398 S ipy 1 iLSS^ *"' CONGRESS Hi. D 398 .B8 Copy 1 THE WESTERN AND EASTERN QUESTIONS OF EUROPE. / BY ELIHU BURRITT. 1 1 REPRINTED FROM THE N. Y. TIMES, WORLD, AND HARTFORD COURANT. iT. ^^ HARTFORD : Hamersly & Co., Publishers. 1871. AUTHOR'S NOTE Several intelligent and influential readers having expressed the opinion that the reflections herewith presented to the public were worth preserv- ing in a more permanent form than the daily papers in which they first appeared, the Author submits them in a pamphlet and commends them to the thoughtful consideration of both American and English minds in- terested in the great questions that have come, or are soon to come, to the front before the civilized world. New Britain, Conn., March 20, 1871. 2 ^^^ ^ Questions of Westerist Europe, The Cost of Small Nationalities. The hyperbole of popular comparisons or measurements may exagger- ate contrasts, but they make them impressive. It is common to hear even a poor man say this or that " is worth its weight in gold," sometimes even when the this or that is his bright and active boy of fifteen years, and weighing a hundred pounds avoirdupois. This simile exaggerates the relative value of the two things compared, but the estimate expressed is clear and impressive. The same simile reversed may be applied even more truthfully to entities in the political world, which have been held at a higher price than they are worth to themselves or to mankind. By the simile reversed, I mean that there are several small nationalities in Europe which cost their weight in gold, though they are worth virtually nothing to themselves as political communities, and less than nothing to the great family of nations. And this vast cost of their worthless being is not borne by themselves, but by outside Powers and peoples. Their present pohtical existence is of no more value to their own subjects than each of seven kingdoms would be to its subjects if England were again resolved into the old Saxon heptarchy, or if France were reparceled into as many independent States. Let us glance at the status of these small nationalities as they appear in the scale of dignity. They are the " unprotected females" in the com- munity of European nations. They themselves no more pretend to the ability of self-standing and self-defending powers than does a lone and defenceless woman sojourning or traveling among rude and stalwart men. Her very weakness is her safety. She feels and trusts it as such. She believes it will enlist some stout and gallant champion in her defense, should she be assaulted by a ruflSan. This weakness may be safety, but it is not dignity. And this weakness is not the raison d'etre, but the 'poumir d'etre, of these small nationalities. And it is a wonder that en- 2 COST OF SMALL NATIONALITIES. lightened patriotism can see in them a reason for independent existence. Their subjects are yet as patriotic as those of the Great Powers, and as intelh'gent, doubtless. But, with all this patriotism, they must at times see and feel how the pigmy stature of their little State dwarfs their own political status. What is their opinion, what is their political entity worth, when weighed against that of the same number of Englishmen, French, Prussians, or Russians ? What is the weight of their Government's opin- ion or ability in a great " question " that moves Christendom ? Let us glance at the reason and value of these small States in the light of the freedom, the liberal institutions, and the general " rights of man," which they procure and maintain for their subjects or citizens. Take Ireland, for example. Could any form of independent nationality, under a constitutional monarchy, or a republic, raise an Irishman one political inch above an Englishman on the sister island, or in any quality or enjoy- ment of freedom to think, speak, move, or act in " the pursuit of happi- ness?" Would the "repeal of the Union," or a republic, cheapen a single acre of land, or even transfer one to a new owner without pay to some- body ? Ireland elects and sends to the Imperial Parliament more repre- sentatives pro rata of her population than she would be allowed to send to Washington were she united to the American Republic. If independ- ent, would she send more or better representatives to Dublin ? If she could and did, could and would they be more unanimous at Dublin than in London, or make better laws for the best good of her people than they could if equally honest and united in the British Parliament? In a word, could any form of national independence give an Irishman in Ireland a single possibility of freedom in "the pursuit of happiness" which he can- not enjoy or reach, as a subject of the United Kingdom, on the same foot- ing as an Englishman in England ? We might go around the whole circle of would-be independent nation- alities, and apply the same questions to them. Crossing the diameter of this circle, what, may we ask, can the subjects of the two Danubian Prin- cipalities be, enjoy, or hope more than they could if they were part and parcel of the Austrian Empire ? What possibilities of progress, freedom, political dignity and material prosperity can the motley populations of European Turkey attain under the Mohammedan rule of Constantinople, which they could not possess under the Russian sceptre at St. Petersburg ? What liberties do the few millions of Sweden enjoy, or pretend to, which the population of Denmark do not possess and use ? What is the raison d'etre'? Wherein does it pay, in political privilege or status, to keep up two independent nationalities for Spain and Portugal ? To use a term COST OF SMALL NATIONALITIES. 3 more familiar to the American than perhaps to any other community, these old sovereignties do not pay, in dignity, strength, and freedom, for what they expend themselves to keep up their independent existence. But, in some cases at least, where one of these small nationalities has paid out of its own pocket a farthing for its own deceptive and fruitless independence, the " Great Powers " around it have paid a pound sterling as their annuity on this life assurance policy. If any thoughtful reader thinks this an aggravated estimate, let him just glance at the causes of all the wars in Europe for the last two hundred years, at the " wars of suc- cession," or wars to maintain a " balance of power." Let him analyze the composition of the English national debt, and see how much the na- tionality of Spain has cost the English people, and how they have been paid in ingratitude and indignity for their money and their blood. Why, a few days ago the English Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, stated that England's bill of costs in the Crimean War was £80,000,000 in money, not counting the blood she poured out like water in the struggle. Now $400,000,000, besides the sacrifice of precious life, was a pretty large sum to sweat out of the incomes and industries of the English people in less than two years. It was a pretty large sum for them to pay for the sham autonomy of two Danubian provinces, or even for the existence of Turkey itself as an inde- pendent nationality. But this sum is small compared with the cost of Belgium to England. It involved a great expense to France and other outside nations to rive that small country from Holland, one of the freest and most solidly prosperous nations in Europe ; one of the first maritime countries in the world, of which Belgium formed a part, and from which she could have derived as much advantage as any section of the Nether- lands. Well, from the time this new nationality was first set upon its feet, its " protection " has cost England more than it has Belgium itself. Al- though three or four other Great Powers signed the guarantee papers with her, she knows that not one of them attached more obligation to the compact than to the old vitiated Treaty of Vienna ; that not one of them feels bound to fight for Belgium, unless its own individual interests were involved. So England has virtually assumed the whole obligation and cost of defending that small nationality. From the date of the treaty, 1839, she has apprehended an attack upon the independence of her protege, and she has felt bound to prepare to resist such an attack. For thirty years or more, the invasion of Belgium has been one of the front-rank probabili- ties for which she has provided in her armed peace establishments. It is a moderate estimate that these prepai-ations for the defense of Belgium 4 THE BALANCE-OF-POWER REGIME. have cost England £5,000,000 a year for the last thirty years. She has just now voted £2,000,000, as an extra appropriation, to provide against the increased peril of the hour. But this sum is only a small instalment of the amount involved in her military armaments in behalf of Belgium. If no outside Power touches that little Kingdom with its little finger, this new danger will cost England £20,000,000. But think of what would come if either Prussia or France should attack Belgium. England has just released all the other parties that signed with her the Belgian guar- antee ; she has engaged, single-handed, to enter into this tremendous struggle, and fight for France or against France for the independence of Belgium. Just think for one moment of the illimitable peril of blood and treasure involved in this obligation, whichever horn of the dilemma Eng- land shall be obligated to take. Suppose, at some desperate crisis of this conflict, Prussia should violate the territory of Belgium, and France should call upon England to fulfill the letter of her bond, and send her iron-clad fleet to the Baltic to shell the Prussian ports, bombard Berlin, and depose and capture Victoria's eldest daughter, and destroy Potsdam and all the royal palaces. Or pursue the alternative, and suppose that England should oblige herself, by this new bond, to join Prussia in the complete subjugation of France. In either case, when all that Belgium shall have cost England, from 1839 to the end of the chapter, shall have been com- puted, will not the total illustrate the cost of small nationalities ? The Balance-of-Power Regime. In these weeks of centuries for days, Christendom is making history very fast. Changes of public opinion are worthy of being put in the front rank with the events which this history is to record. Does the general appre- ciation of these momentous events indicate a change of public opinion in refei-ence to the policy in which they originated ? The American mind never had much occasion to be exercised in regard to the balance-of-power regime on this Continent. Virtually, as a nation, we have no neighbors, in the European sense, or none to fear or oppose our growth and expan- sion. "We would not admit for a moment that the neighbors we have on the north and south have any reason to fear insult or injury from us in consequence of this rapid and immense growth of our national territory and power. We believe, and would have them believe, that Canada and Mexico are just as safe from any violation of their rights on our part as THE BALANCE-OF-POWER REGIME. 5 they were when we did not number ten millions. "We have this full faith in ourselves in regard to our disposition and intentions toward our weaker neighbors. We will not now stop to inquire if we should have the like faith in them if the case were reversed, and ihey were growing at our rate and we at theirs. One thing is quite evident : the American mind clearly sympathizes with Prussia in this tremendous struggle with France, and seems to throw upon the French the onus or responsibility of the war. It is true that, perhaps, thi'ee out of every four Americans charge Louis Napoleon with being the cause of the war, though nothing is more certain than that his fiercest opponents were the most eager to rush into it, and he the most reluctant to cast his all upon the temble hazard of the sword. The whole English nation leans to Prussia as manifestly as the American does. Now, a com- mon and equal suspicion or dislike of the French Emperor, doubtless has a good deal to do with this bias in both cases. But, I am confident that no fair-minded and intelligent American or Englishman, on second thought, would believe that if Napoleon had never been born, or if France had been a republic since 1848, this war would have been avoided. To be- lieve that it would have been avoided, one must believe that the domina- tion of the old balance-of-power regime over the sentiment and policy of nations has been broken. Does the sentiment of America, England, and of other countries that side with Prussia, indicate this belief? Does it show the progress of a great change in public opinion in regard to the free growth and expansion of nations ? that one has no cause to fear the simjjle increase of territory, population, and power on the part of its neigh- bor ? If this new and more hopeful public opinion is beginning to mani- fest itself in this way, is it inspired by a sentiment like our American faith in our own fair and honorable mind and intent toward our neighbors ? Does it proceed from a new or increasing confidence in the disposition and policy of great and growing Powers ? To bring it to a most practical actuality, is it the sentiment of outside nations that France had no cause of fear in the growth and power of Prussia, though it absorbed into itself and wielded the whole German-speaking empire on the Continent ? For one, I should be rejoiced to believe that the public sentiment of the great majority of Christian nations had reached this " consummation so devoutly to be wished." What a change such a sentiment must bring into the relationships and policies of the Great Powers in time to come ! How different from • the sentiment of those Powers which led to the Cri- mean war ! Then Russia crossed the Pruth and threatened to hold two or three Danubian principalities as hostages or guarantees for the better 6 THE BALANCE-OF-POWEU REGIME. treatment on the part of Turkey of her Christian subjects, or for the better observance of some of her treaty stipuhitions in their behalf. The balance- of-power regime trembled with angry emotion at this covert or fancied attack upon its domination. England, France, Italy, and Turkey arose in arms to resist and avenge it. Not one iota of faith was given to the protestations of Russia that she did not intend to add an acre to her ter- ritory by her movement against Turkey. No ; she was not to be trusted for a moment. If let alone, she would hold the Danubian Provinces in permanent possession after Turkey had conceded her claims. Then she would go on from step to step until she had conquered and annexed the whole of European Turkey. Then, Avith this additional force, she would set out on her march against Western Europe. The vanquished Turks would give her power to tread down Austria and Prussia, and, gathering force from extinguished nationalities, she would overpower France and then make England the last victim of her victories. Such apparently was the sentiment of England, France, and Italy in regard to Russia ; and the American mind seemed to share or sanction it to some extent. What a great and hopeful change ! No European Power has ever expanded its territory and dominion so rapidly as Prussia during the last ten years. She has subdued or annexed to herself a full half dozen Belgiums in population and territory. She went to war with Austria, and drove her out of the door of Germany for a cause which not one well-read American in a hundred can describe or remember. Within the last decade she has made herself from a second-rate Power to the first in Europe in every element of strength. But she is a highly-educated and honorable nation, and the world may repose confidence in her good intentions. She would be as unlikely to injure or insult a neighboring nation, in consequence of her increased power, as the United States would be in regard to our weaker neighbors. France ought to have shared this feeling of confidence, and not to have looked upon the growth of this great Power, abutting upon the whole line of her territory, either with hostility or alarm. To my mind this change of public opinion in regard to the growth of nations, if it is real and permanent, is one of the most hopeful signs for the time present and to come. If it is really a radical change of opinion it must abolish wars, and, what are almost worse, the half-crushing armed peace establishments of Christendom ; for they belong to the balance-of- power policy. If, for instance, the French Government should some day become so liberal, so like the Belgian, that the Belgian people should vote unanimously to become part and parcel of France in order to avoid the ENGLAND'S POSITION AND DUTY. 7 expense of an independent nationality, and to feel themselves equal sub- jects of a great Empire, it would be comforting to believe that Great Britain vi'ould not oppose it or fear the annexation or union, but would believe in the honorable intentions of the French nation thus augmented, and consequently would not apprehend that they would make Antwerp another Cherbourg as a menace to so confiding a neighbor. England's Position and Duty from an Outside Stand-Point- At this remarkable crisis in the history of Europe, the position and duty of England are earnestly discussed by the most influential organs of public opinion at home and abroad. English, American, German, French, and many other writers and speakers of different countries and languages, are laboring to demonstrate what England should do or not do at this juncture. I therefore venture with deference to put forth a few thoughts on this exciting question from a stand-point which, I regret to notice, so few American journalists and public men seem disposed to adopt. "Blood is thicker than water," even though the water may be stirred from the bottom by some temporary excitement. And the common blood of our two great nations will never grow thinner than it is now. We have a long march side by side before us ; and we must feel more interest in the right wing of the grand army than any outside nation can do. If, in- stead of keeping step with us, it turns aside to fight with wind-mills, or imaginary enemies, we must lose some of the great victories for mankind which we might win and share together. And to a man of plain, common sense, most of the arguments that are now being pressed upon England seem calculated to drag her out and far from the high road to these victo- ries. For it is the most prominent feature of these arguments that they are based upon an old traditional sentiment as Avell as policy of the Eng- lish government and people. They insist that, although England may quite transform her traditional home policy, her old traditional sentiment and attitude toward foreign countries must be maintained for the sake of consistency, if from no other motive ; that, though it is safe and right to enfranchise and trust what so recently were regarded as dangerous classes at home, it is unsafe to trust to the honor and good faith of neighboring nations, or even to relax the traditional suspicion of their evil intentions. Now this traditional foreign policy is founded in an old and sedulously stimulated sentiment of suspicion, which alone can sustain it. But it was an old sentiment that inspired and upheld that home policy which the g ENGLAND'S POSITION AND DUTY. English people have condemned and transformed. And that foreign policy which has involved England in such sacrifices of blood and treasure must drag her into still bloodier wars if the sentiment that sustains it is not changed. Why should it outlive the public feeling and opinion which she has changed on so many other questions? To an American, of average intelligence and sincere respect and good will for the mother country, it is a wonder that she can still burden her heart and soul with such suspicions of other governments and peoples; that she can feel her place and safety so endangered by the mere growth of a neighboring nation in territory and population. I would appeal to a history as fresh and vivid as the events of yester- day. Did not the whole English nation, as loudly as ours, condemn such a suspicion on the part of France towards Prussia? Did they not believe and say as strongly as we did, that France had no reason to fear the erec- tion and consolidation of thi<5 new and vast German power abutting upon her territory for its whole length, and almost flanking it at both ends? Why did they, as well as we, believe and say this ? Neither they nor we wished France to expose herself to any danger, to any insult or incivility from her new and powerful neighbor. This was the reason. We had the fullest confidence in the honorable disposition and good faith of Prussia. If all the German states, including Austria, had united with her in one consolidated empire, with Frederick William on the throne, and Bismarck on his right and Moltke on his left hand, would not England as well as America have said to France, "You have nothing to fear; these Germans are a peace-loving, honorable race. Don't go and increase your army on their account; don't yie'd to any suspicion of their good faith and intent toward you as a neighbor ?" Well, now, is not Belgium as much French in language, religion, prox- imity, and other affinities, as Hanover was Prussian? Suppose all these affinities, in addition to other more social forces, should work out the vol- untary union of France and Belgium in one consolidated, one-hearted na- tionality. Would it not be our duty, and the first and best we owed Eng- land, to say to her as a nation what she and we said to France: "Don't be uneasy about this union. France and Belgium have only done what you and Scotland did under the first James, and perhaps in the same way. This union is no more dangerous to you than was the act to France that made your two kingdoms one. You believed, as fully as we, in the good faith and peaceable disposition of the Germans towards the French. Let us both believe the same of the French toward you. Why, Prussia has united lo herself nearly half a dozen Belgiums in territory and population- ENGLAND'S POSITION AND DUTY 9 Don't fear French invasion or French insuU, because they have added only four or five millions to their census. Trust their honor and good faith as neighbors. They have as much to gain and hope for from peace and unity with you as you have with them. Believe that what you would not do unto them they would not do unto you. This faith will be worth more to you than all the iron-clads you could put on the ocean." Every American who wishes England well must feel anxious lest she should yield at this juncture to the loud advocates of her old traditional policy founded in this suspicion of her neighbors. All who feel that the whole human family has a large stake in her well being, must regard with concern the position which she has assumed and resumed in regard to both Belgium and Turkey. An observing, friendly outsider mighk well wonder if the English people are really aware of what they have taken upon themselves by assuming these obligations towards each of those countries. We might well ask them to consider for a moment what is involved in their renewed obligation to Belgium, and what would result from it in a very probable contingency. The leading journalists and statesmen of England do not mince matters when speaking of her traditional policy toward that State, and the main reason for it. That policy will never al- low the union of Belgium with France, because it would endanger the safety of England to allow the French to possess Antwerp, which they could make another Cherbourg. Rather than permit such a union, they would go to war with France. Just think what this determination involves. Is it not clear to every intelligent mind that, if the union did create such a danger, the more spontaneous and unanimous the union the more immi- nent the peril, according to the old logic of suspicion? For if the union were effected by force or fraud, the Belgians would be hostile to the French, and be a source of weakness instead of strength. In that case Antwerp would not be so dangerous to England as it could be if the two populations were heartily united in will, interest, and policy. Then would not the advocates of the old balance-of-power theory make a strong case, and argue that the fairer the means and motives to the union, the greater the danger to England? They might, according to their logic, go further still in case that Belgium should be the first to make the advance, and charge her with being the most criminal party to the dangerous union, and to merit the first and severest punishment from England. This is the complexion to which this old policy of suspicion must come at last. If maintained to the bitter end of its argument, it engages to crush a people in the clearest, fairest exercise of its inherent and inalien- able right to change its own nationality. It imposes the burden, the weak- 2 2Q COMPARATIVE DUTIES AND RELATIONS TO FRANCE. ness and insignificance of a protected independence upon a State that is unable to stand upon its feet without outside help. If its people prefer such a condition, well and good; if not, equally well. Their will, interest and right are not to be weighed against other great interests in the bal- ance-of-power scales. Now could any thing be more repulsive to the great masses of the English people than this act of forcible compression upon a small but independent State? But this old traditional balance-of- power policy inevitably involves and contemplates such an act of violence and wrong. And the living, breathing, speaking soul of this policy is a suspicion of the bad faith and evil intentions of neighboring nations. To change, to transform this costly and perilous sentiment, would be the best service the true friends of England could render to her, or to the peace of the world. Comparative Duties and Relations to France. A great number of reading and thinking men must notice the fact that many of our leading journals of both political parties denounce the policy and attitude of England towards France. They seem to taunt her with cowardice and meanness ; with love of money and love of life ; with fear to impose upon her people the sacrifice of blood and treasure which a war for the rescue of her neighbor would involve. In applying to her these epithets, they never seem to recognize any corresponding relations and duties of the United States to France. This omission seems hardly fiiir to either of the parties. Indeed, it implies a virtue on our part as a nation which we can hardly claim. What, then, ought England to do for France that she has not done from the beginning of this fearful struggle to the present moment ? Could she have done anything more than she did do to prevent the war ? Did the United States, or any other power than England, even attempt to do anything to prevent it ? Since the commencement of the war to the present moment, have the United States, or any power than England, even attempted to end it, a propria motu, by any actual effort ? Has any negotia- tion between Prussia and France for an armistice, or any preliminary step toward peace, been effected by or through any other power than Eng- land ? It is true that General Burnside, as a mere private individual, has labored generously to induce a conference between the two belligerents that might lead to peace. But, on the other hand, the almost premier COMPARATIVE DUTIES AND RELATIONS TO FRANCE. jj general of the United States and in their pay and duty, has been fol- lowing the German army almost as an actual member of its royal staff, receiving its honors and hospitalities, and imparting to it the vphole value of his experience in our civil war. What, then, should England do as a former ally and near neighbor to France ? Was she at fault because, like us, she could not approve of the cause of the war ? With all her duty to France as an ally and friendly neighbor, ought she to have said to her, even by implication : " Go on ; pitch into Prussia, with whatever cause you avow or entertain, and if you are worsted we will step in and rescue you from the humiliation you in- tended to inflict upon her?" Does not the vigorous, decisive policy which so many of our influential journals and public men urge upon England, mean all this ? Certainly they cannot believe that any mere threat on her part could affect Prussia, or check her design or progress, unless backed by an armed force that could and would arrest her. Such a threat would do no more to this end than the noisy gongs the Chinese beat to frighten the British army in their first battle with them. What force, then, could England alone bring into the field that would be of any account to thwart or check the German armies ? Remember what took place in the Crimean war ; how it required nearly all the available ships of western Europe, and many of North America, to convey 100,000 English and French troops, with their armaments, to Sebastopol. Suppose England should find ships enough to land in France every soldier in her regular army, with all their cavalry, cannon, and other munitions of war. Sup- pose she could muster a force even of 100,000 men on French soil, what would they be and do, even with the fortress of Metz or Sedan to back them, before 600,000 Germans, who would face them with their terrible artillery ? But let us be as liberal as its sanguine friends would wish as to the possibilities of such an intervention. Let us suppose that England could land 100,000 men in France ; that such an array, with the French forces, would beat back the Germans from Paris, and even from the last acre of French territory ; that she could impose an ultimatum upon Germany, or say : " Thus far shalt thou come, and no further." Would not the question then arise : " How far shall she come, and no further ? " Shall she have any French territory ? " Not an acre ! " cries France, from peasant to prince. " We intended to have a good slice of her's, but not a morsel of ours shall fall into her hands." Shall she have any money to pay her back part of what she has spent in the war ? " Not a single franc ! " cries French patriotism, wherever it breathes. " With the help 12 COMPABATIVE DUTIES AND RELATIONS TO FRANCE. of England we have driven the last German regiment from our soil, and are we going to pay them for destroying our armies and burning our cities and villages? A thousand times, no /" When England has heard this no reverberating through the whole area of France, what kind of i/es Avould she be able to force upon the lips of the French Government and people ? Let us imagine her predicament and language : " But you must pay Prussia something, in land or money, to reimburse her for all her blood and treasure spent in this war, which, you know, you forced upon her. We did not come over here to fight for you, merely or partly to save your money, or even all your land, but to save you from having all the breath beaten out of your body as a nation ; to save your national existence from destruction ; to set you on your feet again, to walk with us as a coequal power. We did not come here to bar the payment of your just debts to Prussia, which you rushed into against our urgent advice and remonstrance." Now let us hear France : " Call you this backing your friends ? Why, you are confederate with Prussia in our humiliation and dismemberment. After all this show of help and friendship ; after having aided us to drive her forces out of France, you talk of giving her the territory which she seized but could not hold ! You talk about our paying her costs in this war as well as our own ! Albion perfide! and all this after the mag- nificent triumph you have helped us to achieve ! " Now if the ai-med intervention of England could do all that its friends could conceive or wish, in what way could this most hate-breeding cause and question between her and France be averted ? The friends of this " vigorous policy " seem to make it England's duty alone to interfei-e in behalf of France ; and reproach her for considering money or blood in face of her obligations fo her neighbor. In discussing her means for war, they intimate that she has plenty of money to hire soldiers abroad, if she cannot raise them at home. Let us grant this ; but I would put it to every intelligent and patriotic American between the two oceans : Does England owe more to France than we do, as an ally, as a friend, a helper in the infancy of our nation, when at the point of being strangled in its cradle ? Do we, can we pay our debt to her by these cheap and windy expressions of platform sympathy and type-talk about " old associations," and all that sort of thing? Littlest and meanest of all, can we pay what we owe her in the brassy and costless coin of reproach dashed into the face of England for her inability or hesitation to pay our debt as well as her own to her neighbor in this time of need ? I would not lower the dignity and gravity of this argument by an illustration which might COMPARATIVE DUTIES AND RELATIONS TO TRANCE. 13 excite a smile for its rusticity ; but when considering this cheap process of asking such a creditor as France to " to take the will for the deed," I am reminded of the saying of a poor but friendly man to his neighbor : — " O Sam ; I am so glad to see you ! I would give you some cider, if I had any, and good cider too." To a man with parched lips this cheap though sincere will must give increased thirst. Suppose, then, that the friends of this vigorous policy should feel the pulse of the American government and people on the question, not only of England's duty but of our own to France. Suppose they address an appeal to Congress to show more magnanimity and higher sense of ob- ligation to her ; to set aside all the love of money, life, and comfort which England has evinced, and send over to the rescue of France our whole navy and an army of 50,000 men under General Sherman. Perhaps with the help of the British Provinces we might muster ships enough to convey such a force across the ocean ; especially if England would furnish cannon, horses, forage, and other munitions of war at a fair price, or with- out price. With such cooperation, she might shake oflF her ''"apathy" toward her distressed ally and furnish an army of 100,000 to march side by «ide with the American contingent. Or if they think this would be im- practicable, let them urge the argument they press upon England ; or say that we, too, have plenty of money ; and if we cannot send an army across the ocean, we can hire and officer one there, and save Paris and France itself from subjugation. Surely the high-minded, generous American people would not haggle or hesitate over only a thousand millions of dol- lars, more or less, in behalf of a country to which we owe all that one nation can owe to another. England would have to expend that sum if she went to the help of France. Surely we owe France as much as she, and can afford to pay as much in money or blood, or both. Let the friends of armed intervention, who have such clear and brave perceptions of Eng- land's duty to undertake it alone, put fairly and squarely before the gov- ernment and people of the United States the proposition to send to the succor of France such an American contingent in men or money as we have suggested. Let them ask honestly, earnestly, and in good faith, and without delay, and see what answer they will receive. 24 A NEW WAY TO PAY OLD DEBTS. A New Way to Pay Old Debts. I am no politician, and I i-ead the leading organs of public opinion with equal interest. However they differ on subjects of home and foreign policy, I have been struck with a common feature of their views in re- gard to England's relation and duty to France at this crisis of the struggle between that country and Germany. In the first place, with all the history of our national existence before them, they seem to ignore our debt to France, or to regard it as a mere trifle compared with what England owes that distressed neighbor, who wrested from her the Thirteen American Colonies perhaps twenty or thirty years before they could have won their independence by their own unaided efforts. Or if they recognize any obligation on our part to France, they seem to imply that it may be fully liquidated by the cheap currency of a wordy sympathy, but that England must be held to pay her debt in the hard cash of blood and her people's earnings to save her neighbor's money or landed estate. Then there are other aspects of the arguments urged by them which they can hardly consider. They seem to make our geographical position a moral virtue, or a kind of distinctive institution of our Republican govern- ment. I wonder if they ever think of the inference that dispassionate minds draw from this argument : that ''distance lends enchantment" and solution, too, to our national obligation to France ; that nature pays our debt to her by interposing the ocean between her shore and ours ; that she is too far off to be helped by our navy and army ; that our war-ships have too much business in antipodean seas to be spared for the aid of France, or to " pay for a dead horse." Surely those who press these ar- guments cannot believe that the $10,000,000 or $12,000,000 worth of arms shipped by our manufacturers or jobbers are an instalment of the debt we owe her ; for every one of them costs her the full factory price, if no more. There is another inference, very singular and very salient, that strikes one in the very front of these arguments. It is this : that though we are bound to keep out of or withdraw from all entangling alliances of debt to a foreign nation, England has no right to do the same ; no right to be like us, to adopt our home and foreign policy ; no right even to approximate to us in her institutions, to reduce her standing army to the standard of ours, though ours has a continent to defend while hers has only a small island, on which all the Powers of the continent could not land 100,000 men if they should unite in the attempt. No — so the argument runs — she must raise and sustain a great army that shall cope with the hosts of A NEW WAY TO PAY OLD DEBTS. 15 any continental Power, and be the first and foremost in any great war in Europe, while we stand by and boast that we are the first and foremost in peace by virtue of our genius as a republic. But the most remarkable and prominent feature of all these arguments is the direct suggestion of a new way to pay old debts, or to " kill two birds with one stone." Perhaps it is fair and right to say that the public journals and speakers that taunt England with love of money and love of human life as the reason of her hesitation to fight for France, do not in the same article or speech suggest how she could be forced to pay her debts all round. But in collateral arguments they do this very distinctly. In the first place, according to their logic, in fighting for France, England would not only pay her own debt but ours, too, to her neighbor and former ally. Although, of course, she never did and never can owe France as much as we do, yet, as she is the nearest debtor, she ought to pay what she owes and we, too, cost what it might. Now, if we could drive her into such a war, it would be a cheap as well as new way to pay an old debt, which we have acknowledged time and again. If we could force her into this armed intervention by dint of taunts and fiings at her selfish love of peace, we should do as much for France as if we ourselves sent a fleet and 50,000 men to her aid. Then should we not pay our debt to France handsomely ? But another consideration seems to peer over all others in favor of this economy. It even improves upon the proverb of " killing two birds with one stone." It proposes to kill three or four at least. We shall not only compel England to pay what we owe France, but to pay us in full tale for all the damage her Alabamas did us. Nothing can be more direct and outspoken than the intimation that England would have to settle our claims more nearly on our own terms, even if she drew her sword for France under the pressure of American sentiment and influence. Our leading journals, of both political parties, reproduce this consideration al- most daily. Near the conclusion of this letter, I glanced at the most widely circulated and influential Republican journal in America, and read these lines, leading a paragraph on the subject: "The present time of embarrassment in England appears a very good opportunity for America to settle her old claims. England betrays much anxiety to arrange with us before plunging into greater complications in the East." The first and foremost of these complications is the intervention in behalf of France, to which a combined force of English and American opinion is urging her. The working-men of England, who are pressing her in this direction, in their address to their brethren in the United States, are afraid we shall 15 THE CONQUERING FRANCE OF THE FUTURE. improve this " very good opportunity" to recover our bill of damages from her while she is paying our debt to France. Speaking of her hesi- tation to engage in such a war, they say : " To excuse this culpable inac- tion on the part of English statesmen, it is said that they are hampered by the fear that America will take advantage of England's position, if she went to war, and endeavor to enforce disputed claims connected with your late unhappy civil strife." Thus this new way of paying old debts seems to be understood both at home and abroad as the direction our policy is to take in regard to this great question. It is a very adroit and ingenious policy. It kills three birds at least with one stone. What an attractive scope and motive for grandiloquent sympathy with France ! What a heroic role for a great and generous nation owing what we do to her ! If we can press England into a war for her, while she is clutching with the foe we will pounce upon her back with a score of American Alabamas. She will fear this act of heroic hostility on our part and postpone the intervention we are trying to force her into until she has paid us what we demand. Under such a pressure of embarrassments she will not haggle over the amount. We shall get our pay in full from her, and we shall pay our debt to France in full in the money and blood of England. The animus, aim, and end of this economy bespeak a shrewd policy ; but, on the whole, I wonder if the American nation would be proud of its adoption and success. The Conquering France of the Future, and the "Way to Her "Victories. At this moment of physical disaster to France, when the sympathies of the outside world, in both hemispheres, are flowing in upon her in a flood of gosd-will, the question as to her future must come to every thoughtful mind susceptible of a friendly interest in her well-being. No nation in the history of the world ever drank of such a bitter cup of experience in one-half year as that now pressed upon her lips. The peoples that stand by can almost taste, if not share the draught. Even the new and power- ful empire that has forced it upon her knows and feels how bitter it is. As she puts it to her lips she turns her despairing eyes from one bystand- ing nation to another for a look of sympathy, for a hand of comfort, in the supreme agony of her distress. What shall they say and do? What kind of hand shall they put forth to fold in hers, so weak and tremulous THE CONQUERING FRANCE OF THE FUTURE. 17 with this tremendous struggle ? Shall they tell her, in the midst of the black desolations smoking with her best blood, to arise from the ground and gird up her loins for another trial of the sword when the fatherless sons of her fallen shall be able to wield it ? Shall they by one act, or word, or look of condolence, suggest or admit that she has lost one inch of her great place or one iota of her moral power in the world in this contest of brute forces ? No ; a thousand times, no ! A city set upon such a hill as Paris, so far as the heart of its best vitality is concerned, cannot be hid, cannot be bombarded nor captured. The great lamp of its science and civilization that has lighted benighted nations and guided them through the dark of barbarism to the morning of an enlightened life — that lamp is hung too high to be reached by Krupp's mortars. In the best realm a nation can own, France has yet an empire unbounded by the Rhine, the Don, or the Volga, and no one but herself can excide an Alsace or a Lor- raine from this dominion. This terrible conflict and its issue, and other events of almost equal importance, have brought the civilized world to the appreciation and bal- ancing of other powers than those brute forces that have so long shaken the nations with violence or alarm. They are beginning to consider the spiritual place .and power of the Pope as divested of civil or secular sovereignty. Even the most decided Protestant peoples can and do agree that it would immeasurably enhance the dignity and influence of his po- sition if he should lay off from the majestic robe of his spiritual royalty the fustian scarf of temporal dominion. What they and all other outside nations say to tlie Pope let them now say, with equal force of argument and illustration, to France in this unprecedented crisis in her existence. Let them say to her, not in the patronizing tone of humiliating sympathy, not as to a fallen and humbled nation, " Put off from your regalia this gaudy Na- poleonic figment of military glpry. It dims the lustre of the best jewels in your diadem. It is to your best sovereignty what the wooden sceptre of civil power is in the right hand of the Pope. Go up and sit and reign on that higher throne which no usurper nor rival can shake or reach — the throne of that intellect and infinite genius to which the whole world pays you admiring and willing tribute. In hoc vince. In this high place of power you may say again, and say forever : Veni, vidi, vici. No Rhine, nor Pyrenees, nor sea, nor ocean shall bound this dominion of your mental vitality and might. The brute forces of all the outside world shall do soft and silent homage to this your great realm of moral power." If this be a turning point, a decisive crisis in the life of France, it is one of almost equal moment to all the other nations of Christendom. They 3 18 THE CONQUERING FRANCE OP THE FUTURE. have not only to consider her future, but to determine their own ; and theira is bound up in the same bundle with her destiny. Universal civil- ization for a generation is involved in the programme they plan for this yeai''s action. What is the role they propose for the two closing decades of the century ? Is it the one that has blackened France and Germany with the desolations of this bloody war ; that has furrowed their lands of sunny green with the red-hot ploughshare of ruin, and strewn them with a million graves, and sown them with the Dead Sea salt of millions of hu- man eyes weeping over them? Are there no voices coming up out of this black night of woe to reach the council-tables of cabinets to plead against a new history of human slaughter? During all this tremendous conflict the eyes of the world have been fixed upon England. What she ought to do and could do for her nearest neighbor and ally has been discussed with vigorous freedom on both sides of the Atlantic. Whatever decision the public mind has reached on her duty and ability during the wai% there is now a part for her to act for France which she owes to her, to herself, and to civilization. There was a time, if not in this war, when she ought to have '* stood by her ally." There was a time — and it has gone to the ineffaceable records of history — when Louig Napoleon invited the Powers of Europe to a Congress of Nations to arrange for a proportionate and simultaneous disai'mament, in order to lift from the peoples the increasing and crushing weight of that preposterous armed-peace system which has so long endangered their safety and consumed their revenues. If England had stood by her ally in that effort as faithfully as she did in their joint wars, France to-day might have been free from the footprint of a foreign foe, and Germany without a widow to mourn this bloody conflict. The poet has not exagge- rated the sadness of the i-eflection, " It might have been." Let the dead past bury that with all its forgotten things. It might have been — what might not have been ? — for the good of mankind and the glory of our race, if a single rivulet of opinion had run the other way at the council hour that decided the attitude and act of a great nation. Surely, if such a na- tion has a conscience, and the moral sensibilities of a human memory, England must remember, over the red and smoking desolations of France, how she declined her invitation to a Congress of Nations, to reduce those huge standing armies that have wrought, as the end of their training, these horrible destructions. Before and above all other nations England is bound by every obligation of honor, of duty to herself, to the ally pros- trate and bleeding on the altar of the armed peace-system, and to the whole world and its future, to come forward and take up the proposition THE CONQUERING FRANCE OF THE FUTURE. 19 of Louis Napoleon, and press it upon the Powers of Europe with all the moral force of her influence. With all the humiliations that have fallen upon France, it would be more cruel to her spirit than any she has suf- fered if England should wait to have her ask with her own lips and in her own behalf for a reduction of the armed-peace establishments of the other nations to the footing of her own reduced abilities. To put upon her this cruel necessity would be the unkindest cut of all upon the sensibilities of her nature. To spare her this bitterest draught of humiliation is Eng- land's role and duty beyond the obligation of any other Power. There are more urgent considerations pressing upon her to initiate this measure than upon any other nation. Some of these it may be as well for us to suggest as for her to remember. No other nation in Christendom has said, paid, fought, and bled so much for the maintenance of a balance of power as England. A balance of what kind of power? Of wealth, genius, learning, manufacturing skill and production, capacities of commerce, acreage of territory, or increase of population ? No ; not one of these powers is meant to be put in the scales. Nothing but the balance of brute forces, of the most brutish kind, is em- braced in this old policy. How has she been able to make the beam lie level in her favor ? By hiring the brute force of other countries to put in her scale when her own weighed less than the brute force of France or Russia, or even young America when it was just out of its cradle as a nation. It is because she has done, sacrificed, and suffered more than any nation to effect and preserve a balance of power that we may urge her to prosecute the policy or its principle in the inverse direction. That is, balancing these brute force powers by leveling them downward. There is a mathematical verity which even the German emperor, who claimed to reign above the rules of grammar, would not have dared to controvert. It is this : " If from equals you take equals the remainders will be equals." No nation in Christendom has even more self-interested reasons than England for inducing the great Powers to apply this mathematical truth to their armed-peace establishments. She is at this moment at work with all the energies of her alarm and ability, endeavoring to keep the beam of these brute forces even by leveling up ; by arming the whole island, cap- a-pie, against some giant invader. And all this increasing armament gives her no sense of peace or safety. She will never attain to that sen- timent until she renews virtually the proposition of Louis Napoleon, or convokes a congress of nations to npply Euclid's verity to their policy. Cannot a very child in reasoning see how it would work, as well as what it means ? " If from equals you take equals the remainders will be 20 THK CONQUERING FRANCE OF THE FUTURE equals." That is the way he puts it on the blackboard for school-boys ; and they might put on the council-boards of cabinets in this way : " If you take equal halves from your armed-peace establishments the remainder halves will be equal." That is clear to any boy's understanding. Does not this keep the beam of the brute forces level? Does not this preserve a balance of power? Would not this policy defend and assure England better than any coalition she can enlist or subsidize agaiiist this new Ger" many or Russia ? Let her look at the programme of her own political future, for free and universal education of her masses, for universal suf- frage, vote by ballot, for all the freedom and intelligence of opinion and action enjoyed by American citizens. How can she expect to keep up the balance-of-power regime except by this leveling-down principle? Can she ever raise an army, except in actual invasion, by conscription ? Can she balance despotisms by borrowing their dead weights to put in her scale ? Simultaneous and proportionate disarmament, then, is as great a necessity to England as to any Power in the world. But if England owes it to her own peace, sense and condition of safety, and to her new political constitution to move without delay for this simul- taneous disarmament, she owes it to France in the urgent obligation of honor as well as duty. When France arises to her feet again, how is she to balance these brute forces around her? With all her regular army destroyed, scattered, or demoralized, with half her navy transferred to her victorious foe, with ten milliards of francs to pay for her subjugation, besides her own expenses in the war and the interest of her old debt ; with not even seeding for her soil, and with the very roots of her agricultural and other industrial interests burnt out, how is she to level up to the armed-peace establishments of Germany and Russia ? If American opinion has any force or any useful work in the outside world, now is the time and the occasion to bring it to bear in favor of this general, simulta- neous, and proportionate disarmament. This is the best mission in which it can be employed, and this is the best victory it can win for the France we owe so much, and for the civilized world we aspire to lead in the path of our progress. Have we not been writing and speechifying boastiully for half a century about the influence of our ideas and institutions on Euro- pean nations ? Have we not been predicting through all this period that they must approximate their systems to ours ? Well, what part of their systems was most distant and dissimilar from ours ? Let every American who has traveled in England, France, or Germany, answer this question, and, ten to one, he will say, it is their large standing armies in time of peace. Do we wish, even for the glory of our influence, as well as for THE ALABAMA ACCOUNT. 21 their good, that they shall approximate as nearly as possible to us in their institutions ? Then we must induce or attract them to rediu-e their armed- peace establishments to the standard of our>-<. On this side of our system lies the nearest point of their approach to us. A Congress of Nations is an old American idea. The very sound of the term has the ring of all these united continental States in it. But wlien we associate the great object with it, the idea embraces a sublime signiticauce to mankind. The Per Contra of the Alabama Account. With sincere respect for such officials before the bar to which they are trained, the court to which we must refer these claims is not an Old Baily tribunal, nor any American one, in which the ex parte or nisi prius aro'u- ment of "a Philadelphia lawyer" is to carry the day. Nor is it to be held in the cabin or cave of that classic Sibyl whose leaves furnish such a rhetorical figure to the brilliant notions of justice and adjustment which many American writers and speakers seem to entertain. There exist for many important questions which can not be solved by technical law, courts of equity to adjust them between individuals. If such a court of equity be indispensable in a country full of laws and statutes designed to meet every case, how much more is such a court necessary to adjust a question between two great nations in the absence of any thing that can be called a definite, settled international law ! Whatever, then, be the form or process of adjudication — whether it be by a court of arbitration or by a conference of commissioners — the case between us and England must go to the bar of equity. And, to the credit of the. American mind, I think we may say that no lower tribunal and no lower verdict would satisfy it. The pagan Sibyl's leaves are not the leaves of our account current with England in this matter. The mode of settlement they represent would not satisfy American notions of justice and equity. Suppose, for instance, England, wishing to settle the case satisfactorily to us, should submit it to a jury of twelve conscientious and intelligent Americans at Washington, before an American judge, and with only American counsel to represent and defend her cause. Let no one deem this supposition fanciful. For one, I believe the English people would be willing to have the case go to such a court to-morrow, and abide the issue. But what would be the process and issue? I would put it to every patriotic American to say if it would not make his cheek redden and tingle with shame if such a court did not bring to the case the loyal spirit and principles of impartial equity. The whole American nation 22 THE ALABAMA ACCOUNT. would be the most losing and dissatisfied party if full justice were not done to England in the presentation of her case, in the arguments of the coun- sel, in the charge of the judge, and the verdict of the jury. Any charge, suspicion, or consciousness of unfairness on their part, would smite the na- tion like a shame. But what would the nation expect at the outset of the trial? Unquestionably this — that Caleb Gushing, Mr. Evarts, and Judge Black, or whoever the American counsel chosen by England might be> should read up her case with diligent and honest care ; that they should present and make a full and fair use of every fact and circumstance that should be admitted in her behalf. Nothing less than this and their best learnino- and eloquence in pleading her case would satisfy the American people, however they might desire the verdict to be in their favor. Let us, then, suppose such a court to be summoned at Washington, and such counsel to be chosen by England, with such duties devolving upon them. Let any intelligent mind that remembers the historical detail, re- flect upon the heads of the brief which this counsel would bring into court, or the items per contra. It is probable such a mind would turn to the first and most sensitive count of the indictment, or the animus of the English government and people, to see what could be fairly put in against that charge. I will not pretend to suggest the facts the learned counsel woulJ adduce to meet this and all the other counts. But as no other liv- ing American had such opportunities as myself to become acquainted with the primary sources of English opinion during the war, I would like to indicate a few facts and circumstances which might be put among the per contra items. First, then, as to the sentiment of the English nation towards us in the first two years of the war. I think the current American measure applied to this sentiment is not American in an honest, democratic sense. What is called the ruling or aristocratic class has been too often and too long re- garded as the English nation that feels, thinks and acts, and determines tlie character and action of the government. Because a majority of this aristocratic class seemed to be against us, many of our writers and speak- ers, more sensitive to their opinion, yielded to the impression that the great masses of the English people partook of the same feeling of hostility to us. No impression could be more unfair. Tliese great masses were with us and for us with a sympathy which equal millions of one country never before manifested towards the people and cause of another nation. Their clear and honest perceptions of truth and right operated like an enlighten- ing conscience upon the whole public mind of England, even when it was not clear and certain to "the ruling classes" whether our struggle was a THE ALABAMA ACCOUNT. 23 war for emancipation or only for union without emancipation. Even in that unhappy period of doubt in regard to this great question, these hon- est-hearted masses held stoutly to their faith in the justice of our cause, and held England, as with a sheet anchor, fast against all the inside and outside influences that were combined to impel her into intervention. But was it only a sentiment by which they clung to the right and true? Far from it. For nearly four years they stood the siege of the cotton famine with a heroic endurance never paralleled before in human patience and continuance. Thousands upon thousands of them let every article of fur- niture and comfort go one after the other for food, and sat down silent in the ashes of poverty, nor bated one jot from their stout will against the intervention into which the Confederate States had counted upon starving the English nation. On the sentiment count, then, I think the American public would ad- mit, as a per contra item, these four years of suffering, during which more than 100,000 honest, patient Lancashire operatives had to be fed with charity soup — men and women, and even children, who would have been prouder to beg from door to door than to ask or permit the English gov- ernment to furnish them cotton at the cost of its recognition of the inde- pendence of the Southern States. Then, as an incidental circumstance, the fact might be admitted, to what little value it was worth, that no neutral nation ever suffered more pecu- niary loss in its industrial interests from a foreign war than did England during the conflict in America. Of course this is comparatively a small and natural item of damage, but it may be worth mentioning as one of the circumstances upon which the Confederate States depended in counting upon English intervention. This large and continued loss was one of (he influences she had to resist in breaking down their expectations. In this light it might come in with other per contra memoranda. There is another fact, more salient and appreciable, which the American people must admit at no inconsiderable value, as a more tangible and pa- tent proof of the general policy and animus of England toward us during the war. It is known now, better than at any previous time, that she not only resisted all the influence that her "ruling class" could bring to bear upon her, but all the urgent and persistent pressure of the French govern- ment in favor of intervention to establish Southern independence. Surely an American court of equity would admit this fact to the full value of its evidence. Even in regard to the escape of the Alabama itself, though the English nation is ready, willing, and waiting, to pay the damage she inflicted on 24 THE ALABAMA ACCOUNT. our commerce, our own I'ecent experience might well dispose us, and even make it good policy in us, to admit extenuating circumstances. We have had lately several cases, and we may have many more hereafter, to prove how our own government may be outwitted and bamboozled by blockade runners or privateers fitted out in the face and eyes of all our naval forces and authorities at Brooklyn. But no American who remembers the speech of Lord Stanley in Parliament will doubt that England is ready to admit her mistake in regard to the Alabama, and to pay what damage it did to us. I doubt if her counsel will institute the plea of ignorance of the character of the ship and its destination, or even plead the accident which, it is said, prevented her timely arrest, or the illness of the judicial officer who was directed to arrest her. But while we do not admit this plea of ignorance or accident to bar our claim for full damages, we must concede that when England did get her eyes open to these adroit and elaborate de- ceptions on the part of the Confederates and their sympathizers, she did take efficient and costly steps to prevent the sailing of other and more formidable ships built to break as well as run our blockade. There were the two tremendous rams, with their Turkish names, constructed by the Lairds at Birkenhead, as if for Turkey Or some other oriental Power, but really designed for Charleston or Mobile as blockade breakers. There was no positive evidence of their destination, no positive attempt at an aggressive act ; so the English government, to prevent the possibility of such an act, bought them in as for its own service. Then there was its law^suit in regard to the Alexandra, another suspected privateer. These cases may be admitted for consideration at least, to guide the course of our government in analogous circumstances. Undoubtedly the utterances of English orators and writers stung Amer- ican sensibilities more deeply than the money lost by all the ships sunk by the Alabama. But the bark- of a Roebuck, who likened himself to the dog Tear'em, should not drown the voices of such defenders of our cause as John Bright, W. E. Forster, Thomas Hughes, and hundreds of other noble men who stood by us in the severest crisis of our struggle with a power and eloquence of advocacy which should entitle them to the grate- ful and everlasting memory of the American people. These are the men that represent the majority of the English nation — the great masses of the people who stood so true to us through the conflict. Let the eloquent arguments of Bright, Argyll, Forster, Hughes, Mill, and other statesmen, and the more eloquent' though silent sufferings of a million of patient op- eratives in our behalf, be admitted to a place in the per contra memoranda. The last fact I will suggest for such a court of equity, is the noble and THE ALAR4MA ACCOUNT. ' 25 illustrious life which Richard Cobden sacrificed for our cause. In all hu- man probability he Avould have been alive to-day to enrich his country and his age with the wealth of his character if it had not been for liis devotion to the justice, truth, and freedom involved in the American conflict. In- deed, one might almost believe he saved his strength and voice to plead our cause in the House of Commons. I think the last time that his per- suasive voice was heard in that House was in our behalf. I happened to be present on tliat occasion, and on sitting down he accidentally recognized me in the Speaker's gallery, and came and spoke to me in that old familiar way, so genial, and cordial, and simple. I tried to thank him as well as I could, as an American, for standing by us through evil and good report so nobly. It was the last time I ever saw him alive. The weather, which was exceedingly severe, aggravated the old ailment which his arduous la- bors had revived, and he retired to his country residence at Midhurst, to rest and recover strength. Before he had improved much the American question came up again in Parliament. The weather was still unrelent- ingly bitter, and his voice was weak and his strength low. But he could not refrain from one more effort in our behalf. He started for London, hoping to be able at least to make a short speech. But on his arrival his old ailment had come back upon him with such violence that he had to be driven to his lodgings instead of the House of Commons, and there he laid himself down and died, virtually for our cause. His life was worth much to the world as well as to his own country. It was worth much to us, and he laid it down for us in actual sacrifice. That life let* us admit into the per contra page in our reckoning with England. The Eastern Question. Russia from a Cosmopolitan Standpoint. If any nation in the world is enabled and bound by its position to view the great questions that agitate Europe from a cosmopolitan standpoint, it is America. The force and vahie of our opinion on such questions depend upon this point of view. The moment we descend into the low arena of local interests and prejudices, we lay off the dignity of the umpire for the badge and bludgeon of the partisan. As the position of Russia is henceforth to become an exciting question to the Old World, we owe it to her, to ourselves, and to universal civilization, to form and utter our opin- ion from a higher level of consideration than the one assumed by the partisan powers of Europe. To ascend to this point of reflection will cost our national mind an effort in which it has never yet succeeded. The power of English opinion is so great upon us, say what we will ; so much of our knowledge and conception of European matters comes to us through the English press and literature, that, in spite of our boasted independence of thought and action, our first views of Eui'opean nations and questions become, almost mechanically, English. In watching this tendency of American opinion, one may see it in all our leading journals of both politicid paities. A few days ago a leader appeared in one of the most influential of them not only urging the ability, but apparently the duty, of England to ally to herself, or subsidize Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, and raise an army of 400,000 men to oppose Russia's growth and march ; or rather to prevent her from becoming, two or tlu*ee centuries hence, as near a neighbor to England in India as she is now to France or America itself. Nothing could be more completely English than the whole argument of that article. It was perfectly English in its view of Russia, past, present, RUSSIA FROM A COSMOPOLITAN STANDPOINT. 27 and to come. It was as full ot the old balance of power animus and the- ory as any Tory argument you could find in the Edinburgh Review. Now the very worst thing we can do to the English people by our opin- ion, is to adopt and express theirs on these great questions ; to justify and inci'ease their panics and prejudices in regard to the character, and intent, or even ability of their neighbor nations. And if we really have an honest and loyal wish for her well being in the world, the best we can do to promote it, is to erect a fair, impartial opinion of our own, which shall serve to check her drift into these periodical fantasies of suspicion and alarm. Our opinion should be a harbor buoy, fast anchored in a firm holding, not a sham lightship, drifting with the same current that bears her toward a lee shore of disaster. The best that America can do for her, or any other European nation, is to establish such a moorage for hei-, and any other power driving out rudderless to the wild sea of war. But America must re-read, if she cannot stop to re-write, for herself the histoiy and character of other peoples and governments, before she can anchor such a moorage of fair and independent opinion. She owes it to them to write their histories for herself, and from her own standpoint. This she will do some time or other; but, without waiting for that, she may read their histories as they have been written in the salient acts of their life and being. Of all European histories the American mind has studied, not one of them, probably, has been read so completely through English spectacles as that of Russia. I think it is safe to say, that American opinion as to a foreign nation has never been so completely English as in regard to that Power and people. And this identity of view and sentiment is as hurtful to England as it is unfair in us. I am conscious that this opinion is so com- mon to both countries, and so strong in each, that an American may be charged with political heresy if he ventures to view Russia from a fair, cosmopolitan standpoint. In attempting this, I do not wish to differ with- out motive from the authorities which the American public has so long accepted. It is impossible to condense within a newspaper column the structure of an argument which requires for its development the space of a large volume. In such contracted limits the statement of facts must be bald, and the reasoning brief. Out of this necessity, then, I think, no fair and impartial mind, that has well studied the subject, will demur to the state- ment, that no nation in the world ever did or suffered more for civilization in the same sj^ace of time, and with the same means, than Russia has done. In the way of suffering, certainly no intelligent reader of history 28 RUSSIA FROM A COSMOPOLITAN STANDPOINT. will doubt the truth of that part of the statement. For several centuries she served as a breakwater against the barbarous and blasting hordes of Tartary, which else would have flooded the whole of Europe with their tyranny. But though she broke the flood that would have beat upon Germany, France, and perhaps England, she could not save herself from the I'uinous inundation. Though it engulfed her for centuries, she ab- sorbed it so that it did not spread farther west. In this long period of suffering for civilization — longer than the Egyptian bondage and harder to bear — the nations of central and western Europe had time and means to grow to the status and stature of independent governments and peoples. But their fairest historians have never recognized how much of their safety and growth in these centuries they owed to Russia, who braved and bore the worst dangers of them all. But Russia has done even far more than she has suffered for the civil- ization of the world ; and done more in the same time and with the same means, than any other nation, to that end. It is remarkable how rarely we find an English or American writer who measures her against other countries by these standards ; who seems even to recognize how little working capital she had to begin with, and what she has accomplished with it. Indeed, she had to import into her realm the very seeds of civil- ization she possessed ; or the few Scandinavian, German, Italian, Greek, and other foreign elements that she introduced. If all the enlightenment they produced were put in one lustre, it is doubtful if it would have made as much light as the single town of Salem could emit when St. Pe- tersburg was founded. In this world's history did ever a sovereign feel and deplore so deeply the want of this working capital of civilization as did Peter the Great ? How he apprenticed himself and his young nobles to common trades, in foreign countries ; how he scoured those countries for teachers of every useful art and branch of instruction, is partially re- corded in our school-books. From, his time to this, no nation has been more teachable, or learned ipore from foreign instructors, and from the experience and example of other countries, than Russia. Then look at the heterogenous populations out of which she had to construct her em- pire. Begin at the Arctic sea and guage them through to the Euxine, and from the Baltic through Siberia to Behring's Straits. Apply a moral standard to their races, religions, and habits, not as they are now, but as they were when she took them under her sceptre. Was thei'e any other Power in the wide w^rld that could reach them with more of the elements or influences of civilization ? On the whole, is not the world indebted greatly to her for what she has done for these barbarous popula- COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND CAPACITIES OF RUSSIA. 29 tions ? Consider how comparatively brief is the space of time that slie has had them under her sway ; and how in this pei-iod their old pagan idol- atries and superstitions have been displaced for at least the nominal faith and worship of the Christian religion. And now comes that great act and proof of advancing civilization, that emancipated her millions of serfs, and which makes them the freemen of the empire, to con.stitute that middle class to be what the emancipated serfs or vilHans of other countries have been to them. Did any nation ever surpass Russia in this single act of civilization ? It is impossible for her to stop at this step. She must take others in the same direction. She is taking them rapidly and successively in every department of enlighten- ment and progress — in literature, in popular education, railways and all kinds of internal improvements. The Russia of Peter the Great is as dead as the England of the last Henry. The Russia of the next genera- tion will not be the Russia of to-day, but a nation, if not abreast, at least not far behind the civilization of older and more favored countries. This is a fact in the future almost as certain as any in arithmetical or geometri- cal progression. And in all these anxieties and preparations for incoming events, this fact must be recognized and appreciated by those who consider them from a cosmopolitan standpoint. The Commercial Relations and Capacities of Russia. The geographical position and producing power of Russia qualify her for a great part to act for the benefit of the whole Eastern hemisphere. What Egypt was to Canaan and other countries in time of dearth, Russia is to western and southern Europe in seasons of short crops. Her granaries pour forth a steady abundance that countries under famine cannot exhaust. What their stores of grain are worth to them in such a time of need, no nation knows better by repeated experience than England. What could she have done for Ireland, even with America to draw from, if she could not have had Odessa and other grain ports of the Black Sea to go to ? Now that railways and other facilities of transportation are progressing so rapidly, they will become more and more the granaries of Europe, which will supply its teeming populations with cheaper bread than they can grow at home. Every year Russia's producing power will become a more vital necessity to England and other countries of western Europe. This she 30 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND CA PACITIES OF RUSSIA. ' and they are coming to recognize more and more distinctly. Their vital or material interests, more truthful and reliable than their political instincts, have and feel an immense stake in all the railways and internal improve- ments in Russia that tend to increase this producing power, and to make it more accessible and available to them. In a word, they want to bring Russia nearer to them ; and with one hand they are lending her money and helping her to this end, while with the other, or political hand, they are trying to push her up against the icebergs of tfie frozen ocean. But grain is only one of the productions which Russia supplies to western Europe. Her iron, flax, hemp, tar, and turpentine are increasing and indispensable necessities to them. In the Crimean war the Irish linen manufactories would have stopped, and Ireland would have suffered a flax famine as severe as was the cotton famine to England, if it had not been for a supply of the raw material imported at the enchancement of 50 per cent, through Prussia. Every ship in the British navy that thundered in the Black Sea or Baltic, showed its sails and cordage of Russian hemp, and every rope hardened with Russian tar. In spite of all orders in council or proclamations to the contrary, England imported during the war nearly as much from Russia as in time of peace, and paid nearly twice as much for it. Indeed she could not carry on the war without commercial help from her enemy. But with all these vital or food-relations to the rest of Europe,*with all that Russia is commercially now, and is to be to the largest division of the human race, it is distinguished over all other large regions of the globe by one remarkable physical characteristic. It is virtually a riverless empire. It is full of rivers great and small, but either they run to no ports of her own, or they are worthless for commerce. Those that flow into the northern sea are frozen up half the year, and cannot be counted. The narrow straits that connect lakes Ladoga and Onega can hardly be called rivers. The only one really that Russia may call her own in Europe is the Dwina, with the port of Riga at its mouth ; and that is inaccessible and un- available during the winter months. I would earnestly commend to the reader a few minutes' study of the map of that vast and important empire. Aside from the subject under notice, he must be struck with a peculiarity unparal- leled in any region of the globe of equal extent. He will see that tlie old proverb, "rivers to the ocean run," is not true of Russian rivers, or seas either; Count the rivers that run into the Black Sea. They are many and large, but none of them really debouch in Russian territory. To appreciate this singular circumstance we naust apply to it an easy standard of measure- ment. Imagine, then, a great bayou in the Mississippi just below Vicks- COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND CAPACITIES OF RUSSIA. 31 burg, of the dimensions of the Black Sea. Imagine all the rivers in the United States, from Maine to Texas, to run into this salt water bayou, and that all the commerce that floats on those rivers has to pass through that short length of the river that connects the inland sea with tht; Gulf of Mexico. Then realize, if you can, that this short and narrow strait is called the Bosphorus, and that N