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 rROCEEDING^ 
 
 «V A 
 
 CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, 
 
 FHOM HIE STATES Of 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS, CONNECTICUT, AND RHODE-ISLAND ; THE COUNTIES OF CBLV 
 
 SHIRE AND GRAFTON, IN THE STATE OV NEW-HAMPSHIBE ; AND 
 
 THB COUNTY OP WINDHAM, IN THE STATU OF VERMONT ;— 
 
 CONVENED AT HARTFORD, IN THE STATE OV C0NNBCT1CUT-, 
 DECEMBER 15th, 1814. 
 
 / 
 
 THiRD EDITION, CORRECTED AND IMPROVED. 
 
 BOSTON : 
 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY WELLS AND LlLLr 
 
 1815. . 
 

REPORT, &e. 
 
 The Delegates from the Legislatures of the Stales of IVIassu 
 chusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode-Island, and from the 
 Counties of Graflon and Cheshire in the Slate of Neu'- 
 Hampshire and the county of Windham in the Slate of 
 Vermont, assembled in Convention, beg leave to report the 
 ,. follo-vvino; result of their conference. 
 
 o 
 
 The Convention is deeply impressed with a sense of the ardu- 
 ous nature of the commission which they were appointed to exe- 
 cute, of devising Ihe means of defence against dangers, and of re- 
 lief from oppressions proceeding from the act of their own Go- 
 vernment, without violating constitutional principles, or disap- 
 pointing the hopes of a suffering and injured people. To pre- 
 scribe patience and firmness to those who arc already exhausted 
 by distress, is sometimes to drive them to despair, and the pro- 
 gress towards reform by the regular road, is irksome to those 
 whose imaginations discern, and whose feelings prompt, to a 
 shorter course. — But when abuses, reduced to system and accu- 
 mulated through a course \)f years, have pervaded every depart- 
 ment of Government, and spread corruption through every re- 
 gion of the State ; when these are clothed with the forms of law, 
 and enforced by an Execulive whose will is their source, no 
 summary means of relief can be applied without recourse to di- 
 rect and open resistance. This experiment, even when justifia- 
 ble, cannot fail to be painful to the good cillzen ; and the suc- 
 cess of the effort will be no securily against the danger of the 
 example. Precedents of resistance to the worst administration, 
 are eagerly seized by those who are nalurally hostile to the best. 
 Necessity alone can sanction a resoit lo this measure; and it 
 should never be extended in duration or degree beyond the exi 
 gency, unlil the people, not merely in the fervour of sudden 
 excitement, but after full deliberation, are determined to change 
 the Constitution. 
 
 It is a truth, not to be concealed, that a senliment prevails (o 
 no inconsiderable extent, that Adrniniilralion have given such 
 constructions to thai inslrnmenf, and practised so majiy abuses 
 
as are of a more remote and general description, in the hope of 
 attaining future security. 
 
 Among the subjects of complaint and apprehension, which 
 niight be comprised under the former of these propositions, the 
 attention of the Convention has been occupied with the claims 
 and pretensions ad\ anced, and the authority exercised over the 
 militia, b}- the executive and legislative departments of the Na- 
 tional Govermnent. Also, upon the destitution of the means of 
 <lefence in which the Eastern States are left ; while at the same 
 time they are doomed to heavy requisitions of men and money 
 for national objects. 
 
 The aulhority of the National Government ov€r the militia is 
 derived from those clauses in the Constitution which give power 
 to Congress " to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute 
 the lav.s of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel inva- 
 sions" — Also, " to provide for organizing, arming and discipli- 
 ning the militia, and for governing such parts of them as may 
 be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to 
 the Slates respectively the appointment of the officers, and the 
 authority of training the militia according to the discipline pre- 
 scribed by Congress." Again, ''The President shall be Com- 
 mander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and 
 of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
 service of the United States.^^ In these specified cases only, 
 has the National Government any power over the militia ; and it 
 follows conclusively, that for all general and ordinary purposes, 
 this power belongs to the States respectively, and to them alone. 
 It is not only with regret, but with astonishment, the Convention 
 perceive that under colour of an authority conferred with such 
 plain and precise limitations, a power is arrogated by the execu- 
 tive government, and in some instances sanctioned by the two 
 Houses of Congress, of control over the militia, which if conce- 
 ded, will render nugatory the rightful authorily of the individual 
 States over that class of men, and by placing at the disposal of 
 the National Government the lives and services of the great body 
 of the people, enable it at pleasure to destroy their liberties, and 
 erect a military despotism on the ruins. 
 
 An elaborate examination of the principles assumed for the 
 basis of these extravagant pretensions, of the consequences to 
 which they lead, and of the insurmountable objections to their 
 admission, would transcend the limits of this Report. A few 
 general observations, with an exhibition of the character of these 
 pretensions, and a recommendation of a strenuous opposition to 
 them, must not however be'omitted. 
 
 It will not be contended, that by the terms nsed in the con- 
 stitutional compact, the power of the National Government to 
 
tiiW out the militia is other than a power expressly limited to 
 three cases. One of these must exist as a condition precedent 
 to the exercise of that power — Unless the laws shall be opposed, 
 or an insurrection shall exist, or an invasion shall be made, Con- 
 gress, and of consequence the President as their organ, has no 
 more power over the militia than over the armies of a foreign 
 nation. 
 
 But if the declaration of the President should be admitted to 
 be an unerring test of the existence of these cases, this important 
 power would depend, not upon the truth of the fact, but upon ex- 
 ecutive infallibility ; and the limitation of the power would 
 ronsequenth' be nothing mure than merely nominal, as it might 
 always be eluded. It follows therefore that the decision of the 
 President in this particular cannot be conclusive. It is as much 
 the duty of the State authorities to watch over the rights reserv- 
 ed, as of the United States to exercise the powers which are 
 delegated. 
 
 The arrangement of the United States into military districts, 
 with a small portion of the regular force, under an officer of high 
 rank of the standing army, with power to call for the militia, as 
 circumstances in his judgment may require; and to assume the 
 command of them, is not warranted by the Constitution or any 
 law of the United States. It is not denied that Congress may 
 delegate to the President of the United States the power to call 
 forth the militia in the cases which are within their jurisdiction — 
 But he has no authority to substitute military prefects through- 
 out the Union, to use their own discretion in such instances. To 
 station an officer of the army in a military district without troops 
 corresponding to his rank, for the purpose of taking command 
 of the mihtia that may be called into service, is a manifest evasion 
 of that provision of the Constitution which expressly reserves to 
 the States the appointment of the officers of the militia ; and the 
 object of detaching such officer cannot be well conceived to be 
 any other, than that of superseding the Governour or other officers 
 of the militia in their right to command. 
 
 The power of dividing the militia of the States into classes, and 
 obliging such classes to furnish by contract or draft, able bodied 
 men, to serve for one or more years for the defence of the fron- 
 tier, is not delegated to Congress. If a claim to draft the militia 
 for one year for such general object be admissible, no limitation 
 can be assigned to it, but the discretion of those who make the 
 law. Thus with a power in Congress to authorise such a draft 
 or conscription, and in the Executive to decide conclusively 
 upon the existence and continuance of the emergency, the whole 
 militia may be converted into a standing army disposable at the 
 will of the President of the United States. 
 
8 
 
 Tb<£: power o? couipelling (he militia and oilier citizens of (lie 
 Ignited States, by a forcible draft or conscription to serve in the 
 regular armies, as proposed in a late oflicial letter of the Secretary 
 of War, is not delegated to Congress by the Constitution, and 
 the exercise of it would be not less dangerous to their liberties, 
 than hostile to the sovereignty of the States. The effort to de- 
 duce this power from the right of raising armies, is a flagrant 
 attempt to pervert the sense of the clause in the Constitution 
 which confers that right, and is incompatible with other pro- 
 visions in that instrument. The armies of the United Slates 
 have always been raised by contract, never by conscription, and 
 notliing more can be wanting to a Government, possessing the 
 power thus claimed, to enable it to usurp the entire control of 
 the militia, in derogation of the authority of the State, and to 
 convert it by impressment into a standing army. 
 
 It may be here remarked, as a circumstance illustrative of the 
 determination of the Executive to establish an absolute control 
 over all descriptions of citizens, that the right of impressing sea- 
 men into the naval service is expressly asserted by the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy in a late report- Thus a practice, which in a 
 foreign government has been regarded with great abhorrence by 
 the people, finds advocates among those who have been the loud- 
 est to condemn it. 
 
 The law authorizing the enlistjnent of minors and apprentices 
 into the armies of the United States, without the consent of 
 parents and guardians, is also repugnant to the spirit of the Con- 
 stitution. By a construction of the power to raise armies, as 
 applied by our present rulers, not only persons capable of con- 
 tracting are liable to be impressed into the army, but those who 
 are under legal disabilities to make contracts, are to be invested 
 with this capacity, in order to enable them to annul at pleasure 
 contracts made in their behalf by legal guardians. Such an 
 interference with the municipal laws and rights of the several 
 States, could never have been contemplated by the fraraers of 
 the Constitution. It impairs the salutary control and influence 
 of the parent over his child — the master over his servant — the 
 :2;uardian over his ward — and thus destroys the most injporfant 
 relations in socIet*y', so that by the conscription of the father, and 
 the seduction of the son, the power of the Executive over all the 
 effective male population of the United States is made complete. 
 
 Such are pome of the odious features of the novel system pro- 
 jjosed by liie rulers of a free country, under the limited powers 
 derived ham the Constitution. What portion of them will be 
 embracetl in acts finally to be passed, it ia yet impossible to de- 
 termine. It is, however, sufficiently alarming to perceive, that 
 iliese projeclse manate from the highest authority ; nor should ij: 
 
be forfijoHen, l!ial by llie plan of tlie Secretary of War, the clas- 
 sification of Ihc militia embraced llie principle of direct taxalion 
 upon tlie white popnlation only; and that, in (he House of Re- 
 presentatives, a motion to apportion llie militia amonc; the while 
 population exclusively, which would have been in it-i operation a 
 direct tax, was strenuously urged and supported. 
 
 In Ihis whole series of devices and measures for raising men, 
 this Convention discern a total disregard for the Constitulion, and 
 a disposition to violate its provisions, demanding from the indi- 
 vidual States a firm and decided opposition. An iron despotism 
 can impose no harder servitude upon the citizen, than to force 
 him from his home and his occupation, to wage olfensive wars, 
 undertaken to gratify the pride or passions of his mas'ser. The 
 example of France has recently shewn that a cabal of individuals 
 assuming to act in the name of the people, may transform the 
 great body of citizens into soldiers, and deliver them over into 
 the hands of a single tyrant. No war, not held in just abhor- 
 rence by a people, can require the aid of such stratagems to 
 recruit an army. Had the troops already raised, and in great 
 numbers sacrificed upon the frontier of Canada, been employed 
 for the defence of the country, and had the millions which have 
 been squandered with shameless profusion, been appropriated to 
 their payment, to the protection of the coast, and to the naval 
 service, there would have been no occasion for unconstitutional 
 expedients. Even at this late hour, let Government leave to 
 New-England the remnant of her resources, and she is ready and 
 able to defend her territory, and to resign the glories and advan- 
 tages of the border war, to those who are determined to persist 
 in its prosecution. 
 
 That acts of Congress in violation of the Constitution are ab- 
 solutely void, is an undeniable position. It does not, however, 
 consist with the respect and forbearance due from a confederate 
 State towards the General Government, to fly to open resistance 
 upon every infraction of the Constitution. The mode and the 
 energy of the opposition should always conform to the nature 
 of the violation, the intention of its authors, the extent of the 
 injury inflicted, the determination manifested to persist in it, and 
 the danger of delay. But in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and 
 palpable infractions of the Constitution, affecting the sovereignty 
 of a State, and liberties of the people ; it is not only the right 
 but the duty of such a State to interpose its authority for their 
 protection, in the manner best calculated to secure that end. 
 When emergencies occur which are either be\^ond the reach of 
 the judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit of the delay inci- 
 dent to their forms, States, which have no common umpire, must 
 be their own judges, and execute their own decisions. It will 
 
10 
 
 thus be proper for the several States to await tlic ultimate dis- 
 posal of tlie obnoxious measures, recommended by (he Secretary 
 of War, or pending before Congress, and so to lise their power 
 according to the character these measures shall finally assume, 
 as elFectually to protect their own sovereignty, and the rights 
 and liberties of their citizens. 
 
 The next subject which has occupied the attention of the 
 Convention, is the means of defence against the common enemy. 
 This naturally leads to the inquiries, whether any expectation 
 can be reasonably entertained, that adequate provision for the 
 defence of the Eastern Sates will be made by the National 
 Government ? Whether the several States can, from their own 
 resources, provide for self-defence and fulfil the requisitions 
 which are to be expected for the national Treasury ? and, gene- 
 rally, what course of conduct ought to be adopted by those 
 States, in relation to the great object of defence? 
 
 Without pausing at present to comment upon the causes of 
 the war, it may be assumed as a truth, officially announced, that 
 to achieve the conquest of Canadian territory, and to hold it as 
 a pledge for peace, is the deliberate purpose of Administration. 
 This enterprise, commenced at a period when Government pos- 
 sessed the advantage of selecting the time and occasion for mak- 
 ing a sudden descent upon an unprepared enemy, now languishes 
 in the third year of the war. It has been prosecuted with vari- 
 ous fortune, and occasional brilliancy of exploit, but without any 
 solid acquisition. The British armies have been recruited by 
 veteran regiments. Their navy commands Ontario. The Ame- 
 rican ranks are thinned by the casualties of war. Recruits are 
 discouraged by the unpopular character of the contest, and by^ 
 the uncertainty of receiving their pay. 
 
 In the prosecution of this favourite warfare. Administration 
 have left the exposed and vulnerable parts of the country desti- 
 tute of all efficient means of defence. The main body of the 
 regular army has been marched to the frontier. — The navy has 
 been stripped of a great part of its sailors for the service of the 
 Lakes. Meanwhile the enemy scours the sea-coast, blockades 
 our ports, ascends our bays and rivers, makes actual descents in 
 various and distant places, holds some by force, and threatens 
 all that are assailable witii fire and sword. The sea-board of 
 four of the New-England Slates, following its curvatures, pre- 
 sents an extent of more than seven hundred miles, generally oc- 
 cupied by a compact population, and accessible by a naval force, 
 exposing a mass of people and property to the devastation of 
 the enemy, which bears a great proportion to the residue of the 
 maritime frontier of the United States. This extensive shore 
 has been exposed to frequent attacks, repeated contributions. 
 
n 
 
 and constant alarms. The regular forces detached by the na- 
 tional Government for its defence, are mere pretexts for placing 
 oificers of high rank in command. They are besides confined 
 to a few places, and are too insignificant in number to be includ- 
 ed in any computation. 
 
 These Slates have thus been left to adopt measures for their\ 
 own defence. The militia have been constantly kept on the aiert, I 
 and harassed by garrison duties, and other hardships, while the 
 expenses, of which the National Government decline the reim- 
 bursement, threaten to absorb all the resources of the States. 
 The President of the United States has refused to consider Ihe 
 expense of the militia detached by state authority, for the indis- 
 pensable defence of the Stale, as chargeable to the Union, on the 
 ground of^i refusal by the Executive of the State, to place them 
 under the command of officers of the regular army. Detachments 
 of militia placed at the disposal of the General Government, have 
 been dismissed either without pay, or with depreciated paper. 
 The prospect of the ensuing campaign is not enlivened by the 
 promise of any alleviation of these grievances. From authen- 
 tick documents, extorted by necessity from those whose incli- 
 nation might lead them to conceal the embarrassments of the 
 Government, it is apparent that the treasury is bankrupt, and 
 its credit prostrate. So deplorable is the state of the finances, 
 that those who feel'for the honour and safety of the country, 
 would be willing to conceal the melancholy spectacle, if those 
 whose infatuation has produced this state of fiscal concerns, had 
 not found themselves compelled to unveil it to public view. 
 
 If the war be continued, there appears no room for reliance 
 upon the national government for the supply of those means of 
 defence, which must become indispensable to secure these 
 States from desolation and ruin. Nor is it possible that the 
 States can discharge this sacred duty from their own resources, 
 and continue to sustain the burden of the national taxes. The 
 Administration, after a long perseverance in plans to baffle every 
 effort of commercial enterprise, had fatally succeeded in their 
 attempts at the epoch of the war. Commerce, the vital spring 
 of New-England's prosperity, was annihilated. Embargoes, re- 
 strictions, and the rapacity of revenue officers, had completed 
 its destruction. The various objects for the employment of 
 productive labour, in the branches of business dependent on 
 commerce, have disappeared. The fisheries have shared its 
 fate. Manufactures, which Government has professed an in- 
 tention to favour and to cherish, as an indemnity for the failure 
 of these branches of business, are doomed to struggle in their in- 
 fancy with taxes and obstructions, which cannot fail most seri- 
 ously to affect their growth. The specie is withdrawn from 
 
12 
 
 circulation. The landed interest, the last to feel theae burdens, 
 imist prepare to become their principal support, as all other 
 sources of revenue must be exhausted. Under these circum- 
 stances, taxes, of a description and amount unprecedented in 
 this country, are in a train of imposition, the burden of which 
 must fall uilh the heaviest pressure upon the states east of the 
 Potowmac. The amount of these taxes for the ensuing year, 
 cannot be estimated at less than five millions of dollars upon the 
 New-England States, and the expenses of the last j ear for de- 
 fence, in Massachusetts alone, approaches to one million of 
 dollars. 
 
 From these facts, it is almost superfluous to state the irre- 
 sistible inference, that these States have no capacity of defray- 
 ing the expense requisite for their own protection, and, at the 
 same time, of discharging the demands of the national treasury. 
 
 The last inquiry, what course of conduct ought to be adopted 
 by the aggrieved States, is in a high degree momentous. When 
 a great and brave people shall feel themselves deserted by their 
 Government, and reduced to the necessity either of submission 
 to a foreign enemy, or of appropriating to their own use those 
 means of defence which are indispensable to self-preservation, 
 they cannot consent to wait passive spectators of approaching 
 ruin, which it is in their power to avert, and to resign the last 
 remnant of their industrious earnings, to be dissipated in support 
 of measures destructive of the best interests of the nation. 
 
 This Convention will not trust themselves to express their 
 conviction of the catastrophe to which such a state of things in- 
 evitably tends. Conscious of their high responsibility to God 
 and their country, solicitous for the continuance of the Union, 
 as well as the sovereignty of the States, unwilling to furnish ob- 
 stacles to peace — resolute never to submit to a foreign enemy, and 
 confiding in the Divine care and protection, they will, until the 
 last hope shall be extinguished, endeavour to avert such conse- 
 quences. 
 
 With this view they suggest an arrangement, which may at 
 once be consistent with the honour and interest of the National 
 Government, and the security of these States. This it will not 
 be difficult to conclude, if that government should be so dis- 
 posed. By the terms of it these States might be allowed to as- 
 sume their own defence, by the militia or other troops. A rea- 
 sonable portion, also, of the taxes raised in each State might be 
 paid into its treasury, and credited to the United States, but to 
 be appropriated lo the defence of such State, to be accounted 
 for with the United States. No doubt is entertained, that by 
 such an arrangement, this portion of the country could be de- 
 tended with greater effect, and in a mode more consistent with 
 
13 
 
 economy, and Ihe public convenience, than any Avhich has been 
 practised. 
 
 Should an application for these purposes, made to Congress 
 by the State Legislatures, be attended wilh success, and should 
 peace upon jus( terms appear to be unattainable, the people would 
 stand together for the common defence, until a change of Ad- 
 ministration, or of disposition in the enemy, should facilitate the 
 occurrence of that auspicious event. It would be inexpedient 
 for this Convention to diminish the hope of a successful issue to 
 such an application, by recommending, upon supposition of a con- 
 trary event, ulterior proceedings. Nor is it indeed within their 
 province. In a state of things so solemn and trying as may 
 then arise, the Legislatures of the States, or Conventions of the 
 whole people, or delegates appointed by them for the express 
 purpose in another Convention, must act as such urgent circum- 
 stances may then require. 
 
 But the duty incumbent on this Convention will not have been 
 performed, without exhibiting some general view of such mea- 
 sures as they deem essential to secure the nation against a relapse 
 into difficulties and dangers, should they, by the blessing of 
 Providence, escape from their present condition without abso- 
 lute ruin. To this end, a concise retrospect of the state of this 
 nation under the advantages of a wise Administration, contrasted 
 with the miserable abyss into which it is plunged by the profliga- 
 cy and folly of political theorists, will lead to some practical con- 
 clusions. On this subject, it will be recollected, that the imme- 
 diate influence of the Federal Constitution upon its first adop- 
 tion, and for twelve succeeding years, upon the prosperity and 
 happiness of the nation, seemed to countenance a belief in the 
 transcendency of its perfection over all other human institutions. 
 In the catalogue of blessings which have fallen to the lot of the 
 most favoured nations, none could be enumerated from which our 
 country was excluded — A free Constitution, administered by 
 great and incorruptible statesmen, realized the fondesfhopes of 
 liberty and independence — The progress of agriculture was 
 stimulated by the certainty of value in the harvest — and cem- 
 merce, after traversing every sea, returned with the riches of 
 every clime. — A revenue, secured by a sense of honour, collected 
 without oppression, and paid without murmurs, melted ai', ay the 
 national debt ; and the chief concern of the publick creditor arose 
 from its too rapid diminution. — The wars and commotions of the 
 European nations, and the interruptions of their commercial 
 intercourse afforded to those, who had not promoted, but who 
 would have rejoiced to alleviate their calamities, a fair and golden 
 opportunity, by enriching themselves to lay a broad foundation 
 for national wealth. — Although occasional vexations to com- 
 
14 
 
 merce arose from the furious collisions of the powers at war, 
 yel the great and good men of that time conformed to the force 
 of circumstances which they could not control, and preserved 
 their country in security from the tempests, which overwhelmed 
 the old world, and threw the wreck of their fortunes on these 
 shores. — Respect abroad, prosperity at home, wise laws made 
 by honoured legislators, and prompt obedience yielded by a con- 
 tented people, had silenced the enemies of republican institu- 
 tions. — The arts flourished — the sciences were cultivated — the 
 comforts and conveniences of life were universally diffused — and 
 nothing remained for succeeding administrations, but to reap the 
 advantages, and cherish the resources, flowing from the policy 
 of their predecessors. 
 
 But no sooner was a new administration established in the 
 hands of the party opposed to the Washington policy, than a 
 fixed determination was perceived and avowed of changing a sys- 
 tem which had already produced these substantial fruits. The 
 consequences of this change, for a few years after its commence- 
 ment, were not sufficient to counteract the prodigious impul e 
 towards prosperity, which had been given to the nation. But a 
 steady perseverance in the new plans of administration at length 
 developed their weakness and deformity, but not until a majority 
 of the people had been deceived by flattery, and inflamed by 
 passion, into blindness to their defects. Under the withering 
 influence of this new system, the declension of the nation has 
 been uniform and rapid. The richest advantages for securing 
 the great objects of the Constitution have been wantonly rejected. 
 While Europe reposes from the convulsions that had shaken 
 down her ancient institutions, she beholds with amazement this 
 remote country, once so happy and so envied, involved in a ru- 
 inous war, and exclmled from intercourse with the rest of the 
 world. 
 
 To investigate and explain the means whereby this fatal re- 
 verse has been effected, would require a voluminous discussion. 
 Nothing more can be attempted in this Report, than a general 
 allusion to the principal outlines of the policy which has pro- 
 duced this vicissitude. Among these may be enumerated 
 
 First. — A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a 
 combination among certain States, by exciting local jealousies 
 and ambition, so as to secure io popular leaders in one section of 
 the Union, the control of publick aifairs, in perpetual succession. 
 To which primary object most other characteristicks of the sys- 
 tem may be reconciled. 
 
 Secondly. — The political intolerance dispiayed and avowed, 
 in excluding from office men of unexceptionable merit, for want 
 of adherence to the executive creed. 
 
15 
 
 Thirdly.— The infraction of the judiciary authority and 
 rights, by depriving judges of their offices in violation of the 
 Constitution. 
 
 Fonrlhlif. — The abolition of existing Taxes, requisite to pre- 
 pare the Country for those changes to which nations are always 
 exposed, with a view to the acquisition of popular favour. 
 
 Fifthly. — Tiie influence of patronage in the distribution of 
 offices, which in these states has been almost invariably made 
 among men the least entitled to such distinction, and who have 
 sold themselves as ready instruments for distracting publick 
 opinion, and encouraging administration to bold in contempt the 
 wishes and remonstrances of a people thus apparently divided. 
 
 Sixthly. — The admission of new States into the Union, form- 
 ed at pleasure in the western region, has destroyed the balance 
 of power which existed among the original Slates, and deeply 
 affected their interest. 
 
 Seveiifhly. — The easy admission of naturalized foreigners 
 to places of trust, honour or profit, operating as an inducement 
 to the malcontent subjects of the old world to come to these 
 States, in quest of executive patronage, and to repay it by an 
 abject devotion to executive measures. 
 
 FAirhthly. — Hostility to Great-Britain, and partiality to the 
 late government of France, adopted as coincident with popular 
 prejudice, and subservient to the main object, party power. 
 Connected with these must be ranked erroneous and distorted 
 estimates of the power and resources of those nations, of the pro- 
 bable results of their controversies, and of our political relations 
 to them respectively. 
 
 Lastly and principally. — A visionary and superficial theory 
 in regard to commerce, accompanied by a real hatred but a feign- 
 ed regard to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance in effiirts^ 
 to render it an instrument of coercion and war. 
 
 But it is not conceivable that the obliquity of any administra^ 
 tion could, in so short a period, have so nearly consummated 
 the work of national ruin, unless favoured by defects in the 
 Constitution. 
 
 To enumerate all the improvements of which that instrument 
 is susceptible, and to propose su<ih amendments as might render 
 it in all respects perfect, would be a task, which this Convention 
 has not thought proper to assume. — They have confined their 
 attention to such as experience has demonstrated to be essential, 
 and even among these, some are considered entitled to a more 
 serious attention than others. They are suggested without any 
 intentional disrespect to other States, and are meant to be such 
 as all shall find an interest in promoting. Their object is to 
 strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate; the Union of the 
 i^tates, by removing the grounds of existing jealousies, and pro- 
 
16 
 
 vitliiig; tor a fair un(t et|iial repieseulatioii, and aliinilationof pow- 
 ers wliicli liave been misused. 
 
 The first amendment proposed, relates to the apportionment 
 of Representatives among the slave-holding States. This can- 
 not be claimed as aright. Tiiose Stales are entitled to the slave 
 representation, by a constiUitional compact. It is therefore 
 merely a subject of agreement, which should be conducted upon 
 principles of mutual interest and accommodation, and upon which 
 no sensibility on either side should be permitted to exist. It 
 has proved unjust and unequal in its operation. Had this eff'ect 
 been foreseen, the privilege would probably not have been de- 
 manded ; certainly not conceded. Its tendency in future will 
 be adverse to that harmony and mutual confidence, Avhich arc 
 more conducive to the happiness and prosperity of every con- 
 federated State, than a mere preponderance of power, the prolifick 
 source of jealousies and controversy, can be to anyone of them. 
 The time may therefore arrive, when a sense of magnanimity 
 and justice will reconcile those States to acquiesce in a revision 
 of this article, especially as a fair equivalent would result to them 
 m the apportionment of taxes. 
 
 The next amendment relates to the admission of new States 
 into the union. 
 
 This amendment is deemed to be highly important, and in 
 fact indispensable. In proposing it, it is not intended to recog- 
 nise the right of Congress to admit new States without the origi- 
 nal limits of the United States, nor is any idea entertained of 
 disturbing the tranquillity of any State already admitted into the 
 union. The object is merely to restrain the constitutional power 
 of Congress in admitting new States. At the adoption of the 
 Constitution, a certain balance of power among the original par- 
 ties was considered to exist, and there was at that time, and yet 
 is among those parties, a strong affinity between their great and 
 general interests. — By the admission of these States, that balance 
 has been materially affected, and unless the practice be modi- 
 fied, must ultimately be destroyed. The Southern States will 
 first avail themselves of their new confederates to govern the 
 East, and finally the Western States midtiplied in number, and 
 augmented in population, will control the interests of the whole. 
 Tims for the sake of present power, the Southern States will be 
 common sufferers with the East, in the loss of permanent advan- 
 tages. None of the old States can find an interest in creating 
 prematurely an overwhelming Western influence, which may 
 hereafter discern (as it has heretofore) benefits to be derived to 
 (hejn by wars and commercial restrictions. 
 
 The next amendments proposed by the convention, relate to 
 the powers of Congress, in relation to Embargo and the interdic- 
 tion of commerce. 
 
ir 
 
 Whatever theories upon tlie subject of commerce have liitli- 
 erto divided the opinions of statesmen, experience has at last 
 shewn, that it is a vital interest in the United States, and that its 
 success is essential to the encouragement of agricuUnre and man- 
 ufactures, and to the wealth, finances, defence, and liberty of the 
 nation. Its welfare can never interfere with the other great in- 
 terests of the State, but must promote and uphold them. Still, 
 those who are immediately concerned in the prosecution of com- 
 merce, will of necessity be always a minority of the nation. 
 They are, however, best qualified to manage and direct its 
 couise by the advantages of experience, and the sense of inte- 
 rest. But they are entirely unable to protect tliemselves against 
 the sudden and injudicioiis decisions of bare majorities, and the 
 mistaken or oppressive projects of those who are not actively 
 concerned in its pursuits. Of consequence, this interest is al- 
 ways exposed to be harassed, interrupted, and entirely destroy- 
 ed, upon pretence of securing other interests. Had the mer- 
 chants of this nation been permitted, by their own government, 
 to pursue an innocent and lawful commerce, how different would 
 have been the state of the treasury and of publick credit ! How 
 shortsighted and miserable is the policy Avhich has annihilated 
 thjs order of men, and doomed their ships to rot in the docks, 
 their capital to waste unemployed, and their affections to be 
 alienated from the Government vvhicli was formed to protect 
 them ! What security for an ample and unfailing revenue can 
 ever be had, comparable to that v.hich once was realized in the 
 good faith, punctuality, and sense of honour, which attached the 
 mercantile class to the interests of the Government ! Without 
 commerce, where can be found the aliment for a navy ; and 
 without a navy, what is to constitute the defence, and ornament, 
 and glory of this nation ? No union can be durably cemented, in 
 which every great interest does not find itself reasonably secured 
 against the encroachment and combinations of otiier interests. 
 When, therefore, the past system of embargoes and commercial 
 restrictions shall hav«; been reviewed — when the fluctuation and 
 inconsistency of publick measures, betraying a want of information 
 as well as feeling in the majority, shall have been considered, 
 the reasonableness of some restrictions upon the power of a bare 
 majority to repeat these oppressions, will appear to be obvious. 
 
 The next amendment proposes to restrict the power of making 
 offensive war. la the consideration of this amendment, it is not 
 necessary to inquire into the justice of tlie present war. But one 
 sentiment now exists in relation to its expediency, and regret 
 for its declaration is nearly universal. No indemnity can ever 
 be attained for this terrible calamity, and its only palliation must 
 hf found in obstacles to its future recurrence. Rarely can the 
 
18 
 
 swlale oi" this country call for or justify ofTeusive war. The ge- 
 nius of our institutions is unfavourable to its successful prosecu- 
 (ion ; the felicity of our.situation exempts us from its necessity. 
 — In this case, as in the former, those more immediately expo- 
 sed to its fatal effects are a minority of the nation. The com- 
 mevi ial towns, the shores of our seas and rivers, contain the pop- 
 ulation, whose vital interests are most vulnerable by a foreign 
 enemy. Agriculture, indeed, must feel at last, but this appeal 
 to its sensibility comes too late. Again, the immense population 
 which hus swarmed into the West, remote from immediate dan- 
 ger, and which is constantly augmenting, will not be averse from 
 the occasional disturbances of the Atlantick Slates. Thus inte- 
 rest may not unfrequenlly combine with passion and intrigue, to 
 plunge the nation into needless wars, and compel it to become a 
 military, rather than a happy and flourishing people. These 
 considera*it)ns, which it would be easy to augment, call loudly for 
 thcMimitation proposed in the amendment. 
 
 Another amendment, subordinate in importance, but still in a 
 Jiigh degree expedient, relates to the exclusion of foreigners, 
 hereafter arriving in the United States, from the capacity of hold- 
 ing oifices of Irust, honour or profit. 
 
 That the stock of population already in these States, is amp'y 
 sufficient to render this nation in due time sufficiently great and 
 powerful, is not a controvertible question — Nor will it be seri- 
 ously pretended, that the national deficiency in wisdom, arts, 
 science^ arms or virtue, needs to be replenished from foreign 
 countries. Still, it is agreed, that a liberal policy should oiier 
 the rights of hospitality, and the choice of settlement, to those 
 who are disposed to visit the country. — But why admit to a par- 
 ticipation in the government aliens who were no parties to the 
 compact — who are ignorant of the nature of our institutions, and 
 have no stake in the welfare of the country, but what is recent 
 and transitory ? It is surely a privilege sufficient, to admit them 
 after due probation to become citizens, for all but political pur- 
 poses. — To extend it beyond these limits, is to encourage for- 
 eigners to come to these states as candidates for preferment. The 
 Convention forbear to express their opinion upon the inauspi- 
 cious effects which have already resulted to the honour and 
 peace of this nation, from this misplaced and indiscriminate lib- 
 erality. 
 
 The last amendment respects the limitation of the office of 
 President to a single constitutional term, and his eligibility from 
 the same State two terms in succession. 
 
 Upon this topick it is superfluous to dilate. The love of 
 power is a principle in the hinnan heart, which too often impels 
 to the Tise of all prjicticable means to prolong its duration. The 
 
19 
 
 viffice of President lias charms ami atUaclions which operate as 
 powerful incentives lo this passion. The first ami most nahnal 
 exeriion of a vast patronage is dircclcd (owards Ihe scciuil y of 
 a new election. Tlie interest of the <-()untry, iiie welfare of tlie 
 people, even honest fame and respect for the opinion of poster- 
 ity, are secondary considerations. All the engines of inlrigne, 
 all the means of corrnpfion, are likely to be employed for this 
 object. A President, whose political career is limited to a single 
 election, may find no other interest than will be promoted by 
 making it glorious to himself, and beneficial to his conntry. But 
 the hope of re-election is prolifick of temptations, under which 
 these magnanimous motives are deprived of their principal force. 
 The repeated election of the President of the United States from 
 any one State, affords inducements and means for intrigue, which 
 tend to create an undue local influence, and to establish the dom- 
 ination of particular States. The justice, therefore, of securing 
 to every State a fair and equal chance for the election of this 
 officer from its own citizens, is apparent, and this object will be 
 essentially promoted by preventing an election from the same 
 State twice in succession. 
 
 Such is the general view which this Convention has thought 
 proper to submit, of the situation of these States, of their dan- 
 gers and their duties. Plost of the subjects which it embraces 
 have separately received an ample and luminous investigation, 
 by the great and able assertors of the rights of their Country, in 
 the National Legislature ; and nothing more could be attempted 
 on this occasion, than a digest of general principles, and of re- 
 commendations, suited to the present state of publick affairs. 
 The peculiar difficulty and delicacy of performmg, even this 
 undertaking, will be appreciated by all who think seriously upon 
 the crisis. Negociations for Peace are at this hour supposed to- 
 -be pending, the issue of which must be deeply interesting tojiU. 
 No measures should be adopted, which might unfavourably affect 
 that issue ; none Avhich should embarrass the Administration, if 
 their professed desire for peace is sincere ; and none, which on 
 supposition of their insincerity, should afford them pretexts for 
 prolonging the war, or relieving themselves from the responsi- 
 bility of a dishonourable peace. It is also devoutly to be wished, 
 that an occasion may be afforded to all friends of the country, of 
 all parties, and in all places, to pause and consider the awful state, to 
 which pernicious counsels, and blind passions, have brought this 
 people. The number of those who perceive, and who are ready to 
 retrace errours, must, it is believed, be yet sufficient to redeem the 
 nation. It is necessary to rally and unite them by the assurance, 
 that no hostility to the Constitution is meditated, and to obtain 
 their aid, in placing it under guardians, ^vho alone can save it 
 
20 
 
 from (lesnucdon. Should llus fortunate change be effected, the 
 hope of happiness and honour may once more dispel the sur- 
 roundin'5 gloom. Our nation may yet be great, our union dura- 
 ble. But sliould this prospect be utterly hopeless, the time will 
 not have been lost, which shall have ripened a general sentiment 
 of the necessity of more mighty efforts to rescue from ruin, at 
 least some portion of our beloved Country. 
 
 THEREFORE RESOLVED— 
 
 That it be and hereby is recommended to the Legisla- 
 tures of the several States represented in tliis Convention, to 
 adopt all such measures as may be necessary effectually to pro- 
 tect the citizens of said States from the operation and effects of 
 all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of 
 the United States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting 
 the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or 
 impressments, not authorized by the Constitution of the United 
 States. 
 
 Resolved, That it be and hereby is recommended to the said 
 Legislatures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application 
 to be made to the Government of the United States, requesting 
 their consent to some arrangement, whereby the said States 
 may, separately or in concert, be empowered to assume upon 
 themselves the defence of their territory against the enemy ; and 
 a reasonable portion of the taxes, collected within said State?, 
 iXiay be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, and appropri- 
 ated to the payment of the balance due said States, and to the 
 future defence of the same. The amount so paid int6 the said 
 treasuries to be credited, and the disbursements made as afore- 
 said to be charged to the United States. 
 
 Resolved, That it be, and it hereby is, recommended to the 
 Legislatures of the aforesaid States, to pass laws (where it has 
 not already been done) authorizing the Governours or Com- 
 manders in Chief of their militia to make detachments from the 
 same, or to form voluntary corps, as shall be most convenient 
 and conformable to their Constitutions, and to cause the same to 
 be well armed, equipped and disciplined, and held in readiness 
 for service ; and upon the request of the Governour of either of 
 the other States, to employ the whole of such detachment or 
 corps, as well as the regular forces of the State, or such part 
 thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with 
 the safety of the State, in assisting the State, making such re- 
 quest to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or at- 
 tempted by the publick enemy. 
 
21 
 
 Resolved, Tliat the following aniendmenls of the Constitution 
 of the United States, be recommended to the Slates represent- 
 ed as aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the 
 State Legislatures, and, in such cases as may be deemed expe- 
 dient, by a Convention cliosen by the people of each State. 
 
 And it is further recommended, that the said States shall 
 persevere in their eflforts to obtain such amendments, until the 
 same shall be eflfected. 
 
 First. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportion- 
 ed among the several States which may be included within this 
 union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, in- 
 ciudingjithose bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding^ 
 Indians not taxed, and all other persons. —^ 
 
 Second. No new State shall be admitted into the union by 
 Congress in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, 
 without the concurrence of two thirds of both Houses. 
 
 Third. Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on 
 the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the 
 ports or harbours thereof, for more than sixty days. 
 
 Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the concur- 
 rence of two thirds of both Houses, to interdict the commercial 
 intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation or 
 the dependencies thereof. 
 
 Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize 
 acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concur- 
 rence of two thirds of both Houses, except such acts of hostility 
 be in defence of the territories of the United States when actu- 
 ally invaded. 
 
 Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall 
 be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representa- 
 tives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil office 
 under the authority of the United States. 
 
 Seventh. The same person shall not be elected President of 
 the United States a second time ; nor shall the President be 
 elected from the same State two terms in succession. 
 
 Resolved, That if the application of these States to the go- 
 vernment of the United States, recommended in a foregoing Re- 
 solution, should be unsuccessful, and peace should not be con- 
 cluded, and the defence of these States should be neglected, as 
 it has been since the commencement of the war, it will in the 
 opinion of this Convention be expedient for the Legislatures of 
 the several States to appoint Delegates to another Convention, 
 to meet at Boston, in the State of Massachusetts, on the third 
 Thursday of June next, with such powers and instructions as 
 the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require. 
 
22 
 
 Resolved, That the Hon. lieorge Cabot, the Hon. Chauncey 
 Goodrich, and the Hon. Daniel Lyman, or any two of them, be 
 authorized to call another meeting of this Convention, to be hol- 
 den in Boston, at any time before new Delegates shall be chosen, 
 as recommended in the above Resolution, if in their judgment 
 the situation of the Country shall urgently require it. 
 
 Hartford, January 4th, 1815. 
 
 GEORGE CABOT, 
 NATHAN DANE, 
 WILLIAM PKESCOTT, 
 HARRISON G. OTIS. 
 TIMOTHY RIGELOW, 
 JOSHUA THOMAS, 
 SAMUEL S. WILDE, 
 JOSEPH LYMAN, 
 STEPHEN LONGFELLOW, Jr. 
 DANIEL WALDO, 
 HODIJAH BAYLIES, 
 GE0RG£ BLISS, 
 CHAUNCEY GOODRICH, 
 
 JAMES HILLHOUSE, 
 JOHN TREADWELL, 
 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, 
 NATHANIEL SMITH, 
 CALVIN GODDARD, 
 ROGER M. SHERMAN, 
 DANIEL LYMAN, 
 SAxMUEL WARD, 
 EDWARD MANTON, 
 BENJAMIN HAZARD, 
 BENJAMIN WEST,- 
 MILLS OLCOTT, 
 WILLIAM HALl. Jr.. 
 
STATEMENTS, 
 
 PREPARED AND PUBLISHED BV ORDER OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, 
 
 hi;li> at iiARTKono, deckmber 15, 1814, 
 
 AND PRINTED BY THFIR ORUFn. 
 
 SCHEDULE (A,) 
 
 She\ving the ascertained expenses of the war, prior to July 1, 1814. 
 
 Military Department, or huid forces, from January 1, to Sept. 30, 
 
 1812, including about six months of peace, and three months of 
 
 >var, in that year, $7,46 ',814 80 
 
 From Sept. 30, 1812, to Sept. 30, 1813, - 18,484,750 49 
 
 From Sept. 30, 1813, to Dec. 31, 1813, - 5,887,747 00 
 
 From Jan. 1, to July 1, 1814, - - - 11,210,238 00 
 
 Asc 
 
 jrtaincd expenses of the Land forces from > «^of..- rr,. r,n 
 Jan. 1, 1812, to July 1, 1814, \ ^^•^'"47,^^0 .J 
 
 Naiy Department, from Jan. 1, to Sept. 30, 1812, 
 
 about six montlis of peace, and three months of 
 
 war, the sum of - - - $2,038,612 95 
 
 From Sept. 30, 1812, to Sept. ^ 6 4*^0 707 20 
 
 30, 1813, ^ 
 
 From Sept. 30, to Dec. 31, 1813, 1,248,145 10 
 From Jan. 1, to July 1, 1814, 4,012,899 90 
 
 -14,320,305 15 
 
 Ascertained war expenses to July 1,1814, S57.367,915 44 
 
 to which must be added, large sums not ascertained, 
 and, also disbursements made by individual States, 
 these must be more than ... - 3,000,000 00 
 
 $00,367,915 44 
 
 Note. — The Military and Naval expenses of the United States from 
 January 1, 1812, to June 18, 1812, when war was declared, are in- 
 eluded in the above Account, and Avere, partly on account of the peace 
 establishment, and, in part, preparations for war. So that this enor- 
 mous expenditure Avas incurred in the j^lilitary and Naval dcj)ar!- 
 ments alone, in tAvo years of small AYnrlore. and m six months iliat 
 preceded it-. 
 
»24 
 
 SCHEDULE (B,) 
 
 Shewing the I'cceipts at the Treasury of the United Stales from 
 January 1, 1812, to July 1, 1814, including about 6 months of peace, 
 and aliout two years of war, (o wit — 
 
 From Jan. 1, to Oct. 1, 1812, from the proceeds (^f 
 Ihe customs, llie sales of land, <fec. being three fourths 
 of the revenue year, $8,201,210 18 
 
 The f)alancein the Treasury charged this account, 3,947,818 36 
 
 On the 11 million loan under the act of March 
 14, 1812, 5,847,212 50 
 
 $17,990,241 04 
 Receipts from Oct. 1, 1812, to Oct. 1, 1813, towit— 
 From the proceeds of the customs, $12,396,491 55 
 Sales of land, - - - 830,671 53 
 
 Other items of revenue, - 140,879 35 
 
 13,568,042 43 
 
 On account of the 11 million loan, $4,337,487 50 
 On the 10 million loan, act Feb. 
 8, 1813, - - - . - 14,488,125 09 
 
 Treasury Notes issued on the act of 
 June 30, 1812, - - - 4,898,300 00 
 
 Do. do. act Feb. 
 
 2^, 1813, 253,000 00 
 
 23,976,912 50 
 
 Receipts from Oct. 1, 1813, to Jan. 
 1, 1814, to wit— 
 
 From the customs and sales of 
 lands, «fcc. - - • - $3,678,565 00 
 
 On the 10 million loan, - - 1,511,875 00 
 
 On the «even and half million loan, 3,907,335 00 
 Treasury notes, - - - 3,778,700 00 
 
 12,876,475 00 
 
 Receipts from Jan. 1, to July 1, 
 1814, to wit— 
 
 From the proceeds of the customs, 4,182,088 25 
 Sales of publick lands, - - 540,065 68 
 
 Internal duties and direct lax, 2,189,272 40 
 
 Postage and incidental receipts, 166,744 00 
 
 1 
 
 $7,078,170 33 
 
 On the 7 1-2 million loan, 
 act Aug. 2, 1813, - $3,592,605 
 
 On 10 million loan (part 
 of the 25 millions) - 0,087,011 
 
 Carried forward, $0,679,676 $7,078,170 33 $68,417,670 97 
 
^5 
 
 Brouglit up, 
 
 Treasury notes 
 on ict Feb. 25, 
 1813, - $1,070,000 
 
 Do. on act 
 iMarch 24, 1814, 1,302,100 
 
 9,679,676 $7,078,170 S3 $68,417,670 97 
 
 2,462,100-12,141,776 00-10,210,946 33 
 
 l)ediict cash in the treasury, July 1, 1814, 
 
 87,637,617 30 
 4,722,659 32 
 
 $82,914,957 98 
 
 Deduct payments mnde at the trea- 
 sury in the s i me period from Jan. 1, 
 18i2, to Julv 1, 1814, to wit— 
 
 Thecivil'list, Indian department, &c.«4,697,872 32 
 
 Interest and principal of the publick 
 debt, 21,101,417 72-25,799,290,04 
 
 Left for war purposes in this period, - - $57,115,667,94 
 
 Note. — Thus while the war cost above 60 millions of dollars, and 
 
 the land forces 46 millions of the sum, there was but a smdl British 
 
 army employed agniust the United States, and in this period, disgrace 
 
 generally attended the American arms by land. 
 
 SCHEDULE (C) 
 Shewing the great increase of the revenues of the United States, 
 from the adoption of the Constitution to the adoption of the restric- 
 tive system ; and while commence continued free, and the great 
 diminution of these revenues since that system was resorted to — 
 they were as follow, as by Treasury statements. 
 
 Prior to 1792, 
 
 $4,418,913 
 
 1893, 
 
 11,064,067 
 
 In 1792, 
 
 3,661,932 
 
 1804, 
 
 11,828,307 
 
 1793, 
 
 4,714,423 
 
 1805, 
 
 13,560,663 
 
 1794, 
 
 5,128,432 
 
 1806, 
 
 15,559,931 
 
 1795, 
 
 5,954,534 
 
 1807, 
 
 16,398,019 
 
 1796, 
 
 7,137,529 
 
 1808, 
 
 17,060,661 
 
 1797, 
 
 8,403,560 
 
 1809, 
 
 7,773,473 
 
 1798, 
 
 7,820,575 
 
 - 1810, 
 
 9,384,214 
 
 1799, 
 
 7,475,773 
 
 1811, 
 
 14,423,529 
 
 1800, 
 
 10,777,709 
 
 9 months of 1812, 
 
 6,927,706 
 
 1801, 
 
 12,846,530 
 
 
 
 
 1802, 
 
 13,668,223 
 
 
 $215,988,703 
 
 Note-^A.s bonds were given for the duties, and they usually become 
 payable the next year — the duties payable in any year, were, gene- 
 rally, collected on the importations of the preceding year, as the 
 $17,060,661 received in 1808 were the duties on the great importa- 
 tions of 1807, a few small sums excepted. 
 
 Note, also — -All these revenues arose from commerce, except 
 $16,262,651. 
 
 It will be observed that all the sources of revenue exclusive of im- 
 post and tonnage duties, did not, on an average, amount to <]uite one 
 million of dollars a year ; so that the ittipost and tonnage duties, the 
 
 4 
 
2^ 
 
 four years preceding the lorts; embargo, amounted to about fifty-eight 
 millions of dollars, or to $14,500,000 a year. And if there had be*-u no 
 embargoes or restrictions on commerce these would have increased, at 
 least not ilecreased till the war was commenced. That commenced 
 four years and a half after the embargo was laid. It will be seen that 
 all the revenues amounted, in four years, before the embargo, to 
 $62,579,274, and deducting for other sources of revenue, one million a 
 year, there will remain $58,579,274 received from imposts and 
 tonnage duties : whereas in the three years and nine months after the 
 eml)argo was laid, all the revenues, as above, amounted only to 
 $38,508,922, or at the rate of $40,817,990 in four years ; but in these 
 four years were included, not only the ordinary million a year, but the 
 two million direct tax of 1798, and the new internal duties of those 
 four jears, whence was collected at least two millions and a half; 
 hence deduct $6,500,000 from $40,817,990 leaves, received from im- 
 post and tonnage duties $34,317,990,— $24,261,284 less than was 
 received in the four years preceding the embargo; that is, above six 
 millions a year, or above twenty-seven millions for the four years and a 
 half, the restrictive system existed before the war; hence this sum was 
 clearly lost by this system — See Schedule F. 
 
 Note, also — The said $16,262,651 was received thus, — from in- 
 ternal revenue, $6,460,003; direct tax, $1,757,240; sales of laud, 
 $6,161,283 02; postage of letters, &c. $667,343; miscellaneous, 
 $1,216,775. 
 
 Therefore, it is clear, that if there had been no restrictive system or 
 war, the old debt of the United States, would have been, before this 
 time, paid, or nearly paid. 
 
 SCHEDULE (D,) 
 
 Shewing the state of the army of the United States previous to 
 July 1, 1814. It was thus— effectives 27,010; aggregate 31,539; sta- 
 tioned as follows : 
 
 In the first Military District, at Boston, Portsmouth, Portland and 
 Eastport, aggregate number 655 
 
 2 Military District at New-London, &c. 714 
 
 at New- York, 2,116 
 
 at Fort Mifflin, «fec. 308 
 
 at Baltimore, Norfolk, 2,244 
 
 North and South Carolina and Georgia, 2,244 
 at New-Orleans, Mobile, &c. 2,378 
 
 3 
 
 do. 
 
 4 
 
 do. 
 
 5 
 
 do. 
 
 6 
 
 do. 
 
 7 
 
 do. 
 
 Stationed on the sea board, 10,659 
 
 8 Military District at Detroit, Sandwich, &c. 2,472 
 
 9 do. division of the right, 11,793 
 
 at Bufifaloe, Sacket's harbour, &c. 6,613 
 
 -18,408 
 
 on the Canada line, 20,880 
 
 total— 31,539 
 
27 
 
 Recruiis enlisted from January 27, 1814, to September 30, 1814, a* 
 by the retimi of the Inspector General were 13,898: 
 towit— in February 1814, 980 
 
 March „ 2,357 
 
 April „ 2,501 
 
 May „ 2,1 3S 
 
 June „ 1,445 
 
 JuTy „ 1,486 
 
 August „ 1,687 
 
 Sept. „ 1,304 
 
 13,898 
 
 Note— An army of 31,539, early in the year 1814, was, no doubt, a 
 much larger army than the United States kept up the two tirst years 
 of the war ; and if properly employed, 31,000 regular troops were cer- 
 tainly adequate to oppose any force Great Britain, in those years, 
 emj.loyed against the United States— 31,000 men, according to the 
 estimates of the War and Treasury Departments, should not have cost 
 more than 12 millions a year, or 24 millions in the two years; whereas 
 the land forces did cost 46 millions and more, in the wasteful manner 
 in which the war was conducted. 
 
 Note, also— When it is considered the United States had on the 1st 
 of July, 1814, a regular army of 31,539, and enlisted in 8 months, 
 from February 1, to October 1, 1814, 13,898 men, for what possible 
 p etence can the national government have recourse to conscription, 
 and measures destructive of the liberties of the people, to fill the ranks 
 of the army ? The course of enlistments amply proves, that if the army 
 be well paid and supported, and according to contracts, there can be 
 no occasion to resort to such violent measures. 
 
 Note, also— Of the 10,659 regular troops on the sea board, only 
 1,369 were stationed iu New-England. 
 
 SCHEDULE (E.) 
 
 Though the operations of the war in 1 781 and 1 782 were great, espe- 
 cially in the Southern States, yet it cost America far less than fifteen 
 millions a year, as will appear oy the publick documents. In 1782 Con- 
 gress made an estimate for an army of 25,000 men. This estimate, 
 which proved to be correct, was a little over eight millions of dollars. 
 The individual States' expenses will be found not to have exceeded four 
 millions a year, and Navy expenses were trifling. In 1 781 the expensps 
 were about three millions more than in 1782.— Prices were about the 
 same then as now. 
 
 The following is an abstract of the expenditures of the United States 
 from the adoption of the Constitution, to Oct. 1,1812, taken from Trea 
 sury Reports : 
 
28 
 
 Prior to 
 In 
 
 1702, 
 1702, 
 1793, 
 1794, 
 1795, 
 1796, 
 1797, 
 1708, 
 1799, 
 1800, 
 1801, 
 1802, 
 
 $ 1,71^,120 
 1,766C()77 
 1,707,848 
 3,500,348 
 4,350,596 
 2,531,930 
 2,833,500 
 4,623,223 
 6,480,166 
 7,411,369 
 4,981,669 
 3,737,079 
 
 1803, 
 1804, 
 1805, 
 1806, 
 1807, 
 1808, 
 1809, 
 1810, 
 1811, 
 9 months of] 8 12, 
 
 4,062,824 ' 
 4,052,858 
 6,357,234 
 6,080,209 
 4,984,572 
 6,504,338 
 7,414,672 
 5,311,082 
 5,592,604 
 11,760,292 
 
 $ 107,763,309 
 
 Note. ...These expenditures do not include the interest and principal 
 of the publick debt. 
 
 Never ;if(er the peace of 1783, till 1812, did the expenditures of the 
 United Slates amount to seven millions and a half in any year. 
 
 In 1781 Cornwallis was taken, and it is ascertained that over 26,000 
 British troo's were sent into the four Southern States in less than two 
 years in 1780 and 1781. The Ignited States were oblig;ed to keep up 
 larise forces in the Middle and Northern States; and the militia drafts 
 were often made in those two years. — During the long; period from 
 March 4, 1789, to Oct. 1, 1812, the whole Military expenditures of the 
 United States were but $44,066,745 65 including Indian wars, war with 
 France, and with the Barbary powers, the Pennsylvania insurrection, 
 and several millions expended in the present war before October, 1812. 
 Much less than two millions of doHars a year.. And the Navy expen- 
 ditures diu-ing the s»me long period were but $29,889,660 78. About 
 one million and a quarter a year. 
 
 Further, An examination of the publick documents will shew, that the 
 eight-years-war of the revolution did not cost more than 205,000,000^ 
 of specie dollars. More than half that sum w as expended in the three 
 first years, when paper money was abundant, and the American and 
 British armies most numerous; a period in which we withstood the 
 forces of the enemy alone, in a manner so honourable to our arms. 
 
 SCHEDULE (F.) 
 This Schedule brings into one view the great loss of revenue occa- 
 sioned l)y the Restrictive System, and the enormous waste of publicK 
 nionies in the two first years of this war; the i)articulars whereof are^ 
 stated in the preceding Schedules. 
 
 1. 27 millions of dolhus, at least, were lost by reason of 
 restrictions on commerce, for four years and a half before 
 
 the Avar was declared or commenced, as in scheduleC, $27,000,00(^_^ 
 
 2, War expenses, as stated in schedule A, to the amount 
 of $60,367,915, at least, were incurred in this war before 
 •luly 1, 181 I; whereas, on any scale of expenses of any' 
 wars, ever carried on in this coimtry heretofore, the war 
 expenses from .January 1812, to .July 1, 1814, ought not to 
 have exceeded 27 millions, if indeed they could equal that 
 sum. There then wa^ clearly a wasteful and improvident 
 
29 
 
 Amount broii<j;ht forward, 27,000,000 
 expenditure of |iulilick monies, in the war and navy depart- 
 ments, in (his short period, of more than 33 millions of dol- 
 lars, 33,000,000 
 
 Revenue and pnblic monies lost l)y foolish restrictions, ; 
 
 and in a |)rofligate management of the war, - - $U0,000,00Q 
 
 Schedule E, also, shews how moderate our military ej^penses were 
 prior to the jiresent war. 
 
 Note....l{an\ this large sum been saved, as it might have been, with 
 perfect ease by a wise and economical administration, the credit of the 
 United States, at this moment, would have been unimpaired, and the ' 
 very heavy direct and internal taxes now laid on the people to supply 
 the place of this sum, so lost and wasted, might have been avoided. 
 
 In fact, examine the expenditures of all former wars in this country, 
 the force brought against it in the two first years of this war, and every 
 cause of necessary ex|)enditure, and it will appear, that not so much as 
 27 millions ought to have been expended in the military and naval de- 
 partments in the period in question. 
 
 SCHEDULE (Gf,) 
 
 Shewing the amounts of the several Internal Duties, distinctly, that 
 have accrued for the two first quarters of the year 1814. Ascer- 
 tained to have been received in each State a^d Territory of the 
 United States, viz. 
 
 IN. lines oi 
 
 Licenses fori 
 
 Licenses 
 
 Duties on 
 
 
 
 States and 
 
 Stills and 
 
 CaiTiages. 
 
 for 
 
 Sales at 
 
 Refined 
 
 Stamps. 
 
 Territories. 
 
 Boilers. 
 
 
 Retailers. 
 
 Auctio. . 
 
 Sugar. 
 
 
 New-Hamp. 
 
 4817 '.)■:; 
 
 6155 08 
 
 15154 
 
 351 29 
 
 
 544 05 
 
 Massachusetts, 
 
 61217 8(3 
 
 33160 78 
 
 79220 
 
 12285 05 
 
 120 09 
 
 14281 18 
 
 Vermont, 
 
 19710 52 
 
 2532 18 
 
 12271 
 
 7 96 
 
 
 13 35 
 
 Rhode- Island, 
 
 16265 23 
 
 2842 88 
 
 15702 
 
 6039 23 
 
 
 5329 80 
 
 Connecticut, 
 
 42878 36 
 
 13092 61 
 
 28556 
 
 79 48 1-2 
 
 
 7388 37 
 
 i\ew-Y^ork, 
 
 154484 67 
 
 21687 23 
 
 156492 
 
 8872 69 1-2 
 
 
 51935 06 
 
 New-Jersey, 
 
 18429 59 
 
 16253 92 
 
 27163 
 
 2823 86 
 
 
 3350 49 
 
 Pennsylvania, 
 
 271780 
 
 25707 08 1-2 
 
 118852 
 
 10871 61 
 
 
 45590 45 
 
 Delaware, 
 
 1447 50 
 
 5118 18 
 
 7477 
 
 116 25 
 
 
 2701 56 
 
 Maryland, 
 
 36736 37 
 
 16965 97 1-2 
 
 42300 
 
 5344 !1 1-4 
 
 
 20300 82 3-4 
 
 Virginia, 
 
 148442 91 
 
 28836 91 
 
 46691 
 
 2018 20 
 
 
 21378 03 1-2 
 
 North-Caro. 
 
 44780 20 
 
 13594 29 3-4 
 
 20f)44 
 
 444 14 1-4 
 
 
 5212 413-4 
 
 Georgia, 
 
 11076 68 
 
 6532 12 1-4 
 
 11931 
 
 1003 17 
 
 
 2145 76 
 
 Sonth-Caro. 
 
 32215 67 
 
 15024 72 
 
 20343 
 
 923 52 
 
 
 lOolO 16 
 
 Ohio, 
 
 8470S 59 
 
 456 24 
 
 15200 
 
 
 
 3246 87 1-2 
 
 Kentucky, 
 
 56082 19 
 
 2634 69 1-2 
 
 13684 
 
 160 08 1-2 
 
 
 4135 38 
 
 Tennessee, 
 
 46855 97 
 
 661 11 
 
 7612 
 
 
 
 946 05 
 
 Louisiana, 
 
 5485 Oh 
 
 840 81 
 
 7079 
 
 1878 30 
 
 26 25 
 
 7119 86 
 
 Illinois Ter. 
 
 490 44 
 
 62 
 
 835 
 
 
 
 5 60 
 
 Michigan „ 
 
 
 54 
 
 1135 
 
 28 93 
 
 
 21 24 
 
 Indiana „ 
 
 1263 73 
 
 4 
 
 1396 
 
 
 
 
 Missouri „ 
 
 2027 38 
 
 75 
 
 1340 
 
 
 
 45 45 
 
 Missisippi „ 
 
 1562 07 
 
 303 
 
 3305 
 
 91 82 
 
 
 652 76 
 
 Dis. ofColum. 
 
 2044 91 
 
 9505 
 
 154 32 
 
 
 10159 56 
 
 
 1062758 9!i 214639 73 1-2 
 
 663887 
 
 534"4 03 
 
 146 34 
 
 217364 23 1-2 
 
 GEOSS TOTAL— $2,212,290 38. 
 
30 
 
 SCHEDULE(H.) 
 
 This shews the great increase of the commerce of the United States, 
 ♦inder federal administrations when it was free. Also its great diminu- 
 tion under embargoes, restrictions antl war. 2. The comparative ex- 
 ports of the severa< Stales from time to time, 3. The kind of exports, 
 as articles domestick or foreign, as productions of tlie forest, of agricul- 
 ture, of the sea, &c. 
 
 1. The exports of the United States every fifth year, to wit 
 
 1791 
 1796 
 1801 
 1806 
 1811 
 
 $17,571,551 45 
 67,064,097 00 
 93,020,513 00 
 
 103,787,000 00 
 61,317,833 00 
 
 Exports of the United States four 
 years next preceding the long 
 embargo, viz. 
 
 1804 $77,701,597 
 
 1805 95,566,021 
 1806, as above, 103,787.000 
 1807 108,343,558 
 
 $385,398,176 
 
 iV(/ff.,..Thus the exports, when 
 commerce was free, increased near- 
 ly 6 fold in 15 years, and under 
 restrictions diminished about one 
 half as stated below. 
 
 Exports of the United States four 
 years under restrictions, and 
 one year in war, viz. 
 
 1808 Domestick Arts $8,417,000 
 
 Foreign do. 
 
 1809 Domestick do. 
 Foreign do. 
 
 1810 Domes. & For. 
 
 1811 do. do. 
 1813 Domestick Arts 
 
 do. 
 
 Foreign 
 
 12,997,414 
 28,841,000 
 20,797,531 
 67,895,597 
 61,317,833 
 25,008,152 
 2,847,845 
 
 $228,122,372 
 
 2. The comparative exports of each State, from time to time, viz. 
 
 'New-Hampshire, 
 
 Massachusetts, 
 
 Vermont, 
 
 Rhode-island, 
 
 Connecticut, 
 
 New-Vork, 
 
 New-Jersey, 
 
 Ponnsylvania, 
 
 Delaware, 
 
 Maryland, 
 
 Virpnia, 
 
 North Carolina, 
 
 Soutli Carolina, 
 
 Georgia, 
 
 year 1791 
 
 $ 
 
 142,858 
 2,445,975 
 
 year 1799 
 
 $ 3H0,089 
 
 11,421,591 
 
 20,480 
 
 1,055,273 
 
 1,143,818 
 
 18,719,527 
 
 9,722 
 
 12,431,967 
 
 297,0(55 
 
 16,299,(i09 
 
 6,292,986 
 
 485,921 
 
 8.729,015 
 
 1,396,768 
 
 470,131 
 710,340 
 2,516,197 
 27,957 
 2,931,624 
 H9,840 
 2,193,355 
 3,131,227 
 524,548 
 l,86t;,021 
 491,472 
 Ohio, 
 Territories of the U. 
 Georgetown, 
 Alexandria, 
 Michigan, 
 New-Orleans, 
 
 year 1806 
 $ 795,260 
 21,199,243 
 193,775 
 2,091,835 
 1,715,858 
 21,762,845 
 33,867 
 17,574,502 
 500,106 
 14,580,905 
 5,055,396 
 789,605 
 9,743,782 
 no return. 
 62,318 
 S. 4,100.583 
 254,353 1 
 991,793 S 
 221,2f0 
 3,887,323 
 
 Doni. Arts. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 do. 
 
 year 1813 
 
 g 29,996 
 1,807,923 
 
 236,802 
 
 974,303 
 
 8,185,494 
 
 10,260 
 
 3,577,117 
 
 13.3,432 
 3,787,865 
 1,819,722 
 
 797,318 
 2,968,434 
 1,004,595 
 
 1,387,493 
 1,045,153 
 
31 
 
 3. The kind of exports from the United States, as articles do- 
 mestick or loreigu; productions of tlie forest, agriculture, of the sea, &c. 
 
 Prod.oftheforest, 
 
 of the sea, 
 \ of agriculture, 
 i of m.inufact. 
 Miscelldueous, 
 
 Foreign articles, 
 
 ■ 
 
 Year 1804 
 
 Year 1805 
 
 4,600,000 
 
 5,201 ,000 
 
 3,420,000 
 
 2,884,000 
 
 30,890,000 
 
 31,552,000 
 
 2,100,000 
 
 2,525,000 
 
 430,000 
 
 1^ 
 
 f, 155,000 
 
 v^ 
 
 Year 1806 
 4,861,000 
 3,116,000 
 
 32,375,000 
 
 2,707,000 
 445,000 
 
 Year 1807 
 5,476,000 
 2,804,009 
 
 37,832,000 
 
 2,1 '-'0,000 
 
 4118,000 
 
 41,440,000 N2,37 7,000 
 
 36,231,597 
 
 53,179,021 
 
 43,504,000 
 60,283,000 
 
 48,700,000 
 59,643,578 
 
 77,671,597 1 95,556.021 I 103,787,000 1108,343,578 
 
 This statement shews, that about three fourthsof the domesti<k exports 
 of the United States are the protluce of agriculture, and for four years 
 prior to the embargo, exceeded on an average 33 miliions a year. It 
 will readily be seen what great losses there must have been in regard 
 [to these articles, when the regular exportation of them has been capri- 
 Icio'.isly interrupted for 7 years past, by embargoes, restrictions and 
 ,War, the same as to the produce of the forest, and, that of the sea; the 
 'vlatter amounting, on an average, for four years next before the em- 
 bargo, to above 3 millions of dollars a year, has been by restrictions 
 i and v/ar, wholly destroyed — And the shipping employed formerly, in 
 I acquiring these productions of the sea, is nearly rotten at the wharves, 
 and the seamen engaged in this branch of business, very important, in 
 a publick view, are scattered and gone. 
 
 The domestick articles in the four years next before the restrictive 
 system, were 50 millions more than the same articles exported in the 
 four years under it, and before the war. 
 
 Note.— Page 8. 
 
 Extract from Report of the Secretary of the Navy, dated Novembet 
 
 15, 1814. 
 
 There is another branch of the service which appears to me to merit 
 the serious deliberation of the legislature, with regard tot lie establishment 
 of some regular system, by which the voluntary enlistments for the navy 
 may derive occasional reinforcement from the services of those seamen, 
 who, pursuing their own private occupations, are exempt, by their itine- 
 rant habits, from publick service of any kind. In my view there would 
 be nothing incompatible with the free spirit of our institutions, or with 
 the rights of individuals, if registers, with a particular descriptive re- 
 cord, were kept in the several districts, of all the seamen belonging to 
 the United States, and provision made by law for classing and calling 
 into the publick service, in succession, for reasonable stated periods,, 
 such portions or classes, as the publick service might require, and if any 
 
3-2 
 
 individual, ^o called, should be al)sent at the time, the next in sui 
 cession should perform the tour of dut}^ of the aiiseutee, who shoulu 
 on his return, he liable to serve his original tour, and his substitute ti 
 exemjit from his succeeding regular tour of duty. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It appears from the following esBlfcfrora a speech of Mr. Madisdtl 
 in the Debates of the Virginia C^^Ention, that he had a ijrophetid 
 view of circumstances which woul^^Ruce a majority of States to su' 
 PORT ViaraNiA against the carryins^latcs. See also the sjieeches ■ 
 Mr. Nicholas in that Convention, and the essays in the Fcdcralis 
 Avritten by Mr. Madison. 
 
 Extract from debates in Virginia Convention, — Richmond Ed. p. 22^ 
 
 I will not sit down till I make one more observation on what fe 
 from my honourable friend. He says, that the true difference betwec 
 the states lies in this circumstance — that s">>me are carrying states, aui 
 others productive, and that the operation of the new government wi 
 be, that there will be a plurality of the former to comi;ine against tl 
 ititerest of the latter, and that consequently^ it will be dangerous topn 
 it in their power to do so. I would join with him in sentiment, 
 tills were the case. Were this within the bounds of probability, 
 should lie efjually alarmed, '>ut I think that those States which ai 
 contradistinguished as carrying states, from the non-im:iorting statf 
 will be but few. I suppose the southern states will be considered t 
 all, as under the latter description. Some other states have bee 
 mentioned by an honourable mem'»er on the s:ime side, which are n« 
 considered as carrying states. New-Jersey and Connecticut can tl 
 no means be enumerated among the carrying states. They recei\ 
 their supplies through New- York. Here then is a plurality of noi 
 importing states. 1 could add another if necessarj'. Delaware, thoug 
 situated upon the water, is upon the list of non-carrying states, 
 might say that a great part of New-Hami^shire is so. I believe a m. 
 jority of the peojtie of that State receive their supplies from Mass u-hn 
 setts, Rhode-'sland, and Connecticut. — Might I not add all thos* stati 
 Avhich will be admitted hereafter into the union ? These wiil ' e iioi 
 carrying states, and will support Virginia in case the carrying stdt* 
 n ill Httempt to combine against the rest. 
 
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