DT 108 
 
 1-3 
 .C72 
 
 Copy 1 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 029 957 898 7 • 
 
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 DT 108 
 .3 
 
 .C72 
 Copy 1 
 
 1885 
 
 No. 3 
 
 BULLETIN 
 
 American Geographical Society 
 
 NO. I I WEST 29TH STREET 
 NEW YORK 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I'AGE 
 
 The War in the Soudan for the Rescue of "Chinese Gordon " : by Gen'l R. E. 
 
 Colston, of Washington, D. C. ........ 125 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 PRINTED FOR THE SOCIETY 
 
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 JACOB H'f^IS. 
 
 JEast 112 JiOriffitiztie ±rom IfasTtizifrtoTi 
 
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 (^^..^y-iyt.--o/v V{>yt.<,^>t^CyV/ 
 
 THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUDAN 
 FOR THE RESCUE OF GORDON. 
 
 BY 
 
 GENERAL R. E. COLSTON, of Washington, D. C. 
 
 FORMERLY OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY. 
 
 I propose to present in this paper an outline narrative 
 of tlie war in tlie Soudan for the rescue of " Chinese 
 Gordon." The limits of such an article forbid more than 
 a brief allusion to the events which led to this war, and 
 which are still fresh in the public mind. They may be 
 summarized as follows : 
 
 The brilliant and prodigal career of the ex-Khedive 
 Ismail-Pasha ending in his financial ruin. 
 
 The installation of European commissioners of the 
 public debt, followed by swarms of high-paid British 
 officials taking entire control of Egyptian finances, rev- 
 enues, railroads, and telegraphs. 
 
 The resistance of Ismail to their usurpation of his 
 powers, and his compulsory abdication enforced by the 
 British and French Consuls-General, June 26, 1879. 
 
 The merely nominal rule of his son Tewfik, and the 
 sacrifice of every Egyptian interest to the payment of 
 foreign bondholders ; the dissatisfaction of the people, 
 and the opposition of the Egyptian army to being made the 
 chief victims of this policy, culminating in the military 
 revolt of Arabi-Pasha ; the bombardment of Alexandria, 
 
 125 
 
126 Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and the British occupation of 
 Egypt in 1882. 
 
 These events made England the sole and absolute 
 arbiter of Egypt's fate, for France had withdrawn from 
 the " Dual Control " before the bombardment of Alex- 
 andria, rather than participate in that ruthless deed! 
 
 In October 1883, after one year of British domination, 
 this was the situation of affairs.: 
 
 The young Khedive was deprived of all real authority, 
 British commissioners having more than ever before ab- 
 solute control of the resources of the country and its en- 
 tire administration. 
 
 The Egyptian regular army was entirely disbanded, 
 except a few of Arabi's disaffected regiments, sent to the 
 Soudan as a punishment for their rebellion. 
 
 A new native army composed of fresh levies, supposed 
 by a convenient fiction to be the Khedive's army, but 
 commanded by British officers, was created under Sir 
 Evelyn Wood. A native constabulary force called ge7i- 
 darmerie (whose officers were chiefly Italian), raised to 
 serve as police and not as soldiers, was organized under 
 Valentine Baker-Pasha, the British ex-colonel of hussars. 
 
 The hitherto undisputed power of the Egyptian gov- 
 ernment, which had enabled it to enforce order and 
 obedience upon the turbulent and barbarous populations 
 of the Soudan, was fatally impaired, for the garrisons 
 had already been reduced for reasons of economy, in order 
 that the bondholders' coupons might be paid ; and now a 
 general impression that the Khedive had sold his country 
 to Christians and foreigners began to prevail among the 
 people, and to give double encouragement to the Mahdi's 
 rebellion which had commenced two years before. 
 
Tile British Campaign in the Soudan. 127 
 
 Having taken entire possession of the country, avowed- 
 ly not as a conqueror but expressly as a friend and pro- 
 tector, solely to defend lier ally tlie Khedive against Ms 
 rebellious subjects, England became in equity Egypt's 
 guardian, and as she had rendered her defenceless, she 
 was bound by every consideration of Justice to shield her 
 from all harm. 
 
 How had she come to occupy such, a position after her 
 repeated declarations that the Suez Canal was the only 
 British interest involved in Egypt, and that so long as it 
 was safe, England would decline all interference in Egyp- 
 tian affairs ? 
 
 She had been driven step by step, almost unwittingly, 
 to assume this role by the pressure of British bondhold- 
 ers numerous and powerful enough to control both Par- 
 liament and ministers. England's attitude at this time 
 was tersely described by Hon. Henry Labouchere, the 
 eminent M. P. and also editor of Truth, in these words : 
 " Why are we in Egypt ? That shylock may have his 
 POUND of flesh ! " 
 
 Two courses were open to England. 
 
 One was to frankly assume a protectorate and to gov- 
 ern Egypt directly, either continuing the Khedive in his 
 role of a mere figure-head or else removing and pension- 
 ing him off like an Indian Rajah. 
 
 The other was to limit the sphere of British action to 
 securing the Khedive's power until he could re-organize 
 his own army and consolidate his government. This ob- 
 ject once attained, he should have been left free to govern 
 Egypt in his own way, providing only for his compliance 
 with the obligations he had contracted. 
 
 But just at this time commenced that astounding series 
 
 /. 
 
128 Tlie British Oampaign in the Soudan. • 
 
 of vacillations, both, political and military, that were 
 destined to produce such disastrous results. 
 
 To proclaim a protectorate over Egypt was to falsify 
 the declarations so often repeated to the world, and to 
 incur the hostility of Turkey and France as well as the 
 jealousy of other powers. 
 
 On the other hand, to withdraw her army from Egypt 
 and leave the Khedive to govern independently, seemed 
 to the British ministry a sacrifice of prestige and of the 
 advantages apparently secured by the occupation. 
 
 In the words of a distinguished publicist ^' : " The 
 ministry cherished the delusion that some middle course 
 was open to them, by which, while retaining the ad- 
 vantages of a virtual protectorate, they could avoid the 
 liabilities inseparable from its overt assumption. . . . 
 We have deranged every thing and have established 
 nothing in its place." While England held the Khe- 
 dive in the most absolute tutelage, shorn of every power, 
 ■she wished the world to believe that he enjoyed entire 
 freedom of action and was alone responsible for the 
 acts of his government. In pursuance of this x^olicy of 
 half measures, a partial evacuation was announced by 
 Mr. Gladstone at the Guildhall banquet in London on 
 the 9th of Nov., 1883, and this declaration was con- 
 sidered as the prelude to a complete withdrawal of 
 the British army from Egypt. Consequently the reforms 
 and innovations forced upon the Egyptian people in spite 
 of their bitter antipathy were now regarded by them 
 as temporary evils which would cease with the British 
 occupation. To quote again from the same writer : 
 
 * Edward Dicey, Professor of Political Science and Economy at Oxford, in the 
 Nineteenth Century for March, 1884. 
 
The British Qmrupaign in the Soudan. 129 
 
 " Egyj^t was given to understand that after having 
 bombarded Alexandria, invaded the country, exiled 
 Arabi, deprived the Khedive of his authority, disor- 
 ganized the native administration, destroyed the mech- 
 anism by which hitherto order had been maintained 
 after a fashion, and established in its stead a number of 
 institutions on paper, which could be converted into reali- 
 ties only if ensured by a prolonged occupation, we were 
 about to throw up the task we had undertaken and leave 
 the country to its fate — i. e., to a state of confusion closely 
 bordering upon anarchy." 
 
 But this programme of evacuation was suddenly aban- 
 doned. Mr. Gladstone's Guildhall speech was made on 
 the 9th of November, and on the 20th, news reached 
 London of the entire annihilation in the Soudan of 
 Hicks-Pasha's army of eleven thousand men, and of the 
 defeat and death of Consul Moncrieff at Tokar. The 
 orders already issued for the embarkation of one half of 
 the British army and the withdrawal of the remainder 
 from Cairo to Alexandria were countermanded, and the 
 Soudan suddenly loomed up into formidable pi'ominence, 
 for while Enoiand had concentrated all her efforts to 
 suppress Arabi's rebellion, another much more formida- 
 ble had broken out in the distant regions of the Upper 
 Nile. The easy triumph over the TCi&f^ fellaheen in the 
 holiday campaign of Tel-el-Kebir had been thought the 
 end of the troubles, but now it seemed only the 
 beginning thereof. 
 
 A description of the Soudan with its relation to Egj'pt 
 proper is necessary to a complete understanding of what 
 follows. 
 
 In the words of Herodotus, Egypt is the gift (or crea- 
 
130 The British Campaign in the Soudan'. 
 
 tion) of the Nile, for being a rainless country, she de- 
 pends upon her 07ily river for her very existence. The 
 experience of fifty centuries has proved that Egypt 
 can never be safe unless she controls the banks of the 
 Nile at least as far south as Khartoum. 
 
 From the sea to the mouth of the Atbara above Berber, 
 a distance of one thousand seven hundred miles, not a 
 single affluent falls into the Nile, and the breadth of its 
 valley above the Delta varies from a mere rocky canon to 
 -a very rare masimumof three to four miles, the average 
 being under two. Three million of people, being nearly 
 one half of the population of Egypt and Nubia, are 
 crowded into that narrow ribbon one thousand five hun- 
 dred miles long by two in breadth, without any possible 
 outlet, for all the vast spaces east and west (some eight 
 hundred thousand sc[uare miles) are The Deseet. 
 
 Vegetation stops just where the waters of the Nile can- 
 not be lifted by irrigation, and the dividing line between 
 that and the desert is as sharply marked as a gra^'el walk 
 across a grass lawn. Between the Nile and the Red Sea 
 is the Arahian Desert^ and on the west, extending until it 
 joins the Sahara, is the Lihyan Desert. 
 
 Yjgy^i 2Jro2X'r extends only to the first cataract at Assou- 
 an, about seven hundred miles from the sea (lat. 24° 5'). 
 
 Between the first cataract at Assouan and the second 
 cataract at Wady Haifa, -the country is called Lower 
 Nubia, and from Wady Haifa (lat. 22°) to New Don- 
 gola (lat. 18°) is Upper Nubia. 
 
 All the regions south of Dongola are embraced under 
 the name of Soudan — an immense and indefinite region, 
 stretching across the entire continent of Africa, on both 
 sides of the equator, and subdivided by geographers into 
 
Tlie Bi'itisli Campcdgn in the Soudan. 131 
 
 Eastern, Central, and Western Soudan. The name is 
 derived from tlie Arabic aswad, black, of wliicli tlie 
 plural is suda ; so that Beled-es- Soudan means simply 
 the country of the blacks, or, as we would call it, 
 Nigritia. 
 
 The Egyptian Soudan comprises but a small portion 
 of that immense territory. Its most important provinces 
 are Dongola, Kordofan, Darfour, and Bahr-el-Ghazelle, 
 west of the White Nile. Its eastern boundary is the 
 Red Sea down to Massowah ; thence the Abyssinian 
 frontier, between which and the White Nile is the large 
 and fertile province of Sennaar. When Gordon was 
 Grovernor-General of the Soudan (1874-1879), a chain of 
 Egyptian garrisons, of which Grondokoro was the princi- 
 pal, reached as far as the great lakes, all connected by 
 telegraph with Cairo. This region, claimed by the 
 Khedive as part of his dominions, was called the 
 Equatorial Provinces ; but in reality it is occupied by 
 warlike negro tribes — Dinkas, Shillooks, Dowers, and 
 others too numerous to mention, and generally partici- 
 pants in the slave-trade either as hunters or hunted ; so 
 that the Khedive's authority was limited to a small circle 
 around each military post. Even in time of peace and 
 under Ismail's and Cordon's strong government those 
 tribes would frequently attack small Egyptian detach- 
 ments, as when they massacred young Linant and his 
 party in 1875. It flattered Ismail's pride to imagine that 
 his empire extended to the lakes, but in fact, beyond 
 Sennaar on the east, and Bahr-el-Chazelle on the west, 
 the Khedive's authority was purely nominal. 
 
 Mehemet-Ali, the great-grandfather of the present 
 Khedive, was a man of eminent abilities, but merciless 
 
132 Tlie Britisli Camixtign in the Soudan. 
 
 and unscrupulous. He liad no sooner consolidated his 
 tenure of the vice-regal throne than he resolved to 
 increase his territory. This was impossible within the 
 narrow valley of the lower Nile ; but above the arid 
 deserts of Nubia are broad and fertile regions inside of 
 the southern rain-belt, and well watered by the Atbara, 
 the Sobat, and other affluents of the Nile. The so-called 
 island of Meroe was formerly the centre of a civilization 
 older than the Pharaohs. Standing upon the site of the 
 ancient city, I counted no less than forty -two pyramids — 
 smaller, it is true, than those of Gizeh, but of a size to 
 be considered gigantic in any other land. Later still, 
 Meroe was the seat of five populous Christian bishoprics.* 
 Sennaar, lying between the White and the Blue Niles, pos- 
 sesses a soil of unrivalled fertility and produces wheat, 
 corn, cotton, sugar, and gum in prodigious abundance, 
 beside the senna to which it gives its name. Kordofan, 
 on the west of the White Nile, is a sterile and almost 
 waterless region, yet it yields vast quantities of ostrich 
 feathers and the great bulk of the best gum-arabic of the 
 world. But better still, the master of those provinces 
 controls the rich trade of Central Africa — ebony, gold- 
 dust, ivory, indigo, india-rubber, and above all, slaves. 
 A pretext was easily found, and in 1822 Mehemet-Ali 
 had achieved the conquest of Sennaar and Kordofan. 
 Until that time the country had been ruled by number- 
 less Sultans, as they called themselves, and its condition 
 
 * A fact mentioned by early historians and confirmed by the researches of Mon- 
 signor Daniele Comboni, Bishop of Nigritia, a most accomplished Arabic scholar 
 and archeologist. He was a native of Verona, a man of splendid presence, genial 
 nature, and the most liberal-minded priest I ever met. lie accompanied me on my 
 return journey from El Obeid through Khartoum, Berber, and Suakim to Cairo, 
 and he died in Kordofan in 1881, in the prime of middle life, a victim to the mur- 
 derous climate. 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 133 
 
 from time immemorial had been one of continual rapine, 
 anarchy, and savagery. Commerce could hardly be said 
 to exist, for caravans had to pay heavy tributes to every 
 robber chief, and even this did not always secure their 
 lives and property from attacks by roving bands of 
 Bedouins. Striking mementoes of that period of brig- 
 andage are the ruins of ancient castles seen on many 
 basaltic islands rising one or two hundred feet above 
 the river-bed. Some, like the feudal fortresses on the 
 Khine (which they so much resemble), were once the 
 strongholds of bandit chiefs, whence they could spy out 
 the approach of their prey ; while others served as 
 refuges in which the agricultural population stored their 
 crops to save them from the raids of the desert nomads. 
 Mehemet-Ali's conquest was accompanied by fearful 
 cruelties on both sides. I have stood at Shendy upon 
 the very spot where Mehemet's son, Ismail, was roasted 
 to death with all his chief officers and a portion of 
 his troops. Ismail had made extortionate demands for 
 gold, slaves, and forage upon the local Sultan, el Nhnr 
 (the Tiger), and had struck him across the face with his 
 pipe-stem because the forage fell short. The crafty chief 
 retired humbly from his presence, promising that an 
 abundance would be supplied before morning. All 
 the afternoon and evening immense quantities were 
 piled all around the quarter of the town where Ismail 
 and his troops were holding high revel. But an hour 
 before daylight the stacks were simultaneously fired 
 at every point, and the doomed Turco-Egyptians found 
 themselves surrounded by a circle of flames from which 
 none escaped, for el Nimi^ with his Nubians stood out- 
 side and shot down or speared every one who attempted 
 
134 Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan.' 
 
 to break tlie fiery barrier. To avenge liis son's death, 
 Mehemet-Ali sent another army under bis son-in-law — 
 the famous Defterdar (so-called from Ms office of regis- 
 trar or treasurer), whose name still lives in Egyptian 
 traditions on account of his fiendish cruelties. This 
 army of Asiatic Turks showed little mercy to African 
 barbarians. More than 100,000 people were slaughtered 
 between Abou Hamed and Khartoum, and a still larger 
 number, chiefly boys and young women, were sent down 
 as slaves to Lower Egypt. The bloody memories of the 
 conquest were never forgotten, but so thorough had it 
 been that sixty years elapsed without a general attempt 
 at rebellion. 
 
 Even the worst evils are often followed by good re- 
 sults. By degrees, order, defective as it might be, arose 
 from absolute chaos. Mehemet-Ali visited the Soudan 
 and his military eye perceived at one glance the strategic 
 importance of the point of land at the Junction of the 
 A¥hite and the Blue Niles. There he founded Khartoum 
 (lat. 15° 30') and made it the capital of the Soudan prov- 
 inces, with a government palace, extensive barracks for 
 troops, an arsenal, a ship-yard, and a growing population 
 which, in 1876, had increased to more than 40,000. A 
 despotic and often cruel government, establishing strong 
 garrisons at important points, commanded peace and en- 
 forced obedience. Commerce, agriculture, and industry 
 took the place of pillage and murder, and were efficiently 
 protected though heavily taxed. Famines which were 
 the frequent consequence of continual wars and rapine, 
 disappeared after a government strong and regular, even 
 if arbitrary and tyrannical, had given the husbandman an 
 assurance of reaping the crop which he had planted. 
 
Tlie British Cmnpaign in the Soudan. 135 
 
 Every tiling in this world is relative. Wliat would be 
 an intolerable government for France or England may be 
 very acceptable to a semi-civilized population, especially 
 if it is better than any thing they have experienced before. 
 I explored the greater part of the Soudan — the deserts 
 between the Nile and the Red Sea from Kenneh to 
 Suakim, as well as Kordofan on the west of the Nile. 
 Altogether I spent two years travelling 6,000 miles on 
 camel-back among the most numerous and powerful 
 Bedouin tribes now in insurrection, and visiting all 'the 
 principal cities — Berber, Dongola, Debbe, El Obeid, 
 Khartoum, Suakim, etc., etc. In all my explorations I 
 had the best opportunities, and I made it a point to ex- 
 amine the condition of the country and the people. 
 There were certainly no reasons to bias my Judgment, 
 and I give now the result of my experience and observa- 
 tions. 
 
 Everywhere I found the primary eleiaent of civilization 
 and without which none can exist, — suhrnission to law. 
 It may be thought a crude aud defective law, but it pos- 
 sesses the advantage of the universal assent of the people, 
 being based upon the Koran, which on the whole, is a 
 humane and equitable code. Life and property were 
 safer than in our own wild border lands. Of that ruffian- 
 ism which makes a hero of a bandit like Jesse James and 
 glorifies the monster who has killed a score of men in 
 private brawls, there was not a trace. Murders were 
 rare and generally punished with death. I remember 
 seeing at El Obeid the body of a murderer hanging from 
 the gallows on the market-place. He had been con- 
 victed after a regular trial before the Cadi, but it was 
 not until the case had been carefully revised by the 
 
136 IVie JBritish Ganvpaign in, the Soudan. 
 
 Mgliest tribunal and tlie sentence approved by tlie Khe- 
 dive himself tliat lie was executed ; for no provincial 
 governor was authorized to cany out a capital sentence, 
 except Gren. Gordon, upon whom the powers of life and 
 death had been conferred by special firman for the pur- 
 pose of suppressing the slave trade. Even the wild 
 Bedouins, fierce nomads without fixed habitations, and 
 yielding only a limited allegiance, had been compelled to 
 abandon the plundering habits of their forefathers, and 
 their sheikhs were held answerable with their heads for 
 the safety of life, travel, and property throughout their 
 deserts. In many thousand miles of travel among the 
 now rebellious tribes, the Bishareens, Hassaneeyehs, 
 Kababeesh, and others, I have met hundreds of caravans 
 loaded, some with the most valuable products of Central 
 Africa, others with European goods going to the interior. 
 The commerce thus carried on by land, exclusive of the 
 river trade, amounted to twenty-five or thirty millions of 
 dollars a year. Yet no caravan, large or small, needed 
 the protection of an armed escort, and all travelled in 
 perfect safety under the charge of unarmed camel-drivers 
 and the half-dozen merchants owning the goods. The 
 certainty of swift and stern punishment by t^iQ Khedive's 
 governmsnt, known to possess irresistible power to infiict 
 it, was sufficient to guarantee security to all. 
 
 In Kordofan, one of the remote provinces, European 
 as well as native merchants carried on an active trade by 
 means of the electric telegraph, which reached to Darfour 
 and the lakes, and they regulated their transactions by 
 the daily quotations of ivory, gum and ostrich feathers at 
 Cairo and Alexandria. This fact came under my per- 
 sonal observation at El ObeYd, as well as the following. 
 
The British Camjpaigii in the Soudan. 137 
 
 A branch of tlie great Austro-Italian Roman-Catholic 
 mission at Khartoum was established at EI Obeid, con- 
 sisting of twelve or fifteen priests and sisters. In that 
 city of thirty thousand people, of whom two thirds were 
 Mussulmans and the rest heathen negroes, priests and 
 nuns in their distinctive costumes were daily seen plying 
 their vocation absolutely unmolested in any way, though 
 I cannot say that they made any converts, except the 
 little boys and girls whom they purchased in infancy and 
 taught in their school, and who continued good Christians 
 so long as they were clothed and fed — and no longer. 
 There were also some other branch missions far away 
 from the protection of the garrison at El Obeid, and they 
 remained unmolested until the Mahdi captured that city, 
 when twelve members were held for ransom and released 
 upon payment of seventy thousand dollars by the Aus- 
 trian consul at Khartoum. I can assert with truth that 
 wherever an Egyptian garrison could enforce its authority, 
 life and property were reasonably well protected, far better 
 than could have been expected in such distant regions, 
 and among a semi-barbarous people. 
 
 Yet I do not pretend to say that even under Ismail the 
 Soudan was an Arcadia. By no means ! For some years 
 after the conquest, the military governors, all Turks, 
 were cruel and rapacious, and confirmed the hatred for 
 Turkish officials so deeply implanted in the Soudanese 
 heart, and embracing all Egyptians whom they regard as 
 Turks. But for the last thirty years, a milder regime had 
 gradually prevailed. It cannot be denied, however, that 
 the rapacity of the governors aud their subordinates 
 could never be entirely checked at such a distance from 
 the seat of government at Cairo. The peasant or laborer 
 
138 Tlie British Campaign m the Soudan. 
 
 liad to pay in extortions nearly as mncli again as the just 
 amount of taxes wliicli found its way to the government 
 chest. But yet he had enough left to live easily in his 
 frugal way, and was secure in the enjoyment of this sur- 
 plus ; whereas, before the conquest he never knew when 
 war or the roving Bedouins would rob him of his sus- 
 tenance and his life. No doubt there were numerous 
 cases of wrong and oppression. • Traders frequently had 
 to pay heavy backsheesh to avoid worse extortion ; but, 
 after all, the government gave them the protection with- 
 out which they could not have carried on their trade at 
 all. Many poor wretches received the kourbash to force 
 from them the payment of their taxes ; but it was a point 
 of honor with them, and they would have been branded 
 as cowards by their fellows if they had paid up before 
 taking as many strokes as they could bear. A civilized 
 people is ruled by moral suasion, not, however, without 
 severe j)enalties to enforce its laws ; but barbarians can- 
 not be controlled without a good deal of brute force. 
 Full allowance being made for taxation and extortion, 
 the population did not have to bear nearly so heavy a 
 burden as that laid upon the Irish people in rents alone ; 
 nor had they to contend with evictions and starvation. 
 The mildness of the climate making clothing and shelter 
 almost a superfluity, the fertility of the cultivated land, 
 and the increase of their flocks combine to procure to the 
 Egyptian and Soudanese people a far easier life than falls 
 to the lot of the peasantry of Ireland and all northern 
 Europe. If law, order, and a regular government, even 
 though defective, are preferable to anarchy, brigandage 
 and incessant war, the Soudan was in vastly better condi- 
 tion under Ismail-Pasha than it had ever been before the 
 
The British, Campaign in the Soudan. 139' 
 
 conquest. And be it remembered tliat tlie only alternative 
 is between tliis imperfect but strong government, and a 
 return to tlie former chaos and savagery ; for tlie Soudan- 
 ese, if left to themselves, must inevitably fall under the 
 rule of numerous rival chiefs of slave-traders, of whom 
 Abou-Saoud, Zobehr-Pasha, and Osman-Digma are repre- 
 sentative types. 
 
 Such, then, was the condition of the Soudan under 
 Gordon's administration before the deposition of Ismail ; 
 and it cannot be denied that that country enjoyed 
 many benefits of an incipient civilization, destined to in- 
 crease and develop if its government remained undis- 
 turbed. 
 
 But no government can be supported without taxation, 
 and an ignorant people are unable to realize that the pro- 
 tection they receive is far more than an equivalent return 
 for the taxes which they pay. It is not astonishing 
 therefore that the Soudanese lost sight of the advantages 
 they enjoyed in the security for life and industry, and 
 considered all taxation as robbery. In the memory of 
 their fathers, time had been when no governors and sol- 
 diers were sent to make them pay tribute to a Turkish 
 viceroy at Cairo. The traditions of the cruel conquest 
 with fi.re and sword sixty years before still lingered 
 among the people, and it told them of the days when 
 they were subject only to their own native sultans. With 
 the natural tendency of a primitive people to extol " the 
 good old times," they forgot that those petty despots 
 were the absolute and unsparing masters of the lives and 
 property of their subjects, and kept the country in a state 
 of perpetual strife and devastation. These memories, kept 
 alive by the extortions of some rapacious officials, nursed 
 
140 Tlie British Camjpaign in the Soudan. 
 
 the race-hatred of the Soudanese for the Egyptians, but 
 with the great mass of the people it was a passive senti- 
 ment which would remain dormant unless aroused by ex- 
 citing causes. 
 
 A much more active and dangerous element of discon- 
 tent was found in the large and powerful class engaged 
 in the slave-trade, that curse of Africa probably as old as 
 the negi'o race with which it seems to be an innate in- 
 stinct ; for as Sir Samuel Baker remarks, the first impulse 
 • of a freed negro, as soon as he has a chance, is to acquire a 
 slave of his own. That this trade existed in the days of 
 the Pharaohs is placed beyond doubt by the images of 
 chain-gangs of negro slaves carved upon their monuments. 
 
 The strength and magnitude of the slave-hunting and 
 slave-trading organizations cannot be appreciated without 
 a description of their system of operations. 
 
 An enterprising adventurer starts with a capital of 
 £1,000 which, if he has it not, he can always borrow in 
 Khartoum at 100 per cent, interest. He enlists 150 
 men from the thousands of slave-hunting soldiers and 
 desperadoes who swarm in Khartoum and Dongola, eager 
 for such employment. He supplies them with fire-arms 
 and abundant ammunition ; he buys a few hundred 
 pounds of glass beads and a few hundred yards of coarse 
 cotton fabrics for presents and barter. He charters six 
 or eight Nile-boats and leaves Khartoum about the 1st of 
 December. Sailing some five hundred miles or more up 
 the White Nile, he lands at some eligible point and pene- 
 trates into the interior. First he begins to trade for ele- 
 phants' tusks, but this is only a preliminary to more 
 serious business. He invariably finds some negro chief 
 at enmity with another and anxious to secure an ally so 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 141 
 
 well provided witli fire-arms. A bargain is soon con- 
 cluded, and they make a joint nigM-attack upon tke ene- 
 my's villages, setting tke straw kuts on fire. All tke 
 warriors wko resist are shot down with musketry as 
 they rush out of their blazing homes. The rest, together 
 with the women and children are captured, as well as the 
 cattle still coralled in the zeribas.'"" The negro chief is 
 delighted, for his enemy is " wiped out," and he himself 
 is rewarded with fifty or one hundred cattle and three or 
 four handsome slave girls. He and his people covet cat- 
 tle above all things, and the trader has captured probably 
 some two thousand head which he proceeds to barter for 
 ivory — a cow for a tusk, which is all profit since the cows 
 have cost him nothing. When no more ivory is to be 
 had, the trader usually picks a quarrel with his late allies 
 who in their turn are murdered or enslaved, their women, 
 children, and the coveted cattle being added to the pre- 
 viously acquired booty. 
 
 In an average season, a party one hundred and fifty 
 strong will secure ivory to the amount of £5,000. The 
 men are paid their wages in cattle and slaves which have 
 cost nothing, and receive in addition one third of the 
 stolen cattle, leaving some four or five hundred slaves 
 worth five or six pounds per head for the trader's own 
 profit. These he crowds into his boats, guarded by a few 
 of his men, while the rest establish zeribas from which 
 they raid the country all around and procure more slaves 
 for the time when their leader returns the next year with 
 a larger force. 
 
 * This word, of frequent occurrence hereafter, is spelled variously — zaribah, 
 zeriba, etc., in the attempt to represent its true sound, which is zab-ree-bah, with 
 accent on middle syllable. It means an enclosure, generally of thorny brush-wood, 
 or a stockade. 
 
142 Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 Meanwhile tlie slaver sails back down tlie Mle and is 
 met at safe points by the regular slave-merchants called 
 jellahs, mostly Arabs, waiting to purchase the slaves for 
 ready cash. These unfortunates are now marched off by 
 various routes, avoiding the Egyptian garrisons, some 
 down the Mle, others across the deserts to the Red Sea, 
 multitudes perishing by the way. The survivors find a 
 ready market in Egypt, Arabia, "Turkey, Persia, and all 
 the Mussulman provinces of Asia, while the successful 
 adventurer returns with his ivory and gold to Khartoum, 
 already a rich man. There he repays his loan with 
 interest, jjurchases fresh supplies for the men he left 
 behind, enlists more followers, and starts back the fol- 
 lowing December to operate year after year upon an 
 ever-increasing scale. 
 
 The practical working of this system is fully illustrated 
 by the career of the notorious Zobehr-Pasha who rose 
 from a common slave-hunting hireling to a conqueror, 
 and narrowly missed becoming a king. 
 
 He was of that turbulent Dongola race who take 
 to slave-hunting as naturally as a duck to water, and he 
 began his career as a mere enlisted mercenary ; but be- 
 fore long he started on his own account, and possessing 
 a natural aptitude for organizing and commanding men, 
 his zeribas were soon numbered by scores, forming a 
 chain of fortified posts extending more than a thousand 
 miles beyond Khartoum. Around his head-quarters at 
 Shaka a town grew up as large as El Obeid, and there 
 he kept up a royal state, with a body-guard, and chained 
 live lions in his audience-hall. Dr. Schweinfurth states 
 that in 1871 no less than 2,700 jellabs visited that place 
 to buy the numerous slaves Zobehr had captured and 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 143 
 
 collected there. Having devastated all tlie surronnding 
 regions, Ms base of supplies was tlien tlie powerful king- 
 dom of Darf our ; but Zobelir having incurred the enmity 
 of its monarch, the latter forbade the exportation of the 
 grain without which the slavers could not subsist. From 
 his numerous zeribas Zobehr assembled an army of 
 twelve or fifteen thousand men, and in a great battle at 
 Menowatshee, in 1874, he defeated and killed Sultan 
 Ibrahim and his two sons, thus extinguishing a dynasty 
 which had ruled over Darf our for four hundred years. 
 If let alone, he would have seized the vacant throne, 
 but the Khedive Ismail was too far-sighted to permit 
 a chief who once before had defied his power and 
 attacked his troops, to become an independent king. So 
 he sent a regular army, too strong to be resisted, to com- 
 plete the subjugation of Darfour so nearly accomplished 
 by Zobehr. The latter, making a virtue of necessity, 
 turned over his conquest to the Khedive, expecting in 
 return to be made Governor-General of Western Soudan. 
 His hopes were encouraged, and he was invited to Cairo. 
 But before going there he assembled his lieutenants at 
 Shaka, and made them take a solemn oath upon the 
 Koran to obey whatever orders he might send them from 
 Cairo. Arrived there, he was made a pasha and assigned 
 a pension of £100 a month. He had brought with him 
 £100,000 in gold, which he vainly expended in urging 
 his claims. He was treated with great honor, but kept 
 in a sort of gilded captivity. Disappointed and irritated, 
 he sent secret orders to his son Suleiman to summon all 
 his followers to rebel against Gordon, and in a short time 
 Suleiman raised ten or twelve thousand men, far better 
 fighters than Gordon's troops, and secretly supplied by 
 
144 Tlie JBritish Cmn^aign in the Soudan. 
 
 Zobelir witli money, arms, and ammunition. This re- 
 bellion was not suppressed until twelve battles had been 
 fought by Romulo Gessi, Gordon's valiant lieutenant, — 
 killed some years later fighting another rebellion of 
 slave-hunters. Suleiman himself was captured and 
 'Gessi had him tried and shot for treason, with Gordon's 
 approval, and among his papers were found Zobehr's 
 letters inciting the rebellion. The latter was imprisoned 
 for some months, then released, though still forbidden to 
 leave Cairo, but not deprived of his honors and pension. 
 When Gordon, in 1884, found his position at Khartoum 
 untenable, he urged the British authorities to send 
 Zobehr to succeed him, as being the only man able to 
 organize a government and prevent utter anarchy, but 
 his record was too black, and the authorities wisely 
 refused to trust him. 
 
 Zobehr was only one of many powerful slave-hunting 
 warrior-chiefs. Another was Abou-Saoud who also 
 raised a rebellion, and after causing much trouble, 
 made terms and was received back into favor. Yusuf 
 who did the same, was made a pasha and was exter- 
 minated with six thousand men by the Mahdi, in 
 Sennaar. Another was Osman-Digma who has done 
 such splendid fighting near the Red Sea, and is still 
 continuing the war against the British, In fact, slave- 
 hunting is war on a barbarous and often extensive 
 scale, and its leaders have to possess no inconsiderable 
 military capacity. 
 
 The slave-trade was the only one that flourished before 
 Mehemet-Ali's conquest, and it continued to flourish un- 
 hindered until General Gordon's appointment as Gov- 
 ernor-General of the Soudan (1874-1879). From the de- 
 
Tlie British Camjpaign in the Soudan. ] 45 
 
 scription given above of tine modus operandi of the 
 slave-hunters, it is evident that the number slain in 
 the raids or left to starve after the destruction of all 
 their subsistence must nearly equal those reduced to 
 slavery ; and of the latter, at least one third perished by 
 the way, although none but the young and able-bodied 
 wevQ considered worth carrying away. In spite of this 
 frightful mortality, not less than thi-ee hundred thousand 
 slaves were annually brought down the Nile and across the 
 deserts from Central Africa. Baker, Schweinfurth, and 
 other African explorers bear witness to the devastation 
 produced by this hellish brigandage which reduced to 
 absolute deserts provinces as large as France and Grer- 
 man}^, and that had formerly supported a numerous popu- 
 lation. One of Ismail-Pasha's strongest claims to the sym- 
 pathy of the civilized world is the vigorous and earnest 
 attempt he made to suppress this atrocious crime. He 
 gave Grordon orders to annihilate it by the sternest exer- 
 cise of military force, and invested him with unlimited 
 powers for that purpose. The effort was only partly suc- 
 cessful, for it is impossible to change in a few years 
 the customs and traditions of centuries, although Gor- 
 don's sub-governors were afraid to disregard his instruc- 
 tions, and many slave caravans were intercepted and con- 
 fiscated for having ventured too near the Egyptian 
 garrisons. This fact came to my personal knowledge 
 at El Obeid, where I was detained several months by 
 the effects of the deadly climate which shattered my 
 health for ever and killed a number of my comrades and 
 escort. That city was the residence of the governor 
 of the province of Kordofan, and in peace times was gar- 
 risoned by some three thousand Soudanese troops. More 
 
146 The Britisli Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 tlian once I saw gangs of slaves Just released from the 
 traders, being marclied down to the barracks by an 
 Egyptian sergeant to be enrolled as recruits. They were 
 great, tall fellows, emaciated by fatigue and starvation, 
 and all just as perfectly naked as they were born. They 
 walked in single file, each one fastened to the next by 
 a piece of wood about five feet long, reaching from the 
 back of the neck of the first man to the throat of the 
 next behind him. Thus they had marched hundreds 
 of miles, never released for an instant except when 
 one would drop dead and be left for the vultures and 
 hyenas. Perhaps half of them had perished by the way, 
 and it was impossible to send back the rest to their coun- 
 try. So the government made soldiers of them and gave 
 them the women slaves for wives. This had at least the 
 effect of discouraging the slave-trade by the confiscation 
 of the merchandise. These fellows as soon as enrolled 
 were clothed in a good white cotton uniform, fed on fair 
 rations, of bread and meat, better than they ever had 
 before in their lives. They were taught Arabic and the 
 Mohammedan religion of which they soon became zeal- 
 ous proselytes. They learned military drill and discipline 
 very promptly and perfectly. These Soudanese regi- 
 ments formed of men who had been warriors in their 
 own country, not only looked very soldier-like, but they 
 were greatly superior as fighters to the troops recruited 
 from the meek and peace-loving fellaheen of Lower 
 Egypt. 
 
 But the current was too strong to be entirely stopped, 
 and it sought secret channels out of reach of governors 
 and garrisons. I was at Khartoum in 1876, during 
 Gordon's governorship — but at that particular time he 
 
The British Camjxdgn in the Soudan. 147 
 
 was on a tour of inspection to Gondokoro and tlie lakes. 
 I made many inquiries and obtained mucli information 
 from tlie Austrian Consul, who was in full sympathy with 
 Grordon, and he told me that it was true that slave cara- 
 vans were no longer brought to Khartoum, and that 
 the traders had to seek concealment. " But," added he- — 
 " if you wanted to purchase a hundred boys or a hundred 
 girls, they can be procured and delivered to you at a safe 
 place in twenty-four hours for $35 to $50 per head." 
 Nevertheless, it is believed that under Gordon's rule the 
 annual importation from Central Africa was reduced 
 from three hundred thousand to less than one hundred 
 thousand, and in the attainment of this result, great num- 
 bers of the traders were financially ruined, and hundreds 
 of the slave-hunting soldiers caught red-handed were 
 shot — ^'■jpoiir encourager les cmtres.'''' It must be kept 
 in mind, however, that this warfare was carried on 
 against slave-hunting only. In the nature of things no 
 interference could be attempted or was desired with 
 regard to domestic slavery as it existed in Egypt and 
 the Soudan. 
 
 As a natural and inevitable consequence, all the power- 
 ful class of slave-hunters, together with all those who 
 derived profit from the slave-trade, such as jellabs, 
 usurers, furnishers of supplies, bandits and adventurers, 
 were driven to desperation by restraints which meant 
 ruin to them, and they were ready for revolution. 
 
 But far more formidable than all the rest, if once 
 aroused into hostility, were the half million of Bedouins 
 roaming the deserts east and west of the Nile, of whom 
 every male above fifteen is a warrior. They are of dif- 
 ferent blood from the people of Egypt and the Soudan, 
 
148 The British Ca/mpaig^i in the Soudan. 
 
 tlieir ancestors having crossed over the Red Sea from 
 Arabia long before the Christian era, and they have 
 mingled but little with other races. They are true 
 Ishmaelites, and exhibit the characteristics of the Arab 
 race, being slender, of medium size, well formed, with small 
 hands and feet and arched instep, varying in color from 
 olive to dark bronze, and with straight aquiline features. 
 They are proud, indomitable, and. prefer independence to 
 life itself. Having but few wants, their deserts supply 
 them with nearly all that they need. They are nomads 
 whose wealth consists of flocks and camels, living where 
 agriculture is impossible, and scorning the inhabitants of 
 towns as " dwellers among bricks." Even Mehemet- All's 
 iron hand could extort from them only the most limited 
 allegiance. Though born- warriors, they never submitted 
 to conscription, and they paid tribute to the Khedive 
 because they found it to their interest to do so, being 
 granted in return the monopoly of the carrying trade 
 across their country, and allowed to retain their patriar- 
 chal form of government under their great sheikhs, who 
 can trace their origin even beyond the days of the 
 Prophet."^* On these the Khedive bestowed high rank, 
 privileges, and revenues on the condition of their insuring 
 the peace and safety of trade and travel through their 
 territories, and this they did so effectually that, as I 
 stated before, no caravan needed an armed escort. The 
 principal Bedouin tribes are the Ababdehs, Bishareens, 
 and Hadendowas, on the east of the Nile ; the Has- 
 
 * In my first lecture, published by the American Geographical Society in 1880, 
 " Life in the Egyptian Deserts," I gave a very complete description of the man- 
 ner and customs of the Bedouin tribes. We are compelled to write Arab names as 
 they sound, hence the diversity in spelling them by English, French, Italian and 
 German writers. 
 
The British Omnjpaign in the Soudan. 149 
 
 saneeyehs, Kababeesli, and Baggdras, on tlie west. All 
 tlie tribes wear tlie same costume, wliicli for tlie common 
 people consists of a few yards of coarse wliite cotton 
 clotli wound around tlie waist and legs to tlie knees, witb 
 sandals for tlieir feet. The upper part of tlie body is 
 exposed to tlie burning rays of tlie sun, mitigated only 
 by tlie abundant grease with which they plaster their 
 hair, and which melts and flows upon their breasts and 
 shoulders. They all go bare-headed at all times, even 
 when on the march the thermometer registers 150° or 
 160°, with the fierce African sun vertical over their 
 heads and the burning sand under their feet. Stranger 
 than all, while some of the tribes arrange their hair in 
 thick cushions, six or eight inches high, others shave 
 their heads and seem to suffer no inconvenience from an 
 exposure which would kill a European, or even an Egyp- 
 tian in fifteen minutes. All the Bedouins go armed at 
 all times, their equipment consisting of shields of hippo- 
 potamus or giraffe hide, lances, and the broad, straight, 
 double-edged, two-handed swords with which they make 
 their headlong charges. Feuds are frequent among the 
 sub-tribes, and their internal quarrels, of which the 
 Egyptian government took no notice, always kept alive 
 their warlike spirit. It is from these tribes that the 
 Madhi and Osman Dio;ma obtained the OTeat mass of 
 their best and bravest soldiers. 
 
 With such elements it is evident that the Soudan was 
 like a train of powder which a single spark might fire at 
 any moment. Yet no general rebellion would have been 
 attempted so long as the Khedive's government retained 
 its power and prestige. But just at that time occurred 
 a remarkable combination of circumstances. 
 
150 The British Cam/paig7i in the Sotidan. 
 
 1st. IsmaYl-Paslia's strong personality was eliminated by 
 liis forced abdication. 
 
 2d. Gordon deprived of Ismail's unlimited support, and 
 disgusted at the complaints of tlie British commissioners 
 at Cairo, because, under his upright administration, the 
 Soudan no longer yielded a surplus, resigned his office 
 and his successor, Raouf-Pasha, reestablished the old 
 abuses. 
 
 3d. The Egyptian government was disorganized and 
 its army destroyed by foreign interference and by Arabi's 
 rebellion. 
 
 4th. The iniquitous bombardment of Alexandria 
 aroused the dormant Mussulman fanaticism, and the 
 British occupation of Lower Egypt impressed the Sou- 
 danese with the idea that the Khedive had sold his 
 country to Christian foreigners. 
 
 The natural consequence was that all the bonds which 
 had kept the Soudan in subjection were loosened at 
 once. Gordon himself had warned Ismail, when invested 
 by him with unlimited powers, that when he left, it 
 would never again be possible to return to the old 
 Q'egione, and this explains the expression -he used later : 
 ^' I laid the egg which hatched the Mahdi." 
 
 It is worthy of notice that no rebellion could have 
 succeeded which did not appeal to the passions or inter- 
 ests of all classes. The slavers' grievances had awakened 
 no interest in the Bedouins of the desert or the tillers of 
 the soil. Therefore Zobehr, Abou-Saoud, and Yusuf 
 had been defeated. Other Mahdis had appeared from 
 time to time, but appealing only to religious fanaticism, 
 they had been easily crushed. But now only a leader 
 was wanted who could unite all the elements of discon- 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 151 
 
 tent under a common standard, and ' at the most critical 
 and opportune moment tlie leader arose. 
 
 In the town of New-Dongola, on the west bank of the 
 Nile, some forty-four years ago, was born a Nubian boy 
 with all the characteristics of his race ; a tall, well-pro- 
 portioned form, dark-brown complexion, straight features, 
 long and crisp, but not woolly hair. His name was Mo- 
 hammed- Achmet, and his occupation in youth that of a 
 carpenter and boat-builder. Before reaching manhood 
 he resolved to become a fakir., and for this purpose he 
 learned to read and write. The fakirs (Arab plural, 
 fokarali) are a class who may be considered as half 
 priests, half laymen. They are the school-teachers of 
 Mussulman countries, and the instruction they impart is 
 limited to reading and writing Arabic and learning by 
 heart as much of the Koran as possible. They are also 
 the expounders of the Koran which is not only the re- 
 ligious but also the civil and political law of Islam, so 
 that they are to some extent the lawyers of the country ; 
 nor are they without medical pretensions, though their 
 practice consists mainly in charms and the use of written 
 texts of the Koran applied to the person of the patient or 
 taken internally. A great portion of their income is de- 
 rived from the sale of amulets supposed to protect the 
 wearer against bullets and wild beasts, and the crops and 
 flocks from the evil-eye.* Their influence over the super- 
 stitious masses is immense. They are always called 
 
 * One of the Egyptian staff-lieutenants attached to my expedition, a graduate of 
 the Cairo Military School, quite intelligent, a fair mathematician and surveyor, 
 reading and speaking French fluently, but a devout Mussulman, wfore an amulet 
 composed of leaves of desert plants, the hair of a hyena, a piece of serpent-skin, 
 the whole wrapped in a piece of parchment on which was a text of the Koran writ- 
 ten by a fakir. This talisman, he assured me in all seriousness, rendered him in- 
 vulnerable to all attacks of wild beasts as well as to the influence of the "evil-eye." 
 
152 Tlie British Ocmupaign in the Soudan. 
 
 sheikhs (elders), and are treated with great reverence, 
 which is still increased by their affectation of superior 
 sanctity. 
 
 It was not long before Sheikh Achniet, by his display 
 of extraordinary piety, acquired the reputation of a holy 
 dervish, a grade above that of fakir, and corresponding 
 somewhat to the mendicant friars of Catholic countries. 
 There was an ancient tradition among Mussulmans, that 
 about the end of the thirteenth century of the Hegira 
 (1882-3) a |)rophet would arise who would restore the 
 glories of Islam and conquer the whole world. It was 
 prophesied that this Mahdi (derived from hada^ to lead — 
 Mahdi, led by God) would be named Mohammed, would 
 be a carpenter by trade, would have only four fingers on 
 his left hand, and certain moles or marks upon his face. 
 By accident or design, Mohammed- Achmet while working 
 at his trade had chopped off a finger of his left hand, and 
 he claimed that his face bore the signs indicated by the 
 prophecy. To increase his reputation for holiness, he re- 
 tired to a cave in the island of Aba above Khartoum and 
 became a hermit, pretending in the approved style of 
 prophets to have visions and revelations from God. He 
 was living there in comparative obscurity, evolving him- 
 self into a Mahdi when I passed not far from his retreat 
 in 1876. 
 
 There can be no doubt that he was a man of uncom- 
 mon shrewdness and ambition, and that he kept himself 
 fully informed of all the events occurring in Lower 
 Egypt. The wonderful rapidity with which news travels 
 through mysterious channels in Mussulman countries is a 
 well-established fact. In this way the disaffection of 
 the army and people, the forced abdication of Ismail- 
 
Tlie British Campaigri in the Soudan. 153 
 
 Paslia, the dictatorsliip of England and France, and tlie 
 pronunGimniento of Arabi-Paslia were known in tlie 
 Soudan two weeks after tliey occurred, in spite of tke 
 official suppression of all adverse intelligence by tele- 
 graph. It is a significant fact that the first military 
 rising that brought Arabi to the front took place in 
 February, 1881, and that as early as July of the same 
 year, Mohammed- Achmet proclaimed his mission. Raouf- 
 Pasha, then governor of the Soudan, received at Khar- 
 toum, early in August, a message from him to this effect : 
 " J3ismiTlah, er rachman, er raheem ! — In the name of 
 God, the gracious, the merciful ! Blessings be on the 
 Lord Mohammed and his race ! . . . This is sent 
 by the servant of the Lord, Mohammed- Achmet, the son 
 of Abd- Allah. . . . God has said in His only book 
 [the Koran] : ' Oh ye that believe, I will show you a way 
 by which you may be saved from great troubles ; only 
 believe in God and in His messenger, and fight the Lord's 
 battles with your goods and your bodies. And know 
 this and hold it fast : that God has called me to be a 
 Caliph, and that the Prophet (whom God bless !) has 
 proclaimed that I am the expected Mahdi, and has placed 
 me upon his throne above princes and nobles. And God 
 has strengthened me by His angels and proj)hets, and by 
 the elect and believers among the Djinns [the genii or 
 demons, some of whom the Mussulmans believe to have 
 been converted to Islam]. And He has also said, God 
 has given thee signs of thy mission, namely the moles on 
 thy left cheek. And another sign He has given me, that 
 out of the fire appears a standard which will be with me 
 in the hour of battle, carried by the angel Azrael, whom 
 God bless ! And He has also told me that whoever does 
 
154 Tlie British Campaign m the Soudan. 
 
 not believe in me does not believe in Him or His 
 prophets. Whoever fights against me will be destroyed 
 in this world and the next, and his goods and his chil- 
 dren will be a prey to the believers ! " 
 
 After this preamble, he summoned all governors and 
 peoples to submit to his authority and join his standard 
 for the destruction of all Christians, foreigners, and Turks, 
 and the conquest of the entire country. He further pro- 
 claimed the abolition of all debts and taxes, and prom- 
 ised that all who fell in battle in his cause would enter at 
 once upon the enjoyment of the delights of the Mussul- 
 man paradise. 
 
 At first, Raouf-Pasha tried persuasion and sent the ex- 
 rebel Abou-Saoud to the island of Aba. The Mahdi, as 
 he was now called, received him surrounded by several 
 hundred men in coats of mail and drawn swords. When 
 Abou-Saoud represented to him the madness of rising 
 against the government which possessed soldiers, breech- 
 loaders, cannon and steamers, the Mahdi replied : " If 
 the soldiers shoot at me and my people, their bullets will 
 do us no harm ; and if they attack us with steamers, both 
 steamers and cannon will sink together." 
 
 Negotiations failing to produce submission, E-aouf re- 
 luctantly had recourse to force, but he made the mistake 
 of underestimating the importance of the incipient rebel- 
 lion. On the tenth of August, 1881, he sent three hun- 
 dred regulars and one cannon on two steamers under 
 Abou-Saoud. This force would have been more than 
 sufiicient if the soldiers had not been inclined to believe 
 in the Mahdi's divine mission. When they landed and 
 met the Mahdi, they refused to fire at the "holy man" ; 
 — nevertheless the holy man and his people killed one 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 155 
 
 hundred and thirty of the soldiers, and the rest fled in 
 terror to their steamers. The gunner was ordered to fire 
 the cannon at the Mahdi, who was sitting on horseback a 
 short distance from the shore, but in his excitement and 
 terror he fired wide of the marJi, and the Mahdi coolly 
 turning his horse rode quietly awa}^, while the discom- 
 fited expedition returned in dismay to Khartoum. This 
 first success over the government troops gained for 
 the Mahdi much prestige and a large increase of fol- 
 lowers. 
 
 In December following, the governor of Fashoda, a 
 Kurd named Rashid-Bey, advanced against the Mahdi 
 with four hundred regulars and two thousand Shillooks. 
 A short and fierce battle was fought at Jebel Gedir, in 
 which the governor and all his troops and nearly all the 
 Shillooks with their king were slaughtered by the Bag- 
 gdras. All the Remington rifles and ammunition of the 
 regulars and a large quantity of supplies fell into the 
 hands of the Mahdi, who captured Fashoda, an important 
 military post on the White Mle. This second victory 
 was followed by the accession of several considerable 
 tribes. To the powerful and fierce Baggaras, who had 
 already joined the Mahdi's standard, were now added the 
 Kababeesh and Hassaneeyehs in Kordof an and the Abou- 
 Rof in Sennaar, while the Ababdehs and Bishareens, 
 between the Nile and the Red Sea, were ready to rise at 
 the approach of the Mahdi who sent emissaries every- 
 where with the ominous message : " Be ready, I am 
 coming ! " 
 
 In the meantime Raouf-Pasha was superseded, and 
 Giegler-Pasha, a talented Bavarian engineer, with whom 
 I had become well acquainted in Kordofan, was left in 
 
156 Tlie Britisli Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 temporary coniinand until tlie arrival of Abd-el-Kader, 
 tlie new governor-general. The situation was very 
 critical, for nearly tlie entire Soudan was rising; but 
 Giegler who had been vice-governor since Gordon's time 
 displayed great energy. He enlisted and organized a 
 considerable force from the Chiaggias, Dongolawees, and 
 other tribes which still remained loyal to the government. 
 To these were joined about fifteen hundred regulars. 
 This army, well armed and equipped by Giegler's care, 
 and numbering nearly six thousand men, started up the 
 Nile about the middle of March, 1882, for Jebel Gedir. 
 Their commander was Yusuf, formerly a great slave- 
 hunting chief, who had killed Munza, the king of Mon- 
 buttu.* Later he had rebelled against the Egyptian 
 government, by whom he was pardoned and received 
 back into favor. He had commanded Egyptians under 
 Gessi in the rebellion of Zobehr's son Suleiman, and had 
 contributed to Gessi's victories, for which service he had 
 been made a pasha. In June news reached Khartoum 
 that Yusuf-Pasha with his entire force had been annihi- 
 lated by the Mahdi into whose hands fell all their arms, 
 ammunition, and a vast amount of supplies. As usual in 
 those desert battles, only a mere handful of the van- 
 quished escaped to tell the story of the disaster. The 
 consternation of the European and Egyptian population 
 of Khartoum and Berber was extreme, and with good 
 reason, for before mid-summer Darfour was entirely lost, 
 while Kordofan and Sennaar were in great danger, 
 although Egyptian garrisons still held Bara and El 
 Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, and the city of Sennaar, 
 the capital of the province of that name. 
 
 * See Schweinfurth's " Heart of Africa " for an account of King Munza. 
 
The British Gampaign in the SoudoM. 157 
 
 It was at this juncture tliat the new governor-general, 
 Abcl-el-Kader-Paslia, arrived at Khartoum. He was an 
 accomplished officer who had received several years' 
 training in the Imperial Military School of Vienna. He 
 was a Turk by birth and a man of splendid, soldier-like 
 presence. He had held a high command of Egyptian 
 troops during the Turco-Russian war in 1877-78, and on 
 several occasions had given proof of military skill and 
 much personal bravery. One of his first measures was to 
 abolish the government monopoly on all articles of trade 
 except ivory, and to endeavor to allay dissatisfaction and 
 revive trade by lowering tariffs and promising a regular 
 steamer service on both Niles. But these reforms came 
 too late, for nearly the entire Soudan was already in 
 arms. 
 
 Abd-el-Kader lost no time in organizing means of 
 defence. No troops could be drawn from Lower Egypt 
 where Arabi's rebellion was at its height. Abd-el- 
 Kader had but a few companies of Soudanese regulars. 
 He enlisted several thousand Chiaggias and Dongolawees 
 and formed them into regiments fairly armed and 
 equipped. He strengthened his position at Khartoum 
 by erecting a substantial line of earthworks defended by 
 artillery. His force was also augmented by many irregu- 
 lars di^awn from the Bedouin tribes still faithful to the 
 Khedive. 
 
 If any illusions had existed as to the formidable char- 
 acter of the Mahdi's rebellion, they should have been dis- 
 pelled by the events now taking place. It had been gen- 
 erally believed up to this time that the Mahdi's victories 
 were due to accidental causes, and that if he should meet 
 with a serious disaster, his followers would forsake him 
 
158 The British Caiupaign in the Soudan. 
 
 and his power would suddenly collapse. But this expec- 
 tation was totally disappointed. The Mahdi's forces were 
 repeatedly defeated, but he seemed to gather new strength 
 after each repulse. On the 24th of June he attacked 
 Bara, near El Obeid, and was driven oif with great 
 slaughter. On the 28th of August his relative and 
 lieutenant, Amr-el-Makashef, attacked Duem on the Nile 
 above Khartoum, with fourteen thousand men. The town 
 was well fortified and garrisoned by five hundred Egyp- 
 tians. The attack lasted four hours, until three thousand 
 rebels had fallen under the withering fire of the Keming- 
 ton breech-loaders. The remnant of this force retreated 
 to Sennaar and was again defeated by Salah-Aga, and 
 Amr-el-Makashef was killed ; but the main body suc- 
 ceeded in crossing the White Nile and Joining the Mahdi 
 who had invaded Kordofan after the destruction of Yus- 
 suf-Pasha's army. 
 
 On the 8fch of September, 1882, the Mahdi re-inforced 
 by the accession of the Hassaneeyeh and Kababeesh 
 tribes, appeared at the head of sixty thousand warriors 
 before El Obeid which had been well fortified and 
 was defended by a garrison of six thousand regulars, 
 and twelve pieces of artillery. A furious attack was 
 made at daybreak of the 9th. The rebels' charge upon 
 the outer works was so desperate that the soldiers gave 
 way and retreated upon the inner line. The enemy 
 rushed after them in hand-to-hand fight and would 
 have entered the place pell-mell with them ; but Is- 
 kander-Bey, the Egyptian commander, exhibited rare 
 coolness and decision. He concentrated a heavy fire of 
 rifles and artillery upon the struggling mass of the enemy 
 and of his own soldiers, killing three hundred of the lat- 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 159 
 
 ter, but saving the town. On the 11th and the 14th 
 the Mahdi's troops again stormed the works with desper- 
 ate valor, opposing only swords and spears to the terrible 
 fire of breech-loaders and artillery, until fifteen thousand 
 men (one fourth of his army) lay dead or dying before 
 the walls of El Obeid. After this enormous loss, the 
 Mahdi sullenly retired to re-organize his shattered forces. 
 It is a noteworthy coincidence that at the very same time 
 (September 12, 1882) Arabi-Pasha was defeated with 
 very feeble resistance at Tel-el-Kebir. 
 
 The terrible reverse at El Obeid would probably have 
 ended the career of a leader of ordinary capacity. Not so 
 with the Mahdi ; it only proved his formidable power 
 and tenacity of purpose. Allowing his followers only 
 time enough to go home and secure their crop of dourah, 
 he returned in December with one hundred thousand 
 men, captured Bara, and then laid siege to El Obeid, 
 which surrendered on the l7th of January, 1883, after an 
 heroic resistance. Every article of food had been con- 
 sumed, including even dogs. The soldiers had eaten 
 their leather-straps, and the starving population rose in 
 desperation to demand submission to the Mahdi. All the 
 inhabitants, not excepting the Christian Syrian and Greek 
 merchants, acknowledged him as a prophet, and the garri- 
 son with the gallant Iskander-Bey joined his ranks, pro- 
 fessing conversion to full belief in his divine mission as 
 proved by his astonishing success. The greatest won- 
 der is that they should have resisted so long a prophet 
 who appealed so strongly to their religious traditions and 
 sympathies. Among the captives were the members of 
 the Catholic mission. The Mahdi treated them well in 
 spite of the failure of his arguments to convert them, and 
 
160 Tlie Britisli Campaign in the Scnidan. 
 
 finally liberated them upon the payment of a ransom by 
 tlie Austrian Consul at Khartoum. 
 
 This signal victory produced an immense effect 
 throughout the Soudan. The Mahdi was now in pos- 
 session of the capital of Kordofan, the largest city west 
 of the Nile. Darfour and Kordofan were completely in 
 his power, Sennaar nearly so, and the tribes which had 
 wavered in their allegiance now recognized in him the 
 true Madhi sent of God to break the yoke of Turks and 
 infidels. The material results of his success were the ac- 
 cession of the conquered garrison (some five or six thou- 
 sand brave and trained soldiers), the capture of a large 
 number of breech-loaders, twelve pieces of artillery, and 
 a large supply of ammunition. El Obeid became his 
 capital and his base of operations until Khartoum fell 
 into his hands. ^Already the latter city was threatened 
 by Bedouin raids, and numerous secret emissaries were 
 inciting the people to rebellion. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs in the Soudan at the 
 beginning of 1883. The attention of the Khedive and 
 his government had been so concentrated upon the sup- 
 pression of Arabi's rebellion that they had overlooked 
 the Mahdi's. It was only after the capture of El-Obeid 
 that they realized the extreme gravity of the situation. 
 But they were now entirely helpless. The Khedive 
 naturally applied for aid to his self-appointed guardians 
 and protectors, but he was answered that British interests 
 being in no way involved in the Soudan, England would 
 give him no assistance. Yet, at that moment, a little. 
 help would probably have checked the rebellion before 
 it became too strong. With the British army of occupa- 
 tion were several Anglo-Indian regiments accustomed to 
 
Tlie British Ckvmpaign in the Soudan. 161 
 
 a liot climate ; tlie Suakim-Berber route was open, for the 
 Bedouins of that desert were still loyal and the season 
 was favorable. An expedition sent at this juncture 
 would at least have saved Khartoum and the Eastern 
 Soudan, as well as the lives and the millions wasted 
 later in disastrous failure. 
 
 Not only was England's aid refused to the ally whose 
 army she had destroyed and whose government she had 
 disorganized under the guise of friendship, but the 
 Khedive was forbidden to use his own still considerable 
 resources. He realized that unless he sent an army to 
 suppress the Mahdi's rebellion, the vast empire of the 
 Soudan would be lost to Egypt. He directed Genl. 
 Charles P. Stone (formerly U.' S. A.), Chief-of-Staff of 
 what had been the Egyptian army, to prepare plans and 
 estimates for a campaign. Although this skilful and ex- 
 perienced officer had never in person visited Upper 
 Egypt or the Soudan, he had studied the reports of the 
 expeditions which he had sent under American officers 
 to explore those regions, as well as those of Sir Samuel 
 Baker and General Gordon. He knew the geography and 
 topography of that country, and understood the peculiar 
 difficulties of warfare in the deserts. He was an excel- 
 lent organizer and a judicious officer, by no means given 
 to prodigality in public expenditures. After mature 
 consideration, he estimated that a force of twenty-seven 
 thousand regular Egyptian soldiers was necessary to re- 
 conquer Kordofan, suppress the rebellion, and reinforce 
 the garrisons so as to insure future tranquillity. AVhen it 
 is remembered that AVolseley took over ten thousand 
 British troops south of the 2d Cataract merely for the 
 purpose of relieving Gordon and returning, without any 
 
162 The Britisli Cmnfcvigi^ in tJie Soudan. 
 
 intention of suppressing tlie Mabdi, Genl. Stone's estimate 
 appears very moderate, especially considering the very 
 different value of Britisli compared to Egyptian soldiers. 
 
 There were sufficient funds in the Egyptian treasury 
 to fit out the expedition, and the required number of 
 trained soldiers could have been very promptly raised by 
 recalling the lately disbanded regiments to their colors. 
 But just at that time the coupons were due to the foreign 
 bondholders, and moreover, Egypt was to defray the 
 cost of the British army of occupation and to pay 
 $25,000,000 for the destruction of her own city of 
 Alexandria by the British fleet. It mattered not that 
 the Egyptian debt had been declared by British finan- 
 ciers in an official report to Parliament to be more than 
 double what was justly due. The bondholders' coupons 
 must be paid though all Egypt perish. " Shylock must 
 have his pound of flesh ! " Therefore, when the Khedive 
 asked of his British masters permission to send an ex- 
 pedition and submitted Genl. Stone's estimates, he was 
 answered that Egypt could not be permitted to increase 
 her financial burdens, and that the funds in the treasury 
 could not be applied to the recovery of the Soudan. 
 
 This opportunity being thrown away, nothing remained 
 but to notify Abd-el-Kader to make the most of the 
 means at his command. We have already seen with 
 what energy he set about fortifying Khartoum and or- 
 ganizing a force from the yet loyal tribes and the Don- 
 golawee and other slave-huntiilg soldiers now out of 
 employment. The only reinforcements given him were 
 three or four of Arabi's disaffected reg-iments, sent to the 
 Soudan in December as a punishment for their rebellion, 
 but too late to save El ObeYd. With this accession, he had 
 
Tht British Campaign in the Soudan. 163 
 
 in hand, an available force of about eight thousand men 
 for active operations. During the spring and summer of 
 1883 he defeated the Mahdi's forces in four severe con- 
 Hicts. But his success excited Jealousy and intrigues at 
 Cairo. Sir Evelyn Baring, who from a Major of iVrtillery 
 had become the virtual autocrat of Egypt as Minister 
 Resident, was unfriendly to him as he was afterwards to 
 Gordon. Abd-el-Kader wa^ recalled. His successor as 
 governor-general was Allah-ed-Deen, while his little 
 army was put under the command of an ex-major of he 
 Bombay army, until then unknown to fame, who was 
 made a general under the title of Hicks-Pasha. He must 
 have been a man of ability, for in spite of his ignorance 
 of the people, the country, and even the language of the 
 heterogeneous force he commanded, he inflicted three 
 serious defeats upon the Mahdi's lieutenants on the east 
 bank of the Nile, so that Sennaar was almost clear of 
 rebels. The Khedive's ministers now urged the re- 
 capture of El Obeid as necessary to the safety of Khar- 
 toum and the eastern Soudan. The British commis- 
 sioners being consulted, advised against it, but they did 
 not forhid it, as they had the power to do. Says Prof. 
 Dicey : " There is no doubt that England could if she had 
 chosen have hindered the campaign of Hicks-Pasha. By 
 the fact of her not exercising her right of veto, she be- 
 came in reality responsible for it." And Sir Samuel 
 Baker wi'ote at the same time : " Everybody knew that 
 England was the only power in Egypt, and that the Khe- 
 dive could not move his little finger without her special 
 permission ; and that as she had completely fettered the 
 Egyptian authorities, she alone was responsible foi- the 
 situation." 
 
164 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 But this was only anotlier instance of tlie policy of half 
 measures. The intention of the British authorities at 
 Cairo was, if the expedition was successful, to claim 
 credit for having permitted it ; if otherwise, for having 
 advised against it ; and in any case to shut the mouth of 
 those who pretended, that the Khedive did not possess 
 absolute freedom of action. Yet while permitting it, 
 every thing was refused that might insure success. " We 
 absolutely refused," adds Prof. Dicey, "to allow either 
 English or Indian troops to be sent. We also insisted 
 that the native Egyptian arni}^ which had been organized 
 under British officers, should not be sent to the Soudan, 
 because as these officers still retained their rank in the 
 British army, their participation in a Soudan campaign 
 might be deemed inconsistent with the theory that our 
 intervention in Egypt was only of a temporary and pro- 
 visional character. Though we enforced, both by precept 
 and example, the necessity of placing their troops under 
 British officers, we allowed them to enter upon a momen- 
 tous campaign while refusing the Egyptian government 
 a permission to enlist the services for the Soudan of any 
 officer either on active duty or on half pay." Sir Samuel 
 Baker's arraignment of this shuffling policy is still more 
 severe (see his letter to " The Times," dated Cairo, 
 April 5, 1884). 
 
 Hicks-Pasha organized an army of eleven thousand 
 men. On his staff were eleven Englishmen who like 
 liimself had severed all connection with the British 
 service, as well as some officers of other European na- 
 tionalities. Although he had six thousand camels, mules, 
 and horses, so many ^vere needed for supplies, baggage, 
 and ammunition, tliat he was unable to carry more than 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 165 
 
 one day's water. From tlie moment lie left tlie Nile, 
 none was to be found in tlie deserts of Kordofan, except 
 in tlie rare and scanty wells of very great deptli (from 
 one linndred to two hundred and fifty feet by my own 
 measurement), and therefore very easy to destroy. Major 
 von Seckendorff, an Austrian on Hicks-Pasha's staff, sent 
 the last intelligence ever received from his army in a 
 letter dated Sept. 25th, from Duem, describing the fatigu- 
 ing twelve days' march along the Nile from Khartoum to 
 that place. He said : 
 
 " We hope to be in El Obeld in five weeks, if we do not die of thirst on the 
 road. . . . The laclc of water is terrible ; all the wells on the road are de- 
 stroyed ; when we inarch from here we leave the Nile, and other rivers there are 
 none ; and we cannot carry more water than we need for twenty-four hours. 
 The False Prophet will give endless trouble. He musters a great force, 
 and disposes of over fifteen thousand good breech-loaders and fourteen cannons, 
 besides holding two fortified cities, Bara and El Obeid. The most important 
 thing is that he commands well-mounted cavalry, and fanaticism makes heroes of 
 all. his people — a description which certainly does not apply to our troops. If our 
 cavalry gives timely notice of attack from the Arabs, then all will go well ; but if 
 they succeed in taking us by surprise, then we must be prepared for the worst. If 
 they defeat us once, not one of us will return home, for then the entire Soudan 
 will rise as one man. Khartoum and all will be lost. The people will then place 
 unbounded faith in the False Prophet. This shows you that our position is by 
 no means enviable. Yet I have not painted things darker than they are." 
 
 This letter was absolutel}^ prophetic of what followed. 
 x\s the army advanced after leaving the Nile, the Bedouins 
 retired, destroying the wells and closing around its flanks 
 and rear. At Kashgill, two days' march from El Obeid, 
 a great battle was fought. The Egyptians, already ex- 
 hausted by heat and thirst, formed in a square, stood 
 their ground with the courage of despair for three days 
 without a drop of water. Of those eleven thousand men 
 none survived except one hundred and fifty, carried off as 
 prisoners to El Obeid. Hicks-Pasha, his European of- 
 
166 Tlie British Campaign in the Sloudan. 
 
 ficers, and AUah-ed-Deen, the governor-general, fell fight- 
 ing to the last. Snch entire extermination is only what 
 must happen on the desert, for if an army can be cut off 
 from water for three or four days, there is no need to fire 
 another shot. Should any fugitives escape the sword or 
 the lance, they fall exhausted vnthin a few hundred yards, 
 never to rise again. Von Seckendorff's ominous prediction 
 was fulfilled to the letter. Not one man ever returned 
 from that doomed army. 
 
 : The battle of Kashgill was fought Nov. lst-3d. Three 
 days later another Egyptian force was destroyed at Tokar 
 on the shores of the Red Sea, eight hundred miles from 
 Kashgill, by the Mahdi's chief lieutenant, Osman-Digma 
 who had stirred up the warlike Bishareens inhabiting the 
 deserts between Berber and Suakim. Col. Moncrieff, the 
 British Consul at Suakim who had volunteered to lead 
 this force, was killed with eleven oflicers and one hundred 
 and fifty men. One cannon and three hundred rifles fell 
 into Osman-Digma's hands. 
 
 I have stated above that the news of these two disas- 
 ters reaching London a few days after Mr. Gladstone's 
 Guildhall speech announcing a gradual evacuation, j)ut 
 an immediate stop to all. idea of reducing the British 
 forces in Egypt. 
 
 The consternation in Cairo was immense, and with 
 good reason, for all the troo]3s in the Soudan except the 
 enfeebled garrisons, had perished with Hicks-Pasha. 
 Now, Khartoum, Sennaar, Kassala, Berber and even 
 Suakim were in imminent peril. With them the entire 
 Soudan would be lost, and the rebellion would endanger 
 Egypt herself. 
 
 Once more the Khedive and his ministers turned 
 
Tlie British Ccmipaign m tlie Soudan. 167 
 
 to tlieir allies and guardians witli frantic appeals for 
 protection. The British. Ministry's reply was that 
 all the country above the First Cataract must be aban- 
 doned ! . . . 
 
 Should the reader incline to believe that I am 
 biased in my judgment of events by anti-British preju- 
 dices, I beg leave to state that nothing that I could say 
 approaches the severity with which the course of the 
 British government was denounced from the time of 
 Ismail's deposition and even before, to the present time, 
 by some of the most talented and prominent men of Eng- 
 land, among whom are Prof. Dicey, Sir Samuel Baker, 
 Henry Labouchere, Sir Henry Layard, and a number of 
 others. I am not affected with either anglo-pJiobia or 
 anglo-mania. Next after being an American (a good 
 long way after, it is true), I would prefer being an Eng- 
 lishman. My judgment on this subject is formed upon 
 British statements, and my narrative of the campaign is 
 taken mainly from British accounts impartially presented 
 and criticised. 
 
 I quote from a letter to the " The Times," dated 
 Cairo, April 5, 1884, from Sir Samuel Baker, the African 
 explorer and Gordon's predecessor as Governor-Greneral 
 of the Soudan, a man whose position and experience give 
 unconuuon value to his utterances upon the Soudan 
 question : 
 
 " We have so completely abstracted every vestige of power and authority from 
 the unfortunate Khedive, that he cannot even nominate his own officers in any 
 branch of the military or civil services. Having divested the legal ruler of the 
 country of all importance, we add insult to injury by utterly disregarding his per- 
 sonal existence in Egypt. . . . The so-called ' authority ' of the Khedive 
 was rudely, if not brutally, negatived by direct orders from Downing Street to 
 abandon the Soudan against the wishes of the ruler, supported by his Ministry, who 
 resigned en masse at the presumptuous intrusion of the British dictum. 
 
168 Tlie British Ganupaign in the Soudan. 
 
 " This act of unwarranted interference, by which an enormous area of the Otto- 
 man Empire was wrested from its legitimate ruler and thrown into the direst 
 anarchy, at once awakened Egypt to the hypocrisy of British declarations. The 
 mask was for the moment cast aside. . . . Cotite que coute, the Soudan was 
 to be abandoned, and proclamations to that effect were issued without delay. The 
 fact of such a proclamation bore an immediate and fatal result ; every tribe that 
 would have remained faithful to the government if prepared to assert its power, 
 was in self-preservation forced to abandon a government that had forsaken the 
 most sacred duty of upholding the rights of those subjects who had declared their 
 loyalty." 
 
 When Tewfik-Paslia was notified of the commands of 
 the British Ministry, what manhood still survived in him 
 after so many humiliations was aroused. For the first 
 time he refused to obey, and declared his resolution to 
 abdicate and to throw the responsibility upon England 
 rather than submit to the sacrifice. 
 
 But this could never be permitted, for it would destroy 
 the beautiful fictions of England's disinterested occupation 
 of Egypt and non-interference with purely Egyptian 
 concerns, and of the Khedive's supposed independence of 
 action ! A middle course was adopted. Tewfik was 
 quieted by being permitted to call upon his suzerain-lord, 
 the Sultan, for Turkish troops, provided that Turkey 
 bore the expense and would bind herself to withdraw as 
 soon as the Soudan was pacified. But this qualified con- 
 cession was almost immediately withdrawn; and when 
 Turkey prepared an expedition, England assumed the 
 preposterous position of recognizing the Sultan's para- 
 mount rights over the Soudan, and yet ordering her iron- 
 clads to prevent, by force if necessary, the landing of 
 Turkish troops in the Soudan. (See Sir H. Layard.) 
 To quote from Prof. Dicey {Nineteenth Century^ March, 
 1884): ' _ 
 
 " Put into plain English, the programme came to this : England refused to send 
 troops to the Soudan herself ; she forbade Egypt to send troops ; she consented to 
 
The British Cam])aign in the Soudan. 169 
 
 troops being sent from Turkey only under conditions which rendered their dispatch 
 impossible. In other words, England insisted that Egypt should abandon the 
 Soudan to its fate. Now if this abandonment had been confined to Darfour, 
 Kordofan, and the Equatorial Provinces, which Ismail Pasha had added to his 
 dominions, no objection would have been raised. But what Egypt was bidden to 
 do was to give up Khartoum, the centre and head-quarters of her trade with Cen- 
 tral Africa, to relinquish the possessions which had belonged to her since the time 
 of Mehemet-Ali, to sacrifice all her garrisons and settlements in the Soudan, and 
 to permit the establishment of a powerful and hostile state in the vicinity of her 
 own defenceless frontier, and in command of the river on which she depends for 
 her existence. She was bidden, too, to do this while our English army was occu- 
 pying her soil with the avowed object of strengthening the hands of her govern- 
 ment, while her own military resources were not yet exhausted, and while the 
 armed assistance of Turkey was at her service upon terms which for her own part 
 she was disposed to accept. Under these circumstances it is hardly to be wondered 
 at if the Khedive and his ministers should have refused this programme." 
 
 A question suggests itself here. Wliy should England 
 object to Turkey's sending troops to a dependency of lier 
 own empire, unless it was feared that this re-assertion of 
 her sovereignty over Egypt might produce awkward 
 complications in case that England, at some future day, 
 should want to annex Egypt absolutely, according to her 
 usual and time-honored practice ? 
 
 Meanwhile the order to evacuate the Soudan had been 
 prematurely announced, and its effect was to add new im- 
 petus to the rebellion. All the populations and the 
 Bedouin tribes who had hitherto held a hesitating alle- 
 giance, waiting to side with the stronger l)arty, now felt 
 that their only safety lay in joining the Mahdi. If the 
 evacuation had been secretly decided upon and quietly 
 managed, the garrisons might have been safely with- 
 drawn, but its imprudent announcement doomed them to 
 destruction. 
 
 Scattered over that immense territory between Berber 
 and Gondokoro, as large as France and Germany together, 
 were 26,000 Egyptian troops and 20,000 non-combatants^ 
 
170 The British Oampaign in the Soudan. 
 
 European and Egyptian mercliants witli tlieir families 
 wlio could expect no mercy, for tlie Malidi. liad decreed 
 extermination against all Egyptians and foreigners. What 
 was to be tlieir fate 'i 
 
 WitL. tliat superb contempt for wliat they call inferior 
 races, characteristic of the British ruling classes, the 
 Ministry replied : " Let the garrisons be speared ! " 
 
 A perusal of the English papers of that date will prove 
 that I am merely stating the naked facts. Be it remem- 
 bered to the credit of the British press and people, that a 
 universal cry of indignation arose from them against the 
 inhuman decree of their rulers. Grordon, that noble 
 type of modern Christian cliivalry, protested in these 
 words : 
 
 " You have 6,000 men in Khartoum. You have garrisons in Darfur, in Bahr- 
 Gazelle, and Gondokoro. . Are they to be sacrificed ? Their only offence is their 
 loyalty to their sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to 
 their fate. You cannot evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must 
 either surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards.. The 
 latter is the only course which ought to be entertained. . . . But if, in a 
 moment of panic, orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the 
 Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of Egypt, which may 
 have fatal consequences." * 
 
 Public sentiment had quickly become too strong to be 
 disregarded ; yet the government still refused to send 
 troops. Again a middle course was adopted. Since 
 Grordon was so bitterly opposed to abandoning the garri- 
 sons, let him undertake their rescue. His name and in- 
 fluence might relieve the difficulty. On the 18th of 
 January, 1884, he was requested by the ministers to as- 
 sume the task, and he left London that same afternoon. 
 
 * Gordon's words, "your army, your garrisons," when speaking to the British 
 Ministry of the Egyptian troops, prove with what scorn he flung aside the hypo- 
 critical disclaimer of responsibility and solidarity with regard to the events in the 
 .Soudan. 
 
Tilt British Campaign in tlie Soudan. 171 
 
 His mission was proclaimed to be one of peace, and lie 
 was expressly" ordered to abstain from all aggressive 
 measures. 
 
 Stopping but one day in Cairo to confer with tlie 
 authorities there, he crossed the Korosko desert accom- 
 panied only by his faithful comrade, Col, O. H. Stewart, 
 a few loyal Bishareen sheikhs who guaranteed his safe 
 transit, and a son of Zobehr-Pasha who, no doubt, was 
 sent by his treacherous father as a spy. Gordon had de- 
 clared that if he could not have an army he would go 
 alone, and the only material aid given him was £100,000 
 in gold. The prestige of his name was expected to supply 
 all deficiencies. He reached Khartoum in exactly one 
 month (Feb. 18th). On his arrival he was received with 
 fulsome protestations of loyalty by the principal sheikhs 
 and all the demonstrations so dearly loved by the people 
 of those regions. But he found the situation very different 
 from what he had left it four years before. His disinter- 
 estedness, justice, and liberality had won him great per- 
 sonal influence and respect ; for a governor-general who 
 refused to fill his pockets was a miracle in the Soudan, 
 and probably his sanity was somewhat doubted in con- 
 sequence. But mOvSt of the good he had accomplished 
 had been undone by his successors, and what was chiefly 
 remembered now was his energetic suppression of the 
 Central African slave-hunting. This was a grievance not 
 to be forgiven by the slave-trade interest which com- 
 prised nearly the entire population of Khartoum. Their 
 opposition was too powerful to be overcome, and it would 
 render his mission impossible. This consideration com- 
 pelled him to issue a proclamation reducing taxes, abolish- 
 ing all monopolies, and removing restrictions upon slave- 
 
172 The British Campaign in the Soudcm. 
 
 buying and selling, if not upon slave-hunting. The regis- 
 ters and records of indebtedness to tlie government, the 
 kourbashes and other instruments of punishment, were 
 burned in front of the governor's palace. At the same 
 time he sent the Mahdi a robe of state, and invested him 
 with the rank of Emir or Sultan of Kordofan, both of 
 which honors the Mahdi rejected with a defiant message, 
 saying that his mission was from Grod and he wanted no 
 dignities from infidels. This act of Gordon was an error, 
 for it was construed as a confession of weakness, and it 
 seemed absurd to ojffier the Mahdi the gift of a province 
 whose possession was already his own by the conquest of 
 his victorious arms. 
 
 The condition of affairs is so well described by Sir 
 Samuel Baker that I quote his o^vn words : 
 
 " A few weeks' reflection brought the natural reaction. The discontented saw 
 their opportunity — -Gordon had no army to support his moral power. Morality is 
 held in slight respect in the Soudan unless backed up by military material. With 
 all the best intentions, Gordon found his overtures rejected. His proclamations 
 were ignored, and the announcement of abandonment was corroborated by the dis- 
 patch of the sick and incapables towards Cairo, together with many of the civil em- 
 ployes. It became impossible for the wavering tribes to continue loyal. Had 
 Gordon been supported by a military force sent up from Cairo, he might have post- 
 poned the movement of evacuation, but when once assured of the reality of that 
 fatal act, even the loyal tribes threw in their lot with the general cause of insur- 
 rection. 
 
 " In the meantime the Egyptian garrisons upon the Red Sea coasts were threat- 
 ened by the gathering forces of the rebels, headed by one Osman Digma, a slave- 
 trader of evil repute in the Soudan, who had become an emissary of the Mahdi. 
 The Egyptian forces were severely defeated, .the British Consul Moncrieff was 
 killed, and the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat were invested by the victorious 
 Arabs. Suakin was threatened, and ^it became absolutely necessary to equip a 
 powerful force from Cairo for the relief of the beleaguered garrisons. 
 
 " It was then that the ridiculous absurdity of British interference was exemplified. 
 At the battle of Tel-el-Kebir we had destroyed the Egyptian army, and we had set 
 up in its stead a model army of 6,ooo men, under the command cf General Baker 
 Pasha, who was summoned from Constantinople by the Khedive of Egypt, with 
 the sanction of the British Government, to reorganize and to command the Egyp- 
 
The British Ca/mpaign in the Soudan. 173 
 
 tian forces. He had quickly resolved order out of chaos, and had gained the confi- 
 dence and approval of the Khedive and all Egyptian authorities, when he was 
 suddenly superseded by a British officer who was forced upon the Khedive (Sir 
 Evelyn Wood), and the British Government, which pretended to restore the 
 authority of the Khedive, dealt the first blow and crushed that authority by super- 
 seding the officer whom he had himself selected, and thrusting upon his acceptance 
 an officer upon the active list. Thus the Khedive's army was taken completely 
 out of his hands by way of proving our sincerity in restoring his authority. 
 
 ' ' At the same time Baker Pasha organized the gendarmerie, which in military 
 appearance rivalled the regular army. This civil army was too military for the 
 taste of British officials, and an order was issued (not by the Khedive) by the 
 English authorities that the military element must be eliminated, and the gendarm- 
 erie must consider itself a distinctly civil force ; it must therefore drop the martial 
 appellation and be termed ' constabulary.' It was not to be considered as a fight- 
 ing force. Events pressed forward. The littoral of the Red Sea was in a blaze, and 
 troops were instantly required. It will be deemed incredible, but at the first 
 moment of actual necessity there were positively no available troops in Egypt. 
 The regular army of Sir Evelyn Wood had been recruited on the agreement that 
 they were not to be employed beyond the frontier of Lower Eg}'pt ; therefore they 
 could not be called upon to serve in the Soudan. It was also determined that no 
 British officers upon the active list should be permitted to engage in hostilities in 
 that distant province, which had been declared to be beyond the sphere of British 
 intervention. Here was a muddle. Tliere was an army that was not allowed to 
 fight, and this was the standing army of the Khedive, under Sir Evelyn Wood and 
 ■ a host of British officers.' The gendarmerie of Baker Pasha had been reduced to 
 constabulary, and were expressly told ' that they were only a civil force to be em- 
 ployed simply in Lower Egypt.' Thus, with all the expense of a most perfect 
 military organization, there was not a single battalion to be found in a moment of 
 grave emergency. This was the efficiency which resulted from a British adminis- 
 tration. At the same time the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar were surrounded by 
 the enemy, and the brave defenders of the former were starving." 
 
 Sinkat, the only town between the Red Sea and Ber- 
 ber, was a summer-resort where the merchants and of- 
 ficials of SuaMm repaii'ed during the hot season. It was 
 a small place, about forty miles west of Suakim, and it 
 had been fortified and garrisoned since the troubles be- 
 gan, because its position in the mountains commanded 
 the Suakim-Berber trail. For weeks it had been besieged 
 by Osman-Digma's forces, and vain attempts had been 
 made to relieve it. Tokar, another fortified position fifty 
 miles south of Suakim and near the seashore, was also 
 
174 The British Campaign in the Sondafii. 
 
 besieged, and it was known in Cairo that unless relief was 
 sent at once both, those places must fall. Baker-Pasha 
 was the only man available, but there were no troops. 
 Zobehr-Pasha was employed to raise a force. The streets 
 of Cairo and all the towns in Egypt were searched for 
 blacks, and men were dragged off in chains to fill Zobehr's 
 ranks ; but at the last moment he was deprived of his 
 command, and the bewildered blacks were forced into 
 the railway train for Suez by cavalry with drawn sabres. 
 .These men, together with one thousand five hundred 
 of the reluctant " constabulary police " drafted in spite 
 of pledges to the contrary, and about one thousand 
 Turkish Bashi-bazouks (Egyptian service), composed 
 the unpromising materials out of which Valentine 
 Baker was ordered to form an army for the relief 
 of Sinkat and Tokar. Not only were they known 
 to be averse to fighting, but most of them were 
 suspected of sympathy with the Mahdi's cause. How- 
 ever, Greneral Baker with this force. Joined by five hun- 
 dred more men dragged from different parts of Egypt, 
 attempted to carry out his indefinite plans of campaign. 
 He left Cairo on December 17th for Suakim which he 
 proposed to make the base of his operations. He was 
 given supreme militar}^ and civil command, with the 
 power of life and death. 
 
 Probably no general ever proceeded on an expedition 
 with an army less trustworthy and plans less definite than 
 those of Baker-Pasha. For this he is not to lie l)lamed. 
 In consentino; to assume the chief command he acted 
 solely from a sense of duty, and for six weeks he labored 
 incessantly to drill, discipline, and fashion into the sem- 
 blance of an army the heterogeneous elements composing 
 
Tlie JBritish Campaign in tlie Soudan. 175 
 
 liis command. His original purpose liad been to move 
 first to tlie relief of Sinkat. 
 
 " The first march was to have been made to the foot of the hills seventeen miles 
 away ; on the second the forces would enter the hills by a pass three miles long, 
 ending in a narrow gorge at the place were two hundred Egyptian troops had been 
 killed. The latter point was to be temporarily fortified and garrisoned by two 
 hundred men and two guns. The troops would after this get on open ground, and 
 arrive at Sinkat by a long march of twenty-two miles. They would rest one day 
 and on the next take off all the women and children from the town and return by 
 four marches to Suakim, evacuating on their way the fort at the head of the pass, 
 because there is no water there and consequently the post could not be held per- 
 manently. IJut Tokar was thrice attacked by the rebels before this plan could be 
 carried out, and General Baker was directed to relieve that place at all hazards. 
 This determination abandoned Sinkat to its fate. For a fortnight the garrison 
 had been eating roots and tree leaves. It was an enfeebled band indeed which 
 sortied to die amid the rebel hordes. Tewfik-Bey had harangued his men, saying 
 that by fighting they might save themselves, but that by remaining they must die 
 from hunger in a few days ; flight was impossible. The men thus animated with 
 Tewfik-Bey 's spirit, destroyed the military stores, exploded the magazine, filled 
 their pouches to the utmost with cartridges, and issued forth, six hundred strong, 
 against the rebels. 
 
 " Osman Digma's hordes rushed to the attack. Tewfik-Bey and his men fought 
 nobly, For a long time they repulsed every attempt to break their ranks. Finally 
 superior numbers prevailed, and with a tremendous rush the rebels burst through 
 one of the sides of the Egj'ptian square. A general massacre ensued, and not a 
 soul escaped. According to the latest reports only four sick men, who were un- 
 able to take part in the sortie, the Cadi of Sinkat, and thirty women were spared 
 by the rebels." 
 
 This disaster occurred on tlie lltli of February, 188-i. 
 
 On the 2d, Baker had sailed from Suakim and landed 
 at Trinkitat, about fifty miles south. Thence to Tokar, 
 the distance is only twelve to fifteen miles. This town, 
 already noted for the defeat and death of Consul Mon- 
 crieff in Nov. 1888, was a small fortified post on a 
 diminutive fresh-water creek which falls into the sea at 
 Trinkitat. Baker began his advance from his intrench- 
 ments at that place on Sunday, Feb. 3d, with nearly 4,000 
 men, four Krupps and two Gatling guns. He had 
 sent from Suakim to Caii'o an urgent request for rifles to 
 
176 TJie British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 replace tlie old muskets witli wliicli numbers of Ms 
 troops were armed. In I'eply he received orders to try 
 to force his way to Tokai- without delay, and with the 
 English officers connected with the expedition he began 
 the march, expecting defeat. The spies had falsely re- 
 ported that the roads were clear with the exception of 
 small bands of rebels. On Monday forenoon a portion 
 of the advance was attacked on the march, and the fight 
 was begun by a few Arab horsemen charging upon 
 Baker-Pasha's cavalry which fled. Baker then formed a 
 square which the enemy surrounded. The Bashi-baz- 
 ouks then fled in confusion, and the gunners deserted 
 their guns. Baker-Pasha was several times surrounded 
 by the enemy, but, with his staff, managed to cut his way 
 through. All the camels, baggage, and artillery were lost 
 in the battle. Most of the Egyptian officers and men 
 bolted. Col. Sai'torius tried hard to rally them, but with- 
 out success. The Europeans behaved splendidly. Col. 
 Sai-torius narrowly escaped with his life. The enemy 
 pursued almost into Trinkitat. The Europeans, police, 
 and Turkish infantry were cut to pieces. Twenty-five 
 hundred men were killed, including fourteen European 
 officers. No mention is made of the wounded, for none 
 survived except those who were able to i-etreat with the 
 routed army. Baker, with the remnant of his force, suc- 
 ceeded in reaching Trinkitat, where they re-embarked on 
 the British gunboats and returned to Suakim. This 
 event took place just at the very time that Gordon was 
 speeding on his wa}^ to Khartoum across the Korosko des- 
 ert. The news met him at Berber, from which place he 
 telegraphed that in spite of Baker's defeat he was still 
 confident of success, 
 
 % 
 
The British Gampaign in the Soudan. 177 
 
 Meanwliile Osman-Digma, reiuforced' by tlie couquer- 
 ors of Sinkat, continued the siege of Tokar, wliicli lie 
 ca])tured on the 21st. He then blockaded Suakim coni- 
 ])letely on the land side and harassed its garrison by 
 nightly attacks. His double success had gained him the 
 accession of the Bedouin tribes occupying the country 
 between Suakim and Berber, who until then had been 
 undecided which side to take. The capture of 4,5(M> 
 rifles and ten guns (including those taken in Tokar), with 
 abundance of ammunition, helped him materially in his 
 subsequent battles against Gren. Graham. 
 
 In the meantime Gordon had reached Khartoum and, 
 as we have seen, had found the situation far diiferent 
 from what he had expected. His efforts were now con- 
 centrated upon strengthening the defences of Khartoum, 
 avowing his purpose of retaining its permanent posses- 
 sion. By this means he hoped to secure the safe retreat 
 of the garrisons in the far south. He was willing to 
 abandon the country west of the A¥hite Nile and south 
 (^f Khartoum, but he was hrmly convinced of the al>so- 
 lute necessity of retaining possession of the Eastern 
 Roudan. His views, as expressed before he left London, 
 were so judicious and so forcibly expressed that I quote 
 them here : 
 
 "On 'Chinese' Gordon's arrival in England he was interviewed Ijy a corre- 
 spondent of the Pall Ala II Gazette on the situation in the Soudan. The following 
 is a transcript of Colonel Gordon's remarks ; 
 
 " So you would abandon the Soudan ? But the Eastern Soudan is indispensable 
 to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your hold upon Egypt proper if you 
 abandon your hold of the Eastern vSoudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk, than what 
 it would to retain your hold upon the Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material 
 as exists in the provinces. Darfur and Kordofan inust be abandoned. That I ad- 
 mit ; but the provinces lying to the east of the White Nile should be retained, and 
 north of Sennaar. The danger to be feared is not that the Mahdi will march 
 northward through Wadi Haifa ; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will 
 
178 Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 ever go so far north. Th'e danger is altogether of a different nature. It arises 
 from the influence wliich the spectacle of a conquering Mohammedan power, 
 established close to your frontiers, will exercise upon the population which you 
 govern. In all the cities of Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done, 
 they may do ; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they may do 
 the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this danger. The success of 
 the Mahdi has already excited dangerous fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Pla- 
 cards have been posted in Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive 
 out the Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the Mahdi 
 the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take fire." 
 
 A.s to tlie provinces to be abaudoiied, Gordon's plan 
 was to turn them over to tlie descendants of their ancient 
 sultans. But this idea was altogether impracticable. In 
 three generations those families had sunk into obscurity^ 
 and ih.^ new rulers would l)e slave-hunting chiefs like 
 Zobehr-Pasha, Osman-Digma, and Abou-Saoud. Or else, 
 the Mahdi, who announced his mission to be the exter- 
 mination of all Turks and foreigners and the conquest of 
 the country down to the sea, would establish an empii-e 
 so strong and aggressive as to be a permanent and formi- 
 dable menace to Egypt. 
 
 Up to this time nothing had been done to nullify the 
 repeated declaration that no British troops would be 
 sent to the Soudan. But Gordon had been in Khartoum 
 just one day when 5,000 British soldiers, under the com- 
 mand of General Sir Gerald Graham, sailed from Suez 
 for Suakim on the 19th of Fel^ruary, 1884, and attacked 
 the Mahdi's lieutenant, Osman-Digma, at the very moment 
 when Gordon, in pursuance of his instructions, proclaimed 
 his mission to be one of conciliation, and offered the 
 Mahdi peace and recognition ! 
 
 Why this contradictory course of action ? If England 
 had no interests in the Soudan, why was Graham sent 
 there ? Not to relieve Sinkat or Tokar ; it was too late 
 
The British Campaign in the Souclan. 179 
 
 for tliat. Not to defend Suakim, for oue battalion and 
 two gunboats were amply sufficient, and Admiral Hewett 
 was at that time commander of tliat post, with 500 
 marines and several war-ships. Then what for 'i To 
 avenge the death of Moncrieff and Hicks-Pasha in No- 
 vember and Baker's recent defeat ? But these were 
 purely Egyptian disasters in which England had dis- 
 claimed all responsibility or concern. Moncrieff had left 
 his legitimate consular duties to volunteer with an Egyp- 
 tian expedition, and Baker was no longer a British, but 
 an Egyptian officer, as were Hicks and his comrades, and 
 certainly England's honor was in no way affected by their 
 disasters. AVhy then attempt to avenge them by waging 
 war on the Red Sea while proclaiming peace on the 
 White Nile ? This action of the British government can 
 be attributed only to the incredible vacillation which 
 seemed to pervade all their Egyptian policy, or else to a 
 spirit of " Jingoism " which assumed that England's 
 honor demanded that she should avenge Egy[>tian disas- 
 ters merely because Englishmen had been in command, 
 while yet refusing to admit that this national honor was 
 most deeply involved in shielding from harm an ally 
 whom she had tied hand and foot under the guise of 
 protection. The double-dealing course now adopted was 
 certain to defeat the avowed object of Gordon's peaceful 
 mission, and to expose his life to the most imminent peril. 
 
 Accordingly, immediately after Grraham's invasion, we 
 find Gordon attacked at Khartoum and asking most ui'- 
 gently that British, Indian, or Turkish troops be sent to 
 his support. 
 
 I will here present an outline of Graham's campaign, 
 which, from the nature of the case, is necessarily drawn 
 
180 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 from Britisli official reports and the accounts of Englisli 
 war-press correspondents.* 
 
 On the 28tli of February, 1884, General Graham 
 landed at Trinkitat with 4,000 effective men, and on the 
 29th he attacked Osman-Digma's position at Teb, about 
 eight miles from the sea. The British were formed in 
 one square with cavalry covering the front and guns at 
 the angles. They advanced with a degree of caution fai- 
 greater than would have been displayed before a civilized 
 foe, and the desperate fighting of the Arabs showed that 
 this caution was well timed. The weak intrenchments, 
 armed with the captured guns, were not carried until 
 after four hours of stubborn conflict. Osman-Digma's 
 forces were estimated at about 10,000 men, of whom not 
 more than one fifth were armed with Remington rifles. 
 The rest were supplied with scimetars and spears. But 
 neither the rifles nor the guns under the Arabs' manipu- 
 lation caused any great loss among the British. The 
 wounds were chiefly received at close quarters during the 
 fanatical charges or rushes upon the troops. 
 
 " The rebels were in no military order, but were scattered here and there, so as 
 to take advantage of the abundant cover which the ground afforded. They clung 
 to their position with desperate tenacity. There were 2,000 rebels directly in front, 
 while many hundreds hung around the two sides of the square. 
 
 " As the British moved forward, firing as they advanced, the rebels, armed with 
 spears and huge cross-hilted swords, rose within two hundred yards of the advancing 
 lines and rushed against the British at breakneck speed, heedless and fearless of 
 death. They fell right and left, though some of the brave fellows reached within 
 five paces of the square. None of them bolted ; they only fell back sullenly when 
 they were forced. The British pursued them as far as the wells of Teb, where the 
 
 * It is a matter of regret for the sake of historical accuracy that there are no 
 other sources of information. It would be curious and interesting to have the Arab 
 accounts and their estimates of the British numbers and losses. Unfortunately 
 neither the Mahdi nor Osman-Digma wrote any reports or had any war-correspond- 
 ents with them. 
 
The BritisJi Campaign in the Soudan. 181 
 
 rebels made their last stand. Sheiks who advanced empty-handed, to show that 
 they bore charmed lives, were stricken down with bayonet thrusts. 
 
 " The Highlanders carried the next earthwork, capturing three guns. At the 
 end of four hours of arduous fighting the British gained possession of the rebel 
 camps, of the huts, and the wells. 
 
 " The cavalry on the right flank charged the retreating rebels, who did not bolt, 
 but struck the troopers who rode among them, giving blow for blow. A splendid 
 display of heroism was made by three mounted rebels. They resolutely maintained 
 their ground against the shock of two cavalry regiments before being cut down. 
 They continued to fight after the third charge, killing several soldiers and wound- 
 ing Colonel Barrow with their spears. The enemy retired very slowly, and in con- 
 sequence of this the British kept up their firing for a long time after the fortunes 
 of the day had been decided. 
 
 " All advices concur in acknowledging that the Arabs fought with desperate 
 bravery. Osman Digma brought 12,000 men into the field. The most of these 
 took part in the charge against the British lines. During the entire battle the 
 Arabs' want of organization and regular discipline constantly exposed them to the 
 deadly effect of the continuous fire which the British poured upon them hour after 
 hour." 
 
 The British loss Avas stated at 24 killed and 147 
 wounded, and the Arab loss at 2,000. These figures de- 
 _scribe more eloquently than words the reckless bravery 
 of these sons of the desert, charging with naked breasts 
 and only sword and spear upon the serried ranks of a 
 British square pouring into them the murderous fire of 
 breech-loaders and machine-guns. 
 
 On the day following the battle of Teb, Gen. Graham 
 entered the ruins of Tokar and recovered the guns lost 
 by Baker-Pasha one month before ; after which he re- 
 embarked his troops and returned to Suakim to operate 
 against Osman-Digma, who had rallied his forces near 
 that place. 
 
 Suakim derives its importance from being the best sea- 
 port on the Red Sea, and the terminus of the great 
 caravan route which leaves the Nile at Berber and brings 
 to the sea-board the trade of the Soudan. Its population 
 is about 5,000. The government buildings and the best 
 
182 The British Oawtpaign in the Soudcm, 
 
 portion of tlie town are built of white coral rock upon a 
 coral island, separated by a channel 200 yards in width 
 from the 'mainland on which are the suburbs, bazars, 
 etc. A narrow causeway serves as communication be- 
 tween the town and the mainland. The only supply of 
 water is brought on donkeys and camels from very in- 
 different wells some two miles distant ; but since the 
 British established a garrison they have been supplied 
 with condensed water from their steamers. A line of 
 earthworks has also been erected to cover the wells. The 
 island-town, if defended b}^ a gun-boat on each side of 
 the causewa}^, is perfectly impregnable to any attack that 
 the Bedouins could make against it, but the suburbs had 
 been continually harassed by Osman-Digma since August, 
 1883. He had now concentrated his forces at Tamai 
 wells, only eleven miles from Suakim. 
 
 On the 12th of March Gren. Graham advanced to attack 
 him. The difficulty of securing a sufficient provision of 
 water for even that short distance rendered his move- 
 ments very slow. He bivouacked that evening within 
 two miles of the enemy who kept up a desultory fire 
 during the night. The British left their bivouacs at 
 8 o'clock, marching in two squares of one brigade each, 
 about 900 yards apart. This is a summary of the British 
 accounts of the battle. 
 
 " They moved in echelon, the Second brigade leading. This brigade was com- 
 posed of the Forty-second, Sixty-fifth, Royal Marines, and Naval Brigade, v\dth 
 Gardners and Catlings. The First brigade comprised the Eighty-ninth, Gordon 
 Highlanders, Sixtieth Rifles, vs'ith Royal Artillery nine and seven-pounder batte- 
 ries, and Royal Marines. As the Second brigade moved off to the left or southerly 
 direction, led by General Davis, it was joined by General Graham and his staff. 
 We could plainly see the enemy ranged all along the hills on our front and right. 
 Their black skins stood out boldly against the glare of day. Some were within 
 twelve hundred yards. 
 
 " Meanwhile the cavalry, which had taken up a position on our left rear, sent 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 1 83^ 
 
 forward two squadrons, together with the Abyssinians, to skirmish. These were 
 quickly engaged, and a hot fire was soon raging. The enemy coming on. the skir- 
 mishers fell back, and the Second brigade advanced seven hundred yards, firing as 
 they went. The troops had opened out nearly into line, their rear to a great extent 
 being covered by the First brigade, which was half a mile away on our right. As 
 we gained the edge of the nulla the fire became very hot from our side, the enemy 
 mostly contenting themselves by attempting to rush at us with their spears and 
 swords. Our men could not easily be got, despite trumpet calls and officers'' 
 shouts, to reserve their fire and aim carefully. In a few minutes our line was ob- 
 scured by dense smoke from our own rifles, and under cover of this the enemy 
 crept up the sides of the nulla, and a succession of rushes by our brave and reso- 
 lute foes was made at the troops. The Sixty-fifth, who were on our right, marines 
 on their left, and Forty-second on extreme left, were nearest to the brink .of the 
 nulla, which, on their front, made a bend inward toward them. The enemy appear 
 to have gathered there one thousand strong. Creeping up under cover of the 
 smoke and sloping ground, they dashed at the marines and Sixty-fifth. A hundred 
 swarthy Arabs came bounding over the rocks up the 'plain, spear and sword in 
 hand. Half Mere instantly shot down, but thirty or forty were able to throw them- 
 selves upon our bayonets, giving and receiving fearful wounds. 
 
 " Quick as lightning the rush increased, and in less time than it takes to tell the 
 Sixty-fifth gave way, falling back upon the marines. The bulk of the regiment 
 crowded in upon the marines, throwing them in disorder, and back everybody was- 
 borne in a confused mass, men and regiments being inextricably mixed up. Gen- 
 -eral Graham and his staff tried their best to hold and rally the men, and General 
 Davis and all the officers labored to get the troops to stand their ground in an or- 
 derly way. A large force of rebels charged down ixpon the Second brigade like 
 men inflamed with desperate ferocity, shouting and yelling and utterly heedless of 
 death, and succeeded in capturing all the Catlings and Gardners belonging to the 
 brigade, which was driven back eight hundred yards. 
 
 "By this time the fire from the First brigade on our right as well as front, 
 and the cavalry on our left, held the Arabs, and the oflicers succeeded in checking 
 the retreat ; the Black Watch, who were fairly in hand, and a portion of the 
 marines largely assisting in stopping what might have been a much more serious 
 disaster. The brigade was reformed, and the men who had got out of their regi- 
 ments were sent into their own lines again. I must revert to the way in whicli 
 several hundreds of marines and Highlanders fought back to back, firing and re- 
 tiring in excellent order. They were over two hundred yards to the brigade front 
 when it was halted and reformed, and to their great coolness and steadiness is 
 largely due the final success of the day. 
 
 " The troops being rallied, Gen. Graham immediately ordered a bayonet-charge, 
 the gallant troops went for the enemy, and a fearful hand-to-hand fight ensued for 
 the possession of the guns, which the British finally succeeded in recapturing. 
 Following up their advantage, they continued to press the rebels, who would not 
 run, but continued to retire slowly, striking blow for blow, until they were driven 
 beyond their camp, when Gen. Graham ordered a halt, quickly followed by a for- 
 
184. The British Ckcntpau/N in the Soudan. 
 
 ward movement. zVs the British advanced, men sprang up sometimes within two 
 hundred yards of them, armed with spears and brandishing a huge shield. These 
 would charge down upon the British ranks without hesitation, at breakneck speed, 
 until the latter's bullets laid them low. The British stormed up the works where 
 the rebels were in force. The gallant blacks, with no thought of flight or surren- 
 der, held out their spears and shields against bullets and bayonets until the trenches 
 all around were like one grave. 
 
 "The next objective point was the second intervening ridge, eight hundred 
 yards off. The red granite boulders and rocks were rugged and sharp and hot, 
 and the march was a most trying one. With a cheer the men took the first ridge, 
 firing, as they went along, occasional shots at the enemy's main, body, whom we 
 could see gathered on our right on the second ridge. The^ Arab's fire in reply to 
 ours was feeble and wild, and they soon, began trotting off towards the mountains 
 as we advanced. Gen. Graham, with a portion of his staff, directed the advance, 
 and, with a ringing cheer, we carried the second ridge, the defence of which was 
 insignificant. Gaining the top, we saw in the valley Tamai', one hundred and 
 eighty feet below, the tents and huts composing the camp of Osman Digma. There 
 were very few Arabs about, and of these the troops soon made short work. The 
 Arabs retired before the English slowly and sullenly. They were defeated, but 
 not put to rout. They walked away as if sauntering through a bazaar, with arms 
 folded or swinging at their sides. They were often shot down, but this did not 
 hasten their companions' speed. It was impossible to take prisoners. The 
 wounded Arabs would lie motionless, without uttering a single cry or moan, and 
 watch their chance to stab the advancing British with knife or spear. The victors 
 walked among the wounded as among so many vipers. A wounded Arab killed a 
 British marine during the night. Another attempted to stab Colonel Herbert 
 'Stewart while his aide-de-camp was giving the wounded man water. 
 
 " The rebels entered the second square upon their hands and knees, beneath the 
 muzzles of the Gatling guns. They then commenced slashing with their weapons, 
 doing terrible execution. The British were no match for the rebels at close 
 quarters. " 
 
 After four hours' lighting the Bedouins sullenly retired 
 from the field and the battle of Tamai was won. 
 
 The British loss was one hundred killed and one hun- 
 dred and fifty wounded. The Arab loss was estimated 
 at over two thousand. 
 
 After the battle, Osman's camp was burnt, and the 
 British returned to Suakim the next day. They were 
 victorious, but it had been a very narrow escape ; for, if 
 the First Brigade had been broken like the Second, none 
 
Tlie British 0(mipaig)i in tlie Sovdrm. 185 
 
 but the mounted meu could ever have cut their way back 
 to Suakim. 
 
 This retreat, after a victory, illustrates the peculiar dif- 
 ficulties of warfare in the Soudan. It was impossible to 
 pursue the Arabs among the foot-hills, where the British 
 could not retain their formation in squares, and where 
 the enemy could lie in ambush in every ravine. In fact, 
 if the Arabs had avoided battle on the plain from the 
 first, and had drawn the British into the hills, the result 
 might have been very different. But the insuperable dif- 
 ficulty was the want of water. Not one drop could be 
 found in the hills or on that arid plain scorched by trop- 
 ical heat, so that the retreat was inevitable. It will be 
 seen further on how the Bedouins manage to supply 
 themselves with water where Europeans would perish 
 f(^r want of it. 
 
 The expectation entertained that the Arabs would be 
 discouraged by their heavy losses at Teb and Tamai was 
 quickly dispelled. Osman-Digma reoccupied his former 
 position as soon as the British retired, and harassed them 
 in their lines around Suakim by nightly alerts. General 
 Graham, hoping to crush him by a final defeat, made a 
 second advance. His purpose was to attack Osman's 
 position at the wells of Tamanieb, a short distance beyond 
 Tamai. Several days were consumed in establishing a 
 water depot half-way, and the difilculty of the under- 
 taking may be imagined when it is known that every 
 drop had to be brought in goat-skins on camel-back from 
 the condensing steamers in the harl)or oi" the brackish 
 wells outside of the town. On the 24th of March the 
 troops moved out from their camp, and l)efore they had 
 advanced eight miles, one fourth of the soldier gave out 
 
186 Tlit British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 entirely, and were left behind, and another fourth dropped 
 to the rear exhausted, following as best they could after 
 being relieved of theii' guns and cartridge-belts which 
 were packed on camels. On that plain the thermometer 
 rises to 120° or 130° in the sun in March every day, 
 (150° or 160° in July and August), and this terrible 
 heat which Europeans cannot withstand, is just enough 
 to make the Bedouins feel comfortable. This and the 
 absolute lack of water are some of the points completely 
 overlooked by those who find it so easy to plan and crit- 
 icise campaigns from the " Horse-Guards " in London or 
 the Head-quarters at Cairo. It is certain that if Osman- 
 Digma had known to what helpless condition the fear- 
 ful heat had reduced the British column on that 
 march, he would have attacked it then and there, and a 
 naassacre like that of Hicks-Pasha would have occurred. 
 But unconscious of this circumstance, and warned by his 
 experiences at Teb Tamai, he had resolved to avoid 
 another encounter with the British on the plain, and to 
 draw them into the hills. Accordingly, his forces slowly 
 retired, skirmishing: from a distance, inflictino- no loss and 
 suffering but little. On the 26th, starting very early 
 fi'om their water-depot, the British reached the wells of 
 Tamanieb, where the men and horses slaked their thirst. 
 This slight skirmish was magnified into a battle, and the 
 English papers announced in big capitals the capture and 
 destruction of the " toivn of Tamanieb," when, in fact, 
 this was the name of the wells ; for no town was ever 
 built on the desert. What was burnt was Osman's camp 
 of brush huts, such as he would leave behind him at 
 every change of position. The most valuable object 
 <captured at Tamanieb, as stated by the English papers, 
 
 % 
 
The Britisli' Campaign in the Soudojn. 187 
 
 was Osman-Digma's fiying-pau, which had the honor of 
 being sent to England as a trophy. On the following day, 
 General Graham returned to Suakim with all his forces, 
 and on the 1st of April he re-eml)arked, leaving only a 
 battalion of marines and some war-vessels to hold the 
 place, and declaring the campaign to be at an end. 
 
 Yes, it was at an end ; but not because its object had 
 been accomplished, or because Osman-Digma was con- 
 quered, but because it was evidently impossible to con- 
 tinue it. General Graham was too skilful a soldier not 
 to know that his troops could not follow the enemy under 
 a torrid sun and through waterless deserts and moun- 
 tains, and that if they remained at Suakim during the 
 summer, the climate would destroy them. But the de- 
 parture of the British was inevitably construed as a tri- 
 umph for the Mahdi's cause. All the wavering tribes 
 joined his standard, and from that time forward Suakim 
 was closely blockaded, if not besieged, from the land-side. 
 
 Meanwhile the news of Graham's invasion had reached 
 Khartoum and neutralized all the effect of Gordon's 
 peaceful protestations. Before the middle of March he 
 was attacked at Khartoum, and then began that won- 
 drous defence, whose details will probably never be fully 
 known, since its hero has perished. Never was there a 
 brighter illustration of the power of a strong will and an 
 upright and noble mind. One man alone, forsaken by 
 his government, without help, an utter stranger in ideas, 
 language, customs, and religion, was enabled by the mere 
 force of his character t(^ mould into a fighting army a 
 heterogeneous crowd of Egyptians, Soudanese, and negro 
 savages, and to hold them in hand for ten months, under 
 hardships and privations, in spite of their natural and 
 
188 Tlie British Cmiypaigu in the Soudan. 
 
 religious sympatliies all favorable to the Malidi's cause. 
 Tlie same wonderful fascination over barbarians that had 
 enabled him to conquer the Tae-Ping rebellion in China 
 was exhibited here in Khartoum. 
 
 It was not long, however, before he became satisfied of 
 the impossibility of rescuing the garrisons, or even holding-- 
 Khartouni more than a few months without aid, and he 
 made repeated and urgent requests to his government to- 
 send him British, or Indian, or Turkish troops, or, as a 
 last resort, to send Zobehr-Pasha, he being the only man,, 
 in Gordon's judgment, possessing sufficient inlluence and 
 force of character to organize a government and prevent 
 utter anarchy after his own retirement. Perhaps Zobehr 
 did possess the ability, but he was a double-dyed traitor,, 
 and at that very time was in secret communication with 
 the Mahdi.'''" If he had been sent to Khartoum he 
 would undoubtedly have betrayed Gordon to his death in 
 revenge for his son Suliman's execution. For once the 
 Ministry acted wisely in declining to send him. But 
 why did they still refuse to send troops when it became 
 evident that without military support Gordon's mission 
 must fail and he must become the victim of his own 
 heroism ? The following extracts show in what Jight 
 Gordon viewed the action of his government : 
 
 " London, May 5, 1884. — Parliamentary documents give a dispatch to Sir 
 Evelyn Baring from General Gordon, dated Khartoum, April i6th, in which he- 
 says : ' As far as I understand the situation you say there is no intention of sending 
 relief here or to Berber. You refuse me Zobehr-Pasha. I consider myself free tO' 
 act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can. If I can 
 suppress the rebellion I shall do so, otherwise I shall retire to the equator and 
 leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Sennaar, Kassala, 
 
 * This fact having been discovered after the fall of Khartoum, he was impris- 
 oned at Gibraltar and afterwards banished to the Island of Cyprus and deprived of 
 his honors and emoluments. 
 
Tlie British Cam.paign in tJie Soudan. 189 
 
 Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to 
 smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties if you would retain peace in Egypt.' 
 
 " The documents include a telegram from Colonel O. H. Stewail to Sir Evelyn 
 Baring, in which he says : ' General Gordon has acquainted me with your intention 
 not to relieve Khartoum. It is proposed that I shall go to Berber, trusting to the 
 success of your negotiations for the opening of the Suakim and Berber route. 
 Doubting, however, success, so far as the Berber road is concerned, unless it is 
 opened by advancing troops, I am inclined to think my retreat safer by way of the 
 equator, and shall, therefore, follow General (rordon's fortunes.' " 
 
 Still the Ministry seemed unable to decide upon any 
 course, and Gordon's appeals remained unlieeded. Some 
 of them were deeply pathetic. In one of a later date he 
 
 says : 
 
 " How many times have we written asking for reinforcements, and calling your 
 serious attention to the Soudan, and no answer came ? Men's hearts become 
 weary of delay. While you are eating, and drinking, and resting in good beds, we 
 and those with us, soldiers and servants, are watching night and day, trying to 
 quell the movement of the Mahdi." 
 
 It certainly seems that a strange indifference to Gor- 
 don's fate was exhibited at that time by the government. 
 It was officially stated in the House of Commons that he 
 had no orders to remain in Khartoum if he found his 
 mission impracticable, and that he was perfectly free to 
 return when he thought proper ; a declaration which 
 seems like bitter mockery in view of his perilous situa- 
 tion ; for at that very time a number of non-combatants 
 that he had attempted to send to Lower Egypt for 
 safety were massacred at Shendy with their escort of 500 
 soldiers. After Graham commenced hostilities at Suakim 
 in March, there was no time when Gordon could have 
 escaped northward beyond Berber, for his steamers could 
 navigate no farther, and the insurgent tribes held all the 
 country below. A reference to the debates in Parliament 
 on this question shows the position taken by the Ministry : 
 
190 The British Campaign in the Soudan,. 
 
 "On the 1 2th of May the Right Hon. Sir Michael. Hicks- Beach, Conservative 
 member for East Gloucestershire, moved in the House of Commons his motion of 
 May 2d, that the House regrets that the course of the government has not tended 
 to promote the success of Gen. Gordon's mission, and that steps to secure his per- 
 sonal safety have been delayed. The honorable gentleman, in making the motion, 
 said he did not mean to question the wisdom of the government's policy in de- 
 manding the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt. What he called in question vfa.s 
 the present conduct of the government toward that country. He called in review 
 the circumstances which led to the departure of Gen. Gordon to the Soudan. 
 'The object of his going,' Sir Michael said, 'was to bring about the peaceful 
 evacuation of the country. A more heroic offer than that made, by Gen. Gordon 
 was never made by living man. Yet when he arrived at Khartoum the govern- 
 ment, instead of seconding his proposals, negatived them. With strange incon- 
 sistency the government insisted upon a pacific policy in one part of the Soudan 
 •and went to war in another part, thereby destroying any chance which Gen. Gordon 
 might have had for carrying out his mission. The government was worthy of 
 blame for not having sent assistance from Suakim. They have practically deserted 
 the brave soldier, the Christian hero, in his hour of peril. This "is the general 
 feeling of the entire country. England now demands that Gen. Gordon and those 
 who trusted him shall be rescued.' 
 
 " Mr. Gladstone, on rising to speak in defence of the government's course, was 
 greeted with hearty and long-continued applause. He congratulated Sir Michael 
 Hicks-Beach on his forcible speech, but strenuously denied that the government had 
 ■deserted Gen. Gordon. Continuing, the Prime-Minister denied that the govern- 
 ment had failed to do one single act that was for the safety and success of Gen. 
 Gordon. ' The .charges which the honorable gentleman has just preferred against 
 the government are absurd. They can only be accounted for by his lack of knowl- 
 edge of the true facts.' Mr. Gladstone thereupon referred to official dispatches to 
 prove Gen. Gordon's security, and to justify the action which the government had 
 taken. He contended that the charges failed to note the fact that Gen. Gordon 
 had orders to resort to military force if peaceful measures should not prove success- 
 ful. 'The demand of the honorable gentleman,' he insisted, 'amounted to a 
 war of conciuest against a people struggling to be free. The war which the Mahdi 
 is waging is a war for freedom. Is it that which the honorable gentleman wishes 
 England to put down ? ' " 
 
 It is fortunate for Mr. Gladstone that his fame does 
 not rest upon the course of his Cabinet in the Soudan 
 <|uestion. To err is human, and great as he undoubtedly 
 is as a statesman, it cannot be denied that he erred 
 grievously in this matter, probably led into mistakes by 
 the representations of military men on whose Judgment of 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 191 
 
 professional subjects lie natui'ally thought he could safely 
 rely. He must have been himself deceived as to " the 
 true facts " when he spoke of " Gen. Gordon's security " ; 
 and his statement that " Gordon had orders to resort to 
 military force if peaceful measures should not prove suc- 
 cessful " seems absolutely absurd in view of the fact that 
 he had been sent without a single soldier, that all the 
 foi-ce available for active operations had been destroyed 
 with Hicks-Pasha, and that Gordon had no force what- 
 ever except the garrison of Khartoum, already insufficient 
 for its defence, as well as unreliable and wavering in its 
 loyalty. Furthermore, if, as Mr. Gladstone said, " the 
 Mahdi was waofino; a war for freedom," which Eno-land 
 should not put down, what was his lieutenant, Osman- 
 Dio'um, fio-htino; for that he should be crushed ? If the 
 Mahdi's forces ought not to be opposed on the White 
 Nile, why should Graham have been sent to slaughter 
 them on the Red Sea ? 
 
 By this time public sentiment had become too power- 
 ful and excited to be satisfied by such subterfuges, and it 
 compelled the Ministry to organize an expedition for 
 Gordon's relief. Its purpose was emphaticalh' declared 
 to be, '■'■ Rescue and retire.'''' 
 
 This tardy determination having been reached, the first 
 step was evidently the selection of the best line of oper- 
 ations, and this selection must be the result of a thorough 
 study of the country, all the more necessary because war 
 in the Soudan has to be carried on under circumstances 
 so essentially different from those prevailing in other 
 lands, and which are these : 
 
 I. Outside of the very narrow valley of the Nile the 
 country furnishes absolutely nothing for the support of 
 
192 The British Cmnpaigv in the Soudan. 
 
 an army, wliicli must therefore carry all its supplies, iu- 
 cluding even forage for its animals. 
 
 II. There are no roads and no vehicles in the Soudan 
 — only camel-trails, and every thing must be transported 
 on camel-back. 
 
 III. And most important of all, the Soudan is a rain- 
 less, waterless land. Away from the Mle there are no 
 rivulets, creeks, or springs — nothing but rare and scanty 
 wells at long intervals, or rocky reservoirs in deep ravines, 
 like those of Gakdul and Abou-Klea, where the rain-water 
 collects during the brief rainy season. Droughts of two 
 and three years' duration are not uncommon, and had 
 just occurred when I travelled over the deserts on both 
 sides of the Mle in 1873, '74, and '75. In such seasons 
 great numbers of cattle, and even camels, perish. No 
 animals are used for transportation except camels, for they 
 alone can travel live days without water, even in sum- 
 mer, and on the caravan routes wells are often that far 
 apart. Consequently water sufficient to supply men ( and 
 cavalry and artillery horses in the case of an army) has 
 to be carried in goat-skins which waste a large pro- 
 portion by evaporation. From my experience of (5,(K)0 
 miles of desert travel I Judge that every 1,000 men, with 
 the usual proportion of horses in an army, would require 
 500 camels for water alone, and at least 800 more for 
 ammunition, supplies, forage, etc. This is what renders 
 all long desert routes impossible for a European army. 
 If Gen. Herbert Stewart succeeded, not without much 
 suffering from hunger and thirst, in crossing the level 
 Bahiuda plains (as will be seen later), it was because the 
 distance was only 150 miles, the desert less arid, and the 
 wells much closer than the average ; besides which he had 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 193 
 
 3,500 camels for 2,500 men in tlie lightest possible march- 
 ing order, for his rations gave out on the road. 
 
 This vital necessity of a certain and abundant supply 
 of water makes it self-evident that no British army, even 
 if no larger than 4,000 or 5,000 men, can operate in the 
 Soudan except along the Mle, which is the only unfailing 
 supply. 
 
 Had this fact been recognized in time, four months 
 would not have been wasted in vacillating about the 
 route, and these four months gained would have saved 
 Grordon. 
 
 I make the charge without reserve oi- hesitation, that 
 the failure of Wolseley's relief expedition was due to no 
 other cause than the inconceivable and inexcusable igno- 
 rance of the British civil and military authorities in Egypt 
 concerning the country which they had virtually occupied 
 f o]' more than six years ; surely time enough to have 
 -learned all about it. More than this, no greater mistake 
 could be made than to suppose that the Soudan was 
 a terra> incognita. So fai- from it, every route from Cairo 
 to the AVhite Nile has been an avenue of trade and travel 
 for a thousand years, and is as well known as was the old 
 national stage road between Baltimore and Wheeling be- 
 fore the days of railroads. 
 
 Furthermore, at the War Department in the citadel of 
 Cairo, occupied as head-quarters by the British staff, there 
 is any number of the most accurate and complete maps 
 and reports of that region, made by French, English, 
 Italian, and American engineers, officers, and explorers — 
 some as recent as 1878, and containing the most minute 
 information. Most of these documents are to be found 
 also in the principal libraries of Europe and America. So 
 
194 The British Ca^mpaign in the Soudan. 
 
 that ignorance of the geograpliy, topography, and watei- 
 supply of the Soudan routes was absolutely inexcusable^ 
 especially in a military staff whose first duty was to learn 
 these very things. 
 
 There are three routes from Cairo to Khartoum. (See 
 the map.) 
 
 I. By the Nile to Korosko, crossing the desert aud 
 striking the Nile again at Abou-Hamed. 
 
 . II. By the Nile all the way on or along the river. 
 
 III. By Suez and the Ked Sea to Suakim. Thence 
 across the desert to Berber, and thence to Khartoum by 
 the river. 
 
 Let us examine them in order. 
 
 I. The first follows the Nile to Korosko, 690 miles 
 above Cairo and 100 miles below the second cataract. 
 Here it leaves the river and strikes across the great bend 
 of the Nile. It is 500 miles shorter than the all-river 
 route, but, although one of the most frequented by cara- 
 vans, it must be ruled out of military operations, for it 
 crosses one of the worst deserts in the Soudan, consisting 
 of hard gravel plains diversified with zones of deep sand 
 and rocky ridges, without a bush or blade of grass. The 
 camels, which find some grazing on other deserts, have 
 to carry grain on their backs for their own consumption 
 on this one. It is 250 miles across, with only one well — 
 half way — so scanty that it can supply only some 400 
 camels per day, and so brackish that its name is Moor a — 
 hitter. None but camels and Bedouins can drink its 
 water. Caravans of 100 or 200 camels cross this desert 
 by forced marches, as I did, in seven days, carrying 
 drinking water to last from Nile to Nile, but no European 
 army could cross it at all. Meeting the river again at 
 
The British Oampaign in the Soudan. 195' 
 
 Abou-Haraed, the route follows the river or near it 133 
 miles to Berber. At tliis point the Nile again becomes- 
 navigable 225 miles to Khartoum. Total distance from 
 Cairo 1,298 miles. 
 
 The Korosko desert is one of those that the Arabs call 
 Atmoors, in contradistinction from the Berreeyeh^ or wil- 
 derness in which there is vegetation as well as game, and 
 where the Bedouins roam with their flocks, though culti- 
 vation is impossible for want of rain. The Atmoors are 
 entirely destitute of vegetation, and consequently of 
 animal life, excepting only the ostrich and hyena, which 
 cross them swiftly by night, and the ever-present vultures 
 hovering over the caravans by day. Nothing relieves the 
 glare of the yellow sand. The marches are terrible, and 
 yet it is worse to halt during the day than to keep in 
 motion, for the fearful heat makes rest or sleep impossi- 
 ble even under the tents, with the burning sand under 
 you and the vertical sun overhead. The Korosko atmoor 
 being one of the great avenues of trade, the trail is per- 
 fectly well marked by the skeletons of camels, averaging 
 over 200 to the mile, by my own actual count. Thousands 
 of these animals perish of exhaustion on this route every 
 year. The atmoors are generally from six to ten days' 
 march across, and are like oceans which caravans traverse 
 upon their desert-ships, but where it is death to tarry. 
 
 11. The route following the Nile continuously fulfils 
 the paramount condition of insuring an unfailing supply 
 of water, but it presents the disadvantage of being the 
 longest and slowest of all. From an engineer's point of 
 view it is divided into three sections. 
 
 The first, from Cairo to the second cataract (795 miles), 
 is travelled every winter by hundreds of tourists in daha- 
 
196 The British Cmwpaign in tlie Soudan. 
 
 beahs and Cook's steamers, and is as well known as the 
 Hudson from New York to Albany. It is navigable at all 
 seasons, but always best at liigli Nile. Trans-sLipment is 
 made at the first cataract, by the aid of a five-mile rail- 
 way around it, but from August to January, small steamers 
 can be hauled over it. 
 
 The second section, from the second cataract to Berber, 
 and above to Metemneh, where Grenl. Herbert Stewart 
 struck the Nile again after crossing the Bahiuda desert, 
 has been thoroughly explored by the eminent civil-engi- 
 neer Sir John Fowler, who devoted many winters to 
 surveying and locating the projected Soudan railroad for 
 Ismail-Pasha. ' Nothing can be more complete than his 
 report, printed in London, together with his map, accu- 
 rately marked off in sections of fifty kilometers, and from 
 which the accompanying map is partially compiled.* 
 This section, from the second cataract to Berber, is ob- 
 structed by numerous other cataracts, rapids, and shallows, 
 making its navigation very difficult for all but the native 
 craft called nuggars. The difficult}^ of navigating this 
 great double bend, or 8, of the Nile is what forces the 
 Soudan trade away from the river at Berber to seek an 
 outlet at Suakim on the Red Sea. It was sadly demon- 
 strated by the tragic fate of Col. O. H. Stewart, in Sept., 
 1884. x\.l though the Nile was at its highest, and his 
 steamer had passed safely over the fifth cataract (which, 
 when I saw it at low watei*, seemed impractical)le for any 
 boat), he was wrecked at the fourth cataract, half way 
 between Abou-Hamed and Korti, and was massacred by 
 the Bedouins with his entire party. Nevertheless the 
 
 * This map was engraved for the Century Magazine, to illustrate my article on 
 the'Soudan, in the No. for March, 1885, and its use has been courteously granted 
 to the Am. Geogr. Soc. , by the editors of the Century. 
 
 \ 
 
Iit%^ 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 '^% 
 
 J2_ 
 
 bI^' 
 
 ^«^7 - 
 
 *ad-»A 
 
 
 4*165l- 
 
 ■"-^ 
 
 ass.6- 
 
Tlie British Cahipaign in the Soudan. 197 
 
 entire distance is fairly navigable for tlie native boats 
 (larger tban Wolseley's wliale-boats), provided always 
 that advantage is taken, as it should be, of the proper 
 stage of the ISTile. It is also quite practicable for the 
 cavalry and artillery horses, with part of the baggage on 
 camels, to follow along the banks of the river, keeping 
 abreast with the boats. 
 
 The third section is of easy navigation from Berber to 
 Khartoum, and almost equally so thence nearly to the 
 great equatorial lakes. The chief objection to this all- 
 river route is the length of time it consumes. 
 
 The last route to be considered is the Suakim-Berber, 
 and as the mistaken predilection in its favor has been the 
 chief cause of the British failure, I will describe it in 
 some detail. 
 
 I must lie permitted to state here that in an " Open 
 Letter," written in June, 1884, and published in the Sep- 
 tember No. of the Century Magazine, in an illustrated 
 article, written as early as September, 1884, though pub- 
 lished in the Century for March, 1885, and in a letter to 
 the K. Y. World oi March 1, 1885, 1 proved conclusively 
 that the Suakim-Berber route is utterly impossible for a 
 E.'.ropean army, while hostile Bedouins hold the deserts. 
 I predicted further that the projected railroad would 
 never be built, and that the British would never advance 
 twenty miles from Suakim, all of which predictions were 
 verified by subsequent events. 
 
 I am not astonished that the Suakim route was the 
 favorite with those ignorant of its difficulties. It looks 
 so very easy and rapid on the map : 120 miles by rail 
 from Cairo to Suez ; 900 miles by steamer, in four days, to 
 Suakim ; 250 miles to Berber, which caravans travel in 
 
198 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 ten days ; thence 225 miles along the river to Khartoum — 
 altogether 1,500 miles, and twenty-five days would cover 
 the distance. 
 
 Yes, if an army could move over the country as easily 
 as a pencil across the map, or even as a party of travellers 
 in time of peace, this would certainly be the route. How 
 prone are stay-at-home critics to imagine that at ten 
 thousand miles' distance they can judge of the routes to 
 be followed better than those on the spot. It was just 
 so in this case. The journey is all quick and easy enough, 
 except that two hundred and fifty miles' stretch to Berber, 
 which is an impassable barrier in time of war for an army 
 which cannot move in fractions at several days' interval, 
 but must keep together before the enemy. This route is 
 utterly impracticable for these reasons : 
 
 It crosses a rainless desert, not nearly so arid as that of 
 Korosko, but yet affording nothing for the subsistence of 
 mea or horses. Though caravans can cross it in ten days,, 
 an army .with its materiel would require twenty-five at 
 least (the British staff said thirty), if , tliey encountered 
 no opposition. Where a caravan can find water and 
 grazing for its few camels, an army would jDerish for waut* 
 of both. A march of fifteen miles from Suakini would 
 bring the army to the foot of the great Arabian chain 
 which begins at Suez and runs parallel to the Bed Sea 
 down to the equator. Many of its peaks rise to eight 
 thousand feet, its passes, or " gaps " being from two to 
 three thousand. It is eighty miles across, consisting of 
 several parallel ridges separated by deep valleys. Be- 
 yond this chain, a plateau extends one hundred and sixty 
 miles farther to the Nile, very broken and abounding in 
 narrow, steep rocky or sandy passes, where a caravan is 
 
The British, Campaign in the 8oi(/2an. 199" 
 
 compelled to move in single file. For this entire distance 
 the water supply is barely sufficient for small caravans. 
 
 It often happened to me, travelling in the Soudan with 
 only two hundred men and four hundred camels (a larger 
 caravan than the average), to find the wells I depended 
 upon just exhausted by a preceding caravan. I would 
 then have to wait from one to three days for the water to 
 ooze in again sufficiently to enable me to replenish my 
 water-skins, and I would leave the wells exhausted for 
 the next comers. 
 
 Now, remembering that General Graham, with four 
 thousand choice troops, came so near being destroyed in 
 the plain, within fifteen miles of Suakim, it is evident 
 that no army could venture to advance through the moun- 
 tains inhabited by the most warlike Bedouin tribes,. 
 and the deserts beyond, with less than six or seven 
 thousand men, requiring for the transportation of water,, 
 ammunition, supplies, baggage, and forage for all the ani- 
 mals, not less than eight or ten thousand camels. How 
 could such a force find water enough when the best wells 
 on the route cannot supply over six hundred in twenty- 
 four hours ? 
 
 "Suppose that the fierce Bedouins, whose homes are in these mountains, have 
 allowed the British, strung out in a long, slender column vulnerable at every point, 
 to cross the numerous defiles where a few hundred men could slop a whole army_ 
 Suppose the invaders to have emerged without serious Idsses from the mountain 
 range out upon the plateau extending to the Nile, and which itself is very rugged 
 and abounding in difficult passes and belts of deep, loose sand,— the toughest 
 obstacles of all. The worst is yet to come. Water was comparatively plentiful in 
 the mountains, and the heat was moderate. But now the only supply is from the 
 scanty wells upon the line of march. The Bedouins retreat, destroying the wells 
 behind them (which is a very easy thing to do), and swarms of them hang around 
 the flank and rear of the invaders to harass them and cut off their stragglers. The 
 heat rises every day above one hundred degrees, even in November and December,, 
 and one hundred and fifty degrees and more in summer ; in that cloudless land 
 
200 The BritisJi Campaign in tlie Soxdan. 
 
 there is no shade. The plain quivers under the fierce sunlight, while the mirage 
 deludes the eyes with the mockery of fictitious lakes. This is what I experienced 
 day after day on the deserts. Suppose now the invaders to have consumed their 
 supply of water. If the enemy can cut them off from the A\'ells for three days, 
 there is no need of firing another shot. Not a soul of them can survive. It is the 
 story of the Roman legions perishing in the Parthian deserts, and of Hicks-Pasha 
 in Kordofan. 
 
 " In the ' Waterless Land ' water is the paramount ciuestion. If it be asked how 
 a large body of Bedouins, like the ten thousand who nearly destroyed the British 
 squares at Tamai, manage to subsist, the reason is plain. In the first place, they do 
 not need the enormous trains required for a European army. They are the most 
 abstemious of men. Each man carries a skin of water and a small bag of grain, 
 procured by purchase or barter from caravans. Their camels and goats move with 
 them, supplying them with milk and meat, and subsisting upon the scanty herbage 
 and the foliage of the thorny mimosa growing in secluded wadies. As to water, 
 they know every nook and hollow in the mountains, away from the trails, where a 
 few barrels of water collect in some shaded ravine, and they can scatter, every man 
 for himself, to fill their water-skins. On my first expedition, near the close of the 
 three years' drought, I reached some wells on which I was depending, and found 
 them entirely dry. It was several days to the next wells. But my Bedouin guides 
 knew some natural reservoirs in the hills about six miles away from the trail. So 
 they took the water camels at night-fall, and came back before morning with the 
 water-skins filled. An invading army would find it hard to obtain guides, and even 
 if they did, they must keep together, and could not leave the line of march to look 
 for water. Besides, the Bedouins, accustomed from infancy to regard water as 
 most precions and rare, use it with wonderful economy. Neither men nor animals 
 drink more than once in forty-eight hours. As to washing, they tiever indulge in 
 such wasteful nonsense. When Bedouins came to my camp, water was always 
 offered them. Their answer would frequently be : " No, thanks ; I drank yester- 
 day.' They know too well the importance of keeping up the habit of abstemious- 
 ness. No wonder they can subsist where invaders would quickly perish." * 
 
 A railroad was proposed as a solution of tlie difficulty ; 
 tliis only proved tlie total ignorance of those wlio sug- 
 gested it as to the conditions and circumstances of tlie 
 case. No one denies that a railroad can be built in time 
 of peace across the Arabian chain without much moi'e 
 difficulty than across the Alleghany range (excepting the 
 lack of water and timber), but even then it would be 
 
 * Extract from my " Open Letter" to the Century, published in the September 
 No., 1884. 
 
Tilt British Ccmijjaign in the Soudav. 201 
 
 a work of a 3"eai' or two ; aud Gordon liad to be relieved 
 in a few niontlis, or it wonld be too late, as the sad result 
 proved. It seems to have been imagined that the Snakim 
 desert was a level sand-plain on which there was nothing 
 to do but to lay the rails. Every engineer knows how 
 difficult it would be and how long it would take to con- 
 struct a railroad over such a range of mountains, through 
 which not even a preliminary survey had ever been made 
 outside of the regular camel trail. Yet two ridiculously 
 abortive attempts were made, as will be seen further. 
 
 I have already charged that the failure of Wolseley's re- 
 lief expedition was due to ignorance of the country in 
 which it was to operate. Here is proof positive that this 
 ignorance was absolutely inexcusable. This Suakim route 
 has been travelled by hundreds of caravans every year 
 from time immemorial, and every well upon it is better 
 known than a corner grog-shop is to all the topers on its 
 block. It had been repeatedly and accurately mapped 
 out years ago. In addition, one of many explorers, 
 my friend and comrade. Col.- H. Gr. Prout, now of 
 New York, a most able engineer, twice promoted for 
 efficient aud valuable services in the Soudan, and for 
 a time Vice-Governor-Greneral under Gordon in 1877-79, 
 was sent to join my expedition in Kordofan in 1875. I 
 had gone there by the Nile route some months before ; 
 he came by the Suakim route, and he was ordered to 
 make a detailed map, survey, and report of it, especially 
 as to the water supply and the feasibility of constructing 
 a railway. The report (which lies before me now), 
 printed in English, with map and profile, at the staff 
 printing-office, in the citadel of Cairo, contains the most 
 ample information (the map and profile accompany this 
 
202 The BritisJi Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 paper). It mentions every group of wells on tlie route, 
 and their capacity. The largest can supply only 600 men 
 and their animals ; others vary from 500 down to 250, 
 the average being about 400. I passed over the same 
 route the following year, and can confirm from personal 
 observation the perfect accuracy of Col. Front's report. 
 This document Avas perfectly accessible to the British 
 authorities, and a couple of hours' study of it would have 
 convinced any intelligent staff officer that the Suakim 
 route is out of the question for an army. This informa- 
 tion conveyed to head-quarters should have put a stop to 
 all the fatal vacillations and delays that followed. Why 
 this neglect of a proper and necessary study of the 
 theatre of war ? Was it stolid stupidity, or was it conceit 
 which took it for granted that what was not already 
 known to the British commanders was not worth learn- 
 ing ? This blind preference for the Suakim route was 
 the paramount and fatal blunder which caused the final 
 failure of the relief expedition, for its consequence was 
 the loss of four or five months in repeated changes of 
 plan, as follows : 
 
 (1) Official announcements published at the time show 
 that when Grordon's pressing appeals for help aroused a 
 popular sentiment demanding his relief (which was before 
 Oraham's army had re-embarked from Suakim, April 1st)? 
 this officer was expected to open the road from there to 
 Berber ; but he was too skilful and judicious to attempt 
 such an impracticable undertaking, and the idea was 
 given up. 
 
 (2) At the beginning of May, at the very time that Mr. 
 Gladstone was declaring in the Commons that " the Mahdi 
 was waging a war for freedom and should not be put 
 
 % 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 203 
 
 -do WD," orders were issued for a survey of the Nile 
 route by Admiral Hay, witli a view to ascertain 
 its practicability for gun-boats ; — an order ridiculous in 
 itself, for the whole course of the Nile had been described 
 a hundred times before. At the same time a camel-depot 
 was ordered to be established at Assouan (first cataract) 
 for the transportation of the expedition. 
 
 (3) On the 11th of June the Suakim route was decided 
 upon, and on the 16th engineers were sent there with the 
 plant for a railroad, and on July 19th iron-clad cars were 
 sent. As late as July 12th this announcement was made 
 public : '' The operations for the relief of Khartoum, it 
 has been finally decided, will begin early in September. 
 Gen. Wolseley continues to advise that the line of the 
 chief attack be by way of Suakim and Berber. Addi- 
 tional material for the new railway is being sent to 
 8uakim. The preparations for an expedition up the Nile 
 have been suspended," 
 
 (4) Lastly (Aug. 18th), it was announced officially that 
 the Suakim route was abandoned. The railroad material, 
 landed one month before, was shipped off to India, and 
 the Nile route w^as finally adopted. It was not till after 
 this date that boats were ordered to be constructed in 
 England, Canadian voyageurs enlisted, and transportation 
 and supplies collected. Four changes of programme and 
 four months wasted before the fii^st serious preparations 
 were even commenced ! ■^'' 
 
 But even after all these vacillations, when the Nile 
 route was finally decided upon (near the end of August), 
 
 * It will be seen later that three months after Gordon's death and the fall of 
 Khartoum another railroad plant was sent to Suakim, which railroad Graham's 
 second expedition was expected to construct to Berber, and which was also sent 
 back without being even unshipped. 
 
204 The British Ccnnpaign in the Soudan. 
 
 tlie military authorities proceeded with as iiincli delibei-a- 
 tion as if they had had full control of the seasons. 
 
 It is an axiom that in war, time is an element of the first 
 importance. How especially so in a country where military 
 operations can be carried on only for a few months of 
 the year ! The Nile is as regular as the sun. It begins to 
 rise about the 21st of June, rises steadily until about Sept. 
 1st, remains at its full until about Oct. 1st, and. then de- 
 creases regularly until the next June. It does not vary 
 more than live or six days from year to year in centuries, 
 and to ignore these facts, known to the world since 
 Herodotus wrote, -lOO years b.c, is unpardonable. Had 
 the Nile route been decided upon in May, boats could 
 have been built or collected and every preparation made 
 for the expedition to leave Cairo July 15th, when the 
 Nile had been for nearly four weeks on the rise. It was 
 perfectly clear navigation to the second cataract which 
 should have been reached ])y Aug. 15th. Then, with a 
 steadily rising Nile, the passage of the upper cataracts 
 would have been easy. Korti could have been reached 
 fully four months earlier, and full advantage could have 
 been derived from the cool season which is delio:htful 
 . in those regions. The fall of Khartoum and the death of 
 Gordon are the direful consequences of that fatal delay. 
 
 Nevertheless, late as it was when the final decision was 
 adopted, no attempt seems to have been made to compen- 
 sate for the lost time. Wolseley did not reach Egypt until 
 Sept. 9th, and the camel-corps organized in England did 
 not sail from there until Sept. 26th. The whale-boats 
 ordered from England did not leave the second cataract at 
 Wady Haifa until the 19th of Nov., and altogether the fact 
 seemed to be ignored that the Nile was steadily falling,, 
 
Tlie JBriUsh Cmnpaign in the Soudmi. 205 
 
 and that cataracts and shallows which could easily be 
 passed at the right season would become altogether im- 
 passable at low Nile. 
 
 Yet the military authorities had abundant warnings of 
 the danger of delay, as can be seen by a perusal of the 
 journals of that date. Sir Samuel Baker's letter of April 
 5, 1884, is so truly prophetic of what followed, that I 
 quote a few passages. The italics are my own. 
 
 " In this we see a continuation of tliat spasmodic policy which has characterized 
 every operation in Egypt since the first shot was fired at the forts of Alexandria. 
 There has been no carefully organized plan, no definite aim, no foundation for the 
 edifice of a future ; but a hand-to-mouth series of attempts, each of which has been 
 a direct contradiction of our most solemn declarations. 
 
 ' ' For the last two years with regretful accuracy I have expressed my opinion upon 
 the present and future of Egyptian affairs. Dark as the present may be, the com- 
 ing events will be still darker, unless the policy of Great Britain shall be radically 
 changed. The country is bankrupt ; brigandage, which was formerly unknown, 
 is rampant even in the Delta (seventy-four cases within one month) ; the Soudan 
 is in a blaze of insurrection, and General Gordon in a most dangerozis position, as 
 by a letter I received from him of the wtJi of March, he doubts the possibility of 
 defending Khartoum beyond a certain period. 
 
 " Will England permit this sacrifice ? We have been a grievous curse to Egypt, 
 and we are entirely responsible for the miseries and disasters which have befallen 
 this unhappy country. It may suit the convenience of British oiificials to pooh- 
 pooh the gravity of the situation which they have themselves provoked, but the 
 facts are patent to all : the crisis has arrived, and unless iuiinediate preparations 
 shall be made for the relief of General Gordon at Ivhartoum, we shall be again too 
 late, as -rue were at Tokar and Sinkat. What will be the humiliation of England 
 should he fall through the apathy or incompetence of the British Government ? 
 
 " / do not wish to prophesy evil, but I see it. Let the British public awaken to 
 the facts of the situation ; England is responsible for the misdeeds of her Ministry, 
 and she is the guaranty for the safety of General Gordon, who was started upon 
 an impossible enterprise. As we invaded Abyssinia to release a British consul, we 
 are bound to deliver our envoy at Khartoum should his retreat be intercepted. 
 
 ' ' Not a day should be lost in preparing for this necessity. The route from 
 Suakim to Berber can only be opened and secured by Indian troops. 77ie Nile 
 will afford the most sectire route from- Cairo to I\hartoum if immediate prepara- 
 tions shall be made for an expedition at the first rise of the river in July. I have 
 already suggested to the highest authority this plan of advance, which requires the 
 most careful but energetic management. Still I have no hope that such energ}- 
 will be exhibited ; the apathy and vacillation which have induced a series of dis- 
 
206 The Britisli Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 asters tuill stave off the evil hour until one more garrison shall have /teen ovcr- 
 po'Mered ; but should Khartoum fall, and Gordon be thus cruelly abandoned, let 
 "the Government beware of the scorn of the British people." 
 
 " Apathy and vacillation." The latter, especially, was 
 the fatal cause which paralyzed diplomatic as well as 
 military decisions. I have already mentioned the Minis- 
 try's contradictory course regarding the intervention of 
 Turkish troops. Yet in a pecuniary view alone, how 
 much cheaper to have paid a few millions to the Sultan 
 for Turkish regiments ! Going there as the soldiers of 
 the Padishah, the chief of Islam, no religious antagonism 
 could have existed between them and the Soudanese. 
 They would have appeared as the representatives of the 
 lawful head of their religion, commissioned to put down 
 a, schismatic, false prophet ; while, on the contrary, the 
 British represented what is most hateful to a Mussulman, 
 •an infidel and a giaour. This alternative had been re- 
 jected. There was another even more promising, and to 
 this day it is an unexplained mystery why it was aban- 
 -doned. The great empire of Abyssinia is contiguous to 
 the theatre of war in the Soudan. Its people are Chris- 
 tians of a very rude and barbarous type. They are of 
 the same or a kindred race with the Bedouins of the 
 deserts, and are equally indomitable warriors. They had 
 defeated in 1876 on the plain of Gura an invading Egyp- 
 tian army of fifteen thousand regular troops, splendidly 
 armed and equipped, which they attacked with the same 
 reckless bravery as that displayed by the Bedouins 
 against the British squares. The Egyptians escaped an- 
 nihilation only by retreat into a large fort previously 
 constructed by an American officer (Col. S. H. Lockett), 
 from which they repelled several furious assaults. They 
 
Tlie British Camjyaign in the Soudan. 207 
 
 were glad enoiigh later to conclude a peace, and be al- 
 lowed to return to their own country.'^* The Abyssin- 
 ians' most ardent desire is to obtain an outlet on the 
 Red Sea, from which they have been entirely shut out by 
 Egypt. Early in April Admiral Hewett went on a mis- 
 sion to King John. It was stated at various times that 
 the latter was willing to furnish thirty thousand or more 
 men for two shillings per head per day, provided he was 
 given the port of Massowah and a strip of territory along 
 the Red Sea. It was the very best arrangement that 
 could have been made, and it was only a question of 
 money, for those people are extremely avaricious. Eng- 
 land could have secured King John's co-operation for one 
 fifth the cost of her expeditions, and it would probably 
 have saved Gordon ; for the Abyssinians, accustomed to 
 the climate and the country, woald have had but a short 
 distance to march from their own territory down the Blue 
 Nile and the Rahat, relieving the garrisons of Kassala 
 and Sennaar, and reachinor Khartoum from the southeast 
 without difficulty. Why the arrangement was not con- 
 cluded is not known. Probably British pride revolted at 
 the idea of Gordon's being rescued by an army of barbari- 
 ans. The last information on the subject was a dispatch 
 from Admiral Hewett, received on the 12 th of June. 
 
 " In this the Admiral reported that his mission to King John, of Abyssinia, was 
 •completely successful. A treaty was signed securing free transit from the Soudan 
 through Abyssinia to Massowah. Another treaty, suppressing tlie slave trade, was 
 negotiated. Admiral Hewett telegraphed also that he had reached the coast of the 
 Red Sea, ready to embark on his return." 
 
 * A very interesting account of the Abyssinian war with Egypt in 1874-76 is 
 given in " Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia." New York : Atkins & Prout, 
 i8So. By Col. Wm. McE. Dye, formerly U. S. A. (at that time on the general 
 staff of the Egyptian army), who was wounded in the battle of Gura. 
 
208 Tlie British Campaign in the Soudcm. 
 
 It is evident that he had accomplished nothing of any 
 value, in spite of the assertion of complete success. 
 
 In themeantime, • Gordon had every reason to believe 
 himself abandoned by his OAvn government. 
 
 " The Egyptian correspondence shows that the Government refused to allow 
 Indian troops to relieve General Gordon, on the ground that India has no direct 
 interest in the Soudan. Among the dispatches included in tlie correspondence is 
 one from Earl Granville to Sir Evelyn Baring, suggesting that British troops be 
 dispatched to Wadi-Halfa to support General Gordon. To that dispatch Sir Eve- 
 lyn Baring replied that the military authorities deprecated the proposed movement 
 on. account of the climate. On April gth, General Gordon telegraphed that three 
 thousand Turkish infantry and one thousand cavalry could accomplish the relief of 
 Khartoum, and crush the Mahdi in four months. Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed 
 to Earl Granville that it would be impossible to organize a Turkish force in time 
 to be of any use, and that to dispatch troops of the Sultan would involve political 
 difficulties. On April 23, Earl Granville telegraphed to Mr. Egerton as follows : 
 
 " ' General Gordon should be immediately instructed to keep us informed in re- 
 gard to any immediate or prospective danger at Khartoum, and that, in order to 
 be prepared for such danger, he should advise us in regard to the force necessary to 
 secure his removal. We do not propose to supply him with a force for tlie pui'- 
 pose of making military expeditions, such being beyond the scope of his commis- 
 sion and contrary to the pacific policy wliich was the purpose of his mission.' " 
 
 Every pretext seems to have l)eeii used to refuse aid. 
 Granville's dispatch is absurd on the very face of it. 
 What good could Gordon accomplish by informing him 
 of any immediate or prospective danger at Khartoum, 
 when it would take four months after the receipt <)f his 
 telegraphic dispatch before any relief could reach him i 
 And what an abuse of words to speak of " the pacific 
 policy which was the purpose of his mission," when Gra- 
 ham had just been slaughtering thousands of Bedouins 
 on the shores of the Red Sea ! 
 
 Left to his own resources, Gordon made the l:)est dispo- 
 sitions in his power. The Mahdi having refused his 
 overtures and having attacked him at Khartoum, Gordon 
 sallied out against him on the 16th of March, but was re- 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 209 
 
 pulsed iu a hard fight at Halfiyeli, just outside of Kliar- 
 toum, by the treachery of two bhick chiefs whom he had 
 made pashas, and who were summarily tried and shot a 
 few days later. Hayino; exhausted the o-old he liad 
 brought from Cairo, he issued Inlls which the merchants 
 accepted upon his personal guaranty, as well as paper and 
 leathei' money for circulation, and in this way he procured 
 funds for soldiers and supplies. He raised an army by 
 promising freedom to slayes who enlisted in his ranks. 
 He protected that army from the attacks of a suj^erior 
 force by planting torpedoes in front of his lines. He 
 conyerted his small river steamers into gun-boats by 
 plating them with iron and l)uilding turrets on them.* 
 But in spite of all his efforts he was already enmeshed 
 in the fatal net which he was . doomed never to break 
 throuofh. 
 
 By the end of March the whole country south of Ber- 
 ber was in a state of reyolution, and Grordon had almost 
 daily fights Avith the enemy, and in the latter half of 
 April his head-quarters at the Khartoum palace were 
 assaulted by the rebels' fire from the opposite shore. By 
 the beginning of May the iVrabs, crossing the Blue Nile, 
 had established themselves at Buri, a mile from the east- 
 ern corner of the entrenchments. At this spot the be- 
 sie2:ers suffered terribly from the mines which General 
 Gordon had laid down. As early as the middle of April 
 Gordon had begun to have recourse to this method of 
 disposing of his assailants. On May 7th, nine mines 
 (according to Mr. Power's diaiy ) were exploded during 
 
 * They were not over sixty or seventy feet long, and had been brought in sec- 
 tions to Berber on camel-back during Baker's governorship. I travelled down on 
 one of them from above Khartoum to Berber in January, 1876, and was frequently 
 grounded, once, among others, at Shaliluka wliere Sir Charles Wilson came to grief. 
 
210 TliG British Cairupaign in the Soudan. 
 
 an attack, and one hundred and twenty of the Mahdi's 
 men were blown to pieces. 
 
 In the meantime Berber was captured and its garrison- 
 massacred, as well as a number of its inhabitants, on the 
 26th of May. So closely was Gordon invested that it 
 was not until the 25 th of June that he and his com- 
 panions had the first news of this additional disaster 
 which isolated them still more from the outer world. 
 Nevertheless they continued their defence with renewed 
 vigor. On July 9th Grordon drove the rebels out of 
 Buri (see plan of Khartoum), killed numbers of them, 
 capturing quantities of rifles and ammunition, and driv- 
 ing the enemy out of thirteen zeribas or stockades, which 
 they had constructed on the river banks. Mr. Power's 
 diary closes at the end of July, up to which date Gordon 
 had lost seven hundred men. He continued the defence 
 so energetically that after three months the siege was 
 raised. Descending the river in four steamers, with 
 troops and cannon, he bombarded and destroyed Berber in 
 September, and drove the rebels from Shendy and all the 
 other positions that they held along the river. But it 
 was impossible for his steamers to navigate beyond Ber- 
 ber. He tried, ho~\7ever, to establish communication 
 with Dongola, and for this purjDose he sent his trusty 
 companion. Colonel O. H. Stewart, Yice-Consul Power,, 
 with Mr. Herbin the French consul, twelve Greeks and 
 other refugees, in the lightest steamer that he had, hoping 
 that the Nile being at full height they might get over 
 the cataracts. By wonderful good luck they passed 
 through the fifth, but near the fourth cataract the steamer 
 struck on a rock, and sank so suddenly that Colonel 
 Stewart and his party barely escaped to the west bank 
 
The 13ritisJi Campaign in the Soudan. 211 
 
 without having time to arm themselves. There they 
 were met by some Bedouins of the Monassir tribe, who- 
 professed friendly intentions and invited them to take 
 shelter in two native houses, where the whole party were- 
 ruthlessly murdered, except a stoker and four sailors. It 
 was learned afterwards that Gordon, hojDeless as to his 
 own fate, had sent Stewart away to save him from the de- 
 struction that he foresaw. For a time Gordon's steamers 
 enabled him to send foraging parties up and down the 
 river, by which means he secured ample supplies for the 
 garrison and the people. There is but little doubt that 
 if he had thought only of his own safety he might at that 
 time have escaped with a small body of picked men, by 
 steaming up the river to the equator and taking his 
 chances of making his way across to Zanzibar, But 
 all his steamers together could not transport over eight 
 hundred men, and his departure would leave Khartoum 
 and all its helpless inhabitants to the same fate that had 
 befallen the people of Berber. It is needless to say that 
 Gordon would have died a hundred times sooner than seek 
 his own safety by abandoning his post and the people 
 who trusted him. 
 
 From that time the cords drew closer and tighter about 
 him. The enemy planted along the river the Krupp 
 guns they had captured fi'om Hicks and at El Obeid, and 
 seriously impeded the movements of the steamers. But 
 Gordon's energy never relaxed, and what is most wonder- 
 ful, though a great part of the population was disaffected, 
 and many of his soldiers deserted him, yet so great was 
 the power of his character that the rest remained faithful 
 to him to the last moment. How many times in those 
 weary days must he have gazed with anxious eyes dow» 
 
212 Tlit JJritkli Campaign in tlie tSoudan. 
 
 tlie Nile, watching in vain for tlie approach of the relief 
 which nevei' came until it was too late ! 
 
 While he was thus continuing his heroic struggle, let 
 us see what was being done for his rescue. 
 
 We have already seen that it was not until the 18th of 
 August that the Suakim route was finally abandoned, and 
 the Nile route adopted, but there Avas still time to achieve 
 success, if an energetic effort had been made to redeem 
 the precious time already lost. Unfortunately more time 
 yet was wasted in useless delays. General Wolseley, 
 the hero of the holiday campaign of Tel-el-Kebir, in high 
 favor in court circles, and pi'ocl aimed (very erroneousl}?") 
 by his admirers as England's only general, was just then 
 receiving an ovation in Londou, and he was called in to 
 advise the Ministry. Having gained his first laurels by 
 the use of whale-boats and Canadian voyageurs in the 
 Red-River expedition in 1870, he insisted that the same 
 means were absolutely necessary on the Nile. A 
 dispatch, dated '' War OtRce, August 8, 1884," was 
 addressed to Lieutant-General Stephenson, by the Mar- 
 quis of Hartington, detailing the plan adopted for the 
 expedition up the Nile for the relief of Gordon, which 
 plan was evidently drawn up by Lord Wolseley. It pro- 
 posed the use of small boats for transportation beyond 
 the second cataract, '' such as were employed in the Red- 
 River expedition." 
 
 To this Lieutenant-General Stephenson replied by tele- 
 graph : " Small boats proposed not suitable. Can procure 
 large amount water transport locally." 
 
 Being a practical soldier, and gifted with the common- 
 sense and ability to make use of the means that he found 
 a*fc hand, he saw the folly of wasting invaluable time 
 
The British Campaign in the iSoudan. 213 
 
 waiting for boats to be built in England, while plenty 
 better suited for the purpose could be had on the spot. 
 But his curt condemnation of Lord Wolseley's pet idea, 
 no doubt, cost the lieutenant-general the command of the 
 Nile expedition, and unfortunately caused the appoint- 
 ment of the originator of the plan ; for on August 26th, 
 he received from the War Office the following telegram : 
 
 "After anxious consideration, her Majesty's Government have come to the con- 
 clusion that it is unjust to you to ask you to be responsible for directing an opera- 
 tion which, after full knowledge of plan, yoii consider to be impracticable. They 
 have, therefore, decided to send Lord Wolseley to take temporarily the chief com- 
 mand in Egypt. Government highly appreciate the manner in whicli you have 
 carried out the important and difficult duties of your command, and earnestly hope 
 that you may feel yourself able to remain in Egypt whilst Lord Wolseley is there, 
 and assist him with your advice." • 
 
 Lieutenant-General Stephenson promptly replied : 
 ^' Will willingly remain here as you wish." Thus it fol- 
 lo^ved that three months more were lost while the boats 
 were being built and the voyageurs were being enlisted 
 in Canada, so that it was the 19th of November before 
 the first division of the expeditionary force was ready to 
 start from A¥ady Haifa, in eight hundred whale-boats. 
 Judging from the illustrations in the London Graphicy 
 from dra\vings made on the spot, it must have been a 
 very brilliant spectacle, the white-painted whale-boats, 
 in double file, each covered with an awning, towed by 
 steamers, the soldiers sitting comfortably smoking their 
 pipes with all the ease of pleasure tourists. It seemed 
 like a parade or a review, and must have looked very 
 picturesque — mais ce n'etait pas la- guerre. No doubt 
 the expedition appeared much more symmetrical, much 
 more pleasing to a martinet's eye than if it had been 
 transported in the common rough countr}- boats. I am 
 
214 The JBritish Campaign in tlie Soudan, 
 
 not able to state what was the expense in money of this 
 extra-smartness of appearance, bnt I know this : its ulti- 
 mate cost was Gordon's life, and the success of the relief 
 expedition. How could Wolseley fail to understand that 
 no superiority of English boats and Canadian voyageurs 
 (which was by no means proved by the performance) 
 could compensate for the delay it involved 'i When it is 
 remembered that iha advance of the relieving force 
 reached Khartoum only three days after Gordon's death, 
 can there be any doubt that the catastrophe would have 
 been averted by the saving of two or three weeks, not to 
 say months, of the time so unnecessarily wasted ? 
 
 And yet, Gordon's situation must have been perfectly 
 well known to General Wolseley. In a letter dated Sept. 
 9th Gordon said : " We have sufficient money and provis- 
 ions to last four months. At the end of that time we 
 shall be much embarrassed." 
 
 Another letter, published in the official "Egyptian 
 Blue-Book," addressed to General Lord Wolseley, dated 
 November 4th, says : 
 
 " I have five steamers and nine guns at Metemneh awaiting your orders. I can 
 hold out forty days longer with ease. After that it will be difficult. The loss of 
 Colonel Stewart is terrible. I told him to give you all the information possible. 
 He had my journal from January 3 to September 10. The Malidi is eight miles 
 from Khartoum. Sennaar is all right. ]\Iy journal from September 10 to date is 
 on board one of the steamers which you will find at Metemneh. I continue to 
 have occasional fights with the Arabs. It is rumored that all the Europeans 
 with the Mahdi, including Slatin Bey and the nuns, liave become Mussul- 
 mans. Lupton Bey has surrendered. I have sent out scores of messengers 
 in all directions during the last eight months. Do not send private letters to me, 
 the risk is too great. Do not write to me in cipher. I have none and it is of no 
 use. The Mahdi knows every thing. Take the road from Ambukol to Metemneh. 
 You need not fear the Mahdi. Both the Greek consul and the Austrian consul 
 are safe. The Mahdi has captured a letter from the king of Abyssinia to me. 
 Your expedition, as I understand, is for the relief of the gairison of Khartoum, 
 which I failed to accomplish. I decline to admit that it is for the rescue of me 
 personally." 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 2 1 5 
 
 It was evident from this that Gordon considered it im- 
 possible to hold out beyond Jan. 1st at the latest, and that 
 Wolseley was aware of it. But even after the start was 
 made, Wolseley's advance was unaccountably slow, for he 
 took forty days to reach Korti, 400 miles, with only 
 6,000 men, while 4,000 more were still below Dongola. 
 If his excuse was the difficulties of navigation, they 
 could have been avoided by starting when the river was 
 high. He was now (Dec. 16th) at the great bend of 
 the Nile, where it chano-es its course from south-west 
 to north, 160 miles from Abou-Hamed and- about the 
 same from Metemneh. He was at last within striking- 
 distance of the enemy and might expect an attack at any 
 moment. Strategy dictated concentration, instead of 
 which he sent oJff General Herbert Stewart, on the 30th,. 
 across the Bahiuda desert to Gakdul wells, 97 miles off, 
 with 1,150 men and 2,000 camels. Leaving the troops 
 there, Stewart returned to Korti and went back on 
 the 8th of January with 1,500 more men and as many 
 camels. By this time more troops having reached Korti,. 
 Wolseley, without waiting to see the result of Stewart's 
 movement, sent away General Earle up the Nile towards 
 Abou-Hamed, at right angle w"ith Stewart's direction, 
 with 2,500 men, while he remained at Korti with an 
 equal numbei', entirely beyond supporting distance of 
 those two detachments which were now several days'' 
 march from him. 
 
 Meanwhile Stewart left a small force to hold Gakdul 
 wells— which, by the way, are not wells at all, but 
 natural rock reservoirs of rain-water, much preferable 
 to wells as Ions; as their water holds out. Thence he ad- 
 vanced towards another reservoir at Abu-Klea, twenty- 
 
216 The British Oa/mpaign hi the Soudan. 
 
 three miles from the Nile, but he found the enemy barring- 
 the way, about three thousand strong, in two divisions. 
 On Saturday, Jan. 17th, Stewart, leaving his baggage in 
 a zeriba, moved his force of fifteen hundred men in 
 sej^uare formation, with artillery at the angles. The 
 British passed around the flank of the enemy who then 
 wheeled and charged furiously upon the front of the 
 square. Recoiling from the terrible fire which met them 
 there, they turned and attacked the rear of the square, 
 where a cavalry and a camel regiment (dismounted) were 
 stationed. This side of the square was broken, " owing, 
 it is said, to the unruly conduct of the camels, which got 
 powder-burned and became unmanageable." The British 
 maintained a hand-to-hand conflict with admirable steadi- 
 ness, while the other parts of the square and the enfilad- 
 ing fire of the artillery did terrible execution. It was 
 while rallying and reforming the broken square that the 
 gallant Colonel Burnaby, the hero of twenty battles and 
 of the " Ride to Khiva," was killed. He had cut down 
 one Bedouin and was parrying the sword-thrusts of 
 another, Avhen a third rushed past him, turned around, 
 and pierced him in the neck with his spear. The enemy 
 were finally driven back, leaving eight hundi'ed slain 
 around the square. 
 
 By five o'clock the Hussars had possession of the wells, 
 where the troops remained to rest and procure water until 
 four o'clock of the afternoon of the 18th. With the 
 purpose of striking the Nile above Metemneh, General 
 Stewart turned slightly to the right after passing the 
 wells of Shebacat. 
 
 " Nothing was seen of the enemy until sunrise on the igth, when the troops ar- 
 rived at a point some five miles distant from the Nile. The Soudanese were thep 
 
 \ 
 
Tlie British ikmipaign in the Soudan. 217 
 
 seen to be in great force between our troops and the Nile, and mainly gathered 
 about some intervening ridges. General Stewart, however, as the troops had been 
 marching all night, determined that the men should not fight upon empty stomachs, 
 and called a halt. 
 
 " The troops were promptly dismounted, and the first care of the General was to 
 form a zeriba. The camels were unloaded and a fortification was thrown up, com- 
 posed pi-incipally of the saddles and baggage. The hospital was placed in the cen- 
 tre, protected by Gardner and Gatling guns. All the vi^liile the men were construct- 
 ing the zeriba, a hot fire was kept up by the enemy's sharpshooters, who were 
 concealed behind bushes and high grass on all sides. 
 
 "Their fire was, on the whole, well directed, and had most disastrous effect, 
 General Stewart himself lieing severely wounded in the thigh. Altogether twelve 
 were killed and forty wounded here. Mr. Cameron, the correspondent, of .the 
 Standard, and Mr. St. Leger Herbert, representing the Morning Post, were also 
 shot dead. Mr. Burleigh, of the Daily Telegraph, was slightly wounded. The 
 command now devolved by seniority upon Sir Charles Wilson. 
 
 " When the zeriba was nearly completed, the force was formed into a square and 
 the advance was sounded at 2 P.M. The front of the square was composed of the 
 Naval Brigade and Grenadiers, the right flank of the Coldstreams, Scots Guards, 
 and part of the Heavy Corps, and the left flank of the Mounted Infantry, while 
 the Sussex Regiment and the remainder of the Heavy Corps brought up the rear. 
 
 ' ' After the British force had advanced for about two miles, the enemy also 
 began to move forward in two large bodies in echelon. They first directed their 
 attack on our right front, toward which they charged, but our men stood perfectly 
 steady and delivered a terrific fire into their midst, mowing them down in heaps. 
 So telling was each volley that none of the attacking force could get within sixty 
 yards of our front line, though they made three desperate charges. Our loss here 
 was six killed and twenty-three wounded. The guns were worked admirably by 
 Captain Norton of the Royal Artillery, and did immense execution. 
 
 " While one body of the enemy was thus fruitlessly attacking the square, another 
 body, mostly on horseback, made for the zeriba. The force garrisoning it was 
 made up of detachments of every corps, under the command of T^ord Charles 
 Beresford, R.N. The attack on the zeriba was sustained for two hours, when the 
 enemy were compelled to retreat before the fierce fire kept up by the garrison from_ 
 guns and rifles alike. One man was killed and three wounded while they were 
 helping to erect a small redoubt some fifty yards to the right of the zeriba. This 
 small work, when finished, was held by Lord Cochrane and forty of the Life 
 Guards and Scot Greys, who by their steady fire did much to repel the constant 
 rushes of the enemy. 
 
 " The loss of the rebels during the whole day must have been quite 2,000, reck- 
 oning both killed and wounded. Among the enemy's forces were many slaves, 
 several of whom gave themselves up to the British. They say the Mahdi sent them 
 from Khartoum. 
 
 "At sunset the square reached the Nile, and then encamped for the night. 
 Early next morning the square mnrched back to the zeriba, and in the evening the 
 
218 The British Ccwnpaign in the Soudan, 
 
 whole force returned to the river, where strong intrenchments were thrown up. 
 The total British loss, including the loss at Abu-Klea, was one hundred and four 
 killed and two hundred and sixteen wounded. 
 
 " On Tuesday we moved forward through the villages surrounding Metemneh, 
 and on Wednesday morning a reconnoissance in force was made of the place itself. 
 It proved to be tolerably well fortified. Some shots were fired from the Gardner 
 and Gatling guns, and the enemy answered occasionally with one gun or with rifle- 
 shots fired through loopholes in the walls. Very little was, however, seen of the 
 defenders, who appeared very unwilling to show themselves. A pleasant surprise, 
 however, was in store for the men, as four of Gordon's steamers arrived on the 21st, 
 which at once landed five hundred men and five guns as reinforcements.". 
 
 They had left Khartoum about one month before, and 
 reported that Gordon had been fighting hard for two 
 weeks before they left. No doubt he had sent them for- 
 ward to hasten up the relief which he was looking for. 
 An evidence of his belief in the hopelessness of his situa- 
 tion is the fact that he sent his diaries and other impor- 
 tant papers by these steamers, in order that they at least 
 might be preserved, and in an accompanying lettei* he 
 said that he knew he was being betrayed, but that he 
 was powerless to prevent it. 
 
 On the 22d and 23d, Sir Charles Wilson, on Gordon's 
 steamers, bombarded Sheudy for two hours with six 
 guns, destroying the town almost completely. Several 
 villages around Metemneh were also burned to the 
 ground, but as it turned out it was a fatal loss of time, 
 "for had Sir Charles Wilson started on the 21st as soon as 
 the steamers reached him, he might have arrived in time. 
 It was not until the 24th that he left for Khartoum on 
 two steamers with part of the Sussex regiment, Colonel 
 Boscawen being left in command of the entrenchment at 
 Gubat with about nine hundred men. Lord Wolseley, 
 before hearing of Stewart's victory, had on Monday, the 
 26th, despatched a strong convoy to Gakdul, followed on 
 
Hie British Campaign in the Soudan. 219 
 
 Wednesday, tlie 28th, by the Royal Irish and the West 
 Kent regiments. 
 
 When Sir Charles Wilson started for Khartoum from 
 Metemneh, his expedition was not supposed to be hazard- 
 ous. The report that Onidurman had been captured by 
 the Mahdi on the 13th rendered it probable that the 
 steamers might have to run the gauntlet of a few shots 
 when they arrived at the junction of the Blue and White 
 Niles ; but this was not regarded as a formidable danger. 
 The vessels continued on their way unmolested, and they 
 reached Halfiyeh on the 28th. 
 
 " Here the banks of the river were lined with rebels, who opened fire with four 
 Krupp guns at the steamer. No material damage seems to have been done, 
 'Owing, no doubt, to the fact that General Gordon had all the steamers protected as 
 far as possible with plates of iron and other means of keeping out missiles. They 
 •discoveied that the repoit that Onidurman had fallen int ) the hands of the enemy 
 was only too true, and from that position also the enemy opened fire. Things 
 began to look worse v/hen the enemy was found to be in possession of the island 
 ■of Tuti, which lies ai the junction of the two Niles, just outside the city of Khar- 
 toum (see plan of Khartoum). Still pressing on under a storm of bullets, they 
 •came within hail of Khartoum. To their dismay they found that instead of being 
 welcomed as deliverers, the garrison of the capital took up the fire from which they 
 had been suffering and received them as foes. No flags were flying from the public 
 ibuildiiigs in the town, which appeared to be in undisputed possession of the enemy. 
 The palace, a well-known building, visible from the river, was to all appearance 
 gutted. Finding it impossible to effect a landing in face of the overwhelming 
 forces of the enemy, they "were compelled to lelreat out of range, and then 
 ■endeavor to obtain what information ihey could by communication with the shore 
 ;as to the fate which had befallen General Gordon. All reports agreed in asserting 
 that Khartoum was in the hands of the Mahdi, and that tlie city passed into 
 his possession by treachery." 
 
 Five natives present at the time declared that the offi- 
 ■cers commanding the three steamers left at Khartoum 
 took the Mahdi's troops to the main gate of the city, 
 where they entered under cover of the night. 
 
 It was ascertained later, with a considerable degree of 
 probability, that for several days previous Farragh-Pasha 
 
220 The British Campaign, in the Soudan. 
 
 (a Soudanese promoted by Gordon) liad been receiving- 
 from tlie Malidi proposals for a capitulation ; that he had 
 repeatedly pressed Gordon to accept the terms offered, 
 which the latter angrily refused to do ; that on the aftei- 
 noon preceding the capture, Farragh had again urged a 
 surrender, probably showing an insubordinate spirit, and 
 that Gordon, yielding to one of those impulses of ungov- 
 ernable wrath which were a trait of his character, struck 
 Farragh and drove him from his presence. That night 
 (26th), Farragh being in charge of the ramparts, admitted 
 the enemy within the gates. He soon reaped the just 
 I'eward of his treason. A few days after the capture he 
 was put to the torture to make him reveal the hiding- 
 place of supposed treasures, after which he was hanged on 
 the public square at Omdurman. 
 
 For a few days some doubts were entertained as to 
 Gordon's fate. The most reliable reports assert that the 
 Mahdi had 60,000 men in the vicinity of Khartoum, and 
 tliat he introduced a number of his emissaries into the 
 city. Those emissaries mingled freely with the native 
 troops under General Gordon, and by bribes, threats, and 
 a]:>peals to their religious feelings induced them to 
 mutiny. Seven thousand of the garrison deserted to the 
 rebels, leaving General Gordon only 2,500 faithful 
 soldiers. A dispatch of Feb. 17th gives the following 
 account of his death, afterwards confirmed b}^ others : 
 
 "A cavass of Ibrahim Bey Ruchdi, who accompanied General Gordon from 
 Cairo, has come in from Khartoum. He states that on the morning of the 26th 
 of January he heard a disturbance, and came out witli his master to see what was 
 the matter. They met General Gordon, with about 20 cavasses and some 
 notables, coming out of the inner gate. When the party arrived at an open space 
 before the house the rebels met them and fired, killing General Gordon, his secre- 
 tary, and some others, and the survivors fled. A few soldiers turned out and fired 
 
Tile British Campaign in the Soudafi. 221 
 
 at one of the gates, but there was scarcely any fighting, and Khartoum was practi- 
 cally taken without firing a shot." •- 
 
 This was followed by a second dispatch : 
 
 " KoRTi, Feb. 17th, Midnight. 
 " A messenger attached to the Intelligence Department has come in six days 
 from Nasri, a place about one day's journey from Khartoum. He corroborates 
 the news of the fall of Khartoum and the death of General Gordon. The regular 
 soldiers were marched out of Khartoum into the Njunnit camp, some of them 
 being killed by the Mahdi's troops, who fired on them as they left the town. All 
 the Turkish — /. t'., Egyptian soldiers were killed by the rebels, who, however, did 
 not kill the women and children. The men liolding Tuti Island also fled. The 
 Austrian consul was killed in his own house, while M. Nicola, the Greek consul, 
 and a doctor were taken alive." 
 
 It is believed that about 4,000 of tlie Greek, Levan- 
 tine, and Egyptian residents were slaughtered, but the 
 horrors of the massacre that occurred that night will nevei' 
 be fully known. 
 
 Such was the trao;ic fate of one of the most chivalrous 
 and noble-hearted soldiers that ever shed lustre not only 
 upon his own country, but upon the human race, 
 
 Khartoum fell on the 26th of Jan., and Sir Charles 
 Wilson arrived in sight of the captured city on the morn- 
 ing of the 28th. Before giving up the attempt to reach 
 it, his steamers sustained for four hours the fire of thou- 
 sands of riflemen, eight Krupps, and several machine- 
 guns. One man was killed and five were wounded on 
 board the vessels. There was no .alternative but to re- 
 turn to Grubat. On the 29th one of the steamers was 
 wrecked and had to be abandoned. On the 31st, accord- 
 ing to the report of Lieut. Stuart-Wortley (R. N.), the 
 other steamer, on which were Sir Charles Wilson and his 
 party, was wrecked about four miles above the enemy's 
 position, Just below the Shabluka cataract. The steamer, 
 while dropp'ng down stern foremost nearly clear of the 
 cataract, struck hard, and the rock made a large hole 
 
:222 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 in tlie bow. She sank to tile level of the deck. Sir 
 Charles bivouacked on an island with his party, to 
 which were added some 250 fugitives from Khartoum, 
 whom he picked up along the Nile. His intention was 
 to remain there until relieved. Lieut. Stuart- Wortley, 
 with four Englishmen and eight natives, left at dusk in a 
 row-boat and floated safely by the enemy's works through 
 a few volleys of musketry. They arrived at Gubatat 3 
 o'clock on the morning of the 1st. Immediately on re- 
 ceiving the news, Lord Charles Beresford, R. N., com- 
 manding the Naval Brigade, with the Sofia, one of the 
 steamers left at Gubat, manned by British seamen of the 
 Naval Brigade, started up the river to relieve Sir Charles 
 Wilson and his companions. The steamer moved up 
 slowly against the stream, and was not able to get up 
 there before Tuesday (8d). It was fired at incessantly 
 by the enemy's riflemen, who were estimated to be 4,000 
 strong, and a battery of three Krupp guns, at a point 
 about forty miles above Metemneh, The steamer was 
 almost past the position when a round shot went through 
 the boiler, but the vessel went on some 200 yards with 
 the remaining steam, thus getting away 500 yards from 
 the enemy, whose two guns ^^'^ere in embrasures pointing 
 down the stream. The steamer then anchored, and the 
 Gardner and the heavy guns were shifted so as to fire 
 straight to the front. The enemy were then unable to 
 show. above the parapet, and dared not move their gun 
 to the only embrasure pointing up stream, but fired 
 wildly from the others. Only the guns' muzzles were 
 visible, and the detachments in charge were unable to 
 point their pieces towards the steamer, because they must 
 have exposed themselves. The enemy had neglected to 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 223 
 
 provide a covered way for getting out of their rifle-pits, 
 and when any one attempted to leave them, the Gardner 
 and the marksmen speedily accounted for him. Lord 
 Beresford then anchored, and Chief Engineer Henry 
 Bembow, E,. N., repaired the boiler under fire. Fortu- 
 nately the missiles mostly went over tlie vessel, the range 
 being only 500 j^ards. Sir C. Wilson, seeing a dense 
 cloud of steam rise, thought that the boiler had burst. 
 He lauded his party, guns, etc., on the right bank, and 
 marched down towards the spot, aiding Lord C. Beres- 
 ford by his fire. Tuesday afternoon and night were 
 spent in the diflicult work of effecting repairs. Sir C. 
 Wilson halted for the night a few miles lo^ver dovvn; 
 next morning Lord C. Beresford picked the party up, 
 taking them on to Gubat. 
 
 " The enemy liad considered the capture of the steamer a certainty, and when 
 they saw in the morning that she M^as getting up steam and in sound condition, 
 they were in consternation. The steamer went a couple of hundred ynrds up 
 stream so as to turn round out of range, and then came down at a speed of nine 
 knots. Mr. Keppel put a shell into the centre of an embrasure. The enemy 
 seemed afraid to show themselves above their defences, and they must have lost 
 heavily by the steamer's fire The whole party at length got away on the morning 
 of the 4th. The steamer's loss amounted to one seaman killed, seven men wounded, 
 and Lieutenant Van Koughnet, R. N., wounded. Several men were scalded by 
 the outburst of sleam. Sir Charles Wilson's loss was two men killed, and twenty 
 wounded — all Egyptians, — and four men of the Sussex Regiment slightly injured." 
 
 Gen. Wilson arrived at Gubat Feb. 6th, and left the 
 same day for Korti. 
 
 The revulsion of feeling when the news of Gordon's 
 death reached London was beyond description. The 
 London Times of Jan. 30th (weekly edition), after pub- 
 lishing the accounts of Stewart's victory, said in its edi- 
 torial column : 
 
 ' ' It is a new evidence of Gordon's untiring energy and inexhaustible resource that 
 as soon as the relieving e.vpedition touches the Nile, he is ready to offer substantial 
 
224 Tlie British Cam/paign in the Soudan. 
 
 assistance. His steamers will now exercise a potent effect upon the fortunes of the 
 campaign, since they not only increase enormously the striking power of the little 
 force encamped at Gubat, but will also enable a helping hand to be held out to 
 General Earle as soon as he reaches the navigable portion of the river. In fact, 
 thanks to them and the heroic exertions of Sir Herbert Stewart, Lord Wolseley now 
 has hold of Khartoum itself, and the military object of the expedition is practically 
 attained. The moral effect of these victories, and of the commanding position they 
 secure, cannot but be enormous, and any further resistance that may be offered by 
 the Mahdi must be of a comparatively broken and ineffectual kind. It now remains 
 to make a wise use of the magnificent results attained by the courage of our troops, 
 and to see that policy shall in some degree rise to the level attained by our arms. 
 Some permanent arrangement must be made for the maintenance of the advan- 
 tages 'so dearly bought, and for the enduring settlement of a district consecrated by 
 the blood of brave men, and rendered forever memorable by the extraordinary 
 achievements of General Gordon." 
 
 Two days later this ven' natural exultation was 
 changed into mourning and indignation. A few extracts 
 from tlie London press will show better than any woi'ds 
 of mine the state of ])ublic sentiment at the time. 
 
 The Times, in its editorial discussion of the last news 
 from Egypt, says : 
 
 " No words of ours are adequate to express the mingled feelings of dismay, con- 
 sternation, and indignant disgust which have been universally evoked by this news. 
 The present situation is the lamentable result of a long course of disregard of the 
 elementary maxims, of statesmanship. The country is obliged to confess that every 
 thing has been done that could be done to add to the risks of defeat. Advice has 
 been spurned, time wasted, and opportunity lost. The splendid valor of our sol- 
 diers, which offered the last chance for retrieving the mistakes of policy, was handi- 
 capped by the choice of a line of march which was at the same time long and diffi- 
 cult and without means of communication and without a base of supplies. By the 
 loss of Khartoum, which was his objective point, Lord Wolseley's whole expedition 
 is in the air. Concentration of his forces is the first necessity which confronts Lord 
 Wolseley. But where shall he concentrate ? The only effective base is Suakim, 
 and to make this available, Osman Digma must be vanquished, and the road to> 
 Berber opened. General Gordon must be saved or avenged. . The honor of the 
 country must he vindicated at whatever cost." 
 
 In another place the Times says : 
 
 " The fall of that solitary figure (Gordon), holding aloft the flag of Erigland in the 
 face of hordes of the sons of Islam, will reverberate through every bazaar of Cairo 
 and Calcutta. The result will be a long and deliberate abandonment of respect for 
 the British Government and its officials bv the followers of Islam. But England 
 
The British Qampaign in the Soiidcm. 225 
 
 will save General Gordon, if alive, and if slain, will a\enge his death. Woe to his 
 murderers, if he has been killed ! " 
 
 Tlie StcDidard says in its leading article : 
 
 "Let none foriiet General Gordon's last act of heroism. Though knowing: that 
 X harilU -^aitors in his camp, he stood by the town and people committed to his 
 I* ^vge, and sent his only means of escape to help the British expedition on its way 
 to his relief. He has won undying fame for his country if only by this act. The 
 grievous blow which England has suffered must be met with calm reason, and not 
 with panic passion. All party spirit must be dropped, and a resolution taken by 
 the whole country that the path of precedence and honor points to a recapture of 
 Khartoum. If we shirk this duty, the lives of thousands of British soldiers will 
 have to be risked hereafter in trying to retrieve the blunder." 
 
 The Morni'iig Post says : 
 
 " The mouse-trap policy of the Mahdi appears to have had terrible success. It 
 seems that the Mahdi's calculation was to lure the British army into a perilous posi- 
 tion. The pressing question of the moment is, ' Can Lord Wolseley rescue General 
 Stewart's column ? ' " 
 
 On the 6th of Feb., the Times said : 
 
 •' The news of the fall of Khartoum is the worst that has reached this country for 
 many years, and the gravity of the situation so abruptly revealed can neither be con- 
 cealed nor palliated. Thought serves only to bring home the full meaning of the 
 announcement. It matters little whether the event took place two days or two 
 months before the arrival of Sir C. Wilson ; the goal of the expedition is in the full 
 possession of the enemy : the present operations are at an end. At last the thin 
 ice over which the country has been led for so many weeks has broken up, and 
 we are face to face with dangers which it is useless to attempt to hide. That the 
 mere announcement of the fall of Khartoum should have brought such a complete 
 change over the whole military situation is a sufficient proof of the complete un- 
 soundness of our military policy, — a policy depending on chance for. its fulfilment, 
 inadequate and contrary to the great principles of military science, unable to bear 
 the stress of the smallest failure. The expedition has toiled for months up the 
 Nile ; it has made a long desert journey ; it has suffered and fought. But the 
 present emergency finds it still not in possession of Berber, the most important 
 strategic point of all, and the one which, as was pointed out long ago, should 
 have been the first objective. If we were now at Berber, instead of at Gubat, 
 the outlook would be altogether different.* Berber could be reached in six 
 weeks by fresh troops. f How are we to get to Gubat, to Debbeh, or some 
 point in rear ? There is surely nothing to be gained by minimizing the gravity 
 
 * Not at all unless the road to Suakim were open. 
 
 f Where from and how? Still clinging to the delusion of the Suakim-Berber 
 route. 
 
226 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 of the situation ; the wisest course will be to accept frankly the possibilities 
 with which we are confronted, and to face the danger at once. At Abu Klea there 
 is a force perhaps two hundred and fifty strong, with many wounded. At Gubat 
 .there are about nine hundred men, with more wounded. Abu Klea and Gubat 
 have been made strong enough to withstand any direct attack at present buVa 
 neither the provisions nor the ammunition supply can be very large. Theic _-_Jjr^ jhi 
 camels, it is true, and there is an ample supply of water. Metemneh is still hei- J^ 
 by at least two thousand Arabs, whom we cannot now afford to dislodge, and whose 
 proximity constitutes a source of danger under certain circumstances. Tm^o steam- 
 ers remain at Metemneh apparently, and have doubtless been secured : but their 
 crews may be treacherous, since the stranding of Sir C. Wilson's steamers may not 
 have been accidental. One infantry regiment is approaching Abu Klea, marching 
 slowly and in detachments across the desert. Another was intended to follow. The 
 wells are held by a force little exceeding a battalion. General Earle is somewhere 
 near Birteh with four regiments. The dispersion of force which has thus been 
 arrived at is extreme, and two courses only present themselves to Lord Wolseley. 
 He may retire his whole force on both lines of advance, and concentrate at Deb- 
 beh, the strategical importance of which point, in view of a possible advance of the 
 Arabs, has been previously noticed. No position higher up the Nile would be 
 equally secure. Or he may reinforce Gubat, and pressing General Earle's column 
 forward, make the attempt to seize Berber at any sacrifice. The river navigation 
 before the flotilla is, however, very diflicult, and weeks must elapse before General 
 Earle can count on reaching Berber ; while, with only two steamers available, to 
 make the attempt from Gubat appears barely possible. We may expect, therefore, 
 thai Lord Wolseley will fall back, if it is yet possible to do so, and measures must 
 betaken without a moment's delay to open the Suakim-Berber route at any sacrifice. 
 The option no longer exists ; the step must be taken if the military situation in the 
 Soudan is to be saved. Berber must be taken whatever it may cost. There is no 
 alternative policy of retirement ; the honor of the country must be maintained, 
 even if forty thousand men are required. We have been brought face to face with 
 a grave emergency, and we must meet it like men." 
 
 This language was a reflex of tlie popular feeling, aud 
 indicated a natural, altliougli unreasonable, desire foi- 
 vengeance. The government announced that General 
 Wolseley would be ordered to capture Berber and Khar- 
 toum at any cost, and to inflict the direst punishment 
 upon the rebels. Punishment for what, if those people 
 were Justifiable in fighting for their freedom ? Gordon 
 had fallen by a surprise in a night attack, but this was a 
 perfectly legitimate incident of war. The government's 
 
Tlie British Caiwpaign in the Soudan. ^'2T 
 
 subsequent course made it doubtful whetlier these 
 menaces were any more than a stratagem to gain the 
 time necessary to calm popular excitement. 
 
 The most important, in fact the vital, question just now 
 was whether General Wolseley's forces could be brought 
 back safely from their exceedingly perilous position. 
 
 We have already seen that General Wolseley, having 
 arrived within striking distance of an enemy who, one 
 year before, had proved his ability to put 100,000 men 
 in the field, had sent General Herbert Stewart with 2,500 
 men across the Bahiuda desert, 160 miles, to Gubat ; and 
 at the same time, General Earle, with 2,500 men up the 
 Nile, at right angle to Stewart's course. Looking at the 
 map, it will be seen Earle had to follow the river 160 
 miles to x\bou-Hamed, where it makes another sharp 
 elbow, and resumes its north and south direction. 
 From Abou-Hamed to Berber is 133 miles, making 
 up to that point 293 miles of the most difficult naviga- 
 tion, this being by far the worst section of the Nile. 
 From Berber, where it again becomes navigable, to 
 Gubat, is 150 miles. So that Earle would have had to 
 travel 443 miles before he could hope to make his junc- 
 tion with Stewart. The latter had taken with him nearly 
 all the available camel transportation. Earle took the 
 greater part of the water and transportation and could not 
 possibly leave the proximity of the river, while Wolseley 
 at Korti, with 2,500 men, had no transportation of any 
 kind sufficient to move to the support of either Stewart 
 or Earle. Wolseley's army was thus divided into three 
 fractions of 2,500 men, at the three angles of an equi- 
 lateral triangle of 150- or 160- mile sides — utterly beyond 
 tactical supporting distance of each other, and this in a 
 
 / 
 
228 Tlie Sritish Cam/paign in the Soudan. 
 
 country where the enemy would certainly attack the two 
 moving columns separately, and where no supplies could 
 be found, except what the troops carried with them. 
 A more absolute disregard of strategy cannot be con- 
 ceived. 
 
 When Wolseley sent General Herbert Stewart across 
 the desert to Metemneh, it must have been with the' ex- 
 pectation of opening communication with Gordon. The 
 steamers would then have transported Stewart's force 
 to Khartoum, and it is to be supposed that Wolseley, 
 leaving a reserve at Korti and strongly occupying the 
 desert route by establishing fortified posts at the wells of 
 Hambok, Abu-Haifa, Gakdul, and Abu-Klea, would him- 
 self have moved on to Khartoum. Having then com- 
 mand of the river, he could have sent a force by steamers 
 to occupy Berber within three days after reaching Khar- 
 toum. This shows still more manifestly the absurdity of 
 his sending Earle to Berber by the liver some three. hun- 
 dred miles, which it would take him over thirty days to 
 travel. The reason alleged by Wolseley was to cover 
 his flank from a possible attack from Berber, but he 
 would have been infinitely safer from a flank or any othei' 
 movement, if he had kept Earle with him. Now, how- 
 ever, all his calculations were at fault. Khartoum, which 
 he had expected to occupy as his new base, had fallen ; 
 Stewart's column was en Vaif% and if Earle had reached 
 Berber, he would have been isolated there, and in greatei- 
 danger than before. The first step imperatively de- 
 manded was the concentration of the force so rashly 
 scattered. The moment Wolseley was certain of the fall 
 of Khartoum, he should have recalled Earle's column. 
 We will see that it was not %ntil Feb. 14th that Sir 
 
Tlie British Cmnimign in the Soudan. 229 
 
 Red vers Buller fell back to Abu-Klea, and the 25tli wlien 
 Earle's column was ordered to concentrate upon Korti. 
 
 " In the meantime advices from Gubat, dated February ist, gave gloomy state- 
 ments about the condition of General Stewart's little army there. The men had 
 been placed on three-quarter rations These, however, had been once supple- 
 mented with a dole of beans and some fresh meat. 
 
 " On the 7th, dispatches from Korti indicated a very serious state of affairs at 
 the British position near Metemneh. Lord Wolseley telegraphed to the War 
 OfHce that a courier who had just arrived from Gubat reported Colonel Boscawen, 
 the commander at that place, seriously ill, and that the Mahdi's forces were prepar- 
 ing to attack the British camp. The Arabs had several heavy guns, which were 
 being gradixally moved up so as to bear on the British camp, and other field-pieces 
 were being manoeuvred for the same purpose. 
 
 ' ' The main earthworks erected for the protection of the camp from the river 
 front had been greatly strengthened, and it was calculated that they would be com- 
 pleted that night. 
 
 " The remainder of the royal artillery, with ten guns, including one Gardner, 
 had arrived. A convoy had been sent back to Gakdul wells for more stores, and 
 had taken forty of the wounded along. 
 
 ' ' The force at Gubat on the gth consisted of twenty-six hundred men, of whom 
 twenty-three hundred were effective, and several guns. But intelligence was 
 received that the Mahdi's forces were advancing from Khartoum to attack the 
 camp with overwhelming numbers. 
 
 " By this time Sir Redvers Buller, having arrived at Gubat and taken the com- 
 mand, decided to evacuate the riverside fort and retire to Abu Klea, which he con- 
 sidered a better strategical position. Lord Charles Beresford, who had been 
 patrolling the river with his two steamers, so as to prevent, as far as possible, the 
 enemy from erecting fortifications and securing supplies, abandoned the steamers, 
 rendering them useless to the Mahdi by removing the essential portions of the 
 machinery. (All of them were now destroyed except the three captured by the 
 Mahdi at Khartoum, and the command of the river was now in his hands). On 
 the 14th of February the whole of the troops marched out, halted for the night in 
 the desert, and reached Abu Klea the following day. This retreat was probably 
 due to a skirmish on the 13th inst., from which it was evident that the Mahdi was 
 sending powerful reinforcements to Metemneh. A convoy of wounded had left 
 for Gakdul under^ Colonel Talbot, and, when about eight miles on the road, was 
 attacked by a large force of the enemy — part coming from Metemneh and part 
 from Khartoum. A sharp little skirmish ensued, but on the appearance of a de- 
 tachment of light camelry coming from Abu Klea, the enemy disappeared. The 
 convoy met with no further opposition, and reached Gakdul on Tuesday the 17th." 
 
 The gallant Herbert Stewart had died of his wound 
 the day before, and was buried at Grakdul wells. A few 
 
230 TJie Britisli Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 days later Sir Red vers BuUer retreated to Korti, his 
 troops suffering greatly from hunger, heat, and thirst, and 
 severely harassed by the enemy. So difficult was his 
 retreat, that the English press termed it a miraculous 
 escape. 
 
 ' Let us now look at the operations of Earle's column. 
 This general had left Korti on the 5 th of January oh his 
 ex-centric movement towards Abou-Hamed. His progress 
 was very slow, his boats finding great difficulty in passing 
 over the shallows and rapids. He occupied nearly fifteen 
 days in reaching Homdab at the fourth cataract, about 
 ninety miles above Korti. The toils and obstacles he had 
 to contend with show how utterly impossible it would 
 have been for Wolseley to give him any support in case 
 of need. While at the fourth cataract, he had a practi- 
 cal demonstration of the folly of wasting the season of 
 high Nile, for the hapless Col. Stewart's steamer wrecked 
 there last September, by striking a rock two feet below 
 the surface, was now to be seen high and dry sixteen feet 
 above water. It was not until the 24th of January that 
 he left Homdab. I quote Wolseley's dispatch of that date, 
 which shows how greatly he underrated the enemy's 
 tenacity of resistance. 
 
 " General Earle's column, thoroughly provisioned and equipped, comprising 
 artillery, cavalry, and camel corps, staited to-day fiom Homdab for Berber. 'I'he 
 march is to be made by way of Abou-Hamed. The enemy, which includes ihe en- 
 tire fighting force of the Monassir tribe, under the command of Wadgamr, who 
 ordered the murder of Colonel Stewart, and the fighting men of other tribes under 
 Moussa, are assembled in war order at Biiti. This is forty miles above Homdab, 
 the starting-point of to-day's expedition. 
 
 " General Wolseley says that botii Wadgamr and Moussa boast that they are 
 determined to give battle. If so, an engagement between these chiefs and Gen- 
 eral Earle by Monday would seem inevitable. General Wolseley states, however, 
 that the soldiers who go with General Eade are all in the best of health and 
 spirits. They regard General Stewart's battle of last Saturday as a glorious vie- 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 231 
 
 tory, are proud of the achievements of their comrades, and are anxious to meet 
 the rebels on their own account. General Wolseley declares that the Arabs 
 have been depressed by the news of Stewart's victory, and that its effect has been 
 so great and widespread that, in his opinion, it may properly be considered doubt- 
 ful if General Earle meets with any serious opposition before reaching Berber." 
 
 Why so mucli delay occurred is not fully explained. 
 It was only on tlie tenth day after leaving Homdab that 
 Earle had accomplished the forty miles separating him 
 from Birti. Several days were spent in reconnoitring. 
 
 " The enemy were found to be entrenched for a distance of half a mile at Birti, 
 parallel to the river, so as to be able to fire on the boats. Their numbers were es- 
 timated at from two to three thousand, though the natives report that there are 
 many more. The rapids are consequently to be passed in the following manner : 
 On its arrival at the foot of the rapids, one battalion will disembark, march to the 
 top of the bank, and establish itself there, so as to protect the passnge of boats. 
 The next battalion, having brought its boats safely up, will protect the passage of 
 the first, and so on. 
 
 " General Earle's cavalry, while reconnoitring, has found the enemy entrenched 
 in a position flanking the river and across the road. Colonel Butler thereupon fell 
 back. The South Staffordshire Regiment is on the island of Dalka, waiting for 
 the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders). On Thursday, February 7th, the camel 
 corps had a skirmish inland with some hostile Arabs, who were driven from the 
 wells where the engagement occuired with a loss of sixty killed and six taken 
 prisoners. The British troops captured a number of rifles, camels, and cattle." 
 
 Finally, on the 10th, an engagement occurred, which 
 ordinarily would be considered little more than a skir- 
 mish, but w^hich was called the Battle of Birti or Kir- 
 bekan, and is thus related by General Brackenbury, who 
 took command after Earle's death. 
 
 " Camp Opposite Dalka Island, Feb. loth. — Having found the enemy in 
 position stated in telegram of gth inst., General Earle concentrated Staffords and 
 Black Watch here yesterday, reconnoitred the position, and this morning advanced 
 to attack it. Enemy held a high ridge of razor-backed hills, and some advanced 
 koppies in front, close to the river. Two companies Stafford and two guns being 
 left under Col. Aldeyne to hold the enemy in front, we marched six companies 
 Black Watch and six companies Stafford around the high range of hills, entirely 
 turning the enemy's position, which we attacked from the rear. The enemy's 
 numbers were not great, but their position was extremely strong and difficult of 
 access, and they fought with most determined bravery. 
 
232 Tlie British Campaign in tlie Souda/n. 
 
 ' ' The Black Watch advanced over rocks and broken ground upon the koppies, 
 and after having by their fire, in the coolest manner, driven off a rush of the enemy, 
 stormed the position under a heavy fire. General Earle was among the foremost 
 in the attack, and, to tiie deep sorrow of every officer and man in the force, was 
 killed on the summit of the koppie. The Staffords attacked the high ridge over 
 the most difficult ground it was possible for troops to advance upon, and carried 
 the position. In this attack their gallant commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Eyre, was killed. Meanwhile, the squadron of the igth Hussars, under Colonel 
 Uutler, swept round to the rear, and captured the enemy's camp. Our success is 
 complete, and the whole position is in our hands. It is difficult to estimate the 
 enemy's loss, but their dead are lying thick among the rocks and in the open, 
 where, when they found themselves surrounded, they tried to rush through our 
 troops. Scarcely any can have escaped. 
 
 " Our advance by river will be continued to-morrow at daylight, and I shall en- 
 deavor to carry out your instructions to General Earle, with which I am acquainted." 
 
 A dispatch from Kirbekan says : 
 
 ' ' A visit to the scene of Tuesday's battle shows that the enemy's position was 
 strongly fortified and carefully protected by screens of stones and rocks. The 
 South Stafford Regiment was only able to capture the high ridge by climbing on 
 their hands and feet. The ridge is about four hundred feet high." 
 
 " London, Feb. ii, 1885. — The following are additional particulars of General 
 Earle's battle on Tuesday : After the British forces had succeeded in completely 
 surrounding the enemy's position on Tuesday morning, General Earle commanded 
 the Black Watch regiment to carry the enemy's works at the point of the bayonet. 
 The regiment i-esponded gallantly to his command. The pipers struck up, and 
 with inspiring cheers the men moved forward with a steadiness and valor which the 
 ■enemy were unable to withstand, and which called forth expressions of admiration 
 from the lips of General Earle. From loopholes in the enemy's works rifle puffs 
 shot out continuously, but the Black Watch kept bravely advancing. They scaled 
 the difficult rocks which lay in their path, and drove the rebels from their shelter 
 at the point of the bayonet. Unhappily General Earle fell at this point as he was 
 gallantly leading his troops to victory.* 
 
 * When hardly anything else is to be obtained but dry official accounts, it is some- 
 what' refreshing to find a a scrap of individual narrative. The following is taken 
 from a letter of a private soldier to his mother — published in the Nineteenth Century, 
 June, 1885. It illustrates the difference between official 2i\\A actual XyxiXoxj . 
 
 " I read with some interest the account of our little, though important, battle of 
 Kerbeka. I see also that, as usual, through all our three campaigns, the poor 
 public-forgotten 19th Hussars has no mention, excepting that at captured the 
 enemy's camp before their position was taken, with twenty banners, of which 
 twenty I am the possessor of on.e. The account of General Earle's death is some- 
 what? exaggerated. The real thing is this. . After the whole of the position was 
 taken, Earle went up the rocks to inspect a small hut (mud) in which some rebels 
 
Tht Britisli Campaign in, the Soudan. 233 
 
 " Meantime the cavalr)' pushed beyond this scene of conflict and captured the 
 enemy's camp, three miles to the rear of their intrenched position. This manoeuvre 
 was accomplished before the Black Watch had succeeded in carrying the main 
 position. 
 
 "While the main attack was being delivered, two companies of the Soutli Staf- 
 fordshire regiment were directed to seize a high rocky hill which the Arab riflemen 
 were stoutly defending. The British sprang boldly to the charge, but the enemy 
 clung desperately to their position and disputed the ground inch by inch. But the 
 men of Staffordshire were not to be denied, and they finally drove the enemy from 
 the hill. This brought the battle of El Kirbekan to a close. From first to last it 
 was gallantly contested. 
 
 " The enemy consisted of Arabs of the INIonassir and Robatat tribes. With them 
 were numbers of dervishes from Berber. It is impossible to judge of the number 
 of the enemy, owing to their extended position and the rocky nature of the ground. 
 The corpses of the Arabs who were slain lie in heaps upon the ridges from which 
 they were driven by the British charge. The leader of the foe, who was from 
 Berber, and several emirs were among the killed. The number of fugitives who 
 escaped from the field of battle was very small." 
 
 On Wednesday the cavalry, half of the Cornwall regi- 
 ment, and the Egyptian camel corps advanced three miles 
 and occnpied a strong position pending the arrival of the 
 remainder of the column. 
 
 were suspected to be secreted. He was warned not to do so, but he poked 
 his head in at the hole used for a window, put it out again, and beckoned to some 
 one below. Again he put his head in at the fatal window, and as he withdrew it 
 and looked around again, the muzzle of a rifle was placed close to the back of the 
 General's head, and the vagabond inside blew his brains out, the charge coming out 
 of the front of his helmet ; the fellow then threw the rifle at him. The man was 
 brought out of the house by Major Blade, of the Intelligence Department, and was 
 instantly cut into a hundred pieces. There was another house found -with a horse 
 and camel, and inside were twenty-six men and their store of ammunition, and the 
 whole lot were burnt alive in the house, and blown to atoms by the continuous ex- 
 ploding ammunition ; the horse and camel -were also burnt to a cinder ; so that 
 really, you see, the General met with his death through inadvertence. He was a 
 brave man, and deserves all credit. When our column marched out on that 
 eventful Pancake Day, we Hussars scouted away in front of all ; next came the 
 poor General leading the infantry, amongst whom was Colonel Eyre, of the 
 Staffordshire Regiment, notable in that he rose from the ranks ; and when the 
 General gave the order to charge the enemy, Eyre was the first i;p the hill, and 
 turning round he shouted, ' Come on, you men of Staffordshire ; I '11 take this 
 point or die in the attempc ' ; upon which the men rushed up the hill and took it 
 gallantly, and bayoneted every Arab in it ; but the brave old Colonel was shot 
 down. W. H. Saunders, G Troop, igth Hussars. 
 
234 The British Campaign in tJie Soudan. 
 
 It would appear that General Wolseley had not yet 
 opened his eyes to the impossibility of continuing the 
 campaign, for on the 13th of February he telegraphed the 
 Khedive that he believes "there will be no more lighting 
 along the Nile until General Brackenbury reaches Berber^ 
 with the late General Earle's force." 
 
 If he had ever reached Berber he would have found 
 himself out of range of all help, surrounded on all sides, 
 and with no other alternatives but to die in battle or by 
 famine. It is absolutely inconceivable that Wolseley 
 could have thought for a moment of letting him advance 
 farther when he knew that Sir Bedvers Buller was 
 preparing to retreat, and all the steamers were lost. 
 That he was so slow in coming to a just estimate, of the 
 hazardous position of his two detached columns speaks 
 ill for his generalship. His only excuse is perhaps 
 the wild dispatches from London bidding him capture 
 Berber at any cost, and at the same time giving him 
 cartt blanche Si^ to future operations. In the meantime, 
 Bi'ackenbury, having advanced but a short distance above 
 Kirbekan under continuall}^ increasing difficulties, crossed 
 his entire force to the east bank of the Nile on the 25th 
 of February, and had hardly done so when he received 
 orders to fall back at once upon Korti, where the entire 
 army was finally re-concentrated on the 9th of March. 
 But Wolseley's position was still one of the greatest 
 peril, according to all the rules of probability. Judging 
 from the ability and the wonderful energy the Mahdi 
 had displayed before, it was to be supposed that after 
 the capture of Khartoum he would hurl his entire foi'ce 
 against the British, and that the Bedouin tribes occupy- 
 ing the deserts for live hundred miles in their rear 
 
Tlie Bi'UlsJi Oampujigii in the Soudan. 235 
 
 on each side of tlie Nile would rise en masse to cut off 
 their retreat, inflamed by religious enthusiasm as well as 
 as by the knowledge that the rich spoils of the British 
 army would be theirs in case of success.'^^' If these Bedou- 
 ins had combined together, there could have been no es- 
 cape for Wolseley. His only base of supplies was Cairo, 
 from which he was separated by twelve hundred miles of 
 desert. True, the Nile was there, but falling more and 
 more every day for four months to come. Then the fear- 
 ful heat was even now coming, the terrible Khamseen, 
 which no EiTropeans could Avithstand if compelled to 
 keep moving without shelter. ISTo supplies or reinforce- 
 ments could possibly reach him in less than three months, 
 if ever at all. If the Bedouins, avoiding battle, had kept 
 the British at the centre of a movable circle of twenty 
 or thii'ty miles in diameter, removing and destroying all 
 supplies within their reach, complete destruction must 
 have been their fate. 
 
 But with barbarians every thing goes by impulse, and 
 in the East it is always the improbable — almost the im- 
 possible — which happens. Dissensions arose in the Mahdi's 
 ranks immediately after the capture of Khartoum. Part 
 of his soldiers scattered to take their booty home. The 
 Baggaras, his first proselytes, dissatisfied at the small 
 amount of plunder found in Khartoum, deserted him and 
 joined a rival prophet, named Muley Hassan Ali, who 
 arose in Kordofan, claiming to be the true Mahdi. He 
 defeated Mohammed Achmet's troops and entered El 
 Obeid in triumph, mounted upon a white horse and bear- 
 ing a naked sword, given to him by the prophet Mo- 
 
 * The Ababdehs and Bishareens are the sole occupants of the Eastern Desert as 
 far down the Nile as Edfou (See map). 
 
236 TTie British Ocmipaign in the Soudan. 
 
 hammed himself to slay the false Mahdi. The magnifi- 
 cent success which should have placed Mohammed Ach- 
 met on the highest pinnacle of power was, in fact, the 
 beginning of his decadence. After being killed some ten 
 or twelve times by the journals, he finally died of small- 
 pox in July, leaving his prophet's mantle to another 
 Mahdi, who was soon after assassinated by his own fol- 
 lowers. 
 
 To these peculiarly Oriental circumstances Wolseley, 
 "the lucky," owed his escape from the trap into which 
 he had ventured. On the 23d of March he ordered the 
 evacuation of Korti, alleging with much truth the fatal 
 effects of the climate. Typhoid fever, dysentery, and sun- 
 strokes were increasing among the troops, even before the 
 advent of the dreaded Khamseen. The army fell back 
 to Dongola— thence to the second cataract, where Sir 
 Kedvers Buller was left with two brigades ; the rest 
 went back to Lower Egypt, while Lord Wolseley himself 
 returned to England in May, to be loaded with rewards 
 and honors for having made one of the most egregious 
 failures on record, for it was not due to any defeats in 
 battle, but solely to vacillation and delay. 
 
 The last act in the drama is Gen. Graham's second 
 campaign at Suakim. Why it should ever have been 
 undertaken nearly two months after Gordon's death and 
 when Wolseley's force was already in full retreat, it is difii- 
 cult to explain. But what could be expected from a 
 government that had never known its own purpose for a 
 month ahead? It had refused aid in the Soudan when 
 it was easy and opportune, and afterwards sent an army 
 when it was too late ; it had proclaimed peace at Khar- 
 toum, and at the same time slaughtered 6,000 Bedouins 
 
Tlie JBritish Ca')npaign in the Soudan. 237 
 
 at Suakim to prove its peaceful intentions ; it had invited 
 Turkisli intervention and then forbidden it even at the 
 cannon's month ; it had sought Abyssinia's help and alli- 
 ance and refused to pay the price she asked, though not 
 one tenth of what was afterwards spent in failure ; and 
 now, when really the war had no longer a raison frStre, 
 a fresh campaign was inaugurated for no other purpose 
 than vengeance. To restore England's prestige and 
 avenge Gordon's death, Khartoum must be captured and 
 " the Mahdi must be smashed ! " And to do this, the 
 Suakim-Berber route was once more selected, Avithout any 
 consideration of last year's experience. 
 
 My opinion might be considered by some as tinged 
 with American prejudice, but the British Journals abound 
 with much more severe denunciations. Here is the Judg- 
 ment of Sir A. H. Layard, formerly Minister to Constan- 
 tinople, and of world-wide celebrity, from his letter to the 
 Times, dated Feb. 14th. 
 
 " It is scarcely necessary for me to refer to what I consider the unnecessary, and 
 consequently wicked, bombardment of Alexandria, and the short but bloody cam- 
 paign on the Nile ; the shocking and useless slaughter of the Arabs near Suakim, 
 with whom we had no cause of quarrel ; and the hopeless mission of the heroic 
 Gordon, and his desertion and death. These events, and the most culpable vacil- 
 lation and delays on the part of the government, have led to the expedition to- 
 Khartoum in which we are now engaged, which has already cost us the lives of 
 many brave men, and will cost us the lives of many more, whom England, in these 
 critical times, can ill spare. 
 
 " Why are we going to Khartoum? No one, it seems, can answer the question. 
 And yet the soil of the Soudan is reeking with the blood of our soldiers and with 
 that of the wretched Arabs, whom we are pleased to call ' rebels.' Why ' rebels ' ? 
 They are not our subjects, and have done us no wrong. Gordon, betrayed by his 
 own government, has fallen in a war brought on by ourselves while holding a 
 fortified place to which we had no right. Hitherto England has not been wont to 
 avenge the death of her heroes by the wholesale massacre of brave men. 
 
 ' ' I have only glanced at a few of the blunders — and worse than blunders — com- 
 mitted by the government. But it is useless to recur to the past. What is to be 
 done in the future ? We must now of necessity, and at any sacrifice, take Khar- 
 
238 Tlie Britisli Cmnpaign in tlie Soudan. 
 
 toum, not to avenge the death of Gordon, but to restore our prestige and credit, 
 which the incapacity of the Ministry has so seriously compromised. To retreat would 
 be to make Eastern races believe that we had been defeated and driven back by 
 the undisciplined hordes of the Mahdi — a belief that might be productive to us of 
 the most serious consequences. We cannot retain Khartoum permanently ; we 
 cannot allow any European Power to possess it. Nor can we abandon it to the 
 wild tribes of the Soudan. To do so would be to expose those who have befriended 
 us to massacre, to endanger Egypt proper, to re-open the .slave trade on a vast 
 scale, and to destroy our coiiinlerce in those regions. It appears to me, therefore, 
 that we have only one course to pursue — to allow the Sultan, who is the legitimate 
 owner of ihe Soudan, to occupy it. We cannot consistently with our reputation 
 and dignity ask his aid to take Khartoum ; but when we have established ourselves 
 there, and made the so-called ' rebels ' feel our power, surely there would be no 
 loss of either if we handed over the country to those who have. a right to it. It 
 would, indeed, be well worth our while to assist the Sultan to occupy it by helping 
 him with our transports and by forwarding his troops inland. It would, in the 
 end, be a considerable saving of blood and money were we to do so. 
 
 "But, it will be objected, Turkish rule is bad and corrupt. At any rate, it 
 would be better than the anaixhy which would prevail in the Soudan after we had 
 abandoned it ; for there are no native elements out of which a strong and stable 
 government could be formed. We could take measures to restrain any abuse of 
 power on the part of the Turkish authorities — by keeping, for instance, at their 
 side a capable and energetic man in some such capacity as our Commissioner. In 
 the hands of the Mahdi, or of any one likely to succeed him, Khartoum would 
 again become a centre of the slave-trade. With Turkey we could combine for its 
 complete suppression." 
 
 Sir Heuiy Layard's plan, as marked out in this letter, 
 miglit be liable to objection ; but it had at least the merit 
 of a definite object in view. 
 
 Between the 10th and 15th of March, Gen. Graham's 
 force of about 5,000 of the elite of the British army, com- 
 prising, among other regiments, the Coldstream and 
 Grenadier Guards, the Royal Artillery, the 5th and 17th 
 (Irish) Lancers, landed at Suakim and repeated the per- 
 formance of the preceding year with much greater loss 
 and less success. The movements were so similar that it 
 becomes tedious to describe them in detail. The first 
 step was always to establish zeiibas and water-depots be- 
 fore moving a few miles from feuakim ; then having a 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 239 
 
 brush witli the enemy and — going back. On the 20th of 
 March an engagement took place at Hasheen which 
 nearly resulted in disaster, as is shown by the following 
 account : 
 
 " The Arabs displayed desperate bravery. The marines drove them from the 
 hills and forced them to retire to the plains. Then the Indian troops charged upon 
 the Arab position, but were outflanked, and an unsuspected body of Arabs suc- 
 ceeded in getting behind their line. The Indians (Bengal cavalry) found them- 
 selves between two fires and they fled. During this retreat they were closely 
 pressed by the Arabs, who hamstrung the horses and speared the riders. The 
 Bengalese fell back in confusion upon the English infantry and guards, who had 
 been foimed in a hollow square, and the square leisurely retired while the Arabs 
 were yelling that they had regained their lost position. At this juncture the artillery 
 came to the rescue, and a brisk fire of small-shot from the machine-guns and shells 
 from the Kriipp field-inortars drove the Arabs from their position. The marines 
 maintained a steady firing throughout the engagement. 
 
 " The honors of the day are probably due to the Irish Lancers, who changed the 
 tide of battle by a desperate charge and retrieved the fortunes of Gen. Graham's 
 command when they seemed almost hopeless. The British troops have returned 
 to iheir former camp, near Suakim." 
 
 On the 2 2d another and more serious conflict occurred 
 upon the same ground, which is thus described : 
 
 "Suakim, March 22d. — While detachments of English and Indian infantiy 
 were making a zeriba seven miles southwest of Suakim to-day they were suddenly 
 surprised by a rush of Arabs who had been massed and concealed in the defiles 
 west of Hasheen. 
 
 " The English formed a square as quickly as possible, but the camels, mules, 
 and horses were driven back in confusion on the troops, causing a stampede, and 
 amid clouds of dust the Arabs penetrated the south and north sides of >,the square. 
 Meanwhile the marines and Berkshire Regiment, who were on the east and west 
 sides of the square, maintained a continuous fire, holding the enemy at bay, while 
 a charge of the cavalry and the fire from the guns at the Masheen zeriba checked 
 the onslaught of the Arabs, which at first threatened a serious disaster to the 
 British." 
 
 " March 23d. — Nearly all the casualties were due to spear thrusts received in 
 hand-to-hand engagements. The Arabs got between the transport train and zeriba, 
 speared the men of the transport corps, and killed the animals. They fought 
 savagely, refusing to give or take quarter. 
 
 " Gen. McNeil, who was commanding the zeriba, reports vaguely that there 
 were several thousand rebels in the fight, and that over one thousand were killed or 
 wounded. Gen. McNeil is blamed for not taking precautions against a surprise. 
 
240 The Britisli Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 " The damage done to transport materials yesterday is immense. The guards 
 and artillery were sent to reinforce the troops who were attacked. The whole 
 British force remained in the field during the night. 
 
 " The camels and mules were hamstrung by the Arabs. Scores of camp- 
 followers were cut up. Arabs scattered about in the whole vicinity intercepting 
 native fugitives. The appearance and yells of the Arabs were so sudden that the 
 whole assemblage of transport animals, mixed with natives, became panic-stricken 
 and surged on the zeriba, making resistance hopeless. The scene was indescrib- 
 able. Arabs glided and crept in all directions among the animals. The Haden- 
 dowas swarmed from the bush like magic and attacked the zeriba fiercely on all 
 sides. The Soudanese coolies were mistaken for enemies, and many were killed 
 by frieiids. 
 
 " The enemy began an attack at 3 o'clock this morning. They were repulsed, 
 and the ground was cleared by 4." 
 
 " London, March 23d. — Gen. Graham telegraphs from the advanced zeriba 
 that the British position there is strong and secure against any number of the 
 enemy. He regrets the serious British losses in yesterday's fight, but exonerates 
 Gen. McNeil from blame, believing he did the best that could be done under the 
 circumstances. Gen. Graham praises the gallantry of all the troops. He says the 
 cavalry would have given the alarm had not the rugged nature of the ground pre- 
 vented their seeing more than a short distance. Though the rebels met with a 
 temporary success, they learned a severe lesson. The corpses of over 1,000 Arabs 
 have been counted on the field of yesterday's battle, including the l)odies of many 
 noted chiefs." 
 
 " London, March 24th. — The Standard's Suakim dispatch says the British 
 killed in the engagement of Sunday were seven officers and sixty-three men. 
 Many bodies of boys and women were found on the battle-field." 
 
 In tliis fight the total loss on the British side, including 
 friendly Arabs, was greater tlian ever before, being 580 
 killed and wounded and 1,000 camels. 
 
 This engagement was followed by the inevitable return 
 to Sualvim. Thouo^h the British advanced zeriba was 
 secure, as General Graham said, against any number of 
 the enemy, it was a physical impossibility to hold it, for 
 the labor of keeping a watei'-train constantly going over 
 these seven miles, protected by troops every step of the 
 way as it must be, would have speedily worn out the 
 whole army. How much security or tranquillity the 
 British enjoyed in their lines aiV)und Suakim is vividly 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 241 
 
 described in tlie following Soudan correspondence of the 
 London Telegraph. 
 
 " How the Hadendowas do it nobody but they themselves can tell, but night 
 after night they come into the middle of our camp, stab and hack a few soldiers, 
 and go out again scathless. Sometimes they creep in five abreast past our sentinels ; 
 sometimes they come right up to our tents, half a mile within the line of redoubts 
 and pickets, and bring camels and horses with them. But, whatever the audacity 
 of their entrance, the impunity of their departure is the same. Our guards turn 
 out, bugles sound the alarm, signals flash, rifles are let off, a gun-boat fires over- 
 head into black space, but next morning there are only our own mutilated and 
 dead in evidence of the assassins' presence. The Hadendowas have left none be- 
 hind them, or had none to leave. It is horriVjle in the highest degree, this monot- 
 ony of midnight murder, and depressing beyond language to find our head-quarters' 
 staff apparently so unteachable by experience. 
 
 " Crawling along on all fours, they traverse the space between them and their 
 victims with all the patient caution of wild beasts stalking prey. They reach the 
 doomed tent. For the sake of the sea breeze the doorway is open, and the next 
 instant the murderer is standing by the sleeping soldier's side. He feels a hand 
 passing over his body and starts. A cry is rising to his lips. It is strangled in his 
 throat by a groan of pain, and before the gallant fellow can even warn his com- 
 rades the fierce spear is driven home through his body, the heavy two-handed 
 sword has fallen across him. But the tent is alarmed. There is no time to lose ! 
 Slashing this way and that, the murderers stab and hack with the fury of fiends, 
 and then as the camp starts to its feet in clamor they are off. Not a sound beti'ays 
 their passing. There is no trace of blood to tell of retribution. They are gone — 
 back into the villainous gullies, back into the scattered brush, and next we can 
 imagine them sitting to refresh themselves outside our line of redoubts — to listen 
 gleefully to the storm they have raised — the bugles telling the old tale of niurder 
 completed and the murderers gone, the aimless volley of rifles, the din of voices, 
 the impotent utterances of our indignant guns roaring for an impossible vengeance. 
 They hear the tempest of the camp's alarm swell up and dwindle away, and then 
 quietly get up and pass on to where their friends are waiting to congratulate and to 
 rejoice — to rub their spear-heads against the red tips of the assassin's weapons, to 
 smear their swords with the blood still wet on their blades. And in our camp ? 
 The hospital stretchers there are carrying away the mangled, mutilated bodies of 
 ovir men, their comrades standing to their arms, savage with useless rage, as they 
 look at the lantern-lit group of surgeons and wounded. It is a horrible episode, 
 yet of nightly occurrence. 
 
 " ' Murder ! Murder ! ' I heard the word ring out last night from the ordnance 
 camp and then came a cry — the bitter cry of a man suddenly overtaken by the 
 agony of death. A shot and then another and another. Then a confusion of 
 muffled sounds. Then silence. I was only 400 yards away. The night had been 
 so still that the water lapping on the quay was plainly audible where I lay. 
 Presently came this brief uproar of alarm, subsiding as suddenly as it had arisen. 
 
242 Tlie Bvitisli Carnpaign in the Soudan. 
 
 Signals were flashing overhead. A party of Hadendovvas had either crept straight 
 across the camp; or passing along the rear, had traversed its complete length, cross- 
 ing twice on their way the electric light thrown by the Dolphin, had reached, with- 
 out being observed, the farthest batch of tents from their starting-point, the nearest 
 to the town. Behind them, only a hundred yards off, was Quarantine island, with 
 its camp ; nearer still lay our shipping, with the gun-boats close in shore, com- 
 manding one line of their retreat, the whole of the British troops intercepting the 
 other. Behind them was the sea ; on their left the town, yet, such is the confidence 
 inspired by nightly success and impunity, that the assassins did not hesitate to 
 creep even into such a des]3erate position as this. And their work was desperate 
 and terribly complete. Of the whcle of the occupants of the tents — 24 in all — 
 only two escaped their spears and swords, while the murderers retreated apparently 
 unharmed. As they went back rifles were wildly emptied after them, and the 
 Carysfort fired volleys into the dark. But there was no trace of blood. Inside the 
 tents the sight was dreadful — blood everywhere, and men lying about in all direc- 
 tions wounded and groaning." 
 
 On tlie 28t]i of March, General Graham having con- 
 structed more zeribas and established additional water- 
 depots, moved again to the position occupied by General 
 McNeil on the 2 2d. In two weeks he had approached 
 only two miles nearer to Tama'i, the old battle-ground of 
 last year. The heat was growing fearful, sunstrokes and 
 fever cases multiplying greatly. Finally, on the 2d of 
 April, he advanced to Tamai, and found it evacuated. 
 After resting and watering his troops, he burned Osman- 
 Digma's camp, as he had done last year, and returned to 
 Suakim on the 4th. The wily Bedouin was learning les- 
 sons in war ; he had ordered his followers to avoid a reg- 
 ular battle, and to draw the British after them into the 
 hills. At this time Graham was instructed to open nego- 
 tiations with Osman-Digma, which the latter refused to 
 entertain. 
 
 It must be stated here that, in connection with Gra- 
 ham's expedition, a second attempt was made to construct 
 a railroad. The London Engineering contained the fol- 
 lowing information : 
 
The JBritish Campaign in the Soudan. 24(^ 
 
 " The military authorities have at length made up their minds, and a standard 
 gauge railway is to be laid from the Red Sea to the Nile. The construction of the 
 line does not appear to offer any obstacles which railway engineers are not in the 
 habit of contending with. There are said to be eleven groups of wells in the 
 total distance, but many of these would be utterly inefficient for engineering work. 
 
 " The military authorities have, however, determined to be independent of such 
 chances, and have made a contract, according to which a four-inch pipe is to be 
 laid along the whole route. 
 
 " H. G. H. Tarr, of Yonkers, N. Y., has been offered the contract of laying the 
 three hundred miles of pipe across the desert to supply water to the English soldiers 
 in the Soudan. He has not decided whether he will accept the contract. 
 
 " The pumps are to be supplied by the H. R. "VYorthington Hydraulic Works, of 
 New York, who have achieved such a signal success in the pumping of petroleum 
 thiough long distances in America. There are to be six double pumps, with steam 
 cylinders eighteen inch in diameter by eighteen-inch stroke. 
 
 " The Admiralty has been directed to find the necessary vessels for transporting 
 the plant to the spot, and shipments were to have been made, it was said, this 
 week, both from Hull and London. Each vessel will take a complete equipment 
 for the construction and working of five miles of the line, so that should any mis- 
 hap occur to one vessel, the whole work will not be detained for want of some vital 
 feature. The list made out includes a locomotive and ballast trucks and trollies, 
 one crane, two crabs, pumps, steam boilers, permanent way complete, electric light 
 plant, and all other necessary appliances, including fifteen thousand sleepers, etc.,. 
 etc. 
 
 " As for the time that will be taken in the construction of the line, it is very dif- 
 ficult to make a forecast with any pretence to accuracy at present. The great im- 
 portant and uncertain factor at present is the question of native labor. If that can 
 be obtained easily on the spot, a great part of the difficulty will be overcome. In 
 any case, the first instalment of plant cannot be landed at Suakim much under a 
 month, and it will doubtless be well into May before the whole of the appliances 
 are on the ground. It is evident, therefore, that this proposed line can have little 
 influence on the present military situation on the Nile." — Engineering, Feb. 20, 
 1885. 
 
 The Illustrated London Neios added : 
 
 ' ' It has now been decided also to lay down the long-talked-of railway to Berber. 
 The route chosen will be about two hundred and seventy miles in length, and will 
 run over the best water district, there being, however, a perfectly arid stretch of 
 fifty miles. The work will be carried on by Messrs. Lucas & Aird, who have in- 
 formed the Government that the first thirty-five miles of railway gear has already 
 been arranged for, and will be ready for shipment this week. If all goes well, the 
 railway will be constructed in four or five months. " 
 
 The London Times of Feb. 20t]i made the following 
 prophecies. [The italics are my own.] 
 
24:4c The British Campaign in the Soudam,. 
 
 " Arrangements have already been made by Messrs. Lucas & Aird for the co- 
 operation of natives, and workmen from other parts will also co-operate with the 
 men now sent out immediately on their arrival. Thus, the public may rely on the 
 fact that there will be no hindrance or delay in pushing the road to the front. 
 
 ' ' The reports point to a fight in the neighborhood of Tamai' or Tamanieb, and 
 this wf.ll be followed up by a rapid advance to Sinkat, where it may possibly be de- 
 sirable to garrison for a time. Sinkat is comparatively cool, and would form a 
 healthy summer station, the occupation of which would probably paralyze _ the 
 action of the tribes, and enable the railway pioneer force to advance along the 
 northern route unopposed. It has generally been believed that the movement of a 
 small force to Berber would have been possible after General Graham's victories 
 last year, and this is still more likely to be the case now, when, after defeat, the 
 Arabs will be at once follotved up to their stronghold. The probability seems to be, 
 therefore, that after one battle the military situation in this portion of the theatre 
 of war will clear itself ; while there can be little doubt that the final suppression of 
 Osman Digma will produce a moral effect at Khartoum." 
 
 Tlie '■^Thunderer " was certainly most unfortunate in its 
 predictions wlien assuring tlie public of the fact that there 
 would be '' no liinclrance or delay in pushing the road to 
 the front." It failed to take into account the rather serious 
 objections the Bedouins made to its construction. Its 
 surmise that a fight at Tamai or Tamanieb would be " fol- 
 lowed by a rapid advance to Sinkat " was equally unlucky, 
 and all its prophecies were completely falsified by events. 
 
 But, in my opinion, the most absurd idea of all, con- 
 sidering the localities and circumstances, was that of con- 
 structing a line of pipe to convey water from Suakim to 
 Berber. The credit (?) of originating it was claimed by 
 one of the New York dailies. Now, although an Ameri- 
 can editor is expected to know everything — and a good 
 deal more, — he may be excused for being unfamiliar with 
 the peculiar difficulties of the Soudan deserts. Some 
 months before, another New York dail}'' had given its 
 readers a highly imaginative and fictitious description of 
 the shady groves, smiling oases, e;plivened by the warbling 
 of birds, and the purling streams to be found on the Sua- 
 
The British Cmnpaign in the Soudan. 245 
 
 kim-Berber route ! But tliat the British military author- 
 ities, who ought to have hnovju, and had no possible excuse 
 for not knowing, the nature of the country and the obsta- 
 cles in the way, should have at once Jumped at the idea 
 and proceeded to make contracts for carrying it out, 
 is really inconceivable. I hope Messrs. Worthington <fe 
 Tarr were given the contracts, and made a good thing by 
 them. They were not responsible for the imbecility of 
 the scheme. It seems to have been imagined that there 
 was nothing to do but to lay the pipe down and cover it 
 with sand, for the paper said : 
 
 " It has been settled that the pipe is to be laid in zig-zag lines to allow for ex- 
 pansion and contraction under the sand. The laying of the pipe, if a sufficient 
 force of men is put to work, ought to proceed at the rate of about twenty miles a 
 day. [Twice as fast as an army could march !] An American gentleman convers- 
 ant with all the details of the oil pipe-line system, now in London, is in consulta- 
 tion with the British Government, and there seems to be a disposition to expedite 
 the work. 
 
 " It will, of course, be necessary to have a guard at every pumping-station on 
 tlie route. These stations will also be stopping-places for the railroad trains." 
 
 There wei'e to be engines every twenty-five or thirty 
 miles, and water was to be supplied at the rate of one 
 hundred and fifty gallons a minute, or over two hundred 
 thousand gallons per day, which would have to be ob- 
 tained chiefly from the condensers at Suakim ! And 
 what would the Bedouins be doing all the while ? 
 
 All this shows the absurdity of trying from the 
 " Horse Guards " in London to direct operations in a 
 country thousands of miles away, and about which the 
 Commander-in-chief and his advisers evidently knew 
 nothing. It also illustrates the folly of supposing that 
 the same means mil accomplish the same results in 
 regions differing so entirely and absolutely in every re- 
 
246 Tlie British' Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 spect as Pennsylvania and tlie Soudan. It was assumed 
 tliat because a pipe-line liad been highly successful in 
 conveying oil hundreds of miles in America, it would be 
 equally available for conveying water in the desert. But 
 in America supplies of all kinds, transportation, water^ 
 fuel, timber, w^orkshops, machinery, willing and intelli- 
 gent labor, are to be had in abundance far exceeding the 
 demand ; and in addition, perfect peace and the full pro- 
 tection, not only of the law but of the entire community, 
 ensuring the swift punishment of any trespasser daring 
 to tamper with the line. In the Soudan, on the con- 
 trary, no supplies, no water, no timber, not even a prac- 
 ticable road. Every stick of timber, every railroad tie,, 
 every pound of coal, to be brought from abroad. Not 
 only no native labor to be had, but every Bedouin bend- 
 ing all his energies to prevent the construction of the 
 line, and to cut it in a hundred places every night if it 
 were ever built ! 
 
 Now, let it not be supposed that I claim credit for ex- 
 traordinary acumen or prophetic foresight for asserting 
 before the railway was shipped and Graham sailed that 
 the former would never be built and that the British 
 would never advance twenty miles from Suakim. My 
 predictions were based upon my hioiuledge of the coun- 
 try, and I would have confessed myself an idiot if I could 
 not have formed a correct judgment. But the point I 
 make here against the British military authorities is, that 
 this same knowledge had been perfectly accessible to 
 them for six years at least, and that there was no 'excuse 
 for their not mastering it, or for not drawing correct con- 
 clusions from it. In my letter V> the New York World, 
 published March 1, 1885, I used the following language : 
 
The British Cam,paign in the Soudan. 247 
 
 " My knowledge and experience of engineering must be behind the times, for I 
 confess I cannot conceive of any patent-lightning process by which a railroad can 
 be built in a few weeks across a lofty chain of mountains, eighty miles broad, and 
 then one hundred and sixty miles farther, when not even a line has ever been sur- 
 veyed, and when ihe only trail goes up and down grades so steep that camel-riding 
 is often un.'-afe. Think of the grading, blasting, tunnelSng, etc., that must be done 
 before the track can be laid — in a couniry where even wooden ties must be brought 
 from abroad ; for all the stunted mimosas between Suakim and Berber could not 
 yield ties enough for ten miles. And wlio is to build this railroad under this tropi- 
 cal African sun ? Nothing hns been said about bringing laborers to do the' work. 
 I fancy the job is not attractive, and even for high pay it will not be easy to obtain 
 them. Are the soldiers to build the raiKvay ? They would have cjuite enough to 
 do to protect the laborers from the attacks of the Bedouins, unless we suppose the 
 latter to fold up their hands and look on meekly while the road was building. And 
 if the road were built, how many regiments would have to be echeloned along the 
 line to keep it from being cut at a hundred points ? The idea seems too absurd for 
 serious contemplation, and yet some British officers who could see from Suakim the 
 mnjestic chain lifting its lofiy crests less than fifteen miles away, asserted six weeks 
 ago tliat a narrow-gaxige road could be laid as fast as the troops can march ! But 
 the project was soon abandoned, as it will be again beyond a doubt. 
 
 "General Graham may once more land his troops at Suakim, but mark my 
 words, the Coldstream and Grenadier Guards who have just left London will never 
 march to Berber." 
 
 Referring to tlie pipe-line scheme, wliicli had just 
 been published, I^adclecl : 
 
 " The scheme is so idiotic that it must be a canard. How could it be possible 
 to procure distilled water enough for an army and i;s animals in^ the first place? 
 But if enough could be produced, how could the pipes be laid across the mounlains 
 and plains for two hundred and fifty miles ? [with the enemy all aioundj. If laid 
 how could they be protected from being cut ? . . . Moses himself in the Sinai 
 desert never attempted such a miracle ! " 
 
 How the plan worked is shown by the following press 
 dispatch : 
 
 " April 25, 1S85. — The building of the Berber Railway hns been suspended out- 
 side of Suakim, owing to the inability of the army to afford protection to the line- 
 beyond the camp. It has been decided that the forces necessary for such protec-^ 
 tion cannot be spared." 
 
 Not only so, but nightly attacks were made upon the 
 British outposts, in which the Bedouins often succeeded 
 
248 The JBritish Cmwpakjn in the Soudan. 
 
 in burning quantities of tlie wooden sleepers and other 
 material brought from England at great expense. Only 
 a few miles were laid, to be quickly torn up by the 
 enemy. Three months later the steamers, which had 
 never even unloatted the material, took it back to Eng- 
 land, and that was the last heard of the railway and the 
 pipe-line. General Graham was a distinguished engineer 
 officer, that being his special arm of the service ; he had a 
 splendid record,* and he and Herbert Stewart did the 
 most and the best fighting in the Soudan. He understood 
 perfectly that a I'ailway to Berber can never be built 
 while hostile Bedouins hold the deserts, and in all the 
 accounts of the war, I have not seen a single word to 
 show that he ever advocated the undertakino;. 
 
 The burning of Osman-Digma's camp was the last 
 episode of the campaign. On the 7th of May, Lord 
 Wolseley came from Cairo to Suakim by sea to review 
 Graham's army and compliment it on its achievements. 
 After this the two generals and all the troops re-embarked, 
 leaving a garrison of one thousand two hundred marines 
 at Suakim, who from that time forth were closely be- 
 sieged in their lines, protected by gun-boats. It was 
 officially reported the following August, that of that 
 number only one hundred were fit for duty in conse- 
 quence of the terrible effects of the climate. 
 
 * " General Graham entered the British army as an ensign in the Royal En- 
 gineers, in 1850. He served through the Crimean war with that body, receiving 
 promotion for his gallantry and gaining the highly-prized Victoria Cross for heading 
 a party in an assault by ladders at the Redan. Twice during the Crimean war he 
 was wounded. In the Chinese war General Graham also distinguished himself, 
 taking part in the assault of Tangku and the Taku forts, and also in the capture of 
 Pekin. His promotion was gained step by step, until, in 1881, his present rank 
 was reached. In the campaign against Arabi, in 18S2, General Graham com- 
 manded the Second brigade, and won new honors." 
 
1 he British Oampaigii in the Soudan. 249 
 
 The condition in wliicli the country and the people were 
 left by the British evacuation is well described by the 
 war correspondent of the London Graphic, in a letter 
 dated May 30, 1885, as follows : . 
 
 " The withdrawal of British troops from the Soudan goes on rapidly, alike on the 
 the Nile and at Suakim. Dreading the arrival of the Mahdists on the departure of 
 the British from Dongola, the majority of the population are fleeing north, and the 
 authorities are obliged to provide shelter and food for the refugees at Wady Haifa, 
 while trying to induce some neighboring powerful sheikh to take the government of 
 the district. The Mahdi, however, has retired up the White Nile to Jebel Ellini, 
 and announces that he will not advance on the Dongola district till after next 
 Ramadan. Indeed, he is thought to have little chance of doing so, as his influence 
 is weakened by the growing power of his rival the anti-Mahdi, Sidi IMuley Achmed. 
 One by one the positions beyond Suakim, which have been so carefully fortified by 
 the British, are being abandoned. Otao and Handoub, on the road to Berber, 
 have been evacuated ; and though the railway is still protected by ihe frequent 
 running of an armored train, the Arabs tear up the rails, and indulge in small 
 skirmishes wheneyer possible. It is evident already that the tribes are flocking 
 back to Osman Digma, even many of the friendlies, taking with them the British 
 weapons they have received. Suakim itself is in a state of perpetual confusion, 
 with troops continually embarking, the harbor filled with transports hearing the 
 now useless railway stock, and sickness and depression prevailing amongst the 
 soldiers. The heat seriously affects Indian as well as British regiments, and over 
 I, TOO have beer:i invalided within the last two months. Airy huts, with thatched 
 roofs, are being constructed for the men. Lord Wolseley has gone back to Cairo, 
 handing over the command of the Nile force to General Dormer, and preparations 
 are being madfe both at Cairo and Alexandria for the temporary accommodation of 
 the British troops. The Guards have at last been disembarked at Alexandria, and 
 this proceeding raises anew fresh comments as to the change of plans, none of 
 which are over-complimentary to England and her vacillation. Egypt looks 
 anxiously for the reply to the British note, inviting Turkey to occupy Suakim and 
 other Red Sea poits. If Turkey refuses, the note slates that England must ar- 
 range for some civilized Power to occupy the positions, while, as soon as order and 
 a stable government are secured, the English troops will be withdrawn irora Egypt." 
 
 Meanwhile the probabilities of war with Rnssia about 
 the Afghanistan question diverted public attention, and 
 the Soudan almost passed out of mind. The Soudanese, 
 however, have persistently continued their advance. 
 Dongola fell into their hands, and in December they 
 became so threatening^ that Sir Redvers Buller, then 
 
/n^ 
 
 250 The British Ccmipaign in the Soudan. 
 
 commanding at the second cataract, found it necessary to 
 drive them back. He advanced from Wadv Haifa, and 
 on the 30th of December, 1885, he met the enemy at 
 Ghiunis. The usual result occurred. There was a skir- 
 mish, a few volleys fired, and the Bedouins, after leaving 
 two hundred or three hundred killed and wounded on the 
 field, retreated, to advance again as soon as the British 
 retired to their former positions. Lord Rosebery, Foreign 
 Secretary, subsequently instructed Sir Henry Drummond 
 Wolff, the British Commissioner in Egypt, to withdraw 
 the British troops from Wady Haifa. So that the whole 
 of Nubia, as well as the entire Soudan, is abandoned to 
 the horrors of anarchy and brigandage. It was found 
 impossible, however, to withdraw the British from the 
 first cataract without exposing Egypt herself to the danger 
 of invasion. A few regiments are still at Assouan (1886), 
 and their condition may be inferred from these extracts 
 from letters published in the London Journals.'"' 
 
 " While men's minds are wholly occupied with the Irish question at home, our 
 troubles abroad are certainly not decreasing. In Egypt and Uurmah the flower of 
 the Bi-itish army are being sacrificed. 
 
 ' ' Our best troops are silently perishing by disease on the banks of the Nile. 
 Our bravest officers,, with the courage of their race, are sacrificing their lives, one 
 after the other, in the vain attempt to remedy one continued series of mistakes, 
 which commenced with our occupation of the country, and seem unending, In 
 each instance of wanton and uncalled for interference with foreign nations we have 
 failed ignominiously. We went to Egypt avowedly to put an end to Arabi's rebel- 
 lion, and to restore peace to the country. We have succeeded in maintaining just 
 as much order as the presence of the British troops inspires ; we have, indirectly, 
 lost Egypt the Soudan ; we have covered the desert with the bones of brave Eng- 
 lishmen and Arabs in our vain attempts to force back into subjection a province 
 we had neither the wisdom to keep for Egypt nor the energy to reconquer ; we 
 sacrificed Gordon at Khartoum to the indecision and vacillation of a government 
 which sent him there in a moment of panic, and kept him there a lingering martyr 
 
 * The printing of this paper having been delayed by various causes, I have added 
 for the sake of completeness a few references to later events. 
 
The British Campaign in the Soudan. 251 
 
 to its shamefiil violation of its promises of support. And now a second time we 
 are pliying the same miserable part in Burmah. 
 
 " How much longer are our troops to remain in Egypt? The reports from 
 Assouan are most pitiable. The Dorset, Berks, and Durham regiments have each 
 lost about four hundred men, half their strength, from enteric fever or from suii- 
 •stroke. Five or six hours after the moment of attack suffices to carry them off. 
 In the last month there were fifty-two deaths, and one man reports that the day 
 before he left Assouan for Cairo eight men were lying dead in llie mortuary, and 
 five others were being buried. With the thermometer 126° in the shade, it is no 
 wonder that our men die like fleas. Thus, four years after the first fatal step, 
 English soldiers are still being sacrificed by hundreds in that terrible Nile valley." 
 
 The troops at Suakim are suffering quite as much. 
 A correspondent of the London Standard writes : 
 
 " I cannot help wishing that the people at home Icnew the exact state of affairs 
 out here. If they could only hear the howls of rage and vows of vengeance when 
 •some one reads aloud a statement in the papers from home that ' the climate of 
 Suakim is pleasant," they might think there were two opinions upon the subject. 
 If being held in a vice of fearful heat is pleasant, Suakim is decidedly so. If 
 men dying of heat apoplexy is a sign of a healthy climaie, Suakim may be called 
 salubrious. To live in a place where the temperature never goes below 96°, and 
 frequently rises to 1x2° and 120°, is to drag out such an existence as none who 
 have not expeiienced it can possibly imagine. To make matters worse, the epi- 
 demic of enteric fever continues unabated, and a melancholy procession to the 
 cemetery may be seen alwa\s once, sometimes twice, a day. At the present rate 
 •of mortality more than half of ihe European troops here will be in their last rest- 
 ing-place within a year, and the other half will have been invalided home two or 
 three times over. What with the smells from want of drainage, the fearful, tor- 
 turing heat, and ike condensed water, which is often putrid, Suakim is about the 
 last place to keep Englishmen in. The Sliropshire regiment, which came out over 
 nine hundred strong, is now about seven hundred, and will be less when the next 
 draft of sick men leave. They lost only two killed in a niglit alarm, and have had 
 a reinforcement from Suez of fifty. Can any thing speak more plainly than this ? 
 Last year the Marine Battery, five hundred strong, invalided fifteen hundred men 
 away, which means that it took two thousand men to keep up the regiment to the 
 small strength of five hundred." 
 
 And what is there to show for all this fearful waste of 
 treasure, and of what was still more precious — gallant 
 and noble lives? National humiliation resulting from 
 the consciousness of inexcusable failure ; loss of national 
 prestige throughout the world ; bitter sorrow for the fate 
 
252 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 of the hero to whom rescue came too late ; Egypt despoiled 
 of half her territory and crushed under the burden of addi- 
 tional debt ; vast provinces where order reigned before, 
 which were then rapidly opening to humanizing influ- 
 ences, and were connected with the rest of the Avorld by 
 increasing commerce and by telegraph, now so completely 
 beyond the pale of civilization that nothing more is. 
 known of what is going on there than of the savages 
 living around the equatorial lakes. These are some of 
 the fruits produced from the evil seed planted on the 
 ill-omened day when England was reluctantly induced 
 to interfere in Egyptian affairs "in order that Shylock 
 might have his pound of flesh." Speaking of that inter- 
 ference at Cooj)er Institute, in November, 1882, after 
 the arbitrary and impolitic deposition of Ismail-Pasha,, 
 and the bombardment of Alexandria I said : " England, 
 has sown iniquity, and she will reap disaster." How 
 she must regret to-day that first fatal move which led 
 step by step, to the final catastrophe ! Sir Samuel Baker,, 
 who is so thoroughly familiar with the country and the 
 people, protesting against the abandonment of Khartoum, 
 even before Gordon was sent there to effect its evacu- 
 ation, uttered these prophetic words in the Nineteenth 
 Century for January, 1884 : 
 
 " Khartoum is a name that is known among the wildest savages of equatorial 
 Africa who never heard of Paris or of London ; to them it is the centre of all that 
 is great, and it is the capital of ever}' thing. The abandonment of Khartoum would, 
 in their estimation, be the disruption of a central power, which would imply impo- 
 tence. The slave hunters have been suppressed by the authority from Khartoum, 
 and the force required for that suppression has emanated from that centre of strength 
 and government. If, therefore, Khartoum should be abandoned, the protection 
 that was the support of loyal tribes of the interior would have been withdrawn, the- 
 supporting power would have been overthrown, and the slave hunters would again 
 be in the ascendant. The result would be immediate : those tribes which have beens 
 
The BriUsh Carrvpaign in the Sotidmi. 253 
 
 faithful to the government would become the first victims to those who had been 
 against the government. A general anarchy would ensue, and the loyal would be 
 sacrificed to the slave gangs which had been kept in subjection by the imperial 
 forces. The slave-trade would be renewed with tenfold vigor, as no power would 
 remain to curb the atrocities of the traders. This deplorable situation would ren- 
 der impossible all future attempts at government, as the natives would have lost all 
 confidence of support ; they would have seen that the loyal had been sacrificed by 
 the abandonment of the government upon which they had depended for protection, 
 while those who had openly defied the laws had triumphed by rebellion. All the 
 good results of the last five and twenty years of exploration and energetic action 
 against the slave-trade would have been entirely dissipated, and the end of the long 
 struggle would have yielded victory to the wrong-doers. The work of sixty-four 
 years, since the conquest of the Soudan by Mehemet-Ali-Pasha, would have been 
 utterly destroyed, and the Soudan would relapse into the frightful barbarism de- 
 scribed by Bruce a hundred years ago. It is ridiculous to suppose that any Soudan 
 races are capable of self-government. If we refuse this to Ireland, how can we ex- 
 pect a better result from ignorant barbarians, who would extinguish all progress by 
 a chronic inter-tribal strife? As local autonomy would be impossible should Khar- 
 toum be evacuated by the Egyptian -forces, the Soudan, deprived of its capital^ 
 would resolve into a political chaos, until some superior force should take advantage 
 of the general disruption, and restore order by military conquest." 
 
 Dark as this picture is, tlie reality is probably even 
 worse, for the rumor comes that Khartoum has been 
 razed to the ground, probably in consequence of the strug- 
 gles for its possession by rival Mahdis and slave-hunting 
 chiefs. 
 
 Of the British invasion of the Soudan, no traces will be 
 left, except the bleaching bones of thousands of Bedouins 
 on the banks of the Nile and the shores of the .E,ed Sea, 
 together with revived and redoubled hatred of that form 
 of Christian civilization which could bring no better boon 
 to those distant regions than the slaughter and destruc- 
 tion of a people that had never done England any wi'ong. 
 In this connection a reflection almost forces itself upon 
 every thinking man. If England had devoted to the edu- 
 cation, the material and moral improvement of Ireland 
 one tenth of the millions she has spent in the last thirty 
 
254 The British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 years in unnecessary, if not unjust, wars against weak and 
 uncivilized nations, liow much stronger she would be now, 
 and how much better she would deserve the title, which 
 she arrogantly claims, of being the leader of Christian 
 civilization ! 
 
 I will add only a few words of comment. I have al- 
 ready said enough of the political and military vacillation, 
 as well as the inexcusable and, it might be thought, wil- 
 ful ignorance of the theatre of war, which precluded the 
 possibility of success. As to strategic ability, none was 
 displayed. Lord Wolseley's separation within reach of 
 the enemy of his small force into three detachments, be- 
 yond supporting distance, showed a lack of generalship 
 and common-sense, the consequences of which he escaped, 
 not by any skill on his part, but through fortuitous cir- 
 cumstances, which he had no reason to count upon, and 
 over which he had no control. Bad generalship may by 
 chance escape the due punishment of its blunders, but it 
 is none the less bad for all that. 
 
 As to the tactics employed, they were, perhaps, the 
 best under the circumstances and before such an enemy, 
 but military men cannot but wonder why an uncivilized 
 and undisciplined foe, armed almost exclusively with 
 swords and spears, should prove so formidable that an 
 army of select British regiments, supplied with the best 
 breech-loaders and abundantly strengthened with artillery 
 and machine-guns, dared not meet them on the plain with- 
 out constructing stockades and forming squares. Stranger, 
 still, in three different engagements a square was broken, 
 one being driven back eight hundred yards, and all its 
 guns captured by naked savages charging on foot, — a 
 deed which Napoleon's cuirassiers failed to achieve at 
 
The British Campaign in the iSoudan. 255 
 
 Waterloo in tlie days of slow-firing flint-muskets ! A 
 numerical superiority of four or five to one is hardly suf- 
 ficient to explain tliis wonder, wliicli must be due to sev- 
 eral causes. First, the innate bravery of tlie warlike, in- 
 domitable Bedouins, who prize independence above life 
 itself. Secondly, the contempt of life frequently found 
 in savage races, perhaps because their existence offers so 
 little to make it desirable; and, thirdly, the fanatical 
 faith which inspires Mussulmans with the absolute con- 
 viction that from battle against infidels they fly straight 
 to that delicious jDaradise of verdant groves, cool breezes, 
 and rivers of milk and wine. Nothing could appeal more 
 powerfully to the imagination and senses of a passionate 
 race, whose lives are an incessant struggle against hunger, 
 scorching heat, and thirst. How often in my desert 
 marches have I seen those very same Bedouins, — at that 
 time peaceable camel-drivers and goat-herds, trudging 
 along day after day, half-naked, bare-headed, and bare- 
 footed, upon the blistering sand, with seldom water enough 
 to quench their thirst, living on scanty rations of coarse 
 bread or parched dourah and camel's cheese, and I won- 
 dered if they really thought life worth li\ing ! For such 
 men battle and death have no terrors. Above the smoke 
 of musketry and the sheen of flashing bayonets, they be- 
 hold with the eye of faith the cooling spray of Eden's 
 fountains ; they see the peerless, black-eyed houris of 
 paradise waving the Prophet's green-silken banners, and 
 opening their arms to welcome the warrior to their em- 
 brace, and they rush upon death with the gladness of a 
 lover meeting his bride. It cannot be denied that faith is 
 strongest in ignorant races, and diminishes in proportion 
 to intelligence and civilization. I do not question in the 
 
256 llie British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 least tlie sincerity of the average civilized Christian, but I 
 very much doubt whether there are mau}^ v^ho would 
 gladly fly to certain death to gain immediate admission to 
 heaven. They would more probably follow the example 
 of those two chaplains of General Jubal Early's command 
 in the Valley, whom he once met running to the rear at a 
 2.20 gait. The old soldier, who could swear as hard as he 
 could fight, addressed them in his usual forcible style : 
 
 " Blankity blank your blank souls ! Where the 
 
 blank are you running to ? " 
 
 They could hardly gasp out : 
 
 " General ! the Yankees are coming ! '' 
 
 " Blankity blank you ! " rejoined the irate Gen- 
 eral ; '■'■ f 01' forty yeai's you have been wanting to get 
 to heaven, and blank you, now you turn back when within 
 just two minutes of it ! " 
 
 There is a good deal of human nature in that. We all 
 want to go to heaven some time or other — but not yet 
 awhile ! • 
 
 The criticisms I have made Inay appear harsh, but they 
 are mildness itself when compared with the denunciations 
 of many of the most eminent English soldiers and 
 civilians, expressed in Parliament and through the press, 
 only a few of which I have quoted. It is an undeniable 
 fact that the Soudan war was one of the most complete 
 military failures of modern times, and that after all her 
 expenditure of blood and treasure, England was forced 
 to retire baffled from the struggle against barbarians. 
 In the words of the London Times, of Feb. 13th : 
 
 "The Nile expedition, with its immense cost in men and money, represents a 
 dead loss to the nation, a loss directly and wholly due not to the difficulties with 
 which the government had to contend, but to the obstinacy with which they re- 
 fused to recognize facts plain to all the world, and to assume responsibilities which 
 it was their primary duty to discharge." 
 
Tlie British Campaign in the Soudan. 257 
 
 But errors of judgment, though lamentable, leave no 
 stain upon British arms ; for valor never shone 
 brighter than when England's young soldiers, most of 
 whom saw war for the first time, braved the terrible 
 African heat and thirst, withstood unflinchingly the 
 assaults of countless hordes of fierce Bedouins on the 
 deserts of the Soudan, and plucked victory from the jaws 
 of destruction. 
 
 One of the best traits of the English character is 
 its love of fair play and its appreciation of a plucky 
 foe. This was never better illustrated than in the 
 Soudan war. Every official report, as well as the letters 
 of all the war correspondents, express the most unstinted 
 praise and admiration for the courage and unsurpassed 
 gallantry of the Soudanese. Those veteran officers who 
 had had most experience of war were foremost in their 
 eulogies of the Bedouins' bravery. This generous tribute 
 mitigates in some degree the horrors of war, and, coming 
 from equally brave Englishmen, we may say of. it in the 
 words of a gifted poetess : 
 
 "... accept it thus, 
 An homage true they tender, 
 As soldiers unto soldiers' worth, 
 As brave to brave will render ! '" 
 
 Unfortunate as were the i-esults of the Soudan war, it 
 was not without its laurels. England will feel a just 
 pride in the prowess of her troops, who showed themselves 
 worthy successors of the soldiers of Plassey and Assaye, 
 of Salamanca and Waterloo, of Inkerman, and a hundred 
 other glorious fields. Herbert Stewart, Burnaby, Earle, 
 Eyre, and many other gallant soldiers, sealed with their 
 blood their devotion to their country. England had 
 
258 TJie British Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 naturally the most cause to regret their loss, but every 
 soldierly heart in every land joined with true sympathy in 
 the feeling of sorrow for their fate ; and perhaps it is no 
 exaggeration to assert that the glory of having produced 
 such a splendid type of modern Christian heroism as was 
 exhibited in Gordon, is suificient consolation for the fail- 
 ure of the campaign. An ancient poet said that an 
 upright and resolute man struggling undismayed against 
 adversity is the admiration of gods and men. Such a 
 man was Gordon, England's Sir Galahad, her knight 
 truly sans peur et sans reproche. While she justly 
 mourns his loss, his noble life and death will remain a 
 bright example for her soldiers in all time to come, and 
 wherever civilization sheds her light, his name will be 
 engraved high in the glorious roll of those heroes of 
 humanity whose fame will never die ! 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EGYPTIAN HISTORY, FROM ME- 
 HEMET-ALI TO iSS6. 
 
 1769. — Moliammed- or Mehemct-Ali horn at Kavala, Macedonia. 
 
 iSoi. — Goes in command of a band of Albanians to fight the French in Egypt. 
 
 1S05. — Proclaimed Viceroy by the Mamlook Leys. 
 
 1S07, Marcii 7. — British invasion of Egypt. Gen. Eraser captures Alexandria. 
 
 1807, Sept. 14. — Compelled to evacuate Egypt after great losses. 1,000 heads of 
 
 British soldiers killed in batile exposed on Place de Rumelia, Cairo. British 
 
 prisoners well treated and returned without ransom after evacuation. 
 iSlI, March I. — Melicmet-Ali exterminates the Mamlooks at the Citadel, Cairo^ 
 
 and throughout Egypt. 
 lSn-iSi8. — Suppression of Wahabee rebellion in Arabia by his son, Ibrahim- 
 
 Pabha. 
 1S15. — Mehemet-Ali organizes his army upon European system. 
 1S20-1S21. — Conquest of Dongola, Sennaar, and Kordofan. Ismail-Pasha burnt 
 
 to death at Shendy. 
 1823. — Mehemet-Ali founds Khartoum, capital of the Egyptian Soudan. 
 1823-1827. — Ibrahim-Pasha's campaigns in Greece. Destruction of Turkish and 
 
 Egyptian fleets at Navarino (1827). 
 1832. — jMeb.emet-Ali rebels against Sultan. Ibrahim defeats Turks at Koniah 
 
 (Asia Minor). European powers inlerfere and slop Ibrahim's advance. 
 1839. — Meiiemet-Ali rebels again. Ibrahim conquers Syria, defeats 'J'urks at 
 
 Nezib, and threatens Constantinople. Europe interferes, compels Mehemet- 
 Ali to give up Syria, but (1S41) he is recognized Vicei^oy for life wiih succession 
 
 to eldest male of his family, 
 1841. — Establishment of his dynasty guaranteed by Turkey, England, France,. 
 
 Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Egypt remains a vassal of the Porte, pays 
 
 tribute, and furnishes contingent in war. 
 1846. — Catholic mission founded at Khartoum under protection of Austria. 
 1S48. — Mehemet-Ali becomes insane. Ibrahim-Pasha regent. 
 1S49. — Mehemet-Ali dies. Ibrahim also. Abbas his nephew succeeds him. 
 1S54. — Abbas assassinated. Said-Pasha, third son of Meiiemet-Ali, succeeds him. 
 1S63. — Deatli of Said. Accession of Ismail-Pasha, son of Ibrahim. 
 1866. — By doubling the tribute he obtains the title of Khedive and change in order 
 
 of succession to his eldest son, instead of eldest male, who is his uncle, Ilalim. 
 1869. — Opening of Suez Canal with fetes costing $10,000,000. Sir Samuel Baker 
 
 appointed Governor-General of Soudan. 
 1869-1878. — Numerous appointments of American officers in the Egyptian Army. 
 1S74. — Gordon succeeds Sir S. Baker as Governor-General of Soudan. 
 
 259 
 
260 Tlie JBritisli Campaign in the Soudan. 
 
 1874, Oct. — Zobehr defeats and kills the Sultan of Darfour. Ismail-Pasha sends 
 an army and completes the conquest and annexation of Darfour. 
 
 3875. — Gordon establishes garrisons in "equatorial provinces" up to the lakes. 
 Zobehr summoned to Cairo, made a pasha, and held in gilded captivity. 
 
 1875, Oct. and Nov. — Commencement of Abyssinian •wo.t. Munzinger-Pasha, with 
 1,000 men, and Col. Arrendrup, with 2,500, entirely destroyed. 
 
 •1876. — Egyptian army of 15,000 regulars, under Ratib-Pasha, defeated at battle of 
 Gura Plains, March, 1876, by King John. Evacuate the country in May. 
 Establishment of "mixed tribunals." Financial difficulties. Mr. Cave re- 
 ports to British Government that Egypt equitably owes less than ;!f45,ooo,ooo 
 of the ^100, coo, 000 for which she had issued her bonds. 
 
 3877. — Ismail voluntarily appoints Commissioners of the Public Debt, English, 
 French, and Italian. They gradually seize the entire administration and 
 usurp Ismail's powers. Turco-Russian war. Ismail sends contingent of 
 20,0Q0 men. 
 
 1878. — Rebellion of Zobehr-Pasha's sons at his instigation in the Soudan. 
 
 1879, Feb. iS. — Commissioners reduce the army. Emeute of 2,500 regular officers 
 discharged penniless and refused the two years' back pay due them. They 
 compel the Ministry to partial payment. 
 
 1879. — Ismail, exasperated by seeing himself and his country sacrificed for foreign 
 bondholders, dismisses the Commissioners. They appeal to their governments 
 (June 26), which obtain from the Sultan a firman deposing Ismail. Tewfik 
 succeeds him. 
 
 End of 1879. — Gordon resigns and Raouf-Pasha succeeds him as Governor-General 
 of Soudan. 
 
 1881, Feb. 2. — Achmed-el-Arabi, Col. 4th Infantry, and three other colonels pro- 
 test against promotions of Circassians over their heads. Sent to citadel in ar- 
 rest. Their regiments rise in arms, rescue them, and compel dismissal of 
 Minister of War. 
 
 1881, July. — Mohammed Achmed proclaims himself the expected Mahdi. 
 
 i88i, Aug. 10. — He defeats the force sent by Raouf-Pasha to suppress him. 
 
 1881, Sept. 9. — The Ministry being about to disperse the mutinous regiments at 
 Cairo, Arabi surrounds the Khedive's palace with 4,000 men, demands dismis- 
 sal of Ministry, a constitution, and a parliament. Sherif-Pasha appointed 
 Prime-Minister. 
 
 1881, Dec. 8. — Reshid-Bey with 1,500 men defeated and killed by the Mahdi in 
 Sennaar. 
 
 1881, Dec. 26. — Assembly of Notables convene, announce a just and equitable 
 plan of constitutional government, and guarantee payment of public debt and 
 its interest. 
 
 1881, Dec. — Plan rejected by England and France. Ministerial crisis. 
 
 1882, Feb. 3. — Sherif-Pasha resigns (Feb. 5th). Arabi Minister of War. 
 1882, Feb. 23. — Raouf-Pasha recalled ; Giegler acting Gov.-Gen'l of Soudan. 
 1882, March 15. — Yusuf-Pasha leaves Khartoum with 5,000 men to attack the 
 
 Mahdi. 
 
The Bfitish Campaign in the Soudan. 261 
 
 1882, April II. — Trial of Circassian officers' for conspiracy to murder Arabi. 
 Ministry convoke Assembly of Notables without Khedive's consent. 
 
 1882, May 6. — Sennaar hard pressed by rebels, who are finally defeated with 
 great loss. 
 
 1882, May 12. — Abd-el-Kader-Pasha, the new Governor-General, reaches Khar- 
 toum. 
 
 1882, May 20. — English and French squadrons repair to Alexandria to overawe 
 the people. Their presence produces intense irritation. 
 
 1882, May 25. — England and France demand Arabi's banishment. Refused by 
 the Ministry. 
 
 1882, June II. — Massacre at Alexandria. 150 Europeans and 700 natives killed 
 and wounded. 
 
 1882, June 13. — News reaches Khartoum of Yusuf-Pasha's total destruction at 
 Jebel Gedir. 
 
 1882, June 24. — The Mahdi repulsed at Bara (Kordofan), with loss of 3,000. 
 
 1882, July II. — Bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet. 
 
 1S82, July 23. — Arabi proclaimed a rebel by the Khedive. 
 
 1882, Aug. — Sir Arch. Alison occupies Alexandria with 6,000 British troops. 
 
 1882, Aug. 15. — Lord Wolseley arrives and takes command. About 30,000 British 
 in Egypt. 
 
 1882, Aug. 24. — British seize Suez Canal and make it their base, in spite of pledges 
 to respect its neutrality given to de Lesseps, which had kept Arabi from de- 
 stroying it. 
 
 1882, Aug. 28. — Amr-el-Makashef attacks Duem, and is repulsed with loss of 
 3,000. 
 
 1882, Sept. 8-14. — The Mahdi makes three assaults on El Obeid. Defeated ;; 
 loss 15,000. 
 
 1882, Sept. 9. — British captured advance post at Kassassin. 
 
 1882, Sept. 12-13. — Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Total defeat of Arabi's army. 
 
 1882, Sept. 15. — Cairo occupied by British. Arabi surrenders. 
 
 1882, Sept. 25. — Khedive re-enters Cairo. Sherif Prime-Minister. 
 
 1882, Dec. 10. — Some of Arabi's disaffected regiments sent to the Soudan. 
 
 1882, Dec. 15. — Lt.-Col. O. H. Stewart (nth Hussars) reaches Khartoum and re- 
 ports situation to British Government. 
 
 1883, Jan. 5, 17. — The Mahdi captures Bara. El Obeid, reduced to starvation, 
 surrenders to the Mahdi, and the garrison join his ranks. 
 
 1883, Feb. 20, 24, and 27. — Abd-el-Kader defeats the rebels in three engagements. 
 
 1883, March 10. — General Hicks arrives at Khartoum. 
 
 1883, March 22. — Abd-el-Kader defeats the rebels at Karkodj. 
 
 1883, March 26. — He is recalled to Cairo and superseded by Allah-ed-Deen. 
 
 1883, April 29. — Hicks-Pasha defeats rebels at Marabia (Sennaar). Achmed-el- 
 
 Makashef killed. 
 1883, May. — Hicks-Pasha defeats the Mahdi near Khartoum and at Jebel- Ai'n, and 
 
 drives him back to Kordofan. 
 1883, Aug. 13. — Osman-Digma attacks Suakim, and is repulsed with loss. 
 
262 The British Cam/paign in the 8oudan, 
 
 1883, Aug. 20. — Hicks-Pasha supersedes Suleiman as Commander-in-Cliief in 
 
 Soudan. 
 1883, Sept. 8. — He leaves Khartoum with 11,000 men to recapture El Obeld. 
 1883, Nov. 1-4. — Is exterminated with all his force at Kashgill. 
 1883, Nov. 6. — Consul Moncrieff, with Egyptian force, destroyed at Tokar. 
 1883, Nov. 9. — Gladstone's speech at Guildhall, announcing partial evacuation of 
 
 Egypt. 
 1883. Nov. 20. — News of the disasters reaches London. 
 3883, 26-30.— Suakim attacked by Osman-Digma. British Ministry order Tewfik 
 
 to abandon Soudan and Nubia to ist cataract. 
 1883, Dec. 2. — Seven hundred Egyptian troops destroyed near Suakim ; only 
 
 fifty escape. 
 1883, Dec. 18. — Baker- Pasha leaves Cairo for Suakim with a motley force of 4,000. 
 
 1883, Dec. 26. — Turkey notified that her intervention will be allowed in Soudan. 
 J884, Jan. 8. — Sherif's Ministry resign rather than abandon Soudan. Nubar- 
 
 Pasha, Prime-Minister. 
 T884, Jan. 18. — Gordon leaves London. (24) Reaches Cairo, and leaves next day 
 for Khartoum. 
 
 1884, Feb. 4. — Baker defeated at Tokar, with loss of 2,500. 
 
 1884, Feb. 10. — Suakim attacked. Defended by British gun-boats. Admiral 
 
 Hewett, Governor. 
 1884, Feb. II. — Fall of Sinkat. Tewfik-Bey and garrison die fighting to the last. 
 1884, Feb. 18. — Gordon reaches Khartoum and is warmly received. 
 1884, Feb. 19. — Sir Gerald Graham sails from Suez for Suakim with 5,000 men. 
 1884, Feb. 21. — Tokar captured by Osman-Digma. 
 
 1884, Feb. 29. — Battle of Teb. Graliam defeats Osman-Digma with great slaughter. 
 1884, March 2. — Graham re-takes Tokar. (5) Returns to Suakim with all his force. 
 1884, March 8. — Earl Granville notifies Sir Ev. Baring that Egyptian frontier 
 
 must be at 1st cataract. 
 1884, March 13. — Battle of Tamai'. 2d Brigade broken and guns lost and recaptured, 
 
 British loss, 180: rebels, 2,000. 
 1884, March 16. — Gordon attacked at Khartoum. 
 1884, March 21. — Makes sortie, and is repulsed at Halfiyeh by treachery of two 
 
 pashas. 
 1S84, March 24. — Terrible march of British towards Tamanieb. One half pros- 
 trated by heat. 
 1884, March 27. — Tamanieb wells occupied and Osman-Digma's camp burnt. 
 1884, March 29. — Sir Herbert Stewart with cavalry force pushes on to Handoub 
 
 wells. 
 1884, March 30. — Returns exhausted. All Graham's army return to Suakim. 
 1884, April I. — Graham re-embarks for Suez with all his force. 
 1884, April 2. — Osman-Digma captures many cattle and 1,000 sheep within one 
 
 mile of Suakim. 
 1884, April 5. — General Stephenson and Sir E. Baring ordered to report on 
 
 Korosko, Suakim, and Nile routes. 
 
The British Oa/mpaign in the Soudan. 268- 
 
 1884, April 8. — Gordon telegraphs that he has supplies for five months. 
 
 1884, April 16. — Consul Power reports Khartoum blockaded north, east, and west. 
 
 1884, April 20. — Refugees sent for safety from Khartoum intercepted at Shendy ;. 
 
 450 soldiers and 1,500 people massacred. 
 iS84, April 30. — Admiral Hewett interviews King John at Adowa. Gordon sends 
 
 indignant dispatches to Sir E. Baring, charging abandonment. 
 1884, May 8. — River route adopted for rescuing expedition. Camel depot ordered 
 
 formed at Assouan. 
 1884, May 12. — Mr. Gladstone's declaration that the Mahdi is fighting for freedom 
 
 and should not be put down. England withdraws proposition to Turkey to 
 
 send her troops to Soudan. 
 1884, May 26. — Berber captured. The garrison and 2,000 people massacred. 
 1884, May 27. — El-Fascher, capital of Darfour, captured by the rebels. 
 1884, June I. — River route abandoned. Suakim-Berber route decided on. 
 1884, June 14. — Admiral Hewett reports King John willing to furnish troops. 
 1884, June 16. — Engineer troops sent to Suakim to survey route. 
 1884, June 30. — Mudir of Dongola defeats 13,000 rebels. 
 J884, July 19. — Railroad plant and iron-clad cars sent to Suakim. 
 1884, Aug. 18. — Suakim route abandoned. Railroad plant shipped to India. 
 
 River route finally adopted. 
 1884, Aug. 31. — General Lord Wolseley sails from England. (Sept. 9) Reaches 
 
 Cairo. 
 1884, Sept. 15. — Gordon shells and destroys Berber. (i8) Col. Stewart, Consuls 
 
 Power and Herbin, with a number of refugees, wrecked at fourth cataract and 
 
 massacred. 
 1884, Sept. 26. — Camel corps leave England. (Oct. 5) Wolseley at Wady Haifa. 
 
 (6) Gordon shells Shendy and other towns. (28) 6,000 British troops south of 
 
 Sioot. 
 1884, Nov. 3. — Wolseley reaches Dongola. (15) 800 whale-boats reach Wady 
 
 Haifa and start (Nov. 19) with 3,000 troops up the Nile ; 6,000 more on the 
 
 way between first and second cataracts. 
 1884, Dec. 6. — Sir Herbert Stewart with 1,000 men pushes forward from Dongola 
 
 to Ambukol. 
 1884, Dec. 13. — Wolseley reaches Debbe. (16) Joins Stewart at Korti. 
 
 1884, Dec. 25. — 10,000 British troops between second cataract and Korti (30) 
 Stewart starts with 1,150 men and 2,000 camels for Gakdul. (Jan. 2, 1885) 
 Occupies Gakdul wells. (3) Returns alone to Korti. 
 
 1885, Jan. 5. — General Earle sent up the Nile towards Abou-Hamefl with 2,400 men. 
 1885, Jan. 8. — Stewart starts back from Korti with 1,500 more men and as many 
 
 camels. 
 1885, Jan. 10. — Burnaby leaves Korti with a supply train for Stewart at Gakdul. 
 1885, Jan. 13. — Omdurman captured. 
 
 1885, Jan. 17. — Battle of Abou-Klea wells. Burnaby killed. 
 1885, Jan. 18. — Gordon makes unsuccessful sortie. 
 1885, Jan. 19. — Battle of Shebacat wells (or Gubat). Stewart mortally wounded. 
 
264 The British Cmnj^aign in the Soudan. 
 
 1885, Jan. 21. — Four of Gordon's steamers arrive at Gubat. (22 and 23) Sir 
 
 Charles Wilson shells villages. (24) Starts up the Nile for Khartoum with 
 
 two steamers. 
 1885, Jan. 24. — Earle's column leaves Homdab for Abou-Hained. 
 1885, Jan. 26. — Khartoum captured and Gordon killed. About 4,000 slaughtered. 
 1885, Jan. 28. — Sir C. Wilson finds Khartoum in possession of the enemy and 
 
 turns back. 
 1885, Jan. 29. — One steamer wrecked. (31) The other also. He takes refuge on 
 
 an island. 
 1885, Feb. 1-2. — Gallantly rescued by Lord Charles Beresford on another steamer 
 
 from Gubat. 
 1885, Feb. 8. — Wolseley directed from London to capture Berber at all hazards. . 
 1885, Feb. 10. — Sir Redvers Buller reaches Gubat with reinforcements. 2,600 . 
 
 men there. 
 1885, Feb. 10. — Battle of Birti or Kirbekan. General Earle killed. Brackenbury 
 
 in command. 
 1885, Feb. II. — West Kent Regiment leave Korti for Gubat. 
 1885, Feb. 12. — Sir Gerald Graham assigned to command of Suakim expedition. 
 
 Railroad to be laid " at once ! " 
 1885, Feb. 14. — Sir Redvers Buller evacuates Gubat after disabling remaining 
 
 steamers. 
 1885, Feb. 16. — Sir Herbert Stewart dies and is buried at Gakdul wells. 
 1885, Feb. 19. — Sir R. Buller ordered to concentrate at Korti. 
 1885, Feb. ig. — Departure of the Guards from London for Suakim. 
 1885, Feb. 20-25. — Buller's difficult retreat to Korti. 
 1885, Ftb. 25. — Brackenbury crosses his fcrce to east bank and same day receives 
 
 orders to concentrate at Korti, and crosses back. 
 1885, Feb. 28. — Contract made for pipe-line for Suakim route. 
 1885, March 2. — Wolseley announces purpose to hold Korti-Gakdul route. 
 1885, March 9. — All his force concentrated at Korti. 
 1885, March 10. — Grenadier and Coldstream Guards (General Freemantle) reach 
 
 Suakim. 
 1885, March 15. — Zobehr-Pasha and his two sons arrested for treason and incar- 
 cerated at Gibraltar. 
 1885, March 20. — Wolseley retires from Korti to Dongola and gradually to second 
 
 cataract during April and May. 
 1885, March 20. — Battle at Hasheen. Graham defeats Osman-Digma and returns 
 
 to Suakim. 
 1885, March 22. — Second battle at Hasheen and return to Suakim. 
 1885, March 28. — Graham advances to McNeil's zeriba. Two miles' advance in 
 
 two weeks. 
 1885, April I. — Finds Tamai wells evacuated. Burns Osman-Digma's camp and 
 
 returns to Suakim. 
 1885, April. — Railroad project abandoned. Plant sent back to England. An- 
 other Mahdi appears in Kordofan. 
 
1 he British Ca/mpaign in the Soudcm. 265 
 
 1885, May 7. — Wolseley goes through Cairo and Suez to Suakim, reviews Graham's 
 
 army, and returns to Cairo. 
 1885, May 5-20. — Graham re-embarks with his army and returns to Alexandria, 
 1885, June 21. — The Mahdi dies in Kordofan. Abd-AUah Kalif succeeds him, 
 1885, July. — Wolseley returns to England. Lt.-Gen. Stephenson left in command 
 
 of all British forces in Egypt. 
 1885, Dec. 30. — Sir R. BuUer attacks and defeats rebels at Ghinnis, above Wady 
 
 Haifa. 
 1886. — British forces withdrawn, leaving two regiments at first cataract. 
 
I 
 
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