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PREPARATIONS FOR 
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 WALTER L. FISHER 
 
 Preprinted from 
 The University Record, Vol. II (New Series), No. i, January, 1916 
 
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 The University Record 
 
 Volume II JANUARY I916 Number i 
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE^ 
 
 WALTER L. FISHER, LL.D. 
 Former Secretary of the Interior 
 
 Half-truths are dangerous because the element of truth which they 
 contain carries conviction and easily leads to its application far beyond 
 the real significance to which it is entitled. We are at present in grave 
 danger of just such a misconception of one of the most prevalent state- 
 ments with regard to military preparation. The sentiment of this 
 country is undoubtedly opposed to militarism. Our ideals and purposes 
 are peaceful. No imperiahstic propaganda could hope to succeed if its 
 character and purposes were understood. The agitation for increasing 
 our military forces is as a whole genuinely peaceful in its purpose. 
 Certainly it makes its great appeal upon the ground that preparation for 
 war is essential for the preservation of peace. The proverbs of the 
 ancients and the utterances of our early Presidents are the mottoes it 
 repeats: Si vis pacem para bellum, "If you wish peace prepare for war." 
 
 And undoubtedly in a world where selfishness and greed and lust of 
 power still move the mass and the rulers of men to the extent they do, 
 today, where force is still believed to constitute a necessary if not a' 
 proper means of advancing national interests and national ideals, 
 mihtary preparation against war is an essential for securing peace. 
 But there is real danger that we shall be misled — or may deceive ourselves 
 — into believing that preparation for war is the most important thing for 
 us if we desire to secure our own peace and to promote the peace of the 
 
 ' Delivered (in part) as an address on the occasion of the Ninety-seventh 
 Convocation of the University of Chicago held in Leon Mandel Assembly Hall, 
 December 21, 1915. 
 
2 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 world. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more unfortunate than such a 
 result. If we wish peace, the most important thing is not to prepare 
 for war — although that we should do. If we wish peace, the most 
 important — the all-important — thing is to prepare for peace; to do the 
 things that make for peace and that promote peace, not the things 
 that make for war and promote war. And yet these peaceful measures 
 are the things that are receiving scant attention. 
 
 I am led to present to you some thoughts upon this subject because 
 the significance of the great war in which the larger part of the civilized 
 world is now engaged is the one absorbing interest of our whole intel- 
 lectual Ufe. I have no thought that I shall say things that have not been 
 better said by others — that I have anything original to impart. I 
 am moved by a deep conviction that mankind is struggHng with destiny 
 as it has seldom struggled before, and that it is the duty of every man 
 and woman — and especially of every educated man and woman — to 
 think of this world-war, its causes, and its probable results; and, as his 
 thoughts become at all definite, to express them, if it be only in confirma- 
 tion of, or dissent from, the views expressed by others which are Ukely 
 to affect pubhc opinion and pubUc action. It is a time for each human 
 being, in humiUty and sincerity, to ask himself: "What do I think? 
 What is the explanation of this appalMng catastrophe and what is to 
 follow it ? What should and what can I, in my tiny circle of possible 
 action, do to help, if ever so little, toward a right solution of the problems 
 it presents?" 
 
 What might be called its purely academic interest is greater than 
 any other interest of the student. It pervades the Ubrary and the 
 laboratory, the classroom and the lecture-hall, and the quiet cloisters of 
 the university. WTiat a compelling stimulus to intellectual activity it 
 is; what a zest it adds to all our studies in physical, political, social, 
 and economic science; to what fierce tests it is subjecting our theories of 
 human progress and social evolution! 
 ; . ' There is nothing, indeed, so instructive, so absorbing, so essential for 
 us — as individuals and as a nation — to understand as the mighty con- 
 flict that is now going on ; its causes and its consequences, its horrors and 
 its folly. It is important for all of us to appreciate the reality of its 
 horror. But I am not qualified to picture this horror if I would, and this 
 is not the place or the occasion. It is fitting, however, for us to consider 
 its folly, and how we in the future may escape such folly. "Wisdom 
 is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom: and with all thy getting 
 get understanding." 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 3 
 
 There is a call for the public service of educated men and women 
 such as has not been heard in the world since the French Revolution. 
 For we must go back to France and the Napoleonic era for any such 
 epochal events as are happening in the world today. It is quite possi- 
 ble, perhaps it is exceedingly probable, that the actual consequences 
 upon our whole intellectual, social, political, and economic outlook that 
 will follow and result from this war will be greater than those that fol- 
 lowed even that great upheaval of civilized society. It is only as we 
 understand how fundamental are the issues that are forced upon us 
 that we shall meet those issues intelligently and wisely. Our danger, 
 and the danger of Europe, is that we shall see its causes and effects 
 superficially and shall devise superficial remedies and adopt a super- 
 ficial settlement. There are so many essentially superficial phases of 
 the situation that are nevertheless so important and so compelUng in 
 their interest that we can all be forgiven for misconceiving their relative 
 importance compared with the deeper issues; but it is only as we find 
 and face these deeper issues of transcendent consequence that we shall 
 work good out of this awful evil that has fallen on mankind. 
 
 Already the danger of one great folly from a superficial view of 
 this war has become apparent, and that is that we shall think of it as 
 due to, and as an exhibition of, ruthless military power; that it is due to 
 what is called Prussianism, and that if we could just curb and destroy 
 Prussianism the world could go on quite satisfactorily, upon the whole, 
 and without any serious or fundamental disturbance of the established 
 social, political, economic, and intellectual order. No mistake could 
 be made so disastrous to the future peace and progress of mankind as this. 
 Even if the Prussian war-god sits the saddle in Germany today waging 
 war with a ruthlessness that appalls mankind and an efficiency that 
 compels its admiration, nevertheless how pitiful would be the conclusion 
 that what appalls us is not war, but merely the ruthlessness and effi- 
 ciency with which it is made. 
 
 It was an American thinking of war in America who said that "War 
 is hell!" — not German war or English war or Russian war, but war, 
 wherever waged or by whatever nation. There was never a great war 
 waged that did not produce all the atrocities of this war, on one side or 
 on both. The scale of the atrocities may be greater, as the scale of this 
 war is greater. Even the doctrine of frightfulness is a doctrine that has 
 been defended and practiced by every nation, even our own, within 
 such limits and under such conditions as each nation has determined for 
 itself at the time and according to its exigency as it saw it. There are 
 
4 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 few follies equal to the folly of imagining that war can be made 
 humane. 
 
 Our own "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
 States in the Field" (General Orders No. loo, 1863), issued under 
 Abraham Lincoln, the most humane of Presidents, and again issued 
 without modification during the war with Spain in 1898, announced: 
 
 To save the country is paramount to all other considerations. 
 AND 
 
 18. When the commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order 
 to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though 
 an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender. 
 
 19. Commanders, whenever admissible, should inform the enemy of their intention 
 to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, 
 may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the 
 common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity. 
 
 No matter how clear the evidence may seem to some of us today, 
 we are too near the event to be sure of our perspective. We must not 
 forget how often "Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." Even if 
 we make certain that Servia was the occasion, not the cause, of this 
 war; that Germany had prepared for "the day" and that she chose the 
 day which she thought was most favorable to her; that she, and no 
 other, precipitated this horrible cataclysm of cruelty and destruction — 
 even if we spare whatever nation is responsible no part of the just con- 
 demnation of mankind for touching the match to the powder that had 
 been so assiduously laid throughout Europe, and that needed only the 
 match — how blind, how pitifully and perversely blind, we should be not 
 to recognize that the fundamental error consisted in having a state of 
 international relations that was prepared for the match; that the 
 fundamental responsibility, deeper than Prussianism, was with the 
 nations that built and maintained their civilizations over a powder 
 magazine! Without now discussing whether any other basis of inter- 
 nationalism is practicable than the basis of national armament and of 
 military force, how foolish, how unfair, to say that, in a society of 
 nations based on force, that nation which acquires and uses the greatest 
 and the most efficient force is exclusively to blame for an explosion that 
 leads to a test of force! The matured and distant judgment of man- 
 kind will be little concerned with awarding praise or blame on the basis 
 of the relative extent or efficiency of military preparation, or even of the 
 relative ruthlessness with which military force was used in a state of 
 society based on force and on the use of force to secure or to retain the 
 right to exploit other lands and peoples. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 5 
 
 The truth is that the really great differences between the warring 
 nations are only differences of degree — degrees of militarism, degrees of 
 democracy, degrees of political and economic intelligence. I do not 
 minimize these differences. So gigantic is the scale on which the world- 
 movement proceeds that these differences of degree become of huge 
 dimensions and importance when the diverging lines are projected into 
 the expanded field of action. In war, international differences are 
 centrifugal. Chasms widen as the circumference of the conflict expands 
 and the conflict becomes more intense. War distorts and exaggerates 
 and intensifies every difference of national feeling, every national mis- 
 understanding. If, however, it be true that Germany is more mili- 
 taristic than England or France or Russia or Italy, it is true only as a 
 statement of the degree in which each of these nations has been and is 
 militaristic. If it be true that Germany believes that she has a national 
 ideal and peculiar national interests — political, economic, intellectual — 
 which can be advanced by military force, the same thing is true of each 
 of her rivals. If it be true that militarism in Germany is a menace to the 
 world, it is also true that militarism in the rest of Europe is a menace to 
 the world. Does Germany believe that she has a peculiar mission to 
 perform in the unfolding of civilization, that her form of political organ- 
 ization, her economic and intellectual processes, offer the greatest assur- 
 ance of human progress, and that it is her duty as well as her right to 
 impose this Kultur on the world ? England has been obsessed by the 
 same megalomaniac folly. So have we. If, happily, we are less sure 
 that we are the people, and that wisdom is in danger lest it die with us, 
 can we claim anything more than that we have seen the futility of such 
 egotism, ever so little sooner and ever so little more clearly than some 
 others? Are John Bull and Brother Jonathan types of modest self- 
 effacement and humility before the slowly unfolding secrets of the 
 universe ? 
 
 We have been reading much of the lords and prophets of war in 
 Germany; but have they uttered anything more frankly militaristic 
 than Lord Roberts, "Little Bobs," the mihtary idol of Great Britain? 
 
 How was this Empire of Britain founded ? War founded this Empire — war and 
 conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, 
 when we propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, 
 Germany naturally refuses; and pointing not without justice to the road by which 
 England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly 
 or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany 
 is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and 
 the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human 
 
6 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 annals, can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year and 
 half ago [or of General Bemhardi three months ago] with any feelings except those of 
 respect ? 
 
 Norman Angell, in his recent book on America and the New World 
 State, has collected this and many other quotations which demonstrate 
 that there is an "Anglo-Saxon Prussianism" which differs only from 
 German Prussianism in the extent to which it has attained popular 
 support or oflBicial power. And yet it was the bitter complaint of Bem- 
 hardi and Trietschke that their ideas had so little influence among the 
 people or in oflScial circles. The most interesting to me of all Angell's 
 quotations is that from the Belgian author, Doctor Sarolea, who, in 
 his book on The Anglo-German Problem, says: 
 
 What is even more serious and ominous, so far as the prospects of peace are con- 
 cerned, the German who knows that he is right from his own point of view, knows that 
 he is also right from the English point of view; he knows that the premises on which 
 he is reasoning are still accepted by a large section of the English people. Millions 
 of English people are actuated in their poUcy by those very imperialistic principles 
 on which the Germans take their stand. After all, German statesmen are only apply- 
 ing the political lessons which England has taught them, which Mr. Rudyard Kipling 
 has sung, and Mr. Chamberlain has proclaimed in speeches innumerable. Both the 
 English Imperialist and the German Imperialist believe that the greatness of a country 
 does not depend mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the resources of the home 
 country, but largely on the capacity of the home country to acquire and to retain large 
 tracts of territory all over the world. Both the English ImperiaUst and the German 
 Imperialist have learned the doctrine of Admiral Mahan, that the greatness and pros- 
 perity of a country depend mainly on sea-power. Both believe that efficiency and 
 success in war is one of the main conditions of national prosperity. 
 
 Now as long as the two nations do not rise to a saner polirical ideal, as long as 
 both English and German people are agreed in accepting the current poUtical phi- 
 losophy, as long as both nations shall consider mihtary power not merely as a neces- 
 sary and temporary evil to submit to, but as a permanent and noble ideal to strive 
 after, the German argument remains unanswerable. War is indeed predestined, 
 and no diplomatists sitting round a great table in the WiUielmstrasse or the Ballplatz 
 or the Quai d'Orsay will be able to ward off the inevitable. It is only, therefore, in 
 so far as both nations will move away from the old political philosophy that an 
 
 understanding between Germany and England will become possible It is the 
 
 ideas and the ideals that must be fundamentally changed: "Instauratio facienda ab 
 imis fundamentis." And those ideals once changed, all motives for a war between 
 England and Germany would vanish as by magic. But alas! ideas and ideals do not 
 change by magic or prestige — they can only change by the slow operation of intel- 
 lectual conversion. Argvunents alone can do it. 
 
 Let us turn from the war lords of England and Germany to those 
 who do not speak under the influence of military training or military 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 7 
 
 occupation. We are told by the translator of Dr. Paul Rohrbach's book, 
 The German Idea in the World, that it — 
 
 probably inspired more Germans than any other book published since 1871, for every- 
 body felt that it presented a generally true picture of the fatherland and indicated the 
 paths which the Germans had resolved to follow. 
 
 This opinion I have had substantially confirmed by most competent 
 authority. I think it gives us a real insight into the ideas that have 
 moved the German people. You will note that the author does not 
 hesitate to praise the Anglo-Saxon or to criticize the German, and that 
 his underlying and dominating purpose is peaceful expansion. 
 
 The markets of the world! We need them today for our existence as positively 
 as we need our own land, and the day is approaching with irrevocable certainty when 
 we shall need them even more. We can be nationally healthy only so long as our 
 share in the business of the world continues to grow, and only if this is the case shall 
 we be able to foster the inner values which spring from our national idea, and let them 
 take part with the other factors in the shaping of the culture of the world 
 
 The German idea, therefore, can only live and increase, if its material foundations, 
 viz., the number of Germans, the prosperity of Germany, and the number and size of 
 our world-interests continue to increase. As these foundations continue to grow they 
 compel the Anglo-Saxons to make their decision between the following two 
 propositions: 
 
 Will they reconcile themselves to seeing our interests in the world maintain 
 themselves by the side of their own, and come to an agreement with us concerning 
 them ? Or will they fight, with force of arms, to remain the sole mistress of the world ? 
 If they choose the latter, it will depend on our strength whether we conquer or sur- 
 render, or hold our own 
 
 We have progressed, within a generation, with a rapidity which creates the belief 
 that we can wipe out within a decade the losses of a century. But we grow dizzy, 
 when we contemplate our political economy, shooting up to steep heights and resting 
 only on the small support of European Germany, especially when we compare it with 
 the much wider security across oceans and continents which England and America 
 have built. It is here where the abyss is lurking into which our new grandeur may be 
 hurled unless we secure it with stronger props than are made of iron or gold. We have 
 now reached the point which illustrates a fact which no one can view too seriously, 
 namely, that the world-power of the Anglo-Saxons does not rest solely on external 
 supports, such as wealth, colonies, dominion over the seas and flourishing industries, 
 but that corresponding to these material possessions a growth of character and of inner 
 worth and an increase in the breadth of the Anglo-Saxon idea have actually justified 
 the people possessing them in reaching out for the dominion of the world 
 
 The true attitude of England toward our navy and commerce is revealed by such 
 comments as were contained in the famous article in the Saturday Review of September, 
 1897, which made a great stir in England and the whole world, and frankly stated that 
 England's prosperity could only be saved if Germany were destroyed. "England," 
 the article says in part, "with her long history of successful aggression, with her 
 marvelous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among 
 
8 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same 
 blood, with a lesser will-force, but perhaps with a keener inteUigence, compete in 
 every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India 
 and the East, the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever — 
 and where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible, and trade has followed the 
 flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a 
 mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, 
 from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be 
 first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever 
 seen. If Germany were extinguished tomorrow, the day after tomorrow there is not 
 an Englishman in the world who would not be richer. Nations have fought for years 
 over a city or a right of succession. Must they not fight for two hundred fifty million 
 pounds of commerce ? " 
 
 Doctor Rohrbach says: 
 
 We know very well that it does not reflect the feelings of the whole of England, but 
 nevertheless of a considerable portion of the English nation 
 
 The two political catchwords "Reaction" and "Government by feudal classes" 
 which foreign public opinion frequently uses to describe German conditions, are not 
 calculated to bring success to the German idea in the world. But they are not the 
 only obstacles. Like other people we suffer from the defects of our virtues. The 
 reverse and unfortunate complement of that sense of duty and industry which we 
 call the positive poles of our character, are an offensive superiority and awkwardness 
 
 of behavior which are constantly putting us at a disadvantage Between these 
 
 two observations there is so much German awkwardness, indolence and ignorance of 
 the national idea in its highest sense, that we can explain the progress abroad which 
 we have made, only by the one thing in which we excel all other people: our exact and 
 conscientious labor and our remarkable diligence. 
 
 The real evil lies in the doctrine of political and economic imperialism 
 common to so many nations — the doctrine that holds that the economic 
 welfare and progress of every nation and of its people depend upon 
 securing constantly expanding markets and sources of supply, constantly 
 expanding opportunities for trade; and that such opportunities are only 
 to be found, or at least are best to be found, by acquiring political 
 dominion over, or spheres of influence in, other countries, especially in 
 countries relatively backward in industrial development, but capable 
 of such development. If this is sound doctrine economically, if it really 
 is enlightened selfishness, if it is not to be restrained by the sense of moral 
 obligation to respect the rights of other nations, if, indeed, the whole 
 theory is to be gilded and disguised by a supposed moral obligation to 
 uplift the relatively backward peoples and develop the relatively unde- 
 veloped lands— the theory of the white man's burden — it would seem an 
 irresistible conclusion that force must continue to rule the world, and 
 that peaceful civilization can go forward only under a dominant nation, 
 or under a balance of power between several dominant nations. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 9 
 
 I do not believe that this doctrine will indefinitely continue to con- 
 trol policies and international relations. It is not morally sound. It 
 is not economically sound. It is not even enlightened selfishness. It 
 must and will disappear with the demonstration of its futility. This 
 doctrine and civilization, as the masses of mankind are coming to con- 
 ceive of civilization, are irreconcilably opposed. Force as a means of 
 promoting economic interests or of advancing intellectual ideals is certain 
 to diminish and to disappear, just as certainly as human slavery and 
 the imposition of theological or religious dogma by force have already 
 disappeared. The rapidity of the process will depend chiefly, if not 
 entirely, upon the progress of education and intelligence among the mass 
 of mankind. If, therefore, we desire to reduce the chance of war, either 
 because it is right for the world that it shall be reduced, or because we 
 are thinking only of ourselves and wish to escape its horrors, if our 
 desire is to prepare for peace, the surest way to accomplish this result is, 
 first, by seeing that our own national purposes and methods are not 
 based upon the desire for economic expansion by means of political 
 dominion or special privilege, or any sort of sphere of influence that dis- 
 criminates in favor of our people as against those of any other nation; 
 and secondly, by doing everything in our power to bring other nations 
 to this same conclusion, including active co-operation with other nations 
 to produce this result. 
 
 Our peace depends upon ourselves and upon the peace of the world; 
 and one of the greatest steps toward the establishment of the world-peace 
 upon which our peace so largely depends is a sympathetic and effective 
 co-operation between the Anglo-Saxon and the German and Scandinavian 
 nations, to which Earl Grey has referred as "nearest to us in mind and 
 sentiment." 
 
 We are told that at the end of the war our potential enemies will 
 certainly be exhausted and unable or disinclined to take up a quarrel 
 with us. I wish I could have the assurance upon this score that some of 
 my fellow-pacifists entertain; but I cannot forecast either our own 
 wisdom or the degree of human emotion and human folly that will 
 survive — that possibly may be born of — the greatest exhibition of 
 human emotion and human folly that the world has ever seen. Our 
 first duty, our most enlightened selfishness, is to do everything in our 
 power now and at the close of hostilities to remove the causes of war, 
 to create alternatives for war; but as we cannot hope to remove every 
 cause for war, as we cannot be sure that effective alternatives for war 
 will be devised or will be accepted, we have ourselves no sane alternative 
 
lO THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 but to be prepared for effective defense. We have seen too clearly the 
 realities of war to risk its coming or its consequences. Our defense 
 must be real or it will only add to our danger. Within the limits of 
 what is strictly necessary for defense our preparation must be made as 
 though it were certain to be needed. No fear that other nations will 
 be led by our example to increase their armament unnecessarily can 
 stand for one moment against the possibility of our need. What is 
 incumbent upon us is to make it as clear as possible that the character 
 and the extent of our military preparation are strictly defensive; indeed, 
 our first inquiry should be into the possibilities of a military policy that 
 will be on its face and in its essential characteristics defensive. 
 
 With the greatest deference, and subject to correction by demonstra- 
 tion and not by assertion, I venture to suggest that there is such a thing 
 as a defensive military policy, which is essentially different in important 
 particulars from an aggressive military policy, and that the plans for 
 military and naval preparedness which are being presented to us either 
 by the President and his political advisers, or by the General Board of the 
 Navy, or the General Staff of the Army, do not recognize or apply the 
 distinction. 
 
 I am not discussing these things as an expert, nor do I assume that 
 my audience is composed of experts. I am, however, not without the 
 support of expert opinion, although it has not been allowed much public 
 expression. And I assume that the great audience of our ordinary 
 fellow-citizens, as inexpert but as intensely and vitally concerned as we 
 are, will in the end settle our military policy on sea and land, for this is 
 necessarily the way of democracy. Admiral Mahan says: 
 
 Justly appreciated, military afifairs are one side of the politics of a nation and 
 therefore concern the individual who has an interest in the government of the state. 
 They form part of a closely related whole, and putting aside the purely professional 
 details .... military preparations should be determined chiefly by those broad 
 political considerations which affect the relations of states one to another or of several 
 parts of the same state to the common defense. 
 
 Robert Wilden Neeser, whose book, Our Navy and the Next War, is an 
 argument for greater naval strength, nevertheless says : 
 
 In the last analysis it is the people who govern, it is the people who must be 
 informed of their military condition. The regulations which forbid miUtary and 
 naval men writing for publication for the purpose of discussion should be rewritten. 
 The freest discussion on all military and naval topics by oflScers of both services 
 should be encouraged, such writings to be signed by the authors, for which they would 
 assume the entire responsibility. When this privilege has been given, then the people 
 will have a means of getting at the truth and the authority in each case will be known. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE II 
 
 By sealing the lips of those capable of giving the truth we have encouraged scarehead 
 articles upon our naval preparedness which carry Uttle weight and make no lasting 
 impression upon the minds of the people. 
 
 Major-General Francis Vinton Greene has also called attention to the 
 fact that Germany permits pubUcation of frank discussions of military 
 subjects — several thousand mihtary books in a year as against several 
 scores at the most in English-speaking countries. 
 
 At all events, whether they like it or not the experts must convince 
 us, untrained as we are. What we want and what we are entitled to 
 have is candor and the fullest, freest opportunity for the expression 
 of every sincere and intelligent judgment that has been or is being 
 formed within our military and naval service. We are dealing with 
 what is alleged to be and what we beUeve is matter of Ufe and death. On 
 such a matter the order prohibiting officers in our military establishment 
 from uttering and pubUshing opinions upon mihtary policy' seems 
 especially unwise and leaves the country altogether too dependent upon 
 the officials or official boards that for the moment control the adminis- 
 tration of our mihtary and naval service. In that service are experienced 
 and serious students of the problems of military and naval poUcy whose 
 views upon fundamentals and upon important details disagree with the 
 views of both the military and the political heads of our mihtary and 
 naval establishments. These dififerences of opinion are not being given 
 to the public. We are thus being led to the unwarranted conclusion 
 that there is unanimity among our experts as to the kind and extent of 
 military preparation we should have. 
 
 I am a convinced advocate of securing and utilizing expert advice in 
 the administration of public affairs. I have the highest regard and 
 respect for the officers in our naval and military service. I attach the 
 greatest importance to their opinions with respect to the things that will 
 produce the most efficient military preparation for war and that will 
 produce the greatest results in actual warfare. But what we are deciding 
 is not the sort of an army or navy that will be most powerful in war, 
 but what sort of an army or navy will be most effective for securing peace. 
 And that is a question which involves issues of national policy that are 
 not exclusively military — in which, indeed, the military motive is of 
 secondary importance. 
 
 '"Officers of the Army will refrain, until further orders, from giving out for 
 publication any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation 
 in the United States or abroad, as any expression of their views on this subject at 
 present is prejudicial to the best interests of the service." — War Department, General 
 Order No. lo. 
 
12 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 We must tell the Navy Board and the General Staff — not have 
 them tell us — what it is we want an army and a navy to do; what are 
 the purposes for which we wish to use an army and a navy. Then and 
 then only can they tell us what kind of an army and navy will be best 
 adapted for our purpose. Otherwise their opinions and estimates must 
 necessarily be based on the assumption that we want a miUtary establish- 
 ment adequate to defend all our outstanding possessions and obligations, 
 and to maintain all our supposed national policies and interests, and in the 
 event of war, in the language of the recent report of the War College, 
 "to insure a successful termination of the war in the shortest time." 
 
 All this may sound somewhat captious and theoretical, of little 
 practical value, but I am not without knowledge that there exists among 
 military experts — and in our own military service — a recognition of the 
 fact that there is a substantial difference between a defensive and an 
 offensive military policy and that it is not being recognized in the plans 
 which are oflScially recommended for our military preparation. We are 
 being urged to support a military program which we are assured is 
 intended only for defense; but it is not an exclusively defensive pro- 
 gram. I do not intend to impugn in any degree the sincerity of its 
 advocates — I think they believe that they are advocating a defensive 
 policy; but they have not defined nor had defined for them what it is 
 we wish to defend, nor have they abandoned that hoary maxim of 
 military science that a strong offense is the best defense. 
 
 We shall make a serious mistake in all that we do toward military 
 preparedness against war and for peace unless we tell our military 
 experts and tell them in a way that they will understand and accept 
 that we want a military estabUshment planned and prepared for defense 
 and not for offense, even though offense may help defense — that we 
 consciously and definitely intend to abandon and to have them abandon 
 whatever military advantage there may be in having an army and a 
 navy prepared to take the aggressive and to seek out and attack in force 
 an enemy away from our own boundaries and waters. Only in this 
 way can we convince the world that our object is pacific, that we are 
 not merely repeating the hollow assurances of other nations that have 
 built great navies and trained great armies in the name of peace only to 
 use them for aggression when the opportunity and the temptation came. 
 Only in this way can we be sure that we shall not yield to temptation 
 when it comes. What is there in our national history to justify the 
 claim that we will not use force to extend our boundaries or our dominion 
 over the lands of weaker nations, no matter how sincerely at this time 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 13 
 
 we intend not to do so ? What right have we to thank God that we are 
 not as other men, especially those Prussians? With an army and a 
 navy designed for and substantially limited to the defense of our own 
 lands and shores, we can with some confidence and effectiveness advo- 
 cate those principles and agencies of international policy that are best 
 adapted to reduce the chances of war. 
 
 To illustrate what I have in mind, and not I alone, but others whose 
 military experience and training give greater weight to their opinions, 
 let me ask you whether it is not clear that a real substantial clarification 
 of the Monroe Doctrine, adopting and extending the suggestions of 
 President Wilson's message, would not in itself do more to make war 
 against this country unUkely than all the increase we are likely to make 
 in our army and our navy ? We hear much of possible war with Japan. 
 Should we not do more toward the prevention of such a war by dis- 
 cussing with Japan the issues surrounding Japanese immigration and 
 the Open Door in China man-fashion and in a way and with results that 
 would do justice to our interests and to Japanese interests and to that 
 self-respect which Japan has earned her right to entertain ? If we really 
 intend to give national independence to the Philippines, should we not 
 remove a great menace to our peace if we could secure international 
 guaranties of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Filipino 
 nation ? If we should open the Panama Canal to the warships of all 
 nations under international guaranties of the safety of the Canal itself 
 and of our peaceful ownership and operation of it, should we not make it 
 a prize less likely to excite the cupidity of other nations and less likely 
 to lead to war with us ? If we did these things, should we not need an 
 army and a navy quite different in character and size from those we 
 should need if we do not do them? Can we intelligently determine 
 what sort of an army and a navy we need without considering what it is 
 we propose to defend ? If we retain all these possessions and interests 
 and international policies, where can we stop in our military prepara- 
 tion ? What folly to retain them if we do not propose to make serious 
 and adequate preparation to defend them, and could not make really 
 adequate preparation if we would. 
 
 It may be said that these matters really make no difference in the 
 sort of military preparation we ought to make — that it will require the 
 same sort of an army and the same sort of a navy to defend our own 
 lands and waters that we should need to defend the Philippines and 
 the Panama Canal and to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. No doubt some 
 military authorities would make precisely this claim; but I venture to 
 
14 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 assert that excellent military authority is of quite a different opinion, 
 and that it is supported by many considerations that appeal and should 
 appeal to that great public which under our democratic government 
 must and should decide the fundamental questions of policy directly 
 involved. 
 
 We are at least entitled to ask questions. If our navy is intended 
 only to defend our own shores from invasion, could we not enormously 
 increase the number of our submarines for the same money that it is 
 proposed to spend on dreadnaughts; and would not the result give 
 us a far more effective navy for purely defensive purposes? Does 
 not a single superdreadnaught cost as much as many submarines, 
 depending on the types selected? If modern war — if this war — has 
 taught us anything it is that a navy of the dreadnaught class is of little 
 if any practical value against a stronger navy of the same sort. The 
 weaker navy is inevitably bottled up. It dare not come out into the 
 open unless it is prepared to risk all upon the result of its unequal con- 
 test with a stronger force. Unless we are prepared to enter the endless 
 competition in naval expenditure, is not the navy of the era that ended 
 with this war a waste of money and a self-deception as an eflficient 
 instrument of defense ? Is not this confessed by the insistence of those 
 who cling to this type of navy that the United States must increase its 
 navy until it equals the navy of any other nation ? Some say any other 
 nation except England, either because they are appalled at competition 
 in naval expenditure with England, whose existence as a world-power 
 depends upon predominance at sea, or because they think we should 
 assume that war will never occur between England and the United 
 States. Some insist that we must have a navy equal in aggressive 
 strength to the combined navies of any two other nations except Eng- 
 land; and that anything less than this will leave us without adequate 
 protection for the very reasons that are given as underlying the dread- 
 naught naval theory. Has not this war demonstrated that a navy 
 composed chiefly of great numbers of submarines, supplemented by the 
 torpedo boat, the destroyer, and the aeroplane, would be of immense 
 defensive value against the most powerful dreadnaught navy afloat ? Is 
 not a single submarine an effective fighting unit against any fleet, while a 
 single dreadnaught is of practically no value whatever ? Might not a few 
 submarines encounter and destroy a mighty fleet, while a dreadnaught 
 navy outclassed in strength by an invading squadron would Ue impotent 
 in the harbor ? Are we not about to commit this nation to a program of 
 dreadnaughts that need yet more and more dreadnaughts to make them 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 1$ 
 
 useful ? Is it not wise to delay this program at least until we can know 
 more than is now possible as to the place of the dreadnaught in the 
 future navies of the world ? Secretary Daniels says that expert opinion 
 on this subject has undergone great fluctuations within the past few 
 months. He has himself substantially increased the number of sub- 
 marines for which the Navy Department is asking over the number 
 recommended by the Navy Board. Why not spend our dreadnaught 
 money, at least for the present, on submarines and other defensive 
 agencies? Even Neeser asks the question: "With the offensive sub- 
 marine now a certainty, should we continue to build battleships?" 
 And his answer is an evasion and is also based upon the premise that 
 "the ultimate aim of war is to command the sea." Having already 
 called the offensive submarine "a, certainty," he says: "The new 
 cruising submarine, if a success, may become a serious menace to a 
 battleship fleet; but it does not seem a sufficient menace to stop the 
 construction of those ships which have so long and in the face of all 
 challengers held command of the sea." 
 
 But it may be said that such a navy as I am discussing could not be 
 used so effectively as the dreadnaught in foreign waters away from its 
 base. Precisely so; and is not this one of its chief advantages to us? 
 Could we do anything that would so effectively stamp our military 
 policy as intended only for defense as to create a navy that, while power- 
 ful for defense would by its very character have less power for aggres- 
 sion ? If we wish only to defend ourselves, do we need any other navy ? 
 Can we do anything that will so completely convince the world that we 
 mean what we say when we declare that we are arming only for peace ? 
 Can we do anything that will so increase our power to influence other 
 nations to adopt the policies and the agencies that make for peace? 
 Even if we had to concede that a defensive navy would lack some of the 
 aggressive power that we might desire in actual warfare, can we not 
 well afford to make this sacrifice for the immense gain in making war 
 less likely to occur ? 
 
 Is it not a choice between this policy and the race for naval suprem- 
 acy which alone will enable us " to command the sea" ? Norman Angell 
 may be urging some propositions about which there may well be differ- 
 ence of opinion, but he has at least convincingly demonstrated one 
 fallacy: 
 
 Mr. Churchill lays it down as an axiom that the way to be sure of peace is to be 
 so much stronger than your enemy that he dare not attack you. One wonders if the 
 Germans will take his advice. It amounts to this: Here are two likely to quarrel; 
 
l6 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 how shall they keep the peace ? Let each be stronger than the other, and all will be 
 well. This "axiom" is, of course, a physical absurdity. On this basis there is no 
 such thing as adequate defense for either. If one party to the dispute is safe, the other 
 is not, and is entitled to try and make itself so. 
 
 Is there not a distinctively defensive policy applicable to the army 
 just as to the navy? The arguments for increased land forces and 
 reserves seem entirely sound. But this does not relieve us — even us 
 laymen — from the necessity of considering what they should be and how 
 they should be obtained. I do not propose to discuss details of military 
 organization. It is important, however, for the public to understand 
 that there are differences of opinion and of interest in the army as to 
 what branches of the service should be increased. I am expressing no 
 opinion, except that there should be complete freedom in the service 
 for the public discussion of the issues. 
 
 All the military opinion about which I know anything is agreed that 
 for a defensive policy we need trained oflSicers, trained infantry, trained 
 artillery, adequate equipment, and both an adequate supply of munitions 
 and provision for increasing and maintaining an adequate supply of the 
 things for which modern war makes such insatiate demands. Does 
 the program of preparedness that has been prepared for us contemplate 
 these things ? We are told that our preparation must be a genuine and 
 a serious thing, that at the close of this war some victorious nation or 
 combination of nations may decide to use its trained and veteran troops 
 against us in resentment, or envy or lust of power or hope of loot, and 
 that we must be ready and remain ready, that we must keep our powder 
 dry. We are told that only thorough training and the very best equip- 
 ment for an army in the leash would avail for our defense. And how 
 is it proposed to secure such an army ? Make a small increase in our 
 regular troops and give a citizen soldiery annually a few months' 
 intensive training that will not interfere too seriously with their business 
 and professional occupations. Is there then no serious need for pre- 
 paring against the possibility of a real invasion ? 
 
 The truth is that at and for some time after the close of this war 
 the United States may be in less danger from attack than at any time 
 in its history. We all hope with differing degrees of confidence that 
 out of the horrors and destruction of this war will come a real advance 
 toward some form of international relations and international arrange- 
 ments that will reduce the burdens of armament and the probabilities 
 of war. If our hopes were really more than hopes, this nation might 
 well await the outcome without increasing at this time its military 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE tj 
 
 establishment — not that we might not then take wise precautions to 
 meet the actual situation that will then be disclosed, but that we could 
 be so much wiser then than we possibly can be now. It is because our 
 hopes are only hopes, and not certainties, that we are urged to prepare 
 now against a possibility that might be so unspeakably disastrous to 
 this country, to its men, and especially to its women and its children, 
 that we are not justified in delaying at least adequate preparation to 
 resist attack. But if we are really to prepare against a real attack, 
 what folly it is to be less than adequately prepared. We should analyze 
 the situation that is at all likely to confront us and meet that situation. 
 What is the situation ? 
 
 It seems clear that we need anticipate no attack from Great Britain 
 or indeed from any of her allies for some time after this war, no matter 
 what its outcome, unless we ourselves furnish some new and gratuitous 
 occasion for a quarrel. For a hundred years we have settled amicably 
 every issue with Great Britain, and many of the issues have been pecul- 
 iarly irritating and important to both nations. Our substantive rela- 
 tions were never more sympathetically friendly, and new causes would 
 have to arise to strain them. Our diplomatic relations were never so 
 assured by treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of issues upon 
 which we may disagree. Certainly this is true of Great Britain; and 
 with her friendship and the already increased and growing appreciation 
 of the reality and value of the Anglo-Saxon tie, a war between the two 
 great Anglo-Saxon nations is practically unthinkable. I mention Great 
 Britain because it seems not worth while to discuss the effect of our 
 proximity to Canada in the event of war. Canada is probably a host- 
 age in our reach against war with England; but let us assume that it 
 would be a military asset for Great Britain. No other first-class 
 power except England has any foothold in North America from which 
 land forces could be drawn or in which they could be landed. Any 
 other formidable enemy would be compelled to transport its invading 
 army across the ocean. I have had no opportunity to examine or to 
 discuss with military officers in whose judgment I have confidence the 
 recent report of the War College division of the General Staflf. We are 
 all, however, entitled to question its soundness or its availability, as 
 the President and the Secretary of War have questioned them. They 
 are civilians like ourselves. 
 
 General Greene, however, has discussed at some length the problems 
 presented to us in the event of such invasion and has advised us of the 
 conclusions of such mihtary students as Freiherr von Edelsheim in the 
 
i8 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 service of the German General Staff. His conclusion is that our initial 
 problem would be to prevent the landing, or to defeat after it landed, a 
 force of 240,000 infantry with the ordinary normal complement of 
 cavalry, artillery, stores, etc., and that this is the largest force that 
 it would be practicable to transport to our shores as a single expedition. 
 The War College now makes a larger estimate. Germany has per- 
 mitted the public discussion of military problems of this sort. We 
 have refused or restricted it. The weight of available military authority, 
 however, seems agreed that we should have 500,000 trained soldiers to 
 meet an invasion and that this number of really trained men adequately 
 equipped would successfully repel the invasion. It may be that, con- 
 sidering the disadvantages attending disembarkation, substantially less 
 than this number would suffice for effective defense, provided they are 
 trained soldiers, and not half-trained miUtia or national guardsmen. I 
 speak in no terms of disrespect of our militia — quite the contrary. 
 I merely insist upon the fact, recognized by the intelligent militia officers 
 themselves, that men in active civil life who give all the time they can 
 to military training cannot successfully oppose regular troops. The 
 militia can quickly become an army, but it cannot be an army; and what 
 we should need if an invasion threatened us would be an army. Then let 
 us have an army — no larger than we need for the puprose of manning our 
 defenses and repelling an invasion, but a real army of real soldiers ade- 
 quate for this purpose and a miUtia adequate to fill the ranks as they 
 need filling. I do not say 500,000 men; I say what number we need 
 for the defensive purpose which we intend to accomplish. 
 
 The suggestion of universal military service in this country can be 
 intelligently determined only by considering separately each of the 
 objects for which it is alleged to be desirable. Its main— its real- 
 purpose is military. If it is not necessary or at least desirable for strictly 
 military purposes, it will never be adopted because of its alleged physical 
 or disciplinary benefits. And for what conceivable purpose of mihtary 
 defense should we train to arms millions of the young men of the United 
 States ? From a mihtary point of view this surely would be a senseless 
 waste of time, energy, and money. If we are to have an army, let us 
 have a real army, trained and efficient for its purpose. Let us have no 
 superficial training of millions of schoolboys, no amateurish conscription 
 of the adult manhood of the nation, creating a paper force immensely 
 greater than any possible need for any purpose that we ought to enter- 
 tain only to demonstrate its inefficiency if a test of strength should come, 
 to disseminate through the nation a false feeling of security, and to 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 19 
 
 encourage the natural tendency toward brag and bluster to which Brother 
 Jonathan has been unfortunately susceptible. 
 
 There is undoubtedly a strong feehng in the United States that, no 
 matter what we should do in the way of military preparation, we should 
 be in no danger of imperialistic ambition or that aggressive militarism 
 which precisely the same pohcy has undoubtedly tended to create else- 
 where. There is far greater danger from these sources than our people 
 realize. This false assumption of a superior resisting power of Americans 
 to the allurements of imperialism and national expansion only makes the 
 danger more real. Human nature is essentially the same in Prussia and 
 in the United States. 
 
 It is not in Germany alone that the Nietzschean exaltation of the 
 Will to Power stirs the atavistic savage that lingers in most of us and 
 in some of us to an exceptional degree. Few Americans may beUeve 
 that war is a biological necessity, but many are easily persuaded that 
 it is a necessity on other grounds, and its exhibition of primitive virtues 
 and barbarian vigor distracts attention from its hideous cruelties 
 and its senseless waste. We need to be constantly reminded that mankind 
 is not degenerating because it is finding less use for some superb quaHties 
 of the animal and the savage, that evolution is out of the jungle, not 
 back into it. 
 
 If German blood or German training makes men more prone to 
 exalt force in international affairs, it will be well for us to remember that 
 in 1910 there were in the United States 8,282,618 people who were born 
 in Germany, or one or both of whose parents were born in that country. 
 This takes no account of more than 2,000,000 of our population similarly 
 derived from Austria. 
 
 If the United States is to have increased miUtary forces — and it seems 
 essential that we shall — let us not be bhnd to the dangers that are insepa- 
 rable from military training and military strength. Let us endure with 
 patience the taunts of the militant pacifist whose motto is "Speak 
 softly and carry a big stick." I try sometimes to visualize that 
 peace-loving and peace-seeking community in which that motto is 
 carried into practical effect, as its distinguished author illustrates 
 it in his own delightful way. Picture to yourselves the citizens of 
 Chicago leaving their homes in the morning, each armed with a 
 big stick, suited to his taste — one with beautifully polished knobs 
 on the heavy end of the stick and one with nails carefully dis- 
 posed upon its surface, to emphasize the value of the weapon as a 
 deterrent of force, and an incentive to peace — each swinging his little 
 
20 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 pacifier jauntily as he trudges sturdily or saunters leisurely along, speak- 
 ing softly to those he passes about mollycoddles, cowards, and the Ananias 
 club. How certain it would be that no thought of violence would disturb 
 the peaceful serenity of such a happy community. It is an excellent 
 motto, but hard to live up to; and we shall do well not to underesti- 
 mate the difficulty. Nations, hke individuals, when they carry big 
 sticks, seem predisposed to raise their voices. 
 
 It is said that the disbandment of our armies after the Civil War 
 demonstrates that military training will not create a miHtaristic senti- 
 ment in the United States, but it is not from those who have had actual 
 experience in war and have gone through the pit of hell, or at least 
 looked into its mouth, that we need fear militaristic sentiment so much 
 as from the man who has merely worn the trappings and studied the 
 manual of arms. It is the little knowledge that is the dangerous thing. 
 
 Has consideration been given to the political dangers of an organ- 
 ized citizen soldiery containing millions of men, who would not regard 
 the military work seriously because war would not really seem imminent ? 
 
 The suggestion of a new sort of army — a continental army — is 
 obviously due to the desire to meet the difficulty of putting the militia 
 under direct federal control; for it proposes nothing but a partially 
 trained force of volunteers. Does it not seem far wiser to extend federal 
 support to the militia upon condition that the training shall comply 
 with federal requirements ? 
 
 Has not Schornhorst shown us our true military policy, when by 
 transferring every man to the reserve as soon as he had been trained, 
 the active army of 42,000 men, to which he was restricted by the Peace 
 of Paris, became the army of 150,000 that contributed so powerfully to 
 the defeat of Napoleon ? Why should we not adopt the poUcy of train- 
 ing our soldiers as intensively as possible and then transfer them, as soon 
 as they are trained, to a reserve receiving proper pay from the gov- 
 ernment, and subject to be called to the colors whenever needed ? Would 
 not such a plan give us a vastly superior army to that available in any 
 other way ? Would it be any less a citizen soldiery because it had one 
 year's continuous training instead of three months' training for each of 
 four years? Would not the interference with business or professional 
 activity be far less and the cost to the country far less than under the 
 plans proposed ? 
 
 If some mechanical training accompanied the miUtary training, it 
 might extend the period of active service; but might it not equip the 
 soldier for a more useful citizenship and make enlistment more attract- 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 21 
 
 ive ? The same thought applies to the education of the reserve of 
 trained officers that should be provided. 
 
 Universal military service would undoubtedly distribute the military 
 burden, but it would create the burden for the sake of distributing it. 
 It is not "shirking" to oppose the imposition on our people of a burden 
 which it is both unnecessary and unwise for them to assume. By making 
 service in the army and in the militia of real value to those who enlist, 
 as well as to the nation, we should create a military system that would 
 justify itself, and that would secure forces amply sufficient for our 
 defense. There should be no illusion as to the effect — if not the pur- 
 pose — of doing more than this. Our sons, once trained, would be 
 available for war beyond our borders, and even statutory declarations 
 against using them there would not remove the consequences of their 
 availability.' 
 
 It may well be questioned whether the agitation for universal mili- 
 tary training or any other form of conscription does not tend to discredit 
 and to prevent a degree of actual military preparation which might 
 otherwise receive popular support. 
 
 It is said that what we lack in the United States is discipline, 
 and that military discipline will supply the need. We do want 
 civic discipline, the conscious and willing subordination of imme- 
 diate individual freedom of action to concerted and co-operative 
 control for the good of the community, a control in determining 
 the extent and character and purpose of which the disciplined 
 shall have a voice. Shall we get this from a training that consists 
 chiefly if not wholly in obedience to orders? No military discipline 
 in or out of the schools can be made much more than this for the 
 great mass under the practical limitations that must prevail. Few, 
 indeed, will be the individuals who will be trained to direct others, 
 and these few will learn chiefly to direct the others in a routine 
 essentially arbitrary and mechanical. 
 
 Their's not to reason why, 
 Their's but to do and die, 
 
 ^ On January 4, 1916, the Associated Press sent out from Washington a dispatch 
 for which it claimed exceptionally reliable information, stating that: "a navy equal 
 in strength to those of any two world powers except Great Britain, and an army pre- 
 pared to fight for the integrity of the Pan-American idea anywhere in Pan-America is 
 the ultimate aim of the plans of the military experts." 
 
 On January 6, 1916, Secretary Garrison said before the Military Committee of 
 the House of Representatives: "We have determined and announced that the sover- 
 eignty of the other republics of this hemisphere shall remain inviolable and must 
 therefore at all times stand ready to make good our position in this connection." 
 
22 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 is the ideal of military discipline, the quality we are called upon to praise 
 and admire in the soldier. It is an admirable ideal for military purposes, 
 but not so good for civic purposes, and what we are now discussing is the 
 alleged civic advantage of military discipline upon the young manhood 
 of the country. 
 
 As to the suggestion that military drill in the pubUc schools would 
 be justified on the ground of physical development President Lowell of 
 Harvard says that his experience on the Boston School Board convinced 
 him that military drill in the public schools is a mistake; that the boys 
 tired of drill, and were disinclined later to join the militia. He thinks 
 other kinds of physical training are better, and that while his objection 
 does not apply to colleges, drill should be a very small part of military 
 training. 
 
 Former President Eliot says: 
 
 I feel strongly another objection to military drill in secondary schools, namely 
 that it gives no preparation whatever for the real work of a soldier. In the Boston 
 High Schools military drill includes nothing but the manual of arms, company move- 
 ments on even surfaces, and a few very simple battalion movements, mostly those of 
 parade. The real work of a soldier is to dig in the ground with pick and shovel; to 
 carry a burden of about fifty pounds on long marches; to run very short distances 
 carrying a similar burden; and to shoot accurately with a rifle; throw hand grenades; 
 and use rapidly and well machine guns and artillery. Military drill in schools has 
 no tendency to prepare boys to do the real work of a soldier. The Swiss do not begin 
 to train their young men for their army until they are about twenty years of age, 
 except that they encourage voluntary rifle clubs for practice in shooting. 
 
 Assuming, however, that there would be both physical and disci- 
 plinary advantages in mihtary training, it would not follow that we 
 should obtain these advantages by compulsory military service. 
 
 It is said that military training would increase respect for law and 
 order, and the proof of this is said to be the comparative statistics of 
 crimes of violence in Switzerland and the United States. How about 
 the comparative respect for law in England and in the United States, 
 although England has not adopted universal military training ? 
 
 If we were situated as is Switzerland, where any war or serious 
 threat of war is certain to require the military service of every able- 
 bodied citizen, and where, even then, every unit in the small population 
 must have the very highest military efficiency practicable, we might 
 justify universal military training, in and out of the schools. We may 
 be sure that any attempt with us to train a citizen soldiery under the 
 Swiss system would almost certainly be perfunctory, because it would 
 not be taken seriously. We must never forget that the discipline which 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 23 
 
 Germany has given her citizens is a discipline which is not confined to 
 their service in the army. The German people are trained to regard the 
 state as the instrumentality through and by which they — each of them 
 individually and all of them collectively — can best advance their inter- 
 ests — can best secure for themselves the necessities and the pleasures of 
 life. Behind even the verhoten is a larger consciousness of the advantages 
 of communal action, a larger practical realization of those advantages, 
 than obtains in any other great nation today. 
 
 Germany's industrial and social progress has been attained in spite 
 of, and not because of, her system of enforced military training and 
 service. Undoubtedly the conviction which has existed in Germany 
 that war was a real and constantly impending probability has had an 
 influence, perhaps a determining influence, in securing the adoption of 
 certain policies, such as the government ownership and operation of 
 railroads, and the development of waterways in connection with the 
 railroads as a "co-ordinated" and interdependent transportation system. 
 The same conviction of the imminence of war has perhaps had its influ- 
 ence in securing some of the social and industrial legislation which sound 
 views of public policy justify and demand without the slightest regard 
 to their military value. There is no evidence, however, that these social 
 and industrial results in Germany were due to the military training of 
 German citizens. Prussia is not the portion of the German Empire in 
 which we find the most inspiring examples of peaceful progress. Again 
 I find Paul Rohrback instructive when he points out the antagonism 
 of " the material provincialism of the small state and the old individualism 
 of the German races, which in this case has been hardened and quickened 
 by the long political separation." He says: 
 
 But we Germans of the Empire err if we think that this explanation settles the 
 question. An equal share of the responsibility for the existing estrangement should 
 be laid at the door of the North German element which has gained hegemony in the 
 new Empire, and which shows its inabihty to achieve in the world what one may call 
 moral conquests. The shortsighted inflexibility of the North German, and most 
 especially of the Prussian character, which can produce great things only among its 
 own people, is easily explained by the course of its history. It deserves great, and 
 perhaps even the sole, credit for the growth of Prussia to the state of a world-power, 
 and therefore, indirectly, for the union of the greater number of integral parts of the 
 old Empire into the new Empire. Nevertheless, this special side of the Prussian char- 
 acter is developing more and more into an actual source of danger for our national 
 future, especially in its modem unpleasant variations. 
 
 No; German social and industrial progress is not due to military 
 training, but, as Paul Rohrback says, to German industry, and to the 
 
24 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 fact that Germany has made more progress toward having her govern- 
 ment perform the true functions of government in its internal and peace- 
 ful relations to its citizens than has been made by other governments, 
 especially our own. Unless our preparation is not only planned for 
 defense and is, as far as practicable, unadapted for aggression, the prepa- 
 ration itself will add to the possibilities of war, because we shall be less 
 afraid of the consequences of mistake and less on our guard against those 
 who from ignorance or self-interest seek to persuade us to maintain 
 unsound national ideals or purposes. 
 
 Other nations may of course make the same sort of mistake; may 
 permit themselves to assert against us interests that are not their true 
 interests or that they have no right to assert. We may have to defend 
 ourselves against aggression born of their mistakes, but so far as actual 
 war is concerned we are in far less danger from the selfishness or muddled 
 thinking of other nations than we are from the selfishness or muddled 
 thinking of our own people. We are defended, not only by our geo- 
 graphical separation from Europe and Asia, but by the character of our 
 country itself, its extent and physical conformation and, more than all 
 this, by the conflicting interests of our possible enemies. The balance 
 of power in Europe has always been more of a defense to us than even 
 our isolation. The conquest of the United States has been impossible — 
 the attempt unthinkable — except by land and naval forces too large to 
 be spared from Europe. It was largely because of this condition that 
 we succeeded in the war of the Revolution, and got off with a little 
 humiliation in 1812. Only the creation in Europe as a result of this war 
 of new conditions in which one or other of the contending parties is 
 left so completely crushed as to destroy all fear from that nation in the 
 mind of the victor or victors can possibly threaten us, and then the victor 
 must have some motive, must see some advantage in making war upon us. 
 
 No European nation can have any real motive to attack the United 
 States except to prevent us from asserting claims or exercising rights in 
 other countries which are not in accordance with its interests. There 
 can be no motive of conquest, and it is equally unthinkable that any 
 European nation would make war on us to impose discriminatory com- 
 mercial or political conditions upon us, or merely to punish us or to loot 
 us or force from us a money payment as the price of peace. Theoretically 
 any of these things might happen; practically they can be dismissed from 
 serious consideration. 
 
 If the United States becomes involved in war it will be because it 
 asserts some right or claims some privilege outside of its own territory, 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 2$ 
 
 the assertion of which right or privilege runs counter to the interests 
 of some foreign power, or it will be because some foreign power asserts 
 a similar right or privilege against us. We cannot of ourselves control 
 the motives or the actions of other powers except by international agree- 
 ment, backed by force or by measures short of force which may be 
 equally effective for the purpose. Our first concern, however, is with 
 our own attitude toward these matters. What are the rights or privi- 
 leges we claim or wish to claim outside of our own territory ? Are we 
 claiming or are we likely to claim any rights or privileges that are Ukely 
 to be challenged by other nations ? What are the foundations for such 
 claims ? Are they sound in principle and in law ? How important to 
 us is their assertion if challenged ? Are they important enough to fight 
 for? Are there other remedies than war available to us if they are 
 challenged ? What are they ? Is our claim similar in character to that 
 of other nations, and should we take steps to unite all nations who are 
 interested in the same essential claim for its defense against a possible 
 aggressor ? Should we unite North and South America in the defense 
 of our common interests, and if this seems desirable, why should we draw 
 an artificial Une excluding agreements with European nations in matters 
 where our common interests are as clear as, or clearer than, our Pan- 
 American interests ? 
 
 To reach right answers to these questions we must above all 
 clear our minds of the false doctrine that enduring economic interests 
 can be promoted by force. Undoubtedly temporary advantages 
 can be secured by the exploitation of other nations, especially — perhaps 
 exclusively — undeveloped peoples and undeveloped lands; but in the long 
 run the commerical interests of the world are mutual. Our prosperity 
 is dependent upon prosperity elsewhere. Every nation obtains materials 
 or goods from others and sells to others its own surplus of materials 
 or goods. Every nation has most to gain by helping to advance 
 the trade of the world, to make all nations prosperous while fostering 
 its own commerce by every means consistent with sound economic 
 laws. So far as the happiness of the mass of mankind or of the 
 masses of any particular nation is concerned, the adjustment of world- 
 commerce to the natural laws of commerce wholly overbalances the 
 temporary advantages of exploitation. Otherwise it would be to the 
 economic interest of this nation to encourage the continuation of 
 the war in Europe so that we might continue our artificial trade in 
 munitions. We owe much to Norman Angell for his convincing 
 presentation in effective popular form of the economic fallacy that 
 
26 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 world-commerce follows national lines and that imperialism is com- 
 mercially profitable. 
 
 The imperialistic theory is built upon the history of the British 
 Empire and upon a misunderstanding of that history, especially upon a 
 failure to comprehend that economic conditions are now so radically and 
 irrevocably different that the British Empire itself is commercially and 
 politically revolutionized. The history of England cannot be repeated 
 any more than can the history of Rome, and wise men would not desire 
 to repeat either if they could. We cannot ignore the process by which 
 the world has been convinced that the welfare of the mass of the people 
 is the real test of national success. Privilege may gain from exploitation, 
 but not democracy; and democracy has come to stay as the economic, 
 social, and intellectual ideal of civilization even more than as a political 
 ideal. This will be clearer to mankind after this war, and we may suspect 
 that it is becoming clearer and clearer during the war. Right now in 
 the trenches no power can keep the soldier from thinking and thinking 
 about the state and his relation to it. Even if he is led to magnify the 
 value of organization and efl&ciency, he intends to ask for organization 
 and efficiency in his interest and not in the interests of privilege 
 or class. 
 
 The very first thing that we Americans should consider today is 
 the relation which we wish our government to assume toward us as 
 individuals and toward other nations. Our whole attitude toward this 
 war and its results depends upon our conception of the function of the 
 state. What are our ideals of the individual life and of community 
 life? Do we conceive that the most desirable life for ourselves — for 
 individual men — is a life in which there is the least possible restraint 
 upon individual freedom of action, not only the action of each man in 
 those things that concern him alone — if, indeed, there are any such 
 things — but also in those things that affect others, leaving the result of 
 the conflict between individuals to be decided by the relative strength 
 or cunning of the individual? There are those who, consciously or 
 otherwise, really desire a world in which the strong, the astute, the intel- 
 lectually and physically superior, are to have the fullest freedom to 
 enjoy every advantage which they can obtain over their inferiors. If 
 they are shrewder, if more far-seeing, if they are stronger, more vigorous 
 physically and intellectually, they contend that it is their right to anti- 
 cipate those who are less alert, less far-seeing, less cunning, in seizing the 
 things or the positions that are available, and that, having seized them, 
 it is their vested right to hold them, even when it becomes clear that these 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 27 
 
 things and these points of vantage are essential to the community as a 
 whole and to the general mass of mankind. Men who hold this view 
 regard it as a merit, as a demonstration of worth, that they foresaw what 
 some day the community would need, some natural resource, some par- 
 ticular piece of property, the potential value of which was not generally 
 appreci3,ted at the time, and that they acquired it so that in the day of 
 need they could profit from the needs of their fellows. We shall have to 
 get rid of this idea in our individual and national Ufe if we are to get rid 
 of the most prolific source of war in the field of international relations. 
 
 Let us not confuse creative industry with mere shrewdness or fore- 
 sight or superior mental or physical capacity. Superiority of this kind 
 should have no reward for itself, but only for its exercise for the benefit 
 of others, for the community as a whole. When it confines itself to 
 forecasting the future and seizing now those things that are to be valuable 
 hereafter, it has no real claim to the gratitude or the respect of others. 
 It has added nothing to the wealth or the welfare of mankind. It may be 
 difficult to draw the Une, but it is none the less certain that there is a line 
 of distinction between creative and predatory wealth; and the duty of the 
 community is to draw the line as rapidly as it can discern where it really 
 lies, and to approximate it even when its exact location is not entirely 
 clear. It is the business of the community to protect community inter- 
 ests and to promote community welfare. If there is anything clear in 
 our philosophy or our history it is that civilization is developing in this 
 
 direction: 
 
 With thousand shocks that come and go, 
 
 With agonies, with energies, 
 With overthrowings, and with cries, 
 
 And undulations to and fro. 
 
 We know now that success in war depends — after the first shock — 
 on social and industrial solidarity far more than upon the number of 
 trained soldiers that can be placed in the field. It is easier to enlist men 
 and to train them if the front can be held for a time — in our case if the 
 first invading expedition can be held off or seriously crippled — than 
 it is to organize the national economic and industrial forces to support the 
 troops if they are to be successful under the conditions of modern warfare. 
 In his annual message of December 7 President Wilson emphasized our 
 duty in this regard: 
 
 While we speak of the preparation of the nation to make sure of her security and 
 her effective power we must not fall into the patent error of supposing that her real 
 strength comes from armaments and mere safeguards of written law. It comes, of 
 course, from her people, their energy, their success in their undertakings, their free 
 
28 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 opportunity to use the natural resources of our great home land and of the lands outside 
 our continental borders which look to us for protection, for encouragement, and for 
 assistance in their development, from the organization and freedom and vitality of our 
 economic life. 
 
 The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last congress are more 
 vital to the nation in this its time of test than at any other time. We cannot ade- 
 quately make ready for any trial of our strength unless we wisely and promptly direct 
 the force of our laws into these all-important fields of domestic action. 
 
 He then proceeds to select one pressing economic problem to which 
 to direct particular attention. He says: 
 
 In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation problem is 
 an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from time to time 
 of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much longer be able to cope 
 with it successfully as at present equipped and co-ordinated. I suggest that it would 
 be wise to provide for a commission of inquiry to ascertain by a thorough canvass of 
 the whole question whether our laws as at present framed and administered are as 
 serviceable as they might be in the solution of the problem. It is obviously a problem 
 that lies at the very foundation of our eflSciency as a people. Such an inquiry ought 
 to draw out every circumstance and opinion worth considering, and we need to know 
 all sides of the matter if we mean to do anything in the field of federal legislation. 
 
 The issue thus raised will be found to go far deeper than mere changes 
 in "the process of regulation." No lesson of the war has been more 
 clearly taught than that efficient transportation is of the very essence of 
 military efficiency and strength. It is equally true, as President Wilson 
 says, that the transportation problem in peace "lies at the very founda- 
 tion of our efficiency as a people." Our present method of dealing with it 
 is increasingly unsatisfactory to the private interests involved, and it is 
 not satisfactory to the public. We have secured many improvements 
 by adopting public regulation, but as this regulation proceeds it becomes 
 more and more apparent that the transportation system of the country 
 is essentially one interrelated and interdependent whole. There may 
 always be a rivalry in economy and efficiency of service, but competition 
 for traffic is moderated by a division of territory, or a gentlemen's 
 agreement, while competition in rates has almost disappeared. 
 
 Governmental regulation has served to bring out clearly the essen- 
 tially monopolistic character of our railroad system as a whole and the 
 necessity of that "co-ordination" to which President Wilson refers. 
 The question is whether co-ordination in the public service can be 
 obtained so long as our railroads do not have a common financial interest 
 as among themselves, but only a common financial interest as against the 
 public. Can a public service which is essentially monopolistic be satis- 
 factorily performed as a competitive enterprise ? Are we not losing the 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 29 
 
 benefits of competition without obtaining the advantages of regulated 
 monopoly ? We are certainly irritating and discouraging private enter- 
 prise based on competitive profits. So unsatisfactory is the result 
 that some of our leading railroad officials regard public ownership as the 
 only escape from what they consider destructive regulation. The 
 question is whether "co-ordination" can be obtained without public 
 ownership. 
 
 Germany has owned and operated her railroads, from the pomt of 
 view of public service, in peace and in war, not from the point of view of 
 profits, although the profits have been large. The probabilities seem 
 to be that after the close of this war every railroad in Europe will be 
 nationalized. Military reasons may be the determining factors in this 
 result, but it may well be questioned whether any satisfactory solution 
 of the transportation problem can be reached in any other way. 
 Whether our government should take over our railroads and when and 
 upon what conditions may raise many questions of expediency, but 
 if we are to treat the issue with open mind it is important that we 
 should understand that if, in the public interest, the government should 
 do so, it will not be invading the domain of private enterprise, but will 
 merely be taking back to itself a function of government which, for what 
 seemed sufficient reasons of expediency, it had previously delegated to 
 private agencies. 
 
 I take it we shall all agree that if there is something which it is the 
 true function of government to perform, that thing will never be per- 
 formed as it should be until the government performs it. We may 
 disagree about what is the true function of government; but once it is 
 determined that on principle the performance of a particular service is 
 a function of government, that means, if it means anything, that under 
 right conditions of government it will be better performed by the govern- 
 ment than if left to private enterprise. If a government is not per- 
 forming all of the functions of government it is to that extent a failure as 
 a government. The results must continue to be less satisfactory and 
 less efficient than they should be and can be if the government is per- 
 forming all of its functions, is qualified to perform them, and is perform- 
 ing them properly. Now, nothing is more clearly settled in the law of this 
 country and in the principles upon which that law is based than that 
 railroads as common carriers are performing a function of government. 
 The Supreme Court of the United States, and many other courts, have 
 so held. (See United States v. Joint Tariff Association, 171 U.S., 505, 
 570; Talcott V. Pine Grove, 23 Federal Cases, 652, etc.) Indeed, the 
 
30 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 construction and control of the public highway is historically and on 
 principle one of the first of the functions of government; and a railroad 
 is a public highway. My purpose in discussing this matter has been 
 to indicate how deep the issues of industrial mobilization go. In 
 England it already involves the relations of the trade unions to the 
 government. 
 
 It is insisted by some that the abolition of war or even its substantial 
 diminution is an idle dream; that we may be reasonably certain that for 
 one reason or another this country will be involved in war within a 
 comparatively short time. Very well. It is now clear that industrial 
 mobilization is as essential to modern war as is military mobilization, 
 and such mobilization cannot be effectively made after hostilities occur 
 unless the government already has the powers and is exercising the 
 activities essential to effective mobilization. It is even more difficult 
 to agree upon the principles and to create the machinery for industrial 
 mobilization than for military mobilization, and lack of actual experience 
 in applying the principles and operating the machinery may be dis- 
 astrous in the one case as in the other. Do the prophets of war propose 
 to face now the problems of economic and industrial mobilization? 
 If they do, it will be necessary to abandon some dogmatic assumptions 
 which have heretofore formed and still form so large a part of our political 
 thinking. 
 
 One of the most significant things in the development of all modern 
 thought has been the decline in the acceptance of dogma. Outside 
 of the exact sciences, like mathematics, we have learned to look with 
 suspicion and distrust on dogmatic statement of laws or principles. 
 William G. Sumner says: "If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doc- 
 trines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, 
 because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and betray him against 
 himself." Consciously and unconsciously, the pragmatic philosophy 
 is succeeding the dogmatic, in science as it is in theology. Experiment 
 is succeeding assumption as the sure foundation of human progress. In 
 no field is this so important as in the field of poUtical and social science — 
 of nothing is it so true as of government. In the United States we have 
 been particularly in danger of dogmatic error because of the wide 
 acceptance of the proposition that that government is best which 
 governs least, a dogmatic principle as vicious and unsound as the opposite 
 dogma upon which socialism is based; for the dogma that the state 
 should directly cover the whole field of human industry is equally fal- 
 lacious. The truth, as usual, lies between. Government is not best 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 31 
 
 when it governs least; nor is it best when it governs most. Govern- 
 ment is best when it is doing well whatever will promote the welfare 
 of the community most if done by the community than if left to be 
 done by part of the community. And yet, progress is unquestionably in 
 the direction of the extension of governmental activities into fields 
 heretofore left to private enterprise, and we must be open-minded toward 
 further movement in that direction. Germany is strong today in war, 
 not only because she is prepared for war, but because she has gone 
 farther than other nations in the assumption by her government of those 
 social and industrial responsibilities which government should assume 
 whenever it is apparent that, by so doing, the welfare of the nation — 
 the greatest good to the greatest number — will be promoted. She has 
 not accepted socialism, but she has been hampered by no dogma that the 
 state must govern as Uttle as possible. To the extent to which she has 
 accepted and acted upon the principle that it is the true function of 
 government to do whatever will promote the interest of the community 
 better if undertaken by the community than if left to private enterprise, 
 just to that extent has she strengthened herself and secured the grate- 
 ful loyalty of her people. So we, too, must proceed, if we would pre- 
 pare for the constructive uses of peace that grateful recognition of the 
 value of the nation to its people, and that patriotic support of the people 
 for the nation, which we are being exhorted to prepare for the destructive 
 purposes of war. 
 
 In the long retrospect we shall find nothing clearer than that the 
 evolution of government is steadily toward the assumption of new 
 functions in the service of the people. Slowly, but surely, the movement 
 has steadily gone forward in this direction, and always over the protests 
 of those who have insisted that each advance was an unwarranted 
 invasion of the field of private enterprise, of the rights and liberties of the 
 individual. 
 
 Even the collection of taxes for the support of the state was once 
 farmed out to those who found in it an opportunity for private profit. 
 The practice found its justification in the claim that an army of tax- 
 collectors would be a public menace, and that the government could 
 not possibly collect the taxes as economically and efficiently as private 
 individuals. Today it would be a rare individual indeed who would 
 conceive that it is not the function of the state directly to collect the 
 taxes necessary for its own support. 
 
 Time will not permit even the enumeration of other functions once 
 supposed to be peculiarly private in their character, but which are 
 
32 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 now exercised by the government almost as a matter of course. It is 
 almost axiomatic that the government shall conduct the Post-Ofl&ce, 
 shall supply water, and shall extinguish fires. All of these things were 
 once regarded as peculiarly sacred to private enterprise. I once repre- 
 sented a cHent who owned and operated as a private profit-making enter- 
 prise the sewer system of a thriving middle-western town which was 
 prevented by financial limitations in its charter from performing this 
 primary municipal function. In reading Ferrero I was amused and 
 instructed by his account of the sources of the wealth and political power 
 of Crassus in 69 B.C. Ferrero says : 
 
 Since the houses at Rome were mostly built of wood, and the ^diles had so far 
 failed to organize efficient measures of prevention, fires were at this time exceedingly 
 frequent. This suggested to him a very ingenious idea. He organized a regular fire 
 brigade from amongst his slaves, and established watch stations in every part of Rome. 
 As soon as a fire broke out the watch ran to give notice to the brigade. The firemen 
 turned out, but accompanied by a representative of Crassus who bought up, practically 
 for nothing, the house which was on fire, and sometimes all the neighboring houses 
 which happened to be threatened as well. The bargain once concluded, he had the 
 fire put out and the house rebuilt. In this way he secured possession of a large number 
 of houses at a trifling cost, and became one of the largest landlords at Rome, both in 
 houses and land, which he was then able of course to exchange, to sell, and to buy up 
 again, almost as he chose. Having become in this way one of the richest, if not the 
 richest man in Rome, his power steadily increasing with every rise in the price of 
 money, Crassus soon became a dominating figure in the Senate and the electorate, and 
 indeed among all classes of the community. 
 
 Indeed, when, later, an aedile who sprang from the common people ex- 
 tended the function of government in Rome to include the operation of afire 
 brigade, his activities were very much resented, and the privileged classes 
 found it difficult to explain and impossible to justify his popularity with 
 the people. I have no doubt that Rome rang with the same arguments 
 about the invasion of the field of private enterprise with which the public 
 ownership of railroads, and other public utilities is received in this 
 country today. 
 
 I am far from suggesting that, in any given community, at any given 
 time, it would be axiomatic, or even expedient, for the government to 
 undertake all or any of these enterprises. I am merely asserting that it 
 is by no means true that it should not do so solely because it would 
 conflict with some dogmatic conception of the state. It is a question of 
 wise expediency under existing conditions in every case, remembering 
 always that the inexorable law of social evolution is moving steadily 
 toward the assumption of community functions by the community. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 33 
 
 The argument that the government has been too weak, too inefficient 
 or too corrupt to be trusted with functions which might be performed 
 by a better government is only a confession of the indictment against 
 our government and us. It is quite true that, in determining the ulti- 
 mate interests of the community we must look for the long result. We 
 must not destroy the incentives that are essential to progress. The 
 whole fabric of existing civilization is based upon the institution of pri- 
 vate property, upon the conception that in the existing stage of human 
 development the best and most effective way in which to advance the 
 well-being of mankind is by an appeal to the self-interest or the necessi- 
 ties of individuals; but even if we are entirely sure that necessity and 
 financial gain are the most effective incentives to industry for the mass 
 of mankind, are we not all coming to see that there is a point at which 
 we overload the lure ? Once we rise above the pinch of poverty, and 
 attain physical comfort and intellectual opportunity, are there not other 
 incentives besides money that will stimulate and attract the very highest 
 talent and the very greatest industry ? Is not this demonstrated by the 
 financial sacrifices made by so many of the very best men in our pubHc 
 service? You know what are the desires, the hopes, the aspirations 
 that animate you. What is it that you think would prove most satis- 
 fying and would call out the best there is in you ? Is it not the conscious 
 and effective use of your faculties, for the accomphshment of things 
 which you think are worth while? Is not the basis of real happiness 
 obscured by false standards of success? There are dangers in democ- 
 racy, just as there are dangers in privilege, but mankind has definitely 
 discarded the old ideal of aristocracy. The purpose of civiUzation is not 
 to produce an efflorescence, but to elevate the mass. The aristocracy 
 of the future is to be an aristocracy of service not of privilege, of achieve- 
 ment, not of acquisition. 
 
 The very first and most essential of all our preparation must be 
 to make our government — local, state, and national — what it should 
 be. This is the service for which we need universal training, and a 
 patriotism that is nobler and more useful than all the patriotism of war. 
 
 It is suggested that we already respond to the civic appeal more 
 easily than to the appeal for military sacrifice, but Hiram Maxim says: 
 
 I wonder why it is that we are not as enthusiastic in this social service work as 
 we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and more that 
 appeals to the martial imagination in attacking war and warriors than there is in the 
 prosaic, tame, and glamourless enterprise of simply saving human life in peaceful pur- 
 suits for the mere sake of saving it ? 
 
34 ' THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 Senator Root has recently made an eloquent appeal for military 
 preparation, in which he said: 
 
 Do not let us deceive ourselves. Adequate preparation for the preservation of 
 our liberty means a vast expenditure, but it means more than that; it means a will- 
 ingness for self-sacrifice, a spirit among our people, the length and breadth of the 
 land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the graduates of 
 the common school, among professional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and 
 laborers — a national spirit among the people of the land, and a determination to pre- 
 serve the liberty and justice of the American Republic, and to make a sacrifice of 
 means and convenience, comfort, and if need be, of life, in the cause. 
 
 To every word of this we should subscribe. But I wish the Senator 
 had gone on to demonstrate — as he could do so well — that the patriotism 
 and self-sacrifices of peace are of more transcendent importance, even 
 as a preparation for war, than any present resolution of willingness to 
 sacrifice "means and convenience, comfort, and if need be, of Ufe," upon 
 the field of battle. I am not detracting in the least from the importance 
 of making defensive miUtary preparations; but a determination to 
 preserve the liberty and justice of the American Republic, and to make 
 some sacrifice of means and convenience and comfort in the piping times 
 of peace, will be our best preparation for war and our most likely insur- 
 ance against it. 
 
 Do not let us deceive ourselves. The United States of America, 
 as a nation, is worth preserving, is entitled to our loyalty and devotion, 
 only to the extent that it is an agency to promote the moral, intellectual, 
 and physical well-being of its people, not some of its people, but all of its 
 people — only to the extent that, in very truth, in the realities of the 
 everyday life of the men, the women, and the children who inhabit it, 
 its conscious ideal is the greatest good to the greatest number. To 
 carry out that ideal means a vast expenditure, willingly and intelli- 
 gently made; it means a preparedness for self-sacrifice in times of peace 
 quite as much as in times of war — nay, a greater self-sacrifice, because 
 the progress of civilization is measured by the extent to which peace 
 supersedes and supplants war. It means a spirit among our people the 
 length and breadth of the land, among the rich and the poor, among 
 the highly educated and the graduates of the common school and those 
 to whom fortune unhappily has given no schooling at all, among pro- . 
 fessional men, merchants and bankers, farmers and laborers — a national 
 spirit determined to make the American Republic an agency of liberty 
 and justice at home and abroad. 
 
 In the service of this ideal, let us destroy every special privilege and 
 be prepared to sacrifice means and convenience and comfort and, if 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 35 
 
 need be, life itself to protect that government and the people it governs 
 against every assault by force or cunning, whether from within or from 
 without. Let us make social justice and social service our national 
 ideal; and to this end let us control and develop our national resources 
 in times of peace, not only that they may be mobilized in time of war, 
 but because a government which is performing this sort of service to 
 its people will be thus most effectively organized for peace. By all 
 means let us have an army and a navy adequate for the defense of such 
 a nation, but let us realize that far more important than armies and 
 navies are our national purposes and policies. 
 
 Are we really without the desire and the hope that the United States 
 may acquire exceptional advantages in the commercial development 
 of other countries — let us say, in this hemisphere or parts of it, in Cuba 
 and the West Indies, in Mexico and Central America ? Are we entirely 
 free from the subconscious thought that here is our sphere of influence ? 
 How far is this thought at the bottom of the modern development of the 
 Monroe Doctrine, especially as conceived by Secretary Olney when he 
 declared that "the United States is practically sovereign on this conti- 
 nent" ? Is it because of its hoped-for economic advantages to us that 
 we insist upon a doctrine which seems no longer to have any political 
 justification? Certainly we are no longer in apprehension that our 
 republican form of government would seriously be jeopardized if any 
 European nation should acquire political dominion over, or should plant 
 its colonies in. South America. Those countries repudiate and resent 
 our assumption of a benevolent protectorate over their national interests. 
 They look with suspicion upon all our declarations of disinterestedness, 
 and point to our dealings with Mexico in the acquisition of Texas and 
 California, and to other incidents in our history, as proof of the justice of 
 their fears. Even the declaration of President Wilson, that this country 
 will never again seek to acquire a foot of territory by force of arms, 
 is regarded merely as the expression of a personal opinion, or as in the 
 same class with the diplomatic assurance of pacific intention which has 
 usually preceded the extension of the British, or the French, or the 
 German, or the Italian domains. 
 
 There is a clearer mutual understanding and a closer community of 
 political and commercial interest between the principal countries of 
 South America and the great nations of Europe than between those 
 countries and ourselves. The ties of race and language and religion are 
 closer. Few of our people understand how the eastward trend of the 
 southern portion of this hemisphere brings South America into as close 
 
36 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 or closer proximity to Europe than to the United States, especially when 
 available trade routes are taken into consideration. South American 
 development has been financed in Europe, not in the United States, 
 and to attempt to expand our commerce in that direction without assum- 
 ing the large financial obligations that are essential to it is merely to 
 work against the natural laws of trade. 
 
 Pan-Americanism exalts physical geography, which is important; 
 but commercial, intellectual, and racial geography is more important. 
 Pan-Americanism must be based on and be measured by real mutuahty 
 of interest and obUgation. We should recognize and strengthen our 
 mutual interests with La tin- America; but we should not forget other 
 equally or more important interests in Canada and Europe. The pres- 
 ervation of existing political geography to the south of us against change 
 by violence should tend to increase stability where this is especially 
 desirable; but why should we insist that the Americas are a separate 
 international unit over which the United States is to maintain a benevo- 
 lent protectorate at its own risk, and without control over their domestic 
 conditions or foreign poHcies ? 
 
 To assert that the Monroe Doctrine is essential to our national 
 safety has become an absurdity. Monarchical institutions no longer 
 threaten our Republic. We have lived to see a republican form of gov- 
 ernment firmly established in France, and to see constitutional monarchy 
 develop steadily toward the essentials of representative democracy. 
 We have lived for more than a century in immediate contact with a 
 great, self-governing colony of England, with the result that we have 
 influenced its institutions far more than it has influenced ours. The 
 whole purpose of President Monroe's famous declaration, and the whole 
 justification for making it, have undergone a transformation so complete 
 that nothing but the lack of intelligent discussion of the question can 
 explain the extent to which it is regarded as something as holy as the 
 Ark of the Covenant by so many of the American people. 
 
 It is safe to say that we beUeve in something called the Monroe Doc- 
 trine because we do not understand it, and are making no attempt what- 
 ever to define it or to appraise its value to us. Let us not confuse it 
 with that doctrine which is practically recognized by all the great nations 
 of the world, viz. : that wherever a nation is in fact so situated that the 
 acquisition or control of immediately adjacent countries by great and 
 powerful rivals would jeopardize its peace and security, that nation, in 
 the exercise of its right of self-defense, can justly insist upon its rival 
 refraining from such an extension of its domain. The point is well 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 37 
 
 illustrated by the declaration of Paul Rohrbach with reference to the 
 possible absorption of Holland by Germany. He says: "The resulting 
 disturbance of the political equilibrium in Europe would be so distinctly 
 in favor of Germany, that all the other states would be justified in 
 rising in protest against it." The right of a nation to protect its vital 
 interests has been universally recognized, subject always to the possible 
 exercise of superior force to override the objection. No nation has 
 questioned the right of another nation to assert its vital interests, 
 although it may have questioned its power to maintain them. The issue 
 is an issue of fact. Does the particular thing which is threatened 
 jeopardize the vital interests of the protesting nation ? 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine has never been accepted by other nations as 
 sound in principle, although the acquiescence of Great Britain has pre- 
 vented it from being challenged; but if we were frankly to assert that 
 the acquisition of Mexico by a European nation would be regarded as 
 an unfriendly act because it threatened the vital interests of the United 
 States, it is exceedingly unlikely that there would be any attempt to 
 deny that we were justified in interfering. Whether we should assert 
 such an interest in the future of Mexico would depend upon the question 
 of fact as to its influence upon our national security. Whether our inter- 
 est would be admitted would depend upon the question of fact as to the 
 effect of the proposed action upon the vital interests of this nation. It 
 might depend upon our military abiUty to sustain our position; but 
 what I am trying to make clear is that the validity of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine depends upon principles of universal international apphcation, 
 and not upon principles pecuUar to us or to the American continents. 
 
 In the interests of national security, we should ourselves confine 
 the Monroe Doctrine to these limits. In its present vague form it is 
 a menace to our peace and to the peace of the world — all the more 
 dangerous because we have not now, and we do not propose to have, 
 miUtary force sufficient to maintain it if it should be seriously questioned. 
 Nothing is so dangerous to peace as the assertion of a right which is 
 offensive to others, which they believe to be unjustified, and which we 
 are not, and do not expect to be, prepared to defend. It is in support 
 of the broader Monroe Doctrine and incidentally to get the support of 
 the Pacific Coast that the Navy League is insisting that we should have 
 a navy on the Pacific stronger than Japan's and another navy on the 
 Atlantic stronger than the navy of any other nation except England — a 
 policy which fortunately, there seems to be no probability whatever of 
 the United States being persuaded to adopt. And yet, if we do not have 
 
38 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 such a navy, I must agree with Homer Lea when he says that "the 
 Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval and military power sufficient 
 to enforce its observance by all nations singly and in coaHtion, becomes 
 a factor more provocative of war than any other national policy ever 
 attempted in modern or ancient times." 
 
 Our greatest duty, therefore, is not to build fleets to maintain the 
 Monroe Doctrine, but it is to consider whether the Monroe Doctrine, 
 in any other sense than the protection of our vital national interests, is 
 worth the risk of war and the cost of preparing for it. If it cannot be 
 justified upon the ground of defense, can it be justified upon the ground 
 of self-interest? The Monroe Doctrine may have helped drive Maxi- 
 milian out of Mexico. It may have served us in some indeterminate 
 directions during the first half of our national existence, but if it has 
 profited us in any other way the evidence does not seem to be available. 
 Certainly we can show no financial profit, and no prospect in this direction. 
 
 It may not be clear that our trade in Latin America would have been 
 substantially greater if it had been colonized by European nations and 
 developed under their flags, but it certainly is not clear that this would 
 not have been the case. Our total trade with South America for the 
 year ending June 30, 1913 (unaffected by war), was a Uttle over $360,- 
 000,000. Our trade with Canada the same year was over $535,000,000. 
 Approximately $162,000,000 of our South American trade was with 
 Brazil alone, the greater portion being imports of coffee, which we may 
 safely assume would have sought a market in this country no matter under 
 what flag the coffee had been raised. It seems equally true that our 
 sales of agricultural implements to South America would doubtless have 
 been as great if the flag of England or Germany or France or Italy or 
 Spain had been flying in the southern portion of the hemisphere. 
 
 I am not regretting the poHtical independence of the South American 
 repubhcs. On the contrary, I share in the feeling of pride in their 
 achievements, which is perhaps not justified by our contribution to that 
 result. I am merely pointing out that the further assertion of the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine would seem to have no justification in the commercial results 
 obtained by it; and the extension of our trade in the future will depend 
 upon considerations with which the Monroe Doctrine has nothing what- 
 ever to do. But even if it were true that its abandonment would result 
 in some diminution of our commerce, which I do not believe, the loss 
 would be utterly insignificant in comparison with the expenditure we 
 shall have to make if the Monroe Doctrine is to be anything but a 
 source of weakness and of danger. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 39 
 
 There is a widespread popular impression that Germany has ulterior 
 designs on South America, and that, if successful in the present war, she 
 will restrict the trade of other nations and discriminate against this 
 country. I find no justification for this opinion. I have no doubt that 
 Germany resents and disagrees with the doctrine of Monroe. I have no 
 doubt that, whether successful or unsuccessful in the war, she will seek 
 to push her trade and commerce in South America. But all of the 
 indications are that Germany has been looking to the Near and Middle 
 East as the field peculiarly adapted for her political and commercial 
 expansion. It is the Bagdad Railroad and the ancient Babylonian 
 empire upon which she seems to have fixed her desires, and with respect 
 to which she so bitterly resents the restrictions for which she holds 
 England responsible. There is much misunderstanding about German 
 colonization in South America. It is estimated that the total German 
 immigration now in Argentina, for instance, is only 30,000, while there 
 are 950,000 Italians, and 150,000 French.^ I have been unable to obtain 
 the total figures for Brazil; but in 1910 the immigration was 30,857 
 Portuguese; 20,843 Spanish; 14,163 Italians; 3,902 Germans, etc. 
 
 I shall refer to only one other matter of this character, and that is 
 our relations with Japan; and I select them because we are supposed 
 by many to be in greater danger of a collision with Japan than with any 
 other nation, unless it be Germany. It is said that Japan is likely to 
 attack us, because we offer an enticing opportunity for loot, because 
 Japan wishes to acquire the Philippines, and because she wishes to 
 force us to accept her people as immigrants and to treat them on a parity 
 with the immigrants from other countries. 
 
 I think we may dismiss, as unworthy of our own intelligence, the 
 suggestion that Japan would make a wanton attack upon this country 
 merely in the hope of exacting an indemnity or of pillaging our Pacific 
 Coast. Japan has done nothing that would justify the assumption that 
 she would be influenced by such a motive, even if she could be persuaded 
 
 'The ofi&cial immigration figures in Argentina for the period from 1857 to 1908 
 are as follows: 
 
 Italian 1,799,423 
 
 Spanish 79S>243 
 
 French 188,316 
 
 English 42,765 
 
 Austro- Hungarian S9,8oo 
 
 German 40,655 
 
 Swiss 28,344 
 
 Belgian 20,668 
 
 Other 203,242 
 
 The emigration was a little less than half the inamigration. 
 
40 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 that she would succeed. No nation in the history of the world has so 
 clearly earned the right to have its motives, its intelligence, and its 
 achievements treated with respect than has Japan. Her ambition is 
 clearly to secure the respect of the civilized world, and to deserve it. 
 In my judgment she will be more punctilious in respect to international 
 morals than many nations that boast a broader civilization. But if 
 nothing else would restrain her, she is too intelligent not to know that 
 all she could secure in the way of pecuniary advantage would have to 
 be returned many fold in the competition of armaments that would 
 inevitably ensue, until this country had made her atone for every wrong 
 that she had done to us. The day of the international marauder on 
 any such scale as this is over. 
 
 The Open Door in China is one of the issues which are thought to 
 be provocative of trouble with Japan. Hiram Maxim says a Japanese 
 diplomat asked him by what logic we can proclaim America for the 
 Americans and disclaim Japan's right equally to proclaim Asia for the 
 Asiatics. What is the answer? Baron Shibusawa recently said in 
 my hearing that Japan was especially desirous of cordial relations with 
 the United States for three reasons: first, because Japan recognized 
 many obligations of gratitude to the United States for our conspicuous 
 part in the acceptance and development of modern conditions and insti- 
 tutions by Japan; secondly, because one-fourth of Japan's foreign com- 
 merce was with the United States, and Japan was anxious to retain and 
 increase it; thirdly, because the greatest world-problem was the adjust- 
 ment and mutual understanding of oriental and occidental civilization 
 and that Japan believed the two nations best adapted to bring this 
 about were Japan and the United States, working sympathetically 
 together for this purpose. Such speeches may be only international 
 compliments; but they deserve thoughtful consideration. 
 
 As to the Philippines, there is no evidence that Japan desires them 
 at this time, when her hands are full to overflowing with opportunities 
 in Korea and China. And what is our policy in the Philippines ? Do 
 we really intend to establish there an independent nation ? Do we pro- 
 pose to retain control over its international policies after we have given 
 it independence ? If we do not control, do we none the less propose to 
 protect the Philippine nation against the consequences of its own policies, 
 or to guarantee its sovereignty or territorial integrity? If we seek to 
 retain no special advantages over other nations in the commercial 
 development of the Philippine Islands, and are animated by sincerely 
 benevolent motives, should we not seek to secure international guaranties 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 41 
 
 that would be far more effective than anything that we alone can do to 
 assure independence of the nation for whose existence we are to be 
 responsible ? Is it at all clear that Japan would not gladly join in such 
 an arrangement ? 
 
 The remaining source of future trouble with Japan is the policy 
 which we adopt toward her with respect to immigration and the rights of 
 her people while residing in this country. There can be no question that 
 Japan resents the manner in which her people are being treated on the 
 Pacific Coast. Whether California is justified or not in the substance 
 of what she seeks by restricting the rights of the Japanese to acquire 
 and hold land is entirely outside the point. The citizens of the United 
 States are under restriction with respect to land ownership in Japan, 
 and this subject is susceptible of diplomatic adjustment on a basis that 
 will recognize the mutual self-respect of both countries. Japan has given 
 evidence of the most substantial character of her desire to meet and treat 
 this issue in a broad-minded and practical way. She asks merely that 
 it shall be so treated. If we treat her thus, and have California treat 
 her thus, we shall do more to reduce the probability of friction with Japan 
 than all the naval and military preparations we shall make against her. 
 
 It is said, however, that we must enormously increase our navy 
 if we are to protect our interests in the Panama Canal. Before the Canal 
 was constructed the argument ran quite the other way. The construc- 
 tion of the Canal was so to facilitate the passage of our fleet from the 
 Atlantic to the Pacific, or the reverse, that it would double the efficiency 
 of the fleet, and constitute an asset of incalculable value in the event of 
 war. Now, however, it has become merely an extension of our coast 
 line, a vulnerable point which it is essential to take extraordinary pre- 
 cautions to protect. If this is true, we have gained only a military 
 liability by the construction of the Canal, having admitted the merchant 
 vessels of all nations to the Canal on a parity with our own. Proximity 
 to the Canal is our only advantage over other nations so far as our 
 foreign commerce is concerned. If it is to take a huge navy to protect 
 it so that it may be used for the passage of our fleets in time of war, there 
 would seem to have been little net gain from a military point of view. 
 Should we not be far better off if, having made this splendid contribu- 
 tion to the commerce of the world, we should now completely neutralize 
 the Canal, under international guaranties, in which we should invite 
 all civilized nations to join ? The basis of the agreement might be either 
 the closing of the Canal to the warships of belligerent nations, or the 
 opening of the Canal to all belligerents alike, upon the condition that 
 
42 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 no encounter should be permitted to take place within a specified dis- 
 tance from either entrance. The practicability of this plan would neces- 
 sarily depend upon the extent to which the Canal could be secured from 
 injury or a surprise attack from some belligerent who did not respect 
 its obligations. Either plan would probably result in greater protection 
 of our interests in the Canal than any security derived from the size 
 of the fleet available for its defense in the event of war between the 
 United States and any first-class naval power. 
 
 But the necessity of naval protection for the Canal must be considered 
 in the light of General Goethals' testimony before the subcommittee 
 of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
 General Goethals testified that on the assumption that the naval contest 
 had been ended, and that the control of the sea rested with the enemy, 
 so that the enemy's transports were free and able to land troops, a force 
 of 25,000 men with proper land defenses would be able to hold off an 
 invading expedition against the Panama Canal at least as long as the 
 time that was necessary for the capture of Port Arthur. If this be 
 true, it would seem clear that the defense of the Panama Canal would 
 necessitate no departure from the defensive naval pohcy in which the 
 submarine would largely replace the dreadnaught and the battle cruiser. 
 The Canal is peculiarly adapted for defense by submarines and there 
 is a difference of expert opinion as to whether its land defenses should 
 not be confined to defense against raids. 
 
 It will naturally be said that even if we abandon the policy of 
 extending our commercial interests by force or by the show of force 
 other nations will not do so, and unless we are prepared to assert our 
 rights in foreign lands our financial interests will suffer, our pride be 
 humbled, and our people be humihated and abused. There are cases 
 in which we must be prepared to send warships into foreign seas to 
 enforce respect for the flag of the United States, and for those who are 
 entitled to its protection. The policies I am suggesting would never 
 leave this country without a navy containing sufficient warships to 
 compel the respect of or to punish those inferior nations from which we 
 need have any apprehension of wanton insult or ill treatment of our 
 nationals. No civilized nation of consequence would in time of peace 
 refuse atonement for insult or injury to any of our people. We may 
 conclusively assume that every reparation would be made, and every 
 precaution would be taken against the repetition of such an incident. 
 Nothing but the wilUngness of the offending nation to proceed to war 
 would call for a larger navy than we should have; and our naval 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 43 
 
 policies in the event of war would depend upon, and be determined by, 
 the larger considerations to which I have referred. Assuming that 
 we were protected at home against invasion, we might effectively 
 resort to other weapons than the use of force. There are some con- 
 ceptions of national honor and of what is essential for its vindication 
 that are reminiscent of the code duello; but they cannot long survive that 
 discredited institution. 
 
 To the contention that we must have a navy adequate to protect 
 our foreign trade and keep open the highways of commerce, it seems 
 sufficient to reply that unless we develop a real merchant marine our 
 foreign commerce would be carried on neutral ships; that no blockade 
 of our extensive coasts could be made effective; and that nothing but 
 the dominion of the seas could give us an assurance of uninterrupted 
 foreign trade if private commerce is not to be safe under the sanctions 
 of international law. General Greene has aptly said: 
 
 We do not need and will not have in this country an army of seven hundred 
 thousand men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand; we are not compelled to and 
 we will not enter the battleship race of England and Germany. England must run 
 this race or die. We are not so situated, and it would be supreme folly for us to waste 
 our resources or our thoughts on any such contest. 
 
 But a defensive mihtary poUcy does not assume a poHcy of inter- 
 national isolation. If there is anything which this war and the issues 
 arising out of this war have made clear, it is that no nation can longer 
 live unto itself, and least of all that a great commercial nation like the 
 United States can refrain from active and direct participation in the 
 determination of those policies and the creation of those agencies by 
 which law is to be substituted for war and the peaceful development 
 of the world is to be assured. The peaceful development of the United 
 States is indissolubly linked with the peaceful developmxcnt of Europe 
 and the world. We can no longer refrain from alliances because they 
 may involve us in issues from which, thus far, we have happily been free. 
 We must take our place in the family of nations and assume our full 
 measure of responsibility. Nor need we despair of making substantial 
 progress toward the substitution of peaceful means for the settlement 
 of international differences by force of arms. 
 
 The declaration of President Wilson with regard to Pan- 
 Americanism in his annual message should serve the useful purpose 
 of directing public attention to the inapplicability of the old concep- 
 tions of the Monroe Doctrine to existing conditions. If this nation is 
 really definitely to abandon the role "which it was always difficult to 
 maintain without offense to the pride of the peoples whose freedom of 
 
44 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious miscon- 
 ceptions of our motives," and is to interpret the Monroe Doctrine as an 
 invitation to "a full and honorable association, as of partners, between 
 ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, north and 
 south," it marks a tremendous forward step in the national policies of 
 the United States. It must not be forgotten, however, that the invita- 
 tion has not yet been accepted, and, above all, that it has not yet been 
 embodied in any international undertakings that can be regarded as a 
 substitute for the doctrine of Monroe. 
 
 The President's message is admirable so far as it goes, but it leaves 
 unanswered the question as to what this country would propose to do 
 in any of the contingencies to which I have referred. Are we to have a 
 defensive alliance with the Latin-American nations, and if so, upon what 
 mutual terms and conditions ? Can we, and shall we, make a real start 
 toward "the parliament of man, the federation of the world," by a 
 Pan-American alliance in the interests of peace? Undoubtedly there 
 never was an opportunity so favorable as this; and why should we not 
 press home our opportunity by inaugurating that League to Enforce 
 Peace, which is the most practical of all the suggestions that have thus 
 far been made for the substitution of law for war by international 
 agreement ? 
 
 I trust that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States will 
 seize the opportunity which is peculiarly within its grasp. Never, it 
 seems to me, was anything more timely than the referendum which 
 is now being taken by that great national association of the business 
 interests of America. I think it is safe to assume that few, indeed, 
 in this audience are aware of an event which is almost epochal in its 
 importance. 
 
 On the second day of September, 191 5, a Special Committee of the 
 Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, composed of 
 men of large business experience, representing commercial institutions 
 of the highest and most conservative standing, unanimously recom- 
 mended that Congress and the President be called upon to do all :"n 
 their power to promote the establishment of: 
 
 1. A more comprehensive and better-defined sea law. 
 
 2. An International Court. 
 
 3. A Council of Conciliation. 
 
 4. International Conferences for the better establishment and progressive 
 amendment of International Law. 
 
 5. The organization of a System of Commercial and Financial Non-Intercourse, 
 to be followed by military force, if necessary, to be applied to those nations entering 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 45 
 
 into the foregoing arrangements and then going to war without first submitting their 
 differences to an agreed-upon tribunal.' 
 
 The first four of these recommendations are regarded as based upon 
 considerations so convincing that the committee appointed to formulate 
 arguments against the recommendations involved, so that all phases of 
 the question should be presented on the taking of the referendum, said: 
 
 It is assumed that the first four proposals of the committee are directed to con- 
 ditions so well understood that the agreement about the answers to them is so nearly 
 universal as to render unnecessary any attempt to formulate objections to them. 
 
 As to the fifth proposal, the committee which is in charge of the referen- 
 dum vote states that it involves the adoption of a new principle "which, 
 however moderate in its immediate form, may be regarded as a depar- 
 ture from accepted rules of conduct in international law"; and it sets 
 forth a number of objections, which it says "may be deserving of atten- 
 tion." 
 
 All of these objections, however, were met in advance in the unani- 
 mous report of the special committee. Having already pointed out that 
 "the problem of securing peace and justice among nations is simply an 
 extension of what we have successfully solved in the national and 
 municipal realms," and that international conferences have already 
 secured results of the greatest importance for the peace and progress of 
 the world, the committee expresses the opinion that — 
 
 This movement toward international agreement and law was gaining in strength 
 each year. Stopped by the war, there is little doubt that it will revive stronger, and 
 pursue its course in a more regular and systematic way when the war is over. Business 
 men perhaps more than others should be anxious to support such endeavors for a 
 better understanding among nations, estabhshing more firmly enlightened standards 
 to govern their interrelations and furnishing a more elaborate and organic body of 
 international public and administrative law. The present war has again incon- 
 trovertibly shown the fundamental need for this. The problem is, then, not new or 
 novel, but needs only to be broadened and organized to 3deld all the desired benefits. 
 .... There is a difference of opinion as to the employment of force to compel any 
 signatory nation to submit its cause to an international tribunal before going to war. 
 Your Committee, however, beheves that the great majority of the practical men of 
 
 ' The preliminary count of the votes of the constituent members of the national 
 chamber on this referendum, announced on January 5, 1916, showed the following 
 results: 
 
 Proposition i, 763 in favor; 29 opposed. 
 
 Proposition 2, 753 in favor; 21 opposed. 
 
 Proposition 3, 744 in favor; 28 opposed. 
 
 Proposition 4, 769 in favor; 13 opposed. 
 
 Proposition 5(a) 556 in favor; 157 opposed (economic pressure). 
 
 Proposition 5(6) 452 in favor; 249 opposed (military force). 
 
46 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 the United States who hold themselves responsible for reasonable progress see the 
 necessity of the employment of an adequate pressure or force to compel signatory 
 nations to bring their cause before an International Court or Council of Conciliation 
 before going to war; because however desirable it may be, theoretically, not to use 
 force, yet the history of the last one hundred years, the many wars during that time, 
 and the events of the present war have made apparent the fundamental need of an 
 international power to enforce the submission of international disputes to a court. 
 The alternative is constantly recurring wars, and, in the interval between these wars, 
 the increasing absorption in preparation for war of the resources of the principal nations 
 of the world. 
 
 The committee demonstrates the wisdom and the practicability of 
 the use of economic pressure as a preliminary to the use of force, and 
 points out that, while such pressure involves economic loss to the nations 
 that apply it, "war, too, is costly and self -injurious to the nations which 
 essay it." 
 
 Your Conunittee has studied sympathetically the arguments of those who, on 
 principle, oppose all force, even to enforce law instead of war; likewise, the argument 
 of those who respect the tradition that the United States should "keep free of entan- 
 gling alliances." It must be conceded that the latter described a past policy under 
 which our nation has grown in prosperity and happiness. But your Committee is 
 forced to see that our country is already directly involved in the present war, because 
 the lives and prosperity of American citizens have been involved, and because the 
 future peace and prosperity of our country will be involved in the settlement of 
 the war. 
 
 Your Committee believes that American citizens, realizing the world's imperative 
 need of the substitution of law for war, if militarism is not to dominate, are ready, nay, 
 feel it the clear call of duty, to take their share of the work and responsibility neces- 
 sary to estabUsh this substitution. We cannot escape if we would, we would not if we 
 could; the call of women and children, of the helpless and the weak, suffering inde- 
 scribably from needless war, is an irresistible compulsion to all Americans, and, not 
 least, to American business men 
 
 Knowing that civilization is made up of the work and suffering and martyrdoms 
 of the past, we are willing, yes, anxious, to "pay back," in kind if necessary, what 
 we are enjoying, if thereby we can help on this greatest forward step of civilization — 
 the substitution of law for war. Your Committee believes that the time is ripe, as 
 never before, for the fundamental advance in civilization that the estabhshing of an 
 
 international Court and Council represents Your Committee beheves that it 
 
 is practically possible that the time has arrived, if the United States will but do its 
 share of the work. There is little real hope for success if the United States is not a 
 
 part of it If, at the close of the war there exists the legalized purpose of the 
 
 United States to join in the work needed to enforce peace, there will be a most practical 
 reason to expect success for this so necessary step forward. In fact, the beginning of 
 the necessary organization may be in existence at that time, by reason of the agreement 
 between the United States and some of the neutral nations of South America and 
 Europe. It is a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest that has ever come to any 
 nation. It is a great adventure practically within our power to promote — an enter- 
 prise that appeals to all that is best in us — an opportunity we will not miss. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 47 
 
 Remember, these are not the words and this is not the action of a 
 body of visionary enthusiasts; it is the unanimous recommendation 
 of a special committee of the greatest commercial body in this country, 
 appointed "to examine into the relations between the present war and 
 business, and submit suggestions as to the future." Nor is it the only 
 indication of the progress of higher ideals in international relations. 
 
 There is a despatch which was sent by Sir Edward Grey to Sir 
 Edward Goshen, British Ambassador at Berlin, at the very crisis of the 
 diplomatic interchanges which preceded the war, which I have read and 
 re-read with mingled feeUngs of sadness and hope. It has always seemed 
 to me the most tragic of all the official documents which have been pub- 
 lished by the warring nations, and, at the same time, the most encour- 
 aging. Just as it seemed inevitable that the explosion would occur, that 
 the catastrophe must happen, after the suggestions and counter- 
 suggestions, the complaints and counter-complaints had been discussed 
 under the forms and usages of diplomacy. Sir Edward Grey struck a 
 new note that went straight to the heart of the underlying cause of all 
 the difficulty. On July 30, 1914, he authorized Sir Edward Goshen to 
 say to the German Chancellor: 
 
 If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my 
 own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a 
 party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be 
 pursued against her or her allies, by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. 
 I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, 
 and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The 
 idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals; but if 
 this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for 
 generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will 
 follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the powers than 
 has been possible hitherto. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey did not indicate exactly what he had in mind, but 
 with the fate of Europe trembling in the balance, Utopia seemed nearer 
 and more practically available than had seemed possible before. It was 
 to be "some more definite rapprochement between the powers than has 
 been possible hitherto" — some arrangement to which Germany could 
 be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile 
 policy would be pursued against her or her allies "by France, Russia, and 
 ourselves, jointly or separately." Oh, the pity that Utopia had not 
 seemed nearer a little while before; that this despatch should have 
 waited for "this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe 
 has gone through for generations." What a tragedy that it should have 
 
48 THE UNIVERSITY RECORD 
 
 been received by a chancellor who heard it without comment "because 
 His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures 
 along the frontier." 
 
 That despatch has not yet been answered. The German Chancellor 
 asked for and received a copy as a memorandum, as "he would like to 
 reflect on it before giving an answer." He has had much time and much 
 occasion to reflect. That despatch will be imanswered at the close of the 
 war. The future of mankind depends upon the spirit in which its dis- 
 cussion is resumed, and upon the conditions which then exist. After 
 this present conflict, so much more destructive and appalling than any that 
 Europe has gone through, why should not the United States hold open 
 a road that will at least lead toward Utopia by adopting the suggestions 
 on which the members of the national Chamber of Commerce are now 
 voting — by having in existence the beginning of a League to Enforce 
 Peace by agreements then already made between the United States and 
 some of the neutral nations of South America and Europe ? Si vis pacem, 
 para pacem. If we wish peace let us prepare for peace. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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