LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 0DD017373Eb ;•■ *° ■' '•^u-o"^ , O « 9 , <5i '-^ > i'%. ^^ .-..., ^^^_ ^^ ..* "-^ ■ .^r^% °o C" * ,-J'"' . ' xOr.. '< .-i-^x •^^^AT^,". -^ ^^^-vx.^^^iJ' W: A^^ ^0 -e.'^^ .^ ° "' r'^-i.?T7-v ^^^.. .•^'^ O •3' .V '^,. ^° ^^'K; ^. ^.. ,-V ipeecli of Hob. J?' J. CRITTEXDEN, of Kentucky, 6'n his resolutions, c * isD^liver^din the ^-.aate of the United States, January 7, 1861. Mr. C^^ITTENDEN. I will occupy the floor but a little while on this occasion. do not desire to procrastinate, or see procrastinated, the coming to a final decision m this measure. Mr. President, if I could indulge myself with the hope that the resolution which I have jiroposed for 'amendments to the Constitution could obtain that majority in this Senate, which'would recommend it to the States for their adoption, by conven- '•"n r by Legisliiture, I should never have made this motion for a reference of the I to the people. It is the extraordinary condition of the country, the extra- /' circumstances by which we are now surrounded, and the peculiaf 1 in which Congress itself is placed, that has induced me to attempt lordinary a resort. We believe that amendments to the Constitution are .te (d giie that permanent security which is necessary to satisfy the public , and restore quiet to the country. Those amendments can not be r'^cora- ded, nor can we proceed in the measure of amendment, unless it be by a j-third fnajoiity. I have feared that that majority could not be hoped for .'re; and it is ir? this last extremity tliat I have proposecJ that we should invoke the ,udgment of the people upon the great question on which their government depends. It is not an ordinary question ; it is no question of party ; it is no question of policy; it is a question involving the existence of the Union, and the existence of the gov- t-rnment. Upun so momentous a question, where the public councils themselves are so divided and so distracted as not to be able to adopt, for the want of the requisite iiiajoriiy, those means that are supposed to be necessary lor the safety of the country and the people, it has seemed to me not improper that we should resort to the great source of all political authority — the people themselves. This is their government; this is their Ujiion ; we are hut their representatives. I speak in no feeling of iiattery to the people, sir. No; I call upon them to pronounce their judgment, and do their duly to their country. If we cannot save the country, and they will not save the country, the country is gone. 1 wish to preserve it by all the means, ordinary and extraordinary, that are within our possible reach. That is the whole feeling, and that is the entire principle upon which I have acted in making this proposition. I s'-e nothing improper in it. It may be ohjecied to as not a mode recognized by the Constitution. Well, sir, it is not forbidden by the Constitution, nor does it conflict with any principle of the Constitution, and it aims at nothing but what is entitled to influence here. That influence will be v.'eighed by the Senate properly and justly. It is simply an appeal to the people to aid us, their representatives, by giving us their judgment and their opinion upQi> the subject. That judgment and opinion will not be humiliating to us. If they she d condescend to pronounce their judgment and give their opinion, there is no bun ation in obeying the voice of a great nation, whose representatives we are, and wl e .servants we are proud to call ourselves. Their sentiments and their opinions \ 1 be our safest guide upun this question, surrounded as it is by so niairy diflii'iilti<^ and disabled as we are by our own distractions and divisions in Con^eis( "t'ron ;ting upon it without some power to control and to govern indi- vidual opinion I "^ not thii necessary, Mr. President, that I should enlarge upon this subject. TriiTlbjeci to I >tained is a constitutional one. It is to ascertain the sense of the peop!', and for loses salutary to the people, and necessary for the preservation of the country, in he circumstances whicli surround it. Tl? n, sir, as e constitutional amendments which are proposed for the sanction ''f ''''■"' ' on which they are to give their opinion, I had occasion some time '?*' - oiirks, and I intend now to add only a fewmore, 1 do not intenr •^ fe'' • ■ i . laT'ge into this question. I do not know that I shall at an< ime — •C'ertaiijiv low, when I am not fully apprised, perhaps, of the varioi jnjectioti'- itr I riy le nrtade to them. The first remedy propc ' --sts in a ne *•"'' u the Constitution, and which proposes for n settle t l"^"' md the qyesiion of slavery in respect to tt 'o s< hat — liow 1 to provide that all the territory north of •^ slavery; the south slavery shall be recognized anr" *^^ ng there for its protection. ' "r- r roportion of it, shal' br 9 ' 5' 2 „ ^0.2 jito the Union. Then they are to be admitted with such provisions as they m choose to make in their constitution in respect to .slavery — excluding it or admittii it. This IS all. To the North all is given ; to the South it is only provided th, things .shall remain as they are until the territory becomf.s a State, and then it is i adopt this institution of slavery or not, according to the wish of the people that ai interested in the new State. It seems to me there is something very just and ver fair on the face of this proposition. We are a great nation, composed now of thirty-three States. Fifteen of these havt this peculiar institution of slavery : the others have excluded it, each acting accord- ing to its own free choice under the Constitution. Slavery existed in these and more States when the Constitution was formed. The Constitution took things as they were, recognized them as they were, and left them as they were, to the exclusive jur- isdiction of the several States. Those who had the institution of slavery were left to the sole dominion over it; those who were without it were left to the free a i fiiil course of their own will and of their own wisdom upon the subject, on the one 1' continue tu exclude it, or on theotner side to continue to retain it. This was the general, reciprocal justice whicii the Constitution did to all sections of the con Now. sir, 1 ask the same standard and the same measure of justice. Let i things as they are; that js the object. To the north of 36° 30' slavery- has", he eluded. I say, therefore, slavery is excluded. To the south slavery exists as a n. of fact. I ask you to recognize it. That was the principle upon which the frai. of our Constitution went, recognizing the status existing at the time, adopting tl. accepting that as a basis. This is what I understand in respect to all ihe State TLiis /.'5 all now that I ask ; all that this proposition is. There are ■■outh of that lini the i.idian Territory, and the Territory of New Mexico; that is all. Of the Indian Territory I need say nothing; that is appropriated to others, and up?u the terras of thai appropriation it rests. By those terms, however, slavery n)ay be recognized as existing there; for the fact is, it does exist. So in all New Mexico; and how comes it to exist in i\'ew Mexico ? It exists potentially in New Mexico in virtue of the de- cision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the so-o!ten quoted caseofDrcd Scott. They say that all the people of the United States have tlie right equally to go into the common territory of the United States, and carry with them any species or description of pro[)erty recognized as such in the States from wliich they emigrate. Potentially, then, slavery does exist there ; but more than that : by the great compro- mise measures of 1850, a territorial governmeut was formed for New Mexico, and one of the compromises, one of the adjustments on that great occasion, was to give this Territory, which was a subject of dispute in respect to tiie question of slavery, power to "legislate on all rightful subjects of legislation." It was intended to cover this case ; it did cover the case of slavery by the broad and distinct terms in which the power was given to the Territorial Legislature. That was the agreement betweea the North and the South : " We will say nothing about slavery ourselves, but we will constitute a territorial government, ami we will give to that territorial government, representing the local interests, representing the local population, the power to dispose of this subject according to the wishes and according to tlie interests of the people of the Territory." In the exercise of that power, the people of l'" Territory did pass an act authorizing and regulating slavery in every particular; d that act no'.v exists. Slavery only to a very limited extent exists there ; but it exist y law actually. Now, what does this amendment of mine propose? Not that entieman shall agree that slavery may exist there ; not that they shall concede a principle; not that they shall concede any policy ; but simply that they may recoa ^ a fact, a fact that they cannot dispute — the fact of the actual existence of sla under actual law, emanating from that Territory under the power granted in ti ompromise of 1850, which was intended to settle the afiairs of the country, and elieve uslfom 'he troubles which have now returned, ''l-t was hailed by the whf jople, accepted as a peace offering on all sides, and has bVen continued from tha y. Undtr the lower given by that act of Congress of 1850, slavery has been itted inf that Territory, and all that is proposed by my amendment is, as I said, piy to re ofen''-^^. lat, and furthermore, the fact being recognized, that it shall be ionized thai that ate of things, that fact, shall continue as it is, until the Territor ili.|v»*vc acquired sufficient population, according to the ratio of representation fc preftpMta lives, to title it to onffp'^' '"jr in Congress, and then to be admitt.ed i no the "tJ^mon on an lal footir rest of the States, and with a constituiioi adop'-'Rg <>'' exclud- ^.^a^'' 4 to the judgment of the people theniselve.-. , jroposiiion in that respect. Well, I conf it seems to m grant. Soaje gentlemen are averse tc nnise. Wp" ' tnis r otnpromise. May it not v prop- 's ? But if it were a cot compromise, and upoo what principle are wo opposed to'compromise ? All human life IS but a compromise. From the cradle to the grave, every step of it is_a compro- mise between man and society. And when peace is the reward of compromise, it has been usually blessed. A man, it is said, in respect to^the compromise of a law- suit, must be allowed to purciiase his peace. A man can purchase nothing better, nothing dearer tnan his peace, even in private transactions. How in is it in relation to divisions between great communities, different countries, or great sections of the same country ? Are they not more necessary there? Are they not more demanded by the interests of society, more demanded by humanity itself, than in any condition of life? Just as much more demanded as the consequences are greater and more momentous, and more destructive ordinarily. If there were no compromise, parties would have to settle by force or by war, these questions. Is there in this vompromi.-e anytliing repulsive to any section of this country? I know the great Republican party of this country have declared themselves against the extension oi slavery. Is this in the sense of that declaration? is this in the sense of that tenet of their faith, an exteu-ion of slavery? I have before shown, what is the iui'isputablfi fact, that slavery does exist here by law, which covers the whole Territory. It is not extending slavery into a Territory where no slavery exists. Slavery doe-* exist there; and the question is, wliether you will let it exist, according to the laws under which it does exist, until tiie Territory becomes a Slate, and decides for itself whellier slavery shall continue longer or not. Is there such stringency in the doctrines of the party on this subject, that neither for weal nor for woe, neither for peace no for war, will they, mediately or immediately, on a principle of compro- mise or on a principle of justice, recognize the existence of slavery in the Territory of New Mexico? What gentleman, as a siatesman, can stand upon that ground? What Senator can stand upon that ground 1 Say that we are here, as 1 verily, believe we are, upon the brink of intestine and civil war, that that war can be prevented by recognizing the fact of the existence «f slavery, and agreeing that it shall continue for ten or fif- teen years, until the territoriy shall become prepared to enter the Union as a Slate, and tiiat Senators had rather encounter civil war, had rather encounter the destruc- tion of this Union, and of this Government, than to agree to these terms — upon what grounds? Upon any grounds of [uiblic welf;ire? Upon any avowed grounds of policy or of patriotism ? Can any Senator stand upon that ground? What is his ground, then ? The Republican party sees that by possibility, under tiiis adjustment, that Stale, if it chooses slavery, may come into tlie Union hereafter as a slave State. Are they pledged against that under all circumstances? Are their general rules rules that admit of no exceptions? The old maxim is that the exc>.*ption proves the rule. If the rule be reasonable, there always are exceptional circumstances that may occur, which would prevent the application of the rale; but here are general rules thai admit of no exception; and civil war, ])estilence, famine, and everything else, are to be encountered, rather than to recede one single hair's breadth from a partic- ular, prescribed doctrine. 1 cannot conceive it possible. But sti]ipose, Mr. President, that this proposition does make such provision that the ultimate result of it may be, if the people of the Territory choose, that it may hereafter be entitled, under this amendment of the Constitution, to come in as a slave Stale. Wiiat do gentlemen say to that? Is it a dogma that no slave State ever shall hereafter be admitted into this Union; and will they, tor the maintenance and pre- servation of thai dogma, sacrifice the country ? Will ihcy encounter civil war and disunion and all its fearful consequences, rather than >ield up in a single instance this dogma of no more slave States? Surely if that dogma were lo be pressed with ever such heartfelt conviction, and such heartfelt zeal, it could not be but that, in the hearts that had so adopted and embraced it, such an exception might be made as this. When the fate of ray country is on the one side and my dogma on the other, let the dogma go rather than the country be prostrated. Is any member of the •Senate prepared to say, in the face of this country and of the world, that rather than yield up his dogma in a single instance, he will see the country go lo ruin, or he will attempt to enforce his opinion by the sword? Is there any man who will do such a thing as that, so contrary lo the law and teachings of the Almighty, and contrary to 'II humanity ? Sir, we are one people. I glory in liie thought. Will one half of Jthe people un- "ftake lo say, I have a conscientious scruple about admitting a slave State, and I •end to substitute that scruple in place ot all your territorial rights? This Gov- inent, as made by our fathers, was made by States who held slaves and Stales ) did not. We now stand in the same aliiiude. Then, in their time, most or all he Stales held slaves, and now a minority of them onlv hold slaves. Shall the mt majority, holding uo slaves, plead as afl apology for usurping all the com- mon territory of the country, a conscientious scruplp, a dogma upon their part that f no more slave Stales shall be admitted? I ask my honorable friends on this side ofl the Chamber if that is I he political system of ethics upon which they intend to act; if it is that which they can avow, as a party, for monopolizing that which is com- mon property ? Will they plead a conscientious scruple ? Sir, it is a great nursery for concientious scruples, indeed, if men can make titles in themselves to common property in that way. 1 do not know why a man who held with me a tract of land might not take the same scruple against me, and say that I was heretical, and vio- lated all his dogmas, in politics and religion; tiiat his scruples would not allow him to be in such communion with me as to hold property in common ; and how does he gratify his conscience, and how does he dissolve this question of casuistry '? By taking tlie whole property to himself and turning me out. I say it is a great nursery for scruples of this sort, if an argument of that kind is to be found here. And now, Mr. President, see how exactly the very Territory in dispute comes Avithin the line of all that reasoning which would show that every part of the coun- try ought to be considered as equally entitled to share in the enjoyment of it. That country was but recently acquired from Mexico ; and it was acquired by conquest. Is it not as plain a case, that every section of the country paid its proportionate part of the consideration, as if it had been bought with money, and each citizen had con- tributed trie number of pence that his interest amounted to? Did not the South contribute her part of the treasure which bore the expense of that purchase? Did she not contribute her portion of the blood that was shed in obtaining it? Did she not even a little more of it than our northern brethren, because of their remote situa- tion ? We were nearer the scene of action, could get to it more easily, and there- fore, perhaps, there were more southern than northern men engaged in the war. The millions of money that it cost were paid, not out of a sectional purse, but out of a national purse, to which all contributed. We fought, one as well as another, and all sections did their duty. I do not recur to these things for reproach upon any section of our country. No, sir; I. love it all too well. It is all my country. I am not the man to degrade any portion of it by any lunguag? I have to use. This territory, then, plainly and clearly, was acquired by us all. It is but the work of yesterday. Now, a portion attempt to take it. They have scruples about allowing us our full and unrestricted and unreserved equal right in the territory. Can this be proper? We are but one community, with diverse institutions in rela- tion to domestic slavery, as well as In relation to many other subjects. We have grown u[. in, and cultivated habits suitable to, all the circumstances surrounding us, just as every people on earth have. The institution of slavery has given a variety to the form of society in which it exists. The absence of it has given form to a somewhat different condition of society, but equally adapted to its people. So it will be everywhere. You say, then, ior instance, by way of mitigating the wrong done, that you only exclude slaveholders; you only exclude three hundred thou- sand — not a section of the country ; not States ; not fifteen States; but three hun- dred thousand slaveholders in those States. Whether that is a correct coin{)utation of them I do not know; nor is it of the least importance to this argument. No ; the wrong does not stop there. All the millions that have been reared in the society formed, and receiving its character, and receiving its complexion from that institu- tion, though they may not be the owners of slaves, have t)een brought up and habit- uated to the habit and form of society which that institution has given birth to. That makes a difference in the habits of a people not to be worn off in a day or a minute — transient, I admit; but they are, for the present, their habits. Their feel- ings and their habits go along together; and neither would you northern men prefer to go into the society of these people under circumstances equal; nor would the southern man, with his habits and feelings, prefer to go into nortliern society, sim- ply because of chang-es in the custom and habits; that is all. By restraining the slaveholders from going into any Territory, then you restrain the formation of any such habits as this other man, Avho is not a slaveholder in the southern States, has formed. You do not expel him, but you erect a barrier: not an insuperable one : you create a new difficulty in his way in going there, where he is to rnt-et witf strangers, and strangers of somewhat different habits from himself. But, as a matter of right, looking at it according to the political principles up< which our great political society is formed ; looking at it upon thecommoa popu' principles upon which the Constitution was formed, have you a right, in the dis' bution of the public property, to make any distinction between the portions of country holding slaves and those who do not hold them ? Why have you more r to do it in respect to the public lands and Territories of the United States iha respect to any otixer species of public property ? If yo-^ had money in the Trea •would you insist upon taking all of that ? No. I know you would not, Why? Because it is a common property. When, instead of money, we come to divide ter- ritory, land, does not the same principle apply — not merely upon the ground of ordi- nary equity or justice, but because our Constitution has been formed, those who made it well knowing that in difl'erent sections of the common country for which it was made, difl'erent scruples might obtain, difl'erent dogmas might prevail? But these were not to be looked to at all. Our Constitution, in its provisions, leaves us all free to entertain th«se dogmas; but it does not leave us free to disregard the great prin- ciples of equality and equal justice, and equal distribution, as among honest fellow- citizens, of land as well as money, and everything else. No part of the country, no section of the country, has a right to set up its particular opinion on any subject as the image of orthodoxy, and say those who do not come up to this rule of ortho- doxy shall not share with us in any thing that belongs to this Government. This is regulated, not by conscientious considerations, not by a scruple, but by broad, plain, common political principles; such as our common Constitution was framed upon. Would you, upon any ground of diflerence as to a question of religion, have a right to make any distinction ? Would you have a right to say that no Presbyterian should settle in this territory, because he is a Presbyterian? Would you iiave a right to say that no Congregalionalist shall settle there ? Suppose we were divided by a sectional line in our religion ; would any one of us have a right to invoke his ff'ligion as a reason why he was entitled to more, and his brother to less, or to nothing? Nobody would pretend that. You have no right to bring up scruples of that sort, or questions of that sort, agamst another. This question of .slavery has been, to no small extent, connected with the ques- tion of religion. The pulpit has taken it in hand ; the pulpit has become the min- ister of politicians, and politicians have ministered to ministers of the Gospel, neither to the benefit nor profit of the Gospel ; and now scruples — I may as well call them scruples of religion as well as scruples about slavery — are pleaded on one side. You do not plead it eo nomine as a religious preference that you are entitled to, or as a religious distinction. You plead it, to be sure, as a distinct opinion of your own upon the subject of slavery; but you have been able to force that question of slavery into a great political position before the country, by the aid of the pulpit. It has become with some a religious feeling. I am not one of those who feel a dis- position to speak, or allow myself to speak, disrespectfully of religion; but I point you to these things as facts that we see and know, that there has been a combi- nation, a mixing up, of these questions with religion and with politics; and we are taught from the pulpit daily, not of the jiolitical improvidence, not of the political impolicy of slavery ; but we are taught that it is a great sin, and that we are to put it far away from us. Now, suppose all this doctrine is right : does it come under our Constitution ? Does it come within the principles of our Constitution that we shall set up any such standard ? The Con.-titution has set up a standard, and it is a standard of tqual jus- tice and principle. It recognizes and estimates each man, and each community of men, not according to their religious opinionsat all, but according to political rights; and their political rights are equal, however different they may be in their religious opinions or in any conscientious scruples, however honorable. We have no right to !k you, as an assurance that it shall not be done, to declare that the Constitution ought no' • be .so construed as to give power to do it ? I think there can he no omo • that. I do not intend to go more particularly or precisely in question at this time, and I hope it will never be requir There are some questions involved in this matter in reli which 1 desire merely to give my opinion. I have said ti bl' me ill these controversies. It is so of necessity. Our • that in all long-continued controversies. It has been sc le South has not acted rashly? Who can say that tht unwisely 1 I cannot. To say' nothing of the past polilic committed, but to look to the present, 1 do not believe in is a new doctrine. It has sprung up and grown wonr' It is not namei' • '"" ' tion. It has no n^'" laws. If il me 't i^ to secede from thn bold front and character of revolution, it is nothing but a lawless violation of the Consiitutioii. That is my opinion. I do not intend to argue it ; but I wish fo lake the responsibility of saymg, in these momentous times, when the Consiitulion of the country is apt to be run down, and trodden down ; when a right of secession is urged ; a right to go off, and to take with them forts, and arsenals, and everything prepared for the common defense, that I cannot agree with it. It is new to me. It is of modern growth. But, sir, I do not desire to be carried ofl' into that question. I want only to bear ray testimony for the Constitution of my country. 1 want it to be known — and, as far as my poor voice can go, it shall go — that ihis Constitution, so far from its being liable to be broken by anybody that chooses to secede, as they call it, is a grand and inviolable iuotrunieni, upon which no man should lay his unhallowed ha?)d, or attempt to withdraw himself. If he is oppressed, let him take the responsibilities of revolution ; let him defy the war; let him proclaim himself a revolutioiiist, and not attempt to hide his revolution in the little subtilties of law, and the little subtilties with which he surrounds seee.-sion, as it is called. I do not believe in it. It is no justiticatiori. My honorable friend from Louisiana [Mr. BENJAiMiN] quotes Mr. Madison and Mr. Webster as authority for this doctrine. Why, sir, if the gentle- man had extended his inquiry a little further, he would have seen that no doctrine was ever repudiated more precisely, exactly, and sternly, than this doctrine of seces- ihion was by Mr. Madison ; and Mr. Webster's name and fame are identified with the argument by which he was supposed to have destroyed every pretext on which such a doctrine could stand. If it is intended merely as another name for revolution^ be it so. 1 do not know that gentlemen have not a right to so denominate their actions if ihey please ; but a constitutional right to break the Constitution — a consti- tutional riglit to destroy the Union — would be indeed a strange form of government. I am tor the Union ; but, my friends, I must be also for the equal rights of my State under this great Constitution nnd in this great Union. You must be prepared to grant them. I hope you will be. You desire to maintain the Union. You say you do. I believe it. I do. But we must preserve it on the proper terms of equal respect and equal regard. The dogma of my State is, tliat she has as much riglit to go into the Territories with her slaves as you, who do not choose to hold such properly, have to go without them. That is their dogma. Would it not be best fur both of us to re- nounce the pretension to go on its own dogma at the expense of the other, and let us make that odious thing, if it must be called so — a compromise — again to restore our fellowship and our brotherhood. Balance the consequences of a civil war and the consequences of your now agreeing to the stipulated terms of peace here, and see how they compare one with another. I will not repeat again what is asked of you. It is but a trifle in point of territory, a trifle in poinc of any material value that can be assigned to it, and there is no breach of any principle. It is an exception, and a fair exception upon exceptional grounds, to the principle you avow. On the other side, you have civil war Mr. TRUxMBULL. Will the Senator allow me to ask him, if he has any assu- rance that civil war is to be averted by his resolution ; if he does not know that a State has already undertaken to secede, and says she wants no compromise, and will have none? Mr. CRITTENDEN. It is proper that I should answer the question of the Senator from Illinois. I belifve it will. Of course I cannot say for certain; I may be mistaken, I believe it firmly, and I believe it without a doubt. It may not satisfy all. I never expected it would. That it will satisfy a sufficient portion of the country to preserve the p'^ace, and to preserve the Union everywhere, is my belief. I think, if the gen- tleman is disposed to grant it^Jw; will find in the experiment that all this commotion '' be put an end to, not instantly. It may have commenced already, for all I "''^rlesion. It may not satisfy South Carolina. Hers is a peculiar case; •"y almost all the southern States: at any rate to such an o further proceeding in this revolution, no further secession, lat is my belief; and I hope and trust, sir, that we shall el confident of the result, and that it will be the restora- d then these glentlemen may go on honorably in this new country. Let them commence now by this first gloric js 1 be a noble starting point. But lei them goon withoi v/ay is to take the sword in hand, and woe be to tiiem , ider that policy, to administer this Government! If the elied upon, then woe to your Administration ! Yourvic- md ashes. Grant these measures, and jiyou will fating —'•oIp country. ^'^~ih '