M^ 
 
^ * MEMOIR 
 
 
 Ufl 23 ON 
 
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 Copy 1 
 
 THE ^..xxuERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 NE¥ YORK CITY 
 
 ADDRESSED TO THE 
 
 HON. JOHN B. FLOYD 
 
 SECRETARY OF WAR, 
 
 JAMES St. C. MORTON, 
 
 F1K8T LIEUT. ENQINEEBS. 
 
 PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 WILLIAM A. HARRIS, PRINT.ER 
 
 1858. 
 
<. 
 
 X-- 
 
\{\l^ INTRODUCTORY LETTER. 
 
 Washington, District of Columbia, 
 
 September 30, 1858. 
 
 Sir : I beg leave to lay before you the accompanying Memoir on the 
 *^ Dangers and Defences of New York." 
 
 It contains practical ideas relating to a branch of American military 
 .science which has as yet been substantially overlooked or neglected by 
 the Bureau to whose province it belongs. 
 
 The branch in question, namely, the defence of our sea-board cities 
 against great naval military expeditions, has indeed grown in im- 
 portance of late years, with electrical rapidity; and it is perhaps 
 excusable, that as yet no actual constructions are to be seen on the 
 Atlantic coasts, attesting the watchfulness and promptness of our 
 Engineer Department. 
 
 But the latter should have shown before now, some indication that 
 it has, at least, officially recognized and appreciated the dangers, 
 which, novel in magnitude, have lately begun to threaten the nation. 
 
 But as no warning of approaching disaster, much less any provision 
 to meet it, has emanated from the proper official quarter, I conceive 
 that it becomes individual officers to make the government acquainted 
 with the exigencies into which it would be thrown by a war with 
 England or France. 
 
 In the first part of the Memoir I endeavor to show that America 
 now lies exposed to the worst effects of a species of warfare, which 
 though of secondary importance when, 40 years ago, the present system 
 of fortification was adopted, has received a ten-fold development, and 
 has assumed the proportions of a vital danger, since the construction 
 of steam navies by the great maritime powers. 
 
 The landing upon our shores of hostile armies in 1812 and '14 was 
 productive of no greater injury than certain conflagrations, devasta- 
 tions, and plunderings, which served rather to irritate than subdue 
 the spirit of the people : but the campaigns which result from similar 
 expeditions at the present day, exhaust the strength of first-class 
 nations, and their issue decides the terms of peace. 
 
 I do not claim originality in this part of my memoir,* for Greneral 
 Gadsden, Major Chase, and Major Sanders, prognosticated, years ago, 
 the worst results from the neglect to provide against hostile descents. 
 If I succeed in placing their views, which coincide with mine as to 
 the nature of the danger, in a striking light, I shall be satisfied; for 
 by so doing I will secure to the second part of the Memoir, which 
 advances an original and entirely novel proposition, an attentive con- 
 sideration. 
 
 * "With the exception that I am the first to point out tlie possibility of a foreign army 
 landing on the outside of Coney Island, and on the northern shore of the Sound. 
 
IV INTKODUCTO&Y LETTER. 
 
 This proposition consists of a plan or system of fortification for the 
 defence of extensive lines, wliicli, based on the immutable principles of 
 the science, departs from old fashioned rules, and adapts itself to the 
 latest improvements in the rifle ; and which is likewise calculated on 
 the supposition that the reliance of New York, in her necessity, will 
 be her citizen soldiery. 
 
 In military statements and arguments, an all-important element is 
 the topography of the country or district concerned ; and in this re- 
 spect I enter on the discussion with unsurpassed advantages. 
 
 My duties as Light House Engineer of the New York district, have 
 given me every opportunity to render myself familiar with every part 
 of New York harbor^ and all the waters which empty into it, and with 
 its shores on every side : I am also well acquainted with the Sound 
 and outer shores of Long Island: I have travelled habitually over the 
 latter, in every direction; and, in fine, the descriptions of the to- 
 pography and hydrography of the vicinity of New York and Long 
 Island, which will be found in this Memoir, are the result of thorough 
 personal study and observation of the localities. 
 
 As to the existing fortifications of New York, I have certainly a 
 perfect insight into their objects and capabilities, as I was formerly 
 stationed, on regular military duty, at both Fort Hamilton and Sandy 
 Hook. 
 
 In conclusion, permit me, Mr. Secretary, to express my profound 
 sense of a two-fold obligation to you ; for it was your assigning me 
 to Light House duty that gave me the advantages which impart to 
 my opinions on this subject all the merit they possess : and your habit 
 of encouraging the expression of independent views, by officers of all 
 grades, has emboldened me to advance mine. 
 
 I remain. Sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. ST. C. MORTON, 
 First Lieut. Engineers. 
 
 Hon. John B. Floyd, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
PART I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 At the present moment the United. States present towards Great 
 Britain and France an attitude which is parallel in many respects to 
 that of Russia towards the same States in 1853. 
 
 The material wealth and integral power of both this country and 
 Russia have rapidly increased to Ibrmidable dimensions. 
 
 The great extent of both countries, and their comparatively isolated 
 geographical situation have been greatly relied on in each case as 
 securities against foreign invasion, while both have seaports which 
 have been left without adequate defences. 
 
 Russia, as well as ourselves, has a navy inferior in size to those of 
 her rivals,, and here, indeed, the parallel is least to be insisted on, for 
 our sailors and officers are the best in the world, as well the individual 
 vessels of our fleet, while in both material and ' ' personnel ' ' the Rus- 
 sian navy is far inferior to the French or English, It may be added 
 that while our immense commerce, which, according to tonnage, is 
 the largest in the world, demands a large navy to protect it, that of 
 Russia is small, and her navy is more designed as an aggressive force 
 than to guard her merchantmen. But these points in which the 
 parallel fails will be found to add additional strength to my argument, 
 which^ drawn from the comparison, deduces from the policy pursued 
 towards Russia in the eastern war of 1854-'56, the inference that a 
 similar course will be adopted by either of, or both the allies in a future 
 war with the United States. 
 
 That policy, of attacking the extremities of the State, and paralyzing 
 them, in the hope of thereby weakening and disordering its vital parts, 
 does not seem to have been premeditated at the outset of the war in 
 question. 
 
 The weight and rapidity of the blows that were struck at Sevastopol, 
 Odessa, Kertch, Kimburu, Bomarsund, and Sweaborg do not seem to 
 have been anticipated by the allies, any more than by the Russians. 
 
 Whether the governments of France and England were not fully 
 alive to the almost incredible power which they wielded, in their yet 
 untried steam navies, or whether a grand invasion of Russia seemed 
 most likely to bring the Czar to terms, or whether the first proposition 
 to harass the enemy into a peace was overruled by commanders who 
 saw a greater prospect of glory in magnificent combined land opera- 
 tions ; whatever^ in short, may be the reason for it, this seems highly 
 
6 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 probable ; that the policy pursued was the result of circumstances that 
 took place subsequent to the declaration of war.* 
 
 This will seem less singular when it is considered that the eastern 
 war is the first in which either side has placed its entire reliance in 
 attempts to ravage and destroy all the military and naval power of 
 the other, that could be reached by the guns of a fleet or b}' the opera- 
 tions of a land force, debarked from, and co-operating with a fleet. 
 
 All maritime expeditions prior to this war have been either vehicles 
 of invasions of magnitude, directed against the capital of the State 
 attacked, or they have had in view the conquest of some province or 
 colony, or the capture of some valuable stronghold, or the ruin or 
 possession of important naval establishments ; in all these cases there 
 is this distinctive essential to be remarked, which is, that they were 
 regarded as either designed to gain a certain definite advantage which 
 was to be attained for itself, without regard to its bearing on the main 
 results of the quarrel, or otherwise were of so serious a nature that the 
 fate of the contest turned inevitably on the issue of one invasion. 
 
 The only exception to this is to be found in the American war of 
 181 2-' 14 when was organized the policy which is lately proved to be 
 the safest and most effective that can be selected, and which indeed 
 was at that time practiced with terrible effect. 
 
 It may be thought that the war referred to, and its incidents, form a 
 sufiicient precedent to refer to in an American memoir ; but if I limited 
 myself to it I would be obliged to discuss at length some arguments 
 that might be brought against my conclusions. 
 
 It would probably be asserted that the events of 1814 have already 
 received due consideration at the hands of officers fully competent to 
 produce a suitable plan for the defence of the country ; or that it is 
 unlikely that in the present enlightened age we should be subjected to 
 a magnified repetition of the barbarous scenes of that war ; which ob- 
 jections I am in no need of meeting, by taking the more enlarged 
 scope of argument which I adopt. 
 
 It may be objected also, that we constituted, in 1812, a second rate 
 power, and that any arguments drawn from the harassing mode of 
 warfare then pursued towards us, and from its distressing effects on 
 the country, might be answered by this objection : that we are now 
 grown to be one of the foremost nations of the earth, and that we are 
 
 « The main historical facts which support this view of the case are, the landing at Gallipoli, 
 the construction of entrenchments there, and delay of the allies at this point while the 
 Eussians were advancing to the Danube, likewise the protracted stay at Varna, during the 
 period that the Turks were so hard pushed to maintain themselves on tlie line of the Danube, 
 and in Silistria. 
 
 These delays were considered inexplicable at the time, and seem so still, unless we adopt 
 the hypothesis that the allies were at first in hopes of meeting, on Turkish soil, the entire 
 strength of Russia, and that on finding that Nicholas was disposed to preserve a defensive 
 attitude, they counted, at least, on being firmly opposed at the frontier by an army, the 
 beatmg of which would be a serious blow to the empire; this expectation was also deceived 
 by the tactics of the Russians, who plainly intended to retire before the allies, and not 
 gratify their hopes of delivering a decisive pitched battle. 
 
 Tlie vexation and disappointment of Marshal St. Amaud were excessive on hearing that 
 the siege of Silistria was raised, and that the enemy was retrograding towards the Pruth. 
 
 It seems to be at this period that the expedition against Sevastopol was planned, as a 
 means of occupying the army, and as the most important part of the project of ruining the 
 ports, harbors, military depots, and navy of Russia. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 7 
 
 beyond the reach of injury from the predatory and destructive system 
 which once did us so much damage. But the system which Great 
 Britain initiated in 1812 has heen found eflfective, thanks to the power 
 of her steam navy, even against the colossal empire of Russia, and 
 hence we may reasonably expect that, in a similar conjuncture of cir- 
 cumstances, it will be adopted without hesitation or delay by either of 
 the Allied Powers with which in future the United States may be en- 
 gaged. 
 
 This supposition is reduced to a certainty by the nature of the addi- 
 tions which are being made to the navies of the former States : the 
 despatch gun-boats, the bomb vessels, the iron floating batteries, and 
 the immense screw steamers, with capacity to transport thousands of 
 troops, all indicate that the policy of 1814 and 1854 is now become a 
 fixed idea with the governments of France and England, to be adopted 
 whenever the occasion serves. 
 
 We shall furnish the occasion or grounds of quarrel the moment 
 that we indicate a design to acquire Cuba, or to extend our support to 
 Mexico or the Central American States ; then it will be said that, like 
 Russia, we are growing too grasping and formidable, and must be 
 checked and reduced again to a level that shall not endanger the 
 balance of power. 
 
 But if our seaports are destined to receive the heaviest shocks from 
 the armaments which were irresistible at Sevastopol and Bomarsund, 
 at least we shall have the satisfaction of acting on the offensive in 
 other quarters. 
 
 Our policy would doubtless be to invade Canada, for the third time, 
 if England were our enemy, and Cuba, at any rate, besides ; for we 
 are irresistibly drawn to the occupation of that island in time of war 
 with any maritime power by all possible military reasons ; and such 
 a course would be sufficiently justified by necessity, as, indeed^ have 
 been the precedents of the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, of Malta in 
 1798, and that of the Danish fieet in 1807. 
 
 But if we are to follow this programme, which is surely more con- 
 genial to Americans than a passive resistance, however obstinate, and 
 if our regular army and disciplined and enlisted volunteers are to be 
 employed in aggressive campaigns, then it becomes absolutely neces- 
 sary to organize a seacoast defence, by means of fortifications and 
 militia, that will prevent the necessity of recalling our active armies 
 from the frontier to resist a naval expedition. 
 
 The small size, numerically, of an army, will, in our next war, as 
 in the last, occasion us to resort to privateering', except where our 
 ships or squadrons meet with single vessels or fleets of not dispropor- 
 tionate size. We cannot, then, look to the navy for protection to our 
 seacoast cities ; and^ indeed, if it were twenty times as large, it would 
 be insufficient to guard so many points at once ; or even if that were 
 possible, the task should not be assigned to the navy — it should rather 
 be occupied in convoying transports with troops and ammunition to 
 Cuba, or in fighting the enemy's ships and destroying his commerce 
 in distant seas. 
 
 It cannot be for a moment supposed that we might rely on the 
 generosity or humanity of the enemy to spare our cities from bombard- 
 
8 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 ment. The events of 1812-14 show that it is upon our own resources 
 for defence that we must depend for security. The burning of the 
 Capitol, the marauding expeditions of Admiral Cockburn in the Dela- 
 ware and Chesapeake, and the expedition of Packenham against New 
 Orleans^ where '■'■booty and beauty" was the watchword, as well as 
 their Indian allies, with the massacres and scalpings which took place 
 after the defeat of Winchester's army in January, 1813, show what is 
 the nature of British warfare. 
 
 The following brief account of the atrocities committed along our sea coast during the 
 war of 1812-14 can be confiimed by many of our citizens, as well as by reference to the 
 histories of the war, of Thomas, Breckenridge, Ingersoll, and others. 
 
 In February, 1831, Admiral Cockburn appeared in the Chesapeake, which he laid under 
 blockade, and then commenced a series of attacks against farm houses, gentlemen's seats, 
 &c. These were robbed, the cattle carried off, killed or maimed, and the slaves armed 
 against their masters, or sent off to the West Indies. 
 
 The first town attacked was Frenchtown, which was plundered by a detachment of 500 
 marines, who burnt some houses and vessels at the wharf. 
 
 In May, Havre de Grace, Fredericktown, and Georgetown, were visited similarly, and 
 after being thoroughly plundered were partially burnt. During this month reinforcements 
 brought up the strength of the fleet to 7 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, and some smaller ves- 
 sels. On the 18th, the repulse of Craiiy island took place, and some circumstances were made 
 the ground of excuse for the barbarous two days sacking of Hampton on the 25th. On this 
 occasion murder and rape were added to the barbarities practiced at other points. 
 
 In July, Cock])urn, proceeding to North Carolina, treated Ocracoke and Portsmouth as 
 lie had the other towns 
 
 In 1814 the downfall of Napoleon enabled Great Britain to turn 
 more land forces against us, and her minister threatened to " chastise 
 %s ivell arid to cripple the United States for Ji/ty year's to come." 
 
 This year, at the north, New York, New London, and Boston were 
 blockaded, and Saybrook, Wareham, and Scituate, attacked. At each 
 of these places houses, factories, and shipping were burnt. The re- 
 pulse at Stonington saved that town from the execution of the British 
 commander's threat of " reducing it to ashes." 
 
 In June, operations were resumed in the Chesapeake by the pil- 
 laging of Benedict, Marlboro', Kinsale, and Tocomoco. 
 
 In August, the British received reinforcements, and, landing at 
 Benedict, marched upon Washington, gaining on the road the battle of 
 Bladeusburg, (the details of this expedition are given at length in the 
 chapter on Maritime Expeditions.) Having gained possession of our 
 National Capital, these modern Vandals burnt the Senate House, the 
 Kepresentative Hall, the Supreme Court room, the President's House, 
 and, in a word, all the public buildings except the Patent Office, as 
 well as some private ones. 
 
 This expedition likewise pillaged Alexandria, where the city was 
 forced to deliver at the wharves all the merchandise in the storehouses 
 and all the vessels in the vicinity. 
 
 Far from the atrocities of these campaigns being universally repro- 
 bated and disavowed in England, the spirit of the British seems to 
 have warmed with approbation towards the commanders who executed 
 them. 
 
 In an account of the expedition against Baltimore, written shortly 
 after the war, by a British officer, the reason for the admiral's not 
 persevering in the attempt against the city is stated to be, that, from 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. \i 
 
 the distance, and want of conveyances, the hootij of the place could 
 not be removed to the ships. 
 
 As the tone and arguments of the history in question were no doubt 
 congenial to the temper of the British at the time it was published, 
 and as I cannot express them as forcibly as I find them, I beg leave 
 to insert the greater part of the author's conclusion. Comment upon 
 it is unnecessary. 
 
 The recommendations of the author as to the policy to be pursued 
 in a future war with America, are, in a word, to re-establish the sys- 
 tem of 1814 on an immense scale. 
 
 " We have long been habituated to despise the Americans as an 
 enemy unworthy of serious regard. * * * * Instead of 1,500, 
 had 10,000 sailed from the Garonne under General Ross how differ- 
 ently might he have acted !" 
 
 "There would have been then no necessity for are-embarkation 
 after the capture of Washington, and, consequently, no time given 
 for the defence of Baltimore, but marching across the country he 
 might have done to the one city what he did to the other. And it is 
 thus only that a war with America can be successfully carried on. 
 * * * America must be assaulted only on her coasts. Her harbors 
 destroyed, her shipping burned, and her seaport towns laid waste, 
 are the only evils she has reason to dread. ***** 
 
 " To the plan proposed, of making desert the whole line of coast, 
 it may be objected that by so doing we should distress individuals 
 and not the government. But they who offer this objection forget 
 the nature, both of the people whose cause they plead, and of the 
 government under which they live. 
 
 " In a democratical government the voice of the people must at all 
 times prevail. The members of the House of Representatives are the 
 very persons who, from such proceedings, would suffer most severely, 
 and we all know how far private suffering goes to influence a man's 
 public opinions. ******* 
 
 " By compelling the constituents to experience the real hardships 
 and miseries of warfare, you will compel the representatives to a vote 
 of peace. * * * Burn their houses, plunder their property, block 
 up their harbors, and destroy their shipping in a few places, and 
 before you have time to proceed to the rest you will be stopped by 
 entreaties for peace." 
 
 These expeditions, it will be remembered, took place when England 
 was engaged in a mortal struggle in another hemisphere, and, con- 
 sequently, at a time when her power was not commensurate with her 
 malice ; for this, and for another reason, we may look for still more 
 convincing proofs of my presages of evil in our next war. 
 
 The maritime and military resources of England and France have 
 developed wonderfully since 1815. Large fleets of screw steamships, 
 of great tonnage and tremendous armaments ; flotillas of shot proof 
 floating batteries, and transport vessels in any quantity, replace the 
 sailing fleets of the last war. 
 
 The eastern war of 1 854-' 5 6 astonished the world by the display 
 of a colossal maritime power which surprised even the people of the 
 two nations which had been accumulating it without becoming con- 
 
10 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 scious of its true extent ; and, by the way, it is certain that their pre- 
 sent confidence of power is a strong incentive to the exercise of it. 
 
 In a former paper, on a kindred subject, I have given tabular state- 
 ments of the naval and military forces displayed by the allies in the 
 war referred to. Here, it is more to my purpose to give a compara- 
 tive view of the strength of the expeditions simultaneously engaged 
 in during that contest, and the distance from home at which they 
 operated, and the same information with regard to the most celebrated 
 expeditions of former times. 
 
CHAPTER II, 
 
 ON MAKITIME EXPEDITIONS. 
 
 Before a person can consider himself competent to form an opinion 
 on a weighty military question, especially when probabilities and con- 
 tingencies are involved, and if he is not enlightened by some personal 
 experience relating to the matter, he must at least acquaint himself 
 with all the precedents which history offers. In this way he will 
 guard against running into extremes, and also will naturally be led 
 to discuss the case in a plain and anti-theoretical manner. 
 
 For example : a man who has been at the pains of studying those 
 parts of history which relate to invasions that have taken place across 
 seas, will not believe that telegraphs and railroads protect this coun- 
 try from insult better than entrenchments or forts ; neither will he 
 be inclined to trust our defence altogether to gunboats, or iron floating 
 batteries ; nor will he fully acquiesce in the more orthodox opinion, 
 that the stone castles which dot our coast, completely provide for our 
 safety. 
 
 It does not require, indeed, any great research for a person who has 
 noticed the events of the last ten years, to form some notion of the 
 formidable nature of the naval expeditions that foreign powers can set 
 on foot at the present day ; but it is necessary to estimate these also as 
 compared with those of the last century, and still earlier times ; this 
 comparative power should be considered, in order that the means of 
 resistance may be proportioned accordingly. 
 
 Ten years ago we ourselves fitted out a maritime expedition that 
 was almost unexampled for the brilliancy and completeness of its^ 
 operations ; and the expeditions of the British and French to China, 
 the Crimea, and the Baltic, are still fresh in every one's recollec- 
 tion. 
 
 But Americans are slow to reflect on the probabilities of similar 
 armaments being turned against their own country ; and constantly 
 dismiss the suggestion that such a contingency may arise, with the 
 argument that we beat the British at New Orleans, and that we are 
 better able to receive them now than in 1814. | 
 
 This blindness with regard to the actual situation of the country is 
 attributable to the fact that we do not realize and appreciate the 
 aggressive power that the steamship fleets of England and France 
 possess. 
 
 It would seem that with nations, as with individuals, wisdom must 
 be bought at the price of experience ; for, with the example of Rus- 
 sia before us, we remain apathetic in the matter of our coast defences. 
 
 Russia had, perhaps, a right to suppose Sevastopol too remote to 
 need fortifications on the landward side of its port ; but it would be 
 inexcusable heedlessness in us to fail to profit by the lesson that 
 Nicholas received. 
 
12 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 Notwithstanding the clearness of the case, however, it seems that 
 there needs some foil or contrast, to set off vividly representations 
 of it, which, alone, would fail of receiving an attentive and reflective 
 examination. 
 
 In a word, I can think of no better way of enabling the reader to 
 judge of the magnitude, concentrated strength, and celerity of the 
 present style of naval military warfare, than by presenting him with 
 a condensed summary of the most celebrated maritime expeditions ; 
 since by reflecting on the means of national aggression developed 
 in these, and on the causes which influenced their success, and by 
 considering afterwards the mutations which these causes have under- 
 gone, especially within the present century, we will naturally come 
 to conclusions that will be better founded and more certain than could 
 result from inferences, however logical, drawn merely from the events 
 that have passed within our own knowledge. 
 
 I need not say that officerg of personal experience, and whose judg- 
 ment has been formed in the field, may dispense with the aid which 
 is offered by the following historical sketch, but I hope that the latter 
 will be found interesting at least, by this class of readers. It will be 
 seen that I have excluded from this sketch the expeditions of Mahome- 
 dan nations ; these, though formidable and successful in many in- 
 stances, such as the expeditions against Candia and Malta, have not 
 been chronicled with much exactness as to numbers; and besides, 
 there are perhaps more than enough to serve my purpose without 
 them. As to the expeditions of ancient history, it would be pedantic 
 to refer to them in this treatise. 
 
 It will be found, upon inquiring into the impediments and causes 
 of failure of maritime expeditions, that they may be reduced to 
 three heads : 
 
 Ist. The effect of winds- and weather on sailing fleets. 
 
 2d. The attacks of the fleets by those of the enemy. 
 
 3d. The fatal epidemic diseases of certain climates. 
 
 As to the first cause, it has always been the main difficulty of 
 maritime expeditions ; and the chances of ill consequences from it 
 have been more numerous in proportion to the distance from home at 
 which the descent was to take place. From the time the transports 
 weigh anchor at their point of departure till the conclusion of the 
 expedition, we find the winds bafliing all the calculations of the com- 
 mander-in-chief. 
 
 To guard against the contingencies consequent on the weather, and 
 the inequality in the rates of sailing of the difierent ships of the 
 flotilla, it has been usual to appoint a rendezvous, at which the latter 
 are all to assemble, within a day or two days' sail of the point of land- 
 ing. This measure of precaution, though indispensable, has not in 
 €very case been successfully carried out. For example: Hoche's ex- 
 pedition, the Invincible Armada, and the projected Boulogne expedi- 
 tion, were all ruined by storms, which either wrecked or dispersed 
 the fleets, and prevented any attempt at debarkation. 
 
 Where the objective point has been far distant, the provisioning of 
 the troops, in view of possible detention from adverse winds, has been 
 a serious difficulty. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 13 
 
 In cases where the rendezvous has been effected according to the 
 intention, sailing vessels have sometimes been prevented from ven- 
 turing to lie oif the beach selected for debarkation by the danger of 
 being wrecked upon it, in the event of certain winds springing up, 
 and making it a lee-shore. Sometimes the debarkation has been in- 
 terrupted or suspended, after having commenced, from this cause. 
 The length of time which must elapse between the departure of a. 
 fleet of sailing vessels and their arrival off of their destination is 
 necessarily considerable, because the entire convoy must wait upon the 
 slowest vessel in it, and the voyage is thus rendered much longer than 
 the average time. This detention will of course give the enemy so 
 much additional time to prepare for the defence of the point menaced, 
 and will^ besides, increase the probabilities of meeting with bad 
 weather. 
 
 The uncertainty of the weather has sometimes acted to prevent 
 combinations, at a given time and place, of fleets which happened to 
 be in distant parts, and which might be wanted to act in concert at a 
 fixed time. In a word, the winds and weather, by their uncertainty, 
 variableness, and violence, have always, previous to the invention of 
 steam, been the grand cause of delay, disaster, and sometimes of fail- 
 ure to maritime expeditions ; they have, also, indirectly confined 
 within a certain rather low limit the strength of these expeditions, 
 since the difiiculties springing from them increase in a rapid ratio 
 with the number of sailing vessels required. 
 
 But a consideration even of the few facts presented in the sketches 
 of the Crimean and Bomarsund expeditions, will show that future 
 undertakings of this nature will enjoy an immunity almost complete 
 from difficulties and dangers arising from the winds and waves. 
 
 The immense size* which is now given to steamships will render 
 the number of vessels necessary to carry an army very small, so that 
 a rendezvous can be more readily arranged. 
 
 The enormous vessels that will hereafter be used, will also be per- 
 fectly safe from all the perils of the seas, and their power and speed 
 will render them independent of wind and weather. 
 
 *The "Himalaya" steamship, which was used to carry troops to the Crimea, appears to 
 have answered the purpose admirably, both as to speed and stowage of a great number of 
 men ; and the success of this trial, with the demonstration furnished by the building of the 
 " Great Eastern," that the same can be done on a still grander scale, will probably result in 
 the construction of a few monster ships by the British and Freuch, for purposes of distant 
 warfare ; indeed, the latter vessel, which can carry 10,000 troops with all their baggage, is to 
 be purchased by Napoleon, for military purposes. 
 
 The British Parliament is now considering the proposition of a Liverpool ship-builder, to 
 build six " Mastodonian steamships," to be used for the transportation of troops to distant 
 possessions. Each of these is to be 30,000 tons burthen, and capable of steaming 500 miles a 
 day ; they are to be wind-proof, water-proof, and fire-proof, thereby making the perils of the 
 seas a moral impossibility. 
 
 The "Napoleon" (French) war steamship is a full-rigged ship with a screw-propeller. 
 Her engine is 900 horse-power, and under steam alone her speed is 13i knots per hour. 
 
 The Napoleon was found capable of towing three ships at once, one of them a three-decker, 
 at the rate of over five knots. 
 
 The " Great Eastern " steamship is capable of conveying 10,000 troops a distance as far 
 from England to India, at the same time carrying 18,000 tons of coal and cargo. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF MILITARY DESCENTS SINCE 1400 A. D. 
 
 Edward III. besieged Calais with 40,000 men, whom he conveyed 
 in 800 vessels of all sizes. 
 
 (1414 to 1417.) Henry V. entered France with an army of 30,000 
 men, which were carried over in 1,500 boats and vessels, large and 
 small. 
 
 Charles V. took Tunis with 30,000 men and a fleet of 500 vessels. 
 
 (15*78.) Sebastian of Portugal entered on his expedition to Morocco 
 with 20,000 men. 
 
 The Invincible Armada of Philip II. of Spain, numbered 337 ships, 
 and carried 11,000 sailors and 20,000 soldiers, with 2,630 brass guns; 
 it is well known that a violent storm wrecked half the ships and 
 caused to perish 13,000 men of this expedition. 
 
 (1630.) Gustavus Adolphus entered Germany with 15,000 or 18,000 
 men, conveyed thither by a fleet manned by 9,000 sailors. 
 
 (1660.) Louis XIV. sent an expedition against Ireland which num- 
 bered 73 ships-of-war, 29,000 sailors, 5,800 cannon, and 6,000 troops: 
 (this fleet was beaten at the Hogue.) 
 
 In 1700 Charles XII. conceived and executed the descent upon Co- 
 penhagen, as a diversion which should save the Duchy of Holstein, 
 belonging to his brother-in-law, and invaded by the King of Denmark. 
 He had 20,000 soldiers, in transports, and a fleet which kept at a 
 distance that of the enemy. 
 
 Charles' fleet anchored ofi" Humblebeck, three leagues from Copen- 
 hagen, and found the Danish army, with cavalry and artillery, drawn 
 up, behind entrenchments, to contest the landing of the troops. The 
 Swedes, however, entered their boats, carrying with them to the shore 
 a great quantity of chevaux-de-frise, and other military implements 
 in flat-bottomed boats, which had been brought for that purpose. 
 
 In this order the army approached the beach, the king himself 
 leading the division of 500 grenadiers which formed the advance ; on 
 nearing land and getting within wading depth, the whole army, at 
 the example of Charles, threw themselves into the water, and charged 
 the enemy under a violent fire of musketry and artillery ; the Danes 
 were driven from their works with precipitation, and Charles, who 
 received next day a reinforcement of 12^000 men, advancing towards 
 the city^ made preparations to bombard it. 
 
 The Danish king, to save his capital, consented to evacuate Hol- 
 stein and to pay a ransom of 400,000 rix-doUars ; thus this entire 
 campaign, which was completely successful, terminated in six weeks. 
 
 In 1747 a British expedition was sent to capture the French fortress 
 of Pondicherry ; it was commanded by Boscawen, and consisted of one 
 ship of 74 guns, six of 60 and 64, five of 50, and five carrying from 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 15 
 
 14 to 40. After 31 days of open trenches, the besiegers were forced 
 to abandon the enterprise. 
 
 In 1757 Lally's expedition sailed from Brest, to the East Indies, 
 for the purpose of taking Fort St. David ; this fleet, which carried 
 1,100 troops, was reinforced at Mauritius by 11 sail, and on arriving 
 at Pondicherry, by 1,000 European troops and a corps of Sepoys, 
 bringing up the total force to 5,000 men, a half of whom were Euro- 
 peans. This expedition was entirely successful, Fort St. David being 
 taken and razed. 
 
 In 1775 Charles II. of Spain, sent an expedition to Algiers, com- 
 manded by Gen. O'Reilly and Admiral Castejon. The land forces 
 numbered 19,200 picked troops, and were carried in 340 transports, 
 protected by 44 ships of war, manned by 3,300 of the best sailors ; 
 the artillery numbered 100 large cannons, and 4,000 mules were taken 
 along for its use, and that of the army generally. 
 
 This expedition landed (July 18) on the beach in the Bay of Algiers, 
 in view of 80,000 Turks, of whom two-thirds were cavalry. In the 
 battle which followed, the Spaniards were forced to retreat to their 
 ships, which they did under cover of a slightly built tete-de-pont. 
 
 In 1796 Hoche's expedition to Ireland left Brest. It numbered 
 16,000 men, or, according to some accounts, 25,000. The difference 
 is probably the force belonging to the Dutch fleet which was to have 
 sailed from Antwerp and joined Hoche. This junction did not, how- 
 ever, take place. 
 
 The expedition was composed of — 
 
 15 ships-of-the-line, with 600 troops aboard of each; 
 
 12 frigates and 6 corvettes, with 250 troops in each; 
 
 A razee, with 400 troops; 
 
 6 large vessels, with 2,250 troops; 
 
 And a couple of ships for carrying powder and ammunition. 
 
 The fleet eluded the British blockading fleet in a fog, and sailed for 
 Ban try bay on the 16th of December. The same day a violent storm 
 dispersed the vessels, and wrecked three of them. The expedition, 
 however, reassembled off Cape Clear, and on the 24th had arrived at 
 its destination, when another tempest forced it to leave the vicinity of 
 the land. This storm was followed by others, and the expedition 
 finally returned, disheartened, on the 1st of January, 1797. 
 
 1798. Bonaparte left Toulon with 13 ships-of-the-line, 90 other 
 ships-of-war, and more than 300 transports, and with 23,000 soldiers. 
 A part of this expedition stopped at Malta, and took that | lace, 
 (though defended by 7,000 men,) and then proceeded to join the main 
 body, which had arrived at Aboukir. The signal victories this expe- 
 dition gained over the Turks, prove that it would have been, but for 
 the British counter-expedition, an example of a perfectly successful 
 one. 
 
 In 1799 the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland took place. It 
 numbered 40,000 men, and was intended to menace the French on the 
 Meuse and Rhine, and cause a rebellion in Belgium ; and, also, it was 
 intended to capture the Batavian fleet of nine ships-of-the-line and 
 some frigates. The latter part of the enterprise succeeded, but for the 
 
16 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 rest nothing was accomplished, except the driving of the French from 
 their positions, and the occupying of a small tract of country. 
 
 In October, 1800, Admiral Keith appeared off Cadiz with a large 
 fleet, and with numerous land forces. At that time the city was a 
 prey to a violent yellow fever, and its governor appealed to the 
 humanity of the Admiral to spare it an aggravation of its misfor- 
 tunes. Keith replied by requiring the surrender of all the ships of 
 war in the harbor, and was about to enforce his demand by a debarka- 
 tion, when he was checked by orders from home, which were the re- 
 sult of fears for the health of the troops. This expedition afterwards 
 formed part of the one next mentioned. 
 
 In 1801 Abercrombie's expedition to Egypt occurred. The lan^ 
 forces consisted at first of from 17,000 to 20,000 men ; the fleet, under 
 Admiral Keith, was composed of 4 ships of 80 guns, 3 shij)s of 74 
 guns, 5 frigates, 12 brigs, 40 other ships of war, and a flotilla of gun- 
 boats. The landing was efiected on a sand beach, by means of 100 
 flat-bottomed boats, each of which carried 50 soldiers, besides the 
 oarsmen. It was successfully executed, though opposed by 2,000 
 Frenchmen, with some artillery. The fire of some of the smaller 
 vessels of the fleet protected the operation. 
 
 In this landing 3,500 men gained the beach at once, and drove off 
 the French, with a loss of 8 guns. Within two weeks Abercrombie 
 gained the decisive battle of Alexandria. As he was joined shortly 
 after by 16,000 more troops, from the East Indies and England, this 
 expedition should be rated at 36,000 men. 
 
 In 1807 the British were at war with Napoleon. Both these nations 
 were, at the same time, in a state of profound peace with Denmark — 
 a state which possessed, as its only safeguard, boast, and power, a 
 fleet of 18 ships- of- the-line, 15 frigates, and 25 gun-boats ; besides 
 these and their armaments, and their efficient crews, it possessed im- 
 mense naval stores of all descriptions. To prevent this fleet coming 
 into the hands of Napoleon, by treaty or otherwise, the British fitted 
 out a secret expedition, which announced itself and the declaration of 
 war at the same time. It was composed of 26,000 troops, in an im- 
 mense number of transports, and protected by a fleet which embraced 
 21 ships-of-the-line. Appearing before Copenhagen, Lord Cathcart 
 summoned the Danish Prince to place the fleet of Denmark in the 
 hands of the British ; and on receiving a refusal to this outrageous 
 demand, landed his troops between Kronenburg and Copenhagen, 
 drove in the Danish outposts, and planted his heavy ordnance. After 
 ineffectually summoning the city to surrender, Lord Cathcart ordered 
 it to be bombarded, and from the morning of the 3d to the evening of 
 the 5th it was subjected to an incessant storm of shot and shells from 
 60 mortars and howitzers and 52 twenty-four-pounders. In this bar- 
 barous and unequal warfare some two thousand of the inhabitants, of 
 all classes, were killed and wounded, and between six hundred and 
 seven hundred houses were burnt, when, finally, the Crown Prince 
 consented to yield to all the British demands, and so saved the city 
 from being laid in ashes. 
 
 In 1808 Sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition to Portugal took place. 
 The mouth of the Mondego river was selected for the landing, because 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 17 
 
 the French would not be apt to contest it. Between the Ist and the 
 5th of August, 12,300 men, with all their baggage, artillery^ and 
 materiel, were landed. On the l*7th, marching toward Lisbon, they 
 defeated 14,000 French under Laborde, and on the 19th another brigade 
 was landed at the Bay of Maceira, an open sandy beach, and joined 
 Wellesley. And during the last week in August, Sir John Moore's 
 division landed, also at the Bay of Maceira, (while a furious surf was 
 beating the shore.) All these troops brought the British force up to 
 25,000 effective men. 
 
 A few remarks are here called for by the importance of this suc- 
 cessful descent, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, and the 
 risks that were run by Wellesley, in calculating so securely on gain- 
 ing the battle which must decide the fate of his army. Napier says, 
 that the coast of Portugal, from the Minho to the Tagus, presents, 
 with few exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore ; all the harbors 
 which are presented by the rivers have bars which render access dif- 
 ficult, in most cases, even to boats. 
 
 With the slightest breeze from the sea, a terrible surf breaks along 
 the whole line of coast, and forbids all approach ; and when the south 
 wind, which commonly prevails from August to the winter months, 
 blows, a more dangerous shore cannot be found in any part of the 
 world. 
 
 But, as rivers and mountains, and even the Alps themselves, have 
 proved ineffectual barriers to great captains, so in this case, Welling- 
 ton contemplated these dangers only with the resolve to overcome 
 them. 
 
 A timid or cautious general would have been deterred by consider- 
 ing that a sea breeze might spring up during the debarkation that 
 would leave half his force on land, while the rest was carried off in 
 the vessels, which must gain the open sea or be wrecked on the lee 
 shore ; or he would picture to himself the army landed, and separated 
 suddenly from its provisions and artillery by a storm which might 
 drive off the transports before they could be unloaded. In either case, 
 he would expect the ruin of the expedition from an attack upon the 
 force landed by the main body of the enemy. 
 
 Or, even if the landing were an entire success, the army would 
 have a very uncertain retreat, or base of operations ; and, if worsted 
 by the French, its entire loss might be the consequence of the con- 
 juncture of that event with stormy weather ; for a gale from any 
 quarter from south to northwest would have driven away the fleet. 
 To gain a permanent base the British leader had to count on forcing 
 the position of Torres Vedras, and capturing the forts on the Tagus ; 
 thus opening the latter harbor to his vessels. 
 
 The result, however, demonstrated the wisdom of a bold course ; 
 for the weather was tolerably propitious, (though Sir John Moore's 
 division wrecked nearly all its boats in reaching land,) and the French 
 preferred to fight an offensive battle to receiving the attack, as was 
 their best policy. 
 
 The convention of Cintra, by which Junot agreed to evacuate Por- 
 tugal, was the speedy result of the descent just described ; and cer- 
 
 2 
 
18 DAJ^GERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 tainly the magnitude of the gain warranted the risks of the under- 
 taking. 
 
 In 1808, the English expedition against Antwerp and Flushing 
 comprised 35 shi})s of the line, 23 frigates, and other ships-of-war, 
 making a total of 155 ships and 80 gun-hoats, manned by more than 
 30,000 sailors, and carrying 42,000 troops, with 160 pieces of heavy 
 land ordnance, besides the ships' complement of guns. 
 
 In the words of Napier, "above 40,000 of the finest of Britain's 
 soldiers, a fleet of power to overthrow all the navies of the world com- 
 bined ; marine and land forces together, more than 80,000 fighting 
 men." 
 
 That this expedition, after promptly reducing Flushing and Fort 
 Bartz, was allowed to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, was not 
 the result of military circumstances, but of the incapacity of its com- 
 mander. 
 
 The army of invasion organized by Napoleon at Boulogne numbered 
 160,000 veteran soldiers ; it was to cross in 3,000 gunboats which 
 were built expressly for the purpose, and wliich were to be protected 
 from the British cruisers by 60 ships of the line ; the latter were to 
 rendezvous at Boulogne after deceiving and leading ofi" the enemy's 
 fleet by a feigned expedition into other quarters. 
 
 Everything was as perfectly planned as possible, the troops were 
 thoroughly drilled in embarking and disembarking with their arms, 
 baggage, and artillery, and all that was necessary seemed to be the 
 two days required for the crossing, when a conjuncture of unfortunate 
 accidents prevented the occurrence of an event that would have been 
 famous to the end of the world. 
 
 1816. Lord Exmouth's expedition to Algiers, in 1816, is pretty well 
 known, and I will limit myself to giving the more important sta- 
 tistics of it. 
 
 The fleet consisted of 1 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 bomb-ketches and 10 small ves- 
 sels of 2 guns each, making a total of about 450 guns, with mor- 
 tars in addition* ; this force was joined at Gibraltar by the Dutch fleet 
 of five ships of 36 and one of 24 guns, under Admiral Capellam, 
 raising the number of guns to 652, (some writers have given it as 
 "about a thousand.") 
 
 Sailing into the Bay of Algiers, this formidable fleet came to anchor 
 opposite the fortifications, and poured upon them an incessant fire ; 
 no less than 50,000 solid shot, or more than 500 tons of metal, and 
 960 ten and thirteen inch shells, together with rockets, were showered 
 upon the works and city within about six or eight hours. 
 
 The fortifications were ruined and the city nearly destroyed, while 
 
 * Blofeld's Algeria. 
 
 i\0 
 
 f 108 guns^ 
 
 
 104 " 
 
 
 74 " 
 
 
 50 " 
 
 
 40 " 
 
 
 36 " 
 
 
 16 " 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 19 
 
 the loss of life, both in the Algerine troops and the inhabitants of the 
 place, was enormous. 
 
 The entire Algerine fleet was, in addition, burnt or sunk at its 
 moorings in the harbor. 
 
 1830. After a year's blockade of Algiers, the French finally resolved 
 to take the city, and on the 25th of May, 1830, an expedition sailed 
 against it from Toulon ; it tarried some time at the bay of Palma in 
 Majorca, but finally arrived in the bay of Torre Chica on the 14th of 
 June. 
 
 The number of land forces amounted to 30,000 men, all of whom 
 were landed between 4 and 12 o'clock. 
 
 The landing was protected by the fire of two steamers, which aided 
 in repulsing the attacks of the Turkish cavalry, but the French sufi'ered 
 some loss from the fire of certain batteries which were served for several 
 hours against them. 
 
 Three days after the landing, the French were attacked by 40 or 
 50,000 Turks, but repulsed them with loss, as they did also on the 
 24th and 25th. 
 
 The French then advanced on Algiers, and after a short seige, took 
 the place. It contained 1500 brass guns, and money to the amount 
 of $10,150,000, and in its port were 12 vessels of war. 
 
 1854. I shall enter more into detail concerning the allied expedition 
 to the Crimea than any former one, for the reason that it presents 
 what I believe to be a presage of the events which will follow the next 
 declaration of war which may be exchanged between this country and 
 England or France. 
 
 Nations are hardly more apt than individuals to profit by any ex- 
 perience but their own ; but experience of this kind is so dearly 
 bought, that it is worth considering whether a portion of the price 
 might not be advantageously invested as an insurance against the 
 payment of the whole. 
 
 In August, 1854, the allied generals resolved upon the expedition 
 to the Crimea ; the army had been concentrated at Varna since May, 
 and tired of inaction, made its preparations with great rapidity. 
 
 The French constructed barges for the disembarkation of their ar- 
 tillery ; each one would carry two pieces complete, with 12 horses and 
 18 gunners, and drivers. They were to be towed by towboats, and 
 the arrangements were such that in 15 minutes from touching the 
 shore the guns might open fire. 
 
 The English provided for the same purpose, platforms which were 
 to rest upon two boats which were to be lashed together. 
 
 On the 1st of September, the troops embarked and sailed for the 
 first rendezvous, which was the island of Baltchik : at this place 
 there were assembled 250 vessels of all kinds, having on board 60,000 
 soldiers in addition to the sailors and marines. 
 
 On the 5th the French sailing vessels left Baltchik, and on the 7th 
 the steamships and the British fleet ; the general rendezvous was the 
 Isle of Serpents, Three fast steamships were sent in advance to re- 
 connoitre the coast and select a landing place. 
 
 On the 11th the British fleet was assembled twenty miles to the 
 north of Cape Tarkeen, and the French fleet opposite the cape, ten 
 
20 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 leagues off shore ; the next day the reconnoitering vessels returned, 
 and their report caused the point called "Old Fort," near Eupatoria, 
 and only a few miles from the present position of the fleets, to be 
 chosen for the landing. 
 
 The shore at that place presented a low strip of beach, which is 
 separated from the shore by three sheets of water of say a mile in 
 length by half a mile in width, and which is joined to the main land 
 by two natural causeways between these sheets of water. 
 
 Behind these rose a plateau, which was, however, easily accessible 
 at the distance of a couple of miles from the landing place. 
 
 On the 12th the fleets and convoys, which covered a space of seven 
 leagues, sailed for Old Fort; but a squall occurring during the night, 
 the fleets anchored in the bay of Eupatoria, and waited there for the 
 steamers to tow up the convoys. 
 
 The 13th was consumed in bringing in the convoys, and the land- 
 ing took place next day. 
 
 The movement of the vessels commenced at 2^ a. m., and by 7^ 
 a. m. they were anchored in their respective positions. 
 
 The French ships were drawn up in three lines, each a mile long, 
 in the bay below Old Fort, and the British ones in the next bay, 
 nearer to Eupatoria, farther in or off, according to the draught of the 
 vessels. 
 
 Each of the three French divisions was in a single line of ships, 
 and their boats were distinguished by different colored flags ; on the 
 arrival of the first boats, the ground to be occupied by each division 
 was marked by its flags. 
 
 No Russian troops appeared to contest the landing ; but as a pre- 
 caution, the boats of the 3-deckers were sent ashore first, filled with 
 troops, and provided with Congreve rockets ; five vessels were also 
 moored close to the shore, with their broadsides bearing on the beach, 
 and enfilading the road by which the enemy's artillery must approach 
 to annoy the troops. 
 
 At 8.30 a. m. the French commander gave the signal for debarka- 
 tion, and the British one followed in about a half an hour ; it would 
 appear that the latter did not arrive in any designated order, but their 
 landing was quite as rapidly effected as the French. 
 
 With regard to the latter, the entire first division was set ashore in 
 one trip of the boats ; making a force of 9,0*70 men, 9 guns, and the 
 borses of the general officers, and with provisions for four days, which 
 was transferred from the ships to the beach in fifty minutes. 
 
 By noon all the French infantry had landed, and 40 pieces of artil- 
 lery, and by nightfall the entire debarkation had been effected, all but 
 part of the horses and artillery. The landing of the latter was inter- 
 rupted at dark by a storm of rain, which put a stop to the operation. 
 On this day the 4th French division and a detachment of British 
 troops, that had on the previous day been making a feint or diversion 
 at Katcha, returned ; they had been conveyed in steam-frigates. 
 
 On the 15th these troops were all landed, as well as the horses and 
 
 artillery, in spite of a severe surf which beat upon the beach. As an 
 
 nstance of its violence, the boat which carried General Forey and his 
 
BANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 2 1 
 
 staff was capsized in the breakers, and the officers saved themselves 
 only by swimming. 
 
 The force thus thrown, in a little more than a single day, upon an 
 exposed beach^ and one which was likely to be defended by a powerful 
 Russian army, consisted of over 60,000 men and 137 cannon. 
 
 The official accounts state the numbers as follows, viz : 
 
 English of all arms 27,600 men and 65 guns. 
 
 French of all arms 27,800 men and 72 guns. 
 
 Turks of all arms 6,000 men. 
 
 Total 61,400 men and 137 guns. 
 
 After one day — the 16th — spent on the beach, the French army was 
 ready to march upon Sevastopol ; but, to the great chagrin of St. 
 Arnaud, was compelled to tarry for the British, who were so much 
 encumbered with baggage that they did not complete their prepara- 
 tions before the 18th. 
 
 On the 19th the allies took up the line of march, and on the 20th, 
 or on the sixth day from that which saw their fleet cast anchor off the 
 Russian coast, they attacked the enemy, under Menschikoff, and forced 
 them from the redoubtable position of the Alma. 
 
 As I shall refer to this battle in my remarks on descents, it is worth 
 while to give the statistics of it, as furnished by the French, English, 
 and Russian official accounts. 
 
 The Russians were encamjied on a position which crossed the great 
 road about 2^ miles from the sea ; their front was two miles in extent 
 and protected by the river Alma, which, though generally fordable, 
 had steep banks ; the troops were posted on the slopes of the hills in 
 rear of the river ; and on the summits, which varied in altitude from 
 350 to 400 feet, was their reserve. A heavy covered battery flanked 
 the whole of the right of the position, and artillery was also posted 
 so as to command the passages of the river and the approaches gen- 
 erally. A trench some hundred yards long, half way down the slope 
 on the right, afforded cover against an advance. 
 
 The Russians had 42 battalions and 16 squadrons, a force estimated 
 by St, Arnaud at 50,000 men, and by Lord Raglan at from 25,000 to 
 50,000, and they had 82 guns. 
 
 The battle, as is well known, was decided by the turning of the left 
 of the position by Bosquet's division, and the Russians retreated be- 
 hind the Katcha ; their loss amounted to 4,500 men, and that of the 
 allies to 3,300 men. 
 
 Of the campaigns which succeeded this memorable descent it is not 
 my province to speak, but it is important to my argument to mention 
 the sum total of the troops who were, during the eleven months siege 
 of Sevastopol, thrown upon the shores of the Crimea : 
 
 The French troops sent amounted in all to - - 309,268 men. 
 
 English - 99,618 " 
 
 The Sardinians amounted to 10,000, and 7,000 Turks 
 
 were landed September 14 - - - - 17,000 " 
 
 Total 425,886 '' 
 
22 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YOEK CITY. 
 
 excluding what Turkish reinforcements were sent, which brought 
 their numbers to over 8 battalions at a late period of the siege. 
 The French losses, from all causes, amounted to - 69,229 men. 
 Those of the English to _ . - - 32,290 ^' 
 
 Total - - - - - 101,519 '' 
 
 It will be observed that losses sustained by the Allies by sickness at 
 Varna or at Gallipoli do not enter into the above table. The entire 
 forces sent by the Allies to the East amounted to a greater figure than 
 the above ; for example, the British sent to the East 107,040 men, of 
 whom 70,910 returned with their regiments, the balance being made 
 up of killed, invalided, prisoners, and some deserters. 
 
 However, the table above is restricted to an accurate exposition of 
 the power of the expedition, which had for its object the capture of 
 Sevastopol ; by its strength, the distance from home at which it 
 operated, the rapidity and certainty of its movements, and by the 
 •entire success with which it was crowned, after encountering the 
 utmost rigors of winter, and a defence almost unparalleled for bravery 
 and obstinacy, and unequalled in point of engineering skill, by every 
 criterion; in fact, this expedition far surpasses any previous one in the 
 history of the world. 
 
 ; 1854. While the expedition to Sevastopol was assembling at Varna 
 another grand descent was being made upon the Russian establish- 
 ments in the Aland islands, in the Baltic. This latter expedition con- 
 sisted of a combined French and English fleet, (which must have been 
 of great power, though I have been unable to find the exact number 
 of vessels and guns,) carrying a land army of 10,000 French and a 
 small force of British troops. The Freuch army was in two brigades, 
 with 200 artillerymen and 150 sappers. The embarkation of the 
 latter took place at Calais, and the fieets rendezvoused first at Faroe 
 sound, then at the anchorage of Ledsund, and finally appeared before 
 Bomarsund on the 7th of August, 1854. They anchored just beyond 
 the range of the guns of the fortress ; on the 8th the debarkation was 
 effected by placing the troops in launches, which were towed by row- 
 boats manned by sailors ; the main landing was at a point 6 miles 
 southwest of the works, while a body of 3,000 landed 9 miles to the 
 north, to facilitate the investment. 
 
 The siege was conducted by land exclusively, except that some ves- 
 sels (on the 15th) cannonaded the place from a distance of 1^ mile, a 
 range at which many of their shells, even, fell short of the walls ; and 
 on the 16th the place surrendered. 
 
 The result of this success was the capture of 2,400 troops, of 200 
 guns, and considerable supplies of powder, balls, and provisions. 
 The Russians likewise lost the costly works that had been built to 
 insure possession of the Aland isles; for, previous to leaving, the 
 allies reduced the main fortress and the towers of Bomarsund to a 
 heap of ruins. 
 
 This expedition, in itself, was a great exhibition of power ; but 
 when we consider that it was conducted at the same time with the 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 23 
 
 gigantic and unprecedented one to the Crimea, a vivid idea will be 
 formed of the military and naval resources of France and England. 
 
 AMERICAN EXPEDITIONS. 
 
 In 1739, England having declared war against Spain, a combined 
 expedition, under Admirals Anson and Vernon, sailed from England 
 and Jamaica to acquire possession of the richest portions of Spanish 
 America. The fleet of the latter took Portobello in November, and 
 afterwards Fort Chagre, on the isthmus; but Anson's squadron, that 
 was to have co-operated on the opposite side, at Panama, had been 
 scattered by storms off the Horn, and Vernon returned without result. 
 
 In 1740, (October,) Lord Cathcart's expedition left England, and 
 assembled at Jamaica, where it was joined by a body of colonial troops. 
 It then numbered 29 ships of the line, 80 smaller vessels, and 15,000 
 sailors, besides 12,000 land forces, equipped with all sorts of warlike 
 instruments and every kind of convenience. This expiKlition attacked 
 Carthagena, the strongest town in Spanish America, and demolished 
 its fortifications. The excessive mortality in the expedition caused it 
 to return to Jamaica without further effect, in November, 1741, after 
 losing about 20,000 men. 
 
 In 1742 the Spaniards collected a large fleet and numerous land 
 forces in Cuba, and made a descent in July, with 36 vessels, upon 
 Forts William and Frederica, on the St. Mary's. They were repulsed 
 by Gov. Oglethorpe. 
 
 In 1745 the Louisburg expedition took place. It consisted of 100 
 vessels, which rendezvoused at Canseau, where they were joined by 
 the squadron of Admiral Warren, from Antigua. After besieging 
 the place by land and sea for six weeks, during which several men-of- 
 war joined the blockading fleet from England, the place capitulated. 
 
 In 1746 a large fleet left France under d'Anville, but it effected 
 nothing, having been wasted by storms and shipwrecks. 
 
 In 1747 a French fleet sailed with troops for Canada and Nova 
 Scotia, but was encountered by the British fleet under Anson and 
 Warren, and what ships were not taken were forced to retreat. 
 
 In 1755 the French sent reinforcements to Canada in 12 ships-of- 
 war, under Dieskau; two of which were intercepted and taken by Ad- 
 miral Boscawen. Braddock's expedition arrived in America, from 
 England_, the same year. 
 
 In May, 1758, Amherst's expedition sailed from England, and ren- 
 dezvoused at Halifax. The fleet was composed of 22 ships-of-the-line 
 and 15 frigates. The army numbered at least 10,000 effective men. It 
 sailed against Louisburg, the French naval station, and arrived in 
 Chapeau Rouge bay, where it waited for six days, whilst a storm 
 rendered a landing impracticable. During this time the French 
 strengthened and extended their lines of field-works and abattis. 
 
 On the 8th June the surf was still dashing heavily, when the de- 
 barkation took place under the cover of the fire of the frigates. Not- 
 withstanding the French batteries and the capsizing and destruction 
 of several of the boats by the surf, the landing was effected, the 
 French lines taken, and Louisburg invested the same day. In less 
 
24 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 than two months the place was reduced to ruins, and capitulated; 
 5,600 troops and sailors became prisoners, and five ships of the line 
 and four frigates were captured. The rest of the French fleet (five 
 vessels) had been burnt or taken previously. 
 
 In January^ 1759, Admiral Pococke attacked Martinico with 10 
 line-of-battle ships and 6,000 effective troops. Being repulsed from 
 that island, he sailed for Guadalupe, which island he took after a 
 struggle of three months. 
 
 In June, 1759, the expedition destined to take Quebec rendezvoused 
 at Louisburg. General Wolf commanded the land forces, amounting 
 to about 8,000 men, carried in numerous transports. The fleet, 
 under Admiral Sanders, numbered 20 ships of the line and as many 
 frigates and armed vessels. 
 
 On the 26th June the landing took place on the isle of Orleans. 
 On the 29th batteries were erected on the main land opposite Quebec ; 
 but though the town was injured by their fire the citadel was beyond 
 their range. 
 
 In July, Wolfe attempted to gain a footing on the opposite shore of 
 the St. Lawrence, above the Montmorenci, but was repulsed, with the 
 loss of 400 killed alone. 
 
 On the 13th September, having deceived the French as to his in- 
 tentions, Wolfe crossed to the north shore, above the town, and 
 gained the battle of the Plains of Abraham, which Montcalm preferred 
 to deliver, rather than throw his army into Quebec. 
 
 The French, second in command, was obliged on September 17th, 
 from the want of provisions, to surrender the city. 
 
 In January, 1762, General Monkton and AdmiralRodney appeared 
 off Martinique, the richest of the French colonies, with a fleet of 16 
 ships-of-the-line and 13 frigates, and transports containing 12,000 
 troops ; this island was naturally strong and was well fortified, but 
 was taken in about five weeks. The same expedition took Grenada, 
 St. Lucia, and St. Vincents. 
 
 In May, the same expedition, having received reinforcements of 
 troops and supplies from the North American colonies and from Eng- 
 land, received orders to attack Havana. The land forces now 
 amounted to 11,000 effective English troops, besides the quotas from 
 New York and New England ; 2,500 negroes from Jamaica and the 
 Leeward islands, were also enrolled, and subsequently used in the 
 labors of the trenches. After twenty-nine days of open trenches, the 
 Moro Castle was taken by storm, and on the 11th ot August the city 
 capitulated. 
 
 The fruits of this expedition were the most important naval and 
 military station of the West Indies, 9 ships-of-the-line, and 4 frigates, 
 besides an immense booty, of which the property of the Spanish king 
 alone amounted to $10,000,000. 
 
 It succeeded in spite of all the difficulties of a tropical summer, the 
 yellow fever, and a difficult position, improved by strong and well 
 defended fortresses. 
 
 In 1769 an expedition set out from Cuba, and arrived before New 
 Orleans with 3,000 chosen troops on board ; the commander took 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 25 
 
 possession, in the name of the Spanish government, of the whole 
 valley of the Mississippi. 
 
 (In the preceding year the French inhabitants had rebelled and 
 •declared their intentions of joining the colony to France as a depen- 
 dency, or otherwise of forming an independent republic.) 
 
 On the 25th of June, 1776, Sir William Howe arrived oflf Sandy 
 Hook ; Admiral Howe arrived on the 12th July ; General Clinton 
 arrived soon after, as did also Admiral Hotham, with troops from 
 Charleston and England. 
 
 The army thus united amounted to 24,000 men, English, Hessians, 
 and Waldeckers ; they were ready to open the campaign in August. 
 
 The battle of Flatbush followed, and resulted in the retreat of the 
 Americans on the night of the 29th. 
 
 February 11, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton arrived at John's island, 
 thirty miles from Charleston, having sailed from New York the 26th 
 December. Charleston was defended by General Lincoln, who built 
 a chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries from the Ashley to the 
 Cooper river ; these mounted eighty pieces of artillery, and on all sides 
 of the town where a landing was practicable, batteries were erected 
 and covered with cannon. 
 
 On the 21st the British fleet crossed the bar, and in a few days the 
 €ity was invested by sea and by land. 
 
 In April, Clinton received a reinforcement of 3,000 men from New 
 York and took Fort Moultrie. 
 
 On the 12th of May the city surrendered. 
 
 In July, 1780, the French fleet, under the Chev. de Ternay, arrived 
 at Rhode Island; it had two ships of 80 guns, one of 74, two frigates 
 of 40, a cutter of 20, an armed hospital ship, and 32 transports with 
 6,000 men, under Rochambeau. 
 
 In August, 1781, De Grasse's fleet of 28 sail of the line, appeared 
 in the Chesapeake, from the West Indies, and landed 3,200 troops 
 under Marquis de St. Simon, to assist in the siege of Yorktown. 
 Eight more ships-of-the-line arrived soon after, under De Barras,from 
 Rhode Island. 
 
 In February, 1794, Admiral Jervis landed at Martinique with 
 6,000 troops, and took possession of the island, with the exception 
 of the forts, which were occupied by Rochambeau with 800 men. 
 The British were subsequently driven ofi", a reinforcement having 
 arrived of 1,500 French, from Brest, and the blacks having been 
 enrolled by the latter. 
 
 In 1795-'96 Abercrombie retook from the French the island of St. 
 Lucia and Deraerara. 
 
 In 1802 Leclerc's expedition sailed from France to St. Domingo ; it 
 consisted of 20,000 men, who were afterwards reinforced by 15,000 
 additional troops, making a total of 35,000 soldiers. The fleet num- 
 bered 30 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates. The failure of this expedi- 
 tion was due partly to the vicious plan of operation, but chiefly to the 
 yellow fever which committed dreadful ravages both in the land and 
 naval forces. The army of Toussaint did not exceed 20,000 men, 
 but was exempt from the sickness which carried oft' almost the whole 
 of the invading troops. 
 
26 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 1814. The English expedition, in 1814, againstWashington was com- 
 posed of Admiral Cockburn's fleet in the Chesapeake, reinforced by a 
 squadron with General Boss' army, which embarked at the Garonne 
 river, in France. 
 
 The latter fleet comprised thirteen armed vessels and three trans- 
 ports, and carried 2,500 troops: arriving at Bermuda it was joined 
 by three men-of-war, which had on board 1,600 troops ; continuing 
 the voyage the combined fleet joined that of the Chesapeake, which 
 consisted of three line-of-battle ships, several frigates, and some 
 sloops-of-war and gun-brigs. There were in this fleet 700 marines 
 and a division of marine artillery, bringing up the land forces to 
 about 5,000 men. 
 
 On the 19th and 20th of August the latter were disembarked at 
 Benedict, about fifty miles southeast of Washington. On the evening 
 of the 20th a flotilla was sent, under Cockburn, up the river to attack 
 that of Commodore Barney, which was, however, blown up by the 
 Americans. General Boss, in command of the army, proceeded to 
 Upper Marlborough, where he arrived on the 22d, having marched 
 forty miles in three days. Here he was joined by Cockburn, and the 
 united forces of the expedition marched, the night of the 23d, five 
 miles nearer to Washington. 
 
 On the 24th the advances to Bladensburg took place^, and our army 
 was beaten. The capture of Washington, and the atrocious treatment 
 our capital received at the hands of the British, are still fresh in the 
 recollection of our citizens. 
 
 The attack upon Baltimore, during the ensuing month after the 
 above occurrences, was made by the same expedition, which, having 
 received on board the army, again disembarked it at North Point, on 
 the Patapsco, thirteen miles from the city. 
 
 I'he repulse of the combined attack of the enemy on this occasion, 
 and their retreat to the ships, are well known ; and I will take ad- 
 vantage of the circumstance to conclude my reference to this expedi- 
 tion, the main facts relating to which 1 have already given, viz : the 
 numbers of the vessels and land forces, and the distance from which 
 they came. 
 
 1815. The expedition which had performed the exploit of burning the 
 American Capital proceeded from the Chesapeake to Jamaica, (two 
 ships only excepted, which were sent to England with wounded and 
 prisoners.) Here they were joined by a fleet of men-of-war and trans- 
 ports carrying 2,500 infantry, six companies of rifles, two squadrons 
 of dismounted dragoons, detachments of engineers, artillery and 
 rockets, and also recruits for the regiments that had served in the 
 Chesapeake. Major General Keane arrived in this fleet, and took 
 command of the whole. 
 
 Having set sail from Jamaica on the 20th November, the expedition 
 reached the mouth of the Mississippi, or rather they anchored oppo- 
 site the Chandeleur islands, near the entrance of Lake Borgne. Here 
 the plan of attack was concerted. 
 
 Considering it impracticable to reduce the forts which commanded 
 the navigation of the river, and as the ships could not pass up unless 
 this were effected, it was decided to land on the banks of the lake, 
 
DANGEKS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 2T 
 
 and make a push for the city before any strong defences could he pre- 
 pared by the Americans. 
 
 The troops being got on board, the lighter vessels entered the lake 
 on the 13th of December. They were opposed by the American gun- 
 boats, which were, however, captured by a flotilla of fifty launches 
 and barges. 
 
 The vessels now penetrated as far as their draught allowed, and on. 
 the 16th began to debark their detachments upon a sandy strip called 
 Isle au Poix, at the mouth of Pearl river. The vessels had to send 
 their boats for this purpose nearly thirty miles, and the soldiers 
 underwent great hardships from the total want of tents or fuel. 
 
 The entire force was not debarked until six days had elapsed, and 
 the whole week was consumed in the operation, in organizing the 
 troops into divisions, and assembling boats, packing ammunition,, 
 stores^ &c. ; and it must be recollected that the British were as yet 
 only in possession of a barren island. 
 
 The debouches of Bayou Catalan or Bienvenu into the lake, about 
 thirty miles, or a day's sail from the island, was selected as the point 
 of landing, and the advance guard of 1,600 men and two guns was 
 sent there to seize on a favorable spot. These surprised the guard, 
 and then pushed up the river to Villere's canal, where, having en- 
 camped, they sustained a severe attack from our troops under Jackson 
 and General Coffee, who were aided by the fire of the schooner Caro- 
 line, under Commodore Patterson. 
 
 The whole British army hastened at the sound of the cannonade to 
 effect its landing, and by the 24th it was all in the position first occu- 
 pied by the advance guard. 
 
 General Jackson, finding that his attack on the advanced guard 
 had rendered the enemy cautious, and would prevent an immediate 
 march upon the city, decided to improve the time by entrenching 
 himself, and selected the position which lay in rear of the Rodriguez, 
 canal. This position was 1,620 yards in extent, resting its right and 
 left on the river and on a swamp respectively, and was protected in 
 front by the canal. 
 
 The entrenchments consisted simply of a parapet of earth running, 
 in a right line from the river to the swamp, where it took a square 
 turn to the rear ; an unfinished redan was just beyond the ditch, at 
 the junction of the line with the river. 
 
 The canal formed a wet ditch for the entrenchment. It had five feet, 
 of water in some parts, but in others was very shallow ; its banks 
 were, however, very slippery and soft, from the effect of rain and the 
 opening of the levees. The defenders of the position amounted at this • 
 time to about 2,000 men, and this force repelled (as will be mentioned) 
 the first attack of the British. In the grand attack, the army under 
 Jackson amounted to 3,500 or 3,700 men, as he was joined on the 4th 
 by 2,500 Kentuckians, of whom about 1,500 were detached to garrison 
 the battery on the right bank. 
 
 The British army now landed had, on entering the ships, amounted 
 to about 8,000 soldiers, and it seems probable that, with Lambert's 
 reinforcement and with the marines, the number that took part in the 
 battle of the 8th of January was about 10,000. 
 
28 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 While the Americans were fortifying their position, and the main 
 army of the enemy was concentrating in advance of it, the British had 
 thrown up batteries, which, firing hot shot at the Caroline and Louis- 
 iana, had burnt the one and dislodged the other from her position, 
 which had prohibited an advance along the levee. 
 
 The way being now clear, the British advanced on the 28th, and, 
 on approaching the American line, opened a fire of cannon, bombs, 
 and rockets, which they followed up by a violent attack, which lasted 
 seven hours, resulting in the repulse of the enemy. 
 
 At this juncture the British were reinforced by 1,600 infantry under 
 General Lambert, who thus arrived in time to assist in the decisive 
 battle of the 8th. 
 
 General Pakenham, who had also arrived from England and taken 
 command just previous to the advance, now concluded to abandon the 
 idea of storming the American lines, and to commence his attack by a 
 heavy cannonade, which should breach the works and silence their 
 artillery. Accordingly thirty heavy guns were brought up from the 
 ships, and were mounted, on the 31st, in six batteries, which opened 
 fire next day. 
 
 The delay caused by bringing up the guns was improved by Jackson, 
 and the American batteries were so strong by this time, that they 
 silenced the British fire and drove the artillerists from their pieces. 
 This success was greatly contributed to by the flotilla and by the 
 battery which Jackson had thrown up on the opposite side of the 
 river, both of which took the enemy's line in flank. An attempt to 
 turn the American left, by an attack from the swamp, was also 
 defeated. 
 
 The success of a future attack seemed, therefore, to depend on 
 silencing the battery across the river, and there was no way of doing 
 so but to take it. To this end General Pakenham, who displayed 
 certainly much energy, ordered Villeres' canal to be deepened so as to 
 admit of passing the boats upon the Mississippi from the bayou, which 
 should carry a detachment to the opposite shore. The canal being 
 finished on January 6th, Pakenham ordered Colonel Thornton to 
 Cross the river on the night of the 7th, and take the important battery. 
 The capture was to be announced by a signal rocket, when the main 
 body was to commence its attack on Jackson's line. This programme 
 of attack was very simple, and its failure in execution was not due to 
 any ill-conduct of the British troops. 
 
 The battery on the opposite bank was carried by 500 British, and 
 was held during the main attack by Colonel Thornton, while the army 
 of Pakenham performed prodigies of valor in the attempt to storm 
 the works, but, as it is universally known, the courage of the troops 
 sufiiced only to increase their losses. 
 
 My object has been chiefly to exhibit clearly the difiiculties of the 
 landing ; and to bring the enemy from his ships to the point where 
 the result of the expedition depends upon the fate of a battle on land; 
 the chances, at this crisis, of the success or failure of the expedition 
 may be calculated on general principles, seeing that all the marine 
 probabilities which are especially under consideration, and at the out- 
 set of the expedition counted against it, are by this time eliminated. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 29' 
 
 It is sufficient, therefore, to state that in this short campaign the 
 British lost near 5,000 men. In the battle of the 8th January Gen- 
 eral Lambert reported a loss of 2,070^ and Colonel Haynes of 2,600. 
 
 The result of this tremendous defeat was the retreat of the whole 
 force, and their re-embarkation, an operation which was conducted 
 with great energy, and without serious loss. It was rendered tedious 
 by the necessity that now existed of constructing a brush road over 
 the swamp to the place where the troops must re-enter the boats. 
 This road took nine days to construct, and it was not till the night of 
 the 18th that the beaten army was ready to evacuate its position. 
 
 It regained the point of embarkation by a stolen night march, and 
 finally found itself once more aboard the fleet, though the operation 
 of transferring the troops to the vessels lasted several days, owing to 
 the prevalence of foul weather, and the distance of the vessels, which 
 were about a day's pull, in boats, from the shore. 
 
 While the points of this history remain unconfused by the accounts 
 of more powerful expeditions, it will be well to deduce some conclu- 
 sions from it that it will be useful to refer to in the sequel. 
 
 In the first place, it appears that a force of about 10,000 men suc- 
 ceeded in overcoming all the difficulties of concentration at one point, 
 although starting in detached corps from the Mediterranean, France,. 
 England, and the West Indies. Next, they accomplished their de- 
 barkation at a place perhaps the worst adapted in the world for such 
 operations, owing to the shallowness of the water and its muddy 
 shores, and the contracted avenues to the objective point. Third, 
 their advanced guard had actually reached the highway to New Or- 
 leans, and had but to disperse or defeat an army of about its own 
 numerical force, and composed of irregular troops alone, in order to 
 complete the success of the expedition. 
 
 That it did not do so must be imputed, cceteris paribus, to a want of 
 military tact in the commander-in chief, or his neglect of his duty ; 
 for had he informed himself of the number of his enemy's forces, it is 
 plain that every rule of warfare would counsel him to attack at once, 
 without giving time for entrenchments to be built and reinforcements 
 to arrive. 
 
 That the expedition was not successful appears, therefore, to have 
 been due first to the bad generalship of Pakenham, and secondly to 
 the genius and heroism of Jackson, who used to the uttermost the 
 time, the locality, the resources at his disposal, and the militia under 
 his command. 
 
 I repeat, that the expedition was successful in so far that the result 
 of it depended on military operations entirely disconnected with the 
 fact of its being a maritime expedition ; and that even in these opera- 
 tions the probabilities, as they would be estimated if the numbers and 
 tactical positions of the armies were alone considered, and the genius 
 of Jackson left out of consideration, were greatly in favor of the 
 invaders up to the very moment when the retreat of the British hegan. 
 Even after the blunder of not marching at once on New Orleans; 
 after the dilatory and undecided conduct of the British general 
 between the 24th December and 8th January, which gave Jackson 
 time to consolidate his lines and batteries^ and to double his army 
 
30 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 and after the terrible slaughter of the British in the battle of the 8th, 
 there was still an even chance at least, for the commander-in-chief to 
 reckon upon, provided only he had judgment and decision enough to 
 appreciate and make use of it. I allude to the success of the enemy 
 on the right bank, which would have been enough in the hands of a 
 general like Jackson, had the British such a one, to insure the forcing 
 of the American lines ;* after that, the British would have been 
 superior in numbers, artillery, and discipline; and if they were beaten 
 in the open field, it would have been for want of a leader equal to the 
 illustrious warrior whom Providence assigned to the command of our 
 army. 
 
 This speculation upon the abstract probabilities which related to 
 the battle of the 8th of January is offered merely as an exercise, as 
 I may say, to assist the reader in understanding the general discussion 
 in hand: it no more reflects on the imperishable glory of our arms to 
 say that Jackson was out-flanked at New Orleans, than to say that 
 General Taylor was surrounded at Buena Vista. In both cases the 
 disadvantages under which the generals labored, enhance their repu- 
 tation. 
 
 1847. The expedition which under Scott subjugated Mexico is still 
 80 fresh in the minds of Americans that I shall not refer to any other 
 pages of its history than those which relate the manner in which the 
 landing was efiected. 
 
 As a military operation the landing will always be a model for 
 imitation, both as to the arrangement of the plan, and the details of 
 its execu^^ion ; the enemy were to the last moment in doubt as to the 
 place selected for the debarkation, but even if they had divined it, or 
 been secretly advised on the subject, the nature of the locality and 
 the measures adopted by the general to cover the operation would 
 have insured its success, though opposed by the whole disposable 
 Mexican force. 
 
 The expedition, as is well known, rendezvoused at Lobos, where 
 the army was organized ; the troops detached from General Taylor's 
 command had assembled by the end of January at Brazos St. Jago 
 and Tampico, and were sent from thence to Lobos, a distance of about 
 €0 miles ; the rest of the troops arrived at the rendezvous from New 
 Orleans. 
 
 On the 2d of March the transports all sailed for Anton Lizardo, and 
 preparations were made for the landing, which General Scott decided 
 to effect on the sandy beach, at a point west of Sacrificios island, 
 and about three miles south of the city and castle of Vera Cruz. 
 
 One hundred and forty-four surf boats had been ordered for the 
 "[anding, but 65 only had arrived ; these were to be towed behind the 
 ships from Anton Lizardo to the landing place, when the troops were 
 to enter them, and make the shore under cover of the guns of the 
 smaller vessels, which would be so disposed as to sweep the beach by 
 their fire. 
 
 "'■■ In support of this view, see Jackson's despatch to the War Department, in which he 
 says that "The enemy now occupied a position from which thej' might annoy us witliout- 
 hazard, and by means of which they might have been able to defeat, in a great measure, 
 the effects of our success on this side tlie river." 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YuRK CITY. 31 
 
 On the 9th, Worth's division was put on board of the men-of-war 
 and steamers, and those of Patterson and Twiggs, after filling up such 
 vessels of the squadron as were not occupied by Worth's, were put 
 into transports, which were towed by the steam vessels of the fleet. 
 
 The expedition, advancing in the above order, arrived about noon 
 at the selected spot ; the surf boats were immediately filled by the 
 troops of Worth's division, which, upon gaining the beach, formed 
 and marched forward to the sand hills, where they took up a position 
 to protect the operation from any attack of the Mexicans, 
 
 The surf boats continued their trips with alacrity, and before next 
 morning the entire army was established on the shore. 
 
 The landing of materiel and baggage continued without interruption 
 until the 12th, when a heavy norther sprung up, causing such a surf 
 that the operation had to cease entirely ; this norther blew constantly 
 (except a lull of a few hours on the 13th) until the 17th, when it abated, 
 and the landing of stores and artillery was recommenced ; the whole 
 of the army materiel was not, from this cause, got on shore till the 
 the 24th, having been interrupted the third time on the 23d. 
 
 The army in the meantime had advanced on the city and completed 
 the investment of it ; a parallel and several batteries had been con- 
 structed, and on the 22d the bombardment commenced ; the city was 
 overwhelmed with shot and shell for four days, when its governor 
 offered to capitulate. 
 
 Thus in eighteen days from the time the expedition anchored ofi" 
 the beach it had accomplished the preliminary and all-important 
 measure of the campaign. 
 
 The Mexicans Avere deprived of the strategetical advantages which 
 were offered by the fortress both in its character of a retreat for troops 
 and harbor of refuge f'T privateers ; the army also gained a secure 
 base of operations, and was enabled to march on the capital by the 
 paved road which leads to it from Vera Cruz. 
 
 In this descent an army of about 12^000 men was landed on an open 
 beach, exposed to the most violent winds, and only three miles from a 
 fortress and 'castle of the enemy. The landing of the provisions, 
 artillery, and baggage was repeatedly interrupted by severe storms, 
 but in spite of all these difficulties the expedition achieved, in a little 
 over two weeks, a success which had been pronounced an impossibility 
 by foreign military critics. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 A few important general conclusions may be drawn from the 
 facts of Chapter HI, and from the accounts in history, of the descents 
 made prior to 1400. 
 
 It appears that the seas have never proved a sufficient barrier to the 
 aggressive spirit of powerful maritime states, even when the art of 
 ship-building was comparatively in its infancy, and almost before the 
 science of navigation came into existence; and that, when the compass 
 was still uninvented, not to speak of the epochs when oars were the only 
 propelling force employed, formidable expeditions, both as to num- 
 bers and equipments, have crossed seas and oceans, and have landed 
 successfully on hostile shores. 
 
 In proportion as successive improvements in the construction of 
 vessels have diminished the dangers which such invasions must 
 hazard, before the debarkation has reduced the chances against them 
 to the usual ones of land warfare, there appears a constant tendency 
 in maritime nations towards exerting more of the national integral 
 strength in this sort of warfare, and also a more frequent resort to it^ 
 both in schemes of conquest, and as a means of distracting the enemy 
 from the land warfare in which he may be simultaneously engaged. 
 
 The constant communication of an invading army with its ships, 
 and by means of them with its own country, appears to be essential 
 to the prosperous issue of these expeditions; and the chances for ful- 
 filling this condition of success are directly influenced, like the 
 probabilities in favor of a satisfactory landing, by the nature of the 
 vessels at command — their sea-worthiness, speed and size, as well as 
 number. Accordingly there can distinctly be traced^ in the History 
 of Maritime Expeditions, an increased probability of the success of the 
 latter in proportion to the improvements in ships and navigation. 
 
 If these views are strongly sustained by the events of trans-oceanic 
 warfare previous to the invention of steam, they are proved to be 
 correct beyond dispute by the almost incredible impulse which that 
 motive power has given to the aggressive spirit and military prepara- 
 tions of France, England, and Russia. Steam has done as mucli 
 towards aggrandizing the aggressive strength of France and England, 
 and the distances at which they can exert it, as the invention of the 
 mariner's compass did towards enlarging the area of navigation. 
 
 Without much exaggeration it may be said that steam has so con- 
 tracted and bridged the Atlantic that we are ten days march from 
 England and two from Halifax ; but, if this expression conveys a fair 
 idea of the speed and certainty of the voyages of steam fleets, it is 
 inadequate to represent the ease with which the journey is performed 
 by the troops, and the facility with which the baggage and artillery 
 are transported. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 33 
 
 The Atlantic telegraph, also, whenever it is made serviceable, will 
 be of immense advantage to the British. The intended movements 
 of our squadrons can be indicated in England simultaneously with 
 their departure from our ports, and the operations of their fleets or 
 expeditions directed against them; or our sea-board cities can be guided 
 from home with a double advantage as to time, 
 
 ^ It may be said that the arguments I adduce only prove that our 
 navy should be increased ; but we must view the case as it is. Our 
 navy is not only insignificant in size compared to those of France and 
 England, but is likely to continue so. 
 
 Even, however, if it were equal in size to those of our rivals there 
 would be enough for it to do in distressing our enemy's commerce and 
 fighting his squadrons on the high seas, without leaving any force to 
 spare for the passive defence of our coasts. 
 
 Besides, is not England, with her immense navy and powerful 
 channel fleet, in constant apprehension of a descent by the French ? 
 Did not Wellington repeatedly caution the government against the 
 dangers of invasion ? 
 
 It seems certain that the chief difficulty to be provided for by the 
 French, in their plans for invading England, is the uncertainty of 
 keeping up the communications of the army landed, with home. This 
 is, as before remarked, very necessary, both for supplying reinforce- 
 ments and against the contingency of a retreat. 
 
 The isolation of the invading army, and the impossibility of its 
 making a retreat in case of failure, are therefore staked on the issue 
 of a naval battle ; and it is fair to presume that it is this risk which 
 delays the order for the execution of a design which must be cherished 
 by every French soldier and sailor. 
 
 In our case, however, this dissuading reflection is wanting to pre- 
 serve our coast from insult ; but the reader will need no assistance in 
 making up his mind on the point immediately in question if he will 
 glance over the subjoined condensed account of the British and 
 American navies. 
 
 Indeed, there seems to be no necessity for insisting any further, 
 even upon the main case which I have endeavored to make appear. 
 
 The conclusions that an unprejudiced reader of the account in 
 question will arrive at, with regard to the military attitude of this 
 country, cannot fail to be identical with those which I have, to the 
 best of my ability, advanced and supported. 
 
 On the one hand there is given, in a late number of the Washington 
 Union, the following statement of the United States naval force on 
 active service. 
 
 Active service. 
 
 Line-of-battle ships 10 None serviceable. 
 
 Frigates 10 3 serviceable. 
 
 Sloops 21 All fit for active service. 
 
 Brigs 3 All in service. 
 
 Schooners 1 Useless. 
 
 Screw steamers, 1st class 6 5 readv for service. 
 
 3 
 
34 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 Screw steamers, 1st class 2 Building. 
 
 Screw steamers, 2d class 6 1 serviceable, 5 building. 
 
 Screw steamers, 3d class 4 Inferior. 
 
 Screw steamers, 4tli class 1 Inferior. 
 
 Side-wheel steamers 7 Effective. 
 
 Actual available force. 
 
 Frigates 3 150 guns. 
 
 Brigs 3 16 guns. 
 
 Sloops, screw 1 13 guns. 
 
 Paddle steamers 7 39 guns. 
 
 Sloops 21 388 guns. 
 
 Frigates,, screw 5 172 guns. 
 
 Light screw 2 11 guns. 
 
 42 789 guns. 
 
 Thus it will be seen that the government is prepared to send to sea 
 at once, in case of war, only 42 vessels, sail and steam, of all classes, 
 carrying 789 guns. In addition to these, it has at disposal 5 or 6 
 small steam vessels in the revenue and coast survey service, none of 
 which, however, are fit for war purposes, except the Harriet Lane, a 
 new paddle cutter of 650 tons. 
 
 On the other hand, the British navy is described as follows : 
 
 Great Britain has some 90 vessels of the line, carrying from 72 to 
 190 guns, the majority of them screw steamers. Her sailing vessels 
 of the line are most of them in disuse, being used for receiving, store, 
 and transport ships. Her screw propellers of this class carry long 
 32^8 and 8-inch guns, and one 10-inch pivot gun. She has some 30 
 large screw frigates, carrying heavy guns, most of them 8-inch. She 
 is also building a class of steamers^ several of which are in the water, 
 designed to cope with our own new vessels of the first class. 
 
 Her present class of screw sloops are large vessels, of from one 
 thousand two hundred to two thousand tons, carrying from twelve to 
 twenty-four heavy 8-inch guns, with one pivot gun. She has about 
 two hundred and fifty light steam vessels, all screw, divided as fol- 
 lows : Despatch vessels of six hundred and fifty tons and three hun- 
 dred horse power each, carrying two or four 32-pounders and two 
 pivot 8-inch guns ; a class of vessels of about four hundred tons and 
 one hundred horse power, carrying two howitzers and one 8-inch 
 pivot. 
 
 Her third and most effective class of vessels are small screw gun- 
 boats, ranging from two hundred to three hundred tons burden, with 
 from twenty to sixty horse power, carrying a light 8-inch gun or long 
 32-pounder and one or two 24 or 32-pound howitzers. Besides these 
 she has between forty and fifty paddle steamers of various sizes : from 
 the Terrible, of one thousand eight hundred tons and twenty guns, to 
 the Pigmy, of fifty tons and one gun. 
 
 From this statement it will be seen that if she has men to man 
 them, Britain can place thirty screw steamers of the line, twenty 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 35 
 
 screw frigates, forty screw sloops, and one hundred and fifty ligliter 
 steam vessels on the Atlantic coast, without decreasing the strength of 
 any one of the fleets on other stations, and still have a large force to 
 hold in reserve. In this enormous navy we find combined, to an 
 almost incredible extent, the main requisites which I have shown to 
 be essential to the success of naval military expeditions, viz : rapidity 
 and precision of manoeuvres and of combinations, as well as of voyages; 
 speed and certainty of communications, and capacity and concentrated 
 power in the vessels. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 On reviewing hastily the four chapters just concluded the following 
 points will be found to have been incontestably established : 
 
 1. That the United States being, above all the powers in the world_, 
 in a condition to defy any other sorts of attack, will be, in any future 
 war, subjected to a series of naval-military expeditions which shall 
 have for object the destruction of the government naval establish- 
 ments and the ruin of our commercial cities. 
 
 2. That these expeditions will be on a most immense scale, and 
 formidable, as well from the late scientific and military improvements 
 in warfare, as from the numbers of the troops and the rapidity and 
 certainty of the descent. 
 
 3. That these expeditions will follow immediately upon the decla- 
 ration of war, be isimultaneous with it^ or even be themselves the only 
 announcement of hostilities, may be inferred from the usage of na- 
 tions, and of Great Britain especially, during the last 50 years. 
 
 4. And, lastly, it will certainly happen that those of our seaboard 
 cities will be first attacked which offer the richest prizes, and which it 
 would affect the country most to ruin (commercially or materially) 
 and which possess the least capacity of resistance. 
 
 5. These expeditions may be of an entirely naval character* or they 
 may be. descents in which the fleet would co-operate with the land 
 forces, either offensively or merely as forming and protecting the com- 
 munications and retreat f of an army of debarkation ; or it may 
 serve in both of these capacities. | 
 
 It is against attacks of our seaports by fleets alone that the seacoast 
 fortifications of the United States are intended ; this appears from the 
 nature of the works themselves, which are mostly stone castles looking 
 upon entrances § to harbors, or on roadsteads, where they merely pre- 
 vent an enemy's fleet from effecting a rendezvous or taking shelter or 
 making their station || for blockading purposes. This, also, is the 
 theory which is stated expressly in the written reports of the Chief 
 Engineer of the army, and it is especially laid down in the assemblage 
 of letters by several of the highest officers of the Engineer Corps, 
 which is to be found in General Totten's Eeport on the National De- 
 fences of 1851. 
 
 6. I therefore propose, as a supplement to the oflicial system of 
 American fortifications, a plan for defending the seacoast cities from 
 naval descents, of which the essential features are — 1st, the use of 
 
 '■' Such as Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt ; French attack on San Juan de Ulloa ; attack 
 on Copenhagen in 1801 by Nelson and Parker ; projected attack on Cronstadt; bombard- 
 ments of Odessa and Kimburn. 
 
 t Pakenham's and Washington expeditions. 
 
 I Sevastopol, Bomarsund, and Kertch. 
 
 § Fort Warren, Fort Sumter, Fort Delaware, Fort Richmond, Fort Schuyler. 
 
 II Castle Calhoun, fort at Sandy Hook, Fort Taylor, and fort at Ship Island, Fort Jefferson, 
 
DANGEKS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 37 
 
 fortifications of a cheap description and adapted to the range of the 
 Minie rifle or its equivalent, the new regulation United States rifle 
 musket ; and 2d, that the main reliance, in the defence of these works, 
 is the militia and volunteer regiments belonging to the city which 
 may be attacked. 
 
 The city of New York — with its great material wealth in private 
 and public buildings and stores, its navy and ship yards, its factories, 
 machine shops, and foundries, and its other workshops of all kinds — 
 is, in itself, a worthy object for a grand expedition ; but the incentives 
 to an enemy to attempt such an enterprise would include, besides, the 
 hope of paralyzing, to a certain extent, the trade of those great dis- 
 tricts of country, of which New York is the commercial centre. 
 
 But although the loss to the country in general which would spring 
 from the bombardment and conflagration of New York would be 
 severe, (the manner in which that event would be felt it is unneces- 
 sary to explain to practical business men,) I need not dilate on it 
 here ; for the readers to whom I address myself are especially New 
 Yorkers, who ought not to need any additional stimulus to interest 
 them in the matter, than the possibility of lasting injury to the city 
 which their boldness, enterprise, and perseverance, have placed first 
 among all competitors on the western continent. 
 
 I say lasting injury, for it is certain that the country at large would 
 recover from the shock of a blow struck upon New York much sooner 
 than could the latter, individually, which must remain for a long time 
 a maimed member of the general system ; while, to carry out the 
 analogy, the vital streams of trade which now circulate through it^ 
 being directed into other channels for the time, would so aggrandize 
 the neighboring ports, that their rivalry might be of material hind- 
 rance to the restoration of the city in its former pre-eminent position. 
 
 The citizens of New York have always shown themselves solicitous 
 for the safety of their port, and in every case where the necessity of for- 
 tifications has been pointed out by engineer officers, they have been 
 prodigal of their efforts to secure appropriations for the building of 
 them. 
 
 They have done their share towards the work of making the city 
 perfectly secure from all foreign aggression, and it must be with great 
 difficulty that they will listen to the unwelcome assertion that the de- 
 fences which they have been assured are all sufficient for the purpose 
 are far from being so ; that their powerful protection from attacks, in 
 one quarter at least, is an illusion; that, supposing an enemy's army 
 landed on Long Island, the immunity from a bombardment is to fol- 
 low from certain scientific and strategetical influences (which the forti- 
 fications are to exert) which shall deter him from approaching the 
 city by roads which are entirely unprotected. 
 
 It will be enough for a man of common sense to be informed that 
 the barriers to an enemy's advance are not material and visible for 
 him to despise them ; and certainly if an enemy does not see any 
 ahead of him, he will not be as apt, as a less interested party, to 
 listen to an argument showing that it is highly dangerous for him to 
 advance and prosecute his enterprise. 
 
 Here is a prize worth more than Sevastopol, Copenhagen, Bomar- 
 
38 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 sund, Kimburn, or Kertch, as booty to an enemy; and which would 
 be double the loss to this country that it would profit its destroyers ; 
 and it lies as open to attack, from several quarters, as if not a cent had 
 been spent on its defences. A chain is no stronger than its weakest 
 link; and any one opening by which the city can be approached, 
 is as good as two, or three, or as a free entrance in all directions. 
 I will not, at present, discuss the question, whether, or no, the castles 
 which are set on the banks of the water avenues to the city will alto- 
 gether bar the passage of any foreign fleets and flotillas ; but, taking 
 it for granted that heavy guns and mortars cannot be brought 
 afloat against the city, will proceed to demonstrate that they can be, 
 and very readily, by an enemy which should rendezvous at Halifax, 
 voyage for forty-eight hours in steam vessels and in transports towed 
 by steam if necessary, and, arriving in Long Island Sound, disembark 
 in one of the numerous harbors of that quiet lake, and march upon 
 Brooklyn with a force of say 70,000 or 100,000 men, and with a train 
 of light mortars and howitzers, by which the entire city would be re- 
 duced to ashes by firing across the East river. As an alternative, the 
 city might be required to give up as prizes of war the naval stores and 
 ships-of-war in the harbor, the American merchant ships in port, and 
 furnish, in addition;, a contribution of as many millions of dollars as 
 the pressing necessity might make the loss preferable, to the other 
 threatened evils. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 DEFENCE OF NEW YORK AGAINST A NAVAL-MILITARY EXPEDITION. 
 
 The 0§icial Theory and Practice analyzed and criticised. 
 
 In the report, to the Secretary of War, of General Totten, chief en- 
 gineer, of 1840, which is substantially repeated, in essential respects, 
 in his '' Report on the National Delences^" of 1851, we find that the 
 theory of the defence of New York, according to which all its fortifi.- 
 cations have been and are to be made^ is as follows : 
 
 1. To prevent a fleet from appearing before the city and bombard- 
 ing it ; to this end there are a certain number of castles built on the 
 shores of the bay and East river. 
 
 At the Narrows are forts Lafayette, Hamilton, and Richmond, and 
 batteries Hudson and Morton. Across the channel, at this point, is to 
 be stretched a strong boom, which shall stoj) an enemy's fleet, or de- 
 lay it long enough to give the forts time to cripple or destroy it. A 
 work on the site of Fort Tompkins, and a battery to rake the beach, 
 are in construction. The former is to remedy the ill location of Fort 
 Richmond, and the dislocated arrangement of the whole system on 
 Staten Island. 
 
 In second line behind these, on this approach, and close to the city, 
 are forts Columbus and Castle William, and South Battery on G-ov- 
 ernor's Mand, and a trifling work on Ellis' Island. These were 
 originally built to effect all the purposes of the works below ; but are 
 now chiefly of value as tending to discourage an enemy from running 
 the gauntlet of the lower works, with the idea of receiving their fire 
 without reply, and revenging himself on the city. 
 
 To close the avenue presented by the East river, there are two forts, 
 opposite each other, on Throg's Neck and Willet's Point. (One of 
 these is not yet begun.) 
 
 2. To prevent a hostile fleet from taking position in the lower bay, 
 (Sandy Hook bay,) and thence blockadiug this entrance of the port, a 
 castle is to be built on Sandy Hook. 
 
 3. To prevent an enemy from disembarking on Long Island, or 
 on the main land, and marching on the city, with a train of mortars 
 and howitzers, to bombard it, we have nothing but the same works, 
 which are said to effect this purpose, totally distinct from the other, 
 by the following theory: To prevent a hostile fleet from landing an 
 army at Gravesend bay, below the Narrows, the (unbuilt) fort on 
 Sandy Hook is supposed to suffice, because it bears on the main ship 
 channel within cannon range. This power of being capable of firing 
 on the enemy' s ships while they are traversing the distance of 2 miles 
 within 1^ miles of the fort is supposed, as it appears from General 
 Totten's report of 1856, sufficiently formidable to hinder the concep- 
 tion of the enterprise. Other engineer officers yield the point that 
 Sandy Hook might be passed, if not by day, at least by night, by such 
 
40 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 an expedition, or that the fleet, instead of passing by Sandy Hook, 
 might, as urged by Major Chase, take the East, or the 14-foot chan- 
 nel, and arrive at Gravesend bay without coming within range of the 
 fort ; but they say that, even if arrived here, the enemy could not land 
 his troops, owing to the fire of the forts at the Narrows. 
 
 On the East river, General Totten supposes that the landing would 
 be stopped, or its object frustrated, by the works at Throg's and Wil- 
 let's Points, owing to the following causes: The enemy would not 
 land on the main land below Fort Schuyler, because he would have 
 more than 20 miles to march on New York, and would have to cross 
 the Harlem river. He would, it is pretended, be prevented from 
 landing on Long Island by the fort on Willet's Point, which has a 
 strategetical hearing on his advance on Brooklyn. This is a fair state- 
 ment; for, in General Totten's report of 1840, we find — 
 
 "But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving 
 parties in suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the 
 river and falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having 
 no obstacle in his front. 
 
 "To prevent this efiectually, and also to accomplish other objects, 
 a work should be erected at Willet's Point, opposite Throg's Point. 
 
 "This work * * would involve a march against the navy yard 
 from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be 
 collected on the New York side might, under cover of this work, be 
 crossed over to Long Island and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting 
 off his communication ivith thejleet." 
 
 In short we have the works of New York built on the following 
 theory : 
 
 1st. To stop fleets from sailing up to the city, forts, castles and 
 batteries, which oppose the passage by their fire, and which are to be 
 aided by the material obstacle of booms stretched across the water. 
 
 2d. A work to prevent a fleet from making a resort of Sandy Hook 
 tay. 
 
 3d. To prevent an expedition from marching on the city, after 
 landing on the main land below Throg's Neck, the natural barrier of 
 the Harlem river is to be defended by troops in the field. 
 
 4th. To prevent an expedition from marching on the city, after 
 landing on Long Island, below the work on Willet's Point, reliance 
 is placed entirely on his fear of attacks on his rear by troops issuing 
 from that work. 
 
 5th. To prevent a landing in Gravesend bay, within 10 miles of 
 Brooklyn, it is supposed that the fleet must pass within range of a 
 projected, but yet uncommenced, work at Sandy Hook, and that it 
 would be deterred from doing so by fear of the damage it would sus- 
 tain. And I will here add the opinion of individual officers, that, 
 even if it did pass, the anchoring and landing in Gravesend bay would 
 be so cannonaded that the operation would be impossible. 
 
 The above is a fair and accurate exposition of the entire system of 
 the fortifications of New York. 
 
 It has always, however, been considered by some eminent ofiicers 
 of the corps that the system is faulty in theory, and it is so, in mj 
 opinion, both in theory and execution. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 41 
 
 Avoiding discussion for the present of the first three points, let us 
 consider the fourth and fifth, to which this memoir relates. 
 
 It has always been asserted by Major Chase, and by the late Major 
 Sanders of the Engineer Corps, that a landing in Gravesend bay is 
 perfectly practicable; the sailing past Sandy Hook at night by the 
 large ships is easy enough, and the losses would be far from checking 
 the progress of a powerful fleet of vessels, capable, as ships-of-the- 
 line and frigates are, of receiving a great number of shots, and sus- 
 taining the fire of forts for hours. Smaller vessels can enter New 
 York bay by the East channel, which does not lie within range of 
 Sandy Hook, and gun boats can pass within a stone's throw of the 
 point of Coney Island. But this main ship channel might, as Major 
 Chase insists, be avoided altogether ; for, provided the expedition were 
 altogether conveyed in light draught vessels, it might take the 14-foot 
 channel, which leads to Gravesend bay, without passing under the 
 fire of Sandy Hook ; there is, indeed, no doubt of the practicability 
 of either of these passages. 
 
 As to the anchorage and beach of Gravesend bay being within and 
 under the fire of the works at the Narrows, that would appear, if so, 
 to be an accidental circumstance, from the following considerations : 
 Fort Hamilton, the nearest one, is built in a hollow, and is prevented 
 by a ridge of land, which lies between it and Gravesend bay, from 
 seeing the latter, except from the upper or barbette battery of the 
 side which bears upon it; now, this side^ like the side fronting on the 
 Narrows, is casemated, and its scarp wall is pierced with embrasures 
 for guns, so that if the fort, identically as it stands, had been built 
 on top of the said ridge, a hundred yards to the southward of its 
 present site, instead of behind it, there would have been, in addition 
 to the nine or ten barbette guns that can now be directed on Graves- 
 end bay, a complete tier of guns in casemate, which latter have always 
 been valued by the Engineer Department at a much higher rate than 
 guns in barbette. As, however, this advantage, which, at a time when 
 bomb-proof floating batteries were unknown, was really of great im- 
 portance, was neglected, for no sufficient reason, and for no cause, as 
 far as the shape, construction, or cost of construction of the work was 
 concerned, we must conclude that the action of Fort Hamilton upon 
 Gravesend bay, as prohibiting or interfering with debarkations, was 
 not an element of the design of the fort. 
 
 This view is strengthened by considering, that, when the fort was 
 built, our largest guns were 32 and 42 pounders, with an extreme 
 range of about 1,900 yards, obtained with the maximum charge and 
 elevation ; now, if the work were furnished only with an armament 
 of these, the farther beach of Gravesend bay would be a mile beyond 
 the range of its guns, even if it were seated on the ridge above- 
 mentioned. 
 
 Another argument in support of the opinion that the works at the 
 Narrows were not originally intended to prevent debarkations on 
 Gravesend beach is to be found by examining Fort Lafayette, which 
 stands just in advance of Fort Hamilton, on a shoal in the Narrows. 
 
 This fort is square, and one face has a view down and one up the 
 Narrows ; an angle is thus left bearing across the Narrows, so that its 
 
42 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 guns cannot be directed square across ; this is probably because of the 
 works in that quarter on the opposite side, which might otherwise be 
 in danger from chance shots from this work ; but another angle bears 
 nearly towards Gravesend bay, and thus no guns could be mounted, 
 except the two in the angle itself, having a bearing in the necessary 
 direction to interfere with a debarkation on its beach, and what 
 renders this view still more evident is that the face which bears most 
 directly on the said beach is not provided with embrasures for cannon, 
 but is merely loop-holed for the use of musketry. 
 
 As to the redoubt behind Fort Hamilton, one face of it sees the bay, 
 but it has no more guns on the side which bears in this direction than 
 on either of the other three, viz : three guns, one at each end of the 
 ■face, and one in the middle, the redoubt mounting in all 8 guns. 
 
 If, to get General Totten's opinion on this subject, we consult his 
 ^'Reports" of 1840 and of 1851 to the Secretary of War, we find the 
 following recommendations, which relate directly to it. In the first 
 place, he recommends the construction of works, one on the east 
 bank, a shoal to the eastward of the channel, and one on another 
 called the middle ground, as " an outer barrier at the very mouth of the 
 harbor :" to prevent access to the inner harbor, and thus to render a 
 close blockade of the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy, dis- 
 posed to debark an army, to land at or near Rockaway, on the beach 
 exposed to the ocean and storms. 
 
 He says expressly, that without some '"'outer barrier" of this sort, 
 a squadron would land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, within 
 *7 miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its commanding heights, and of 
 the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any sort. 
 
 "This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of 
 war, to be as fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on 
 the rumor of an expedition being in preparation in England, 27,000 
 militia were assembled to cover the city from an attack of this sort. 
 It is apparent that the defences near the city and those at the Narrows, 
 indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot be made to pre- 
 vent this enterprise." 
 
 General Totten subsequently admits, that there is great doubt 
 whether the shoals mentioned are stable enough to warrant building 
 upon, and says that "all other means failing, works may be erected 
 on Sandy Hook, which will have a good action on the channel, and 
 under cover of which bomb-ketches, or steam batteries, or both, may lie. 
 
 " With such an arrangement, there would be little probability of 
 the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station." 
 
 To sum up. General Totten substantially admits, 1st, that the 
 works at the Narrows will not prevent a landing at Gravesend bay ; 
 
 2d. That it requires works that shall close the exterior mouth of the 
 harbor, to prevent such a landing ; 
 
 3i. He proposes to do ivhat he can towards this by a work at Sandy 
 Hook. 
 
 Now the East channel runs in a convex line with regard to Sandy 
 Hook, and its nearest edge at the closest point is 6,000 yards from 
 it, or a mile beyond any possible range of our heaviest ordnance. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 43 
 
 This channel is deep except where it crosses the bar, where there is, 
 at low water, always 19 feet. 
 
 By this channel, transports could enter freely, even supposing the 
 fort at Sandy Hook built, while their protecting fleet of liners and 
 frigates could either enter at night or hastily by day, by the main ship 
 channel. 
 
 According to General Totten's own showing, therefore^ the landing 
 at Gravesend bay, is a thing to be expected in our next war. 
 
 It is worth while, however, at this point, to endeavor to ascertain 
 for ourselves how the case really is : whether the forts at the Narrows 
 can prevent a debarkation in Gravesend bay or not ; and this will not 
 give us much trouble since we have only to consider the distance of 
 the forts from the anchorage and beach, and compare this with the 
 distance that the heaviest guns in our service will carry. 
 
 Forts Hamilton and Lafayette are the nearest works to Gravesend 
 beach, lying on the same side of the Narrows: the distance from these 
 to the point of Coney Island, which is the nearest part of the further 
 half of the beach, is 2f miles, while it is 2^ miles to the furthest part 
 of the same half, which is the edge of Coney Island itself; so that 
 there is a quiet landing place of some two miles in extent, none of 
 which lies closer to Fort Hamilton than 2f miles, and the greatest 
 part of which is nearly 3 miles from the same point. As to the works 
 on Staten Island, Battery Hudson, on the side of the high bank which 
 forms a point into the bay, and which is the nearest point of Staten 
 Island to Gravesend bay, is 2^ miles from the further edge of the 
 channel where it passes Coney Island and the entrance to Gravesend 
 bay, and is 3^ miles from the beach of the latter on the near or inner 
 side of Coney Island. 
 
 The 10-inch columbiad, with a charge of 18 lbs., and firing a shell 
 of 100 lbs., will carry, at the angle of greatest range, 35°, (see 
 Thiroux, page 351,) as far as 4,828 yards, according to the Ordnance 
 Manual. 
 
 But, lately, it has been found that this charge is too heavy for the 
 piece, which is very apt to burst with it ; and by a recommendation 
 of the Ordnance Board, approved by the Secretary of War, the charge 
 for 10-inch columbiads is restricted to 14 lbs. at the utmost, with the 
 additional restriction of not firing solid shot from them. 
 
 Likewise, the 8-inch columbiads are restricted, by this regulation,, to 
 charges not exceeding 8 lbs. Their maximum charge was formerly 
 15 lbs., which, with a shell, and at the elevation of 2 Yi°, gave a range 
 of 4,468 yards. 
 
 What is the diminution of range that follows from a reduction of 
 the charges of 10-inch and 8-inch columbiads, respectively ^ and ^, 
 (nearly,) I am not able to say ; but we may suppose that it will not 
 be less than ^ and ^ of the ranges of the respective pieces. 
 
 This will fix the maximum range of our 10 and 8-inch columbiads 
 at 4,225 and 3,351 yards, or in other words, they will not carry as far 
 as 2| or 2 miles, respectivel3^ 
 
 It must be recollected that there is, with these ranges, owing to the 
 elevation, no ricochet; and, also, that there is no sort of accuracy of 
 
44 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 fire at high elevations. On this point, Sir H. Douglas says that, 
 "elevation is, inversely, the exponent of accuracy." 
 
 At 2^ miles from the battery, therefore, an enemy's vessel cannot 
 be reached at all ; and for, say, a half mile inside of this distance, she 
 runs very little risk of being struck.* 
 
 Now, the distance from Staten Island to the further side of the 
 main ship channel, where it passes in front of the anchorage of Graves- 
 end bay, behind Coney Island, being 2^ miles, and it being 3^ miles 
 to the shores of the bay, it is a matter of certainty that the largest 
 men-of-war can come to an anchor, in a line parallel to the shore in 
 question, and protect the landing of an army by their heavy guns, 
 being themselves out of the reach of army annoyance from the bat- 
 teries on Staten Island, and in perfect safety also from storms ; the 
 shallower waters of the bay would admit all sorts of gunboats and 
 light draught vessels, and the launches, &c., of the men-of-war. 
 
 The large vessels lying, as sujiposed, opposite Coney Island would 
 also be 2^ miles from Forts Lafayette and Hamilton, and consequently 
 out of the range of their guns, while the gunboats, flatboats, or launches 
 used in the debarkation, could land the troops, all along the inside 
 sheltered beach of the island, without running more than a trifling 
 risk. This would occur in passing by the point, which lies just inside 
 of the extreme range. Immediately beyond this, however, the beach 
 retreats so as to be altogether out of reach. In short, the debarkation 
 of a foreign army at Gravesend bay is at this moment entirely feasible. 
 
 After the pains to which I have put the reader that he may con- 
 vince himself of the fact that a debarkation on Gravesend beach is easy, 
 and not to be greatly incommoded, much less prohibited, by the fire 
 of any existing or projected fortifications, he will be surprised to learn 
 that, even if the beach in question were under the fire of some of our 
 works, or if from any other reason there should be objections, on the 
 part of the supposed expedition, to the landing of the army upon it, 
 there are equal facilities for the latter, out of sight, as well as out of range, 
 of all our forts upon the outer or seabeach of Coney Island. 
 
 To explain this, I must briefly describe the lower bay of New York, 
 which is not to be judged of (except by persons used to the sea) by 
 looking at the charts. 
 
 This lower bay is an immense sheet of water, which has the shape 
 on the map of on equilateral triangle, with sides of 15 miles each, the 
 points being at Amboy, the Narrows, and the Highlands. Two sides 
 are bounded by Staten Island and Jersey ; while the third side, which 
 lies due north and south, is partly limited by Coney Island and by 
 Sandy Hook, opposite each other, while the intervening space of 7 
 miles is open, apparently, to the ocean. 
 
 I say apparently, because '' the bar," which is at two places dry at 
 low water, stretches entirely across the space, which, lying between 
 Coney Island and the Hook, seems to admit freely the waves of the 
 Atlantic. 
 
 There are several channels across the bar, by which vessels find an 
 
 o While on this subject it may be noted that these facts show that the 10-inch seacoast 
 mortar is equally effective iu range and accuracy with the columbiads. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 45 
 
 exit, more or less round about, according to their draught of water ; 
 the heaviest class being obliged to follow down along the inside of it, 
 in a due southerly course, till they come nearly opposite the Hook, 
 when they turn suddenly square to the east, and so stand out to sea. 
 
 The track thus followed by the heaviest vessels is called the main 
 ship channel, and it is, and is constantly being used, as a harbor ; 
 vessels of all sizes anchor in it, and it is considerably smoother in 
 easterly weather than the regular quarantine anchorage off Seguine's 
 Point, because the latter, which has the same shield from the waves, 
 namely, the bar, is more remote from it. 
 
 In an east or southeast gale there is, on the east bank, (which is 
 that part of the bar which stretches three miles from Coney Island 
 without any channel, and which is, at one point, bare at low water,) a 
 continuous line of breakers, which are so violent that they can be 
 seen dashing and throwing up foam, from Fort Hamilton ; and the 
 force of the sea is thus altogether spent, so that on the inside or west 
 of the bank there is no more than a regular swell, in which vessels of 
 all tonnage can safely ride at anchor, especially as there is good hold- 
 ing ground of mud and sand.* 
 
 The only difference that would be felt by this harbor, if Coney 
 Island, instead of the east bank, sheltered it on the east, would be, 
 that it would be protected from the force of the wind as well as waves ; 
 but, with good holding tackle, the wind can do no harm, and a vessel 
 properly provided with it can lie behind the east bank as safely, if 
 not as comfortably, as in the North river. 
 
 The landing would be, of course, effected in fine weather, (and 
 there are, indeed, few days in summer when the weather is heavy 
 enough from the eastward to prevent,) and might take place with 
 perfect safety on the outer beach of Coney Island. Along this beach 
 there are no breakers in moderate weather, and the swell is mostly 
 stopped at the outside of the east bank, so that flatboats and launches 
 could make short and easy trips between the ships and the shore. 
 
 The whole operation would be entirely out of the reach of the guns 
 of any of the forts, and the beach itself is hidden altogether from the 
 latter by the row of sand hills which form the high part of the 
 island. 
 
 There is, therefore, a certainty that a foreign army can' be debarked 
 on the outer beach of Coney Island, and that it may maintain com- 
 munication with its fleet, (the latter having a safe anchorage,) and 
 with Halifax, Bermuda, or England, by means of the 14-loot and 
 the East channels, without possible molestation from any works that 
 are now built, or that have been projected or named by the Engineer 
 Bureau. 
 
 But the peril from another quarter is still more evident, and there 
 is, if possible, still less to say for the oflScial theory of the defence. 
 
 « This reference to storms must not lead to the impression that they are to be expected 
 in summer weather, which is the time when an expedition would probably appear off our 
 coasts ; on the contrary, the whole season may pass without a single violent gale; but I 
 have said enough to show that even the worst weather would not damage a hostile fleet 
 which should station itself just below Coney Island, to land an army, and to keep up 
 communications with it and the sea. 
 
46 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 Long Island Sound is practically an immense roadstead, and on 
 the Long Island side there are smaller bays and harbors which offer 
 every facility for landing troops and stores. 
 
 Such are Smithtown bay, Huntington bay. Oyster bay_, Hempstead 
 harbor, and Manhasset bay, at 40, 30, 20, and 15 miles from New- 
 York, respectively. 
 
 It cannot be denied, and in fact it is essentially taken for granted 
 by General Totten himself in the report (of 1840) that a landing 
 may be expected in one of these bays. 
 
 What, then, is to prevent the enemy from marching on Brooklyn ? 
 Nothing according to General Totten' s plan, unless the commander- 
 in-chief of the expedition has his head so filled with obsolete military 
 science, that he will not " leave a fortress in his rear." 
 
 It is entirely to the chance of the hostile expedition being com- 
 manded by a man who has notions exploded sixty years ago by 
 Napoleon_, that New York depends for safety. 
 
 Should nothing more be done than I have been able to find recom- 
 mended officially to check such an expedition, we will have as a con- 
 solation for the plundering and destruction of the cities of New York 
 and Brooklyn and the navy yard, the honest but fruitless justification 
 of the Austrian, Melas : " This Bonaparte violates all the rules of 
 scientific warfare." 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS BEARING UPON A NEW DEFENSIVE PLAN. 
 
 Something more effectual than is yet proposed by our Chief Engineer 
 is requisite to stop the approach upon New York of a great military 
 naval expedition, with all the appliances of modern war, and counting 
 its 50,000 or 70,000 men. 
 
 That we must be prepared for such a contingency cannot be denied 
 in the face of the facts and numbers of Chapter III, and it follows 
 that it is proper to decide at once what is the plan which shall offer 
 us the most chances of success in the short but severe campaign which 
 we may soon, perhaps, be engaged in, in the protection of the soil, of 
 our commerce, our public works, and our dwellings, from the fate of 
 Washington and Copenhagen. 
 
 In arranging such a plan of action we must consider : 
 
 1. The nature of the army that is to be resisted ; 
 
 2. That of our own troops ; 
 
 3. The topography of Long Island, including the probable landing 
 points ; the line of march of an invading army, the positions to receive 
 the attack in ; 
 
 4. The choice of positions for the defence, and the manner in which 
 localities may be taken advantage of to increase the chances in our favor ;. 
 
 5. Finally, the best manner of combining artificial, permanent, and 
 field works with the natural advantages of ground, so as to attain; 
 enough strength without excessive expense. 
 
 An attempt to depreciate the citizen soldiery of America, her best 
 safeguard, would be as incompatible with my feelings as it is remote 
 from my intentions. 
 
 I need not be reminded of the victories that our militia and volun- 
 teers gained in the late war over veteran troops, recently drafted from 
 the splendid peninsular army of Wellington ; nor of their successes 
 in Mexico, which rival in daring and romantic brilliancy the exploits 
 of the soldiers of Cortez, and which they did not decline to purchase 
 with losses almost unparalleled in warfare.* 
 
 What our citizen troops have done, they can perform again. Such 
 armies as were victorious under Jackson, Scott, and Taylor, are un- 
 doubtedly competent to meet in the field any foreign ones of equal force. 
 
 But our history offers no precedent of engagements between armies 
 of European proportions ; and the experience of other nations proves, 
 that in proportion to the numbers engaged, discipline and unity of 
 action become more and more indispensable to success. When bodies 
 of 50,000 or 100,000 on a side meet in the open field, individual 
 bravery, even when stimulated by patriotism, is less to be prized than 
 perfect mutual and reciprocal confidence between the troops, their 
 ofiicers, and their commander; and this cannot be infused at once 
 into an army, but requires for its development years of active service, 
 which perfect each man in the knowledge of his duties, give him the 
 
 « I refer of course to the proportion of the killed and wounded to the number of troops, 
 engaged . 
 
48 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW TORK CITY. 
 
 habit of implicit obedience, and confirm his respect for his superiors. 
 
 It is, no doubt, by tbis principle that Wellington would have jus- 
 tified his boast that, " with 70,000 such troops/' as he commanded in 
 the peninsula, " he could go anywhere and do anything." 
 
 History offers examples where armies, not wanting in courage,, 
 have found their very numbers a disadvantage in battle, and the oc- 
 -casion of immense losses in retreat.* 
 
 The British and French troops of the present day are not inferior 
 to any that have been heretofore opposed to our arms. Their cam- 
 paigns in India, Algeria, and the Crimea, have tempered them to the 
 highest pitch of efficiency. 
 
 As to numbers, it is reasonable to count upon a hundred thousand 
 such being thrown at once upon our coast ; while in point of arms 
 and equipments, we may expect that an invading expedition would 
 be amply provided ; for their recent experience has shown our rivals 
 exactly what is needed, and in what quantity, in undertakings of 
 this sort. 
 
 If we fancy such a force, fresh from the ships, with their arms, 
 clothes, and shoes in good order, and with only a day or two days' march 
 to perform in order to behold their point of destination, stimulated 
 too by the promise of plunder and prize money, we have surely a 
 picture calculated to excite uneasiness, and give us cause to cast about 
 for the most certain means of safety in such an emergency. 
 
 In calculating beforehand the chances of a battle, there must be 
 considered not only the probabilities of victory, but the result to be 
 derived from it, and the consequences of defeat. 
 
 If in the battle which will perhaps decide the possession, for exam- 
 ple, of Long Island, our arms should be successful, the fruits of vic- 
 tory, beyond the glory acquired, would be of a negative kind, being 
 limited to the keeping of what we have already got ; for the losses 
 would be about equal, and the enemy's ships would receive his beaten 
 troops, and protect by their broadsides their embarkation. If, on the 
 contrary, our troops should be beaten, there would be no possibility 
 of preventing the enemy from advancing without delay to Brooklyn 
 heights and the shore of the East river, and there erecting a few 
 mortar and howitzer batteries, with which to either burn down New 
 York, or compel the alternative of a ransom that would impoverish 
 the city ; as to the navy yard, it would be a fair object for destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 ■■■'•Take the battle of Narva, for instance, in which 80,000 Russians, behind entrench- 
 ments, were beaten by the advanced guard of the army of Charles XII, composed of 
 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, or 8,000 men in all. The Russians lost in this battle 
 18,000 men in killed, besides a great number who were drowned in attempting to retreat 
 over the bridge of the Narva ; their left wing, also, which had not been engaged, laid 
 down its arms the next day when the Swedes prepared to attack it in turn. Charles thus 
 made 30,000 prisoners, but he contented himself with ordering them home. 
 
 Charles had landed with 20,000 men ; but was so impatient to raise the siege of Narva, 
 that he pushed on with his best troops, routed three Russian corps on the way, and on 
 the third day appeared before the Russian lines. His artillery immediately played upon 
 and breached the earth-works on the right, when he led his fatigued troops, after a short 
 test, to the assault. Voltaire gives the Russians of that time the same character for 
 bravery that the Eastern war has since rendered indisputable, and attributes this defeat to 
 rheir want of discipline and the habit of warfare. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 49 
 
 In a word, an American defeat on Long Island would involve the 
 greatest misfortunes that could occur to New York and Brooklyn ; 
 while, on the other hand, a victory would be rewarded with no sub- 
 stantial and material gains. 
 
 In this game, where the stakes are so disproportioned, we should at 
 least endeavor to have great odds in our favor. 
 
 If, therefore, we could even calculate on opposing to a foreign army, 
 landed on Long Island, a force equal in numbers and discipline, or 
 which should make up in numbers for any inferiority in discipline, it 
 would still be desirable to favor our troops with every advantage that 
 can be derived from fortification ; and if the aids of the engineer are 
 not to be disdained in this hypothesis, how much ought they to 
 be prized in the actual case ; for it is certain that we shall never 
 see a disciplined American army of 80,000 or 100,000 men, on Long 
 Island ; and it is equally true that no number of raw troops that 
 could be collected on the island would be a match, in the field, for 
 80,000 or 100,000 veteran troops. 
 
 Considering that the maintaining of large regular armies is pro- 
 hibited by the nature of our institutions, it happens fortunately that 
 imperfectly disciplined troops pre so well adapted as they are to the 
 defence of entrenchments and fortifications : indeed, in this sort of 
 warfare, they have, in many instances, surpassed regular troops, in 
 obstinacy and devotedness. 
 
 Irregular or undisciplined troops in large masses fail in the field 
 because such is the natural course of events ; but place the same men 
 behind entrenchments, or otherwise, in such a manner that the duty 
 of each consists in defending his post, and you eliminate from the ad- 
 verse chances all those which follow from the impossibility of using 
 the army on the battlefield like a tremendous machine ; concentrating 
 at one point, perhaps, and feigning retreat at another — extending or 
 contracting the order of battle, surrounding, outflanking, or surprising 
 the enemy — in short, if irregular troops, composed of brave and good 
 marksmen, do not, defend entrenchments against odds, even of the 
 best soldiers, it is the fault of the entrenchments, or of the manner in 
 which they are disposed in them, or of their commander. 
 
 It has, therefore, been the custom of generals in command of raw 
 levies, to accustom them to war, by engaging them constantly in small 
 affairs; or, if compelled to accept battle, to select a strong position 
 that cannot be attacked except in front, and entrench it as much as 
 possible ; in arranging the troops care is taken to obviate the necessity 
 of changing materially their posts during the engagement. 
 
 The general who is charged with the defence of Brooklyn will, 
 therefore, look about him for a favorable position, which shall, besides 
 offering facilities for fortification, be situated directly in the path of 
 an enemy, landed on any probable part of Long Island, and which 
 cannot be outflanked. 
 
 This selection involves of course a thorough personal examination 
 of the general features of the coast, its harbors and beaches, and with 
 the topography of the island, its hills, plains, and roads, its towns 
 and villages, from one end to the other. 
 4 
 
PART II. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 DESCRIPTION OF LONG ISLAND. 
 
 Long Island is about 100 miles long ; its outer or southern shore is 
 a sandy beach, protected from the direct effect of easterly storms by 
 keys, or sandy strips, which inclose between themselves and the main 
 land extensive bays ; these last, though shallow, have some deep 
 channels, which permit small coasting vessels to navigate them. The 
 largest of these bays are Jamaica bay, Great South bay, and Great 
 West bay. 
 
 On the north shore we see, instead of level sandy plains, bounded 
 by bays of the south side, high bluffs or grassy hills, with clean 
 gravelly beaches at their base ; the general line of shore is indented 
 by several safe and extensive harbors, which admit ships of the largest 
 class. The principal of these are Huntington and Oyster bays. 
 
 The whole sound may in fact be regarded, as far as large vessels 
 are concerned, as one harbor, tor there is good anchorage and plenty 
 of water throughout it, and it hardly ever happens that there is in 
 summer such a storm on it as to oblige vessels to seek shelter ; besides, 
 when such is the case, shelter can always be obtained by running 
 across the sound to the windward side of it, and anchoring under the 
 lee of the land. 
 
 The eastern end of the island is forked, and* the broad expanse 
 between the two points, Montauk and Oyster Pond, is so protected by 
 these and by some islands, that there are numerous safe bays and 
 harbors. 
 
 Gardiner's and Peconic bays, with Sag and Fort Pond harbors, are 
 the principal of these. 
 
 To describe Long Island with regard to the facilities it offers for a 
 landing by a foreign armj^, it may be said that in the summer months 
 a landing is practicable everywhere round its shore. In case of severe 
 easterly weather, which may be looked for in winter, and occasionally 
 in the spring and fall, the outer beach is covered by breakers, and the 
 inlets into the bays on this side are dangerous to enter ; but in all 
 weather, except north, northwest, and northeast storms, which need not 
 be expected except in the fall or winter gales, a landing can be effected 
 on the north side ; and during these gales, when we will suppose a 
 fleet separated for a couple of days from its land force, it can find 
 shelter, within a short distance, under the north shores of the sound, 
 whence it can return and resume its communications, with the force 
 debarked, the same day that the storm ceases. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 51 
 
 As to the east end of tlie island, the facilities are perfect for landing 
 and keeping up communications with the force landed, except in 
 extraordinary weather. 
 
 At the west end, Gravesend bay and Coney Island offer every facility 
 for debarkations.; but of this a practical proof was given us in '76 by 
 the British, and I have before discussed their capacities. 
 
 The topography of Long Island needs but a short description. 
 
 A chain or ridge of hills runs from Gravesend bay to Oyster Pond 
 Point. These hills are perhaps from 130 to 170 feet high, with well 
 wooded or grassy slopes. The hills are of gravel, with some clay. 
 
 On the north side the slopes of the hills descend, covered with green, 
 to the waters of the sound ; at their foot is a narrow beach of sand 
 and gravel, which goes off suddenly into deep water. 
 
 At a few points the hills have been undermined by the waves, and 
 present steep gravel banks with boulders at their base. 
 
 On the south side the hills terminate in a fine undulating plain, 
 which becomes flat and sandy as it approaches the ocean. 
 
 The only exception to this rule is at Great West bay, where a range 
 of low hills commences, and continues so as to form the eastern fork of 
 the island, which terminates at Montauk Point 
 
 The farms on Long Island are, on the average, of a fair productive- 
 ness, and these would no doubt be taxed to the utmost to aid in the 
 support of a foreign force occupying the island. 
 
 The topography of Long Island is therefore such as to lend itself 
 easily to all sorts of military operations and manceuvres, and the 
 roads which traverse the country, especially the longitudinal ones, 
 favor the latter to a considerable degree. 
 
 Thus we have the Long Island railroad, which joins Brooklyn to 
 Greenpori ; and there are numerous plank roads and macadamized 
 and shell roads, all terminating in Brooklyn, and favoring combined 
 concentric marches of several columns upon that city. 
 
 The essential facts of a military nature that relate to Long Island 
 may be summed up in a few words : that it is perfectly easy for a 
 foreign army to debark on its shores at any time and march upon 
 Brooldyn, keeping up constant communication with its ships, and 
 supplying itself, to a certain extent, with provisions from the country. 
 The great extent of coast open to attack and the natitre of the shores, 
 which are, unfortunately, exposed everywhere to the broadsides of 
 men-of-war, render it extremely improbable that an American army 
 could anticipate and repel the attempt of a grand expedition to debark 
 a land force. 
 
 The overwhelming batteries of a fleet, the uncertainty as to the 
 time or place of the attempt, and the harassing nature of the move- 
 ments of a defensive army which should endeavor to show front to a 
 fleet in all its manoeuvres; all these considerations, render it extremely 
 impolitic to trust to the repelling of an attempt to land an army on 
 Long Island. The other alternative is, that of fighting the enemy 
 after he has landed ; and a defensive battle is indicated as offering the 
 most chances of success by the nature of our troops and the necessi- 
 ties of the occasion. 
 
 If a defensive battle is decided on^ it is of the highest importance to 
 
52 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 select, in advance, the position on which it is to be fought, and this 
 leads us at once to inquire whether there is any one position which 
 will interdict the approach of an enemy upon Brooklyn, no matter 
 what point of the island he has landed at? 
 
 I believe I can indicate a position which not only satisfies the above 
 condition rigorously, but also combines unusual military advantages 
 with the property, of capacity of being rendered almost impregnable 
 by a few permanent works. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 DESCRIPTION OF TUB DEFENSIVE POSITION WHICH I PROPOSE TO STRENGTHEN 
 
 BY FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 In order to form a correct idea of this position I recommend the 
 reader to take a " county map of Kings and part of Queens county" 
 and look over it, at the same time following my description of the topo- 
 graphy ; that is unless he can look at the place itself, which of course 
 a military man would do, if possible, before forming an opinion, or 
 unless he knows it already _, as is the case with many New Yorkers, 
 who are in the habit of driving for pleasure over the fine roads which 
 traverse the beautiful district lying between Brooklyn and the sea- 
 side. 
 
 The large Coast Survey map, in four sheets, of New York harbor 
 and the vicinity, embraces, indeed, this extent of ground ; but since 
 this map was made the city of Brooklyn has been built out a great 
 distance. The villages near it have become towns ; paved and graded 
 streets are to be found where hills and valleys are indicated in the 
 map ; hills have been cut down and low spots filled in ; several ceme- 
 teries and the Brooklyn reservoir occupy parts of the chain of hills 
 which the map indicates as wooded, &c. In a word, this map is alto- 
 gether behind the times. 
 
 As to the county maps, they omit the delineation of hills, and con- 
 sequently require to be assisted by the description which follows. 
 
 The west end of Long Island is nearly detached from the rest of it 
 by the waters of Jamaica bay on the south, and of Flushing bay on 
 the north sides ; these penetrate towards each other so much as to 
 leave only five miles of land between them. 
 
 The tract of country which is thus partly detached contains nearly 
 eighty square miles. It is divided into two nearly equal parts by the 
 chain of hills before referred to, which commence at the Nar.'-ows and 
 run northeast to about the middle of the space between Flushing and 
 Jamaica bays, where they branch, the highest branch keeping on, and 
 the lower one turning square to the northwest, and following Flushing 
 creek to its outlet in Flushing bay. 
 
 To the north of these hills lies the city of Brooklyn, with the towns 
 of Williamsburg, Astoria, Newtown, and Bedford. 
 
 Having now sketched the outlines of the picture, it remains to fill 
 in the details of that part of it with which we are particularly con- 
 cerned. 
 
 The range of hills forms an important feature in a military respect, 
 and besides offers an excellent panoramic view of the district lying 
 between itself and the sea, which is the part of the country to which 
 I particularly invite attention. 
 
 This range beging with a high hill overlooking the Narrows and 
 Fort Hamilton. 
 
54 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 Standing on the summit of this and facing to the right, we look 
 down upon the regular lines of grassy embankment, and the rows of 
 casemate chimneys, which indicate Fort Hamilton ; and upon the red 
 streak, which a little closer, but still three-fourths of a mile off, marks 
 the masonry parapet of the redoubt. The purple hills of Staten Island 
 and the intervening glistening strait of the Narrows, form the back 
 grounds of the picture. 
 
 Looking directly forward, that is, in a southerly direction, we see a 
 gently undulating cultivated plain, which, with the exception of a 
 slight wooded rise at the village of Bath, on the water side^ sinks 
 insensibly to the level of the sea. The belt of blue water beyond, 
 fringed at its shallow edges with brown, which, limiting the plain on 
 the right, extends itself diagonally to the front and left, is Gravesend 
 bay, where the British landed in 1776. The thin strip of white 
 sandhills beyond the bay, and separating it from the sea, is Coney 
 Island. Beyond this again lies a broad strip of blue ocean ; the faint 
 line on its surface, which looks like a low beach or island, is Sandy 
 Hook, and the indistinct hills which bound the view and appear to 
 overhang the Hook, are the highlands of Neversink. 
 
 Turning gradually towards the left, or eastward, we observe that 
 Coney Island, after it ceases to form a breakwater, protecting Gravesend 
 bay from the breakers of the Athmtic, extends itself far to the east, 
 being separated from the mainland by meadows and marshes, and by 
 a narrow creek. 
 
 The view which presents itself, if we turn still further to the left, 
 can be seen to better advantage from our next stand-point, which is 
 more elevated than the present one, and which faces more to the east. 
 
 This point is Ocean hill, in Greenwood cemetery, the highest or 
 next to the highest point of land on Long Island ; to reach it we will 
 follow the ridge, observing that the latter subsides almost to the level 
 of the plain before we arrive at the limits of Greenwood, and that 
 this cemetry is seated upon the opposite declivity, and is sufficiently 
 extensive to cover the whole side of the hill which culminates at the 
 spot already referred to. 
 
 From Ocean hill we can see, in a southerly direction, the Highlands, 
 Sandy Hook, and the ocean, in nearly the same relative positions as 
 they appeared to take when seen from our first elevation ; but the 
 view of Gravesend bay and Coney Island is intercepted by a slight 
 rise of land, on which is the village of New Utrecht. Looking east- 
 erly, a slight rolling plain is spread before us, reaching so far that we 
 can hardly make out in the distance the houses and spires of Flatlands, 
 and beyond that village the broad expanse of Jamaica bay, flattened 
 into a thin belt; while the sandy key, which separates it from the blue 
 ocean horizon, is almost indistinguishable. 
 
 This key, which is called Rockaway beach, stretches almost as far 
 to the eastward as we can see from this point, for there is a high spot 
 on our left which limits the landscape in this direction ; we notice, 
 however, that the bay does terminate within the segment of the 
 horizon, which is open to our view, since our attention is attracted by 
 the white hotels at Rockaway, which, reflecting* the sun strongly. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 55 
 
 look nearer tliau they really are, and mark where the beach joins 
 the land. 
 
 Looking more downwards, we see, close by, the village of Flatbush, 
 which gave the name to the defeat of our troops in 1776, and exam- 
 ining the country in the vicinity more carefully, we distinguish several 
 plank roads leading to Canarsie, Batli, Gravesend, and Coney Island, 
 as well as some country roads. 
 
 Quitting Ocean hill, and proceeding still further eastward on the 
 ridge, we shortly arrive at Mount Prospect, where we see the same 
 picture as that just described, from a slightly different point of view ; 
 in front, and close by, lies the town of Flatbush ; and the passes forced 
 by the British in 1776 are also in sight before us. 
 
 As we follow the ridge eastward from Mount Prospect it subsides 
 considerably, and, at the point where it is crossed by the railroad, it is 
 almost lost ; immediately to the east of this low place, however, is a 
 high hill, which is occupied by the cemetery of the Evergreens. 
 
 A short distance beyond the Evergreens cemetery, and on the summit 
 of the ridge, is the new Brooklyn reservoir, and immediately next to 
 it is a cluster of cemeteries, of which the principal one is that on 
 Cypress hill. 
 
 On the highest point of this hill is an observatory, which affords a 
 magnificent view of the entire horizon ; ascending it and turning our 
 backs on the North prospect, which embraces the cities of New York and 
 Brooklyn, the North and East rivers, and the noble bay, we see in 
 front a handsome undulating plain, dotted with houses, spreading 
 out till it loses itself in meadows and marshes, which are limited by 
 the waters of Jamaica bay. The village of East New York and the 
 plank road to the town of Jamaica are seen in the foreground. 
 
 Jamaica bay, which is rather a network of creeks and islands, is 
 also fully overlooked from this hill ; the sand strip which protects it 
 from the ocean, and Rockaway inlet, through which the creeks all 
 issue out, are likewise in full sight, as well as a broad strip of the sea, 
 which alone bounds the view. 
 
 Proceeding from Cypress hill still eastward, Ave find the ridge con- 
 tinuous, and maintaining a considerable altitude ; at the distance of 
 three miles, and after crossing the Myrtle avenue and Williamsburg 
 plank roads to Jamaica, we arrive at a summit which deserves especial 
 mention — I refer to the one overlooking the source of Flushing creek, 
 which is a meadow called the " Head of the Fly." 
 
 Looking southward from this hill we see the plain limited by 
 Jamaica bay, as in the view from Cypress hill ; turning eastward we 
 see the ridge prolonged as far as the eye can reach, but at our feet is 
 a hollow or depression in it_, which in a manner divides the range at 
 this point. (This hollow is traversed by the road from Newtown to 
 Jamaica, which last lies three miles off" in an easterly direction.) 
 
 Turning to the north we see the flat, reedy meadows, and swamps, 
 in which Flushing creek rises ; below them, occasionally, the windings 
 of the creek itself; beyond, the waters of Flushing bay. into which it 
 empties, and finally the East river. 
 
 The valley down which we have just looked, and which, with 
 
56 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 Jamaica hay, more than half cuts the island in two, is limited on 
 either hand by high sloping banks. 
 
 The western bank, which is the most important to this description, 
 is admirably adapted for the posting of troops or the locating of forti- 
 fications, for the purpose of interdicting tlie passage of the meadows 
 or creek to an invading army. 
 
 For a mile in advance of these heights there is nothing to obstruct a 
 clear view of the creek and its marshy borders, and following the bank 
 down towards the bay we arrive shortly at a hill which lies on this side 
 of a small creek, which maybe considered the limit, in this direction, 
 of the position which needs to be occupied to cut off the eastern part 
 of the island from Brooklyn. I propose it for the limit, because here 
 the natural obstacle to an enemy's march, formed by the creek, be- 
 comes so considerable, that a position behind it would be strong 
 enough without fortifications, provided it were properly watched and 
 guarded. 
 
 If the reader has now gained a good idea of the topography of the 
 west end of Long Island, he will be able to follow the route I will 
 now indicate as traversing the line which I propose to fortify. 
 
 Commencing at the abovementioned hill, on the west side of Flush- 
 ing creek, to proceed up the creek, along the heights which border it 
 and the meadows in which it rises, to the hill above the " Head of the 
 Fly;" here the line goes obliquely down the last named hill, preserv- 
 ing its southerly course, and gaining the plain ; it then passes the 
 Union and Centreville race grounds, and joins the marshes of Jamaica 
 bay at a certain creek, near Torbell's landing. 
 
 This part of the line I shall call its eastern division. The line now 
 turns an obtuse angle, and runs southwest, along the meadows, till 
 it reaches Flatlands, near Bergen Island ; this part of the line is the 
 centre division. 
 
 From Flatlands the line turns at another obtuse angle, nearly equal 
 to the first, and runs east to Fort Hamilton, ascending obliquely the 
 lofty hill which is mentioned in the first part of this description. 
 
 The whole length of this line is 14^ miles, counting between the 
 extreme points that need to be fortified ; and I propose to locate upon 
 the line seventeen permanent redoubts, to be built immediately ; the 
 spaces between these to be closed, when the occasion arises, by earth- 
 work entrenchments. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF FORTIFICATION THAT ARE: 
 APPLICABLE TO THE DEFENCE OP BROOKLYN. 
 
 I have two reasons for incorporating into this memoir the synopti- 
 cal and analytical description of certain celebrated lines of fortification, 
 which will be found in the following chapter. 
 
 In the first place, I wish to prevent unprofessional readers from 
 forming the opinion that my proposition for the defence of Brooklyn 
 is visionary and impracticable, owing to the extent of the line of 
 works of which it involves the construction. 
 
 This extent of 14 miles will appear reasonable in every point of 
 view, when^ after a perusal of this chapter, the reader shall compare 
 the projected line with the others described ; he will find that the for- 
 mer is not only shorter, but vastly more susceptible of an obstinate 
 defence, in proportion to its development, than several famous lines, 
 which have, in both recent and more remote wars, been of the great- 
 est service to generals in embarrassing and perilous circumstances. 
 
 The proposition that a given extent of position can be more strongly 
 fortified by the system of works here advocated than by any other 
 which has ever been adopted, except, indeed, the Russian lines at Se- 
 vastopol, which are models for study and imitation, (and, to a cerlain- 
 degree, the French lines at the same place,) may be demonstrated by 
 an argument which in brief amounts to this: 
 
 The two most essential requisites in lines have always been, as they 
 are at present, the presenting everywhere, to obstruct the advance of 
 the enemy, difficult material obstacles, which shall be rendered as near 
 impassable as possible by the fire of its defenders ; (this involves, evi- 
 dently, the disposing of the troops in such a manner that their mus- 
 ketry shall reach every portion of the space directly in front of the 
 lines.) And secondly, that the troops must not be so scattered along 
 the entrenchments, in order to fulfil strictly the first condition, as to 
 render any point of the line weak, and powerless to resist a violent 
 attack by a large column which should attempt to surprise or storm 
 the works. 
 
 These two conditions are now, and have hitherto been, universally 
 recognized, but have been, oiuing to the limited range of the musket, 
 difficult to combine in the same lice. Thus we find in history exam- 
 ples where each has been altogether conceded to the other, according 
 to circumstances ; among which the most prominent in influencing the 
 general's decision have been the nature of the country, whether inac- 
 cessible or level, and that of the troops at his command, whether 
 regular soldiers or undisciplined. 
 
 There are also instances of a general's having been enabled, by- 
 making good use of the advantages of a position, and profiting by the 
 excellence of his troops, to satisfy both conditions in his defensive ar- 
 rangements ; for when the works can be assailed but from one direc- 
 tion at a time, and, if the troops are accustomed to manoeuvres, a suit- 
 
58 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 able force can be amassed on that portion which is indicated by the 
 enemy's movements as the point of attack. 
 
 But this inherent difficulty, which, in former times, has thus ham- 
 pered all sorts of schemes for the defence of extended positions, has 
 been dissipated by the invention of the Minie rifle, which, by expand- 
 ing the range at which infantry fire is effective, in an immense degree, 
 gives the engineer the fullest latitude of conception, and renders easy, 
 both of design and execution, plans which may combine in themselves 
 every desirable defensive property, and which are adapted as well for 
 undisciplined troops as for regular soldiers. 
 
 I must here enlarge a little upon the several points of the foregoing 
 argument, more especially for the purpose of making it evident that 
 the range of the infantry musket is the guiding element of all projects 
 of fortification, and so explain the possibility of so great an improve- 
 ment, in the construction of lines, being consequent upon the invention 
 of Captain Minie. 
 
 The lines that have been actually constructed may be divided into 
 three varieties, which correspond with the three cases mentioned above; 
 being respectively adapted to the fulfilment of either of the two es- 
 sential conditions of defence, independently of the other, and to the 
 c6mbination of the two in the same project. 
 
 The first variety includes all lines Avhich consist of uninterrupted 
 entrenchments, which present no gaps except where roads lead through 
 them. The second comprises those composed of redoubts, or detached 
 independent works of any kind, which are expected to prohibit the 
 enemy's crossing the position they occupy, by their musketry and 
 artillery fire ; and, finally, there are lines which combine the two 
 sorts of entrenchments just mentioned. 
 
 Continuous lines are weakest, from the fact that, if the enemy suc- 
 ceeds in forcing his way through them at any point, even should no 
 more than a single battalion effect an entrance at first, a way is 
 cleared for the main columns. The entire system of entrenchments is 
 taken in the rear, and the defenders find themselves in one of the 
 most perilous situations that can occur, namely, with their line of 
 battle pierced, and either of the two parts of the army, or both, liable 
 to an irresistible flank attack. 
 
 It is noticeable that the very pains which may be taken to guard 
 against minor attacks or false attacks, by garrisoning equally every 
 point of the line, render this catastrophe more imminent ; for the evil 
 is thereby incurred, of presenting everywhere only a feeble rank of 
 troops to meet the attack of the overwhelming columns of a concen- 
 trated attack ; so that an army posted .behind such entrenchments, 
 even though superior in numbers to its assailants, would probably be 
 disastrously beaten if the latter should attack in heavy masses at dif- 
 ferent points at once ; preventing the defenders from concentrating on 
 these points by false attacks, as well as by such celerity of action as 
 should leave them no time to effect the requisite manoeuvres. A 
 striking exemplification of this remark is to be found in the forcing 
 of the French lines at Turin in 1706, where Marshals Feuillade and 
 Marsin awaited the attack of the Austrians under Prince Eugene and 
 the Duke of Savoy, who, although with an inferior army, carried the 
 entrenchments and totally defeated the former; the immediate fruit of 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 59 
 
 which victory was the capture of the French artillery and baggage, 
 and the raising of the siege. In the attack Eugene divided his army 
 into eight columns, and directed them against the weakest part of the 
 French lines. 
 
 The second variety comprises all arrangements of detached works, 
 whether enclosed or open at the gorge, and in a single line or in 
 quincunx order, which aim at preventing the passage of the enemy by 
 their fire alone, or by the additional resistance of troops in the field. 
 
 Detached works are better adapted than continuous entrenchments 
 to the strengthening of a tolerably extensive position, particularly if 
 regular troops are to be had for its defence ; for in this case the works 
 may be regarded merely as auxiliaries, and as sheltering, to a certain 
 extent, manceuvres effected in their rear ; or they may defend particu- 
 lar important points, and so advantageously take the place of large 
 bodies of troops which might be better employed elsewhere. 
 
 I can think of no example better calculated to illustrate my remarks 
 on this head than is afforded by the battle of Pultawa, where Peter 
 the Great gained his first but inestimable victory over the Swedes ; a 
 victory which resulted in a considerable degree from his judicious loca- 
 tion of detached redoubts, and from his exact appreciation of their 
 intrinsic merits, and of their precise sphere of usefulness in a defensive 
 battle. 
 
 The Czar not only originated on this occasion this modification of 
 defensive works, but brought to perfection the theory and practice of 
 them, as combined with field operations. 
 
 He established his cavalry on the right of his line, placing it in the 
 intervals between seven redoubts, which were well supplied with 
 artillery. His infantry were behind slighter entrenchments of, I 
 believe, the continuous order. 
 
 Charles XII had decided on attacking the Russian right with his 
 cavalry, (and had, to favor this manoeuvre, despatched Greneral Creutz, 
 with 5,000 cavalry, the night before, with orders to make a detour 
 and fall upon the flank of the same wing simultaneously with the 
 general advance ; this body had, however, lost its way, and failed to 
 •co-operate.) The assault of the Swedish horsemen was completely 
 successlul, and the Russians were driven from their redoubts in confu- 
 sion. However, the latter now opened their fire of artillery, and irom 
 this cause (and the non-appearance of Creutz' s division) Charles' 
 troops were checked, and the Czar found means to rally his c ivalry, 
 which, charging in turn, forced their former assailants to retreat, 
 after experiencing great losses. 
 
 This seems to have been the decisive action of the day. The Rus- 
 sian infantry immediately issued from their lines and attacked the 
 Swedes, while their cavalry, dashing to the rear, cut off their commu- 
 nication with Pultawa, and cut to pieces the reserve of 3,000 men. 
 
 This may be called the first period of the battle, the result of which 
 is well known. Charles' irremediable defeat was owing in part to the 
 enemy's superiority in numbers and artillery, for he had but 21,000 
 troops in the field and 4 guns, against the 70,000 men and T2 pieces 
 of the Russians ; and the failure of Creutz was also against him. But 
 the serious check which his cavalry received, and which spoiled the 
 plan of attack, and gave the Czar an opportunity for his subsequent 
 
60 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 brilliant manoeuvreSj was independent of the disparity of numbers^ 
 and was due altogether to the redoubts on the right flank. 
 
 It must here be recollected that the redoubts in question were in 
 the first place strictly auxiliaries, and that Peter's disciplined troops 
 gained the victory by a counter attack, and also that the position de- 
 fended was of small extent. 
 
 It is a different affair when a position of many miles in extent de- 
 pends principally upon lines of works for its strength, and especially 
 in case the defenders are other than veteran troops. 
 
 The battle of Fontenoy (1745) furnishes another instance in point. 
 On this occasion the French line was strengthened on the right by 
 the village of Antoin, next by that of Fontenoy, and on the left by 
 the wood of Barri, which had been fortifi(>d, in order to render it 
 equally defensible with the villages, by three redoubts. 
 
 The Duke of Cumberland, after the Hanoverians had been twice 
 repulsed before Antoin, and the English three times before Fontenoy, 
 decided to attack the left wing, and ordered General Ingoldsby to 
 carry the redoubt which lay nearest to Fontenoy. 
 
 The general, however, on approaching it, declined to assault it 
 before he should receive a battery of cannon ; and as much time was 
 thus lost, the duke ordered the advance to be made in column between 
 the redoubt and the village, and under the fire of both. 
 
 The indomitable bravery of the British enabled them thus to pene- 
 trate the French lines, but it was with immense losses, which, though 
 insufficient to stop the advance, still must have had a great effect on 
 the troo})S, and prepared their commander for giving the order to 
 retreat, which followed the counter attack executed by the " Maison- 
 du-Roi," or household troops of France. 
 
 That Marshal Saxe himself attributed a considerable share of bis 
 glory to the redoubts mentioned, appears from his speech to the king 
 after the victory. He said: " 8ire, I have to reproach myself with 
 not having placed another redoubt between the wood and Fontenoy; 
 but I did not believe any general would risk passing through the 
 interval." 
 
 I adduce the above example merely to give force to my remarks 
 concerning the proper sphere and adaptation of detached works. 
 
 In discussing the merits of lines composed of these latter, as they 
 have been employed, or could have been employed, previous to the 
 introduction of the long-range infantry rifle, the following considera- 
 tions occur : 
 
 To impede sufficiently the advance of the enemy through the gaps 
 between them, the redoubts should not be further apart than double 
 the range of musketry. On this account, and because of the limited 
 distance at which the musket is effective, the number of redoubts 
 must be great to enable them to supfiort a long line properly. The 
 consequence follows that each one must be small, and have a weak 
 garrison, and hence there is little reliance to be placed on the indi- 
 vidual resistance of these redoubts, and but a slight effect can be 
 expected from their fire. 
 
 The above consideration leads us to an estimate of the minimum 
 number of inclosed works that can form a defensive system, for they 
 must be within 500 or 600 yards of each other, at the furthest, if the 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 61 
 
 ordinary infantry musket is the arm of the troops ; but whenever the 
 fortifications have been regarded as the main reliance of the defence — 
 and this is the case we are investigating — the redoubts^ or lunettes, 
 have been placed within 250 or 3U0 yards of each otlier, so that the 
 difficulty, thus touched upon, becomes very doubly serious, and has 
 this consequence : that to derive the greatest benefit from inclosed 
 works alone in the defence of extended positions, they must be few in 
 number, and the intention must be abandoned of forcing the enemy 
 to pass under their fire, and experience great loss, in order to cross the 
 lines. 
 
 As there is no material obstacle between the works to retard the 
 columns of attack, this conclusion amounts to placing the aid derived 
 from the fortifications, when they are of this sort, in a subordinate 
 estimation, coraj)ared to the active defence which is expected from the 
 troops in the field. 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that the system of defence for long lines, which 
 involves the use of detached ivorks only (unless, indeed, the country 
 is of a very rugged and mountainous or otherwise broken and inac- 
 cessible nature,) is worse fitted than continuous systems for a defence 
 by irregular troops. 
 
 Here the reader will please to rtcoUect the abstract of the argument 
 in hand, and note that ths above reflections, which are suggested by, 
 and refer to, only those lines that have been constructed (in actual 
 warfare) before the eastern war, do not apply in such a degree to simi- 
 lar works that may hereafter be thrown up, because of the improve- 
 ments which have within a few years been made in the habitual fire- 
 arm of the infantry soldier, an element in warfare which forms the 
 very foundation of ail plans of fortification, whether temporary or 
 permanent. 
 
 The smooth-bore musket, (which had not indeed received much im- 
 provement, in regard to range, since Peter the Great and Turenne de- 
 fended with it the entrenchments of Pultawa and Dunkirk,) was con- 
 sidered by military writers of the date of Wellington, and up to the 
 time when the Minie rifle was invented, to be effective — that is, be 
 tolerably accurate of aim, and to cause mortal wounds, at ranges inside 
 of two hundred yards ; and three hundred yards was the furthest 
 limit at which deadly effects were expected from it. 
 
 It is by a comparative estimate that the prodigious effects of the 
 Minie rifle may be judged of by those who have not had the advantage 
 of witnessing its performances ; and such of my readers may, by re- 
 ferring to the tables in my first " Memoir on Fortification," assure 
 themselves of the correctness of the following statement : that the 
 Minie rifle, or the new United States regulation rifle musket, is four 
 times as accurate at six hundred yards, as the musket (smooth-bore) is 
 at three hundred yards. As to the force of the elongated projectile 
 of the new piece, it is sufficient to say, that at one thousand yards it 
 will pierce through and through a pine plank of three inches thick. 
 At Bomarsund a French battery was " exceedingly annoyed" (in 
 the language of the official account) by the fire of some Finnish rifle- 
 men, who were stationed in high points of the Keep, although the 
 range was 900 yards. During the siege of Sevastopol the allied bat- 
 eries were repeatedly silenced by the Russian riflemen in the " rifle 
 
62 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 pits," which were between six hundred and seven hundred yards dis- 
 tant ; and the effects of this fire were so severe that the pits were or- 
 dered to be taken at any hazard ; the great losses sustained in the 
 execution of this order is a proof that the necessity for it must have 
 been great. 
 
 It may, therefore, he considered perfectly demonstrated by experi- 
 mental practice, and by actual warfare, that the detached works, which 
 may be thought accessary to strengthen future defensive positions, may 
 be placed more than twice as far apart as in former times, and still 
 fulfil the desirable condition of perfectly sweeping by their fire all the 
 ground over which they are distributed. It follows from this, that to 
 protect a given extent of country, and form a defensive system, half as 
 many redoubts as were formerly requisite will now suffice ; and hence, 
 the number of troops disposable for their garrison remaining the same, 
 each one may be made larger, more capable of defence individually ^ 
 and constituting more of an impediment to the enemy ; and, in fine, 
 such a system may be made to combine every desirable requisite a& 
 constituting a highly del'ensive artificial military position, with the 
 sole exception of not presenting a continuous material obstacle to the 
 enemy. 
 
 If, therefore, we combine a continuous line with a system of large 
 detached works at 1,200 or 1,400 yards intervals, we shall have as 
 perfect a system of fortification as is possible or can be desired. 
 
 The preceding discussion on continuous and on detached lines has 
 been longer and more elaborated than I intended ; but as it has de- 
 veloped fully all the military elements of the problem of defending 
 with undisciplined troops, or with inferior numbers, an extensive po- 
 sition, we can, in considering the third class of lines, spare ourselves 
 the pains of theoretical analysis, and form a correct judgment upon 
 the lines which I propose for the protection of Brooklyn and New 
 York, by simply submitting the scheme to the test of the general princi- 
 ples already elucidated, having the data of a knowledge of the topo- 
 graphy and extent of the position, and a description of the system of 
 fortification which is to be adopted. 
 
 But, though a theoretical consideration of the third class of lines is 
 here superfluous, an example will be of use as serving to fix definitely 
 the notions which the preceding reflections give rise to ; and I will, 
 therefore, briefly refer to the wonderful lines by which Todleben ena- 
 bled the garrison of Sevastopol to resist so long the most tremendous 
 maritime expedition that the world ever saw. 
 
 These works, which are described by many authors, should be studied 
 by every officer who professes to reflect upon the principles of his art. 
 Nothing can surpass them in boldness of design ; and never will there 
 be seen a more masterly adaptation of detached works, and continuous 
 entrenchments, to the topography of a position. In this instance it 
 was the location of the works alone which gave the line any strength ; 
 for the different fragments of it were, from the short time allowed for 
 their construction, of no more than a minimum strength, and formed, 
 intrinsically, insignificant obstacles. Nothing, also, can more promi- 
 nently display the military genius and originality of the modern 
 Vauban, than his having seized the opportunity offered by the arm.ing 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 63 
 
 of the Russian infantry by the Liege rifle, to expand the scale of for- 
 tification at once to four times the dimensions which it had been re- 
 stricted to by the contracted range of the smooth-bore infantry musket. 
 
 [The report of Capt. G. B. McCleUan, accompanied by a map, gives 
 the best description of the lines in question that I have seen ; and I 
 am indebted to it for the following abridged special account :] 
 
 I will refer my readers to this, for definite information relating to 
 the topography of the ground occupied by the lines ; for my present 
 purpose it is sufficient to state that they formed a semi-circle resting on 
 the harbor at both extremities, and having an extent of over tour 
 miles ; their site is varied by hills and valleys, running on the west 
 side parallel, and on the east, perpendicular to^ the general direction of 
 the works. 
 
 The line fortified may be divided into seven fronts — that is, units — 
 each one being composed of a continuous_entrenchment, resting at each 
 end on strong detached works ; the first is from the left of the line to 
 the Little Redan, its length being nine hundred yards ; the second 
 from the latter point to the MalakhoiF, seven hundred yards ; the 
 third lies between the Malakhofif and Great Redan, and is one thousand 
 one hundred and sixty yards long ; the fourth reaches from the Great 
 Redan to the Flag- staft' bastion, and is one thousand six hundred and 
 seventy yards long, or almost a mile; the fifth is from the latter point 
 to the Central bastion, five hundred and fifty yards ; the sixth ex- 
 tends to the Quarantine bastion, one thousand four hundred yards ; 
 the last front is one thousand yards long. 
 
 The familiar names of the Malakhoff, Redan, &c., refer to the- 
 works which were first constructed by Todleben when he undertook to 
 fortify Sevastopol, on the land side, in the shortest possible time. 
 
 He commenced by occupying the important points by detached 
 WORKS GENERALLY CLOSED AT THE GORGE. The first efforts of the garrisou 
 were directed toward giving these sufficient strength to resist assault; 
 afterwards, they were connected by re-entering lines of a weaker pro- 
 file, which served to enfilade the ravines and flank the main works. 
 These lines were generally, though not always, continuous. 
 
 As to the theory of the defence, the Russian engineers appear to 
 have relied upon the collateral works for flanking defences, and ar- 
 ranged so as to obtain a sweeping fire from these over the ground 
 lying in front of either of the independent detached works, 2)referring 
 to take their chance of stopping the enemy, by heavy losses, before 
 he arrived at the ditches, rather than devote their means to the im- 
 mediate flanking, at short range, of these ditches.* 
 
 *The most interesting details connected witli these lines are, the rifle-pits and the bomb- 
 proofs. 
 
 The latter were ample in number. They were sometimes under the rampart, some- 
 times under the second line of defence, often under special traverses, and occasionally 
 entirely imder ground, and even hollowed in the solid rock. The underground ones are 
 considered by Captain McClellan the best, as in that position they would afford no cover 
 or other advantages to an assailant who might gain a temporary footing in the salient of 
 the work. 
 
 The lifle-pits consisted sometimes of a little pile of stones, or baskets of earth, enougb 
 to shelter one man ; while the largest were semi-circular excavations that would hold forty 
 men. These were arranged, in front of the Volhynian redoubt, in two lines, forming a 
 salient aagle 250 yards in advance of the work. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF SOME CELEBBATED LINES. 
 
 It is unnecessary to go very far back into history to get enough 
 •examples of extensive lines to serve to deduce general principles from. 
 It is, however, certain that the most celebrated generals of all ages 
 have relied upon them to extricate themselves from positions of great 
 danger. 
 
 It was by means of strong lines that Ctesar resisted a much superior 
 army of Gauls at Alexia. Turcnne made use of double lines at the 
 jsiege of Dunkirk. Prince Eugene covered his army, while besieging 
 Lille in 1704, from the attacks of the Duke of Burgundy by lines. 
 The French lines at Turin, in 1706, have an unfortunate celebrity, 
 from the facility with which they were stormed by Prince Eugene; the 
 ill arrangement of the works, and their weakness, combined with the 
 bad generalship exhibited by Marshal Feuillade in attempting to 
 defend entrenchments that were intended, like most lines of circum- 
 vallation, only to resist surprises by small parties, to cause the defeat 
 of the French and the raising of the siege. 
 
 In 1709 the French lines at Malplaquet were forced by the allies 
 under Marlborough and Eugene ; but so terrible were the losses of the 
 latter, that they experienced all of a defeat but the name. 
 
 As it was, the lines were incomplete, and the position itself was ob- 
 jectionable on account of its separating the French army into portions 
 which must each depend on its own resources, as it could not be suc- 
 cored if driven back. 
 
 There were some hollow ways, also, by which the position could be 
 approached, and certain passes through the forest in front which had 
 not been well defended. In addition, the French had not outposts in 
 this woods beyond the abattis, so that their general was ignorant of 
 the movements of the enemy till the latter had approached near the 
 position. 
 
 With regard to the nature of the entrenchments themselves, much 
 fault is to be found with them for being open in the rear, and also 
 presenting intervals by which the enemy could penetrate ; this weak 
 disposition was not strengthened, as it should have been, to make it 
 consistent with the intention of a " line with intervals," by strong 
 enclosed works ; on the contrary, none of the latter were used. 
 
 Above all the position was susceptible of being turned, and in the 
 battle (which was conducted by Eugene with great skill) it was turned ; 
 this circumstance alone would have decided the French to retreat, but 
 they did not do so till after night, and the allies were not aware of 
 their having lelt the field till next morning. 
 
 The latter were, however, too much weakened and disordered by 
 their losses to pursue. 
 
 In 1710, the French armies having been reduced to a sirictly defen- 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 65 
 
 sive policy, Marshal Villars fortified and occupied, as a frontier defence, 
 the line extending from the sea, at the mouth of the Oanche river, to 
 the Meuse ; first following the Canche, then across a divide to a river 
 flowing into the Scarpe, at Arras, and down the Scarpe to the Scheldt, 
 at Valenciennes ; from this across a divide to the Sambre, and down 
 this to the Meuse, at Namur. 
 
 The enemy was in advance of the left of the centre, besieging the 
 fortified town of Betteune. 
 
 The object of the greater portion of the line was to prevent maraud- 
 ing expeditions of the enemy, and for this purpose the rivers, where 
 they existed, formed a sufficient obstacle^ if defended simply by patrols ; 
 and between Valenciennes and Landrecy a continuous line of field works 
 served equally well ; the patrols, or "flying camps,"' were furnished 
 and supported by the fortified towns along the line. 
 
 The^ portion extending from the Canche river to Arras was unpro- 
 tected/by any natural obstacle, and was directed in front of the enemy ; 
 it was here the French army encamped, and the line was of, say, six- 
 teen or twenty miles in length, formed by a series of redans, located 
 with regard to the configuration of the ground, and strengthened by 
 redoubts and by marshes formed by backing up the streams. 
 
 This part of the line was chiefly intended to protect the French 
 army in its manoeuvres to the right or left, for the purpose of opposing 
 the allies in their attempts upon either of the fortified places of the 
 frontier. ******* 
 
 The "lines of the Queich" were first fortified in 1743, when they 
 consisted of detached works, in the location of which but little atten- 
 tion was paid to reciprocal support. 
 
 During the seven years war, in 1760, the line was re-established, 
 and the general arrangement and ensemble of the works were very 
 much improved. 
 
 During the war of the French revolution, in 1797, the line was 
 again put in a defensive state, but on a plan not exactly the same as 
 in 1760. 
 
 The following is a description of the lines as they existed in 1760: 
 
 To comprehend their object, it is necessary to state that they were 
 situated so as to close the passage into France which lies between the 
 Vosges mountains and the Rhine ; being thus a complete barrier to 
 an invading army coming from Mayence, or the Palatinate, above that 
 city. 
 
 The extent of the line was about fifteen miles ; its left was the town 
 of Anweiler, which was surrounded by a loopholed wall, and which 
 closed the debouche through the mountains, by which, otherwise, the 
 line might be turned on this flank. 
 
 The right rested on the Rhine, was protected in front by a large 
 marsh, and was strengthened by a village^, which was fortified with 
 care. The centre was protected by the fortified city of Landau. 
 
 From Anweiler through the mountain valley of the Queich were 
 fortified posts, strengthened by inundations effected by dams thrown 
 across the small tributaries of the river. 
 
 At the point where the mountains subside into I he plain was a vil- 
 lage, which was fortified and surrounded by seven redoubts ; between 
 5 
 
66 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 this and Landau the line was protected by the Queich, which could 
 be raised by mill-dams so as to inundate its banks, and received addi- 
 tional support Irom a canal in rear of the latter ; hence no entrench- 
 ments were thought necessar}^ on this portion, especially as they were^ 
 for some distance, under the fire of the artillery of Landau. 
 
 Below, or to the right of Landau, the first mile and a half was 
 formed of a continuous redan line, which was so disposed as to ri^tain 
 the waters of the river and create a wide marsh in front ; a lunette 
 and a redoubt were stationed in advance, and a mill and an entrenched 
 village strengthened the position. 
 
 For a thiidof the distance from this to the Rhine, the line was 
 formed of slight entrenchments preceded by small inundations, on the 
 farther side of which two entrenched villages and two enclosed works 
 were situated. 
 
 From the last point indicated, to the right, the position was pro- 
 tected by field works of the nature of a cremaillere line, adapted care- 
 fully to the ground, and laid out with great skill, so as to supply the 
 want of a natural strength equal to that of the other positions ; the 
 continuous line was strengthened by advanced detached works. The 
 extreme right was upon high ground, with a steep ravine in front, 
 which was occupied by redoubts and strengthened by abattis. The 
 marsh in front has already been mentioned. 
 
 There was every facility througliout the line for communication 
 from one end to the other, by good roads running the whole length 
 of it, in its rear ; and on the left half of it there were several parallel 
 roads, so that communications would not be interrupted by the enemy 
 even if he should gain a footing inside of the line. 
 
 This line is a highl}' instructive iustance of a frontier barrier, 
 adapted not only to resist the invasion of a large army, but also cal- 
 culated to secure the country in the rear from marauding j^arties, 
 which might otherwise enter for purposes of plunder. 
 
 The continuous riature of the line was intended to effect the latter 
 object, and it was expected that the fortified villages and redoubts, and 
 especially the Place of Landau, would (like the inclosed works I re- 
 commend in my project for the fortification of Brooklyn) enable an 
 army of defence, by occupying them strongly, and calculating on 
 meeting the enemy, at any point of the line that might be forced by 
 him, with a reserve, to repel a much superior army. * * * 
 
 In 1761, Frederick the Great found himself reduced to the greatest 
 extremities ; he was hard pushed by the Austrian and Russian armies; 
 the great disparity of forces forbade his receiving battle, and to retreat 
 would be to lose Schweidnitz, and otherwise greatly imperil the cam- 
 paign, which was a critical one for Prussia. 
 
 From this danger, the greatest he had ever encountered, Frederick 
 saved himself by a stroke as daring as it was well combined. He 
 occupied and entrenched the position of Buntzelwitz, near Schweidnitz, 
 where liis army could receive an attack with every chance of success ; 
 at the same time he prevented the investment and siege of Schweid- 
 nitz, covered Breslau, and kept within reach of his magazines. 
 
 These famous lines formed a sort of oblong, with six salient angles; 
 these last were located on projecting and commanding hills or spurs ; 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 67 
 
 he whole position was formed by a cbain of hills of different declivi- 
 ties, varying from steep to gentle, and separated from each other by 
 several brooks ; the two principal of these covered the front. The 
 perimeter of the camp measured from twelve to seventeen miles, ac- 
 cording to an estimation, around the most salient and detached works, 
 or round the more continuous line in the rear. The ground inclosed 
 was a fine plain, adapted to manoeuvres, and a wood, which stood in 
 front, had the effect of hiding the latter in a great degree from the 
 enemy's view. All the hills were strongly entrenched by works 
 which held a numerous artillery, and slighter lines connected these 
 points. The whole perimeter of the position was also surrounded by 
 abattis, trous-de-loup, and fougasses ; and though put in a respectable 
 attitude of defence by ten days and nights' incessant labor, directed 
 and supervised by the King himself, the Prussians did not cease to 
 improve their lines during the whole time they were menaced by the 
 enemy. 
 
 On arriving in front of these lines, the Austrian general, Laudon, 
 was for attacking them, but would not do so without the co-o[)eration 
 of the Russian army. Failing to persuade the commander of the lat- 
 ter to approve his plan, both armies decamped after spending twenty 
 days before the lines, Avhich had by that time attained an almost 
 impregnable strength. ****** 
 
 The Spanish lines of Boulou, in April, 1794, are an instance of a 
 strong and extensive, position, strongly entrenched, but which fell 
 easily, in consequence of an oversight or blunder on the part of the 
 designer of the works. These lines were occupied by a Spanish army, 
 to prevent the French revolutionary .army of 35,000 men from enter- 
 ing Spain by way of Bellegarde. The camp was traversed by the 
 Tech, and separated from the plain of Vallespir by a chain of hills, 
 and was fortified with exceeding care. The line was in the form of a 
 right angle, the point of which was towards the front and right. The 
 right side commenced at a hill, strongly entrenched, on the far side of 
 the river, and, crossing the narrow valley, ran up the mountain on 
 the hither side, resting finally on the castle of Montesquiou, near the 
 summit, and around which it was not supposed the enemy could pass. 
 The left lialf of the angle, or the front of the position, ran on the far 
 side of the river, and finally, turning short, crossed it, resting on the 
 height of La Guardia, which commanded the bridge of Ceret. The 
 arc thus fortified had an extent of 11 or 12 miles. The weak point 
 of this position was the extreme right, which could be turned, owing 
 to the omission to fortify the highest peak of the mountain which lay 
 to the right, and in rear of, the castle of Montesquiou. The French 
 general accordingly attacked the camp by sending 10,000 infantry 
 and 800 cavalry to seize the height in question, which they did with- 
 out opposition, while the main body made demonstrations in front. 
 The result was that the Spaniards considered themselves lucky in 
 being able to retreat by an improvised road over the mountains, 
 (leaving all their guns, 150 in number,) their line of retreat by Belle- 
 garde being overlooked by the same height which enabled the French 
 to gain the rear of their Avorks. * * * * 
 
 During 1794 and 1795 the French had been constructing on the left 
 
68 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 bank of the Rhine, strong lines, for the purpose of blockading Mayence, 
 which city they expected to besiege, Mayence, being built on both 
 sides of the river, formed a tete-de-pont for the Austrians, and the 
 latter unexpectedly issued from it, (Oct. 29, 1795,) broke through the 
 lines, and thus took up an extremely advantageous position between 
 Jourdan's and Pichegiu's armies, the latter of which was especially 
 threatened, and might have been disastrously beaten if this successful 
 attack on its left wing had been vigorously followed up. Owing to the 
 attack being unforeseen, the garrison of the lines consisted at the time 
 of but 3,000 men ; and of these a certain proportion had just arrived, 
 having been detached from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and 
 were not, from their little acquaintance witli the localities, or with 
 their duties, much better than spectators of the combat. 
 
 The lines were composed altogether of open works, the main defence 
 being a continuous line of curtains, flanked by redans and bastions, 
 and located on the edge of the heights looking towards Mayence. In 
 advance, and in some parts in rear also, were fleches and lunettes, but 
 nowhere redoubts, so that the whole line could be turned by the forcing 
 of any weak point of it. In addition to this defect, the works were 
 nowhere strong enough to resist the attack of large bodies of men, and 
 also presented a weak point at their right extremity ; which, instead 
 of being connected with the river, left a wide meadow, which might 
 be used to turn the flank of the whole position. This oversight was 
 the more fatal as the line of retreat of the centre and left wing would 
 be menaced in case of the successful attack of, or turning of, the right. 
 
 The Austrian General Clerfayt, having a perfect acquaintance with 
 the French lines, attacked them in three columns, putting his greatest 
 strength into the attack on the French right. In this he was assisted 
 by a flotilla, which landed two battalions in the rear of this end of 
 the line. The attack on the right and centre being successful, the 
 French left had to retreat, though its defence had been successful, and 
 the whole army retired in disorder on the Pfrim river, in order to get 
 nearer to the main body. In this battle the Austrian soldiers scaled 
 the works, musket in hand. The immediate results were the capture 
 of all the French heavy artillery, and great stores of siege materials 
 and provisions. * * * * * ^ 
 
 Wellington's lines of Torres Vedras (1810) are justly celebrated for 
 their vast extent, their natural strength, and the admirable manner 
 in which every resource of the engineer was called into action in 
 adapting the defence to the site, the means disposable, and the neces- 
 sities of the case. 
 
 Not less wonderful are these lines for the complete manner in which 
 the labor of their construction was repaid by the invaluable results 
 obtained by their means. 
 
 No less a stake than the possession of Portugal'depended on their 
 strength ; and, indeed, if they had been forced, the consequences 
 might, like those of the capitulation of Baylen, have been propagated 
 in a manner to be felt throughout Europe, 
 
 But for these lines there can be little doubt that the victorious Mas- 
 sena, with his 110,000 veteran soldiers, who had pursued the British 
 to this contracted cul-de-sac, would have driven them into the sea, or 
 
DAISGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 69 
 
 at least forced them, like Sir John Moore's army, to end a disastrous 
 retreat by seeking safety in their ships. 
 
 This supposition is corroborated by all the circumstances of the cam- 
 paign, but especially by the excessive solicitude exhibited by Welling- 
 ton in hastening the construction of the works, and incessantly laboring 
 to augment their strength during the entire year that seemed likely 
 to witness an attack upon them. 
 
 The lines were two in number, concentric, and extending from the 
 sea to the Tagus ; and, as the British fleet and gunboat flotilla had 
 the entire possession of both these barriers, the position could not be 
 turned. 
 
 Thus shutting off Lisbon from the rest of Portugal, they afforded 
 an unequalled position for a defensive battle, with every chance of 
 success ; and even if beaten, which must be with great loss to the 
 attacking army, the defenders could still retreat into their fleet ; an 
 operation which was assured by the entrenched camp, or tete-de-pont, 
 which, isolating the extremity of the peninsula, would effectually 
 protect an embarkation. 
 
 The total force under Wellington's command amounted at the least 
 to 130,000 men, British and Portuguese together; of these 60,000 
 were detailed for permanent garrisons for the forts and redoubts ; the 
 remaining 70,000 were the best troops, and were designed for ma- 
 noeuvres. 
 
 The first line was originally intended to serve as a check to an 
 attacking enemy, and the second was to be the main reliance ; if this, 
 too, was forced, the army was to take refuge in the entrenched camp, 
 and enter the ships under its shelter. 
 
 The first line, however, became so strong, by dint of constant labor 
 upon it, that Wellesley finally made his calculations to take a decisive 
 position behind it. 
 
 The first line was 29 miles in extent^ and beginning at Alhandra, 
 upon the Tagus, crossed the peninsula, following, on its western slope, 
 the Zizandre, and finally terminating where that river empties into the 
 ocean. Beginning on the right, (at Alhandra,) the first five miles of 
 works were upon a ridge which liad naturally been steep, but was now 
 scarped for a height of 15 or 20 feet, so as to be almost inaccessible. 
 The next five miles were laid out upon two mountains which were de- 
 fended by redoubts. The centre of the line was occupied by field 
 works, (strengthened by an immense redoubt mounting 25 guns,) all 
 seated upon the lofty Mount Agraca, which, besides the strength 
 afforded by its height, presented a view of tlie whole line of works on 
 either hand, and of the approaches to them. 
 
 Of the 10 or 12 miles on the left, the first seven were lines well 
 seated behind obstructed ground, and with the river Zizandre flowing 
 in front of them ; the remainder of the line was protected by inunda- 
 tions, and the field works were strengthened by many redoubts and 
 forts, one of which was of enormous size and mounted 40 cannon. 
 A paved road ran behind this part of the ground, and contributed to 
 strengthen it by facilitating manoeuvres from one wing to the other. 
 
 A feature of the ground, that was very advantageous to the British,, 
 was this : that in front of the line, opposite Mount Agraca, rose the 
 
70 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 towering Monte Junta, whicli could only be crossed at some miles 
 distant from the front, and which, therefore, would prevent the French 
 from attacking hoth wings of the British line at once ; also, the for- 
 mer must be very cautious iu attacking the left, even singly, as the 
 latter might sally from their lines, during the passage of the moun- 
 tain, and attack the front or rear of the column en route, thus taking 
 it at a great disadvantage. 
 
 The second line was laid out at from 6 to 10 miles behind the first, 
 and extended from Quintella to St. Lorenzo, a distance of 24 miles— 
 without giving a description of it, let it suffice that it was stronger 
 than the first, and that in it, still more than in the other, redoubts, 
 forts, water-cuts, scarps, abattis, and entrenchments of all sorts, were 
 constructed without regard to labor or expense. 
 
 To give a proper idea of the pains bestowed on the works of Torres 
 Vedras, the following description of the defences of the outpost line of 
 Arunda is given: 
 
 Across the ravine on the left of Arunda, a wall of dry stone was built, 
 30 feet high and 16 feet thick ; across the valley of Arunda an abattis 
 was constructed of full grown oaks and chestnuts, which had to be 
 dragged several hundred yards, and were so reset and crossed as to 
 be perfectly impenetrable, while a breast-work, in the rear, afforded 
 cover for troops. Along the ridges for three miles ran a stone wall 
 six feet high and iourteen feet thick ; altogether it was considered 
 that the single division tliat guarded this post could defend it against 
 20,000 men. 
 
 The entrenched camp or tete-de-pont had an extent of 3,000 yards 
 and was seated near by the permanent fort of St. Julians, at a dis- 
 tance from the second line varying from 24 miles to two days' march 
 in its rear. 
 
 Before Massena arrived in front of the lines he was altogether 
 ignorant of their strength ; a reconnaissance of them induced him to 
 change his first intention of storming them immediately, and, upon 
 a closer examination, he despaired of doing so until he should receive 
 reinforcements. It then became a question of time, whether he could 
 remain long enough to give the latter time to join him ; for the coun- 
 try in his rear was not fruitful enough to afford subsistence for a great 
 length of time to his numerous army. On the other hand the anglo- 
 Portuguese forces, and the inhabitants of the inclosed district, were 
 in equal straits for food ; the latter much the most, for in the strug- 
 gle of endurance which ensued, and which lasted through the winter, 
 40,000 persons died of want within the lines. 
 
 During the blockade, however, the lines continued to increase in 
 strength ; and the storming of them, which had appeared hazardous 
 at first, became at last an impossibility ; the reinforcements did not 
 arrive, and the French had exhausted the country of every sort of 
 subsistence that would support life. 
 
 Finally, after displaying in the highest degree the obstinacy which 
 characterized him, Massena was obliged to retreat, baffled, not bythe 
 army, but the Imes of Wellington. * * * * 
 
 Soult's lines on the Nivelle form an instance of a strong position 
 of great extent, but badly fortified and ill-defended. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 71 
 
 In fhe latter part of 1813 Soult found himself stationed on the 
 Spanish frontier of France, with about G6,000 soldiers ; his task was 
 to prohibit the passage of the combined army of 90,000 men under 
 Wellington. He decided to take his stand in the triangular district 
 which is bounded by the sea, by the Nivelle river, and the mountains 
 on its left bank, and by the Nive, from its source to the Mondarin 
 mountain, which last commanded the bridge over it, and which could 
 not be turned. 
 
 Both flanks were thus secure, and the front was strongly seated on 
 mountains and strengthened by a river ; in its centre, and on a com- 
 manding height, was a large redoubt, called the signal redoubt ; in 
 front of it, on the slopes, were numerous field works, and in advance 
 of these, trenches and abattis. Three large redoubts lay towards the 
 left, and on the extreme right inundations had been effected, which 
 formed a great obstacle to an approach on that side. 
 
 The whole extent of front to be defended was 16 miles. Soult spent 
 three months in entrenching this position, but the works were ill- 
 planned, being mostly open works, and easily turned by the gorge. 
 Many of the redoubts that were commenced were incomplete when 
 attacked, and some were so placed that the garrisons could not depress 
 their pieces enough to bear upon the attacking columns. Their re- 
 vetments, of dry stone, were readily climbed by the British, but most 
 cf the works taken were entered by the gorge. The troops were de- 
 prived, by the broken nature of the ground, and the want of roads in 
 rear of the works, of the power of mutual support ; so that however 
 strong an attack might be experienced by either wing, it could not be 
 reinforced from the centre. 
 
 In the attack of these lines, which took place in November, Wel- 
 lington profited by all the defects of his opponent's arrangements. 
 
 His main attack was against the left of the centre, the key of the 
 position, and he threw 44,000 men upon the 15,000 French who 
 guarded the works near this point, holding in check a division of 
 12,000 men in another quarter by 6,000 British. The works were not 
 found a serious impediment by the attacking columns owing to the 
 defects above mentioned ; one fort especially was so ill situated that 
 the defenders were driven out of it by a battery of horse artillery 
 which galloped up an unfortified hill in its rear and opened a jDlung- 
 ing fire into it. 
 
 With all the disadvantages of bad communication it seems probable 
 that the defeat of the French, and their retreat from the position, 
 would have been obviated by the use of redoubts instead of open 
 works ; by giving them a strong profile, and by a judicious location 
 of them among the hills and between the lines of field works. 
 
 This view is borne out by the stubborn resistance which the signal 
 redoubt offered ; it held out after the whole line had retreated, and 
 withstood three attacks with a loss of but one man killed, while the 
 British lost 200 in killed and wounded ; the redoubt finally capitu- 
 lated, as further resistance could be of no service to the defence of the 
 position. ******* 
 
 As the two remaining examples of lines that I have examined have 
 
72 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 not had the merit of being tested by actual attacks, I will dispose of 
 them briefly" : 
 
 The first is the entrenched camp (as it was called) of Drissa, con- 
 structed by the Russians in 1812, on the occasion of the grand inva- 
 sion of their country by Napoleon. Without going into detail, it is 
 worth mentioning that the works were laid out on an arc of five miles, 
 which corresponded to a chord of 3\ miles. 
 
 On the front, and distributed over an extent of 7,000 yards, were 
 ten redoubts ; at the two extremities this line rested upon the river. 
 Between the redoubts open batteries of artillery were established. 
 Each redoubt was covered in front by low field works, of 220 yards 
 development, and laid out at 130 yards in advance. 
 
 Before the left of the line there was a wooded marsh ; and to pre- 
 vent the enemy from profiting by this, some of the trees were "cut 
 down, and used in forming an abattis, which was of about 2,000 yards 
 extent, and over 420 yards in advance of the line of redoubts. 
 
 Between the seventh and eighth redoubts there was built a large 
 bastion-shaped work, with a gorge of about 320 yards, which commu- 
 nicated with the redoubts by a sort of curtain of 140 yards in length. 
 Behind the centre of this bastion, and about 200 yards in rear of it, 
 was located another redoubt. 
 
 A second line of works lay at a distance of 360 yards behind the 
 front of the first — it was composed of five redoubts ; and finally, at 
 900 yards in rear of the centre of this second line was another redoubt, 
 making seventeen in all. 
 
 The bastion and nearly all the redoubts liad their ditches palisaded, 
 and were surrounded by a triple row of trous-de-loup. 
 
 This defensive camp, or lines rather, is worthy of much study, and 
 I shall offer it as a strong support to my argument. At present it is 
 only necessary to remark, that the general disposition, in this case, 
 is evidently formed on a wish to have the defence accumulated in a 
 few inclosed works of great strength, which, being situated at an 
 average of 750 yards apart, from centre to centre, will each have a 
 flanking fire over the nearer half of the intermediate entrenchments. 
 
 It is also probable that the latter were arranged to facilitate counter 
 attacks by the garrison, in case the enemy should be repulsed. * * 
 
 The lines of circumvallation of the allies at Sevastopol were con- 
 structed with the single view of shielding the army from a Russian 
 attack. The usual object of lines of circumvallation is chiefiy to pro- 
 hibit the entrance into the besieged place of reinforcements of troops, 
 ammunition, or provisions, which might otherwise elude or break 
 through the investing force, and make a dash for the gates of the 
 place. But here the investment was only half complete, which is the 
 same thing as entirely neglected. 
 
 The Russians could enter the fortifications on the south side in any 
 force, large or small, by crossing the bay, or by marching along the 
 shore. Consequently the lines from Inkerman to Balaklava were 
 purely defensive. It is to be remarked, also, that these extensive 
 works were not judged necessary at first, but that the allies were in- 
 duced to adopt them, and afterwards to continually strengthen them 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 73 
 
 by receiving severe admonitions and demonstrations of their value, 
 especially in the battles of Balaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya. 
 
 The lines were double ; the first one extended from Inkerman to 
 Balaklava, along the northern and eastern boundaries of the plateau 
 of Chersonese, and along the Tchernaya, and behind the canal, (which 
 forms a second obstacle to an attacking army,) and so along to the 
 hilly ground of Balaklava. The total extent of this first line was 
 over six miles. Its object, as stated before, was to protect the right 
 of the besieging army and its depots at Balaklava, and its line of 
 communication with the latter point. 
 
 That the advanced line fully effected this purpose is proved by the 
 resistance which it enabled the French and Sardinian troops, who de- 
 fended the position attacked, to offer to the Russian attempt of August 
 16, 1855. 
 
 On this occasion the enemy's forces, consisting of 6 divisions of in- 
 fantry, 3 of cavalry, and 15U guns, and estimated in all at from 40,000 
 to 50,000 men, made an obstinate attack on that part of the lines 
 which lay in the vicinity of the Traktir bridge over the Tchernaya. 
 
 They were repulsed with the loss of 3,329 killed alone. The num- 
 ber of wounded is not stated, but the French took care of 1,600 of 
 them, besides those who were carried ofi" by their comrades. 
 
 This signal repulse was effected by 12,000 French and 10,000 
 Sardinian troops; and the result is to be explained only by admitting 
 the great defensive value of the lines as an adjunct to the naturally 
 strong position. 
 
 This conclusion is made positive by the fact that, after the battle of 
 the Tchernaya, the French took greater pains than ever to add to their 
 works^ which they rendered almost superfluously strong. 
 
 The second line ran across the peninsula, from Streletzka bay to the 
 sea, in a southerly direction, following the elevated ground ; the extent 
 of it was about 8,000 yards, the works were continuous, and strength- 
 ened at various intervals by eight redoubts, in the shape of bastions 
 closed at the gorge. These bastions were of great size, and probably 
 quite strong. 
 
 The object of this line was, like the third line of Torres Vedras, to 
 provide against a ruinous defeat of the allied armies, which should 
 necessitate a retreat into some secure position, wliere they could await 
 reinforcements, or from which they could, if fortune should continue 
 against them, re-embark into their fleets and leave the Crimea entirely. 
 
 The second line was therefore laid out so as to be defensible by a 
 small part of the army, while the maiti body might be transferred to 
 the ships. 
 
 In my propositions for the defence of New York I shall have occa- 
 sion to refer to this last line, which is, in several points, analogous to 
 the one I suggest. The chief features of resemblance are, its extent, 
 the closing of the gorges of the bastions, the connecting them by con- 
 tinuous lines, and the variable distances at which they are placed, 
 together with the great average distance which is flanked b}^ each. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 PRINCIPLES RELATING TO LINES DISCUSSED AND APPLIED TO THE PARTICULAR 
 
 CASE IN POINT. 
 
 First. Each extremity of a fortified line should rest upon an obstacle 
 which may he considered impassable by an enemy, and wliich the 
 latter should be unable to outflank or march around. Large rivers^ 
 the sea, rugged mountain ranges, such are the indispensable supports 
 to the flanks of an extensive entrenched position. 
 
 Thus the lines of the Queich rested upon theEhine and the Vosges; 
 the French lines of the Nivelle upon the sea and upon the inaccessible 
 Mondarin mountain, updn which were works that commanded the 
 bridge over the Nive river, passable only at that point for the enemy. 
 
 The lines of Torres Vedras extended from the Tagus to the sea. 
 
 The French lines of circumvallation at Sevastopol rested at each 
 flank on the sea, and the English, or advanced ones, upon the sea and 
 on the strong position of Inkerman. 
 
 The lines at Mayence might have been made to rest at both ends on 
 the Rhine, but the right flank was not joined to the river, and the 
 neglect of this precaution was the cause of the Austrians forcing the 
 position. 
 
 At the lines of Boulou a similar neglect, in not securing the moun- 
 tain summit, which formed the extreme right of the position, caused 
 the loss of it to the Spanish. ***** 
 
 Second. The lines should present a continuous uninterrupted bar- 
 rier of a profile not easily to be clambered over. Gaps in the line are 
 as good for the enemy as breaches ready made by his artillery or sap- 
 pers, because the moment the artillery of the delences is silenced, and 
 the troops are driven temporarily from the parapets of the flanks, the 
 assaulting column can enter at a run, without any impediment to give 
 the defenders time to resume their fire. 
 
 It must here be understood that, though uninterrupted, the en- 
 trenchments should not be simply of the kinds commonly called con- 
 tinuous; that is, of a series of curtains, flanked by any or all of the 
 elementary field works which are open at the gorge. It was such a 
 line as this which caused the defeat of the French at Turin, and such 
 will always involve the ruin of their defenders, owing to the following 
 reasons : 
 
 The army which guards an extensive, continuous line, ]must find its 
 safety in completely prohibiting the enemy from crossing it at any 
 point; should they succeed in passing the line at the centre for example,, 
 they could concentrate their forces, and, marching to the right or left, 
 attack in flank the defenders, who must receive their reinforcements 
 from the wings by piecemeal ; and, as is always the case when the flank 
 is surprised^ the latter arrive too late to be of service, and in time only 
 to be beaten in detail. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 75 
 
 But if, to guard against the lines being forced at every point, the 
 general posts his troops so as to render the entire length of the works 
 equally strong throughout, he renders his defeat a matter almost of 
 certainty; for the dissemination of his forces, which is thus produced, 
 renders it impossible, with the largest army, to have enough troops 
 everywhere to resist the onset of a column which perhaps is made up 
 of the main body of the enemy. 
 
 Manoeuvres of the troops for the purpose of accumulating them at 
 the point attacked are not practicable, for the forcing of a fieldwork 
 insufficiently garrisoned is the affair of a few minutes; and, besides, 
 the attention of the defenders will be distracted, by several false 
 attacks, from the decisive one. * * * * 
 
 Third For these reasons the [technically called] continuous lines 
 have seldom been resorted to without being strengthened by strong 
 redoubts, or star forts, situated at intervals either in front or in rear 
 of, or forming a portion of the line. 
 
 At the same time it is apparent that the same reasoning that has 
 just been given will apply in a certain degree even when the lines are 
 supported by redoubts ; I should say that it has been susceptible of 
 application until the recent improvements in the soldier's musket, 
 which, by vastly increasing its range and accuracy, afford an oppor- 
 tunity for reconciling those clashing conditions which as I have just 
 shown are not to be harmonized at all in continuous lines, and which 
 it hitherto required great skill to reconcile, even with the assistance of 
 inclosed works. To make clear the point in question, it must be 
 stated that writers on the subject of field fortification generally fix 
 the limit of effective range of the musket, in actions of this nature, at 
 less than 200 yards — it will carry further, but with no exactness — 
 and at 300 yards the force of the ball is spent. The exceptions to ■ 
 this rule are few : the greatest variation is found in the practice of 
 Vauban, who calculated the lines of defence of his field-works (in 
 which he exhibited as much genius as in his permanent fortresses) so 
 as to count upon the extreme range of the musket ; tbat is, he fixes- 
 the distance from the flanking parts to the salients at 300 yards; but 
 (as St. Paul justly observes) the musket ball cannot be relied on at 
 this distance, either for penetrating power or accuracy; and in addi- 
 tion, the fire of the flanks ought to reach to some distance in front of, 
 and beyond the salient defended by them, so as to give a cross fire on 
 the enemy before he arrives at the ditch. This basis fixes the length 
 of the single front of continuous lines of different kinds, as follows: 
 
 Redan lines, at the maximum .>. 240 yards.. 
 
 Tenaille lines, with large salients 320 " 
 
 Tenaille lines, with small salients 240 " 
 
 Bastioned lines, (maximum) 240 " 
 
 The disadvantages of the tenaille lines when made of the maximum, 
 dimensions, the chief of which is the exposure of the lines to ricochet 
 fire, cause the length of 240 yards to be made the rule. 
 
 Now, basing the calculation on the same range of the musket, if, 
 the continuous line is to be strengthened by redoubts, either these 
 will not be close enough to support the whole line, or there will be a< 
 
76 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 great number of them. For example: a line of redoubts, to protect, 
 by tbeir fire, each other and the intermediate spaces, must be double, 
 and arranged in quincunx order. Dr. Sellon estimates the distances 
 in each line at 440 yards from centre to centre, which will amount to 
 one redoubt for each 220 yards. 
 
 A line formed of detached lunettes, with a second line of redans in 
 the rear, (all rendered enclosed works by stockades,) has spaces of 
 250 yards at the farthest. In case, therefore, that the latter alterna- 
 tive is chosen, the redoubts will require for their garrison, a great part 
 of the reserve, which ought to act independently of the works ; and 
 also the garrison of each one must be small, and the work itself must 
 be small, and consequently weak ; the consequence would be that, so 
 far from improving the defence of the continuous line, they would 
 aggravate the disadvantages of the defenders. For this reason re- 
 doubts, supporting lines, have generally been placed at wide inter- 
 vals, and made of large size, strong, and capable of holding a large 
 number of troops. Frequently star forts have taken the place of 
 redoubts, as being intrinsically stronger. This arrangement has been 
 the best one possible, in consideration of all the circumstances ; the 
 deficiencies of it have been inevitable results of the short range of the 
 smooth-bore musket. 
 
 These deficiencies, to recapitulate them briefly, have been : 
 
 1st. That the inclosed works have not protected by their fire the 
 whole length of the open entrenchments which closed the interval 
 between them, thus leaving weak points in the line. 
 
 2d. That for a still stronger reason, they have had no power of 
 mutual support b}^ reciprocal flank flre. 
 
 It will be seen that the limited range of the musket has been so 
 great a restriction ujjon the defensive combinations for the defence of 
 extended positions, that no possible arrangement could be contrived 
 to render lines, even theoretically, strong ; flne natural advantages of 
 topography and the genius of a great general have been the main 
 strength of such dispositions. 
 
 At the present time, however, this restriction is entirely removed 
 by the invention and introduction into all services, as the habitual 
 arm of the soldier, of the rifle-musket with the Minie (or its equiva- 
 lent) projectile. 
 
 Lines may now be constructed of great extent and defensible by a 
 not extraordinary force, and in localities which it would. formerly have 
 been considered impossible to defend. 
 
 The demonstration of this assertion, which has not before been 
 made, follows naturally at this point of the argument. It can be 
 shown that lines can now be combined so as to fulfil all the requisites 
 of a continuous line and still permit of the defending force being 
 chiefly concentrated at a few points, leaving, besides, a large enough 
 proportion of troops to form a powerful reserve ; in other words, all 
 the advantages of any lines that were ever constructed may be pre-* 
 served, while the former inherent and inevitable deficiencies are 
 eliminated. ******* 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 77 
 
 Fourth. Of the proper location and nature of enclosed works in lines. 
 The enclosed works of a modern system of lines should be — 
 Ist. Located as far apart as possible, to conform to the other essen- 
 tial conditions ; because the fewer they are the more pains can be 
 taken with each one to strengthen it, and also, the more troops can 
 be stationed in each, out of the total number that can be spared for 
 the garrisons. 
 
 Hence, each work could be stronger in itself to resist a separate 
 assault, and also would give a more formidable flanking fire upon the 
 approaches to and ditches of the intervening entrenchments. 
 
 2d, The works should not, however, be so distant as to prevent 
 their sweeping, by their musketry as well as their artillery fire, all 
 the ground between them, including the immediate vicinity of the 
 curtains which join them, and the enfilading of the ditches of the 
 latter. 
 
 As I propose to confide the flanking of the entire system to the 
 inclosed works specified, and as the necessity of a thorough flanking, 
 both of the approaches and ditches, of all entrenchments, is an uni- 
 versally admitted military principle, no more need be said on this 
 point. 
 
 It is evident that the basis, according to which must be determined 
 the intervals in question, is the effective range of the regulation musket 
 in the hands of the private soldier ; this element for the rifle-musket, 
 with which all the United States infantry is to be armed, is 600 yards. 
 As the distance specified is not obtained from any published or 
 official authorities it will be as well to state my reasons for adopting it. 
 In the first place, it will be recollected, as was quoted from St. Paul, 
 that the smooth-bore musket was expected to kill at 300 yards ; the- 
 Aide Memoire du Genie says that at 300 yards musket bullets begin to- 
 give fatal wounds. The line of defence has accordingly been fixed at 
 from 160 to 200 yards, so as to give, upon the approaches to the 
 flanked angles, a cross fire, for, say, a hundred yards in advance. For 
 about this distance the assaulting columns would therefore be under a 
 more or less effective fire, which would continually increase in accuracy 
 as they approached the ditch, and would produce about its maximum 
 destructive effect upon the troops while they should be accumulated 
 in the latter and occupied in climbing the scarp. 
 
 Let us therefore find the range at which the Minie ball will produce 
 a mortal wound, and see whether it can be assumed as the correlative 
 of the 300 yards for the smooth-bore. 
 
 At 300 yards the musket bullet will penetrate 3| inches into white 
 pine wood ; this is an ample estimate,, as it is from the French "Aide 
 Memoire du Genie," which, if I am not mistaken, refers to heavier 
 bullets and a larger charge than our percussion muskets carried. 
 With regard to the latter, it appears* that at 300 yards none of their 
 shots penetrated into oak, and only ^-^i\\ part stuck where they hit. 
 Now, the range at which the rifle-musket will give an equal penetra- 
 tion is at least 1,000 yards. f 
 
 *Ord. Manual. 
 
 t Tables of experiments in "Report on small-arms," or table 12 of my Memoir on Fort/- 
 ficalion, 1858. 
 
78 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 As to accuracy, all the published tables go to prove that the new 
 piece is more exact at 1,000 yards than the musket at 300. For ex- 
 ample, one series * of trials has found the mean deviation of round 
 musket balls, at 300 yards, to be 3| feet vertically by 6 feet hori- 
 zontally. Of the whole number of balls fired in this trial 12 per 
 cent missed the target_, of 5 by 10 yards. 
 
 A similar trial f showed that the mean deviation of the elongated 
 projectile, from the rifle-musket, at 900 yards, was 2 feet 10 inches 
 vertically and 1 foot 9 inches horizontally, while only 2 per cent, of 
 the shots failed to hit the target, which was 5 by 6 yards. 
 
 It must be considered, however, that for firing at early dawn, or on 
 a dark day, or at a company dressed in grey or blue, there is not as 
 good a chance to aim as is always the case at trials, which are conducted 
 in fine weather, and where the mark is a white, conspicuous object ; 
 and these drawbacks would be much more important at 1,000 yards 
 than at GOO. It must also be taken into account that the undulations 
 of the ground, in any position likely to be advantageous for entrench- 
 ments, would probably pi event an uninterrupted view of 1,000 yards 
 in extent ; and, in addition, the flanking work must be of an exces- 
 sive size to be formidable enough to check, by its fire, the body of men 
 which could advance through the interval of 2,000 yards, which would 
 separate the supporting inclosed M'orks, if each were expected to de- 
 fend a length of 1,000 yards In order, therefore, to be on the safe 
 side, I have adopted the figure of 600 yards as the effective range of 
 the neiv piece, considered as the arm of the private soldier. 
 
 The deadly fire of the Russian rifle pits at Sevastopol, at from 600 
 to *J00 yards distance, and the sharp shooting at 900 yards during the 
 siege of Boraarsund, are confirmations, which I regret not having 
 space to enlarge upon, of the correctness of my conclusion. 
 
 The range of grape shot is 600 yards also ; a circumstance which 
 had an influence with me in fixing the line of defence at that distance. 
 The two requisites, with regard to relative location of the inclosed 
 ivorks in a line, will then bo satisfied by placing them at intervals of 
 1,200 yards apart, counting between their flanks, or 1,400 yards from 
 centre to centre. Of course, if the nature of the ground should re- 
 quire it, they might be placed closer ; the system would thereby gain 
 more rapidly perhaps in strength than would be counterbalanced by 
 the expense, for the redoubts need hardly ever be so close as to incur 
 the defects (of numerous works) mentioned on page 76, which are not 
 important, until they get within 700 yards of each other. * =)- * 
 
 Fifth. To place the inclosed works in conformity with the locality and 
 topography, the following principle should be kept in view. 
 
 They should be seated upon commanding spots, which lie also 
 rather in front of the line of continuous works; thus situated, they 
 will be difficult of access themselves, and will, moreover, gain a 
 plunging and reverse fire upon the lower ground, in front of the in- 
 termediate curtains, and upon the ditches of the latter. 
 
 The range of both artillery and musketry will be greater from 
 these high points, and also there will a greater number of shots 
 
 * Table 3 of same memoir. f Table 9, idem. 
 
. DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 79 
 
 tell in an enemy's column, which must appear larger than if viewed 
 from a level. 
 
 The moral eifect is, besides, worth noting, as soldiers invariabl}^ 
 dislike to pass under the fire of commanding works. 
 
 This condition is, after all, one that needed only to be stated ; and 
 I have discussed it more for the sake of uniformity than anything else, 
 as it has always been followed in actual lines. * * * 
 
 Sixth. The size ot the inclosed works 
 
 They should be large enough to deliver a very heavy flanking fire 
 on the approaches, &c., of the entrenchments. 
 
 This fire should be of both artillery and musketry ; in fact all the 
 artillery disposable for the defence of the lines, except the flying bat- 
 teries, should find room in the redoubts. 
 
 In the redoubts, if placed as above recommended, will be the most 
 advantageous position for the action of artillery upon the enemy's 
 columns, and in them, also, the guns will be most secure from capture. 
 
 It must be recollected, however, that not only does artillery require 
 much space on the terrepleins, but that it will not do to crowd the 
 latter with pieces to the exclusion of a proper number of troops ; for in 
 that case the work would be very liable to be taken by assault ; hence, 
 the more pieces the work carries, the greater should be the garrison 
 of it. 
 
 Let us suppose that each work carries two six-gun batteries of artil- 
 lery, one on each flank, the space required for these and three traverses 
 ^vill be 45 yards. 
 
 Probably 200 yards of banquette for infantry will suffice, as it is 
 about 80 yards greater than the whole length of a bastion face in the 
 modern system of fortification. This will altogether give the flank a 
 length of 250 yards. 
 
 The flanks are the lines which, according to my system, must fix 
 the size of the work, since the latter must positively give a great 
 column of fire in both directions to fulfil the pait imposed on it by 
 the theory of the defence. 
 
 The flanks being fixed in length and direction, it remains to decide 
 on the manner of joining their ends. The front of the work should 
 give its fire towards the approaches by which an enemy could march 
 to assault it ; hence its best disposition will be in two lines or faces, 
 making equal angles with each other and with the flanks. 
 
 This arrangement will, in view of the obtuseness of the angles so 
 obtained, permit of all the guns of the two faces, or of a face and 
 tlank, being directed along either capital of the work ; so that an 
 approach must be under at least the full direct fire of one face. 
 
 The lengths of the faces should vary according to the position and 
 importance of the work, say from 60 yards each to 100. 
 
 As to the gorge, I propose to construct it in the shape of a bastion 
 front. 
 
 The gorge will in most of the redoubts, that is, in all that are laid 
 out on a part of the line which has but little curvature, have a length 
 of about 160 yards ; which gives ample room for the trace proposed. 
 
 The object of closing the gorge is purely to make the work equally 
 strong in rear as on the other sides, to resist an escalade. It has no 
 
80 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 view of the collateral works, nor of the curtains ; and, consequently, 
 we have only to consider how it can be arranged to defend itself in the 
 strongest manner and at the least expense. 
 
 That the entrance gate of the work is in the gorge is another reason 
 for desiring to arrange the latter in a manner to make it as defensible 
 as possible. 
 
 The bastioned trace is undoubtedly the one best calculated to answer 
 the single purpose of the gorge, from its strength and simplicity. 
 
 The garrison of the redoubts just described should be, on an average, 
 2,000 men. ******* 
 
 Seventli. In deciding upon the shape and size of the inclosed works of 
 a line, we must, besides the action ofeach upon the ground around it, 
 consider the necessity of providing for its separate and independent 
 defence against attempts at escalade, or even a short siege. 
 
 It is impossible to separate perfectly these two essential points in 
 any other sort of ivorh than a redoubt: but in this the lines of rampart 
 may have precisely the lengths and directions that will enable them 
 fully to sweep the country around, and their approaches, by their fire, 
 and to perfectly enfilade the ditches of the curtains, and flank the 
 ground in front of them ; this is possible without the slightest inter- 
 ference witii the dispositions for the independent defence of the work, 
 in front or rear ; and if this second condition has guided me in plan- 
 ning the gorge of my proposed works, it is because in this quarter the 
 other one goes altogether out of the question. 
 
 The second condition, relating to the individual defence of each 
 enclosed Avork depends upon : 
 
 Ist. The arrangements for flanking its ditches ; 
 
 2d, On the profile. 
 
 It is because of the peculiar property of a redoubt, of satisfying the 
 above condition separately from the other, that I have chosen it in 
 preference to the star fort, or bastion fort, which have generally been 
 constructed to defend the more important points of lines. 
 
 The reason has probably been that there have not been the means 
 of providing for the individual defence of the work, that become neces- 
 sary for a redoubt ; from the same cause, in the field redoubts that 
 have been used in actual warfare, there has generally been a neglect 
 of flanking arrangements. 
 
 The latter, when introduced, have consisted of — 
 
 1. Galleries of timber, loopholed, along the reverse of the ditches, 
 at the salient angles, so as to enfilade, each, the ditch of one face. 
 
 2. Similar galleries running across the ditches at their middle 
 points, for firing both ways each, thus enfilading one ditch. 
 
 The timber and plank necessary for these constructions, and the 
 time requisite to build them, have often been wanting, and so have 
 decided engineers not to adopt the redoubt, but to prefer some trace 
 that would enable the garrison of each work to defend it from the 
 parapets, without any su})plementary arrangements. It must be re- 
 membered also, that, from the causes I discussed at the outset of this 
 section, depending on the range of the musket, the second condition 
 in question has always been the one most important in an enclosed 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 81 
 
 work, from the impossibility of satisfying the other more than very 
 imperfectly. 
 
 The star fort of 8 points certainly satisfies the second condition as 
 well as a redoubt, arranged with the timber-flanking galleries in 
 question. The former gives a strong fire upon the approaches along 
 either capital, from two lines, which are each, a third of the width of 
 the work in length. There are dead spaces in the inner ends of the 
 ditches, it is true ; but the salient ends are well flanked, and the de- 
 fence from open ramparts is preferable to the firing from the detached 
 and inconvenient galleries of redoubts. 
 
 These star forts, however, are not adapted to the purpose of my 
 proposed line, from the important reason that one third of each of 
 the two sides, which would face towards the curtains to be flanked, is 
 prevented (by its being broken forwards to flank the ditches of the 
 remainder) from giving its fire in the direction of tbe curtain. Be- 
 sides, star forts are, not so easily as redoubts, adapted to irregular 
 ground ; and after passing a certain size, (say of 8 points, with faces 
 of 60 yards, and with a garrison of 600 troops,) a better form will be 
 found in the bastioned fort, in which the flanking lines do not bear so 
 large a proportion to the main lines of the work as one-half — the ratio 
 in the former. Even in the bastioned fort, however, there is too 
 much indentation of the rampart, and too much sacrifice of the most 
 essential condition that inclosed works ought to satisfy in lines. 
 
 In view, therefore, of all the arguments for the different sorts of 
 enclosed works for the purpose in question, I should be inclined to 
 choose redoubts, even if made on the plan of flanking by timber gal- 
 leries. But when we consider that, in the case in question, these 
 timber galleries may be dropped, and a much more convenient, con- 
 solidated, and infinitely stronger flanking arrangement substituted 
 for them, there can no longer be any hesitation in the choice. * * 
 
 Eighth. In the Brooklyn lines proposed, there is no reason for not 
 making the 15 or 17 redoubts that will benecessaryofapermanent nature. 
 
 A revetted, partly detached, scarp would render each one impreg- 
 nable ; and then a judicious location of them would render the whole 
 line impregnable. I use the word impregnable in consideration of 
 the probable length of the attack, and of the supplementary means of 
 defence, which I will point out beyond, to resort to, in case of a more 
 obstinate attempt. 
 
 The redoubts, if revetted, should have three bastionnets, or recipro- 
 cally flanking masonry caponnieres. These should be put at the sali- 
 ent and two shoulder angles. There should be two half bastions at 
 the inner ends of the flanks, and joining to these would be the two 
 half bastions of the gorge front. 
 
 The use of masonry at the three outer angles is here unobjection- 
 able, comparatively, with the requirements of the general theory of 
 the defence. They cannot be attained and breached, or counterbat- 
 tered, by any sort of artillery firing, except from batteries placed on 
 the edge of the ditch ; for, being close to the counterscarp, (which is 
 only the width of the ditch from them in the direction towards any 
 other location of the enemy's batteries,) they cannot be reached by 
 the most curved of ricochet fire ; and as to the breach batteries re- 
 6 
 
82 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 ferred to, they cannot be placed until after a siege, and I believe not 
 then, if the supplementary defence I will mention is adopted. 
 
 To describe briefly the bastionnets specified, it will be sufficient to 
 state that they are casematedcaponnieres, which are placed something 
 like the tours bastionnes of Vauban's second and third systems. They 
 are armed with howitzers for firing cannister and small grape, and 
 completely enfilade the ditches by a grazing fire. Their shape is 
 bastioned_, so as to prevent any dead angles being occasioned at any 
 part of the scarp. They do not extend above the coping of the scarp, 
 and are consequently hidden from all exterior views by the crest of 
 the glacis. 
 
 The half bastions, which flank the outer half of the flanks of the 
 redoubts^ are preferable to bastionnets, because the ditches they enfi- 
 lade, lead towards the front, and thereby oifer a chance to the enemy 
 to open a curved fire along them which would breach casemates or 
 any detached scarp of flanks at their inner ends. 
 
 With regard to the profile, the redoubts in question ought to have 
 their ramparts and parapets of the usual dimensions ; though the last 
 perhaps had better be twenty-five feet thick on the flanks and faces. 
 
 The scarp for its entire circuit should be twenty feet high ; but of 
 this the upper eight feet should be a thin detached wall, arranged 
 with a banquette three and a half feet high. This detached wall 
 should follow round the coping of the bastionnets. 
 
 On the gorge side the scarp might be detached in the same manner 
 on the faces and flanks of the half bastions ; the curtain would most 
 likely bo formed of a range of bomb-proofs, for shelter, and to hold 
 powder and stores. 
 
 It is certain from the experience at Sevastopol, in 1854 and 1855, 
 that mortars will form a preponderating element in future siege 
 trains ; their shells will demolish and level thin parapets, and will 
 render uninhabitable any works not profusely supplied with bomb- 
 proofs. 
 
 There should be, consequently, enough of the latter in each redoubt 
 to suffice for holding all its stores of powder and a fair supply of pro- 
 visions, with a surplus depending on the money disposable for the 
 purpose. The three bastionnets, it will be noted, are bo :ib-proof. 
 
 If the enemy should make his preparations, before any part of the 
 line, for shelling it, the redoubts of that portion should immediately 
 be filled with laborers, and a great number of temporary bomb-proofs 
 of beams and earth be constructed at the foot of its terreplein slopes,* 
 or under the rampart, or entirely under ground. 
 
 The parapets are made thick enough to prevent their being blown 
 away by the bursting in them of large shells, which would otherwise 
 open a view into the interior for the enemy's artillery. 
 
 Several reasons concur to recommend the partial detaching of the 
 scarp, so as to form a chemin-des-rondes and breast-height wall. 
 
 In the first place, there will be a considerable saving of expense 
 
 •"■ The expcriincc of Sevastopol shows that the army defending lines, or an entrenched 
 cam}), can, by the assistance of a few works to prevent inimt-diate attack, so fortify any 
 one menaced point as to put it in a condition not to be taken without a siege. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 83 
 
 effected by the diminution of masonry, wliich amounts to about a 
 cubic yard for every lineal yard of wall. 
 
 2d. The work is rendered thereby much more secure against attacks 
 by storm, because the banquette in rear of the thin wall may be lined, 
 during the assault, by two ranks of troops, who can open a direct and 
 plunging fire on the assailants, crowded together in the ditch below. 
 The short range at which this fire will be delivered will cause it to be 
 exceedingly effective. These troops can also take hold of the ends of 
 the scaling ladders which the enemy may rear against the scarp and 
 cast them off and dash them to the ground before any stormers had 
 time to mount them. 
 
 3d. In order to give the space necessary for the banquette, and for 
 a free communication behind it, between the thin wall and the exte- 
 rior slope of tlie parapet, the mass of earth forming the latter must 
 be set back a certain distance from the edge of the scarp. 
 
 There is thus a little room subtracted from the interior area of the 
 work, and the parapet is a trifle shortened ; but, in redoubts of the 
 size I recommend, neither of these consequences are at all objection- 
 able. It is only in the diminutive two and three story forts of our 
 sea-coast, that every foot of space has to be studiously economized, and 
 want of room is an insuperable obstacle to the use of the chemin des 
 rondes. 
 
 There is, however, a great and solid advantage which is consequent 
 upon thus setting back the weight of the parapet from the sustaining 
 wall. 
 
 The latter may be breached and tumble in ruins into the ditch, 
 without the earth of the parapet even tending to slide down after it; 
 while the parapet, in case it does rest close to the scarp, is entirely 
 undermined when the latter falls, and caves in, together with some 
 of the rampart on which it rests, so that not only is there an easy 
 ascent provided for the enemy by the earth assuming over the ruins 
 of the wall its natural slope, but the interior of the work is opened 
 to the enemy's marksmen and artillery, which will render it difficult 
 to make a hand to hand defence of the breach. 
 
 Take the case, however, of the partly detached scarp, and suppose 
 it to be breached ; there is less wall to fall in, and the earth which 
 follows it in its fall is a small triangular prism, which slides off on a 
 plane which is nearly the prolongation of the exterior slope of the 
 parapet ; the latter is, therefore, not even reduced appreciably in 
 thickness, and, as a covering mass and as a breast-work, remains as 
 good as ever. 
 
 All the enemy gains, therefore, in this case, by breaching the 
 scarp, is creating a steep slope to ascend by, without diminishing the 
 offensive powers of the work or preventing the adoption of all sorts of 
 arrangements for the close defence of the breach. 
 
 These are the main advantages secured to the defence by the adop- 
 tion of the chemin des rondes and its covering wall. It will be seen 
 that it is especially suitable for the isolated redoubts proposed for the 
 Brooklyn lines, and that the simplicity of the latter, and their con- 
 siderable area, render the introduction of this arrangement uncom- 
 monly free from any counterbalancing objections. 
 
84 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 There are one or two of the latter which it may he well to mention, 
 though they are of much less weight in the case of these redoubts 
 than as applied to extensive fortresses ; and even in recent examples 
 of these in Europe we find many instances of the use of the chemin- 
 des-rondes. 
 
 The chemin-dcs-rondes is ?aid to give a facility to the enemy, after 
 he has gained the top of the wall at any point, to extend his troops to 
 the right and left so as to mount at the same time a wide extent of 
 the parapet. However, the garrison has also a better opportunity of 
 preventing the first lodgment, and of reinforcing more promptly 
 the troops defending the point where the enemy succeeds in gaining 
 a footing. 
 
 Another defect attributed to the thin covering wall is, that it may 
 be knocked down very soon by the enemy's artillery. This is not, 
 however, so much the case if it is hidden from exterior view by the 
 glacis, as it can then be reached only by curved fires, which are un- 
 certain. 
 
 Another consideration is, that probably only a short extent of the 
 wall, on the faces, will be demolished, Avhile that on the flanks and 
 gorge will remain intact. This will also be the case only for the one 
 or two redoubts that may be bombarded, while the eighteen or nine- 
 teen others enjoy all the advantages of the arrangement, without being 
 subjected at all to this drawback. 
 
 Now, even supposing that a considerable length of the wall, on the 
 faces of one or two redoubts, should be ruined, the chemin des roudes 
 would still have effected, for these redoubts, all it was intended to 
 perform. 
 
 If the enemy had tried to storm them before deciding to take the 
 time and pains to plant his heavy guns and wait their effect, he will 
 have been repulsed with severe loss — a result, in a good measure, at- 
 tributable to the detached scarp ; and it is certain that the knowledge 
 of this construction would tend to prevent the experiment being tried, 
 and thus occasion the delay necessary to construct batteries and arm 
 them. 
 
 There would thus be gained by the defenders several days, which, 
 they could turn to profit by putting the redoubts attacked into a per- 
 fect state of defence by the construction of fougasses, mines, jialisades, 
 and all sorts of obstacles, and by crowding them with men, and 
 sheltering the garrison with a great number of bomb-proofs. 
 
 In the rear and on each flank new field works and batteries could 
 be thrown up and armed ; while the interior preparations were in 
 progress, the former should bear upon the approaches to the redoubt, 
 and strengthen it by their fire. 
 
 It will be recollected that the flanks and gorge remain intact, and 
 that 12 feet of scarp, at least, remains on the faces throughout, and 
 there is, consequently, if the work has a large garrison, no probability 
 of the work being surprised^ a contingency that scarps are intended 
 especially to prevent ; hence an assault ought to be frustrated with 
 certainty, considering the time and means that have been disposable in 
 preparing for it. 
 
 As the redoubts I propose are the main feature of the line, I have 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 85 
 
 discussed them at much length ; the strength of the system, however, 
 depends, not so much on the individual strength of these works, but 
 on their acting in concert and harmony with the earthworks which 
 form the continuous barrier. 
 
 With regard to the efficacy of inclosed forts in strengthening a line 
 of field works, we have any amount of testimony from history. The 
 employment of strong redoubts and forts on the summits of all the 
 hills which formed salient portions of the lines of Buntzelwitz is an 
 example. The number and magnitude of the redoubts in the lines of 
 Torres Vedras, and their heavy armaments of cannon, show that Well- 
 ington placed great confidence in them. The vigorous defence of the 
 signal redoubts in the lines of the Nivelle, which did not surrender 
 till the open works had been forced, goes to show that with all the 
 disadvantages of a false position and incomplete communications, 
 these lines might have held out if they had been more frequently 
 garnished with similar works. 
 
 At the entrenched camp of Drissa, the main reliance was upon 
 redoubts, which were palisaded with care, and so placed that the 
 enemy could not force the general line by merely overrunning the in- 
 termediate entrenchments ; he was obliged to take two or three 
 redoubts ; a certainty which warranted the Russians in fortifying 
 these points as they did. 
 
 The efficacy of inclosed works was strongly exemplified at the battle 
 of Borodino, where the single redoubt of Chewardino, situated 2,000 
 yards in front of the line, on a hill, after being assaulted and taken 
 three times, was not securely possessed by the French, till 10 o'clock 
 at night, after a sanguinary struggle of sixteen hours. To gain this 
 point was of the highest importance in the eyes of Napoleon, who 
 designed to refuse his left, pushing his right forward. This single 
 redoubt therefore, (says M. De Sellon,) permitted the Russians to 
 dispute the decisive point for a whole day. In the same battle the 
 Russian left was protected by some works in advance of the heights 
 of Semenofskoi, and it is due to these, that this part of the line held 
 out as it did, for six hours, against the enormous masses which Ney 
 and Davoust had accumulated upon this point of attack, which was 
 subjected also to the fire of near four hundred pieces of artillery. 
 
 The great redoubt of Borodino was not taken till towards 3 o'clock 
 in the afternoon, after having cost the lives of several thousand 
 soldiers ; it was the resistance of this redoubt to the assaults of the 
 viceroy, that prevented the latter from effecting (as Napoleon intended,) 
 a break between the centre and left wing of the Russian army. 
 
 The small redoubt, on the British left at Inkerman, had a great 
 share in influencing the result of that battle, enabling the guards to 
 hold out till reinforcements arrived to their support, and these, like- 
 wise, resisted long enough to give the French an opportunity to 
 discover that the demonstration in the right was a feint, and to re- 
 pulse the enemy by their rapid movement, which attacked the Russians 
 in flank. 
 
 The French lines (the 2d line) before Sebastopol, exhibits almost the 
 identical arrangement of pentagonal redoubts, and curtains that I 
 propose to adopt; the location of the redoubts upon the advanced and 
 
86 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 elevated portions of the site, and the junction of them by nearly 
 straight lines of entrenchments, are features worthy of imitation. 
 
 In the advanced line of the Allies, reaching from Balaklava to 
 Inkerman, we also find redoubts occupying some of the most im- 
 portant points of the topography. 
 
 The consequences of relying upon open field works, that is, either 
 of continuous lines or lines with intervals, made up of elementary 
 works which are open behind, and which can consequently be turned 
 and rendered useless by an army who can gain a foothold in any 
 quarter of the line, are exemplified in the fate of the French lines at 
 Mayence, at Turin and at Maiplaquet. 
 
 The same causes led in each of these cases to the loss of the position; 
 they each exhibit a dissemination of the troops, rendered necessary 
 by the nature of the works, which require that every yard of parapet 
 shall be manned from one end to the other ; the consequent weakness 
 of the whole line at every point, and the inevitable yielding of the 
 thin rank of troops, guarding the points assailed by overwhelming 
 columns of the enemy, are seen in each instance ; this succession of 
 events is rapidly followed by the advance of the consolidated forces, 
 wlio have penetrated the line, upon the dei'ending troops who have 
 not had time to Ibrm, in order to meet an attack in the rear, which 
 completely spoils all previous plans for a successful resistance. * * * 
 
 Ninth. The entrenchments connecting the redoubts should be 
 deiended by a line of skirmishers only, to accord with the general 
 theory of the system ; they should not therefore be revetted lines, but 
 earthworks, thrown up on the anticipation of a descent on the island, 
 and strengthened by abattis and trous-de-loup on the slopes in front. 
 
 The ditch and parapet should run in a direct line, or a re-entering 
 angle, from one redoubt to the other, and in such a manner that the 
 reverse or inside of the latter could be enfiladed from the redoubts. 
 
 The position this curtain must occupy being known in advance, 
 there is a very cheap obstacle which might make the approach to the 
 line quife difficult. I allude to thorn hedges, which should be planted 
 as thickly as possible, where circumstances admit. 
 
 The curtains thus laid out and strengthened, would offer sufficient 
 impediment and sufficient cover for a line of skirmishers to oblige an 
 enemy, who might endeavor to pass them in preference to assaulting 
 the redoubts, to make his attack in heavy columns ; for any other 
 disposition ot his troops would be too weak to force the skirmisher* 
 to retire. 
 
 But the numbers and compactness of a column render it a mark 
 that is difficult to miss, and the columns of attack in question must 
 advance under a double or triple fire, both from the redoubts, which 
 open with artillery, (the nearest one with an effective musketry also) 
 and from the skirmishers in front, sustained by the reserve. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the probable losses would be excessive, 
 and would appear sufficient to frustrate the attempt to pass between the 
 redoubts; so that even the temporary field works recommended would 
 probably necessitate the siege of one or more of the latter ; should that 
 be found to be the case, the entire duty of the intermediate entrench- 
 ments, in the general scheme of defence, would be fully accomplishedj 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. « 7 
 
 and I think there woukl no longer be any doubt of the complete effi- 
 cacy of the system; for I have already shown that the redoubts are 
 proof against surprises or escalades, or attack by storm, preceded by 
 bombardments, and that consequently a siege is necessary to gain pos- 
 session of them. 
 
 But while the batteries, parallels, and approaches of an attack in 
 form are being constructed, there can be at least as many hands em- 
 ployed on this side of the lines in strengthening them, and throwing 
 up additional redoubts and batteries in rear of them, so that it may 
 safely be assumed that the new works will render the first line as 
 impregnable to a siege as it was at first to a precipitate attack. * * 
 Tenth. An easy and rapid communication from one wing to the other 
 is an essential requisite of a good system of lines ; the advantages of 
 it appear in many of the examples I have adduced, and the results of 
 a neglect of arrangements for this purpose, or of localities which 
 prevented such arrangements, are evident in others. 
 
 For instance, the lines of Buntzelwitz were thought to owe much 
 of their strength to the free communication, from one point to another, 
 afforded by a fine plain, which was adapted to the manoeuvres of all 
 arms of the service ; and the existence of a wood which concealed the 
 movements of the troops, in part from the enemy, was considered to 
 be an additional advantage. 
 
 The left of the lines of Torres Vedras was much strengthened by 
 being posted in advance of a good road, which ran for about ten miles 
 parallel to the fortifications. 
 
 According to Napier, Soult owed his defeat, at the lines of the 
 Nivelle, in a certain measure, to the want of roads or communications 
 of any kind along his position. 
 
 In the case of the Brooklyn lines, there should be a hard wide road 
 leading the whole length of them in their rear, and in addition to 
 the already existing plank and other roads, two or three roads might 
 on occasion, be improvised, leading from some central position in the 
 rear, where the resetrve would be posted; for besides parallel manoeuvres, 
 there should be every facility for the latter to march directly upon 
 either quarter of the line that might be menaced by the enemy, and 
 it can be shown, beyond doubt, that it is the judicious management of 
 the reserve which will constitute the safely of the system. 
 
 Some of the roads specified would have the great advantage of being 
 completely hidden from any views of the enemy, who must therefore 
 remain partly in ignorance of the movements of the reserve: while 
 on the contrary, every manoeuvre of the latter would be discovered, 
 from the parts of the lines situated on the summits of the hills which 
 overlook the country all the way to the sea shore. * * * * _ * . 
 
 Eleventh. Transmission of intelligence and orders: There is in 
 a fixed position, which is occupied long beforehand in expectation of 
 attack, every facility for making perfect arrangements for conveying, in- 
 stantly, information to the headquarters and to the posts interested, 
 of every movement of the enemy : and the rapidity and certainty 
 which a proper organization will impart to combined movements of 
 different divisions, are so valuable, that no pains should be spared to 
 insure them. 
 
88 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 The means usually resorted to have been the semaphore, and for 
 night use, rockets ; but in foggy weather both are rendered useless, 
 and the rockets are apt to be confounded with shells thrown by the 
 enemy, or the similar signals of the latter ; besides, rockets can only 
 be a very meagre reliance. 
 
 On these accounts it will be found worth while to establish an 
 electric telegraph along the line as a check on the former methods, 
 and even as a main reliance, for its scope is much greater than the 
 semaphore, which is limited to a set of preconcerted signals ; it is also 
 less liable to great errors. 
 
 Besides some semaphores there should, therefore, be telegraph wires 
 laid along the line, having stations in the redoubts; and similar lines 
 should run along the radial roads to the general headquarters at the 
 central position. They need not, of course, be established till the 
 necessity occurs. ******* 
 
 Twelfth. Convenient debouches should be arranged to permit the re- 
 serve to attack the enemy in turn, in case he should be repulsed so as 
 to warrant the attempt. ****** 
 
 T/mieenth, and lastly : Not only the construction of the lines should 
 be correctly planned, but the manner of defending them must be in 
 harmony with the nature of them. 
 
 The redoubts are proof against assaults, and consequently, against 
 the most violent siege ; for the trenches and batteries of the enemy 
 can be responded to by superior works thrown up by the garrison 
 during the siege ; there is however a remote jjossibility of an assault 
 giving the enemy a temporary footing on the curtains, which are, 
 from economy, of earthwork. Instead, therefore, of posting all the 
 troops, not required for the garrisons of the enclosed works, along the 
 curtains, the greatest solicitude should be to maintain a strong reserve, 
 which, being in constant communication with the line, by means of 
 signals, should continually manoeuvre so as to be opposite the main 
 point of attack. 
 
 Should the enemy break through the line between two redoubts, he 
 will have suffered greatly from the fire of the troops in the entrench- 
 ment, and likewise from the redoubts on each side while advancing to 
 it, removing or breaking down the abattis and other obstacles, and 
 climbing the ditch and parapet. On attaining the rear side of the 
 breastwork, he will find that its defenders have taken shelter behind 
 the redoubts on either side, and that they are firing upon his flanks 
 from their new position, which is reinforced, perhaps, by the gar- 
 risons of the adjoining lines of curtain. All the time the artillery 
 and musketry fire of the redoubts will continue, and the enemy must 
 experience considerable losses while amassing his troops to march 
 against the reserve, which will now be at hand, to take part, either 
 ofi'ensively or defensively, in the combat. 
 
 It might happen that the general in command might see an oppor- 
 tunity of sallying out beyond the line during the attack, and throwing 
 his whole force on the flank of the enemy. 
 
 I have .-aid enough, however, to make clear the general method 
 which alone would be suitable to the defence of such a line as I pro- 
 pose for the defence of New Yor k. 
 
DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 89 
 
 With this fundamental idea, the rest must depend, as in all battles, 
 on the time, place, and opportunity. No perfectly elaborated arrange- 
 ment can be followed out strictly, and as many battles have been won 
 by the inspiration of the moment as by preconcerted plans. * * * 
 
 This appears to be a proper place to allude to a plan for the defence 
 of Brooklyn, which resulted (some 15 years ago, I believe,) from the 
 conferences of a board of engineers. This plan, however, has never 
 been made jiublic, nor has it, to the best of my information and re- 
 search, ever been offered, officially, even to the Chief Engineer, much 
 less to the Secretary of War, or to Congress : hence the fact of such 
 a plan having been discussed does not conflict with my assertion in 
 the preface, that the government has never been warned of the danger 
 to New York from descents upon Long Island, and still less been pre- 
 sented with any plans for their prevention. 
 
 This plan I have not been able to find in any printed or written 
 documents, and have heard it stated differently by the officers who 
 have mentioned it. One account is that Brooklyn was to be isolated 
 from the rest of Long Island by a " chain of permanent redoubts," 
 extending from Willet's Point, along the hills, to Fort Hamilton, (a 
 distance of 21 miles,) to be connected, in time of war, by a line of 
 field works. Another account states that permanent redoubts are to 
 be used, but that they are not to constitute a line, but merely to 
 occupy the important points along the ridge in question. 
 
 Applying the principles elucid;'ted in the foregoing general discus- 
 sion on lines to these plans, the defects of the latter become manifest. 
 
 In the first place, however, let us inquire what sort of redoubts 
 would be used, and the answer may be guessed, if we observe the 
 nature of that one which lies at present at the right flank of the pro- 
 posed line. I refer, of course, to the redoubt of Fort Hamilton. 
 
 This redoubt is insignificant in size, being 32 yards square on the 
 outside. It has 8 guns in barbette, which take up about half the 
 room on its contracted terreplein, leaving space for perhaps 30 or 40 
 men, in two ranks, to fire in either direction. Its parapets are but 4 
 feet thick, and are of masonry, which a short cannonade would knock 
 down, leaving the terreplein open to a rifle fire, which would soon 
 clear it of its defenders. 
 
 If these redoubts are to be used merely as auxiliary defences, that 
 is, as strengthening particular important points, and are intended to 
 hold out only against an attempt at storming, they will be less objec- 
 tionable than in any other point of view ; but they are too small to 
 hold a garrison whose fire shall be of any hindrance to the passage of 
 a strong column in their vicinity — an inconvenience which might also 
 be avoided by the enemy, as they would be very far apart ; and if 
 subjected to a cannonade they must certainly fall. 
 
 Besides, this hypothesis involves necessarily that of an active defence 
 of the position by an army in the field, and I have already shown that 
 all defensive plans which rest on the basis of an army of militia must 
 calculate to place the latter behind entrenchments of some kind, so as 
 to neutralize the immense advantage which veteran troops have over 
 them, if they have a chance to manoeuvre against them in the field. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the redoubts were intended to strengthen a 
 
90 DANGEES AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 continuous line of field works, the plan of the hoard appears in a still 
 worse light ; for how can a line of 21 miles in extent, open to attack 
 at all points, he defended by any number of works of this weak de- 
 scription? 
 
 It must he recollected that the plan under discussion was proposed 
 hefore the invention of the Minie rifie, or rifie musket, and hence the 
 redoubts must have been calculated to occupy intervals of 600 yards 
 at the maximum ; this involves the construction of over 60 redoubts ; 
 (a number that will appear great when compared with the 15 or 17 
 redoubts of my plan ;) now, if made strong, each of these redoubts 
 would want a large garrison, and an entire army of 50,000 or 60,000 
 men would be required to hold them all, without counting the 100,000 
 men or more that would be needed to garrison the line of field works 
 and furnish a reserve ; if the redoubts were, on the contrary, intended 
 to be of the same size, and to have an equal garrison with the one at 
 Fort Hamilton, then the line would certainly be broken through by 
 a determined assault, or by several simultaneous assaults, which, on 
 so long a line would prevent any relief being sent from one wing to 
 the other. 
 
 I hardly think, however, that any officer will be found to advocate 
 the plan just criticised ; for, if any should satisfy himself that a Jine 
 21 miles long could be defended by either system of redoubts and 
 entrenchments that could have been meant by the board, he must at 
 least concede that a line 14 miles long is much easier guarded ; and 
 that when the latter is so located that only 6 miles of it can be attacked 
 at a time, and arranged to correspond with a defence by the new rifle 
 musket, it may be regarded as impassable, and a hundred fold superior 
 to that of the board. 
 
 Finally^ the west half of the site that was proposed for this line, 
 by the board, is now laid out in streets, built up, occupied by ceme- 
 teries and reservoirs, or otherwise appropriated for other purposes 
 than military ones. 
 
CHAPTEK VI. 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE MEMOIR. 
 
 It is the intrinsic military advantages as a defensive position, of the 
 line I propose to fortif}'', that render the defence of Brooklyn feasible, 
 and these advantages are independent, in a great measure, of the 
 system according to which the works are projected. 
 
 I, therefore, invite particular attention to the following comprehen- 
 sive tableau of the line, in which its grand properties, extent, and 
 merits are set forth, disembarrassed of minutiae of topography, and 
 not confused by reference to the means or mode of its defence. 
 
 1. The line extends from the head of Flushiug bay to Fort Hamil- 
 ton. It thus isolates Brooklyn from any point of Long Island where 
 an expedition can land ; for no fleet can pass the forts on the East 
 river, and these are below Flushing bay ; nor can a fleet pass the 
 batteries on the Narrows where Fort Hamilton is situated. 
 
 2. The line is 15 miles in extent, involving the fortification of a 
 length of 144" miles, and comprises three grand divisions of nearly 
 equal length. 
 
 The first division is of 6 miles, and runs from Fort Hamilton, 
 east, to Jamaica bay. This division fronts towards Gravesend bay 
 and Coney Island. 
 
 The second division borders the marshes of Jamaica bay, running 
 northeast for 4 miles, and opposes any landing on this shore. 
 
 The third division is 5 miles long ; it runs north from the shores 
 of Jamaica bay to the head of Flushing bay, and stands in the way 
 of any approach from any point on the Sound or Atlantic shores of 
 Long Island. 
 
 3. The principal merit of this line, which renders its defence a 
 matter of certainty, and which follows from the fact that each of these 
 three divisions rests both flanks upon the water, is, that whatever 
 part of Long Island an expedition might land at, the latter would be 
 checked in its advance by a single division of the line, and would be 
 restricted to the attack of this one. 
 
 In other words the three divisions are isolated from each other, and 
 it is impossible to march around the exterior of the line from one 
 division to another. 
 
 This extraordinary natural property of the line has this inestimable 
 consequence ; that althoucjh the line is 15 miles long, only 5 miles of 
 it, or 6 miles at most, will ever need to be defended at a time. The 
 entire force behind the lines can therefore be concentrated upon either 
 division the moment that the news of the debarkation of a foreign 
 force upon the island is telegraphed to Brooklyn. ***** 
 
 A similar condensed description of my plan for fortifying this line, 
 and a brief exposition of its advantages, are as follows : 
 
 1. The two divisions facing the south and east to be made the 
 
92 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 
 
 strongest, because they are the longest, and liable to regular land 
 attacks, aided by artillery. 
 
 The division fronting on Jamaica bay to be calculated to resist 
 gunboat attacks, and a debarkation within effective cannon range. 
 
 2. The fortifications on each division to be an uninterrupted line of 
 earthwork entrenchments, but with arrangements for sorties, and 
 flanked and otherwise supported, at distances of 1,400 yards, by 
 detached redoubts with masonry scarps, which shall be impregnable 
 against any assaults or attempts at storming. 
 
 3. The heavy artillery to be placed in the forts, where it shall 
 sweep all the country in front, and take in flank an enemy marching 
 to the assault of the lines of earthwork between the forts. 
 
 The light artillery to be placed, on the day of battle, wherever it 
 may seem that it is most wanted, behind the earthworks. 
 
 The defending army to be stationed so as to form two ranks for the 
 entire length of the earthworks, and to furnish the forts with garri- 
 sons of 2,000 men each : the remainder of the troops to form a reserve 
 to march to the assistance of the point most violently attacked. 
 
 4. Estimates. — Thus posted an army of 50,000 men would defend 
 Brooklyn against any army that could be brought against it ; 20,000 
 men would guard the earthworks, and 15,000 would hold the forts, 
 while there would be left a reserve of 15,000 to aid in the defence at 
 the decisive point of attack. 
 
 It will be seen that the above calculation provides for the defence 
 of only 6 miles in length, or of only a single division, though the 
 largest of the line ; but it will be recollected that only one division 
 can be attacked at a time. No general would split an army, however 
 large, to land half of it to the east and half of it to the west of the 
 lines ; to divide an army into isolated corps, without concert or com- 
 munications of any sort, in order to attack a consolidated enemy, would 
 be a gross military blun;;er. 
 
 It is true that a gunboat attack upon the centre division might 
 take place simultaneously with the assault on the division on the 
 right or left, and in view of that, the estimate for the garrison of the 
 lines may be increased by 5,000 men, and to guard against all pos- 
 sible attempts on the remaining division which might take place as 
 diversions to distract the defence, we will allow for the remaining 
 division a garrison of one-third the full quota, say 10,000 men, which 
 may be regarded as constituting a second reserve. The total number 
 of troops that can ever be required to man the lines, allowing for a 
 reserve of 25,000 men, is, therefore, 65,000. This number of troops 
 can be furnished at a few days' notice, and fully armed and equipped, 
 from the city and State of New York alone ; and I believe that they 
 are equally well suited to defend the above projected works as the 
 works themselves are to the defensive position which I indicate. 
 
 To utilize the valour and marksmanship of our militia, their general 
 should place them so that each man's duty will be simply to defend 
 his post ; in this way the advantage that foreign armies would other- 
 wise enjoy, that of outmanoeuvring our troops in the field, would be 
 neutralized. 
 
 This has been my leading principle in selecting the defensive posi- 
 
\ 
 
 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 93 
 
 tion, and in deciding on the nature of the works which should render 
 it impregnable. 
 
 It is this principle also which renders absurd the lines of detached 
 redoubts, proposed by some engineers, to extend from Fort Hamilton 
 to Willet's Point ; and doubly absurd the scientific ''rule and com- 
 pass" arguments of others, who prove that no attack will ever take 
 place on Brooklyn, because, they say, the enemy's rear, flank, or com- 
 munications, might be cut off should he attempt one. 
 
 I regard it as an important advantage of the proposed lines, that, 
 being convenient of access to the city, the redoubts can be made the 
 rendezvous of militia and volunteer regiments and companies, for the 
 purposes of drilling and target-firing. 
 
 Let each regiment have its station assigned to it in the line, per- 
 manently, so that in practicing and marching, in and to that vicinity, 
 it may become acquainted with the face of the country, the roads, and 
 the ranges at which artillery and musketry will begin to be efiective 
 from the particular redoubt, to which it belongs. 
 
 The redoubts would, I believe, be accepted by the New York regi- 
 ments with pleasure, if offered to them to use as armories, and store- 
 houses, and places of rendezvous ; and the government would, by such 
 an arrangement, have the works taken care of free of charge. 
 
 The lines would in this manner be, very probably, made a popular 
 resort for pleasure excursions, and as a pleasant drive, and so form an 
 additional attraction in the vicinity of the city. 
 
 It would be premature, in this memoir, to present any estimate of 
 the cost of such a line of fortification as I propose ; but I must, at any 
 rate, anticipate the possible objection that its expense would be out 
 of proportion to its value to New York. 
 
 The line can, in fact, bo constructed with extraordinary economy. 
 The land which must be bought for the sites of the redoubts will not 
 cost much, for no part of the line is located in built districts, or within 
 the corporate limits of Brooklyn, or even upon valuable farm land ; 
 on the contrary, the plats of ground which the government will 
 require, lie either on bare and stony or wooded hill tops, or on sandy 
 and cheap cultivated ground, or on meadows and marshes. 
 
 As to the building of the redoubts, I respectfully propose that the 
 City of New York should take the contract for the entire work, and 
 that it shall use in the execution of it the forced labor of all the con- 
 victs in its City prisons. 
 
 If this arrangement were adopted, the City would be benefited by 
 having the expenses of its convicts paid by the federal government, 
 while the latter would get its work done at an absolute minimum of 
 expense : seeing that the cost of it would amount to no more than the 
 bare wholesale value of the materials, and the actual expense of board- 
 ing and lodging the masons and laborers ; the profits of the workmen 
 being in this case lost by them, and paid by neither party of the? 
 contract. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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