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EXTRACTS KKOM 
 
 MOLTKES CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 PERTAINING TO THE WAR 870 71 / ^ , 
 
 TRANSLATED BY HARRY BELL 
 
 Master Signal Electrician, U.S.A. 
 
 The Army Service Schools Press 
 
 Kort Leavenworth, Kas. 
 
 I9II 
 

 By T raivsf«l» 
 AUG 4 \^u 
 
PARI I. 
 
 Plans of Campaign, - - pp. 1 to 176 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Correspondence, Aug. 3 to 18, pp. 177 to 229 
 
PART I 
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 
 
 General von Moltke's first work concerning location and 
 position of the Prussian forces in a probable war between 
 France and Germany was written in 1857, when that gei;eral 
 was detailed as chief of the general staff of the ai my. In that 
 year an assembly of the German Confederation in Fi-ankfurt 
 on the Main had" under consideration conditions of the garri- 
 son of the Confederate fortress of Rastatt. Being requested 
 by the minister of war, Count v. Waldersee, to give his opin- 
 ion concerning tlie right of Prussia to participate in the gar- 
 risoning of that fortress and concerning the advisability of 
 abandoning Landau as a Confederation fortress and constitut- 
 ing Germersheim as such, General v. Moltke composed the 
 following memorial, which also considered in its scope the pos- 
 sibility of a war with France: 
 
 MEMORIAL NO. 1 
 
 Berlin, 28 November, 1857. 
 
 The military frontier between Germany and 
 France divides itself into two main sectors; one, the 
 line of the Rhine from the Wesel to Mayence, made 
 extraordinarily strong by numerous fortresses, and 
 the other, the line from Mayence to Switzerland, 
 which is protected only by the fortresses of Germers- 
 heim and Rastatt and the Black Forest. 
 
 In case of war between France and Germany it 
 is almost certain that the French main attack will be 
 made on the line Strassburg— Ulm, while a secondary 
 deployment of forces from direction of Metz and Val- 
 enciennes will be made in the hope to contain the 
 Prussian forces on the lower Rhine. 
 
 Not counting on the neutrality of Belgium and 
 
 the attitude of the Netherlands, the chain of 
 
 fortresses along the Rhine forms a serious obstacle to 
 1 
 
an advance farther north. On the other hand, the 
 ease with which France can concentrate an enor- 
 mous mass of troops at Strassburg, even the pro- 
 jected building of a permanent bridge there across 
 the Rhine, the sphtting up of Southern Germany into 
 small states and before all the isolation of the Vllth 
 and Vlllth German Confederation Corps, leaves no 
 doubt but what France will be successful in the start 
 in this very theater of operations. 
 
 Existing conditions clearly define Prussia's atti- 
 tude in case of a French attack. 
 
 Two army corps, presupposing that they are 
 mobilized at the proper time, will dispute possession 
 of the advantageous terrain on the left bank of the 
 Rhine with the opponent until the mass of our forces 
 and the Xth Confederation Corps are concentrated 
 between Cologne and Mayence. 200,000 men then 
 will enable us to relieve Jiilich and Saarlouis and to 
 take the offensive, be that on the right or on the left 
 bank of the Rhine, which at the same time will call a 
 halt to any advance of the enemy into Southern Ger- 
 many. 
 
 It was just this view of things and of course the 
 firm confidence in the power of Prussia and in its 
 good will which, in 1831, caused the South German 
 States to send the Vllth and Vlllth Confederation 
 Corps not to the Lech (thereby leaving themselves 
 unprotected) but to the Main, where an army 
 was thus concentrating numbering at least 300,000 
 men, while one Prussian and the IXth Confederation 
 Corps assembled at Bamberg as a reserve. 
 
 Since then conditions have changed. Prussia is 
 no longer regarded in the same light, and Austria's 
 influence in Germany has increased. The fortified 
 places Ulm, Rastatt and Germersheim give the South 
 German States greater independence. As far back 
 as 1853 Austria, supposing a threatened attack by 
 
Franco, insists that Germany take a combined, so- 
 called central. |)osition on the Main, 
 
 The N'llth and Vlllth Confederation Corjis, from 
 Bavari.i. VViirtemberjjr, Baden and the Grand Duchy 
 Hesse, are to assemble between (iermersheim, Rastatt 
 and Stiilljs''art. and the theaterof war is to be ])rei)ared 
 on the central Rhein by a fortified camj), the cost of 
 which is estimated at 12 millions gulden. Austria 
 says it will send 150, (KX) men there in the shortest 
 time possible and follow these up with 50,000 reserves. 
 It a|)pr()ve(l the location and position of the Prussian 
 ami of the IXth and Xth Confederation Corps. 
 
 As a matter of fact these are two central stations 
 with entirely diverjring- lines of retieat. Still Prussia 
 will always have its own army and its separate 
 theater of war, which, for defensive purposes, is 
 bounded by the Main. 
 
 The organization of the Prussian army, its readi- 
 ness for war and Prussia's own interests guarantee 
 that Prussia will be at the Main with all available 
 forces within six to eight weeks. 
 
 In the convention Austria declared that, in un- 
 favorable circumstances, it would take twelve weeks 
 to concentrate 120,000 men on the Rhine. It is of 
 course true that the completion of the railroads from 
 Linz via Munich. Ulm and Stuttgart will facilitate 
 matters, but in this case not only the distance is a 
 great factor but also the time required by Austria 
 to organize new formations. es])ecially should it 
 have greatly reduced its army in the mean time. 
 
 If France has decided on an attack on Germany, 
 that attack will be in the nature of a surprise. 
 
 In time of i)eace there are garrisoned some 150,- 
 000 men between Paris and the northeastern fron- 
 tier: Strassburg is connected by rail with Metz, Paris 
 and Lyons and is but half the distance from 
 Stuttgart than from Munich and Nuremberg, the 
 
-4- 
 
 southern central position between Stuttgart and 
 Rastatt — therefore Gemersheim would be entirely too 
 near the hostile frontier to serve as a point of concen- 
 tration. Only if Austria places an army be- 
 fore or at the outbreak of war on the upper Rhine, 
 may the South German States hope to directly protect 
 their domains. If Austria does not do this, the re- 
 trograde movement of the Vllth and Vlllth Confed- 
 eration Corps will come to a stop in favorable con- 
 ditions at Ulm, and possibly only behind the Lech or 
 still farther to the rear. 
 
 An impartial estimate of the situation would lead 
 the South German Governments therefore to the con- 
 clusion that their immediate succor may be found in 
 Prussia and that the first retreat must be directed 
 not eastward but northward towards the Main. 
 
 Prussia's position on the Rhine protects North- 
 ern Germany. If Austria can hot take over this role 
 of protection for Southern Germany, then the fortified 
 places there have to rely on their own resources. 
 
 Considered from a mere military point of view, 
 it does not appear desirable that Prussia should ex- 
 tend its original position beyond the Main, and we 
 can but designate it a disadvantage if we would 
 weaken our forces in the field- already much exhaus- 
 ted by participation in garrisoning fortresses— by an 
 additional or new participation in garrisoning a Con- 
 federation fortress in Southern Germany. 
 
 But, if political conditions imperatively require a 
 participation in the peace garrisoning, then sight 
 must not be lost of the fact that just Rastatt may be 
 invested in the first few days after the outbreak of 
 war and threatened by a formal investment. 
 
 This is almost certain considering the proximity 
 of this fortress to the left flank of the probable hos- 
 tile line of operations, the supplies now in Strassburg, 
 and the facility of communications. To draw off the 
 
5- 
 
 Prussian jrarrison, in such an event will only lead to 
 the U)ss of the fortress. In case of an unfortunate 
 outcome. Prussia would have to hear all the blame. 
 
 Lantlau and (lermersheim are a little closer to the 
 I'russian central position and can therefore be more 
 easily reinforced. 
 
 If we have the choice whether to make one or the 
 other of these places a Confederation fortress, we un- 
 doubtedly will decide on (Jermersheim *, it being, 
 provided the garrison is equally strong, a better point 
 and of more strategical importance on account of its 
 position on the Rhine. It is evident that Landau, after 
 Ciermersheim has been properly fortified, will be of 
 little importance to the general interest of the Ger- 
 man Confeileration, considering that it is surrounded 
 by dominating hills, that it can be reached directly 
 from Strassburg on an unprotected railroad, and that 
 it covers or protects no material terrain sector. 
 
 Still, as in case of Rastatt, the same holds good 
 for Landau, i. e. that none of the Prussian troops 
 stationed there in peace, may be diverted from there 
 in case of outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 In how far these mere military disadvantages 
 may be offset by permanent political interests of 
 peace, has to be decided by higher authority. 
 
 • H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Prus.sia made the follow- 
 ing notation in ihr nuirKin: "This point of view, oriprinated 
 hy niH, is just now very important t») Prussia and should he 
 pressi'd in the conv^-ntion, tliiit is, to insist on Prussia's ri^ht 
 of transferrinjr th«' jf;irrisoii of !..-indau to (ierniersheim and to 
 enlarjre it alrtady in time of p^-acf and thus to transfer to an- 
 otln-r Held thf ('ntii<- (pn-stion of tlie fortress of Rastatt." 
 
The following memorial of October 1858 seeks, in connec- 
 tion with an exposition of the relation of Germany to its 
 smaller neighboring States, to outline Prussia's primary mili- 
 tary measures in a probable war with France. 
 
 MEMORIAL NO. 2 
 
 Berlin, October 1858. 
 I. MILITARY— POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
 
 It is not possible to state accurately the attitude 
 of two large powers in the event of outbreak of war, 
 even if only in general outlines, without at the same 
 time paying proper attention to the military-political 
 situation of the smaller states adjoining the theater 
 of war. 
 
 In case of war between France and Germany 
 the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Sardinia 
 would have to be considered. 
 
 The Netherlcmds are apparently outside of the 
 probable theater of war — only Masstricht and Lux- 
 emburg being within it. The main point to consider 
 is whether it would be friendly or enimical to Bel- 
 gium. It is confined to a strictly defensive attitude, 
 which is also favored by the conditions of the terrain. 
 
 It is true that a Dutch army might appear offen- 
 sively from this state (which is hard to traverse and 
 is protected by streams and overflows and is not 
 endangered on any side) and to defend— in conjunc- 
 tion with Belgium and Prussia— its domain more 
 surely outside of its frontiers. But the state of the 
 Dutch army makes it impossible to count on success 
 in a campaign. 
 
 Undoubtedly the Schiitterie (i; e. the Nether- 
 lands Militia), supported by line troops, may help to 
 defend the half ruined fortresses, the dikes and 
 dams of the fatherland against invasion. 
 
 6 
 
— 7- 
 
 ConsideriiiK tho actual streiij::th of the army in 
 winter time lO.OOOmen — the mobile army can hardly 
 amount to more than 80.000 men. And for this oi'- 
 ^Mni/,ati»»n there is an absence of necessary cadres 
 and eiiuipment. Tlie ^''^'Jitei- part of the men only 
 serve four months with the colors. Cavalry horses 
 can be obtained only from Hanover and Oldenburg 
 and that requires six months time. Only the artillery 
 is up to date. 
 
 Under these circumstances it seems certain that 
 the intention is to niei'ely defend the so-called 
 Utrecht line. Bergen. Breda and Herzogenbusch 
 are already considered merely as advanced posts 
 and Maastricht, so important for the entire Rhine 
 country, is to be abandoned. It ai)pears that 
 the defensive works of that place are intentionally 
 allowed to deteriorate and that the munitions of war 
 stored there are being transferred. 
 
 It is doubtful whether or not the king of the 
 Netherlands, as a (ierman Confederation Prince, will, 
 under the.se conditions, furnish his contingent for 
 Luxemburg. It would not be at all imjtrobable, that 
 Prussia would have to take over the defense of this 
 important place by itself and even have to occupy 
 Maastricht in order to prevent it from becoming a 
 French depot to serve as a base for an advance towards 
 the Uhine. 
 
 It is hardly to l)e expected that Ibilland would 
 take sides against Germany in order to regain, with 
 the helj) of France. Belgium or a part of it. In such 
 a case we may certainly count on Belgium to fulfill 
 its obligation under the treaty of the Confederation. 
 
 To occupy Holland at the very start by Prussian 
 troops, to make sure of having in our possession the 
 very rich sources of supplies offered by that country, 
 would mean an unjustifiai)le s|)litting upof our forces 
 and would undoubtedly lead to war with England. 
 
Belgium, since gaining its independence, has 
 made more progress than any other European State, 
 In spite of its different elements there has arisen a 
 strong feeling of nationality. The original feeling 
 of absolutely necessary dependence on France no 
 longer exists. Belgium sees in France its only actual 
 enemy to its national independence; it considers 
 England, Prussia and even Holland as its best allies. 
 
 If we respect Belgium's neutrality we would pro- 
 tect thereby the largest part of our western frontier. 
 
 It is of course true that France can concentrate 
 with ease and in the shortest time a large army at 
 our immediate frontier in Metz. Still, operations 
 against the lower Rhine require a broader base, 
 which can be furnished only by Belgium. As it is 
 not probable that Belgium will ally itself with France, 
 France's first step will always be to invade that 
 country in order to take serious measures against 
 Prussia. 
 
 To protect its neutrality, Belgium intends to or- 
 ganize a force of 100,000 men. Peace measures, 
 however, have not been taken in such a manner as 
 to allow us to hope that it could put an efficient army 
 in the field. The Belgian fortresses require an 
 army of 40,000 men. Entirely abandoning the rest 
 of tha couitry and the capital, it is the intention to 
 concentrate the rest of the army in a fortified camp 
 at Antwerp and to make a stand there until outside 
 support arrives. 
 
 Considering the extended net of railways it is 
 possible that in a very short time 50,000 to 60,000 
 men— the larger part of them being reserves— can be 
 assembled, who have served but a few months. The 
 cavalry will be very inferior and the artillery will 
 form the best part of the army. 
 
 But even if this army occupies the best perman- 
 ent works, help for it must not be too long delayed. 
 
-9 
 
 There is mo hope to expect such help from Holland, 
 
 Envrhmd's army is in India and will be reciuired 
 there for years to come. Kven if 10.000 to 15,000 
 Britishers can make a landing'' at Ostend or Nieuport, 
 which is very dinicult. or even if their ships go as 
 far as Antwerp, that would not mean that it would 
 be possible to proceed offensively aj?ainst a French 
 army. 
 
 Relgium can expect help only from Prussia. 
 
 But for this purpose the fortified camp at Ant- 
 werp is badly chosen. With the means which remain 
 in the open field to the Vllth and Vlllth Prussian 
 Army Corps after occupying; the Rhine and Confed- 
 eration fortresses, and eventually also Maastricht and 
 Venloos. there is no chance of direct supi)ort within 
 twenty miles (German miles-80 Eng:lish miles). 
 Now. however, the recommendations of the govern- 
 ment to build a fortified camp at Antwerp has been 
 rejected by the House of Parliament, and the Belgian 
 army will be (lisapi)ointed in its expectation to find 
 protection behind the present works there. 
 
 On the other hand, a fortified camp at Namur 
 would cover the largest part of the country and even 
 the capital in some manner and secure the direct 
 support of the Prussian troops, or eventually their 
 falling back on that camp, while there is no chance 
 to fall back on Antwerp at all. The flank position on 
 the Maas, in connection with the fortified Naumur, 
 protected on the left by the Ardennes, but a day's 
 march from the fortresses of Charleroi, Dinant and 
 Huy, with the rich Luettich and the railroad in rear, 
 seems very suitable for the offensive as well as for 
 the defensive, as also for the subsistence and rein- 
 forcement of the Belgian army. 
 
 It is uncpiestionable that the location of the Bel- 
 gian army at Antwerp is also of advantage to us 
 in so far as the P'rench attack will have to leave 
 
—10— 
 
 there a large corps and will be considerably weakened 
 in consequence when reaching our frontier. Still 
 we must consider that Belgium, the frontier places 
 of which are in bad condition, will be lost sooner than 
 our corps can reach the Rhine from the center of the 
 monarchy and that it will have to be re-taken. 
 
 Consequently the question arises as to whether 
 the Belgian Government, without our entering into 
 definite agreements with it, can be induced to concen- 
 trate its army on the Maas instead of at Antwerp. 
 
 More unfavorable than in the northern, are the 
 political conditions in the southern part of the 
 large theater of war in case of a war between France 
 and Germany. 
 
 In similar manner as the Kingdom of the Neth- 
 erlands, Sardinia, in the Paris Peace Convention, 
 was made a bulwark against future attacks by France 
 on Germany. Sardinia is in possession of the im- 
 portant passes across the Alps from Montblanc to the 
 sea; it received ten millions of French contribution 
 moneys to secure these passes by fortresses, w^hile 
 on the other hand Alessandria, close to Lombardy, 
 was deprived of many things. Still, conditions since 
 those days did not develop in accordance with the 
 policies of the different cabinets; and the latter 
 themselves have been brought to a different stand- 
 point partly by the national and social ideas taking- 
 possession of the people. 
 
 For a number of years the national movement is 
 increasing in Italy, having for its aim the confedera- 
 tion of all Italian States under one general government. 
 
 Sardinia feels called upon to be the champion of 
 this movement. The domination of Austria in Italy 
 is the main obstacle to the accomplishment of the ob- 
 ject. At the European Congress at Paris in 1856 a 
 
- 11- 
 
 Sardinian miiiistor prolesttHl, in tlie name of Italy, 
 ajrainst that (h)ini»iati()n: "There can be no under- 
 standing between Sardinia and Austria, as lonp: as 
 the latter owns an inch of Italy." The Sardinian 
 army waits impatiently for the moment when it can 
 even up. in a new campaig-n, scores with Austria. 
 Alessandria and Casale, now fortified, are the sup- 
 portinpf points for the expected war. 
 
 In Italy, within this national tendency, is felt the 
 far-reachiny: republican sentiment. In case of con- 
 flict both will separate, will oppose each other. Even 
 now the Sardinian y:overnment, which is the most 
 powerful of the Italian dependencies, cannot shake 
 off its suspicious ally. More than once a breaking 
 off of diplomatic relations with Austria was imminent, 
 in place of the government having the courage 
 to muzzle the press. If in a probable war the govern- 
 ment or the Mazzini faction will control the move- 
 ments is doubtful and will mainly depend on condi- 
 tions under which France enters the theater of war. 
 So far however, and up to a certain point, all differ- 
 ent parties are in accordance and relentlessly insist 
 on war with Austria. 
 
 On account of its excellent military system, Sar- 
 dinia is a formidable opponent. It does not at all 
 profess to await, inactively, foreign interference. It 
 can concentrate within four to five weeks an army of 
 6(.).(M)() men at Turin, ready to take the field, which 
 can reach Stradella within a few marches and there, 
 based on Casale, Alessandria and Genoa, cover the 
 entire country in a strong position, flank a hostile 
 crossing over the Ticino. immediately threaten Mai- 
 land and also can be reinforced for an offensive oper- 
 ation by a part of the very imjmrtant fortress gar- 
 risons (40,00() men). 
 
 So much for the threatening position of Sardinia. 
 The remaining Italian powers are of less importance. 
 
-12- 
 
 but as long as France keeps troops in the "Church 
 Domain" the southern frontier of Lombardy can- 
 not be considered secure. 
 
 It is clear that in this case Austria can not ap- 
 pear in Germany in force nor in a short time. 
 
 Of special importance, finally, is Stvitzerland, 
 which forms a bulwark in the center between the 
 German and Italian line of defense. 
 
 Neutral Switzerland separates the armies which 
 Austria can place in Germany and in Lombardy, it 
 is the key to the interior of France, to the ' 'Franche- 
 Comte. " If we may now assume that a French army 
 will enter this mountainous country, then it will find 
 itself there in a central position difficult to attack, 
 from which it can debouch via the upper Rhine 
 against Southern Germany or via the easy Alpine 
 passes against Upper Italy, in which case not only 
 Austria's offensive against Sardinia but also its de- 
 fensive in Lombardy can be taken in rear and from 
 which even the Tyrol can be threatened. 
 
 The consequence of hostile occupation of Switzer- 
 land would be that the Rhine and the Ticino would no 
 longer form the original defensive line of the Ger- 
 man armies but rather thelller and the Mincio. The 
 line of the first position would be from Rastatt via 
 Ulm, Feldkirch and Peschiera to Mantua and the 
 rich countries of Suabia and Lombardy would at the 
 very start be abandoned to the enemy. 
 
 Consequently the question, whether Switzerland 
 can maintain and will maintain its neutrality — as- 
 sured to it since the peace of Westphalia— becomes 
 of the utmost importance. 
 
 Switzerland emerged from the war of 1847 as a 
 Confederation State and with a well organized army 
 of some 100,000 men; it is true that this people's army 
 has many defects, has hardly any cavalry, but it is 
 
-13- 
 
 well suited to the defense of the fatherland and can 
 he confoiitrated in a very slioit tinu' that is within 
 throe wet'ivs. 
 
 Kvon thoiijrh the fortifications of Geneva have 
 l)een razed, and those of Basel are useless, and though 
 France dominates the approaches to Lyon and Besan- 
 con in French Switzerland, still the Jui'a and the Aar 
 compose a very strong defensive line. If now Switz- 
 erland intends to maintain its neutrality, France 
 must, in its very serious war against Germany, de- 
 tach a special army for operations the outcome of 
 which is doubtful and which will l)e of great advan- 
 t&ge only if the operations can be quickly ended and 
 sooner than the German armies are enabled totakeup 
 the offensive. 
 
 The liberal and radical i)rinciples have also found 
 a foothold in Switzerland. As is known, France has 
 sympathetic followers in the Waadtland and in 
 Geneva, it has increased its influence with success 
 and has. as a matter of fact, furnished the arbitrator 
 lately in a matter of great imi)ortance toSwitzerland. 
 There seems to exist no favorable sentiment towards 
 Germany. Public opinion and the press will apparently 
 take France's side in case of hostilities. Still Switz- 
 erland's interests are well established. In giving up 
 its neutrality the independence of the country is en- 
 dangered: the country will immediately become the 
 theater of war, in which it can gain nothing because 
 additions to its country are entirely beyond the in- 
 terests of Switzerland. 
 
 We may therefore reasonably assume that the 
 Swiss Government, at the decisive moment and 
 in spite of all party opinions and sympathies, will 
 guard its neutrality and protect it with the entire 
 forces at its conmiand. 
 
 If the policies of the Sardinian (iovernment are 
 in entire opposition to those of the Austrian Govern- 
 
—14 — 
 
 merit, if on the other hand the Kingdom of the 
 Netherlands has dropped down to military unimpor- 
 tance, still we can not deny that it is of the utmost 
 importance to pave the way in the very start to a 
 friendly understanding with Belgium and Switzer- 
 land. In this the question is: Shall Germany, in 
 case of war with France, have two armies of 100,000 
 men for or against it, and shall we have to defend the 
 lines from Luxemburg to Basel or from Ostend to 
 Geneva? 
 
 Germany, with its two world powers, has an 
 army of over a million of men. If we consider the 
 number only, we are justified in coming to the con- 
 clusion that France by itself alone is far from being 
 strong enough to wage a war against Germany. 
 This conclusion is entirely justified, if we may 
 assume that Germany will be united, or will in the 
 end be united— i.e., that Austria and Prussia will 
 form a union. The greatest danger to the peace of 
 Europe lies in the unity of the two German world 
 powers, and, if circumstances still demand war, that 
 unity guarantees a favorable outcome. 
 
 In order to take up the enormous war with the 
 German Central Europe, in which war England 
 might finally participate, France needs additional 
 preparatory steps — i.e., the spreading of its power 
 in the Roman West (Romanischen Westen). 
 
 The situation of the Italian peninsula furnishes 
 an opportunity (which France will not allow to 
 go to waste, as soon as interior conditions show 
 this to be advisable) to occupy the attention of the 
 different parties with exterior matters. 
 
 By an armed interference in Italian politics 
 France threatens in the first place neither Prussia 
 nor the main part of the German Confederation 
 States. The operation is first of all directed against 
 
-15- 
 
 Austria, and that is, only against tiiat part of Austria 
 outside of Germany. In this France probably does 
 not insist on an addition of terrain, it ostensibly 
 fights for national ideas, and the primary question is 
 to reestablish Italy. 
 
 No matter how weak Southern Germany is on 
 account of its disunion, France will there, between 
 Austria and Prussia, seek an addition of terrain, but 
 only, as in Italy, influence, prestige and protectorate. 
 On the other hand, it will concentrate all its force for 
 the recapture of the Rhine line, the loss of which has 
 never yet been forgotten. And this Prussia will 
 have to prevent by itself alone, if Austria, driven 
 out of Italy, has no longer the will nor the power to 
 engage in a new campaign. 
 
 In quiet times Prussia's prestige in Germany 
 may be minimized or forced into the background by 
 Austria's rivalry, but in case of threatened danger 
 will always come to the front. If Prussia should 
 show its disapproval of the pressure on Austria in 
 Italy by it (Prussia) placing its army on the Rhine, 
 then the smaller German states cannot decline to 
 participate in the general battle, which then will 
 assume threatening proportions as far as France is 
 concerned. 
 
 It is difficult to say in advance in which manner 
 this participation will be made. In the year 1830 the 
 South German States were very glad to beheve that 
 Prussia would be their first support. They diligently 
 sought that support. Later discussions, treaties 
 and conventions did not bring a definite agreement, 
 and the question as to the supreme command will 
 always be a difficult one. In accordance with the 
 treaties of 1848, the IX. and X. Confederation Corps 
 are to join the Prussian army, and, on the other 
 hand, the VII. and VIII. Confederation Corps are to 
 concentrate at Rastatt. To support these corps, 
 
—16- 
 
 Austria expects to immediately proceed with 150,000 
 men to the Rhine, or to at least behind the Black 
 Forest, to be followed by a reserve of 50,000 men as 
 shortly thereafter as possible. The actual carrying 
 out of that plan would correspond entirely to the 
 general interest; we shall see in how far it will 
 actually be carried out. 
 
 It is of course true that the VII. and VIII. Con- 
 federation Corps can be assembled at Ulm or Wtirz- 
 burg in about the same time as they can be at Rastatt 
 and Germersheim— that is, between the thirtieth and 
 forty-first day. In this matter the deciding factor 
 will be the difference that in the one case the separ- 
 ate contingents will advance against a concentrated 
 hostile army, while in the other case they will march 
 away from that army. 
 
 If we, as undoubtedly appears to be the case, 
 leave the initiative to France, a concentration at 
 Rastatt— Germersheim is impossible, and consequently 
 there remains but a choice between Ulm and Wtirz- 
 burg as points of concentration. 
 
 If the South German contingents intend to seek 
 Austria's help, then, no matter whether that help is 
 met at the Iller, on the Lech or even at the Inn, the 
 retreat and subsequent advance will make Suabia 
 and Bavaria the permanent theater of war. If, on 
 the other hand, the contingents can count on finding 
 Prussian support at Wiirzburg, then it is very doubt- 
 ful if a French army will try to penetrate deeper 
 into South Germany. 
 
 No matter how desirable it is to ascertain all 
 these conditions in advance, conventions treating 
 with that matter would, at the present time, hardly 
 come to a satisfactory agreement. But when forced 
 by necessity the South German governments will not 
 very long vacilate between the far off and uncertain 
 support which will result in making their country 
 
— 17- 
 
 the theater of war, ami the nearby siij)port which 
 will protect their domain. In the latter case the im- 
 portant anil clifUcult (juestion as to supreme command 
 will answer itself, 
 
 II. FIRST rOSITIONS OF THP: PRUSSIAN ARMIES 
 
 ICvi'iitiially ill roiiiM'ftioii with the (u'lniaii t'oiif* deration 
 
 Corps 
 
 The above views seem to make it advisable, after 
 leavin^^ the observation troops on the western fron- 
 tier, to divide the balance of the army into three 
 larger detachments, of which the first takes over, on 
 the lower Rhine, the defense of the Rhine Province 
 an<l its line of fortresses: the second forms on the 
 Main the offensive army proper, and the third being 
 held in readiness on the Saale to march towards the 
 one or the other directions according to how the hos- 
 tile attack develops. 
 
 It should be stated how strong each army de- 
 tachment is to be. what army corps are to compose 
 it. and when it can be concentrated 
 
 /. The army on the lower Rhine, in addition to 
 the Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps already there, 
 would consist of the Illd Army Corps and finally also 
 of the Xth German Confederation Corps. 
 
 The Hid Army Corps is selected for this army 
 detachment because it is the most suitable one in the 
 center of the monarchy and can be sent to the Rhine 
 even before the general mobilization to protect there 
 the concentration of the Vllth and Vlllth Corps. 
 
 If the Xth German Confederation Corps can be 
 counted on at all, its geographical situation makes it 
 advisable to designate it for the lower Rhine, where 
 it will protect the districts of its separate contingents. 
 
 There would arrive in the vicinity of Diisseldorf: 
 the Hid Army Corps on the 30th day, 
 the Xth Army Corps on the 44th day, 
 after orders for mobilization are issued. Conse- 
 
—18— 
 
 quently there would be at our disposal on the Rhine, 
 within four weeks, three Prussian army corps; or 
 about 100,000 men, not counting the strong fortress 
 garrisons, and in about six weeks more than 135,000 
 men which, based on the Rhine line, will have to 
 bring each and any hostile operation to a standstill. 
 
 Even in case we can not reckon on the partici- 
 pation of the Xth German Confederation Corps, it 
 does not appear advisable to send a larger force than 
 three Prussian army corps to the lower Rhine in the 
 start and before conditions have better developed. 
 The line of Prussian fortresses there is so strong that 
 it can for a long time be held even against superior 
 forces, and it has already been shown that the enemy 
 can hardly reach that line without having materially 
 weakened his force by detachments. 
 
 France can secure to itself permanent possession 
 of the left bank of the Rhine only by taking Cologne 
 and Coblenz, and this would mean sieges connected 
 with the utmost difficulties considering the activities 
 of the defensive army and the fact that the French 
 army would have the Wesel and Mayence on its 
 flank. 
 
 It would not be advisable to engage in battle on 
 the left bank with superior forces, still we can not 
 abandon that part of the Province without resistance. 
 
 Conditions in Belgium will have to decide 
 whether the Vllth Army Corps is to be advanced as 
 far as Aix-la-Chapelle and the Vlllth to Trier, or if 
 it will be possible to merely observe the frontier (for 
 the present covered by neutral terrain) and to meet at 
 the Mosel with our entire force the advance coming 
 from Metz. 
 
 2. The army on the Main is to be formed of 
 three Prussian and later on the IXth German Confed- 
 eration Corps. Of these will arrive: 
 the IVth Army Corps on the 36th day, by marching, 
 
-19- 
 
 the Vth Army Corps on the 32d day, by rail, 
 
 the Vlth Army Corps on the 42d day, it leaving the 
 
 12th Division behind, 
 the IXth Confederation Corps on the 33d day, 
 after orders for mobilization have been issued. 
 
 Consequently, by about the same time the con- 
 centration of the Rhine Army has been completed, 
 an additional 86,000, or respectively 120,000 men, 
 would be consolidated on the lower Rhine, and of these 
 the larger part would already be there when the con- 
 tingents of the Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps 
 leave for their points of concentration. It is clear, 
 that this available force will give greater protection 
 to the concentration of the two mentioned corps at 
 Wiirzburg or at Bamberg, than were that concen- 
 tration made at Ulm, where the Austrian corps 
 will arrive only one or two months later. If the 
 Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps join the main 
 Prussian army on the Main, there will be formed, by 
 the 42d day, an army of over 200,000 men, which 
 will protect the territory of the South German States. 
 
 3. The Reserve Army on the Saale consists of 
 the lid Army Corps and the Guard Corps, a total of 
 66,000 men, for which we recommend the vicinity of 
 Halle and Weissenfels as a point ot concentration be- 
 cause the most important railroads center there and 
 by the utilization of which roads the corps can reach 
 in a very short time either Dtisseldorf, Frankfort or 
 Bamberg, as also, in case of need, Breslau and Ham- 
 burg. 
 
 The Guard Corps can reach Halle— Weissenfels 
 on the 40th day, the lid Army Corps on the 46th day. 
 
 Only by that time some conditions, uncertain 
 until then, will be cleared up; first, the steps taken 
 by Russia, and the necessity of taking steps against 
 Denmark. By that time we can ascertain further 
 whether France makes its main attack against Belgium 
 
—20— 
 
 and consequently against Prussia; if we can count on 
 an active participation of the Belgian army, provided 
 we give that country open support; if the South Ger- 
 man States have actually received Austria's promised 
 help and if their contingents have joined the Austrian 
 army; and finally, if we can not count at all on the 
 support of Germany and Austria in the ensuing war. 
 In all these cases an immediate move of the Reserve 
 Army to the lower Rhine via Hanover and Cassel 
 would appear necessary. The army on the Main, in 
 that case but 86,000 men, would under such condi- 
 tions, by a defensive attitude, cover the left flank of 
 the Rhine Army, which would be reinforced to at 
 least 165,000 men, which latter army then would be 
 charged with the offensive to be made in Belgium 
 and, if ever possible, in France. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the Belgian army remains 
 in passive defense of its fortified camp at Antwerp 
 and thereby draws a part of the French army 
 to it, while the contingent of the Vllth and Vlllth 
 Confederation Corps, possibly after an unsuccess- 
 ful attempt to concentrate at Rastatt, are falling 
 back on Franconia, the Reserve Army, to give them a 
 rallying place, would have to be sent to either Wiirz- 
 burg, Bamberg, or even Bayreuth, and to join there- 
 after the Main Army. 
 
In the spring of 1860 General v. Moltke composed a mem- 
 orial which treated of the political and military situation of 
 Prussia, as well as of the advance of its army in case of a war 
 with either Russia or Austria or France. The following is 
 that part of the memorial treating of a war with France. 
 
 MEMORIAL NO. 3. 
 
 Berlin, Spring of 1860. 
 
 POSITIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN A 
 WAR WITH FRANCE 
 
 'The skillfulness of Emperor Louis Napoleon 
 accomplished the separation of the politics of the 
 European Cabinets. The dismembering of the trac- 
 tats of 1815, fundamentally declared for and actually 
 accomplished, did not conduce to again bring the cab- 
 inets into harmony. 
 
 With the help of other first class powers Russia 
 had been humbled, without that help, Austria. From 
 the first campaign France emerged without any ma- 
 terial result whatsoever, and with but little from the 
 second. But the moral success obtained is immense. 
 The emperor has strengthened his position in the 
 country, the army has gained the feeling of invinci- 
 bility. France not only has become the head of the 
 Roman world, it has also chained the entire German 
 territory to its policies, whether or no. Neither Rus- 
 sia nor Austria found help anywhere, and they on 
 their part will hardly give any help. The one, en- 
 gaged in reconstruction, will require years before it 
 again can bring its force to be felt outside its territory; 
 the other, deprived of some of its territory, shaken in 
 its finances, disarms and le.ts things around it take their 
 own coarse. There is no reasonable hope to expect the 
 
 21 
 
—22— 
 
 Idees Napoleonnes to stand still; a European coalition 
 which could oppose their advance is now less possible 
 than heretofore. Up to now France has battled for 
 others, now it will fight and conquer territory for itself. 
 Theories of peoples' elections, of nationahties and of 
 the natural frontiers are excuses for all purposes, 
 the army and navy are the means for carrying them 
 out. It is now England's and Prussia's turn, Cher- 
 bourg and Chalons threaten both of them. 
 
 There can be no doubt at all but what the French 
 are able to land on the other side of the Channel and 
 that there they can cause serious damage. But it is 
 impossible that the emperor can capture England or 
 incorporate a part of it permanently in France. An 
 actual increase in territory is only possible on the 
 Rhine. There Prussia stands, and probably Prussia 
 alone. The French navy is the forceful means to 
 keep England quiet, while the French army demands 
 back the once possessed and never forgotten Rhine, 
 That once accomplished, Europe will acquiesce in 
 the fact, as it did in the case of Belgium, Krakau, 
 Neuenburg and Savoy, 
 
 The help, on which we may count from outside, 
 should not be estimated too high as to its effect. 
 
 Even if Russia should decide on participation, 
 we must remember that the mobilization of its army 
 is very slow, that concentration takes time, that it 
 stands a hundred marches behind the front which 
 we will have to defend in the start. In any war, 
 especially a war with France, Russia dare not leave 
 the kingdom of Poland unprotected, and cannot dis- 
 regard Turkey. A Russian auxiliary corps of even 
 only 66,000 men could hardly reach, by rail, the Rhine 
 within four months. 
 
 From the entire territory of Great Britain and 
 Ireland, England at the present moment cannot as- 
 semble 60,000 men to defend the Channel; it cannot 
 
-23— 
 
 utilize its militia on the main land. Seriously threat- 
 ened in its own country, it cannot support us directly. 
 
 More important to us than these two powers in a 
 war are the two small powers on the Rhine, Belgium 
 and Holland, on account of their immediate partici- 
 pation, for with them it is a matter of absolute ex- 
 istence should France reach out toward the Rhine, 
 and, though thus far they have shown little inclina- 
 tion to support Prussia, they will undoubtedly per- 
 ceive at the decisive moment that they can expect 
 help only from Prussia. 
 
 The census shows that Belgium has 80,000, Holland 
 30,000 able-bodied men. If this force could be timely 
 assembled at Liittich and Maastricht and supported 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle by a few Prussian corps, we could 
 execute an excellent defense on the Maas. 
 
 But we cannot count on this. Both armies, 
 especially that of Holland, have been neglected in 
 the highest degree. In Brussels and in the Haag 
 nothing is thought of but the strictest defense. The 
 Belgian army is to be assembled at Antwerp in a 
 position yet to be made, and there, abandoning the 
 entire country and its capital, without possibility of 
 retreat, its back to the sea, wait for help from Eng- 
 land, which latter cannot hel"! itself. The Hollanders 
 hope to finally arrive there and to engage in a pas- 
 sive defense behind the Utrecht line until somebody 
 or other saves them. 
 
 Prussia is a member of the German Confedera- 
 tion. Attacked by France, it may expect help from 
 the Confederation, the help of half a million soldiers 
 in the field. 
 
 We will assume that the Confederation war is 
 declared in Frankfurt and that none of the German 
 states evades its duty. Prussia now will be required to 
 place half of its fighting force at the disposal of a still 
 unknown commander-in-chief at a moment when it, 
 
-24— 
 
 attacked on it own frontiers, needs all its means to 
 save its very existence. The immense Confederation 
 help can shrivel down to an Austrian — South German 
 army passively defending the Black Forest, 
 
 Of the North German States, we cannot count at 
 all on Saxony, but on the other hand Hesse and 
 Nassau cannot prevent their countries from being 
 garrisoned by Prussian troops. The states of the 
 Xth Confederation Corps are also compelled to join us; 
 the corps itself, in the start, ought to be held at our 
 disposal for protection of the coast. 
 
 It is not probable that Sardinia will emancipate 
 itself from France in the near future and demand 
 back Savoy. If it, continuing the inaugurated libera- 
 tion of Italy, should turn against Venice, it will un- 
 doubtedly hold the four Austrian corps, at the pres- 
 ent time still mobile and which are now stationed at 
 Verona, Treviso, Padua and Laibach. It is true that 
 in that case the mobilization and start of the corps 
 intended for Germany will not be very quick, but 
 just through this fact conditions in Germany will 
 take a shape more favorable to us, for the South 
 Germans will be compelled to seek on the Main and 
 on the Neckar the help which they will not find on 
 the Iller and on the Lech. 
 
 It is clear, on the other hand, that France will, 
 in its attack on Prussia, find no active ally except in 
 Sardinia and possibly Denmark. 
 
 The time has not yet arrived for Russia when 
 combined action of the Slavic East and the Roman 
 West against Central Europe can transform the 
 situation of the world. Such an advance would unite 
 all German elements and would require the complete 
 and free development of power of all our neighbors 
 to carry out that Titantic struggle. Russia is not in 
 such a situation at present. 
 
 If we could believe that Austria would ally itself 
 
— 2n— 
 
 with France aprainst Prussia, that step would imme- 
 diately unite all (Jermany under Prussia, for the 
 annihilation of Prussia and supremacy on the part of 
 Austria are not to the best interests of the minor 
 states. Austria itself would be but a weak ally to 
 France. Its power would be lamed in the highest 
 degree by Russia and Sardinia as well as by inte- 
 rior conditions in Hungary and also in the German 
 countries. 
 
 Emperor Napoleon and his official journals will 
 undoubtedly easily prove that a war against Prussia 
 is the latter's own doing and that that war does not 
 concern the Confederation. But in the case of actual 
 invasion of other than Prussian territory, this argu- 
 ment would hardly be sound. Although the prep- 
 arations for war in ♦^he Confederation may not 
 indicate very active steps, still they are very dis- 
 <iuieting to France, as those preparations will chain 
 a part of the attacking army in the Vogdes. If 
 France be now enabled to come into contact with 
 Prussia, without invading other Confederation terri- 
 tory, it will be because an entire passiveness of our 
 German allies is not entirely beyond the realm of 
 possibility. 
 
 France can come into contact with Prussia in two 
 ways. One of them would be a direct landing on the 
 P>altic Sea coast. It is said that the French navy can 
 transport GO. 000 men, possibly even a greater number, 
 if the question is one of a journey of but a few hours to 
 land a force on the other side of the Channel. Dif- 
 ferent are conditions of transport in foreign seas. 
 History since the Crusades shows but expeditions of 
 30,000 men and only then where an attack by land 
 was absolutely impossible. In the Crimean war, to 
 make this possible, it re<iuired the fleets of the two 
 great European sea powers to do this. 
 
 The distance from Cherbourg through the Katta- 
 
—26— 
 
 gatto on the Pommeranian coast is 250 miles (1000 
 English miles). A steam fleet towing transports can 
 cover that distance even under favorable conditions 
 in hardly less than eight days. 
 
 What is England's attitude as to such an under- 
 taking? The preparations on a grand scale in the 
 French ports cannot be kept secret; they threaten 
 England as well in such a degree that even the most 
 positive promise would not altogether allay uneasi- 
 ness. England would have to put its Channel fleet 
 into commission and reenforce it from distant stations. 
 
 Would England allow such a favorable oppor- 
 tunity to destroy the entire dangerous French fleet 
 at one fell swoop, which, having an army on board, 
 would be unable to fight? 
 
 Still, we will assume that this fleet passes the 
 Dunes unmolested, that its further objective is un- 
 known, that it would anchor in the Greifswald Bod- 
 den, that it would not encounter any forces preventing 
 a landing, and that 60,000 French disembark at 
 Rugen. Even the undisputed possession of this 
 island, as long as no naval establishment exists there, 
 would not justify the expense. 60,000 men, who 
 would have to invest Stralsund and Stettin, would 
 hardly attempt further operations toward Berlin. 
 The fleet would have to return and bring another 
 contingent after an interval of weeks, during which 
 time the corps first landed would be left helpless in 
 hostile country, without a possible chance of retreat. 
 
 If France at all decides on a naval attack, it is 
 far more probable that the Elbe will be the objective. 
 The distance is but half of that to Riigen, a landing- 
 could be made near Gliickstadt, and after taking 
 Hamburg and Liibeck the French, based on Den- 
 mark and in connection with the Danish army, could 
 try to advance towards Berlin on the right bank of 
 the Elbe. That these allies then, during the 14 days' 
 
—27- 
 
 niarchorevcn in Holstoin. will experience a complete 
 catastrophe before the arrival of the next contingent 
 is so apparent that such an undertakinp: could only 
 be very desirable to us. 
 
 But it is hardly possible that a main operation 
 will be based on the sea, as long as there is a land 
 basis. 
 
 France joins Prussia directly, and the second 
 method to attack us without entering anything but 
 Prussian territory would be an advance from Metz 
 across the Saar; that means, on a front ten miles 
 long from Luxemberg to Saarlouis, while the shortest 
 line of operation to Coblenz and Cologne leads twice 
 that distance across the Mosel and the mountains 
 along that stream. Any attack from Mayence would 
 flank such an advance and bring it to a halt. Even 
 if the Palatinate is drawn into the French base, it 
 will make no difference, for from Bingen to Trier we 
 can, in three marches, cut through all communica- 
 tions with France; the enemy's main operations con- 
 se<iuently will undoubtedly come from the lower 
 Rhine towards the Main: that is. towards Southern 
 Germany. 
 
 As a matter of fact France needs a larger base 
 to attack Prussia. It dare not violate Belgium's neu- 
 trality. It cannot capture the Rhine without tra- 
 versing Belgium, and it cannot hold the Rhine without 
 possessing Belgium. The Emperor has the choice in 
 an attack on Prussia to either have the German Con- 
 federation or Belgium and England against him. 
 Now, we must not place too high a value on the help 
 of either the one or the other, for France is strong 
 enough to carry out its ojierations against Germany, 
 Belgium and England by itself without allies if Prus- 
 sia does not prevent it therefrom with the forces at 
 its command. We may only hope that our neighbors 
 will occupy a part of the enemy north and south 
 
—28— 
 
 and hold him— we will have to bear the main attack. 
 For this we must keep together all of our fighting 
 forces. We must not detach either towards Belgium 
 or Holland, nor give any corps to the Confederation 
 army, the Confederation contingents should rather 
 join the Prussian army. Not treaties'with the Con- 
 federation but the necessity of the moment will effect 
 this. 
 
 As is known, in time of peace the largest part of 
 the French artillery and cavalry, whose transporta- 
 tion by rail is more difficult, is now in garrisons in 
 France. The excellent railroad net allows all fight- 
 ing forces of the country to be concentrated at Paris 
 on six to eight special main lines. 
 
 Chalons is in direct connection by rail with Basel, 
 Strassburg, Mannheim, Saarbrticken, Mezieres, 
 Lille and Calais. A primary concentration in a pre- 
 pared camp there threatens at the same time South- 
 ern Germany, Prussia, Belgium and even England. 
 
 A more distant concentration of troops behind 
 the Seille at Nancy leaves us in doubt whether the 
 attack will be made via Strassburg or Metz. On the 
 other hand, if Belgium be the objective, a concentra- 
 tion must be made at Maubeuge, Valenciennes and 
 Lille and we must regulate our primary concentration 
 in such manner that we are prepared for an attack 
 from Ltittich, Metz and Mannheim. 
 
 It has been recommended in case of a war with 
 France, to concentrate, under any and all conditions, 
 the Prussian army at Trier, to reinforce the country 
 there by fortifications and thus to protect the entire 
 country by means of an impregnable flank position 
 which no enemy could afford to pass. It is true that 
 the Saar, Mosel, Sauer and Kyll, which flow together 
 here in a very confined space, are of themselves no 
 very important streams, but, having deep mountain 
 passes, form important defiles of extraordinary power 
 
2fl- 
 
 of resistance even against very superior forces. 
 The bridvres at I'onz. \Vasserl)illi^ and Trier as well 
 as crossin^rs to Ik.' constructed, facilitate crossing if 
 they should he fortified and even without being so; 
 and as in Trier, considering the proximity of the 
 Rhine line, we are in direct comnuinication with 
 Wesel. Cologne, Cohlenz and Mayence, we can al- 
 ways have towards the south, west and north a line 
 of retreat vertically behind our front, which on and 
 of itself i)roniises an unusual freedom in maneuver- 
 ing. Thereto should be added, that finally the re- 
 treat in all directions leads through a terrain which 
 allows the avoidance of superior numbers, before 
 these can fully deploy. 
 
 The theory goes still farther: it does not want 
 the retreat to the Rhine: it wants to advance offens- 
 ively from a think position, but will also return here. 
 It also wants to make front towards the east and to 
 base on Trier. 
 
 An absolute recjuirement for such a ])rocedure is 
 the neutrality of Belgium. Could we now be certain 
 of that, the concentration at Trier would answer all 
 purposes. It. better than any other position, would 
 directly protect the Rhine province and would flank 
 any advance of the opponent towards the Main. In 
 connection with Luxemburg and Saarlouis it would 
 allow the shortest and most effective offensive against 
 Lorraine. But we know that the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium is questionable, almost improbable. If a French 
 army could cross the Mass at Liittich and Maastricht, 
 it would not allow itself to be prevented from operat- 
 ing against Cologne by the fact that the Prussian 
 army, double the distance away, is in a flank position 
 at Trier. As a matter of necessity, we would have 
 to leave that Hank position, advance through the 
 Eifel and in doing so l()se our base at Trier. For, 
 should we lu' thrown back into that direction, we 
 
-30- 
 
 would be completely cut off from the rest of the 
 monarchy and would enter into the most unnatural 
 and most disadvantageous conditions. This fact con- 
 fines into narrow limits the value of Trier in the 
 theory; in practice the concentration of our main 
 force there is absolutely impossible, because, consid- 
 ering the readiness for war of our neighbors, we 
 have no time therefor. 
 
 For the defense of the Rhine province the Rhine 
 will remain the base, even if an army detachment, to 
 defend the country on the left bank as long as pos- 
 sible, cannot be concentrated better than at Trier. 
 
 The Rhine forms an obstacle forty miles long 
 from Mayence to Cleve which on account of the 
 breadth of the stream is hard to overcome and this 
 barrier is advantageous to defensive as well as of- 
 fensive purposes on account of four important for- 
 tresses. Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne and Wesel are 
 on the average but three days' march from each 
 other. A hostile crossing between them is threatened 
 on both banks in flank and rear at one and the same 
 time. Each one of the Rhine bridges, held by us, 
 forms a flank position for the next one. 
 
 The front of the Rhine line can be enveloped only 
 on the left flank. Considering its extraordinary 
 strength it would be neither necessary nor ad- 
 visable to concentrate all of our fighting forces be- 
 hind it. Far rather will the larger half of them 
 remain at disposal to secure on the Main the only 
 vulnerable flank. 
 
 This shows that: 
 
 1. We will place two armies in position under 
 all circumstances, which will directly support each 
 other in the defensive or disengage themselves by 
 the offensive. 
 
 2. The first concentration of these armies can 
 be effected only with certainty under the protection 
 
—31 — 
 
 of the Rhine fortresses behind the Rhine and the 
 Main, where also rail transportation ceases and where 
 the operations, that is march in j,''. must commence. 
 
 A French attack we may class into four combi- 
 nations: 
 
 /. Kxclusively against Prussia, avoiding the 
 Beijrian ami South (Jerman territory; we have already 
 stated that this oi)eration is very improbable. 
 
 ^. France respects the Belgian neutrality and ad- 
 vances directly against the Mosel and through South- 
 ern (lermany towards the Main. 
 
 This attack is improl)able, considering politi- 
 cal reasons, because, as already stated, France can 
 not permanently keep the Rhine province, without 
 also possessing Belgium. The danger will not be lost 
 sight of in Brussels, and Belgium would always have 
 to be observed, even if only with a small force in the 
 start. We assume that for this puri)ose the army at 
 Lille would remain — 40,000 men. On the other 
 hand, the army of Paris would effect a junction with 
 that of Chalons and would form an army of -some 
 140.<X)0 men at Metz for an attack on the Mosel, and 
 furthermore, the armies of Nancy, Lyons. Tours and 
 Toulou.se with that of Strassburg, in similar 
 strength of 140,000 men, would be disposable for op- 
 erations against Germany and the Main. 
 
 This combination allows the concentration of our 
 entire fighting forces between Coblenz and Frank- 
 furt. In the defensive we could hold the Rhine or 
 the Main, according to whether we advance through 
 Mayence or Coblenz offensively with superior forces 
 against either the one or the other of the hostile 
 armies. 
 
 Trier would be the point of assembly for those of 
 our fighting forces which are first ready. The Mosel 
 and its branches assure the retreat of these corps on 
 Coblenz and Cologne, if they have to retreat before 
 
—32— 
 
 superior numbers. As soon as our fighting forces are 
 concentrated, the Rhine army, reinforced as much as 
 possible, would advance toward Trier, the Main army, 
 for the time being behind the Main, in case of need 
 behind the Lahn and the Sieg, would confine itself 
 to the defense or even fall back to the left bank of 
 the Rhine. The offensive of our Rhine army from 
 the Mosel will soon bring the operations of the 
 French on the right bank of the Rhine to a standstill. 
 
 Such a procedure is mostly to the best and ex- 
 clusive Prussian interests, it best protects our own 
 domain. On the right bank of the Rhine the enemy 
 would have to advance as far as across the Lahn 
 before he could reach this domain. 
 
 Should the South German contingents have 
 joined our Main army, then that army would become 
 of such strength that it would be far superior to the 
 Strassburg army and could, instead of falling back, 
 advance towards the Neckar. It would press back 
 the enemy on Strassburg and would get into connec- 
 tion with our Rhine army via Mannheim and Germers- 
 heim and would disengage that army should it be 
 thrown back on the Mosel. 
 
 3. France advances through Belgium against 
 Prussia without touching the rest of Germany. 
 
 This case is probable, if Southern Germany, 
 favoring Austria or even France, should declare its 
 neutrality under the pretext that Prussia has forced 
 the war. 55,000 men from Lyon and Toulouse, con- 
 centrated at Strassburg, would be sufficient for the 
 present for observation. There could be assembled: 
 From Paris, Tours, and Lille, at Lille 145,000 men; 
 from Nancy, Chalons and Algiers, at Metz 120,000 
 men. The French in that case would be compelled 
 to occupy Belgium, to hold the Belgian army in Ant- 
 werp, possibly also to observe the Hollanders behind 
 the Waal, and thus they would reach Aix-la-Chapelle 
 
vvith hardly more than 100,000 men. The Metzarmy 
 will have to invest Luxemburg and Saarlouis, to ob- 
 serve Mayence and Coblenz, and would have finally but 
 200,000 men or less to advance against the Rhine. 
 As in that case our flank is secured, the Main army 
 may be called up to defend the Rhine and we would 
 be enabled, before the armies of Metz and Lille could 
 unite, to take the offensive in greatly superior num- 
 bers against the one or the other from Coblenz or 
 from Cologne. 
 
 It appears to be of more advantage if we carry 
 on a defensive war on the Mosel if we, based on 
 Cologne and Wesel, attack the enemy advancing via 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, in order to disengage by a victory 
 the Belgians at Antwerp. In this case we would have 
 to occupy Trier with our fighting forces, first ready, 
 and to support it from Coblenz so as to keep our 
 hold on the Mosel. 
 
 -4. France attacks Belgium, Prussia and Ger- 
 many. 
 
 This case is the most probable one. In the war 
 against Prussia there is such danger for Belgium and 
 Germany that France cannot count on a permanent 
 neutrality of these countries. Both would gain time 
 to complete their armament and a change in politics 
 can become exceedingly dangerous. An English 
 auxiliary corps would lead the Belgian army to active 
 operations, and in Southern Germany the sentiment 
 of the people might easily make it impossible for the 
 Cabinets to entertain anti-German politics. 
 
 If it is necessary to guard Belgium and Germany 
 by separate armies, it appears to be advantageous for 
 France to increase these armies in the very start, 
 to advance offensively and thus to prevent as- 
 semblies of hostile fighting forces, to gain territory, 
 to support the war from foreign sources and to gain 
 a larger base. 
 
-34- 
 
 It will have to be the first endeavor of the French 
 to reach the Prussian army as the center of gravity 
 of the German forces and to defeat it. An advance 
 towards the Main would disrupt the concentration of 
 the South German contingents and would endanger 
 the strategic advance of the Prussian army, which 
 advance in that direction is not protected by a strong 
 line of fortresses. Consequently, there is for France 
 no more favorable operation than to appear as quickly 
 and as strong as possible on the lower Main. To 
 protect its left flank a weaker army would have to 
 advance towards the Mosel and advance against us 
 through Belgium, and a stronger army to advance 
 against the Maas, which latter the French should 
 endeavor to take immediate possession of; this ad- 
 vance would also draw off a part of the Prussian 
 army from the Main. 
 
 We imagine the division of the French fighting 
 forces to be about as follows: 
 
 40,000 men at Lille against the Belgian army 
 
 which is falling back on Antwerp; 
 80,000 men at Valenciennes and Maubeuge 
 
 against the lower Rhine; 
 40,000 men at Metz against the Mosel; 
 100,000 men at Nancy / as main army 
 
 90,000 m en at Strassburg ( against the Main 
 Total 350,000 men 
 
 These forces could be opposed by: 
 
 300,000 Prussians 
 100,000 Austrians 
 120,000 Confederation troops 
 50,000 Belgians 
 30,000 H ollanders 
 Total 600,000 men 
 
 If we assume that for the time being the Belgians 
 and Hollanders will be held back by from 40,000 to 
 50,000 French, this will leave 
 300,000 French against more than 500,000 Germans. 
 
-35- 
 
 If, however, for the present the Xth Confedera- 
 tion Corps has to remain where it is, opposed to 
 Denmark, if the Austrians do not come at all or come 
 too late, if the Belgians and Wiirtembergers have to 
 concentrate first at Ulm or Wiirzburg, if we cannot 
 count at all on Saxony, then only the Badenser, the 
 Hessians and Nassauers would join us with 25,000 
 men. 
 
 Even under these assumptions we will be numer- 
 ically equal on the Rhine and the Main to the French 
 fighting forces, and even superior, not counting that 
 the latter will be weakened by the investment of 
 Luxemburg, Saarlouis, Landau, Germersheim and 
 Rastatt. 
 
 Taken as a whole, we would have to be on the 
 defensive on the Rhine, and advance offensively from 
 the Main. 
 
 By the defensive we do not mean a passive wait- 
 ing. Four fortresses of the first class assure to the 
 Rhine not only an extraordinary power of resistance, 
 but also make a crossing of the stream possible. 
 The defender may change his base from one to the 
 other bank without danger. Should the attacker 
 have actually forced a crossing at some point, he sees 
 all his communications endangered at the same mo- 
 ment. To invest fortresses in such a case is impossible. 
 The Mosel and Erft, the Lahn and Sieg form sectors 
 on both their banks against which the enemy will 
 have to deploy, while we can either accept the attack 
 or avoid it. Should the armies of Valenciennes and 
 that of Metz have joined, then 100,000 Prussians 
 would suffice to prevent them, by an active defense, 
 from taking a foothold on the Rhine. It is of course 
 true that in such an event our Rhine province would 
 be the theater of war and that it would have to be 
 relieved therefrom from the Main. 
 
—36- 
 
 And there the entire rest of our fighting forces 
 must be concentrated. 
 
 An army on the Main, which is strong enough to 
 take the offensive, secures at one and the same time 
 Southern Germany and the eastern provinces of our 
 monarchy, but an eventual retreat must not be made 
 on those but on the Rhine Province. No matter if 
 the French advance from Strassburg to Wiirzburg, 
 Ntiremburg or even to Ulm, as long as v^e hold the 
 Rhine our advance from the Main will threaten their 
 communications; each battle will threaten their flank. 
 Before the enemy has gained a larger victory it is 
 impossible for him to penetrate into Franconia or 
 into Suabia. He is absolutely attracted by our flank 
 position on the Main and he must attack it. The 
 right flank of that position is impregnable on account 
 of the fortress of Mayence, and, to gain that position 
 farther up the Main, the opponent must endanger 
 all of his communications, especially when by addi- 
 tions to the works of Mainspitz a debouching from 
 that place is more facilitated. 
 
 We may accept with more confidence the de- 
 cisive battle on the Main, because we can, in that 
 case, reinforce the Main army in the shortest 
 time by one corps of the Rhine army and because 
 in case of absolute necessity that army can be re- 
 ceived by the Rhine army on the Lahn. A vic- 
 tory in our favor will throw the French back on 
 Strassburg, and if we pursue in that direction, we 
 would be enabled at the same time to transfer the 
 main offensive via Mayence to the left bank of the 
 Rhine. Conditions then existing will decide whether 
 the offensive then can be directed against the Eif el in 
 order to disengage our Rhine army or at once against 
 the Vogdes. 
 
 A concentration at the Main is imperatively re- 
 quired. It covers the left flank of our Rhine position. 
 
—37— 
 
 directly covers the North and indirectly the South of 
 (Jermany and alTonis them the possibility to con- 
 centrate their tiyrhlin^ forces and to have them join 
 the Prussian army. An offensive starting from the 
 Rhine would lead to Relprium, where we cannot 
 ac(iuire anylhin^^ for ourselves; one from the Main 
 would lead towards Lorraine and Alsace, the only 
 part of France where we will be enabled to get a 
 footholil by an investment of Metz and Strassburg. 
 
 Still, the offensive effect of the Main army is 
 dependent on the fact of it being strong enough. 
 We have seen that the French can send 190,000 men 
 towards the Main, who of course will have to invest 
 Rastatt, Landau and Germersheim. 
 
 \Vf cannot hoi)e that in a war with France we 
 can do with but a part of our army; we cannot form 
 a reserve army for eventual cases, but will have to 
 concentrate all of our forces at once and await a de- 
 cision on the Rhijie or on the Main. 
 
 Without help from the Confederation, three of 
 our army corps would suffice to carry on the defen- 
 sive on the Rhine and that would leave us six corps 
 for the Main. ♦ 
 
 We think the first position to be about as follows: 
 
 The \ Illth Army Corps at Trier, to protect as 
 far as possible the Rhine Province against immediate 
 and most pressing danger; the 15th Division will join 
 the 16th there by marching on the 21st day. 
 
 The Vllth Army Corps at Aix-la-Chapelle to ob- 
 serve there our frontier and to be a factor in Bel- 
 gium's policies. The corps will reach that place, by 
 marching jiiainly. on the 24th day. 
 
 The IV'th Army Corps at Cologne, which it can 
 reach by rail on the 28th day and where it will go 
 into cantonments at Enskirchen. 
 
 If the authorities in P>russels decide to concentrate 
 the Belgian army not in Antwerp but at Liittich, 
 
—38— 
 
 then by drawing- the IVth Army Corps to the Maas 
 an army of 120,000 men would be formed. 
 
 If France respects Belgium's neutrality, the 
 Vllth and IVth Army Corps should be concentrated, 
 in five days' marching-, at Trier, and there would be 
 100,000 men on the Mosel. 
 
 About the same time, with help of the railroads, 
 the Illd and the Vth Army Corps could reach a point 
 between Mayence and Frankfurt, could be re- 
 inforced by troops from Baden, Hesse, Nassau, and 
 consequently there could be 90,000 men on the Main. 
 
 This shows that we will require thirty-three days 
 for the first stages of the defense. The center of grav- 
 ity, however, will be formed only with the arrival of 
 the Vlth and the Guard Corps, which will reach Frank- 
 furt on the Main by rail on the forty-seventh day; it 
 may be possible that we could not assume a vig:orous 
 offensive until the arrival also of the 1st and lid 
 Army Corps, which will take about two months. 
 
 If we once have our fighting forces together, then 
 we may expect to be equal, with God's help and our 
 own means, to any French attack. Our only danger 
 lies in time conditions. We must not hide the fact 
 from ourselves that France can easily surprise us 
 strategically. We must not await the enemy's 
 initiative. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance to show our forces 
 on the Main as soon as possible in case of war in 
 order to dominate the sentiment of the South Ger- 
 man governments; even should our Vlllth Army 
 Corps arrive in time at the Mosel, it would not be 
 strong enough to permanently hold its position there 
 against the forces which may be expected to come 
 from Metz. 
 
 This clearly shows how important it is for us at 
 this moment to have a greater part of our army on 
 the Rhine than is furnished by the Vllth and Vlllth 
 
—39— 
 
 Ai'my Corps. To call up a niohilo army corps from 
 tlie ceritral provinces would result in expense and 
 evil and would appear as a provocation. 
 
 On the other hand, we miyfht g:ain our object by 
 the estai)lishnu'nt of a maneuver camp. As France 
 occupies a camp at Chalons with 60,000 men, it could 
 not raise a protest against such a procedure. 
 
In close connection with the line of thought in the pre- 
 ceding memorial, General v. Moltke composed a memorial in 
 November 1861, in which he treated of the importance of the 
 Prussian fortresses for the defense of the country in a war 
 with France. This memorial reads: 
 
 MEMORIAL No. 4 
 
 Berlin, November 1861. 
 
 CONCERNING THE STRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE 
 
 PRUSSIAN FORTRESSES IN REGARD TO THE 
 
 DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY IN A 
 
 WAR WITH FRANCE 
 
 Only the strategical value of a fortress in regard 
 to the defense of the country should decide whether 
 larger sums are to be expended for its upkeep or en- 
 largement. Only the conditions of the place in re- 
 gard to facility of building and fortification decide in 
 the second place what should be done for it with due 
 consideration of requirements of the times. 
 
 We can not construe in advance the course a war 
 takes and consequently it will be impossible to judge 
 the influence of fortresses on the war, still, certain 
 definite conditions may be considered as permanent 
 or guiding for a short duration. 
 
 The political situation of States changes, but it 
 requires larger periods of time to materially change 
 their relations to each other. No one will deny that 
 Russia or Austria, being engaged now and for de- 
 cades to come in internal renovation, are less danger- 
 ous neighbors than is France with its immense avail- 
 able force, and that considering this fact our fort- 
 resses on the Rhine are more important than the ones 
 on the Vistula or those in the Silesian Mountains. 
 
 The strength of the armies of the neighboring 
 states and the points where they can be advanta- 
 geously assembled, are well known and based on 
 
 40 
 
—41- 
 
 permanent considerations. The railroad net, follow- 
 ing up the main requirements of commerce, is clearly 
 defined for all times to come. It may be added to 
 but never materially changed. 
 
 The large rivers which traverse our land from 
 south to north form an unchangeable form of defense. 
 By all these permanent conditions, direction of trans- 
 portation and first concentration of the Prussian army 
 are governed. They can be ascertained in advance 
 and prepared in accordance and the value of fortresses 
 in event of war can be definitely ascertained. 
 
 However, what course our own operations will 
 take is more uncertain the more we study out their 
 probable course. Still we may ascertain in advance 
 probable events, because they are connected with 
 probable or permanently existing conditions. 
 
 We can not neglect to consider experiences of 
 former wars even if they give us no definite stand- 
 point for future action. Half centuries and whole 
 centuries have passed since then and have materially 
 changed the political and strategical situation. What 
 a diff'erent importance had Schweidnitz in the newly 
 conquered Silesia, andGraudenzas the single Vistula 
 fortress, in the time of the Great King, than it has for 
 us now, or who may assume that Stettin will again 
 have the importance it had in 1806? 
 
 In order to arrive at our probable aim, we must 
 study military events as they will presumably happen 
 in the future and to consider present conditions as 
 much as possible. In this case we have to reckon 
 partly with unknown and changed conditions and also 
 with known and permanent ones. We can not arrive 
 at a material and correct result, still we can arrive at 
 a 'probable result, and in a war that one will always 
 remain the only base on which we have to take our 
 measures. 
 
—42— 
 
 A war with our neighbors on the west is just one 
 which, considering our present conditions, is the most 
 probable. 
 
 France can hardly put more than 350,000 men in 
 the field for an attack against us; it might, in case of 
 need, put twice that number in the field to defend its 
 home country. The French army is in a very 
 efficient state to take the field; in time of peace, it is 
 stationed prepared against the east and may be con- 
 centrated in a very short time by utilizing the net of 
 railways. We can not reckon on taking France by 
 surprise. 
 
 These very conditions show that an offensive war 
 against France promises success only under special 
 unusual conditions. 
 
 Such a war may be avoided, supposing our entire 
 fighting force were concentrated on the Rhine and 
 would not be attacked, a situation which would have 
 been brought about even without the Peace of Villa- 
 franca in 1859; it may be executed, if, as at that time, 
 a larger part of the French fighting army were held 
 in some other theater of war. But in most other 
 cases we should have to be contented if we should 
 succeed in concentrating our main forces under the 
 protection of the Rhine line, in order to form there, 
 probably on our own territory, to do battle with the 
 invading enemy and drive him back. 
 
 According to our calculations, there could arrive: 
 100,000 French at Trier on the 21st day; 80,000 French 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 31st day; 100,000 French at 
 Mayence on the 35th day; consequently, the defen- 
 sive war against France comes into the foreground 
 which however does not preclude an offensive contin- 
 uation of the same. 
 
 In order to attack Prussia only, France can ad- 
 vance between Sierck and Saarbriicken without 
 violating non-Prussian territory. But such a base 
 
- 43 - 
 
 misses but seven miles (28 Enjrlish miles', while the 
 operations a^rainst Cologne, which must be made on 
 the same base, cover four times that distance, lead 
 across the Mosel and the Eiffel against the strong 
 Rhine barrier and can be flanked by the latter. As 
 an ailditional matter of fact, France can never per- 
 manently hold the Rhine province, if it captures it, 
 without at the same time holding Belgium. 
 
 C'onsecjuently there are but two lines of action 
 possible: one through Belgium towards Cologne, the 
 other through the Palatinate or Southern Germany 
 towards Mayence. To connect the two, or to cover 
 the tlank of one of them, a secondary operation via 
 Trier will have to be made. And this already shows 
 the necessity of a concentration of the Prussian field 
 forces at Cologne and Mayence and the desirability 
 of a position in observation at Trier. 
 
 A French advance on the lower Rhine threatens 
 the very existence of Belgium as well as Holland and 
 endangers England's interests. And still the Belgian 
 army confines itself to its camp in Antwerp, the Hol- 
 land army behind its Utrecht lines, and England, 
 which is hardly able to protect itself, cannot bring 
 help either by land or sea which will amount to any 
 thing. We ourselves, considering the times, cannot 
 afford to protect Belgium's frontiers and have there- 
 fore less need to engage in treaties, because it will 
 always be advantageous to us to have a French army 
 weaken itself in advancing through Belgium and he- 
 cause it will have to leave at least 40,000 men in 
 front of Antwerp. Such an operation will in the end 
 lead to our very strong Rhine front. 
 
 The advance through southern Germany would 
 bring France into conflict with the German Confed- 
 eration. As long as Austria must use all its forces 
 to maintain its position at the southern foothills of 
 the Alps and to dominate conditions in its interior, 
 
-44— 
 
 it cannot at all be counted on to appear for the pro- 
 tection of the upper Rhine, even not if it is threatened 
 at the Mincio only by the Italian army. Prussia also, 
 in the start, cannot meet a French invasion coming 
 from Strassburg, it can only drive off the invading- 
 enemy by an operation. Therefore the Vllth and 
 Vlllth Confederation Corps will be too weak to de- 
 fend Germany's frontier against very material su- 
 perior forces. 
 
 Which of the two operations France will choose 
 is hard to say in advance and may possibly not be as- 
 certained at the very moment of mobilization. The 
 first leads directly to the objective, the latter promis- 
 es the better assured success. An invasion of south- 
 ern Germany might easily be but the preparatory 
 campaign for the execution of an attack on Belgium 
 and Rhenish Prussia in order to first split up Ger- 
 many, to isolate Prussia, and then to defeat the lat- 
 ter. 
 
 A concentration of the Prussian armies requires 
 advance preparations, which have to be made even 
 before we know the enemy's intentions. Therefore 
 the first position must meet the requirements of dif- 
 ferent eventualities and must be made in such man- 
 ner that the enemy cannot interfere with it. 
 
 Cologne and Mayence are the terminals of large 
 railways, which traverse North and Central Europe 
 towards the west; on these railways transportation 
 can be had with surety undei* the protection of the 
 Rhine fortresses. P'rom the Rhine on, marching will 
 begin; there the operations commence. 
 
 If proper preparations are made, it will be pos- 
 sible to concentrate three army corps on the lower 
 Rhine, three on the Main, a total of 200,000 men, 
 within three weeks. In this we need not fear that 
 we will be disturbed in our primary concentrations 
 by a F'rench attack. Conditions are not the same at 
 
-46- 
 
 ihf Mosel. where 2.'). 000 men from Metz can arrive 
 within ten days at Trier, that is carh'crthan the Kith 
 I)ivisi(»n can hf inohih/.od thcri'. 
 
 i!y th.e time the raih-oads leadinjj: towards the 
 Khiru' will ay^ain he I'voo. the mohihzation of the 
 other three Prussian army corps will be comi)lete(l. 
 They of themselves will form a reserve, possibly on 
 the central Elbe or on the Saale. It is possible that 
 a part of them has to be held back there for the 
 present; for instance, to oppose a landing- of hostile 
 forces on the (lorman north coast -the advance 
 preparations of which cannot be concealed in the 
 French harbors in order to exercise a necessary 
 coercion in (It'rmany. or to meet interior conditions. 
 Hut as a matter of fact these corjjs shoidd not be 
 used to operate by themselves as a reserve army or 
 to take up rallying: [)ositions. but they should, as 
 soon as communications are again ojjened, advance 
 to the reinforcement of the first line of the armies. 
 After these three first wt^ekswe may be able to see in 
 which direction this reinforcement has to be made, 
 whether towards Cologne, towards Mayence. or, 
 supposing misfortune in Southern (lermany, towards 
 Wiirzburg or even towards Haml)erg. If, in a war 
 towards the west. France must be assumed to be 
 taking the initiative, its operations have to be a gov- 
 erning factor in the matter of using our reserves. 
 
 But even should tho French main operations be 
 directed through F.elgium. it would be a question if 
 the lower Rhine army ought to be reinforced. 
 
 We can count with a.ssurety on the fact that the 
 Xth Confederation Corps will join the Pi-ussian i)o- 
 sition on the lower Rhine, which position protects 
 the entire district of the north (ierman States which 
 furnish this corps. Then, after diMlurting the IIol- 
 stein-Lauenburg contingent, there will be l.SO.dOO men 
 concentrated there, which uill be sufficient for de- 
 
-46- 
 
 fense behind the strong Rhine line in any case and 
 which will make the siege of a fortress there im- 
 possible. 
 
 A further reinforcement of the Rhine army 
 would be justifiable only if we wanted to take the 
 offensive, with it. This offensive through Belgium 
 would in the first place relieve Antwerp and would 
 consequently be reinforced by some 60,000 men; but 
 a further continuation of the same would lead through 
 the French line of fortresses to the fortified Paris. 
 It can have no objective, cannot come to an earlier 
 stand until the French capital is taken and the 
 French Monarchy overthrown. Direct captures and 
 acquisitions of territory we cannot make or maintain 
 either in Belgium or between Belgium and Paris. 
 Consequently we could arrive but on an indirect road 
 to the object of war indemnification, by dictating 
 peace terms either on the Seine or on the Loire. 
 
 The offensive from the Main has a less important 
 but more easily attainable objective. It is directed 
 against the weaker fortified part of the French fron- 
 tier. If the provinces of Lorraine and Alsace, in prior 
 times belonging to Germany, should be recaptured, 
 it is quite reasonable to assume that we will keep 
 them. A requirement for this is that the French 
 army be defeated first in one or more battles, that 
 Metz and Strassburg are being invested, and that 
 these investments are protected by our main forces 
 in the field. If this is successful, then we would 
 have an advantage in peace negotiations which can- 
 not be attained in operations through Belgium. 
 
 A concentration of as many troops as possible on 
 the Main is necessary, however, not only for the of- 
 fensive but alsofor the defensive. 
 
 The defensive task of the Main army is the pro- 
 tection of the lower as well as of the upper Rhine by 
 offensive flank operations. Advancing through May- 
 
once, makinjr tlie Mosel a base for a continuous 
 movement towards the north, it will threaten all 
 communications of a French army which may have 
 advanced from Beljrium against the lower Rhine. 
 Such hostile movements may he met more effectively 
 in such a manner than hy a direct advance of the 
 same numbers from the Rhine line itself. 
 
 An offensive advance of the Main army, on the 
 left or on the riprht bank of the Rhine as circum- 
 stances may dictate, will most effectively stop any 
 operation of the French main army which may be di- 
 rected against the upper Rhine or which may have 
 already been commenced. 
 
 In all these cases we do not consider the Main 
 as a flank position but as the base for a flank oi)era- 
 tion. 
 
 If the South Germans intend to directly defend 
 the upper Rhine or the Black Forest, they would 
 completely scatter their fighting forces, which are 
 far from sufficient for all i)urposes. Neither an 
 Austrian nor a Prussian army could support them 
 there in the start. They have only the choice to re- 
 treat on lllm or to advance on Mayence in order to 
 draw close to the one or to the other army. 
 
 The retreat of the upper Rhine army in the first 
 direction would draw alonp: the enemy into the in- 
 terior of Germany, would make Suabia the theater 
 of war and would force Baden and Wiirtemberg: to 
 treat with the enemy, to save their very existence. 
 And just the fortified camps proposed by Austria 
 offer the best opportunities for such treaties with the 
 enemy. If opposed by a strong: French army the re- 
 treat would not come to a halt even at Ulm should 
 the Austrian forces not be there. 
 
 At the first glance, an advance of the upi)er Rhine 
 army in direction of Mayence appears to abandon 
 Southern German v. It is true that Karlsruhe and 
 
—48— 
 
 Stuttgart may be occupied or endangered by the 
 enemy, and even Munich may also be in the same 
 danger from flying columns. But it would be im- 
 possible for the enemy to remain there or even to ad- 
 vance farther from there if 300,000 men were to be in 
 his immediate flank by the advance of the Main Army 
 and its junction with the upper Rhine army. Such 
 a force in such a position would draw^ the enemy and 
 would liberate Southern Germany.. 
 
 It is the intention of the South German govern- 
 ments to concentrate their troops between Rastatt 
 and Germersheim. If this, considering the proba- 
 bility of a rapid French advance, will be possible, if 
 the concentration can be made possible only on the 
 Jagst or on the Main, is an open question. An abso- 
 lute requirement for joining Prussia will always be the 
 certainty of finding a Prussian army on the Main. 
 
 This clearly shows how important it is for us, in 
 a military as well as political respect, to appear on the 
 Main as rapid and as strong as possible. In most 
 cases three corps will be sufficient for our purposes 
 on the lower Rhine, but we cannot be too strong on 
 the Main. Only there can Prussia protect Southern 
 Germany, only there can it assure to the smaller 
 States the possibility to stick to Germany, and only 
 there can Prussia stand at the head of all German 
 fighting forces. 
 
 Not counting the German general interests, and 
 only considering mere Prussian conditions, it will be 
 clear that the French can not advance even with the 
 strongest army from Southern Germany on Berlin as 
 long as Prussia stands on the Main with large forces. 
 The worst step we could take would be a marching off 
 in an easterly direction to oppose such an advance. 
 There is no doubt but what our fighting force on the 
 Rhine will draw the hostile fighting force as a magnet 
 will iron. Back of the Main, between Mayence and 
 
41» - 
 
 Frankfurt, we find an excellent position to await the 
 attack of even superior forces in which we can rein- 
 force our force by parts of the lower Rhine army, 
 rhe rijrht tiank of that position is protected by the 
 fortress of Mayence and by the Khine. and a French 
 army can enveloj) the left flank only by endangering? 
 its own communications. This would be even more 
 dithcult of execution if Mayence should, more than is 
 the case now, facilitate an offensive advance between 
 the upper Rhine and Mayence. 
 
 The very great importance of Mayence is clearly 
 shown by what has been said above. 
 
 In a war against the West, Mayence is a shield 
 and a sword at the same time for Prussia. It pro- 
 tects the primary concentration of our army on the 
 Main, secures the left Hank of our entire Rhine po- 
 sition, compels the enemy who has invaded Southern 
 Germany to an attack on an almost impregnable 
 position or forces him to an enveloping movement 
 which uncovers all of his communications and. finally, 
 forms the supporting point for our offensive in the 
 only direction promising success. We might say that 
 Mayence. without being Prussian property, is now 
 the most imjKirtant fortress for Prussia. Its loss 
 would shatter our entire hold on the Rhine and give 
 the unprotected southern part of Germany to the 
 enemy. 
 
 If we now assume that the Prussian army, in its 
 strong position at Mayence and behind the Main, 
 could be overcome, then such an assumption neces- 
 sarily presupposes that we are opposed b> the French 
 main force and that at the same time the lower Rhine 
 cannot be attacked in superior numbers. 
 
 The retreat of the Main army across the Taunus 
 can not be endangered, as only the left flank of the 
 .Main position can be enveloped. Consecjuently we 
 would unite on the Lahn or on the Sieg with the 
 
—so- 
 lower Rhine army for renewed opposition, and fin- 
 ally, after subsequent defeats, retreat from superior 
 numbers through Coblenz or Cologne. On the left 
 bank of the Rhine we also find a country entirely suf- 
 ficient to support the army, and after the army has 
 been reorganized for renewed operations under the 
 protection of the river, it would utilize for the of- 
 fensive the crossings which are protected by fort- 
 resses. 
 
 If the Prussian fighting force on the Rhine is not 
 completely annihilated, which presupposes grave 
 errors in leadership, the French army can not operate 
 against Berlin. If an advance by us through Cob- 
 lenz or Mayence were made, the French army would 
 find its communications with France endangered on 
 the right bank of the Rhine, while we would have the 
 western half of the Monarchy behind us. According to 
 my views, Berlin and the Provinces are protected in 
 the surest and most effective manner by a continuous 
 stand on the Rhine. The retreat from the Main to 
 the eastern Provinces would easily take the form of 
 a dangerous parallel march with the enemy and would 
 hardly come to a stand at the Thuringian Forest at 
 Erfurt, but far rather only behind the Elbe. 
 
 There now remains to be considered the case of 
 the French main attack being made through Belgium 
 towards the lower Rhine and probably supported by 
 a secondary operation from Metz. 
 
 Undoubtedly the French will find but little resis- 
 tance in Belgium, but they will have to occupy Brus- 
 sels and will have to invest Antwerp with its new, 
 immense fortifications. The highroads and the rail- 
 roads indicate that a further advance will be made in 
 direction of Liittich and Aix-la-Chapelle. 
 
 Maastricht then would become of great impor- 
 tance. But this place, which requires a very large 
 garrison, the Hollanders have intentionally allowed 
 
-51- 
 
 to fall into decay and have evacuated. A defensive 
 position on our part iK'twecn Diiren and Jiilich is 
 not without military value. On the left are the 
 mountains accompanyinvv the Roer as far as (Jemiind, 
 a distance of some 3 to 4 miles; these mountains 
 have no road suitable for an army which has to be 
 accompanied by wagons, and on the right Jiilich 
 forms a very strong flank protection, even in the 
 state it is now after having been razed. 
 
 If we will conduct a decisive battle on the Roer to 
 protect our Province on the left bank of the Rhine 
 depends entirely on the (luestion whether or not we 
 have had time to throw a fighting force there which 
 is equal to that of the enemy, and on this we can not 
 reckon with any certainty. 
 
 The hostile operation from Metz would have for 
 us the disadvantage of being made at a time when 
 the mobilization of the Ifith Division has not been 
 completed. Still, if that operation is to have a far 
 reaching result, it can be made only with the employ- 
 ment of enormous forces. 
 
 The necessary investment, or at least the obser- 
 vation, of Luxemburg and Saarlouis, will weaken 
 the attack by about 20,000 or 15.000 men, and an ab- 
 solute superiority of forces is required to overcome 
 the resistance of a Prussian detachment at Trier. A 
 division in position there can make front towards the 
 south as well as towards the west behind strong sec- 
 tors and can allow the enveloping movement to take 
 its course, before giving up its position, as it has the 
 freedom of choice to fall back on Cologne, Coblenzor 
 Mayence on one or the other bank of the Mosel. and 
 because it will find, in any direction taken, a support 
 in the terrain for renewed resistance. 
 
 In a further advance the army from Metz will 
 get with its rear to Luxemburg and the Ardennes 
 and, as long as the main French force has not de- 
 
-52- 
 
 bouched to beyond the Maas, it will get into the most 
 difficult situation, if we on our part take the offen- 
 sive in force from Mayence or Coblenz. 
 
 Of course we know that Luxemburg and Saar- 
 louis cannot prevent the invasion of the enemy, but 
 can merely hold a force of the enemy equal to about 
 their own garrisons. This small effect is not on 
 account of the construction, but on account of the 
 situation of the two places. The fortresses will gain 
 their full importance only in connection with the 
 army of operations. All places on the extreme fron- 
 tier (or as in this case Luxemburg beyond the fron- 
 tier) have the disadvantage that in the face of an 
 enemy ready for war the army of operation can not 
 be concentrated in their vicinity, and that conse- 
 quently they will attain their actual importance only 
 in the later phases, if the offensive is taken by us, if 
 that offensive can be made in their direction, and if, 
 until that happens they have not been taken (being 
 left to their own resources). We may of course ex- 
 pect from Luxemburg that it can hold out for several 
 weeks after being invested; this, however, is doubt- 
 ful of Saarlouis, considering its small extent and the 
 well known peculiarity of the place. To this comes, 
 that our offensive, in case of an attack on the lower 
 Rhine, will be made probably against the right flank 
 of the French main army in its advance across the 
 Maas, that is towards the northwest, and that time 
 and forces on our part may easily be insufficient to 
 make detachments at the same time towards the 
 southwest to relieve Saarlouis. 
 
 Trier, of itself much more important than Saar- 
 louis, is not so close to the frontier, can consequently 
 be easier reached and supported, and would have a 
 far greater value as a fortress. 
 
 In our entire military-political relation to France 
 it would undoubtedly be desirable to have a larger 
 
—53— 
 
 force than two of our army corps permanently sta- 
 tioned in time of peace in the western half of the 
 Monarchy. A permanent maneuver camp, but far 
 better a fortress of the first class, at Trier would ful- 
 fill all requirements. A peace garrison there of from 
 10,000 to 12,000 men, which would be joined at mob- 
 ilization by the 16th Division, would be sufficient to 
 protect this part of our frontier, the only part which 
 directly joins France. 
 
 We have already mentioned the operation so im- 
 portant for the defense of our Rhine front, which the 
 Main army will make through Mayence toward the 
 Mosel. If Trier does not furnish sufficient support to 
 the detachment concentrating there, then that de- 
 tachment will already have started its retreat towards 
 the Rhine, and the Main Army will undoubtedly find 
 the difficult defiles of the Mosel already occupied by 
 the enemy. In that case it could advance only via 
 Coblenz. If, on the other hand, Trier were fortified, 
 then a body of troops could maintain itself there even 
 against greatly superior numbers, a second crossing 
 over the Mosel would be assured to the Main Army, 
 and its further advance would have, on the base Cob- 
 lenz— Trier, a far greater freedom of movement and 
 far greater security for the retreat. 
 
 We undoubtedly could abandon Saarlouis as soon 
 as Trier becomes a fortress. If that could be done 
 without Trier being a fortress, is a question, in the 
 answer of which we must consider also the not alto- 
 gether military factor, of what impression this would 
 have on the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine, 
 Jiilich already having been razed. 
 
 The invasion of the Rhine Province on the left 
 bank does not at all give the assurance of possessing 
 the land, as long as the Prussian army has not been 
 beaten and as long as one of the three great Rhine 
 fortresses has not been taken. 
 
—54— 
 
 The French main army cannot operate directly 
 against Coblenz through the Ardennes and the Eifel 
 Mountains, for such an advance would expose its flank, 
 after leaving the central Maas, to the force assembled 
 at Coblenz. To invest Coblenz on the banks of three 
 streams requires very large means. It is one of the 
 peculiarites of this place that the fall of one of the 
 independent forts would close to us the Rhine cross- 
 ing there, but that the opponent himself can use that 
 crossing only after he has taken all the forts, 
 including Ehrenbreitstein. 
 
 Even then the further operations will lead not 
 only through the difficult terrain of the Wester For- 
 est, but also into the direct sphere of action of our 
 large concentration of troops on the Main. 
 
 Of far greater importance than Coblenz to a 
 French attack is Cologne, considering its relation to 
 the Rhine Province and its highways and railroads. 
 Five marches would bring the French army from 
 Liittich to the gates of the Rhenish capital. In 
 such a direct advance all of its communications would 
 remain protected. 
 
 Arrived at Cologne, it will have to be decided 
 whether to attack that place on the left bank, or to 
 invest it on the right bank, or whether to cross the 
 stream in the face of the lower Rhine Army, to beat 
 that army, and to start the investment after that and 
 protect it by the main force of the army. 
 
 The possession of Wesel would, for a French 
 army, be of far less importance than that of Cologne 
 and Coblenz. In order to secure communications in 
 some measure, the French army could march on the 
 left bank of the Maas down to Roermond and Venlo, 
 and in doing so, of course, would keep as far as pos- 
 sible from the Main army. Bat in order to reach 
 Wesel. the Rhine would have to be crossed atXanten, 
 and an advance by the lower Rhine Army would 
 
—55- 
 
 bring about a situation, the disadvantages of which a 
 French army could avoid only by a decisive victory. 
 The entire operation is possibly only by a complete 
 change of the base of operations, by landings on a 
 large scale on the coast of the North Sea, by co-oper- 
 ation of Denmark and combinations of a doubtful 
 nature. 
 
 What we have stated above ought to be sufficient 
 to show the great importance of Cologne for defend- 
 ing the Rhine. The foremost requirement to be made 
 of this place is that it should not go to pieces at the 
 first forcible attack; that means, it should be impreg- 
 nable, for a formal siege requires that it be invested 
 on two sides and protected to the right and left on 
 both banks of the river against the two neighboring- 
 fortresses — reqirements which are hard to attain as 
 long as the lower Rhine Army is on the Rhine. 
 
 The operation, probably easiest of execution, 
 might be that the French invest Cologne by a strong 
 corps on the left lank, gain at Dusseldorf or at 
 Ruhrort a Rhine crossing by surprise, or by force, 
 and then attack the lower Rhine Army. 
 
 If, however, the latter army accepts the battle 
 not with its rear to the Eastern provinces, not with 
 its front to the west, but to the north, its left wing 
 touching the Rhine valley, its right flank the moun- 
 tains, then even the loss of the battle cannot prevent 
 its retreating behind the sectors of the Sieg or the 
 Lahn, its joining the Main Army and with it advanc- 
 ing to a renewed offensive, in which case Cologne and 
 Coblenz would furnish material support whether the 
 one or the other bank of the Rhine is used. 
 
 The extraordinary strength of our theater of war 
 on the Rhine cannot be misjudged. It could be en- 
 dangered only, if we should take the off ensive on the 
 left bank prematurely and with insufficient forces. 
 
Ill .)iiiu\ IStlo, litMUM-al V. Moltko workoii out a moiiu)rial, 
 basiiiii' Ills views on a war iiuuiiiurated by Napoloon Jll to 
 (.'aptiirt^ tlu> loft bank of the l^luno. Aftor an exhaustive con- 
 teMi[>hition i>f the probable attitude of all interested l'"uroiu>an 
 Powers, tiie (u'ueral jiives eomparisons of the Freneh ami 
 Prussian forees as well as of their eoneentrations, and tinally 
 dist'usses ueeessary nieasuri's in I'ase the Freneh should be in 
 superior nuinbers in the start. 
 
 MEMORIAL NO. 5 
 
 Berlin, Jioic, IS(hK 
 If ill the near fiituiv the political situation oi' 
 Eiiropo invites Emperor Napoleon TIT to a new oper- 
 ation towainis the exterior, or if interior conditions in 
 France compel him to do so, the left bank of the 
 Rhine will, before all. form that terrain which can 
 be immediately reached, taken possession of, and 
 maintained. The Iniuiin.u" oi' an actual tiiihtine- force 
 on the Baltic coast deserves no serious consideration. 
 It required the tleets of the two lai\uest maritime 
 powers to transport oidy IM.OOO men, almost without 
 cavalry and entirely without means of transporta- 
 tion, from one side of the Black Sea to the other. 
 Preparations tor and actual embarkation required 14 
 days: debarkation, not at all interfered with by the 
 enemy. 10 days. A similar expedition, tive times the 
 distance and not made against an isolated extremity 
 but aiiainst the heart of Russia, or asrainst Prussia 
 with its network of railways, promises certain defeat. 
 The sympathetic war against Russia, for the 
 restoration of Poland, is merely the war ag'ainst 
 Prussia for the capture of the Rhine, which with all 
 its ditficulties at least promises a certain object and 
 practical results. This long- desired annexation, 
 which in the course of events also makes the capture 
 
 56 
 
-57- 
 
 of Bel^^ium necessary, touches the vital conditions or 
 existence of all states in such a de^ee that it be- 
 comes of the utmost importance to France to cease 
 the war a^^ainst the immediate participants, before 
 the rest of the world can take a hand. 
 
 The fact of the two powers adjoining each other 
 directly appears to make this possible, at a time when 
 in the largest countries of both hemispheres threat- 
 ens a war of principles or of nationalities, or where 
 the war is already in progress. 
 
 It is true that at the present moment Russia 
 stands on its western frontier ready for war and with 
 large fighting forces; but, harrassed by an interior 
 crisis and in war against Poland, it will hardly feel 
 inclined, nor be able to send an army against French 
 encroachments on the Rhine. Under ordinary con- 
 ditions, when its army is scattered in the large 
 expansion of the country from the Vistula to the 
 Volga, a Russian army, on account of the slowness of 
 mobilization, concentration and transportation, can- 
 not timely arrive from such a distance before the end 
 of the first campaign. 
 
 Aus/ria's military forces also are chained down 
 to many points. The Magyar and Slavonic races are 
 not yet satisfied with the union; Austria has to con- 
 tinuously watch Rus.sia in the Orient concerning the 
 steadily progressing decay of the Osman Empire; it 
 has to guard in Italy its endangered possessions, to 
 regain what it has lost. 
 
 In the new Italy France may see an ally who 
 will draw Austria's power in a very large degree to 
 itself and away from the Rhine. But this new friend 
 can easily do too much, can do what Catholic France 
 dare not countenance. Therefore he will have to be 
 watched. 
 
 The Tuilieries may count on JJenmark, and pos- 
 sibly also on Svjeden, to make a diversion, which, 
 
-58- 
 
 eventually supported by a French over sea expedition 
 on a small scale, may contain a part of the fighting 
 forces in Northern Germany. But to do this, Eyig- 
 land's acquiscence is necessary. If the latter should 
 declare against French aggression, its veto in the 
 Rhine question will not have an indirect but an im- 
 mediate effect, not by augmenting the German 
 fighting means on the Rhine, but by holding back 
 those of the French. At the present time England 
 is France's ally; still nothing would try this alliance 
 harder than an invasion of Belgium, a threatening 
 of the coast of the North Sea, or a threatening of 
 Antwerp. The Empire will have to have a regard in 
 respect to England in so many and so very important 
 matters, that it may be presupposed with great cer- 
 tainty that it will, in an attack on the Rhine, respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium, for the sake of England. 
 
 In this case France is still opposed by the entire 
 German Confederation, the defensive resistance power 
 of which will occupy the entire offensive power of 
 France, and the main point will be to confine the 
 battle into limited spaces. At the present time, in 
 addition to Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse, Oldenburg and the 
 Netherlands occupy territory on the left bank of the 
 Rhine. Prussia can in no way be eliminated, it stands 
 with all its power for the support of the Rhine Prov- 
 ince. Should the remainder of the Confederation 
 States be recompensed otherwheres, the material for 
 that recompense could be found only in the Prussian 
 territory on the right bank of the Rhine. From it the 
 Rhine will have to be captured, it will have to defray 
 the costs of recompense, the war is directed before all 
 against Prussia, and in that Prussia must be isolated, 
 if ever possible. 
 
 It is of course true that a French army can in- 
 vade the Prussian Rhine Province without entering 
 territory not belonging to Prussia. Still, the frontier 
 
—59— 
 
 from Sierk toSaargemiind is but 32(English)miles long. 
 An operation based on Metz leads forl20(English)miles 
 parallel to the Rhine front across the Mosel and the 
 mountains along it to Cologne. Saarlouis would at the 
 same time have to be attacked, Luxemburg and 
 Mayence observed, Coblenz invested and detachments 
 would have to be made against Wesel in order to in- 
 vest Cologne. Without capturing this c-enter of 
 gravity of the province, the possession of the latter 
 would never be secure. It will hardly be possible to 
 involve the Prussian fighting forces in a decisive 
 battle against their will and before completion of this 
 concentration on the left bank of the Rhine, because 
 they, being in firm possession of all crossings from 
 Wesel to Mayence, can draw back in any desired di- 
 rection. On the Rhine, of course, a longer halt 
 would ensue, which appears dangerous, politically 
 considered. But if the entire Prussian fighting force 
 is once concentrated there, then an ofi^ensive advance 
 via Coblenz or Mayence on the right bank of the 
 Mosel will cut off all communications of the French 
 army with France and force that army to reconstruct 
 them, with a changed front, through the defiles of 
 that stream. 
 
 But France needs a broader base in its attack on 
 Prussia and must extend that base, if Belgium re- 
 mains out of the question in consideration of politics, 
 to Southern Germany for military reasons. 
 
 The defense of the entire western frontier of 
 Germany requires three armies to be placed'into po- 
 sition on the lower, central and upper Rhine. The 
 strength of the Confederation fighting force not only 
 allows this division, but requires it as well as the ex- 
 pansion of the stretch to be protected. With due re- 
 gard to the issue of orders, subsistence and to mobility, 
 we cannot, without disadvantage, rnake the separate 
 armies stronger than from 150,000 to 200,000 men, 
 
—60- 
 
 and the stream from Schliegen to Cleve is 320 (Eng- 
 lish) miles long. 
 
 Of these three armies the central one would have 
 to be the strongest. It forms Germany's offensive 
 force, which flanks the French advance across the 
 lower as well as the upper Rhine and which transfers 
 the war into hostile territory. 
 
 But the dispositions of the enormous fighting 
 means of the Confederation is dependent on collective 
 Confederate Acts, for which not only national strat- 
 egic thoughts, but also manifold local requirements 
 and special interests would be the basis. It is easily 
 understood and based on actual conditions that the 
 States of the Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps 
 re(iuire a special and strong army for the direct 
 protection of their own domain and if for this they 
 demand that parts of their contingents support 
 them, they are justified, in so far as that can bedone — 
 but these States would labor under a delusion if, for 
 instance, they should demand that the IXth and the 
 Xth Confederation Corps should join the army of the 
 upper Rhine. The Prussian position covers all the 
 States of these corps and the nearest interest of 
 these States is to do their share in the maintaining 
 of that position, the Xth Corps to be on the lower 
 Rhine, the Xlth Corps on the central Rhine. 
 
 Even the Saxon Division, should the French 
 troops suddenly spread through the open door of 
 Strassburg over Southern Germany, could not timely 
 arrive for the defense of the Black Forest. It would 
 work on the same lines as the Prussian or the Aus- 
 trian corps. 
 
 The Hessian troops undoubtedly will not leave 
 their endangered land in order to go to Rastatt or to 
 Ulm, and the transportation of the contingents of the 
 Xth Corps from north to south would cross the gen- 
 eral movement of the masses from east to west, 
 
-61— 
 
 which would ruin any projected concentration of the 
 armies on the Rhine. 
 
 A direct help in Southwestern Germany can be 
 furnished only by Austria. The relation of Austria 
 to Germany is far too important to the former to let 
 us believe that it would not reinforce the upper 
 Rhine Army with all available forces and as quick as 
 possible. It is of course true that Austria's posi- 
 tion as a European power is very complicated. Ex- 
 perience has shown that it cannot at all times have 
 an army disposable in Germany. Even in less unfav- 
 orable political situations than in 1859, and not 
 counting- what it has to protect in the East and in 
 its interior, it must guard its own and German inter- 
 ests in Italy, Tyrol and Switzerland. The occupation 
 of the latter by France touches Austria as directly as 
 would an invasion of Suebia. 
 
 The extension of the territory alone makes it 
 difficult for Austrian help to become effective on the 
 Rhine and in the Black Forest, and this help may be 
 possible only on the Iller or on the Danube even with 
 the best and most patriotic intentions. 
 
 The fact is there is an absence of a great power 
 in Southern Germany directly joining the Rhine, 
 which, as is the case in Northern Prussia, would be 
 compelled to an immediate holding of the most ad- 
 vanced frontier for its vital interests. 
 
 At the first moment of a French attack the con- 
 tingents of Southwestern Germany will hardly be 
 sufficient to protect Baden and Wiirttemberg and 
 may possibly not be able to offer any resistance 
 except at Ulm. 
 
 In these conditions the empire might see the 
 possibihty of separation, which would localize the 
 battle with Prussia. However, this very unnatural 
 union, so much in opposition to actual interests, or 
 even only neutrality find little encouragement in 
 
—62- 
 
 the sentiment of the princes or the people of 
 Southern Germany. They would have to be forced 
 into a renewal of the Rhine Confederation by armed 
 demonstration and France would in any case have to 
 send a special army to Southern Germany. 
 
 If we may presuppose Belgium's neutrality, then 
 the French fighting forces will have to concentrate 
 between Metz and Strassburg for an attack on the 
 Rhine territory, and the main operations would have 
 to be made on the Main, against the center of gravity 
 of the defense, against the Prussian army concen- 
 trated there. This direction goes around the strong 
 line of fortresses on the lower Rhine in the very 
 start, touches the domains of the smaller States, 
 separates Prussia from Southern Germany and 
 threatens the former's communications between the 
 western and eastern halves of the Monarchy. It 
 leads to the quick decision, on the shortest road, 
 which France needs. 
 
 But in order to reach the Main, the Rhine will 
 first have to be crossed. A direct advance through 
 the Bavarian Palatinate and Hesse - Darmstadt 
 against Frankfurt is threatened in the very start in 
 the left flank from the Mosel and must be protected 
 on that side by a special army detachment. 
 
 After Landau and Germersheim are invested, 
 the principal crossing is at Mannheim as indicated 
 by its road connections, which is beyond the inter- 
 ference of the important point — Mayence. 
 
 From there the right flank of the operation 
 also will have to be secured against all that may be 
 disposable from the Vlllth and the Vllth Confedera- 
 tion Corps. 
 
 Furthermore, it is possible that already at Mann- 
 heim the resistance of the Prussian Main army may 
 be encountered, which might increase the difficulties 
 of crossing there or further down stream. 
 
—63— 
 
 It is necessary therefore to have a special army, 
 starting from Strassburg, to throw back from the 
 Rhine the contingents of Southwestern Germany and 
 by advancing down stream on the right bank open 
 the crossings for the main army. 
 
 Consequently it is no arbitrary assumption, but 
 one based on necessity, to say that France will have 
 to put three separate armies into the field. The 
 strength of each one of them is governed by the 
 objects already discussed. 
 
 The left auxiliary army, starting from Metz and 
 Diedenhofen, can in the start have the Prussian 
 Vlllth Army Corps in its front, and if it advances 
 quickly the latter corps may not be fully concen- 
 trated. A strength of 45,000 men assures it the 
 necessary superiority, at least in the start. 
 
 The army from Strassburg also will not find the 
 contingents from Baden, Hesse, Wiirtemberg and 
 Bavaria concentrated, as its offensive, should the 
 army be of ordinary strength, may extend as far as 
 Ulm. Still, Rastatt will have to be invested and an 
 advance made towards the Neckar in such strength 
 that below the point where the, latter flows into the 
 Rhine the defender will have to evacuate the bank of 
 the Rhine. 
 
 Finally, the army from Strassburg would proba- 
 bly find Bavarian or possibly Austrian forces at Ulm 
 and should not be weaker than those, even on the 
 defensive. 
 
 All these military, and, later on, political tasks, 
 could hardly be solved with less than 90,000 men. 
 
 The French main army then would be composed 
 of the remainder of the French offensive forces. 
 
 At the present time France is engaged outside 
 of its own territory with— 
 
 40,000 men in Mexico 
 1,900 men in Cochin China 
 16,200 men in Rome 
 
 A total of 58,100 men. 
 
-64— 
 
 To these detachments Alg-eria has contributed 
 17,4(5(5 men and there remain in Algeria only 37,542 
 men, the number of which cannot be decreased on ac- 
 count of conditions existing there. Regiments may 
 be taken from there, it is true, but they will have to 
 be replaced by others. 
 
 Accordingly, 100, 000 men should be deducted 
 from France's entire active force. 
 
 Not counting 111,600 men for depots nor new re- 
 cruits, France can now put into the field: 
 
 23 infantry divisions - - - 230,000 men 
 15 cavalry divisions - - - - 32,000 men 
 Artillery reserve ----- 24,000 men 
 
 a total of - 28(5,000 men 
 
 Were Emperor Napoleon compelled, in order to 
 remain master of the situation in Italy, to keep an 
 observation army in readiness at Lyon, he would 
 hardly be in the situation to commence a war against " 
 Germany with any hope of success. Only were King 
 Victor Immanuel to give a guaranty for the worldly 
 possessions of the Pope and be satisfied with taking 
 Venice, the above stated strength would be available, 
 and then of course the Austrian fighting force would 
 be drawn from the Rhine. 
 
 The fortresses situated on the northeastern 
 French frontier require about 152,500 men for gar- 
 risons. Longwy and New-Breisach, lying on the 
 first line, have to be occupied with 44,500 men. For 
 this the conscription and occupation troops of the 
 second and third Corps Districts are insufficient. It 
 is true that troops may be called up from districts 
 farther in rear, but war garrisons like those of Strass- 
 burg, Metz and Diedenhofen would undoubtedly al- 
 ways require a nucleus of line troops. 
 
 If we however assume, so as not to underesti- 
 mate France's offensive power, that for this, and for 
 
—65— 
 
 Paris and Lyon, as well as for the protection of the 
 coast and the Belgian frontier, 34,000 men would be 
 sufficient, then there would finally be about 250,000 
 men disposable for active operations in the field, and 
 we would have to estimate the strength of the differ- 
 ent PYench armies as follows: 
 
 1st Army of Metz - - - - 45,000 men 
 2d Army of Strassburg - - - 90,000 men 
 3d Army of Weissembourg and 
 
 Bitch, at most - - - - 115,000 men 
 
 Emperor Napoleon was enabled to bring his 
 armies in the wars in the Orient and in Italy into 
 the field in a surprisingly short time, but there were 
 not over 150,000 men then, and the entire army fur- 
 nished the men, horses, and materials for these 
 armies. It will be different if the entire French 
 army has to be mobilized at one and the same time, 
 and the most careful researches lead to the belief 
 that France can do this no quicker than can Prussia. 
 
 The intention of France to proceed to war will 
 make itself manifest in its purchasing many horses, 
 which it can do in its own country only partly in 
 spite of the materially increased breeding of horses 
 and the Algerian remounts. 
 
 For a comparative estimate of time required we 
 should count only that day as the first, on which 
 France issues orders for the joining of the men on 
 furlough and reserves. This order cannot be kept 
 secret and it can be assumed that it will immediately 
 be wired to Frankfurt, Berlin and Vienna. That day 
 consequently should also be counted the first for the 
 mobilization of the German Confederation forces. 
 
 In order to have the troops ready in their garri- 
 sons to allow the transportation to their concentra- 
 tion points to proceed without interruption, it will 
 require, as with us, 14 days. 
 
 For simultaneous concentration on both sides of 
 
-66- 
 
 the Vogdes between Strassburg and Metz the 3d and 
 2d Corps will be ordered to march; the 1st, 4th, 
 5th, 6th and 7th Corps would go by rail. 
 
 The troops in garrisons in the south and west of 
 France have to pass either through Lyons or Paris. 
 There is a double-track railroad from Lyons to the 
 field of concentration, from Paris three may be used 
 with the addition of a few marches. 
 
 With these communications it will be possible to 
 concentrate all disposable French fighting forces 
 along the Rhine-Bavaria-Baden frontier quicker 
 than can be done on the Prussian side, having but 
 three trunk railroads from east to west (two of them 
 single track). 
 
 There will be assembled for the French main 
 army and the army of Strassburg: 
 
 in 3 weeks ------- 112,000 men 
 
 in 4 weeks (or to be more ac- 
 curate in 26 days) - - - 205,000 men 
 
 In addition, France has at its immediate disposal 
 in the camp at Chalons a corps of 23,000 men which 
 is but eight marches from the frontier. If we cal- 
 culate three days' preparation, three days of rest, 
 and two marches toward Prussian terrain, if 12,000 
 reserves are sent by rail to follow the corps to Died- 
 enhofen, if the corps is reinforced by 10,000 men 
 from Metz, Luneville, or nearby garrisons, then it 
 may be possible that 45,000 men can be at Trier on 
 the 16th day to interfere with the mobilization of the 
 17th Division and to prevent the bringing up of war 
 garrisons for Luxemburg and Saarlouis. 
 
 This utilization of the nearest ready fighting 
 means would only then be resultless, if at the stated 
 time the Vlllth Prussian Army Corps were already 
 concentrated on the Mosel. 
 
 Furthermore preparations might be made in 
 secret, to bring the 23,000 men in camp at Chalons in 
 
—67— 
 
 about four days to Forbach immediately after orders 
 therefor are received; from there they would proba- 
 bly, without encountering- resistance, appear in seven 
 to eight forced marches through the Palatinate on 
 the 12th day in front of Mayence, to try to execute a 
 blow against that place. But Mayence, as a fortress, 
 is in an excellent condition for defense; all that re- 
 mains to be done is to provide it with a garrison of 
 infantry and especially of artillery. If we are at all 
 alert it will not be difficult to do this, using Prussian 
 or Darmstadt detachments. For a perrranent sup- 
 port of this and other similar undertakings, as well 
 as for the opening of the campaign on the Rhine, the 
 necessary fighting forces, as already shown, are not 
 so readily at hand. 
 
 If we now take a glance at the defensive means 
 of Germany, we see that the eight Confederation 
 corps are equal to the French offensive force, and 
 that by the junction of other Prussian or Austrian 
 corps we will have a decided superiority, as soon as 
 the masses are at our disposal on the frontier. 
 
 We must not lose sight of the fact that, consid- 
 ering the enemy will take the initiative and also con- 
 sidering the extensive railroad net, the entire hostile 
 fighting force can be concentrated on the northern 
 frontier of France against Belgium and Germany 
 quicker than can our forces on the Rhine. That 
 frontier and the Rhine converge from the 100 (Eng.) 
 miles long line between Lille and Wesel toward the 
 southeast and finally join on the Lauter. 
 
 Consequently danger of an immediate contact is 
 smaller on the lower Rhine and the possibility of an 
 uninterrupted concentration there more secure, than 
 on the upper Rhine. 
 
 Therefore we see in advance that the necessary 
 forces to defeat a hostile advance through Belgium 
 are easier to concentrate than would be the case 
 against an advance from Alsace. 
 
-68- 
 
 For the assembly of the Prussian main forces, 
 three different fields of concentration come into main 
 consideration. 
 
 1. The Bavarian Palatinate. In addition to 
 the main army there the Vlllth Prussian Army Corps 
 would have to be placed on the Mosel, the Vllth and 
 VIII Confederation Corps on the Murg. The distance 
 between Luxemburg and Rastatt is more than 80 
 (Eng.) miles, and one main army and two auxiliary 
 armies (in direct communication with the main army) 
 will be sufficient. 
 
 This first position of the German arms in the face 
 of their restless neighbor should receive the prefer- 
 ence, theoretically, to any other; it more than any 
 other covers all Confederation lands against the west, 
 has an absolute offensive character, and leads most 
 surely to a retorsion of the hostile attack. But it 
 presupposes Belgium's neutrality, at least were that 
 not to be presupposed, all those fighting means would 
 drop away which are required for the defense of the 
 lower Rhine. It further presupposes a single leader- 
 ship, and one which is forceful enough and not allow 
 itself to be confused or hindered in the pursuit of the 
 general object by particular and special interest — re- 
 quirements hard to meet in practice considering the 
 division of Germany into states and position of its 
 two great Powers extending beyond the frontier of 
 the Confederation. And not at all counting these 
 considerations, the very unequal conditions of readi- 
 ness for war of the different contingents, of the great 
 distance, in spite of the generally favorable converging 
 of the trunk lines of the German railways towards 
 the central Rhine, will hardly allow a concentration 
 in the Palatinate, which is unprotected by a larger 
 natural obstacle and so near the French frontier. 
 We have seen that after four weeks already 200,000 
 French can advance to that point. 
 
-69- 
 
 This shows that we must enter the Palatinate in 
 the course of the operation but must not designate it 
 as the rendezvous of the separately arriving corps. 
 
 2. More easy of access and next in offensive ef- 
 fect appears to be a conceniraiion of the main force 
 behind the protecting sector of the Mosel. It would be 
 possible, by rail transportation to Cologne, Coblenz, 
 and Mayence, in addition to marches, to concentrate 
 within 33 days on the Mosel: 
 
 1 Prussian army corps at Trier and beyond, 
 4 Prussian army corps at Wittlich, 
 1 Prussian army corps at Coblenz, 
 
 a total of 200,000 men. This position covers the 
 Prussian possessions directly, is protected from en- 
 velopments on the right by Luxemburg, on the left 
 by the Rhine, has a strong obstacle in its front, and 
 the most assured retreat to the Rhine fortresses. 
 
 The distance from Luxemburg to Basel is 
 160 (English) miles and consequently it becomes 
 necessary to have tivo independent main armies, that 
 is, in addition to the one on the Mosel another one on 
 the upper Rhine. If Austria is in the situation to 
 send its three Confederation corps to the latter and 
 to the Rhine, then both armies will co-operate, at least 
 in the offensive. And even in the defensive each and 
 any attack movement of the French against the one 
 or the other would have one of them on their flank. 
 
 But unfortunately it cannot be denied that the 
 opponent can appear on the Mosel or on the upper 
 Rhine several days earlier, i.e. in the start with 
 superior forces, before the concentration there is 
 completed. 
 
 This position consequently would be the correct 
 and executable one, if the neutrality of Belgium 
 were assured and if the first concentration were pre- 
 pared in advance by corps mobilized before then. 
 
 3. More secure and more certain of execution in 
 
-70— 
 
 any event finally is a co)) centra Hon of the main forces 
 0)1 tJic Main, becaiiso this field of concentration is di- 
 rectly reached by rail from all parts of Germany, is 
 more distant from the French frontier, and protected 
 by the powerful Rhine line. Of course in this case 
 we cannot protect at the first moment with the means 
 at hand the German territory on the left bank of the 
 Rhine a.u'ainst hostile invasion. —The concentration on 
 the Main is a necessary make-shift in the face of the 
 initiative left to France by the separation of Germany, 
 and the defensive line. 280 (Ent>-lish) miles, from 
 Wesel to Basel requires the placinj>- of tlircc separate 
 armies, namely: One on the lower Rhine, which, 
 however, if Bel.uium remains neutral and if time al- 
 lows, can immediately advance to the Mosel. one on 
 the Main, and one on the uppiM- Rhine. 
 
 Prussia has the military power and has enouiih 
 general German as well as special Prussian interests 
 to furnish the prepondering part of iico of these 
 armies, which the Gonfederation States can join in 
 accordance with their j»eo.ura{)hical situation. It will 
 furnish these two armies even should it be confined 
 entirely to its own resources. 
 
 The Rhine with its forti-esses will always remain 
 the defensive front of Prussia against France. This 
 line is so exceedingly strong, as to not at all require 
 the total fighting foives of the Monarchy for holding 
 it and the larger part of the forces will remain avail- 
 able for an ofi'ensive which can be made fi-om the 
 center or from one of the wings. 
 
 The right wing is secured against France by dis- 
 tance mainly. Its envelopment, 200 (English"! miles, 
 across the lower course of the Schelde. Maas and the 
 Rhine and past Antwerp through Belgium and Hol- 
 land is impossible in consideration of military and 
 political reasons. 
 
 It is true that the left wing is advantageously 
 
-71— 
 
 supported by Mayence, still for reasons which have 
 already been explained, it needs a strong- army for 
 the offensive as well as for a permanent defensive. 
 
 In assigning positions to the contingents of the 
 central and minor States of Germany, we cannot leave 
 their territorial interests out of sight. Each one of 
 them will demand to have its domain secured, Prus- 
 sia's position on the Rhine secures this protection to 
 the north. Giving- political rivalries first considera- 
 tion, we can adopt other systems in time of peace, 
 but in case of war with France the pressure of the 
 situation will force the Xth and IXth Confederation 
 Corps to join the Prussian defense. Even the Sax- 
 on Division, if it actually joined the South German 
 Army at Rastatt, would certainly not retreat on Ulm 
 but on Wurzburg, and would consequently enter the 
 sphere of operations of the Main Army. 
 
 The defense of Southern Germany will in the 
 start be the task of the Vllth andthe Vlllth Confed- 
 eration Corps and of the IITd Austrian Corps. 
 
 We have mentioned above that Austria will have 
 to protect not only its own interests but also German 
 territory by a strong deployment of forces in Italy, 
 the Tyrol, and Switzerland. The distance alone shows 
 that it is improbable that the corps, which Austria 
 designates for the German theater of war, can be 
 disposable in the start at the upper Rhine. If they 
 will be, after the course of about three weeks, in po- 
 sition there or in Boralberg, or in Tyrol, or in lower 
 Austria, depends on the very much complicated Euro- 
 pean position of the Empire. Consequently we must 
 consider the possibility that the Austrian contingent 
 cannot appear in the start on the upper Rhine for the 
 defense of Southern Germany. 
 
 If in the time mentioned (3 weeks) 100,000 
 Frenchmen can debouch via Strassburg, then of 
 course the most obvious reasons force Southern Ger- 
 
—72— 
 
 many to at once concentrate all of its own forces. 
 
 A local defense of the Rhine can have no possible 
 success and to concentrate the Vllth and the Vlllth 
 Confederation Corps, even if immediately behind the 
 Black Forest, would mean to leave at least Baden en- 
 tirely defenseless. Having an extent of 300 ( Eng- 
 lish) miles and directly joining France, and with a 
 depth of but two or three marches, this frontier ter- 
 ritory can be protected only by a flank position in 
 the Rhine valley, and Rastatt is the only place for 
 that. 
 
 Wiirttemberg also cannot be held in the start 
 against hostile superior forces, and both of these 
 states can be liberated again only by the help of 
 Austria or Prussia. In accordance to whether this 
 help arrives quicker and stronger from the north or 
 from the east, the retreat will have to be made on 
 either the Iller or the Main. Thus it is probable that 
 in that case only the latter direction is the proper 
 one for all troops which Bavaria places in the field 
 for the protection of the Palatinate, and also for the 
 Baden contingent. 
 
 Concentrated on the Murg the Baden contingent 
 covers at least its lower Rhine district; there it forms 
 the advance guard of the Main army which is then 
 only but five marches distant, and through which 
 army alone it can be timely supported. 
 
 It is of undoubted interest to Prussia, the politi- 
 cal conditions of which are more simple than those 
 of Austria, to meet a French attack against Germany 
 with its entire forces. 
 
 Even if we can expect no gratitude from Russia 
 on account of our attitude during Poland's insurrec- 
 tion, that power is chained down too much by inter- 
 ior conditions to prevent or interfere with the utili- 
 zation on the Rhine of our army corps in the east of 
 the Monarchy. We can without fear trust the cadre 
 
—73— 
 
 and garrison battalions of the districts close by to 
 maintain order in the Grand-Duchy of Posen. 
 
 It seems improbable that Denmark, even if 
 Sweden helps it, will take the offensive against Ger- 
 many. If France would bring about such a diversion 
 it has to support it by troops which we would not 
 have to fight on the Rhine in that case. A Prussian 
 and the Xth Confederation Corps will probably be 
 sufficient to meet this threatening danger and to 
 guard the coasts. 
 
 The mobilization of the army and the transpor- 
 tation of four army corps to the Rhine will take the 
 first four weeks. Thereafter we may be able to see 
 how many of the others will have to be held back, 
 how many can follow up and into which direction 
 they are to be started. 
 
 We may in general designate Cologne and May- 
 ence as the first concentration direction in any war 
 with France, consequently we can regulate the 
 transportation in advance. Our railroad net does not 
 lead across the Rhine intoto; there are now only two 
 single-track lines to Aix-la-Chapelle and a similar one 
 to Trier, the latter in addition passing immediately 
 along the French frontier. Consequently an inter- 
 ruption has to occur on the Rhine and the foot march 
 resorted to for any further concentration farther 
 west. On the other hand, railroads and steamers 
 connect the two terminals Cologne and Mayence, 
 which allows, according to necessity, sending troop 
 transports from the one to the other wing. 
 
 To the Rhine and to the Main the present rail- 
 road net forms three independent trunk lines from 
 east to west and one like it from north to south. 
 
 The concentration will be eflfected in the shortest 
 possible time if 
 
 the Vlllth Army Corps concentrates by marching, 
 the Vlth Army Corps is sent via Bamberg, 
 
—74— 
 
 the IVth Army Corps is sent via Cassel, 
 the Vth Army Corps is sent via Hanover, 
 the Vllth Army Corps is sent via Wetzlar. 
 
 The last four corps (exclusive of a part of the 
 Landwehr cavalry) will reach with their rear detach- 
 ments the terminals of the transport by the 27th day. 
 
 To where these terminals should be transferred, 
 how far the transport trains should go, whether 
 the troops arriving- at Cologne should be imme- 
 diately sent farther up stream or those arriving 
 at Mayence and Frankfurt down stream, can be 
 regulated, considering connections and facilities 
 along the river, according to conditions then existing. 
 
 Should the neutrality of Belgium be still doubt- 
 ful, then we could place, after the end of the first 
 four weeks: 
 
 The Vth and Vllth Army Corps at Cologne and 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. 
 The Vlllth Army Corps at Coblenz and Trier. 
 The IVth and Vlth Army Corps at Frankfurt 
 and Mayence, respectively. 
 
 If we can ascertain by that time that the Belgian 
 territory will not be touched, the Vth Army Corps 
 can immediately be sent via Cologne to Coblenz and 
 the Vllth via Wetzlar also to Coblenz or to Frank- 
 furt. 
 
 Thus, in the same space of time, there would be 
 assembled either: 
 
 The Vlllth, Vllth and Vth Army Corps on the 
 Mosel between "^rier and Coblenz, 
 
 The Vlth and IVth Army Corps on the Main 
 between Mayence and Frankfurt: 
 
 or, if we may expect but an auxiliary army on 
 the Mosel, and the main hostile force in the Palatinate 
 and Southern Germany: 
 
 The Vlllth and Vth Army Corps on the Mosel 
 between Trier and Coblenz, 
 
—76— 
 
 The Vlth, IVth and Vllth Army Corps on the 
 Main, between Frankfurt, Mayence and Darm- 
 stadt. 
 
 Then there would be, for bringing up the corps 
 from the eastern provinces, in any case two (the 
 northern) railroads clear and within five days one 
 corps, the Illd, could be brought to Cologne, Coblenz 
 or Mayence, followed by the lid Corps. 
 
 Within five weeks we can have concentrated: 
 
 On tJie Mosel On the Maim, 
 Either 140,000 and 70,000 J 
 
 or 105,000 and 105,000 a total of 210,000 men. 
 
 or 35,000 and 175,000 ) 
 
 If by that time at least the Vllth and the Vlllth 
 Confederation Corps have reached the upper Rhine 
 and the IXth Confederation Corps the Main, and if 
 by that time the French masses have not yet crossed 
 the frontier, then we could take the position men- 
 tioned under (1) above: 
 
 200,000 men in the Palatinate, 
 35,000 men on the Mosel, 
 80,000 men on the Murg, 
 
 But there is little hope of being able to do that, 
 considering what we have already said of the enemy's 
 preparedness. 
 
 On the other hand, the question arises for Prus- 
 sia: Is it more advantageous and more correct to con- 
 centrate the larger number of Prussian corps on the 
 Mosel or on the Main? 
 
 If our own main force can be in position at the 
 proper time and strong enough on, the Mosel and 
 occupy the Saar line, then we will defend at the same 
 time our entire territory, abandon not a single foot 
 of it to the enemy, secure the inhabitants on the left 
 bank of the Rhine against hostile invasion, and will 
 not have to commence the very start with a retreat. 
 If we are strong enough our offensive from the 
 
—76- 
 
 Mosel will protect the Rhine Palatinate and indirectly 
 even the upper Rhine. These advantages are self- 
 evident; the (luestion only is, can the concentration 
 be made? 
 
 A coini)arison of rail transportation in France 
 and Germany shows: 
 
 During the first stages of the war, we cannot 
 oppose a suitable detachment ready for operation to 
 the French corps assembled in Chalons, which is 
 o5.()00 men strong, inclusive of reserve, and which 
 can reach Trier on the fourteenth day. 
 
 In order to secure the mobilization of the 16th 
 Division it would have to be started before the out- 
 break of war: or, a permanent maneuver camp must 
 be prepared by us on the Mosel; or, Trier must be 
 made a fortress of the 1st class. 
 
 On the invent ij-firHt day 1(50, 000 men can be as- 
 sembled at those points on the French northeastern 
 frontiei' from which the advance is to be made. 
 (That the French would commence their main opera- 
 tions earlier than on that day and with less forces 
 is not probable, considering the lack of artillery 
 necessary for the mobilization of a larger army.) 
 But if they start only on the twenty-second day from 
 the line Diedenhofen Ritsch, they can, after invest- 
 ing Saarlouis with about 10,000 men, be ready with- 
 out doubt on the twcnty-chjhtJi day to cross the Mosel 
 from Trier to Trarbach with 150,000 men. 
 
 We have seen above that by that day the Vlllth, 
 Vllth and Vth Corps can be concentrated at Wittlich. 
 These three corps number together about 100,000 
 men. 
 
 It is true that the transports of the Vlth Army 
 Corps on the Saxony — Bavaria line, which unfortu- 
 nately is not very reliable, can be ordered to proceed 
 at once via Mayence down the Rhine to Coblenz. As 
 the direct march from Bingen via Simmern is then 
 
—77— 
 
 hardly safe, and as the facilities of all steamers and 
 of the railroads along- the Rhine will be fully taken 
 up by transporting the Vth Army Corps from Cologne 
 to Coblenz, the timely arrival of the corps at Wittlich 
 is somewhat doubtful and even if it arrives in time it 
 would not make our force there ecjual to the French. 
 
 In addition, as shown above, a part of the French 
 fighting force coming from Chalons can have occu- 
 pied Trier several days before and can have started 
 towards Wittlich. 
 
 Therefore the first asseml)ly of our fighting force 
 there cannot be ordered with certainty. For that 
 security of the upper Mosel is necessary and there is 
 not time for that. Here also the strategic importance 
 of Trier plainly appears. 
 
 Considering the conditions as stated and the rail- 
 roads now existing, the first concentration of our 
 main force can be effected with absolute certainty on 
 the Main only, should the outbreak of war find our 
 army still on a peace footing. 
 
 If in that case the French intend to advance with 
 150,000 men towards the Mosel, an invasion of the 
 Rhine Province would ensue, as we have already 
 stated, but by no means a permanent occupation of 
 the same. On the other hand, the army desig^nated 
 to undertake the task must not be weaker than 45,000 
 men, if after all unavoidable detachments, it is to be 
 equal to our Vlllth Army Corps, which gradually as- 
 sembles. 
 
 This will leave the French 115,000 men, which, 
 concentrated in front of the Forbach — Lauterburg 
 line and crossing the frontier on the 22d day, cannot 
 appear before the 29th day in front of Mayence and 
 Frankfurt and that with 100,000 men at most, even 
 if they do not encounter any resistance in the Pala- 
 tinates or when crossing the Rhine. We have seen 
 that by that time the Vlth, IVth and Vllth Army 
 
—78— 
 
 Corps, also lOO.OOO men strong-, will be concentrated 
 on the Main; and in addition a part of the Illd Army 
 Corps will have arrived there and we can also count 
 on the arrival of the Hesse-Nassau contingents. 
 
 Th.e French, who will also have to secure them- 
 selves against Mayence, would then have to force a 
 crossing of the Main against i)robal)le superior forces. 
 Through a junction of the Vth with the Vlllth Army 
 Corps there would be, at the same time, considerably 
 superior forces opposed to the F'rench auxiliary army 
 in the Rhine Province. 
 
 It is therefore very probable that the French 
 will commence their main operations only when all 
 their lighting forces, 250,000 men, are disposable, 
 that is, on the 26th day, at which time Prussia 
 can have but 17(5,000 men concentrated on its west- 
 ern frontier. 
 
 As the French cannot encounter serious resist- 
 ance in either the Rhine Province or in the Pala- 
 tinate, they would reach with their auxiliary army 
 Trier, and with a strong advance guard (after having- 
 invested Landau and Germersheim) Mannheim on the 
 2Gth day, would try to secure the Rhine crossings 
 there and in that vicinity, and, following with the 
 main body in the same direction, reach the Main with 
 about 180,000 men on the o:^d day. 
 
 Althoug-h on the 32d day the Illd Cor|)s will have 
 joined the Vlth, IVth and Vllth there, the total 
 strength, inclusive of the Hesse-Nassau contingents, 
 will be only 150,000 men. 
 
 Of course in the meantime the transport of the 
 Vth Army Corps would have been continued via Co- 
 logne to and on the Rhine and thereby we could 
 oppose the French attack on the Main in equal force; 
 still in that case the VHIth Army Corps would re- 
 main without any support and our Rhine Province 
 would remain in the hands of the enemy. 
 
-79— 
 
 In order to meet this primary superiority of the 
 French, the Main army has three different options. 
 It can 
 
 (a) take the offensive via Mayence to the left 
 bank of the Rhine to interfere with the enemy's ad- 
 vance, or 
 
 (h) await that advance on the defensive behind 
 the Main, or finally 
 
 (c) conduct an active defense behind the Rhine 
 line from Mayence to Mannheim. 
 
 The offensive i)rocedure is the most desirable 
 one, it is the more audacious operation, although the 
 most precarious one. 
 
 The fortifications of Mayence favor debouching 
 as well as the retreat of larger masses of troops, 
 which latter, in an unfavorable outcome, can also be 
 directed towards Coblenz. 
 
 With a full strength of 140,000 men we could 
 take up this operation hardly before the 33d day. 
 But we know that the French will be ready with 
 larger forces already on the 26th day and that they 
 can have invested Mayence on the left bank on the 
 33d day. Therefore we must start earlier, about the 
 28th day, and consequently weaker, with 100,000 
 men, in which case the first contact would take place 
 very close to Mayence. It is possible that this con- 
 tact will come unexpectedly to the French, that we 
 will meet with our whole force only one of their 
 columns and will gain a success at the very start. 
 For, considering the enormous numbers, the oppon- 
 ent will probably advance on the five existing roads, 
 which are 52 (Eng.) miles from each other at the 
 frontier. These roads converge towards Mayence in 
 such manner that about opposite Alzey it would re- 
 quire but one march to assemble all columns, and we 
 might possibly have to fight with double our number, 
 which would not be offset even if we could count by 
 
—80— 
 
 that time on the co-operation of the Vth and Vlllth 
 Army Corps coming from the Mosel. 
 
 Even if at this time the French have crossed the 
 Rhine at Strassbiirg with 90,000 men, they would 
 meet us in the Palatinate with about e(]ual numbers. 
 Should a stronger detachment towards the Black 
 Forrest suffice to secure the right tlank of the Strass- 
 burg Army against the South German contingents, 
 then at about the time when we are engaged in the 
 Palatinate, that army could have reached the Neckar 
 and we would hardly have any other choice than to 
 either return to behind the Main or to base ourselves 
 on the Mosel only. 
 
 In that case it would most decidedly l)o best for 
 us to take the offensive through the Palatinate, if the 
 rest of Germany is willing and ready for a forceful 
 and offensive conduct of the war, if the IXth Confed- 
 eration Corps were joined with the Prussian corps on 
 the Main, if the Vllth and Vlllth Con federation Corps, 
 supported by Austrian corps, would attack the Strass- 
 burg Army or hold it. But if we could pi-esuppose 
 such a deployment of the German fighting forces and 
 such a combined action, the French attack would 
 hardly be made. 
 
 To (b). If, on the other hand, we remain on a 
 strict defensive behind the Main, then the French, 
 provided they start on the 27th day and advance 
 through the Palatinate across the undefended Rhine, 
 could, after leaving 20,000 men in front of Landau 
 and Germersheim, reach Darmstadt with 180,000 
 men on the 3od day. 
 
 According to reconnaissances so far made it is 
 true that our Main Army of 150,000 men will find a 
 favorable defensive position behind the Nidda be- 
 tween Hochst and Bonames. In attacking its front 
 the enemy would be confined, in a very disadvantage- 
 ous manner, to the limited terrain between the men- 
 
HI — 
 
 tioiicd creek ;iii<l the Miiiii. Mnvolopin^" our* Icfl, vviiij-v 
 vi.-i llaiiaii and AscliaH'cnlnirK ('iidaiiKcrs all I^Vcncli 
 coimniiiiicaljoiis, must lie pcoU'clcd ajvainsl Mayriur, 
 atid lakes more Mian one da.\''s innrcli lo r<'acli oni- 
 roads of reti'eal across I lie Tanniis. 
 
 IWil I. he (l;in)-',<'r in llie (kd'ensive lies in llu! 
 enemy's (ln()win^>- back onr rii'.hl wing', ('oreing' us in- 
 to (he <lirecU()ii of C'assel and culiinp; our (•(unrminica- 
 I ions wilh tlie lower I'liine, on which stream we intend 
 lo h.ise all oin- oporaLions, even toward;; the east:, 
 should I he I'Vench desire to pass oiu' poilion (hat. 
 way. 
 
 IVIayence heing' 12(EnK) miles distant, does no 
 loti^er directly protect tliis rijj;ht wiuR, and a mere 
 obsi'rvation of the Main as Car as IVIayence would not 
 at all sullice, as that stream, unimportant in it sell", can 
 easily l)e bridged, ancJ is even Idrdable at places. To 
 this must l>e added, th;d. on account ol' the densely 
 wooded terrain to tlie south, the exact intent ion ol" 
 the enemy can be preceived only at the last moment. 
 
 Therefore I he position behind the Nidda, camiot 
 be occupied in the very start and held under all 
 eventualities. A ftcr t heenemy will iuive driven back 
 all our observation det;i<dimerd.s seid. across I he Main, 
 the cor'ps would (ir.st have to be coiiceid rate(| in 
 bivouacs, about aroiuid Hofheim, so that they couNi 
 take a position witii tlw rip.ht as well as with the hd't 
 winj'.on iicichst,. In this the l(d"t Hank should be cov- 
 ered by a detacluMl division whi(di, throuj-vh local de- 
 fense of l^'rankfurt, g'ains the necessary I'lnwi for the 
 army t,o j.',o into position behind the Nidda or on the 
 Main Ixdow the mouth of (Ik; Nidda. 
 
 Shoidd there be no jj;(><»<I d(!fensiv(! posilion be- 
 tween lliiclisl and Mayence, then one rruist Ik^ sou j.';h(- 
 farther in rear and in immediate c(jnnection with that 
 place, that is at MrbenlxHm, in order tliat above all 
 else the ri^ht witiK and the conruMttion throuKb l^lu-' 
 Taunus with the Rhine will r<'main s<'c,ure. 
 
—82— 
 
 Nevertheless, a hostile superiority of 30,000 or 
 40,000 men will be felt in any position. It would be 
 offset after five days by the arrival of one Prussian 
 corps (probably the lid) which would be disposable 
 even if we were conii)elled to leave two corps in the 
 eastern Provinces a.uainst Denmark or Poland. Fin- 
 ally, by the 38th day, the Saxon Division would prob- 
 ably complete the IXth Confederation Corps on the 
 Main, for the purpose of which the railroad would be- 
 come clear on the 28th day. Then the superiority would 
 be on our side, and it is self-evident how important it 
 is to delay the French advance, even if for but a few 
 days. This, it is plain, can be done only if we are 
 able to dispute the Rhine crossing- with the enemy. 
 
 To c). If the Vlth Army Corps is transported at 
 once to Darmstadt and partly beyond it, the most im- 
 portant points between Mayence and Mannheim on 
 the right bank of the Rhine can be occupied on the 
 28th day, that is, on the arrival of the French, and if 
 any French detachments have already arrived that 
 far they can be driven back; thereafter the IVth and 
 Vllth Army Corps can be concentrated about at Bens- 
 heim in a central position of readiness, from where 
 they can reach threatened points between Mannheim 
 and Oppenheim in one day's march. On this stretch 
 then a Rhine crossing could hardly be forced in the 
 face of 100.000 men, because duriug the execution of 
 the crossing the enemy could not bring his superi- 
 ority of numbers into play. 
 
 If the opponent declines to take the shortest route 
 to the Main and should try a crossing above Mann- 
 heim, it would be doubtful if he could throw a bridge 
 there considering the proximity of Germersheim and 
 the presence of the Baden contingents which we 
 would support. In case of success he would still have 
 to force the Neckar line, from which line our retreat 
 to behind the Main would not at all appear to be en- 
 dangered. 
 
— 8^— 
 
 The French at the present time own at Strass- 
 burg a crossing over the Rhine which the Main army, 
 on account of its distant situation from there, can- 
 not dispute with them. If they intend to take that 
 route with their entire force, then to cover that dis- 
 tance, the necessity to move two such important 
 masses in the narrow Rhine valley on at most two 
 roads, the siege of Rastattand Germersheim and the 
 crossing of the Neckar would take so much time as 
 to make it impossible for them to reach the Main be- 
 fore the 38th day, at which time our reinforcements 
 would have arrived and we would have become the 
 stronger party. 
 
 As a matter of fact the French have the numer- 
 ical superiority only in the first phases of the cam- 
 paign and, in order to bring them into play, are com- 
 pelled to attack the Prussian army on the Main in the 
 shortest possible time, that is, on the most direct 
 route. For this they will require an army which, 
 advancing on the right bank of the Rhine, opens the 
 crossings on that stream to their main army. This 
 means that the French army will have to be separated 
 into two parts, the main army advancing through 
 the Palatinate, and the second army, which, however, 
 must also be strong, operating from Strassburg down 
 stream. This of course complicates our task more 
 and more. 
 
 We have to make a defense of not only our front 
 on the Rhine, but also of the flank on the Neckar. 
 This is not so serious as it looks, because we will be 
 in a position between the two separated main forces 
 of the enemy. We can defend the Rhine with smaller 
 forces and the Neckar with our main forces. As the 
 danger increases so also increases the prospect of a 
 decisive victory. 
 
 If the Strassburg army has been compelled to 
 weaken itself materially in front of Rastatt and the 
 
—84— 
 
 South German contingents, then we will oppose it on 
 the Neckar with superior forces. If then the Wiirt- 
 tembergers and Bavarians are able to take the offen- 
 sive on their part, it will hardly be possible for the 
 army of the French right wing to avoid a complete 
 defeat. 
 
 Still we must not shut our eyes to the danger 
 threatening us should, during our advance south, the 
 French main army succeed in crossing the Rhine be- 
 low Mannheim. In that case we would be cut off 
 from the low^er Main and from the Rhine Province, 
 and w^ould have to lay our base on the eastern pro- 
 vinces. 
 
 It is true that in the closest connection with the 
 Vllth and Vlllth Confederation Corps we would, after 
 having driven the French right wing back across the 
 Rhine, be fully equal to the center of the French 
 army after it has advanced, but in that case entirely 
 new conditions will obtain. 
 
 Which of the three operations here discussed will 
 be the correct one for the Main army, cannot be defi- 
 nitely decided on in advance, for that depends on 
 conditions obtaining after concentration has been 
 completed. 
 
When in August, 1866, during the peace negotiations be- 
 tween Prussia and Austria, the attitude of France seemed to 
 indicate an interference of France in those negotiations, Gen- 
 eral V. Moltke addressed a memorial to the Minister-Presi- 
 dent Count V. Bismark*, in which he discussed the military 
 measures to be taken in case of a war with France. 
 
 MEMORIAL NO. 6 
 
 TO THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT, COUNT V. BISMARK- 
 SCHOENHAUSEN 
 
 Berlin, 8 August, 1866. 
 Your Excellency will allow me to hand you en- 
 closed a short exposition concerning our military 
 attitude against France at this time, and I desire to 
 remark that according to our calculations France can 
 not concentrate an army of operation of 250,000 men 
 between Metz and Strassburg earlier than in 26 days. 
 
 MEMORIAL 
 
 It is of manifest importance to arrive at a 
 definite settlement with Austria as soon as practi- 
 cable in order to have a free hand against the east 
 and the west, if our neighbors should try to rob us of 
 the fruits of our victory. In the negotiations at 
 Prague, consequently, minor points are of no impor- 
 tance; the main point should be to again have at our 
 disposal the troops now in Bohemia and in Moravia. 
 
 The first probability might be that France may 
 demand from us cessation of terrain, which would be 
 in opposition to the task now set Prussia to unite the 
 entire Germany and to protect it, a task, for the so- 
 lution of which we have just taken the first and most 
 important step. 
 
 *A copy of this memorial was sent to the Minister of War. 
 Although this work is published in Moltke 's Military Corre- 
 spondence, War of 1866, under No. 329, it is reprinted here for 
 the sake of continuity. 
 
 85 
 
—86-- 
 
 Should France make such a demand, the natur- 
 ally resulting- war would be a popular one in the 
 entire German territory, outside of Austria. It can 
 not be doubtful at all that an alliance against France 
 would be formed with the South German States 
 against the surrender of the greater part or of even 
 the whole of the territory occupied by us south of the 
 Main. In such a case not only the Confederation 
 with the North German States but also with the 
 states composing the entire territory of Germany 
 would ensue, would receive new life. Considering 
 their present state of readiness for war and their 
 present location, the South German contingents could 
 be concentrated at Mannheim within from 8 to 10 
 days numbering some 80,000 men. By the same time 
 there could be concentrated around Mayence our Main 
 army iby marching") and the lid Reserve Corps, de- 
 pendent on whether the latter remains at Nuremburg 
 or is at once started on the march to Wiirzburg, by 
 rail or by marching— a force of 90,000 men. 
 
 In no case could France concentrate in so short a 
 time an offensive army which would be strong enough 
 to cross the Rhine at any point in the face of these 
 first positions; and when peace has been established 
 with Austria, the question would only be as to the 
 time in which the French army, equal to our own, 
 can be concentrated in the west. 
 
 Conditions for a war of the French Empire 
 against victorious Prussia and the united German 
 people at this very instant appear so little favorable, 
 that it undoubtedly will not be engaged in unless an 
 understanding has already been arrived at with Aus- 
 tria for the continuation of the war, which of course 
 would make all peace negotiations of no use. 
 
 Therefore it is necessary to look at this probabil- 
 ity from a military standpoint. 
 
 As, in accordance with treaty stipulations, Italy 
 
—87— 
 
 cannot come to peace terms without our sanction, 
 Austria would have to send at least the largest part 
 of its South Army to the other side of the Alps, and 
 this appears to have been done already. Consequent- 
 ly there could be only some 150,000 men opposed to 
 us on the Danube, a force which is in part badly de- 
 morahzed by the battles of June and July of the 
 present year. 
 
 Still, I do not believe that we can afford, in a 
 simultaneous war with France, to continue the of- 
 fensive war against Vienna, as that offensive, pro- 
 vided it would not come to a standstiH on the Danube, 
 would require all of our forces. Of course, should the 
 Austrians advance beyond the Danube, we could 
 concentrate 160,000 to 180,000 men on the Thays 
 within 8 days and presumably win another battle with 
 that force. However, it is not at all probable that 
 they will do that, they will far rather remain on the 
 defensive behind that stream until French co-opera- 
 tion becomes effective. The armistice agreed on is 
 for four weeks and that space of time is sufficient for 
 the French preparations and even if our preparations 
 are completed before then, we need time to transport 
 our armies from the Danube to the Rhine. 
 
 Should Austria raise serious difficulties in the 
 conference at Prague, it will indicate an under- 
 standing with France, and consequently our military 
 forces in Bohemia should not be reinforced, but 
 should at once be transported to the Rhine. 
 
 Four army corps, about 120,000 men, will be 
 sufficient to successfully carry on, from the vicinity 
 of Prague, a defensive based on Dresden, which is 
 fortified. 
 
 By the 9th of September there can have arrived 
 at Mayenee and Mannheim a total strength of 150,000 
 men— two army corps by rail via Oderberg— Berlin — 
 Cologne, one army corps by rail from Dresden— 
 
—88— 
 
 Leipzig: -Cassell and the Elbe army, presupposing: 
 a union with South Germany, on the two roads i'rom 
 EfterWtirzburg:— Frankfurt on the Main and Pilsen 
 — Nuremberg: Stuttg:art—Bruchsal, provided a start 
 is made on Aug;-ust 22, and the strength of the North 
 German forces there will then be increased to a total 
 of 240.000 men. 
 
 We would have to count olf 15,000 troops of the 
 line for Mayence, the exclusive possession of which 
 ])Uice must be secured in the treaties with the South 
 German States, and further about that many more 
 troops of the "tield army for Saarlouis, Coblenz, 
 Colog:ne, Wesel and Luxemburg-, 
 
 This will leave more than 200,000 men, and count- 
 ing- in the South German conting:ents we will have 
 an artny of operation of nearly oOO,(100 men. 
 
 But in arriving at these results we must take 
 cognizance of the following assumptions: 
 
 (a) That Prussia alone exercises the right of 
 garrisoning Mayence, in order to have that place 
 absolutely secure against any and all French under- 
 takings. 
 
 (b) That the governments of Bavaria, Wiirttem- 
 berg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt place their rail- 
 roads and materials at our disposal for the trans- 
 portation of the Elbe army. 
 
 (c) That the Bavarian troops at once take a 
 position somewhere along the Wurttembei-g frontier, 
 to be in the position to reach the Rhine by marching 
 within ten days. We cannot count on the contingents 
 of the remaining South German States to reach there 
 within that time, if they are now at their respective 
 stations. 
 
 In treaties with the South (lerman States these 
 three points should not be lost sight of. 
 
 It is not probable that France will make its at- 
 tack through Belgium. By doing so it would come 
 
—89— 
 
 into conflict with England and would have to weaken 
 its forces materially by occupying Belgium and 
 Antwerp. 
 
 An invasion of Southern Germany would not di- 
 rectly lead to the desired object, because it would 
 leave Prussia unendangered and would always have 
 the German armies on its flank. 
 
 Without doubt, the French attacking army would, 
 advancing between Luxemburg and Rastatt, directly 
 proceed to that country the possession of which it 
 strives to gain. Our Rhine fortresses, which nat- 
 urally should be placed in a state of preparedness, 
 are consequently not in immediate danger, and we 
 would be justified in concentrating the entire fight- 
 ing force, which Germany can assemble against 
 France, between the Main and the Neckar. Insofar 
 as there is no time for concentrating that army in 
 the Palatinate, the attack may be awaited behind the 
 Rhine, for the mere possession by the French of the 
 left bank of the Rhine does not secure them posses- 
 sion of the land. They will not be able to overcome 
 the necessity of crossing the stream in the face of 
 the defender, and have to weaken their army by the 
 investment of Luxemburg and Saarlouis, by observa- 
 tion against Coblenz, Mayence, Germersheim, Landau 
 and Rastatt. 
 
 Therefore, it can be said in general, that the 
 war against Austria, considering its present weakness, 
 and against France will have to be conducted in a 
 defensive manner, but should not be avoided, con- 
 sidering the large object to be gained thereby. 
 Even if the outcome should not be entirely successful, 
 Germany would for all time to come be assembled 
 around Prussia, while the voluntary cession of even 
 the smallest part of German territory would make 
 the future leadership of Prussia impossible. 
 
 If we are successful in concluding peace with 
 
—90 
 
 Austria within the next few days, France would 
 sui-oly object to all conditions of the treaty; it could 
 choose no more favorable time for a war than the 
 present. In that case it would be material to quickly 
 consolidate Noi'th Germany in order to ojipose in 
 sufficient force dangers coming from the west and 
 the east. 
 
The following work— without date — presupposes the pos- 
 sibility of utilizing the territory of Luxemburg and — differing 
 from former memorials, which in the main were based on. a 
 defensive attitude of Prussia — treats of an advance of the 
 North German fighting forces on Prance. 
 
 MEMORIAL NO. 7 
 
 A. ADVANCE AGAINST THE LINE METZ — DIEDENHOFEN 
 
 Prior concentration of: 
 
 the 1st Army at Luxemburg, Sierck; 
 
 the 2d Army at Rehlingen, Saarlouis; 
 
 the 4th Army at Sulzbach, Saarbriicken, Voelk- 
 
 lingen, utihzing the Nahe and the Bexbach 
 
 railroads; 
 the 3d Army to secure against Strassburg or act 
 
 as a left flank army following via Saarge- 
 
 miind— Morchingen. 
 
 1st day 
 
 Ist 
 Army 
 
 Luxemburg 
 
 Sierck 
 
 2d 
 Army 
 
 ( Rehlingen 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 Saarlouis 
 
 4 th f 
 Army I 
 
 ( Busendorf, 
 I Felsburg, 
 ] Tromborn, 
 [ Hargarten, 
 
 Ham below 
 Varsberg, 
 Ludweiler, 
 St. Avoid 
 Merle nbach, 
 
 2d day 
 
 ( Katten- | 
 
 J hofen, J 
 
 Konigs- j 
 
 I machern, I 
 
 ( Dalstein, 
 j Busendorf, 
 I Brittendorf, 
 
 ( Eblingen, 
 
 ( Bolchen, ( 
 
 od day 
 in front of 
 Diedenhofen; 
 Remingen, 
 Metzerwiese, 
 
 I Betsdorf, 
 I Homburg, 
 1 Vigy, 
 I Brittendorf, 
 
 St. Barbe, 
 
 Hallingen, ■{ Bolchen, 
 Fiillingen, I Flanville, 
 Buschborn, [ Courcelles. 
 
 Uh day: Eight corps (250,000 men) one to two 
 miles from the Mosel. One division in front of 
 Diedenhofen, one corps against Metz. 
 
 First Army south of Buss across the Mosel, to 
 support the attack in the front. 
 
 Eight corps, on a front of 12 (Eng.) miles, two 
 echelons deep. 
 
 Start: first line early in morning, second line in 
 afternoon. 
 
 91 
 
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The political situation after 1866, and the task of the 
 fortress of Luxemburg in the year 1867, had brought about a 
 change in the military relations of Northern Germany towards 
 France. Details of this are contained in the following two 
 letters. 
 
 NO. 8 
 
 TO THE MINISTER OF WAR, GENERAL OF INFANTRY 
 V. ROON 
 
 Berlin, 15 May, 1867. 
 
 If we abandon our military position in Luxem- 
 burg the question arises, should some other point 
 near the French frontier be fortified to protect the 
 Rhine Province. 
 
 The most natural procedure would be to enlarge 
 Saarlouis, which lies at about the center of the line 
 only thirty-two (Eng. ) miles long, from Luxemburg 
 to the Bavarian Palatinate. A large fortified place 
 with a strong garrison would of course have a general 
 influence on this entire stretch of frontier. Saar- 
 louis cannot be transformed, except by material en- 
 largement, into a fortress which will be able to 
 withstand a formal attack considering present-day 
 fire effect. 
 
 Not counting the fact that the terrain, especially 
 on the right bank of the Saar, is unfavorable to a 
 more extended fortification, we have but lately 
 learned the difficulties any fortress in the immediate 
 vicinity of the frontier causes us. Such a fortress 
 must be fully prepared and garrisoned in time of 
 peace. The first may be done pecuniarily, but not 
 the latter, for, as a matter of policy, the Land- 
 wehr is designated to garrison the fortresses, and 
 it cannot be assembled in time of peace. 
 
 93 
 
—94— 
 
 Consequently there would only remain to throw 
 troops of the field army into a fortress and that is 
 field troops of our peace organization— considering 
 that we are opposed by an enemy who is fully pre- 
 pared and stationed so close to us. The enlarged 
 Saarlouis would require the entire infantry of the 
 16th Division to be secure against a sudden attack. 
 
 In any case, under present strained conditions, 
 the enlargement of the place could hardly be finished 
 at the time when required. Although one element 
 of the state of "strained conditions," i. e, Luxem- 
 burg, is now eliminated, the main disturbing factor 
 remains: the demand of France for supremacy in 
 Europe (which of course is not justified at all); that 
 means, forcing Prussia to relinquish the position 
 which it has gained in Germany. In spite of all its 
 preparatory arming, France, still without an ally, 
 would hardly be in the situation to conduct war 
 against Germany. It is probable that France will 
 wait for its new armament which may be completed 
 by next year. 
 
 Even if by that time the reorganization of the 
 French army should be completed and if consequent- 
 ly 300 battalions can take the field in future 1000 men 
 strong instead of 700 men strong, the North German 
 army would be numerically superior. After organ- 
 izing a field army, a third of which in any case would 
 be composed of raw levies, France would have ex- 
 hausted its reserves, and replenishment and new for- 
 mations could be effected only by recruitment or by 
 volunteers, while our Prussian Landwehr forms a 
 nucleus from which even the army of operation can 
 be reinforced. In the French artillery the number 
 of guns will have been increased to 1014, but not the 
 number of trained artillerymen, while Prussia can 
 this year put 1240 guns into the field. 
 
 Consequently, next year the means for a success- 
 
—95— 
 
 ful war against France will be available in North 
 Germany without counting on South Germany, and 
 the main point will only be to concentrate these 
 means at the proper time and correct place. 
 
 Therefore I see more security for us in the 
 hastening of extending our railroads than there 
 would be in construction of any fortifications. 
 
 With existing railroad connections we can trans- 
 port to the Rhine, by the 30th day after orders are 
 issued for mobilization: 
 
 3 army corps by marching, 
 
 4 army corps by rail, a total of 
 
 7 army corps. 
 
 The remaining six army corps can be transported 
 only after that day, and the marching into position 
 of the army cannot be effected in less than six weeks. 
 
 But it is doubtful if the 200,000 men, first as- 
 sembled, will be sufficient to carry the offensive into 
 France which would better than anything else pro- 
 tect our Rhine Province. 
 
 In order to augment the North German railroad 
 net, we do not need construction of railroads for 
 strategical purposes, but only completion of such 
 lines which are already projected by the require- 
 ments of commerce and communication. 
 
 In order to open new trunk lines for military 
 transportation to the Rhine, the following lines will 
 have to be completed: 
 
 1. The Borssum— Halberstadt line. 
 
 2. The continuation of the Halle— Nordhausen 
 railroad from Heiligenstadt, be that directly via 
 Witzenhausen, via Mtinden, or even Gottingen. 
 
 3. The Fulda— Hanau railroad. 
 
 Should, in case of the last named road, the ter- 
 rain difficulties be so great that its construction, by 
 using all possible means, could not be completed 
 
-96— 
 
 within a yoar— wliich is of course a matter to be de- 
 cided by professional men — then, 
 
 •1. a second track would have to be laid on the 
 raiiroatl from Hehra to Cunlersliausen. 
 
 In the lirst three cases the cuuvstion is of a con- 
 struction of about SO iKii.«;lisli I miles, which will 
 }»ive us live independent lines, an advantage worth 
 millions to us in case of war, for then we would be 
 enabled to complete concent i-at ion of the army with- 
 in four weeks. 
 
 If hastenin.u- the work means additional cost, the 
 sums so expended ought to be considered as mere 
 loans. 
 
 If the state should be re(iuired to advance a few 
 millions for hastening the completion of the projected 
 lines, that would i)e entirely justitied by the political 
 situation. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to mention that in addition 
 to the above named, practically but short, lines, the 
 connection between Triei- and Cologne and the con- 
 struction of a second track on the railroad on the 
 left bank of the Rhine will always remain desirable 
 from a military standi)oint. Still, I consider the 
 conmnuiication from the center to the west of the 
 Monarchy uiuier existing political conditions the 
 most important and respectfully leave it to the ex- 
 cellent judgment of Your Excellency, if this matter 
 cannot be facilitated by conununicating with the 
 Minister of Fiiumce and Conunerce. 
 
No. 9 
 
 TO THE MINISTER OF WAR, (JKNKRAE 01'' INFANTRY 
 V. ROON 
 
 Berlin, (! Jiiln, IS(;7. 
 
 I respectfully return to Your Excellency the 
 inclosures to the correspondence of the 1st of this 
 month.* 
 
 Concerning the enlargement of Saarlouis, J have 
 already, under date of 15 May, this year, expressed 
 my opinions of the necessity of keeping this place, 
 which is on the immediate frontier, in a continuous 
 state of readiness, and that all of the battalions of 
 the 16th Divisions, which would have to be thrown 
 into the fortress at the first sip:n of danger, would 
 be sufficient as a garrison. 
 
 If we were compelled to conduct the war de- 
 fensively on the Rhine, the operation of relieving 
 the division, besieged by the enemy in Saarlouis, 
 would be a very difficult one. 
 
 Are we enabled, as is to be hoped, to offensively 
 invade France, we need no fortress in order to de- 
 bouch across the Saar. 
 
 Streams like the Rhine and the Vistula of course 
 can be crossed in the face of the enemy only on 
 fortified bridges. Still the Saar and the opposite 
 bank of it can be passed easier at any other point 
 
 *'IMiiH fiorrosponclence contained information tiiat the 
 (lienciral War Department of the War JVliniHtry had sketched 
 out a tentative plan for th(! en]ar^(!ment of tin? f<jrtr(!HH of 
 SaarlouiH. The inclosurcH mentioned above contained 
 extracts from tliat phm witli exj)lanatory notes. 
 
 97 
 
—98- 
 
 than via the rocky slope at Saarlouis on the single 
 road at Ober-Felsberg. 
 
 I also do not think very much of the place as a 
 depot for an offensive advance. A good railroad net 
 in our rear, which of course has first to be prepared 
 here on the Rhine, and which must be prepared, 
 secures the transportation of all necessities even if 
 the depots are laid into the Rhine fortresses. I 
 again call attention to the fact that, according to my 
 view, all means which are available for the defense 
 of the country should be utilized first and foremost 
 for construction of railroads which are strategically 
 the most important. 
 
 According to the projected work, Saarlouis of 
 to-day would form a part of the fortified camp to be 
 provisionally constructed by next year, for the estab- 
 lishment of which there is no need. 
 
 Fortified camps have a great disadvantage in so 
 far as there is no actual guaranty that an army will 
 be in them, that they are weak in the absence of the 
 army, especially if, as is the case here, there is no 
 existing central fortification. 
 
 They also cannot assure actual rest to troops 
 within their limits. The troops would nightly be 
 alarmed by some battery or other going into position 
 in a fold in the terrain and firing at long range. 
 Only if the camp is situated on a large river or delta, 
 like the Alsen Sound, an army detachment can, by 
 crossing to the other bank, find the protection and 
 rest necessary for its reorganization or for a more 
 extended stay. 
 
 So far, in the annals of war, the history of forti- 
 fied camps is in most cases connected with their 
 capitulation, and I would recommend the construction 
 of such a camp least of all at Saarlouis, where, for 
 instance, the range of the forts on the Felix Hill 
 reaches to beyond French territory. 
 
— &9— 
 
 Concerning the projected smaller forts which are 
 intended to prevent the enemy from using our rail- 
 roads, I believe that these forts will certainly accom- 
 plish no more in that connection than will arrange- 
 ments made in advance for blowing them up at suit- 
 able points. The destruction of a viaduct like that 
 at Saarbrticken or Gorlitz interrupts the continuity 
 of a line for the entire course of a campaign and I 
 doubt if a fort of smaller dimensions will hold out for 
 that length of time. 
 
 It is of course true that these forts would be 
 useful, could they prevent the enemy from destroying 
 valuable structures. 
 
 Should the French utihze, for instance, their 
 fighting forces which are first ready to invade the 
 country on the left bank of the Rhine, then they 
 would undoubtedly destroy the crossing at Saarlouis 
 if forced to fall back, which would be very much 
 against our interests. Still, then also the tunnels of 
 the Nahe railroad would have to be protected in 
 similar manner, for should they be destroyed, we 
 could not use that road for a long time to come. 
 However, it is dependent on the locality in each case 
 whether or not it will be possible to take any structure 
 under fire in such manner as to prevent the enemy 
 from destroying it. 
 
 Consequently, I do not believe that there will be 
 any material advantage in the projected forts. 
 
Tlic colli iniious |>rc|>!ii;i( ioiiN lor war hy li'raiict* Hiiifc I lie 
 H|)riii); ol ISii7 cvtMi aKcr llic I ,ii \cml)iir^; (iiit>s|ion wjih 
 st'llicil caiiNi'ii (lit< IMiiiislcr- rrcsidonl ('oiiiil v. iiisiuarlv lo 
 i-all on |li<< Cliicl ol Slair ol llio army in liio l>c<;imiiii>; ol 
 tSt'|»ti'iiil>cr, lor a \\ril(i>n o|iiiiioii: 
 
 No. 10 
 
 To llir Miiii}<hr-l*r<.'<iiltHl, Coinil r. Hisnid rL'-SchocH- 
 lniKsrn, Hcflin: 
 
 ("rcisau at Si'h\\»M(lnit/,. 
 
 (> ScptiMubor. 1S(»7. 
 In vo\A\ to Wnw K\colltMu-.\'s lottcr ol" (ho 2(1 
 instant, I lia\o tho honor to sulMuit Iho l"ollo\\inti-: 
 
 AiH'oichn^- to iu\ opinion I'^-anco is anniii.u' and 
 l)roi)aiMn.u' ("or vvai' uiulor Iho auspiros of its War 
 Ministr\' sinoo last spriniv. parH\ 
 
 1. in ofdor to ri'('til'> |)rior notvlocts in ils inili- 
 itar.N' orivani/.alions; 
 
 2. in or(l(M' to l)i"iniv t ho l''roiu'h dot'onsixc l"oi-ct\s 
 to a hi.u'luM' phmo ron'ospondinj^' to now I'oiuhtions, 
 ospoi'iaily in ordoi- to facihtalo tiuickor mobilizations, 
 and tinailN'. paiM 1\ 
 
 ;>. iindor Iho su[)[>osilion Ihal tlio appafonlly 
 vai'ihit inii' pohcios o{' tho I'iinpiM'or may hi'in^' about 
 a suddiMi outlifoak ot" war. 
 
 In cAc\\ otuM)r tho many nu>asuros takon by (ht» 
 b'ronoh \'ov rt>adinoss for war. w t> oan trai'o owe of 
 thoso thriH' nu»ti\'os as iMthor a basis or an au\iliar\' 
 roason for llu>m. 
 
 As Iho doxt'lopmont oi' tho i'Voiu'h forcos. mon- 
 lionod undtM" C2\ cannot > iM ha\t' boiMi rtMoht>d, I'on- 
 sitlorin.u' tlnMnaU>rial sh(>i1oomin.us and lon.u slandin.u' 
 ni'Kk'cis. moasuros fi>r proparodness for war will 
 
 100 
 
—101— 
 
 continue probably even if French politics should be 
 of an entirely peaceful aspect. 
 
 What wei^'ht we will have to give, different 
 reports received concerning- this matter, will depend 
 mainly on whether they can be explained as being 
 based on the one or the other motive, or if they are 
 to be brought into connection with an imminent 
 political (question. 
 
 In general, there is no doubt whatever but what 
 France is hostile towards us and will remain so for 
 the present; all measures taken by it consequently 
 will have the character of ill will and preparation for 
 war. Whether or not there is any reason in the 
 present political situation to await an actual develop- 
 ment of the crisis, is beyond my judgment and Your 
 Excellency is in a better situation to know all about 
 that. 
 
 The separate exterior symptoms, which have 
 appeared lately, and which may be of military im- 
 portance, are: 
 
 (a) The purchase of horses in Hungary, com- 
 menced since the settlement of the Luxemburg 
 question, and still continuing, the horses being sent 
 via Nabresina (northwest of Trieste on the railroad to 
 Vienna) and the Mont Cenis to France. This meas- 
 ure seems to indicate the intention to improve, not 
 the quantity but the (luality of the French military 
 horses. In the spring, unsuitable horses purchased 
 in a hurry were sold l-'il head in the 0th Dragoons 
 alone — and 10,000 head loaned out to farmers. Ac- 
 cording to a report in our hands, dated the end of 
 July, of the Horse Artillery Regiment of the Guards, 
 that regiment was from ten to thirty horses per 
 battery below its peace strength. 
 
 (b) The reported purchase of grain and beef 
 cattle in Italy; the purchase in England of woolen 
 blankets and other articles necessary for a winter's 
 
—102— 
 
 campaign; the reported— not yet confirmed— placing 
 of orders, in Vienna for maps of the German theater 
 of war, especially of the rivers, 
 
 (c) The reported intention of moving the regi- 
 ments from the camp at Chalons to the northeastern 
 districts of Diinkirchen and as far as Strassburg— 
 the unusual keeping up of the divisions and brigades 
 of these troops— and the reported new formation of 
 a division in Paris. The latter two reports are de- 
 nied by official organs (newspapers) and it is said 
 lately that the intended change of station of 'troops 
 shall not be made, because it has made the French 
 people too uneasy. Should it actually be made, there 
 would be forty-eight battalions of field troops more 
 in the terrain situated east and north of the line 
 Calais —Paris—Basel than were there last year. The 
 consequent decrease of number of troops in the re- 
 maining provinces of France would, however, amount 
 to but fifteen battalions, which may be explained by 
 the return of the troops from Mexico and Rome. 
 
 (d) Under certain conditions also the proposed 
 measures to be taken in the French navy are a 
 strange symptom. Whether and to what extent the 
 French navy is to play a role in a war against 
 Prussia, is hard to determine in advance. It is a fact 
 that the French navy is superior to ours, even if no 
 additional steps are taken to increase it, still a report 
 of such a contemplated increase might easily ex- 
 cite the mistrust of other maritime powers, though 
 they would keep aloof in the conflict. Consequently 
 it is a question whether the naval preparations on 
 the part of France are connected more with an Ori- 
 ental than with a German question. 
 
 (e) The completion of new formations in the in- 
 fantry, artillery and train troops possibly may be re- 
 garded less in a military sense than judged as motives 
 mentioned in (1) and (2) above. 
 
—103— 
 
 (f) Under the same catagory would be classed 
 the fortification works started in the spring and late- 
 ly resumed. Those at Belfort I specially hold as en- 
 tirely irrelevant to us, and they probably would play 
 no role at all in a war between France and Germany. 
 
 I will remark the following: 
 
 We cannot deny that French army matters have, 
 since the spring, taken a great step ahead in most 
 directions. 
 
 The effective strength of trained men has been 
 increased by 70,000 men through the addition of two 
 years' conscripts, the number of horses available 
 now may suffice to mobilize the army in about the 
 same time as can the Prussian army, —the field artil- 
 lery has been increased by 34 batteries. But two 
 very important results have not yet been attained: 
 on the one hand, according to numerous reports con- 
 firming each other, the number of completed chasse- 
 pot rifles is less than 50,000 (only the larger part of 
 the infantry of the Guards and the 16 infantry regi- 
 ments up to this in the camp at Chalons can be sup- 
 plied with them so far), and in the second place the 
 number of trained, but not the number of available 
 men has been increased, because no new recruitment 
 has so far been started. 
 
 The increased recruitment expected heretofore 
 (in June) of about 160,000 men has not yet been ef- 
 fected, and by the Decree of the 7th of August only 
 the usual contingent of about 100,000 men has been 
 called to the colors at the regular September recruit- 
 ment and that under keeping to the old custom of al- 
 lowing conscripts to purchase their freedom from 
 service, etc. 
 
 Consequently, according to our conception, France 
 will at the present time not be able to oppose against 
 Prussia a stronger army than the above mentioned 
 field army of at most 300,000 men. 
 
-104— 
 
 As it now appears that Emperor Napoleon did 
 not succeed in formino;- in Salzhurp: the desired Aus- 
 tria-South German alliance, the above military con- 
 siderations do not lead to the belief that France can 
 undertake a campaip:n this fall, which at the present 
 time it is not stronj*- enough to carry on without an 
 ally. 
 
 Another decidin.u- factor mipfht be — what meas- 
 ures date from the time before the convention at 
 Salzburj?, and what a/Ver that convention, and there- 
 fore started in conse(]uence of that convention. 
 The MoiiUeiu- de I'annee reports that the Decree of 
 Aug-ust 24 dismissed the present oldest active class 
 (18()2) to the reserve, and in addition that by the De- 
 cree of August 81, after the usual autumn maneuvers 
 the semi-annual furloughing of officers, non-commis- 
 sioned oflicors and soldiers will be more numerous 
 than heretofore. Although these measures are no 
 absolute indication of peace, but in the main have 
 for their object making room for the training of 
 younger men, they do not absolutely indicate hostile 
 intentions. Should in the meantime Your Excellency 
 have reasons to suspect contrivances of France in the 
 matter of new political dissensions in the near future, 
 the above points contained in from (a) to(d) would be 
 entitled to careful consideration. 
 
No. 11 
 
 To the Miiiinter-President, Count v. Bismark-Schoen- 
 
 hausen, Berlin: 
 
 Creisau, 9 September, 1867. 
 
 In continuation of my letter of the Gth instant 
 (No. 10) I have the honor to report that from the 
 publications of the Moniteur de Varmee it has been 
 ascertained: 
 
 1. The augmentation of troops in the north- 
 eastern garrisons in France does not, as stated in 
 that letter as being possible, amount to forty-five, 
 but to twenty-eight battalions. The earlier assump- 
 tion that the troops of the camp at Chalons would 
 remain in the northeast has been confirmed, it is 
 true, but in their place troops have been transferred 
 from the northeast to the south and west. 
 
 2. The same number of the Moniteur declares 
 expressly that the troops up to now at Chalons would 
 become part of the territorial command in their 
 garrisons. In the same sense this number of the 
 Moniteur brings a "Dementi of the Constitution" 
 against keeping these troops as a part of the active 
 divisions. 
 
 3. The rumor of the reinforcement of the Army 
 of Paris by a division reduces itself, according to the 
 same number of the Moniteur, to the fact that in 
 place of the 1st Division, to be disorganized (the 
 regiments of that division to go to the west and 
 south), a new division under the same numerical 
 designation is to be formed under the command of 
 General Douay. 
 
 4. The late reports of contemplated movements 
 of the navy, especially at Toulon, are now explained 
 to be connected with an intended inspection on a 
 large scale. 
 
 105 
 
To Korv(> as a basis in a vliHcussioii willi llic Assistant ('hi(>f 
 of tlui (JcMuiral Staff coiu-cmmuii};' I1u> positions aiul ihv lirst 
 oj)t>ralions of th(> army in a {-ainpai^n against France, (General 
 V. MoltU(> niailt"tli<> follo\vin<;' not(>s: 
 
 No. 12 
 
 lloi-liii. 11) NovcMiiber, 18(17. 
 
 Ill tlu' event of (lilTiculties with France next 
 s[)rin^\ it is {)f()l):ihle that Austria's and DcMiniark's 
 attitude will he (l()ul)Lful, to say tiie least, and that 
 therefore it will he necessary to leave parts of our 
 li«4ht iii.u' forees o|)i)osed to them. 
 
 As in such a ease the XI 1th Army Corps would 
 have to eoneentrate at Neisse. the 1st Army Corps 
 traiisportiMl via l>aml)er.u- and Fraid^furt to Ilansdorf 
 and would have to march from there to Gorlitz, and 
 a strong- division of the IXtli Army Corps would have 
 to proc(HHl by rail via llamhur.u', Berlin and Kotthus 
 also to Ci()rlit/. makin.u' a total of SO, 000 men, which. 
 reinforciHl l)\' Laiulwi^hr, would have to iiniti' alon.u" 
 the mountains according' to the nature of the opera- 
 tions taken later on by Austria; but they would have 
 to occupy Dresden in any case. The rest of the IXth 
 Army (\)rps concentrates in the fort i tied camp at 
 Diippel. 
 
 In this movement all the lines leadinji' west will 
 remain untt>uched. and we can send there ten army 
 corps, a total of more than ;U)(),()00. 
 
 The advance" .uuard marchin.u- on France will he 
 formed by the r)th Division, which can be at Saar- 
 briicken on tlie 17th day, an(i the KUh Division, 
 which concentrates about the same time the other 
 side of Trier. 
 
 Both divisions will iiave to cover the march of 
 
 106 
 
—107 
 
 the army in the Rhine Palatinate and also the march 
 of" the Virth Army Corps, as well as to secure the 
 railroad as far as })()ssible. 
 
 By the twenty-fifth day the Otli Division and the 
 IVth Army Ci)ri)S will arrive at Neunkirchen, the 
 former via Kreuznach, the latter via Kaiserslautern; 
 the Vllth Army Corps will arrive at Wittlich, and 
 parts of these three ort»-anizations may arrive at those 
 places even before then, which will enable the ad- 
 vance guards, supported by them and by the terrain, 
 to hold their position in front and will i)revent the 
 necessity of their having- to retreat via Neunkirchen 
 and Wittlich. 
 
 In case these movements could not be made, then 
 of course transportation on the Nahe and the Bex- 
 bach railroads would have to be commenced earlier. 
 
 At the stated lime the Ifjth Division is assembled 
 at Morbach, the lid and the Xlth Corps are echeloned 
 between Alzey and Mayence, and the Vth and the 
 Xllth Corps at Mannheim (the latter probably a little 
 later?). 
 
 On the whole, on the twenty-fifth day, there will 
 be at our disposal ei^ht army cori)S, about 250,000 
 men, between the Saar and the Rhine, which can be 
 concentrated in the center in three marches, to the 
 front or to one of the flanks in seven marches. 
 
 At our disposal then in honu; garrisons are the 
 Guard Corps and the Xth Army ('ori)s, some 05,000 
 men, which can be transi)orted to Dresden or via 
 Binj^en and Mayence after the twenty-fifth day, to 
 allow us to utilize 150,000 men against Austria and 
 250,000 men against France. 
 
 If by that time it were ascertained that no large 
 force would be re(|uired against Austria, then the 
 army against France could be reinforced by the 
 thirty-second day to over IJOO,000 men, without leav- 
 ing Silesia and Saxony unguarded. 
 
-108- 
 
 Fightinp: forces against France: 
 
 1st Army VII and VIII Army Corps. 
 2d Army III. IV and finally Guard Corps. 
 8d Army II, XI. and linally Xtli Army Corps. 
 4lh Aj-my V and XII th Army Corps. 
 
 DEFENSIVE 
 
 If we should be unable to complete our prepara- 
 tions ahead of the French, then we must expect the 
 enemy's offensive operations to begin by the twenty- 
 fifth day. 
 
 Smaller detachments of the enemy, which may 
 advance on the left bank of the Mosel. will offensively 
 advance against the 16th, 13th. and lllli Divisions or 
 against parts of these. 
 
 Should 50.000 French or more march against 
 Coblenz — Cologne, which is not probable, then the 
 above mentioned divisions will unite with the 15th 
 behind the Mosel to guard the crossings. An offen- 
 sive executed by the center of the army via Saar- 
 bi*iicken and Saarlouis will compel the enemy to im- 
 mediately evacuate the country on the left bank of 
 the Rhine. 
 
 Should the French main force advance from 
 Metz— Nancy against Mayence — Mannheim, we have 
 to learn that fact through the resistance which the 
 Hid Army Corps will have to make at Saarbriicken 
 and Neunkirchen. 
 
 Then it will be a question whether or not we will 
 be able to make a front halfway on our advance, 
 at Homberg, about the thirtieth or the thirty-second 
 day. with the Hid, IVth and the Xlth and lid Corps 
 uibout 125,000 men\ the latter continuing the march. 
 
 A position prepared in advance behind the upper 
 Blies and at so important a railroad appears to be 
 favored by the terrain. 
 
 It will undoubtedlv be the enemv's endeavor to 
 
—109— 
 
 combine his attack at that point from the west with 
 one from the soutii, tiie latter executed probably l)y 
 the fighting" forces assembled at Strassburg. To 
 meet that, it is necessary to leave the Vth and the 
 Xllth Corps in march to Landau, in order to hold, by 
 an offensive from there, the Strassburg Corps or to 
 draw near to the main army via Piermasens, should 
 that army march on Bitsch. 
 
 Should our left wing be threatened by such a 
 move it would at th(> most result in a retreat on 
 Coblenz, which is not an unfavorable direction at all. 
 On the other hand, and being strategically of more 
 disadvantage, the left wing of the French main force 
 is endangered by the Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps, 
 should we succeed to bring the«e up on the day of 
 the decision. 
 
 Leaving nothing but observation detachments on 
 the Mosel, these two corps should be started in the 
 general direction of iiirkenfeld, St. Wendel or Tholey. 
 But as their actual arrival at a certain point cannot 
 be counted on as to day and hour, the battlefield can 
 not be designated defmitely in advance. Slill an 
 apt and comj)etent leader will not be unable to regu- 
 late the march of the two corps with that of the main 
 army -by having the former make longer, the latter 
 shorter marches- so as to insure the union of both 
 on the day of the decision, should that be farther to 
 the rear on the Lauter or Alsenz, where then in addi- 
 tion to the lid and Xlth Cori)s, possibly also the 
 Guard Corps and the Xth Army Corps might be dis- 
 posable on the thirty- fourth or the thirty-sixth day. 
 
 It remains to })e decided later, whether we will 
 make a stand on the twenty-fifth day with the Hid 
 and IVth Corps, 05, 000 men, at Neunkirchen or 
 Homburg, or accept battle about the thirtieth day 
 with the Illd, IVth, Vllth, Vlllth, lid and Xlth 
 Corps, 200,000 men, opposite Kaiserslautern, or wait 
 
-110— 
 
 until the thirty-fourth day for the Guard Corps and 
 the Xth Corps, presupposing of course that the 
 Strassburg Army is held in check by the Vth and the 
 Xllth Corps. 
 
 OFFENSIVE 
 
 If we are able to bring our army into position 
 opposite the French army so timely that the latter 
 has not been able to drive back the Hid and IVth 
 Army Corps behind the line Neunkirchen— Zwei- 
 brticken by the thirty-third day, then by that day the 
 Xlth and lid Army Corps, coming from Alzey, will 
 have approached to behind that line, and the Guard 
 Corps or the Xth Corps, continuing their travel on 
 the Nahe and Bexbach railroad, have reached there, 
 a total of 150,000 men. 
 
 The Vllth and Vlllth Corps have marched to 
 the vicinity of St. Wendel and Tholey. 
 
 The advance guards will be advanced to the Saar. 
 
 The Vth and Xllth Corps are concentrated at 
 Landau. Their attitude depends on that of the hos- 
 tile fighting forces assembled at Strassburg. They 
 have to cover towards the south the advance of the 
 main army westward, to protect the railroad con- 
 nections and to finally draw near the main army. 
 
 The offensive of the main army will be directed 
 on its object, the French offensive, which at that 
 time we may assume to be close in our front. Even 
 should that not be the case, we are certain to meet it 
 if we advance in the direction Nancy — Pont a 
 Mousson, which threatens France the most, and 
 which line can be reached within seven marches. 
 
 In that advance the strictest concentration is 
 necessary. 
 
 The Second Army is assigned to the Saarbriicken 
 —St. Avoid— Han on the Nied roads; the Third 
 
-iii- 
 
 Army the Saargemiind — Piittlingen — Baron weiler 
 road. 
 
 On the whole only the artillery will march on 
 these roads, the cavalry and at least a part of the 
 infantry will use parallel roads, consequently short 
 marches and bivouacs. 
 
 The marching depth of the corps must be regu- 
 lated so that it will not be more than eight (English) 
 miles. 
 
 The advance guards, accompanied by so much 
 cavalry as the terrain demands, march half a march 
 in front. 
 
 The leading corps of each army starts at day- 
 break, the second corps after cooking, the third 
 corps follows at the proper time the next morning. 
 
 The opponent cannot advance in close concentra- 
 tion. Considering the nature of French troop lead- 
 ing it is not probable, though possible, that the 
 French army will await us in a prepared position and 
 thus have all its fighting forces in hand. 
 
 If the advance guards encounter resistance which 
 they cannot overcome, main bodies in rear support 
 the advance guard. Two corps of each army are 
 concentrated each evening, the third, if necessary, 
 can be brought up by a night march, or will arrive 
 behind the front the next morning as a reserve. 
 
 The First Army marches via Kreuzwald to Fiil- 
 lingen, one division as right flank guard via Bolchen 
 to Contchen on the Nied towards Metz. 
 
 On the first day after crossing the frontier the 
 leading elements of the three armies will be twelve 
 (English) miles apart, on the third day but eight 
 (English) miles, on the line Ftillingen — Baron weiler. 
 The depth of the column, with sideward bivouacs 
 and short marches, would be confined to eight (Eng- 
 lish) miles (measures for subsistence to be taken in 
 accordance therewith). Thus we could deploy any 
 
\V1 
 
 (lay 'jr>().(M)() nuMi Ww bat lie, !iol. only to l.lic front, but 
 uIho loward;! I be Hank, sboiild (be P'rciicb ai'iny ad- 
 vance l(» lb(> attack iVoni cilbcr tbc Ni«'d or Ibc 
 Scillc. 
 
 I'bc killer o|>i'ialion \\t»idd ba\t> Ibc Kmirlb 
 Ai'ni\' in Ibc tkinl\ and \\(»ubk in caMc ot" a lost ballU', 
 merely lercc ns lo retire on lb<' Kbiiie bn*'. 
 
 A concent rat ion bebind tbc SeiUe bas tbc ad 
 vatdap.c' l«>i" tb(> l'"rencb main arni.\' ot" bciniv in tbc 
 ver.\' start in connection wilb I be Stras.sljnrp, Army. 
 Ibil a rapid ad\am-e on onr pari \ia Saarbrdcken and 
 l''inst nu'.en will lead ns to t be in nei' line of opera t ions 
 belw'cen t be two armies. Sbonid I bese armies al- 
 i"»'ad>' be nniled at Saai'lMirc.. I ben. brinjvin).'.' up onr 
 IA)urtb Ainiy, and bavinj-V a .r.ood ba.se, Ibc battle 
 VVonId lead m a direction w bicb would, in case of 
 vi(l(M>' on onr part, drive I be I'Vencb arin\ away 
 from raris. 
 
 More datiKiM'ons would be I be tirst operation, 
 wbicb. Ill c.iseof reverst>, would cut all onr commnni- 
 c;it ion.-;. It i.s true tliat tln>n;ilso coiidil i(»iis would 
 be |)recarioiis tor tbeenem.w but not so mucb as on 
 our sitb'. consi(b'rinp, Ibc |>ro\iinit.\ (d' two torli'esses 
 and I be Mosel sector. 
 
 Still. Ibis presupposes I bat I be l''reiu-b. in ac- 
 cordanc«> wilb a strict l\' defensiNe pl.in ot" war, b.i\<> 
 conc«Mit r.aled tlieir in;iin force lietw(>en I >iedeiib(d"('n 
 ;ind M(>t.'., w liicb would mean ;ill .abseiuM' td" conm'C 
 lion Willi tbc p.irt oi" I li(> l"ori-es wbicb are conipelle(i 
 lo lea\ <> t be r.iilroad in tlu> Ivbiiu' \ alK\\ at Strassburj-V 
 (o H\H>id I'.reat lo^;s ot' limt>. 'kbereby I bese forct^s 
 would run into d.ini'.cr, as wo i-an «'asily rtMiifori'o our 
 l'\>urlli Ariin t'lom I be concentration ;it llonibiiri.v. 
 
 It' alttM' t be «>nd ot" trom t"our to ti\o w«^'ks, we 
 sbouM still be wilbout inl'oianation as lo tbc position 
 ot" tbe l''r<Micb main t'orce, a reconnaissance in force 
 S(Mit oul \^\ tbe l''irst Arm\ \ ia Keibmvon towards 
 
ii:t 
 
 liciclicfslK'f}'; :iii(l oiif hy IIm' 'l'liii'<l Ai'iiiy (ow.-ifd;; llici 
 St'ille would he llic iiic.-uis to dccido if vvc vvoidd liiivtJ 
 to .s<'('k (lie oMpoiicnl, llici'c. Ill I li;i,(, cast' of coiii'sc 
 oiu" adv.'iiicc would have lo he made lowJirdu llic Nicd 
 or ii|» I lie Saar. 
 
 {•'iiially, we iniiHl. coiiHidcr liu' po.s; iMIil y llial 
 the P'rciicii will (hd'ciiHi Vcly li<)ld IIk' vvcakci pail of 
 llic coiir;.!' (d" llic IVIoscI bt'twccii liiiiicvillc and IVIcI/,. 
 
 Ill Ilia I case o!i<' division of llic l*'irsl Army v\oiild 
 liolil llic Nicd croHsinKs casi of IVIcI/,, llic Army 
 ilscir lal'.c a po,'^;ilioii al i'cllrc !i^':<dnsl Mclz, and i»\v 
 corps of llic 'I'liird Army would liavc lo procc<'d to 
 ( '-lialcaii-Salins, to prol<'cl llic l»d'l flank. 
 
 The remainder of the army, more llian '^(lO.OOO 
 men, would proceed towards C-lieininol and NoUK'ny, 
 would drive oil" the oiilpost, position of the enemy on 
 the Seill<' and direct the attack towai'ds Tout ;i 
 lViou:;soii. 
 
 TIm' proh.'ihility will Im- thai we will meet \\\i\ 
 h'reiich army hclvvecn the Ulics .and the S<'ille, .and 
 our measures should princip.ally he h;i,;c(| on thai, 
 suppo.'.il ion. 
 
 In ;iiiy c:i;;e the i^'oiirth Army should he so much 
 rcinforccMl th.at- the wcstw.ard .advance will not he 
 disl.iU'lxMJ from the ;;outh. 'i'his c;i.n <';isily he done, 
 as the karj'.er the Strusshiu'j.', Ataiiy is, tJic sm.allcr 
 will he the l'Ven(di m.ain :irmy. 
 
 Should t Im- oper.at ion he conducl('(| IVoni StrasH- 
 hurjvon the riM'ht hank of Uic Rhine, llial- would not 
 cliaiij.',<' any tliiuK herein; t he separal ion of t he l'V<'nch 
 lorccH woidd he moi'c complete, the d;in).';cr to our oC- 
 rensive advance lens. 'I'Im' I'ourth Army would cioss 
 l,lie lihinc ;d, (l<'rm<'r;;heim. 
 
Tlio mi'Msuic lt> he (akcii in casr ol an ortcnsivt' advanri" 
 ol' 1.Ih> I<\'<mi('Ii l)i<ron> roinplction ol IIhmi- iii()l)ili/,ali(>ii art> 
 tllMtMlsst>«l l)\ ( icncral \'. IMnlllvi' in I he rollowiii;.', : 
 
 NO. i:; 
 
 Hi rliii. Jl March, ISdS. 
 
 II iMiinol 1>(> st'(M) in ;uK;iiUH' if tlu> !''r(MH'li will 
 wait for llu> I'rivulal ion arniamcnt of tluif liivhlin.u' 
 ("(M'ccs, ov il llii\\ will aiKanro to llu- allark with 
 what lli(\\ now liaxcal ( Ikmt disposal. 
 
 Wo. on our paiM. can hold to but one mcMluMl cd" 
 placini»' (Mir ann\ in i-i>;idinoss. winch must l>o in ai*- 
 t'ordaiu'o with hoth oxonlnalh ios. 
 
 Onr plans I'oi- this woro woi"kod out last Noximh- 
 hvv and wo now ha\o only to oxannno il' tho lali\st 
 tahlos (d' niohili/.ation. I h(> add it ion ( I l.msu I lorsl\dd) 
 to tho railroad niM ini.wht hasUMi a ('om-iMit ral ion on 
 llu> Uhiniv 
 
 TluMi wo shonld (>\:inuno. in what reflation this 
 MU>thod. to ho dosii>natiMl as tho pornianont ono. 
 stands to a stratt'jvioal attack Miad(> by l"'ianco. 
 
 'I'akin.u- tho case (d" a s( raloirii'al alt.ack. TiMHH) 
 I'^riMudi conld roach I ho Khin(> lino on tho Hdth da\'. 
 their K^uliiiiV oKmucmiIs prol>al>l\' a low da\s oarlit>r: 
 thai is, at a tinio when t hi> I\hnu> I'orti'osscs ai'o not 
 coinpli>tol>' supi^liod. l»ot\>ro t lu> I ,andwidir •varris(>ns 
 ha\o arrix od and whon I'onstnpionl 1\ acti\<> liuhtinii" 
 Iriiops i^i' tho lini' wonid ho I'lHiuirod thori'. 
 
 Il cannot ho assnnioti that iho I'Voiudi will ivo as 
 I'ai' as tho \\\>scl, t>\ on if thi\\ shonld ijvnoro Lnxoiu- 
 luiri;"'s nont i-alit\'. Tho disad\ aniaivos wonM all Ih> 
 o\\ their siilo. 
 
 Thoi-o ari> six battalions o\' tho lllh l>i\isii>n in 
 (.\)K\iViu\ Tho thro(« in Aix la-l'hapollo and .liilich 
 could wait until coinpU'tiiMi oi' their nu)bih7,a(ion» 
 III 
 
( licii- coinmiiiiic;!! ion, ;il Ic.'ist vi;i I Xisscldorf, v\(tiil(l 
 iKtl !>(' (Mul.'iiM'.crcd ; the (lircc in ('olilcn/, should for 
 
 IllO pfCSCIll !>(' lol'l, (ll<'fC. 
 
 VVc (•;itiiio( iTckod with ccrlMiiily oti tho four 
 h;il l;ilioiis of I he Hll h l»ivisi«tii in S;i;ii'louis; Ihcy (•:in 
 noil her ;il. once he (h';iv\ri oil' noc relieved hy L.-uid 
 wclir. 
 
 In Ihe sl;irl we woidil li;iv<' to reiionnce holditij'; 
 l,he terrain on l,h(> iefl. of Uie Ivliine under Ihe ;l:ile(| 
 assumptions. (/()Mse(iU(>nlly we coidd lirini- lt;ick ;il 
 once I heir supplies l)\' steamer ;ind rail. I do nol hc- 
 licve thai, this procediu'c woidd cMUse a h'ss unf.-ivor- 
 imi)r('Hsion Ihan if Ihey were lo rel re;d, lijrlitinK- 
 
 Kive hatlidion;; ."itid live ;.(|u;i(lrons in Trier form 
 an advanced detachment, which, especially il rein- 
 forced l»y half a 1».mI tcry from Cohlen/ hy steamer 
 may cahnly await the enemy's adv.'ince. Their rein- 
 foj-cemenls will arrive on the SI h (l;iy. Tli<" ro:id to 
 ('ohlen/, oilers a series of positions, in which a li)-, hi 
 cat! he hrokeii oil" without dani-.er, and the river can 
 easily he? crossed at, I'errdvastd. 
 
 More dillicull is llie rel,re;d lor the h;dl;dion in 
 Sanrhriicken, hut lli;it will he prolecled hy live 
 S(iuadrons. It, is desirahle I hat I his hat lalion shoidd 
 rr/>//ir itself alotiK Hie Nahe railro;id, then via Sitn- 
 meiMi. 
 
 I am of of)inion that we shoidd nol, hlow up l,li(^ 
 vv()»"ks on the railroad, as we have y:oi)i\ chances lo 
 ag'ain he on the S:i;ir in fourteen (l;iys. That the en 
 emy should destroy the works is possihie mihI proh- 
 ahl(*, hid, not certain, and then it wouhl miike no dif- 
 ference had we done it, or Ihe enemy. 
 
 (londitions will have t,o decide wlH'lJH'r we will 
 destroy an emhatd\(n<'nt , hut not a viaduct or lunncl, 
 which delays the enemy some days, dr.'iws his ;illen- 
 tiori, hut can \u' reconstriictfd within a few days. 
 
 iiy the 20LI) day there will liave arrived at May- 
 
—116- 
 
 ence the largest part of the Xlth, IVth and Vth 
 Corps. It is possible that the transportation of the 
 Illd Corps from Cologne cannot be continued up the 
 Rhine. 
 
 But in any case there probably will be so many 
 fighting forces on the right bank of the Rhine from 
 Cologne to Mayence by the 20th day, that 70,000 
 French cannot attempt to cross the stream. 
 
 Then we would have to take the offensive as 
 early as possible from Cologne, Coblenz, Mayence 
 and finally also from Mannheim, The French rail- 
 roads will undoubtedly be taken up with the trans- 
 port of peace cadres up to the 10th day. Thereafter 
 the reinforcing detachments, more than 100, 000 men, 
 will have to be brought up after completion of cloth- 
 ing, equipments and organization, as well as the mo- 
 bile National Guard for the frontier fortresses. 
 
 Reaction would then set in. 
 
Shortly thereafter General v. Moltke sketched out his 
 views as to the marching- into position of the German figliting 
 forces and the probable first movements, in the following 
 memorial:* 
 
 No. 14 
 
 Berlin, in April 1868. 
 
 If war should happen this year, we may count 
 with certainty on the fact that it will be only with 
 France alone. Incomplete equipments, armament, 
 etc. the disinclination of Hungary and the attitude 
 of Russia preclude Austria's participation. Conse- 
 quently we will be able to utilize nearly all of our 
 forces against the one enemy. 
 
 Still, it is advisable to leave the Vlth Corps at 
 home in the start, or at least to transport it last, and 
 to relieve the Xllth Corps, which cannot be left in its 
 present station. Finally, it is necessary to leave a 
 strong force to protect the provinces and the coast, 
 especially the North Sea coast, as France will hardly 
 leave an arm like its fleet unused. 
 
 In less than three years we can build no fortifi- 
 cation or maritime protection, and active defense 
 will have to do its best. 
 
 Accordingly the Vlth and IXth Corps cannot be 
 counted on, they will form only the last transport 
 echelon. 
 
 This leaves eleven army corps, 360,000 men, and 
 these will form a force which is equal to the French 
 force, even if the latter does not direct itself against 
 different attacking points. 
 
 We will gain a material superiority as soon as 
 
 *0n the cover of this there is a note in the liandwriting 
 of the general r^s follows: "final, and governed by present 
 conditions, sketch of a plan of operations. 20-5 v.M.'' 
 117 
 
—118- 
 
 the South Germans join us even if with only from 
 40,000 to GO. 000 men. 
 
 Equality or superiority, will be attained only if 
 we are able to concentrate our forces opposite the 
 French at the proper time. 
 
 This concentration will take place within two 
 time limits, which are confined by the capacities of 
 the available railroads. 
 
 Firtit period, counted from the first mobilizotion 
 day to the 22d day: 
 
 ARMY MEN 
 
 1st 00,000 
 
 2d 60,000 
 
 3d 70,000 
 
 4th 80,000 
 
 Vllth Army Corps by 
 
 marching- 
 VIII th Army Corps by 
 
 marchinj^- and using 
 
 auxiliary line Call 
 Hid Army Corps, R.R. 
 
 Hanover 
 IVth Army Corps, R.R. 
 
 Halle-Marburg 
 lid Army Corps, R.R. 
 
 Halle-Fulda 
 Xth Army Corps. R.R. 
 
 Paderborn — Wetzlar 
 Hessian Division in - - 
 One Bavarian Brigade i 
 Vth Army Corps. R. R. 
 
 Leipzig- Wiirzburg 
 Xlth Army Corps (21st 
 
 Division marching) 
 Wiirttemberg Division, 
 
 rail and marching 
 Baden Division, rail an 
 
 marching 
 
 d 
 
 Coblenz and 
 beyond on 
 the Mosel 
 
 Mayenceand 
 beyond in the 
 Bavarian 
 Palatinate 
 
 Mayence 
 
 Darmstadt 
 Landau 
 
 Mannheim 
 
 Stuttgart 
 Rastatt 
 
 Total 280,000 men. 
 
 The First Army concentrates towards Wittlich. 
 It will try to see if it can support its advance guard 
 at Trier. Should a superior French army advance 
 through Luxemburg, it will give way, probably at 
 
- 1)9— 
 
 Bernkaatel, to the rig'ht bank of the Mosel, keeping 
 possession of the crossinprs. If it has no enemy in 
 its front, it will draw near the Second Army with 
 which it will keep up connection and march abreast 
 of. In a battle in the Palatinate it would be of de- 
 cisive importance for the First Army to appear at the 
 rig'ht time on the enemy's left flank. 
 
 The detachment of the IGth Division at Saar- 
 briicken will not be ordered back, but immediately 
 reinforced from Mayence via the Nahe railroad by 
 the 5th Division, to keep us informed what parts of 
 the enemy advance on the Palatinate. 
 
 If after that conditions permit, the Hid and IVth 
 Army Corps will continue their journey without in- 
 terruption on the Nahe and P)exbach railroad, and 
 the Second Army will asseml)le on the line Homburg 
 — Zweibriicken. 
 
 The Third Army follows by marching imme- 
 diately as reserve. 
 
 Conditions obtaining at place and time will gov- 
 ern whether we will accept battle, even before the 
 arrival of the second transport echelon between the 
 Blies and the Rhine, with the 
 
 Second and Third Army- - - - 180,000 men 
 later supy)()rted by the First Army 00, 000 men 
 
 that is, with ------ 190,000 men 
 
 Should the French army have already invaded 
 the Palatinate in force when our army corps reach 
 the Rhine, then of course th<! two railroads diverging 
 there could not be used for transporting the entire 
 Second Army. 
 
 Both armies would then await the arrival of re- 
 inforcements in a strong defensive position in front 
 of Mayence, for instance, with their right wing on 
 the Donnersberg. Accordingly the First Army should 
 be sent through the Hunsruck. 
 
—120- 
 
 Concerning- the destruction of the Nahe railroad 
 the detachment at Saarbriicken will receive direct 
 orders from general headquarters. 
 
 The Fourth Army is designated to receive or 
 support the South Germans. Southern Germany will 
 best be protected by an offensive with all forces far 
 into France. 
 
 If by the 22d day a French army has not yet 
 crossed the upper Rhine, the Fourth Army concen- 
 trates on the line Neustadt — Landau (the contingents 
 from Baden via Maxau, those from Wtirttemberg via 
 Germersheim) and follows the forward movement of 
 our main army as a left echelon. 
 
 Even if, as is probable, a French army is con- 
 centrated at Strassburg, it will not dare, considering 
 the deployment of our large forces in the Palatinate, 
 to cross the Rhine below Strassburg. (An incursion 
 through the Breisgau with an auxiliary army would 
 be of no effect on the campaign a^d would merely 
 weaken the French fighting force.) The Strassburg 
 Army can operate only against the left fiank of our 
 offensive advance. But we stand on the inner line 
 of operation between the Strassburg Army and the 
 enemy's main line, which latter, if it desires to make 
 full use of the railroad net, can concentrate only on 
 the other side of the Vogdes, about on the line Die- 
 denhofen— Nancy. Therefore we have the choice, if 
 the advance of the Strassburg Army offers the op- 
 portunity of a short, quick, offensive advance on the 
 left bank of the Rhine and upstream, to give to the 
 Fourth Army a decided superiority by reinforcing it 
 from the Third Army; against the west we would 
 confine ourselves in the meantime to the defensive. 
 
 If on the other hand, the French have been en- 
 abled to cross the upper Rhine before we complete 
 our concentration, the Vth and the Xlth Corps would 
 march up the Rhine on the right bank, would receive 
 
—121— 
 
 the Wiirttembergers and Badensers in Bruchsal and 
 Rastatt and advance on the enemy's communications 
 and compel him to turn about. We should not be 
 afraid of this partition of our figchting forces and we 
 can carry out the offensive with our main force 
 towards the west after the arrival of the second 
 transport echelons, because the enemy has also di- 
 vided his forces and abandoned all connection between 
 them. 
 
 The fact that the South German contingents do 
 not directly join the Fourth Army but operate inde- 
 pendently, based on Ulm, for the defense of the 
 Black Forest, must not be lost sight of and in that 
 case we would allow them to do so and, leaving but 
 but an observation detachment on the Neckar, open 
 the offensive on France with all four armies. The 
 capture of Southern Germany can have no effect on 
 us, before we have had a battle which will call back 
 the French for the d'^fense of their own territory. 
 During the time the French march from Strassburg 
 to Ulm we march from Mayence to Nancy. There 
 we will endanger the communications even of the 
 French South Army, while we on our part will have 
 our Rhine land in our immediate rear. 
 
 Only the loss of the South German fortresses 
 would be a material disadvantage. 
 
 Second Period— to the 30th day. 
 
 Immediately following the above mentioned corps, 
 there would have to be transported: 
 
 the Guard Corps via Hanover— Cologne; 
 
 the Xllth Corps via Corbetha — Fulda; 
 
 (the 22d Division joins the Xlth Corps by marching). 
 
 Should, after three weeks, conditions be such as 
 to show that the 18th Division is a sufficient force in 
 Schleswig, and should a Landwehr garrison suffice 
 for Dresden, then within this period the following 
 could be brought up to the Rhine: 
 
-122— 
 
 the 17th Division via Kreiensen— Wetzlar; 
 the 1st Army Corps via Cassel. 
 
 After three weeks the Bavarian corps also would 
 have to be concentrated in the vicinity of Wiirzburg 
 — Nordlingen. 
 
 In case the French have invaded Southern Ger- 
 many, the Bavarian corps would co-operate with the 
 Fourth Army; provided it could not immediately join 
 that army via: 
 
 Stuttgart — Bruchsal ; 
 Heilbronn; / Heidelberg; 
 
 Aschaffenburg; \ Darmstadt. 
 
 The ordre de bataille* would then be about as 
 follows: 
 
 First Army, Vllth and Vlllth Corps - 60,000 men; 
 Second Army, Hid, IVth and Guard Corps 110,000 men; 
 Third Army, lid, Xth, Xllth & 1st Corps 120,000 men; 
 Fourth Army, Vth, Xlth, each one Baden, 
 
 1 Wiirttemberg Di v. , 2 Bavarian corps 140,000 men ; 
 
 A total of - - - 430,000 men. 
 
 The Third Army forms the reserve for the other 
 three. 
 
 A second army reserve would have to be formed 
 of the 17th Division and eventually the Vlth Corps, 
 which would bring the fighting force to a numerical 
 strength of 480,000 men, and which reserve would 
 have to secure the communications to the rear of the 
 greatly extended line of operations, 
 
 ■■■As shown by a marginal notation, General v. Moltke 
 assumed the Army Commanders. Chiefs of General Staff and 
 Quartermaster Generals of these armies as follows: 
 First Army -Grand Duke v. Mecklenburg or Gen. v. Herwarth; 
 
 Schlotheim. Veith. 
 Second Army-Prince Frederick Charles; 
 
 Stiilpnagel. Strantz. 
 Third Armv — v. Stein metz; 
 
 Wittlieb. Stiehle. 
 Fourth Army-Crown Princ^e; 
 
 Blumenthal. Stosch. 
 
—123- 
 
 Concerning the Bavarians specially, Nordlingen 
 — Wtirzburg is to be recommended as a point of con- 
 centration for them, "because the concentration will 
 first have to be effected in their own territory, and 
 because the Bavarian government will willingly ac- 
 ceed to these views," the Bavarian territory being 
 thereby directly protected. 
 
 In case of a French invasion there will of course 
 be an inclination to throw the 1st Corps to Ulm, and 
 that corps will then draw on itself the French fight- 
 ing forces, and that in a direction very dangerous to 
 us. But if the contingents from Baden and Wiirtt- 
 emberg have joined our Fourth Army, the Bavarian 
 corps can find support nowheres. 
 
 For' the event, that we can advance on the left 
 bank of the Rhine with all our forces, the Bavarian 
 corps would have to be drawn up directly via Maxau, 
 Germersheim and Ludwigshafen. 
 
 If, however, there is no necessity for the entire 
 Fourth Army to advance towards Strassburg, a posi- 
 tion of the Bavarian corps at Vendenheim against 
 Strassburg might be sufficient to secure to us, after 
 the forcible capture of the barrier-forts, the impor- 
 tant Mannheim— Weissemburg— Vendenheim— Nancy 
 R. R. 
 
 We might possibly also charge the Bavarians 
 with an investment of Strassburg, 
 
On May 13, 1868, a conference took place in Berlin be- 
 tween General von Molbke and the military plenipotentiaries 
 of Bavaria and Wiirttembei'g concerning the combined em- 
 ployment of the North and South German fighting forces in 
 case of a war with France. The subject matter of his views 
 expressed in that conference General v. Moltke submitted to 
 the Chancellor, Count v. Bismarck, as follows: 
 
 No. 15 
 
 Berlin, 13 May, 1868. 
 
 Theoretically speaking, and considering the ex- 
 isting offensive and defensive alliance with Southern 
 Germany, nothing will be necessary except for the 
 South German contingents to be ready at the proper 
 time and in full number to carry out the orders which 
 His Majesty, the King of Prussia, will issue in his 
 capacity of commander-in-chief in accordance with 
 the situation in case of a war with France. Practi- 
 cally, however, the matter is different. 
 
 The offensive and defensive alliance is always an 
 incomplete form of mutual help, and has just so 
 much value, as each party of the alliance is able to 
 give help. In this relation conditions of proportion 
 are by no means equal. 
 
 The North furnishes an army, the South fur- 
 nishes contingents; we have a war lord, the South 
 but a confederation commander-in-chief; the South 
 with the best intentions can but furnish us a coalition. 
 
 The difference between a Union army and a 
 coalition is well shown by the campaign of 1866. 
 
 Austria had a defensive and offensive alliance 
 with Southern Germany. It demanded no less than 
 that the South German contingents should unite 
 with the Austrian army in Bohemia. With a superi- 
 
 124 
 
—125— 
 
 ority of 90,000 men there was a hope to attain the 
 main object of the war. But in this plan the South 
 Germans were expected to leave their territory de- 
 fenseless against an invasion and it is easily under- 
 stood that they declined to do so. 
 
 The same thing- occurred in a less degree with 
 Bavaria. Bavaria had a defensive and offensive 
 alliance with the South German States and had the 
 supreme command. Its field marshal demanded what 
 was entirely correct from a military standpoint, i.e., 
 the Vlllth Confederation Corps to join the Vllth 
 Confederation Corps. But Nassau, Frankfurt and 
 Darmstadt demanded protection, and an advance was 
 made west around the Vogel Mountains, where a 
 junction to the front was impossible. 
 
 And vice versa: Assuming that the Rhine land 
 and Westphalia had been a Sovereign Grand-Duchy, 
 would it have been possible, even with the existence 
 of a defensive and offensive alliance, for it to send 
 its entire force out of the country and to Bohemia, 
 where the decision was to be found? 
 
 All special considerations may be disregarded 
 in a Union, in a Confederation they have to be taken 
 into account. Consequently the question is not to 
 demand from the South Germans w^hat is militarily 
 correct for the attainment of the w^ar object, but to 
 demand what they can and will perform with due 
 regard to their own security. And that may be 
 arrived at by discussion. 
 
 An immediate offense in superior force, which 
 threatens the enemy in his own country, which holds 
 his fighting force there, secures indirectly the whole 
 of Germany. All states will willingly participate in 
 that offense. But for such an offense political initia- 
 tive is required and a readiness for war as cannot be 
 found now in Southern Germany. 
 
 Consequently also the first defensive protection 
 of South Germany has to be considered. 
 
—126— 
 
 We believe the lower as well as the upper Rhine 
 are best protected by an army on the central Rhine. 
 The South German States need a firm guaranty that 
 we will be there in time and in great strength, in 
 order to come to a decision as to their measures, and 
 that guaranty I can give. 
 
 There are two ways for a defense: 
 
 1. The direct, for which the South German 
 States can concentrate within their frontier, in order 
 to hold the Rhine Valley or the Black Forest from 
 about Rottweil, or to at least hold the Iller in protect- 
 ing Uim. We do not consider this way the correct 
 one, but we cannot object thereto. That in this 
 way a direct participation by North German troops 
 is excluded, is the result of long distance as well as 
 of the guarding of the independence of the South 
 German States. This then leaves but — 
 
 2. The indirect defense, which bases itself on 
 the North German fighting force on the Neckar and 
 Main, advances on the flank and on the communica- 
 tions of the invasion made by the enemy and forces 
 an immediate retreat of the same. Two Prussian 
 army corps, 66,000 men, would be expressly assigned 
 to form, with a combination Wiirttemberg— Baden 
 corps and two Bavarian corps, a left wing army of 
 140,000 men. This army would operate up the Neckar 
 or up the Rhine, dependent on whether the enemy 
 has already advanced, and on the left bank of the 
 Rhine in case the advance is only threatened. It can 
 be reinforced as necessary, if the enemy uses larger 
 forces in his undertaking against Southern Germany, 
 as in that case he will weaken his forces in our front 
 by just so much. If he should renounce such a pre- 
 carious expedition, as seems probable under the con- 
 ditions, then the left wing army would at once con- 
 form to the movements of the main army and join it. 
 
 Of course all this presupposes that the South 
 
—127— 
 
 German contingents are at hand at the proper time. 
 
 Considering- the existing readiness for war of 
 our neighbors we must insist that on the 21st day, 
 after orders have been issued in Berlin for the mob- 
 ihzation of the North German Army, the South Ger- 
 man contingents are ready for march and transpor- 
 tation in larger detachments within their territorial 
 frontiers, that the rolling stock of the respective 
 railroads is in readiness and that each State has 
 taken proper steps for the erection of depots to sub- 
 sist its troops and has the means to transport supphes. 
 
 Concerning now specially the different points of 
 concentration, we would have to come to an agree- 
 ment with the separate States, with due regard to 
 local conditions and special interests, as to the fol- 
 lowing: 
 
 The Baden division assembles the troops garri- 
 soned in the southern part of the Grand Duchy un- 
 der protection of Rastatt, the ones in the northern 
 part will join after they become disengaged through 
 the advance of the left wing army. The Wtirttem- 
 berg division has only to draw up the regiments be- 
 coming disposable by cutting the Ulm garrison in 
 half, to be concentrated at Stuttgart— Ludwigsburg. 
 
 We would counsel for Bavaria a formation of two 
 army corps, of which the 1st Corps assembles at 
 Nordlingen, the lid at Wiirzburg. The troops in the 
 Palatinate would form into a strong brigade at Lan- 
 dau, which in case of need retires on Germersheim. 
 
 Of course in this distribution of the South Ger- 
 man fighting forces not the strategic advance oi these 
 but the first position of readiness made necessary by 
 existing conditions, is meant. The actual junction, 
 considering the limited time, may have to be made 
 possibly during the course of operations against the 
 enemy. 
 
 If a French army should have already crossed 
 
—128— 
 
 iho I]|;i(.'k I<\)rost on tlic 21st (hiy, the Pi-iissian corps 
 of the Ic'fl vvinji' army would advance in llio direction 
 IhMlbronn liU(l\viu'sl>iii"K Stud.uail. would receive 
 the Wiirtteinber^" division, and draw up the lid Ba- 
 varian ('Or|)s from Wiirzhur.u-. Thus Ulni and the 1st 
 Bavarian Cori)s would securi> the Bavarian territory 
 and, !)> an ad\ anc-e.a pari of t he\Viirttenil)er^" territory 
 a.u'aiMsl I he inxasion of I he hostile leiulin.u" elements. 
 The left winiv arms' must under all circumstances be 
 made numericail\' superior to and must inmiediately 
 attack the hostile main force* in Southern CJermany in 
 a direction endan.uvrin.u' all of that force's communi- 
 catitHis. 
 
 When, on the othei' hand, the enem\' who has 
 advanc(Ml across tlu> Rhine las a matter of fact, he 
 cannot do otherwise'^ turns down the Khine a.uainst. 
 ourstron.u- liirhtin.u' force concenti'atcdt)!! theNeckar, 
 then tlu> \Viirttend)eri>' division would immediately 
 have to join. full\' utili/.in.u- the railroads, tlu* left 
 win^' ai'iny j^oin.u' via Rruchsal, and the lid Bavarian 
 (\>rps also, .u'oin.u' via Darmstadt and lleidelber}^', as 
 well as the 1st Bavarian Corps. \ia Stutt.uart. 
 
 lftlu> decision to i)roceed to war has been ar- 
 rixi'd at in proper time it at least will not be impos- 
 sibli' to assemble the left win.u' army in the Palati- 
 nate even befoi'e the enemy crossivs the upper Khine, 
 in order to thus protect, in comiection with our main 
 foi'ce, this Naluable \):w[ of (lerman .uround and to 
 j^ive, Ihrouiih an oll\'nsi\e on the left baidv oi' the 
 Khine. the lu^st secui'ily io the South. This means 
 that tlu> entire South (!tM-man cont in<>'ents, utilizing 
 thealread\ mentioned railroads via Maxau, (liMniers- 
 heim and liUdwi.ushaf(>n, should be joined with the 
 Prussian Corps at tlu> start in tlu> vicinity of Landau. 
 
l^iiHod oil his (liH(!ussi<)iiH witli tlio RepiniHOiilaliveH of llin 
 Soutli Gm-inaii Artniew, (iciuiral von Mollkf^ t^onipoHcd, in 
 1868, till) following? hUoLcIi of a plan, whiuli lie revised and 
 Hup|)l(inieiiti'd in .January and Marcli 18(59: — 
 
 No. 16. 
 
 A. FIRST CONCKNTIiATION OF 'rilF ARMY IN A VVAIi 
 WlTIi FRANCE Ai.ONlO 
 
 In a war which we conduct against France alone, 
 we are in the fortunate situation of bein^' able to 
 concentrate our entire fighting- forces in the Bavar- 
 ian Palatinate, utilizing' six trunk lines. 
 
 If the French desire to utilize their entire rail- 
 road net, they will be compelled to concentrate 
 around Metz and Strassburg in two groups separated 
 by the Vodges, between which we will be in the 
 very start on the inner line of operations. 
 
 It would not l)e justifiable to leave a [)art of our 
 field army for direct defense on the lower Rhine. 
 That is protected by Belgium's neutrality and, if this 
 should not be respected, by the distance of the 
 French frontier from ours. In the Palatinate we 
 will be as close to Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne as are 
 the French to Diedenhofen and Mczieres. Our op- 
 eration on the left bank of the Rhine across the Mo- 
 sel takes the French operation against the Rhine in 
 rear and comi)els the French to make front to the 
 south with all their communications in the flank. 
 
 It woukJ be just as little justifiable were the 
 South Germans to try and directly defend the ui)per 
 Rhine or even only the Black Forest. In connection 
 with the North German fighting forces and sup- 
 ported by them, an advance from tlie Palatinate on 
 
 129 
 
— i3b— 
 
 the left bank and up-stream will be of the utmost ef- 
 fect, even should the enemy have already crossed 
 the stream. 
 
 But the most assured protection to the strong 
 lower, as well as to the weaker upper Rhine would 
 be given by a decisive offensive with superior fight- 
 ing forces into France, and it requires but a timely 
 concentration of the means at hand to take that of- 
 fensive. 
 
 Four armies would have to be formed: 
 
 First (right wing) Army around Wittlich, Vlllth & 
 
 Vllth Arm3^ Corps .60,000 men 
 
 Second (main) Army at Neunkirchen— Homburg 
 
 Hid, IVtli, Xtli and Guard Corps 130,000 
 
 Third (left wing) Army at Landau,— Vth and 
 
 Xlth Army Corps | 60,000 
 
 with the latter finally two South German [ 
 
 army corps J 80,000 
 
 Fourth (resei-ve) Army in front of Mayenee, the 
 combined IXth Corps, (18th Iiif.,HessianDiv.) 'j 
 
 and Xllth Army Corps } 60,000 
 
 And eventually the 1st, lid and Vlth Corps ) 100,000 
 
 We can count on 300,000 Prussian combatants 
 for the offensive, and under favorable conditions on 
 500,000. 
 
 FIRST ARMY 
 
 Vlllth Army Corps. 
 
 The Vlllth and Vllth Army Corps are to be as- 
 sembled in the shortest possible time in the vicinity 
 of Wittlich — Bernkastel on the Mosel. 
 
 To protect this concentration the garrison of 
 Trier forms the advance guard and should be rein- 
 forced immediately by at least one battery from Cob- 
 lenz by rail, by steamer or by forced marches. The 
 detachment must hold positions as near Trier, 
 Schweich or Wittlich as possible. 
 
 The battalion of the 69th Regiment joins the gar- 
 rison in Saarbriicken. It falls back in the direction 
 of St. Wendel, but only when forced to do so, and 
 tries to protect the railroad as long as possible, the 
 
-131— 
 
 destruction of which is to occur only when directly 
 ordered by superior headquarters. 
 
 In order to affect the concentration of the remain- 
 ing troops of the army corps, it appears best to di- 
 rect the 29th Regiment, the remainder of the 3d Bat- 
 talion Foot Artillery ard the Jager battalion (to be 
 brought up from Wetzlar by rail to Boppard) to the 
 vicinity of Bernkastel on the roal via Castellaun. 
 
 The 60th, 67th and 72d Regiments will be trans- 
 ported on the 10th and 11th day to Andernach and 
 Coblenz and with the mounted battalion of the artil- 
 lery regiment and the pioneer battalion march on the 
 road via Kaiseresch to Wittlich. 
 
 It will be advisable to have the 33d Regiment, 
 which will complete its organization on the 16th day, 
 brought by steamer to Andernach and let it follow 
 on the same road. 
 
 The 8th Cuirassier Regiment and the 7th Hussar 
 Regiment can march via Adenau and in addition the 
 1st Battalion of the Artillery Regiment. 
 
 The 28th Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the 
 Artillery are to be sent via Priim and from there ac- 
 cording to circumstances to Trier or Wittlich. Only 
 in case (which is very improbable) that this march 
 will be endangered from Luxemburg, the troops in 
 Aix-la-Chapelle and Jtihch will first have to be drawn 
 back to the Rhine. 
 
 Thus, the concentration of the entire corps, ex- 
 cept the 33d Regiment, in the district Trier— Wittlich 
 — Gonzerath can be completed by the evening of the 
 16th day of the mobilization. 
 
 To be able to assemble it on the left as well as 
 on the right bank, it is advisable to throw a boat 
 bridge at Bernkastel even before the arrival of the 
 ponton train. 
 
 On the 14th already the advance guard can be 
 reinforced by three battalions, four squadrons, and 
 several batteries. 
 
—1:12- 
 
 VlUli Arm II Cor/'s; 
 
 According' t<» the I ravel mid tnaiH-h lahlcs skctclicd 
 out for (he VI I 111 Afiny Corps, il will use (lie lailioad 
 lines niKMidc Ivliiiie Uniia Colej'.nc hiireii Call 
 and llie Mill InfaidrN' Division llie line \ia Viersen to 
 Mupen. 
 
 ()nl.\ the pioneer troops will start by marching' 
 iVdin Dent'/. 
 
 Considerinjv that tlie road from Call to Wiltlich 
 will bo taxed to its I'ldl capacity, it is advisable to es- 
 tablish an au\iliar\' depot and a line of i-oniinuiiica- 
 lions headipiartei's in Stadtk\ll. 
 
 In this niannei' the troops (d' the corps, e\clnsi\c' 
 of their trains, will be concetit rated in the \icitut\' of 
 Wittlicli on the evening' of the 17th inol>ili/ation day. 
 
 The entire corps with all of its columns aiul 
 trains will lu' i-ead\' and able to take up operations in 
 Wiltlich on the liOth day, at Trier on the *Jlsl day. 
 
 This means that tln' l<'irst Arm.w after the closo 
 of IIk' 171 h da.w i-an enter a battle at Wiltlich, or 
 inarch oil' in any order(>d direi'tion, with M) bat talions, 
 \V1 S(piadrons and ;U) batteries a total of (iO.OOO tnen. 
 
 She ad\ance ivuard in Triei" will |)r(»babl>' ha\eto 
 be i"einl"oi"ced earlier than that, accordini'' toi'ircum- 
 s tan COS. 
 
 I ieadciuarters o\' the 1^'irst Arms' will \va\v to 
 re.uulal(> the station of the tcoops arrixin^ successive- 
 ly at Wittlich. and the Supply Depai'tment will have 
 to take pi"i>per steps in ad\aiu-e for their subsisitMice 
 in crowdtHl cantonmtMits, which pri'sumabl\- will bo 
 for but a \erv short time. 
 
 SKCONl) AKMY 
 
 ///</, l\'th. Mil (///(/ CiiartI Corps. 
 
 On the aiM'ival of the troo[» ti'anspoi-ts we will 
 learn from the weak detachment at Saarbriiekeu (2 
 
-133— 
 
 battalions, 4 squadrons of the Vlllth A. C.) to what 
 extent and in what direction the Nahe and the Lud- 
 wig railroad can be used in the Palatinate. 
 
 On these lines, of which the latter is protected 
 in the very start by a Bavarian brig^ade at Landau, 
 the first detachments of the Illd and IVth Army 
 Corps will arrive early on the 12th day. These then 
 detrain as far to the front as circumstances will 
 allow, in order to first support the detachment of the 
 Vlllth Corps, then to relieve it and to protect the 
 railroads; they will also eventually move more to the 
 rear in order to drive off weaker hostile detachments 
 which may already have invaded the country. 
 
 The two mentioned corps will have their full 
 quota of troops on the 15th day and take a position 
 in front of the line Neunkirchen — Zweibrvcken (about 
 near Bildstock and St. Insbert), behind which posi- 
 tion the Xth and the Guard Corps will debark hy the 
 19th day at Neunkirchen and at Homburg. 
 
 In the afternoon of the 19th day after mobiliza- 
 tion then, the troops of the entire Army, but without 
 trains, will be concentrated; about 104 battalions, 107 
 squadrons, and 00 batteries — about 180,000 com- 
 batants. 
 
 It is not probable that by that time a stronger 
 French army will have crossed the frontier. Should 
 this be the case, then the Second Army will have to 
 fall back in direction of Kaiserslautern on the Re- 
 serve Army, in which case the railroads in rear of 
 Neunkirchen and Homburg should be but temporarily 
 interrupted. 
 
 If on the other hand the Second Arm.y holds the 
 position on the frontier, its headquarters can order a 
 reconnaissance of four cavalry divisions, supported 
 by infantry, against the Mosel district Diedenhofen 
 —Nancy to gain information concerning the enemy. 
 
— 134 - 
 
 THIRD ARMY 
 
 Mil, Xfll) drrp^, Ft<f and lid Bnrarian Corp^i, 
 Wnritcnihcnj a)id l-tdclv)! Divii^ion. 
 
 Hy the arrival of the two infantry divisions of the 
 Vth Army Corps, the Bavarian position at Landau will 
 be rein forced the 13th totheir)th mobilization day. By 
 noon of the 18th mobilization day the troopsof the Vth 
 Army Corps will have arrived, and also, by marching 
 and partly by rail, the larg^er part of the Xlth Army 
 Corps, about 44 battalions, 40 squadrons. 20 batteries, 
 a total of about 55.000 Prussian combatants, which 
 will find a stronp; position behind the Kling creek. 
 
 (Bridge at Maxau to be kept intact and protected. 
 Rastatt to be occupied by the 34th Regiment, sup- 
 plies, reinforcements, etc., to be sent there. A 
 Prussian engineer officer to be sent to Rastatt.) 
 
 The arrival of the Stnith Germans has been 
 promised by that day. which would augment the 
 Third Army to a strength of about 150.000 men. 
 
 Here also army headquarters will order a recon- 
 naissance by the cavah-y in the direction of Strass- 
 burg. 
 
 FOURTH (RESERVE) ARMY 
 
 Combined IXth Corps, Saxonian Xllth Corps 
 and eventually 1st and lid Corps. 
 
 By the twentieth mobilization day there can be 
 assembled in an extremely favorable battle position 
 al Marnheim on the road to Kaiserslautern: 
 
 The 18th and the Hessian Division (concentated 
 at Worms) as combined IXth Army Corps and the 
 Xllth Army Corps, in the start 00.000 men, which 
 will inunodiately be followed by reserve artillery and 
 by the cavalry. 
 
 Had the Second Army been forced to retreat, we 
 would accept the decisive battle at Marnheim with 
 about 160,000 men i,six complete army corps). 
 
- 135- 
 
 The Vth and XTth Army Corps undouljtedly can 
 also be timely drawn up from the Tliird Army, and 
 that within three mnrches. 
 
 Furthermore, the corps of the First Army con- 
 centrated on the sixteenth and seventeenth d;iy at 
 Wittlich (insofar as they do not have important fi^ht- 
 in^' forces in their front, which, however, would then 
 also be absent from the Fretich fiRhtinp: forces) am 
 be started in direction of Lauterecken to the enemy's 
 left flank and rear. 
 
 Presupposing timely arrival, on the twentieth 
 day .W),()()0 men (nine complete corps, even if the 
 Vllth cannot come up) can be engaged combined, 
 and this lighting force can be materially strength( ned 
 in the next succeeding days; if at all possible the 1st, 
 lid and the Vlth Army Corps also should be drawn up. 
 
 If the Second Army has maintained its position, 
 then the Fourth (Reserve) Army can have reached 
 the former's immediate rear by the ("vciiiruv of the 
 twenty-first day. 
 
 All army corps will be comijlololy su[)i)li('(l with 
 their trains only by the twenty-third or twenty-fourth 
 day, still the offensive can commence on the twenty- 
 second. 
 
 Should it be found that the hostile main force 
 turns through Luxemburg or finally through ]>elgium 
 against the lower Rhine, then in a movement against 
 the north the First Army would form the advance 
 guard behind the Mosel, th'' Second Army the left, 
 the Fourth the right wing, and the Third Army 
 would, according to conditions, offensively advance 
 against Strassburg or against Melz. 
 
 Consequently the proposed concentration makes 
 it possible; t,o accept a (kifemsive battle in front of the 
 Rhine on the twentieth day after commencement of 
 mobilization and that with probable superior numbers, 
 and to offensively advance accross the frontier on the 
 
-136- 
 
 twenty-second day with 300,000 men in a westerly 
 direction. Whether or not the 1st, lid and Vlth 
 Corps, still in rear, can also be drawn up to the 
 Rhine can be ascertained then. Possibly it will 
 always be necessary to send one division from one of 
 those corps to relieve the Xllth Corps in Dresden. 
 
 COAST DEFENSE 
 
 For active defense of our coast four Landwehr 
 divisions will be organized and that at the same time 
 as the above discussed main concentration of the 
 army. 
 
 1st Z)is^ric^. — Emden— Bremerhaven; in addition 
 to 8,000 men local garrisons, the 3d Landwehr Divi- 
 sion— 10,800 men — at Bremen. 
 
 2d Disfric^.— Hamburg- — Wismar; in addition to 
 local garrison (17,750 men), the mobile 17th Infantry 
 Division— 15,000 men — at Hamburg. 
 
 As a reserve for both, the mobile Guard Land- 
 wehr Division, 15,000 men, in Hanover. 
 
 Thus we can concentrate about 40,000 men for 
 defense of the North Sea coast. 
 
 3d District. — Stralsund— Colberg; in addition to 
 local garrisons, the 2d Landwehr Division, 10,400 
 men, at Stettin. 
 
 J^th District.— Danzig— Meme\; in addition to local 
 garrisons, the 1st Landwehr Division, 10,400 men, at 
 Elbing. 
 
 A total of about 60,000 men. 
 
 Should a French landing expedition be intended, 
 it undoubtedly will occur in the North Sea and prob- 
 ably in the very first stages of hostilities. If the 
 French fighting forces are attacked in their own 
 country, the French will hardly undertake such an 
 operation. 
 
 The coast divisions (the mobile ones first) would 
 
—137— 
 
 then be available to guard the lines of communica- 
 tions to the rear. 
 
 Should Denmark participate in the war, then it 
 may become necessary to draw up the 17th Infantry 
 Division to support the 18th in the Duchies. 
 
 Should* the French occupy Belgium they must 
 
 posed on the 10th of March, 1869. 
 
 utilize at least 120,000 men for that purpose, in order 
 to occupy Brussels and to besiege, invest or at least 
 observe the Belgian army assembled in Antwerp. 
 
 But as this procedure cannot be tolerated by 
 either England or Prussia, France will be forced to 
 at once place all of its fighting forces on a war foot- 
 ing. In addition to Rome and Algiers it would have 
 to observe the western frontier and the north coast. 
 After garrisoning the fortresses Paris and Lyon, it 
 would have about 180,000 men to carry out its ag- 
 gression. 
 
 It surely cannot be the intention to await the de- 
 velopment of events with this large force in a pas- 
 sive attitude; on the whole, the entire matter might 
 only be the start of a war against Germany, and, of 
 course, in a direction which is the least dangerous to 
 us. 
 
 Should the French main force be concentrated in 
 the vicinity of Metz — Strassburg, the two armies 
 would be in two separate theaters of war, 1G9 to 200 
 (English) miles distant, and without possibility of 
 mutual support. 
 
 Should the Hollanders join a French All-ance, 
 this reinforcement would be offset by an English 
 landing in Antwerp. 
 
 The French North Army would be contained in 
 Belgium and could not undertake anything serious 
 against our line of fortresses on the Rhine. We 
 
 *Here commences the addition to the memorial com- 
 
—138— 
 
 would assemble in the Rhine Palatinate all disposable 
 forces against the South Army, would take the of- 
 fensive with a superiority of 100,000 men, would 
 frustrate a march by the enemy about via Luxem- 
 burg to Aix-la-Chapelle to join the North Army, 
 would force the South Army back on Paris, and 
 would at the same time force the evacuation of Bel- 
 gium. 
 
 If the French enter Belgium at all, they can do 
 so only by concentrating their main force on the line 
 Lille — Mezieres and advancing through Belgium 
 across the Maas. 
 
 That would mean that they will reach our fron- 
 tier from ten to fourteen days later than they could 
 from the line Metz — Strassburg; that they have no 
 hope of receiving support in Southern Germany; and 
 that they will have to weaken their army by at least 
 80,000 men by investing Antwerp. They could then 
 reach our Rhine front with hardly more than 200,000 
 men. 
 
 According to my view, we could meet such a pro- 
 cedure more effectively if we advance against the 
 French from the Mosel than were we to appear from 
 the Rhine fortresses in the front. We would compel 
 the French to make front towards the south, which 
 would leave all their communications on the flank. 
 
 The distance from Maubeuge to Cologne is larger 
 than that from Hombnrg to Cologne. Supposing 
 that mobilization starts at the same time on both 
 sides, we would arrive in good time from the Palati- 
 nate, still we could do that quicker from Coblenz and 
 Mayence and on a shorter road. 
 
 If we desired to advance on Paris with our main 
 force from the Palatinate, not paying any attention 
 to the invasion of the French main force, then we 
 would reach the vicinity on the other side of the Ar- 
 gon Forest, as we would find no resistance, about the 
 
—139— 
 
 same time the French would reach our frontier at 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. We are 120 (English) miles, the 
 French 320 (English) miles from the opponent's capi- 
 tal. 
 
 Still the mere advance on the fortified Paris 
 would of course not bring the matter to a decision, 
 and we might better operate from the line Luxem- 
 burg— Pont a Mousson, converging along the Mosel 
 in the direction of Sedan. From there we will at one 
 and the same time threaten Paris and compel the 
 French army to return from Belgium, to make front 
 against us and accept our battle, without which the 
 war cannot be ended. 
 
 That operation would bring the relations for both 
 sides to a crisis. We conduct the operation in a hos- 
 tile country, but that country might also be in a state 
 of insurrection at the same time; we have no railroad 
 behind us and weaken ourselves at Diedenhofen, 
 Metz and Verdun. The loss of the battle could not 
 be calculated, still in the battle we will be the strong- 
 er, as the French will have to leave a prrt of their 
 forces opposed to the Belgian army, or will, should 
 they march off, draw the Belgians after them. 
 
 We would gain the same advantage with less 
 danger if we advance from the line Luxemburg — 
 Trier — Coblenz converging on Liittich, in which case 
 of course we would have to march through the Eif el, 
 Ardennes and Hohe Venn. 
 
 In order to reach the line Coblenz—Luxemburg 
 for our first position, no material changes are neces- 
 sary in the measures already sketched out for the 
 concentration in the Palatinate; all that is required 
 would be to stop the troop transports at Coblenz and 
 diverge them from Mayence to Bingen and Coblenz. 
 
 The Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps would 
 be concentrated on the 15th day of 
 mobilization at Stadtkyll - - - 60, GOO men 
 
—140— 
 
 The Second Army can reach the vicinity 
 of Luxemburg— Trier, in 3 marches, 
 even if the route of transport is not 
 changed, consequently by the 18th to 
 the 21st day . - - . - 130,000 men 
 
 The Xlth and Xllth Corps, as well as the 
 18th Infantry Division, can be concen- 
 trated at ColDlenz by the 18th day - 73,000 men 
 
 The Vth Corps and the Darmstadt Divi- 
 sion, via Bingen, at Zell on the Mosel 
 by the 20th day ----- 45,000 men 
 
 In about 4 to 5 marches, that is by the 
 
 26th day, and by converging marches, 
 
 the army of . - . - - 308,000 men 
 
 would be closely assembled in the vicinity of Malmedy 
 — Montjoie and ready for an advance against Liittich. 
 The distance from Lille — Maubeuge to Liittich 
 could be covered by ten average marches. If we as- 
 sume that the French will complete mobilization and 
 march into position by the 15th day, they cannot in- 
 terfere with this advance. 
 
 B.— FIRST CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY IN A WAR 
 AGAINST FRANCE AND AUSTRIA 
 
 In case Austria takes part in a war of France 
 against Prussia, we could not bring to bear a supe- 
 riority in numbers towards either side by a division 
 of our forces. 
 
 Conse(iuently the question of first importance is: 
 against which enemy will we carry out a defensive 
 in the start with weaker forces, in order to take the 
 offensive against the other with as strong a force as 
 possible. 
 
 Undoubtedly the Rhine with its fortresses gives 
 us a better defensive line against France than we 
 have against Austria. We can count with certainty 
 on the fact that this defensive line, supported by 
 100,000 men, will hold out from six to eight weeks, 
 
—141— 
 
 but we would have Southern Germany, if not against 
 us, certainly not with us. The French would go 
 around our Rhine front via Worms, and operate 
 through Franconia against Berlin, and only an offen- 
 sive in strong force from the Palatinate can prevent 
 them from doing so. To this is to be added that the 
 Austrians probably will not accept a battle in Bo- 
 hemia nor in Moravia, but will await the effects of a 
 French invasion in a fortified camp at Olmtitz or be- 
 hind the Danube, which might then easily bring our 
 offensive to a standstill. 
 
 Austria— at the present time having but 100 men 
 per battalion— will hardly be ready as soon as we will 
 if we commence mobilization early for an unavoid- 
 able war, and we may have a free hand for from six 
 to eight weeks. 
 
 France not only is our most dangerous enemy, 
 but also the one most ready. If we invade French 
 territory, French pride will not wait for Austria, but 
 we will be attacked at once. If we have superior 
 numbers we may hope to gain a victory in the very 
 first few days. Such a victory will probably cause a 
 change in the French dynasty. As we desire noth- 
 ing from France, we may be able to conclude an 
 early peace with the new reigning power. 
 
 Should Austria in the meantime have actually 
 occupied Silesia, Brandenburg and the capital, if our 
 weak defensive army— without having been beaten— 
 had given away, nothing definite would have hap- 
 pened to our disadvantage. 
 
 Add to this, that in the west we cannot expect 
 foreign support and have to be strong there in conse- 
 quence, while in the east Russia would presumably 
 give more or less active support. If we advance 
 against Vienna, it is true that Russia has no active 
 interests in helping us; but it is different if the Aus- 
 trians threaten Berlin. 
 
—142— 
 
 For these reasons I would sug-gest to concentrate 
 ten army corps for immediate offensive in the Pala- 
 tinate, to place three army corps in position against 
 Austria, which, reinforced by the 1st and 2d Land- 
 wehr Divisions, would be of a strength of about 
 120,000 men. The defense of the little endangered 
 Baltic coast will in that case have to be abandoned. 
 
 Should Austria intend to turn its entire force 
 against us, Russia would be left completely free to 
 carry out its probable intentions in the Orient; Aus- 
 tria can hardly leave the Wallachia— Moldavia fron- 
 tier entirely without troops. 
 
 An advance into Silesia is seriously endangered, 
 should a Russian observation army — concentrated, 
 say, at Czenstochau (on the Warsaw— Kattowitz R. 
 R.) — commence operations. Such an observation 
 army presumably will be assembled in consideration 
 of conditions in the Kingdom of Poland, and the 
 Austriaz's will be compelled to have an army opposite 
 it at Olmutz. 
 
 Only '.[,e troops not required for this army will 
 be disposable to advance from Prague directly on 
 Berlin. This is the most dangerous direction for us. 
 
 We on our part would have to decide in the first 
 place whether to base our weaker defensive army 
 on the Oder or on the Elbe. The former direction 
 facilitates connection of the fighting forces from 
 Silesia with those which must be started to Dresden 
 — Gorlitz to relieve the Xllth Corps. A retreat be- 
 hind the Oder brings us closer to Russian support 
 and leads finally to the large reduit fortress on the 
 Vistula and to Danzig, which, situated on the sea, is 
 more suited than any other of our war depots to re- 
 ceive and protect an entire army for a longer time. 
 
 Still in spite of these large advantages we must 
 consider that the Russian support is not at all as- 
 sured, and that it is a dangerous practice to directly 
 
—143- 
 
 join a stronger ally. By doing so the Prussian de- 
 fensive army would lose its independence and must 
 coordinate its movements to the intentions of its ally. 
 
 To this is to be added that the probable advance 
 of the enemy directly on Berlin can be flanked closer 
 and more effectively from the Elbe than from the 
 Oder. 
 
 In a retreat on Torgau we remain in connection 
 with our main forces on the Rhine and finally find a 
 receiving place in the enlarged Magdeburg, which, 
 actively defended by an as yet unbeaten army of 
 100,000 men, would be difficult to attack. 
 
 I would therefore prefer the latter direction, if 
 it can be reached. 
 
 Should the force designated for the defense of 
 the eastern half of the Monarchy be assembled at 
 one point, that point would be Gorlitz, on account of 
 its location and railroad connections, from which we 
 can meet the advance of the enemy in Silesia as well 
 as we can in the Lausitz or in Saxony. 
 
 Consequently there remains to be considered — 
 
 1st, That we cannot possibly leave Silesia at the 
 very start without troops and abandon it altogether; 
 
 2d. that it is not advisable to draw the Xllth 
 Army Corps up to the Rhine, if it cannot be replaced 
 in Dresden by at least one infantry division; 
 
 3d. that even if fully concentrated we should 
 accept a decision only under the most favorable con- 
 ditions, as very probably we may be compelled to 
 retreat. 
 
 Consequently, a partition of forces appears to 
 me absolutely; necessary. 
 
 Finally, with our forces combined we can appear 
 only in Silesia or in Brandenburg and the Austrians 
 can advance in both directions; they can do so in 
 the first direction with a secondary army, the con- 
 centration of which I presume to be at Olmtitz — 
 
-144- 
 
 v^hich at the same time would serve as an observa- 
 tion army against Russia and might therefore be 
 easily stopped from a further advance, so that but a 
 weaker detachment may possibly be sufficient to 
 guard Breslau; but in the latter direction the Aus- 
 trians will advance with their main force via Dresden 
 di.'ectly on Berlin, 
 
 I believe the Vlth Army Corps will have to con- 
 centrate at Neisse — Frankenstein, threatening via 
 Glatz the hostile main railroad at Wildenschwerdt. 
 A detachment in the fortified camp at Cosel, eventu- 
 ally supported by Landsturm, will serve for observa- 
 tion of at least upper Silesia. Compelled by superior 
 numbers, the corps will fall back on Liegnitz, taking 
 the hostile advance on Breslau in the flank. The 
 movement via Gorlitz is protected by the "Riesenge- 
 birge " (the chain of mountains between Silesia and 
 Bohemia) and facilitated by the railroads. 
 
 The lid and 1st Army Corps would in general 
 have to be drawn up to Dresden, with exception of 
 the 1st Division, which should be posted in Gorlitz to 
 keep up the connection with Silesia. The two Land- 
 wehr divisions would join the concentration at Dres- 
 den. 
 
 The advance on Dresden is difficult for the 
 Austrians and offers us a presumably fortunate 
 offensive. Should we be compelled to retreat, we 
 can do so either on the one or the other bank of the 
 Elbe and at Riesa, and in any event at Torgau, we 
 cut loose from the pursuit. 
 
 It is not probable that the Austrians would ad- 
 vance beyond Dresden on the left bank of the Elbe; 
 to reach Berlin they would have to cross the stream 
 between our fortresses and in the face of our de- 
 fensive army. 
 
 There are but two through routes on the right 
 bank, the highways via Herzberg and via Liibben, 
 
— ii5— 
 
 which run about parallel at an average distance of 
 six miles from each other. The first has the advan- 
 tage of running along the railroad, but it runs so 
 close to the Elbe that we can reach it via Torgau and 
 even via Wittenberg in one march. The enemy can 
 hardly pass and pay no attention to our army there, 
 which in any case is some 60,000 men strong. To at- 
 tack that army behind its protection, the Elbe, is dif- 
 ficult. Even the complete investment of the bridge 
 head at Torgau and of the fortress of Wittenberg 
 would not give entire security against the army's ad- 
 vance. With that obstacle behind it, advancing ver- 
 tically against the enemy's line of operation, against 
 one (necessarily very deep one) or several (in that 
 case two marches distant) columns of the enemy, we 
 would not have to be afraid of a decisive battle, as 
 in case of misfortune the stream precludes pursuit — 
 the bridges being open to us and closed to the enemy 
 —and as the connection with Magdeburg can not be 
 endangered. 
 
 But in order to guard Berlin as much as possible 
 against danger, at least against hostile detachments, 
 one detachment would have to directly retire on the 
 capital in addition to the flank defense which is so 
 important according to my views. That detachment 
 would be composed of the 1st Division at Gorlitz, and 
 it has to remain fully oriented as to the enemy's ad- 
 vance. It is not so easy for an army to march with 
 weak forces into a city of some half a million inhabi- 
 tants, as long as there is nucleus of armed force 
 around which armed resistance could rally. 
 
 We still have to consider the position or attitude 
 the South German States will take in the supposed 
 war situation, and what we can demand of them. 
 
 As always with mere coalitions, who will not al- 
 ways be exactly what is desirable from a military 
 standpoint, nothing is done but what is thought to 
 
—148— 
 
 be advantageous to both parties to the Coalition. It 
 would be entirely useless to stipulate anything else 
 in advance, because it is never carried out. We can 
 not expect of the Bavarians that they will send their 
 entire fighting force to the Rhine Palatinate and 
 abandon Munich to an Austi'ian invasion. We can- 
 not even demand that they will join us behind the 
 Erz Mountains. 
 
 An army in the Rhine Palatinate would protect 
 the Rhine as far as Basle more effectively than it 
 could protect the Bavarian eastern frontier in a con- 
 centration around Dresden, seeing that Salzburg is 
 twice the distance, and before all because we, even 
 if united with Bavaria, vv^ould hardly be strong 
 enough for the offensive through which a'lone such a 
 flank position gains its value. 
 
 The Bavarians have a vital interest in seeing 
 their Rhine Palatinate protected and they will not 
 object to the brigade, now there, joining our fighting- 
 forces at Landau. According to my view the Bavar- 
 ian main army should concentrate on the lower Inn. 
 
 Passau offers a strong defensive position, the 
 Danube and the Isar secure the retreat on Regens- 
 burg and Ingolstadt against superior forces. But 
 the Bavarians, in consideration of direct protection 
 of Munich may prefer a concentration at Altotting— 
 Tittmoning, " although they will always have to fall 
 back to one side on Ingolstadt if opposed by a strong- 
 er army. 
 
 Both concentrations are acceptable to us. They 
 seriously threaten Austria's capital and its connef^- 
 tion through Moravia. The Austrians cannot do 
 without an observation army against the Bavarians 
 and, in order to make that enemy of no danger in 
 
 1 Allotting;' is east of Munich near the Inn; Tittmoning is 
 on tlie Salzaeh, southeast of Altotting; consequently a con- 
 centration between the Inn and the Salzach would result. 
 
—147— 
 
 fear, that army must be strong, thereby weakening" 
 the main army some other place. Austria cannot at 
 one and the same time observe the Russians and of- 
 fensively advance in Silesia, in the Lausitz, or 
 against the Bavarians. It will be weak in one of 
 these places and there we must take the offensive 
 and disengage the endangered auxiliary army. 
 
 However, we could not approve a concentra- 
 tion of the Bavarian forces say in a fortified camp at 
 Ingolstadt, to be inactive there. 
 
 Not only Baden but also Wurttem berg are threat- 
 ened sooner and more directly by France than by 
 Austria. Their contingents would have to be sent to 
 the Rhine Palatinate as has already been agreed on. 
 
 Then there would be disposable there, inclusive of 
 a Bavarian brigade: 
 
 North Germans 310,000 men 
 
 South Germans ^0,000 ^ 
 
 350,000 men 
 
 French active army.. 336,000 men. 
 
 Deduct: in Algiers 35,000 men 
 
 in Rome 5,000 men 40,000 men. 
 
 290,000 men. 
 
 From this total should be deducted the necessary 
 line troops for the fortresses Strassburg, Metz, Died- 
 enhofen, Lille, etc., for Paris and Lyon, at least if 
 we get ahead of the French offensive. Even if there 
 is.no necessity, considering conditions in Spain, for 
 the placing of an observation corps near the Pyre- 
 nees, we will have hardly more than 250,000 men in 
 the first line opposed to us. 
 
 The French Reserve Army, 93,000 men, has still 
 to be organized. 
 
 Of our immediately available Landwehr divisions 
 
—148— 
 
 we can utilize at least 35,000 men against the west. 
 Consequently: 
 
 350,000 men against 295,000 men 
 or, +35,000 men against j 03,000 men 
 
 385,000 men against 343,000 men 
 
 The Bavarians surely would put forward their 
 best efforts for the protection of their own country. 
 Under such conditions their strength might be esti- 
 mated as 50,000 men 
 
 Opposed to Austria then would be 
 
 (Prussians) 110,000 men 
 
 a total of 160,000 men, 
 but these would be in separate groups without direct 
 mutual support. There is no doubt but what the 
 Austrians can advance with superior numbers against 
 any of these groups, but it is just as certain that 
 these g]-()ui)s will fall back and that Austria's offens- 
 ive operations will be materially hindered by the 
 other groups. 
 
 As soon as we are able to have a part of our 
 fighting forces disposable against the French, we 
 will assure to ourselves as well as to the Bavarians 
 the greatest help, by bringing up those available parts 
 to the Danube via Stuttgart and Wiirzburg. 
 
No. 17 
 
 To Colonel Veith and Lieutenant Colonel Count 
 Wartensleben* 
 
 Berlin, 1 December 1868. 
 
 It should be considered, whether it would be ad- 
 visable to transport the reserve artillery ahead of the 
 reserve cavalry. 
 
 With the Second Army, which is more or less on 
 outpost, numerous artillery would be an impediment 
 in case of a necessary retreat. Stronj? cavalry would 
 be a great help. 
 
 On the other hand, the artillery is of more value 
 than the cavalry in the strong position at Marnheim. 
 
 As a matter of fact the large cavalry reconnais- 
 sance can be dispensed with up to the 28th day, be- 
 cause we will become ready for operations only from 
 the 30th to the liGth day. 
 
 I leave it to you, whether or not changes can be 
 made in the march and travel tables, in order to 
 make the Second Army ready for operations as early 
 as possible, even at the cost of the Reserve Army. 
 
 In any case it appears advisable to me to com- 
 plete the full equipment of the Vth Corps ahead of 
 the Xllth Corps. If a front has to be made against 
 the south, the latter corps will in any case have to be 
 relieved first. 
 
 *Chief8 of Sections, Gi'eat General Staff. 
 
 149 
 
Ill the winter of 1868-69, General v. Moltke again worked 
 out a memorial, in which he fully discussed the first position 
 of the army in a war against France and against Austria at 
 one and the same time, and also in a war with the former 
 alone. This work, published in part in the General Staff Ac- 
 count of the War of 1870-71, has Moltke's own notation: 
 "Applies also to 1870." During 1869 and 1870 this work was 
 revised several times, the last timetn July, 1870. 
 
 NO. 18 
 
 FIRST POSITION OF THE ARMY 
 
 If the political situation brings about a war of 
 France against Prussia, then the attitude of Austria 
 will be either decidedly hostile or at least very 
 doubtful. 
 
 Should we oppose one half of our army to each 
 of these two powers, we would be superior to neither. 
 Therefore the first thing to be considered is: against 
 which enemy will we in the start assume the defen- 
 sive with minor forces, in order to advance offensively 
 as strong as possible against the other? 
 
 The Rhine with its fortresses undoubtedly affords 
 us a defensive line against France, which we have 
 not against Austria— a line which 100,000 men can 
 hold from four to six weeks against any and all supe- 
 rior numbers. 
 
 But in a defensive attitude against that side we 
 would hardly have South Germany with us, if we do 
 not have it against us. The French would go around 
 our Rhine front via Worms to operate through Fran- 
 conia against Berlin, while our main force, even after 
 successful operations, would come to a stand possibly 
 in front of Olmtitz or on the Danube. It would not 
 at all be impossible for the Austrians to decline to ac- 
 cept a decision in Bohemia or Moravia, and await be- 
 
 150 
 
—151- 
 
 hind their defensive lines the success of their allies. 
 In financial straights, with weak peace cadres, Aus- 
 tria requires in any case a longer time to complete 
 its mobilization, and it is very probable that we will 
 have a free hand against France for some six to eight 
 weeks, if we take the initiative. 
 
 Neither Austria nor France are strong enough to 
 carry on a war without allies against Northern Ger- 
 many. As soon as Austria commences its mobiliza- 
 tion, we should immediately declare war against 
 France. We should not be kept from doing this by 
 the fact of being the aggressor, for we may be sure 
 that Austria will not mobilize, before an understand- 
 ing has been arrived at between both powers as to an 
 advance, for which France merely gives its ally time 
 to prepare. 
 
 If we invade French territory, then the French 
 sentiment will not wait for Austria. France is not 
 only the most dangerous but the most ready enemy, 
 and we will be certain to encounter our enemy very 
 soon. The size of the armies, their hmited space of 
 concentration and the difficulties of subsistence 
 and supply indicate a quick decision as far as both 
 sides are concerned, and we may say with certainty, 
 that in the first few weeks a contact will be had, 
 which, in case of being to our advantage, would 
 cause Austria to return its half-drawn sword to the 
 scabbard. 
 
 Had the Austrians completed their armament and 
 concentration while we were seeking a rapid decision 
 on the other side of the Rhine, had they occupied 
 Silesia and a part of the provinces of Brandenburg 
 and Prussia, then surely nothing definite would have 
 been lost, as long as our fortresses there hold their 
 own and as long as the defensive army there retreats 
 unbeaten. It is probable that after the first unsuc- 
 cessful battle a change in the Dynasty will occur in 
 
—152— 
 
 France, and as we do not desire to take anything 
 away from France we may soon be able to conie to 
 terms with the new Government or new Monarchy. 
 
 Considering all these reasons, I suggest that we 
 designate ten army corps for an offensive against 
 France, and three army corps for a defensive 
 against Austria. For the reinforcement of the latter 
 and for the active defense of the coast, a mobile 
 Landwehr division should be formed and the 17th 
 Division should be kept back for observation against 
 Denmark— that division to be replaced in the IXth 
 Army Corps by the Hessian Division. 
 
 It is self-evident that all forces should be em- 
 ployed against France if we have to fight against it 
 alone for a longer time. 
 
 1.— DEFENSE AGAINST AUSTRIA 
 
 It is hard to state in advance with what numer- 
 ical superiority Austria can take the field against us, 
 but it is certain that that country's superiority will 
 develop only with the progress of its mobilization and 
 armament. 
 
 In 1866 Austria put 340,000 men in the field, 
 which took it four months. There is no reason to 
 assume that at the present time it could arm and 
 mobilize quicker or in stronger force to-day. 
 
 Interior conditions of the Empire will hardly allow 
 the provinces to be stripped of all troops; considera- 
 tions in respect to other countries, especially Russia, 
 and possibly also Bavaria, will compel Austria to 
 place troops also on other frontiers besides the Prus- 
 sian frontier. It is not to be assumed that Austria 
 will leave a free hand to Russia in the Danube Prin- 
 cipalities nor in Gahcia in order to employ all its 
 
—153— 
 
 forces against us. If Russia, not counting the Cau- 
 casian Army, places in tlie field— 
 
 8 inf. divisions at Bender; 
 12 inf. div. and 2 cav. div. at Wolocysk; 
 2 inf. divisions against Brody, 
 
 it can still concentrate 18 infantry divisions and 2 
 cavalry divisions in a comparatively short time around 
 Czenstochau, which v^ould threaten the rear of any 
 advance through Silesia. 
 
 It seems probable that Austria will be forced to 
 concentrate an observation army possibly at Olmiitz 
 and eventually on the lower Inn, and then only the 
 remainder of its fighting forces, exclusive of many 
 garrisons, could be utilized against us. 
 
 Even if Russia does not actively interfere at the 
 beginning of the campaign, all Austrian operations 
 in Silesia are endangered from the Russian side in 
 the degree in which they advance. 
 
 Consequently all considerations make it apparent 
 that the Austrians will march from Bohemia directly 
 on Berlin, and that on the right bank of the Elbe, as 
 otherwise they would have to re-cross that stream 
 between our fortresses and in the face of our de- 
 fensive. 
 
 Therefore we must take our measures primarily 
 against such an operation. 
 
 With due regard to the most rapid and combined 
 assembly of all of the North German army corps it is 
 advisable to designate the 1st and the lid for the de- 
 fensive against Austria and to reinforce them by the 
 1st and 3d mobile Landwehr divisions to 83,600 men. 
 Under the pressure of the moment the active de- 
 fense of the Baltic Sea coast must be left to the 
 forces now stationed for defense on the North Sea, 
 and this can be done, because there is Httle probabil- 
 ity of an expedition in the North Sea. 
 
-154— 
 
 Furthermore, there would remain disposable for 
 defense in Silesia the Vlth Army Corps with a 
 strength of 30,000 men and adding to it the above 
 83,600 men would give a total of 113,600 men. 
 
 To assemble that force at one point, for instance 
 at Gorlitz, is not allowable. 
 
 On the one hand it would not be justifiable were 
 we to take all the troops from Silesia, and on the 
 other hand we could not draw off the Xllth Army 
 Corps from Dresden before it is relieved, and that by 
 at least one Prussian division. 
 
 The Silesian Army Corps can best be concentrated 
 on the line Neisse— Frankenstein to guard the fron- 
 tier and to threaten, viaGlatz, the enemy's main rail- 
 road at Wildenschwerdt. 
 
 Should the enemy enter Silesia at all, he would 
 do so with that part of his army, the concentration 
 of which I presuppose to be at Olmiitz, which must 
 at the same time serve for observation against the 
 Russians, and the operations of which consequently 
 can be made more difficult by having to detach minor 
 forces. Presumably that corps would not be strong 
 enough to oppose the enemy's advance on Breslau, 
 but it would flank such an advance by retiring via 
 Schweidnitz. 
 
 However, if the Austrians advance with their 
 combined forces against the Lausitz, then the draw- 
 ing up of the Vlth Corps to Gorlitz will be protected 
 against Bohemia by the mountains and hastened by 
 using two railroads. 
 
 It is also to be presumed that the main power of 
 our defensive army will be too weak to directly op- 
 pose the enemy. Retiring on Berhn, it would draw 
 the enemy after it to that place, which is just his ob- 
 jective, or the decision would have to be accepted on 
 the open field this side of the capital. 
 
 Better success is promised by a flank position, 
 
—155— 
 
 which can be based on the Oder or on the Elbe at one 
 and the same time. For the former, we would take 
 a position at Gorlitz, which facilitates connection with 
 the Vlth Corps and in which we would be closer to 
 Russian support. But this support is only a con- 
 ditional one, and it will always remain a matter of 
 grave doubt whether or not to join a stronger ally 
 directly, for that means to place ourselves under 
 his orders. But as a matter of fact the Elbe flanks 
 the hostile advance on Berlin, and effectively so, 
 because on that stream our defensive army remains 
 in connection with the main forces on the Rhine and 
 finds, until it can be reinforced from there, a sure 
 rallying point in the enlarged Magdeburg. The Elbe, 
 with its fortresses, affords to an offensively conducted 
 flank defense such great advantages as can only be 
 acceptable when opposed to a superior enemy. Each 
 and every advance from any bridge-head compels the 
 enemy to make front and to fight with all of his 
 communications on one flank. In case of reverses, 
 we find complete security behind the stream, while 
 the pursuit would take the enemy away from Berlin. 
 
 That the enemy can get ahead of us in that di- 
 rection would not scare us; the advantages of the 
 situation will appear only when the enemy under- 
 takes to pass us. Of course in such a procedure 
 Berlin will have to be guarded by a detachment on 
 the road thereto against incursions by flying columns. 
 The enemy also must weaken himself by sieges the 
 farther he advances, at least on the right bank, at 
 Dresden, Torgau and Wittenberg and by a careful 
 guarding of his hne of communications. In this he 
 may easily lose his numerical superiority before he 
 reaches the capital, when then correct leadership will 
 succeed in uniting all forces and chance a decision, 
 having his line of retreat open to Magdeburg. 
 
 As the flank operation becomes more effective 
 
—166— 
 
 the farther upstream it commences, Dresden would 
 be the proper point for the concentration of the — 
 
 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Infantry Divisions; 
 1st and 3d Landwehr Divisions; 
 2d Cavalry Division. 
 
 On the other hand, the 1st Cavalry Division would 
 have to be brought to Gorlitz to facilitate its reach- 
 ing the Vlth Corps. 
 
 If shortly before breaking out of hostilities our 
 main forces move from Dresden to the strong position 
 at Stolpen (25 km. east of Dresden), in which opera- 
 tion it would remain protected on its right flank by 
 the impassable Sandstone Mountains, and if at the 
 same time the Gorlitz detachment is called up to 
 Bautzen, then the possibility exists at the very start 
 to attack with all disposable forces the enemy de- 
 bouching from the Lausitz Mountains. In any case 
 we would draw him on our force and into the direc- 
 tion of Dresden. All the rest falls into the province 
 of operations, which we can touch here only insofar 
 as they demand the first position of the fighting 
 forces. 
 
 Concerning now the South German States, we 
 must not expect in this nor in any other coahtion 
 anything except what is to the immediate interest of 
 all parties. 
 
 In a war against France alone the direct joining 
 of the Bavarian army to the North German fighting 
 force on the central Rhine gives the best protection 
 against a French invasion into Bavarian territory, 
 and if correct military views in Munich have the 
 upper hand, this requirement will be complied with. 
 We cannot require this, however, when Bavaria has 
 to defend its own frontier against Austria. 
 
 We may assume that in that case Bavaria would 
 undoubtedly be able to concentrate 60,000 men on the 
 
-157- 
 
 lower Inn. Such a position would assure us the help 
 which we have to expect of Bavaria. Being in rear 
 of the hostile concentration in Bohemia and Moravia 
 it threatens Vienna in such a degree that Austria 
 cannot help but send a force at least equally strong 
 against it. Against such a force the Bavarian army 
 would hardly be able to permanently protect Munich, 
 but it could contain that force until a general decision 
 had been arrived at at Ingolstadt. However, we can 
 not allow the Bavarians to take a waiting position in 
 the very start at Ingolstadt; we must demand that 
 they exchange shots at the very beginning with 
 Austria. 
 
 Wiirttemberg and Baden are directly threatened 
 by France as well as by Austria, and we can expect 
 them to join our offensive. 
 
 If we succeed in bringing about an early decision 
 in France, then, even if the Austrians have made 
 progress in the meantime in Silesia or Brandenburg, 
 the direction of our operations would be against them 
 through Wiirttemberg and Bavaria. 
 
 Consequently it is of main importance to take 
 the field against France quickly and in superior 
 numbers. 
 
 2. OFFENSIVE AGAINST FRANCE 
 
 Less complicated than for the defensive against 
 Austria is the plan of operations for the offensive 
 against France. It consists mainly in seeking out 
 the enemy's main force and to attack it where found. 
 The only difficulty lies in executing this simple 
 plan with very large masses. 
 
 In its mobile stage the French active 
 
 army numbers 336,000 men 
 
 deduct for Algiers 35,000 \ .f. f.(.f. u 
 
 and for Rome 5,000 \ ^"'""" 
 
 which leaves disposable 296,000 men 
 
 But as soon as we get ahead of the French of- 
 
-158— 
 
 fensive, a part of these line of troops will be abso- 
 lutely necessary for garrisoning Strassburg, Metz, 
 Diedenhofen, Lyon and Paris, 50,000 men at the low- 
 est estimate. 
 
 If after that conditions do not require observa- 
 tion corps to be placed at the Pyrenees or on the 
 Channel, we still would in the start meet hardly 
 more than 250,000 men in the field. 
 
 The ten North German corps number 330,000 
 men. 
 
 Of course there still are 93,000 reserves in 
 France. The simplest manner to utilize them would 
 be for reinforcing the battalions of 800 men now to 
 1000 men, and this would bring the French army in 
 the field to about the same strength as that of the 
 North German army. But it appears that that is 
 not the intention, but that a special reserve army is 
 to be formed, and this pre-supposes new formation 
 and is an additional reason for us to advance quickly. 
 
 We have a reserve of 26,000 men in the already 
 organized Guard and 3d Landwehr Divisions, which 
 presumably follow up in the course of the campaign. 
 
 If we can count with some certainty on 30,000 
 men of the Baden and Wfirttemberg Division, then 
 the proportion, at the opening of hostilities, of our 
 forces to the hostile fighting forces, will be as 360,000 
 to 250,000, and later on 386,000 to 343,000 men.^ 
 
 It is self-evident how important it is to fully util- 
 ize the superiority which we have in the start, and 
 in the North German forces alone. 
 
 This superiority will be materially increased at 
 the decisive point, if the French engage in expedi- 
 tions against the North Sea coast or into Southern 
 
 1 Addition in 1870:— "How conditions are now in July, 
 1870, we are justified in assuming that all South German 
 forces will join us, that is 70,000 men. In that case we would 
 oppose the 250,000 French with 400,000 men and would still 
 have three army corps in reserve.'' 
 
-151) - 
 
 Germany. To meet the former we have sufficient 
 means without weakening the field army, and the 
 latter expedition cannot be dangerous to us for the 
 present. 
 
 The main point is to concentrate our actual su- 
 periority in such a manner as to enable us to bring it 
 to account at the decisive moment and in that the 
 first question is: where may we expect to meet the 
 enemy? 
 
 The neutrality of Belgium, Holland and Switzer- 
 land confine the theater of war to the area between 
 Luxemburg and Basel. Should France disregard 
 this neutrality and advance through Belgium against 
 the Prussian Rhine, then it would have to weaken 
 itself by 80,000 to 100,000 men in Brussels and in 
 front of the Belgian army assembled in Antwerp, 
 not counting probable difficulties with England. A 
 further advance across the Maas we could more ef- 
 fectively oppose from the direction of the Mosel, 
 than from the Rhine. Our Rhine front is so strong 
 that it requires no immediate support, and in addi- 
 tion, the distance from Brussels to Cologne is greater 
 than that from Mayence, Trier or Kaiserslautern to 
 Brussels. Our advance from the south forces the 
 enemy to make front and to fight with his communi- 
 cations in the flank — which are already threatened 
 by Belgium. An original concentration of our fight- 
 ing forces south of the Mosel would consequently en- 
 able us to meet the danger of this invasion on the 
 left bank of the Rhine, as well as to get ahead of it 
 by an offensive on French ground. Not counting 
 political difficulties with England, the violation of 
 Belgium's neutrality offers too little hope of success 
 to be probable. 
 
 France would encounter no less difficulties should 
 it attempt to carry out operations through Switzer- 
 land to join hands with Austria. Capturing and 
 
— i60- 
 
 holding this mountainous country would occupy more 
 than 100,000 men for a long time. In addition a di- 
 rect conjunctive operation of both allied armies 
 would be of no interest to each one separately, they 
 have to pursue entirely different objects on sepa- 
 rated theaters of war in order to finally gain their 
 combined object— the defeat of the Prussian power. 
 
 We are therefore justified in assuming that the 
 French will effect their first concentration on the 
 line Metz— Strassburg in order to advance against 
 the Main, going around our strong Rhine front, to 
 separate North and South Germany, to reach an un- 
 derstanding with the latter and, based on that, to 
 advance against the Elbe. 
 
 This also will mean a concentration south of the 
 Mosel and of all disposable North and South German 
 fighting forces in the Bavarian Palatinate as the 
 most suitable means to oppose such plans. 
 
 Expectation of easy success might easily induce 
 the French to advance with a part of their fighting 
 force from Strassburg against Southern Germany. 
 But an operation upstream on the flank of this march 
 would prevent any and all further advance across the 
 Black Forest and would compel the opponent to first 
 gain elbow room against the north. If the Baden — 
 Wiirttemberg Corps has joined our left wing, then 
 we are in the situation to reinforce it from the Pa- 
 latinate to such an extent that a decision may be 
 sought, about in the vicinity of Rastatt, and should 
 the outcome be fortunate for us the enemy's retreat 
 would result in annihilation. To attain that object 
 we can without fear make detachments from our 
 main force, as the enemy in our front will have been 
 weakened by just so much as he has made detachments 
 from his main army for operations on the upper 
 Rhine. 
 
 Should the South German Governments prefer 
 
—161— 
 
 a direct defense of their domain by a position behind 
 the Black Forest or at Ulm, then we would be re- 
 lieved of the necessity of supporting them. We can 
 leave them to their own devices, as the march of a 
 French army, extending via Stuttgart and Munich, 
 will become effective on our strategic flank only, 
 when the important decisions against the weakened 
 enemy in our front have fallen. 
 
 If the French would fully utilize their railroad 
 system for quick concentration of all their fighting 
 forces, they are compelled to detrain in two main 
 groups, at Strassburg and Metz, separated by the 
 Vogdes Mountains. If the presumably smaller group 
 at the first point is not assigned against South Ger- 
 many, then it can be drawn up to the main force on 
 the upper Mosel only by marching. 
 
 In the Palatinate we stand on the inner line of 
 operations between both hostile groups. We can 
 turn against the one or the other and, provided we 
 are strong enough, against both at the same time. 
 The concentration of all our forces in the Palatinate 
 protects the lower as well as the upper Rhine and al- 
 lows an offensive into the enemy's country which, 
 provided it is made at the correct time, will probably 
 get ahead of the French setting foot upon German 
 ground. 
 
 The only question remains, if we, without run- 
 ning danger of being interfered with in our first con- 
 centration, can transfer the point of concentration 
 across the Rhine into the Palatinate and to the im- 
 mediate French frontier, and this question, according 
 to my opinions, should be answered affirmatively. 
 
 Our mobilization is prepared down to the very 
 last detail. There are six trunk lines available for 
 transporting troops to the vicinity between the 
 Mosel and the Rhine. The time tables, showing day 
 and hour of starting and arrival of each troop unit, 
 
ai*e prepared. On the 12th day the first detachments 
 can detrain close to the French frontier; and on the 
 15th day the fighting troops of two army corps will 
 be assembled there. On the :20th day the number of 
 our fighting forces will be 300,000 men and on the 
 2ith day the armies will have their full comple- 
 ments.* 
 
 We have no reason at all to suppose that the con- 
 centration of the French army to a mobile footing, 
 
 * riie notes c'oiu'erniiij>' tlie position in re;uliiiess of the 
 li^hlinj;' forces in tliis nu'Uioiial iuive hvvu cliaufied by the 
 inar<;inal note "For 1870"'. It states: for the 12th day. read 
 "lOtii"; for the 15lh, "13th"; for the 20th, "18th", and for the 
 24th, "20ti»'' with "nearly all trains". 
 
 These elian^es apparently are based on the following 
 marginal notes in the handwriting;- of Genei'al v. Moltke: 
 
 ",l('eor(/i)(</ to the prcparatioiitifor 7S70: 
 
 SECOND AKMY 
 
 on the 10th mobilization day 
 up to incl. the 12th mobilization day 
 u " 15th 
 
 u a i9t,h " " 
 
 inclusive of the 1st section of trains and columns of all 
 
 four army corps. 
 In the vicinity of Landay there will be concentrated — 
 of the Third Army: 
 
 the Xlth A.C not later than the i:Uh day of mobilization, 
 the Vth A.C not later than the 18th day of mobilization, 
 inclusive of the 1st section of trains; 
 
 of the Fourth Arm!/: mobilization 
 
 2r)th Div. will reach Gollhcim t)n the - - - i3t,h 
 18th " with the troops the same line on the - 15th 
 
 so that the IXth Corps, able to commence opera- 
 ations by the adilition of the trains, etc., of the 
 2r)th Div., can, after 1 day of rest, reach Hom- 
 
 bar<;- on the 19th 
 
 the Xll AC (with the 1st sec. of trains, etc.) de- 
 trains at Mayence by the . . - 16th 
 and can be echeloned from Homburg to Kaisers- 
 lantern by the - . . . 19th 
 of the First Army: 
 
 the V'llth \A\ can reach Saarburg—Zerf— Trier 18th 
 
 and the Vlllth A.C oan be echeloned from west 
 of Saarlouis to llermeskeil. 
 
 The 1st section of trains are present with both corps." 
 
 BNS. 
 
 yc^DS. 
 
 BAT 
 
 8 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 30 
 
 24 
 
 8 
 
 64 
 
 76 
 
 27 
 
 104 
 
 84 
 
 48 
 
 104 
 
 108 
 
 60 
 
—163— 
 
 for which so far they have no experience, can be 
 made quicker. Since Napoleon Bonaparte's time 
 France has known only partial mobilization, in which 
 the part of the army taking the field was completed 
 from the part remaining at home. 
 
 Considering the numerous garrisons and camps 
 in the northeastern part of the country, France can 
 of course, on account of the excellent railroad sys- 
 tem and plentiful rolling stock, assemble an army 
 of 150,000 men at the frontier in a very short 
 time. Such a procedure of a quick initiative would 
 correspond with the national character and has been 
 discussed in military circles. Assuming such an im- 
 provised army, which would be well supplied with 
 cavalry and artillery, were concentrated on the 5th 
 day at Metz and on the 8th day crossed the frontier 
 at Saarlouis; we still could timely start our railroad 
 transports and detrain our main force on the Rhine 
 by that time. To that point the invasion would still 
 have to cover six marches and would come to a stand- 
 still there on the 14th day opposite equally strong 
 forces. Being in possession of the stream crossings, 
 a few days later we would take the offensive in 
 doubly superior numbers. 
 
 The disadvantages and dangers of such a pro- 
 cedure on the part of France are so apparent that 
 France would hardly decide on it, and in any case it 
 will be unable of execution should we ourselves take 
 the initiative. 
 
 If this shows the correctness of the concentra- 
 tion in the Palatinate, objection still may be raised 
 against a concentration of all disposable fighting 
 forces there and on the Mosel, based on the seeming 
 exposure of our Rhine front. We have already in- 
 dicated that it is protected by Belgium's neutrality 
 and, should that be violated, by the distance, by its 
 own strength, and by operations. 
 
—164- 
 
 A fighting force like the one we place in the field 
 against P>ance, can of course operate only if divided 
 into several armies. The strength of each of these 
 armies should depend on special tasks and the assign- 
 ment of the separate army corps to the armies should 
 be made with due regard to having all in readiness 
 in the shortest time. 
 
 Without interfering greatly with the latter point, 
 the following organization ought not to be changed: 
 
 1st Army— Vllth and Vlllth Army Corps 
 
 —as right wing around Wittlich - 60, 000 men 
 
 2d Army-IIId, IVth, Xth and Guard 
 Corps — in the center at Neunkirchen 
 — Homburg - , - - - 131,000 men 
 
 3d Army— Vth, Xlth, Baden-Wiirttem- 
 berg Corps and eventually a Bavarian 
 brig, as left wing at Landau and Rastatt 99,000 men 
 or, should the two Bavarian Corps join 130,000 men 
 
 4th, a Reserve, consisting of the com- 
 bined IXth and Xllth Army Corps in 
 front of Mayence _ . . . 63,000men 
 
 Total ----- 353,00 0men 
 
 or. under above assumption - - - 384, 000 men 
 
 Of course, should we be engaged with France 
 alone, then the 1st, lid, and finally the Vlth Corps, 
 100,000 men, can also be drawn up. However, these 
 corps can arrive only later on, as the railroads will be 
 fully occupied up to the 20th day. On the other 
 hand, the two Bavarian corps could immediately join 
 the- Third army, which would bring the strength of 
 that army up to 130,000 men and the whole force, 
 after three weeks, would be increased to 484,000 
 men. 
 
 FIRST ARMY 
 
 To secure the concentration of the Vllth and 
 Vlllth Corps on the upper Mosel, it will be correct to 
 not draw back the troops garrisoned there, but to 
 
—165— 
 
 leave them as an advance guard at Trier and Saar- 
 briicken and to reinforce them. 
 
 The position of the latter place will of course be 
 occupied for the present by the troops there and the 
 two battalions and four squadrons in Saarlouis, which 
 will be sufficient for mere observation and protection 
 of the railroads against minor raids by the enemy. 
 Orders will be issued by higher authority for suc- 
 cessive destruction of the railroad and for that pur- 
 pose a railroad detachment will be attached to the 
 detachment there. If ever possible, the detachment 
 will not retire beyond Neunkirchen and will either 
 be reinforced or relieved on the twelfth day by 
 stronger detachments of the Hid Army Corps. 
 Thereupon it will return to its corps. 
 
 On the other hand, the garrison at Trier— four 
 battalions, four squadrons and one battery (which 
 latter is to be immediately sent from Coblenz)— forms 
 a body of troops which is not so directly threatened 
 by the enemy and, very favorably supported by the 
 terrain, must hold itself at Trier, Schweich or at 
 least at Wittlich. On the fourteenth day detach- 
 ments will arrive there for permanent support, by 
 the sixteenth the entire Vlllth Corps (exclusive of 
 the 33d Regiment) will reach there, and by the 
 seventeenth the Vllth Corps (exclusive of trains) and 
 then 50 battalions, 32 squadrons, 30 batteries will 
 be ready for battle and able to start on the twentieth 
 day entirely mobile in any desired direction. 
 
 SECOND ARMY 
 
 The position at Saarbrucken and eventually at 
 Neunkirchen will keep us informed how far the 
 Palatinate railroads may be used with security. On 
 these roads the first detachments of the Illd and 
 IVth Army Corps will arrive by the twelfth day. 
 After both corps have their full complement of troops 
 
— 166- 
 
 by the fifteenth, they will take a position near the 
 frontier (about near Bildstock and St. Ingbert), be- 
 hind which the Xth and the Guard Corps will detrain 
 and thus 104 battalions, 108 squadrons, 60 batteries 
 will be assembled around Homburg by the nineteenth 
 day. 
 
 THIRD ARMY 
 
 The position of the Bavarian brigade at Landau 
 will be reinforced on the fifteenth or sixteenth day 
 by the arrival of the infantry divisions of the Vth 
 Corps. By the eighteenth the largest part of the 
 Xlth Corps— mainly by marching— will be assembled 
 and there will be in a strong position behind the 
 Kling creek 50 battalions, 40 squadrons, 30 bat- 
 teries or Prussian combatants alone, which will 
 be able to extend help to the Baden — Wiirttemberg 
 Corps between Rastatt and Karlsruhe, if the French 
 should have crossed the upper Rhine, or, should this 
 not be the case, that corps will be drawn up to the 
 Xlth Corps, 
 
 Should a French army have already crossed the 
 Rhine and be marching on Stuttgart, the Third Army 
 will concentrate on the line Pforzheim— Calw in two 
 marches, and the Reserve Army would then form the 
 left wing echelon of the offensive towards the west. 
 
 THE RESERVE 
 
 Of the Reserve the IXth Corps (formed by the 
 18th Division and the Hessian Division to be assem- 
 bled at Kirchheimbolanden) and the Xllth Corps — 
 52 battalions, 40 squadrons, 31 batteries— will be 
 assembled the other side of Mayence by the twen- 
 tieth day. At present it seems not probable that 
 the French will have attacked our farthest advanced 
 Second Army with superior numbers prior to that day. 
 
 If France had concentrated its entire force 
 
—167— 
 
 against that army, if the Second Army would have 
 had to fall back on the Reserve Army, then we would 
 be in a good situation after the twentieth day to accept 
 battle with 200,000 men in an exceedingly favorable 
 position at Marnheim. Should that be the case, the 
 French could not have started any other larger 
 operation against the upper Rhine or the lower 
 Mosel, and it would be entirely correct to reinforce 
 our main force by the Third Army and to direct the 
 First Army across the Nahe to the flank and rear of 
 the hostile advance. With only moderately good 
 leadership 300,000 men would be concentrated for 
 the decision. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the Second Army holds its 
 ground on the frontier, as we may assume with some 
 probability will be the case, reinforcements will reach 
 it in time from the reserve, whilst the First and 
 Third Army secure the flanks, and thus the offensive 
 might be taken into the enemy's country at once. 
 
 Should we still be in ignorance by then as to the 
 point of assembly of the main forces of the enemy, 
 there are four cavalry divisions of seventy-six squad- 
 rons each at hand which, supported by infantry, 
 should furnish us the desired information. 
 
 3. COAST DEFENSE 
 
 For the defense of our coasts and for similtan- 
 eous observation of Denmark, four divisions are de- 
 tailed, besides the garrisons of the fortified places, 
 especially that of Sonderburg, viz: 
 
 one Guard Landwehr division, 
 two Landwehr divisions, 
 the 17th Infantry Division. 
 There are local garrisons of about 8000 men on 
 the stretch of coast from Emden to Bremerhaven and 
 the 2d Landwehr Division, a total of 10,800 men, 
 should be stationed at Bremen for active support. 
 To protect the Elbe and the coast of Schleswig- 
 
—168— 
 
 Holstein, as well as the stretch from Hamburg to 
 Liibeck, there are assigned as local garrisons 17,750 
 men, and furthermore the mobile 17th Infantry Di- 
 vision. 15, ()()() men, which latter should be concen- 
 trated ai'ound Hamburg. 
 
 The (luard Landwehr Division, 11,000 men, 
 should be stationed as a general reserve at Hanover, 
 in consideration of the existing railroad net. 
 
 The 1st Landwehr Division remains disposable 
 for defense of the less endangered Baltic Sea coast 
 of Pomerania and Prussia. 
 
 It a|)])ears justifiable to draw off the 17th Infan- 
 try Division from Schleswig, as it can quickly be re- 
 turned by rail in case of need, and especially because 
 it seems not probable that Denmark will decide at 
 the start of the campaign to be hostile. 
 
 A French landing, if at all intended, will un- 
 doubtedly be made in the very first stages of the 
 war. As soon as we have entered French ground 
 such far-reaching expeditions have logically to be 
 abandoned. 
 
 Furthermore, the French ileet will hardly under- 
 take an invasion into the Baltic Sea. The route 
 around Skagen could hardly be kept concealed and 
 we would have ample time to follow it on the rail- 
 roads with our fighting forces. 
 
 Far more probable appears a debarkation on the 
 North Sea coast or at some Jutland port, in order to 
 at least gain a land base for such a hazardous under- 
 taking and in order to finally unite with the Danish 
 reinforcements. 
 
 After what has been stated above, we would op- 
 pose such an expedition very soon with 40,000 men 
 of our field troops, the reinforcement of which does 
 not need to bother us, because there will be sufficient 
 troops left in the country which up to then could not 
 be transported to the theater of war, and which are 
 
—169— 
 
 not absolutely required at the frontier on account of 
 the weakness of the French main army. 
 
 In the further course of the campaign presuma- 
 ably the two mentioned Landwehr divisions can be 
 spared and be at the disposal of the army or for 
 guarding the line of communications. 
 
Concerning the presumable strength of tlie French army, 
 General von Moltke made the following notes, which bear no 
 date, but may be assumed to have been made during the win- 
 ter of 1869-1870. 
 
 No. 19 
 
 If the entire cadres of the French army are 
 filled to their war strength there would be 
 
 370 battalions _ . 259, 000 men 
 
 62 cavalry regiments 31,000 " 
 
 164 batteries 25.000 '' 
 
 engineers ...^ 8,000 "^_ 
 
 Combatants proper. . ... 323,000 men 
 
 This total does not include 12,000 men of artillery 
 trains and baggage trains nor 65,000 reserves required 
 at the depots which in time of peace are performed 
 by cadres only. These numbers are offset by our 
 own train and recruit battalions. 
 
 If we deduct only 10,000 troops of the line for 
 Algiers and 15,000 only for Paris, Lyon, Strassburg 
 and Metz— the National Guards taking over the ser- 
 vice of all other places — it will leave an army of op- 
 erations of hardly 300,000 men. 
 
 There is no reason to suppose that the mobiliza- 
 tion of the French army will be completed any soon- 
 er than that of the Prussian. On the other hand, 
 the more complete French railroad net will enable 
 France to have the largest part of all available fight- 
 ing forces at the initial concentration points near our 
 frontier at a time when we reach the Rhine with but 
 a part of our fighing force. 
 
 If the French desire to fully utilize their rail- 
 roads, they will have to detrain one part of their 
 
 170 
 
—171— 
 
 fighting force east, the other (main) part west of the 
 Vogdes mountains. 
 
 If the Army Detachment concentrated in the 
 Rhine valley is to gain a political or military object, 
 it must be at least 50,000 men strong. This will 
 leave 250,000 men at most opposite the line Luxem- 
 burg— Weissenburg. 
 
 We are justified in assuming that these concen- 
 trations can be completed after the course of three 
 weeks. 
 
For the information of the Chiefs of Sections of tlie Great 
 General Staff General v. Moltke composed the following 
 wcn-k in tlie sjji-ing of 1870, in which he explained his views 
 as to the execution of tlie advance of the army against the 
 Mosel line. It is to be noted that in the attached march table 
 cognizance is taken of only the North German fighting 
 forces. 
 
 No. 20 
 
 Berliu, 6. May, 1870. 
 
 The operation against France will consist simply 
 in our advancing, closed up as much as possible a 
 few marches in French territory until we meet 
 the French army and give battle. 
 
 The general direction of this advance is Paris, 
 because in that direction we are most certain to find 
 our objective — the hostile army 
 
 On the direct road from the Palatinate to Paris 
 is Metz. This place will be circumvented on the left 
 and will be observed only. 
 
 The next strategic advance, in so far a battle 
 does not ensue sooner, is the line of the Mosel, Lune- 
 ville— Pont a Mousson. 
 
 In this advance, the Second army will be in the 
 first line, the P^ourth in the second, and both flanks 
 will be covered by the First and Third army. Our 
 initiative will lay down the law to the opponent. 
 
 On the line Luneville— Pont a Mousson we have 
 two railroads in our rear; there, if not sooner, a de- 
 cisive battle must ensue and beyond this we can ar- 
 range no details. 
 
 No counting the resistance which we may en- 
 counter sooner, this advance of 60 (English) miles 
 finds its main difficulty in the limited area in which 
 the masses have to advance. If the French advance 
 to meet us in corresponding strength, that difficulty 
 
 172 
 
— iVs— 
 
 will be common to both sides. It is different if 
 they await us assembled or advance to meet us de- 
 ployed for battle. 
 
 To enable us to deploy for battle we need a 
 whole day, which the advance guard must secure to 
 the army. We can learn where we may meet the 
 enemy only through the advance guard. Therefore 
 it must be strong, and especially So in cavalry. 
 
 The advance guard will be formed of the 5th In- 
 fantry Division and one cavalry corps. For the latter 
 there are 76 squadrons of the 3d, 4th and 10th and the 
 Guard Cavalry Divisions available under a comman- 
 der to be specially selected. The 6th Division fol- 
 lows as support. 
 
 Different from decision in battle, the task of the 
 cavalry is not to be kept closed up, but it will ad- 
 vance in different directions by divisions and these 
 latter will send out detachments until the main con- 
 centration point of the enemy has been ascertained. 
 The infantry division can support these smaller 
 detachments, using wagons, but on the whole it will 
 remain in close order so as to afford a rallying point 
 in strong positions to the cavalry. 
 
 The cavalry can advance several marches ahead 
 of the infantry; its strength secures its return. 
 
 The larger infantry detachments must avoid each 
 and every movement to the rear. It is advisable to 
 make all assemblies towards the front. The 5th Di- 
 vision is protected by the cavalry from the danger of 
 encountering the concentrated hostile force; in con- 
 nection with that division, it can hold out against a 
 hostile corps for 24 hours. It must precede the army 
 by a whole march. 
 
 It is true that the Second Army will be concen- 
 trated on the 19th day at the frontier (Bildstock — 
 St. Ingbert), but it has no trains as yet. In addition, 
 the Fourth Army has to be drawn up. The first 
 
-174- 
 
 arriving echelons of the latter can be started siicces-- 
 sively in the direction of Zweibriicken, but the last 
 will require four days to close up, and the complete 
 concentration behind the Second Army may take 
 until the 24th day. 
 
 It does not appear advisable to cross the frontier 
 sooner than we are ready to accept battle. 
 
 Under existing conditions it will be necessary for 
 Royal Headquarters to regulate the marches of all 
 corps and divisions. 
 
 It will be possible to make the march as far as 
 the Mosel with the Second and Fourth Army in three 
 main columns and in two echelons in the breadth and 
 depth of one march, so that the assembly of 150,000 
 men towards the center and even towards a wing 
 of the first line can be made in one march. 
 
 All corps will be immediately followed by their 
 trains; the latter will halt (parking alongside the 
 roads) only when the advance guard reports the prox- 
 imity of the enemy. 
 
 The length of a march should be 10 (Eng.) miles; 
 the start to be made early every morning. 
 
 The IVth and the Xth Corps will have independ- 
 ent advance guards. 
 
 As the cavalry divisions of the Second Army are 
 in front, the march depth of the infantry divisions of 
 that army will be six hours. Therefore the Fourth 
 Army will come in contact at noon with the trains of 
 the Second Army, which should not prevent it to go 
 into bivouacs, even if, when necessary, the march is 
 to be continued in the afternoon. 
 
 According to the political situation it is not prob- 
 able that the First Army will encounter resistance in 
 its advance to join the right wing of the Second 
 Army. 
 
 On the other hand, it is very possible that the 
 Third Army will have to be reinforced by the Fourth 
 
-175- 
 
 Army in the start. If this is done in a large meas- 
 ure, the residue of the Fourth Army will follow the 
 advance of the First and Second Army. 
 
 Should the French have concentrated their main 
 force opposite our front, the Third Army joins the 
 general advance against the Mosel, but sight must 
 not be lost of the possibility that we may have to 
 make front towards the south. 
 
 Concerning the concentration of all or at least 
 the larger part of our fighting forces, that matter 
 will be governed each day by general orders. 
 
—176- 
 
 
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PART II 
 
 Operations from August 3 to September 2, 1870 
 
 No. 94 
 
 To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz— Losheim. 
 Hq. Mayence, 3 August, 1870, 11:00 a.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Dilatory advance of the French justifies assump- 
 tion that the Second Army can be concentrated on 
 the 6th instant in front of the forest zone at Kaisers- 
 lautern. 
 
 If rapid advance of enemy cannot be prevented, 
 concentration of Second Army takes place behind 
 the Lauter. 
 
 Combined action of both armies in the battle in- 
 tended; First Army from St. Wendel andBaumholder. 
 
 His Majesty orders that First Army concentrates 
 on the 4th against Tholey. To-morrow Third Army 
 crosses frontier at Weissenburg. General offensive 
 intended. 
 
 No. 95 
 
 To H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles— Alzey. 
 Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, 11:00 a.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Dilatory advance of the French justifies assump- 
 tion that the Second Army can be concentrated on 
 the 6th instant in front of the forest zone at Kaisers- 
 lautern. 
 
 First Army v^ill be drawn to Tholey to-morrow. 
 Combination of both armies in the battle. 
 
 If rapid advance of enemy cannot be prevented, 
 
 177 
 
—178— 
 
 concentration of Second Army takes place behind the 
 Lauter. First Army to Baumholder. 
 
 Third Army crosses frontier to-morrow at Weis- 
 senburg. General offensive intended. 
 
 No. 96 
 To Headquarters First Army— Losheim. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, noon. 
 Telegram: 
 
 By orders of the King 1st Cavalry Division at- 
 tached to First Army. Will reach Birkenfeld from 
 noon the 5th to incl. 8th of August, hq. probably 7 
 August. 
 
 No. 97 
 
 To Headquarters Third Army— Speyer. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, noon. 
 Telegram: 
 
 By order of the King 2d Cavalry Division at- 
 tached to Third Army. Headquarters will reach 
 Castel on the Rhine August 4, the regiments of the 
 Vlth Corps there also from the 3d to 6th August, the 
 regiments of the 1st and lid Corps reach Bingen on 
 the 5th and the 7th or 8th August respectively. 
 
 By noon August 3, only indefinite information 
 had been received at Royal Headquarters of the 
 battle at Saarbriicken the day before. This caused 
 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to ask the 
 following: 
 
 No. 98 
 To Commanding Officer— Saarlouis. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, noon. 
 Telegram: 
 
 What happened yesterday at Saarbriicken? We 
 have only rumors, but no official report. 
 
 (Same to Hq. VIHth A. C.) 
 
 Only at 5.15 p.m. a telegram was received in 
 Mayence, sent from Lebach at 11.20 a.m. and from 
 
Saarlous at 2.28 p.m., from General v. Goeben con- 
 taining more definite information of the battle at 
 Saarbriicken, which caused General v. Moltke to 
 issue the following orders: 
 
 No. 99 
 To Headquarters Vlllth Army Corps— Lebach 
 (via Saarlouis). 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 3 August 1870, 7:45 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Possession of Saarbriicken at present time of no 
 importance to us. First Army has orders to assemble 
 at Tholey. Vlllth Corps will move guiding its march 
 accordingly. 
 
 No. 100 
 
 To Headquarters Second Army— Winnweiler. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 4 August 1870, 12:00 noon. 
 
 I have the honor to inform headquarters Second 
 Army that the orders of the 4th instant brought by 
 Lieutenant General v. Stosch to these headquarters 
 and containing intended movements are in accord- 
 ance with the King's intentions. 
 
 For the purpose of orientation for the next few 
 days I will state: 
 
 The First Army is concentrating to-day in the 
 triangle Tholey— Lebach— Ottweiler (hq. Tholey, 
 connection via St. Wendel) and will remain there for 
 the present. It has not yet been decided whether 
 the 1st Army Corps will be permanently attached to 
 that army or kept at disposition of the King. Con- 
 sequently it might be advisable to send the troops of 
 that corps to the vicinity of Tiirkismiihle — Tholey— 
 St. Wendel and to keep headquarters of the First 
 Army permanently informed of the location of head- 
 quarters of 1st Army Corps. 
 
 The Third Army takes the offensive today, for 
 the present in southerly direction. After it has ad- 
 vanced to Hagenau and not met strong hostile forces, 
 
— iso- 
 
 it will turn against the Saar at Saargemtind, proper- 
 protecting its left wing. 
 
 If that is the case, it is the intention to have the 
 Vlth Army Corps, now detraining at Landau, march 
 to Pirmasens as connecting link between the Second 
 and Third Army. 
 
 Still, the Third Army will hardly reach the upper 
 Saar before August 9th, and it is therefore not nec- 
 essary for the Second Army to reach the Saar with 
 its main forces before that day. 
 
 The enclosed sketch shows what is known here 
 so far of the position and strength of the hostile 
 army. The advance of the Third Army will bring 
 certain information concerning the whereabouts of 
 the corps MacMahon and Failly. The intentions of 
 the enemy appear to be a strict defensive on the Saar 
 for the present. Considering these points and in so 
 far as hostile forces do not cross the Saar today, it 
 is left to H. R. H.'s discretion whether or not the 
 leading elements of the Hid and IVth Army Corps 
 very soon advance to the line Ottweiler — Neunkirch- 
 en — Homburg, but if they do they must halt there 
 and await the arrival of the rear echelons, in order 
 to get as soon as possible across the terrain which 
 greatly interferes with the deployment of larger 
 forces. 
 
 Finally, I will state that the King has to-day 
 ordered the drawing up of the lid Army Corps, and 
 that it will detrain probably on the 9th or 10th of 
 August in Neunkirchen and Homburg with both in- 
 fantry divisions. 
 
 The 3d Landwehr Division, placed at the dis- 
 posal of the Second Army for guarding the line of 
 communications, which has been sent from here for 
 the present toward Homburg (to arrive there on the 
 7th or 8th August), can be detrained in toto or in 
 part at points farther in the rear, at your discretion, 
 
—isl- 
 and in doing this would relieve two companies sent 
 from here to-day by steamer to Bingen and Worms. 
 
 On the 9th instant a ferry service will be ready 
 at Rosengarten — Worms to allow loaded wagons com- 
 ing from Darmstadt to be ferried there and sent on 
 to Alzey. 
 
 In the matter of assuring subsistence, after to- 
 day several trains will be at the disposal of the prop- 
 er authorities on Lines A and B, Complete control of 
 projected lines will be given to the authorities of the 
 lines of communications of the Second Army only 
 after completion of transport of the lid Army Corps, 
 that is at about the 11th instant (when that corps 
 reaches the terminus). It will also have control of 
 Line B by the 10th instant. 
 
 (Here follows a sketch of the area between 
 Metz and Strassburg, showing French forces as fol- 
 lows:— 
 
 Bourbaki's Corps (Guard ) at Metz; Bazaine's (3) 
 at Bolchen; Ladmirault's (4) west and east of Bu- 
 sendorf (larger force west, smaller east); Frossard's 
 (2) between Forbach and Saarbriicken; one division 
 or brigade of the 2d Corps west of Saargemiind; 
 Failly's (5) south of Bitsch; MacMahon's (1) south of 
 Hagenau; and one brigade from either 1st or 7th 
 Corps advanced to the immediate north of Strass- 
 burg. ) 
 
 Notes to this sketch: 
 
 There are no further reports of the 6th Corps, ex- 
 cept that the 47th Regiment is supposed to have been 
 in Chalons still on the 29th July. 
 
 It is said that the attempt to embark an expedi- 
 tionary corps has been given up (according to latest 
 reports). 
 
 It is also questionable whether the 1st Corps did 
 not march already via Zabern. 
 
 There is no information at hand concerning the 
 7th Corps reported to be concentrating upon the up- 
 per Rhine. 
 
—182- 
 
 No. 101 
 To Lieutenant General v. Blumenthal — Landau. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 4 August 1870, 12:00 noon. 
 
 In reply to your communication of 5 p.m. yester- 
 day, I have the honor to inform you that the inten- 
 tions stated therein are entirely in accord with our 
 views and intentions. 
 
 Full freedom is left the Third Army in the exe- 
 cution of its task. A direct combined movement 
 with the Second Army is at present impossible, if 
 for no other reason than the difficult Haardt Moun- 
 tains. To bring the operation of both armies into 
 consonance can be done only from these headquar- 
 ters with due regard to the measures taken by the 
 enemy. 
 
 It would be very desirable could H. R. H. en- 
 counter the Corps MacMahon, or Failly, as soon as 
 possible. In Hagenau, if not prior to reaching there, 
 it must be ascertained if those parts of the French 
 army have also been drawn up to the line St. Avoid— 
 Saargemiind. A further advance southward would in 
 that case be but a thrust into the air and necessitate 
 a change of direction to the upper Saar. 
 
 The Second Army will to-day reach the following 
 points: 
 
 Illd Corps. Baumholder — Kusel: advance guard 
 towards St. Wendel; 
 
 IVth Corps, Landstuhl; advance guard towards 
 Homburg; 
 
 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions advanced to near 
 the frontier. 
 
 Both corps will have to halt for the present until 
 the remaining ones close up. These latter reach to- 
 day: 
 
 Xth Corps, Meisenheim; 
 
 IXth Corps Winneweiler; (Hq. of Prince Freder- 
 ick Charles); 
 
 Guard Corps, Otterberg— Kaiserslautern; 
 
 Xllth Corps, Gollheim. 
 
-183— 
 
 The First Army to-day stands in the triangle 
 Tholey — Lebach — Ottweiler. 
 
 By the 7th of August presumably the Second 
 and First Army will come into direct connection on 
 the line Ottweiler — Zweibrticken. 
 
 The hostile army, the position of which as far as 
 known here will be shown by enclosed sketch (see 
 Note No. 100), is remaining in a passive attitude. 
 
 It is true that day before yesterday our detach- 
 ment in Saarbriicken was dislodged by three of Fros- 
 sard's divisions, but the railroad depot in St. Johann 
 is to-day still unoccupied by the enemy. This seems 
 to show that the intention is to take a defensive po- 
 sition in force behind the Saar, after interrupting 
 the railroads, construction of fortifications, etc. 
 
 In that case the frontal attack of the Second 
 Army will be materially supported by the advance 
 of the Third Army, which, in order to use as many 
 roads as practicable, should be made in such breadth 
 as the proximity of the enemy allows. 
 
 It has not yet been decided whether to attach 
 the Vlth Corps to the one or the other of the armies, 
 and for the present it will be at the disposal of the 
 Third Army. That corps, in the advance westward, 
 may effect a very desirable connection between the 
 Third and Second Army on the road to Pirmasens 
 and would prevent a possible advance of the enemy 
 from Bitsch between the two armies. 
 
 The object to be gained is the simultaneous in- 
 terference of all three armies in the decisive battle, 
 and these headquarters will try to regulate all move- 
 ments thereof. 
 
 The Baden as well as the Wiirttemberg divisions 
 have signified their desire to be attached to a Prussian 
 division and have no intention to form a corps by 
 themselves. H. R. H will use his discretion in arrang- 
 ing this matter. 
 
—184— 
 
 When the Vlth Army Corps no long-er requires 
 the transport facilities, the troops of the line of com- 
 munications (8 battalions, 4 squadrons) placed at the 
 disposal of the Third Army, will reach Landau on 
 the 9th of August, the further movements of which 
 troops (by rail or otherwise) is left to H. R. H.'s dis- 
 cretion, with the remark that on the whole, after the 
 9th instant, Line D and Line E are entirely at the 
 disposal of the authorities of the Lines of Commun- 
 ications of the Third Army. 
 
 No. 102 
 To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz — Tholey. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 4 August 1870, 12:00 noon. 
 Telegram. 
 
 Your position (Tholey — Lebach — Ottweiler) ap- 
 proved; remain there until further orders. 
 
 No. 103 
 To Headquarters, First Army — Tholey. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 4 August 1870, 12:00 noon. 
 
 In explanation of my telegram of today, I in- 
 form you as follows: 
 
 The Third Army commences the offensive to-day 
 in the direction of Hagenau, and then against the 
 upper Saar. The Second Army remains on the move 
 towards the line Neunkirchen — Homberg. The First 
 Army will receive further orders to either support 
 the latter or to advance against the left flank of the 
 hostile army. We have no intention of crossing the 
 Saar before the 9th instant, behind which the enemy 
 apparently intends remaining on the defensive. 
 
 The 1st Army Corps, which is still detraining at 
 Birkenfeld and Kaiserslautern, will be placed in 
 position by the Second Army in such manner that it 
 can be attached to either the First or the Second 
 Army for further operations. Orders for this will be 
 issued later. 
 
-185— 
 
 The enclosed sketch (see note to No. 100) shows 
 the details of the hostile positions as far as known 
 here. 
 
 Line F is from now on entirely at the disposition 
 of the authorities of the lines of communications of 
 the First Army. 
 
 At 8 p.m., August 4, the following telegram sent 
 by General v. Stemmetz was received by the Chief 
 of the General Staff at Royal headquarters: 
 
 "Hq. St. Wendel, 4 August 1870, 3:36 p.m. 
 
 By orders of the King I marched to-day with 
 the First Army to the vicinity of Tholey, but would 
 rather have preferred to remain in the position at 
 the Saar, because that forms an offensive flank for 
 the advance of the Second Army, and the First Army 
 could accomplish more than in position at St. Wendel 
 or even at Baumholder, where the First Army is but 
 an elongation of the front of the Second Army. 
 Consequently I do not understand the strategic 
 thought in giving up the position on the Saar, for 
 which there is no reason in the general situation. 
 Information concerning the matter would be very 
 acceptable, to correctly guide my further actions. 
 Had the Crown Prince been at Weissenburg on the 
 6th, this fact and the advance of the Second and 
 Third Army to Nancy or Luneville would have com- 
 pelled the enemy, deployed on an extended line, to 
 leave the Saar and would have offered opportunity 
 to the First Army to successfully interfere. I fear 
 now that the French will see an advantage gained 
 for them by us taking a new position." 
 
 General v. Moltke replied the same evening: 
 
 No. 104 
 To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz— Tholey. 
 Hq. Mayence, 4 August 1870, 8:45 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Desired information concerning motives of King 
 as to measures taken now en route by letter. The 
 Crown Prince was in Weissenburg already on the 
 4th. 
 
—186- 
 
 In the preceding- telegram General v, Moltke re- 
 fers to the orders of 4 Aug., 12:00 noon, cited in No. 
 103. In addition, the request of General v. Steinmetz 
 caused further written explanations, which were 
 sent at noon on the 5th: 
 
 No. 105 
 
 To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz — Tholey. 
 Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, 6:00 A.M. 
 
 I thoroughly agree with Your Excellency as to 
 the importance of your knowing the motives and 
 perceiving them correctly, on which are based the 
 orders of the King to you. I therefore now have the 
 honor to answer in the following your inquiry of the 
 4th instant more in detail than could be done by 
 wire. 
 
 As already discussed in Berlin, I mean with 
 Your Excellency in person, or in any case with 
 your Chief of Staff and Chief Quartermaster, it is 
 the task of the First Army, in addition to protecting 
 the Rhine Province, to decisively interfere in the 
 battle against the left flank of the enemy. 
 
 This interference, of course, cannot be executed 
 independently, but must take place in conjunction 
 with the Second Army. 
 
 The point, where it may take place, is not only 
 dependent on that army, but also on the movements 
 of the enemy. 
 
 The day when orders were issued for the con- 
 centration at Wadern, the Second Army was still so 
 far in rear that contact the other side of Kaisers- 
 lautern was probable, even certain. Therefore we 
 had to be certain of the possibility to draw up the 
 First Army to Baumholder for the battle. 
 
 To-day it is still possible that contact will take 
 place on the line Ottweiler— Homburg. At Tholey 
 then the First Army would be in the correct position. 
 
 Only when the Second Army has approached the 
 
—187- 
 
 Saar will the time have arrived to send the First 
 Army across that stream. 
 
 A separate advance of the First Army against 
 the enemy, who appears to be closely concentrated 
 with all his forces, could lead only to defeat. 
 
 The combined movements of all three armies can 
 be ordered only by the King and in those orders the 
 freedom of executing them will be left entirely in 
 the hands of the different army headquarters and 
 they can act according to the situation. 
 
 In the meantime General v. Steinmetz had also 
 sent a telegram to the King in this matter, as follows: 
 
 "Hq. St. Wendel, 5 August 1870, 1:30 a.m. 
 General Moltke has informed me that a general 
 offensive is intended and in the same telegram has 
 ordered the concentration of the First Army at 
 Tholey by your command. To-day he informs me 
 that the First Army will remain until further orders 
 in its position at Tholey— Ottweiler—Lebach. On 
 the other hand the Second Army informs me that it 
 will occupy the line Neunkirchen— Zweibriicken on 
 the sixth. By this the Second Army gets ahead of 
 +he First, and as I have not received any orders con- 
 cerning a further advance, I have no base on which 
 to act intelligently." 
 
 This caused General v. Moltke to give further 
 explanations of his views on which the orders were 
 based, to the First and Second Army: 
 
 No. lOG 
 To Headquarters, First Army— Tholey. 
 Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, 12:30 p.m. 
 Telegram : 
 
 The road St. Wendell — Ottweiler— Neunkirchen 
 will be cleared to-morrow by the First Army. 
 
 The 1st Army Corps is definitely assigned to the 
 First Army; goes by rail via Homburg and detrains 
 in Neunkirchen. Letter en route. Headquarters of 
 line of communications and field railroad detachment 
 
—188— 
 
 detrain in Birkenfeld commencing early to-morrow 
 morning. 
 
 No. 107 
 To Headquarters, First Army— Tholey. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, noon. 
 Telegram: 
 
 In reply to telegram to His Majesty, First Army 
 headciuarters is informed that even if the leading ele- 
 ments of the Second Army reach the line Neun- 
 kirchen — Zweibriicken on the Gth, the assembly of 
 that army will be completed only on the 7th, and the 
 troops, if ever possible after their exhausting march, 
 should receive a welcome day of rest on the 8th. 
 
 Considering this, it is entirely correct for the 
 F'irst Army to remain in its present position to-day 
 and to-morrow and merely clear the St. Wendel — 
 Ottweiler - Neunkirchen road, which is absolutely 
 necessary for the movement of the Second Army. 
 
 However, on the 7th, the First Army, to which 
 the 1st Army Corps (Hq. Birkenfeld) is permanently 
 assigned by orders of the King, must approach to the 
 Saar, using the Lebach — Saarlouis and the Illingen — 
 VolkHngen roads without creating unnecessary atten- 
 tion, so near that it, crossing the Saar, between Saar- 
 louis and Volklingen, will be ready after the 8th to 
 take the offensive again the hostile left flank, while 
 the Second Army simultaneously advances to the 
 front. 
 
 His Majesty especially reserves to himself the 
 right to order the execution of such operation, as the 
 commencement and the direction of it are dependent 
 on the conditions which will have arisen at that time 
 with the Third Army. 
 
 No. 108 
 To Headquarters, Second Army Kaiserslautern. 
 Hq. Mayence, 5 August 1870, 12:30 P.M. 
 
— i89- 
 
 Teiegram : 
 
 The St. Wendel — Ottweiler— Neunkirchen road 
 will be cleared by the First Army, 
 
 Headquarters lines of communications and field 
 railroad battalion detrain early to-morrow morning in 
 Birkenfeld, the provision column of the Illd Army 
 Corps, now behind, in the succeeding night. Advance 
 of strong cavalry across the Saargemiind — Bitsch 
 railroad desirable. 
 
 Prussian railroads to be kept intact; 
 
 No. 109 
 To Headquarters, Second Army — Kaiserslauterh. 
 
 Hq, Mayence, 5 August 1870, noon; 
 
 His Majesty has ordered that the 1st Army 
 Corps be permanently attached to the First Army, 
 the Vllth to the Third and the lid to the Second 
 Army. The latter will detrain between the 8th and 
 11th, probably in Neunkirchen and Homburg, To 
 facilitate the concentration of the 1st Army Corps 
 it has also been ordered that the trains carrying this 
 corps arriving from this afternoon on in Kaiserslau- 
 tern, keep traveling through Homburg to Neunkir- 
 chen and detrain there. 
 
 Headquarters of the First Army has received 
 orders to i mmediately clear the St. Wendel — Ottweiler 
 — Neunkirchen road and to echelon the army on the 
 7th ontheLebach — Saarlouis and the Illingen— Volk- 
 lingen roads. The First Army will then be ready to 
 support, as originally planned, the operations of the 
 Second Army, especially through action against the 
 hostile left flank. 
 
 If further development of conditions with the 
 Third Army do not require a different proceeding, 
 the subsequent advance against the Saar from the in- 
 tended position ordered by Royal headquarters will 
 not be made before the 9th, and thus the larger 
 
—190- 
 
 part of the Second Army will have a day of rest on 
 the 8th, which it stands in need of. 
 
 His Majesty will presumably transfer Royal 
 headquarters from here to Homburg on the 8th in- 
 stant. 
 
 General von Steinmetz was not at all satisfied 
 with the explanations furnished him by Royal head- 
 quarters and on August 6th he sent to General 
 V. Moltke an additional letter stating his views as to 
 the task of the First Army. This letter read: 
 
 Hq. Hellenhausen, G August 1870. 
 
 Your letter of the 5 August reached me at 2:30 
 a.m. to-day, 6 August. 
 
 In reply I have the the honor to state that I had 
 no doubt at all concerning the task of the First Army 
 as long as the Second Army endeavored to carry out 
 its strategic march against the Saar; that task 
 could only consist in facilitating the advance of the 
 Second Army by drawing the hostile troops away 
 from that army and onto the First Army ' and when 
 the Second Army could no longer advance without 
 fighting, the First Army would have to effectively 
 support the Second in any ensuing battle. In this 
 sense also was conceived the reconnaissance on a 
 large scale which was frustrated by orders from 
 Royal headquarters for the First Army to march to- 
 wards Tholey, and the position of the First Army be- 
 hind the Saar— from Saarbrlicken to Saarlouis— had 
 been in consonance with my conception of the task; 
 but now, drawing the First Army iDackto Tholey and 
 possibly as far as Baumholder, leaves the enemy 
 complete freedom of action behind the Saar and will 
 increase the difficulties of advance for the Second 
 Army. 
 
 The enemy has utilized the opportunity to fortify 
 himself in his position from Saarbrlicken to Forbach 
 and appears to desire us to attack him in that position. 
 The question now is, if and how we should do that. 
 
 At the present time the troops of the First and 
 Second Army, literally speaking, stand arm in arm; 
 
 1 Marginal Note by Moltke: — "This Avould have meant 
 defeat for the First Army.'' 
 
-191- 
 
 that is, should the Second Army continue its march, 
 the two armies would become mixed, or the First 
 Army will at least become very much confined in its 
 freedom of operation. Therefore, and especially as 
 the advance of the Vllth and Vlth Army Corps 
 needed regulation, I was not able to evacuate the St. 
 Wendel— Ottweiler— Neunkirchen road, as the troops 
 to be sent to the westward might already have 
 reached villages occupied by other troops, which would 
 have entailed a complete rearrangement of quarters 
 westward and also southward, considering that room 
 had also to be made for the 1st Army Corps and the 
 1st Cavalry Division placed under my command in 
 the meantime. 
 
 The First Army, which has had to make two 
 marches so far from Tholey to the Saar, is now with- 
 in one day's march of that stream and, if the First 
 and Second Army should make a combined attack on 
 the enemy behind the Saar, has the necessary freedom 
 of movement and has also regained si^fficient room 
 for the deployment of its troops. ^ 
 
 For the subsequent operations after the enemy 
 has been driven away from the Saar, it becomes nec- 
 essary for me to know what direction of operation is 
 given to the Second Army. I assume that direc- 
 tion will be towards Nancy" so that the First Army 
 will not be forced toward the fortresses along the 
 Mosel. 
 
 The main reason for my request to be furnished 
 this information was to find out whether His Majesty 
 intended to order this or something else, and I here- 
 by renew my request, as my measures must neces- 
 sarily depend on the intentions of His Majesty." 
 
 No. 110 
 To the Royal Minister for War— Mayence. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870. 
 I have the honor to inform the Royal Minister 
 
 1 Marginal Note by General Moltke: —"In place of over- 
 lapping the enemy it would be overlapped itself, should it 
 advance from Saarbriicken — Volklingen on Bolchen." 
 
 2 Marginal Note by General Moltke:— "Plans of opera- 
 tions, when in immediate contact with the enemy, can not be 
 given to hold good for any length of time in the future." 
 
—192- 
 
 for War that H. M. the King- has ordered the forma- 
 tion of a combination corps of troops for special pur- 
 poses in and at Kaiserslautern, which will be com- 
 posed of the following organizations: 
 
 1. The 3d Landwehr Division, so far attached 
 to general headquarters of the lines of communica- 
 tions of the Second Army, which accordingly will be 
 detrained in Kaiserslautern, 
 
 2. The Infantry Regiments Nos. 19 and 81, 
 stationed in and around Mayence and the 7th Reserve 
 Uhlan regiment, which will be started from here on 
 the 8th of August by marching. 
 
 3. The three reserve foot batteries now march- 
 ing from Cassel to Mayence, which will be sent from 
 here, without a stop, by marching. 
 
 In place of the 3d Landwehr Division, the head- 
 quarters of tjje lines of communications of the Second 
 Army will receive the following troops, sent by rail 
 to Mosbach, where they will detrain on and after the 
 10th instant. 
 
 The Landwehr Regiments Nos. 53 and 56, at 
 present in Wesel, the Landwehr Regiments Nos. 16 
 and 55, at present in Minden, and the 5th Reserve 
 Hussar Regiment, at present in Paderborn. 
 
 There being no exact information concerning the 
 victory at Weissenburg on August 4, caused the fol- 
 lowing inquiry: 
 
 No. Ill 
 
 To Lieut. General v. Blumenthal, Weissenburg, 
 or wherever found. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 9:10 a.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 So far His Majesty has not received the smallest 
 detail concerning the battle at Weissenburg, nor any 
 information concerning our losses, while the French 
 
-193- 
 
 papers already contain these details. This must be 
 immediately attended to. 
 
 Even before Royal Headquarters had any in- 
 formation of the battle of Spichern on August 6th, 
 the following orders were issued, based on the re- 
 ports of General v. Rheinbaben, commander of the 
 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions: 
 
 No. 112 
 
 To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz— Sulzbach. 
 Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 5:45 P.M. 
 Telegram : 
 
 The enemy appears to be retreating from the 
 Saar. His Majesty leaves it to your discretion 
 whether or not to cross the frontier. The Saar must 
 be crossed below Saarbriicken as the Saarbrticken — 
 St. Avoid road belongs to the Second Army. Send 
 reports here until 10 a.m., to Ludwigshafen until 
 1 p.m., to Kaiserslautern until 4 p.m., and after, 6 
 p.m. to Homburg. 
 
 No. 113 
 
 To Headquarters, Second Army— Homburg. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 5:45 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 First Army crosses below Saai-briicken to-morrow 
 to pursue the enemy. Desirable that in addition to 
 cavalry also infantry of the Second Army keep at 
 the enemy's heels. Saarbriicken — St. Avoid road 
 belongs to Second Army. Send reports to-morrow 
 (as in 112). 
 
 No. 114 
 
 To Headquarters, Third Army, 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 5:45 p.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Enemy appears to leave the Saar. First and 
 
—194— 
 
 Second Army in pursuit. Send reports to-morrow 
 (as in 112). 
 
 A teletyram from General v. Goeben from Saar- 
 briicken at 0:30 p.m. brought the first information of 
 the victory at Spichern to Royal Headquarters; Gen- 
 eral V. Moltke immediately asked by wire: 
 
 No. 115 
 To General of Infantry, v. Goeben, Saarbriicken. 
 Hq. Mayence, 6 August 1870, 7:45 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Please report approximate strength of enemy, 
 and numbers of hostile regiments. Have prisoners 
 been taken? 
 
 Concerning the victory at Worth, 6 August, the 
 following telegram was sent: 
 
 No. 116 
 To Headquarters First Army, Through General Goe- 
 ben — Saarbriicken . 
 
 Hq. Mayence 7 August 1870, 3:30 A.M. 
 Telegram : 
 
 Third Army has gained new great victory on the 
 6th over MacMahon and parts of Canrobertand Failly. 
 Stand made there by the enemy as well as west of 
 Saarbriicken makes it not improbable that strong- 
 hostile forces are still in readiness near the Saar. 
 Reconnaissance by cavalry necessary. 
 
 A copy of this telegram was also sent to Head- 
 quarters Second Army in Homburg, and a few hours 
 later the following orders: 
 
 No. 117 
 To Headquarters, Second Army — Homburg. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 7 August 1870, 8:15 A.M. 
 Telegram ; 
 
 Information only now received that after the 
 
-1D5- 
 
 victory of the Crown Prince yesterday at Worth, 
 MacMahon retreated on Bitseh; might reach that 
 place to-day; cavalry and left wing- of Second Army 
 might gain touch with him to-morrow possibly at 
 Rohrbach. 
 
 No. 118 
 
 To Headquarters, Third Army — Sulz. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 8 August 1870, 3:30 a.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 So far but one telegram received from Sulz, that 
 one dated 10:15 p.m. Absence'of most important in- 
 formation. Where was the battle? In what direc- 
 tion did enemy retreat? 
 
 No. 119 
 
 To Lieut. -General v. Blumenthal — Sulz. 
 
 Hq. Mayence, 7 August 1870, 9:30 A.M. 
 
 Hearty congratulations on your brilliant success. 
 
 Your first telegram of last night was not re- 
 ceived here, therefore we learned but this morning 
 that battle took place at Worth and enemy retreats 
 on Bitseh. A telegram was at once sent to Second 
 Army that MacMahon possibly could be reached to- 
 morrow in the vicinty of Rohrbach by cavalry and by 
 the left wing of the Second Army, in case he keeps 
 the direction on Saargemiind which is still held by 
 the French. 
 
 There also was yesterday a very hot fight at For- 
 bach against four divisions under Frossard, in which 
 finally (at least the leading elements of) the 14th, 
 16th, 5th and parts of the 6th Divisions took part. 
 The main body of the Second Army intends to take 
 a position to-day on the line Saarbriicken— Neu- 
 Hornbach; the First Army will halt with its main 
 body on the line Forbach — Volklingen and will pur- 
 sue the enemy with cavalry only. 
 
 Concerning intentions of hostile main force we 
 have but rumors. 
 
— 19G- 
 
 The most correct measure undoubtedly would be 
 a general offensive against our Second Army, which 
 has not yet been able to concentrate all of its corps, 
 as all of its leading elements have continued on the 
 march so far. Still, the French would encounter a 
 superiority and such a step seems not in consonance 
 with their conduct so far displayed. 
 
 Should the French main army retreat on Metz, 
 it goes far away from MacMahon, leaves him to your 
 pursuit and exposed to an eventual flank attack by 
 the Second Army. 
 
 Should MacMahon be received, should the two 
 French armies join, this could hardly be made any 
 other place than in the vicinity of Saarburg, where 
 we will arrive about the same time. 
 
 It is of importance to us to learn whether Mac- 
 Mahon debouches to the west or to the southwest. 
 
 As far as we can see conditions now, it appears 
 to me to be the most correct procedure for the First 
 and Second Army to advance now not against the 
 Mosel above Metz, but first southward, to join your 
 army, as the next measure to be taken by the 
 French main force must be in the nature of recon- 
 naisance. 
 
 Concerning the parts of the enemy at Hagenau, 
 possibly they are intended for garrisoning Strass- 
 burg, where at present hardly anything is but garde 
 7)iobile. You will have to leave back sufficient force 
 to guard against them. It is very desirable to take 
 Hagenau in the first panic. The siege train will be- 
 come mobile to-day. Siege of Strassburg can now 
 be seriously considered: an advance as far as Ven- 
 denheim would secure to us utilization of the Strass- 
 burg— Nancy railroad. What you will have to leave 
 behind will be relieved eventually by a Landwehr 
 division reinforced by two line regiments and one 
 cavalry regiment. 
 
 We are about to start to Homburg. 
 
—197— 
 
 No. 120 
 
 To Headquarters, First Army— Volklingen. 
 
 Hq. Homburg, 7 August 1870, 10:15 P.M. 
 Telegram. 
 
 His Majesty orders that the First Army remains 
 in position between Saarbrticken and Volklingen to- 
 morrow with the VHth and VHIth Army Corps, hold- 
 ing the heights of Spichern against any attack. 
 Orders for future advance can be given only after 
 cavalry has gained definite information concerning 
 enemy's whereabouts. Second army also halts. 
 
 No. 121 
 To Headquarters, Second Army— Blieskastel. 
 
 Hq. Homburg, 7 August 1870, 11 P.M. 
 
 His Majesty fully approves the measures to be 
 taken on the 8th as outlined in the letter brought to 
 these headquarters by Major General v. Stiehle. 
 
 Information received from the Third Army states 
 that the hostile army retreated in the utmost confu- 
 sion after the battle of Worth. Artillery tried to go 
 into position at Niederbronn but was captured by the 
 Bavarians. Enemy retreated on road to Bitsch, pur- 
 sued by the cavalry, which captured four additional 
 guns. Dead and wounded mark the line of retreat. 
 Third Army reaches Niederbronn to-day. No parts of 
 Failly's corps were present in the battle. As so far 
 the cavalry divisions have not ascertained whether 
 the enemy retreated from Forbach and Saargemiind 
 on Metz or in a southernly direction, the First 
 Army has received orders to remain in its position 
 to-morrow and hold the heights of Spichern. Thus 
 the right flank of the Second Army is perfectly pro- 
 tected. 
 
 The telegram sent by General v. Steinmetz (see 
 No. 125) has been read to His Majesty. His Majesty 
 is now considering the issue of a proclamation or 
 general order to the French Nation. 
 
— 198— 
 
 No. 122 
 To Headquarters, First Army—Volklingen; Sec- 
 ond Army — Blieskastel; Third Army— Sulz, or wher- 
 ever found. 
 
 Hq. Homburg-, 8 August 1870. 
 Telegram : 
 
 His Majesty orders that all military reports, 
 questions, reports of army headquarters are to be ad- 
 dressed to me. 
 
 No. 123 
 To General v. Steinmets, Volklingen, or where found. 
 
 Hq. Homburg, 8 August 1870. 
 Telegram : 
 
 As so far no report has been received if the 
 enemy has evacuated Bolchen and Busendorf, the 
 First Army must remain to-morrow in the position 
 ordered for to-day. The Second Army will reach the 
 Saar to-morrow with its last corps. Acknowledge 
 receipt of this by wire. 
 
 No. 124 
 To Headquarters, Second Army — St. Johann, or 
 
 where found. 
 
 Hq. Homburg, 8 August 1870, 11 p.m. 
 Telegram : 
 
 Will your headquarters be in Johann to-morrow? 
 What movements are ordered for to-morrow? The 
 nid Corps can not detrain in Saarbriicken. ' 
 
 No. 125 
 Pencil draft in v, Moltke's handwriting for a let- 
 ter from H. M. the King to General of Infantry v. 
 Steinmetz. 
 
 No date (apparently 8 August 1870.) 
 
 Replying to telegram which you sent on the 
 
 7th instant to headquarters, Second Army, I call your 
 
 attention to the orders which assigned to the First 
 
 Army originally the direction on Saarlouis. In order 
 
 1 This latter is a reply to a question if the IIcl Corps could 
 not be detrained in Saarbriicken instead of Neunkirchen. 
 
-199— 
 
 not to isolate that army, but to cause it to await the 
 arrival of the Second Army in a flank position, the 
 First Army was held, by order of the 29th July and 
 3d of August on the line Warden — Saarburg, there- 
 after around Tholey andLebach. By the First Army 
 extending its cantonments beyond the last named line 
 as far as Ottweiler, it came into the march direction 
 of the right wing of the Second Army, and conse- 
 quently, by orders of the 5th instant, was confined 
 for its further advance to the roads towards Volklin- 
 gen and Saarlouis. In spite of this the army took the 
 direction via Guichenbach and Fischbach towards 
 Saarbriicken — Forbach, a further advance on which 
 line would be flanked by the enemy's forces still at 
 Bolchen. 
 
 We therefore have to disapprove your views ex- 
 pressed in the telegram to the Second Army, and em- 
 phatically declare that the Second Army advanced 
 entirely in accordance with our views, which fact we 
 have communicated to General of Cavalry, Prince 
 Frederick Charles. 
 
 No. 126 
 
 To the General Government of the Coasts — Hanover. 
 
 Hq. Homburg, 9 August 1970, 9:10 a.m. 
 
 Telegram: 
 
 After 4 p.m. to-day Royal Headquarters will be 
 
 in Saarbriicken. ^ 
 
 No. 127 
 
 To Headquarters, First, Second, Third Army. 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 9 August 1870, 8 P.M. 
 
 Reports received justify the assumption that the 
 
 enemy has retreated to behind the Mosel and even- 
 
 tially Seille. 
 
 All three armies will follow these movements. 
 
 The Third Army receives for this the Saarlouis— 
 
 Dieuze road and connections south. 
 
 The Second Army: St. Avoid— Nomeny road 
 
 and south. 
 
 1 All telegrams as to change of location of headquarters 
 were sent to all headquarters and general governments. 
 
—200— 
 
 ,The First Army: Saarlouis— Bolchen— Tennsch- 
 en road and south. 
 
 To protect the march the cavalry should be sent 
 further ahead than usual and supported by advance 
 guards thrown far to the front to give the armies 
 time for closing up when necessary. 
 
 Any change in the above march direction will be 
 ordered only by His Majesty in so far as may be 
 justified by the enemy's position or movements. 
 
 The 10th of August may be utilized by the First 
 and Second Army to give a day of rest to the troops 
 or to start them on the roads assigned to them. 
 
 As the left wing can reach the Saar only by the 
 12th, the corps of the right wing will have to shorten 
 their marches accordingly. 
 
 No. 128 
 To Headquarters, Third Army— Merzweiler, or 
 where found. 
 
 Hq. Saarbrlicken, 9 August 1870, 9:30 A.M. 
 Telegram : 
 
 First and Second Army resume the advance on 
 the Mosel on the 10th; direction of Third Army with 
 right wing on Saarunion — Dieuze; cavalry ahead. 
 
 No. 129 
 
 To Headquarters, Baden Division — Brumath. 
 (Same to Third Army) 
 
 Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870, 10:45 A.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Please inform the commander of the troops in 
 front of Strassburg that His Majesty orders him 
 to prevent any and all trains carrying troops and 
 supplies from the south to reach Strassburg. Com- 
 plete siege desirable; reinforcements for that are now 
 en route. ^ 
 
 1 Assembled at Hagenau for that: 1 Landwehr Division, 
 (12 bus., 4 sqns, 3 btrs); 34th Fus. Reg., 30th Inf. Reg., 2d Res. 
 Drag. Regt., 2 Res. Batteries, 3d F. A. Regt.— a total of 18 
 battalions; 8 squadrons; 5 batteries. 
 
- 201— 
 
 No. 130 
 
 To his Majesty, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg 
 — Schwerin — Hamburg. 
 
 Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870, noon. 
 Telegram : 
 
 The 1st Landwehr Division should be transported 
 within the next few days to the upper Rhine. You 
 should as soon as possible report location of the troops 
 to the Executive Commission in Berlin, and the latter 
 also should be directed to conform the travel to the 
 schedules of the Line Commission. 
 
 These headquarters should be continually kept 
 informed as the location of the divisions. 
 
 No. 131 
 To Major General Baron Schuler v. Senden— 
 Kaiserslauters. ^' 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 10 August 1870, 3:30 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 3d Landwehr Division to be immediately started 
 on the march to Saarlouis. Await further orders 
 there. 
 
 No. 132 
 
 To Headquarters, First, Second, Third Army, 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 10 August 1870. 
 
 To preserve orders in the transports it is neces- 
 sary for headquarters of the line of communications 
 to confine itself to those lines which are assigned to 
 each army, and to send to the rear, as far as practi- 
 cable, also on those lines only, trains carrying 
 wounded and other things. All such transports must 
 be reported as early as practicable to the Line Com- 
 mission, and in any event the time of their starting. 
 
 General Headquarters of lines of communications 
 must at all times keep Superior Headquarters, the 
 Line Commission, and the War Ministry informed of 
 
 2 Commander of 3d Landwehr Division. 
 
- 202- 
 
 the location of their headquarters and must, in addi- 
 tion, direct all commanding- officers of lines of com- 
 munications to stop interfering with movements of 
 trains. 
 
 According to the regulations of the system of 
 lines of communications, which regulations must be 
 strictly complied with, the Director of Railroads at 
 Headquarters, Lines of Communications is the proper 
 person to regulate railroad trafic. 
 
 The following was added to the letter sent to 
 Headquartert, Second Army. 
 
 It will be necessary to organize a special Line 
 Commission for the roads from Neunkirchen west- 
 ward and the Quartermaster General of the Second 
 Army probably will have to supply the needs of the 
 First and Third Army. 
 
 No. 133 
 To the General Government of the Coast District 
 — Hanover" 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 10 August 1870, 7:45 P.M. 
 Telegram : 
 
 After 5 p. m. to-morrow Royal Headquarters will 
 be in St. Avoid. 
 
 No. 134 
 
 To General of Infantry v. Steinmetz— supposed 
 to be in Volklingen. 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 10 August 1870, 7:30 p.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 There are persistent rumors that Your Excellency 
 has removed his headquarters to-day from Volklingen 
 to Lauterbach. 
 
 So far no official report has been received here 
 concerning this nor of the movements of the First 
 Army to-day, nor of probable changes in the position 
 of the First Army intended for to-morrow which 
 should be furnished without delay. 
 
-203— 
 
 No. 135 
 
 To Headquarters, First Army — Lauterbach. ^ 
 
 Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870, 8:30 P.M. 
 
 The following reports have been received so far 
 from headquarters Second Army: 
 
 The Hid Army Corps (right wing) reaches Fal- 
 kenburg to-morrow and sends out an advance guard 
 for the support of the independent cavalry. 
 
 The leading elements of the IXth Army Corps 
 are at Beningen — Merlenbach. 
 
 The main body of the Xth Army Corps reaches 
 Hallimer, sending an advance guard towards Or. 
 Tanchen — Landorf, 
 
 The Guard Corps proceeds to Insmingen, its ad- 
 vance guard toward Altdorf— Wirmingen— Morchin- 
 gen. 
 
 The IVth Army Corps sends its leading elements 
 as far as Harskirchen, its advance guard to the line 
 Altweiler— Mtinster — Marimont. 
 
 The leading elements of the XHth Army Corps 
 will reach Metzingen— Dieblingen — Wustweiler. 
 
 Headquarters of the Second Army will be in 
 Piittlingen. 
 
 No. 136 
 To Headquarters, First and Second Army. 
 
 Hq. Saarbriicken, 10 August 1870. 
 To prevent misunderstandings it is hereby or- 
 dered that in addition to the villages situated on the 
 main highway from St. Avoid to Trittlingen, Falken- 
 berg, Herlingen, Han on the Nied, Nomeny, the Sec- 
 ond Army will use for the purpose of requisition only 
 those places located within one (Enghsh) mile north 
 of that road. 
 
 1 In the meantime a report had been received that head- 
 quarters had been transferred there. 
 
—204— 
 
 No. 137 
 
 To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz— to be 
 looked for starting from Lauterbach. 
 
 Hq. Saarbriicken, 11 August 1870, 6 a.m. 
 
 Your Excellency's letter of yesterday, ' I received 
 at 10 p.m. 
 
 The occupation of Buschborn by the 35th Regi- 
 ment is not at all in accordance with orders of the 
 King concerning the advance of the armies and must 
 be changed without delay. 
 
 I shall not fail in submitting Your Excellency's 
 desire concerning the trains to His Majesty but 
 must state my conviction, that it is entirely impossi- 
 ble to allow the trains to march otherwise than on 
 the roads on which the respective corps are marching. 
 How bad it is to deviate from that rule is shown by 
 the confusion which occurred yesterday on the road to 
 Forbach, where the trains of the Hid Army Corps 
 marched in addition to those of the VIHth, Vllth and 
 1st, and where the IXth Corps is to march to-day. 
 
 Finally, I again call attention to the fact that 
 the three main highroads assigned to the three 
 armies are to be taken only until the cavalry sends 
 in information as to the location of the hostile main 
 force. Then the three armies must not only concen- 
 trate within themselves, but will also have to draw 
 close to each other and at the present time it cannot 
 be said whether the First Army will pass Metz — which 
 in any case is but to be observed— on the south or on 
 the north. For the purpose of this observation a 
 Landwehr division— already mobihzed- will be 
 brought up. 
 
 lln this letter General v. Steinmetz complained that parts 
 of the Second Army were met on the roads assigned to his 
 army. He further requests authority in a further advance on 
 Metz to concentrate the trains of the First Army at St. Avoid 
 and to let them follow up from there on the highway via 
 Falkenberg. 
 
-2(35- 
 
 No. 138 
 
 To Headquarters First Army— to be looked for 
 starting from Lauterbach. 
 
 Hq. Saarbriicken, 11 August 1870, 10 A.M-. 
 
 H. M. the King has been kept in ignorance of 
 the whereabouts of army headquarters and location 
 of the corps of the First Army during the entire day 
 yesterday until 10 p.m.; and today it is so far not 
 known what movements are intended. H. M: 
 the King consequently calls your attention to exist- 
 ing orders requiring daily reports to be submitted, so 
 as to enable His Majesty to make proper dispositions 
 of the corps at any moment, which is more and more 
 necessary the closer the armies get to the enemy. 
 
 Enclosed herewith is a synopsis of the reports 
 received here from the Second Army which, in con- 
 nection with the previously furnished sketch of the 
 movements of the Second Army to-day, will give 
 First Army headquarters a base for its further 
 movements. 
 
 It has further been reported that trains of the 
 First Army are on the road to Forbach. His Majes- 
 ty orders that these trains be immediately taken off 
 the road which originally was assigned for the trains 
 of the Second Army. 
 
 Concerning finally the request of the 8th instant 
 for permanent assignment of railroad trains on the 
 Rhine— Nahe railroad to bring up supphes to the 
 First Army, His Majesty has decided that the First 
 Army should first of all use the land transportation as- 
 signed it on the different routes and that support by 
 railroad trains can only he had in absolute need. 
 Proper requisition for rail transportation should in 
 that case be submitted, stating actual amounts to be 
 transported, to the Commandant lines of communi- 
 cations and to these headquarters only when ammu- 
 nition is required. 
 
—206 - 
 
 ENCLOSURE 
 
 Reports from the Second Army up to evening 
 of August 10: 
 
 1. Railroad bridges at Herny blown up. 
 
 2. Small infantry detachments of MacMahon's 
 Corps, marching on Metz. 
 
 3. This morning strong columns marching out 
 of Metz towards Bolchen and Range. 
 
 4. Military trains coming from Chalons arrived 
 in Metz night of 9-lOth. 
 
 5. Have seen camp of two hostile brigades at 
 Range. 
 
 6. Strong infantry and artillery columns are 
 marching from Metz toward Courcelles, Mont and 
 Range. 
 
 No reports have been received from the First 
 Army. 
 
 It can be assumed with a degree of certainty that 
 a part of the French Army is going into camp on the 
 French Nied 
 
 No. 139 
 
 To Major General v. Stiehle.* 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 11 August 1870, 10:45 A.M. 
 
 Thanks for all your reports, the more so as we 
 have not heard anything from the First Army. I 
 cannot even tell you to what point the 1st, Vlllth and 
 Vllth Corps are marching to-day. Rroper steps 
 have been taken to correct this matter. 
 
 Rosition behind Nied undoubtedly only a position 
 of observation, main army evidently behind the Mo- 
 sel. Leave it to your judgment if the Illd Corps 
 had not better halt to allow others to close up. 
 
 *Aide to His Majesty and Chief of the General Staff of the 
 Second Army. 
 
-2b7- 
 
 No. 140 
 
 To Headquarters, First, Second, Third Army-. 
 
 Hq. Saarbrucken, 11 August 1870, 11 a.m. 
 
 Cases again have arisen of absolutely unneces- 
 sary destruction of railroads by our troops, and it is 
 consequently necessary to issue the strictest orders 
 forbidding the destruction of railroads and tele- 
 graphs between the advancing armies and the enemy 
 and to hold all organizations and officers to the strict- 
 est account in this matter. 
 
 It is also necessary in our interests to at once 
 occupy all telegraph and especially railroad stations 
 in all towns reached by our troops, to prevent 
 
 No. 141 
 
 To Headquarters First and Second Army. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 11 August 1870, 7 P.M. 
 
 It is not improbable that a considerable portion 
 of the enemy is this side of Metz on the left bank of 
 the French Nied. Closer connection between First 
 and Second Army consequently becomes necessary. 
 
 H, M. the King has ordered the following: 
 
 The Illd Army Corps in Falkenberg will be the 
 supporting point for this junction of the armies. 
 
 The First Army will march to-morrow in good 
 time with two corps to the line Bolchen— Mohringen, 
 with one corps to Buschborn. 
 
 The Second Army will send the IXth Corps to 
 Lubeln, west of St. Avoid, at which place the lid 
 Army Corps, as far as it is disposable, will join. 
 The Xth Army Corps will proceed (about via Lellin- 
 gen) to the rear of the Illd Corps. The Guard, IVth 
 and Xllth Corps are to be drawn up towards the left 
 wing of the above sketched position in such manner 
 that they can join that position if required, or con- 
 tinue the march in direction of Nancy. 
 
 The outposts of the First Army will in general 
 be advanced to the German Nied. 
 
—208— 
 
 All army corps will leave the second section of 
 their trains in their to-day's location, leaving the 
 roads completely clear. 
 
 To-morrow's location of headquarters of both 
 armies to be reported at once. 
 
 Added to letter for Second Army: Extract of 
 above orders has been sent to headquarters Illd 
 Army Corps in writing; and telegraphic extract sent 
 to headquarters IXth Army Corps. (See No. 142.) 
 
 No. 142 
 To Headquarters IXth Army Corps— Forbach. 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 11 August 1870, 8 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 His Majesty orders that the corps marches via 
 St. Avoid to Lubeln early to-morrow. Second section 
 of trains to be left there to-day, clearing roads. 
 
 On the morning of 11 August, H. R. H. Prince 
 Frederick Charles, Commander of the Second Army, 
 sent the following letter to General v. Moltke, giving 
 his views of the situation as then existing: 
 
 Hq. Puttlingen, 11 August 1870, 9:45 A.M. 
 Your Excellency: 
 
 I sent you a report from Saargemiind that the 
 enemy appeared to have concentrated in dense masses 
 behind the French Nied, this side of Metz. 
 
 It appears as if this concentration of hostile 
 masses will lead to a battle. It does not seem prob- 
 able that the enemy will advance from his excellent 
 position and attack us, although this would be more 
 in consonance with the French character than the 
 heretofore defensive attitude. The enemy has not 
 succeeded very well in his defense; it is reasonable 
 to assume that he may now try the offensive. Al- 
 though it is not very probable that he will do so I 
 shall prepare for that event in such manner as to 
 prevent him from attacking my corps separately, 
 before the Second Army is concentrated, insofar as 
 to preclude the possibility of being defeated. 
 
 The march of my army to-day is known to you. 
 
- 209— 
 
 At its conclusion I shall hold my leading elements 
 and will execute a turn to the right with my army 
 (Illd Corps the pivot) only on receipt of the King's 
 orders. 
 
 I would suggest that the First Army be informed 
 of this and ordered to march in such manner that it 
 touch with my Hid Corps— partly elongates the 
 front, if necessary, against the enemy, but that it 
 especially endeavors to envelop the hostile left flank 
 with strong forces. I would not utilize more troops 
 against the hostile front than what appear necessary 
 to hold him there— similar to the conduct of my army 
 at Sadowa— and to prevent the enemy's piercing our 
 center. The main pressure I shall bring to bear on 
 the enemy's right flank, advance there offensively 
 and strong and will have at least one corps follow as 
 reserve in echelon of my enveloping movement. 
 
 We still have provisions to last us for four or five- 
 days, thanks to the enormous supplies taken in 
 Saargemiind and Forbach. Your Excellency, how- 
 ever, will do well to take the necessary steps to have 
 supplies brought up to-morrow by rail to Falkenberg 
 and also have the troops of the lid Army Corps, at 
 least in part, transported by rail to that place or at 
 least as far as St. Avoid, to appear as strong as pos- 
 sible in the battle. 
 
 All ray corps are good and will do their full duty. 
 Everybody is eager to get at the enemy. The King 
 can have full confidence in them in that respect. We 
 must have to be prepared for enormous losses and 
 for a two days' battle; although I do not entirely be- 
 Heve the latter to be the case. I shall prepare for it. 
 We can go into position in daytime in the front of 
 the enemy: the preparatory movements towards the 
 flanks will have to be made at night on reconnoitered 
 roads, no fires ought to be built and the battle should 
 be started very early— not later than 5 o'clock. God 
 will be with us. 
 
 In the evening the Chief of the General Staff of 
 the Army replied: 
 
, —210— 
 
 No. 143 
 
 To H. R. H., Prince Frederick Charles. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 11 August 1870, 8 P.M. 
 
 Your Royal Highness' letter of this forenoon 
 was received by me at 6 p.m.; there was not suffi- 
 cient time to send this reply with the messenger who 
 carries instructions which have now become neces- 
 sary. These instructions are based on the views of 
 Your Highness, that a new leader of the army de- 
 cides on the forceful and sudden offensive, which is 
 the only correct method, considering that our corps 
 are divided in the area between Saarlouis to Zabern; 
 still they only provide the first measures to be taken 
 in case of the probable attack against the Illd Army 
 Corps. 
 
 The full turn as far as Verny would not be nec- 
 essary and would even be dangerous should, as is 
 not improbable, the enemy's detachment retreat to 
 behind the Nied and should his main force be south 
 of Metz behind the Seille or Mosel. I hope that our 
 plans are in consonance with your Royal Highness' 
 intentions. By to-morrow afternoon we will have 
 six corps assembled, two of them in reserve, and we 
 can be ten corps strong by day after tomorrow. ^ 
 Should this not become necessary, the IVth, XHth 
 and Guard Corps would not have to be called up, in 
 order to allow us to continue the advance against the 
 
 Mosel in as much breadth as possible. - 
 
 ****** 
 
 As notwithstanding our haste the messenger 
 leaves only now, I hand him this letter to carry 
 
 1 Remark by Prince Frederick Charles: that means in- 
 cluding the corps which have covered a day's march and 
 which are not fresh. 
 
 2Note by Prince Frederick Charles: This view wiJl un- 
 dergo a change as soon as Moltke receives information to-day 
 that Nancy is free of the enemj^ and that masses liave again 
 been seen 'marching from Metz toward the Nied. 
 
—211— 
 
 along, asking your Royal Highness to pardon the 
 hurried writing. 
 
 Early on the 12th a supplement to the orders of the eve- 
 ning of the 11th, was sent to Hq. Second Army: 
 
 No. 144 
 To Headquarters Second Army— Piittlingen. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 7 a.m. 
 As up to this hour no reports have been received 
 which make the direct calling up of the Xth Army 
 Corps to the north of the Hid necessary, it is left to 
 your discretion to send that corps farther westward 
 if that still can be done. 
 
 Presuming that Strassburg would be invested very soon, 
 and supplementary to the orders of 10 August (No. 129) the 
 following two queries were sent: 
 
 No. 145 
 To the War Ministry — Berlin. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870. 
 Telegram: 
 
 When and where will the siege train be mobile 
 and when ready to start? 
 
 No. 146 
 To Headquarters Baden Division— Hagenau. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 7:15 a.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 What measures have you taken in obedience to 
 my cipher telegram of the 10th instant? Wire an- 
 swer. ' 
 
 No. 147 
 To Lieut. -General v. Fransecky— Saarbriicken.^ 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 11:50 A.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 IHeadquarters replied, that two infantry brigades were 
 placed on the north side and west side and cavaly on the 
 south side for purpose of investing Strassburg; that one bat- 
 talion was at Kehl. 
 
 2Commander of lid Army Corps. 
 
—212— 
 
 When will the lid Army Corps be assembled 
 with its troops at Saarbriicken? When will the last 
 trains reach there ?^ 
 
 No. 148 
 
 To Headquarters, First Army — Bolchen. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870. 
 
 The First Army can now get its subsistence sup- 
 plies until further orders from the railroad depots 
 Forbach, St. Avoid andFalkenberg, in so far as they 
 are not procured by requisition or carried on the 
 army's own transportation. But the wagons sent to 
 the above mentioned points will have to keep off the 
 main highway Falkenberg — Forbach as much as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 No. 149 
 
 To Headquarters First, Second and Third Army. 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 4:30 P.M. 
 
 As far as can be seen from reports so far re- 
 ceived, the enemy's main force is retreating through 
 Metz across the Mosel. 
 
 His Majesty the King orders: 
 
 The First Army to-morrow the 13th instant ad- 
 vances against the French Nied, main body towards 
 hne Tennschen — Pange. and secures the railroad de- 
 pot of Courcelles. Cavalry reconnoiters towards 
 Metz and crosses the Mosel below there. Thus First 
 Army covers right flank of Second Army. 
 
 Second Army marches to^^ ards line Buchy — 
 Chateau-Salins and sends outposts to the Seille; it 
 will try, if possible, to secure the crossings at Pont a 
 Mousson, Dieulouard, Mardache, etc. Cavalry recon- 
 noiters to beyond the Mosel. 
 
 Third Army continues advance towards the line 
 
 IReply: At present lid Army Corps in triangle Neun- 
 kirchen—Homburg— Saarbriicken, except larger part of trains 
 and columns; the latter still en route from Berlin to Saar- 
 briicken and would be assembled in Homburgand Xeunkirch- 
 en only by the 14th. 
 
—213— 
 
 Nancy— Luneville. Orders for its further utilization 
 will be issued in the next few days. 
 
 The trains can everywhere follow the army corps 
 as far as the Mosel and Meurthe. 
 
 After 5 p. m. to-morrow Royal Headquarters will 
 be in Herlingen. Send reports here up to 2 p.m. 
 
 No. 150 
 To the General Government, Coast Districts — 
 Hanover. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 5:30 P.M. 
 Telegram : 
 
 After 5 p.m. to-morrow Royal Headquarters will 
 be in Herlingen, west of Falkenberg. 
 
 No. 151 
 To Lieut. General v. Kummer -Mayence. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 5:30 P.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 All troops assigned to your command have been 
 started to Saarlouis and vicinity, where they will 
 arrive on the 15th and 16th. Written orders sent by 
 me to Saarlouis. (.See next number.) 
 
 No. 152 
 
 To Lieut. General v. Kummer — Saarlouis. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 12 August 1870, 11 A.M. 
 
 His Majesty the King has issued following orders 
 for the utilization of the detachment of troops under 
 your command, which , will be joined in addition 
 within the next few days at Saarlouis by the 3d Re- 
 serve Hussar Regiment and the 5th Reserve Uhlan 
 Regiment— the brigade of Major General v. Stranz. 
 
 It is the task of the 3d Reserve Division to hasten 
 to Metz and prepare the siege of that fortress by 
 temporary investment. Diedenhofen is to be ob- 
 served. In any event it must prevent operations 
 from Metz against the communications of the armies 
 
—214— 
 
 continuing the advance. Until arrival of the 3d 
 Reserve Division at Metz, a detachment of the First 
 Army' will remain in front of Metz and it will orient 
 Your Excellency as to conditions in and in front of 
 that fortress. At the present time it is not known 
 of what the hostile garrison is composed. 
 
 No. 153 
 
 To Lieut. General v. Fransecky— Saarbriicken. 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 13 August 1870. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Transportation by rail via Neunkirchen or Hom- 
 burg of troops and trains of the lid Corps cannot be 
 tolerated. 
 
 No. 154 
 
 To General Government of Coast Districts- 
 Hanover. 
 
 Hq. St. Avoid, 13 August 1870, 11:30 A.M. 
 Telegram: 
 
 Instructions have been issued to the Guard 
 Landwehr Division that it must apply to the Line 
 Commission in the matter of rail transport to Karls- 
 ruhe. 
 
 It will receive there orders from Lieut. General 
 V. Werder. ' 
 
 The division will be relieved in Hanover by 
 Silesian Landwehr battalions. 
 
 No. 155 
 
 To Headquarters First and Second Army. 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 13 August 1870, 9 P.M. 
 According to information so far received larger 
 
 IThat army was directed to leave a division there. 
 
 2v. Werder had been assigned a command of the siege 
 corps at Strassbui'g, and the Guard Landwehr Division was 
 attached to that corps. 
 
—215— 
 
 hostile detachments have halted at Servigny and 
 Borny this side of Metz. 
 
 His Majesty orders that the First Army remains 
 to-morrow, the 14th August, in its position on the 
 French Nied and observes by advanced advance 
 guards whether the enemy retreats or advances to 
 the attack. 
 
 Should the latter be the case, the Illd Army Corps 
 of the Second Army will be sent to-morrow to oppo- 
 site Pagny, the IXth to Buchy in the direction of the 
 Mosel (Pont a Mousson), where they will, provided 
 they start early, be ready to interfere in a more 
 serious battle in front of Metz. The road from 
 Herlingen via Buchy to Pagny must be kept clear of 
 all trains. 
 
 On the other hand, the First Army is in a situa- 
 tion to prevent any advance of the enemy southward 
 by a flank attack. 
 
 The remaining corps of the Second Army will 
 continue the advance against the stretch of the Mo- 
 sel from Pont a Mousson to Marbache. The Xth 
 Corps will take position in front of Pont a Mousson. 
 
 The cavalry of both armies must be sent ahead 
 as far as possible and must disturb an eventual re- 
 treat of the enemy on the Metz— Verdun road. 
 
 No. 156 
 
 To Lieut. General v. Werder— Hagenau. 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 14 August 1870. 
 
 By orders of the King I have the honor to in- 
 form Your Excellency that the troops assigned to 
 your command have been started in the following 
 manner, are now ready at your disposal, or will ar- 
 rive— 
 
 Fuisilier Regiment 34 at Hagenau, being for the 
 present under the orders of Lieut. General v. Beyer; 
 
 Regiment No. 30 at Hagenau; 
 
-■216— 
 
 2d Reserve Dragoon Regiment at Hagenau; 
 
 Guard Landwehr Division at Karlsruhe; 
 
 1st Landwehr Division at Karlsruhe; 
 
 One Reserve battery F. A. Regiment No. 1 at 
 Karlsruhe; 
 
 Two Reserve batteries F. A. Regiment No. 3 at 
 Karlsruhe. 
 
 The Grand Ducal Baden Division is already at 
 Strassburg. The mobilization of the siege train, as 
 well as of the required fortress artillery and fortress 
 engineer companies is completed, and they will be 
 brought by rail as close to Strassburg as possible. 
 
 It is Your Excellency's task to take this place as 
 as soon as possible. 
 
 No. 157 
 
 To Headquarters First, Second and Third Army. 
 Hq. Herlingen, 14 August 1870. 
 
 The order of march of the artillery and train col- 
 umns, on themselves very satisfactory, is greatly in- 
 terfered with by the carelessness of the hired and 
 requisitioned subsistence vehicles. 
 
 Therefore His Majesty orders that the following 
 points be strictly observed: 
 
 1. All vehicles on the march will keep on the 
 right side of the road and fully clear the left side. 
 Vehicles or columns traveling at an increased rate 
 and overtaking moving vehicles or columns going in 
 the same direction will pass the latter on the right 
 and close to them. 
 
 2. Marching two vehicles abreast is allowed to 
 batteries and ammunition columns and that forma- 
 tion should be taken when the respective column of 
 troops marches in readiness for battle, or when it 
 can be ascertained by the commanding officers that 
 no other columns travel on the same road one direc- 
 tion or the other. To march that way, of course the 
 
-217— 
 
 road must be broad enough to accommodate three ve- 
 hicles abreast. 
 
 3. Each column halting for any reason what- 
 ever or for feeding, must under all circumstances 
 clear the road and park alongside of it. This espec- 
 ially applies to sutler vehicles, which must be at once 
 driven off the road, taking care however not to ill- 
 treat the animals. 
 
 4. All commanders of troops and all field 
 gendarmes should again be directed to watch over 
 the execution of the above orders and to punish 
 all violators of same, or report them to their proper 
 authorities. 
 
 No. 158 
 To the Minister of War, General of Infantry v. Roon. 
 Hq, Herlingen, 14 August 1870. 
 
 Referring to your letter of the 12th instant; I 
 have the honor to inform Your Excellency that by 
 orders of His Majesty the 1st Army Corps and the 
 1st Cavalry Division have been attached to the First 
 Army, the lid, IXth and the Xllth Army Corps to 
 the Second Army, the Vlth Army Corps and the 2d 
 Cavalry Division to the Third Army. 
 
 The Guard Landwehr Division has received or- 
 ders also to proceed to Strassburg to reinforce the 
 troops there, and it has been started by rail to Karls- 
 ruhe. This division will be replaced in Hanover by 
 the Landwehr Regiments Nos. 23, 63, 22 and 62 and 
 these latter will for that purpose be called up from 
 Cosel and Glatz and transported by rail from Frank- 
 enstein. 
 
 No. 159 
 Draft of Operation Orders for the 15th of Au- 
 gust. ' 
 
 IThese orders were not issued. It seems they were 
 sketched out by v. Moltke in the expectation that by the 
 
—218— 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 14 August 1870. 
 
 The First Army marches off to the left to-morrow, 
 the 15th August, and takes position on the line 
 Pommerieux— Arry, between Seille and Mosel, south 
 of Metz. 
 
 One division remains at Courcelles. It is desig- 
 nated to take over the observation of Metz, as soon 
 as only its proper garrison may be assumed to be in 
 and around that place: this division will be relieved as 
 quickly as possible by the mobile 3d Landwehr 
 Division. 
 
 For final support of the First Army, the right 
 wing of the Second Army UXth and Xllth Army 
 Corps), marching on Pont a Mousson, will be in 
 readiness a mile away. 
 
 Those parts of the Gth Cavalry Divison which 
 are still near Metz may be called back by the Second 
 Army in the course of the forenoon. 
 
 The Second Army will resume the march to the 
 Mosel. It is advisable to give the troops a day of 
 rest in rotation as the stream is crossed: still head- 
 quarters of the Second Army must not fail in sending 
 cavalry, as strong as possible, and supported by in- 
 fantry detachments as far as practicable, without 
 delay towards the Metz— Verdun road. 
 
 It will depend on reports received from the First 
 Army if that army can also, and on the shortest 
 road, advance against that road. Crossings are to 
 be at once reconnoitered below Pont a Mousson and 
 prepared. 
 
 evening of the 14th reliable information would be received 
 that the largest part of the French army had arrived behind 
 the Mosel. But as by 6 p.m. the situation with the enemy 
 had not yet been ascertained, and nothing was known at 
 Royal Headquarters of the battle ensuing in the meantime, 
 the orders given in No. 161 came into force. The main points 
 of these orders, however, recur in the orders for the 16th (No. 
 168), of course with due regard to the happenings on the 14th. 
 
— 2i9— 
 
 No. 160 
 
 DRAFT FOR OPERATIONS 
 
 No date, apparently 14 August 1870. 
 If reconnaissance show that larger masses of 
 troops are in front and behind Metz — 
 
 First Army.— hine Courcelles — Orny — Pournoy. 
 Xllth Corps as support takes its rest day in 
 Buchy— Soigne, 
 
 Total - - - . 120,000 men. 
 As soon as lid Corps arrives 150,000 men. 
 
 Xth Corps rests to-day. On the 15th August at 
 Gorze with 3d Cavalry Division. 
 
 16th August five corps behind the Madine, that 
 is on the left bank of the Mosel towards Metz, also 
 150,000 men. 
 
 Third Army on the march to Paris. 
 
 No. 161 
 
 To Headquarters, First, Second and Third Army, 
 as well as to Headquarters Illd, IXth and Xllth 
 Army Corps. 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 14th August 1870, 6:00 P.M. 
 
 Observations by the First Army have not re- 
 sulted in any definite clearing up of the situation in 
 front of Metz. Still we may assume that the largest 
 part of the hostile army is still this side of Metz. 
 
 Considering that after exhausting marches the 
 armies need a day of rest, and because such a day of 
 rest can be connected for a part of the army corps 
 with security against possible offensive undertakings 
 coming from Metz, His Majesty the King hereby 
 orders: 
 
 The leading elements of the Illd, IXth, and Xlth 
 Army Corps remain in their place to-morrow; these 
 corps will close up within themselves and cook meals. 
 
 The First Army also remains with the 1st and 
 
—220— 
 
 Vllth Army Corps in its present position; the Vlllth 
 Army Corps, except that part detached via Bolchen 
 to BazoncoLirt— Alben for purpose of closer connection 
 with the right wing of the Second Army, should be 
 drawn up, which at the same time will facilitate the 
 subsequent necessary left flank movement of the 
 First Army, There is no objection to the cavalry, 
 especialy the 3d Cavalry Division, going farther to 
 the front. 
 
 To better clear up the situation in the meantime 
 it is absolutely necessary to advance on the left bank 
 of the Mosel with larger forces against the connect- 
 ing roads of the enemy, Metz — Verdun. 
 
 This task the Second Army will assign to all the 
 cavalry now on the left bank of the Mosel and sup- 
 port that cavalry in the direction of Gorze and Thiau- 
 court by those corps which cross the Mosel first. 
 
 For this purpose the Illd Army Corps must pre- 
 pare to-morrow a crossing below Pont a Mousson. 
 
 The lid Army Corps continues its march in the 
 direction it now has. 
 
 The battle of August 14th made special orders necessary 
 early on the 15th : 
 
 No. 162 
 
 To Headquarters Second Army— Pont a Mousson. 
 Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870, early. 
 Telegram: 
 
 1st and lid Corps have, through heavy fighting, 
 driven strong hostile forces into Metz. Parts of the 
 18th Division were also engaged. The IXth Corps 
 will get close to the battle to-day. Disposition as to 
 Hid Corps reserved. Pursuit important on the Metz 
 —Verdun road. 
 
 No. 163 
 
 To Headquarters First Army — Varize. 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870, early. 
 
—221— 
 
 Telegram: 
 
 His Majesty orders that the First Army to-day 
 holds the terrain gained in yesterday's battle, as far 
 as it is not within range of the fortress guns. The 
 Vlllth Corps should at once be drawn up to support 
 the 1st and Vllth. The IXth Corps which already 
 was engaged yesterday, will be drawn close to the 
 battlefield. The leading elements of the lid 
 Corps will to-day reach Han on the Nied. His Maj- 
 esty will proceed to Pange. 
 
 No. 164 
 
 To Headquarters IXth Army Corps. 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870. ^ 
 
 The IXth Army Corps will immediately advance 
 with all forces to Peltre— Jury, to be ready for a hos- 
 tile advance. His Majesty proceeds to Pange. 
 
 No. 165 
 
 To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz. 
 
 Near Flanville, 15th August 1870, 10:45 a.m. 
 
 His Majesty having convinced himself that there 
 are no parts of the enemy this side of Metz, the ad- 
 vance of the First Army is no longer required. The 
 1st and Vllth Corps have received orders direct from 
 these headquarters to halt and to send ahead only 
 cavalry for observation of the fortress and to protect 
 the wounded. The Vlllth Army Corps, in so far as 
 it has already started on the march, should proceed 
 to Orny, where it will receive orders direct. 
 
 No. 166 
 
 To Headquarters Vlllth Army Corps. 
 
 Near Flanville, 15th August 1870, 10:45 A.M. 
 
 His Majesty having convinced himself that there 
 are no parts of the enemy this side of Metz, the ad- 
 vance of the Vlllth Army Corps is no longer neces- 
 
 IThis order was received at 5 p.m. nt corps headquarters. 
 
—222- 
 
 sary. Should the corps be now en route, the march 
 should be directed to Orny, passing Pange. 
 
 No. 167 
 
 To Headquarters, Second Army. 
 
 Near Flanville, 15 August 1870, 11 a.m. 
 Telegram: 
 
 French driven completely into Metz and now ap- 
 parently in retreat on Verdun. All three corps of 
 the right wing (Illd. Xllth IXth) are now at com- 
 plete disposal of Second Army headquarters; the 
 Xllth Corps is already on the march to Nomeny. 
 
 No. 168 
 
 To Headquarters First, Second and Third Army, 
 Hq. Herlingen, 15 August 1870, 6:30 p.m. 
 
 As long as it has not been ascertained if more 
 than the regular garrison is in Metz, it will be neces- 
 sary to leave one army corps of the First Army in 
 the vicinity of Courcelles, which will very shortly be 
 relieved by the corps under Lieutenant General v. 
 Kummer following up from Saarlouis. The other 
 two corps of the First Army will take a po- 
 sition to-morrow, the 16th, beween the Seille and 
 Mosel, about on the line Arry — Pommerieux. A 
 crossing over the last named stream should be at 
 once reconnoitered and provided that has not already 
 been done in that vicinity by the Illd Army Corps, 
 in which case it will be kept intact for the use of 
 the First Army. 
 
 By a telegram of 11 a.m. this date, the Second 
 Army received free disposition of all its corps. An 
 early report concerning its movements is expected, 
 and in general the following is remarked: 
 
 Conditions under which the 1st and Vllth Army 
 Corps and parts of the 18th Division victoriously 
 fought last evening preclude any pursuit. The fruits 
 of the victory can be gathered only by a forcible of- 
 
-223— 
 
 fensive of the Second Army against the roads from 
 Metz as well as via Fresnes and Etain towards 
 Verdun. It is left to Headquarters Second Army to 
 conduct such an offensive with all disposable means 
 at hand. Even if through this the Second Army 
 gets for the time being ahead of the First Army, 
 care will be exercised at these headquarters in ar- 
 ranging the further advance westward and the 
 troops allowed all necessary rest. The leading ele- 
 ments of the Third Army to-day reached the line 
 Nancy — Dombasle — Bayon; its cavalry is raiding 
 towards Toul and south thereof. After 5 p.m. to- 
 morrow Royal Headquarters will be in Pont a Mousson ; 
 send reports here until 1:00 p.m. 
 
 No. 169. 
 
 Unsealed Orders for the respective detachments 
 of both Armies. 
 
 Hq. Herlingen, 16 August 1870, 7:15 A. M. 
 
 The IXth Army Corps shall to-day, if possible, 
 cross on the bridge prepared by the Hid Army Corps 
 in the vicinity of Arry or in any case approach close 
 to the river. Therefore it is advisable for the First 
 Army to let that corps pass on ahead, and the bivouac 
 of the Vnith Corps should be changed accordingly. 
 
 News of the battle ensued at Viouville — Mars la Tour 
 caused the following orders to be issued on the evening of the 
 16th of August: 
 
 No. 170. 
 To Headquarters, First Army — Pommerieux, 
 
 Hq. Pont a Mousson, 16 August 1870, 5:00 P.M. 
 The enemy retreating from Metz has been at- 
 tacked to-day at Rezonville by the Hid Army Corps, 
 coming from Gorze. The Xth Corps is being drawn 
 up from the west. In order to force the enemy into 
 a northerly direction from Chalons and Paris, and 
 because he appears in considerable force. His Majes- 
 
-224— 
 
 ty orders that the two disposable corps of the First 
 Army cross the Mosel immediately after the troops 
 of the IXth Corps. Until the troops have crossed, 
 the trains of all three corps must remain on the right 
 bank of the stream. 
 
 The subsequent direction of the Vlllth and Vllth 
 Army Corps will be regulated by Army Headquarters 
 with due regard to bringing them into touch with the 
 enemy as soon as possible. 
 
 These headquarters will issue the necessary orders 
 for continuing the march of both armies westward. 
 
 No. 171. 
 To Headquarters, Second Army — Thiaucourt. 
 
 Hq. Pont a Mousson, 16 Aug., 8:00 P.M. 
 
 Headquarters First Army has received orders to 
 cross the troops of the VHIth and Vllth Army Corps 
 over the Mosel immediately behind the troops of the 
 IXth Army Corps to-morrow, and send them in the 
 shortest direction against the enemy. 
 
 Proper formation of the First and Second Army, 
 in the sense of a subsequent advance westward, can 
 be attended to later; at present the most important 
 point is to force as large a part of the hostile army 
 away from Chalons and Paris in a northerly direction 
 and to pursue it to and into Luxemburg territory. 
 
 The remainder of the Second Army may now 
 halt and rest, and it will be sufficient if the crossings 
 over the Mass are occupied by advanced leading ele- 
 ments. 
 
 Before Headquarters Second Army had sufficient 
 information concerning the seriousness of the battle 
 at Vionville— Mars la Tour, Major General v. Stiehle 
 wrote the following letter to the Chief of the Great 
 General Staff, which, before the departure of Second 
 Army Headquarters for the battlefield, he left in Pont 
 a Mousson to be handed to Royal Headquarters on its 
 arrival. 
 
—225— 
 
 The orders mentioned in General v. Stiehle's 
 letter are printed in the General Staff Account of the 
 War of 1870-71, part I, appendix 20. 
 
 "Hq. PontaMousson, 16 Aug. 1870, 2:00 p.m. 
 
 I leave behind me a copy of Army orders just 
 issued for the perusal of Your Excellency. 
 
 The report of the Illd Corps at Vionville, dated 
 10 a.m., justifies the assumption that a strong de- 
 tachment has been forced off and is retreating on 
 Diedenhofen; the Hid Corps has orders to directly 
 pursue, taking ahead its left wing, to either force 
 the retreating enemy into the fortress of Dieden- 
 hofen or against the Belgian frontier. As such 
 eventualities were foreseen, to-day's Army orders 
 give the right wing of the Second Army (Xth, Illd, 
 IXth Corps) a certain independence and leave dis- 
 positions of that wing in the hands of General v. 
 Voigts-Rhetz, in so far as His Royal Highness should 
 not be present. 
 
 I believe it is correct to quietly leave the other 
 four corps of the Second Army on the march towards 
 the Maas from Bannoncourt to Commercy, to gain 
 possession there of the crossings to-morrow. After 
 that we undoubtedly will have to halt for several 
 days in order not to emerge from the Argonnes into 
 the plain of Champagne with only some of our lead- 
 ing elements. 
 
 As reports of the cavalry state that Toul is only 
 weakly occupied and little prepared. General v. Al- 
 vensleben has received instructions as to the impor- 
 tance of undertaking a raid against that place to se- 
 cure our railroad connections, —we must be satisfied 
 in merely calling his attention to this fact, we can- 
 not order anything in the absence of definite infor- 
 mation. 
 
 To-day and to-morrow we will get far ahead of 
 the Third Army, an additional reason to halt oh the 
 Maas. 
 
 ^ ^ :^ i^ ^ ^ 
 
 Just received, 2 p.m. 
 
 General v. Kraatz reports from Thiaucourt at 
 11:30 a.m. that the Hid Corps is batthng with strong 
 
—226— 
 
 forces at Rezonville, General v. Rheinbaben is 
 there with nine regiments of cavalry and four bat- 
 teries. The 20th Division is marching to the sound 
 of the guns; notification is being sent to the 19th Di- 
 vision. We ride to the spot via Gorze. " 
 
 General v. Moltke replied: 
 No. 172 
 
 To Major General v. Stiehle. 
 Hq. Pont a Mousson, 16 August 1870, 8:00 P.M. 
 
 According to our views the decision of the cam- 
 paign rests in driving northward the main hostile 
 forces retreating from Metz. The more the Hid 
 Army Corps has in its front, the larger the victory 
 will be to-morrow, when the Xth, Illd, IX, Vlllth, 
 Vllth Corps and finally also the Xllth Corps will be 
 disposable against the hostile force. 
 
 Only when this main object is reached, the First 
 and Second Army would be separated for a continu- 
 ation of the march westward. The corps of the Sec- 
 ond Army not now engaged may halt. 
 
 A quick arrival on the Maas appears of minor 
 importance, but the capture of Toul of great value. 
 There is at present no necessity for the debouchment 
 of the three corps from the Second Army. 
 
 The day before the battle of Gravelotte— St. Privat the 
 following orders were issued: 
 
 No. 173 
 To Headquarters First Army— Coin on the Seille. 
 Hq. Pont a Mousson, 17 August 1870, 2:00 a.m. 
 The Hid and Xth Corps held their positions yes- 
 terday. Nevertheless support as early as possible, 
 at daybreak, is urgently desirable. 
 
 The corps of the Second Army, coming up, have 
 to cover larger distances than those of the First 
 Army. Therefore it is necessary that the corps of 
 the First Army start immediately, utilizing all avail- 
 
—227— 
 
 able crossings (which probably has already been or- 
 dered) . 
 
 His Majesty will very shortly proceed to Gorze, 
 where he expects to receive early reports. 
 
 No. 174 
 
 To Headquarters First and Second Army. ^ 
 
 Hill south of Flavigny, 17 August 1870, 1:45 P.M. 
 The Second Army will fall in at 5 a.m. to-mor- 
 row the 18th and advance in echelons (the orders to 
 First Army road read— advance in echelons from the 
 left wing), between the Yron and Gorze creeks (in 
 general, between Ville sur Yron and Rezonville). 
 The Vlllth Army Corps will join this movement on 
 the right wing of the Second Army. In the start 
 the VHth Army Corps will have the task to protect 
 the movements of the Second Army against possible 
 operations from Metz. Further orders from the 
 King will depend on the measures taken by the 
 enemy. Send reports for the present to hill south of 
 Flavigny. 
 
 No. 175 
 
 To General of Cavalry Count v. Manteuffel- — 
 Courcelles. 
 Hq. Pont a Mousson, 17 August 1870, 10 p.m. 
 
 In the very probable case of the French Army 
 executing an attack in superior forces on the 1st 
 Army Corps, after the corps Frossard, Decaen (suc- 
 cessor toBazaine), Ladmirault andtheGuardelmper- 
 iale were defeated yesterday after a long and bloody 
 battle by the Hid, Xth and parts of the Vlllth and 
 IXth Army Corps at Vionville, it would be in entire 
 accord with His Majesty's intentions, should Your 
 
 IDelivered by a general staff officer of Royal Headquar- 
 ters. 
 
 2Commanding General 1st Army Corps. 
 
—228— 
 
 Excellency, for purpose of covering our communica- 
 tions, fall back in the direction of Remilly. 
 
 Shortly before Royal Headquarters left Pont a Mousson, 
 the following orders were issued early on August 18, 1870: 
 
 No. 176 
 
 To Headquarters, First Army— Ars on the Mosel. 
 Hq. Pont a Mousson, 18 August 1870, 4:00 a.m. 
 
 Nothing is changed in matters of command in 
 the First Army. Direct orders from His Majesty 
 may also to-day be expected to be received on the 
 battlefield. 
 
 The Vnth Army Corps will for the present as- 
 sume a defensive attitude. Connection with the 
 Vnith Army Corps can be sought only towards the 
 front. 
 
 Should it be ascertained that the hostile army 
 retreats into Metz, our corps will execute a turn to 
 the right. 
 
 Direct support for the First Army, should that 
 become necessary, will be given by the second line 
 of the Second Army. 
 
 During the battle of Gi-avelotte-St. Privat the following 
 orders and directions were issued by Royal Headquarters to 
 the different headquarters: 
 
 No. 177 
 To Headquarters, Second Army. 
 Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 9:20 a.m. 
 There is an unimportant skirmish fight on the 
 right wing of the Vllth Army Corps. The troops 
 visible on the hills towards Metz appear to be mov- 
 ing northward, that is, possibly towards Briey. It 
 does not appear that the First Army requires more 
 extended support than can be furnished by the Hid 
 Corps from Vionville or St. Marcel. 
 
—229— 
 
 No. 178 
 
 To Headquarters, Second Army. 
 
 Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 10:30 A.M. 
 
 Reports received justify assumption that the 
 enemy intends to hold his position on plateau between 
 Le Point du Jour and Montigny la Grange. 
 
 Four hostile battalions have advanced into the 
 Bois des Genivaux. His Majesty considers it ad- 
 visable to start the XHth and Guard Corps in di- 
 rection of Batilly in order to reach the enemy at St. 
 Marie aux Chenes, should he march towards Briey— 
 and in case he should remain on the heights to attack 
 him from direction of Amanweiler. This attack 
 would have to be made in conjunction with the First 
 Army attacking from the Bois de Vaux and Grave- 
 lotte, the IXth Corps attacking against the Bois des 
 Genivaux and Verneville, and the left wing of the 
 Second Army attacking from the north. 
 
 No. 179 
 
 To General of Infantry, v. Steinmetz. 
 Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 12:00 noon. 
 The battle now being heard is but a partial en- 
 gagement near Verneville and does not make a gen- 
 eral attack of the First Army necessary. The First 
 Army should not let strong bodies of troops be seen, 
 and in any case only its artillery for purpose of pre- 
 paring the subsequent attack. 
 
 No. 180 
 
 To Headquarters, Second Army. 
 
 Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August 1870, 1:45 p.m. 
 
 The IXth Corps is now engaged in artillery bat- 
 tle in front of the Bois Doseuillons. The actual 
 general attack along the entire line will not be made 
 sooner than important fighting forces can advance 
 from Amanweiler. 
 
LEJa12 
 
Extracts 
 
 From 
 MoltKe's 
 
 Correspondence 
 
 Pertaining: to War 1 870-71 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 019 644 796 9 
 
 
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