Class. 
 Book 
 
 0)4^ 
 
 Copyright ]\^^^ 
 
 COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 
 
MODERN GERMANY 
 
MODERN 
 GERMANY 
 
 IN RELATION TO 
 
 THE GREAT WAR 
 
 BY VARIOUS GERMAN WRITERS 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 WILLIAM WALLACE WHITELOCK 
 
 A.B., Johns Hopkins University 
 Ph.D., University of Munich 
 
 ® 
 
 NEW YORK 
 MITCHELL KENNERLEY 
 
 1916 
 

 COPYRIGHT I916 BY 
 MITCHELL KENNERLEY 
 
 4 
 
 
 PRINTED IN AMERICA 
 
 M 20 1916 
 ©CI.A4334il 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 BOOK I— GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS, BY PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 9 
 
 II. THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN KULTUR, BY PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, 
 
 OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 56 
 
 ni. Germany's international economic position, by professor Her- 
 mann SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 89 
 
 IV. Germany's colonial policy, by dr. wilhelm solf, secretary of 
 
 STATE FOR THE COLONIES I4I 
 
 V. THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM, BY PROFESSOR HANS DELBRUCK, OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 1 69 
 
 VI. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN INSTITUTIONS, BY PROFESSOR 
 
 GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 1 84 
 
 VII. THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY, BY DR. HANS LUTHER, 
 
 CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN 2X8 
 
 BOOK II— GERMANY'S ALLIES 
 
 I. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
 A. THE INNER STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MON- 
 
 ARCHY, BY PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 237 
 
 B. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S FOREIGN POLICY, BY PROFESSOR OTTO- 
 
 CAR WEBER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE 246 
 
 n. TURKEY, BY PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 265 
 
 BOOK III— OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE 
 I. England's policy of force, by professor erich marcks, of the 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 293 
 
 n. France's policy of force, by professor paul darmstadter, of 
 
 THE LTNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN 318 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 ni. BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS, BY PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 34O 
 
 IV. RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM, BY PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 38 1 
 
 V. Serbia's role, by professor hans uebersberger, of the univer- 
 sity OF VIENNA 410 
 
 VI. THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA, BY PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF 
 
 THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE OF HAMBURG 42O 
 
 BOOK IV— THE CAUSES AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
 
 I, THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR, BY PROFESSOR HER- 
 MANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 443 
 
 II. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 508 
 
 III. Belgium's neutrality, by professor walter schoenborn, of the 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 531 
 
 BOOK V— THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR 
 
 I. KUL TUR, THE POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM, BY PROFESSOR FRIED- 
 RICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 559 
 
 n. THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, BY PROFESSOR ERNST ZITEL- 
 
 MANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 584 
 
 III. THE MEANING OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 615 
 
 MEN WHO WROTE 'THIS BOOK 625 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
 
 This book is a translation of Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 
 which was published in Germany in 191 5. It is a collection 
 of essays by a number of leaders of thought in modern Ger- 
 many, and in each case the man is a master of the subject he 
 is chosen to discuss. The writers are, in nearly every instance, 
 professors in German and Austrian Universities, many of them 
 past or present servants of the state in certain capacities in their 
 university work ; the exceptional instances are government officials 
 who are in charge of the state activities about which they write. 
 
 The various chapters, which go to make up the book as a whole, 
 were completed, for the most part, in March of 191 5. At that 
 time Italy had not seceded from the Triple Alliance, and entered 
 into the war on the side of the Allies ; and for that reason Italy 
 has not been included in the discussion of the war, except in 
 references in footnotes. The effect, therefore, has been that 
 Italy is treated as a neutral state. 
 
 A literal rendering of the title of the book, of course, would 
 be Germany and the World War. The book, however, is very 
 much more than a discussion of Germany and the world war. It 
 is a presentation of the civilization or Kultur of Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary in our modern civilization; of Germany's posi- 
 tion in the world-order, and of what Germany is striving toward 
 today. It reveals, as does no other book available, the historical, 
 cultural and social foundations of modern Germany — the mind 
 of Germany at work. It shows us the things Germany is doing 
 and anticipating, in the fields of science, industry, and social and 
 state functions, the significant and important things that are 
 implied in German Kultur, and how this great urge arose out of 
 the very springs of the life of the Teutonic peoples and was 
 determined by the necessities of a growing nation in a circum- 
 scribed territory. 
 
 While the title of the book is Germany and the World War, 
 and while of course the war in most of its varying phases is 
 dealt with in many of the chapters, it is perhaps well to call 
 attention to the fact that the war is of secondary importance 
 to the general purpose of the book, which is to reveal and express 
 Germany to the world in terms of German civilization and 
 German social vision. 
 
4 INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
 
 The book is an outgrowth of the conclusion reached by the 
 highest intellects in Germany that Germany and Germany's 
 aims ought to be interpreted to the world with honesty and 
 understanding. The leaders of German thought were agreed 
 that Germany owed it to herself as a duty to interpret herself 
 to the world, and they undertook the task in that spirit. This 
 book, therefore, growing out of such an agreement and determi- 
 nation, represents the best expression of German thought to-day. 
 
 There are certain details to which attention must be called 
 in which this translation varies from the original German book. 
 
 First, the little foreword to the German book, addressed to the 
 German public, and possessing no value to American readers, has 
 been omitted, and, in its place, has been substituted this introduc- 
 tory note endeavoring briefly to indicate the spirit of the book, and 
 its importance and value to American readers. 
 
 Secondly, the chapter in the German edition of the book enti- 
 tled Krieg und Menschlichkeit Bearbeitet auf Grund amtlichen 
 Materials ("War and Humanity, Prepared From Official Pa- 
 pers") has been omitted. It is a record and an interpretation 
 of official papers which are already sufficiently known to Ameri- 
 can readers; and in effect a restatement of the attitude of Ger- 
 many on questions of international law which are thoroughly 
 discussed in the chapter included herein entitled **The War and 
 International Law." The value of this book does not lie in 
 official papers so much as it does in the fact that it is an expression 
 of the view taken, by German philosophers, of Germany in rela- 
 tion to our world of to-day. 
 
 Thirdly, a great many footnotes in the original book have 
 been omitted from this American edition. It is a habit of the 
 very learned, especially of the German philosopher, in his desire 
 to be comprehensive and even encyclopedic, to use footnotes to 
 a greater extent than is customary in America, except perhaps in 
 scientific, legal and technical publications. In some instances 
 the matter in the footnotes has been incorporated in the text. 
 For the most part, however, all footnotes that give authority for 
 statements of fact or that give the source of quotations, hav^ been 
 included. In cases where the subject of the footnote, or the 
 publication quoted, is already known in America, the footnotes 
 have been omitted. The rule has been merely to use footnotes 
 to give sources of information and authority not readily available 
 to the American reader, and in many cases explications of the 
 book or publication cited are given. 
 
 In one instance the variation from the original is in new 
 matter included in this edition. The chapter entitled "Ger- 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 5 
 
 many's International Economic Position," by Professor Hermann 
 Schumacher, was written, in common with the rest of the book, 
 at the beginning of 191 5; but at the time this translation was 
 in preparation there was available much more complete, as well 
 as later, information in relation to loans and other details of 
 finance and economics, and this later information has been gath- 
 ered and incorporated in this chapter under direct authority of 
 Professor Schumacher. 
 
 Another matter to which it is perhaps well that attention 
 be called is the use of one or two German terms in the trans- 
 lation. The chief instance of this is in the retention of the Ger- 
 man word Kultur, This word, in its German significance, in its 
 inclusiveness, expressing as it does the German attitude toward 
 race development, is essentially untranslatable. It would have 
 been necessary to use an entire phrase to render its meaning in 
 English. In its German form, however, the word Kultur has 
 come to have for Americans something of its true German sig- 
 nificance. 
 
 In certain instances the word Kultur has been used in relation 
 to the civilization and racial progression of other peoples, such 
 as those of France, England and Belgium. In these cases the 
 word has been adopted in the English version because it is used 
 in the German sense, embracing so many things in these civiliza- 
 tions, and thus seemed to express the meaning more satisfactorily 
 than an English equivalent. 
 
 Kultur — the true significance of that misinterpreted word, and 
 all that it means to the German people, is thoroughly revealed 
 in the second chapter in the book entitled ''The Spirit of Ger- 
 man Kultur," by Professor Ernst Troeltsch. 
 
 The word Dreibund is used in this English version to provide 
 against the possible and quite easy confusion of the Triple Alli- 
 ance and the Triple Entente. 
 
 In these remarks it has been kept in mind that the chief pur- 
 pose of this book is to interpret Germany, but it is perhaps well 
 to remember that the book also seeks to interpret Germany's 
 allies, and especially Austria-Hungary, to the world, and, in this 
 translation, to America. 
 
BOOK I 
 
 GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE 
 WORLD 
 
MODERN GERMANY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS 
 PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 
 
 Germany's Historical-Political Growth 
 
 THE political character of Germany is frequently misunder- 
 stood in foreign countries, and Germany falsely judged in 
 consequence. In America, especially, there is an inclination to 
 adopt the English viewpoint, and to measure Germany according 
 to the standards of a state existing under diametrically opposed 
 conditions. The statement is scarcely open to challenge that the 
 spirit and character of a nation depend not alone upon its in- 
 ternal social structure, but in even greater degree upon the politi- 
 cal necessities that spring from its geographical position and its 
 relation to other states and Pov^ers; but, in judging Germany^ 
 this truth has generally been lost sight of. 
 
 The bases for a secure national existence are quite other on 
 the European Continent than in England or America. In the 
 latter countries the nation pursues its course in relative seclu- 
 sion, protected by the sea and undisturbed by the immediate 
 neighborhood of equally pow^erful states v^^hose enmity may, 
 under given conditions, become a serious menace; on the Euro- 
 pean Continent, on the other hand, in a space approximately 
 equal to the territory of the United States, are crow^ded to- 
 gether five Great Powers, besides a dozen smaller states, most 
 of them saturated with ancient traditions and civilization, all 
 armed to the teeth, and all filled with an intense longing for 
 national independence and power, that finds expression in jeal- 
 ously guarded borders and in uncompromising agricultural and 
 politico-military competition. The very spirit of international 
 relations in the different countries is to a great degree influenced 
 by these differing life conditions. Neither Englishmen nor 
 
lo MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Americans have ever been forced to keep so watchful an eye on 
 their neighbors or to observe so carefully as we the change of 
 pressure in the gauge of international politics, caused by military 
 preparations and diplomatic moves. In the feeling of relative 
 security, instead of having to protect their borders, they have 
 been free to devote themselves to the advancement of their wel- 
 fare, and to make their commercial interests the pivot of their 
 political activity. The Continental states of Europe, on the other 
 hand, are filled with a spirit of suspicion and rivalry, that leads 
 them to regard a strong military organization as the absolute 
 prerequisite to their national safety, and hence to their prosperity 
 and civilization. Germany in especial is subject to so relentless a 
 politico-military pressure on her borders that, before all things, 
 she is forced, through the imperative law of self-preservation, so 
 to strengthen herself in a military sense as to be able, in case of 
 necessity, to maintain herself in the face of a world of enemies. 
 
 France Is free from danger on the Pyrenean border, while to 
 the west she Is protected by the sea. Russia enjoys on the Asiatic 
 side, as well as toward the north and south, not alone perfect 
 security, but more or less favorable opportunity for expansion. 
 Each of these states has but one border to protect. Germany 
 must protect herself on two borders, east and west, and were It 
 not for the alliance with Austria-Hungary, she would be Imper- 
 iled on still a third side. This position of our country. In the 
 centre of Europe, without other natural boundaries than those 
 furnished by the sea-coast on the north and by the Alps and the 
 border mountains of Bohemia on the south, Is the decisive factor 
 In our political geography ; nor would it be difficult to trace much 
 of our peculiar political character to this source: not alone the 
 monarchic-military basis In the structure of the state and the 
 framework of our national life, but likewise the indisputable but 
 often misunderstood and distorted fact that our potential military 
 strength can be called forth in Its entirety only for defense, not 
 for attack. 
 
 Our Intellectual life, also. Is plainly under the Influence of 
 this central geographical position. Many good points as well as 
 many weaknesses of our national character result from It: our 
 open mind for foreign art and foreign ideas ; our receptiveness to 
 the good and beautiful, without regard to Its national source; 
 a cosmopolitan spirit ever ready to hearken to the call of other 
 nations and whose dream Is of a republic of letters ; a frequently 
 exaggerated recognition of, and admiration for, the characteris- 
 tics and accomplishments of other peoples ; a facility In the adop- 
 tion of their customs and manners ; an extreme, one might almost 
 
MODERN GERMANY ii 
 
 say, unworthy, delight in foreign words and things, which mars 
 the noble simplicity of a truly national style in speech and life. 
 In the last analysis, this results from the fact that ours is the 
 central European country and nation, open in all directions to 
 the outside world, at no point thrown back upon itself through 
 the existence of natural boundaries, as, for example, is England 
 in her insular position. The latter country, with its immoder- 
 ately developed individuality, is not alone incapable of sympa- 
 thetic and deep study of foreign character, but is all too prompt, 
 without other than superficial understanding, to criticize and be- 
 smirch the character of other nations, as at the present moment 
 that of the Germans, when political and commercial advantage is 
 to be gained thereby. And here again our peculiar geographical 
 position leads to a manifold echoing of this malevolent censure. 
 Let us be under no misapprehension : the number of Germany's 
 friends is small, the number of her enemies, even in neutral 
 countries, is large. Foreign observers have sought to explain this 
 widespread and regrettable dislike of us by the fact that in inter- 
 course with representatives of other nations Germans often exhibit 
 an exaggerated self-consciousness, accompanied by bad manners, 
 that betrays the parvenu. As opposed to this view, may be cited 
 the not uncommon experience that our fellow-countrymen are only 
 too inclined, when abroad, to adopt the foreign manner of life, 
 as though it were superior to their own. On the other hand, 
 we have no desire to deny the fact that the German, ever ab- 
 sorbed with the essence of things, rather than with the form, 
 not infrequently neglects to present his own personality in a 
 favorable manner; as a result, his ofttimes more or less uncon- 
 ventional exterior makes a less pleasing impression than that 
 resulting from the polished courtesy of the Frenchman — ^which, 
 however, promptly ceases with the stirring of chauvinism — or than 
 that made by the firm though somewhat tiresome manners of the 
 Englishman. There may, therefore, be some truth in this re- 
 proach, although the spitefully exaggerated form in which it is 
 generally presented renders it as untrue as are other sweeping 
 judgments of the character of entire nations numbering millions. 
 But only grudging ill-will can be satisfied with this explanation. 
 More important is the justification for aversion which the advo- 
 cates of democratic principles, whose influence is dominant in 
 the majority of countries, discover in our institutions. They fail 
 to find their personal ideal of political freedom realized in Ger- 
 many, especially in Prussia, owing to the fact that with us the 
 monarchic military authority has not yet surrendered to the civil 
 or social-democratic majority. This consideration, to be sure, 
 
12 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 has in no wise prevented our enemies from sympathizing with 
 Russian despotism. I w^ould recommend for their perusal cer- 
 tain passages in Sir Robert Seeley's political lectures. The tend- 
 ency there is to show that conceptions of political freedom 
 differ and that the outward form of a government must be 
 adapted to the vital political requirements of the state. A nation 
 which, like the German, is surrounded on all sides by the strong- 
 est military powers, without natural protective boundaries, can- 
 not have the same institutions as England in her insular security. 
 The degree of political freedom permissible in the forms of 
 government must evidently be inversely proportional to the 
 political and military pressure exerted against the boundaries of 
 the state. Disregard of this rule entails upon a country the 
 fate of Poland in the eighteenth century, when that state paid 
 for undue freedom from political restrictions with its national 
 existence. We Germans, on the other hand, enjoy an intel- 
 lectual and personal freedom by no means inferior to that of 
 Englishmen or Americans, but which, in some respects, is su- 
 perior. And the fact that our form of government is neither 
 parliamentary nor republican should awaken in the breasts of 
 members of those nations w^ho are capable of political judgment 
 merely the perception that the national requirements under which 
 we live are different from their own; it should not be a cause 
 either for dislike or contempt. Tolerance, not only in religious 
 but also in political life, is a virtue that is generally the result 
 of a higher capacity for discrimination and the lack of which 
 gives proof only of vulgar narrow-mindedness and mental limi- 
 tations. 
 
 The fact that we Germans are less favorably criticized in the 
 press and by public opinion in foreign lands than either the 
 English or French is in great part to be explained, furthermore, 
 by the circumstance that we are in a lesser degree the creditors of 
 other nations than they, and that we have lacked their skill in 
 purchasing the venal press of the various countries. Even in 
 regard to Russia, mental and verbal criticism is less severe where 
 the power of the ruble is felt than w^here it is absent. Within 
 the Empire we are in the habit of devoting our money to our 
 own undertakings, and our education in conceptions of honor 
 and incorruptibility has been too uncompromising for us to under- 
 stand, in the manner of Englishmen, Frenchmen and Russians, 
 the art of influencing public opinion in our favor. Democratic 
 parliamentarism is in this respect as greatly our superior as is 
 Russian bureaucracy. 
 
 The principal cause, however, of the dislike of Germans, is 
 
MODERN GERMANY 13 
 
 generally overlooked. It lies in the simple circumstance that we 
 live at the centre of Europe and have more neighbors than 
 any other nation. Propinquity, in view^ of the tension in inter- 
 national relations, is generally synonymous with rivalry or 
 enmity. So deep a feeling of distrust, of fear, of covetousness, 
 of race-antagonism, and of a perhaps even sharper enmity of kin- 
 dred peoples and races, are bound up in our thousand-year-old 
 history with this sense of nearness, so many motives of envy, jeal- 
 ousy, of implacable desire for revenge, that such an excess of 
 malevolence must, in the end, inevitably pass beyond our neigh- 
 bors and exert its influence also upon distant peoples. The fact 
 that Englishmen in this respect are more fortunate is due neither 
 to their greater amiability nor to their superior manners — the 
 latter, we believe, are open to a good deal of criticism — nor is it 
 due to their old and established reputation as a European Power, 
 nor to the respect paid to their political institutions, that have 
 served as models for so many nations. In great part it results 
 simply from the aristocratic exclusiveness of their position in 
 Europe, like that of some dweller in a private manor, whereby 
 they are removed from the countless frictions and misunderstand- 
 ings to which Germans, living as it were in the midst of an over- 
 crowded tenement, are exposed a thousand times daily. 
 
 This fact cannot be sufficiently emphasized: Our historico- 
 political destiny lies in our geographical position. Living at the 
 centre of the Continent, surrounded by Slav and Romance peo- 
 ples, as well as by remnants of Germanic races, we find ourselves 
 forced to maintain an attitude of self-reliance calculated to in- 
 spire respect, if we wish to escape being trodden down and 
 crushed in the struggle of nations — as unfortunately was our 
 fate for so many centuries. 
 
 In former times, before the crystallization of effective national 
 consciousness and while the sense of religious unity formed a 
 strong political bond among the undeveloped peoples of Chris- 
 tian Europe, this central position, together with the lack of 
 strong natural boundaries, may possibly have operated as a fac- 
 tor favorable to the spread of the German race and to its influ- 
 ence in the world. In the south, the gentle approaches to 
 the Alps lured ever onward across the mountains, in contrast 
 to their abrupt descent on the Italian side. During the 
 Middle Ages the German emperors were the standard-bearers 
 of the idea of a universal Christian Empire, which for centuries 
 furnished the basis for European civilization. This was the 
 real imperial epoch of our history. It lies buried in the distant 
 past; but we may be permitted to recall it, to recall its heroic 
 
14 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 splendor and its contribution to civilization, when other nations 
 are disposed to see in Germany the upstart among the European 
 congeries of states. Our emperors marched at the head of their 
 German legions toward Rome, whence they directed the des- 
 tinies of the Christian world, at a time when the tottering An- 
 glo-Saxon monarchy was about to fall a victim to a handful of 
 Norman raiders, when the Capetians were but beginning to 
 conquer for themselves a modest local authority in the Isle de 
 France, and when Russia still lay shrouded in the obscurity of 
 pre-historical barbarism. The German nation was at that time 
 the exponent of the great ideas which controlled the world; 
 but for its own national future it failed to provide. The neces- 
 sity of maintaining a firm grasp on Italy, and if possible on 
 Burgundy, the great struggle between emperor and pope that 
 resulted therefrom — all these were factors which preventeid 
 Germany from laying a firm national foundation, such as Eng- 
 land and France were preparing for themselves during this 
 long period of strife. The princes of the Empire gained an 
 unduly powerful, semi-independent position, the empire itself 
 fell to pieces, and with the coming of the Reformation — that 
 drew its best strength from Germany and found its greatest pro- 
 tagonist in the person of a German — the political powers in 
 the Empire were too weak either to smother the movement or to 
 carry it to complete triumph. The religious dispute split the 
 nation permanently and completed its political disintegration. 
 While religious freedom and tolerance gradually, and as the 
 fruit of bitter strife, gained the upper hand, political power was 
 lost, precisely at the moment when the European system of 
 states was in process of formation. Two remnants only of the 
 German people, Austria and Prussia, achieved or maintained 
 the position of Great Powers. But Austria was too heavily 
 handicapped with non-German territory and clung too tena- 
 ciously to an all-embracing Catholicism permanently to retain the 
 leadership of the German people. The future of Germany de- 
 pended rather on Prussia, even at a time when the Hohen- 
 zollern rulers had not yet begun to dream of a universal Ger- 
 man polity. 
 
 But only through unexampled energy and economy of its 
 military and financial resources was Prussia able, in the midst 
 of the European states, to raise itself to independence and power. 
 It was compelled to assume a political structure consonant with 
 the conditions under which it had arisen, and to adapt itself to 
 general political conditions and to the resulting requirements. 
 Hence the origin of so-called Prussian militarism. It is a form 
 
MODERN GERMANY 15 
 
 of government which does not seek primarily the comfort and 
 happiness of the individual, but rather the power and great- 
 ness of the state, since without the latter, general prosperity can- 
 not be regarded as secure. This system has made the rela- 
 tively large standing army the backbone of a central adminis- 
 tration that takes cognizance of every man and every penny, that 
 teaches self-denial, order and conscientiousness in civil as well 
 as military life, and that has accustomed its citizens rather to 
 fulfill their political duties than to aim at the increase of their 
 political rights. It safeguarded the intellectual freedom of the 
 individual at an earlier period than any other European govern- 
 ment. The "Common Law" of the Prussian state, which came 
 into being during the period of the promulgation of the Ameri- 
 can constitution and of the French Revolution, contains the 
 fundamental guarantee of the most important personal rights, 
 such as religious freedom, personal liberty and security of prop- 
 erty against unlawful administrative encroachment. The differ- 
 ence is that there was no question here of the promulgation of the 
 universal rights of man — it was simply a codification of limita- 
 tions which the state had voluntarily imposed upon itself in its 
 relations with its subjects during the ''age of enlightenment." 
 Public education and enlightenment have been so successfully 
 advanced under the system of Prussian militarism that to-day 
 the state is practically without illiterates, and like the other 
 German states in this respect it leads all other great countries 
 of the world, notably France and England, not to speak of 
 Russia. This system of government, which has by no means 
 been inimical to the conceptions of true freedom, despite its com- 
 pulsion to order and the fulfilment of duty, has proved itself 
 highly adaptable to the transition from enlightened absolutism 
 to the modern constitutional state, with parliamentary control, 
 freedom of the press, the right of assemblage and a healthy form 
 of local self-government. It has developed the fundamental 
 conception of the equality of citizens before the law; in a 
 much higher degree than usually assumed, it has made a reality 
 of Chancellor Hardenberg's demand of 1807: "Democratic in- 
 stitutions under a monarchical form of government." But it 
 opposes a transformation that would place the government in 
 the hands of changing majorities and subject the army to corrupt 
 parliamentary influences — a statement true not alone of Prussia, 
 but of entire Germany. France may indulge in such experiments ; 
 our position is too precarious to admit of the attempt. 
 
 Since the time of Frederick the Great, the Prussian name has 
 enjoyed respect and consideration throughout Germany. Goethe 
 
i6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 speaks approvingly of the "worth, dignity and perseverance of 
 the Prussians." Since the enthusiastic revolt against Napoleon 
 In 1813, since the impressive sacrifices and achievements of the 
 Wars of Liberation from 181 3 to 1815, in the eyes of German 
 patriots Prussia has stood as the future leader in the struggle 
 for German unity. Unfortunately, this unity could be achieved 
 only through separation from the kindred German races of 
 Austria; but the painful operation that severed the Hapsburg 
 Dual Monarchy from the German Empire was nevertheless In 
 the final analysis salutary. It rendered possible a permanent in- 
 ternational union of the two powers, much closer and freer from 
 misunderstandings and rivalries than would have been the case 
 had the old political bond been renewed by means of a loose 
 and artificial federation. Even without such a formal union, 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary are united for better or for 
 worse. Mutually they uphold and support each other in their 
 positions as great World Powers. But Prussia Is, in its relations 
 to the outside world, an absolute unit with the rest of Germany. 
 
 Foreigners find difficulty in grasping the political peculiari- 
 ties of the German Empire, since this is possible only when seen 
 against the background of the country's complicated history. 
 Even such distorted views are encountered as that the other 
 German states have been conquered by Prussia and forced into 
 the union. The only force exercised in this connection was that 
 which existed In the will of the people and in the historico-po- 
 lltical necessity of the moment driving them toward unity. 
 There is between Prussia and the other federal states no greater 
 opposition than, for example, between Massachusetts and Vir- 
 ginia. To speak of ''Prussia" and ''Germany" in antithesis Is 
 misleading. This mode of expression dates from the period of 
 the Confederation of the Rhine, when the German states other 
 than Prussia and Austria which were under the immediate pro- 
 tection of Napoleon, were pleased to call themselves "the real 
 Germany." It is rooted in the thoroughly mistaken conception 
 of a fundamental difference between Prussia and Saxony or Ba- 
 varia or Wiirttemberg, in regard to race and civilization. There 
 are, to be sure, racial diiferences within the boundaries of Prus- 
 sia, as within those of the rest of Germany, but they serve to 
 enrich rather than to Impoverish the national life, and retard 
 in no wise the fusing of all Into a unified whole. In the eigh- 
 teenth century, at the time of Goethe and NIcolal, It may still 
 have been possible to speak of an antithesis In the intellectual 
 life and culture of Weimar and Berlin; but since the days of 
 Humboldt, Fichte and Schlelermacher this antithesis has been 
 
MODERNj GERMANY 17 
 
 eliminated. The various currents of German life have united and 
 merged to form a fuller and stronger stream. The thought and 
 culture of the German people is to-day quite the same in Berlirt 
 as in Weimar, Munich, or Heidelberg. The endless variety of 
 provincial peculiarities are reconciled to form one great whole 
 through the bond of a common national interest. The industrial 
 west and the agrarian east, despite their difference in customs 
 and social structure, long since perceived their mutual interde- 
 pendence and realized that only in union could they hope to 
 survive. Great civic republics and centres of trade, like Ham- 
 burg and Bremen, feel themselves to be integral parts of this 
 national civic and economic federation, in the same manner as 
 the agricultural territories of Bavaria, Hanover and Oldenburg. 
 The inhabitants of the southern and central mountain districts, 
 whence our rivers find their way to the sea, look with precisely 
 the same pride upon the flag at the masthead of our ships of 
 war and commerce as do the North-Germans of the plains and 
 sea-coast. Everywhere, together with self-conscious pride in 
 characteristic local peculiarities, is to be found in the same bos- 
 oms the realization and conviction that only in a firm and har- 
 monious union of all the racial stems and provinces are freedom, 
 prosperity and power to be secured for the German people. The 
 significance of Prussia for the German Empire lies in the fact 
 that her firm political structure, welded upon the anvil of neces- 
 sity, has furnished the strong backbone for the new national or- 
 ganism. Prussia's political spirit has become the spirit of the 
 new German Empire. Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Saxony fight 
 for the same national possessions with the same patriotic devo- 
 tion as the men from Brandenburg, Pomerania and East 
 Prussia. 
 
 The unifying of Germany and the formation of the Empire 
 was not possible by peaceful means. These blessings had to be 
 gained upon the field of battle against the opposition of power- 
 ful European states; for, in view of our central geographical po- 
 sition, a fundamental change in international relationships was 
 thereby brought about. The new order, therefore, was not to 
 be achieved merely as the result of a national movement, through 
 patriotic gatherings and manifestoes — what w^as required to real- 
 ize it, was a bold and far-sighted policy, under monarchical guid- 
 ance and with military emphasis. This fundamental considera- 
 tion gives the key to the whole form of our national existence. 
 Conditions being thus, Prussia, as the strongest German state, 
 was called upon to assume and retain the leadership ; and the 
 Prussian government found itself forced in secret to gather mili- 
 
i8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 tary strength for this great task, in the face of the keenest oppo- 
 sition by the democratic parties. From this fact arose the neces- 
 sity of emphasizing strongly the monarchic-military factor in 
 Prussian life, and of making it secure for the future against par- 
 liamentary majorities. The leadership of the Empire could be 
 given into the keeping of no other hands than those which ruled 
 Prussia. Therefore the Kaiser, invested with the uncurtailed 
 power of a genuinely ruling Prussian king, stands to-day at the 
 head of the federated governments of the Empire. The impor- 
 tance of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is frequently under- 
 estimated abroad, as its activity does not force itself on the 
 public; but since the founding of the Empire its federative char- 
 acter has remained intact. Germany is a federal state, with 
 strongly marked characteristics and self-consciousness in its indi- 
 vidual members. The tendency toward unity is perhaps less 
 strong than in the North American Union. The far-reaching 
 administrative decentralization in this form of constitution needs 
 as a counter-balance a strong and uniform direction in the conduct 
 of its foreign policy, and this must of necessity be placed in the 
 keeping of the Emperor, acting under the advice of the Imperial 
 Chancellor. 
 
 The Empire is thus provided with a strong monarchic head; 
 nor is the power of the Emperor or that of the King of Prussia 
 the impersonal shadowy prerogative of a parliamentary ruler — 
 it is a real, living, directing force. In the minds of foreigners 
 the conception of a personal government is generally bound up 
 with the picture of arbitrary power, lawlessness and despotism. 
 They are too unfamiliar with our history and the spirit of our 
 institutions to understand that a free constitution and a strong 
 monarchic power are by no means irreconcilable. The English 
 constitution is based upon the fact that the various classes of 
 society, under the leadership of the aristocracy, succeeded in re- 
 ducing the royal power to a state of impotence. Conversely, our 
 constitution has crystallized about the monarchy as a centre, 
 around which the various classes of society — nobles, burghers 
 and peasants, and in addition already a considerable percentage 
 of workingmen — have formed themselves in a body, the whole 
 permeated and held together by the different elements of the 
 civil service and the officers and the army in general. This in- 
 ner growth of our organic political life is still in process of de- 
 velopment, and is now, under the influence of the present great 
 events, approaching a happy consummation. Our rulers declare 
 themselves to be such "by the grace of God," but not in the 
 sense in which Englishmen understand the notorious jure divino 
 
MODERN GERMANY fi9 
 
 of the Stuart kings. The meaning of this characterization from 
 the viewpoint of political law is simply that the royal power was 
 not granted by the people, but that it rests upon ancient, his- 
 torical right that has grown and ripened coincident with our 
 history, thus proceeding from a combination of factors which 
 piety may be inclined to ascribe to a higher dispensation. Ex- 
 alted, mystic conceptions, such, for example, as those indulged 
 in by Frederick William IV, are of a purely subjective, indi- 
 vidual nature and without the faintest constitutional significance. 
 The monarch is not, in our eyes, the representative of God upon 
 earth, but merely, as Frederick the Great expressed it, the first 
 servant of the state. And when William II takes pleasure in 
 acknowledging himself to be the instrument of the Most High, 
 this is intended in no other sense than might be employed in the 
 religious conception of any other calling. It intensifies moral 
 elevation and the sense of responsibility, but does not in any 
 manner touch constitutional prerogatives. 
 
 By the side of the Emperor and the federated governments 
 stands the Reichstag, a representative body of the German people, 
 resting upon the broadest democratic basis, with whom the former 
 powers must agree on such matters as the appropriations for army 
 and navy and the levy of indirect taxes and customs duties. But 
 universal, direct, equal suffrage, with secret ballot, which is the 
 basis of this parliamentary body, could not with equal justice be 
 claimed for the Prussian legislature. In the Empire equal suffrage 
 rights may be regarded as the corresponding equivalent of the 
 universal duty to bear arms and of the burden of universal in- 
 direct taxation. In Prussia, on the contrary, where the Land- 
 tag, or legislature, decides on questions of direct taxation, from 
 which a large part of the electors are exempt, such equal rights 
 might, at times, lead to serious injustice. It must, nevertheless, 
 be admitted that the present arrangement, which rests upon the 
 principle of a suffrage graduated according to tax liability, has 
 with the passage of time degenerated in favor of plutocracy and 
 is in need of a thorough revision. Absolute universal suffrage, 
 however — which, by the way, has not yet been realized even in 
 England — is not practicable in Prussia, for the reason that par- 
 liamentary friction could not be still further increased without 
 seriously disturbing the smooth working of our already highly 
 complicated governmental machine. Government with us is 
 more difficult than in parliamentary states, or than in such states 
 as recognize the separation of the various powers, as in America. 
 Our German governments are forced to resort to compromises 
 with the various political parties, in order to gain a majority to 
 
20 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 support them in the main outlines of their policy. Transcen- 
 dental government (above parties) presupposes a much higher 
 degree of knowledge, application and skill on the part of respon- 
 sible circles than government by means of party rule. In Prussia 
 It is, nevertheless, necessary to have a government that stands 
 above parties, not alone for the reasons already given, which 
 spring from our peculiar political position, but owing to the 
 nature of the parties themselves. The division of the various 
 factions has been carried much further with us than in England 
 or America; the divergence of principles Is sharper, the spirit of 
 criticism Is much more highly developed than is the actual ad- 
 ministrative ability. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to 
 say that the German parliamentary parties represent rather the 
 various interests of civil society than real political ideas or prin- 
 ciples. With these social Interests, however, are bound up op- 
 posing views of religion, of cosmic conceptions and of nationality 
 in so complicated a manner as scarcely to be understood by a 
 foreigner. 
 
 Closer examination of the various sections of the Conserva- 
 tives and Liberals need not be entered upon here; but some 
 observations seem appropriate in regard to parties like the Centre 
 and the Social Democrats, which may be characterized as 
 international and which in fact form the complement to the 
 pronounced nationalistic side of our public life. One may be 
 permitted to characterize the ideals which they represent as "su- 
 pernational." These tw^o political parties are a palpable mani- 
 festation of the ineradicable cosmopolitan idealism that is Inher- 
 ent in German blood. The ideal of the Centre Party is the 
 unity of the Cathohc Church with the Pope as leader. The 
 Ideal of Social Democracy Is the brotherhood of the working 
 classes of all countries, the triumph of labor over capital, of the 
 cooperative system of organization over that of a master class — 
 m the last analysis, the metamorphosis of the world Into one 
 great cooperatively governed commonwealth of producers and 
 consumers. That such ideals, despite doctrinaire exaggerations, 
 are nevertheless quite reconcilable with stanch national convic- 
 tions was demonstrated long since by the Centre Party, through 
 its practical cooperation in parliamentary work; w^hlle the patri- 
 otic attitude of the Social Democrats at the outbreak of the war 
 justified the opinion of those who had claimed that members 
 of this party were from every point of view worthy to be con- 
 sidered a valuable and indispensable part of the nation. It Is the 
 party of radical opposition in all questions of domestic policy, a 
 natural phenomenon of reaction called forth by the strongly 
 
MODERN GERMANY 2i 
 
 developed, yet politically necessary, monarchic-military principle 
 in our form of government. The intensity of opposition is 
 greater than in any other state, but it is unavoidable; and, al- 
 though the conduct of government is thereby rendered extremely 
 difficult, nevertheless in many respects it has proved a beneficial 
 incentive to the w^hole body politic. Without the Social Demo- 
 cratic Party, social conscience could scarcely have been awak- 
 ened as has been the case. The idea of social justice has gained 
 a power in our legislation and administration that permits the 
 Government to take up the fight on any question of social poli- 
 tics with a good conscience, while it has, on the other hand, not 
 been without beneficial influence on the working classes. Our 
 legislation for the insurance of workingmen, the state-socialistic 
 spirit of which was at first the subject of foreign derision, is 
 now generally imitated, even in England, which originally 
 seemed furthest from such ideas. Our legislation for the pro- 
 tection of workingmen, for which England may be said to have 
 furnished the model, has gone further than the original. Eng- 
 lish labor commissions have been astounded by the general con- 
 dition and the high standard of living of our workers, which is 
 unmistakably and continually improving. The hopeless doc- 
 trine of the "iron law of wages" has long since been thrown 
 onto the scrap heap. 
 
 In no other country, taken by and large, is the system of 
 taxation more just than in Germany. Especially Prussia, with 
 its progressive income and supplementary property tax, in 
 this respect towers high over the French Republic. We cannot, 
 of course, avoid social conflicts in the future, but they will 
 be fought out, we hope, along the lines of common national 
 interests, even though the international sympathies of the leaders 
 of labor may not entirely disappear. The workers will 
 perceive more and more the significance of the state for them 
 as for others; casting aside prejudice, they will learn to 
 acknowledge and appreciate more and more the Government's 
 spirit of justice, and the readiness of self-sacrifice of the pros- 
 perous classes, who in 19 13 without a murmur assumed the 
 burden of a defense contribution of a billion marks. And, al- 
 though our Social Democrats reject militarism on principle, 
 nevertheless in practice they are excellent soldiers. The stern 
 discipline of the army has raised the political and unionist or- 
 ganizations of our workers to an exceedingly high plane. 
 
 Less significant than the social and religious divergencies 
 in our party life are those of a national character, which are 
 bound up with certain abnormal aspects of our history. The 
 
22 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 German Empire is a national state of a peculiar kind: its boun- 
 daries are not identical with those of the German race and of 
 the German language. At many points they fall considerably 
 short of these; at others they extend somewhat beyond them. 
 As early as the sixteenth century certain important outlying 
 portions seceded from the great German territory, coherent eth- 
 nologically and linguistically as it existed in the Middle Ages 
 at the time of the old empire, but as yet without the bond of a 
 common written language. This secession was due to the fact 
 that the centrifugal tendencies resulting from international con- 
 ditions were stronger than the unifying power of the weakened 
 and disrupted empire. Toward the southwest the Swiss fell 
 away in order to form, with certain Romance elements, a sepa- 
 rate state of strongly marked individuality; but numbering as 
 they do to-day more than two and a half millions, they continue 
 to use, in addition to their Allemanic dialect, the German lit- 
 erary language, and have remained in close and uninterrupted 
 touch with German thought. In the northwest descendants of 
 the Frisians and Franconians have attained not alone an inde- 
 pendent political existence, but have developed also an indi- 
 vidual language, and regard themselves as a separate people. In 
 addition to the six million and odd inhabitants of the Protestant 
 Netherlands, under this classification are to be reckoned nearly 
 four millions of Flemish residents in Belgium. Besides the 
 above loss through segregation of boundary districts, many mil- 
 lions of Germans have been lost to the Fatherland by the exten- 
 sive colonization of former times, and especially through the 
 prodigious emigration of the last century. They are to be 
 found in Transylvania and Hungary, in Russia, and above all 
 in the United States, all of which received during the nineteenth 
 century an influx reckoned by millions, that brought to them a 
 valuable Teutonic element in the upbuilding of their national 
 life. 
 
 The formation of the German Empire and the resulting eco- 
 nomic prosperity has gradually served to check this feverish 
 movement toward foreign countries. But the political rebirth 
 of Germany was not accomplished without an extremely serious 
 and significant loss of Teutonic national territory: the Germans 
 of Austria, living in immediate contact with their brothers of 
 the neighboring land, were excluded from the boundaries of the 
 Empire. They number to-day approximately ten millions, and 
 belong to us through language and education. Their sympa- 
 thies strengthen the bond that unites us to the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Monarchy. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 23 
 
 These kindred German elements on foreign territory, how- 
 ever, have never served as an excuse for a policy of "irreden- 
 tism" on our part. Political considerations and also, to an 
 extent, the emphatic disinclination of these disrupted border 
 remnants of our nation, have always precluded such plans from 
 being entertained by serious and responsible politicians in Ger- 
 many. Our sympathies naturally extend to our fellow-country- 
 men in other lands, especially to those who, surrounded by 
 foreign elements, are in danger of losing their national charac- 
 teristics. We strive to aid them to maintain the German 
 language, customs and education. This absolutely non-political 
 cultural design has been pursued for many years by the Associa- 
 tion for German Ideals in Foreign Countries {Verein fiir das 
 Deutschtum im Auslande), previously known as the German 
 School Association, in view of the nature of its chief activities. 
 The results of such an educational movement have naturally 
 been favorable to the standing and interests of the German 
 nation abroad. Valuable influence may in this manner be ex- 
 erted, especially upon commercial interests, for trade follows 
 not alone the flag, but the language as well. When on occasion, 
 however, nationalistic jingoes and hotspurs have overstepped 
 these boundaries, they have promptly not only met with an 
 emphatic rebuff in responsible governmental quarters, but in 
 addition have learned that the great majority of the leaders of 
 public thought will have nothing to do with such plans. 
 
 On the other hand, in the course of history the inclusion into 
 the German state of certain border territory w^ith foreign ele- 
 ments has proved unavoidable, as in North Schleswig, in Al- 
 sace-Lorraine, and especially in Poland and Upper Silesia. 
 Such elements, however, form together only about seven per cent 
 of our entire population, which, according to the last census 
 (1910), numbered approximately sixty-five millions, and which 
 to-day must have reached nearly the seventy million mark. This 
 element, therefore, cannot be regarded as exercising any seri- 
 ously adverse influence on the national character of the German 
 Empire. An absolute separation of nationalities at the frontiers 
 is quite impracticable, since Germanic and foreign elements are 
 in many cases inextricably mixed; and the political necessity for 
 the inclusion of such elements is dictated by the need of a 
 boundary, not favorable, perhaps, but tenable from a military 
 point of view. In Alsace-Lorraine, where approximately two 
 hundred thousand of the inhabitants speak French, the national 
 question is complicated by the still continuing protest against 
 the annexation of the provinces — although this step was the 
 
24 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 result not alone of an irresistible nationalistic demand, but was 
 dictated by military necessity for the protection of our bound- 
 aries against France. It must never be forgotten that it is 
 here a question of former Germany territory that was illegally 
 torn from us at the time of our greatest weakness. Metz and 
 Strassburg in French control represent sally ports against Ger- 
 many, whereas under German dominance they are a bulwark 
 for the protection of our borders. Many observers are of the 
 opinion that the placing of these territories upon a footing of 
 approximate equality with other Federal States of the Empire 
 has proved a detriment rather than an advantage; but other im- 
 partial critics declare that the process of amalgamation, con- 
 strained by its very nature to be slow, is progressing normally. 
 At all events, we are justified in the hope that the experience 
 of this war and the resulting elimination of the most embit- 
 tered nationalistic propagandists may pave the way to perma- 
 nent improvement and final settlement of the conditions. 
 
 The one important national problem of Prussian and German 
 politics is Poland. As a state Poland could not live, as a nation 
 it cannot die. At the time of the various divisions national sen- 
 timent did not yet exist. As regards the dismemberment of the 
 land, Prussia found herself on the horns of a dilemma. She faced 
 the alternative either of becoming a partner in it or of surren- 
 dering the entire booty to Russia, and thereby of permitting this 
 dangerously strengthened neighbor to advance her boundaries 
 close to Berlin. The territory taken by Frederick the Great 
 had previously been the home of German civilization ; that added 
 by his successors transformed Prussia temporarily into a half- 
 Slavic state. In our opinion it is fortunate that the main por- 
 tion of these Polish provinces did not remain in Prussian pos- 
 session. It is a fact, however, that the Prussian Government 
 was desirous of retaining a larger share of these former Polish 
 possessions than Russia was willing to grant. The motive for 
 this desire was the need of a more or less satisfactory boundary 
 in that great plain which possesses but few natural lines of de- 
 fence. One must admit that the portion finally awarded to 
 Prussia, and which to-day forms the province of Posen, was for 
 this reason the very least that could be demanded. Even so, 
 the boundary, with the deeply encroaching Russian salient be- 
 tween Silesia and East Prussia, is so unfavorable, from the mili- 
 tary point of view, as to admit of defence only through great 
 superiority in numbers or in generalship. Together with this 
 boundary line, Prussia acquired a Polish population, whose Ger- 
 manizing, at that period of growing nationalistic tendencies, was 
 
MODERN GERMANY 25 
 
 from the start practically out of the question. It numbers to-day, 
 with the inclusion of other elements, notably those of the more 
 ancient Upper-Silesian stock, four millions of people, who form 
 a kind of separate community within the German state. The 
 position of Prussia is different from that of Austria in regard 
 to the Poles of Galicia. Prussia Is and must remain a strongly 
 centralized and uniform state; it cannot grant to the Poles a 
 separate political existence, but on the contrary must see to it 
 that the youth of the country, who of course are subject to the 
 universal duty of bearing arms, do not constitute a useless for- 
 eign element in the German army. They must understand the 
 German language, and the German school and German adminis- 
 tration are the sole means to this end. It is mainly this necessity 
 that has constantly brought about fresh conflicts. There is room 
 for discussion as to the possible extent of concessions to be made 
 to nationalist feeling, but the problem is how to satisfy in a just 
 manner the national demands of our Polish citizens, without at 
 the same time losing sight of Prussian and governmental exigen- 
 cies. That problem up to the present no one has succeeded in 
 solving. The present crisis bears with especial weight upon this 
 sensitive point in our national and political life. The Polish 
 question, in view of the changes which the war has rendered 
 possible, must in the future be earnestly and sympathetically con- 
 sidered. As a factor in the outbreak of hostilities it was of no 
 moment, and in the struggle itself our Polish-speaking citizens 
 have done their full duty. 
 
 The German nation, despite its long history, is nevertheless 
 not an ancient race. In point of age it lies midway between 
 France and Russia, as do likewise Austria-Hungary and Great 
 Britain, although these two countries may be said to approach 
 the French rather than the Russian extreme. France, with an in- 
 crease of population of but 1.8 per thousand, shows unmistakable 
 signs of degenerative age; Russia, with an increase of 21 per 
 thousand, those of effervescent youth ; while Germany, whose 
 increase is 13.6 per thousand, represents what may be described 
 as the prime of life. Perhaps w^e have already passed the highest 
 point of our increase in population — until 19 10 it stood at 14.5 
 per thousand, recently it has fallen slightly — but in any event 
 we stand well above the United Kingdom, which shows only 
 an increase of 8.7, about the same as that of Austria-Hungary. 
 Our increase, therefore, is about 900,000 yearly; and only a far- 
 seeing and unrelaxing economic policy can solve the problem of 
 feeding this ever-rising population on a fixed territory. That 
 we have been successful is proved by the fact that emigration has 
 
26 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 steadily decreased since the eighties, until in 191 3 but 25,800 
 persons left the country — that is to say, less than accretions 
 through immigration. The constantly increasing capacity to sup- 
 port our growing population has been gained not alone through 
 mechanical and industrial advance, but also through the progress 
 of agriculture. German economic life is characterized by the 
 union of agriculture and manufacturing industry, not by their 
 opposition. But it lies in the nature of things that the results of 
 progress and industry are more perceptible in the manufacturing 
 field. In this, German energy, mature yet still youthful, mani- 
 fests itself very clearly. France has long since passed the 
 zenith of her industrial development ; she is the t) pical capitalistic 
 nation, retired from business, as it w^ere, and living on her 
 savings. Russia is, in this respect also, still in youthful im- 
 maturity. England in recent years has seemed likewise on the 
 point of passing into the class represented by France. We are 
 in the ascending scale; commercially also we arc about to become 
 a World Power. 
 
 II 
 
 Character of Germany's World Policy Contrasted with the 
 Imperialism of Her Enemies 
 
 At the time of the founding of the German Empire, Europe 
 was still the political world beyond which the eyes of its states- 
 men scarcely strayed. The new state became ^ member of the 
 European system, assuming the position among the Great Powers 
 which Prussia had hitherto held. With the resurrection of the 
 imperial dignity no thought was given to a revival of the old 
 ideas of the earlier imperialism. On the contrary, the new Em- 
 pire was created in conscious opposition to this ideal of the Mid- 
 dle Ages. The German people and its leaders had not failed 
 to profit by the history of a thousand years. They were fully 
 aware that a policy aiming at world dominion easily carries the 
 nation which represents it into paths of degeneration and deform- 
 ity, economically as well as politically. The German Empire 
 aimed to be nothing but an equal among the other Great Powers 
 of the world. The paramount prestige which it temporarily en- 
 joyed among the European states was only the natural effect of 
 the deep moral and political impression made by its remarkable 
 achievements and successes, and especially by the impressive per- 
 sonality of its great statesman. But an actual dominance, threat- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 27 
 
 ening the interests of other states, was not the corollary of this 
 prestige. 
 
 The European system has been based, from its inception, upon 
 the principle that the component states recognize each other's 
 entire independence, and that a certain number of these powers — 
 previously five, since the advent of Italy, six — preserve among 
 themselves a species of balance, so that no one of them can exer- 
 cise exclusive or excessive power. 
 
 This system of Great Powers, enjoying equal rights and mu- 
 tually respecting each other, this international commonwealth 
 upon which rests the European civilization of the last four hun- 
 dred years, is a new phenomenon in the history of mankind which 
 developed only during the period from the sixteenth to the nine- 
 teenth century. Neither the history of ancient times nor that of 
 the great Oriental states knows this principle of equality and of 
 mutual recognition in an international community of powers. It 
 came into existence as a result of the community of religious and 
 cultural interests among the states of the Christian Occident, 
 following the shipwreck of the imperial and papal dreams of 
 universal power. But this idea did not develop spontaneously 
 and in peaceful harmony ; it was born rather of the struggles of 
 rivalling interests in the uninterrupted continuance of which remi- 
 niscences of the imperialistic idea of the Middle Ages played a 
 considerable part. The clashing of the tendency towards a uni- 
 versal monarchy with the conception of the autonomy of the na- 
 tions is what has called into being the European idea of the bal- 
 ance of power. This has proved, it is true, an uncertain bal- 
 ance, but the many disturbances which it has suffered have at no 
 time led to a permanent dominance of any one single state. This 
 relationship of the Powers was previously confined to the Conti- 
 nent of Europe. The colonial world, as well as commercial and 
 maritime interests, were excluded from its purview. In this field 
 England, the outlying member of the European system, had in 
 the course of the eighteenth century gained an almost exclusive 
 ascendency. But this condition, which had resulted concomitant 
 with the great development of states since the sixteenth century, 
 though considered unwelcome was not keenly or universally 
 felt to be a disturbance or menace to the balance of power, so 
 long as the maritime interests of the Great Powers remained too 
 unimportant seriously to influence the general political situation. 
 Not until recently did a change take place in this respect. 
 
 England's conception of the European balance of power was 
 to the effect that it should be the means of increasing and main- 
 taining her maritime ascendency. It meant that the Continental 
 
38 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Powers should destroy each other by constant warfare, in order 
 that England might have a free hand at sea and in the colonies. 
 Throughout the centuries of modern history it has been the 
 relentless principle of British policy to fight the strongest Power 
 of the Continent by means of the others. 
 
 The mutual rivalry of the Continental states at all times 
 furnished England with a convenient handle for such a policy. 
 Moreover, this political maxim of hers helped to prevent the 
 Continent from ever finding peace and to perpetuate and in- 
 tensify the differences of the various Powers. In this connec- 
 tion, however, it cannot be denied that at the time of Louis 
 XIV and Napoleon I, Europe's balance of power and her free- 
 dom were seriously threatened, or even almost destroyed, and 
 that it was due to the assistance of England that they were 
 maintained and restored. Especially in the person of Napoleon 
 was there a decided recrudescence of the old imperial conception, 
 of the dream of universal monarchy. Not alone the political 
 exigencies resulting from the struggle with England endowed 
 his plans with an all-embracing scope looking to the subjection 
 of the entire European Continent; but bound up with these per- 
 sonal aims we find ambitions which were an inheritance from the 
 past of France and Europe in general, and which through the 
 personal lust for power of the Corsican assumed gigantic propor- 
 tions. But the moment which, through the cooperation of the rest 
 of Europe with England, saw the thwarting of this mighty 
 attempt to found a Continental despotism, brought with it the 
 consummation of England's undisputed sway over the seas, com- 
 merce and colonies. The European balance of power was, and 
 remained, for England primarily a means to this end; it became 
 more and more a deceptive catch-word intended to mislead 
 public opinion by the fetich of European freedom and to conceal 
 the fact that it was the discord of the Continental Powers that 
 smoothed England's way to world-dominion. 
 
 The European system is to-day an obsolete notion. The 
 surface of the earth, through the vast increase in international 
 intercourse, has assumed a unified aspect from the economic and 
 political standpoint. A new system of World Powers is coming 
 into being. All the Great Powers to-day have interests across 
 the seas much the same as England, with whom they have come 
 into more or less keen competition, unless content to shape their 
 course according to the latter's dictates. To the six European 
 Great Powers have been added the United States and Japan. 
 In the same manner as the medieval states, those of to-day are 
 beginning to group themselves and to delimit the spheres of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 29 
 
 their influence and interests. As in the period of mercantilism, 
 an important role is again being played by the commercial seclu- 
 sion of the various states and by the endeavor to gain for them- 
 selves greater and self-sufficing trade territory. Not w^ithout 
 justice has this been spoken of as the New Mercantilism. The 
 spirit of commercial competition and political rivalry has arisen 
 anew^, with a strength long unknown. A struggle identical 
 with that which, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
 resulted in the creation of the European Great Powers, is to-day 
 being waged to determine the World Powers in the future system 
 of states. In this connection the fact of England's command 
 of the seas stands forth with new significance. In former 
 times England, through her maritime interests and colonial 
 possessions, reached far beyond the confines of the European 
 system of states of which she formed in a measure an 
 extraneous part; her existence was dual: she was at the same 
 time a European and a World Power. Now, to the full 
 extent of her possessions and interests, she has become an integral 
 part of the new and greater system of states, and in this new 
 setting the successful maintenance of her claim to the sole ruler- 
 ship of the seas would mean nothing less than world-domination. 
 Sir Walter Raleigh's saying: ''Who rules the seas, rules the 
 world," has gained a new significance to-day. The ocean, which 
 in this age of extended steamship traffic, of cables and wireless 
 telegraphy, forms one vast unit, has in truth become to-day, as 
 Friedrich List foresaw, "the highway of international inter- 
 course." To seek to control this element is as though one were 
 to say to the inhabitants of a city: "In your houses you may 
 do as you will, but when you step into the street you must act 
 according to my rules and interests." 
 
 Here is the great problem of the future: Will the principle 
 of the equality of the various states govern the new world system 
 as it did the old European system ; or will a single Power, namely 
 England, finally succeed in founding upon the basis of her 
 predominance at sea a w^orld dominion that will seriously limit 
 the independence of the other Powers, that may prevent them 
 under certain circumstances from pursuing their vital interests, 
 and that will grant them only so much space and freedom of 
 movement as seems consonant with her own interest and 
 convenience ? 
 
 In the answer to this question all the Powers are interested, 
 but none so vitally as Germany. 
 
 With the new era of imperialism Germany finds herself 
 placed in an extremely difficult position. No sooner had we 
 
30 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 succeeded in gaining for ourselves a normal national existence, 
 such as France and England had enjo3^ed for centuries, than 
 the foundations upon which it rested, namely the European state 
 system, with its old inherited standards and relationships, changed 
 and expanded into the system of world states. In this latter 
 system a continuous rise in the scale of national and international 
 life again threatens our painfully won commercial and political 
 position. We are surrounded by states, many of which have 
 grow^n to gigantic stature, while we, confined at the centre of 
 the civilized and overcrowded Continent, were cut off from free 
 access to the seas by the barricade of the British Isles. We 
 were, therefore, unable to gain, or even to aspire to, such expan- 
 sion of our territory as would have corresponded to the example 
 of other nations or to our increase in population. This we could 
 have done only by exposing ourselves to the dangers of a world 
 war, in which, presumably, the surrounding Powers, unhampered 
 in their expansion, would have leagued themselves against us. 
 Such is, approximately, the situation to-day; and not alone our 
 enemies, the English, but even the Americans, influenced by 
 them, have disseminated the view that in the last analysis it 
 was the impulse of the German people toward expansion that 
 brought about the war. As disproof of this legend, the fact 
 must be emphasized that for many years the German Emperor 
 and his advisers have systematically and unswervingly pursued 
 the policy of avoiding all attempts at an expansion which could 
 have been bought only at the price of a world war. Conditions 
 were unfavorable to us owing to the fact that the most valuable 
 colonial territory was already in firm possession at the time when 
 we appeared upon the scene. Germany's advent was too long 
 delayed for her to profit in the division of the world as her 
 interests demanded. That was not our fault, but our destiny. 
 Even after 1871, for more than ten years Germany's interior 
 as well as exterior condition was not such as to permit her to 
 undertake far-reaching plans of expansion, without serious danger 
 to herself and with the prospect of success. The contemptuous 
 charge which English writers now bring against Bismarck that, 
 in the blind passion of war against the opposing Clericals and 
 Social-Democrats, he missed the favorable moment to found 
 a great colonial empire for Germany, betrays entire misappre- 
 hension of the difficulties of our foreign policy at that time. 
 Not until the formation of the Dreibund, and the signing of 
 the treaty of 1884 with Russia, was Bismarck free to take up 
 the question of a colonial policy. And if he undertook this 
 only with the greatest caution, with the guiding principle of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 31 
 
 allowing the flag to follow commerce, so to speak, his policy 
 was based upon the clear perception of Germanj^'s peculiar 
 position in the world, w^hich has not changed materially since 
 then and which may be summed up in two sentences. First, 
 we lack the natural basis for the up-building and control of a 
 great colonial empire, such as France and Russia possess, thanks 
 to the propinquity of the territory which they are colonizing, 
 or such as England enjoys through her maritime position and 
 her long mastery of the seas; second, colonial and foreign 
 complications in which the interests of the various Powers are 
 involved, react with especial force and in a dangerous manner 
 on Germany, in view of her central position, which subjects her 
 to a concentric pressure from the other states and thereby 
 threatens her very existence. This circumstance has not ceased 
 to be of importance to-day, when through the increase of our 
 transoceanic interests, w^e find ourselves face to face with the 
 necessity of changing from a European Power Into a World 
 Power. It is this difficult position of Germany at home that im- 
 parts to her foreign policy a peculiar character, frequently misun- 
 derstood and falsely judged, not alone in other countries, but even 
 among ourselves. It becomes thereby, in a degree, experimental, 
 uncertain, and calls for extreme caution. There is no other 
 course than to determine by experiment what gains are possible 
 without precipitating armed conflict. The unchanging principle 
 which has guided German policy has been the avoidance of a 
 world war for the sake of colonial expansion; it has sought, 
 instead, to advance the interest of the nation by peaceful means. 
 
 This fact has impressed upon Germany's world policy its 
 special character, which is strikingly different from the imperial- 
 ism of England, France, Russia and the other Powers. 
 
 French imperialism resulted rather from the desire to recover 
 through great and successful colonial enterprises the prestige 
 lost in the w^ar of 1870 than from the natural impulse toward 
 expansion of a healthy, sturdy race. It created a great colonial 
 empire in Southwestern Asia, in Madagascar, in Senegambia, 
 and especially in Northwest Africa in conjunction with Algeria, 
 without being driven thereto through increase of population or 
 by the needs of export. The aim of this policy was political 
 rather than commercial, an important consideration in the expan- 
 sion and development of the northwest African territory being 
 the hope of finding in the Moorish soldiers a substitute for the 
 numerically insufficient recruits at home. 
 
 Russian imperialism is of a healthier and sturdier nature. But 
 in her case it is even more apparent that aims of political power, 
 
32 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 not commercial considerations, are the dominant factor. The 
 question is here not of founding a distant colonial empire, but of 
 advancing the country's boundaries in all directions. It is 
 Russia's destiny, one may say, to be forced to seek expansion 
 to the proportions of a continent, thereby becoming a menace 
 to all its neighbors. Vital interests urge this vast continental 
 power in every direction tow^ard the sea. Peter the Great 
 opened a w^indow on the Baltic for the ancient Muscovite em- 
 pire; Catherine II succeeded in reaching the coasts of the Black 
 Sea. But these confined, inland seas fail to satisfy the greater 
 commercial and political needs of the present. For a long time 
 Russia's chief aim has been the straits upon vi^hich stands Con- 
 stantinople, and u^hich by the treaty of 1841 are closed to her 
 ships of w^ar, as to those of all other nations. She regards the 
 Dardanelles as the key to her house, and would fain transform 
 the Black Sea into a Russian Mediterranean, in order to bring 
 the coasts of Asia Minor and Europe under her mediate or 
 immediate authority. This political desire for expansion has 
 a religious background, which renders it holy in the eyes of the 
 orthodox Russian nation: namely, the expulsion of the Mo- 
 hammedans from the Cathedral of St. Sophia. But bound up 
 with this is an extremely important commercial consideration^ 
 Two-thirds of Russia's grain export, which represents billions 
 of rubles and which is of the most vital importance in the preser- 
 vation of her domestic economic welfare, must pass through the 
 Dardanelles; therefore the closure of this passageway, a thing 
 which may happen in every Balkan war, has the most serious 
 results for her domestic and foreign trade. Hence Russia's 
 claim for the political control of these straits. This considera- 
 tion determines her attitude toward the Eastern question. 
 
 Free access to the Mediterranean would, however, not per- 
 manently satisfy Russia; she would seek also to open a way past 
 Gibraltar and through the Suez Canal, in order to be enabled to 
 dispatch her fleet to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, Toward the 
 north, likewise, she feels the need of gaining a free passage from 
 the Baltic into the ocean. Since the control of the Danish straits 
 would be difficult to acquire and retain, Russia has of late 
 years turned her eyes toward Sweden and Norway, which, owing 
 to the Gulf Stream, possess ports free from ice throughout the 
 year. Her strategic railways in Finland — one near the coast, 
 the other somewhat inland — could easily transport troops and 
 munitions in either direction. The possession of Narwik would 
 be of great value to Russia. Her fleets would then be able to 
 cooperate in the Atlantic, from south and north. But this is 
 
MODERN GERMANY 33 
 
 only one side of Russia's efforts at expansion. More important, 
 perhaps, even than the European field is the Asiatic. The entire 
 history of Russia consists of a gradual extension into the vast 
 territory of forests, moors and steppes beyond the Ural Moun- 
 tains and the Caspian Sea. This is at one and the same time 
 a process of agricultural and military settlement, very different 
 from the colonizing of the West-European maritime nations. 
 The Russians are fond of emphasizing the fact that their advance 
 into Asia brings them into contact with peoples who neither in 
 customs nor feelings are foreign to the simple Russian peasants 
 and Cossacks, as they are to the West-European colonists and 
 pioneers of civilization; they say that they are able to under- 
 stand the soul of the Orient and are therefore its natural leaders. 
 The only limit to this advance is the sea; but the ocean itself 
 holds an invitation to further expansion. A gateway to the 
 sea was gained in Siberia and in the Province of Amur. But the 
 harbor of Vladivostok, which is closed to shipping part of the 
 year, could not satisfy the desire for an open port on the Pacific 
 Ocean ; therefore Port Arthur was seized — and then lost. The 
 war with Japan temporarily checked the advance in this direc- 
 tion and produced a fundamental change in the situation. Like- 
 wise the movement toward India and along the Persian Gulf, 
 as a result of these events, has come to a temporary standstill. 
 Russian imperialism has again turned toward Europe. Never- 
 theless, its Asiatic aspect is sure to assume prominence anew; 
 its aim is to bring under the rule of the "White Czar" the 
 entire European-Asiatic territory that has not yet assumed the 
 established form of a modern state and to whose Oriental 
 inhabitants this yoke may not appear oppressive. 
 
 The maritime imperialism of England is not less far-reaching 
 than that of Russia. The world domination that she has built 
 up and that she still seeks to extend and strengthen, rests upon 
 the basis of her mastery of the seas. An English historian has 
 characterized his country as "Oceana"; another calls it a "world- 
 w^ide Venice," in which colonies are city districts and oceans are 
 canals. In a double ring the colonies are grouped around the 
 motherland. From the constitutional point of view, an inner 
 ring may be said to be formed by the great dominions with 
 representative government, which are autonomous states within 
 the boundaries of the Empire. The endeavor which the Imperial 
 Federation League has sought to realize is to weld them into 
 a commercial and military union under common direction; but 
 this ambition seems likely to encounter insurmountable obstacles. 
 The remaining colonies, with the Indian Empire, constitute the 
 
34 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 outer ring. It is the duty of certain of them to render secure 
 for England the great ocean lanes, upon which depend both 
 her commerce and her safety. From Gibraltar stretches such a 
 chain of stations, by way of Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and the Suez 
 Canal, thence from Aden and Koweit to the confines of India, 
 and then through the Straits' Settlements to Singapore and East 
 Asia. Egypt plays a special role in the scheme of the British 
 Empire: it is the point at which England's African and Indian 
 interests unite. Cecil Rhodes' gigantic conception of giving a. 
 firm central support to British influence in Africa by means of 
 a Cape-to-Cairo railroad fits into this scheme, as does also the 
 recently exposed desire of England to bring the Persian and 
 Arabian coasts under her control and to turn the Indian Ocean, 
 together with the Persian Gulf, into a British lake, guarded by 
 her possessions in East Africa, Southern Asia and Australia. 
 
 Such is the imperialism of our enemies. How modest in 
 comparison seems that which Germany has striven for and 
 achieved! There is not only a difference of degree, but like- 
 wise of kind. That which we call "world policy" is something 
 quite different from the imperialism of the other Powers, despite 
 a certain superficial similarity. It has not been our chief aim, 
 in the manner of these states, to build up a great colonial empire 
 by which to increase our power among the nations of the world ; 
 rather has our endeavor been, in keeping with our peculiar 
 geographical and political position, before all things to secure and 
 advance our industrial and export interests. As Bismarck de- 
 sired, our colonial undertakings have been the organic result 
 of our commercial needs. The main incentive has been furnished 
 by the increase in our population and the necessity of providing 
 them with food. One may endeavor to provide for a growing 
 population in two ways: either through the acquisition of new 
 territory into which it can overflow, or through an increase in 
 industrial activity, which brings a greater volume of food into 
 the country in exchange for exports and which renders it possible 
 for the nation to increase within its limited territory. We were 
 forced to choose the second way, since the first seemed to us 
 impracticable. It led us, however, to the goal which we had 
 set ourselves: emigration has ceased, and our people are content 
 and prosperous. Though not underestimating our colonial pos- 
 sessions, we cannot say that they form an empire of political 
 im.portance like those of France, Russia or England. The terri- 
 tory which they offer our people is neither suitable nor sufficient 
 for purposes of settlement; they provide but a fraction of our 
 need in tropical food products and in raw material for manu- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 35 
 
 iactures; nor do they furnish a market worth mentioning for 
 our exports. The hopes which are entertained as to the possi- 
 bility of future development do not materially alter this opinion. 
 Despite this fact, we have made no effort to secure by force 
 great or more valuable colonies. The misfortune of a 
 world war has always seemed greater to us than the possible 
 resulting gain. We were content to have obtained a footing 
 at different points throughout the w^orld and to possess a training- 
 school for colonial administration. Our main object has always 
 been the establishment of the principle of the open door in the 
 great commercial districts of East Asia, South America and 
 Morocco. In these places we desired to be able to trade under 
 the same conditions as the French and English, in order to 
 advance our export interests. In this connection we have con- 
 sistently championed the independence and Integrity of the exotic 
 countries, whenever their measure of civilization seemed to hold 
 out a promise of well regulated and secure relations. We opposed 
 in general the proposition that it is necessary to control such 
 countries politically in order to enjoy advantageous commercial 
 intercourse with them. According to English imperialism, 
 ^'peaceful penetration" of a country means nothing less than the 
 preliminary step to Its political subjugation. Hence the readi- 
 ness in Anglo-American circles to interpret our relation to 
 Turkey as in the nature of England's to Egypt, or of France's 
 to Morocco. At the time of the granting of the concession to 
 Germany for the building of the Bagdad railway. In 1903, Sir 
 Harry Johnston, an English colonial expert, conceived the fan- 
 tastic plan of encouraging Germany in the founding of a great 
 eastern empire, embracing the districts traversed by the railway, 
 namely Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey. They 
 Avere all to be brought under German suzerainty. The basis for 
 this plan was the expectation that Germany's ambition and desire 
 for expansion would in this manner be diverted Into channels 
 innocuous to England. Doubtless, also, there existed the gener- 
 ous Intention of arousing distrust among Germany's threatened 
 friends and of involving her in deadly conflict with Russia. 
 
 This scheme, which at the time was most severely criticized 
 even by the Pan-Germanists and rejected as a "gift of the 
 / Greeks," still haunts the brains of Englishmen and Americans, 
 ' and has given birth to such grotesque imaginings as Usher's book 
 on "Pan-Germanism." It is self-evident that neither the German 
 Bank nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs ever indulged In such 
 fantastic dreams. Our Interests In Asia Minor and Mesopotamia 
 were limited to gaining for ourselves at these points an important 
 
36 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 market, capable of great development, and a source from which 
 raw material might be obtained for our manufactures — there 
 was no question of German colonization or of political domina- 
 tion. The Bagdad railway was a purely commercial undertaking, 
 and if it possessed any political significance it was solely that 
 Turkey might by its construction be strengthened along com- 
 mercial and military lines and placed in a position to be better 
 able to resist possible imperialistic encroachment by Russia or 
 England. It was not fear of Germany's imperialistic plans that 
 inspired England's relentless opposition to this undertaking; 
 rather was it her disinclination to see Turkey strengthened, and 
 in addition the dread lest this shorter rail route to the Persian 
 Gulf might prove a successful competitor with the waterway 
 through the Suez Canal. To this was added the general appre- 
 hension of seeing England's absolute and exclusive preeminence 
 challenged on these coasts, which serve as a connecting link 
 between India and Egypt. Germany's readiness to make conces- 
 sions in this affair is a matter of general knowledge. We met 
 England's desires in regard to the last section of the road, from 
 Bagdad to Koweit, and agreed to place it under international 
 control. Further, we agreed with Russia to take steps for 
 connecting the Bagdad railway with the branch planned for 
 Persia. 
 
 Germany's foreign or world policy is thus seen to be quite 
 different from that of England, Russia or France. It was 
 not given to us to create a great colonial empire comparable 
 to those of our enemies ; but neither has that been our endeavor, 
 since the conditions to such an end were from the start too un- 
 favorable, owing to our geographical and political position and 
 to the previous distribution of colonial territory. We have in 
 the main contented ourselves with striving to advance our vital 
 interests in the economic sphere by trying to secure "a place in 
 the sun" with the other World Powers, in order to increase and 
 maintain the export trade necessary to provide the nation's 
 food supply. An unfriendly observer might perhaps say that 
 the grapes were too sour. And why should we not admit having 
 made a virtue of necessity in proceeding along moderate lines 
 in our foreign policy? Did we not wish voluntarily to be ex- 
 cluded from the list of World Powers, there was no other course 
 for us on the occasion of the last act in the division of the world 
 but to raise our voice and now and again to demand our por- 
 tion. But in doing this we have on principle avoided war with 
 other Colonial Powers, and even the most unfriendly judge 
 
MODERN GERMANY 57 
 
 must admit that the preservation of peace has been the golden 
 thread in our world policy. 
 
 Si vis pacem, para bellum. He who desires peace must prepare 
 for war. The German government has made this approved 
 saying its guiding principle. The caution with which it avoided 
 dangerous disputes went hand in hand with the thorough-going 
 preparation for the eventuality of an unavoidable conflict, which 
 it did not wish for, but faced without fear. A policy of peace 
 without preparation is a sign of weakness and impotence. 
 Thorough preparation creates quiet self-confidence and that de- 
 gree of respect in the eyes of the world requisite for sober self- 
 restraint in the interest of peace, without the danger of exposing 
 the state to the loss of its dignity and power. Our aim has been 
 so to strengthen ourselves in a military way that any possible 
 desire of our enemies to attack us might thereby be held in 
 check. In this attempt we could not limit ourselves to our 
 army; it was necessary for us to possess a fleet in keeping with 
 our position, our maritime interests and our place as a World 
 Power. Unobstructed access to the sea is for us, as for every 
 World Power, an absolute necessity. The way to the ocean lies 
 through the English Channel, unless our ships are to follow 
 the long and costly course around the Shetland Islands, which 
 is by no means devoid of danger during the stormy months of 
 winter. The English, and even the French fleet, in certain 
 circumstances, might block this course for us. In the Baltic 
 Sea we are threatened by the third great navy, that of Russia. 
 In distant lands and seas the German merchant and sailor, the 
 settler and missionary need the protection of German cruisers. 
 In the present condition of the world only that state which 
 possesses a strong high-seas' fleet can maintain its position in 
 the foremost rank. Our Emperor was the first to perceive this 
 simple truth and to draw the logical conclusion from it. In 
 Admiral Tirpitz he found the discriminating aid who has created 
 a German fleet capable of inspiring respect. In the naval 
 program of 1900 our aim is plainly stated. Our fleet was to 
 be sufficiently strong to cause even the greatest naval Power 
 to hesitate to attack us or to attempt injury to our vital interests, 
 since the probable loss which it would sustain in case of war 
 would threaten its own superiority. It was the least with which 
 we could be content; the present state of affairs furnishes the 
 proof of this. The defensive aim of our naval preparations 
 could not have been more clearly expressed. In our threatened 
 position we could not feel even measurably safe unless able on 
 land and water to offer adequate resistance to the political and. 
 
38 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 military pressure exerted by our enemies against our borders. 
 In order to secure peace we had to make them respect us. In 
 this sense we have always regarded the high cost of our military 
 preparedness in the light of an insurance premium against the 
 danger of war. This preparedness and the prudent circumspec- 
 tion of our policy has resulted in the preservation of peace during 
 forty-three years. 
 
 This circumspect and restrained foreign policy, content to 
 renounce great and brilliant successes for the sake of preserving 
 peace, and limiting itself to the minimum of development of 
 German influence in foreign lands consonant with the nation's 
 welfare, has encountered much public opposition. Especially 
 has the Pan-German Society, since its founding in 1890, with 
 varying emphasis but unceasingly, opposed the Foreign Office. 
 It complained that this policy showed a lack of boldness, of 
 ''the will to power," of decisive success. The Imperial Chan- 
 cellor von Billow on one occasion reproached this doubtlessly 
 patriotic group of political critics with acting rather under the 
 influence of a warm heart than of a clear head, and with allowing 
 themselves, freed from any shackles of responsibility, to be car- 
 ried away on the wings of their fancy. To decide whether a 
 political move was wise or the reverse is always an extremely 
 difficult matter for an uninitiated observer. Such a one lacks, 
 at any given moment, the ability to take in at a glance the entire 
 political chess-board and hence fails to grasp the general situa- 
 tion, especially as the facts known to the public are always 
 capable of divergent interpretation and explanation. Notably 
 in criticising Germany's world policy are the dangers frequently 
 lost sight of which every single step is apt to entail upon our 
 European position, that lays us open to joint pressure from 
 without. Had we acted according to the desires of the Pan- 
 Germanists, peace could scarcely have been preserved so long. 
 Nor should we have felt, as to-day, so strongly and unanimously 
 that we have drawn the sword in justifiable self-defence, that 
 we have been attacked by our enemies and are forced to fight for 
 our existence. 
 
 As a general proposition, it is undoubtedly laudable to accustom 
 the public, with disregard of domestic party questions, to inde- 
 pendent discussion of the great problems of our foreign policy 
 from a broad national basis. For we Germans have hitherto 
 been only too prone in the press and in the forum to thresh out 
 party questions, leaving the responsibility for the power and 
 greatness of the Fatherland in the experienced hands of the 
 Government. Our history under Bismarck's guidance showed us 
 
MODERN GERMANY 39 
 
 the frequent folly of the criticism of the great problems of states- 
 manship by uninitiated publicists and parliamentarians, who were 
 slaves to party doctrines. On the other hand, the successes 
 of his policy accustomed us in international questions to trust 
 blindly in the guidance of the Government. The successors of 
 the great chancellor have not enjoyed the confidence of the 
 public to the same degree. It is easy to understand their sensi- 
 tiveness under the spirit of criticism that awoke among un- 
 initiated and irresponsible fault-finders. No one desires to see 
 in public discussions a cessation of interest in international ques- 
 tions; but with the growth of political training and under- 
 standing, there comes a corresponding discretion in the expression 
 of opinion and in the award of praise and blame. The difficul- 
 ties of a country's foreign policy increase in direct proportion 
 with the possibilities for embarrassing complications and with the 
 resulting need for the exercise of prudence. It is less difficult 
 for an Englishman or American, even for a Frenchman or 
 Russian, to discuss the problems of his country's foreign policy 
 than for a German, since ours is the most difficult international 
 position. The politicians of the Pan-German Society cannot be 
 said in such discussions to have displayed on the whole a percep- 
 tion of the attainable or to have been sufficiently careful to 
 avoid fantastic excesses; but in other national patriotic circles, 
 also, displeasure over the apparent failures of the Government 
 and the decrease of German influence in the world has expressed 
 itself in noisy emphasis of the "will to power," at times even 
 with threats and rattlings of the sword. 
 
 In the famous book of General von Bernhardi the necessity of 
 a **w^ar of prevention" is urged with a frankness that does credit 
 rather to the soldier than to the statesman. Torn from their con- 
 nection and more or less distorted, his statements are quoted in 
 numberless pamphlets and newspaper articles, especially in those 
 from English and American sources. Such books as Bernhardi's 
 are made use of by our enemies to convince neutral countries that 
 Germany not only desired the war but wantonly brought it about 
 in order to escape from an untenable position. It is impossible to 
 over-emphasize the fact that such writings are in no sense the ex- 
 pression of our official policy and that they had nothing to do with 
 the outbreak of the war. They are, on the contrary, in direct 
 contrast w^ith the peaceful and restrained policy of the Emperor 
 and his government. Whoever knows Kaiser Wilhelm II 
 realizes that he uttered the absolute truth in solemnly declaring 
 that he was forced by his enemies to draw the sword. The 
 history of his reign of twenty-five years gives proof of his 
 
40 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 steadfast desire to preserve peace as long as it was compatible 
 with the honor of the German name and the interests of the 
 Empire. This is an indisputable fact, which rises to confute our 
 enemies in their attempt to throw the responsibility for the 
 war upon us. They have sought to avoid this difficulty by 
 inventing and spreading the fiction that the peace-loving Emperor 
 was forced into the war by a military clique. The English in- 
 ventors of this fable, in their absolute and characteristic ignor- 
 ance of German conditions, must have confused Berlin and 
 Petrograd. But the fertile political imagination of the English 
 is not satisfied with a single version. The author of one of the 
 Oxford pamphlets thinks himself better informed. It was not 
 the work of the military clique of Potsdam (whose existence 
 seemed a trifle too misty), but that of the 'Tan-German League." 
 An anonymous writer, under the cloak of "Daniel Frymann," 
 had ofFered the suggestion in a pamphlet, "If I were the Kaiser," 
 that Germany would do well, if her foreign office could not 
 be better managed, to introduce parliamentary rule like that 
 of England and France. From this suggestion promptly and 
 with easy facility, the English writer draws the conclusion 
 that the Pan-German League had threatened the Emperor with 
 dethronement and thereby forced him to renounce his peace 
 desires. And the same author claims to have discovered still 
 another reason for Germany's eagerness for war, and this the 
 strangest of all. The country, he declares, was on the verge 
 of a great economic collapse, owing to the lack of markets for 
 its accumulated and unsalable wares, and it began the war in 
 order to relieve its desperate plight. These arguments are pure 
 inventions, absolutely without foundation, and give evidence of 
 such childlike ignorance of conditions in Germany that they 
 serve only to amuse us, despite the seriousness of the subject 
 and of the present moment. The motive for such inventions is 
 a wicked desire to libel us and the author betrays unmistakably 
 his attitude of mind when at one point he represents as highly 
 plausible, in view of the Archduke's friendliness for the Slavs, 
 the assumption that the murders at Serajevo were planned in 
 Berlin rather than In Belgrade! How desperate must be our 
 enemies' case if they must needs have recourse to such weapons. 
 But even in apparently unbiassed American writings — which 
 are, however, really governed by English ideas — we encounter 
 the widespread and evidently generally accepted explanation 
 that Germany found herself forced into the war by reason of her 
 restricted position and the paralyzing pressure exerted by Eng- 
 land and her allies upon the country's commercial and political 
 
MODERN GERMANY 41 
 
 freedom of movement. Whatever may have been the Imme- 
 diate occasion for hostilities, Germany, it is claimed, w^as the 
 actual aggressor, in the eflFort to escape from her untenable 
 position and to improve her position in the u^orld through the 
 defeat of England and France. The genesis of this explanation 
 is quite evident. Germany's constricted position and the pres- 
 sure exerted for many years by England and her allies upon 
 the country's vital activities are well-known facts; nor wnll any 
 one be convinced by the English attempts at denying the invldi- 
 ousness of Great Britain's policy towards Germany when it is 
 so apparent as in the Morocco question. Support for the above- 
 mentioned explanation may have been found in the fact that 
 writings such as General Bernhardi's seemed to expound the 
 same ideas. 
 
 Yet, such a construction is absolutely false. The w^eak point 
 is the assumption of Germany's untenable and desperate posi- 
 tion. A political extremist who measures his demands by the 
 unprecedented successes of Bismarck's times and who entertains 
 the naive belief that things can continue indefinitely in 
 the same manner, may, perhaps, regard as unfavorable the 
 political position of the German Empire, in view of the 
 lack of similar successes and achievements in this vastly more 
 difficult period of "w^orld politics." But he who limits his 
 demands to a normal and sensible standard must admit that 
 we have by no means fared badly considering our extremely 
 difficult position. It is impossible to deny that we had entered 
 upon a period of remarkable economic advance. The problem of 
 adequately employing and feeding our growing population within 
 the boundaries of the Empire itself, since we possess no colonies 
 fit for settlers, much less a great colonial empire, had been solved 
 for a long time to come. Agriculture and industry had been 
 brought into harmony, and so close an approach made to Aris- 
 totle's ideal of "autarchy," or national self-sufficiency, that 
 its complete realization in the future scarcely seems unlikely. 
 We had taken measures for the welfare of our w^orkers as no 
 other country in the world has done; the national w-ealth show^ed 
 most satisfactory improvement. And yet, in addition to all this, 
 w-e did not omit to complete our military preparations on land 
 and sea. The balance of our debit and credit w-hich was taken 
 in 19 1 3, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth 
 anniversary of the Kaiser's reign, show^ed satisfactory progress 
 in all departments. Despite the jealousy and ill-will of our 
 neighbors we had become richer and stronger from year to 
 year. 
 
42 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Our development into a World Power bj^ the side of our 
 more favorably situated neighbors had continued slowly but 
 steadily. It was our hope through industry to maintain the 
 ''place in the sun" which we had w^on with such difficulty. We 
 hoped likewise that increasing strength would inevitably bring 
 with it freedom of commercial activity. Our position was far 
 from untenable; least of all could we look forward to its im- 
 provement through a world war on the result of which would 
 depend the very existence of our race and its position in the 
 world. None of the Great Powers in a general war would have 
 as much to lose as we, even with Austria-Hungary as our ally. 
 The situation was unmistakable — war was to be thought of for us 
 only in the event of compulsion. With anxiety we saw this 
 compulsion ripening in the growing enmity of the Powers which 
 opposed us. Therein alone lay our danger, and despite the 
 moderation and caution of years, we were not able to avoid it. 
 As an obstacle in the path of England's and Russia's imperialistic 
 ambition our strength as a World Power had to be crushed. 
 Although naturally opposed to each other, these two Powers, 
 through the great changes in international relations and through 
 their mutual understanding with France, our old irreconcilable 
 enemy, had been gradually brought to form the fatal alliance, 
 which from the start was aimed at us. Finally, following the 
 bloody tragedy at Serajevo, the critical moment arrived when, 
 after frequent increase and relief of the tension and after repeated 
 strengthening of military preparations, Russia, the strongest 
 military power among the allies, hurled the fire-brand from its 
 hand and precipitated the world conflagration. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Germany's Foreign Relations Since iSyi 
 
 France had never unreservedly accepted the conditions of 
 the Peace of Frankfort. Her statesmen and patriots had re- 
 mained true to Gambetta's watchword: Never to abandon the 
 thought of revenge, even though they did not speak of it. The 
 recovery of Alsace-Lorraine appeared to them as a kind of 
 national duty ; and even during the period before the disputes 
 with England in colonial matters had been adjusted, their eyes 
 remained fixed threateningly on Germany. After 1871 Bis- 
 marck was never without the fear of the forming of a coalition 
 against the Empire, the natural centre of which was France. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 43 
 
 In order to weaken pressure from this direction, he left no stone 
 unturned to promote the consolidation of the Republic, which 
 he assumed would be less militaristic than a restored Bourbon 
 monarchy. For the same reason, he welcomed and embraced 
 the opportunity to divert the ambition and energy of the country, 
 which had shown such astounding powers of recovery, into 
 colonial undertakings on a great scale. But the Republic adopted 
 the militarism of the empire, and developed it to a higher degree 
 than would have been possible to a monarchical government. 
 Further, colonial imperialism by no means forced the hopes of 
 revenge permanently into the background ; on the contrary, in 
 the end it served to vitalize them anew. The deep hatred for 
 the conqueror of 1870, which smouldered in the hearts of most 
 Frenchmen, kept alive the legend nourished by the country's 
 conscienceless jingoes that Germany was constantly on the point 
 of attacking France. We can state with absolute sincerity that 
 this has never been the case since 1871, not even in 1875, despite 
 diplomatic gossip to that effect. Especially in recent years has 
 Germany's strongest desire been to enter into an understanding 
 with France on the basis of neighborly confidence and security 
 from hostilities, which would have enabled her with a free and 
 undisturbed mind to promote the development of her commercial 
 interests in the world. The courteous attentions and attempts 
 at rapprochement of our "Peace Emperor" seemed excessive to 
 the national pride of many Germans. He succeeded thereby in 
 elevating the tone of international intercourse, but failed to change 
 French sentiment. Blood revenge, which has been eliminated in 
 personal relations in civilized countries, seems to be irrepressible in 
 the relations of states to each other. France thus became the 
 country in w^hich Europe's hatred against Germany was nursed. 
 New hatred displaced the old. In order to strengthen herself 
 against Germany, France finally abandoned her colonial rivalry 
 with England. The humiliation in the Fashoda Affair (1898-99), 
 resulting in the renunciation of all claim to the territory of the 
 sources of the Nile and therew^ith the abandonment of her 
 former Egyptian ambitions, paved the way for the later under- 
 standing with the mistress of the seas. The real pivot, however, 
 on which the policy of France turned was the alliance with 
 Russia. It was an old political conception of the days of Napoleon 
 and Alexander I, that had never quite been lost sight of but 
 which, since the eighties, had become the chief support of the 
 hope for revenge. So greatly had the patriotic imagination of 
 French speculators and money-savers been excited and blinded 
 by this idea that in the course of twenty years they invested 
 
44 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 at least seventeen billion francs in Russian bonds. Without 
 this sum, Russia's recent development of her agriculture, manu- 
 factures and railways would have been quite impossible. 
 
 During the critical years from 1863-70 Russia served as the 
 protector of Prussia's rear. The traditional union of the two 
 ruling houses was further strengthened by the personal con- 
 fidence which Bismarck enjoyed at the court of Alexander II 
 and which the jealous intrigues of Gortschakow failed to under- 
 mine. Prussia's attitude toward the Polish insurrection of 1863 
 had shown Russia that it possessed a trustworthy friend in the 
 former state. But in Russia they seemed unable to forget the 
 role which Nicholas I had once played in Germany, and believed 
 themselves justified in claiming Germany's aid in Russia's policy 
 of expansion and desire for power, the recognition and satis- 
 faction of which would gradually have brought Germany into 
 a position of dependence, in fact, of servitude. Austria's atti- 
 tude during the Crimean War and the ancient rivalry of the two 
 states regarding influence in the Balkans, which had been intensi- 
 fied by Austria's elimination from Germany and Italy, had made 
 Russia more determined in her hostile feeling toward the Haps- 
 burg monarchy. The result of this since 1876 had been a 
 gradual troubling of Germany's relations with Russia. Bis- 
 marck was firm in the conviction that a strong Austro- 
 Hungarian state was a vital necessity for Germany, in the face 
 of the growing Russian power. From his ^'Memoires" we 
 know that in 1876 he opposed the Russian plan of a war of 
 extermination against Austria, and that the Russian government 
 thereupon came to an understanding with Austria, with the 
 result that the storm-centre shifted from the Carpathians to the 
 Balkans. Again at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck's attitude 
 was not such as his Russian friends believed they had a right 
 to expect. Bismarck likens Russia to an exacting woman who 
 expects her suitor to divine and execute her unexpressed wishes. 
 What Russia expected was that Germany should throw the full 
 w^eight of her authority into the scale, in order to obtain for 
 her neighbor a predominance in the Balkan Peninsula. But 
 this would have increased Russia's power in a very dangerous 
 manner, while at the same time it would have rendered Ger- 
 many's relations to the other Powers extremely unpleasant. As 
 is well known, Bismarck contented himself with the role of 
 the honest broker, and it was with his indulgence that, owing 
 to England's protest, the peace treaty of San Stefano was not 
 carried out but was revised in favor of Turkey. As in the 
 Crimean War, Russia had once more been checked in her vie- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 45 
 
 torious march toward Constantinople. Her opposition to Eng- 
 land, about which international politics turned in the nineteenth 
 century, as they had turned about the enmity of France and 
 England in the eighteenth, had been dangerously increased. This 
 found expression in Russia's advance into Asia toward the bor- 
 ders of India. At the same time the friendship between Russia 
 and Germany had suffered a severe strain, which, it is true, was 
 temporarily concealed but which did not admit of real cure. In 
 view of France's irreconcilable attitude, Bismarck realized the 
 necessity, as a safeguard against the resentment of Russia, of 
 a union w^ith the state which the Czar has just threatened with 
 annihilation. 
 
 In 1879 the alliance was entered into with Austria-Hungary, 
 whereby each of the contracting parties pledged itself to come 
 to the aid of the other in the case of an unexpected attack 
 by Russia, which they hoped to avoid. Nothing was further 
 from Bismarck's desire than thereby to render the break with 
 Russia complete. On the contrary, he took great pains to 
 bring about a renewal of friendly relations with that Power, so 
 as to preclude the danger of an armed conflict. And following 
 Italy's entrance into the German- Austrian alliance in 1882, as 
 a result of her resentment at France's occupation of Tunis, he 
 succeeded in realizing the treaty with Russia, in which the latter 
 country promised, in the event of war between Germany and 
 any other Power, to maintain an attitude of benevolent neu- 
 trality. Russia's motive for entering into this agreement was her 
 desire to gain protection against England on the Continent. 
 Bismarck had won through the friendly understanding with 
 Russia the opportunity for freedom of action in the Balkans. 
 Conditions at that time still justified his guiding principle that 
 the Balkan question did not concern Germany and that it was 
 not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. Bismarck's 
 chief gain, however, was that through the agreement he held 
 Russia back from responding to the friendly advances of the 
 French Republic. He had succeeded in isolating England and 
 France, while drawing the three eastern empires more closely 
 together. Upon this basis, also, rested the possibility of Ger- 
 many's assuming an active part in international politics and 
 of entering upon a course of colonial acquisition, at first in Africa. 
 The Berlin Congo Congress of 1884 is an event which demon- 
 strates the new aspect of affairs. 
 
 The march of events in Bulgaria from the year 1885 on soon 
 brought Russia again into sharp opposition with Austria, and 
 this reacted also upon her relations with the Gernjan Empire. 
 
46 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The suspicion that Germany was attempting to play a part in 
 the Balkan question was fostered and strengthened by forged 
 letters which reached the Czar from French sources. Even 
 without this, Alexander III, who had had no personal experience 
 of dynastic relations with the Prussian rulers and who had been 
 guided into other channels by his Danish wife, was easily Inclined 
 to distrust Germany and much more susceptible to Russian na- 
 tionalistic and Pan-Slavic Influences than his predecessor. Bis- 
 marck, however, was able, in the course of a personal Interview 
 In 1887, to demonstrate that the documents In question had 
 been forged and thereby remove a pregnant source of distrust 
 from the Russian side. The crisis of 1887 was safely passed, 
 but the state of mind which had rendered it possible remained 
 as a continuing danger. It was a characteristic sign of the 
 times that at this moment the high tide of the Boulanger move- 
 ment coincided with the Russian anti-German press campaign. 
 From both camps came the demand for an alliance of the two 
 countries against Germany, and In Russian nationalistic and Pan- 
 Slavic circles the saying began to be heard that the road to 
 Constantinople led by way of Berlin and that the settlement of 
 differences in the Eastern question was to be sought on the 
 Rhine and the Oder. 
 
 Yet Russia's main interest lay In her expansion in Central 
 and East Asia. The consequent danger of a conflict with Eng- 
 land caused the Russian government, despite the growing un- 
 friendliness toward Germany of natlonalistically Influenced pub- 
 lic opinion, to consider the renewal of the agreement with this 
 country for three years valuable enough to prefer It to an un- 
 derstanding with France. Kaiser Wilhelm II likewise has 
 taken all possible pains to cultivate and maintain the tradi- 
 tional relations with Russia which his grandfather urged upon 
 him on his death-bed, Bismarck's retirement, however, Intro- 
 duced a change In the political program In as much as his suc- 
 cessor, Caprlvl, did not attribute the same importance to the 
 formal signing of a treaty as the originator of the Russo-German 
 Treaty had done. The machinery seemed to him too compli- 
 cated; he feared, above all, to arouse Austria's distrust in case 
 the secret agreement should become known. It was thus chiefly 
 out of consideration for the Austrian alliance that the renewal 
 of the Russian convention in 1890 was abandoned. It was 
 thought that friendly relations with Russia might be maintained 
 and cultivated even without such a formal basis, which, further- 
 more, had had no value as a counterbalance against the anti- 
 German sentiment of the public. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 47 
 
 It is a question of opinion whether this view did not under- 
 estimate the importance of the treaty. At all events, there now 
 became manifest in Russia an increasing desire to welcome 
 French advances, in order not to face England and the Dreibund 
 quite isolated. The naval visits to Kronstadt and Toulon 
 followed. The Franco-Russian treaty, that Bismarck had con- 
 sistently striven to prevent, became a reality, though this dual 
 alliance did not yet assume precisely the aspect of a threat 
 to Germany. It appeared, like the Dreibundj to be of a de- 
 fensive character, and could be regarded as a means for preserving 
 the European balance of power. It was directed against England 
 as well as against the Continental Powers. 
 
 England betrayed the fact that in France and Russia she 
 recognized her probable future antagonists, not alone on the 
 occasion of the vast increase of her naval armament in 1888, which 
 was based upon the ''two-power standard" and which ushered 
 in a new epoch in modern naval history, but likewise during 
 the period of the succeeding ten years. She welcomed, therefore, 
 the lapsing of the close alliance between Germany and Russia, 
 a development which she had striven in all ways to bring about ; 
 she now sought to bring Germany's policy into line with British 
 interests. Harmonious cooperation of the greatest naval power 
 and the greatest military power for the preservation of peace 
 was proclaimed as the program of the future. The so-called 
 Zanzibar Treaty was entered into, whereby Germany surrendered 
 important coast possessions and territorial claims in East Africa, 
 in exchange for Heligoland, whose future maritime importance 
 no Englishman at that time suspected (1890). 
 
 England's idea in arranging her relations with Germany in 
 this manner was to bind the latter country's hands in colonial 
 matters. Relations, therefore, became increasingly strained as 
 Germany in 1894 (in conjunction with France) successfully 
 opposed a violation of the Congo Act by England, and later in 
 connection with the events in South Africa from the time of 
 the Jameson Raid to the annexation of the Boer Republics. 
 The long accumulated displeasure at German competition, the 
 jealousy caused by the thriving of our manufactures and trade, 
 the hatred of the successful rival, found at this time astoundingly 
 strong and undisguised expression in the English press; especially 
 noteworthy was this in an article in the Saturday Review, 
 which with a warped but ominous variation of Cato's warning, 
 uttered the watchword: Germaniam esse delendam! 
 
 This indiscreet revelation of England's true feelings was an 
 important factor in causing the German people to give friendly 
 
48 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and intelligent support to the first great naval programme of 1898. 
 At this time, however, England still regarded Russia, not Ger- 
 many, as her most dangerous enemy. The agreement of 1899 
 had laid the basis for a future understanding with France. But 
 Russia, with its designs on the Persian Gulf, with its ambition 
 to become the dominant Power in East Asia and in the Pacific 
 Ocean, aroused the most serious apprehension in England. 
 Especially was this so during the Boer War, which for years 
 taxed the country's powers. Hence the endeavor of the British 
 government to gain Germany, which had preserved absolute 
 neutrality during this war, as an ally against Russia. It was 
 at this time that Chamberlain uttered the rally cry for a Teu- 
 tonic union, comprising England, America and Germany (1899). 
 Germany, however, was far removed from unfriendly intentions 
 against Russia, with which, as a matter of fact, it had just 
 reestablished better relations. An alliance with England, under 
 the conditions then existing, would have implied an abandonment 
 of the development of the navy and of an independent position 
 in world politics. An additional factor was the unwillingness 
 of the parliamentary government of England to bind the country 
 by definite treaties for definite eventualities. So these negotia- 
 tions came to naught. The year 1900 witnessed the unanimous 
 action against China of the World Powers, including the United 
 States and Japan. But the Imperial Chancellor, von Biilow, 
 did not allow himself to be swept by England beyond the provi- 
 sions of the Yangtse agreement into opposition against Russia 
 in the Manchurian question. This attitude of the German 
 government finally convinced England that in no event would 
 Germany permit herself to be used against Russia. The British 
 government now took a most unusual step by forming. In 1902, 
 an alliance with Japan, aimed primarily against Russia. This 
 treaty from Its inception bore the germs of war, which broke out 
 in 1904 and which resulted in freeing England for a long period 
 from the fear of Russia's growing power. Japan had under- 
 taken the role intended for Germany. The unfortunate out- 
 come of this war, however, and the resulting revolution pre- 
 pared Russia for becoming an ally of England just as the humilia- 
 tion of Fashoda had done in the case of France. 
 
 The period when Germany finally freed herself from the 
 enticements of English diplomacy coincides, approximately, with 
 the time when the results of the two naval programmes of 1898 
 and 1900 began to be evident in the beginnings of a powerful 
 sea fleet. Since that time the policy of England, protected by 
 Japan against Russia, took a decidedly anti-German turn. King 
 
MODERN GERMANY 49 
 
 Edward VII, who had ascended the throne shortly before, was the 
 originator of the ''encircling policy" against Germany, which 
 began with the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and was 
 extended by Russia's admission to the group in 1907. The 
 full development of this policy followed a few years later 
 through the agreements arranged by Sir Edward Grey with 
 the two governments in question and which transformed the 
 entente into an actual war alliance against Germany. The 
 development and manifestations of this ''encircling policy," the 
 attempts at decreasing the political tension, the effects of the last 
 Balkan Wars, the outbreak of the present great world war — 
 all these will be treated in later chapters of this book, and are 
 therefore not discussed here. It will be proper at this place only 
 to add a few general remarks on the nature of the relations 
 between the Powers in question and the aspects of the conflict 
 of interests. This will be done in order to indicate the guiding 
 principles of Germany's policy in the years immediately preceding 
 the catastrophe. The question mainly concerns Russia and 
 England. 
 
 In the direct relations between Germany and Russia no 
 points of serious friction existed; the aim of Germany's policy, 
 especially since 1894, has unmistakably been to renew the 
 former pleasant relations between the two neighboring states. 
 In her attitude toward Russia during the bitter experience of 
 the Japanese War and the resulting internal disturbances Ger- 
 many was as friendly as is possible for a neutral power to be. 
 Witness the generous utterance of Kaiser Wilhelm: "Russian 
 sorrow is German sorrow." Russian publicists have recently 
 brought the emphatic accusation against Germany that the latter 
 country took advantage of Russia's necessity in 1904 to obtain 
 more favorable conditions in the commercial treaty renewed at 
 that time than were consonant with Russia's real interest. It is 
 a fact that these conditions were more favorable for us than those 
 of the treaty of 1894. But at that time Germany had found 
 herself in an extremely unfavorable position, which Russia had 
 utilized to the full ; and it was only right and proper that when 
 this condition had changed, Germany should take thought for 
 her own commercial interests to the best of her ability. But 
 no unfriendly pressure of any kind was exercised by her. The 
 complaints of the injustice done Russia by these treaties have, 
 moreover, been greatly and deliberately exaggerated by Russian 
 writers. This was done in order to prepare sentiment effectively 
 for the negotiations for a renewal of the treaty in 191 7. In 
 this the pressure which the "encircling policy" had for years 
 
50 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 exerted upon Germany from all sides was to be used for the 
 promotion of the commercial ambitions of the Russian govern- 
 ment and Russian society. But the conflict of commercial inter- 
 ests existing at this time was, despite the threatening speech 
 indulged in by Russian writers, not of a nature to carr\^ with 
 it the danger of war. Doubtless, a mutual attitude of fairness 
 and restraint in the negotiations would have smoothed out 
 any existing difficulties. German designs on Russian territory 
 did not exist ; nor can it properly be assumed that before the war 
 Russia had cast covetous eyes on the East Prussian provinces. 
 The conflict of political Interests was limited, In the main, to 
 the Balkan question and to the relation of Germany to Austria. 
 Nor did the differences seem insurmountable if Russia and 
 Austria but held to the convention of Miirzsteg of 1903, which 
 had declared the principle of the status quo for the Balkan 
 Peninsula — that Is to say, if Russia would temporarily restrain 
 her desire for expansion and limit herself to a policy of Internal 
 commercial, social and political reforms, In order to strengthen 
 her position, which nobody was threatening. But as a conse- 
 quence of the Franco-Russian alliance, shipwreck overtook the 
 efforts of the German government to bring about a closer under- 
 standing after the Japanese War, and thereby to lay a founda- 
 tion for an understanding of the three empires, at w^hich Bismarck 
 had aimed as the best guarantee for permanent peace. 
 
 After the Algeciras Conference (1906) the French alliance 
 exercised greater powers of attraction, and eventually brought 
 Russia together with France into the agreement with England 
 ( 1907) . The German government having been unable to prevent 
 this agreement, naturally drew from that fact the conclusion that 
 it would be wise to maintain its close relations with Austria. This 
 all the more because the union of Russia and England, the two 
 former opponents In Oriental affairs, had emphasized and sharp- 
 ened anew the differences between Russia and Austria, w^hlch 
 had been only temporarily adjusted by the agreement of 
 Miirzsteg. Russia, bound in East Asia by Japan, in Persia by 
 England, turned anew with a changed front toward the Near 
 East. And it appears that England, without explicitly with- 
 drawing her opposition to the complete exclusion of Turkey 
 from Europe and to Russian occupation of Constantinople and 
 the Straits, nevertheless understood the art of awaking hopes 
 and expectations in the breasts of Russian statesmen which ren- 
 dered them useful tools for English designs against Germany. 
 Had Russia limited herself to the demand that under certain 
 restrictions passage through the Dardanelles be granted to her 
 
MODERN GERMANY 51 
 
 ships of war, it is probable that neither Turkey nor Austria 
 would have offered serious opposition. But Russia's desire 
 went much further. She planned to extend her rule over Con- 
 stantinople, the Straits, the Balkan countries, the Black Sea 
 and Asia Minor, and to these plans the German-Austrian com- 
 bination formed a serious obstacle. Repeated attempts were 
 made at various times, by Russia in Berlin, by the English in 
 Vienna, to bring about in one way or another a rupture of the 
 close alliance of the two Central European Powers. All these 
 efforts failed. It would be less in place to-day than ever to 
 speculate whether Germany stands in greater need of Austria, 
 or Austria of Germany, to maintain their position as World 
 Powers — the important fact is that, in the European constellation 
 of states as then existing, the two Powers were mutually inter- 
 dependent and that the realization of this community of interests 
 has manifested itself far beyond the actual terms of their written 
 treaty. 
 
 The effects of the Russian-British understanding in the Balkan 
 question became more apparent after the meeting of Reval 
 (1908), beginning with an increased agitation of the Greater 
 Servian movement, which w^as directly aimed against the Aus- 
 trian occupation of Bosnia, and indirectly against the integrity 
 of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in general. The resulting 
 tension became still more intense through the Young Turk 
 Revolution, which gave a dangerous impetus to the nationalistic 
 aims of the Balkan nations and of the Ottoman Empire, and 
 increased the delicacy of Austria's position in Bosnia. Austria's 
 decision to annex Bosnia was the result of this situation (Oct. 5, 
 1908). Formally, it w^as a breach of the provisions of the Berlin 
 Treaty, but it was dictated by an imperative, vital interest of 
 the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, this act made no real change 
 in conditions in the Balkan Peninsula, and all fears of more 
 ambitious designs on Austria's part were rendered idle by the 
 fact that at the same time Novi Bazar, in which Austria had 
 treaty rights, was given back to Turkey. Nevertheless, as the 
 result of England's activity, a storm of protest was heard on 
 all sides against this one-sided action of Austria; and for Ger- 
 many the fateful question arose: What position was she to take 
 in the matter? Treaty obligations did not enter into considera- 
 tion, only the political situation ; but as this was conceived by the 
 German government there was no course but to support Austria 
 unreservedly and emphatically in this act so unmistakably dic- 
 tated by vital interests. Cold practical considerations w^ere the 
 determining factor in this decision, not the romantic sentiment 
 
52 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 of "nibelungen" fidelity. The Imperial Chancellor, Biilow, 
 recalled at that time (March 9, 1909) in the Reichstag, Bis- 
 marck's words: *'A state like Austria-Hungary, when abandoned 
 by its ally, will become alienated and inclined to grasp the hand 
 of the enemy of its faithless friend." (Speech of February 6, 
 1888.) To be sure, as a member of the entente, Austria would 
 gradually have sunk from her former position of power; but 
 Germany likewise would have found herself in a future inter- 
 national crisis in a position of dangerous isolation. 
 
 The immediate and decisive support which Austria received 
 from Germany was an important factor in quieting the attacks 
 of the Powers against the Dual Monarchy and in preserving 
 peace, but, under cover, the clash of interests continued. The 
 Greater Serbian agitation, encouraged by Russia, continued 
 despite the agreement of 1909, and was still further strengthened 
 by the final outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The 
 danger which this involved for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
 became more and more manifest; it was, therefore, a matter of 
 course that Germany should continue to stand firmly and de- 
 cisively on Austria's side in the resulting conflicts. 
 
 Naturally, Turkey was threatened even more by Russia's plans 
 of expansion; but this consideration played no part in the out- 
 break of the present war, not becoming a factor until later 
 on. The German instructors in the Turkish army were just 
 as little an indication of a control of Turkey by Germany as 
 the English instructors in the navy were an indication of such 
 a control on the part of England. The only difference is that 
 the German military commission, with the earnestness and zeal 
 characteristic of German officers, took a real and active interest 
 in the strengthening and military education of the Moslems. 
 Our commercial interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia 
 justify to-day without doubt a keener participation in Balkan 
 affairs than at the time of Bismarck, but they were not a decisive 
 factor in the outbreak of the war. We as little desired to make 
 the Mesopotamian affair a cause for war as the Moroccan. With 
 the moderation and restraint which characterize our international 
 policy, we had come to an understanding with England and 
 Russia on the question of the Bagdad Railway. The construc- 
 tion put upon these facts by an American author is as ridiculous 
 as it is arbitrary and unfounded. He argues thus: 'ToUowing 
 Bulgaria's understanding with Austria, only the conquest of 
 Serbia was needed to bring about the realization of the Levantine 
 Empire of the Pan-Germanists — hence the Austro-Serbian con- 
 flict and the war." It is astounding that such figments of the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 53 
 
 imagination can find a place in serious American magazines. Ger- 
 many's policy in regard to Russia may be thus summarized : We 
 are determined to oppose every efFort by Russia and her agents 
 aimed at the destruction or degradation of Austria, even at the 
 risk of war. It Is permissible in this connection to recall another 
 remark of Bismarck: "The preservation of the Austro- 
 Hungarian monarchy, as a strong, independent Power, is for Ger- 
 many a requisite of the European balance of power, for the 
 accomplishment of which, If necessary, the peace of the country 
 may be sacrificed with good conscience." 
 
 The German Empire is an obstacle in the path of the British 
 efforts to attain world-rule In the same manner as Austria is 
 an obstacle in the path of Russian Pan-Slavism. For almost 
 twenty years the successful competition of German industry in 
 the commerce of the world has aroused the jealousy, the envy 
 and the hatred of British business men and of the government 
 which they control. To be sure, the competition in no wise 
 endangered the growth of England's export trade and appro- 
 priated for Germany only a part of the riches created by the 
 increase in international commerce; but German export trade 
 was increasing more rapidly than England's and this rapid up- 
 ward tendency, which marked the entire economic activity of 
 the German people, was considered a source of danger to the 
 preservation of England's commercial supremacy. 
 
 An additional consideration was the growth of our fleet to 
 the size of a respectable sea power; In actual number of ships, 
 it is true, it was scarcely half that of the British fleet, but by its 
 absolute size it nevertheless awakened respect. It was due to 
 this fact that the British Admiralty drew together in home waters 
 the chief units of its fighting forces, which had hitherto been scat- 
 tered over the Seven Seas, and even left the protection of the 
 Mediterranean in great part in the hands of the allied French 
 fleet. There was no suspicion that our naval preparations were 
 of an aggressive character; sensible English people have never 
 expected an attack of the German fleet on England; but Eng- 
 land did not intend to permit any strong sea power whatsoever 
 to exist which. In certain contingencies, she might have to take 
 into account. Her aim was to maintain undiminished the im- 
 mense advantage she possessed over every other fleet in the 
 world. Politicians who gave thought to the conditions necessary 
 to maintaining England's naval supremacy were alarmed by 
 the tendency to grow^th shown not alone by the German fleet 
 but likewise by the trade and commerce of this Continental 
 rival. For the greater the absolute strength of the German 
 
54 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 fleet, the more difficult it became for England to maintain 
 permanently the proportion of superiority over her rival which 
 she then still possessed. What would the result be if Germany 
 should raise the number of her dreadnoughts to sixty? How 
 would England then be in a position to maintain twice that 
 number? Whence would come the men and money for this 
 purpose? From the article of Archibald Hurd in the Fort- 
 nightly Review of October, 191 2, or the report of the British 
 Admiralty on Canada for the same year, the conclusion is easily 
 reached that these apprehensions were calculated to lead to a 
 decision to check the further development of the German sea- 
 power by a preventive war. Even the modest basis of our world 
 policy and of our defensive maritime preparations seemed intoler- 
 able to Englishmen, because, with intuitive correctness, they 
 realized that Germany's economic strength and naval power 
 might one day, without war, through gradual, uninterrupted 
 development, challenge England's world supremacy. That, in 
 fact, was the aim of Germany's policy; we desired to develop 
 slowly in peaceful competition with England, until one day 
 the older World Power would recognize Germany as possessing 
 equal rights in determining the politics of the world. This 
 development England sought to preclude by the war, follow^ing 
 the failure of her efforts to induce Germany to limit her naval 
 armament without corresponding political concessions and to 
 accept a position incompatible with political independence. 
 
 The aim of these endeavors was, of course, to perpetuate the 
 great superiority which England at that time possessed in naval 
 strength and to place this superiority upon a basis of interna- 
 tional law. The principle of British rule, it was intended, 
 should in this manner gain treaty recognition for all time. Ger- 
 many was to be forced, although she had to reckon not only 
 with the English but also with the French and Russian fleets, 
 to limit her naval strength to suit the interests and convenience 
 of the nation which rules the seas. In order that England might 
 be absolutely safeguarded in her naval supremacy, and relieved 
 from undue exertions in maintaining her superiority, Germany 
 was expected to renounce the policy of providing as generously 
 for her own safety at sea as political considerations required and 
 her internal strength justified. The method underlying this 
 naive request would, if applied to Continental conditions, justify 
 Germany in demanding of France and Russia a limitation of their 
 military strength to a point where it would seem innocuous to 
 Germany. What would England say to such a request? There 
 is in that country evidently quite another standard for tlie rela- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 55 
 
 tions of the Continental Powers among themselves and for their 
 relation to England. England is far from granting to the Con- 
 tinental Powers a position of equality in international questions. 
 France and Russia may submit to such a relationship, if they 
 consider it compatible with their dignity and independence. 
 Germany demands a position of equality with England, and re- 
 fuses to recognize in principle and for all time her dominance of 
 the seas. This was the principal cause which drove England 
 into the war against Germany. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN KULTUR 
 
 PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 BERLIN 
 
 THE Homeric heroes, according to legend, were wont to go 
 into battle hurling imprecations at their foes, and it would 
 seem that fighters always have experienced the desire to stigmatize 
 their opponents as morally inferior. A change came with the 
 knights of the Middle Ages, when the consciousness of repre- 
 senting a privileged class and the desire to illustrate Christian 
 mansuetude, even in battle, gave birth to practices exhibiting 
 a certain esteem and courtesy. The rules of warfare and the code 
 of honor of that time have remained operative in the maxims 
 of our modern armies, and above all in the standards of the mod- 
 ern officer; but the great mobilized masses of to-day, and espe- 
 cially the nations themselves, counting millions of souls, once 
 more experience the emotions of Homeric heroes and accompany 
 the battle of their armies with primitive and violent race- 
 hatred. 
 
 This seems to be a psychological law and applies, with tem- 
 peramental differences, to all the belligerents. But that which 
 we are experiencing to-day is something that transcends the 
 sphere of emotions. It is a new weapon which is wielded by 
 the modern press. It is in the nature of a crusade against 
 Germany, of a ''Kulturkrieg,'' which takes advantage of existing 
 predispositions or adverse sentiments in order to create and 
 propagate to the greatest possible extent a decided and uncon- 
 querable antipathy. This vituperative literature strives to justify 
 the war as the carrying out, so to speak, of a verdict of interna- 
 tional proscription. ^ 
 
 This Kultur war is primarily the work of England, in whose 
 
 ^ See the London Times, December 22, 19 14, statement of Professor Sayce: "The 
 Germans are still what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barbarians who 
 raided our ancestors and destroyed the civilization of the Roman Empire. For 
 a thousand years the blight of German conquest hung oyer Western Europe, 
 until at last the conquerors perished in internecine conflict or were absorbed 
 into the older populations, and the Dark Ages came to an end. 
 
 "We must trust that they will not return with a new avalanche of Teutonic 
 barbarism, but that the Germans may resume their old vocation as the intel- 
 lectual 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for Western Europe. Germany 
 has no ancient culture to fall back upon, and what that means may be best 
 understood from the contrast between German savagery in the present war 
 and the chivalry of the civilized Japanese in their war with Russia." 
 
 56 
 
MODERN GERMANY 57 
 
 political intrigues against Germany it has long been clearly 
 perceptible. The inciting of the whole world against Germany 
 and the attempt to starve her out would appear indefensible 
 unless it were shown that the destruction of Germany is really in 
 the interest of humanity and that the moral inferiority of the 
 Germans demands it. A colossal campaign of suggestion is there- 
 fore undertaken in order to justify and uphold this manner of 
 warfare. Expressions of just appreciation, once so general, are 
 now suppressed, and from Capetown to Edinburgh, from Rome 
 to Bordeaux, the censorship does its brutal work. 
 
 From a purely political standpoint such a policy is cleverly 
 calculated. The unscrupulous determination to make use of 
 every weapon, combined with the art of rendering this policy 
 morally popular, are old traits of Britain's political skill, and 
 the idea is as clever as is its execution. The latter may be 
 divided into two closely connected and yet different processes. 
 The first of these consists in influencing the daily press and 
 incidental literature, in which the most grotesque and crude 
 statements find a place, and the reader is made to shudder by 
 tales of Huns, barbarians, child-murderers and cannibals. The 
 hoi polloi demand such coarse pabulum, which is rendered more 
 palatable by pictures and films, made to order in case of neces- 
 sity. The other phase of the undertaking is left to scholars and 
 celebrated authors, who in more dignified language and with 
 scientific evidence, exhaustively picture the inferior or at any 
 rate the dangerous qualities of the German mind, at least in 
 its regrettable modern development. These products of their 
 pens are distributed in countless copies, and furnish the catch- 
 words and theories which are the weapons of the daily press 
 when they feel that, in connection with tales of horror, they 
 must offer their readers something more positive. In this en- 
 deavor English publicists are, of course, generously supported by 
 their French colleagues — indeed, the latter frequently provide 
 their brethren across the Channel with the most telling points 
 and most damaging charges, either revived or manufactured on 
 the spur of the moment. Russian writers naturally lack such 
 far-reaching influence.^ 
 
 1 See Germany and Europe, by J. W. Allen, London, 19 14. ''The existence in 
 Europe of a great state specialized for military purposes and directed by people 
 dominated by such views — this is the immediate cause of the war" (p. 56). . . . 
 "These deficiencies account for the old stupidity which marks almost all Ger- 
 man work. The German mind is at once powerful and dull" (p. 46). Mr. 
 Allen instances, as proof of their mentality, the works of Treitschke,_ Nietzsche 
 and Bernhardi, and the pan-German publicists; but he knows, and indeed ex- 
 pressly states, that these writers do not agree, and do not dominate German 
 thought. He remarks further that the great groups, such as the Catholics, 
 the Social Democrats and the Liberals, do not countenance the publications of 
 the small pan-German group; but he calls on them to bear witness to German 
 
58 
 
 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The former of these two phases of the Kultur war must be 
 regarded from the psychologic, or rather, from the psychopatho- 
 logic standpoint, and falls under the chapter of "Truth and 
 Falsehood." The other, respectable portion of the anti-German 
 literary output is of a different nature. In this group we find 
 discussions of German character written from varied stand- 
 points — some more conservative, some more radical — but all 
 tending to present the war under the aspect of a Kultur war 
 and to disguise the physical struggle as a moral and spiritual one. 
 Despite this, how^ever, they present earnest and exhaustive 
 studies of things German. Analysis frequently takes the place 
 of polemics. For it is here a question of the spirit of German 
 Kultur, which is presented either directly as the cause of the 
 war, or as something inimical that must be fought, but which, 
 by force of its inherent weight, often compels to purely scientific 
 
 mentality and Kultur. Sometimes, however, he retracts his statements: "This 
 mental condition seems to have amounted to what may roughly be described 
 as a will to war, and may be regarded as the real cause of the war. But 
 this mental state was not, ot course, a simple thing, all of a piece. It might 
 even be argued that it did not really exist at all" (p. 30) ; and later he says, 
 "Germany has meant the war, partly unconsciously, these twenty years" 
 (p. 58). ' Finally the conclusion of his argument suggests the moderate terms 
 of peace offered to Germany because of her value to Europe, the terms of 
 peace including the condition that Free Trade be established throughout Europe 
 and that everywhere — except in the British Empire — the various nationalities 
 are to be permitted to determine their own political future. 
 
 See also Germany and England, by the late Professor J. A. Cramb, Lon- 
 don, 19 14. It is an honest, chivalrous and thoughtful work, but it is of course 
 one-sided, and in one important point it is strangely in error. His book was 
 written before the war, but it has had a large circulation. Professor Cramb 
 pleads for the establishment of conscription; and he describes the threatening 
 German danger. It is not German inhumanity that he considers the danger; 
 it is the great political and intellectual development of the modern German 
 Empire, driven by fate towards the hope of world-dominion, and thus into 
 an inevitable struggle with England — an England determined to maintain her 
 universal power. He bases his arguments chiefly on the works of Treitschke, 
 and interprets England politics in the light of Treitschke's ideas. The final 
 motive of Germany as well as of England, according to Professor Cramb, is 
 not material, but spiritual, world-dominion; it is Germany's purpose to destroy 
 Christianity, and to set in its place a German religion of worldly ideals, of 
 the power of will, of heroism, the ideal of which is Napoleon, the prophet of 
 which is Nietzsche. He holds that modern German development means the 
 annihilation of exotic Christianity and creation of a new national religion 
 which derives from Odin and the old Teutonic heroes; that the Germans, with 
 their ideas of world-dominion, are experimenting at the same time with a 
 new universal religion: "Corsica, in a word, has conquered Galilee" (p. 133). 
 The English spirit, on the contrary, holds similar ideals of heroism, a religion 
 of freedom, with reverence as well as fearlessness in its attitude toward the 
 Riddle of the Universe. Because of these differences. Professor Cramb fore- 
 sees an inevitable struggle between these rivals: "And one can imagine the 
 ancient mighty deity of all the Teutonic kindred, looking serenely down upon 
 that conflict, upon his favorite children, the English and the Germans, locked 
 in a death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of the children of Odin, the 
 War-God!" (p. 152). 
 
 See also The IVar and Democracy, by R. W. Seton-Watson, J. Dover Wilson, 
 Alfred Zimmern and Arthur Greenwood, London, 19 14: Germany and the Ger- 
 man Emperor, by G. H. Perris, London, 1914 (Fourth Edition); and Britain's 
 Case against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, Manchester, 19 14. The last publica- 
 tion discusses the variation between the old Germany and the new Prussian 
 Germany, and upholds England's claim for world-dominion because she stands 
 for the maintenance of the present world order, which the German principle 
 of force aims to destroy. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 59 
 
 or historfco-phllosophfcal discussion. Much misunderstanding 
 and caricature are mixed with all this, as is also much that 
 shows distinct bias. But in the main we meet here the 
 scientific method, which was developed b)^ Germans precisely 
 for such purposes and which is now turned by our enemies 
 against us. Alongside of this is our own war literature, which 
 is already of considerable volume. It shows us as we see our- 
 selves. It is on the whole drawn with German honesty, and 
 may be studied with profit by friend and foe, though of course 
 the picture is only a rapid sketch of what is seen by the flash- 
 light illumination of the war. But this is all that can be ex- 
 pected, as on both sides the cultural contrasts of Europe are 
 revealed by such momentary flashes, now that the hazy concep- 
 tion of the ''respectable European" has practically been elimi- 
 nated by the conflict. 
 
 Let us endeavor, then, as calmly as may be in the face of 
 the perils surrounding us, and w ith reference to the war literature 
 that has come into existence, to characterize these great con- 
 trasts and the position occupied by German civilization within 
 this framework. We may then draw our conclusions without 
 having to descend into the degrading arena of war polemics, 
 with its increasingly disgusting abuse. 
 
 So-called European Kultur, or, more properly expressed, the 
 Kultur of the white Christian races, is not, as a matter of 
 fact, so uniform as appearances would indicate, or as each 
 fraction assumes it to be when it naively identifies its own 
 particular Kultur with that of Europe. Likewise, the view 
 that modern science had produced a uniform type of Kultur, 
 consonant to the demands of reason, is as erroneous as is the 
 view that Christianity implies and guarantees a homogeneous 
 Kultur. The dispute is by no means a product of this war. 
 England and France have long carried on the Kultur war by 
 means of the press, lectures and festivals. England, in addi- 
 tion, has done this through Christian missions in order to prepare 
 against the day of political reckoning, or merely to emphasize 
 the existence of a moral contrast. 
 
 The various civilized states differ even in the material bases 
 of their existence. The two Americas are independent, unas- 
 sailable colonial states, self-sufficing commercially, destined in 
 the future to undergo the social developments through which 
 Europe has already passed. The British Isles are the centre of 
 a world empire comparable only to the old Roman Empire; as 
 in the latter, the citizens of the home state have grown into a 
 proud master caste, versed in all the arts of ruling the most 
 
6o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 heterogeneous territories and nations. The states of the Euro- 
 pean Continent are military states, whose populations continue 
 to outgrow their natural boundaries and who consequently come 
 into serious conflict with each other, not only on the Continent 
 itself, but also beyond its borders, over the division of the colonial 
 territory which they require. These conflicts are of ancient 
 date, and in the course of more than a thousand years the out- 
 come has varied, so that to-day the purely political causes of 
 disagreement are complicated by questions of honor and national 
 traditions. Finally, the Russian Empire belongs to the type of 
 bureaucratic predatory states which, like ancient Assyria, have 
 no natural boundaries, and devote their excess of vitality to 
 territorial conquests, instead of to inner development. 
 
 These multifarious conditions cause great differences among 
 the various states as regards their Kultur. But there are, in 
 addition, differences of feeling, of thought, of the entire character 
 resulting from the racial individuality of the various na- 
 tionalities. They spring in part from the peculiar historical 
 development of the chief individual groups, but are not to be 
 explained entirely in this manner. There is in each case a 
 peculiar mixture of elemental tendencies and historical destiny, 
 of social-political and moral-intellectual development, acting and 
 reacting upon each other, yet each with its own individual cause 
 of being. It is clear from this that one can comprehend no single 
 one of these types of Kultur without considering it in its 
 entirety, as resulting from the intermingling of its various ele- 
 ments and tendencies; especially must it be studied under the 
 mutually interdependent phases of its external and internal life, 
 of its material and spiritual properties, of the historical fortune 
 it has met with and its inner qualities of character. The result 
 is, therefore, that one must not seek the Kultur of a nation only 
 in its science and art, its religion and morality, its culture and 
 schooling, as the English, with their penchant for simplifying 
 everything, are especially prone to do; rather must it be sought 
 in the manifestations of the nation's life as a whole, in the more 
 or less uniform national spirit created and revealed by the 
 mutual interplay of these manifestations. It is, therefore, quite 
 futile to quote statistics of renowned poets, scholars, artists, in- 
 ventions and machines, as unfriendly second-rate newspapers are 
 so fond of doing, taking as their standard only the accidental 
 celebrity of the press or the encyclopaedia. This is one of the 
 childish things which will automatically disappear with the war. 
 The system of treating certain authors selected at random as 
 typical of the German spirit is equally futile. We need do 
 
MODERN GERMANY 6i 
 
 no more than mention the ridiculous trinity Treitschke-Nietzsche- 
 Bernhardi, which to many controversialists is holier than the 
 Christian trinity, but which in the better class of writings even 
 among our enemies is recognized and condemned as an arbitrary 
 and stupid selection.^ 
 
 Nothing is to be gained by such crude methods. The real 
 question is to grasp, in the broadest manner possible, the mani- 
 fold and paradoxical manifestations of the life of a nation and, 
 viewing them from a single or from as few central standpoints 
 as possible, to fathom and understand them as a uniform whole. 
 These central points, as our modern historical and historico- 
 philosophical teaching shows, are primarily to be found In the 
 political and social development of a nation, which determines 
 its spirit. If not exclusively, at least in the main. ^ 
 
 We can understand England if w^e keep in mind her Insular 
 character, her national union under the Tudors, her absolutely 
 unique position as regards the church, her Puritan Revolution 
 and the contemporary turning to trade and manufacture, her 
 fortunate position during the great European conflicts, which en- 
 abled her to appropriate a fifth of the globe and transformed 
 her Into an extra-European Power, dependent only upon herself. 
 From this point of vantage one grasps the significance of the 
 middle class, which is the pillar of English trade, with Its com- 
 bination of strong law-abiding religiousness and keen business 
 
 1 See Germany and Europe, by J. W. Allen, p, 4 et seq. He refutes the state- 
 ments of the authors of Tlie War and Democracy (p. 350 et seq.) that the 
 philosophy of force is common to all nations: "What is true and what is more 
 serious, is that men like Harnack, Eucken and Wilamowitz, who should re- 
 pudiate all intellectual kinship with Machiavelli and Nietzsche — men who are 
 leaders of European thought — publicly support and encourage the policy and 
 standpoint of a Government which, according to British ideas, has acted with 
 criminal wickedness." 
 
 2 It is perhaps well to pause here to say that the term Kultur is not only 
 peculiar to German scientific language, but particularly to German thought and 
 feeling. It is ceaselessly mocked at by the second-rate press as "Kultur with 
 a K." It conforms to German History and manner of thought, in which tb; 
 unity of the nation has been brought about by a spiritual development that has 
 become one with her politico-social being. At the same time, Kultur harks 
 back to Lutherism and the national church, in which the state and highest 
 intellectual interest have become completely one. The Anglo-Saxon demo- 
 cratic language speaks only of civilization, by which is meant the natural 
 right of the individual, and through it the control of the state, the freedom 
 of religion and the church, the recognition of the private character of personal 
 belief and conviction, and the influence of public opinion on government and 
 private life. See The War and Democracy, Chap. IX, p. 348 et seq. In France, 
 too, the ideas of state, society, philosophy and aestheticism are closely con- 
 nected. But they do not call this Kultur as the Germans do, but civilisation, 
 progres, humanite, in order to express the logically necessary and rational 
 character; implied in the German Kultur, however, there is something roman- 
 tically, individualistically irrational, the idea of self-education and the improve- 
 ment of the individual and the nation. For an English view of German Kultur, 
 see Viscount Haldane's address, "Germany and Great Britain," delivered at 
 Oxford at the time of the Agadir crisis; and note that he says the mutual study 
 of the national mind of the two countries is indispensable, and note also that 
 he calls attention to the fact that education (Bildung), which is general in 
 Germany, in England leads to the establishment of class distinctions. 
 
62 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 sense, its leanings toward the Free Church and toward an indi- 
 vidualism that resents governmental tutelage and that expresses 
 itself through control of the government, through individual 
 independence, and above all through public opinion. Again, from 
 this point of view, may be understood the development of that 
 class of pioneers and conquerors who seized, organized and ex- 
 ploited the colonies and who called into being that firm, masterful 
 Englishman who regards the world as belonging to him, and looks 
 upon himself and his customs and habits as the only possible ones 
 anywhere. The national armies and universal duty to bear arms, 
 as seen on the Continent, are inconceivable in such a colonial em- 
 pire. Its activity is divided between business and voluntary 
 military' and pioneer service, that shifts from point to point 
 throughout the world. Above this middle class stands a 
 monarchy and aristocracy, who are treated with conservative re- 
 spect by the English democracy, owing to the latter's character, 
 which chiefly aims at independence; nevertheless, owing to the 
 pronounced commercial and industrial interests of monarchy and 
 aristocracy, they do not form a social type as different from the 
 rest of the population as that of the Prussian landed aristocracy. 
 Further, above this middle class Is a social stratum of cultivated 
 individuals, who, by virtue of their wealth and the opportunities 
 thus oltered to them, may be said to belong to the noblest and 
 most cultured specimens of intellectuallsm. 
 
 But this class is much smaller than the corresponding class in 
 Germany, and much less the result of universal popular education. 
 That, on the other hand, beneath the "Hebrew Philistine middle 
 classes," as Matthew Arnold calls them, there exists a substratum 
 of the most abject poverty and helpless misery, has been shown 
 plainly enough by English sociological work, the Salvation Army, 
 and the most recent British social legislation. These were the 
 conditions from which arose what Cramb, with natural emphasis 
 on all that is great and striking in them, characterizes as the 
 general tendencies of English imperialism during the last cen- 
 tury and a half : "To give all men within its bounds an English 
 mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look 
 at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the 
 standpoint of an Englishman ; to diffuse within its bounds that 
 high tolerance in religion which has marked this empire from its 
 foundation ; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness 
 of life and death characteristic of our great poets and our great 
 thinkers; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever- 
 higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly, 
 we associate with the temper and character of our race wher- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 63 
 
 ever it is dominant and secure."^ The Conservative is recog- 
 nizable in these words; nevertheless, in his ideal he includ* lib- 
 eral English civilization as a world principle. The differences 
 are, in fact, not very great from a world-political point of view: 
 some Englishmen regard world dominion as the execution of a 
 bold, imperialistic conception of power, others as safeguarding the 
 moral world system of freedom against chaos. England's world 
 dominance is to some the promotion of the masculine spirit of 
 rule; to others it appears a right and duty imposed by God; but 
 to both it seems a matter of course. 
 
 The foundations of French Kultur were laid much further 
 in the past. It is the prototype of national culture in Europe, 
 gradually evolved through the consolidating influences of kings, 
 court, administration, Gallicanism, and centralization of intellect 
 in Paris. Thoroughly aristocratic, it was determined in the 
 paths of its modern spiritual development by the acceptance of 
 the Renaissance and the Counter Reformation. The aristocratic 
 culture of this classic period was then passed on to the middle 
 classes, which secularized and rationalized it, separated it from 
 church and monarch, and placed it upon the foundation of a 
 purely scientific conception of state and society. Basing their 
 claims on this theory of the state, the middle classes took the 
 power into their own hands and set up a rule of the people which 
 they declared to be demanded by reason, human progress, freedom 
 and social equity. This is the ideal of the bourgeois republic, 
 erected upon the foundation of clear and relentless science, con- 
 stantly calculating anew, in ingenious constitutional concepts, the 
 proper share of the will of the individual in the power of the 
 state, conceiving itself as the expression of reason (otherwise 
 expressed, of individual rationalism), and hence as the principle 
 of humanity, progress and anti-clericalism. The new republic 
 connects itself to the glorious old political aspirations of the 
 French military state by means of its propaganda for democracy, 
 science and humanity, at one moment w^th the material weapons 
 that liberate nations, at another with the magic of an elegant and 
 lucid literature of suggestion. The intellectual element, however, 
 of this democratic humanity consists au fond even to-day in the old 
 aristocratic ideal of the esprit classique, in the cult of form and 
 lucidity, in elegant ease and mathematical keenness, in the alterna- 
 tion of scepticism and dogmatism — all of this inspired by that 
 specifically French quality of imagination and feeling, the charm 
 of which is felt in every line of French literature. By this means 
 
 "^Germany and England, Cramb, p. 139 et seq. 
 
64 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 French genius has succeeded in presenting itself to that portion 
 of the world which is not under the sway of English civilization, 
 as the standard of humanity, democracy and progress, producing 
 at the same time the impression of a firm, established, but never- 
 theless impressionable and artistic protean power. Yet the 
 French peasantry and small capitalists continue to be ruled by 
 the bourgeoisiej although under democratic forms, much in the 
 same manner as at the time of the anciem regime and the Na- 
 poleonic prefects. 
 
 Freedom and equality are postulates of individual reason, on 
 which society is built up, rational and lucid. But this indi- 
 vidual reason is really only the spirit and taste of the old 
 aristocracy, leveled to the plane of the bourgeoisie. The 
 French Republic is a democracy in the form of its constitution 
 and parliament, a democracy of high-sounding phrases, but it is 
 not a real democracy of feeling, spirit and Kultur. The efforts 
 of Socialism to create such a democracy are always wrecked by 
 the omnipotence of the bourgeoisie, or else they end in violent 
 temperamental outbreaks. He who has no share in the bour- 
 geois mentality does not count, and is thrust back into the arms 
 of clericalism, the enemy of all culture. The breach with the 
 national religion and the national past, and the resulting adop- 
 tion of science as the creator of the new, progressive and uni- 
 versally valid order of society, is the most characteristic trait of 
 the French mind, which, through all these breaks with the past, 
 has maintained only the artistic spirit of the Renaissance. That 
 enables France to act as leader to all nations which have experi- 
 enced or desire a similar breach and it creates a feeling of affinity 
 with all Romance peoples who are equally under the influence 
 of the Renaissance. The world-wide influence of suggestion of 
 the French is to be understood in this manner; truly, it is one 
 of the most important results of European development. It can, 
 however, scarcely be ascribed to hate or prejudice, if we Ger- 
 mans believe that we recognize, not the strength of progress, but 
 the aging of a great civilization, in this disturbed spirit, that has 
 broken with the national religion and that is therefore so en- 
 tirely rationalistic. This is likewise the opinion of many French- 
 men, in view of the fact that all attempts at innovation and re- 
 juvenation merely lead back into clericalism. Whoever recalls 
 the brilliant essays of Melchior de Vogue in the Revue des deux 
 Mondes of former years is reminded of strange, haunting au- 
 tumn moods; whoever has read the social novels, le Mannequin 
 d" Osier or VAnneau d'Amethiste, by the modern Voltaire, now 
 
MODERN GERMANY 65 
 
 so ferocious,^ knows that the inevitable, logical consequence of 
 such pure rationalism — namely, scepticism — is already manifest- 
 ing itself in France in a high degree. For the moment, to be 
 sure, a violent nationalism and the religion of revenge for the 
 Franco-Prussian War has arisen as a "new idealism" to check 
 this tendency, and has decked itself with all the splendor of the 
 French claims to culture inherited from the eighteenth century. 
 But in the long run this is likely to prove a futile and unpro- 
 ductive idea. 
 
 In respect to our third great enemy, there can be up to the 
 present no question of a pronounced contrast of kindred civiliza- 
 tions. It is true that the highly gifted masses of Russia hold 
 within themselves possibilities and probabilities of an important 
 new and essentially Russian Kultur. Were such a civilization 
 really to materialize, it would undoubtedly be the most religious 
 in Europe, and would result in an entirely new type, which 
 would combine the specific orthodox religiousness with the pe- 
 culiarities of an agricultural people still free from West- 
 European capitalism and rationalism. Every one familiar with 
 Dostoyevsky, Soloviev, and Tolstoi will look forward to such 
 future possibilities with great expectation — if, indeed, we may re- 
 gard them as possibilities. But the unorthodox West-Slavic ele- 
 ments, which are under European cultural influences, would not 
 be a factor, since they lack all prerequisites for participation in 
 the manifestations of a specifically Russian spirit. Pan-Slavism is 
 not a Kultur conception but a political weapon and a means of 
 agitation. But that with which we are concerned at present is 
 precisely not Russian Kultur in any spiritual sense. It is rather 
 Czarism, with its traditional policy of force and conquest, which is 
 meant to divert attention from the inner questions of Russian 
 civilization to external politics. When Russian liberals and 
 revolutionists seek to gain profit for Russian liberalism through 
 an alliance with the Western Powers, and at the same time to 
 indulge their hatred against reactionary Prussia, formerly the 
 ally of Nicholas I, this has nothing to do with the conception of 
 independent Russian Kultur; nor, on the other hand, has it any- 
 thing to do with such a conception when the feelings of the ortho- 
 dox mass are aroused against the impious Catholic and Protestant 
 West and directed toward the conquest of Constantinople. The 
 inclusion of Russia in this Kultur war against the German spirit 
 is, therefore, meaningless, hypocritical bombast, which is not 
 without its difficulties for the liberals in England and France. 
 
 1 This refers to Anatole France and his anti-German attitude since the war.— 
 
 Translator's note. 
 
66 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The cooperation of Russia is of purel)^ military and political 
 importance. From the point of view of Kultur, the victory of 
 autocratic Russia, with her Peter and Paul prison, her system 
 of Siberian exile, her pogroms and her pseudo-constitutionalism, 
 would mean nothing else than the advancement of the most vio- 
 lent and senseless reaction. There is no need, therefore, to con- 
 sider what Russian civilization will be in the future. 
 
 The pictures that we have before us, in contrast with our own, 
 are those of the English and French civilizations, whose influ- 
 ence, in each case, extends far beyond the boundaries of the coun- 
 try in question. The English spirit is dominant in North Amer- 
 ica, despite that country's manifold peculiarities; while the 
 French spirit controls anti-clerical Italy and the Romance coun- 
 tries in general. Only by utterly disregarding the deep-lying 
 differences in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin conceptions of 
 democracy and of the strong esthetic and temperamental differ- 
 ences between the Anglo-Saxon and Romance peoples, can one 
 conceive of Western civilization as identical with the democratic 
 ideal of freedom, progress and humanity; only then can one, 
 with a wealth of illuminating demagogic rhetoric and with all 
 the ardor of the sincere doctrinaire, contrast it with the German 
 class-state and the German philosophy of force. Connected with 
 this, as a rule, is the doctrine of nationalities, looking to the 
 emancipation of all those groups that consider themselves to be 
 separate nationalities, and that would fain set themselves up as 
 independent democratic states, by means of a plebiscite and under 
 international guarantee. It is easy to picture the horoscope 
 which, from this standpoint, the opponents of Germany and Aus- 
 tria cast for those countries: disintegration into small democra- 
 cies, with a minimum of military equipment, under the control 
 of the liberal Great Powers. England herself would, of course, 
 remain unchanged by the operation of this principle, since, as w^e 
 are constantly assured, she consists only of willingly incorporated 
 nationalities and is now, or is in process of becoming, a m.odel 
 commonwealth of democratic, self-governing units, similar to 
 that of North America. This democratic rhetoric furnishes the 
 main basis of the attacks against Germany. Judged by this stand- 
 ard, German-Prussian imperialism is indeed a thing to be con- 
 demned in the interest of humanity and the future of the human 
 race. Nor is there anywhere the least hesitancy shown in so 
 doing. Material is thereby furnished for the press campaign, 
 while at the same time the moral ideal is proclaimed with which 
 the most heterogeneous elements make a war of extermination 
 against Germany seem justifiable to themselves and others, in 
 
MODERN GERxMANY 67 
 
 order to avoid admitting that the whole situation is merely 
 the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of 
 France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial 
 world supremacy. 
 
 The real nature and tendency of German Kultur is not to be 
 learned from such international rhetorical phrases or from super- 
 ficial moralizing, but only from an analysis of Germany's devel- 
 opment and of the German spirit. 
 
 The decisive factor in this connection is to be found in the fact 
 that the German Empire is a very recently created state, with 
 complex and msecure boundaries, situated in the middle of Eur- 
 ope, and unwelcome to all the previous Great Powers, for w^hom 
 this politically free space in their midst formed the natural bat- 
 tlefield and the natural source of territorial compensation. One 
 needs only to recall the dismay which so humane a statesman as 
 Gladstone experienced at the disturbance of the then existing 
 political balance through the birth of the German Empire, and 
 simultaneously through the formation of the Italian Kingdom, 
 the latter event being rendered possible only by the former. 
 This disturbance, and its continual augmentation by the eco- 
 nomic and political growth of Central Europe, is the true reason 
 for all the dislike and antagonism. In the youthfulness of this 
 late-comer and trouble-brewer in the European system of states 
 is to be found, moreover, the reason for its lack of finish, its 
 sanguine vitality, its passionate self-consciousness, and the mass 
 of still unsolved administrative problems. In the minds of out- 
 siders this may be a ground for criticism, in our own it indicates 
 merely the strivmg for an ever-growing unity and increasing sta- 
 bility of the Empire, as well as the hope of a prosperous and 
 great future. These are hopes that befit a vigorous adolescence, 
 but which, under the relentless pressure of reality, will doubtless 
 adjust themselves to the outside world. They indicate no more 
 and no less than does the boundless optimism of the Americans — 
 namely, the vitality and self-confidence of a j^outhful state. 
 
 But the decisive factor in determining the spirit of German 
 Kultur is the manner in which the German state was founded 
 and the peculiar compound of plastic forces which moulded the 
 nation. The Thirty Years' War left in its train chaos, religious 
 disunion, poverty and a motley of small states. Austria, whose 
 attention was concentrated on the Orient, could not undertake 
 the reconstruction of the German Empire — her interests, in fact, 
 lay in the perpetuation of the prevailing state of chaos. The 
 memories of a former German Empire had faded, and seemed 
 like those of a foreign world. But the vitality of the nation was 
 
68 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 not extinct: it crystallized gradually around the new military 
 power, the Prussia of Frederick the Great, which, through a 
 series of well-known events extending over two hundred years, 
 finally became the backbone of a new, if narrower, empire. That 
 this was the only road open for reuniting the nation into a state 
 every child in Germany knows to-day. The prerequisite for the 
 development of Prussia into the German Empire was the devel- 
 opment of a spiritually united and homogeneous German nation, 
 which justified its demand for a firm state-edifice. This has been 
 the work of German literature, poetry, philosophy and science, that 
 since the eighteenth century have disseminated a new spirit of 
 unity throughout Germany, torn as it was by religious differences 
 and sunk into philistinism. The result was Wilhelm von Hum- 
 boldt's great school and university reform, which has been copied 
 in all the German states and which has enabled the spirit of 
 German Kultur to become the unifying principle and the bind- 
 ing force. The great educated middle class adopted the cause 
 of Liberalism, which took upon itself in the remarkably peace- 
 ful Revolution of 1848 the establishment of German union. 
 In this effort it was forced to turn to Prussia to obtain the 
 necessary military support, though at that time in vain. In the 
 year 1870 Liberalism in all non-Austrian states finally suc- 
 ceeded, with the aid of Prussia, in the formation of the Empire; 
 to-day, in spite of all frictions, it has become incorporated in 
 the politico-military edifice. Since the recuperation of Ger- 
 man economic life and the founding of the Customs Union a 
 new creative factor has been added. This is the combined in- 
 dustrial activity of the whole nation; as a result of the founda- 
 tion of the Empire, this industrial development began to bring 
 forth all the latent energies of the people, and in the entre- 
 preneur and working classes produced a third important element 
 of the body-politic. Not without friction has this element hith- 
 erto adjusted itself to the other two; nevertheless, it is bound 
 to them by innumerable ties, resting as it does mainly upon the 
 basis of discipline and order and upon the achievements of me- 
 chanical art and science, of school and education. It was this 
 third factor that made possible the tremendous growth in popu- 
 lation, which since 1870 has increased by twenty-four million, 
 the feeding of whom is the chief problem of the Empire to-day. 
 In the interplay, friction and adjustment of these three forces 
 is represented the German Empire of to-day. Here, and not in 
 the alleged antithesis between un-German, power-seeking Prus- 
 sia and the other, idealistic but politically weak states, lie the 
 problems and contending factors of the new Empire; in Prussia 
 
MODERN GERMANY 69 
 
 herself these are not less real than in the other parts of the 
 Empire. The only difficulties that arise from Prussianism to- 
 day are those resulting from the peculiar social structure of the 
 class of great land-owners in Prussia, and especially from their 
 intimate relationship with the Prussian administration. The 
 military organization, the energy and system of this administra- 
 tion, its spirit of discipline and responsibility have been willingly 
 adopted by the whole country, which competes with the Prus- 
 sians along these lines. For the nation is convinced that no in- 
 dependent German civilization is possible without the protec- 
 tion of a great powerful state, and that the sustenance of our 
 millions is not feasible without a firmly united Empire, capable 
 of a strong commercial and economic policy. 
 
 Finally, one must not forget the great substratum of the 
 peasantry and lower middle class, from which large groups with 
 clearly realized aims are continually making their way upward. 
 In these classes are stored the nerve power, the natural instincts, 
 the elementary spiritual forces, which reach self-realization only 
 with the level of self-conscious culture. The tremendous im- 
 portance of this fount of national strength and the close con- 
 nection of essential characteristics of the nation with this popular 
 stratum and its peculiarities of mind and sentiment, so difficult 
 of explanation, is made instantly clear at a time of war, like 
 the present, when its importance becomes decisive. 
 
 Like all great nations, Germany is rich in contrasts and com- 
 plexities; as compared to its two great opponents, it is much 
 further from a state of final development. In times of peace, 
 therefore, it presents an aspect capable of widely divergent inter- 
 pretations; but it is the result of great fateful moments like the 
 present to bring about what otherwise years could not accom- 
 plish — not alone the union of the diiferent parts and gro.ups, 
 which in face of the deadly danger naturally think only of the 
 preservation of the state — but above all the revelation of the 
 hidden or obscured unity of spirit. Inward coherence reveals 
 itself and spiritual unity flashes forth.^ 
 
 1 The theory of the Prussianization of Germany is not accepted by the 
 authors of The War and Democracy. They recognize that Germany was, at 
 the outbreak of the war, and is still, an inner spiritual whole. Thus, on page 
 120, it is said that the German war literature shows: "First, a great con- 
 solidation of the German national unity, and secondly, a tendency ... to hark 
 back ... to the wars of Liberation. . . . No one can read recent articles by 
 the leaders of German thought without feeling that the Germans are still, 
 before all things, and incurably, the people of poets and philosophers, and that, 
 by a tragic irony, it is the best and most characteristic qualities of the race 
 ■which are sustaining, and will continue to sustain it, in the conflict in which 
 its dreams have involved it." Also (p. 230) : "Here we have to learn from 
 Germany, for German statesmen, strangely enough, have taken an immense 
 trouble to make their policy a democratic one. The whole Germ.an nation is 
 behind them, because for years and years they have taught the nation through the 
 
70 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The picture as it presents itself may be sketched in the fol- 
 lowing outlines: 
 
 The Germans are preeminently a monarchic people. To this 
 they are bound not alone by ancient inherited sentiments of 
 fealty, loyalty and trust (which to-day manifest themselves 
 chiefly in relation to the person of the Kaiser as the upholder 
 and symbol of German unity), but even more by national neces- 
 sity. Only under monarchical leadership can the work of unity 
 and development of a nation encompassed by danger be accom- 
 plished. That has always been the case and is still so to-day. 
 All European nations have achieved their unity by means of 
 monarchy. The exceptional case of the United States proves 
 nothing to the contrary, since in this instance the question was 
 one of development without the presence of neighboring states. 
 The French Republic is only a translation into republican 
 form of that which the Bourbon and Napoleonic monarchies 
 had created, and it has often enough suffered from friction 
 between the Army, desirous of monarchic leadership, and the 
 elements of democracy. Unity and coherence and a cor- 
 porate military force demand a consistent and independent 
 leadership which cannot be shaken; and this can be attained 
 only in a monarchy, to whatever degree dependent upon the 
 popular will and the free support of the people. Moreover, 
 united Germany shows the most pronounced diversity in 
 her social structure, embracing all classes from the old Prussian 
 landed nobility down to the factory worker and peasant. It is 
 in a period of transition from an agrarian to an industrial state, 
 and is in need, therefore, in an especial degree, of a leadership 
 unfettered by social distinctions, which has nothing to gain for 
 itself and which in its own interest must be as just to all as 
 lies within its power. No parliamentary majority can fulfil 
 these demands. Great as may be the advantages of a parlia- 
 mentary form of government for the discovery and training of 
 political talent, as well as for the political education of a people 
 in general, it is a menace to the unity of the military and politi- 
 cal leadership of a youthful state. Hence the desire for parlia- 
 mentary rule is not widespread in Germany, quite apart from 
 the legal and historical difficulties of such a form of government 
 in a confederation of states. 
 
 No plutocracy, no committee of "intellectuals," no syndicate 
 
 schools, the universities, the press, their own reading of history and their 
 own idea of what true civilization is. . , . The real strength and danger of 
 Germany is not what her statesmen and soldiers do, but what Germans them- 
 selves believe. We are fighting not an army but a false idea." It is quite 
 true that the unity of spirit in Germany is the work of the nation itself within 
 the last twenty years. The outbreak of the war did not create, it revealed it. 
 
/ 
 
 MODERN GERMANY 71 
 
 of workmen's unions could provide us with what we need. 
 That can be given only by a monarchy, and for that reason — 
 whether through sentiment or understanding — we are monarchi- 
 cally inclined. And it accords with a strong monarchy, such 
 as we require, that its hand should be felt everywhere, both in 
 great and little things. Personal freedom and human dignity 
 do not suffer thereby in the least. While public servants are 
 placed in a safer and more independent position, owing to the 
 rights guaranteed to them by the laws, than in democracies, the 
 average citizen experiences absolutely no repression through the 
 monarchy. It is, of course, natural that a monarchic ruler, with 
 his plenitude of power, should exercise great influence; but this 
 is the case with every form of government, even with parlia- 
 mentary majorities. We, at any rate, consider ourselves in 
 many respects freer and more independent than the citizens of 
 the great democracies. 
 
 Closely connected with this is the military character of the 
 German state and people. It is rooted in the old Teutonic 
 warlike character which no esthetic cult, no puritanism and no 
 commercial philosophy has succeeded in breaking, and which is 
 a matter of course to our peasants. Even more, however, is it 
 due to our geographical and political position, which can be 
 secured against our neighbors only by superior strength. For 
 this reason the last century has been conducive in the highest 
 degree to the development of this military character. It has 
 injected the conception of honor and the esprit de corps of the 
 officers of Frederick the Great into Scharnhorst's Army of the 
 Nation, and has so intimately united the Prussian ability for 
 organization and rule with the ethical idealism of German edu- 
 cation that they have thoroughly coalesced. The result of this 
 is the remarkable efficiency of the professional officer and of the 
 popular army. In the last analysis, national unity rests upon the 
 army in the same manner as does the monarchy. All the ideal 
 forces of education, science and technical training have been 
 absorbed into the organism of the army; conversely, the mili- 
 tary system furnishes the model and the requisite strength for 
 the remarkable organization which prevails throughout the Ger- 
 man nation and in which initiative of the individual and disci- 
 pline of the w^hole are successfully united. All this is imposed 
 upon us by fate, which has placed us in the centre of Europe; 
 of this necessity we have made a virtue, which, despite unde- 
 niable difficulties and frictions, has stamped the whole na- 
 tional character with masculine clearness and lucidity. But the 
 most important consequence of this universal bearing of arms is 
 
72 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the fact that an effective war can be waged only with the real 
 and enthusiastic approval of the people; it must thus always be 
 a war of defence. There can be no thought of world domina- 
 tion with a popular army nor with a fleet which, based on 
 conscription, can be used only for the protection of the country 
 and of its trade and industry. The bitterness against German 
 militarism — the hardships of which we alone have to bear — is 
 really based only on the fact that the German army is so difficult 
 to defeat, and that those who would like to dislodge Germany 
 from her place, or prevent her from rising into prominence, find 
 themselves forced to imitate this institution, which is psychologi- 
 cally much less adapted to many other nations.^ 
 
 The school organization parallels that of the army, the public 
 school corresponds to the popular army. The latter as well as 
 the former was called into being during the first great rise of 
 the coming German state in opposition to Napoleon. When 
 Fichte, while the country was groaning under the Napoleonic 
 yoke, considered the ways and means of resurrecting the Ger- 
 man state, he advised the infusion of German culture into the 
 mass of the people, through the creation of national primary 
 schools along the lines laid down by Pestalozzi, which were 
 to educate the children, according to well-established methods, 
 to mental independence, moral self-control and intellectual self- 
 development. This program was actually adopted by the dif- 
 ferent German states, and developed during the last century 
 into a comprehensive school system of elementary, secondary and 
 university education. This has become the real formative fac- 
 tor of the German spirit. There is in this school system a 
 
 1 See Germany and the German Emperor, by G. H. Perris, London, 1914. A 
 characteristic expression of the average English opinion. The question, How 
 can such a superior nation come under the sway of a military despotism, and 
 virility, originality, liberty, and individualism be so completely lost ? is answered 
 by an analysis of the whole of German history. After the Reformation, Ger- 
 many was so drained of all vital energy that she could express herself only in 
 romantic verses and abstruse metaphysics. Thus completely weakened, she 
 succumbed to Bismarck's despotism. At the same time the modern economic 
 revolution, while it deprived her of the remainder of her originality, on the 
 other hand certainly supplied the necessary means for unity. It is Germany's 
 tragedy, therefore, to have reached no sane democratic and progressive unity, 
 but to be disintegrated again by Prussian brutality and its consequences. The 
 contrasting picture of England is interesting and instructive: "If England 
 became the mother of Parliaments, the exponent of evolution in political and 
 social life, as well as in science and philosophy, it is ultimately not because 
 oi any innate superiority of the British nature, but because her insular posi- 
 tion has, since 1745, protected her from internal warfare, and for a much 
 longer period has set her full in the current of modern forces, so that feudalism 
 and clericalism withered early, and no speculation could get far away from 
 the bracing winds of practical interest" (p. 115). 
 
 See War and Democracy. The German outlook on life is called a "confused 
 and patchwork philosophy" (p. 108), and it is explained by attempting to show 
 that it originated in her long and debilitating political misery. Prussianized 
 Germany, it declares, is sick, and, because it is undemocratic, it furnishes a 
 case of morbid nationality-development. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 73 
 
 Democratic and State-Socialistic element such as Fichte in- 
 tended. On the other hand, it is closely connected with the 
 achievements of the army and of German industry and techni- 
 cal science, which have become famous throughout the world for 
 the quality of their results and for their scientifically enlight- 
 ened methods. 
 
 This system also naturally involves certain dangers — conven- 
 tionalizing to type, a pedagogic spirit and, as it were, a casting 
 of minds in the administrative mould. Our system is most un- 
 popular with the English, who prefer a vastly looser school or- 
 ganization which makes for firmness of character and good fellow- 
 ship rather than for education and general intellectual develop- 
 ment. But the dangers referred to are neutralized by careful 
 individualizing, by fostering the Kantian spirit of independence 
 and self-government, and by the teaching of ancient classics for 
 purposes of moral character-building. This is particularly the case 
 in a great number of secondary schools, whereas the dangers are 
 met in the universities by the spirit of free and pure science, that 
 serves no utilitarian purposes. The English, on the other hand, 
 prefer material utility and routine to our university education, 
 leaving free, pure science to private scholars or holders of fel- 
 lowships. Their secondary schools reflect class and social dis- 
 tinctions much more than ours, while their free national schools 
 are under a complicated administration of the church, the gov- 
 ernment or the local bodies. It is extremely difficult to determine 
 the greater or lesser advantage of the two systems. They corre- 
 spond to the general character of each nation, and considering 
 our character and our tasks, we have every reason to be thank- 
 ful for our system. We are certain that our present accom- 
 plishments and successes would not have been possible but for it, 
 and we are confident of being able to overcome all its dangers 
 by our alm.ost excessive spirit of individualism, originality and 
 personal freedom. A spontaneous movement to this end has 
 already begun to manifest itself among our present-day youth.^ 
 
 The touch of State Socialism w^hich the army and the school 
 are thus shown to exhibit is even more pronounced and compre- 
 hensive in the general system of German administration. This 
 system is the outgrowth of the patriarchal state of the seven- 
 teenth century, and also of the enlightened "police state," which, 
 
 1 See Universities and National Life, by Viscount Haldane, London, 1912 
 (Second Edition), the chapter on "German Organization," p. 77 et seq., which 
 discusses the German school system in relation to England. 
 
 See also The War and Democracy, pp. 356-363, on the English dislike of the 
 German educational system: "We have hardly yet begun in England to realize 
 the possibilities of educational development along the lines of the British ideal, 
 both as regards young people and adults" (p, 361). 
 
74 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 by its thorough-going work, rescued the German people 
 from the economic desolation left in the wake of the Thirty 
 Years' War and the Napoleonic conflicts. But this administra- 
 tive system has passed through new phases and has acquired 
 new characteristics since the great period of Stein ; it has de- 
 veloped from a patriarchal bureaucracy into a rational and far- 
 seeing guardian of all the interests of the State and the people. 
 It has joined hands with the great system of self-government in 
 the cities and districts, with the various forms of insurance, and 
 finally with the supervising and advisory parliaments, thus de- 
 veloping an enormous activity the effects of which are seen In 
 the prosperity and security of present-day Germany. Unfet- 
 tered work and free competition of industry and agriculture 
 would never have accomplished this unaided, as they have failed 
 to accomplish it, as a matter of fact, in England and America. 
 In this connection, we must above all refer to the great work 
 of social Insurance, which is gradually being copied by the whole 
 world, and also to the housing, land and labor legislation of our 
 cities — in which there are no Ill-famed slums and which, with 
 the general Increase of population, are on the high road to a 
 marvellous prosperity. Nor must we forget the rational land 
 policy, the encouragements to prosperity, and the protection of 
 homesteads In the country. It Is true that these things have 
 their dark side. Criticism Is heard of the predominance and 
 number of the official class, of bureaucratic "enforcement of 
 felicity," exaggerated respect, for position and title, the habit of 
 depending upon the police for help and a certain tendency to 
 groveling subordination. Englishmen, who In this respect pre- 
 fer freedom from state intervention, are generally averse to this 
 form of administration and are accustomed to speak contemptu- 
 ously of the character which it has Imparted to the Germans. 
 But these are dangers which we ourselves strive to counteract 
 within the system, not In opposition to It. He who knows our 
 administration from Its Inner working, not merely from the 
 outside, and especially he who has made a study of the great 
 system of municipal self-government, with Its bold experiments 
 in far-reaching social legislation, will have no fears of bureau- 
 cratic ossification as a final result. He will, on the contrary, 
 see in It the growth of an established vigorous State-Socialism, 
 which Is the inevitable development of modern society, and 
 which even England has been compelled to inaugurate In her 
 latest legislation. Our own love of freedom and the character 
 of our great administrators guarantee that flexibility and life 
 
MODERN GERMANY 75 
 
 will be preserved In the system, which has stood the test so 
 brilliantly in the present war and which has yet many great 
 problems to solve in the future. 
 
 Only on the foundations here described was the development 
 of German economic life possible; it synchronized in its growth 
 with the development of our political unity and strength. The 
 Germans, to be sure, are by nature an extremely diligent people, 
 trained to careful and conscientious toil since the days of the 
 boroughs of the late Middle Ages, and inured to hard work and 
 thrift by the misery and poverty of the period of petty states. 
 They are still to-day more industrious than the English, who 
 are accustomed to growing rich with less labor and who con- 
 sider this as their proper privilege. But only since the birth of 
 the new state have the Germans successfully entered the cur- 
 rent of the modern economic movement and raised themselves 
 to the plane of their present extraordinary economic achieve- 
 ments, under careful state guidance and with the spur of capi- 
 talism and mechanical art. This primarily has increased the 
 population, and this increase was again an incitement to more 
 extensive labor. The result has been gradually to change us 
 from a purely continental and preponderantly agrarian state 
 into an empire in which industry and agriculture are combined 
 and whose interests extend far beyond the seas. Great inter- 
 nal difficulties are inherent in this dual tendency, but at the 
 same time there are great advantages of an economic and psy- 
 chological nature, as we are realizing most keenly at the present 
 moment. German agriculture feeds the nation in time of w^ar, 
 the German peasantry furnishes the best soldiers, and the large 
 land-holder, accustomed to command, supplies the officer corps 
 with the major part of its members. We are not a nation of 
 rentiers, like the French, not a rural military and bureaucratic 
 state bent on conquest, like the Russians, not a purely industrial 
 and commercial nation, like the English, whose fleet is the bul- 
 wark of their luxury and who provide for their younger sons 
 by giving them posts in the colonies. We are still a nation 
 working at high tension, that must employ all its arts of or- 
 ganization, of order and calculation, as well as its whole political 
 strength and unity to feed its increasing millions. To this very 
 fact the war was chiefly due, since our industry and increase in 
 population gave birth to our maritime policy, resulting in clashes 
 with England, the exclusive ruler of the seas. To these circum- 
 stances, far more than to German ideas and theories, are we also 
 indebted for our great unpopularity. Our middle-class popula- 
 tion, in pursuit of a livelihood. Is forced out into the world to 
 
76 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 take places abroad as clerks, barbers, mechanics, teachers, superin- 
 tendents and foremen, and they are naturally regarded as unwel- 
 come competitors. A still more important factor is that our 
 industry is compelled to concentrate itself chiefly on finished high- 
 class products, not necessities, and that these products are not 
 welcomed like those of dealers in raw stuffs and partly made-up 
 goods, but must often struggle for a market against native finished 
 goods. In addition, our business methods are frequently unwel- 
 come to the established mercantile intercourse of older commercial 
 countries. This is the result, to be sure, not of German character, 
 but of Germany's commercial position ; but it is easy to generalize 
 from such a basis and to stir up sentiment against the German 
 spirit, as is being systematically done at present. 
 
 All the things here mentioned — monarchy, army, school, ad- 
 ministration and economy — rest upon an extraordinary instinct 
 for order, combined with stern discipline and an earnest sense 
 of duty. With this we penetrate more into the inner being of 
 the German. Whence comes this trait, whether from natural 
 endowment or from historical training, it is difficult to say. 
 Nor does it matter. It is enough that things are as they are. 
 It is in this sense that our ruler designates himself as the ''First 
 servant of the State," and that the great German thinker ex- 
 claims: "Duty, thou sublime word!" — the same thinker whose 
 chief merit it is to have established philosophy on clear and classi- 
 fied logical principles. Order and duty, solidarity and disciphne 
 are the watchwords of our officialdom, of associations and cor- 
 porations, of large and small business concerns, of our labor 
 unions, and of the great social insurance undertakings. Method 
 and system are the principles of scientific work and the technical 
 arts, of education and social legislation. Even free artistic tem- 
 perament and imagination do not move only in the sphere of in- 
 spiration and mood, but seek, precisely in the case of our greatest 
 men, to take their place in the general psychic development, in the 
 cosmic conception and in the scheme of moral achievement. No 
 examples need be mentioned, for this is the characteristic 
 trait of the German which strikes strangers first of all. 
 Many regard it with unfriendly eyes. Englishmen are fond 
 of designating it as pedantic and doctrinaire. A Russian 
 newspaper says: "The German has but one aim throughout 
 his whole life. To be German, therefore, is identical with in- 
 finite boredom." An Italian recently expressed the opinion that 
 in Germany method is so highly developed that it renders genius 
 superfluous. It is difficult to argue about a matter in which the 
 decision rests on purely subjective standards, and in regard to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 77 
 
 which It is true that, in our case, as in others, virtues have their 
 drawbacks. At all events, there is no plethora of geniuses in 
 other countries, and we may well be satisfied with so universal 
 and widespread a substitute. 
 
 But the dangers in this connection are after all not so great. 
 For as one-sided development inevitably calls forth counter- 
 balancing qualities in the human soul, so this sense of order 
 finds its balance in extremely gentle and tender traits of heart 
 and mind, in family instinct and love of home — the most beau- 
 tiful expression of which is the German Christmas festival. It 
 is further counteracted by the tender depth and primitive sin- 
 cerity of feeling as expressed in our folk-songs, and by the stern 
 sense of justice and self-assertive tenacity as shown in the ethics 
 of our peasantry. Under the surface of the metropolitan jour- 
 nalistic writings this is the genuine German character, which 
 finds its way through a hundred channels, even into the highest 
 classes, and which is now manifesting itself on all sides in our 
 national army and touching our hearts with song and comrade- 
 ship. Naturally, these elemental popular traits are as a rule 
 completely lost upon the foreigner; just as we, in the case of 
 other nations, can only divine these undercurrents by means of 
 their anecdotal literature. At all events this is the point of 
 contact with the Englishman, who is otherwise so different from 
 us in spirit, but who feels also the need of a similar counter- 
 balance to his commercial and utilitarian sense. But we limit 
 this world of sentiment less to home and family ; we let it extend 
 into every phase of life and cosmic conception; it finds expres- 
 sion in our art and poetry, our social attitude and our judgment 
 of our fellowmen. This fact is revealed by those poets whom 
 one may characterize not as our greatest, but as the most essen- 
 tially German: Jean Paul, Adalbert Stifter, Wilhelm Raabe, 
 Willibald Alexis, Fritz Reuter, and above all Jeremias Gott- 
 helf, who is not characteristic of Switzerland alone. 
 
 Comparing them with Dickens and George Eliot, or Zola, 
 we gain at least a dim conception of the difference in national 
 spirit. But even where German poetry and character-delinea- 
 tion rise to the heights of universal humanity and spiritual great- 
 ness, we still meet this basic element, operating on the whole 
 man with the force of a certain childlike heartfelt directness, as 
 demonstrated by Goethe, Bach or Beethoven. Nay, this differ- 
 ence extends even into the field of religion. Luther, who domi- 
 nates German Protestantism, is distinguished by his childlike, 
 popular traits and primitive strength of feeling from the sober, 
 logically precise, and morally correct Calvin, whose spirit still 
 
78 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 lives in Calvinism and non-conformity, although much external- 
 ized, formalized and deteriorated along utilitarian lines. The 
 keen observer would herein likewise discover the chief difference 
 between German and French or Italian Catholicism. 
 
 But as a matter of fact this entire antithesis in the sense of 
 order and sentiment does not exist to such a pronounced degree 
 as is apparently the case when viewed from without. For these 
 two tendencies have a common source from which they flow and 
 in which their inner unity is to be sought — namely, the German 
 metaphysical and religious spirit. Our sense of order is not 
 founded on its usefulness for material and social ends, but ema- 
 nates, together with the sense of duty, from an ideal concep- 
 tion of the spirit which is the rule and law of human life and of 
 the universe. Nor is this feeling identical with a sentimentality 
 that clothes, covers and seeks to compensate the asperities of 
 life. It is rather the child of an elemental cosmic conception 
 which realizes that this feeling is basic in the universe. The 
 German is by nature a metaphysician who ponders and strives, 
 from the spiritual inwardness of the universe, to grasp the inner 
 meaning of the world and of things, of man and destiny. It 
 will always be idle to explain the origin and development of this 
 predominant, though by no means universal, characteristic. It 
 remains the final German life secret, much discussed among 
 the Germans themselves, the cause of sacrifice and suffering, the 
 motive power of wonderful achievements — the problem of an 
 ever-new compromise with practical life and its realistic demands. 
 
 It is seen above all in the significance of religious life, as 
 revealed by German history. The life of the burghers of the 
 late Middle Ages was the first complete realization of Chris- 
 tianity within the limits possible for an active people. From 
 this class came the Reformation and the division of the Church, 
 which has decided the fate of modern Europe, disrupted the 
 unified German state, and lastingly bound up the general life 
 of the single states with their religious organizations. At the 
 period of national spiritual renascence of the eighteenth century, 
 the great problem of life was the reconciliation of the modern 
 spirit with Christianity, the creation of a scientific, critical theol- 
 ogy, the adaptation of the Christian idea to a religiously deep- 
 ened conception of humanity. This problem has remained until 
 to-day the chief point of German interest. But at the same 
 time the old traditional churches have displayed vital activity, 
 and they are regarded by many intellectuals as the natural 
 means of maintaining a moral idealism among the people. This 
 has resulted, it is true, in very confused conditions. To remove 
 
MODERN GERMANY 79 
 
 this confusion, whether in the manner of French anti-clerical 
 legislation or in that of the Anglo-Saxon freedom of conscience 
 and disestablishment of the churches, encounters difficulties, not 
 alone in historical, political and legal conditions, but likewise in 
 the depths of the German spirit itself, to which the Puritanic 
 separation of politico-social institutions and purely individual 
 culture is foreign. We regard state and spirit as belonging to- 
 gether, and an old inherited instinct makes us avoid a separa- 
 tion in the interest of both, despite the difficulties created by 
 the modern spiritual cleavage. We suffer the confusion of this 
 situation rather than resign ourselves to the Anglo-Saxon divi- 
 sion of politico-social civilization and private individual spiritual 
 training. In such a separation, experience teaches, the latter 
 suffers grievously. The whole system in England presumes the 
 general domination of an inviolable orthodox}', while on the 
 other hand the French bourgeoisie has made anti-clerical enlight- 
 enment a state question. This point shows with particular clear- 
 ness the fundamental dissimilarities of the nations. 
 
 A similar metaphysical tendency, though naturally less closely 
 connected with the state, holds sway in German art. For that 
 very reason, its real centre is music, since in it is voiced, in a 
 manner most appealing to us, all that is unutterable and inex- 
 pressible in the German character, simplicity and heroism, 
 mirth and melancholy, faith and doubt, empirical knowledge 
 and intuition. From Bach, Gluck and Handel down to the 
 present day there is an unbroken series of the sublimest crea- 
 tions. Through its music the essence of the German spirit is 
 usually most easily revealed to foreigners, as is shown in Romain 
 Rolland's great novel, ''Jean Christophe," to choose but one 
 illustration. It is true that this metaphysically inspired, impul- 
 sive and stirring art, is in sharp contrast with the artistic con- 
 ception of the Latin races, with their sense of clearness, form, 
 grace and transparency, which is an inheritance from the Re- 
 naissance. Herein the great national contrasts are clearly 
 revealed, contrasts which simply cannot be overcome and eradi- 
 cated, and in the expression of which each people must live out 
 its ow^n life. For this reason German music cannot be torn 
 from its organic connection with the entire national life, from 
 national religious faith and war-like heroism, from national self- 
 consciousness and the hopes bound up therewith. How closely 
 all these things are connected may be seen in the "Meister- 
 singer," that most German creation of a master who in other 
 respects may be said to be modern rather than purely German. 
 Precisely for this reason, the protest of RoUand against German 
 
8o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Kultur and the severance of modern realistic Germany from 
 old idealistic Germany proceeds from a false basis. For our 
 enemies such a separation may doubtless be highly desirable, for 
 us it lies neither in the realm of the desirable nor of the pos- 
 sible. 
 
 It is much more difficult to apply the same line of thought to 
 German plastic art. For in this field, in Germany as elsewhere, 
 influences are many and varied. Moreover, our situation is 
 here very complicated. The great German tradition of the 
 Middle Ages was interrupted, and in the period of desolation 
 it was foreign art and literature that helped us find ourselves 
 again. Especially in the plastic arts are the various influences 
 highly involved; it is impossible, not alone owing to the limita- 
 tions of space, to draw here one clearly defined line of specifi- 
 cally German development. But that which is not possible 
 from the point of view of the history of art, may, nevertheless, 
 be indicated from the point of view of the history of civiliza- 
 tion. Despite the German's yearning for the sunny south, the 
 northern Gothic germ is in his blood, while the French have 
 completely broken with the great France of the Middle Ages 
 and turned sympathetically toward the Renaissance and the 
 Counter-Reformation. The German's thought is always 
 chiefly occupied with substance, expression, movement, not with 
 line, form, symmetry and delicacy. This explains fundamental 
 dissimilarities between the Germans and the Latin races, for 
 the latter of whom, moreover, art stands in much closer con- 
 nection with the immediate forms and instincts of life. 
 This finds ample expression in the present Kultur war, and 
 in the minds of many forms the basis for the charges 
 of barbarism, just as the classical Frenchman saw only the 
 untamed drunkard even in Shakespeare, the poet of the 
 Renaissance, and as the Italian regarded, and probably still re- 
 gards, northern Gothic art as barbaric art. This has been the 
 source of a mass of international criticism, scattered throughout 
 the world as commonplaces on the wings of elegant French 
 journalism and eagerly accepted, especially by Anglo-Saxons, 
 whose Puritanism and commercialism have deprived them of a 
 definite artistic tradition. Further discussion on this point is 
 without object. We Germans find the great symbols of our 
 mode of artistic conception in Diirer, Holbein, Griinwald and 
 Rembrandt; and we let the real artistic creative power of the 
 present follow its own path, knowing that it cannot be fettered 
 by theories and that it is certain to return to those old symbols. 
 
 It is easier to characterize German philosophy in a uniform 
 
MODERN GERMANY 8i 
 
 manner. It has, to be sure, naturally shared in all the move- 
 ments of European thought; but in the main it is precisely this 
 philosophy which is the expression and the cradle of the meta- 
 physical German spirit, and its central position in German spir- 
 itual life is of the greatest importance. The reader is already 
 familiar with the main outlines, and a few words must suffice 
 for this great subject. 
 
 German philosophy was created by Leibnitz and Kant. Their 
 spirit has acted on classical German literature and poetry, and 
 in conjunction with these it laid the foundation of German 
 idealism, which once more to-day, after many fluctuations, domi- 
 nates German philosophy and has done more inwardly to form 
 and strengthen the youth of Germany than anything else within 
 the last twenty years. If in truth it is the task of modern 
 philosophy, as distinguished from the ancient and medieval, to 
 seize hold upon and philosophically digest and apply modern 
 natural science and its all-permeating mechanical concept of 
 nature, German idealism up to the present may be said to have 
 set itself the task of combining with the mechanical concept of 
 nature, the full appreciation of the moral, religious and artistic 
 spirit, and the assertion of freedom with the mechanical princi- 
 ple. In this effort, German idealism has hitherto undertaken 
 its most abstract and elemental investigations, but never more 
 ardently than at the present moment. By this means German 
 philosophy has remained in closer touch with the religious life 
 of the people than has the French scientific dogma of atheism. 
 On the other hand, it has penetrated much deeper into the 
 general spirit of religion than can be the case with the essentially 
 practical and conventional religion of England and her not less 
 practical and utilitarian philosophy. 
 
 German philosophy is free, autonomous idealism. There can, 
 in truth, be no question here of that so-called philosophy of 
 force, nor of nationalism or chauvinism. The only question is 
 that of the fundamental relation of nature and spirit, and within 
 the bounds of spirit the question of the individual to the body 
 politic. It is chiefly the spirit of Kant and Fichte which has 
 inspired these investigations up to the present day. Their spirit, 
 only calmer, more realistic and cosmopolitan, permeates the 
 national uprising of 1914, as it permeated that of 181 3. For- 
 eigners, it is true, are inclined to criticize this philosophy as 
 abstruse metaphysics, or as semi-theology, and many contemptu- 
 ous references to it are to be found in the literature of the war. 
 But those who judge thus are in no case the leaders of thought. 
 They are the average anti-clericals and the equally average Eng- 
 
82 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 lish utilitarians and **matter-of-fact" men. The leaders of 
 thought, even in those countries, have turned their efforts to-day 
 tovi^ards a similar idealism, and are in many cases indebted (as 
 for example, Bergson and Boutroux) to German philosophy. 
 The basic difference is that in Germany philosophical idealism 
 possesses a much stronger national tradition and has a much 
 voider influence in educated circles, but in the main the European 
 leaders of thought converge in a truly remarkable manner. 
 There w as no need of going to v^ar for the sake of our divergent 
 philosophies.^ 
 
 Such a concentration on the spiritual elements of culture as a 
 vv^hole, w^hich unmistakably characterizes the historical develop- 
 ment of Germany since the Reformation, indicates a pronounced 
 talent for scientific work in general. Thus, together with the 
 increasing realistic tasks of the nation, we observe an increas- 
 ing development of its powers in the field of empiric science. 
 No mention is needed of what the nation has achieved in the 
 line of natural science and mechanical art. It has in all branches 
 fully attained to the science of the older and more advanced 
 nations, and perhaps in some lines even surpassed them. But for 
 purposes of our discussion, this Is unimportant. English scien- 
 tists, who in their war fury will at best but credit their German 
 colleagues with the discovery of the spectrum analysis as an Inde- 
 pendent piece of research, may receive their answer from the 
 German scientists, if these should think It worth their while. 
 
 On the other hand, a word In regard to German historical 
 science may not be out of place. At Its Inception it was strongly 
 Inspired by philosophy, and embraces, in thoroughly cosmopolitan 
 fashion, the development of languages, art, religion, politics, as 
 well as the economics of the whole world open to our knowl- 
 edge. In this effort It was emphatically supported by the in- 
 vestigations of travelers and geographers. But among other 
 
 1 See German Philosophy and the Present Crisis, by G. Dawes Hicks, 
 Hihbert Journal, October, 1914, Vol. XIII, No. i. In this sober-minded article 
 the writer claims that this entire system of philosophy has been superseded 
 'by "Bismarckism." It is perhaps sufficient, in reply to this, to say that, 
 despite our gratitude to the founder of the Empire, there has developed in 
 Germany a reaction against "Bismarckism" as a system. The maxims and the 
 deeds of a statesman who was called upon to overcome almost superhuman 
 difficulties cannot be regarded as an ethical system for eternity. It is a 
 strange fact that foreigners do not recognize German idealism — which they 
 are always so ready to call "political immaturity" — when it treats political 
 and social problems according to German history and not according to those 
 French and English traditions which they accept almost as natural rights. 
 It is impossible, of course, under our state and educational system, for German 
 social philosophy to be what the English and French democratic systems de- 
 mand; which proves that our social philosophy is idealistic. For further testi- 
 mony on this point, see TJie War and Democracy, referred to in footnote, 
 p. 69. German philosophy and the "potato-bread spirit," of which Mr. Lloyd- 
 George speaks, of course, have as much in common as have English philosophy 
 and miners' strikes, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 83 
 
 numerous problems with which the science of the newly created 
 and growing state found itself face to face was the particular 
 problem of the state. Hegel, continuing the thought of an- 
 tiquity as represented by Plato and Aristotle, had already recog- 
 nized this as a quite peculiar problem, absolutely distinct and 
 different from those of merely private morals and of social 
 science. In Ranke's cosmopolitan investigations it was stated 
 in its purely historical sense as the distinction between the in- 
 carnation of political power and all other historical creations. 
 The historical school of jurisprudence has effectually supported 
 these apperceptions. Herein, it is true, German historical 
 science, as emphatically as Plato had done in his day, opposed 
 the democratic fiction that the state is an institution created by 
 the individuals for their own security and happiness. This 
 antithesis naturally became intensified in the days of the fierce 
 struggles for national unity, during which the great historical 
 investigators, von Sybel and von Treitschke, seemed to be 
 developing into political publicists rather than historians. But 
 ^ anyone versed in such matters is aware that these political 
 thinkers in no way intended to deny the existence of political 
 ethics, but merely to distinguish them from the rules of private 
 morality. 
 
 It is precisely this distinction which English democrats, 
 whether of Christian or anti-Christian stripe, fail to recognize. 
 They measure all foreign states by their private moral rules, 
 but leave the politically so advantageous immoralities of English 
 politics to the responsibility of the Government. We are in 
 this respect more honest, and penetrate further below the sur- 
 face. The saying that "might makes right" has never been 
 the motto of German thinkers, despite the fact that for them 
 the conception of right and morality was more difficult and in- 
 volved than for those who, in the manner of Puritanism, pro- 
 claim a universal democratic natural right, which they reconcile 
 with their own political aspirations by declaring their own state 
 to be the guarantor and controller of natural rights throughout 
 the world. 
 
 German historical science, however, has by no means re- 
 mained at the standpoint of the seventies. Without abandoning 
 its conception of the nature of the state, it has again extended 
 its view to include the entire cosmopolitan horizon, and has 
 elevated purely political interests to the historico-cultural plane. 
 It is, however, not possible at this point to enter further into 
 this subject. It suffices to mention Mommsen, von Wilamowitz 
 
84 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and Eduard Meyer, or to recall the names of Harnack, Dllthey 
 and Schmoller. 
 
 To all this must be added German literature and poetry, as 
 the most important revelation of the German spirit. It may 
 seem surprising that they should be mentioned last in this con- 
 nection. But that is due precisely to the universal function which 
 they exercise among us. German life and feeling in the eight- 
 eenth century had been forced back into a literary existence, and 
 the entire vital energy and force of the nation was compressed 
 into its literature. Literature, therefore, was the centre of all 
 philosophical, scientific and cultural interests, and drew within 
 its sphere social and finally state problems as well. Not with- 
 out significance is it that Goethe, the typical representative of 
 this literature, found the solution of his problem in universal, 
 but at the same time thoroughly individual, self-culture. This de- 
 termined the character of modern German literature. It ab- 
 sorbed into itself the essence of German life, and in this way 
 operated like a philosophy. It formed, deepened and transfig- 
 ured the life of the nation in all fields of activity. In this con- 
 nection the classical and romantic schools were, in truth, not in 
 such marked opposition; they were united in the ideal of self- 
 culture, differing only in the means to be employed for its 
 achievement. Indeed, in carrying out this thought and in im- 
 planting it in the soul of the people, the romantic school was 
 perhaps more efficacious even than Goethe. 
 
 In the course of the nineteenth century, German literature, 
 it is true, fell from the heights attained (of which further dis- 
 cussion is superfluous), but with fresh energy, it is now recov- 
 ering from this decline. The literary revolution of the eighties 
 prepared the way for a deep inner change and revival, which, 
 at present, we feel within us only as a shadowy desire and im- 
 pulse, but which is surely an indication of vitality and unex- 
 hausted power. This is, therefore, the place for a word about 
 Nietzsche, whose name has been so misused in this Kultur war. 
 
 Nietzsche is rather a poet than a thinker. German philosophy 
 is concerned with him but slightly, German politics not at all. 
 He preached against the triteness, shallowness and self-compla- 
 cency of German culture of the eighties, deepened vastly the 
 conception of personality, strengthened the longing for sincere 
 living and originality, and thereby blazed the way for a new 
 romantic movement; in its development this movement has 
 become much more German than would have accorded with 
 Nietzsche's Latin and Slavic sympathies. Even before the war, 
 the morbid, irritable and egoistic quality of his teaching 
 
MODERN GERMANY 85 
 
 was in process of elimination, and doubtless in the spiritual ele- 
 vation resulting from the war it will be permanently overcome. 
 But only trivial Pharisees and narrow-minded sectarians can 
 deny the incentive to new aims and inner searchings that owe 
 their origin to him. 
 
 How deeply this spiritual and scientific interest is rooted in 
 Germany is shown by the remarkably broad classes which are 
 permeated by it. All officials, teachers and preachers have 
 enjoyed this education. The centres of scientific work are 
 remarkably numerous and well equipped. In this respect Ger- 
 many is perhaps unique. But even more important is the fact 
 that an army of publishers, associations, institutions and enter- 
 prises uninterruptedly provides the people with this intellectual 
 pabulum. Music and philosophy, science and education are con- 
 tinually popularized. A kind of democratization of all educa- 
 tion is under way which strives to render the very best and 
 deepest universally accessible. He who is familiar with the 
 systematic activity of the Kunstwart and of the Durerbund 
 with their remarkably cheap dissemination of genuine art and 
 serious thought, knows with what earnestness this work is 
 carried on. A Dutch socialistic paper was not wrong in declar- 
 ing recently that this was one of Germany's greatest services in 
 the field of culture. 
 
 This brings us to the last, most important and most disputed 
 subject: the German conception of freedom. It combines the 
 metaphysical religious spirit, which we have just characterized,, 
 with the political needs of the youthful Empire — as described in 
 the opening passages of this chapter — in a peculiar, and it must 
 be admitted, often paradoxical manner. Hence, as all contro- 
 versialists correctly divine, and some express with striking clarity, 
 this conception is different from the French and from the Anglo- 
 Saxon. 
 
 The French idea of freedom rests upon the conception of the 
 equality of all citizens in their contributions to the carrying out 
 of the common will. Theoretical constitutional maxims which 
 safeguard the egalite and liberie, and occasionally incite the im- 
 agination and the passions of the people, are of supreme im- 
 portance, although in practice they fail to exclude the dominance 
 of plutocrats and lawyers. Of fraternite it is perhaps best not 
 to speak at all; it is and remains, in the words of Count Cham- 
 fort, somewhat like the fraternite of Cain and Abel. 
 
 The English idea of freedom, on the contrary, is a compound 
 of Puritanic ideas and of conceptions dating from the times of 
 the old Saxon Estates. It represents personal responsibility and 
 
86 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 self-government of the individual; his independence of the 
 state, based on a natural right; the creation of the state by 
 the individual. Without attaching great importance to consti- 
 tutional theories it exercises practical control over the powers 
 of the state; it guarantees freedom of religious opinion, liberty 
 in matters of conviction, and independence of spiritual culture 
 from state interference. It is the realization of the universally 
 recognized dominating position of the English citizen, w^ho 
 imposes upon inferior races the rules of life suitable to them, 
 while reserving his own rules for his individual determination. 
 The Englishman acts from his own free utilitarian convictions 
 and in reliance on his personal inviolability. It is his creed that 
 this freedom coincides with the welfare of the state, which he 
 proves either in Puritanical fashion, by means of Providence, 
 or rationalistically, by means of evolution — in any case, which- 
 ever way he looks at it, he considers it a matter of course. 
 For this reason he links the state and government to public 
 opinion, which is the product of these free and clever egoistic 
 units, and he sees therein the guarantee of reason, morals and 
 freedom. 
 
 Upon either of these two bases, great and mighty developments 
 of political and social life are undoubtedly possible and have ac- 
 tually been realized. But the German idea of freedom is funda- 
 mentally different. Rising gradually from long centuries of 
 inferiority and servitude, the German first experienced freedom 
 in German education and the spiritual content of individuality. 
 These ideals were permeated from the start and for all time 
 by the old German longing for independence and defiant self- 
 assertion, though these were for a long time denied political 
 realization. German freedom came into being, according to 
 Kant's conception of it, as the freedom of spontaneous recogni- 
 tion of duty and right, and in the romantic conception of an 
 infinite wealth of culture, individual, but in all cases mutually 
 complementary. Up to the present it has, in the main, retained 
 this character. In conjunction with this, the old tendency 
 toward particularism has persevered, manifesting itself in pro- 
 vincial, dialectic and dynastic peculiarities, and in the proverbial 
 German love of dispute and discord. But this latter quality is 
 to-day greatly moderated in its disruptive effects. It has been 
 sublimated into individualism and distinctiveness, and has defi- 
 nitely subordinated itself to the strong feeling of political soli- 
 darity, which will no longer brook foreign domination and is 
 determined to regulate its own life from within, in the true 
 German spirit and manner. By these means we have sought in- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 87 
 
 wardly and morally to overcome the worst obstacle to German 
 freedom ; namely, the separation of classes and castes dating from 
 the period anterior to 1848. That is even in our day the most 
 difficult and peculiar task of German freedom. From this point, 
 truly, it was and still remains a long way to actual political 
 freedom. The English model of Parliament and the system 
 of self-government have helped us greatly along this path ; likewise 
 a great influx of French Democratic thought has permeated Ger- 
 man party life and is still generative to-day. Our energies are 
 directed, and must for a long time be devoted to the utilization 
 and adaptation of these incentives in forms suitable to our nation. 
 Nothing demonstrates more clearly than this that we are still a 
 young and unfinished state. Our policy regarding the various 
 nationalities embodied in the German Empire has also much to 
 learn along these lines. 
 
 The democratization inevitably resulting from the popular 
 army, the public school and the emancipation of the working 
 classes, will continue to develop in Germany and will find means 
 to adjust itself to military and political exigencies. That is a 
 result in Germany, as everyAvhere else, of the condition in which 
 modern nations find themselves; our freedom will always be dif- 
 ferent, however, from that of the Western nations. Parliaments 
 are necessary, but in our eyes they are not the essence of free- 
 dom. The right of suffrage and the cooperation of the people 
 in the duties of government educate to political maturity; but 
 not even this is the freedom which we mean. German freedom 
 will never be purely political; it will always be bound up with 
 the idealistic thought of duty and with the romantic thought of 
 individuality. Even as a political conception it will bear the 
 mark of its essentially intellectual and cultural origin, in the 
 same manner as the Englishman's conception bears the mark of 
 Puritanism and the Frenchman's that of revolution. Above all, 
 we desire to gain and develop this freedom ourselves and not 
 to receive it as a gift from foreigners — least of all as the result 
 of defeat, as the literature of our enemies so often consoHngly 
 holds out to us in prospect. Here lie our definite tasks for the 
 future. The freedom of the nation must grow and develop to 
 completion in a victorious Germany, and this freedom will be 
 German freedom, not French, not English, and above all, not 
 Russian freedom. 
 
 If, now, from this point of vantage we gather together all 
 the traits described into the entity which they represent in life, we 
 shall, in the main, have correctly formulated the spirit of German 
 civilization as contrasted with that of the civilization of our 
 
88 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 enemies — allowing, of course, for errors. Nor do our enemies, 
 for their part, picture it very differently, save that they accen- 
 tuate other points than we and with an unfriendlier emphasis. 
 It would be childish to try to distinguish between these distinctive 
 factors by a dogmatic pronouncement. The great national 
 civilizations all have their advantages and their drawbacks, and 
 there is room enough in the world for all. Let us draw atten- 
 tion to one result only of the German conception of freedom. 
 It has not the nationalistic impulse of French liberty to force 
 itself on all mankind as the scientifically sole possible form; nor 
 like that of England, the pretended moral impulse to regard 
 all civilization as dependent upon the supremacy of English in- 
 stitutions. 
 
 German freedom does not strive for world dominance^ neither 
 material nor intellectual. It stands for the freedom of the 
 various national entities who may not destroy each other s possi- 
 bilities of development nor allow them to become conventional- 
 ized in the name of any law, no matter of what nature. In 
 this sense we believe that we are the people who are striving 
 for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does violence 
 to none and brings freedom to all. 
 
 The longer the war of weapons continues, the more unrelent- 
 ing this Kultur war has become and the greater the skill of our 
 enemies in transforming by lies or imagination violent national 
 egoism into humanitarian principles. In this the Machiavellism 
 of the Italians has excelled all previous performances. We, for 
 our part, know that for us this war is not primarily a question 
 of principles and ideas, but rather one of life and death, and 
 that the war of diplomacy and cultural enmity has been threat- 
 ening us ever since we have enjoyed an existence in a political 
 sense. We are, in the first place, fighting for our life. But 
 this political life of ours as a Great Power carries with it an 
 aspiration that fills us with unshakable confidence — the belief 
 that the various nationalities must be released from England's 
 dominance in the political and moral ordering of the world and 
 her tyrannical control of the seas. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
 POSITION 
 
 PROFESSOR HERMANN SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF BONN 
 
 AS was more explicitly shown in the preceding chapter, Ger- 
 many lies at the centre of the most densely settled part 
 of the globe, and is surrounded by a greater number of popu- 
 lous, powerful, and ambitious neighbors than any other country. 
 On all sides, especially on the eastern and western frontiers, 
 the way lies open for peoples strange in race, civilization and 
 speech to enter the country with the products of their hands 
 and brains. Germany has thus been designed by nature as the 
 highway, and at the same time the gathering-place of Europe. 
 Great cultural advantages undoubtedly result from this situa- 
 tion. Germany has never been able to live for herself, in jeal- 
 ous exclusiveness. Outside stimuli have at all times acted upon 
 her life. No other nation has developed a like interest and 
 understanding for foreign modes of life, and none has so great 
 cause to appreciate foreign achievements along lines of civiliza- 
 tion. Upon this basis, aided by German strength and thorough- 
 ness, there has grown up a many-sided and rich life of the 
 spirit. Germany has become the glorious land of poets and 
 thinkers. 
 
 But as a result of her geographical position, she also became 
 the battle-ground for the settlement of all the disputes of Europe. 
 For not alone to travelers, w^ith foreign wares and foreign 
 thoughts, but likewise to warriors, with weapons of death and 
 firebrands in their hands, were her unprotected fields open. Upon 
 these have been settled the greater part of European wars. Time 
 and again has the nation experienced terrible visitations, been 
 robbed of the fruits of its industry, and set back for generations 
 in the development of its powers. Whereas England, her 
 coasts safe from foreign foes, was enabled to lay aside her 
 gains and savings in undisturbed security; and France, despite 
 the many wars waged (mainly beyond her own borders) 
 by her glory-seeking kings, found it possible to preserve the 
 continuity of her commercial development, the wealth and cap- 
 ital of the German nation were repeatedly destroyed. These dis- 
 asters were felt the more keenly in view of the fact that our 
 
 89 
 
90 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 limited territory was not richly endowed by nature. With its 
 sand dunes and hilly stretches, it is inferior in natural fertility, 
 not only to France and England and Northern Italy, but like- 
 wise to Hungary and Southern Russia. It possesses no rich 
 meadows, like those of the broad coastal regions of Western 
 Europe. It brings forth neither cotton nor silk, nor rice nor 
 corn, and wheat only sparingly. It hides no gold within its 
 bosom, and but little silver and copper. 
 
 Three great and vital tasks are thus presented for solution 
 to the German nation. Culturally, w^e must develop the ad- 
 vantages of our position at the heart of Europe, by cultivating 
 every opportunity for peaceful intercourse, by the adjustment of 
 intellectual interests, and by the encouragement, without na- 
 tional stultification, of understanding for all that is noble and 
 capable of development in foreign life ; politically, we must offset 
 the disadvantages of our situation by developing our strength 
 ^nd holding ourselves ready to repel from our borders even a 
 numerically superior enemy; commercially, we must overcome 
 the handicaps of our position and of our past, by multiplying the 
 productive factor of our labor as compared to the factors of 
 soil and capital. These are the three great tasks which fate 
 has laid upon the German people before all other peoples. They 
 have not chosen them deliberately, the tasks have been imposed 
 upon them. So long as the nation continues, so long will it be 
 forced to strive for their accomplishment. The more nearly it 
 succeeds, the better will it serve, not alone itself, but likewise 
 humanity in general, whose welfare, as Germany believes, can 
 be advanced only upon a basis of a multiplicity of equal and joy- 
 ously laboring nations, but which must wither under any crush- 
 ing world supremacy. 
 
 For the performance of the political task it is not sufficient 
 to resort to energetic measures in the moment of danger. This 
 may be done by nations for whom nature has provided a more 
 or less satisfactory protection, like the United States, which occu- 
 pies almost an entire continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
 Ocean and has at no point an equally powerful neighbor; or 
 like England, who, thanks to her insular position, has remained 
 untouched by the international disturbances of the Continent. 
 The danger of invasion has in recent years filled England's im- 
 agination; in Germany, however, it has, at all times, through 
 frequent recurrence, been a terrible reality. In the face of 
 this constant danger of invasion, that permanent protection which 
 nature has refused us must be artificially provided through or- 
 ganization, in contrast to England and the United States. This is 
 
MODERN GERMANY 91 
 
 the stern lesson which history, supported by geography, at every 
 turn impresses upon us, with an emphasis that it employs toward 
 no other people. 
 
 To follow this teaching has not been easy for the German 
 people, for originally its individuality ran counter to the political 
 requirements of its position and history. Since the times of 
 Cssar and Tacitus, much has been written by strangers regard- 
 ing the individual German's love of liberty, and we have often 
 been described by natives and foreigners as a nation rich in 
 striking individualities. Individualism is deep-rooted in the Ger- 
 man soul. The antithesis between the natural inclinations of the 
 individual and the vital demands of the whole nation was for 
 a long time our undoing. It was gradually overcome only 
 through two forces. At first a strong governing will, as exem- 
 plified in the Prussian Kings, was able to hold it in check only 
 by imperious authority; it required the conscious determination 
 of the people, developed in the relentless but indispensable school 
 of bitter experience, finally to overcome it. These two forces 
 were welded together through Bismarck's creative power, and 
 the present war has convincingly shown their irresistible strength. 
 The lasting protection which, to our undomg, we had lacked 
 during our previous disunion, was given to us by the Prussian 
 Kings in times of greatest stress when they imposed the universal 
 duty of bearing arms. This they did, not in arbitrary despotism, 
 but with a proper care of their people and as the strong and 
 wise providers for our political needs. 
 
 In doing this they have unconsciously greatly helped also 
 to prepare the way for the solution of the third or economic 
 problem. For since the days of Scharnhorst, we have been ac- 
 customed to regard the duty of military service, not alone as a 
 measure of protection, the necessity of which has now for all 
 time been impressed upon each one of us, but at the same time 
 as an indispensable form of training. Clear-sighted observers from 
 all civilized lands have in recent years come to a realization of 
 this fact. Military service, as the school of physical development, 
 takes its place by the side of the public school, which provides 
 the elements of mental culture for each individual; it has hitherto 
 been a matter of regret to us that every single individual did 
 not come under the beneficent influence of military discipline as 
 wtU as under that of the public school. Compulsory education 
 and the requirement of military service are the two solid pillars 
 upon which rests the proud edifice of Germany's defensive power 
 and her economic strength. That which we were forced to learn 
 in bitter days in the army, in order to save ourselves from de- 
 
92 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 structlon, has later borne rich fruit in the field of our economic 
 life, at the start almost to our astonishment. The same 
 qualities which render our soldiers unconquerable in war are re- 
 sponsible for the superiority which the army of our workmen 
 so often show in peace. They are the qualities which alone 
 render every great organization efficient: the highest possible 
 development of the individual combined with the most efficient 
 cooperation of all. 
 
 Individual power demands mental, physical and moral develop- 
 ment. Mental efficiency is secured by our school system, which 
 is more highly developed than elsewhere and which finds its broad 
 homogeneous basis in our 61,557 public schools, and its many- 
 sided completion in the war academy, twenty-two universities, 
 eleven technical high-schools, six commercial high-schools, four 
 agricultural, forestry and veterinary high-schools, three high- 
 schools of mining, sixteen for plastic art and eleven for music. 
 Physical training, as stated, is gained by means of military service, 
 which develops self-command and adaptability, punctuality, order 
 and cleanliness. To these in recent years has been added a new 
 and unique educational element in our system of workmen's in- 
 surance with its 22,838 offices, 114 trade associations and 31 in- 
 surance offices. This system has not alone provided expert med- 
 ical attendance in all cases of greater or lesser need for every 
 working-man's family, and thereby greatly assisted in the pres- 
 ervation and improvement of public health; it has developed far 
 beyond this into a general social-political and social-hygienic 
 training of the entire people, in the same manner as it has 
 turned its attention from mere relief of poverty to its prevention. 
 Thus in later life are developed the seeds of a healthy and 
 economically sensible manner of living which for the great ma- 
 jority were sown during the period of military training. Finally, 
 moral efficiency, which naturally depends greatly on that of mind 
 and body, has also been increased through military service for 
 the mass of the people. For here, through the most severe 
 training, that quality is acquired which transforms a man, as the 
 result of voluntary and intelligent subordination, into a useful 
 member of the great present-day organizations — namely, disci- 
 pline, the modern sister of industry. A sense of duty, such as 
 the tasks of war require, even to the sacrifice of one's life, cannot 
 fail to suffice also for cooperation m the tasks of peace. But 
 only he who can obey can learn properly to command. The 
 army, therefore, educates for us not alone recruits, but also 
 officers for the vast undertakings of our industrial life; and es- 
 pecially does it furnish those efficient intermediate workers, equally 
 
MODERN GERMANY 93 
 
 trained In obeying and commanding, who may be styled the 
 under-officers of our great industries, and of whom no other 
 nation can show the counterpart. 
 
 Without discipline, even the most able leaders are unable to 
 make many men effectually useful in one common pursuit. In 
 such case, the force of their will is broken in endless disputes, 
 and a conception is lost before It takes shape in action. On 
 the other hand, a group of men accustomed to discipline are like 
 plastic clay. They need only the shaping hand of the creative 
 artist. Nothing so smoothes the way from conception to realiza- 
 tion, and so widens thereby the empire of the human will, as this 
 quality of intelligent subordination, which raises the disunited 
 desires of many wills from the arena of paralyzing conflict Into 
 the realm of powerful cooperative action. A nation accus- 
 tomed to discipline, and that is likewise educated and energetic, 
 is, therefore, by its very nature, a nation of organizers. The 
 German people have proved themselves such in all branches of 
 the army and in industrial life; in agriculture and manufacture, 
 in trade and traflfic. In times of peace our military organization, 
 which embraces the nation, and the equally Impressive organ- 
 ization of our economic life, stood side by side and often quite 
 without mutual understanding. No fact in the present war, 
 which has entered into all spheres of popular life as no previous 
 war, is more characteristic, on the German side, than that these 
 two, in closest cooperation, have been welded together Into un- 
 conquerable unity. Victory will be gained by us, not through 
 a rigid, antiquated "militarism," but through a vigorous concep- 
 tion of organization that holds promise for the future. Instead 
 of being abandoned. It will be further strengthened into exem- 
 plary power. 
 
 The Idea of organization grew in the field of economic life 
 out of the vital necessities of the people, in the same manner 
 as this Idea in the military field was forced upon us through the 
 exigency of our position and our past. 
 
 Politically, we could hold the difficult position apportioned to 
 us by fate only by not dividing our national strength, but by 
 concentrating it, numerically increasing and carefully husbanding 
 it. On the other hand, the strong union which we finally 
 achieved through the founding of the Empire and by means of 
 universal military service, proved a powerful impelling force to 
 further growth. Immediately following the war of 1870 there 
 
94 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 was a sudden remarkable increase in the birth rate, which be- 
 came an important factor in our further development, in so far 
 as this new generation, on reaching its full potentiality as a 
 labor force, proved a powerful stimulant to our economic life 
 when this began its marvellous rise around the year 1895. But 
 aside from this temporary increase resulting from the war, Ger- 
 many suffered in general under the decrease in the birth rate 
 common to all Western Europe. If the number of inhabitants, 
 despite this fact, increased more rapidly than those of other 
 European civilized nations, this, as is well known, is not to be 
 explained by an increase in the birth rate, but by a decrease 
 in the death rate. In Germany the ''fight against death" was 
 early taken up on all sides, with German scientific thorough- 
 ness and system. The death rate constantly decreased from 
 28.8 per thousand, which was the mark from 1871 to 1880, to 
 16.4 in 1 91 2. Thus it was possible, despite the falling birth 
 rate, to bring the yearly excess of births in 1874 up to 500,000; 
 in 1887 to 600,000; and again in 1895 ^"d 1896 to register a 
 further yearly increase of 100,000; in 1902 this excess reached 
 900,000. This tremendous increase from 41,000,000 in 187 1 
 to nearly 70,000,000 in 191 5, or 75 per cent in forty-five years, 
 so raised the population of Germany that to-day it occupies 
 among European nations a position second only to that of Rus- 
 sia. France, which at the beginning of the 19th century held 
 this position, stands to-day, with approximately 40,000,000, in 
 fifth place. Great Britain, on the basis of her white inhab- 
 itants — ^45,000,000 in Europe and approximately 20,000,000 in 
 other countries — does not equal the German figure ; and although 
 Russia, which in Europe alone is nine times the size of Ger- 
 many, excels the latter notably in numbers, it is culturally so 
 inferior in the mass of its people that it fails to equal us, not 
 alone in its power of production, but even as a consumer. Hence, 
 Germany enjoys the economic advantage over all European coun- 
 tries of having the broadest basis of production and consumption. 
 It is the greatest inland market in the world, with the exception 
 of the United States. Compared to its inland market, its for- 
 eign market is of relatively less importance than is the case in 
 any other European country. We have learned for the first time 
 during the war the strength that results from this condition. 
 This valuable knowledge will not again be lost, but will bear 
 fruit for us in many years of peace. 
 
 The constant striking increase of our population has been 
 primarily of importance in subjecting German economic life to 
 the driving force of incessantly mounting demand, as is the 
 
r MODERN GERMANY 
 
 95 
 
 case elsewhere only In the United States. Food, clothing and 
 shelter, and above all a chance to work, had to be provided for 
 this increasing mass. Thus enterprise and industry are kept 
 alive in the whole nation, new organizing tasks of the most im- 
 portant kind are uninterruptedly unfolding, and all efforts to 
 reduce the increasing volume of work, through the introduction 
 of improved methods, find rich reward. Under the pressure of 
 these natural conditions, resulting from healthy German energy, 
 a scientific spirit and organizing instinct have developed in all 
 branches of our economic life. 
 
 Slowly but steadily, this has become apparent in the field of 
 agriculture, which at the time of the founding of the Empire 
 was the most important of all the great branches of our 
 economic activity. Forty-five years ago Germany might still be 
 described as an agricultural country. She was able to satisfy 
 not only her own domestic demand for food, but also exported 
 her superfluous products to England. The latter country, since 
 gaining a position of world dominance as the result of the long 
 Napoleonic wars among the Continental Powers, had sacrificed 
 its agriculture more and more to trade and manufacture, in re- 
 liance upon its fleet. German agriculture had, to be sure, dur- 
 ing the first half of the nineteenth century, improved considerably 
 in its scientific and technical methods; but even under the strong 
 influence of Albrecht Thaer, the first successful founder of a 
 higher agricultural school, this advance had consisted mainly in 
 introducing here and there better methods, as the result of 
 experience, in place of those handed down from previous gener- 
 ations. 
 
 Had German agriculture continued to be carried on in this 
 empirical manner, it would not have proved equal in any notable 
 degree to the task of providing for the great increase in popu- 
 lation. The German nation would in that case have found 
 themselves in an embarrassing dilemma. It would have been 
 forced either to feed its increasing numbers with foreign prod- 
 ucts, and thereby place itself in the position of growing de- 
 pendence on foreign countries (the dangers of which course the 
 present war has forever impressed upon us), or it would have 
 had to send abroad these consumers of food who threatened its 
 safety, and would thereby have decreased not only its produc- 
 tive power but also its defensive strength. These two discour- 
 aging alternatives increased as practical possibilities at this mo- 
 ment owing to the fact that, coincident with Germany's striking 
 growth in population, an historically important development oc- 
 curred through the beginning of competition in the sale of grain 
 
96 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 from overseas in our markets. Previously transport of large 
 masses of goods had been limited to small distances, hence within 
 European boundaries; but precisely at this time the great mod- 
 ern improvements in communication made possible the importa- 
 tion of such staple foods as grain, from all parts of the earth. 
 Simultaneously the great newly opened-up grain territory in the 
 Western part of the United States invited emigrants in large 
 numbers, as no other foreign country had ever done. This 
 double danger became apparent soonest and most emphatically 
 in England. In that country, subjected as it was to its full 
 influence, the number of wage-earners engaged in agriculture 
 and forestry, which in all great European countries fluctuates 
 to-day between 35 and 69 per cent, fell to 11.9 per cent in 
 the entire United Kingdom, and in England and Wales even 
 to 8.5 per cent; at the same time the importation of grain for 
 bread rose to fully three-quarters of the public demand. In 
 Germany also this double danger became threateningly apparent. 
 Importation of those products of the cheap and fertile American 
 soil, requiring little labor and capital, was felt most disturb- 
 ingly by German agriculture from 1875 on, while at the same 
 time the stream of emigrants, mostly agricultural workers, con- 
 tinued to swell, till in 1881 it reached 220,902. Had this de- 
 velopment been allowed to continue uninterruptedly in Germany 
 as in Great Britam, then, on the one hand, our agricultural pop- 
 ulation would have suffered a diminution of three-quarters of 
 its numbers, resulting in a probably fatal loss of our defensive 
 strength ; on the other hand, our demand for imported grain for 
 bread would have increased eight-fold over the present-day fig- 
 ure, and thereby a starvation of Germany would have become 
 for us the unavoidable danger which to-day our enemies vainly 
 strive to make it. 
 
 Bismarck took steps to meet this danger. With correct 
 appreciation of the vital needs of the German people, in 1879, 
 he introduced duty on grain. By this means, he saved our agri- 
 culture from being driven to methods of extensive production; 
 on the contrary, by guarding its market he gained for it that 
 security which was needed for its further intensive development. 
 Under the protection of our tariff, the spirit of science and 
 organization was able to enter upon its astounding path of 
 victory. 
 
 Agriculture, which hitherto had been the victim of conserva- 
 tive routine, was guided into paths of science and progress, as 
 is well known, by Justus Liebig, the founder of the science of 
 plant physiology and agricultural chemistry. He undertook the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 97 
 
 most extensive investigations regarding the nutritive needs of 
 plants and the nutritive value of the soil. Our present-day 
 knowledge of fertilizers is based upon these experiments. Up to 
 that time, however, England had excelled in many ways in inten- 
 sive agricultural production. 
 
 The science of artificial fertilization was at this time de- 
 veloped in Germany and it has been practically applied in ever- 
 rising degree. It was found that that which the soil needed 
 could be produced outside the agricultural sphere. Thanks 
 to this valuable discovery, one connecting link after the 
 other was forged between agriculture and the manufacturing in- 
 dustries. It was only now that the vast treasures became useful 
 with which Germany is provided, in striking contrast to all other 
 countries of the world. She possesses deposits of a salt which in 
 foreign countries is hardly known even by name — namely, Kali. 
 In close connection with our agriculture, our industry of Kali 
 mining has increased ten-fold in the last twenty-five years, its 
 production rising to 10,000,000 tons in round figures, so that 
 to-day we export a considerable amount of this important fer- 
 tilizer — for example, in 191 3 63,600,000 marks' worth. Even 
 more important fertilizers are produced by the great manufac- 
 turing industries. From the previously worthless and troublesome 
 slag of our railway industry, in which the so-called Thomas 
 method is supreme in Germany, we extract as a result of German 
 discoveries the fertilizer rich in phosphoric acid of the so- 
 called Thomas "meal," of which to-day 10,000,000 tons in round 
 figures are used yearly. Our coke industry provides us, finally, 
 with the third chemical ingredient which the soil needs for 
 plant growth, and this the most important, namely, nitrogen ; this 
 is due to our having learned to extract ammonia, among other 
 valuable ingredients, from the previously deleterious coke gases; 
 but important as this new by-product of our coke furnaces has 
 become for us — and in the last six years its worth has nearly 
 doubled — nevertheless it does not satisfy the needs of our agri- 
 culture. In order to secure in sufficient quantity the nitrogen 
 from which plants build up their albumen cells, we have become 
 one of the greatest importers of Chili saltpeter. Almost 
 half of all Chili saltpeter which reached Europe was used by 
 us. This was a line in which our agriculture was dependent 
 upon foreign countries. Even in times of peace we had 
 felt this painfully. The war has already revealed itself to the 
 Germans in many lines, not only as a destroyer but also as 
 a creator, but it will doubtless remain the proudest achievement 
 among many of our industries that, in the midst of the most 
 
98 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 bitter struggle which a nation has perhaps ever had to undergo^ 
 we have created a great new industry exclusively by scientific 
 means. The new nitrogen industry, which the war has magically 
 called into being, provides us not alone with that of which we 
 had been deprived, as a result of the interruption of our import 
 trade, but it provides us with better and more material. It 
 holds out great possibilities of development likewise for times 
 of peace. At all events, one cause of depending upon foreign 
 countries has been removed for all time. And it may be ex- 
 pected that that which has been achieved with regard to nitrogen 
 on such a vast scale, and with such astounding swiftness, will 
 be more or less possible also in other cases, where the inter- 
 ruption of our imports calls into activity similar forces, which 
 remain dormant in times of peace. 
 
 The feeding of domestic animals has been put upon a similar 
 basis as the nourishing of plants by scientific means, by which not 
 alone agriculture but also manufacture was so vitally influ- 
 enced. The science of feeding was developed, with constantly 
 increasing care, from all points of view at the same time as 
 the science of fertilization, and the possibility was thus opened 
 up of widening the narrow circle of ancient and approved ar- 
 ticles of food by means of new ones furnished by trade and 
 industry. It was natural that at first we should take the 
 easiest course and import with little trouble all that we lacked 
 and desired. Therefore, in times of peace, trade in fodder 
 was by far the most important. The war has forced us in 
 great part to abandon this simple method, and has given us at 
 the same time the strength to produce for ourselves that which 
 hitherto foreign countries gladly and cheaply provided. In the 
 beginning this was accomplished with greater difficulties and 
 more serious expense, but in the long run it will necessarily prove 
 to be a step forward. 
 
 The scientific theory of the nourishing of plants and animals 
 was supplemented by scientific advance in their breeding. Plant 
 and animal rearing was first practiced outside of Germany, es- 
 pecially in Scotland; but also in this line it was reserved for 
 Germany to unite practice and science in an inseparable union. 
 The first great success was achieved in the cultivation of that 
 species of beets from which the German chemists Marggraf and 
 Achard discovered the way to obtain sugar, upon the basis of 
 which discovery a firm, hitherto unknown industry grew up to 
 take the place of the West Indian cane sugar, of which Europe 
 had been deprived by Napoleon's Continental System. Through 
 nursing, the sugar producing qualities of the beet were so in- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 99 
 
 creased that the average weight of beets necessary to produce 
 a kilogram of raw sugar was decreased from about 26 pounds 
 in 1870-71 to 13 pounds in 1910-11, and at the same time the 
 average return in sugar from each hektare of land was raised 
 from 42 cwt., at the beginning of the seventies, to 104 cwt., in 
 the year 1910-11. Beet sugar thus not only set an example 
 for agriculture of great and immediate value and of strong in- 
 citing power, but at the same time this industry, originally due 
 to war, gained such strength that since 1875 it has made us 
 quite independent of imported sugar; by rapid strides it ad- 
 vanced to the point of being our leading export industry, and in 
 1898 exceeded in the value of its products all others upon our 
 export list. Germany owes to plant-rearing her standing as the 
 leading country in the supply of sugar. 
 
 The German beet, however, is merely the most striking ex- 
 ample of a great movement, which with increasing strength 
 has seized upon Germany's whole agricultural activity. In every 
 line of agriculture improvements in the methods of manuring, 
 nursing and soil preparation, based on scientific research, have 
 increased the returns in an ever greater degree. In the twenty- 
 five years from 1885-1910, during which our population increased 
 30 per cent, our grain crop rose from 18,200,000 to 25,800,000 
 tons, and our potato crop from 29,700,000 to 45,900,000 tons, 
 an increase of 45 and 55 per cent respectively. As in the pro- 
 duction of beets, so likewise in the production of potatoes, Ger- 
 many leads the world. In 191 3 Germany produced 54,000,000 
 tons on 3,400,000 hektares of land, while Russia, Germany's 
 closest competitor, produced a crop of only 3,600,000 tons, al- 
 though she had 4,600,000 hektares of land under cultivation. 
 
 In the production of wheat, oats and barley, Germany oc- 
 cupies, it is true, third position; but in this connection she is 
 inferior only to the United States and European Russia, which 
 are, respectively, fifteen and nine times as large. In contrast 
 to this. Great Britain and Ireland occupy thirteenth position in 
 the production of wheat, seventh in that of oats, and fifth in that 
 of barley and potatoes. Although France is more favorably 
 placed according to statistical returns, occupying fourth position 
 in wheat and third position in potato production, there is never- 
 theless a surprising difference in her comparative production on a 
 like extent of land. To the hektare she produces 27.6 cwt. 
 of wheat, compared to Germany's 51.2; of rye 20.6 compared 
 to Germany's 38.2; and of potatoes 192.2 against Germany's 
 309.2 cwt. 
 
 What is true of agriculture is also true of cattle raising. 
 
loo MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Save in the breeding of horses — in which Germany Is excelled 
 in Europe only by Russia, not quite equalled by Austria-Hungary 
 and followed by France and Great Britain only at considerable 
 distance — advance Is not to be reckoned primarily by the num- 
 bers of animals. Limited territory sets fixed limitations in this 
 field. It is in cattle breeding a question rather of carrying out 
 to its fullest extent the economic principle of accomplishing the 
 most with the least expenditure; and this is shown by the fact 
 that, on one hand, we have greatly Increased the weight of the 
 individual animal in the case of cattle and hogs, and, on 
 the other, we have strikingly hastened growth to the period of 
 slaughter. The success of these extremely important efforts in 
 the line of meat production cannot, of course, be expressed In 
 statistics. But even disregarding such considerations, Germany's 
 position among the nations of Europe as a breeder of animals Is 
 most favorable. In the breeding of hogs, which furnished nour- 
 ishment for two-thirds of her people, Germany is far In the 
 van. Russia, France and Great Britain and Ireland together 
 did not possess in 191 3 as many head of these animals as we 
 still possessed on December i, 1914 (25,333,772). In cattle rais- 
 ing, Germany, with 20,000,000 head, is, to be sure, excelled by 
 Russia, with 37,100,000 head; but this great numerical difference 
 Is without doubt in the main balanced by superior quality. Cer- 
 tainly, Russia has nothing to show equal to our 11,000,000 
 remarkable milch cows. 
 
 After Germany, in order come Austria-Hungary, with 16,- 
 500,000 head of cattle, France, with 14,700,000, England, Ire- 
 land and Wales with 10,600,000; for Scotland no figures are 
 obtainable. The fact that In the most extensive branch of ani- 
 mal raising, namely sheep raising, Germany has deliberately re- 
 mained behind Russia, Great Britain and France — perhaps too 
 far in the rear — does not vitiate the advantage which she enjoys in 
 the other two lines of animal breeding. It remains true that by 
 closely united science and practice we have created In our animal 
 possessions a source of wealth such as no other people has 
 achieved. In case of necessity we can consume these, and In 
 times of peace by means of the acquired methods we can re- 
 produce this wealth. Nevertheless, the war has shown us, more 
 emphatically than books and speeches were able to do In peace- 
 ful times, that there Is still room for much improvement in this 
 field of our economic life, perhaps precisely because our advances 
 have been so rapid. Tasks which are not only remunerative, but 
 also necessary, were suddenly by the war brought to the atten- 
 tion of the whole nation with convincing clearness. Here again 
 
MODERN GERMANY loi 
 
 the present enforced conditions will be more than a mere episode, 
 they will prove the source of new developments rich in promise 
 for the future. Like agriculture, cattle raising after the war 
 will be placed upon a firmer foundation than ever. He who has 
 been forced to learn to do without an imported article returns 
 to its use reluctantly. 
 
 II 
 
 In the same manner as in agriculture, so likewise in the field 
 of industry has Germany, in a short space of time, undergone 
 changes greater than previously in unnumbered centuries, thereby 
 rising from a modest position to a height hitherto occupied by 
 no other great country. 
 
 Germany, it is true, in the sixteenth century led all other 
 nations in the industrial arts. But it was brought down from, 
 this proud position through the Thirty Years' War and the re- 
 sulting political schism. Even after this there remained some- 
 thing of the former renown of South German cities, such as 
 Niirnberg and Augsburg; and many products of German in- 
 dustry, as the steel ware of Solingen and Remscheid, still enjoy 
 their ancient reputation far beyond the borders of Germany. 
 But in general Germany was ill adapted for the new system of 
 mass production. She lacked a great national market, the neces- 
 sary capital and enterprise. Not until 1834 were the number- 
 less local markets hitherto protected by tariff walls brought to- 
 gether by the German Customs' Union into one general market, 
 commensurate in its power of absorption with modern mass 
 production. But aside from the union attained in customs' mat- 
 ters, the unfortunate political division was painfully apparent. 
 Thus, up to the year 1877 not less than twenty-nine different 
 patent laws were passed in the German Empire. To gain pro- 
 tection in all the individual German states was too complicated 
 and costly, and that of a single state was insufficient for produc- 
 tion on a large scale. Even in Prussia in 1871 only thirty-six 
 patents had been granted. It was natural that, under such con- 
 ditions, Germans with promising inventions should turn to Eng- 
 land, which in 1852 had issued a liberal and uniform patent law\ 
 A patent secured in that country opened up, not only the valuable 
 market of Europe, but likewise colonial markets — indeed, those 
 of the whole world. Numerous valuable products of German 
 inventive genius were therefore patented in England, and many 
 who were conscious of ability in industrial pursuits emigrated 
 
I02 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 thither. Thus German technical ability served only to strengthen 
 England's position of supremacy. The island kingdom had al- 
 ready through its own strength accomplished much in the line 
 of modern industrial development, thanks to the fact that its 
 position enabled it quietly and uninterruptedly to devote its 
 powers to commerce, while the Continental states were engaged, 
 for its benefit, in destroying each other in ever-recurring wars. 
 With the invention of the steam-engine, but before all with the 
 long series of new industrial machines, notably in the textile 
 and iron industries, England had won her first great victories in 
 modern technical fields. Here the means were at hand of 
 cheaply obtaining the most important raw materials in large 
 quantities, partly from the rich native soil, partly from the 
 colonies. In England the factory system was first developed, 
 consciously, ruthless against the workmen, not shrinking from 
 absolute cruelty. On the other hand, foreign inventions and 
 foreign workers of all kinds had here their meeting-place. 
 Before America became the great land of immigration, this dis- 
 tinction belonged to England, not, however, for immigrants from 
 the lowest class, but for those from the highest. England became 
 the "workshop of the world," not exclusively through her own 
 strength, but as the meeting-place of much of the industrial 
 ability of the whole world ; as such, she not only exported her 
 wares to other lands, but served them also as the great model 
 workshop. Especially Germany passed through these two stages 
 of dependence. In the first place, she served as a market for 
 English goods, and up to the year 1879 scarcely any other great 
 commercial territory welcomed them so freely. But when she 
 began to develop her own modern industry, she found herself 
 in many ways dependent on foreign countries, politically and 
 economically united — not only on England, but likewise on 
 France, and even Belgium. She then became a large importer 
 from these countries of machines, half-finished articles, foremen 
 and entrepreneurs. 
 
 The superiority of England — the result of political conditions 
 in the past — demanded of Germany a great display of energy, if 
 the latter country wished to win for itself a position of inde- 
 pendence and respect, commercially, as it had succeeded in doing 
 politically through the war of 1870-71. Considerations founded 
 upon natural conditions, and hence of permanent nature, were 
 added to this historical and hence temporary circumstance. First 
 of all, the island position of England gave her an extraordinary 
 advantage in regard to transportation of goods. Germany, at 
 the centre of the Continent, is in much higher degree dependent 
 
MODERN GERMANY 103 
 
 upon the more expensive form of transport by land. She had 
 to find some means of compensating this high cost of transporta- 
 tion if she intended to become a competitor in the markets of 
 the world. This was especially true in regard to the iron in- 
 dustry, for which nature, kindly disposed, had deposited coal and 
 iron ores in juxtaposition in England, and in the immediate neigh- 
 borhood of the sea; while in Germany, as in the United States, 
 they are widely separated. Such a counterbalance for the nat- 
 ural advantages of geographical position was to be found only 
 in tirelessly perfecting production by all the methods of science 
 and organization. In many industrial branches recognition in 
 the markets of the world was possible only through success in 
 gaining and retaining technical and commercial leadership. But 
 even in those lines where transportation does not play so decisive 
 a role, as in the ''heavy" iron industry, England's insular posi- 
 tion gives her advantages. Thus, for instance, especially on the 
 west coast, the air is heavily charged with moisture from the sea, 
 a circumstance which so facilitates the spinning of cotton-wool 
 that for a long time it seemed impossible to equal the fineness of 
 Lancashire yarn. 
 
 All these considerations, taken together, resulted in awaking 
 a stronger and more versatile scientific spirit and organizing in- 
 stinct in German industry than was the case in any other na- 
 tion. That w^hich had originally been withheld and made per- 
 manently difficult, owing to unfavorable historical development 
 and geographical conditions, it was necessary to attain through 
 superlatively efficient training and concentration of power. Here» 
 as in agriculture, only the most efficient work was satisfactory. 
 
 The first prerequisite for obtaining this highly efficient kind 
 of work was to diminish the pressure of English competition. 
 For it is by no means true that all kinds of competition act as 
 an incentive and intensifier of one's powers. This ail-too gen- 
 eral doctrine, formed to favor the stronger, was perhaps still 
 true in the days of Adam Smith, when capitalistic industry was 
 in its infancy. We know to-day that competition may be so 
 strong that enterprise is paralyzed, not incited, by it. In such 
 a case it is necessary to reduce the pressure to such an extent that 
 the stimulating effect of the competition may make itself felt. 
 It was in precisely such a situation that many German indus- 
 tries found themselves when the new German Empire came 
 into being. Bismarck recognized the gravity of the situation 
 and, in 1879, caused the introduction of a moderate pro- 
 tective tariff on manufactured articles and grain. Several pur- 
 poses were served thereby: struggling German industries were 
 
I04 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 protected from ruinous competition with foreign-made articles; 
 the home market was secured for home products; the increase 
 in price of many foreign-made articles stimulated German in- 
 genuity and enterprise; with financial conditions thus rendered 
 easier, leisure was gained to invent, test and perfect improve- 
 ments in all departments of production. 
 
 At this period, moreover, occurred another event of great por- 
 tent. Up to this time Germany had profited little by the in- 
 vention of Benjamin Bessemer, whereby pig iron was transformed 
 into steel in about twenty minutes. By the methods in vogue 
 before Bessemer, this operation required about one and one-half 
 days and the saving in time by the new method caused a reduc- 
 tion in price of approximately 40 per cent. Bessemer's inven- 
 tion was the result of experiments with British ores, which are 
 free from phosphorus. German iron ore contains a great deal 
 of phosphorus, and hence Bessemer's invention had been of prac- 
 tically no value to the Empire's mineral interests. England, on 
 the other hand, had greatly strengthened her industrial supremacy 
 by the Bessemer process. German iron manufacturers were 
 forced either to import Bessemer steel or the ores reducible by 
 the Bessemer process. Some new method was needed that would 
 apply to phosphorous ores as the Bessemer process applied to non- 
 phosphorous ores. Germany possessed rich deposits of iron ore 
 in Lorraine; the pressing problem was to find a way to treat 
 them. This way was found, oddly enough, in 1878 by an English 
 engineer named Thomas. British supremacy was menaced, al- 
 though this was not realized at the time. In fact, so sure were 
 the British that Bessemer steel would never be rivaled that the 
 Thomas method was not only not adopted, but was decried. 
 Not so in Germany, however. Scientists, engineers, mine-owners 
 and manufacturers united to develop the new invention to the 
 technical and commercial perfection necessary. These efforts 
 were so successful that Germany became not only England's 
 commercial rival in iron products, but a leader in the development 
 of the iron industry. 
 
 The scientific enterprise which carried the Thomas process to 
 commercial perfection found ample opportunities in the various 
 branches of the complex process of turning ore and coal into iron 
 and steel. Experiments tending to the utilization of the gases 
 produced by the manufacture of coke led to the discovery and de- 
 velopment of that many-sided secondary industry — the produc- 
 tion of coal tar, benzol, and ammonia for securing nitrogen, as 
 previously described. Benzol and coal tar are the basis of our 
 great peace trade in dyes, and in war they have been of ines- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 105 
 
 timable value in the production of munitions and as a substitute 
 for benzine. 
 
 With this spirit of scientific enterprise was closely united the 
 spirit of thorough organization. In all other European coun- 
 tries, and especially in England, ore and coal mines, coke ovens 
 and blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills were all sep- 
 arate and distinct enterprises. In Germany these various 
 branches of the iron industry were at an early period organized 
 and combined into immense concerns, with the result that great 
 savings were made in the cost of production and transport. In- 
 deed, the system of organization was carried beyond the proc- 
 esses of production into that of marketing, so that the great 
 series of operations from the first handling of the raw product 
 to its final delivery into the hands of the ultimate consumer were 
 united in one vast and systematized undertaking. In so far as 
 possible, commercial chance and accident were eliminated. 
 
 Scientific enterprise and thorough organization naturally 
 brought about a great increase in productivity and acted as the 
 equivalent of the natural advantages which England enjoyed, 
 natural advantages that tended to prevent development along 
 scientific lines. The steel industry was the first to show marked 
 signs of growth, since in this line particularly, owing to the 
 Thomas invention, German methods first developed. In the 
 twenty years from 1890 to 19 10, the steel business grew ap- 
 proximately seven times as rapidly as England's in point of 
 production. We equaled England in 1893, and to-day we pro- 
 duce almost three times as much steel as our former superior 
 rival. In pig iron progress was not so rapid, since the Thomas 
 invention, and its development was not so soon used in this field ; 
 our output did not equal England's until 1903. But in the 
 period since then we have gained so rapidly that our present 
 output is nearly double that of our rival. In 191 2, Germany 
 produced 17,600,000 tons. Great Britain and Ireland 9,000,000 
 tons. Germany at last united politically and devoting herself 
 to previously neglected fields, by untiring and skilfully directed 
 labor has won back what she possessed before the Thirty Years' 
 War — European supremacy in the entire field of the iron in-^ 
 dustry. 
 
 The importance of this cannot be overestimated. Within re- 
 cent years a universal change has taken place in the industrial 
 activities of mankind. Up to the end of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, the utilization of vegetable and animal raw material was 
 the basis of industrial life. No country possessed a modern in- 
 dustry on a large scale which could be compared in point of 
 
io6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 strength and firmness of organization with the cotton industry of 
 Lancashire. In fact, the Lancashire cotton industry was the 
 standard of modern industrial ideas. With the development of 
 cheap and quick transportation facilities, however, the basis of 
 industrial life changed and the utilization of mineral raw ma- 
 terials assumed first importance. In the United States, owing to 
 a railroad system whose total mileage exceeds that of all Europe, 
 the Iron industry gained first place; In England, with her su- 
 premacy in trans-Atlantic shipping, especially after the change 
 from wooden to iron and steel ships, the Iron Industry assumed at 
 least a temporary supremacy to cotton, which had been the In- 
 dustrial mainstay for centuries. This change, characteristic of 
 our day and generation, took place earlier and more markedly 
 In Germany, although even to-day the German demand for rails 
 is not a third of that of the United States, and her shipbuilding 
 not a fourth of that of England. Yet, despite these facts, the 
 iron industry in Germany ranks first In point of importance, and 
 although it does not stand with that of the United States, it 
 exceeds that of England. 
 
 Great Britain is still preeminent In cotton manufacturing: the 
 number of her spindles (55,971,501) exceeds that of the fol- 
 lowing three countries combined — the United States (3i,5i9r 
 766), Germany (11,404,944), and Russia (9,111,835). Her 
 supremacy In iron has been lost to the two countries which, less 
 burdened with the traditions of a glorious Industrial past, were 
 able to devote their entire strength to tasks of the present. The 
 importance of this In present-day economics cannot be magni- 
 fied. Cotton manufacture is simply the transformation of raw 
 material into cloth; iron manufacture embraces many and varied 
 products. So long as Germany was backward In the iron in- 
 dustry, these other fields were closed to her; but as soon as her 
 iron and steel equalled the foreign in quality and price, indus- 
 trial opportunities gave the skilled German workman ample 
 employment. 
 
 From 1900 to 1907, cotton products, ranging in value from 
 219,000,000 marks to 432,000,000 marks, occupied first place in 
 the German export list, with the exception of the year 1902. But 
 from 1908 on, first place has been preempted by the export of 
 machines. In 1880, the total value of machines exported was 
 only 42,000,000 marks. In 1890, 67,500,000 marks, but by 1907 
 it had reached the sum of 387,000,000 marks, as against an im- 
 port value of 83,000,000 marks. These figures were still, how- 
 ever, far behind those of England: her exports were valued at 
 627,000,000 marks and her imports at only 67,000,000 marks. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 107 
 
 Five years later, the tally was different. In 191 2, Germany ex- 
 ported 630,300,000 marks' worth of machines and England 631,- 
 600,000 marks' worth, while British imports were greater than 
 Germany's. The year follow^ing, in 19 13, the value of the ex- 
 ports of German machines was 680,300,000 marks. It may 
 safely be assumed that the domestic sale of machines is greater 
 in Germany than in Great Britain and Ireland, and, taking this 
 into account, there seems no reason to doubt that in 19 13 Ger- 
 many held first place in Europe in the machine industry, the 
 position which she had reached ten years before in the pig iron 
 industry and twenty years before in the steel industry. 
 
 Since 1908, moreover, iron ware has held second place on 
 the German export list. The term embraces a multitude of ar- 
 ticles. The export value of these products in 19 13 was 652,000,- 
 000 marks. Various forms of iron products are not included 
 in this list, such as iron bars, sheet iron, iron pipes, iron wire, 
 iron rails, pig iron and loop iron, which represent an export 
 value of 672,000,000 marks. 
 
 In third place in the export list, since 191 2, comes pit coalo Its 
 value in 19 13 was 516,000,000 marks (coke amounting to 147,- 
 000,000 marks), only 300,000,000 marks below the British fig- 
 ures. The closely related iron and coal industries make up a 
 full quarter of the whole German export trade, amounting to 
 more than 2,700,000,000 marks annually. No other branch of 
 industry in any other country has conquered for itself such a 
 position in the markets of the world. This has been won with- 
 out force or favor from the government, purely on the face value 
 of the goods themselves, and although it may be altered tempo- 
 rarily by forcible measures, in the long run it can be lost only 
 by superior efficiency of competitors. 
 
 This may be taken as a general rule in regard to German 
 industries, applying to many others with even greater force. Al- 
 though in many instances the amount of the output is not suffi- 
 cient to figure largely, yet the methods of production and market- 
 ing are classic examples of the lines along which German industry 
 is developing. Take as an example the German chemical in- 
 dustry. Engaged in this are 195 stock companies, employing 
 300,000 workers and producing in peace times goods valued at 
 1,750,000,000 marks, and in war great quantities of both de- 
 structive and curative agents. The success of this thoroughly 
 modern industry was not based on any special source of raw 
 materials but altogether on methods and labor. Success has not 
 been due to lucky discoveries, to a few secret formulas: it springs 
 absolutely from systematic efforts to achieve definite goals. This 
 
io8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 organized scientific labor, for example in the case of one factory 
 alone, led to the application for 798 patents in 191 1, or more 
 than two per day; this factory was the Elberfeld Dye Works, 
 which employ regularly four hundred scientifically trained chem- 
 ists. The energy for such constant achievement cannot be called 
 forth by the arbitrary exercise of power, no matter how ruthless, 
 nor by imitation, no matter how close; it can be achieved only 
 through long, patient and intelligently planned labor. And any 
 interference or cessation of progress means retrogression in this 
 field of labor, which is more closely related to scientific investiga- 
 tion than others. 
 
 It is not due to accident, therefore, but to the quality of the 
 workers and their product, that the German dye industry, which 
 is characteristic of the Empire's technical skill, is its most typical 
 €xport industry. It produces four-fifths of the world's demands 
 in dye stuffs, and its experienced workers and methods will con- 
 tinue to develop new fields not only for the benefit of Germany 
 but for that of the world. As regards the value of its exports, 
 the chemical industry, to be sure, ranks less than that of the 
 machine and iron industry; but when the import figures are 
 considered, it holds third place in foreign trade. 
 
 Even more favorable is the ratio of export to import in a 
 fourth industry, that of electricity and its allied trades. The ex- 
 port value is less, but that is due in part to the fact that in this 
 trade more branch factories have been established in foreign 
 countries than in the chemical industry. All four of these In- 
 dustries — the manufacture of machines. Iron, chemicals and elec- 
 trical products — form a group representing in their processes 
 typical modern Industry, turning out products of exceptional 
 quality and conducted upon the most advanced lines of modern 
 big business. In all these chief branches of our export industry, 
 remarkable personalities are in active control, assisted by large 
 staffs of young workers who have been expertly trained in techni- 
 cal and commercial schools for their particular line of work. 
 In these Industries there Is an unusually high proportion of 
 educated officials as compared with mere hands, of skilled labor 
 as compared with unskilled. 
 
 To the adequate training of the worklngman, Germany has 
 devoted unceasing care for more than a century. In addition to 
 universal compulsory school attendance up to a certain age and 
 universal compulsory military service, the state has added a sys- 
 tem of thorough vocational training for all branches of indus- 
 trial activity. Nor Is purely cultural education for the worker 
 neglected. In the so-called "extension schools," every oppor- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 109 
 
 tunlty is given the pupil, and ft is made his duty, to carry on his 
 studies begun in the lower grade schools and to apply them to 
 whatever line of work he is following. Although attendance 
 is not compulsory, custom is rapidly making it so. At the end 
 of 1912, in Prussia alone, 19,371 teachers made up the staffs of 
 2,235 industrial and 392 commercial extension schools; many 
 of these teachers were practical workers. Other federal states 
 have advanced even further than Prussia in the development of 
 this branch of education. 
 
 Even more noteworthy is the progress made in social legisla- 
 tion. The same geographical circumstances that have driven 
 Germany to rigid economy in handling her natural treasures and 
 raw material have forced her also to constant care for her 
 most valuable possession — human energy. Step by step, work- 
 men's insurance and protective legislation for workmen have been 
 developed, until to-day they are the greatest organizations deal- 
 ing with ''human economics" in the world. At the beginning of 
 the war, for instance, 25,000,000 persons were insured in the so- 
 called Workmen's Insurance against accident, 18,000,000 against 
 sickness, 16,000,000 against disability and old age; in 191 3 the 
 combined insurance organizations, with a capital of 3,057,000,- 
 000 marks, paid out for relief the sum of 840,000,000 marks, or 
 at the rate of 2,250,000 marks daily. 
 
 The rapid development of our industrial enterprises, calling 
 as it did for the expenditure of all our strength, brought with 
 it the danger of imperiling national health. England suffered In 
 this respect during the early years of the nineteenth century. Our 
 social legislation, which seeks to prevent injuries and to relieve 
 them If they do occur, has been the chief means of protecting us 
 from a like disaster. It is due to this legislation that we possess in 
 our urban industrial workers soldiers equally efficient as those 
 of our rural levies. They have shown themselves not only phys- 
 ically capable of meeting the inclemency of the weather and 
 hardships and deprivations of all kinds, but more than that, 
 they have withstood that "mass test of the national nerves,'* 
 which is one of the effects of the war. In times of peace, when 
 controversies as to the suitability of certain measures tended to 
 narrow and obscure the view, it w^ould have been impossible to 
 foresee how fully the demands of war have justified this social 
 legislation, to which Bismarck gave the original impetus. The 
 President of the Imperial Insurance Bureau has said: 
 
 "The battle of Koniggratz, it is well known, was won by the 
 German schoolmaster. Now it is the German schoolmaster and 
 the system of social legislation that win the victories." 
 
no MODERN GERMANY 
 
 All Germans will heartil)^ agree to this. 
 
 Encouraged by the numerous insurance organizations in which 
 he is given a share in administration and jurisdiction, the work- 
 man himself has taken a hand in his own education. He has 
 been compelled, in a short period, to pass through a develop- 
 ment which in England was spread over many years. Although 
 this did not lead to the violent conflicts which occurred in Eng- 
 land, naturally Germany did not escape friction and disturb- 
 ance. Here, too, economic insight defeated political blindness 
 only after a long struggle. In 1891 our labor unions numbered 
 in round figures only 350,000 members, while in the previous year 
 in the Reichstag elections the Social Democrats polled 1,500,000 
 votes. In 191 2 the economic and political organizations of the 
 German workmen were in close agreement in numbers. In the 
 Reichstag elections there were 4,500,000 Social Democratic votes, 
 and the labor unions of all kinds numbered 3,750,000 members. 
 In 1 89 1 our system of unions stood far behind the older Eng- 
 lish system. It did not show a quarter of the English strength. 
 In 1906 it equalled the English figures, and in 191 2 it ex- 
 ceeded them in membership by nearly a million workmen, and 
 in yearly contributions by about 20,000,000 marks. The organ- 
 ization of the German workmen is to-day by far the most pow- 
 erful of its kind in the w^hole world. 
 
 Up to recently nearly the whole German working class seemed 
 to be separated from the rest of the German people by an im- 
 passable chasm. In vain in times of peace was a means sought 
 for bridging this breach. The war accomplished the miracle, be- 
 cause it was clearly recognized by the whole nation, and by every 
 individual worker, as an unjust war of aggression and as such was 
 indignantly resented. Our Social Democratic body of workers, 
 which had previously opposed our military system and had been 
 inclined to a pacifist policy, would have continued its opposition 
 if a single doubt had existed of the justice of the German cause. 
 Again, for the second time, the German people had reason to 
 thank their enemies for an inspiring outburst of unity. In the 
 gathering of princes in Versailles, on the iSth of January, 1871, 
 the German Empire was created, to the accompaniment of the 
 thunder of cannon on French soil; again on the 4th of August, 
 1914, in the east as well as in the west, the terrible voices of can- 
 non were heard, as the representatives of the whole people in 
 the German Reichstag united in a holy war enthusiasm. In 
 1870 a portion of the representatives abstained from voting for 
 the war credit. In the present war an amount such as the world 
 has never seen was unanimously approved. In spite of many- 
 
MODERN GERMANY in 
 
 sided jealousy and enmity, the German people have maintained 
 their outward political unity in fourty-four years of peace. In 
 the future, when the unavoidable strife of parties again breaks 
 forth, we shall in spite of all attacks know how to maintain the 
 finally acquired union of national thought and feeling. That 
 will remain as an especially valuable gain from the terrible 
 struggle. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The financial development of German industry — a subject too 
 complex to admit of analysis here — demanded capital, Germany 
 was still a poor country at the time of the founding of the Em- 
 pire. Even the basis for the development of capital, a uniform, 
 regulated, sound monetary system, did not yet exist. The political 
 disunion was apparent in the fact that nearly every one of the 
 German states had its own coinage, and as a natural result of 
 the wide-spread poverty, the old silver standard still existed 
 everyw^here, outside of little Bremen. As England, the ruler of 
 the commerce of the world, had attained the gold standard in 
 l8i6, through a series of fortunate events, active participation 
 by Germany in international trade was rendered extremely diffi- 
 cult. For the same reason, the development of her internal 
 economic life was delayed. The war of 1870-71 brought the 
 solution. In political union was found the hitherto lacking con- 
 stitutional basis for a statesmanlike reform of the German mone- 
 tary system, while at the same time the French war indemnity 
 provided the means necessary to the adoption of the gold standard 
 hitherto enjoyed by England alone. It was not yet practicable, 
 however, to establish a complete gold standard. As long as the 
 gold supply of the world was limited, geographically, to western 
 North America and Australia, and, technically, to the old-fash- 
 ioned placer or washing method, there was not enough available 
 metal to meet demands. It was the time of the "universal pulling 
 at the golden blanket" and the high tide of international bi- 
 metallistic endeavors. 
 
 In 1879, when Germany's gold stock was less than 1,500,000,- 
 000 marks, we were forced to retain, in conjunction with the 
 new gold coins, the old silver "thalers," which were legal tender 
 up to any amount. The great increase in gold production, due 
 to the process of mining employed in the Transvaal, made the 
 adoption of an exclusive gold standard possible in Germany. 
 In 1906, according to the statistics of the American Director of 
 Mints, Germany ranked second among the states of Europe, with 
 
112 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 a gold stock of 3,853,000,000 marks, standing, it is true, 484,000,- 
 000 marks behind France, but exceeding Russia by 263,000,000 
 marks and England by 1,505,000,000 marks. Upon this firm 
 basis, Germany was enabled, in 1907, to complete her monetary 
 reform by the withdrawal of the *'thalers" from circulation. 
 
 Therewith bills on Berlin acquired the same gold value as 
 bills on London, which had up to this time been without com- 
 petition in the control of international payments. In Germany 
 we were at last able to take measures to achieve independence of 
 England in this field. By means of our London and trans-oceanic 
 branch banks, we succeeded in this effort in districts which had 
 remained behind in their development and which did not yet pos- 
 sess their own firm banking system. In competition with the 
 thirty-two English Colonial Banks, which possess two thousand 
 branches throughout the British Empire, we have accomplished 
 hardly anything, nor, in fact, have we sought to do so. Indeed, 
 England was able to retain on the whole her rich inheritance 
 in this field so undiminished that before the war London could 
 still describe itself as the center of international exchange. This 
 position it owed to the carefully cultivated reputation of unlim- 
 ited capacity and unquestionable honesty. Will it be able to 
 maintain this reputation after the war, or will the wealthy 
 United States succeed in gaining it for itself, and so assume the 
 leadership in the international money market? Perhaps in this 
 field, also, the relationship of equality of the leading commercial 
 powers, for which Germany is striving, will be established, so 
 that every species of supremacy will be swept aside and each na- 
 tion given the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to the full 
 extent of its capacity. 
 
 Not only the fact that the monetary reform was carried out 
 became of importance for Germany's position in international 
 commerce, but also the manner in w^hich the gold standard was 
 introduced. The gold stock of a country may be centralized or 
 decentralized. It is centralized when it lies in the vaults of 
 the banks, especially of the central note bank, decentralized when 
 it circulates freely. All centralization means economy. The 
 more the whole cash reserve is brought together, the more profita- 
 bly can it be utilized. Such a concentration also brings about a 
 certain saving of interest. For these reasons the British have, to 
 a very large extent, centralized their gold reserve. This system, 
 first developed in England, is regarded by many as a model, and 
 steps along this line have been taken in France and Russia. 
 One fact has been insufKciently considered. The organization 
 of the monetary system must be adapted, more than any other 
 
MODERN GERMANY 113 
 
 organization, not alone to normal conditions but to crises. In 
 cases of abnormal demand, which are scarcely to be foreseen, it 
 becomes necessary to be able to lay hands on cash in unusual 
 quantities. This may be obtained from domestic or foreign 
 sources. Only he who controls the gold market can depend on 
 foreign countries. 
 
 It is one of England's chief advantages in international com- 
 merce that, as the earliest and up to 1872 the sole gold-standard 
 country, she became the gold market of the world. This posi- 
 tion she was enabled to maintain, even after the appearance of 
 competing purchasers of gold in consequence of the adoption of 
 the gold standard by other nations, owing to the fact that she 
 controlled politically and commercially two of the greatest gold 
 producing countries — South Africa and Australia. England be- 
 lieved, therefore — relying on her monopoly of the commerce in 
 gold — that she might confidently assume the risk which attaches to 
 her monetary system. In proportion as her commerce in gold 
 decreased or was threatened, this risk was sure to become per- 
 ceptible. Hence the Bank of England was compelled in this war 
 to increase its gold holdings by other means. Therefore it incor- 
 porated into its stock the Indian reserve currency, the gold in 
 hand of the Egyptian National Bank, and probably also the gold 
 reserve of the National Bank of Belgium, which was transferred 
 to England, as well as the gold treasure of the Argentine Conver- 
 sion Fund. Moreover, it accumulated gold in South Africa and 
 Australia through sequestration of the mine output of those 
 countries, as well as in Canada from the debts of American finan- 
 cial circles due to England. This money was not brought across 
 the ocean, it is true, on account of the high rate of insurance, but 
 it is counted as part of the Bank of England's cash. Further, 
 the Bank of England exacted a certain amount of gold security 
 for advances made to the Allies of Great Britain. This measure 
 was applied, in the first instance, to Russia. Apparently 8,000,- 
 000 pounds sterling w^re transferred from Petrograd to London 
 at a very early date. But France likewise was allowed a credit 
 of 1,500,000,000 francs only against a cash security of 500,- 
 000,000 francs in gold. 
 
 By these unusual means the Bank of England succeeded 
 in raising the gold cover for its notes and its other 
 liabilities falling due without notice. At the end of August, 
 19 1 4, the gold cover had been as low as 18 per cent. On 
 December 2, 191 5, it had risen to 28.7 per cent, but was still 
 9.8 per cent below what it was on July 23, 19 14. Conditions 
 were worse in France, where the gold cover within the same 
 
114 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 period fell from 51.5 per cent (July 30, 19 14) to 28.5 per cent 
 (December 2, 1915), and in Russia, where it decreased from 
 57.6 per cent (July 29, 1914) to 26.4 per cent (October 29, 
 1915). In regard to the Imperial Bank of Russia, it is even 
 doubtful whether it does not book the gold transferred to Lon- 
 don among its assets. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why 
 the item "gold abroad," showing 35,600,000 rubles on October 
 29, 191 5, should have risen to 228,500,000 rubles on November 
 29, 1915, while the gold stock of the Bank, given at 1,600,000- 
 000 rubles on November 29, 191 5, is approximately the same as 
 it was on October 29, 1915, and on July 29, 1914. At any 
 rate, in contrast to the general deterioration of the gold hold- 
 ings of our enemies, the Imperial Bank of Germany has an im- 
 provement to show. The gold cover for all its obligations due 
 without notice — not only banknotes but deposits likewise — in- 
 creased from 30.1 per cent on July 31, 19 14, to 32.1 per cent 
 on November 30, 19 15. 
 
 While the central note bank of England is dependent upon help 
 from outside, the German Imperial Bank rests entirely upon its 
 own strength. For Germany from the start refused to assume 
 this dangerous risk, for the sake of the saving of interest, that 
 results from a thorough centralization of the cash reserve. The 
 Empire, in the gold which is in circulation, possesses a strong 
 internal reserve capable of meeting the demands even of the 
 greatest crisis, because gold circulates more freely in Germany 
 than in England, France and Russia; the combined amount of 
 gold in circulation and gold stock in banks in Germany exceeds 
 that of England. This explains how the German Imperial Bank, 
 in the throes of the greatest war which any country has ever had 
 to sustain, has been able, week by week, to augment its gold 
 stock, so that after sixteen months of war it had increased by 
 1,182,000,000 marks, or 98 per cent (November 30, 1915: 2,- 
 435,000,000 marks), as compared with the time of the outbreak 
 of the war (July 31, 1914: 1,253,000,000 marks), and that it 
 excelled the gold stock of the Bank of England of even date 
 (December 2, 191 5: 51,100,000 pounds sterhng) by 1,400,000,- 
 000 marks, or 134 per cent. It is true that at first France, 
 and finally England also, by her proclamation of July 8, 1915? 
 have done all in their power to imitate Germany's methods, much 
 derided at the start, of withdrawing the gold reserves from cir- 
 culation ; but since both countries possess only small reserves 
 of that kind, their success was very modest. The Bank of Eng- 
 land up to the end of October, 191 5, shows an increase of its 
 gold holdings of only 13,800,000 pounds sterling, not a quarter 
 
MODERN GERMANY 115 
 
 of that of the Imperial Bank of Germany, while the Bank of 
 France's gold stock rose only by 736,000,000 francs — that is to 
 say, by half of that of the Reichsbank. This strong and steady 
 increase of Germany's gold stock, which remains inexplicable for 
 all whose knowledge is confined to the British financial system, 
 while astonishing In itself, is yet all the more remarkable for the 
 fact that this flow of gold into the coffers of the Central Bank 
 from channels of uncontrolled circulation Is taking place with- 
 out application of any measures of compulsion. The sole Im- 
 pulse Is to be sought In the universal patriotism of the people. 
 As a fight carried on with "silver bullets," the war Is in Germany 
 a national war. 
 
 The credit of a country Is built upon the gold stock of its 
 banks. In the present war, in Germany the gold stock Is en- 
 joying larger internal accretions and suffering smaller deletions 
 than In England, France and Russia. The most Important task 
 of the gold stock Is to adapt circulation to rapidly changing de- 
 mand, by keeping It elastic. In Germany this has been achieved 
 in absolute perfection by bringing the supply of currency into 
 immediate causal connection with the demand for the circulating 
 medium, bank notes being Issued on the basis of trade bills, the 
 amount of which rises and falls with the degree of economic 
 activity. The greater the amount of bills signed and discounted 
 for the payment of goods purchased, the greater becomes the 
 amount of bank notes in circulation ; and this again diminishes 
 to the degree that these discounted bills are redeemed. A per- 
 fect adjustment to the demand for money is thus automatically 
 brought about, and the Imperial Bank has to provide only the 
 necessary metal cover. In Germany this Is fixed by law as at 
 least one-third of the face value of the total issue of notes, where- 
 as in England, France and Russia corresponding rules are lack- 
 ing. The elasticity achieved through this method of providing 
 cover for the bills of exchange does not exist in those countries, 
 or only to an imperfect degree. In France this elasticity is 
 menaced by the fact that bank notes may be Issued, not only 
 for discount transactions but likewise for loans against commer- 
 cial collateral. It Is quite absent in England, where the bank- 
 note system, for historical reasons, Instead of being In organic 
 union with the economic life, has been brought into outward 
 inflexible connection with the financial administration of the state, 
 and where, furthermore, the amount of bank notes issued with- 
 out metal cover is limited. This fundamental defect in her 
 financial system, although at times extremely inconvenient, Eng- 
 land was able to endure as long as her commerce In gold suffered 
 
Ii6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 no interference. By means of this she was able, through the 
 great elasticity in the gold stock, to make up for the lack of 
 elasticity in her bank-note system. But in case the commerce 
 in gold is in any way impeded, the results of this fundamental 
 defect in the system can be temporarily alleviated only by all 
 the unusual measures for the maintenance of the gold stock 
 already described. 
 
 In Germany, on the other hand, we have been able to maintain, 
 in time of war, the elasticity which distinguishes our bank-note 
 system in time of peace. Slight changes were necessary to this 
 end. In the first place, in war time, the place of the individual 
 as buyer and as employer of labor is largely taken by the state, 
 which thus determines to a great extent the amount of payments. 
 Hence, if it is desired in war time, as was the case in time of 
 peace, to make the amount of currency conform to the demand 
 for money, it is necessary to bring the bank-note system into 
 organic union, not only with the nation's economic activity, 
 but with that of the state, also. This w^as achieved by making 
 the bills of exchange and promissory notes issued by the Govern- 
 ment discountable through the Imperial Bank, if payable within 
 three months ; they w^ere thereby given the same standing as cover 
 for bank notes which private bills of exchange enjoy. By means 
 of this simple logical adjustment to war conditions, the Imperial 
 Bank attained the same automatic elasticity for the unusual de- 
 mands of war that distinguishes it under normal conditions. 
 
 Supplementary measures also were necessary. Since the Im- 
 perial German Bank, in order to maintain its metal cover on a 
 high level, is not permitted, as is the Bank of France, to use the 
 funds gained from the issue of bank notes for loans against com- 
 mercial collateral as well as against bills of exchange, it en- 
 deavored to limit as much as possible the amount, and especially 
 the length of time, of such loans. For these purposes only the 
 capital of the bank and the deposits may be used. In times of 
 war, however, credit demands show a general increase. Espe- 
 cially was this true on the present occasion; for, following the 
 lead of the Paris Exchange, the Vienna and Brussels Exchanges 
 were closed on July 27, 1914, the London Exchange on July 
 30, and the Berlin and New York Exchanges on August i. 
 A relief for the resulting extraordinary difficulty in the sale of 
 bonds and stocks had to be provided by making loans upon them 
 legal, and this without obstructing the Imperial Bank in the 
 fulfilment of its great principal task. Accordingly, as early as 
 August 4, 19 14, after the Prussian example tested in earlier 
 wars, loan banks were established, authorized to grant loans to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 117 
 
 the total of 3,000,000,000 marks against judiciously appraised 
 securities, as well as with unlimited personal liability on the 
 part of the borrower. 
 
 For this purpose these institutions issue "loan bank notes" 
 in amounts as low as one mark, whereby a corresponding change 
 in the denomination of bank notes is avoided. These loan 
 bank notes, for w^hich, in addition to the double security above 
 mentioned, the Empire assumes liability, must be accepted at 
 full face value by all authorities of the Empire and of the 
 federal states. That the public showed no reluctance in tak- 
 ing up this new currency was in accordance with the experience 
 of former wars. It is, however, one of the surprises of the 
 present war that advantage was taken of this new credit 
 system only to a degree which seems slight for a nation of 
 nearly seventy million people. The maximum amount of the 
 loan bank notes in 1914 was 1,317,000,000 marks (December 
 31, 191 4) ; in the first half-year of 191 5 it rose to 1,574,000,000 
 marks (April 15, 1915), while on November 30, 191 5, the total 
 issue stood at 1,631,000,000 marks, of which 889,000,000 marks 
 were in circulation. It is subject to constant fluctuations. If 
 the increase, incidental to the war loan issues, must be consid- 
 ered surprisingly small, the decrease wont to follow them must 
 be called surprisingly rapid. Advances taken in connection with 
 the three big war loans, which in all amount to 25,500,000,000 
 marks, on October 30, 191 5, stood at no more than 1,054,000,- 
 000 marks, or approximately 4%. What is more significant in 
 regard to the economic strength of the German people, under- 
 rated both at home and abroad, is the surprising fact that the 
 demands made on the loan banks by subscribers were smaller on 
 the occasion of each succeeding war loan. Up to the time when 
 the first installments fell due, payments made by means of funds 
 raised through the loan banks, as compared to the total pay- 
 ments, were as follows: 
 
 Total From Loan 
 
 Total Amount First Payment Banks Funds % 
 I war loan: 4,481,000,000 2,568,000,000 710,000,000 27.6 
 II war loan: 9,103,000,000 6,085,000,000 521,000,000 8.6 
 III war loan: 12,160,000,000 8,732,000,000 566,000,000 6.5 
 
 England resorted to a measure similar to the German loan 
 banks, but narrower in scope, in that it is confined to war loans, 
 while it is much less stringent as regards the loan conditions. 
 Loans are made to the full, instead of to a partial value of the 
 security, for three years, instead of six months, and at a discount 
 
ii8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 of 1% under the legal discount rate, instead of at the rate of 
 interest for loans on commercial collateral, which would be higher 
 than the discount rate. When the second English war loan was 
 to be raised (McKenna), conditions were made still lighter for 
 subscribers, in that the former liberal conditions, relative to the 
 loanable value of the security given, were replaced by quite ex- 
 traordinary rights of exchanging new loan scrip for old govern- 
 ment bonds. 
 
 By organizing the loan business independently of the Reichs- 
 bankj the note cover by bills of exchange — one of the pillars of our 
 bank-note system — was maintained in its full strength. The other 
 pillar, which consisted in the metal cover, has been very greatly 
 strengthened through the notable accretion of gold from inland 
 sources. But it was necessary, from the very beginning, to or- 
 ganize this support so that all strains to which it could con- 
 ceivably be subjected within the extreme limits of possibility 
 might be successfully withstood. It was therefore determined 
 that the loan bank notes should be reckoned as governmental 
 obligations, as part of the cash in hand of the Imperial Bank. By 
 this means the central German note-bank would be enabled, even 
 in face of a diminishing gold reserve, to meet all demands the war 
 might impose on the inland market. This extreme precautionary 
 measure — the importance of which has entirely failed of compre- 
 hension abroad — has, like so many others adopted for contin- 
 gencies that eventually did not arise, not proved of any practical 
 significance. The sound condition which our monetary system 
 has preserved, even in war time, is shown precisely by the cir- 
 cumstance that the German bank notes have more successfully 
 maintained the ratio of gold cover necessary in times of peace 
 than the bank notes of the Bank of England, despite all emer- 
 gency measures, and more than those of the Bank of France or 
 the Russian Imperial Bank, which have entirely discontinued 
 their regular reports. In this manner Germany has given proof 
 that her monetary system is, of its own strength, equal to the 
 most severe demands, in war as well as in peace. Nor is this 
 fact militated against by the precautionary measure taken by the 
 German Imperial Bank, in consideration of the cessation of all 
 influx of gold from abroad, for the checking of the export of 
 gold ; this it permits only for certain definite purposes. The 
 same thing has taken place in England, though not quite to the 
 same extent nor in the same forms. England, too, has not been 
 able to maintain the free exportation of gold. Thus there is no 
 difference of principle, but only of degree. 
 
 Very much the same considerations obtain with regard to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 119 
 
 the exchange rates, if only for the reason that much more com- 
 plicated channels for international payments had to be made 
 use of. Germany's foreign exchange, soon after the war broke 
 out, suffered a depression which was increased by deliberate mis- 
 interpretation as well as by genuine misunderstanding, but which, 
 broadly speaking, was soon checked. The English rate of ex- 
 change was maintained as long as England's excess of imports 
 was kept within bounds. Only when, in 191 5, this excess be- 
 gan to assume inflated proportions, did the exchange begin to 
 drop, and it has shown unmistakably an increased tendency to 
 do so since the month of April. The difference existing in this 
 respect between Germany and England — which is all the more 
 important because the English themselves characterize the pound 
 sterling as international currency, in contrast to the cur- 
 rency of other countries — is connected with the question of 
 trade balance. It is true that to-day Germany's trade balance is 
 negative, but the excess of imports, owing to the restriction of 
 German commerce, is moderate. England's trade balance has 
 developed unfavorably to an incomparably greater degree. In 
 the first ten months of 1915, the excess of England's imports 
 from the United States alone over the exports was 396,600,000 
 pounds sterling, as against 194,800,000 pounds sterling during 
 the same period of the preceding year. In this connection, more- 
 over, it must not be forgotten that the enormous purchases made 
 for the account of the government are not included in these fig- 
 ures. It is not unlikely that by the end of 191 5 the unfavorable 
 balance of England's trade will amount to 8,000,000,000 pounds 
 sterling. 
 
 In England, as is not the case in Germany, there are no obsta- 
 cles in the way of employing whatever means seem useful in sup- 
 porting the value of currency, and all such means are b.eing lib- 
 erally employed. Thus, many hundreds of millions of marks' 
 w^orth of foreign securities were sold and — in addition to several 
 smaller bank loans — the great Morgan loan of $500,000,000 
 was placed on the market. But all means prove futile. 
 The pound sterling, the presumed unassailability of which used 
 to be the mainstay of England's hegemony in the world's trade, 
 has dropped, as the mark did before, and it will continue to 
 drop the longer the big British importation of war material, 
 food-stuffs and raw material continues, the more hands are 
 withdrawn from the British export industries, the more the ad- 
 vances grow which England has to grant her allies (which Mr. 
 McKenna, on September 21, 191 5, figured as amounting to 423,- 
 
I20 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 000,000 pounds sterling) and, finally, the more the British cred- 
 its in the United States diminish. 
 
 The depreciation of the German rate of exchange, as likewise 
 the cutting ofif of Germany from the world's commerce, will 
 pass into history as an instructive war episode in Germany's eco- 
 nomic life. Germany possesses sufficient strength to effect the 
 transition from war to peace just as efficiently as, under much 
 more difficult conditions, she performed the reverse process. As 
 regards the depreciation of the English rate of exchange, with 
 all its many concomitant phenomena, the longer the war lasts, 
 the more it will grow into an event of world historic character, 
 the importance of which will still be felt in the years following 
 the war. 
 
 Upon the described basis of our financial system, newly cre- 
 ated with much care in time of peace and wisely strengthened in 
 the present war, it was possible to build up an efficient private 
 banking business. As the reconstructed German Empire was 
 forced to content itself with an insufficient gold supply, so it 
 was inadequately provided with capital with which to meet the 
 great demands made upon it. It was forced, therefore, to have 
 recourse to the countries of old established wealth. Economical 
 methods and efficient organization were consequently especially 
 necessary in the banking system. 
 
 The five most prominent banks to-day, taken together, had at 
 the time of the founding of the Empire a stock capital of only 
 122,800,000 marks. By 1880 this had risen to 246,000,000 
 marks; in 1895 to 413,000,000, and on January i, 1915, it had 
 reached 1,020,000,000 marks, to which must be added 325,000,- 
 000 reserve funds. These banks placed their capital at the 
 disposal of the growing industry and trade. They expressly 
 styled themselves ''Banks for Commerce and Industry," went 
 in deliberately not only for the simple and safe operations of the 
 money market, like the English joint-stock banks, but also for a 
 share in the growth of Germany's economic life, and sought to 
 develop the spirit of enterprise in all promising undertakings 
 They considered it not only their right, but their duty, to enter 
 into the more remunerative but likewise more risky stock invest- 
 ment business. 
 
 The close connection which naturally soon developed between 
 banks and business in the young German Empire was not with- 
 out drawbacks. The large banks, which showed marked prefer- 
 ence for long-term investments subject to the fluctuations of 
 the market, hesitated at the start to go into the short-term 
 deposit business, which is the prominent feature of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 121 
 
 English banking. As late as 1890 the great Berlin stock 
 banks had only 100,000,000 marks in deposits. At about 
 that period, however, the systematic fostering of this branch of 
 business was undertaken, in order to help the great banks of 
 Germany to attain their full strength. On January i, 1915, 
 the four greatest Berlin banks showed deposits amounting to 
 1,748,000,000 marks. In connection with this it should be re- 
 membered that in Germany, contrary to the English custom, 
 credits granted for commercial purposes, but not yet used, are 
 not entered on the books as deposits. On the above date the 
 nine leading Berlin banks combined had at their disposal a 
 capital of funds and deposits amounting to 6,000,000,000 marks. 
 
 But even this does not fully express the strength which they 
 have attained. The great Berlin banks to-day no longer stand 
 alone. As they continually engage in great speculative undertak- 
 ings, it has always been their aim to diminish the risk con- 
 nected with the expansion of that class of business with all the 
 means at their disposal. The effort to reduce such risk has been 
 in a large measure responsible for the fact that our young Ger- 
 man banks have grown to such vast organizations. The first 
 point to be remembered is that an increase of deposits does not 
 imply, as in England, a reduction of the banks' own funds; on 
 the contrary, this gives an impulse to an increase of the stock 
 capital and reserve funds; for since the assets and liabilities 
 cannot be balanced against each other, as is the case in Eng- 
 land, where the banks persevere in the old-fashioned custom of 
 confining their business to the stereotype short-term credits, in 
 the German banking system the relation between the bank's own 
 funds and the deposits is quite different. It is no mere coinci- 
 dence that the Deutsche Bank, the Diskontogesellschaft, and the 
 Dresdener Bank excel all other German banks in the develop- 
 ment of their deposit business, and at the same time have far 
 outstripped them in the increase of their capital stock and re- 
 serve funds. 
 
 In accumulating these great amounts a means has been sought 
 and found of balancing the risks by investing the banks' funds 
 among a great variety of interests, with the result that the debtors* 
 solvency depends to a great extent on quite diverse economic 
 circumstances, frequently of a mutually neutralizing effect. Pre- 
 ponderant dependence on closely connected commercial interests 
 — that is to say, dependence on the conditions of a single locality 
 or on a single branch of commerce or industry — is everywhere 
 carefully avoided. Geographically, as well as in regard to the 
 lines of business pursued, the activity of the individual banks has 
 
122 ]VIODERN GERMANY 
 
 been extended as completely as possible. Their investments in 
 German enterprises are naturally heavy; their activity, how- 
 ever, is not confined to the Empire's boundaries but extends to 
 nearly every country on earth. 
 
 This expansion has taken place mainly in the form of wide- 
 spread aiftliations. There have been cases of consolidation of 
 more or less importance; but there is a fundamental diiierence 
 between the three great French consolidated banks, with more 
 than lOOO branches throughout the provinces, and the compre- 
 hensive organizations under the German banking system. Local 
 peculiarities have been retained in a much higher degree. This 
 has been the case especially where different banks have been 
 united, not in a giant organization, but merely in details of finan- 
 cial or personal control, without affecting their separate existence. 
 The fact that the three greatest German banks in their yearly 
 statement for 1914 showed not less than 318.000,000 marks 
 permanently invested in other banks is an indication of the im- 
 portance attained in German banking by this system of affilia- 
 tions. It has been estimated that in the combined balance of 
 all the German banks these three great institutions, together with 
 the banks affiliated with them, hold no less than 60 per cent of 
 the total. 
 
 Mistaken foreign theories to the contrary, German banking 
 has developed along these lines in a few years from small be- 
 ginnings to a great and powerful position. There is no deaden- 
 ing conventionality in its vast organization to cause needless 
 interference with its efficient working, nor are there any worn- 
 out traditions and governmental regulations standing in its way. 
 On the contrary, the German banking system is free, in con- 
 trast to that of France and England, to use its great powers to 
 the fullest extent. All the fears born of tliis freedom have 
 been proved by the experiences of the war to be entirely ground- 
 less. Without this unrestricted freedom, the German banks 
 could never have identified themselves with all branches of na- 
 tional economic life, as they have done, and in which they have 
 now attained a position of leadership. 
 
 To begin with, they won for themselves a dominant position 
 in the world of finance and capital. Compared with the power 
 of the great banks with their widely distributed clientele, which 
 in most cases is easily influenced, the German stock exchange has 
 come to occupy a secondary position both in standing and in- 
 fluence. In England the stock exchange is able to maintain its 
 monopoly largely because of its activity in the floating of securi- 
 ties. Not without justice has it been said that, while the great 
 
MODERxN GERMANY 123 
 
 German banks make use of the stock exchange as a medium 
 in promoting their new enterprises, in England it is the banks 
 that are made use of by the promoters and speculators. That is 
 v\hy the closing of the exchange was less keenly felt in Ger- 
 many, especially as it proved easier in Berlin than in London 
 and Paris to liquidate smoothly the transactions for the end of 
 July. A reopening of the exchange ostensibly took place in the 
 two latter countries, but under such drastic restrictions that a 
 free market does not exist. Judging from the soundness and 
 strength exhibited by our great banks in the war, which are 
 of such paramount importance for the stock exchange, it may 
 be confidently assumed that when the time comes for the reopen- 
 ing of the Berlin exchange, happily freed from its old obligations, 
 it will occupy a position among European exchanges not only as 
 strong as before the war but even stronger, and that it will 
 not fail to give proof of its innate sound condition. 
 
 In the industrial field, also, the banks have gained a position 
 of leadership. Without them, the rapid and striking develop- 
 ment of our industrial production would not have been possible. 
 Their concentrated financial strength guided our young and 
 feeble industrial enterprises past the danger of being crushed 
 out of existence by more highly developed and experienced com- 
 petitors. Indeed, the banks have not only assisted individual un- 
 dertakings in case of necessity or furnished them the means for 
 extensions of their business — they have been mainly responsible 
 for carrying the idea of comprehensive organization, which proved 
 so effective in banking, into the entire sphere of industry. For 
 wath its allied banks throughout all Germany, the individual 
 great bank is no longer interested merely in a single undertaking 
 in one branch of industry, but in several mutually competing 
 undertakings. The evils which unrestricted competition in trade 
 brings about are consequently felt also by the banks. Their aim, 
 therefore, must be to diminish this harmful competition. Accord- 
 ingly, they extend their interest in the particular undertaking 
 to include all allied and mutually dependent undertakings, and 
 thus become the leaders in the development of the ''cartel" sys- 
 tem. They are extremely active in furthering the organization 
 of our industries along cooperative lines by means of efficient 
 associations.^ 
 
 This development of our banking system, which, from dis- 
 tinct private concerns, has brought forth a great body of insti- 
 tutions pursuing national and cultural aims, completes the organ- 
 
 1 A "cartel" is an agreement between industrial or commercial concerns pro- 
 viding for joint action in their business policy, without otherwise destroying 
 the independence of the members. — Telanslator's note. 
 
124 :\IODERX G£RMAx\Y 
 
 ization of the internal forces of Germany's economic life. In 
 this new setting;, the economic strength of the German people, 
 which was iinalh- freed through the victorious war of 1870-71 
 from the handicap of political disunion, has developed astounding 
 vitality- in almost all fields. In a period of forty years strenuous 
 work has thus retrieved that which had been neglected, Ger- 
 many to-day is no longer a poor country. Careful estimates 
 agree in showing that Germany now occupies the first position 
 among European nations, not only in respect to the collective 
 wealth of the people — amounting to about 310,000,000,000 
 marks — but also in respect to her total yearly income, which 
 represents 43,000,000,000 marks. This great change has not 
 been recognized in other countries, because Germany, in con- 
 trast to England and France, still continues to devote her im- 
 mense savings primarily to the development of her own powers, 
 and invests only a small portion of them in foreign loans. In 
 the last five years, of the stock and bonds put on the market in 
 England 18 per cent (38,000,000 out of 210.000,000 pounds), 
 and in France 30 per cent (1.523,000,000 out of 4,914,000,000 
 francs) were domestic securities;^ whereas in Germany no less 
 than 85 per cent were so applied, while in 1912 only 255,000,000 
 out of 2,425,000,000 marks were invested in foreign securities. 
 It is on account of this sustained demand for capital within the 
 country that Germany in time of peace, despite her large sav- 
 ings, shows regularly a higher rate of interest in the money 
 market than England and France, where industry does not con- 
 tinually demand such great sums. It is only since the war that 
 these conditions, which are so important for German foreign 
 exchange, have begun to show signs of a readjustment. Ever 
 since the month of December, 1914, when the Imperial Bank 
 reduced the previous war discount rate from 6 per cent to 5 
 per cent, the old established difference in the official rate of dis- 
 count between Germany and England and France has disap- 
 peared. And while formerly the price of the French 3 per cent 
 loan was considerably higher, it is now below the price of the 
 3 per cent German loan. 
 
 The different method in the use of capital explains, further- 
 more, why at the beginning of the war the German stock ex- 
 change was in so much better condition than that of England, 
 not to speak of France. The great economic crisis of the 
 Balkan States, following in the wake of the Balkan wars (which 
 were financed mainly by France) and the scarcely less severe 
 crisis in Mexico, Brazil, Argentine and Canada, as well as the 
 bursting of the Russian bubble, affected the money market of 
 
MODVAiS GKRMANY 125 
 
 France most stronj^Iy, tliat of England in scarcely lesser decree, 
 and tliat of Cjermany least of all. Germany had her capital 
 undiminislied, t})erefore, for financing the war. It enabled us, 
 shortly after the he^innin^ of the war, to raise a loan of a larger 
 amount than the French war indemnity of 1871. 'i he subse- 
 quent loans, which were twice and three times as large as the 
 first, were, in part, also raised with the help of money saved 
 in time of peace. But in the main their great success, which 
 was a surprise to the Germans also, was due to other causes. 
 
 Germany succeeded in making the transition from peace to 
 war conditions witli unexpected ease and thoroughness. That is 
 partly explained by the character of this war. Every German 
 felt that it was a war of defense. Every one realized the dan- 
 ger which menaced the whole, and was ready, as a part of this 
 whole, to serve the nation and sacrifice himself for it. The 
 moment that war had been declared, the interest of the individual 
 subordinated itself to that of the state. There was no opposition 
 between the state and economic interests. Everything which 
 the latter had to offer was placed at the disposal of the state. 
 
 Combined with these inner forces, which have never swayed 
 a great nation in like degree and extent, external forces were 
 at work creating, as if by magic, that many-sided structure of 
 our new war economy. This we owed to England. For when 
 the latter paralyzed our foreign trade immediately at the out- 
 break of war, our economic organization of peace times to a 
 very large extent became entirely useless. In many cases there 
 was no choice between peace and war economy. Activity was 
 only possible within the new war organization. The pressure 
 of the enemy from the outside eliminated the necessity of pres- 
 sure on the part of the government. Voluntary service per- 
 formed what compulsion could never have accomplished to 
 the same extent. 
 
 In this way Germany was able to restore in striking manner 
 in her body economic the circulation interrupted by her forcible 
 exclusion from the world's commerce; while in normal times 
 it pulsated throughout the whole earth, it is now limited to the 
 narrow circle of national economic life. This narrowing of its 
 course has resulted in accelerating the circulation. Everything 
 which formerly served the countless and varied purposes of an 
 export trade, amounting yearly to over 10,000,000,000 marks, 
 was now enlisted in the service of the one great object of the 
 country itself. Germany was no longer working for the whole 
 world, but, even more devotedly and attentively than formerly, 
 almost exclusively for her own needs. Thus, she accomplished 
 
126 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the great feat of freeing herself, in the main, from the old 
 dependence on extensive imports and on easily exhaustible sup- 
 plies, by founding her entire war economy on her own work. 
 So completely has the economy of peace times been transformed 
 into that of war that it is certain to-day that Germany is able 
 to provide herself with adequate supplies for any length of 
 time. It is true that this may not always be done as eco- 
 nomically as formerly, that it is still necessary to be saving in 
 many things, that numerous inconveniences must be borne by 
 those who remain at home, but the times of anxious doubt are 
 past. We are sure to-day that no matter how long the war 
 lasts, Germany can keep it up with her own resources. The 
 "isolated state" which hitherto existed only in theory has become 
 a reality. 
 
 Independence in production also means financial independence. 
 Practically our entire financial strength remains in the country. 
 It flows only from one hand to the other, above all in a broad 
 and rapid stream from the state to the individual. As often as 
 our money completes this course of inland circulation, just so 
 often does it become available again for the state in the nature 
 of loans. It is only a question of carefully selecting the time 
 for a new loan and of preventing large parts of the stream, which 
 essentially remains the same, from being withheld from the state 
 by artificial means. If these precautions are taken, Germany's 
 defeat cannot be caused by financial difKculties. 
 
 If our financial troubles have been overcome, thanks to our 
 "isolation," they oppress our enemies more and more from month 
 to month, until to-day no state feels the financial burden of the 
 war more than England. Our enemies lack the forces which 
 in Germany produced a new and firmly knitted war economy. 
 
 As far as England is concerned, from the very beginning 
 a deep and serious war sentiment was lacking. It was believed 
 that this was only a new, somewhat greater adventure on foreign 
 soil, to be added to the list of numerous wars which England 
 had waged all over the world in the course of the past few 
 decades. At home the public felt itself safe. There the war 
 was not regarded by all as of vital interest for the entire 
 nation. On the contrary, the British drew the sword in the 
 behef that they would suffer no more through the war than if 
 they remained neutral, and they even endeavored to convince 
 themselves that they were magnanimously entering the combat 
 for Belgium and not for their own interests. Under such con- 
 ditions it was not possible, even among the English people, in 
 whom political instincts are probably more strongly and more 
 
MODERN GERMANY 127 
 
 generally developed than in any other nation, for the interest 
 of the state to take precedence over the interest of the indi- 
 vidual. 
 
 Even externally the war had but little effect at first. Trade 
 with the enemy countries ceased, it is true, but otherwise all 
 connections with the economy of the world remained the same 
 and the seas were open for export and import. The economic 
 organization of peace times was not brought to a standstill. On 
 the contrary, now that important competitors had been put out 
 of the way, it was a question of developing it as much as possible. 
 Great advantages for the economy of the country from the war 
 were expected by the people and by the government. Economic 
 interests were not placed at the disposal of the state, but it was 
 expected that they would be promoted by the state to a degree 
 impossible in times of peace. But the matter turned out differ- 
 ently than had been expected. Everywhere the demands of the 
 war have been miscalculated, but nowhere so much as in Eng- 
 land. More men and means were required than had been im- 
 agined. This resulted in that great conflict between state and 
 economy which is taking place in England to-day. It consists 
 chiefly in the fact that a war organization which has not been 
 voluntarily created by the nation is being forced upon it. It 
 is only partly possible to conceal the coercive character of the 
 measures that have to be taken. As a matter of fact, it cannot 
 be doubted that the recruiting system is regarded as an un- 
 welcome coercion, more so than the military service in those coun- 
 tries which have for centuries been accustomed to the great idea 
 of the protective and educational character of universal con- 
 scription ; and as regards production, it is undeniable that the 
 government of free England had to use compulsory measures in 
 a manner such as has been witnessed in no other country. While 
 in Germany all concerns, whether large or small, devoted them- 
 selves voluntarily to the new tasks imposed by the war, many 
 hundreds of factories in England had to be placed under gov- 
 ernmental control in order to supply the urgent needs of the 
 war. 
 
 All of this is of added importance because England, whose 
 productive power in many fields \yas not able even in time of 
 peace to accomplish as much as Germany, has to provide not 
 only for herself but also to a great extent for her allies. For 
 France has been affected economically and financially through 
 the war perhaps even more heavily than in a military sense. 
 Her territory occupied by Germany contains her most highly 
 developed industry, that of mining and iron, which might have 
 
128 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 been best able to compensate for the prostration of her manu- 
 facture of fancy goods. Of the French output of coal 68.8 per 
 cent, of coke 78.3 per cent, of iron ore 90 per cent, of pig iron 
 85.7 per cent, of steel 76 per cent is produced in the eight prov- 
 inces of which our victorious troops have been in possession 
 for over a year. Thus France is paralyzed in her industrial 
 productive strength. She is in need of foreign supplies to a far 
 greater degree than in time of peace. The circulation of forces 
 in her economic body has been most severely disturbed. She 
 is suffering constantly from heavy, depleting loss of blood. 
 
 Similar conditions prevail in Russia. Just as England is an 
 industrial and commercial state, standing in need of the products 
 of foreign agriculture to a degree hitherto true of no other peo- 
 ple, so Russia represents the greatest agricultural country w^hich 
 the w^orld has ever seen. With the agricultural products of her 
 vast territory, she pays for all the industrial products which her 
 uneducated population is as yet unable to produce in sufficient 
 quantity and quality. With these products she must, above all, 
 meet the interest on the greatest foreign debt which any state 
 has ever contracted. Russia to-day, cut off from the world, is 
 unable to dispose of the great staple products of her soil. Con- 
 sequently she is not only deprived of the strength to which 
 was lately due, as a result of abundant crops, the satisfactory 
 condition of her finance and the unmistakable improvement of 
 her economic life, but she has also suffered so fundamental a 
 disturbance in the circulation of her economic forces that all 
 hope of cure must seem futile. Since only a strong, healthy, 
 industrial state, such as Russia cannot yet claim to be, is in a 
 position to conduct a modern war by its own strength, the need 
 for foreign supplies felt by the Russian state and by Russian 
 national economy must increase with every month of the war. 
 Germany alone has proved equal to the task of cutting herself 
 free, without impairment of vitality, from the world's economic 
 life, with which she was so thoroughly intertwined, and of placing 
 herself upon her own feet. Germany alone has been able satis- 
 factorily to finance the war with her loans to the amount of 
 25,500,000,000 marks. Only Germany is able, from every 
 point of view, successfully to play the role of the "isolated state." 
 From this fact, which was a surprise e/en to the nation itself, 
 Germany may still have to draw important deductions. 
 
 IV 
 
 The general systematic development of domestic economic 
 strength in the field of agricultural and industrial production, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 129 
 
 as well as in that of money and credit, was bound to make its 
 effect felt beyond the boundaries of Germany. For the great 
 quantities of foodstuffs and raw material which, in times of peace, 
 Germany imported from all parts of the world for her con- 
 tinually growing population, had to be paid for. This could 
 be done only with the products of German labor and with 
 services rendered to other countries in the field of transport or 
 in money and investments — that is to say, only by activity in 
 those spheres of economic life in which England considered her- 
 self entitled to a monopoly of the whole world. We have 
 already dealt with money and capital transactions. We must now 
 turn to the question of transport and commerce. 
 
 Conditions in the field of transportation do not favor Ger- 
 many. The country is blessed with a number of noble rivers, 
 but while England is washed by the sea on all, and France 
 on three sides, Germany has access to the great international 
 highway only in the North, whither all her rivers, with the 
 exception of the Danube, flow. Sea-traffic is therefore not only 
 of slight importance to inland trade, but it does not play in the 
 field of foreign commerce the same part as in England and 
 France or the United States. But her central Continental posi- 
 tion and the w^ealth of her neighbors are an advantage to Ger- 
 many. She has a great Continental trade, in addition to her sea- 
 borne trade. Of the 21,000,000,000 marks which represent her 
 commercial transactions for 191 3, approximately 8,000,000,000 
 worth was transported by land. When the sea trade is checked, 
 land trade may be increased; herein lie possibilities of adjustment 
 and development unknown before the war. Because of this 
 land branch of her foreign trade, which has suddenly experi- 
 enced an abnormal increase, Germany must organize her inland 
 transportation as efficiently as possible. The same is true of that 
 part of her trade which is carried on by sea; for since out 
 maritime transport is confined to the short line of our North 
 Sea coast, most of our import and export goods have to make 
 long interior journeys. 
 
 Up to the time that Germany determined to adopt a pro- 
 tective tariff for the sake of her industries, the nations did not 
 fully realize the importance of this transport question. Bis- 
 marck, who carried the tariff idea to rapid victory, also accom- 
 plished the nationalization of the Prussian railroads. All classes 
 in Germany to-day regard this as his greatest and most beneficial 
 achievement along economic lines. Many separate and poorly 
 organized enterprises were brought together under one manage- 
 ment, an operation which represented the first great economic 
 
I30 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 consolidation and which even to-day remains the greatest that 
 not only Germany but perhaps the world has ever seen. It 
 offered countless possibilities of economy, and it has proved to 
 be the most brilliant stroke of business that Prussia or any other 
 modern state has ever done. At the same time, this nationaliza- 
 tion also exercised a strong influence on our industry. In the 
 first place, it had a wholesome effect on industrial competition 
 by limiting it to the field of prices and cost of production, and 
 by preventing it from encroaching on the field of freight rates. 
 In the second place, by introducing uniformity in the gauge 
 and rolling stock, it created facilities hitherto unknown in the 
 transportation of bulk articles; this has vastly strengthened out 
 industry in its development into big concerns and has rendered 
 possible the present high degree of standardization of our products. 
 
 As the German railway system is to-day the greatest in Europe, 
 and only surpassed by that of the United States, so is the 
 Prusso-Hessian railway combine the greatest single undertaking 
 in the world. This is not the most important feature in German 
 inland communication. As long as the German railways were in 
 private hands, the development of the artificial as well as of the 
 natural waterways was carried on only half-heartedly ; with gov- 
 ernment ownership, hundreds of millions of marks have been ex- 
 pended in creating a highly developed and closely interconnected 
 system of waterways, surpassed in efficiency by no other. It is 
 characteristic of German methods that recently efforts have be- 
 gun to be directed towards taking the railways and waterways 
 out of the field of unregulated competition and bringing them 
 into a powerful union, to the end of a reduction of freight rates. 
 
 Our shipping trade is based upon this system of interior com- 
 munication, which on all frontiers extends far into the neigh- 
 boring states. Proofs of our old maritime ability, as in the 
 days of the Hanseatic League, have never been lacking, but the 
 prohibitive features of Cromwell's Navigation Act, which with 
 ruthless deliberation established England's position in mari- 
 time trade, pressed heavily upon German shipping. Not 
 until the revolt of the United States from England did the 
 Act suffer a modification important for the Hansa cities, and 
 not until 1849 was it repealed. Then, for the first time, sea- 
 traffic with the coasts of the various continents was legally open 
 to the Germans. But German shipping still suffered from the 
 fact that it lacked a national flag, and consequently protection 
 and dignity. This state of affairs was changed by the founda- 
 tion of the German Empire. Not alone was the path of de- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 131 
 
 velopment now open, but a strong national mainstay had been 
 created. 
 
 On this new basis German shipping gained its first great 
 success in the emigration traffic. When the preponderance of 
 emigration shifted from England to the Continent, the ancient 
 advantages and disadvantages of the geographical position of the 
 various countries underwent a complete reversal. England's in- 
 sular position prevented her from finding an adequate substitute 
 for the failure of her own emigrants, w^hile the German Hansa 
 cities of the North Sea took deliberate advantage of their Con- 
 tinental situation. Through its emigrant trade to the United 
 States Bremen gained a leading position. With Hamburg, it 
 succeeded, when the stream of emigrants thinned in Germany, 
 in making up for the loss and even in increasing the original 
 traffic by an influx from other countries. Through the merits 
 of their organization, the two cities were able to retain their posi- 
 tion as the greatest emigrant ports in the world, even when the 
 growth of German commerce transformed the country from a 
 land of emigration into one with an excess of immigration. It 
 was in this field of emigrant traffic that Germany first suc- 
 ceeded in securing maritime independence of England. It was 
 more difficult to achieve this in the field of passenger traffic, for 
 on account of her Colonial possessions and her position in inter- 
 national trade, England has more cabin passengers requiring 
 transportation than any other country. It was possible to gain 
 a place equal to England's only by attracting a portion of the 
 non-English traffic through offering the best possible accommo- 
 dation. Germany succeeded in this on several of the chief ocean 
 routes, as was most clearly shown perhaps in the attraction ex- 
 ercised by her ships in the international tourist traffic. Thanks 
 to her successes in both fields of passenger traffic, Germany has 
 been enabled to gain a leading position on certain portions of 
 the seas in the technically highest developed maritime branch, 
 viz: the liner traffic, which is distinguished by speed and regu- 
 larity of service. In the North Atlantic field Germany was 
 able to win the blue ribbon, which England succeeded in re- 
 capturing only by granting, contrary to German custom, a high 
 government subsidy to the Cunard Line for its two vessels, the 
 Mauretania and the Lusitania. 
 
 Germany realized, however, that in order to conquer and to 
 maintain in all departments of shipping a place next to England's, 
 she would have to increase her competitive power to the highest 
 possible degree by organizing the shipping business along the 
 most rational lines. This was achieved by developing the liner 
 
132 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 traffic, which was limited to fixed routes with definite ports and 
 hence greatly subject to the risks of trade fluctuations, into a 
 widely ramified system, in which one line helps the other. By 
 this system a greater freedom of movement, and hence a greater 
 degree of insusceptibility to natural and artificial crises, is gained, 
 together with a far-reaching invulnerability against the effects of 
 competition. In shipping as in banking, the chief impulse to 
 iurther development lay in the desire to effect a counter-balance 
 against local risks, and the novelty and limit placed to that de- 
 velopment helped to make success possible. For while in England, 
 with her older traditions, the growth of the shipping business was 
 scattered, owing to her wealth in harbors and capital, German 
 shipping is concentrated in two neighboring North Sea harbors, 
 on whose small population it was originally, and is even to-day, 
 to a great extent dependent for capital. In this field, too, Ger- 
 many has achieved deliberate concentration of her strength to 
 a much greater extent than England. Foreign countries can 
 show no counterpart to the Hamburg-American and North Ger- 
 man Lloyd Lines, with their many-sided and systematic organi- 
 zation. Other countries have not developed their shipping lines 
 into great coordinated systems to the same degree as Germany 
 has. Nevertheless, England still enjoys a notable superiority in 
 the shipping field. In tonnage of ships, she exceeds Germany 
 five-fold. Wherever the dominion of the great liners ceases, and 
 the task is one of carrying the great volumes of agricultural 
 staple goods, which are only transported for a short period of 
 the year and in extremely varying quantities, England still enjoys 
 her former predominance. In the so-called trampship business, 
 the most international branch of all, England continues to hold 
 sway, as in scarcely any other line. 
 
 This supremacy in the trampship business is of great im- 
 portance to the ship building industry. With the change from 
 wooden to iron and steel ships, the attention of builders was 
 turned from lumber producing countries to those rich in iron. 
 At the same time the business grew from the narrow plane of 
 the small undertakings of artisans to the large scale of capitalistic 
 enterprise. The system of large production, which England first 
 developed, owing to the invention of the Bessemer process in the 
 iron industry, was extended almost immediately into all branches 
 in which iron figured largely. Since the sixties England became 
 the ship-builder of the world. Even more strikingly than for 
 the world's carrying trade, do her figures for ship building (65 
 per cent for the period 1901 to 1910) surpass those of Germany 
 (9.5 per cent) for the same period. This great superiority is 
 
MODERN GERMANY 133 
 
 due, in part, to the international reputation which England has 
 acquired as the possessor of the greatest navy. She was consid- 
 ered the builder of the best ships. Under the influence of the 
 development of our war fleet, on the one hand, and of our pas- 
 senger liners, on the other, Germany has in a short space of time 
 established her independence in this field of high-class construc- 
 tion. Her great passenger steamers stand in the first rank, 
 and her warships are inferior to those of England only in num- 
 bers, not in quality. The second mainstay of England's ship- 
 building is the English tramp-steamer. In contrast to passen- 
 ger and war ships, the trampship is a wholesale article. Just as 
 up to within a few years our machine industry was limited al- 
 most entirely to individual products, so our ship-building trade 
 has neglected cheap construction en masse. Energy has been 
 concentrated upon the production of expensive and constantly im- 
 proving individual ships. But just as our machine industry in 
 recent years passed, as we have seen, through an important stage of 
 standardization and then became the greatest German export 
 industry, it is one of the great questions of German economic life 
 whether we shall succeed in carrying the idea of production en 
 masse, which is a controlling conception of to-day, into the field 
 of our ship-building. Here, as in so many branches of industry, 
 by placing production upon a practical and rational plane, we 
 should retrieve lost opportunity and recover the flourishing state 
 of the old Hansa period. 
 
 Shipping, which can be maintained on the highest plane of 
 development only when supported by eflScient ship-building, is the 
 pace-maker for foreign trade. Although in relation to economic 
 life in its entirety foreign trade does not play in Germany by 
 any means the part it plays in England, or in France, never- 
 theless its statistics reflect strikingly the general development. 
 The table for international trade stands thus in millions of 
 marks : 
 
 Germany. England. France. 
 
 1890 8,195 15,300 8,337 
 
 1900 11,088 17,899 9,208 
 
 1907 17,011 23,741 12,104 
 
 1913 22,530 28,644 14,814 (1912) 
 
 Although in 1890 England was so far in the van that, in a 
 sense, she was removed from competition, Germany has gained 
 considerably on England, while France has remained far behind 
 both countries. The result of this development is that Ger- 
 many, like the United States, increased her share of international 
 
134 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 trade in the period from 1 890-1912 from 11 per cent to 12.9 
 per cent, while in the same period England's share has fallen 
 from 20.2 per cent to 16.6 per cent and France's from 11 per 
 cent to 9 per cent. Despite this, these two countries have 
 maintained their previous superiority to the extent that foreign 
 trade in 191 3 in England represented 596 marks to each indi- 
 vidual of the population, in France (1912) it represented 370 
 marks, but in Germany only 322 marks. But the chief com- 
 petitors facing each other are England and Germany. It is with 
 them chiefly that we propose to deal hereafter. 
 
 More important than the total figures are the differences in 
 single lines. In import trade, in which England is still far 
 ahead of Germany, raw material and foodstuffs hold first place 
 in both countries. In 191 3, they formed 72.1 per cent of all 
 German imports; in addition, there were 11.7 per cent of half- 
 finished goods, which, like raw material, are subjected to a 
 process of further manufacture, while only 13.7 per cent were 
 finished goods. The first twenty items on the import list are 
 raw materials, among which stand, far in the lead, cotton (607,- 
 000,000 marks), wheat (417,000,000 marks), wool (412,000,- 
 000 marks), barley (390,000,000 marks), copper (335,000,000 
 marks), skins (321,000,000 marks). 
 
 The twenty-first and twenty-second positions are held by agri- 
 cultural products, such as butter and oil-cake, with a total value 
 of 237,000,000 marks, and the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth 
 by cotton and woolen yarn, both half-finished products, with 
 a total value of 224,000,000 marks. There follows again a 
 series of raw materials, until the first finished article of manu- 
 facture is reached with machines, to the value of 80,000,000 
 marks, in thirty-third place. On account of this relative unim- 
 portance of manufactured imports, the two countries of tem- 
 perate climate which have the most extended territory, the 
 United States and Russia, compete for first position on the 
 German import list. England has maintained third position 
 against Austro-Hungarian competition. No independent coun- 
 try takes from England so many goods as Germany; not even 
 her own colonies take so much, with the exception of India. But 
 even among England's exports to Germany, raw material and 
 half-finished products play an important part. The first five 
 positions are held by coal, herrings, and three different kinds of 
 yarn. In 191 2 the value of finished goods was only 246,000,000 
 marks, out of 842,000,000 marks for the whole import list. 
 
 Of quite a different character is the German export trade, 
 which in 191 3 reached the 10,000,000,000 mark, and which is 
 
MODERN GERMANY 135 
 
 only 622,000,000 marks behind that of England, and 101,000,000 
 marks behind that of the United States. In this list in 1913, fin- 
 ished goods held the lead, with 63.3 per cent, to which was added 
 1 1.3 per cent of semi-manufactured goods. All parts of the 
 earth share in these exports, which consist mainly in industrial 
 products. In the van stand those countries which possess great 
 purchasing power, as the result of a high state of development 
 or of a numerous population. England stands far in the lead. 
 In 19 1 3 her imports from Germany, amounting to 1,438,000,000 
 marks, far exceeded her exports thither, amounting to 876,000,000 
 marks. But the great difference in the total figures of Ger- 
 many's trade with England is chiefly explained by the fact that 
 England was able to maintain her old commission trade by serv- 
 ing her colonies with European products, and it is counterbal- 
 anced in great part by the fact that the British colonies, con- 
 trary to the motherland, show a greater export trade to Ger- 
 many than an import trade from that country. The former 
 advanced 560,000,000 marks during the ten years from 1900 to 
 191 1, the latter only 140,000,000 marks. England is followed 
 by Austria-Hungary (1,104,000,000 marks), Russia (880,000,- 
 000 marks) and France (790,000,000 marks). Fifth position 
 in Germany's export trade is held by a non-European country, 
 the United States, with imports of 713,000,000 marks, as against 
 exports of 1,711,000,000 marks. Germany imports more goods 
 from the United States than any other country. Next rank 
 again five European countries. It is obvious that the European 
 countries are the most important for German export trade. In 
 her export trade, too, Germany shows herself to be a European 
 Continental state. All the sea coasts of the world may be 
 reached with little trouble by water; in the case of transporta- 
 tion by land, that one of the rivals often enjoys an advantage 
 who can avoid the trans-shipping of his goods. By the geograph- 
 ical position of Germany, which in this point proves an ad- 
 vantage rather than the reverse, the fact may doubtless be ex- 
 plained that German export trade has gained on that of Eng- 
 land in Europe. For the period from 1890-19 11 it has been 
 shown that in every European state, except Portugal, imports 
 from Germany increased more rapidly than those from Eng- 
 land. Germany is still surpassed by England in the outer circle 
 of European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and 
 Turkey, as well as France, but she is in advance of Britain in 
 the other European states, although only slightly so in the inner 
 circle comprising Sweden, Norway, Italy, Bulgaria, and Bel- 
 gium. This advantage is marked in all her neighboring states 
 
136 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 not yet cited, as well as in Russia and Serbia. Beyond the bor- 
 ders of Europe, however, the picture is quite different. In the 
 countries beyond the seas, Albion has maintained the penetrat- 
 ing strength of her trade. England's exports show almost 
 everywhere a greater increase in the years from 1890 to 191 1 
 than Germany's; only Mexico, San Domingo, and Guatemala, 
 in addition to the German colonies, are exceptions. 
 
 The German export trade, which is thus distributed over 
 the different countries according to a kind of natural law, is 
 made up of an extraordinary variety of goods, and consists mainly 
 of finished products. Aside from pit coal, coke, grain and kali, 
 it shows no such bulk articles as the import trade. For her 
 machines and iron-ware, which occupy the leading position, in- 
 clude innumerable separate classes. This versatility may be con- 
 sidered a German peculiarity. England has among her expprts 
 bulk articles also. These are the products of her textile in- 
 dustry, which at the time of the founding of the German Em- 
 pire formed fully one-half- of the English export list, and still 
 to-day make up nearly two-fifths of it. Since the Germans did 
 not appear until late in the markets of the world, and lacked 
 such great staple articles, they were forced to interest themselves 
 in that medley of goods which the English — at first contemptu- 
 ously, then enviously — styled ''German articles," ''German nick- 
 nacks," or "muck and truck trade." This multifariousness vests 
 the German export trade with that adaptability which distin- 
 guishes it and which has made the German overseas merchant 
 the experienced, resourceful and energetic man whom every one 
 fears as a competitor. The trade in the great staple articles 
 known as Manchester goods is, on the contrary, carried on along 
 smooth, well-beaten tracks, in which there is slight opportunity 
 for gaining new experience. It represents, furthermore, that 
 branch of modern factory industry which may be most easily 
 taken up in new industrial countries. Here again original ad- 
 vantages have been transformed into disadvantages and vice 
 versa. This is not due in any way to improper competition, but 
 is the natural result of progressive development. 
 
 England has had to suffer under the pressure of this develop- 
 ment resulting from natural conditions, not alone in neutral 
 markets but even in her own. English imports from Ger- 
 many in 19 1 2 were 69 per cent finished articles, while the 
 German imports from England showed only 29 per cent of such 
 goods. At the start it was believed in England that these in- 
 dustrial imports were the result of an inferior competition based 
 on starvation wages and contemptible practices. They desired 
 
MODERN GERMANY 137 
 
 to protect their own well-developed, high-quality industry against 
 the undesirable intruder. As a consequence, there was passed 
 the British Trade Marks Act of August 23, 1887, which re- 
 quired the country of origin to be stamped on all imported 
 goods. The stamp "made in Germany," it was intended, should 
 become a mark of inferiority for all German goods. As a matter 
 of fact, it has become a testimonial to German ability. It 
 showed the world, to its surprise, that German goods were no 
 longer by any means "cheap and nasty," as they were still called 
 at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition in 1876, and it served 
 as an unintentional English advertisement of German industry. 
 
 When it w^as seen that a mistake had been made, there was 
 a shift from the attack on foreign "truck" to an attack on for- 
 eign products of quality. The Patent Act of 1907 increased for 
 a foreigner the difficulties in securing a patent. Any patent may 
 be cancelled if the greater part of the goods are manufactured 
 abroad. In this way, protection for many German inventions 
 is prevented, or else German patent-holders are forced to sur- 
 render the rights to Englishmen or to build factories in England. 
 But this weapon also turns against those who have forged it. 
 For the patent law injures the English intermediate trade by 
 forcing the foreigner to ask himself whether a particular product 
 is intended for use in England, or only for passage through that 
 country. 
 
 At the same time an effort was made to protect the monopoly 
 in high-class English manufactures by organizing a campaign of 
 vilification against German products. The entire English press 
 throughout the world was impressed into this contemptible serv- 
 ice. The limit, which it would be difficult to surpass in times 
 of peace, was reached by Eastern Engineering, a monthly maga- 
 zine founded in 191 2 by the British Engineers Association for 
 China. 
 
 This campaign is still going on, in war time, only with height- 
 ened wantonness. The campaign of defamation is assuming the 
 gigantic proportions of the modern war en masse. The restric- 
 tions placed on patents are developing into patent-robbery, at 
 least temporarily; the efforts toward tariff protection, started 
 by Chamberlain, are finding their realization in the prohibition 
 against "trading with the enemy," which applies not only to 
 entering Into future obligations, but to carrying out those already 
 assumed. The competition in the shipping trade in times of 
 peace, for which the British state granted subsidies of hitherto 
 unheard-of amounts, is now becoming piracy; England had long 
 
138 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 prepared for this by stubbornly blocking all progress in inter- 
 national law regarding naval warfare. 
 
 But war is "the continuation of politics, only with other 
 means." It was reserved for England, whose policy was al- 
 ways strongly influenced by economic considerations, to carry 
 the war spirit into all branches of economic life, with a coarse 
 brutality such as mankind has not yet seen. What had long been 
 regarded as a universally accepted attainment of civilization in 
 regard to warfare is trodden under foot by England, without 
 regard to the future, and her opponents thereby find themselves 
 forced to measures of retaliation. The rules which were gal- 
 lantly observed forty-five years ago in the war between Germany 
 and France are throw^n to the winds by England, who brutalizes 
 and embitters warfare. The war is systematically extended to 
 the peaceful civil population, and private property is seized, not 
 alone at sea but even on land. 
 
 Complaints had long been heard over the "inevitable Ger- 
 man." Now the hour had struck to get rid of the diligent rival. 
 Immediately with the outbreak of hostilities, all male German 
 and Austro-Hungarian citizens between the ages of seventeen 
 and fifty-five were cooped up both in England and her colonies 
 in concentration camps, first invented by the English in the 
 South African War. Regard for public opinion seems to have 
 led to certain modifications in the motherland, but the policy of 
 force was allowed full rein in the Crown Colonies, which are 
 under the Colonial Secretary, not under Parhament — this, not- 
 withstanding the fact that in this case the fear of spies could 
 not be offered as an excuse, and the common interest of the 
 whites suggested caution. In Hongkong the Germans were even 
 imprisoned in Chinese prisons, despite the protest of the British 
 Governor, who replied to the order by resigning his position. 
 
 Together with the elimination of these dangerous individuals, 
 began the destruction of that which they had created by cease- 
 less work. Wherever the Germans were most successful the 
 English proceeded to enforce liquidation of their affairs. The 
 spirit which ruled this procedure is indicated clearly in The Alien 
 Enemies' (Winding Up) Ordinance, which was promulgated on 
 December 7, 19 14, in the Straits Settlements and in Further 
 India. It decrees not alone that enemy firms — even those stock 
 companies entered according to British law whose shareholders 
 are at least two-thirds foreigners^ — are to be forcibly liquidated, 
 at the cost of a commission of 2^/^ per cent; but, following liqui- 
 dation, all books, letters and vouchers, accounts and documents, 
 together even with the statement of the liquidator, may be de- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 139 
 
 stroyed. The president of the Bremen Chamber of Commerce 
 expressed the feelings of the whole German nation when he char- 
 acterized this measure, taken in the name of the King of Eng- 
 land, as ''the worst warping of justice that has occurred since 
 the existence of civilization"; he adds that the British state has 
 thereby illustrated "the downfall of all governmental order." 
 
 The English, however, look to time for the principal gain 
 in their economic life. This viewpoint finds expression, with' 
 classical brevity, in The London Times of December 11, 1914, 
 in the following words: 
 
 "From a British manufacturer's point of view, the longer the 
 war continues the better for British industries. We may feel 
 the pinch at present, but years hence we shall get the benefit. 
 Every German firm in British Colonies, which has been eating 
 into the very vitals of the British manufacturer and operatives, 
 will be ruined. If we had had a larger military force to rush 
 into the field and subdue Germany at the start, the effects would 
 not have been so far-reaching." 
 
 It was in the same spirit that Sir Edward Grey, on August 
 3, 1914, in justification of the British declaration of war, made 
 the following statement, the cold-blooded calculation of which 
 aroused the indignation of the German people, fighting for its 
 most sacred possessions: 
 
 "For us, with a powerful fleet which we believe able to 
 protect our commerce and to protect our shores and to protect 
 our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little 
 more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside." 
 
 One cannot expect from the mouth of a diplomat the cynical 
 frankness which characterized the British Admiral Monk, when 
 he gave utterance to the famous words: 
 
 "What matters this or that reason? What we w^ant is more 
 of the trade which the Dutch now have." 
 
 In The United Service Institution for 1909, in the prize essay 
 of a British naval officer on England's wars, the writer sums up 
 the results of his investigation in the following equally frank 
 soldierly declaration : 
 
 "We give all sorts of reasons for w^ar, but at the bottom 
 of them all is commerce." 
 
 In expectation of the war now raging. The Saturday 
 Review made, as early as 1897, this statement, which has often 
 been repeated in milder form by British newspapers in all parts 
 of the world: 
 
 "If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after 
 to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would 
 
I40 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a 
 right of succession; must they not fight for 250,000,000 pounds 
 of yearly commerce?" 
 
 If not the whole truth, still a great degree of truth is con- 
 tained in this statement of an American newspaper: 
 
 ''This war was not made in Germany, but 'made in Germany' 
 is the cause of it." 
 
 Events, however, have already disappointed the great hopes, 
 and especially the business calculations, of Sir Edward Grey. 
 Englishmen will learn that there are higher forces in national 
 life than cold-blooded desire for gain. As the development of 
 German commercial strength in production and trade was not 
 the result of frivolity and arbitrariness, or even of hostility to 
 the English — an attitude foreign to our people, with few ex- 
 ceptions — but springs of necessity from natural forces which can- 
 not be eliminated, in like manner war cannot bring victory to 
 backwardness over progress. It can destroy the careful but anti- 
 quated work of previous generations, but not the forces of prog- 
 ress, rich in promise for the future, which created this work. The 
 longing of the German people is only to gain a freer field for the 
 exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own 
 benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. As surely as 
 Napoleonic plans of world-conquest are foreign to the soul 
 of the nation, just so surely will that longing remain alive in 
 it while the earth bears German men. For this reason the 
 war appears to the German people as a war of freedom. It is 
 aimed against Russia's Pan-Slavic plans of conquest on the 
 European-Asiatic Continent, and against England's rule of the 
 sea. It aims at a balance of power, not alone on the European 
 Continent to the advantage of a clever outsider, but likewise 
 upon the ocean. In this fight for the equality of the nations, 
 Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind. 
 And thanks to her scientific training and strength of organiza- 
 tion, she will win mankind's gratitude, as soon as the mists of 
 defamation have cleared away and freedom has been achieved for 
 ^he judgment of the nations. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY 
 
 DR. WILLIAM SOLF, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE 
 COLONIES 
 
 THIS article is no apology, no excuse for our having colonies, 
 and no explanation why we have them. Germany has 
 colonies because she wished to, and had to have them. We 
 know that we have obtained all of our colonies in a legal manner 
 and have not stolen them, and we are responsible to ourselves 
 and to no foreign power for the existence of our colonial posses- 
 sions. If I have determined to prepare a contribution for the 
 purposes of the present book dealing with Germany's colonial 
 policy, it is done with the well-considered intention of showing, 
 by means of an analysis of the spirit of our colonial administra- 
 tion, how far Germany's colonial policy is from being "mili- 
 taristic," in the sense In which that adjective is used by our ene- 
 mies. 
 
 Our enemies are not clear in regard to the fundamental fact 
 that that which is called "militarism" stands in close Interrela- 
 tionship w^ith the geographical, economic and general political 
 foundations on which a modern state develops. They ignore the 
 fact that in every modern centralized state, which from the inter- 
 play of Its geographical, commercial and political factors is im- 
 pelled to form a standing army, the spirit of militarism exists 
 and everywhere takes on the same or similar forms of activity. 
 
 Although in the birth of German militarism in Prussia, the 
 same factors were originally active as in other countries with 
 standing armies, nevertheless certain special factors of local geo- 
 graphical and national-ethical nature gave it a particular stamp. 
 The principal element in this differentiation was that of bitter 
 necessity — the position of small and poor Prussia, surrounded by 
 mighty and rich neighbors, w^ho obstructed and rendered diffi- 
 cult, as much as possible, her rise and existence. The dira 
 necessitasj or "holy necessity," made the concentration of all 
 powers imperative, and left no chance for a costly policy of 
 force and prestige. Necessity drove the Prussian rulers to a 
 stronger centralization of their state, to the creation of a bu- 
 reaucracy w^hich treated the inadequate supplies of the public 
 treasury with the care accorded to the "Arc of the Covenant." 
 
 141 
 
142 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Necessity has been the great teacher and disciplinarian of the 
 Prussian state, on the throne, In the army, among the employees 
 of the Civil Service, and In all ranks of the people; It created 
 that laconic, reserved, but wiry and persevering Prussian type. 
 
 The Prussian state Is Indeed like the woolen shirt, which irri- 
 tates but furnishes warmth; It was forced to assume rough and 
 harsh characteristics, created by bitter necessity. In constant 
 pitiless discipline and fulfillment of duty, the people and their 
 princes became great; the state remained long deprived of all 
 that makes life rich, joyous and beautiful. The peculiar marks 
 of militarism which gave Prussia her Individuality remain with 
 her to-day, for the reason that the prerequisites for the existence 
 of Germany as a state are more and more found to be the same 
 as those which were once the deciding factors for Prussia. 
 
 While other countries, as the result of a more fortunate geo- 
 graphical position, were able more easily to regulate their gov- 
 ernmental, military and economic needs and Institutions, ''holy 
 necessity" — the present time proves this once again — remained 
 the indispensable teacher and long familiar disciplinarian for 
 Prussia, lying as she does at the centre of Europe, protected 
 for long distances by no natural boundaries and surrounded by 
 jealous enemies. ^'Tou jours en vedette'' may serve as a motto, 
 not alone for Prussia but also for the whole German Empire, 
 which has only of recent years approached a condition of af- 
 fluence. The whole German nation is to-day filled with the 
 same spirit which first rendered Prussia great and unconquer- 
 able. 
 
 The tactics of our enemies In accusing us of militarism are as 
 unjust as they are foolish. They misunderstand entirely the 
 peculiar bases of our young empire. Were Germany free to 
 act and move in the same manner as other states have long been 
 able to do — most of which have for centuries enjoyed political 
 and territorial union — she would perhaps have rid herself of 
 many characteristics which have been the result of her develop- 
 ment during a period of great stress. 
 
 We see that In ''New Germany." We thought in our col- 
 onies to gain the freedom of development denied us In the 
 Fatherland. In her colonies Germany did not reckon with 
 foreign foes, did not contemplate the conquest of her possessions 
 by European Powers. Trusting In the solidarity of interests of 
 the white race, and supported by the provisions and spirit of 
 the Congo Act, the military protection of our colonies was 
 slight, and Intended principally for the preservation of peace 
 and order among the natives, and for the suppression of the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 143 
 
 slave-trade. Such were the legally limited tasks of our defence 
 and police troops. In all the colonies of Africa and in the South 
 Seas the German government introduced at many points dif- 
 ferent and freer rules in the field of administration and military 
 control, as well as in economic life, in trade and traffic, in rail- 
 road management, in agriculture, etc., than was possible at 
 home. In none of our colonies is there a military administra- 
 tion. Were militarism the idol of Germans, and did Germans 
 really possess the war-like characteristics and piratical instincts 
 attributed to them, our colonies would inevitably furnish proof 
 of the fact, and a welcome arena would be seen in them for this 
 supposed soldierly brutality and love of fighting. The fact that 
 this is not so, that we have introduced a civil and peaceful form 
 of government and have not transplanted the restraints and 
 limitations historically necessary for Germany into these new 
 fields of our administrative activity — that, taken all in all, we 
 have developed a freer spirit in them — this appears truly re- 
 markable. It shows the real spirit of the German nature and 
 policy as it manifests itself when free from foreign enemies, from 
 belligerent neighbors and ''holy necessity," and as it would 
 everywhere and universally manifest itself were this possible. 
 
 The history of the conception of colonial aspirations in Ger- 
 many and of its slow, gradual development shows that no am- 
 bitious impulse for great deeds, no prompting of a sudden whim 
 or passing ill-humor, no desire for an increase of power prompted 
 the German government to enter upon the thorny path of an 
 active colonial policy. Formerly this was freely acknowledged, 
 even in the camp of our present enemies, who are now actively 
 engaged in taking possession of our colonies. Prince Bismarck 
 was finally brought to abandon his views against the acquisition 
 of distant colonies by the bitter experiences which Germans suf- 
 fered at the hands of the "impartial" and ''just" British colonial 
 administration in the Fiji Islands, in their ten-year struggle for 
 lawfully acquired land titles and monetary claims. For a 
 long time it was his sincere desire to be guided in all ques- 
 tions of maritime and commercial importance by the assump- 
 tion of the identity of German and British interests. But the 
 effect of the annexation of the Fiji Islands by England in the 
 year 1874 upon the trade and plantation undertakings of Ger- 
 mans settled there showed Bismarck clearly that England was 
 ready to go hand in hand with Germany in the introduction 
 of freedom in trade and commerce only so far as she herself 
 was able to gain by this partnership. These experiences were 
 the main factor in forcing Bismarck to the conviction that Ger- 
 
144 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 man interests overseas were in need of a more thorough protec- 
 tion than could be expected from England, friendly, it is true, 
 but selfish and under certain circumstances given to acting ruth- 
 lessly against foreign interests. With other colonial powers we 
 had had even worse experiences. 
 
 Long enough had the arbiter of the destiny of the young 
 German Empire postponed Germany's entrance into the ranks 
 of the colonial powers, for fear of the dissipation of its energies 
 so urgently needed for internal strengthening. Had the spirit 
 of German trade and enterprise in foreign colonies enjoyed 
 protection and equal opportunity, had the expectation been justi- 
 fied that the colonial territories as yet unappropriated would 
 remain open to international commerce, German policy would 
 perhaps never have taken this step. Its ultimate necessity 
 was the result of bitter experiences. The care and responsi- 
 bility for the future of the German nation, rapidly growing in 
 numbers and in economic power, forced the government to place 
 under the protection of the German flag a portion of the still 
 unappropriated lands in Africa and in the South Seas. As these 
 were territories whose position had hitherto not seemed desir- 
 able to the older colonial powers, it might have been expected 
 that the recognition of the German occupation would have met 
 with recognition by the other powers without friction. For 
 Germany was most careful, in this connection, to avoid encroach- 
 ment on existing rights or interests. 
 
 The reverse was the case. Innumerable obstacles were placed 
 in the way of Germany's claims to new land. Step by step we 
 were forced to contend with the jealousy and malevolence of 
 neighboring colonial powers. Attempts were made by every 
 means to block German colonial plans and to diminish the Ger- 
 man colonial territory. The other colonial powers had orig- 
 inally confined themselves to occupation of the unclaimed coastal 
 districts of the African Continent, but after the birth of the con- 
 ception of the colonial "hinterland" there began keen competition 
 in the expansion of colonial possessions from the coast into the 
 interior of Africa. France especially sought at this point to cur- 
 tail our West African colonies, by despatching numerous military 
 missions and by the manufacture of legal claims. In the years 
 1898 and 1899, French colonial agents in Dahomey, basing their 
 claims on a wrong longitudinal calculation, occupied a stretch of 
 land of two thousand square kilometers, to the injury of the neigh- 
 boring Togo Land. Negotiations covering sixteen years, fre- 
 quently most delicate but always conducted on the German side 
 with the greatest patience and long-sufFering, were necessary with 
 
MODERN GERMANY 145 
 
 the French government, as well as new and expensive boundary 
 expeditions, in order to convince the latter government of the 
 incorrect work of its former commissioners and to uphold the 
 German treaty rights at this boundary. 
 
 So difficult was it made for Germany to come to a definite 
 understanding with her colonial neighbors regarding her boun- 
 daries that even to-day, after a complete generation, the boun- 
 dary lines of the German protectorate have not yet everywhere 
 been finally regulated and settled. Mountains of documents 
 have been written and oceans of ink spilled in this connection. 
 The French colonial administration has at all times shown itself 
 notably lacking in the spirit of conciliation and broad-minded- 
 ness in questions of boundary regulation. 
 
 The responsible leaders of Germany's policy have missed no 
 opportunity to emphasize how much they valued the preserva- 
 tion of pleasant relations with their colonial neighbors, espe- 
 cially with England, and that these pleasant relations should 
 not be disturbed by differences in colonial matters. In the 
 report concerning the motives for the German-English under- 
 standing of July I, 1890 (the so-called Zanzibar Agreement), 
 these words occur: "The thought is not to be entertained of 
 being forced into a rupture with England on account of a colo- 
 nial dispute. It is not to be doubted that our colonial posses- 
 sions are materially too unimportant to balance the disadvan- 
 tages of a war which would deeply affect the prosperity of both 
 parties. Not alone is actual warfare to be avoided, but alienation 
 of the nations, embittering of feeling in wide circles and diplo- 
 matic feuds on account of these possessions can not be counte- 
 nanced. We desire urgently to maintain in the future our former 
 cordial relations with England." 
 
 On December 11, 1894, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince 
 Hohenlohe, explained to the Reichstag the guiding motives of 
 Germany's colonial policy. They were, he said, partly of an 
 economic, partly of a national, and partly of an ideal and re- 
 ligious nature, the latter in respect to the campaign against the 
 disgraceful slave-trade and the support of the missions. He 
 closed with the warning that, with due regard for all foreign 
 rights, the maintenance of our colonial possessions was demanded 
 by our national honor and was an outward sign of our national 
 prestige which we would stand ready to defend. 
 
 On February 13, 1896, Herr von Marschall, Secretary of 
 Foreign Affairs, said in the Reichstag: 
 
 "It is not the German fashion to seek quarrels or to cause 
 trouble or to attack others' rights. We are always ready, and 
 
146 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 have given proof of it to England, to respect the rights and In- 
 terests of others. We are most w^illing on this basis to stand In 
 close relationship w^ith all nations. But this Is on the assump- 
 tion that our consideration of others Is founded upon a full 
 measure of reciprocity." 
 
 On December 14, 1895, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Bil- 
 low^, declared that by * world policy" he understood simply "that 
 In the field of commerce, Industry and shipping we demand the 
 same consideration as all other countries, and that w^e intend to 
 stand upon a footing of equality vulth the vv^hole w^orld." Again, 
 on November 14, 1906, he said that It v^^as his aim so to conduct 
 a w^Ise, w^ell-considered and deliberately moderate world policy 
 that the safety of the German people might not be endangered 
 and the future of the nation not compromised. 
 
 But on no occasion have the true aims and the unselfishness 
 of the German colonial policy been shown in a clearer light 
 than In our attitude toward the colonial plans of King Leo- 
 pold II of Belgium. Prince Bismarck, from the start, did every- 
 thing in his power to further them. His bridal present to the 
 young Congo State was Catanga, rich In copper and to-day 
 the pearl of the Belgian colonial possessions. Two German ex- 
 plorers at that time had just proclaimed Its economic Impor- 
 tance. To secure a large free trade zone In Central Africa 
 appeared to Bismarck almost as desirable as the acquisition of 
 colonies of our own. But how little the Belgian King acted in 
 accordance with the spirit and aims of the Congo Act of the year 
 1885! What bitter struggles and material sacrifices Belgium 
 was compelled to make in order to recover from the selfish mo- 
 nopolistic policy of Leopold's period in the Belgian Congo! 
 
 With justice the geographer, Dr. Supan, declared that no 
 colonial policy had ever been so inspired by the spirit of peace 
 and respect for the rights of others as the German. 
 
 Even Gladstone saw himself compelled in the British Parlia- 
 ment, In 1885, In view of the moderate attitude of the German 
 government, to Invoke the blessing of heaven upon Germany's 
 colonial aspirations, and to welcome her as England's friend 
 and colleague for the blessing of mankind, and to declare: 
 
 *'I welcome her entrance Into this field of action and shall 
 be delighted for her to become our associate In spreading light 
 and civilization In poorly civilized territories. In this work she 
 will encounter our most heartfelt and best wishes and every 
 encouragement which lies In our power." 
 
 Many misunderstandings would perhaps have been avoided 
 had the planless division of Africa in the 8o's of the last cen- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 147 
 
 tury, dictated by various outw^ard circumstances, been more 
 organically regulated by mutual understanding and considera- 
 tion of the interested states. Proposals were frequently made 
 looking to a consolidation and re-grouping, especially of the 
 German and English colonial possessions in Africa, and aiming 
 at a simphfication of their administration. Unfortunately these 
 efforts were made at a time when in the colonies in question, 
 through private and governmental activity, so many interests 
 of various kinds had been created that a peaceful territorial 
 adjustment or exchange could not but seem impracticable, even 
 with the best intentions. The right moment for the regula- 
 tion of European possessions in Africa on a natural basis had 
 been irrevocably neglected. 
 
 One might, however, have expected that with the outbreak 
 of the present war the interested Powers would have remem- 
 bered Article 11 of the Congo Act of February 26, 1885. 
 This article binds the parties to the Congo Act, in case one 
 of the Powers exercising rights of sovereignty in the Congo 
 Basin should be involved in a war, to lend their good offices, 
 in order that, at the request of the state in question, the dis- 
 puted territory be placed during the war under the rule of 
 neutrality. This wise and humane provision had been in- 
 cluded in the Congo Act at the special initiative of the United 
 States of America. One of that country's delegates, Mr. Kasson, 
 had, in an exhaustive and convincing exposition, shown what 
 terrible atrocities had resulted from involving the Indian tribes 
 in the military complications of the European states which 
 possessed colonies in North America in the eighteenth century. 
 The repetition of such unfortunate happenings should, he 
 said, be avoided in the Congo Basin. Efforts should be made 
 to prevent, in case of war, the arousing of the passions of the 
 Central African tribes, already by nature inclined to pillage 
 and plunder, so that the work of incipient civilization and the 
 entire success of the missionaries might not be destroyed at one 
 blow. 
 
 On the German side, immediately following the outbreak of 
 hostilities, the necessary steps were taken to bring about, 
 through the intervention of the United States, the neutralization 
 of that part of the Cameroons belonging to the Congo Basin, 
 covered by the convention, as well as of German East Africa. 
 A similar effort was made also by Belgium, as shown by the 
 Belgian Gray Book; France was at the start inclined to agree 
 to the proposition; later, however, under the influence of Eng- 
 land, who openly declared it necessary to injure Germany 
 
148 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 at all possible points, she rejected the proposal, in union with 
 Great Britain. As the reason for the rejection, it was declared 
 that Germany was the one who had started the opening of 
 hostilities in Africa. 
 
 According to all available reports, however, it stands estab- 
 lished that in East Africa, as well as in the Cameroons, hos- 
 tilities were begun by the Allies. Particularly in the Cameroon 
 portion of the Congo Basin, the German stations at the begin- 
 ning of the crisis were cut off from all news from Europe, 
 and in many cases were surprised by the enemy forces. But 
 even in the event that later searching investigation should prove 
 that in individual cases these conflicts had been precipitated 
 by subordinate German representatives, unfamiliar with the 
 Congo Act, there would still have been time according to the 
 wording of Article 1 1 , had there been the proper desire, to inter- 
 vene and disregard an isolated incident. 
 
 Germany fulfilled her duty by working for the peace of 
 Africa, despite the fact that the only information which reached 
 her was of attacks by English ships in German East Africa. As 
 is shown by the Belgian Gray Book, with almost cynical frank- 
 ness, England and France did not themselves take their officially 
 offered grounds of refusal very seriously. These were nothing 
 more than masks for their true intentions of violence. 
 
 The opening of hostilities on Colonial soil reawakened all 
 those instincts and inclinations which it has been the earnest 
 endeavor during recent years to restrain among the natives by 
 peaceful training, and gradually to eliminate altogether. This 
 cannot fail to undermine seriously faith in Europeans as the 
 representatives and imparters of "civiHzation." All previous 
 achievements in the opening up of Africa and the elevation of 
 its population have been wiped out at one blow. The un- 
 counted millions expended by Christian missionary work in 
 Central Africa have been spent in vain. The action of the 
 English and French toward the German civil population in 
 the protectorates, contrary to international law and all colonial 
 tradition, has thoroughly undermined the position of the white 
 race. 
 
 Upon England and France, then, rests the full responsibility 
 in the judgment of history for the disastrous violation of the 
 Congo Act, which, but a short while ago, would have been 
 considered unthinkable. 
 
 The general administration of the German colonies has fre- 
 quently been characterized by foreign critics as military and 
 bureaucratic. This criticism is unfounded. A military admin- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 149 
 
 istratlon exists nowhere in the German protectorates; civil 
 administration has been introduced everywhere in such a way 
 that the troops are subject to the governor, and the latter again 
 to the Colonial Secretary, as the representative of the Imperial 
 Chancellor in the field of Colonial Administration. This is 
 not universally the case in foreign countries; a great part of 
 the troops in the French colonies, including the Foreign Legion, 
 is directly responsible to the war ministry at Paris, which in 
 West Africa has even introduced universal conscription. One 
 might here more justly speak of militarism than in regard to 
 our system, since under our administration in Togo Land and 
 the South Seas there are no colonial troops at all, and but few 
 in the other colonies. 
 
 The charge of bureaucracy, which has also frequently been 
 made in Germany, has been answered by a report (191 3) 
 regarding the administration of the European colonial states. 
 Extensive investigations have shown that the number of officials 
 in the German colonies was by no means excessive, that they 
 were even fewer than in most of the colonies of other countries. 
 A comparison of the budget appropriations for the officials of 
 tropical colonies demonstrates that the German protectorates in 
 Africa have lower expenses for the administrative staff than most 
 of the neighboring English, French, Belgian and Portuguese col- 
 onies. Equally incorrect is the statement that bureaucracy in 
 the German colonial administration excludes the people from 
 a share in it. In no other colonial state in the world is, for 
 instance, the home administration of the colonies subject to 
 so extensive control through Parliament, as in Germany. But 
 likewise, in the colonies themselves, the people's representatives 
 organized in the governmental council have not less influence 
 than in the tropical colonies of like development of other colonial 
 powers. This is true to an even higher degree of the representa- 
 tive body in our only settlement colony, South West Africa. 
 With the progress of the financial independence of the colonies 
 from the mother country, self-government will increase in scope. 
 This principle has repeatedly been announced by the central ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 Like the general administration, the financial management 
 in the German colonies is thoroughly liberal. The greatest 
 publicity, the most punctilious accounting and the strictest con- 
 trol on the part of the financial authorities of the Empire and 
 of Parliament prevent all exploitation and inhuman tendencies 
 in the financial administration of the colonies. 
 
 There is in our colonies no special taxation of foreigners, 
 
150 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 no deviation from the principle of equality and justice. Only 
 in the case of the missions are certain privileges granted. 
 
 One of the principal sources of Income is from the customs 
 duties, w^hich are laid in the main upon articles of luxury or 
 such other goods that can be dispensed with or that may be 
 replaced — seldom or never on those needed for the increase of 
 production, such as machines, utensils, etc. Owing to the fact 
 that revenue is chiefly based on the customs, it is possible in 
 the German colonies to keep those taxes low by means of which, 
 in other colonies, the raising of the revenue is shifted entirely, 
 or in great part, on to the shoulders of the natives. While, of 
 course, fully realizing the educational value of the tax for the 
 natives, the German government believes that it should be 
 increased gradually, according to the natives' understanding 
 of the nature of taxation and with consideration for their eco- 
 nomic strength. 
 
 The financial administration of the German colonies has also 
 refrained from imposing taxes on articles of consumption, in 
 addition to the import duties, a system which has been developed 
 in the colonies of countries in which discriminations In the im- 
 port tariff in favor of the motherland cause a shortage in the 
 customs revenue. Such consumption taxes have mostly the pur- 
 pose of placing the burdens of the colonial administration upon 
 the natives. 
 
 These principles which, after some years of hesitation and 
 uncertainty, are at present universally applied throughout the 
 German colonies, have had the pleasing result that the native 
 population gradually has developed not only peaceful coopera- 
 tion but absolute confidence in the administration, while the 
 economic situation and state of civilization have advanced every- 
 where in the most favorable manner. The financial sacrifices 
 which were necessary for a considerable time were not made 
 in vain, and the liberal and lenient methods applied in the* 
 financial administration have been so far from preventing a 
 favorable economic development that to-day Togo Land and 
 Samoa are able to meet all their expenses, while the three great 
 African colonies meet all those of the civil administration, only 
 New Guinea receiving a subsidy for general administrative 
 purposes. 
 
 The economic colonial policy of Germany is filled with the 
 same spirit of humanity and inspired with the same liberal 
 ideas that distinguish the other branches of her colonial policy, 
 especially that In regard to social matters, which stand in such 
 close connection with those of an economic nature. Wher- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 151 
 
 ever the contrary is asserted abroad, there is an absence of 
 facts to serve as proof. It is true that occasionally some German 
 writer or politician is cited to testify to the correctness of 
 such false statements. For example, Meynier, the French 
 writer on colonial subjects, refers to a German colonial poli- 
 tician entirely unknown in Germany, *'Carl Otto," who is said 
 to advocate economic exploitation of the colonies, without re- 
 gard for the natives. On the strength of the authority quoted 
 by Meynier, the respected French colonial magazine, La 
 Depeche Coloniale, believes itself justified in writing: "Uon 
 appliqua sans Jiiesure la politique de la colonisation a la maniere 
 forte/' Thus simply by substituting the word 'Ton' for 
 "Otto," the German Government is held up as the representa- 
 tive of principles in its colonial policy which are not only illiberal, 
 but actually detestable. 
 
 Every chapter of this book shows how little the German 
 colonial policy is inclined, in its care for the welfare of the 
 natives, to the principles of colonization a la maniere forte, 
 and how determined it is in its resistance to all contrary de- 
 sires. This policy ''a la maniere forte'' has been entirely absent 
 from Germany's general economic policy of colonial adminis- 
 tration, although in this field opposing desires and interests 
 were not lacking. These measures, based on force, belong 
 to the arsenal of the old Mercantilism, which has recently re- 
 appeared under the name of the New Mercantilism. Their 
 aim is to exploit the colonies exclusively from the standpoint 
 of their financial usefulness to the motherland, with disregard 
 of the welfare of the colonies themselves, and with the greatest 
 possible exclusion of other countries from remunerative under- 
 takings in them. Such a policy tends to the most ruthless ex- 
 ploiting of the natural resources and of the strength of the 
 natives, by means of monopolies, differential tariffs toward 
 foreign countries, and bounties for the motherland. Although 
 these measures are no longer employed in the same brutal 
 manner as in the palmy days of Mercantilism, nevertheless 
 colonization a la maniere forte is being tentatively put forth 
 by this Neo-Mercantilism in the field of international eco- 
 nomics. Germany has not followed this current in her colonial 
 economic policy, although nearly all the colonial Powers mani- 
 fest an inclination to readjust their economic policy from this 
 point of view. Germany has remained consistently faithful in 
 her protectorates to the principles of free trade and the open 
 door, of international competition on an equal footing and of 
 industrial freedom of trade and residence. Likewise, monopo- 
 
152 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 lies and concessions tending to check economic development 
 have been recently refused by the German colonial administra- 
 tion, which, indeed, has sought to set aside those already 
 existing. 
 
 Germany is the only colonial state, except Holland, that 
 has not favored her ow^n trade either in the tarifif lav^s of the 
 motherland or in those of her colonies. France has assimilated 
 Algeria and a portion of her colonies from the point of view of 
 customs. She regards them almost completely as within her tariff 
 boundaries, w^hich fact gives French commerce the advantage over 
 that of other nations trading w^ith these colonies. In regard to 
 her other colonies France has introduced preferential tariffs favor- 
 ing the motherland, and reciprocally the colonies, which amount 
 to as much as 85 per cent of the normal duties. In Tunis, 
 likewise, France has favored her own trade in important lines, 
 such as grain, by admitting them free of duty when carried 
 in French bottoms. Portugal has introduced discriminating 
 customs rates up to 90 per cent of the regular tariff in favor of- 
 her own colonial shipping. Spain has acted similarly. England 
 also enjoys tariff advantages as high as 33 per cent of the normal 
 rate in her self-governing colonies. She has in this manner 
 secured for British industry a market which, without this 
 preference, she would not have been able to maintain to the 
 same degree. Likewise, the United States has to a large extent 
 assimilated its colonies in customs matters. Belgium has, it is 
 true, no preferential tariff, but by means of her extensive system 
 of concessions she has practically precluded the competition of 
 other states and secured a monopoly in the trade w^ith her own 
 colonies. 
 
 Further measures for the benefit of the motherland in its 
 relation to the colonies are shipping subsidies without correspond- 
 ing return, rebates of charges made to national trade (as in 
 the Suez Canal) as well as export duties on goods not intended 
 for the motherland. In the French colonies the export duties 
 are entirely or partially remitted for goods bound for France. 
 In Further India the export trade with France is quite free 
 from duty; in other colonies it is reduced 50 per cent. If the 
 goods are from the plantations of Frenchmen they are wholly 
 or in part relieved of export duty. Cocoa pays in St. Thome an 
 export duty of eighteen reis per kilo when exported in Portu- 
 guese ships, but sixty rets per kilo when shipped in foreign bot- 
 toms and bound for foreign ports. 
 
 German economic policy practices none of these measures 
 in favor of Germany's own colonial trade. The few export 
 
MODERN GERMANY 153 
 
 duties on the products of the German colonies are entirely of 
 a fiscal or protective character, and not for the purpose of 
 discriminating to the advantage of the motherland. This almost 
 unique adoption of the principles of free trade in the German 
 colonies has occasionally resulted in hardships vv^hich have 
 been publicly aired in Germany. It is sufficient to mention 
 the fact that important classes of products from the German 
 colonies do not find a market in Germany, although they are 
 badly needed there and have therefore to be imported from 
 other countries. Thus, in the absence of any preferential regu- 
 lations, the following articles do not go to Germany, but to 
 foreign countries : Diamonds, principally to Antwerp ; South 
 West African copper to the United States and Belgium; East 
 African skins and hemp to North America. While France 
 exports the products of her West African colonies almost en- 
 tirely for use in French factories, most of the cocoa and palm 
 oil from the Cameroons is sold in England. The principal 
 export article of our South Sea colonies, copra, is carried in 
 great part to Marseilles and other non-German ports. We, on 
 the contrary, buy these raw materials in large quantities from 
 other countries, especially from foreign colonies, thereby de- 
 veloping their export trade. The result of this is that our 
 import trade with these colonies stands at a disadvantage com- 
 pared with our export trade, and that we furnish excellent 
 markets for the industries of foreign colonial states. The 
 Manchester Guardian justly remarked in regard to this liberal 
 trade policy of ours: 
 
 "Germany, in mounting degree, receives the products of 
 our English factories indirectly, by our disposing of them in 
 India and other colonies, which obtain the money for them by 
 the export of raw materials to Germany." 
 
 Germany's international economic policy stands consistently 
 on the principle of "Live and Let Live," and everywhere main- 
 tains the open door for foreign commerce and shipping in her 
 spheres of interests and colonies, in the hope that German trade 
 and shipping will be treated in equally liberal manner. There 
 was from the start no room for a narrow-minded colonial policy 
 in connection with such broad and generous principles. There 
 would seem to be more reason to reproach Germany's colonial 
 policy with the opposite fault, when it is borne in mind that 
 only since 1893 have the German colonies enjoyed the right 
 of the most favored nation in the German customs territory; 
 and when the praise is remembered which the French colonial 
 politician, Renty, gives to our colonial trade policy: 
 
154 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 "The German colonies in Africa are surrounded by trade 
 rivals, who will profit by the former's inactivity in order to 
 gain the market for themselves and to develop a predominant 
 influence under the protection of the German flag." 
 
 In one field only has the German colonial trade policy 
 sought to make use of measures of colonization a la maniere 
 forte, not, however, in order to promote German trade and 
 injure that of other countries, but, at the sacrifice of important 
 commercial and financial interests, to advance humanitarian 
 aims and common international interests in the African Con- 
 tinent. The German government is a leader in the movement, 
 by means of international measures, of exclusive and prohibitive 
 duties, to impede and if possible to prevent entirely the im- 
 portation of brandy, as well as of weapons and ammunition 
 into the African Colonies of the European states, according 
 to the declaration of Brussels relative to the Congo Act. It 
 is only owing to the opposition of other European colonial 
 states that this object has not been entirely accomplished. Some 
 of the states would not support the Idea of an international 
 agreement to put an end to the smuggling of weapons and 
 ammunition, so beneficial for their trade, and to the not less 
 lucrative trade in brandy, so deleterious to the natives of Africa. 
 Although exposed to the danger of smuggling from neighbor- 
 ing colonies, the German government took steps against the 
 trade in weapons and brandy in its African colonies by Introduc- 
 ing measures which are more radical than anything that other 
 colonial states were willing to adopt. For instance, the Im- 
 portation of brandy for the use of natives is absolutely forbidden 
 in German East Africa and German Southwest Africa and 
 Samoa. In the Cameroons Its use has been greatly restricted 
 by an especially high duty, prohibition zones and other meas- 
 ures of control; In Togo Land, the Importation of brandy was 
 materially reduced, despite financial loss to this protectorate, 
 whose revenues are small. 
 
 In the same manner as freedom of trade Is absolutely un- 
 restricted in Germany's colonial policy, save as afifected by the 
 above-mentioned humanitarian measures, so is commercial free- 
 dom the rule In connection with a liberal industrial policy. 
 While in the colonies of other countries there is frequently a 
 ruthless effort to prevent Industries and trades from being 
 developed which flourish in the motherland, there are no such 
 measures in the German colonies; even for foreigners there is 
 absolute freedom of trade and residence. In German East 
 Africa several thousand East Indians, who are British sub- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 155 
 
 jects, find themselves freer to practice their trades undisturbed 
 than even in several British colonies, as, for example. South 
 Africa. On the other hand, no industries are artificially en- 
 couraged by means of premiums and other kinds of favors, as 
 in Australia and Canada, w^ith the aim of crushing out inter- 
 national trade. The German colonial trade policy makes use of 
 such measures as little as it does of colonial protective tariffs. 
 
 The attitude of the German government in regard to the 
 investment of foreign capital in the colonies corresponds to this 
 liberal policy in regard to trade and industry. No obstacle 
 is placed in the way of foreign capital. Of course, in cases 
 v^here capital is found to be entering upon a course contrary to 
 the general interest, as was the case with some large chartered 
 companies, the endeavor is made by the same measures as are 
 employed in like case against German capital — viz., by agree- 
 ment or by redemption of their rights — to obviate the evil. As 
 a result of these liberal conditions, the investment of foreign 
 capital in the German colonies has considerably increased. Of 
 the 506,000,000 marks represented by the capital of various 
 companies which is at present invested in German colonies, not 
 less than 89,000,000 belong to foreigners. The German gov- 
 ernment is careful to assure itself that the invested capital and 
 the undertakings founded thereon in the protectorates are as 
 sound as possible. A ''Permanent Trade Commission of the 
 Colonial Administration" acts in an advisory capacity to the 
 colonial authorities in questions which regard capital and its 
 influence. 
 
 Likewise in the field of money, banks, and credit, thoroughly 
 liberal tendencies are the rule. The use of money is introduced 
 everywhere in the protectorates in place of barter, and wages 
 are paid in cash instead of in kind. In agreement with this, 
 we find markets encouraged in the German colonies with the 
 aim of facilitating for the natives advantageous sales of their 
 products. In the field of credit, also, the German colonial ad- 
 ministration has been successful in advancing ideas of social 
 protection for the natives, by prohibiting the giving of credit 
 by merchants for tropical products, the so-called trust system, 
 that is so harmful to the native element. Further steps along 
 this line have been taken by the creation of savings banks through 
 the local authorities and post offices, or in connection with the 
 existing trade banks. 
 
 From all this it is plain that the general economic policy 
 of Germany in her colonies is in no way a colonization a la 
 maniere forte, but that it is rather a colonization decidedly 
 
156 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 a la maniere douce; for it Is free from mercantilism, which 
 is militarism in the field of political economy. Despite the 
 rejection of all severe measures calculated to injure other na- 
 tions for the benefit of German interests, it is able to show such 
 brilliant successes that it finds its justification in itself and sees 
 no cause to depart from its well-tested principles. Especially 
 during the last ten years this policy has produced such rapid 
 economic progress in the German colonies as is seen in but 
 few colonies of other countries. Capital, which was at first 
 shy, has shown an increasing confidence In the economic de- 
 velopment of the German colonies, so that to-day more than half 
 a billion marks is represented by the companies operating there. 
 Twenty years ago less than 62,000,000 marks of private capital 
 were invested in the German colonies. If capital during this 
 period has Increased tenfold, the extent of the foreign trade of 
 the German colonies has grown twice this amount In the same 
 time. These brilliant economic successes have been achieved 
 under a thoroughly liberal colonial trade policy, thanks to the 
 efficiency of the merchants, planters and other entrepreneurs 
 active in the colonies, who are mostly Germans, supported 
 as they are by a liberal and far-sighted administration, with 
 an understanding of economic questions. 
 
 In matters of jurisdiction In the colonies there exists a dif- 
 ference between the whites and the natives, but no one who 
 knows the principles underlying the treatment of the natives 
 will for a moment doubt that this difference owes its origin to 
 fatherly care for the natives, and finds its justification therein, 
 and that this legal differentiation Is not planned to bring about 
 a privileged position for the whites as a master race. In regard 
 to these guiding principles, I expressed myself exhaustively two 
 years ago, before the Reichstag, and I should like to repeat here 
 what I then said: 
 
 "The natives are our proteges, and the German government 
 has, therefore, the duty to regard their lawful interests as its 
 own. For we do not wish to annihilate the natives, we wish to 
 preserve them. This is a duty of common decency which we 
 undertook with the raising of the German flag In our African 
 colonies and In the South Seas. The exercise of this duty is 
 also a matter of wisdom; for by this means alone can we secure 
 the possibility of a reasonable economic policy and thereby the 
 basis for German national activity. 
 
 "I shall not repeat the phrase of the 'master nation' and the 
 'serving race.' I am of the opinion, however, that the white 
 man stands In relation to the natives as the guardian to the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 157 
 
 ward, as the grown person to the child. If, for example, the 
 native is granted unrestricted control of his land, he will dis- 
 pose of it in a short time, waste the money received for it and 
 fall into poverty. If the government, in addition, permits the 
 free use of alcohol, moral deterioration is added to poverty; the 
 natives degenerate and disappear. Of course, to colonize in 
 this fashion is possible, and it is the desire of many so to do. 
 For what else is the aim and the hope of the great horde of 
 colonists who regard natives chiefly as a handicap to the develop- 
 ment of their own interests? To what other goal do all the 
 efforts lead which are sought to be justified by phrases like the 
 'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest'? That 
 colonization simply implies the economic exploitation of the 
 colonies is just as false as that the duty of our home adminis- 
 tration is limited to efforts looking to the improvement of trade, 
 industry and agriculture. Besides the natural wish of the 
 ruling nation to reap advantages from its colonies, we must not 
 forget that the colonies are the home of people to whom we 
 have promised our protection, for whom we must take thought. 
 Other duties are born of this one, equally great for the colo- 
 nizer. The peoples with whom our colonization activity brings 
 us in touch stand upon a lower level of civilization, occupy a 
 much inferior standpoint than we civilized whites — in some cases 
 they are very far beneath us. Not alone the legal obligation 
 which belongs to us as protectors, but our position as a civilized 
 state forces us, with the obvious arguments of a civilized cosmic 
 conception, to aid these peoples, and to try to provide better 
 living conditions for them than they, with their limited intel- 
 ligence and capacity, have been able to provide for themselves. 
 
 ''To colonize is to 'missionize' — to missionize in the noble 
 sense of educating to Kultur. In the same manner as the cor- 
 rect appreciation of the spiritual essence of his own nation is 
 one of the most important duties of a statesman, likewise the 
 colonizer must unceasingly strive to study and to fathom the 
 thoughts and feelings of the natives, and must regulate his 
 methods accordingly. His tasks are many and multifarious. 
 The natives are ignorant — they must be instructed. They are 
 lazy — they must learn to work. They are afflicted with all kinds 
 of diseases — they must be cured. They are savage, cruel and 
 superstitious — they must be tamed and enlightened. All in all, 
 they are big children who need training and guiding. 
 
 "These principles have nothing in common with the stand- 
 point of a master class which is so violently attacked by the 
 Social Democrats. Nor can they be characterized as a weak 
 
158 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 policy of cuddling the natives. These principles are pre- 
 eminently practicable; by means of them alone can one solve 
 the chief problem of every colonial system, the problem of 
 rendering native labor useful, and of releasing the energy stored 
 up as rudis indigestaque moles in the lower peoples for the aims 
 and broad field of activity of our higher intelligence. 
 
 "I come now to a difficult point, and I beg you not to mis- 
 understand me — I believe, indeed, that I cannot be misunder- 
 stood in this connection. How are the natives to be educated 
 to this work of civilization — are they to be persuaded to work 
 (I do not use the word 'forced' in order to avoid misunderstand- 
 ing), or what means are to be employed? That depends upon 
 the character of the different peoples, on their moral level, and 
 the degree of their education. This problem must be solved 
 differently in every protectorate. It cannot be accomplished 
 from this end by means of general principles. Each governor 
 must study the question in his territory and act accordingly. 
 But for the planter, as well as for the merchant, there is in 
 the colonies but one single policy — that of the preservation of 
 the natives, the utilization of their work for the planters, a 
 multiplication of their needs and therewith the increasing of 
 their purchasing power to the advantage of our trade. 
 
 "The division of work between the natives and the whites 
 must be such that the native places the work of his hands at 
 the service of the white man's intelligence. The policy of feed- 
 ing on the lower races, of extermination and destruction, is 
 antiquated and immoral, likewise unwise — one does not kill the 
 hen that lays the eggs. Treat the native with justice. This 
 may not preclude severity and harshness where they are neces- 
 sary. But grant him conditions of life consonant with his 
 wishes, and raise him gradually. For periods of fifty and one 
 hundred years make but slight difference in the development 
 of peoples. In this manner the economic development of the 
 colonies will vigorously progress — by means of the natives and 
 with them, not despite the natives and against them." 
 
 These principles governing the policy to be followed with 
 the natives are not newly announced and introduced by me, 
 but since the beginning of our colonial activity they have been 
 practiced with absolute conviction by every one of my prede- 
 cessors in office. In the interest of the natives, as the postulate of 
 harmonizing in an equitable manner the traditions of the primi- 
 tive peoples, the protection of whom we have undertaken, with 
 the conceptions of Germans as representatives of European cul- 
 ture and civilization, the creation of a separate legal position 
 
MODERN GERMANY 159 
 
 for the natives was a prerequisite. While, in the main, for the 
 whites the law of the motherland holds, the tribal customs of 
 the natives were on principle not disturbed, in so far as this did 
 not offend against the most elemental rules of common sense 
 and morality. This consideration was our duty as human be- 
 ings. The colonies are the home of the natives. The white 
 man is more or less a guest. There are millions of negroes to 
 a few whites. The natives have a right to see their view of 
 life and law respected. German law can demand from them 
 only secondary recognition. Where tribal customs offer no 
 solution, German legal principles may be applied. And this 
 actually occurs, only on the basis of custom, it is true, not by 
 force of express legislation. The introduction of German law 
 as a whole had to be withheld for reasons of legislative policy. 
 Germany herself had had occasion to learn, when in the sixteenth 
 century the foreign Roman law was forced upon her, that how- 
 ever excellent a law system may be, it is not calculated to satisfy a 
 nation and awaken confidence if it has not grown out of the life 
 of the people itself. A system of law so developed in all lines as 
 the German can be grasped and made use of only by a correspond- 
 ingly developed intellect. The native of the German colonies is 
 absolutely without this mental maturity. He would be incapable 
 of making beneficial use of the rights which the German law 
 would give him, and he would be unable to fulfill the duties 
 which it would place upon him. It is only necessary to think 
 of the oath upon which German procedure is based. The 
 native has not yet learned to make clear, trustworthy observa- 
 tions and to repeat them simply and unadorned before the court. 
 His unbridled imagination causes him to see visions which have 
 little to do with reality. The taking of an oath would place 
 him in danger of legal prosecution. Were we, however, to 
 release him from responsibility, on the ground that he lacked 
 mental training and the required perception, the oath would 
 sink to a mere empty formula and lose all its value as a proof 
 — the very purpose for which it is taken. It would then be bet- 
 ter to suppress the taking of all oaths. 
 
 The retention of the tribal laws can be nothing more than a 
 transition in a progressive development. The association with 
 the whites constantly creates new complications which require 
 legal settlement. As a matter of fact, numerous breaches have 
 already been made in the tribal system, and it is the undeviating 
 aim of the government to maintain the natives' law on a level 
 with improving economic and cultural conditions. 
 
 All members of tribes indigenous to the protectorate, as well 
 
i6o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 as hybrid tribes, come under the head of "natives." In addi- 
 tion, members of outside negro tribes are reckoned in this cate- 
 gory. Those belonging to other races than the white who pos- 
 sess German citizenship, or who, as citizens of other civilized 
 states, stand on a footing of equality with our own, either accord- 
 ing to treaty right or by custom, are subject to the laws of the 
 whites. 
 
 The German Empire represents the protective power in the 
 colonies, which is nothing less than full sovereign power. It is 
 exercised by the German Emperor in the name of the Reichstag. 
 By virtue of sovereignty, the Empire and the Emperor possess 
 legislative power, which the Empire exercises in the form of 
 laws and the Emperor in the form of ordinances. To a limited 
 degree, the right of issuing ordinances is vested also in the 
 Imperial Chancellor and the governors. The Empire makes 
 law primarily for the whites; the regulating of the native law 
 lies within the provinces of the Emperor, the Imperial Chan- 
 cellor and the governors. A greater mobility is called for in 
 this latter field than is possible with the legal machinery of the 
 Empire. Since the Empire regulates the budget of the protec- 
 torates, it possesses a far-reaching influence on the administra- 
 tion, together with the possibility of supervision of legislative 
 measures, most of which are issued in the form of laws. 
 
 For the whites and that part of the native population on a 
 like footing, the German civil, criminal and bankruptcy laws, 
 as well as the German rules of procedure, are in general in 
 efFect, by virtue of the law concerning the protectorates. This 
 is true, likewise, of the regulations touching matters of volun- 
 tary jurisdiction. Provisions of Prussian law have supple- 
 mentary force. It was necessary for the courts to be organized 
 on a basis of simplicity corresponding to the existing primitive 
 conditions. Only two grades of courts were created: district 
 and upper courts. The district judge has individual jurisdiction 
 in questions which in Germany are under the jurisdiction of 
 the judges of local courts. In other matters the district court 
 sits with three members in some cases, with five in others, on the 
 bench. The larger number acts in cases of crime or serious 
 misdemeanor. The upper court consists of the chief justice and 
 four assessors or associates. The district judges and the chief 
 justice must be qualified to hold the office of a judge in one of 
 the federal states, and they are authorized to exercise their 
 judicial functions by the Imperial Chancellor. In the exercise 
 of these functions they are independent and subject only to the 
 law. The assessors are chosen from the ranks of those subject 
 
MODERN GERMANY i6i 
 
 to the jurisdiction of the court {Gerichtseingesessenen) . The 
 right of appeal {Revision) is still lacking. Its introduction is 
 contemplated through the establishment of an Imperial colonial 
 court. The state's attorney takes part in criminal cases only 
 at the main proceeding in the first instance, in connection with 
 the prayer for legal remedy, and in cases before the higher court. 
 Lawyers and notaries have a similar position as in Germany. 
 
 The law for the natives, as already explained, is based on 
 the tribal law. The resulting difference in comparison with 
 the law governing the whites is limited to the question of ma- 
 terial rights and the manner of procedure in the presentation 
 of claims; it does not extend to the personal standing before the 
 law. The native has different, but not inferior rights. Life, 
 health, freedom and property are secured to him to the same 
 extent as to the white man. To him also the government lends 
 its strength in obtaining his rights. There are, it is true, in 
 East Africa, Togo Land and the Cameroons remnants of so- 
 called house-slavery. But this is without influence on the 
 personal legal standing of those subject to it. The house-slave 
 is considered by the judge as legally competent, and enjoys full 
 legal protection. The government has taken steps to prevent 
 such conditions arising in future and an early termination of 
 those still existing is aimed at. 
 
 For the protection of the natives againt the exploitation of 
 their inexperience, detailed regulations have been issued in regard 
 to the making and to the nature of credit and surety under- 
 takings and of contracts for work. Credit and surety under- 
 takings must have in some cases official approval, while in others 
 reduction to writing suffices. Especial attention has been given 
 to labor contracts. It was important, among other things, to 
 prevent conditions similar to slavery from arising, as well as to 
 obviate alienation of the worker from his home connections. 
 Labor contracts may not exceed a certain length of time. The 
 hours of daily work are fixed. The rate of wages is regulated. 
 Wages must be paid in cash and may not be curtailed. In addi- 
 tion, the employer has numerous duties regarding the social 
 welfare of the workers. He must provide healthy living quar- 
 ters, proper care, sufficient food, nursing in the event of sick- 
 ness, medicine, bandages and, if necessary, medical attendance. 
 In the case of a sufficient number of workers, specially ar- 
 ranged sick-quarters and a complete apothecary shop must be 
 kept ready. Disregard of these duties entitles the worker to 
 break the contract without losing his right to wages, or the con- 
 tract violated by the employer may be voided by the authorities. 
 
i62 MODERN GERM.\NY 
 
 In connection with the regulation and de^•elopment of real 
 estate rights, it was the constant aim of the eovernment to main- 
 tain the natives in possession of land sufficient for them and 
 their descendants to be permanently protected against eco- 
 nomic ruin. They were either confirmed in their original hold- 
 ings or received as much land as tliey needed for their liveli- 
 hood. Disposing of this property to whites, as well as its en- 
 cumbrance, has been either absolutely forbidden or made con- 
 tingent on the approval of the governor. It was intended that 
 the natives be protected against exploitation by foreign greed. 
 These protective provisions are still in force, despite the fact 
 that, owing to continued development, nati\"e real estate law 
 has appreciably approximated to that of the whites. 
 
 The real estate book {Grujidhuch) forms the nucleus of 
 German real estate law. In it the holdings of land are fixed 
 officially as to size and location, as well as the conditions of 
 ownership and encumbrances. In the real estate book, which 
 may be inspected by any one, reliable information is given in 
 regard to the actual and legal conditions of any piece of ground, 
 and the necessary data are offered for the conclusion of a real 
 estate transaction. Especially does it promote the extremely 
 important branch of credit on real estate, by giving trust^vorthy 
 information on the points important for this purpose. This 
 institution has been introduced into the colonies and arrange- 
 ments have been made for the natives to avail themselves of it, in 
 so far as it does not threaten them with disadvantages. Land 
 entered in the real estate book may be acquired by the natives 
 without limit. The governor, however, decides as to the entering 
 of their holdings in the book, in the interest of the natives them- 
 selves; for the legal and economic conditions resulting from this 
 entering presuppose, for their profitable use, a higher degree of 
 understanding than the native on the average possesses. 
 
 Family and inheritance laws of the natives have been least 
 influenced by Gexman legal ideas. Marriage and its legal re- 
 sults are so deeply rooted in the spiritual life of a people, how- 
 ever low it may stand in the scale, that it is impossible to at- 
 tempt to adapt them to our higher conceptions until the neces- 
 san* moral basis has been created. The spread of Christian 
 principles through instruction and exemplary conduct prepares 
 the way for leading the natives to the propex goal. The gov- 
 ernment is constantly endeavoring to bring about by all mild 
 means a moral elevation of the people's character, in order to 
 give to the wife and mother her proper position in the family. 
 
 The material law of inheritance of the natives has hitherto 
 
MODERN GERMANY 163 
 
 proved unamenable to legal regulation, in the same way as 
 has the law of the family. In German East Africa, how- 
 ever, where Indians and Arabians live in conditions of com- 
 fort, a beginning has been made toward official regulation of 
 estates. The heirs, in the case of an inheritance, may entrust Its 
 administration and distribution to the local authorities. Similar 
 possibilities have been created among the inhabitants of Samoa, 
 among whom, as a result of deaths, disputes as to title and 
 land play an important part. 
 
 A radical change has taken place under German rule in the 
 field of criminal law. The decisions of responsible authorities 
 resting upon established principles of penal law took the place 
 of the frequently arbitrary caprice of tyrannical chieftains. 
 Such principles were seldom found in the native laws, which 
 showed scarcely the first beginnings of an enlightened system of 
 penal laws. They could be abstracted only from the German 
 statutes. German penal law thus furnished the provisions ac- 
 cording to which the natives are made responsible for criminal 
 offenses. There could, however, be no thought of proceeding 
 sweepingly by introducing the German criminal code as a whole. 
 With its sharply defined legal conceptions and definitions of 
 criminal acts, it would have remained incomprehensible to the 
 natives. On the other hand, it was necessary to leave a certain 
 amount of freedom to the judge, in order that he might give 
 to the customs and conceptions of the natives the proper influence 
 in weighing the question of guilt. Thus far no exhaustive enu- 
 meration of punishable acts has been made In any of our protec- 
 torates. It Is, however, a matter of course that punishment 
 is dealt out for such crimes as result from superstition or from, 
 the cultural conceptions of the natives, as, for example, the giving 
 of poison, blood-revenge, etc. 
 
 The considerations which operate against an enumeration of 
 punishable acts are not operative as regards the fixing of the 
 different kinds of punishment. There are, therefore, general 
 rules respecting them. Admissible punishments in the African 
 colonies are castigation, fines, imprisonment with enforced labor, 
 imprisonment in chains and the death penalty. In the South 
 Seas castigation and imprisonment in chains are not permissible, 
 but in their place enforced labor without Imprisonment has been 
 substituted. Where castigation is permitted, it was already cus- 
 tomary before the establishment of German rule. It Is still 
 Indispensable as an educational measure, since the natives them- 
 selves consider It necessary for their own protection and demand 
 its application. It cannot be applied In the case of women or 
 
i64 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 elder persons; natives of higher education or of a better social 
 position are, on principle, to be exempted from its operation. 
 The right of castigation may be exercised only upon approval 
 by the governor. The punishment is applied under the super- 
 vision of a physician. The death penalty rests on the ultimate 
 decision of the governor. 
 
 Jurisdiction over the natives rests, on principle, in the hand 
 of the local administration, as represented by the Bezirksamt- 
 mann (sub-governor) and the heads of the stations. The 
 reasons urged against the separation of the judicial and ad- 
 ministrative functions are convincing. The administrative of- 
 ficial is in uninterrupted touch w^ith the natives; he is in the 
 best position to discover their ideas of right and he enjoys 
 their confidence. His dignity w^ould suffer if he did not have 
 the power to punish and to decide disputes. Natives are ad- 
 mitted to the proceedings as far as possible as advisors and 
 experts. In this manner they help to spread a knowledge of the 
 law and themselves become familiar with the legal conceptions 
 of the whites. This tends to strengthen confidence in the legal 
 verdicts. Native customs serve as a model for the conduct of 
 the proceeding; the hearing is oral and public. The natives 
 are not sworn, but a deliberately false statement is punishable. 
 Measures for securing a confession which are not permissible 
 according to native custom may not be employed. 
 
 While in German East Africa and South West Africa the 
 law is administered only by whites, in the Cameroons, Togo 
 Land and in the South Seas, part of the jurisdiction has been 
 left in the hands of the natives or entrusted to them. The gov- 
 ernment, however, has retained control and the right of re- 
 vising the decision. In the Cameroons for certain native tribes 
 and territories, local chiefs are active as single judges, and 
 native courts of arbitration serve as collegiate courts. Their 
 jurisdiction is limited according to the amount at issue and the 
 seriousness of the ofiFense. They have no jurisdiction in cases 
 of murder and manslaughter. The courts of arbitration serve 
 furthermore as courts of appeal in cases heard before the na- 
 tive chiefs. All cases can in the last instance be submitted to 
 the governor for decision. Furthermore, provision has been 
 made for a revision in cases where large sums of money are in 
 dispute or severe punishment is involved. The decision in these 
 circumstances rests with the governor or the chief justice. 
 Execution is limited to such property which the debtor can dis- 
 pense with without endangering his economic position. Tribal 
 possessions may be taken in no case. The proceedings take 
 
MODERN GERMANY 165 
 
 place without the presence of a state's attorney. Criminal 
 prosecution is left to the decision of the court. There is thus 
 no legal obligation in the matter. The accused is at liberty at 
 any stage of the proceeding to secure counsel. 
 
 From the history of the development of our military strength 
 in the protectorates, it is clear that the acquisition of colonies 
 by Germany was carried on by peaceful means and that her en- 
 trance into the ranks of colonial Powers was not prompted by 
 conquistador instincts. When Germany entered upon the acqui- 
 sition of colonial possessions, those in authority conceived of 
 their development as purely mercantile and under mercantile 
 forms, as great trade and plantation undertakings. It was not 
 considered advisable or w^ise to employ military force for these 
 chartered companies. The Empire provided protection for them 
 as regards the outside world; internal safety was left to their 
 own police-soldier forces. 
 
 This system did not prove adequate. The companies, in 
 their attempts peacefully to open up the country, encountered 
 the opposition of native potentates, or came into conflict, as in 
 the Central African districts, with tribes that had long car- 
 ried on trade there and whose ruthless exploitation and slave- 
 trade could not be quietly endured. 
 
 The companies were likewise powerless, through lack of the 
 necessary force, to put a stop to the incessant fighting of the 
 native tribes among themselves. The possibility of their exer- 
 cising influence toward a healthy development of their spheres of 
 interest continued to decrease. The various concerns soon found 
 themselves at the end of their financial resources. The Empire 
 stepped in, and by means of the power at its disposal succeeded 
 in establishing an orderly state of affairs. 
 
 The experience was thus again repeated, which has been 
 that of all colonizing Powers, that the opening up and develop- 
 ing of territories occupied by peoples of inferior civilization is 
 impossible without the protection of military force. 
 
 As a result of this observation, police and defence troops 
 were established in the possessions of the companies, which 
 were taken over as protectorates by the Imperial Government. 
 The express purpose of these troops was, as stated in the be- 
 ginning, the maintenance of peace and order in the protectorates 
 and the suppression of the slave-trade. Nei<-her at the beginning 
 nor in the course of later development was there any thought, 
 in connection with the organization of a military force in our 
 colonies, of guarding the territories under our protection against 
 states belonging to the civilized community of international 
 
i66 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 law. While in Southwest Africa, our sole colony suitable for 
 settlement purposes, the defence troops are made up of white 
 officers, petty officers and men taken from the home army as 
 volunteers, in the tropical colonies only the first two classes are 
 white, the rank and file being negroes serving for pay. 
 
 The strength of the various defence troops was regulated ac- 
 cording to the power of the natives in the colonies in question. 
 From small beginnings their numbers increased automatically 
 with the progressive opening up of the colonies; nevertheless, 
 they remained within moderate limits, save for temporarily 
 necessary increases. In recent years there has been rather a 
 reduction than an increase of these troops in the various 
 colonies. 
 
 The fighting unit generally is a company. Divided into such 
 units, and widely scattered, the defence troops are distributed 
 over the colony. That which the individual troop lacks in 
 numerical strength must be made up for by its intrinsic worth, 
 which is the result of adequate training and instruction. The 
 soldiers who have come from the home army furnish the quali- 
 ties necessary for this purpose, but the European instructors 
 have also succeeded, by tact and discretion, in raising the negro 
 troops to the highest possible standard of discipline and military 
 efficiency. It is a proof of the sound condition of the whole 
 organization that up to this time none of the negro troops have 
 failed in any case. Their reliability stood the test in brilliant 
 fashion in recent occurrences. 
 
 Not alone, however, in the purely military field, but espe- 
 cially in the non-military field have the defence troops accom- 
 plished great things. From the beginning of our colonial ad- 
 ministration up to the most recent time, officers and petty- 
 officers of these troops have worked hand in hand with the civil 
 authorities in the peaceful labor of general administration. The 
 results achieved in this connection furnished the basis on which 
 the civil administration could proceed with its extensive measures 
 as soon as a district was pacified. 
 
 In the work of establishing stations and district offices the 
 troops were of the greatest assistance. Officers, petty-officers 
 and men have never failed, by strenuous work together with tire- 
 less interest and practical common sense, to accomplish their 
 prescribed work, despite a frequent lack of training in the 
 technique of civil administration. The individual tasks were 
 by no means slight and required political skill and a grasp of 
 the affairs of the natives. Supported in general by only a 
 slight military force, these men, transplanted into absolutely 
 
MODERN GERMANY 167 
 
 unfamiliar territory, had, first of all, to gain a firm footing in 
 order, by gradually extending their influence into broader spheres, 
 to accustom the inhabitants to their new masters and to the 
 new order of affairs. 
 
 Closely connected with the general activity of the adminis- 
 tration are the technical and cultural tasks performed by the 
 troops in the various districts. Most of the stations are entirely 
 the work of the troops, who succeeded in creating not alone 
 practical, but likewise architecturally pleasing buildings for the 
 administration, surrounded by hospitals, w^lls, storehouses, mar- 
 kets and slaughter houses, and where the means were available, 
 tasteful gardens and all kinds of useful institutions serving 
 cultural aims. 
 
 Special attention was paid to the development of roads. Most 
 of them were laid out by the troops and provided with bridges, 
 dams, tunnels, culverts, etc. Worthy of mention are also the 
 attempts made in raising domestic animals. The efforts met with 
 excellent success, for example In Southwest Africa in the line 
 of horse-breeding. The achievements of the troops in the field 
 of administration and the cultural improvement of the colonies 
 deserve all the more acknowledgment because in most cases the 
 means for these purposes were very limited. 
 
 In addition to the manifold claims upon them in military 
 and administrative fields, a large number of officers of the troop 
 and of the medical staff find time for scientific activity and have 
 published in pamphlets and current scientific works the knowl- 
 edge of land and people which they have gained in the colonial 
 service. Others, through extensive work In the field of cartog- 
 raphy, have gathered extensive material important for the open- 
 ing up of the colonies. Special attention must be called to the 
 service which the officers of the medical staff of the troops have 
 rendered, not alone in the exercise of their medical profession 
 with the troops, but also In scientific study of tropical sickness 
 and animal epidemics, as well as in the line of tropical hygiene. 
 
 We thus see that in all branches of colonizing work the 
 troops have developed a multifarious and strenuous activity. 
 Though with the continuing development of the colonies they 
 will have to place In other hands one or the other of the 
 branches of their successful activity in the field of general ad- 
 ministration to which they have become devoted — thus finally 
 limiting themselves entirely to their military duties — neverthe- 
 less the satisfaction and the credit belong to the troops for 
 having laid the foundation for the political, cultural and eco- 
 nomic development of the colonies. 
 
i68 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Now that the war has extended even to the colonies, the 
 defence troops find themselves face to face with tasks which 
 they were never intended to perform. Their use for purposes 
 of defence against an enemy from abroad had not been con- 
 templated. Such a contingency seemed excluded, since, as al- 
 ready mentioned, the protectorates had been neutralized by the 
 Congo Act in case of war-like developments among the signatory 
 Powers in Europe. 
 
 It remained for the enemies of Germany to break that agree- 
 ment and to carry the war into the colonies. But despite the 
 employment of numerically much superior forces, they have 
 not yet been successful in obtaining any decisive success. The 
 defence-troops have proved w^orthy of their traditions also in 
 meeting this absolutely new task.^ 
 
 1 This chapter was written in the early part of the year I9IS.^Translator's 
 
 NOTS. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM 
 
 COMPARED WITH THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND 
 
 RUSSIAN SYSTEMS 
 
 PROFESSOR HANS DELBRUCK, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 BERLIN 
 
 THE Prussian army, which forms the backbone of the 
 Imperial German army, goes back to the reconstruction 
 of the old Prussian army, which, shattered by Napoleon in 
 1806, had gone to pieces. In order to free Prussia from the 
 French yoke, General Scharnhorst conceived the idea of sum- 
 moning to arms the entire population capable of bearing them. 
 In 1 81 3, this plan was put into operation. Only through this 
 tremendous effort of Prussia, in conjunction with all the other 
 Powers, was it possible to put an end to the menace of Napoleon's 
 universal dominion. Napoleon's power was already so great 
 that his mediate and immediate subjects amounted to seventy 
 million; his opponents, taken all together, were scarcely more 
 numerous. No one of them, therefore, could be spared for 
 victory, neither England, nor Prussia, nor Austria; and Prussia, 
 which did not yet number five millions, was forced to intro- 
 duce universal military duty and carry it to complete adoption. 
 This universal duty of bearing arms proved such a brilliant 
 success in the Wars of Liberation that it was retained in times 
 of peace, although it was not alone a heavy burden for the 
 Prussian people but was fraught with difficulties in execution. 
 
 The standing army still showed great resemblance to the 
 armies of the eighteenth century, as the English army still does 
 to-day. A large proportion of the soldiers served twenty years, 
 and even longer. As a result, there was in this army but little 
 room for the recruits who were called by universal conscription, 
 especially as these w^re to be retained with the colors for a 
 period of three years. The great mass of the recruits, very 
 superficially trained or not at all, were incorporated into the 
 Landwehr. This Prussian Landwehr thus bore a great sim- 
 ilarity to the British militia, and its military usefulness was 
 slight. Only gradually, in the course of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, was this evil overcome. On the one hand, the class of 
 soldiers serving for a long number of years dwindled, as the 
 
 169 
 
170 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 favorable development of economic life and Industry brought 
 about better wages than the slender pay in the army. To-day 
 it is considered sufficient to retain merely that number of soldiers 
 after a long period of service adequate to satisfy the need for non- 
 commissioned officers. On the other hand, after long hesita- 
 tion, the time of service w^as reduced from three years to two 
 years — with the exception of the cavalry and the mounted field 
 artillery. This reduction, in 1893, aroused great apprehension 
 in officers' circles and among many patriots. It was thought 
 that the military spirit would suffer, and that the army would 
 really be no army at all, but merely a Volkswehr, or militia, 
 since only the first-year class would be under arms at the 
 moment when the elder class was released and the new re- 
 cruits were not yet trained. But subsequent success proved 
 that the fears were groundless. Through continued and great 
 efforts, and through the most careful use of the time, the two- 
 year period of service has been made to furnish excellent mili- 
 tary material. 
 
 The organization is now very simple. The duty of military 
 service extends from the twentieth to the forty-fifth year. The 
 two youngest classes form the standing army. The next 
 classes are made use of in the event of war, approximately to 
 double the strength of the regiments, to form reserve regiments, 
 and to create Ersatz or compensating battalions with Ersatz 
 reserves. Landwehr regiments are formed from the elder Land- 
 wehr soldiers, and finally from the last classes up to the forty- 
 fifth year are formed the Landsturm, or last reserve regiments, 
 who are used principally for barracks service and as guards for 
 prisoners, but who In this war have frequently fought at the 
 front. Recourse is had only in the last event to the youngest 
 class from the seventeenth to the twentieth year. 
 
 When Minister of War Boyen, the disciple and follower of 
 Scharnhorst, organized the new army of peace in the autumn 
 of 1 8 14, he established the principle that the standing army 
 should contain about ten thousand men for every million of 
 the population. This represented at that time, as Prussia num- 
 bered ten million in population, something over icx),ooo men, 
 or I per cent of the total number. This percentage has varied 
 but little during the last century. When no fresh contingents 
 were formed for some time It would occasionally sink slightly 
 below that level; and when for the purpose of absorbing the 
 excess of young men, new regiments were authorized, usually 
 as the result of parliamentary struggles, the ratio would increase 
 by a fraction over i per cent. In the summer of the year 
 
MODERN GERMANY 171 
 
 1914 it stood at I.I 17 per cent for the army, and 1.27 per 
 cent for the army and navy together, not counting the officers. 
 The natural aim, however, of such a policy — to have all service- 
 able young men pass through the training school of the army — 
 has never been realized, not even at the outbreak of the present 
 vv^ar. Although in the year 19 13 the standing army was in- 
 creased by 63,000 recruits, there still remained 30,000 thor- 
 oughly serviceable young men, and not less than approximately 
 200,000 with slight physical disabilities {Ersatz reserve and 
 Landsturm with weapons), who might have been called to the 
 colors and who are now, with the progress of the war, gradually 
 being drafted into the army. The reforms undertaken in the 
 army during the last century had, on the whole, for their pur- 
 pose not so much to increase the numbers in the army in propor- 
 tion to the population as through reduction of the term of 
 service to reduce the individual burden connected with this 
 militaristic system, and to make room for the training of a 
 greater fraction of the nation. But we have never carried the 
 universal duty of military service to its final conclusion. 
 
 Of the greatest importance, from the political as well as the 
 military standpoint, is the institution of the One-Year Volun- 
 teers {Einjdhrig-Freiwillige). The name "volunteer" is no 
 longer applicable. It originated at the time when the army 
 was not yet large enough to accommodate all eligible men, and 
 when lots were drawn among the superfluous. In order to 
 enjoy the privilege of one-year service, a recruit had to relinquish 
 the right of drawing lots, and to this extent the service was vol- 
 untary. To be eligible to serve as a one-year volunteer a young 
 man has to provide his outfit, and receiving no pay, to support 
 himself. Likewise, proof must be given of a superior education, 
 by means of school testimonials or on the basis of a rather severe 
 examination. The one-year voluntary service, then, is in no sense 
 a privilege of wealth, but rather a privilege of education, for, 
 whereas the examination may never be remitted, assistance is 
 given to young men of superior education who lack the means 
 for supporting themselves throughout the entire year. 
 
 The one-year service, which was introduced by Minister of 
 War von Boyen in 1814, together with the duty of general 
 military service, has two striking advantages. In the first place, 
 military service for only one year interrupts but slightly the 
 general training of our young men. On the contrary, it is 
 regarded by many as a great advantage that young men, whether 
 merchants, students or farmers, interrupt once in their life their 
 civil employment and become familiar with an entirely new 
 
172 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 world. In the second place, these one-year volunteers provide 
 the indispensable material for replenishing the body of officers. 
 After one year of service has rendered a sifting possible, the 
 superiors select those suitable for the position of officers, who 
 are then called to the colors twice for a period of eight weeks, 
 thoroughly trained, and commissioned as officers. In the event 
 of mobilization, these reserve and Landwehr officers are inter- 
 mingled with the regular officers in such a manner that a great 
 number of reserve officers are drawn into the line regiments, 
 while regular officers are assigned to the reserve and Landwehr 
 regiments, especially in positions of command. Acquaintance 
 with German officers' corps in time of war shows that a large 
 proportion of them are judges, state's attorneys, teachers, pro- 
 fessors, artists, writers, farmers, merchants, engineers and officials 
 of all kinds. 
 
 The French army is different from the German in three 
 important points. In order to maintain a strength approxi- 
 mately equal to that of Germany, in view of the difference in 
 population (thirty-nine and one-half million as against sixty- 
 eight million), the levy is much stricter than with us. In 
 France the duty of universal military service is not merely a 
 theory, but a reality. The army, therefore, does not, as in 
 Germany, form i per cent but i^ per cent of the population. 
 Further, the system of one-year voluntary service is lacking. 
 An attempt was made in 1872, it is true, to introduce it, but as 
 time passed it became more and more apparent that the French 
 administration was too unreliable in its application. The one- 
 year service became the privilege of wealth and Influence. All 
 of the representatives in parliament were active in procuring 
 this advantage for the sons of their constituents, and the ex- 
 amination became a mere farce. Accordingly, in 1906 the 
 system was abandoned. This was bearable as long as the time 
 of active service In the French army was only two years, as In 
 the German. But with the return to a period of three years 
 (August 13, 1913), a condition was created that In the long 
 run could result In nothing less than the choking of higher 
 education in France. From a military point of view, the gain 
 was a corps of reserve officers of admirable qualifications. But 
 it Is self-evident that a student or an engineer who is forced 
 to Interrupt his course for a period of three years, and not for 
 two as In Germany, and to immerse himself In a military exist- 
 ence, Is able to resume his former studies only In exceptional 
 cases. In respect to the French military organization, it may 
 be truthfully said that militarism has become a power Inimical 
 
MODERN GERMANY 173 
 
 to civilization. Finally, the French army is distinguished from 
 the German through the make-up of the corps of officers. In 
 Germany, officers are chosen exclusively from among young men 
 of higher education and members of educated families. Only in 
 time of war are non-commissioned officers who have distinguished 
 themselves by unusual bravery promoted to the rank of commis- 
 sioned officers. In France, non-commissioned officers may rise 
 to the rank of captain. This is not the place to discuss the 
 relative advantages of the tw^o systems. Politically, the obser- 
 vation may be permitted that these old captains were the chief 
 supporters of ''Bonapartism," of the rule of the sword, under 
 Napoleon I as well as under Napoleon III. 
 
 The Russian army resembles superficially the French most 
 closely. It also is based on the universal duty of bearing arms 
 and on the three-year service — indeed, for a large proportion 
 of the army, as the cavalry, mounted artillery, engineer troops 
 and the five army corps in Asia, this extends to four years. In 
 191 3 this period of service was increased by a further half-year, 
 through the provision that the eldest class of soldiers may not 
 be released until the recruits have completed their training. 
 It may be said, then, that there is in the Russian army an 
 average period of service of four years. This is without refer- 
 ence to the Cossacks, who are a permanent and but poorly dis- 
 ciplined body. But even greater is the distinction which re- 
 sults from the difference in wealth and education of the French 
 and Russian peoples. While in France all young men who are 
 at all serviceable actually serve, in Russia, despite the immense 
 size of the army, many of them remain exempt, so that universal 
 service exists in theory but not in practice. Russia possesses 
 neither the wealth nor the human material for a corresponding 
 body of officers. The great mass of the Russians — approximately 
 eighty per cent — are peasants, who in almost all cases can 
 neither read nor write. The broad middle class, which in France 
 as in Germany furnishes the corps of reserve officers, exists in 
 Russia in but slight degree. Indeed, there is even such a lack 
 of individuals fit to become non-commissioned officers that the 
 companies have only half as many as in Germany. Russia is 
 thus not in a position to form the reserve and Landwehr bodies 
 which serve to increase the French and German armies to 
 such a great extent in case of mobilization. Reserve divisions 
 are formed, it is true, but in the main the veteran reservists are 
 used simply to fill out and replace the cadres of the standing 
 army. On the other hand, the mass of the Russian people is 
 so great that the Russian army on a peace footing is larger than 
 
174 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the German, Austrian and Italian armies reckoned together. 
 In 191 1, on a peace footing, Germany had 615,000 men under 
 arms, Austria-Hungary 395,00O, Italy 243,500, or a total of 
 1,253,500, while Russia had 1,380,000. 
 
 In foreign countries the effort has been made to spread the 
 view that the mad race in the increase of the armaments of 
 European countries was caused by the constant growth of the 
 German army. This is true only to the extent that, following 
 our victories in 1866 and 1870, all the other states increased 
 their armaments. But how slight the growth of the German 
 army has been during the last twenty years is seen from the 
 following table: 
 
 Called to the colors in Recruits ^ 
 
 1894 283,200 
 
 1898 267,900 
 
 1904 262,600 
 
 1905 282,100 
 
 1906 270,400 
 
 1910 285,400 
 
 191 1 292,200 
 
 191 2 308,000 
 
 Not until the year 19 13 did the number of recruits rise to 
 382,900 (one-year volunteers, etc., included). This notable 
 increase, like the lesser increases of the three previous years, 
 was caused by the extremely threatening attitude of Russia 
 on our borders, in connection with the disturbances in the 
 Balkans. In 191 3, simultaneously with an increase of our army 
 by 63,000 recruits, the Russian contingent of recruits was in- 
 creased by 130,000, and since at the same time the period of 
 service was lengthened by a half-year, the army's peace footing 
 rose from 1,380,000 to 1,850,000, or by 470,000. The German 
 army at this time numbered in round figures 790,000, including 
 the officers (30,000) ; and, by a further increase of the con- 
 tingent of recruits in the autumn of 191 4 to 661,175 privates, 
 the entire army (including officers, non-commissioned officers, 
 volunteers, etc.) would have stood approximately at 830,000 
 men. 
 
 Let us now contemplate, from the point of view of "militar- 
 ism," the three armies which we have compared. Various 
 meanings may be attached to this word. First, we may under- 
 
 1 Including the navy, one-year volunteers, public-school teachers, etc. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 175 
 
 stand the absorption of the nation's strength to a degree that 
 seriously hinders its cultural development. This is most strik- 
 ingly the case in France. The combining of the absolutely 
 universal obligation to bear arms v^^ith the three-year period 
 of service proved a condition intolerable in the long run for 
 a civilized nation. A few months previous to the outbreak of 
 the war, a French visitor who called upon me could not restrain 
 himself from expressing his absolute despair at this French 
 law. As a result of it, French civilization, he declared, would 
 be destroyed. Not without justice, therefore, was the suspicion 
 rife at the time the law went into effect that it indicated the 
 early coming of war. It was impossible to conceive of it as 
 a permanent condition ; it could be regarded only as a. disguised 
 and round-about form of mobilization. To deny or to doubt 
 this is to concede all the more unreservedly that France had, in 
 fact, fallen into a militarism inimical to civilization. 
 
 Conditions were not otherwise in Russia. Although In that 
 country the three or four-year period of service affects only a 
 small proportion of the people — and those mostly peasants at 
 that, who are on such a low level that it is a matter of in- 
 difference whether they wear the uniform of the Emperor a 
 shorter or longer time — nevertheless, it is all the more un- 
 fortunate for the mass of the nation that the army and navy 
 absorb so large a part of the annual revenue of the state that 
 nothing is left for a public school system. It may be true that 
 the ruling classes and the Church in Russia do not desire a 
 public school, because they fear that an enlightened peasantry, 
 able to read, might disrupt Church and State; but even if this 
 design and the sinister motive prompting it does not exist, 
 the means to the end would be lacking. A universal public 
 school is an extremely expensive institution. Russia, however, 
 Is too poor to maintain at the same time an Immense army, a 
 great fleet and a good general system of education. Here 
 again we find a kind of militarism which one must designate 
 as an enemy of culture. 
 
 The German military system Is so little Inimical to culture 
 that it has not alone not prevented us from maintaining together 
 with it a model system of education from the public school 
 up to the universities, but we have also been able to carry out 
 great social reforms, as a result of which in Germany there is 
 practically no longer a proletariat class. 
 
 The military spirit in the three armies which we have ex- 
 amined is chiefly represented in their corps of officers and in the 
 education which they impart to the youth of the land. If it Is 
 
176 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 justifiable to call this education 'militarism," it is nevertheless 
 clear that the reproach which that word carries again applies 
 to Germany least of all. 
 
 Here is the declaration which was signed by more than four 
 thousand German teachers of the higher schools: 
 
 "We teachers in Germany's universities and advanced schools are 
 servants of science and conduct the work of peace. But it fills us with 
 indignation that the enemies of Germany, with England in the van, 
 seek to draw a distinction, ostensibly in our favor, between the spirit 
 of German science and what they call Prussian militarism. In the Ger- 
 man army there is the same spirit as in the German people, for the two 
 are one, and we also are part of it. Our army also cultivates science 
 and owes its achievements to this fact in no slight degree. The service 
 in the army renders the youth of the land capable for all works of 
 peace, science among them. For it educates them to a self-denying 
 sense of duty, and gives to them the self-confidence and sense of honor 
 of the truly free man, who willingly subordinates himself to the state. 
 This spirit lives not alone in Prussia, but it is the same in all the states 
 of the German Empire. It is the same in war and in peace. Our army 
 is now engaged in war for Germany's freedom, and therewith for all 
 the possessions of peace and morality, not alone in Germany. Our 
 belief is that the whole culture of Europe is dependent on the victory 
 which German 'militarism' will achieve — manly discipline, fidelity and 
 the spirit of sacrifice of the united German people." 
 
 He knows the German army of to-day but superficially who 
 judges it by the outward uniformity and the severe, often 
 harsh form of drill by which it is created. The aims and 
 achievements of true military training are thus characterized by 
 a leading military authority (Deutelmoser) : 
 
 "An army fit for war is not a great machine in which, if it is prop- 
 erly constructed throughout, the motive power proceeds from one point 
 and by automatic compulsion sets the most distant wheels in operation. 
 Each element of which an army is composed is an individual being, has 
 its own world of thoughts and feelings, with an individual will, which 
 may just as easily express itself against the operation of the whole as in 
 agreement with it. Herein lies the principal difficulty in the leading of 
 great masses. If the highest plane of agreement is to be reached, it is 
 needful that the many thousands act together, not under mechanical 
 compulsion, but as independently thinking and willing units. Formerly 
 this was quite different from today, since the close-rank formations of 
 the past left but slight latitude for the individual. King Frederick's 
 Grenadiers fought shoulder to shoulder, closely knit in serried ranks. 
 Each one supported the other, and the command of the leaders regulated 
 the gunfire or the fight with the bare weapon quite as mechanically as 
 did the orders on parade. The battle formation of present-day infantry 
 fighting, on the contrary, is that of the deployed firing line. The deadli- 
 ness and quick fire of modern weapons means sure annihilation to mass 
 formations, such as the close ranks of the linear tactics. They demand 
 that the fighting troop be split into its smallest elements, the individual 
 riflemen. And the carrying power of these weapons necessitates further 
 that this separation take place while at a great distance from the enemy. 
 Thus the individual, at the very moment when brought face to face 
 
MODERN GERMANY 177 
 
 with the immediate danger of death, is deprived of the influence of the 
 word of command. He must, furthermore, seek cover in the landscape 
 in order to offer the smallest possible target to the enemy. As a result, 
 he disappears from the supervising eye of the leader more than might 
 be desired, and he is in a high degree left to himself. The danger is 
 herewith created that the expediency and uniformity of the action be 
 lost, and that the 'will to victory' give way to the consciousness of the 
 continuing presence of death, calculated to undermine the morale. There 
 is but one counter-measure for this: so to develop in each man in time 
 of peace the independent power of decision that he knows how to act 
 correctly without constant direction, and above all to train him to hon- 
 orable feelings and strength of will which under the stress of necessity 
 and danger by their own force overcome the instinct of self-preserva- 
 tion." 
 
 Can one blame us Germans that we value highly, from a 
 purely pedagogical standpoint, quite aside from its military 
 worth, such a training, which aims at subordination, obedience 
 and fulfillment of duty, as well as at free and independent deci- 
 sion, but never at despotic oppression; and that we wish the 
 entire youth of the country, as far as possible, to enjoy ft? 
 That is all that Germany has done. It is true that from time 
 to time we have increased our army and created new units, but 
 only in correspondence to the increase in the number of young 
 men. The reproach of competing in military preparation, there- 
 fore, is directed really against the German mothers, who have 
 taken care that Germany since 1870 has increased from forty 
 to sixty-eight millions, while France has remained stationary 
 at about thirty-nine to forty millions, owing to a lack of the 
 maternal instinct among Frenchwomen. 
 
 The British army stands, as a purely mercenary institution, 
 in fundamental contrast to the German, French and Russian 
 armies, which are all three more or less national armies. The 
 Englishmen hates the compulsion which the universal duty of 
 bearing arms implies, as well as the military spirit with which 
 the entire people become filled, as the result of passing through 
 military training. From this feeling, therefore, has proceeded 
 the reproach of "militarism" which is directed against Ger- 
 many, especially Prussia, since this institution was first created 
 in the latter country and has been only imitated by the others. 
 Is a mercenary army, how^ever, in every connection less mili- 
 tary than a national army? I read recently in an English news- 
 paper (the London Morning Post) that the essence of mili- 
 tarism lies in the misuse of military power for ambitious aims. 
 The English nation, thanks to its mercenary army and its tre- 
 mendous fleet, has brought into subjection more than 350 million 
 people, nearly a quarter of all the inhabitants of the earth, and 
 
178 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 it exercises supremacy over all the seas of the world. This 
 would never have been possible with a national army. 
 
 General Ian Hamilton demonstrates in his book "Compulsory 
 Service" (1911), that precisely for this reason England must 
 not introduce universal military service, since the recruiting 
 for the colonial army, which upholds England's world su- 
 premacy, would thereby suffer too great a restriction, and since 
 a popular army is not adaptable for this work. Lord Esher, 
 the friend of King Edward VII, expresses the same opinion 
 in a pamphlet, "The Maritime and Military Position of the 
 British Isles." 
 
 "The British people," he says, "are war-like and aggressive; 
 they have for centuries been constantly fighting, and, indeed, 
 until quite recently it has been difficult to find any single year 
 in which the British Empire has not been at war in some part 
 of the world." 
 
 One should, therefore, he says, speak not of "Imperial De- 
 fence" but of "Imperial Offence." A popular army is not 
 suited to such work. As a matter of fact, all states which have 
 created great colonial empires have always made use of specially 
 hired troops for this purpose, with the exception of Russia, and 
 recently Italy in the Tripoli campaign. But the Russian army, 
 as a result of the low state of culture, the limited levy and the 
 long period of service. Is nearer to the nature of a mercenary 
 army than that of Germany and France. English militarism is, 
 therefore, much more adaptable for a misuse of power than is 
 Continental militarism; and It is only necessary to read in "The 
 History of Our Own Times," by Justin McCarthy, the story 
 of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, in order to see what 
 spirit the Colonial army produces in Its officers. The entire race 
 of the descendants of the great King Baber, twenty-four princes, 
 were exterminated. Lieut. Hodson murdered three princes with 
 his own hands, on detecting them among the prisoners; and 
 McCarthy declares that public opinion in England, as a whole, 
 recognized Hodson's deed as patriotic and worthy of praise. A 
 mercenary army. It Is true, has also its sense of military honor, 
 and is, therefore, not without idealism; but this idealism is quite 
 different from that which Inspires the German army and, we are 
 glad to add, the French army as well. For that which we style 
 a universal duty to bear arms, the English have no other expres- 
 sion than "compulsory service." It will not be long before they 
 have learned otherwise on this point. In quite the same manner 
 as with us, tens of thousands of young men in England, especially 
 of the upper classes, have voluntarily entered the army, not for the? 
 
MODERN GERMANY 179 
 
 sake of the "king's shilling," but in order to stand shoulder to 
 shoulder with Tommy Atkins in the defence of their country, or 
 more accurately, to uphold England's world supremacy. Even 
 at the moment when they summon the whole world to battle 
 against Prussian militarism, they themselves are already in the 
 midst of it. 
 
 The German army is the most thoroughly trained and most 
 powerful war instrument of all the armies of the world, but at 
 the same time the one which is the least available for a mere 
 policy of ambition and thirst for power. It is true that it is 
 bound in unconditional fealty and obedience to its Emperor, 
 but the Emperor himself dare claim this obedience only as the 
 representative of the nation's interest as a whole, or as he him- 
 self expressed it on the occasion of his coronation, as "The First 
 Servant of the State." In other words, our army is strong only 
 on the political defensive, as when it is a question of defending 
 the existence and the honor of the Empire against foreign aggres- 
 sion. If in foreign countries the German spirit of aggression 
 is often spoken of, and to this end German military writers are 
 quoted, it must be made clear that by this is meant a strategical 
 and tactical offensive, the spirit of which, It is true, is properly 
 cultivated in our army. But to a political offensive, to the delib- 
 erate starting of a war like the present, for the sake of conquest or 
 for world supremacy, our people would never lend themselves; 
 and of what value would be all the technical skill and discipline 
 in this army without the spirit which results from free and full 
 agreement, and which is none other than the spirit of the entire 
 nation? Not more than 15 per cent of the army now in the 
 field was in uniform on the day before the mobilization; the 
 other 85 per cent are citizens and peasants, workers and students, 
 the great proportion heads of families. Would such men 
 be ready, for the sake of mere plans of ambition, to let them- 
 selves be led to death? 
 
 But the objection to this is made in foreign countries that 
 the real ruling class in Germany is the officer caste. In the 
 first place, our officer class is not a caste. Under Frederick the 
 Great it possessed something of this character; to-day entrance 
 into this body is open to every qualified young man of educa- 
 tion and breeding. War Minister von Roon spoke of that class 
 on one occasion when writing to Emperor William I as: "That 
 part of Your Majesty's subjects who bear Your Majesty's weap- 
 ons." This class, upon whose efficiency and educational activity 
 our national freedom in great part depends, enjoys among us the 
 greatest consideration, but it is far removed from ruling the 
 
i8o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 state. The English officer-corps, shortly before the outbreak 
 of the war, was on the point of mutiny and had already refused 
 obedience to the civil government, because the parliamentary 
 policy in Ireland displeased it. The French officer corps has 
 obeyed the civil government since 1871, but, as is well known, 
 with inward revolt. They had to submit to the leaders of the 
 parliamentary groups, of the political slate-makers and dema- 
 gogues, not because they were victims of the superstition that 
 the Chambers represented the will of the French people (the 
 French themselves speak with the greatest contempt of this rul- 
 ing body), but because they had been defeated at Sedan. Every 
 one in France is aware that had the French army been success- 
 ful in defeating Germany, it would have marked the end of 
 parliamentary lawyer-rule, and the army would have seized the 
 powers of government, as under the Bonapartes. In Germany 
 it is not the army which rules, but the Emperor, with the Federal 
 Council and the Reichstag. To be sure, the Emperor feels 
 himself to be the supreme commander and head of the army, 
 and he will always have respect for its feelings, but he will 
 consider in equal degree the feelings of his people, because he 
 knows he is able thoroughly to fulfill his duties as ruler and to 
 exercise, to its full extent, his royal right, only if the army and 
 people are united under his leadership. Neither will the officer- 
 corps ever mutiny as in England — not even if the Emperor, for 
 political reasons, acts against its desires — nor can the victorious 
 army oppress civil freedom, as in France, because the army is 
 the Emperor's, who is bound by the Reichstag and the Consti- 
 tution. If there have ever occurred disputes between officers 
 and civilians, it was only in regard to questions of local and 
 slight importance, which were exaggerated abroad in an un- 
 friendly fashion. How superficial these differences were has 
 been strikingly brought to our realization by this war. 
 
 From whatever point of view one contemplates the constitu- 
 tion of the armies of the four states which we have considered, 
 it is clear that the reproach of "militarism" applies least of all 
 to Germany; unless it be for the fact that this country first of 
 all enunciated the principle that every citizen is a born defender 
 of the Fatherland, and consistently carried it through, the other 
 states falling into line later. With this principle, however, Prus- 
 sia first saved Europe from the universal domination of Napoleon 
 and then from that of the Czar. 
 
 Even if we may claim that Germany (Prussia) for the last 
 one hundred years has kept, with slight variations, her army in 
 the same ratio to her population (i per cent), we are neverthe- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 
 
 i8i 
 
 less forced to admit, and we do it gladly, that in one respect 
 we have greatly increased our armament. 
 
 In order not to be excluded from international politics, in 
 order not to be forced to be an idle spectator when the other 
 Great Powers divided Africa and Asia among themselves, in 
 order finally to protect her constantly growing maritime trade, 
 Germany has gradually, since 1888, developed her fleet and 
 thereby aroused England's deepest jealousy. But in this con- 
 nection, also, quite false data are circulated abroad regarding 
 us. In order to prove how the Germans were hastening the 
 growth of their navy, the English have always compared the 
 number of ships which were laid down; but this gives quite a 
 false impression, as England needs only two, Germany three 
 j^ears for the building of a great battleship. A correct com- 
 parison is afforded by the following table, which groups together 
 the battleships and the big armored cruisers. 
 
 BIG BATTLESHIPS READY 
 
 England 
 
 Germany 
 
 Englaito 
 
 Germany 
 
 1907 
 
 1. Dreadnought 
 
 2. Indomitable 
 
 3. Inflexible 
 
 4. Invincible 
 
 None 
 
 21. 
 22. 
 
 23- 
 
 24. 
 
 Ik 
 
 27. 
 
 I9I2 
 
 King George V. 
 
 Centurion 
 
 AJax 
 
 Audacious 
 
 Australia 
 
 New Zealand 
 
 Queen Mary 
 
 1912 
 
 10. Oldenburg 
 
 11. Kaiser 
 
 12. Friedrich der 
 
 Grosse 
 
 13. Goeben 
 
 1908 
 
 None 
 
 
 5. Temeraire 
 
 6. Bellerophon 
 
 7. Superb 
 
 28. 
 29. 
 30. 
 31. 
 •32. 
 
 1913 
 
 Iron Duke 
 Marlborough 
 Emperor of India 
 Benbow 
 Tiger 
 
 1913 
 14. Kaiserin 
 
 1909 
 
 8. St. Vincent 
 
 9. Collingwood 
 
 1909 
 
 1. Nassau 
 
 2. Westfalen 
 
 15. Prinzregent Lmt» 
 
 pold 
 
 16. Konig Albert 
 
 17. Seydlitz 
 
 10. Vanguard 
 
 33- 
 34. 
 35. 
 36. 
 37. 
 
 1914 
 
 Queen Elizabeth 
 
 Warspite 
 Barham 
 Valiant 
 Malaya 
 
 1914 
 
 1910 
 
 11. Neptune 
 
 12, Indefatigable 
 
 1910 
 
 3. Rheinland 
 
 4. Posen 
 
 5. V. d. Tann 
 
 18. Markgraf 
 
 19. Grosser Kurfiirst 
 
 20. Konig 
 
 21. Derfflinger 
 
 1911 
 
 13. Colossus 
 
 14. Hercules 
 
 15. Orion 
 
 16. Conqueror 
 
 17. Monarch 
 
 18. Thunderer 
 
 19. Lion 
 
 20. Princess Royal 
 
 1911 
 
 6. Ostfriesland 
 
 7. Helgoland 
 
 8. Thiiringen 
 
 9. Moltke 
 
 Is. 
 39. 
 40. 
 41. 
 42. 
 
 191S 
 
 Resolution 
 
 Revenge 
 
 Ramillies 
 
 Royal-Oak 
 
 Royal-Sovereigni 
 
 191S 
 
 22. Kronprinz 
 
 23. Liitzow 
 
 To this must be added: 43. Agincourt; 44- Erin; 45. Canada. 43 and 44 were built for 
 Turkey, 45 for Chili; these were subsequently seized and added to the British fleet 
 
i82 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 In the year 19 15 England had thus from 42 to 45, Germany 23 
 great battleships ready; since 1910 the ratio has changed but 
 slightly; and if a certain competition in this line has existed 
 between England and Germany, it was begun by the former, 
 not by the latter. Germany, it is true, has taken the liberty 
 of building a fleet, of entering upon the construction of modern 
 dreadnoughts, but only as following England's lead. 
 
 The charge is thus disposed of that Germany created her fleet 
 in order some day to attack England with it. For more than 150 
 years the English nation has lived in the constant fear of a 
 foreign invasion. At one time it was the Spaniards, generally 
 the French, occasionally the Russians, and now it is the Ger- 
 mans who disturb the peaceful sleep of the English citizen. To 
 what purpose, however, does Germany build a fleet, if not to 
 attack England with it? England, it is true, needs a fleet to 
 protect and maintain her world empire, such as history and the 
 bravery of her ancestors have bestowed on her ; the German fleet, 
 however, is not in keeping with the meagreness of the German 
 colonies; it is a strong battle fleet; it would be a pure luxury if 
 it were not intended for an attack on England. 
 
 The error in this reasoning lies in overlooking the value 
 and importance of military preparation, even if not put to any 
 actual use. Our naval experts have always claimed that a 
 fleet, even in the face of a greatly stronger enemy, is of notable 
 importance, because the latter, even with the prospect of com- 
 plete victory, is sure to suffer severe losses himself, which will 
 weaken his position in the world. This has been called the 
 ''principle of risk." If there were, perhaps, in Germany persons 
 so fanciful as to dream of an immediate landing in England, 
 in responsible circles there was a much soberer line of thought. 
 It was desired, it is true, that the great battle fleet should be 
 for something more than the mere protection of our own coasts, 
 but this by no means implied a desire for an attack on those of 
 England. What was desired lay between these two extremes. 
 Our aim was to' be able to exercise, whether on England or 
 on other Powers, a pressure sufficient to compel them to grant 
 to Germany in world politics such a place in the sun as her power 
 and her internal strength gave her the right to demand by the 
 side of the others. New and extensive territory in Africa 
 and Asia was continually being divided up among English, 
 French, Russians, Americans and Japanese. Germany could 
 not permit herself, and did not intend, to be permanently ex- 
 cluded from this. Had Germany built no fleet she would not 
 have been able to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey. Eng- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 183 
 
 land, no doubt, found it extremely unpleasant that the main 
 part of her fleet was held permanently in the North Sea through 
 the growth of Germany's navy. But it is a long step from this 
 to an attack, and England would have removed the drawbacks 
 of the situation without great trouble by an honest understand- 
 ing with Germany. Undoubtedly, there was in England a party 
 which loyally strove for such a peaceful understanding, and the 
 Emperor and Chancellor, supported by universal public opinion, 
 met this movement willingly half-way and without any arriere 
 pensee. If, nevertheless, the opposition party in England finally 
 gained the ascendency, this was not due to the actual impossi- 
 bility of a compromise, and in still less degree to any aggressive 
 intentions on Germany's part; it was due solely to the fact that 
 the aggressive policy of Pan-Slavism in the Balkan Peninsula, 
 which finally resulted in the murder of the Archducal Heir 
 Apparent, brought about a general crisis in Europe and gave the 
 English war-party the upper hand. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN 
 INSTITUTIONS 
 
 PROFESSOR GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 
 
 THE charge has been brought against Germany and Prussia 
 that they lack the spirit of free institutions, that they are 
 ruled by a harsh militarism inimical to culture. He who speaks 
 thus may perhaps have in mind Herbert Spencer's thoroughly 
 mistaken conception of the two separate modern types of state: 
 the old reactionary type of the military state, and 'the advanced 
 liberal type of the industrial state. Or the present-day glorifica- 
 tion of democracy may hark back to the constitution of Attica, 
 to the days when the great statesmen of Athens from Solon and 
 Kleisthenes to Pericles created the democratic constitution by 
 which the demos, or people, were supposed to rule. Spencer's 
 conception is as mistaken as is the comparison of our great states 
 with tiny Attica. This state had, at all events in the period of 
 its democratic glory, a thorough military form; and to-day the 
 United States of America maintains a small army only because 
 it has no powerful neighbors. It would support a large standing 
 army, says Professor Sloane of Columbia University, if it had 
 three such dangerous neighbors as Germany has (Preussische 
 Jahrbilcher, Vol. 158, p. 466). We admire Attica, which at 
 the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War counted 250,000 inhabi- 
 tants, not so much on account of the rule of the demos, as for 
 the fact that it saved western civilization from suffocation by 
 Persia. It saved this civilization because it was able to unite 
 its infantry division of hoplites, who were drawn from the 
 burghers and peasants, with its aristocratic cavalry squadrons, 
 and to build a war fleet capable of opposing the Persians. The 
 true greatness, however, of this incomparable democratic state 
 is to be seen in the fact that, three hundred years before Christ, it 
 ^ followed its great aristocratic leaders, and that these leaders, while 
 not emancipating the slaves and half-free classes, educated the 
 mass of the ordinary citizens to a devotion to their public duties 
 that has scarcely been equalled since. The superiority of Athens 
 lay not in the rule of its demos, but in the obedience of its people 
 
 184 
 
MODERN GERMANY 185 
 
 down to the Peloponneslan War to their aristocratic leaders, 
 and in the fact that these leaders created in the people a strong 
 public spirit and educated them to devote themselves to the ideals 
 of the state. 
 
 There have been, no doubt, barbaric and semi-barbaric peoples 
 of warlike nature who, as a consequence of a rough nomadic life, 
 possessed a military, more or less despotic constitution preclud- 
 ing free political institutions, like the Arabians under Mahomet, 
 or like many of the German tribes and states during and after 
 the wanderings of the peoples. But a military constitution and 
 lack of poh'tical freedom are by no means historically inseparable, 
 nor does one by any means alwa3^s follow the other. 
 
 If we exclude the older types of states organized on a military 
 basis (which cannot really be compared with the present-day 
 states), the best explanation for the causes of the development 
 in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of military states, lead- 
 ing to certain limitations of civil freedom, is given by the great 
 Oxford professor, Seeley. He says: "The amount of free- 
 dom that may reasonably exist in a state is in indirect propor- 
 tion to the military-political pressure exerted by foreign states 
 against its boundaries." 
 
 Germany was driven to universal military service by the un- 
 precedented pressure of the French wars and of the Napoleonic 
 domination from 1792 to 1 81 3. The development of the German 
 fleet and the army increases from 1890 to the present day are 
 traceable to the English encircling policy {Einkreisungspolitik) , 
 and to the increased pressure of Russia and France against Ger- 
 many. Had England, who, during the period from 1792 to 
 1 81 4, destroyed the fleets of the other nations and conquered 
 most of their colonies, been content with the position of power 
 which she enjoyed from 181 5 to 1850; had she continued to the 
 present day the peaceful policy pursued from 1846 to 1870, 
 when she granted independence to her most important colonies 
 and limited her naval programme — in such event, we Germans 
 would probably have built no fleet nor made such increases in 
 our army as we have made. But since Disraeli's day she has 
 followed a new policy of conquest. During the period from 
 1800 to 1900 she annexed between seven and eight million 
 square kilometers of land and one hundred millions of people, 
 and increased her fleet enormously. England has again become 
 such as Kant described her in the eighteenth century: most 
 greedy for conquest and the most warlike state in Europe. It 
 is no wonder that the other states have been forced to imitate 
 her in a degree. But has England by this fact become less free.. 
 
i86 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 less democratic? Certainly not. Just as untrue is it that Prus- 
 sia and Germany, because during the last two centuries they 
 assumed a military character, have become a country without 
 freedom, without a constitutional form of government. Ger- 
 many is different, it is true, in essential points, from France, 
 England and the United States. She does not have parliamentary 
 government — that is to say, control of the highest administra- 
 tive positions by the parliamentary majority. But the freedom 
 of the citizen is protected against arbitrary encroachment on the 
 part of the state authorities as well, if not better, than else- 
 where. 
 
 But what is understood by this political freedom in which 
 we are said to be lacking? Principally two things: i. A cer- 
 tain Influence of the people on the government, on legislation 
 and on the leading principles of interior and foreign policy; 2. 
 a secure guarantee of the freedom of action of the citizens in 
 questions of faith and religion, in family life, in expressions of 
 opinion, in literature and in the press, in private economic af- 
 fairs, in the formation of societies, in public gatherings, etc. It 
 is necessary that every civilized state should to-day exercise 
 influence in such matters by certain legislative measures. But 
 it must do this with tact and discretion, applying the laws im- 
 partially; the courts and the administration should act in a 
 strictly legal manner. 
 
 In determining the powers of the Government, as well as in the 
 circumscription of the sphere of individual freedom as against the 
 powers of the state and arbitrary actions of the Government, 
 one thing above all must be avoided: class rule and class abuse. 
 Or rather, since this is never entirely feasible, class abuse must 
 be limited by law as much as possible. And since for the last 
 two hundred or three hundred years all civilized states have 
 seen entirely new class systems develop, with the most pro- 
 nounced tendencies toward class abuse and class dominance, the 
 vital question of the new interior development of the state is in 
 many cases the following: Where, under what forms and in- 
 stitutions of government, and with what laws has the nearest 
 approach been made to preventing the degradation of the lower 
 classes and to limiting the abuses of the ruling classes? It can- 
 not be questioned that, although royal despotism in ancient 
 times and in the Middle Ages in many cases manifested and 
 directly promoted pronounced class abuse, nevertheless the later 
 enlightened despotism as well as the military and bureaucratic 
 state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have limited this 
 notably. Just as certain is it that, although the development of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 187 
 
 the democratic idea in the constitutions led to the expectation of 
 the ehmination of class abuses — indeed, it held this out as a 
 promise — nevertheless, while not unavoidable nor common to 
 all states, in many of them the increase of democratization 
 brought with it an increase of these abuses. This was the result 
 chiefly of the moral and political level which the upper classes 
 had reached before gaining greater rights and greater influence; 
 and of the moral and mental development of the lower classes, 
 who fought against the upper in the free state for political 
 rights, but even more for possessions and income. 
 
 The greater the political freedom is in any given state from 
 the dual point of view of influence exercised by the people on 
 the Government and the protection of the individual rights of 
 freedom, the more emphatically can it be affirmed that these 
 two factors have a beneficent effect proportionate to the degree 
 of morality and of political and individual virtues attained to 
 by the upper and lower classes. Premature granting of politi- 
 cal freedom leads ofttimes to the downfall of the nation, or at 
 least to bitter and long-continued inner strife. Extensive politi- 
 cal freedom is held to be more easily realized with success in 
 small states, especially those protected against the outside world, 
 like Switzerland, than in large states, among well-balanced na- 
 tions than among hot-blooded races. Such freedom, it is 
 claimed, operates much more often in a beneficial manner in 
 times of quiet development than in times of great social changes, 
 of technical advances and of outward and inward struggles. 
 
 But let us come to the point. Let us try to grasp the spirit 
 of German institutions as it developed from 1650 to 181 5, and 
 as it was rounded out from 1815 to 1915. It first took form 
 in the secondary states, which were mostly ruled by the patri- 
 cian classes ot the cities and the rural nobility. These states 
 gained a firm governing power through gifted families, through 
 the union of several territories and through the political strug- 
 gles and wars of the period; from semi- or entirely aristocratic 
 republics they became military and bureaucratic states. There 
 arose here the best type of that which has been styled enlightened 
 despotism. Representatives of this were the Prussian Princes 
 from 1640 to 1786, IVIaria Theresa, Joseph II, and certain 
 Saxon, Brunswick, Hessian, Bavarian and Wiirttemberg princes. 
 In England the same type of state had been discredited by the 
 Stuarts of the seventeenth century, while Cromwell's dictator- 
 ship had approximated to it temporarily. In the Netherlands 
 the princes of the House of Orange had been too weak, as 
 
i88 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 'Opposed to the capitalistic city aristocracy, to reach their goal. 
 In France love of display and conquest, religious intolerance, 
 royal extravagance and vanity undermined enlightened despo- 
 tism. In the England of a later period a foreign dynasty, w^ith 
 mostly incompetent princes, was able to accomplish nothing from 
 1714 to 1815 and w^as crowded aside by a great and capable 
 aristocracy. The latter succeeded in establishing England's trade 
 supremacy, but at the price of outrageous enrichment and domi- 
 nation of the upper classes, and of degradation of the workers, 
 which caused the country to stand on the brink of a social revo- 
 lution practically from 1790 to 1850. This was prevented from 
 coming to a head only by the severest of discriminating laws, by 
 military force and cannons. 
 
 What, now, did the German bureaucratic and military state 
 in Prussia and in Austria and in the German secondary states 
 achieve from 1640 to 1840? What did it indicate? Of what 
 did it consist? What were its aims? How is the spirit of the 
 resulting institutions to be expressed In a few words? 
 
 This German bureaucratic and military state suppressed or 
 checked feudal class rule and made it possible for the ruling 
 princes to create efficient executive state organs at the centre and 
 at the periphery. It put an end to the economic struggles between 
 the city and the country. There was thus created a strong mon- 
 archic power of a type which became an example for the whole 
 world. It brought together the best elements of the people of 
 all classes in bureaucratic and military service to form a new 
 leading class, a new civil service aristocracy that stands high 
 above the feudal as well as the money and capitalistic aristocracy 
 of other countries and times. In the main, it succeeded in pro- 
 tecting and saving the peasant class from being overburdened or 
 impoverished and from being robbed of its land by extortionate 
 sales. It reformed the corrupt city and guild constitutions of 
 the Middle Ages, and rendered the city inhabitants ready for 
 sound self-administration and for freedom of trade and resi- 
 dence, and it assisted the peasant class to gain free ownership 
 of its land. It introduced religious tolerance and universal edu- 
 cation. It created at first in the individual states, then in the 
 Customs Union and the Empire, a free interior market and a 
 national trade constitution. It advanced and emancipated science, 
 through the codification of the law, through great reforms in 
 the organization of the courts, and through the suppression of 
 all Star Chamber justice it guaranteed In the years from 1746 
 to 1840 personal individual freedom such as existed at that time 
 in no other European state. Although at the same time the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 189 
 
 military burdens, the weight of taxation and the governmental 
 conduct of economic matters did at many points operate oppres- 
 sively against the citizens; although England, through her par- 
 liamentary constitution (the admiration and imitation of w^hich 
 was preached by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century) was 
 in certain respects much in advance of Germany — despite all 
 this, there is room for a difference of opinion whether the Eng- 
 land of the three Georges or the Prussia of Frederick the Great 
 stood higher from a cultural point of view. Of none of the 
 English kings or statesmen could an English poet have said w^hat 
 Goethe said of Frederick: "He shone upon us from the north 
 like the pole star, about which the whole world seemed to 
 turn.'; 
 
 It is true that the energetic development of the bureaucratic 
 and military state had also its drawbacks: from 1780 to 1850 
 it became somewhat petrified, and the change to constitutional 
 life was not made easily or quickly. We shall later return to 
 this point. But, on the other hand, its traditions prevented 
 hurried, ill-considered constitutional experiments, and its vital 
 institutions, adapted both to the nation and to the times, have 
 laid the foundations for a free constitutional life. 
 
 In order to prove thfs, let us first examine somewhat more 
 closely the personal elements of the bureaucratic state and then 
 its more important government reforms. Our first question is: 
 Of what nature was the class of civil servants and officers who, 
 in Germany, under the leadership of the prince, the "first servant 
 of the state," from 1640 to 1840, secured governing powers — 
 the class that from 1640 to 1820 ruled mainly alone, but from 
 then on in cooperation with the estates and the constitutional 
 representatives — and that in Germany to-day still possesses po- 
 litical preponderance, as in no other state in the world? Imita- 
 tion of it, it is true, has been attempted since the middle of the 
 nineteenth century in many differently ruled states, for instance, 
 in the American Civil Service reform and in the British service 
 in India. 
 
 Since the once healthy local system of self-government had 
 degenerated into oligarchic class domination, and since the 
 landed aristocracy and the city patricians more and more abused 
 and exploited the peasants and small burghers, the better Ger- 
 man princes felt increasing need of protecting the middle and 
 lower classes through councilmen, judges and magistrates who 
 stood outside of the old aristocratic and city cliques. For this 
 purpose clergymen and court officials offered their services, but 
 especially jurists who had studied in Bologna, Prague, Leipsic, 
 
I90 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and other new German universities, and had gained knowledge 
 of Roman law and of the imperial prerogatives it prescribes; 
 in other cases these officials were burghers or noblemen from 
 neighboring states who had no connection with the home cliques. 
 In this way the Hohenzollern of the fifteenth century ruled in 
 the Mark Brandenburg by means of knights, priests and writers 
 from their Frankish home state. Their successors in the six- 
 teenth century depended, in the main, on the Saxon or Meissen 
 jurists, like the two Chancellors Distelmeyer, and also on Saxon 
 and Bohemian noblemen. When, under Joachim Friedrich 
 (1598-1608), the estates complained of the many foreigners in 
 office, th'e elector replied that they themselves were quite lacking 
 in the necessary knowledge; and his minister, the Bohemian 
 Count Schlick, added that with the exception of one or two 
 persons, the elector had no faithful men among the Brandenburg 
 nobility. 
 
 In the seventeenth century there appear, by the side of and 
 above the native Brandenburg civil servants, the powerful Prot- 
 estant nobility of East Prussia (such as, above all, the Dohnas), 
 and capable officials from Cleve-Mark, Magdeburg and West- 
 phalia, whom the Great Elector gladly attracted to Berlin. An 
 especially important foreign element for the Brandenburg-Prus- 
 sian officers' and officials' class was furnished by the French 
 Huguenot families, who had fled to Brandenburg-Prussia, and 
 among whom were many learned men, jurists and officers. In 
 the year 1688 there were, among 1,030 Brandenburg officers, 
 not less than 300 Huguenots, and probably also many Dutch, 
 Swedes and Danes. We shall refer again to the fact that in 
 many provinces, as late as 1713 to 1740, the nobility would not 
 enter the Brandenburg army. The daughters of Huguenots in- 
 fluenced the official class by marriage with the nobility of all the 
 provinces; in like manner the Princesses on the Brandenburg 
 throne of the families of Orange and the Palatinate brought with 
 them from the Netherlands and Heidelberg thoughts and men 
 of Protestant and progressive stripe, thereby forming at the 
 court itself a strong counterweight to the ruling squire class, or 
 Junkerstand. From the time of Friedrich Wilhelm I, it became 
 the custom to fill the higher provincial offices with a prepon- 
 derant number of men from the other provinces, in order to 
 create a royal local administration which stood above the selfish 
 interests of the provinces and the nobility. Under Frederick 
 the Great, and even more perhaps under Friedrich Wilhelm III, 
 the great talents and characters from the whole of Germany 
 thronged to the Prussian service. The great Minister of Jus- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 191 
 
 tice, Carmer, was from the Palatinate and of Scottish, extrac- 
 tion; the Minister of Mining and Commerce, Heinitz, was a 
 Saxon; Baron von Stein was from the Rhine, Hardenberg 
 and Scharnhorst were Hanoverians; Gneisenau came from Aus- 
 tria, Niebuhr from Holstein. The great reforms from 1808 
 to 1820 could scarcely have been carried through without this 
 foreign contingent in Prussian officialdom. 
 
 It is a simple physiological fact that through this blood and 
 race mixture from 1680 to 1820 the production of remarkable 
 talent, even of genius, in Prussian official circles was likely to 
 be considerably increased. 
 
 At all events, within this order of officials and officers from 
 different provinces and classes there grew up a united spirit, 
 with distinctive feelings and views; there came to exist a strong 
 bond of union, a pronounced esprit de corps, in contrast to the 
 classes and circles inimical to the king and the civil service, to- 
 gether with an increasing devotion to the ruler, the government 
 and the state. The officials all felt themselves to be an ecclesia 
 militans, a reform party within the state, opposed to all manner 
 of local, special and class interests. Sons of officials and of 
 officers were encouraged to follow the career of their fathers. 
 Frederick the Great w^as fond of saying that in this manner the 
 sons grew up from their youth in an atmosphere of honor and 
 with the welfare of the state at heart. Talented and striking 
 characters from both high and low social strata were welded 
 into a uniform official class. It was here possible — as once in 
 the Roman Church — for the lowest day-laborer or peasant's son 
 to rise. Ministers of such origin sat beside counts and princes 
 from 1640 to 1850, although for certain positions nobles were 
 preferred, or ordinary citizens were ennobled to fill them. One 
 need only refer to the career of Rother, who advanced between 
 the years 1806- 1848 from the rank of an army clerk to that of 
 a minister of state. 
 
 The sons and grandsons of the most selfish squires {Junker), 
 the most bitter enemies of the monarchy, acquired quite different 
 feelings in military and government service, and became imbued 
 with the conception and interests of the state. The new associa- 
 tions in which they found themselves and amid which they 
 worked freed them from the old ties, and turned many of them 
 into efficient cooperators in an anti-feudal policy for the benefit 
 .of the peasants, trade and industry — a policy which tended to 
 •strengthen the monarchy. They shared in the enlightened tend- 
 encies of Frederick the Great, and in the political ideals of 
 F'riedrich Wilhelm III and his advisers. 
 
192 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 This sense of spiritual unity in the bureaucratic state was 
 strengthened by the gradual development of an identical eco- 
 nomic basis for all members of the official and officer class. 
 
 Those occupying official positions in the old established states 
 were landed proprietors and generally hereditary holders of the 
 office, or they held yearly elective positions which, as wealthy 
 aristocrats, were open to them only. With the increasing divi- 
 sion of labor, both of these classes of officials proved insufficient, 
 even harmful. In neither case was the office-holder's chief 
 devotion given to his work, but to his material possessions and 
 their increase, to family and class interests. With the growth 
 of the power of money in the economic life and the increasing 
 division of labor, appointment by the ruler of officials for life, 
 living exclusively for their work, and receiving fixed remunera- 
 tion and special training, became feasible and more and more 
 frequent in the monarchic state. The Roman emperors were 
 the first to develop such an official class, working for fixed sal- 
 aries; the Church of Rome applied this form of the imperial 
 administration to its priests, and the other states, with France in 
 the lead, sought from the thirteenth century on to develop such 
 an official class; from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century it 
 gradually repressed the older official system. Burgundy and 
 Austria imitated the French model, and the more important 
 German territorial states followed suit. 
 
 It was a new and difficult question to organize all the offices 
 and bureaus, to find, educate and train suitable men, and to 
 develop official careers; this effort could succeed only gropingly, 
 and against great difficulties. The chief problem was to con- 
 quer constantly arising abuses. It was a question of creating 
 in that epoch of incipient money circulation a social mechanism 
 of the most complicated kind ; even the most capable princes 
 and governments succeeded in accomplishing this only through 
 particularly favorable circumstances and by efforts continued 
 through decades and centuries. 
 
 German officialdom of the fifteenth to the seventeenth cen- 
 tury had been, to a great extent, a body of rather doubtful men ; 
 but in Prussia from 1670 to 1750 trustworthiness and efficiency 
 had become the rule among them. Gneist speaks of the officials 
 and generals who surrounded Frederick the Great as forming 
 one of the most intellectual generations which Germany had 
 ever produced. The old system of payment by perquisites or in 
 kind from property administered by the officials themselves had 
 to be superseded by a regular and reliable system of salaries in 
 cash; the hunt for vacant fiefs and other similar privileges had 
 
MODERN GERMANY 193 
 
 to be done away with and the right of appointment to be gath- 
 ered into the hand of the sovereign. A clear civil service law, 
 distinct official instructions and a strict government control had 
 to be introduced, while allowing the officials far-reaching initia- 
 tive in making proposals within the province of their office. 
 The officials had to be made subject to just laws of disciplinary 
 punishment and a gradually adapted system of examinations, 
 admitting only the efficient and well-trained. A certain routine 
 of promotion had to be established, and in consequence thereof a 
 certain tradition as to the classes from which officials were to 
 be taken. The result of all this was to create uniform stand- 
 ards of duty and official probity throughout the entire official- 
 dom. 
 
 To be sure, there were dangers connected with this Institution 
 of professional officials, such as development of cllquedom, of 
 patronage by superiors and members of Parliament, and of a 
 tendency to stagnant routine. Furthermore, with the guaran- 
 teed income and comparative security from dismissal which the 
 officials enjoyed, there was also the danger of their inclining too 
 much to consulting their own convenience and developing a 
 lack of initiative in their official activity. The official Is called 
 upon to display the greatest degree of ardor and devotion for 
 objects which do not concern his personal Interests. Personal 
 ambition alone is not sufficient as an Impelling force; it must be 
 supplemented by a strong sense of duty, high ethical and intel- 
 lectual training, and a strong moral and political esprit de corps. 
 
 The assured economic position, Income and pension, the rule 
 adopted at an early period against taking part in stock transac- 
 tions or engaging In business, had the beneficial effect of en- 
 abling the official to devote himself entirely to his work and to 
 the interests of the public, and of placing him above the social 
 battles of the classes. 
 
 "The essence of the state and of official position," says Ernst 
 Meyer, "is the protection of the general welfare against the 
 particular interests of the wealthy classes." 
 
 It was the historical task of the bureaucratic state to create 
 for this purpose an order w^hose collective intellectual and spir- 
 itual qualities were devoted to the service of the state, who 
 subordinated their personal interests as well as their prejudices 
 to official duty. To be sure, that ideal was unconditionally 
 attained only in the case of nobler natures, in connection with 
 home education, school and university training. 
 
 Prussian officialdom, however, approached thereto most 
 closely in the eighteenth century, and again from 18 10 to 1 840. 
 
194 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Furthermore, in the constitutional period from 1850 on, the 
 ethical and political qualities of the official class remained the 
 intellectual and moral backbone of the state. Only in connec- 
 tion with great events and great spiritual, political and moral 
 movements, and under the guidance of great princes, generals 
 and statesmen, was Prussia able to raise her officials to their 
 high plane of efficiency, of integrity and cooperation. And in 
 the other great territorial states the development had been simi- 
 lar in the years from 1700 to 1850. But in 1786, as well as in 
 the period from 1720 to 1850, the natural drawbacks of the 
 bureaucratic state became evident. The officials had become a 
 ruling class. The people rightfully demanded a greater share 
 in the state and government. It was necessary that a constitu- 
 tional epoch should rejuvenate the bureaucratic state, raise it 
 again to a higher plane; competition with nobility and civilians 
 demanded greater efforts of it. We can with confidence state 
 that the political transformation which took place from 1840 to 
 the present time has not destroyed the chief qualities of our 
 just, intelligent, mentally and morally elevated official class» 
 
 We shall now speak of the principal achievements of the Prus- 
 sian bureaucratic aristocracy from 1640 down to our own time. 
 They deserve careful consideration, if one wishes fairly to judge 
 the drawbacks of the German bureaucratic and military state in 
 the period to 1840 and if one desires duly to appreciate its effect 
 on present-day conditions. These achievements consist in: i. 
 The introduction and carrying out of universal education, the 
 founding of the public school as well as of other institutions of 
 learning. 2. The organization of the army and the adoption of 
 the universal duty of bearing arms. 3. The judicial reforms. 
 4. The reform of the system of self-government, beginning in 
 this period, and its later development. 
 
 In considering the inner structure of society in the European 
 civilized states from the Carlovingian period down to the sixteenth 
 and seventeenth centuries, nothing is more important, next to 
 the division of wealth, the feudal system and the beginnings of 
 monetary development and government finances, than the fact 
 that the thin upper stratum of the country and city aristocracy, 
 under the guidance of priests and clergymen, had learned to read, 
 write, reckon and keep books, while the mass of the people in 
 city and country, owing to their lack of such knowledge, were 
 condemned to social subordination, to dominance and exploita- 
 tion at the hands of the aristocracy of the learned. The Ger- 
 man Reformation had set up the requirement that the entire 
 
MODERN GERMANY 195 
 
 <jrerman nation must learn to read the Bible unaided. That is 
 the origin of modern public schools, the first message of good 
 hope for the elevation of the lower and middle classes. The 
 enlightenment of the eighteenth century next demanded the 
 sharing of the people in this intellectual progress, and thus gave 
 a strong impulse to the development of the schools. The better 
 ruled German states, especially Prussia, underwent in the eight- 
 eenth century and down to 1850 an important improvement in 
 their school system, although the upper conservative classes 
 feared that as a result the young men would become insubordi- 
 nate and the girls dissolute. The development of the public 
 school, however, was not completed in Germany and elsewhere, 
 until the period from 1830 to 1850. At the same time the 
 government school system, effecting a marked restriction of the 
 religious and private schools, gained a general victory in Ger- 
 many. Now^here else was universal education made a reality 
 to such an extent as in the German bureaucratic states. The 
 result was a uniform spreading of moral and cultural concep- 
 tions, and an approach of the lower and middle classes to the 
 upper without parallel anywhere else. In France, Guizot had 
 created a more or less widespread school system in the period 
 from 1830 to 1840; in England the state did not begin to con- 
 cern itself with education until a generation ago. The moral 
 and economic destitution of the lower classes in England from 
 1750 to 1830 is one evidence of this fact. The generation at 
 the helm to-day in Europe was born from 1850 to 1870. In 
 the sixties, of children from six to fourteen years of age, only 
 4 per cent were non-attendants at school in Prussia, while in 
 France 20 per cent, in England 25 per cent and in Russia 90 
 per cent came under this head. 
 
 The greatest social reformers of all times have appreciated 
 the political and social importance of the public school. Solon 
 desired to open the schools of Attica to the great majority of the 
 people; Robert Owen laid chief stress in social reform on schools 
 for the children of workers; and the best English administra- 
 tive officials of India demanded schools for that country, in 
 order to combat the caste sj'stem from within. Extensive politi- 
 cal rights and a democratic constitution, without a good public- 
 school system, are a political paradox, if not, indeed, a madness 
 or a crime. And, in addition to the public school, the people 
 must have extension schools, and industrial and vocational 
 schools. The higher system of education, the universities, the 
 technical and commercial schools, can be built properly only 
 upon this foundation. Especially in this line has no other nation 
 
196 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 in the world made greater progress than Germany, from 1850 
 down to the present. It may be stated without exaggeration 
 that the advancement of talent in the lower classes, a certain 
 freedom of vocational choice, the approach of all classes to each 
 other and the bridging of the abyss separating the people from 
 the aristocracy is rendered possible only through a broad and 
 efficient system of educational institutions, from the lowest grade 
 to the highest. The 110,000 non-commissioned officers in the 
 present-day German army, who became soldiers with a common- 
 school education, thanks to the instruction offered them as non- 
 commissioned officers, enjoy the opportunity, as well as the right 
 to enter, when 32 years of age, into the lower and middle posi- 
 tions of the army, civil or municipal service. This service has 
 from a third to a half-million excellent officials, of whom many 
 before i860 passed on to higher careers, and whose sons and 
 grandsons are still to-day in many cases advancing to the upper 
 ranks of officialdom. 
 
 Previous to 1834, when graduation from the Gymnasium was 
 first introduced, and down to 1840 when it became more and 
 more the requirement for admission to all higher official posi- 
 tions, many of the numerous ex-non-commissioned officers ad- 
 vanced from the middle positions to the higher service. This 
 still occurs to-day in individual cases. It would have been bet- 
 ter to retain in the main the principle of advancement which 
 obtained from 1790 to 1850. 
 
 Finally, on the subject of education let us make one more 
 observation in regard to scientific freedom in our universities, 
 since they have recently been frequently branded as unfree 
 government institutions. The European universities grew up 
 from the fourteenth century, in connection with the Church; 
 their first great achievements were in Bologna, Paris, Prague 
 and Leipsic, and then throughout Germany after the Reformation. 
 Their guildlike character, however, led in the seventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries to a narrow-minded system of cliques and 
 nepotism. The free university administration degenerated in the 
 same manner as the old free city constitutions. A striking new 
 revival of the German universities begins with the great princely 
 foundations; Halle and Gottingen in the eighteenth century, 
 Berlin, Munich and Bonn at the beginning of the nineteenth 
 century head the list. The older universities followed the mod- 
 ern lead and were remodeled on similar lines. The right of 
 the princes to appoint professors rejuvenated the universities. 
 Government funds in greater and greater amounts were placed 
 at their disposal. Appointment by the state does not preclude 
 
MODERN GERMANY 197 
 
 the fact that savants proposed by the faculties are almost al- 
 ways appointed. The absolutely free body of Privatdozenten, 
 or free-lance lecturers, furnishes the necessary healthy competi- 
 tion for the officially appointed professors. Each of the numer- 
 ous federal states strives to attract the best men. He who is 
 disciplined in Gottingen may receive a call to Berlin, as did the 
 brothers Grimm. Freedom in lecturing, teaching and method, 
 as well as in literary activity, is unlimited. The administration 
 of the university by the faculty and the academic senate pre- 
 serves the republican form, as contrasted with the American 
 absolutism of university presidents and the influence of trustees, 
 who, believers in a protective tariff, remove professors advo- 
 cating free trade — a thing which could not happen in Germany. 
 At all events, the German universities during the last sixty 
 years have stood assuredly not under but above those of other 
 civilized states. This has always been unconditionally admitted 
 in Russia, North America, Japan and elsewhere. 
 
 The European armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- 
 turies rested upon the system of the free enlistment of paid 
 mercenaries from the home country and from abroad, these mer- 
 cenaries being welded together into brotherhoods and companies 
 by private military contractors (condottieri), mostly noble cap- 
 tains w^ho had become rich, or by war commissioners who had 
 received an enlistment patent from some prince. The traditions 
 of the Swiss who hired themselves out in foreign lands, and the 
 mercenary brotherhoods {Landsknechtsbruderschaften) which 
 had been formed by Emperor Maximilian, originally controlled 
 this development. William of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, 
 and the French kings and generals improved the organization 
 and the methods of fighting, sought to transform these bodies 
 partially into national troops, and paved the way for monarchic 
 discipline. The regiments, which wTre formed only for the 
 summer months, gradually became permanent. The Great Elec- 
 tor was the first, in 1660, after the Northern War, not to re- 
 lease his troops in Brandenburg-Prussia. From that time on 
 there was a Brandenburg-Prussian army, which from 1660 to 
 1786 was the first, as well as the best, in Europe. The Elector 
 transformed the purely private enterprises of majors and cap- 
 tains, who were only perfunctorily controlled by princely war 
 commissioners, into bodies of troops whose officers he appointed. 
 During the period from 1680 to 17 13 the army became a purely 
 governmental undertaking of permanent nature, the officers 
 changed from greedy money-makers into officials with the gov- 
 
198 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ernment's commission and under princely control. An increas- 
 ing proportion of officers and men were already natives and sub- 
 jects, or became such. The system of levies w^as used in con- 
 junction wath that of free enlistment; communities and cities 
 were called upon to furnish soldiers. The general canvassing 
 of soldiers as the only method, especially in foreign countries, 
 proved to be too dear, and often furnished useless rabble that 
 constantly deserted. 
 
 When Friedrich Wilhelm I, for the sake of h!s household, as 
 he said, from 1714 to 1730 at times went too far in the hiring 
 of foreign soldiers and thereby brought about unfavorable re- 
 sults, recourse was had to the mixed system, which continued 
 until 1808. A portion of the company consisted of enlisted 
 foreigners, who served almost for life and who were encour- 
 aged as much as possible to marry native women; during part 
 of the year, for reasons of economy, they were given furloughs 
 within the garrison for industrial work — the so-called Frei- 
 wdchter. This part of the army could not be increased in time 
 of war. The other part consisted of native peasant boys, who 
 were apportioned to the regiments according to the so-called 
 canton districts. They received training for one year, supple- 
 mented by several periods of from one to two months, and 
 remained for twenty years subject to call. They were the 
 more numerous in time of war, as the foreigners were in time 
 of peace. Although the so-called canton ordinance of 1773 
 declared that ''all the inhabitants of the land are born to bear 
 arms," the tiigher classes of society were not yet subject to this 
 military duty, and the exceptions increased for economic reasons 
 until 1806. A determined opposition against this duty of national 
 military service was offered from 1733 on, not primarily by the 
 peasants, who were proud to be enrolled and have a bunch of 
 feathers in their hats, but by their overlords. The latter con- 
 sidered it an infringement of their rights that the peasant was 
 now more dependent on his regiment commander than on his 
 overlord. The duty of military service was a great step toward 
 the development of universal citizenship. The peasant had now 
 a direct connection with his king, whom he had often seen, per- 
 haps spoken with, and whose battles he had helped to win. 
 
 A still more important fact was that, with the increase of the 
 army (171 3, 38,000; 1740, 83,000; 1786, 200,000; 1806, 250,- 
 000 men — the last two numbers equalling 2.3 per cent and 3.7 
 per cent, respectively, of the population), the whole nobility were 
 more and more drafted into the corps of officers. The poor lower 
 nobility of Pomerania early entered military service in order to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 199 
 
 increase their small incomes; the Brandenburgian nobles also 
 readily joined the army. But it was quite otherwise from 1713 
 to 1740 with the East Prussian aristocracy, who lived generally 
 on their feudal incomes and whom Friedrich Wilhelm I had 
 frequently to compel to send their fourteen- to eighteen-year-old 
 sons to the cadet schools and regiments. The result as a whole, 
 however, was that the entire nobility of the kingdom, by the 
 year 1800, had become accustomed to seeing all of their sons 
 officers or officials. That nobility, in 1700 still in great part 
 feudal and anti-monarchic, was now a faithful and trustworthy 
 monarchic party, to which fact was due their loyal devotion in 
 the nineteenth century to the national cause. 
 
 Under this system Prussia had a small army for peace, a large 
 army for the field. The foreigners, lifelong professional sol- 
 diers, formed the core and backbone about which the native 
 peasants were grouped. A relentless discipline was needed to 
 keep these utterly different elements together. In time of war 
 there were usually no more foreigners to be had, but it was 
 always easy to fill out the regiments by means of the numerous 
 men liable for service in the cantons who had not yet been 
 called. Although the whole Prussian military system had a 
 certain harshness, nevertheless it appeared, even to Mirabeau- 
 Mauvillon, despite its drawbacks and evils, to possess great 
 advantages. It provided for the poor nobility, he said, and 
 gave work and shelter to the idle proletariat ; as a result Prussia, 
 despite her poverty, had a like birthrate with the most prosperous 
 and fertile countries of Europe. 
 
 On the other hand, unfriendly criticism of the Prussian mili- 
 tary system increased from 1786 to 1806. The elder officials 
 supported it unreservedly, but public opinion and the young 
 generation of the most capable officers demanded more and more 
 the abolition of the foreign levy, the formation of reserve or 
 militia troops, or even indeed universal military service. 
 
 The government down to 1806 was not energetic and bold 
 enough for a great reform; the footless w^ar against France 
 from 1792 to 1795, the ill-conceived divisions of Poland between 
 1793 and 1795, which strengthened Prussia only outwardly, not 
 inwardly, had been too costly to leave any money over for mili- 
 tary reform. This came, however, from 1808 to 1820. Among 
 the regulations introduced during this period were the univer- 
 sal duty of bearing arms, the creation of a large Landwehr in 
 connection with the regular army, a thorough reconstruction of 
 the officers' corps, on the basis of equality of the ordinary citizen 
 with the nobles. It was no slight task, even under the pressure of 
 
200 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 war, for War Minister von Boyen, In the years 1814 to 181 5, 
 to create a moderately large army of peace, with three years* 
 service, besides the two classes of Landwehr reserves which 
 were formed on the basis of universal conscription. This was 
 an achievement of the great Idealistic and liberal statesmen and 
 generals to which the vacillating King, Friedrich Wilhelm III, 
 gave his approval only because Boyen cleverly represented It to 
 him as merely the development of existing Institutions. The 
 two Ministers, Altenstein and Dohna, had been, in 18 10, as 
 were later the Berlin city representatives, against general mili- 
 tary service, in the pretended interest of civilization. Scharn- 
 horst conceived of a standing army of the Indigent and of a per- 
 manent militia of the upper classes In connection with it. Gnei- 
 senau attributed the relaxing and deteriorating of the nations 
 and the dying out of a sense of public duty to the standing mer- 
 cenary armies. Universal military duty, he said, mingles the 
 upper and lower classes, does away with social prejudices, com- 
 pels better education of the common people and rests upon a 
 moral principle which sets the masses in movement and blends 
 them together. Baron von Stein regarded the universal duty 
 of bearing arms as the chief means of creating a sense of soli- 
 darity, of combating the opposition of the various classes to each 
 other and the tendency of the upper classes to unwarlike and 
 eifeminate habits. 
 
 Metternich, of course, regarded universal military duty as a 
 mistake. Emperor Alexander feared the democratic character 
 of this Institution so greatly that in Paris he expressed doubt 
 whether It would not soon be necessary to send help to the King 
 of Prussia against his own army. In Koblenz, Gneisenau, as 
 commanding general, was suspected of being a demagogic gen- 
 eral. The French made merry over the Prussian "child-army." 
 General Biilow and many of the elder generals urgently de- 
 manded the return to the old system. Only Adjutant-General 
 von Witzleben held the King in 1819 firmly to the great re- 
 form. 
 
 The Prussian army law of September 3, 1814, is perhaps 
 the most Important law of this epoch. It has been of funda- 
 mental importance for the development of moral and political 
 conceptions, at first In Prussia, then In Germany, during the 
 w^hole period down to the present. It was a democratic law In 
 the best sense of the word. Germany stands, as does no other 
 state, upon universal education and the universal duty of bearing 
 arms. With universal military duty the standing army became, 
 above all else, a training-school for the whole nation. Its intro- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 201 
 
 duction, says one of our great historians, was a bold stroke, with- 
 out precedent, bringing to mind the energy of the antique concep- 
 tion of the state. Universal military duty presupposes the agree- 
 ment of people and government. It permits of no war of which 
 the nation does not approve. With it no war of conquest is possi- 
 ble, but only a defensive war, a war for the life and existence 
 of the nation. 
 
 The changes which, from 18 14 down to to-day, took place 
 in the Prussian and German army constitutions need not be 
 traced here. They did not change its basic character. How- 
 ever heatedly the reform of the army was discussed from 1859 
 to 1866, however strongly feudal the officers of the standing 
 army temporarily seemed, while the Landwehr appeared to be the 
 only popular part of the organization, nevertheless this basic 
 idea remained: The standing army, with its professional offi- 
 cers, is the backbone of our military strength and the school for 
 the whole nation; but the greater part of the troops who take 
 the field are citizens, not professional soldiers nor professional 
 officers. We still have, as from 18 13 to 1815, as in 1830, 1848, 
 1864 to 1870, a people's army, which is more truly popular 
 than any other army in the world. It is not more beloved of 
 our princes and nobility than of our citizens, peasants and 
 workers. Every one who is familiar with our Social Democ- 
 racy knows that even for the Social Democrat his period of 
 service remains the most delightful memory. We have wit- 
 nessed the manner in which the Social Democrats, without ex- 
 ception, joyously responded to the summons. He who knows 
 the relation of our officers to their men is aware that I have 
 been justified in often making this declaration in lectures and in 
 writing: "If our entrepreneurs and their agents stood toward 
 their workers on the same footing as our officers toward the 
 men under them, we should have no social question among 
 us." 
 
 All this chatter about an unsocial despotic German militarism, 
 inimical to liberal civilization, is the talk of people who have, 
 or desire to have, no knowledge of our internal conditions. 
 
 We pass now from the reform of school and army to the 
 judicial reform. Nothing is more important for the security of 
 the individual freedom of modern man in the state of to-day 
 than a high standard of public justice: Justitia fundamentum 
 regnorum. No task was more difficult in the change from the 
 state of the Middle Ages to the modern commonwealth, than 
 the creation of an able, impartial body of judges, of an up-to-date 
 
202 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 court organization, of efficient civil and criminal laws. Much 
 of this was accomplished by the old Prussian state before 1800; 
 and together with the other German states, Prussia made con- 
 siderable progress from 1800 to 1870. Between that date and 
 the present day Germany has achieved a model of uniform court 
 organization and a uniform code of civil law, which unites the 
 merits of the Code Civil and of the old Prussian state law 
 {Landrecht) . 
 
 It is no easy task to present concretely, in a few w^ords, the law 
 reforms of a thousand years. But let us attempt it. 
 
 The elder Germanic legal procedure provided for the conduct 
 of cases by the community under the presidency of the count and 
 of the magistrate, whose functions were merely formal; a 
 strictly formal verbal process, without appeal, led to the deci- 
 sion. As early as the time of Charlemagne the communities 
 proved inefficient and the Emperor replaced them by sheriffs 
 (Schoffen). This reform was not sufficient. The Schoffen 
 court in the late Middle Ages had completely broken down. 
 From the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in all European 
 states, it was necessary to introduce a monarchic system of court 
 organization, judges appointed by the ruler, and a scientific body 
 of law. But the change from the old to the new was extremely 
 difficult. To create a learned body of judges was no easy task, 
 especially for the lower courts. Old and new institutions re- 
 mained for hundreds of years, existing side by side, and mutually 
 obstructing each other. The Roman Law gained the upper hand 
 more and more from the fifteenth century on, not as a better, but 
 as a written, learned system of a higher state of civilization. The 
 legal procedure of the Roman Church, with its principles of 
 equity, and that of the princes and their counsellors, which was 
 fashioned after it, was preferred to the procedure of the old court 
 organizations. At the same time there grew up the written pro- 
 cedure with clerks of the court. Next, from the eighteenth cen- 
 tury on, there appeared, as an important step forward, the col- 
 legiate courts, like the Imperial Court and the higher princely 
 courts. 
 
 In the local courts everything remained unchanged; the func- 
 tions of the sheriffs sank, in most places, to mere cooperation in 
 the drawing up of legal documents. The judges had insufficient 
 legal training, or none at all ; they became dependent on grasping 
 clerks and cunning lawyers, as well as on the latter's go-betweens, 
 the so-called procurators, who were the channel through which 
 all corruption passed. Almost all the judges, especially those of 
 the lower courts, were without regular pay and were supposed to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 203 
 
 live from perquisites of the court. As Late as the sixteenth cen- 
 tury, the courts sat only one to two weeks four times yearly, 
 although the written procedure long since had demanded a con- 
 tinuous official activity throughout the whole year. The civil 
 law was entirely uncertain, the criminal barbaric; the procedure 
 was everywhere conducted according to precedent and whim. 
 Interference with justice by the princes and their commissioners 
 was the order of the day ; the dragging out of the cases was pro- 
 moted by the cupidity of the judges and lawyers, and the tedious- 
 ness of the written procedure became unbearable. As there 
 was confidence in no body of judges, in no city or manorial court, 
 the sole hope of a just decision rested in sending the papers in 
 the case to the law faculties, or to the few Schoffen courts that 
 were still respected. Jurisdiction in Germany reached its lowest 
 point about 1650. 
 
 The attempts at reform in Brandenburg-Prussia from 1650 to 
 1740 were numerous — but of little avail. Provincial upper 
 courts were created ; in 1 7 1 7 criminal cases were taken from the 
 local county courts, that is to say, from the overlords; in 1718, 
 in East Prussia, the county law was reformed ; frequent attempts 
 were made to revive the system of oral pleadings in the Berlin 
 Upper Court {Kammergericht) . But it remained mere patch- 
 work. The reformers were powerless against the advocates of 
 the old dilly-dallying methods. There were no funds with which 
 to pay competent judges. 
 
 It was the great achievement of Frederick the Great and of his 
 relentlessly energetic High Chancellor, Samuel Cocceji, that 
 during the period from 1745 to 1755 an upright, learned body of 
 judges was created, no longer dependent on perquisites, but with 
 regular salaries, that the "procurators" were done away with and 
 reduced to lawyers' clerks, that the body of judges and lawyers 
 was thoroughly overhauled and placed under close surveillance, 
 and that the payment of lawyers was deferred until the termina- 
 tion of the cases. Through Cocceji justice became speedy in 
 Prussia. Cocceji, says Ranke, founded the Prussian judiciary 
 anew. From that period on, he adds, personal freedom was to a 
 certain extent guaranteed. Star Chamber justice was done away 
 with and jurisdiction confined to the regular courts admitting of 
 two appeals. All judges stood now under the surveillance of the 
 chief justice, all lower courts under that of the upper courts. 
 The training of judges was strictly regulated by examination and 
 by promotion through the preparatory grades of Auskultator 
 and Kejerendar. The personnel and the organization of jus- 
 ^tice had now reached the plane to which the Prussian adminis- 
 
204 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 trative system had already attained in the years from 1680 to 
 1740. 
 
 What Cocceji began was completed by two men, less ruthless 
 than he, but standing even above him in point of moral nobility 
 and intellectual endowment — the High Chancellor von Carmer 
 and his Councillor Suarez (i 780-1 795). 
 
 The reform of the civil procedure (April 26, 1781, and July 
 6, 1793), the introduction of oral pleadings, the increase of the 
 judges' power to unlimited freedom in establishing the material 
 truth, and the limitation of lawyers' activity was designed to se- 
 cure justice for the peasants and the people of the lower classes. 
 This has been called the procedure by inquiry: The judge was 
 bound ex officio to discover the truth. He was vested with a 
 kind of tutelary, almost state-socialistic power, which was to 
 counteract the untrustworthiness of the lawyers of that time and 
 the helplessness of the litigants. The judges were intended to 
 occupy, on a small scale, a position such as the all-powerful king 
 occupied on a large scale, with his desire to understand and to 
 help the lowly. The windmill owner of Sans-SoucI who is sup- 
 posed to have Impelled the King to leave him In peace by saying: 
 ^7/ y a des juges a Berlin j" never spoke thus. But Carmer 's code 
 of procedure, like the King's interference in behalf of the miller 
 Arnold against his overlord. Count Schmettau, made the whole 
 Prussian people believe that there was now one state in Europe 
 in which the obscure man could secure justice against the great 
 man. 
 
 Attempts were made in all the greater German territories, 
 from the sixteenth century on, to create a uniform whole out of 
 the conglomeration of the adopted Roman Law, the German legal 
 institutions, and the legislation subsequent to the year 1500. 
 Friedrlch Wilhelm I attempted to do what Leibnitz had advised ; 
 Cocceji also outlined a plan, but only Carmer possessed the cour- 
 age to influence Frederick the Great to attempt the creation of 
 a code comprehensible to the people. It was intended to make 
 it so clear and complete that the disputes of the jurists should 
 cease. The outline was printed during the period 1784 to 1788; 
 and despite many attacks and criticisms It was put Into effect on 
 June I, 1792. Its aim was not to create a new law but to codify 
 and elucidate the existing law. 
 
 This general common law {Allgemeines Landrecht) reflects 
 the conditions of the half-feudal, half-absolute state, of the bu- 
 reaucratic and military state. It was from the start subject to 
 much discussion, but it was nevertheless recognized as an epoch- 
 snaking advance by the greatest and most far-seeing men of the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 205 
 
 age. It provided for the first time a uniform law for a state with 
 radically different provinces. It created a fixed and purely Ger- 
 man law nomenclature ; it was a compromise between Roman and 
 German law. It vastly increased legal security. It helped more 
 than anything else the transition from the "police state" to the 
 legal state. It was the worthy predecessor of the French code 
 civil and of the German general civil code {Biirgerliches Gesetz- 
 buck) of our day. It became the foundation for the whole Ger- 
 man legal life of the nineteenth century. 
 
 The nineteenth century continued to build upon the founda- 
 tions of the eighteenth century. The jurisdiction of the ma- 
 norial courts in Prussia, which had long since been restricted, 
 w^as in 1849 entirely abolished, although it was much superior 
 to the jurisdiction of the English justices of the peace; Lord 
 Brougham, as is well known, once remarked of the latter that 
 it was worse and more partial even than the justice of a Turk- 
 ish "cadi." Trial by jury was introduced. The great reforms 
 in procedure and court constitution between 1 877-1 879 created 
 in all Germany a uniform procedure, and attached laymen as 
 assessors to the courts of the first instance. In short, Germany 
 has to-day a system which, as regards the legal protection of 
 the people and of individuals, is surpassed by that of no other 
 nation; it has enjoyed this, in its main outlines and principles, 
 for quite a number of generations. 
 
 We come finally to the question of self-government. It is, 
 in the proper form, the best training school for political free- 
 dom; it can, however, develop along false lines into an instru- 
 ment of class rule and of political corruption. We understand, 
 in this connection, by self-government the administration of the 
 municipalities and other communal units by the citizens them- 
 selves, with more or less independence as regards the state 
 authorities and officials. If this independence goes as far as it 
 went at one time in the German Free Cities, or in the greater 
 Territorial Cities from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, as 
 well as among the manorial lords, or in the county and district 
 corporations, the resistance of the state to this independence 
 and its abuses becomes necessary, as the German princes from 
 1500 to 1800 found to be the case. Since in England a strong 
 monarchy from the early Norman kings down to the Tudors kept 
 the nobility and cities subordinate to the central power, the 
 healthy self-government which grew up in the county, township 
 and parish caused great admiration on the Continent, espe- 
 cially in Germany, down to the time of Gneist,^ and sugges- 
 
2o6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 tlons were made for its imitation in Germany. But the advo- 
 cates of such measures failed to see that the English self-gov- 
 ernment in county and township had long since degenerated 
 into class rule. 
 
 In the state of to-day the central power and its organs must 
 rule absolutely in the whole legislative field, in foreign and 
 military affairs, and as regards justice. In the field of finance, 
 police and internal administration the authorities of the munici- 
 palities and other communal corporations may be entrusted with 
 the carrying out of certain governmental affairs; others, espe- 
 cially institutions of general utility of all kinds, may be left 
 entirely or partially to them, ordinarily in such a manner that 
 they choose their own bodies and appoint their own officials 
 for these undertakings. Especially does the purely business ad- 
 ministration of the municipalities belong to this category. 
 
 Where the communal authorities are inspired by the proper 
 feeling, this self-government, within its proper limits, is a 
 higher form of political life. These locally chosen authorities 
 stand nearer to concrete conditions, and bring a great sum of 
 character and intelligence to bear on the public service which 
 would otherwise be lost to it. Such a self-government edu- 
 cate? the whole people politically, raises its sense of solidarity. 
 But it must not be forgotten in this connection that the well-to- 
 do classes are primarily the ones to enter this service of self- 
 government, and that they are continually subjected to the 
 temptation of misuse of power. An eminent teacher of German 
 constitutional law said, therefore, not without justification: 
 "Self-government is always more or less class rule." Only by 
 taking this point of view, which enables one to contemplate as a 
 whole the historic development of self-government and its dif- 
 ferent possible results, is one able correctly to appreciate the 
 various phases of its growth. 
 
 From this point of view it is easy to understand why the 
 German governmental authorities of the seventeenth and eight- 
 eenth centuries were obliged, in the same manner as they found 
 it necessary to eliminate the rule of the nobles in the heart of the 
 state, to resist just as strongly the freedom of the German cities 
 as that of the manorial rulers and of the county and district cor- 
 porations of the rural nobility. The Prussian city administra- 
 tion, as well as the rule of the rural nobility, had to be brought 
 under governmental control during the seventeenth and eight- 
 eenth centuries; the administration of the taxes and debts of the 
 Estates proved too corrupt and had to be transferred to the 
 state. It was found necessary to place the district and county 
 
MODERN GERMANY 207 
 
 government under partial or entire state management, and the 
 city administration had to be freed of its pronounced abuses. 
 
 Let us examine somewhat more closely the transformation of 
 urban and rural self-government in the eighteenth and nine- 
 teenth centuries. The German Free and Territorial Cities 
 were in the seventeenth century in a deplorable condition. The 
 economic decadence from the end of the sixteenth century, the 
 destruction due to the Thirty Years' War, the vast indebted- 
 ness, the clinging to the ideal of local economic independence 
 in the age of upgrowth of national states, the selfish exploita- 
 tion of city rule by a small oligarchy — these are the characteris- 
 tics of urban life of that period. The rising territorial state 
 had to combat as anachronistic the independence of the cities in 
 matters of economic policy. The cities in which the rulers of 
 the great German states had their abodes, Berlin, Munich, and 
 Dresden, began at this time to revive again, but all others were 
 losing ground in proportion as they were independent. 
 
 In the Brandenburg-Prussian cities, governmental interfer- 
 ence was brought about primarily through the municipalities* 
 inability to meet the interest on their debts, and through the 
 complaints of their creditors. Princely commissions for inves- 
 tigation were numerous from 1680 to 1750; they revealed not 
 alone the hopeless condition of the city finances, but an abyss 
 of the worst abuses of the governing clique as well. 
 
 In the same period, through the creation of a standing army, 
 the cities wxre given princely garrisons — barracks did not yet 
 exist. Every citizen had soldiers permanently billeted upon 
 him; the commandant of the city assumed position beside the 
 aldermen and was forced frequently to interfere. He had to 
 inform himself as regards the city administration, negotiate with 
 the body of aldermen, and regulate various matters in conjunc- 
 tion with them. He reported to the War Commissioner of the 
 territory or to the Chief War Commissioner in Berlin. As the 
 old direct city taxes proved unavailing, the Great Elector and 
 his son introduced in their place the city excise tax (1664 to 
 171 3)) which the aldermen generally opposed, but which the 
 plain people desired. It w^as possible to collect this tax satis- 
 factorily and justly only by changing it from a city to a princely 
 tax. The commissioner, the so-called tax councillor of later 
 times, who supervised the excise in six to fifteen neighboring 
 cities, automatically became between 1680 and 1740 the royal 
 comptroller for the whole city administration. Was his report 
 too unfavorable, there would be appointed for the city in ques- 
 tion, for one or two years, one of the above-mentioned investi- 
 
2o8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 gating commissions, which would result in a rearrangement of 
 the whole constitution and administration of the city in the 
 form of a so-called "city hall ordinance." 
 
 The most important point, at the same time the preliminary 
 for all material reform, was the regulation of the city indebted- 
 ness. A greater part of the indebtedness was paid off from the 
 royal treasury, the unduly high rate of interest was reduced, in 
 some cases the means for payment of interest and refunding 
 were gained from the excise tax. The suffrage for the city 
 council and city courts and their powers were regulated anew. 
 Everywhere the yearly changing city administration was done 
 away with, and a magistratus perpetuus created; the super- 
 fluous and dishonest aldermen and city officials were elimi- 
 nated and replaced by better elements. Appointment to many 
 offices by the head of the state remained customary, although 
 the old right of election was usually not formally rescinded. 
 The aldermen, who were, according to precedent, called in for 
 auditing purposes but contemptuously treated — in case of dis- 
 pute even beaten — gained an established position. The magis- 
 tratus perpetuus, cut down to a smaller number of members, 
 came under the strict surveillance of the tax commissioner 
 {Steuerrat). 
 
 This commissioner also, it is true, occasionally abused his 
 power. But, on the whole, the tax commissioners in the eight- 
 eenth century were among the most capable officials; through 
 them the whole city administration once more became honest, 
 economical and just. An entirely new and better police system 
 was rendered possible. The greatest obstacle to such a system was 
 eliminated. In almost every city of from five to forty thousand 
 inhabitants and over, there were from two to five independent 
 communities, existing side by side, and ten to twenty so-called 
 princely, noble, and religious "franchises" (Freiheiten) , inde- 
 pendent of all city authority. This condition was done away with 
 by centralizing all executive powers in the hands of one city coun- 
 cil and of the city commandant. The Prussian state obtained 
 thus from 1680 to 1750 uniformly governed cities, an ideal 
 which London did not realize until 1888 or 1889, for which 
 reason the condition of its police and administration was often 
 likened, even in England herself, to that of Constantinople. 
 
 The Prussian state had thus from 1706 to 1808 achieved a 
 city government thoroughly controlled by the central power, 
 but absolutely honest and capable, and which was able to make 
 proper use of the far-reaching communal freedom that Baron 
 von Stein gave to it in the City Ordinance {Stddteordnung) of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 209 
 
 1808. This law became the basis of Prussian and German inde- 
 pendent self-government of modern times. It is, together with 
 the law regarding general military service of 1814, politically the 
 most important and beneficent German law of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury. 
 
 The Prussian City Ordinance of 1808 determined the later laws 
 of 1 83 1 and 1853, and those of the new Prussian provinces, and 
 up to a certain point also those of the rest of Germany. Its 
 characteristic features were: i. That the collegiate magis- 
 tracy governs the city. 2. That the representatives of the citi- 
 zens, the aldermen, elect the members of the magistracy and 
 also vote the budget and the taxes. 3. That numerous depu- 
 tations or commissions formed from the magistracy, the alder- 
 men, and qualified citizens administer the city's affairs in de- 
 tail. In the magistracy there is a minority of paid members 
 elected for from six to twelve years (burgomaster, syndic, cham- 
 berlain, public works commissioners and superintendent of 
 schools), together with a majority of honorary members elected 
 from among the citizens and who usually give their whole time 
 to the city's administration. The paid members receive a pen- 
 sion in case of failure of re-election. The best elements of the 
 professional state officials have placed themselves at the disposal 
 of the cities for these positions. The aldermen naturally possess 
 great influence, for the reason that they appropriate the funds for 
 the administration of the city; but one reaches membership of 
 the council as a rule only after having learned to fulfill serious 
 duties by years of work in the mixed commissions, and in the 
 various administrative branches. In this manner the boards 
 of aldermen of the German cities have, on the whole, been 
 kept from developing into city parliaments, in which only 
 honor, influence and contracts are sought and in which the 
 majority, by cunningly devised tax schemes, lays the minority 
 under contribution, and individuals selfishly pursue their own 
 interests. 
 
 The German chief city burgomasters stand head and shoul- 
 ders, as regards capacity and achievement, above the majority 
 of their colleagues in other civilized states; the latter in part 
 are capable only of presiding at banquets or of putting their 
 name to what their secretaries have thought out, planned and 
 submitted to them, like the Lord Mayor of London, or like 
 the majority of the mayors of the French cities; those in the 
 United States stand in many cases at the head of secret or open 
 unions which plunder the cities, as has long been the case in 
 New York. 
 
2IO MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The German burgomasters often play a decisive part in the 
 German parliaments; they rise to ministerial positions or be- 
 come chief burgomasters after having been ministers, like the 
 present chief burgomaster of Berlin, who is a retired Imperial 
 minister. The German burgomasters have become the real 
 educators of the German people in political thought and in the 
 fulfillment of their duty toward the state. 
 
 The German city constitution founded by Stein was justly 
 taken as the model for the Prussian county ordinance {Kreisord- 
 nung) and the constitution of the counties from 1872 on. Before 
 this end was attained, however, the Prussian and German county 
 constitutions had to pass through many crises and make many 
 false starts. 
 
 If in East Prussia the rural village communities remained 
 too long merely an appanage of the feudal manor, nevertheless 
 the development of the aristocratic County Estates {Kreis- 
 stande), from the seventeenth century on, and their employ- 
 ment for the military and tax purposes of the state from 1640 
 to 1806, resulted in the county commissioner (Landrat), who 
 had originally been chosen from among their members, becom- 
 ing more and more a royal official, without ceasing to be a 
 trusted confidant of those within the jurisdiction of the county. 
 Hardenburg attempted to make him altogether a dependent 
 professional official, but did not succeed in his attempt. The 
 feudal reaction, under the guidance of the romantic Crown 
 Prince, from 1820 to 1840, gained the upper hand in the con- 
 duct of the state, without being able to suppress entirely the 
 old Prussian liberal officialdom, which from 1806 to 1820 had 
 saved and reformed the state. The provincial constitutions on 
 the basis of the old Estates and the provincial county ordi- 
 nances (1823 to 1848) were a baneful victory of the feudal 
 reaction, but the controlling officials did not surrender to 
 these bodies the right of taxation or other important func- 
 tions. The victory of liberalism brought from 1848 to 1850 a 
 one-sided liberal county and communal ordinance, which was 
 again set aside in 1853. The reform of local self-government 
 made no progress until 1872. But then, from 1872 to 1891, 
 came one of the most sweeping reforms which the Prussian state 
 ever experienced: the introduction of a healthy form of rural 
 self-government, together with the reform of the administra- 
 tive organization and the creation of the jurisdiction by admin- 
 istrative law courts {Verwaltungsrechtsprechung) calculated to 
 protect the rights of the individuals and the public. We will 
 not enumerate the individual laws in question. A central posi- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 211 
 
 tlon is held, as mentioned, by the new county constitution of 
 1872, an imitation of the city ordinance. Its characteristic 
 points are a justly divided representation of the great landed 
 proprietors and the smaller holdings, and of the small cities 
 belonging to the county system; a corresponding taxation of 
 the counties voted by this representative body; and a reform of 
 the office of county commissioner {Landrat) . The Landrat 
 remains half state-official, half-trusted confidant of the county, 
 but a county committee assists and controls him. The county 
 authorities attend to government affairs, and the economic ques- 
 tions of the county. The development of administrative juris- 
 diction, the reform of the local governments and of the provin- 
 cial authorities, finally the ordinance for rural communities 
 {Landgemeindeordnung) of July 3, 1891, all conceived and car- 
 ried out in the same spirit, complete the great reform. 
 
 The spiritual fathers of this reform were the liberal his- 
 torian of constitutional law, Rudolf Gneist, and the conserva- 
 tive Minister of the Interior, Fritz von Eulenburg; moderate 
 liberals and those conservatives friendly to great reforms had 
 united for this work, towards which there was violent opposi- 
 tion. Bismarck had come to realize more and more the neces- 
 sity for such reform. It was a question of imposing strict 
 duties of self-government upon the county aristocracy and the 
 peasants, and of letting the lower classes share in these duties. 
 By this means, that which had been done for the city inhabi- 
 tants by the city ordinance of 1808, was now done for the open 
 country. 
 
 All classes dov n to the workers take part to-day in the city 
 and county administration. The beneficial effects of this are 
 seen to-day among the Social Democrats whose share in the 
 system of self-government is praised by all unbiased leading 
 officials, especially by the burgomasters. They are doing excel- 
 lent service in this line, and they thereby become accustomed to 
 fulfill serious official duties, like the middle and upper classes. 
 
 In most of the other German states, reforms similar to those 
 here described have begun to be undertaken. England, after 
 long seeking in the dark, achieved modern laws of self-govern- 
 ment comparable with those of Germany only through her two 
 great Local Government Acts of August 13, 1888, and March 
 15, 1894. In France, Napoleon did away with almost all self- 
 government, and since 1870 not much has been done to change 
 this. 
 
 What Is left, then, of the reproach of our enemies and of 
 
212 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 many of our lukewarm well-wishers among the neutrals, that 
 Germany is to-day still a reactionary military and bureaucratic 
 state, without political freedom, and that since Bismarck's days, 
 instead of working for political and democratic advance, we 
 have striven only for power and military strength, and finally 
 that we proclaim the doctrine that might is greater than right 
 and wish to destroy England's position of world supremacy and 
 place ourselves in her stead by the power of arms? It is true 
 that the German Empire was born amid the clangor of arms 
 from 18(34 to 1870; it would not exist at all had it not been 
 for the Prussian army and Bismarck's plans for practical politi- 
 cal power. But would the United States have come into exist- 
 ence without the Revolutionary War, without Washington, 
 without France's military- aid, and would it continue to exist 
 without the victory of the Northern States in the Civil War? 
 Is it possible to conceive of France without her wars from 1490 
 to 18 15? Did England's world power arise without maritime, 
 commercial and colonial wars extending through centuries? 
 
 It is certain that Prussia and Germany issued triumphant 
 from the pitiful divisions of the German nation in the Holy 
 Roman Empire only by means of the Brandenburg-Prussian 
 military and bureaucratic state, which finally from 1866 to 
 1870 brought about German unity. It was not victorious, how- 
 ever, because of its military strength alone, but because at the 
 same time it possessed a model interior administration and 
 because its organization represented a political training and 
 schooling of the highest order for Germany. 
 
 Certain South German states, it is true, did not gain a con- 
 stitutional form of government until the period from 1818 to 
 1848 — Prussia, indeed, not until 1848 to 1850. It would per- 
 haps have been better for Prussia had she entered upon the 
 constitutional path as early as 1820 or 1830. But the earlier 
 entrance upon this course would not materially have altered 
 the fact that the monarchy, army and officials, even after the 
 granting of the constitution, remained the chief controlling 
 powers, which remain to the present day. Nor would an earlier 
 adherence to such principles have altered the fact that Germany's 
 geographic position, as it had done for centuries and is still doing 
 to-day, invited her neighbors to invasion and conquest. Germany 
 would have shared the fate of Poland, if the military and bureau- 
 cratic state had not been victorious and survived, feudal control 
 by the nobles being out of the question. If in 1830, 1848, or later, 
 some, or even a majority of the German states had followed the 
 course of the Swiss democracy, the spirit of the ''little canton" 
 
MODERN GERMANY 213 
 
 would have become triumphant with us, as in Switzerland. We 
 should assuredly not have become a united Empire. Nor should 
 we, in compensation, have produced other poets like Goethe and 
 Schiller, which, according to English jingoism, should be our 
 only legitimate occupation. 
 
 But if we did not have the official aristocracy of our con- 
 scientious civil servants and of our incomparable body of offi- 
 cers, we might have a ruling aristocracy of money and cap- 
 ital, such as on the whole impose their will in England, France 
 and in the United States. In that case, to be sure, we should 
 have a somewhat more complete democratization of all 
 our institutions. We are undoubtedly advancing toward 
 changes along these lines — for example, toward a reform of the 
 Prussian suffrage law. But we desire neither England's nor 
 France's parliamentary system, nor party rule such as that in 
 the United States, based in part upon purchased votes. Cer- 
 tainly, many of our institutions are still a long w^ay from per- 
 fection. But we, nevertheless, consider them better than those 
 of the great western democratic countries — at all events more 
 adapted to Germany's spirit and history. 
 
 Undoubtedly, democracy is able to bring forth healthy con- 
 ditions in small states. And the great states, likewise, to-day 
 strive more earnestly than formerly to educate the mass of the 
 people to self-rule and to a share in the government. But in 
 doing this certain dangers are always run: the democratic form 
 of government usually brings forth capitalistic class-rule, cor- 
 ruption, buying of votes, and an uncertain, changeable foreign 
 policy. At all events, the blessings of democratic reforms are 
 to be gained only in those cases where a strong, self-reliant, 
 central power is preserved, and where the populace, before gain- 
 ing greater rights and influence, has been accustomed for a 
 long time to important government duties. The degree of ad- 
 missible democratic institutions is determined to-day more than 
 ever, as Seeley teaches us, according to the security of the 
 state's exterior position (such as Switzerland, but not Germany, 
 enjoys), and according to the degree in which healthy, aristo- 
 cratic strength is preserved, such as England possesses in her 
 gentry, and Germany in her officialdom. 
 
 The present-day German Empire presents a strange mixture 
 of "great state" and "little state," of aristocratic forces and 
 conditions in Prussia, of democratic in the west and south. 
 These forces have learned to adapt themselves to each other, to 
 understand each other, and to unite for the accomplishment of 
 Igreat tasks. Prussia has developed from a territorial state> 
 
214 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 which was almost a republic of nobles, to a constitutional state, 
 after passing through the military stage; she has educated her 
 aristocracy to the conception of public duty through service as 
 officials and officers and through self-government. The royal 
 power has reconciled itself with the democratic and constitu- 
 tional tendencies, on the basis of the official state which it pre- 
 eminently represents. The Imperial power has made social 
 reform its motto, in conjunction with exterior protection, with- 
 out in any wise destroying the spirit of industrial enterprise. 
 The landed aristocracy and the aristocracy of wealth have 
 clasped hands, and each of them finds honor and occupation in 
 the army and in the administration. The means of reconcilia- 
 tion with the lower classes is found in the universal duty of 
 bearing arms. 
 
 Our ministers and party leaders spring to-day almost more 
 from the middle class than from the aristocracy, in part also 
 from the lower classes. But almost all of these political lead- 
 ers have been through the school of official service and of self- 
 administration, so that they do not bring with them into their 
 high positions the instincts of the money-maker or the van- 
 ity of the position-seeker. Bismarck and the Eulenburgs, Ca- 
 privi, Hohenlohe and Billow, Bethmann and Delbriick, Bot- 
 ticher and Miquel, Bennigsen and Eugen Richter, as well as 
 Schulze-Delitzsch, rose by passing through this school and that 
 of self-government. In the middle-sized and small states purely 
 official ministers are more common even than in Prussia. Nat- 
 urally this type of character, which prevails on the ministerial 
 benches and among the party leaders, has its drawbacks as 
 well as its advantages. But where does one find a type of 
 humanity, a ruling class, or an institution without the comple- 
 mentary faults of its good qualities? 
 
 The attacks which are made to-day in such violently exag- 
 gerated fashion, especially in England and France, and even in 
 the United States, against the manner in which Germany is 
 governed, result chiefly from a lack of understanding of Ger- 
 man conditions and from the difficulty of grasping them with 
 English or French conceptions and prejudices, when viewed 
 from the standpoint of fundamentally different governmental, 
 administrative, legal and social conditions. In addition, in 
 individuals, anger at the destruction of war, the influence of 
 aroused national passion, personal experiences, the degree of 
 politico-historical training, or the lack of it are factors which 
 give birth to such fairy tales as the one that Germany was 
 driven into the war by the teachings of a neurasthenic philos- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 215 
 
 opher (Nietzsche), of a chauvinistic general (von BernhardI) 
 and of a great historian who hated England (von Treitschke). 
 These three wicked men, it is claimed, have for the last twenty 
 to thirt}^ years hypnotized the whole of Germany, deceived her 
 into believing that England was bound for destruction in any 
 event, and that Germany must seize her inheritance. We shall 
 not examine this stupid invention more closely; it is disproved 
 in another part of this book. In closing, we shall say a few- 
 words further in regard to the misleading statements of Pres- 
 ident Emeritus Eliot, of Harvard University, in the New York 
 Times. He is well known to many German scholars, who had 
 certainly hoped to hear more veracious and more sensible things 
 from him about Germany. 
 
 We are not conversant with his earlier work as a natural 
 scientist. As a director of the leading American university, his 
 achievements have been great and exemplary. But as a politi- 
 cal historian he is an absolute failure; he looks down upon 
 Germany with arrogant superiority, because he sees that Ger- 
 many has other institutions than his native country. 
 
 He speaks somewhat in this manner : You Germans have, it is 
 true, achieved something in literature, art, science and edu- 
 cation, but if you do not renounce your autocratic government, 
 your standing army with its universal military service, your 
 secret treaties, your unyielding bureaucracy, your love of 
 power, your aspirations for colonies, we free Americans can 
 have no sympathy for you. 
 
 Much — indeed, most of that which he blames us for — ap- 
 plies to the majority of European and non-European states, and 
 above all to France, Russia and England. But France appears 
 to him sufficiently democratic to be pardoned for having founded 
 by military means an immense colonial empire in the last forty 
 years. He closes his eyes to Russia's brutal policy of force and 
 conquest, because she was the originator of the Hague confer- 
 ences! In regard to England, he does not seem to be quite 
 aware through what measures of force her tremendous colonial 
 empire came into existence, or how gigantic her conquests by 
 force have been precisely in the period since 1870. But Eng- 
 land, in compensation for this, does not have universal military 
 duty, which, according to him, takes away freedom, restricts 
 unfettered social movement, and costs even the well-to-do lib- 
 erty, health, and under certain conditions life itself. All states 
 to-day enter into secret treaties, even the United States, but 
 Germany alone is made responsible for this. Germany is blamed 
 by Eliot for having conquered and annexed Schleswig-Holstein 
 
2i6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and Alsace-Lorraine, in 1864 and 1870, respectively; he for- 
 gets to say that both were German countries, and that the latter 
 had once been taken from us by force. Eliot complains bit- 
 terly that there was no vote of the people taken in regard to 
 these conquests. I should like to remind him of what his 
 colleague, Sloane {Preussische Jahrbiicher, Vol. 158, p. 460), 
 says in regard to the conquests of the United States: "We 
 have gained neighboring territory through force, through war 
 or occupation, and through purchase or exchange. In none of 
 these cases have we inquired through a vote of the people as to 
 the wishes of the inhabitants in the particular territory, nor have 
 we approached the Hague tribunal for advice. We have always 
 had the same excuse, namely, that it was required by our inter- 
 ests." Professor Sloane possesses the historical and constitutional 
 knowledge in which President Eliot is so sadly lacking. The 
 latter declares that our relation to other states cannot improve 
 until we have repudiated Bismarck's policies. Eliot would as- 
 suredly consider us insane were we to demand of the Americans 
 that they renounce the policy of Washington and of the great 
 Federalists, who gave them a fatherland, in the same manner 
 as Bismarck's policy gave us ours. 
 
 Eliot takes the attitude of the child who expects roses from 
 an apple-tree when he blames us for not sharing the political 
 opinions of the present-day American, who stands for "human 
 freedom and peace." We answer him that we do stand for these 
 things, but we cannot strive for such goals at all times nor 
 always under the conditions which appear proper to him and 
 to some Americans who share his views. 
 
 We have reached the end of our discussion. Its aim was 
 to attempt an exposition of the spirit of our public life as this 
 presents itself to the German writer on economics and consti- 
 tutional law. Naturally, our view is in direct opposition to 
 that taken of this spirit by our enemies, who in many cases are 
 quite ignorant of Germany and her history. 
 
 The judgment of our enemies will not be easily changed. 
 But the truth in regard to the causes of the present war and 
 the state of German conditions will, nevertheless, finally pre- 
 vail — more, to be sure, through the logic of facts than through 
 the efforts of German scholars. With time the world will 
 learn the truth as to German militarism, German lack of free- 
 dom and German barbarism. It will be recognized that Ger- 
 mans know well how to appreciate the blessings of political 
 freedom, but only when it is joined with a strong sense of feel- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 217 
 
 ing for the state and for the fulfilment of political duty. The 
 fact will be recognized that we suffer from fewer abuses of 
 class power, because in addition to and above the aristocracy 
 of wealth, we possess an unimpeachable official aristocracy and 
 a strong monarchy and imperial power. Ir will be recognized 
 that we appreciate the right of self-government for municipali- 
 ties as highly as other nations, but that we are willing to grant 
 these rights only to such as have been educated to them. It 
 will be recognized that we are no warlike, aggressive nation, 
 precisely on account of the universal duty of bearing arms, and 
 that we are by far less greedy of conquests than the English, 
 the Russians, the French and the Americans. It will be recog- 
 nized that our imperialism demands only *'a place in the sun,'* 
 while that of England aims at exclusive control of interna- 
 tional trade. The world will come to realize that we protect 
 the smaller states better than England, unless they conspire 
 against us. We prevented France in 1830 from annexing Bel- 
 gium, and in 1867 Napoleon from annexing Luxemburg. 
 
 In contrast to the world-embracing plans of our enemies, we 
 stand for the balance of power among all the great civilized 
 states, for the system which the great Scipio family once de- 
 sired to introduce in the Mediterranean, when selfish merchants 
 of Rome forced the state into the course of international trade 
 supremacy. Since that time, in every case, the momentarily 
 greatest states have succumbed to the same temptation — first 
 Spain, then Holland, then France, then England. To-day the 
 United States faces a like danger. These tendencies toward 
 world supremacy have always injured rather than benefited 
 the states manifesting them. We Germans shall not succumb 
 to this danger. We are, therefore, the nation capable of doing 
 most for the advancement of international law and interna- 
 tional arbitration. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY 
 
 DR. HANS LUTHER, CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN 
 
 CO-OPERATION of the citizen in public affairs is a char- 
 acteristic of the modern state. Strange to say, the opin- 
 ion is encountered among foreigners, even among intelligent and 
 usually well-informed foreigners, that such a citizenship scarcely 
 exists in Germany, if, indeed, at all. This conception seems to 
 result from the conviction that the democratic form of govern- 
 ment is the only one that gives citizens the proper influence on 
 the destinies of the state. This is a confusion between form 
 and substance. The important question is the realization of 
 the state as a corporate entity in which the individual lives in 
 freedom and can assert himself. By what means this goal is to be 
 reached is a question of form, which must be decided differently 
 according to the historical and geographical conditions of the 
 individual nations. The constitutional principles of the so- 
 called democratic states, likewise, vary greatly among them- 
 selves. It is only necessary, for example, to compare the United 
 States with France. Furthermore, constitutional forms, like 
 all things human, are subject to development. The German 
 constitution will continue to progress without doubt in the 
 line of an ever-increasing development of citizenship. 
 
 If the present condition of citizenship within the German 
 Empire is to be understood, one must consider not only the 
 right of suffrage, as it exists in the Empire for the Reichstag, 
 and in the component states of the Union, e. g., for the Prus- 
 sian legislature, or Abgeordnetenhaus. The fact is of great 
 importance that citizens whose appointment depends on election 
 cooperate to a marked degree in ordinary administration — that 
 is to say, not alone in connection with legislation, which is 
 reserved for the legislative bodies. Such elected members, for 
 example, are found in Prussia in the County Councils 
 {Kreisausschilsse) and District Councils (Bezirksausschiisse). 
 These authorities are called upon to decide in regard to a 
 variety of important administrative questions; in addition, they 
 constitute Administrative Courts {Verwaltungsgerichte). Fur- 
 
 218 
 
MODERN GERMANY 219 
 
 ther, the laity is well represented also in the other courts. Thus, 
 the more serious crimes are tried by the Schwurgericht^ in which 
 the jurors decide questions of fact as well as of guilt. Less 
 serious offenses are decided before a court consisting of a pro- 
 fessional judge, who presides, and two laymen, who are called 
 Schoffen. Laymen are active, likewise, in civil cases, in so far 
 as they deal with affairs of trade and industry or with condi- 
 tions relating to commercial employers and employees; in all of 
 these courts the presiding officer alone is a professional judge, 
 while the associates, who are in the majority, are laymen. The 
 associates in the industrial and mercantile courts ( Gewerbegericht, 
 Kaufmannsgericht) are chosen directly from the members of the 
 business in question, primarily according to the principle of pro- 
 portional election. 
 
 All these rights of the citizens concern the state in a narrower 
 sense. No one, however, will be able to judge or even to under- 
 stand the German state organism who sees nothing on the one 
 hand but the state, and on the other the individual. Public life 
 is built up in numerous intermediate steps passing over the family, 
 over the community, the profession, race connections and many 
 other unifying conditions until a comprehensive whole is reached. 
 This comprehensive whole alone is the state in the narrow sense. 
 If, now, it is the duty of the state organism to adapt itself to the 
 actual conditions of the nation's life, it must in its various activi- 
 ties do justice to all of these intermediate phenomena. The 
 resulting organisms of a vastly manifold nature are, however, 
 not an exclusive peculiarity of the German Empire. England 
 has a great number of such organisms intervening between the 
 individual and the state in the narrow sense, and which in their 
 collectivity represent the sum total of public life {Staatsleben), 
 These intermediate organisms exist, of course, also in France and 
 other countries, although less developed. Hence, if one wishes to 
 gauge the importance of the individual in public life, the ques- 
 tion must not be: What influence has the individual upon the 
 affairs of the state in the narrow sense? It must be framed 
 thus: To what degree does the individual play a part in the 
 general expression of public life? Having thus correctly ex- 
 pressed our question, we are faced by an abundance of rights, 
 but likewise duties, of the individual citizen in the public life 
 of Germany. In no other country are the intermediate organ- , 
 isms between the state and the individual endowed with so 
 many rights and so much actual influence on public life as in 
 the German Empire. 
 
 The legal point of departure for these intermediate organ- 
 
220 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 isms is the conception of self-government, or municipal home- 
 rule. Considered purely from the juridical point of view, the 
 corporations for the exercise of self-government are legal per- 
 sonages of the public law, who are not subordinate to the state 
 as its appointees, but stand side by side with the state with a 
 certain degree of independence. By means of such a legal for- 
 mula, however, one cannot grasp the fundamental nature of 
 these typically German forms of expression of public life. The 
 whole of German history reveals a strong impulse of the people 
 toward self-government, in the broadest sense of the word. 
 This tendency has at times proved most dangerous in the his- 
 tory of the German people. In the old German Empire the 
 tendency of the individual to regard rather the particular ob- 
 ject close at hand than a more distant general goal was a de- 
 structive element, which was overcome only gradually along the 
 course of development leading through the strong "territorial 
 state.'* To-day, however, self-government is no longer a disturb- 
 ing factor. For the mighty German Empire of the present has 
 given to the German people that state and national consciousness 
 which almost all the other nations of the world have possessed 
 for a long time, and which they, therefore, begrudged us Ger- 
 mans. On this basis, self-government is a source of strength, 
 since it directs the attention of the individual not alone to those 
 affairs of public life which are removed from his immediate per- 
 ception, but also to those matters directly under his eye and hence 
 subject to his judgment. A German body politic without a 
 system of self-government is unthinkable. 
 
 In the modern development of self-government, the cities, or 
 municipalities {Stadtgemeinden) y can claim for themselves the 
 right of priority. They are followed by the rural communi- 
 ties {Landgemeinden), Organizations of a higher kind in 
 Prussia are the counties {Landkreise) , which embrace the 
 smaller cities and the rural communities, and the provincial 
 units (Provinzialverbdnde) , which are formed from the greater 
 cities and the counties. Provinces and counties are called com- 
 munal unions {Kommunalverbdnde) , in contrast to the single 
 communities (Gemeinde). Besides these communal corpora- 
 tions, with extensive functions, there are still a large number 
 of special organs of self-government, namely, such bodies as 
 are called upon to fulfill one or more definitely specified duties. 
 These bodies have in many cases come down from olden times, 
 especially as local associations for common interests (Interes- 
 senvereinigungen) . These cooperative bodies are most highly 
 developed in regard to water rights; an example are the numer- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 221 
 
 ous dike-associations. Modern vocational representation Is of 
 more widespread importance: the chambers of agriculture, the 
 chambers of commerce, the chambers of trade and industry; 
 undoubtedly also we shall soon have labor chambers or cham- 
 bers of workmen. All of these chambers, each of which Is 
 limited to a definite territory, have public legal authority to 
 protect the vocational interests which they represent. In the 
 case of disputes as to the extent of their authority, they can 
 appeal to the decision of the Administrative Courts. The Gov- 
 ernment does not exercise any influence on the appointment of 
 the chief officers of these bodies for self-government. The 
 members of the trades or callings represented in these cham- 
 bers work in perfect freedom through their many organs. Fur- 
 ther, these bodies are not restricted in their freedom of combi- 
 nation. In this way associations have arisen whose influence 
 on our entire public life has been very perceptible: the Council 
 of Agriculture {Landwirtschaftsrat) from the chambers of ag- 
 riculture, the Diet of Commerce {Handelstag) from the cham- 
 bers of commerce, the Diet of Trade and Industry from the 
 chambers of trade and industry. Legislation has recognized 
 these free associations in various ways; for example, the Council 
 of Agriculture, as well as the Diet of Commerce, were given 
 seats in the Imperial Distribution Board {Reichsverteilunffs- 
 stelle), whose important task is the distribution of the grain 
 and flour on hand to the various communities. 
 
 The German Diet of Cities {Stddtetag) is also represented 
 in the Imperial Distribution Board. It is a union of the Ger- 
 man cities sprung from their own initiative. This association 
 is all the more important because it is in the city organizations 
 that the idea of self-government is most highly developed. The 
 tasks of the cities are more comprehensive than those of any 
 other self-governing body, including the other communal cor- 
 porations. The counties and the rural communities have, only 
 when considered as entities, approximately identical tasks. The 
 activity of the provinces is more or less confined to definite 
 lines, such as highways, care of the insane, of the blind and of 
 the deaf and dumb, and supplementary charities. The cities, on 
 the contrary, can each claim in their particular territory the 
 same universality of aims as the state. To be sure, they are 
 excluded from a number of fields of public activity, naturally 
 from that of foreign affairs. For the rest, the cities determine 
 alone what tasks lie in their province simply by assuming them. 
 Their decision is influenced by the state only to the degree that 
 certain tasks are assigned to the cities by law. On the other 
 
222 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 hand, there is no legal requirement for the cities to secure the 
 state's approval before extending the field of their activity. Ac- 
 tual development has forced them, in many fields, to the fore- 
 front of progress. A few statistics will prove the truth of this 
 statement in a general way. In the period from 1895 to 1908 
 the budgets of Prussian cities of 25,000 inhabitants and over 
 increased more than threefold. At present the total cost of 
 running the German communities is not less than that of the 
 Empire itself. The debts of the municipalities — in the main 
 contracted for profitable purposes — are notably higher than the 
 Imperial Government debt before the outbreak of the war. 
 
 The constitutional form of the German cities is republican — 
 if, indeed, one can properly apply to self-governing bodies this 
 conception adapted to the state as a whole. Chief importance, 
 in this connection, attaches to allowing individual citizens the 
 greatest possible participation in affairs. It may with confi- 
 dence be asserted that the acts of the self-governing bodies are 
 acts of the citizens. To be sure, chief place in the city adminis- 
 tration is held by a burgomaster, generally styled "Chief Bur- 
 gomaster," who is always a professional official, and nearly al- 
 ways a lawyer (jurist). His constitutional influence, however, 
 is clearly circumscribed. He is not appointed by the central 
 government (as in Holland), but is chosen by the other officials 
 of the city, and requires only the approval of the state govern- 
 ment. The overwhelming majority of Germans agree that this 
 practice of filling the chief city positions with professional offi- 
 cials is one of the greatest safeguards for the relative independ- 
 ence of the cities from the state as a whole. Professional su- 
 periority of the central state officials, constantly in touch with 
 public affairs, by which the layman is so likely to be unduly in- 
 fluenced, carries no weight with a Chief Burgomaster; for he, 
 too, has professional experience, generally of an entire lifetime, 
 to draw upon. The danger, moreover, that the Chief Burgo- 
 master, since he himself is an official by profession, might secretly 
 feel himself more in sympathy with the government officials than 
 with the inhabitants of the city, is obviated in the first place by 
 the fact that the other city officials elect him — generally for twelve 
 years. Further, the preeminence of his position depends precisely 
 upon the independence of the city administration from the state. 
 Hence the professional Chief Burgomasters, as well as the assist- 
 ant burgomasters, city councillors, deputies, etc., are in the prac- 
 tice of our public life determined supporters of the idea of self- 
 government. 
 
 The position of these professional city officials within the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 223 
 
 self-government organism is quite different in the various Ger- 
 man states, nay, even within the various sections of the indi- 
 vidual states. In this connection the individual "city ordi- 
 nances" are determining. Efforts to create a uniform system 
 in place of the existing variety are sporadic, and, except where 
 special abuses have developed, are generally regarded as inad- 
 missible interference with justifiable local peculiarities. This 
 is a further proof that German constitutional life has not been 
 built up according to some system or other thought out with 
 pen and paper. Therefore, it finds no favor with those persons 
 who believe in the beneficent power of only one formula. Ger- 
 man constitutional life has developed organically and is, there- 
 fore, multiform and variegated, like a mountain group which 
 does not lack uniformity in its basic outlines and inner harmony. 
 We have thus in the city administration in some places the bi- 
 cameral, and in others the uni-cameral system. In the case of 
 the uni-cameral system, there is only one determinative body, 
 namely, that of the city aldermen — municipal representation 
 after the model of popular representation in the state; their pre- 
 siding officer is the Chief Burgomaster. In the case of the 
 bicameral system, there exists, beside the body of aldermen, a 
 "magistracy," with co-determinative functions. In this system 
 one of the aldermen is elected from their midst as chairman at 
 their meetings, whereas the Chief Burgomaster presides in the 
 "magistracy," but has only an equal vote with all the other 
 members. The underlying principle, however, of all the mu- 
 nicipal systems is the same, namely, that the aldermen are 
 elected by the citizens. Electoral franchise varies in the dif- 
 ferent city statutes; in some we find three classes of voters, in 
 others universal equality of direct suffrage, et cetera. The 
 method is predominant of electing only a third of the repre- 
 sentative body at a time, so that a certain amount of consistency 
 is preserved in the administration. Widespread, but recently 
 much opposed, is the so-called houseowners' privilege, whereby 
 half of the aldermen must be houseowners. In all cases the 
 aldermen are elected directly by the inhabitants of the city. 
 The Chief Burgomaster, on the contrary, and the other prin- 
 cipal city officials, and especially the members of the "magis- 
 tracy" (where such exists), are elected in some cases by the 
 aldermen, in others in the same manner as these themselves, 
 by the citizens. The "magistracy" is not made up exclusively 
 of professional officials, but at least half of its members are 
 citizens who serve in an honorary capacity. This variety of 
 suffrage rights does not appear to be of decisive influence on the 
 
224 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 quality of the work of the various city administrations. For, 
 taken by and large, despite the fact that certain differentiations 
 exist, the main tendencies of the work of administrations is 
 everywhere the same. 
 
 Everywhere, also, the prerequisite of administrative success 
 is identical, namely, cooperation of citizens and professional offi- 
 cials. This cooperation is extremely close. In the first place, 
 the fact that all city administration is local in many cases gives 
 the aldermen familiar with the conditions the advantage over 
 the professional officials, w^ho are often strangers. Further, it 
 is a distinctive characteristic of our system of self-government 
 that the officials and the elected representatives of the citizens 
 do not stand in the same relationship to each other as the 
 Government and the popular representatives in the states. The 
 division of power between Government and Parliament is 
 nearly always such that the Parliament only has cooperative 
 functions in regard to law-making and appropriation of funds. 
 The actual administration, however, which is the part of the 
 state's activity most keenly felt by the individual, is exercised 
 exclusively by the Government. This is true not alone of Ger- 
 many, but likewise of states with a parliamentary form of gov- 
 ernment. Matters are quite different in the German city ad- 
 ministration. Here the representatives of the citizens, the 
 aldermanic body, are the executive power, enjoying equal rights 
 with the ''magistracy." In those cities in which there is no 
 ''magistracy," the aldermen administer the city's affairs alone. 
 It is self-evident, however, that so great a gathering as that of 
 the aldermen (about 75 members in a city of 300,000; in Ber- 
 lin, 150 members) cannot decide every single administrative 
 question. For this reason the notion of "current administra- 
 tion" has developed in our municipalities. Every important act 
 of administration, such as all special matters of moment, and, 
 of course, all fundamental questions, are decided upon by the 
 entire aldermanic body, at least concurrently. At the same time, 
 the current administration is not controlled entirely by the pro- 
 fessional officials. For this purpose administrative deputations, 
 or committees, have been created. These administrative commit- 
 tees are the most ingenious contrivance of our city constitutions. 
 
 Since the Chief Burgomaster, or the "magistracy," is respon- 
 sible for the current administration, the committees are subor- 
 dinate to them in a legal sense, it is true; but as a matter of 
 fact, the committees are a means of making the aldermen, and 
 even individual private citizens, permanent participants in the 
 current administration. For although, generally, a professional 
 
MODERN GERMANY 225 
 
 official is chairman of the committees, the vast majority of the 
 members are aldermen or so-called citizen deputies {Biirger- 
 deputierte) — that is to say, citizens who are elected as members 
 of the committees by the aldermanic body, although they are not 
 aldermen. With such a membership of the committees, it is 
 impossible for the professional officials to conduct the adminis- 
 tration otherwise than in agreement with the committees. The 
 members of the committees, however, gain an insight into all 
 the details of the city's affairs. The custom exists of having 
 certain committee members constantly attend to a certain line of 
 affairs. In this manner the city administration is conducted, in 
 its smallest details, under continuous, active and decisive coopera- 
 tion of the citizens. For as a rule the entire municipal adminis- 
 trative field is divided up among the various committees. Thus 
 we have committees for the administration of buildings, gardens, 
 charities, schools, hospitals, bathing and other sanitary branches, 
 cemeteries, savings banks, street railways, drainage, water-works, 
 gas-works, electric works, slaughter houses, etc. ; in addition, 
 according to the field of activity of the individual cities, there 
 are committees for theatres, orchestras, museums, public libraries, 
 harbor improvements, factory sites, forestry and universities. 
 Further, there are special committees for individual undertakings, 
 as for example, the building of a bridge, the making of treaties of 
 municipal incorporation, cooperation in the building of a local 
 railway, the starting of an exposition, etc. In these executive 
 committees the citizens are called upon for extremely active 
 administrative participation, for in these cases the citizens do 
 not act from a distance and through the intermediary of some 
 outside intelligence, as they do in the exercise of their federal 
 suffrage right. The citizen here decides of his own knowledge, 
 and the privilege therefore becomes an important duty. One 
 ideal of citizenship is thereby achieved. 
 
 The best proof of any public institution is furnished by its 
 success. By their fruits ye shall know them. SchmoUer has 
 already called attention to the fact that the excellence of the 
 institutions of a state may be measured by the services rendered 
 to the poorer classes. That these services are greater in the 
 German Empire than in any other state in the world is disputed 
 by no one who knows. In this connection, the activity of the 
 German state as regards the poorer classes is to be measured not 
 only from the point of view of the state — that is to say, on the 
 assumption that the state wishes to maintain its human material 
 in as good a condition as possible. Equally decisive is the de- 
 sire to create real citizenship. This is apparent from the one 
 
226 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 fact alone that the nucleus of these endeavors has always been 
 the development of the school system. Germany is the country 
 with the fewest illiterate persons. But likewise the social in- 
 surance institutions (sick insurance, invalidity insurance, old- 
 age pensions and accident insurance, together with the assist- 
 ance given dependent relatives), are devised with care and fore- 
 thought in such a manner that the persons insured are not 
 alone not dependent on the state but that they themselves or 
 their employers pay a considerable insurance premium. Hence, 
 these insurance undertakings, owing to the feeling of right and 
 security which they give to the insured, work for an enhance- 
 ment of citizenship. I shall now endeavor to describe more in 
 detail the achievements of citizenship in the field of self-govern- 
 ment. 
 
 As a determining factor the question may be asked, first, 
 as to whether class politics are played in our municipal adminis- 
 tration. In answering this question, one must start with the 
 fact that the municipal representative bodies seldom reach their 
 decisions from political considerations such as govern the poli- 
 tics of the state. Thus, in a great number of cities, factions 
 are not known in the representative bodies. In other cities, it 
 is true, factions exist, but the lines of division separating them 
 are not political in a broad sense, but of a communal nature. 
 In a final group of cities, it must be admitted, the factions cor- 
 respond to certain political parties of the state, but even with 
 such conditions, experience shows that important municipal de- 
 cisions are reached without decisive regard for political party 
 programmes. This applies to a considerable extent even to the 
 Social Democratic party, which is striving to form a faction of 
 its partisans in every municipal body, as it does in the national 
 representative body. Since our city administration, owing to 
 the extent of its activity and to the degree of its independence, 
 is so powerful a body, the result is that the decisions are pre- 
 ponderantly made with a view to particular local conditions. 
 These particular local conditions, however, usually cannot be 
 included in a political programme, all the less so since every 
 alderman has personal knowledge of the matters upon which 
 he has to decide. For this reason, the work in the municipal 
 bodies is far more personal than in the national representative 
 bodies. This fact alone offers a certain protection against class 
 politics, since personal opinions and private interests need not 
 by any means coincide. Where they do agree, and where per- 
 haps single families or groups of families possess a predomi- 
 nating influence, there exists the danger of affairs being con- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 227 
 
 ducted against the public welfare; this danger may as a rule 
 be considered the greater, the smaller the municipality is. The 
 ^'houseowners' privilege," according to which half of the city 
 representatives are houseowners, is regarded by many as a kind 
 of legal basis for class politics. 
 
 In spite of this privelege, however, in very many cities the 
 houseowners are of the opinion that the city administration does 
 not sufficiently consider their interests, and that, ow^ng to their 
 burden of taxation, they stand in need of particular protection 
 against the communal authorities. Now, the opinion of the 
 houseowners is mistaken, but the very existence of such an opin- 
 ion proves that one is not justified in speaking of a general 
 houseowners' oligarchy in the city administrations. 
 
 There are still other draw^backs which some persons thought 
 they discovered in the text of the city constitutions but which do 
 not exist in practice; as, for instance, the fear lest the city 
 administration, as controlled by the "three-class" suffrage, might 
 act anti-socially. As a matter of fact, in the majority of the 
 Prussian cities, suffrage is proportional to the income, so that 
 only under quite exceptional circumstances can the working class 
 gain a majority in the aldermanic body. Nevertheless, the 
 city administrations show an unmistakable social tendency. 
 Practically everywhere, at least In all the larger communities, 
 the spontaneous activity of the city authorities in one line or 
 the other has surpassed, in many cases very considerably, the 
 social legislation of the Reichstag. Even the question of insur- 
 ance against lack of occupation, toward which the German Im- 
 perial government has hitherto turned an unfriendly ear, has 
 in many cities, in so far as single communities can undertake 
 such a problem at all, been solved to a certain extent. Like- 
 wise, the workmen in the employ of the city enjoy benefits of a 
 social nature which are entirely lacking in the vast majority of 
 private undertakings. 
 
 Yet the number of the workmen employed by the cities is in 
 many cases considerable. This is to be explained by the fact 
 that the German municipalities, in ever-increasing degree, have 
 taken over those great undertakings which are for the immediate 
 benefit of the community. For us the thought is incomprehensible 
 that the city's waterworks should not be under municipal adminis- 
 tration. So, too, the gas and electric works are in a vast majority 
 of cases under city management. The same is true of most of the 
 tramways. All this was possible because the German cities were 
 entitled to undertake these enterprises of their own volition, with- 
 out need of any cooperation on the part of government. The 
 
228 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 influence of capital, which is not slight in Germany, is equally- 
 powerless to influence the decisions of the city administrative 
 boards. It is true that in individual cases capital has shown itself 
 friendly to the idea of having the city acquire public utilities. 
 On the whole, however, bitter fights were fought, for it was a 
 question for the cities not of acquiring possession of the under- 
 takings, but above all, of doing this at a price which insured a 
 return on the money. Undoubtedly capital is at the present 
 moment endeavoring to maintain, as far as possible, what remains 
 of its power in city works, and to recover lost ground as far as 
 possible. Characteristic illustrations of this condition are the 
 ''mixed economic concerns" {gemischtwirtschaftliche Unterneh- 
 mungen), which have been much discussed in Germany recently. 
 In this species of enterprise great public undertakings are to be 
 worked conjointly by the municipal administration and private 
 capital. Outwardly, the creation of such "mixed economic con- 
 cerns" is advocated on the ground that purely public enterprises 
 are not conducted in a suflSciently business-like manner. Whether 
 this claim is to the point or not is open to dispute. It may be 
 stated, however, that in such enterprises, which are carried on 
 for the public interests, the essential point is by no means only 
 to place them on a paying basis in the sense of a private enter- 
 prise; often the general economic condition of a city is benefited, 
 when this aim is abandoned, as for example, when a tramway 
 is run rather from the point of view of facilitating transportation 
 than with an eye to high dividends. This is the common opinion 
 in our cities. For this reason a year ago in the general session of 
 the Diet of German Cities, the designation ''mixed economic 
 concerns" was replaced by the new one of the "public enterprise 
 under legally private form" {Offentliche JJnternehrnung in Pri- 
 vatrechtsform) , This means that the German cities are deter- 
 mined, even if in such great enterprises they profit by existing 
 advantages of the private legal form of the concern — as, for 
 example, when founding their electricity works on the basis of a 
 stock company — not to let them lose the character of public utility 
 concerns conducted exclusively for the public Interest. But opin- 
 ions differ, likewise, in regard to the question whether the private 
 legal form is advisable or necessary for the attainment of the 
 desired goal. Thus, in regard to the gigantic electricity works of 
 Berlin, which are soon to be taken over by the city, the attempt is 
 to be made so to determine the changeable provisions of the city 
 statutes that even without the private legal form the advan- 
 tages of private management may, nevertheless, be secured for 
 the new city undertaking; the directing and supervising board 
 
MODERN GERMANY 229 
 
 are to enjoy the same powers as they would in a stock company. 
 
 Unfortunately, I must refrain from consideration of the 
 other fields of activity to w^hich the city administrations ex- 
 tended in times of peace. The reader is referred to the pre- 
 vious enumeration of the various administrative committees, 
 which gives a general though by no means exhaustive idea of 
 communal activity. That enumeration does not comprise all 
 those matters which the city administration undertakes, not as 
 intrinsically within its province, but which are referred to as 
 affairs ''transferred by the state." Under this head, for ex- 
 ample, is to be reckoned the police administration, which is in 
 the hands of special government authorities only in the largest 
 Prussian cities, and even so not in all cases. On the other 
 hand, I cannot close my discussion without mentioning the ac- 
 tivity of the municipalities since the outbreak of the war. 
 
 The war tasks of the communes in the beginning were based 
 upon legal obligations only to a slight degree. Even in regard 
 to the granting of assistance to the families of soldiers, at least 
 in the larger cities half of the burden rests on the shoulders of 
 the municipalities, which must in addition devise proper means 
 for carrying out the various measures. Thus, in every city the 
 question arose as to what portion, if any, of the grants to sol- 
 diers' families, should be paid to the landlord as rent, and un- 
 der what conditions. It had to be decided whether grants 
 should be made in the form of money or goods. The extending 
 of help to the unemployed lay entirely in the discretion of the 
 municipalities. It is necessary still to-day to continue this form 
 of assistance, although our economic life has again reached a 
 very high standard, for there are numerous branches of economic 
 activity that are entirely suspended in time of war. In addition 
 to this support, there are many direct contributions toward the 
 needs of the army, such especially as furnishing quarters for the 
 soldiers. A line in which work of the communes attained quite 
 special importance was the providing of food. 
 
 When, after several months of war, it was realized In the 
 German Empire that special measures would have to be taken 
 in order to make our food and provender supply hold out, the 
 first attempt made was to secure the necessary amount and its 
 distribution by means of private enterprise. To this end the 
 War Grain Company was founded, whose task it was to buy up 
 the necessary amount of grain for the last months of the harvest 
 year. Two-fifths of the company's capital was contributed by 
 the large German cities. In order to give an idea of the elas- 
 ticity of the administration in the large cities, mention may be 
 
230 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 made of the fact that It was possible to raise this money within 
 a very few days. But after a few more months it became evi- 
 dent that the method of private economic enterprise was not an 
 adequate solution of the food problem. The Empire, therefore, 
 took the matter in hand as a public task. As such, it was di- 
 vided into two main undertakings, apart from the plan of or- 
 ganization. One was the collection of the existing supply of grain 
 and flour, the other was its distribution to the consumers. For 
 collecting the supply, the form of private enterprise was adhered 
 to with complete success, the purchase of the material being 
 entrusted to commissioners of the War Grain Company — on the 
 basis, it is true, of previous requisition. In later undertakings — 
 as, for example, the securing of the supply of oats and potatoes — 
 the method of collecting by private means was abandoned and this 
 task was assigned to the counties in which the supplies lay. The 
 county communal organizations took up this work with great 
 energy. But even more general is the activity of the communes 
 in the distribution of the supply to the consumers. In this con- 
 nection, the most difficult task fell to the share of the cities. 
 Many things are to be distributed, as oats and other provender 
 to owners of horses, but especially flour in the raw state, or as 
 bread to the consumers; care for the potato supply also was 
 imposed on the cities. The attempt to limit the consumption 
 of bread at first appeared difficult to the degree of impossibility. 
 Nevertheless, the cities completely solved the problem within a 
 few weeks after the order was issued by the Imperial govern- 
 ment. Everywhere the new economic condition is evident from 
 the presence of bread and flour cards. These cards are not or- 
 ders issued against money for a certain amount of bread and 
 flour; they are a manifestation of an absolutely new economic 
 problem which the war has brought with it — the problem of 
 supply. They give to the holder merely the right to purchase 
 a certain amount of bread and flour, a right which he has not 
 without such a card. It is characteristic of the German system 
 of self-government that by no means all the cities have chosen 
 the same form of bread and flour cards. Only such economic 
 territories as, in certain respects, belong together, despite mu- 
 nicipal separation, have effected a union. In many cases the 
 cities have also linked themselves together with the surrounding 
 country districts to form economic units. For the rest, the 
 flour and bread cards show clearly that they are adapted to 
 local conditions. The system of control is different in large 
 and small cities. The amount of flour in proportion to bread 
 varies according to the customary food consumption of the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 231 
 
 inhabitants. The task of the cities, however, was not completed 
 with the issuing of bread and flour cards. Less noticeable, but 
 just as difficult, is the regulation of flour distribution to the 
 bakers and dealers. It is thus not alone the measures taken 
 by the Imperial government that deserve to be regarded as 
 a remarkable achievement in organization ; even more noteworthy 
 is the vigor with which the municipalities took hold of 
 the great problem. The solving of the problem indicates 
 nothing less than a complete change in our economic life. In 
 the city administrations politically liberal views are in the as- 
 cendancy, tending to uphold the freedom of private enterprise. 
 But as little as this fundamental political conception hindered 
 the municipalization of the great interests serving the public, as 
 little has it been an obstacle when it was necessary to safeguard 
 the people's food by means of quick action. 
 
 The activity of the municipalities in the work of feeding the 
 nation, however, goes much further. A considerable number of 
 cities, especially the largest, held it to be their natural duty 
 with the outbreak of the war to lay aside a certain emergency 
 supply of the chief foodstuffs. The leading idea in doing this 
 was mainly the consideration that in war-time, when the rail- 
 roads are frequently subject to unexpected strain in transporting 
 troops, a stoppage in supplies could easily take place. At the 
 same time, from the very beginning the possibility of a certain 
 shortage in foodstuffs in the last months of the harvest year was 
 taken into consideration. In addition to these voluntary accom- 
 plishments dealing with the various food supplies, it was made 
 compulsory for the cities in the course of the winter to provide 
 for a supply of non-perishable pork. The reason for this meas- 
 ure was the economic consideration that, through the slaugh- 
 tering of a number of millions of hogs, the danger would be 
 eliminated of their being fed with food suitable for human be- 
 ings. The solving of this task fell in great part to the cities. 
 In its accomplishment the previously mentioned voluntary union 
 of municipalities in the Diet of the German Cities {Stddtetag) 
 facilitated the framing of uniform contracts, which in many cases 
 are backed by government funds. 
 
 All these achievements of the cities in war-time were accom- 
 plished without serious dispute in the city administrations. Al- 
 though in the municipal executive bodies tongues were not 
 stopped by a general civic political truce, nevertheless action was 
 speedy and energetic. In view of the novelty and vastness of 
 the tasks, this seems to me to mark a great success in organiza- 
 tion in the field of self-government. The success is all the 
 
232 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 greater in view of the fact that for the accomplishment of these 
 undertakings considerable sums of money had everywhere to 
 be raised, which was accomplished without recourse to the open 
 market. The finances of the cities proved to be in so sound a 
 condition that for the new fiscal year, 191 5, in many cases no 
 increase of taxation was necessary, while in other cases rela- 
 tively slight increases sufficed. At the same time, no municipal 
 administration repudiated any of its financial obligations. There 
 was not even an interruption in the redemption of the city 
 debts. 
 
 In a state which possesses so efficient and independent a form 
 of self-government, there lives assuredly the spirit of free citi- 
 zenship. Indeed, our whole body politic is imbued with this 
 spirit. The wholesome struggle in internal politics is only con- 
 cerned with the limitations and the form in which that spirit 
 is to manifest itself. Without doubt, continued development will 
 tend to an ever fuller growth of the rights of the individual 
 citizen. The power and strength of the German Empire must, 
 of course, not be allowed to suffer on that account. For, al- 
 though we desire to be free citizens, we wish to be such only 
 on our free native soil and as members of a powerful state. 
 
 Closing Word by Chief Burgomaster W ermuth of Berlin 
 
 We are aware how many ill-considered opinions the world 
 has formed in regard to the essence and value of the spirit of 
 German citizenship. It will be difficult in the future, as it has 
 been in the past, to prepare the way everywhere for a correct 
 appreciation, nor shall we be successful in this with a single effort. 
 But the war has advanced us materially in this respect. It has 
 become an important witness for the truth, whose voice other 
 nations will hear. It shows the Germans not as a nation re- 
 stricted in their internal political life, under guardianship and 
 in bonds and without political self-consciousness resting on con- 
 viction; on the contrary, it reveals a picture of the consciously 
 disciplined strength of an inwardly free commonwealth, which, 
 ready for self-sacrifice and with a clear vision of its aims in 
 each of its members, stands at the helm of its own destiny. 
 What nation not imbued with a free spirit of self-determination 
 could do this? What nation in such case would be able to raise 
 herself, not only in culture and science, commerce and technical 
 achievements, but also politically to the height achieved by Ger- 
 many? 
 
 It is true that the movement toward freedom which governs 
 
MODERN GERMANY 233 
 
 our public life ever more strongly is not without checks and 
 limitations. But wherever in our state organism we encounter 
 such control, of which foreigners disapprove, it proves to be the 
 very factor which has made us great and strong. What is fore- 
 most in my mind is compulsory military service, which claims an 
 important part of the strength of the nation and of its economic 
 powers. It is dismissed with the contemptuous catch-word "mili- 
 tarism," and yet in our ears it has a pleasant sound. It is the great 
 leveller and educator, it is one of the tested foundations of our 
 national life in which are rooted our strongest moral forces. 
 We shall always retain this military duty, and we shall ahvays 
 use our military power exclusively to protect ourselves against 
 injustice; if used for other purposes, it would disintegrate. 
 Equally important as the blessings resulting from compulsory 
 military service must we regard those which spring from the 
 long-standing institution of compulsory education, that has now 
 broadened out into compulsory attendance at the so-called "con- 
 tinuation schools." 
 
 Our citizenship has ample room for free development. Uni- 
 versal and equal suffrage throughout the German Empire guar- 
 antees to the individual his proper influence on the fundamental 
 principles of our public life. This finds expression in the right 
 of legislation and control of the German Reichstag. But of 
 special importance for the position of the citizen is his immedi- 
 ate participation in the administration of public affairs, whether 
 these be affairs of state or of the municipalities or of other pub- 
 lic associations. More than anything else, this direct interest 
 in the great public workshop gives to the right of citizenship 
 its highest value and awakens as does no other factor the sense 
 of solidarity, sharpening the sense of responsibility for future 
 development. The broadest field in this connection is offered 
 by self-government in the municipalities, which for more than 
 a hundred years have regarded this as their most precious pos- 
 session. The high development of the German city system is 
 due to the free and untrammeled activity of the best men in 
 their administration. The excellent results which have been 
 accomplished in this line will be unconditionally acknowledged, 
 even abroad. Especially under the stress of this world war 
 have the German cities shown themselves amply prepared for 
 the onrush of difficult tasks. And when, in the future, history 
 shall render its decision as regards this great period, it will not 
 neglect to give due praise to the unselfish work of German citi- 
 zens in the self-government of the German municipalities. 
 
BOOK ir 
 GERMANY'S ALLIES 
 
CHAPTER I 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
 A. The Inner Structure of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 
 PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 VIENNA 
 
 THE world has always been skeptical as to the solidity of 
 the monarchy ruled over by the Austrian Royal House. 
 Napoleon I contemptuously referred to it as a "geographical 
 conception," by which expression he meant that practically all 
 prerequisites were lacking for its existence as a state. Strange 
 to say, no one ever took the trouble to learn by what means this 
 conglomeration of countries, formed by the marriage of the 
 Austrian dynasty with foreign dynasties, and lacking all inte- 
 gral unity, has been able, from 1526, the year of its birth, 
 down to the present day to play a world-historical role, which, 
 as far as we can predict, it will continue to play for many 
 years to come. 
 
 The backbone of this unique commonwealth, to which with 
 the passage of time other German countries have attached them- 
 selves (Hungary and Bohemia, 1526), is formed by the "East 
 Mark," erected by Charlemagne as the outpost of his vast empire 
 against the Avars, the "yellow peril" of that time. This 
 culturally important function, both for Christianity and Euro- 
 pean civilization, was later effectively exercised by the "East 
 Mark," developed into the Eastern Empire, or Austria, against 
 the Magyars, and again in conjunction with a portion of the 
 Magyars against the Turks. As already mentioned, in the year 
 1526 the countries of the Hungarian and Bohemian crown at- 
 tached themselves to the House of Austria — that is to say, to 
 the ruling branch of the House of Hapsburg in Austria, the 
 powerful dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
 Nation. They did this by choosing as their king Archduke 
 Ferdinand, the later Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. From the 
 standpoint of the controlling constitutional view at that time, 
 Ferdinand, through marriage, had acquired clainis to the suc- 
 cession in these kingdoms. But it is subject to no doubt that 
 these claims to the royal power would have been unsuccessful 
 had not the noble and religious oligarchic corporations in both 
 
 237 
 
238 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 kingdoms (known under the name of "estates"), believed that 
 they would gain, from connection with a dynasty so powerful in 
 the German Empire, security for their own preeminent political 
 position in the face of inner disturbances — more especially revolts 
 of the peasants — as well as against foreign attacks. For Hun- 
 gary, it must be remembered, the Turkish danger was always 
 imminent. In so far as the Hungarian and Bohemian nations 
 remained under the rule of the nobility and the church, the 
 preservation of both of these nations was dependent on the con- 
 tinuance of the monarchy. The achievements of the dynasty 
 for safeguarding and strengthening all the countries ruled over 
 by it, were acknowledged by the estates of these countries from 
 1720 to 1722; this they did, partly in the manner of the Hun- 
 garians by offering the right of female succession to the dynasty 
 threatened with extinction in its male branch; partly, like the 
 non-Hungarians, by acknowledging the family law of 17 19 
 founded upon this principle. The public acts of the dynasty 
 and of the estates looking to this result are included under the 
 general name of the Pragmatic Sanction, which might thus, in 
 view of the pronouncement of the estates, be styled a plebiscite 
 for the monarchy and the dynasty — were there not a contradic- 
 tion of terms in the name "plebiscite" when applied to aristoc- 
 racy and estates. 
 
 The peculiar laws which governed the feudal monarchy and 
 according to which the ruler could dispose of his prerogatives 
 as of his own property, or the so-called patrimonial conception 
 of the state, made it possible for the Austrian rulers, by means 
 of their royal or princely right, to unite the countries under 
 their power which resisted a joining together through a federa- 
 tion of the estates. Supported by this patrimonial view of the 
 state, tke various monarchs welded together those rights of 
 rulership which belonged to them by virtue of the various con- 
 stitutions, as well as those which were not dependent on feudal 
 cooperation, to form a single sovereign right; they, then, by 
 virtue of their prerogative of organization, created uniform or- 
 gans of authority for the whole territory under their rule, for 
 the purpose of gaining uniform exercise of the rights created 
 by this welding process. 
 
 At the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth 
 century, the royal administration and legal procedure in the 
 German-Austrian countries were remarkably well organized, 
 when compared with the inefficiency of the preceding period; 
 this organization extended to all conceivable conditions. The 
 chief aim of the legal reform was to furnish protection to the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 239 
 
 unfree peasants and other socially inferior groups of the popula- 
 tion (the so-called minus potentes) against the misuse of power 
 by the feudal over-lords, who possessed jurisdictional and police 
 powers, or against such misuse by the authorities in existence 
 under the system of self-government which obtained among the 
 estates. The princes derived their authority for this reform from 
 the "missionary" conception of their right of jurisdiction, accord- 
 ing to which it was a power given to them by God for the 
 suppression of every form of injustice, and in the exercise of 
 which they were responsible to God alone. Their position was 
 strengthened by the fact that the members of the estates, w^ho 
 were at loggerheads among themselves, assumed the identical 
 standpoint by appealing to royal assistance in their disputes. 
 
 It was not possible to proceed with the same thoroughness in 
 organizing the Hungarian and Bohemian territories, as these 
 countries were burdened with vastly more powerful feudal 
 groups than was the case in the German-Austrian lands. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Austrian rulers, by firmness and wisdom, 
 which were especially necessary in the case of the recalcitrant 
 Hungarian estates, were able to maintain their jus belli ac pacis 
 — that is to say, the military administration in the constructive 
 or organizing sense of that word, as well as the management of 
 foreign affairs. Further, they established the right of forming 
 crown and governmental councils for consideration of the prin- 
 ciples of government and of the governmental acts of the crown, 
 as exclusive monarchical prerogatives and removed from the co- 
 operation of the estates. In this manner, they were enabled 
 throughout the whole territory under their rule to establish, 
 within the above-mentioned limits, those uniform and central regu- 
 lations which made it possible for the monarchy to carry out its 
 world-historical role. The Austrian rulers were financially able 
 to pursue their policy of centralization, for, according to the 
 constitutional view of the time, they possessed unrestricted right 
 of disposal as regards the income from the domains set aside in 
 each country for the benefit of the monarch, and also as regards 
 that accruing from certain tributes levied for the same purpose 
 (the so-called "chamber revenue") ; in addition, they controlled 
 the taxes which were voted by the estates. The underlying 
 principle of this policy is known as the Austrian unity, or im- 
 perial concept {Gesamtstaats- oder Reichsidee) . 
 
 The extremely primitive form of the feudal-monarchic constitu- 
 tions, which gave to royal absolutism legal authority to use its 
 rights to the full scope permitted by the political situation, ren- 
 dered it possible under Empress Maria Theresa, in the year 1749, 
 
240 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 to establish both for the German-Austrian and the Bohemian 
 lands a single supreme legal tribunal and a single office for 
 the consideration and preparation of the government's decrees. 
 For the same reason, it has been possible to maintain this central- 
 ization down to the present day, whereas Hungary succeeded in 
 resisting all centralization extending beyond the army adminis- 
 tration, the administration of foreign affairs and the immediate 
 participation of the Sovereign. Imperial decrees sent to Hungary 
 could be promulgated only through the Hungarian Royal Chan- 
 cellery. This was due to the fact that in Hungary the feudal 
 system found a broader basis in the constitutionally organized 
 lower and middle nobility, and was therefore more capable of 
 resistance than in Bohemia, where the agrarian foundation of the 
 prerogatives of the higher nobility became constantly more inse- 
 cure, as the result of the agrarian reforms in neighboring Prus- 
 sia. In this difference as regards the success of centralization is 
 to be seen the reason for the later development of so-called 
 Dualism. 
 
 At all events, the efficiency of this centralization, carried 
 through with such patience and foresight, was brilliantly at- 
 tested at this period: all the uniform national states had ac- 
 quiesced in the destiny prepared for them by Napoleon I, yet 
 this state, which he had styled a ''geographical conception," un- 
 dertook the role of ultima ratio and destroyed the fiction of the 
 Emperor's invincibility. Through this success the monarchy 
 aided the development of the idea of national freedom, which 
 had been threatened by Napoleon's plans of universal power, at 
 the same time that it created for itself the great problem which 
 down to the present day governs its political life; as a result of 
 the development of human rights, this problem took the place 
 of that other one, which had been solved, of the suppression of 
 the privileged estates. 
 
 In the year 1804 the regent of the monarchy was proclaimed 
 Emperor; in 1806 the royal sovereignty was announced as ex- 
 tending to those countries that had stood in a constitutional 
 relationship to the old historical German Empire, which was 
 abrogated. With these countries Austria entered into the Ger- 
 man Confederacy, founded in 181 5, but whose dissolution oc- 
 curred in 1866, as the result of the unfortunate outcome of the 
 struggle with Prussia for the leadership of Germany. 
 
 The extremely difficult task of transforming the monarchy 
 on a constitutional basis took place in the year 1867, after 
 several failures between 1848 and 1867, and again after an in- 
 terregnum of absolutism extending from 1849 to i860; the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 241 
 
 result was that the non-Hungarian countries known as Reichs- 
 ratslander gained permanent constitutional representation in 
 the Reichsrat (Austrian Parliament), and that the Reichstag 
 (Hungarian Parliament), under the form of a convention with 
 the monarch — that is to say, by means of the so-called compromise 
 — agreed to the demand for recognition of uniformity in the 
 management of foreign afifairs and in the army organization. As 
 a result the centralization, previously so extensive, became limited 
 to those activities which at all times have been the absolutely 
 undisputed prerogatives of the monarchy. In the matter of par- 
 liamentary control of the affairs of state, the two agglomerations 
 of territories which had been formed into states act independently. 
 Despite the uniformity of the army organization, this independ- 
 ence is maintained even in the furnishing of recruits and also 
 as regards the system of defense, for which only an agreement on 
 general principles is provided ; all the more is it true in regard to 
 those affairs which are not common to both states. The contribu- 
 tions of the two states toward the expenses of the common ad- 
 ministration, the so-called quota, are agreed upon at regular 
 intervals of ten years between the two parliaments and by sanc- 
 tion of the monarch. For the same period of time, with the 
 approval of both parliaments, the agreement of the two states, 
 or the compromise, is effected in regard to the regulation of their 
 customs and commercial-political relations; down to the year 
 1907 this was in the form of a customs-union, but in that year 
 it took the form of a treaty of customs and trade. This treaty 
 extends also to the sumptuary taxes, which are so closely 
 related to the customs, to the minting of coins and printing of 
 paper money, and to other commercial-political matters. The 
 fixing of the yearly budget of the two states for the common 
 administration — the so-called common budget — whose larg- 
 est item is for the army, is accomplished separately by means 
 of two parliamentary bodies, the so-called delegations; these are 
 elected by vote of the two chambers in either of the two parlia- 
 ments and meet always at the same time in Vienna and Buda- 
 pest, alternately. These delegations also exercise parliamentary 
 control of the common ministers, according to the forms exist- 
 ing for this purpose. This system of union between the two 
 monarchic states is called dualism, not only because the ruler 
 enjoys separate and distinct prerogatives as King of Hungary 
 and Emperor of Austria, but also because of the separate parlia- 
 mentary handling even of those affairs common under the union. 
 The Emperor's autograph letter of 1868, announcing the change 
 of the state's name from "Austrian Monarchy" to "Austro-Hun- 
 
242 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 garian Monarchy," and of the ruler's title from "Emperor of 
 Austria" to ''Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary," was 
 Intended as an outward sign of the altered constitutional position 
 of Hungary within the monarchy. 
 
 Universal, equal and direct suffrage was established in the 
 year 1907 as the elective system for the Austrian central parlia- 
 ment, the Reichsrat, through the decisive influence of the 
 Emperor, before which all obstacles yielded. In Hungary a 
 movement has been launched by the monarch, as King of Hun- 
 gary, for the development of the same elective system, which 
 is already in preparation. 
 
 In both states legislation has been decentralized. Among 
 the Hungarian crown lands, the kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia 
 and Dalmatia occupies a preeminent position, like that of a 
 separate state, by virtue of which the constitutional relation be- 
 tween Croatia and Hungary proper can be altered only through 
 agreement between the Croatian diet and the Hungarian parlia- 
 ment. The Croatian diet likewise controls cultural legislation. 
 The head of the government, who is called banus. Is constitution- 
 ally responsible to this diet. 
 
 In Hungary proper not alone the administration of local and 
 provincial Interests, but also to a great degree the administra- 
 tion of the state, is carried on through the self-governing bodies 
 of the municipalities and counties; the formation of these bod- 
 ies. It is supposed, was effected by the administrative organiza- 
 tion of Charles the Great; throughout the ages they have formed 
 the bulwark of the political freedom of the ruling classes of the 
 Magyars. 
 
 As regards the kingdoms and countries represented In the 
 Reichsrat and making up the state of Austria, they have 
 throughout the whole period of constitutional growth formed 
 the basis on which the Austrian state w^as built up. All of 
 them, seventeen in number, have representative bodies in their 
 one-chamber diets, which cooperate In legislation, especially In 
 matters pertaining to agriculture, public works, charities, schools 
 and municipalities; they have legislative rights as regards laws 
 touching nationality, civil and criminal matters. Further, it is 
 the practice of the Imperial legislative powers to turn over to the 
 various countries control of all affairs within each one's sphere. 
 The diets and the national committees elected from their midst, 
 control the provincial administration or the administration of 
 the land by virtue of the right of financial self-government consti- 
 tutionally granted to them; they furthermore exercise oversight 
 of the extensive self-government of the communities, which also 
 
MODERN GERMANY 243 
 
 enjoy local police authority. The system of home-rule is almost 
 republican, in so far as the central administration cannot auton- 
 omously settle disputes with the independent local government 
 of the country ; it must appeal to the Imperial Court for a deci- 
 sion. The system is republican also in the fact that the state 
 can establish its legal financial claims against a province only 
 in the civil courts or in the Imperial Court, according to their 
 private or public nature. The municipal authorities, as well as 
 the highest communal authorities who supervise them, including 
 the national committees, are called autonomous authorities, owing 
 to their independence of the state ; for the same reason the central 
 and autonomous administration are spoken of as a dual adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 The two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were 
 united to the monarchy in 1908, received in the form of an im- 
 perial decree a catalogue of universal rights of citizens; they 
 received also an almost complete constitution formed after those 
 of the Austrian provinces, but containing some deviations due to 
 consideration for the peculiar religious and national conditions 
 of the two countries. The supreme government of the two 
 provinces is in the lands of a common ministry. 
 
 It is noteworthy that as early as 181 1, that is to say, in the 
 epoch of pronounced absolutism and centralization, the univer- 
 sal Civil Code {biirgerliches Gesetzbuch), regulating the civil 
 law in the non-Hungarian countries, announced in articles 16 
 and 17 that every human being has certain natural rights which 
 are dictated by reason; and that all prerogatives resulting from 
 these rights must be assumed to exist as long as their restriction 
 by law is not proved. The same law announces in article 1459 
 that the right of a person in respect to his own acts is subject to 
 no limitation through the lapse of time. These principles of 
 natural rights are the formal sanction of the efforts of the 
 Austrian rulers, beginning as early as the sixteenth century, 
 which looked to the improvement of the position of the bonded 
 peasantry, who were under the dominance of their feudal masters 
 and manorial lords; these efforts find their culmination in 
 the elimination of this personal lack of freedom under Emperor 
 Joseph II, and in the suppression in the years 1848- 1849 of the 
 imposts and personal services to the over-lords, partly on the 
 basis of indemnification and partly without such indemnifica- 
 tion. To have brought about this legal condition without blood- 
 shed, in the face of a socially powerful body of feudal nobility, 
 is one of the great achievements of the Austrian policy. 
 
 The constitution of April 25, 1848, which was the first effort 
 
244 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 to found constitutionalism in the non-Hungarian provinces, con- 
 tains in Article IV this important statement of natural rights: 
 ''The inviolability of nationality and language is guaranteed to 
 all classes of society." 
 
 This principle v^^as given emphatic expression in the following 
 manner in Article XIX of the fundamental law concerning the 
 General Rights of Citizens, which forms the basis for the develop- 
 ment of Austria's law as regards nationalities: "All the dif- 
 ferent races of the state stand on an equality, and each has an 
 inalienable right to have its nationality and religion respected 
 and preserved. The equality of the various languages in school, 
 in office and public life is recognized by the state. In those 
 provinces where more than two races live, public schools are to 
 be so organized that each race receives the support necessary 
 for the development of its language, without compulsion to learn 
 a second tongue." Despite the fact that famous jurists have 
 taken the position that this principle, as it stands, cannot be 
 directly applied and that special laws are needed for its execution, 
 nevertheless, the two highest courts — namely, the Imperial Court 
 and the Court of Administration — have formulated, for the safe- 
 guarding of public rights by means of ingenious decisions, a far- 
 reaching protection of the national minorities in the various 
 provinces; nor, in view of the strong nationalistic tendencies of 
 the autonomous local authorities, has difficulty been encountered 
 in its practical application. Further, the legislatures of the 
 various provinces with mixed nationalities seek to attain the same 
 object by means of thorough-going laws regarding language, 
 school and electoral rights for the diet. 
 
 The organizing of Austria's various nations by law into cen- 
 tral and branch associations is in process of being carried out. 
 This advance is due mainly to the noble-spirited writings of the 
 publicists, Adolph Tischof, Otto Lang and Karl Renner. Le- 
 gal development along this line has been less favorable in Hun- 
 gary, owing to the undeniable obstacles created by the dogma 
 of the national supremacy of the Magyar race. Nevertheless, a 
 comparison of the legal position of the non-Magyar nationalities 
 with that of the non-Russian nations of Russia, or with that of 
 the barbarically suppressed Balkan countries, is quite inadmissi- 
 ble. There are, furthermore, plain indications that in the im- 
 mediate future, as a result of the contemplated adoption of 
 universal and equal suffrage, the dogma of national priority will 
 be subjected to further modification. 
 
 As a result of the stubbornness and violence of the national 
 iiisputes within the Monarchy and of the emphatic manner in 
 
MODERN GERMANY 245 
 
 which the constitutional demands of the Magyar nation are 
 customarily expressed, extremely unfavorable conclusions have 
 been drawn throughout the entire world regarding the solidity of 
 the Austro-Hungarian union. This unfavorable estimate may 
 safely be assumed to have been one of the causes for the decision 
 in favor of war by the Triple Entente. But from these national 
 struggles, which, compared with the deathlike silence of the non- 
 Russian peoples of Russia, must be regarded as a symptom of 
 an extensive freedom of movement among the nations of the 
 Monarchy, there has been developed, as we have shown, as a 
 result of the hearty cooperation of the legislative and judicial 
 branches, an admirable law system regarding the relation of the 
 races among themselves, such as is found nowhere else. This 
 may serve to give an idea of the extent of the demands of the 
 various races, which, whenever necessary, are satisfied by judicial 
 protection, without regard for the increased administrative diffi- 
 culties. An admirable short summary of this ingenious system of 
 law is to be found in a recent article from the pen of the Austrian 
 jurist, Herrnritt, in the Austrian Zeitschrift fiir Oejfentliches 
 Recht. This system regarding nationalities, at a period when 
 nationalism has developed into a serious danger for the West- 
 European world, represents a cultural achievement by the state 
 of the highest order; the various races of the Monarchy have 
 never realized its benefits more than at present, when Russia 
 feels herself called upon to substitute her "civilizing and liberating 
 mission" and her policy of nationalities for the work done within 
 our borders by our own Monarchy. The Austrian Monarchy, 
 owing to its ancient character as a tribunal of arbitration, in 
 which point no other monarchy in the w^orld is to be compared 
 to it, has for centuries been able to bind together its heterogeneous 
 national elements into a conservative commonwealth ; it has aston- 
 ished the entire world to see how these diverse elements prove 
 equal to tasks in cooperation through the influence of the mon- 
 archical power to which they would not have been equal through 
 ties of confederation. And if we are again successful in re- 
 pelling from Europe the Asiatic hordes, which England and 
 France have so unexpectedly summoned and so powerfully sec- 
 onded, history will be forced to ascribe a glorious share in this 
 success to our monarchical system, that is the subject of such 
 great misunderstanding. 
 
246 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 B. Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy 
 
 PROFESSOR OTTOCAR WEBER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 PRAGUE 
 
 The foreign policy of Austria-Hungary finds problems 
 awaiting it in three directions: toward Germany, Italy and 
 the Orient. The connection with Germany and Italy has existed* 
 for centuries. It came about through the fact that the ruling 
 princes of Austria, the Hapsburgs, became at the same time 
 Roman-German emperors. Not alone in Germany, but in Italy 
 also, the Empire has interests at stake, as the result of family 
 possessions. After the dissolution of the German Empire in 
 1806, there was created the German Confederation, in which 
 Austria again played the leading role. But in the year 1866 a 
 change took place. Austria separated from Germany, and under 
 Prussian leadership was first formed the North German Con- 
 federation, and then, following the Franco-Prussian War, the 
 German Empire. The question arose in Austria as to what 
 attitude she was to assume toward the new state. 
 
 Austria had in Italy, on the one hand, her own possessions; 
 on the other, near relatives of the Imperial family were ruling 
 in the small Italian states. The Austrian occupation was re- 
 garded as the greatest obstacle in the way of Italian unity. In 
 1859, the Kingdom of Sardinia succeeded, with the aid of for- 
 eign assistance, in acquiring Lombardy, and in 1866 Venetia. 
 Between these two dates the Italian kingdom had been formed, 
 into which the small Austrian states were absorbed. Despite 
 this success, a portion of the Italians considered their task not 
 yet accomplished, since territory occupied by compatriots was 
 still under Austrian rule. From this fact was derived the doc- 
 trine of Italia irredenta, which held that there was still an "un- 
 redeemed" Italy. Even with the most liberal interpretation, the 
 term could be applied only to certain parts of Istria and Dal- 
 matia, which had previously formed part of the old Republic 
 of Venice. The other portions of Austria-Italy had never be- 
 longed to the territories which to-day constitute the Kingdom of 
 Italy. Trieste, Gorizia and the County of Mitterburg in Istria 
 have for centuries belonged to Austria ; while the Trentino, whose 
 connection with Austria dates only from a century ago, was 
 an independent bishopric. The second question, therefore, for 
 Austrian diplomacy to decide was as to the attitude it should 
 assume toward the new Kingdom of Italy and its ambitions. 
 
 The problem is quite a different one as regards the Orient. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 247 
 
 From the earliest times Austria had stood as a barrier against the 
 tribes who poured in from the East: Avars, Magyars, Turks. 
 It was a question of preserving Western civilization, and at the 
 same time of carrying it into the East. Austria has always 
 served as a connection between West and East : the course of the 
 Danube — the great river flowing through the country — urged to 
 a commercial connection with the Orient. With the incorpora- 
 tion into Austria in 1526 of Hungary and Transylvania, this 
 oriental policy gained a further impetus. Fresh acquisitions in 
 the eighteenth century, like Galicia and Bukovina, rounded out 
 still more the eastern boundaries of the Monarchy. 
 
 The third question which demanded an answer was whether 
 Austria, following the course of the Danube, should make new 
 territorial acquisitions, or content herself merely with the eco- 
 nomic conquest of the Orient. While Austria-Hungary early 
 came to an understanding with Germany and Italy, her relations 
 with the Power which also had important interests at stake in 
 the Orient — namely, Russia — remained always doubtful. On 
 this account the relations of the Danube State to Russia during 
 the last sixty or seventy years have been of the greatest impor- 
 tance. 
 
 For the last two hundred years the aim of the Muscovite 
 State has been to gain Constantinople and a passage into the 
 Mediterranean. For this purpose It was necessary to destroy or 
 absorb Turkey and split It up Into Its various elements — Slavs, 
 Greeks, Rumanians. With the Slavs In the Balkan Peninsula, 
 Austria-Hungary had intimate connection through her own 
 South-Slavic subjects. Of these South-Slavs, the Croatians have 
 always been distinguished by their pronounced attachment to 
 Austria and a certain unfriendliness tow^ard Hungary. The 
 feeling at the beginning of the eighteenth century that started 
 the movement of the Pragmatic Sanction was a logical outcome 
 of this. It established the mdlvisibillty of the Austrian coun- 
 tries and the succession to the throne within their boundaries. 
 The Croatians had feared lest they might be separated even- 
 tually from Austria. Their South-Slavic sister-nation, Serbia, 
 who is distinguished from Croatia by religion and script, found 
 her chief point of accord with the latter country in hatred of 
 Hungary. This w^as Intense enough to outweigh her affection 
 for Austria. Thus movements against Austria always found 
 encouragement on Serbian soil. Austria-Hungary's attitude 
 toward Turkey and toward the latter's vassal states, as well as 
 toward her own Slavic subjects. Is strongly influenced by Russian 
 politics; In the changeable attitude of the latter toward Austrian 
 
248 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 policy the key Is chiefly to be sought for the acts of the Austrian 
 foreign minister. 
 
 The relations between Russia, Austria and Prussia had been 
 friendly since the "Holy Alliance" had transformed a romantic 
 idea of Emperor Alexander I, of Russia, into a practical reality. 
 Personal friendship among the monarchs strengthened this con- 
 nection. In the year 1849 Russia helped to suppress the Hun- 
 garian revolt. The manner In which this was done, it Is true, 
 did not quite meet the wishes of the Austrian government. The 
 message which the Russian general after the capitulation of the 
 Hungarian army sent to his Emperor — "The whole of Hun- 
 gary lies at Your Majesty's feet" — gave no intimation that the 
 Austrians had cooperated bravely In the suppression of the Hun- 
 garian revolution and that the Russians had merely been their 
 allies. 
 
 Russia herself over-estimated the value of her assistance to 
 Austria. She believed that she had made the entire Austrian 
 policy subject to her dictates. In the year 1853, trusting to 
 this and filled with contempt for the other European Powers, she 
 undertook an attack against Turkey. She had, however, made a 
 mistake in her calculations. Not only did Austria refuse to 
 cooperate with her In this attack against the Porte, but likewise 
 France, England and later Sardinia proclaimed their opposi- 
 tion to it. We are interested, however, only In Austria's attitude. 
 She hoped to be able, under the guidance of Count Buol, to 
 support the Western Powers, to persuade Russia to abandon 
 her dangerous design, and thereby to gain territorial acquisitions. 
 And this she thought to do without taking part In the war. 
 This proved to be a mistake. The result was that without 
 gaining the confidence of the Western Powers, she earned Rus- 
 sia's bitter hatred, and In the treaty of peace (1856) was forced 
 to give up the principalities of Moldau and Wallachia, which 
 she had already occupied. Russia made Austria pay dearly for 
 her course. As a matter of fact, she had no reason to resent 
 the attitude of the Danube State, for if Austria had joined the 
 other enemies of Russia, the latter might have been brought 
 at that time Into the greatest distress, and the fruits of a suc- 
 cessful war for Austria would probably have been the acquisi- 
 tion of one or more of the Balkan States. One may say of 
 Austria's policy at this time that it was weak, but uncondi- 
 tionally peaceful. 
 
 From this time on, at every turn, Vienna encountered Russia 
 as an enemy. This enmity was without cause, for it was Aus- 
 tria's foreign minister, Count Beust, who at the end of the six- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 249 
 
 ties pointed out the possibility of altering the conditions of the 
 peace of 1856, which had placed sharp limitations on Russia's 
 naval power in the Black Sea. When later, during the Franco- 
 Prussian war, Russia, of her own initiative, declared the agree- 
 ment void, she was able to refer to Beust's proposition. Neither 
 Germany nor Austria offered opposition to Russia, but it proved 
 difficult to win England over. In the year 1871 the new German 
 Empire was brought into being; Austria-Hungary accepted this 
 condition without hesitation, and took successful steps to enter 
 into pleasant relations with the new state and also with Russia. 
 Beust's successor, Count Andrassy, followed wisely in this path. 
 In the year 1872 there was a meeting of the three Emperors in 
 Berlin, the immediate result of which was the establishment of 
 friendly relations among them; and during the next year this 
 led to treaties among the three Powers. Visits of Emperor 
 Alexander II to Vienna and of Emperor Franz Joseph to Petro- 
 grad rendered possible the settling of all delicate diplomatic ques- 
 tions in a peaceful manner. 
 
 But this truce was not destined to last long; critical days 
 began in the Balkan Peninsula. The states standing under 
 suzerainty longed more and more for full independence, and the 
 peoples directly subject to the Porte wanted freedom. In Herze- 
 govina a dangerous rebellion broke out, which communicated it- 
 self to Bosnia, was encouraged by Serbia and Montenegro, and 
 even affected the South-Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary. 
 So deeply was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy affected by this 
 that two absolutely unimpeachable witnesses, the Russian diplo- 
 mat Count Ignatiev and Prince Nikita of Montenegro, expressed 
 the thought independently of each other that Austria would 
 have to interfere. Above all, however, Russia desired to profit 
 by the disturbances in the Balkan Peninsula for her own pur- 
 poses. As a prerequisite to this she had to be certain that 
 Austria-Hungary would not attack her from behind. Hence 
 in Reichstadt in Bohemia, on July 8, 1876, a treaty was made, 
 according to which, in case of Russian success, the Danube 
 State was to acquire a portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 This agreement was supplemented at the beginning of the 
 year 1877 to the effect that these provinces were to fall 
 entirely into Austria-Hungary's hands, not alone for occupation 
 but for absolute possession. Protected in this manner, Russia 
 began the war against Turkey, in which she at first suffered 
 heavy losses; but later, when Rumania had joined her, bril- 
 liant successes followed. Russia desired to profit unrestrictedly 
 thereby. In the treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878), the 
 
250 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 map of the Balkan Peninsula was completely altered. There 
 was no more talk, however, of a cession to Austria-Hungary! 
 The latter country could not allow itself to be treated thus, and 
 since England also assumed an attitude of emphatic opposition 
 to Russia, a great clash of arms seemed imminent. It was due 
 to Bismarck that this catastrophe was prevented. 
 
 In the Congress of Berlin, that lasted from June 13 to July 
 13, 1878, Russia was forced to submit to material changes In 
 the treaty of San Stefano. The destiny of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina was settled. On June 28, England's second representative 
 at the Congress, Lord Salisbury, made the motion that the two 
 provinces should be given up to Austria-Hungary for occupation 
 and administration. For reasons of safety, she was also granted 
 the right of military occupation of the district of Novl-Bazar 
 (Sandjak). It would have been easy for Austria at that time 
 to carry through the annexation of these provinces; neither 
 England nor Russia would have been able to prevent this. It 
 was due primarily to the consideration of Count Andrassy for 
 Turkey, whose feelings he desired not to wound, that Austria- 
 Hungary did not occupy them. The Sandjak of Novl-Bazar 
 remained under Turkey's civil administration. 
 
 A glance at the map shows how important the possession of 
 these provinces is for Austria-Hungary. They furnish the nec- 
 essary hinterland for the South-Slavic provinces, Dalmatia espe- 
 cially gaining protection In her rear. It must not be forgotten 
 that Herzegovina territory touches the Adriatic Sea at two 
 places, cutting Dalmatia at these points. Further, It must be 
 remembered that the continual disturbances in these countries 
 were a constant danger to Austria-Hungary and that an end 
 could be put to them only by firm and energetic administration 
 on the part of Austria. Even the most uncompromising enemies 
 of the Dual Monarchy cannot deny that It has accomplished 
 important cultural work in the two provinces In the period since 
 1878.^ Military occupation of the Sandjak was important and 
 of value for Austria's political position, as by this means a 
 wedge was driven between Serbia and Montenegro. It was 
 assumed in foreign countries that Austria some day would take 
 advantage of this advance post to make an attack against Sa- 
 
 ^ See Austrian Policy since 1867, by Murray Beaven, Oxford Pamphlets, 
 1914, pp. 8-9: .. . "That Austria efficiently carried out the task entrusted to 
 her is not now disputed. . . . The condition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at 
 the date of their definite annexation in 1890 is a standing contradiction to Mr. 
 Gladstone's Midlothian statement: 'There is not a spot upon the map of Europe 
 where you can lay your fingers and say: "There Austria did good."'" 
 
 See also The War and Democracy, by R. W. Seton-Watson, London, 1914, 
 p. 146: "Great material progress had been made. Roads, railways, public build- 
 ings had been created out of nothing, etc." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 251 
 
 loniki, through the Vardar valley. A state with an aggressive 
 military policy w^ould assuredly have taken this step in the 
 course of the following years. 
 
 We may be permitted finally to recall to the mind of the 
 reader that at the Congress of Berlin the independence of Ru- 
 mania, Serbia and Montenegro was established, the principality 
 of Bulgaria created, and, in addition, a separate Turkish prov- 
 ince of East Rumelia. The last two, after a few years, cele- 
 brated their union. As a reward for Rumania's faithful assist- 
 ance her "patron" (Russia) deprived her of the valuable province 
 of Bessarabia, giving her in return only the Dobrudja. 
 
 The attitude of Russia in these last years had been so unre- 
 liable and so threatening to the general peace of Europe (as a 
 result of Emperor Alexander II having given himself into the 
 hands of advisors who preached the evangel of Pan-Slavism and 
 were obsessed with the most rabid Germanophobia), that Prince 
 Bismarck was most doubtful of the continuance of German- 
 Russian friendship and sought to guard against a Russian attack. 
 It w^as evident that such an attack would instantly have caused 
 a war betv^^een France and Germany, and against this double 
 danger Bismarck was called upon to protect the German Empire. 
 He, therefore, made a treaty offer to Austria which met the secret 
 wishes of Count Andrassy. Emperor Franz Joseph forgot in 
 the most generous manner the events of 1866, and gladly agreed 
 to this treaty. Bismarck succeeded in convincing Emperor Wil- 
 liam I of the necessity of such an alliance. On October 7, 1879, 
 a treaty was signed between Austria and Germany of a purely 
 defensive character. It was aimed expressly against Russia and 
 obligated both signatories, in case of an attack by Russia, to 
 support each other with their whole strength, and to sign peace 
 only in common. No other state was mentioned, but it was 
 said that in case "such a Power" (meaning France) should attack 
 Germany, or Austria-Hungary (probably indicating Italy), and 
 should be supported in this attack by Russia — in such an event 
 also the above-mentioned treaty should come into force. The 
 treaty was drawn for no definite period of time, but was to 
 continue automatically, unless abrogated. So clearly did it meet 
 the needs of the two states, and so great a factor has it been for 
 thirty years in preserving European peace, that it has thus con- 
 tinued automatically since 1879. 
 
 The fact must be emphasized that this treaty had a most de- 
 sirable influence on Russia. In the year 1881 it was possible to 
 renew, among the three emperors, the friendly conferences 
 which, in 1884, led to the meeting of the three monarchs in 
 
a^2 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Sciernfewice. It was intended to prevent war-like complica- 
 tions, and to this end misunderstandings were to be settled by 
 discussion as they arose. This was a revival of the agreement of 
 1872. 
 
 Lord Salisbury called the signing of the German-Austrian 
 alliance "an event of great joy"; three years afterward it re- 
 ceived an important extension, which was greeted by England's 
 hearty expressions of sympathy. 
 
 In the year 1881, France unexpectedly occupied Tunis. Italy 
 had designs upon this country; she regarded this ruthless act of 
 France as the result of her own absolute isolation, from which 
 she now made energetic efforts to free herself. The negotia- 
 tions, begun in Rome, were brought to a relatively speedy con- 
 clusion through the visit of the royal Italian couple to Vienna. 
 As early as May, 1882, the alliance between Austria-Hungary, 
 Germany and Italy was signed, which is known as the Dreibund. 
 It is said to have been made for a period of twelve years, with 
 certain clauses relating to its abrogation, and has subsequently 
 been regularly renewed before its expiration. The last term 
 ran until the summer of 19 14, but it was renewed as early as 
 December 7, 191 2. We are not definitely familiar with its pro- 
 visions ; it is known only that the three Powers have reciprocally 
 guaranteed each others' possessions, and that the alliance is ex- 
 clusively for purposes of defense. We know, further, that in 
 the year 1902 it was supplemented by a provision touching Aus- 
 tria-Hungary and Italy alone, to the effect that territorial ac- 
 quisition in Macedonia by Austria-Hungary was to bring with 
 it a compensation for Italy. This provision, however, was 
 rendered nugatory by the recent Balkan wars. 
 
 Count Andrassy retired from his position immediately fol- 
 lowing the formation of the German-Austrian alliance; but his 
 successors, no matter who they have been, have faithfully pur- 
 sued his policy. This policy may be expressed in the following 
 manner: continuance of the friendship with Germany and Italy, 
 maintenance of correct relations with England and France, with 
 whom Austria has but a few points of contact, careful preserva- 
 tion of peace with Russia, strengthening and upholding of the 
 Turkish Empire, and preservation of peace in the Balkans. 
 
 To preserve friendship with Germany was the easiest of all. 
 This was largely owing to the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm II has 
 maintained the most intimate personal relations, not only with 
 Emperor Franz Joseph, but with the latter's probable successors 
 as well. We all vividly remember the close bonds of friendship 
 which united the German Emperor both with Crown Prince 
 
MODERN GERMANY 253 
 
 Rudolph and with Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This Austro- 
 German friendship successfully stood the test on many occa- 
 sions. To mention two striking examples will suffice. It was 
 the Austrian diplomatic representative, Count Welsersheim, 
 who, at the portentous conference of Algeciras (1906), at a 
 very critical moment, supported Emperor Wilhelm, to use the 
 latter's own expression, "as a most brilliant second"; Austria in 
 1909 received a full return when her ally checked the threaten- 
 ing attack of Russia, and thereby preserved peace. 
 
 It was a much more difficult matter always to preserve peace- 
 ful relations with Italy. The exaggerated ardor of Italian 
 patriots, who were united in the effort to rescue "unreclaimed" 
 territory {Italia irredenta), has been a stumbling block in the 
 path of our well-intending statesmen; but in conjunction with 
 the never-failing skill of Italian statesmen, it has proved possible 
 for Vienna to overcome these obstacles. For the Italian Govern- 
 ment was hitherto always wise enough to perceive that the great- 
 ness and prosperity of the country did not depend upon the 
 acquisition of a village In the Trentino or in Dalmatia, but that 
 it did depend upon the development of Italian supremacy in the 
 great and promising territory in North Africa. After Tunis had 
 been lost to Italy, and her Abyssinia enterprise had come to 
 naught, she finally turned her attention to Tripoli, and during 
 the conquest of this country and the war against Turkey she 
 found her rear most effectively protected by Austria. Questions 
 of common interests between Austria and Italy in the Balkan 
 Peninsula were also settled in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. 
 Apart from the already mentioned treaty concerning Macedonia, 
 it was necessary to confer in regard to Albania. According to 
 a report which has never been contradicted, toward the end of 
 the nineties a division of the spheres of interest in the Balkans 
 was effected between Austria and Russia; through this division 
 Albania would have come under Austrian influence. It was 
 obviously important for Italy not to lose sight of the east coast 
 of the Adriatic. In full appreciation of this condition, in the 
 year 1897, and again in the year 1900, the Austrian Government 
 gave the Italian Government the assurance that it desired to 
 settle the future of Albania only on a basis of mutual under- 
 standing. The result of this loyal agreement was that, when in 
 19 1 3 the re-formation of the Balkan Peninsula was being dis- 
 cussed, the two Powers conjointly advocated an independent 
 principality for Albania, the practicability of which, it is true, 
 has not yet been proved beyond doubt. 
 
 As we have seen, through the meeting in Scierniewice, the 
 
254 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 relation of Austria with Russia had taken on a more or less 
 favorable aspect, which the ministers, Counts Kalnoky and Go- 
 luchovski, strove honestly and successfully to preserve. Nor 
 was this relationship disturbed by any direct Austro-Hungarian 
 differences, such as border disputes in Galicia or Poland, or by 
 commercial rivalry; the only disturbing factor was jealousy as 
 regards the Balkans. 
 
 In that connection there were many dangerous shoals to be 
 crossed. As, for instance, when in the year 1885 Bulgaria and 
 East Rumelia formed their union, and immediately war broke 
 out between Bulgaria and Serbia; in 1886 the fall of the first 
 Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, took place, and in 
 the next year the new Prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, was forced 
 to sue for Russia's recognition. In these various affairs Austria 
 succeeded in gaining many important concessions from Russia. 
 These matters lead us to discuss in detail the relation of Austro- 
 Hungarian politics to the rise and development of the various 
 Balkan States. 
 
 As early as the fifties in the last century, weighty voices in 
 Austria had called attention to the importance of Serbia. Many 
 persons believed that Serbia was destined to play the same role 
 in the Balkan Peninsula as Sardinia had played in Italy, and 
 Prussia in Germany. It was, therefore, in Austria's interest to 
 maintain the most friendly relations with Serbia, without, how- 
 ever, allowing this state to become too powerful. The first of 
 these aims was accomplished at the time of the war already re- 
 ferred to between Bulgaria and Serbia (1885-86), when the 
 Austrian government placed an emphatic check on the victorious 
 advance of Bulgaria into the heart of Serbia. The immediate 
 result was a close treaty of friendship between Serbia and Aus- 
 tria. As long as King Milan reigned, conditions remained un- 
 changed. With the advent, however, in 1889, of Milan's son, 
 Alexander, to the throne, the relation of the great state to its 
 small, restless neighbor became less favorable. A condition bor- 
 dering on anarchy, fostered by Russia, came into existence, and led 
 eventually to the king's murder. The murderers placed Peter 
 Karageorgevich on the throne, and Russian dominance now be- 
 came evident in Serbia, driving the country into increasing en- 
 mity toward Austria. The statesmen of Austria felt called upon 
 to combat this unfriendly attitude in the commercial field and 
 this led to the so-called **Hog War." The heavy economic 
 losses which resulted from it rendered the name of Austria 
 daily more odious, and drove Serbia unreservedly into Russia's 
 arms. There may be people who hold the opinion that Austria- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 255 
 
 Hungary might have acted with more consideration for Serbia's 
 feelings, and have shown greater readiness in meeting the de- 
 mands of the king's murderers, without regard to political eti- 
 quette. Translated from diplomatic language into plain Eng- 
 lish, this would mean that the statesmen who had gained power 
 in Serbia should have been flattered by gold and favor. But, on 
 the other hand, it must not be forgotten that this course was 
 generously followed with regard to Montenegro, which has ex- 
 isted down to the present time on Austrian gold ; yet, despite 
 this fact, the Russian Czar was able to declare that Montenegro 
 was ''Russia's sole genuine friend in the Balkan Peninsula." 
 
 Another consideration to which weight must be given is the 
 fact that, as a result of the racial affinity of the Serbs on the 
 two sides of the Austrian boundary line, Serbian enmity early 
 succeeded in arousing tendencies within the Empire which ren- 
 dered a friendly attitude toward the new government in Bel- 
 grade scarcely possible. 
 
 The relations of Austria to Bulgaria have at all times been free 
 from such difficulties; so that the Vienna government, after the 
 failure of its efforts to support Serbia against Bulgaria, was 
 able to turn, without scruple, to the advancement of the Bul- 
 garian plans. The disagreement between Serbia and Bulgaria, 
 which had assumed unexpected proportions as a result of the 
 last Balkan War, offered a tempting opening for the Austrian 
 statesmen, nor did the Vienna government need to have this 
 pointed out to it a second time. Unfortunately, this led to less 
 favorable relations with Rumania. 
 
 Of the two non-Slavic states which, toward the north and 
 south, guard the entrance to the Balkans, Rumania has from 
 the start been favorably inclined toward the policy of the Drei- 
 hund. She had felt all too keenly in 1878 the thanklessness of 
 Russia, who, as already mentioned, had deprived her of the 
 fruitful province of Bessarabia. Other factors, however, con- 
 tribute to render Rumania's attitude comprehensible — the na- 
 tionality of King Charles, who was never able to forget that 
 he had been a German prince, and Italy's alliance with Aus- 
 tria. There was naturally a bond of union between Rumania 
 and the linguistically related country south of the Apennines. 
 Rumania carefully abstained from participation in the last Bal- 
 kan War, awaiting the development of affairs. When, after 
 the victory of the Balkan League, disputes that eventually led 
 to war broke out in regard to the division of Macedonia be- 
 tween the previous allies, Serbia and Bulgaria, the two leading 
 i^lav states, Rumania at the last moment drew her sword to 
 
256 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 enforce a decision. The territorial extension which she desired 
 was to be secured only from Bulgaria. The Viennese govern- 
 ment thereby found itself in a difficult position — should it side 
 with Rumania or Bulgaria? To decide this question in a man- 
 ner above criticism was, perhaps, beyond human wisdom. At 
 all events, the immediate result was in so far unsatisfactory that 
 neither Bulgaria nor Rumania felt that their interests had been 
 sufficiently considered; especially did the Bukharest government 
 make this known through a perceptible cooling in its Austrian 
 sympathies. Fortunately, however, great political policies are 
 not controlled by temporary sentiment, but by permanent interests, 
 and these tend constantly to lead Rumania back to the Central 
 Powers. 
 
 In this connection mention must be made of the fact that in 
 view of the unavoidable action and reaction of interior and foreign 
 politics, the governments both at Vienna and Budapest will find 
 a rich field for activity after the war: a more general regard 
 for the feelings of the Italian subjects in one part of the Empire 
 and of the Rumanian subjects in the other will lead to a better 
 understanding between the two states. 
 
 As regards Greece, the other Balkan border state, she has 
 always enjoyed friendly treatment at the hands of Austria- 
 Hungary, as was repeatedly made clear at the time of the set- 
 tlement of the Cretan question. 
 
 It must not, however, be forgotten that all of these states of 
 which mention has been made formerly formed part of Turkey 
 in Europe, and that every increase in power of any of them 
 denotes a weakening of Turkey. How difficult was it, then, to 
 reconcile the preservation of Turkey with the benevolent atti- 
 tude which the young, ambitious Balkan States expected of 
 Vienna! In this connection it must be borne in mind that each 
 sign of coolness from Austria-Hungary was apt to drive the 
 states in question into Russia's arms. The difficulties which the 
 various Austro-Hungarian ministers were called upon to meet are 
 scarcely to be gauged. These difficulties were often still fur- 
 ther increased by Turkey's recalcitrant attitude in regard to sin- 
 cere suggestions of reform. 
 
 During the last decade of the nineteenth century, Russian and 
 Austrian politics in the Balkans were fairly at a balance ; no par- 
 ticularly warm friendship developed between Austria-Hungary 
 and Russia, but on the other hand there was no marked clash 
 of opposing interests. In Petrograd diplomats were well satis- 
 fied to be able to oppose to the Dreibund the alliance with 
 France, which had taken shape during the years 1891 to 1895, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 257 
 
 and efforts were made to preserve the friendly relations of the 
 moment. Russian statesmen at this time conceived ambitious 
 plans as regards Asia. They hoped to be able to carry them 
 through without great difficulty; the only Power which might 
 be dangerous to them in this connection, England, stood "in 
 splendid isolation." These Asiatic plans demanded European 
 peace as a prerequisite, and when, In 1897, Emperor Franz Jo- 
 seph paid another visit to Petrograd, the opportunity was taken 
 advantage of to divide the Balkan Peninsula into Russian and 
 Austrian spheres of interest. The friendly understanding 
 thereby achieved seemed to justify a hope that in the future 
 every movement in the Balkan Peninsula would be observed by 
 the Austro-Hungarian and Russian statesmen, and discussed 
 by them before it could develop into a dangerous conflagration. 
 The plan seemed to be successful, and a few years later it was 
 decided to subject the Macedonian trouble to the same treat- 
 ment. On October 2, 1903, the Russian and Austrian foreign 
 ministers met at the Imperial Austrian hunting lodge at 
 Miirzsteg and reached a definite understanding by which all 
 problems arising in the future in the Balkans were to be solved 
 in common. The Macedonian revolt was to be the first ques- 
 tion so treated ; in this manner, the Austro-Russian understand- 
 ing was confirmed, and Russia was able without anxiety to de- 
 vote herself to her Asiatic endeavors. 
 
 Russia's Asiatic plans had encountered opposition from a 
 quarter where it had not been anticipated — Japan. In the year 
 1904-5 war broke out between the two states, resulting, after 
 stubborn resistance, in Russia's complete defeat. As a result of 
 this war, an internal movement started in Russia, w^hich for a 
 long time paralyzed the resources of the state and occupied its 
 entire strength. While Russia was passing through this grave 
 crisis, Austria-Hungary observed a strictly correct attitude. The 
 possibility of proceeding to a change of the status quo in the 
 Balkan Peninsula during this period (even if this had meant 
 merely the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was 
 not taken advantage of by the government on the Danube. Aus- 
 tria-Hungary's statesmen may perhaps be blamed for weakness 
 at this point, but they can in no wise be charged with war-like 
 proclivities. Austria-Hungary was at that time in just as favor- 
 able a position for war as ten years later. The provisions of 
 the Dreibundj which was intended for defense, not for attack, 
 Vv'ere carried out literally. Russia was enabled undisturbed to 
 recall her defeated regiments from Asia and to employ them 
 for the suppression of the revolution — her influence in the Bal- 
 
258 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 kans suffered not the slightest diminution. Austria-Hungary 
 carried out the programme of Miirzsteg in a meticulously con- 
 scientious manner. Count Goluchovski was displaced in the 
 Vienna foreign ministry by Count Aehrenthal. But for the mo- 
 ment Austria-Hungary's policy continued as before, although; 
 European conditions had long since undergone a great change. 
 This change must be briefly considered here, since the policy of 
 the Danube State could not escape its influence. 
 
 An English pamphleteer of the present war has characterized 
 the Dreibund and its epoch, in a manner which calls for un- 
 reserved endorsement. He states that the Triple Entente was 
 created as a reply to the Dreibund, and he continues thus: 
 
 **Both alliances were concluded originally as purely defensive. 
 For twenty years European peace rested upon a secure basis, for 
 the simple reason that there was no Power which might have 
 profited by a disturbance of the peace." 
 
 This is correct down to the last word — for if one reckons 
 twenty years from the formation of the Dreibund one reaches 
 the year 1902, and this was the first year of the reign of King 
 Edward VH. Under him the one Power which might have had 
 an interest in a disturbance of the peace, namely, England, came 
 into the foreground. This is not the place to enumerate the 
 reasons and the many proofs of England's belligerent attitude. 
 The fact remains that at this time the encircling of Germany 
 began, which was gradually to include Austria-Hungary also. 
 There followed King Edward's trips to Paris, Spain and to 
 Italy, in the course of which this policy was partly prepared and 
 partly carried through. The crowning touch was put to it by 
 the English king's visits to Ischl and Reval. We are unfortu- 
 nately insufficiently informed in regard to these events, but the 
 results plainly indicate their ^nature. The attempt to entice 
 Austria to abandon the Dreibund was a failure; but, on the 
 other hand, the pronounced differences between England and 
 France and between England and Russia were temporarily elimi- 
 nated. One could not long fail to see that storm clouds of the 
 most threatening character were gathering at all points. 
 
 Quite unexpectedly, however, even to the most trained ob- 
 server, the storm broke in Constantinople. The Young Turk 
 movement in 1908 brought old Turkey to her knees. The 
 ''Sick Man," for whose recovery the European doctors had so 
 often vainly striven and who had been forced to swallow so 
 many "reform pills," to no avail, was now finally made an end 
 of; a new and youthful spirit, armed with all the modern meas- 
 ures of Kultur (parliamentary system, etc.), was to rule at the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 
 
 259 
 
 Sublime Porte. The states of the Dreibund encouraged In the 
 most emphatic manner this movement toward betterment at the 
 Golden Horn, as it was in accordance with their conservative 
 peace policy that the existing Turkish State be upheld. At the 
 same time, however, it appeared to Aehrenthal high time finally 
 to put an end to the uncertain status in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 and frankly to apply the proper name to a situation which had 
 in fact long existed. Austria-Hungary, through thirty years of 
 unremitting effort, had so striven for the welfare of these occu- 
 pied provinces that it appeared only right that the occupation 
 should be changed into an annexation, as a reward for this labor. 
 We will let the English pamphleteer speak again on this point. 
 He says: 
 
 "Bosnia-Herzegovina had been Austrian territory for thirty 
 years, save in name only; and there was no more reason for 
 assuming that Austria would ever leave these countries than for 
 the assumption that Great Britain would willingly abandon 
 Egypt." ^ 
 
 How was this measure carried through? Far from springing 
 a fait accompli on Europe, Austria had carefully prepared the 
 ground for the annexation. According to our information, the 
 Russian Foreign Minister Isvolsky, on June 19, 1908, suggested 
 to his Austrian colleague the words which the latter afterward 
 used. He did even more: he advised not only the annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, but likewise that of the Sandjak. In 
 September of the same year the two ministers met at Buchlau 
 in Moravia. Aehrenthal made no secret of his intention to 
 carry out the annexation. The Russian minister seems to have 
 agreed in principle, but with diplomatic slyness at the same time 
 he attempted to gain for his own state what in June he had 
 already hinted at: he demanded a further revision of the Treaty 
 of 1856, namely the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian 
 war fleet. Russia was at last to gain the long-desired entrance 
 into the Mediterranean. The demands of the two ministers 
 stand in marked contrast to each other as regards their import. 
 One of them desired only clearly to establish an existing condi- 
 tion, whereby the actual relations of the Powers would not suf- 
 fer the slightest derangement; the other sought to force the 
 
 '^Austrian Policy since 1867, Beaven, pp. 16-17. See also The War and 
 Democracy, by R. W. Seton- Watson, p. 146: "To any impartial observer it had 
 been obvious from the first that those who dreamt of Austria-Hungary's vol- 
 untary withdrawal from the two provinces were living in a fool's paradise. 
 The formal act of annexation merely set a seal to thirty years of effective 
 Austrian administration. , . . Austria had come to stay, and Aehrenthal, in 
 annexing the provinces, felt himself to be merely setting the seal to a docu- 
 ment which had be»n signed a generation earlier. . . ." 
 
26o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Eastern question into a new phase and greatly to strengthen 
 Russia's power. 
 
 Both statesmen, however, separated in seeming satisfaction. 
 As was later learned. Count Aehrenthal offered no objection in 
 principle to the passage of the Russian ships through the Dar- 
 danelles, on the condition that certain measures of precaution 
 were taken for the safety of this maritime highway, similar to 
 those taken with regard to the Suez Canal. But this matter 
 was by no means ripe for action and settlement, while there was 
 no reason for delay as regards the Austro-Hungarian proposi- 
 tion. In connection with Bulgaria's proclamation of the change 
 to a kingdom, Austria-Hungary completed the annexation of the 
 two provinces on October 5, 1908. 
 
 Thereupon a storm broke loose in the Russian, English and 
 Serbian press, which w^as calculated to make one believe that the 
 three Powers had suffered injury in the most unheard-of manner. 
 As a matter of fact, they seem to have been surprised only by 
 the speedy action of the Austro-Hungarian minister, whereas 
 there could be no room for doubt as to his intention, and also 
 as to harmlessness of the act. Isvolsky asserts, however, that 
 he had been outwitted by von Aehrenthal — a fact which does 
 slight honor to his skill as a diplomat. The date of the annexa- 
 tion, it is true, seems not to have been fixed in Buchlau, Aehren- 
 thal promising to write once more beforehand to his colleague. 
 The Russian received this letter in Paris on October 2, but 
 allowed the following days to pass without making a move. Not 
 until a week later, in London, did he make an outcry and pub- 
 licly declare that he had been duped. 
 
 Russia and Serbia stood in need of an excuse for their anger 
 against Austria-Hungary, and England also desired to let the 
 Vienna government feel the force of her displeasure for having 
 resisted the English bait. Both sides began to arm, war ap- 
 peared inevitable between Austria and Serbia, and Russia 
 seemed ready to take part. 
 
 In this connection one step of the Austrian minister must be 
 clearly remembered. Simultaneously with the annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary surrendered her val- 
 uable and important position in the Sandjak and gave this terri- 
 tory back to Turkey. An act of such unselfishness is unknown to 
 history. Thereby Austria abandoned her designs on Saloniki 
 and retained for herself only the commercial conquest of the 
 Balkans. It might have been expected that the new Turkish 
 government would appreciate Austria's moderation and give its 
 blessing to the rechristening of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfor- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 261 
 
 tunately, the new rulers at Constantinople were badly advised, 
 and offered the most stubborn opposition to Austria's policy. 
 Only as a result of extended discussion, and of a boycotting 
 which bore heavily on Austria's commerce, followed finally 
 by the payment of a large sum of money, was the approval of 
 the annexation gained in Constantinople. 
 
 Meanwhile, a veritable witches' sabbath had come upon 
 Europe, and it required a very emphatic declaration by Germany 
 that if Russia attacked Austria the German Empire would be 
 found by the latter's side, to force Russia to call a halt, thereby 
 placing a damper on the Serbian outburst. But the wick con- 
 tinued to smoulder with much evil-smelling smoke. Serbia 
 declared herself threatened in the highest degree by conditions 
 which she had calmly contemplated for thirty years, and she now 
 sought to mobilize Serbians in Austria-Hungary for her own 
 purposes. Austria's desire for peace, for which her surrender of 
 the important Sandjak had again given so convincing a proof, 
 was contemptuously interpreted as weakness. It became an 
 axiom in the Balkan states, especially in Serbia, that Austria 
 was a dying power. It was claimed that the patriarchal 
 respect which the aged Emperor Franz Joseph enjoyed among 
 his subjects scarcely sufficed to hold the state together. This 
 view was spread throughout the whole political world, was 
 everywhere more or less accepted, and influenced opinion against 
 the Danube State in the most remarkable manner. As excuse 
 for the credulous, who have since had their calculations upset 
 by Austria's cohesive strength, it must be stated that they were 
 unfortunately to a great extent supported in their view by 
 Slavic voices within the Monarchy itself. This is an ex- 
 tremely regrettable confession, but one which cannot be with- 
 held in devotion to truth. It was not a question of agents 
 provocateurs who were paid by the Austrian Government to 
 mislead foreign countries, but of conscienceless, traitorous scoun- 
 drels whose company we do not begrudge to our enemies. 
 
 Count Aebrenthal, who had guided the ship of state with 
 firm hand during a difficult period, became seriously ill and 
 was forced to make place for Count Berchthold. Difficult 
 tasks awaited this diplomat as he undertook the burdens of 
 office. Serbian discontent continued uninterrupted, partial 
 mobilization had to be undertaken anew, Austria's commerce 
 suffered under continued threat of war, and the state paid 
 heavily for this apparent peace. 
 
 The Balkan Alliance continued meanwhile to be quietly 
 formed. Before the Young Turkish state could develop its 
 
262 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 full strength, the one-time vassals of European Turkey hoped 
 completely to destroy it. 
 
 The Balkan War broke out. Austria-Hungary took no 
 steps to furnish aid to Turkey — a course which would have 
 been to her political advantage — but abandoned the Balkan 
 Peninsula to the Balkan peoples. Turkey was conquered and 
 lost nearly her entire European possessions. A violent dispute 
 immediately broke out in regard to the booty, the allies being 
 unable to agree on the division of the spoils. Serbia was de- 
 termined, before all, to reach the Adriatic and acquire a harbor. 
 Montenegro likewise demanded a portion of Albania, together 
 with Scutari, the old Albanian capital. The Vienna Govern- 
 ment offered uncompromising opposition to both of these de- 
 mands; in this it enjoyed the most ardent support from its ally, 
 Italy, which could permit as little as could Austria, a Slavic 
 great power to gain a firm footing on the east coast of the Adriatic 
 or occupy important portions of Albania. For it was perfectly 
 clear that Serbia or Montenegro would serve merely as proxy 
 for Russia. The two allies were successful in their opposition, 
 and Serbia, ousted from the west, turned toward the east. It 
 was demanded that Bulgaria surrender Macedonian territory, 
 upon which she had already placed her hand ; over this dispute 
 w^ar broke out between the two previous allies, the results of 
 which have already been discussed. The peace of Bukharest of 
 19 1 3 is the epilogue to these conflicts. 
 
 Serbia's machinations against Austria, incited by Russia, con- 
 tinued to increase in violence. The tension between the two 
 Powers became unbearable. On June 28, 19 14, the explosion 
 occurred. Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort were 
 shot down in Serajevo by Serbian murderers. This death was 
 really a dramatic fatality. It had been said of the murdered 
 Archduke that had he lived he would have worked for an im- 
 provement of the condition of the Slavs in Austria; certain is it 
 that his whole environment had educated him to Slavic sym- 
 pathies. It would be presumptuous positively to assert that the 
 Archduke would have substituted for the Dualism a Trialism in 
 Austria, by which the South Slavs would have been enabled to 
 play an important role. Nevertheless, such an intention must 
 be considered as within the realms of the possible. By this means 
 the South Slavic inhabitants of Austria would perhaps have been 
 able to win over their brothers beyond the border and thus offer 
 the strongest check to Serbia's propaganda in Austria. All these 
 dreams were shattered by the death of the Archduke. A 
 thorough-going search for the actors in the tragedy and their 
 
MODERN GERMANY 263 
 
 backers, which Austria was in duty bound to make, led to persons 
 who were in positions of honor and trust in Serbia. Indeed, the 
 tracks led even beyond the Serbian boundary. It w^ould have 
 been unworthy of a great state to permit such a band of murderers 
 to remain at its borders without making an effort to avenge the 
 crime and to prevent a recurrence of similar events, which the 
 next time might involve the monarch himself. Vengeance was not 
 demanded in the first heat of anger, but only after four weeks 
 had elapsed and after contempt had again begun to be expressed 
 at Austria's weakness. It was demanded that an investigation 
 of the strictest kind be made by the Serbian government, and 
 that guarantees be given that the affair would not degenerate 
 into fine phrases and regretful shrugging of the shoulders. 
 The sole possible manner of securing a serious investigation was 
 to undertake it with the cooperation of Austrian officials. Only 
 w^ith such control would it have been possible to get to the bot- 
 tom of the matter, and to prevent the Serbian government from 
 encouraging such crimes in future. But precisely against this 
 condition did the Serbian government protest most violently, 
 thereby giving proof that It had cause to fear the investigation. 
 A government quite uninvolved In the affair might quietly have 
 submitted to this formality. That Austria had at last developed 
 energy was regarded In Belgrade as an insult.^ 
 
 Although Austria's demand was justified and, as pointed 
 out, offered the only guarantee for a rigid prosecution of the 
 investigation, the Vienna government would have been willing, 
 as we know to-day, to renounce its demand at the instigation 
 of its ally, Germany. But Russia, desiring war, did not await 
 the result of German intervention, but mobilized, and thereby 
 started the World War. 
 
 If we now throw a comprehensive glance back on the Austro- 
 Hungarlan policy of the last twenty or thirty years we cannot 
 but arrive at the conclusion that it has been conservative and 
 peace-loving in the highest degree. True friendship towards Aus- 
 tria's allies, and friendly readiness to meet her rival, Russia, 
 half-way — such have been its characteristics. 
 
 Austrian diplomacy refused to take advantage of favorable 
 opportunities to Increase its power, such as the Russo-Japanese 
 
 1 See Austria- 
 at Cleveland; Ne 
 
 Hungary and the War, Ernst Ludwig, Consul of Austria-Hungary 
 ■Jew York, 191 5, p. 65. An interesting precedent is noted. On 
 June 10, 1808, Prince Michael Obrenovich of Servia was assassinated in 
 Topchider. The traces of the murder led to Servians living in Hungary. For 
 this reason an investigation was started by the Hungarian government. There- 
 upon Servia requested that Servian officials be allowed to assist in the investi- 
 gation, and the Hungarian government, having nothing to hide, consented 
 without hesitation. 
 
264 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 War. One Is almost tempted to say that It neglected to pro- 
 tect the Turkish Empire against Its vassals. It abandoned the 
 Balkans to the Balkan nations, and protected its own Interests 
 only to the minimum of necessity. For herself Austria desired 
 and received nothing beyond the possession of the two provinces 
 which had been offered to her by Russia and almost forced 
 upon her by Europe. Nor were these provinces taken until 
 thirty years of beneficent service had been rendered to them. 
 But all this restraint availed Austria nothing. At the moment 
 when she showed courage to demand vengeance for a crime 
 without parallel, her enemies attacked and sought to punish 
 her for the sole crime which she had committed — namely, that 
 of living. 
 
 History, the judge of events, will undertake In more peaceful 
 future times the Impartial award of praise and blame. It 
 will establish this fact: the Austro-Hungarian policy may fre- 
 quently be accused of unduly calm reserve and caution, but 
 never of belligerency or desire for war. The best expression 
 of this is to be found In a statement of the universally revered 
 Emperor Franz Joseph: 
 
 "Austria-Hungary can never wage an ofEensIve war, she 
 ^ust wait until she Is attacked." 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 TURKEY 
 PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 
 
 TURKEY'S accession to the cause of the Central Powers 
 was a great surprise to outsiders. For many years we 
 had been accustomed to see the Sublime Porte skillfully play 
 one Great Power off against the other, without identifying her- 
 self with the interests of either. The friendly relations of 
 Germany and Turkey were a matter of common knowledge, 
 but so was the deep-seated influence of the Entente Powers. 
 From Germany and Austria-Hungary the Porte had nothing to 
 fear; at the beginning of the war England, Russia and France 
 had solemnly guaranteed her territorial possessions in case of 
 loyal neutrality. The Ottoman Empire, moreover, had shortly 
 before suffered the terrible disaster of the Balkan War; party 
 conflicts were raging within its boundaries, and sweeping re- 
 forms demanded attention. In short, even a superficial acquaint- 
 ance with conditions seemed to show that Turkey's traditions 
 and interests dictated absolute neutrality. Nevertheless, from 
 the beginning of the war those in authority at Constantinople 
 left no stone unturned in the effort to be prepared for a pos- 
 sible struggle on four fronts against the Entente Powers; and 
 when finally the demands of the Western allies became un- 
 reasonable, in the last days of October, 19 14, they drew the 
 sword. 
 
 The official publications of England and Russia make it 
 appear as if peaceful Turkey had been plunged into an under- 
 taking of incalculable consequences and of a nature contrary 
 to her true interests, through pressure from Germany exercised 
 through the German military mission and through the cruisers 
 Goeben and Breslau, which the Turkish Government had pur- 
 chased. For purposes of anti-German propaganda, this expla- 
 nation is admirable; unfortunately, it does not accord with the 
 facts. The English and French fleets lay at the entrance to 
 the Dardanelles; the faintest sign, therefore, from the Sublime 
 Porte would have sufficed to bring relief from unwelcome Ger- 
 man coercion. The German military mission might have been 
 rendered innocuous just as easily as the English naval mission. 
 
 265 
 
266 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 But these considerations are not to the point. Turkey entered 
 of her own initiative into this war, which is for her a war of 
 defense in the strictest sense of the word. The fact that the 
 decision of the cabinet was not unanimous proves nothing as to 
 the government's desire for war — it is a matter of common 
 knowledge that several of the English ministers resigned their 
 portfolios. That Turkey was in close touch with her German 
 advisers in regard to this decision is only natural. But the very 
 fact that she had selected German advisers and that she had 
 joyfully welcomed German ships in the Dardanelles proves 
 conclusively that in responsible Turkish circles an identifica- 
 tion with the German cause was desired from inner conviction. 
 According to the Turkish, as well as to the German view, the 
 interests of the two countries were identical. The development 
 of the German friendship into a German-Turkish community 
 of interest, in the face of the political supremacy of the Entente 
 Powers on the Bosphorus and of the French and English 
 influence in matters of education and the press — that is the real 
 problem of the German-Turkish alliance. 
 
 The only possible course for the Asiatic states, If they wish 
 to survive despite the European policy of power, lies in strength- 
 ening themselves internally by making use of the ideal forces of 
 the modern state and in adapting themselves to the demands of a 
 world organized along capitalistic lines. The decisive problems 
 are, therefore, those of the state and of economJcs. The problem 
 of civilization, or culture, is inseparably connected with each of 
 these. Hence, that Asiatic state will show Itself most capable of 
 survival which is able to graft the new requirements onto the 
 ancient roots of Its strength, and which gains the opportunity for 
 organic development through outward conditions of peace. Japan 
 occupied this unique position, thanks to her insular situation far 
 removed from Europe, and thanks to the homogeneity of her popu- 
 lation and to the adaptability of her ideals of government and of 
 her civilization. China, which might easily follow in the same 
 course, is forced to contend with other and more serious diffi- 
 culties: ancient historical divergencies between the provinces, 
 the proximity of the Great Powers, whose greed for land and po- 
 litical and commercial interests run counter to the strengthening, 
 even to the preservation of China, and finally childish experi- 
 ments with a form of state that disregards all national tradi- 
 tions. But, from every point of view, the position of Turkey 
 favors survival the least. 
 
 Geographically, Turkey invites the interference of the Great 
 
MODERN GERMANY 267 
 
 Powers. Placed at the meeting-point of three continents, she 
 commands the natural gateway into Asia and threatens the 
 flank of Africa. If strengthened in a military way, she might 
 block land communication between the Mediterranean and the 
 Indian Ocean, she might indeed threaten the water connection 
 between these two seas. As mistress of the Bosphorus and 
 of the Dardanelles, Turkey holds in her hand the key to the 
 international commerce of all the Mediterranean powers. At 
 the same time, her territory is by nature one of the richest in 
 the world and the seat of the most ancient civilization of man- 
 kind. There where the Babylonian, the Assyrian and the Greek 
 civilization has bloomed, as well as that of the Caliphs, a new 
 and glorious world might at any moment arise. The ruins and 
 deserts of Asia Minor call, as it were, for the living w^aters of 
 European organization. 
 
 Even more complicated are the ethnographic conditions. Tur- 
 key unfortunately is not inhabited by Turks, as Japan is by 
 Japanese; Turks and Arabs, Armenians and Kurds, Greeks and 
 Bulgarians are forced to live side by side in this empire, not 
 to speak of smaller remnants of other races. This mixture of 
 races was much worse before the Balkan War, and in this 
 respect the painful amputation of the European provinces was 
 undoubtedly beneficial to Turkey. The racial mixture, how- 
 ever, is to-day still a problem. This multiformity, however, 
 would not be such an impediment did the peoples in question 
 live entirely within the Turkish boundaries. But the bulk of the 
 Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians, the Christian citizens of 
 Mohammedan Turkey, live outside of Turkey. Especially do 
 the Greeks flirt with the thought of liberation and the realization 
 of the national ideal of a Greater Greece. Their enthusiasm, 
 therefore, for the renaissance of Turkey is not great. Likewise 
 the Bulgarians, who are not very numerous, regard themselves 
 as "unredeemed." The Armenians are scattered throughout the 
 entire empire, but the main portion of the nation dwells in Russia 
 and Persia and the recollection of their national independence lives 
 unquenched in their hearts. The unfavorable position of the 
 Russian Armenians influences them, it is true, in the main to be 
 loyal cooperators in the rebuilding of Turkey; but certain circles 
 have sought too long by sanguinary means to force the interfer- 
 ence of Europe and have suffered too greatly from the Kurds to 
 be able entirely to repudiate this past. Of the Mohammedan 
 peoples, the uncivilized Kurds are not for the moment to be 
 considered in the work of cooperation; while the Turks and 
 Arabs, the most important national elements, stand in sharp racial 
 
:268 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 opposition to each other. The Turks are the master nation, 
 they have conquered all these countries and peoples, they are the 
 upholders and the military backbone of the state. The glorious 
 traditions of Turkey are bound up with their name, with their 
 national dynasty. The Arabs, on the other hand, are the chosen 
 people of religious tradition, according to the Mohammedan 
 view the chief among the nations ; in their aristocratic pride they 
 submit only with inward protest to the rule of the Turks, who 
 excel them in capability and especially as regards character. The 
 leadership of Islam properly belongs to the Arabs. But the 
 opposition between Turks and Arabs is by no means the whole 
 of the problem. The Arabs are split as regards religion; their 
 most industrious racial relatives are the Catholic Syrians, to whom 
 for a double reason Turkish supremacy is hateful. Both peoples, 
 finally, are represented beyond the boundaries of Turkey, and 
 Pan-Turkish interests are furthered among the Turks, Pan- 
 Arabic interests among the Arabs — a fact which does not con- 
 tribute to simplify the ethnologic problem of the Ottoman State. 
 National and political boundaries thus coordinate at no point; 
 we have here the difficulties of Austria-Hungary translated to 
 the Orient. They are increased still further by an economic 
 factor. The nations most active commercially of Turkey are 
 Christian, especially the Greeks and Armenians. They have 
 for a long time furnished the commercial as well as the cultural 
 connection with Europe, or more properly expressed, with the 
 Levantines, the South-European emigrants who settled on the 
 east coasts of the Mediterranean, where they served to advance 
 the economic interests of European expansion. The elder 
 Turkish civilization oppressed and molested this class, and In 
 consequence it sought the protection of those powers interested 
 in the weakening of Turkey. Such ancient habits are not to be 
 uprooted on the spur of the moment, by means of a still very 
 imperfect constitution. The ruHng race of Turks has not been 
 able. In view of its national character and traditions, to com- 
 pete commercially with these elements. The Anatolic peasant, 
 upon whose labor In the last analysis the welfare of Turkey 
 depends, is too undeveloped and too ruthlessly exploited to 
 form the nucleus of the national economic system of the Moham- 
 medan-Turkish state, though, together with his Arabian co-reli- 
 gionist In Irak, he will one day be called upon to play this role. 
 Political power and economic strength, the two fundamentals 
 of a modern state, are thus divided among different peoples in 
 Turkey, a fact which plainly tends to sharpen racial contrasts. 
 Then, too, there is the constantly threatening danger of commer- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 269 
 
 clal and political interference by great and small Powers, which 
 see in the evolutionary conflicts in Turkey only the "beginning 
 of the end," and eagerly await the moment which, with the 
 ruin of Turkey, will bring the long hoped-for and carefully 
 prepared realization of their secret desires. 
 
 Previous to the age of capitalism, of commercial intercourse 
 and imperialism, these centrifugal elements of Turkey were 
 held in check by the patriarchal and absolute Islam state. Herein 
 the Turkish-Islamic elements, strengthened by Arabs, Kurds 
 and Albanians, ruled not alone de facto, but also de jure, as a 
 master caste over the economically active Christian Raja peoples. 
 If the latter provided public revenues, the former bore arms 
 for their protection. The real state was formed only by the 
 faithful; the Christians were subject peoples, who as regards 
 their individual and legal rights formed separate groups under 
 the protection of the Turkish government. The Turkish 
 Sultan was the absolute ruler, for the Turks had conquered 
 the Arabs and Kurds, although the latters' position as Moslems 
 was a different one from that of the non-Moslem races ; the fiction 
 of the Islam state with the Caliph at its head was preserved. 
 The Sultan as the most powerful ruler in Islam claimed the 
 Caliphate, that is, the temporal leadership of the faithful. He 
 was the protector of the Holy Cities, he waged his wars as 
 Holy Wars (djihad), he was the protagonist of the Faith 
 against Heresy. The Holy Law of the Sheriat was the law of 
 the state, although in practice it was frequently not applied, or 
 was supplemented by secular laws, the so-called kanun-namehs. 
 With all the conscious strength of racial bonds, the Ottoman 
 state rested upon a purely religious foundation. Nationalistic 
 thought is in the Orient a product of most recent development. 
 The state was held together by the will of the ruling Turkish 
 class and supported by the consciousness of religious solidarity 
 among its Mohammedan subjects. The Christians were sub- 
 ject foreign peoples, like the Tartars in present-day Russia. 
 The economic bond, well into the nineteenth century, was the 
 Turkish feudal system, which was not based like the Western 
 system on land, but on rent and tax-rent. It lies in the nature 
 of Orthodox Islam to spread ; if it retreats its destiny is sealed. 
 Turkish supremacy is slowly being crowded out of Europe, and 
 the previously so despised "heathen" are beginning gradually 
 with their commerce, with their political power, and above all 
 with their ideas, to undermine the ancient conception of the 
 state. The superior strength of the modern state is recognized, 
 hence the work of reform by Mohammed II. The army was 
 
270 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 reorganized, the feudal system gave way before the provincial 
 constitution, European jurisdiction and legal equality of the 
 Christians was proclaimed ever anew, but never, or only par- 
 tially, made a reality. The previously contemptuously granted 
 "capitulations" became an unbearable burden, which robbed the 
 growing modern Turkish state of all freedom of movement. The 
 premature ultra-liberal experiment of a western constitution 
 {mid hat, 1876) was crushed by the reaction of Abdul-Hamid. 
 The power of the state became a despotism. Opposed to the 
 advance of European ideas, the Sultan emphasized more and 
 more his title as Caliph. With increasing feebleness, he attempted 
 a policy of prestige-seeking by gathering, at least theoretically, 
 around his tottering throne the Mohammedans of the whole 
 world, who, in the face of increasing intercourse, become more 
 conscious of their solidarity, although their political union is 
 no more than a Utopian dream. Europe, therefore, ignorantly 
 regarded him as a Prince of the Church, a sort of Mohammedan 
 pope. But absolutism in its exaggerated form led to a catas- 
 trophe. Young Turkey came into being with the watchword of 
 the French Revolution. 
 
 The belief in the omnipotence of modern ideas gives the Turk- 
 ish Revolution and the resulting attempts at reform a touching 
 character. Only gradually and following bitter experiences were 
 the ideal value of historical inheritance, and the importance of 
 power for practical politics recognized as the real state problem 
 of the present. The question arises : How must the new Turkish 
 state be organized under the above described geographic, ethno- 
 graphic and historical conditions, if it is to assert itself? 
 
 Self-assertion was the goal clearly in view of everybody follow- 
 ing the revolution; indeed, in regard to the question of sover- 
 eignty, there w^as a marked sensitiveness, even where this 
 sovereignty was nothing more than a name. Bulgaria's declara- 
 tion of independence, the Bosnian and Cretan questions were 
 the source of almost as great excitement as later the Tripoli 
 and Balkan wars. Up to the time of the outbreak of the World 
 War, the degrading tutelage of the "capitulations" was keenly 
 felt. All interference of the Great Powers in internal affairs 
 was indignantly resented. Maintenance of Turkish independ- 
 ence — this was the first, the fundamental demand of Young 
 Turkey. No protectorate, of whatever nature it might be, no 
 international supervision was to be endured. But for the carrying 
 through of this program, strengthening of the state was neces- 
 sary, and before all a reorganization of the army. This task, 
 however, demanded as a prerequisite the purifying of the consti- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 271 
 
 tutional conception of the Empire. But on this point there was 
 a wide divergence of opinion among the different parties, and 
 the embittered conflicts of the various committees were mainly 
 in regard to the fundamental attitude toward the problem of 
 the state. There was a violent struggle as to the form of govern- 
 ment — whether It should be that of a union or of a federation — 
 and also as to its character — whether a neutral Turkish national 
 state on a constitutional basis, or a state of the Caliph of all 
 Islam. 
 
 The first of these questions was the chief point of dispute 
 between the Committee for Unity and Progress, on the one hand, 
 and the Liberals, on the other. A Turkish statesman has char- 
 acterized this antithesis, which seems to him also a structural 
 antithesis, as the difference between the centralization of France 
 and the decentralization of England and her daughter states. 
 "At bottom, the battle of the two parties was In effect that 
 between the Ideas of Auguste Comte and those of John Stuart 
 Mill and Desmoullns." Closely connected with this was the sec- 
 ond problem of state, although on this point the defenders of the 
 different theories frequently united in a single party. Should 
 the various nationalities and religions be brought together with 
 equal rights and duties under the standard of Ottoman national 
 unity? This was the view especially of the theorists from 
 Paris. Or should the Turks, as the rulers, dominate all and 
 seek contact with their ethnological relatives beyond the borders 
 of the Empire? This was the hope not alone in many circles in 
 Constantinople, but equally among the tools of Russia. Or, 
 finally, should the glorious Caliph tradition be preserved as de- 
 veloped by Abdul-Hamid, and Pan-Islamism be used as a weapon 
 against the outside world, as many among the Mohammedans 
 held, especially the Arabs and the rank and file of the army? 
 
 The Turkish parliament and the struggles of the committees 
 have often been severely criticized; but could such a portentous 
 decision be reached without conflict? The ideals of the Caliphate 
 as a state and those of the French Revolution cannot be com- 
 bined without compromise. 
 
 The liberal, European neutral form of government was at 
 first triumphant; Christians, who had previously been excluded 
 from the army, were now admitted. Utopians throughout the 
 world were jubilant. It had not been a revolution, it was de- 
 clared, but an evolution. It was proper that the form of state 
 should thus develop of itself. The experienced politicians of 
 the old regime, however, continued to rule, the Young Turks 
 not immediately assuming the actual direction of affairs. Time 
 
272 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 was to be granted for the new ideas to make their way. This 
 was the great mistake in the calculation. Power, not ideas, is 
 the decisive factor in all historical development. Presently out- 
 lying territories were lost, while within the Empire itself con- 
 fusion reigned ; in short, the exigencies of the battle for existence 
 forced the advocates of centralization to assume responsibility. 
 The idea of a federal state gave way at the moment of need, 
 because those upholding it coquetted with the possibility of foreign 
 protectorates and thereby endangered the basis of the state's 
 preservation. 
 
 The army, as the upholder of the revolution, was forced to 
 seize the reins of government, or all would have been lost. 
 All "imported" desires of the theorists had to be sacrificed to 
 the necessity of maintaining the morale of the army. Thus, under 
 the spur of necessity, return was made to the old conception of 
 the Islam state, with retention, however, of the constitution. 
 The Christians in the army had not measured up to the standard ; 
 but neither had the Turkish soldier proved of great value in a 
 secular war for the unfamiliar conception of the "Fatherland." 
 
 "Fanaticism is the only motive able to move the Anatolian 
 soldier. . . . The idea of a fatherland is foreign to the Turkish 
 mind, and the Young Turk Committee that had striven to 
 create 'Ottomanism' achieved naught." These are the words of 
 a French eye-witness of the Turkish collapse in the Balkan war.^ 
 For the army, the state conception of Islam was a necessity. The 
 emphasizing, however, of the Islamic idea in the constitutional 
 state had become less dangerous, as the result of the Balkan 
 War, since the most important Christian provinces had suffered 
 amputation, and the Islamic element was numerically far in 
 excess in this new and diminished Turkey. In addition, there 
 had been a steady stream of Mohammedan immigration from 
 the lost provinces. Further, in the Islam state Arabians and 
 Turks, the most important national elements, were able to work 
 peacefully together on the basis of historical tradition, and with 
 typical Oriental disregard of nationality. A decisive factor, 
 finally, was the knowledge that the European Powers with 
 Mohammedan subjects regarded with suspicion the idea of the 
 international solidarity of Islam; but since the days of Abdul- 
 Hamid the Turkish government had learned how to play on this 
 string. To counteract the increasing pressure of the Powers, 
 the decision was reached in Constantinople to cultivate Pan- 
 Islamism as a political weapon. The Young Turks desired to 
 
 1 Histoire de VEmpire Ottoman, Le Vicompte de la Jonquiere, Paris, 1914 (2me 
 ed.), Vol. II, p. 396. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 273 
 
 be an Islamic Great Power, and by means of the international 
 nature of Islam they thought to increase their prestige. Thus, 
 the outcome of the constitutional struggles and of the military 
 reverses has been a centralized Islam state — not the state, how- 
 ever, of the old Caliphate, but a modern constitutional state, 
 with the Caliph at the helm and with Pan-Islam tendencies. The 
 Christian subjects enjoy freedom and equality in the Turkish 
 Empire, but the state religion is Islam. We have a parallel in 
 the religious character of the Christian constitutional states, 
 Austria and Russia. In the same manner that Russia is waging 
 a war for the realization of ancient religious ideals, so likewise 
 the Sultan-Caliph proclaims the holy war of Islam. The Turkish 
 demands, on the basis of this solution of the problem of state 
 are: self-preservation, strengthening of the army, a constitution, 
 and the Islamic character of the state. 
 
 The economic problem has, of course, not yet been solved; 
 but its elements, so far as the state's interests are concerned, are 
 evident. Every genuinely Turkish policy must reckon with the 
 inherited economic conditions and with the natural treasures 
 of the soil. The new state authorities, however, despite their 
 good intentions, found themselves face to face with a difficult 
 situation springing from inherited conditions. In their efforts 
 to pursue a national economic policy, they ran counter to foreign 
 interests at every turn. Foreign policy and economic reform 
 were inseparably bound together. This resulted not only from 
 the backwardness of the country, but very largely from two fur- 
 ther fundamental causes, one historical, the other economic: 
 from the "capitulations" and from the lack of capital in Turkey. 
 
 The "capitulations" have developed from old commercial 
 treaties. As regards the state, their chief economic significance 
 lies in the fact that tariff increases require the approval of the 
 treaty Powers, and that Europeans enjoy immunity from taxa- 
 tion. The customs duties are exclusively ad valorem. In recent 
 years they have been gradually raised from eight to fifteen per 
 cent. The economic condition is monstrous which allows a state 
 no tariff differentiation, either as regards countries or classes 
 of goods. In case of an increased need of revenue, quite uncon- 
 templated economic inj'ury may result. Every fractional tariff 
 raise must be arranged with the Powers, each of whom demands 
 compensation in the form of commercial or even political con- 
 cessions. But even this is not all. The immunity from taxa- 
 tion of the Europeans, who are almost exclusively merchants, 
 makes it impossible adequately to tax the natives engaged in 
 
274 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 commerce, since they would thereby be rendered incapable of 
 competition. It has thus hitherto been impossible, though these 
 circles are financially the most competent, to tax them cor- 
 respondingly, and the chief burden has been laid on the feeble 
 shoulders of the rural population. The leading men of Turkey 
 longingly awaited the moment when it would be possible to 
 free themselves from this economic strait-jacket, to say nothing 
 of the restrictions placed upon the authority of the state as 
 regards police and judicial matters. The war has at last 
 opened the way in Turkey for healthy reforms in these fields, 
 especially for the regulation of the finances on an independent 
 basis. 
 
 Lack of capital in Turkey, both government and private, 
 was another incentive for the policy of interference. The fact 
 that the Turkish national bank, la Banque Ottomane, is an 
 absolutely French undertaking, will not be gone into further 
 at this point, important as it is; but Turkey is a thoroughly 
 typical debtor state. In the balance of trade the item of commer- 
 cial paper stands exclusively on the debit side of Turkey's ledger. 
 In order to secure money for her loans, she is driven to great 
 sacrifices — indeed, the attempt has even been made to force her 
 to grant political concessions in return for loans. For economic 
 and strategic reasons, extension of her railroads was needed. 
 European private capital was eagerly offered for these promising 
 undertakings, but behind the companies stood the political repre- 
 sentatives of the capitalists, and their desires were defeated or 
 hindered by competing states. The Anatolian railway was not 
 allowed to be continued through the eastern part of Asia Minor, 
 since Russia considered her boundary threatened thereby; and 
 even the Hedjaz railway, which had been built by Turkey herself 
 with non-European capital, was refused a terminus on the Red 
 Sea, since England feared for the Suez Canal. When one Power 
 gained a concession, despite the protests of the other Powers, the 
 latter immediately demanded indemnity concessions. Turkey's 
 national economic policy, therefore, was not dictated by her own 
 interests, but by the private economic interests of European 
 capitalists, or by the political ambitions of the great Powers. 
 
 As long as Turkey worked in conjunction with all the Powers, 
 there could be no great uniform plan for her benefit, or for 
 strengthening the country internally. To throw herself un- 
 reservedly into the arms of any one of the Powers was not possible 
 without a complete breach with all the others; and the danger 
 was always present that the price of healthy economic develop- 
 ment might be the loss of independence. For was there a single 
 
MODERN GERMANY 275 
 
 great Power which had an interest in seeing Turkey strengthen 
 herself as an independent state? Was not the desire of all of 
 them to gain economic spheres of interest in order to pave the 
 way for territorial acquisitions? The interests of the Turkish 
 state demanded European guidance, since economic reform could 
 not be achieved independently. The more uniform this guidance 
 was, the better it would be. The natural leader of Turkey, 
 from the Turkish point of view, must be that great Power whose 
 own interests demanded a strengthening of Turkey. But did such 
 a Power exist? 
 
 Before we attempt to answer this question, however, we must 
 contemplate the economic problem from the economic point of 
 view, in the narrower sense of the word. What are the economic 
 conditions and demands for the future suggested by Turkey's 
 natural treasures? Soil and climate predestine Turkey as an 
 agrarian state along great lines. Grain is not the only factor 
 in this connection ; the most important place is held by the 
 product which has greater value in the world's market — cotton. 
 In addition to the well-watered territory of Southern Anatolia, 
 which offers a fine field for this staple, the ancient country be- 
 tween the Euphrates and the Tigris, where cotton even grows 
 wild, is one of the natural places for its cultivation on a vast 
 scale. Were the necessary irrigation provided, results might 
 be achieved according to the statement of the English engineer, 
 Sir W. Willcocks,^ which would far surpass in quality and quan- 
 tity the Egyptian product. New Turkey must reckon with this 
 great potential factor in determining her future political attitude 
 toward the Powers. 
 
 But Turkey has also an industrial future. In view of her 
 stage of development, she will not be able for many years to 
 count upon native industries of a quality equal to those of Eng- 
 land or Germany, since a high grade of popular education is 
 a prerequisite for this. But she will be in a position before 
 long to provide independently for the industrial utilization of the 
 products of her soil by simple weaving and milling industries. 
 The production of petroleum w^ill be another important activity. 
 There are petroleum deposits of great extent in Asiatic Turkey, 
 not to speak of mineral treasures which are as yet almost un- 
 touched. Turkey's interest, therefore, demands that if she is 
 to enter into closer relation with any Power, not only must the 
 political aims of the two states be reconcilable, but their natural 
 economic conditions be complementary, so that Turkey may 
 be hindered neither politically nor economically in her justifiable 
 
 1 The Irrigation of Mesopotamia, 1905. 
 
276 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 development into a modern state, but assisted in a full and 
 speedy evolution. 
 
 What, then, must be the nature of Turkey's foreign policy, 
 on the basis of her political and economic needs as outlined above ? 
 To continue to solve the problem as hitherto — namely, with the 
 rival cooperation of all the Powers — has already been shown 
 to be irreconcilable with Turkish interests. Let us for this 
 purpose examine the political and economic relation of the vari- 
 ous states to Turkey. 
 
 Russia, Turkey's powerful northern neighbor, must at the 
 start be rejected as a possible mentor, for the Muscovites are 
 hereditary enemies of the Ottomans. The gradual advance of 
 the Russians, first to the banks of the Black Sea and then around 
 this great inland body of water, was made at the cost of Turkey. 
 The Dardanelles are the historical goal of Russia's imperialistic 
 policy, they are the gateway to the ocean for Russian trade, 
 while for the Russian Church the possession of Constantinople 
 and Jerusalem would mark the fulfilment of century-old long- 
 ings. Political hopes, economic necessity and religious antitheses 
 make Russia the natural enemy of Turkey. Far from strength- 
 ening Turkey as a state, for more than a century the policy of 
 the Czars has been in every way to weaken her as much as 
 possible. Whoever strengthens or supports Turkey is the enemy 
 of Russia. This is the explanation of Russia's anger against 
 Germany in the matter of the German military mission of 
 19 1 3-1 4. The view taken by public opinion in Russia at the 
 time was "that a real strengthening of Turkey appears to the 
 Russian Empire as something which must be prevented." ^ Rus- 
 sia, it is true, saved Constantinople in the Balkan War from being 
 engulfed by the Bulgarians; but this she did not in order to 
 preserve it for the Turks, but that she might conquer it for 
 herself, as Sassonov boldly stated on February 9, 19 15, during 
 the war session of the Duma. Whatever may be thought re- 
 garding the indiscretion of this statement, nevertheless it formu- 
 lated the will of the nation. ^ In keeping with this, Russian 
 schools, churches and commercial enterprises were established 
 for the purpose, not of strengthening, but of undermining Tur- 
 key. Moreover, Russia is an agrarian state like Turkey, she 
 produces the same things in great quantities; her industries are 
 in a state of infancy to which Turkey's might easily attain — 
 
 ^ Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik 1888 his 1913, Count Ernst zu Reventlow, 
 p. 383. 
 
 2 See Preussische Jahrbiicher, Mitrofanov, 1914- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 277 
 
 hence, economically an alliance between Russia and Turkey would 
 be contrary to reason. In such a case, Turkey would sink, 
 politically as well as economically, to the condition of a Russian 
 province, and Russia would merely acquire a few additional 
 enslaved foreign peoples. 
 
 But if Russia was the hereditary enemy of Turkey, until re- 
 cently England was her traditional friend. Up to the last few 
 decades of the nineteenth century, England had a genuine interest 
 in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire : English and Turkish 
 interests seemed identical. 
 
 England's interest in the maintenance of Turkey was two- 
 fold — it was governed by colonial as well as international con- 
 siderations. With one hundred million Mohammedan colonial 
 subjects of her own, England could not with impunity view 
 the growing sentiment of Pan-Islamism. Since the mutiny of 
 1857, rio security was felt regarding the Islamic population of. 
 India. Friendly diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte 
 were sought in order that England might pose as the protector 
 of Islam and thereby influence the loyalty of the Indians. The 
 chief factor, however, in England's Turkish policy was her 
 antagonism to Russia. The high tide of this feeling was reached 
 at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. In keeping with an old 
 principle of action, England avoided the creation of a land 
 boundary between her own possessions and any Continental Great 
 Power, and for this reason she strove for the preservation of 
 Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan as the natural buffer states 
 between the Russian and English spheres of interest. The aban- 
 donment of this policy w^as not the result of a sudden decision, 
 but was due to a number of motives. After the opening of the 
 Suez Canal, despite England's efforts to prevent it, this direct 
 course to India became so important that Great Britain was 
 forced to occupy Egypt. The Red Sea, however, is a continua- 
 tion of the Suez Canal. This meant for England the beginning 
 of the problem of an Arabian question. But at the same time 
 the new course of English policy, commonly called Imperialism, 
 had been entered upon. 
 
 In addition to the Cape-to-Cairo program, there arose the 
 new battle-cry "From Cairo to Calcutta!" Egypt, which was 
 still legally a Turkish province, became the corner stone of 
 the British world empire. The occupation of Egypt, called 
 temporary In all ofliicial statements, became thereby definitive. 
 The friendship between England and Turkey suffered a severe 
 strain. The logical extension of this policy could result only in 
 the severance of the Arabian provinces from the Ottoman Em- 
 
278 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 pire. Only if weakened, could Turkey be permitted to remain 
 mistress of the borderlands of the Red Sea. England, therefore, 
 began to foster throughout Arabia the seditious elements and to 
 hinder the strengthening of Turkey. The rebels in the province 
 of Asir, in the Yemen district, which had never been entirely con- 
 quered by Turkey, found support and encouragement from Eng- 
 land. The Hedjaz railway, which is vital for the strengthening 
 of Turkish influence in Arabia, could not be continued to the 
 Red Sea, owing to English opposition. Turkey, it is true, was 
 badly advised in the unfortunate Akaba affair. Further inland, 
 where the Bedouin Empires of the Banu Sa'ud and of the Banu 
 Rashid stood opposed to each other, the former, who were enemies 
 of the Turks, gained the upper hand by means of English 
 weapons. As a consequence, Turkey saw herself forced to fur- 
 nish weapons to the Banu Rashid; this was a measure which 
 cut both ways as regards the peace of Arabia and Mesopotamia. 
 This policy carries us through the Central Arabian uplands 
 to the Persian Gulf, where Turkish supremacy had never been 
 very firmly established, although individual local sheiks and other 
 rulers found it to their advantage to accept an official Turkish 
 title. The extension of British influence to this point was 
 part of the policy that aimed at the protection of India's flank, 
 and that did battle against the pirates and slave-dealers, and is 
 not to be construed as a manifestation of political enmity to 
 Turkey, any more than England's relations with the southern 
 coast of Arabia. The treaty with Maskat in 1798 was aimed 
 rather at France and Holland. The treaties in the early part of 
 the nineteenth century, also, were merely treaties of commerce 
 and friendship — thus England's connection with the Gulf was 
 legitimate and long-standing. As early as November, 1839, 
 the first Anglo-Indian report was published in regard to the 
 harbor of Koweit, which later became so celebrated; but in the 
 period of imperialism these treaties gradually acquired a different 
 character. One little sheik after the other renounced the right 
 of negotiation with foreign powers — in 1892 the Sheik of Bah- 
 rein, in 1899 the Sheik of Koweit. These are protectorate agree- 
 ments with careful avoidance of the word. But Turkey like- 
 wise asserted certain claims to Koweit, whose sheik was a Turk- 
 ish kaimmakam, and to Bahrein. Koweit became of the greatest 
 importance for Turkey with the beginning of the Bagdad rail- 
 way, as for a long time it was regarded as the only possible 
 terminus of that road. England, however, sought to gain posses- 
 sion of this harbor. It was not until 191 3 that an agreement 
 was reached in regard to Koweit between England and Turkey, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 279 
 
 by which Turkey was forced to yield to English pressure along 
 the whole line. England at the same time sought and gained 
 a free hand in respect to Bahrein. At about the same period 
 Ibn Sa'ud occupied the last Turkish possessions on the Persian 
 Gulf in which Turkish garrisons were still to be found, namely 
 the districts of El-Hasa and El-Katif. According to the general 
 belief of the Orient, Sa'ud is merely a tool of England. Thus 
 at the very moment when Turkey's outside possessions began 
 to be of importance for the increase of her strength, she found 
 herself face to face with the silent and tenacious Arabian policy 
 of England, seeking to deprive her of one province after the 
 other. 
 
 In regard to England's ultimate aim, however, there could 
 be no doubt in the mind of any thinking Oriental after her action 
 in Persia. Russia, following her disastrous defeat at the hands 
 of Japan, had ceased to be England's chief opponent. Germany 
 was so greatly strengthened that England changed her traditional 
 Asiatic policy fundamentally, in order to secure a free hand 
 against Germany. The idea of a buffer state was definitely 
 abandoned in the Persian Treaty of 1907, and North Persia was 
 sacrificed to Russia. In his book, *'The Strangling of Persia'* 
 (London, 1912), W. Morgan Shuster has shown the absolute 
 lack of scruple in the course which was followed. He had been 
 employed to reorganize the finances of Persia. But as this did 
 not agree with the interests of Russia, he was forced to yield. 
 He says: 
 
 ''Russia is now (April 30, 1912) the sovereign power in 
 Persia. She is the practical and effective ruler of the country. 
 The whole of Persia is to-day a satrapy. The peoples, however 
 brutally treated, have no means of protest. Fear, deadly sicken-, 
 ing fear of the prison, noose and torture, is the force with which 
 Russia governs." (p. 236.) 
 
 Accordmg to Shuster's opinion, however, responsibility for 
 this lies with England, who, from dread of Germany, has sacri- 
 ficed every one of her ideals in her Asiatic policy. "British 
 prestige has suffered all over the world, and the English people 
 are openly dissatisfied because they can no longer appear as 
 the friend of weak and struggling nations." The Turks under- 
 stood this. The interest of the British world empire, as conceived 
 in the Foreign Office after 1907, demanded the dismember- 
 ment of Turkey, for in view of the unparalleled rapidity of Rus- 
 sia's advance in Persia, the Persian Gulf was threatened unless 
 Russia could be deflected toward the Dardanelles. Arabia, 
 Mesopotamia and South Persia to be given to England; the 
 
28o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 north of Turkey to Russia — such was the plan which would 
 have fulfilled Muscovite hopes and at the same time have realized 
 the uninterrupted English overland connection of Cairo and 
 Calcutta. Furthermore, this would have given the death blow 
 to Germany's ambitions in Turkey. Such political aims are 
 seldom realized by a direct process; but only by keeping these 
 ultimate aims of England in mind is it possible to understand 
 her policy toward Turkey. This has been openly admitted by 
 French observers. Rene Pinon speaks thus of England : 
 
 "She boldly assumed the offensive, encouraged the revolts of 
 Yemen and Hedjaz, gave shelter in Egypt to the committees of 
 the 'national Arab party,' despatched the engineer Sir William 
 Willcocks to Mesopotamia — provoked finally the Koweit aifair 
 and profited by that of Tabah." ^ 
 
 The aim of all these undertakings was to weaken Turkey. 
 And that policy which had been successful in Egypt, should 
 it not be feasible also in other Arabian provinces of the Ottoman 
 Empire? 
 
 England's imperialistic course and her understanding with 
 Russia rendered her impossible as a political guide for Turkey, 
 whereas from a purely economic point of view she seemed to be 
 predestined to be such. France, the oldest friend of the Porte, 
 was for similar reasons excluded from this candidacy, despite 
 the fact that since the days of Francis I her enmity towards Aus- 
 tria had frequently brought the two countries together in a 
 community of interests, that the "capitulations" had developed 
 mainly from French treaties, that the modern Orient is quite 
 controlled by French cultural ideals, and that France is not alone 
 the traditional banker but likewise the chief creditor of Turkey. 
 The author of the anonymous Oxford pamphlet No. 39 ("Tur- 
 key in Europe and Asia") even regards this indebtedness of 
 Turkey as the chief reason for her continued existence down 
 to the present day. France, it is true, has for a long time 
 advanced claims against Syria. She has no desire to be excluded 
 from a division of Turkey ; but on the other hand, French inter- 
 ests might easily have become reconciled with the maintenance 
 of Turkey. It is even possible that Russia's advance may have 
 disquieted her ally on the Seine, but France was ready to sacri- 
 fice everything to her policy of revanche. Therefore, she sec- 
 onded the Anglo-Russian political work of undermining Turkey, 
 and this she did with her most characteristic weapons — with her 
 press and her financial policy. The aim of the latter especially 
 was to keep Turkey in leading strings: on the occasion of the 
 
 1 L'Europe et I'Empire Ottoman^ Rene Pinon, Paris, 1908, p. 392. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 281 
 
 loan (1910) France did not hesitate to demand the right 
 of political interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish 
 ministry of finance. This caused, as is well known, the failure 
 of the transaction, and Germany thereupon sprang into the 
 breach; the money was, it is true, not so cheaply obtained, but 
 on the other hand it brought with it no political humiliation. 
 From the purely commercial point of view, France, with her 
 plentiful capital, might very well seem a desirable friend to 
 an impecunious Turkey; but Turkey, growing in strength, did 
 not offer the needed commercial advantages; for France does 
 not possess a highly developed industry like England or Ger- 
 many, but exports to Turkey simple articles manufactured en 
 masse, which might be produced equally well in Turkish territory 
 within reasonable time. The two countries are not comple- 
 mentary to each other in respect to trade, but are competitors. 
 Further, such satisfactory deals could not be made by French 
 bankers with Turkey if she became strengthened. Hence, while 
 it was to France's interest to maintain Turkey, it was so only 
 under the status quo. The financial independence of Turkey, 
 on the basis of an active trade balance, which would be in keeping 
 with the country's own interests, ran counter to the interests of 
 the money market of Paris, and on that account was undesirable 
 in the eyes of the French government. 
 
 Thus as regards the Entente Powers, there was no great 
 objection to the dismemberment of Turkey — at all events, they 
 were all equally interested in her gradual disintegration and 
 the prevention of her renascence. But Turkey did not fall to 
 pieces; for before an agreement had been reached as to her 
 dismemberment she had found a strong helper in Germany. The 
 accession of Emperor Wilhelm II to the throne coincides, approx- 
 imately, with the time when Germany, through her economic 
 development, was forced into the path of world politics. Follow- 
 ing the Emperor's first visit to Constantinople (1888), the 
 building of the Anatolian railway was started; the second visit 
 (1898) ushered in the period of the Bagdad railway. To the 
 superficial observer it appeared that a new power, in addition 
 to France, England and Russia, had entered the lists In order 
 to gain economic concessions from disintegrating Turkey, and 
 thereby to lay the foundation for claims to territorial acquisi- 
 tions in the final division. It so appeared without doubt; In 
 Germany, too, "unofficial" politicians spent their time in "an- 
 nexing" Anatolia and Syria in order to secure colonies for 
 Germany's future excess of population. And yet a glance at the 
 
282 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 map, at Germany's unfortunate geographical position, shows the 
 folly of such plans. In the face of the Mediterranean Powers 
 and Russia, a German colony on Turkish soil would have proved 
 a still-born child. The German Imperial policy proceeded from 
 healthier considerations, and had none but economic aims. Herein 
 lies the fundamental difference between the German Oriental 
 policy and that of every other state, with the possible exception 
 of the United States. Since Germany could not think of occupa- 
 tion nor of protecting herself even in local possessions, she advo- 
 cated the independence and the strengthening of Turkey. There 
 was system in this policy, for in Morocco and China the same 
 course had been pursued. Germany discouraged premature re- 
 forms, which would have led only to a guardianship for the 
 Oriental states, or even to the dominance of some especially inter- 
 ested Great Power. This may have given rise to the opinion that 
 Germany was the upholder of barbarism. 
 
 "In Macedonia, as in Russia, as in China, as in Morocco, as 
 everywhere, the interests of William II run counter to the 
 needs of humanity," says Victor Berard. ^ 
 
 The author is undoubtedly right in stating that our policy 
 was not of a sentimental kind, but was guided solely by German 
 Interests. But those interests did not demand territorial acquisi- 
 tions, as was the case with the other Powers, but exclusively 
 economic Influence. In the entire Islamic world, In North Africa, 
 in Egypt, in India, everywhere where higher races had first been 
 commercially exploited by European Powers and then deprived 
 of their political rights. It had been demonstrated that territorial 
 acquisition was, In the long run, a mistake; this policy had. It 
 Is true, been of great advantage for a few generations, but with 
 the increasing education of peoples capable of development it had 
 Inevitably led to serious conflicts. In view of this fact, Ger- 
 many had no intention, in the general division of the Oriental 
 world still remaining independent, to acquire even a slight 
 portion for her exclusive exploitation; on the contrary, a much 
 better bargain was anticipated through the maintenance of the 
 Oriental states, since we reckoned on being able more than to 
 hold our own In a market thrown open to international compe- 
 tition. From this point of view, therefore, a strengthening of 
 these states, especially of Turkey, was desirable In our own 
 Interest; for only a strong state Is In a position to develop Its 
 trade to Its own advantage without diplomatic concessions. It 
 Is only necessary to follow this course of reasoning to realize that 
 Germany promised to be for Turkey an ally whose help and 
 
 1 La France et Guillaume II, Paris, 1907, p. 208 ff. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 283 
 
 advice the latter state could accept, since Turkey was not the 
 object of, but a partner in, Germany's political reckoning, and 
 that not alone from an economic point of view. 
 
 In his book, In which he justifies his foreign policy, Prince 
 Billow says regarding this point: 
 
 "Especially since the Oriental voyage of the Emperor and 
 Empress have our relations with Turkey and Islam been care- 
 fully nurtured. These relations were not of a sentimental na- 
 ture; we had, on the contrary, an important economic, military 
 and also political Interest In the maintenance of Turkey. The 
 country was for us, both from the economic and financial point 
 of view, a fruitful field of activity, to which Rodbertus and 
 Friedrlch List had already called attention, and which we have 
 cultivated to great advantage. In the undesirable, but not Im- 
 possible case of a general war, the military strength of Turkey 
 might have been a very perceptible factor on our side. Turkey 
 was the most desirable neighbor possible for our Austrian allv. 
 That her collapse might be a loss for us was revealed by the last 
 army bill, which resulted from the situation brought about by 
 the Balkan War. — Turkey has for many years remained a useful 
 and important link In the chain of our political relations." ^ 
 
 From the point of view of these military and political Interests, 
 it Is explicable that the German Empire, following old Prussian 
 traditions, at the very beginning of Its Turkish economic policy 
 assisted in modernizing the famous Ottoman Army. Likewise, 
 German-built railways did not serve economic purposes alone. 
 In many places. In planning the course of the line, economic 
 advantages were sacrificed to the strategic desires of the Turkish 
 general staff. During the period of absolutism, many a desirable 
 plan could not be carried through, but there was no lack of 
 good will and sincere work; a Frenchman, Victor Berard, who 
 is by no means a friend of Germany, Is forced. In speaking of 
 the Graeco-Turklsh war, to acknowledge the success attained. 
 He says: 
 
 ''Without the discipline and the strategy of von der Goltz, 
 the army of the Caliph would never have gained the Thessallan 
 victories." ^ 
 
 Rene Pinon, another unbiassed Frenchman, thus characterizes 
 the German policy: 
 
 "The certain and permanent interest of Germany Is to pre- 
 serve and Increase the Turkish power, and to make use of it 
 in order to extend her own power throughout the domain of 
 
 ^ Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II, Vol. i, p. 31. 
 ' La mort de Stamboul, p. 96. 
 
284 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Islam. To galvanize the Sick ]\Ian, to fortify his army for the 
 purpose of using it as an auxiliary for her own political designs — 
 such is the interest of Germany and such is the policy of the 
 Emperor. Thus the Ottoman Empire continues, despite so many 
 predictions, stronger perhaps than it has been for a long time, 
 at all events more Mussulman, more Turkish." ^ 
 
 With these words, a political opponent frankly admits that 
 the German policy, by its very character, has served the best 
 interests of Turkey. He is forced to admit the same of Ger- 
 many's economic policy, especially as regards the effect of 
 the Bagdad Raihvay: 
 
 ''If, then, the Bagdad Railway is to become an instrument 
 of domination, this may well be for the benefit of the Turks and 
 of Islam. As for Germany, if she succeeds in carrying through 
 her gigantic enterprise she will, without doubt, gain political 
 advantage from it, but she will find it primarily a means of 
 economic expansion, a market from which her products will 
 be scattered throughout Central Asia." - 
 
 That Turkey also would enjoy great economic profit from it 
 is self-evident; demand increases with traffic facilities, and autor; 
 matically revenues from customs and taxes rise. The history 
 of the Chem'in de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie has again proved the 
 fact that railways, even when they show a private deficit, never- 
 theless pay well from a government point of view, and this is 
 the best justification for the "kilometer guarantee" granted in the 
 case of the German undertakings. But even more important 
 for Turkey than the increase of revenue, is the fact that through 
 her railways the distant provinces have been brought so much 
 nearer to the capital that her political solidarity gains in strength 
 through the greater mobility of troops and officials. 
 
 The great problem of the German-Turkish relations is char- 
 acterized by the catchword "Berlin to Bagdad." Political enmity 
 has seen in this an effort by Germany for dominance; Turkey 
 has been spoken of as "a German province," or at all events a 
 German protectorate over Turkey has been thought possible. 
 The problem, however, is purely economic; it would be non- 
 sensical to develop a future protectorate in a military way to 
 the point of being self-protecting, not to speak of the geographical 
 and political obstacles to a possible German desire for conquest. 
 No, Bagdad and Berlin stand here in opposition, as the termini 
 of a vast railway undertaking that is approaching completion, 
 and which binds together countries of quite different commercial 
 
 1 L' Europe et I'Empire Ottoman, p. 76. 
 'Ibid., p. 334. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 285 
 
 structure and renders possible an exchange of their products. 
 It makes them independent of inimical competition, of the attacks 
 of enemies, and above all of the dominance of the sea. What is 
 in question, therefore, is a great unified trade territory as the 
 basis of political friendship. Every one of the states through 
 which the line passes — the German industrial states in the north, 
 the great Turkish agrarian state in the southeast, and the Balkan 
 states in between — will seek to carry out their own national 
 policy; but they all have the same interest in exchanging their 
 products through this new artery of international communica- 
 tion. Although, on account of the lower cost of transportation 
 in times of peace, freight will be sent by sea, nevertheless pre- 
 cisely the present international crisis shows the incalculable 
 importance of such a secure means of land communication, 
 which is comparable in importance to the great trunk lines of 
 the United States. Germany, however, has not the least inten- 
 tion of taking advantage of Turkey's economically undeveloped 
 condition by crushing her with capital. The experiences of other 
 states have taught us that a political friendship can never con- 
 tinue if the stronger party exploits the weaker economically. 
 The attempt, at all events, will be made to protect the future 
 economic interests of Turkey, against ephemeral private interests, 
 even of German entrepreneurs ; for only in this manner can 
 there be permanent profit. Thus the words "Berlin to Bagdad" 
 have also an idealistic meaning. They symbolize the friendly 
 relations between Germany and Turkey, they show the path 
 which Germany has followed in opening up the riches of Turkey 
 for the Turks, as well as for the whole world, the path along 
 which Germany will continue to provide Turkey with whatever 
 of a material and spiritual nature she needs for her inner de- 
 velopment. 
 
 The identity of German and Turkish interests was so evident 
 that Abdul Hamid, in pursuance of a wise policy, turned ever 
 more emphatically toward Germany. In view of the unpopu- 
 larity of absolutism which had finally led to political caricature 
 and to oppression, it was easy for our enemies to represent ''reac- 
 tionary" Germany as the fortress of the old regime, and the 
 enemy of Turkish freedom. These disseminations found, it 
 is true, no credence among the military circles of the Young 
 Turks, who had learned the blessing of German industry; but 
 they encountered belief among the refugees who had been 
 affectionately welcomed in Paris and London, and who after 
 the successful revolution controlled the opinion of the thoughtless 
 
286 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 mob with French catchwords of freedom. But even they, after 
 a period of error, were won back by the force of facts to Abdul 
 Hamid's pro-German policy. A ''former Grand Vizier" who 
 is friendly to the Entente Powers, has recently in a neutral 
 publication admirably characterized this reversal. His course 
 of reasoning brings us directly to the threshold of the war. He 
 writes : 
 
 "All that Germany had done to uphold Turkey, as providing 
 her with the weapons of war, sending a military mission, ab- 
 stention from active participation in anti-Turkish movements, 
 great works of public utility — the Young Turks had attributed 
 all this to the personal friendship of the sovereigns or even to 
 a desire for 'fat' and onerous contracts. All the Franco- 
 English acts Karmful to Ottoman interests, as the seizure of 
 Egypt, questions regarding the frontier of Yemen and Akaba, 
 the Armenian, Cretan and Macedonian questions, the benevolent 
 protection of Greece, the protectorate of Tunis, the occupation 
 of Metelin, etc. — all these were considered only as a natural 
 consequence of a tyrannical system and of a disastrous political 
 course, and not as marking a new departure in the policy of 
 the states who were the authors of these moves." ^ 
 
 For this reason. Young Turkey with Kiamil, the friend of 
 England, threw itself into the arms of Great Britain, who at the 
 time of the separation of Bosnia and Bulgaria, reached the 
 zenith of her influence. Gradually, however, the truth began 
 to make itself felt. Russia was unmasked as an accomplice in 
 the Bosnian affair, and she recognized Bulgaria after establishing 
 her influence at Sofia. After the fall of Kiamil, brought about 
 through internal causes, England treated the Young Turks as 
 her enemies and supported the opposition. 
 
 "The Young Turks, full of illusions as regards the liberal 
 sentiments of Western Europe . . . were greatly astonished 
 to find that this liberal Europe had welcomed Ottoman consti- 
 tutionalism not as a new instrument of Turkish unity but rather 
 as a new means of separatism for the Christian races in Turkey." 
 
 Europe made concessions to "Liberal Turkey" as little as she 
 had done when Turkey was "absolute." The furious press 
 campaign against the Turkish loan of 1910, which even frightened 
 off England from undertaking it, shows the unreliability of the 
 feelings of the Western Powers. The sale of the German men- 
 of-war and the granting of the loan through Berlin and Vienna 
 
 1 "Reflections sur le role de la Turquie," Revue Politique Internationale, 
 November and December, 1914, p. 351 ff. The editor says the writer of this 
 article is "a very high person who played a role of the first importance in the 
 events of the last five years." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 287 
 
 showed where Turkey's true friends were to be found. Russia 
 feared that a strong Turkey would permanently block her way 
 into the Mediterranean, England entertained similar fears for 
 Egypt. "The Young Turks were thus brought to retrace their 
 steps, to enter into a path of German friendship which appeared 
 to them to offer a better way out." 
 
 Even worse was the effect of the reproaches which were ad- 
 dressed to Young Turkey from the camp of the Entente Powers. 
 They were blamed for their nationalism because, on the basis 
 of local autonomy, a crowd of small and easily influenced 
 states had been hoped for on Turkish soil. When it was found 
 that this dismemberment of Turkey had not come about on a 
 crie au national'isme a outrance. (Nationalism was bitterly de- 
 nounced.) The non-Turkish peoples enjoyed greater freedom 
 than the Algerians and East Indians; they were forbidden only 
 to foment revolution, and to educate their children in an anti- 
 Turkish spirit. ''What barbarism ! Better the old regime!" This 
 was repeated ad nauseam. Equally grotesque did the reproach 
 of Pan-Islamism appear to the Turks. The Mohammedans of 
 Russia, England and France did not enjoy the political rights 
 to which they were entitled. 
 
 "The European and American, and even certain Asiastic peo- 
 ples, have cast off the yoke which deprived them of human rights. 
 Is It so extraordinary that the Mussulmans have the same ideas 
 and the same desires? It seems that it is extraordinary, since 
 as soon as a Mussulman begins to manifest them, to feel himself 
 the equal of other men and to demand an amelioration of his 
 social and political condition, this Is branded as the crime of 
 Pan-Islamism. — A Caliphate Is not tolerated which may become 
 a symbol of progress for Mussulmans in general. If German 
 diplomacy has been able successfully to undergo severe tests at 
 Constantinople, this was because the Turks felt that this diplo- 
 macy was not directed to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, 
 nor to an encouragement of disruptive elements, nor that it 
 was an indication of violent opposition to the renascence and the 
 progress of the Islam world." 
 
 When things were going badly for Turkey, the German press 
 was the only one which did not join In the joyful acclaim of the 
 victory of the Balkan States. "It was the Anglo-French joy at 
 this period which destroyed the political reputation of Klamil 
 Pasha, caused his overthrow and the return to power of the 
 Young Turks." 
 
 When, following the war, Turkey strove for internal re- 
 forms, the prerequisites were an increase in the tariff and the 
 
288 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 building of railways. Certain territory had to remain unopened, 
 because Russia so desired, and the building of the Bagdad Rail- 
 way, which meant the laying of the foundation for Turkish 
 prosperity, was deferred and the necessary tariff increase not 
 permitted, because the Entente Powers did not consider the 
 welfare of Turkey but desired only to place obstacles in Ger- 
 many's way. When in future the diplomatic history of this 
 period is written, "it will be seen what enormous sacrifices 
 Turkey had consented to in order to enjoy — and that with 
 restrictions — the rights and advantages which the smallest Chris- 
 tian state (Montenegro, for example) acquired at its birth." 
 
 Plainly perceptible at this time was the influence of Russia, 
 which blocked all progress, and in the face of which even Eng- 
 land did not dare to send English police officers to Turkey for 
 her reform of the provinces. 
 
 At this point the war broke out, and Turkey immediately 
 declared her neutrality. England's first act was to confiscate 
 the two Turkish dreadnoughts which had already been paid for 
 and were to have been turned over to Turkey at this time. ''The 
 seizure was made without warning, without the slightest attempt 
 at courtesy, and no offer was made by the British government 
 to pay back at least the price of the two ships." 
 
 Turkey, then, as is well known, purchased the German ships 
 Goeben and Breslau. The storm which thereupon broke out 
 against Turkey in the Entente press, the threats which were 
 made against her, the plans for dismemberment which were 
 evolved — this was well calculated to awaken among the Turks 
 the conviction that their last hour had come, "that the plans 
 projected in the form of threats had already somewhere been 
 reduced to writing." 
 
 Preparations were, therefore, made for war, but the first 
 blow was not struck until the French and English fleets already 
 lay in the Dardanelles, and Russian mine ships were strewing 
 mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus. 
 
 This presentation of the case by a leading Turkish statesman 
 sounds quite different from the English Blue Book. That at 
 this time, and after such experiences, Turkey no longer trusted 
 in the promise of the Entente Powers to observe her integrity 
 can astonish no one. The same guarantee as to her territory 
 before the Balkan War, though given by all the Powers, had not 
 prevented her from losing her European provinces. Could she, 
 then, now trust to the deceitful promises of her natural enemies, 
 who had banded together to destroy her sole natural protector 
 in order themselves to have a free hand in the Orient? For 
 
MODERN GERMANY 289 
 
 Russia, this war was admittedly a struggle for Constanti- 
 nople, and as regards England the Bagdad Railway question 
 played an important role. The Sultan, therefore, unfurled the 
 standard of the Prophet as a last recourse. If he summoned the 
 Moslems of the whole world to a Holy War, it was done for 
 the reasons stated above. He emphatically embraced the cause 
 of the German Empire; for only from Germany, which has an 
 interest in her preservation, can Turkey expect help. 
 
BOOK III 
 
 OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 ENGLAND'S POLICY OF FORCE 
 PROFESSOR ERICH MARCKS, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 
 
 THE British world empire is the greatest known, not alone 
 to the history of modern times, but to that of ancient as 
 well. It has grown to its present proportions through stages 
 clearly and logically resulting one from the other. In this de- 
 velopment there have not been lacking pauses and digressions, but 
 the coherence of the whole is of impressive unity. Likewise, the 
 means employed are uniform and of constant recurrence; every- 
 where a policy based on force, a chain of conquests, of life-and- 
 death struggles, prompted by as bellicose a spirit as that of any 
 other nation — indeed, one is tempted to say, as that of any 
 nation save Russia in the world with which we are familiar. 
 
 This development does not begin until a late period. The long 
 conflicts for the conquest of France form an older, independent 
 series. The modern history of England commences with the 
 Tudors, the inauguration of her far-aiming foreign policy with 
 Ehzabeth. England had first to free herself, economically and 
 politically, from the power of other states, before being able 
 to assume her own position in the world. Of tremendous im- 
 portance in that connection was her separation from the Catholic 
 Church; it assigned to England her place in a definite inter- 
 national group and influenced deeply her internal spiritual devel- 
 opment. It gave an impulse toward independence, both internal 
 and external. But the most important factor in the develop- 
 ment of the country was its insular position. This became decisive 
 after Europe's entrance upon what may be styled the "oceanic" 
 period: from 1600 on, England influenced the Continent, from 
 an outside position, in trade and politics, while herself turning 
 to the sea and the outer world. She seized upon the Baltic, the 
 North Sea, and then the Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became 
 the shipbuilder and merchant for the majority of the European 
 nations. The sea was for her the source of everything: inde- 
 pendence, security, acquisition of goods and territory; the ocean 
 protected her and saved her from having powerful neighbors. 
 Thus, she was able to hold fast in her internal life to parliament, 
 popular administration and government, avoiding the establish- 
 
 293 
 
294 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ment of a powerful, armed monarchy, such as was necessary on 
 the Continent. England was able, undisturbed, to develop the 
 characteristics of her race — namely, individual energy, called 
 forth by contact with the sea; personal freedom, complemented 
 but not suppressed by a strong government. Thanks to the sea, 
 she was free to turn to the outside world, herself protected in 
 the rear. But in doing this, without being chained to Europe, 
 she never lost touch with the Continent — not alone, however, be- 
 cause Europe remained the field for her commerce. English 
 politics never ceased to lay hold on and influence the Continent, 
 at first rather in a defensive manner, then more and more as a 
 deliberate policy. The division of power on the Continent was 
 always for England one of the fundamental conditions of her 
 own existence; it influenced her attitude toward the world be- 
 yond Europe; but at the same time, owing to a hundred com- 
 mercial and political ties, she always continued to be a European 
 Power. Her insular position enabled her to enjoy the tremendous 
 advantage of being able to exercise her influence on the Continent, 
 without finding herself forced to tie up her strength in so doing. 
 The Continent was always involved in its own affairs, in its own 
 differences and antitheses; England was able to influence it 
 without being drawn too strongly into the vortex. The country 
 grew thoroughly accustomed to this untrammeled position, to the 
 fact that it had no neighbors, and that it would never have any, 
 not even on the sea — this came to seem more and more a God- 
 given privilege. The limitations under which other Powers suf- 
 fered, owing to their geographical position, did not exist for Eng- 
 land. The security furnished by her girdle of waters challenged 
 her, as it were, to venture out into limitless space and to regard 
 every check as an injustice. 
 
 The course to be followed by the island people lay plainly indi- 
 cated; only gradually, how^ever, was it entered upon. England 
 started out by freeing herself from ancient European bonds, and 
 by rendering innocuous her neighboring states, Scotland and Ire- 
 land, which she united to herself. She sought to find a path 
 midway between the two great Powers of the sixteenth century, 
 France and Spain, and to maintain her own independence. Her 
 real entrance onto the stage of modern world history did not begin 
 until the struggle of Elizabeth against the more powerful of 
 these two states, namely, the Spain of Philip H. In this con- 
 flict, political and religious independence went hand in hand 
 with England's first strong bid for maritime trade, for the 
 treasures of the New World, for gain and adventure. States- 
 man and merchant, pirate and admiral united in the efifort, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 295 
 
 and this union remained characteristic for England's future. A 
 strong touch of daring and lawlessness marks all of England's 
 world struggles throughout the centuries down to the present 
 day. And through it all there was the union of trade and state, 
 the control of all commercial and colonizing expansion by the 
 government of the country; these two forces have worked in- 
 separably together, trade and maritime enterprise always being^ 
 backed by the power of weapons. Already in the struggle against 
 the Armada (1588), a sturdy feeling of patriotism, a crude 
 national pride, bound all other motives, noble and ignoble, into 
 a firm unity. Upon this victory against Spain was founded 
 the pride and glory of the greatness and culture of the Eliza- 
 bethan period — the greatness of Shakespeare. But the ambition 
 of the younger generation, impatient of the aged Queen, was 
 already eager for extensive enterprises of conquest in the Spanish 
 and American world. 
 
 The first Stuarts brought about a reversal; England sank 
 back into herself, inglorious and inactive. The Puritans under- 
 took the colonization of North America in opposition to the 
 home policy. Not until fifty years after Elizabeth's death — 
 that is, after the year 1650 — did a second impulse for an English 
 world policy manifest itself out of the confusion of the Puritan 
 Revolution: Oliver Cromwell renewed the war against Spain 
 and added that against Holland. He acted as a Protestant, 
 yet nevertheless attacked the neighboring Protestant state. He 
 desired to acquire Spanish colonies and gained a footing in the 
 West Indies, he led England politically and as a warlike state 
 into the Baltic and the Mediterranean; but his greatest blow 
 was delivered against the commercial rival across the Channel, 
 through the sea battles of Robert Blake, which were decisive 
 not alone for the moment but also for the future. Religious 
 faith, power and commerce were again as closely bound together 
 as under Elizabeth, but this time the attack proceeded exclusively 
 from the English side, and the lust of conquest spread far and 
 wide. This impulse was directly transmitted to posterity, which 
 indirectly, despite all resistance, inherited also the spiritual senti- 
 ments of the Puritans. England was permeated through and 
 through by their sternness, their self-discipline, their love of work, 
 their economy, their national and religious ambition. Eng- 
 land's expansion in the world was due, in no small degree, to 
 the spirit of Puritanism which she had imbibed. From the 
 Puritans, also, was derived her claim to play the role of the 
 people chosen of God from among the nations, singled out with 
 
296 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 especial moral right to force her way into the world for the 
 universal good. 
 
 The Restoration of 1660 carried the foreign and colonial policy 
 of Cromwell's times to further development; it also led to a 
 continuation of the war against Holland. Then, after Holland 
 had been rendered innocuous, the struggle against France claimed 
 first attention. The same causes are again operative : in addition 
 to religious factors, those of a purely secular nature, as expressed 
 in the opposition to France's threatening political and military 
 power, and even more pronounced than in the case of Holland, 
 to her commercial rivalry. For France under Louis XIV did 
 not aim alone at the hegemony of the Continent. She rose 
 rapidly in industry and trade, and under Colbert's leadership 
 turned her attention to the sea, and even beyond, and became the 
 first colonial power of the time. London and the Whigs took 
 up the fight along the whole line and turned the struggle into 
 a commercial and world war. 
 
 This was waged as a gigantic duel with the weapons of force 
 for the possession of the world, and with power and wealth as 
 the prize. The battleground was Europe : allied with the French, 
 England had at first repressed the Netherlands; her policy was 
 now to proceed against France, hand in hand with the Nether- 
 lands and Europe. King William HI of Orange formed this 
 union and left it as an inheritance to posterity; in 1688 and 
 1 701 he led Europe against the French hegemony. More closely 
 than ever before, England identified herself with the European 
 coalition : the common enemy bound them together. Spain's 
 power had long since been broken, and the Austrian branch of 
 the Hapsburgs inherited from the Spanish not its threatening 
 greatness, but only its hatred of France. 
 
 England announced the principle which she had previously 
 supported In practice: the principle of the European balance of 
 power, which she applied against every Important European 
 state. It became England's chief weapon against the French, 
 and grew Into an essentially English theory. Its effect has always 
 been to create such a balance among the Continental states 
 that England's accession to any group rendered this mt the 
 strongest; England is the fifth wheel to this wagon; balance 
 of power means England's dominance of power. From her island 
 she holds the Continent In suspense and remains the arbiter of 
 all; she paralyzes the strongest state on the Continent which 
 might become inconvenient to herself, by means of the other 
 states, which she organizes and leads. She becomes the ally 
 of the enemies of her enemy. In this manner she defeated 
 
MODERN GERMANY 297 
 
 Spain and Holland ; and thus she sought to gain the Emperor 
 against France. She opposed the greatest military Power by 
 the second greatest, or if possible by a collection of Continental 
 states: as Austria, Prussia, German Middle States, Italian 
 states. Savoy, and occasionally Russia. England herself sent her 
 armies and her generals across the Channel; or she preferably 
 employed Continental troops for her service; while paying her 
 Continental allies, she herself also took part in the struggle, but 
 her real battlefield remained the sea, her peculiar weapon the fleet. 
 She fought with France and sought to prevent the union of 
 France with Spain and with Spain's vast colonial possessions; 
 she forced her way into the Spanish-American trade, and seized 
 the slave trade; she finally had to fight the Bourbons in both 
 Paris and in Madrid. She opposed Spain through her alliance 
 with Portugal, and through the acquisition of Gibraltar she 
 assured the entrance into the Mediterranean for her fleet. Time 
 and again, through wars and peace congresses, she rearranged 
 Europe according to her own advantage, but always on the plea 
 that she was doing it for the good of the other states, for the 
 balancing of their power. In the 126 years since 1688 she brought 
 about one war after another: according to Sir J. R. Seeley, more 
 than half the time w^as spent in war, and even the ''years of 
 peace" were often enough an open conflict. ^ 
 
 There were pauses, increases and decreases in warlike activity, 
 but the guiding impulse was furnished by professional soldiers, 
 and this impulse was active even in times of truce. The elder 
 Pitt brought thus, in four short years following 1756, his country 
 and its future under the control of his stormy ambition, of his 
 world-embracing policy of power — one of the most imperialistic 
 of English history. He was consciously an aggressor; he desired 
 war and gain; he and his like — statesmen, generals, admirals, 
 controlled the course of events, and were the real leaders of 
 the great mass of merchants and business men and colonists. 
 During that century, says Seeley, England's history lies not in 
 England, but in America and Asia; the expansion of England 
 becomes the dominant fact of this period. Pitt's saying is familiar 
 that America was won on German battle fields, indicating the 
 world-wide significance of the Seven Years' War, when the 
 dice were really cast for the possession of Canada and for the 
 future of India. Following 1600 and 1650, the year 1760 
 indicates a new epoch : the idea of conquest occupies the fore- 
 ground. By seeking to hold the colonial empire in subjection 
 to the motherland, England lost the thirteen North American 
 
 ^The Expansion of England, Sir J. R. Seeley, London, 1901, p. 20. 
 
298 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 colonies, it is true. France had her revenge for Canada, by 
 encoura«ging this revolt. But on the sea England was successful 
 against France and her allies. Precisely at this period, about 
 1780, for the first time a number of seafaring neutrals formed 
 a union against England's attacks on neutral trade. The loss 
 of the Thirteen Colonies appeared to have disrupted England's 
 colonial empire, and in fact, the situation was discouraging: 
 nevertheless, the younger Pitt again resurrected his country, 
 and in India the development continued uninterrupted. In 1773, 
 India gained something more like a state organization through 
 a governor general, the country was drawn closer to Parliament 
 and the central government, and in India English supremacy, 
 English wealth and English conquest grew uninterruptedly. 
 Periods of peace, of acquisition, were always followed by far- 
 reaching wars, and this possession now for the first time became 
 internally and externally of real importance for England. 
 
 From tJiis point of view, as from every other, the epoch of 
 the French wars reached its culmination during the last years 
 of their duration. Pitt unwillingly entered the war against the 
 French Revolution; the feeling of the English nation, as repre- 
 sented by Burke, supported such a policy all the more ardently, 
 with a passionate consciousness of old and deep-lying antagonism. 
 From 1793 to 1815 the world war was, in its last analysis, a 
 war between France and England; Napoleon accepted the entire 
 inheritance of four generations and in grandiose manner sought 
 to realize it. The battle was for everything: for the Continent, 
 the seas and the colonies, for trade, not alone that of the enemy, 
 but likewise of his allies and of the neutrals; and in this war 
 England at last won universal supremacy over trade and colonies. 
 She crushed the French, Spanish and Dutch shipping trade, and 
 the Franco-Spanish fleet. She sought, in the same manner as 
 Napoleon, to cut of^ the enemy commercially. She secured a 
 firmer footing in the Mediterranean and in Africa; she assured 
 the route to India; she robbed the Dutch and French of Cape 
 Colony and of the islands which controlled this route ; she waged 
 under Wellesley the last decisive war against the French — India 
 now for the first time assumed its full importance. Canada and 
 the West Indies had never been lost; the balancing weight of the 
 world empire, however, had now definitely been shifted to India — 
 it continued to develop around the Indian Ocean. 
 
 At one and the same time England fought for, and upon the 
 Continent; she pursued her old policy of letting the Continental 
 Powers bear the main burden of the land warfare. There were, 
 however, years when she appeared to the Continent as the com- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 299 
 
 mon enemy, for the reason that she maltreated every state upon 
 the sea, destroyed all trade and disturbed the existence of all 
 neutrals. Again, in 1800, an alliance of neutrals was formed 
 against England — she disrupted It by force. The resulting 
 hatred was great and explicable; the coup d' etat against Copen- 
 hagen in 1807, by which a possible future rival was ruthlessly 
 and pitilessly crushed, aroused wide-spread and deep dissatisfac- 
 tion, and Canning's coolly practical justification of the pretended 
 necessity by no means pleased the neutrals. The United States, 
 with its trade unbearably restricted by France and England, 
 and long maltreated by England, in 1812, after long hesitation, 
 declared war on the unfriendly motherland, and hoped by this 
 means to acquire Canada. By this time a reversal of feeling 
 in Europe had already taken place: the pressure exerted by 
 Napoleon, his universal supremacy, drove all the Continental 
 states into England's arms, and with their assistance she tri- 
 umphed in 1 8 14-15 over her deadly enemy, the tyrant of the 
 world. As the ally and almost the leader of the Continent, 
 she again regulated in Vienna the affairs of the Continent in her 
 own interest. The arch enemy was conquered, but it w^as not 
 intended to annihilate him. Germany was not to be allowed to 
 become too great, while Prussia was to be divided into an Eastern 
 and a Western portion, and Russia's future growth was to be 
 checked in time. The European balance of power was again 
 in the foreground — the struggle of 1688 was at an end. 
 
 Throughout a long war period England had stood in the fore- 
 front; for one hundred and twenty-five years every war had in 
 the last analysis been her war. For fifty years she was now 
 able to enjoy the fruits thereof in peace. This time she had 
 protected herself for many years to come. From 1815 to 1865, 
 and again to 1874, her attention was carefully fixed on European 
 politics; she soon withdrew from the group of the conservative 
 Eastern Powers, and fell back jealously upon herself. Wherever 
 able, she created counterbalances to these powers, encouraged the 
 smaller rising states against them, and thereby increased her own 
 strength. From 1830 she relied upon France, which had grown 
 liberal, but at the same time remained France's distrustful rival. 
 Every independent manifestation of strength by France — in the 
 eastern Mediterranean, in Spain, upon the sea, before and after 
 1848, w^as carefully watched' and suppressed. Friendship and 
 enmity alternated under Louis Philippe, and especially under 
 Napoleon III. Palmerston desired to prevent the latter's alliance 
 with Russia — the French fleet aroused suspicion and angry 
 panic in England. Nevertheless, the antagonism towards Russia 
 
300 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 was in the foreground. This had its root in India, and spread 
 by way of Afghanistan, to the routes to India, Egypt and the 
 eastern Mediterranean. It early led to rivalry in the Turkish 
 question; Russia desired to subdue or annihilate Turkey; on 
 that very account England protected her and closed the Mediter- 
 ranean to Russia — indeed, even the maintenance of a fleet on 
 the Black Sea was denied to her. This antagonism again burst 
 forth in the Crimean War in 1854, which, viewed from a broad 
 standpoint, was primarily England's conflict and England's suc- 
 cess. The war expelled Russia from the Balkans, but turned 
 her all the more definitely toward Central Asia. For a long 
 time this remained England's sole European war. Her diplomacy 
 was as energetic and belligerent as could be desired, and in Lord 
 Palmerston (1830 to 1865) there was a strong consciousness of 
 power which achieved many successes; but on the whole diplo- 
 matic measures were sufficient. 
 
 Thus protected, with the prestige of her former victories, Eng- 
 land turned during these two generations back to her own peculiar 
 field — the world beyond Europe. With the exception of Russia 
 alone she here encountered no rival. She w^as able to employ 
 peaceful weapons, and in this period, since she was without oppo- 
 sition, she depended for the conquest of the world upon her trade, 
 her industry and free colonization. This was the dawn of the 
 days of her great world-surpassing epoch, which reached its full 
 glory toward the middle of the century. Freedom of trade cor- 
 responded to the position of supremacy of British industry, in- 
 ternally and externally; the liberal period developed the method 
 and the doctrine of freedom in every field of human activity, 
 in commercial policy, as well as in constitutional matters and 
 those concerning Imperial administration. Conviction and in- 
 terest went hand in hand. Likewise as regards the Imperial 
 policy, the state withheld its hand: it gave the widest possible 
 rule to the great colonies ; it left the settlement of the new terri- 
 tories, especially of Australia, to economic enterprise alone. It 
 was inclined to hold the reins of colonial administration as 
 loosely as possible. While the Conservatives were in favor of 
 having the state control the colonial policy, the Radicals held 
 that it would be wisest to grant absolute freedom to the colonies 
 and to India, that the best thing would be to get rid of them. 
 In the Colonial Office, there was for a long time, to say the 
 least, a spirit of negligence, of the most pronounced abstention 
 from interference. This was the characteristic tone of the period. 
 
 England on that account, however, did not cease to hold 
 fast to her traditions of a policy of force. The two tendencies 
 
MODERN GERMANY 301 
 
 existed side by side. The conception of a strong governmental 
 policy gained the upper hand in India. Despite all reforms, 
 conquest and war still remained in full force there. The 
 possession and the security of the Empire led automatically to 
 expansion; the governor generals, Lord Hastings and Lord 
 Dalhousie, continued in a warlike manner down through 1850 
 the work of Wellesley. Finally there came the Sepoy Rebellion 
 of 1857, ^^^ the taking over by the government of the East 
 Indian Company. Force was here the only possible measure. 
 Trade spread this policy further, beyond Farther India and 
 toward China. The infamous Opium War of 1840, which 
 was waged by official England to uphold the poisoning of China- 
 men with opium against China's opposition, to protect Anglo- 
 Indian merchants in their profits from this trade and to increase 
 it, while strengthening England's position in the Chinese Empire 
 — this war, which was coolly and with conviction defended by 
 the Liberal Palmerston, was quite in the spirit of the mercantile 
 policy of the eighteenth century; trade and power indissolubly 
 bound together. In i860 there came the aftermath of the war: 
 wherever England found force necessary for breaking up and 
 strangling the world she employed it ruthlessly even in these 
 liberal days. 
 
 At the same time, in Europe and America she was the protector 
 of struggling national states, of their emancipation and of their 
 freedom. This, like the liberal commercial policy, corresponded 
 to the sentiments of the new ruling middle class and at the 
 same time redounded to the profit of British politics. This course, 
 however, was not everywhere consistently pursued. Where, as in 
 the case of Turkey and Austria, the old ruling state was needed 
 by England's interests as against Russia and where it therefore 
 had to be protected from the young national movements directed 
 against it, there at times she found herself between two fires 
 and occasionally in great embarrassment — as in the case of the 
 Balkan nations, the Poles, and Hungarians, and for a time also 
 in relation to the Italians. While on the whole she encouraged 
 Italy's rise, she was all the more opposed to that of Germany. 
 Thus she supported Denmark, in spite of all national and liberty- 
 loving claims of Schleswig-Holstein and of the German nation. 
 She did not desire any Germans between the Baltic and the 
 North Sea, just as she had looked with disfavor on the German 
 Customs Union and the economic unity of the nation. England's 
 encouragement of the principles of freedom and nationality has 
 always ceased when her own commercial and political advantage 
 was at stake. Indeed, this encouragement was in great part 
 
302 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 inspired by her advantage. Wherever England supported a 
 nation struggling for freedom, in South America or in Southern 
 Europe, this was always done in the well-considered interest of 
 British trade, and English assistance always meant a carefully 
 placed mine to be sprung against a possible rival among the Great 
 Powers. The parliamentary freedom to which she generously 
 helped her proteges by no means always corresponded to their 
 political maturity and their general welfare. Considerations of 
 practical British politics were always dominant, seeking to make 
 capital with the public abroad out of this reputation of English 
 love of freedom. This does not mean that public opinion among 
 English Liberals, who took pride in these humane achievements 
 of their country, was insincere; even English diplomacy was not 
 necessarily so. But, as in the case of her war against France, 
 England has always skilfully understood how to make herself 
 appear as the benefactor of the whole world. Her own interests 
 at this time corresponded to many humane desires, in which her 
 own people believed, and she profited by this coincidence to appear 
 before herself and before the world as liberal, cosmopolitan and 
 ready to help, when in reality she acted in the main solely for 
 herself. Her cousins in North America, whom at all times she 
 sought to impress by these moral means, experienced to their cost 
 how strong the prompting of force nevertheless remained in 
 England. How keenly felt were the disputes in regard to the 
 Oregon boundary, after the year 1840. How decisively in the 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, with a certain matter-of-course air, did 
 England assume rights regarding the future Panama Canal 
 (1850). Above all, how puzzling and insultingly one-sided was 
 the attitude of Liberal England in the American Civil War, her 
 sympathy for the slave-dealers against the Union springing from 
 commercial selfishness and political rivalry. 
 
 Her political motives remained unchanged. Outwardly, she 
 was peaceful and liberty-loving; without doubt, this corresponded 
 to the secret wishes of dominant Liberalism; it corresponded 
 absolutely to the sentiments of the idealistic, radical wing of the 
 party represented by Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone. The oppo- 
 site view was supported by Palmerston, but he died in 1865; 
 internal conflicts and the great Gladstone Reform Ministry forced 
 foreign measures into the background for a period of ten years. 
 Liberal England had Its fling. But then, from 1874 on, Benjamin 
 Disraeli brought about a radical change. 
 
 The conditions which were the basis of England's relation 
 to the world since 18 15 underwent a change between i860 and 
 1870. The development of the Continent had been completed, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 303 
 
 new national states came into existence, and pressed Austria 
 and France into the background ; on the other side of the ocean 
 the Northern States had been victorious, and the welding of the 
 Union was complete. In America, as well as in Germany, a 
 strong competition grew up against England, who had previ- 
 ously stood alone. Free trade suffered an eclipse, protection 
 gained the upper hand, new industrial states claimed recognition, 
 new world Powers began to assert themselves as England's peers. 
 The world, which had stood empty since 181 5, open only to 
 England, gradually again became filled, and England again 
 found herself with competitors. In Asia, Russia advanced as 
 a dominant power; in the Balkans Pan-Slavism sought to gain 
 a footing. Disraeli was the first to strike a blow against this: 
 he awoke the spirit of English imperialism, the English sense 
 of power, the English policy of battle, from the half-slumber of 
 recent times to a new activity. His conception turned toward 
 the great world without; he united romanticism and realism, 
 national tradition and the free fancy of individual genius, and 
 lo ! England stood among the nations with a sword in her hand. 
 In 1878 by threats of war she drove Russia back from Constanti- 
 nople, she resumed with more vigor the older task of protecting 
 India. Disraeli acquired the Suez Canal shares and the island 
 of Cyprus; in South Africa, which his predecessors had half 
 allowed to slip through their fingers, he assumed a firm policy; 
 here, as in the North, he secured the route to India; he set 
 the imperial crown upon the head of his Queen. He it was 
 who announced that England was not a European, but pre- 
 eminently an Asiatic powder. The fresh air of a new period 
 swept through the land under his leadership (1874 to 1880). 
 
 Once more Gladstone and the party of peace gained the 
 upper hand. But in 1882 Gladstone, much against his will, was 
 forced to carry out the testament of Beaconsfield and seize 
 Egypt. He was forced to take up the struggle in regard to 
 Afghanistan against Russia, who, repulsed from Constantinople, 
 turned again with renewed energy toward India, and in 1885 
 he came to the verge of war. Asia thus drew him also into the 
 current of world politics. Further, Africa always demanded his 
 attention: on all sides new Powers stretched their hands toward 
 the Dark Continent — in addition to France — England's old rival 
 — Italy, Belgium and Germany. In 1884-85 Bismarck gathered 
 all these threads in his hand, strengthened the Congo State, and 
 assured freedom of trade in Central Africa against England, 
 acquired colonies for Germany in Africa and the South Seas, 
 and by international pressure compelled unwilling England to 
 
304 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 recognize her new competitor. The English colonists at the Cape 
 and in Australia became alarmed; the motherland heard their 
 cries. The new era was well under way; England, now plainly 
 deprived of her previous supremacy, returned to the old principles 
 of her former period of conflicts. Her indifference regarding 
 the course of events continued precisely as long as she remained 
 without a competitor: when this was no longer the case, she 
 changed her system, and imperialism again assumed the helm, or, 
 rather, now for the first time really grasped it. 
 
 The intellectual work of preparation was of an older date; 
 as early as 1868 Sir Charles Dilke had referred to the unity of 
 the Anglo-Saxons and of their world-civilizing power; his telling 
 reference to "Greater Britain" possessed political power in itself.^ 
 There now began the flood of real imperialistic literature. In 
 1883 Seeley published his lectures on the British Empire, which 
 in ''The Expansion of England" celebrated the spirit of English 
 history. This was a book of immeasurable creative power, com- 
 parable in its sentiments with Treitschke's writings, but plainly 
 far more influential as regards future development than the lat- 
 ter's books have ever been. In his "Oceana" Froude shortly after- 
 ward depicted South Africa and Australia, attacked the dis- 
 rupters of the Empire, the Little Englanders, and hoped in the 
 future for a United British Empire in place of the United King- 
 dom. ^ Seeley 's closing chapter (p. 312) in the same spirit called 
 his country into the ranks of the world states, the greatest growing 
 Powers, such as North America and Russia — "Will England sink 
 to the level of Spain?" The new sentiment made its way in 
 these years. The idealism of Gladstone, which threatened to dis- 
 rupt the Empire, suffered shipwreck in 1886 in the Irish Ques- 
 tion; the Unionists came into power. Beaconsfield triumphed 
 from beyond the grave; from 1885 on Salisbury opposed the ad- 
 vance of Russia, and did this by means of a strengthened and in- 
 dependent Bulgaria. In this manner, he checkmated his ancient 
 enemy in the Balkans; in the conflicts of the following years he 
 stood behind Austria, Italy and the entire Dreibund in opposition 
 to Russia and France ; the English fleet played an important role 
 as a potential factor at the time of the crisis of 1887. 
 
 From then on the system of imperialism became more firmly 
 established, year by year. By it England sought to protect India, 
 through rounding out its boundaries and extending them, and 
 through its Balkan policy. Again, after a pause, the conquest 
 
 1 Greater Britain : a Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries, by Sir 
 Charles Dilke, London, 1868. 
 
 2 Oceana, or England and Her Colonies, by J. A. Froude, London, 1886. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 305 
 
 of the Soudan was resumed and the same system established in 
 Egypt. In South Africa Britain entered upon a series of rapid 
 conquests, by means of which it was intended to restrict the 
 Transvaal and to limit the development of the German colonies. 
 South Africa's importance for the Empire increased as a "way 
 station" for India, and the connecting of the northern and south- 
 ern portions of the Dark Continent, the ambitious plan for a line 
 from the Cape to Cairo, took form in men's minds. The new 
 system was also developed from within ; the problems of imperial- 
 ism were thought out, solved and carried forward by great 
 organizations. We shall not at this point trace in detail these 
 movements during the period from 1885 on. It was a question, 
 indeed, of holding together the vast Empire, which before had 
 appeared destined to disruption, and which now, with the rise 
 of new foreign Powers, for the first time it was sought properly 
 to strengthen. The problem was to protect English industry 
 and its export, and to render its millions of workers secure as 
 regards food and maintenance. It was a question of drawing 
 together the moral and commercial, as well as the military and 
 political forces ; the unity of the race, of its civilization, commerce 
 and power were at stake. The problems of the customs union, 
 of the defense union of the motherland and the outlying posses- 
 sions came into being, and henceforth remained in the foreground 
 of British politics; the question arose what organization was to 
 be given to the vast Empire which was to be created, and also 
 what share the great colonies were to receive in determining the 
 Imperial policy. These questions had to be answered by the social 
 and political powers in England, by her citizenry, by the army of 
 workers, whose influence was of such recent growth — in short, 
 by all the industrial classes. In addition, the new money powers 
 which were rising, together with, and above those of trade, were 
 concerned in the solution of these problems — the Stock Ex- 
 change, the "city," the individual capitalists living from in- 
 comes, all of whom ranged themselves by the side of the indus- 
 trial North of England, and whose wealth encircles the Empire 
 and the world. The question of England's foreign policy was in 
 the hands of these powers. The old Liberalism of Gladstone 
 had but little understanding for this problem of force, but the 
 new period rejected the old doctrine; the new Liberals, like 
 Rosebery, became imperialists; the workers of Birmingham, 
 with their leader, Joseph Chamberlain, deserted to the camp of 
 the Unionists, and in their own interest advocated the "will to 
 world power"; even more emphatic was the approval of the 
 Stock Exchange. The decision was taken before all else to 
 
3o6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 strengthen the Empire, to render its world position secure 
 through preparedness, especially as regards the navy, which was 
 being constantly increased, and to draw closer all inner bonds, 
 at the same time that an aggressive foreign policy was pursued. 
 
 This course of action is quite explicable. As long as no other 
 Power interfered in those parts of the world on which England 
 had placed her hand, she abstained from appropriating the land 
 in its entirety; she was willing to permit peaceful development, 
 but only under one condition: that no other state should inter- 
 fere. But other states had now appeared in the arena. Hence, 
 it was a question of grabbing everything in sight. A mania for 
 conquest seemed to take hold upon England; the manner in 
 which she laid hands forcibly upon all within reach was astound- 
 ing. From 1883 to 1885 Germany had acquired her modest 
 colonial empire, the most unpretentious of any of the great na- 
 tions, in West, Southwest and East Africa, and in the South 
 Seas. There is no need to name the territories and their extent; 
 their number is insignificant, and they have been but slightly 
 added to during succeeding years. A long list of British 
 annexations occurs as early as the seventies, and in 1882 these 
 are followed by that of Egypt. From 1884 on there was con- 
 quest upon conquest in Africa, year after year, in north and 
 south, east and west, Rhodesia and the adjoining territory form- 
 ing the climax. In addition, there were the South Seas and 
 East India, Beluchistan and Upper Burma, the Afghanistan 
 border lands — always something new, constant increase in terri- 
 tory, treaties on all sides, wars everywhere. The conquest of 
 the Boer States in 1900 marks the culmination, but by no means 
 the end, of this policy. Certain later occurrences will be men- 
 tioned as occasion offers. It has been estimated that Eng- 
 land's colonies are approximately one hundred times the size 
 of the motherland, and ten times the extent of the colonies 
 of all other countries together; that Britain rules over about 
 one-fifth of the world's territory and one-fourth of the inhabi- 
 tants; that in the quarter-century since the great recrudescence 
 of the policy of annexation, England has occupied an extent of 
 territory approximately equal to that occupied in all the preced- 
 ing centuries. She aimed at being the greatest of Powers, from 
 every point of view, as regards the strengthening of old 
 possessions as well as the acquisition of new ones; and the leader 
 of this policy knew whereof he spoke when he cited the law 
 according to which "the great states are constantly becoming 
 greater and the small states smaller" (Lord Salisbury, 1899). 
 
 England had taken from the others whatever she was able 
 
MODERN GERMANY 307 
 
 to take. Naturally, this was not done at random; there was a 
 distinct plan, and the insatiability with w^hich it was followed is 
 shown by the facts. The plan for Africa has already been 
 touched upon. It is identified with Cecil Rhodes, the brilliant 
 financier and statesman, in whose veins Howed the blood of the 
 first adventurous, piratical conquistadors of Elizabeth's time 
 — "from Cape to Cairo!" The war against the Boers was 
 planned by Rhodes, and Chamberlain inherited the policy and 
 carried it through. It was by no means a battle for gold 
 and diamonds alone, but for political power, for supremacy in 
 South Africa, for a universal imperial goal along heroic lines. 
 One may have an understanding for it, but it is impossible to 
 deny that it was an aggressive struggle for power. It belongs 
 to the same order of wars as those on the East Indian frontiers, 
 which spread uninterruptedly on all sides, toward Asia, Persia, 
 Arabia and Egypt. The ancient English impulse toward power 
 has remained here in its primitive and unexhausted strength. 
 In this connection it is plainly to be seen that the Liberal oppo- 
 sition against this tendency had never gone very deep. The 
 British nation as a whole has regarded itself for centuries 
 as a master nation; this feeling constantly drew fresh nourish- 
 ment from the Indian Empire. The thought of renunciation 
 did not occur to England, She was fond of justifying her 
 own desire by the excuse: We dare not withdraw from India 
 (nor from Egypt now) for the sake of the natives. We have 
 no desire to deny that this foreign dominance produced beneficial 
 results as to civilization; but against those blessings are to be 
 reckoned great and oppressive burdens and drawbacks for the In- 
 dians and the Egyptians, while both countries have been admin- 
 istered and ruled over and exploited, commercially and polit- 
 ically, for the benefit of England, and not for that of their 
 inhabitants. We may think this natural, but in doing so we 
 place ourselves in opposition to the attitude which the English 
 themselves love to assume and with which everyone is familiar — 
 England's gain is the gain of the whole world. Every nation 
 and country, they say, which comes under British rule should 
 rejoice, and the rest of the world must rejoice with them, for 
 British rule means enlightenment and civilization. 
 
 As the result of her history, England is much given to regarding 
 in a naive and childlike manner her interests as identical with 
 those of the whole world, her existence as synonymous with 
 that of humanity. In speaking of "humanity," she means Eng- 
 land; in uttering the word "cosmopolitan," she thinks of her 
 own nationality, of her own Empire, which enjoys the his- 
 
3o8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 torical advantage of being identical with European civilization 
 throughout great stretches of the world's territory. She is only 
 too ready to forget that other national individualities have 
 grown up in the world by her side, with a longing to press 
 outward, and that they, too, are conscious of their own worth 
 and desire to assert their own State and their own Kultur 
 in addition to the English. She has too great a desire to see 
 the whole map of the earth painted in one color. The world 
 to-day demands more pronounced differences. England's claim, 
 however, and likewise her mania for the annexation of all 
 unclaimed land, is in opposition to this; her presumption is, 
 accurately speaking, limitless. The most cultured among the 
 leaders of the new imperalism, a disciple of Gladstone, as Secre- 
 tary of State once expressed himself on this point in classical 
 manner, in the early days of the movement. 
 
 "The Little Englanders," said Lord Rosebery in 1893, "hold 
 that our Empire is large enough. That would be true if the 
 world were elastic; but since it is not so, we have no choice 
 but to keep pegging out claims for the future. England has 
 to consider not only what she wants now, but also what she 
 will require hereafter. It is our heritage and responsibility 
 that the world, in so far as we can mould it, be populated by 
 Anglo-Saxons. We shall grossly fail if we shirk the responsi- 
 bility laid upon us — we must not decline to take our fair 
 share in the partition of the world which has been forced 
 upon us." ^ 
 
 It is impossible to speak more clearly or in terms more 
 exclusive of others. A more unconditional aiming at power 
 cannot be conceived than is here expressed by the representative 
 of the state ; nor must it be forgotten that the power of the state 
 stood behind the speaker, with its new weapons in army and fleet, 
 especially with its fleet, which was uninterruptedly increasing. 
 This striving was the result of the reaction against the new na- 
 tions, its growth was logically organic and limitless. It was 
 incited to increase by the dangers which constantly threatened 
 the Empire. All the colonies and dominions of the Empire 
 have that which England herself has not — namely, neighbors. 
 India has the Russians and the Japanese, Australia the Japanese, 
 Egypt has Turkey at least and perhaps others as well. South 
 Africa has the Germans, the West Indies and Canada the 
 United States. Even if the United States harbors no evil de- 
 signs, there is a permanent and natural threat simply in the 
 geographical conditions; the consciousness of certain antitheses 
 
 * The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1893, London, 1894, p. 68. 
 
 
MODERN GERMANY 309 
 
 between the two great Anglo-Saxon states has from time to time 
 made itself felt, and it continues to persist beyond the intention 
 of individuals and historical periods. The force of progressive 
 development and growing self-assertion of the individual countries 
 continues operative, and keeps alive the question as to how long 
 this ''World Venice," with the sea for streets,^ will continue to 
 exist, and whether the form of a federation offers means for bind- 
 ing it together permanently. 
 
 How narrow is the foundation of the motherland for this 
 maritime empire! Ireland, in unreconciled opposition, stands 
 against the main island, and Ulster against Ireland. Classes 
 struggle against each other within the social bounds of the 
 motherland and the workers threaten with revolutionary meas- 
 ures. Discord and anxiety everywhere — will the Empire be 
 able to conquer them? In civilization, trade, race, history and 
 sentiment England possesses many unifying forces, and the 
 English political leaders seized upon these and sought to 
 unify them and strengthen them; in this the colonies assisted 
 the motherland. But despite the strength of these forces and 
 of these efforts, heavy clouds have during the last thirty years 
 continued to hang above the Empire. This has been seen and 
 realized with increasing anxiety. A final factor entered. Into the 
 problem. The Imperial policy was begun under Disraeli in 
 the period after 1874, as a foreign policy In the narrow sense; 
 as such since the heyday of Imperialism it has recorded its great- 
 est achievements. For beside and above all future dangers of a 
 general nature, was the immediate tangible danger: England 
 had enemies all over the world who threatened the Empire. 
 
 We have seen these enemies; there was Russia; there was 
 France. The troubles with France in North Africa continued 
 through the whole of the eighties and nineties of the last cen- 
 tury. Russia and France formed their Dual Alliance about 
 1890, directly against Germany and Austria, but Indirectly 
 against Great Britain, who was the common enemy of both. 
 The nearer the end of the century came, the more clearly was 
 the Dual Alliance seen to be directed against England. The 
 movements on the Continent forced England to increasing cau- 
 tion; her far-famed "splendid isolation" constantly became 
 more precarious. She had, however, since the Congress of 
 Berlin never lost touch, more or less direct, with Germany and 
 the Dreibund. Through the centuries Germany had hitherto 
 been her ally, the fighter of her battles on the Continent. Eng- 
 land's relation to Austria, of ancient date, and her relation to 
 
 1 The Expansion of England, Seeley, p. 288. 
 
310 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Italy, which the new kingdom had inherited from old Savoy, 
 were continued under Lord Salisbury. In the important crisis 
 Bismarck had acted with him and with Disraeli, at the same 
 time always emphatically upholding the independence of the 
 German Empire. The great Chancellor, from his position at 
 the center of Europe, had influenced all the States of the world 
 and held all the strings in his hands; he had always been incon- 
 venient to England and not a little disquieting. He remained 
 unassailable, however, because world interests wexe not yet pre- 
 dominant in Germany. But following his fall, Germany took 
 her place directly in the world arena, and after 1894 she broke 
 with England and in a manner sought touch with France and 
 Russia. She defended her position in Africa and acquired a 
 footing in East Asia. Her economy became part of the great 
 stream of the world's economy, and the government was thereby 
 forced to provide in a political and military way for the future 
 of German industry, for its exports, and for its human masses, 
 in the same way as England had done under like circumstances. 
 
 Germany had no choice. If she was not to languish and 
 starve, she had to pursue a world policy and to base her power 
 on a fleet of her own. She forced her elder cousin on the other 
 side of the Channel to take notice. The English nation did so 
 grudgingly, and with evident distnist and displeasure greeted this 
 new commercial and military- Power which was in process of 
 formation; expre>:sions were heard that sounded harsh and 
 threatening in German ears. The attitude of the British govern- 
 ment was dillerent. Public opinion in Germany during the 
 Boer War burst out as threateningly as in the other European 
 states, especially in France; following the clash which the Kruger 
 telegram unexpectedly brought about, the German government 
 maintained an absolutely correct attitude; this neutral support 
 during the South African struggle was very valuable to Eng- 
 land. These were England's most diflicult years. English 
 statesmen between 1900 and 1 902 gave expression to their 
 astonishment that their country was so hated by neighboring 
 peoples; there was a feeling similar to that of 1800. England 
 sought Germany's friendship. She desired to win Germany as 
 her protector against Russia. For the last quarter of the nine- 
 teenth century Russia was for England the successor of Louis 
 XIV and of Napoleon I; Russia and France were her daily 
 anxiet}- during the last ten years of the century. The English 
 standpoint was primarily dictated by the interests of her world 
 empire ; but precisely this consideration brought her into opposition 
 to the Dual Alliance. Her safety or her danger was dependent, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 311 
 
 as we saw from the beginning, in the narrowest sense on the 
 division of power on the Continent, and in Europe in general. 
 
 Every appearance of a strong Power in Europe was for Eng- 
 land an innovation which required an immediate explanation, 
 and nearly always she regarded it as a threat. Such appearance 
 was watched with jealous eyes. In 19 12 an Anglo-American 
 of passionate English sympathies expressed this fact as an uncon- 
 ditional doctrine. He warned England, as an incentive, that 
 her position in the world depended upon allowing no Great 
 Power to arise, especially in her neighborhood ; thereby he simply 
 dogmatized the English custom of centuries.^ Did this system 
 of suppression and attack drive England to oppose Germany's 
 development? Not at the start — Russia was for England the 
 original enemy. Between 1898 and 1903 English politicians 
 thought that Germany might perhaps become England's ally — 
 that is to say, her "soldier" against Russia. But Germany could 
 surrender her freedom, make an enemy of her neighbor in the 
 East and become dependent on England, only if England 
 was ready to make corresponding concessions. But such was 
 not the case. There was no English-German alliance, and 
 Germany remained untrammeled. Instead, therefore, England 
 turned to Japan. The military power which England needed 
 against Russia was set in motion in the East, instead of in the 
 West. The Japanese thrust, which it was intended should drive 
 Russia from the Far East, resulted automatically in driving her 
 forward in the West, which meant against Austria and Ger- 
 many. 
 
 The Japanese War was an English war of attack. Russia 
 was defeated, and collapsed internally for a while. At the very 
 start of the campaign (in the spring of 1904) England made 
 her Morocco Treaty with France. This was the same France 
 whose African expansion in 1898 had run amuck of England 
 at Fashoda, on the Upper Nile, and who at that time had 
 given way pitifully enough before England's threats of war; 
 since then the two former enemies had drawn together. It 
 has been asserted that the agreement of 1904, whereby England 
 was to receive Eg\pt and France Morocco as a recompense, 
 was entered into for reasons of imperial policy, and not as a 
 measure against Germany ; England, it is claimed, desired merely 
 to secure Egypt against France, and only as a result of Ger- 
 many's opposing France in Morocco did the treaty take on an 
 anti-German spirit. This explanation seems to me untenable in 
 every respect. England already held Egypt securely, without 
 
 1 The Day of the Saxon,, General Homer Lea, London and New York, 19 12. 
 
312 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 having to recompense France; the retreat from Fashoda had 
 shown this very clearly. Naturally, it lay within the conception 
 of the imperialistic policy to obviate any further claim of France 
 in the Nile Valley — to that extent the treaty was a welcome 
 corroboration. Nevertheless, it was directed from the very 
 start against Germany; such was its real intent. No one could 
 doubt that a far-reaching treaty with France, with important 
 secret provisions, and which brushed Germany aside without 
 more ado, implied enmity against Germany — indeed, that it was 
 aimed directly against Germany. France had at bottom always 
 been inimical to Germany; since 1871 she had never known any 
 other purpose than revenge; secondary objects in her colonial 
 policy had gained only a temporary place in her program, and 
 in a crisis had always been sacrificed to revenge. Whoever placed 
 his hand in that of France knew the significance of such an act 
 — knew at least, what France expected. Following Germany's 
 refusal and the alliance with Japan, the treaty indicated Eng- 
 land's definite turning against Germany as its fundamental inten- 
 tion: it inaugurated, after certain preliminaries, the first great 
 move in the policy of Germany's isolation {Einkreisung) . 
 
 The history of this policy does not come within the scope 
 of the present article. It is our aim only to connect it with 
 this general review of England's policy of force. The sole 
 question here is whether England's attitude toward Germany 
 since 1901 and 1904 is to be understood from this point of view. 
 This question must be answered affirmatively. England's enmity 
 does not spring mainly from friction in Africa and the Near East, 
 as has been stated, from clashes between her imperial policy and 
 Germany's expansion — although such clashes are naturally not 
 to be denied; it results primarily from Germany's power in 
 general, which was objectionable to England, in an especial degree 
 after Russia had been reduced as desired. At this time Ger- 
 many created her fleet. To the commercial inconvenience caused 
 by Germany were now added her military and political power. 
 Therefore, the old game was played again: England sought 
 to isolate the new rival, by uniting the latter's enemies into a 
 league; as she had done for centuries, she turned against the 
 strongest Continental state and armed the others against it. 
 
 There followed tTie misunderstanding connected with the de- 
 parture of the Russian Baltic fleet for the Far East and with 
 the Dogger Bank incident, which must have held a strong 
 danger of war not yet understood by us; there followed the 
 complications regarding Morocco, in which from the start, before 
 and after Delcasse's fall, England pursued a markedly un- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 313 
 
 friendly policy toward Germany. I do not propose to relate 
 here the Morocco Affair; nor the gradual concentration of the 
 British fleet in home waters as a move against Germany; nor 
 the history of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. I am con- 
 cerned only with the disclosure, revealed by this second treaty 
 aimed at Germany's isolation, of the motives of England's policy. 
 Here again the threat to Germany, it is claimed, was the result, 
 not the motive of action. England and Russia divided Persia 
 into three portions: a Russian, an English, and between them a 
 neutral sphere of influence. England thereby secured the way 
 to the sea and to India. Did she enter into this treaty for the 
 sake of India? Incidentally, no doubt: her policy is always 
 universal, and it must be considered from the Asiatic angle. The 
 treaty protects India and the routes from Cairo to India. But 
 w^as England at that time in need of protecting herself against 
 Russia? Russia was defeated, and only beginning to rise again; 
 she was not in a position for the moment to undertake anything 
 against India. England was strong at this time, not Russia. 
 The understanding with England closed for Russia the southern 
 passes, as the Japanese War closed the routes toward the Far 
 East. The protection of India was desirable, but it was by no 
 means imperative. The real importance of the treaty lay in the 
 fact of an agreement having been reached between the two giant 
 empires and in the course upon which it now definitely forced 
 Russia — namely, against Turkey, the Balkans, Austria and Ger- 
 many. It was a truce between the two great World Powers ; this 
 time again the threat was really intended for Germany. Nor 
 was this the case merely because the German plan for the Bagdad 
 railway encroached on the Asiatic territory which England desired 
 to control for the sake of the connection with India. This im- 
 perialistic consideration did not later prevent England and Ger- 
 many from reaching an agreement (to which the latter had 
 always been open) in regard to the Bagdad railway, in the treaty 
 of 191 4, the carrying out of which the war prevented. 
 
 The true significance of the treaty of 1907 was the shackling 
 of Germany, from considerations of general policy. The anti- 
 German spirit in the Russian government and England's jealousy 
 of Germany joined hands in this effort. Whether the aim of this 
 policy of isolation was war or the suppression of Germany 
 need not be discussed here. What, however, England feared 
 from Germany, using every means in her power to prevent it, 
 was expressed by Sir Edward Grey in a speech in the House of 
 Commons in March, 1909, in a diplomatically negative form, 
 although quite positive as regards intent. This was after the 
 
314 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 first failure in the attempt to isolate Germany. England feared, 
 he said, Germany's attempt to dominate and dictate the policy 
 of the Continent, and to bring about thereby a complete and 
 deliberate isolation of England. This intention existed, accord- 
 ing to English suspicion, and he desired to prevent its realization ; 
 therefore, he acted to this end according to tradition.^ 
 
 The ten years following the Boer War are a history of 
 increasing English power. Settlement was sought for those 
 problems of imperialism of which I have spoken. Chamberlain 
 developed his great agitation for a protective tariff; imperial 
 reform was ardently striven for, but nowhere were there definite 
 forms or clear prospects. Success attended England's foreign 
 policy, but not her imperial policy; yet her standing in the world 
 advanced greatly. Her export trade increased in a correspond- 
 ing manner; the anxiety regarding commercial retrogression 
 which might have been felt between 1895 and 1900 had long 
 been overcome. Nevertheless, the King and his diplomats 
 labored unceasingly on the ring w^hich was to encircle Germany. 
 Sacrifice on sacrifice was made to Russia, to Japan and to France 
 for the sake of this "encircling" policy ; the Mediterranean front 
 was much weakened. A great system was created for injur- 
 ing the present enemy at future cost. It was unmistakable that 
 all this converged against Germany. The danger of the sacri- 
 fices which were made to the friends of to-day, who were the 
 probable enemies of to-morrow, was clearly perceived; peace- 
 loving Liberalism emphasized this strongly, as also its own 
 desire for peace, basing its arguments on ideal and economic 
 reasoning. But the voice of the Imperialists drow^ned out all 
 others; nor were the crises of 1909 and 191 1 capable of silenc- 
 ing it. 
 
 England was in the throes of a panic at the thought of a 
 German invasion, as she had been shaken in the seventeenth 
 century by the "No Popery" outburst, and in the nineteenth cen- 
 tury by the dread of the French fleet. Lord Roberts carried on 
 his agitation for the strengthening of the army, for universal 
 compulsory service, and he held up the spectre of Germany to 
 frighten his countrymen. Reference has been made to Homer 
 Lea's fanciful dissertation. The war-enthusiastic American made 
 this announcement to the English apodictically and with cold- 
 blooded fanaticism : In permitting the union of Germany, England 
 lost the citadel of her European power; she dare not allow any 
 European state to become too great. Germany desires to destroy 
 England's power and to erect a German Empire upon the ruins. 
 
 '^Parliamentary Debates, 1909, Vol. Ill, p. 58. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 315 
 
 England must prepare to resist, she dare not permit such a 
 Power to exist; the crisis is at hand, war is unavoidable. Wars 
 have created this Empire and w^ars will lengthen or shorten its 
 existence. Lea's appeal is dedicated to Field Marshal Roberts. 
 
 In the year 19 13, the historian Cramb gave a series of lectures 
 on Germany and England, which in book-form stirred the entire 
 Anglo-Saxon world. ^ They are a consistent, eloquent exhorta- 
 tion for preparedness, for compulsory service, for war. Cramb, 
 also with violent generalization, with forceful deduction, con- 
 structs a belligerent Germany, a Germany bound to be belligerent. 
 He ratiocinates the necessity for this war. He, too, glorifies Rob- 
 erts and war; he desires war for England, for her position of 
 powder. He is a war idealist. His was a thorough-going militar- 
 istic sermon, and most remarkable was the echo which it later 
 awakened. This militaristic movement was not the only one, 
 but success proved that it was the strongest. 
 
 Although the Liberal government rejected general compulsory 
 service. General Hamilton, in a book - to which Viscount Haldane 
 contributed an introduction, brought forward his convincing 
 reason for a paid army. It was a most astounding and instructive 
 argument for Germans; he maintained that only a paid army 
 permits of what is an impossibility with a popular army: that is, 
 wars of offense in far-distant foreign lands, and in keeping with 
 British traditions and British Imperialism, a strong foreign policy 
 — in other words, a policy of conquest. The army and the fleet 
 carry on war, the other classes quietly continue their work and 
 foot the bills. "The mass of the nation, therefore, does not find 
 war so terribly tragic." This was the voice of English tradition; 
 the nature of England's conquests, even those of the last twenty- 
 five years, was accurately expressed by it, and there was no inten- 
 tion of abandoning this policy. Least of all was there any desire 
 in England to renounce maritime supremacy. An irresistible 
 wave in favor of such a policy of force, proceeding from the 
 most diverse sources, swept over England. 
 
 Given a sincere desire, it is not difficult to understand 
 why England, on account of her imports, if for no other reason, 
 regards with suspicion the possibility of a strong foreign fleet 
 in her hom.e waters. As was previously asserted, her history, 
 her long isolation have spoilt her. Her claims have become 
 and remain limitless. Wherever a possible rival arises she sum- 
 
 1 Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, late Professor of Modern History, 
 Queen's College, London; New York, 19 14, p. 43 ff. 
 
 2 Compulsory Service. A Study of the Question in the Light of Experience, 
 by General Sir Ian Hamilton, with an Introduction by the Right Hon. R. B. 
 Haldane, London, 19 10. 
 
3i6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 mons the world against the new competitor, and as she has always 
 done, reproachfully identifies her own interest with that of 
 mankind in general. She desires once and for all to hold open 
 for herself and for her world empire the routes to her colonies, 
 — that is to say, the oceans ; whoever seems even to threaten these 
 routes is the enemy of England and of humanity; no growth 
 of power sufficient for this purpose is to be permitted. The sole 
 guarantee of this desire of England is seen in the increase of 
 England's actual maritime supremacy, her absolute dominance 
 of the seas. England desires also to hold open the overland 
 routes which lead to her colonies, and she seeks to exclude all 
 outsiders from them^the routes from the Nile to South Africa, 
 and from the Nile to the Indus and the Ganges. She lays her 
 hand heavily upon the offenders wherever they may be: in each 
 case it was Germany who felt the weight of her displeasure. 
 
 England has united the world against Germany to-day, pri- 
 marily for the reason that Germany's power was too close at 
 hand and inconveniently great — she is playing against us the 
 game of 1689 ^nd 181 3. Her procedure and her motives have In 
 no wise changed, her policy is that of attack and alliance, as 
 always. Her enemy, to be sure, is no longer the same. Ger- 
 many's ambitions have never been universal, like those of Na- 
 poleon I or of Louis XIV, never has she exercised or attempted 
 a European hegemony; not even against England did she assume 
 the offensive. She was content to remain a nation like the 
 others, striving for her portion of light and air. The universal 
 policy existed solely in England, in no wise in Germany. Does 
 England not also block the way of the other Powers? Does 
 she not with her allies threateningly enclose Italy in the Mediter- 
 ranean? Do not national states, national fleets arise in all parts 
 of the world? Does not each one of them, in its effort toward 
 development, feel the oppressive hand of this ancient ruler of 
 the world, who lords it over the seas? Does she not embitter 
 the life of neutrals more than ever by seeking to enforce against 
 them her own arbitrary rules, as in 1780 and 1800? Where are 
 the small states, the embryonic nations, which England claims 
 to protect to-day? Her hand lies heavily upon them all. The 
 only one which she protects, the pretendedly neutral Bel- 
 gium, was from the start her ally and accomplice. England has 
 assumed the offensive not alone toward us. Her imperialism, 
 her alliance with Russia, her animosity towards Germany have 
 urged her on for a number of years to a deadly attack against 
 Austria-Hungary and Turkey, her previous friends — she seeks 
 to destroy them also. England claims she is fighting for law 
 
MODERN GERMANY 317 
 
 and the existing order — in truth, she is upholding her ancient 
 supremacy. For this she sacrifices old and new states, historical 
 Austria, the last states of Islam, the recently created power of our 
 Empire. She protects France, because France serves her ends and 
 has become harmless to her. But an energetic and live state must 
 force its way against England's claim to rule the world, and fight 
 to gain the right of existence. 
 
 If England really introduces universal compulsory service, then 
 as regards international politics for the first time will she become 
 a nation in the fashion of the others — a nation which measures 
 its political responsibility, the responsibility for war, with terrible 
 earnestness by the tribute of blood which all of its sons pay; a 
 nation which through this responsibility learns self-control, order 
 and patience. The history of England's past, to which she holds 
 fast to-day and which she has striven to continue in the present, 
 is a history of wars of conquest, of wars of attack, whose aim 
 was to protect her growth in the outside world and to destroy 
 every European rival; it is a history of wars, of aggressive 
 policy, of aggressive world policy, always and at all points. 
 It may be regarded as imposing: the cohesion of this world- 
 nation In respect to population, territorial possessions, civilization 
 and power is still impressive. To plead the advancement of the 
 interest of humanity is possible for British self-assurance and 
 British cant only owing to hypocrisy or to the infatuation of the 
 other nations which she seeks to deceive. England is fighting 
 for herself and for a worn-out, world-supremacy the claims of 
 which run counter to the national life of the present and of the 
 future. She is fighting for a universality of power, which in 
 reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern 
 w^orld has seen. For this reason she has brought together under 
 arms, true to her policy of 1904 and 1907, the nations who have 
 for long been displeased by Germany's new manifestation of 
 vitality. From the narrow point of view, this was perhaps 
 clever, as she seeks to weaken one of her enemies by the others; 
 but it is scarcely wise from the point of view of far-seeing wis- 
 dom; it was, however, thoroughly In keeping with England's 
 history. This England has been fond of representing as a 
 history of peace and benevolence — it has never been such. 
 English commerce and Kultur have forced their way as roughly 
 and ruthlessly as In the case of any nation in history; more 
 deliberate almost than with any other has been her policy from 
 time immemorial of simply exterminating every rival. Thus 
 it has been, and thus it Is still to-day — the freedom of the world 
 demands that there be a change in the future. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 FRANCE'S POLICY OF FORCE 
 
 PROFESSOR PAUL DARMSTADTER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 GOTTINGEN 
 
 OUR greatest historian has said that in 1870 the German 
 army was fighting Louis XIV. This statement holds 
 in fact a great truth ; it means that the foreign policy of France 
 during the last three hundred years has been guided by one 
 purpose, that its aims have been pursued with absolute consistency 
 throughout the changing periods of history. These aims consisted 
 in the expansion of France to the so-called natural boundaries 
 of the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, in her domination in Middle 
 and Southern Europe, and in the founding of a great overseas 
 empire. The execution of these plans naturally aroused the 
 opposition of other Powers; Spain, the German states under the 
 leadership of Austria, and especially England saw in these French 
 efforts a menace to their vital interests. Powerful coalitions be- 
 tween the Island Kingdom and the Continental Powers brought 
 about the defeat of the French plans. The great colonial empire 
 which, in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth 
 centuries, had been built up in North America by painful labor, 
 was lost in the Seven Years' War, as irretrievably as were the 
 bold hopes of gaining the upper hand in East India. The 
 hegemony in Middle and Southern Europe which Napoleon 
 achieved, could not be maintained; indeed, after his fall the so- 
 called "natural boundaries," which had been conquered in the 
 Revolutionary Wars, had to be surrendered. But it is char- 
 acteristic of the exceptional tenacity of French policy that even 
 after the destruction of these plans, after the collapse of her 
 hopes, France attempted, by new means and new paths, the 
 achievement of the old ambitions — to extend France's territory 
 in Europe and to build up a powerful world empire. 
 
 The peace treaties of 1 814-15 forced France back within the 
 boundaries which had existed under her old kings, and left her 
 only a few scant ruins of her colonial possessions: several West 
 Indian islands, Cayenne, a couple of East Indian cities, the 
 Island of Reunion, and the colony of Senegal, which was at 
 that time quite unimportant — all in all, scarcely 100,000 square 
 kilometers, with at the most one million inhabitants. 
 
 318 
 
MODERN GERMANY 319 
 
 The terrible state of exhaustion in which the country found 
 itself after the Napoleonic Wars prevented it for the time being 
 from contemplating expansion in Europe, but even in the Restora- 
 tion period there was a beginning made tow^ard the creation of a 
 new colonial empire. The monarchy of Louis Philippe and 
 the Second Empire continued to advance along these lines. The 
 foundations for a new colonial empire were laid in Algiers on 
 the West African coast, in Madagascar and on the Red Sea, in 
 the South Seas and Farther India. An attempt was made to 
 gain influence in the Levant, especially in Syria and Eg}'pt — 
 indeed, even in America an effort was made to continue the old 
 tradition, although in a new form. The fact that the French 
 world policy of this time did not achieve more imposing results 
 w^as due to the opposition of England, despite the Entente 
 Cordiale. It is, however, due also to the fact that France never 
 entirely abandoned the hope of realizing the old ambitions of 
 her European policy. In the southwest the "natural" boundary 
 was won back in i860; in 1870 the hope was entertained of a 
 similar gain in the northeast. This hope, however, was not 
 realized : France was driven back from the Rhine to the Vosges 
 Mountains, and in addition lost a part of her Moselle terri- 
 tory. Her ambition for supremacy in Middle Europe was shat- 
 tered by the founding of the German Empire. 
 
 The peace of Frankfort in this way destroyed the hopes which 
 the French had entertained for several hundred years and in 
 part already realized. No wonder, then, that all their efforts 
 w^ere devoted to undermining this peace, which many regarded 
 as only a truce. No measure w^as spared to keep alive the memory 
 of the lost provinces and hatred of the victor. The lost prov- 
 inces, whose inhabitants had been an object of contempt on ac- 
 count of their faulty knowledge of the French language, became 
 almost a cult and in schools, in newspapers and in literature the 
 ''poor" inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, "who were groaning 
 under German oppression," were represented as martyrs, and 
 the recovery of the lost brothers as the holiest duty of France. 
 The legal status created by the Peace of Frankfort was recog- 
 nized in no school book, on no map, and not even in scientific 
 books and magazines. With the exception of Jean Jaures, there 
 was scarcely a leading politician who accepted the state of 
 affairs resulting from 1871. Sentiment and historical recollec- 
 tions plaj'cd their part in this — bonds of friendship and relation- 
 ship, as w^ell as here and there the honest belief that the "lost" 
 brothers were suffering under German rule. The politico-mili- 
 tary consideration that Alsace and Lorraine, Strassburg and 
 
320 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Metz represented sally ports against Germany, and that espe- 
 cially from Alsace South Germany might be held in continuous 
 check, was not lost sight of. Immediately following the conclu- 
 sion of peace, the way was prepared from a military and 
 diplomatic point of view for the war of revanche. In 1872 
 universal military duty, after the Prussian model, was legally 
 introduced into France; later it was still further developed in 
 the Defense Law of 1889. In no country of the world has 
 the so-called ''Prussian Militarism" been more relentlessly car- 
 ried through than in the French Republic. Diplomatic prepara- 
 tions encountered serious obstacles, as no Power indicated a readi- 
 ness to enter into a treaty with the Republic, whose internal 
 firmness as yet evoked but little confidence. 
 
 As the re-conquest of the lost provinces was out of the 
 question for the moment, French policy again sought, as it had 
 done after 181 5, to counter-balance the losses suffered in Europe 
 by colonial acquisitions. In this it remained true to its old 
 traditions. But from this endeavor of French policy after 1878 
 resulted this remarkable situation : France encountered the stub- 
 born and sometimes bitter opposition of England, while from 
 Germany she met with the most uncompromising encouragement, 
 and often with vigorous assistance. In the years 1884-85, when! 
 Jules Ferry directed the destinies of France, and again occasion- 
 ally during the nineties, w^hen Hanotaux was at the helm on the 
 Quai d'Orsay, did France and Germany work in harmony in 
 the field of world politics. Jules Ferry warned his compatriots 
 against "forever keeping their eyes turned toward the blue line 
 of the Vosges," and neglecting all else that was happening in 
 the world.^ At this time, and even later, many Germans may 
 have thought that the old differences would disappear and the 
 old wounds heal, but those who thought thus — and their num- 
 ber in Germany was not small — were in sad error as regards 
 the sentiment of the French nation. French policy, it is true, 
 gladly accepted German support in order to attain a definite 
 goal, but never through gratitude did it lose sight of that other 
 goal which it considered more important. So far-seeing a states- 
 man as Jules Ferry, who desired no more than to work hand 
 in hand with Germany in clearly circumscribed fields, encountered 
 the most bitter opposition from many of his compatriots, and 
 after his fall (1885), there was a violent revival of the revanche 
 doctrine; this reached its height in the temporary triumph of 
 that thoroughly doubtful character, General Boulanger. It was 
 
 ^ Jules Ferry, by Rambaud, p. 394. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 321 
 
 due only to the great restraint of Germany that war was avoided 
 at this time (1886-87). 
 
 A prominent American historian says in his book regarding 
 the genesis of the World War in 19 14: "The French have 
 been ready for war with Germany, whenever they saw a good 
 opportunity, for the last forty years." ^ French diplomacy has 
 for forty years striven to create such a favorable opportunity. It 
 was apparent to French statesmen that, in view of the increasing 
 population of Germany and of the stationary French census, 
 there was no prospect of success so long as France was de- 
 pendent upon her own strength. The efforts of French diplo- 
 macy were, therefore, turned to bringing about the strongest 
 possible coalition against Germany. As Austria, upon whose 
 support she had based her expectations after 1870, showed signs 
 of reaching an understanding with the new German Empire, 
 Russia presented herself in the first line as a possible ally of 
 France. As early as 1872 the Temps suggested an alliance with 
 the Empire of the Czar. German diplomacy early recognized 
 such a possibility, especially after the Russian Chancellor Gort- 
 schakov, in 1875, boastfully claimed the credit for having saved 
 France from a new German attack. After the relation between 
 Germany and Russia, following the Congress of Berlin, had 
 become plainly less friendly, and especially after the signing of 
 the treaty between Germany and Austria, an alliance betw^een 
 Russia and France was advocated as a countermove by Russian, 
 as well as by French politicians. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that the opposition which existed at 
 this time between the two Powers and England in regard to 
 world politics was a further important factor in making the 
 signing of the treaty seem desirable. Nevertheless, for a long 
 time there was hesitation on grounds of principle in Petrograd 
 at entering into an alliance with the Republic. But this scruple 
 was finally overcome, as many believe, on account of the pro- 
 English turn which German politics took and on account of the 
 non-renewal of the so-called Mutual Guaranty Treaty (Riick- 
 versicherungsvertrag) following Bismarck's fall. There can, 
 however, be no doubt that had there been a war between Ger- 
 many and Russia previous to 1890, French muskets would 
 have "gone off by themselves." In addition to the plainly 
 existent community of political interests between the two states 
 at this time, the close financial relations which bound them 
 together must not be forgotten. As an outward sign of the 
 agreement, in July, 1891, a French squadron proceeded to 
 
 ^ The War in Europe, by Albert Bushnell Hart, p. 139. 
 
322 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Cronstadt, on which occasion the proud autocrat of Russia 
 listened, standing, to the Marseillaise. On August 27, 1891, 
 notes were exchanged between the two governments sealing the 
 understanding, which was extended by a military convention, and 
 in 1894 changed to a formal alliance. 
 
 The Franco-Russian alliance was, according to the intent 
 of French politicians, primarily directed against Germany, and 
 was intended at a favorable moment to lead to war and 
 to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. It is easy to understand that 
 Alsace-Lorraine was a matter of entire indifference to Russian 
 statesmen; they desired to use the alliance for exploiting France 
 financially and for advancing Russian politics against England 
 in the Near and Far East — in case of necessity of course also 
 against Germany. Those French politicians who saw in the 
 extension of the colonial empire an important task for the 
 French government, counted upon making use of Russian sup- 
 port against England. According to the change in the relation 
 of France and Russia to England, their own relation to Germany 
 became now more friendly, now less so. In 1894 France and 
 Germany together opposed England when she seized upon 
 a strip of the Congo State. In 1895 Germany, Russia 
 and France joined hands in East Asia. But when the German 
 Empire, as the result of the telegram which the Kaiser sent to 
 President Kruger, on the occasion of the repulse of the Jameson 
 Raid, appeared on the verge of a serious conflict with England, 
 the French government let it be announced in London that 
 France had only one enemy, and that was Germany. Thus, 
 despite all colonial rivalries, France was ready to support Eng- 
 land in a war against Germany; or, in other words, at that time 
 also she placed Continental above world politics. This attitude 
 of France had naturally marked effects on Germany's policy, 
 while France herself was thereby brought to suffer the greatest 
 humiliation she had known since 1871 — the "Fashoda" episode. 
 
 The improvement in the relations between the two Western 
 Powers dates from the very same year, 1898, the year of 
 Fashoda. Delcasse, who directed France's foreign policy after 
 this year and who doubtless perceived the growing hostility 
 between Germany and England, made it his main object in life 
 to bring about a close understanding between England and 
 France, and to carry through the idea of revanche by means 
 of this alliance. This plan of the clever Southern Frenchman 
 gained in probability of realization when, with the accession of 
 King Edward VII (1901), a decided shift took place in British 
 policy — England, like France, now saw in Germany her chief 
 
MODERN GERMANY 323 
 
 opponent. Indeed, England was even ready to pay a high price 
 for French friendship and to fulfill France's dearest wish on the 
 stage of world politics: in payment for the recognition of her 
 de facto supremacy in Egypt, England granted a free hand to 
 France in the greater portion of Morocco. Thus, by the agree- 
 ment of April 8, 1904, the chief goal of French policy was 
 achieved, the ancient opposition to England was checked, and 
 the possibility created of carrying through to realization, in 
 alliance with Great Britain, French wishes as regards Europe. 
 It remained only to bring the understanding with England into 
 agreement with the Russian alliance. The differences which 
 existed and still exist between England and Russia are undoubt- 
 edly more fundamental than those between England and France 
 — more so, probably, than those between England and Germany. 
 Nevertheless, English and French diplomats, working together, 
 were able in 1907 to bring about an understanding between 
 Russia and England, which did not remove the antipathy betv^^een 
 the two Powers, it is true, but merely bridged it over. It is 
 not possible to-day to decide who deserves the greatest credit 
 for the creation of the Triple Entente, but the chief gain from 
 it undoubtedly accrues to France. The three Powers were held 
 together by their common hatred of Germany. According to 
 the intention of the French — and with that alone are we con- 
 cerned at this time — the Triple Entente was to serve for the 
 realization of the revanche idea, in the manner of the previous 
 alliance with Russia. The Entente was still further extended 
 by military agreements with England, which were primarily 
 directed against Germany, and through an exchange of notes 
 (1912) which was not formally a treaty, but which in reality 
 bound England, as the Military and Naval Convention had 
 done, to support France. French politics had at last been suc- 
 cessful, after nearly forty years of effort, in bringing about the 
 powerful coalition with which it was intended to destroy the 
 German Empire. 
 
 There was, however, much more to the European policy of 
 France than the forming of treaties with Russia and the under- 
 standing with Great Britain. It was, to be sure, out of the 
 question for France, after the occurrences of 1870-71, to resume 
 plans for a Confederation of the Rhine, such as Napoleon 
 had undertaken. But ardent encouragement was given to the 
 anti-German propaganda in Alsace-Lorraine. It is not known 
 to what extent other disruptive movements within the German 
 Empire and within the allied Hapsburg Monarchy received 
 
324 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 encouragement from French sources. The manner in which 
 intelligent Frenchmen, even in private conversation, threw 
 doubt upon the unity of the German princes and races was 
 astonishing; they were inclined to overestimate the importance 
 of occasional separatist expressions of individuals and newspapers. 
 This was still more pronounced in respect to the disagreements 
 of the peoples of the Monarchy on the Danube, among whom 
 the Czechs especially enjoyed the sympathy of the French. 
 
 The principal aim of French diplomacy, particularly in the 
 last ten or fifteen years, was at all points to undermine German 
 policy, to weaken Germany's position in the world, to destroy 
 her alliances with other states, and to draw the latter within 
 the sphere of France's influence. French statecraft in these 
 efforts, in which it was naturally encouraged by Russia and 
 England, made skilful use of two weapons whose power we 
 must not underestimate: French Kultur and French capital. 
 
 French Kultur, and especially its chief organ of expression, 
 the French language, has something quite irresistible for many 
 peoples. If it possessed for those of the Germanic race at times 
 a decisive influence, it is only natural that its attraction was even 
 stronger for the Romance nations, who not infrequently regard 
 it as the only Kultur; from the superiority of the French article 
 to their own they draw the easy conclusion that in the political 
 sphere also France is entitled to stand as the leading represen- 
 tative of the Latin peoples. 
 
 Not less important was the extremely adroit use of French 
 capital for the increase of the political influence of France. 
 French capital is invested in government loans, railways, indus- 
 trial undertakings and newspapers of other countries, and thus 
 made serviceable, not only for the commercial, but for the 
 political aims of France as well. 
 
 The influence of France is naturally greatest in French-speak- 
 ing countries, such as French Switzerland and Belgium. For 
 a time it seemed that united Italy would be permanently removed 
 from the French sphere of influence. The occupation of Tunis 
 by the French (1881) impaired the political relations betv^^een 
 the Italian kingdom and France and brought about Italy's union 
 with the Central Powers. Italy was successful also in freeing 
 herself from the economic tutelage of France, and the hope did 
 not seem without foundation that Italy would create for herself 
 a system of Kultur independent of France. In spite of the 
 unfriendly attitude which for many years France had mani- 
 fested toward all Italian efforts to achieve power — reference 
 need be made only to the support which France gave to the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 325 
 
 Abyssinian Chief, Menelik — French diplomacy was, nevertheless, 
 successful in making its influence again strongly felt with the 
 ''Latin sister nation." Here again Delcasse was the guiding 
 spirit: In order to make the Italians forget Tunis, he offered 
 to them the much less valuable Tripoli as recompense. The 
 minister was seconded In his efforts by the French ambassador 
 in Rome, Barrere, who understood the art of Influencing Italian 
 public opinion in favor of France. The unremitting emphasis 
 on the Latin relationship, the encouragement of ''irredentist" and 
 republican movements, the activity of the Freemasons, who were 
 encouraged by France, and the attraction of French Kultur, 
 which is for many Italians irresistible, caused wide circles in 
 Italy entirely to mistake the true Interests of the country and 
 to ally themselves politically with France.^ 
 
 The argument that France was the leading Latin power 
 was of course made use of In Spain. Although French capital 
 there plays a much greater role than In Italy, there are In Spain 
 powerful factors against the dominance of French influence. Old 
 traditions, as well as recent experiences of the Spaniards In the 
 Morocco affair, operate against France's propaganda along the 
 lines of civilization and finance. Catalonia, however. Is entirely 
 under Prench influence. Portugal Is dependent on France cul- 
 turally, but politically and economically on England. 
 
 In the eastern part of the Mediterranean French propaganda 
 can look back upon a tradition extending over many hundreds 
 of years. France claims the protectorate over the Roman 
 Catholics In the Orient. The Alliance Israelite is active in 
 working for France, and large amounts of French capital are 
 invested In Turkey In all sorts of undertakings. Although 
 France has In the Orient very important material and cultural 
 interests, nevertheless she has made her policy as regards Turkey 
 quite secondary to the wishes of her Russian ally, and thereby 
 lost her traditional Influence in the Ottoman Empire. Indi- 
 rectly, the revanche policy stood here In the way of the realiza- 
 tion of other important French Interests. The policy of France 
 as regards the Balkan States has also of recent years mainly 
 served Russian purposes. Worthy of mention Is the fact that 
 in Greece and Rumania France has been able to awaken sym- 
 pathies which in great part are traceable to cultural propaganda; 
 and the further fact that Greece Is also financially dependent on 
 France. 
 
 France's greatest success since 1871 In the field of world 
 
 1 In the meanwhile Italy has broken with the Central Powers and joined the 
 Triple Entente. 
 
326 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 politics has been in the building up of a new colonial empire of 
 vast extent. Her traditions here lead back to the time of 
 Richelieu and Louis XIV. The desire to increase France's 
 power and greatness, to find a recompense for lost territory 
 and to reap military laurels, have all been determining factors 
 for the French imperialism of early and modern times; but it 
 would be unjust were we to fail to give due weight to the fact 
 that other important considerations of an economic and politico- 
 military nature also influenced the men who built up the modern 
 French colonial empire. France possesses no superfluous popula- 
 tion, and she has therefore no need to-day for settlement colonies. 
 On the other hand, territorial markets removed from competi- 
 tion are for France all the more valuable, since in many branches 
 French industry is no longer able successfully to meet competition 
 in the free markets of the world. The import of raw materials 
 and food stuffs from her own colonies is also a matter of moment. 
 It is very important for a country with so large a capital at 
 its disposal to be able to invest it advantageously in colonies. A 
 great colonial empire must be protected by obtaining footholds at 
 certain points along the important routes of international trade. 
 Finally, there is a connection between France's world policy 
 and her revanche policy; the French endeavored more and more 
 by the enlistment of the inhabitants of their colonies to fill out 
 the vacancies resulting in the ranks of their army through the 
 falling birth-rate. New colonies represented, therefore, the 
 strengthening of France for her European task. 
 
 The resumption of the French colonial policy has been in- 
 fluenced by the general tendency of the times toward colonial 
 expansion. France, who possessed a chain of colonies on the 
 Dark Continent, felt naturally the greatest interest in an occur- 
 rence of such historical importance as the division of Africa. 
 
 Although in this manner ancient traditions, sentiment and 
 important interests forced France to take part in world politics, 
 public opinion at the start was without enthusiasm for colonial 
 expansion, in part even inimical to it. Great political parties, 
 such as the Radicals and the Monarchists, often offered the bit- 
 terest opposition to a colonial policy, whose supporters numbered 
 statesmen belonging to the moderate party. The opposition stood 
 out against this world policy partly on grounds of principle, but 
 chiefly because the country was thereby turned aside from its 
 real task, the preparation for the war of revanche. The greatest 
 successes which France has to show since 1871 were achieved in 
 conscious opposition to the revanche policy, in cooperation with 
 Germany and against England. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 327 
 
 From the collapse of her American colonial empire, France 
 had saved certain fragments: the small islands of St. Pierre 
 and Miquelon, Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as French 
 Guiana. The Monroe Doctrine barred the way to an expansion 
 of the French colonial possessions. It is worth}- of remark that 
 France is the sole European power which has endeavored to 
 violate the ]\Ionroe Doctrine (at the time of Napoleon III). 
 It is also remarkable that even after 1871 the French colonial 
 empire in America gained by expansion, although the gain was 
 unimportant in size: in 1877 France acquired from Sweden 
 the little Island of St. Barthelemy, without protest from the 
 United States. Not without justice does an American historian 
 call attention to the fact that this occurrence is of the same 
 significance as the sale of St. Thomas to Germany; yet against 
 such an act, when only suggested, the American press violently 
 protested.^ In this connection it must also be mentioned that a 
 French company first undertook the building of the Panama 
 Canal, an undertaking which, as is known, came to grief, but 
 which nevertheless shows the ambitious French world policy. 
 The American journalists and scholars, who are never weary of 
 talking of the "German danger," which is supposed to threaten 
 America also, should glance at the map of the West Indies, 
 and then ask themselves the question from which direction the 
 United States, and especially the Panama Canal, might have to 
 expect an attack. 
 
 France has been able to awaken for herself in the United 
 States widespread sympathy, which is in part traceable to the 
 ancient brotherhood in arms during the American War of Inde- 
 pendence, in part to the similar republican form of government. 
 The French have recently undertaken a very active cultural 
 propaganda both in North and South America. Latin America, 
 even more perhaps than Latin Europe, regards France as the 
 leading Latin nation and Paris as the center of culture of the 
 whole Romance world. South Americans who have gained 
 wealth delight to spend it on the Seine, where they are honored 
 by the nickname of *'rasta." In addition to the cultural propa- 
 ganda, we must not overlook the important part played by 
 French capital in South American undertakings. In the South 
 Seas, since the thirties of the nineteenth century, France has 
 controlled a number of islands, of which the most important 
 is Tahiti; under the Second Empire, New Caledonia was ac- 
 
 1 The IMited States as a World Power, by Archibald Cary CooHdge, New 
 York, 1908, p. no. 
 
328 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 quired, and under the Third Republic several further groups 
 of islands, which, however, are of no great importance. 
 
 Far more important has been the French expansion in East 
 Asia. In the face of England's great superiority, the increase 
 of France's ancient East Indian possessions was not to be thought 
 of; in compensation, however, she was able to acquire a great 
 colonial empire in Farther India. Here Napoleon III laid the 
 foundation through the acquisition of Cochin-China and the 
 protectorate over Cambodia. Under the Third Republic French 
 rule was extended, especially through the initiative of Jules 
 Ferry, over Annam and Tonkin, and from these varied elements 
 the great and promising colony of Indo-China was formed. 
 French diplomacy was able to secure "spheres of interest," in the 
 neighboring countries of Siam and China, which represent far- 
 reaching opportunities for the capital and industry of France. In 
 South China France has possessed since 1898 a point of support 
 in the harbor of Kuang-chow. As for the rest, the Far Eastern 
 policy of France has had to show the greatest consideration for 
 the interests of her Russian ally. 
 
 France's expansion in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean 
 stands in close connection with her East Asiatic polic}^ She 
 sought to follow England's example in obtaining stations on the 
 route to East India. On the old route around the Cape of 
 Good Hope, France possessed, as an inheritance from former 
 times, the Island of Bourbon or Reunion; from the days of 
 Louis XIV, she had laid claim to the great Island of Mada- 
 gascar, and at the time of the Restoration these had been revived 
 and had led to the acquisition of the small island of St. Marie, 
 on the east coast of Madagascar. At the time of the July 
 Monarchy certain islands to the northwest of Madagascar were 
 occupied. During the eighties of the nineteenth century mem- 
 ories of the old claims and traditions were awakened. After 
 a bloody war a protectorate was established over Madagascar in 
 1885, and after a second war the island was declared a French 
 colony in 1896. Even before the opening of the Suez Canal, 
 Napoleon III had laid claim in 1862 to Obok on the Red Sea, 
 on the new route to India. This small colony was further 
 extended during the eighties of the nineteenth century; it 
 acquired considerable importance through the seizure of the 
 harbor of Djibuti, and especially through the relations which 
 were established with neighboring Abyssinia. 
 
 By far the most important field of French expansion, how- 
 ever, in recent years was in the northwest of the Dark Continent. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 329 
 
 France pursued various aims, all of which were not fully real- 
 ized. In the Mediterranean, where Algeria and Corsica already 
 belonged to France, an attempt was made to bring the whole 
 northern coast line of Africa from the Straits of Gibraltar to 
 the Suez Canal under her rule. 
 
 As an Atlantic power, France, who possessed various col- 
 onies at the west coast of Africa from Senegal to the Congo, 
 aimed at occupying the greatest possible extent of territory on 
 the Atlantic coast-line, at providing as great a hinterland as 
 feasible for the coast colonies, and then at binding these coast 
 colonies to each other through the hinterland, where this was 
 not possible on the coast itself. 
 
 Finally, the plan was entertained of effecting a territorial 
 connection between the Atlantic possessions and those lying on 
 the Mediterranean. We need not decide the question whether, 
 and to what extent, the attempt was made to create an empire 
 through Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. 
 
 Ever since the French had gained a firm footing on the soil 
 of Algeria, their aim had been to win political and economic 
 influence in the neighboring states, Tunis and Morocco, and 
 to incorporate these territories at a favorable moment into their 
 North African empire. The possession of these two commer- 
 cially valuable countries was, according to the French view, abso- 
 lutely necessary for the security of Algeria. Tunis, as well 
 as Morocco, holds a supremely important position as regards 
 world politics, the latter lying at the Straits of Gibraltar and 
 the former at the narrow dividing line between the western and 
 eastern halves of the Mediterranean. But precisely for this 
 reason England, who had watched with the greatest displeasure 
 the conquest of Algeria by the French, opposed their occupation 
 of further territory on the North African coast. Italy also 
 desired possession of Tunis, to which, aside from geographical and 
 historical reasons, she thought she possessed just claims, since 
 great numbers of her sons had emigrated to the country and 
 were there active in all branches of life. It appears that Eng- 
 land was at first inclined to support the Italian claims. Offers 
 of a like nature w^ere made in 1876-77 to the Italians from the 
 German and Austrian side. But the irresolute Italian govern- 
 ment failed to take advantage of the opportunity^ and Britain 
 preferred to reach an understanding with France in regard to 
 the protectorate of Tunis. It may be that it was more to the 
 advantage of Britain's maritime interests if Tunis, Sardinia and 
 Sicily were not in possession of the same state; a misunder- 
 standing between the two sister nations was at that time entirely 
 
330 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 in line with Britain's policy. The controlling consideration, 
 however, was the desire to bring France under British influence 
 and to prevent the threatening alliance with Russia. ' At the 
 Congress of Berlin (1878) the British delegate, Lord Salis- 
 bury, offered to the French delegate, Wadington, Tunis as com- 
 pensation for Cyprus, which England had at that time received 
 from Turkey. "How long are you determined to leave Carthage 
 in the hands of the barbarians?" the English statesman is de- 
 clared to have asked. Bismarck also agreed, since he hoped, 
 but as events proved falsely, that the colonial activity of the 
 French would draw them away from the revanche idea. The 
 French government, however, hesitated a number of years before 
 making use of the authorization, as many statesmen feared a 
 breach with Italy; moreover, public opinion was unfavorable 
 to plans of colonial expansion. Meanwhile the Italians sought 
 to strengthen their economic influence in Tunis by all possible 
 means, in the manner later characterized as penetration pac'ifique. 
 The French government, with Jules Ferry at its head, seized 
 upon boundary violations by a Tunisian tribe as an excuse for 
 occupying the country. In April, 1881, French troops entered 
 Tunis, and on May 12 of the same year the Bardo Treaty 
 was concluded, whereby the country became practically a French 
 colony. 
 
 It appears that in France in the eighties the project was 
 entertained of extending French rule to Tripoli, but to these 
 plans the British government is said to have offered the most 
 determined opposition. Later (1900, or perhaps earlier) the 
 decision was reached to surrender Tripoli to Italy, together 
 perhaps with other concessions, in return for the recognition of 
 the French claims to Morocco. This decision was all the easier 
 since France had definitely renounced claims to Egypt. 
 
 If France was able to proffer w^ell-founded claims, from a 
 historical, material or cultural standpoint, to any country in the 
 world, it was Egypt. As early as the eighteenth century various 
 statesmen had contemplated the conquest of the country of the 
 Nile and the cutting of the Suez Strait; the bearing of the tri- 
 color to the land of the Pharaohs by Napoleon meant only the 
 carrying out of plans that had long been in incubation. Even 
 after the failure of the Napoleonic expedition, French influence 
 had remained dominant in Eg>^pt. The Suez Canal was a French 
 undertaking. It is not without its tragic side that precisely 
 this work, which was a triumph of French capital and of French 
 intelligence, should have destroyed French influence in Egypt. 
 England followed the building of the canal with the greatest 
 
MODERN GERMANY 331 
 
 distrust and disapproval; after it was once completed, Great 
 Britain sought to gain control of the canal and of Egypt. The 
 history of the occupation of Egypt by the English, which need 
 not be related at this point in detail, was the result of many 
 shady intrigues and of a not always consistent policy on the part 
 of British statesmen. France had several opportunities to main- 
 tain her old influence, or at least to prevent the one-sided occupa- 
 tion by the English in 1882. It is possible that an Anglo- 
 French occupation of Egypt would have had the same results 
 as the Prusso-Austrian action in Schleswig-Holstein in the years 
 following 1864. At all events, the French parliament, which 
 on July 19, 1882, refused by a large majority the credit de- 
 manded by the Freycinet Ministry for the occupation of the 
 Suez Canal, missed the last opportunity to secure for France a 
 voice in determining the destiny of the Nile country. In reach- 
 ing the decision, for which Clemenceau as leader of the oppo- 
 sition bears the chief responsibility, the controlling motive was 
 the fear lest France's military position in Europe be weakened 
 through sending troops to Egypt. Thus here again the policy 
 of revanche stood in the way of a world policy: the French 
 would not have been forced out of Egypt, if they had not placed 
 greater value upon the possession of Alsace-Lorraine than upon 
 all territorial acquisitions. 
 
 Only with difficulty and most reluctantly did the French 
 reconcile themselves to the accomplished fact of English su- 
 premacy in Egypt. The result was a long-continued unfriend- 
 liness between the two Western Powers. France sought in 
 other latitudes a recompense for the lost Land of the Pharaohs, 
 and as England possessed interest in these districts, the an- 
 tagonism between the two countries grew bitter. It was in this 
 situation that Germany and France began the cooperation already 
 referred to, which, it is true, lasted only a short time but which 
 greatly assisted the expansion of the French colonial empire. 
 
 Beside Indo-China and Madagascar, the chief scene of this 
 expansion was West Africa. From the seventeenth century 
 France possessed settlements on the Senegal; w^ith the beginning 
 of the eighteenth century the idea had been broached of penetrat- 
 ing into the interior by following the course of the Senegal 
 River and thus founding a great African empire. General 
 Faidherbe, in the middle of the nineteenth century, revived these 
 plans and by force of arms subdued the territory drained by the 
 river; in addition, in the period from 1830 to 1870, the French 
 acquired a series of settlements on the West African coast, on 
 the Rivieres du Sud, on the Ivory Coast, in Dahomey and \n 
 
332 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Gabun, which, however, were without connection and without 
 hinterland, and hence of but small worth. The zealously prose- 
 cuted exploration of the Dark Continent, in which numerous 
 Frenchmen took part, showed that the interior of Africa was 
 of much greater value than had previously been assumed. It 
 was, therefore, quite natural that the Powers possessing colonies 
 on the African coast should seek to expand them toward the 
 interior. From the end of the seventies, the French, following 
 the plans of Faldherbe, sought to extend their rule toward 
 the Niger. 
 
 Gradually, the idea was conceived of conquering the entire 
 basin of the Niger, of uniting it on the one hand with the 
 colonies of the Gulf of Guinea, and on the other with Tunis 
 and Algeria, passing through the Desert of Sahara. Starting 
 from Gabun, the French explorer, de Brazza, had undertaken 
 an expedition Into the interior and planted the French flag on 
 the Congo (1880). French expeditions traversed the Desert 
 of Sahara, the Niger territory and the territory lying north of the 
 Guinea coast, and the diplomats sought to make use of the results 
 of these expeditions, which consisted of treaties with native 
 chieftains covered with the latter's ''crosses," as legal titles In 
 their dealings with other states. For from 1880 competition for 
 African colonies became very keen. The mysterious "Interna- 
 tional Association," behind which King Leopold II of Belgium 
 concealed himself, signed a great number of treaties In the 
 Congo Basin; in 1884 Germany raised her flag at numerous 
 points on the West African coast, and Portugal and Spain re- 
 vived ancient claims. England, however, opposed French ambi- 
 tions on the Niger and the Congo. The British were successful 
 in 1884 in bringing the coast line of the Lower Niger under 
 their rule and in excluding the French from the extremely 
 valuable territory along the mouth of that stream. By cun- 
 ningly recognizing Portugal's historic claims, they sought to 
 bring the Congo Territory practically under their own control. 
 But at this point Germany and France, Bismarck and Jules 
 Ferry, joined in opposing them. Through this united action of 
 the two Powers the British-Portuguese intrigue was defeated, 
 and the work of the Belgian king was rescued. 
 
 By the treaty of February 5, 1885, France acquired the 
 broad territory between the coast and the lower stretches of the 
 Congo, which was later greatly Increased. Further, she suc- 
 ceeded in securing a preemption on the new Congo State. The 
 boundary division between the German and French colonies 
 caused no difficulty. Bismarck had impressed on those who 
 
MODERN GERMANY 333 
 
 crossed the seas to found colonies the duty of treating the French 
 claims with the greatest consideration, or, as he once expressed 
 It, of regarding them as "taboo." If this close understanding 
 between Germany and France, as It existed in 1884-85, had been 
 of longer duration, presumably both Powers in their negotiation 
 with England would have achieved far more favorable results. 
 But after the fall of Jules Ferry, a marked estrangement occurred 
 between Germany and France. Germany found herself thus 
 forced to approach England again and to limit the aims of her 
 colonial policy far more than would have been necessary had 
 the pleasant relations of 1884-85 continued. After 1885 there 
 occurred a marked relaxation In colonial expansion in France 
 also. The negotiations w^ith England regarding the limitation 
 of mutual spheres of interest in West Africa led to the agree- 
 ment of August 5, 1890, which in French colonial-political 
 literature is regarded in much the same manner as the treaty of 
 July I, 1890, in German writings. The causes for the two 
 treaties are probably to be sought in the international grouping 
 of states, which at that time w^as very favorable for England — 
 that is to say. In the unfriendly relation between France and 
 Germany. 
 
 The agreement of August 5, 1890, fulfilled a desire of the 
 French colonial party: it secured for France the territorial 
 connection between her possessions on the Senegal and the Niger 
 and those on the Mediterranean; but on the other hand, it sur- 
 rendered to England the broad stretch of territory between the 
 mouth of the Niger and Lake Tschad, to a line corresponding 
 approximately to the southern boundary of the desert. Reckoned 
 in square kilometers, France obtained a vast stretch of land, but 
 most of It was desert. "The Gallic cock," Lord Salisbury is 
 said to have remarked mockingly, "has obtained a lot of sand 
 in which to scratch." England gained on the map a much 
 smaller territory, but it was fertile and thickly settled. 
 
 Even after 1890 many boundary questions were still un- 
 settled ; it was still uncertain whether the French Dahomey 
 district would maintain its territorial connection with the posses- 
 sions on the Niger, and whether the French Congo district 
 would obtain a connection with the possessions on Lake Tschad. 
 Germany, who from her Cameroon colony would have been able 
 to break the connection between the French Sudan and the 
 Congo colony, again showed herself most friendly: In the treaty 
 of February 4 — March 15, she abstained from the extension, 
 accorded to her by England in 1893, of the Cameroons to the 
 boundary line of what was then the Egyptian Sudan. In the 
 
334 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 treaty of July 23, 1897, Germany regulated the northern bound- 
 ary of her Togo colony in a manner most favorable to France. 
 The settlement of the boundary between their mutual posses- 
 sions at the bend of the Niger led to extremely delicate negotia- 
 tions between France and England. An understanding was 
 reached in the treaty of June 14, 1898, by which the Dahomey 
 colony obtained a union m ith the possessions in the Sudan. The 
 West African colonies of the Germans, English and Portuguese 
 were henceforth merely '^enclosures" in the vast French colonial 
 empire. 
 
 The ambition of the French colonial party, however, which 
 in 1895 ii^ the person of Hanotaux had again won an important 
 influence in political matters, looked even beyond this. It is 
 not possible to determine with absolute certainty the extent of 
 their ambitious plans in detail, whether they aimed merely at the 
 extension of the French colonial empire to the Upper Nile, or 
 whether they wished to extend the French sphere of interest as 
 far as the Red Sea; certain it is that it was desired to open up 
 "from above" the entire Egyptian question anew. The time 
 seemed favorable for this: England had serious difficulties in 
 South Africa, and appeared, moreover, to be at odds with Ger- 
 many. France had assured herself of aid from the Congo Stat& 
 and Abyssinia. In this connection, as a link in the chain of far- 
 reaching undertakings, is to be considered the Marchand Expe- 
 dition, to which a much more innocent interpretation was sought 
 to be given after its failure, and especially after the formation 
 of the Entente Cordiale with England. England was successful 
 in her attempt to defeat the whole French plan. The British 
 government, on March 28, 1895, through Sir Edward Grey, 
 declared most emphatically that it considered the whole territory 
 of the Nile as its sphere of interest and that an advance by 
 France on the Nile territory would be regarded as an "un- 
 friendly act." 
 
 In 1896 England undertook the reconquest of the Egyptian 
 Sudan; and when in July, 1898, Marchand finally reached the 
 valley of the Nile at Fashoda, the greater part of the Sudan 
 was already in the possession of the English. On September 2, 
 1898, the English entered Khartum, and the victor (Kitchener) 
 proceeded to Fashoda and ran up the British flag. France's 
 position thus became untenable. Marchand found himself facing 
 a greatly superior force. More important still, however, was the 
 fact that France lacked all support in Europe. As a result of 
 the policy pursued by France, Germany had again come to an 
 understanding with England, and Russia was not inclined to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 335 
 
 support France in an African dispute. The French govern- 
 ment, therefore, saw that it would be forced to yield, unless 
 it was willing, single-handed, to enter on a hopeless war with 
 England. Marchand was ordered to retire from Fashoda. The 
 plan of extending the French colonial empire to the Nile had 
 suffered final shipwreck. In the treaty of March 21, 1899, 
 which set the seal upon the defeat at Fashoda, France was forced 
 to renounce those territories which had previously belonged to 
 the Egyptian Sudan, especially the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal. 
 In compensation, the territories of Wadai, Borku, Tibesti, Kanem 
 and Baghirmi were added to the French sphere of interest. 
 
 France had thus, it is true, not achieved all the aims of 
 her African policy, but she had been successful in acquiring a 
 vast connected territory, which extended from the Mediterranean 
 to the Congo and to the Gulf of Guinea, from the Atlantic Ocean 
 to the western border of Egypt. 
 
 There was lacking to the great French colonial empire in the 
 North and West of Africa only the final cornerstone to com- 
 plete the colonies lying on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic 
 Ocean — namely, Morocco. Many diplomatic negotiations were 
 undertaken from 1889 to 1902 in regard to the countries grouped 
 under this name, but as yet little is known with certainty re- 
 garding their nature. In 1900 France purchased Italy's agree- 
 ment to a protectorate over Morocco by granting her a free 
 hand in Tripoli ; she conceded two zones of influence to Spain, 
 which announced historic claims to North Morocco and new 
 claims to the coast lying opposite the Canary Islands ; ^ nego- 
 tiations are also said to have been undertaken between Ger- 
 many and France. England's opposition, however, to the com- 
 plete occupation of Morocco by the French had hitherto been 
 most stubborn. It was a traditional guiding principle of Eng- 
 land's policy to allow no foreign colonies in the neighborhood of 
 the Straits of Gibraltar. But this principle, like many other 
 maxims and traditions of the older British policy, was sacrificed 
 to higher considerations — that is to say, to the enmity toward 
 Germany. The British government decided to permit France 
 to seize Morocco. This was the essence of the agreement of 
 April 8, 1904, which in addition regulated a series of other dis- 
 puted points. In this connection, the recognition by France 
 of English supremacy in Egypt, which had already been implied 
 by the agreement of 1899, was not of great importance. Although 
 the agreement contained the customary phrases, as, for example, 
 
 1 In the end, however, the treaty was not ratified by the Spanish Government. 
 
336 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 "that France has no intention of changing the status quo In 
 Morocco," no one could entertain any doubt that France had 
 now a free hand there — with one important limitation: the 
 northern part of the Sultanate, the territory lying on the Straits 
 of Gibraltar, was apportioned to Spain. By the treaty signed 
 on October 3, 1904, the Spanish sphere of interest was more 
 clearly defined, and in addition to the district in the north, an- 
 other in the southwest of Morocco was surrendered to Spain. 
 
 The Franco-English agreement of April 8, 1904, contained 
 provisions regarding Morocco, Egypt and various other parts 
 of the world ; but it was undoubtedly, according to the intent of 
 its creators, an attack on the position of the German Empire as 
 a World Power. The land which lies on the Atlantic Ocean 
 at the entrance to the Mediterranean is one of the most im- 
 portant districts of the world from the international point of 
 view. It is rich in undeveloped natural resources, and if German 
 trade with the Sultanate was not yet very important, neverthe- 
 less the future held out glittering prospects. Morocco was, more- 
 over, one of the few remaining independent Mohammedan king- 
 doms, and it lay in the interest of German policy as a whole to 
 maintain them as far as possible. Prince Bismarck, it is true, 
 had once said: "We should be glad to see France take posses- 
 sion of Morocco; she would then have her hands full, and we 
 should not grudge her the increase of her territory in Africa as 
 a recompense for Alsace-Lorraine." 
 
 This statement, however, was made in the year 1880. France 
 had since then acquired many districts in Africa, and Bismarck 
 had not been able to foresee that she would ruthlessly shut oH 
 this territory from the free competition of other countries, in 
 so far as this was not prevented by definite agreements. The 
 international position of the German Empire had, moreover, 
 completely changed since 1880. But even if this had not 
 been the case, the manner in which the agreement of 1894 
 between France and England, with the approval of Spain, 
 Italy, and Russia, had disposed of a great country was neces- 
 sarily calculated to arouse the protest of Germany.^ The Con- 
 vention of Madrid of 1880, in which Germany as a signatory 
 Power took part, offered the opportunity for interference. The 
 German Emperor declared on March 31, 1905, in Tangiers that 
 he considered the Sultan of Morocco an independent ruler, and 
 
 ^ Le ConMct Franco-Allemand en 1905, Guilbert and Ferrette, p. 84: "There 
 is nothing so vile and so contrary to our traditions as that attitude of bluster 
 and brag in ignoring Germany and treating her as a negligible quantity." 
 
 See also the private utterances made by M. Delcasse as quoted in the same 
 book, p. 83. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 337 
 
 the Imperial Chancellor protested openly against the contem- 
 plated and already begun "Tunification" of Morocco. As France 
 at this time — the time of the Russo-Japanese War — was de- 
 prived of Russian support, she declared herself ready, after some 
 hesitation and following Delcasse's resignation, to discuss the 
 Morocco question in an international congress. This was held 
 in January, 1906, at Algeciras. Thanks to the diplomatic sup- 
 port w^hich the majority of the Powers gave to France, the latter 
 country was able, despite the formal declaration of Morocco's 
 independence, to obtain a controlling position in the Sultanate, 
 which made it possible for her to carry through her program 
 without directly offending against the decrees of the conference. 
 
 In the following years, with various excuses, France con- 
 tinued to occupy by military force other portions of the Sultanate. 
 The extremely peaceful procedure of the German government, 
 which often went too far in the opinion of one portion of the 
 public, suffered these encroachments with great restraint ; indeed, 
 in the agreement of February 9, 1909, Germany expressly recog- 
 nized "the special political interests of France" and asked only 
 for consideration of the economic interests of Germany. The 
 expectations which were entertained on the German side, and 
 which did not concern Morocco alone, were not fulfilled. The 
 French continued to extend their power in the Sultanate, and 
 finally, in May, 191 1, they occupied Fez. The German govern- 
 ment therefore dispatched a warship to the harbor of Agadir, in 
 order to cause France to enter upon new negotiations regarding 
 Morocco. 
 
 The Algeciras Act, which was based upon the sovereignty of 
 the Sultanate, could no longer be upheld. Morocco was in 
 complete disorder, and there was nothing left for Germany 
 but to bring about a reconsideration of the whole Morocco 
 question. It has always been alleged by the French and Eng- 
 lish that Germany desired to obtain a portion of Morocco for 
 herself. This view has been at all times categorically denied by 
 those in authority in Germany. It was the intention of the 
 German imperial government to obtain a compensation, after 
 the precedent set by the other Powers, for the surrender of 
 Morocco to France — such a compensation was sought for and 
 obtained in Central Africa. France was forced by the agreement 
 of November 4, 191 1, which moreover guaranteed the free com- 
 petition of all nations in Morocco, to surrender a portion of her 
 Congo colony to Germany. In return, Germany recognized the 
 French protectorate in Morocco. The final demarcation of 
 the two Spanish spheres of interest, which were considerably re- 
 
338 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 duced, took place in the treaty of November 27, 19 12. So far 
 as is known, no agreement has up to the present been reached 
 regarding the city of Tangiers. 
 
 Thus, in these long drawn out negotiations, France has in 
 the main been successful in enforcing her will. She was com- 
 pelled, it is true, to agree to the surrender of considerable terri- 
 tory, which, moreover, divided her Congo colony at two points, 
 but she obtained what was far more important — namely, su- 
 premacy over the greater part of Morocco. France's African 
 empire was now complete. 
 
 The French world policy of the last generation has been 
 extremely successful. A territory of over ten million square 
 kilometers, with a population of about forty million, is to-day 
 subject to France; by far the greater part of this territory has 
 been acquired since 1880. The Sahara Desert, it is true, occupies 
 a very large portion of the French colonial empire; the number 
 of Europeans in this entire empire amounts to a million at the 
 most, and many of these are not of French nationality. But broad 
 districts in North Africa, on the Niger, on the Guinea Coast, 
 in IMadagascar and in Indo-China are fertile, rich in resources, 
 already valuable to-day, and capable of great development. The 
 commerce of the French colonies has recently advanced with 
 great strides. France's own trade with them in recent years has 
 been estimated at one and one-half to two billion francs. France 
 manifests the desire to exclude the trade of other nations from 
 her colonies, and indeed in such a manner, according to the 
 view of clear-sighted Frenchmen, as to have done serious eco- 
 nomic harm not only to the colonies but also to France herself. 
 Is France, with her stationary number of inhabitants and her 
 industries, backward in many branches, in a position to develop 
 along all lines so great a colonial empire? 
 
 The hopes which Bismarck once entertained from his encour- 
 agement of France's world policy have been in no sense fulfilled. 
 Despite this world-political success, the French have not ceased 
 to keep their eyes fixed on **the blue line of the Vosges Moun- 
 tains." On the contrar3% the revanche idea has become more 
 pronounced, especially of late years. The ^lorocco question 
 revived the animosity toward Germany, and the manner of its 
 settlement, which brought about a surrender of French territory, 
 left a sting in the minds of many Frenchmen ; but there were 
 other important factors which led to the resumption of France's 
 Continental policy. The alliance with Russia and the entente 
 with England set narrow limits to French policy in all parts of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 339 
 
 the world. There was neither in the Near nor in the Far East, 
 nor in Africa, further territory in which France could undertake 
 conquests without trespassing on British or Russian interests. 
 The union of the "Bear" and the "Whale" in common hatred of 
 Germany seemed to offer the most favorable, and perhaps the 
 last opportunity for the recovery of the lost provinces on the 
 eastern border; for it was plain to be seen that this union 
 promised to be of short duration. All the more important 
 was it, therefore, to make the best of the opportunity. 
 
 It is extremely difficult to-day to lay the responsibility on any 
 one individual or group of individuals, but there is no doubt that 
 from 1912 on public opinion in France was systematically incited. 
 Much of this may be ascribed to the agitation for the revival 
 of the three-year period of service; but this measure itself was, 
 w^e may assume with certaint}', a preparation for war. The feel- 
 ing of France, as reflected in her press and literature, became 
 pronouncedly more warlike than it had been since 1887. Glori- 
 fication of war, descriptions of alleged oppression of the Alsace- 
 Lorraine inhabitants, venomous attacks on leading German citi- 
 zens, contemptuous references to German conditions and institu- 
 tions, especially as regards the German army — these comprised 
 the daily reading of the French. The future will have to deter- 
 mine to what extent this policy of inciting feeling against Ger- 
 many practised by the French press was influenced by Russian and 
 English efforts, and by English money, and whether the English 
 and Russian press received their inspiration from French sources. 
 It would be unjust to deny that there were currents opposed to 
 this excess of jingoism. Up to the time immediately preceding 
 the war, men were not lacking who raised a warning voice and 
 urged an understanding with Germany. The essentially un- 
 important occurrences in Luneville and Nancy showed how 
 thoroughly unfriendly the feeling of the nation had become, as 
 the result of the conscienceless campaign of the press. The 
 belief in France's great superiority in aviation intensified the 
 self-confidence of many to an extreme point ; numerous pamphlets 
 were already busy with the "destruction of Germany"; the 
 leading men were entirely in the grip of the new nationalistic 
 tendency, which was celebrated by word and pen as the "new 
 spirit." And when Russia prepared to seize the sword in an 
 affair quite foreign to French interests, France did not hesitate 
 a single moment to begin the w^ar of revenge against Germany. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS 
 
 PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 HEIDELBERG 
 
 BELGIUM is, according to the opinion of her first king, 
 Leopold I, "the most threatened country in the world"; she 
 has, as Banning, the clever henchman of Leopold II, writes, 
 "nowhere political or military boundaries." She turns the sides 
 of her triangle directly toward the Great Powers, who from 
 time immemorial have disputed with each other for predominance 
 within her boundaries. Nor does she contain within herself the 
 firm kernel of ethnological unity. Were her fate to be decided 
 according to the rule by which our enemies seek to dazzle the 
 whole world — namely, freedom and independence of even the 
 small nationalities^ — Belgium, like Switzerland, would imme- 
 diately be broken up into fragments, for, in the oft-quoted words 
 of a Belgian, Pol de Mont, director of the Antwerp Museum, 
 "there is no Belgian nationality." The Flemish-Germanic 
 majority and the Walloon-Romance minority stand in such sharp 
 contrast that one can scarcely speak of cultural unity; even 
 this "artificial" nation seemed recently seriously threatened with 
 disintegration. Thus in the Belgian microcosm the great Euro- 
 pean contrasts have for a long time met in conflict. 
 
 Under such conditions, how was the continuance of an inde- 
 pendent small state in any wise possible? As is known, the 
 state, together with its neutrality and its "antiquarian" name, 
 is mainly the creation of the Great Powers at the Conference of 
 London in 1831 — an "experiment," as it was styled by its first 
 king and again by a Belgian minister at the national celebration 
 of 1880, an experiment to which at first scarcely greater vitality 
 was ascribed than in our own days to Albania, that creature of 
 the Great Powers called into being in a moment of desperation. 
 If, nevertheless, Belgium did not only continue to exist for more 
 than eighty years but developed in an astoundingly successful 
 manner, are we justified in assuming that in this she was protected 
 exclusively by the continuing force of the treaty which called 
 
 1 This rule, of course, may by no means be applied to Ireland, India, French 
 Flanders, Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Finland, Russian Poland, the Ukraine, etc. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 341 
 
 her Into being? To think thus would be to exaggerate the im- 
 portance of such an agreement. Rather did the Belgian state 
 show unexpected powers of life, in the first place, because its 
 roots struck more deeply into the past; and in the second, be- 
 cause the same conditions continued as had called it into exist- 
 ence. In other words, the nature of the Belgian state is to be 
 understood only historically, and in order to grasp many mani- 
 festations of the most recent time one must go far back into the 
 past. 
 
 The Southern Netherlands have from time immemorial been 
 a frontier territory, important in war and for the spread of 
 civilization. When from the third to the fifth century, A.D., 
 the Salic Franks pressed forward at this point against the 
 Romanized Celtic-Germanic Walloons, the manner of their set- 
 tlement determined for all time the destiny of the country. 
 For it was in the great northern marsh districts, and in a por- 
 tion of the neighboring hilly land, that the invaders advanced 
 without serious opposition into the neighborhood of Boulogne. 
 Meanwhile, as the southerly forests and hilly districts offered 
 protection to the aborigines, the latter maintained themselves in 
 the main unmixed. Thus at this period those ethnographic and 
 linguistic divisions became marked which for almost fifteen hun- 
 dred years, with unexampled tenacity, have maintained them- 
 selves without material changes. A line from west to east, 
 running somewhat north of Armentieres to a point south of 
 Maastricht, divides the Flemish-Low-German district in the 
 north from the Walloon-French district in the south.^ With 
 passionate stubbornness, the struggle has been carried on for 
 many hundreds of years about this ethnological and linguistic 
 boundary; the Germanic portion, it is true, has suffered some 
 losses, even in addition to the capital city of Brussels. If we 
 Germans of the Empire have been guilty of any mistake, it is 
 that we have remained too unsympathetic, in justifiable consid- 
 eration for national susceptibility, while in France there has 
 been absolutely no reserve on this account. 
 
 The World War has torn the bandage from our eyes and 
 relaxed this unduly great restraint. The struggle of our Ger- 
 manic brothers, although they may at times manifest distrust 
 
 1 It is generally believed that Belgium is more French than anything else, 
 but statistics show that at the close of the year 19 lo the population was divided 
 according to the languages spoken as follows: 
 
 Flemish (Low German) 3.832,193 or 54.05 per cent 
 
 High German 77,395 or i.i per cent 
 
 Walloon-French 3,180,003 or 44.85 per cent 
 
 In round numbers, of 100 Belgians 55 speak the Germanic, 45 the Romance 
 or Latin tongue. 
 
342 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 toward us, Is from now on our struggle; the Flemish speech, 
 w^hich seems rustic and unpolished to the Celt, sounds, at least 
 to such of us as are accustomed to the Platt-Deutsch of North 
 Germany, homely and familiar, refreshing in its unspoiled pic- 
 turesqueness and expressiveness, and in its vital force that springs 
 from the depths of the popular soul. It deserves protection 
 against being engulfed by other languages. 
 
 The older history of the Belgian Netherlands has little to 
 say of such linguistic struggles; undoubtedly, this peculiar 
 north-and-south division, which left the Romance districts in 
 the East bordering on the German Rhine country and carried 
 the Germans to the extreme West, was an element in prevent- 
 ing the complete absorption of these national remnants by Ger- 
 many and France, respectively, and In giving to them at an 
 early date a certain Individuality; this rendered them valuable 
 cultural intermediaries between the two great nations. This 
 Individuality, however, down to the year 1830 never developed 
 into complete political independence; never, despite notable 
 struggles, were these Southern Netherlanders able, like the Dutch 
 and the Swiss, to maintain themselves permanently against a 
 world in arms — their position did not render this possible. De- 
 pendence was the historical form of their existence. 
 
 When the central kernel In the world empire of Charle- 
 magne, through the discord of his grandsons and the unfortu- 
 nate Treaty of Verdun, had shrunk to the small disorganized 
 Franklsh Middle Kingdom, which was destined in rapid disin- 
 tegration to be swallowed up by Its eastern or western neigh- 
 bor and which became for both of these neighbors a source of 
 endless disputes down to the present World War — at this early 
 date the attempts to maintain an independent buffer state could 
 not possibly prove a permanent success. As soon as Germany 
 overcame her internal disunion, her established strength acted 
 upon the Belgian Netherlands like a strong magnet on loose 
 pieces of iron: from 925 on they became, together with the 
 whole of Lothar's state, a settled German possession. The 
 German Imperial boundary included from that time on the 
 greater part of present-day Belgium, extended in the south with 
 the Bishopric of Cambral even far into French territory, fol- 
 lowed the Scheldt to Ghent, and from that point turned north- 
 ward toward the coast, leaving the purely German Flanders on the 
 west of the Scheldt In French possession. German rule was 
 here quite dependent on the destinies of the German Emperors. 
 As long as the latter remained in full power, German sovereignty 
 was energetically upheld. With the weakening of the Imperial 
 
MODERN GERMANY 34a 
 
 authority, from the beginning of the thirteenth century on, the 
 Imperial administration began to disintegrate and to become a 
 mere over-lordship. When in the sixteenth century the Im- 
 perial power and sovereign authority over the Netherlands v^ere 
 united in the House of Hapsburg, it appeared at the start as 
 if in the Burgundian County (15 12) the reins w^ere once more 
 to be drawn tighter. But the dynastic interests of the Haps- 
 burgs ran counter to those of the Empire, and in the final reg- 
 ulation of Charles V, in 1548, the separation from the Em- 
 pire was continued in favor of sovereign independence. Never- 
 theless, the fact that those parts legally belonged within the 
 Empire remained for the future unchallenged. The archbish- 
 opric of Liege, which was in the Westphalian district and was 
 generally ruled by Bavarian princes, remained as strong a mem- 
 ber of the Empire as the other principalities. Not until the 
 period of the Revolutionary Wars, in the years from 1792 to 
 1794, was the separation of the Belgian Netherlands from Ger- 
 many completed. 
 
 These facts are only too likely to be left out of consideration. 
 Certainly, we do not pine for a return to the Holy Roman Em- 
 pire of the German Nation. Nevertheless, it would be foolish 
 were we to seek to underestimate, in our relations to our Ger- 
 manic relatives on the other side of the present-day boundaries 
 of the Empire, the strong ideal value of a common past and a 
 one-time common governmental allegiance. What, then, would 
 become of the Belgian people without the tie of historical mem- 
 ories? It w^as discovered in the recent Balkan Wars that in the 
 case of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs, modern claims to power 
 were based upon, and inspired by, causes lying far in the past. 
 We, for our part, have refrained at all times from attempting 
 to press such historical rights, but when the Frenchman treats 
 it as a matter of course that he should found the boundary 
 claims of his country on ancient. Gaul, surely, our nearly nine- 
 hundred-year-old possession may also count for something in 
 our favor. 
 
 These memories touch the Belgian but little, it Is true. For 
 him, at least in former times, local autonomy has always pos- 
 sessed more value than independence as a state. Subordination 
 to a higher state power, if not all too oppressive, has been 
 generally held by him as quite bearable, if only local independ- 
 ence, traditional customs and freedom were protected, and his 
 commercial prosperity secured. When these possessions were at- 
 tacked, he protested stubbornly and energetically ; but the heroic 
 period of his history, w^hich was also the epoch of splendor of 
 
344 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 his cultural development, did not begin until the German im- 
 perial power was already on the decline. The independence of 
 his state was a matter of little moment to the Belgian ; he found 
 himself in the midst of the great world conflicts, dependent in 
 the main entirely on himself, and like the hero of his ancient 
 popular epic, Reineke Fox, in dealing with the Bear and Wolf, 
 he was forced frequently to maintain himself with cunning and 
 prudence against superior enemies, against France's desire of 
 conquest, and against England's selfish interference. Since he 
 was always able to profit by the rivalry of these two nations, 
 their hundred-year struggle, together with the complete paraly- 
 sis of the German imperial power, was the basis for the up- 
 growth and bloom of the quasi-independent neo-Burgundian 
 state, which united for the first time the separate territories of 
 the Netherlands. The present-day Belgian proudly looks back 
 to this state, despite the character stamped upon it by foreign 
 dominance, as the precursor of the modern state. As soon as 
 the condition of impotence had been overcome, both in the East 
 and West, Burgundy's neutral position, it is true, was at an end. 
 In the titanic struggles of the Hapsburgs with the Valois kings, 
 in the presence of the immediate French danger, Burgundy suc- 
 cumbed to the superior powers of attraction of the Hapsburg 
 state. For a small state, which was not in a position to pro- 
 tect itself by its own strength against superior enemies, this con- 
 nection was by no means the worst imaginable condition, pro- 
 vided the protecting Great Power was not too far distant nor 
 too different in spirit, and provided it did not make its motto 
 the suppression of justifiable individuality and the exploitation 
 for its own purposes. This was not to be feared from the closely 
 related German Empire, in which there was always more than 
 enough readiness to respect individuality. Unfortunately, the 
 union took place at first with the absolutely foreign and uncom- 
 prehending, stiff-necked and intolerant World Power represented 
 by the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs. The Southern Neth- 
 erlands, after brave attempts at independence, let slip, under 
 the pressure of religious disagreement, the final opportunity of 
 the year 1579, and withdrew from the heroic struggle of their 
 northern Protestant brothers. They, therefore, remained bound 
 to the Spanish Empire, and the coldness and rigidity of this 
 moribund organism soon penetrated their inner being. The 
 sombrest period of their history followed the Peace of West- 
 phaha. Belgium, paralyzed by the closing of the Scheldt and 
 the cutting off of her sea trade, was henceforth, to use the ex- 
 pression of Pirenne, *'a body without a soul, a cause for dis- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 345 
 
 pute in connection with treaties, a barrier, a battlefield." Fi- 
 nally the reversion to the German line of the Hapsburgs (171 3) 
 slowly brought to the exhausted country once more peaceful re- 
 cuperation. 
 
 Meanwhile France had taken up again with great energy the 
 expansion toward the Rhine boundary which she had system- 
 atically begun as early as the thirteenth century. For two 
 hundred and fifty years she kept the Belgian Netherlands in 
 a state of uncertainty. There lies before me a recent book 
 by the Flemish historian, Josson, which I should like to see 
 widely disseminated.^ France's aim is pictured vividly on the 
 title-page: La France places her foot triumphantly on Belgian 
 soil and plants the blue-red-white tricolor in Brussels. This, 
 indeed, has always been France's aim. Time and again, under 
 the self-delusion of a natural right to the Rhine boundary, 
 has France sought to conquer the country. During the two 
 hundred years following the Peace of Westphalia, Josson 
 counts not less than fifty-two French invasions — an average of 
 one every four years! The intermissions were filled out by 
 an ardent propaganda for French civilization, which prepared 
 the ground for the inevitably following military attack. This 
 aggressive tendency survived every change in the form of 
 government. It manifested itself under Louis XIV, violent, 
 lawless and destructive; only the united strength of affrighted 
 Europe, under England's leadership, was able in the end to 
 check it. Under the feeble rule of Louis XV the lust of con- 
 quest was only suppressed, not extinguished ; and in the epoch of 
 the Revolutionary Wars and of the Napoleonic Empire it 
 reached its highest imaginable point. Far more dangerously 
 even than a century before was the balance of power on the 
 Continent threatened, and once more England, for her own 
 advantage, sprang into the breach. 
 
 British interest in the opposite coast line of Flanders had been 
 very keen even toward the end of the Middle Ages, and had 
 led to the Hundred Years' War with France. Flanders was 
 the centre in the great struggle between Philip II and Eliza- 
 beth. Cromwell's policy was governed by opposition to Catho- 
 lic Spain and to the rival sea power of Holland, and this led to 
 the occupation of Dunkirk (1658). Following the uncertain- 
 ties of the British policy under the last Stuarts, William III of 
 Orange finally turned back to the historical straight line in 
 recognizing the attacks of France against the Netherlands as 
 
 "i-Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-i9i3)» 
 by Josson, Breda, 1913- 
 
346 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the chief danger for England as well as for Holland; through 
 his action the European balance was re-established. This was 
 the grouping for one hundred and fifty years: England allied 
 with the eastern enemies of France, generally with a small 
 personal stake in the Continental wars, for even at that time 
 she preferred to fight her battles with foreign troops. Her gain 
 w^as on that account all the greater, since frequently at the 
 eleventh hour she left her allies in the lurch, in order to make 
 sure of her booty without loss of time. 
 
 While France's attacks were again and again repulsed, steps 
 were taken to prevent any other Great Power from gaining a 
 dangerous hold on the Flanders coast, or even from developing 
 peacefully its maritime strength. When, therefore, Austria's 
 claims to the Spanish inheritance in the Netherlands could not 
 very well be disputed, England took measures not alone for a 
 permanent suppression of Belgium's sea trade, but also crippled 
 the Hapsburg supremacy in a military sense through a provision 
 made in the Boundary Treaty granting Holland the right of occu- 
 pation of important fortresses on the Belgian southern frontier and 
 on the sea coast. According to the expression of Ed. Descamps, 
 "Belgium was between the Dutch anvil and the English ham- 
 mer." This was the first attempt to transform this part of the 
 Netherlands, for British purposes, into a species of neutral bul- 
 wark against France's desire for expansion. This attempt 
 failed miserably within a generation, for, in 1745, neither the 
 Dutch garrisons nor English assistance were able to protect the 
 country against the attack of French troops. Subsequently the 
 fortresses, which were occupied only as a matter of form by the 
 Dutch, fell to ruins, until finally Joseph H forced their evacua- 
 tion. All protection was lacking when the French Revolution 
 threw all diplomatic safeguards to the winds. Shortly before, 
 England, as well as Prussia and Holland, had guaranteed to the 
 House of Hapsburg its Belgian possessions "in eternity." Eng- 
 land, however, did not enter the world war on account of this 
 paper treaty, but because the danger threatening the Nether- 
 lands and the opening up of the Scheldt River imperilled her 
 own military and commercial interests. Despite her active par- 
 ticipation with her Continental troops, she was not able to pre- 
 vent the incorporation of Belgium in the French Republic, nor 
 later in the Napoleonic Empire. 
 
 The foreign dominance, continuing for twenty years, which 
 now began for the country, did not fail to leave its imprint on 
 Belgium, although the oppression was deeply resented. The 
 definitive breach with the past of the Middle Ages, the central- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 347 
 
 izing tendencies and democratic ideals, French law, civilization 
 and feeling for the state, exercised a deep and lasting influence, 
 especially on the kindred Walloon portion of the population, 
 which explains their later actions. 
 
 Outwardl), the violent enmity of France and England con- 
 tinued to control the destiny of Belgium. While thirty for- 
 tresses on the southern border were finally dismantled, Napo- 
 leon devoted unremitting attention to safeguarding the sea coast 
 and the Scheldt. We are familiar with the gigantic plans which 
 aimed at making Antwerp the strongest fortress and the great- 
 est naval port of the Continent, the most powerful arsenal of 
 the French fleet — *'a pistol leveled at the heart of England." 
 We are also familiar with the counter-measures of England: 
 The ill-fated Walcheren Expedition in the summer of 1809, 
 and the siege of Antwerp (1814), which was so brilliantly con- 
 ducted by Carnot. At this period, when the Emperor's star 
 was already in decline, all peace negotiations came to naught 
 principally owing to England's demand for the abandonment of 
 Belgium, which Napoleon stubbornly refused; nor was it due 
 to chance that during the Hundred Days the last great decision 
 was fought out on these battlefields. 
 
 It was now necessary to find a new solution for the security 
 of the Belgian territory, without allowing it to fall into the 
 hands of a Great Power inimical to British interests. England 
 believed that she would best meet both conditions of the prob- 
 lem by advocating the country's union with Holland, under the 
 monarchy of William I of Orange. She insisted all the more 
 emphatically upon Holland's gaining Belgium, since she herself 
 appropriated the valuable Dutch colonies of Ceylon and Cape 
 Colony, and despite this fact reckoned upon the compliance of 
 her one-time rival. The new English creation, however, was 
 destined speedily to show itself as incapable of life. Adequately 
 to protect Belgium against France was far beyond the power of 
 the little Dutch army, which was not even able to garrison the 
 fortresses which had been developed on the southern frontier 
 under Wellington's direction with the so-called French "con- 
 tributions," and which were intended to transform the country 
 into an immense bulwark against France. The Powers were 
 forced to hold themselves ready for any emergency, and in the 
 secret treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, of November 15, 181 8, they 
 apportioned, for the event of war, the occupation of Belgian 
 frontier fortresses between England and Prussia. 
 
 The old Boundary Treaty was thus in a sense revived under 
 a new form. But the boundarv was that of a state at odds with 
 
348 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 itself. The religious and economic differences of the north 
 and the south were irreconcilable. Serious mistakes of the intol- 
 erant Dutch Protestant government led to neglect of the favor- 
 able opportunity for throwing the balance permanently in favor 
 of the Germanic element and the native Netherland speech 
 throughout the entire state, and drove the Flemish clericals and 
 the Walloon Liberals into each others' arms. The downfall of 
 the Dutch rule came about through the influence of the July 
 Revolution of 1830. The rebels, it is true, would never have 
 been able to maintain themselves by their own strength. France 
 stood behind them. Napoleonic memories had become stronger 
 from year to year; "revenge for Waterloo," reestablishment of 
 the ''natural boundaries" — such was the violent demand. French 
 agents encouraged the Belgian revolt; French volunteers by 
 the thousands filled the ranks; France threatened invasion with 
 her troops; a French prince, Louis Philippe's second son, the 
 Duke of Nemours, was chosen by the Belgian Congress as king, 
 which meant a younger French branch on the throne, as in the 
 Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions; and this 
 amounted to nothing less than a disguised annexation. Only 
 owing to fear of a threatening European war did the Citizen 
 King refuse his consent. But the French army marched twice 
 into Belgium, nevertheless, rescued the defeated revolutionists 
 from the Dutch troops (1831), and forced the surrender of 
 Antwerp (1832). It is plain that under the mask of European 
 politics the Belgian revolt was a new phase of French expansion 
 toward the Rhine; but in keeping with the bourgeois-capitalistic 
 character of the Orleans monarchy, it was carried out with 
 milder methods, according to the principle announced at that 
 time in the Journal des Debats, that there is another way of 
 destroying states than by war — namely, by protecting them. 
 Under such circumstances France, it is true, had to be content 
 with a partial success; for the opposition of Europe, which was 
 still united, was too pronounced against a new expansionist 
 move by France. 
 
 That Power which had created the kingdom of the United 
 Netherlands as a bulwark against the southwest could, least of 
 all, calmly contemplate its destruction. Wellington had at one 
 time thought of throwing English troops into the reconstructed 
 frontier fortresses, but Lord Palmerston, in unison with the 
 representatives of the three Eastern Great Powers, at the Con- 
 ference of London, in 1831, preferred another solution. On 
 that occasion, for the first time in the whole course of history, 
 the attempt was made to place the Belgian Netherlands on their 
 
MODERN GERMANY 349 
 
 own feet, free of all connection with any other power. With- 
 out the creation of some new method of protection, this would 
 of course have been tantamount to surrendering the country to 
 France. For Belgium was entirely incapable of defending her 
 numerous fortresses. The decision was therefore taken at the 
 Conference of London to raze a part of them at once, so that 
 at least the remainder might be kept up. Even of these Talley- 
 rand remarked: "If peace continues, the Belgian fortresses 
 will fall of themselves, since no one will repair them; in case 
 of war we shall take them." The new protection which was 
 to render them superfluous was the neutralization of the coun- 
 try. The dependence on any single state was to be replaced by 
 dependence on the five European Great Powers, in the form of a 
 guarantee of neutrality. To continue our previous figure, the 
 country was no longer to be subjected to the irresistible attrac- 
 tion of any one magnet, but was to be kept under equal influ- 
 ences from all sides, in a state of apparent freedom and inde- 
 pendence. This was a pis aller for the sake of avoiding, or at 
 least deferring, a settlement by arms with France; for "all pre- 
 requisites were at the time lacking for a final settlement of the 
 thousand-year-old War of Succession between the Gauls and the 
 Germans for the ruins of the ancient Middle Kingdom of Lo- 
 thar, the grandson of Charles the Great." The attempt was 
 watched on all sides with mixed feelings and with but slight 
 confidence; in the Belgian National Congress the neutraliza- 
 tion was attacked as prejudicing the independence of the state, 
 as reducing it to the condition of a hermaphrodite; even Well- 
 ington in the House of Lords declared that it was absurd to 
 regard this guarantee of the Powers as sufficient protection. 
 Tw^enty-five years later (June 8, 1855), Lord Palmerston, the 
 real father of this neutrality, and who benevolently character- 
 ized Belgium as a "daughter," was not inclined "to attribute 
 great importance to that kind of obligation." After long and 
 difllicult negotiations, the Belgian state was thus called into being, 
 and finally recognized by the Dutch King, as the one most con- 
 cerned, following stubborn opposition and renewed explanations. 
 What was the reason that this "experiment," in spite of all 
 doubts, succeeded beyond expectations? It was primarily owing 
 to the fact that the system of balance of power on the Euro- 
 pean continent, which allowed no single state to advance its 
 boundaries into the Belgian territory, w^as so important from a 
 military point of view. England, which was the strongest World 
 Power at the time, would merely have robbed herself of her 
 insular impregnability by occupying the coast of Flanders, and 
 
350 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 she was able to carry out her plan of excluding every Conti- 
 nental Great Power from the country in no more convenient man- 
 ner than by maintaining Belgium's neutrality. The smoothing 
 of the course of the young state was, moreover, greatly helped 
 by the personality of the first king, the cautious, far-sighted 
 Leopold I, of Coburg, despite the limitations placed upon him 
 by the constitution. In a certain sense, one may even declare 
 that it was owing to him that Belgium immediately succeeded 
 in emerging again from the state of isolation which so little 
 corresponded to her position and past. For the extremely active 
 house of Coburg, which was scattered throughout nearly all the 
 European countries, was, in itself, a little World Power. Leo- 
 pold I was from the start England's candidate, owing to his 
 tendencies and connections. Accordingly, he continued to strive 
 to preserve the closest touch with the great Sea Power across 
 the Channel, and chiefly by this means did he save Belgium 
 from entire submersion by French influence, at a period when 
 the middle European states were entirely occupied with their 
 own internal affairs and their mutual relations. Under the 
 pressure of the four Great Powers, he even agreed to renew with 
 them the secret treaty once entered into with the King of the 
 Netherlands against France (December 14, 1841), with the 
 result that measures were taken against a possible threatening 
 of the fortresses, Prussia, for example, obtaining the right of 
 entering and garrisoning them. There have been disputes as 
 to the interpretation, the legal and practical significance of this 
 treaty, for which the constitutionally provided approval of the 
 Chambers was never obtained. This, however, is certain, and is 
 admitted by Descamps, who so ardently represents the Belgian 
 point of view, that in its intent it was a breach of the neutrality 
 that had been so recently solemnly announced.^ The Belgian 
 delegate at that time likewise designated it as ''compromising." 
 
 France, nevertheless, had no need to be dissatisfied with the 
 course of events. She had gained all that was to be gained 
 without fighting. While the Eastern Powers had made no secret 
 of favoring the rights of the Dutch King, France repeatedly 
 assumed the attitude of the seemingly disinterested and noble 
 rescuer of the new independent Power, thereby arousing long- 
 continuing sympathies, which gave birth to a legend directly 
 counter to the truth. The inordinately praised Belgian consti- 
 tution was thoroughly French in spirit; the language of the 
 government, of the administration and of the army, trained by 
 French officers, was that of France. ''Every endeavor of our 
 
 ^ La neutralite de la Belgique, 1902, p. 282 ff. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 351 
 
 government," the influential leader Rogier, a man of French 
 extraction, ventured to w'rite to Lord Palmerston, "must look 
 to the destruction of the Flemish race, in order to prepare the 
 way for Belgium's union w^ith our great fatherland, France." 
 King Leopold himself, through his marriage with Louise, tliz 
 daughter of Louis Philippe, protected himself against any future 
 attacks of the Orleans Court; but by so doing he further 
 strengthened the French influence. Nor did he hesitate on one 
 occasion to make use of the threat against the Eastern Powers 
 that he did not fear war with them, as in such an event he 
 would throw himself unreservedly into the arms of France — a 
 course which was plainly irreconcilable with his duties of neu- 
 trality. 
 
 In France, which was weakened in a military way, a period 
 of quieter and more peaceful propaganda had followed upon 
 the determined attacks made by the Revolution and Bonapart- 
 ism. He who possessed patience might well, with Guizot, call 
 the new order of affairs "a. brilliant solution for France of the 
 Belgian question," or with Talleyrand give expression to the 
 conviction that the future would bring about union, at a 
 cheaper price than seemed possible at the moment. On Novem- 
 ber 16, 1834, however, Le National of Paris said: "The day 
 will come when, in case of a European war, Belgium's neutral- 
 ity will disappear, at the desire of the Belgian people them- 
 selves. Belgium will as a matter of course place herself at 
 France's side." 
 
 The year 1840 threatened to involve France in the whirlpool 
 of war, when, as compensation for her diminished prestige in the 
 Orient, she sought to obtain the Rhine boundary, and her states- 
 man, Thiers, let it be understood that France "would not allow 
 herself to be blockaded by neutral powers." At this time the 
 French government had already informed itself as to the de- 
 fensive strength of Belgium. In case that was not sufficient, it 
 was said, to prevent the passing of an army corps through her 
 territory for the purpose of threatening the French border, 
 France would regretfully see herself forced to send troops into 
 the country for this purpose. The "bourgeois monarch," however, 
 did not in the end venture on this occasion to carry his words 
 to a military conclusion. This lack of a boldly expanding policy 
 was undoubtedly no small factor in his final fall. 
 
 As regards the Second Republic, the aged Prince Metternich 
 was of the opinion that from France, shaken as she was, her 
 neighbor need not fear a political war, but only a war of propa- 
 ganda. The two kinds of warfare were scarcely to be distin- 
 
352 ' MODERN GERMANY 
 
 guished, however, when in the Spring of 1848 hundreds of 
 armed volunteers pressed across the Belgian frontier, in order 
 to stir up the population and to enforce incorporation with 
 France. Only through the cautious measures of the Belgian 
 government, and through the bold act of an engineer who 
 drove the railway train of the revolutionists directly into the 
 midst of Belgian troops, was it possible to stifle the movement 
 by the trifling skirmish known as that of Risquons-Tout. 
 
 Scarcely was the sky cleared of this and similar clouds when 
 the situation was completely changed by the coup d'etat of Na- 
 poleon III — for the moment to Belgium's advantage. It was 
 the universal belief that the country, to use the expression of 
 King Frederick William IV, "would be the next victim of 
 the crowned bird of prey." In fact, Napoleon III, according to 
 the testimony of OUivier, considered Belgium **as an artificial 
 creation erected in the path of France's greatness, which had 
 no right to inviolability." If, at the start, despite many signs 
 of unfriendliness and threats, he held himself in restraint, 
 this was in the main due to consideration for England, whose 
 friendship, so long as he did not feel himself firm upon the 
 throne, could not fail to seem more valuable to him than a pre- 
 mature gain of territory. During the Crimean War the Belgian 
 government, in the same manner as Sardinia, properly refused 
 the invitation of England and France to enter the war on their 
 side against Russia, basing its refusal on Belgium's duty as a 
 neutral. But the more fortune smiled upon Napoleon and the 
 more France again raised herself to the position of arbiter of 
 Europe, the more plainly in speeches, newspapers and pamphlets 
 was the French desire for annexation expressed. Leopold I, it 
 M^as said, was merely *'a sentinel of the Holy Alliance against 
 France," "a kind of English prefect," who prevented Belgium 
 "from returning to the motherland"; neutrality was "a chimera 
 and an impossibility" ; "France would not feel herself freed 
 from the stain of Waterloo until Waterloo itself should have 
 become French." 
 
 To reconcile the annexation of Belgium with the freedom 
 and independence of the various nationalities, which he had 
 found it to his advantage to advocate, was for Napoleon evi- 
 dently not a difficult task, since in a note found among his 
 secret papers he "proved" that there was no such thing as Bel- 
 gian neutrality. In his circular of September 16, 1866, he an- 
 nounced: "An irresistible power . . . forces the nations to 
 unite into great bodies and causes states of the second class to 
 disappear. . . . The Imperial French Government . . . has 
 
MODERN GERMANY 353 
 
 recognized annexation as demanded by an absolute necessity." 
 Since the historical opposition of Great Britain had to be 
 reckoned with, Napoleon hoped to seize his prey in union with 
 Prussia. After the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the English 
 Prince Consort Albert remarked (October 6, 1861) that in the 
 same manner Belgium would soon be the price for German 
 unity. As early as 1862, the secret negotiations with Bismarck 
 began, in which the latter, despite apparent agreement with the 
 Emperor's longing for annexation, nevertheless in the end left 
 him in the lurch. Anyone familiar with the course of events 
 can only smile at the statement that Bismarck treacherously sug- 
 gested the annexation plan to Napoleon, in 1865, in Biarritz. 
 He did not, however, wish to lose the benevolent neutrality of 
 the Emperor before he had made a reality of German union; 
 therefore, on August 20, 1866, he made Benedetti draw up 
 under his own eyes and give to him the proposition for an 
 alliance which was to bind Prussia to assist in France's assault 
 on Belgium and her conquest of Luxemburg. He then pro- 
 ceeded to systematic delay in the matter. 
 
 While the Central Powers of Europe continued to grow 
 stronger year by year, without France's receiving the hoped-for 
 compensation, the old cry of ''revenge for Waterloo" was 
 changed into the new demand, "revenge for Sadowa"; and Na- 
 poleon HI, whom his early luck seemed completely to have 
 deserted, saw himself compelled, almost against his will, in or- 
 der to maintain his throne, to continue the pursuit of the elusive 
 prey, stealthily, by paths which promised to lead him to success 
 without danger of war. Owing to this, Belgium in the suc- 
 ceeding years was repeatedly brought to the verge of destruc- 
 tion. The first route led through Luxemburg. "Once there," 
 said Benedetti, on January 7, 1867, to Ollivier, "we shall be on 
 the road to Brussels; w^e shall arrive there all the sooner." We 
 are familiar with the plan of purchase which was negotiated with 
 the King of Holland, and also with the masterly skill with 
 which Bismarck succeeded in frustrating it, so that the Emperor 
 was forced to be content with a scant apparent victory — the 
 Prussian evacuation of the federal fortress of Luxemburg and 
 the declaration of the little country's neutrality, under the united 
 guarantee of the Powers. This guarantee, however, according 
 to the construction put upon it by the British government in 
 Parliament, at the most gave to the individual guarantor the 
 right of interference in the case of a breach of the neutrality, 
 but did not impose this as a duty; moreover, it automatically 
 ceased when one of the guarantors violated the neutrality. 
 
354 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The second attempt bore an even more friendly appearance. 
 This was the resumption of former plans to unite Belgium with 
 France in a customs union, by way of preparation for a later 
 political union. Informed by Bismarck concerning Napoleon's 
 intentions, the British government despatched a confidential note 
 to Paris, in which it declared a customs union or a military con- 
 vention as irreconcilable with Belgium's neutrality.^ Thereupon 
 the Emperor sought to obtain the end which he tenaciously held 
 in view by a third course, which was to place the world face to 
 face with an accomplished fact. This was the purchase of the 
 railways of the Grand Luxembourg Company by the French 
 Eastern Railway Company, immediately behind which stood the 
 imperial government. This was not conceived as a means 
 merely for enforcing a customs union: the aim, above all, was 
 the military control of these important railways leading to 
 Brussels, Liege and the Dutch boundary. When the Belgian 
 government, determined to defend its independence, through 
 an emergency ordinance made any such disposal of the railways 
 conditional on its approval, thereby voiding the contracts of sale 
 which had already been perfected, for a while the most serious 
 consequences seemed unavoidable. ^'Belgium opens the gate- 
 ways into Germany for us," wrote Napoleon to War Minister 
 Niel, on February 19, 1869, "we can advance from there over 
 the lower Rhine to any point desired." 
 
 Le Moniteur Diplomatique wrote on March 11: "It is a 
 mistake to believe that the neutrality of Belgium would be 
 irreconcilable with the passing of a French army through her 
 territory. The most authoritative publicists admit that neutral 
 states may permit the passing of the army of a foreign state." 
 
 Niel drew up a plan of mobilization for the conquest of Bel- 
 gium. Despite all this, extreme measures were again avoided 
 and a compromise brought about in no slight degree through the 
 skill of the Belgian Minister, Frere-Orban, and as a result of 
 the political situation, which portended an interference on the 
 part of England. 
 
 If one reviews these constant attacks by Napoleon in the 
 sixties, there can be no doubt that the Franco-German war was 
 destined to decide the question of Belgium's existence. For only 
 the fear of an alliance between Prussia and England had hith- 
 erto caused Napoleon to hesitate. If the Continental enemy 
 had been disposed of, England would never have checked the 
 
 1 This recalls the "Conventions anglo-belges" of 1906 and 1912, discovered 
 bj?^ the German authorities in the archives of the city of Brussels. They would 
 have constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality, according to the opinion of 
 the British government of 1868. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 355 
 
 victorious French advance into Belgium. The most clear-sighted 
 observers of the events of those days agreed on this point. "Were 
 Germany defeated," said Bismarck to Moritz Busch — "a catas- 
 trophe I pray to God to prevent — the English could be of no 
 assistance to the Belgians; they themselves would be glad to 
 remain safe in their own country." And in the House of Com- 
 mons, Disraeli referred to the Rhinelands, which had been guar- 
 anteed to the Prussian state in 181 5, as if to indicate that 
 through their conquest by France, Belgium's independence would 
 be irrevocably lost. 
 
 Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Franco-German war, 
 while the strength of the enemies may have seemed approximately 
 equal, England, outside the scene of action, was able to play the 
 pleasant role of casting the decisive vote in favor of preserving 
 Belgium's neutrality. Gladstone's attitude, it is true, betrayed 
 great fear of being drawn into the whirlpool of war. He ap- 
 peared at first to be satisfied with the declaration of both Pow- 
 ers that Belgian neutrality would be respected until violated by 
 the enemy. When finally Bismarck published Benedetti's treaty 
 of^er of 1866, Gladstone took a further step, as the result of 
 aroused public opinion in England, and doubtless also because he 
 feared lest the two enemies, following an indecisive battle, might 
 reach aft understanding at Belgium's expense.^ He denied ex- 
 pressly in the House of Commons, on August 10, England's com- 
 pelling duty to protect Belgian neutrality, irrespective of exist- 
 ing circumstances, and declared this view, referring to Lord 
 Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, to be "a rigid, impracticable 
 construction of the guarantee." In the interest of England, 
 however, he had on the day before considered it necessary to 
 effect a separate agreement with each of the two belligerent 
 governments to continue for twelve months after the end of the 
 war; according to these agreements, in case of violation of Bel- 
 gian neutrality by either France or Germany alone, England's 
 military forces were to proceed on Belgium's soil against the 
 offending Power, together with the troops of the other state. ^ 
 Although the revival of the guarantee of 1839 was contemplated 
 at the expiration of the specified period, nevertheless a diminu- 
 tion of its importance was inevitable, since such separate agree- 
 ments were considered to be necessary in extreme circumstances; 
 
 1 This fear existed among the better classes in England, according to Sir 
 Robert Morier. See his statement of August 9, 1870: "Do they not see that 
 it is Germany that is with its best blood defending the integrity of Belgium, 
 whilst we are making speeches at the Mansion House?" (Memoirs, II, 164-167). 
 
 2 Sir Robert Morier (Memoirs, II, p. 208) remarks that this excludes any 
 activity of the only valuable factor, viz., Britain's naval forces, and he calls 
 it a "monstrously absurd treaty." 
 
356 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 important personages, such as the French historian Sorel and the 
 oft-mentioned Belgian Major and later Chief of Staff, General 
 Ducarne, considered the treaty of 1839 as entirely abrogated in 
 consequence. 
 
 Without her own mobilization and frontier guard, Belgium, 
 it is true, would have been the scene of bloody battles, despite 
 the treaty. In the French council of war, before the battle of 
 Sedan, it was earnestly debated whether the surrounded army 
 should not force a passage into the Departement du Nord 
 through Belgian territory; fear of the seventy thousand Belgian 
 troops on the frontier alone caused the plan to be abandoned. 
 
 ''I can assure you," declared General Chazal, who was Bel- 
 gian Commander-in-Chief in the military commission of 187 1, 
 "that General Wimpffen and the officers of his staff, who came 
 to my camp after the battle of Sedan, made no secret of the 
 fact that this plan would have been carried out if our frontier 
 had not been well guarded and if they had not considered us 
 strong enough to resist every attempt of this kind." ^ 
 
 The few thousands who nevertheless fled over the frontier 
 after the capitulation of Sedan were easily disarmed. 
 
 As regards the preservation of her neutrality, Belgium owed 
 most to the German victories. This was clearly appreciated in 
 the country, especially in Flemish circles, in which a feeling pre- 
 vailed as if an evil dream had been dispelled. At this time the 
 Flemish poet, Emanuel Hiels, sang thus: 
 
 How shall we, German brothers, our gratitude express 
 To you, whose brav'ry saved us when sore was our distress 
 From Prankish bands of robbers, who came with this design: 
 O'er Meuse and Scheldt to lord it, and o'er the German Rhine? — 
 How shall we prove we're grateful? Your death heroic saves 
 Our Flanders, too, from danger, from peril's rushing waves. 
 
 King Leopold II, who in the dangers of 1867 had sought to 
 secure support in the east by the marriage of his brother with a 
 HohenzoUern princess, declared, on September 18, 1870, in a 
 letter to Crown Prince Friedrich, that he expected great things 
 of the new German Empire, which he regarded as representing 
 the revival of order and justice in Europe; and in the Crown 
 Prince's reply, written under Bismarck's influence, attention was 
 called to the guarantee which Belgium gained through a strong 
 Germany; the country had nothing to fear either from Ger- 
 many, he declared, or from France, so long as the former re- 
 mained strong. 
 
 ^La neutralite beige, Woeste, Paris, 1891, p. 58; La defense de la Belgique, 
 Brussels, 1907, p. 200 S. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 357 
 
 The history of more than forty years has proved the truth 
 of these words. The period of unceasing danger to her existence 
 was followed by an epoch of peaceful security for Belgium, in 
 which she was able to develop her strength, in the main in close 
 connection with Germany's economic rise. During this long 
 period there seems to be only one moment mentioned in the enemy 
 war literature when Belgium's existence is claimed to have been 
 threatened by Germany. In the spring of 1875, Bismarck, in 
 the warlike state of mind attributed to him in view of France's 
 increasing military strength, is said to have been determined 
 upon the destruction of Belgium and ready to divide the country 
 between Holland and France. As a matter of fact, conditions 
 were quite the reverse. As I have been able to convince myself 
 by documentary proof, France was the state in which plans for 
 such a division as a compensation for Alsace-Lorraine were en- 
 tertained, not alone in the peace negotiations of 1871: in the 
 following years the French minister repeatedly suggested to 
 Prince Bismarck that such an equivalent might be found in Bel- 
 gium. The Third Repubhc, then, by no means abandoned the 
 historically consistent French tendency toward expansion; weak- 
 ness and isolation imposed merely a temporary restraint upon 
 her. From time to time, however, the old desires gained defi- 
 nite expression. Nor are we dealing here only with the words of 
 irresponsible writers Hke Victor Hugo, Girardin, Lepelletier, 
 Cassagnac, Jouet, who demanded as compensation for Alsace- 
 Lorraine the advance of the northern boundary to the Rhine 
 and the annexation at least of the Walloon provinces of Bel- 
 gium, but also with the utterances of generals and ministers of 
 war, hke Zurlinden (1887) and Etienne (1906), who have un- 
 reservedly proclaimed such ideals.^ 
 
 The more France pushed her preparations for carrying out 
 the revanche idea, the more threatening became the danger 
 to Belgium of being again surrounded by the waves of the titanic 
 struggle and perhaps of being drawn into the maelstrom. So 
 long as weakened France, single-handed, faced a powerful, sati- 
 ated and indisputably peaceful Germany, this danger w^as small; 
 it grew when in the eighties the Republic acquired increasingly 
 strong support from the Russian Empire. Belief in the efficacy 
 of neutral guarantees has never been very great in the minds of 
 serious politicians and officers of Belgium; on the contrary, the 
 vital needs and the relentlessness of military necessities control- 
 
 1 For details see Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en WaUonie 
 (843-1913), by Josson, Breda, 1913, P- 650 ff. 
 
358 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ling a Great Power met with an understanding that to-day seems 
 suddenly to have been lost. 
 
 *'We are convinced," for example, says the military writer, 
 Navez, ''that the states guaranteeing our independence fully in- 
 tend to stand by their obligations. But this intention does not 
 bind them very strongly. Their leaders consider, not without 
 justice, that their primary duty is to their own nation, which has 
 placed its destinies in their hands. The law of self-preservation, 
 the fear of becoming the helpless prey and victim of another 
 Power — this overrides for a state all other considerations: salus 
 populi suprema lex esto." 
 
 And the Belgian general, Dejardin, remarks: "In war situa- 
 tions occur the demands of which are more imperative than the 
 most solemn treaties." ^ Again and again, clear-sighted men 
 have emphasized the fact that for her complete security Belgium 
 could depend only on her own strength. During the German- 
 French crisis of 1887 the Belgian system of defense was sub- 
 jected to new examination and reform. 
 
 It had already at that time deteriorated far enough from its 
 original purpose. For a long time nothing had been left of the 
 bulwark created by the Great Powers against France. The nu- 
 merous fortresses on the southern frontier, which required more 
 than a small mercenary army to hold them, had fallen to ruin 
 at the middle of the century and become useless. Although dur- 
 ing the time of the weak and isolated monarchy of Louis Phi- 
 lippe, reliance could be placed, for lack of better help, on the 
 counter-efforts of other Powers, in the fifties there was need of 
 taking measures in keeping with the new conditions resulting 
 from the rise of Napoleon III. At this time the plan of making 
 Antwerp a strongly fortified military camp, which would offer 
 the army in case of foreign invasion a place of refuge and the 
 chance to maintain itself until the coming of outside help (espe- 
 cially from England), was adopted after long preparations and 
 disputes (1859). Compared to the previous neglect of all pro- 
 tection, this was a definite step forward for Belgium ; and that 
 was the reason why France, where it was customary to regard 
 the little neighboring state as certain prey, viewed the change 
 with highly unfavorable eyes and attributed it to British or 
 Prussian influence. Napoleon III even resented the razing 
 of the fortresses on the French frontier, and had the audacity 
 to protest to the Belgian minister, Rogier, at the dismantling of 
 some of them, on the ground that in the event of an invasion of 
 the imperial troops becoming necessary they might have served as 
 
 1 La defense de la Belgique, by Navez, pp. 285-287. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 359 
 
 points of support.^ The French protests at the strengthening of 
 Antwerp must be viewed in the light of such pretensions. As a 
 matter of fact, the absolute stripping of the extensive southern 
 frontier represented a considerable yielding to France compared 
 w^ith previous times. 
 
 In the sixties the first construction of the Antwerp fortifica- 
 tions was undertaken, and after the Franco-German War fur- 
 ther improvements were carried out in the light of these experi- 
 ences, and again extended after 1906 on a still greater scale, in 
 keeping w^ith the development of technical know^ledge. This 
 system of defense, it is true, was the merest minimum with 
 which to maintain independence: it was not sufficient in case of 
 a new European conflict to prevent the passage of an enemy 
 army from either direction, an eventuality which was becoming 
 constantly more probable on account of the mutual strengthen- 
 ing of the Franco-German border. The plans of Brialmont, 
 proposed in the period after 1882, had that eventuality in view 
 and were therefore directed towards perfecting the Meuse for- 
 tresses. Liege and Namur were intended as main bridgeheads 
 to serve as points of support of the field army and to form, to- 
 gether with Antwerp, the great protective triangle which, it 
 was hoped, would close the country on both sides. At the time 
 of the war alarm of 1887, sanction w^as obtained for the im- 
 mediate carrying out of these plans, advocated with especial 
 warmth in an anonymous memoir later attributed to C. Ban- 
 ning, director of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
 fairs, who stood very close to the King. 
 
 Again we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the 
 outcry raised in the French camp. In the succeeding years a 
 press campaign was carried on systematically against the Belgian 
 throne and government, based on some genuine documents stolen 
 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, Banning's 
 memorial among them, and on spurious and counterfeited pa- 
 pers. This culminated in the. direct accusation against King 
 Leopold II of having violated the obligations of Belgium's neu- 
 trality by entering into a military convention with Germany, 
 which was represented as providing in certain eventualities — 
 namely, a threat from the French side — for the entrance and 
 occupation by German troops, in a manner similar to the 
 secret treaty of 1831. The strengthening of the Meuse fort- 
 resses, it was claimed, had been in the interest of Germany and 
 Belgium, which, according to an article in the Figaro^ was now 
 to be regarded merely as a German province. The accusation 
 
 "^Frerc-Orban, II, by Hymans, pp. 7 and 71. 
 
36o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 was false. It was emphatically denied in Belgium by those per- 
 sons best in a position to know, such as Woeste and Beernaert. In 
 a sitting of the Chamber on February 5, 1890, de Chimay, the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Belgian govern- 
 ment appreciated its obligations of neutrality: "to assert that 
 it has violated these obligations by treaties, that it has bound 
 itself to one or the other of its neighbors — this is to invent a 
 ridiculous fable." 
 
 What is interesting to-day in these happenings is that the 
 existence of a one-sided military convention on Belgium's part, 
 as protection against a threat to her neutrality, was regarded, 
 not alone by French complainants, as an inexcusable breach of 
 her obligations of neutrality, but also by authoritative representa- 
 tives of the Belgian government as well.^ The attitude which 
 in 1887 was taken in England as regards the possibility of a 
 German (or French) passage through the Belgian territory is 
 also remarkable. In The Standard, the official organ of the 
 government at this time, on February 4, 1887, a sharp distinc- 
 tion was made, in the letter of an unnamed diplomat and in the 
 leading article, between "the merely temporary exercise of the 
 right of way and the permanent illegal occupation of territory." 
 Only in the last case, not in the former "trifling breach of law," 
 it was said, did England's honor and interest call for interfer- 
 ence. 
 
 The leading article, which is, of course, more important, says: 
 "If one or the other were to say to England, 'All the military 
 approaches to France and Germany have been closed ; and only 
 neutral approaches lie open to us. This state of things is not 
 only detrimental, but fatal to our military success, and it has 
 arisen since the Treaty guaranteed the sacredness of the only 
 roads of which we can now avail ourselves. We will, as a fact, 
 respect the independence of Belgium, and we will give you the 
 most solemn and binding guarantees, that at the end of the 
 conflict, Belgium shall be as free and as independent as before.' 
 If Germany (and, of course, our hypothesis applies also to 
 France) were to use this language — though we trust there will 
 be no occasion for it — we cannot doubt what would be the 
 wise and proper course for England to pursue, and what would 
 be the answer of the English government. England does not 
 wish to shirk its true responsibilities. But it would be madness 
 for us to incur or assume responsibilities unnecessarily, when 
 
 1 See "La neutralite beige violee par rAUemagne," by Juliette Adam, Noiivelle 
 Revue, 54 (1888). 
 
MODERN GERMANY 361 
 
 to do so would manifestly involve our participation in a tre- 
 mendous war." 
 
 The similarity with the occurrences of 19 14 is striking. The 
 German Empire acted at the latter date precisely according to 
 the English suggestion of 1887; but that which was previously 
 a "trifling," and hence bearable breach of law, now became 
 (since England desired a break and welcomed a cause of war 
 that would lend itself to propaganda) a crime, to suffer which 
 would have besmirched England's honor. 
 
 An unprejudiced appreciation of the Meuse fortresses shows 
 that far from representing a threat to France, they amounted to 
 a further strengthening of the defense system against Germany. 
 This resulted rather from the geographical conditions than from 
 the intention of the Belgian government, which at that time 
 undoubtedly earnestly desired protection on both sides. For 
 Liege, which was not only stronger but also nearer the outer 
 circle, could not but be regarded as a more efficient check on 
 the short German border line than the weaker Namur, which 
 was situated further inland and commanded only the angle be- 
 tween the Sambre and the Meuse. Moltke declared in 1890 that 
 at least a part of the fortifications on the Meuse seemed to be 
 directed against Germany. In view of her thoroughly peaceful 
 intentions, Germany might, nevertheless, have been satisfied 
 with the new system, if this had offered genuine protection 
 against a French advance. But, according to the opinion of all 
 Belgian and foreign experts, it possessed one great weakness: 
 after deducting the garrison forces necessary for the extensive 
 fortifications, the remaining field army was much too feeble to 
 be able to operate successfully. 
 
 ''The fortifications on the Meuse," declared Moltke further, 
 "will be a burden to Belgium as long as she cannot mobilize 
 70,000 additional men, and this she will be able to do only 
 with a sj^stem of recruiting which meets the demands of our 
 epoch." 
 
 Neither the Crown nor the military leaders in Belgium were 
 lacking during the following years in correct appreciation of the 
 situation.^ This was especially true of the War Ministry. Laws 
 
 1 From among the numerous Belgian writers, I quote only Navez, La defense 
 de la Belgique, p. 288: "After the war the victorious state would say to us: 
 'Since you have proven incapable of protecting my frontiers by an adequate 
 defense of your own territory, as you were bound by the treaties to do, I 
 shall henceforth take care of the matter myself, and therefore I shall occupy 
 your country. Your carelessness in the question of national defense entitles 
 me to do so.' " A similar standpoint was taken by M. Lebeau, ex-Minister 
 of State, a man who was instrumental in the foundation of the Belgian state, 
 in a speech delivered before the Brussels Chamber on February 16, 1855. He 
 said: "History teaches us what becomes of neutralities which are supposed to 
 . be sufficiently guaranteed by what is sometimes termed 'a scrap of paper.' 
 
362 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 were constantly proposed which were intended to lead by gentle 
 degrees from the antiquated mercenary system to the universal 
 duty of bearing arms. The clerical legislative majority, by its 
 determined opposition, was guilty of the crime of serious pro- 
 crastination, and the government was also frequently weak 
 enough to leave its own party in the lurch. 
 
 Might not this evil condition easily lead to a secret under- 
 standing with a foreign Power, in violation of neutrality, in 
 order to provide in case of necessity the protection clearly recog- 
 nized as needful but hitherto neglected? Germany did not fail 
 frequently to urge Belgium to strengthen herself defensively. 
 From Bismarck's much-discussed saying in 1887 that Belgium's 
 neutrality would be best protected if she provided herself with 
 a good army, there is a chain of similar opinions down to the 
 statement of Emperor William II, when in 1912 he was able 
 personally to convince himself of the admirable reorganization 
 of the Swiss army: "I wish that I were as well protected on 
 my right flank as I am on my left." These are plain warnings, 
 which give the lie to the long-contemplated plans of conquest 
 that our enemies attribute to us. When at last by the adoption 
 of the military program of 1909, and especially that of 191 3, 
 the desired goal seemed nearly attained, it was too late for the 
 events of 19 14, since the last military law would not have been 
 fully enforced until three years later. 
 
 During the armed peace of the nineties between the Dual 
 Entente and the Dreibund, as long as on both sides there was 
 still hesitation in bringing about changes in the actual con- 
 dition of Europe, and while Russia acted as a restraint on 
 France, Belgium had reason to feel safe to a certain degree; in- 
 deed, so strong was this feeling that a remarkable capitalistic 
 and imperialistic development took place at that very time in 
 the little state. 
 
 The man who for his own advantage guided the country into 
 these new paths was its King, Leopold II. He united in him- 
 self the business sense of the Coburgs and Orleans in an un- 
 canny manner — indeed, in the end, this degenerated almost into 
 
 Undoubtedly, owing to the power of public opinion, such neutralities exert 
 in our present day a much greater force than in former times. However, 
 we should not commit the error of believing that no duties are connected with 
 this neutrality, or can grow out of it. We must be able to safeguard our- 
 selves, at least to a certain degree; and if ever we were to neglect such an 
 important interest and forget so great a duty, we should thereby expose our- 
 selves to the eventuality of the other side declaring to us what the First Consul 
 of the French Republic declared to the Republic of Venice: 'If you had 
 known how to protect yourselves against a cotip de main, if you had known 
 that the enemy could so easily gain entrance to you and that he was on the 
 point of occupying a strategic position detrimental to my army, I would not 
 have entered your territory.' " See also Frere-Orban, II, by Hymans, p. 27 ff. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 363 
 
 monomania. He was through and through a ruler of the great 
 merchant type, with a world-embracing outlook, a cool, calcu- 
 lating imagination and ruthless determination, of absolutely 
 worldly disposition — in the one-sided development of his char- 
 acter a peculiarly striking figure, who in many respects gave to 
 Belgium her modern stamp. It is sufficient at this point merely 
 to recall the manner in which, in the face of British opposition 
 but w^ith Bismarck's benevolent encouragement, he developed the 
 Congo State in the eighties as his exclusive, personal creation; 
 how, since 1890, already involving the state in his undertakings, 
 he carried through that extreme capitalistic system which com- 
 bined the most successful financial exploitation with the darkest 
 social defects; how the desire for Belgium's greatness was 
 strangely mixed in him with the most arrant selfishness, so that 
 finally his own people were forced to take the Congo from him 
 as a Belgian colony, as the result of painful and costly negotia- 
 tions. The final result is of importance: The Belgium of 1908, 
 who ruled over an immense colonial empire eighty times as large 
 as herself, was no longer that little state which had once 
 been created as a European bulwark against France and which 
 later, in the system of the balance of power, with difficulty main- 
 tained its place in the scale. Whatever her writers on constitu- 
 tional law may say in theoretical justification of her colonial 
 acquisitions, the fact remains that the basis of the neutrality 
 treaty of 1839 had been thereby seriously disturbed. 
 
 Permanently guaranteed neutrality demands in return a self- 
 denying regard for the prescribed limitations. This small state, 
 however, without a merchant fleet or vessels of w^ar, had en- 
 tered the field of broad world politics. Able to maintain her- 
 self only by the guarantee of her creators, not by her own 
 strength, she had adopted in Africa the imperialistic policy of a 
 Great Power, in the last analysis at the expense of others. Her 
 neutrality, which was always a delicate and fragile thing, through 
 the connection with the vast African empire, was subjected to a 
 test of strength to which, in the long run, it was scarcely likely 
 to prove equal. The position is not tenable that this colonial 
 empire, together with the entire Basin of the Congo, has been 
 neutralized since the Berlin Act of 1885, that only peaceful cul- 
 tural tasks here came into question, and that for the settlement 
 of differences of opinion there were other than warlike means. 
 For a colonial policy always remains a policy of force, and the 
 policy in the Congo State was of this nature in an especially 
 marked degree, despite the humanitarian mantle which was at 
 first so readily used as a disguise. In view of the primitive 
 
364 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 stage of civilization in the colonies, misunderstandings and 
 clashes were inevitable, as experience had already amply taught 
 under the rule of Leopold II. Even if, as was of course possible, 
 they did not lead to armed conflict, there nevertheless resulted 
 manifold questions of common interest, of dependence and dis- 
 pute which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon the 
 neutral position of the motherland. Did not France's right of 
 preemption, guaranteed by the separate treaties of 1884, 1894 
 and 1908, contain the germ of favoritism which, as the Franco- 
 German negotiations of 191 1 have shown, might become a 
 source of serious inconvenience for Belgium? In addition to 
 Portugal, England for the first time had become the immediate 
 and deeply interested African neighbor of the Belgian territory 
 {Katanga), a neighbor upon whose favor or disfavor the de- 
 velopment of the Congo colony depended to an important de- 
 gree. It is not yet possible to determine to what extent the 
 outburst of indignation in England over the Congo atrocities, 
 which in its essence was no doubt sincere, was made use of by 
 the British government, which took a hand in the affair and 
 long deferred the recognition of the Belgian colony, as a means 
 of political pressure to support counter-demands in Europe. 
 That m Belgium serious fears were entertained along this line 
 is undoubtedly shown by an article in the influential clerical 
 publication, Bien Publique, of November 20, 1907, which char- 
 acterized the British consular agents who were gathering ma- 
 terial in the Congo State for new accusations as heralds of a 
 future annexation, and declared that the independence of Be)' 
 gium herself might be endangered through such occurrences. 
 The Brussels Socialist, C. Huysmans, was not so far wrong 
 when he declared at the Socialist Congress in Nuremberg in 
 1908: ''Belgium has not annexed the Congo State; it is the 
 Congo State which is annexing Belgium. Belgium has become 
 involved in the Anglo-German dispute, and our happy neutrality 
 has thereby been seriously impaired." ^ 
 
 Finally the far-reaching concessions for exploitation of the 
 country and for railroads in the interior of the Congo colony, 
 which Leopold II had granted as late as 1906 to English, French 
 
 ^A similar opinion was uttered immediately before the war by the Belgian 
 deputy, de Brouckere (Neue Zeit, July 31, 1914): "The annexation of the 
 Congo State was decided on and it was believed that we would rule the colony. 
 To-day, it is recognized that the colony is ruling us. We have entered the 
 circle of the World Powers without expanding our little territory, and the 
 great ones will not let go of us again. . . . To-morrow perhaps England, who 
 considers military duty a burden only within her own boundaries, will again 
 call on us to observe our obligations. What will the Government do? Will 
 our big money interests permit the Government to offer a resistance which 
 sooner or later must lead to our renunciation of the Congo?" 
 
MODERN GERMANY 365 
 
 and American syndicates, involved manifestations of favoritism 
 w^hich were apt, in certain circumstances, to involve the govern- 
 ments in question. On the other hand, Belgian capitalism, 
 v^'hich had waxed fat on the temporarily unheard-of Congo earn- 
 ings, had long since expanded beyond the boundaries of the 
 state, and everywhere, in European foreign countries, had built 
 railroads and street railways, exploited mines and called num- 
 berless other commercial undertakings into being, without, in 
 time, taking precautionary measures to insure the financial sta- 
 bility of the great banks. 
 
 A capitalistic expansion of this kind, of course, could not be 
 forbidden to the business men of a neutral state. Nevertheless, 
 the vast scope of these international activities, which King Leo- 
 pold continued to encourage by example and precept, were not 
 without their serious aspects. They created a large number of 
 connections and opportunities for disputes, and in view of the 
 interlocking of modern economic and political affairs, this might 
 easily lead the Belgian state into an attitude of partiality among 
 the groups of Great Powers. In truth, Belgian capital was more 
 and more used in ways advantageous to France and members of 
 the Triple Entente: her investments, for example, in Russia, 
 exceeded by nearly a half-billion francs those in other countries, 
 and the number of joint-stock undertakings preponderatingly 
 financed in Belgium was exceeded only by those capitalized in 
 France.^ This fact could scarcely fail to be of influence on the 
 policy of the state as a whole in critical times, and was apt to 
 lead to an internal jeopardizing of its neutrality, which, as the 
 Belgian statesman, Frere-Orban, once declared "demands a cer- 
 tain balance of influence in the field of material affairs." 
 
 Belgium's neutrality in Europe had for a long time found its 
 strongest support in England. Not, however, that this state 
 regarded the sanctity of treaties with especially great respect! 
 This pretence, which the article in The Times of March 8, 191 5, 
 frankly abandoned, was industriously made use of in Eng- 
 land only during the first months of the war for purposes of 
 propaganda. Previously such pretenses had by no means always 
 been regarded as necessary; on neither side of the Channel was 
 it considered possible to disguise the fact that England's attitude 
 toward Belgium was determined not by noble, unselfish feelings, 
 but by pure self-interest. In a speech recently rescued from 
 oblivion by A. Schulte, the former Minister of Foreign Aflfairs, 
 
 1 See Annuaire de la Vie beige a I'etranger, 1912, p. 213 ff. Belgian capital 
 invested in Russia is given as amounting to 441,000,000 francs, and the Belgian 
 companies in France are said to number 172, as against 112 in Russia and 
 50 in Germany. 
 
366 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 de Favereau, declared in the Senate, on December 8, 1909, in 
 speaking of the guarantor Powers in general: 
 
 ''You see, gentlemen, that if one weighs the value of this 
 guarantee, one becomes convinced that it was not dictated by 
 magnanimous feelings toward Belgium, but by considerations 
 which affect the Powers personally. And one comes to the con- 
 clusion that their intervention in our favor, when the moment 
 comes, will be controlled by the demands of their own interests." 
 
 An article in The Tiines of January 29, 1906, had raised 
 this question with special reference to England. Voices, how- 
 ever, were to be heard which spoke in quite a different key. 
 In his strange book, "The Day of the Anglo-Saxon" (1912), 
 which is dedicated to Field Marshal Lord Roberts, the Ameri- 
 can Anglo-Saxon, Homer Lea, declares (p. 226) English oppo- 
 sition to the violation of neutral territory to be wrong, "for the 
 British Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is 
 only a means of evading responsibility and shifting it upon those 
 nations which delude themselves with the belief that such decla- 
 rations are inviolable; whereas no nation has violated neutral 
 territory and denied their obligations more frequently than the 
 Saxon." Let us read, in addition, how the Englishman, Major 
 Stewart Murray, speaks in his essay, "The Future Peace of the 
 Anglo-Saxons" (p. 40), of Britain's breach of neutrality against 
 Denmark in the year 1807, which George Canning also sought 
 to justify on the ground of necessity: "Nothing has ever been 
 done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the agree- 
 ments of so-called international law; we considered it advisable 
 and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; 
 therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of having done so? 
 No, certainly not ; we are proud of it — for people of this country 
 to talk of the sanctity of international law is nothing but hy- 
 pocrisy or ignorance." 
 
 As far as the Belgian state is concerned, it is immaterial 
 whether England was impelled to protect its neutrality through 
 respect for the treaty or through selfish interests. But an effec- 
 tive protection was to be expected only as long as in Europe's dis- 
 cordant camps Great Britain maintained an impartial, isolated 
 position, enabling her to prevent either side from a violation of 
 Belgian neutrality, for fear of arousing her enmity. As soon as 
 she made an end of her isolation and took sides, this barrier was 
 removed, for if all the guarantor Powers fell to fighting 
 among themselves, whose interference was then to be feared? 
 It may, therefore, be stated that the decision as to Belgium's 
 neutrality was reached ten years before the entrance of the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 367 
 
 German troops, at the time when England, through her treaty 
 with France (1904), established connection with the Dual Alli- 
 ance and soon thereafter managed to overcome her natural aver- 
 sion to Russia. The neutrality of Belgium in effect ceased to 
 exist when it was realized that in a future world war the British 
 power would be thrown to the side of France; when the con- 
 ference of Algeciras (1906) proclaimed the new alignment of 
 states to the whole world, and plans were hinted at regarding a' 
 military cooperation of England and France, and the landing o| 
 a British expeditionary force; when a saying of Lord Kitchener 
 was going the rounds: "The boundary of the British Empire 
 in Europe is not the English Channel, but the line of the 
 Meuse" ; and when Lord Roberts let it be known that in August, 
 191 1, the fleet and the army had stood ready to interfere in 
 Flanders. It began to be realized in Belgium that the war of 
 the future would not halt at the boundary of the country, like 
 that of 1870. "Will the new policy which England appears to 
 have adopted," inquired Favereau, in the above-mentioned speech 
 in the Senate in support of the army bill of 1909, "allow her to 
 play in future the benevolent role the benefits of which we have 
 hitherto enjoyed? Will she not, in the moment of danger, find 
 herself bound by ties which, as regards one of the combatants, 
 will deprive her of that complete independence that is essential 
 to her activity in our behalf?" And he suggested the disquiet- 
 ing possibility of a permanent occupation of Antwerp by Great 
 Britain. The army bill of 191 3 was even officially based on the 
 consideration that England had abandoned her position of isola- 
 tion and joined one of the two groups of Powers; henceforth, 
 it was claimed, she would no longer be in a position, as in the 
 past, to protect Belgian neutrality.^ 
 
 It is thus all the more to be lamented that Belgium still clung 
 to the British power. "They would protect us even against our 
 will," says the Brussels senator, Hanrez, in a speech on Septem- 
 ber 2, 1908. This led, as many signs indicated, but as could 
 not be proved until the Anglo-Belgian Conventions of 1906 
 and 191 2 were found, to a secret abandonment of the obligatory 
 impartiality, to an important military surrender to the Western 
 Powers, and to a premature decision regarding action in a future 
 war. The warning of the Belgian minister, Woeste, was disre- 
 garded: "For us to become the ally of one of our neighbors, to 
 permit ourselves to be involved in an adventure as its follower 
 
 1 In this connection see the remarkable pamphlet of the French socialist, 
 Francis Delaisi, La guerre qui vient, Paris, 19 n, P- 25. (American edition, 
 Tfie Future War, Boston, 191 5, p. 56.) 
 
368 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 — this would be to transform Belgium into a battlefield, and to 
 bring down upon us the fate of the conquered, and perhaps con- 
 demn us to be devoured by the victor." 
 
 The Belgian government is not the only one to bear the 
 blame for thus taking sides in a manner which its position for- 
 bade ; it was fully supported in this step by the influential classes 
 of the country. Although many an individual German may have 
 had cause to appreciate friendly assistance, and although on 
 occasion there may have been an official exchange of courtesies, 
 nevertheless the latest attempts at Belgian justification picturing 
 the relationship as quite undisturbed until the war upset things 
 in an entirely unexpected manner, give an absolutely false impres- 
 sion. Undoubtedly, the commercial and industrial superiority of 
 Germany, especially as manifested since the nineties, and her 
 great abundance of strength were not precisely pleasant for a 
 weaker neighbor; but in the presence of the envy, distrust and 
 hatred thereby created, it was far too often forgotten in Bel- 
 gium to what extent the country was by nature dependent on 
 this hinterlandj which in the commercial treaties of 1892 and 
 1905 had made much appreciated concessions to Belgium. It was 
 likewise forgotten that among the purchasers of Belgian export 
 goods Germany stood first on the list, with the yearly expendi- 
 ture of a billion francs, and that Antwerp had grown to be 
 one of the most important harbors in the world solely through 
 its German connections, without which it would be a city of 
 the dead. Instead of appreciating these and further facts, the 
 Belgians let themselves be more and more deceived by an inimi- 
 cal press campaign, which claimed to see in every German mer- 
 chant the pioneer, or even the spy, of the Prussian military in- 
 vasion. In the end the Belgians threw themselves so unre- 
 servedly into France's arms, ''the true fatherland," ^ that in 1913 
 a Walloon official of calm judgment recognized the danger for 
 Belgium, and in a pamphlet that is well worth reading sought to 
 give his compatriots a clear understanding of German methods 
 and ambitions — without finding great response, it is true. ^ 
 
 On the French side, of course, no stone was left unturned 
 since the beginning of our century to push the "peaceful penetra- 
 tion" which the Third Republic had set itself as its immediate 
 goal. In this field it enjoyed great advantage over the German 
 competitor, through the adoption of the French language by the 
 Walloons, while the separation of High and Low German had 
 
 * See Frankrijk de eewvenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843- 
 1913), Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 677. 
 ^Belgique et I'Allemagne, published under the pseudonym "Integer," I9i3. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 369 
 
 made the German-speaking part of the Netherlands an isolated 
 linguistic island. There was in France full appreciation of the 
 powerful weapon which the language represented; it was the 
 medium of an ancient, refined, fascinating Kultur, which for 
 hundreds of years had held the ruling classes of the Belgian 
 people captivated. "We desire to annex the free intelligence," 
 announced the French consul, Crozier, in Antwerp, in 1909, and 
 on the Flemish side at least it was well understood what this 
 meant. The statement of the former burgomaster of Brussels, 
 Karel Buls, sounds like the commentary to this: ''The Bel- 
 gians who assist in the annexation of their brains are paving the 
 way for the annexation of their native soil." 
 
 Only in this connection can the tremendous expenditure be 
 understood which government and society in France, year in, 
 year out, devoted to propaganda in Belgium. Of primary con- 
 sideration was the press, for which, in addition to a flood of 
 honors and "ribbons," a secret fund of 200,000 francs was pro- 
 vided for in the yearly budget of the Republic. It was, there- 
 fore, not surprising that the hearts and pockets of the Belgian 
 editors opened in sympathy to the "great nation." Another 
 easy method of winning their adherence was to employ them 
 as paid reporters for French newspapers, whereby they were 
 in a measure reconciled to the unpleasant competition of Pari- 
 sian newspapers, which were sold in enormous quantities in 
 the streets of Belgium. The convenience of the paper-shears 
 (which played no part in the case of German newspapers, owing 
 to linguistic reasons) finally set the seal on this Franco-Belgian 
 press alliance. It is an old story, the manner in which Uln- 
 dependance Beige, according to the saying, was for many years 
 only La Dependance Franqaise. During the first Morocco 
 crisis the semi-official Journal de Bruxelles itself had to ad- 
 mit, on August 7, 1906, that a portion of the Belgian press re- 
 peated in a parrotlike manner every accusation made on the 
 French or English side. During the second Morocco crisis of 
 191 1 these occurrences were repeated in an even more flagrant 
 manner. Evidently on this occasion anxiety as to the fate of the 
 Belgian Congo was also a factor. Although it was finally estab- 
 lished in the press that the proposal to use this territory as a 
 compensation had emanated from France, but had been rejected 
 by Germany, distrust of Germany nevertheless continued to un- 
 dermine public confidence. The intention of economic conquest, 
 at least, was ascribed to the Empire, and it sounded like a voice 
 in the wilderness when occasionally the fact was justly appre- 
 
370 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ciated that in the Morocco Treaty, Germany, by safeguarding 
 international commercial interests, had benefited Belgium also.^ 
 
 The expression, the **Moroccanization" of Belgium, which 
 was coined at that time, was not exactly a compliment to the 
 independence of the little state. As a matter of fact, the wave 
 of French influence was not limited to the press alone. The 
 next important field was that of the schools. In contrast to the 
 few German schools in Belgium, there were a large number of 
 institutions directly supported by France, which in their text- 
 books proclaimed the fact that the "Rhine throughout the 
 whole of its course" is the natural boundary of France. In 
 addition, there was theatrical propaganda in its various forms — 
 performances by the Comedie Francaise (at the instigation of 
 the French government), variety theatres, music halls, moving 
 pictures. Furthermore, there were lecture courses in the Uni- 
 versite des Annales, which was founded in Brussels in 1909 on 
 the French model; the united propaganda of the Associations 
 pour la vulgarisation de la langue jranqaise, which was con- 
 nected with the Alliance Francaise; the congresses which 
 brought together all those of Gallic sympathies at Liege ( 1905) , 
 Brussels (1910) and Mons (1911) ; numberless visits from one 
 side to the other, and fraternization feasts, especially at the in- 
 ternational exhibitions of Brussels (1910) and Ghent (1913). 
 French participation in the latter was undisguisedly admitted by 
 the Minister of Commerce, David, in the Parisian Chamber of 
 Deputies, as being a demonstration against the plan of founding 
 a Flemish university; Belgian protests, which were published 
 against such an interference, complained that France was show- 
 ing clearly that she already considered Belgium as conquered 
 territory. 
 
 In view of all this, it is not without its tragi-comic side to 
 notice how these Walloons and the Franskiljons, forgetting 
 their German extraction, outdid each other in their addresses of 
 welcome, their grateful homage to French power, civilization 
 and language, while the Parisian guests, accepting the trib- 
 utes with offhanded politeness, met these Belgian parvenus 
 with an air of cool scorn, expressive of their secret disgust. If 
 the burgomaster of the metropolis. Max, imagined that he was 
 making' an especially happy remark in calling "the Brussels 
 boulevards a continuation of those at Paris," the name "Brus- 
 sels" indicated in French mouths merely a "district" of Paris, 
 the whole of Belgium an "appendage," a "corner" of France. 
 "Ideas, land, inhabitants, everything is miserable in Belgium," 
 
 ^ Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 59. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 371 
 
 was the opinion of Taine; and Beaudelaire held the people to 
 be "the most stupid in the world." When Octave Mirbeau 
 poured the vials of his contemptuous and derisive wit over the 
 Belgians, it was too much even for his victims, despite their 
 long-suffering tolerance of all that proceeded from the south- 
 western quarter of the Continent. 
 
 The propaganda extended also to the military field. In 
 France the Dual Alliance and the Entente had greatly increased 
 the army's confidence in its strength. In Belgium this feeling 
 was given most emphatic expression by the defiant French monu- 
 ments which were erected in Waterloo (1904), Antwerp 
 (1905), Fleurus (1906) and finally even in Jemappes (1911), 
 where now at the top of an obelisk a golden Gallic cock recalls 
 the Austrian defeat of 1792, which led to the annexation of 
 Belgium by the First Republic. ''Another monument in honor 
 of France," said one of the Belgian newspapers at the time; 
 ''if things continue in this fashion, in the end we shall have to 
 present Belgium to them in gratitude for the monuments." The 
 Walloon author, Dumont-Wilden, together with his friend, Leon 
 Souguenet, were present at the unveiling ceremony. They had 
 just returned from a trip through Alsace-Lorraine, the impres- 
 sions of which they described in a book, "The Victory of the 
 Conquered" (1912), in the most anti-German manner, employ- 
 ing the vocabulary that has since become so popular of "Attila," 
 "barbarians," "brutality," etc. 
 
 The sight of German troops in the two provinces had awak- 
 ened in their minds only one thought, "The enemy! Belgium's 
 enemy also!" They were now taking delight in the great 
 demonstration at Jemappes. "Here likewise in Belgium a new 
 feeling had been born ; the eyes of the people were opened to 
 the danger from the East, and it was not an idle act devoid of 
 courage when ten thousand coal miners began to sing the Mar- 
 seillaise." They realized that "danger threatened exclusively 
 from the East, and it occasioned a feeling of relief among the 
 Belgians to know that in the worst event they would not have 
 to fight against the French Republic, the liberator of Belgium 
 and of the Scheldt." 
 
 When in 19 12 funds were to be gathered for increasing the 
 French air fleet, Belgium contributed by entertainments given 
 to this end. 
 
 It looked as if a large portion of the Belgian population, 
 chiefly the politically most influential part, were coming to share 
 more and more the views of the monthly magazine, Les Marches 
 de L'Est, which had been started in Paris in 1908, and accord- 
 
372 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ing to which Belgium was reckoned as part of the Eastern prov- 
 inces of France, together with Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine and 
 French Switzerland. The Belgian newspaper, Reveil JVallon, 
 founded in 1907, already developed a regular program for Bel- 
 gium's union with France, first of all in customs, post, mutual 
 recognition of citizenship, etc., and closed with the words: "We 
 are enemies of Prussia, and all our sympathies are with good 
 and kind France, whose misfortune has only increased our love. 
 We remain thoroughly Walloon when we defend French civi- 
 lization." In view of such feelings, the deafening cries of ''Vive 
 la France r even in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, may be 
 understood, when in the sitting of February 6, 191 3, a clerical 
 member ventured to describe the French election laws as rotten. 
 At this period the Walloon state official who has already been 
 mentioned, wrote: "As things are now progressing with us, we 
 are steering automatically in piping times of peace directly toward 
 French annexation." ^ 
 
 Viewing all this together, one is justified in doubting whether 
 this was an attitude suitable to the inhabitants of a neutralized 
 state. In view of so one-sided an attitude, is it surprising from 
 a social, economic, political and military standpoint if in Ger- 
 many there grew up a deep distrust of the fairness of her "neu- 
 tral" neighbor? 
 
 The Flemish were not partners in these acts, at least not 
 such as were conscious of their racial bonds and who had not, 
 like Maeterlinck and Verhaeren, long before the war, taken up 
 their position in the Gallic camp. All who sympathized with 
 the Flemish movement had, it is true, carefully avoided all con- 
 nection with Germany, but they had nevertheless been forced 
 constantly to repel the attacks of the French propagandists and 
 their Belgian adherents. The movement was on the whole 
 purely Belgian, yet it doubtless deserves the most whole-hearted 
 sympathy, and in its invisible connections with the political par- 
 ties, the most thorough study by Germans; but at this point it 
 claims attention only in its ultimate aims, as affecting the nature 
 of the Belgian state. Whoever regards this as merely a linguis- 
 tic and literary movement is familiar only with its beginnings 
 in the forties and fifties of the last century. The language was 
 merely the most obvious expression of national individuality. 
 To bring the language again into repute after long suppression 
 and obscurity, to win for it a favorable position in the general 
 cultural development — this was the chief object. To attain 
 this end was possible only by overcoming the dominance of the 
 
 ^ Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 134. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 373 
 
 Gallic party and by giving to the Belgian state, according to 
 the relative strength of its races, a predominantly German char- 
 acter, or at least one of racial equality. The continuing democ- 
 ratization of political life, resulting from the extension of the 
 franchise and the proportional system, caused this phase of the 
 movement to be constantly more strongly emphasized, and 
 brought about from the early seventies in the legal, administra- 
 tive and military fields notable legislative successes looking 
 toward equality. In the educational field, however, the strug- 
 gle continued with varying successes and defeats up to recent 
 times; if, as regards the public and secondary schools, some 
 results at least were achieved, although with slight guarantee 
 of permanence, this was doomed to remain miserable patch-work 
 unless the Flemish population were enabled to secure national 
 university education. For in the last analysis everything de- 
 pended on the attitude of the upper classes. As long as ad- 
 vanced education was to be obtained only with a French stamp 
 and was valued only from that point of view, and such educa- 
 tion alone guaranteed vocational advance; as long as the higher 
 official positions were almost exclusively open to Walloons and 
 Franskiljons, all legal successes were deceptive, for there was 
 an absolute lack of Impartial administration of the laws. In 
 the main, although with certain enforced concessions, the ruling 
 class stood upon the principle of government which had once 
 been laid down by Rogier: 
 
 *'An effective administration demands a single recognized lan- 
 guage. For Belgium this can only be French, and to attain the 
 desired end it is necessary that all positions In the civil and mili- 
 tary administration of the country be Intrusted to Walloons or 
 men from Luxemburg; in this manner the Flemish will tempo- 
 rarily be deprived of the advantages appertaining to these posi- 
 tions and thereby be forced to learn French. The Germanic ele- 
 ment In Belgium will thus gradually be eliminated." 
 
 To overturn this principle was the real significance of the de- 
 mand for a Flemish metamorphosis of the University of Ghent; 
 therein lies the decisive importance which this institution gained 
 in the struggle of nationalities during recent years. The nearer 
 success seemed along this line, the more violent became the coun- 
 ter-efforts. On the Walloon side this was taken to indicate the 
 end of their supremacy, and if this result was really unavoidable, 
 at least there was no desire to be tyrannized over by the Flemish 
 in future as the Walloons themselves had tyrannized over the 
 Flemish up to that time. If they could no longer be the ruling 
 party In this somewhat stormy union, in which serious frays 
 
374 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 were not infrequent, then preferably separation from bed and 
 board. The idea of administrative separation along Walloon- 
 Flemish lines, which had been proclaimed for the first time in 
 1897 ^f'd originally opposed as a dangerous vagary, gained 
 strength perceptibly after the cry of Emile Dupont in the Senate 
 sitting of March 9, 1910, ''Long live administrative separation!" 
 When the general elections of 19 12 again brought disappoint- 
 ment to the extreme Radicals and left them w^ithout the means of 
 breaking the power of the clerical majority, who for over a quar- 
 ter of a century had been at the helm, the Liberal Walloons de- 
 clared in favor of the principle of a separation at the Congress of 
 Liege, on July 7, 19 12, thus hoping to obtain supremacy at least 
 in their part of the country. Shortly thereafter in the Hainault 
 provincial council, the proposer of the reform, Andre, declared 
 that Belgium was suffering from Jacobin centralization. She 
 would have to return to local autonomy.^ Reference was made to 
 the relation of the German Federal States to each other; there 
 was discussed a sort of imperial parliament, perhaps after the 
 model of the Austro-Hungarian "delegations," standing over the 
 two districts with Brussels as neutral territory between them. ^ 
 While Hainault and Liege had already been won over to the idea, 
 the clerical provinces of Namur and Luxemburg opposed it for 
 fear of a liberal majority in the future "Wallonia." The Flem- 
 ish members maintained an attitude of expectant disapproval, 
 but at the end they were not entirely irreconcilable. In both 
 camps there were, it is true, warning voices, which characterized 
 separation in administration as "a disastrous rending of the na- 
 tional unity." Nevertheless, the idea seemed to gain support 
 and Belgium to be on the verge of dissolution. For, in the light 
 of the whole situation, there cannot be the slightest doubt that 
 a Wallonia with an administration of her own was merely a prep- 
 aration for French annexation. Did not Jules Desiree, one of 
 the chief protagonists of the idea, describe Wallonia as "a por- 
 tion of reconstructed France," and did not the newspaper, 
 Flandre Liberale, say, in its issue of June 26, 1912: "An enor- 
 mous number of Walloons would at the present moment be de- 
 lighted to be united to France. One needs only to have friends 
 and relatives in Wallonia to be absolutely convinced of this." 
 But in such a case would the little Flemish nation, overrun by 
 French partisans, have been able to maintain its independence? 
 
 ^ Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 133: The author maintains that German decen- 
 tralization, which serves to multiply intellectual and artistic centres within the 
 Empire, corresponds better with our traditions than the centralization of the 
 French capital. See also Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en 
 
 Wallonie (843-1913). Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 835. 
 2 See Pour la separation, Jennissen, 191 1. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 375 
 
 The future seemed to hold the most serious Internal dis- 
 turbances for Belgium, when suddenly the World War changed 
 all this and drove the quarrelling factions temporarily together. 
 But, looking beyond the natural bitterness and grief of the 
 present, the Flemish should realize the importance of this hour 
 of destiny which has rung for them. For those who w^ish to 
 hear, the voices of all who hope for a victory of the Western 
 Powers are clearly revealing a secret joy: "This is the end of 
 the Flemish movement!" In the Petit Journal of Paris, on De- 
 cember 21, 19 1 4, Gerard Harry, the friend of the Walloons, 
 declared that the Flemish had now realized the uselessness of 
 their dialect, that it was without value, like a vitiated coin, and 
 that they w^ould henceforth be advocates of the supremacy of the 
 French language in Belgium. Will they be ready for suicide in 
 this manner, or will they remember one of the co-founders of 
 their national movement, the poet Hendrik Conscience, who 
 called them "the advance guard of the German race"? Will 
 they take to heart the words of one of their noblest, the historian 
 Leon Vanderkindere, who, in comparing France with Germany, 
 exclaimed: "Here a dying civilization, yonder a civilization 
 full of strength and glory! Are we then condemned always to 
 follow France and to turn our back upon the future? The 
 Flemish population is also Germanic. Will not this poor little 
 branch, which has been separated so long from the parent stem, 
 at last begin to flourish anew?" 
 
 However the final decision of the Flemish may turn, the 
 German Empire should not allow itself to be deceived in the 
 slightest degree by a temporarily unfriendly attitude; for it is 
 greatly to its own interest, by carefully considering racial pecu- 
 liarities and religious leanings, to maintain and strengthen a 
 Germanic bulwark against the ever-renewed Gallic attacks. 
 
 What guarantee in the world conflagration of 19 14 could this 
 inwardly disrupted state, with its insufficient army, its one-sided 
 government, and the overwhelming French sentiment of the 
 strategically more important southern part of the country, offer 
 to the German Empire? During recent years talk of the 
 coming war had constantly become more frequent and disturb- 
 ing. The writings of high-placed, mostly French officers, which 
 sought to depict its probable course, were numerous. All those 
 which have come under my observation have assumed, as a mat- 
 ter of course, that Belgium would be drawn into the struggle, 
 fighting always on the side of France, never on that of Germany. 
 As a matter of fact, on both sides of the border strategic prepa- 
 rations for war had for years been under way. It is a one- 
 
376 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 sided, partial view in the current military writings of our ene- 
 mies, and occasionally also in those of neutral foreign countries, 
 to attribute an exclusively offensive character to the German 
 preparations, and to them alone.^ The camp at Elsenborn had 
 been for a long time the object of continual anxiety in Belgium, 
 just as truly as the double-tracking of the few German railway 
 lines leading to the Belgian border. The aim of these lines was 
 undoubtedly mainly strategic, and the German General Staff 
 would have neglected its duty if it had not taken all possibilities 
 into consideration. Why defensive considerations, such as the 
 need of quickly throwing an army to the border against a Franco- 
 English thrust, should have played a decisive role in this connec- 
 tion must be seen by every one except such as desire at any price 
 to find proof of a long-prepared and deliberate German con- 
 quest of Belgium. How untenable such one-sided accusations are 
 cannot be better shown than by the printed words of a Walloon 
 
 in 1913. 
 
 The German invasion, he says, is regarded "as certain, as 
 inevitable, without any one apparently pausing to consider how 
 insulting this matter-of-fact assumption is for Germany and her 
 leaders. As regards the contrary case, namely a French invasion, 
 it is hardly mentioned except as a matter of form. The con- 
 struction of the railway lines is spiritedly discussed, without the 
 question being asked what part, in case of a conflict, would be 
 played by the French railway company whose line runs to the 
 fortress of Namur. However this may be, can one doubt that if 
 the French (and we, of course, in their train) are fully pre- 
 pared to see the Germans break through into Belgium, the Ger- 
 mans on their side are not less convinced that their possible 
 enemies have the same intention? They assert — and not with- 
 out reason — that the French are already familiar with the way. 
 If the Eiffel railway lines, as they declare, possess a strategic 
 character, it is due to the above fact. And if the French pene- 
 trate from one side, will not the Germans enter from the other?" ^ 
 
 In this connection we must hold before our mind's eye the 
 map of the south and west. Corresponding to the encampment 
 of Elsenborn (47 km. from Liege), there were on the French 
 border: Givet (35 km. from Namur); Maubeuge (67 km. 
 from the capital city of Brussels), for which during the last ten 
 years expenditures had been made and which, as was commonly 
 known, contained vast stores of English munitions;^ Lille (65 
 
 1 See America and the World War, Theodore Roosevelt, 191 5. P- 21. 
 
 2 See Belgique et I'Allemagne, p. 28. • , \ 
 
 3 See Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallome (843-1913), 
 Josson, Breda, 19 13, p. 860. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 377 
 
 km. from Ghent), and Dunkirk (60 km. from Bruges). In 
 addition, there were the forts of Valenciennes, Hirson, Mezieres 
 and Longwy.^ The network of railways was naturally, in view 
 of the active traffic on some portions, far more highly developed 
 and provided the amplest facilities for the speedy transport of 
 troops. "Within a few hours after the beginning of hostilities," 
 says the Belgian general, Dejardin, "the enemy would be able 
 to occupy Courtrai, Tournai, Ath, Mons, Manage, Charleroi 
 and Namur." ^ 
 
 The seacoast facing England was absolutely unprotected. 
 The German public was acquainted with the military arrange- 
 ments between France and England, and with the intention In 
 case of war immediately to land a strong British expeditionary 
 force. Further evidence of this was given by the indignation of 
 the French and British press at the proposition which was made 
 in the summer of 19 10 in the Lower Dutch Chamber for the for- 
 tification of Flushing. It appears that English attempts were 
 made to bring Holland also into the military system aimed at 
 Germany. But this state knew better than Belgium how to pre- 
 serve its neutrality, and sought to provide in Flushing a new 
 and firm support, which, by controlling the southern branch of 
 the Scheldt, might prevent the sending of English troops to Ant- 
 werp through Dutch waters. By adopting the proposal, despite 
 the interference of the French government, after some delays 
 and changes, in June, 1913 (just in time), and by immediately 
 putting it into operation, Holland acted not alone for her own 
 interest, but within her rights. Nevertheless, the Entente press 
 and its Belgium imitators accused Holland of favoring Ger- 
 many, and tried to show by constitutional law that Holland had 
 at least no right to refuse passage to forces which were intended 
 for the preservation of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 During this entire dispute the entrance of the troops of the 
 Entente Powers into Belgian territory was treated by French 
 and English military writers as a matter of course. An article 
 of a military attache in the Echo de Paris, copied without com- 
 ment on January 3, 19 12, in the Independance Beige, esti- 
 mated the British troops which could be landed in Antwerp, 
 Bruges and Ostende within from eight to ten days to reinforce 
 the Franco-Belgian forces guarding the district around Namur, 
 at 100,000 men; it demanded a definite military understanding 
 between France and Belgium. Arnold White, the writer for 
 the British Admiralty, spoke of the cavalry forces which General 
 
 1 See Frankrijk de eeuwenonde vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), 
 Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 859; La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 242 ff. 
 
 2 Cf. La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 245. 
 
378 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 French was to lead against the Rhine. ^ On October g, 1912, 
 the semi-official newspaper, La Metropohj was able to announce: 
 ''The government is aware that even those states among the 
 guarantors of our neutrality upon whom we have hitherto 
 thought we could most firmly count, consider our protection as 
 only relatively sufficient; nor do they conceal this fact, but on 
 the contrary they have let it be known that in case of an inter- 
 national conflict in which Belgium was the battlefield, foreign 
 bodies of troops would enter the country for the purpose of 
 strengthening our insufficient defense." 
 
 How could the German General Staff have failed to consider 
 most earnestly the probability of an enemy attack through Bel- 
 gium? Oceans of ink have been wasted in foreign countries in 
 the effort to twist the unauthoritative strategic schemes of Ger- 
 man military writers, in which Belgium figured as a factor, into 
 proof of German longing for conquests. Does not justice at 
 least demand that the far more numerous plans of a like nature 
 on the other side be not entirely disregarded? Reference has 
 already been made to them, and at this point only a few espe- 
 cially characteristic utterances need still be cited. ''The best 
 means for the military conquest of a country," writes the French 
 major, Boucher, "is to flood it beforehand in times of peace 
 with one's adherents." ^ That which is here attributed to Ger- 
 many had been amply provided for, as we know, by France, espe- 
 cially in the Walloon provinces. 
 
 The corroboration is scarcely needed which is found in Jen- 
 nissen: "Reputable Walloons have, in addition to the duty of 
 protecting the country against German imperialism, the further 
 duty of guarding France against a rear attack, the renown and 
 happiness of that country being an object of their desire, as the 
 health of the whole tree is desirable to the individual branch." ^ 
 
 "We might," says Major Chenet, "content ourselves with 
 dragging out the conflict in Lorraine, while the main attack was 
 made through Belgium with the united French, English and 
 Belgian forces. This plan seems the wisest if we are really de- 
 termined to take the offensive. We gain touch in this manner 
 with our allies, and a successful battle brings us within a few 
 days across the Rhine, with the result that the German forces 
 would be driven to a hasty retreat from Lorraine." * 
 
 Even La France Militairej the organ of the French Gen- 
 
 ^ Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), 
 Josson, pp. 818-819. 
 
 ^ La Belgique a jamais independante, Boucher, 1913, p. 10. 
 
 ^ Pour la separation, Jennissen, 191 1, p. 16. 
 
 * Neutralite beige et invasion allemande. Lecomte and Levi, Paris and Brus- 
 sels, 1914. P- 583- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 379 
 
 eral Staff, said on January 14-15, 1906, without any thought of 
 a German violation of Belgian neutrality: "It may well be 
 that for reasons of strategic interest, which are undeniable, a 
 portion of the German army will seek to reach the French north- 
 ern boundary by passing through Luxemburg, just as it may also 
 be that a French army, for equally strong strategic reasons, may 
 seek to operate on Belgian soil." ^ 
 
 We need only mention the fact that such a thrust would have 
 been a risk of the most serious sort for Germany, at a moment 
 when she needed all of her forces without exception for repelling 
 the Franco-Russian attack and when she saw herself threatened, 
 by the greatest naval Power in the world. One additional fact 
 must be mentioned : the Krupp works lie scarely one hundred 
 kilometers from the Belgian border, in the poorly guarded in- 
 dustrial territory of the Ruhr district. One need only imagine 
 a similar position for Creusot near the Franco-Belgian border — 
 at Noyon, for example — in order to estimate the danger for 
 Germany. 
 
 Protection in this direction was absolutely necessary. When 
 on August 2, 19 1 4, Germany demanded the right of passage 
 through Belgian territory, with the promise of full indemnifi- 
 cation, she asked only for that which had been regarded by Eng- 
 land as admissible in 1887 and which was not plainly forbidden 
 by Belgian neutrality. In the case of Belgium's benevolent neu- 
 trality, the German government was ready to pledge itself in 
 addition "to guarantee after the war the territorial interests 
 and the independence of the kingdom," and "to withdraw from 
 the country immediately following the signing of peace." This 
 offer was even repeated on August 10, after the storming of 
 Liege. 
 
 The Belgian government, however, bound as it was by inclina- 
 tion, agreements and completely one-sided military subservience, 
 refused the offer on both occasions. Incited to resistance by 
 England, for her own advantage, and trusting to the supposedly 
 superior strength of the Triple Entente, it preferred war — in- 
 deed, it allowed the struggle in part to degenerate into an irregu- 
 lar guerrilla conflict, and thereby brought the miseries of such 
 a war upon the land. 
 
 There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate, 
 for which the Belgians have to thank the perverted policy of 
 their ruling classes. As if deceived by an ambiguous, misleading 
 
 1 See La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 203. It surely is no mere coin- 
 cidence that at the very same time (the middle of January, 1906) Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Barnardiston had his first interview with the Belgian General Ducarne. 
 
^8o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and yet in the end true oracle, they thought (wrongly) to see 
 the danger exclusively in the East ; but only the one-sided hostile 
 measures which they took to meet it and which involved them in 
 guilt, transformed into reality that which they had mistakenly 
 feared. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM 
 
 PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 VIENNA 
 
 SINCE the time of Catharine II, Russia's foreign policy has 
 been based primarily on the fomenting of a spirit of an- 
 tagonism between Prussia and Austria. Martens, the Russian 
 writer on constitutional law, remarked that Catharine II, with 
 wonderful foresight and political tact, had made use of the 
 irreconcilable difference between Prussia and Austria to enforce 
 her will against both. Although Frederick II and Joseph II 
 recognized the danger of the enormous increase of Russia's power 
 owing to the mutual antagonism of the two countries, they were 
 both prevented, partly by circumstances and partly by their ad- 
 visers, from directing their own policy in such a manner as to 
 counteract it. For a whole century Russian diplomacy was able 
 to make use first of one and then of the other of these two mu- 
 tually opposed states to further Russian interests, whether in 
 Polish, Oriental, or other questions, to advance Russia's boun- 
 daries constantly further westward, and to secure for her a 
 decisive position as arbiter even in Germany's internal affairs. 
 Both Austria and Prussia, through distrust of each other, and 
 often for the sake of momentary success, have deliberately ren- 
 dered aid to the Russian power. Russia, however, was all the 
 time most careful to see that neither of the rivals should be- 
 come too strong, and then, in the consciousness of victory, render 
 impossible the policy that Russia had previously pursued with 
 such success. 
 
 It was an axiom of Russian diplomacy to permit German 
 unity neither under Austrian nor Prussian leadership. Nicho- 
 las I, who regarded himself as the bulwark of European 'legiti- 
 macy" and who was never weary of urging Austria and Prussia 
 to suppress with armed force every movement in Western Eur- 
 ope directed against such legitimacy, immediately abandoned this 
 principle when he became frightened by the possibility of German 
 unity and strength. When the Parliament at Frankfort, at the 
 beginning of its activities, seemed to promise the union of Ger- 
 many, the Czar immediately overcame his hatred of the Febru- 
 
 381 
 
382 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ary Revolution and of the new French government. On August 
 30, 1848, the Imperial Russian Chancellor, Nesselrode, wrote to 
 Count Kiselev, who had formerly been Russian Minister at the 
 French court, but was then in Paris merely as unofficial repre- 
 sentative of Russia, that an absolute solidarity of interest ex- 
 isted between Russia and France, in regard to Germany, for the 
 union of which the Parliament of Frankfort was laboring. 
 
 "It is unquestionably true," wrote Count Nesselrode, "that 
 matters for serious consideration will arise, for Russia and 
 France, if these dreams take on any degree of reality, through 
 the creation of a strong united Power at the center of Europe 
 — of a Power which is not provided for by existing treaties, 
 which represents a nation of forty-five million people, which 
 is obedient to only one central authority and which disturbs 
 every balance, at least in the form in which it has previously 
 existed." ^ 
 
 The government of Nicholas I showed by this that, in order 
 to keep Germany weak and hence internally disunited, it was will- 
 ing even to act hand in hand with a government owing its exist- 
 ence to a revolution. That the Czar also was more than ready 
 to renounce his attitude of opposition to the revolution, if to the 
 interest of Russia, may be shown by still another fact, which 
 has become of special, almost pragmatic interest to the policy of 
 Russia as regards Austria down to the present day. Under his 
 government and with his approval, there began again that under- 
 mining work of Russia which aimed to incite the Austrian Slavs 
 against their own empire and to corrupt them to this end by 
 rich stipends. The first one to furnish this weapon to Russian 
 diplomacy w^as Michael Pogodin, professor at the University of 
 Moscow. He w\as the chief supporter of the official nationalism 
 approved by the Czar, with its trinity of doctrines: autocracy, 
 orthodoxy and Russian nationality. At the beginning of 1840, 
 on his return from a trip to Austria, he rendered a report of 
 his journey to the Minister of Instruction, Count Uvarov. The 
 tenor of his deduction is that Austria resembles an aged tree 
 rotten at the core, which is doomed to destruction by the Slavs 
 who are constantly growing more conscious of their own strength. 
 Austria, he said, feared Russia more than any other Power, be- 
 cause all her own Slavs down to the Adriatic Sea sympathized 
 with Russia and looked to her for their freedom. Just as Fate 
 seemed to offer to Poland under Sigismund III and to Sweden 
 from the time of Gustavus Adolphus down to Charles XII the 
 possibility of creating a world monarchy, so now the time had 
 
 '^ Recueil des Traites et Conventions, Martens, 15, p. 237. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 383 
 
 come for Nicholas I, since two empires, Turkey and Austria, 
 were at the same moment given into his hand. Pogodin did 
 not content himself with foretelling the impending disintegra- 
 tion of Austria; he also indicated the means by which this 
 process might be hastened, through modest expenditures of money 
 and support of the various scholars and declared supporters of 
 Russia, as well as by flooding the Slavic provinces of Austria 
 with Russian literature and orthodox propaganda. And Czar 
 Nicholas I, the unyielding autocrat, the incarnation of legiti- 
 macy, was so much pleased with this report of Pogodin that he 
 caused his approval to be expressed to the writer and made him 
 a present of two thousand rubles. 
 
 Pogodin's impressions of his travels found the proper soil for 
 their dissemination and philosophic justification in the circles of 
 Slavophiles which were at that time springing up in Moscow. 
 The year 1848 aroused the wildest expectations. "Before the 
 dawn of another day," wrote Ivan Kireevskij, on May 2, 1848, 
 ''Austria will fall to pieces. Slavic states are beginning to crys- 
 tallize out of her." ^ The greatest satisfaction was aroused in 
 Russia by the Slavic Congress at Prague, and especially by the 
 mass publicly celebrated in Prague according to the orthodox 
 ritual by the ex-priest, Stamatovich, from Neusatz; in his sermon 
 he glorified Peter the Great, Stephen Dusan of Serbia, and the 
 Hussite leader, Zizka. Even before this historical occurrence, 
 Fedor Tjutczev, the celebrated poet of Slavophile circles, whose 
 influence on Alexander II was especially great, had called atten- 
 tion in his memorial, ''Russia and the Revolution," to the Hus- 
 site traditions of the Czechs and to their importance for the fu- 
 ture union of the Austrian Slavs with Russia. The revival of 
 the Hussite religion and its union with orthodoxy would natur- 
 ally greatly have simplified the problem of the incorporation of 
 the Austrian Slavs with Russia. In his memorial Tjutczev 
 calls Russia and the Revolution the two sole real powers of 
 Europe, although standing in sharpest opposition to each 
 other. It is indicative of his lack of scruple that he nevertheless 
 finds it reconcilable with his strictly conservative and anti-revo- 
 lutionary principles with regard to the future of Bohemia, to 
 declare in the j-ear 1841, in referring to a statement of Hanka, 
 the Czech scholar and Russian pensioner of unsavory memory: 
 ''Bohemia wnll not be free, independent and absolute master in 
 her ow^n house until the day when Russia again enters into 
 possession of Galicia." ^ 
 
 1 Life and Works of Pogodin, Barsukov, 9, p. 262. 
 
 2 Russian Archive, 1873, p. 925 ff. 
 
384 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 In view of this attitude of influential Russian circles toward 
 Austria, it is no wonder that Nicholas I regarded himself as 
 Austria's special protector and assumed this role likewise toward 
 Prussia. This "protectorate" was oppressive for Austria, espe- 
 cially after the death of Emperor Francis. At his accession to 
 the throne, Emperor Francis Joseph found himself facing a 
 difficult situation in this respect. The Russian assistance in 
 Hungary, which the Czar had in a certain sense given to himself 
 in order to prevent the spread of a successful revolution in Po- 
 land, had served so to strengthen his pretensions to a protectorate 
 over Austria that a break could not be avoided. Nicholas now 
 considered that the moment had come to realize Russia's desires 
 in the Orient, regardless of Austria. He was so sure of himself 
 that he did not even consider it necessary to inform the Austrian 
 Court, and to inquire whether, without serious injury to its 
 vital interests, it could render the assistance which the Czar held 
 to be a matter of course. Austria herself was expected to assist 
 in the establishment of Russian supremacy in the Danube princi- 
 palities, in the Balkans and on the Bosphorus. The breach, 
 therefore, was inevitable. The Crimean War showed for the 
 first time what power Austria and Prussia possess as against the 
 rest of Europe, and what influence the two may exercise on the 
 configuration of Europe if they act together. But the time had 
 not yet come to give to this union a permanent and settled char- 
 acter. The old differences seemed likely to be settled by an 
 appeal to arms, and this appeal was made. Russia's hatred of 
 Austria rendered this manner of settlement possible; Bismarck's 
 genius, however, looking far ahead, by the manner in which he 
 settled the conflict, laid the foundation for the later alliance 
 and for the present loyal brotherhood in arms between Prussia- 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 The Crimean War was, therefore, the cause of Russia's aban- 
 doning her system of balance between Prussia and Austria and 
 of her violent hostility towards Austria. The result of the war 
 did not permit Russia, it is true, to take immediate vengeance 
 on Austria; but she made no secret of her enmity. Only the 
 pressing need for the solution of a number of great problems, 
 such as the emancipation of the serfs, diverted her attention from 
 Austria. In addition, there was the Polish rebellion of 1863, 
 which served in a measure to cool the sympathies of the other 
 Slavs for Russia. Characteristic, however, of the real aims of 
 the Russian policy is the well-known memorial of 1864, La Po- 
 litique du Present, which was written probably for Alexander II, 
 at the command of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 385 
 
 Peace must be preserved, it was argued, because Russia was 
 in need of it in order, through the development of her com- 
 merce, her system of communication and her military strength, 
 to become better prepared for the solution of her future prob- 
 lems. The Slavic peoples of Austria were urged to remain 
 quiet until they had acquired the power to disrupt the Aus- 
 trian state, and the same admonition was given to the Slavs 
 of Turkey. The danger of the Austrian Slavs becoming Ger- 
 manized was represented as passed. In 1858 the so-called Slavic 
 Charity Committee had been founded in Moscow under Im- 
 perial auspices, and its activities soon spread to the Austrian ter- 
 ritories. This organization had been made directly dependent 
 on the so-called Asiatic Department of the Ministry for Foreign 
 Affairs, which had entrusted it with the unofficial Pan-Slavic agi- 
 tation in Austria. A number of distinguished personages, such as 
 the ex-]VIinister of Instruction, Count Uvarov, the Curator of the 
 Moscow Educational District, A. N. Bachmetev, Secretary of 
 State, Count Bludov, indeed even the Empress Maria Alexan- 
 drovna, who in this was acting under the influence of Countess 
 Antonina Dmitrievna, Bludov and the poet Tjutczev and his 
 daughter, were either active in the management or else supported 
 the committee annually by large contributions. The Russian 
 government acted from this motive when, contrary to its usual 
 custom, it permitted on the occasion of the Pan-Russian ethno- 
 graphic exhibition in Moscow not only a Pan-Slavic section to 
 be attached to it but also the holding of a political congress, 
 although this plan had given occasion for violent press attacks. 
 The large number of Czechs who appeared were no doubt an 
 especially pleasing sight for the Russian ruling classes. Precisely 
 from this quarter, however, an unpleasant incident was to arise. 
 The leader of the Czech deputation, Rieger, had given his prom- 
 ise to the Parisian Polish Committee to speak at the congress for 
 the Polish cause. When he did this at the banquet at Sokol- 
 niki, in a manner calculated not to offend the Russians, and then 
 proceeded to say that efforts must be made to grant rights to the 
 Poles and thereby to close the circle of all the Slavs, his speech 
 was received not only with murmurs of disapproval and whis- 
 tling, but Prince Czerkasskij gave him a sharp reprimand by 
 referring meaningly to the manner in which the Poles were 
 acting toward the Galician Ruthenians. With ruthless frank- 
 ness, unusual for an official personage such as he was, Prince 
 Czerkasskij called attention to the oppression of the Ruthe- 
 nians in Galicia by the Poles, and urged these to grant to the 
 Ruthenians that which the Russian government in the King- 
 
386 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 dom of Poland had granted to the Poles. He did not even hesi- 
 tate to remind his hearers that East Galicia was not Russian 
 territory-, and to imply indirectly how painful it was that it was 
 not then united with Russia, as it had been from 1809 to 18 14. 
 The Slav Congress ended with this dissonance. 
 
 Shortly after the Moscow Slav Congress, there appeared — in 
 the winter of 1869-70 — in the magazine Zarja that sensational 
 series of articles by Nikolai Jakovlevich Danilevskij, which in 
 1 87 1 was published under the title, ''Russia and Europe," and 
 which since then has run through a number of editions and be- 
 come the gospel of wide circles of Russian intellectuals. Its in- 
 fluence has remained remarkably strong down to the most recent 
 times and in the most influential circles. Danilevskij was the 
 first to state and develop in a systematic manner the policy of 
 the destruction of Austria and Turkey. The Oriental question 
 is, according to him, a question of all Slavdom, and it therefore 
 concerns Austria and Turkey in like degree. It can be solved 
 satisfactorily only through the splitting up of both empires. 
 Austria, to whom at one time had fallen the duty of protect- 
 ing Europe against the Turks, had fulfilled her mission, he 
 says, as early as 1740, and since that time had lost all justi- 
 fication for her existence. The existence of Turkey had 
 ceased to be justified the moment that Russia became strong 
 enough to take the Balkan States under her wing. Turkey's 
 mission was to keep these Slavs from being Europeanized. In 
 place of these empires, according to Danilevskij, there must be a 
 Slavic Federation, with Russia in control, and with a Russian 
 Constantinople at the centre; in addition, there must be joined 
 to Russia the whole of Galicia and a portion of North Hungary, 
 styled in Russian terminology "Hungarian Russia." Included 
 in this federation w^as to be reckoned, moreover, a Bohemian- 
 Moravian-Slovak kingdom, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia and 
 Northwest Hungary; a Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom, 
 consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old 
 Serbia, North Albania, the so-called Vojevodina and the Banat 
 of South Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Carniola, Tri- 
 este, Goricia, Gradiska and Istria, two-thirds of Carinthia and 
 a fifth of Styria as far as the Drau; a kingdom of Hungary, 
 formed from the remaining portions of Hungary and that part 
 of Transylvania inhabited by Magyars; a kingdom of Rumania, 
 consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, parts of Bukovina, half of 
 Transylvania, etc. The numerous plans for dividing Austria- 
 Hungary, as discussed in Russia in newspapers, magazines and 
 public meetings immediately following the outbreak of the war. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 387 
 
 were mainly along the lines laid down by Danilevskij. One 
 point must be emphasized : Danilevskij was more honest than 
 the present generation.^ He frankly admitted that Europe 
 and Russia have nothing in common, and that they must stand 
 opposed to each other throughout all the future. 
 
 At the same time, but independently of Danilevskij, the dis- 
 tinguished Russian military writer, General Rostislav Fadeev, 
 published a brochure animated by the same hatred of Austria- 
 Hungary; in this he argued that the Oriental question was to 
 be solved in the Russian manner, but only after the destruction 
 of Austria-Hungary. For Fadeev also the Oriental question is 
 a Pan-Slavic question, the solution of which, in accordance with 
 Russia's desires, can be permitted by Austria-Hungary only at 
 the risk of her own existence. Hence, as Field Marshal Paskie- 
 vich declared, the road to Constantinople leads through Vienna. 
 Fadeev did not hesitate to state plainly that in the conflict with 
 Austria-Hungary reliance might be placed on the Austrian Slavs. 
 It was only needful to gain their confidence ; but this Russia could 
 do by freeing Galicia. Fadeev said that were one to ask any non- 
 Russian Slav, he would reply: ''What confidence can Russia's 
 cousins have in her when her very brothers, who sigh and pine on 
 her borders, can hope for no help from her?" In 1849, 1859 and 
 1866 the "unhappy" Galician Russians might have been freed 
 without trouble. When this six-hundred-year-old captivity of Red 
 Russia was ended, continues Fadeev, the West Slavs would be 
 ready to listen to Russia. She would then stand geographically in 
 the midst of the West Slavs, and in addition, by the reclaiming of 
 Bessarabia, the connection with the South Slavs would be rees- 
 tablished. Although more cautious than Danilevskij, Fadeev 
 intimated the final goal to be a Pan-Slavic Federation on the 
 ruins of Austria and Turkey, with the Czar at the head as the 
 successor of Constantine the Great, and with the Grand Dukes 
 as federal princes.^ 
 
 While Fadeev believed that Prussia could not permit the 
 destruction of Austria, and that on this account the former's 
 enmity was to be reckoned with — in which circumstance he esti- 
 mated at its true value the united military strength of the previous 
 rivals — Danilevskij was of a different opinion down to the time 
 of the Franco-Prussian War. Till that time he was still in- 
 clined to regard Prussia as the sole ally of Russia in the solution 
 of the Oriental question — that is to say, in the destruction of 
 Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Impressed by the German vic- 
 
 ^ Ritssia and Europe, Danilevskij, p. 423 ff. 
 
 ^ Mnenie vostocnom voprose, Fadeev, St. Petersburg, 1870. 
 
388 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 tories, however, and regardless of the fact that Russia reaped 
 immediate advantage from them, he revised his previous opinion 
 even before the capture of Paris and declared France to be the 
 future ally of Russia and the possible coming German Empire 
 to be Russia's most dangerous potential enemy in the matter of the 
 partition of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. With Machiavellian 
 perspicacity, Danilevskij demonstrated that it did not lie in 
 Russia's interest immediately to interfere in the conflict and to 
 save France from the imposition of severe terms of peace. Such 
 a peace as seemed probable w^ould create a permanent breach 
 between Germany and France and prevent the two Powers from 
 uniting against Slavdom in Russia on the basis of European or 
 Latin-German interests. Nor was a victorious France, in Dani- 
 levskij 's opinion, even with a renewal of the friendship of the days 
 of Tilsit for Russia, desirable from the Russian point of view, 
 since the latter country could not support France's ambitious 
 plans which might easily lead to conflicts, causing France to renew 
 her previous Polish intrigues. Russia, also, would follow a 
 strongly conservative policy along German lines, in view of the 
 expected danger of revolutionary or democratic propaganda. 
 
 "On the other hand, in case of Germany's victory and the 
 temporary weakening or even humiliation of France, all these 
 prejudices and influences will lose their force. France, whom 
 only Russia can support In the recovery of her political position, 
 will, even though reluctantly, have to abandon her encourage- 
 ment of supposed Polish Interests, If these run counter to her 
 own vital interests. Russia, willy-nilly, will cease to support 
 Prussia and Germany, if they venture boldly and undisguisedly 
 to pursue aims of their own which are opposed to the evident 
 interests of Russia." ^ 
 
 Further, through the defeat of France, Russia, he claimed, 
 would regain the affection of the so-called Slavic Intellectuals 
 outside of Russia who, as the result of the French Revolution 
 and of France's services for the national unity of Italy, as 
 well as because of the liberal expressions of French authors, 
 politicians and statesmen and of many really sympathetic traits 
 of the French national character, had hitherto been devoted to 
 France and had hoped to win her support; this hope, however, 
 had proved deceptive, since in the belief of the French, as of 
 other Europeans, the fruits of f r-eedom were not to grow and ripen 
 for the Slavs. Russia, he said, would appear as the sole llbera- 
 
 ^ Rossija i frank o-germauskaja Vojna, Zarja, 187 1; reprinted in Shornick 
 poUticeskich i ekonomisceskich slatej, N. J. Danilevskago, St. Petersburg, i%o, 
 p. 27. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 389 
 
 tor of all the Slavs, in view of the opposing interests of Germans 
 and Slavs, of their century-long struggle and of the antipathy 
 with which the German character was viewed by the Slavs and 
 Latins, as well as in view of the fact that France after her de- 
 feat would be fully occupied in healing her wounds and looking 
 after herself. 
 
 "No one except Russia can save the Slavs from being en- 
 gulfed by Germany; no one except the Slavs can be Russia's 
 permanent guard against the ambitions which will not delay in 
 manifesting themselves with such clearness that only those born 
 blind can continue not to see them." ^ 
 
 Danilevskij closes this remarkable exposition by calling atten- 
 tion to the fact that Russia at that moment (that is to say, be- 
 fore the proclamation of the German Empire in Versailles) 
 found herself in this dilemma: "All our sympathies are with 
 France, but political interests compel us to wish for Germany's 
 complete victory and the weakening of France." 
 
 Thus, just as the Crimean War was a turning-point in the 
 Austro-Russian relations, the Franco-German War of 1870-71 
 became a turning-point for those of Russia and Prussia. Yet it 
 was owing to the German victories that Russia, at the most criti- 
 cal moment of the western struggle, was enabled to free herself 
 from the most humiliating condition of the Peace of Paris, viz.^ 
 the inhibition against Russia's building and maintaining a naval 
 fleet in the Black Sea. "The success of the Prussian arms was 
 likewise a victory for us," says a Russian diplomat in a memorial 
 published a few years ago.^ With the very first German victories, 
 which seemed to proclaim the possibility of a powerful German 
 empire at the Russian frontier, the most influential Russian pub- 
 licist of all times, M. N. Katkov, began in his Moskovskiya 
 Vedomosti a press campaign, aiming to arouse widespread patri- 
 otic disquietude at the German victories. In this efFort he was 
 successful. Although Czar Alexander II, even after the peace 
 of Frankfort, continued faithful to the ideas expressed in the 
 famous telegraphic exchange with his uncle. Emperor William I, 
 expressions of discontent to the eifect that Russia had unre- 
 servedly allowed herself to become Prussia's tool were not in- 
 frequent. 
 
 "This statement," says Saburov, "was repeated times without 
 number and finally became a historical truth for the Moscow 
 patriots, although there was not a grain of truth in it; if there 
 
 "^ Rossi] a i franko-germanskaja Vojna, Zarja, 1871; reprinted in Sbornick 
 politiceskich i ekonowUsceskich slate j, N. J. Danilevskago, St, Petersburg, 1890^ 
 p. 29. 
 
 ^ Zapiska P. A. Saburova, Russian Archive, 19 12, p. 470. 
 
390 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 were advantages, these were undoubtedly mutual. For begin- 
 ning with this period, Emperor Alexander II no longer felt him- 
 self politically restrained in Europe; he was freed from hamper- 
 ing ties and in a position to give to Russia her previous standing 
 as a World Power." ^ 
 
 The visit of Emperor William I and Bismarck in 1873 seemed 
 to strengthen this bond. 
 
 "For us," says Saburov, "this revived the memory of our posi- 
 tion at Tilsit, but without the defeats of Austerlitz and Fried- 
 land. And our lord and master, the Czar, had only to em- 
 phasize our political understanding with Prussia in order to 
 attain a brilliant position, without drawing the sword from the 
 scabbard. It is not to be wondered at, in view of so important 
 a political success, that the thought of a closer and permanent 
 alliance awoke in the minds of the monarchs. The system had 
 brought forth rich fruits. It would have borne still more in 
 the future. The indicated political course would probably have 
 served to solve the difficulties in the Oriental question, which 
 soon thereafter came into prominence, if Czar Alexander II 
 had been an autocrat not alone by reason of his rights but also 
 by personal disposition." ^ 
 
 But while the Czar held fast to ^he alliance with Prussia, 
 the anti-German sentiment grew stronger in Russian society 
 and affected the leader of Russia's foreign policy. Chancellor 
 Prince Gorczakov, whose most prominent characteristic was 
 boundless vanity. He had sensed the anti-German wave in 
 Russian society and hastened to adapt Russia's foreign poHcy 
 to it. The Czar was too weak-willed to force his conviction 
 upon the Chancellor, or, as would have been the most natural 
 course in the case of such a difference of opinion, to dismiss 
 him. And so 1875 arrived and with it the comedy of France's 
 rescue from an alleged German attack, which Prince Gorczakov 
 brilliantly staged. This was an unmistakable indication for 
 Bismarck that doubt was beginning to be felt in Petrograd as 
 to whether a mistake had not been made in 1870-71 in not 
 interfering in favor of France. Czar Alexander II, to whom 
 Bismarck complained about the dishonorable attitude of Gorcza- 
 kov, ''admitted the state of affairs, but contented himself, while 
 laughing and smoking, with remarking that Bismarck should 
 not take this vanite senile seriously." ^ As Bismarck observes, 
 it was a remarkable fact that Alexander II, despite his con- 
 
 1 Zapiska P. A. Saburova, Russian Archive, 1912, p. 470. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 470 ff. 
 
 ^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Bismarck, 2, Chap. 26. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 391 
 
 tempt for the minister, nevertheless intrusted him with the 
 entire machinery of the foreign office. This lack of character 
 manifested itself ever more clearly by his instability as regards 
 the Pan-Slavic movement, which continued to grow in violence 
 after the outbreak of the revolt in Herzegovina. 
 
 Although the Czar, on July 8, 1876, at a meeting with Em- 
 peror Francis Joseph in Reichstadt, had concluded an agree- 
 ment concerning the Oriental question, and in August, before 
 his departure for Warsaw and Livadia, had spoken to Reutern, 
 the Minister of Finance, with bitterness in regard to the Pan- 
 Slavic agitation, his feelings underwent a complete change in 
 Livadia as the result of his surroundings. Even the Russian 
 Ambassador at Constantinople, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ig- 
 natiev, the exponent of the Pan-Slavists, was astonished on the 
 occasion of his visit to Livadia to see how the Czar and Chan- 
 cellor had fallen under the influence of one of the members of 
 the Slav Charit}^ Committee of Moscow, Porochovczikov by 
 name, who had gone thither on his own authority and in flam- 
 ing w^ords had pictured the warlike sentiments "of the whole 
 of Orthodox Russia"; he had frightened the Czar by telling! 
 him that the Russian people would make war against the will 
 of the government and without awaiting its decision. Under 
 the influence of this feeling and without awaiting the result of 
 the mission of his Adjutant-General, Count Sumarokov-Elston, 
 the Czar inquired in Berlin, through General von Werder, 
 whether, in the event of an Austro-Russian war, Germany 
 would remain neutral, an insinuation which Bismarck rejected 
 politely, but firmly.^ 
 
 In view of this answer, the thought of a settlement of the 
 Oriental question by a war with Austria had to be temporarily 
 abandoned. But this original plan continued to exert so strong 
 an influence that war was begun against Turkey with insuffi- 
 cient forces. For only four army corps wxre left in European 
 Turkey in the event of a war with Austria. It is Prince Nikolai 
 Nikolaievitch, the elder, to whom we owe this knowledge. Pub- 
 lic sentiment in all camps, among the liberals as well as among 
 the Pan-Slavs, was in equal degree inimical to Austria. All 
 circles of society were in favor of the war, at least against 
 Turkey; the radicals because, following the successful battles 
 against the ''outer" Turks, they hoped for a settlement with the 
 ''inner" Turks, whereby they meant especially the government. 
 Despite the Treaty of Of en-Pest of January, 1877, the Czar, 
 who had been forced again into closer relationship with Austria- 
 
 ^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Bismarck, 2, Chap. 28. 
 
392 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Hungary, because of Berlin's refusal, disregarded these treaty 
 obligations in the peace negotiations of San Stefano. The conse- 
 quence for Russia was the Congress of Berlin, the results of 
 which, naturally, did not agree with those of San Stefano. 
 
 These results were received with bitterness by the Russian 
 public. Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov made his celebrated Moscow 
 speech (July 4, 1878), with its violent attacks upon Russian 
 diplomacy and its unmistakable reflection on the Czar. As 
 neither the Czar nor the Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov, had 
 the courage to admit that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been 
 surrendered to Austria-Hungary by a treaty long before the 
 war — indeed, that without this concession Russia would not 
 have been in a position to carry on the war — the entire weight 
 of the public's anger turned against Austria-Hungary and 
 Prince Bismarck, to whom Russia's discomfiture at the Con- 
 gress of Berlin was unjustly ascribed. As a measure of pro- 
 tection against Russia, influenced by this popular movement 
 which Alexander H with his customary weakness did not dare 
 oppose, Bismarck and Andrassy signed the Austro-German 
 alliance, which we have seen to-day so brilliantly justified by the 
 severe tests of war. The increasing movement of terrorism in 
 Russia, however, to which on February 13, 1881, Alexander fell a 
 victim, served somewhat to distract the attention of the coun- 
 try from foreign politics. 
 
 The new Czar, Alexander HI, whose palace on the Anitchkov 
 Bridge, even before his accession, had been the center of anti- 
 German intrigues and who had had no small share in bringing 
 on the Turkish War, had seen on the field of battle the weak- 
 nesses of the Russian army organization too clearly not to 
 desire a more or less extended period of rest and military re- 
 organization for the country. The nihilist movement, with 
 the numerous outrages and the danger threatening the dynasty, 
 also compelled him to seek support from the two Emperors 
 against this internal danger. This was the reason that the 
 so-called Tri-Emperor Alliance continued in force, and that in 
 1 88 1 and 1884 Russia even agreed anew by treaty to the 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this Russia, it 
 is true, was still influenced by the hope of keeping Bulgaria in 
 a state of absolute dependence, indeed, despite its own ruler, 
 of turning the country into a sort of Russian satrapy. When 
 these plans miscarried, and when, in the matter of the annex- 
 ation of East Rumelia, which Russia now energetically opposed 
 despite the peace of San Stefano, a definite break with Prince 
 Alexander of Bulgaria occurred, leading to the abduction of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 393 
 
 the Prince by Russophile officers and finally to his abdication 
 against the will of the Bulgarian nation, Russia's role in Bul- 
 garia was at an end. The regency under Stambulov found 
 its chief support in England and Austria-Hungary, and a 
 world conflagration seemed likely to result from the Bulgarian 
 question. But Russia still lacked allies for a war against 
 Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the danger again passed. 
 It is worthy of note that the fact was established by Russians- 
 that in the country's conflict with Bulgaria an important part 
 was played by the Russian iron industry greedy for foreign 
 markets, and by Russians interested in railroad building. It 
 was on their account that the Russian government sought to 
 influence Bulgaria to turn over the building of her railroads 
 to Russians, in which operation it naturally strove to have 
 those lines built which in the war of 1877 had shown themselves 
 to be the chief lines of operation for the Russian army — that 
 is to say, the lines from the Danube toward the South. It 
 was construed as a betrayal of Russia on the part of Prince 
 Alexander of Battenberg that he insisted on developing the 
 Bulgarian railways in a westerly direction, which would con- 
 nect them, not with the Russian, but with the Austrian sys- 
 tem; all the more was this so regarded since the execution of 
 such a plan involved but half the expenditure necessary for the 
 southern lines. This railway question was the cause of the 
 Prince's unpopularity in Petrograd. For according to the 
 plan supported by the Russian general, Sobolev, who was the 
 premier of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian railways were to be built 
 not only by Russian entrepreneurs and Russian engineers, but 
 even by Russian workmen, whom it was planned to bring from 
 Russia for this purpose. Naturally, Russia was to receive the 
 contract for the entire rolling stock.^ 
 
 The conflict with Bulgaria gave the final impetus in bring- 
 ing about the Franco-Russian Alliance. Efforts in this direc- 
 tion had been made on the French side as early as the seven- 
 ties. The dissolution of the Tri-Emperor Alliance (although 
 it is not correct to speak of a formal alliance) opened up a 
 more favorable outlook for the French government. The re- 
 fusal which the French Foreign Minister, Flourens, gave to 
 the Bulgarian deputation that had come to Paris in January, 
 1887, to seek the assistance of the, European Cabinets against 
 Russia, reconciled the Russian government with the French 
 Republic, which had once refused to surrender the revolutionist 
 
 1 See Vnesnaja PoHtika RossiJ v Konce, Pokrovskij, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija. 
 Rossii V XIX veke, p. 204 ff. 
 
394 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Hartmann after he had made an attempt on the life of Alex- 
 ander II. When, as a result of the alarming military prepara- 
 tions of the French Minister of War, Boulanger, a conflict 
 with German}^ seemed most probable, Russia ranged herself 
 on the side of France and in the "Schnabele" case her action was 
 inimical to Germany. This happened in April, 1887, that is 
 to say, four months after the rebuff to the Bulgarian deputation 
 in Paris. The decisive factor, however, in bringing about the 
 Franco-Russian alliance was the offer of the Republic to 
 place its capital at the disposal of Russia, especially as the 
 German government, in view of the official enmity of the Rus- 
 sian government and of Russian public opinion, could not pos- 
 sibly continue to assist Russia financially. "From the year 
 1888 on," says Pokrovskij, "French capital was closely con- 
 nected with the destiny of the Russian autocracy." ^ Although 
 Katkov (regarding whom a foreign diplomat stated that he 
 did not know who was the Russian Foreign Minister, Katkov 
 or Giers) openly declared in the columns of his Moscow news- 
 paper that Russia could be the ally only of a monarchic France, 
 this bitter pill was swallowed in Paris. The rejection by the 
 Russian Ambassador, Baron Mohrenheim, of Floquet as French 
 premier, because he had once joined in a Polish demonstration 
 against Alexander II, was coolly accepted by the leading circles 
 of France; and Floquet himself later renounced the portfolio 
 of Foreign Affairs as the price of Russia's pardon. The arrest 
 of the Russian Nihilists by the energetic Minister of the In- 
 terior, Constans, in June, 1890, gave the final proof of the 
 French Republic's good behavior. At the close of 1890 the 
 President of the French Republic and the Ministers of War 
 and of the Interior were the recipients of high Russian decora- 
 tions; and in July, 1891, the alliance was publicly sealed by 
 the reception of Admiral Gervais' squadron at Kronstadt, for 
 which France had long ardently hoped. In August, 1891, took 
 place the first formal conclusion of the defensive and offensive 
 alliance. In the autumn of 1892, this was supplemented by a 
 military convention signed by the Chiefs of the General Staff 
 of the two armies, Boisdeffre and Obruczev. In the autumn of 
 1893 the return visit was made by the Russian fleet to Toulon, 
 and in the spring of 1894 the definitive treaty of alliance was 
 finally signed, simultaneously in Paris and Petrograd, by the two 
 Foreign Ministers, Casimir Perier and Giers. 
 
 In the meanwhile, however, Russia's attention had been to 
 
 1 See Vnesnaja Politika Rossij v Konce, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v 
 XIX veke, by Pokrovskij, p, 174 ff. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 395 
 
 a great degree distracted from Europe and turned toward the 
 East by the development of her Asiatic policy, which in the 
 spring of 1891 found its symbolic expression in the laying of 
 the corner stone of the great Siberian fortress in Vladivostock. 
 Witte himself in the autumn of 1892 characterized the build- 
 ing of the Siberian Railway as an event of world importance, 
 such as mark the beginning of new epochs in the history of' 
 the nations and not infrequently call forth an entire change 
 in the existing economic relations of the various states to each 
 other.^ The defeat of China in the Chino-Japanese War of 
 1894-95 offered an opportunity to Russia of forcing on China 
 her friendship and her protection against Japan. Russia's ex- 
 pansion toward the Far East was bound to encounter the oppo- 
 sition of England and Japan. A free hand, therefore, was 
 needed in Europe. This was the reason why the ruling cir- 
 cles in Russia modified their plans in the Near East. Accord- 
 ing to the saying of Prince Lubanow-Rostowskij, Ambassador 
 to Vienna and later Minister of Foreign Affairs under Nicholas 
 II, it was necessary "to place the Balkans in cold storage until 
 we have finished with other pressing affairs." ^ This purpose 
 was served by the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897, which 
 aimed to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and which, in 
 the same manner as the Miirzsteger agreement of 1903, pro- 
 tected Russia's rear in view of the threatening complications in 
 the East. This object was completely attained, thanks to the 
 loyalty of Austria, who, by conscientious observance of the 
 treaty, even sacrificed her own interests in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. Austria-Hungary and Germany, during the unfortu- 
 nate war with Japan and the resulting internal disturbances, 
 strove to uphold the tottering throne and the threatened soli- 
 darity of the Russian state. Indeed, it is the opinion of Rus- 
 sian radical parties, especially of the Social Democrats and the 
 Social Revolutionists, that the Russian revolution was defeated 
 primarily through Germany's attitude. The Russian Minister 
 of War, Kuropatkin, in his final report emphasized the loyal 
 attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the following 
 words: "The recent war has given to us the consoling convic- 
 tion that our western neighbors (Germany and Austria-Hun- 
 gary) entertain no plans of conquest as regards Russia, for 
 the years 1905-6 would have been most favorable for a change 
 in the present boundaries of the Empire in the West." ^ 
 
 ^ See Vnesnaj'a Politika Rossij v Konce, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v 
 XIX, veke. by Pokrovskij, p. 220. 
 
 ^ Balkanskij Krisis i Politika Izvolskago, P. Miljukov, p. 3 ff. 
 
 ^ Zapiski generala Kuropatkina o russko-japonskoj vojne, Berlin, 191 1, p. 555. 
 
396 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 This loyalty had very unfortunate results. A great change 
 was brought about in Russian politics through the defeat in 
 East Asia. The Russian intellectuals had absolutely no sym- 
 pathy for the East Asiatic policy of the government; Slavophile 
 influences and traditions w^ere much stronger in all Russian 
 parties. In order to win these sympathies, it was necessary 
 only to direct the attention of the foreign office toward Europe 
 and to blow into a flame the embers of Balkan hatred against 
 the Porte, which were glimmering under the ashes. Conserva- 
 tive and radical parties of the newly created Russian parliament 
 agreed that the treaties with Austria-Hungary were harmful 
 for Russia, since the maintenance of the status quo in the Bal- 
 kans was not in the interests of Russia, if only because the main 
 object of Russia's Oriental policy for two hundred years — 
 namely the acquisition of the Dardanelles — was as little likely 
 to be achieved in this manner as its secondary object, the libera- 
 tion of the racially related coreligionists in the Balkans and 
 their inclusion in the Russian sphere of influence. 
 
 The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. P. Izvolskij, who 
 even as a diplomatic representative had believed in the Pan- 
 Slavic spirit, was able to adapt himself quickly to this dominant 
 sentiment. Through the understanding with England in Au- 
 gust, 1907, concerning the division of the spheres of interest in 
 Central Asia and especially in Persia, the way was opened for 
 joint action with England in other questions as well. The 
 anti-German turn which British policy had taken since the ac- 
 cession of Edward VII to the throne made a Russian alliance 
 seem desirable. Conversely, it was in Russia's interest to draw 
 England, the hitherto bitter enemy of her Oriental aims, to 
 her side, in order, in the unavoidable conflict with Austria- 
 Hungary in the Near East, to isolate the latter state and fur- 
 ther to hold Austria's ally, Germany, in check by another enemy 
 in addition to France. Besides, the two most influential po- 
 litical parties of Russia at that time, the Octobrists and the 
 Cadets, were in favor of a rapprochement with England, which 
 they hoped would result in a more liberal internal policy on 
 the part of the Russian government. Bo^-h parties were, more- 
 over, strongly influenced by Russian, and especially Moscow 
 business interests, which, on account of the dangerous competi- 
 tion of the far more capable and highly trained German in- 
 dustry, had long demanded that the government assume an 
 anti-German attitude. 
 
 When in January, 1908, Aehrenthal announced in the par- 
 liamentary ''delegations" the plan for an active economic policy 
 
MODERN GERMANY 397 
 
 by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and the building of the 
 Sandjak railway, the authorities in Petrograd considered it a 
 timely moment to make public the long contemplated change 
 in Russian politics. Too weak, as the result of the defeats in 
 Manchuria and of the disorganization called forth by the revo- 
 lution, to be able successfully to oppose the policy of Vienna, 
 Petrograd sought to accomplish this in two other ways: first, 
 by an agreement with England concerning questions in the Near 
 East (an object which was attained through the meeting of the 
 Czar with King Edward VII in Reval) ; and secondly, through 
 the encouragement of the Pan-Slavic agitation among the Slavs of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
 
 The failure in the Far East and the revolution, which 
 brought Russia to the verge of destruction and almost com- 
 pletely put an end to her influence in European questions 
 (Uabsence de la Russie) was felt especially keenly by the West 
 Slavs as a strengthening of German influence and as a detri- 
 ment to their political standing. As a result of this feeling, 
 there began as early as 1906 a movement, the object of which 
 was the establishment of Slavic solidarity. The Russo-Polish 
 dififerences were felt as a hindrance to this solidarity, and hence 
 to the strengthening of Russia. As a consequence, the efforts 
 of the publicists were directed toward bringing about a recon- 
 ciliation. A division of the Poles themselves declared the rec- 
 onciliation possible under certain conditions, above all the au- 
 tonomy of Congressional Poland. The Cracow monthly re- 
 view, Swiat Slowianski, was the first openly to advocate this 
 idea. In Russia this movement was well received. The Con- 
 servatives, who had been frightened by the revolution, saw 
 Russia's salvation in Pan-Slavism. The Slavophile wing of 
 the Russian Liberals, however, inspired by the general disap- 
 proval of the educated Russian circles of the East Asiatic policy, 
 regarded this as a strengthening of Russia's position in Europe. 
 The speech of Aehrenthal regarding the Sandjak railway, as 
 indicated, caused the leaders of Russia's foreign policy seri- 
 ously to take under consideration this movement both within and 
 without the boundaries of the Empire. 
 
 ''The especially self-confident tone" (of Aehrenthal), says 
 an article in the January number, 1909 (p. 386), of the in- 
 fluential Petrograd review, Vestnik Evropy, which is published 
 by a member of the Imperial Council, "in which this new 
 Austrian program was announced caused marked anxiety in the 
 Slavic states, and could not fail to make an unfavorable impres- 
 sion in Russia also; all the more was this the case since diplo- 
 
398 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 macy still regarded the fiction of the Austro-Russian agreement 
 in the Macedonian question as existing. As a matter of fact, 
 Russian policy in the Balkans had long since lost all independence 
 and become transformed into a passive tool (?) of the exclu- 
 sively Austrian influence. Hence, it was no longer taken into 
 consideration in Aehrenthal's plans. The Austrian minister, 
 who was once ambassador in Petrograd, where he maintained 
 intimate relations with the most influential personages of our 
 reactionary parties, made use of his observations to draw the 
 corresponding practical deductions, but he failed to consider the 
 fact that reliance can be placed upon the feelings of court cir- 
 cles only with great caution, as they are in their very nature 
 extremely changeable and subject to the influence of those familiar 
 social elements which unite complacency with loudly proclaimed 
 patriotism. It is not always advisable publicly to announce 
 things which may without hindrance be accomplished by ac- 
 tions. The gradual expansion of the Austrian sphere of in- 
 terest in the Balkans called forth a protest from no one, so 
 long as it was not openly formulated as an official principle 
 which implied the direct denial or ignoring of foreign inter- 
 ests, Slavic and Russian. This unexpected action gave a strong 
 impulse to the Slavic movement, and the new Slavic cult found 
 ardent adepts among us, due in part to the arrival in Russia 
 of several prominent Czech and Serb politicians. The Slavic 
 question in Austria herself has become extremely acute; vio- 
 lent street fights between Germans and Czechs take place con- 
 stantly at various places, and frequently rise to the plane of san- 
 guinary battles. Perhaps the aggressive ( ?) policy against the 
 Turko-Slavic provinces was undertaken in order to distract at- 
 tention from these internal conflicts and to open up new per- 
 spectives to the Slavs. The strengthening of the Slavic ele- 
 ment, at the cost of the neighboring Balkan countries, pre- 
 pares the way for the transformation of the monarchy into a 
 federation, in which the Slavs will occupy their proper posi- 
 tion." 
 
 However wrong this exposition is in so far as it regards 
 Russian policy, and however maliciously it misrepresents con- 
 ditions in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it nevertheless gives 
 an excellent picture of the character of the congress to which 
 the three Austrian parliamentarians, a Czech, a Liberal Slo- 
 vene and a Russophile Ruthenian, were bound on their journey 
 to Petrograd in May, 1908. That the National Democratic or 
 Pan-Polish wing of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council 
 favored this step, even though not openly, is subject to no 
 
MODERN GERMANY 399 
 
 doubt. The Petrograd discussion took place too much as if 
 by program to allow of any assumption but that a previous 
 arrangement existed. It was really intended to prepare the 
 way for a Pan-Slavic Congress. The tenor of the negotia- 
 tions, however, was that the practical prerequisite of such a con- 
 gress as well as of Pan-Slavic solidarity must be the reconcilia- 
 tion of the Poles and the Russians. Suddenly during the dis- 
 cussion the Polish leader in the third Duma, Roman Dmowski, 
 arose and declared that this reconciliation was quite possible, 
 that the Poles were ready to do their part tow^ard it, for Ger- 
 man civilization was the common enemy of all Poles and Slavs, 
 and that in order to resist it, all other considerations must be put 
 aside. Shortly after the Petrograd meeting, Dmowski an- 
 nounced this new program of the Poles in a small book, 
 "ISliemcy, Rosy a i kwestya polskaf 
 
 As a result of universal franchise, the Ruthenians, who had 
 hitherto been almost completely deprived of political rights, 
 were sent to the Vienna Parliament in relatively large num- 
 bers. The general suffrage right, however, had also had the 
 effect on the Polish side of bringing new and especially Pan- 
 Polish elements into the hitherto uniform and exclusive Polish 
 Club. The appearance of the Ruthenians on the political stage 
 was made use of by the Pan-Polish Party for a violent agita- 
 tion, under the plea that the Polish landed class in East Galicia 
 was threatened. This agitation was successful. A Pan-Polish 
 partisan became leader of the hitherto all-powerful Kolo Pol- 
 skie in the Vienna Parliament. Their program was openly 
 Russophile in three of the component states of former Poland. 
 Their first duty they considered to be the crushing of the Ger- 
 man Empire in order to free their brothers in Posen. Until 
 the accomplishment of this task they were ready to defer their 
 final aim, namely the rehabilitation of Poland with her boundaries 
 of 1772, and loyally to fulfill the duties of Austrian or Rus- 
 sian subjects — in which connection, Dmowski said, it must be 
 a matter of indifference to the Russian or Austrian government 
 what ideals they seek to realize in the future. In order to 
 attain this first goal they were ready temporarily to abandon 
 their claims as against Russia to Lithuania and Little Russia; they 
 demanded in these countries for their compatriots only a status 
 of equality; in Congressional Poland, on the other hand, they 
 asked full autonomy and the use of the Polish language in the 
 administration, courts and schools. 
 
 As a compensation for this, they offered the Russian govern- 
 ment the foUow^ing: Wherever the Ukrainian language was 
 
400 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 recognized in administration, courts and schools, the Russian 
 language was to enjoy the same standing. Frankly expressed, 
 loyalty toward Austria ceased at the point where the existence 
 of the state or the security of a boundary clashed with the oppor- 
 tunity to gain a ruble. The Russian government, however, 
 which had always checked the Ukrainian movement in the 
 sharpest manner, as representing a threat to the unity of the 
 Russian race and hence to the supremacy of the Great-Russians, 
 was now, after its experiences with the various nationalities 
 in their efforts to obtain autonomy and with the strong Ukrainian 
 Club of the first and second Dumas, all the more eager to sup- 
 press such a movement even beyond its own borders. This 
 Ukrainian danger was thus the bond which united the Poles 
 of the Pan-Polish movement and the Russian government. 
 Shortly before the Petrograd meeting the weapon of a Ukrai- 
 nian student had put an end to the career of the Governor of 
 Galicia, Count Potoczki, who, failing to realize the essential 
 interests of the state which he served, had encouraged the Russo- 
 phile movement and its advocates. 
 
 In addition to the ancient antagonism between Russia and 
 Austria-Hungary in the Oriental question, there was now a 
 second dangerous cause for dispute, namely that in regard to 
 the Ukrainian question. As much as the Russian government 
 was interested in' hindering, even beyond its own borders, the 
 cultural growth of the Ukrainian people, just so much was it 
 in Austria's interest to encourage the intellectual and economic 
 development of those Ukrainians who were loyal to Emperor 
 and state. Without scruple as to its means, as it has always 
 been, the Russian government did not hesitate to carry its cam- 
 paign against the Ukrainian movement into Austrian territory. 
 With Russian money and supported by the Pan-Polish Podolian 
 group, which was all-powerful in the Polish Club, the Russophile 
 movement now took up work in Galicia with redoubled strength, 
 and prepared the way, especially through a wide-spread spy sys- 
 tem, for a military attack by Russia. 
 
 The Slavic Congress in Petrograd in May, 1908, had brought 
 together the radical and conservative parties in the field of Pan- 
 Slavic politics. Soon after, it even came to a certain distribu- 
 tion of work between the two groups. The Conservatives, 
 whose center of agitation lay in the old Pan-Slavic Charity As- 
 sociation and in the new Galician-Russian Society, prepared the 
 way for a Russian invasion of Galicia by means of treasonable 
 corruption through generously expended money and agitators 
 and in the portions of M>^ravia adjoining Galicia by means 
 
MODERN GERMANY 401 
 
 of Russian farmers (?) sent thither ostensibly for learning in- 
 tensive agriculture. The radical parties, on the other hand, 
 whose center was the Moscow Society for Slavic Civilization 
 and whose mouthpiece was the Moskovskij Jezenedelnik of 
 Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi, operated more discreetly. Their aim 
 was, by satisfying Polish desires in Russia, to win over to the 
 side of Russia, through Pan-Polish influence, the Austrian Poles, 
 and especially the latter's representatives in the Austrian Par- 
 liament and in the Austro-Hungarian "delegation," in order 
 that these, together with those Czechish and South-Slavic par- 
 liamentarians already ''bagged" by Russia, might cripple Austria- 
 Hungary. It was hoped in this manner to disrupt the alliance 
 between Austria-Hungary and Germany, and to render diffi- 
 cult and to delay Austria's military preparations, if not, indeed, 
 to defeat them. These final aims are clearly revealed in the 
 controversy between Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi and the feuille- 
 toniste Mensikov in the Novoje Vremja, in the course of which 
 Trubeczkoi made this noteworthy remark: 
 
 "Publicists of the stamp of Mensikov regard the rapproche- 
 ment of Russia and the Poles as a sentimental dream. In re- 
 ality it is the only practical policy. It is the sole means for par- 
 alyzing our most dangerous enemy in Europe — namely, Austria 
 — and for rendering a conflict with her impossible. To make 
 friends with the Poles means for Russia to draw all the Slavic 
 races of Austria over to her side and to transform them all into 
 allies." 1 
 
 The Russo-Polish reconciliation was planned to take place 
 on neutral territory, in Prague, at a Pan-Slavic preliminary 
 congress held in July, 1908. This result, however, was not 
 achieved. Even the Pan-Polish partisans left the Prague Con- 
 gress disillusioned. Austria's hospitality, however, was taken 
 advantage of by one of the participants. Count Vladmir Bob- 
 rinskij, a member of the Duma, to agitate in East Galicia on 
 the journey home against the Monarchy and to form connec- 
 tions for a system of military espionage. The first chilling frost 
 soon fell upon the young Pan-Slavic movement, which its prime 
 movers in the Liberal camp w^ere fond of calling the "Neo- 
 Slavic" movement, since the old Pan-Slavic movement was too 
 much discredited among the West and South Slavs as being 
 Pan-Russian, and perhaps also because in this way it was hoped 
 to mislead the Austrian government. 
 
 The outbreak of the Young Turk revolution was hastened 
 by the meeting in Reval in May, 1908. In July, 1908, the 
 
 "^Moskovskij Jezenedelnik, 19 lo, Number 27, Column 4. 
 
402 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Young Turks obtained the revival of the Turkish Constitution 
 of the year 1876. Induced by false friends, they sought also 
 to renew Bosnia's relation as vassal to the Porte, by calling rep- 
 resentatives of that country to the Turkish parliament. The 
 result of this w^as Austria's annexation policy in the autumn of 
 1908. Public opinion in Russia became greatly excited, as the fact 
 had never been made known that in previous years Russia herself 
 had several times given her consent to this purely formal act. 
 The Serbian agitation in Russia occurred at this moment, and 
 was an added cause of excitement. True to the principles of 
 Neo-Slavism, the Czechs, the Pan-Poles and the Slovenes should 
 have opposed this declaration of annexation in the legislative 
 bodies. But some members lacked the necessary courage, and 
 they contented themselves with discordant declarations, while 
 others, such as the Pan-Poles, supported the Crown. This dis- 
 appointment may also have been a factor in the conciliatory atti- 
 tude of Russia's Foreign Minister, P. A. Izvolskij, at the end 
 of the annexation crisis. 
 
 Although Aehrenthal, on the occasion of the meeting in Buch- 
 lau as early as September, 1908, had gained Izvolskij 's consent 
 to the annexation, in return for which Austria was to agree to 
 the opening of the Dardanelles for Russia's warships, Izvolskij 
 kept this secret on account of the high tide of the Pan-Slavic 
 movement, and he immediately assumed the leading part in the 
 diplomatic action of England, France and Russia against the 
 annexation. His ambition was painfully disappointed by Eng- 
 land's refusal to agree to the opening of the Dardanelles; he 
 thus saw himself robbed of the important compensation which 
 Aehrenthal had promised him, while the Austro-Hungarian 
 Minister threatened to make sure of his share in the deal. De- 
 spite the fact that the director of the archives of his ministry, Gor- 
 jainow, had published in 1907 the chief points of the Reichstadt 
 Agreement (1870) and that of Ofen-Pest (1877), in his book 
 ''Bosphorus and Dardanelles," Izvolskij went to Buchlau without 
 knowing anything of these treaties and their contents.^ Al- 
 though later he learned of this obligation of Russia toward 
 Austria-Hungary in connection with the possession of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, nevertheless he encouraged the defiant atti- 
 tude of Serbia and Montenegro, w-hich lacked all justification, 
 and demanded the surrender of certain portions of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina to these two states. But since Russia was not in 
 the position to back up with the sword the policy which Izvolskij 
 had inaugurated against the Dual Monarchy, mainly in com- 
 
 1 Zapiski Ignatjeva, Historischer Bote, February, 1914, p. 456. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 403 
 
 mon with England but partly also with Italy, Petrograd found 
 itself forced to draw in its horns following a plain hint from 
 Berlin. At the end of March, 1909, the diplomatic campaign 
 which Izvolskij had begun in October, 1908, ended with a 
 painful defeat for Russian prestige. But since it was only a 
 diplomatic defeat and the military inferiority of Russia, Serbia 
 and Montenegro was not taken advantage of by the other side 
 in order once and for all to render the existence of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy safe in the South, Russia gave full reign 
 to her enmity toward Austria-Hungary. 
 
 The great uproar caused in Italy by the annexation and the 
 ambiguous attitude of the Italian government, which had made 
 secret preparations for war against Austria-Hungary for the 
 spring of 1909, drew Russia's attention to this ally. In the late 
 autumn of 1909 the Czar paid his return visit in Racconigi, on 
 which occasion he ostentatiously made a wide detour in order 
 to avoid Austrian soil. A secret understanding seems to have 
 been reached at this time between Russia and Italy against 
 Austria-Hungary, which inaugurated Russia's betrayal of the 
 South Slavs, whom she surrendered to Italy, and Italy's dire 
 treachery toward her ally. Italy's open breach with her previ- 
 ous friends, however, was not desired, for, according to the view 
 of a French diplomat which Prince Trubeczkoi quotes with 
 praise, "Italy, in case she openly joined the Triple Entente, 
 might, without becoming more useful, make demands on her 
 new associates to which at present she has no right." ^ 
 
 Russia was angry, and was ready in any possible manner to 
 make up for the blow to her prestige as the guardian power of 
 the Slavs and for her failure in the Dardanelles question. The 
 Pan-Slavic movement, secretly encouraged by the Russian gov- 
 ernment, continued its accustomed activity. Meetings in Petro- 
 grad alternated with meetings in Sofia and Prague. The Rus- 
 sian government even allowed itself to be officially represented 
 in the Pan-Slavic Sokol Congress in Prague, in the spring of 
 19 1 2, by Sebjakov, assistant to the Minister of Public Instruc- 
 tion. So certain was it of itself that on Austrian soil and in 
 the presence of representatives of the Austrian government, it 
 gave this support to the Sokols, who were determined to help ruin 
 the Austrian Monarchy, internally and externally. Although 
 warnings enough were heard even at that time, yet the world 
 war of 19 1 4 first revealed the importance of these organizations 
 in the plans of Russia and Serbia. For the rest, Czech, Pan- 
 
 1 Russia a^ a Great Power, Prince S. Trubeczkoi, p. 122 ff. 
 
404 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Polish and Russophile members of the Austrian Parliament saw 
 to Russia's interests in the name of Pan-Slavic brotherhood. 
 
 In order to advance Russian aims in the Balkans, Izvolskij 
 made another attempt to found a Balkan League, with Turkey 
 in the lead, as the latter country at the time played a part in 
 his calculations owing to the unfriendly attitude of the Young 
 Turks toward Austria. This Balkan League was intended as 
 a wall against the Dual Monarchy. In order to render the 
 combination possible, Izvolskij demanded that Serbia and Bul- 
 garia inform the Porte of their disinterestedness in Macedonia. 
 As the Bulgarian government neither could nor would give such 
 an assurance, the plan came to naught. But the idea, in an- 
 other form, was taken up again two years later (1911) by 
 Czarykov, the Russian Ambassador at the Golden Horn. In 
 return for the opening of the straits to Russian men-of-war, 
 Russia offered to assume, single-handed, the protection of the 
 Porte against her own greedy proteges in the Balkans (Serbia 
 and Bulgaria) and to guarantee the safety of the Dardanelles 
 against a coup on the part of Italy. 
 
 Encouraged by the signs of internal disintegration in Turkey, 
 as manifested in the Albanian revolt and in dissensions among 
 the Turkish officers, Italy had considered the moment oppor- 
 tune for seizing Tripoli in time of peace, as the country was 
 stripped of troops. Since the Turks could not possibly acqui- 
 esce in this act of piracy, Italy declared war on the Porte at the 
 end of September, 191 1. Czarykov considered the moment fa- 
 vorable for putting through a new edition of the Hunkiar- 
 Iskelessi treaty of 1833, the acceptance of which would have 
 been tantamount to the setting up of a Russian protectorate 
 over Turkey. The resistance of Turkey and the disapproval 
 manifested in Bulgaria brought about the failure of Czary- 
 kov's plans and caused their disavowal by Petrograd. 
 
 Russian politicians, however, were in no way embarrassed. 
 The opportunity was all too favorable for Turkey's enemies 
 to profit by the Turko-Italian War for their own purposes. 
 Thanks to the war, Russian diplomacy was at last successful in 
 bringing about a union of the previous rivals and enemies, 
 Serbia and Bulgaria, which was directed equally against Austria- 
 Hungary, Turkey and Rumania, and which was soon joined 
 by Montenegro and Greece. The 13th of March, 19 12, was 
 for Russian diplomacy a day full of promise, as it was then 
 successful, against all the efforts of its enemies, in creating a 
 weapon which permitted its politicians and army leaders to 
 await in the background the moment favorable for interfer- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 405 
 
 ence. It was, perhaps, not the Intention of Russian diplomacy 
 to turn this weapon in the first instance against the Porte. But 
 the fear on the part of the Balkan states, lusting for the 
 Turkish possessions, lest the favorable moment pass without 
 being utilized, drove them to declare war against Turkey in 
 the autumn of 1912. The Russian diplomats were most skill- 
 ful in denying all responsibility for this war and in protecting 
 the Balkan League in the rear, on the pretext of maintaining 
 the status quo and the territorial disinterestedness of the Great 
 Powers — that is to say, primarily Austria-Hungary. The main 
 object, of course, was to secure freedom of movement for Rus- 
 sia's vassal, Serbia, so as to enable her to expand freely and 
 strengthen herself for her future task: participation in the de- 
 struction of Austria-Hungary. This part of the Russo-Serb 
 program suffered defeat, it is true, owing to the determination 
 of Austria-Hungary not to grant to Serbia access to the Ad- 
 riatic by annexing Albania, in which determination she was 
 upheld not alone by her loyal ally, Germany, but also by Italy, 
 who had long had her eyes fixed on Valona and South Albania. 
 
 As Serbia now looked for compensation in Macedonia, quar- 
 rels arose between the allies in regard to the booty which they 
 had taken from the Porte. The task of Russian diplomacy was 
 like that of squaring the circle. It was a question of satisfy- 
 ing Bulgaria and Serbia at the same time. The Russian min- 
 ister in Belgrade, Hartwig, knowing that thus only could he 
 hold Serbia to her allegiance to Russia, had made promises to 
 her a long time before which Sassonov was forced to ratify, willy- 
 nilly. The Czar strove to preserve the Balkan League through 
 the exercise of his personal influence, and on May 26, 19 13 (O. 
 S.), he sent a telegram proclaiming Russia as the only court 
 of last resort for the whole of Slavdom. Austria-Hungary 
 saw herself compelled to announce through the Hungarian 
 Premier, Count Tisza, that she was not prepared to recognize 
 this protectorate. Neither was this appeal of the Czar well 
 received in Sofia or in Belgrade. At the end of June, 191 3, 
 war broke out between Bulgaria and her previous allies, Serbia 
 and Montenegro, putting a final end to the Balkan League. 
 This was an even worse defeat for Russia than her failure in 
 the Albanian and Scutari questions, and one which deprived her 
 of a weapon that she had prepared primarily only against 
 Austria-Hungary. The effect was most evident in the violent 
 attack which Pan-Slavic circles in Russia made on Russian 
 diplomacy. 
 
 Right at the start of the Balkan War, in the autumn of 
 
4o6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 19 1 2, the Pan-Slavic movement had begun in Russia w^ith re- 
 newed force. The peculiar attitude of the parliamentarian rep- 
 resentatives of the Czechs and Slovenes in the Austrian and fed- 
 eral administrative bodies — not to speak of the South Slavs — 
 appeared to these circles as a sign that the moment had ar- 
 rived to destroy Austria-Hungary. At this very time treatises 
 were published by Russian military writers which sought to 
 prove that half the Austro-Hungarian army might be regarded 
 as negligible, since it consisted of Slavs who had no interest in 
 fighting against Russia. Austria-Hungary, they said, was the 
 most helpless state next to Turkey. Russian diplomacy, there- 
 fore, need not show the least consideration for Austria-Hun- 
 gary.^ Even before this the Russian senator, Grigorij Evreinov, 
 had prophesied in a brochure the early disintegration of the 
 Dual Monarchy as an anti-national state, and had demanded 
 that Russia announce, in addition to her unshakable solidarity 
 with the great Slavic world, her intention to utilize every op- 
 portunity of an international nature to unite Bosnia, Herze- 
 govina and the Sandjak with Serbia and Montenegro.^ 
 
 "For the removal of the anti-national state, Austria-Hun- 
 gary," says Evreinov obscurely, ''there are at work for Russia 
 the providential forces of the progressive evolution toward a 
 union of racially related people." 
 
 He becomes clearer when he says that he cannot enter into 
 details as to how Russia can hasten this process by clever 
 policy. Evreinov seeks also to prove that the Triple Entente 
 is from a material standpoint stronger than the Dreibundj quite 
 irrespective of the position of Italy, which in case of armed 
 conflict intends to play the part of a tertius gaudens. The 
 most violent instigation against Austria-Hungary was indulged 
 in at the Slavish banquets in Petrograd, which were presided 
 over in person by General Skugarevskij and at which the editor 
 of the Government Messenger, Basmakov, an official personage, 
 played a prominent part. The government, however, did not 
 lose sight of its own interest on account of this Pan-Slavic 
 movement, which outwardly pretended to be so altruistic. The 
 Galician Russian Society, with Count Vladimir Bobrinskij, one 
 of the most prominent nationalist leaders of the Duma, at its 
 head, with the assistance of certain dignitaries of the Russian 
 church, such as Archbishop Antonij of Volhynia, who were 
 
 1 "The Military-Political Position of Russia," by General Parensov, in 
 Slavanskija Isvestija, No. 8, of January 6-19, 1910; "The Austro-Hungarian 
 Army," by Colonel Potocldj, in Okrainy Rossij, No. 45, November 10-23, 1912, 
 p. 640. 
 
 ^ Ideologija bliznevostocnego voprosa, Petrograd, 191 1. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 407 
 
 eager to proselyte, began to speak of the oppressed condition of 
 "Russian Macedonia" — that is to say, Galicia — in which the 
 non-existent Russians were alleged to be exposed to the greatest 
 maltreatment. 
 
 The real reason was, as a matter of fact, that the Rus- 
 sian government and nationalistic circles had for years noted 
 with disapproval the Ukrainian population of Austria making 
 notable advance and the Austrian government aiding its ef- 
 forts, although not adequately or consistently. If the unity of 
 the Russian race in Russia, which w^as outwardly maintained 
 only through the most ruthless oppression of the White Rus- 
 sians and the Little Russians (Ukrainians) as regards their na- 
 tional characteristics, was threatened with destruction through 
 the upgrowth of a powerful cultural Ukrainian nucleus on 
 Austrian soil, there was only one way in w^hich to stamp out 
 this danger, and that w^as through the annexation of this ter- 
 ritory by Russia. More than once during the course of the 
 Balkan crisis it appeared as if Russia was about to declare war 
 on Austria under the pressure of this movement. But, although 
 Russia, before the outbreak of the Balkan War, under the pre- 
 tense of a trial mobilization, had drawn together large masses 
 of troops on the Galician frontier, she nevertheless did not feel 
 herself well enough prepared for this difficult task. Moreover, 
 France and England did not yet seem ready to cooperate in the 
 task. Russian preparation for so serious an undertaking was 
 probably not considered sufficient in Paris and London. In 
 Pan-Slavic circles, however, this abstention of Russia was re- 
 garded as cowardice on the part of Russian diplomacy. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it is explicable that the peace 
 which came to Europe late in the summer of 19 13 through 
 the Treaty of Bucharest, proved only a preparation for war. 
 Although Russian diplomacy — that is to say, Sassonov — had 
 sought as early as 19 10 in the Potsdam agreement to renew 
 the friendly relations with Berlin which Izvolskij had scorned, 
 the efforts were soon abandoned. Perhaps this was only a hint 
 to London and Berlin, and at the same time a paying out of 
 France for her attitude during the annexation crisis, which may 
 not have sufficiently met Russia's expectations of what was 
 incumbent on an ally. Sassonov changed his attitude toward 
 Germany, however, when the latter country called a halt on 
 Russian diplomacy, which, with its customary willful inter- 
 pretation of the Peace of San Stefano and of the Congress of 
 Berlin, sought to secure a firm footing in Armenia, or at least 
 
4o8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 to make use of the Armenian question as an excuse for Inter- 
 ference at any time, as In Macedonia. 
 
 The mission of LIman von Sanders, late In the autumn of 
 19 1 3? gave Russia the opportunity to let loose all the latent 
 anti-German animosity of the Russian press. Any strength- 
 ening of the Porte, and especially of the defenses of the Straits, 
 ran counter to the plans of Russian statesmen. It was well 
 known that the English Naval Commission would take no 
 measures to Improve the Turkish fleet, but on the contrary was 
 expected to serve as a check and procrastinating force as re- 
 gards Turkish naval preparedness. Therefore, the recall of 
 von Sanders and the German oflScers was demanded, and as 
 Russia's wishes did not meet with the proper response, the de- 
 cision was taken, probably before the completion of the strategic 
 railways, to attack Austria-Hungary and Germany. At all 
 events, the preparations for mobilization In Russia began very 
 early in the year 191 4. Time was an Important question, also, 
 as France was not In condition and did not intend long to bear 
 the burden of the three-year service. The most important 
 consideration, however, was that England — that is to say, pri- 
 marily Sir Edward Grey — expressed a readiness to fight on the 
 side of Russia and France. One of the chief promoters of the 
 present World War, the Russian ex-diplomat, Branczaninov, 
 who encouraged the war sentiment in Russia through a daily 
 newspaper and who belonged to the Liberal wing of the Pan- 
 Slavlst party. Intimated In his weekly paper, after a visit to Grey, 
 that England was ready to fight by Russia's side. 
 
 War, he said, offered for England (that is for the British 
 government) a way of escape from the Internal difficulties of 
 the Home Rule question ; a victory of the fleet under the Lib- 
 eral government would secure its position for a long time to 
 come. 
 
 ''They know this, but with the peculiar hypocrisy of English- 
 men they mention It only in friendly Intercourse, secretly as it 
 were, and not as naive people like M. Sassonov might desire, 
 officially in black and white, with their signatures and seals at- 
 tached. Is It not strange to think that, on account of the Irish 
 question, within a month and a half to two months Europe 
 will be involved in a general way?" ^ 
 
 This was written on March 18, 19 14 — three months before 
 the outrage in Serajevo. It is explicable that Russia, follow- 
 ing this assurance of English assistance, hastened to bring on 
 the conflict, if for no other reason than on account of her own 
 
 ^ Novoye Zveno, 1914, No. 13, p, 407. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 409 
 
 Internal complications that threatened a revolution, as Miljukov 
 informs us. That the projected attack on the Austrian Crown 
 Prince was known in Russia's official circles cannot be 
 absolutely proved. But there are many indications that this 
 occurrence did not find Russia's leading men entirely unpre- 
 pared. In this manner it was intended to bring Austria-Hun- 
 gary into a critical position, and either force her into war 
 against Serbia, or, if she drew back, to cause her to be crushed 
 by universal contempt. The attitude of the Serbian govern- 
 ment and of the Serbian press immediately following the out- 
 rage showed that Russia had quieted Serbia's fears as to the 
 results of the awful crime. When Austria-Hungary finally de- 
 cided, after a display of too great patience, energetically to put 
 an end w^th armed force to the Serbian intrigues on her soil, 
 Russia had the excuse for war which she had so long sought. 
 Her aim was, to be sure, not the protection of Serbia, but 
 the destruction of the Dual Monarchy and the weakening and 
 humiliating of Germany. But it was important to act quickly 
 so as not again to miss the favorable opportunity. 
 
 England and France must not be given too long a time for 
 consideration, nor must there be a possibility of localizing the 
 struggle and of diplomatic settlement. This is to be read in 
 every line of the Russian Orange Book, despite its falsity. The 
 English, too, jealous of Germany's growing commercial and 
 naval power, believed that the moment had come to crush Ger- 
 many and Austria-Hungary. Instead of checking the Russian 
 desire for w^ar, as they had done before. Sir Edward Grey and 
 his immediate cooperator stimulated it, not only in Petrograd 
 directly but also by way of Paris. Encouraged in this manner, 
 Russia proceeded to general mobilization, without awaiting the 
 result of the Austro-Russian negotiations in Petrograd, and 
 although Austria-Hungary had only eight corps mobilized 
 against Serbia. 
 
 That this meant war with Germany had long been clearly 
 known in Petrograd. The British Ambassador, Buchanan, had 
 so informed Sassonov at the beginning of the crisis. But war 
 was desired in Petrograd, because success was thought to be 
 certain. And so the war came about. The Russian govern- 
 ment will before long have to answer for this to its ow^n people, 
 beyond the circle of the Pan-Slavist fanatics, when it fails to 
 accomplish the destruction of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 
 But in the consciousness of the justice of their cause, Germany, 
 Austria-Hungary and Turkey will emerge with increased 
 strength from the conflict forced upon them. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 SERBIA'S ROLE 
 
 PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 VIENNA 
 
 WHEN in 1690 the Patriarch, Arsenije HI, Crnojevich of 
 Ipek, with 100,000 Serbs, placed himself under the 
 protection of Emperor Leopold I, it might reasonably have been 
 expected that the destiny of the whole Serbian nation was for- 
 ever united with Austria. That this did not prove to be the 
 case was due in part to mistakes made by the Vienna govern- 
 ment in the religious field, but the principal reason was that 
 before many years had passed Russia had begun her undermin- 
 ing work among the Austrian Serbs. Vienna drove the Serbs 
 into the arms of Peter the Great, and the Czar immediately 
 seized the opportunity of creating a firm basis for Russian influ- 
 ence in the interior of Austria. Since the use of the Cyrillic, or 
 Slavic, alphabet in printing was forbidden, as constituting a 
 dangerous threat to the Catholic Church, the Serbian bishops 
 turned to Russia for teachers and books, and during the last 
 years of his reign Peter the Great sought to satisfy their de- 
 mands. Russian teachers began to w^ork among the popula- 
 tion in the Hungarian-Slavonian borderland. Aside from the 
 fact that previous to Lomonosov, the Slavonian-Russian lan- 
 guage which now began to spread by books and teachers among 
 the Serbs, was adapted to its task neither from a linguistic nor 
 literary point of view, this influence was deleterious in other 
 ways to the spiritual development of the Serbs. There arose 
 that Slavonic-Serbian literary language which, under Russian 
 influence, became further and further separated from the living 
 speech of the people and which created a chasm betu^een the 
 educated and the uneducated classes of the Serbian population. 
 As permission for founding a Serbian printing establishment 
 in Austria was not to be obtained, one was set up in Venice 
 in 1758, thanks to Russian assistance. Unfortunately, the dis- 
 approval with which Vienna regarded the sending of books 
 from Russia did not lead it to draw the proper conclusions re- 
 garding its own acts. It continued to consider the furnish- 
 ing of intellectual nourishment to its Serbian subjects as be- 
 yond the province of the state, and not until the end of the 
 
 410 
 
MODERN GERMANY 411 
 
 eighteenth century was a printing establishment founded in 
 Vienna for "Illyrian" books. 
 
 A further factor was the peculiar position of the Serb immi- 
 grants. The rest of the population assumed toward them the 
 unfriendly attitude of a privileged, exclusive class. Previous 
 to the Peace of Belgrade (1739), when the Pashalik of Bel- 
 grade belonged to Austria, a systematic policy in the highest 
 court circles regarding the Serbs was altogether lacking. As a 
 consequence, the Serbs generally succeeded only through cunning 
 and tenacity in obtaining their desires. When, however, under 
 Maria Theresa, as the result of political developments, Hun- 
 garian influence gained in strength, dissatisfaction increased 
 among the Serbian population, especially among the officers of 
 the frontier regiments formed from Serbs. 
 
 Russia, which since the accession of the Czarina Elizabeth 
 had been notably active in the role of protector of the Greek 
 Oriental peoples, and especially of the Serbs, made an effort in 
 the early fifties — through discontented officers of the border 
 regiments to whom the most enticing promises w^ere held out 
 — to induce the Serbs in Hungary to emigrate into Russia. 
 They were to settle between the Bug and the Dnieper, in so- 
 called New Serbia, as an advance guard against Turkey. This 
 plan w^as partly successful. But as the Vienna government put 
 a prompt stop to the emigration in the interest of the Empire's 
 protection and as furthermore the settlers in Russia suffered 
 bitterly, the movement came to a sudden end. 
 
 Of great importance, however, was the affection felt by the 
 Austrian Serbs for Russia, and the strong influence of Russian 
 teachers, Russian literature and the Slavonic-Serbian literary 
 language. And yet to Austrian weapons alone was due Serbian 
 freedom and the creation of a national center. The foundation 
 of present-day Serbia was laid by the Austrian administration 
 of the Pashalik of Belgrade from 171 8 to 1739, without which 
 the revolt of 1804 would have been impossible. When Kara- 
 george and the other leaders of the revolt sought to place them- 
 selves under Austria's protection, only to find the door closed 
 against them owing to Vienna's attitude on the question of Tur- 
 key's sovereign rights, the spiritual head of the Austrian Serbs, 
 the Metropolitan Stratmirovich, turned to Czar Alexander in his 
 celebrated appeal, in which he proposed the formation of a 
 Serbian Turkish vassal state under a Russian Grand Duke, 
 Austria to surrender her Serbian possessions against indemnifica- 
 tion at some other point. 
 
 In Petrograd, despite the friendly relations with the Porte 
 
412 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and the treaty which was still in force, less consideration was 
 shown for the Sultan's government than was the case in Vienna. 
 The revolutionists received encouragement in the form of money, 
 and when, two years later, a breach occurred with Constanti- 
 nople, a military convention was entered into with them which 
 demanded greater sacrifices from the Serbs than was consonant 
 with the aid which they received from Russia. In addition, 
 the Imperial Councilor, Rodofinikin, appeared in Belgrade as 
 chief Russian agent, and soon revealed to the leaders of the 
 Serbians, as well as to the people themselves, the most unpleas- 
 ant side of the Russian protectorate. In a short time he had 
 gained universal hatred for himself, through his ruthless ad- 
 vancement of Russian interests, without regard for the suffer- 
 ings and dangers of the Serbian nation. Rodofinikin was the 
 type of the majority of Russian agents in Serbia. He also was 
 the first, in his memorial of November, 1808, to lay down the 
 lines of Russian policy for the future. 
 
 Russia, he said, must strengthen her position as sole domi- 
 nant power in Serbia for all time to come, in order, in case of 
 attack by Austria, to strike the Dual Monarchy in the flank 
 through Serbia and through the revolutionary element in the 
 adjoining South Slavic Austrian districts. The representatives 
 of Russian policy in Serbia, from Rodofinikin to Hartwig, have 
 held true to this principle, quite independently of the relations 
 between Austria and Russia at any given moment. 
 
 Serbia, however, was betrayed and sacrificed by Russia when- 
 ever Russian interests demanded it. This happened in the Peace 
 of Bukharest in 1812, when Karageorge was forced to flee from 
 Turkish vengeance. When two years later (181 5) Milos Ob- 
 renovich again unfurled the standard of revolt and national 
 defense that Karageorge had been forced to abandon, he turned 
 for help to Vienna. The Congress was then in session, and 
 Czar Alexander present. Emperor Francis received the depu- 
 tation, and one of the Serbian delegates, the High Priest Mat- 
 thias Nenadovich, relates in his memoirs the following charac- 
 teristic dialogue: 
 
 "Have you seen the Czar?" suddenly demanded Emperor 
 Francis. 
 
 "We have requested an audience, but have not yet been re- 
 ceived." replied Nenadovich. 
 
 "Ah, that diabolic policy!" sighed the Emperor. "He be- 
 lieves that no one knows the Russian government's activity 
 among the Serbs! And why will the Czar not receive you? 
 
MODERN GERMANY 413 
 
 Perhaps because he is a guest in my castle? That would make 
 no difference to me." ^ 
 
 When Milos Obrenovich, by his own strength and without 
 foreign help, defeated the Turks, and the grateful nation pro- 
 claimed him hereditary Prince of Serbia, the Russian Minister 
 at the Porte, Baron Stroganov, immediately protested. Russia 
 was decidedly opposed to the creation of a hereditary princi- 
 pality in Serbia, since such a form of government might more 
 easily escape from Russian influence. Indeed, Russia, the proto- 
 type of autocratic power, after the principle of hereditary sov- 
 ereignty had become an accomplished fact in Serbia, aimed 
 through the creation of a senate to limit the ruler's power. At 
 the request of Russia, the Porte agreed in the Constitution of 
 1830 that the members of this senate could not be removed 
 from their office by the Prince unless it was proved that they 
 were involved in guilty actions against the Turkish govern- 
 ment. Russia had calculated cleverly; it w^as clear from the 
 beginning that a senate whose members enjoyed such rights 
 could not fail to live in constant conflict with the Prince. With 
 the help of the senate, Russia has always been able to enforce 
 her w^ill in Serbia. As Petrograd never forgave Milos for ac- 
 quiring the hereditary princely power, everything was done to 
 destroy his standing with the Serbian people. Russia created 
 her own party by means of gold, and constantly sought, through 
 intrigues and force, to have the senate made up of men who 
 were her unquestioning tools. She did not even hestiate to 
 stir up the Serbian people against their ruler by means of a Rus- 
 sian Consul, Vasczenko, who traveled throughout the country, 
 carrying on his work of instigation. The new Constitution of 
 1839, which deprived the Prince of all power and gave it into 
 the hands of the seventeen senators, was Russia's work. There 
 was no other course for Milos Obrenovich than to abdicate in 
 favor of his eldest son, Michail (June 13, 1839), and to leave 
 the country. Nor did Russia rest content until the Obrenovich 
 dynasty had been entirely driven out. 
 
 When the Serbian senate elected Alexander Karageorgevich, 
 Russia did not recognize the election because it had not taken 
 place in the presence of the Russian representative, and it had, 
 therefore, to be repeated in the presence of this representative. 
 The new dynasty, however, could not meet Russia's constant 
 demands and soon lost the Czar's favor. When through the 
 Treaty of Paris (Article 28) Serbia, as a vassal state of Turkey, 
 was placed under the collective protection of the European 
 
 ^ The Serbian Question, by Vladan Georgevitch, p. 19. 
 
414 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Powers, Russia's reply was to expel Prince Alexander Kara- 
 georgevich. The Serbian National Assembly again placed the 
 dynasty of the Obrenovichi on the Serbian throne, and Prince 
 Milos returned from exile. After his death, which soon oc- 
 curred, his son Michail succeeded him. But Michall, like- 
 wise, did not long enjoy Russia's favor. On June 3, 1868, 
 the Petrograd newspaper Golos said: 
 
 "The Obrenovichi dynasty is Incapable of carrying out the 
 plans for a Slavic future in the peninsula. There is only one 
 candidate who Is worthy of mounting Serbia's throne, namely 
 Peter Karageorgevich, the son of Alexander Karageorgevlch. 
 He must be elevated to the throne of Serbia for the sake of the 
 Serbs and of the unhappy Inhabitants of Bosnia, Herzegovina 
 and Montenegro." 
 
 A week later, on June 10, 1868, Prince Michall was mur- 
 dered in the park of Topchlder. 
 
 Thanks to the presence of mind of the ex-President of the 
 Council of Ministers, Ilja Garasanin, and the other Serbian 
 officials, Russia this time did not enjoy the fruits of the murder. 
 Michail's nephew, Milan, not yet of age, was proclaimed Prince 
 by the Serbian National Assembly. From the very beginning 
 of his reign he had to reckon on Russia's 111 will. The memoirs 
 of General Georji Ivanovich Bobrikov, who as Russian mili- 
 tary plenipotentiary was active at Milan's side In 1877, give a 
 clear impression of the manner in which Russia ventured to use 
 Milan, when, as a result of the disasters at Plevna, Serbian 
 assistance against Turkey was badly needed. At this time Rus- 
 sia formed her connection with the Serbian Radical party, which 
 since Milan's time has remained the representative of Russian 
 Interests. Only on Andrassy's intercession did Serbia receive 
 Nish and the district of PIrot from the Congress of Berlin, 
 Russia not concerning herself either about her Serbian or her 
 Montenegrin ally. 
 
 Petrograd's tactics, however, soon after led to directing Ser- 
 bia's attention toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, which since 
 1876 had so often been offered to Austria-Hungary by Russia 
 and with the occupation of which, on the basis of the Congress 
 of Berlin, Russia had been thoroughly satisfied. As Milan 
 sought support from Austria-Hungary, Russia incited against 
 him the politicians of his own party, and they brought about 
 a series of revolts. Like his uncle, Michall, Milan up to 1878 
 was In favor of the Idea of a Serbian Piedmont, but his experi- 
 ences with Russia forced him to abandon this Idea, as only 
 Austria-Hungary supported him and his house. When King 
 
MODERN GERMANY 415 
 
 Milan, after the unfortunate day of Sllvnitza, saw himself 
 forced to abdicate in favor of his minor son Alexander, Russia 
 had reached the goal for which she had so long striven. King 
 Alexander lost favor with his people through his marriage with 
 Draga Mashin, which was engineered by Russia. The Rus- 
 sian legation was undoubtedly not without responsibility for 
 those terrible murders during the night of June 11, 1903. The 
 bloodstained throne was now occupied by that Peter Kara- 
 georgevich, who had been Russia's candidate in the year 1868. 
 With him the Radical party, which was the Russian party, 
 gained full power. The chief aim of Serbian politics since that 
 June day has been the national liberation of the "unredeemed" 
 Serbs in Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 
 
 *'To quiet the unattainable demands of social freedom pro- 
 claimed by Serbian Radicalism and in the interest of order in 
 the course of internal politics, the government saw itself prac- 
 tically forced to make use of the national liberation of the 
 ^unredeemed' Serbs as a political narcotic." ^ 
 
 In a memorial which the Minister of Foreign Affairs caused 
 to be written for King Peter after his accession in March, 1904, 
 by the then head of the Propaganda Section of the Ministry, 
 Sveta Simich, the program of the immediate future was outlined 
 in the following manner: 
 
 1. Alliance with Montenegro. The Prince must undertake 
 to carry out a common foreign policy directed by Belgrade. 
 
 2. Agreement with Bulgaria in regard to reforms in Mace- 
 donia and Old Serbia. Formation of a customs union for the 
 purpose of extending the Serbian economic area. 
 
 3. Economic emancipation from Austro-Hungarian markets; 
 definite advancement of the commercial-political interests of 
 the Western powers, Russia and Italy, as the best means for 
 rendering the Greater Serbian idea popular in Europe. 
 
 4. Advancement of the coalition idea of the small Serbian 
 and pro-Serbian parties in Croatia, for the purpose of support- 
 ing the Hungarian party of independence in its battle against 
 the Throne and Dualism. 
 
 5. Agitation in Bosnia for a union with Serbia. Discredit- 
 ing the Austro-Hungarian administration through systematic 
 propaganda and encouragement of the discontent of the Ortho- 
 dox and Mohammedan population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.^ 
 
 This program meant open warfare with Austria-Hungary. 
 The fact that at the moment Russia was involved in the Far 
 
 "^ Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serhien, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 12. 
 2 Ibid., p. 15 ff. 
 
4i6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 East was a cause of serious disquietude. As the result of the 
 loyal attitude of Austria-Hungary, however, that which Peter's 
 Prime Minister, General Savva Gruich, had feared before the 
 outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War did not come to pass. 
 
 "The relations between Russia and Japan have grown so 
 strained recently," he wrote on December 27, 1903, "that war 
 is now inevitable. I hope, nevertheless, that the Czar, in his 
 love of peace, will avoid war, for it would be a disaster not 
 only for Russia but also for us Slavs of the Balkans, whose sole 
 hope is in Russia's help. There is something disastrous in your 
 foreign policy! We fear that Austria, as soon as Russia is 
 seriously engaged in the Far East, will finally annex Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina and proceed to absorb Old Serbia — beyond the 
 Mitrovitze." 
 
 Meanwhile, especially after the tariff war with Austria-Hun- 
 gary, an active campaign had been started from Belgrade to stir 
 up dissatisfaction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the other South 
 Slavic territories. The Young Turk Revolution (1908) seemed 
 to simplify the problem. On the ground of its transformation 
 into a constitutional state, the Porte might demand the return 
 of Bosnia and Herzegovina; that would later offer the possi- 
 bility of taking these states more easily from Turkey than they 
 could be taken from Austria-Hungary. This was the opinion in 
 Belgrade circles. But when Emperor Francis Joseph announced 
 the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian hopes suf- 
 fered a collapse, and indignation ran high. Not for an in- 
 stant was it admitted either by Serbia or by Russia, the lat- 
 ter's protector, that Serbia had no right to interfere in this act, 
 and that in any event only the Porte and the signatory powers 
 of the Treaty of Berlin were in a position to protest. Through 
 his reception of the Serbian Crown Prince George, the Czar 
 gave the Serbians plainly to understand that he was on their 
 side and that they might rely on him. Only in the light of this 
 encouragement can one understand the following speech in the 
 Skupshtina by Stojan Protich : 
 
 "As long as Austria-Hungary remains what she is to-day, it 
 will be impossible to entertain friendly relations with her. Au- 
 stria-Hungary desires to remain a Great Power, but her compo- 
 sition renders her the fatherland of a whole series of different 
 nationalities with pronounced individuality. Peace and neigh- 
 borly relations can exist between us and Austria-Hungary only 
 if Austria-Hungary gives up her claim to be a Great Power and 
 resigns herself to the role of an Eastern Switzerland." ^ 
 
 1 Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 15. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 417 
 
 The Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Milovanovich, 
 indulged in no less unsuitable language in regard to the Dual 
 Monarchy : 
 
 "The freedom which the Balkan peoples gained from 18 12 to 
 1876 was achieved through Russia, while Austria-Hungary's first 
 act in the Balkans was to make slaves of the people of two 
 Serbian countries. Danger for the Balkan countries is to be 
 apprehended only from Austria-Hungary, and the balance must 
 be maintained against Austria-Hungary. The road to the ^gean 
 Sea must be blocked for Austria-Hungary. She must cease to 
 be a Balkan state. "^ 
 
 The tone which the Serbian press permitted itself toward the 
 Monarchy may be guessed after these attacks by responsible 
 men. 
 
 Since Russia was not in a position to protect her protege 
 against well-deserved punishment, Serbia was forced to beat a 
 retreat and to admit in an official declaration, first, that her 
 rights were not affected by the annexation, and second, that she 
 pledged herself to change the course of her present policy to- 
 ward Austria-Hungary, and that in the future she would main- 
 tain a friendly attitude. This was on March 13, 1909. But 
 this act of penitence was forced and purely outward. As 
 Serbia was sure of the support of Russia, who, as Rodofinikin 
 had often said, stood in need of her for the destruction of 
 Austria-Hungary, she was able quietly to carry out her former 
 plans. The Serbian Prime Minister, Stojan Novakovich, dur- 
 ing the last weeks of the annexation crisis did not hesitate to 
 say in a brochure that the Serbian state "must reach from 
 Timok to the Adriatic Sea and from Vardar to Grain among 
 the Alps." ^ Russia was the godfather of the Balkan League, 
 the foundation of which was laid on March 13, 19 12, in the 
 Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. According to Russian plans, this Balkan 
 League was to give proof of its efficacy in the struggle against 
 Austria-Hungary and by severing the South Slavic districts 
 from the Monarchy. It happened otherwise, however. Bul- 
 garian interests demanded war against the Porte on account of 
 Macedonia, out of which she was later so disgracefully cheated 
 by her allies. 
 
 The conflict was still raging; the first disillusionment had 
 been experienced through the refusal of Austria-Hungary and 
 Italy to grant Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea, in which act 
 Russia acquiesced. P. Miljukov, certainly an unimpeachable 
 
 ^ Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, by Sosnovsky, 2, p. 205. 
 ^ Najnovija Balkanska Kriza i Srpsko Pitanje, by Stojan Novakovich, 19 10. 
 
41 8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 witness, after a visit to Serbia, wrote that there was no need 
 to fear that Serbia w^ould turn to Austria-Hungary as the result 
 of Russian acquiescence in the question of the Adriatic harbor. 
 The Serbian peasants, who controlled seventy-three seats in 
 the Skupshtina, were all Russophile, since the love of Russia 
 had not been tested so severely among the Serbian people as in 
 Bulgaria. Serbian intellectuals realized that they could do 
 nothing but remain Russophile, largely because of their inerad- 
 icable hatred of Austria. Logically and politically, Serbian pol- 
 iticians regarded a rapprochement with Austria as possible, but, 
 psychologically, for the Serbian democracy to side with Austria 
 was quite out of the question. No one was afraid of a war 
 against Austria, as the Serbs were conscious of their own 
 strength. War was not desired at the moment only because 
 time was wished for in which to complete the preparations which 
 had been successfully begun after 1909. Encouraged by success, 
 the Serbs would proceed to even bolder schemes. No one could 
 tell when this struggle with Austria would come, whether in 
 five or fifteen years, but that it would come every one was con- 
 vinced. The question of "war or peace" was answered for 
 Serbia by "Peace for a new war." ^ 
 
 The restive forces of Belgrade gathered around the Crown 
 Prince and in the "Narodna Obrana" precipitated this war. 
 The outrage of June 28, 19 14, against the Austrian heir ap- 
 parent and his consort was intended to furnish the prerequisite 
 for the favorable outcome of the struggle, toward which Rus- 
 sia, well prepared for war, lent her influence. In 19 10 the 
 Russian ex-Minister of War, Kuropatkin, in his work, "Tasks 
 for the Russian Army," had written the prophetic words: 
 
 "On the basis of the estimate of Austria's interests in the 
 Balkan Peninsula, in Chapter XV the conclusion was reached 
 that, as early as the second half of the eighteenth century, it 
 became apparent as regards Russia's plans in the Balkans that 
 during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russian 
 sphere of action and influence must be limited to the eastern 
 half of the Peninsula; this was tantamount to an acknowl- 
 edgment that the western half of the Peninsula, which is in- 
 habited by the Serbian race, belonged to the Austrian sphere 
 of influence. 
 
 "These lessons of history, however, were quickly forgotten 
 ty the Russian government, and in the early years of the 
 nineteenth century Russia's interference began in the affairs of 
 the Serbian inhabitants of Turkey, which has not ceased even 
 
 '^Retschj, No. 5, January 6-19, 1913. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 419 
 
 to-day. This interference in the course of the nineteenth and 
 the first years of the twentieth century is the chief cause of the 
 distrustful and at times inimical relations between Russia and 
 Austria. If Russia does not cease this interference in a mat- 
 ter foreign to her and which at the same time touches Austria's 
 vital interests, a war may be expected between Russia and 
 Austria in the twentieth century on account of the Serbian 
 question." ^ 
 
 Kuropatkin has been proved to be right. Since the Czar did 
 not think it necessary to condemn the infamous outrage, re- 
 sponsibility for which in Belgrade was laid by the judicial in- 
 vestigation on circles near Crown Prince Alexander, it cannot be 
 surprising, in view of this attitude, that he considered the repara- 
 tion "disgraceful" which Austria-Hungary found herself forced 
 to demand, sword in hand. He held his protecting hand over 
 the Belgrade ruling classes, who were implicated in the royal 
 murders, and prepared for the attack on the Dual Monarchy. 
 
 ^ Zadacsi russkoj armij, Vol. 2, p. 334 ff. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA 
 
 PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE 
 OF HAMBURG 
 
 IN order to understand rightly the position of the Great Pow- 
 ers in East Asia before and during the war, it is necessary to 
 study them in connection with the developments of the last 
 twenty years. The year 1894, the beginning of the Japanese- 
 Chinese War, is the natural starting-point, for this date marks 
 the opening of the latest period in the history of the Interna- 
 tional relations of the countries of the Far East among them- 
 selves and of other countries to them. Up to that time the 
 interests of the Occidental Powers in China had been regarded 
 as directed toward one identical aim of commercial policy and 
 had consequently been handled in common. But from that 
 period on, there is a parting of the ways by which the Powers, 
 singly or In groups, tried to attain their goals. These goals 
 were as divergent as were the nature and extent of the posses- 
 sions of the various Powers from which they had resulted. 
 England's sole colonial possession on the East Asiatic coast was 
 the island of Hongkong, which she had acquired, together with 
 the desired control of the opium trade, by the Peace of Nan- 
 king in 1842, but In addition she possessed in all the more im- 
 portant cities of China, national settlements in which her offi- 
 cials not only conducted the administration but exercised, in a 
 limited degree, legal jurisdiction over the Chinese. Further, 
 thanks to her dominant position, she avowedly regarded herself 
 In East Asia, more even than elsewhere, as the real arbiter of 
 nations.^ Although in China proper up to that time England 
 had given no hint of other plans than such as concerned her 
 commercial interests, in the Chinese vassal states toward the 
 west she had operated all the more energetically from India as a 
 base. 
 
 In the year 1885, the Viceroy of India sent a military force 
 to Burmah, which was under Chinese suzerainty. In reply to 
 her protest, China received the customary answer that her rights 
 would be fully respected ; yet at the same time the King of Bur- 
 
 1 See The Far Western Question, Valentine Chirol, p. 3 ff. 
 
 420 
 
MODERN GERMANY 421 
 
 mah was sent as a prisoner to Calcutta and the country de- 
 clared by the Viceroy as "incorporated into the possessions of 
 Her Britannic Majesty." In the Agreement of Peking, 1886, 
 England undertook to see that the embassy bearing tribute due 
 to China every ten years be regularly sent. The members of the 
 embassy were all to be Burmese! Yet a considerable time pre- 
 viously the Anglo-Indian government had stretched out its feel- 
 ers toward the north, in order to bring the border states of the 
 Himalayas under its control and thus gain possession of the 
 Thibet plateau, which, as Lord Curzon later characterized ft, 
 is "the glacis of the Indian fortress." Every step here was an 
 encroachment on the undeniable sovereign rights of China; this 
 was done with less hesitation, as China's military weakness pre- 
 vented her from defending her possessions. 
 
 Nepal — the home of the Gurkhas — had become a dependency 
 of India since the war of 1814, although, in order to preserve 
 a semblance of China's suzerainty, embassies were still allowed 
 to proceed thence to Peking to pay tribute — the last of these 
 embassies from Nepal appeared in China in 1887. In the year 
 1835 the Indian government had taken over the district of Dar- 
 jeeling, east of Nepal, by pensioning the prince; and in 1861, 
 Sikkim, which adjoined it on the east, was incorporated, partly 
 at first, into the Indian possessions, since "the fact of British 
 ascendency and the situation of Sikkim in a direct line between 
 Calcutta and Lhassa could not but suggest its adaptability as a 
 highway for trade between the two regions." ^ Not until the Cal- 
 cutta Agreement of 1890 was the British protectorate over Sik- 
 kim recognized, but the regulation of the Indo-Thibetan "trade" 
 — and this was the important point for the Indian government in 
 the development of its further designs on Thibet — was reserved 
 for later negotiation. For the time being Bhutan, a depend- 
 ency of Thibet and hence of China, and which adjoins Sikkim 
 and controls the passes to the highlands, was left undisturbed. 
 
 In the manner of England in the southwestern borderlands of 
 China, France, in the course of the nineteenth century, had 
 formed in the southern districts on the peninsula of Farther 
 India a broad foundation for her policy of force. As early as 
 1787, under the stimulus and with the assistance of the Catholic 
 Mission at Versailles, a treaty had been made with Annam, ac- 
 cording to which certain strongholds in Cochin-China were to 
 be ceded to France for assistance given. From this point as a 
 basis, although seventy years later, the expansion of the French 
 power toward the north was made, "in the interest" of the king- 
 
 1 China and Her Neighbours, R. S. Gundry, p. 395. 
 
422 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 dom of Annam and of its "rights" — after the territory of Saigon 
 had been conquered in 1862 and Annam thereby reduced to the 
 position of a helpless tool. In 1867 Cambodia, ostensibly a vas- 
 sal state of Annam, was "protected" against the claims of Slam 
 and placed under French protection; in 1874 a treaty was made 
 with Annam itself in which the French protectorate was not yet 
 clearly announced, it is true, but at least foreshadowed. These 
 measures called forth energetic protests, not only from China, 
 to which country Annam stood in a tributary relation, but they 
 also caused a great outcry in England, who then as now con- 
 sidered the disregard of the rights of others as her exclusive 
 privilege.^ The relations with China became more critical in 
 the year 1882, when France proceeded with military force 
 against Tonkin, in the extreme north of Annam, and took pos- 
 session of the country. The following year the entire kingdom 
 of Annam was declared under the protection of France. In 
 order to put an end once and for all to China's resistance to 
 these infringements of her rights, France decided on military 
 measures: in 1884 war resulted, and in the peace of 1885 China 
 gave the assurance that she would withdraw her troops from 
 Tonkin and recognize all French treaties with Annam. France 
 in return promised "to respect the southern boundaries between 
 China and Tonkin and to protect them against the attack of any 
 other nation and under all conditions." ^ 
 
 Therewith France had created for herself the desired great 
 colonial empire, which left Slam as the only independent state 
 on the peninsula of Farther India. But at the same time 
 France had become the immediate neighbor of China proper, 
 and this fact may not have been without influence on the deci- 
 sion which the Indian government reached at this time In regard 
 to Burmah. Both European Powers had now a Chinese fron- 
 tier. In each case in the Province of Yunnan, and they were 
 neighbors; both saw the possibility of advancing their interest at 
 this point. In the same direction toward the rich district of the 
 upper Yangtse, and thence farther east; and both were aware 
 that their ambitions might lead to dangerous clashes. 
 
 The American minister. Colonel Denby, who in 1889, soon 
 after these events, undertook a journey through southern Man- 
 churia, declared after his return that "the extensive borderlands 
 in the north and west of the Chinese Empire would some day 
 
 1 Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, H. 
 Cordier, Vol. II, p. 299: "Les criailleries du gouvernement anglais." 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 435 and 523. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 423 
 
 In all likelihood suffer the same fate as Burmah and Tonkin." 
 Russia was at that time the cause of such fears. 
 
 Russia's desire for expansion Into Chinese territory was also 
 of ancient date. The conqueror of Siberia had pressed forward 
 in the seventeenth century Into the Amur regions and northern 
 Manchuria, till through the treaty of Nerchinsk, in the year 
 1689, ar» end was put to further conquests. Not until one hun- 
 dred and seventy years later did a new active policy begin at 
 this point. In 1858 advantage was taken of the Franco-English 
 war against China to bring the northern bank of the Amur 
 River, and in i860 the entire coast district as far as the Tumen 
 River and to the borders of Corea, Into Russian possession; thus 
 entire northern and middle Manchuria was surrounded by the 
 territory of the Czar. In 1872 the Russian naval port was 
 transferred from Nicolalevsk to the more southerly Vladivostock. 
 But Russian activity w^as not limited to the Amur territories. 
 The great Mohammedan revolt under Yakub Beg In Turkestan 
 at the middle of the nineteenth century induced Russia In 1871 
 to occupy the so-called III district, together with Kuldja. In 
 the treaty of Livadia In 1879 Russia took advantage of the in- 
 capacity of the Chinese negotiators In order to gain possession, 
 not alone of the entire III Basin, but In addition to obtain extraor- 
 dinary commercial privileges, such as absolutely free trade In the 
 whole of Mongolia. The treaty was, in fact, a monstrosity, and 
 was rejected by Peking, as was to be expected; In 1881 It was re- 
 placed by another treaty, by which the greater part of Turkestan, 
 inclusive of Kuldja, was given back to China, but extensive rights 
 of a commercial nature were nevertheless left to Russia, such as 
 free trade in Mongolia and certain parts of East Turkestan, 
 consular representation in a great number of cities In this terri- 
 tory, which were otherwise closed to trade, etc. By this treaty 
 Russia obtained a highly favored and unique position In the 
 northern and northwestern outlying districts of China, from 
 which she was In a position at any time to make her influence 
 felt In the adjoining provinces of Kansu and Shensi. 
 
 While thus in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
 France, England and Russia had laid a foundation in the 
 southern, western and northern outlying districts of the Chinese 
 Empire for their political power, reaching as far as the border 
 of China proper, and which at any suitable time might be ex- 
 tended beyond these limits, Japan, the only other Asiatic 
 state concerned beside supine China, w^as forced for the moment 
 to remain without a share In this development, as she was en- 
 tirely occupied in strengthening herself Internally and did not 
 
424 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 yet understand the far-reaching ambitions of the European Pow- 
 ers. In Japan, too, however, the impulse toward expansion was 
 soon felt in the interest of strengthening her internal condition. 
 In order to give occupation to the Samurai (the noble warrior 
 class), who were in a state of unrest, the government undertook 
 in the year 1874 a military expedition against the Island of 
 Formosa, whose savage inhabitants, it was claimed, had murdered 
 Japanese merchants in the previous year. The island belonged 
 to China, and had been settled by Chinese in the seventeenth 
 century. The government at Peking, therefore, protested, and 
 the result was that the families of those murdered received an 
 indemnity from China, and Japan's occupation of the island was 
 not carried out. Japan then turned to the Liu-Kiu Islands, of 
 which she took possession in 1879, on the basis of a pretended 
 tributary understanding dating from the year 1609, although the 
 islands acknowledged themselves to be vassals of China. China's 
 protest remained unnoticed. The real object, however, of Japan's 
 desires was now, as it had been for centuries, Corea, a tributary 
 state of China by its own acknowledgment. The Chinese govern- 
 ment, it is true, had acted in a degree contrary to its own con- 
 struction of the situation by allowing Corea to conclude commer- 
 cial treaties with several foreign Powers, among others in 1876 
 with Japan, who had obtained this end by military pressure. 
 
 According to occidental legal principles, the inevitable logical 
 conclusion was that Corea was an independent state and that 
 it had been tacitly recognized as such by China; the latter coun- 
 try, however, persistently refused to allow such an inference to 
 be drawn from these treaties. At all events, in the treaty of 
 1876, Japan succeeded in having Corea designated as an "inde- 
 pendent state" which "enjoys the same sovereign rights as does 
 Japan." As the result of Japanese intrigues, a series of murders 
 and disturbances took place in the Corean capital in 1884, so 
 that iinally Chinese and Japanese troops had to interfere. In 
 tile following year, in a special treaty of Japan with Corea, nor- 
 mal relations were reestablished, and a few months later (1885) 
 an agreement was reached with China, according to which in 
 future disturbances neither China nor Japan was to send 
 troops to Corea without a previous mutual understanding. The 
 question of China's legal relationship to Corea was not dis- 
 cussed and remained open to dispute as before. Japan's plans, 
 however, in regard to the Asiatic Continent, which were an in- 
 heritance from the past, became more ambitious as the empire 
 grew stronger and more conscious of its position in the political 
 development of the East. 
 
 i 
 
MODERN GERMANY 425 
 
 Matters stood thus in the year 1894, when Japan, in further- 
 ance of these plans, took advantage of the outbreak of new dis- 
 orders in Corea, and of the sending thither of Chinese troops, in 
 order to declare war on China. The entire question of the 
 division of power and the aspirations of the foreign states in 
 East Asia was hereby opened up; the revelation by the war of 
 China's absolute helplessness hastened the march of events. 
 England, w^ho at first underestimated Japan's strength, openly 
 took the side of assaulted China, and her aversion to the vic- 
 torious Island Empire led her at the beginning of October, 1894, 
 to make an appeal to the European Great Powers to unite in a 
 protest and to check Japan's victorious course. The proposal 
 was refused as untimely. But when, in the further course of 
 the war, it became clear that in the peace negotiations Japan 
 intended to make extensive territorial acquisitions in China 
 proper, and thereby to go far beyond her original goal, which 
 was the recognition of Corea's independence, the European Pow- 
 ers became seriously disturbed, lest in this manner the seed of 
 permanent disturbance be planted in East Asia. That these 
 fears were only too well founded was proved by the results — 
 one needs only to ask British merchants in East Asia. When, 
 therefore, in the spring of 1895 Russia revived the English 
 proposition, France and Germany this time showed themselves 
 to be receptive; whereas England at first hesitated, and finally, 
 to every one's surprise, declared that she saw no cause for ob- 
 jection to the Japanese conquests. The French historian, H. 
 Cordier, says in regard to England's action: "The attitude of 
 the British Cabinet led to the belief that it was bound by a 
 secret treaty with the Tokio Cabinet. This, however, was a 
 mistake, as events later showed; but it is certain that Albion at 
 that time was already seeking to win the gratitude of the con- 
 queror, who, however, did not allow himself to be at all deceived 
 by England's change of front." ^ 
 
 Germany, who regretted this first serious breach in the Euro- 
 pean solidarity of action in East Asia, made an effort, after 
 Russia and France had decided upon a protest against Japan's 
 peace conditions, to make use of her participation in the inter- 
 ests of restraint and moderation. Almost two months before the 
 protest was made, in March, 1895, she confidentially informed 
 the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu, of what was about 
 to occur, and advised him, since opposition to the three Powers 
 W£LS out of the question, to forestall the whole proceeding by a 
 
 1 Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec des Puissances Occidentales, Vol. 
 Ill, p. 289. 
 
426 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 voluntary modification of Japan's conditions of peace and thus 
 to avoid even the semblance of any humiliation of the victorious 
 country. Unfortunately, Count Mutsu did not follow this 
 friendly advice — indeed, it even appeared as if he had not brought 
 it to the knowledge of his colleagues in the cabinet; at 
 all events, it has remained unknown to the Japanese down to 
 the present day. When in May, following the Peace of Shi- 
 monoseki, protest was actually made, it was again Germany who 
 (at the request of Japan) insisted that China should first of all 
 ratify the treaty as had been originally agreed ; afterward, the 
 Chinese government was given to understand, China might make 
 the proposition to Japan of substituting an increase in the war 
 indemnity in place of territorial cessions on the Asiatic conti- 
 nent. China was assured that Japan would be ready to accept 
 the proposal. In this course Germany's sole aim was to save 
 Japan from all appearance of submitting to force. It is evident 
 that, when once the protest had become unavoidable, Japan had 
 every cause to be thankful that Germany took part in the inter- 
 vention in the interest of moderation. Unfortunately, the 
 malevolent British press, systematically copied by that of Japan, 
 kept the Japanese nation from understanding the real situation. 
 
 In the Peace of Shimonoseki, Japan obtained the final recogni- 
 tion by China of Corea's independence and the surrender of the 
 Island of Formosa, as well as of the Pescadores Islands, lying 
 between Formosa and the continent, while the Peninsula of Liao- 
 tung, which had also been ceded, was given back to China, to- 
 gether with Port Arthur, according to agreement, in return for 
 a money indemnity. If Europe had believed that through this 
 restitution the dangers which might result from the Japanese 
 conquests in China proper were obviated, such a supposition could 
 not fail even at this time to be recognized as unjustified by any 
 one familiar with political conditions in Corea and with the 
 history of Japan's relations to that country. For centuries Co- 
 rea had enjoyed no independent existence, and under the politi- 
 cal conditions of the nineteenth century she was less capable 
 than ever of attaining such a poskion. The "independence" of 
 this entirely unorganized state which Japan had fought for, 
 could have no other meaning for the initiated than as being the 
 first step toward the incorporation into the empire of the victor. 
 This aim was thenceforth systematically pursued by Japan and 
 quickly achieved. 
 
 The whole political development in East Asia, however, now 
 struck into paths which in no wise suited German aims. In 
 view of Germany's European position, it was self-evident that 
 
MODERN GERMANY 427 
 
 she could never hope to obtain territorial acquisitions in the 
 Far East, such as England, France, Russia and Japan possessed. 
 She was, however, determined to develop to the limit of her 
 ability her already important commercial interests in China, 
 which clearly offered great possibilities for the future. Such 
 aims required that Chinese territory remain open to free com- 
 petition in trade and that a strong, enlightened native govern- 
 ment preserve order and repel illegitimate interference from out- 
 side. The German manufacturer and merchant need never fear 
 an honest competitor, although they do fear the political oppressor 
 and conqueror. The inviolability of China's territory, the open 
 door for trade and the firm establishment of the Chinese govern- 
 ment have therefore formed the guiding principles of Germany's 
 policy during the last twenty years — not from disinterested mo- 
 tives, but from proper appreciation of her own interests. If 
 there was a time when doubts were entertained in Germany as 
 to the practicability of this policy, this was due primarily to 
 the greed for power of the four other Great Powers, in contrast 
 to whose gigantic plans the German aims sank into utter insig- 
 nificance. The following exposition will make this clearer; it 
 will also show that this greed for power, despite vociferations to 
 the contrary, was irreconcilable with the principle of the open 
 door and with China's inviolability; in addition, it will furnish 
 proof that England, France and Japan, as the result of a com- 
 mon plan, sought to prevent all further development of Ger- 
 many's position in the Far East and to exclude German compe- 
 tition. 
 
 Immediately following the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia and 
 France began to advance their broad front in the north and 
 south on China's borders in such a manner that Germany (and 
 England in even more marked manner) was filled with increas- 
 ing apprehension. In June, 1895, France, despite her promise 
 of 1885, succeeded in securing from China, not alone the advance- 
 ment of her Annam boundary into Yunnan, but also the opening 
 up to French trade of several places in Yunnan and Kuangsi. 
 But especially valuable was China's agreement to the extension 
 of the Annam railways into Chinese territory, and the exclusive 
 privilege of mining undertakings in the provinces of Yunnan, 
 Kuangsi and Kuangtung; as a result of this, these three provinces 
 were practically transformed into an exclusive sphere of French 
 influence. These agreements were extended in 1897 ^"d 1898 
 by concessions for the building of certain railway lines through 
 Yunnan and Kuangsi. 
 
 Similar steps were taken in the north by Russia. In the year 
 
428 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 1 89 1 the building of the great Siberian Railway had been begun. 
 It was originally planned to pass exclusively through Russian 
 territory. For this reason it would have been forced to make a 
 wide detour in order to reach Vladivostock, and would have had 
 to traverse the wild, uninhabited mountain districts on the north- 
 ern shore of the Amur River, instead of tapping the fruitful 
 plains and prosperous cities of Manchuria. A way out of the dif- 
 ficulty, however, was gained by an agreement with China in the 
 year 1896. According to this, Russia obtained the right to build 
 the road from a point in southern Transbaikalia, through northern 
 and middle Manchuria in a straight line toward Vladivostock. In 
 addition, another line was to be built with Russian capital from a 
 point on the Manchurian line in a southerly direction, reaching 
 the sea at the harbors of Ta-lien-wan (Dalni, Dairen), Port 
 Arthur and Newchwang, and connecting with a further line to 
 Tientsin and Peking. For general purposes of safety, Russia 
 was to be allowed to protect her railways by military guards; 
 further, she acquired the right to adopt certain military measures 
 in Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, the conditional surrender of the 
 Bay of Kiaochow, on the coast of Shantung, as a base for the 
 Russian fleet, and concessions for the exploitation of mines in 
 Manchuria. Russia thus obtained an important extension of her 
 northern sphere of power throughout the whole of Manchuria, 
 and if we regard the Bay of Kiaochow as marking the southern 
 boundary, far into the territory of China proper as well. In this 
 manner Russia acquired the much-coveted possession of ice-free 
 harbors on the Pacific Ocean. There remained only the inclu- 
 sion of ''independent" Corea to round out the immense territory. 
 Here, however, Russia's plans came into conflict with Japan's 
 well-advanced interests. 
 
 It was self-evident that such concessions on the part of China 
 had been obtained by Russia and France only through the exer- 
 cise of strong political pressure, and the helplessness exhibited 
 by the Chinese government filled Germany with anxiety con- 
 cerning her own interests. It was no longer possible to count 
 on protection against the encircling and constricting efforts of the 
 politically more favorably placed oppressors of China; the divi- 
 sion of China into "spheres of influence" seemed on the point of 
 becoming an actuality, and whoever did not undertake to pro- 
 tect his own position ran the risk of being smothered. It was 
 these considerations which decided Germany, in the year 1897, 
 after having repeatedly called China's attention to the situa- 
 tion and after an especially marked slight by the officials of 
 Shantung, to occupy the Kiaochow Bay district, in order to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 429 
 
 make it a base for her fleet and trade, without regard for the 
 pretended Russian claims, of which she had not been notified. 
 England, who, as we have remarked, w^as much more disturbed 
 than Germany, compensated herself for the French increase of 
 territory by a corresponding frontier adjustment between Bur- 
 mah and Yunnan, which she obtained from China in the year 
 
 1897. The acquisition of Kiaochow by Germany was not re- 
 garded by England at the moment with unfriendly eyes; for one 
 reason, because, as Lord Salisbury remarked to the German 
 Ambassador in London, on January 12, 1898, he "thought it 
 probable that no great injury had been inflicted upon England," ^ 
 and further because Russian interests were seemingly impaired, 
 and the probability was thus increased of gaining Germany's 
 help against Russia. There was still another consideration. Af- 
 ter Germany had acquired certain rights to particular railway 
 lines and mining undertakings, and was thus, in the English 
 view, definitely indemnified in China, England determined to 
 carve out for herself the ''spheres of interests" which she thought 
 were due to her. 
 
 On February 9, 1898, the British Minister in Peking handed 
 a note to the Chinese government, in which he demanded the 
 assurance that "China would never alienate any territories of 
 the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power." 
 The government, which was doubtless somewhat astonished by 
 this strange demand, of course gave the desired assurance with- 
 out delay, especially as the expression "any other Power" natu- 
 rally included England also.^ In this remarkably simple manner, 
 England brought the "Yang-tsze valley" into her sphere of in- 
 fluence, and a telegram from Lord Salisbury, of September 24, 
 
 1898, to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, shows what we 
 must understand by this somewhat indefinite expression. Ac- 
 cording to this, it includes "the provinces adjoining the Yang- 
 tsze River, as well as Honan and Chekiang" ^ — that is to say, 
 not less than nine of the eighteen provinces of China, precisely the 
 largest and most fertile, a territory which extends from the fron- 
 tiers of Burmah and Thibet to the Pacific Ocean. This action 
 is characteristic of the way in which England acquires "inter- 
 ests." It is self-evident that a claim of this kind to the "Yang- 
 tsze valley," which rests purely on a one-sided declaration by 
 England, has been recognized neither by Germany nor, so far 
 as known, by any other Power, nor can it be recognized. An 
 
 1 British Blue Bock, 1898, China, I, No. 49. 
 
 2 Ibid., China II, Nos. i and 2. 
 
 s British Blue Book, 1899, China II, No. 46. 
 
430 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 explanation to that effect by the German Ambassador to Lord 
 Salisbury, on May 13, 1898, leaves no doubt on this point.^ 
 
 Through this advancement of their political interests by the 
 Great Powers in the territory of China, the points of possible 
 conflict were naturally multiplied in the south and the south- 
 west between England and France, in the north and northeast 
 between Russia and Japan, in a slight degree also between Russia 
 and Germany. Even America, who had hitherto held quite 
 aloof, but who after the war with Spain in 1898 had acquired 
 the Philippines (in which consideration for the developments in 
 East Asia had doubtless not been the least important factor), 
 was thereby drawn into the larger Japanese sphere of interest 
 in the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Germany and Russia 
 soon came to an understanding, as the claims of the latter state 
 did not extend beyond Manchuria. This was a disappointment 
 to England, who felt, despite her vast sphere of interest, that she 
 was interfered with on all sides, as she was unable to free herself 
 of the delusion that any overseas success of another Power is a 
 derogation of her rights. She seemed temporarily uncertain as 
 to her plans, but considerations of general policy were finally 
 decisive for her attitude in East Asia. Russia appeared for the 
 moment the most annoying opponent, first because she cut off 
 from England's exploitation long stretches of territory running 
 to the sea, and second because her activity in the East precluded 
 her from similar activity in the West, where it was more desired 
 by England. The latter country's uneasiness had been increased 
 following the leasing by Russia, in the spring of 1898, of the har- 
 bors of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (Dalni) from China, 
 When England decided to occupy the harbor of Wei-hai-wei, 
 lying opposite on the coast of Shantung, for so long a time as 
 Port Arthur should remain Russian, the British government ex- 
 plained that the sole object of this action was to maintain the 
 balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, menaced by Russia's 
 occupation of Port Arthur.^ Immediately thereafter France took 
 possession of the Bay of Kuang-chow wan on the south coast of 
 the Province of Kuangtung. 
 
 Once more, during the Boxer troubles (1900-01), the com- 
 mon danger drove the Powers to concerted action, but their 
 rival interests quickly brought them again into opposition. Al- 
 most does it appear as if the critical state of affairs in 1900 had 
 temporarily moved England to accept the condition of things in 
 China as they had shaped themselves, and earnestly to devote 
 
 1 British Blue Book, 1899, China I, No. 96. 
 
 2 Ibid., No. 2. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 431 
 
 her strength to preserving the further inviolability of Chinese 
 territory and to securing the open door for trade. Only thus 
 can the fact be explained that on October 16, 1900, she made 
 an agreement in London with Germany, the Power most inter- 
 ested in both of these principles, whereby the two states pro- 
 claimed their firm intention to uphold the above maxims "for all 
 Chinese territory, in so far as their influence extended." All 
 the Powers w^ere to be invited to join in the agreement, and as 
 a matter of fact, all of them — including Russia, France and 
 Japan — did so, with the proviso that the status quo should re- 
 main unchanged in the future. 
 
 But the hope proved to be vain; the decisive factors in Eng- 
 land's European policy soon crowded all consideration of indi- 
 vidual East Asiatic questions into the background. The most 
 important among these factors w^as the conviction that the Ger- 
 man sea trade and the German fleet were increasing in an undue 
 manner, and should therefore be suppressed. The oft-quoted 
 articles in the English newspapers and magazines, such as The 
 Spectator, The Saturday Review, The National Review, etc., 
 in many cases written by naval officers, and dating back to the 
 year 1896, reveal this growing enmity toward Germany, which 
 finally overshadowed all else. The gradually developing idea of 
 encircling and isolating Germany made it necessary that Russia's 
 energy be turned back toward the West, especially, as she was 
 beginning to become dangerous in the East. While down to 
 1898 it had been thought necessary to weaken Russia, on ac- 
 count of her Asiatic policy, and that to this end German assist- 
 ance might be enlisted, the ultimate aim now changed, and with 
 it the method of procedure. Russia was to be forced out of East 
 Asia, but without thereby having her usefulness against Ger- 
 many permanently decreased — that is to say, her strength must 
 not be unduly weakened, and her expectations in West Asia, 
 in Turkey and in the Balkans were to be increased. 
 
 For the solution of this new problem England made use of 
 the Russo-Japanese antagonism which, as explained above, had 
 grown up in Corea. At the beginning of the year 1902 she 
 concluded for five years the alliance with Japan, regarding which 
 negotiations had been carried on since 1898, and which had 
 been first conceived of as a triple alliance to Include Germany. 
 In the treaty the contracting parties mutually recognized "the 
 Independence of China and of Corea," and furthermore the spe- 
 cial interest of Japan in Corea was acknowledged, and pro- 
 tection against "the aggressive action of any other Power" agreed 
 upon. The casus foederis w^as not to arise in case of war with 
 
432 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 a single Power. By unduly extending her undertakings, which 
 included not only the whole of Manchuria but had also en- 
 croached on Corea, by contemptuously repelling the Japanese 
 efforts toward compromise, and by overestimating her own ca- 
 pacity, Russia substantially aided England in promoting her 
 plans. 
 
 In the year 1904 war broke out with the well-known results: 
 Japan obtained a free hand in Corea; Russian rights in South 
 Manchuria, especially as regards the harbors of Port Arthur 
 and Dalni (Dairen), as well as the corresponding portion of the 
 Manchurian Railway, were transferred to Japan. But — and 
 this was important in its results for Japan's internal economy 
 and hence for the independence of her policy — she received no 
 indemnity for the cost of the war. England's first goal had been 
 attained ; Russia was excluded from the sea coast south of Vladivo- 
 stock, while her possibilities of development remained untouched 
 at other points, and ample room was provided for them in the 
 West by England's Persian and Turkish policy. In addition, 
 Japan, owing to her need of money, remained chained to Eng- 
 land for further undertakings. 
 
 But this was not all which the year 1904-5 brought to British 
 politics in the way of success. Advantage was taken of Rus- 
 sia's war — perhaps more in response to the pressure of the *'go 
 ahead" Indian party than from the voluntary decision of the 
 government at London — to carry the plans for the acquisition 
 of the "Indian glacis," namely Thibet, a step nearer to develop- 
 ment; especially as there was reason for fearing that Russia 
 might forestall England by putting herself in possession. On 
 the plea that the Lama authorities had failed to carry out the 
 agreement of 1890 in regard to the India-Thibet trade, a mili- 
 tary expedition was undertaken in the autumn of 1904 to 
 Lhassa, and a treaty extorted which made the position of Thibet, 
 to say the least, very like that of a British protectorate. This 
 treaty, moreover, entirely put an end to China's sovereign rights, 
 since it dealt with Thibet as an "independent" state. The case 
 of Corea had shown the advantage of recognizing the "inde- 
 pendence" of such states for purposes of more ambitious under- 
 takings. 
 
 The aroused Chinese government, however, brought about the 
 repudiation of the treaty of Lhassa, and in 1906 on its own 
 initiative entered into a new one with England. The provisions 
 of this latter treaty, however, are so elastic and ambiguous that 
 England is in a position at any time to open up the Thibet 
 question when conditions seem favorable for so doing. Later 
 
MODERN GERMANY 433 
 
 developments — the action of China against Thibet, the flight of 
 the Dalai Lama to India, the fall of the Chinese dynasty, and 
 the effort of the Lama hierarchy to obtain independence — would 
 repeatedly have been taken advantage of by England as an 
 excuse for interference, had not once more considerations of gen- 
 eral policy (above all in regard to Russia) dictated "watchful 
 waiting." In the great settlement with Russia in 1907, in re- 
 gard to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, both Powers pledged 
 themselves for the present to withhold their hands from the 
 Thibetan booty, to acknowledge China's sovereign rights, and, 
 further, to respect her interests. But in order to hold the door 
 open for the future, in any event, England declared in Peking 
 in 1 9 10 that she found herself compelled to insist upon the 
 maintenance of an effective Thibetan government, since the 
 fact of Thibet having its own government was a prerequisite for 
 the security of future English plans.^ 
 
 For the same purpose, in the year 19 10, England bought from 
 the little Himalaya state, Bhutan, for a yearly payment of loo,- 
 000 rupees, the right to direct its external relations.- Bhutan 
 has "external relations" only with Thibet, whose vassal state 
 it is, and with China, under whose mediate suzerainty it stands.^ 
 The following is from the pen of an English authority on East 
 Asiatic affairs: " ^Devant ces suzerainetes-lal wrote a witty 
 Frenchman, speaking of Chinese pretensions In Annam ; 'on salue 
 et on passe/ (One salutes and passes on in the presence of 
 such rights of suzerainty.) Before contradictions such as these, 
 one might exclaim, we can only hold our peace dumbfounded." * 
 In place of Annam, Thibet may be substituted. 
 
 In tracing this particular course of England's struggle for 
 power, we have meanwhile anticipated developments in China, 
 and we must again retrace our steps to the year 1905. From 
 this period on British politics had no further need of primary or 
 secondary aims, there was but one task for the World Empire: 
 the destruction of Germany, of her fleet, of her colonies and of 
 her overseas commerce. The accomplishment of this task drove 
 England to that feverish activity in East Asia by which she 
 sought to influence the course of events to her own advantage. 
 Patiently, she laid all her usual interests aside in order to press 
 into her service all the Great Powers for her great European 
 stroke; they follow the promptings of the strings which she ma- 
 
 1 British Blue Book, 1910, "Further Papers Relating to Thibet," Nos. 315 
 and 347. 
 
 2 Ibid., No. 346. 
 
 3 See China and Her Neighbours, R. S. Gundry, p. 350. 
 * Ibid., p. 95. 
 
434 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 nipulates, in part without being conscious of what they are do- 
 ing. A criss-cross of agreements extending in all directions, 
 binds the different Powers; they have all been entered into at 
 England's instigation, or at least under English supervision, and 
 are intended to eliminate the possibility of clashes in the East, 
 in order that the collective strength may remain unimpaired and 
 free to be used in the West. China has to bear the costs of this 
 policy, for the wishes of each one of the states concerned must 
 find fulfilment in the great empire in order to prevent its defec- 
 tion. Each such fulfilment, however, costs China a part of her 
 possessions, either in land or in sovereign rights. And while 
 each of those interested grabs all that is within reach, each agree- 
 ment proclaims its aim to be the ^'inviolability of China" and 
 the "open door for the trade of the world." There is scarcely a 
 chapter in the history of international relations which bears so 
 plainly the stamp of untruth. 
 
 In order to understand in the following discussion the lengths 
 to which the English plans against the German Empire had gone 
 in Europe, it Is well to recall the agreements which were made 
 in 1906 betW'een the British military attache in Brussels and the 
 Belgian Chief of the General Staff, in regard to the landing of 
 British troops in case of conflict with Germany. In the year 1912 
 these were further developed. 
 
 Even before the signing of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, 
 In August, 1905, England and Japan substituted for their treaty 
 of alliance that w^ould not have expired until 1907 a new one 
 for ten years; by this, Japan gained an absolutely free hand in 
 Corea to secure her Interests, while a like privilege was granted 
 to England "in the proximity of the Indian frontier for safe- 
 guarding her Indian possessions." The first of these points was 
 a concession to Japan, in return for which the alliance was to 
 be extended to India, and If necessary, to Thibet and Afghanistan 
 — an extension which in the year 1902, according to a statement 
 of Count Hayashi, had been denied by Japan. This protective 
 measure was necessary, as it was not yet certain how Russia 
 would act in the unsettled Thibetan question. In 1907, when 
 the provisional Asiatic understanding with Russia had been ef- 
 fected, and Russia had thereby become a link in the chain which 
 was being forged about Germany, the alliance with Japan had 
 become superfluous also in the revised form. A substitute for it 
 could be only a question of time. 
 
 The agreement with Russia, which was perhaps the hardest to 
 bring about, was an Important step forward in the preliminary 
 work of eliminating delicate points of friction and possibilities of 
 
MODERN GERMANY 435 
 
 conflict, at least for a number of years. A scarcely less Impor- 
 tant factor in this connection was the proper conduct of the 
 restless and uncertain Japanese policy. Through the "Pan- Asi- 
 atic" movement in Japan, which began with the year 1899, and 
 whose fantastic aim was the freeing of the Asiatic peoples from 
 the yoke of Europe, especially the elimination of Western influ- 
 ence in East Asia, it was realized that the new Great Power 
 might become a very disturbing element in the British plans, if 
 that movement were to achieve serious influence on the attitude 
 and decisions of the Japanese government. This danger un- 
 doubtedly existed after the war with Russia, and not only Eng- 
 land but even France was uneasy regarding her East Asiatic 
 possessions. It was, therefore, a not unimportant result of Eng- 
 land's efforts that at the time (1907) the Russo-English treaty 
 was made, agreements were brought about between Japan and 
 France, as well as between Japan and Russia, in which the con- 
 tracting parties pledged the preservation of the status quo and 
 mutually guaranteed each other's possessions, together with all 
 the rights thereto appertaining. This, truly, was in strange 
 agreement with the maintenance of the "inviolability" of China 
 and of the "open door," which both treaties solemnly guaranteed 
 in the preamble! 
 
 A treaty between England and France was not necessary in 
 1907 — they had long been in agreement as to the ultimate end 
 of all their actions. This is clearly shown by a remark of Paul 
 Deschanel, President of the French Chamber, when on January 
 22, 1909, after eulogizing the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 
 in the course of a speech on "Asia in International Politics," he 
 said : "This treaty is of more value in its European results than 
 its Asiatic, as it permits both Powers to concentrate their main 
 strength in Europe and thereby to w^ork more effectively for the 
 maintenance of the European balance of power and of peace." 
 
 The expression "peace" in the secret language of English- 
 French-Russian-Japanese diplomacy is a catch-word of import 
 similar to that of the "inviolability of China" — the initiated ut- 
 ters neither of them without a knowing smile. For the sake 
 of more important interests, England conveniently turned her 
 eyes away from the danger point in the southwest, of which 
 mention has several times been made, while the French built 
 their great Tonkinese railway Haiphong-Laokai into the Prov- 
 ince of Yunnan, In 19 10 they reached the capital city as a 
 temporary terminus. They made great efforts to obtain a fur- 
 ther concession toward the north to the Upper Yangtsze, in 
 order to gain the rich western territory in Ssechuan; they ap- 
 
436 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 peared to be deciding in their own favor the oft-discussed ques- 
 tion whether trade w^ith these promising districts and with those 
 beyond w^ould follow the route down the Yangtsze through the 
 British sphere of influence, through English-controlled Burmah, 
 or toward the south through the French colonial empire. But 
 England noticed nothing. The previous bickerings had ceased, 
 in spite of the warnings from British mercantile circles; there 
 was no more talk of the much-discussed railway from Burmah 
 to Yunnan, and thence to Yangtsze. 
 
 The unasked-for assurances of her ''inviolability" and of her 
 "independence" — which was threatened by no one except the 
 Powers pledging it — was a source of serious anxiety to China; 
 she saw that Japan and Russia acted in Manchuria more and 
 more in the manner of rulers; she had before her eyes the un- 
 mistakable fate of "independent" Corea with a Japanese Resident 
 General in control, and in consequence she drew her own deduc- 
 tions as to the meaning of the expression "inviolability" in the 
 language of the treaty Powers. A further factor was that in the 
 agreements of 1907, treating of China's inviolability, strange to 
 say, precisely those two Powers had abstained from joining for 
 which the inviolability of China and the open door were an 
 absolutely vital necessity — namely, Germany and the United 
 States. China may, therefore, have felt a certain relief when 
 the United States, too, in November, 1908, signed an agreement 
 with Japan in which both contracting parties pledged themselves 
 to maintain the independence and inviolability of China, the 
 open door and the status quo. The aim of this agreement is 
 apparent. The question, however, may remain unanswered 
 whether America, fearing for the safety of the Philippines, had 
 suggested the treaty, or whether — and this is more likely — Eng- 
 land and Japan, or both, desired it in order to preclude the 
 possibility of a clash between the two rivals in the Pacific Ocean 
 (at this time regarded as highly undesirable) and in order to be 
 able all the more effectively to make Germany appear in the 
 eyes of the Chinese as the sole enemy of their independence. 
 
 It was soon to be made plain to the United States that it 
 ascribed an undeserved importance to that part of the treaties 
 meant for advertising purposes, in which the words "inviola- 
 bility of China" and the "open door" played such a prominent 
 part. Toward the end of 1909 the American Secretary of State, 
 Knox, proposed to the Powers the "neutralization" of the rail- 
 ways in Manchuria, especially of the great north and south 
 line, which had been divided between Russia and Japan in the 
 Peace of Portsmouth; this meant the formation of an Interna- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 437 
 
 tional syndicate for the purchase of the Russian and Japanese 
 railway interests in order to maintain Manchuria as Chinese 
 territory open to the trade of all. The result was, as might 
 have been expected, the reverse of what had been aimed at. 
 Russia and Japan repelled this interference with their proceed- 
 ings in the most emphatic manner; the common danger, more- 
 over, induced them to a union which otherwise could scarcely 
 have come about. Again 'inviolate" China footed the bill. 
 
 In July, 1 9 10, the two Powers entered into a treaty whereby 
 they mutually guaranteed the status quo in Manchuria against 
 the attacks of all third parties. At the same time, according to 
 French newspaper dispatches, it was agreed in a supplementary 
 clause that Japan should have a free hand in Corea and that 
 Russia should be equally free in Mongolia, which belonged to 
 China. Events proved the correctness of the statements. A 
 few weeks after the signing of the treaty, "independent" Corea 
 was annexed by Japan. In the spring of 191 1, quite independ- 
 ently of China, Russia, through an ultimatum, forced an im- 
 portant extension of her special political and commercial privi- 
 leges in East Turkestan and Northern Mongolia as compared 
 to those granted by the treaty of 1881. Japan and Russia entered 
 a joint protest, and with success, against the projected loan to 
 China by an international syndicate for the reorganization of the 
 administration in Manchuria. It is doubtful whether this under- 
 standing between the two Powers "operating" in the North, with 
 its surprising results — especially the resumption of Russian activ- 
 ity in the East — was according to the English programme; but 
 official England, unswerving in its aims, abstained from all pro- 
 test, and in 191 1, Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament that 
 the British government must recognize the fact that "Russia and 
 Japan have special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." Thus, 
 as far as England was concerned, the fate of China's Mongolian 
 territory had been sealed. 
 
 Toward the end of 191 1, in the midst of the Chinese revolu- 
 tionary disturbances, the northern part of Mongolia announced its 
 independence — scarcely to the surprise of Russia — under the 
 Lama High Priest of Urga, and at the beginning of 19 12 Rus- 
 sia informed Peking that she recognized this "independence" 
 and desired to render "assistance" to the new state; that she 
 was going to build a railway from the Baikal Lake on 
 the Siberian line to Urga, which would later be continued 
 toward the south as far as Kalgan and connect there for 
 Peking. The system of "independence" in the manner of Corea 
 and Thibet had brought forth imitators. The projected railway 
 
438 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 line, Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan, is of such importance for Russian 
 politics and trade that negotiations in regard to it have not been 
 allowed to come to a standstill even during the w^ar. According 
 to newspaper dispatches, on September 17, 19 14, Russia entered 
 into a treaty with the Mongolian "government" in regard to the 
 building of railways, granting of a non-interest-bearing loan and 
 carrying through of administrative reforms, which transformed 
 Mongolia practically into a Russian protectorate. In the sitting 
 of the Duma, at the beginning of February, 191 5, Minister Sas- 
 sonov gave promise of the early announcement of "the signinftc of 
 the three-cornered Russian-Chinese-Mongolian treaty." 
 
 As a result of this development, which had grown ever more 
 pronounced since 1910 and which from year to year excluded 
 greater portions of the Chinese Empire from general trade, Ger- 
 many turned to America, at the beginning of 19 12, with the 
 request for an expression of the views of that government. The 
 reply of Secretary of State Knox, with an optimism scarcely to 
 be understood even to-day, expressed the opinion that all the 
 Powers had hitherto acted in accordance wnth their mutual 
 pledges to respect the inviolability and sovereignty of China. On 
 the motion of Germany, the document was printed in the news- 
 papers in February, 1912. It is easy to imagine the impression 
 which it must have produced in the circle of the "knowing ones." 
 
 Even more emphatic than in the case of Russia was the oppo- 
 sition which the American plan of neutralization of 1909 aroused 
 in Japan. It served to sharpen the already existing animosity 
 against America, due to the attitude of the Western States re- 
 garding Asiatic emigration. At times, the relations between the 
 two Powers became so strained that England was seriously con- 
 cerned, not only regarding the general effect on her alliance 
 plans in Europe, but especially as to the possibility of herself 
 being drawn into a conflict between Japan and America through 
 her treaty obligations. There w^as pressing need of a correspond- 
 ing change in the treaty of alliance of 1905. In 191 1, the same 
 year in which the Belgian Minister to Berlin called the atten- 
 tion of his government to the danger of its understanding with 
 England, Sir Edward Grey and Baron Kato, at that time Japa- 
 nese Ambassador to London and now Minister of Foreign Af- 
 fairs, agreed upon a new treaty, four years before the termina- 
 tion of the old one; it was to run to 1921. The paragraph in 
 regard to safeguarding English rights "in the neighborhood of 
 the frontiers of India" was omitted — the treaty with Russia of 
 1907 had rendered this superfluous. In its place was substituted 
 a new paragraph, according to which neither of the two Powers 
 
MODERN GERMANY 439 
 
 was required to aid its ally in a war against a third Power with 
 which the state not fighting had signed a treaty of arbitration. 
 There existed such a treaty between England and America — 
 England was therefore relieved of her duty to Japan as regards 
 America. 
 
 Naturally, this new treaty, that had apparently become quite 
 meaningless, called forth extremely sharp criticism in Japan; 
 and in fact the question calls for an answer: By means of what 
 other concessions did England gain relief from the obligation of 
 aiding against America, a relief which was especially important 
 at that time? There can be no further doubt to-day, after 
 Minister Kato's speech on September 5, 1914, in the Japanese 
 Diet and in view of the whole conduct of Japan since the out- 
 break of war, that these concessions were made at Germany's cost. 
 Japan had received carte blanche as regards the German protec- 
 torate at Kiaochow, German commercial privileges in Shantung, 
 probably also the German possessions in the South Seas, and as 
 regards China proper — in the last case to an extent of which 
 wx have no knowledge. Immediately after the outbreak of the 
 war, Japan seized upon the more or less unprotected German 
 possessions; moreover, according to a Peking dispatch to The 
 Times (London), in the middle of February, 191 5, she de- 
 manded from China, in addition to various other far-reaching 
 concessions, special rights in Eastern Mongolia, in Southern 
 Manchuria, in the provinces of Shantung and Fukien (opposite 
 Japanized Formosa), as well as in certain parts of the district 
 of the Middle Yangtzse — demands, the granting of which by 
 China would bring her into a relation with Japan similar to 
 that which existed in Corea before the annexation in 19 10, 
 These demands, it is explained, were brought to the knowledge 
 of England, France, Russia and America, although in modified 
 form, in January, 19 15, and The Times found them, according to 
 agreement, ''quite justified." Whether the rest of the world 
 will join in this view will be shown in the future. 
 
 The preceding exposition gives an incomplete idea of the far- 
 reaching policy of force of England, France, Russia and Japan, 
 in East Asia, as well as of the systematic effort of England, even 
 with considerable sacrifices and denial of precisely those princi- 
 ples the upholder of which she otherwise claims to be, to isolate 
 Germany in these regions also and to destroy her politically as 
 well as commercially. To this end she brought about a chain 
 of agreements, the pretext for which was the inviolability of 
 China and the open door, and from which Germany alone was 
 excluded on principle. By this means it was intended to create 
 
440 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the impression in China that Germany alone entertained designs 
 against the territory and the political independence of China, 
 and was therefore to be regarded as dangerous for the latter state, 
 an enemy of the Allied Powers, and a menace to peace. The 
 press of England, as well as that of China, Japan, France and 
 Russia, to which it supplied material, prostituted itself to this 
 end uninterruptedly for years by insults, slanders and suspicions 
 of Germany and the Germans, of Germany's official representa- 
 tives and of her merchants, in order to rob the modest but all- 
 too-successful commercial rival of reputation and standing. 
 
 As a matter of fact, Germany and America were the only 
 ones who honorably upheld the principle of China's inviolability 
 and of the open door, and who never strove for territorial gains 
 at the cost of China; they desired nothing but freedom for their 
 trade under peaceful conditions. In view of these facts, the 
 speech of the Japanese Minister, Kato, of September 5, quoted 
 above, sounds strangely grotesque. According to this, it was not 
 in revenge for the protest against the Treaty of Shimonoseki that 
 Japan declared war on Germany, as the European w^orld had 
 been taught to believe, but "in response to England's request for 
 Japan's assistance," because "the trade with East Asia, which 
 Japan and England regard as among their particular interests, 
 is subject to continual menace (from Germany) ; because fur- 
 thermore, according to the view of the (Japanese) government, 
 it constitutes a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent 
 peace in East Asia for Germany, whose interests run counter to 
 those of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to possess in a corner of 
 the Far East a basis for her powerful activity, and, finally, be- 
 cause this is opposed to the more mediate interests of our own 
 (Japanese) Empire." 
 
 Even Minister Kato would scarcely dare seriously to assert 
 that Japan's participation was rendered obligatory, under the 
 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, by England's attack on Germany. In 
 Article II of this Treaty occur the words, "unprovoked attack or 
 agressive action" against one of the signatory Powers. No 
 answer was given by Japan to Germany's offer to exclude the 
 East Asiatic territory from the field of war operations, nor did 
 she reply to a similar motion by China. For the rest, Kato's 
 speech contains its own refutation. 
 
BOOK IV 
 
 THE CAUSES AND THE OUT- 
 BREAK OF THE WAR 
 
CHAPTER I 
 THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR 
 
 PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 HEIDELBERG 
 
 IN the vast mass of controversial literature regarding the 
 World War, chief place is usually given to those causes 
 w^hich are close at hand and easily apprehended. Even among 
 those authorities who desire to give more than an ex parte ex- 
 position there are many who confuse discussion of the final causes 
 w^ith an understanding of the more deep-lying ones; especially 
 among neutrals is the superficial belief encountered that through 
 diligent study of the Blue Books alone may the question be satis- 
 factorily answered: What is the truth? As a matter of fact, 
 the sequence of events leading up to the beginning of the World 
 War stretches far back into the past, and the deeper one delves 
 in this tangled mass the more convinced does one become that 
 great w^orld-historical forces must long since have been set in 
 motion to bring about this outcome as it were in the nature of 
 an inexorable fate. Only he who appreciates them to their full 
 extent is able to perceive at what points those forces destructive 
 of peace have prevailed, and, operating together, have led to 
 such terrible results. During the years previous to the outbreak 
 of the war, the plain meaning of many occurrences was not rec- 
 ognized, because we desired not to disturb the maintenance of 
 peace by premature alarms; but now, when all these possibilities 
 have been swept aside, the chief lines of development of the last 
 decades stand forth so clearly that the attempt may be made to 
 outline from a comprehensive point of view a history of the 
 events preliminary to the war. 
 
 The central position of the German Empire results in bring- 
 ing it into many-sided relations to all the Powers and in making 
 it at all times dependent on their political grouping. 
 
 Inter-dependence and mutual consideration as regards other 
 states, its own interests and those antagonistic thereto subject it to 
 constant anxieties; it is forced to maintain its position under the 
 most complicated conditions of competition operative in the case 
 of any state. On this account, the leaders of Germany have never 
 been able to expound their aims so clearly as the statesmen of 
 those countries who, thanks to a more independent position, could 
 
 443 
 
444 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 follow a more direct line of policy. One result of this is that 
 serious political writing has not been developed as independently 
 among us as was to be desired ; foreign countries, therefore, owing 
 to the necessary reserve of responsible organs on the one hand 
 and of the absolute unrestraint of unauthoritative voices on the 
 other, have not always been able to gain a correct impression. 
 
 As a matter of course, I shall seek to estimate the cross-cur- 
 rents and interplay of the policies of other nations as measured 
 by the standard of Germanic policies. Although surrounded by 
 an army of inimical writers of pamphlets who, in blind passion, 
 disdain no weapon and in their ignorance eagerly seize upon 
 every argument, I shall nevertheless maintain a dignified manner 
 of speech, despite the difficulty at times for a German to do so 
 in these days. Above all, it is my aim to fulfill the duties of 
 the objective historian and to do justice to a broad, universalistic 
 grasp of the problem, as has been most notably done among all 
 the historians of the world by a German, Leopold von Ranke. 
 In his spirit, I shall seek to straighten out the threads of this con- 
 fused tangle and to pave the way, to the best of my ability, for 
 an understanding of events which, although no deduction can be 
 final to-day, may at least be traced in outline as leading to the 
 war. 
 
 I. PRELIMINARY 
 
 French Revanche. The Dual Alliance. Beginnings of Anglo-German 
 
 Rivalry 
 
 I The two basic facts to which the origin of the world war 
 is to be traced are the formation of the German Empire 
 in 1870-71, and the vengeful determination of the French some 
 day to overturn by force the condition of things established at 
 that time in Europe. 
 
 The entrance of Germany into the circle of the Great Powers, 
 which looked upon her advent with disfavor, was followed by 
 a period of peaceful policy on her part which sternly held aloof 
 from all Continental ambitions. Bismarck studiously observed 
 the rule of the conqueror, not "to bend the bow too far," and 
 took up a defensive attitude toward French revanche. The for- 
 mation of the Dreihund, as the world has repeatedly had to ac- 
 knowledge during the last generation, served exclusively this aim 
 of peaceful maintenance of the existing order. Opposed to this, 
 French revanche, although the result of patriotic motives and 
 testifying to the inexhaustible vitality of the French aation. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 445 
 
 aimed at the recovery of France's dominating position on the 
 Upper Rhine and of the resulting command over South Ger- 
 many — the key to France's former hegemony. This ambition, 
 w^hether openly expressed or veiled in cautious and ambiguous 
 diplomatic language, v^as of a distinctly offensive character. The 
 sentiment of revanche w^as not always the same in its expres- 
 sion — in peaceful times it resigned itself to a manifestation of 
 patience, but its intensity invariably flared up w^ith the appear- 
 ance anywhere in the world of a possibility of gaining assistance. 
 Most significant of this spirit was the fact that death was 
 threatened to any French statesman who had the courage seri- 
 ously to oppose its demands. 
 
 Revenge thus became the invisible regulator of the whole 
 internal French party life, and inspired the leading men during 
 these forty-four years with such an uncompromising hostility that 
 all the other Powers had to reckon with it as an unalterable fact. 
 Bismarck's policy, therefore, contented itself with isolating French 
 ambition in Europe without provoking it, and with encouraging 
 it in friendly fashion to occupy itself with colonial expansion. 
 This manner of meeting the danger was successful as long as 
 Germany, fully occupied with her own problems, limited herself 
 to a Continental policy; the situation immediately became more 
 delicate when the modest colonial acquisitions which Bismarck 
 had made led to tension with England, and when soon there- 
 after aggressive Pan-Slavism likewise raised its head in the 
 Bulgarian question. Immediately with the mere suggestion of a 
 new grouping of the Powers, Jules Ferry's effort toward a 
 Franco-German rapprochement, on the basis of a colonial under- 
 standing, was nullified ; in an instant and without inherent cause, 
 its place was taken by General Boulanger's agitation, and many 
 Frenchmen appeared unable to resist the propaganda of an ad- 
 venturer who — for the first time since 1871 — seemed to hold 
 out hopes for the gratifying of their desires. Although Bis- 
 marck, who even then had great difficulty in holding Russia and 
 France apart despite his gifts as a statesman, succeeded once 
 more in checking this recrudescence of revanche, it was never- 
 theless the Boulanger episode which — even in the opinion of our 
 enemies — gave the deciding impulse toward an era of increased 
 military preparation in the world. 
 
 With the retirement of Bismarck, the situation, which had 
 become more and more tense and which was now only arti- 
 ficially maintained, became even more delicate. Despite the 
 friendly advances and diplomatic efforts which Bismarck had 
 made during the last years, there was a renewal of pressure 
 
446 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 from Russia, whose efforts to form an alliance with Austria- 
 Hungary he had once blocked. Although we succeeded, it is 
 true, in improving our relations with England, and in the treaty 
 of 1890 gained certain things which were for us of vital neces- 
 sity (peaceful compromise in Africa, and above all the acquisi- 
 tion of Heligoland), yet the unavoidable took place: our two 
 Continental neighbors no longer allowed themselves to be held 
 apart, but began to approach each other. That which in Bis- 
 marck's time had loomed up as a possibility, the avoidance of 
 which had called for one political sacrifice after the other, be- 
 came soon after the accession of Emperor William H a stern re- 
 ality which had to be reckoned w4th. 
 
 Through the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891, 
 Germany's existence became subject to a permanent and heavy 
 burden. The immediate revival of the French idea of revanche 
 showed that any one in Paris who wished to rise politically would 
 now have to make himself completely subservient to the secretly 
 cherished aims of the national ambition. If in the year 1871 a man 
 like Renan had declared that the only possible future programme 
 for France was "to strengthen the growing hatred of the Slavs 
 for the Germans, to encourage Pan-Slavism and without reserve 
 to advance all Russian ambitions," it was now believed that the 
 key had been obtained which would once and for all open the 
 gates to the promised land of revenge. The German Empire was 
 from now on permanently exposed to the possibility of a war 
 on two fronts, and in view of the nature of its open borders, 
 was able only through an increase of its defensive strength to- 
 ward the east and west to adapt itself to a geographic and mili- 
 tary situation such as no Great Power in the world has to meet. 
 Even so, in the quarter of a century during which Emperor 
 William H has stood at the Empire's helm, our militarism has 
 consisted in the fact that, although the German nation willingly 
 undertook increased burdens, our policy was, nevertheless, the 
 maintenance of peace. 
 
 The responsible leaders of this policy did not allow themselves 
 to be betrayed into seeking alleviation of the pressure under 
 which Germany was laboring by an appeal to arms ; they did not 
 allow themselves to be tempted into war either by favorable 
 opportunities, which repeatedly offered themselves, or by con- 
 sideration of advantages which might be gained by a ''preven- 
 tive war," against which Bismarck, too, had consistently raised 
 his voice. 
 
 The condition of coercion created by the Dual Alliance was 
 bearable at the beginning, since the Russian rulers, once they had 
 
MODERN GERMANY 447 
 
 the treaty safely in hand, turned their attention toward Asia 
 and began to exploit the European situation for far-reaching 
 plans of world conquest. During the next decade, the French 
 had to admit to themselves with bitter disappointment that their 
 beloved ally, instead of helping them to realize their dreams of 
 revenge, had "deserted" to the Far East, with his military forces 
 and their capital. A further development was that Russia en- 
 tered into an agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1897 — the 
 scope of which was widened in 1903 — regarding the status quo 
 in the Near East; this sealed for a long time the greatest source 
 of danger for Europe and eliminated the pressure to which Ger- 
 many's policy had been constantly subjected. 
 
 Although as a result Germany was able to sustain the imme- 
 diate pressure of the Dual Alliance on the Continent, the Em- 
 pire found itself henceforth, through the mere existence of the 
 combination, in a difficult position as soon as it desired to extend 
 its activity overseas. Germany was not driven into transoceanic 
 enterprise, however, by arbitrary desire or in the effort to gain 
 prestige, but by economic necessity and the rapid colonial expan- 
 sion of the old World Powers. The last Great Power to arrive 
 on the scene saw that if it desired to secure for itself even a 
 modest and purely economic share in the possibilities of the fu- 
 ture, before the world was divided forever, it w^ould have to 
 take part in some manner in this competition. We were at times 
 blamed for a too noisy and a too great zeal in our new course, but 
 it must not be forgotten that this was only the outward expres- 
 sion in the turning of the nation's thoughts to new tasks of 
 inner, practical reality. 
 
 Germany's position ofifered no natural sphere of expansion and 
 her past no traditions on which we could build ; it was necessary 
 at every point where we desired a place in the sun to lay the 
 foundations on fresh ground. One need not be in all respects 
 in agreement with the methods of this policy to admit that it 
 remained free from the capitalistic corruption which in other 
 countries has almost invariably accompanied imperialistic expan- 
 sion; that it did not seek the conquest and destruction of small 
 nations, and finally that it did not imperil the present peace of 
 Europe for the sake of the future aims which it pursued. We 
 might, it is true, have avoided all the dangers which are bound 
 up with that which is called world politics, but only at the price 
 of a renunciation which no virile growing people with faith in 
 its own future would submit to. While this was out of the ques- 
 tion, we realized that this new policy was only possible on the 
 basis and within the limits of the restricted Continental position 
 
448 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 of our Empire. In England this was understood — ^here from the 
 start was the key to the new situation. 
 
 English statesmen boasted during the nineties of the "splen- 
 did isolation" of their Empire, and they regarded this position 
 with equanimity, since a balance of the Continental Powers in 
 which the Dreibund and the Dual Alliance mutually held each 
 other, corresponded exactly to the traditional condition In which 
 England had always endeavored to keep Europe, In order mean- 
 while to carry out undisturbed the completion of the greatest 
 of all colonial empires. At the beginning of the nineties, Eng- 
 land had drawn a step nearer to Germany, and was united 
 by treaty with the other two members of the Dreibund in regard 
 to common interests in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. She 
 had even gone so far as to proclaim In a protocol ''the identity 
 of the interests of the Dreibund and those of England." But 
 on that account there was no inclination to make the least sac- 
 rifice for the sake of pleasant relations with Germany. On the 
 contrary, she considered Germany to be too securely held in 
 check for England to see any necessity for showing great con- 
 sideration for our interests; Germany's power was valued only 
 to the extent that it was serviceable as a check to the Dual Al- 
 liance and only so long as it was subservient to England's Insular 
 policy. British statesmanship of this decade aimed, therefore, 
 at the exploitation of Germany's hemmed-In position In the in- 
 terest of England's world aims. As a Continental Power, we 
 found ourselves called upon to avoid deadly quarrels with the 
 members of the Dual Alliance for what were, after all, secondary 
 colonial interests ; as the latest comer among the Colonial Powers, 
 it was to our Interest to see that Independent and promising 
 trade territory was neither divided up politically nor shut off 
 commercially, but that it remained an independent unit with an 
 open door. England's policy, however, was the reverse in both 
 respects. 
 
 Thus, the course of England and Germany in the world began 
 to diverge more and more, not as regards actual claims, which 
 at no point seriously clashed, but in the matter of future possi- 
 bilities and of considerations of policy on a broad scale. We 
 were frequently forced to oppose England's actions and to refuse 
 our cooperation in cases of projected Intervention. A difference 
 of views became constantly more pronounced. Opportunities 
 were welcomed by German statesmen to demonstrate the possi- 
 bility of cooperation with the Dual Alliance. Thus it was 
 chiefly from this European point of view that Germany joined 
 in the Franco-Russian protest against the Treaty of Shimonosekl, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 449 
 
 in order to preserve China's integrity. This step seemed to be 
 evidence of a certain emancipation of German policies from those 
 of England. Moreover, the Germans carried through their part 
 in this intervention (which was later much criticized) in a man- 
 ner especially mild and considerate for Japan; it remained for 
 the English, who originally had desired the same thing, later 
 to place upon Germany (in the eyes of the Japanese) all the 
 odium of being the originators of this movement. 
 
 At this time the British Liberal cabinet resigned, and Lord 
 Salisbury, the leader of the Conservatives, undertook the direc- 
 tion of affairs. In view of the friendly words with which in 
 1879 he greeted the formation of the Austro-German Alliance, 
 it seems to have been forgotten that in the year 1864, while he 
 was still Sir Robert Cecil, he had opposed the mere possibility 
 of a strong Germany more violently than any one of his com- 
 patriots; as regards his attitude in later years, one may venture 
 to say that the beginnings of a German world policy met only 
 with opposition or misunderstanding from him. His principal 
 object now w^as to prevent joint action of Germany and the 
 Dual Alliance in world politics. With this in mind, soon after 
 his accession to office (the occurrence did not at that time be- 
 come public) he personally made to Emperor William II, con- 
 trar\^ to all English traditions, the proposal to divide Turkey. 
 The Emperor, however, resisted the temptation to make our policy 
 subservient to that of England. It was to Germany's interest 
 to uphold the political and commercial preservation of Turkey 
 as one of the few open fields of promising actfvity — in other 
 words, to carry out the program which a few years later we 
 officially announced and which to-day we are defending as far 
 as this is still possible, w4th our weapons against the greed of 
 the Great Powers. Any pronounced cooperation of Germany in 
 such a scheme of division would have caused Russia's interfer- 
 ence and have thrown on us all the burdens of a resulting war. 
 Such an endangering of world peace on the Continent was, no 
 doubt, highly welcome to Salisbury's policy, which a German 
 statesman of those days was fond of describing as *'the chestnut 
 policy," but it was in no sense in the interest of a Power such as 
 Germany, which first of all had to consider its Continental posi- 
 tion. If from this failure of Salisbury's attempt to lead Ger- 
 many on, there remained a personal feeling of pique, the follow- 
 ing year was destined to bring about a further increase in the 
 tension. Unmistakable antagonism became apparent in respect 
 to the future of the non-English portions of South Africa. 
 
 In South Africa, as elsewhere, the guiding principle of Ger- 
 
450 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 man policy was not to allow a further portion of the globe to 
 be swallowed whole by the giants. For this reason, even before 
 the Jameson raid, Germany had declared that she would not 
 permit a departure from the treaties of 1884 which formed the 
 basis for the Boer Republics at that time. Several days before- 
 hand the German Ambassador had warned the Foreign Office 
 of the projected filibustering expedition, but a pretense had been 
 made of absolute ignorance and, instead of taking timely pre- 
 cautions, there was an evident desire to profit by the accomplished 
 fact. Hence, the congratulatory telegram of the Emperor to 
 President Kruger was not so much a world-political act of of- 
 fense from the German Empire as a world-political act of de- 
 fense, for the sake of the status quo and of the rights of small 
 nations. Moreover, the step was not taken against official Eng- 
 land, which repudiated all share in Jameson's undertaking and 
 was compelled to place the ring-leaders on trial, but against a 
 predatory attack in connection with which English statesmen 
 were later proved to be connected in a compromising manner. 
 That the outraged sense of right throughout the civilized world 
 found expression through the authority of the German Emperor 
 was resented all the more strongly in London. As early as 1894 
 The Saturday Review, which was closely connected with South 
 African interests, had taken an emphatic stand against the Ger- 
 man Empire and had dismissed with disdain all thought of an 
 alliance ; ^ now for the first time its columns gave voice to the 
 indignant cry: ''Ger mania est delenda." ^ It was at this same 
 time that we came to realize that in no question of world 
 politics should we be able to count even on France's formal ob- 
 servation of neutrality toward us, while England knew from this 
 moment that she could have an alliance with France at any time 
 she seriously desired it. 
 
 Disputes and differences in the field of colonial politics alone 
 would not have been sufficient to disturb the relation between two 
 nations which had been bound for centuries by a comradeship 
 in arms and by tradition, and which had never met as enemies. 
 
 ^ The Saturday Review of August 8, 1895, while acknowledging the con- 
 venience offered by an alliance with Germany, objects to it for the following 
 reason, which has its root in the century-old tradition of British policy: "First 
 of all, we English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and 
 commerce; and our chief rival in trade and commerce to-day is not France, but 
 Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and 
 to lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the 
 issue might be, we stand to lose heavily." 
 
 ^ The Saturday Review of February 1, 1896: "The biological view of foreign 
 policy is plain. First, federate our colonies and prevent geographical isolation 
 turning the Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Ger- 
 many, as Germania est delenda. Third, be ready to fight America when the 
 time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting wars against peoples from whom 
 we have nothing to fear." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 451 
 
 But for a number of years a new cause for antagonism had 
 come into existence, a trade rivalry, which in England was at 
 first regarded with astonishment, then with growing anxiety, and 
 finally with resentment. This rivalry was felt all the more 
 keenly, as precisely at this time there began a series of unfavor- 
 able years for England economically. The per capita figures of 
 the English export trade, which for some time had been on the 
 decrease, began to fall more noticeably, in the period following 
 1895, while the German figures advanced strikingly. From year 
 to year German competition was regarded more suspiciously in 
 England, from year to year comparative statistics became more 
 unfavorable, until finally in 1903 German production of pig iron 
 for the first time exceeded that of England, and the value of 
 German exports to England was higher than the value of Eng- 
 lish exports to Germany. 
 
 The anxiety caused by these events, which doubtless was a 
 factor in the above-mentioned reserve of the English govern- 
 ment, furnished from the year 1895 on a constantly stronger 
 reason for diplomatic coolness. Under the first sting of the 
 new trade rivalry, the provocative articles of The Satur- 
 day Review were not without effect; in circles naturally 
 by no means anti-German they fostered the thought that Eng- 
 land's general policy called for "a new taking of bearings." Ar- 
 guments were ready to hand which were familiar to the mind 
 and the interest of every Englishman, and which the history of 
 centuries had shown to be the basis of all political calculation. 
 Once launched upon such a line of argument, with English con- 
 sistency, there was no drawing back from the most extreme de- 
 ductions. In an article in the issue of September 11, 1897, 
 which has become celebrated. The Saturday Review said re- 
 garding the two irreconcilably opposed nations who had taken 
 the whole world for their province and who demanded commer- 
 cial tribute from it: 
 
 "England, with her long history of successful aggression, with 
 her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she 
 is spreading light amongst nations dwelling in darkness, and Ger- 
 many, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a 
 lesser will-force but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, com- 
 pete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the 
 Cape, in Central Africa, in India, and the East, in the islands 
 of the Southern Seas, and in the far North-West, wherever — 
 and where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible and trade 
 has followed the flag, the German bagman is struggling with the 
 English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, 
 
452 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from tem- 
 perance to trade gin — there the German and the Englishman are 
 struggling to be the first. A million petty disputes build up the 
 greatest cause of war the w^orld has ever seen. If Germany 
 were to be extinguished to-morrow, there is not an Englishman 
 in the w^orld who would not be the richer the day after to- 
 morrow. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right 
 of succession — must they not fight for two hundred and fifty 
 million pounds of yearly commerce?" 
 
 This calm toying with a war of prevention is carried on all 
 the more cold-bloodedly since the mad idea is believed to be not 
 only practicable but even easily so and without danger. 
 
 ''England is the only Great Power who could fight Germany 
 without tremendous risk and without doubt of the issue — the 
 growth of Germany's fleet has had no other result than to bring 
 down England's hand on her all the more heavily. The German 
 ships would soon be at the bottom of the sea or in convoy toward 
 English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the 
 Baltic ports would lie under the guns of England, waiting until 
 the war indemnity was paid. Our work over, we should not 
 even need to take the trouble to alter Bismarck's words to Ferry, 
 and to say to France and Russia: 'Seek your compensation. 
 Take from German land whatever you like ! You can have it.' '* 
 
 One link after the other is forged, until the chain is complete 
 which, as the result of shop-keepers' considerations, leads to the 
 world war; it is the first conception of the Triple Entente, in 
 the overheated brain of a journalist. With such unspeakable 
 logic and frivolity did they dare to speak before the German 
 fleet had become important and before political instinct had taught 
 the necessity of modifying the language of passion and preserv- 
 ing appearances before the world. It was, to be sure, only an 
 individual voice, unauthoritative and without immediate in- 
 fluence, but the chorus of similar voices was increased in these 
 years by The National Review and The Spectator, and it re- 
 vealed a growing sentiment, calculated to become irresistible to 
 the "man in the street" and in the counting-house if some day, 
 for reasons of a general political nature, England's world policy 
 would have to be settled anew. It represented a rising wave in 
 the country where public opinion rules which might easily be- 
 come unpleasant for those statesmen who sought to oppose it, 
 but which would quickly bear aloft the one who knew how to 
 take advantage of it. 
 
 We touch here, it is true, on something which cannot without 
 more ado be called an immediate cause of war. Such considera- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 453 
 
 tions are subject to the general political aim of a government — 
 that aim is decisive and still unweakened. It must even be 
 admitted that the argument as regards trade rivalry had lost 
 weight in the course of the last decade before the war, and had 
 given way at many places to a clearer insight. It w^as not pos- 
 sible to advance it in the same sweeping manner as in the early 
 years, since the bases for such an argument had again shifted 
 considerably. Above all, the notable rise in English export 
 statistics following the period of stagnation could not fail to 
 calm the most timid spirits, and the wiser heads with time rec- 
 ognized the fact that in the relations of the two countries com- 
 mercial interdependence held too important a place for them to 
 bend their energies on mutual destruction. It may perhaps be 
 stated that trade rivalry leading to the verge of war could no 
 longer be used as an argument with such evident success by Eng- 
 lish publicists as at the start. When, however, the war broke 
 out, the elemental forces of this abyss were perceived to be of an 
 extent and provocative violence which was surprising. 
 
 In the latter half of the nineties, however, the forces which 
 were gradually gathering momentum were as yet by no means 
 strong enough to determine the attitude of the leading statesmen. 
 Even had they desired to listen to such promptings, they would 
 not yet have been able to accede to them, in view of the marked 
 opposition which England faced at all points. The actual an- 
 tagonism, then existing, of Russia in Asia and France in North 
 Africa represented far greater dangers than the anxious suspi- 
 cions regarding Germany. 
 
 II. THE PRELUDE 
 
 English Offers of Alliance. Boer War, The German Fleet 
 
 The impression is created that England, before definitely lay- 
 ing down her policy along lines opposed to Germany, had made 
 certain attempts to solve the many-sided world problems with 
 which she was confronted by means of more friendly relations 
 with Germany. The further course of events and the political 
 development of the men who took part in the pourparlers seem 
 to-day to speak with unmistakable clearness as regards the mean- 
 ing which was at the bottom of this tentative sounding by Eng- 
 land. In any event, one must admit that the determination of 
 the English to abandon their position of ''splendid isolation" be- 
 tween the Dual Alliance and the Dreibund was not destined 
 inevitably and at once and by a single possible path to lead to a 
 
454 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 clearly recognized goal. While the great British world interests 
 of the past and present were opposed only by the Powers of the 
 Dual Alliance, anxiety as to the future pointed to Germany. At 
 the period of Fashoda, of the Chinese Revolution and of the Boer 
 War, there was doubtless, in the interplay and complexity of 
 political interests, more than one possibility in case it was de- 
 sired to exchange the unstable political condition for that of a 
 firmer union. 
 
 Although Lord Salisbury had always replied evasively to the 
 German tentative questionings of the eighties and nineties, it ap- 
 peared as if in the later years of his leadership he was inclined 
 to a different view. It was the opposition to Russia in East Asia 
 (early in 1898) and the threatened conflict with France in Africa 
 which first gave rise in the British Cabinet to the thought of a 
 more intimate connection with Germany, or, more correctly ex- 
 pressed, of a treaty acting as a counterpoise to the far-reaching 
 political influence of the Dual Alliance. At the end of March, 
 1898, the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, for the first 
 time sounded the German Ambassador. The tendency of his 
 question was revealed by his speech on May 13, 1898, in which, 
 in the midst of a sharp attack upon Russia, he called for an alli- 
 ance with England's American "cousins," and declared any war 
 well worth the price which would lead to an alliance of the 
 Anglo-Saxons ; he laid his cards openly on the table : 
 
 "Great Britain might have declared war on Russia, but with- 
 out an ally we are not in a position seriously to harm her." 
 
 An ally against Russia — that was the part which Germany was 
 expected to play. After the matter had been touched upon several 
 times in interviews of Count Hatzfeldt with Salisbury, Balfour 
 and Chamberlain, in the summer of 1898 England made a move 
 in Berlin in this connection. On July 10, 1898, Major Mar- 
 chand's company occupied Fashoda, and the Franco-English crisis 
 seemed to be leading toward war. In the ensuing negotiations the 
 fact was not concealed from the English that Russia, for her part, 
 entertained no desire and felt no need of supporting the French 
 revanche idea so long as Germany upheld Russia's position in 
 Asia. If, however, it was urged in Berlin, an Anglo-German 
 alliance directed against Russia were to be formed, reaction on 
 the Russo-German relations could not be avoided. What could 
 England offer in the way of protecting our rear ? By emphasizing 
 the fact, moreover, that Russia had shown a more conciliatory 
 spirit in Asia, the principle "to live and let live" was indicated as 
 the one that would lead to a permanent improvement of the rela- 
 tions. In any case, assurance would have to be given that the 
 
IMODERN GERMANY 455 
 
 entire British government an3 Parliament wouI3 ratify such an 
 alliance. For as soon as something of Chamberlain's plans became 
 known, public opinion grew unsettled. The Saturday Review 
 stormed against this worst of all madnesses and this bitterest of 
 all humiliations, and repeated that as long as the economic strug- 
 gle continued,^ *'a sincere understanding between the two nations 
 would be impossible; if we have need for an alliance, why do we 
 not make overtures to France?" Obsessed with this one idea, and 
 with a cunning appreciation of the popular mind, the article at- 
 tacked the Court influences which were behind this alliance, and 
 even ventured to ''remind the Court and Mr. Chamberlain 
 that a nation that has dethroned dynasties before w^ill deal harshly 
 with the party which betrays English interests now." Even 
 though German statesmen were willing to pass over outbreaks of 
 this nature, they could not but ask themselves whether they were 
 W'illing to lay the foundations for a new German Continental 
 policy on such uncertain ground, which shifted w4th every change 
 of party, and whether they could dare lightly to disregard the 
 situation created by the Dual Alliance. 
 
 There thus remained only the possibility of an agreement as to 
 individual questions which might prepare the way for a general 
 understanding. A great deal, it is true, w-as not to be expected 
 from the British Prime Minister, who on a previous occasion had 
 declared that Germany asked too much, although absolutely no 
 demand had yet been made by Berlin. The sole result of all 
 the negotiations, therefore, was an agreement made in October, 
 1898, looking to economic exploitation of the Portuguese colonies 
 by Germany and England, in case Portugal failed to meet her 
 loan obligations. This was an understanding the subject of which 
 lay beyond the real world political danger zone and which did 
 not involve our relations with other Powers. From the English 
 point of view it foreshadowed preparations for the Boer War, 
 and in this respect it may have been intended to bind Germany's 
 hands for the future as regards this question. In any case, it was 
 for Germany a contingent agreement, in which the question 
 whether the contingency was to arise or not, in the nature of 
 things, depended on the good will and loyalty of the other side — 
 that is to say, on assumptions which proved to have been unjus- 
 tified. 
 
 Was this to be the prelude to a closer union? If Germany had 
 no intention of being drawn into an alliance without a quid pro 
 
 "^ The Saturday Review of September lo, 1898: "We do not love Emperor 
 William, neither do we love the German people. And the reason is that we 
 have to fight the German trader, with his cheap and nasty merchandise, ia 
 every market of every country of the world." 
 
456 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 quo, she had even less desire for a return which would have 
 involved her, not in an understanding, but in a war with a third 
 nation. After the outbreak of the Boer War, England continued 
 to act according to her customary methods, which position and 
 traditional experience had necessarily developed. We, however, 
 were called upon to realize that we were expected simply to play 
 the part of a Continental sentry in the Boer War, and that if we 
 consented to assume this part at England's command, we should 
 find ourselves threatened by the war on two fronts, which we had 
 hitherto avoided. At this time, less than ever, could we afford 
 frivolously to extend the antagonism with France to the colonial 
 field (from which Bismarck had always managed to exclude it), 
 in order, in the words of Frederick the Great, to play the Don 
 Quixote to English trade. 
 
 In the Boer War, Germany could not have taken any other 
 course than she did. Compelled before the war to limit herself 
 to advising President Kruger most earnestly to yield, after the 
 outbreak of hostilities neutrality was imperative. Public opin- 
 ion in Germany, as in France and America, was in the main pas- 
 sionately with the Boers; for sentimental reasons, it took sides 
 in this most heroic of struggles which a small and free people 
 has ever carried on against a giant World Powder, nor did it hesi- 
 tate to call by their right name such things as the horrors of 
 the concentration camps, which aroused indignation in all civi- 
 lized countries and which brought the blush of shame to the 
 cheek of many Englishmen. That in England this German at- 
 titude produced a painful impression is explicable; that the re- 
 sulting resentment was directed solely against the Germans was 
 due to the later basic change in the country's policy. The Ger- 
 man Empire, despite the efforts of the Pan-Germans, main- 
 tained neutrality. Chamberlain's siren calls during the disas- 
 trous week of the Boer War, and the bait of a new triple alli- 
 ance between the German race and the two great branches of 
 the Anglo-Saxons were taken only at their real worth ; emphatic 
 protest was successfully made against the excesses and violence 
 of the British maritime policy, and the sale of weapons to Eng- 
 land by Germans was prohibited as contrary to the spirit of 
 neutrality. But just as Germany wished to avoid becoming an 
 accomplice in the strangling of the Boer Republics, she was also 
 careful not to let herself be made use of by England's old ene- 
 mies. At the most intense period of the war, perhaps with the 
 desire to disrupt the Anglo-German tentative understanding, 
 France and Russia approached Germany with the proposal to 
 bring about in connection with them the end of the war, in 
 
MODERN GERMANY 457 
 
 order to save the Boers and to humiliate England. Emperor 
 William II, however, who was not guided by Machiavellian 
 considerations as regards England, rejected the proposal, since 
 Germany, as he said, must always abstain from a policy which 
 might bring her into conflict with a sea power like England. 
 In order to appreciate this action, one needs only to ask him- 
 self whether, after the experiences of January, 1896, Germany 
 could seriously have counted on fighting shoulder to shoulder 
 with the nation of the revanche against England. The Em- 
 peror more than once took steps to modify the strong current of 
 German public opinion. 
 
 Meanwhile German statesmen profited to the full by the les- 
 sons of the Boer War. These were the years during which 
 the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution placed the fate of the 
 greatest empires in question, when old Powers broke like rotten 
 reeds, and the world seemed about to be divided up among a 
 few states ; we were still under the fresh impression of what the 
 absolute rule of the seas meant and what military capacity Eng- 
 land, together with her great colonial white territories, was 
 able to develop overseas by means of her fleet, in defiance of all 
 other Powers. Germany could not close her eyes to the fact 
 that the previous policy of freedom of action, of the open door, 
 and of peaceful development, could not be carried through with- 
 out the possession of a fleet — indeed, that even a neutral position 
 in great crises could not be maintained save with loss; that our 
 colonial and trade interests, which were increasing in value, 
 were without defense in the world; that in view of our con- 
 stricted Continental position, without a fleet we were exposed 
 to being forced weakly to trim our sails to every w^ind and to 
 yield unquestioningly. Moved by the course of events of the 
 Spanish-American War, Prince Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chan- 
 cellor, emphasized the fact that we must not risk exposing our- 
 selves to the danger of suffering at the hands of England the fate 
 imposed by the United States on Spain — for the British press 
 evermore haughtily threatened against the youngest Colonial 
 Power a fate such as had for good and all excluded the oldest 
 Colonial Power from the field of competition. And during the 
 Boer War we also learned through the stopping of Imperial 
 German mail ships that in a naval war there is for Eng- 
 land no limit to aggressions against neutrals, that in critical 
 moments the lacunee in maritime law are filled out by naval 
 power — that is, to say, by England's dominance of the sea. The 
 policy of the free hand was practicable in future only in case 
 this hand was not powerless on the seas. The German Empire, 
 
458 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 therefore, determined upon a new far-seeing program for the 
 development of the fleet, which had already been strengthened 
 in 1898, in order to gain the same undisputed guarantee of 
 peace in the world in general that we were able to uphold on 
 land toward the East and West — not for the sake of a future 
 offensive, but in order to deter an enemy from deliberately as- 
 suming such an offensive by precipitating a war of prevention at 
 a moment devoid of danger. The Secretary of the Navy, von 
 Tirpitz, proclaimed the object of the fleet thus: The stronger 
 it is, the more difficult and the more dangerous will it be for an 
 enemy to defeat it. 
 
 "An enemy will find himself faced by the question, in begin- 
 ning a war against Germany, whether such an undertaking will 
 pay for the costs — that is to say, whether it is worth the risk. 
 He will probably make a compromise with us, if we possess a 
 strong battle fleet. Therein lies the strong guarantee of peace 
 which is given by a powerful fleet, and this is the best protec- 
 tion which we can provide for our commerce." 
 
 Immediately thereafter, the outbreak of the troubles in China 
 (the murder of the German Minister, in July, 1904) led to 
 renewed cooperation with England, whereby we obtained a clear 
 and illuminating perception of the limitation of possible united 
 action with this Power. As soon as the Anglo-German Yangtsze 
 Agreement no longer seemed capable of being used for the pur- 
 pose of disrupting the German-Russian relations, London lost 
 all interest in it and sought to becloud its meaning with a 
 mass of misunderstanding, a proceeding which brought w^ith it 
 a clear interpretation in the German Reichstag and correspond- 
 ing disclosures in Petrograd. The wind soon veered around 
 so sharply — presumably as the result of the change of rulers 
 — that the Under-Secretary of State, Cranbourne, in March, 
 1901, ventured openly to deny any curtailment of the treaty, 
 while the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, 
 officially asserted the correctness of the interpretation by the Ger- 
 man Ambassador. The Daily News, however, admitted with 
 refreshing frankness that the agreement was worthless to Eng- 
 land, since Germany could not be counted on against Russia — 
 this was and remained for London the crucial consideration if it 
 was to act in concert with Berlin. 
 
 • The uncertainty as regards Anglo-German relations was still 
 pending when the change of rulers finally prepared the way 
 for the new aims of England's foreign policy. The personal 
 influence of King Edward on the policy of his country has been 
 variously estimated; the French, who really knew, enthusiastical- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 459 
 
 ly praised him to the skies, while the English, in keeping with 
 their manner of political thought, preferred to attribute to him a 
 much smaller influence in their parliamentary life. At all 
 events, a new factor of extraordinary energ}^ and individuality 
 made itself felt in the control of England's destinies: a man 
 who was determined personally to become the sponsor for the 
 unbroken course of foreign policy, independent of changes in 
 party rule and beyond the limits fixed by tradition. Whether 
 in the determination of his course, personal rivalry and sensi- 
 tiveness on one side or sympathies on the other were a factor, is 
 perhaps not so important as the repressed ambition of a per- 
 sonality which had so long stood in the shadow of power; now, 
 when the close of the Boer War had prepared the way, this 
 personality was all eagerness to assume the lead in the change 
 that had long been seen to be gathering, and he was confident 
 of being able to direct it into new lines. 
 
 Though King Edward may have been determined from the 
 start to make an end of England's splendid isolation in another 
 direction than that of Germany, the previous negotiations with 
 the latter country were not yet on that account discontinued. 
 The English statesmen who held the real power in their hands 
 were not prepared for or inclined to a sudden change of atti- 
 tude. But the last episode of the Anglo-German discussion re- 
 garding an alliance which began with the obsequies of Queen 
 Victoria, revealed at the start a different atmosphere. The ne- 
 gotiations demonstrated anew that England was most ready to 
 bind us with heavy obligations, and in addition to handicap us 
 with the odium of these obligations in Russian eyes, but that for 
 her own part she intended to maintain the understanding with 
 Russia touching world-political questions, which had now be- 
 come less difficult, and at the same time to make use of the Ger- 
 man sword on the Continent, where more strongly marked an- 
 tagonisms w^ere again rampant. That, even in this position, we 
 should not have been able to expect much from the British states- 
 men is clear — they were the same politicians who shortly after- 
 wards decided upon the policy of isolation against Germany. We 
 were, after the experiences of the previous years, all the less in 
 doubt regarding England's secret intentions, as at this very time 
 Germany's Bagdad Railway plans encountered more strongly 
 marked opposition in London, as soon as the change of this 
 project from a purely German into an international German- 
 French-Russian undertaking seemed to render impossible the out- 
 break of Continental disputes. 
 
 If the pourparlers were still kept up for some time after the 
 
46o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 close of the Boer War, this was only the shield which England 
 used to cover her defection for the purpose of forming another 
 alliance. The definiteness of the change which began at this 
 time rendered it improbable that this last move toward a rap- 
 prochement was at all seriously meant. An indication of the 
 coming shift was seen in Chamberlain's speech in October, in 
 which, by way of justifying the concentration camps for the 
 Boers, he called attention deliberately to the German conduct of 
 war in the year 1870. This speech called forth a well-merited 
 and sharp reply by the Imperial Chancellor. During the next 
 months England admitted that, in view of the feeling of the 
 Lower House, it would be hard to put the projected treaty with 
 Germany into acceptable form. Immediately after this formal 
 withdrawal, on January 30, 1902, the alliance with Japan was 
 consummated, and soon thereafter the way was open for negotia- 
 tions with France. The weapon against Russia which it had 
 not been possible to gain from Germany's policy of peace had 
 been found in East Asia. 
 
 Following this prelude of Anglo-German negotiations for an 
 alliance, was developed the main drama of an alliance directed 
 against Germany, the course of which did not permit of im- 
 mediate determination in detail, but which could not fail soon 
 to reveal its final aim. There began one of those great diplo- 
 matic actions which only a state of the far-reaching world con- 
 nections of Great Britain can undertake, and even such a state 
 only for the sake of a positive and dominant ultimate purpose. 
 Unswervingly, England carried out her policy In clear percep- 
 tion of the goal to be attained and without scruple as to her 
 methods. 
 
 III. PREPARATION 
 
 Steps in the British Policy of Isolation from igo2 to 1908 
 
 The Anglo-Japanese alliance of January, 1902 — an unheard- 
 of step by a European Power — did not yet form according to its 
 wording and meaning part of the program of Isolating Ger- 
 many, but was directed solely against Russia's East Asiatic posi- 
 tion. But In its effects, and especially in Its extension through 
 the negotiations with France which were entered into immedi- 
 ately afterwards. It was a step leading toward the conception of 
 the "encircling" policy. Whoever with the eye of an historian 
 views the causal connections of these twelve years Is Impelled to 
 regard the decision of the British Cabinet of August, I9i4) as 
 the unavoidable outcome of a long and logical development. As 
 
MODERN GERMANY 461 
 
 compared to the German Empire, which in Its constricted Con- 
 tinental position must reach its decisions as each case presents 
 itself, England enjoys the tremendous advantage of being able 
 to operate according to a uniform and far-seeing plan prepared 
 long in advance. This does not mean that every single step is 
 henceforward to be explained as consciously taken as the result 
 of a single motive and with a single end in view; such cannot 
 be the case, since, owing to the uncertainty of many factors and 
 to the multiplicity of the commingling interests, things do not 
 develop in the manner in which human calculation would fain 
 have them develop. But the new course is entered upon, and the 
 underlying tendencies become more and more dominant at each 
 forward step. 
 
 It is meet at this moment, before the fundamental change in 
 the grouping of the states is discussed, to analyze the inner- 
 European situation and the feeling of the nations toward each 
 other. The Dual Alliance, it is true, existed in full strength, 
 but it lacked an offensive character against the Dreibund. 
 Undoubtedly, In France there was still the undercurrent of 
 revanche, but In the years following Fashoda it seemed more 
 than ever under the control of reason, and even leading men in 
 Paris dared to dream of the possibility of permanent European 
 peace. In the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of January 
 23, 1903, Jaures openly declared that the Dreibund had been 
 called Into being without a distinctly offensive character as re- 
 gards France, and that it was only intended to render Irrevoca- 
 ble the results of the war of 1870, which were so painful for 
 France; he no longer believed, he said, that any plan of attack 
 against France had been entertained by Germany for thirty-one 
 years. There existed on the Continent, even In the minds of 
 those who had once been defeated, a state of relaxation; to 
 this state England, with a single definite purpose in view, 
 aimed to put an end. That her motive for doing so — namely, 
 German growth and German ambition — held in fact at this 
 time no menace for England, was later openly admitted by a 
 leading publicist, who said: "Indeed, during the fifteen years, 
 1 890- 1 904, we added to our own colonial dominions more than 
 twice the whole area of Germany's colonies." ^ But the fact was 
 that this new policy was not dictated by the realities of the 
 present, but aimed to free itself in advance from future anxieties 
 by preventive measures, for which its own past offered more 
 than one example. 
 
 1 Robert Crozier Long, "Germany and the Entente," Fortnightly Review, 
 October, 1909. 
 
462 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 As soon as Great Britain was safely in possession of the 
 Japanese alliance, her ultimate aims were more clearly revealed. 
 Characteristic was the course of the last joint action of England 
 and Germany, which was undertaken for enforcing the German 
 and English claims for debt against Venezuela and which cul- 
 minated in the blockade of December, 1902. Accompanying 
 developments threw an illuminating light on the seriousness of 
 the last alliance offer in 1901, for as if at a pre-arranged signal 
 there burst forth a storm of disapproval from leading politicians 
 at the cooperation of the two countries. This disapproval was 
 voiced most strongly by the opposition, who were already eagerly 
 expectant of the Conservative inheritance and who, moreover, 
 were close to the King, All sensitiveness dating from the time 
 of the Boer War, which had long since vanished as regards 
 Frenchmen and Americans, was industriously nourished as re- 
 gards Germany, and the mere thought of having to bear in 
 Washington in common with this Power the odium of an inter- 
 vention made even the most sensible men completely lose their 
 heads. 
 
 After this prelude, the official policy of England was more 
 clearly revealed with the opening of the battle against the Bag- 
 dad Railway, a project which, although it was encouraged by 
 German statesmen, was intended to serve purely commercial 
 ends. At the time of the Boer War and the efforts toward an 
 alliance, even The Times paid us the grudging compliment of 
 saying that there was no Power to which England would more 
 willingly entrust such an undertaking. Public opinion, which 
 had been carefully manipulated, now burst forth against the 
 plan without a dissenting voice, incited by practical interests and 
 vague instincts. According to trustworthy information, Balfour 
 and Lansdowne had been ready to come to an understanding 
 with Germany in regard to the last section of the railway in 
 Mesopotamia, and as late as April 8, 1903, Balfour advocated, 
 although meeting with general disapproval, the cooperation of 
 English capital in this international undertaking under German 
 leadership. On April 23, however, he had changed his mind, 
 and he asserted that in no event would England join in the 
 work, as she had no guarantee that she would stand on a footing 
 of equality in the management. With the demonstrative ap- 
 proval of the whole country, the volteface was made — a week 
 before King Edward undertook his memorable trip to Paris. 
 After the King's return, Lansdowne declared even more em- 
 phatically that the creation of a maritime base or of a fortified 
 harbor on the Persian Gulf, as the terminus of the railway, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 463 
 
 must be regarded as a serious menace to British Interests, and 
 would be opposed In every possible way. This put a temporary 
 end to the continuation of the line beyond the first section, and 
 from this undertaking, which had been started not even as a 
 purely German commercial scheme, we learned what we must 
 be prepared for in the world henceforward from the other side 
 of the Channel. 
 
 At the same time the new policy was put Into play on the 
 Continent for the first time. The more unavoidable the war 
 desired by England between Russia and Japan became, the more 
 important was it to seek an understanding with Russia's ally, In 
 order to avoid possible bad counter-effects. It was King Ed- 
 ward who, letting his hand be more plainly seen, In the spring 
 of 1903 sought new connections in the familiar atmosphere of 
 Paris. There is no question from which side the initiative came. 
 The Daily Graphic later denied the "legend" that the minister, 
 Delcasse, was the main originator of the Entente Cordiale. 
 "The truth is that Delcasse became a convert to the idea of the 
 Entente with hesitation and against his will. The credit for it 
 belongs exclusively to King Edward and Lord Lansdowne." 
 And on the other side, Le Temps proclaimed the truth by rap- 
 turously exclaiming: "For he (King Edward) acted alone. 
 The trip to Paris In 1903, which started the Anglo-French 
 movement, was his Individual w^ork. It was announced to Mon- 
 sieur Loubet before the two Governments were Informed." In 
 his toast on May 3 to the ties of friendship which were to be 
 drawn still closer, the King assumed the fervent tone which 
 was still further intensified on the occasion of President Loubet's 
 return visit to London ; while at the time a German-Canadian 
 tariff dispute Increased in intensity, in October, 1903, a Franco- 
 English arbitration treaty smoothed the way for the extremely 
 complicated negotiations — the course of the Russian-Japanese 
 War more than anything else made France desire to grasp the 
 hand which was extended to her from across the Channel. 
 
 From the purely German standpoint, our policy has been 
 blamed for not taking advantage of Russia being fully occupied 
 with Japan in order to deal with Russia's ally at our door, who 
 would never 'peacefully reconcile herself to the loss of Alsace- 
 Lorraine. The Emperor's deep feeling of responsibility led him 
 rightly, as In the Boer War, In the interest of the world's peace, 
 to reject a war of prevention (such as England Is waging against 
 us to-day), and in this he acted In keeping with Bismarck's 
 testament. While England permitted the humiliation by Japan 
 of France's ally (and openly admitted that she would not 
 
464 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 quietly acquiesce in a Japanese defeat), she earned as the result 
 of Russia's discomfiture the unconditional readiness of the 
 French nation to accept the English proposals. The legend 
 which soon made its appearance that Russia had been driven by 
 Germany into the East Asiatic undertaking was nowhere so 
 lovingly nursed as in that country whose statesmen had been the 
 sole instigators of the war. 
 
 The result of one year's negotiations was the Anglo-French 
 agreement of April 8, 1904, which put a definite end to the 
 previous differences between the two Powers in all parts of the 
 world. The agreement is undoubtedly not to be judged ex- 
 clusively as an offensive measure against Germany ; its realization 
 was made easier through the need of the two Powers to re-in- 
 sure themselves, as it were, while the struggle in East Asia was 
 still in the balance; nor was it less to the interest of England's 
 imperial policy to remove all causes for possible friction in New 
 Foundland and Senegambia, in Siam, Madagascar, and the New 
 Hebrides, and above all to bring about the ultimate acknowledg- 
 ment by France of England's position in Egypt — this meant the 
 breaking of the last tie which had bound England to the Drei- 
 bund for tu^enty years. The unique feature of the agreement, 
 however, was to be seen in the return made by England to her 
 partner for recognizing the British position in Egypt — namely, 
 the surrender of Morocco, and even more so in the double deal- 
 ing with which she sought to cover up the future indemnifica- 
 tion of France. 
 
 While France acquiesced on the Nile in the inevitable, she 
 received in compensation an object of future value which in 
 every respect accorded with England's world-political schemes. 
 England had certain interests in Morocco, it is true, which she 
 might sacrifice, but she possessed no definite rights; she had 
 hitherto rather stood out against France for the principle of the 
 independence and integrity of the Sultanate. France, who un- 
 der Delcasse had sought to approach her prey for a number of 
 years through treaties with Spain and Italy, had repeatedly in 
 official manner recognized this principle; she had known as 
 early as 1901 that Germany also was determined to uphold it, 
 for the sake of her important trade interests, if for no other 
 reason. Morocco could thus develop into an object of Franco- 
 German dispute only if the ultimate object of the policy in view 
 was carefully concealed. As a matter of fact, there was in addi- 
 tion to the public agreement of April 8, which ostensibly pro- 
 claimed Morocco's independence, a secret understanding which 
 
MODERN GERMANY 465 
 
 provided under certain conditions for the division of the Sultanate 
 between France and Spain. ^ 
 
 Thus, the two Powers, quite without authority, took steps not 
 only for shutting off a further portion of the earth commercially 
 for an indefinite period, but for bringing it into a relation of 
 absolute dependence. Delcasse, who dared not reveal the secret 
 game, neither formally consulted German diplomats nor asked 
 for Germany's approval or even for her opinion of the public 
 agreement. It w^as a double-faced treaty, a dishonest game — for 
 this very reason its intellectual instigators in England were mor- 
 ally bound, in view of the obligations which they had under- 
 taken, to guarantee the fulfilment of French hopes at any price, 
 even in the event of a clash with Germany; they were, indeed, 
 called upon to make the inviolability of France the chief con- 
 sideration in their calculation. This they were determined to 
 do. Precisely for the sake of such possibilities had these states- 
 men, who had failed in their attempt to impress Germany's 
 sword into their service, made use of the French desire for 
 revenge; for the same reason they made the North Sea instead 
 of the Mediterranean the chief seat of naval power. The ball 
 had been set rolling. 
 
 For the time being Germany maintained an attitude of watch- 
 ful waiting. As Delcasse, however, continued to avoid all dis- 
 cussion of the Morocco question with Germany, it became clear 
 that there w^as more at stake than merely Morocco. Unless we 
 were ready to surrender unconditionally to the new combination, 
 it was imperative to seek from the start to prevent the strength- 
 ening of England's world policy by the additional element of 
 French desire for revanche. As soon, however, as we made a 
 motion to protest in the matter of Morocco, England, unscrupu- 
 lously taking advantage of every incident, assumed the haughti- 
 est tone in order to strengthen the knees of her hesitating part- 
 ner. With this end in view, no doubt, the First Lord of the 
 Admiralty, Lee, made the oft-cited speech which, as regards 
 words at least, was one of the most arrogant cases of playing 
 with the idea of a war of prevention which the world has ever 
 seen. England, he said, must forbid the further growth of the 
 
 1 The secret clauses of the Anglo-French agreement were revealed by the 
 Temps of November ii, 191 1, and subsequently in Parliament admitted by Sir 
 Edward Grey. Of their meaning E. D. Morel, in his Morocco in Diplomacy 
 (London, 1912), says that they "tend to involve this country in approval and 
 diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and 
 thereby to inevitable conflict with Germany." The French Baron d'Estournelles 
 de Constant admits, in his speech in the Senate on February 6, 19 12, that 
 France was pursuing two irreconcilable policies, a public policy of integrity 
 which was not the true one, and a policy of secret agreements which was aiming 
 at a protectorate and at the partition of Morocco. {Debats Parlementaires, 
 Seance du 6 fevrier, 1912, p. 161.) 
 
466 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 German fleet; following the declaration of the naval war the 
 British fleet would have destroyed the German before the 
 enemy would have had time to read of the declaration of war 
 in the newspapers (February 3, 1905). This was a well-calcu- 
 lated outburst in the genuine English manner, which the govern- 
 ment did not repudiate and which was intended as encourage- 
 ment for Paris, in order to make capital of Gallic excitability 
 by means of tempting pictures at the time of the Russian defeats. 
 If this was intended at the same time as an intimidation of 
 Germany, it did not, of course, cause us to swerve from our 
 course. The protest against the fate intended for Morocco, 
 which found expression in the Emperor's trip to Tangiers, may 
 to outsiders have had the appearance of a move of diplomatic 
 offensive: as a matter of fact, the provocation was to be sought 
 in the camp of the opponents, who, while ready to spring, con- 
 cealed the secret treaty even from the parliaments of their own 
 countries and thereby completely confused public opinion. The 
 object of our tactics was to manoeuvre our opponents, who had 
 silently disregarded our rights, out of their position and to find 
 out whether Delcasse's aim of turning the suppressed revanche 
 idea into an element of offense had already taken hold of the 
 whole French nation. 
 
 As soon as the seriousness and the justice of our procedure 
 was recognized in Paris, the majority of Rouvier's ministry be- 
 came filled with anxiety, and despite the efforts of the British 
 press to stiffen their resistance, they seemed on the point of 
 yielding. England then went a step further. Toward the end 
 of May, 1905, she made an oral promise to place the British 
 forces in the field beside those of the French, to mobilize her 
 fleet in case of a German attack, seize the Kaiser-Wilhelm Ca- 
 nal, and to land one hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Hol- 
 stein; in addition, she declared her readiness at an early date to 
 draw up a treaty in regard to these military obligations.^ The 
 motive which had led to the treaty of 1904 was here revealed 
 in its true significance, and Delcasse was so enchanted by this 
 possibility that he was ready to agree to any condition. But 
 common sense did not entirely desert the French statesmen at 
 the decisive moment. A wave of dismay swept over the country 
 when it learned that Germany was prepared to consider the 
 formation of this alliance, the offer of which had not remained 
 concealed from her, as a cause for war. The cabinet meeting of 
 June 4, 1905, forced Delcasse, who had placed his cards on the 
 
 1 See the revelations by the Matin, October, 1904; De la paix de Francfort 
 6 la conference d'Algesiras, by Andre Mevil, Paris, 1909. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 467 
 
 table, to resign. It was not Germany alone who had brought 
 about the downfall of this most uncompromising advocate of 
 revanche since Boulanger; in even greater degree it was the 
 indignation of all conscientious Frenchmen. "This is not how we 
 understood the agreement with England," wrote Jaures. "Del- 
 casse gave the British government the impression that he was 
 ready for any step, and the British government played the part 
 of tempter to this vain man." The question was whether 
 this newly revived spirit of revanche would sink to rest after 
 the fall of its propagandist, as in the case of the Boulanger epi- 
 sode, or whether the government, which now declared its readi- 
 ness to bring the Morocco question before an international con- 
 ference, would nevertheless continue along the same dangerous 
 path. 
 
 England now proceeded with more caution in her policy of 
 encircling Germany by a concentric attack, after the shipwreck 
 of this first indiscreet attempt. It is characteristic of Eng- 
 land's tenacity in this connection that King Edward, immedi- 
 ately following the conclusion of peace between Russia and 
 Japan, ventured to sound Russia, who had been rendered harm- 
 less in the Far East, on the proposition for a rapprochement, 
 which the London press had approvingly discussed even during 
 the war. When Count Witte, in September, 1904, returned 
 from the peace negotiations in Portsmouth, he found waiting for 
 him in Paris an invitation from King Edward, together with 
 the written draft of a treaty between the two Powers drawn up 
 by the King and Count Benckendorff, of somewhat the same 
 nature as that which two years later formed the basis of the 
 Anglo-Russian agreement regarding Central Asia.^ The Rus- 
 sian was without authority (and personally would scarcely have 
 been inclined) to respond in any manner to this offer, but 
 the first attempt to provide defeated Russia with a new footing 
 for an attack against Europe had been made by London; well- 
 informed Russian papers received the suggestion with favor, with 
 the reservation that some years of peace w^ould be required for 
 recuperation and preparation; but they already began indus- 
 triously to spread the doctrine of Pan-Slavism. The hour, how- 
 ever, had not yet struck; they contented themselves with a 
 promissory note for the future, with the redemption of which 
 Sir Arthur Nicolson, the new Ambassador to Petrograd and one 
 of the most active diplomats in the school of King Edward, was 
 intrusted. 
 
 1 Disclosed by Count Witte in the Petrograd Rjetsch, the organ of the Cadet 
 party. 
 
468 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Meanwhile the nearer the time came for the Conference of 
 Algeciras, the closer touch France sought with the Power upon 
 whose diplomatic and, in the last analysis, military support as 
 well (in view of the continuation of Russian weakness) she 
 had been dependent since April, 1904. In the autumn of 1905, 
 Rouvier, upon whom the disclosure in the press of the alliance 
 offer exercised a certain moral pressure, sounded London, in 
 his turn. Whether the Balfour-Lansdowne Cabinet ever an- 
 swered the inquiry cannot be positively stated. Its retirement 
 was imminent, but with an eye to the future, it took pains 
 openly to announce as a new principle the necessary continuity 
 of the whole foreign policy. The essence of this new continuity 
 was the program of King Edward, which both parties had now 
 adopted as their own. The Liberal Cabinet, therefore, which 
 was formed on December 10, 1905, entered upon the unre- 
 stricted inheritance of its predecessor, especially as regards all 
 the consequences of the agreement of 1904. But the attitude 
 is characteristic which the new incumbent of the Foreign Office, 
 Sir Edward Grey, took toward the French offer. He wished 
 to avoid binding himself by a formal promise, and therefore 
 did not renew the alliance offer of the Conservatives. Instead, 
 he approved the French suggestion to hold confidential pour- 
 parlers of military and naval specialists. What importance he 
 attributed to them is shown by the fact that he did not let the 
 whole Cabinet into the secret, but only a small inner coterie. 
 Thus, before the conference of Algeciras, the "conversations 
 d'ordre militaire'' were started, which, periodically repeated, 
 gradually became a fixed institution of increasing secrecy and 
 of more binding effect than political treaties. They grew into 
 a military convention with a view to a certain definite eventual- 
 ity, which could any day be brought about by continuing the 
 policy of encircling Germany. From the first moment. Grey 
 entered upon the course which in July, 19 14, morally involved 
 the policy and, as he said, the honor of his country — this policy 
 of the seemingly free hand, which, while pretending always to 
 require ratification by Cabinet and Parliament and the appeal to 
 public opinion, was in reality prostituted to the secret ambitions 
 of a small circle and to the accompanying military influences. 
 It may be that the instigator of this step, who was at that time 
 still unknown to the Continent, was himself deceived as to the 
 freedom of his decision and that he believed himself to be oper- 
 ating more cautiously than the Conservatives; but, as a matter 
 of fact, the Liberals now entered upon the downward course, on 
 which it is difficult to turn back, and the French were well 
 
MODERN GERMANY 469 
 
 aware why they owed "eternal gratitude" to the new Premier. 
 
 In addition to all this, the military result of the first conver- 
 sations (in the last days of 1905 or the first of 1906) gave to 
 the French more valuable guarantees than contained in the offer 
 in May. The plan of a landing In Schleswig-Holstein, which 
 was exclusively in England's interest, was abandoned, and for It 
 was substituted the landing in Northern France, which was 
 more Important for the French. As a necessary corollary of a 
 joint Anglo-French action, the cooperation of the Belgian army 
 was forthwith Included In the plan of campaign by the two 
 General Staffs. Immediately thereafter, at the moment when 
 the Conference of Algeciras met (the middle of January, 1906) 
 and when there was no immediate danger of war, the British 
 military attache, Barnardiston, began In Brussels (in conjunction 
 with diplomatic overtures in the same city) those confidential 
 discussions with the Belgian General Staff, on the basis of the 
 Anglo-French conversations authorized by his government, 
 which his responsible superiors now falsely describe as "academic 
 discussions"; the Belgian diplomat, Baron Greindl, has more 
 appropriately characterized them as "equally naive and per- 
 fidious." It Is In keeping with Grey's guiding principle, that 
 these negotiations, too, were declared not to be formally binding. 
 While discussing the sending of English troops in the event of 
 a German attack on Belgium — for the probability of which he 
 offered absolutely no proofs — the military attache went deeply 
 into the question of the closest cooperation with Belgium's mili- 
 tary forces; and the Belgian military authorities unconditionally 
 entered into his plans, although they could have been as little 
 In doubt as their government in regard to the unacademic char- 
 acter of these discussions. Thus the encircling policy of the 
 "free hand" began from the very start to Involve In its mili- 
 tary and political snares a neutralized state whose Inviolability 
 the English had hitherto upheld as a dogma. 
 
 The Conference of Algeciras began its labors following this 
 new grouping of the Powers. As events showed, the German 
 Emperor and his advisors contented themselves with upholding 
 the principle of the Integrity of Morocco and of the open door, 
 and decided to wait and see whether the formal, rather than 
 practically valuable paper Inhibition would prevent the "Tunifi- 
 catlon" of Morocco by France. Certain German critics have 
 later regretted that we missed our opportunity, since In view 
 of the openly revealed policy of isolation against us, a settlement 
 by arms would have been the proper course, the result of which, 
 at a moment when Russia was Incapable of fighting and France 
 
470 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 was unprepared, could scarcely have been doubtful, despite the 
 undeveloped state of the German fleet. But it is explicable 
 that a conscientious government nevertheless answered in the 
 negative the question whether Morocco was worth a war, which 
 means something else to the German nation than to Brit- 
 ish diplomats; and if one disregarded the special, to contemplate 
 the general situation, from which the former had resulted, there 
 was always the possibility that after the temporary solution of 
 the Morocco question — through which she had purchased 
 France's recognition of her position in Egypt — England would 
 again return to more peaceful paths. 
 
 In the future, therefore, it was a question not so much as to 
 the fate of Morocco and the results of the Conference, but 
 rather as to whether England intended to persist in her plan of 
 isolating Germany and to develop the forces which had been 
 set in motion into a regular machine that would finally close 
 about its prey. If such an intention really existed, Germany 
 had cause to fear the worst from the unavoidable power of at' 
 traction of the new grouping of Powers and from the reaction 
 on French revanche, as soon as Russia's eagerness for the of- 
 fensive should have revived again. For in such a case it was a 
 question of whether in an open or disguised system of isolation 
 there would be room for more or less friendly Anglo-German 
 relations. With this in mind, a German statesman, in July, 
 1906, frankly asked Sir Edward Grey whether he believed that 
 openly admitted friendly relations to Germany would be com- 
 patible with England's new friendship for France. The Eng- 
 lishman coolly avoided the question by saying: 
 
 "That depends on German politics." 
 
 The German thereupon replied, hitting the nail on the head: 
 
 *'No, it rather seems to depend on French interpretation of 
 German politics." 
 
 From that time on England considered the unconditional up- 
 holding of France to be the best guarantee for the existence of 
 her own world empire, and left Germany to think as she might 
 of the fact that the Anglo-German relations in future were to 
 be determined by the revanche idea. That was the new basis 
 of the policy which, in July, 1914, was put into practice. This 
 kind of a political community of interest inevitably creates mu- 
 tual dependence, which in the long run increases in intensity 
 and finally gets beyond control. 
 
 It became apparent that it was a question of one of the most 
 fundamental changes of front in English history. This is seen 
 from the answer which King Edward, in August, 1906, gave 
 
MODERN GERMANY 471 
 
 to another German statesman who broached the question of 
 eliminating any possible causes of friction : "There are no fric- 
 tions between us; there exists only rivalry." The father of 
 the encircling policy herewith avowed the fundamental thought 
 which he had absorbed from the obscure instincts and the public 
 opinion of his people and which he had made the guide of his 
 whole policy. Causes of friction and disagreement may be over- 
 come; rivalry has its permanent source in the nature of things 
 themselves. It would disappear only in case Germany were 
 voluntarily to withdraw and quietly watch England's future 
 game, or else bring the question to a decision in open conflict. 
 
 England was prepared for either alternative. The first dread- 
 naught was launched during the Algeciras Conference, and 
 England triumphed in the thought that she had checkmated 
 Germany with this new type of vessel. But the exultation 
 changed to depression when Germany, as she could not avoid 
 doing, began to build the new type of ships and when it was 
 seen that England had really dealt herself a serious blow. This 
 competition on which the German fleet entered under almost 
 even conditions, served markedly to increase the sense of rivalry. 
 England pressed her preparations on land with equal energy. 
 In July, 1906, Minister of War Haldane brought in a plan for 
 the reorganization of the army, which was the result of the new 
 military situation and which called for the creation of an expe- 
 ditionary force of 160,000 men. In keeping with the purpose 
 for which this force was intended, the Belgian "vassals" were 
 immediately informed of the increased eflSciency. The ultimate 
 aims of this policy became so clear that the German Im- 
 perial Chancellor found himself, on November 15, 1906, called 
 upon openly to say that the Entente Cordiale would be a men- 
 ace to the peace of Europe unless its relations to Germany were 
 friendly. 
 
 "A policy which aimed to encircle Germany — to .form a ring 
 of Powers around us, in order to isolate and paralyze us — this 
 would be a dangerous policy for European peace. The forma- 
 tion of such a ring is not possible without the exercise of a cer- 
 tain pressure. Action creates reaction. From action and reac- 
 tion there may finally result an explosion." 
 
 Despite this prophetic warning, England proceeded to an un- 
 derstanding with Russia along the lines which King Edward 
 had long since marked out. New elements for the moral isolation 
 of Germany were gathering. While the British Prime Minister 
 greeted the Duma with well-calculated homage, the British 
 press began a campaign of provocative attacks against German 
 
472 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Kultur, which were intended to create sentiment and to call 
 forth echoes throughout the world. They seem like an anticipa- 
 tion of the tone of the present-day war literature. And when 
 Russia, who required time for recuperation after the defeat in 
 the East, proceeded to call the Hague Conference, the air was 
 filled in all countries with projects of disarmament. This was 
 followed by unctuous denunciations of Germany for refusing to 
 meet an offensive policy of isolation with her own disarmament, 
 and the odium of endangering peace was thus placed on the one 
 who was in reality the threatened party. The German Imperial 
 Chancellor replied at that time with truth that w^e had never 
 misused our military strength, and that we should not do so in 
 the future: ^'Germany cannot be placed under compulsion, not 
 even under moral compulsion." (April 30, 1907.) 
 
 Under such auspices, the negotiations came to a close in 
 Petrograd, where, following the death of Count Lamsdorff, Is- 
 volski had assumed direction of the Foreign Office. The Anglo- 
 Russian agreement, of August 31, 1907, which applied to Persia, 
 the Persian Gulf, Thibet and Afghanistan, resembled the agree- 
 ment of 1904 in that it swept aside, for the sake of a higher object, 
 the world-political differences betw^een the two Powers ; it did not, 
 however, represent an adjustment of all questions in dispute, 
 but rather a truce in the future spheres of influence. Even if the 
 agreement was not aimed directly at Germany, nevertheless the 
 decision as to Persia's fate one-sidedly and arbitrarily closed up 
 a further portion of the world. While the press of the two 
 countries painted in the darkest colors the dangers of German 
 imperialism, the countries themselves proceeded on their course 
 of boundless conquest. This treaty also is undeniably to be 
 understood as part of England's imperial policy, especially from 
 the point of view of the military security of India and of the 
 Indian "glacis." It was also from anxiety as to its own future 
 that this statesmanship, capable as it is, thanks to its positions 
 of strength scattered throughout the world, of far more ambi- 
 tious undertakings than the German Continental Power, deter- 
 mined to satisfy its much-feared rival, Russia. That such great 
 sacrifices were made, however, is only to be explained, as in the 
 occurrences of 1904, by the recent shift in the world policy of 
 England, which proceeded to act without, and if necessary 
 against Germany. To this extent, in this agreement also, in 
 which there is no mention of Germany, the indirect effects which 
 no doubt had been calculated are more important than its actual 
 content. In the year 1865 Palmerston had considered a strong 
 Germany as desirable, in order to act as a check upon France 
 
MODERN GERMANY 473 
 
 and Russia; at the present moment Earl Percy, Under-Secretary 
 of State, interpreted the meaning of the understandings with 
 France and Russia from the contrary point of view: "To sup- 
 port these two states against a union of the two Central Powers, 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary." Soon thereafter a leading 
 publication openly revealed the ultimate design: 
 
 ''The Persian understanding, valuable in itself as it was and 
 remains, was less important as an achievement than as a basis 
 for other efforts of constructive diplomacy." 
 
 The meaning of this "constructive diplomacy" was self-evi- 
 dent. After rendering the Russian rival innocuous in the Far 
 East and after temporarily satisfying him in the Middle East, 
 the aim was to guide Russian ambition, which had long desired 
 to wipe out the Japanese disgrace and to divert internal revolu- 
 tionary forces, back to the Near East, which was the most nat- 
 ural historical field for the newly revealed tendencies of all of 
 Russia's political parties. That the increasingly pronounced 
 world-political differences w^ere transferred to this dangerous 
 theatre, where the rivalries of the Great Powers had for so 
 long lain dormant, produced incalculable consequences. As a 
 result of King Edward's strategic move, the differences between 
 Austria and Russia in the Balkans, which had slumbered for a 
 decade, flared up anew; and since they naturally reacted upon 
 Germany, the Franco-Russian Alliance could not fail to take 
 on a more offensive character than it had possessed for sixteen 
 years. Whoever seeks to fathom the causes of the World War 
 finds himself here at the point where the decisive involution of 
 the relentless forces of destiny begins. 
 
 Russia's new policy became apparent when she interpreted as 
 a political violation of the Miirzsteg programme the purely eco- 
 nomic project of a Sandjak railway, for which Austria drew her 
 authority from the Berlin Act, and entered a sharp protest. 
 This meant the opposing of all economic activity by Austria be- 
 yond her own boundaries, just as England had undertaken to 
 thwart Germany's plans throughout the world. In the question 
 of the Macedonian reforms, which had always represented a field 
 of conflict for the rival influences of the Great Powers, Austria- 
 Hungary and Russia found themselves progressively at odds, 
 while in this connection England sought to institute an extension 
 of the agreements of 1907. The meeting of King Edward and 
 the Czar at Reval, in June, 1908, indicated, under the cloak of 
 a far-reaching programme of Macedonian reforms, in reality the 
 coming partition of European Turkey. In this case also Eng- 
 land was inspired by the thought that that which she had not 
 
474 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 been able to carry through with Germany she might accomplish 
 despite her — that is to say, cold-bloodedly to start an era of Euro- 
 pean struggles for power, which in the language of the Island 
 Kingdom is styled the maintenance of the European balance of 
 power. It was seen from the start that there could not fail 
 to be a reaction on the large and small states of the Balkans, and 
 although for the time being the Young Turk Revolution re- 
 sulted in a complete check for the original program, neverthe- 
 less the stone had been set rolling. 
 
 At the same time the effort was made to undermine the Drei- 
 bund from within. The position of Italy in the Dreibund 
 had been growing weaker for several years. This was due to a 
 series of agreements with the different Powers providing mutual 
 guarantees in regard to the Balkan and Mediterranean questions 
 — agreements that were in effect "re-insurance" against all pos- 
 sible contingencies. After the Anglo-German antagonism became 
 manifest, at the conference of Algeciras, Italy's position suffered 
 a severe blow; it was apparent that the opening up of all the 
 Balkan questions for the future might prove a serious menace 
 to her. And from the English standpoint the hope was perhaps 
 entertained that under such auspices Austria-Hungary herself 
 might be won over to the plans of the new Entente. Before a 
 definite course was finally taken against the Dual Monarchy, the 
 attempt was made to gain its friendship. And once more it was 
 King Edward, who personally, at a meeting with Emperor Francis 
 Joseph in Ischl (August, 1908), endeavored to entice the Haps- 
 burger away from his German allies. He met with an uncom- 
 promising refusal. All the more determinedly did England, 
 since Austria-Hungary would not become her tool, proceed to 
 carry out against her the scheme of isolation, for which the 
 foundations had been laid more than a year before. 
 
 The Imperial German Government understood thoroughly the 
 new situation, as the result of which it was at every point forced 
 onto the defensive and with each counterstroke laid itself open 
 to the suspicion of taking the offensive. In an illuminating state- 
 ment addressed to the Federal Governments, the Imperial Chan- 
 cellor, in June, 1908, drew the following picture of the Euro- 
 pean situation: 
 
 "We must reckon with the fact that if we or Austria-Hun- 
 gary should become involved with one of the Entente Powers in 
 a serious conflict of interests, the understandings and agreements 
 would crystallize into concrete alliances, so that together with 
 Austria we might find ourselves face to face with a strong coali- 
 tion. We cannot eliminate the fundamental causes of the politi- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 475 
 
 cal dangers that surround us without stultifying ourselves. As 
 far as Germany is concerned, they are due to the continued 
 growth of her economic strength since the founding of the 
 Empire. It is the groundless fear of a possible misuse of the 
 economic, and hence also of the political, power of Germany and 
 of her closest ally that drives other states to form alliances 
 against us, and that would perhaps overcome their hesitation to 
 attack and crush us, if they felt that they were strong enough 
 to do so." 
 
 A period now began which was to test the strength of the 
 opposing groups of Powers ; a period which was to show whether 
 the aim of the unprecedented diplomatic preparations, which 
 were the work of England, was to be war or peace. 
 
 IV. THE FIRST TESTS OF STRENGTH OF THE TRIPLE 
 
 ALLIANCE 
 
 Bosnia, igo8-og. Isolation Through the Efforts of Publicists and 
 Pacificists. Death of King Edward. The Morocco-Congo Treaty 
 of igii. 
 
 After the preparation for the encircling policy in the years 
 1909 to 19 14, there follows its practical application, a series of 
 strength tests which, arising at first from questions of petty 
 local importance, are seen to develop each time into a European 
 crisis leading to the verge of war. These result in some cases 
 frotn the after-effects of the Morocco question, w^hile later on 
 the scene shifts to the East, filled with inflammable material by 
 the reopening of the Oriental question. These crises seem to 
 the observer like the breathing of the new^ Europe created by the 
 policy of Edward VII. At the start, the manifestations of life 
 shown by the new group of Powers do not reveal the functioning 
 of a machine whose parts easily and unfailingly cooperate; but 
 with the lapse of time, despite, or rather because, of an occasional 
 failure or dislocation, the unity becomes more marked. As the 
 complicated machine begins to work harmoniously, its activity 
 is steadily increased, and the stronger its effects are felt the 
 stronger becomes the resistance of the threatened states, as the 
 German Chancellor had predicted. Even when, after a crisis, 
 a temporary relaxation sets in betw^een individual members of 
 the two camps, the result is merely a heightening of the accumu- 
 lated tension at other points. On this account, these episodes, 
 despite the hopeful reception given their momentary solution 
 each time, appear in retrospect like the hasty catching of breath 
 in the midst of a silent and desperate test of strength, each time 
 leading only to a still fiercer struggle. 
 
476 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 The first of these tests — the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 — came 
 unexpectedly, and showed by its course that it was as yet too 
 early to speak of a concerted movement in the policy of isola- 
 tion. 
 
 Immediately after the meeting in Reval, the active imagina- 
 tion of Minister Isvolski began to work. In a letter dated June 
 18, 1908, which he would gladly have repudiated later, he pro- 
 posed to the leader of Austria-Hungary's policy the annexation 
 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even of the Sandjak, in return 
 for which Russia planned to obtain passage through the Darda- 
 nelles. A generation previously Russia had pointed the way for 
 the Dual Monarchy into Bosnia, and thereafter repeatedly — 
 for the last time through Kuropatkin — had suggested to Vienna 
 to change the administration of the provinces entrusted to her by 
 the Treaty of Berlin into an actual annexation corresponding 
 to existing conditions. Isvolski was thus only continuing the 
 course of Russia's policy for the previous thirty years, which, 
 without the slightest regard for the little Serbian brother, rec- 
 ognized this territory as within the undisputed sphere of interest 
 of Austria-Hungary. According to the bitter words of King 
 Milan, Russia had hitherto ''always made use of the Serbian 
 nation in the nature of convenient small change for the settle- 
 ment of her indebtedness to Austria." ^ The Russian minister, 
 even after the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution, held 
 fast to his program, and at a meeting with Count Aehrenthal 
 in Buchlau reached an agreement without difficulty as to the 
 means for carrying it through. 
 
 It is not surprising that Austria, in view of this promised 
 support, quickly proceeded to act. For the transformation of 
 Turkey into a constitutional national state could not fail to 
 endanger the hitherto passable condition of affairs in Bosnia, not 
 alone on account of the possibility of a nationalistic Turkish 
 demand for the country's return, but also because of the danger 
 of Serbian propaganda, which counted on the temporary nature of 
 the Austro-Hungarian mandate. Further, it was imperative to 
 take timely precautions at the most vulnerable spot against the 
 danger of an opening up of the whole Balkan question through 
 the policy of isolation, which had now become more imminent. 
 The annexation decree of October, 1908, merely served to 
 strengthen Vienna in several directions. This represented in 
 nowise a policy of conquest in the style of the World Powers, 
 which were insatiably seeking what they could devour; on the 
 contrary, it was simply a change in the legal form of a title 
 
 ^Die serbische Frage, Dr. Wladau Georgewitsch, p. 6i, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 477 
 
 which had long been recognized by Europe. Indeed, so thor- 
 oughly did Austria renounce any policy of force that she sur- 
 rendered at the same time to Turkey the garrison rights in the 
 Sandjak granted to her by treaty, and publicly abandoned the 
 ambitious plans which no doubt had taken form at times in the 
 imagination of her statesmen. 
 
 The effect of the decree of annexation was most unexpected. 
 The reason for this was that Isvolski was unable to obtain Lon- 
 don's agreement to the Russian part of the program — the open- 
 ing of the Dardanelles. For in England the Reval program 
 was no longer considered practicable, owing to the Young Turk 
 Revolution. Following the fall of Abdul Hamid, the hated 
 protagonist of German influence, the more ambitious hope awoke 
 in the minds of British statesmen of again becoming the pro- 
 tector and councillor of a youthful and constitutional Turkey, 
 and, thanks to this position, which carried with it consequences 
 so important for England's world policy (Arabia and the 
 Persian Gulf), the further hope of finally making an end of the 
 German competitor. Thus, as a result of the changed situa- 
 tion, British statesmen found themselves in the painful posi- 
 tion, to the astonishment of Isvolski, of being forced to oppose 
 the opening of the Dardanelles, to which in Reval they had 
 been favorable. The effect of the decree of annexation, there- 
 fore, was seen not alone in the formally justified protest of 
 Turkey, the anger of Serbia, who saw her secret hopes demol- 
 ished, and the disappointment of Isvolski, who found himself 
 diplomatically out-manoeuvred, but above all in the outburst of 
 English bitterness, which was quite unexpected in Vienna. The 
 London Foreign Office received the notice of the annexation 
 in the most unfriendly manner, and the irresponsible organs of 
 the press let loose the vials of their wrath against the unpardon- 
 able wrong inflicted on humanity and international law by this 
 immoral act — all of this with the moral bathos which is always 
 in evidence in England when they dare not mention the 
 real motives. The English Balkan Committee, which had been 
 in touch with all the national revolutionary elements of the 
 Balkans, now incited the Turks to a trade boycott and to 
 demands for compensation; especially did they stir up the Serbs. 
 It was a cause of astonishment that London was even more 
 Pan-Slavic than Petrograd itself — had it not been England her- 
 self, who at the Congress of Berlin made the motion for the 
 Bosnian mandate to Austria (analogous to her own acquisition of 
 Cyprus), and had she not a short while previously turned with 
 ill-concealed horror from the blood-stained dynasty in Bel- 
 
478 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 grade? It is known that on the very day of the reception of 
 the Austrian ultimatum, in July, 19 14, the British representative 
 in Petrograd said: "Direct British interests in Serbia are nil, 
 and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned 
 by British public opinion." 
 
 The secret of this violent opposition of England in the autumn 
 of 1908 was to be sought neither in Serbia nor in any anxiety 
 for the formalities of international law, but in a system of gen- 
 eral policy which, seeing defeat for certain of Its expectations, 
 set up with cunning calculation aims that gave even greater 
 promise for the future. 
 
 This was an opportunity to show Austria-Hungary, who a 
 short while before had refused to be drawn into the British 
 plans of isolating Germany, what a state faithful to the Drei- 
 bund would have to expect from across the Channel. It was 
 an opportunity to pour balm upon the wounds of the new 
 Russian Entente ally, to whom, contrary to desire, it had been 
 necessary to refuse the promised compensation, and at the same 
 time to deflect the anger of this ally (in view of Isvolski's char- 
 acter this was not difficult) against Austria-Hungary, who had 
 been the winner in the game. By offering generous diplomatic 
 help to Russia, it was possible to prevent the new friend from 
 entertaining doubts as to the power of the Entente. By making 
 the proposal for an international conference and by inciting in 
 the most violent manner the press of the friendly countries, the 
 British Foreign Office could not fail either to frighten Austria- 
 Hungary into yielding or at least to prove to Russia the indis- 
 pensability of the Entente. Finally, by arousing a strong Pan- 
 Slavic movement from Moscow to Belgrade there was prospect 
 of confining Russia henceforth to her ''proper field of labor," 
 a consummation which London had sought for some time. In 
 this manner it was possible, in any event, for England to turn 
 Isvolski's unfortunate little game into a remunerative specula- 
 tion along big lines. 
 
 For a moment it appeared as if the action would be a suc- 
 cess. Soon the whole Slavic world was in flames. For a long 
 time French publicists had sought to arouse the slumbering 
 forces in this region, but it was England who provided the 
 latter with the opportunity for their first political demonstration 
 before the eyes of the world. The Serbians, to w^hom King 
 Edward's ambitious policy suddenly gave a foothold such as 
 they had never had in all their history, challenged their neigh- 
 bor in the most provocative manner; they quickly accustomed 
 themselves to the idea that the historical role of an Eastern 
 
MODERN GERMANY 479 
 
 Piedmont was reserved for them, and eagerly took up the catch- 
 word coined by France that Austria-Hungary must suffer the 
 fate of an "Eastern Switzerland." Indeed, for the first time 
 the political lines of attack of Austria-Hungary's enemies were 
 seen to extend into the heart of the Dual Monarchy, where 
 individual politicians whose stock in trade was "nationality" 
 stood ready to cooperate. At all points, in the diplomatic strug- 
 gle of the winter 1908-09, forces were for the first time aroused 
 which in the years preceding the World War constantly grew 
 more threatening and finally became a factor in its outbreak. 
 
 The fact that England's portentous policy at this time failed 
 of its aim was primarily due to the much greater strength of 
 the bond between Germany and Austria-Hungary than of that 
 holding the Entente together. The German Imperial Chan- 
 cellor after the decree of annexation, the date of which had not 
 been known to him beforehand, immediately informed Vienna 
 that it might feel absolute security as to Germany's attitude,. 
 in which connection he said: "This is for us a matter of self- 
 evident loyalty." Whoever criticizes the unconditional nature 
 of this approval as being in opposition to the Bismarck tradition 
 in questions of Austria's Balkan policy, forgets that it was no 
 longer a matter of the special local interests of an ally which 
 might be supported or not according to wish, but that vital in- 
 terests were at stake w^hich, in the new world situation as cre- 
 ated by the encircling policy, concerned both parties equally. 
 In a speech in the Reichstag in March, 1909, Prince Biilow 
 therefore very properly recalled Bismarck's saying: "A state 
 like Austria-Hungary, if left in the lurch, will be alienated and 
 will feel inclined to offer its hand to the Power which has 
 been the enemy of its untrustworthy friend." An abandonment 
 of Austria-Hungary at this moment would merely have played 
 into the hands of King Edward and completed the isolation of 
 the German Empire. 
 
 The fact that Germany w^as successful in defeating the action 
 of England and Russia through her firm support of Austria 
 was due in part to two considerations. She succeeded tem- 
 porarily in relieving the Morocco crisis, which had continued 
 after the Algeciras Conference, and in persuading the French, 
 who were no doubt fully informed of Russia's lack of military 
 preparation, to maintain an attitude of more or less reserve in 
 the Bosnian crisis. The Franco-German Declaration of Feb- 
 ruary 8, 1909, had as its formal basis the Algeciras agreement 
 and the renewed French recognition of the independence and 
 integrity of the Sultanate. France merely promised to place 
 
48o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 no obstacle in the way ot Gernian> *s eonimerclal and industrial 
 interests in Morocco, while Germany acktunvledized that France, 
 as Morocco's neighbor, was called upon to uphold peace and 
 order for the sake of special political interiors. The inequality 
 of the respective promises is self-evident. Nevertheless, the at- 
 tempt was more or less successful in this crisis to brinii about a 
 lessening of the tension with France, without the sacrifice of our 
 rcval interests. Russia, as we have said, despite all her brave 
 words, which were blindly swallowed in Belixrade, was not 
 ready in a military way. German diplomacy, by the declara- 
 tion of Its unconditional support of Austria- Huniiary. made the 
 retreat easy for Russia: at the same time it discovered the man- 
 ner in which the Great Powers might fonnally check the wild 
 eagerness of Serbia's preparations — for which several of them 
 were responsible. On March 31, ioch'), Serbia, who was forced 
 to acquiesce in Europe's decision, on the ad\ ice of the Great 
 Powers, pledged herself by a formal declaration to abandon her 
 unfriendly attitude toward Austria-Hungary and to live once 
 more on the footing of neighborliness with that state. It was 
 reserved for the future to show whether the spirits of evil could 
 be exorcized in this manner. 
 
 The first test of strength of the Entente resulted, therefore, 
 in a defeat, since uniform and coherent diplomatic and military 
 leadership was lacking. For those who staged the game this 
 may have served merely as a warning to make good that which 
 was lacking. In England it was decided to await an oppor- 
 tunity with an ot^cially smiling face. In a speech on March 
 30, 1909. Grey laid down the guiding lines for the future. 
 Two causes for conflict, he said, between England and Germany 
 must be avoided. One was England's attempt to isolate Ger- 
 many ; this would never be submitted to by a nation of the 
 strength and power of Germany. The other was the attempt 
 of any one Power to dictate the policy of the Continent: this 
 England would never permit. The first of the alternatives 
 directly admitted the existence of something which the Eng- 
 lish newspapers had hitherto characterized as a German idee 
 fixe, and placed a check on the diplomatic measure of isolation. 
 The second alternative, on which the emphasis was placed, ex- 
 pressed in cautious form a denunciation of that which it was 
 customary- to style, plainly enough for the ears of Paris and 
 Petrograd. the danger of a Gemian hegemon\-. It was a ques- 
 tion only of selecting a new formula, not a new policy. 
 
 In England the conclusion was reached that the Entente 
 a^rreements did not furnish a satisfactory weapon of defense. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 481 
 
 and the question arose whether England's own nnllitary strength 
 should not be strengthened. There began a period of those 
 paroxysms of panic which occasionally sweep over the island, 
 or, rather, which are artificially created for the sake of a polit- 
 ical purpose. Although the panic outwardly found expression 
 in ridiculous outbursts of fear of Zeppelins, German spies and 
 waiters, there was behind it a more serious movement. The 
 French had constantly called attention to England's lack of mil- 
 itary preparations. The agitation for universal military serv- 
 ice, long carried on by Lord Roberts, now began to find a 
 stronger response. The spectre of a German invasion was 
 used to make the unfamiliar idea palatable. The French jingoes 
 admitted to each other, with tongue in cheek, that the leaders 
 of the agitation themselves did not believe in the possibility of 
 such an invasion, and calmed the French nation by the informa- 
 tion that as a matter of fact something more important was 
 at stake — namely, an expeditionary army, which, in a certain 
 eventuality, was to fight by the side of the French on the Con- 
 tinent.^ The British press took up the French argument that 
 England's military weakness robbed the Entente of its value, 
 and that in case of war an auxiliary army must be sent to Bel- 
 gium.^ A strong Continental army was already regarded merely 
 as the logical consequence of England's new Continental policy, 
 and unhesitatingly on each side of the Channel Belgium was 
 fixed on as the scene of its activity! 
 
 At the same time there began an active naval propaganda. 
 The Cabinet itself went so far as to make the assertion (later 
 acknowledged to be wrong) that the German fleet, despite offi- 
 cial German figures, was being more rapidly developed than 
 was provided for and publicly proclaimed in its program; 
 if the government indulged in a juggling with figures, the op- 
 position went to the length of shrieking that the German fleet of 
 dreadnaughts was on the point of outstripping the British. The 
 anxiety in England was, to a certain degree, even communicated 
 to the Americans. After an authority such as Admiral Mahan 
 gave expression, in the summer of 1909, to the fear that some 
 day the German fleet would disregard the Monroe Doctrine, 
 numberless British writers encouraged this distrust and saw 
 
 1 See De la paix de Francfort a la conference d'Algesiras, Mevil, p. 314. 
 
 2 "Germany and the Entente: A Letter from Berlin,' by Robert Crozicr Lonsf, 
 Fortnightly Rezievj, October, 1909, p. 747: "The logical complement of our new 
 Continental policy is a numerous conscript army. That this is no arbitrary 
 deduction is shown by the remarks of a writer in the Temps some month? ago 
 that England's military weakness deprived the Entente of meaning, and by the 
 statement lately made by General Hippolyte Langlois that in case of war it 
 would be necessary for England to land troops in Belgium to assist France." 
 
482 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 with satisfaction that with the beginning of the twentieth cen- 
 tury in American eyes Germany, not Great Britain, was "the 
 enemy." They were perfectly well aware that a German men- 
 ace to the Monroe Doctrine belonged to the same class of friv- 
 olous inventions as the statement of the British press in Japan 
 that the Calif ornian land laws (which exclude Japanese from 
 acquiring land) were due to the intrigues of German-Amer- 
 icans ! 
 
 As far as the influence of the British press extended in the 
 world, a beginning was now made, with finely organized skill, 
 to sow the seed which in the summer of 19 14 sprang up to 
 such a bloody harvest. The more widely spread international 
 cultural connections of England and France were everywhere 
 systematically utilized for an unscrupulous campaign against 
 Germany. It will be one of the future problems of history 
 to determine the role played by this press, by the group of 
 newspapers owned by Lord Northcliffe, with its train of de- 
 pendent organs throughout the provinces and the whole Eng- 
 lish colonial empire, by the Reuter Bureau and by the Asso- 
 ciated Press, by the Temps and the Matin, in preparing anti- 
 German sentiment. In the following years this machine func- 
 tioned so regularly and unfailingly that it is incorrect to speak of 
 statesmanship being stampeded by public opinion ; rather a de- 
 liberate political design is obvious which, operating from above 
 downward, grows with a latent energy of immeasurable effect. 
 The exaggerations of the German press have been described as 
 counterbalancing those of the foreign press, and the admission 
 has been made by us that sins have been committed by both 
 sides — who can check the political passions of irresponsible per- 
 sons! In this comparison, however, it must never be forgotten 
 that the thoroughly decentralized German press, as every one 
 knows who is familiar with international press conditions, is 
 not to be likened to the corresponding forces of our enemies; 
 its lack of territorial, capitalistic and party unity precludes a 
 like uniformity and cooperation; it does not give the keynote 
 to the orchestra but represents merely a many-voiced chorus 
 that accompanies and interprets the events; its anti-English rep- 
 resentatives up to the time of war were without influence either 
 on the government or on wide circles of the population. And 
 finally, one of its pronounced peculiarities is that, thanks to its 
 structure, it has remained free of those capitalistic influences that 
 have played a shocking part in the imperialistic propaganda of 
 other countries. 
 
 Even temporary agitation may produce lasting impressions. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 483 
 
 The psychological effects of the English panic on the French 
 mind increased from year to year, and even the agreement with 
 Germany in 1909 did not serve as a check to this tendency. The 
 Franco-Russian alliance had formerly perhaps caused greater 
 outbursts of joy on the occasion of fraternal banquets, but in 
 the nature of things this had been confined in the main to 
 the upper stratum of the ruling classes, and had not brought 
 the two nations into closer touch. Now, however, regardless 
 of the formally loose bond of the Entente, two civilized peoples 
 had been drawn close together, and public opinion on both sides 
 was brought into mutual and intensifying contact. The spirit 
 of revanche, which for the last ten or fifteen years had played 
 only a diplomatic role in the Russian alliance, saw now, with 
 deep satisfaction, on the other side of the Channel an entire 
 nation the victim of similar elemental feelings of hatred and 
 of fear. 
 
 Furthermore, the military agreements of the two countries, 
 despite the elastic character of the Entente, in the nature of 
 things led to a spirit of closer cooperation than was the case 
 with the Russian alliance: after agreeing in regard to the essen- 
 tials, the theater and the plan of war, the military representa- 
 tives drew into constantly closer touch. General French began 
 his studies on the Belgian terrain as early as 19 10. The secret 
 English war hand-books of Belgium ^ — which are the most sys- 
 tematic work of the General Staff of a Great Power regarding 
 a neighboring neutral country of which we know and which 
 were printed in the years 191 2-19 13 — are the result of his ex- 
 haustive preparatory studies, of which the Belgian government 
 could not possibly have remained in ignorance. How far the 
 cooperation between England and France in working out a 
 common Belgian plan of campaign had gone was shown shortly 
 afterward when the press of the two countries most bitterly at- 
 tacked a Dutch bill (at the beginning of 191 1) for coast de- 
 fense, proposing the fortification of Flushing. The English took 
 the position that such a fortification — which was fully within 
 the right of Dutch sovereignty — was entirely unpermissible, 
 since it might hinder the English from efficiently protecting Bel- 
 gian neutrality against possible German aggression; they would 
 fain have forbidden the Dutch, in protecting their neutrality, 
 from making use of those means by which they might keep 
 foreign armies and fleets away from their territory. The press 
 heightened the comedy by denouncing German pressure as the 
 
 ^Belgium, Road and River Reports, prepared by the General Staff, Londor, 
 Vol. I (1912), Vol. II (1913), Vol. Ill (1914). 
 
484 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 cause of this fortification and then denouncing the alleged Ger- 
 man desire to conquer Holland as a danger for the future. So 
 strong was this indignation that the conclusion was inevitable 
 that the fortifying of Flushing interfered with the military 
 plans of the two nations.^ The combinations worked out by the 
 General Staffs were apt in the end, through mutual incitement, 
 to become a menace to peace; the military factors, left quite 
 free of parliamentary control, contrary to all English tradi- 
 tions, were at liberty to develop, until finally they could not fail 
 to react with determining force on the plans of the statesmen. 
 
 Whoever follows this encircling scheme of diplomacy and 
 press, accompanied by military and naval preparation, finds him- 
 self at the moment of the death of King Edward, its spir- 
 itual originator (May, 19 10), face to face w^ith the question: 
 Does all this not simply mean preparation for the great war, 
 and was that which the world is to-day experiencing not delib- 
 erately planned long ago? Despite the temptation to answer 
 this question affirmatively, it must not be forgotten that at 
 least the English aim of isolating Germany might have been at- 
 tained by peaceful methods. According to the opinion of well- 
 informed men as regards the intentions of the King, it is possi- 
 ble that he himself would have preferred such a solution. His 
 object would have been attained if Germany had been crippled 
 by bloodless means, if her slightest action had been frustrated 
 and her treaties disrupted or weakened, her chances for the 
 future ruined, and Germany herself, through constant pressure, 
 forced to discontinue the increase of her navy and to become 
 such an unimportant member of the world system of states as 
 the English calculations demanded. King Edward's aim would 
 have been reached had the German Empire, at the same time 
 that the distribution of the world among the giant states went 
 triumphantly forward, encountered protest and ill-will at every 
 step beyond its narrowest bounds; had its efforts at self-expres- 
 sion, which, in view of the increase of its population and of its 
 sources of energy urged toward outward activity, been consis- 
 tently denounced as unpermissible or as an inexcusable menace 
 to the world, while another state that had become innocuouSj 
 with a stationary population, was left free to expand at will. 
 
 1 The Belgian Minister, Baron Greindl, in his report of November 23, 1911, 
 says: "The idea of a flanking movement from the North undoubtedly forms part 
 of the combinations of the Entente cordiale. If that were not the case, the 
 plan of fortifying Flushing would not have caused such an outcry in Paris 
 and London. It was not even concealed there why it was desired that the 
 Scheldt should remain without protection. The purpose was to be able with- 
 out hindrance to throw an English garrison into Antwerp, that is to say, in 
 our territory to create a base of operation for an offensive, in which we were 
 to be compelled to partake, in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 485 
 
 Such a world-political restriction might attain an apparent suc- 
 cess, but it carried with it the danger of driving the encircled 
 state to desperate reaction. For such an event England had 
 planned as a last resort, if necessary, to visit as a preventive 
 measure on the German Empire the fate once prepared for the 
 Spanish, Dutch and French commercial Powers. This method 
 does not lead to war as the only solution, but it may finally 
 render it inevitable — especially when the forces of which it 
 makes use (French revanche and Russian offensive) get out of 
 hand and blindly pursue their own ends. Such was the fateful 
 inheritance left behind by King Edward. It cannot be stated 
 that he desired the World War, but without his interference this 
 war w^ould never have come about. 
 
 The dangers were not to be obviated by relaxation of the 
 tension at one point. German statesmen, who in February, 
 
 1909, had sought an understanding with France, now tried to 
 follow up this idea of removing causes of friction throughout 
 the w^orld, by a similar move towards Russia. They returned 
 to the policy which in the eighties had avoided a break with 
 Petrograd, had rendered possible in the nineties a friendly re- 
 lationship w^ith the Dual Alliance, and had maintained during 
 the Japanese War a benevolent neutrality. The new Imperial 
 Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, and the head of the Rus- 
 sian government, Sassonov, reached an agreement in November, 
 
 1910, to the effect **that neither of the two governments would 
 enter into an alliance which might be aimed against the other." 
 Especially did they declare their mutual interest in the main- 
 tenance of the status quo in the Balkans and in the Near East, 
 and reached an understanding in regard to the Persian ques- 
 tion, which had been settled in 1907 only on a one-sided basis. 
 In return for Germany's recognition of Russia's position in Per- 
 sia, Russia definitely abandoned her opposition to the Bagdad 
 Railway, to which, it was agreed, certain connections should be 
 made. 
 
 These events which, from the standpoint of the peace of the 
 world, might have indicated a desirable alleviation, were re- 
 garded in the camp of the Triple Entente with mixed feelings. 
 Although nothing was further from Russia's thoughts than a 
 **re-insurance agreement," and although an official declaration 
 to this effect was immediately made, London and Paris felt that 
 the Entente had been weakened. It may be that all the Rus- 
 sian statesmen were aiming at was, by concessions on a minor 
 point, to purchase Germany's moral support in other cases of 
 dispute, or merely to gain time temporarily until ready for 
 
486 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 war. It may also be that Russia wished to give warning that 
 another course was open to her, both to her old ally (who in 
 the previous year had not satisfied all her demands but had made 
 an independent agreement with Germany) and to her new 
 partner in the Entente, following the re-formation of the Cabi- 
 net and the demise of King Edward. At all events, the prac- 
 tical indirect result of the Potsdam Agreement was, both in 
 England and in France, to create, after the first dissatisfaction', 
 a greater desire to advance Russia's policies or to take the lead 
 themselves wherever possible at other points. Matters had al- 
 ready gone so far that every diminution in the effort to isolate 
 Germany at one point resulted in an increased activity at others, 
 the final effect being an intensifying of the whole situation. 
 While certain Englishmen began to consider an analogous Anglo- 
 German agreement, the old advocates of Germany's isolation 
 were puzzled what to think of Sir Edward Grey, who no longer 
 had the clever King behind him.^ A well-informed critic such 
 as Garvin declared that in matters like the Bagdad Railway, 
 which was a vital question for England more than for any 
 other Great Power, the Triple Entente had ceased to exist. 
 Even less did the French hide their disappointment, and they 
 mourned with even sharper grief the English King, whom they 
 missed; they were disturbed by the withdrawal of the Russian 
 troops from the Polish border, and they wondered reproach- 
 fully whether for the sake of revanche they should not have 
 placed themselves much more unreservedly at the disposal of 
 their Russian ally. 
 
 Instead of its disorganization, a firmer consolidation of the 
 Entente was therefore demanded, energetic action abroad in- 
 stead of restraint — regardless of the danger that the incipient 
 relaxation of the world situation might again yield to an im- 
 perilling of peace. "It is high time," wrote the Temps in 
 March, 191 1, "that an end be put to the unsatisfactory con- 
 dition of the Entente by actual cooperation." At this very time, 
 after an interregnum of six years, the energetic Delcasse had re- 
 turned to the Cabinet as Minister of Marine, and before long 
 he had again imposed his views on the weaker characters in the 
 ministry. The group formed by the Temps and the Comite 
 du Maroc began to promulgate a new Morocco program, which 
 promised a marked diversion towards foreign questions. Eng- 
 
 1 Thus H. H. Johnston, in the Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1910, 
 remarks with regard to what he considers the necessary "adjustment of the 
 political relations between the British and German Empires": "If such an end 
 could be attained without too great a sacrifice of vital British interests, it is 
 the end above all others which should be immediately and unflaggingly pur- 
 sued by British statesmen." 
 
 i 
 
MODERN GERMANY 487 
 
 lish cooperation was certain from the start, and for the pur- 
 pose of mutual encouragement, the press again began the popu- 
 lar game of question and answer in regard to the nature of the 
 Franco-English agreements, resulting on both sides in unwitting- 
 revelations and in the creation of a spirit of recklessness. 
 
 The manner in w^hich England bolstered up France's ex- 
 pected action in Morocco by an enthusiastic speech of Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey on March 13, 191 1, on world peace and by an un- 
 restricted treaty of arbitration with America, will always be a 
 source of wonder. To be sure, there were reasons of a world- 
 political and domestic-political nature for this speech, but the 
 theatric reception which was given to it proved that an un- 
 mistakable application in the field of foreign politics outweighed 
 all other considerations. Grey's journalistic confidant. Spender, 
 felt that he might venture to revive the meaningless saying of 
 Napoleon in an up-to-date form: "The British Empire is 
 Peace." Impetuously he stretched both hands toward America, 
 and quieted the French, who were somewhat disturbed by this 
 "world peace," by saying that the German military spirit had 
 in reality received a body blow by this speech and that the life 
 of the nations was to be governed by a new principle which was 
 to replace the old "blood-and-iron" policy. The culmination 
 lay in the question: "Now that England has held out the olive 
 branch to the nations, is there any justification for an addition 
 to the present German naval program?" The statesman whom 
 Spender praised for never having been a sentimentalist thought 
 thus to solve all problems with a peace speech; even at the last 
 minute before the World War he once more produced arguments 
 of this kind, which are probably a peculiarity of his mentality. 
 
 The immediate effect of the speech, after the German Im- 
 perial Chancellor had replied with a manly declaration of our 
 point of view, was to give the signal for the renewal of the 
 publicity campaign for the encircling of Germany, in which, 
 by the cooperation of harmless friends of peace in all countries, 
 the cannons of pacifism were turned against us. While the 
 giant states prepared anew for the partition of the world, they 
 sought to persuade the Germans to adopt, as the English Oppo- 
 sition sarcastically remarked, a "change in the rules of the 
 game," and because the state which had been systematically 
 isolated for seven years did not begin to disarm, it was out- 
 lawed as the disturber of the peace of the world. It thus be- 
 came steadily clearer that a threat against Germany was con- 
 cealed in Grey's confused dreams of peace, and the absolute 
 dependence of the political and non-political brains in America 
 
488 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 on English arguments was revealed, although not for the last 
 time. Even he who does not regard the policy of the Liberal 
 Cabinet as pure Machiavellism but takes into consideration its 
 traditional mode of expression and the restrictions that regard 
 for others imposes upon it, cannot escape the suspicions that 
 Grey desired under all circumstances to uphold the action of 
 France in Morocco against the expected German protest and 
 to denounce this, when it should come, as a disturbance of the 
 peace of the world. For precisely during these weeks (April ii, 
 191 1 ), the British minister secretly gave his consent to the ad- 
 vance of the French on Fez. 
 
 The situation in the Morocco question had long since become 
 untenable. In the course of the last five years the Algeciras 
 Act had been more and more nullified, as the result of internal 
 anarchy and even more through France's ''readiness to help." ^ 
 That which was proclaimed as the "peaceful penetration" of 
 Morocco proved to be, even in English opinion, a system of 
 financial strangling, of brutal reprisals, of continuous intrigues 
 and provocations, which increased until the idlest excuses were 
 regarded as justifying the French advance on Fez. On the 
 other hand, the Franco-German negotiations of 1909, which had 
 at least provided security for Germany's trade interests and an 
 economic cooperation in Africa, had resulted in failure in De- 
 cember, 1 9 10, and had altogether ceased. This was entirely 
 owing to France, as well-known French writers afterward ad- 
 mitted.^ This failure was due in great part to the frequent 
 cabinet changes and the alliance of politicians with capitalistic 
 interests in Paris; a decisive factor, however, was the feeling 
 of self-confidence, carefully nursed in London, that the French 
 aims might be realized, if need be, without regard for Germany 
 and without offering compensation. Since Delcasse's return to 
 power, there was a determination to risk the march on Fez with 
 British support; once safely in Fez,, the French would see to 
 it that military necessity and the well-seasoned game of creating 
 "incidents" should make it impossible for them to leave; a 
 complete occupation of the capital was, of course, the natural 
 prelude to the declaration of the protectorate. This was an 
 attempt to rob the German Empire of the remnant of the com- 
 pensation agreed upon, through the pressure brought to bear by 
 the general political situation and by means of a political method 
 in which one seemingly innocent step necessitated the next. 
 
 '^Morocco in Diplomccy, Morel (London, 1912), p. 40: "Torn . . . across and 
 reduced to waste paper." 
 
 2 E.g., Le coup d'Agadir, Albin. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 489 
 
 That was the culminating act of the policy begun in April, 
 1904 — a policy which, according to the opinion of an English- 
 man, aimed to make the state which was in reality threatened 
 appear in the light of the warlike aggressor, unless it submitted 
 to humiliating exclusion.^ 
 
 German diplomats had given warning after warning, w^ith 
 increasing earnestness, of the results which would follow if the 
 Algeciras Act were to be nullified in this manner and if the 
 signatory Powers should again obtain freedom of action. As a 
 deaf ear continued to be turned to these warnings, Germany de- 
 cided to speak more plainly. On July i, 191 1, the gunboat 
 Panther was sent to Agadir, for the protection of German in- 
 terests in South Morocco, which were threatened by disturb- 
 ances. According to the intention of Secretary of State von 
 Kiderlen-Wachter, the measure was for no other purpose than 
 to show our unwillingness to leave our well-established inter- 
 ests unprotected; it was, as later characterized by the French- 
 man, Marcel Sembat, also an indication of the desire "for a 
 chat," for the purpose of carrying to a conclusion the inter- 
 rupted negotiations — naturally with but two participants, as 
 they had been started in the year 1909. Germany's object in 
 the negotiations, as the French were officially informed by von 
 Kiderlen at the very start, was not the occupation of South 
 Morocco, since recognition of the French position had now be- 
 come unavoidable, but the acquisition of a compensation else- 
 where. Only in case this was not to be obtained, would it 
 become necessary in the nature of things to revive Germany's 
 claims in Morocco. 
 
 It is worthy of note that resentment at the demonstration at 
 Agadir was not so strong in Paris, where they were doubtless 
 conscious of their own sins of omission, as it was in London. 
 While Sir Edward Grey had never been willing to admit that 
 the march on Fez, which he had approved, had created a "new 
 situation," he now proclaimed, filled as he was with distrust 
 of the German explanations, that a "new situation" had been 
 created. On July 4, before France had yet spoken, he took a 
 definite stand, declaring that England would recognize no agree- 
 ment brought about without her cooperation. Hastily, France's 
 second sprang between the principals, before the duel had begun, 
 in order to bring about a result in accordance with her own 
 
 ^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 127: "Had Germany wanted war, her 
 course was clearly indicated, and it has been one of the most shameful features 
 of the persistent misleading of the British public in favor of a diplomacy 
 immoral from its inception, that Germany, the provoked party, has been repre- 
 sented, both in the crisis of 1905 and in the crisis of 1911 — crises entirely 
 brought about by that diplomacy — as working for war." 
 
490 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 wishes. The point of danger during the succeeding negotia- 
 tions was from the start neither Berlin nor Paris, but London. 
 
 Grey's act became more peremptory at the very moment 
 when, in the Franco-German negotiations, the question was 
 taken up as to the extent of compensation in the French Congo. 
 Begun by an article in The Times of July 20 of unusual im- 
 portance and from an unusual source, it culminated in the speech 
 of Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on July 21. 
 The Times accused Germany of demanding a compensation 
 such as England had received in Egypt, and went to the length 
 of saying that no British government could agree to this, even 
 if a French government should be found ready to accept it. 
 While the discussion was concerned with the extent of boundary 
 changes in the French Congo, The Times poured oil on the 
 flames by making the charge that Germany was making *'a claim 
 for absolute European predominance." This well-calculated 
 catchword, which we shall encounter up to the moment of the 
 outbreak of the war, revealed the fundamental political antag- 
 onism which had determined all of England's actions for a 
 decade. In his next measures, however. Grey, according to his 
 English critic,^ adopted the arguments of The Times in a man- 
 ner which would have been befitting a French minister. Even 
 in England curiosity was expressed as to the motive of his 
 action. 
 
 Contrary to the agreement, he was constantly kept Informed 
 from Paris regarding the progress of the negotiations between 
 the two countries; if he received false information from Paris 
 (through the underground channels which connected the 
 French party of action with the British Embassy), this was the 
 fault of the French; but if he gave more credence to this in- 
 formation than to the official German declarations, that was his 
 own fault. Even without this, he was, however, quite clear 
 as to what he wanted. He desired, even without formal ad- 
 mission of England to the negotiations, to force Germany's 
 compensation to be made as small as possible, in the interest 
 of France, and to bring about such a balance of the scales that 
 in any event Germany would be worsted. If the Entente was 
 to issue with greater strength from this final settlement in 
 regard to Morocco, he would have to stand by its uncompromis- 
 ing partisans in Paris and prevent at any price the party advo- 
 cating relaxation of the strain between France and Germany 
 from gaining political power. This could be brought about 
 
 '^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 170: "He could not surely have been more 
 jemphatic in defense of a purely French interest, had he been_ the servant of 
 the French Republic, instead of a servant of the British Empire." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 491 
 
 only by provoking Germany and encouraging France — creating 
 at the same time, it is true, war possibilities which could hardly 
 have arisen from the Franco-German negotiations alone. 
 
 Stripped of all the accretions of diplomatic misunderstandings 
 and dissensions, this was the significance of the speech which 
 Grey caused the Radical member of the Cabinet, Lloyd George, 
 to make on July 22; the Foreign Minister went so far in his 
 autocratic policy as to inform only the Premier, Asquith, re- 
 garding the import of this step. The speech was an undis- 
 guised threat to Germany of English readiness for war, a sound- 
 ing of the alarm which quickly brought the Franco-German 
 negotiations to a critical stage. At the same time England 
 made ready, in the effort further to strengthen France morally, 
 to take those military and naval measures necessary in emer- 
 gencies. It is interesting in this connection to see from some 
 of the existing documents to what point the long-standing plans 
 for the inclusion of Belgium in the sphere of military action 
 had been developed. In August the English planned, in case 
 of the outbreak of war, a landing in the Belgian town of Zee- 
 briigge, even in the event that Belgium did not previously ask 
 for help; when the Belgian general, later informed of this plan, 
 modestly called attention to the necessity of an agreement on 
 the part of his government, he received the cool reply that in 
 any case {en tout etat de cause) the English would have entered 
 the country. Lord Roberts, who spoke from knowledge if any 
 one was in the position to do so, likewise admitted with mili- 
 tary frankness that the British expeditionary army was held 
 ready "to embark for Flanders to do its share in maintaining 
 the balance of power in Europe." England was prepared to 
 march, even without an appeal for her help and without for- 
 mally taking notice of Belgian neutrality, not for the sake of 
 protecting the latter or on account of possible international obli« 
 gations, but solely and alone for the "European balance of 
 power." This meant, in the language which she had used for 
 seven years, that she desired to turn the scale under all condi- 
 tions in France's favor and against Germany, for the sake of her 
 own political aims. She desired thus, from a military stand- 
 point, to do precisely the same thing for which in the year 19 14, 
 w^ith her customary moral abhorrence, she publicly blamed the 
 threatened state which forestalled her. 
 
 The result of this sword-rattling policy was that the field 
 of negotiations was much narrowed and the extent of the Ger- 
 man compensation greatly limited. The peaceful restraint of 
 Germany alcne made this solution possible. 
 
492 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 English interference had a double after-effect, even after the 
 final settlement on the basis of the Morocco-Congo Agreement 
 had been reached. From this time on in the French nation the 
 conviction took root that England's armed support might be 
 counted upon unconditionally in case of necessity, even beyond 
 the measure of her obligation. Although persons of independent 
 thought may have recognized with dismay the fact that for a 
 decade France had become absolutely subservient to England's 
 political ambitions, the revanche instinct had become irresistible 
 in ever-widening circles of the population. Even the modest 
 compensation which Germany had enforced caused furious in- 
 dignation; the legend of the German plans of attack, which had 
 not even existed against France when isolated after 1871, was 
 the basis for widespread excitement, and the nation began to 
 concern itself with the fate of Alsace-Lorraine in ever more 
 provocative manner. The boasted esprit nouveau, sustained by 
 a feeling of superiority on account of the possession of the new 
 weapon, the aeroplane, and excited by constantly occurring inci- 
 dents, began to speak openly of the ''hour" which was at last 
 approaching. A French writer expressed the ''new feeling" by 
 saying: "The agreement of 191 1 is either the prelude to a 
 genuine understanding between Germany and France, or the 
 prelude to a war." 
 
 It may have appeared to many at this time that the tension 
 would relieve itself in an immediate threat of war. The great 
 lines of historical development, however, are never straight, but 
 cross and recross each other in unaccountable manner. Thus 
 the last phase before the World War saw a relaxation of tension 
 at precisely the most dangerous point. But at the same time 
 forces which had been loosed by the policy of England as here 
 exposed, steered independently and brutally toward objects 
 which were to be attained only by war, and these forces suc- 
 ceeded in surpressing all the elements working for peace, and 
 finally in uniting new and old antagonisms to bring on the 
 World War against the Central Powers. 
 
 V. THE LAST PHASE 
 
 Anglo-German Attempts at Disarmament. Offensive of Pan-Slavism 
 and Revanche. IQ12-IQ14. 
 
 Just as an abatement of tension with Russia had followed 
 the crisis of 1908-09, there now followed on the diplomatic 
 struggle of the summer and autumn of 191 1, which had caused 
 
MODERN GERMANY 493 
 
 an upheaval of the deeps, the attempt or the "bluff" at an Anglo- 
 German relaxation. The impulse for the movement came from 
 England. A doubt had arisen in the minds of the English 
 as to whether they had not perhaps bent the bow too far in 
 the last crisis and avoided the danger by the narrowest margin. 
 An independent politician like Lord Rosebery openly attacked 
 a political system which, with its ententes, assumed obligations 
 that, under certain and by no means unlikely conditions, might 
 compel England to enter upon a gigantic war. Such a system, 
 he said, was in its uncertainty even more dangerous than one 
 of open alliances, which possessed the advantage of limiting and 
 defining. Among publicists and journalists the number of those 
 increased who attacked the dangerous development which the 
 agreement of 1904 had undergone and demanded parliamentary 
 control of its increasingly offensive character.^ 
 
 It was openly admitted that England had not acted loyally 
 toward Germany in the Morocco question, and the warning was 
 given that the continuation of this policy meant lending Eng- 
 land's support to French revanche.^ There was an increase in 
 the number of such protestants in the Liberal Party, which was 
 at the helm, and in financial and industrial circles, with their 
 influential organs, The Manchester Guardian and The Econ- 
 omist, and among the Radicals, the Irish and workers. Even 
 the Novoye Vremya on occasion during the following years 
 spoke with petulance of the majority of the ministerial party, 
 which, it said, had come under the influence of the pacifists and 
 the Germano-philes. The Cabinet therefore saw itself com- 
 pelled to do something in order to satisfy its own followers. It 
 was all the more ready to do this since, after the settlement of 
 its Morocco obligations, it possessed a freer hand as to France. 
 Perhaps in the inner circles of the party the course of events in 
 the last crisis had shaken faith in the mistaken belief as to Ger- 
 many's unconditional desire for war. 
 
 The government, therefore, sent one of its most noted mem- 
 bers to negotiate with German statesmen. Lord Haldane, who 
 
 "^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 198: "There was unwarrantable, unsanc- 
 tioned transmutation of a strictly limited agreement with France into an in- 
 strument of aggression against the Power which challenged France's infringe- 
 ment both of that Power's interests and rights under its own treaty with 
 Morocco, and under the Algeciras Act. Parliament should place beyond doubt 
 or question that this nationally unauthorized transmutation must cease." — The 
 Daily Neivs says the Treaty of 1904 had gradually developed into an "agree- 
 ment by England in the interest of France to oppose Germany diplomatically 
 at all times and in all places, and should the event arise, by force of arms." 
 
 "Morocco in Diplomacy. Morel, p. 196: "We have not treated Germany fairly, 
 and Germany has a legitimate grievance against us on that score." On page 199 
 he warns the English against a situation "whereby it might become to-morrow 
 the agent of some ephemeral French Government or other bent upon war with 
 Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine." 
 
i^94 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 was in Berlin from the 8th to the nth of February, 191 2, was 
 one of those in the inner circle who was informed from the 
 start of the secret obligations toward France. In the last crisis 
 he had advocated energetic action. But at the same time, less 
 insular in his outlook, he possessed a sympathetic understanding 
 for German philosophy and for all that which beyond the Chan- 
 nel is to-day trodden under foot as German Kultur. Had he 
 not even, although himself the creator of the unfortunate terri- 
 torial army, striven to make his compatriots see that Scharn- 
 horst and Clausewitz, Moltke and Roon would not have been 
 possible without the great thinkers of Germany? His person- 
 ality was admirably adapted either to mediation or to double- 
 dealing. He discussed with the leaders of Germany all those 
 points where the interests of the two countries met, in order 
 to discover a basis for rapprochement. As the Englishman 
 made no secret of the fact that his country would not quietly 
 acquiesce in an attack by Germany on France (the ancient legend 
 carefully nourished by the French revanche politicians), the Im- 
 perial Chancellor gave the most solemn assurance that Germany 
 would never wage an offensive war against France, but would 
 draw the sword only under provocation. On the contrary, he 
 emphasized the fact that a loyal understanding between Germany 
 and England would in all probability obviate the danger of a 
 European war. All causes for possible conflict, he said, would 
 be smothered in the seed by the weight of such a union. 
 
 On the English side there had been partial abandonment of 
 King Edward's position that there were no frictions, that only 
 rivalry existed. Certain frictions of this kind were acknowledged, 
 and England declared herself ready to remove them. With sin- 
 cerity and genuine desire for peace, the German government 
 seized the hand held out to it. Time alone could show whether 
 a relaxation of the tension at one point would produce a general 
 effect. 
 
 That Russia had already taken advantage of the Anglo-Ger- 
 man tension in order secretly to prepare a new offensive in the 
 Balkans did not promise well. On February 29, 191 2, soon 
 after Haldane's visit to Berlin, there was formed, under Rus- 
 sian auspices, the Balkan League, which had been in the making 
 since the beginning of the Turco-Italian War and which aimed 
 at the dismemberment of European Turkey. It undertook to 
 regard the attempt of any Great Power (Austria- Hungary or 
 Italy) to interfere, even provisionally, as a casus belli. It has 
 never been disputed that the League was aimed at Austria- 
 Hungary from the start. The Pan-Slavic tendencies, which 
 
MODERN GERMANY 495 
 
 had been merely an ideologic disguising of Russia's unbridled 
 policy of force, now took possession of the whole press, of the 
 intellectuals and the various parties in the Duma, and finally of 
 the representatives of the ofificial government. Seeking to clear 
 the way toward Constantinople of all obstacles — the traditional 
 goal of Russia's ambition — the upholders of these ideas no longer 
 shrank from accepting the destruction of Austria-Hungary as 
 the indispensable preliminary to their program. 
 
 A policy of offense, however, which aimed at the destruction 
 of a Great Power, indicated the most fateful overturning of all 
 genuine political balance, a revolutionizing of the status quo 
 in Europe, compared to which all other peace-destroying aims, 
 even that of the revanche, were only child's play. And yet 
 publicists, w^ho had long accustomed themselves to understand by 
 the '^maintenance of the balance of power" the isolation of Ger- 
 many, do not hesitate to justify this Pan-Slavic ambition in the 
 name of European balance of power, which would otherwise 
 have fallen a victim to German hegemony! 
 
 If one surveys from these two points of view the ensuing 
 development of the whole European situation, the impression is 
 gained of two main currents crossing each other; it seems as 
 if the tangle of action and reaction could no longer as hitherto 
 be grouped under a simple exclusive formula. The policy of 
 the Imperial government was to seek in every manner possible 
 a relaxation of the tension at the one point where this appeared 
 possible, and where in the last analysis the decision would come; 
 on this account it avoided to the degree of self-sacrifice giving 
 at any point cause for distrust, but it was impossible longer to 
 remain blind to the fact that the fateful tendencies of the new of- 
 fensive were spreading faster than those making for an abate- 
 ment of the tension, and that they threatened our vital interests 
 with destruction. Germany found herself forced to oppose 
 Russia's threatening attitude tow^ard Austria-Hungary, unless 
 she desired to lose her one faithful ally and to see the Dual 
 Monarchy suffer internal disruption. If she permitted this, 
 her own isolation would be complete and courage given to all 
 her enemies for a final crushing blow. In this last stage of the 
 policy of isolation, in which the German Empire was forced defi- 
 nitely on the defensive, it was characteristic that the English 
 statesmen were no longer openly at the helm as previously. 
 Rather had Russian Pan-Slavism, as the real heir of King Ed- 
 ward, for the sake of other aims than the world policy of Eng- 
 land, taken over his activities in the making of world history. 
 Hence, even if London did not approve of all the methods and 
 
49B MODERN GERMANY 
 
 plans of her Entente ally, it could afford to await the development 
 of affairs with reserve — indeed it could at the same time lend its 
 support to the experiment of a military abatement. After hav- 
 ing regulated the clock of the universe anew, there was no 
 longer cause for concern as to the striking of the hours. 
 
 It can cause no astonishment that the German government had 
 not allowed itself to be caught by the formula of an under- 
 standing which Grey had conceived and Haldane brought to 
 Germany, but which had no practical meaning.^ It need not, 
 however, be assumed that the negotiations which were carried 
 on in London during the ensuing years were from the start 
 only a blind to conceal a contrary policy. Events showed that 
 as regards the future delimitation of the spheres in Central 
 Africa, as well as in the questions which were bound up with 
 the continuation of the Bagdad Railway, an understanding was 
 by no means impossible. Even the more delicate question of a 
 possible reduction of naval preparations was discussed now with 
 more success than in 1909. The British public was quieter in 
 thought than in previous years, and certain perspicacious pub- 
 licists even recognized the fact that a strong German fleet need 
 not of necessity possess an offensive character, since the vital 
 need of maintaining great open markets in the world made the 
 possession of a corresponding naval power indispensable for the 
 German Empire.^ Distrust, it is true, was more pronounced in 
 the official head of the navy; neither the personality nor the 
 manner of expression of Mr. Churchill was calculated, in view 
 of his mocking reference to the ''German luxury fleet," to ren- 
 der easy for the Imperial government renunciation of so vital 
 a sovereign right as the autonomous determination of its neces- 
 sary armament. Nevertheless, there was a certain gain even 
 in this field, as on both sides the maintenance of a relative 
 strength of the two fleets in a ratio of 16 to 10 was declared 
 to be possible and satisfactory. 
 
 If, meanwhile, France had been crowded somewhat into the 
 background by the two principal opponents of the Central Pow- 
 ers, it was nevertheless of tremendous importance what form 
 her obligations toward the two members of the Entente would 
 take. It was a prelude to the Balkan War pregnant with con- 
 
 ^ The formula reads: "The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing 
 peace and friendship between themselves, England declares that she will neither 
 make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Germany. Aggression upon Ger- 
 many forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which 
 England now is a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such 
 an object." 
 
 ^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 212: "This she can attain only by the 
 possession of a fleet which will make the strongest Power hesitate either to 
 attack her or to ignore her." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 497) 
 
 sequences that the Premier, Poincare, on the occasion of his 
 visit to Petrograd in August, 19 12, obligated himself to advo- 
 cate the renewal of the three-year military service period. The 
 Russian statesmen had based their demand for this on the like- 
 lihood of serious complications in the "Austrian question" ; the 
 fact was recalled that at the time of the formation of the 
 Dual Alliance the three-year period of service had been in effect, 
 and the final argument was used that otherwise a pro-German 
 party would gain powder and endanger the Alliance. The Pan- 
 Slavic offensive, clear as to the course which It desired to pur- 
 sue, imposed upon Its ally an almost Intolerable increase of 
 military burdens. Only for the sake of the hopes which had 
 from the start bound the French revanche to the Dual Alli- 
 ance, did the French politicians, under the continuous pressure 
 of diplomatic and military extortion, submit to the inevitable.^ 
 Poincare, who shortly afterward was elected to the presidency 
 of the Republic, lent his name to this program; and even if the 
 French were successful in gaining in return certain military con- 
 cessions from Russia, nevertheless this system of mutual obli- 
 gations could not fail in the end still further to increase the 
 tension in the atmosphere in France and Russia. At all events, 
 it was this obligation of France, undertaken before the Balkan 
 War, and the outcome of the war itself which forced the Ger- 
 man government in the spring of 191 3 to draw up an extensive 
 military program. Such was the causal and chronological se- 
 quence of events. 
 
 At the same time England drew closer the bond with France. 
 The fact that she had another iron in the fire made it all the 
 more impossible for her to dispense with her Entente ally, who 
 followed the negotiations with Germany with unconcealed dis- 
 trust. In the summer of 19 12 Britain sought, at first by harsh 
 ■compulsory measures, to prevent Italy from renewing the Drei- 
 bund in order to render that country subservient to her own 
 interests in the Mediterranean. As the attempt proved a fail- 
 ure, the concentration of the entire French fleet in the Med- 
 iterranean was provided for by a naval convention in Septem- 
 ber, 1912, England, for her part, logically undertaking the pro- 
 tection of the northern coast of France. With justice, a French 
 senator, Chautemps, remarked in regard to this agreement that 
 it was based on the principle of the division of labor: "We 
 surrender to England and to Russia the responsibility for the 
 
 1 See the revelations in Gil Bias of May 25, 1913, and the confession of the 
 Minister of Finance, Dumont, in the French Chamber. Of this confession the 
 Manchester Guardian of May 31, 1913, said: "The French Government has 
 been blackmailed by Russia." 
 
498 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 safety of our west coast, as well as the protection of our colo- 
 nies against an enemy occupation." And although England 
 resisted the continuous efforts of the chauvinist press to induce 
 her also to adopt the system of universal military service, never- 
 theless with this naval convention she assumed an increased 
 moral responsibility on land as well as on the sea. It was strictly 
 logical that, following the outbreak of the Balkan War, the 
 extent of the general political obligations should, at France's in- 
 stigation, be finally set down in writing. 
 
 This was done in the exchange of letters between Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey and Ambassador Cambon on November 22, 1912. 
 These documents, which were evidently formulated by Grey, 
 proceeded on the assumption that the previous ''consultations" 
 between the naval and military experts of the two countries did 
 not restrict the freedom of decision of the two governments in 
 question. But as it might become essential, in certain eventu- 
 alities, for each government to know whether it could depend 
 upon the armed assistance of the other, the proper course to be 
 pursued was formulated by Grey in the following words : 
 
 "I agree that in case either Government has grave reason 
 to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or any move 
 that threatens the general peace, it shall immediately discuss 
 with the other whether both Governments are acting together 
 to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what 
 measures they are prepared to take in common. If these measures 
 involve participation in the action, the plans of the General Staffs 
 should at once be taken into consideration and the Government 
 is then to decide what effect is to be given to them." 
 
 The exchange of notes sounds harmless and without binding 
 force; it was from the start designed as an ostensible document 
 for consumption by the British public and by the world in 
 general. It was an agreement which contained the obligation 
 for action in certain eventualities, but it was so worded that 
 Grey could deny in Parliament its binding force, and even at 
 the last moment declare himself *'to be free from engagement." 
 In this document it was not so much a question of the word- 
 ing as of the permanence of feeling of its originators, who were 
 able at will to bring about the eventualities in question, or to 
 prevent them. As a matter of fact, the government of par- 
 liamentary England had surrendered the power of decision into 
 the hands of its foreign minister and of its military and naval 
 experts in a manner never done in monarchical Germany. It 
 was from that time just as much bound morally as if it had 
 signed a formal treaty, for, to quote Grey's words, it had 
 
MODERN GERMANY 499 
 
 pledged "England's honor." On July 30, 19 14, the French am- 
 bassador demanded the redemption of the pledge by recalling this 
 exchange of letters. 
 
 Even in time of peace, the agreement, knowledge of which 
 had quickly spread beyond the inner circle, could not fail to 
 have a most encouraging effect on French sentiment; its mere 
 existence was a menace to peace. The worst feature of all was 
 that the far-reaching pledge viewed the essentially general con- 
 dition of an "unprovoked attack." For if Russia were one day 
 to assume the offensive against Austria-Hungary, thereby giving 
 effect to Germany's obligations as an ally of the latter country, 
 France also would be drawn into the war. Russia was thus 
 placed at the point of control, and was able to set in motion 
 this whole series of mutually interdependent obligations. Fur- 
 ther, she was from now on sure of England's moral support, 
 which was the final factor in the situation; the moment she saw 
 fit to press the button, the agreements of the general staffs of 
 France, England and Belgium came into force. 
 
 Thus the Balkan War began at a time when the tendencies 
 aiming at the isolation of the Central Powers were increasing 
 in strength, and the course of the struggle served still further to 
 heighten them. The weakening of European Turkey, the in- 
 citing of Pan-Slavic greed, the overweening outburst of Serbian 
 megalomania, and especially the preparation for a future attack 
 on Austria-Hungary — these were the results of that which the 
 Triple Entente triumphantly proclaimed as its victory. It was 
 found, to be sure, that the Russian offensive had not realized all 
 its ambitions. The mad drive of the Slavs toward the Ad- 
 riatic had for the last time brought Austria-Hungary and Italy 
 together in united action in Albania, after the renewal of the 
 Dreibund during the war. The Czar had set himself up as 
 chief advocate of the Slavic cause and spoken to the Slavic 
 peoples in so commanding, and for Austria-Hungary, with half 
 her population Slavic, so inadmissible, a manner that Napoleon 
 himself, as protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, could 
 not have spoken more authoritatively; but he had been able 
 neither to prevent the war between the Serbs and Bulgars nor to 
 force his way to the Adriatic. Although the decision in March, 
 191 3, in the Winter Palace in Petrograd, was for peace, the 
 world owed this not to a real desire for peace, but solely to 
 the realization by those in power in Russia that they were not 
 yet ready. Therefore the war against Austria-Hungary was 
 postponed, but most unwillingly and with bitterness. The un- 
 bridled recrudescence of the Pan-Slavic propaganda was due to 
 
500 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 this disappointment, as were also the unheard-of provocations 
 of Austria-Hungary by the press. It became constantly more 
 unlikely that the Czar and Sassonov would be able again to 
 stem so powerful a current. 
 
 Louder than had been the case for a generation, came the 
 echo from France, where the burden of the three-year period of 
 service, which had been forced on the country by the Russian 
 ally, was creating an intolerable situation, for which, how- 
 ever, the wicked German neighbor was made responsible. Every 
 incident on the border line (as the landing of the Zeppelin in 
 Luneville and the insults offered to Germans in Nancy) brought 
 clearly to view that there slumbered in the French national soul 
 an elementary hatred of all that which, in impotent longing for 
 revenge, was styled German barbarism. There was now at last 
 no hesitancy shown in unrestrainedly proclaiming this and in 
 treating in the more serious newspapers the "Alsace-Lorraine 
 question" in a more provocative manner than at anv time since 
 1871. 
 
 The primary cause of the encircling policy, however — the an- 
 tagonism between Germany and France — had during the Balkan 
 War been crowded into the background more than at any time 
 in a decade. The influence toward compromise exercised by 
 Germany during this crisis had not remained unnoticed among 
 the leaders of England; and while they for their part urged 
 moderation in Petrograd, the world beheld the astonishing spec- 
 tacle of the two rivals working together in the same field as 
 guardians of the world peace. British statesmen assured every 
 one who would listen that they were now convinced of the peace- 
 ful character of Germany's policy. In the summer of 191 3, the 
 celebration of the twenty-fifth year of the reign of Emperor 
 William gave an opportunity to the German nation and to wide 
 circles throughout the world gratefully to recall the services of 
 the German Kaiser in preserving the world's peace in more than 
 one crisis. The commentaries of the British press at that time 
 were couched in a tone which had nothing in common with the 
 spiteful utterance of the French and which gave no hint of the 
 outbreaks of which it proved itself capable a year later. The 
 colonial negotiations, therefore, from the summer of 191 3 on 
 followed a course constantly more promising. It must not, how- 
 ever, on that account be thought that German statesmen shut 
 their eyes to the unchanging fundamental tendency of British 
 policies. When at the height of the Balkan crisis the secret 
 Franco-English agreement of November, 19 12, became known, 
 it was declared with evident anxiety in an official German re- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 501 
 
 port: "The net is constantly being drawn closer in which 
 French diplomacy has succeeded in entrapping England." It was 
 herein prophetically remarked of the dangerous game played by 
 the British government that: "The constant encouragement 
 which it gives directly and indirectly to French chauvinism may 
 one day lead to a catastrophe, in which British and French sol- 
 diers will pay with their blood on French battlefields for Eng- 
 land's policy of isolation. The seed which King Edward sowed 
 is bearing fruit." 
 
 This was made certain by Russia's offensive policy, which 
 after a short pause was more energetically renewed. Viewed 
 from the outside, it seemed almost to have crowded into the 
 background the antagonism between England and Germany, and 
 Russian statesmen now^ turned their attention with equal force 
 to the two Central Powers, which they recognized as an 
 inseparable obstacle in their path. The plan for the renewal of 
 the Balkan League, for which the Russian Ambassador in Bel- 
 grade was the most ardent worker, was based on the assump- 
 tion of the annihilation of one Great Power. The Pan-Slavic 
 press even declared that it was true that the Balkan question was 
 not yet settled, but that the Austrian question had become more 
 important: "A catastrophic liquidation of Austria's crimes, 
 which have piled up for centuries, is imminent." ^ 
 
 After the fall of European Turkey had been brought about^ 
 attention began to be turned to Asiatic Turkey and to the un- 
 dermining of German influence there, although it was realized 
 in Petrograd that this action likewise was bound to lead to 
 war. The Russian protest against the sw^eeping powers of Gen- 
 eral Liman von Sanders in Constantinople in January, 19 14, was. 
 the crucial point of the final diplomatic test of strength, and 
 cast illuminating light on the whole European situation. The 
 fate of Asiatic Turkey, which the German Empire desired to 
 maintain intact, was the real question at issue. That the Ger- 
 man commission was not without precedent is proved by the 
 corresponding British naval commission, whose labors, assum- 
 ing that they were sincere, were bound to contribute to in- 
 suring Turkey's possession of Constantinople and of the key 
 to the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, Russia, urged on by French 
 influence, attacked only the German commission ; and if she was 
 partially successful in her effort, this was due to the support 
 which she unexpectedly received from England. The solution 
 of the riddle can only be that from the start England considered 
 the naval commission as a mere blind. 
 
 '^ Novoye Vremya, February 13, 1914. 
 
502 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 In Petrograd these discussions led to still more violent threats 
 of war: "Russia desires peace, but is prepared for war," wrote 
 the Bourse Gazette on March 13, 1914. ''The Russian army, 
 which has always been victorious, will entirely forget the de- 
 fensive idea to which it has had to resign itself m the most recent 
 period of our history." ^ 
 
 The military and financial cooperation with France had en- 
 tered since the autumn on a stage more and more inimical to 
 peace. After Joffre in August, 191 3, had come to the fore as 
 the future generalissimo, arrangements had been made during the 
 succeeding months for a new billion-franc loan, the purpose of 
 which was the building of a network of strategic railways in 
 Poland that were to render possible a Russian offensive against 
 Germany. We saw a little while ago how tempting was the pros- 
 pect for the French money lenders; the assurance was constantly 
 given that the building of the railroad and the payment by in- 
 stallment would go hand in hand. The alliance of French cap- 
 ital and Russian politics for better or for worse which had come 
 about of recent years, had for a long time been an instrument 
 in the policy of isolation; it had now become a weapon for an 
 attack in the immediate future, and every one knew what was 
 really meant when the Temps revealed the purpose of this 
 last loan with the mysterious words: "All parties must unite 
 harmoniously in preparing for ultimate success." It was openly 
 admitted even in official Russian publications that the country 
 was preparing against Germany, and although the completion 
 of the railways was not to be expected under two or three years, 
 the outbreak of war was destined to show how far the imme- 
 diate preparations for war had advanced since the beginning of 
 the year. 
 
 In addition, other motives increased more and more the mili- 
 tary impetus in wider circles of society. The antagonism of 
 the nations was increased by the economic rivalry, which had 
 been the basic cause of enmity between Germany and Great 
 Britain. The belief, which was shared by such men as Prince 
 Trubetzkoi and Prince Kotchubey, that the Germans had driven 
 Russia into the war with Japan and then made use of 
 their neighbor's necessity to extort a favorable commercial treaty 
 for themselves, had spread gradually throughout the circles of 
 'Russian politicians and economists. When economic writers be- 
 gan now to urge timely preparation, in view of these experi- 
 ences, for the renewal of the commercial treaties in 191 7, this 
 
 ^ Petersburger Boersenzeitung, March 13, 1914- The article is said to have 
 been inspired by the Minister of War, Suchomlinov. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 503 
 
 was understood by leading men to mean that Russia must as- 
 sume so powerful a military and diplomatic position for this 
 event (which coincided in point of time with the completion of 
 the Russian measures of military preparation) that the country 
 would be able to free itself from the humiliating condition of a 
 commercial tributary. When Sassonov ventured in the Duma 
 to make use of this historical and economic argument, it was 
 clear to the whole world that he had unconditionally capitulated 
 to the anti-German elements. The commercial argument was 
 brought into connection with the general tendencies of Russia's 
 Balkan policy. A man like the historian, P. von Mitrofanoff, 
 who by no means belonged to the Pan-Slavists, declared openly: 
 
 ''The impetus toward the South is a historical, political and 
 economic necessity, and any state which opposes this movement 
 is by that very fact an enemy. ... It has become clear to 
 the Russians that if conditions remain as they now are, the 
 way to Constantinople leads through Berlin. Vienna is in re- 
 ality a secondary question." 
 
 The insatiable desire for expansion of the vast eastern em- 
 pire created a willingness to sweep aside all of the opposing 
 Great Powers. Although England's diplomatic game had orig- 
 inally aimed to turn the thoughts only of Russia's ruling class 
 into this new channel, the antipathy to the Germans, which is 
 historically and psychologically explicable and which makes the 
 Slav more deeply conscious of racial antagonisms than ourselves, 
 gained uninterruptedly in strength in all strata of the popula- 
 tion. A nationalistic feeling which was increasing in self-con- 
 sciousness, a species of new-fashioned Russian patriotism which 
 shaped its far-reaching plans by antagonism toward Germany, 
 expressed and sated itself through this antipathy. "The dislike 
 of the Germans," remarked the same objective observer, "is in 
 everybody's mind and on everybody's tongue, and seldom has 
 public opinion been so uniform." Every competent judge proph- 
 esied that in case of war Russia would not have to reckon with 
 the outbreak of a revolution, as at the time of the unpopular 
 Japanese War, but that a war against Germany would be ex- 
 ceedingly popular in the army and in the Duma, in society and 
 among intellectuals — indeed, even among the masses of the 
 people. 
 
 If one seeks to apportion responsibility as regards public opin- 
 ion in these last months before the World War, in which, as 
 in a final taking of the breath for a coming struggle, there was 
 an extreme mental tension, one is astonished by the growing 
 similarity in the threatening language of the leading organs of 
 
504 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the Triple Entente; they had adapted their varied roles to each 
 other for this purpose in a remarkable manner; and they were, 
 moreover, bound together by invisible golden cords (not tc^ 
 speak of the lower forms of financial dependence), from The 
 Times, which received for its Russian edition a disproportion- 
 ate subvention, down to Le Temps, which another Parisian pa- 
 per characterized as the "authoritative organ of passive obedi- 
 ence to all the demands of Monsieur Isvolski." All of the al- 
 lies now made use of the same language, which each one un- 
 derstood even though it added its own individual interpreta- 
 tion. We have seen how for years England concealed her gen- 
 eral policy aimed throughout the world at Germany under the 
 formula of ''the European balance of power" ; when Le Temps 
 spoke of the necessity of ''reestablishing the European equilib- 
 rium," every one understood that this was a question of Alsace- 
 Lorraine; for Russia, however, the European balance of power 
 meant nothing less than liberty to destroy Austria-Hungary and 
 Asiatic Turkey, and to clear away every important obstacle 
 which stood in her path. Thus, even before the war, by a sim- 
 ilar political terminology, it was customary to accuse the inher- 
 ently powerful German Empire of being destructive of peace; 
 while waxing strong without war, it had no desire to change the 
 status quo of the world at any point. The finishing touch in the 
 hemming in of Germany was furnished by the accusation brought 
 against the state which was encircled and thrown upon the 
 defensive, of striving for an intolerable hegemony in Europe. 
 
 In this situation, which was constantly becoming more por- 
 tentous, the effort was made in Petrograd and Paris to change 
 the various ententes into a definite alliance; if only in view of 
 the possibility of a successful outcome of the Anglo-German ne- 
 gotiations, a closer and more regular union by treaty was thought 
 preferable to the previous elastic bond. Following the custom- 
 ary prelude from irresponsible sources, advantage was taken of 
 the holiday spirit called forth by the visit of King George in 
 Paris on April 21, 19 14, to urge the formation of an Anglo- 
 French alliance. Grey, who for the first time visited the Con- 
 tinent, resisted the insistent urging of Minister Delcasse and 
 Ambassador Isvolski. He still remained an advocate of the 
 "free hand," since by binding his country in this manner he 
 would have encountered opposition in the Cabinet and especially 
 in his own party. But he was experienced enough in the art 
 of arousing hopes to be able to console the disappointed French 
 with the possibility of a Cabinet change (since the Unionists 
 were not bound by precedents) and with the suggestion that in 
 
MODERN GERMANY 505 
 
 the methodical cooperation of the members of the Entente they 
 already possessed what was tantamount to a formal alliance. 
 He promised to develop this cooperation into a kind of. organic 
 institution under his presidency in London. 
 
 Grey went even a step further. When the proposition was 
 made for an Anglo-Russian naval convention, he announced his 
 approval and obtained the decision of the Cabinet to enter into 
 the necessary negotiations. More interesting than the custom- 
 ary technical discussions of the naval staffs, which were to fol- 
 low the model of the Franco-Russian naval convention, is the 
 political view, according to which the Russian originators of 
 the plan demanded that England neutralize as great a portion of 
 the German fleet as possible in the Baltic. By this means the 
 overwhelming superiority of the German fleet over the Russian 
 would be nullified, and perhaps a Russian landing in Pomerania 
 rendered possible. In this field, the British government could 
 perform an important service by sending, before the commence- 
 ment of actual war operations, a great number of merchant ships 
 to the Baltic ports, in order that the lack of Russian transport 
 ships might be made good. The negotiations, the basis of which 
 soon became known to the German government, were carried 
 forward so successfully that as early as the end of May the 
 nations concerned let as much regarding them filter through as 
 was needed for putting the public into the right state of mind. 
 The general political importance of these plans cannot be too 
 highly estimated. They show the logical and deliberate course 
 of offensive diplomacy in Petrograd, which at this very time 
 led the press to discuss with ever new variation "Russia's undis- 
 puted claim to Asiatic Turkey," as well as the subject of Aus- 
 tria-Hungary's approaching catastrophe. It seemed nearer than 
 ever before to its goal of enlisting the naval power of England 
 in its service against the powerful ally of the Dual Monarchy 
 and of Turkey. 
 
 The negotiations prove further the essentially offensive char- 
 acter of Grey's policy. He may perhaps still have maintained 
 a "free hand," as in December, 1905, and not consciously have 
 pursued a course inevitably leading to war, as was the case with 
 Russia; but by consistently enlarging the system of "peace guar- 
 antees" — that is to say of constricting Germany by close con- 
 nections with states entertaining offensive intentions, with whose 
 aims he was familiar — he was tying the hands of his own coun- 
 try ever more tightly. He thus clung to the course which he 
 had followed since the beginning of his ministry, and his con- 
 duct in Parliament on June 11, 19 14, continued to be consistent, 
 
5o6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 when he was forced to meet the questioning:s of his thoroughly 
 alanned party colleagues. He referred to a ministerial declara- 
 tion of the previous year that no secret understandings existed 
 which might restrict or hinder the govejnment and Parliament 
 in their freedom to decide whether England should take part 
 in a future war; nor were there, he said, at this time any 
 negotiations either under way or in prospect which made this 
 declaration less true. This statement was as true formally as it 
 / was essentially based upon a shameless falsehood. Grey and his 
 nearest friends in the Cabinet were fully aware of the signifi- 
 cance oi allying the first Naval Power in the world with the un- 
 controllable desire for war of its political partners. 
 
 It was England alone who was now able at will to open or 
 close the gates of the Temple of Janus. So well informed an 
 observer as Theodor Schiemann constantly gave utterance to the 
 warning in these weeks that as soon as Paris and Petrograd 
 should have made sure of England's support an early European 
 war was to be expected as a most probable result. The decision 
 of Grey and Asquith undoubtedly was due in part to the fact 
 that their political party, which had long been fundamentally 
 disrupted, was in the Ulster question driving the country to- 
 ward the verge of ci\'il war and the army toward mutiny. The 
 consideration that the Liberal Cabinet was likely soon to be 
 displaced by that of the much more resolute opposition party 
 could not fail to act as an encouragement on Grey, who had 
 long been following the foreign policy of the Conservatives, 
 much more than that of the Liberals. On the other hand, the 
 government had become so dependent on the opposition that it 
 strove to avoid giving it cause to criticize the country's foreign 
 policy. French internal politics, with their bitterly uncompromis- 
 ing struggles of cliques, in which no one dared to give voice to the 
 unexpressed thought of all : ''War or peace with Germany ?" had 
 iong since reacted in a fateful manner on the foreign policy ; it 
 became apparent at this time that in England, too. the diffi- 
 culties resulting from internal diiterences tended to turn the 
 scale against peace. 
 
 Grey's policy appears in a light all the more ambiguous when, 
 with the greatest possible increase of the obligations which he had 
 undertaken against Germany, the probability had become stronger 
 of an agreement aith Germany. As the result of tireless nego- 
 tiations, the Anglo-German agreement came formally into ex- 
 istence in the course of the summer. It regulated the com- 
 mercial future of the Portuguese colonies in East and West 
 Africa, bv dividing them into an Enelish and a German sphere 
 
MODERN GERMANY 507 
 
 of Interest; at the same time it brought about a settlement sat- 
 isfactory to both parties, concerning the final configuration of 
 the Bagdad Railway, and a compromise as to conflicting in- 
 terests which had hitherto been the cause of estrangement. If 
 Sir Edward Grey's ultimate aim had really been an under- 
 standing with Germany, the above agreement would have given 
 proof that such an agreement was possible if sincerely desired; 
 but if the agreement was — as soon proved to be the case — only 
 a make-believe concession to that part of the English public 
 which desired peace w^ith Germany, It was sure to give way 
 under a general and heavy strain. At all events, It was the 
 will of destiny that the British Empire be brought face to face 
 in its full significance with the question of its future relation 
 to Germany, undisturbed by local differences. When the gov- 
 ernment followed up the naval visit to Kronstadt by that to 
 Kiel, it apparently continued symbolically to keep both Irons in 
 the fire. In truth, however, Grey proceeded till the end along 
 the course of those of whom Lady Macbeth says: 
 
 "They would not play false, and yet would wrongly win." 
 
 At this moment Russia's Balkan policy, which von Hartwig 
 directed in Belgrade, produced its bloody harvest. On June 28, 
 19 1 4, the heir to the crowns of Austria and Hungary was mur- 
 dered in Sarajevo. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 
 
 PROFESSOR HERMANN OXCKEN. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 HEIDELBERG 
 
 ONLY he who is thoroughly familiar with events prelimi- 
 nary to and leading up to the war is in a position to form 
 an objective picture of the outbreak of hostilities. Without this 
 insight into these preliminar}- events, no one, approaching the 
 happenings of the final week, would be able under any circum- 
 stances to open the door that leads to understanding. 
 
 The real questions at the root of this desperate struggle are 
 not touched upon in the official blue and white books, and the 
 superiicial observer might easily gain the impression that a tech- 
 nical discussion between a few individual diplomats had led, 
 in a single week, through misunderstanding, awkwardness and 
 malevolence, to the greatest war in the world's history. Among 
 diplomats one now hears ad nauseam such harmless expressions 
 as ''European balance of power," "national honor," ''human 
 civilization" and "anxiety for the peace of the world," with 
 which we had become familiar enough before the war; but they 
 are merely blinds intended to conceal the great motive forces 
 of history and a movement which had long been consciously 
 under way. 
 
 The blue books, too, though not without value as historical 
 sources, are at the same time political briefs of the various 
 governments. The apparently so copious material is, in reality, 
 very incomplete. Each state has selected those documents which 
 seem to it useful in sustaining its special pleading; hence, a com- 
 paratively greater unrestraint in making public her papers is 
 shown by England, who was for a relatively long time not 
 directly concerned in the questions at issue and who would seem 
 to have occupied toward them the position of watchful mediator. 
 
 The material of the blue books is not alone incomplete as a 
 whole, but the individual documents are frequently abbreviated, 
 and at times even demonstrably falsified.^ English history since 
 
 1 The English falsification is easily recognized even by the ordinary reader. 
 No. 105 of the Blue Book contains a letter written by Sir Edward Grey to 
 Ambassador Bertie at Paris, dated July 30th. Added are three annexes, the 
 correspondence _ between Grey and Cambon of November 22-23, 19 12, and a 
 report concerning military preparations and boundary violations by Germany, 
 which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to Ambassador Cambon at 
 
 508 
 
MODKRX GFRMAXY 509 
 
 the time of Lord I^aJrnerston offers many examplr-s of unscru- 
 pulous castration and twistinj/ of official df^spatches. Jn the 
 present hlue book, also, one falsification can be proved with 'd\y- 
 solute certainty, despite later futile efforts to suppress the dam- 
 aging evidence. An important fact is that this falsification a>n- 
 cerns the reasons v^hv England was obliged to, and why even- 
 tually she did, render assistance — precisely in this ajnnection 
 did Grey have need of supplementary feats of editorial leger- 
 demain. 'J'his forgery led in turn to the futile attempt in the 
 French yellow book (which at more than one point reveals for 
 those familiar v.ith previous centuries the well-known sprightly 
 unreliability of French diplomatic rep^jrts' ) to bring about agree- 
 ment with the Knglish statements, by means of an equally awk- 
 ward falsification.^ 
 
 London- The third annex, which is of importance in this connection, in the 
 first edition of the iJlue Book is dated "Ju'v 3^. ip»i4-" ^n the second edition 
 this date, v,hich cannot be reconciled with that of Grey's letter, is omitted I But 
 that is not all. In the first edition this rcjxjTt — in the English translation of 
 the lilue Hook— btKins with the words: "The German army had its advance 
 I>ost9 on our frontiers yesterday (Frula.y)." But since Fri'Jay was the 3i8t 
 of July, the date of the document oujsjht to have been the first of August, 
 Consequently the word "Friday," which gave things away, was likewise elimi- 
 nated in the second edition. If, however, annex three is of July 31st, or 
 even of August ist Cwhich would Ix; more consonant with its military con- 
 tents), it is imoossible that it should have \>ten enclosed in a letter of Grey's 
 of July 30th. But since the letter refers to annex three ("he gave me a paper 
 of which a copy is also endosed, shov/ing that the German military j>repara- 
 tions were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than 
 anything I'Vance had yet done"), it must have been falsified either as regards 
 the flate or as regards the contents, at least to the extent of the quoted sen- 
 tence, which was probably interpolated later on. That calls all the events 
 recited in No. 10 , into question, and since we have now become thoroughly 
 suspicious, we begin to understand why the British Minister should have done 
 something so unu-,ual in diplomatic routine and at the same time so superfluous 
 as to pick out and send by special messenger to his representative in Paris 
 the correspondence of November, 19 12, which was long since known there, and 
 the military report which he asserted he had just received from Paris through 
 Ambassador Cambon. The reason for this falsification is that the government 
 felt a belated need of presenting somewhere in the Blue Book the obligations 
 undertaken in November, 19 12, in neat juxtaposition with a military docu- 
 ment which proved the actuality of the "menaces^' which the former docu- 
 ments had foreseen. 
 
 1 The most typical example is a compilation from diplomatic and consular 
 reports, dated July 30, 1913, which aims to prove that recently sentiment in 
 Germany had taken a turn op{x>sed to peace justifying Prance's r>olicy to a 
 large degree. In this collective refXjrt, which can hardly lay claim to being 
 considered as an authentic source of historical evidence, we find the fol- 
 lowing sentences: "If it is true that the Emperor is discussed, and that the 
 Chancellor is unpopular, Mr. von Kiderlen was the most hated man in Ger- 
 many. But he is beginning to be less badly thought of, for he is making 
 people understand that he is going to have his revenge." Mr. von Kiderlen- 
 Wachter died December, 1912 1 Thus the collective report was compiled, not 
 on July 30, 19 13. but precipitately and with consequent lack of truthfulness 
 in the autumn of 1914- Further incongruities in Mr. Cambon's reports have beea 
 laid bare in the North German Gazette of December 21, 1914. 
 
 2 The letter addressed to Mr. Cambon by Mr. X'iviani, dated July 30th CYellow 
 Book No. 106), gives part of the information, contained in annex three, of 
 No, 105, of the Blue Book, and which consequently cannot have come into 
 being before July 31st, or rather August ist. It can be proved that this letter, 
 too, is a fabrication, made up from various reports dating from different 
 periods. The purpose was to secure credence for annex three, No. 105, of the 
 British Blue Book. 
 
5IO MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Finally, it must not be forgotten that in the blue books one 
 is able to follow from day to day only the visible course of 
 the negotiations, conferences and efforts at mediation, as these 
 were undertaken, continued and again interrupted. The invisi- 
 ble impulses in the course of affairs find expression only in iso- 
 lated instances in this mass of diplomatic documents — a word or 
 a hint which assures a friend of readiness to help in case of 
 need, encouraging him to action, which may be far more deci- 
 sive than any official effort at mediation. The reader must not,, 
 therefore, allow himself to be diverted by occurrences in the 
 foreground, but must endeavor to penetrate beneath the surface 
 and to interpret the various events in the spirit of the war's en- 
 tire preliminary history and of the personages engaged. Only 
 in that case do the decisive turning-points and the controlling 
 features of this vast game stand out in clear perspective. 
 
 The authors, accomplices and abettors in the murder of the 
 Arch-Ducal heir apparent intended the deed as a decisive event, 
 which was to result in the desired disruption of Austria-Hun- 
 gary and in changing the face of Europe. The date deliber- 
 ately chosen for the crime was the five hundred and twenty-fifth 
 anniversary of the Battle of the Amsel Field, following which 
 a Serbian, Milos Obilicz, had stabbed the victorious Sultan 
 Murad. It was planned that the new "hereditary enemy'* 
 should receive a mortal wound on this day, which was cele- 
 brated as the "independence day" of the Serbian nation for the 
 first time in 19 14, with provocative speeches in favor of the "en- 
 slaved brothers." The more the strong personality of Franz 
 Ferdinand appeared to guarantee the future of the Dual Mon- 
 archy, the more important did it seem to Servian jingoes to re- 
 move this future obstacle by murderous means. Employment 
 of such means is constantly met with in the history of the Ser- 
 bian nation and crown throughout the nineteenth century. The 
 outbursts of joy following the deed showed what Serbia believed 
 to have been accomplished. The criminally exaggerated na- 
 tionalistic feeling of the Serbs, among the official and military 
 circles of whom knowledge of and cooperation in the crime was 
 widespread, is to be held mainly responsible, not the subordinate 
 tools in its commission. It was the plan of the murderers to 
 take advantage of the dangerous tension of the political at- 
 mosphere of the summer of 19 14, intensified as it was by the 
 clamor regarding Russian preparedness, in order to make sure, 
 in the general confusion, of reaping the fruits of their deed. The 
 important question now was as to what lengths in protecting the 
 
MODERN GERMANY Sll 
 
 culprits and the Serbian state the Russian abettors, who had 
 been directly concerned in creating this chauvinistic sentiment, 
 were ready to go, as well as those European politicians who for 
 years, through their trifling with the possible dismemberment of 
 -Austria-Hungary, had been indirectly concerned in bringing 
 about the situation. 
 
 The moral guilt of the Serbian government was increased by 
 its behavior after the deed. No spontaneous effort was made 
 by It to proceed against the conspirators on Serbian soil by 
 means of its own agents, although so many signs pointed to- 
 ward Belgrade; even less did it attempt at the last moment in 
 Vienna to free itself from connection with the movement which 
 it had brought about. The solemn obligations undertaken by 
 it on March 31, 1909, had been entirely forgotten. On the con- 
 trary, so certain did the government feel of the continuation of 
 the backing it had hitherto enjoyed that it permitted the press 
 of the country to discuss day by day the impotence and the dis- 
 solution of the neighboring Monarchy; the oflScial governmental 
 publication even went so far as to declare that the internal 
 conditions in Austria-Hungary had been the sole cause of the 
 crime. So hopelessly obsessed was Serbia by her delusion of the 
 disintegration of Austria-Hungary that she either thought that 
 country incapable of any vigorous action or else saw no reason 
 for fear in braving it. 
 
 It was inevitable that the deeply injured state, which had so 
 long patiently borne Serbia's threats, should at last be aroused. 
 To countenance this aggression meant to endanger not alone its 
 prestige, but its very existence. One needs only to ask how long 
 Russia would have quietly submitted to a similar agitation In 
 Sweden or Rumania, looking to the separation of Finland or 
 Bessarabia; or how long the United States would have suffered 
 a continued deliberate disturbance of the peace by Mexico. 
 Would not both of these states. If a similar agitation, backed up 
 by a third Great Power, had led to an attack on their official 
 liead, have sought satisfaction and security by armed force and 
 without asking permission of any one? In self-defense, Austria- 
 Hungary saw herself compelled, now or never, to put a check 
 upon these forces which were aiming at her destruction, even at 
 the risk of arousing Russia to bring to bear the full weight of 
 her offensive strength. 
 
 The German Imperial Government, which before the 23rd 
 of July was Informed only In a general way of Austria-Hungary's 
 views and Intentions, had expressed its entire agreement. ''With 
 all our heart," says the White Book in this connection, "we 
 
512 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and 
 assure him that any action considered necessary to end the move- 
 ment in Serbia directed against the existence of the Monarchy 
 would meet with our approval." We did not close our eyes to 
 the fact that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, and the 
 bringing of the whole of Slavdom under the Russian scepter, 
 would render the position of the German race in Middle Europe 
 untenable, and that in this crisis an isolated and morally weak- 
 ened Austria would lose for us her full value as an ally. Hence, 
 Germany left an entirely free hand to her ally in proceeding 
 against Serbia, without taking part in the preparations or know- 
 ing beforehand the details of the ultimatum. As had previously 
 been the case more than once, the Central Powers, which were 
 the ones really threatened, saw themselves, in view of the con- 
 stantly increasing number of their enemies, forced to action, 
 though it is wrong to represent the steps they took as a diplo- 
 matic offensive. Only a superficial reader of the Blue Books 
 will allow himself to be misled by the impression that, as far 
 as appearances go, it was Austria-Hungary, who in the week 
 from July 23 to August i, by making demands, took the diplo- 
 matic offensive, and that the German Empire became her accom- 
 plice through its approval of Austria-Hungary's procedure; it 
 must not be forgotten for a moment that the offensive character 
 of the Triple Entente and of the Pan-Slavic movement, whichi 
 aimed at the destruction of Austria-Hungary, had long since 
 forced the Central Powers into a defensive position. 
 
 The demands which Austria-Hungary made on Serbia on 
 July 23, with the setting of a time limit, were characterized by 
 our enemies as excessive, and intolerable for a sovereign state 
 — especially was the demand that Austrian judges participate in 
 the investigation of the crime said to be without precedent. 
 As a matter of fact, there is no lack of precedent in modern 
 history in cases which the nature of the provocation and the 
 stage of civilization of the offending state made such a step 
 necessary. No doubt Austria-Hungary intended it as a les- 
 son for Serbia when she sought to enforce the fulfilment of 
 the disgracefully disregarded promises which this state had made 
 in 1909. From the start, however, she gave definite guarantees 
 to the Great Powers in regard to the scope of her contemplated 
 action by declaring that she would not violate Serbia's terri- 
 torial rights, but would recognize the integrity and independ- 
 ence of the country; there was no question of a "permanent" 
 impairment of Serbia's sovereignty. Austria-Hungary did not 
 aim at a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans, but 
 
MODERN GERMANY 513 
 
 claimed merely the right of taking, in her discretion, the neces- 
 sary preventative measures for the protection of her vital inter- 
 ests, which were seriously threatened by the undermining ac- 
 tivity of the Serbian agitators. Accordingly, Germany took 
 the stand that this purely Austro-Serbian conflict must re- 
 main localized; following the declaration of the Central Pow- 
 ers that they were striving for such a localization of the quar- 
 rel, the French and British governments promised their good 
 offices in the same effort. As long as the conflict remained lo- 
 calized, the peace of the world was assured. But as soon as 
 Russia or any other Power seized on an incident of such char- 
 acter in order to interfere, there could be no doubt as to what 
 action was to be expected from the Triple Entente in the im- 
 mediate future. 
 
 Events immediately proved that the leaders of Russian Pan- 
 Slavism were not to be deterred even by the murder of the 
 Archduke, but were ready to deny all the monarchic traditions 
 of their ow^n history rather than to surrender the criminals and 
 abandon their hopes of Serbia. This state, as the nucleus of 
 their Balkan policy, was indispensable to their offensive. A 
 word from Petrograd would have sufficed to bring the Serbs to 
 reason before the ultimatum — this word was not spoken by the 
 state which, in the summer of 19 13, had assumed to be the 
 arbiter of the Slavic world. The offensive tendencies of a 
 policy of force, which was not to be turned aside from its aims 
 by the danger of the most serious complications, continued to 
 gain in strength. When, a fortnight after the murder in 
 Sarajevo, further disclosures regarding the Anglo-Russian naval 
 convention percolated through to the public, a Russian news- 
 paper cried triumphantly: "We are now able, thanks to the 
 support of the British fleet and to our now completely prepared 
 army, to demand that Berlin put an end to that political system 
 which is in keeping neither w^ith our dignity nor with our in- 
 ternational position." The word of 1 870, "archipret," uttered 
 at this moment could not fail to act as an incitement to Bel- 
 grade. Russia was determined from the start to permit the 
 enforcement of Austria's demands under no circumstances. 
 The same minister who found nothing to say publicly in con- 
 demnation of the Serbian crime characterized Austria's de- 
 mands as "provocative and immoral," and attributed to them, 
 despite the Monarchy's positive promises, the intention to devour 
 and crush Serbia; later the Czar also could see nothing but a 
 "disgraceful" war against a small country. Thus, like Ger- 
 many's wish to localize the conflict, Russia's determination to 
 
514 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 intervene at any price against Austria's punitive procedure was 
 beyond question. With this intention, Russia continued quietly 
 her military preparations. 
 
 A decisive factor in such a policy was from the start the ques- 
 tion as to how far Russia could reckon on her Entente asso- 
 ciates. Only in case of the latter's unreserved support would 
 there be no further obstacles to overcome. Sassonov would have 
 preferred immediately to mobilize the Triple Entente and ta 
 have had the mutual obligations of the contracting states become 
 operative at once ; he therefore proposed to the French and Brit- 
 ish Ambassadors a declaration of solidarity, with hypocritical 
 justification that only a common attitude of firmness could pre- 
 vent a war. While the French Ambassador unreservedly adopted 
 the Russian proposal, the British representative showed himself 
 at first much more reserved, in which position he was later sus- 
 tained by Grey, and he let it be understood that his country did 
 not desire war on account of the Serbian question. All the more 
 emphatically did Sassonov declare that "the general European 
 question" was involved in this Serbian question, and that on this 
 account England could not efface herself ; he admitted at this 
 early date (July 24) that Russian mobilization would at any 
 rate have to be carried out, and that an Imperial Council would 
 decide the question the following day.^ From this first moment 
 on, with full realization of her action, Russia used the question 
 of the European balance of power as a goad, and ofiFered her 
 military resources in solving it. 
 
 Everything depended upon whether England would follow 
 along this path. For, although France had apparently already 
 taken up her position, it was nevertheless to be expected that she 
 would make her final decision dependent on England's attitude. 
 The country in which the policy of isolating Germany had origi- 
 nated was now to speak the decisive word. 
 
 In England's later official statement credit was claimed for the 
 earnestness of the country's efforts for peace. It is not to be 
 denied that Grey undertook a series of efforts at mediation, but 
 it is not merely a question as to good intentions, but rather as to 
 what practical value these efforts had and what was their real 
 aim: the preservation of the world's peace under conditions which 
 would have been honorable for all concerned, or a one-sided dip- 
 lomatic success for the Entente, which would have been decisive 
 for the whole future. His point of departure was shown by the 
 fact that he characterized the Austrian demands as intolerable 
 and the German position as to localizing the conflict as a mere 
 
 1 British Blue Book No. 6. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 515 
 
 phrase ^ ; by unreservedly refusing to advise moderation in Petro- 
 grad,^ he betrayed a growing sympathy with all the arguments of 
 the Russian interpretation. On July 15, Sassonov, disappointed 
 at England's reserve, telegraphed to London: "In the event of 
 the situation becoming more critical, possibly leading to concerted 
 action by the Great Powers, we count upon England's readiness 
 to place herself unreservedly by the side of Russia and France 
 for the purpose of upholding the European balance of power, 
 for the preservation of which she has always stood and which in 
 the event of an Austrian triumph would undoubtedly be dis- 
 turbed." ^ By means of this catchword, calculated to appeal to 
 the English mind, he sought to befog the issue in dispute, which 
 England found an awkward one. Grey, however, allowed the 
 Russian appeal concerning the European balance of power to 
 influence him with increasing weight. The British Ambassador 
 in Petrograd, who personally did not belong to the extremists, 
 ventured, without doubt in agreement with his instructions, on 
 the same day to formulate the views of his government as re- 
 gards the real nature of its mediation, to the effect that "England 
 could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better 
 purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disre- 
 garded, might one day be converted into an ally than if she were 
 to declare herself Russia's ally at once." * These words should 
 be placed as the motto at the head of all later efforts at media- 
 tion by British statesmanship. They show that Grey differed 
 only as to method from the Russian advocates of extreme action, 
 but that he did not shrink from the end to be obtained. 
 
 His proposal to increase the twenty-four hour time limit of the 
 ultimatum was of importance only as a demonstration ; in case of 
 success, Russia, who w^as ready for intervention, would merely 
 have gained a further start in her military preparations. 
 
 Events moved too fast for the proposal. Serbia's reply on the 
 afternoon of July 25th indicated only an apparent readiness to 
 meet Austria half-way: in reality, she rejected all those demands 
 of Austria the carrying out of which would have meant energetic 
 action by the government against the intrigues of Serbian sub- 
 jects aimed at Austria. Hence Austria was compelled to reject 
 such an answer ^ from a state which, five years before, had vainly 
 promised to mend its ways, and to break off diplomatic relations, 
 according to her threat. That Serbia was in no doubt as to the 
 
 1 Introduction to Blue Book, p. V. 
 
 ' Blue Book No. 1 1 ; Orange Book No. 20. 
 
 8 Orange Book No. 17. 
 
 * Blue Book No. 17. 
 
 ^ Italy also disapproved of the Serbian note. See Yellow Book No. 72. 
 
5i6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 reception of her reply is shown by the fact that she had started 
 to mobilize even before sending the note. On the same date 
 (July 25th) Russia ordered the mobilization of the military dis- 
 tricts adjoining Austria-Hungary. The conflict thereby entered 
 on its second stage. 
 
 Grey now considered it advisable to formulate a proposal for 
 mediation. On the evening of July 26th, after receiving Russia's 
 approval, he suggested to the French, German and Italian gov- 
 ernments to authorize their ambassadors in London to meet in 
 conference for the purpose of considering a peaceful solution. 
 This suggestion was unacceptable to Austria-Hungary for the 
 reason that it indirectly recognized Russia as a Power interested 
 in the Serbo-Austrian conflict, and that it would have brought 
 before the ''areopagus of the Powers" this affair of a state which 
 from every point of view had been most severely provoked. Only 
 he who is familiar with the extent of the mutual obligations of 
 the Entente Powers and with the thorough-going organization of 
 their London headquarters in the summer of 191 4 is in a posi- 
 tion to realize what role would have been played at this confer- 
 ence by Russia's two confederates — not to speak of Italy. Dur- 
 ing its course Russia might have continued her preparations, 
 while Germany would have been forced to promise not to mobi- 
 lize. Finally, no unprejudiced person will claim that the man 
 who was ready at the favorable moment to metamorphose him- 
 self into an ally of Russia was the ideal neutral leader of nego- 
 tiations, conducted under the pressure of Russian mobilization.^ 
 The longer one considers the proposal for mediation, the clearer 
 does it become that it was calculated to gain at least a diplo- 
 matic victory for the Entente Powers. It is, therefore, not sur- 
 prising that the German government, while declaring itself 
 ready, in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, to undertake 
 mediation jointly with the other Great Powers, pronounced it to 
 be impossible "to call her ally in the latter's dispute with Serbia 
 before a European tribunal." ^ Instead of this, in order to com- 
 pose the misunderstanding between Austria-Hungary and Rus- 
 sia, Germany assumed the initiative by suggesting direct negotia- 
 tions between these two Powers, as the most hopeful measure for a 
 peaceful solution, and succeeded in gaining England's adherence 
 to the idea of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, 
 in place of the conference plan.^ 
 
 The efforts of German diplomacy were directed toward pre- 
 
 1 Orange Book No. 2.2. 
 
 2 White Book. 3, No. 14; Blue Book No. 46. 
 
 3 Blue Book No. 67. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 517 
 
 venting a tragic outcome through simultaneous warning and 
 peaceful explanations. On July 26th, Germany had called atten- 
 tion in Petrograd to the inevitable results of the first step on 
 the path of mobilization: "Preparatory military measures by 
 Russia will force us to counter-measures, which must consist in 
 mobilizing the army. But mobilization means war. As we 
 know the obligations of France towards Russia, our mobilization 
 w^ould be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot 
 assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war." ^ 
 Consonant with this, Paris was informed that only the localizing 
 of the conflict would prevent untold dangers, but at the same 
 time that Germany's intentions in regard to France were purely 
 peaceful. Every suggestion, however, for united efforts toward 
 peace w^as rejected by Paris with deep distrust. France could 
 not make up her mind to undertake in Petrograd a step similar 
 to that of Germany in Vienna; the slightest move in this direc- 
 tion, it was feared, would prove compromising in the eyes of 
 Russia, and it was considered necessary by intentionally colorless 
 newspaper declarations to avoid even the faintest suspicion of a 
 "solidarity with Germany which might be wrongfully inter- 
 preted." ^ Paris preferred, with folded arms and without initia- 
 tive, to watch the fateful course of events. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Russian government strove to convince the 
 leading British statesmen that the Central Powers' apparent un- 
 willingness to yield was due only to the widespread delusion in 
 Germany and Austria that England would remain neutral under 
 all circumstances. Only by destroying this delusion — that is to 
 say, by an unmistakable rapprochement w^ith the Dual Alliance 
 — could England exorcise this danger, it was claimed. The 
 readiness with which Grey adopted this suggestion is worthy of 
 notice. While on the one hand, in disregard of the suggestions 
 of his own ambassador in Petrograd, he made no effort to exer- 
 cise a moderating influence on Russia and thereby to contribute 
 to the success of the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, 
 on the other hand he made a series of moves which according 
 to his belief were, perhaps, calculated to moderate an assumed 
 desire for war on Germany's part, but the practical significance 
 of which was a one-sided pressure on Germany and Austria and 
 which by unmistakable statements regarding England's possible 
 attitude encouraged both Petrograd and Paris to more energetic 
 action. Whether his movements were directed by deliberate cal- 
 culation or were due to mental astigmatism, united with insu- 
 
 1 White Book. 
 
 2 Yellow Book No. 62. 
 
5i8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 perable prejudices, Is a question that will be answered differently 
 according to one's psychology. 
 
 The very first step showed that Russia's suggestion had been 
 heeded — that England must definitely Indicate her position. 
 Grey declared to the German Ambassador on July 27th that If 
 Germany assisted Austria, because she could not afford calmly 
 to see her ally crushed, other Issues might bring other Powers In, 
 and the war would be the greatest ever known. ^ This meant 
 nothing less than that England would oppose the defeat of France 
 or (as this had never been Germany's object) that she would 
 conceivably under this pretext enter Into a European war. This 
 comforting information was Immediately communicated to the 
 French.^ At the same time military measures were announced. 
 To Russia's plaint that a false Impression existed In the minds 
 of German statesmen as to England's future attitude. Grey 
 made answer: "This impression will be dispelled by the orders 
 we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it 
 happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave." In 
 this underhanded manner, he wished it to be understood that his 
 reference must not be taken to mean that anything more than 
 diplomatic action was promised,^ but he told the Russians clearly 
 what they wished to know. For, as a matter of fact, this mili- 
 tary measure was ordered on July 23rd by Churchill, secretly 
 and on his own initiative; the new feature was that the Cabinet' 
 decided on the evening of July 27th to publish it. If the desire 
 was thereby to intimidate Germany the inevitable result was still 
 further to stiffen the resistance of France and Russia. This was 
 the sense In which the measure was regarded and discussed by 
 the French. "Great Britain's attitude Is becoming firmer," a 
 French diplomat Informs Paris with satisfaction. The Reuter 
 Bureau was even more frank than Grey desired, when it in- 
 formed the world that the British decision ''greatly encouraged 
 Russia." 
 
 It may be that Grey's step was meant as a bluff, was intended 
 to create the impression of readiness to strike, but was not an 
 indication of a real intention to do so. As has been justly re- 
 marked, there is a dangerous element In such a step; by the use 
 of bluff a government may venture too far and then no longer 
 be able to find a justifiable excuse for retreat. The danger is 
 greatly Increased when this bluffing is carried on by more than 
 one, and each word of encouragement is eagerly seized upon by 
 
 iBIue Book No. 46. 
 
 2 Yellow Book No. 63. 
 
 3 Blue Book No. 47 ; Yellow Book No. 66. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 519 
 
 the other party to the game and passed along in exaggerated form. 
 Therein lay Grey's tremendous responsibility. A method which, 
 with such measures and with such coadjutors, aimed at a decisive 
 success for the Entente could not fail, despite all fair-sounding 
 efForts at mediation, to aid in bringing about the war, instead of 
 preventing it. 
 
 On the afternoon of July 29th, after Austria had declared war 
 on Serbia, Grey once more made use of his method, in a more 
 emphatic manner. He informed Prince Lichnowsky, the Ger- 
 man Ambassador, that as long as the crisis was restricted to the 
 issues at present actually in question, England had no thought 
 of interfering. But if Germany became involved, and then 
 France, the conflict might take on such proportions that all 
 European interests would be at stake. The Ambassador, he said, 
 must not be misled by the friendly tone of the conversation into 
 thinking that England, In such an event, would stand aside. In 
 case British interests required England to intervene, she would 
 do so at once, and the decision would be speedily taken.^ At first 
 blush it might be held that even this warning, which was really 
 tantamount to a threat, was only meant to act as a damper on 
 Germany's dreaded thirst for war. But a few hours before, 
 Grey had informed the French Ambassador, Cambon, that he in- 
 tended to speak thus to Prince Lichnowsky. He had thereby in 
 advance transformed the peaceful effect of his words in the 
 minds of the Entente allies into an action tending toward a war- 
 like solution and increasing the warlike sentiment. 
 
 In this notable conversation with Cambon, Grey had empha- 
 sized the fact that England did not wish to be drawn into an 
 Austro-Serbian, nor even into an Austro-Russian conflict. Eng- 
 land did not want to take a hand, he said, in a struggle between 
 Teutons and Slavs for the supremacy in the Balkans. But if Ger- 
 many, and in turn France, became involved, they had not yet 
 made up their minds what they would do. France would then 
 have been drawn into a quarrel which was not her ow^n, but in 
 which, in keeping with her alliance, honor and interest obliged her 
 to engage. England would then be free from engagements, and 
 would have to decide what action British interests required of 
 her. Cambon understood the conversation so well that in re- 
 peating it he summed up the train of thought somew^hat more 
 definitely in this way: should other issues be raised, and Ger- 
 many and France become involved so that the question came to 
 concern the hegemony of Europe, England would then decide 
 
 1 Blue Book No. 86. 
 
520 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 what It was necessary for her to do.^ The cue had been uttered 
 which was understood b)^ the two men who had so often made 
 use of it. Only apparently was it a question of two separate 
 contingencies — of one in which England would abstain, and of a 
 second in which she would intervene. Grey was fully aware that 
 the first case, as the result of the Austro-German and of the 
 Franco-Russian treaty obligations, would with automatic swift- 
 ness bring the second in its train. But he deliberately set in 
 motion the machinery of the Triple Entente, in order to force 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary to retreat along the whole line. 
 He still avoided definitely binding himself, but he foresaw that the 
 immediate result would be, if Germany did not retreat, to bring 
 about a situation by means of which he hoped to be able to stam- 
 pede the whole Cabinet to the most extreme measures. 
 
 The die had been cast. The very next day Cambon demanded 
 that the bill of the provisional agreement contained in the letters 
 of November, 19 12, be honored; and when certain of English 
 support, the French government, on the 30th of July, gave Petro- 
 grad the assurance of unconditional armed assistance, which it 
 had hitherto withheld. The result was the removal from Russia's 
 path of the final obstacles in the way of a definite decision for 
 war. 
 
 While England unmistakably drew closer in this manner to 
 the Dual Alliance, and while the Russian preparations were no 
 longer limited to mobilization on the Austrian boundary, but 
 were already extending into the military districts bordering on 
 Germany, the latter country, despite the more difficult conditions, 
 was with increased energy pursuing its efforts for peace. Im- 
 mediately following the return from his northern voyage, the 
 Emperor threw the whole weight of his personal authority and 
 of his well-known love of peace into the balance. He recognized, 
 of course, the difficult position of the Czar, but nevertheless he 
 appealed to him, in a telegram on the evening of July 28th, in 
 the name of their common interests and their long-standing 
 friendship. Above all, however, did he assure the Czar that he 
 would use his entire influence **to induce Austria-Hungary to seek 
 a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia." ^ Accord- 
 ingly, the Imperial Chancellor informed the British Ambassador 
 on the same evening that he was making every effort, both at 
 Vienna and Petrograd, to persuade the two governments to dis- 
 cuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way ^ 
 
 iBlue Book No. 87. 
 
 2 White Book, Exhibit 20. 
 
 3 Blue Book No. 71. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 521 
 
 — that is to say, to bring about a renewal of the direct negotiations, 
 which had been suspended since Austria's declaration of war on 
 Serbia. 
 
 The course was difficult, but not without prospect of success. 
 The reply of the Czar spoke, it is true, of his indignation at the 
 declaration of war by Austria and of the improbability of his 
 being able to continue to resist the pressure, but he nevertheless 
 accepted the offer of the German Emperor: "At this solemn 
 moment I beg you earnestly to help me." On the other side, 
 likew^ise, the efiFort to induce the Austrian ally to renew the nego- 
 tiations w^as successful. 
 
 The measures subsequently taken by the Imperial German 
 government showed that for the sake of preserving the peace of 
 the world Berlin was ready to go even beyond the position taken 
 on July 23rd regarding the Austro-Serbian conflict. In a note 
 sent to Vienna, on July 29th, it was admitted that Austria-Hun- 
 gary, in view of her previous experiences, could not be satisfied, 
 despite a certain readiness on Serbia's part, without receiving 
 positive guarantees for the fulfilment of her demands; but the 
 attempt was made to suggest, in the event of war, a limit to 
 Austria's action, which should have quieted all uneasiness on the 
 part of Russia. Since Austria, according to her previous decla- 
 ration, sought no territorial increase in Serbia, the note argued, 
 presumably the sole aim of the future military operation would 
 be to obtain such guarantees. If this was correct, Germany ad- 
 vised Austria to issue a public declaration to this effect, in order 
 to avoid all misunderstanding. The Imperial Chancellor w^as 
 justified in saying to the British Ambassador, Goschen, that the 
 fact that he had gone so far must be regarded in England as 
 proof of his earnest desire for peace.^ As he remarked on another 
 occasion, he was sparing no energy in the effort to urge Vienna 
 to moderation.^ During the same twenty-four hours, while Grey 
 was giving uninterrupted and dangerous encouragement to his 
 allies, the Imperial German government was continuing in Vi- 
 enna its efforts toward mediation ; in such a manner, indeed, that 
 the Imperial Chancellor could characterize it in his speech of 
 August 4th as ''going to the limit consonant with our relation 
 as an ally." ^ 
 
 After Austria-Hungary had decided, on the evening of July 
 30th, to take Germany's advice, the negotiations between Vienna 
 and Petrograd were resumed. The possibility of maintaining 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 75. 
 
 ~ Blue Book, No. 107, 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 103, 104. 
 
522 
 
 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 peace was thus again opened up at the eleventh hour, through the 
 intervention of the German Emperor and the compliance of our 
 ally. We know from these last negotiations that Austria-Hun- 
 gary declared her readiness to respect the sovereignty of Serbia 
 and the integrity of her territory, and further that Germany 
 was prepared to become surety for this pledge. We know, too, 
 of a renewed suggestion by Grey that Austria-Hungary should 
 cease her military advance after the occupation of Belgrade and 
 the surrounding territory, and should accept the mediation of the 
 four Powers between herself and Russia; this proposal also was 
 supported in Vienna by the German government. 
 
 But all hopes of peace were shattered by Russia with a single 
 blow. Sassonov, in the negotiations with Austria-Hungary, re- 
 sumed on the evening of July 30, increased his demands — work- 
 ing hand in hand with England ! — in such a manner that it would 
 have meant the complete surrender of the Monarchy.^ Nor was 
 this all: a few hours later, while Vienna was still considering 
 her reply, Russia suddenly, with a fateful decision, burned all her 
 bridges behind her. The certainty gained from a series of actions 
 on the part of British diplomacy that in case of war the aid of 
 France and England might be reckoned on, caused Russia to 
 decide against peace. That this consideration was a decisive fac- 
 tor in the change of front is shown by the report of the Belgian 
 Minister in Petrograd, an acceptable witness, even in the eyes 
 of our enemies; this report, written on July 31, pitilessly exposed 
 the chain of cause and effect so carefully concealed by Grey. It 
 acknowledges that "Germany has striven here, as she has in 
 Vienna, to find a way to avoid a general conflict." It offers this 
 revelation: "England let it be understood at first that she would 
 
 ^ It is remarkable that the tone of the formula originally chosen by Sassonov 
 (Orange Book No. 60) was, "at the demand of the British Ambassador" (Yellow 
 Book No. 113), made considerably sharper, as may be seen here: 
 
 YELLOW BOOK 
 
 "If Austria agrees to stay the ad- 
 vance of her troops on Serbian ter- 
 ritory, and if, recognizing that the 
 Austro-Serbian dispute has assumed 
 the character of a question of Euro- 
 pean interest, she admits that the 
 Great Powers shall examine the sat- 
 isfaction which Serbia might give to 
 the Austro - Hungarian Government 
 without affecting her sovereign rights 
 and independence, Russia undertakes 
 to maintain her waiting attitude." 
 
 This interference on the part of England with the formula is bound to 
 arouse grave doubts as to the love of peace of the British policy. Sassonov 
 had every reason to thank Grey "for the friendly and firm tone" which he has 
 adopted in the pourparlers with Germany and Austria (Orange Book No. 69). 
 
 ORANGE BOOK 
 
 "If Austria, recognizing that the 
 Austro-Serbian Question has assumed 
 the character of a European question, 
 declares her willingness to exclude 
 from her ultimatum the poiiits which 
 threaten the sovereign rights of 
 Serbia, Russia binds herself to cease 
 her military preparations." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 523 
 
 not permit herself to be drawn into a conflict. To-day, however, 
 Petrograd is convinced — indeed, assurance has been given — that 
 England will uphold France. This support is a very strong fac- 
 tor in the problem, and has served in great measure to help the 
 war party obtain the upper hand." 
 
 The Russian war party, therefore, decreed complete mobiliza- 
 tion, which was to set the world afire. Without being threat- 
 ened in a military way, either by Austria-Hungary^ or by the 
 German Empire,^ it took the step the unavoidable consequences 
 of which on the German side were as clear to the Czar's govern- 
 ment as they must have been to the other members of the En- 
 tente,^ who claimed to be so greatly concerned for peace. The 
 insatiable Asiatic lust for war herewith broke bounds, the lust 
 which in recent years had been strengthened by the secret and 
 open encouragement of the Western Powers, and which now, 
 without asking its promoters, brutally throttled the final efforts 
 at diplomatic mediation. The responsibility for the plot rests 
 with more than one state in the camp of our enemies; the re- 
 sponsibility for the deed must be borne by Russia alone, who, 
 in the words of Helfferich, at this moment became the incendiary 
 in a peaceful world.* 
 
 What followed were merely inevitable consequences, which 
 developed with automatic speed and which at only one point were 
 subjected to what seemed a voluntary decision. 
 
 Through Russia's general mobilization, the moment had come 
 for Germany when she saw herself forced to meet with the 
 greatest possible promptness the probability of a war on two 
 fronts; every hour in which she passively permitted the concen- 
 
 1 Russia could not possibly have seen a threat in Austria's partial mobiliza- 
 tion against Serbia. The Russian assertion in the communique of August 2nd 
 (Orange Book No. 77), that at the same time (July 31st) reports had been 
 received of a general mobilization by Austria, does not accord with the facts. 
 
 * That the alleged German preparations, which are said to have necessitated 
 the Russian mobilization, are contrary to facts, is evident, as that argument 
 was used only in relation to other Powers, but was not used by the Czar or 
 his advisors in their negotiations with the German Emperor or the German 
 diplomats. In connection with the Russian mobilization, see the German White 
 Book, and the report of July 31st of Baron De I'Escaille, the Belgian Minister 
 at Petrograd. 
 
 3 On July 27th, Secretary of State von Jagow informed the British Ambassador 
 that "if Russia mobilized only in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but 
 if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so, too, and the 
 Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult 
 exactly to locate her mobilization" (Blue Book No. 43). Similarly the French 
 Ambassador reported that Mr. von Jagow had "pointed out that if Russia 
 mobilized, Germany would be obliged to mobilize as well, that we also would 
 be forced to do so, and that the struggle would be almost inevitable" (Yellow 
 Book No. 67). 
 
 * It is significant that the introduction to the British Blue Book suppresses 
 the fact of the Russian general mobilization, and then says in the last para- 
 graph: "At this moment, on Friday the 31st, Germany suddenly dispatched an 
 ultimatum to Russia demanding that she should countermand her mobilizatioa 
 within twelve hours." 
 
524 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 tration of millions of men on her unprotected eastern border 
 would have been an inexcusable imperilling of the Empire. 
 Hence, on July 31st, at midnight, the Russian government was 
 informed that, on account of Russia's general mobilization of her 
 army and navy, Germany had proclaimed a state of impending 
 w^ar, which would be followed by mobilization if Russia did not 
 stop her military measures against Germany and Austria-Hun- 
 gary within twelve hours and notify Germany to that effect. As 
 the time limit set in this ultimatum passed without a reply from 
 Russia, on the afternoon of August ist, at 5 o'clock, the Emperor 
 ordered mobilization of the entire German army and of the 
 Imperial fleet; on the same afternoon, before the formal decla- 
 ration of war had been received in Petrograd, Russian troops 
 had already passed the border and begun hostilities. 
 
 Simultaneously with the ultimatum to Russia, the demand was 
 made on the French government to declare within eighteen hours 
 whether it would remain neutral. As we have seen, France from 
 the very beginning had taken sides in the secret diplomatic game, 
 but as regards the outside world had hitherto held herself in 
 reserve. That under all circumstances she would stand by her 
 Russian ally was known in Berlin, even without the malicious 
 words attributed to Ambassador Jules Cambon: *'We are not 
 Italians." And not less clearly had it been made manifest that 
 all political initiative and decision in Paris was limited to wait- 
 ing for the cue to be given by Petrograd, and especially by Lon- 
 don. Hence, the evasive reply from Paris, which meant war 
 but was so couched as to force the German government to make 
 the declaration, was not unexpected. 
 
 While war was started by Russia on the Continent, it re- 
 mained still a question whether England would immediately take 
 part. The apparent uncertainty could not last long. In this 
 last diplomatic game Grey's only anxiety was to find a suitable 
 cause for war which would act so irresistibly on the decision in 
 the Cabinet and afterward in Parliament and in the public mind 
 that no protest of the peace elements could make way against it. 
 On the other hand, it was the task of German diplomacy to de- 
 prive this enemy set on war of every excuse which might justify 
 the war before the country; nay, more, it had to make every 
 effort to render the decision of the Cabinet difficult, if not in- 
 deed impossible, and if everything else failed, to force the enemy 
 at least to confess the true reason for the war. 
 
 With this thought in mind, the Imperial Chancellor had al- 
 ready, on July 29th, before the final crisis, started to sound Eng- 
 land in the event that Russia's ruthless desire for war should ren- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 525 
 
 der a Continental conflict unavoidable. Since he was clearly 
 aware, from England's policy during recent years and from 
 Grey's most recent asseverations, that at the root of England's 
 political calculation was the determination to prevent at any cost 
 a diminution of France's power, he informed the British Ambas- 
 sador that Germany was prepared, provided English neutrality 
 was certain, to give every assurance to the British government 
 that even In the event of a victory she aimed at no territorial 
 acquisition at the expense of France.^ Reviewing the negotiations 
 for disarmament during recent years, he was able to give expres- 
 sion to the conviction that, as the aim of his policy during his 
 chancellorship had constantly been the relaxation of tension be- 
 tween Germany and England, he now had In mind an agreement 
 of neutrality between the two Powers. To such an extent, then, 
 was the German Empire ready to tie its hands in the final unde- 
 sired struggle against French revanche that It renounced In ad- 
 vance all possible gain from the conflict — the same German 
 Empire of which the French Prime Minister had declared in 
 the sitting of the Chamber of December 23, 19 14, that It had 
 for more than forty years tirelessly pursued the aim of destroy- 
 ing France in order to subjugate the world. Thus far were we 
 ready to go In meeting that Power of whose share In the out- 
 break of the threatening world conflagration we were fully cog- 
 nizant. 
 
 On the next day the offer was rejected unconditionally. 
 Grey's reply characterized any such stipulation as that proposed 
 as unacceptable. France, he said, even without loss of territory 
 in Europe, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great 
 Power and become subordinate to German policy. The proposal 
 was evidently so unwelcome to Grey that he characterized such 
 a "bargain" with Germany, at the expense of France, as a dis- 
 grace from which the good name of England would never re- 
 cover. With justice, Helfferich declares that Grey considered 
 himself merely as the ally of France whom Germany sought to 
 seduce. The fact that he expressly reserved freedom to act as 
 circumstances might require blinded no one ; this was the formula 
 which, in the case of France and Russia, Indicated probable 
 assistance, but as regards Germany, hostile Intervention. It Is 
 with this In mind that the close of his reply Is to be interpreted, 
 if It is to be properly appreciated. He says that if the peace 
 of Europe could be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, 
 his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement by 
 M^hich Germany could be assured that no aggressive or hostile 
 
 iBlue Book No. 85. 
 
526 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 policy would be pursued against her by the Triple Entente. 
 This final verbal arabesque was the ultimate achievement which 
 the leader for ten years in the policy of isolating Germany was 
 able to produce in the cause of the world's peace. The fact that 
 he declared the idea of a general rapprochement as practicable 
 only after the passing of the crisis — an idea hitherto rejected as 
 "Utopian" — showed how vitally important he considered this 
 crisis to be. Only the diplomatic defeat, as striven for by him, 
 of the Central Powers, resulting in their permanent disability 
 for an independent policy, would have represented for him the 
 crowning of the work and would have opened up for the world 
 the outlook into a hitherto impossible new era. 
 
 Meanwhile, following the start of the Russian mobilization 
 and the German ultimatum, the current of events swept so 
 swiftly and irresistibly onward that Grey, in his bewilderment, 
 was no longer able to check it, even had he desired to lay hold 
 of the possibility of peace. As soon as German mobilization, the 
 consequences of which for France he naturally realized, became 
 imminent, he determined to place the long-deliberated question 
 before Germany and France: Did they intend to respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium? The French government had already 
 become anxious. Grey was forced to admit that the Cabinet 
 had not yet reached a decision, and that this question of neu- 
 trality would be, ''I could not say a decisive, but an important 
 factor in determining our attitude." Cambon, however, was 
 insistent: ''Will you help us?" Grey's reply was evasive — he 
 was not yet able publicly to assume a formal obligation. Pa- 
 thetically Cambon reminded him of 1870: it was not in Eng- 
 land's interest, he said, that France should be humiliated by 
 Germany. In that event England, he declared, would be in a 
 very much weakened position in regard to Germany. In the 
 year 1870 England had committed a sad mistake by permitting 
 a great increase in Germany's strength — was she going to repeat 
 this mistake? 
 
 The question of Belgian neutrality gave to Grey the long- 
 sought-for excuse for war which he needed to stampede the 
 Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion, and which the British 
 press and that of the world have since then discussed ad infini- 
 tum, with appeals to international law and to humanity. 
 
 That this excuse for war was only a subterfuge is proved by 
 several indisputable facts. In anticipation of Grey's designs, on 
 August 1st, before it had finally declared itself, the German 
 government demanded of him whether England would obligate 
 herself to remain neutral in case Germany promised not to vio- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 527 
 
 late Belgium's neutrality. Grey, however, refused to give such 
 a promise, by w^hich, if he had really been concerned for Bel- 
 gium, he might have saved the unhappy country from its fate.^ 
 Grey was thereby prevented beforehand from playing the trump 
 of Belgian neutrality — he considered it permissible, however, to 
 keep this inquiry from the knowledge of the Cabinet and Parlia- 
 ment. Indeed, he even went further. Following Grey's re- 
 fusal. Prince Lichnowsky urged him at least to formulate the 
 possible conditions for England's neutrality, the Ambassador 
 himself increasing the offer of July 29th by proposing a guaran- 
 tee on the part of Germany of the integrity of France and of 
 the French colonies. This offer also Grey withheld from the 
 Cabinet, as all negotiations on this basis would have defeated 
 his pre-determined action. Such conduct is to be explained only 
 by a fixed determination for war. 
 
 As a matter of fact. Grey had completely bound England's 
 hands, in the interest of France, even before he was justified in 
 assuming Belgian neutrality to be threatened. On the after- 
 noon of the same ist of August he gave the French Ambassador, 
 who had become anxiously insistent, reason to expect a promise 
 which he was able formally to make to him the very next morn- 
 ing. In the Cabinet meeting on the morning of August 2nd — 
 that in which he withheld the German offers and inquiries! — 
 he caused a resolution to be passed w^hich authorized him (with 
 the customary formal reservations) to inform Cambon that if 
 the German fleet were to come through the North Sea or into 
 the English Channel, with the purpose of hostile attacks against 
 the French coast or French shipping, the British fleet would lend 
 France its full support.^ This far-reaching promise was nothing 
 less than a positive undertaking to go to war against Germany,^ 
 an obligation which was the inevitable result of the spirit of the 
 Franco-English naval convention. The obligation, however, was 
 assumed before the inquiry as regards the passage of German 
 troops had been made in Brussels on the evening (at seven 
 o'clock) of the 2nd of August. This offers positive proof, in 
 addition to the negative proof, that the question of Belgium's 
 neutrality was not the deciding factor — but that, rather, the 
 British fleet, in the period from the 2nd to the 4th of August, 
 independently of the question of neutrality and before a decision 
 regarding it had been reached, would have forcibly prevented a 
 German attack on the north coast of France, thus beginning the 
 
 * Blue Book No. 123. 
 
 2 Blue Book No. 148; Yellow Book No. 137. 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 143. 
 
528 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 war on Its own account. In possession of this statement France 
 gave the above-mentioned evasive reply to the German ulti- 
 matum, which led to the declaration of war. 
 
 The leading imperialistic group of the government, which was 
 determined on war, needed this Belgian excuse in order to over- 
 come the opposition of a strong party in the Cabinet opposed to 
 the war. Nor at the crucial moment did this argument prove 
 sufHcIent for a small minority represented by such men as Lord 
 Morley, John Burns and Trevelyan. The majority, however, 
 was determined to disregard an even stronger resistance in their 
 own party, and in extreme case of need to form a coalition min- 
 istry for the World War with the Conservative opposition, whose 
 manner of poHtical thought was based on force alone and who 
 unconditionally supported the government and urged forward 
 even more violently. With this means at their disposal, says 
 Shaw, ''Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith let loose the lion." 
 
 The real impelling motive of English statesmenship, whose 
 diplomatic exponent Grey was at this moment, must be sought at 
 another point — in the basic conception of the whole policy of 
 isolation. Whoever has followed the significance and the inter- 
 connection of events in the preliminary history of the war will 
 not be surprised to see that the systematic preparation and the 
 tenacious clinging to an idea could have as a final result only the 
 completed deed. When In the course of the war the burdens 
 and sacrifices mounted, contrary to England's expectation, to a 
 point where Belgian neutrality no longer seemed sufficient as a 
 decisive war motive for a healthy national egoism, the political 
 heads of the nation held it to be wiser to discard a fictitious mo- 
 tive which was fundamentally un-English and to call things by 
 their true names. In a leading article in The Tunes, of March 
 9, 19 1 5, this admission was made with a ruthless frankness which 
 cannot surprise the initiated: "We do not set up to be interna- 
 tional Don Quixotes, ready at all times to redress wrongs which 
 do us no hurt. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor 
 and Interest would have united us with France." Soon there- 
 after Lord Haldane, the one-time pro-German decoy of the 
 Cabinet, indulged in this observation: ''Belgium touched our 
 honor, France our sentiment and interest. If we consider the 
 theory of world conquest underlying the successful German 
 movement in favor of a war of attack, it seems to me that It 
 would have been madness to sit still with folded hands while 
 Germany was sweeping aside the obstacles on the Continent to an 
 attack on the British Empire." He also Implies the fact (of 
 which Grey's declaration gives documentary proof) that Eng- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 529 
 
 land would have determined to take part In the world war 
 even without the passage of Germany through Belgium. 
 
 It is not, however, the whole truth to say that England en- 
 tered the war on France's account. By a promise of neutrality, 
 the English might have gained Germany's assurance that France's 
 territorial integrity would not be disturbed. It was not a sign 
 of diplomatic weakness on the part of Germany, but a well-cal- 
 culated move to force her enemies to disclose their last card, 
 when, with knowledge of the naval convention and the promise 
 of August 2nd, she took an additional step and declared herself 
 ready to guarantee not to disturb the north coast of France, 
 French shipping and French colonies. Truly the buckler which the 
 ruler of the seas would have set up before her ally was strong 
 and high enough to protect her colleague in the Entente against 
 every danger. But this was not sufficient — there was a greater 
 interest at stake. 
 
 Concealed under the negative purpose of preventing the weak- 
 ening of France at any price, there existed the positive desire of 
 causing Germany's enfeeblement through a coalition of Powers 
 which could never again be reproduced. There was, on the one 
 hand, the well-weighed belief, which Ambassador de Bunsen in- 
 cautiously admitted, that Germany and Austria-Hungary would 
 probably be strong enough to defeat France and Russia, and that 
 only the decided and immediate intervention of England could 
 render the opposite result certain. On the other hand, there 
 existed the not unfounded fear that, if this opportunity were not 
 seized, the Entente allies would be permanently estranged and 
 w^ould turn away from England — there would thus be nothing 
 left for the English state than to be friendly with Germany 
 and to resign itself to that country's claim to existence. That 
 was the very situation which England had for years striven to 
 prevent, and which now at the last moment she would not accept. 
 This policy had been unconditionally adopted in favor of France, 
 and although England was aware that she was thereby also 
 electing in favor of the Russian offensive against the Central 
 Powers, she had at all times sought so to play the game that at 
 the moment of a great crisis Germany would have to face all 
 three Powers. 
 
 The leading men of the country which, thanks to its insular 
 situation, had risen to a dominant position by taking skillful 
 advantage of the conjuncture of events, could not resist the 
 temptation at this apparently favorable moment to establish the 
 supremacy of their own land on the ruins of Germany's world- 
 embracing efforts. Only by taking full advantage of this oppor- 
 
530 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 tunity could they hope to put the dangerous German rival In 
 trade and industry, on the sea and in the colonies, out of the 
 running for a long time, or perhaps even forever. That the 
 instinct of trade rivalry had, unseen, gained in strength, was 
 proved by the action of British journalism after the outbreak of 
 the war, when it set out to incite the whole world to an attack 
 on German markets, and indulged in dreams of leveling every 
 German foundry to the ground. Thus the basic guiding idea 
 of the policy of isolation finally came dominantly to the fore, 
 for the first time since its conception by King Edward. It 
 lies concealed behind the manner in which Grey, with less 
 certain hand than usual, in the final week threw the weight of 
 his state against every serious chance of peace and finally de- 
 cisively in favor of war. 
 
 The self-deception of Grey is the fundamental error of the 
 policy of isolation. It was not even his most serious mistake 
 when he made the cold-blooded statement in Parliament that 
 participation in the war would not cost the English much more 
 than would neutrality — this argumentum ad hominem, aimed to 
 render calculation as regards the war plausible to the commercial 
 mind of his compatriots, shows, at all events, that in this man the 
 inhibitions which would have led him to prevent the war were 
 but feebly developed. His fundamental weaknesses lie much 
 deeper. He was haunted by the unfounded fear of the world 
 supremacy of Germany, which had so long been denounced as 
 Napoleonic that the world had come to believe in it. He was 
 misled by the fatal undervaluation of the strength of Austria- 
 Hungary and by the mistaken belief in the possibility of eco- 
 nomically starving and cutting off Germany. Just as he over- 
 estimated the anti-German arguments in their entirety, as these 
 were circulated in the camp of the Triple Entente, so he under- 
 estimated the internal powers of his enemy — the ethical and spir- 
 itual, the military and technical, the economic and financial 
 reserve forces of a nation which was able and determined to con- 
 i^kiue its upward course without offensive and in peace. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY 
 
 PROFESSOR WALTHER SCHOENBORN, OF HEIDELBERG 
 
 DURING the war, no single charge has been more effective 
 in arousing public opinion against Germany than that 
 which has been exploited in hostile as well as neutral countries — 
 that we committed an arbitrary breach of international law in 
 violating Belgium's neutrality. A glance at the war literature 
 published in neutral countries shows that no accusation has had 
 more lasting success, though those who have raised their voices 
 the loudest have gradually been driven, through the publication by 
 the German government of documents found in the Brussels ar- 
 chives, from the offensive to the defensive, and this defensive 
 attitude is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.^ 
 
 An examination of this charge and of the grounds on which it 
 is based, as well as of the points which serve as a vindication for 
 Germany, must be confined to an investigation of the legal 
 aspect of the subject, since the accusation does not concern itself 
 with the question whether Germany's action was politically wise 
 or expedient, but whether it was admissible under the law of 
 nations. 
 
 The speech which the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, made before the Reichstag, on August 4, 
 1 91 4, is generally selected by Germany's opponents as a con- 
 
 1 For a characteristic example of the type referred to, see La Belgique Neutre 
 et Loyale, by Professor Emil Waxweiler, Lausanne, 19 15, of which an American 
 edition, entitled Belgium: Neutral and Loyal, was published in New York, 1915. 
 Passages taken at random from the book go to show that Mr. Waxweiler touches 
 but lightly on the dangerous points of the German publications, meeting them 
 with fictitious arguments, or passing them over in silence, thus disclosing the 
 inherent weakness of his position. It is regrettable that his skill in the use 
 of material already well known is greater than his conscientiousness. He quotes 
 (p. 91) — from No. 85 of the British Blue Book — the Imperial Chancellor's state- 
 ment to Sir E. Goshen on July 29th concerning Belgium: "It will depend on 
 the action of France what operations Germany may be forced to undertake in 
 Belgium, but after the war Belgium will maintain her integrity, if she does 
 not take sides against Germany"; and (p. 92) he says: "On July 29th, Germany 
 confessed that thereafter the fate of the little nation that she has guaranteed 
 would be at the mercy of military operations." Note that the statement of 
 the Imperial Chancellor said clearly that France's action would decide Ger- 
 many's attitude! Again (p. 154) Mr. Waxweiler states that "one date domi- 
 nates all these allegations," and says: "It was on July 29th that the Imperial 
 Chancellor, in his conversation with the British Ambassador at Berlin, an- 
 nounced for the first time that, in the event of a conflict with France, Ger- 
 many would only respect the integrity of Belgium if she did not resist the 
 free passage of German troops across her territory." It is statements of this 
 sort that force one to regard with the utmost caution all the new material 
 adduced by Mr. Waxweiler. 
 
532 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 venient starting-point for their campaign. It is true that In 
 connection with the entry into Belgium the Chancellor speaks 
 of a breach of international law; but before being interpreted 
 against Germany, as is generally done, the words of the Imperial 
 Chancellor deserve closer investigation. The pertinent sentences 
 read as follows: 
 
 "Gentlemen, we are now forced to defend ourselves; and 
 necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxem- 
 burg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. 
 Gentlemen, this is contrary to the principles of international 
 law. It is true the French government declared in Brussels 
 its intention to respect Belgitim's neutrality as long as its op- 
 ponents would do so. We know, however, that France stood 
 ready to invade the country. France could wait, but we 
 could not. A French attack on our flank on the Lower Rhine 
 might have had fatal consequences for us. Consequently we 
 were forced to disregard the legitimate protests of the Luxem- 
 burg and Belgian governments. The wrong — I speak quite 
 candidly — which we are now committing we shall endeavor 
 to make good as soon as we have- attained our military goal. 
 He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for what he holds 
 most dear, can think only as to how he can hew his way out!" 
 
 And further: 
 
 "We have assured the British government that as long as 
 England remains neutral our fleet will not attack the* northern 
 coast of France, and that we shall not encroach upon the 
 territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. I repeat 
 this assurance here before the whole world. . . ." 
 
 Naturally, these words can be correctly understood and appre- 
 ciated only if the general situation at the time they were uttered 
 is taken into consideration. Spoken in an hour in which the 
 fate of the German Empire hung in the balance, and forming 
 part of a vital political statement by the government to a politi- 
 cal gathering, they w^ere not intended as, nor could they be, an 
 objective and carefully considered theoretical verdict regarding 
 the legal aspect of Germany's procedure. They represent rather 
 an integral part of a political action. The object of this action, 
 and consequently the real meaning of the words so promptly and 
 eagerly turned against Germany, were subsequently made 
 clear in another equally important announcement of the Imperial 
 
MODERN GERMANY 533 
 
 Chancellor, which must be considered In conjunction with his 
 Initial speech, In order that the latter be clearly understood. 
 In the second war session of the Reichstag, on December 2, 
 1914, the Imperial Chancellor declared: 
 
 "The neutrality of Belgium, which England pretended to 
 protect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock on the evening of the 2nd of 
 August we Informed Brussels that the French plan of cam- 
 paign, which was known to us, compelled us, for reasons of 
 self-preservation, to march through Belgium ; but as early as the 
 afternoon of that very day — the 2nd of August — that Is to 
 say, before anything was known or could be known In London 
 of our action in Brussels, England had assured France of her 
 unconditional support. In the event of the German fleet attack- 
 ing the French coast. Not a word was said of the neutrality 
 of Belgium. This fact Is established by Sir Edward Grey's 
 statement, made In the House of Commons on the 3rd of 
 August, but w^hich, owing to the difficulty in telegraphic com- 
 munication, had not come to my knowledge in extenso on the 
 4th of August. It Is furthermore confirmed by the Blue 
 Book of the British government Itself. How, then, can Eng- 
 land claim to have drawn her sword because we had violated 
 Belgium's neutrality? And how could the British statesmen, 
 who were perfectly cognizant of the past, speak about Belgian 
 neutrality at all ? When, on the 4th of August, I spoke of the 
 wrong we were committing by marching into Belgium, it was 
 not yet certain whether the Belgian government would not 
 In the hour of need decide to save the country and withdraw 
 to Antwerp under protest. You remember, that at the request 
 of our military administration, after the capture of Liege, I 
 made a fresh proposal to the Belgian government to this ef- 
 fect. For military reasons It was Imperative on August 4th 
 to maintain the possibility of such a development at all costs. 
 Even at that time there were many indications of the Belgian 
 government's guilt, though positive written proofs were not 
 then at my disposal. But the English statesmen were per- 
 fectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which were 
 found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by 
 me, establish how and to what extent Belgium had relin- 
 quished her neutrality to England. Two facts are now made 
 quite clear to the world : When our troops entered Belgian 
 territory during the night of the 3rd to the 4th of August, 
 they were in the confines of a state which had long since rid- 
 dled Its own neutrality. The other fact is that England did 
 
534 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 not declare war on us for the sake of Belgium's neutrality, 
 which she had helped to undermine, but because she believed 
 she would be able, with the help of two great Continental mili- 
 tary powers, to crush us. . . ." 
 
 With this, the real meaning of the Imperial Chancellor's dec- 
 larations of August 4th is clearly explained. The German gov- 
 ernment at that time still hoped to accomplish the march through 
 Belgium without meeting serious armed resistance. In order to 
 make it easy for Belgium to adopt an attitude conforming with 
 these expectations, the German government did not assume the 
 position that its troops were entitled to march through by virtue 
 of a legal right, but admitted that it committed thereby a legal 
 infringement. The German government might have spoken 
 differently; but, in the first place, documentary proofs of the 
 previous breaches of Belgium's neutrality were lacking at the 
 time, and, in the second place, it was not only France but also 
 England that was seriously compromised by them. On the 
 afternoon of August 4, however, England's attitude toward Ger- 
 many had not been publicly decided on; there was, perhaps, still 
 hope of preventing her from participating in the war. It was 
 known that England was deeply interested in the integrity of 
 Belgium ; or, to express it more precisely, she was apprehensive 
 of Germany establishing herself permanently on Belgium's North 
 Sea coast. If now, the Imperial Chancellor, in an open session 
 of the Reichstag, expressly declared the entry Into Belgium as 
 wrong, the strongest guaranty conceivable was thereby given to 
 the world that Belgium would later on be completely evacuated. 
 On the other hand, a public reference made by Germany at this 
 moment of Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, through 
 secret agreements with France and England, would have com- 
 pelled the German government forthwith to declare Belgium an 
 enemy and opponent, thus leaving no choice to England. 
 
 For purposes of this investigation, it follows that the words 
 of the Imperial Chancellor, spoken on August 4, 1914, cannot 
 be taken as an estimate of the question in its relationship to in- 
 ternational law. 
 
 The German entry into Belgium has been characterized as a 
 breach of international law from two points of view: 
 
 I. Germany is claimed to have expressly recognized by treaty 
 the permanent neutrality of Belgium, and to have violated this 
 treaty obligation by her invasion. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 535 
 
 2. By the mere fact of being a neutral state — that is to say, 
 by not being a participant in the war — Belgium, it is maintained, 
 had the right to forbid any belligerent from trespassing on her 
 territory; indeed, according to objective principles of interna- 
 tional law, she is not supposed even to have been in a position to 
 permit a belligerent either to enter or march through her terri- 
 tory. On the contrary, she is assumed to have been under the 
 obligation of preventing such action. 
 
 Some have combined these two points of view by identifying the 
 rights and duties of a permanently neutral state in war-time 
 with those of a state which simply happens to be neutral in a 
 particular war. This is correct as regards the inadmissibility 
 of other states encroaching on the territory of the neutral state; 
 but in other respects the rights and duties of the permanently 
 neutral, or neutralized state, are more comprehensive, as is com- 
 monly recognized in theory and practice (see below). 
 
 The neutralization and the resulting permanent neutrality of 
 Belgium was legally based up to the present on the treaties of 
 April 19, 1839. By virtue of these, at the termination of her 
 war of independence against Holland, which was incited by 
 France in order to further her schemes of expansion, Belgium 
 was formally recognized by Holland. The recognition of Bel- 
 gium by the Great Powers, viz., France, Austria, England, Prus- 
 sia and Russia, was expressly renewed, and the provisions of the 
 Dutch-Belgian Treaty were placed under the guaranty of the 
 Great Powers. The permanent neutrality of Belgium was ex- 
 pressed in the following terms (Art. VH, of the main treaty 
 between Belgium and Holland) : 
 
 "La Belgique, dans les limites indiquees aux Articles i, 2, et 4, for- 
 mera un Etat independent et perpetuellement neutre. Elle sera tenue 
 d'observer cette meme neutralite envers tous les autres Etats" (Belgium, 
 within the limits specified in Articles 1, 2, and 4, shall form an inde- 
 pendent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be bound to observe 
 such neutrality toward all other states). 
 
 The guaranty given by the five Great Powers (Holland is not 
 included here) is expressed in the following words: 
 
 "[The five Great Powers] . . . declarent que les articles ci-annexes 
 et formant la teneur du Traite conclu en ce jour entre S. M. le roi des 
 Beiges et S. M. le roi des Pays Bas, grand-due de Luxembourg, sont 
 consideres comme ayant la meme force et valeur que s'ils etaient tex- 
 tuellement inseres dans le present Acte, et qu'ils se trouvent ainsi 
 places sous la guarantie de Leurs-dites Majestes" ( [The five Great 
 Powers] . . . declare that the Article hereunto annexed and forming 
 the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the 
 King of Belgium and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand 
 
536 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 Duke of Luxembourg, are considered as having the same force and va- 
 lidity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that 
 they are thus placed under the guaranty of their said Majesties). (See 
 Sec. Ill, 3.)' 
 
 The second point — viz., the inviolability of the territory of 
 any neutral state — is covered by the provisions of the fifth Con- 
 vention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of October 18, 
 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers and 
 persons in case of w^ar on land, more particularly by Articles i, 
 2, 5, par. I, and Article 10 of that Convention. The original 
 French text of the same reads as follows: 
 
 "Article i. Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable. 
 
 "Article 2. II est interdit aux belligerants de faire passer a travers 
 le territoire d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois soit de 
 munitions, soit d'approvisionnements. 
 
 "Article 5. (Section i.) Une Puissance neutre ne doit tolerer sur 
 son territoire aucun des actes vises par les articles 234. 
 
 "Article 10. Ne pent etre considere comme un acte hostile le fait, 
 par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, meme par la force, les atteintes 
 a sa neutralite." 
 
 ["Article i. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. 
 
 "Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of 
 either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral 
 Power. 
 
 "Article 5. (Par. i.) A neutral Power must not allow any of the 
 acts referred to in articles 2 and 4 to occur on its territory. 
 
 "Article 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, 
 attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act."] " 
 
 The Belgians themselves, as well as the English, have based 
 their charges mainly on the treaties of 1839, while the stipula- 
 tions of the Hague Convention have been frequently quoted by 
 the American friends of Belgium, particularly by Mr. Roosevelt. 
 In this, Mr. Roosevelt and the other supporters of the same 
 view labor under a misconception of the legal position. It is 
 true that in principle the Hague Convention applies to every 
 Treaty Power, but only in case it is actually neutral in a given 
 
 ^ Article I of the Treaty concluded by the Five Great Powers with Belgium. 
 A corresponding provision is contained in Article II of the Treaty of the Great 
 Powers with the Netherlands. 
 
 2 Up to the present time, this convention has not been ratified either by 
 Great Britain or Serbia. It stipulates in Article XX that "the provisions of 
 the present Convention do not apply, except as between contracting Powers, and 
 then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention." But Germany 
 would not derive from that fact justification for declaring the Convention as 
 not binding, if for no other reason than that England — until the evening of 
 August 4th — was not yet a participant in the war; and for the further reason 
 that the quoted stipulations are in effect nothing more than the legal customs 
 existing, and held to be lawful, before the Hague Conference. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 537 
 
 war. The moment such a state itself becomes a participant in 
 the war it is evident that the Convention ceases to be applicable 
 to it and that the laws of war come into force instead. Now, 
 whether or not a state is to remain neutral in a war does not by 
 any means depend exclusively on its own will ; generally speakings 
 a state can wage war against another state at any time, when it 
 believes that its interests demand such action. The law of na- 
 tions does not in any way prohibit this, just as there are no 
 international rules as to when a war is "legally permissible" and 
 when not. 
 
 The Boer Republics had no desire whatsoever for war in 
 1899; they would certainly have preferred to remain "neutral" 
 — viz., in this case immune from attack. A state can perhaps 
 prevent its troops from going to war, and thereby avoid a san- 
 guinary decision by battle, as was done by Bulgaria as regards 
 Rumania in the second Balkan War; but in behalf of its own 
 interests it cannot, in face of the determination of another state 
 to begin hostilities, prevent the advent of a state of war, with 
 all its effects as regards international law.^ Public opinion and 
 general moral sentiment may or may not in a given case approve 
 of involving in a war a state which wishes to remain officially 
 neutral, for the time being or altogether. The legal position is 
 always the same according to international law (with the excep- 
 tion of one special case). The eminent Swiss professor of inter- 
 national law, Max Huber, is quite right when he says, in ref- 
 erence to using neutral territory for warlike operations, to com- 
 pelling a neutral to participate in a war, or to the abandonment 
 of his neutrality by the neutral himself: 
 
 "The decision as to such an action — which regularly results 
 in involving the neutral state in the war — is always determined 
 by the compelling interest of the state, or, what amounts to the 
 same thing, by military necessity. The decision as to whether 
 such a necessity exists, however, can no more be determined by 
 law than the necessity as to war or peace. The law connects 
 certain legal effects — those of the rules of war — with the infrac- 
 tion of the rules of peace, but these effects are the same whether 
 such a necessity existed or not." ^ 
 
 The Hague Convention, concerning neutrality, determines only 
 the duties of belligerents towards the neutral states, and vice 
 versa, consequently also the actions on the part of the one or the 
 other, which constitute a breach of neutrality, and which, as long 
 as the neutrality continues, are not permissible and under given 
 
 ^ See International Law, by Westlake, Vol. II, 2d edition, p. 2. 
 - See Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, Vol. VII, p. 357 ff. 
 
538 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 circumstances not legally compatible with it. On the other hand, 
 the Convention caciiuc, nor is ic intended that it should, give legal 
 guarantee against the termmation — even though one-sided — of 
 the neutrality of a state. Such a general guarantee w^ould not 
 be possible, as international law stands to-day, because it would 
 amount to a prohibition of war. 
 
 Huber, therefore, correctly defines "the question whether neu- 
 trality is to exist or not," as one "of a purely strategic and politi- 
 cal nature," with the single exception of the case "that active 
 and passive neutrality is from the beginning guaranteed (perma- 
 nent neutrality and neutralization)." 
 
 In the ultimatum of August 2, 191 4 (Belgian Gray Book 
 No. 20), the German government in unmistakable manner 
 threatened Belgium with war in case of resistance to the pas- 
 sage of the German troops. By the presentation of the ulti- 
 matum Belgium was already, at least conditionally, "involved 
 in the war." As soon as that condition arose the fifth Hague 
 Convention automatically ceased to apply to Belgium, and dis- 
 regard of its provisions did not signify a breach of international 
 law, provided that "involving Belgium in the war" was in itself 
 legally permissible. According to the above, however, such an 
 "involving" is de jure left to the free determination of each bel- 
 ligerent, provided he is not bound by any special treaty, or, in 
 other words, provided he has not previously recognized the per- 
 manent neutrality of the state in question. The legal question 
 therefore culminates in one point: Was Germany legally 
 bound by the treaty of neutralization; was she in the present 
 case under a legal obligation to respect the permanent neutrality 
 of Belgium, or was she not? If she was not, then the Hague 
 Convention was no longer a legal obstacle to the German ac- 
 tion; whereas, in the former case, it would be applicable in 
 determining the duties of Germany and Belgium. 
 
 Only if Germany, in August, 19 14, was legally bound to 
 respect the neutralization treaty, was her action towards Bel- 
 gium a breach of international law.^ But even in such a case, 
 though entitled to take up arms in self-defense, Belgium would 
 
 1 See America and the World War, by Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1915. 
 p. 112 ff. Mr. Roosevelt's belief that the United States, after ascertaining that 
 the facts were as represented, should intervene against Germany, on account 
 of the violation of the Hague Convention in regard to Belgium, is therefore 
 without any legal justification in so far as the fifth Hague Convention is con- 
 cerned, if only for the reasons given in the text. In common with all the 
 other signatory Powers, the United States only "ratified" the Hague Conven- 
 tions — that is to say, they recognized the Conventions as binding in their own 
 relations towards the other signatory Powers, but they did not "guarantee" 
 the conventions, or bind themselves to enforce their stipulations in the rela- 
 tions between other signatory Powers. "International law," therefore, does not 
 support Mr. Roosevelt's attitude. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 539 
 
 have had to observe the rules of international law concerning 
 the conduct of war. Germany was fully justified in proceeding 
 with reprisals against the lawless resistance of the Belgian popu- 
 lation, which had no regard for the precepts of the laws of war.^ 
 
 II 
 
 The German government has always recognized the validity, 
 in principle, of the neutralization agreements. Serious doubts 
 have been raised, however, in scientific circles in regard to two 
 points: First, was Germany even outwardly and formally bound 
 by the treaties of 1839? A great number of scholars, including 
 conscientious and impartial neutrals, have expressed doubts on 
 this point. For, in the first place, it was not the German Em- 
 pire — which has only existed as such since 1871 — nor the North 
 German Confederation, which only came into being in 1867 — 
 that entered into an obligation in 1839, but Prussia, which was 
 in fact juridically and historically a totally different legal en- 
 tity. 
 
 Futhermore, an event that took place in 1870 makes the pre- 
 vailing opinion at that time as regards the binding force of the 
 treaties of 1839 seem highly doubtful. After the outbreak of 
 the Franco-German War, in order to safeguard Belgium's neu- 
 trality, England concluded with the North German Confeder- 
 acy and with France identical treaties, which provided for a pos- 
 sible alliance on the part of England with either one of the bel- 
 ligerents, for the sole purpose of protecting Belgium's neutrality, 
 in case the other should violate it. Why, one asks, was such a 
 special treaty necessary if the binding force of the old treaties 
 was beyond doubt? Nevertheless, the formal validity of the 
 latter also for Germany must be acknowledged. It is quite true 
 that when a federal state is founded, the treaties previously en- 
 tered into by its individual members do not forthwith, ipso jure, 
 apply to the federacy itself: A state can, in principle, only be 
 bound in its international relations by its own free will. But, 
 as far as is known, the Imperial German government never dis- 
 
 1 In this connection Mr. Roosevelt seems to labor under a strange miscon- 
 ception, according to his statement in The Outlook of September 22,, 1914. 
 p, 175, and further statements in his book, America and the World War, to 
 ■which reference has already been made. He either gives a totally wrong 
 interpretation to the term "hostile act," as used in Article X of the Fifth 
 Hague Convention, and to the article itself, which cannot exclude the opening 
 of hostilities against a State that has remained neutral; or else he fails ta 
 recognize that the German reprisals in Belgium were not directed against the 
 military resistance of Belgium as a State, but merely against the unlawful 
 methods employed by the Belgian population in their resistance. 
 
540 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 puted that the neutralization treaties of 1839 were binding on 
 Germany; on the contrary, as late as April, 19 13, the German 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, referred to 
 these treaties in the Budget Commission of the Reichstag as 
 existing and as valid also for Germany (cf. Belgian Gray Book 
 No. 12, appendix) ; nor has the German government during the 
 course of the war ever denied the formal validity of the treaties. 
 Belgium's history makes the material security which the neu- 
 tralization of 1839 was able to give to the new state appear 
 highly questionable, especially in view of France's annexation 
 schemes (cf. section III, 3) ; and the conclusion by England of 
 the double treaty of 1870, which was chiefly brought about 
 through Bismarck's revelations concerning the like intentions of 
 Napoleon III, certainly does not give proof of confidence on the 
 part of Great Britain in the binding power and efficacy of the 
 old treaties. Nevertheless, the double treaty does not in its> 
 wording imply an annulment of the old treaties ; on the contrary, 
 not only is the view perfectly plausible that the treaties of 1870 
 were only to provide for effectual application of the old treaties 
 in a special case, without being in any way prejudicial to their 
 future efficacy, with all the resulting consequences, but the cor- 
 rectness of this view is also clearly proved by the concluding 
 clause of Art. 3 of the double treaty, which provides that, after 
 the expiration of the new treaty: *'. . . the independence and 
 neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting 
 Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore 
 on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 
 1839." Although this article attributes to the treaties of 1839 
 only the same effectiveness which they had previously possessed, 
 no unbiassed judge can fail to see that we have here an express 
 acknowledgment of the old treaties, also by the North German 
 Confederation. 
 
 The second point of dispute seems to have more weight. Is 
 not the neutralization of a state such as Belgium, situated as it 
 is in the midst of great military Powers, preposterous in itself, 
 and does not permanent neutrality impose inherently contradic- 
 tory duties on such a state ? Much can certainly be said in favor 
 of this point of view. For example, the (armed) neutral state 
 is prohibited from waging an offensive war, but it is directly 
 obliged vigorously to protect its neutrality, even by means of a 
 defensive war; the distinction, however, between an offensive 
 and defensive war is in reality sometimes very slight. Truly, it 
 is in the last analysis absurd to place a state of the second or 
 third order, which is not protected by geographical conditions, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 541 
 
 under the obligation to resist violation of its territory by a Great 
 Power, if need be by means of war — that is to say, to endanger 
 its existence as a state; whereas, every other state is legally en- 
 titled to decide whether or not it will oppose such violation by 
 force of arms. Guaranty treaties with third states do not offer 
 any real equivalent for this. 
 
 But juridically this argument does not seem convincing. The 
 permanent neutralization of states has formed part of the recog- 
 nized principles of international law in the nineteenth and twen- 
 tieth centuries; and despite certain discouraging experiences in 
 other cases, precisely Belgium's permanent neutrality was, until 
 the present war, regularly regarded both in (official) practice 
 and in theory as a reality; even in recent years it supplied the 
 chief arguments in the dispute concerning the admissibility of 
 fortifying Flushing; the jurist cannot very well ignore this. 
 Perhaps the present war will change general conceptions as to 
 the feasibility and practicability of the artificial neutralization of 
 a state ; but to-day an examination of the legal position from the 
 standpoint of international law must still take into account the 
 conceptions which have prevailed until now. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Through its spokesman, the Imperial Chancellor, as well as 
 through repeated pronouncements of von Jagow, the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs, the Imperial German government 
 characterized at the start the German entry into Belgium as an. 
 act of urgent necessity. Likewise, the ultimatum to Belgium, qj^ 
 the 2nd of August, 191 4, was based on the same conception; 
 The march through Belgian territory was absolutely imperative 
 in the interest of self-preservation by the German Empire; only 
 in this way did it seem possible to resist successfully the efforts 
 of Germany's enemies to crush her. The government regretted 
 the necessity of encroaching formally on the rights of a third 
 state (viz., Belgium) and promised all possible indemnification. 
 
 The legal standpoint of the German government can perhaps 
 be best elucidated by a parallel taken from domestic law: A 
 forester, who is attacked by a poacher, sees an armed companion 
 of the latter stealthily approaching under cover of another man's 
 house, and on the point of entering it for the purpose of obtain- 
 ing a favorable aim ; the forester thereupon bursts open the 
 door and enters the house himself, in order to take the second 
 poacher by surprise and overpower him. The action of the for- 
 
542 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ester is permissible, but he must compensate the owner of the 
 house for the damage he has done. 
 
 Two questions arise in this connection: First, was the Ger- 
 man Empire really in a position of urgent necessity? Second, if 
 such necessity existed, was Germany thereby justified according 
 to international law in violating the old neutralization treaties? 
 Both contentions have been disputed by our enemies, but both 
 are sound. 
 
 For it was Germany that was attacked — the proof of this is 
 to be found in the history of the events antecedent to the war. 
 The annihilation of Germany, or at the very least the destruction 
 of her world-position, was the undisputed object of her opponents 
 at the time of and after the outbreak of war. This would have 
 been known to Germany, even if the ludicrous desires and 
 schemes of her opponents for the partition and mutilation of her 
 territory had not been so naively disclosed in their official and 
 private utterances during the first months of the war. Germany 
 was in a most difficult strategic position from the very begin- 
 ning: involved in a war on two fronts with two of the most 
 powerful military Powers of Europe, which had in recent years 
 made tremendous preparations for war; deprived of her freedom 
 of action at sea owing to England's highly threatening attitude 
 even in the last days of July ; and in the beginning, furthermore, 
 forced to rely mainly on her own military resources because it 
 was no longer possible to hope for armed assistance from Italy, 
 and because her ally, Austria, also immediately involved in a war 
 on two fronts, could employ only a part of her forces against 
 Russia, whose army alone was estimated to be numerically equal 
 to the combined forces of the Central Powers, while the French 
 troops available at the very beginning of the war were undoubt- 
 edly not very far inferior in number to the German army. There 
 w^as but one advantage on Germany's side to counterbalance all 
 this: the prospect that the great numerical superiority of her 
 enemies could be effectively developed only after the lapse of 
 more or less time, whereas the rapidity of the German mobiliza- 
 tion was regarded as unparalleled, or at any rate as considerably 
 superior to that of Russia. It was, indeed, as Mr. von Jagow 
 said, a question "of life and death" for Germany, to take advan- 
 tage of this superiority so as to overthrow, perhaps, one opponent 
 before the other could deal a dangerous blow. A delay of only 
 a few weeks meant that the danger of being crushed by superior 
 numbers would become a probability. 
 
 There was, in addition, the following decisive consideration: 
 The Belgian frontier was Germany's Achilles heel, the spot 
 
MODERN GERMANY 543 
 
 where she was exposed to a mortal hurt, since there were prac- 
 tically no obstacles along this front in the way of an army seek- 
 ing to invade the Rhenish industrial districts, which are the cen- 
 tre of strength of Germany at war; there was no ring of for- 
 tresses comparable, for instance, to the northern fortresses of 
 France, to delay the advance of the enemy. The full significance 
 of this situation was naturally appreciated by the French mili- 
 tary authorities, and they were prepared to take advantage of it. 
 Strong French forces — as the German government was reliably 
 informed — stood ready to march along the Belgian section of the 
 Meuse, that is to say, along the Givet-Namur line.^ Even with 
 the best of intentions, the Belgian government could not have 
 prevented France, with her superior numbers, from using Bel- 
 gium as the base for her attack on Germany.^ It is true that on 
 August 1st the French government had assured Belgium that it 
 would respect the latter's neutrality; but at the same time it ex- 
 pressly reserved full liberty of action for itself in the event that 
 Belgium's neutrality should ''not be respected" by another 
 Power.^ What, however, do the words, ''not be respected," sig- 
 nify? They amount to reserving the right of asserting at any 
 time, and of acting on the strength of such assertion, that the 
 fact that a German patrol had by mistake strayed onto Belgian 
 soil, or that a German aviator had flown over some projection of 
 Belgian territory, constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality by 
 Germany. 
 
 1 The correctness of the information which the German government received 
 concerning this is confirmed by: i, numerous statements of reliable witnesses, 
 who testified to the presence of French officers and soldiers on Belgian ter- 
 ritory before the delivery of the German ultimatum to Belgium (these state- 
 ments have been published in America, in Richard Grasshoff's The Tragedv of 
 Belgium, New York, 1915, p. 22 ff) ; 2, the seizure of French mobilization maps 
 of sections of Belgian and Dutch territories, which were tied in packets, and 
 according to the inscriptions, were to be opened only in the event of mobili- 
 zation; 3, the fact that the Belgian government was officially advised by 
 France as early as July 31st of the massing of French troops on the Belgian 
 frontier (see Gray Book, No. 9) ; 4, the fact that on August 3rd, at the very 
 latest, France officially offered the Belgian government the support of five 
 French army corps (see Blue Book, No. 151). 
 
 2 According to the report of April 23, 1912, made by the English Military 
 Attache in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, in the crisis of 191 1 England 
 had intended, with exactly the same justification, to land her troops in Befgium 
 even without the consent of the Belgian government. 
 
 3 The text of the declaration of the French Ambassador reads: "In the event 
 of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French govern- 
 ment, in order to insure its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude" 
 (Gray Book, No. 15). As to the worth of this and a previous English declara- 
 tion bearing on the same matter, see also "Common Sense About the War," 
 by G. Bernard Shaw, in Tlie A'cn' Statesman, November 14, 1914, p. 28: 
 "The apparent moral superiority of the pledge given by France and England 
 to respect Belgian neutrality is illusory in face of the facts that France and 
 England stood to gain enormously, and the Germans to lose correspondingly, 
 by confining the attack on France to the heavily fortified Franco-Gerrhan 
 frontier, and that as France and England knew they would be invited by the 
 Belgians to enter Befgium if the Germans invaded it, the neutrality of Belgium 
 had, as far as they were concerned, no real existence." 
 
544 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 If France had really wished to adhere strictly to the neutrality 
 treaties, she should have said: "We shall respect Belgian neu- 
 trality, until Belgium calls on us or violates her own neutrality." 
 But, as it was w^orded, the French declaration did not in fact 
 offer the slightest security either to the Belgian or to the German 
 government. Nevertheless, it satisfied the Belgian as well as 
 the British government. The French reply was officially known 
 to the German government. But the latter knew more; it 
 knew that on August ist Sir Edward Grey had not only posi- 
 tively refused to pledge England's neutrality in the impends 
 ing war on the basis of Germany's far-reaching concessions, 
 but had also refused for his part to name any definite conditions 
 on which England might engage to remain neutral. In express 
 terms he had declared that a German promise not to violate Bel- 
 gium's neutrality was not sufficient as a condition for England 
 to remain neutral.^ The fundamental difference is very striking 
 between this attitude and that of England in 1870, when she 
 concluded a provisional alliance with each of the belligerents 
 based on the contingency that one of them violate Belgium's 
 neutrality. On the present occasion the violation of Belgium's 
 neutrality was to serve England only as a pretext for war. The 
 German government had, therefore, to reckon with the proba- 
 bility of England's intervention in the war on land and sea.^ 
 That this would entail the attempt to break through into north- 
 west Germany through Belgian territory was practically certain. 
 The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, was perfectly 
 right when, in his report to his government, of December 23, 
 191 1, he wrote concerning the probable development of an An- 
 glo-Franco-German war: '*A British army, landed at Calais 
 and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in 
 order to reach Germany. It would at once force its way into 
 our country from the northwest; that would give it the advan- 
 tage of being able to begin operations immediately. . . ." To 
 guard against this contingency was of vital importance to Ger- 
 many. But the strong military force requisite to cover the Ger- 
 man flank on the lower Rhine would, in the opinion of our op- 
 ponents, have been condemned at the start to inactivity in a 
 merely defensive position along the Belgian frontier; whereas 
 their absence would have at the same time considerably weakened 
 the German offensive in the west. France and England could, 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 123. At the same time this disproves the charge that 
 Germany "would have entered Belgium in any case." 
 
 2 The correspondence of November 22 and 23, 1912, between Sir Edward 
 Grey and Minister Cambon, which had long been known in Berlin, provided for 
 a joint operation of the armies based on the plans of the General Staffs. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 545 
 
 therefore, afford to await the deployment of the tremendous 
 Russian army, and then execute a decisive thrust through Bel- 
 gium. To have refrained from taking the ofFensive and making 
 use of Belgian territory would in itself in all probability have 
 been disastrous for Germany; in view of the added necessity of 
 keeping a large force of troops in readiness on the Belgian fron- 
 tier to prevent a French and English invasion from that quarter, 
 such tactics would have been simply suicidal. 
 
 After carefully considering all these points, no unbiassed 
 judge will deny that Germany was in a position of extreme 
 necessity. But could the violation of the neutralization treaties 
 be justified by this necessity, according to the principles of inter- 
 national law? Most certainly. Agreements can be binding for a 
 state only so long as their observance does not jeopardize the very 
 foundations of its existence. International law can never impose 
 on a state the duty of committing suicide. Such, however, would 
 have been the consequence here. A further observance of the 
 neutralization treaties of 1839 was incompatible with the vital 
 interests of Germany; consequently the treaties ceased to have 
 any binding force for her. This principle has not only been 
 acted upon by statesmen of all times and nations — how else 
 would the breaking of "perpetual" peace treaties by new wars 
 ever have been legally admissible? — but it has also been recog- 
 nized by scholars in Germany, as well as by those in foreign 
 countries which are to-day neutral or hostile.^ It will be neces- 
 sary to quote only a few examples of the many concurrent opin- 
 ions. Thus, in a verdict of the Supreme Court of the United 
 State, Justice Curtis stated in 1908: ". . . while it would be 
 a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute 
 a treaty, the power to do so w^as a prerogative of which no 
 country could be deprived without deeply affecting its inde- 
 pendence." And with especial reference to the German action 
 toward Belgium, even Roosevelt admits in his far from pro- 
 German article in The Outlook (September 23, 1914, page 172) 
 that, "When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, 
 from whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national 
 life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself 
 from death and to perpetuate its life." The Swiss professor of 
 international law, Max Huber, has formulated the guiding prin- 
 ciple in the clearest terms: 
 
 "Just as certain legal obligations cease in common law when 
 
 1 This recalls Gladstone's famous statement concerning the question of the 
 binding force of a guarantee treaty, which Sir Edward Grey quoted in his 
 speech of August 3, 19 14 (Blue Book, p. 93). 
 
546 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 thej^ result in unreasonable restrictions for the contracting party 
 (as, for instance, in cases of self-defense, of extreme necessity, of 
 excessive civil obligations from a legal contract), just so must 
 it be assumed in international law, and in this case with greater 
 justification because of the peculiar nature of a state, that when 
 the fulfillment of a duty is incompatible with the latter's existence, 
 independence, vital interests and moral integrity, this duty becomes 
 null and void, because it cannot be presumed that a state in- 
 tended to bind itself for such a contingency when entering the 
 obligation." ^ In conclusion, we quote the statement of Lawrence, 
 the eminent English professor of international law: "Extreme 
 necessity will justify a temporary violation of neutral terri- 
 tory." - 
 
 Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified in the forum 
 of international law. But to justify her action Germany does 
 not need to have recourse to the plea of extreme necessity, in 
 recognizing the existence of which subjective factors always play 
 a certain part; for long before the German ultimatum was is- 
 sued, the Belgian government had already violated her own neu- 
 trality obligations most seriously to Germany's disadvantage, and 
 thereby herself torn down the barriers raised by the treaty and 
 given Germany the right to defend herself by all means. 
 
 IV 
 
 It is a recognized fact that the neutralization of a state en- 
 tails on it important duties. Its actions are much less free than 
 those of an "accidentally neutral" state — that is to say, a state 
 which does not wish to participate in a given war. What it may 
 do, what it is forbidden and what it is obliged to do is disputed 
 in detail. This much, however, is certain: The permanently 
 neutralized state is obliged to abstain from all action which 
 might possibly result in drawing it into a war waged by others. 
 It may, of course, make war to protect its own neutrality, when 
 this is directly threatened by a third party, but under no circum- 
 stances is it at liberty to participate in an offensive campaign car- 
 ried on by others. Furthermore, it must in times of peace avoid 
 all actions which might possibly, in the event of war, force such 
 participation upon it. No one has formulated these obligations 
 more precisely than the English professor, L. Oppenheim, of 
 Cambridge, in his book on Interriational Law, I, Sec. 95, p. 147: 
 
 "A neutralized state is a state whose independence and integ- 
 
 1 See Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht, Vol. VII, p. 363 ff- 
 
 2 See Principles of International Law, by Thomas Joseph Lawrence, London, 
 1910, p. 609. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 547 
 
 rity are for all the future guaranteed by an International con- 
 vention of the Powers, under the condition that such state binds 
 itself never to take up arms against any other state except for 
 defense against attack, and never to enter into such international 
 obligations as could indirectly drag it into ivar. The reason why 
 a state asks or consents to become neutralized is that it is a weak 
 state and does not want an active part in international politics, 
 being exclusively devoted to peaceable developments of welfare." 
 
 Accordingly, the permanently neutralized state of Belgium 
 should not have engaged in any autonomous policy (Machtpo- 
 litik) ; even the acquisition of the large Congo Colony was, from 
 this point of view, open to question, because it changed the whole 
 basis of the Belgian state and involved it in difficult political 
 problems. In any case, it should not have become a party to an 
 aggressive political combination. In doing so it grossly violated 
 its special obligations and gave to all the guarantors of its perma- 
 nent neutrality (including the German Empire) the right to in- 
 terfere in any manner, even by war, if that should be necessary 
 in view of their menaced interests. 
 
 The Belgian government, nevertheless, did violate these obli- 
 gations. Numerous discoveries, especially in the Brussels ar- 
 chives, placed material in the hands of the German government 
 which furnished documentary proof of an understanding between 
 the Belgian and British governments, plainly not in conformity 
 with Belgium's duty to preserve permanent neutrality. The 
 evidence, it is true — as is easy to understand — is not yet com- 
 plete. It is clear that those negotiations had to be carried on 
 with the strictest secrecy, since cognizance of them would have 
 called forth an immediate protest on the part of Germany. 
 Therefore, even in its hurried flight from Brussels, the Belgian 
 governm.ent had to find time to destroy the most compromising 
 documents, or to carry them off. It is also possible that there 
 was not very much written material in existence; at any rate, 
 it is in conformity with English methods of recent years, when 
 putting important political agreements into writing, to do so in 
 the vaguest possible form. Grey was doubtless quite aware, with- 
 out the example set by Napoleon III and Cavour, that an attack 
 against a third state may also be arranged by word of mouth. 
 In regard to the question of military cooperation, however, a 
 written agreement could hardly be dispensed with, and in this 
 respect the material discovered is by far the most voluminous; a 
 comprehensive examination leaves no room for doubt on any 
 legally important point.^ 
 
 ^ The most important documents have been collected in the publication, 
 
548 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 About the middle of January, 1906, military arrangements 
 were undertaken (on English initiative!) between the British 
 Military Attache in Brussels, Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, and 
 the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarne, 
 which regulated in every detail a cooperation of the British and 
 Belgian forces in case of war. They covered all such matters as 
 the number of troops to be used by both sides; the transporta- 
 tion of the British forces oversea; the places of disembarkation 
 and the provisioning base; the participation of the British army 
 in the advantages provided in the Belgian regulations concerning 
 military requisitions in war; arrangements for the providing of 
 interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, and spe- 
 cial copies of some of the Belgian army regulations which were 
 to be translated into English, etc.^ Of special interest was the 
 fact that the British troops, which were to be landed in Bou- 
 logne, Calais and Cherbourg — that is to say, on French territory 
 — were to be transported by means of Belgian rolling-stock. The 
 participation of France was, therefore, provided for from the 
 very first. A much later document — ^viz., a record of an inter- 
 view between the British Military Attache, Lieut.-Colonel 
 Bridges, and the head of the Belgian General Staff, General 
 Jungbluth, on April 23, 19 12 ^ — proves the continuation of the 
 military agreement; the only change made was that the number 
 of men in the British landing corps had been somewhat in- 
 creased. In a very extensive report, dated December 23, 191 1, 
 which also fell into German hands, the Belgian Minister at 
 Berlin, Baron Greindl, warned his government in vain against 
 tying itself to one side of the great European combinations of 
 Powers — viz., the Entente cordiale — and pointed out that it was 
 placing itself practically at the mercy of this combination, al- 
 though a menace to Belgian neutrality and independence was 
 just as likely to come from that side as from Germany.^ He 
 writes: *'The idea of an enveloping movement from the north 
 
 Die belgische Neutralitdt, Berlin, 19 14. See also The Case of Belgium, by Dr. 
 Bernard Dernburg, New York, jgiS- 
 
 1 According to his own statement. General Ducarne "insisted as emphatically 
 as possible" on certain demands, which 4isproves the English claim of the 
 "academic" character of the conversations. Certainly Lieutenant-Colonel Bar- 
 nardiston's statement would seem to prove that the British Ambassador and 
 General Staflf must have been aware of the true nature of the "conversations." 
 In further proof it is well to recall that the cover of General Ducarne's report 
 bears the inscription, "Conventions anglo-belges." 
 
 2 The correctness of the date has not been disputed by the Belgians. 
 
 ^ 3 That Baron Greindl did not refer here to a tmerely hypothetical "assump- 
 tion," as M. Waxweiler apparently would fiave one believe {Belgium: Neutral 
 and Loyal, American Edition, p. 191), but ^to a very^ area! danger, is proved by 
 his reference to the "disclosures of Colonel Barnardiston, which are just as 
 perfidious as they are naive"; to the "hue and cry in Paris and London" over 
 the fortification of Flushing, and to the disclosures of Captain Faber. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 549 
 
 (I.e., against Germany) is without doubt one of the combina- 
 tions of the Entente cordiale/' The Belgian government con- 
 tinued the military understanding with England, without at- 
 tempting to make any similar overtures to Germany. It had 
 simply chosen between the two groups of European Powers, 
 and England took good care that Belgium should not fail her 
 in the great undertaking she had in view. 
 
 The following is of especial importance in this connection: 
 In the fall of the year 19 14, German troops came into possession 
 of secret military manuals concerning Belgian roads and rivers 
 ("Belgium Road and River Reports, prepared by the General 
 Staff, War Office"), which were published by the British General 
 Staff. There are four volumes, of which Volume I had been 
 printed as early as 1912, Volume II in 1913, Volume III (in 
 two parts) and Volume IV in 19 14. These manuals contain the 
 most minute description of the country based on military inves- 
 tigations. Matters of military importance are specially indicated. 
 These volumes contain detailed information concerning the net- 
 work of roads as regards gradients, bridges, crossings, telephone 
 and telegraph offices, railway stations (giving the length of plat- 
 forms, barriers, local railways, petroleum tanks, etc.). In the 
 description of towns and villages the manuals always state 
 whether all, or part of the inhabitants, speak French. With the 
 same accuracy the whole course of the Scheldt is described, with 
 all its tributaries, depths, breadths, bridges, supply of boats, etc. 
 There is added: I. A survey of billeting facilities arranged ac- 
 cording to communities and villages, with the number of sol- 
 diers who can be quartered in each, the means of transportation 
 on hand, and all the other details useful to the commandant of 
 a place. 11. A collection of important hints for aviators cover- 
 ing the part of Belgium south of the Charleroi-Namur-Liege 
 line, and also the vicinity of Brussels. No less than 125 "possi- 
 ble" landing-places are accurately described, and it is significant 
 that a considerable number of these are in the immediate vicinity 
 of the Liege forts.^ 
 
 Remarks at the head of the various chapters show that the 
 material for the manuals was obtained by means of special in- 
 vestigations made between 1909 and July, 1914. Any one who 
 carefully peruses one of these manuals will concur in the opinion 
 of the German expert that "without the willing and unreserved 
 support of the Belgian government and military authorities 
 
 ^ The following is an illustration from the manual, No. 91: "Five miles out 
 on the east of the Aywaille road, and just north of the Fort d'Embourg, a 
 very good covered landing place on grass could be prepared by the removal 
 of wire fences. It is completely covered from the south by the Fort." 
 
550 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 such a task could not have been accomplished. . . . The quarter- 
 ing lists, which treat Belgium as if it were English soil, can only 
 have been provided by the Belgian government. Without doubt, 
 official Belgian material was used for this purpose. It was 
 adapted for English use, or in many instances simply translated 
 into English." ^ After what is known of the detailed Anglo-Bel- 
 gian negotiations of 1906, this can scarcely come as a surprise. 
 These secret English military manuals prove perhaps more strik- 
 ingly than anything else that in military matters Belgium had 
 surrendered unconditionally to the English. 
 
 Considering how matters stood, it is not surprising that in 
 the offices of the British headquarters for espionage in Brussels 
 a whole packet of blank requisition forms was found, on which 
 the British Embassy in Brussels had certified, with the imprint 
 of its official seal, that the English spy. Dale Long, resident in 
 Belgium, was a member of the British General StafiE, and was 
 authorized to make requisitions in Belgium. Nor was it sur- 
 prising to find in the possession of Grant-Watson, the British 
 Secretary of Legation in Brussels, on his arrest, documents dated 
 191 3 and 19 1 4, containing information of the most intimate 
 kind concerning the Belgian mobilization, and the defense of 
 Antwerp, and even a handwritten memorandum on a report of 
 the Belgian Gendarmery relative to the French mobilization 
 measures of July 27th. ^ Of still more peculiar interest was the 
 news given by an unsuspecting English lady, in a letter dated 
 July 30, 191 4, to a German acquaintance: **My son has left 
 us to-day in order to join Sir John French's Staff in Belgium" 
 (cf. Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, April, 1915, p. 96). 
 
 In the face of the overwhelming amount of evidence, the exist- 
 ence of the military arrangements between England and Belgium * 
 
 1 M. Waxweiler attempts {Belgium: Neutral and Loyal, American Edition, 
 p. 198) to minimize the significance of these embarrassing manuals by tracing 
 them back to espionage. While it would have been possible to obtain many 
 of the single points of information by successful espionage, the overwhelming 
 amount of material prepared, collected and elaborated in the manuals unques- 
 tionably proves the correctness of the German contentions. 
 
 2 Among these papers were orders, issued in the form of a circular, to the 
 higher Belgian commanders, with the fac simile signature of the Belgian Min- 
 ister of War and of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff; and a record of 
 a meeting of the "Commission for the Provisioning Base of Antwerp," held 
 on May 27, 1913. 
 
 ^ Less detailed information is available at the present time in relation to 
 the corresponding agreement between Belgium and France, but that there was 
 an agreement is evident from the existence of the pact with England which 
 is contingent on it. Besides the detailed information already given, the fol- 
 lowing points are worthy of note: i, the inspection of the Belgian fortresses 
 on the Meuse by the French Minister of War, General Picquart, and officers 
 of the French General Staff in 19 13, which was openly mentioned in Belgian 
 newspapers (see Nelte, Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, Vol. VIII, p. 749) ; 2, the 
 fact that several French cavalry regiments were instructed to concentrate on 
 Belgian territory in case of mobilization, which was known to the Belgian 
 General Staff as late as 19 13 (see Josson, Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van 
 
MODERN GERMANY 551 
 
 has been only partly, and then but feebly, disputed by the Eng- 
 lish and Belgians, some of whom ascribed to them a purely 
 ''academic" character. Others attempt to vindicate them by 
 asserting that the arrangements were of a purely defensive na- 
 ture, solely intended for the protection of Belgium against the 
 anticipated German attack. This plea appears to have made an 
 impression on many fair-minded people in neutral countries, 
 especially in Switzerland ; and yet, in face of the above-mentioned 
 facts, it seems almost grotesque, if the spirit and not merely the 
 letter of the neutrality treaties is taken into consideration. 
 Theoretically speaking, it is perfectly correct that a permanently 
 neutral state also may enter into an alliance for the sole purpose 
 of its own defense. But in the case under discussion was it in 
 reality such an alliance? If a small or secondary state, on the 
 basis of an agreement with a Great Power that stands in allied 
 relationship to another Great Power (a neighbor of the secondary 
 state), gives its ally such exact information concerning all its 
 military forces, resources, places of defense — in short, concern- 
 ing everything of military importance in its own territory — • 
 then the first Great Power is actually placed in the position of 
 military dictatorship over the secondary state. The secondary 
 state is no longer in a position successfully to oppose the Great 
 Power, and the far stronger Great Power can at any time 
 threaten it with certain destruction and use it, with or without 
 its consent, as a base of attack against its own opponents. 
 
 The name and purpose officially given to such agreements cease 
 to be of great consequence. The secondary state has practically 
 surrendered its liberty of action, and the Great Power is free to 
 use it for any plans of aggression it may cherish. The smaller 
 state is an accurately appraised factor to be made use of in the 
 military calculations of the Great Power; it is, in fact, no more 
 than its 'Vassal." The Great Power may declare over and over 
 again that only in the event of an "attack" on the smaller ally 
 will it enter the latter's territory; in war such an attack can 
 always be claimed to have been made. Besides, English history 
 teaches us that when British interests are threatened, and espe- 
 cially in the case of a life-and-death struggle of the country, irk- 
 some treaties and stipulations of international law are for Eng- 
 land worth only the paper they are written on — her action 
 
 Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), Breda, 1913, p. 860); 3, the sworn state- 
 ments of French prisoners that strong forces of French troops (among them 
 the following regiments: the 5th, 21st, 28th and 30th dragoons; the 3rd and 
 6th cuirassiers; the 3rd and 8th hussars; and a part of the 40th Field Artillery 
 Regiment) had entered Belgium before the presentation of the Germani 
 ultimatum and had been hospitably received there (see Grasshoff, The Tragedy of 
 Belgium, p. 23 ff.). 
 
552 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 against Malta, Denmark, Egypt and the Boer Republics, as well 
 as her newest "legal" maxims of naval warfare, speak plainly- 
 enough. How England had decided to proceed, especially in 
 regard to Belgium, is shown by the statements made by the 
 British Military Attache Bridges to the Belgian General Jung- 
 bluth, in the above-mentioned interview of April 23, 1912, ac- 
 cording to which the British government ''during recent events" 
 (the crisis of 191 1) had resolved on landing forces in Belgium, 
 even if the latter failed to call for assistance; and in reply to 
 Jungbluth's objection, that to such action Belgium's consent 
 would have been necessary, Bridges stated that he was aware of 
 this; but that as Belgium was not in a position to prevent the 
 Germans from marching through, England would have landed 
 her troops in Belgium in any event.^ In reply to this, Jungbluth 
 merely stated that Belgium was perfectly well able to prevent 
 the passage of the Germans. The Belgian government did not 
 direct any official question to London concerning this point (at 
 least not according to Mr. Waxweiler's account) ; but a year 
 subsequent to this. Sir Edward Grey, apparently half-spon- 
 taneously, gave a reassuring explanation, which he confirmed in 
 a letter dated April 7, 191 3." Asquith and Grey also declared 
 in Parliament in 19 13 and 19 14 that there were, in the event of 
 the outbreak of a war between European Powers, no unpub- 
 lished agreements which would tie the hands of or restrict the 
 government, or Parliament, in their decision whether Great 
 Britain should participate in the war or not. This declaration 
 may have pacified all who were ignorant of the correspondence 
 between Grey and Cambon in November, 19 12, with its refer- 
 ence to the plans of the General Staff of the two countries. 
 
 The conception of a defensive alliance certainly does not re- 
 quire such military Intimacy as the Anglo-Belgian : Austria and 
 Italy, although united by the defensive alliance of the Dreibund, 
 had not given one another such extensive military information. 
 Belgium was, however, according to international law. In duty 
 bound to observe an attitude of reserve toward the Entente cor- 
 diale. An ordinary state may, at Its own risk, join a Great 
 Power or group of Great Powers, even in the most intimate 
 
 1 ". . . L'Angleterre aurait debarque ses troupes en Belgique en tout etat de 
 cause." Whether Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges was officially authorized to make 
 these statements is of no importance; of decisive importance, however, is his 
 official knowledge of British intentions — intentions which were confirmed by 
 the disclosures of Captain Faber and of Field Marshal Lord Roberts. 
 
 -This letter is printed in M. Waxweiler's book, Belgium: Neutral and Loyal 
 p. 196 ff. The salient point is Sir Edward Grey's statement: "I said that I 
 was sure that this government would not be the first to violate the neutrality 
 of Belgium and I did not believe that any British government would be the 
 first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 553 
 
 manner; but for the permanently neutralized state to do so 
 would be an abuse of its duties, according to international law. 
 Would a statesman of Switzerland, which is really neutral, 
 seriously contend to-day that Belgium had done her duty to- 
 ward Germany before the war " d' observer cette nieme neutralite 
 envers tons les autres Etatsf What would England and France 
 have said to a similar Belgo-German "military intimacy"? 
 
 It is not true that Germany "would have marched through 
 Belgium in any case," and that as a result the one-sided and in 
 its effect practically unconditional adherence to the Entente cor- 
 diale ofFered Belgium the only possible means of salvation and 
 security: the English Blue Book itself proves conclusively that 
 Germany arrived at a final decision only after Grey had refused 
 to give an assurance as to England's neutrality in the coming 
 war, even in the event that Germany should bind herself to 
 respect Belgium's neutrality.^ 
 
 It is impossible that the Belgian government should have de- 
 ceived itself as to the fact that it had joined forces with an ag- 
 gressive group of Powers; for, through the Entente cordiale, 
 England was drawn into the sphere of influence of the policy 
 of revenge, which had never been abandoned by France; whereas, 
 on the other hand, Germany was without ambitions in Europe, 
 and was at the same time in the way of satisfying her require- 
 ments for future colonial expansion by means of friendly agree- 
 ments with England. 
 
 The attitude (not yet known in all its details) of the Belgian 
 government before the war, is perhaps politically and psycho- 
 logically comprehensible, nor is this the place for moral dialec- 
 tics; but what cannot be maintained is that Belgium scrupulously 
 fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the law of nations, 
 and that in the face of this the German invasion was a dis- 
 graceful breach of international law. Where are the confiden- 
 tial negotiations and agreements between Belgium and Germany 
 which correspond to those between Belgium and England ? If this 
 entire problem, which is preeminently of a political nature, is meas- 
 
 ^ A careful study of the course of the negotiations makes it difficult to avoid 
 the impression that, from about July 31st on, Sir Edward Grey deliberately 
 tried to provoke Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality, in order to have 
 to present to the world a morally effective pretext for the war. That the 
 violation of Belgium's neutrality was not the deciding factor for the leading 
 men of England is proved: i, by Sir Edward Grey's promise to France on 
 August 2; 2, by Mr. Bonar Law's open letter of the same date, in which he 
 demanded that England go to the assistance of France and Russia, and did 
 not even mention Belgium; 3, by the open statements of the English labor 
 leader, J. Ramsay MacDonald, among others, that if France had similarly 
 violated Belgium's neutrality, England would never have drawn the sword; 4, 
 by the surprisingly frank statements of the London Times and of Lord 
 Haldane. 
 
554 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ured by the standards of international law, it is clear that it was 
 Belgium herself, who, from within, broke down the protecting 
 rampart which treaty and international law had erected around 
 her territory — leaving only a ''paper" wall standing — and re- 
 placed it by military agreements with one of the two groups of 
 the European Great Powers. In this way, Belgium had herself 
 cleared the way for a policy of selfish interest. Belgium's atti- 
 tude necessarily strengthened the position of the Entente cor- 
 diale, both from a military and political point of view ; and Ger- 
 many, as the enemy of the coalition, could, in the event of war, 
 regard the matter only from a practical point of view, and 
 ask herself whether she should leave a sure advantage in the 
 hands of her enemies to make use of at their discretion, or at- 
 tempt to wrest Belgium from the hostile combination by pacific 
 or forcible means. 
 
 The question, however, is asked by many: Did Germany, in 
 the early part of August, 19 14, know of the secret agreements 
 between Belgium and England? From a legal point of view, 
 this is not the decisive point; juristically, the important consid- 
 eration is rather the objective state of affairs. The crucial point 
 is whether Belgium could in truth still claim consistently to have 
 fulfilled her obligations of neutrality towards Germany. The 
 German Imperial Chancellor meanwhile replied in the Reichs- 
 tag on December 2, 1914: 
 
 "At that time there were already many indications of the 
 guilt of the Belgian government. Positive written proofs were 
 not then at my disposal. . . ." 
 
 As the remarks of the Military Attache Bridges had in part 
 come to the knowledge of a number of people, and as Belgium 
 was (according to Waxweiler, on p. 200) "the chosen land for 
 spies of every nationality," it may be taken for granted, even 
 without the statement of the Imperial Chancellor, that it was out 
 of the question for the German government to have been in 
 complete ignorance. The German government knew of an 
 impending French advance along the Belgian frontier — the Ger- 
 man ultimatum to Belgium refers to this — and it also knew, 
 without doubt, that Belgium had not deemed it necessary to 
 adopt adequate military precautions against such an advance; in- 
 deed, this has not been seriously contended by the Belgians. 
 How differently in comparison did Switzerland act after the 
 outbreak of the war! 
 
 But apparently Germany still hoped, by means of speedy ac- 
 tion, to be able to prevent Belgium from taking an active part in 
 the war, and did not, therefore, on account of the country*s 
 
MODERN GERMANY 555 
 
 understanding with the Entente cordiale, treat it from the be- 
 ginning as the ally of the latter; on the contrary, the effort was 
 first made, by asking merely for free passage of German troops, 
 in a sense simply to crowd Belgium aside. 
 
 Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified from the 
 point of view of international law, also for the reason that Bel- 
 gium had previously violated her obligations of neutrality in a 
 way menacing to Germany and favoring the Entente cordiale. 
 
 Least of all are those entitled to inveigh against Germany for 
 breaking the law of nations whose mischievous plans were 
 thwarted by the rapidity of Germany's action; to them apply 
 Hamlet's words: 
 
 "For 'tis the sport, to have the engineer 
 Hoist with his own petard." 
 
BOOK V 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR 
 
CHAPTER I 
 KULTUR POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM 
 
 PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 BERLIN 
 
 "Nur eine auch nach aussen hin starke Nation bewahrt den 
 Geist in sich, aus dem auch alle Segnungen im Innern stromen." ^ 
 
 W. VON Humboldt. 
 
 THE Germans are a brave people, a faithful people and a 
 stupid people, so that they need harsh proofs. ... I am 
 reminded of what I once heard a genial and humane Irish officer 
 say concerning a proposal to treat with the leaders of a Zulu 
 rebellion : 'Kill them all,' he said, 'it's the only thing they un- 
 derstand.' " 
 
 Thus writes an Oxford professor, who bears the memorable 
 name of Walter Raleigh, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets en- 
 titled "Might is Right." That is — so he asserts, and thousands 
 of his countrymen reecho this assertion all over the world — 
 the accursed motto of the Germans, as it was likewise 
 the principle of the buffaloes in North America, until the hunt- 
 ers came and shot them down. The Times calls us hostes generis 
 humani (enemies of humankind). No pope has ever pronounced 
 more terrible anathemas against heretics than England, cultured 
 England, has against us. We ask indignantly why our oppo- 
 nents are not content to send the huge armies and fleets of four 
 Great Powers and the levies of almost all races against us and 
 our allies and to fight out this war of great political and national 
 interests in the manner of other similar wars in the w^orld's his- 
 tory? But if England had her way, we should be outlawed by 
 the whole civilized world, and every German who now helps to 
 defend his home and country would see the eyes of his fellow 
 creatures bent upon him in reproof and contempt, because his 
 nation has committed a crime against mankind. From the depths 
 of the hatred against us, from the cold cruelty, that, dagger-like, 
 thrusts at our entrails, we draw the conclusion that our enemies 
 wish to crush us politically to the utmost conceivable degree. 
 And from that again do we draw the further conclusion that we 
 
 ^ "Only an outwardly strong nation retains that spirit from which all inner 
 blessings flow." 
 
 559 
 
56o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 must exert the last remnant of our strength to maintain our 
 existence as a nation. Our power of resistance will become 
 stronger — a fact which our enemies seem to overlook — not 
 weaker, at the sight of their hate-distorted faces. But we can 
 step before the judgment-seat of mankind, to which they appeal, 
 with a clear conscience. While our conscience, at all times, 
 must be our chief and most severe judge, we know very well that 
 there is also a verdict of history, before whose tribunal we have 
 to justify our actions. It will be pronounced when the passions 
 of this struggle have died away. Only future generations, not 
 our contemporaries, can pronounce it. Nor do we acknowledge 
 our neutral contemporaries, to whom this book is addressed, as 
 our judges in the strict sense of the word, because they also are 
 swayed by sympathies and antipathies, and have not as yet the 
 freedom of mind necessary to pass an historical judgment. They 
 are, however, before all others, fitted to prepare the way for an 
 impartial verdict. We do not beg, we demand and claim as our 
 due from them, a fair hearing of our cause, and the will to con- 
 sider and to understand our reasons. 
 
 There is a desire to designate this war as a war of Kultur, 
 nay, even as a religious war.^ Ideas are to be combated. The 
 "spirit" of our Kultur, our politics, and our militarism is con- 
 jured up, and the wildest and strangest invectives are hurled 
 against it. Not alone our leading statesmen are made responsi- 
 ble. It is plain that the entire German nation is firm as a rock 
 in their support, and from this fact the conclusion is drawn that 
 the poison of a false doctrine, hostile to civilization, has spread 
 through the veins of our people and infected them. Our entire 
 modern history is searched for the cause of this, to prove to the 
 world that amongst all the other highly respectable and innocent 
 nations there is one which is a criminal and a sinner. Let us 
 hear these accusations, as far as possible, in the words of the 
 accusers. 
 
 There are, or rather there were, two Germanics, a good one 
 and a bad one.^ The good Germany was the Germany of Goethe 
 and Kant, who was the apostle of eternal peace, and this good 
 Germany had become great without the protection of might. 
 The bad Germany, on the other hand, emanated from the con- 
 queror state of Frederick the Great. Power was his aim, force 
 and cunning were his aids, and treaties were respected by him 
 only so long as they served his purposes. (How deplorable was 
 
 * See The Prussian Hath Said in His Heart, by Cecil Chesterton, pamphlet, 
 London, I9i5> P- 5- 
 
 2 See Britain's Case Against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, Chapter III, "The 
 Two Germanics." 
 
MODERN GERMANY 561 
 
 it, then, must the believer in this theory immediately interpose, 
 that the England of the elder Pitt made an alliance with Fred- 
 erick and utilized his victories in order to conquer Canada.) 
 The chasm between the two Germanics, it is said, had already 
 begun to be bridged by the Prussia of 181 3, which strove for 
 nobler ends than mere power. But the reactionary period after 
 1 81 5 reopened it. The ideals of intellectual Germany had been 
 maintained by the cosmopolitan professors, who did not regard 
 the end and aim of the state as one of power, but as one of right 
 and liberty. Their cultural standard, it is claimed, was higher than 
 that of the state of to-day, which aims only at power, and 
 which has asserted itself, thanks to Bismarck's work and Treit- 
 schke's teachings. 
 
 This present-ray state is ruled by the all-governing doctrine, 
 that the state is power, that nothing is of such value in life as 
 the state, that it is therefore justified in using every means to 
 secure its power, and that war is a moral necessity. These teach- 
 ings of Treitschke, with their "colossal immorality," ^ had poi- 
 soned the soul of the German people. The other poisoner of the 
 nation was Nietzsche, who had, it is true, not preached state- 
 worship, but the w^orship of might." Under the influence of 
 these two men, the notorious book of General von Bernhardi 
 was written, which demanded the cynical war of aggression 
 against England. He and his countrymen were intoxicated with 
 the idea of establishing a world dominion, and at the same time 
 of forcing German Kultur upon the rest of mankind by the 
 sword, as Mohammed had once tried to do. But what was this 
 German Kultur to-day, and what conception did the Germans 
 have of civilization at all at present? Almost all Germans be- 
 lieved that their civilization had reached the highest point ever 
 attained by mankind, that they had nothing to learn from other 
 nations, but could teach them everything.^ They had in mind 
 only that exclusive Kultur which had developed in the limited 
 sphere of one nation and was maintained by the sword. Kultur 
 was, however, a matter of intellect; it grew by means of intel- 
 lect, and was defended by it. Kultur, when associated with 
 might, ceased to be Kultur, and became might, pure and simple.* 
 Experience taught, so Bishop Welldon declared at a teachers' 
 congress in London, that when Germans had employed the word 
 Kultur during recent years, it did not signify science, education, 
 
 1 See Treitschke and the Great War, by Joseph McCabe, p. 287. 
 
 2 Besides the above-quoted works, see also Nietzsche and Treitschke, by 
 Ernest Barker, Oxford Pamphlets. 
 
 ^Britain's Case Against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, p. 132. 
 
 * Nietzsche and Treitschke, by Barker, Oxford Pamphlets, p. 27. 
 
562 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 art, and literature — or at least only in a secondary sense.^ "Ger- 
 man KultUr is organized efficiency on the largest scale." The 
 immediate result was state-worship, for the state, and the state 
 alone, was the organ of "national efficiency." The individual 
 actually sacrificed all he had and all he was worth to the state; 
 his highest duty was self-sacrifice for the state. Thus it came 
 about, strangely enough, that education in Germany was valued 
 not from the ethical, but from the material and physical point of 
 view, not as a means of civilization, refinement and sympathy, 
 but as a means of conquest. 
 
 Without doubt, if this picture of modern politics and civiliza- 
 tion were correct, the whole world ought to rise in flaming in- 
 dignation, and help the English, French and Russians to quell 
 the spirit of barbarism that is menacing it. But strange remi- 
 niscences arise when we contemplate the various colors of this 
 picture and the palette from which they were taken. "Effi- 
 ciency" is a favorite word of the English; it is a product of 
 English soil. The following has not been said by a German, but 
 by a Swede: 
 
 "The profound moral aphorism: 'Nothing succeeds like suc- 
 cess' ... is held in reverence by the English from the peer 
 down to the longshoreman. Wealth and social power are the 
 objects of the success to which it refers. . . . For higher cul- 
 tural attainments, such as esthetics, science, philosophy, and non- 
 conventional moral talents, English democracy does not show 
 the slightest appreciation. Fresh acquisitions in the sphere of 
 psychic life do not, generally speaking, pertain to the success 
 which succeeds in the England of to-day." ^ 
 
 And what Bishop Welldon says of the material and physical 
 character of our education must be met with a smile. "The 
 simplicity of the English soul," says Steffen, "is equivalent in 
 far too high a degree to a devotion to coarse, material work, 
 purely physical activity, athletic feats, and recklessness." ^ We 
 are of the opinion that other features of the portrait drawn fit 
 us less than they fit the English. The narrow-minded and arro- 
 gant belief In the unsurpassable excellence of their own Kultur, 
 whose function it is to teach, not to learn, is more prevalent and 
 longer established amongst the English than with us; we shall 
 show that an unscrupulous policy of power has existed in Eng- 
 land for centuries in practice, if not in theory. Some portraits 
 by subjective painters are really self-portraits, and therefore we 
 
 1 The London Times of January 5, iQiS- 
 
 'England als Weltmacht und Kulturstaat, by G. F. Steffen, 1902, I, 59- 
 
 8 Ibid.. 11, 182. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 563 
 
 say also in the words of Goethe of the picture presented of us at 
 this time: "Thou'rt like the spirit thou comprehendest, not like 
 me I" 
 
 We shall resist the temptation to return like for like. We 
 cannot, however, refrain from pointing out some unpleasant 
 traits of English character. They are manifest enough, yet the 
 task of understanding the entire Kultur of a foreign people cor- 
 rectly, and of classifying the profusion of forces and tendencies 
 existing in it, is in itself a most difficult task — almost impossi- 
 ble while enmity and passion prevail and find expression in a 
 life-and-death struggle like the one raging at present. But we 
 have every right to an attentive hearing when we defend our- 
 selves against the distortions and misrepresentations of our opin- 
 ions and ideals. We are said to have conceptions as to the rela- 
 tions of Kultur, state and policy of power which are inhuman. 
 Let us explain what the true state of affairs is with us. We will 
 cite those opinions held by the best men of our nation and which, 
 we believe, also enjoy the widest circulation among our educated 
 classes. Extreme and radical views are no more lacking amongst 
 us than in other nations. We do not wish to ignore them here, 
 but we shall put them in their proper place and reduce their 
 importance to the proper measure. 
 
 This must be done first of all with regard to the three men 
 who are alleged to be the chief teachers and representatives of 
 the modern German spirit: Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bern- 
 hardi. Their influence among us is now being exaggerated 
 abroad to a ludicrous degree. We do, indeed, venerate in 
 Treitschke the great, pure and powerful man whose personal 
 integrity even our adversaries dare not doubt, the ardent Ger- 
 man patriot, the divinely inspired artist, who, with deep love and 
 in glowing colors, conjures up before our eyes the men and con- 
 ditions of our past. But we have never been blind to his one- 
 sidedness and impetuosity. Our modern German historical writ- 
 ers follow in Ranke's footsteps, not in Treitschke's. They 
 share, it is true, Treitschke's strong interest in the historico- 
 political problems of the recent past, but consciously strive for 
 Ranke's impartiality and objectivity towards other nations, and 
 they correct at every step the misrepresentations and exaggerations 
 in Treitschke's historical pictures. How differently do we, for 
 instance, regard to-day the Confederation of the Rhine, South 
 German Liberalism, and Frederick William III of Prussia, whom 
 Treitschke eulogized. It is just as great a mistake to character- 
 ize his political doctrines as domineering in essence. Correctly 
 
564 - MODERN GERMANY 
 
 understood, they are not in the least brutal/ They are, indeed, 
 often blunt and one-sided. For the rest, they originated in a 
 period which we have already outgrown. His judgment was 
 moulded in the experiences attendant upon our achievement of 
 national union and he sought to discover, above all, what advanced 
 or hampered this union. Our political judgment of to-day is in 
 many respects more liberal and milder. 
 
 Nietzsche, who did not feel himself to be a German but a 
 European, has influenced not only Germany, but the whole of 
 Europe, and has been received here as well as there with both 
 enthusiastic applause and pronounced opposition. The opponents 
 of Nietzsche's ethics in Germany are much more numerous and 
 influential than the adherents. The tree he planted has borne 
 both good and evil fruit. He has seduced unstable and weak 
 characters to megalomania and moral anarchy, but he has also 
 strengthened the power of moral judgment by his pitiless criti- 
 cism of all conventional sanctimoniousness. This may render 
 him worthy of hatred by those modern Englishmen who cul- 
 tivate the ideal of virtue of the outwardly correct Pharisee. 
 
 General von Bernhardi cannot be mentioned in the same 
 breath with Treitschke and Nietzsche. Neither intellectually nor 
 in influence does he approach them. He is a distinguished writer 
 on military matters, who thought it his duty to enlighten the 
 German nation concerning its position and its task among the 
 World Powers, and concerning the dangers with which Eng- 
 land's envy and ill-will threatened it. He has together with this 
 expounded various teachings on war of which w^e do not ap- 
 prove, but which need not be taken amiss from a frank and 
 straightforward soldier. We in Germ.any were highly aston- 
 ished when we heard that his book, that is as yet little known 
 among us, was held abroad to be the classical expression of our 
 views. Just as little is it permissible to see in it the convictions 
 of our leading statesmen. He shows his own dissatisfaction with 
 the latter plainly enough. The tremendous edition of the Eng- 
 lish translation now in circulation in America is a dishonest 
 means of exciting animosity against us. We vigorously pro- 
 test against the attempt to make the German government and 
 the German people responsible for the opinion of this general. 
 ''There are militarists and jingoes in every country," says Gil- 
 bert Murray, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets.^ "Our own have 
 often been bad enough." We shall hear of them again. 
 
 Let us now investigate the reproaches made against our ideals 
 
 ^ That is shown in the sober essay by Arthur T. Hadley on "The Political 
 Teachings of Treitschke," in the Yale Review of January, 19 15. 
 ^ How Can War Ever Be Right f p. 18. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 565 
 
 of Kultur and state. It is said that we overrate the importance 
 for Kultur of the state, and particularly the importance of the 
 great and powerful state. We overlook the fact that the civiliza- 
 tion of Athens and Florence was far superior to that of the more 
 powerful nations with which they were in touch politically. We do 
 not overlook this fact by any means. Our science strives eagerly 
 to illustrate the wonderful intellectual power and the high state 
 of civilization of these municipalities, and our German travellers 
 study the beauty of Greek and Florentine art perhaps with more 
 earnestness and devotion than the herds of English tourists who 
 are driven through the museums by their guides and who disturb 
 the reverential silence. But can the Kultur of these city-states 
 be understood at all without the strong political impulses that 
 animated them ? Did not Athens at the time of Pericles pursue 
 an imperialistic policy, and is it an accident that Machiavelli was 
 a Florentine and a contemporary of Leonardo? The heads of 
 Bramante in the Brera in Milan and of Castagno in Florence 
 illustrate the ideal of virtu w^hich Machiavelli set up — the ideal 
 of political and martial heroism. The various expressions of life 
 of the cultural and the civic community must not be regarded 
 separately ; they exist under a perpetual interchange of reciprocal 
 influence, the full extent of which can be divined by its various 
 symptoms rather than clearly recognized. It is true that the Ger- 
 many of the eighteenth century is a remarkable instance of the 
 development of a high national culture in a nation politically 
 powerless, rent by strife and on the whole a stranger to state- 
 craft. That is the example of which we are now con- 
 tinually reminded by our enemies, to bring home to us that 
 we would do better to seek our greatness in intellect rather 
 than in power. But do they by any chance set us a good ex- 
 ample? Are they ready to sacrifice even an iota of their power 
 and unity to serve Kultur f They desire to retain the one just 
 as much as the other, and we do not think any the worse of them 
 for it, for they may be justly proud of their national Kultur, 
 which has blossomed in the storms of mighty struggles. Through 
 Shakespeare's historical dramas sweeps the wind that dispersed 
 the Armada, and the century of Louis XIV, which brought such 
 bitter misery to our people, gave to French intellect its incom- 
 parable clearness, elegance, and suppleness, and moreover the 
 sovereign courage to dictate to the world not only the laws of 
 taste, but also the laws of the state and civic society in the 
 ''declaration of human and civic rights." We have, it is true, 
 like England, refused to acknowledge the universal validity of 
 these French laws for civilization and politics, but we are not 
 
566 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 blind to the greatness of these national conceptions. And it Is 
 quite clear to us that England, as well as France, by the early 
 foundation of their national and political union and power, have 
 created a firm basis for their civilization that has given to them, 
 and furthered, their aristocratic assurance, steadiness, self-reli- 
 ance and perfection of form. To-day we are painfully aware of 
 these advantages of our adversaries, because they are turned as 
 weapons against us. The hollow phrases, commonplaces, and 
 half-truths which they hurl against us, have a mundane polish 
 and style and a sovereign confidence of victory, by which they 
 make a much stronger impression on the rest of the world than 
 our more homely arguments. 
 
 The defects in our Kultur have their origin in great part in 
 the fact that we did not attain to political union, power and 
 self-consciousness until very late. Our people were so long 
 obliged to live in narrow, straitened, and poor circumstances 
 that we still feel the effects to-day. But we are proud that the 
 genius of our nation, relying only on its own strength, has worked 
 its way up out of this constriction without the aid and support 
 of a great political life. We cheerfully agree with our adver- 
 saries that Kultur does not originate only in the state and does 
 not have to rely exclusively on the alliance with political power. 
 When Klopstock, Winckelmann, and Lessing began their careers 
 they followed the innate and powerful impulses of their souls, 
 Vv ithout knowing or feeling anything of state and power. It is 
 inherent in the nature of true Kultur, that it springs spon- 
 taneously and independently, again and again, from the vai-ious 
 impulses and needs of the human mind, and that art, science and 
 religion each lay down their own laws for themselves and resent 
 as tyranny every law imposed by other forces. Yet they are 
 independent only in what they strive for ; the strength which in- 
 spires their efforts has its root in the community, and in this 
 again all the faculties and institutions of the political, social, 
 economic and intellectual life work together. Any one who is 
 unable to grasp clearly this co-existence of dependence and inde- 
 pendence in the various branches of historical life will never un- 
 derstand the true relationship of Kultur and state to one another. 
 
 The aim of genuine Kultur is not to be a single province of 
 human life ; it must permeate life completely, including the state 
 itself, which it must raise to be a valuable cultural factor. 
 And, conversely, the true state is aware that its power is, in the 
 last analysis, founded on a spiritual basis. It cannot regulate 
 the working of the spirit; it cannot and should not by forcible 
 means impress Kultur, which it needs for the completion of its 
 
MODERN GERMANY 567 
 
 power, into its service. Kultur must help the state voluntarily, 
 and it can and will do so because its own needs impel it thereto, 
 and because it will receive valuable gifts in return from the state. 
 Therefore it is in the long run an unnatural and unhealthy con- 
 dition, if one great branch of national life flourishes while the 
 other withers. Of course, we must beware of setting up hard 
 and fast rules. It is absolutely false to declare that master- 
 pieces of the mind can be produced only in a great and powerful 
 national state, or that great military victories and triumphs of a 
 nation will necessarily promote the progress of intellectual cul- 
 ture. Where Kultur lacks fertile soil of its own, no sunshine of 
 political power and greatness will help it. And yet even a little 
 of such sunshine can be infinitely valuable to it. Nor was it 
 lacking in the first beginnings of our German literature of the 
 eighteenth century. 
 
 "The first real and higher essence of life," Goethe tells us in 
 his Dichtung und Wahrheit, "was infused into German poetry 
 through Frederick the Great and the events of the Seven Years' 
 War. All national poetry must be shallow, or become so, if it 
 is not based on the most human of foundations, the deeds of the 
 nations and of their leaders when both stand united for one 
 man." 
 
 And Ranke, whom Muir contrasts with Treitschke as "the 
 apostle of unbiassed history," says the same thing: 
 
 "This much, however, is certain, that no other phenomenon 
 contributed so much to the self-reliance which accompanied this 
 soaring of our great spirits as the life and fame of Frederick 
 the Great. A nation must needs feel self-reliant and independent 
 if it is to develop unhampered, and literature has never flour- 
 ished without being prepared for by the great events of history." 
 
 The unintentional and involuntary service rendered by Fred- 
 erick the Great's policy of might to German intellectual life was 
 not requited at the time ; the latter did not place itself at the dis- 
 posal of state interests, but followed its own paths, which led 
 toward the highest idealism, of mankind. In this cosmopolitan 
 manner of thought of our great poets, we of to-day do not by 
 any means see, as foreign nations seem to assume, any aberration 
 from or infidelity to the nation, but a great historical necessity. 
 With the aid of that cosmopolitan thought, the German intel- 
 lect freed itself from the pettiness of the social and political con- 
 ditions of the time, and gained the strength for a complete and 
 unconditional solution of certain problems of life. The state 
 of national disunion brought with it the one advantage, that 
 jnany centers and seats of culture were formed, and the develop- 
 
568 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 ment of individual diversity was furthered. Small states, like 
 great ones, may be beneficial to the promotion of Kultur, but 
 all such effects are indissolubly connected with time and place 
 and distinct phases of development. Our adversaries of to-day 
 play with the idea that it would be a service to German Kultur 
 if Germany were reduced to her former state of political impo- 
 tence and harmlessness. They apparently believe that the Ger- 
 man bird sings best when it is imprisoned in a cage, but they 
 would open their eyes wide with astonishment if the same method 
 were to be prescribed for them. The cosmopolitan Kultiir of 
 Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt was a 
 glorious but transitory flowering — and the fruit which resulted 
 from it was the German Kultur of the nineteenth century, with 
 its national tendency, which has helped to build up the German 
 Empire. Our adversaries, who play off the good Germany 
 against the bad, the unpolitical against the military Germany, 
 have not the faintest idea how closely and intimately these two 
 Germanics are united nor how necessary was the progress from 
 one stage to the other. Toward the end of the eighteenth and 
 the beginning of the nineteenth century was the period when 
 German Kultur began to turn toward the state for the sake of 
 its own completion. 
 
 The fundamental ideas of German idealism had already led 
 to a higher evaluation of the state and the nation in which the 
 individuals were living, and German idealism laid stress on the 
 worth of the individual as a unique source of human beauty and 
 strength. A further step was soon taken, and it was recognized 
 that states and nations were also great historical individualities. 
 It was seen that one state had this, the other that, character, and 
 each was found justifiable, because it had grown individually and 
 according to its own laws of development. 
 
 The Romanticist Novalis was an enthusiastic admirer of the 
 Prussian military state of his time — and that, be it noted, was 
 before 1806! He called the state the embodiment of all activity, 
 and he made the daring statement: "All Kultur emanates, to- 
 gether with the state, from the given conditions." We modern 
 Germans believe that this goes too far, and exaggerates the 
 value of the state for Kultur, If we were to make use of this 
 ingenious sentence of the greatest dreamer among the German 
 Romanticists, the venerable Bishop Welldon would lift up his 
 hands in horror at our fanatical admiration of the Moloch which 
 is called State. We will, however, disclose to him the secret that 
 the enthusiastic veneration of the state on the part of the German 
 Romanticists at that time was largely drawn from English 
 
MODERN GERMANY 569 
 
 sources. The reflections of Burke, on the French Revolution, 
 wherein he glorifies the state as the union of all that is beautiful, 
 good and divine in man, had a deep influence on German national 
 feeling. 
 
 When this began to develop in the first decade of the nine- 
 teenth century, it was not alone esthetic but also ethical motives 
 that turned German idealism toward the state. The moral law 
 of the categorical imperative, which the state set up, demanded 
 action and work, and devotion to the common weal. Fichte, in 
 sublime manner, taught a philosophy of action which was destined 
 to found a new ideal state. And just at that time misfortune 
 overtook Germany and the old Prussian state crumbled to dust. 
 What Germany had to sufiFer under Napoleon's scourge still vi- 
 brates in our hearts to-day and strengthens our will to do all in 
 our power to prevent the return of such misfortune. But more 
 vivid even than the memory of shame and humiliation in our 
 minds, is the memory of the truly wonderful alliance of the 
 German spirit with the Prussian state which was concluded for 
 the salvation and regeneration of Prussia and Germany. The 
 Prussian state of 181 3, rejuvenated by liberal and humanitarian 
 ideals, probably still enjoys the esteem of our adversaries. They 
 do not know it well, however, if they believe that it was more 
 modest and unselfish in its policy of power than the Prussia 
 and Germany of Bismarck. The Prussian statesmen who rep- 
 resented Prussia at the Congress of Vienna were not more mod- 
 est than their honorable colleagues in Europe, Metternich, Cas- 
 tlereagh, and Alexander I, who were so well able to look after 
 the aggrandizement of their states. Precisely those Prussian 
 statesmen who were most deeply imbued with the thoughts of 
 Fichte and Kant demanded most vigorously at this period the 
 annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and Fichte himself, in 1813, 
 wished that the King of Prussia would become the enforcer of 
 German nationalism {''Zwingherr zur Deutschheif') . 
 
 We must, therefore, establish the fact that the doctrine of 
 the "two Germanics" which is at present being expounded in 
 England is not correct. It is incorrect that the "tame" Germany 
 of 1800 was swallowed up by the "savage" Germany of Bis- 
 marck. On the contrary, the "tame" Germany very early showed 
 a most serious inclination toward the "savage" Germany and 
 entered into a voluntary and happy union with it. Certain rem- 
 nants of the cosmopolitan idealism of the eighteenth century 
 remained alive in the Kultur and the political views of the edu- 
 cated classes in Germany for a long time, until they were swept 
 away by the work and teachings of Bismarck. Let us regard 
 
570 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 these boldly, without shrinking. Not as embittered accusers, 
 but as calm and just judges, and historians, let us regard more 
 closely that terrible phantom of the "policy of power" {Macht- 
 politik) with which Bismarck's name has been coupled. How 
 can one drag Bismarck to the prisoners' dock without at the 
 same time subjecting the policy of all the other great modern 
 Powers to just as severe examination? We seem to be dream- 
 ing when we hear the English (of all people precisely the Eng- 
 lish!) now declare that Bismarck and his successors in Germany 
 pursued an especially relentless and unscrupulous policy of power. 
 What else have they themselves done for centuries? By force 
 and lawlessness, the commercial privileges of the Hansa were 
 crushed by England during Queen Elizabeth's reign. With 
 brutal force England fell upon Holland in the seventeenth cen- 
 tury, violated Danish neutrality, and in 1807 captured the de- 
 fenseless Danish fleet. 
 
 "The various countries and peoples of the earth," recently said 
 the Norwegian, Knut Hamsun, "have not gone to England 
 and asked to be taken over by her. The connection between 
 these countries and the mother-country is the result of force." ^ 
 Was the England of the nineteenth century milder and more 
 moderate? By what right did she keep Egypt? By what right 
 did Jameson break the peace in South Africa in 1896 and start 
 on his filibustering raid, to the great satisfaction of the widest 
 circles of English society? And truly not love of right, but 
 auri sacra fames, incited the English to suppress the liberty of the 
 Boers. "No doubt," says Mr. Egerton, "in the making of the 
 British Empire, as in other human transactions, things have hap- 
 pened that one may wish might have happened otherwise." ^ If 
 he had only honestly and conscientiously disclosed the full extent 
 of these "things." Others of his Anglo-Saxon countrymen were 
 more honest prior to the war. No less a person than Lord Rob- 
 erts said: "How was this Empire of Britain founded? War 
 founded this Empire — war and conquest." And in the book, 
 "The Day of the Saxon," by the American, Homer Lea, we read : 
 "The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we 
 make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of 
 fact. ... In just such a manner has the British Empire been 
 made up from the fragments of four great maritime Powers, the 
 satrapies of petty potentates and the wilderness of nameless sav- 
 ages." 
 
 1 In the newspaper Tidns Tegn, January, 1915- 
 
 ^ Is the British Empire the Result of Wholesale Robbery? 19 14 (Oxford 
 Pamphlets) . 
 
MODERN GERMANY 571 
 
 ' In this war, in which England poses as the guardian of inter- 
 national law, she tramples upon it when it suits her interest to 
 do so and when she hopes to escape with impunity. She oppresses 
 Egypt and violates the treaties regarding the Suez Canal; con- 
 trary to the tenets of international law, she sinks a German 
 auxiliary cruiser in the neutral port of Rio del Oro, on August 
 29th, for which act the New York World, of January 11, 1915, 
 takes her to task, saying: "To keep certain supplies out of 
 Germany England has terrorized innocent neutral commerce. To 
 use her great sea power against an enemy with the utmost effect, 
 she has not scrupled even by caprice to bring disaster upon a 
 friend. When remonstrated with, she pleads necessity, which in 
 war knows neither friends nor law." The Brazilian paper, Tri- 
 huna, of December 4, 1914, asks: "Are we an English protec- 
 torate?" and states that a Brazilian ship sailing from one Bra- 
 zilian port to another was stopped and searched by a British man- 
 of-war in Brazilian waters. 
 
 Cunning and force the English declare to be the chief features 
 of the modern German policy of power. The greatest and most 
 effective cunning that a policy of power can employ is to conceal 
 its claws and, as Machiavelli says, ''appear all pity, all faith, all 
 humanity, all honesty, all piety." And the worst and most 
 disgusting form of force that an unscrupulous policy of power 
 can use is that of violating the truth. In this kind of cunning 
 and in this kind of force England is simply unmatched. There 
 are, indeed, as we have seen, honest Englishmen who despise 
 hypocrisy, but the official British policy and the British people 
 will not relinquish it. England uses it with more art even than 
 Machiavelli advises. Machiavelli was still naive enough to 
 assume that the prince who lies and dissembles in public would 
 be conscious of his lies in his heart of hearts. The average Eng- 
 lishman, however, has done away with even this ethical impedi- 
 ment to his hypocrisy, which now and then might cause incon- 
 venient stings of conscience. He raises in his soul an air-tight par- 
 tition between the sphere of his will and the sphere of his 
 emotions. He believes in his humanity, whilst he acts like a 
 beast of prey. He is told that this is infamous hypocrisy. He 
 hears these voices, but either he ignores them totally, because he 
 firmly believes in his virtue, or he meets the accusation with a 
 slight concession and thus quickly salves his conscience. 
 
 ''Sometimes," says Muir, significantly, "England has played 
 the hypocrite. But hypocrisy is the tribute paid to virtue, and 
 except when it is the lie in the soul, it is preferable to the kind 
 of truth which the Great King (Frederick H) cultivated; for at 
 
572 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 least it recognizes the claims of a standard of conduct higher 
 than that of the jungle." ^ These words prove that the lie has 
 become indeed "the lie in the soul" with the English. 
 
 The charge, however, that the Prusso-German policy of power 
 of Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Treitschke knows no 
 higher law than that of the jungle, we reject absolutely. It is a 
 verdict inspired by hatred, animosity and historical short-sighted- 
 ness, and not by just, humane and historical understanding. All 
 three of these were men of high morality; they were grim ene- 
 mies of base egotism and were animated by the high ideal to 
 live and die for their country. But this ideal, we are told, was 
 false, exaggerated, inhuman, because its consequences and appli- 
 cation in the policy of power are inhuman. It was not inhuman, 
 for it emanated from a strict, truthful and courageous concep- 
 tion of life and its moral duties. Everything now depends on 
 understanding this point correctly, for the most serious of the 
 accusations against us revolve about it. The answer which 
 German statesmen and thinkers of modern times are wont to 
 give to the question of the relation between politics and morals, 
 we must make clear and justify. 
 
 The laws of morality, charity and of the sacredness of treaties 
 are eternal and inviolable, but the duty of the statesman to look 
 after the present and future welfare and safety of the state and 
 the nation entrusted to his guidance is also sacred and inviolable. 
 What, then, if a conflict between these duties should arise? Or 
 are conflicts between moral duties not possible? Only shallow- 
 minded people, or fanatics estranged from the world, or con- 
 temptible hypocrites can deny this possibility. Every true trag- 
 edy teaches us the awful fact that our moral life cannot be regu- 
 lated like clockwork, that the purest striving after good may 
 lead to painful issues and terrible conflicts. In the life of na- 
 tions conflicts between private morality and the interest of the 
 state are simply unavoidable, and are as old as history itself. His- 
 torical experience, as well as our own conscience, teaches us with 
 overwhelming force that the statesman can, in such a case, act 
 only according to the maxim: Salus populi suprema lex esto. 
 This was the idea which Bismarck meant to convey in his maxim 
 that "political egotism is the only sane foundation of a great 
 state." The British statesmen, who have created the great 
 British World Empire by force and cunning, may also refer to 
 this principle in justifying their stand. We are very well able, 
 with our historical understanding, to put ourselves in their place 
 and sympathize with the weight of obligations to their people 
 
 1 Britain's Case Against Germany, Ramsay Muir, p. 76. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 573 
 
 under which they acted. One glance Into our historical litera- 
 ture on England, from Ranke's masterpieces to the works of 
 Marcks, Michael, Stahlin and others, shows that we are able 
 and willing to write the history of the formation of the British 
 Empire without hate and malice, with calm understanding, even 
 with admiration. We by no means maintain that the British 
 Empire is solely the "result of wholesale robbery," although a 
 good deal of robbery has taken place. But there are bounds to 
 the policy of power and state egotism which must not be over- 
 stepped, and where the justification of an unavoidable conflict of 
 duties ceases to hold good. 
 
 These bounds consist in this: that a state must not seek to 
 acquire more power than is necessary for its absolute security 
 and the free development of its national energies. It is clear 
 that these bounds do not form a mathematical line, that the 
 judgment of the actors and that of posterity may vary as to 
 whether they are being overstepped in a particular case or not. 
 But there are brutal and obvious transgressions as to which no 
 doubt ought to exist in historical judgment. We take it to be a 
 particularly brutal transgression, for instance, that the English 
 put an end to the liberty of the Boer states, which presented no 
 danger to them, for the sake of acquiring gold fields which were 
 to increase England's vast wealth still more. And the sacro 
 egoismo of the Italians became blasphemy at that moment when, 
 without urgent cause, they fell upon their allies, in order to rob 
 and strangle them. Bismarck's history may be searched in vain 
 for similar outrages of the policy of power. He wanted to put 
 an end to the unbearable misery of the Bundestag under which 
 Prussia and Germany were suffering, and to found a strong 
 national state secure in its existence — no more and no less. 
 There can be no goal more sacred and just for a great and cul- 
 tured nation to strive for. If hypocrites abroad reproach him 
 for having relentlessly used force and cunning to attain this goal, 
 we demand of them to investigate with equal severity the actions 
 of the liberal statesman Cavour, who had to accomplish the 
 same task for his people. It will be found that Cavour was 
 just as high-handed and cunning, and rn some measures even 
 more relentless and revolutionary than Bismarck. After his ob- 
 ject was achieved, Bismarck declared Germany to be "satiated," 
 and warned himself and his successors against every "abuse of 
 the acquired power." He warned especially against the ways 
 "in which the first and second French Empires, in a continuous 
 policy of war and prestige-seeking, had brought about their own 
 
574 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 downfall." ^ He differentiated most carefully between a sound 
 policy of interest and an aggressive policy of prestige, and this 
 diiferentiation we Germans have thoroughly assimilated. Macht- 
 politik, in the German sense, has nothing in common with a 
 policy of prestige, lusting for war. It wishes to be sensible and 
 measured in its aims, but if it cannot be done otherwise, will 
 strive for these aims with all possible energy, and will stake the 
 full strength of the nation on their accomplishment. 
 
 One of these aims for which we are now fighting, Bismarck 
 bequeathed to us. It is of a thoroughly defensive nature. It is 
 the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as an independent Great 
 Power. For this aim, as he says, in his Gedanken und Erinnerun- 
 gen, a German statesman may, if need be, draw the sword with 
 a quiet conscience. We have acted accordingly, and so would 
 any other state have acted in our place. It is one of the worst 
 perversions of the truth of which our adversaries are guilty, to 
 have misrepresented Austria's self-defense, when she was in bitter 
 extremity, against the subterraneous intrigues of Pan-Slavism and 
 of the Greater-Serbia agitators, as a war of wanton aggression 
 against a small nation. This small nation was in truth as dan- 
 gerous to Austria as a submarine is to a battleship — and Russia 
 hastened to its aid, not to protect a small nation, but to cut her 
 way to Constantinople with the sword. Whoever cannot appre- 
 ciate the position of relentless and pressing extremity in which 
 Austria and Germany were placed, is unable to judge historical 
 events objectively and scientifically. 
 
 The contention will be maintained abroad that Serbia and 
 Russia had natural and justifiable interests to defend. Although 
 we are of the opinion that they violently exaggerated these in- 
 terests and overstepped the bounds of a sound policy of power, 
 we at once admit that this question is open to discussion and 
 that a Russian or Serbian may judge of it differently than we do. 
 We could also imagine that a disinterested foreigner might be of 
 the opinion that this M^as an unavoidable collision arising from 
 the depths of the imperative national state-interests of the two 
 parties concerned. Similar judgments have already been passed 
 on many of the great wars in history, but even in such a case 
 the question must always be asked whether a greater desire for 
 expansion did not exist on the one side than on the other. We 
 do not doubt that the judgment of posterity will be that Russia 
 and Serbia wished to weaken, if not to ruin, Austria; and that 
 Austria and Germany were forced to defend themselves. 
 
 Perhaps future ages will say that the collision between Ger- 
 
 ^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Chap. 26. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 575 
 
 many and England was also absolutely unavoidable, because on 
 both sides ambitions were fostered which could be decided only 
 by the sword. Treitschke believed in a future settlement of 
 accounts between England and Germany, not because he wished 
 to replace the British world-empire with a German world-empire, 
 but because he foresaw that England would oppose her superior 
 power to Germany's just and moderate claims.^ He was quite 
 right In his opinion that England, swayed by her instincts of 
 world monarchy would not like to see any Power rise, even if it 
 represented no more than a potential danger to her at some 
 future time. Had France and not Germany been victorious in 
 1870-71, France would have become, or rather have remained, 
 England's arch-enemy. 
 
 As early as 1877 Salisbury declared Germany to be England's 
 most dangerous future enemy,- and a whole school of English 
 publicists have endeavored since the nineties to plant this idea 
 in the heart of the British people. We mention Boulger, who 
 has now with triumphant satisfaction collected his anti-German 
 articles written since 1898 in the book entitled England's Arch- 
 Enemy. We refer the reader to the statements of the English 
 jingoes and militarists which the honest pacifist Norman Angell 
 presents in an instructive chapter of his book, Prussianism and 
 Its Destruction (Chapter HI, The Prussian Within Our 
 Midst). We recall Professor Cramb's lectures on Germany and 
 England, delivered in 191 3, in which he seeks, not without in- 
 genuity, and at the same time with determined energy, to pre- 
 pare the British people for the struggle against Germany. More 
 bluntly than he, Emil Reich states in his book, Germany's Swelled 
 Head, first published in 1907, that the antagonism between Ger- 
 many and England was of exactly the same kind as that between 
 Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage and England and France 
 in former times. "The Germans," he says, "are bound to strive 
 for more expansion, for imperialism. They are simply bound to 
 do soj" From that he draws the conclusion: "If Germany 
 wants to attack England, England ought to attack her long be- 
 fore.'' He openly and unhesitatingly advocated the most ruth- 
 less preventive war against Germany. 
 
 What else has the much-reviled Bernhardi done than to main- 
 tain the right of the statesman, "under certain circumstances to 
 begin at an opportune moment a war which is deemed neces- 
 
 1 "The unreasonableness which lies in every attempt at world dominion finds 
 its revenge in the fact that the imperishable idea of nationality is manifested 
 in the various states with a certain degree of one-sidedness" (Treitschke, 
 Politik, Vol. II, p. 527). 
 
 ^England's Arch-Enemy, D. C. Boulger, London, 1914, p. 10. 
 
576 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 sary" ? It does not meet with our approval that the general has 
 laid down this doctrine. If it is embodied in the political cate- 
 chism of a government and of a nation, it can easily lead to a 
 weakening of the feeling of serious moral responsibility and to a 
 frivolous breach of peace. Of course situations may arise in 
 which the danger of war is so indubitable and manifest that one 
 may feel forced to strike the first blow so as not to be over- 
 powered. But whoever advocates preventive war in theory, 
 induces in practice an abuse of the ultima ratio. The case is 
 similar to that of the right of revolution. When the French 
 National Assembly of 1789 included the right of resistance a 
 Voppression in the general and civil rights of man, the great 
 Irishman, Burke, proved with overwhelming arguments that it 
 thereby destroyed the innermost foundation of political life. 
 And yet he recognized at the same time that chaotic upheavals 
 and elemental hurricanes might occur in the life of a state, when 
 it was imperative to do what the welfare of the whole state, and 
 not what formal right, demanded. 
 
 Bismarck flatly repudiated the doctrine of a preventive war, 
 and our present Imperial Chancellor has emphatically expressed 
 the same opinion. The aim of our policy with respect to Eng- 
 land was to avoid war with her, if this could possibly be done 
 with honor. Why should the Anglo-German antagonism not 
 have subsided in time, in the same way as the Anglo-Russian 
 antagonism, which twenty to thirty years ago often hovered on 
 the verge of war and yet invariably calmed down again ? Nego- 
 tiations were being carried on between us and England shortly 
 before the war, concerning an adjustment of our trans-maritime 
 spheres of interest, which were near a settlement entirely satis- 
 factory to us, and which awoke in us the pleasant hope that Eng- 
 land no longer intended to suppress with brutal force the natural 
 and legitimate growth of our industries, our commerce, our 
 colonial requirements and our fleet. The wish of our govern- 
 ment was also the wish of our people. This fact, indeed, is now 
 recognized here and there in England: 
 
 "Such is the German national ambition — to become a world- 
 power, by peaceful methods, if possible, but to become a world- 
 power! That the bulk of the German people prefers peaceful 
 methods is the most obvious truism ever stated." ^ 
 
 But — so this author continues — it is not the masses who de- 
 cide, but the militarists, whose exponent is General von Bern- 
 hardi. This opinion is refuted by the history of events leading 
 
 1 The Nations of the War. Ed. by L. G. Redmond-Howard, London, 19 14. 
 Vol. Ill, "Germany and the German People," p. 107 ff. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 577 
 
 up to the war and by the unanimous instinctive conviction of the 
 whole nation that this war has been forced upon us, that It Is a 
 defensive war In the highest sense. Only with such a conviction 
 was It possible for our pacifist Social Democrats to rally round 
 the colors to a man. We do not deny that It Is part of our policy 
 of power to carry on with the greatest energy possible a war 
 that has been forced upon us. Ought we to have waited pa- 
 tiently till the English and French entered Belgium, took posses- 
 sion of our unprotected Rhenish provinces and our arms factories 
 in Westphalia, and attacked our main armies in the flank? We 
 were firmly convinced, and we have been confirmed In that con- 
 viction by the documents found later, that this danger actually 
 threatened us. 
 
 It Is mere pharisaIsm to reproach us for our march into Bel- 
 gium. One needs only to put one's self In our place In order 
 fully to realize what adversaries were about to attack us, what 
 terrible dangers were menacing our very existence and our fu- 
 ture; it will be easy to understand that we preferred to violate 
 a European treaty which, as was discovered later on, had already 
 been violated by the Belgian government and by England and 
 France. It is vile calumny to ascribe to us the brutal maxim 
 that Might is Right. If we fostered It and lived up to it, we 
 should act not only brutally, but also foolishly and short-sight- 
 edly, for without respect for the sacredness of treaties no nation 
 can prosper.^ But there Is also a sacred right of self-defense. In 
 the execution of which that unavoidable conflict of duties arises 
 when one must act according to the principle of salus populi su- 
 prema lex. 
 
 That is the spirit of German policy of power and of our con- 
 ception of it. We do not think nor act more harshly or more 
 arbitrarily than others — but we do think more straightfor- 
 wardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a differ- 
 ence between our way of thinking and theirs which should long 
 since have been apparent to any student of the historical and 
 political literature of Germany and of other countries. It was 
 Ranke who taught us to honor truth and to regard states as 
 living personalities, animated by vital impulses and desire for 
 power ; they are all proud, covetous of honor, and egotistical, but 
 no one of them is like the other. They are individualities, each 
 resting on ''special principles of existence," w^hich develop in the 
 course of centuries, as the result of all the political and cultural, 
 
 ^ "A state which would on principle hold loyalty and faith in contempt would 
 be constantly menaced by enemies and would, therefore, not be able to attain 
 its object of becoming a physical power" (H. von Treitschke, Politik, II, p. 544)* 
 
578 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 material and Intellectual forces and characteristics of the particu- 
 lar nation. It Is unavoidable, he teaches us furthermore, that 
 these Individualities of exuberant strength should, when they move 
 and stretch, come Into conflict with each other, now in peaceful 
 competition, now in trials of strength by w^ar. That Is the judg- 
 ment of historical realism Avhich accepts the policies of states as 
 they are, not as they might be according to humanitarian ideals. 
 This truth-loving, sober realism of ours has often been taken 
 much amiss in other countries; the Englishman especially, who 
 is accustomed to hide his ruthless policy of power behind the 
 deceptive mask of humanitarian Ideals, Is Indignant when we 
 show him the true face of things. The British do not direct their 
 attacks against Ranke, but against Treitschke; they overlook the 
 fact that Treitschke expressed only with more passion and pathos 
 what Ranke had previously said. Ranke added another thought 
 that has perhaps borne more fruit on German soil than on that 
 of other countries. He taught us to comprehend the meaning 
 and logic of a great Machtpolitik, He said : 
 
 ''The history of the world Is not that chaotic working at cross- 
 purposes, pell-mell strife and haphazard succession of nations 
 which it seems to be at first sight. . . . What we see in process 
 of development are forces, spiritual, life-giving, creative forces, 
 individual lives themselves, moral units of energy. . . . They 
 blossom forth, fill the world, manifest themselves in the most 
 multifarious forms, war with one another, restrict and over- 
 power one another. In their mutual Influence upon each other, 
 In their sequence, In their existence, their disappearance, In their 
 resuscitation to a continually increasing potency, higher signifi- 
 cance and greater extent, lies the secret of the history of the 
 world." 
 
 Regarded from this lofty point of view the egotism of states 
 and nations takes on a different significance. It becomes the 
 means for the development of all the latent forces In mankind. 
 The history of the world Is the development of* state Individuali- 
 ties, and the moral energies inherent In them decide whether they 
 flourish or perish. The present war exhibits tremendous moral 
 energies on both sides. On both sides one ought to regard this 
 spectacle of utmost exertion of power from that high viewpoint, 
 which, setting aside hatred and animosity, strives to understand 
 the value and result of this universal energy. This energy gives 
 us the assurance that none of the adversaries will entirely crush 
 the other, and that the wealth of individuality In which the 
 world of to-day abounds will not be diminished. It Is the most 
 stupid of all the calumnies directed against us to say that we 
 
MODERN GERMANY 579 
 
 intended to found a world-dominion like that of the Romans, 
 and to force our Kultur on the conquered nations. Our histori- 
 cal convictions and our cultural ideals are based on the concep- 
 tion of a multifarious co-existence of free, strong states, nations 
 and systems of Kultur. We fully agree with that sentence in 
 the declaration of the French universities which runs as follows: 
 **The French Universities continue to believe that civilization is 
 not the work of one single people, but of all the peoples, that 
 the intellectual and moral riches of mankind are created by the 
 natural variety and the necessary independence of the qualities 
 and gifts of all the nations." Not the French mind, but the 
 German mind, has been the first to grasp this great truth. It 
 originated in the days of Herder, Fichte and the German Roman- 
 ticists. "Only as each nation," says Fichte, addressing the Ger- 
 man nation, "when left to itself develops and moulds itself ac- 
 cording to its individual traits, does the deity appear in the 
 national mirror." 
 
 Into this mirror we of to-day look with the same faith and 
 the same emotion as the Germans of a hundred years ago. The 
 great artists and poets of other countries know quite well that 
 nowhere outside their native countries are they received more 
 joyously and more gratefully than in Germany, and that espe- 
 cially the Kultur of the smaller nations, whose suppression we 
 are said to plan, excites our deep interest, as our reception of the 
 w^orks of Ibsen and Maeterlinck, not to mention others, amply 
 proves. We have occasionally gone even somewhat too far in 
 our preference for foreign literature, and this has now and again 
 caused a reaction of national sentiment which has not always ex- 
 pressed itself with great taste. Every great people nowadays has 
 its nationalistic extravagances; arrogant and exclusive admira- 
 tion of their own Kultur is not wanting either in England or in 
 France. Every nation possesses the natural and justifiable wish 
 to assert the worth and the ideals of its own Kultur and to dif- 
 fuse them in the world, because only free competition and the 
 influence of all varieties of national Kultur upon one another can 
 produce that all-embracing feeling for world and humanity, 
 which must lie like gossamer over the atmosphere of our struggles. 
 
 We want to receive and give at the same time; we also want 
 to think and act at the same time, and enrich the one process 
 by the other, without violating any one's right of property. Kul- 
 tur is certainly a servant of the state, and the state is a servant 
 of Kultur, but both Kultur and the state have also an inner life 
 of their own, which is not absorbed by the service of the other. 
 We do not think for a moment of selling our independent cul- 
 
58o MODERN GERMANY 
 
 tural needs and the Inner freedom of our mind to the state, 
 when we freely devote our service to it. Our ideals embrace 
 both personal liberty and devotion to the whole. This combina- 
 tion is one which our enemies cannot and will not understand. 
 And yet, only he who really endeavors to understand it can form 
 a just opinion of what is called our "militarism," almost the 
 worst charge raised against us. 
 
 The historical origin of our army is far too little known in 
 other countries. It is a far too one-sided view to trace it back 
 to the old Prussian army of Frederick William I and Frederick 
 the Great, with its Iron discipline and the aristocratic esprit de 
 corps of its officers. The character of the Prussian army was 
 greatly changed during the period of reform after 1807 by 
 Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen, the disciples of German 
 Idealism and Kantian ethics. They made laws that breathed the 
 spirit of respect for human dignity, and which were to make 
 service in the army a moral duty for all and an act of the highest 
 patriotism. They introduced compulsory military service In or- 
 der to make Prussia — at that time the smallest and most exposed 
 of all the Great Powers — strong by means of the spirit and the 
 utmost exertion of all the moral energies of the nation. This 
 idea has retained its full vigor and vitality up to the present 
 hour. "Kant was quite right," a soldier wrote us from the 
 front; "and In every private of our glorious popular army there 
 is, unconsciously to himself, a good deal of Kantian ethics to be 
 found." Since these ethics, which have emanated from our in- 
 tellectual Kultur, have become an inner link In our national 
 army, our militarism has become part and parcel of our Kultur. 
 
 It Is comprehensible that this spirit of devoted national ideal- 
 ism and personal enthusiasm of the individual stands out more 
 clearly, more brilliantly, more splendidly in time of war than In 
 time of peace. The barracks and drill grounds in time of peace 
 give but a one-sided picture of our army. This schooling in 
 peace Is severe, monotonous and dry, nor can It be otherwise 
 because its purpose Is to bring discipline and technical training 
 to the highest degree of perfection. It is also harsh at times, 
 and it were better if many a word used on the barrack-ground 
 had been left unsaid. Cases of maltreatment occur which we 
 deplore. They are perhaps just as frequent In other armies, but 
 the foreign press, Inspired by Information from England and 
 France, has for years been in the habit of exaggerating every 
 case of maltreatment that occurs in our country, and of sys- 
 tematically depicting our army system as contemptible. We are 
 working hard in our country to put a stop to such Isolated cases 
 
MODERN GERMANY 581 
 
 of maltreatment, and our most intelligent officers have the mat- 
 ter at heart. When General von Moltke recently read the letter 
 of a Greek physician, in which the latter referred to cases of 
 maltreatment in the German army in time of peace, he wrote: 
 "Unfortunately it is not to be denied that deplorable excesses 
 committed by some brutal individuals have occurred. I hope it 
 will be one of the salutary consequences of the war that the Ger- 
 mans will have learnt to respect the human being in every 
 one whether equal or subordinate, and that such deplorable acts 
 will entirely disappear from the army." 
 
 The tendency of modern development will undoubtedly do 
 away with this remnant of past ages. There is no better testi- 
 mony of the spirit that animates our army, even in time of peace, 
 than the love for and pride in his old regiment which lives in 
 every soldier who has served. He cherishes the memory of it 
 during his whole life. A vast number of veterans' societies, in 
 which the former soldiers meet on a friendly social footing, are 
 scattered throughout Germany. If a regiment which is garri- 
 soned in a small town celebrates a jubilee, it is a popular festival 
 for all the inhabitants as well. 
 
 The popular nature of our army is by no means inconsistent 
 with the peculiar esprit de corps of our officers. Some harsh 
 traits may cling to the latter body which might be dispensed with 
 as a remnant of by-gone times, but in its inmost nature it is sound 
 and indispensable. It provides the army w^th leaders of uni- 
 form moral views, strict integrity, unselfish devotion to king and 
 country, and a chivalrous conception of life. It is one of those 
 corporate counterpoises to the too great individualisation and 
 *'atomisation" of modern Kultur. It is desirable and necessary, 
 not only in the army, and has often had to be created elsewhere, 
 with great difficulty, by the cooperative association of men be- 
 longing to the same profession. In the army it is the immediate 
 result of natural and vital development. The strict line of de- 
 marcation between officers and men is adhered to for reasons of 
 military expediency, not of arrogance. It is the mildest of thd con- 
 ceivable and possible means of maintaining the discipline and sub- 
 ordination absolutely necessary in an army. In armies where such 
 a line of demarcation is wanting, punishments are more frequent 
 and more severe than with us. Our soldier knows that it separates 
 him from his superior only outwardly, not inwardly. On the 
 battlefield and in the trenches one spirit of devotion, of mutual 
 hearty confidence, and of heroism, animates leader and soldier 
 in peril and death. Any one who has seen the relations be- 
 tween officers and men at the front will cease to regard our 
 
582 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 militarism as a mechanical drill of obedient menials. He will 
 find warm human feeling, human faith, and human greatness at 
 every step. 
 
 Foreigners will perhaps reply to this: What you describe as 
 the spirit of your militarism is the expression of certain national 
 peculiarities, not all of which are congenial to us, but which we 
 must not begrudge you, as you will not part with them. But 
 your militarism has become an international danger because it 
 has encroached on civil life, because it has militarized all your 
 people outwardly and inwardly to such a degree that they must 
 seek an outlet in foreign conquest. This view is that of enemies 
 who realize they have to deal with a dangerous and strong ad- 
 versary, who is not to be beaten by a levy of troops from all parts 
 of the world. But were we not obliged to be prepared for such 
 a levy, since England had begun to regard with hostile envy our 
 growing economic prosperity and our fleet created for the pro- 
 tection of this prosperity? Were we not in former times always 
 in an unusually dangerous and cramped position between the 
 great military Powers, France and Russia ? ^ Can we forget what 
 we have suffered through our former defenselessness since the 
 days of the Thirt}^ Years' War? It is nothing else but stern 
 necessity that forces us to develop a maximum of military power. 
 It is the only safe guarantee of our independence. 
 
 Why is the accusation not directed against France, who exacts 
 still more from her population than we, who was the first to 
 begin and to cause the competition in armaments between the 
 great European states by the increase of her army in 1886, and 
 who has always kept it alive by her policy of revenge? Why is 
 not Russia, who has created a vast army for the purposes of her 
 notorious thirst for conquest, also accused? And why is Eng- 
 land forgotten, England that has developed the most extreme 
 form of militarism at sea, and who has, against the w^ish of all 
 other nations, successfully stood for the maintenance of its most 
 inhuman theory, viz., the right of capture at sea? Compared to 
 the right of capture at sea, all the little harshnesses of Prussian 
 militarism are insignificant. England is now reaping what she 
 has sown. Our submarines, sinking her merchant vessels, are 
 forced to act on the principle : A corsaire, corsaire et demi. 
 
 We have a right to be deeply embittered by the malevolent 
 calumnies of our adversaries, but we will not close this chapter, 
 
 1 This fact is now recognized by impartial foreigners. The former Dutch 
 Prime Minister, Van Houten, says: "Germany has until the present day been 
 the victim of French militarism in that until 1870 France's efforts were 
 always directed with success at preventing Germany from attaining complete 
 development of power through tmity. France was always supported in these 
 efforts by Russia" {Das Grossere Denitschland, Dresden, February, 1915)' 
 
MODERN GERMANY 583 
 
 which is to assist neutral nations to understand our motives and 
 opinions, with words of hatred and bitterness. Great civilized 
 nations that are at war with each other, dishonor themselves 
 if they regard their adversaries solely with the eye of hate, and 
 do infinite harm to mankind if they seek to cut off the roots of 
 freedom and independence. There is great difference in the 
 aims which we pursue in the war and those of our adversaries. 
 We do not for a moment think of dictating in future to our 
 French, English, and Russian adversaries the extent of the arma- 
 ments which they consider necessary for the maintenance of their 
 honor and independence. Our own bitter experience in the days 
 of Napoleon I has taught us what such an encroachment upon 
 the autonomy of a Great Power means. It is the worst attack 
 imaginable against national liberty. And yet our adversaries, 
 who insist on liberty with such fervor, revel in the idea not 
 only of depriving us of our colonies and our border-territories, 
 but also of rendering us permanently impotent from a military 
 point of view, just as the Philistines rendered Samson powerless. 
 Such extravagant desires emanate from a spirit of policy of 
 power, with which we have nothing in common. The expedient 
 of rendering the adversary permanently defenseless originated in 
 the armory of the world-monarchy. The Romans and Napo- 
 leon I made use of it. But the trend of modern European his- 
 tory, which is directly opposed to that of ancient history, does 
 not lead to a world-monarchy, but to the full, rich life of strong 
 nations which do not brook any attempt at world domination. 
 Absolute sovereignty at sea is also a species of world domination 
 which cannot be tolerated and must collapse sooner or later. 
 England is fighting against the spirit of modern development 
 when she attempts to uphold by force her claim to be sole mis- 
 tress of the seas. The position of England as a World Power and 
 as a civilized nation, which we honor and recognize, will not 
 suffer if the principle of the balance of power, which she has 
 hitherto sought to confine to Europe, is extended to the ocean 
 and to the whole world. Then only w^ill every nation have the 
 breathing space it requires. The day will come when Germany's 
 decision to take up the defensive war against England and to 
 fight for the freedom of the seas will be acclaimed by all. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 PROFESSOR ERNST ZITELMANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 BONN 
 
 TO speak of the war and International law involves three 
 questions : What has been the aim of international law 
 in this war? How far has it stood the test? What is going to 
 become of it? Its past, its present, its future — this we shall deal 
 with briefly from the German point of view.^ 
 
 International law, especially the law of war, which concerns 
 us here, is the fruit of centuries of labor. Particularly during 
 the last decade has its development been pronounced and prom- 
 ising. All civilized nations, Germany as well as her present 
 opponents, have helped to build it up. Czar Nicholas II, in 
 his peace manifesto, suggested the First Hague Peace Confer- 
 ence, and the terms ''Declaration of Paris" and "Declaration 
 of London" preserve and honor the memory of the services ren- 
 dered by France and England. We were proud of what had 
 been accomplished. Statesmen and scholars spoke of interna- 
 tional law as of one of the highest achievements of modern civ- 
 ilization; we felt justified in regarding as a blessing to mankind 
 the fact that the mutual relations of states were no longer to 
 be determined by the arbitrary dictates of force, but by fixed 
 rights and duties. We found, therefore, in the attitude of an 
 individual state towards international law, in the manner in 
 which it respected and observed the law's commands, an im- 
 portant criterion of its civilization, of its worth as a civilized 
 state. Indeed, we only regarded that state as civilized which 
 adapted itself to the rules of international law. 
 
 Herewith is by no means implied, however, that this is the 
 final and most important standard by which to judge the con- 
 duct of a state in its relation to the outside world. Legal pre- 
 cepts are not the highest laws governing human life; they estab- 
 lish merely a minimum of obligations, and within the limit thus 
 drawn, other forces, above all moral forces, should be active. 
 Just as an individual in his private life may keep within the 
 
 1 The following essay was finished early in March, 1915, and makes use 
 of such facts only as had by that time become known. The fundamental view 
 has remained unchanged. 
 
 584 
 
MODERN GERMANY 585 
 
 bounds of the law and may yet act basely and contemptibly, so 
 likewise may the state. In the life of states, too, there are moral 
 obligations, obligations of honor and decency. To be lacking 
 in gratitude, to break faith, even where no written alliance 
 exists, to desert a friend in the hour of need or to betray him^ 
 to attack the defenseless in a treacherous manner, to sacrifice 
 high possessions of mankind to petty personal gains: all this 
 may not be a violation of international law, but it is much 
 worse — it brands the state before the highest tribunal, the tribunal 
 of moral conscience. The view is sometimes encountered, it is 
 true, and it is not a novel one, that for the state there are no 
 moral obligations; that besides the legal tenets, a state is bound 
 only by the law which its own advantage prescribes; indeed, 
 the opposite view is almost scornfully derided as being out of 
 touch with the world of realitj. This standpoint is justified 
 only if the binding force of moral norms is denied also for 
 the individual; but if it is recognized for the individual, the 
 logical conclusion is inevitable that moral norms exist equally 
 for the state. We need not decide here whether, and to what 
 extent, the moral laws governing a state differ from those which 
 concern the individual. The reproach of being out of touch 
 with the world applies, in reality, to this negative doctrine. It 
 is blind to the palpable existence of a public conscience. One 
 example is sufficient. The question whether or not a state may 
 go to war is not a question of international law. A state does 
 not act against international law by going to war, even without 
 the shadow of a reason, unless bound by special treaties not 
 to do so. Yet perhaps nothing at the outbreak of a war occu- 
 pies public opinion so much as the question which state is re- 
 sponsible for the war. This question lies exclusively in the 
 sphere of morals; it is asked whether a state was morally jus- 
 tified in declaring war, or whether its motives were base and 
 reprehensible. How heavily the weight of this moral judgment 
 is felt is proved in every w^ar by the fact that each party to 
 the conflict does his utmost to prove his own innocence and the 
 enemy's guilt; it is moral condemnation which the state shuns, 
 even though it may not have violated any tenet of law. 
 
 A state, therefore, has by no means reached the highest point 
 when it can say only that it is observing the provisions of in- 
 ternational law. Yet even this we used to look upon as some- 
 thing of an achievement. We thought our possession in inter- 
 national law important, and we hoped to attain much through 
 its medium — it was to contribute towards the realization of 
 
586 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 high ideals of humanity. But finer distinctions must be made 
 at this point. 
 
 Everywhere in international law it Is a question only of the 
 duties and rights of states in their relations to each other. These 
 duties and rights are of twofold origin. On the one hand, they 
 are laid down in abstract legal rules, based on the development 
 of legal custom and treaties. Even though only a number of 
 states — not all of them — may have taken part in the creation of 
 these rules, they may yet be termed "general international law," 
 for they arise from general considerations, applying equally to 
 all individual states, and should, therefore, be universally bind- 
 ing. Or else the rights and duties of states rest on a special 
 regulation of Interests by treaty between certain states. These 
 two kinds of law are of unequal value. The special regulation 
 is the result of a concrete situation relative to the power and 
 interests of these particular states ; the obligations into which the 
 Individual state enters in this relation are to the interest of the 
 other state only, and not to the interest of all states in general. 
 Hence such treaty agreements may change, they may cease, new 
 ones may originate, without affecting the interests of the world 
 or universal law. Only those stipulations are within the range 
 of general law, which refer, In the first place, to the genesis of 
 such agreements — that is to say, to the prerequisites of their valid- 
 ity; in the second, to their binding force as long as they hold 
 good ; and finally, to the manner in which they may terminate. 
 
 The general provisions of international law, however, with 
 which alone we are here concerned, do not aim to serve the 
 particular interest of individual states. They serve higher pur- 
 poses, viz., the interests of all states, and therefore the interests 
 of all mankind. The state is the legal form In which a nation 
 seeks to realize Its ideals of life. It is not an end in itself but 
 a means to this end. The individual state, however, Is not 
 alone in the world, there are others beside it. And the Ideals 
 which every individual state has to realize, harmonize fortu- 
 nately to a great extent with those of other states: there are 
 common state Interests, on the one hand, and there are interests 
 of mankind, on the other. To serve these is the aim and pur- 
 pose of general International law. 
 
 This international law Is based primarily on the fundamental 
 idea of "equality": the individual states, without regard to their 
 size, their position and their resources, are supposed to be equal 
 before international law, to enjoy equal rights. International 
 law thus aims to be a protection for the weaker states; might is 
 not to be greater than right. On this basis, international law 
 
MODERN GERMANY 587 
 
 alms at assisting the states in peace time to attain peaceful ends 
 common to them all, which, however, the individual state acting 
 for itself could not attain at all, or only imperfectly. Inter- 
 national law furnishes the rules governing the collaboration of 
 the several states for the purpose of attaining these ends, it 
 creates in this respect a "union of interests" {Zweckverband) 
 of states. 
 
 On war, too, international law strives to exert a regulating 
 influence, though war in itself would seem to break all legal 
 rules. Everlasting peace was not to be hoped for. This dream 
 of noble minds was bound to be shattered by stern reality. The 
 task of international law^ was, as far as possible, to prevent war, 
 but if it should break out, to humanize it. The object of every 
 war is the overthrow of the adversary; but without prejudice to 
 this object, it can still be restricted in the interest of humanity. 
 The laws of war are throughout a compromise between what is 
 necessary for attaining the object of the war and what humanity 
 demands. 
 
 The first aim is to prevent an unnecessary extension of the 
 war beyond the circle of the Powers directly engaged in it. 
 Accordingly, rules concerning the rights and duties of neu- 
 trals have been laid down. Similarly, the so-called Congo Act 
 was conceived as a means of excluding a large part of the Afri- 
 can colonial possessions of the belligerent states from the theater 
 of war, since it could not fail to be evident to every state that 
 to carry war into the colonies would be detrimental to the com- 
 mon interest of the dominant white race, without in any w^ay 
 affecting the issue of the war. The limitation imposed by the 
 Congo Act would have benefited all European states alike. 
 Germany was ready to adhere to it; but England, disregarding 
 the obligation she had entered into, precipitated hostilities in 
 Africa. 
 
 Furthermore, international law aims at limiting the war in 
 regard to the persons engaged. It is the supreme idea of the 
 laws of war that the conflict should be waged solely between the 
 states, through their armies and navies, not by and against indi- 
 vidual citizens. Two principles result from this. One is, that 
 individual citizens may not fight against the hostile state unless 
 they belong to the army or navy. A state which tolerates or 
 even encourages the mischief of the "hedge war" {franctireur 
 war) grossly offends against this fundamental principle of inter- 
 national law, and necessarily brings immeasurable harm down 
 upon the population. No one can have any doubt whatever that 
 the participation of private individuals in hostilities against a 
 
588 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 modern army is without influence on the outcome of the war. 
 The losses that can be inflicted on the enemy are too small to 
 be of consequence, considering the huge size of modern armies; 
 but their inevitable result is that they call forth frightful retri- 
 bution. For the resulting sufferings and horrors no one can be 
 held legally responsible save the state that tolerates or encour- 
 ages the participation of its citizens. 
 
 The second conclusion is that the state may vs^age war only 
 against the foreign state itself — that is to say, against the army 
 and navy, not against peaceful individuals. Through the labor 
 of centuries this principle has ripened more and more into the 
 noblest fruit of international law. It has already been reaHzed 
 by the regulations relative to war on land, which provide that 
 life, freedom, honor and property of non-participant citizens must 
 be unconditionally protected, as far as military exigencies per- 
 mit; plundering is forbidden, and the individual must be indem- 
 nified for what is taken from him for military purposes. We 
 were justified in praising this principle as one of the noblest 
 victories of humane sentiment. In naval warfare, it is true, 
 the inviolability of private property, even if it is not to serve for 
 military purposes, has not yet been recognized. At the Hague 
 Conference, Germany, with other great states, declared her readi- 
 ness to recognize this principle; owing to England's opposition, 
 it came to naught; and thus to the present day right of capture 
 at sea is tolerated by international law. It is the last remnant 
 of a barbarous viewpoint which we had hoped to be able to 
 abolish in a not too-distant future. 
 
 On war as it is carried on between the armies and navies 
 international law has sought to impose restrictions. The ob- 
 ject of war can be attained even if the cruelties formerly 
 practised are avoided. Proceeding from this idea, the Geneva 
 Convention was concluded, which purposed to ease the lot of 
 the wounded and sick of the armies in the field; this was ex- 
 tended to include naval warfare. Regulations were drawn up 
 for the treatment of prisoners of war which were prompted by 
 the clear and humane consideration that war captivity is not 
 penal custody; the prisoner in serving his state has only done 
 his duty, he has done what the enemy state expects its own 
 citizens to do. The ends of war are sufficiently served if, by 
 being kept in custody, the prisoner is prevented from aiding his 
 country; more than this is not called for. 
 
 Finally, international law has endeavored, by a number of 
 separate provisions, to restrict the means of warfare. There are 
 warlike actions which are doubtless injurious to the enemy, 
 
MODERN GERMANY 589 
 
 but the advantages of which are out of all proportion to their 
 cruelty; they are therefore forbidden. Included in this category 
 is the prohibition of using bullets which cause unnecessarily cruel 
 wounds (the so-called dum-dum bullets). 
 
 This is the substance of the ideas of international law, roughly 
 sketched and considered more with regard to broad outlines 
 than to detailed provisions, which are as yet imperfect and but 
 slowly developing. If merely that which has so far been 
 built up as international law were really observed, war would 
 still be terrible enough; nevertheless, without prejudice to the 
 political purposes involved, it would be more humane, and an 
 infinite amount of suffering would be prevented which has no 
 influence on the issue of the w^ar. 
 
 Naturally, however, there was no overlooking the fact that 
 the realization of this hope was uncertain. International law 
 of all existing law is the weakest. Its weakness, to begin with, 
 lies in the nature of its origin. The substance of international 
 law as above described is only slowly developing and growing, 
 the elaboration in detail of the principles is often uncertain and 
 controversial ; only in parts has the law as yet assumed definite 
 form. This will be discussed more fully later on. Secondly, its 
 weakness lies in the means of its realization. International law 
 purports to regulate the relations of independent, sovereign 
 states. There is no organized power to enforce its observance, 
 there can be none. Even if an impartial court existed, competent 
 to decide what is right or wrong in a dispute touching interna- 
 tional law, and even if the individual states had pledged them- 
 selves to appear before this court and to submit to its verdict, there 
 would yet be no means of compelling them to do so. If a bellig- 
 erent state does not keep within the bounds of international law, 
 if it infringes the law, the injured state has no other means of 
 coercion than such as it can itself enforce. This is what is 
 called reprisals : in international law the principle is unchallenged 
 that a breach of the law may be returned by a breach of the 
 law, that wrong may be answered by wrong. On this point, 
 too, we shall have more to say later on. Nowhere else in the 
 legal sphere does this principle exist. It is explained by the 
 fact that there is no coercion possible against a state. 
 
 There are people, not only in Germany, but also abroad, who 
 from this have drawn the conclusion that international law is 
 no true law. This is a mistake. More and more modern science 
 recognizes that compulsion by a superior power is no inherent 
 characteristic of a legal precept. Here is not the place to en- 
 large on this; it may even be regarded as superfluous, for after 
 
590 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 all the question is merely theoretical. In reality no one denies 
 that international law — whether it be true law, or whether it 
 be unworthy of the name — has nevertheless binding force. And 
 because we admit this binding force, we feel in conscience and 
 honor bound to respect it. At the same time adherence to its 
 precepts is a demand of practical wisdom, provided a state is not 
 thinking merely of the advantage of the moment, but is pursuing 
 a far-sighted policy looking towards the future. International law 
 does not aim at the advantage of an individual state, but at that 
 of all states ; what it gives to one, it also gives to the other ; what 
 it takes from a state in limiting its free scope, it returns in the 
 form of increased protection. The more keenly the moral duty of 
 observing this legal order is felt and the more clearly its bene- 
 fits are realized, the more secure is international law as a living 
 force. 
 
 This, however, implies at the same time a restriction of the 
 validity of international law. Though it is a moral duty to 
 observe international law, that duty may yet cease to exist: 
 all law of nations breaks down in the case of necessity, a neces- 
 sity from which there is no escape within the bounds of the law. 
 International law is not an end in itself, its aim is to coordinate 
 the existence of the states. The moment the very life of a state 
 is threatened and its existence cannot be saved except by a breach 
 of the law, the inhibitions of the law cease. To adhere to 
 the law in the greatest of danger and not to seize upon the last 
 means of salvation because of an obstruction of international 
 law, would he to commit suicide. The law cannot demand 
 suicide. The question becomes a purely moral one, transcend- 
 ing all legal points of view. No state has ever regarded and 
 treated, or will ever regard and treat, the matter otherwise. 
 This refers in particular, but by no means alone, to treaty obli- 
 gations which one state has entered into with other states. Such 
 was the position of Germany in relation to Belgium at the out- 
 break of the war. As is well known, Germany undertook 
 scrupulously to respect the integrity of Belgium, as well as of 
 the French territory on the Continent, and to spare the north 
 coast of France, provided England would undertake to remain 
 neutral. Not only did England reject this proposal, but Sir 
 Edward Grey, in reply to the urgent request of the German 
 ambassador, as to whether he could not give the terms on which 
 England would remain neutral, replied he must definitely de- 
 cline to make any promise of neutrality, England must keep 
 her hands free. From this moment Germany could no longer 
 doubt that, besides Russia and France, she would have to face 
 
MODERN GERMANY 591 
 
 England in the Impending war. Thus arose the emergency in 
 which deliverance could be found only in the violation of Bel- 
 gium's neutrality. The action of Germany, who only demanded 
 free passage through Belgium, was therefore justified, even if 
 we leave out of consideration the fact that Belgium herself had 
 already renounced her privilege as a neutral by grossly violating 
 the duties of her position as such. Concerning this, however, it 
 is unnecessary to say more. The matter is cited only by way of 
 example, not for excuse or apology. 
 
 In admitting the plea of necessity, it is true, great care must 
 be exercised. A case of necessity can be pleaded only when 
 the state has really no other means of helping itself than by 
 the breach. If there are other means at hand, a plea of neces- 
 sity cannot be put forward. That is obvious, and it is equally 
 obvious that needless cruelties, needless fury, needless destruc- 
 tion can never be justified by necessity. Necessity is an excuse 
 only for an action which is required in order to save oneself 
 from danger; the action must be necessary for the purpose of 
 self-preservation. 
 
 This effect of necessity is not peculiar to International law; 
 it exists In all law. It exists in civil law, as well as in criminal 
 law, it exists even in the law that regulates the constitutional 
 life of a nation — it expresses the limitation of validity Inherent 
 in all law. But It is of particular importance In International 
 law. In the clash of interests In private life there is still the 
 state, standing above the individual. Its duty is to watch over 
 the general Interest; it can therefore, in the case of necessity, 
 weigh the conflicting interests and, having weighed them, deny 
 the individual the right of necessity in certain circumstances, just 
 as it can demand the life of the individual — e. g., the life of the 
 soldier in war — realizing that life is not the highest of posses- 
 sions. But with states it is otherwise. Whether In this case 
 the supreme and most important interests of the state are at 
 stake, whether therefore the state is justified in breaking the 
 law — this the state concerned must decide for Itself, since there 
 is no superior court, no superior power. Here the law of neces- 
 sity fully asserts itself with all Its primitive force. The well- 
 known "clause of honor" of the arbitration treaties (under which 
 all disputes involving the vital interests, the honor or the Inde- 
 pendence of the state are excepted from arbitration) rests on 
 the same idea, which is the source of the law of necessity. 
 
 Such discussions border on the ultimate problems of thought. 
 The validity of international law, in the last resort, is rooted in 
 
592 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 values of a higher order, whence it derives its strength and, at 
 the same time, its limitation. 
 
 Despite all these restrictions, despite the uncertainty of its 
 sources, despite the weakness of its realization, international law 
 has yet one advantage over all other law. It takes precedence 
 of all laws on account of its immense and unique range, ad- 
 dressing, as it does, all states, that is to say the whole of man- 
 kind, and striving to reconcile the most stupendous conflicts of 
 interests. Further, it is entitled to precedence on account of 
 the moral elevation, the pure humaneness of the aims which it 
 pursues. 
 
 How often has all this been announced at international con- 
 gresses ! With what enthusiasm has it been acclaimed ! Par- 
 ticularly in Germany the appreciation of the value of interna- 
 tional law was steadily growing, as was only natural in view 
 of the German character, which is fond of cultivating inter- 
 national relations. Just as the Germans endeavor to appropri- 
 ate the masterpieces of all literatures by translations, just as 
 they have a liking for the study of foreign languages, and 
 as they are perhaps the most travelled of all the peoples of 
 the world, so they have always, often beyond the immediate 
 need, expounded the idea that above the individual states there 
 is a higher community, a community of civilization. The era 
 of peace maintained by us for more than forty-three years, often 
 with difficulty and at the sacrifice of our pride, has witnessed in 
 Germany an enormous increase in the work of promoting inter- 
 national relations in all spheres of life — economy, sociology, 
 science, art, religion — and in particular of law, in the province 
 of which, as history shows, a large part of the intellectual en- 
 ergy of Germany for centuries has been occupied. The en- 
 deavors to consolidate private law, to create a "world law," 
 have been the subject in Germany of theoretical research and 
 practical advancement; the great attempts to find by scientific 
 methods uniform principles of international private law for all 
 nations of the earth, have in the last century emanated chiefly 
 from Germany; and Germany has joyfully assisted in the 
 Hague discussions concerning a consolidation by treaty of this 
 department of law, hand in hand with the other great civilized 
 nations, whose merits we have gladly recognized. Above all, 
 has the law of nations in a growing measure received loving care 
 in Germany, as an almost endless literature on the subject shows. 
 
 At each of the numerous universities in the German Empire 
 there are one, or in some cases, several chairs of international 
 law. Again and again, particularly in the last decades, the Fed- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 593 
 
 eral governments have insisted that special attention be devoted 
 to the study of international law. Nobody in Germany can 
 be a member of the legal profession or enter the administration 
 of the state without having passed an examination in this sub- 
 ject. And not only with statesmen and scholars has interna- 
 tional law found this consideration, but even in the minds of 
 the people at large the consciousness of its value has increased. 
 It is only natural that the masses are not so keenly interested 
 in this branch as in other parts of the law. The greatest and 
 most immediate interest is always claimed by relations of private 
 law, which daily obtrude themselves on the attention; interest 
 is further aroused by penal law in the repression of crime, and by 
 public law through the development of the internal affairs of the 
 state; comparatively seldom does the importance of international 
 law, as affecting the personal relations of individuals, make itself 
 felt in peace time. But unremitting informative work in this 
 regard, too, has gradually awakened and strengthened the recog- 
 nition by the masses of the importance of international law. 
 This is of the highest value, for law is a live factor only when 
 supported by the consciousness of the whole nation: the activity 
 of statesmen can, in the long run, be only the expression of that 
 which the nation desires. 
 
 Such was the condition of international law up to the summer 
 of last year. What a picture do we now behold in the World 
 War! Is it really more than a heap of ruins that we have 
 before us? A disastrous confusion seems to have taken root 
 abroad in the heads of otherwise high-minded men ; one is tempted 
 to feel that in certain circles the moral value of international 
 law has not been grasped at all. Breaches of the most estab- 
 lished principles of international law have been advocated quite 
 openly in foreign newspapers and speeches. A man like Wells 
 has publicly preached the "franctireur w^ar" against Germany in 
 its most appalling form; Clemenceau has demanded a treat- 
 ment of the wounded Germans in France which would be a 
 violation of all international law. However, words are not 
 deeds. Let us dismiss these overheated outbursts, and look 
 only at the facts. There also a sad picture of devastation is 
 revealed. It is not our task here to enumerate in detail all the 
 offences against the rules of international law committed by our 
 enemies, still less to defend Germany against the charges made 
 against her by the foreign press, and even by foreign govern- 
 ments. There would be nothing gained in doing so, unless com- 
 plete evidence in support of and against the charges were given, 
 
594 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 and that is not possible here; besides, it has already been suffi- 
 ciently done in other works (see especially Der Welthrieg und 
 das Volkerrecht, by Miiller, Berlin, 1915). We shall here 
 try only to find certain leading principles by which matters 
 can be judged, and we shall make use of specific cases only by 
 way of example. 
 
 All violations of international law are divisible into two great 
 groups: either a rule of international law is broken by action, or 
 its very validity is denied. 
 
 To begin with actual infringements of the law, in cases 
 where the validity of the law is nevertheless recognized. The 
 infringement of a legal norm by no means implies in itself a 
 denial of the rule's validity; it proves only that the conception 
 of the binding force of the norm is not strong enough to triumph 
 over the motives that prompt to its infringement. When a 
 thief steals, he thereby breaks the law respecting property, but 
 he does not deny its validity, he breaks it although he recog- 
 nizes its validity. 
 
 In judging the significance of actual breaches of international 
 law, a distinction must be made, as to whether they are com- 
 mitted by individuals or whether they emanate from the state 
 itself. By breaches of international law by individuals are to 
 be understood acts contrary to international law which are com- 
 mitted by individual soldiers or subordinate officers, or by offi- 
 cials not in a commanding position. In accepting this definition 
 theoretical hair-splitting must be discarded. For, strictly speak- 
 ing, there is no such thing as a violation of international law 
 by an individual, for the rules make the state, not the individual, 
 directly responsible for legal duties. But the state issues to its 
 soldiers and officials injunctions and prohibitions in accordance 
 with international law, and if the individual disobeys these in- 
 junctions and prohibitions, he indirectly acts contrary to inter- 
 national law. Breaches of the law by individuals happen every- 
 where in private and public life; it is easy to understand that 
 the laws of peace have a better chance of being observed than 
 the laws of war. In war there are many circumstances condu- 
 cive to infringements of the law. The soldier must act 
 promptly, he is often given no time for thought, the circumstances 
 are frequently obscure, and errors are possible. Adding thereto 
 the power of temptation, the heat of passions unchained by war, 
 and the difficulty of drawing the line between what is justified 
 by the necessity of war and what is contrary to law, one will 
 find it easy to understand why transgressions occur. Nor should 
 too great weight be given to an individual act, considering the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 595 
 
 enormous number of men employed in war — up to this time 
 mankind had had no experience whatever of the consequences 
 w^hich arise when armies of millions take the field. All these 
 are reasons which permit of attaching minor importance to 
 breaches of international law by individuals, however deplor- 
 able and sometimes even atrocious they may be. 
 
 That international law is nevertheless recognized as valid, 
 despite its breach by individuals, is shown especially by the fact 
 that the state to which the perpetrator belongs almost always 
 endeavors to deny the breach of the law. It either denies that 
 the alleged infringement happened at all — as, for instance, dis- 
 claiming that the Red Cross was fired upon, that the flag of 
 truce was abused, that houses were plundered, non-participant 
 citizens wounded, ill treated, dragged into prison, or killed — 
 or it is claimed that conditions prevailed which divested the 
 deed of an unlawful character — as, again, that an open town 
 which was fired on had been defended, that a truce bearer who 
 was made prisoner had by espionage forfeited protection. The 
 controversy thus shifts into the sphere of facts. There is no 
 impartial tribunal above the states concerned that could ascer- 
 tain the truth in strict justice, and passions make bad judges. 
 Our government has gone out of its way to ascertain the truth 
 of accusations against our enemies by taking evidence on oath, 
 with absolute calmness and impartiality, in the same manner as 
 crimes committed within the state are investigated, and the re- 
 sult is bad enough. I refer only to the atrocious deeds perpetrated 
 at Orchies, which have been proved and the proofs of which have 
 been published by our Foreign Office.^ Nor has our govern- 
 ment shirked trouble in investigating alleged breaches of law 
 by Germans, whenever the allegations were not, as they usually 
 were, merely sweeping condemnations, but statements of spe- 
 cific single acts, with date and locality clearly indicated. 
 
 Following the legal maxim ^'ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, 
 non qui negaf (proof is incumbent upon the accuser, not the 
 defendant), Germany might have waited till the other side had 
 
 1 This refers to atrocities committed by French franctireurs at Orchies, in 
 the Department du Nord, described in an official war telegram as follows: 
 "In the village twenty Germans who had been wounded in the engagement of 
 the previous day were found mutilated in a ghastly manner. Their ears and 
 noses had been cut off and their mouths and the openings left after the 
 removal of their noses, stuffed with sawdust. They had then been left to 
 die from suft'ocation." The correctness of the report was confirmed by two 
 French clergymen over their signatures, and as further substantiation there 
 exists a report made to the German Emperor by the chief of the field hos- 
 pital work, Sergeant-General von Schjerning. A punitive expedition was sent 
 by the German forces to Orchies, which was razed to the ground. The case 
 was presented in a very different light in the allied press, which said that 
 the Germans, without provocation, had destroyed the village in a barbarous 
 manner. This took place in the latter part of September, 19 14. 
 
596 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 disclosed Its proof — the French government has not up till now 
 seen fit to publish proofs of the serious charges brought by it — 
 but the German government in the interest of the good repu- 
 tation of our army has not rested its case there. Unquestion- 
 ably on the German side, also, regrettable occurrences have 
 taken place. Despite the severe discipline which has always 
 prevailed in the German army and is traditional with the German 
 soldier, it is impossible that among the millions of Germans in 
 the field there should not be some who commit brutal acts. 
 But what our soldiers have been accused of by the enemy has 
 on closer investigation nearly always been found to be pure in- 
 vention, and the inquiry on our part has been carried through 
 by means of evidence on oath with every assurance of impar- 
 tiality. Often enough the depositions of the enemy subjects 
 themselves have shown the alleged facts to be pure fabrication. 
 Sometimes they were creations of a fancy heated by war, an 
 imagination grown hysterical; at other times exaggerations of 
 insignificant little incidents passed from mouth to mouth, and 
 sometimes — unfortunately very frequently — intentional malicious 
 calumnies. 
 
 For the rest, not a few of the accusations raised in the press 
 against the German army collapse from the legal point of view. 
 It is quite astonishing with what audacity alleged breaches of 
 international law by the German army are judged by people 
 who have not the least notion of international law. Absolutely 
 unquestioned principles are flatly ignored. I shall give just one 
 example, which is, however, a very weighty one. It is rec- 
 ognized by law that an attack on private persons and private prop- 
 erty by the troops is justified when committed after an unlawful 
 attack from the opposing side, and when it is made in self-de- 
 fense, by way of retribution, as punishment, or when impera- 
 tively demanded in the interest of the safety of the military 
 movements. In Belgium, German soldiers have been treacher- 
 ously fired on by persons not in the army, and other treachery 
 has been perpetrated. Thereupon the houses where this took 
 place were burnt down, the inhabitants killed or removed. This 
 has been done and held lawful by all nations in all previous 
 wars. Likewise, it is not unlawful to kill wounded enemies 
 who shoot at the advancing troops from behind. But to speak 
 of such things is to waste one's breath. Amongst those who are 
 at all familiar with international law, with the ideas laid down 
 by it and with the manner in which it has been handled in 
 previous wars, there can be no dispute concerning all these 
 things. Against bad will no explanation, no proof is of avail. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 597 
 
 The breaches of law so far mentioned are prima facie acts 
 of individuals only. In this connection the Hague Convention 
 respecting war on land expressly stipulates in article 3 that a 
 state is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming 
 part of its armed forces. But this responsibility can be taken 
 only to mean that the state is liable for them, and is in particular 
 liable to pay compensation (as the article referred to explicitly 
 lays down) for all such acts. It cannot be construed as mean- 
 ing that the state itself can be charged with every act committed 
 by the individual. It is simply liability of the state for the 
 fault of a third party, not for any fault of its own. Quidquid 
 delirant Achivi, plcctuntur reges. The more numerous such 
 acts are, and the higher the position of the perpetrators, the more 
 must they be regarded as evidence of the low level of the general 
 moral and legal standard in the army, or the civil service, and 
 consequently in the whole nation. It is proof of a lack of cul- 
 tural breeding. And in so far as the state has the duty of at- 
 tending to the necessary education and instruction of the people 
 — since in this respect the state and the people are inseparable — 
 the reproach of an inferior civilization comes home to the state 
 itself. 
 
 But there are cases where the state can be regarded as the 
 guilty party, from a legal point of view, in the event of such acts 
 by individuals. What is meant when we speak of the wrong 
 of the state itself as against the wrong of individuals? Acts 
 committed by the state are only acts committed by individuals. 
 But we consider the state itself guilty, whenever the final deci- 
 sion rests with the persons who conduct the state, the highest 
 leaders of its policies and its army, in short, when its masters 
 in the field and in the office, in their position as such, commit 
 the breach of law. For they are the "organs" of the state, their 
 official action is the action of the state itself. Charges made 
 against them, therefore, affect the state directly. And this 
 charge is a serious one. For the grounds of excuse which in 
 the case of the misdeeds of individuals allow of a milder verdict, 
 fail when the wrong is done by the state itself ; we are not faced 
 by deeds committed under the impulse of the moment, but by 
 acts coolly preconceived and planned in cold blood. Therefore, 
 they weigh much heavier than deeds of individuals. 
 
 A state can become personally guilty in various ways. First, 
 by itself ordering the breach of the law, either in a specific 
 case or by a general order. The individual soldiers or subor- 
 dinate officials who act in observance of such command can, in 
 this event, be considered only as tools, while the state itself is 
 
598 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the really guilty one. A great number of such commands is- 
 sued by our adversaries have come to our knowledge; of many 
 of them, which they would certainly have wished might remain 
 secret, the original documents have fallen into our hands. The 
 order of the Chief in Command of the lOth Russian Army, 
 dated December 5, 1914, may serve as an example: 
 
 "The Commander in Chief has enjoined strict observance of the com- 
 mand of Headquarters that in the attack all able-bodied male inhabitants 
 of the age of ten years and upwards are to be driven in front of the 
 troops!!" 
 
 Oftener, indirect responsibility of the organs of the state 
 must be assumed : the more frequent the excesses on the part of 
 individuals, the more they cease to be mere exceptions ; the 
 longer the state hesitates to punish them, the more justified is 
 the inference that these transgressions are due to orders from 
 those higher in authority. When a large number of Russians 
 taken prisoners were found in possession of material for set- 
 ting fire to houses, the inference could not fail to be that instruc- 
 tions had been given from higher quarters. So, too, when dur- 
 ing the retreat of the Russian army from the Mazurian dis- 
 trict and Bukowina, a number of villages which did not lie in 
 the war zone proper were devastated, and when trains were 
 laden with stolen property. Such a train was found when 
 the Russian army was surrounded in the Mazurian winter battle. 
 
 The state is also guilty when it fails to prevent future recur- 
 rence of unlawful acts of individuals — soldiers or others — by 
 taking appropriate measures; when, in other words, it tolerates 
 their continuance. Granting that the administration in France, 
 England and Russia were taken by surprise and were therefore 
 powerless against the first outbreaks of the people's passion 
 against Germans abroad, it is certain that when these hideous 
 outrages continued they did not prevent them but let events 
 take their course, standing by with folded arms. 
 
 Further, the state makes itself an accomplice if, instead of pro- 
 ceeding against outrages committed, it neglects to punish the of- 
 fenders according to criminal law. As far as we can judge 
 from Germany, our enemies have been sadly remiss in this re- 
 spect. In London and in Russia, for instance, members of the 
 mobs which at the outbreak of the war committed the most hor- 
 rible outrages against the lives and property of Germans, if 
 they were brought to trial at all were nearly always acquitted 
 in court. Wherever breaches of international law abroad were 
 punished, public opinion has been openly opposed to it; as, fox 
 
MODERN GERMANY 599 
 
 instance, the recent mild sentence passed on a mayor in the east 
 of France, who, although a civilian, had fired at a German 
 aviator. Germany may point with pride to the strict justice 
 meted out by her courts. Misdeeds of individual soldiers in the 
 field against subjects of the enemy state have been punished as 
 unrelentingly as if they had been committed against Germans, 
 and German public opinion entirely approves thereof. The 
 proofs of all this lie open to every one. 
 
 Finally, complicity of the state must be recognized when it 
 employs troops which it must have known beforehand would 
 not respect the laws and customs of war existing between civil- 
 ized nations. Out of every corner of the earth our enemies 
 have brought auxilian^ troops to the European seat of war; 
 Germany has had to sacrifice her best blood in fighting semi- 
 savages, according to whose standard of civilization every atrocity 
 in war seems natural. It stands to reason that such troops 
 have no conception of or respect for international law, and that 
 they wnll behave differently from our popular armies in which 
 the flower of the nation is fighting, and where there is hardly 
 a single man who has not had a regular school training. Yet 
 our enemies dare to assert that we are the barbarians! It would 
 be a laughing matter, if it were not so serious. 
 
 Still, in all these cases we have only actual breaches of the 
 law on the part of the state, whereas the rule of the law itself 
 remains recognized, its validity is not disputed. This is made 
 evident by the attempt to dispute the facts alleged as constitut- 
 ing the breach of law. Such attempts, in the absence of an 
 impartial court, may be continued, at least for a certain period, 
 with a chance of success, till the facts speak too loudly. In 
 Lon^vy, close to the Franco-German frontier, a large supply 
 of "dum-dum" bullets, together with other war material, was 
 found. The fact could not be disputed. France, however, de- 
 nies that these bullets were intended for use in the war, con- 
 tending that they were intended for manoeuvring purposes only. 
 This excuse shows that the prohibition of the use of "dum- 
 dum" bullets itself is recognized as valid. It is difficult, how- 
 ever, to regard this as more than a subterfuge. That England 
 intended "dum-dum" bullets to be used in the war is proved 
 by the sworn statements of two captured British officers on 
 whom such bullets were found. 
 
 In other instances the action of the state is admitted, but 
 at the same time the appearance of right is maintained, by ad- 
 vancing legal pretexts which are quite obviously such, and noth- 
 ing more. The fact that Germans who happened to be abroad 
 
boo MODERN GERMANY 
 
 at the outbreak of war were Imprisoned in large numbers and 
 kept in concentration camps was against all international law. 
 In order to cloak this, the pretext that these Germans had car- 
 ried on espionage was made without any grounds for suspicion. 
 Such cases are particularly revolting when judicial procedure is 
 abused in order to lend a semblance of right to a measure con- 
 trary to international law. We had such an experience with 
 the French. German army surgeons were convicted of plun- 
 dering on the most futile pretexts. Fortunately, a technical 
 error in procedure led to a second hearing, which resulted in 
 the acquittal of the accused. Still, the first verdict remains 
 inexcusable. The shooting of distinguished Germans in jVIo- 
 rocco amounts to a judicial murder of the w^orst kind; it is a 
 stain on the honor of French law courts. No sensible person 
 could doubt the unreliability of the native witnesses for the 
 prosecution. 
 
 Finally, many quite obvious breaches of law have taken place 
 without any attempt being made to disguise the facts, while the 
 validity of the legal rule which w-as broken has not been denied 
 at all. Under this classification fall such deeds as the English 
 destruction of the German auxiliary cruiser Kaiser H ilhelm der 
 Grosse, in neutral waters, the British seizure of the hospital 
 ship Ophelia, the theft and destruction of mail bound for, and 
 leaving, Germany. These instances could be multiplied indefi- 
 nitely, as one breach of the law has followed hard upon the 
 other. But enough. We sought only to give examples. 
 
 What is of far greater moment is the fact that in this war 
 many breaches of law have occurred under the plea that the 
 rules offended against had no force in international law — rules 
 whose recognition up to that time had been looked upon as ab- 
 solutely established. It is not a case of denying the facts, but of 
 denying the binding force of the rule contravened. The dis- 
 pute is confined to the legal sphere, and is therefore more dan- 
 gerous. It is a greater threat to the future. For while one may 
 always trust that a particular violation of law will not occur 
 again, the denial of the validity of the legal rule itself amounts 
 to an announcement that a similar course will be taken in the 
 future. The fact that a denial of legal norms on so broad a 
 scale is possible at all is due to the nature of the sources of 
 international law. 
 
 For centuries the general law of nations has, in substance, 
 been developed by practical usage without conscious law-making 
 — that is, as unwritten law\ In the last decades, especially in 
 
MODERN GERMANY 6oi 
 
 the sphere of the law of war, conscious law-making through in- 
 ternational agreements has steadily gained ground. In this con- 
 nection may be mentioned the numerous agreements of the two 
 Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the new Geneva 
 Convention of 1906 and the Declaration of London of 1909. 
 The formulation of international law in these conventions has 
 been hailed with great satisfaction and often^ enthusiastically 
 praised. But it has entailed an evil consequence — an inclina- 
 tion to overestimate the conventions. There is a temptation to 
 consider the convention as the sole source of international law 
 and the conventional law as the only existing international law. 
 Both of these assumptions would be erroneous. 
 
 Above all, it must never be forgotten that the embodiment 
 of international law in state treaties is not identical with a codi- 
 fication, such as civil law has undergone in France in the Code 
 Civil, and in Germany in the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch. The 
 state treaties do not comprise the whole sphere of the law of 
 war; some important matters are not even touched upon. And 
 even where a matter is regulated, it is in no way a complete 
 and exclusive codification of the recognized law. On the con- 
 trary, in both respects, the unwritten law, unless modified by 
 treaty, continues in force by the side of it. This is stated in 
 clear terms in several of the conventions. The Hague con- 
 vention with respect to war on land in its preamble explicitly 
 states : 
 
 "It has not, how^ever, been found possible at present to 
 agree in regard to regulations covering all the circumstances 
 which arise in practice. On the other hand, the high con- 
 tracting parties do not intend that unforeseen cases should, 
 in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbi- 
 trary judgment of military commanders. Until a more com- 
 plete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high con- 
 tracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases 
 not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhab- 
 itants and the belligerents remain under the protection and 
 the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
 from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the 
 laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 
 
 To the same effect, only more briefly and therefore more dis- 
 tinctly, in the convention relative to restrictions with regard to 
 the exercise of the right of capture in naval w^ar, the desire is 
 expressed to frame a certain number of rules, "without affecting 
 
6o2 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the common law now in force in respect to those matters which 
 that law has left unsettled" ; and in the convention concerning 
 the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, it is 
 similarly stated: "seeing that even if it is not possible at present 
 to concert measures applicable to all cases which may in prac- 
 tice occur and which are not covered by the present convention 
 ■ — it is, nevertheless, expedient to take into consideration the 
 general principles of the law of nations." 
 
 Therefore, all other international law, i. e., law not laid 
 dow^n in the conventions, continues to coexist along with the 
 conventional law. The first leading principle, therefore, is that 
 the fact that a rule is not mentioned in the conventions does not 
 permit the conclusion that it is not valid law. Or, in other 
 words, if specific duties are imposed on a state by a conven- 
 tion, that fact is not proof that such duties are the only ones 
 it must observe. Are we to think, e. g., that a neutral state 
 really satisfies the demands of international law, if it merely 
 complies with the duties mentioned by the two Hague Con- 
 ventions respecting neutrality? What a paltry thing neutrality 
 would be if its meaning were limited to those few meagre stip- 
 ulations ! The law established by agreement must needs be com- 
 plemented by the law not so established. 
 
 However, to be able to recognize this unestablished law is not 
 always easy. It originates from actual practice, which is the 
 expression on the part of the states of that which they hold to 
 be right. This common opinion of what is right, as evidenced 
 in actual practice, is binding on the individual state, because the 
 latter is a member of the community of states. General inter- 
 national law is common law, rooted in a community of states 
 of equal rank; it is not autonomous law resulting from the sway 
 of a dominant state. Precedents in international law are fre- 
 quently scarce and contradictory ; interpretation may be doubtful, 
 since it happens that the law as established by practice is often 
 in dispute. There may even be points on which actual precedents 
 are altogether lacking. Numberless questions of law which the 
 present war has raised have not been settled either by written 
 sources or by previous practice. In such cases we are faced by 
 a gap in the law; but that does not mean that there is a lawless 
 vacuum. The gap must be filled up, and that causes many new 
 uncertainties and possibilities of dispute. 
 
 The preamble referred to in the convention respecting the 
 laws and customs of a war on land states very significantly: 
 ^'The high contracting parties have not had in mind that un- 
 foreseen cases should be left to the arbitrary judgment of the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 603 
 
 military commanders." That must be amplified to mean that 
 they are not left at all to the will of the individual states, 
 nor to its legislation. When England now attempts to justify 
 the order of her Admiralty to British merchant vessels to fly 
 neutral flags, on the ground that according to British law such 
 misuse of flags is allowed, nothing at all is proved in reference 
 to the question of international law. England cannot by means 
 of a British statute acquire rights against other states. Rather 
 must the gap be filled in the manner customary in the sphere 
 of law, by analogy, and ultimately by falling back on broad 
 legal ideas — in this case on the ultimate basic principles of in- 
 ternational law, as they have gradually taken shape in common 
 opinion. Only from these broad principles can the decision in 
 the individual case be derived. 
 
 This, too, has found expression in the preamble referred to 
 in the convention concerning war on land. With a view to 
 supplementing the written law, it refers, first, to the established 
 customs, and in the second instance, when such established custom 
 is lacking, to the ''principles of the law of nations, as they result 
 from . . . the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
 conscience." The expression is perhaps not above criticism, but 
 in substance it amounts to what we have said. For instance, 
 the necessary supplement of stipulations concerning the duties of 
 neutrals must be sought in the essential meaning of neutrality 
 itself. To be neutral means to remain impartial, not to favor 
 any of the belligerents. The neutral state is, therefore, in duty 
 bound, in eventualities not expressly mentioned in the conven- 
 tions, to refrain from doing anything which would amount to 
 taking sides with one of the parties to the war, and not to tol- 
 erate anything on the part of the population that would favor 
 the one or the other war-party. Nothing short of this is true 
 neutrality. It is instructive to observe in this war to what vary- 
 ing extent the various neutral states recognize and adhere to 
 these unwritten duties as neutrals. 
 
 The unwritten international law has, however, an even 
 greater import. Considered formally, the validity of the written 
 sources of the law can be disputed in the present w^ar. A treaty 
 binds a state only when "ratified" by it. England has not rati- 
 fied either the London Declaration or the Hague Conventions 
 numbers 5 and 13, which concern the duties of neutrals in naval 
 war or in war on land, nor convention number 10 concerning 
 the adaptation to naval war of the Geneva Convention ; while 
 Russia has not ratified convention number 8 relative to con- 
 tact mines nor number 11 relative to restrictions with regard to 
 
6o4 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 the exercise of the right of capture in naval war. Serbia, Mon- 
 tenegro and Turkey have not ratified any of the conventions 
 of the Second Hague Conference, and Montenegro has even re- 
 fused to recognize the new Geneva Convention. Formally, there- 
 fore, all these conventions are not binding on the state that has 
 not ratified them. Indeed, this non-validity extends even fur- 
 ther. All the conventions just cited contain a clause that might 
 be termed the ''general participation clause" and which provides 
 that these conventions shall bind the states that have ratified 
 them only in case all belligerent Powers have ratified them. The 
 participation in the war of one state that is not a party to the 
 conventions excludes their binding force as regards all the Pow- 
 ers. Only when a convention is nothing but a new formulation 
 of a former one (as, for instance, the convention of 1907 con- 
 cerning war on land compared to that of 1899, and the new 
 Geneva Convention compared to the old one), is the new conven- 
 tion to be valid, at least between those Powers which have rati- 
 fied it, even though there may be a Power participating in the 
 war which has only ratified the old and not the new conven- 
 tion. In respect to such a Power, the old convention remains 
 in force. Apart from this important exception, there is no bind- 
 ing force, formally speaking, for any of the belligerents, in any 
 of the above-mentioned conventions, in consequence of the par- 
 ticipation in the war by Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. But 
 in so far as the conventions are to be considered as not valid, the 
 unwritten international law retains its force; it is applicable in- 
 stead of the written law. 
 
 In determining this unwritten law, however, the written 
 sources play a prominent part. In fact their formal non-validity 
 is scarcely of importance. For, in large measure, it was not in- 
 tended by the conventions to make new law, but rather to 
 formulate the existing law, deciding at the same time ques- 
 tions in dispute and adding improvements and completions. This, 
 too, is directly expressed in the preamble to various conventions 
 (The Hague Convention numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, the new 
 Geneva Convention, the Declaration of London). The formal 
 non-validity of a convention is, therefore, no proof that its con- 
 tents are not valid law, just the same; we may, therefore, add to 
 our first principle this second one: A rule is not to be con- 
 sidered invalid because it is formulated in a convention which 
 itself is not formally recognized as in force. 
 
 Conversely, it may be said, the various conventions, notwith- 
 standing their formal non-validity, when cautiously employed, 
 lend themselves as sources for determining the law that had ex- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 605 
 
 isted apart from them. More than this. The laying down of 
 certain principles of law in the conventions has, even though it 
 may not have imparted formal, binding force, nevertheless gained 
 a dedsive influence on, and confirmed public opinion regarding the 
 legal points involved. The written word, even when formally 
 invalid, is nevertheless not without force. The form which has 
 been given in the conventions to legal principles has become part 
 and parcel of the public's legal views and given shape to them. 
 This is evident from the fact that some belligerents have, at 
 least partly, acknowledged the binding force of the conventions. 
 Typical in this respect is the reply of the German government 
 in answer to the protests by the British government concerning 
 alleged breaches by Germany of the convention concerning 
 mines. The reply, while acknowledging that since Rus- 
 sia had not ratified the convention, it was not valid, owing to 
 the "general participation clause," even as between Germany and 
 England, goes on to say: "Nevertheless, the German govern- 
 ment of its own free will considers itself as bound by it." In 
 like manner, Germany has observed all the conventions; in par- 
 ticular has she recognized the Declaration of London concern- 
 ing the laws of naval war as binding through her incorpora- 
 tion of its stipulations in the German "Prize Regulations" 
 {Prisenordnung) . 
 
 In lamentable contrast to this attitude of Germany is that of 
 England, particularly in regard to the Declaration of London, 
 which she has practically demolished. This has been forcibly 
 and clearly set forth in the memorandum of February 4, 191 5, 
 which the German government issued, together with her decla- 
 ration of British waters as a war zone. England announced her 
 readiness to recognize the Declaration of London as a whole, but 
 subsequently, by a number of additional orders, modified the 
 Declaration to such an extent in all essential details that hardly 
 anything of it has been left. Let us now read the "Introduc- 
 tory Stipulation" w^ith which this convention, signed though not 
 ratified by England, opens. It is as follows: "The Signatory 
 Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following 
 chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized 
 principles of international law." England has herself thereby 
 acknowledged that the law contained in the convention was valid 
 before the war. Moreover: England herself has previously 
 claimed (in her favor) as valid law a number of the principles 
 laid down in the Declaration of London — that is to say, she has 
 actually applied them as law. For her now to disclaim them is 
 sheer arbitrariness. There have always been disputes as to the 
 
6o6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 meaning of the term contraband, but the broad interpretation 
 which England gives to it, the elimination of the long recognized 
 distinction between relative and absolute contraband, and the 
 disavowal of the principles concerning blockade by the closing 
 of the North Sea, are, all of them, breaches of law which can- 
 not be excused on the plea of the formal non-validity of the Dec- 
 laration of London. These are measures undertaken solely with 
 the desire to ruin Germany economically, without considering 
 whether the methods adopted are in harmony with international 
 law or not. That such harmony does not exist, there cannot 
 really be the slightest doubt from a legal point of view. 
 
 Finally, even within the law written and recognized as valid, 
 it is indispensable to fall back on general legal principles. The 
 written word, after all, never can be more than a guide toward 
 a correct decision in legal questions. Its bearing must first be 
 ascertained by scientific method, a task which has to be solved in 
 international law in the same manner as in all other branches. 
 
 In the first place, the words have to be interpreted, their mean- 
 ing has to be ascertained. Interpretation of law is governed 
 by settled principles recognized by the jurisprudence of all na- 
 tions. The letter of the law may not be slavishly adhered to, but 
 at the same time it may not be brushed aside in an arbitrary 
 manner — as is, unfortunately, too often done. If every state 
 were at liberty to read white where black is set down, the writ- 
 ten law would be altogether divested of meaning. Its signifi- 
 cance would cease. An interpretation that lends another mean- 
 ing to a clause than the only one which its phraseology renders 
 possible, must be justified by the law in question itself, other- 
 wise it is merely arbitrary. Under the Hague conventions, the 
 bombarding of undefended towns is forbidden. Now, German 
 war vessels have bombarded the town of Libau. Libau is a 
 fortified port. Projectiles which were thrown did not fall within 
 the fortifications, but hit the commercial quarter of the city. 
 In Russia it was said that the rule forbidding the bombardment 
 of undefended towns was thereby violated. Obviously the phrase 
 "undefended town" in this case is given a sense no one had 
 previously contemplated, or could have contemplated. The for- 
 tified part and the commercial quarter together constitute the 
 "town," and a town is defended if any part of it is defended. 
 
 A particularly remarkable example of the high-handed man- 
 ner in which England, with France and Russia in her wake, 
 circumvents obvious law by tricks of interpretation, is offered by 
 her treatment of Article 23 (h) of the regulations concerning 
 war on land. Here it is expressly stated that it is forbidden "to 
 
MODERN GERMANY 607 
 
 ^declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law 
 '•the rights and actions of the hostile part)^" The text is abso- 
 lutely clear. Nevertheless, England at the outbreak of war 
 issued an order forbidding payments to be made to Germany 
 or Austria-Hungary, and France — here, too, England's docile 
 pupil — has made this prohibition of payment even more strin- 
 gent. On September 27th, she declared that all contracts con- 
 cluded since the outbreak of war with a subject of her enemies 
 should ipso facto become null and void, and that all contracts 
 previously entered into might, on application by the French 
 debtor, be declared void, provided they had not yet gone into 
 effect. England's action was no surprise. In fact, the prohibi- 
 tion of payment conforms with the provisions of English pri- 
 vate law, which has not been able to rid itself of the antiquated 
 idea that the individual citizen of the enemy state is in himself 
 an "alien enemy." 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, in 191 1, in agreement v/ith the majority of 
 English legal writers, declared, that in the opinion of the British 
 government this rule of the English law had not been elimi- 
 nated by the stipulation referred to regarding the regulations 
 of war on land; that Article 23 (h) simply provided that the 
 military commanders of occupied enemy territory might not sus- 
 pend or declare inadmissible in court rights and claims of the 
 inhabitants of that territory. This interpretation is materially 
 incorrect, if for no other reason than because it is not until we 
 come to the third section (Article 42 et seq.) that the regulations 
 concerning war on land discuss the rights and duties of the 
 military authorities in occupied enemy territory, while in the 
 second section, in which Article 23 is found, the general aim in 
 view is to bring about a restriction of "the means of injuring 
 the enemy." What fully settles the point is the fact that at 
 the Hague negotiations the German delegates expressly pointed 
 out the broader meaning which they gave to Article 23 (h) 
 (which had been proposed by them), and that no opposition was 
 raised from any quarter. This is recorded in the minutes of 
 the meeting. It was the very purpose of the proposed Article 23 
 (h) to counteract the existing English law; its aim was to se- 
 cure respect for an important consequence resulting from the 
 great principle of the law of war, viz., the inviolability of pri- 
 vate property. If England held a different v'ltw, she should 
 have brought it forvv^ard at that time. She should not have agreed 
 to the article and — three years later — have ratified it, with the 
 mental reservation to interpret it in a manner different to that 
 in which it was meant by the other Powers. It is unnecessary 
 
6o8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 to state how such behavior would be characterized if occurring in 
 other domains of law/ 
 
 France's proceeding is even worse. That she understood Ar- 
 ticle 23 (h) in the same manner as Germany, there cannot be 
 the least doubt; practically the whole of her legal literature 
 supports the correct interpretation. Since the war, however, she 
 has simply disavowed her previous legal opinion, and, as the 
 docile pupil of England, adopted English measures — nay, out- 
 done the British themselves. A vassal's loyalty evidently gets 
 the better of legal conscience. The less said about Russian ac- 
 complishment the better; it seems that for Russia the bounds of 
 international law have ceased to exist altogether. 
 
 On the other hand, the search for what is law must not stop 
 at the ascertainment of the meaning of the written word. Con- 
 siderations based on the general principles lead to results which 
 should take precedence of the words of the written law. The 
 law-maker — and the state that by conventions creates regulations 
 of international law is on a level with him — by his abstract rules 
 always intends to regulate the real conditions as these are known 
 to him. He is never in a position to foresee the entire manifold 
 variety of cases that may occur in real life. Thus it may easily 
 happen that he lays down a rule that is too general; a case of 
 a peculiar character may arise which falls under the general 
 rule, yet the conclusion may be justified that the law-maker, had 
 he contemplated this case in advance, would have restricted his 
 general rule. The idea which gave rise to that general rule does 
 not apply in this case. And even if the rule at the time it was 
 framed was really applicable in all cases then possible, it may 
 be that after its creation conditions have changed, new facts 
 have arisen and new cases have become possible, which at the 
 time of framing the rule could not have been foreseen, and for 
 which it is now no longer suitable. If in such a case the old rule 
 were to be applied then, in the words of Mephistopheles, reason 
 would become a sham, beneficence a vexation. 
 
 In the jurisprudence of all nations it is recognized that in 
 such cases the administration of the law must be at liberty to 
 deviate from the letter; the legal rule remains inapplicable be- 
 cause the supposition for which alone it is intended does not 
 apply. The German commercial code formerly contained special 
 legal rules for the conclusion of contracts between absent parties. 
 Then the telephone was invented. Without hesitation, juris- 
 prudence dealing with the conclusion of contracts by telephone 
 
 * In this connection see Strupp's treatise in Zeitschrift fiir internationales Recht, 
 19 13, Vol. XXIII, Sec. 2, p. 118 ff. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 609 
 
 has treated as inapplicable the principles regulating the con- 
 clusion of contract between absent parties, although these prin- 
 ciples applied according to the letter. In this sense the old legal 
 maxim holds good : "Cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa'' 
 New actual conditions may call for new legal regulations; we 
 then assume that the law has a gap, and we fill it in the same 
 manner as we fill any other gap. 
 
 This general maxim of jurisprudential procedure is particu- 
 larly important in the case of the law of war. Technical science 
 and politics may offer surprises which of necessity destroy the 
 framework of the old rules of international law. Who at the 
 time of the framing of the rules on naval warfare thought of 
 the possibilities of submarine warfare as witnessed to-day? Had 
 they been anticipated, special rules would have been made. The 
 old principles of naval warfare cannot in this case be applied 
 without modification, new rules are required. In this connec- 
 tion, the principles of neutrality offer still another example in 
 point: Although in the conventions concerning neutrality it is 
 declared that a neutral power is not called upon to prevent the 
 export of arms and ammunition for the benefit of one or the 
 other of the belligerents, circumstances may be such that this 
 stipulation; despite its general application, can no longer take 
 effect. It is devoid of meaning, unless under existing condi- 
 tions the delivery of munitions is possible to both parties, for the 
 ultimate essence of neutrality is that the neutral state must not 
 actually favor any party, it must treat both with impartiality. 
 This general principle of impartiality in treatment has there- 
 fore found expression in both of the Hague Conventions here in 
 question (Convention No. 5, Article 9; Convention No. 13, Ar- 
 ticle 9, and Introduction, fifth paragraph). 
 
 In the present war Germany and Austria-Hungary are sur- 
 rounded on almost all sides by belligerent enemies. The geo- 
 graphical position is such that a delivery of munitions from the 
 United States to Germany and Austria-Hungary is actually out 
 of the question. In such a case it is the duty, the legal duty, 
 despite the stipulations quoted from the Hague Conventions, to 
 prevent the delivery to our enemies of war-material. That alone 
 conforms with the legal nature of neutrality, and therefore with 
 international law^ rightly conceived. A contrary procedure is 
 opposed to it. Laws must be interpreted in this true spirit, not 
 by mere verbal arguments — this truth is as old as jurisprudence 
 itself: "Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac 
 potestatem/' says old Celsus. 
 
6io MODERN GERMANY 
 
 And what will now happen? With sorrow we watch this 
 whole spectacle, international law broken and shattered, a lofty 
 possession of human civilization trodden in the dust. We can 
 no longer close our eyes to the fact that international law has 
 not stood the test in this war. If the law relating to war on 
 land, though actually often broken, has to some extent at least 
 remained recognized, the law relating to naval warfare has been 
 almost completely rejected, leaving us face to face with a verit- 
 able chaos. This is very significant. The whole international 
 law is a community law; it depends, as was said in the be- 
 ginning, on the recognition of the fact that the states are co- 
 ordinated. This conception had become established on the Con- 
 tinent, between the Continental Powers now at war, as can be 
 seen from the manner in which war is being conducted on land. 
 It is different, however, at sea. England has never actually rec- 
 ognized the other states as standing on a footing of equality 
 with her on the water. If the aim of her policy has always 
 been to let no other naval Power arise, if she has consistently 
 endeavored to be the strongest naval Power, the question in- 
 volved was here one of actual strength. But in addition she 
 has always regarded herself as the ruling sea Power in the sense 
 that in questions of maritime law she considered her will as de- 
 cisive for all other European Powers. 
 
 One is justified in the assumption that the conception has not 
 yet found unreserved acceptance in England, even in theory, that 
 the law relating to naval w^arfare is the law of a community of 
 states of equal rank, to which every state whether great or small 
 must submit in like manner. Many of her breaches of mari- 
 time lavv^ may, perhaps, be accounted for by this theoretic back- 
 wardness: England does not regard them as breaches of law, be- 
 cause she still innocently adheres to the opinion that international 
 law in maritime matters is, in fact, English law. As a matter 
 of fact her behavior in questions of naval warfare is altogether 
 based on the principle, "Law at sea is only what I recognize as 
 law, no matter what has been before, no matter what my previ- 
 ous practice may have been, and I recognize only that as law 
 which suits my purpose." All disputes concerning international 
 law would, indeed, speedily cease, if all states had but the good 
 sense to recognize this one maxim as absolute: Law at sea is 
 what England decides to be law. 
 
 What will now happen? Since international law is exter- 
 nally powerless, in that there is no tribunal which can compel 
 the observance of the law, only one remedy remains to the of- 
 fended state; it must help itself. It has been previously men- 
 
MODERN GERMANY 6ii 
 
 tioned that everywhere the right of retribution, the right of re- 
 prisal, is recognized. Every state that has suffered injury in 
 respect to international law^ acts lawfully when it returns one 
 breach of international law by another. But the nature of the 
 reprisals is altogether different in the two groups of breaches of 
 the law which we have distinguished. Where the international 
 law, though broken, is still recognized as valid, a reprisal means 
 only that the injured state returns the injury by a similar in- 
 jury, or if need be, by a breach of another kind. The state 
 thereby breaks the law itself, but breaks it legally; the act is 
 a permissible one. The state breaks the law because it recog- 
 nizes the validity of the law which the opponent has violated 
 and because it wishes to assert it. The reprisal is a breach of 
 the law for the sake of protecting the law. Nevertheless, it is 
 to be applied with great caution. It is useful in so far as the 
 hope is justified that by applying the reprisal the enemy will be 
 induced in the future to forbear from further breaches of in- 
 ternational law. But it is liable to fail only too easily in its 
 object and to conjure up even worse evil. 
 
 According to the principles of international law, a reprisal, 
 because it is a lawful action, does not by any means warrant 
 counter-reprisals. In reality, the danger that a retaliative meas- 
 ure will be reciprocated by a further retaliative measure is ob- 
 vious; and thus, instead of compelling the opponent to respect 
 international law, the reprisal may bring about an increase in 
 breaches of it. Only in rare instances has Germany resorted to 
 reprisals. When the news concerning the imprisonment of non- 
 combatant German subjects in France proved to be true, the 
 German government by way of retaliation imprisoned the 
 French citizens who happened to be in Germany; she retaliated 
 against the unpardonable confinement by England of Germ.an 
 subjects in concentration camps, by imprisoning British sub- 
 jects in Germany. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the 
 confinement of the French and British subjects in Germany is 
 very lenient; they are deprived of their liberty, but for the rest 
 every hardship is spared them, in striking contradistinction to 
 what — according to unimpeachable reports — was, and still is, the 
 lot of at least some of the unfortunate Germans abroad. It is 
 difficult to restrain one's feeling in thinking of the treatment 
 of German w^omen and children by the English in East Asia, 
 or in remembering how a civilized state like France has dragged 
 off Germans to unhealthy parts of tropical Africa, not to speak 
 of that which is taking place in Russia. On the other hand, 
 Germany has refrained from rendering like for like. On no 
 
6i2 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 occasion has the violation of the Red Cross been reciprocated 
 by any sort of retaliatory measure. The judicial murder of 
 Casablanca could easily have been avenged, since we have a large 
 portion of France in our possession. It has not been done. The 
 respect for international law, the sense of duty which civiliza- 
 tion imposes, was powerful enough to drown the call for retali- 
 ation. 
 
 Things are, however, different when legal rules are repudi- 
 ated. All law of nations, according to its nature, is mutual, 
 because it aims to regulate the relations of states to one another. 
 As soon, therefore, as one state in its relation to its enemy refuses 
 to acknowledge any longer the validity of a rule of law, such 
 provision ceases to be binding on the enemy, also. That is, in- 
 deed, the gist of the "general participation clause," which is con- 
 tained in nearly all conventions: No belligerent state shall in 
 regard to international law be more favorably situated than its 
 opponent; a rule which is not binding for the one is not bind- 
 ing for the other. All legal rules, therefore, which one party 
 refuses to accept as binding lose their binding force for the op- 
 ponent also, and if one party puts forward a new legal rule the 
 enemy may do likewise. It must be admitted that international 
 law is a law of weak vitality, in that an individual war-party, if 
 evilly inclined, can render it invalid. Through the English and 
 French prohibition against payments to us, the above-mentioned 
 article of the regulations of war on land ceased to bind Ger- 
 many: we were then at liberty to reply to this prohibition of 
 payment by an identical one in respect to those states, and we 
 did so — although in a very moderate manner. In Germany the 
 foreign claims are merely suspended, not abolished, and foreign 
 private property, though placed under supervision and admin- 
 istration, has in no instance been illegally confiscated. 
 
 England has from the start rendered invalid in its most im- 
 portant provisions the Declaration of London, which according 
 to its own wording must be treated as a whole and cannot be 
 separated. Accordingly, its binding force automatically ceased 
 to exist for Germany, who had at first recognized it. A legal 
 norm cannot bind the one if it does not bind the other. There- 
 fore, Germany was absolutely right when, in imitation of Eng- 
 land's methods of carrying on naval warfare, she declared the 
 English coastal waters a war zone. The rights of neutrals were 
 not thereby prejudiced. If a subject of a neutral Power during 
 a war on land ventures upon the battle-field, a bullet may hit him ; 
 the belligerent is under no obligation to silence his rifles and ar- 
 tillery because they may strike the subject of a neutral Power. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 613 
 
 Nor is Germany responsible if, in the naval war which, after her 
 own manner and with the means at her disposal, she is waging 
 against England, a neutral ship that ventures into the war zone 
 comes to grief. If in a duel a non-participant places himself so 
 that one of the parties has to choose between not fighting or hurt- 
 ing the onlooker, and if this onlooker insists that he must not be 
 hurt, he prevents this duellist from defending himself and thereby 
 actually favors the other party. Is this really to be called neu- 
 trality? England not only wishes to damage Germany by her 
 methods of procedure, she also abuses the rights of neutrals in the 
 most barefaced manner. She represents her treatment of Ger- 
 many as a retributive measure — wrongly so, for Germany had 
 fully observed the Declaration of London, as well as all other 
 maritime laws of war, until their breach by England. But even 
 if she were entitled to retaliate upon Germany — she is not so 
 entitled, as has been said — this would never excuse her viola- 
 tion of the rights of neutrals. She is now going even further: 
 in her latest measures she does not hesitate to discard the old- 
 established rules of the Declaration of Paris, which have enjoyed 
 undisputed validity from the formal point of view. The whole 
 maritime law of war seems to collapse before our eyes. 
 
 The procedure of our opponents, which runs counter to inter- 
 national law, entails the danger that through resorting to re- 
 prisals and counter-reprisals the evils of the war will grow 
 more and more extensive, that the methods governing it will 
 grow more and more merciless, bloody and ghastly. And even 
 beyond this application of reprisals, there is the further danger 
 that, on account of so many infractions, the rulers of states, 
 armies and navies, and the nations generally, will in the end cease 
 to believe in the sacredness of international law. It must be 
 observed with sorrow that the consciousness of the nations regard- 
 ing international law as a binding force, a consciousness which 
 was happily growing, is now on the wane. For this reason it 
 is to be feared that each individual state which suffers from the 
 breaches of the law committed by its enemies will, in the end, 
 cease to regard itself as bound by anything, and will consult 
 only its own momentary advantage, with the sword as the sole 
 arbiter. If this once comes to be the case, war will finally turn 
 into a struggle for complete annihilation among the civilized 
 nations. 
 
 The loss which this war has caused and is apparently still 
 going to cause to international law is immense. Nevertheless, 
 we do not despair of the future of international law — at least 
 not if, as we hope, Germany be victorious. It will be one of our 
 
6i4 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 chief solicitudes then to see that a new international law is built 
 up on broader and more liberal principles. All international law 
 is founded on the conception of equal rights for all nations. 
 Germany has never aspired to world-dominion, nor will she ever 
 do so in the future; history has taught us, only too clearly, that 
 world-supremacy is a delusive blessing. Germany wants light 
 and air for herself, but she also wants every nation to live and 
 prosper in its own individual way. We are convinced that there 
 is room for all in the world, and that the happiness and well- 
 being of one nation does not stand in the way of another's hap- 
 piness, but that, on the contrary, it increases it. England, 
 however, cannot free herself of the idea that at sea she is su- 
 preme, that there her will alone is paramount. Too long have 
 the peoples of the earth submitted to this. The hour is near, we 
 trust, when they need do so no longer. We are waging this 
 struggle not only for ourselves, for our maintenance as a state, 
 for our existence as a nation, for our share in the culture of hu- 
 mankind, but we are in the last resort fighting it in the interest 
 of all nations. This may not be realized to-day, but the time 
 will come when the war will be looked upon from this point 
 of view. The word of the great Dutchman, that the sea is free, 
 has not up to this time been a truth. It shall become a truth, 
 and this will be due to Germany. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE MEANING OF THE WAR 
 
 PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 
 
 THE English are fond of comparing the war which they and 
 their aUies are waging against us to that waged against 
 Napoleon I. They accuse us of purposing to subjugate the Conti- 
 nent to our domination in order to crush and rob England. The re- 
 quirements of w^arfare, it is true, make it imperative that we 
 should gain to a certain point the ascendancy over our Conti- 
 nental enemies, in order to grapple with England, and force 
 her to make peace. But that our policy has been guided by this 
 intention for years cannot be accepted by any impartial student 
 of contemporary history. If this had been our purpose, we 
 would have taken advantage of England's dilemma in the Boer 
 War and of that of Russia in the Japanese War to render one or 
 the other of our present adversaries innocuous. We made no 
 attempt to do so. Rather has our policy been to keep peace as 
 long as this was compatible with the honor and vital interests 
 of our people. Our chances for further progress were vastly 
 greater through the development of our forces in peaceful com- 
 petition with other nations than by a world war, in which all 
 the other Powers except ourselves had a clear and fixed aim in 
 view as the prize of victory. The resemblance of the present 
 war to the Napoleonic conflict consists only in the fact that Eng- 
 land has again set her Continental allies against that Power 
 which she at present regards as the chief opponent to her su- 
 premacy at sea and in international trade. 
 
 It is absurd — in view of the political history of the past 
 twenty years — to speak of Germany's ambition for world domin- 
 ion as like that of Napoleon I. From our point of view the 
 present crisis resembles rather that which the Prussia of Fred- 
 erick the Great endured in the Seven Years' War. To-day the 
 German Empire is fighting for its existence as a Great Power 
 just as the Prussian State did at that time. The question for us 
 is whether we shall be able to maintain our position in the 
 ranks of the World Powers, or whether our opponents will sue-, 
 ceed in ousting us from that position. Allied with us, Austria- 
 Hungary, too, is defending her existence as a Great Power. The 
 
 615 
 
6i6 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 two Central European Powers are in danger of being crushed by 
 the border countries of our continent. These border countries, 
 favored by greater possibilites of expanding beyond the boun- 
 daries of Europe, and united by a community of interests — which 
 is probably only temporary — are endeavoring to cut off the Cen- 
 tral Powers from the outside world, and to reduce their strength 
 to such an extent that they would be harmless as competitors in 
 world politics. 
 
 We must frustrate this attempt and prevent, if possible, a 
 repetition of similar dangerous crises. Our chief and imme- 
 diate goal is to overthrow the plans of our enemies, to teach them 
 the necessary respect for our arms on land and sea, to break the 
 iron ring which has paralyzed our world politics for so long with 
 its concentric pressure, and to gain and secure the possibility for 
 free development of our forces and for undisturbed pursuit of 
 our vital interests in the world. We want to maintain our 
 place in the sun. Nor shall we allow ourselves to be ousted 
 from the ranks of World Powers, in spite of our confined posi- 
 tion on the Continent. We must endeavor to strengthen our 
 position in such a manner that the dangers now threatening us 
 will be reduced as much as possible. But we are far from en- 
 tertaining plans of world domination such as are pursued by 
 England and perhaps Russia. The pubhc, it is true, has a 
 rather hazy conception of the meaning of the phrase "World 
 Power." Certain minor German publicists think that a World 
 Power must be boundless in its demands and its ambition for 
 power. That is not the real significance of this term. Such is 
 certainly not the goal of practical German politics. We do not 
 understand by a World Power one which dominates and dic- 
 tates to the world, nor a new Rome that does not suffer any 
 other Power besides itself to enjoy equal rights. We take the 
 term as meaning a Great Power within the bounds of the new 
 world system of states, a Power of that type which is at once 
 a result and a requirement of the enlarged circumstances of the 
 world. We wish to stand as a World Power next to other 
 World Powers in the future community of states, just as we 
 have stood as a Great Power next to Great Powers in the 
 hitherto existing European state system. It would be contrary 
 to the spirit in which we wage this war were we to lay claim 
 to a supremacy such as England possesses or desires, which threat- 
 ens the independence of other nations. This British supremacy 
 must be ended, but it must not be transferred from one Power 
 to another. Moreover, there is much to indicate that the world 
 supremacy of one Power would be much more unbearable in the 
 
MODERN GERMANY 617 
 
 new world system of states than it has been so far In the European 
 state system. 
 
 The idea on which our policy is based is, therefore, not that 
 of world domination, but rather that of the balance of power. 
 In this connection we must enter a protest against the way in 
 which this conception has for centuries been falsified by England. 
 That which is understood in England by the European balance 
 of power is nothing more nor less than the principle that the Con- 
 tinental Powers must fight, balance and neutralize one another, 
 so that Britain can establish her maritime and commercial domi- 
 nance without let or hindrance. Things are no different to-day in 
 this respect than two hundred years ago. This S5^stem of the bal- 
 ance of power is, according to England's idea, to be limited to 
 Europe. As a World Power, England does not form an integral 
 part of this system. She lays claim only to control and regulate it. 
 In the future world system of states there is to be, according 
 to England's conception, no balance of power, because this 
 would be incompatible with England's supremacy at sea and in 
 commerce. European balance of power is for England only a 
 catchword, a deceptive formula which cloaks her plans of world 
 domination. The real balance of power in the world system of 
 states for which we are striving would be based on the premise 
 that England renounce her claims to absolute supremacy at sea. 
 
 This will be difficult to accomplish. The economic structure 
 of modern England is so dependent on her supremacy at sea 
 that its abolition might have the most disastrous results. Eng- 
 land has become a purely industrial state and has allowed her 
 agriculture to decay; she needs imperatively a regular overseas 
 influx of provisions and raw materials to feed her population 
 and keep her factories going. The safeguarding of these im- 
 ports is the vital question for the United Kingdom; if in a 
 war they were cut off for more than six weeks, or even seriously 
 interrupted, England would be forced by starvation and unem- 
 ployment to make peace. Absolute supremacy at sea, therefore, 
 is regarded in England as a condition necessary to the existence 
 of the British state. If you ask what divine or human law 
 apportioned supremacy at sea to the Britons for all times, the 
 Englishman will draw your attention to the conditions just 
 analyzed, with that naivete with which he confounds his na- 
 tional interests with those of the universe. 
 
 Lust for world-dominion has always had a disintegrating ef- 
 fect upon the national structure of states which have yielded to 
 it. The British dependence on sea traffic is a weakness which 
 has been produced by the lust for maritime and commercial 
 
6i8 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 supremacy in the world. Is this weakness of England sufficient 
 reason for the other Powers to tolerate forever her domination 
 at sea? To a certain extent this seemed a passable excuse so 
 long as England's requirements for existence did not come into 
 irreconcilable conflict with those of other great nations. As 
 matters stand in this war, however, England's supremacy at 
 sea is meant not only to safeguard her own national existence, 
 but to starve the German people, nearly seventy million souls. 
 England is carrying on this war primarily not against our army 
 and our fleet, but against our women and children. For us, 
 therefore, the necessity is just as urgent that this British tyranny 
 be abolished. The world may be sure that we are determined 
 to resort to all possible means to defend our life in this war, 
 which has been forced upon us by England. The relentlessness 
 with which we are compelled to carry on the war is solely the 
 fault of England. The solution of the underlying differences 
 would have been very easy. England need only have agreed 
 to what all nations demanded, that the right of capture at sea 
 should be abolished, at least for provisions and raw material. 
 Then the appeal to starvation as an ally in this war would have 
 been impossible. England thought that in this she possessed a 
 powerful weapon which she did not wish to surrender. Per- 
 haps she will learn by experience that this weapon is two-edged 
 and that its use is fraught with dangers which make it appear 
 advisable to relinquish it. 
 
 Though the English may cling to the idea which permeates 
 all their political life that to them as God's chosen people is 
 due an especially favored place in the world, they cannot expect 
 us to agree to this conception and bow to its consequences. 
 We hope, too, that the other nations on whom the yoke of 
 British naval supremacy weighs heavily will pull themselves to- 
 gether and cast it ofi. The British fleet Is not only a means 
 of safeguarding British vital interests, but is also a very dan- 
 gerous weapon which menaces all coasts and is able to subject 
 all non-British shipping to a paralyzing control. England has 
 at all times unscrupulously and arbitrarily twisted and manipu- 
 lated the laws of naval warfare in the interest of her sole 
 supremacy. She has always infringed on the rights of neutrals 
 in naval warfare in order to damage as much as possible all her 
 competitors — not alone her enemies — in trade and shipping. In 
 the present war the timid protests, made not only by the small 
 naval powers, but even by the United States — protests against 
 the damage to their shipping and against misuse of their flag 
 by England, the mistress of the seas — die timidly away. Has it 
 
MODERN GERMANY 619 
 
 really come to such a pass that the world cannot make a stand 
 against England's naval tyranny, and that the old call for free- 
 dom of the seas has become only an empty word? We cannot 
 and will not believe this. We have taken up arms against 
 England's domination of the sea and of the world at large, be- 
 cause she is menacing our vital interests by a murderous naval 
 warfare contrary to international law. In answer to England's 
 acts, we are carrying on the war with extreme measures and 
 ruthlessness, not because superior power, but because the 
 knavery and deceit of our enemies and our own consequent 
 necessity force us to do so. But we are far removed from 
 wishing to substitute a German tyranny for that of Eng- 
 land. We are fighting for the freedom of the seas and the 
 humane laws of naval warfare formulated in the Declaration 
 of London of 1909, which are in accordance with the concep- 
 tions of the rights and laws of all nations, but not with the 
 special interests of England, who prevented the adoption of 
 these laws. We want to supplement the balance of power on 
 land with the balance of power at sea, to create the only perma- 
 nent and sound foundation for a world system of states. 
 
 In this struggle against British supremacy at sea and world 
 dominion we are fighting for the interests of the world's traffic 
 and trade and for an economic and political prerequisite to the 
 state system of the future. If w^e do not fight this war to the 
 end now, then later on other nations will take it up again. 
 
 Even before the war, England had to relinquish the exercise 
 to its full extent of her maritime supremacy; she had to with- 
 draw a great part of the garrisons from her foreign naval 
 stations, concentrating her forces in home waters. That was 
 the effect of German naval armament. It had already visibly 
 benefited other maritime nations. The pressure which Eng- 
 land had hitherto exercised in foreign continents was decreas- 
 ing perceptibly. 
 
 The great Dominions — whose demonstrations of sympathy 
 and active aid to the motherland are, after all, of only small 
 politico-military value — are, more and more, tending to complete 
 autonomy. The era of colonial rule in Asia and on the north 
 coast of Africa will, it seems likely, soon come to an end, as 
 that in America and Australia has already done. The former 
 dream of the rule of the world by the white race has been de- 
 stroyed by the rise of Japan, and who knows how short a time 
 it may be before the slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics," is realized. 
 The rise of Islam must inevitably be a powerful factor in this 
 change of conditions in the world. Only in Central Africa, 
 
620 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 among the uncivilized negro peoples, does there seem still to be 
 a great future for colonial activity. That activity must, how- 
 ever, limit itself to promoting v^^elfare and morality rather than 
 engaging in the ruthless exploitation of natural treasures and hu- 
 man forces, with an eye to large and immediate profits, as is the 
 practice, for example, in the Belgian Congo. 
 
 The irresistible progress of the littoral countries of the Pa- 
 cific, which makes them the chief problem of trade and politics 
 of the world, is also fateful for British maritime and world 
 dominion. The present war is speeding this development by 
 giving Japan a valuable opportunity, which will perhaps never 
 recur, to make use of her military superiority over China. Will 
 the United States look on quietly at this dangerous proceeding? 
 Is the profit accruing to a few business men for the delivery of 
 munitions of war to our enemies blinding the United States to 
 the fact that this trade is prolonging the war and increasing 
 Japan's opportunity to strengthen her power? Are American 
 sympathies for England greater than American interests? 
 
 But perhaps none of the neutral states has a greater interest in 
 destroying England's naval supremacy than Italy.^ Nature has 
 predestined Italy to the position of supreme Power in the Medi- 
 terranean, but political development has brought it about that 
 to-day the long coast-line of the Apennine peninsula is more a 
 factor of weakness than of strength. England controls, by virtue 
 of her possession of Gibraltar, the western basin of the Mediter- 
 ranean, by her possession of Malta the eastern, and by that of 
 Egypt the Suez Canal. Once Italy had in the all-powerful Brit- 
 ish navy a protector against France, who had come threateningly 
 near to her after the occupation of Tunis. The position of Italy 
 was not ideal, but Great Britain offered her a moderate amount 
 of security. Now England has allied herself with France and 
 entrusted her, within certain limits, with the protection of the 
 Mediterranean. What role could Italy play by the side of a 
 victorious England and France? Of what use would even 
 Trieste be to her, with a growing Slavonic population all around 
 and a hostile hinterland in the rear? Trieste is indispensable to 
 Austria; in Italy's hands it would become a waste place. It is 
 useless now to recall the Dreibund, within the bounds of which 
 Italy satisfactorily promoted her economic and political inter- 
 ests for more than thirty years. We do not know the exact 
 obligations which the Dreibund imposed — especially after the 
 renewal in 191 2. If, in declaring her neutrality, Italy denied 
 
 ^ It is well to recall that this was written early in the year 1915, before 
 Italy had decided to embrace the cause of the Allies. — Translator's note. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 621 
 
 the defensive character of the war, she based her declaration on 
 an interpretation which we naturally refuse to share. But be- 
 hind this explanation are, of course, other reasons to the justice 
 of which we do not, by any means, wish to turn a deaf ear. 
 If, on the other hand, there is now a strong current of public 
 opinion urging her to abandon neutrality and side with the 
 Triple Entente, it is more a mixture of Latin race sentimentality, 
 Irredentist hate of Austria and democratic-republican sympathies 
 that is stirring the national soul, than the sound instinct of po- 
 litical interests. Italy's political interests clearly require a weak- 
 ening of France and England, her superior rivals in the Medi- 
 terranean, and they also require a strengthening of Central 
 Europe. Even in the event of victory, Italy's connection with 
 Republican France would in a country of democratic unrest shake 
 the last remnant of monarchical authority, thereby endangering 
 the course of prudent politics and the very position of power of 
 the country.^ 
 
 Just as Italy is menaced by England and France, so too are 
 the eastern Balkan states — especially Rumania — menaced by 
 Russia. The candid declarations of the Russian ministers and 
 party leaders in the last Duma session (February 9, 191 5) leave 
 no room for doubt that Russia not only aims at the opening of 
 the Dardanelles, but at their outright possession, together with 
 Constantinople and the shores of the Black Sea in Asia Minor. 
 But if the Black Sea thus becomes a Russian sea, how could 
 Rumania escape the danger of complete dependence on her dom- 
 ineering neighbor? In what a situation would she be placed 
 economically, since she has no other access to the ocean except 
 by way of the Dardanelles, through which 95 per cent, of her 
 exports pass? Although the numerous influences which are at 
 work in the country to induce Rumania to join the Triple 
 Entente direct the nationalistic desires of the population towards 
 Transylvanian territory, Rumania's real interests point beyond 
 the Pruth; they demand that she join the Central European 
 "block," with its front turned against Russia, whose victory 
 
 1 While this book was going to press Italy's secession from the Triple 
 Alliance to the side of our enemies took place. It is not possible to discuss 
 this fact here and the literature it has produced, because the motives of the 
 Italian government are not easy to determine. Italy's dependence on England 
 evidently has played as important a part in this situation as the sympathies 
 of the radical Irredentists and Free Masons for France. Article VII of the 
 Triple Alliance treaty does not in any way justify Italy's action, nor had 
 it been interpreted in this sense in August. It is even more difficult to 
 reconcile Italy's stand with Article IV, which bound Italy to maintain a 
 benevolent neutrality in case she should not think it advisable to join her 
 allies in the war. We feel justified, therefore, in using such terms as breach 
 of faith. 
 
622 MODERN GERMANY 
 
 would make Serbia great, but would subject all other Balkan 
 peoples to an insupportable pressure. 
 
 The two great imperialistic currents — the British and the 
 Russian — which have joined in this war against the Central 
 European Powers, are au fond inimical to each other. If Russia 
 holds the Dardanelles, then England's sovereignty in the Medi- 
 terranean, Egypt and the Suez Canal is menaced. It remains to 
 be seen w^hether England will really permit such a change when 
 it becomes imminent. Her hitherto compliant attitude is prob- 
 ably designed to leave to other Powers the odium of opposition 
 to this plan and to gain Russia's sword by prospects which will 
 not be realized for a long time to come. It is certain, however, 
 that Russia and England would soon be at cross-purposes in 
 Asia. Russian expansion in Asia — which Prince Uchtomski, in 
 his great work on the Oriental journey of the then heir to the 
 throne, written in the early nineties, described as the historical 
 mission of Czardom ^ — involves a natural hostility towards the 
 colonizing island people, who in the Far East are scoring signal 
 successes in bringing the influence of west European culture to 
 bear against the Russians, who feel themselves intellectually akin 
 to the Asiatics. The common victory of the two chief exponents 
 of imperialism would at first spell a sort of partition of the 
 world betw^een them, but the final struggle for world dominion 
 would inevitably and speedily follow. 
 
 We are unable to see therein salvation for humanity. We are 
 not only fighting for our own power and independence by trying 
 to stave this off, but for the freedom of all nations. The earth 
 is to be neither Anglo-Saxon nor Muscovite. We do not want 
 world domination by one single nation, but that vigorous co- 
 existence of free nations and states that has hitherto been the 
 foundation of modern Kultur. The Kultur of the newer na- 
 tions would be strangled in the octopus coils of a world-dominat- 
 ing England or Russia, as was once the ancient world in the 
 embrace of world-dominating Rome. British imperialism en- 
 deavors, as Professor Cramb has put it, to give the dominated 
 races an English soul.^ That is characteristic of a nation that 
 has never sought to comprehend and adapt itself to the peculiari- 
 ties of foreign races and nations. The British colonial official is, 
 it is true, able to govern the inhabitants of India, but he does 
 not understand their psycholog)^ English education may be 
 able to impart certain exterior habits of life, but it is not able 
 
 1 Orientreise S. M. des Kaisers von Russland Nikolaus II als Grossfurst- 
 Thronfolger, Prince E. Uchtomski, Leipzig, 1899, Vol. II, p. 388 ff. 
 ^Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914, p. 125. 
 
MODERN GERMANY 623 
 
 to dominate and form Oriental thinking and feeling. The Rus- 
 sians seems to understand the soul of the Orient better, but only 
 in so far as the dull uneducated masses are concerned, the masses 
 who need to be ruled along patriarchal-despotic lines. Russians 
 are essentially foreign to the cultural ideals of the Occident and do 
 not understand them. Even to-day Russian imperialism pro- 
 claims the principle: One God, one Czar, one Empire. With 
 what religious and nationalistic intolerance and with what bar- 
 baric methods this principle is carried out is shown by the treat- 
 ment of the Ruthenians in East Galicia, whom Russia is trying 
 by violent measures to rob of their nationality and of their old 
 allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
 These methods are foreign to the German. We have always 
 had a profounder understanding and higher regard for foreign 
 peculiarities. What w^e regard as the future ideal is a system of 
 World Powers who mutually recognize and respect one an- 
 other's independence and equality, as was formerly the case with 
 the Great Powers in the European community of states. And by 
 the side of these World Powers we want also the smaller or 
 less powerful and less developed states to be safeguarded in their 
 independent existence, provided they do not, if they are our neigh- 
 bors, secretly conspire with our enemies against us. We do not 
 share Lord Salisbury's opinion that the big states must grow 
 greater and ever greater and the small states smaller and fewer. 
 If the necessities of world economics and world politics require 
 a unification of greater political areas, we conceive it as a com- 
 munity of interests of free, independent states, not as the estab- 
 lishment of a world empire according to the British or Russian 
 pattern. And we know that, in forming such a community, 
 much care, tact and patience will be needed. 
 
 We do not stand for any sort of world domination, but for the 
 principle of freedom and equal rights for all the nations of the 
 earth, in so far as they have attained to the necessary stage of civ- 
 ilization. This is in accordance with German nature. It is in 
 this sense that we desire to interpret the much-quoted prophetic 
 words of Emanuel Geibel, one of our noblest poets: ''Am 
 deutschen Wesen soil die Welt genesen." ^ That is the object of 
 German W eltpolitik ; that is also the object of the war. We 
 are not waging it as the aggressor in order to put an end to 
 an untenable position. We are waging it in defense against a 
 long prepared attack of our neighbors, the object of which is to 
 strike us off the list of the World Powers. We are carrying 
 on the war in order to maintain our position in the rank of 
 
 ^ "The spirit of the German race shall heal the sickness of the world." 
 
024 MODERN GERMAX^' 
 
 World Powers, in order :o break the yoke of England's sea and 
 world dominion, but not to succeed to England's position as the 
 ruler of the world. 
 
 We want to found a new balance of power in the world 
 system of states. That is quite a different thing from what the 
 English understand by European balance of power. The false. 
 European balance of power of the EngHsh is a deceptive phan- 
 tasm. It IS merely a means to England's world domination. 
 Real balance of power amongst the World Powers excludes ab- 
 solute domination at sea of any one single Power, and re-estab- 
 lishes the old principle of the freedom of the seas. That it is 
 also of higher ethical value than the English idea of world 
 domination must be clear to every one who perceives a higher 
 ideal in the possibility of free competition of all nations than in 
 the gratification of the national egoism of a single nation, which 
 regards its own welfare as the be-all and the end-ail of the his- 
 torv of the world 
 
THE MEN WHO ^VRQTE THIS BOOK 
 
 Professor Otto Hestze (''G^rm^nj sjid the ^Vcr.d Pc-^rers" 
 and "The Meaning of the War"; is Pr'fess-'r c: Historr it 
 the Univeisitv of Berlin. He is Secrerzrr c: the S>r:etv for 
 the History of Mark Brandenburg. He is the author of 
 y* Gtiomdism and Constitution^cJum ' I'jjI : Cr.z. St^^ice 
 (1911) ; and British Plans 0/ fForld C':,nqu':rt cid ik. Pres- 
 ent War ri9i5'i. 
 
 Professor Erxst Trozltsch. Ph. D.. LL. D.. Tzt Spirit 
 of German Kultur is Prcfessor of Theo.:/27 st the Unrrer- 
 s:ty of Berlin " : - :_ ~ - - - 
 
 (1912;. 
 
 Professor Hermaxx Schitmachz-^ LL. D., Hon. LL. D.. 
 
 ("Germany's T- - ' ^ - ?" i.-sidon" ) is Prcfessor 
 
 of Social aci_^ r UnTvers^tv of Bonn. 
 
 From 1896 to lo: ; t . - 
 istry of Publfr W '-- ? 
 
 College at C h :- : t- ?- -t - : : ; j- - - z 
 
 University or i^i-. 1:: -r- ^t Z : ' ' 
 
 Coliimria Lniversity. He was ser: 7 i 
 
 ment to the L'nitef Stite? t: ^~-:: - ■: : 
 
 the author of Tr£s:\ 
 
 China (1900); and i i t 
 
 editor of Teubner's " H ' : . : T i' i-itry. 
 
 Dr. Wilhzlm Solf ( T - - J 7 r is Serre- 
 
 taiy of State for the C: -.-..::--. :.- : — 7 7 — : - 
 
 He was the represenratrve of tr _ ~ 
 
 He e ■ - i - : - c_ 
 
 Gov, 
 
 tr.e Ljrir.. ' .l^ pCu^* 
 
 V - — i '- — - - 
 
 625 
 
626 THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 
 
 Professor Hans Delbruck, Ph. D., ("The German Military 
 System") is Professor of History at the University of Berlin, 
 and a member of the Privy Council. He was a soldier in the 
 Franco-Prussian War. In 1882 he wsls made a member of 
 the House of Deputies, and in 1884 a member of the Reichs- 
 tag. He is the author of The Strategy of Pericles and Fred- 
 erick the Great (1890); Frederick, Napoleon, Moltke: An- 
 cient and Modern Strategy (1892); The Polish Question 
 (1893); History of Military Science (1900-1906). He is 
 the editor of the "Preussische Jahrbucher." 
 
 Professor Gustav von Schmoller ("The Origin and Nature 
 of German Institutions") is Professor of Political Economy at 
 the University of Berlin. He has held the same post at the 
 Universities of Halle and Strassburg. In 1887 he was made 
 Historiographer of the History of Brandenburg. Since 1899 
 he has been the Representative of the University of Berlin in 
 the Prussian Upper House. He is an Upper Privy Councillor 
 and a member of the Academy of Science. He is the author 
 of a number of books on questions of political economy and 
 administrative and constitutional history. He is the editor of 
 "Constitutional and Sociological Research" and "Annals of 
 Legislation, Administration and Political Economy of the Ger- 
 man Empire." 
 
 Doctor Hans Luther ("The Spirit of Self-government in 
 Germany") is City Councillor of Berlin. He was formerly 
 City Councillor of Magdeburg, and from there he was called 
 to Berlin and made Executive Commissioner of the "Diet of 
 Cities," which is a union of Prussian cities for the purpose of 
 study and improvement in communal and municipal adminis- 
 tration. He is the author of numerous essays on financial and 
 administrative questions. 
 
 Professor Friedrich Tezner, LL. D., ("The Inner Structure 
 of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy") is Professor of Law 
 at the University of Vienna. He is a member of the Royal 
 Court Council. He is the author of a number of legal works 
 and books on the history of law. 
 
 Professor Ottocar Weber, Ph. D., ("Austria-Hungary's For- 
 eign Policy") is Director of the Historical Seminary of the 
 German University at Prague. He is the author of The Peace 
 of Utrecht (1891) ; From Luther to Bismarck (1906) ; Ger- 
 man History: From 1684 to 1806 (1913). 
 
THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 627 
 
 Professor Carl Becker ("Turkey") is Professor of Oriental 
 History and Languages, and Director of the Oriental Sem- 
 inary, at the University of Bonn. He was formerly Instruc- 
 tor in Semitic Philology in the University of Heidelberg, 
 and Professor of Oriental History and Civilization at the 
 Colonial Institute of Hamburg. He is the author of a number 
 of books about Mohammedan races, history and customs. He 
 is the editor of "Islam." 
 
 Professor Erich Marcks, Ph. D., ("England's Policy of 
 Force") Is Professor of Modern History at the University of 
 Munich. He was formerly Professor of Modern History at 
 the Universities of Freiburg, Leipzig and Heidelberg. He Is 
 a member of the Privy Council. He is the author of Queen 
 Elizabeth and Her Times (1897); Germany and England 
 (1900) ; Present-day Imperialism (1903). 
 
 Professor Paul Darmstadter ("France's Policy of Force") 
 Is Professor of Economics and Colonial History at the Univer- 
 sity of Gottingen. He is the author of The Abolition of Serf- 
 dom in Savoy, Sivitzerland and Lorraine (1897) '■> The United 
 States of America: Its Political, Economic and Social Devel- 
 opment (1909) ; The History of the Partition and Coloniza- 
 tion of Africa Since the Period of Discoveries (Vol. I, 191 3). 
 
 Professor Karl Hampe, Ph. D., ("Belgium and the Great 
 
 Powers") is Professor of Medieval History at the University 
 of Heidelberg. He formerly held the same chair at the Uni- 
 versity of Bonn. He Is the author of Emperor Frederick II 
 (1899) j History of German Emperors (1909). 
 
 Professor Hans Uebersberger, Ph. D., ("Russia and Pan- 
 Slavism" and "Serbia's Role") Is Professor of the History of 
 Eastern Europe at the University of Vienna. He is the author 
 of Austria and Russia Since the End of the iSth Century (Vol. 
 I, 1906) ; Russia's Oriental Policy in the Last Two Centu- 
 ries (Vol. I, 1913). He is associate editor of the "Magazine 
 of East-European History." 
 
 Professor Ottq Franke, Ph. D., ("The Great Powers in 
 East Asia") Is Professor of the History and Languages of East 
 Asia at the Colonial Institute of Hamburg. He was for many 
 years In the German consular service in China and later In 
 the Chinese diplomatic service. He is the author of numerous 
 
628 THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 
 
 essays on the subjects of Chinese history, literature, philosophy, 
 politics and language. 
 
 Professor Hermann Oncken, Ph. D., ("Events Leading Up 
 to the World War" and "The Outbreak of the War") is Pro- 
 fessor of Modern History at the University of Heidelberg. 
 He was Professor of Modern History at the University of 
 Chicago in 1905, and later at the University of Giessen. He 
 is the author of America and the Great Powers (1910) ; The 
 World War and the German Americans (1914). 
 
 Professor Walther Schoenborn, Ph. D., ("Belgium's Neu- 
 trality") is Professor of Public Law at the University of 
 Heidelberg. He is the author of The Occupation of Vera 
 Cruz, With an Appendix: Documents Concerning the Policy 
 of President Wilson Towards Mexico (1914), and a number 
 of books on law. 
 
 Professor Friedrich Meinecke, Ph. D., {''Kultur, Policy 
 of Power and Militarism") is Professor of History at the 
 University- of Berlin. He has held the same chair in the Uni- 
 versities of Strassburg and Freiburg. He was formerly in 
 the Prussian Archive Service. He is a member of the Privy 
 Council. He is the author of From Stein to Bismarck (1908) ; 
 Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism (1911). He is the editor 
 of "The Historical Review." 
 
 Professor Ernst Zitelmann, LL. D., ("The War and Inter- 
 national Law") is Professor of Law at the University of Bonn 
 and Honorary Professor of Law at the University of Czerno- 
 witz. He was formerly Professor of Law at the Universities 
 of Leipzig, Gottingen and Halle. He is a Privy Councillor 
 of Justice. He is the author of a number of legal w^orks and 
 books on the history of law.