming of the breach. Colonel Clavigo takes exception to the simulta- neous action of the triple tiers of batteries on the ground of danger from one firing over the other. As the gunners are effectually and entirely covered by the casemate arch, (see Figs. 1, 2, 3, and 4, of Plate 29,) I omit his criticism. In Fig. 1, I have given an example of a barbette battery (n or a') firing over a Haso casemate, (h,) showing very clearly that no apprehensions or anx- ieties can arise with any good reason in the minds of the gunners in the casem te h. The works on the outside of the ditch have a peculiar disposition. The large demi-lune and its redoubt are traced like Cormontaigne's, but the wings or branches terminate on the pro- longation of the faces of the redoubts of the reentering places of arms, closing with a wall the demi-lune gorge. The space between this gorge and the counterscarp of the main ditch is occupied by a glacis, partly prolonged in the direction of the demi-lune ditch, and terminated at about 6m. from the gorge of the latter work, forming a mask in continuation of the crest of the bastion counterscarp. Between these two glacis, and on the capital of the front, is a caponnier similar to Montalam- bert's, separated from these glacis by two lateral ditches. Its object is to sweep these glacis, the crowning of the reentering place of arms, and also to take the breaches of the counterguard in reverse. On the right and left, and at the extremities of these glacis, are the places of arms, the center of which is occupied by masonry casemated redoubts. The communications between all these parts are spacious and convenient, and so well commanded by the caponnier that the enemy cannot effect a lodgment in them without first destroying this work. The main ditch, through the lateral ditches, communicates with the ditch running between the wall of the demi-lune gorge and the foot of the glacis, and the ditch of the demi-lune is gained by a gentle ramp ; and, in addition, a species of narrow caponnier leads to the gate of the gorge of the redoubt of the reentering place of arms. Staircases built against the central caponnier allow an ascent from the main ditch to the caponnier ditch, from which the demi-lune redoubt is gained, and the ditch of the latter work also reached. Another sjiecial communication leads from the caponnier ditch to the cuts of the demi-lune, and a postern under this cut communicates with the ditches of the former. We see then, first, that imohstructed openings through the ditches of the demi-lune and its redoubt, with the ditches of the faces and curtain of the main work, have been completely closed, and that neither the bastion, the counterguard, nor the curtain can be breached, before taking all the exterior works ; second, that the latter will cost the besieger much time ; that he will have to resort to the mine to take the casemated redoubts of the reentering places of arms, and batter from his lodgments on them the covered artillery of the caponnier, until then intact. According to Maurice de Sellon, the duration of the defense of this front has been calculated at fifty-four days from the opening of the trenches. The author does not enter into the details of the mode of conducting the siege, but without doubt the greater part of this time must be considered as included in the taking of the exterior works, supported as they are by casemated fires. This circumstance does not allow us to apply to this system the analysis or siege scale of duration of the defense, which has served as a comparison in the previous modifications of the bastioned system. Since these works are of a distinct nature, they will require different means of attack ; the discussion of which is unnecessary to the object I have in view — that of making the present state of fortifications in France known to my readers, as I saw it. In our opinion tiiere are many points of similarity between the German system and General Haxo's ; and rather than a modification of the bastioned system, it might be considered as an application of the princi25les of the German traces. This system has not been applied to any of the numerous French fortresses, although some of them have been under the inventor's direction. His casemates alone (Plate 29) may be considered as adopted by the French school, replacing advantageously the blindages to be constructed during the first days of the siege. ART OV WAR IN EUROPE. 189 I append a description of the trace of General Haxo^ system to make it better understood. (Plate 21, Fig. 2.) The exterior side C Dzz:360 meters. The perpendicular is one ninth, =:: 40m. ^ to the point A- The flanks H F and E G are perpendicular to the lines of defense, and 53m. long. The faces D F and C E are 68m. long. The ditch between the bastion and counterguard is 15m. broad. The faces of the counterguard are 127m. long; their counterscarps being directed on the point of the perpendicidar A', at 35m. from the point C. The faces of the counterguard overlap the shoulder angles of the bastions 40m. The counterguard is divided at 77m. from the salient by a cut 5m. broad, leaving for a retired battery 45m. The exterior line of tlie counter- guard is 45m. from the exterior side of the bastion. The length of the curtain is 200m. Width of ditch between the tenaille and flanks =36m. Same between the tenaille and curtain =i:12m. The curtain of the tenaille=140m., its flanks=:12m., and its faces :^22m. The interior crest of its flank batteries :=: 20m. The main ditch in front of the counterguard is 20m. broad ; its counterscarp being directed on the perpendicrdar at the point ©, 17m. from C. Flanking Caponnier. — Its salient P is 95m. from C ; its faces are directed on points 5m. from the shoulder angles of tlie counterguard, and 27m. in length. Its flanks U' V are 33ni. The middle point of its gorge is on the lino joining the salients of the counterguard. The demi-lune is laid out on an equilateral triangle, having for its base the line M" M'", 255m. in length from points on the bastion faces 17m. from the shoulder angles. The demi-lune faces are 150m. long, divided to give the salient face 100m. and the cut 5m., and its termination 45m. for the demi-lune place of arms, the demi-gorge lines of which are each 55m. long, and directed on points 3m. in front of the shoulder of the casemated caponnier. The salient of the demi-lune redoubt is 50m. in advance of the salient P of the caponnier. The counterscarp W e'" and A' e' e" changes direction at the points e" and e'", distant 105m. from A' and B', in order to form the mash, and is then directed 10m. in front of the gorge of the casemated caponnier, ending 12m. from its flank walls. To find the point g, draw through X (the end of the perpendicular erected on the demi-lune face to determine the broken cut) and V, (the extremity of the flank of the demi-lune redoubt,) a line which, prolonged, will intersect the line A B of the counterguard salients at 6m. from the flank wall of the casemated caponnier. Next, to construct the redoubt of the reentering place of arms, the point e' being taken at 33m. from e", erect the perpendicular e' h, to the counterscarii at that point, giving it the length of 36m. Next draw h d perpendicular to h e', and produce it to intersect the magistral of the demi-lune in the point W; through W draw a parallel to the exterior side, and 2m. in rear of this draw the parallel W, which will give the point g, and the thickness of the mask, or rather the length of the wall / g. The face b d oi the redoubt of the reentering place of arms is 20m. long. The ditch of the demi-lune is 12m. wide within 90m. of its salient; in rear of this it is 16m. wide. CJioumara's System, A. D. 1846.— (Plate 21, Fig. 3.) While treating of the system of this engineer, we do not pretend to give a complete idea of it, nor to analyze the accuracy of the author's arguments to prove that its defense can be pro- longed to 100 days. The work of this author, " IJemoires sur la Fortification," has been eulogized by many writers of distinction, and even by the French Committee of Fortification. We have, however, nowhere read a complete analysis of his system, but only general reflections upon the most remarkable ideas set forth by him. Aware of the difficulty we should find in describing it briefly, and giving an opinion upon so grave a question, we confine ourselves to mere indications, with the sole aim of examining which of his principles have been admitted by the French school. 190 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 1. Independent scarps and terrepleins. — This principle, already in use before Choumara, has been developed by him, making it a special theory, and demonstrating the many and happy applications that can be made of it in any system. Taking up the bastioned trace, to which he gives the preference, he makes the foot of the scarp follow this trace, while in each bastion the parapets and terrepleins liave directions distinct from the scarps, according to the object they are intended to fulfill. Tlius, in the bastions_, he gives a return (a) to the parapets near the salient angle, forming a kind of lunette, the flank of which serves as a traverse for the contiguous portion v u, directed perpendicular to the ditch of the demi-lune. Breaking it again, he obtains another large shoulder, v' , for the remaining part of the demi-lune ditch. On the flank, and on the part near the shoulder angle, the parajjet is supported by the scarp, and serves as a large epaulement (L) for the other and interior parts of the outworks. This disposition gives a low corridor or gallery, (M,) covered by a parapet for musketry, which, in some parts, has sufficient space to admit of the establishment of a low battery. The author adds to this three large casemated traverses for cannon in each bastion, viz: in the salient and in each shoulder angle, the principal object of which is to annul the eflect of ricochet fire on those points where it was not obtained by breaking the line of the parapet. In an analogous manner are disposed the demi-lunes and redoubts of the reentering and salient places of arms, rounding in the latter the terrepleins and principal parapets at the salient angle to obtain fires of artillery in the direction of the capitals, and in the sectors otherwise destitute of fire. There is no doubt that by this method the efi'ect of ricochet fire, the most powerful means of attack, is greatly neutralized ; but to obtain this end we must suppose the bastion thus arranged to have faces and flanks of unusual extent, otherwise the space for the batteries and the interior space of the bastion would be inconveniently reduced to the manifest prejudice of the defense. To obviate this difficulty Choumara increases his front considerably, basing this change upon a second principle, which is — 2. That the lines of defense should not be regulated by the range of musketry. — The author founds this principle upon the fact that this arm cannot prevent siege works on the glacis, nor even of the passage of the ditch, and that artillery alone can impede tlie approaches of the besieger ; and that hence the range of field artillai-y should determine the dimensions of the front, giving it such length, that from the trench cavaliers to the flank, there should be a dis- tance of 500 meters, which is the point blank range of 4-pouuders. A front of 600 meters of exterior side would fulfill this condition. Choumara fixes it at 500, not to annul entirely the effect of musketry, (the recent improvements in tlie rifle musket were not then known.) This extent of front gives 166m. for the faces of the bastions, and by retiring the curtains in rear of the lines of defense, he obtains flanks of 85m. The great space in these bastions, allows also the construction of interior retrenchments, but tlie great extension of the front increases also the defensive properties, and to these we shall have occasion to refer hereafter. We are not aware how far the French school sanctions this innovation which militates against a principle hitherto regarded as incontrovertible, and which has served to determine the dimen- sions of the different lines of the bastioned system, namely : that the lines of defense should not exceed the effective range of the wall piece, computed at 280m. , this being the heaviest weapon that can be commodiously managed by the individual soldier on a minimum line of breast-heights. The greatest inconveniences would arise, from the impossibility of aj^plying a system of fortifications adapted to polygons only, of not less than 500 yards, or even of 400 yards. Thus for example, how could the principle of independent parapets be applied to the de- tached forts of Paris, most of their fronts being from 250 to 300 meters ? There was no option between a size entirely out of proportion to the intended object which Choumara' s fronts call for, and the simplicity belonging to the old bastioned fronts; and, again, several of these detached forts occupy commanding sites, as Forts Valerian, Bisetre, Nogent, Easny, and Noisy, ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. 191 for example ; to have adopted a system requiring fronts of 400 to 500 meters and upwards, would have thrown the defenses down the slopes of the hills, and in some instances into the valleys- (See Plate 3.) The impossibility of applying this system calling for such an extended front is even more strikingly exemplified in the detached forts about Lyons, (see Plates 4, 5, 6, and 7,) where the irregularity of ground is greater than around Paris. The site of Forts Loyasse, St. Irenec, and others, at Lyons, could not have been occupied by a system demanding such an extent of front to develop its principles. Belfort, another new and recent construction of the French engineers, in like manner could not have been fortified on this principle ; nor, indeed, is it sus- ceptible fully of application in the enceinte now under construction about Toulon and Havre. Third Princiiyle — Interior Glacis. — These glacis (F F, Plate 21, Fig. 3) in the ditches^ with masonry revetments on the inside, are separated from the scarps by a space of fifteen meters, which constitutes the main ditch. The altitude of the crest of their revetments is equal to that of the covered way, (and occasionally to that of the crest of the exterior glacis,) and from this crest descends to the foot of the counterscarp. These glacis extend throughout the ditch, closing the openings between the shoulder angles of the bastions and the flanks of the tenaille, and also extend about the slopes of the earthen caponnier (situated on the perpendicular) which leads to the demi-lune. One of the objects of these ditch glacis is to close the thoroughfare openings of the demi-lune ditches; and another, the principle one, to prevent the opening of a breach in the body of the place from the crest of the main glacis. It is sufficient to examine a profile to be convinced that a battery so placed can only see a small portion of the scarp, the ruins of which cannot fill the fifteen meter ditch which surrounds them, especially if the earth of the parapet does not rest on the coping of the scarp, and much less in the case where it is supported by relieving arches. These glacis, according to Choumara, will prolong the defense considerably; in eff'ect the besieger would 'reach the first counterscarp, and after effecting his descent of the ditch, would find himself at the foot of a new glacis, where he would have to construct approaches similar to those he found necessary for passing up the exterior glacis ; and this, after losing his enveloping position, and viewed in flank by the batteries of the tenaille and flank of the bastion. Having reached the crest of this sunken or interior glacis, he would then have to establish his true breaching batteries, and would have to eff'ect a new descent of the ditch. Choumara estimates the increase given to the defense by this glacis, as follows : In Cormon- taigne's system the besieger reaches the counterscarp on the fifteenth day, and debouches into the ditch ; from this point he only required eight days to take the place, altogether twenty-three, having employed thirteen from the first parallel. Supposing he finds now an interior glacis, he will have to repeat^ and in a worse position, the work he required to reach the breach from the third parallel ; the duration of the defense will then be twenty-three days — plus fourteen, or thirty-seven days. Although we cannot support our opinion by the authority of any writer of note, we do not hesitate to affirm that the result expected from the conception is much exaggerated by the author. In reality the besieger having reached the counterscarp, his first step must be the construction of the counter-batteries to destroy the flank and tenaille. The width of the ditch (45 meters) added to the width of the covered way, gives him a large space in which to establish this battery, and make it superior to that of the flank it is intended to destroy. If the disposition of the bastion has preserved the flank batteries intact, the construction of the counter-batteries will present great difficulties, and will employ more than the usual time; but we cannot admit the impossibility of its final construction. The battery established, and the battery of the opposite flank destroyed, the passage of the glacis, and tlie destruction of its sustaining wall by the mine, will become easy. The truth of this consideration appears to us evident on reflecting that, upon crossing the exterior glacis, the ground is swept by all the fires the place has been able to preserve ; whilst, to cross the interior glacis, the besieger has to con. tend with only the fires of the flanks, and these he ruins before beginning new works, just as if he had to cross an ordinary ditch. 192 ART OP WAR IN EUROPE. On tlie other liand the interior glacis coTers very satisfactorily the masonry of the scarps, with the exception of what it was most expedient to leave open, namely : the masonry of the flanks. Again, tlie ditch of 15 meters is not an obstacle of such a nature as to protect the place from a coup-de-main, after the destruction of a part of the scarp, and the partial filling in by its ruins. Finally we may ask, is the execution of this conception practicable ; nay, is it possible. The considerations of the author do not convince us that a due proportion has been observed between the earth, from the slight excavations of the front and its large terrepleins ; although, on this account, the scarps are constructed with relieving arches left empty. If to obtain this earth a greater width is given to the ditches, the objections become more grave, since there would be a proportional increase in the facility of crowning the counterscarp, and by destroying the flank batteries in order to advance subsequently over ground fully swept by direct fires. Great stress should not, however, be laid on the equalization of excavation and embankment, as by means of railroad transport the expense of procuring embankment beyond the trace, is inexpensive compared with the masonry structures of equal advantage of other systems. Fourth Principle. — Making military edifices enter into tlie system of defense, and serve as interior retrenchments ; the latter with a double object, namely, to serve as redoubts to the bastion, and as a defense of the gorge of collateral bastions, when the besieger has entered the place through one of them. This idea, previously suggested by Bousmard, has always been opposed by the majority of tlie partisans of the bastioned system, and admitted by very few ineers. We must regard it as foreign to tlie French school of the bastioned system, notwithstanding we find it adopted in the detached forts of Lyons, though upon a small scale, yet in many of the works ; and, in general, forming the curtain of the gorge front, as at Vitriolerie, Colambier, La Motte, Villeurbaume, Broteaux, Charpennes, &c., (see Plates 5, 6, and 7 ;) and in the last constructed of the detached works about Paris, where it has been admitted on the gorges of the redoubts of Faisanderie and G-ravelle ; an indication that it is growing in the estimation of the French engineers. (Plate 3.) Eesumc of Choumara's Proposed Improvements. The proposed improvements of the French bastioned front, delineated in Fig. 3, of Plate 21, are comprised in the following resume and outline : 1. A general disposition of the bastions to favor the interior defense, to prevent surprise, to put the besieged in a condition to sustain the assault upon the bastion exterior to its retrench- ment. 2. Particular disposition of the bastion attacked from the exterior, to be made after the front of attack is determined. (First retrenchment and second retrenchment.) 3. Tenaille, with flanks. 4. Interior glacis in the ditch of the enceinte, with cuts in the parts corresponding to the demi-lune ditch, {lo' .) 5. The demi-lune modified with retired parapets, and casemated traverses, &c., on the cajjital, (a! a.) 6. Redoubts of the places of arms of the covered way, detached from the counterscarp of the demi-lune ditch. 7. Redoubt of the salient place of arms of the bastioned covered way, with rounded parapet, corridor, chemin-de-ronde, &c., preferable to the sixth arrangement. 8. Redoubt of the salient place of arms of the demi-lune covered way, with rounded parapet, &c., (K K.) ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 193 9. Casemated traverses to cover the faces and flanks of the works, (a a, b h.) 10. Corridors and chemin-des-rondes generally. 11. Defensive barracks and magazines in the bastions, (I I,/' /'■) 12. Ditches of the retrenchments specially arranged. 13. Ditches of the bastions, demi-lune, and redoubts of the covered way specially arranged. 14. The crest of the covered way specially arranged, as also the exterior glacis. 15. Interior glacis along the covered way. 16. Interior glacis of the enceinte. 17. Special arrangement of the ramps of communication. Such are the various modifications Choumara considered necessary to perfect the most approved French system, in 1824. Comparison hetioeen the theoretic systems revieioed, and the recent practice of the French Engineers, as at Parts, Lyons, Grenohle, and Bayonne. The fortresses of Grenoble and Bayonne offer us examples of the different modifications of the bastioned system we have reviewed, and if not conforming to it in every respect, they show clearly the predominating idea and what delects in the bastioned system it has been endeavored to correct. We may venture to say that considerations connected with the importance of the jjlace, its situation in the defensive system of the country, as well as motives of economy, have had some direct influence in modifying the plans and conceptions of the authors of these defenses. The enceinte of Grenoble, situated on a plain on the left bank of the Isere, is comjjosed of fronts like that represented in Fig. 4, Plate 21, forming with each other rather obtuse angles. The body of the place consists of bastioned fronts with an exterior side of 360 meters. The scarps, constructed with relieving vaults, have a tier of loop holes for musketry. The ditch, 40m. wide, is divided in two 2)arfs by a mash of earth, one part dry with a width of 15m., and the other wet and dry at pleasure. This mask is connected with the tenaille, running parallel with the curtain and flanks, but in front of the latter it is lower. It is provided with a musketry banquette throughout. There is no military edifice in the interior of the bastions, nor have their parapets any casemates such as General Haxo, director of the place, executed in its citadel. On the outside of the ditch is the demi-lune of ordinary dimensions ivithout masonry revet- ment. Two small flanks j)arallel to the capital, detached and retired within the branches of the demi-lune to allow a j^assage between them and the extremities of the demi-lune, are destined to sweej) the interior of the reentering place of arms and protect a retreat from them. The opening of the demi-lune ditch, with that of the bastion face, is closed by a glacis, the gorge of which is a continuation of the counterscarp of the main ditch. Between this glacis and the scarp of the demi-lune there is a narrow ditch, which serves to connect the water of the ditch of this work with the main ditch, and over which the besieged may pass with facility. The main ditch has a dry passage by means of a caponnier extending from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, by which it is connected by a draw-bridge over a small wet ditch. The demi-lune and places of arms have no redoubts. The exterior of these fronts is nothing more than Haxo's ideal front, less the casemated redoubts of the reentering places of arms of the demi-lune redoubt, and the central casemated caponnier. The earthen mask is substituted for the one formed in Haxo's front by the counterguards and tenaille. We may then regard it as a simplification of General Haxo's front or as its application to marshy ground. These defenses of Grenoble are worthy of special notice in connection with this fact of wet and dry ditches, an idea so ably availed of by Coehorn in his systems. In the sequel we shall have occasion to notice the same princijjle at Lyons, and certain German works wherever the locality has admitted it. 194 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. If ditches constantly full are of more difficult passage than dry ones, in comparison with the latter they present many disadvantages which may be summed up in the three following: 1. Confining the defender in such a manner as to render his sorties and other offensive operations extremely difficult if not impossible. 2. Weakening greatly the defense of the works on the outer side of the ditch, from the retreat of their garrisons being compromised, and causing delay in retreat, they are abandoned before they have fulfilled the object for which they were constructed ; and 3. Because attacks with the bayonet against the passage of the ditch are out of the question, there being nothing to oppose it but fires from the parapet which may have been silenced before this time. Thus it is that Vauban condemns these ditches as the worst of all. But if, after the example of Coehorn, a dry ditch is placed behind a wet one the defects enumerated are greatly diminished, and new advantages become apparent for the besieged. In effect, dry ditches facilitate sorties, and the troops in retreat find a secure point to which the besieger will not dare to follow them, since, in this position, he would be exposed in every direction to the fire of the enceinte. From this dry ditch, at Grenoble, the besieger is opposed, by fires of very short and certain range, in all his efforts to cross the wet ditch. When the latter reaches the breach, and attemj)ts to penetrate through its narrow defile, the besieged can oppose him with every kind of resistance from the dry ditch. The circumstances, then, are most favorable ; whilst the assaulting column, confined to a narrow place, is not protected by his previously-constructed batteries, and draws no advantage from numbers. This front, at Grenoble, greatly facilitates sorties, considering the existence of ditches partly wet, because they are effected through the earthen caponnier ; on the other hand, the latter is open to the besieger, since there is no redoubt to check the pursuit to which sorties are exposed. The demi-lune and places of arms appear to facilitate the active operations of the besieged, rather than works intended for a first defense, in which the besieger will find himself alternately exposed to the fire from the walls and the attacks of the garrison. This idea, however, supposes the garrison to be strong and inured to war, and is in harmony, doubtless, with the part this work was destined to perform in the strategic operations for the defense of the South of France, before the extensive fortifications at Lyons had been fully matured. There are none of Haxo's peculiar casemates in the enceinte of Grenoble ; their introduction is limited to certain determinate positions ; for example, at the elevated front of La Bastille, the curtain of which forms a cavalier, looking over the narrow strip of ground that may be occupied by the besieger, and also in some of the reentering angles of the irregular enceinte of this fortress, and in one of the fronts of Fort Loyasse, at Lyons, constructed on a declivity. While Austria, Russia, and Prussia have adopted them in various localities, there are engineers who take exception to them, and Colonel Clavijo expresses himself as doubting the justness of the merit bestowed upon them. He says : " Intended, as they are, to cover the artillery on the terreplein, these batteries have been regarded as a sure means of protecting bastioned fronts from the effect of ricochet fire, restoring to fortification all the strength it had lost by the intro- duction of this fire." This indication is sufficient to show the importance of the question. These batteries (see Plate 29) consist of an arch, a part of which is horizontal and perpendicular to the face (c. Fig. 1) and the remaining part, (6,) toward the embrasure, sloping downwards. This arch is built on the terreplein, and against the parapet, giving the latter the profile represented in Fig. 1, for the purpose of covering the greater part of the masonry of the front of the casemate, and as seen in Fig. 4, and obliquely in Fig. 2. Cheeks to the embrasures are formed in the thickness of the parapet, as seen in plan in Fig. 3, and in section and elevation in the three other figures of this plate. Behind the casemate arch, in some localities, is a court or well, the bottom of which is considerably lower than the floor of the battery. It is walled up in rear, either to ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. . 195 sustaia another battery of the same construction or for an infantry parapet. At Fort Loyasse it was formed with a slope surmounted by an infantry parapet or artillery barbette battery, at pleasure, as a' a" a'" ; which construction I considered to allow the free escape of smoke and security under the casemate from shells falling on the slope a" a'", which, rolling in the ditch, can by bursting produce no material injury. The arch of the casemate, it will be observed, is covered with earth to make it bomb-proof. The advantages of this construction are in the mass of earth covering the front wall remedying one of the greatest inconveniences of the ordinary casemate, namely, protecting the men at the guns from fragments of masonry. The flanks of a bastion being arranged in this manner, the guns are protected from reverse, ricochet, and curved fires, and will be preserved intact to oppose the construction of the enemy's counter-batteries on the opposite salient. Colonel Clavijo then states his objections as being : Because a battery of two or three large howitzers established on the crowning of the opposite place of arms would be sufficient to demolish the thin mass of earth forming the embrasure in the parapet, leaving the front of the arch uncov- ered ; and second, the terreplein of the flanks being occupied by these constructions, and the besieger having gained the bastion, the high parts would be occupied, and the defense of a temporary retrenchment in the gorge of the bastion would become impossible ; and third, the flanks are entirely deprived of the fire of musketry ; and finally, that the mass of earth can be destroyed before the battery is brought into action. Why not establish it as usual behind the scarp of the flank, and leave the terrepleins clear for their final defense? Colonel Clavijo adds: We cannot think that General Haxo's intention has been to generalize the use of his casemates, as his commentators pretend ; nor does the aijplication of them by this engineer authorize the belief. I am quite sure these objections would not have been stated had Colonel Clavijo seen these batteries in a finished state. From the drawing now presented — which corresponds with the construction as I saw it at Lyons, in 1856 — a battery of Haxo's design occupies no additional space whatever on the rampart ; while infantry fire combined with the ordinary barbette battery can be obtained, (as in Fig. 1, Plate 29,) without occupying more space than would be called for by a cJiemin-de-ronde, or the detached scarp ; and they certainly possess the merit of pre- serving the artillery intact against every other than an embrasure shot, ready to counteract the construction of batteries intended to destroy them. Batonne. (Plate 21, Fig. 5.) The hornwork constructed latterly upon the front of attack of the citadel of the fortifications' of Bayonne, presents us another remarkable bastioned front. Difi'ering from the generality of these works, its ditches do not communicate with those of the citadel, but become extinct or lose themselves in the glacis, afl'ording at these points two reenterings, which remove all apprehensions of the work being attacked by its gorge. The front of this hornwork, constructed on a side of from 360 to 400 meters, is bastioned, and the only novelty it ofi'ers, is, that the earth of the parajDet is not thrown forward and supported by the crest of the scarp, but leaves a chemin-de-ronde or communication between the exterior slojje of the parapet, and a part of a loop-holed detached scarp. The latter is strengthened by arches resting on abutments, and at difi"erent intervals there are traversed walls which divide the branches in equal parts — or a Carnot wall from the terreplein of the chemin-de-ronde to its crest ; a profile in common use in the detached forts at Lyons, as in section E F, Plate 7, of Fort Colombier, E, F, G, H, of Fort La Motte, (same Plate ;) C D, of Fort Broteaux ; and, indeed, in some part or other of nearly every work at Lyons ; as, also, in the German system as at Ehrenbreitstein outworks, and numerous others already described. The postern of the hornwork front at Bayonne, is covered by an ordinary tenaille with a similar profile. 196 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. The exterior works are those which offer most novelty of construction, and distinguish this front from the usual bastioned front. The demi-lune traced, as in Cormontaigne's system, has two small flanks, and ends at a certain distance from the counterscarp of the main ditch. Its gorge is closed by a loop-holed wall on the bastioned trace. The center of the latter is occupied by a small semicircular masonry redoubt, with two floors for musketry fire, and admits, at most, of three small pieces of artillery. The covered way has no redoubts, either in the salient or reen- tering places of arms. The demi-lune ditches are closed by traverses "en glacis," which prevent breaching the face of the bastion from the glacis of the salient of the demi-lune. These glacis traverses are con- nected with the interior of the reentering places of arms, and on the opposite side descend along the gorge of the demi-lune, terminating near the central caponnier. Throughout this extension of glacis communication, the counterscarp of the main ditch is revetted only to the planes of these ramps, presenting a gentle glacis as far as the reentering places of arms, that columns of all arms may reach the covered way in the best formation. The space over which these troops advance and retire is under the fire of the flanks, and the loop-holed wall of the demi-lune gorge prevents the work being surprised on that side. This disi^osition of itself gives a new character to the bastioned system, facilitating an active defense so incompatible with the staircases of Cormontaigne, and to a certain extent they are the application of Noizet's conception, simplified by the suppression of the redoubts of the places of arms and of the demi-lune. It will be observed, that the gorge of the demi-lune is traced as a bastioned front /actngr to the rear or towards the curtain ; all parts of which are retired from view along the entire covered way, the flanks of which have a direct commanfl of the faces of the bastions and any breach made in them. Some of my brother officers will recognize in this front similar arrangements to a plan adopted by a majority of a Board of Engineers for Sandy Hook, New York harbor. Clavijo says, considering the " ensemble" of this hornwork, it is in his opinion a model of this class of exterior works, infinitely suijerior to anything we find in the enceinte bastioned system. In place of the small fronts that were generally given to these works, it has here the advantageous proportions of a large front, and the ditches of the wings offer no means either of approaching the work on which they rest. As an exterior work, it is in harmony with the sys- tem of spacious free communications given to it, rendering it susceptible of the most active defense. He objects, however, to the strength of the small work of masonry as a redoubt, the musketry of which will not prevent a lodgment in the breach by the besieger, who can destroy the masonry reduit with comparatively small pieces. With greater strength and capacity to admit a respect- able battery, the resistance of the demi-lune could have been considerably increased. Considering the front, under any point of view, we find in it the defects connected with the bastioned system, as the indefensible state of its covered ways, the exposure to ricochet of all the terrepleins, the absence and want of covered batteries to preserve their fires for the defense of the ditches and for the defense of the interior retrenchments, whether the latter consist of military edifices or any other work ; in short, to preserve the artillery of the work for the moment it is most wanted, that of opposing the construction of the very batteries that are to destroy the masonry of the work. Paris axd Ltoxs. (Plates 3 and 4.) These two great modern places of arms of France, so analogous under many stragetic points of view, present very essential differences in their fortifications. A comparison instituted between their respective works becomes, therefore, of the greatest interest to the professional engineer ; and we consider this the best means of judging of the actual state of fortification in that country. We consider them analogous, first, on account of the great extent of the works and popu- lous cities they defend ; and next, on account of their object in the defensive system of the country. Paris is to the north-northeastern frontier what Lyons is to the southeast; and just ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 197 as the first of these cities would be the main ohject of an invasion from the north of Germany, so would Lyons become one from the Upper Khine or the north of Italy. These two cities, secured against any attack, not accompanied by great trains of heavy artillery and great numerical force, the defensive armies, without apprehension for the fate of these two important points, find themselves in the most favorable position to oppose their adversary in the field, and to check the progress of their invasion from the frontiers ; and when, after a series of reverses, the active army can no longer keep the field, either of these two points ofiers a strong position to resist or repel the enemy, and probably change the face of the campaign. The stragetic influence of armies and fortifications in Europe, and especially in France, is materially blended with the nature of government. The capture of Paris seems to be the conquest of the country, even more disorganizing and disastrous to the continued energies and resistance of the nation than the capture of the Emperor and his military council with an army corps in the field. Hence it is that Paris must be secured, and hence also the impossibility of similar stragetic strongholds ever being necessary in our country. The interest we have in the subject is that of the science of fortification and the application hy the French school of its principles. The two places now under consideration have efiected a change in the defensive system of the territory ; and thus it is that all fortifications of modern construction in France are located in a direct relation with this new conception. Hhe general plan oi i\ie fortifications for both places had naturally to be, and has been, made the same. This consists of a contintious enceinte, protecting the city from storm, and a surrounding girdle of exterior forts, intended to fulfill two important objects: first, to j^revent the bombardment of the city ; and, second, the establishment of a great retrenched camp under the guns of the place, in which the numerous garrison it is supposed to contain may combat with advantage, notwithstanding its numerical inferiority. But even admitting the first basis, still the problem is not solved. It remains to determine the relative strength that should exist between the two lines of defense. The first continuous enceinte might be one that would be merely sufiicient to resist a '^^ coup de main," and not calculated to sustain a second defense, which would be out of the question, considering the overpowering means at the disposition of the besieger, already the conqueror of a stronger line, and actuated by the wealth and treasures of such a city. The line of forts is, then, the true line of defense of the place, and upon these lines must be accumulated all the most efficacious defensive means, whilst the enceinte is like a large redoubt, containing resources destined to reinforce the points of the advanced line that are most threatened. On the other hand, the first enceinte might be regarded as the principal line of defense, and the exterior forts as destined for a first and secondary resistance, or as occupying points favorable for the attack. The difi'erent hypotheses to be adopted as a basis, according to the circumstances in which the armies in the field may be placed, and according to the numerical strength of the garrisons of the places, must determine these relations ; and the different mode of appreciating these by difi'erent engineers, has produced the difi'erent plans proposed for the fortifications of Paris. We shall now compare the fortifications of these two places, and first — Paris. (Plate 3.) The enceinte of this city takes the form of a large pentagon, upon the unequal sides of which are traced ninety-four bastioned fronts, disposed as a consequence upon right lines, with five general changes of direction. These fronts 360 meters on the exterior side, and in accordance with Cormontaigne's trace, are revetted with a scarp of 10 meters in height, oivery indifferent rubble masonry within, faced by a soft stone in courses of eight to ten inches, supporting the solid earthen rampart and parapet. The ditch has a width of 25 meters, the counterscarp a height of 6 meters, and not revetted, and with a slope of 45°. On the outside of the ditch there is no exterior work, simply a glacis. 198 ART OF WAK IN EUROPE. separated by a slight berrn from the counterscarp, which time is rapidly reducing to the common slope of the counterscarp. The glacis covers the masonry of the scarps but partially. Behind this enceinte, the perimeter of which exceeds eight French leagues, runs a wide military road, from which ramps ascend to the bastions and curtains. Between this road and the last houses of the city large spaces have been retained for military edifices and rendezvous of troops, now rapidly encroached upon by city improvements. The interior of the bastions is entirely clear, with the exception of a few, in which it has been found necessary to construct earthen cavaliers, either for the defilement of the adjacent terrepleins, or of the military road, or to batter and command the hollows on the exterior. This enceinte,' notwithstanding its simplicity, is said to have cost two thirds the total value of the city, independent of the national edifices. The circumstance of presenting many fronts on a right line, rendered necessary by its extension, increases considerably its strength, protecting most of its faces and curtains from ricochet, and depriving the besieger of a principal advantage, that of enveloping and concentrating all his efforts to a center. The absence, however, of demi-lunes greatly impairs this advantageous disposition of fronts on a right line, depriving the fronts of all cross fires, leaving them only direct fires, which are no stronger beyond the ditches than fronts composed of right lines, or "en cremailUere," with the exception of good flanking defenses of the ditches ; which, it must be observed, are all liable to ricochet fire, and to be overwhelmed by vertical fire also. Lyons. (Plate 4.) The enceinte of this place does not surround the city as completely as that of Paris ; the hilly nature of the surrounding ground and the rivers somewhat modifying this element. Nevertheless it may be considered as doing so, with respect to its principal and most central position, and serves as a last retrenchment or strong central point of the great entrenched camp formed by the detached forts. This central part is closed on the north by an enceinte running from the Soane, from oppo- site Fort Loyasse, in an easterly direction to the Khone ; on the southwest by a similar enceinte closing the great hilly bend formed by the Soane, resting on Fort Loyasse and the river at one extreme, and bastion No. 1 on the Soane at the other extreme ; and on the east its only interior continuous defense is the Ehone. The first of these two lines, called the old enceinte or lines of Croix Kousse, consists of a loop-holed wall (Plate 6) twenty-five feet in height, and from three and a half to four feet in thickness, flanked by eight small bastions, having between them a mean distance of 300 meters. These bastions or species of ancient towers, projecting very little from the wall, have faces of thirty meters, and retired fianks of about twelve meters, and have all been recently modified with a view to the following results : First. To obtain casemated fires to flank the curtains, preserving those of the upper part, which are partly covered by the orillons of the bastions. Second. The prolongation of the flanks towards the inferior, and the construction of barracks in their gorges, form so many strong points closed in by the gorge with bomb-proof shelters for troops and munitions of war ; thus flanking the interior of the curtains in case the work be taken through a breach thereon — the interior arrangement of these bastions varying in consequence of their ancient form and size. Should time and other duties permit, a more detailed description of all the works of this place will be given. The Orleans bastion, or No. 7 (Plates 4 and 6) of this line, is worthy of particular mention. This is a lunette, the gorge of which is closed by a barrack connected with the curtains on the right and left. The faces consist of masonry scarps, backed by two and three tiers of casemates for artillery and musketry, being a bomb-proof casern throughout. In the salient the masonry of the scarp is broken towards the interior on the upper tiers to obtain artillery fire on the capital. Thus we have in this new labor of the French school a work, in its general construction and use, analogous to the masonry bomb-proof caserns in the center of the fronts of the German system. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 199 The enceinte of Fauviers, (Plates 4 and 5,) constructed nearly new, is much more regular. It consists of six bastions, united by curtains, none of the fronts having a regular symmetrical trace ; the second one is a large casemated bomb-proof battery of two tiers of fire, the lower for musketry, and the ujaper for artillery, surmounted by a barbette battery. The half bastion No. 1 (Plate 5) has its long branch disposed in a similar manner ; the remainder of the latter and the curtain uniting it to bastion No. 2 have the usual profile with relieving arches ; and behind the whole front runs a wall which closes the gorge and separates it from the city. Bastion No. 4 has the usual profile with relieving arches, and two earthen epaulements parallel with the flanks to protect them from reverse fire. The gorge is closed by a loop-holed wall, and casern, firing towards the city. In this enceinte the intention is manifest of constructing no works out- side the ditches. Upon comparing these constructions with those of the continuous enceinte of Paris, we cannot avoid being struck with the different nature of each, and the Lasis of instruction at the Engineer School at Metz. The Paris enceinte is a simple bastioned trace, whilst here we have batteries, casemated or covered from the enemy by orillons, and intended to flank the curtains, consisting frequently of a simple loop-holed wall; and again bomb-proof shelters, and other casemated batteries placed in certain localities for the purpose of battering distant points — the prominent features of the German system. Which of the two best fulfills the object, and what may be the motives of these differences, emanating from the same corps of engineers, are points we shall not touch upon at present. Let us pass on to the exterior forts of the two places, these being the best evidences of the ideas we are endeavoring to investigate. Exterior or detached forts of Paris. (Plate 3.) The second line of defense of thi. /"_ lace consists of sixteen detached forts, to wit: 1. Three forts around St. Denis, forming of this point an independent defensive position, next to which is the Fort d'Aubervilliers, between the roads leading to the north-northeastern frontier. 2. On the right of the latter are four forts surrounding the heights of Montreuil, occupying the summits of the plateau and resting upon the Marne. The ancient Castle of Vincennes is the central point and the arsenal of this second position. Thus this eastern side of Paris is a great battle field and camp ground, fortified by permanent works, between which are several permanent redoubts, on sites commanding ravines or hollows not seen from the forts. The value of this position would be greatly increased by field works constructed under their cooperating influence during an impending siege, and this battle field occupied in proper force might be victoriously disputed against a greatly superior numerical force. 3. The redoubts of Faisanderie and G-revelle, united by an earthern rampart with strong profile, occupy a narrow neck of land formed by a great bend of the Marne, preserving the com- munication between Fort de Nogent, on the heights of Montreuil, and Fort de Charenton, between the Marne and the Seine, together with this avenue of approach, covering the rear of the position of Montreuil and keeping up the communication with the next or 4 group. 4. The line of five forts covering the south of Paris, occupying the great highways that radiate from the capital through this extended line. The west side of the city, twice covered by the Seine, was judged sufficiently protected by the Fort of Mont Valerian, occupying the center of all this line from Fort d'Isly around to St. Denis. An enemy would not venture an advance into the bends of the river. This is also the side opposite the line of probable invasion, a circumstance of much importance in connection with a place of such immense development. Two more forts have been contemplated to occupy points on this line between Mont Valerian and St. Denis, and opposite St. Cloud and Sevres. On an average these forts are 2,000 meters from the continuous enceinte, and about the same distance apart. They are all connected by a military road affording speedy communication between each. An army surrounding Paris within cannon range of the detached forts, would o 200 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. not occupy less than ten leagues. It is not hazarding much to say that in the event of a truly national loar, embodying all the resources and interest of the nation, these fortifications of Paris would render it impregnable against any alliance that could be formed against her, and in that light fulfill all the conditions the science of the engineer can ofler in defense of the capital and, in this case, heart of the Empire. We now advert to the nature of the forts, in like manner as we have done with the enceinte. They have four or five fronts each, the size varying according to the capacity it was deemed necessary to give the former. As an example of the quadrangular works, we shall cite Fort I'Est, at St. Denis. It is constructed upon a rectangle, with sides of 300 to 350 meters. The trace is the bastioned one, as prescribed by Vauban for these polygons. The height of the scarp is ten meters, and the counterscarp from six to seven, and the ditch twenty-five meters wide, nearly. The parapets rest directly against and over the scarps throughout its perimeter, with the exception of part of the front facing the city of St. Denis, and the opposite parallel front, which have their parapets and ramparts thrown back, and the superior part of the scarp loop-holed for infantry fires from a chemin-de-ronde , formed by thus throwing back the rampart on the faces and flanks, and on the curtains as far as the casemates. On the curtain of the gateway front are five casemates, where the parapet is again brought forward and over the scarp, through the center one of which is the entrance, with a Poncelet draw-bridge, with solid earthen bridge or road across the ditch, with slopes of 4.5°. On the terreplein of the work and on the right and left of the entrance is a three-story casern for officers' quarters. On the covered way of the gateway front is a reentering place for arms, in which is a masonry crennated tambour, through one face of which the road passes. The counterscarps of the entire work are earthen slopes. The curtain opposite the gateway has, in like manner, five casemates on the center, one of which is a communication with the ditch. Its gate is covered by a tenaille, from whence there is a communication to the reen- tering place of arms of the covert way, in which, as on the gateway front, is a masonry tambour, with walls two feet six inches thick, crennated, of two faces, two short flanks, and a closed gorge. The crest of the glacis is cut en cremailliere, to throw more infantry fire on the salients in the direction of Fort d'Aubervilliers. The fronts on the right and left are similar, with scarps surmounted by earthen parapets on full ramparts on the faces and flanks, the curtains being casemated, with eleven caserns each, having a door and two windows on the jDarade in each casemate, with loop holes firing into the ditch. There is a communication from the center casern to the bottom of the ditch, and thence, under cover of an open caponnier, to the covert way, with a reentering place of arms in the covert way. The crest of the glacis is cut en cremailliere, as the other fronts, to throw the fire on the salients. Parallel to the curtain oppo- site the entrance is a large three-story casern, not bomb proof. A magazine, within a yard inclosed by a brick wall, is located in the gorge of the northeast and southeast bastions. The covered way of this work is connected with the canal embankment by a covered communi- cation. Eight y-poimder guns are mounted in this work, as well as at Fort de la Breche, and others, of same caliber, are in depot for mounting, together with guns of lighter caliber. The inclosed forts on the east side of Paris are in general fortified rectangles from the bend of the Seine near St. Denis up to the Marne, and similar in details and principles to the one just described, with the exception of Fort d'Aubervilliers, which is an irregular pentagon, the sides of which are 250, 280, and 350 meters, about. The four forts on the crest of the heights of Montreuil have advanced works, extending forward, to occupy the entire plateau of the small spurs on which these forts are located, to command parts of the slopes not battered by the forts ; for which purpose the redoubts before referred to had also to be constructed. The problem of defense for this entire line of heights, covering Montreuil, is particularly ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 201 interesting to the engineers as a study, to aid which I am fortunately enabled to accompany this report with an exceedingly accurate plan, (Plate 3,) giving the horizontal curves of the ground from the surve3's and publications of the department of the Seine. Among the detached forts surrounding the city on the south, are five jjcntagonal ones : that of Charenton, situated on level ground, being nearly regular, with sides of about 300 meters. Powder magazines are constructed in the gorge of each bastion, and on the three least assailable fronts are two barracks and two sets of quarters for officers, the details of which conform with those represented in Plates 30, 31, and 32. In other respects the disposition of the fort is the same as the one heretofore described. The fort on Mont Valerian is also constructed upon a pentagon, but its sides are greater than any of the others, being from 350 to 400 meters. This hill was so conical as not to give suffi- cient space to occupy its summit with a defensive work, yet it was necessary to occupy as high ground as practicable to command the adjacent and surrounding country ; hence the line of its magistral, although horizontal, is some distance down the slope of the hill, leaving its summit as a great traverse and parados for the whole interior of the work. The summit of the hill forms a second terreplein, which is partially surrounded with an earthen parapet, and upon which is located bomb-proof quarters, as given in Plate 30, 31, and 32, and storehouses for artillery, munitions, and equipments. Like all the rest, it has no demi-luncs, and only small places of arms opposite the center of its fronts, with masonry counterscarps, and covered ways on four fronts. In the bastions are high cavaliers, in a great measure amounting to a second work within the first trace, on the slope of the hill, that elevates the crest far above the usual height of bastion cavaliers. The irregularity of the ground has caused a departure from parallelism in the faces and flanks of these elevated parapets, compared with those of the main inclosure ; and the same cause has introduced changes in the profile of the rampart, not only on the several fronts, but difierent parts of the same front. For example^ on the gateway curtain there is no other defense than musketry from behind the crest of the scarp, which forms a stone parapet of three feet six inches thick, backed by an earthen banquette, which is continued on each flank and a short distance on each face. The flank on the right of the gateway, looking from the work, is thrown back from the scarp joining that of the face of the bastion, which extends in the usual manner over the scarp. On the left, there is a similar retired flank connected with the faces of the bastions also thrown to the rear, giving the cJiemin-de-ronde on the faces and flanks of this bastion, witliin which is a high cavalier. Tlie scarps and counterscarps of this i'ront are of solid masonry, with a tambour of masonry covering the head of the bridge connecting with the main gate, and no covert way. Another front has the parapet of both its faces thrown to the front over the scarp, with those of the flanks and curtain thrown back to give the chemin-deronde, and the top of the scarp finished three feet six inches thick, serving as the infantry para23et. A cavalier in the right bastion has its flank on this front, prolonged to the rear to intersect the steep slope of the natural surface of the hill ; while in the left bastion the cavalier flanks are prolonged greatly to the rear, and terminated by a ramp commencing in rear of the curtain and ascending behind this cavalier to the upper plateau. Tliere is a bomb-proof communication under tliis cavalier from one flank to the other in this bastion, connected with one on the line of the capital leading to the gorge ; serving, I presume, as shelter to the troops only. The coun- terscarp of this front is of masonry, with a narrow covert way and glacis coupe on the left ; the prolongation of which gives a ditch through a spur of the hill. In the reentering place of arms is an open masonry loop-holed reduit, with small retired flanks. The descent to the ditch on this front, is by a covered masonry staircase, from the cliemin-de-ronde on the curtain, and the com- munication from its postern across the ditch is covered b}^ a slight tenaille and caponnier to the counterscarp. On another front tlie profile again differs. Upon it there is a double earthen parapet along the whole front, with a chemin-de-ronde on tlie curtain, and flanks in addition ; the sui^erior 26 D 202 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. parapet along the curtain, being a junction of the bastion cavalier flanks. The counterscarp and covert way, with the communications, are in this case similar to the preceding front. In the salients of one of these bastions, and in the salient of the corresponding covert way, are mounted 9i-IXCH LOXG GUNS. The trace of this front is peculiar, in this : that the faces of the bastions produced, fall upon and intersect each other on the center of the face of the scarp of the curtain, and intersect the earthen parapet of the flank about twenty feet in advance of the curtain angle. The prolonga- tion of the face of the scarp of the curtain divides this flank in nearly equal parts. Another front still differs, although arranged on precisely the same jirinciples. The draw-bridge is that of Poncelet ; a correct drawing of the hand-rail of which may be found in Volume 16, Plate 4, of the French Memwial du Genie, maneuvered with the bridge ; a detail we have entirely neglected. A good outline of three of the fronts of Fort Valerian, is given in the Memorial du Genie, Volume IG, Plate 14, Fig. 11 ; which, although intended to illustrate another subject, is very correct. To judge of the strength of these forts satisfactorily, let us consider one of them isolated and without any protection from troops in the field, and we will find : first, that in all the fronts, not exceding 300 meters, the flanking is very imperfect, the scarp being ten meters high ; second, for want of demi-lunes the capitals of the bastions are entirely deprived of fires, except indi- rectly from contiguous posts and by expedients. The bastions are so small, especially in the four- sided jjolygons, that retrenchments are impossible ; and the barracks, constructed without any defensive object, cannot supply the place of retrenchments. An exception to this exists in the redoubts of Faisanderie and Gravelle, where a defensive casern occupies the center of the gorge. Maurice, in his Memoir, has calculated the theoretic duration of the siege of one of these pen- tagonal forts at fifteen days, or four days less than an octagon of Vauban trace. Let us now glance at the organization of the detached forts of Lyons, and examine in what they difler from those just cited, bearing in mind they are all the conception and execution of the officers of the present corps of French Engineers or their cotemporaries and immediate successors. Forts of Lyons. — (Plates 4, 5, 6, and 7.) In these we must distinguish three classes : First, forts on level and low ground with facili- ties for filling their ditches with water. Such are the nine on the left bank of the Rhone, (see Plate 4,) commencing with La Vitriolerie, down the river below the city, and ending with St. Laurent, above the city. Secondly, those situated on high ground and having few irregularities, as the Forts Montessuy and Caluire in advance of tlie enceinte of Croix Eousse; and thirdly, those situated on high and qiiite irregular ground, as Fort Loyasse on the river (Soane) and terminating the enceinte of Fourvi^rs, and those on the crest of the hill in advance of this enceinte following the course of the Soane. Forts on the left bank of the lihone. The first thing that strikes the attention in tliese forts is the combination of wet and dry ditches. Elsewhere we have alluded to the advantage the defense derives from this disposition. Fort of Villeurhanne. — The exterior enceinte of this fort (Plate 7) is composed of four bastioned fronts, connected with two branches forming an obtuse angle, (reentering,) covered by a counterguard. Its scarp is principally an earthen slope, rising from the wet ditch, of seventy feet wide, the level of the water being five feet below and the crest being thirty feet above the level of the site, the flanks of the most exposed fronts being casemated and hence revetted. The reentering angle of the two branches is also revetted and casemated for three guns each side of the reentering. We invite attention to this disposition of batteries much used by Montalembert ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 203 and the German engineers, as well as in our own most recent casemated sea-coast forts, to wit: that of iilacing a gun on the flank and the adjacent gun on the curtain in such close proximity as that the blast from one endangers the explosion of the cartridge that may be in the hands of the gunner loading the other — a dis23osition much ojjposed by European engineers, although adopted in our service as of no consideration. It is not too late for us to reconsider this question in many works remaining to be constructed. The main entrance is in the west front through a large casern in the center of the curtain, with draw-bridge communication to the exterior. The south front has a cut in its curtain revetted with masonry, being more retired and with less elevation. The cut is defended from the interior redoubt, as on the north front and in the Fort of La Motte. In the bastions of the east front are two traverses, starting from the middle of the faces, running parallel to the capital. The space between them has a raised terreplein serving as a barbette cavalier, giving so much additional flank along the glacis of the opposite bastion and capital. The terreplein of these bastions at the gorge is arranged as a glacis to the interior redoubt. The north front is precisely similar to the south. The northwest front, as we have said, is the only one not bastioned. The semi-bastions formed by the junction of the north and northwest fronts are covered by the counterguard of earth without revetment and with a wet ditch . The interior face of the rampart of this second enceinte which forms the counterscarp of the first or interior work is constructed with relieving vaults, affording a loop-holed gallery with a tier of reverse fires over the dry ditch. This gallery communicates with the casemated batteries of the flanks of the east front. The redoubt or interior enceinte takes the form of a trapezium ; the side parallel to the front of attack (or eastern side) is slightly broken and thrown to the rear from the center to obtain room on the capital for a casemated caponnier to flank the scarps and ditch, having two guns in each flank on the lower floor and loop holes on the upper floor, the faces loop-holed on both floors. Other caponniers are constructed with one face on the line of the gorge front to flank the ditches of the north and south branches of this interior work, with one gun and loop holes, and are similar to those of the German system. The gorge is flanked from a projecting part in the center of a large barrack on the middle of the front. The scarp on the north, south, and east faces of this interior work is in part detached from the rampart, forming a chemin-de-ronde, the terreplein of which is about seven feet below the crest, with loop holes through the masonry for infantry fire, and occasionally machicoulis to defend the foot of the scarp in front of a postern, and arranged with masonry traverses. The defensive caponni.ers of the west front are entirely covered with earth. The interior redoubt has a command of about fifteen feet over the crest of the exterior enceinte. The defensive barrack will accommodate about 500 men ; and the armament of the work consists at present of four IG-jiounders, ten iron guns of various calibers, sixteen howitzers, and seven mortars. Such is the organization of nearly all the forts on the left of the Rhone, with slight differ- ences, arising from locality. (See the plans of Forts Vitriolerie, Colombiere, Broteaux, Char- pennes, La Motte, and Tete d'Or, on Plate 7.) The forts of the second class are Montessuy and Caluire. The principal one is Montessuy, situated on the highest part of the peninsula, near the steep bank of the Rhone, (Plate 4,) com- manding the surrounding country, the manufacturing district of Croix-Rousse, and a part of the city. The fort is constructed on an irregular quadrilateral, with sides of 190, 120, and 180 meters in length. The fronts are all bastioned, and with a solid earthen rampart, with loop- holed detached scarps of twenty-five feet, and chcmin-de-ronde, with masonry traverses. It has 204 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. a dry ditch, eighty feet wide, and eighteen feet of revetted counterscarp and covered way of slight elevation, surrounding the entire work. In the covered way of the south front, through which the work is entered, is a small place of arms, with its reduit of masonry and guard-house. The ditch of the curtain of this front is excavated in the j^rolongation of the planes of fire from the flanks, leaving a crest at the height of the draw-hridge, as a communication from the place of arms intercepted hy the draw-hridge. The very short curtain made this necessary, that the hottom of the ditch might he swept from the flanks. The other three fronts offer no peculiarities. The four hastions are empty, with barhettc batteries at the salients. Ui)on the terrejilein, and parallel with the curtain of the south front, are large caserns for artillery stores. The loop-holed chemin-de-ronde, behind the scarp, is similar to those previously described, with machicoulis at the center of the curtain over the postern of the south front ; and others at the extremes of this curtain to command the dead angles arising from its limited length. The barrack, which is a defensive one, like those in the other forts, occupies nearly the center of the terreplein, and inclosed by a rampart of earth, one of whose sides is the curtain of the east front. This rampart, surmounted by a jjarapet, has a command of thirty-six feet over the natural level, producing a very long exterior slope on this curtain, the crest of the parapet being in a plane with the second floor of the barrack. This high rampart is continued across the work north of the barrack to the curtain of the west front, along which it is returned a short distance, and to a line with the side of the barrack. A short return of the south line of this rampart connects it witli the southwestern corner of the barrack ; the whole forming an interior retrenchment and reduit. The magazine is under the terreplein of the north branch of this retrenchment, the rampart of which is made very wide, admitting of these bomb-proofs. The door is placed in the postern which communicates between the north and west and south fronts. The communication between the north and south fronts on the east is secured bj^ the chemin- de-ronde of the eastern front, access to it being had by small posterns, with stairways in the angles of the flanks. A large cistern is built under the barrack. The latter is three stories, loop-holed with a masonry parapet on the roof, giving four tiers of musketry fire, and calculated for 500 men. The armament of this fort was sixteen 24-pounders, five 12-pounders, six mortars, twenty- three 9-pounder howitzers, and six pieces of diflerent calibers in the bastions. At the foot of the glacis of the reentering angle of the covered way of the north front, is a small irregular lunette of masonry, on the flanks of which are two casemates each for a single gun, and in front of them (the flanks) a small revetted ditch. The faces of this lunette are also covered with a ditch with masonry counterscarp. The scarp of the faces is loop-holed, with relieving arches on the interior, and surmounted by a parapet. The gorge is closed by a loop- holed wall and a small guard-house. A large lunette of masonry, similar to one in Fort Charjiennes, exists about 170 yards in advance of the small one on this same north front. The scarps are surrounded by a parapet for musketry, with barbettes at the salients. There is a reverse fire of musketry from the counter- scarp and posterns under the ditch. A system of mines and galleries is formed under the glacis. The defensive barrack is placed in the gorge, and serves to flank it. An underground gallery communicates from this lunette to the fort. The forts on the right bank of the Soane will aflbrd us types deviating still further from the bastioned system. Fort St. Irene, for example, is a lunette, closed at its gorge with a defensive barrack (Plate 5) in its center, the latter forming the curtain of the small bastion trace of this gorge. This barrack is two stories in height, loop-holed and bomb-proof, with its roof arranged for musketry. The profile of this fort is like that of Montessu3^ To flank the faces and flanks there are caponniers ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 205 on the slioulder angles of two tiers of fire, the lower one exclusively for infantry, and the upper one with two pieces of artillery. The faces of these caponniers do not intersect on the capital, the trace being at right angles to the capital, which part is covered by a machicoulis scarp served from the second tier. The counterscarp, which has a loop-holed gallery, also sweeps these ditches with reverse fires, the whole fort being protected by a covered way, with a large place of arms on the capital of the work. The principal entrance to this fort is inclosed as a large place of arms by barracks, with loop-holed walls and earthen ramparts, revetted with masoury, with a ditch. The work itself is divided into two parts by a rampart and parapet crossing the terreplein on a line with the west side of the barrack in the center of the gorge front. The western portion of this lunette so divided is much lower than the other, and communi- cates with it by a postern near the barrack. This dividing rampart is not revetted. The revetment of the scarp of the lunette is of masonry, detached, with a loop-holed cliemin-de- ronde and traverse walls, as in the other works. Machicoulis are formed through this detached scarp, to command the dead spaces and postern openings. The counterscarp gallery is divided into rooms of 11 feet by 8, with two loop holes in each. In the rear are openings for mining shafts and galleries. The great place of arms in the rear of this work calls for further notice. Its north front is occupied throughout nearly its whole length by a loop-holed barrack, which has no other flanking arrangement than that furnished by a central projection or balcony provided with machicoulis to command the entrance to the postern. The east front is formed by a bastioned and loop-holed wall, the curtain of which is occupied by the officers' quarters, &c. In the interior is a storehouse for artillery munitions.* The armament of tliis fort consists of thirty-one pieces of artillery. Fort St. Foi, situated very near the town of the same name, is on the same line of river hills as St. Irene. Its form is that of a parallelogram, one of the shorter sides being on the edge of the plateau, and opposite Fort Vitriolerie. The scarps of the south and west fronts are casemated for musketry on the lower tier, with artillery on the flanks. The western front is broken to the rear in the center, where there is a masonry caponnier of two stories, the upper one for artillery entirely, and analogous to the polygonal trace of Montalembert. In the dead angles of the caponnier, and along the faces of this front, machicoulis are constructed for commanding the ditch at the foot of the scarp. Such, in general, is a description of the enceintes and detached forts of this remarkable system of defense of the city of Lyons. We have previously adverted to the diff'erence in the enceintes of these two great places of war, Paris and Lyons. The differences therein are susceptible of explanation, without neces- sarily supposing a decided difference of opinion in the principles of fortification between the authors of the two designs. Special considerations of economy, or other reasons, may have dictated and required in the one what could not be effected in the other. There is nothing to show, from the study of these two great fortresses, what should be the relative strength between the enceinte and the detached exterior line of defense, while there is strong reason to believe that the engineers of the enceinte at Lyons were more imbued with the advantages of the German school than the simple bastioned trace they practiced about Paris. Upon comparing the detached exterior forts, it is impossible to deny that principles of fortification have been admitted in some of them differing essentially from those admitted in others, and we may even venture to state, of an opposite nature. In the forts of Lyons, the scarps have either musketry fires from covered galleries, or from chemin-de-ronde behind detached scarps ; Hhe artillery of the flanks in the bastioned fronts is •The roiiicuiis of a Roman aciutcUict still exist near tliis latter building. 206 ART OF WAR IX EUROPE. alwaj's casemated if exposed to fire. If, on account of the diminished size of the fronts and depth of ditcli, the flanking of the latter hj parapet fires becomes imperfect, the bastioned trace is abandoned, and, as a substitute^ caponniers and counterscarp fires are introduced; finally, the barracks always enter as a defensive element, and, protecting their masonry from distant fires by the parapets of the covering works, they are reserved to oppose the storming of the breach, and to make a last defense in the reduced space to which both parties are then limited. These ideas are presented, not to make a comparison between the strength of the two places, but to point out the essentially distinct nature of the principles of fortification which have pre- vailed in their construction^ and particularly as there are some who contend the difi'erences are due to locality only, and not any change of views from the teachings, at Metz, of the Isoizet system. We can but think that the fortifications of Lyons decidedly prove that the French corps of engineers do not entirely agree in assigning to the bastioned system that degree of pre- eminence, which imtil latterly appeared generally acknowledged in their country; and that efibrts are being made by several individuals of the corps to adopt and introduce, although with certain limitations, new principles, which, although approved by theoretical demonstration, have not as yet received the sanction of experience in actual warfare. It maybe justly considered that the fortifications of Lyons are an intermediate step between the French and German systems, having many more points of similarity or resemblance to the latter. In the sequel we shall have occasion to develop this view still further, and then be enabled to appreciate better the defensive value of these isolated works, by a comparison between the three types presented, at Paris, Lyons, and various places in Germany. The importance of this investigation, connected with the instruction in fortification in our own country, where as yet we have confined our study almost entirely to the French school, justifies me in presenting the opinion of a talented Dutch engineer and author of the present date, (Merks,) who says : " We have shown that Cormontaigne's trace, with the slight improve- ments subsequently introduced by the school at Mezieres, is no longer used in France, except as a guide in the teaching of permanent fortification in the military schools, and for the reason that it contains certain improvements by means of which, or rather by carrying out their spirit, the existing places constructed by Vauban more than a century ago, might be improved. Those who previous to the Belgian insurrection had an opportunity of examining the French plans for the fortification of Rocroi, and the improvements of the strong places on the northern and eastern frontiers, as well as the works previously constructed by engineers of the same nation, at Alexandria and other points, must have come to the conclusion that in France they are far from following to the letter the precepts of the school of Mezieres." It will now be seen with what reason we deemed it difficult to define in a precise manner what must be understood by the French system of fortification ; but since we must adopt a fixed and determinate basis in order to institute a comparison with the German system, we must con- clude that the former maybe represented by Noizet's trace, denominating it the " modern system corrected," applying to it such modifications of Choumara and Haxo as do not constitute a departure from the characteristic spirit of the bastioned system. Modern German System of FoRTiFicATio>f. Under this head, we designate the series of principles, that have served as a basis for the different traces adopted in the construction of fortresses in the several German States, and according to which several of the ancient works have been repaired or enlarged. Up to this day but few military writers have taken this subject into consideration, and the views of these are too restricted to be of service a^references in describing determinate places. The work of Colonel Humfrey is specially devoted to a description of the works at Coblentz on AKT OF WAU IN EUROPE. 207 the Rhine, (published in London, in 1838,) coniining liis lubors principally to one side of the river ; although accompanying his Memoir with accurate and detailed plans, his observations and opinions concerning the defensive value of tliis place cannot be considered sufficient to form an accurate judgment of the system. The trace presented by Colonel Humfrey refers to a large detached work — Fort Alexander — and his remarks upon its defense are not sufficiently developed with reference to general principles, nor are they applicable when treating of a large continuous enceinte. His princijial aim seems to have been to make known what the Prussian engineers had adopted for the site of the hill in rear of the city of Coblentz, or Fort Alexander, and some adjacent redoubts. Captain Madelaine, of the French service, has made an analysis of the same place, and making Fort Alexander a special subject, arrives at a result diametically opposite to that of the British author. He considers its defensive value as for below that of the bastioned system applied to the same ground. His Memoir is of little or no assistance in reference to our exposi- tion of the system. The various Memoirs recently published by Maurice de Sellon are far from furthering an exposition of the system, since, without detei'raining the principles or the spirit of the new forti- fications, he seems rather to aim at estimating the defensive strengtli of some of their traces, by a comparison with the bastioned trace ; thus, even supposing the results he arrives at accurate, which it will be seen hereafter we are far from admitting, they neither suffice to determine the question, nor to prove whether the German innovations contribute or not a real improvement in fortification. The German engineers, whose works might guide us safely in this matter, observe the strictest silence, indiflferent alike to exaggerated praise on the one liand, or severe strictures on the other. So for as we know, the Prussian Engineer General Bresse alone has written " on the orirjhi and nature of the new fortifications in Germany ;" but this work, containing lengthy general considerations on the subject, does not impart a complete knowledge of the system. The system, springing in a great measure from that of Montalembert, (as stated by Zastrow, who confines himself to this mere indication,) gives rise, as well as Montalembert' s, to a great variety of combinations, and it is not sufficient to present and analyze its leading principles, but we must inquire in what manner they have been combined in each particular case ; which of them pre- dominates, and how far each should be admitted. Thus it is that, on examining in detail the new fortresses of Germany, it might be supposed that tlie same maxims have not been adhered to in all, or that tlieir engineers have not agreed in the choice of a type or front representing the best possible combination ; nor is the diversified topography of the points fortified sufficient to account for these diflerences ; for not only does the general plan of a fortress diff'er according to its special strategic object in the system of the country, but the works likewise of the same place are of a diiferent nature, according to their object, with respect to the place. Thus the places of Coblentz and Posen, both the conceptions of Prussian engineers, differ materially; and we moreover see iu the latter two very distinct traces in the fronts of the enceinte and tliose of the citadel. (See Plate 26, Fig. 30, and Plate 27, Fig. 31.) Greater difi'erences are even observed when comparing the fortresses of the different kingdoms of the Germanic Confederation, and a very cursoryexamiuationof the fortifications of Posen, Eas- tadt, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and others, is sufficient to establish this fact. The difficulty in accounting for this variety in traces, has induced certain French authors to accuse the partisans of this sj'stem of a want of unity, if not confidence, in their own principles ; alleging that, among so many combinations, one surely should obtain the preference, and be constantly adliered to. If this may be said with special reference to the fortresses of the Germanic Confederation, tlic plans and projections of which are supposed to have been revised and approved by a board of 208 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. military meu, must we not suppose a mucli greater variety in conception when turning to the modern fortresses of other countries that have adopted the system followed in Germany ; the latter not being tlie only country that, abandoning the bastioned system^ has sought, by the adoption of new principles, to restore to fortified places their lost value. With the exception of France, nearly all the poioers of Europe, that have been able to devote large sums to the construction of neio fortresses and the repairs of old ones, have folloived in the footsteps of the German engi- neers ; the result being a new school of fortification, supported by the assent of manj' engineers who have had occular demonstration of the insufiiciency of the old places during the last conti- nental wars, yet at the same time opposed by much of the talent of the French engineer corps, and still lacking the test of experience in actual warfare, so indispensable for a safe analysis in such matters. Before entering upon an examination of this system, these considerations will justify our touching upon certain details that may appear foreign to the purpose. While doing this we will endeavor to point out those principles which appear of a general nature, from which will result those that are distinguishing and characteristic. The numerous circumstantial details in the possession of the Spanish Engineer Bureau of the greater part if not all the fortresses of Germany, have put it in their power to give us most accurate descriptive detailed plans of these works. How they may have succeeded in obtaining them it is not for us to know; yet, so far as I liad an opportunity of examining the same works, there is no room to doubt the perfect correctness of what Colonel Valijo has given us. The greatest difiiculty lies in combining this information in such a manner as to render it practicable to deduce fundamental rules and principles, at the same time that we duly qualify those dictated by special reasons and peculiar circumstances. The exposition of this system will embrace — 1. A description of the elementary works of a front, as caponniers, batteries of every descrip- tion, defensive barracks, &c., &c. 2. The organization of an independent work, and its capacity for self-defen.se. 3. Description of the traces most generally used, and their application to marshy ground. A . The composition of the plan of a fortress, and an idea of the general plan of some of the most remarkable fortresses. 5. The attack of the system and its analysis. Elementary Works of a Front . Scarp and Counterscarp Walls. — Scarp walls are of three kinds ; first, supporting directly the earth of the rampart; second, the same with the intervention of relieving arches, containing one or more galleries or tiers for artillery or infixntry fire ; and third, detached from the ram- part, loop-holed, and leaving between them and the exterior slope of the parapet a chemin-de- ronde, the terreplein of which may be at different heights. The second and third are those generally used in Germany. The first is only applied in lines of little importance, and when circumstances require the economizing of interior space. Sustaining >S'carps. — Yauban's proportions are followed for the thickness of these scarps. The height judged suflicient to protect them from escalade, is thirty feet ; their batter one twelfth — the mean between one fifth, given by Vauban, and one twentieth adopted in Franco. Scarps ifith Relieving Arches. — These are used in works of great importance, and when they are exposed to curved fires. They give a secure tier of musketry fire, and are breached with great difSculty, since the falling of the scarp wall does not bring with it the earth of the parapet or rampart. This construction is also apjjlied to the counterscarps giving reverse fires in the ditches, and facilitating the disposition of defensive mines. If these walls have formerly found opponents among the partisans of the bastioned system, their advantages are now ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 209 acknowledged by all, and used in preference to any other. Their greater cost is the only objec- tion to their general use, although there is much contrariety of opinion on this point. According to Gay de Vernon (French) the cost of a scarp, with relieving arches of the same stability as a solid one, is one quarter less than the cost of the latter. Laisne, (more recent French authority,) on the contrary, estimates them at one third less. In the recent German constructions, made of brick, the cost is estimated as being greater by one half; and some suppose the cost to be double. The locality, the kind of material, and its cost, are such variable elements, that the question can only be decided for each particular work. Plate 22, Fig. 6, represents the plan and profiles of one of these scarps with relieving arches, and their usual dimensions, the vent holes for the escape of smoke, chimneys at intervals, and the arrangement for drainage of the backs of the arches, by which the interior is kept perfectly dry. The roof surfaces of the arches receive a coat of hydraulic cement ; upon this is a layer of brick, which is covered by a layer of asphaltic mastic, and over this a layer of clay carefully plastered on. Detached Scarps. — These are either simple or with arches resting upon shallow buttress piers, and give a banquette for a second tier of infantry fire. Altliough analogous to those of Carnot, they ofi'er less resistance, but their construction is less complex. The chemin-de-ronde, usually from six to eight feet in width, occasionally reaches twenty feet. It is then divided by piers, which may be casemated, and admit of artillery. The advantage of these walls is, that their fall does not bring with it the earth of the rampart, thereby rendering the breaches of very difficult ascent. With less height they protect and guard against escalade, by the two-fold difficulty of ascent on the one side and necessary descent on the other. The chemin-de-ronde allows troops ascending the breach to be attacked in flank ; but, on the other hand, it is much exposed to ricochet, and diminishes the interior space by requiring increased depth of rampart. These qualities, and their costing less, is the reason of their frequent introduction in the fortresses of Germany. Tlie English engineers were among the first to experiment upon the utility and advantages of the Carnot wall or detached scarp. In 1823, they constructed a section of such a scarp covered by a glacis, as an experimental target, to ascertain whether they could or not be destroyed with guns of heavy caliber, with long ranges and small elevation. The covering ma.ss of earth in these experiments was sixty feet from the tuall, and was of the same height. The batteries used in this experiment in August, 1824, and the attendant circumstances, were not such as could be practiced against inland fortresses^ although they might along coasts admitting the transportation of such an armament. Yet the wall was soon destroyed, and has more or less discredited such scarps, although the German engineers continue to place full faith in them, and^ I may say, the continental engineers as a body. A full description of these experiments may be found in the published Papers of the Royal Engineers, vol. 2, page 45, &c. This result, although the experiments were not repeated, and notwithstanding the favorable circumstances under which they were made, together with the masonry being still fresh, proved that these curved fires were a powerful means of attack against masonry scarps of all hinds ; and that just as the isolated wall at Woolwich was destroyed, so would the front wall of a scarp of relieving arches or other description sustain the same injury ; and many affirm that scarps backed with earth will sooner yield in consequence of the pressure from behind. In the sequel we shall have occasion to refer to what experience offers on this controverted subject, and then add some remarks to which this important question gives rise. Casemated Batteries and Redoubts — Defensive Barracks. — We shall first describe these works before entering into an explanation of the system of which they constitute a part. The examples given in Plates 22, 23, and 24, may be regarded as general tyjjes, in which certain dimensions and angles only can vary in cases of special application. They are analogous to those proposed by Montalembert ; and it may be said they have only been modified, at one time making them 27 B 210 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. more simple, and at another giving them necessary solidity. Thus the German caponniers are more judiciously disposed than those of Montalemhert, and the defensive barracks, of much greater solidity and more suitably disposed, replace with greater advantage the imperfect towers of the above-named author. As a general jirinciple, arches perpendicular to the scarj) alone are admis- sible, and on no account parallel to it. Mortar Batteries. — These are placed either in the interior of a work on the terreplein, or in the salient angles under the terreplein of the rampart. In some instances, as at Coblentz, they are under bomb-proof arches on the terreplein of the corps-de-place. The object of these bat- teries is to throw hollow projectiles into the works of the besiegers on the glacis, and within sectors on the capitals destitute of direct fire. Armed with mortars and stone mortars, they fire charges of shells of the caliber of twenty-four, in place of baskets of stones, and the small grenade generally used. Plate 22, Fig. 7, represents one of the first kind. The space for each mortar is fifteen feet, with a depth of twenty-four. The arch terminates on the exterior at each end of the casemate, inclining upwards to prevent the blast damaging the masonry. The object of the narrow ditch before it, is to receive the enemy's projectiles, coming within the opening of the battery or rolling from the earthen slopes above, rendering their explosion harmless. Plate 22, Figs. 8 and 9, represent two batteries under the rampart of a salient, for three and five mortars. In the first the space for each mortar is reduced to a rectangle of ten by twelve feet. In the salients formed by the scarps, is constructed a large solid bomb-proof or casemated traverse, covering the battery in front, leaving between it and the face of the battery a court of such width only as is necessary for the shells to pass at the required elevation from the gun-rooms. The communication to these batteries is by a postern under the rampart along the capital, and also by the clieminrogi'essivily applied them. I ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 231 Bavaria. — Fronts of the Fortress of Germersheim . — In this polygonal trace the side has been slightly "tenailled," to give flanking fires to the -wings and flanks of the central caponnier. The latter is united to the scarji by two walls, and has a direct communication with the interior by a postern, which also gives entrance to tlie loop-holed scarp galleries. From the two angles of the polygon laj' ofi' 120 yards for the faces of small bastions, separated from the curtain by cuts, across the whole width of the rampart. The immediate defense of these cuts is by traverses, analogous to those specially used by Montalembert in his circular system. This bastion has a defensive interior barrack extending from the cut of one front across the gorge to the cut of the collateral front, thus rendering this bastion an "independent defensive work," and therefor provided with a system of mines pushed forward from the barrack, with exterior system extending under the salient of the bastion and its ramparts. In the flanked angle blinded batteries are constructed, serving as traverses. The central caponnier is covered by a ravelin, the ditch of which is flanked by casemated batteries closing it, leaving a curved passage, and uniting with and forming a single work with the casemated redoubts of the reentering places of arms. These batteries and redoubts have special entrances from the ditch distinct from those of the places of arms and covered way. The ravelin and places of arms with their redoubts form a first defensive line, which must be demolished and occupied in order to appix)ach the body of the place. Front of the Tete-de-Pont on the Rhine, opposite Germersheim. — This is an example with wet ditches, showing how simply and naturally the sy.stem under consideration favors such a con- struction, securing all the advantages without the objections heretofore urged against them of hampering the active defense. (See Plate 27, Fig. 33.) The front is a right line, slightly broken to the rear. The scarp is of earth, with the exceptions of those of the small bastions, closed at the gorge by a crennated wall, with a block- house of masonry in the center. The flanks of these bastions fire only along the terrepleins and slopes of the curtains. The interior face of the rampart along the curtain is revetted (section h m) and connected with the gorge walls of the bastion, making a continuous interior face of the rampart along the whole line of the work. The center of the front is occupied by a large edifice of three distinct parts. The most retired is a special barrack and last redoubt of the front, (section g h,) battering the terrepleins and foot of the interior face of the rampart. The central part serves as a caponnier for the whole front. It is flanked by two wings projecting from the sides. Under this central part is an arched passage for the flow of the waters of the ditch, which latter is crossed by lateral bridges along side of the caponnier. (Section g h.) The last part serves as a redoubt of the demi-lune. The interior is arranged to preserve the defensive character of these three parts to make a successive defense, while the sides cannot be enfiladed. Around the entire work is a dri/ ditch, the bottom of which is above the water level. It aftbrds a dry, covered communication to the terreplein of the demi-lune, the descent to it from the interior being by gentle ramps, while the wings flank and defend it against an enemy following a retiring sortie ; which sorties can thus be made without the interruption or hindrance of rafts and other arrangements in the wet ditches. The demi-lune ditches are flanked by batteries which close them, and are connected with the redoubts of the reentering places of arms, forming a single work. Two loop-holed walls connect these redoubts with the demi-lune redoubt, the .three forming a continuous line of defensive redoubts, with easy communications with each other and with the interior of the front. An examination of Fig. 33, and the four accompanying sections, (Plate 27,) will make this remarkable front sufficiently understood. The communication by ramps, &c., from the reentering places of arms and covered way, without passing through the respective defending redoubts, is fully delineated in Fig. 33. The great dimensions of the reentering place of arms admit of the establishment of two block-houses, especially intended to command the covered ways. 232 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Fronts of Ingolstadt. — The system adopted for this place is the same as that for the fortress of Germersheim, with some slight diiFerences. The same, system has been adhered to for the tete-de-pont ou the Bavarian part of Ulm, a work executed hy a superior officer of the Bavarian corps of engineers, while the Wurtemberg side, previously described, was executed under the direction of the Prussian Colonel Pritwitz, who also had the direction of the fortress of Posen. It may be said that the Bavarian system is a type of the German system generally, in which the princijiles of the latter have been somewhat circumscribed. Fronts ivith wet ditches at Konigsherg, Prussia. — The Prussian engineers are still actively engaged in the construction of tliis fortress. Its trace differs from any of the preceding, having masonry scarped bastions on the angles of the polygon, and a retired bastion in the center of the curtain, with chemin-de-ronde with a cunette of half the width of the ditch along its center and a depth of not less than six feet water. Plate 26, Figs. 30 c, 30 d, will give the construction. The general princijile steadily kept in view, as stated to me by the Prussian engineers, is, "that the fortress shall be composed of detached parts, eaclr having its separate commander and garri- son, with separate and independent detached works. Thus: the bastions are detached from the curtains; the reduits are in like manner detached; the scarp is detached on all parts excepting the faces and part of the flanks of the bastions." On some of the fronts the ditch is filled witli water from scarp to counterscarp), when there is a masonry casemated caponnier in the center of the curtain (instead of the flat earthen bastion) flanking the faces of the bastions with five guns. Fig. 30 e gives the general dimensions and arrangement of the modification. It will be observed that each of the flanks of this caponnier has five casemates for artillery, closed in the rear with large doors opening on an esplanade that communicates with the curtain by three draw-bridges over the wet ditcli separating it from the scarp, the center one being for artillery and those on the line of the interior face of the rampart being foot bridges covered on the side towards the bastions with a loop-holed wall. Five other casemates form a curve connect- ing tlie flanks. The whole are made bomb-proof, its masonry rising to the height of the scarp, and with the earth above, sliown in the section, serves as a traverse in tlie ditch. Its scarps are about six feet thick ; the casemates eleven to twelve feet wide and sixteen feet deep, separated by piers of from five to six feet. I may here notice a detail that was observed throughout the Prussian works and which is much wanted in our casemates. To erect a purchase under low casemates for mounting and dismounting the guns is exceedingly difficult for want of sufficient height, and even when done the terrepleins are often injured by the ends of the "gin." In these casemates, as well as in those examined on the coast, tlie general practice is to ivork a ring-holt in the masonry of the arch over the point best suited for slingiiig the gun to which tlie tackle purchase is attached. The draw-bridges of these works are in some cases counterpoised by weights on the floor timbers running back and sinking in a well behind the scarjj in the parade, as stated in some previous descriptions ; and in others, by a counterpoise of weights which, as the bridge rises, rest successively on the bottom of a pit or well into which they fall. These weights constitute a continuous chain of balls united with a link and staple, the united weight being a counterpoise for the bridge when horizontal, a.s in Fig. 30 f, Plate 26. A lever to which the maneuvering chain is attached for starting the motion of the bridge and to give an increase of power to break it from its seat, which rust or dirt may have rendered fixed, is a novel idea that may be advanta- geously introduced in some of our works. It is also represented by Fig. 30 f, Plate 26. Tlie chain is attached to the end of the lever at a. When the power of a man is applied to the weights (by a chain over a pulley at d) he puts in application the lever, drawing it in the position of the chain h c, in doing which the end e of the lever is forced down upon the timber below, thus breaking the bridge from its seat, when the lever draws in a line with the chain as attached at the end of the bridge. In tlie rear of several of these fronts, and on the center of their united fronts, there is a large defensive barrack for two thousand men or more, standing out independent on the terre- ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 233 plein of the corps-de-place, serving as a citadel and last redoubt for the whole line. The place of arms on the center of this trace in the reentering of the covered way has a casemated redoubt, the covered way being broken along its faces en cremalliere, with an earthen, sloped counterscarp. Enceintes formed of isolated or "independent forts" of continuous bastioned fronts with ravelins, or of a combination of the enceinte and detached forts, constitute one of the difficult questions upon which European engineers cannot agree, even of the same school and nation. To it may be added the relative proportion in the strength of continuous enceintes, covered by a girdle of detached advanced forts. For the city of Paris no less than six distinguished engineers offered plans materially differing in this important particular. I omit the study and investiga- tion of it, and for which I have much material on hand, for the reason it is not so important in its application to our country, where no large fortresses are to be constructed, but simply depots of naval supplies to be covered, and channels to be defended, or roadsteads to be protected ; repeating the important fact, that nothing within a fortified place, as dock-yards, ships, timber, &c., that is within four thousand yards of a position an enemy may occupy, is protected or safe against bombardment, and that it is of little importance to keep him out by walls and ramparts, if his object is simply to destroy, and we allow him to come within the distance, he can effect his object with long range heavy artillery. The rear of our water batteries are those requiring the greatest consideration of this part of the subject, and in this the many systems I have presented of the present practice of European engineers of all nations, will suffice to enable the officers of our service to apply any of the plans now presented that they may consider expedient for the localities demanding their talents and skill. In the excellent work from which I have drawn so much of this subject relating to the systems now in use by European engineers, by Colonel Clavijo, he proceeds to give descriptions of several of the recent works, and then enters into an analysis of the attack and defense of the two, French and German. To it I must refer my reader, remarking that his investigation leads him to prefer the application of the German jjrin- ciples to the fortifying of a site rather than those of the Noizet school, as now taught in France. General defects attached to the German System. The partisans of the bastioned system have enumerated under the following heads the general defects of the German system : First. The construction of German fortresses must be expensive on account of the numerous works of masonry requiring nice workmanship, and the excess in cost, if expended upon some other systems would produce fronts of greater defensive value. Second. Troops and material of war are distributed throughout the independent works of the place. Thus, the defense loses the strength which union and concerted action imparts to all operations of war, and which can only exist under the immediate direction of one single commander. Third. There will be difficulty in finding for each independent work an officer capable of directing the defense in perfect unison with the plan, more or less active, which the commander of the place may have adopted. Fourth. The numerous works of masonry in this system are liable to be destroyed by curved fires at slight elevations and by heavy projectiles. Fifth. The inconveniences of various kinds attributed to casemates are also inherent in this system. Sixth, and finally, that it is imprudent to abandon the existing systems of fortification before the sanction of experience has placed beyond doubt the advantage of the modern systems. With resi^ect to the first point, "the greater cost of their fortresses," the answer of the German engineers is, that experience has proved the contrary. The meager data we possess on this point and which we present, if insufficient to decide the question, will nevertheless have some explanatory bearing. 30 D 234 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Murks states the cost of an octagon fortified, according to the following systems, to be — First system of Vauhan 35,000,000 or 4,700,000 reals.* Third system of Vauhan 50,000,000 or 6,200,000 " System of Cormontaigne 51,000,000 or 6,700,000 " System of Coehorn 32,000,000 or 4,000,000 " System of Bousmard 52,000,000 or 6,500,000 " Tenailled system of Montalembert 32,000,000 or 4,000,000 " If this data conld be relied upon the question would be resolved in favor of the German system, but not knowing the basis of the author's valuation we cannot come to a conclusion. The Citadel of Posen cost 35,625,500 reals, 11,687,500 of which was expended upon the large barrack, magazine, and large gorge towers, consequently the three fronts and the two wings cost 24,937,500, and each may be said to have cost 6,000,000, which is less than the cost of Cormontaigne's, with a much greater extent of front, which must be born in mind. The total cost of the works of Posen is 114,000,000, deducting the cost of the citadel, there remains for the two enceintes on the right and left of the Wartha and the two forts of the " tete-de-pont" 78,368,000. If this same space had been closed by forts, according to Cormontaigne's system, twelve fronts would have been required, and consequently 80,400,000, without considering the cost of the two interior forts ; we should still have to add the cost of the barrack and the maga- zine. The fortress of Rastadt, without the entrenched camp, cost 7,000,000 florins. That of Ulm, from nine to ten millions. The fronts of the enceintes of Paris, without any exterior work, and witli an earthen counterscarp, cost, each, 800,000 francs, or 3,200,000 reals. The cost of the exterior forts, exclusive of the purchase of the site, was — Fort Mont Valerian 4,828,000 Fort Charenton, a pentagon 3,949,000 The quadrangular forts, mean cost 3,500,000 Each of the fronts on the right bank of the river at Posen cost 674,000 thalers. AVe must here remark that the extent of scarps in a quadrangular fort of Paris is not less than 1,200 meters; whilst the development of the Posen forts, not including the gorge wall, is, at most, 400 meters, which sufficiently explains this difierence in cost, and presents difficulties in judging this subject correctly. The four detached works on the left bank of the Moselle, including the subterranean communications, cost approximately 22,000,000. If the same space had been closed by bastioned fronts, the cost would have been considerably more. Finally, we may state that the system of interior and exterior mines is included in the German fronts and works ; and to strengthen bastioned fronts with the same, the cost will be much increased. The German system cannot justly be objected to, then, on the ground of increased cost. The second and third objections to the German system have undoubtedly more foundation. In effect, the commander of the fortress cannot, as in continuous systems, direct alone the operations of the defense, nor can he at a single glance take in the progress of the siege. Each work has allotted to it a determinate garrison, requiring the officer in command to act inde- pendently at a given time, in accordance with the true spirit of the orders of iiis commander : nor can the latter reinforce him opportunely, either for the purpose of repelling an attack or making sorties, as occasion may call for. While we admit the existence of these inconveniences to be of a serious nature in a general sense, yet in special cases we find their importance much diminished, and consider they are * These fi"-ures must be received as relative, the vaUie of the different currencies not being stated in tlie source from whence this information is obtained. I ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 235 more than counterbalanced by the advantages otherwise accruing from this very objectionable system, as shown from the disposition of these isolated commands. Much of the objection may hereafter be overcome by the use of a telegraph wire, a most simple and effectual means of communicating with the general headquarters. Let us suppose the fortress of Posen to be invested: it is undeniable that against any irregular attack it will be easier to defend it than a continuous system. Each isolated point is provided with secure means of defense. Nor are these points of so complicated a nature as to prevent an of35cer in command from directing the defense against any such attack, while the commander would direct his attention to the curtains, which the enemy might attempt to escalade. The critical situation of the one would give greater freedom of action to the other. We cannot, either, believe that this difficulty of commanding the whole defense exists in the case of a regular investment of three fronts, the other being secure. The artillery of the redoubts and casemated batteries is alone out of sight of the commander ; but the offensive movements of the garrison, their retreat, and every material circumstance connected with the siege, passes under the commander's eyes. If we turn to the defense of Eastadt, the numerous artillery that would be required to operate against Fort Leopold, the probable field of attack, renders it almost certain that two of those "independent forts" could not be attacked simultaneously. The most to be attempted would be to make a false attack ; and the true point being once ascertained, the commander of the place may then give his personal attention to the main attack. In some fortresses repaired according to the German system these principles have been exaggerated, and a pernicious use made of subterranean communications, which, while compli- cating the interior of the works, conceal the movements of the troops from the commanding officer, and has an influence on the morale of the soldier, who becomes reluctant to leave the cover and protection they afibrd. This abuse, springing from the very latitude of the system, and of which many remarkable examples could be cited, has contributed to give more weight to the defects under consideration than they really possess. The objections can only be truly established after some vigorous siege and resolute defense of one of these new fortresses. With respect to the fourth objection, we will bring together the considerations previously stated; and first, as a general principle, the masonry in this system is covered by earthen works, as well as in the bastioned system, and they cannot be systematically battered by direct fire. Second. The position of the caponniers, casemated redoubts, &c., guards against, as a general rule, destruction by curved fires, as experimented with at Woolwich, in a normal direction, or approximating thereto, the only case in which we may say their effect would be certain. Their arches, covered with earth, are calculated to resist the usual shell. Twenty- four-inch mortars, if such could be brought against them, would produce very destructive effects on this system, nevertheless the practice with such mortars at the siege of Antwerp, would seem to remove all fear in this respect. The defensive barracks, by their position and the great mark they present, are the works most liable to be injured from slightly curved fires ; still we think we have shown that, as redoubts, they are far superior to the uncovered redoubts of the bastioned system, and this, in reality, is the material question, ivhich is the best; and to which, in devising a plan for a locality, should we give the preference ? In a matter as yet undetermined by the experience of actual sieges, we may cite in favor of these casemated barracks, the opinion of officers of distinction of the French school, as Bousmard, Choumara, and Fleury; the latter the director of the works at Lyons. Sixtli. Casemates. — This subject alone would require much time, if examined upon Vauban's limited application in confined tower bastions, closed on all sides ; and the restricted and special applications of Chasseloup, together with the more extensive ones of Montalembert; presenting at the same time their various and most remarkable applications, and also analyzing their advantages and inconveniences ; neither does time permit, nor does the occasion call for such a 236 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. discussion. Two points affecting tlie German system are, however, important to notice in rela- tion to these casemates. The difficulty of giving vent to the smoke has always been set forth as one of the greatest objections against casemates. It has been completely set at rest, and repeated experiments have proved, that their fire can be as rapid as may be obtained from artillery elsewhere. Neither does the thickness, six feet and upwards, of scarp, through which howitzers or other short guns are fired, which scarcely enter the embrasui'cs, interfere materially with the firing. It is sufficient, to guard against any inconvenience, that the arches be normal to the scarp and open at the gorge. In addition to this, a reference to our plates will indicate numerous instances of ventilators near the crown of the arches to facilitate the escape of any smoke that may be formed inside the casemate, of which the vent supplies a portion, and all the rest must be forced back after having been thrown forward with the blast of the gun. But this objection overcome, it is argued that the exterior smoke hanging over the ditches contiguous to the embrasures, becomes so dense as to prevent aiming, and renders the fire ineffi- cient from the darkness created in the casemate. This is an objection of recent date by some modern author who attaches much importance to it ; but has not, so far as we can learn, been confirmed by experience, and if it were the case with a low casemate near the bottom of the ditch, it is very certain that the aim is so determinate from the immovable position of the enemy's batteries or other works^ that it is scarcely necessary to see the object to be fired at. But admitting the objection in all its force, an open battery would in like manner be so enveloped in its own smoke as to labor under precisely the same inconvenience. The state of the atmosphere at the time creates the greatest obstacle to the efficiency of casemated batteries from smoke precisely as on ship-board, with low decks, and the men's heads near the ceiling where most smoke accumulates, and from whence it is of most difficult escape, yet no serious inconvenience arises from this cause, even in bombardments when at anchor; although at Sebastopol, on more than one occasion during the bombardment, the commander of an English line-of-battle ship ordered the firing to cease in consequence of not being enabled to see the Russian forts through the smoke enveloping his ship. The influence on the morale of the men, is another defect alluded to. An injudicious appli- cation might undoubtedly be productive of much evil, just as the -best founded principle in forti- fication, if carried to excess, would lead to grave inconveniences. On the other hand it may inspire the gunner with increased energy and confidence in serving his gun, from the certainty of security, in every possible direction than through the embrasure, which when compared with the risks of serving an open battery should commend these casemates as having a beneficial influence on the minds of the soldiers. Certain it is no soldiers ever performed more faithful service than the Eussian gunners in the extensive two and tliree tier casemated batteries of Sebastopol during the attacks upon them by the allied fleets, nor was there any cessation of firing from smoke inside or outside these batteries. The barbette batteries were alone silent for a time, and certainly not on account of smoke, but the want of ammunition, which could not be served at that elevation above the magazines as fast as wanted. In the German system, the great object of the casemate is to cover the flanking artillery, and it can under no circumstances be assigned to any other service, as is the case with the light artillery and other arms of the garrison. It may well be asked, why not shelter the garrisons of the redoubts of the covered ways, if to them alone is assigned the maintaining of these points, and protecting the sorties in their vicinity? With respect to the men at the guns, why not suppose tlieir discouragement greater in an uncovered battery with their pieces dismounted about them by distant fires to which they cannot advantageously reply, than when they await under shelter the moment of meeting their enemy face to face, and competing at the proper time with the other arms of the garrison in the fulfillment of their arduous duty. For the want of such flank casemates the Eussians at Sebastopol were constantly losing their artillery, having to remount the batteries with pieces from the ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 237 fleet, (as already stated in one battery no less than four sets of guns were counted that had been disabled,) and little or no artilleiy was left serviceable at the end of the siege. I cannot doubt there was not a Russian officer present at that memorable siege who would not advocate case- mated flank artillery fire. So far as practicable they resorted to it, by constructing a few cajaon- niers in the ditches. In concluding this branch of the subject, we cannot admit the force ot the objections raised against the German system, and feel assured that the ofiicers of our service will find much in it to approve, and many details they can advantageously introduce in our system of sea-coast defense. A23plication of the German S'jstem to the strengthening and modifying existing Fortresses. A remaining point worthy of examination, is the fitness and applicability of this system to the repair and modification of existing works, or to ingraft upon them the independent defensive works in advance, to give additional strength or occupy new localities that circumstances have made necessary since the conception of the original design. This branch of the subject I consider particularly applicable to the engineer service of our country, where the rapid growth of the wealth and prosperity of a place renders additional defenses necessary, and which in most cases, can best be effected by detached works in accordance with the principles of the German engi- neers. Few systems are as susceptible of being generally adapted to these purposes as the one under consideration. For example, in the case of Cologne, the ancient system consisted of a -wall flanked by large towers, constructed as early as llfiS. It consists at this time (and to all appear- ance the original profile) of a ditch with a masonry counterscarp, the earth from the ditch having formed an elevation on which a crenuated wall is constructed, flanked by round or semi- circular towers ; the crennated wall having two tiers of loop holes, the terreplein of the upper one being supported by small arches resting on piers abutting against the scarj), as in the annexed Fig. 164. Recently the Prussian engineers have covered the old enceinte by a continuous bastioned- Ancient line inclosing the city of Cologne. Riimpart recently constructed on a bastion trace. Fig. 164. trace earthen rampart as shown in Fig. 164, following very nearly the line of the old counter- scarp, with very flat cavalier bastions, about three feet above the curtain. In advance of this enceinte they have more recently added a line of detached masonry redoubts upon their peculiar system, the plan and details of which are very correctly given by Mangin, in his " Memoir on the Fortresses built in Germany since 1815," published in Paris, in 1851. These forts or redoubts are about 800 yards from each other, extending from the river on the right to the river on the left, and about the same distance in front of the enceinte. Between this line of detached redoubts and the continuous bastioned enceinte, is a second line of lunettes, placed in the openings between the detached forts. They have a simple earthen parapet and ditcli, with a masonry block-house in the gorge, covered in rear by an isolated parados. These lunettes have two faces, making an obtuse angle with two short flanks. The berm of the rampart is planted with a hedge. Tlio gorge is entirely open, other than the parados between the magazine or block-bouse and the city. The masonry of these advanced redoubts is mostly of brick, and very excellent, being the 238 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. only truly good brick masonry, on an extended scale, I saw in any of tlie fortresses. The mortar is very superior, made apparently with the tuffa or volcanic stone, found on the Rhine, near Cologne. Where stone is used it is basaltic rock, and most excellent and durable. 3Iuch of the masonry in the ancient walls, now in excellent order and condition, is of brick, with columnar basaltic blocks introduced frequently as headers. I notice this masonry from the fact of most of the masonry of the fortresses in Europe being of a very indifferent character, both as to material and style of the workmanship, although faithfully executed. The system in general of the defenses of this city is, then, an earthen bastioned enceinte, with detached redoubts, with a line of intermediate earthen lunettes, constituting the additions made by the Prussian engineers to strengthen a continuous musketry defense from the old walls and towers commanding all the terrepleins of the bastioned enceinte. Hedges are planted at the foot of the exterior slojje of the bastioned enceinte, and on the glacis of the new work, as shown in Fig, 164, an auxiliary in the defense quite common in Germany and Eussia. The draw-hridges are all maneuvered by a counterpoise of a series of balls forming a chain falling into a pit one after another, resting on the bottom as the bridge rises. The chain from the end of the bridge is braced out from the center of motion to the circle described by the end of the bridge in its ascent. This arrangement equalizes the weights and motion, while it serves at the same time as a guard rail on the side of the bridge, and substitute for the arrangement, hereto- fore referred to, of the French engineers given in the sixteenth volume of their '■'Memorial du Genie." The walls of the ancient crennated scar^j and its counterscarji are mostly, if not entirely, built of the basaltic rock. In the new works the masonry generally commences with about three feet in height, of basaltic rubble stone masonry, with brick above. All the embrasures and loop-holes are formed of and faced with brick. The bastioned enceinte is strengthened with caponniers in the middle of the curtains. Thus this i^lace has become as defensible as most of the modern fortresses of original design. The Tete-de-ponf , on the o^jposite side of the Ehine, was a bastioned hexagon, with small demi-lunes and covered way, without redoubts in the jdaces of arms. To adapt these fronts to the new system, the flanks and the curtains of the front have been demolished, the faces of the bastions have been prolonged to form a tenailled front, and the flanks of the ravelin have been prolonged to the rear across the ditch, and tlirough the new ramjDart, from which it is separated by cuts, forming an independent caponnier. The reentering jjlaces of arms of the covert way have been strengthened with casemated redoubts ; the whole forming a favorable specimen of the facility of modifying the old to conform with the new system of German military science. When greater enlargement has been required, and now constantly called for by the growth of the cities extending to the utmost limit within the old defenses, as in the case of the fortress of Stettin, the union of the new fronts with tlie old is equally manageable by the use of the German system. At Dantzig the portion of the enceinte on the west of the Mottlan is commanded by a series of heights at a short distance. Upon these heights was a line of works of the bastioned trace, partly revetted and partly with earthen slopes. These were the point of attack during the sieges of 1807 and 1814. General Eapp, who commanded the fortress during the latter siege, enlarged the defenses. Subsequently the Prussian engineers have strengtliened them by isolating the two extreme bastions of this line, flanking the ditches with caponniers, and closing the gorges with a defensive barrack in one and a battery in the other, thus securing the flanks of this position. The exterior star forts of Stettin have undergone analogous modifications, by demolishing the fronts towards the place, and substituting walls with defensive barracks. When it is requisite to strengthen an enceinte or a given front by advanced works only, the ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 239 German " independent defensive works" .are equally applicable. They are in effect independent of the main work with respect to position, having their own batteries for flanking the ditches ; hence their taces and flanks need not have, as in the bastioued system, directions dependent upon the enceinte for the necessary flanking fire from either bastion ordemi-lune. Their faces may be directed as best to command the ground in front, without being restricted in their direction by the works in the rear. The greater portion of the places in Germany that have undergone modifications have been enlarged by works of this character. Thus Mayence has been strength- ened by the construction of the extensive Blucher lunette, organized after this system. Other instances could be cited of the application of these principles to the alteration and modification of ancient works, of which Verona, by the Austrian engineers, is a favorable example ; and where they have adopted them harmoniously, with the most ancient bastioned fronts of which we have any authentic record (the ori(jinally invented bastioned fronts of San Michelli ;) but the repetition of additional instances would unnecessarily prolong this report. I may with great confidence commend the system to my brother officers, as well worthy their study for its appli- cation to the modification of our old works, or for any new projects they may be called upon to devise. Russian System of Fortification. Eussia, like all the other continental powers, no longer follows the French system of the bastioned front, as taught at Metz and practiced in France; and, unlike the other nations, has wisely succeeded in finding suitable points to fortify, possessing all requisite strategic conditions without surrounding her cities by barriers, that necessarily restrict their growth, annoy the population by the unavoidable interferences of the military with the civil authorities, and in case of a siege — or in other words, the use of the fortress for which it was intended — bringing upon the population all the evils attendant upon a protracted and resolute defense. Her engi- neers have selected suitable sites, and fortified them without regard to the commerce or wealth of a city or town, but looked to the defense of the nation against invasion as a first condition. Polish Russia penetrates far between the Austrian dominions on one side, and the Prussian on the other. Against these two powers, Russia had to fortify her frontier to resist either of them, or their respective alliances, at the same time adapting her line of defense to offensive, as well as defensive warfare. The line of the Vistula presented many advantages. Its banks, like our Mississippi, were subject to overflow from periodic rains and annual freshets, when the crossing is confined to a few localities. Of these, Warsaw, and Modlin, at the junction of the Narefl' with the Vistula, presented two bluffs, always above water and accessible by roads. These two' points have both been occupied and fortified after their own peculiar manner within the last few years, while at the same time Bresk, Letawski, Dubna, Zwarnia, and Kief, interior positions, have in like manner been selected, and progress made in fortifying them to support the works and army on the frontier, or add to the resistance against an invading force. The fact of the Russian fortresses being isolated works of defense only, and not surrounding cities, has preveuted such general knowledge of their system as has been obtained by travelers visiting the cities of France and Germany. I am only justified in communicating so much as has been previously published, which, indeed, is far more than it was in my power to procure in a day spent in the defenses, at both Modlin and Warsaw. During the campaigns of Napoleou I, the site of Modlin, now called Fort Novo Georgwisk, or new St. George, was selected as one possessing great advantages for a tete-dc-pont and entrenched camp. General Chasseloup, of the French engineers, at that time fortified it, and his trace formed the basis in part of the immense fortress since constructed by the Russians on 240 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. ihe same site a^ter the conquest or subjugation of Poland. The works were commenced in 1831, and furnished in 184 \ It i.s situated at the confluence of the Nareff and Vistula, on the high bluff bordering these streams just at tliis point. The tongue of land between the two rivers is called the "Swedish island." The fortress is situated upon a plateau about one hundred feet above the river. The bluff continues along the Vistula and ujj the Xareff as far as the fortress extends, when it falls with a gentle, though irregular, slope to the shores of this stream. Back from the river the ground on which the works are located, and beyond, is comparatively a level plain. Hence, in these works we have the Russian system unembarrassed with special applications for irregularity of site^ or difficulties of defilement. The central and last resort for the garrison of this fortress (see Fig. 165,) is an immense casemated defensive barrack of a long irregular shape. It extends along the crest of the high grounds bordering the Nareff in two lines, making a very obtuse angle for a distance of 3,070 feet, then turns at right angles, extending to the rear 870 feet, and thence (with a rounding off at the angle) nearly in a straight line to the Vistula for the distance of 2,950 feet, so that the buildings appear as though faced on a triangle, although it is really an irregular hexagon, the entire perimeter of which is 6,800 feet. This immense barrack is of two and three stories in height, depending on slight differences of level in the ground, besides the basement or cellar for storerooms, &c. The upper room is in every case vaulted with a bomb-proof arch, to be covered with earth to make it secure on the declaration of war, an operation in progress at the time of my visit, in anticipation of any hostile efforts that Austria might be induced to make in the great contest of the time. The middle stories have a wooden floor in the soldiers' quarters, and tiled in parts occupied by officers. The casemates and other rooms are 580 in number, the usual dimensions of which are 60' by 20' and 50' by 26'. The floors are strong enough for artillery, for which the exterior walls are prepared with two embrasures on the exterior front of each room, and two windows in the interior, and are about six feet thick. The part fitted up for quarters for the men shows the brick walls and rough wooden floors. The part fitted up for ofiicers is plastered on the brick, and neatly painted. Several of the casemates are elegantly fitted up for the accommodation of the Emperor, which are plastered on the solid brick work, frescoed, and richly guilt. Although this work has been executed some years, it stands well, indicating no mildew or discoloration from dampness. Nor did I discover any effiorescent salt on the surface of the masonry. The entire building is covered with a sheet-zinc roof, over which the earth was being placed to make it bomb-proof. The magazines were constructed, as all the rest of the masonry throughout this extensive work, of brick. There was no interior wooden lining to this brick, vaulted room, but the walls were built with an air chamber all round, about one foot from the interior face, of six inches wide — making, in fact, a brick room or house within and under the bomb-proof; the entire wall, including air chamber and interior partition forming the cavity, was eight feet thick. The air chambers communicate by openings with the exterior and interior of the magazine. Zinc is not onlv used for covering the roof, but also as coping on all the brick masonry of the fortress. The same effects from contraction and expansion of this metal were here noticed, as exists in our own climate and works, showing that it cannot be relied upon if confined. In all the ton"-ue holes for artillery in these casemates, the centers of motion for the chassis is about two feet from the interior face, and generally gives a horizontal rotation of thirty degrees only. It was in this extensive barrack that I first noticed the excellent arrangement of the kitchens, having the boilers against the wall of the room, behind which, in an adjoining apartment, were the furnaces and fuel, thus confining all the smoke, ashes, &c., to this separate room, and keeping the kitchen clean and cool. The escape steam from the boiler rises through i ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. ' 241 a standing part of the cover, in a I'our-incli pipe, whicli passes tlirough the back wall into the furnace room, there it enters a metal box of 6" by 18", fastened to the partition wall, in which the steam is condensed, the water flowing off below and out of the building. The atmosphere of the furnace room is suflicieut to condense the steam iu this metallic box. Water is supplied to this barrack, as well as other parts of the fortress, by a steam-engine of thirty-horse power, throwing or forcing it from the Vistula into reservoirs, in quantities sufficient for 24,000 men per day, all of luhom can be accommodated in this barrack. This building is flanked by three caponniers on the hillside along the river, which have four tiers of fire, iu consequence of extending some distance down the slope of the hill. This slope is inclined from 35° to 40° along the whole shore, making an attack from this side almost impracticable. The water-engine is in one of these flanking caponniers. Citadel. — On the land side the defensive barrack is covered and surrounded at the distance of 200 and 300 yards with a first or interior line of fortified fronts, consisting of five full and one half fronts, like those of the citadel at Warsaw, with casemated redoubts in the reentering places of arms. An exception to this rule exists in the middle front, which has a demi-lunej with a semicircular redoubt of masonry, and a masonry block-house in the salient angle of the covered way. This demi-lune is probably intended to flank the esplanade, extending to the exterior line or main defenses. With the same object, a casemated tower of two tiers has lately been constructed in advance of the left front. The ditch of this tower is defended by musketry fire from an additional or basement story. The exterior slopes of the ramparts are 45°. The rampart of the main work is thirty to thirty-five feet above the level of the country, with ditches about twenty feet below the same level, making fifty to fifty-five feet from the bottom of the ditch to the crest of the parapet. The parapets are twenty-five feet thick, (such parts as I saw and walked upon,) a great excess, as now admitted by the Russian engineers, who said that their experience at Sebastopol proved that none of the allied shot penetrated over nine feet. In the trace of the citadel fronts the curtains are not all broken forward, as those of Warsaw, but are on a right line from flank to flank, and the bomb-proof casemated batteries in the flanks behind the detached scarp are for four to six guns only, instead of ten, as at AVarsaw. The crennated wall in the ditch it la Carnof, or detached scarp, is eight bricks thick, with recesses, arched over every three loop holes, the latter being through a four-brick wall only. The bricks measure eleven and a half inches in length. On the salient angles of the citadel fronts, as well as those of the main enceinte and demi- lune, bomb-proof block-house traverses for three guns were being constructed. Numerous other bomb-proof caserns and blindages were being constructed within these works, forming, however, no part of this system, but which I may again notice as illustrating the absolute necessity for such protection within a fort, and without which it is not defensible by a garrison that cannot be relieved and have rest secured to it at least two nights out of three. Enceinte. — At the distance of 1,500 to 1,C00 yards from the interior line of works, (the citadel,) the second or main line of fortification begins, on the extreme left flank, on the crest of the plateau slope, with the so-called Paris fronts, (or the remains of General Chasseloup's labors,) which are connected with the inner line or citadel by a detached looi^-holed wall follow- ing the crest of the hill en cremailliere, flanked by casemated redoubts. The Paris fronts, which now constitute a single front on a side of the polygon of over 1,000 yards, formerly composed a crown work. The main rampart of this front has, in the ditch, a detached scarp, with casemates to flank the ditches of the demi-lune. The gorge of this demi-lune is closed by a slope of earth so steep that it can be ascended only with extreme difliculty. The main ditch is flanked by a caponnier on the extreme left, and on the right by a prolongation of the flank of the redoubt of the bastion place of arms. 31 D 242 ART OF WAR IN E0ROPE. The left flank is also strengthened by a large semicircular casemated tower of two tiers, and a lower range of loop holes to flank its ditch with musketry. Next to the " Paris" front, comes that of the " Prince of Warsaw," the length of which is about 1,350 y!irds. This front is of quite a peculiar construction, the principal features resembling that of Eastadt, (Plate 26, Fig. 30 b.) The main rampart is broken into tenailles on both extremities, with casemates in the reentering angles to flank the main ditch. On the middle it has three peculiar faces or branches, forming a high, commanding cavalier. Immediately in front of this is an inclosed casemated caponnier on the capital for artillery. In front of this is a ditch, which latter is flanked by casemates in the main wall on both sides of the cavaliers. In advance of this front is a work of great strength, with a masonry redoubt in the gorge, and block house in the salient place of arms, and caponniers on both sides to flank the ditch and covered way. The gorge redoubt has a projecting casemated building to flank the gorge of this work, which is connected to the covered way by two earthen parapets. A reference to Figs. 30 and 30 b, of Plate 26, will show a remarkable coincidence between this " Prince of Warsaw" front and a combination of those of Eastadt and the city of Posen, or the adoption of the German school. The Borodino fronts form together a crown work in appearance, uniting the two adjacent ones, and forming a part of the continuous enceinte. These two fronts are similar, and peculiar in their construction. (See Fig. 166.) The demilunes are cut by a ditch parallel with the line of the polygon, dividing this work in two distinct independent parts, and similar to the tete-de-pont at Warsaw, with the difference that here the ditches separating the demilune into two parts are flanked by the casemated redoubts in the contiguous places of arms on the salient of the bastions. A reference to the accompanying figures will show a caponnier flanking the gorge of this demi- lune, and another across the ditch, dividing it in two parts, that serve to flank it, in coopera- tion with the casemated redoubts of the bastion salients. A casemated redoubt is also constructed on the salient place of arms of the covert way of this demi-lune, whose ditches are closed by caponniers at the shoulders, and flanking them. The casemated redoubts of the covered way are made to serve also as traverses. The gorge of the demi-lune is revetted and connected with the caponnier on its capital, with loop-holed gallery. As a general principle, throughout these works there are two separate systems of flanking ; the one from behind the crest of the elevated ramparts, commanding the distant fields of opera- tions, as well as the ditches, and the other from the masonry detached scarps and caponniers, all of which are loiv, entirely covered from the enemy's fire, serving as an independent flanking system for the defense of all collateral parts, and independent of the rampart defenses, whicli may or not cooperate as occasion demands. The communications on these Borodino fronts, as on all the others, are advantageously arranged, dispensing as a principle with all bridges, being through the caponniers, &c., and bottom of the ditches ; no draw-bridges were therefore observed. Next comes the " St. George front," which is exactly like that of the " Prince of Warsaw." The advanced works of these two fronts are flanked by the more retired batteries of the Borodino fronts. Next in order are the Pultoica fronts, exactly like the Borodino fronts, and assimilated by the Ev,ropean icriters ivho give us the information in relation to these ivorl-s of the Eussians, to crown works as they call them, though constituting a part of the continuous enceinte. The " Ostralenka front," and last, resting on the crest of the hill above the Nareff, is the most simple of all. It consists of a rampart, broken forward as a tenaille, with casemates in the reentering, formed by the branch, connecting it with the Pultowa fronts ; the long face on tbe extreme right rests upon a casemated building, through which the Pultusk road passes, enfilading it with four pieces of artillery. Near this casemated building is a postern on the ART OK WAR IN EUROPE. 243 , long face, with a bridge over the ditch to another casemated building, which serves to flank the ditch and covered wa^^ From the first-mentioned casemated building, (through which the Pultusk road passes,) the road leading into the fortress passes along a revetted communication from one line of works to the other ; or from the flank of the enceinte to the flank of the citadel, which is also flanked by a casemated building. To strengthen the Ostralenka front, there is placed in front of it a detached work called the " Ostralenka redoubt. ' ' It is on uneven ground, and on the slope of a hill ; consisting of a higher part, with a masonry redoubt in its gorge and a caponnier to defend the ditch, which rises gradually towards the left flank to the natural level of the plateau, so that it can be better flanked by the demi-lune of the Pultowa front. The lower part is to protect the low grounds which extend along the Pultusk road. This lower part has also a caponnier to flank it. Both the interior and exterior lines of fortification have revetted counterscarps, and mining galleries under many parts of the glacis and covered way. The whole extent of the exterior line from the banks of the Nareff to those of the Vistula are one half of a Swedish mile, as stated by Swedish writers, or two G-erman miles. Or the circuit of the main work, including the gorge along the river is nearly three German miles of four and two thirds English miles each, as stated by the German writers. To cover the communication with the opposite bank of the Vistula and protect a ponton bridge, which can be established at pleasure, a crown work called the " Warsaw front" has been built on the left bank of the river. It consists of an unrevetted rampart, with wet ditches, and a large masonry redoubt of two tiers of casemates of thirty-two gun rooms in each tier. At the gorge, the work is flanked by a caponnier, which also batters the river slopes. Two masonry block-houses on the flanks protect the ditches. A dyke exlends along the whole of the rear of the work to protect it against the annual inundations. It is said to be in contemplation to con- struct two earthen lunettes on the bank of the river ; one above and the other below this work to sweep the whole plain in its front. See the accompanying figures. On the "Swedish Island" there is an earthen work called ISeuhoff, having a low or sunken interior parade to give greater shelter to the garrison than is obtained by its slight profile. Outside of this work is a large masonry casemated tower, surrounded by a glacis, called Fort Michael, which flanks the low ground of the Ostralenka front and redoubt. Between these two works passes the road over the Nareff communicating with Warsaw. On the extreme point of this tongue of land is a casemated building, called the " Polish Bank," serving as a granary and flour mill, although presenting nothing extraordinary on the outside ; it is bomb-proof and defensible, and in case of necessity may mount thirty or forty guns. The estimated cost of these works was one hundred millions of florins. A reference to the accompanying figures, 165 and 166, from Swedish authority will sufli- ciently explain, in connection with the text, this Piussian system ; from an examination of it, we can but conclude, that the Eussian engineers apply the principles of fortification after the Ger- man school, and have abandoned the French modified bastioned system of Noizet, as taught at Metz. The wrought-iron gun carriage (Fig. 35) was in use at Modlin, Warsaw^ and Narva. 244 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. SKETCH OF THE RUSSIAN FORTRESS OF ST. GEORGE, AT MODLIN, ON THE VISTULA. Conslnicted since IS-IJ. Fig. 165. SKETCH OF THE BORODINO FRONT, AT MODLIN, ON THE VISTULA. Fig. 166. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 245 Ancient System of Fortieication — Perfect Example at Constantinople. I cannot conclude this description of modern fortification, as practiced by the continental nations, with a subject of greater interest to the professional engineer, than the following notes descriptive of the enceinte at this day existing in a very perfect state and condition, forming the nortliern line of the ancient fortifications of Constantinojile. This part is in the most perfect state of preservation on most of its extent, although several of its massive towers have been rent asunder from top to bottom, and others entirely overthrown by earthquakes, yet continuous lines of curtains and towers remain perfect to this day, serving to show what constituted the strongest system of ibrtification in the time of Constautine the Great, (the fourth century.) Such, however, is the perfect similarity of trace throughout this extended line of miles in length, that it must be considered as a system designed and executed according to the plans of one mind — the whole extent being about thirteen English miles ; four miles of which extend from the Seven Towers, at the southwest angle, to the northeast corner, on the Golden Horn, on which part I made the measurements of the accompanying plan and sections. (Figs. 167, 168, and 169.) The north and south portions of the ancient defenses of the city are difficult to trace, having been built upon and around by the miserable tenements of the present population of the city. History tells us this place has been besieged no less than twenty-four times, and only been taken six, to wit: by Alcibiades, Serverus, Constantine, Dandolo, Michael Palajologus, arid Mohamcd II. The existing works have sustained all these attacks since their construction in the fourth century. My readers Avill, I cannot doubt, be greatly interested in finding in this ancient system the flank defenses by bastions of semicircular, square, and octagonal traces ; the casemated covered way, with loop-hole defenses, the wet and dry ditches, and the perfect defilement of the double enceinte of bastions, towers, and curtains. This example of the ancient system of defense is probably the most extensive, and, at this date, in the best state of preservation, as well as combining more of the elements and principles of fortification than any other to be found in existence. Commencing on the exterior, and advancing towards the work, we first meet a counter- scarp of stone masonry about twelve feet high, strengthened by buttresses built against the face of the wall, just the reverse of our practice, which is to build them against the back of the wall. This counterscarp is the boundary of a wet ditch of fifty feet in width ; crossing tliis v/e come to a scarp of twelve feet in height, surmounted by a loop-holed wall of two feet four inches thick, and eight feet high ; passing over this we are on a terreplein of fifty- six feet wide, bounded in the rear by a continuous crennated gallery supporting a stone loop- holed wall. This crennated scarp is flanked by towers, distant one hundred and ninety-five feet six inches from each other, projecting fifteen feet from the face of the scarp on to the terreplein. These towers all join the scarp with right angles, but their terminations are either square, hexagonal, or circular, and in either case are fifteen feet wide from out to out. They flank the terreplein, as well as the wet ditch, and are of such a height as to see into the bottom and middle of the ditch. The towers of this enceinte pass through and behind the scarp to the back of the scarp gallery, thus intercepting the communication along its terreplein, which is eight feet wide. The towers of this enceinte have two tiers of loop holes, with a battlement above. This crennated scarp gallery is walled up and closed by earth in the rear ; the arches or casemates arc five feet four inches wide, by five feet in depth, resting on two-foot piers, with one loop hole in each of these casemates, cut through a wall of two iieet thick. The piers of the small casemates do not abut against the scarp, but leave a space barely sufficient for a man to pass between them and the scarp from one to another. What the communication may have been from other parts of the work to this scarp gallery, I could not discover ; whether it was subterranean from the interior enceinte, oi- from the towers, the obstructions prevented njy discovering. Continuing towards 246 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the interior we now come uiDon a second terrepleiu seventeen feet above the first, behind which is another stone scarp parallel to and sixty feet distant from the face of the previous one of twenty-four feet in height up to its narrow terrejjlein of one foot in width ; above which is a battlement four feet six inches higher, of two feet four inches thick — making the thickness of this scarp three feet four inches, plus a slight batter on the exterior face. This solid scarp, like the preceding one, is flanked by towers distant one hundred and seventy-eight feet ten inches from each other, projecting thirty-four feet six inches from the face of the scarp, thirty-one feet eight inches wide from out to out, and, like the previous one, in plan, have either square, hexagonal, or semicircular terminations. I could discover no uniformity in the order of this arrangement, nor any reason for making the different shapes. The circular ones certainly fulfilled the flanking requisites best, and the square ones least. These large towers, like those in the advanced enceinte, had two stories of loop holes surmounted by a battlement wall, the height of which was such as to command the counterscarp of the wet ditch over the small towers. From each tower there was a side postern to communicate with the terrepleins. A terre- pleiu along the battlement of the main scarp, beyond that in masonry of one foot, was formed with wooden floors, and braced from the interior face of the wall. The openings and other arrangements in the masonry plainly indicated this as the original design. The height of the main towers I could not ascertain. Their second tier of loop holes was above the top of the connecting scarji, and must have been at least fifty feet in height. The communication to their interior was by stone staircases against the interior face of the scarp to the terreplein of the curtains, above which it was by steps within the body of the tower ; and these latter in the tower that I examined happened to be in such condition that I could not ascend to the top, and hence failed to measure their height. The towers of the two enceintes, it will be observed, are so arranged that the small ones are exactly central and between the larger ones. The different stories are separated from each other, or formed by brick arches. The line of these works between the points we are considering is on ascending and descend- ing ground, the general direction being on two right lines, the longest one of which crosses a ravine. The wet ditch is, in consequence, separated by masonry batardeaux from scarp to coun- terscarp to retain the water at the proper level ; earthen pipes passed through these division walls, allowing the water to escape from one level to the other. From the lowest level it passed into and through the city. The ruins of a massive ancient aqueduct exists within many parts of the city, but whether or not and how connected with these wet ditches or other sources of supply, my time and other more important labors would not permit me to examine. In these defenses it will be observed that neither the battering ram or other means of attack practiced by the ancients were available, not only the wet ditch, but the separation of the scarps from each other, was such as to preclude the use of such means as we are informed were in use in those days. The study of these lines of defense is interesting, in connection with the history of fortification ; and this example may well be cited as a more perfect solution of the art of defense, with the then existing means of attack, than any of the systems of fortification of the present day to resist the power of modern artillery. The masonry of all these defenses is rough rubble work, with flat, though very small stone, laid with very thick mortar joints, some as great as iico inches ; occasionally a few courses of brick are introduced, without regard to level or system of any kind, either in vertical blocks or horizontal courses. The only inference to be drawn from this irregularity, with j^artial and exceedingly irregular application of brick, is, that they were used for want of stone, and dis- pensed with at any level or at any part of a course, so soon as stone came to hand. Such is modern and ancient fortification. ART OF WAK IN EUROPE. 247 PLAN OF AN ANCIENT DOUBLE KNCEINTE, TOWEIIS, LOOP-HOLED >=CARP GALLERY, AND WET DITCH, AT CONSTANTINOPLE. From nieiisuremeiits made in October IS-w. Fig. 167. Section on n b of the pUiii. SO. WET DITCH Section and eluvation on a 6 of tlie plan. Ttitcrhr 0/ City. Fig. 169. Tliese measurements were made with a three-lboi pocket tape-line, and poles cut on tlie spot, measured by it. They must be considered only aa near approximations. 248 ART OF WAR IN EUROPK. Stables and Barracks for Cavalry. For cavalry service, the study is to make as suitable arrangements for the horses as for the troops, that both may be convenient for discipline, cleanliness, combining health and efficiency. While for infantry we have to provide quarters, kitchens, and hospitals, for the cavalry arm ; we have to combine all that the infantry requires, with stables, granaries, shoeing shops, equipment rooms, manage, and hospitals for horses with infectious diseases, apart from those for more curable complaints. To accomplish this on a confined and limited piece of ground presents many difficulties, that have given rise to the different systems adopted by the conti- nental powers. Prussia, at the city of Berlin, and within the fortress of Posen, has constructed recently extensive buildings for this purpose, upon the plan of having the troops in barracks disconnected and independent of the stables. These two being the most extensive and perfect of this system, I give such drawings and details as may suffice to make them understood. (Plates 33, 34, 35, and 36.) Plate 33 gives the general plan of the caserne and stable for the Lancers of the Guard, recently constructed at Berlin, from designs made expressly for the purpose, and built at such exi:)ense, as to leave nothing to be desired by those who projected them. It is calculated for four squadrons or about six hundred horses and men, with their officers. The barrack occupies most of the front of a rectangle. All the rooms front on the street court, with windows in each, and a door communicating with a corridor, extending the whole length of the main building, lighted and ventilated by windows opening on the yard ; an arrangement that prevails in most of the recent military buildings for troops, whether barrack or hospital, and certainly well calculated to secure perfect ventilation for every apartment independent of any other. The two wings are arranged for officer's quarters, and the rear center for a mess room, large enough for half the command only at a time. It is three stories above the ground floor, (see Plate 35,) or basement, the latter being used for kitchens, store-rooms, and furnace rooms for warming all the halls and apartments above. Of the furnaces, tivo were in operation for each floor of the main building, and two others in reserve for the same set of rooms, in very cold weather or when repairing otliers. The wings are carried up a fourth story, the three principal stories and basement being for the officers. Their attics, with those of all the rest of the build- ing, are used for clothing rooms, store rooms in general, and tailor's shops for making up all the regimental clothing, from material furnished by the government. The soldier's rooms are all arranged for twelve men each, and for that number are very crowded, not exceeding twdve feet in ividth. This has led to the expedient of arranging the iron bedsteads, such that during the day one is placed on top of another, the top of the corner posts being formed as cups, or recesses, to receive the feet of another. At night they are taken down and jilaced about the floor. In no instance is the bedding rolled or folded, nor is such a thing known as two men being made to sleep together in the same bunk, as is generally the case in our service, and an evil that never should be permitted, and least of all required of soldiers. This arrangement of the iron bedstead is applicable and advantageous in any quarters. The laundries, kitchen, and furnace rooms, are in the basement room, as shown in Plate 34. The stables are one story and a half, (Plate 35,) the half or attic being used for a limited supply of forage. The hospital for horses on the right of the barrack is provided (Plate 33) with eight stalls, in two separate apartments, (each,) one set is for contageous diseases, and the other for non-infectious disorders, the two being separated by walls of masonry. The shoeing shop is on the opposite corner of the front line. It has a chimney stack and hearth for two fires. The lohole hearth is covered with a hood, conducting the smoke to the chimnev. Under the same roof, are coal bins, a store-room for iron, files, rasps, horseshoes, &c., ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 249 and a fire-engine room. There are pumps in the stables and in the kitchens of the soldiers' quarters. Plate 35 gives the jilan of the attic rooms, a general elevation of the front of the barrack, and an elevation of the stables, showing the riding hall, the Hues of stables on each side, and the ends of the wings extending into the court yard, together with a section of the stables. In details these stables corresiiond with those at Posen. All the stalls are paved with brick, and the entire pile of buildings is built of the same material, including the ornament, and may be cited as the successful use of this material in producing a building in great good taste, with simplicity and economy. To illustrate this application of brick for which the German architects are distinguished, I give an elevation and section of the cornice of the main building in sufficient detail to enable a builder to construct it, in the same Plate, (35.) At Posen, within the fortified enceinte, is another Prussian cavalry stable and barrack on the same principle as the one at Berlin just completed. Through the kindness of a gentleman I met at that fortress, I am enable to give (in Plate 36) most minute details of this stable, including the dimensions of the interior arrangements, which may be considered as a type of the Prussian system, and the same as those introduced in the stables at Berlin for the Lancers of the Guard. In sections C D and E F the dimensions are given of the stalls, racks, and mangers. These latter are of iron. The pavement of the stalls and urine gutters is of brick, that of the passage way is of pebble stone. All the walls are of brick. The building can be well ventilated by the large Aviudow over every third stall, and flues from near the ceiliug over everj' stall, often inches square, opened or closed at pleasure by an iron rod coming down against the wall low enough to be reached by hand, yet beyond interference by the horse. The iron feed-box is braced from the center of its face by two iron rods secured into the masonry, one half w^ay between the box and the pavement, and the other on a level with the pavement. The iron chain halter is fastened to a ring on the latter brace, and is free to rise and fall with the motion of the horse's head. Three halter rings are worked in the masonry of each stall, one about a foot above the feed-box, and one on each side on a level with tlie top of the box. These serve for securing the horse in the day time, according to his disposition. All these stalls are separated by posts, to which swing bars are attached. Every third post rises to the ceiling, supporting a girder on which the floor timbers of the attic rest. A continuous slielf is secured on top of the other stall posts, at such height as to allow the horse to pass under it to his stall without risk of striking his head. On this shelf the equipment is arranged. The drainage in both these Prussian stables is by flat brick gutters along the surface ; sewers and underground drains being objectionable. To form a better knowledge of the capacity of these two stables — one for the accommodation of a regiment and the other for two squadrons — I may state that a regiment of Lancers of the Guard consists of four squadrons, with twenty-five officers — two field officers, six captains, four first and thirteen second lieutenants. And a squadron consists of five officers, fifteen non-commissioned officers, three trumpeters, and one hundred and thirty-two privates — making a total of one hundred and fifty men, exclusive of officers, and one hundred and fifty horses. These barracks are designed accordingly. The medical veterinary and non-commissioned staff add a few more to the numerical strength to be provided with stables and quarters, but not essential to particularize ibr my purpose. 32 D */^X 250 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. French Cavalry Depot — Barracks and Stables. The French liave adopted a different system, combining the barrack for the men and stables for the horses under the sameroof. The horses arc on tlio ground floor, which has a fifteen-foot ceiling ; above which, in the second story, are the quarters for the men ; the floor being deafened and made air-tight by liollow bricks laid in mortar. Through the courtesy of the Minister of War, Marshal Valliant, who presented a complete set of jolans of the military buildings, I am enabled to give the minute details and dimensions of their system. According to their plan, (Fig. ITO,) a rectangle of 254 by 208 meters is necessary for the quarters and stables of a regiment of cavalry composed of five squadrons, numbering an effective force of nine hundred and sixty men and eight hundred and fourteen horses — the squadron being one hundred and eighty men and one hundred and fifty-two horses. To this end they construct against the exterior wall of the rectangle (Fig. 170) on three sides, and across the inclosure on the fourth side a line of stables for a single rank of horses. Within this line and parallel to it, with an interval of twelve meters, is another line of stables on the four sides of the rectangle for a double rank of horses standing head to head along the middle of the building. On the center of one of the long fronts an opening is left for the principal entrance about seven meters wide ; on each side of which is a building for the guard, the porter, and quarters for the adjutants and adjutant major. Directly opposite on the other long side is the riding hall or manage of twenty-four meters in width by sixty-five in length. Numerous small buildings are arranged on the corners and parts of the sides of the square for the jjurposes noted in the figure, (170.) Figs. 171, 172, 173, and 174 give the general arrangement of one of these buildings for two ranks o^liorses on the ground floor and the men above. The plan of each story, with the longi- tudinal and transverse section, will clearly explain this system. On first consideration it would seem that quarters above stables would be uninhabitable for permanent residences for large bodies of men. With the exception of Prussia, the practice of the great military powers of the continent corresponds with the French. Eussia has but recently constructed large cavalry depots on this general principle ; France and Eussia confine the buildings to two and three stories, while Austria has found it most convenient, in some structures of this kind now building in Vienna, to put a third and fourth story above the stable floor. The excellence and utility of the system depends greatly on the details of construction. It is indispensable to have the floors air-tight, that none of the fumes of the stable can rise through them. For this purpose a deafening is laid between the floor timbers in some cases. In others, the floors are supported by wrought-iron beams, the spaces between being filled with small brick arches, the brick being made like a honey- comb or cellular, to reduce the weight, and guard against moisture, as well as being better non- conductors of sound and heat. This description of flooring, covered with board or tile, is very satisfactory, and in very general use in the new buildings of Paris, as well as other continental cities. Another method, and the one practiced by the Austrians, is to arch the entire ceiling with brick, resting the arches on piers and the side walls ; an example of wliich is given in Plate 40^ of an infantry barrack in Vienna, and so constructed in a cavalry depot in the city now being finished, as well as others hereafter noticed. In Plate 37 I have given the dimensions of all the details of the French stables. Two arrangements are given for separating the stalls — one by a wide board, attached by a hook and staple to the manger at I, and the other end suspended by chains g g from the ceiling. These .chains of suspension rise vertically only as high as to clear a horse's head ; above that they are attached to two diagonal chains, in order that the center of motion may be kept as low as two meters from the floor. From the swingboard C to the diagonal chains g g the suspender is of rope. At the lower end / is a roller to guard the horse from chafing. At tlie upper end of this roller is a hook that can be disengaged at pleasure with a slight Idow in case a horse should straddle fl^ board. JURT OF WAR IN EUROPE. 251 GENERAL PLAN UV aUAKTERS FOU A KEGIMENT OF CAVALUY, COMPOSED OF FIVE SQUADRONS, OF A TOTAL EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF 960 MEN AND 8H HORSES. ■in /P^. I' r. I I VIA JfL ^l/'^^lh^H If n 12^' 9' \}l ^ ^ i ^ i ^ i i nri ^ nnTT'T'rTTrrrTT"! 954 meters pont . "K ;S; isia -J^- M 2//Of!S£rS iL_ lWI*RIKJ=fS Aig-i ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 255 -jo:. Side view. Front vi «'. y^ -^s:4 i '^"'^ IfW rvr^^F:^ '■ fLAT CELLING Fig. 1Y6 gives a section from front to rear, through the two lines of buildings, showing the arching of the stables. The ceilings of the quarters, it will be noticed, are not arched. These quarters are warmed by a stove in each room, the furnace doors of which open on the corridors, from whence only can the fire be attended to ; a very excellent arrangement, as it admits of the advantage of wooden floors in the rooms without danger from fire ; and stone, brick, or asphalte in the halls, where it does not endanger the health of the occupants of the rooms, while it secures the building from fire ; another advantage of this Austrian and Prussian subdivision of quarters. To carry out the general system of depositing all the arms and horse equipments in the corridors of these, quarters three rows of pins (« of Fig. 176) are secured to the partition walls between the windows, for pistols, lances, and sabers. Along the outside wall, between the windows, are racks with a row of pins on top for the bridles, with three rows of saddles below, (h and c.) The floors of these corridors are of asphaltic concrete. The rooms have two windows through the outside wall and two on the corridors. The door is on the side opening into a hall commu- nicating with the corridor, as in Fig. 177', behind which is a room for a non-commissioned ofiicer. The buildings in the rear, it will be observed, afi'ord no other accommodation than for one rank of horses on the ground floor. Their is no half story above for a limited supply of forage, (a defect that seems to have been discovered and corrected in the nev/ buildings.) Such is the description and arrangement in the old part of this establishment. In the new part the arrangement of the quarters differs in the subdivision, and is as shown in Fig. 178. By this modification greater width is given to the corridor for the equipments, and at the same time, while the rooms are enlarged, giving better ventilation, it economizes much masonry ; two out of every four partition walls being suppressed. In these new corridors fixtures were worked perpaanently into the exterior wall for the saddles and bridles ; for the former long triangular-shaped pins (o) are built in the masonry in three rows, one above the other, between which are short round pins, (h,) the former being for the saddles, and tlie latter for the bridles. In the parade or court-yard of this barrack is a bathing establishment or washing pool for the horses. There are certain localities in our country where it may be advantageously adopted, I therefore cive the following details of its construction : 256 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. Fig. 179 gives the plan, longitudinal, and a transverse section of it. Tlie part with a uniform maximum depth of six feet of water is of twenty-nine feet long by seventeen feet six inches in width ; a ramp (a) descends to this from each end of sixteen feet base, covered with boards on which elects are nailed or otherwise secured to prevent horses slipjjing. The side walls rise two and a half feet above the level of the parade. The water is admitted by a pipe on the side, which, with a waste pipe admits of regulating the depth, and drawing off the whole supply of water at jileasure. The whole structure is of brick masonry up to the level of the parade, above which the side walls and coping are of stone. AUSTRIAN CAVALRY BATHING AND WASHING TROUGH. Sitpplti jiipe 1- M i .er : ;..-/ft...H <.. so-_ ^ 1 FLAV (r~ .«'. -) Fig. 179. Austrian Cavalry Equitation School for Officers, at Vienna. For this school of practice there are two riding halls, an old one of 175 feet long by 56 feet wide, which is considered as adapted to the use of five or six officers at a time. It lias thirteen windows on each side, with a visitor's room and gallery at one end. The second or new one is 238 feet long by 72 feet wide. At one end over the entrance are apartments handsomely fitted up, with large plate glass inclosing them, looking down and into the riding hall. One ofiicer from each regiment, or forty oificers, compose this school of practice, twenty of whom return to their regiments with their horses annually, and are replaced by twenty others — the course of instruction lasting two years. A private from the regiment accompanies the ofiicer, acting as his groom. He becomes well acquainted with stable duty, in the best, neatest, and most perfect manner, who, returning with his horse and his ofiicer, secure to the regiment all the most recent improvements in that arm of service, with two horses equally well instructed. The 7ieiv cavalry equitation stable has a barrack over it for the men forming part of the school. It difi'ers in its arrangement from any of the other Austrian cavalry stables. It is 250 paces in length by 35 paces in width, as stated from memory by one of the ofiicers present, calculated for 150 horses. It is arranged with two ranks of horses head to head through the middle, and a single rank on each side, heads to the wall, with wide passage ways between the side and center ranks. All the passages are paved with wooden blocks, and the stalls have planh floors laid on a brick pavement, with a wide drain along the foot of the stalls. The ceiling, which is not less than twenty feet high, is arched, sujiported on five rows of masonry columns ; one through the center, and the others on each side of the passage ways. Above this stable are the quarters for the forty soldiers who come from the regiments with their officers. The general jilanof the quarters is wide halls, with rooms on each side, the former lighted from the roof. All the arms are deposited in racks in the halls. The cooking is done in kitchens on the same floor or story as the quarters, on tables in tin vessels as heretofore described. The latrines are made (as shown in Plate 40) as good, perhaps, as the nature of the case will ijermit, yet the system cannot be recommended. The arching of the ceiling of the stable forming the barrack floor is peculiar. A cylindrical arch is first constructed from column to column, equal in width to the diameter of the column, or about two feet. Upon these four walls, so formed, is constructed a flat spherical arch or dome within the rectangle of the four columns. The efiect is good, while it forms a fiatter ceiling, with fewer indentations to obstruct the free ventilation, than other systems of arching. AET OF WAR IN EUROPE, 257 We have at present five mounted regiments, and as yet have made no suitable permanent provision for this arm. That there is a necessity for buildings peculiarly adapted to such troops will not, I think, be doubted ; and the information now communicated will, I trust, assist in maturing what may prove the best system for our sei'vice and climate. My impression is, that we should lose no time in establishing, in the West, depots for these regiments, where their campaigns in the summer will enable them to retire in winter to recruit from the breaking- down hardships of our western prairie and Eocky Mountain service. The selection of sites within the settlements, open to supplies and those comforts needed by months of privation in the wilderness, should be made; and then a system for a regiment should be devised, from which no change or departure should be permitted, although the first wants of the service may not call for more accommodation than for one or two squadrons. Let us hope our cavalry officers will devise such plans, and that these notes may lighten their labors in so doing. Aetillert Stables at Lyons, and Austrian Artillery Stables and Barracks at Vienna. The most perfect barrack and stables for artillery on the French system, that I had an opportunity of seeing, is now under construction at Lyons. It is inclosed within a rectangle of 492.90 meters by 320 meters. The extent and capacity is based upon an allowance of 18 to 20 cubic meters of space for a horse in a stable, and from 8 to 10 cubic meters for a man in quarters. There are six buildings fronting on three sides of a square, each building of 141.68 meters in length by 13 meters in width. The basement is arranged with stalls for two ranks of horsesj head to head through the center, divided as in Fig. 170, d g. Above the stable the troops are quartered in two stories, making in this case three stories above ground, each with ceilings of four meters in the clear. The subdivisions of the two upper stories is as shown in Figs. 1T2 and 173, corresponding also with those for infantry, as shown in Plates 30 and 31. Behind each of these six buildings, at a distance of 20 meters, is a row of stables for one rank of horses, heads to the wall, standing out, however, on the terreplein, with a wide street between them and the exterior limits of the depot. These latter buildings have only a half story above the stables for a few days supply of forage. Such, indeed, is the system throughout Europe, never accumu- lating large quantities of hay and straw within the depot, but having the rations supplied every few days from elsewhere. It saves great space in these otherwise extensive establishments, besides guarding against the danger from fire. The riding hall is on the center of the front opposite the main entrance of 60 meters in length by 22 in width and 12 in height. A length of 31 meters by 12 in width sufiices for forty stalls of fifty-seven inches wide by seventy-nine inches from head to foot. The stalls arc all paved with pebbles, (a temporary expedient I can but think,) for want of a better material at hand. The racks, mangers, and dividing swing planks, conform to the dimensions given in Plate 37, " cast-iron mangers." The stair-cases are six feet wide, of stone, and the hall floors of ashphaltic concrete. The quarters are divided in rooms, or by partitions extending half way up to the ceilings, for twenty men each. There is a hanging shelf in the center of each room over a table, and two shelves against the side walls over the heads of the bedsteads. Each room or ajiartment for the twenty men has two windows in front and two in the rear. The floors are of wood, with brick deafening. The shelves on the sides of the rooms rest on iron brackets built in the masonry. Four hooks are screwed under the shelf, of the pattern in Plate 38, two larger ones in the wall under the shelf, and two others between the beds, on a level with the head, for each man. The bedsteads conform with the pattern in Plate 38. The roofs of all these buildings are of tile. The main walls are twenty-four inches thick, and partition walls eighteen inclies. It is well to notice that riding halls are considered quite as necessary for the artUlery service as for the cavalry. In each arm both horse and rider have to be instructed ; and in the artillery 33 D 258 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. service for the traces as well as the saddle — requiring infinitely more time and attention, as the maneuver of the gun carriage and caisson must be performed with a full team of six horses, managed by three men^ or two horses under the control of one man, subject to all the irregularities incident to service in the field, such as the loss of one or more horses, either from the lead, the swing, or the wheel teams, as well as loss of drivers, and injury to harness. For the drill and maneuver of two guns and two caissons, with six horses each, the drill hall or " equitation hall" for the officers of artillery, at Vienna, is 244 feet long, by 64 feet 6 inches wide. These dimensions are found sufiicient to answer very well for instruction with four carriages with six horses each, at the same time ; to turn in half the width of the building, and performing maneuvers with two carriages abreast. At the time I visited this establishment the horses were occasionally detached, leaving two wheel, with one lead liorse, two swing, and one lead without the driver for the swing team, and, in other cases, the driver was mounted on the off horse ; yet, in all varieties of movements, this building was found to be large enough. Officers of artillery only took part in these exercises, it being a school of practice for the officers of that arm especially. Before commencing the artillery maneuvers with the four carriages, they practiced horse- manship, on saddle with and without stirnips and girths, and finally bare-back, as contingencies likely to arise in the field. In noticing this branch of the service, as taught in Europe, in connection with siege, sea-coast, howitzer, and mortar practice, and the construction of the varied description of batteries devolving upon the artillery, and aware of the want of opportunity for our officers gaining any such practice of their arm of service, I cannot too strongly bring to the notice of the War Department this lingering and neglected branch of our army, requiring some powerful effort to be made to preserve the little knowledge of the kind given to the cadet, and enable the zealous and active members of this arm to bring it to that state of the art and science known in other armies. In no European army is the artillery without a head to control and govern it, and bring into notice improvements called for by modern applications of science. My belief is that the want of a chief of artillery is one, and the great cause of our arm of this name seldom or never attaining equal efficiency with other corps in their speciality. It cannot be doubted that a chief of artillery is quite as essential and necessary as a chief of engineers, chief of ordnance, or chief of staff. We have seen the advantages of giving to the constructing branch of artillery a chief, the result of which has been to establish a high degree of method, system, and order, the fruits of which have already been experienced. I entertain the hope that some energetic scientific artillery officer will ere long be called to Washington to control and bring into activity the talent and skill now dormant in this long-neglected branch of our service. No man over forty-five should be selected for this station. To return from this digression to the artillery depot and stables of the Austrian artillery school of practice. Their stables difier from those of the cavalry, being made for this special service, and for horses belonging to the officers. They are brick buildings of one story only, with a brick arch covering a stall of ten feet long, and a passage behind it of eight feet eight inches, or an arch of eighteen feet eight inches, resting on the outer walls on one side, pierced with windows near the ceiling, and on a close partition wall on the other, against which the rack and manger are secured. This partition wall sejiarates the stable from a seven-foot corridor, extending the whole length of the stable under a separate arch. Infantry Barracks. No barracks for infantry afforded much field for instruction, that I witnessed, to compare with those of Austria. As in the case of the cavalry casernes, those for infantry appeared to be II ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 259 a system of ancient date, and still adhered to, with slight modifications of detail to adapt them to the present improvements in the equipment of the troops. Plate 40 is a plan and two sections of a barrack for infantry, near the hay market, in Vienna, constructed more than one hundred years ago. With all the advantages of their general arrange- ment of rooms opening on continuous corridors, this one differs mostly in the corridor not being entirely closed, offering an example of a permanent structure for infantry well adapted to our southern latitudes. This barrack incloses a rectangle, surrounding an interior court, crossed by one line of the buildings somewhat obliquely, apparently once the exterior side of a building of about half the accommodation of the existing one. It is calculated for 4,000 men and 130 officers. The dimension of all parts of this building are given on the plan and sections of Plate 40, for which information I am indebted to the courtesy of a distinguished gentleman, whose acquaintance I made in that city. Each room is calculated for twenty-eight men. They are warmed by iron stoves within the apartments. Every man is provided with an iron bedstead and bedding arranged on each side of the room^ head to the wall, with an interval of eighteen inches between every two. The cooking is all done in apartments on the respective stories of the companies, and in vessels heretofore described. The iron bedstead of the Austrian differs from that of any other nation. It is composed of a head and foot frame of iron connected together by three boards to receive the bedding. These frames consist of two corner posts of seven eighths by five eighths of an inch square iron of 29^ inches in height, put together by two cross bars ; one of angle iron of seven eighths side and quarter inch thickness of metal ; the top of this is fifteen inches above the floor, riveted to the corner posts ; upon the rabbet of this angle iron the ends of the three boards are supported that form the bottom of the bedstead ; a second cross bar unites these corner posts, of seven eighths by quarter inch iron within three and one eighth inches of the top of the post. These two cross rails are united in the center of their length by a piece of iron of seven eighths by quarter inch, that stiffens the frame, at the same time that it prevents the pillow from Mling out at the end. The foot frame is made precisely the same. Three boards of a width together of two feet seven and-a-half inches and six feet four inches long are laid with their ends on the angle iron of the head and foot frames ; this constitutes the outline of the bedstead. To prevent the head and foot frames from receding from each other, a flat iron hook is fastened on the end of each board on top ; when this board is in place, the hook passes down on the outside of the angle iron at both head and foot, thus securing the head and foot frames from receding by three sets of these hooks. Still one other condition has to be attained, that of bracing or retaining the head and foot frames in a vertical position. For this purpose a piece of flat iron of seven eighths of an inch wide and a quarter inch thick for a brace is riveted on the sides of each corner post eight and a quarter inches above the bottom of the boards when in position. This rivet allows this piece of iron to turn upon it as a center. The other end of this iron brace has a notch cut in its edge, serving as a hook. On the outer edge of the two outer boards, and at the distance of eight and a quarter inches from each end, is fastened a piece of flat iron projecting about half an inch beyond the edge of the board with its end slightly upset or thickened ; the notch in the brace hooks on to this piece, thus uniting the whole into the most simple iron bedstead of which I gained information. It is to be recom- mended for its exceeding simplicity, and when taken apart, folding flat, requiring little room, either for storage or transportation. A second and lower brace under the boards, would render it perfect, durable, and efficient. The top and bottom of the corner posts of the different bedsteads are made to set, one on top of another during the day, to be taken down and placed on the floor at night. After a study of the plan and sections of this barrack, in Plate 40, I need add nothing more than to draw attention to the whole structure being built of brick, with arched ceilings, paved corridors, stone staircases^ and wooden floor to the rooms. 260 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. GROUND PLAN OF THE NEW AKSENAL AT VIENNA. TARGET HOUSE. . H . I li-i^h ^ i ^CE*' "' jpr '""•nir wl < »-t- I H > XII]- 38 tnisea ■ 36 toises. (2 250 toises front. Fig. 180. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 261 New Arsenal at Vienna. The most recent and I may say the best barracks in every respect to bo found in Europe, constitute a part of the new arsenal at Vienna, an establishment for the manufacture of every description of small arms, every caliber of artillery in iron and bronze, and equipment for the different arms, as well as carriages for sea-coast defenses, fortresses, and field service. No arsenal in Europe will compare with it in extent ; none in which thei'e is more unity of design. It is doubtless perfect in all resj^ects according to the conceptions of the Austrian military authorities, who must be considered as capable as those of any other nation on the continent. Although my purpose is to give the system of quartering troops by the Austrians as practiced in these latest constructions, the whole establishment, as an example of military architecture is worthy of notice, leaving its uses as an ordnance depot for explanation by those who from a special study of this branch of the profession are more competent to the task. The buildings occupy a rectangle of 360 by 250 toises. (See Fig. 180 for plan, and Plate 42 for a perspective.) At the four angles are quadrangular defensive barracks, of thirty eight toises square, (inclosing a court,) of three stories over a high basement. The corners are carried up one story higher, projecting, in plan, beyond the connecting depots to secure flank defenses. On the center of the two long sides is a barrack of two stories above a high basement, inclosing a court on three sides, that facing the interior being open, yet secured from uninterrupted ingress and egress by a solid wall. These center barracks project so far in advance of the corner ones, as to give a flank fire on the faces of the latter ; they are thirty-two toises square. In the center of the front is a squai'e building of thirty-six toises side for the commandant's quarters, main entrance, guard and porter's lodges, ofiices, &c. It projects beyond the corner barracks to flank their front faces. On the center of the rear line is a barrack, in general character, resembling those on the center of the sides, of 38 by 30 toises square, projecting as the other center buildings. Within the court of this last building is a chapel for the officers and families quartered within the establishment of 10 by 15 toises, with arrangements for the chaiilain to preach to the troops from its front ; all sacramental services being performed within. All these barracks are connected by storehouses ; those on the long sides being 110 by 10 toises, and on the short sides 55 by 10 toises. They are two stories in height, with a spacious cellar entirely below the level of the terreplein. The attic shows as a third story building on each front. Within the extensive inclosure, formed by these barracks and storehouses, are workshops, &c. , &c. Nearest to and parallel with the front is a richly ornamented two-story building of 130 by 30 toises, with projecting wings and center for a museum of ancient armor, arms, trophies, &c., &c., illustrative of the history of this branch of the art of war, with extensive arm racks as a storehouse for the small arms liow being manufactured. These arms are closely laid together, mostly horizontally^ on wrought-iron racks, so arranged that any one musket or rifle can be taken from its place without moving or disturbing any others. They rest on two points of their length upon iron notched bearing bars, and as close together as may be without touching. Next behind and parallel to the museum of arms, is a quadrangular building of 150 by 35 toises, inclosing four courts, mostly of two stories, particularly defined in Plate 42. It is for the manufacture of small arms. Back of this is a machine shop of 100 by 10 toises, of two-story wings and center, with a story and a half on the connecting lines. On the right and perpen- dicular to the machine shop, extending to the rear is the carpenter shop, of 115 by 10 toises. Its elevation is of one and two stories, as shown in Plate 42. On the left is a similar building of 115 by 10 toises for a finishing and fitting shop. Within 2G2 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the inclosure formed by these three last buildings, and in the center of the space, is the foundery for heavy castings, having three large furnaces. Perpendicular to it on the right, and extending back from its rear line, is a building for small castings of 50 by 15 toises, of one story, with wings and center projections ; and on the left a similarly situated and designed building of 50 by 15 toises for a boring mill. Outside of the whole of these buildings on the left is a piece of ground arranged for target firing, fitted with cross walls, sustaining banks of earth, at various distances, and safety obser- vation houses convenient to and behind the respective targets. At the end of this target ground, nearest the front of the arsenal, is a building of 16 by 20 toises for sighting small arms ; the sigU of every musket being adjusted by trial from this building by firing at the targets at suitable distances, from 50 to 600 yards ; at which ranges and intermediate ones the movable sight is adjusted. An expert marksman seldom has occasion to fire more than three times, although occasionally five times has occurred before obtaining an accurate adjustment of the sight. On the right, and in like manner outside of the whole, is a building of 8 by 15 toises for proving the gun barrels after being bored, but before being fitted and mounted. This establishment was manufacturing about 2,400 stand of arms per week, besides artillery, &c. , at the time of my visit. The furnace room is arranged with three furnaces around a semicircle, to melt 10,000 pounds of metal each. The casting pits were in front of each furnace ; over the whole a crane traversed, by which to maneuver the melting pots and guns after being cast. This crane was arranged in a peculiar manner, securing great strength and facility of action. In the center of the circle of the furnaces and casting pits is a cast-iron post, on the top of which is centered a horizontal iron frame, the other end of which rests on an ofi"set on the face of masonry of the furnace, moving horizon- tally on a rail track resting on that offset. This iron frame is the jib of the crane ; upon it is a traveller carrying the purchase blocks, the fall of which, passing over a roller in the head of the center post, is continued down the latter to a cog-wheel geering purchase. The whole arrange- ment is simple, occupies but little space_, and sufiices for maneuvering any weight that can be cast in the three furnaces combined, within any part of the surface of the semicircle. The workshops and other apartments are each warmed throughout by two wrought-iron six-inch pipes conducting steam along the sides and one end of the rooms. In one of the shops a glue-pot boiler, and a warm or drying table are connected with the same steam pipe, the whole receiving its supply of steam from one of the steam-engine boilers. This gluepot and drying table are wrought-iron cases or boxes of convenient shape, through which the steam circulates to warm the drying table, and to boil the water in which the gluepot is set. Water can be drawn from a large faucet — say one and a half inch diameter — in most of the apartments for constant use, or accidental fire. The general arrangement of the barracks conforms with those previously described of the Austrian service, namely : continuous corridors, surrounding a court with doors opening from them into each room. In this case the rooms are 41 feet long by 20 feet 9 inches wide, arched or vaulted ceilings springing 9 feet 9^ inches from the floor, with a versed sine or rise of arch of thee feet. These are for twenty men. In each of these rooms the bedsteads are placed in pairs side by side, heads to the wall, every two being from sixteen to thirty inches apart. Against the wall is a shelf over every two bedsteads, with cloakpins under. The floors of the rooms are of boards, the corridors are paved with stone blocks, of course on top of arches. Each room has two windows opening on the exterior or outside, with a door and two windows on the cirridor. The staircases are in the angles or the corners of the building, and none less than 6 feet wide, of stone steps, rectangular, with frequent landings; no circular staircases are admissible for troops in barracks. Each room is provided with a long center table and two small ones in the corners of the room, as also a blackboard, chalk, &c., for the instruction of the private soldier ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 263 in arithmetic, geography, &c., by the non-commissioned officers. All the plastering of these buildings is on the solid masonry, no lath being used. The store-rooms or depots for carriages, harness, timber, &c., &c., are all fire-proof, and peculiar in the details of their construction. The cellar is lighted from an area along the parade, there being no openings through the exterior wall on this level. Part of the cellar ceiling is arched and part is tloored with timber and plank, as will be seen in the annexed figures of reference. Above this cellar are two full stories with wooden floors, and an attic. The communication from cellar to attic is by wooden ramps at each end of the building, sufficiently strong to sustain the weight of the heaviest gun carriage. At each end of these depot buildings there are large doors on rollers, oj^ening the entire width between the masonry part of the building. On the side facing the parade are other large doors, but on hinges. The annexed figure (181) gives a general plan and section, with the principal dimensions, consisting of the interior and exterior walls, against which, at distances of sixteen feet, piers are General plan ant) section of the depots. Enlarged plan of the depot or storehouses. caeh, and two end ones of 12' caeli, making a length, from wall to wall, of 280'. Fig. 181. r these ' thick. Ei[.'Ilt beams t on tills girder. built on each side, and through these piers an arch of communication is made of 30f inches wide, with a pier of six inches on the wall side and of 4 feet 6^ inches on the inside. In the cellar an arch is thrown from one pier to the other, of IG feet span, supjiorting so much of the main floor over the same part; the upper floors arc supported on timbers. The center part of the three floors, for a width of 2G feet 5 inches, is sujjported by a girder of two pieces of timber resting on the ends of the piers, and by floor timbers from girder to girder. Between the piers the second and third floors are supported on beams resting on the piers. The roof is the most remarkable part ; it is arched with brick throughout. First an arch is formed from the end of one pier to the end of the opposite one, as a, a, a, of the same thickness as the piers, two feet one inch. These arches, with the piers, then become supports for arches of sixteen 264 AET OF WAR IN EUROPE. feet span^ extending from the front to the rear wall, the crown of which is a curve, as at n, n, n. This closes in the building, when a roof surface is formed on top of this arching. All the arch brick I believe to be hollow or cellular, to reduce the weight, the whole object being a durable fire-proof roof. The openings in the exterior wall, shown in the previous figure, consist of a window of four feet four inches interior width, with a loop hole on each side of two feet interior opening, between every two piers or on the distance of sixteen feet. This peculiar and novel construction for a fire-proof building is worthy of study, for api^lication in principle to some of our own struc- tures. In the attic there are three windows, through both the front and rear wall, and differing from the other two stories, as may be seen in Plate 42. The whole of this extensive establishment of highly ornamental, yet simple architecture, is built of brick, with some cut-stone tracery and trimming. In the barracks the muskets and other arms are arranged in the corridors, as described in other Austrian quarters. This arsenal commenced in 1851, was occupied and in full use in 1856, when I visited it. The cost is said to have been T, 900, 000 florins, including 180,000 florins, the cost of the ground, containing lOt yokes of 1,600 square toises each. The sale of the old arsenal in the city, it is sujjposed will fully cover the cost of this new one. The museum is calciilated to hold in its wrought-iron racks 211,968 muskets. MruTAET HosriTAi^. The permanent military hosjiitals of all the European armies that I had the opportunity of visiting are as a general rule admirably well arranged and in most excellent order and condition, the best being such as have the greatest advantages of the recent experience in architectural arrangements ; and as a consequence, the newest building erected for the purpose seems to com- bine the most perfect system for ventilation, securing a healthy atmosphere, in each particular ward, as well as throughout the entire building. Of all that I examined the new one at St. Petersburg I consider decidedly the best, and present minute drawings in plan and sections illustrating the whole design. Considering this establishment so admirably well contrived to fulfill all the requisites of a military hospital, I made the request to be allowed to copy the plans. These were put in my possession, and in addition the Adjutant General, Baron Lieven, by order of the Emperor, caused a perfect set of the working plans to be presented to "the Commission," which will be filed in the library of the War Deijartment. In Plate 41, I have given the information embraced in these plans, together with that from my notes, in sufiicient detail to make the whole understood. The buildings are all of brick. The main structure is three stories in height, on three sides of a square, every ward opening on corridors extending the whole length of the three interior faces, with windows opening on the court yard. Every ward has three windows opening on the exterior, and two windows and a door on the corridor, with a door of communication from ward to ward in most cases. The corridors are so arranged that they may be subdivided by closing large doors, confining the communication to separate staircases. This arrangement admits of any one ward having all its windows and doors open for ventilation without incommoding the sick in an adjoining one, while the corridors may be thrown open in j^art or in whole to like ventilation without subjecting any of the wards to its influence. The plan, either as a hospital or barrack for troops ap^jears to be the best yet devised, and for more than a century practiced by the Austrians, and now adopted by Kussia, Prussia, and Turkey. Notwithstanding all the apartments are arched, and the plastering on the solid walls, I could discover no signs of damp- ness or condensation on the surflices, nor from inquiry could I learn that any difiiculty was experienced from this mode of building. Fires are occasionally made in the "Kussian stoves" ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 265 in the corridors for ventilating tliera, and in one of the wards containing very sick patients, a small fire was lighted in the stove, witli the windows and doors open, the day heing bright sun- shine and warm, the 30th of June, 1855. So perfect is the ventilation and discipline, that in my walk through the many corridors, wards, kitchens, laundries, bathing rooms, latrines, and other parts, not the least offensive smell was perceptible, everything and place heing as neat, clean, and systematically arranged, as could possibly be desired, and far more so than a stranger could believe practicable, occupied as it was on the day referred to by no less than 1,2*73 patients, besides the numerous attendants. Although the system of discipline, combined with medical and surgical science, was of the highest order, yet, that could not have ensured such excellence without a building fully adapted in all its details to the varied wants of the sick and well occu- pying it. I can present nothing to the medical staff of our army superior to this, as an example of the European military hospitals. The corridors are twelve feet wide, covered with painted floor cloth, apparently laid on a brick pavement ; two wood-boxes of two feet square, and a long box for brooms, &c., are placed in these halls, convenient for each room. The floors of the wards are of hard wood, inlaid in geometrical figures over the brick arches, and kept polished, a system of flooring well calculated for hospitals, and one in use in most houses in St. Petersburg, and in the cities of the continent. All the rooms are provided with the Russian or masonry stove, as is the case with every hall, water-closet, or other apartment throughout the building. From eighteen to twenty patients are in a ward, each of whom is provided with a straw palliasse, mattress, sheets, blankets, and two PILLOWS, on an iron-framed bedstead, with j^iainted bottom hoards laid on a flange of the iron frame. There is much economy in this construction, the same cleanliness as though of iron, equal durability, and greater facility in moving, and even in cleaning them. The head frame, above the bottom boards, is filled in with sheet iron, making it close, and preventing the pillows from being disi3laced. The rectangular frarne, or sides and ends is of angle iron, and other parts of square iron. An iron rod rises from the head of the bedstead, on which is a tablet giving the name of the patient, his regiment, company, and regimental number ; also, the number of the ward, and of the bed of that particular ward, his age, period of service, district and department of country where born, whether married or single, the number of days sick before coming to the general hospital, and the special number under which he is received in the hospital. All these details are found indispensable in a hospital receiving patients from army corps ; exceeding a thousand when brought together. This information is written on a printed form, attached to a small slate or black board; beneath it the attending physician writes daily the symptoms of the disease, the external or internal remedy prescribed, and diet for the day ; an extract from this paper is taken to the apothecary who compounds or puts up the prescription, marks and numbers it to agree with the extract ; all for a ward are put in a tray, and by one of the attendants taken to the ward, placed on tables between the beds, and administered by one of the attendants. A physician is always in attendance, having under his charge a set of wards, appropriated to some particular disease. He has two assistant physicians and many hospital attendants. All the hospital ward attendants are instructed in their duties at schools before coming on duty in this establishment, thus insuring a corps of competent hospital attendants. A corps of superannuated soldiers is maintained here for external police. A patient, on coming to this hospital from the camp or casern where his company may be stationed, is first received in a large room on the ground floor, where two physicians are in attendance. They examine him, make the necessary records in their books, send him in an adjoining apartment, where he is cleansed with hot or cold bathing, as may be ordered, and then sent to an appropriate part of the hospital, where the attending physician assigns him to some ward proper for his disease. Hospital clothing is issued to the patient on coming out of the bathing room, and none that he brings with him goes into the hospital beyond this room. It is 34 D 266 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. taken to a laundry, purified, marked in conformity with the records, and placed in depots in numerical order, to be issued according to the termination of the disease. In addition to this bathing room for receiving patients, another is provided for each and every set of wards, warmed by a Kussian stove, containing three metal bathing tubs, and a fourth one on wheels to convey to a ward if necessary ; two of the wheels are on a fixed axle, and a third one, on a movable vertical axis, turned by the handle for drawing it, to and from the ward. Another apartment for each set of wards (and a very large one) is arranged with water- closets, with about ten pans ; which, with a slop sink and urinating pans, are of glazed earthen- ware or porcelain, precisely on the plan of those in our city houses, with hot and cold water in appropriate places. The kitchens are on the ground floor, in which large boilers of five and a half feet diameter are set in masonry, with tinned iron covers ; half of the top is movable on hinges, the other half is fixed ; a six-inch pipe rising through it, conveying the steam into a steam chest in the ■ masonry, from whence it escapes, either condensed or as steam ; which, I could not discover. The fireplace or furnace door for these large kettles is behind the wall, against which they are set, as is now becoming the practice for all cooking ranges in western Europe. Two rooms are thus arranged, with several boilers in each ; and in one of them a small range for the of&cers of the institution who dine together. The oven is in an adjoining apartment. It is heated by wood thrown on its hearth. Two valves regulate the heat, and a third regulates the draft of the smoke flue. Each side of the oven is provided with similar valves to equalize the heat over the entire surface of hearth and arch. The provisions here cooked are sent to each story for a set of wards, in large copper vessels, tinned inside, (two for each story,) by a dumb waiter, holding six of them at a time. It is worked by manual power from below ; and, on reaching the story for which it is destined, are taken into an apartment, and there served out according to the daily prescription. The conva- lescents dine together in large dining rooms, appropriated exclusively therefor. The apothecary's department is in a separate building (see Plate 41) on the ground floor. The medicines, drugs, &c., are in five small contiguous rooms, on shelves and in drawers arranged in classes alphabetically, in glass and earthenware jars, bottles, and phials, in wooden drawers and closets, in none of which was any peculiarity observed, other than in the construction of the drawers ; each of which, on being drawn out, was still a closed box, so made by a sliding cover that, on being pushed back, opens half the length of the drawer — a good arrangement to preserve cleanliness and air-tightness, requisites for many kinds of drugs, to which, in part, may be ascribed the perfect and entire absence of all smell of drugs or chemicals throughout the apartments. Two adjoining rooms, back of this dispensary, are fitted up for decoctions, solutions, and preparations requiring distillation, heat^ warm or boiling water, or steam ; and most admirably arranged is the apparatus for these varied purposes. For the construction and details of this part of the dispensary, see the two annexed drawings, (Fig. 182 and 183,) in perspective, presented to me by the chief of this department. In one of these two apartments (Fig. 182) is a mill, a mortar and pestle, the working of which is greatly facilitated by attaching the latter to a spring above it ; a hot chamber or box, stewholes, sand bath, oven, and a steam boiler set in masonry, from which a pipe conveys the steam to the adjacent room, (Fig. 183,) around which are arranged a variety of vessels, all supplied with steam at a high temperature from the boiler by the faucets (a a a) for each, admitting the steam at pleasure, and obtaining a boiling temperature in a feto minutes ; 6 is a double passage faucet, admitting steam into the large vessel below, or into a hand vessel through the pipe c. At g is an arrangement for boiling in six small vessels at the same time. A hood covers all these boilers tocarrv off" any vapors arising from them. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 267 The dead-house, as every other part of this establishment, is well organized, and preserved in proper condition, morally as well as otherwise. At present it is in a small frame building, (H, plan of building and grounds, Plate 41,) as a temporary expedient, until a proper one can be built. A small chapel, neatly fitted up in conformity with the rites of the prevailing religion of the country, receives the dead, where religious ceremonies are performed, when tlie bodies are conveyed to an adjoining apartment, and there laid out on a continuous table around the room, each body separately covered with either a sheet or a blanket. From this apartment the inter- ments are made twice a day ; and I am not certain whether the religious ceremonies are performed at this last moment, or when the body is first taken to the chapel and dead-house. At the time I visited this set of apartments there were fifteen dead bodies, 1,253 jjatients in the hospital, of which fifty-six men and three women had the Asiatic cholera that prevailed in the city of St. Petersburg, as well as in the neighboring camps, and at Cronstadt. The total number of sick that can be provided for in this establishment, including the summer hospital, is 30 officers and 1,770 soldiers and women, making a total of 1,800 beds. Every year this building is whitewashed^ cleansed, and purified, at which time the patients are put in contiguous wooden buildings, appropriated at other jieriods to contagious and other diseases incident to hospitals, as ophthalmia, &c. The plan of the buildings and grounds (Plate 41) indicates the position of this summer hosjjital, in connection with the permanent buildings. This summer hospital appears to be a part of the Eussian military system. I noticed the same arrangement in the fortress at Modlin, on the Vistula, and in the hospitals in Moscow, which, like the one described, are equally perfect, except in the buildings. Operating rooms, and a library of 1,600 medical works also constitute a part of this military hospital ; an honor to the country that supports it, to the head and heart that organized it, and liiglily creditable to its present chief and his associates for the perfect manner in which they administer and preserve its admirable efiiciency. I should not omit to notice a large chapel for the convalescents, situated at the end of the wing of the third story. It may be of interest to our army surgeons to know the character of the diseases as well as the proportions out of a total of 1,273 of the several kinds incident to the military profession, and in the climate of St. Petersburg. The information is given from the morning report of the 18th of June, 1855, presented to " the Commission" on visiting the institution that day. Acute Diseases — Catarrhal fever Rheumatic fever Gastric fever Intermittent fever.... Fever-s not classed.. Small-pox Measles 27 29 77 55 54 o 6 St. Anthony's Fire 29 Inflammation of the lungs Inflammation of the organs of respiration Inflammation of the liver Inflammation of the spleen Inflammation of the bowels Cholera, Asiatic 40 24 5 6 6 59 Outward Diseases, Exterior and Apparent- Diseases of the eyes Outward inflammation Abcess Sprains Difl'erent swellings Ruptures Watery ruptures Contusions and bruises 40 22 53 5 2 7 2 25 Wounds Ulcers Broken bones Caries bones Diseases of the joints.. 43 42 6 6 4 Chronic Diseases — Disease of the brain and nerves 10 Consumption 108 Disease of the organs of respiration.. Affections of the heart Affections of the stomach Affections of the bladder Diarrhea 79 14 10 10 40 Dropsy 28 King's evil 22 Rheumatism 26 Venereal 139 Scurvy 70 Itch 27 Piles 5 Bowel complaints 29 Total. 1,273 268 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. At Moscow, although the military hospital was on even a larger scale than that at St. Peters- burg, I found nothing specially interesting after having seen the newest and probably the best in the Empire, if not in Europe, at St. Petersburg. As an old building there is nothing to remark, other than as an evidence in the change of design, from a long continuous line of connected rooms, with windows on one side only, and entrance at the extreme ends, to the system of corridors, and wards communicating therewith. This hospital at Moscow, for officers as well as men, contained on the 24th July, 1855, 1,538 patients, 12 of whom were officers of the army. These latter were provided for in wards with six beds each, large and airy, communicating one with another. Everything within this extensive establishment was in the very best order and condition, and in detail precisely similar to that at St. Petersburg, the buildings excepted, which, like most others were arched with brick. The classification of the diseases of these 1^538 patients, from the morning report, is as follows : Fevers and different internal inflammations 416 Diseases of the chest 195 Diseases of the eye 88 Chronic internal diseases 162 Kheumatism ST King's evil 37 Venerea] 188 External diseases 176 Itch 212 Cholera, Asiatic 27 Making a total of. 1,538 The employes attached to this hospital were — On medical service, 18 officers and superior employes. " 218 soldiers and inferior " On police duty 6 officers and superior " " 396 soldiers and inferior " A camp of 25,000 militia, near the Palace of Petrofskoi, furnished many of the patients of this hospital. The military hospital now in course of construction by the Austrians, at Verona, may be considered as next to that at St. Petersburg, in the superiority of its arrangements to all the older buildings for the same purpose in Europe. Its general plan of -wards and corridors is the same as that of St. Petersburg, and in conformity with their long established practice about Vienna. It is calculated for 1,400 beds, and was in part finished and occupied on 21st January, 1856, when the sick numbered 482 of all diseases, of whom six were officers. Some of the details of this building I considered of sufficient novelty to be noted. The building is on four sides of a rectangle, in which particular it is not as good as that of St. Petersburg, where one side of the square is open and free for the unobstructed passage of the wind. The wards are calculated for twenty patients each, with one large window in the center opening on the exterior, and a door directly opposite on the corridor ; over this door, is a large window extending nearly to the ceiling, thus the windows and doors being open, the direct draft is through the middle of the ward, and not over the patients, who are in beds arranged on each side, heads towards the wall. At night a gas light in the corridor and close to the window over the door, suffices to light the ward, as well as the corridor ; and no other light is admitted in the room, except by special order. The rooms are all arched with brick, plastered on the solid wall, and warmed by an iron stove on the center of one side of the ward. The floors of the wards, and corridors, are of boards, except on the ground floor, where the latter are paved with stone, on parts that do not communicate with wards ; J ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 269 in the latter case being invariably of wood. In the corner of each ward is a water closet or room for the close stool, (when a supply of water is not at command.) It occupied a space of four feet square in the clear. Tlie stool or water pan, as the case may be, is placed in a recess in the thickness of the masonry of the covx'iAov partiiion. A low and small door in the corridor commu- nicates from this recess, that when the patient has left the closet, and closed the door into the ward, a servant from without can at once remove the stool, thus avoiding offensive effluvia in the room, and the exposure, and at times pain, of the patient leaving his apartment for one of different temperature some distance from his bed. This appears a better arrangement than the Kussian, if water is available, or a combination of the two plans would be most advantageous. In addition to the means of ventilation by the window over the door, and sashes of the windows opening on the exterior, there is under this latter, a smaller one of two feet square near the floor to admit fresh air at the lowest part of the room, and a similar opening of twelve inches square, next to the ceiling over the door, for the escape of warm or such foul air as ascends. This latter one is closed by a valve movable at pleasure ; the one under the window is closed by a solid shutter. The bathing establishment is on a most extensive scale, and for the use of water and steam in a variety of ways conducive to health. For steam bathing a room is fitted with several bedsteads, one rising above the other in steps, (or amphitheater arrangement,) with sloping head board for the comfort of the piatient, who is laid in his blanket on one of these wooden platforms or bedsteads, and steamed by the admission of any degree and quantity of steam from the boiler in an adjacent apartment. An adjoining room is fitted up with small apartments or stalls of sizes suited for men stand- ing, sitting, or reclining, each having pipes and faucets, admitting a shoiver bath from above, from the side of the apartment throwing the water horizontally, and a third throwing the water upwards from the floor to fall gently on the patient, thus giving the means of bathing any particular part of the body. In two other and adjoining apartments are no less than thirty-six marble bathing tubs, with tubes and valves for hot and cold water. These tubs are sunk several inches in the floor, the top remaining not more than one foot above, making it easy of entrance by an invalid, and at the same time convenient to put a patient in the bath, requiring assistance. Still another apartment is appropriated in this part of the establishment, for a large boiler set in masonry for steam and hot water for the bathing rooms ; connected with this is an apart- ment containing a large masonry cistern or reservoir, rising nearly to the ceiling, supplying a head of cold water for the bathing rooms, &c., and for the steam boilers. This reservoir is filled with the water of the Adige_, pumped up by manual labor. All the bathing establishment, store-rooms, apothecary's department, and kitchens on the basement floor are about three feet above the level of the terreplein of the court yard. A major of artillery is the commander and responsible person for the entire establishment, having a captain to assist him. The surgeons have only to take care of the sick and wounded, and have no authority to order, except in diet, medicine, and what concerns the application and administering of their professional prescriptions. They prescribe daily the food and diet either in half, whole, or special rations, which is written on the board at the head of the i^atient's bed. For each ward a return is made and sent to the kitchen, from whence it is issued at a particular hour, and carried to the ward, on wooden traj^s in bowls, by the orderlies of the respective rooms, placed on a table in the center for such as can come to it, others having it served to them at the bedside by the attendants. To make this convenient, every bed is provided with a board about fourteen inches wide and twenty inches long, with edges rising about a quarter of an inch above the surface, answering as a table or waiter on which to place his food, tumbler, fork, spoon, &c., &c. Although these minutia may seem unimportant to those who have the comforts of a home, they 270 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. contribute, nevertheless, greatly to the comfort of a sick or wounded soldier thrown suddenly into a large hospital with nothing to aid, comfort, or sustain him, hut what may he given to the many. The conveniences provided in this new Austrian hospital are not only of novel con- struction, hut are well worthy tlie consideration of our medical officers. Patients with cutaneous, infectious, or contagious diseases, are placed in wards under the lock and key, the corridor communicating with them being guarded by a sentinel, the corridor itself being locked as well as the wards. Insane patients are also under a guard, the additional precaution being taken of inclosing the stove within an iron grated portion or corner of the room. A single patient of this class was in this hospital at the time of my visit to it. The amputation table struck me as another novelty, a description of which might be accept- able to our medical staff. I saw it in no other hospital. It seemed admirably well adapted to its purpose, consisting of an iron frame as a bedstead, in three equal parts, admitting of the head or foot part being raised or lowered at pleasure to any inclination from sitting to laying out horizontally. This is accomplished by making the bedstead in three parts on hinges, as in Fig. 184. The center part (a) is fixed to an iron elevating screw, similar to that for sight- ing a piece of artillery. By turning the han- dles b, the bedstead may be raised or lowered at pleasure and clamped at any required height by the thumbscrew c. The whole is made to turn on its center by a movement on the vertical pin e, the standing and movable part being separated by the horizontal plane at n. Another adjustment exists for fixing the head and foot frame pieces at any angle at the will of the operator. It is effected by the double irons fastened to the center frame, through which the segments o o pass, that are riveted to the head and foot frames respectively, the thumb- screws t t securing them at the required inclination. Fig. 185 indicates the adjustment and security for elevating and depressing the whole. For this purpose /',-' the arc ^3 V P P is attached to the center frame, passing alongside ,. -"yy the pedestal, having a thumbscrew at / in a plate (a) attached on the outside of the arc j). When the screw h is used to raise or lower the apparatus the thumbscrew / must be free that the arc p J) may raise or fall as required, accomplished by the screw handle h while the patient is upon the couch, if necessary. When at the proper height the inclination is fixed by placing the thumbscrew / in the proper hole of the plate a a and clamp- ing the arc jo p. It must be specially born in mind that these adjustments must be so far under the bedstead as not to incom- mode the operator or his assistants. The original in the Verona arsenal resembles the arrangement here described so far as it was in my power to gain the information by sketching from memory "at night what had been seen in the day. It is sufficiently correct to give any skillful mechanic the requisites for constructing it. The dead-house is here a new building, and seems to embrace every necessary desideratum. It is built of stone, arched with brick, and tile roof. On the right of the entrance is a guard- room, where some one is in attendance night and day. On the left is an apartment of the same size for j?os< jnorfem examinations. Behind these two, and extending the whole length of the •■ ' 't/ /:iw//g, where it is kept on racks in numerical order. The register gives every man's disease, date of admission, regiment, company, and articles of clothing and equipment brought with him; and 35 D 274 ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. the Lospital number assigned him is affixed to his clothing, his ward, and his Led number. Besides hospital clothing every man is provided with a comb and brush. Woolen and cotton clothing is issued and used, as may be directed by the surgeon. Woolen cholera belts were issued to all soldiers in the army, and worn by the patients in the hospitals. The men, however, disliked them much when in the field, and in consequence they were not in general use except in the hospitals. This general hospital did not suffice for the sick and wounded of the English army. The Turkish barrack at Scutari was in consequence appropriated to the wants of their army^ and known as the barrack hospital. The two constituted the depot hospital of the army operating against Russia on the shores of the Black sea. It was under the military command and discipline of Brigadier General Stokes, with an aid-de-camp and a detachment of troops that mounted guard daily. The entire medical and surgical department was under Dr. Cummings, as Inspector Greneral, having the relative rank of a Brigadier General, whose control extended over the division previously described. At the time of my visit, this building contained between 700 and 800 patients under treatment. Each hospital was under the charge of a deputy inspector. The one now under consideration was divided into foiir " divisions," each under charge of a staff surgeon, and each set of wards or jDarticular set and number of patients under surgeons or assistant surgeons. The " Apothecary' s Department" supplies all medicines and surgical instruments. ThQ "■ Purveyor' s Department" s\\^\iYies iooA and hospital stores. These two dej^artments are under the senior medical officer. They may purchase, in case of necessity, on the authority of the senior medical officer, receiving funds from the army commissariat therefor. A medical officer can never exercise military command or authority; that can only be exercised by a military functionary, the duty of the medical corps being confined to healing the wounded and curing the sick, the discipline belonging to army officers only. This particular hospital (the barrack hospital) has a "dispensary" for each of its four divisions, as also a " clean linen store." The dispensary compounds and prepares the prescrip- tions from the surgeon's book, which gives the name, ward, prescription, and diet for the day, which is sent to the ward by one of its orderlies who_, or a nurse, administers each dose as directed. The "clean linen store" is in charge of a matron, who issues sheets, blankets, towels, and all other purveyor's supplies, on the order of the surgeon. The soiled linen is all delivered to her, who has it cleansed and placed in order on the shelves of her store-room. She makes her requisitions on the "Purveyor's Department" in conformity with the surgeon's requirements. Her receipt is sufficient at any moment of exigency during the day for supplies from the purveyor's stores, to be checked and examined weekly with the surgeon'.s requisitions, which are sent in duplicate to the purveyor's storekeeper as his voucher, the medical officers making their requisitions on the matron. The "Chief Medical Store of the General Hospital" is in this huilding, (barrack hospital.) It furnishes the hospitals at Scutari, and fills requisitions from the inspector general in the Crimea and other points on the Black sea. It receives its supplies in bulk from the "Army Medical Ordnance Department" through a "Director General," in London, the requisitions being made on him, who forwards the supplies to the "Chief Medical Storelceeper ." The latter receives them, breaks bulk, and issues on the requisition of inspectors general, or if for the Crimea, on the requisition of the senior medical officer in the field. This department only issues in mass and perfect packages. The dispensaries receive their supplies from the chief medical store. All the supplies in this establishment, the depot of the whole English army, appeared to be in great abundance and of very good quality, so far as could be judged of by one not of the medical profession. ART OF WAR IN EUROPE. 275 Such was the general hospital system of the English army, organized hastily and tempo- rarily for most sudden and unexpected demands upon the talent and skill of its chiefs, who could by no possibility have foreseen the necessity for such immense resources as were called for during this contest against Kussia, greatly surpassing all former precedent, by cholera, exposure in camp and trenches during inclement winter weather, and a courageous and resolute enemy. Some time was necessary to create and render efficient such an organization. When done, how- ever, it was efficient and admirably well conducted, both in relation to the stores and the main object, the cure of the sick and wounded. It will be seen that the general outline of hospital attendance, police and discipline, conforms with the continental practice, and that the buildings used for the purpose correspond with the newest and best of the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian sanitary establishments. The building used for the lieadcjuarters of the medical department and depot hospital is so well adapted to the purpose and so creditable to the Turkish government as to be worthy some further mention. It is capable of holding beds for the accommodation of two thousand patients. It is built in the form of a closed quadrangle, designed for a barrack for tlie Turkish troops. The rooms extend lengthwise along a corridor of sixteen feet luide, extending all around the building facing the court yard. Each room has a door and a window on each side opening on the corridor, and the latter has three corresponding window openings on the court yard. It is three stories high above a high basement, the height of the basement being much greater on the river front, towards which the ground descends rapidly. This basement is loop-holed only on the exterior. There is a rectangular tower of about thirty feet side on each corner, projecting bej'ond the line of the building about six feet and rising many feet above the roof of the main building, terminated with battlements, within which rises a smaller tower surmounted by a hemispherical dome from which rises the flag staff. The floors of the lower corridor are of stone; all the others and of the rooms are of wood. Some of the rooms have galleries covering half the length of the room against the corridor wall, used as dormitories when occupied by troops, leaving all the main floor free and open, an idea not seen anywhere else. The latrines are so objectionable as not to need description, although arranged with great care and freedom of space. The English surgeons made a free use of the chlorides of lime and zinc, preserving the entire building free from all noxious effluvia. The kitchens are arranged in this building much better than in the one built for a hospital. It occupies two large apartments with eight brass-covered boilers in each, of thirty-six inches diameter, twenty-five inches deep, gauged for seventy gallons, and holding two hundred rations, (English,) making sixteen in all, and capable of cooking for 3,200 soldiers. They have separate fires, the furnace doors and ash pits being outside the building. All the smoke flues run to the center of the line, rising in one smoke stack. Three hours are necessary to cook the food thor- oughly in these kettles. Each kettle is provided with a four-inch brass pipe rising from the standing part of the cover joining a horizontal branch receiving the rising pipe of the adjoining boiler. From this horizontal pipe one of the same size conveys the steam to the outside of the building into the open air. The floor of the kitchen is paved with stone. The bath room is fitted with movable tin bathing tubs. What may have been the arrange- ment for the Turkish troops I did not discover ; the apartment, however, indicated its use by the troops quartered in barracks, a practice not known to our service. This building is so well designed for its purpose, so creditable to the Turkish government, whose military institutions have within a few years undergone great and radical changes, and the details of which we are so little acquainted, that I am induced to annex a very perfect perspective, illustrating the whole exterior design, serving at the same time to render these notes more intelligible. (See Fig. 186.) 270 art ok war in europe. French Depot Hospital at Constantinople. The French army appropriated to their use, as a general hospital for the reception of their sick and wounded from the regimental hospitals in Crimea, a new building erected by the Turkish government for a military school. Its plan and general arrangement is as creditable to this nation as the barrack at Scutari, which it closely resembles. It is a rectangular stone structure of about 375 feet long by 277 wide, of two stories in height, with an interior rectangular court yard, situated on a hill overlooking Pera, and fronting the Bosphorus. At the time I examined it 1,600 patients were under treatment, many of whom were wounded Russian prisoners. The latter occupied the corridors, had every comfort, convenience, care, and attention that was bestowed on the French soldiers. The invalids or convalescents capable of leaving their beds, of the two nations, associated and amused themselves together in the court yard, indicating kind and good feelings in their mutual misfortune, although the one had wounds and captivity, while the other had only wounds to pain him. The establishment is under a "director," a branch of the military intendence of the army, having under his control a guard detailed from the regiments, and suiBcient number of other privates, to give an hospital attendant for every ten or twelve patients, and non-commissioned officer (sergeant) for every division, of which there are eight in tliis building. Their authority extends to about 200 patients and their attendants. In general, and at tlie hospitals in France, the sergeants of division and hospital attendants belong to a regularly organized body called the " Infirmerie Imperiale." The necessities of the service, even in the well organized French army, were beyond all their preconceived ideas of an hospital organization — calling for this additional assistance from the line of the army, and found to answer a very satisfactory purpose. For an organization of the sanitary department of the French army, I must refer to a comprehensive work by Vauchelle, in three volumes, published in Paris in 1854, giving the most minute details relating to a " cou7-s d' administration militaire." The wards of this building are very large, having in general four rows of beds of ten each, or forty beds in a room of seventy-five feet in length by forty-eight in width, of twenty feet ceilings. Each of these apartments has five large windows opening on the country, and four windows and a door opening on a corridor of eighteen feet wide, extending all around the four sides of the building, with windows opening on the court yard. Through the middle of each room, and longitudinally, is a wall of masonry pierced with large ojienings corresponding with the windows, dividing it iu two apartments at the ceiling. Water-closets are provided on the four corners and middle of the sides of the square on every story, arranged in the Turkish manner. There are eleven windows on tlie short side of 133 feet G inches nearly, and nineteen on the long side of 230 feet of the corridor inclosing the court yard. Tlie windows are twelve feet one and a half inch from center to center. The kitchen is in a basement of an outbuilding. It has nine large kettles set in masonry, with furnaces beneath, with fire doors and ash pits in the kitchen, causing smoke and dirt, and unlike their more recent structures. Each Ivcttle has a steam escape pipe, as at Scutari. A small adjoining apartment is arranged as a kitchen for the officers, witli a portable French cooking- range. In an adjoining small kitchen attached to the dispensary was a large boiler constantly in use and with fire, making barley water, the barley being in a bag. In this same apartment are four stewholes, in one of which is kept ahvays ready for use flax-seed poultice. In the anti-room of the dispensary is a set of stewholes for compounding medicines. The clean-linen store, spare beds, bedding, cups, cans, stoves, and other hospital furniture, are in apartments at the ojiiJosite end of the building. Iron bedsteads were in use throughout this liospital of a similar pattern, in general, to that i ART OF WAR IN ELTROriC. 277 in Plate 38, with the addition of a shelf secured over the lieadposts, which are carried up straight, on which is placed a tin plate of seven inches diameter, a dish of six inches diameter, and three inches deep, a one-pint and a two-pint cuji. The hedding consists of a straw palliasse twelve inches thick, on top of which is a wool-stuffed mattress of six inches thick, six feet four inches long, and three feet wide, supplied with linen sheets, changed frequently, (and as ordered,) pillow, and blankets. The bottom of the bedstead is of boards. On entering the hospital the "soldier's hook," and all his unnecessary clothing and equip- ment, are received from him, for which a tin label, with a number thereon, is given him as a receipt. From his "book" is extracted his description, and entered on a printed form, which is always found at the head of his bedstead. His hospital and ward number is always seen on a board near the head of his bed. They use none other than army military clothing in this depot. In the English, Sardinian, Prussian, and Russian hospitals the clothing is of a diiferent pattern, belonging to the hospital, as is the case in the permanent hospitals in France, but not in use with the army of the East. Every patient had his portable wooden table. The military hospitals at Lyons, Strasbourg, and in the city of Paris^ all of which were examined, are conducted on the same general principles, differing mainly in the facilities afforded by the character of the buildings, and in projiortion to the date of construction. Although an old building, the establishment at Strasbourg is an example of neatness, cleanliness, and good order. The influence of sisters of charity was manifest in that institution. In concluding this lengthy report, the fruits of a year's observation only, I cannot forbear remarking on our custom of looking to France alone for military information, considering, too often, that the subject is exhausted in a study of what may have been done by her military authorities. That every branch of the military profession is well studied, taught, and practiced by the French officers, does not admit of a doubt. At the same time officers of equal science, tact, and genius are to be found in the other European armies, whose writings and labors may prove quite as useful in their application to our wants as those of France ; and in some things I can but believe that England, Eussia^ Austria, Sardinia, Saxony, and Prussia have afforded me the opportunity of laying before my military friends information quite as valuable as that derived from France. Finally, I must ask the indulgence of my readers for seeking only information of details unaccompanied with new principles, now presented in the language mostly of hasty notes, compiled while in the daily execution of the arduous duties of the command of one of our largest military posts, permitting no time for revision. RICH'D DELAFIELD, Major of Engineers. West Point, New York, May 7, 1858. INDEX Alexander — Fort, 207; Description of, 229. Alexandria — Fortilicadons of, 206. Allies — Embark at Varna, 39; Land at Eupatoria, 40. Alma — Battle of, 40. Ambulance — English, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 80; Cot and Stretcher, 68; Sardinian, 70; Maltese Cart, 72; Litter, 72, 73; India- rubber Spring, 72. Ammunition — Consumption of, at Sebastopol, 54, 55. Amputating Table, 270. Ancient Fortifications — At Constantinople, 243. Antwerp, 19. Apothecary's — English, Department at Scutari, 274; St. Petersburg, 274; French, at Constantinople, 276. Approaches — Description of, 57. Armament — Of Sea-coast Batteries and Fortresses, 5; Prussian, 6; Austrian, 6; French, 6; Belgian, 6; Sardinian, 6; Cham- bered Gun, 12; Forts at Cronstadt, 27, 33, 34; Batteries at Sebastopol, 37, 38; French and English, at Sebastopol, 54, 55, 56, 57; Cherbourg, 127; Fort Victoria, Portsmouth, 140; Defenses of Genoa, 148; Fort de la Ereche, 200; Valerian, 202; Villeurbaune, 203; Montessuy, 204; St. Irene, 205; Rastadt, 226; Of Flanks at Modlin, 241; Of Flanks at Warsaw, 241. Arches — Groins of, 163; Only Perpendicular to Scarp, 210. Armt — French, Strength of, 39, 58; Loss of, 58. Arsenal — At Vienna, description of, 260, 261, 262; Cost of, 264. Artillery — In United States, Necessity of encouraging tliis Arm, 258; Stables at Lyons and Vienna, 257; Barracks at Lyons, Riding Hall, 257, 258. Assault — On Sebastopol, inexpedient, 41; On MalakolT, Little Redan, Mast and Central Bastions, Great Redan, 52. Asphalt — Used by Russians, 36. Attack — On Sea-Coast Batteries, Abandoned, 41; Noizet's System, 188; Cormontaigne's, 191; Choumara, 191; Of Rastadt, 226, 235; Of Pcsen, 235. Aubervilliers — Fort, 199, 200. Austrian— Napoleon Field Piece by, 5; Use of Haxo Casemates by, 188, 194, 195; Hospitals at Verona, 268. B. Bakery — Steam, 58, 59. Balaklava — English Depot at, 38. Balls — Rifle, 6, 7, 10, 11; Cannon, French and Belgian, 10; Prussian, 11; Turkish Stone, 11. Bandages — Perforated, 81, 82. Barracks— Infantry, DefensiYe, 209, 210; At Posen, 210, 212, 223, 249; At Modlin, 240; Cavalry, 248; At Berlin, of Lancers of the Guard, 249; French, 251; At Vienna, 254; Description of, 254; Infantry, at Vienna. 253, 259, 261, 262; Artillery, at Vienna, 257; At Lyons, 257; Napoleon, at Paris, 253; Turkish, 272, 273; Warming and Ventilating, 249, 254; Furniture, 253, 262. Barricade — Grooves, 212. Bastion — Orleans and Lyons, 198; Of Rastadt, 228; In Ancicjit Fortifications at Constantinople, 246. Bastioned — System of Fortification, 186. Bath Rooms— At Hospital, St. Petersburg, 266; At Verona, 269; At Berlin, 272. Bathing — Pool for Horses, 254, 256. Batteries — Sea-coast, 5; Haxo, 20; Casemated Russian, Prussian, Austrian, French, English, 26; Plan of Besieging, at Sebastopol, 48, 57; Floating, Sheathed with Wrought iron, 168 to 172; Casemated, 209; Mortar, 210, 217, 218; At Posen, 223; Flank, 210. Bayonne— Defenses of, 193, 195, 196; Trace, 196. 280 INDEX. Bedsteabs — Hospital, Freiioh, 80, 82; Iron, at Berlin, 248; French, 253; Austrian, 259; Russian, 265; English, at Scutari, 273; At Constantinople, 276. Beef — Concentrated Essence of, 91. Belfort — Fortifications of, 191. Berlin, 19; Cavalry Stables at, 248; Lancers of the Guard, 249; Hospital, 271, 272. BisETRE— Fort, 190. BOMARSUND, 25. Bombardment of Sebastopol — First, by land and water, 48, 49; Second, 51; Third, 52; Fourth, 52. Bomb-ketch or Mortar Vessel, 173 to 176. Bomb-proof Shelters — Russian, 89. Bocsmard — System of Fortification, 186; Defensive Buildings, 192. Bread, 58, 59. Breakwater — Cherbourg, 130, 131; Ancient, at Venice, 159. Breech-loading Small Arms — French, Russian, Norwegian, 8. Brick — Size of, 161. Bridges— Poncelet's Draw, 130; Draw, 200, 202; At Poeen, 224; At Cologne, 238. Broteau.\ — Fort, Defensive Buildings, 192; Carnot Wall, 195. c. Cadets — Russian, of 1855, 35. Calibers, 5. Camp Equipage, 89, 90. Cannon — Rifled, 9, 10, 11; Lancaster, 9; Turkish Stone, Shot for, 11. Canrobert — Resigns Command, 52. Canteen — Sardinian, 92; English, 93; French, 94; Russian, 94; Prussian, 95; Austrian, 96. Caponniers, 20; German, 210, 215; At Rastadt, 227; Of Fort Alexander, 229; Of Germersheim, 231; At Sebastopol, 237. Carbines, 8. Carnot Wall— Detached Scarp, 195, 209; At Biiyonne, 195; Experiments on, 209, 216. Carriages— Gun, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 28, 33, 34. Cart — Maltese, used as Ambulance, 72. Casemates, 12; Height of Embrasure, 15; AtSebastopol, 24; Cronstadt, 24; Bomarsund, 25; English, 31; De Q,uerqueville, 124; Breakwater, 125, 126; Du Hornet, 128; Flamands, 129; Fort Napoleon, 131; Fort Victoria, 140; Cliff Battery, 142; Prussian, 161, 162; Haxo's, 188, 194, 195; Adopted in French System, 188; Case- mate Fires, essential principle of German System, 218; Advantages and Objections to, 235; Smoke in, 236; Use of, at Sebastopol, 236. Cavalry- Barrack, French, 251, 252; Prussian, 248, 249; Russian, 252; Austrian, 252; United States, 257; Transport of, 63 to C7. Cavaliers — At Cronstadt, 227. Cement — English, Portland, used by Russians, 34; Used at Cherbourg, 132. Chapennes — Fort, Defensive Builditigs, 192, 204. Chassis, 13, 14. Chasseloup — System of Fortification, 166. Cherbocrg, 18, 24, 26, 122, 123, 124; General Descciption of, 125, 126; Casemates on Breakwater and Embrasures, 127 to 136; Dock-yards, 133. Chimneys — In Casemaled and Bomb-proof, 212. Choumara — System of Fortifications, 186; Trace, 189; Independent Scarps, 190; Length of Front, determined by Artillery, 190; Duration of Attack, 192; Interior Glacis, 191; Proposed Improvements, 192. CHORENTAN-Fort, 199,201. Citadel— At Modlin, 241. Clavigo— Memoirs of, 188. Coal — Kiln-dried Wood Substituted for, 35. Coblentz, 207; Independent Works, 213; Fort Alexander, at, 229. CoEHORN — Wet Ditches, 194. Cologne — Independent Works, 213; German System applied to, 237; Mangin's Plans of, 237; Description of, 237,238; Masonry of, 238; Hedges at, 238. Colombier — Fort, Defensive Buildings, 192; Detached Scarps, 195. CoLuiRE— Fort, 202, 203. Communications in Fortifications — Independent, 185, 186; Subterranean, in German System, 215. Compress — Perforated, 81, 82. Compressed Food, 90, 91. Concrete — Masses of, in Breakwater at Cherbourg, 132; At Marseilles, 133. Constantinople — Ancient Fortifications, 245; French Hospital at, 276. 4 INDEX. 281 Cooking — For Field Hospital, 75; Furniture for Mess, 90; Utensils for, English, French, Sardinian, Prussian, Russian, Aus- trian, 92 to 96; Austrian System, 259; System at Hospitals at St. Petersburg, 266; At Hospital in Berlin, 271; English Hospital at Scutari, 272; Turkish System, 275, 276. Copenhagen, 19. CoRMONTAiGNE — Tracc, 188; Duration of Attack, 191; Not used in France, 206. Cot— Ambulance, 68, 82. ConNTERscAEP — Masoury and Earth, 20. Cracow, 160. Crane — Iron, at Vienna Arsenal, 262. Croix RotjssE— Lines of, 198, 202. Cronstadt— Defenses of, 26, 27, 28, 29; Fort Paul, 27, 32, 33; Fort Alexander, 27, 32, 33; Fort Peter, 27, 34; Fort Menchi- coff, 27, 30, 31, 32. D. Dantzig, 160; Forti6cations of, 238. Dead-house — At St. Petersburg, 267; at Verona, 270, 271. Defenses of Harbors — Cherbourg, 125 to 136; Toulon, 137; Portsmouth, 139; Casemates at Portsmouth, 142 to 145; Liver- pool, 146; Genoa, 147; Austrian, 149; Pola, 151; Venice 151 to 160; Prussian, 160 to 168; Mouth of Oder, 164 to 167. Defensible Work— Independent, 213, 215; At Rastadt, 216, 230; Coblentz, 216, 230; Cologne Lunette, 217; At Konigsberg, 233; At Mayence, 239; Application to United States, 237. Defensive Buildings — Choumara's, 192; Bousmard's, 192; Fortifications at Lyons, 192; Paris, 192, Konigsberg, 233. Detached Scarps, 209. Desiccated Food, 90, 91; For Hospitals, 91; Bulk of, 91. Diseases— In Hospitals, 267, 268, 270. Ditches— Wet and Dry, 193, 194; At Lyons, 202; Wet, at Rastadt, 229; Wet, atGennersheim, 231; Wet, at Konigsberg, 232; Wet, at Constantinople, 246. Dock-yards — Cherbourg, 18, 133; Fortifications of, 133; Masonry, 133; Portsmouth, 18; Toulon, 18; Cronstadt, 18; Venice, 18, 149; Pola, 18, 149; Genoa, 147 Drainage, 212; Of Cavalry Stables, 249. Draw Bridge— Poncelet's, 130; At Toulon, 139; Fort Victoria, 141; Tre-Porti, 157, 158, 200, 202; At Posen, 224; In Prussian Works, 232; At Cologne, 238. DuFouR — System of Fortification, 181 to 185. E. Earthen Parapets, 26, 27. Electric Telegraph, 110; Fuse for, 112. Electricity — Exploding Mines by, 112 to 122. Embrasures, 31, 124 to 130, 144, 145; At Tre-Porti, 158; At Fort Newfahr, 162; Prussian, 165, 167. Enceinte— Of Fauviers, 199, 202; Of Lyons, 198, 199, 205; Of Paris, 197, 199, 205; Of Ulm, 221; Of Posen, 222; German, superior advantage, 219. England — Napoleon Field Piece, 5. Equitation — Austrian School of, 256; Stable, 256. Est. L'— Fort, 200; Trace, 200. EuPATORIA, 39, 40. European Engineers — Follow German system, 908. P. Factory — Steamships, 60, 61. Fautiers— Enceinte of, 198, 202. Field Guns — Napoleon, England, Austria, Saxony, Prussia, 5. Field Hospitals — English, 75. Firing Mines— By Electricity, 112 to 122. Floating Batteries — English and French, 1C8 to 172. Faisanderie— Fort, 199, 202. Food — Russian, 89; European Armies, 89; Desiccated, 90, 91. 36 D 282 INMlKi Pai#i«eiEito&-7^efPoi^tBlUiOntli, 18; Jinvre; 18; Chefbpiu-g-, W; Tfiuloii, 18Ji9; Paris,a8,'19i 20; VeniceJ 18-,iPola7.18vEaMai,( , : 1 ;:: .i. •.. IS, 21", Kiinigs&rg^, 16; Oronstadt, 19; Modfio, Jft; Ajitwcrp, 19; Copenhagen, 19; Lyons, 19, 20; Coblentz, 21; Verona, 21; Russian, 21; Systems of, 19, 176 to 185, aSO; Fronta of, 20; Trace, German, French, Russian, 21; Earthen Parapets, 26; Noizct's system, 185; Trace, 186; Dufout's, 185; hidepeh'- dent Communication, 185: Russian, 185; Talittkoffsky's Manual; 18a; Austrian, 166; Of Venice, 186? Mouth of the Oder, 186; Vistula, 186; Bastioned, 186 ; Modern System corrected, 166; Bousmard'e, 18G? Chasseloup's, 186; Haxo's, 186; Trace, 189; Choumara's, 186; Length of front j. ISO; As Determined by Artillery, 190; Of Alexandria, 186; Basis of Metz System, 186; Basis of System at the United Stftt^i Military Academy, 186; Of Rocroi, 206; Of Alexandria, 206; Of Eelfort, 19is OrLyons, 191, 199; Toulon, 191; Havre, 191; Of Paris Defensive Buildings, 192, 197; Of Detached Forts, 200; Of Cobtenia, -iftansM Jio'^ :K ,re?07; Posen^ 207;. Rastadt, 210, 226; Co^ognq, S13; U:h», *13; 221 •, Qeimetthiim, 231; iBgolsUrft, 233; Konigsberg, 232; Warsaw, 239; Modlin, 240; Constantinople, 245., ! : ,or. .7:; .,:■.;• FoRTiFicATioKs — Temporary, use and value of, at Sebastopol, 53; By United States Engineers, similar to Russian, at Sebas- topol, 53, 54. Forts— At Cronstadt, Fort Peter, 27; Description of, 34; ll"6rt Paul, 27, 32, 33; Kronslot Battery, 27, 33; Fort Alexander, 27, 32, 33; Fort Menchicoff, 27, 30 to 32. At Sebastopol, Fort Conslantine, Armament and Trace of, 37; Fort Catherine; Ai'niwrtcnl.llnelP^ace-oCj^jl; Fort Michael, Armament and Trace of, 37; FpT* Atex^ideir, Arraamcpl and Tr^c^ of/,37: Q-UflraBtinp -■ir,j-i .r.f-i ci ;:;; ,::;,.BaUeries and Trace of, 38; Fort Nicholas jcmj Trace/^f, 38; Foi-t Paul , and Tuace oft 38; lEjiislijig I^Mll "TCI (iitioM ;83I o) ua fDeftises at Gommejicjement of Sie»e,. 41, 4^; Malakoff Tower, 43; Defensp.'? Erected During Siege, 44, 45, 46; Korniloff Bastion, 44, 45, 46; Little Redan, 44, 45, 46, 50;, Gervaise. Battery, 44, 45, 46; Great ,sior)8->»ino2[ jA ;"IS ,RedanjT45, 46; Mast;Bastioi»,45, 46; Barradc Baueris?, 45>;46; Ojist^'uctiona on Glacis, 47. , .Km-.- >, .'.^Q At Cherbourg, Fort de QuerqueTille, Casemate? and Caserns, of, 124; Foit St. Aniii 127; Fort du Hornet, .£KG ,if- - ,,ATmaraeBt of, 12J, 128; Fort^les f'iataaiidsi Descripli^fii^.iid Casemates ofj 1^,^130; Foftll^apoi^oBi i3Q, 131; Fort, du Roule, 134. . (,,;.: .,,,;,. .> .,,.: ./tjlI At Toulov, Fort L'Aiguelette, 137; Fort Balaguier, MJ;-;F^t;pinB;^oHPrJ3T;iFp??!S,«ieI^9»»?* li!?Jj>J'^J^ Malgue, at Cape le Brun, 137. r.^i: _-[i2 ..-t;' .•..r,!!;,,^ ,1? ;;! ».-.;^/.u:(T ;SSt: ,iiJi:B-; 4s PoRT5T«iocT«, Fort Victc^ria, Pl^ip, gaje|i)a)esfia|?|d;.^?piBnsnt.PAJ0PAot^ta©^ff{fe'Wi jQ»^ 142 to 145. .jlj.o ,Mi.;o[iiWi«)enoa .In ,JyV7" ,-r .;i .At LaVEREOOi,, North -Fort, 14e.,,.,,-.j -;■: .•,...,,,[.': JXl -I'l ei;.-: i .'l.'l^.." .-CiU :-] .-.^tuh : ii:j— fiaj.v-Hoon Near Venice, Plan and Details of, 152, 153;' Fort St. :^jifolfl(„|Ifl}Bnd.!of.}jidp,'il54^Ll5Si; Fort Tre-Porti, near Venice, Plan of, 156, 157; Fort Hainan, 159; Fort Erasmo, 155; Port Newfehr, at mouth of Vistula,, 16|, ri£iKarn1riI;tGe,nwr*62! Fort Valerian, 190, 199, 201; Cost of,234vIi'ortBisetre, 190; Foj-t Kogeat, 190, m; Fort Rasjky, 190; Fort Noisy, 190; At Lyons, 191; Fort Loya5se,,19L 1?5, 202; Fort St. Irwe, 191, 204; Fort Vitri- olerie, 191,202; Fort Colombicr, 192, 195; Fort Le Motte, J92„ 195, .203; ,P?in VdUeurbanm. .192, 203; Fort Broteaux, 192, 195; Fort Charpennes, 192, 204; Fort Faisanderie, 192, 199; Fort Grevelle, 192, 199; Fort St. Denis, 199; Fort Aubervilliers, 199; Fort Charenton, 199, 201; Cost of, 234; Fort Isly, 191; Fort I'Est, 200; Fort St. Laurent, 202; Fort Montessuy, 202; Fort Coluire, 202; Fort St. Foi, 205; Fort Alex- ander, 207; Fort Viniari, 214; Fort Leopold, 226; Fort Alexander, 229. Forts, Detached— Lyons, 197, 202; Paris, 197, 199, 200, 201. -5, gg .axaqiail y.^iiratS. FouNDATioNS-Forts at Cherbourg, 132. i-l , ^ .j^ ,^,,'i .grj ,;,;,^^„3j:,T 3,.iTu3a3 Frexch School— Like German, 198. ik:i „j or| ,v.| 'vuKl -.jibo.'nz'I— ■/TisijiT'jajJr Fronts— -Length of FrenoU, 190; CJioumai»"sv 190; Al G;/euoble, 494; At Ba5rpjine,,),95; Of .P»ri«, J97;;GJerman, 216; ?Q^, .,, ., , ,;-, c ;,. „,, .- 222; Fort Viniap, 222, 224; QonQec.tipg,Fr(iM^te at Rasf^d't,,287.5jFp(t'.Ailexi^i)(^r,,2^q;'.Qf'lj>goi.pt^dt,!,332^ "■■ At Modlin, 241, 242. -■"• ' U£E",S3«no,b^ior.-.qu. '" Furnaces— Shot, at Cronstadt, 33. ^ •.?ii1 f),''.!"? f.ff.'nrvf/i—Tj'/.-.nv.S Furniture— Field Hospitals, 75; Mess, Sardinian, 92; English, 93; French, 94; Russianj 94^; pfi(^r^olfS> ^3^*363. '^^^^'^^ Hospitals, at St. Petersburg, 265; At Scutari, 273; At Constantinople, 27(6, , a "in-' is- 1 'J l'SL FusE-Electric, 111, 112. ' "" ' "" " ' '^^ Jes',A.«o"^A^'j3 .SllS .imiava iiBrr.nD wnllo'H — en.-j.iziazC'f WA3teao3 G. Genoa — Defenses and Dock-yard of, 147. ' German, — System of Fortification, 188, 206; Similar to Haxo's, 188, 198; Imitated at Lyons, 206; Humfrcy's Account of, 206; Described by Zarstrow, 207; Followed by European Engineers, 208; Principles df, 208; 8carp«iid Counterscarp, 208; Composed of Independent Works, 213; (See Cologne, Pozen, Ulm, CcrbtentE;Kate- stadt;) General Organization of, 213, 214, *1S; MinSs, SIS-, Casemate Fire Essential, 218; Pnbl Fronts a consequence of, 218; Trace increases the Front, 218; Another general principle, 819;- 'Hs strong points, 218; Natural consequences of, 219; Enlarges field of operations,'.919; ReWlor^'the advantages of Fortresses, 219; Maxims on which it is fOTinded, 220; lilustraled at RaslaSt^ 26fe; Trace of Rastadt described, 227; Defects attributed to, 233; Cost of, 234;Ap{)li«atioh'«J",-23T;A*'-8t^ttiih, 838; At Dantzig, 238; At Mayence, 239; at Verona,- 239." 'U ;'- -s' I'^i A .:.:.■■,■ -.uZ -A.. ,:::: v:::'.i a-j'T Germersheim, 231; Caponnier, 231; Trace, 231; Wet Ditches at, 231. ,[ J)g Glacis — Interior, 191. moEX. 283 Grenoble — Defenses of, 193. .ODE .nol — ujusnaj Grevelle— Fort, 199, 202. ,ICI /Jo biiBUI— oai J Groins— Of Brick Arches, 163. .08 .rfjii-Ji'l ,-cT ,i7 ,6" ,uluM— 8;J3tt!J Gdn Boats— Russian, 35; English, 175; French, 175. ' -■:!^r; r.i "^ . rH :[-'■'■ ICr .no"? — ShiticJ. Gcn Carriages — Russian, Wrought Iron, 13 to 16; Austrian, 18; At Ci-Biwladtj 28v Wrought Iran, M3. ;:>I)iiI — arrav jJ GtJJ Co^TlTOK.irii:! ,'r. ri:!!):);;:!!:-- j^^I .:<-.i:i ,--:Ue-/i j-mcj ,8!-:n4 li-. :-'j:::r)lirJ L'/j :!• O")! 1 ,Uil« , ll.'i ,)c ^fif--j bo/iosisQ — ny.utd .BOS ,iij;rtiTjO orl; oJ ■ir.litvriK ,'Jo enoiJ/Mjlinol ;Bei ,;>tiiiii.-);i3 H. .K Harbor — Defenses of, Cronstadt, 24, 26; Sweaborg, 24; Sebastopol, 24; Revel, 24; Odessa, 24; Portsmouth, 26; Lirerpool, 146; Venice, 149; English System, 139 to 146; Sardinian, 147, 148, 149; Austrian, 149 to 16Qi Prupjia,B, 160 tip IE .viinsV Jn ,Blu)e'V16T; Carlscrona, 167._. r-i:/;, ..ill ,-'::•■:' iiiji'.ii!; ::'i ■■> ,ifu::z;v::\i t,: .■•:.in;T,: ■ Havre — Fortifications of,. 191. _'.: ,f i'.- .:;| I ,'.:; I , =. : :ni :;• ^i^K-i.iH ; i i;.i/:-- !■::,.•;.: i. y., Haxo's System of Fortification, 186; Casemate, 188, 194, 195; Similar to German, 188j7Al .Grenoble; 193; By Austria, Russia, and Prussia, 194; Description of, 194. .f.8I ,K-(5!?'J|o;!i;ib'f — KOiTAnniTiioH tn jsji-i.tl Hedges— In Fortificatione, 238. : ■ M li'I .1^ .:.: '. ' ;.' li;i ,.;: .-^-•i:.:;iv.ir") :nE .■..an-;:::.',.?; u^: Anr '■:■:.!,< :] -/. .-v -i .•(.-, "/. HoRSEs-^Slingiiig, 66i G7; Feed, 67; Yonlilating Transports Ibr, 67j Nose Bags, 67; Transport of, 107. Hospital— English and Sardinian, .75, T6, 77; Furniture for, 75; Desiccated Food, 91; At St, Petarsburg, Description of, 264; Best in Europe, 265; Discipline of, 265; Model for Barracks adopted b.y Russia, Prussia, Turkey; Cooking Arrangemcjits, 286; Apothecary's Department aiscJJilii)9;of,-a7.Bj. Wotec Ctosat«w873t,^6^,WatiBiiig,ia7fi; -li.') '.lafiimail ,:!!:: ,. iFumiturei 277 ; French at StrRsboufg'.,'to i-:.l:.;iiO jOii: .'^a nojiqhusftb :BcS ,1o fwnU-.-.iii'isus'l. ;8I ,/.iJu;jl/i Hospital Store Wagon, 77 to 85; Russiaii,;83, 84, 86in';0 .rn'O pi.ni-3ily^iioi''ff jEl-fi .1o JsoJ ;i:{i£ ,jioa Hospital Wagox — ^^English, 70, 71. _ l'!.-'>'l ,c-OC: ,io'^ .;8 J!o'''£ "B rn»)i!-{« eiH jSiJI (SiainnoqiiD — TflaaMf..i*TKoI4 Hospital Steamship, 61, 62. .f.OS ,20S .J-ii!"? — t'jss.mt-.'oM Howitzer Fire — Importance of, 214. .OOS ,GCI ,'lo aLi'sioH — jT:ijjrrz'!lA Hcmfret's German system, 206. .£t:£ ,n9ao1 )« jSiS JIS ,0!£ ,>.ii-i.itt/.3 sat.i;:!.' Huts — Sardinian, 86, 87; French and English, 88. .cTi .t'l ,g?l .flC ,iTi.c.ii althji''. .8DS ,iB I;;;i(;RC>H .-GI ;woo8nl/. i-T ,Er .fifiirirbiJiS brin ,il-'..'vi''l , ■-•ilgfi;'! ,i?j,';J — asjuXi .3 ,itr3X3xii.t. Infantry Barracks — At Vienna, 259, 261, 262. Iron Bomb-Ketch, 173 to 176. , M Iron Sheathed Batteries, 168 to 172. Isle of Wight, 139. .CfrS ,!js B^-^nmnO nuD ;■ - ; '- '. .■ — ^. . ..^. .1 IsLT— Fort, 199. .ETE ,f.T ,8a ,10 ,fl^ii9inrL ohith.iiVI .ftt'i , ' I ,:,: ■i—T-/.3iu-.'n .081 ,iio1— vatoVl .ijtiS ,Ls:.>o-no'i m'iJ£-{3 u-iaboM a/IT ;9dl ,1o 93BiT*;8Si ,3i3filifl Ic. no'uiinuQ. ;ogt tnoJiBaJliJiol 'lo ;'':;! ,!•■ an-iT h;,i,ji'-:a mC! ,':•.■ rh;; p. j;: I :.•.;,, i;,, ill" i ,"to <..;o:u-:'\:nol. ;BI ,?.i'ij!,'I Konigsberg — Fortress of, 232; wet ditches, 232. .t£S: ,q-iB'ia 'to .tii.i;»r'I ;t£S L. , -, „ ,^ ... , ^ ..rr 1. ,nr , ll> ,0* .loCOJa/ill-jS JKuiB'-R K.ioij.i: iO— MA.ll La Motte — Fort, Delensive buildings, 192; Carnot Walls, 19.). .,., ,,, n.r . ., ». ^ J r, r, r,„ -''"l 'l"i -CH ,■-- i;;.;r/-;Jj(.U :»I ,ajo1 Lancaster Gdn, 9, 26. r,,, ,-^r^ , ■ , n n Lavatort FOR Soldiers, 141. „, _ 284 INDEX. Leopold— Fort, 296. Lido — Island of, 151. Litters— Mule, 73, 74, 75; French, 80. LoTASSE — Fort, 191, 209; Haxo Casemates, at Lunette — Independent detached, 217; at Rastadt, 227. Lyons— Detached Forls at, 191, 202; Defensive buildings in Forts, Carnot Walls, 195; Fortifications of, 19C, 197, 198; The Enceinte, 195; Fortifications of, similar to the German, 206. M. Machicoulis, 205. Magazines — No interior linings, at Cronstadt, on the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, on the Rhine, the Vistula, at Venice, at Fort Victoria, 34; Service in English casemates, 142, 143, 212, 213; Russian, 214. Mangin— Plans of Cologne, 337. Manuel of Fortification — Teliakoffskys, 185. Masonry— At Bomarsund, 25; Sebastopol, 25; Cherbourg, 25, 131; Malakoft', 25; Fort Paul, 33; Menchicoff, 33; Fort Alex- ander, 34; North Fort, at Liverpool, 146; Defenses of Genoa, 148; Size of Brick, 161; Groins of Arches, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian, 163; of European Fortresses, 238; Ancient Fortifications at Constanti- nople, 246. Maurice de Sellon — Defense of Noizet's system, 188; Defense of Forts at Paris, 202. Mayence — German system applied to, 239. , Medical Supplies — English, transport of, 76, 77; French, 77 to 81. Mezieres— System of fortification, 181 to 184; Not adhered to in France, 206. Mess Furniture, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96. Milk — Concentrated, 91. Mill— Steam flour, 58, 59, 60; Steam saw, 60. Mines— Torpedo, 109, 110; Exploded by electricity, 112 to 122; of German system, 215. Modlin, 19; Fortifications of, 239; description of, 240; Citadel of, 241; Enceinte of, 241; Peculiar system, 242; Immense cir- cuit, 243; Cost of, 243; Wrought-iron Gun Carriages at, 243. Montalambert — Caponniers, 188; His system at Fort St. Foi, 205, Polygonal Front, like the German, 218. Montessuy— Fort, 202, 203. Montreuil— Heights of, 199, 200. Mortar Batteries, 210, 217, 218; at Posen, 223. Mortar Boats, 35, 173, 174, 175. Moscow; 19; Hospital at, 268. Mules — Litter, English, French, and Sardinian, 73, 74. Muskets, 8. N. Narva — "Wrought-iron Gun Carriages at, 243. Nightingale— Miss Florence, 61, 68, 75, 273. NoGENT— Fort, 190, 199. Noisy— Fort, 190. NoiZET— System of Fortification, 185; Duration of attack, 188; Trace of, 186; The Modern System corrected, 206. 0. Oder — Defenses at mouth of, 164 to 167; Fortifications of, 186. P. Parapets — Earthen, 26. Paris, 18; Fortifications of, 196, 197, 198; Enceinte of, 197; Detached Forts of, 197; Cost of, 234; Cost of aadrangular Forts, 234; Ejctent of scarp, 234. Pellissier — Invested with command, 52. • [ Peschiera, 18, 160. Pistols — Austrian, 9. Plan — Of Allied operations against Sebastopol, 40, 41, 47; Change of, 46; Of Napoleon III, 51. PoLA, 18; Dock-yard at, 149, 151, 160. Poncelet— Drawbridge, 200, 202. Portsmouth, 139 to 146. INDEX. 285 PosEN, 18; Trace of Enceinte, 222; Cost of, 234; Trace of Citadel, 222; Cost of, 234; Defensive IjaiTack, 210, 212, 220, 223; Trace of Bastion, 224; Drawbridges, '224; Stables at, 248, 249. Posterns, 213. Powder — Gun Cotton, 11. Prezl, 160. Prussia — Napoleon Field Piece, 5; Haxo's Casemates, by, 194; Cavaliy Stables, 248. R. Raglan — Lord, death of, 52. Railroad — At Sebastopol, 58. Range of Cannon — Long ranges at Venice and Sebastopol, 159. Rastadt— Caponniers, 210; Interior redoubts, 212; Description of Front, 225, 226, 227; German system on marshy ground, 216; Attack and defense of, 226; Bastions of, 228; Cavaliers of, 227; Caponnier at, 227; Lunettes, 227; Connecting Fronts at, 227; Cost of, 234; Attack of, 235, Rations, 89, 97, 103. Reconnoitering — Coast of Black Sea, 39. Redoubts — Interior, 211, 212; Independent, 218. Riding Hall— At Vienna, 256, 258; At Lyons, for artillery, 257. Rifle, 5, 6, 7; All armies, 6; Cannon, 5, 9, 10, 11, 26; Pits, 50. RosNT— Fort, 190. Russia — Napoleon Field Piece, 5. Russian Ststem of Fortification, 185, 239; Independent communications, 186; Use of Haxo's Casemates, 194; At Warsaw, 239; At Modlin, 239, 240; Magazines, 240; High and low defense, 249; Hospitals, 264. s. Sandy Hook — Trace of, 190. Saxony — Napoleon Field Piece, 5. Scarps— Independent, 190; Choumara's, 190; Carnot's, 195; German, 208, 217; Sustaining, 208; With relieving arches, 208, 209; Cost of, 209; French, 217; Detached, 203; Carnot's, tested, 209; Extent of, at Paris Forts, 234. Sea-Coast Batteries — Armament of, 5; Value of, 53. Sea-Coast Defenses, 24; Comparison with United States, 36; Armament of Sebastopol, 37. Sebastopol, 19, 24, 25, 26; Harbor defenses, like Cronstadt and Cherbourg, 36. 37, 38; Forts Constantine, Catharine, Michael, and Alexander, 37; (Quarantine Batteries, Forts Nicholas and Paul, 38; Besieging Army, em- barked, 39; Admirals and Engineers, reconnoitered, 39; English siege train, 40; French siege train, 55; Landed at Eupatoria, 40; Battle of Alma, 40; March on Balaklava and Kamiesch Bays, 40; New plan of operations, 40, 47; Great object in view, 41; Siege determined upon, 41; Idea of assault abandoned, 41; Existing defenses of Sebastopol, 42, 42, 43; Commencement of siege, 44; Change in plan of operations, 46; Ruins of the city, 47; Obstructions on Glacis, 47; Plan of besieging batteries, 48; Bombardment, 17; October 1, 48; Malakolf silenced, 48; Sea attack by Allied fleet, 48, 49; Failure of attack, 49, 50; Idea v'of raising siege, 50; Russian advance on Mamelon Vert and Mount Sapoun, 50; Sufferings from inclem- ency of weather, 50; Second advance of Russians, 50; Rifle pits, 50; Second bombardment and failure of, 51; Dissatisfaction of Napoleon III, his plan of operations discussed and rejected, 51; Failures for want of great commander, 51; French considered a general assault as terrible and doubtful, 52; Result of divided councils, 52; Canrobert resigns, 52; Pellissier invested with command, 52; English success, 52; ■ Third bombardment and failure of, 52; Death of Lord Raglan, 52; Fourth bombardment, 52; Success of the French on the Malakoff, 52; Their failure on the Little Redan, Mast, and Central Bastions, and of the English on the Great Redan, 52; Retreat of Russians from South shore, 52, 53; Sortie by Russians under Liprandi, 53; Attack at Inkerman, 53; Value of temporary fortifications and sea-coast batteries, 53; Similar temporary defenses in United States, 53, 54; French explanation of difficulties, 54; Arma- ment of French and English, during, and at close of .siege, 54, 55, 56, 57; Consumption of ammunition by English, 54, 55; Consumption of siege material, 57; Construction of batteries and approaches, 57 Total French force, 58; Loss of French and English, 58; Use of steam engine, 58; For railroad, 58 Bakery, 58, 59; Flour-mill, 58, 59, 60, Condensing steam, 60; Steam saw-mill, 60; Factory ship, 60, 61 Steam hospital ship, 61, 62; Miss Nightingale, 61; Use of casemates, 237; Caponniers at, 237. Sevres, 199. Shells — Fired horizontally, 5. Ships— Troop, 97 to 108. Shoeing— Cavalry, 248. Sick and Wounded — Transport of, 68 to 70. Siege Material — Consumption of, at Sebastopol, 56, 57. Smokk — Escape for, 212; In Casemates, 236. 28& IJSDKX.i SoATiE— By RusBiauB, SSj: I -./i!t;ioi3a ;i.CS ; . •3:.j.-iT ;8I .zaiol Spring — India-rubber, 72. ,Ci'. St. Petersburg, 19; Hospital at, 264, 265, 266. .Elii ,8ZHaT*o"l St. Irene— Fort, 191, 204. .JX ,riai)oO noO— aa«#ro^ St. Foi— Fort, 205. .00£ .jsajiq: St. L-iuRENT, 202. , ■ '-i vH ^Julimiwo-'J isVxbM ;5 ,):3i'X libil ooDloqoVi— jn«!irH=l St. Denis— Fort, 199. St. Cloud, 199. St.ibles — At Posen, 248; At Berlin, Lancers of the Guard, 248; Shoeing Shop, 248; French System of, 250, 251; Russian, 252; Austrian, at Vienna, 252, 254, 257; Floors and Ceilings of, 253; Dimensions of French, 253; United States, 257. '■^' •'" ;:"••'■ y'"J -.•:A.t.->/}l Steam— Applied to the Art of War, 65; Condensed, for Fresh Water, 65. -' •• ■;''■■"•'■■■'-■• "> — .t...cs;,ii'.;I Steamship— As Bakery, 59; Flour-mill, 60; Condensing Water, 60, 65; Sa\v-niiIl,-60'; Mfechine^h'op, 60; 6i;'''Ho'Sp'itaP, «4,-^j ■''■'"■■''"' 63; Cavalry Transport, 65. ■ ' ■! ,v)IU ,.'.-:-)iiino(jJi5-T(ZAT5A!I ST«-rm-^PoiAifications of, 160, 164, 238'. ■ • ''-'■- '■*^- Store-rooms and Houses— Austrian, 262, 264. '■'■"■•■ •'"•' ■■^''"''■'- <"'•- t''" ^■^■^-^ i'^^ ." aJ-Wi''! gniJcofinoO Stretcher— Ambulance, 68. ■'■^" ''^ -^ .bzuitaH SwiNEMUNDE— Defenses of, 164 to 167. ■^•'' ■■■''-■ '•'■''•'' ''■' '-'--'J— cv::;LnrG-/:y.o :•. 11 Systems or Fortification, 19; Austrian, 160, 186; Swedish, 167, 168; Noizety^j !85'rTi'te'clf,-i66;-bnra't?oh Wa^5ai!,'f9#j Dufour's, 185; Russian, 186, 239; Bousmard's, 186; Chasseloiip's, 186; Haxo's, 186; Trace' of, 189? Choumara's 186; Metz, 186; United States Military Aoademy, 186; Modern System C6n-ectcd; aCf^i German, followed by European Engineers, 208; German, Casemate Fires essential, 2l'9. Gostof, 234j Applications of German, 237, 239; Ancient, at Constantinople, 245. •'- .vi: .'i liisr i --n.-.:rii ' ^' ' -' ■ ' ■]■■'■ ,i .■;.. ,:r i - ' v.-i :.'.: ,~ ' ,-,A>iriLO\XlVao'i .-.k'-iZlH J D'J. ,ali;.iiijioli ;C!.: ,:i::i;;i3ij -irol hnu iJaril ;Ul'ii; ,sj.::sj;:.,^1.1 ;l.;i-S.- ,feX^ .iiilbuXfi lA jfiEe T. Telegraph — Electric, and Semiphoric, 110. .'.".'1 Tent— Sardinian, 86; Tent-abri, Sardinian and French, 86; Turkish, 86; English 87; Russian, 88. Theory and Practice of Modern Systems of Fortification, 176 to 182; Mczires, 181 to 184; Dnfour'3, 196"; Sloiact'sv 18C; Haxo's, 189; Choumara's, 186. -iy.oxaS Torpedo— At Cronstadt, 36; At Scbastopol, 109, 110. ; ) ;OCt .s'j.i , --,:;.:iP. Totleben, 20> . '.■ -■ .iJ'i ifii: .::'ii ,1 ;;■;;- ;i,. i-.'j ;1jOl: Toulon, 18; Naval Depot of, 136; Nelson's attempt upon, corapared-iwith' *«*'-6f •Da«dast»w4iEyo«» at" Cronstadt'anti Sebastopol, 137; Fortifications of, 191.' -'V-^ ,-->i.::c; liii,r::j ■':r/r i;..,;::!:i;.t''j .t-E ,;'.i.:v:.t-J'51[ ri.'.o'.>-/..i!B Trace— Pbit Paul, 33; Fort Peter, 34; Cliff Battery, 143; Noizet-'sj'lSG', CbrmontaigWe's, 188; Hsxo^, 189^' Bayonnej ISfii (■!.• .viiiiA -iii;; i -oFor Sandiy: Hook, 196; Fortifications of Paris, 197, 198; Grenobk, 193; Lyons, 198; Fort L'Est, 200; ■,M ,ii;.;jj j^iia .!■>.. iSort-Vnlerian, 202; Of Sr-. Foi, like Monlalambert's, 205; German, 206; Differs, at Posen and Coblentz, 'V' iwili.| v/'jVI ;0t ,5v-9o7; Gorman,' increases the Front, 218; Maxims attained by German, 220; Eiitisnchcd Camp at Ulm, 221; Front of Posen, 222, 223, 224; Of Fort Vivian, 222, 224, 225; Of Fortress of Rastadt, 225, 226; Of Fort Leopold., 226; Of two German Fronts at, Rastadt, 227; Of Fort Alexander, 229; Fortress of Ger- ' nicrsheim, 231; Ingolstadt, 232; of Kdnigeborg, 232; Ancient Fortifications lal'Gdhstantinople, 245. THStiit^EJtiglishand French Siege, 40, 55. .■■.,■: T-«iw4?dHT^P«r CavSlry, 63 to 67, 107; Of Sick and Wouiided, WtoliB; Of Medlical Supplies, 75, 83, 84, 85; Of Troops, " ■■ • I : . ' English system, of^ 97 to 108. :'■■. ,'■- ■ •• •* ■ : -•jur.ib^i b : .l- :; : j; uj Thiestb, 149.- '■'■f -l'"- ■'uv.'< >'■ -i hfir. !,-vj.=i;r :-,:;; r-aoi.'.Tjjqo Vt imUi .".id ,lf! lio^luqo'/I 'ii; ssiQ ;ie TuR***l^i-^S^ddfyvJ27aJW3;'Bar^afck-'atilSMl^a:iVS1'2v'<■)■: ,'-,:\\:y.:i :!;:^. .hnr^fiifc.rMlliv/ ivvsivei •t'ii;esil!-i bafaivib "in ti". .'KiUt: ;'.iifi.-.ii liniiit'i. :'M jfini^jcjl IhOlI to ;liiv/iT ; , "undfrtod JjiiilT "in inic.aiK i .) i)fi« ,"aRM ..'Uilijit otiJiJ i-jl; /to 'virirri;' ; in ;|->fi n' I 5di i^u.].-^:-')[ -1 '. :. ■ :':.'. SSi'x tiiiOii-j; jir '^ I'ALn- ■■'..■.t^-iZit'A lo iartv^^ ;S0 ,.^:.;, ;jl J„^jij u.J ini ilsiiyna Dfll Ulm— Ervtvenched Camp of, S21i. Trace of Fronts, 232. v, „, .1, • .. 1, ., • 't ■ ;:N;iiitr ir ■■■ '' ■ .. ,' ■ ■ 1 ' i' ■ - . ■: : -ii, ,E-5 ,ji.'i ViiEEiAN^Fort, 190, 199,201,202; Its Traces 3Q3t;, «m/MI>"'lll- I',. ,./<»» .;(■ /.'.i.ri./, ./.( VilUii III../ tV.«.> ^/....mA ( W/M . f A.i../liirri\» /o rtWr Miii-l-r ■' ll..r .» IMI. m.iVi .....A. lA» .ftifr/l'.iM W-l.^ 1.1 v- l^'ort Yill<*url*auU' w r '4-, ^>^ ^ ■'•'V.. A \ Detached Forts about the City of Lyons. Detached Forts about ther of Lyons. Detached Forts about the City of Lyons. Plate 7. n'n.UuiuiMn r. ^'^- Ex. Due. So. 59, :io C.«n[r. 1^1 Sa». i Plate 9. ■•^^i^^. l),.i-. No. ft\>. •M\ t,\n,«. \«( S, WaXe J^ Fr St. Petersburg" and Oonstadt. *^^-. 1 \, I abandoned 1 *»■#< Jtodt, M^y^ \ Fort <-'unstan(in. (3) . Pcl« (u; Tnri f.lmi (ir liritlli: Kliiips nlliwtiil. llio cliiiiiiK'l. ,..•("■ orll'iiiil ,0" IJsi Noas i^t^r^w^A?^"^' ".V. ('l-ftll ("HMtllt >, ^ ■ ■ac^»*'•*!J^»«i^T1^«»l^- '"<)«( -' nj/7, '^'« /o 1 Jji)rnlii I't. \__jL__1" Oranioiibaum Pt, /^Bnsiii ''^'o...„,„ I'nim Wind Mill Hill (-(niWI l)i> k>oii all tlio ilftiMU'OH of tliu ('liiiniu'ls mill Ihiltiuil, qh ^voII an tliu nlMoil lli>i "(invi'i'iinr'H InniHC," iiml wostof Siiiumor Talnco of Iho Kmpcror null constntitly urciipiod by kiiii unJ hU fjiiiily iliiriuj; tlu" pro^pnccitrihe alKed Uvet- Plato 10. PKTKKSIU'IU; -0^ (I \'i liiiii Iliitlnry. I> 1 • •i.>. ,1 1 .1... r 1 ' •1... s I.' ill). •J- ir .• .. .1.1. A.. .11 ." .III. < . .fi ■ . do. ''"-^M.,;.or; 1st So: Ko^ra**.! .■(..I l-ritil-.M.. ». M JftcM A r.. ll.ilT.il.. .S V SenlxDoc.K°r)y.-36 ^'" (V„L- 1 ='Spf>s.Ttn);,rip!rie', R,.pr,rl, HatelJ '''°"iaSketcUy¥ajorOelafield STARB BEFIgHraS (D)F §lBAgT(D)F(n)L. from t}!? rear of tie Dry ' I, /'/ //-' r'./'/. /■' .!>.r. .K'''r,.,„, />A-//'/./j / v^- -ft- \ a i IM* ^K» \'' \ "W^ 1 lias ria!.- i:; APPARATUS FOR EXPLODING ;M] ^^^S ETC., BY ELECTRICITY. Pl Ex. r Apparatus for Proving Cannon Hollow Shot, etc., by Electricity. Plate 14. 31 Fig. 6. Section on 2^2l. Fio-. 2 69, 30 Cong. 1st Sesa. Eiij-rair-.l ;ni K. 1{, .J,/n.tC .V C,.., liiilfair), S. Y. i Plate l^ ^n.Kx.Doc-.^".^"-^'"''""'^- '*• '^^■"- Eastadt.— SectionSo Plate IG. Section of Fort A along the line AB. ^^^tp tS— tttHI -"'■■"■" ■--■■-■ ■-■=■- -j^ilTT Tower and Cflseinatcd Redoubt No. tX. Terre-plein. Capoi micro. ^S^gfS Bastion^o. III. Aavanced Liinotto A^'o. A'XIY// -' - Section of Fort B along the broken line CD. C;ieL'iiiatc iMiSfmiS IDS^FJil^filSS ol T^^7M^ IOIEjP^T and i^^L^'iT of ©M|f;|])^ ]o)iEiFjiif(Ei or nKwa. wmWiDT an.i ^uTir ^r wm:^Mii^u Plate 90. Fie.. I Tit 3 w Scnlf lur Pig. I. '..H 9 " P 1 1 3 I " 5 fi I 3 l OPcgt Pi'ii.ssiaii Enil)rasnr(! Slmtter. Tig. .1 "" "' ^ p, ^ 1 p %l O! Fig. 5 A Mim "illi n Milrkol rctinires iiioro Siiilee on llie k-ft of lln' o]iL'iiiii(t llinii im Uio fijilit, lioucf 7M" ou utiL' wiiU' mill 4" (HI llio oUiPr. r.iKip-IIdk's ill Uie Forts at Fig. 8 , Profile on AS C D K F. =^ ■Q .\rSTKI.\X Emlii'asiire Shutter. Fig. 2 iiiiJ 0. irr"'7®^ v^MW v^!S^S^ , Scalp of Fi'c'l lor Fis'."- 2 aiwl X 1' -i- a- *' 5' C T' S' ^N 1 . ,^a^,,,ii.^i,>..«..,..,,..i»>»..i»>X»l Fig. G Profile on G II. I ot_s: Fig. 7 Piofile <.n L M of Pig. 5. Scale of Fr.nl for Fig's 1. 0, 1, 8, anS 9. I I I I I I I Fig. 9 LiiiN.-;. I'luxriv PLAN' OF A ; POWDER MAGAZINE ih;m.i>i.\ij at sTurriN, IN' IS.')-). Figures D, C, 7, 8, ami 9. ^^'ll. \'.^. Iliii'. Nil. .-ill, aii VMKi. Ist Si-". Ktiirrau'd uml rririti'U l>y K. It Ji'imll k C. , lltliliil'p, I\ ^ Theory and Practice of the French Engineers. Theory and Practice of the German Engmeers. Oil llu- IVrre-Pleiu in tlio iiik-iior i.fji Wink iis iit CODLEXZ ill r..ils ALEXANDKB. Pl!»t( lia rnu'k, V Baii'icado '. ', Bofdi't' II Cilsfiiiiiilo l^iiilnasiitt, Goiieral I'onu of the Caponniei-s. J K. ri. Ju.«vtt (c L-u . num.ii.s.V- SvMK K>- i^oc. Ni>. 51). ;tC Cuiii>. Isi S^*i>. •uajj Theory and Practice of the German Enginers. tEOfoK'l ■wl I'rintoil 1-7 K R Jvuvll A to,, UttSllN, V. J ( Theory and Practice of the German Engineers, PIntc! 24. Inter llc'doubt of a Lunette. Magazines on tl.e rigllt' and left oTirPSitern^-^^- Eg. 10 riL'. 53 Sections of Counterscarp Gallery. 10 a UM F'S^^iP'^^i^^HP^w^ flfl Bfli F "--^-"^ Elevation and Section on a h .JV--h^ "J, Section on a.l. of Plan. Bg w\ Sections of tlie Mining Galleries. Interior Redoubt In half liiistiou nt Eastadt. 1 .. L L. L ! I -- '^' Ww . r.» j [ ^ .,„, c n a r W. tiuutiuii oil '"S- >'' *^ ..I .1.11 >'r.al".l W E.R Jo««llitC,.. lliinalo. N. > y^jii. Ex. Doc. No. Theory and Practice of the German Engineers. Plate 26. __% Theory and Practice of the German Engineers. Plats !T. Fortifications of Posen. 1855. Plate -^S. •■Nil. K\. iKv. N.v. 5'.", ;'» "• n llaxu iJaltdv at Lj ons. Fiaiuc, 1 Elevation on A* F Ki« iX ^"^ \^ '^" ^» K, N.v.M.. ,,.i i..„^. |., .N l^^t^ ml tinm* If ^ HM—m n». t^mim. M t Practice of the French Engineers. Plate 30. OOAlflBi FOE IMFM'TBf. l>la,ii uf a Boinb-iiniol' IJiuldiiiH' liir lodiiiiiu' 500 iiicn; with Cisterns for c(ill('ctiiio- the waters Iroiii the Roof. Elevation on KL. Difft-reut dispositions of Arched Buildings according to tlie number of spans. Vr»Ur«lu(U Filler cuiiipiiwtl of line rand upon itmvp TbP foiuntu i™Un« HI. lb iiiu'lnlli lilalei I'liifcud »llh h.»\it. Aixrluro IliiougU wbleli all ILb •mlcr >""' pa*, r>«i nilLT Inl 1 lV- Plan of the Cellars and Cistei . 1 — ■ns on^i?. (^ — X i X 1 .'/ I 1 j -.:n i r .;i 1 1 1, 111 1.11- J.W 1 iUf' J-OI" j:riii.T.!_„_ 1— J r~ ' ! ..— 1 -^! . h'd 1 5 1 ^ i" " "1 ^ - f "1 ''i : i -■ J ■''loni'lla^n ' is i 1 i ■'! i - I„ : ""~ ~— — ^^^ T "^ Descont-])]))*' for Rain ^fater. B^^A .0 ri^o . 3i^JgS^^^a ^i.!' ^^^*j;■jl,^ys^6«s.^^» .' ^^^ nidimpii IU.|nn Skctrh of the Arches and Stairs ieadina- to Roof. n' /■-. -^ "^ ; / !,v \. J- t*By-f»«"' '"C 5 ■^ Plans of tlie Stainuiv Section on rr. onxi: tbrc iiiiiiiiyjj /« Scale of oToorc for 1 uiulru " | of an Air-hole stem on ST. Detail of the Cornic^. ?v-ri. Ex. Doc No. 50, 30 C. tho Uugo •■"" I'lU'cl-CllI, (liHpOMilioilM of Aich l!iiiln'olr rccelvJng tlic roof-walcr, Filter coiopowl of a (Jcd of fine pjintl |ilncc-a upou n bed of gravDl. Tho njiMli.r<-HCommuniciitifig Willi Iho rrBnt-resi-rcoir oro llirmelicd on iho ■.■xk-rior ^vi^ll inclalHo plnfcs, jilcrcod ivitli Ijok-a. AptTt.ir« Ihroiigli whifL all Iho ivolor rau8l piua from Iho filler into tbo clMlcrn f. AiwHmv lliro-tgh wliieli llii' wnler pnsscs from Uio (lllerc, Inlo ll.o cislcrn e' wlK-n, (ooinplyllioci).l(.Tn r nnti repair il, cIoeo tlio apcrUtrcd wlileb is lower by 0. J&, CislernH fur llio llllwcd ivoler. CouiiTi.inrciilliig pijio provided n-illi a cook, lliut is closed wLen il ia necessary lo I'Niplj iinil repair Ilic cisleni r. Air-lir.le liclivfeii Hio cislernB c and e. WnsW'.m-h- 111 refoi-Knce 2071)3, for tlic aiirplus wnler of IIjo front Ijasln b. WflMk-ivelnj at rerurenco 26720 for llie surplus wiilur of Uio eisferiis r aDj e' I'limp. Waler oliesl for Ilio linlly disfriLiulIdji, iMiiti-liolea, Cross Scetioii on 6' // '■p Plan of tiie Ground Floor on CD. Cistei'n for tho AVater from the Yards. LEliEND. A', Walci^diict from iho yards. /. Front liftsin reeeiving ihc ivnier froiti lie ynrdf. •». Horizontal iHter of grave! held beHveea two uii-lalUc plates pierced willi hole?. ". Yerlical lUlorof ■! com par line ills lllleileach neeonliiiB lo Iho localilv wiUi a bed of flae iatui placed npon a l^^d of friivel. or when lliewaU'r'is more fiwt, of nlleniale layer* of lino ami coar-e sunil, and of piilvcW/ed tlinrcoal, tlio hitler alioat 0. m or uioro in thickness. 0. Apert.ire tlirongh wlilcli tlic- water parses n-om Iho llller into llio dsleru ,,. p. Cisti'in for tbo liltorcil water. .;. Wnslo-weir al ll.o ivferi-nee 2tlJ);i r«r the sin-pl.w of the fronl-ba^Mn /. 5. Waalo-weir al the referonee ati.l'O fur Ihe Eiiriihis of Ihe cistern u. r. Pump. 1. Wnlerclicsl fui-tlio daily di^tiHititiun, '■ Maiilioles, Cross Section on IK Jl nrlinnlnl at lefiTfiifp 18.1.0 P L ■J! I (.-..SP*-. PlaiK(rf tlic Cellars on A B. vvta, ll,,„l.„™ I, Ml I, „,„ ,„ „„,,„„, ^ „,„„, „, ,^^, ftHUllWo liH>treB yf mtorcil wollT, vir; 1 .1 Thi. t«i,.rUji .,ni,i. 1,0 ,|,|,.„„ , „i„i ; Mow i|,„ wtmiuo!e.30gru«.lr«iuile-KMnj jSiTow I'r.a. Tho c«r«oUy of U.o Ihint b«.|i, |, uXwom Ho "■romra !6.Jo «t Ho WMio-woln ,; „„,i fc, retiKiioo KUO otlh, opt,i„„ J J, J,,, Total oTO.(iui) « 11.0 «.«.».««. J«."m U.0 IKol tain ,„„ „„,, k^ j|^„ I loKUii* or n luovoMo viunix Inlrwl.ic.Hl ihiMURli ito hole j. ' '^ ' ' "' ■ 'J' ■ , : s ?■ . ia 8 1 - I i , . f~:i When Ihe elalern ia full it can Ih; emptiud Ity t 500 eubiu metres of flitored wnter, vIk: I'pf llii' pniiip rof xilioMl IsL The capacity of the cwlern /» ln-Iow Ihe referenc.. 20.°20 of i(8 wnalo-woir of tin- uj erlur.- cnlfoiit,. Below Ihf n-ferenco 2»"oO Uio front liofln can only U> rnipil,,,. Uv ,r,.n, n movable piitup ni(ruduee.l Ibmugh Iho hok' I. ' ■ "/ mt ai Sonle of u!,b0H75 f.-r 1 metiv. Ki-iHark.—Tlw capniiv of the Ciatcnis can be iuo«««* ««»rilmg lo tl -^mg ,o tho waau of vad. lo.-ality by cilhc-r e^alvating a gr^aU-r nun.lKr of Cvlk.r. y %!sAa^ •ui[.iay tlie 3Iini=fi;r of War ft" FniSiia. I'omiilli'U iKiiii llip .>il):l>inUi' lli.> dlivHIou ol MvJUii llKi.AfiiLi,ii, C.ivi« iif lliigltuffii, la «fcoiii|mii)- Wiir, by I, lU'liNiK AilllliTV IK-Utlmu'iil. t:n4[iii<."Juu.ll'iluU'lbj K U Jc^utl&l'u.l]ulUik.V. Y. Barrack of the Lancers of the Guard at Berlin. l'l;>to ;-.4. First Storv. Barnick of Ihc Second RegiiiienI of llic Liukhts of the (iiiard, at llciliii. From tin' Do^i^ns [n-t'-^oiiU'd liy tin- iMhiistiT of Wur of I*i-iissi]i. Sec plato ^5. ~J \ ' -.- ' I ~rr- rpn? H^jzy t:;-?^ :'i51 v" '"'^ ■ Fa -"i i — ti' --'- TTPT' 4^ I H3 tf- ' I r Hasoinent. Sv'u. K\. Ovv. N^i' ^H«. It"' r.'»i; »*> Jvw- ).i^'«>..| .n't l'riotr.y.^;,-.„,TO^HH . ,r fEg;^^?if.C>Wtetg^^:% '■■'SiiiE" '•■Tiiaaja-'i'vi'-ia Eieviitiou of the Front of tlie Eanncl l|;IHHHHHHH^ .-J...--. >A ? .^1 H N^ a! as'Sga^;g» aas»W^fiM;s»« .___.: J-S>«Sa8>^>- Garret. I'mlileof llie ,S|„l,leH, JM SCE fot ffig BOB If we m til jLliJLJLJI »^ .i-'i^ M_J|_liLJt_M If Jlfv tt ., M. , CfLJfL.S.B: J£ of tlic Lancers ;it Berlin. Wj'J-^tf-fJWifj'iiVjjjj'ju'jvirir/jJU'jinjy'Lriijir II M '\B lil VA MS 'm 'M III 'Hi tif iti . pli^- .fflJJ___JB_JOiJ^ r t .. ex: __fC_ -ffi^P.L. £i:-^£C-.£L-M.-tt^-£[:- 1^. to JO 30 RU I..K«>-"'"'""''"°' ••'■ '■■ Design of the Cavalry Stables and Riding HaU, at Posen, for two Squadrons. Plato :^.tv Plan. Ki'iiiin; of tlie niof. VvnfWr on AJJ. IMiin. ^— -»'-- -/ ti "^n- I, ij L'J..i' ; Stables RIDING HALL li I'lol'iU' on /:"/■'. „; ~'\A- I ] ■" Stables :=! I liTiTiTnTnTT irn Elevation of the Fmn i cfilTn> Profile, N on C. 1^^ -^^^^p 1, K A \ jix:. Frmno of tho roof of tlu' liiilinj; Hall, T 1 1 i 4 J L 1 \ ^ ^' n / > K a ., Scale for the Plan. Scale fur tlie Prollks. IK) Xm' \n i5 n5 IB \S~\\t .S<.ii. Kx. l>in-. Ko. S«. :'« C'o'iiT- 1st Si'ss. K.nitnTfHj aifj PHntvl l>/ K. a. Jrarll * L->.„ MuOtio .V Y Iron Railing for Grooiniiio- -^yitji cast iron w,,,<. 4. 1 ortion of tliC clovation .,r „ Sfal.l,. „„ y| // French Barracks for Cavalry.— Details relative to the Stables. Plate 87 Fl—f of wpptr Wwy Swinging Imrs tor sci)ai-ating the Hoi-sos in Stable, ^sponsion of the s^vinging bars by moans of iion t'hains. Portion of the longitudinal section of Ih^Klo on frff. ''^"^ i UC i^ifmpj Im.. oooocoaLXXJUOuDuu Sralo «f 0. :17a r«r I iiM'trv. i nchiiis of tlic Railing for Grooming. Siil<' i!i'\;ilii'll III' 11 nii|i|><'l'l III' cast iniii Mfiil |>i'..lil<' of llii' ntiliiii.' Ill' iruii 111! JiF. HU'VllticMl oil -I II. M,in^( rs with Stone Basins, ■ Wft llil l l l ll l l 111! J Vi V. Mangers with Oust Uiou j l ,.;„.. Section nil y?."?. ^^%iitf«taOtt«n».f^i ■ Poc N"'. 5". ^f *^'""K' '■' ''*'^**' \ Cavalry Barracks.— Furniture of the Company (Quarters. riato 30. Infantry-Barrack near th« rr , ^ K near the Ha y-Market, at Vienna. Plato 40. Fuss. 0'5 1 3 2 1 I NOTB. 12 ZoUs 1 h'usn, f U33 1 Klofter. 1 Fuss 11445 English Inehe!. Scale of 9*,oae Klafter being equal to 6 feet. Fuss. C'543210 l" 2* 3' i* ft" *>' T 3' Klafters. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 36 Cong. 1st Sess. Eognotrd mi-l rrintt-U b> K. H. Jwwett k Co^ Itullalo, N. V. / ■ ^- ■■^■^ »» ■■ i ^^ » -^^ ^»»— » » -^ - Y ^i^ ' "'^S MILITARY HOSPITAL AT ST. PETERSBURGH. Wiug for the Bntlis ;ir]■ i i. l i": P: Irnrnrrrr' i" f V T Y r' r p n i: u li L c c n n n n nan n (Ini; S3Jcn=7 EnplWi Fi (Jti tlio (icTicniT I'Jiiti, LcUor (T'. Plan of tlio fir.4 oi- GrouiKl Floor of the Military Hospital of St. Pctersljurg, Ou tlio Gencml Plnii, I.i'tter A. On tin- (..■ii.-n.l I'liui, UUci- K. Section of the Principal Iliiildiiii; On tilt' liiiv ./. h Baseiiuint or Cellar Floor of the Main Building, with the Garden. Oil tlio Keiicr.il rian T-etter A. Cavalry Barracks.— Furniture for the Quarters. Pbto 3S. fcr.i.lIilUalu, N. V. ' I Plate iZ. E.i^Jcvvell & f"oJjt}i.Bul faio . NY Sen. Ex. Doc. N" 5S. Se'i-Conl. I«Sess . DeWield's Rep' Plale 42 ARSENAL AT ¥ A. FREXCH CAST IRON GUN CARRIAGE. 5' c O a ^ a o CO p o O o p a Sen. li\. Due. ^u. 6'J, .'iO Coil"-. Ist Sc EugraveJ aud Printed liv K K Jfivi-tt Ai Co., BulTiJo, N. Y. FRENCH CAST IRON GUN CARRIAGE^^. Fig's 28 and 2d. Freiicli Cast Iron Garrison and Siege Gun Carriages — proposed system — in part adopted. Tig. 28 Model common to 5 patterns of Bronze Guns, and 3 Field and Siege Howitzers. Carriage Mounted with a Howitzer of IC Centimet;es. TVe have dotted the directrix for Siege and Garrison pieces as we'l as for 24 pouuiiers. ■^^^^^^s^^^l • 1 1— F r„ ,= „. 8 p... .»„ H,,..,^,, ,0.^15""''-^'^'"-"'^^^^^^^^ Ff ^'- The CtlB! dJrectiBG; or iTajrersine Scale of -^ This system, lilce that of Wood for Garrison.as well as Sea Coast Carri.agss of the French, admits of several caliljcrs being mounted on the same Carriage. Tig. 29 Model common to Iron Guns of 24. 30 and 36 pdrs, and Howitzers of Iron of 22 Centimetres. Howitzer of 22 Cenlimetres. m^^if^'f-- ''•^ Scale of .^ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 30 Cong. 1st Sess. Kngravcd and I'rinled by E. R. Jewett & Co., Bullalo, N Y PRUSSIAN WROUGHT IRON GUN CARRIAGES. Fig's 30 and 32. Tig. SO GARRISON CARRIAGE, Put toi^cthcr for use as a Barbette Carriage fur a seven foot Parapet. j^p^aM- Scale i Fig. 30 is the arrangement for a Barbette Battery. 4 Tig. 32 ~B ■■■ . — ■■■ -■■■ .— II — t p" , ^ to GARRISON CARRIAGE, Put together for use .as a low Barbette Carriage. For particulars see plates of Prussian Artillery presented by the Minister of War of Prussia, and filed in the War Office at Washington. Sen. E.\. Doc. No. 59, 36 Contr. 1st Sess. Engraved aail I'liDtcU by E. K. Jewett k Co., Buiralo, N. Y. PRUSSIAN WROUGHT IRON GUN CARRIAGE. c8 s o a e o Co Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 36 Cong. 1st Sess. Engraved anU Printea by K. K J«w«tt A: Co., BuIIalOj N Y PRUSSIAN' WRorcJHT IRON GUN CARRIAGES. Fig. 3a. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 36 Cong. 1st Sess, Eugnived and Printed Ijy E R Jewett & Co., BulTalo, N. Y. RUSSIAN WROUGHT IRON BARBETTE GUX CARRIAGES. ri^'s34&35. Sen. Ex. Uoc. No. 59, 30 Conir. 1st Sess. EDgra\ecl auU I'rmled by K K. Jewett & Co., Buffalo, X. Y TRAXSPORTING AND MOUNTIXa GUNS. Fis:. 34 and 35 a yen. Ex. iJoc. No. 59, 3G Coutr. 1st Sess. Engravt-a ana Piiuted by K. R. Je-.vett .t C... Lldll;,!,!, N. Y. PLAiV OF AN IRON CAliRIAGE. Fig. 36. o a O -5 CO o to O 5 o C3 O CO Son. Ex. Doc. No. 50, 00 Cong. 1st Sess. Enjravc'l anJ PrinteJ by E. R. Jewett & Co., BulTaln, M. Y. RUSSIAN WROUGHT IROX GUN CARRIAGE. fe;..?. ^a?^..,;^..wg.:gg..,^'^^^^^ X ^F (H> to Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 36 Cong. 1st Sess. Kngraved and Priutetl by E. R. Jewett k Co., Buffalo, N. Y. Sen-Ex/Doc. N° 59. 1*^5638. 36 Con^ Delafield's Report ?w 3ft. mwm m rui i Showing Ike Rope Manlelel used hy iKe Russians lo pjftlecl their Gnnners from the Mlnet RifU. See PlaU 6. Austrian Gtin Carriages. I Austrian Gun Carriages. Barl.erte Carriage w[th fixed ur jwrnianent i-iiitk' center, iyi" woodeii wheel, aud hoUti-r liir. l«l ^>es.«. 1 I 3> Austrian Casemate Carriages Fia's. 38 ,1 Sen. Kx. Dix-. No. 69, 30 Con;;. 1st So.«. Engraved irnd I'riutca by E. R. Jewtlt v"; Co., Buffalo, Ji.Y, SECTION OF PART OF A NEW WORK AT VENICE. Fig. (3S h.c.) nT^^^^S, K ^ "^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■^^^^^^^^^^'^■^'^^^ Section of the Casemate of part of a new Work constructing for tlie Channel Defences at Venice, showing the Kail_Ti-ack for gun Pintle.Centcrs, and Traverse Circles. Also the Drainage, Ventilation and Earthen Parapet. 10th. Jan., 1856. 8e!i. Ex. Doc. JSu. 59, yu Cong. l!.t besM. Kntravud uud 1 nuH;a bj K. K. Jevvelt ii Co., liulliilu, X V. ScnFx.Doc. N°59._!''Se3s 36*Con|. Delafields Rep' Bowm Ot to Lilli fli\Mi , „ , fr uAici., looking Towards the Allied Lamp Immedialelj after ils surrender, irom the Itornilolt CM^^ for Telegraphic purposes See Plate 8, and Fife. 54 Note: The small frame l,uildffig, lent and scaffolding, were erected ly the Yf r 3nn.l:L\.0oc N°5fl. l^lSesa 30 Clong. Dela.fields Bepl. Foil Oa-thgnne Fori Paul l''MKliiiol Flg■^')Ota) Sho^v-^ng■^he Casemated harbor defences part icnlarly Fori Pa-ul. just before it VTas tlownup. And tlie faces of 7ort CaUiai eironling-lhe Mouth orihehdrhor.a;^ also ruins of pari ol'1iieKarabaliuaFaubour^_. See Plate i SenExDoc N"59. I'.'Keas.'itJ C0115. Belafields Rept. Hg'.Wlb) SowntCoLitfaFhiladA Showing ihe Casemaled harbor defences, and ruins of tkaLarabalnaia Faubourgf — See rlate I Sen Ex. Doc tj" 59.1'^Sess. 36. Coii§.IIela£ems Bept h* Ml I'lHl lulinTllir w D KmUCFotV PaulUirulni. Uio (liitkyardbdy K U J.»frrU & ('oUQt.aurraio,sr Showing ihe casemaled harbor defences, and rums of ihe ifrth Eastern s.d. of the City See PUte 8 Sen.ExIloc.N?59.1«Sess. 36"'Coiti. lelafields Rep- V'.i. 50. A Alexandei Tort (£3=° T^icholas Arsensl C^ aidSliciia Dry-Docks^ View of iKe Diy-Docks, Arsenal Point, aai Taken from lh£ rear of ihe Dock Yard El Qo harbor Casemated Forls, sure fSee Plate 8j i Fori Cfilhan in nt Sen.ikDoc S?59 W^Se3S.3f5 Gong- Delalield's Rept r\f W (e) FortCfll}ianiie[J'I^ PoEirau! fv^ fc^liiR^;!^ --^JSFortfl on heighla oT Noi-lh SKore Slorc huusee on ^'-Dlho^Miarf leading loFoplPaiJ- Lflh.otBowen&Co Philada.' g [E |] Z^i 1 T ® ^1® L, View of Arsenal Point Store houses, on Wharf -eael Side of DockYaii Boy, ruins oi' ForJ Paul, &c See Plate 1 FOK'T MALAKOIT. :)4 ;i. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 36 Conff. 1st Sess. Kugraveil mill Priuted by K K Jcwett & Co., Buffalo, N. Y, SECTIONS OF FORT IMALAKOFF OR THE KORNILOFF BASTION. Fig. 54 a (his.) Hoi-iz. 105.0 Section on EF. ITom. 105,0 Section on GH. 98.0 Section on I^S. Section on TU-UV. -Bom. 105.0 Horiz. 105 100.6 IToru. 100.0 Section on KL. Horiz. 105.0 Section on PQ. 92.6 Horiz, 95.0 Section on MN^-NO. Boriz. 95.0 Section on ef. 8S.1 89.0 _92.3 -•aSS^i^'-- -.'.r^^^i^ Iloriz . 64.0 Section on mn. Section on Uoriz. ':6.0 2Jq. 60.2 ^^iBBri'=»=^. 't^^-BO'" -'..- 10 Scale of 0.002 for 1 mctie. 10 20 30 &p Ketres Sen. E.\. Doc. No. 59, 36 Cong. 1st Sess. iiugr.-nert iinj Printeil by E. R. Jewett 4: Co., BulTalo, N. Y. [■-./. IJoo t.!"" ^Uififtl.ls Rppl ^' !,!alatlio:: Fi§. S^.b. ^l..nvii.e 111. ....i.llerrnce and unconcern of llie Smlor . the progress o( \h work utuier fire.wlhoul Cif^rs oi othev piol«ri,on , and ttu- reklm hei;^ht« of Ihr MaJaWioff an.i MamWcn »ni mk-rYaiin^ ground .See Plata r GREAT REDAN. Fis. 0.) a. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 36 Coug. 1st Sess. Eugravcd and rrinted by E. K. Jcivelt & Co., Buffalo, N Y. -^^^^^^^-5.^^-l:^9_36j^Con4,l" Ses.. DeUh, i Fi§. 57, a IT(E^ See Plale 8. SRn.Ex.Doc,No.59.r*-Sess. 36 Con,.^, Delafields Rep Ftf 57 V showing Swivel ^uns mounted on posts behind the parapet, and Mortai-3 behind the traveraeintherear, flankins the ^ound on the right and in frontof the Redan. i E R Jv, ^Sfee^&iaKPSMS^;*..'^*^^ 3*«P?^(^!Sf^Sfe;iaiiS*.* .^. ^ ^*-^#^^-a.^^^£*^' ■'***^ < . 5^ .^- iS*-^ ~ ^s--*-' . ■*v' iiv ^ •(> I from a French howitzer balterv across the ^or^e of the Meanelon looking over the trenches in the intervening valley or depression — See Plate 8. E.R.Jewett 8c Co Ijtli Buffalo NT f Ser..Ex.I)oc.N-59.1'--Se3s.36 Cong. H^Sess. Ddafields Repl Fig 52 a MamelonVttt "^iu^^ Top of mm ins bciwcn * Cfj.hlh Pliiladi Dll^TEI^IlOl^ ©F TyiE IK©»11[L(0)!F1F iASTIKQlJ, Afler ihe Assault by Ihe Trench, on ihe 8 * Sipi. 1854 See Plate 8, and Fi^. 54/. HUH iai lili hj the Sen Ez uoc iio. i)9. 1=^ Sess. 36 Cong. Dekfield's Pe-.-. Fi^-: 63. E R.J«w»u4Cc.Lith,Bufr«Jo NY { See Plate 8 aud ¥\f b4 ) after the assaull by the French o| ihp 8* SeptT 185.S. i 5>ioi Ri Ho: Sen. Ex.Boc. N°59. 1? Sess 36*!^ Con^. Delafields Bep* H Fort MicKiel ti« 64. SllOTE . Ruins ar'''J^ Hospital ftBarrack; See Plab 8 lUE ^mAMM Noilh Shore "%!:§ Karabalm'ai iWill oncloainl OioDr/Bocb, -a- CO f-t Pi. p4 (3g CO (S) ^ (ok, ^ P^ Sen t'.y Doc ^" 5y.l"'Se-.s 36 Con^ Belaiield's Rep^ FiA 79 of the Frencli English and Sardinian Armies, m ihe Crimea m 1854' & 55 Drawn lrtr.Pi" of Wen pq t^ o (si tfl ■= i=l C=2 O o m ^ £3D ^ s o a y I t / f 6 it 4^ 1 ,c,^ -^Z^. .C>^^ "^, ' "-^C7>** s' (/* S v^" ■i^' , ^^. ^"^ A^'- i>' "^'.i ^^ON K^-^^- ^^^ ^>^'■% K ^P ^f V\- • x"*' *>' -*^^0N "oV ■ - •• " ° ' '/ ^N^^ ■% "o V^^ ^'!^^ - x" <;,. x^^-^' 'r, v .-■^ %.x^ •^J' ,^ <^^-'^. ■^a V "t.. '. " 0' .^^^^ .*> 1 ', .^^\. o Si. '-s-. an"^ v\ v^"^ X N°r. x^^ v^ ^. .>^'■ \..<^ <^ ''A^'C ^^-0^ a'* ^^^.^ •*^ •P^„N 3 ■'•r. \ I • . ■<, « ' ' ■ « 0- A-* -■S-, .■'^^ •P S .x^^' ,AV^' ,.v^.-" ^'^ ,y. .' _^---~v.. >0^ S'^ ■'■S: -<>• ■''*. -V-^ ^ 0' !.• \ - -oi^' ,s x"" --... xVV^' '-^ >0 ., A^' r^^"'^'^v' ■.\V \\' •^. ^°-n.. ■-o^- %.^- VV ■^--0^ .^-^^'' V << ^^■\ -v^ -^..^^ ^^'^ ^^o^ .■i^,^"V"'."^ ^^-c. .A' O r ^'^^ >-^. ■t- -J"- •^\' \\^ ,,^^ .^-^ ' .:•*- ,v^ - 0' x°-n. 'Ill , .'. ' '111" I'