D 615 
 .H35 
 1917 
 Copy 1 
 
> 615 
 H35 
 l917 
 iopy 1 
 
 1LGIUM AND 
 GREECE 
 
 BY 
 
 J. W. HEADLAM 
 
 
 NEW YORK 
 GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 
 
 PUBLISHERS IN AMERICA FOR HODDER & STOUGHTON 
 MCMXVII 
 
»«r 
 
 
 ff7 <sf D. 
 30 »81l 
 
 Copies can be obtained from 
 
 George H. Doran Company, 
 
 38 West 3 2nd Street, New York 
 
 Price 5 cents 
 

 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 IT is not unnatural that during the last few 
 months articles have from time to time appeared 
 in the papers of neutral countries drawing attention 
 to the treatment of Greece by the Allies and suggest- 
 ing that this shows how little regard need really be 
 attached to their professions that they are actuated 
 by the respect for the rights of small States, and that 
 they are defending law and justice against force 
 and violence. It is suggested that when these pro- 
 fessions are put to the proof, Great Britain and her 
 Allies act precisely as Germany has done; we talk 
 of the rights which belong to the weak when Bel- 
 gium and Serbia are overrun by the German armies, 
 but when a small and weak State refuses to do our 
 bidding, it becomes apparent that we are willing 
 to commit exactly the same crimes that we have 
 denounced in others. 
 
 The argument is one that would appeal to simple 
 and ingenious minds. Belgium was a neutral State 
 and so was Greece. Belgium was a small State 
 and so was Greece. The neutrality of Belgium was 
 violated by the German Army, who claimed to use 
 
2 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 the territory as a road to France. The neutrality 
 of Greece was violated by the armies of the Allies, 
 who claimed to use the territory in order to transfer 
 their armies to the seat of warfare between Serbia 
 and Bulgaria. What more could be required? Is 
 it not evident that the Allies are guilty of that very 
 crime which they charge against the Germans? 
 
 The argument may seem conclusive, and it would 
 be conclusive were it not that it omits the cardinal 
 elements on both sides. A promise, a treaty, a word 
 of honour solemnly pledged. And, in truth, those 
 who maintain that the conditions are similar, in the 
 very fact that they do this, assent to the proposition 
 that in international relations promises are empty 
 words, treaties are scraps of paper, pledged honour 
 is as a breath of air which flows hither and thither, 
 purposeless, on the face of the earth. Belgium was 
 neutral and Greece was neutral, but the neutrality 
 of the two States was as different as black and white. 
 For the neutrality of Belgium was the fulfilment 
 of a solemn engagement, the neutrality of Greece 
 was the violation of an engagement equally binding; 
 if the one was a virtue, the other was a crime. 
 
 There has been much talk of the neutrality of 
 Belgium. Men have written long books about it. 
 The whole question has been encumbered by learned 
 disquisitions on international law and The Hague 
 Conference. The pages of the most voluminous 
 and the most worthless of professors have been 
 
BELGIUM AND GREECE 3 
 
 ransacked to find arguments on one side or the 
 other. All this is beside the point. To judge the 
 question we require nothing but a firm grasp of 
 those simple and universal rules of conduct which 
 bind together old and young, learned and simple, 
 civilised and barbarian. Had Grotius and Puffen- 
 dorf and Bluntschli never lived, the issue would not 
 be changed, and it would be much clearer. A 
 definite and formal promise had been made by the 
 five great Powers in Europe that Belgium should be 
 permanently neutral. This meant, first, that they 
 were debarred from going to war against Belgium, 
 and, secondly, that in case of war against other 
 States, they were debarred from using an alliance 
 with Belgium, or using the resources of the country, 
 or the territory of the country, in support of their 
 armies. On this there has in fact never been the 
 slightest shadow of doubt. 
 
 The promise might have been wise or foolish ; it 
 was open to any State to represent that it was one 
 which under modern conditions could not be main- 
 tained, to declare that she wished to be freed from 
 it, and to summon a conference of the guaranteeing 
 Powers in order to arrange for an abrogation of the 
 treaty. But if this was to be done, it must be done 
 in time of peace. For it was characteristic of the 
 engagement that it only became effective when the 
 state of war had in fact arisen; then it was too late 
 to disown it. If two men fight a duel they fight on 
 
4 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 the agreed conventions ; it is open to them before 
 the actual struggle begins to ask that these con- 
 ditions and conventions should be changed ; it is 
 not open to them without warning, when face to 
 face with the adversary, to start the duel by a treach- 
 erous and false stroke. 
 
 So much for Belgium, but what of Greece? Here 
 first, we note that there was no engagement on the 
 part of any Power to respect the neutrality of 
 Greece. According to the general principles of 
 European relations, it was open to any State which 
 had a serious cause of difference with Greece to 
 make on her those demands which she required in 
 her own interests, to embody them in an ultimatum, 
 and, if necessary, to enforce them by war. Con- 
 duct of this kind would be judged on the particular 
 case; it might be justifiable, it might be reprehen- 
 sible; all would depend upon the questions at issue 
 and the cause of difference. When two Powers 
 are at war, to present demands, and, if necessary, 
 go to war with a third Power, is in itself in no way 
 more contrary to ordinary political convention than 
 is the original declaration of war. Much has been 
 talked about the rights of neutrals which is quite 
 beside the point. The state of neutrality is not a 
 positive, but a negative one. It means only that at 
 a particular moment the neutral State is not party 
 to the conflict which is in progress. It may become 
 one at any moment, either by its own action or by 
 
BELGIUM AND GREECE 5 
 
 the action of either of the belligerents. Any such 
 action should, of course, be well weighed and under- 
 taken for serious and honourable objects. If these 
 objects are right and sufficient, the entanglement of 
 another State in war is not in itself something to 
 be reproved, though it may be regretted. And there 
 may be cases where the maintenance of neutrality 
 is in itself a crime, just as the violation of neutrality 
 in other cases may be a crime. 
 
 Now, how did this matter stand with Greece? 
 Here, again, everything is really of transparent sim- 
 plicity. In the year 1912, after the first Balkan 
 war, when a quarrel arose among the allies, a fresh 
 war broke out between Bulgaria on the one hand 
 and Greece and Serbia on the other. In this war 
 Greece and Serbia were successful. As a result of 
 their successes they added each to their dominions 
 territories to which Bulgaria had laid claim. It 
 could easily be foreseen that when opportunity arose 
 Bulgaria would inevitably make every effort to 
 recover some at least of the territory that she had 
 lost. To guard against this danger a treaty of 
 alliance was made between Greece and Serbia. The 
 treaty has not been published and we do not know 
 precisely either the date on which it was concluded 
 or its specific terms. So much, however, is known, 
 that each of the contracting States engaged to sup- 
 port the other in arms in defence of its territory in 
 the case that any attack was made upon it by Bui- 
 
6 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 garia. By this Serbia secured, as she hoped, the 
 firm possession of Monastir and the surrounding 
 districts, and Greece secured Salonika and Kavalla. 
 The treaty was a reciprocal one. Had at any time 
 Bulgaria, as she well might have, threatened Greece 
 with war, Greece would at once have called for the 
 help of her ally, and we cannot doubt that the 
 appeal would have been made and the pledge re- 
 deemed. But the circumstances arose that it was 
 not Greece which called on the help of Serbia, but 
 Serbia which called for the help of Greece. Bul- 
 garia mobilised her forces, and it was shown by 
 every indication that she proposed to throw them 
 on the rear of the Serbian Army just at the moment 
 when Serbia was fully occupied in defending her- 
 self against the overwhelming numbers of the Aus- 
 trian invasion. Never was there a time when one 
 State could with so good a cause summon to her 
 assistance a pledged ally. 
 
 For, let it be noted, Greece was the only State 
 by means of which the necessary help could be 
 given. The Treaty of London, which in this matter 
 had been confirmed by the Treaty of Bucharest, 
 had denied to Serbia access to the sea. She was 
 thereby shut off from free intercourse with the other 
 States of Europe. She had great and powerful 
 allies — Russia, France, Great Britain — but such was 
 the unfortunate geographical position of the king- 
 dom that scarcely a single soldier, much less an 
 
BELGIUM AND GREECE 7 
 
 organised expedition, could find his way to the 
 threatened territory, except over the soil of Greece. 
 It was this condition against which the Serbian na- 
 tion and the Serbian statesmen had struggled, and 
 justly struggled, in the discussions which followed 
 the first Balkan war, for they had seen quite clearly 
 that a Serbia which had no access to the sea would 
 be still a Serbia subject to the caprices or the ambi- 
 tions of Austria. One safeguard alone there was, 
 and that was the alliance with Greece, for the 
 alliance with Greece opened up the single railway 
 by which there was connection with the sea and a 
 great port. 
 
 And this brings us to a matter which is very per- 
 tinent to the whole question. It is customary for 
 German writers, in comparing the German action in 
 Belgium and the Allied action in Greece, to assert 
 that the Germans were under the domination of 
 what they called "Not," or necessity. They were 
 driven, so they declare, under the paramount re- 
 quirements of defending their national existence, to 
 acts which might, perhaps, be condemned. They 
 suggest that there was no such requirement in the 
 landing at Salonika. It was a contrast which, if 
 they were wiser, they would not have suggested. As 
 to the invasion of Belgium we know, and they 
 themselves now know, that there was no necessity ; 
 if it had been merely a question of a defence of the 
 German frontier, that could have been carried 
 
8 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 through with equal ease on the line from Lim- 
 bourg to Switzerland. But that which they mean 
 by necessity was not the protection of Germany, but 
 the crushing of France. It was an illustration of 
 the German way of calling the annihilation of an 
 enemy mere self-protection. 
 
 What hypocrisy it is ! The invasion of Belgium 
 was not a device suddenly adopted in a moment of 
 justifiable panic; it was a plan long conceived, care- 
 fully matured, worked out by the German General 
 Staff, and it was because they had this plan that they 
 ventured to defy Europe and appeal to arms in a 
 matter which was easily capable of settlement by 
 agreement. 
 
 But how do matters stand with Serbia? Here 
 there was a case which justifies the use of the word 
 "necessity." Serbia was attacked on the north by 
 the superior forces of the Austrian Army, on the 
 east and the south by their Bulgarian allies. Against 
 these superior forces she could not maintain her- 
 self. She had as allies three of the greatest Pow- 
 ers of the world, but their alliance was useless to 
 her unless there could be established a free com- 
 munication for ammunition and troops. But the 
 persistent enmity of Austria had always refused 
 Serbia access to the sea ; the small inland State was 
 shut off from the outer world by high mountains and 
 wild passes ; there was only one road by which aid 
 could reach her, and that was from Salonika 
 
BELGIUM AND GREECE 9 
 
 through Greek territory. If we look at the matter 
 from the point of view of Serbia, this will at once 
 show us that the Treaty with Greece was not an 
 accidental and unimportant thing; it was in truth 
 the very condition of her existence. Were the road 
 through Greece which had thus been secured to her 
 closed, she could look for nothing but the annihila- 
 tion which has, in fact, fallen upon her. It is true 
 that the necessity was not that of Russia or France 
 or England, it was that of Serbia; we can under- 
 stand that the Germans would not recognise that a 
 small State opposed to themselves, which had for 
 long been marked out for destruction, should be 
 reckoned in the matter at all, but for the Allies there 
 was a paramount and overwhelming necessity, that 
 of doing all in their power for the salvation of 
 Serbia. 
 
 The application, therefore, was made by Serbia 
 in the height of her peril, at the very crisis of her 
 existence as an independent State, to her Greek 
 ally. The application was made, and it was refused. 
 It was, perhaps, the most dastardly refusal of which 
 there is any record in history, a refusal sufficient 
 to justify a demand that the nation which was 
 guilty of it should be struck out of the society of 
 civilised States. 
 
 When the refusal was made it would have been 
 open to Serbia to call for the help and countenance 
 of Britain, France, and Russia, to lay before them 
 
10 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 the case, and to ask that, as allies, they should 
 support her request with the strongest diplomatic 
 representations, and that, in the case that the refusal 
 was persisted in, they should declare war upon 
 Greece, reduce the country to subjection, and treat 
 the territory as that of an occupied and conquered 
 adversary. Against this not a word could be said on 
 the ground of convention or of law or of morality. 
 
 It will perhaps have been better had they acted 
 thus. What they did was something infinitely 
 milder, and it showed their desire in every way to 
 spare Greece the horrors of warfare. There are 
 cases, and this perhaps is one, in which considera- 
 tion becomes a blunder and leniency becomes a 
 crime. All that they asked was that, while Greece 
 herself might remain neutral, the armies of the 
 Allies should be allowed to use the port of Salonika 
 and the railway for the conveyance of troops to the 
 assistance of the Serbians, who were now engaged 
 in a hopeless struggle against overwhelming forces 
 attacking them on three sides. 
 
 This they asked, and in this Greece tacitly 
 acquiesced. More than this they have never asked. 
 They have not required from Greece that active co- 
 operation to which they were entitled. The situa- 
 tion which arose was indeed an unusual and an awk- 
 ward one. A portion of Greek soil was used as a 
 base by foreign Powers in a war against States with 
 which Greece herself was at peace. But this situa- 
 
BELGIUM AND GREECE 11 
 
 tion arose entirely from the first refusal of Greece 
 to fulfil her obligations. And, given the existence 
 of this situation, with what extraordinary considera- 
 tion have the Allies handled it! For many months 
 they left the full civil administration of Salonika in 
 the hands of the Greek Government ; they did not 
 even proclaim martial law and take the full control 
 into their own hands until Greece had shown by 
 numerous acts that she was working in secret agree- 
 ment with Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria. Greek 
 territory was being used (of this there is abundant 
 proof) to provide supplies for the German and 
 Austrian submarines ; Salonika was full of spies and 
 there was constant communication with the Central 
 Powers; it was seriously proposed to interfere with 
 the communications of the Allies, if not by open 
 warfare, at least by the encouragement of popular 
 risings. Fort Rupel, one of the strongest fortifica- 
 tions erected in modern times, holding an important 
 strategical position and dominating the Valley of 
 the Struma, was surrendered practically without 
 resistance to the Germans ; a Greek army corps was 
 handed over to them with all its provisions and 
 munitions of warfare. Was it to be expected that 
 the Allies would acquiesce in the continuation of 
 such a state of things? What ground is there for 
 complaint that at last — and, as many will be inclined 
 to think, after undue procrastination — pressure was 
 
12 BELGIUM AND GREECE 
 
 brought on the Greek Government and the Greek 
 people by the method of a blockade? 
 
 When the full account of these events is written, 
 it will, I think, appear that never in the history of 
 the world has a State been treated with such con- 
 sideration, for it must always be remembered that, 
 owing to her geographical position, Greece and her 
 capital were entirely at the mercy of the Allies. It 
 has been said that they tried to force Greece to join 
 in the war. This is untrue. As we have seen, they 
 would have been completely and absolutely justified 
 in pursuing such a course. They did not ; from be- 
 ginning to erd they have demanded nothing except 
 the use of Macedonia for military purposes and 
 honest neutrality on the part of Greece. 
 
 What, in fact, we have in the case of Greece is 
 not the ruthless abuse of force on the part of the 
 Allies. It is quite the reverse — a small State pre- 
 suming on the consideration which she knew that 
 she would receive just because of her own weakness, 
 and, trading on the long-established interest which 
 France and England had shown her, using her 
 position to violate her treaties and to commit acts 
 of scarcely veiled hostility, on which no great Power 
 would ever have ventured. 
 
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