.Lis 
 
HoUinger Corp. 
 pH 8.5 
 
f D 515 
 
 III: us 
 
 ;^ 1918 
 : Copy 1 
 
 rmany s 
 Confession 
 
 The Lichnowsky 
 Memorandum 
 
 /^ 
 
 ^ Issued by 
 
 THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
 The Secretary of State 
 The Secretary of War 
 The Secretary of the Navy 
 George Creel 
 
D. Of B. 
 SEP 16 1918 
 
-^ 
 
 
 GERMANY'S CONFESSION 
 
 It has come at last. After protesting innocence 
 and brazenly denying guilt for nearly four years, 
 Germany has admitted her crime against civiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 She has done it through her former ambassador 
 in England, Prince Lichnowsky. He has been 
 corroborated by a former director of the great 
 Krupp gun factory, a Dr. Muhlon. And the 
 truth of their testimony has been substantially 
 admitted by the man who was Germany's for- 
 eign minister when Prince Lichnowsky was Ger- 
 man ambassador in London — namely, Herr von 
 Jagow. 
 
 The documents in the case have been obtained 
 by the State Department at Washington and 
 translated. They are complete and convincing. 
 
 After setting forth all the damning evidence 
 against Germany, Prince Lichnowsky sums it up: 
 
 "First. We encouraged Count Berchtold (the 
 Austrian foreign minister) to attack Serbia, al- 
 though no German interest was involved and the 
 danger of a world war must have been known 
 to us. Whether or not we knew the text of the 
 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia makes no differ- 
 ence whatever. 
 
 "Second. We rejected Great Britain's plan of 
 mediation in the days between the 23d and 30th 
 of July, 1914. We did this after Mr. Sasanof (the 
 Russian foreign minister) had emphatically de- 
 clared he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia; 
 
 3 
 
after Serbia, upon pressure from Russia and Eng- 
 land, had accepted nearly the whole of the ulti- 
 matum, all but two pointi^ in themselves not 
 hard to adjust; and even after Count Berchtold 
 (the Austrian foreign minister) was ready, to 
 be satisfied with the Serbian answer. 
 
 "Third. On the 30th of July, with Count 
 Berchtold willing to listen to reason, before Aus- 
 tria was touched, on the mere mobilization of 
 Russia, we sent our ultimatum to Russia and on 
 the 31st of July we declared war on Russia, 
 although the Czar had pledged his word that 
 as long as negotiations were going on not one 
 man would be sent on the march. We thus de- 
 liberately destroyed every chance of a peaceful 
 settlement. 
 
 *'It is no wonder that in the presence of these 
 indisputable facts the whole civilized world out- 
 side of Germany lays the entire blame for the 
 world war at our door. Is it not natural that 
 our foes declare they will not rest until they 
 have destro3'ed a system which is a perpetual 
 menace to its neighbors? ]\lust they not other- 
 wise fear that in a few years they will again be 
 compelled to take up arms and see their provinces 
 overrun, their cities and villages laid waste?" 
 
 Dr. Muhlon's Evidence. 
 
 Dr. Muhlon, of the board of Krupp's directors, 
 does not make a summing up. He merely gives 
 evidence that in the middle of July, 1914, he had 
 a business conversation with a director of the 
 Deutsche Bank in Berlin, who advised him that 
 the bank would not assist Krupps in ''certain 
 large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey" be- 
 cause the political situation had "become veiy 
 menacing" and the Deutsche Bank would have 
 to wait "before entering into any further engage- 
 ments abroad." This director of the Deutsche 
 Bank was Dr. Helfferich, since vice chancellor of 
 
Germany. He explained: "The Austrians have 
 just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time 
 Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to 
 Serbia, with a very short interval for an answer. 
 * * * A whole series of definite satisfactions 
 will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria- 
 Hungary will declare war on Serbia." 
 
 This is the ultimatum about which the Ger- 
 man authorities have insisted they were not 
 consulted. 
 
 Dr. Muhlon continues: "Dr. Helfferich added 
 that the Kaiser had expressed his decided ap- 
 proval of this procedure on the part of Austria- 
 Hungary. He had said that he regarded a con- 
 flict with Serbia as an internal affair between 
 these two countries, in which he would permit no 
 other state to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he 
 v/ouid mobilize also. But in his case mobiliza- 
 tion meant immediate war." 
 
 "This uncanny communication," Dr. Muhlon 
 saj'-s, "converted my fears of a world war, which 
 were already strong, into absolute certainty." 
 He consulted with Herr Krupp von Bohlen him^- 
 self, in Berlin. And Krupp confirmed the news. 
 He said "that the Kaiser had told him (Krupp) 
 that he would declare war immediately if Russia 
 mobilized, and that this time people would see 
 that he did not turn about. The Plaiser's repeated 
 insistence that this time nobody would be able 
 to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been 
 almost comic in its effect." 
 
 On the day when the Austrian ultimatum to 
 Serbia was deli-\'ered the Kaiser was on a yacht- 
 ing trip in the North Sea. That fact has often 
 been advanced as a proof of German innocence. 
 But when Dr. Muhlon read the ultimatum- to 
 Serbia he had another interview with Helfferich, 
 and he testifies that "Helfferich said to me that 
 the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only 
 as a blind; he had not arranged the cruise on the 
 
usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at 
 hand and keeping in constant touch." 
 
 Von Jagow's Admissions. 
 
 And finally Herr von Jagow, Germany's for- 
 eign minister at the outbreak of the war, in 
 repljang to Prince Lichnowsky's evidence, makes 
 this startling admission, among others: "I by no 
 means share the opinion prevalent among us 
 to-day that England laid all the mines for the 
 outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe 
 in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his 
 earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. 
 * * * Neither was the war popular with the 
 English people. Belgium had to serve as a battle 
 field." Von Jagow even admits that war might 
 have been averted by an international conference 
 on the Serbian situation. "We could not agree," 
 he says, "to the English proposal of a conference 
 of ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led 
 to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was 
 pro-Serb, and, with her Balkan interests, stood 
 rather opposed to Austria." That is to say. Von 
 Jagow admits that war was chosen by Germany 
 as an alternative to an international conference, 
 which would have declared the Austrian demands 
 on Serbia unjust even in the eyes of Italy, the 
 ally of Austria and of Germany. 
 
 How did these confessions come to be made? 
 
 Dr. Muhlon's Conscience. 
 
 With Dr. Muhlon it was evidently a case of 
 conscience. When the war began he resigned his 
 position as a director of Krupp's Works, at 
 Essen, and retired to his estate in Switzerland, 
 near Berne. There he lived a retired life. After 
 a time reports began to circulate of statements 
 which he had made to visitors, and he was put 
 under the surveillance of spies from the German 
 embassy at Berne. Later, members from the 
 
 6 
 
Socialist Party in the Reichstag visited him, and 
 the German press reported that a retired Krupp 
 official living in Switzerland "claimed to be in 
 possession of certain secrets seriously compro- 
 mising the honor of the German Government in 
 the matter of the responsibility for the war." 
 The newspapers began to hint that this official 
 was out of his mind. Dr. Muhlon's statements 
 were then published either as a vindication of 
 him or as an exposure which should aid the demo- 
 cratic revolution in Germany. 
 
 With Prince Lichnowsky it is a different mat- 
 ter. He is a nobleman of semi-royal lineage, 
 "the sixth prince of the princedom of Gratz in 
 Austria and Kuchelna in Prussia." His grand- 
 father was one of Beethoven's patrons. Beethoven 
 wrote many of his works in the Lichnowsky castle 
 at Gratz, where the piano that he used is still 
 preserved; and the present prince, Karl Max 
 Lichnowsky, has carried on the tradition of cul- 
 ture and liberalism which he inherited from his 
 family. He was a brother officer of the present 
 Kaiser in the Life Guard Hussars of Potsdam, 
 but after a brief army career he entered the 
 diplomatic service, and held important posts in 
 Stockholm, Constantinople, Bucharest, and Vi- 
 enna. He retired in 1904, being out of sympathy 
 with the Junker atmosphere of the court. He 
 was not a Prussian, nor even a German. His 
 family was Bohemian, and his mind has never 
 been militaristic. 
 
 To his "great surprise," as he says, he was 
 offered the post of German ambassador to Lon- 
 don in October, 1912, after he had passed eight 
 years "among flax and turnips, on horseback and 
 in my meadows," amusing his leisure with read- 
 ing and with writing occasional political articles. 
 "I do not know," he says, "to whom my appoint- 
 ment was due — at all events, not to His Majesty, 
 as I did not belong to his immediate set, although 
 
he was always gracious to me. I believe that they 
 agreed on me because no other candidate was 
 available." 
 
 Lichnowsky Made a Scapegoat. 
 
 When, in spite of his efforts to prevent it, Eng- 
 land was involved in war against Germany, he 
 returned to Berlin and saw, as he says, that he 
 was "to be made the scapegoat for the catas- 
 trophe which our Government had brought down 
 on us, despite my advice and warning. It was 
 deliberately given out, from official quarters, that 
 I had let Sir Edward Grey hoodwink me." He 
 retired to Gratz, smarting with this injustice, and 
 there he prepared a memoir, called ''My Mission 
 in London," for the private information of his 
 kinsmen and his intimate political friends. 
 
 Of this m^emoir he had five or six typewritten 
 copies made. One he sent to Herr Ballin, the 
 head of the Hamburg-American Line; a second 
 to Herr Gwinner, the head of the Deutsche Bank ; 
 and a third to Herr Theodor Wolff, editor of the 
 Radical-Democratic newspaper, the Berliner 
 Tageblatt. A fourth copy went to a friend, an 
 officer attached to the political department of 
 the German General Staff. This officer appears 
 to have manifolded it on his own responsibility 
 and sent copies to various State officials and poli- 
 ticians. He did that, Herr Theodor Wolff says, 
 because *'he felt the longing to serve the dictates 
 of peace with complete devotion, and he sur- 
 rendered himself to a pacifism which is absolutely 
 incompatible with a military uniform." He con- 
 fessed to Herr Wolff what he had done. "It was 
 impossible," the editor says, "to convince him by 
 any logic or on any grounds of reason that his 
 action was wrong, senseless, or harmful. He was 
 a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Codes, 
 who, out of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang 
 into the abyss." 
 
 8 
 
One of his copies of the memoir reached the 
 socialist newspaper Politiken in Stockhohn and 
 was published piecemeal. The German press 
 took it up. The Reichstag debated it. Lichnow- 
 sky was deprived of his diplomatic rank, forbid- 
 den to write for publications, and virtually im- 
 prisoned on his estates. The newspapers de- 
 manded that he be court-martialed. A typical 
 letter, printed in the semi-official Cologne 
 Gazette, demanded that he "be held up to public 
 contempt ruthlessly." The writer argued: "What 
 will our thousands of war cripples say when this 
 affair is brought to their outraged notice? Have 
 these men joyfully sacrificed their health only to 
 be told at this stage of the war by a Prince Lich- 
 nowsky that it was not necessary?" 
 
 England's Guilt a Fiction. 
 
 Yon Jagow's reply to the Prince only served to 
 make matters worse. His admission that Eng- 
 land had not brought on the war enraged the Pan- 
 German press. It was seized upon triumphantly 
 by the Socialists. The Socialist organ, Vorwaerts, 
 says : 
 
 "Let us establish the facts. * * * The war 
 was not popular in England; it also was not 
 popular in Russia and France. But it has become 
 popular. The whole world — right away across 
 the Atlantic and the Pacific — is united in hatred 
 against us. We, however, have for almost four 
 years been inoculated with the view that 'Eng- 
 land laid all the mines which caused the war' — 
 a view which the Secretary of State (Von Jagow), 
 in accordance with the evidence of the ambassador 
 (Prince Lichnowsky), has now declared to be 
 false! It is, however, by this false view that the 
 whole war policy of the German Empire has 
 been directed — from the declaration of unre- 
 stricted submarine warfare, which brought us war 
 with America, down to those chancellor speeches 
 
which say that Belgium must not again become 
 England's area of military concentration. If all 
 the parties concerned were convinced that the 
 belief in England's guilt is a fiction, why did they 
 feed this belief, and why did they pursue a policy 
 which was based upon it?" And the paper con- 
 cluded: "The German people can not be satisfied 
 with the methods of governing exercised before 
 and during the war. * * * The German people 
 can only endure after the war as a peace-loving 
 nation that governs itself." 
 
 Germany's Place in the Sun. 
 
 But to the American reader, the most important 
 part of Prince Lichnowsky's exposure is not his 
 conclusion that Germany forced a declaration of 
 war. We have long believed that. Our German 
 sympathizers have largely admitted it. But they 
 have pleaded that the Kaiser declared war only 
 because war was inevitable; that Germany was 
 denied her "place in the sun"; that a conspiracy 
 of France, Russia, and Great Britain prevented 
 her from obtaining colonies and extending her 
 trade; and that, consequently, Germany had 
 either to take up arms or be throttled to death by 
 Great Britain's trade enmity. Many of us have 
 been persuaded that these excuses are true ex- 
 cuses; that the British policy compelled Ger- 
 many's appeal to the sword, and that Britain's 
 allies are merely "pulling Britain's chestnuts out 
 of the fire," as the German propagandists are con- 
 tinually charging. 
 
 Of those procured lies, Prince Lichnowsky's 
 memoirs give a very happy disproof. 
 
 It has been pleaded that the policy of France 
 and England in Morocco was anti-German. 
 Prince Lichnowsky writes: "Our obscure policy 
 in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of 
 our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised 
 doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted, 
 
 10 
 
or whether our intention was to keep Europe in 
 a state of suspense, and, on occasion, to humiliate 
 the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a 
 long time in Paris, said to me, 'The French had 
 begun to forget "la revanche" (their desire to 
 avenge Alsace-Lorraine). You have regularly- 
 reminded them of it by trampling on their toes.' 
 After we had declined Delcasse's (the French 
 minister's) offer to come to an agreement re- 
 garding Morocco and then solemnly declared that 
 we had no political interest there, we suddenly 
 discovered in Abdul Aziz a second Kruger. To 
 him also, as to the Boers, we promised the 
 protection of the mighty German Empire, and 
 with the same result. Both manifestations con- 
 cluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a 
 retraction, if we were not prepared to start a 
 world war. * * * Our attitude furthered the 
 Russian-Japanese and the Russian-British alli- 
 ances. In the face of 'the German peril' all other 
 considerations faded into the background. The 
 possibility of another war between France and 
 Germany had been evident, and such a war could 
 not leave out Russia or England, as in 1870. 
 * * * Before Delcasse's fall, and before the 
 Algeciras conference, we could have obtained har- 
 bors and bases on the west coast of Africa, but 
 that was no longer possible." 
 
 In other words, according to Germany's am- 
 bassador, it was Germany's threat of war that 
 united the European nations against her in 
 Africa. It was not their union that led to the 
 German threat. 
 
 England's Attempts at Friendship. 
 
 Nevertheless, Lichnowsky goes on to say, Lon- 
 don "quieted down on the Moroccan affair." The 
 Haldane mission had gone to Berlin to come to 
 an understanding with Germany, and that mission 
 failed, Lichnowsky confesses, "because we de- 
 ll 
 
manded a promise of neutrality" from Great 
 Britain in the event of a European war, "instead 
 of being satisfied with a treaty which secured us 
 against British attack or against any attack with 
 British support." He continues: "However, Sir 
 Edward Grey had not given up the idea of com- 
 ing to an understanding with us. and his first 
 attempts in that direction were in connection with 
 matters relating to trade and colonies. * * * 
 After reaching a settlement with France and 
 Russia on the old questions in dispute, the 
 British statesman intended to come to similar 
 agreements with us. What he aimed at was not to 
 isolate us, but rather to have us, as much as 
 possible, take a share in the existing partner- 
 ships. Having succeeded in bridging over the 
 differences which existed between England and 
 France and between England and Russia, he also 
 wanted to remove, as well as might be, the differ- 
 ences between England and Germany, and to 
 insure the peace of the world by means of a 
 network of treaties which should ultimately also 
 include a settlement of the miserable naval ques- 
 tion; whereas the consequences of our own for- 
 eign policy up to then had been the formation 
 of the entente partnership in which these nations 
 pledged themselves to render mutual support in 
 case of war. As he himself expressed it. Grey's 
 policy was this: 'Without infringing on the ex- 
 isting friendly relations with France and Russia, 
 which in themselves contained no aggressive ele- 
 ments and no binding obligations for England, to 
 seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement 
 with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer 
 together.' " 
 
 British Concessions in the Balkans. 
 
 That this statement of England's policy was 
 not a mere pretense. Prince Lichnowsky proves in 
 his long account of the negotiations arising out of 
 
 12 
 
the Balkan War and the establishment of Al- 
 bania. *'At the outbreak of that war," he says, 
 "we (Germany) had unfortunately declined the 
 proposal of the French Government to join in a 
 declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality 
 on the part of the powers." On the other hand, he 
 says of Lord Grey: "From the beginning, the 
 British statesman took the stand that England 
 had no interest in Albania and was therefore un- 
 willing to be involved in a war over this ques- 
 tion. He wished simply as an honest broker to 
 mediate between the two groups and settle diffi- 
 culties. Thus he in no wise placed himself on the 
 side of the entente (his allies) and during the 
 negotiations, which lasted about eight months, 
 by virtue of his good will and weighty influence, 
 he contributed not a little toward bringing about 
 concord and agreement. Instead of taking a posi- 
 tion similar to that of the English, we invariably 
 assumed the attitude prescribed to us from Vi- 
 enna * * * On every point, including Al- 
 bania, the Serbian harbors, in the Adriatic, Scu- 
 tari, and the definition of the Albanian frontiers, 
 we were on the side of Austria and Italy, whilst 
 Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or 
 Russian point of view. On the contrary, he 
 nearly always took our part in order to give no 
 pretext for war. It was with his help that King 
 Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Other- 
 wise there would have been war over this matter, 
 as we should never have dared to ask our allies 
 to make concessions. 
 
 "Lord Grey conducted the negotiations with 
 circumspection, calmness, and tact. Whenever a 
 question threatened to become involved, he 
 would draft an appropriate formula of agree- 
 ment which invariably proved acceptable to all. 
 His personality commanded equal confidence 
 among all the members of the conference. Once 
 more we issued successfully from one of those 
 
 13 
 
numerous tests of strength which are character- 
 istic of our foreign policy. Russia had had to 
 yield to us at every point, so that she was never 
 in a position to further Serbian ambitions. Al- 
 bania was created an Austrian vassal State and 
 Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of 
 the conference was therefore a fresh humiliation 
 for Russian self-consciousness." 
 
 British Concessions in Africa. 
 
 Similarly, when Germany sought concessions in 
 the Portuguese colonies in Africa, England, as 
 the protector of Portuguese interests in Africa, 
 assisted German}^ in obtaining all she wished. 
 "Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British 
 Government," Prince Lichnowsky writes, "I suc- 
 ceeded in giving the new treaty a form which 
 fully coincided with our wishes and interests. 
 All of Angola up to the twentieth degree of longi- 
 tude was assigned to us, so that we reached the 
 Congo region from the south; and we received 
 the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe, 
 which lie north of the Equator and therefore 
 really belong to the French sphere of interest — 
 a fact which led my fi'rench colleague to lively 
 though fruitless counter representations. Further- 
 more, we received the northern part of Mozam- 
 bique, the Likungo forming the boundary. 
 
 "The British Government showed the greatest 
 obligingness in behalf of our interests. Grey 
 wanted to manifest his good will toward us, but 
 he was also interested in furthering our colonial 
 expansion, it being the English idea to divert 
 the developing German strength away from the 
 North Sea and western Europe out into the open 
 ocean and Africa. *We do not begrudge Germany 
 her colonial expansion,' said a member of the 
 Cabinet to me. Great Britain originally proposed 
 to include the Congo in the treaty as well. This 
 would have given us a right of preemption and an 
 
 14 
 
opportunity for economic penetration. However, 
 we declined this offer, ostensibly out of regard for 
 Belgian susceptibilities. * * * The sincerity of 
 the British Government in its efforts to respect 
 our rights was shown by the fact that Grey, even 
 before the treaty was completed or signed, re- 
 ferred to us certain English promoters seeking in- 
 vestments of capital in the territories assigned to 
 us by the new treaty and desiring British backing 
 in the matter. He did this with the remark that 
 the enterprise contemplated belonged within our 
 sphere of interest." 
 
 British Concessions in Asia Minor. 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky continues: "At the same 
 time I was carrying on in London negotiations 
 regarding the so-called Bagdad treaty. * * * 
 The real purpose of this treaty was to divide Asia 
 Minor into spheres of interest, although this 
 expression was carefully avoided out of regard 
 for the rights of the Sultan. Sir Edward Grey 
 repeatedly declared, however, that there existed 
 no agreements with France and Russia for the 
 purpose of partitioning Asia Minor. 
 
 "After enlisting the aid of a Turkish repre- 
 sentative, in the person of Hakki Pasha, all eco- 
 nomic questions connected with German enter- 
 prises were adjusted essentially in accordance with 
 the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most im- 
 portant concession that Sir Edward Grey made 
 to me personally was the prolongation of the 
 railroad to Basra, for this point had been given 
 up by us in favor of the connection to Alexan- 
 dre tta. Bagdad had hitherto constituted the 
 terminal point of the road. An international 
 commission was to attend to the navigation on 
 the Shatt-el-Arab. We also had a share in the 
 harbor construction at Basra, and obtained 
 rights in the navigation of the Tigris which had 
 hitherto been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. 
 
 15 
 
Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia 
 as far as Basra came into our sphere of inter- 
 est in so far as this did not encroach upon 
 prior British rights, as in the case of the Tigris 
 navigation and the Wilcox irrigation plant, and 
 the whole territory of the Bagdad & Anatolian 
 Railroad." 
 
 British Not Jealous. 
 The English felt "uncomfortable," Prince Lich- 
 nowsky says, about the great increases in the 
 German fleet. He admits, however, that "Eng- 
 land would no more have drawn the sword solely 
 on account of our Navy than on account of our 
 commerce, which is supposed to have aroused her 
 envy and in the end brought the war to a head. 
 
 * * * The talk of English commercial jeal- 
 ousy, of which one hears so much among us, is 
 based upon a wrong judgment of conditions. Ger- 
 many's rise as a commercial power after the^war 
 of the seventies and in the following decades was 
 certainly a menace to British commerce, whose 
 industries and export houses enjoyed a sort of 
 monopoly. But the increasing trade with Ger- 
 many, which ranked as England's best customer, 
 made it desirable for England to remain on good 
 terms with her best customer and business friend, 
 and gradually supplanted all other considerations. 
 The Briton is matter of fact; he reconciles him- 
 self to facts and does not tilt against windmills. 
 It was precisely in commercial circles that I met 
 with the most friendly reception and observed an 
 effort to promote economic interests common to 
 both countries. * * * i became convinced soon 
 after my arrival (in England) that we did not in 
 the least have to fear an English attack or Eng- 
 lish support of a foreign attack, but that England 
 under all circumstances would protect France. 
 
 * * * I never ceased to point out that as a 
 commercial nation England would suffer enor- 
 mously in any war between the great European 
 
 16 
 
powers, and would therefore seek by every means 
 to prevent it, but that in the interest of the Euro- 
 pean balance of power and in order to prevent a 
 preponderance of German power she would not 
 tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. 
 Lord Haldane had told me this soon after my 
 arrival. Every person in authority expressed him- 
 self to the same eliect." 
 
 Late in June of the fatal summer of 1914, 
 Prince Lichnowsky was summoned to Kiel by 
 the Kaiser, and he was on board the imperial 
 j'acht Meteor, when word v/as received of the 
 murder of the Austrian Archduke. "Being unac- 
 quainted with the Vienna viewpoint and what 
 was going on there," he says, "I attached no very 
 far-reaching significance to the event ; ' but, look- 
 ing back, I could feel sure that in the Austrian 
 aristocracy a feeling of relief outweighed ail 
 others." As for the . Kaiser, "His Majesty re- 
 gretted that his efforts to win over the Arch- 
 duke to his ideas had been thus frustrated" by the 
 Archduke's assassination. 
 
 Lichnowsky went on to Berlin and saw the 
 Chancellor, von Bethmann-Holiweg. "I told him 
 that I regarded our foreign situation as very sat- 
 isfactory as it was a long time indeed since we 
 had stood so well with England. And in France 
 there was a pacifist cabinet. Herr von Bethmann- 
 Holiweg did not seem to share my optim.ism. He 
 complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to 
 tranquillize him with the argument that it was 
 not to Russia's interest to attack us, and that 
 such an attack would never have English or 
 French support, as both countries wanted peace. 
 
 "I went from him to Dr. Zimmerm.ann (the 
 under Secretary'),' who was acting for Herr von 
 Jagow (the Foreign Secretary) and learned from 
 him that Russia was about to call up nine hun- 
 dred thousand new troops. His words unmis- 
 takably denoted ill humor against Russia, who 
 
 17 
 
he said stood everywhere in our way. In addi- 
 tion, there were questions of commercial policy 
 that had to be settled. That General von Moltke 
 was urging war was, of course, not told to me. I 
 learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky (the 
 German Ambassador in Vienna) had been re- 
 proved because he said that he had advised Vi- 
 enna to show moderation toward Serbia." 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home 
 in Silesia, quite unaware of the impending 
 crisis. "When I returned from Silesia on my way 
 to London," he says, "I stopped only a few hours 
 in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended 
 to proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end 
 an unbearable state of affairs. Unfortunately I 
 failed at the moment to guage the significance of 
 the news. I thought that once more it would 
 come to nothing; that even if Russia acted 
 threateningly, the matter could soon be settled. 
 I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and 
 declare there and then that I would have no hand 
 in such a policy." 
 
 And here he interpolates some most significant 
 sentences. The world has heard various reports 
 of a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5, be- 
 tween the German and Austrian authorities, at 
 which meeting war was decided on. Prince Lich- 
 nowsky says: "I learned afterwards that at the 
 decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the 
 Austrian demand had met with the unconditional 
 approval of all the personages in authority; it 
 was even added that no harm v»^ould be done if 
 war with Russia did come out of it. It was so 
 stated at least in the Austrian report received at 
 London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Am- 
 bassador to England)." 
 
 He continues: "At this point I received instruc- 
 tions to endeavor to bring the English press to a 
 friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the 
 death-blow to 'Greater-Serbian' hopes. I was to 
 
 18 
 
use all my influence to prevent public opinion in 
 England from taking a stand against Austria. I 
 remembered England's attitude during the Bos- 
 nian annexation crisis, when public opinion 
 showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims 
 to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent pro- 
 motion of nationalist hopes that went on in the 
 days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these 
 and other grounds I thought it extremely un- 
 likely that English public opinion would support 
 a punitive expedition against the Archduke's mur- 
 derers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent 
 warning against the whole project, which I char- 
 acterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recom- 
 mended that counsels of moderation be given 
 Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict 
 could be localized" — (that is to say, it could not 
 be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia). 
 "Herr von Jagov/ answered me that Russia was 
 not prepared; that there would be more or less 
 of a rumpus; but that the more firmly we stood 
 by Austria the more surely would Russia give 
 way. Austria was already blaming us for flabbi- 
 ness and we could not flinch. On the other hand 
 Russian sentiment was growing more unfriendly 
 all the time, and we must simply take the risk, 
 I subsequently learned that this attitude was 
 based on advices from Count Pourtales (the Ger- 
 man Ambassador in Petrograd), that Russia 
 would not stir under any circumstances; informa- 
 tion which prompted us to spur Count Berchtold 
 on in his course. On learning the attitude of the 
 German Government I looked for salvation 
 through English mediation, knowing that Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be used 
 in the cause of peace. I, therefore, availed m}^- 
 self of my friendly relations with the Minister to 
 ask him confidentially to advise moderation in 
 Russia in case Austria demanded satisfaction from 
 the Serbians, as it seemed likely she would." 
 
 19 
 
England Friendly in July, 1914. 
 
 "The English press was quiet at first, and 
 friendly to Austria, the assassination being gen- 
 erally condemned. By degrees, however, more 
 and more voices made themselves heard, in the 
 sense that, however necessary it might be to take 
 cognizance of the crime, anj'- exploitation of it 
 for political ends w^as unjustifiable. Moderation 
 was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum 
 came out, all the papers, with the exception of the 
 Standard, were unanimous in condemning it. The 
 v.'hole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna, real- 
 ized that it meant war, and a world war too. The 
 English fleet, which happened to have been hold- 
 ing a naval review, was not demobilized." 
 
 The British Government labored to make the 
 Serbian reply conciliator}^, and "the Serbian an- 
 swer was in keeping with the British efforts." Sir 
 Edward Grey then proposed his plan of media- 
 tion upon the two points which Serbia had not 
 wholly conceded. Prince Lichnowsky writes: 
 "Mr. Cambon (for France), Marquis Imperiali 
 (for Italy), and I were to meet, v/ith Sir Edward 
 in the chair, and it would have been easy to v/ork 
 out a formula for the debated points, v/hich had 
 to do v/ith the co-operation of imperial and royal 
 officials in the inquiries to be conducted at Bel- 
 grade. By the . exercise of good v\dll everything 
 could have been settled in one or two sittings, 
 and the mere acceptance of the British proposal 
 would have relieved the strain and further im- 
 proved our relations with England. I seconded 
 this plan with all my energies. In vain. I was 
 told (by Berlin) that it would be against the dig- 
 nity of Austria. Of course, all that was needed 
 was one hint from Berlin to Count Berchtold (the 
 Austrian Foreign Minister) ; he would have satis- 
 fied himself with a diplomatic triumph and rested 
 on the Serbian answer. That hint was never 
 
 20 
 
..liven. On the contrary, pressnirc was brought in 
 favor of war. * '■'' * 
 
 Germany Insisted on War. 
 
 "After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come 
 forward with our proposal. We insisted on war. 
 No other answer could I get (from Berlin) than 
 that it was a colossal condescension on the part 
 of Austria not to contemplate any acquisition of 
 territory. Sir Edward justly pointed out that 
 one could reduce a country to vassalage without 
 acquiring territory; that Russia would see this, 
 and regard it as a humiliation not to be put up 
 with. The impression grew stronger and stronger 
 tliat we were bent on war. Otherwise our atti- 
 tude toward a question in which we were not di- 
 rectly concerned was incomprehensible. The in- 
 sistent requests and well-defined declarations of 
 M. Sasanof, the Czar's positivel}^ humble tele- 
 grams later on, Sir Edward's repeated proposals, 
 the warnings of Marquis San Giuliano and of Bol- 
 lati, my own pressing admonitions were all of 
 no avail. Berlin remained inrlexibie — Serbia must 
 be slaughtered." 
 
 "Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided upon 
 his well-knov/n warning. I told him I had ahvays 
 reported (to Berlin) that we should have to 
 reckon with English opposition if it came to a 
 war with France. Time and again the Minister 
 said to me, 'If war breaks out it will be the 
 greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.' 
 And now events moved rapidly. Count Berch- 
 told at last decided to come around, having up 
 to that point played the role of 'Strong man' 
 under guidance from Berlin. Thereupon we (in 
 answer to Russia's mobilization) sent our ulti- 
 matum and declaration of war — after Russia had 
 spent a whole week in fruitless negotiation and 
 waiting." 
 
 21 
 
Germany Ruled by Duellists. 
 
 War was declared. "Thus ended my mission to 
 London," Prince Lichnowsky says. "It had suf- 
 fered shipwreck, not on the wiles of the Briton but 
 on the wiles of our own policy." And of the 
 German traditions that made this policy possible, 
 he concludes: "Were not those right who saw that 
 the German people was pervaded with the spirit 
 of Treitscke and Bernardi, which glorifies war as 
 an end instead of holding it in abhorrence as an 
 evil thing? They said that the feudal knight 
 and junker, the warlike caste and not the civilian 
 lilies, and imposes its own ideals and values; that 
 the love of the duel which animates the university 
 students is still cherished by those who guide the 
 people's destinies. Had not the Zabern affair and 
 the debate on the case in the Reichstag shown the 
 outer world how civil rights and liberties are rated 
 with us when they conflict with military prestige? 
 * * * Properly speaking militarism is a school 
 for the people and an instrument to further 
 political ends. But, in the patriarchal absolutism 
 of a military monarchy, militarism exploits poli- 
 tics to further its own ends, and can create a situ- 
 ation which a democracy freed from junkerdom 
 would not tolerate. 
 
 "That is what our enemies think; that is what 
 they are bound to think when they see that in 
 spite of capitalistic industrialism and in spite of 
 socialistic organizations, the living, as Nietsche 
 said, are still ruled by the dead. The democratiz- 
 ation of Germany, the first war aim proposed by 
 our enemies, will become a reality." 
 
 That is Germany's confession of sin and avowal 
 of repentance, as made by her ambassador to 
 Great Britain. It leaves her without any justifi- 
 cation, except the one which Lichnowsky pleads, 
 that she is governed by a caste of duellists who 
 are determined to dominate the world by the 
 sword. That sword will have to be broken in the 
 
 22 
 
hands of the Kaiser before the world will be able 
 to live with Germany. Lichnowsky, like Muhlon, 
 foresees it. 
 
 Germany to Blame. 
 
 Vorwaerts, the socialist newspaper of Germany, 
 foresees it. And the German-Americans are be- 
 ginning to foresee it, too. One of their most 
 influential dailies, the Germania-Herold, of Mil- 
 waukee, has made editorially "An Open Confes- 
 sion," which reads: 
 
 "It is our duty to make it. We, too, were among 
 those who laid the blame for the world war at 
 the doors of English statesmen. We, too, have 
 time and again repeated the assertion to our 
 readers that these English statesmen, jealous of 
 Germany's success in the world markets, at- 
 tempted to 'encircle' German3^ We, too, have 
 repeatedly stated that Germany is entitled to a 
 place in the sun. We did so in good faith. For 
 we then believed what the organs of the Ger- 
 man Government proclaimed. We believed at 
 the beginning of the war, and years thereafter, 
 what most of the other German papers repeated. 
 
 "We were then fully convinced, that the pro- 
 gram of English statesmen consisted of nothing 
 less than to stop Germany's commercial and co- 
 lonial expansion. With us one-half of the world 
 of the western hemisphere was convinced through 
 the press of Germany. We believed in the press 
 of the old fatherland, which preached hatred 
 against England everywhere, following its gov- 
 ernmental press, where the German voice was 
 sounded. Sir Edward Grey, the dictator of for- 
 eign affairs for Great Britain, appeared to us as 
 a paragon of baseness. Now we and with us the 
 rest of the world which then credulously listened, 
 are convinced of the opposite. We know now 
 that the British statesmen, and with them the 
 statesmen of the allies, did not only have no war- 
 
 23 
 
like measures against Germany in mind but tc 
 the last minute endeavored to their utmost tol 
 avoid the war. The blame for the bloodshed lies! 
 v/ith the German Government. 
 
 "Politiken, the organ of the Swedish socialists! 
 of the extreme left, on March 15, published the| 
 historical document by which this guilt is estab- 
 lished. It was a so-called 'memorandum' by 
 Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, who before and at I 
 the time of the com.mencement of the war was| 
 the ambassador for the German empire in Lon- 
 don." 
 
 After quoting at length from the "memoran- 
 dum," the editor says: "It is to be remembered 
 that these words are not those of a.n English- 
 man. They are the words of one of the noblest 
 of the German nation, to which the .German 
 Emperor entrusted the m.ost important foreign 
 post and with whom William II in his youth was 
 closely associated." And the editor concludes: 
 "Who bears the blame that the German people 
 were goaded into a furious hate and thereby into 
 a war spirit? Only those in the service of the 
 junker class, who are- the ruling military caste 
 in Germany, in control of the government. The 
 pan-Germans in their megalomania are the ones 
 who brought about this calamity upon the Ger- 
 man people." 
 
 iLSr ^^ CONGRESS 
 
 PHHII 
 
 021 546 403 9 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 021 546 403 9