HI Ktt wtiSM ! -v ' ill KfiHl 111 IT ■ uHLT II HmSm Oass_ PRESENTED BY THE CONNECTION OF NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO ILLUSTRATE THE EVIDENCES AND DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY BY THEIR RELATION TO THE INDUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. NOTES AND AUTHORITIES COLLECTED FROM THE MOST EMINENT ANCIENT AND MODERN WRITERS. By EDWARD WILLIAM GRINFIELD, M.A. MINISTER OF LAURA CHAPEL, BATH. Arena non sine calce. LONDON: PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DA VIES, IN THE STRAND. 1818. Gift. 1G'D J 04 Printed by A. Strahan, Printers-Street, London. " The principle in which this branch of logic hath Its foundation, is a native bent, and propensity of the mind, strengthened by experience, and confirmed by habit, from which we are involuntarily led to expect that nature and truth are uniform and analogous through- out the whole universe ; that similar causes of whatever kind, will in similar circumstances at all times produce similar effects ; or if the causes cannot be known, that similar effects, will explain, illustrate, and account for similar effects. This principle, then, resolves itself into similitude ; and reason acts upon it, as in all other cases, by comparing and judging. Thus we argue from truths which have been proved by direct reason, or which are obvious to simple apprehension, to others which are similar in cause or effect ; and if upon com- paring and judging, the principle will bear us out, we conclude the latter to be true: a conclusion which will supply us with a kind and degree of truth sufficient for most of the uses and purposes of human life. " This method of reasoning is analogy, which accord- ing to Quintilian, c is to refer a thing that is doubtful to something similar and different, that uncertainties may derive their proof from certainties.' " Taiham's Chart and Scale of Truth, " The probability of most things, and the possibility of all things contained in the Scriptures, may well be discerned by reason itself, which makes their existence the more easy to be believed." Baxter's Saints' Rest, Part ii. Ch. iii. A 2 The Library of Congress WASHINGTON CONTENTS. PART THE FIRST. THE CREDIBILITIES OF REVELATION IN GENERAL. Introduction. — The object of the work stated. Its connection with the inductive philosophy of the hu- man mind. The origin and foundation of natural theology. To whom the work is addressed. The argument stated. The cautions which are necessary to estimate this kind of evidence. The obligations of the author to Reid and Butler. » Page xxi Sect. I. — Is not a Revelation possible? Does it imply any contradiction ? Does not every possibility admit of being proved by evidence ? - - I Sect. II. — Is not a Revelation desirable, if it can be proved? Does any one object that we have too much light under the Christian Revelation? May not the extreme desirableness of a Revelation be esteemed as some glimpse of its probability ? - 4 Sect. Ill Is not the teachable nature of man a pre- sumption in favour of a Divine Revelation ? Do not a 3 VI we acquire most of our knowledge from others ? Is not some portion of communicated instruction neces- sary to awaken our faculties? Is not our natural assent to testimony a symptom in favour of an histo- rical Revelation? - - Page 1 ] Sect. IV. — Upon what kind of evidence must a Reve- lation depend? Are not miracles essential to its proof? Must it not also accord with our moral sen- timents? - - - 10 Sect. V. — Is it not probable that a Revelation would, upon the whole, agree with the circumstances of man- kind? Would it not appear congenial to our under- standings, and suitable to our external conditions, by being adapted to a state of trial and discipline ? 13 Sect. VI. — Is it not probable there was some Re- velation at the first creation of man ? Do not the circumstances of a new creation seem to require it ? Is it consistent with our natural sentiments of God that he should create man and leave him in total igno- rance of his duty? - - 19 Sect. VII. — Would God have created man otherwise than innocent? Would he not have been the author of evil if he had created man in his present condition? - - 25 Sect. VIIL — Does not the possibility of the fall neces- sarily arise out of man's free agency ? Are not all free agents liable, to similar abuses ? Is this any argument against the creation of free agents ? - 28 Sect. IX. — Do not the contradictions which subsist in our nature between reason and passion intimate some derangement in our moral faculties ? Gould an inno- cent being feel sentiments of shame, remorse, and repentance? 32 Vll Sect. X. — Does not the doctrine of the fall derive some credibility from the opposition which subsists between the wishes and the circumstances of mankind ? Would God have originally made mankind dissa- tisfied with their situations ? Are not these symp- toms of our being in a degraded condition ? Page 35 Sect. XI. — Is not the doctrine of the fall rendered probable from the numerous external ills to which we are exposed? Would God have exposed innocent beings to sickness, pains, disappointments, &c. ? Do not all nations acknowledge their guilt by their cries and confessions ? - 38 Sect. XII. — Are not the hereditary consequences of the fall in unison with our common observations of nature ? Are not children dependent on the conduct of their parents, and subjects on that of their rulers ? Is not infamy and reputation in some degree here- ditary ? Does not this arise out of the nature of a race? - - - 41 Sect. XIII. — Is it not probable there are other intel- ligent creatures in the universe besides man ? Is not this rendered credible by the discoveries of modern astronomy ? Is it not probable that some of these beings are evil and others good ? Have not all na- tions held these opinions ? - 46' Sect. XIV. — Is it not possible that some evil beings may have tempted man to disobey his maker ? Are not superior talents often perverted to the purposes of allurement to vice ? Would not the consequences be very tremendous of introducing evil into an innocent nature? - - - 49 Sect. XV. — Is it not probable that man, upon his first a 4 Vlll creation, might be allowed to hold converse with superior beings ? Does not a state of solitude seem to demand such intercourse ? Might it not be requi- site to bring him into a state of moral trial ? Page 52 Sect. XVI. — What is the present character and situ- ation of man ? Is he not a mixed and intermediate being, partly good and partly evil ? Does not the world accord with this confusion, exhibiting marks both of happiness and misery? Does not hope on the whole predominate ? - - 55 Sect. XVII. — Might not man entertain some expect- ations of pardon on repentance ? Does he wear the appearance of a hopeless outcast? Are not there many symptoms of mercy in his providential treat- ment? - - - 58 Sect. XVIII. — Does it not seem probable that some extraordinary assistance would be granted to aid man in his moral difficulties ? Might not this have been hoped from our natural sentiments of the Deity ? 62 Sect. XIX. — In what manner does it seem probable that a Revelation would be made known to us? Would it not be conveyed by impressing us with the sense of our guilt, and with the hopes of par- don on repentance? To impress these sentiments, would it not institute a sacrificial form of worship ? Would it not also republish the original moral code? - 65 Sect. XX. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not enforce the unity and personality of the Divine Being? Would not this become expedient from the universal prevalence of idolatry ? 68 Sect. XXI. — On the supposition of any Revelation, IX was it not probable that some new relations of the Deity would be discovered to us? Is not this ex- tremely credible from our ignorance of the divine nature ? - - - Page 7 1 Sect. XXII. — Is not the Deity made known to us in natural theology, chiefly after a relative and analo- gical manner ? Are not all his titles as Father, Governor, &c. borrowed from earthly objects, and transferred to the Divine Being ? Are not our con- ceptions of his moral attributes gathered from re- flecting on our own minds, and afterwards transferred to the Divine Intellect? 73 Sect. XXIII. — On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would be published by some extraordinary character ? Would there not be con- siderable reason to doubt whether any dependent creature would be equal to the task ? - 76 Sect. XXIV. — On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that the example of its founder would be held up as a leading evidence of its truth, and a great medium of its utility ? - 79 Sect. XXV. — On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would contain some doctrines relative to a sacrifice and atonement for our sins ? Would it have been adapted to human wants, if it had been deficient in these doctrines ? 82 Sect. XXVI. — Is not the belief of spiritual aid im- plied in natural as well as in revealed theology ? Is it not implied in all prayers ? Does it not arise out of the belief of a Providence ? Do not the philoso- phers of antiquity assert it ? - 85 Sect. XXVII. — On the supposition of any Revelation, - is it not probable that it would confirm our natural sen- timents respecting the immortality of the soul ? Was not there great want of such confirmation ? Page 88 Sect. XXVIII. — On the supposition of any Reve- lation, is it not probable that it would be sanctioned by the doctrines of eternal rewards and punishments ? Does not this probability arise out of the connection of revelation with an unchangeable state of existence ? Could the obedience of mankind have been secured without this doctrine ? - - 90 Sect. XXIX. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not in all probability contain some doctrines beyond the reach of our natural faculties ? Would any religion devoid of mysteries be suited to the na- ture of man ? - 95 Sect. XXX. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not probably contain some positive institu- tions ? Is a merely spiritual religion suited to human nature? - 9S Sect. XXXI. — Is it not equally unphilosophical in na- tural and revealed theology to argue on supposition, instead of enquiring into facts ? When the truth of a Revelation has been ascertained, should we not yield to its authority ? - - 101 Sect. XXXII. — Are not the evidences both of natural and revealed theology ultimately dependent on our belief in the Divine veracity ? Is not this species of faith universally necessary in all evidence ? - 105 Sect. XXXIII. — Is not a Revelation delivered in an historical form, and with the sanction of a divine law, necessarily more clear and intelligible than an abstract religion ? Is not this a proof of its suitability to the XI nature of man, and therefore a presumptive argument in its favour ? - - Page 108 Sect. XXXIV. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not probably be intended for the benefit of all mankind ? Does not this arise out of our senti- ments respecting the Divine attributes ? - 111 Sect. XXXV. — On the supposition of any Revelation, is it likely that it would meet with universal success ? Would not this show that its evidences were irresist- ible ? - - - 114 Sect. XXXVI. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not leave room for the exercise of moral candour in judging of its doctrines and evidences? Is not this one great end of a Revelation ? 1 1 7 Sect. XXXVII. — On the supposition of any Reve- lation, would it not be particularly adapted to the circumstances of the poor ? Are not they most in need of such extraordinary assistance ? 119 Sect. XXXVIII. — On the supposition of any Reve- lation, would it not probably acquire the assent of the majority of the learned ? Would not this distin- guish it from the popular belief of Pagan supersti- tions? 121 Sect. XXXIX. — On the supposition of any Reve- lation, is it not probable that it would be gradual and progressive rather than sudden and instantaneous ? Is not this most suitable to the order of the warld arid to the nature of man ? - 123 Sect. XL. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would not its permanence and continuance become one of the distinguishing marks of its truth ? Are not all impostures transient and mutable ? 126 Xll Sect. XLI. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not probably become the chief medium of diffusing knowledge, civilization, and happiness amongst mankind ? Does not this probability arise out of its presumed connection with the human mind and with natural religion ? - Page 129 Sect. XLII. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not be supported by men of the greatest pro- bity and virtue ? Would not the moral characters of its opponents become an argument in its favour? 132 Sect. XLIII. — On the supposition of any true Reve- lation, would it not in all probability be clearly dis- tinguishable from those which were false and spurious ? Would not this manifest superiority become a pre- sumptive argument in its favour? - - 135 Sect. XLIV. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not probably be calculated to exalt the mercy of God, and to humble the pride of man ? Would any religion devoid of these tendencies have been suited to the human mind ? - - 138 Sect. XLV. — On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not probably become the great instrument of diffusing the theory and practice of natural reli- gion ? - 140 Sect. XLVI. — On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would be the final cause of creation ? Is not such a moral and religious dispen- sation the noblest project which can fill our concep- tions? - - -143 Recapitulation of the foregoing presumptions. Their mutual agreement and consistence exemplified. 146 Xlll A Table of References, by which the force and connec- tion of the evidences of the First Part may be ascer- tained, - - - - 151 A Table of the coincidences and connections between the First and Second Parts of this work, - 154 PART THE SECOND. THE CREDIBILITIES OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION. Introductory remarks. — The connection with the former part stated. The progressive nature of the evidence. - Page 157 Sect. I. — Is it not possible that the Christian Revela- lation may be true ? Is not this possibility conceded by all its adversaries ? - - 168 Sect. II. — Is it not desirable that the Christian Reve- lation should be true ? Does not its extreme desir- ableness, connected with its possibility, require us to examine into its evidences ? - - 170 Sect. III. — Do not the Scriptural accounts of Reve« lation accord with the teachable state of our faculties? Does not its probable truth on this account entitk it to a candid examination ? - - ] 72 Sect. IV. — Is it any objection to the Christian Reve- lation that it professes to be founded on the evidence of miracles ? Is not this the only external evidence on which a Revelation could be founded? 176 XIV Sect. V. — Does not the Christian Revelation accord in many important particulars with the circumstances of mankind ? Is not its morality the same as that which reason approves ? Does it not appeal to our hopes- and apprehensions? Is it not addressed to the hearts and understandings of mankind ? Has it not advanced the temporal happiness of our species? Page 180 Sect. VI. — Is it not to this Revelation that we owe our settled opinion respecting the creation of the world ? Did not all the antients assert the eternity of mat- ter? . - - - 187 Sect. VII. — Is there not some credibility derived to Christianity from its connection with an account of our creation in a state of innocence ? Is not this the only just foundation for the moral attributes of God ? 190 Sect.' VIII. — Is there not some credibility derived to Christianity from its connection with an account of our fall from a state of innocence ? Does not this accord with the present state of mankind, and with our feelings of guilt and self-condemnation? 193 Sect. IX. — Is not man described faithfully by Chris- tianity ? Does not its delineations of human nature agree with those of moralists and experience ? 196 Sect. X. — Is not the present state of man and his con- dition in the world suited to such a religion as the Christian ? Are not our faculties and external situation adapted to our advancement in this religion ? 199 Sect. XI Is not the unity of God the leading article of revealed as well as of natural theology ? Has it not been the chief medium of diffusing the belief of this doctrine? - 205 XV Sect. XII. — Is there not a universal agreement in natural and revealed theology, respecting the Divine attributes ? Is there any new and perfectly original attribute brought forward by the Scriptures? Page 208 Sect. XIII. — Is it any objection to Christianity, that itunfolds to us some new views of the Divine nature? Were not discoveries of this kind to have been expect- ed in any Revelation of God to man ? 211 Sect. XIV. — Is not the Deity made known to us in revealed religion chiefly after a relative and analo- gical manner? Are not all the offices of Christ, drawn from relations amongst ourselves, and then transferred to the author of Christianity ? 214 Sect. XV. — Does not Christianity derive some credi- bility from its appointment of a mediator between God and man ? Could any Revelation have been suited to our wants which had not such an appoint- ment? - - - - - 217 Sect. XVI. — Does not the mediatorial office of Christ, as exhibited in the Scriptures, correspond with the most rational views which can be entertained con- cerning this character? Is not the conjunction,,. of the Divine with the human nature precisely what that character appears to demand ? - - 221 Sect* XVII. — Is not the miraculous birth of Christ, as stated in the Scriptures, analagous in some degree to the miracle which must have originally been wrought at the first creation of man ? - 223 Sect. XVIII. — Does not Christianity derives ome credi- XVI bility from the singular character of its founder ? Could such a wonderful character have been invented ? 228 Sect. XIX, — Is it not a presumptive argument in favour of Christianity that it professes to instruct mankind by the example of its founder? Is not this method of all others the most suited to human nature? - Page 23 1 Sect. XX. — Does not Christianity acquire some cre- dibility from its proposing an atonement for our sins? Would any Revelation have been suited to mankind which did not hold out some atonement ? 234 Sect. XXI. — Ts not the doctrine of spiritual assistance, as contained in the Scriptures, on the whole, congenial to the sentiments of reason ? Does it not chiefly differ from natural theology in the channel by which this influence is derived? 238 Sect. XXII. — - Is there not some connection between the sufferings of Christ, and that principle by which adversity is the school of moral excellence? Are not there strong moral reasons for his appearing in a suffering, rather than a triumphant character ? 241 Sect. XXIII. — Does not the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body confirm our natural sen- timents concerning the immortality of the soul ? Is not this the only hypothesis on which we can found our hopes of existing hereafter as the same beings ? 247 Sect. XXIV. — Are not the Christian doctrines re- specting the day of judgment, and of eternal rewards and punishments, in close alliance with the suggestions of natural theology ? Are not they the same doc- trines more clearly and accurately detailed ? 252 XV11 Sect. XXV. — Does not Christianity derive some cre- dibility from its doctrine respecting the future de- struction of the world ? Is it likely that the race of mankind will be indefinitely multiplied ? Page 255 Sect. XXVI. — : Are the mysteries of Christianity any argument against its credibility ? Are not they all made subservient to moral instruction ? - 258 Sect. XXVII. — Are the positive institutions of Chris- tianity any argument against its credibility ? Are not they few, simple, and affecting? - 261 Sect. XXVIII. — Is not the system of Christianity de- livered like that of nature as dependent on the will and power of God ? Are we not bound to enquire iuto facts as they are ? 264 Sect. XXIX.— Is not the evidence of Christianity the most powerful and comprehensive which can be ad- dressed to the human mind ? Does it not combine the abstract reasonings of natural theology with the historical facts of a traditional religion ? 26? Sect. XXX. — Are not the peculiar evidences of Chris- tianity the strongest confirmations of natural the- ology ? Do not miracles demonstrate the personality of the Deity, and prophecies evincehis providence? 269 Sect. XXXI. — Has not Christianity all the essentials of a universal religion ? May we not infer from its past effects that it was intended for the benefit of the ■ whole human race ? - - -271 Sect. XXXII. — Does not. Christianity profess to be a Revelation designed for the benefit of the whole world ? Is there any other religion which makes the same profession ? - - • 276 XV1I1 Sect. XXXIII. — Are the divisions or the vices of Chris- tians any argument against the truth of our reli- gion ? Does not its liability to abuse naturally arise out of man's free agency ? - Page 2*J9 Sect. XXXIV.— Is it not a strong presumption in favour of Christianity, that it is adapted to the capa- cities of the poor? Does not this peculiarity distinguish it from all philosophic systems of morality ? 283 Sect. XXXV. — Is it not a presumption in favour of Christianity, that its truth has been admitted by the majority of the learned ? Does not this distinguish it from all the popular superstitions of antiquity ? 286 Sect. XXXVI. — Does not Christianity derive some credibility from its gradual and progressive advance- ment ? Could it have possessed the same body of rational evidence if it had been suddenly or super- naturally diffused ? - 289 Sect. XXXVII. — Does not Christianity derive some credibility from its permanence and continuance in the world ? Judging from past experience, is not the cause of infidelity hopeless ? - - 295 Sect. XXXVIII. — Is there not some credibility de- rived to Christianity from its past and present influ- ence on human happiness ? Is it not hence, the most likely method to diffuse civilization throughout the world? - - - - 298 Sect. XXXIX. — Does not Christianity derive some credibility from the impieties and contradictions of its adversaries ? Do not their lives generally cor- respond to the licentiousness of their writings ? 302 Sect. XL.— Does not Christianity derive some credi- XIX bility from being the only Revelation which can by any possibility be true ? Will any reasonable man be- lieve in Mahometanism, who rejects Christianity ? Page 308 Sect. XLI. — Is not the Scripture doctrine that we are saved by the free mercy of God strictly in unison with the suggestions of enlightened reason ? Would not the contrary doctrine be subversive of natural theology ? - - - 310 Sect. XLII. — Does not Christianity acquire some cre- dibility from the acknowledged superiority of our modern system of natural religion ? Is it not at least possible that this superiority may have been derived from Revelation •* - - 313 Sect. XLIII. — Is there not some credibility derived to Christianity from the admissions and eulogiums of its adversaries? - - - 316 Sect. XLIV. — Are not the political circumstances of the Jews a presumptive evidence in favor of Chris- tianity ? - 324 Sect. XLV. — Does not Christianity derive some credi- bility from the superiority of its moral incentives ? 327 Sect. XLVL— If the founder of Christianity had not been divine, would not this religion have naturally tended to lead men into idolatry ? Would not our gratitude have led us to worship a being who died for the sins of the whole world ? 333 Sect. XLVIL — Is there not some credibility derived to Christianity from its aspiring to be the final cause of the creation ? - - - -337 Conclusion. — The amount and consistency of the evidence, - - - - 348 a 2 XX A Table of the Coincidences and Connections of the Presumptive Arguments which are contained in the Second Part, - - Page 346 A Table showing the Coincidences and Connections between the Second and the First Parts of the Work, 349 Notes and Illustrations, - - 353 Appendix, - 529 A List of the Principal Authors which are referred to in the Notes and Illustrations. - 571 INTRODUCTION. It is the object of the following work to exhibit a popular view of what may be termed the Intellectual evidence of the Christian Revelation. Its direct and histo- rical evidence has been so amply unfolded, and been laid, before the public in such a variety of forms, that it would seem to be almost a hopeless attempt to throw any fur- ther light upon this subject. Nor have those internal proofs of our religion which arise from the excellency of its doctrines been by any means overlooked or forgotten. But it is still a desideratum to possess a manual of those evidences which connect it more immediately with the philosophy of the human mind, which point out its relation to the various faculties of man, to the order and constitution of the world ; and which may thus demonstrate its pre* a 3 XX11 sumptive truth, from its alliance with our intellectual powers and with the moral laws of nature. Though much of this kind of reasoning is to be found scattered in the works of our English divines, yet little has hitherto been attempted in the way of a regular and systematic arrangement of this species of evidence. What may be termed the Phi- losophy of Christianity, has accordingly been but little cultivated, though the philosophic principles of the arts and sciences have been developed with considerable success. Thus Professor Campbell has pointed out the connection of rhetoric with the various principles of our nature, whilst Adam Smith has presented the world with an ad- mirable specimen of the same kind of rea- soning, in his history of astronomy and of the ancient physics. For as the general principles of all sciences have their found- ation in the constitution of our minds, so in a particular degree must this be true in those sciences which are more immediately related to our moral faculties. If it be a fact that any Revelation has been given by 15 XXlll God to man, it must have been given through the intervention of our reason ; not only its evidences, but its doctrines must bear some proportion and correspond- ence to our intellectual faculties. Hence it will become not merely an interesting, but an important subject of enquiry, to ascertain, as far as we are able, the nature, and extent of this connection. Perhaps, however, the reason why this department of theology has hitherto been so little cultivated, may be traced to the very obscure and imperfect manner in which the philosophy of the human mind was studied, till Dr. Reid had established it on the foundation of inductive science. Even now the name of metaphysics is esteemed by many as synonymous with all that is dark, uncertain, and mystical : they con- found the ontological subtilties of the schoolmen with the plain phenomena of self-observation, and will not be persuaded to think that there is no more connection between a faithful history of the mind, and the imaginary speculations of antiquity, than between the experimental philosophy a 4 XXIV of Newton and the gratuitous hypotheses of Des Cartes. * When we appeal to the internal prin- ciples of our nature, we appeal to them as facts and phenomena of which every man is conscious ; we do not attempt to explain them as causes but to exhibit them as facts. Upon these fundamental principles, all truth and all evidence must depend. We can be assured of the truth of Revelation through no other channels than those through which we derive our ordinary knowledge ; and in proportion as we can trace out this connection between faith and reason, we shall enjoy a clear and philoso- phic perception of the credibility of Re- vealed Religion. By this method we shall also be enabled to determine the question which has so long been agitated respecting the import and origin of Natural Religion. For if the doctrines of Revelation have a connection with the principles of the human mind, * See an eloquent apology for this branch of science in Stewart's Philosophical Essays, ch. 1.&2. Also a masterly review of the same work in Bo^mdler's Selec. Pieces, vol.ii. XXV they must in some measure be natural, as well as revealed ; they are not to be regarded as arbitrary appointments, but as possessing a real foundation in the nature and constitution of man. Yet if this be true of the peculiar doctrines of Revelation, it must apply with still greater force to those duties that are founded on the obligations which a creature owes to his Creator and Preserver. To at- tempt to resolve our whole perception of such obligations into mere tradition and acts of memory, is evidently to misrepre- sent the state and condition of our minds. But on the other hand, it is equally un- reasonable to deny that man was originally instructed by his Maker in his religious duties ; for it is contrary both to history and to reason to imagine that an intelligent creature should have been left at his first creation, in total ignorance of those obli- gations which are due to the Author of his being. Upon the principles of sober theism, as well as of Christianity, therefore, the truth of a first revelation should be admitted. But when such an original Revelation is allowed, it is impossible to XXVI ascertain the exact force of its influence upon succeeding generations. It is pro« bable that it would have some effect even upon the most barbarous and unenlight- ened; yet this effect, be it more or less, would operate through the principles of reason and conscience, and should never be viewed as a barren historical tradition, but as a moral force acting in concert and combination with our rational and intel- lectual powers. Although this appears to be the most just and philosophical account which can be given of the origin and foundation of Na- tural Theology, yet it is not essential to our argument that either this or any other theory should be here admitted. The question is here taken up simply as a matter of fact, that whether Christianity be true or false as a Divine Revelation, it has numerous correspondences with reason and nature; that there are plain and manifest tokens in it of likeness and resemblance to our moral treatment; and that even a great part of the difficulties and the apparent objections which are to be found in the one, will also XXV 11 upon examination, either equally or par- tially apply to the other. Now this, being a matter of fact, is to be shown by comparison and illustrated by evidence. It depends upon an induction of numerous particulars which are brought forward to substantiate a general propo- sition. Whether you believe with Clarke and Wollaston that the native faculties of reason are, in some degree, able to make out these moral deductions ; or whether you agree with Ellis and Leland in suppos- ing them to be derived entirely from an early Revelation ; still, it being a fact ac- knowledged by all parties, that such deduc- tions are now approved by our understand- ings, it becomes of great importance to ascertain the nature and extent of this harmony between Natural and Revealed Theology. Without pledging any man therefore to a particular theory as to the origin of Na- tural Theology, this term is here used in its most general and comprehensive accep- tation, as comprising all those marks of wisdom and design which may be recog- xxvin nized by the faculties of man, in the human character, or in the works of creation. Though some may be of opinion that neither these marks of wisdom and design, nor the duties which result from them would have been discoverable without the aid of a Divine Revelation, whilst others may be disposed to attribute something more to the native powers of the mind ; yet this difference of sentiment can have no effect whatever upon the general force of our argument. It is equally true that reason approves of these deductions, whe- ther she could have originally invented them or no ; it is equally true that such deductions must be natural, that is, conge- nial to reason and nature, whether our un- assisted faculties could have produced them, or whether some superior power were at first requisite to bring them before the mind. This is admitted even by those writers who are the least disposed to exag- gerate the effects of our natural abilities. " It cannot be denied," says Leland, " that it is a real and great service to religion to show that the main principles and duties/ of it are what right reason must approve.'* XXIX " Natural Religion or the law of nature is not so called because it was originally dis- covered by natural reason, but because, when once made known, it is what the reason of mankind duly exercised approves, as founded in truth and nature." * This is all that our argument requires, and less than this cannot be acknowledged without totally giving up the authority of reason in matters of religion ; a doctrine which is equally de- structive of Natural and of Revealed Theo- lo gy- I have thought it expedient to make these observations, that the general scope and intention of the work might not be misunderstood. It was first and principally designed for men of a speculative turn of mind, who have been accustomed to con- template any Revelation as so highly im- probable, that scarce any degree of evi- dence could persuade them of its truth. For as on all moral subjects much will * See Leland's Advantage and Necessity of Revela- tion, vol. i. sect. 1. Also vol. ii. chap. 1. See also Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things. Introduction p*23. and p. 252. XXX depend upon that state of mind with which we enter on our investigations, it appeared to be of great importance to lay before them a full and candid statement of this ques- tion, as it might be considered by a sober and unprejudiced observer of nature. There is nothing here taken for granted which a serious believer in the truths of Natural Religion ought not to admit ; nothing which is not, in some degree, countenanced and supported by the opinions of the ancient philosophers or of some modern unbe- lievers in Christianity ; or which is not fairly deducible from the principles of rational theism. From such facts, we have argued first as to the presumptions in favour of Revelation in general ; and then have en- deavoured to ascertain the leading doctrines which, it is probable, would be contained in such, a Revelation; and we have after- wards compared these probabilities with the doctrines which are actually made known by the Christian Revelation. It should be remembered, however, that we do not attempt to push our enquiries beyond the range of probable and pre- sumptive reasoning, leaving the direct and XXXI historical evidence of Christianity to furnish a full and satisfactory attestation to its truth. It is our object to clear away those previous prejudices which so frequently prevent the fair investigation of historical evidence. Having effected this purpose, we resign the student to those learned and respectable writers who have authenticated the canon of Scripture, and who have shown, from incontestible arguments, the divinity of the Christian Revelation. Although this be the real object of the work which is here submitted to the public, yet it has been deemed expedient, for a fuller display of the various details which compose the argument, to discriminate, as far as possible, between the probabilities which belong to Revelation in general and those doctrines which are made known to us by the Christian Revelation. For this purpose, the first part is devoted to the consideration of such principles as on the supposition of any Revelation might be reasonably expected to enter into its system. These are collected from the natural sug- gestions of our minds and from our obser- XXX11 rations on the government of Providence, Though it is not pretended that, in all cases, we can nicely distinguish our views from the associations of that Revelation with which we are familiar ; or that, in some instances, we may not have fallen upon what lawyers would term leading questions, that is, questions which carry with them their own answers ; yet this, however it may affect the speculative beauty of the work, is, in reality, the^fullest confirmation of that reasoning which is here employed. For if it be impossible to speculate ration- ally concerning any supposed Revelation without adopting the generality of those doctrines which have actually been incul- cated in the Scriptures, surely this ought to be esteemed as no slight indication of the indissoluble connection of the Christian Re- velation with the dictates of conscience and the deductions of reason. To convince any man of the force and reality of this kind of reasoning, let him attempt to reverse the leading particulars which are here brought forward as likely to enter into any Revelation. Let him endea- XXX111 vour to imagine a Revelation which was not founded upon miracles, the discoveries of which were neither important nor desirable ; which had given no account of the creation of man, of his being created in innocence, and of his fall from that innocence ; which did not correspond to the principles of rea- son, nor to the faculties of the human mind ; which was not adapted to the present state of the world ; which did not inculcate the unity of God ; which contained no doc- trines incomprehensible to reason ; which provided no atonement for our sins ; which held out no terrors to the impenitent ; the author of which was not distinguished for virtue or dignity ; which offered no spi- ritual assistance ; which adduced no fresh arguments for a future life or for a state of rewards and punishments after death ; which exhorted us to confide upon our own merits, rather than on the Divine mercy ; which had not promoted the know- ledge, happiness, and civilisation of the world ; which was not adapted to the capa- cities of the poor, the truth of which had not been admitted by the generality of the b XXXIV learned ; which had been opposed by men of the greatest virtues and probity ; which had not been distinguished by its moral effects, &c. &c. I say, let any man attempt to frame suppositions of this kind, and he will perceive how unreasonable it is to un- dervalue our argument on account of its want of originality. It is the solidity of these speculations which detracts from their novelty ; it is the closeness of this connection between Reason and Revelation which prevents our amusing the reader with anomalies and contradictions. Rut although this work was originally undertaken with no other aim than an attempt to counteract the prejudices of un- believers, yet, as the author proceeded in his plan, he found himself involved with opinions of quite an opposite description. Every presumptive argument to show the truth of Christianity from its agreement with the sentiments of right reason, be- came also an evidence of its wisdom, and consequently an evidence against those who would divorce it from reason and nature. Thus the same artillery which he had XXXV pointed against the enemies of Christianity was found to be equally efficient against its mistaken friends ; no small confirmation to his own mind, that the ground which he had taken was safe and tenable, and that truth and reason and nature were his allies in this apology for the Christian Revelation. To estimate the force of this kind of evi- dence with fairness and candour, it is necessary to review it with a calm, con- templative, and philosophic eye ; to re- member that an argument of this nature is strictly cumulative, and that conse- quently the loss of a few presumptions will not endanger the safety of the rest ; that, in many cases, the evidence is to be multi- plied by its incidental connection with some other probability, that the aggregate weight of the whole must be very considerable, however little any one may be disposed to allow to each independent part ; and that, supposing nothing more to follow than the bare possibility that Christianity may be true, yet every man is bound by reason and self-interest, and by all the obligations of Natural Religion, to institute a serious en- b 2 XXXVI quiry into the evidence of this possible Re- velation. As an apology for that homeliness of style and manner, which to many may wear an appearance of carelessness and neglect, the author begs leave to remark, that it is in fact the result of much study and design. After repeated attempts at a more regular style of composition, he has constantly found that the force of the argu- ment seemed to suffer in exact proportion as it was accompanied with these exterior embellishments. Such is the delicate texture of that species of reasoning which is here attempted, that it will not endure any thing beyond the utmost simplicity and plainness of language. Had he worked up his ma- terials into a uniform and connected dis- course, though something might have been gained in appearance, yet much would have been lost in reality. The force of presump- tive and circumstantial evidence cannot be tolerably ascertained without dwelling upon all its minutest details. To attempt to groupe and to combine is here to exchange argument for eloquence ; it is to lose the xxxvn value and characteristics of a didactic work for one of merely desultory reading and transient amusement. In the Notes will be found a copious collection of illustrations and authorities to support the general reasonings which are here advanced, and in which the reader is referred for farther information to writers of the greatest eminence in literature and theology. The author deems it, however, proper to observe, that in far the greater number of instances, the reasonings had passed through his own mind previously to any direct research into the opinions of others. They are to be regarded rather as separate and independent confirmations of such opinions than as the same thoughts transcribed into different language. In a few instances, he has looked in vain for any authority to support his reasonings, and here they must be left to stand or fall by their own merits. But so generally has he found these speculations confirmed by the opi- nions of some previous writer of ability, that he cannot but feel some' confidence in their connection with truth and natupe ; XXXV111 and he is persuaded, that if they are in- vestigated with due attention and impar- tiality, they will lead the mind into that tone of thinking which may dispose it for the reception of the most important en- quiries. At the conclusion of these introductory observations, the author would again beg leave to express his high obligation to the works of Doctor Reid ; and would earnestly recommend them to all who feel any in- terest in connecting the evidences and doc- trines of Revelation with the inductive philosophy of the human mind. Nor should the writings of his illustrious pupil, Professor Stewart, be passed over in silence, who has taught all the Graces to sacrifice at the shrine of abstract science. To these obligations he would beg leave to join his acknowledgements to the celebrated Analogy of Bishop Butler, a work which, hov/ever deficient in philosophical arrange- ment, is replete with the most profound and original observations on the faculties and situation of man when viewed in con- nection with the doctrines of Natural ii XXXIX and Revealed Religion. But, to study the writings of this eminent prelate to the best advantage, it is requisite that the student should be previously initiated in the school of those distinguished authors, who have at length introduced light and order into the ancient chaos of metaphysics. Amongst these, as it was the wish of Reynolds to pronounce the name of Michael Angelo as the prince and pattern of painters, so it is the grateful ambition of the present writer to conclude his preface with the name of Reid. [See Notes and Illustrations.] THE CONNECTION OF NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. PART THE FIRST. THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION IN GENERAL. SECTION I. Is not a Divine Revelation possible I* 1 hat God can communicate his will in any manner which he deems most advantageous to mankind, must be admitted by all who acknowledge his existence as a wise, inde- pendent, and Almighty Intelligence. The Creator of our faculties can impart know- * See Part II, Sect. I. B 2 ledge to us in any way which appears most proper and desirable to himself. This is a proposition so plain and obvious, that it may be said to be intuitively evident. And that the supposition of a Revelation is not merely an abstract possibility, but a conception which has frequently occurred to the human mind, is plain, from the nu- merous pretences which have been made in the different ages of the world, to a direct communication with Heaven. Had there been any thing absurd, or even very remote, in the supposition of its possibility, it would not have been professed by impostors in re- ligion, nor by legislators, to conciliate obe- dience to their authority. There would have been no success to have been hoped from claims which were altogether repug- nant to reason, and which had no connec- tion with the principles of the human mind* But if we have this perception of the possibility of a Revelation, it will follow that we are capable of receiving proofs of its reality, that upon an inferior degree of evidence we ought to allow of its proba- bility, and that upon a higher degree of s evidence we ought to allow of its certainty. For whatever supposition we can appre- hend as possible, L e. which does not in- volve a contradiction, or exceed the range of our understandings, may be laid before us with such evidence as ought to command our assent. There are some propositions of which we can form no opinion beyond that of their necessary truth ; such as the Eternity of the First Cause, and the incommunica- ble attributes of God. These lie beyond the limits of our understandings, we are therefore impressed with the belief of their necessary existence. But whatever appears to us to be possible, may be shown, by pro- per and adequate evidence, to be either probable or certain ; and, according to our convictions of the evidence, we shall lie under an obligation to proportion our as- sent. [See Notes and Illustrations, No, 1.] B 2 SECTION II. Is not a Divine Revelation desirable f The possibility of a Revelation being granted, it is our next enquiry whether it be important and desirable that it should be true ; for it would be a strong presumption against its probability, if we could discover nothing to recommend it in this respect, to the hopes and wants and wishes of the human mind. But that it is desirable a weak, frail, and fallible creature, like man, should be taught and instructed by the All-wise and Almighty Creator, and that some commu- nications should subsist between God and our rational faculties, — this is as plain a truth as any which can be laid before the human understanding. " Since no one pretends," as Paley remarks, " that even under the Christian Revelation we have too much light, or any degree of assurance which is superfluous," it must be admitted, whether we believe in a Revelation or no, that it would be highly beneficial and advan- tageous to mankind, if some communica- tions of this kind should take place between heaven and earth. This sentiment, if it were not self-apparent, might be supported by many appeals to the expressed wishes of the ancient philosophers. But when it is considered that the whole constitution of human nature is the work- manship of a wise and benevolent mind, it deserves our reflection, whether this ex- treme desirableness of supernatural assist- ance may not, in some degree, import its probability ; at least, whether upon the ac- knowledged principles of rational theism,, we ought not afterwards to be disposed to listen to any evidence which might be of- fered in its favour. It is from intimations of a similar kind in nature, that we are often led to form our opinions concerning final causes ; particularly concerning the ends and objects of our own faculties. Thus in natural theology we argue from many of the contrivances of nature, to the end and purpose for which they were de- signed. If then we apply the same reason- b, a 6 ing to the principles of the human mind, we may, perhaps, be inclined to think, that this universal sense of our weakness, toge- ther with our natural trust on the power and goodness of God, is no slight intima- tion in favour of a Divine Revelation ; at least that it adds something to the previous conception of its possibility. [See Notes and Illustrations, No, 2,] SECTION III. Is not the teachable Nature of Man a pre- sumptive Evidence of a Divine Revela- tion? * If it could be shown that the human mind was furnished with a great variety of innate ideas, and that every individual came into the world with a stock of ready- furnished materials far thinking, then there would exist a considerable presumption against the notion of a Divine Revelation, from the make and constitution of our minds. It might then be argued, that God had made ample provision for each of us, in the suggestions of our own faculties y that as we learnt nothing from each other, but depended exclusively on our own resources, so it was not probable that we should de- rive our religious information from any other medium than that of our own breasts, Upon such an hypothesis, an external Re- velation would not correspond with the fa- * See Part II. Sect. S, B 4 8 culties of man, or with the general appear- ances of nature. But, upon the contrary, if it be a plain and acknowledged fact, that we derive nearly all our information from others, and that the greatest talents and capacities would lie dormant and inactive, unless called into exercise by communicated know- ledge, then it should not be accounted as improbable, that our knowledge of things divine may originally have arisen from ex- ternal instruction. There would be a foun- dation for such an opinion in the frame and constitution of our minds, and the entire system of human knowledge would form an illustration of the style and manner in which such a Revelation might possibly have been given. But since a Revelation, unless it were repeated to each individual, (which would destroy and annihilate the course of nature,) must be afterwards sup- ported by the evidence of testimony, it is a still further confirmation of the foregoing argument, to find we are so constituted, that we are naturally disposed to rely on evidence of this description. There is a prin- ciple of belief inherent in our nature, inde- 9 pendent and prior to all experience, by which children are disposed to pay an un- limited assent to what is told them by others. And though we learn in after-life to limit our belief, and to proportion our assent to evidence, yet the principle itself remains still inherent in our breasts ; and if any man were entirely devoid of it, he could not continue to live and act in the world. His scepticism would first exile him from society, and would afterwards starve him out of nature. Now, it is on the same principle of be- lief in testimony r , that a written Revelation must depend ; and if we had not been fur- nished originally with this disposition of mind, we should have been incapable of estimating its claims to our regard. But since we have been furnished with this principle, it betokens our fitness and ability to enquire into a Revelation of this descrip- tion ; and when it is connected with our , instinctive confidence in the Divine vera- city, it ought, perhaps, to be viewed as a still further presumption in favour of its probability. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 3.] 10 SECTION IV. Upon what kind of Evidence must a Divine Revelation depend? * There seem but two methods by which any revelation could be accomplished. The one is by a change in our internal faculties, the other by a change in the laws of external nature. Had the first been adopted, a miracle would have been worked, though we might not have been conscious of it. It would indeed have been a miracle of a far more violent kind, than any with which we are now acquainted ; being a direct in- terference with the state of our moral and intellectual powers. Whether such a miracle might not have been performed, if it had pleased God, it does not become us posi- tively to determine. But we may be allowed to say, that it appears to be hardly con- sistent with moral wisdom, and would be at utter variance with all our experience . of God's providential dealings with hi& creatures. * See Part II. Sect. 4. 11 The other method is by addressing our natural senses in an extraordinary manner, so as to convince the spectator that the same power which had originally ordained the laws of nature, was now exerted to exceed or to suspend their operations for a particular purpose, connected with our re- ligious and moral welfare. As far as we can judge, this is the only sufficient external evidence by which such a revelation could be authenticated. Unless, then, we are pre- pared to deny what has been already ad- mitted, viz. the possibility of any Revelation, it does not appear reasonable to object to the only method by which the knowledge of such Revelation could be conveyed to intelligent beings, without interfering with the constitution of their minds. Yet it would be necessary, I apprehend, that this miraculous evidence should be exerted in unison with those principles of wisdom and holiness, which we are irresist- ibly impelled to ascribe to the Divine cha- racter ; and without which, even miracles would fail to persuade us of the reality of a Divine Revelation. For we are so consti- 12 luted, that we could not believe in any Revelation which contradicted the funda- mental principles of piety and virtue, or which was not fitted to advance the dignity and happiness of mankind. From these observations it will appear, that though miracles be the grand and dis- tinguishing evidence on which a Divine Revelation must be reared ; yet, that vari- ous degrees of credibility will arise in its favour, from its connection with our moral and intellectual powers, and from its con- geniality with the sentiments of reason. To suppose a total absence of this kind of evidence, would be to destroy all our capa- bility of enquiring into its truth ; whereas, upon the contrary, to develope and illustrate its association with our moral faculties and with the government of the world, is, if not to demonstrate its truth as a matter of historical fact, yet to point out its proba- bility as a matter of abstract speculation. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 4.] 13 SECTION V. Upon the Supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would be adapted to Human Life, as a state of Trial and Dis- cipline f * Although the very name of a Revelation implies the discovery of some important facts which could not have been ascertained by the natural powers of the mind, and the evidence of miracles appears to be essentially requisite to convince us of its truth ; yet as such Revelation proceeds immediately from the Author of our nature, and is addressed to rational and intelligent creatures, it might be reasonably expected that upon the whole it would tally and agree with the circum- stances of mankind, rather than disappoint or contradict the natural sentiments of their understandings. The reasonableness of this supposition would be apparent, even though we were to confine our observations to those parti- * See Part II. Sect. 5, 14 cular phenomena which, at the first view, might seem to contradict it. The evidence of miracles is strictly natural, being pre- cisely the same evidence as that which we daily receive through the medium of our senses. If we were to witness a miracle, we should witness it with the very same faculties as though it had happened in the ordinary course of nature. But when this miraculous fact has become matter of his- tory, the force of this observation becomes still more apparent ; for its truth will then depend precisely upon the same kind of evidence as that of any other historical fact. The same principle of belief which inclines us to give credit to common facts, when reported to us upon good and sufficient testimony, will also dispose us to give the same credit to these miraculous facts, when supported by testimony sufficient to uphold them. The probability of this connection be- tween revealed and natural truth will still further appear, if we consider, that unless the discoveries of Revelation approved themselves to our rational faculties, we 15 could not be in a situation to apply them to our practical advantage. They would neither cheer us in adversity, nor moderate us in prosperity. They would not be ac- commodated to our hopes, our wants, or our wishes ; and, consequently, however we might be persuaded of their speculative truth, we could not apply them to any pur- poses of practical utility. And since we are so powerfully affected by the circumstances in which we are placed, and external nature has so vast an influ- ence on our minds, it would appear pro- bable that this Revelation should, in many respects, be carried on in connection with the ordinary course of society ; that what we learn in the usual course of Providence should in some respects resemble this higher and more spiritual constitution ; and that our duties, and happiness, and edu- cation, as men, should be associated with an advancement and progress in this religious dispensation. Still further to heighten these probabi- lities, it should be remembered, that the Author of Nature and of Revelation is the 16 same ; and that, in the works of the same Author, we may naturally look for traits of likeness and resemblance ; that man is ad- dressed under both dispensations ; that they are carried on in the same world, being co- existent both in point of time and place ; and that the same faculties must necessarily be employed in judging of the evidences, and in making use of the advantages, of na- tural and of revealed theology. There is one observation, however, which it is of great importance to remember, be- cause it will furnish us with a clue to the whole presumptive character of such a dis- pensation. It is this, that this supposed Revelation would, in all probability, be adapted to that state of trial and moral dis- cipline in which we are placed by nature, and under which we are contemplated by natural religion. Since we come into the world with passions which we are obliged to restrain, and since we are surrounded with temptations which we are obliged to withstand, even for our temporal happiness and security, there is every presumptive reason to think, that, if any extraordinary 8 17 assistance in religion were afforded to man, it would be calculated to meet those pecu- liar exigences which arise out of such a state of moral trial and probation. In proportion then as the example of its Author, the tenor of its doctrines, and the tendency of its threatenings and rewards, were adapted to this state of suffering and trial, in that same proportion would it cor- respond with the meridian of human life, and with the natural suggestions of the human mind. Every motive with which it furnished us to mortify and subdue our cor- rupt propensities, and to enable our reason to control our passions ; every doctrine which it inculcated to humble our base, and to elevate our better inclinations, ought to be esteemed an indication of its universal connection with natural theology. Since nothing which is great, excellent, and noble can be obtained in this life, without much labour and solicitude, there would be every reason to apprehend that a Revelation would also encourage the same habits of sobriety and self-denial, of patient and persevering diligence ; and since human virtues are c 18 matured and elicited rather by struggles and adversities than by ease and enjoy- ment, we might naturally anticipate that something of the same character and dis- position would be found to pervade this ex- traordinary dispensation. From such considerations we might de- duce, with the utmost probability, that if any Divine Revelation were afforded, it would, in many respects, agree with the constitu- tion of nature, and correspond with the na- tural suggestions of our minds. And though it might not be possible to determine be- forehand as to the precise nature and extent of this connection, yet, I think, the fol- lowing rule might be safely laid down con- cerning it : " That in proportion as this "■ connection subsisted between things re- " vealed and things natural, not only would " this Revelation become more credible in " itself, but that it would be more adapted " to the circumstances of human life, and " consequently more intimately associated " with the springs of human happiness and " virtue." [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 5.] 19 SECTION VI. Is it not credible that a Revelation was given to Man at his first Creation ? * Upon the first creation of any intelligent beings, it appears to be highly probable, if not morally certain, that God would com- municate his will to them in some direct and extraordinary manner. The circum- stances of a first creation seem to suppose and require such supernatural aid and ad- vice. Since creatures in this situation would have no experience to guide them, it is every way probable to believe that their Creator would become their instructor; and more especially if they were placed in a state of trial and probation, that He would give them such cautionary assistance as might put them sufficiently on their guard. If they were created capable of religious worship, it appears also highly credible that He would instruct them concerning the manner of discharging these solemn duties. These are observations so identified with * See Part II. Sect. 6. C 2 20 reason, and so consonant to our conceptions of the divine character, that no reflecting theist can consistently question their pro- bable truth. Since the only objection which can be reasonably urged against a Divine Revelation, arises out of its supposed interference with some previously established course of na- ture, it does not appear how such an objec- tion can be urged, prior to any course of nature being actually experienced. Unless we suppose the world to have been eternal, and the succession of creatures to have been infinite, we must at last mount up to some period when, what we now call the course of nature, could not have been known. At such a beginning of the world, this objec- tion against a Revelation arising out of its miraculous nature could not be advanced. A miracle, according to our conceptions, is a departure from those laws of nature which are known to us only by experience. To these deductions of reason, we may conjoin the corresponding traditions of his- tory. It was the universal belief of the Pagan world, that \he first religion was pre- 21 scribed immediately by God. The pre- tences of the ancient oracles are also a considerable confirmation of this fact ; for, if there had been no reality of this kind, they could scarcely have gained that credit which so long outlived their deserts. A counterfeit always supposes the previous existence of real coin. And here I would beg leave to observe, that the Mosaic account of the creation of man, as proceeding from a single pair of human beings, has been strikingly illus- trated by the late accurate researches of Mr. Malthus into the principle of population. It has now been clearly established, that the increase of mankind proceeds in something like a geometrical ratio ; that countries, under favourable circumstances, have been known to double their population within fifteen years, and that, consequently, there is nothing at all incredible in the statement of Scripture, that the whole race of man- kind have proceeded from a single pair of progenitors, Although this was a fact which, from its peculiar nature, could not have been pre- e 3 22 cisely ascertained by human reason, yet, when it has been made known to us, it ap- pears to harmonise with our sentiments of propriety and of moral fitness. It appears to be far more adapted to the circumstances of our world, that the human race should have proceeded from a single pair, and that their numbers should have gradually augmented, than that superfluous multitudes should have been at once created. There is in this hypothesis a manifest reference to the ex- isting course of nature, which tends towards a gradual increase of numbers, and to the acknowledged condition of mankind, as being capable of propagating their own species. Besides, if the world had been well peopled at its first creation, there would have been no scope afforded for that im- proveableness of reason which forms such a leading characteristic of our species, and which is so intimately connected with the acquirement and division of property. In- deed, if we are to believe the accounts of antiquity, whether sacred or profane* re- specting the age of the first generations of mankind, it would have been almost im- 23 possible for such a state of society to have subsisted; whereas, upon the represent- ations of Scripture, this protracted length of human life served only to accelerate the multiplication of the species, and the con- sequent cultivation of the earth. The origin of language also (if it be al- lowed to be of divine construction) is of no inconsiderable force, as showing the proba- bility of a Divine Revelation ; for it is hardly conceivable that language should have been given by God without an application to its most important purpose, that of using it in the service of religion, and for the praise and worship of its Author. To these probabilities we may add the well-known traces of resemblance and inter- community which pervaded the most ancient forms of religion, and which multiply in proportion as we go back into antiquity, and approach to the cradle of mankind. Thus tradition and reason combine in establishing the probability of a first Re- velation, to deny which appears to be akin to denying the providence of God ; for if his paternal care did not extend to the first c 4 24 ancestors df mankind, how can we be per- suaded to think that He now superintends the course and constitution of nature ? Without such & Revelation, how could any just or certain opinions be entertained respecting the origin of man, or the form- ation of the world by the will and power of God ? It was impossible that a creature should become acquainted with his own origin, otherwise than by the instruction of his Creator; a power * superior to that of man was required to give him this important information. Till this point was ascertained upon indubitable authority, reason had no data whereon to erect her deductions ; phi- losophy was tormented with doubts which could not be overcome* and history com- menced with hypothesis, and ended in uncertainty. [See Notes and Illustrations, No* 6.] 25 SECTION VII. Would God have created Man otherwise than Innocent f * Upon the supposition that man was created in his present condition, we charge the Deity with being the immediate author of all that sin and misery which we feel and witness. But how repugnant this suppo- sition is to all the principles of reason, and how subversive of all the foundations of natural theology, need not be shown by argument, — it is matter of plain self-evident conviction. No doubt, in the wide and varied gradations of intellect, there might be a place found for beings of no higher mental stature and ability than man. It is not from the meanness of his understand- ing, (which even now is vastly superior to his situation,) but from his moral depravity, that we argue he would not possibly have come out of the hands of his Maker in his * See Part II. Sect. 7. 26 present circumstances. It is one thing to create a being with few and limited facul- ties, and another to make him prone to evil, and disinclined from all that is good. The former act would reflect no kind of moral imputation on the character of the Deity ; it is but supposing him to set a limit to the operations of his power. But the latter would be introducing moral evil, by necessity, into creation. It would be ascribing to God that which it is impossible he should directly cause, viz. the existence of beings originally evil, and who were made by Him, not by themselves, for the purposes of vice, and misery, and mischief. This being plainly repugnant to reason, we are obliged to ascribe the moral evil, which we find in creation, to some mis- fortune and accident which subsequently took place. How this disaster arose, it does not appear that reason could accurately determine. There seems a general ten- dency, however, in the fabulous traditions of antiquity, to ascribe it to the agency of some evil beings superior to man ; nor would it be easy, perhaps, to offer any hy- 27 pothesis which is, upon the whole, more consonant to reason, or more adequate to explain the phenomena we witness. Query. Does not this supposition of our original innocence derive some credibility from our inherent love of the fair and ex- cellent, which formed such a distinguishing feature in the moral systems of antiquity? [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 7-] 15.— 3. 5. 6.7- 8.29. 16.— 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. J5. 1?. 18, 19. 21.25. 26. 28. 35. 41, &c. 17.— 3. 5. 7- 8. 9. 11. 16. 18. 19. 24. 25.26.27.28.29. 34. 36. 37, &c. 18.— 2. 3. 4. 7. 16. 17. 19- 21* 25. 26. 2*}. 28. 29. 30. 32. 33. 34. 37, &c. 19.— 3. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 14. 16. 1-7. 18.25. 26. 28. 42. 44. 20.— 3. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 14. 16. 18. 19. 22. L 4 152 Sect. 21.— 2. 3. 23. 24. 25. 26. 29. 31. 32. 44. 22.— The argument of this section is illustrated by all those presumptions which are brought forward to point out the connection of Natural and Revealed Theology. 23.-4. 5. 17. 18. 19. 21. 24. 25.26. 29. 33. 37. 44. 2k.*— 2. 3. 4. 5. 7- 18. 19. 20. 22. 23. 25. 26. 27. 29. 30. 31. 33.37- 45. 25.-5. 7.8. 9. 10, 11. 12. 14. 16. 17. 18. 19.21.22.23. 24. 26.-2. 3. 5. 16. 17. 18. 19. 21. 22. 23. 27. 29. 32. 36. 39. 40. 42. 43. 27.-2. 3. 4. 5. 7- 16. 18.28.29. 32. 33. 34. 37. 38.41. 42. 28.-4. 5. 7. 13. 16. 17. 18. 19. 25. 26. 2*J. 29. 32. 34. 35. 36. 37. 29.— 1. 3. 4, 18. 21. 23. 25. 26. 32. 43. 44. 30.— 3. 5. 22. 24. 25. 31. 33. 37. 40. 31.— 3. 5. 6. 22. 24. 25. 30. 33. 37. 40. 41. 43. 45. 32 3. 4. 6. 7. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 33. 37. 38, &c. 33,-3, 4. 6. 23. 24. 25. 3a 31. 32. 35. 36. 37- 38. 39. 40. 41. 43. 45. 34.-2. 5. 6. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 16. 17- 18. 19.25.26,27. 28. 32. 37. 38. 39, &c. 35.-5. 8. 9. 10. 11. 13. 14. 16. 19. 28. 36. 38. 39. 42. 43. 44. 36.-4. 5. 8. 9. 10. 11. 14. 16. 19. 25. 28. 29. 30. 35. 38, 39. 42. 44. 37.-3. 18. 24. 27. 28. 30. 33. 34. 40. 41. 42. 44. 45. 38—3. 4. 5. 27. 28. 32. 34. 36. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 45. 39;— 5. 6. 19. 33. 35. 36. 38. 40. 41. 42. 43. 45. 40,-2. 6. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 24. 25. 26. 27.28. 33. 34. 37. 38. 39, &c< 153 Sect. 41.— 2. 3. 7. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 24. 25. 26. 27. 32. 33. 34. 37, &c. 42.-3. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 14. 16. 18. 24. 27. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39, &c. 43.-2. 4. 5. 18. 23. 24. 27. 28. 33. 34. 37- 38. 39. 40. 41. 42, &c. 44.-3. 5. 9. 10. 11. 16. 18. 19. 25. 26. 29. 32. 37- 45. — 2. 3. 20. 23. 24. 26, 27. 28. 32. 34. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42, &c. 46.-2. 5. 6. 7. 13. 14. 15. 18. 20. 22. 23. 25. 26. 27- 28, 29, 32. 34, 37. 39. 41. 43. 154 A Table of the Coincidences and Connections between the First and Second Parts of this Work. Parti. Part II. 1. and 2. These presumptions are illustrated and con- firmed by every section. 3.-3. 5. 6. 9. 10. 13. 14. 15. 16. 19. 20. 23. 24. 26. 29. 30. 34. 35. 36. 3?, &c. 4. — Passim. 5. — Passim. 6.-2. 3. 4. 6. 8. 9. 10. 11. 17. 25. 28. 30. 32. 36. 37- 40. 42. 47. 7.-2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 16. 17- 18. 20. 21. 22. 23. 30. 31. 32. 36. 37- 38, &c. 8.-2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 15. 16. 19. 20. 21. 22. 24. 25. 29. 31. 33. 36. 39. 41, &c. 9.-3. 5. 7- 8. 9. 10. 11. 15. 16. 20. 21. 22. 24. 27. 31. 32. 33. 36. 39. 41. 42, &c. 10. — The same. 11. — The same. 12.— 3. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 20. 22. 25. 26. 28. 31. 33. 13.— 4. 6. 7. 8. 21. 26. 33. 39. 14.— 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 15.— 3.f6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 20. 21. 24. 33. 39. 16. — Passim. 1 7. — Passim. 18.— 2. 3. 4. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 15. 16. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 27. 29. 30. 32, &c. 19.— 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 15. 16. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 27. 29. 30, &c. 20.— 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 14. 23. 24. 25. 28. 30. 31. 33. 34. 35. 39, &c. 155 Part I. Part II. 21.— 3. 4. 5. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 19. 20. 21, 26. 34. 41. 42.46. 22.-2. 3. 5. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 34. 35, &c. 23.-4. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. IS. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 26. 21. 30. 34. 46. 24.-2. 5. 10. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 22. 23. 26. 29. 34. 42. 43. 46. 25.-2. 5. 7. 8. 9- 10. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17- 18. 19.20.21. 22. 23. 26. 27. 31. 32. 34, &c. 26.-2. 4. 7- 8. 9. 10. 21. 26. 29. 31. 32. 34. 37. 38. 4 42. 45. 27.-2. 3. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 23. 24. 25. 29. 30. 31. 32. 34. 35. 42. 45. 47. 28.-2. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 12. 20. 21. 23. 24. 25. 31. 32. 34. 38. 42. 45. 47. 29.-3.4. 5. 10. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 20. 21. 22. 26. 27- 30, 34. 35. 42. 45. 46. 30.— 3. 5. 10. 20. 22. 27. 28. 29. 31. 32. 34. 37. 45. 46. 31. — 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 19. 23. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 42. 32.-3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8j &c. 33. — Passim. 34.-2. 5. 6. 7. 8. 10. 12. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 27. 29, &c. 35.-5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 24. 33. 35. 36. 39. 43. 36. — The same. 37.-2. 3. 5. 8. 9. 10. 13. 14. 15. 16. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 27. 29. 31. 34, &c. 38.-2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14, &c. &c 39.-3. 5. 6. 9. 10. 19. 31. 32. 33. 35. 36. 37- 38. 45. 40.— .5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 20. 27. 31. 32. 34. 36. 37. 38. 40. 42. 47. 156 Part I. Part II. 41.— 2. 3. 5. 6. 7- 8. 9. 10. 23. 24. 30. 31. 32. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 42, &c 42.-2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 29. 30. 31, &c. 43.-3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8- 9. 10. 18. 19. 20. 21. 23. 24. 29. 30. 31. 32. 34, &c. 44.-2. 4. 5. 7. 8. 9. 10. 15. 16. 20. 21. 22. 26. 27. 28. 30. 34. 41. 45. 46. 45.-2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7 V 8. 9. 10. 11. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 26. 29. 30. 31, &c. 46.-2. 4, 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15, &c,&c. &c. PART THE SECOND. INTRODUCTION. If we could suppose that nothing more had been shown by the preceding observ- ations, than the bare possibility that some Revelation might be given by God to man ; and that there was nothing absurd or con- tradictory in the supposition to prevent its becoming a subject of rational enquiry ; we might now proceed to examine those his- torical evidences on which the Christian Revelation in particular professes to be founded. Rut if, previous to our examination of this historical evidence, we should compare the doctrines and arguments of the Chris- tian religion with those general principles which have been stated as likely to enter into any Revelation of God to man, there would unquestionably arise a strong pre- sumption either for or against its credibility, 158 in proportion as we found it agreeable or contradictory to those sentiments which are suggested by the operations of reason, or by our experience of the visible government of Providence. To show the force and reality of this kind of reasoning, let us suppose that Chris- tianity had contradicted these general prin- ciples. Let us suppose that its truth was neither desirable nor important ; that it was not founded on miraculous evidence ; that it did not appeal to our rational faculties ; that it had not given an account of the crea- tion of the world, of man's original inno- cence, nor of his fall from that innocence ; that it was not adapted to a state of moral trial and discipline ; that it did not de- lineate human nature faithfully ; that it did not inculcate the unity of God ; that it did not harmonise with our conception of his attributes ; that it contained no doctrines beyond our comprehensions ; that it had appointed no medium of approach to the Deity ; that it had offered no hopes of par- don on repentance ; no terrors to impenitent sinners ; that it had proposed no atonement 159 for our offences ; that it had commanded us to believe we were saved by the death of Christ, without permitting us to worship Him ; that it had promised no spiritual aid and assistance ; that its Author had not in- structed us by his example ; that its motives to repentance and holiness were not more powerful than those of reason ; that it had brought no fresh arguments for a future life, and for a state of eternal happiness or misery after death ; that it had no visible and posi- tive institutions ; that it had not inculcated a dependence on the mercy of God, rather than on our own merits; that its rewards and punishments were not commensurate with the vast capacities of our souls ; that it had not promoted the knowledge, happi- ness, and civilisation of mankind; that it was not adapted to the capacities of the poor ; that its truth had not been admitted by the majority of the learned ; that its in- fluence had gradually decayed with its age ; that its enemies had been men of distin- guished worth and probity ; that it had not improved both the theory and the practice of morals ; that it was opposed by a regular 160 and consistent system of Deism ; that it Was not intended for the benefit of all mankind, nor capable of becoming a universal reli- gion ; that it did not seem worthy to be esteemed the final cause of nature, &c. &c. Now, let any man, for the sake of trying our argument, imagine that Christianity had thwarted and disappointed our natural ex- pectations in such particulars, and he will perceive what it is that we mean by the connection of Natural and Revealed reli- gion, and what it is that we aim at by asso- ciating its evidences with the philosophy of the human mind. It is readily admitted that a Revelation notoriously false would in all probability have embraced some of these particulars, and thus would have made some approach to the dictates of reason. But this would only verify the remark of St. Austin, " nulla falsa doctrina est quce non aliquid veri per- misceat" It would show, that to render errors and superstitions plausible, they must partake of the nature of truth ; not that truth is to be undervalued because it is liable to be mingled with error. Besides, ii 161 our argument is cumulative, it is to be taken in its whole amount. The question is not whether some of these particulars would not have been embraced by a false Revelation, but whether all of them in con- junction may not be looked upon as a pre- sumptive evidence of a true one. This we affirm to be the case; and till some false religion shall be adduced which comprises all these probabilities, without errors and absurdities sufficiently powerful to coun- teract them, the argument must be ad- mitted as valid, or the entire force of cir- cumstantial and presumptive evidence must be denied. Perhaps it may seem to demand an apo- logy, that some of these probabilities could hardly have occurred to the mind, if they had not been echoed by the experience of a particular Revelation. To a certain ex- tent we are willing to grant the truth of this observation. But as we have before re- marked *, it is not an objection to the force, but to the form of our argument. To show * See Introductiorij Part L M 162 the consistency of Christianity with right reason, and with the wants and demands of nature, it is sufficient that we can per- ceive its reasonableness and propriety after it has been made known. In this, as in many other respects, Revelation agrees en- tirely with natural theologyi the arguments of which are by no means self-apparent, nor to be elicited without much study and observation. The fact is this — Tor the sake of our argument we have been obliged to place ourselves in an ideal situation, as if we had never heard of Christianity. This is like a legal fiction that we may afterwards arrive at an important truth. But the fiction does not in any degree affect the reality of our conclusion ; for whether these particulars could have been foreseen or no, independ- ently of Revelation, (a question which can- not be ascertained with minute precision,) still it is equally clear and certain that they are at present approved and ratified by our judgments. But it is of far greater consequence to repeat, that we do not pretend by these 163 arguments to demonstrate the truth of Christianity, but merely to display its pre- sumptive evidence. Some of these argu- ments are little more than collations of corresponding difficulties, or merely nega- tive agreements between the works and the word of God. These are intended to hum- ble that arrogance which would demand a more complete knowledge of things spiritual and eternal, than that which we now possess of things temporal and material. In others* we adduce various degrees of positive re- semblance ; some of which are only slight analogies, and some amounting to a full and satisfactory proof of a unity of work- manship and design. But whether slight or powerful, they all tend to produce one general effect ; the force of the argument consists in its complexity; and to esti- mate this force with accuracy, we must consider the number and multiplicity, the minuteness and the connection of its com- ponent parts. The same remarks, which an excellent author* has applied to the principles of # See Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 238. M 2 164 natural religion* will also apply to the vari- ous particulars which compose our argument, " They all hang together in such a manner, that if one of them be granted, it facilitates the way for the reception of the rest. Nor is it merely with each other that these prin- ciples are connected. They have a relation to all the other principles of moral philo- sophy ; insomuch that a person who enter- tains just views of the one, never fails to entertain just views of the other. Perhaps it would not be going too far to assert, that they have a relation to almost all the truths we know in the moral, the intellectual, and the material worlds. One thing is certain, that, in proportion as our knowledge ex- tends, our doubts and objections disappear, new light is continually breaking in upon us from every quarter, and more of order and system and design appear in the uni- verse." To enable the reader to judge with greater facility of the extent and complexity of this incidental connection between different parts of the work, numerous references are sub- joined, by which every one will be enabled 165 to perceive the force and consistency of the general argument. But to catch the com- bined result of so many conspiring particu- lars, it is necessary that these references should be examined with care and atten- tion. Hence we submit our labours to the public, rather as materials for thinking, than as professing to offer a finished and complete composition. They are hints and suggestions to awaken the thoughts and meditations of others : where they fail of producing this effect, they fail of all their advantages. It is but a sketch and an out- line, to be filled up by the care and assiduity of the reader. At the conclusion of these remarks, the author would beg leave to direct the atten- tion of the public towards the bearing of this argument, as it tends to counteract the prevailing errors of Antinomian enthusiasm. It is too much the fashion of the present age, amongst those of orthodox sentiments, to decry the use of reason in matters of re- ligion, and to state the doctrines of Reve- lation as if they were merely positive and arbitrary appointments. Perhaps this nar- m 3 166 row and mistaken view of Christian Theo- logy may have arisen originally from a desire to oppose the contrary errors of some of our eminent divines of the last century ; who, it must be allowed, were too much inclined to magnify the powers of reason, and to speak of natural religion as a separate and independent system. But it is the object of the present work to strike out a middle road between these opposite extremes ; to state natural Theology, not as independent, but as associated with revealed religion ; and thus to combine the doctrines of the Gospel with the powers and principles of the human mind. It is the general result and tendency of our work to show, that though human reason be not sufficiently strong to discover truth by its native and unassisted powers, yet that it is able to approve and to recognise it, when it is laid before it with proper authority. " The only view of antiquity," says Warburton, " which gives solid advantage to the Christian cause, is such a one as shows natural reason to be clear enough to perceive truth, and the ne- cessity of its deductions when proposed; 167 but not generahy strong enough to discern it and draw right deductions from it." Div. Legal. Book III. sect. v. " If some," con- tinues the same profound writer, " have allowed too little to natural religion, there are others who have ascribed a great deal too much to it: systems which, however different, are alike injurious to the great truth which they profess to defend. The one, by annihilating natural religion, cut away the ground and foundations of Chris- tianity ; the other, by giving to natural religion certain doctrines of perfection to which it doth not pretend, overturn the superstructure." Book IX. ch. i. p. 77. m 4 168 SECTION L Is it not possible that the Christian Revelation may be true ? The possibility of a Divine Revelation in general being admitted *, it will follow that the Christian Revelation in particular maybe true, supposing it to contain nothing which is derogatory to the nature and attributes of God, or which is plainly contradictory, and therefore impossible for infinite power to effect. That the belief of Christianity does not necessarily imply the admission of any such absurdity or contradiction, is in the highest degree probable from the re- ception which it had met with in the world. It would be scarcely possible that a Reli- gion which thus bore the marks of its own condemnation, should have prospered amongst the most learned and civilized na- tions ; and that individuals of the greatest talents and virtues should have been de- luded into its belief. A gross and palpable * See Part I. Sect. 1. 169 imposture which violated all the principles of reason, and of Natural Religion never could have maintained itself under the governments of modern Europe. It would have become the interest of all legislators to have declared themselves against it ; but such accusations have never been brought against Christianity, because they would be plainly incredible. The very arguments which have been used against Christianity will show that by some possibility it may be true, for who would argue either for or against any thing which it was impossible that mankind should believe? Such a Religion may be false, but its falsity cannot be of that nature which implies its utter impossibility, it cannot shock the common sense and under- standings of Mankind. That Christianity may possibly be true, however unlikely, is, I apprehend, either formally or tacitly ad- mitted by all those who have written against it. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 47.] 170 SECTION II. Is it not desirable that the Christian Reve- lation should be true ? * However any man may be disposed to doubt concerning the truth of Christianity considered as matter of fact and of history, it is not possible to deny that if it were true, it would be for the general benefit and advantage of mankind. It cannot be esteemed as a matter of indifference, for example, whether the whole world has been redeemed by the Son of God. Every one must be left to form his own opinions respecting the truth or the falsity of the doctrine ; but no one could assert, that if the truth of the doctrine were esta- blished, it would not be of the utmost importance to our happiness, and a disco- very in which the whole human race would not be most deeply interested. The same reasoning will apply to each of the other doctrines of Christianity in particular, and * See Part I. Sect. 2. 171 to their aggregate amount as forming one entire and connected system. But when we have allowed not only the possibility, but the importance of this Re- velation, we lie under the strongest obli- gations to enquire into its truth. It is an offence against reason and against natural religion, not to enter into a serious inves- tigation of the argument. Indeed, as we have already remarked, the extreme import- ance and desirableness of such Revelation, ought to be esteemed as a presumptive symptom in its favour, as adding some- thing to the previous hypothesis of its abstract possibility ; since it is evident, that if any Revelation has been given by God to man, it would appear to us of the utmost importance to human happiness. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 48.] 172 SECTION III. Do not the Scriptural Accounts of Revelation accord with the teachable State of our Fa- culties, and with the existing Phenomena of the Human Mind f * Man, upon his first creation, according to the Scriptures, was instructed in his reli- gious duties by God himself. The sacred writings go all along upon the supposition that the first religion was the effect of Di- vine Revelation, not the slow and dubious result of reasoning. They represent man as created with faculties to approve and perceive the force of its truth when brought before his mind ; not that he was born with innate knowledge, or that he had the power of inventing truth independent of instruc- tion. Now, whether the truth of this account be allowed or no, concerning the original creation of man, it must at least be esteemed * See Part I. Sect. 3. 173 a probable and consistent relation, because it accords, upon the whole, with the present state of our faculties, in which some degree of communicated knowledge appears to be essentially necessary to our advancement in moral and religious truth. But when, according to the same Scrip- tures, the faculties and conditions of men became afterwards deteriorated, it pleased God to give him another Revelation of his will, adapted to his altered situation. Now, whatever might be the state of our faculties on the former supposition, we are able to form a decided opinion concerning them, as they are supposed to have been when this second Revelation was given, because it is represented as the very same state in which they now are. Under these circumstances, the Scrip- tures describe man as unable to invent a religion for himself; but as still able to approve of what is taught him on divine authority ; and as possessed of competent powers to investigate the evidence of such a religion. They inform us, that this Re- velation was for many agefs confined chiefly 174 to a particular people, amongst whom it was kept up by frequent miracles ; but that the rest of mankind gradually lost its memory ; and that, for want of a sufficiently author- ised standard to guide their opinions, they fell into the grossest errors and idolatries. Query. Do not these accounts accord with our knowledge of heathen antiquity ? The same Scriptures assert, that at length it pleased God to republish this Revelation on a more extended and comprehensive scale, to adapt it to the common circum- stances of mankind, and to join with its pe- culiar doctrines, the precepts of a most pure and sublime morality. Now, although it is not to be expected that any man should give his assent to the truth of the Christian Revelation till he has fully satisfied himself of its historical veracity ; yet, if this be a fair account of these Revelations, which are contained in the Scriptures, we may appeal to our oppo- nents whether there be any thing in the supposition of their probable truth, which is in any degree absurd. Do not they ap- pear suited to the state of our rational 175 faculties? Is there any likelihood that a rude people, devoid of all traditionary knowledge, and cut off from all intercourse with the rest of mankind, would ever arrive at the knowledge of the true God, or reason out for themselves a consistent theory of religion ? Is there not plainly wanted in matters of Theology, a line to separate truth from mere speculation ? and can this line be drawn by any thing less than Divine authority ? The following quotation from Seneca will illustrate the general reasoning which has been here employed : Boni honestique noti- tiam nos docere natura non potuit ; semina nobis scientice dedit, scientiam non dedit. Nobis videtur observatio collegisse, et rerum scepe factarum inter se collatio per analo- giam nostro intellectu, et honestum et bonum judicante. Epist. 120. 176 SECTION IV. Is it any Objection to the Christian Reoela- tion, that it is founded on the Evidence of Miracles ? Having shewn* that we can form no conception of a Divine Revelation which is not made known to us in a supernatural manner, and the chief and distinguishing evidence of which does not arise from ex- ternal miracles addressed to the senses, it ought rather to be esteemed a presumptivie argument in favour of Christianity, than as any objection against it, that it professes to have furnished us with the only kind of evidence by which the truth of any Reve- lation can be established. That a miracle in itself implies no con- tradiction is plain, from the consideration that it is necessarily included in our con- ception of a Revelation, the possible truth * Part I. Sect. 4, m of which has been already admitted. But if a Revelation itself be possible, it cannot necessarily contain under it any contradic- tion; — a contradiction not being an object of power, and therefore implying a direct impossibility. Another proof of the possibility of mi- racles, which is less dependent on abstract reasoning, arises out of the popular per- suasion of mankind in all ages respecting their existence. Now, although this be not any sufficient proof that they have actually occurred, yet it is full and sufficient proof that they may have occurred, i. e. that they involve no direct contradiction or im- possibility. For how could any opinions become universally prevalent, the very sup- position of which was absurd and incre- dible? Another argument for the credibility of miracles arises out of the impossibility of tracing any necessary or immutable rela- tions between secondary causes and their effects. There is no connecting link, as far as we can discern, between any physical N 178 cause and its attendant consequence be- yond that of the positive will of the Cre- ator, that the one should constantly pre- cede, and the other should constantly follow* Hence all our philosophy must be limited by facts and experience. But if every phy- sical effect depends on the will of the Cre- ator, it is but in the nature of a positive appointment ; and the same authority which made the appointment can at any time suspend or revoke it. Whoever then argues for the impossibility of miracles, should first demonstrate the eternal and immutable relations of physical pheno- mena to each other. But this philosophy would prove equally at variance with faith and with reason ; for it would contradict all the principles of experimental science, as well as subvert all the doctrines of Natural Theology. After this view of the question, we ask, whether the miraculous evidence of the Christian religion does not bear a mani- fest reference to the constitution of the human mind, as corresponding to our ab- 179 stract conceptions of that particular spe- cies of evidence by which alone any Reve- lation could be authenticated, in connection with reason ? [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 50.] N % 180 SECTION V.- Does not Christianity derive some Credibility from its Agreement with the Circumstances of Mankind? * It has been remarked, that the evidence of miracles is precisely the same kind of evi- dence as that which is ordinarily addressed to our senses ; and that the belief of miracles, when reported to us upon testimony, is precisely the same kind of assent as that upon which the whole fabric of history de- pends. Hence we have deduced the pro- bability, that if any Revelation were afford- ed to mankind, it would accord with the existing state of their moral faculties, and that it would, in its general character, bear some resemblance to the course of Provi- dence. Now this is what we assert may be dis- covered in Christianity, when it is soberly and dispassionately compared with our moral * See Part L Sect 5. 181 faculties, and with the state of the world around us. The one is made to correspond to the other, so as to conduce to its plan and its purposes : they preserve a mutual relation, so that the one reflects light and evi- dence upon the other. Even in their difficul- ties, there is a degree of resemblance and proportion, that kind of general harmony and effect, which intimates that they may have proceeded from the same author, and may be intended for the same end, since they are carried on with a degree of intercourse which admits of their mutual illustration. For the full proof of these positions, we must refer to the numerous examples which are brought forward in the present work ; but it may be proper, on the present occa- sion, to mention the following striking par- ticulars. First, it is matter of plain and indisput- able fact, that the morality of the New Testament is essentially the same as that which the wisest moralists and legislators have ever inculcated; that there is not a single moral duty prescribed by the Gospel, which is not approved of by reason, and N-3 182 which is not favourable to human happi- ness; and that, even in its most mysterious doctrines, it still bears a manifest reference to our active virtues. Secondly, it cannot be questioned, that, whether this Religion be true or false, it is most intimately connected with the passions and affections of mankind ; that it appeals to our hopes and fears, bespeaks our love, pity, and gratitude, and that it leaves not untouched any motive, whether pathetic, sublime, or self-interested, which may bring us to co-operate with its purposes. Thirdly, it must also be admitted, that the author of Christianity has proposed his religion to the universal acceptance of all classes of society, but that it is addressed in a particular manner to the poor. Now if Christianity had not the principles of human nature upon its side, it could not have received the support and acceptance of those who are chiefly animated with natural sentiments. Perhaps the peculiar mode of teaching which Jesus adopted, his frequent parables, and his continual allusions to the material world, mightprove even something still more definite. The same observation 183 will apply to the other parts of the New Testa- ment. Thus St. Paul confutes the objections of those who denied the possibility of a Re- surrection, by appealing to our experience of nature in the ordinary course of vege« tation. Again, there are marks of this corres- pondence to nature, discoverable in the peculiar character of the founder of Chris- tianity ; " who was, in all respects, made like unto us, sin only excepted ;'" " who took not upon himself the nature of angels, but who took upon him the seed of Abraham." Had some celestial spirit been selected as the herald of our religion, we could not have accounted for this warm sympathy with the sentiments of our nature : but this difficulty is removed, when we remember that the author and finisher of the Christian faith resembled us in all the innocent emo- tions of humanity ; and that " he submitted even to be tempted, that he might have the power and compassion to succour those who are tempted." Lastly, the history of Christianity, in its temporal effects upon society, demonstrates n 4 184 that it is admirably suited to the character of man, to the constitution of the world, and to the general civilization of the spe- cies. Whether it be true or false in its divine pretensions, even its enemies have allowed it to possess this salutary influence on our social intercourse. But if this is allowed, it must be analogous to the prin- ciples of reason, and associated with the tendencies of God's moral government ; for whatever, upon the whole, leads to the ad- vancement of human happiness and know- ledge, must be consonant to the noblest principles of our nature, and must harmo- nise with the existing constitution of the world. "It should be remembered, however, that we do not adduce these facts, as if they po- sitively proved the truth of the Christian Revelation ; but merely as corresponding to our general anticipations, that, if any Revelation were given, it would act in uni- son and connection with the government of Providence, and in accordance with our moral sentiments. This, I apprehend, is as far as the argument can be applied, with re- 185 lation to those who do not previously admit the truth of Christianity. But to those who do admit it, yet who seek to divorce it from reason and nature, these reflections may be esteemed as a full and satisfactory proof of their dangerous errors and miscon- ceptions ; a proof, not depending upon the interpretation of a few dark and dubious passages of scripture, but drawn out of the vitals of its system, and arising from the whole scope and genius and tenor of the Christian dispensation. There are two books, as Bacon remarks, which have been laid before mankind for their earnest study and attention ; " the Scriptures, which reveal the will of God, and the Creation, which declares his power; whereof the latter is a key unto the former." * " As to the explanation of mysteries, we find that God himself condescends to the weakness of our capacity, and opens his mysteries, so that they may be best under- stood by us ; inoculating, as it were, his Revelations into the notions and compre- * De Augment. Sclent vol i. p. 64. 186 liensions of our reason." * " But the ca- "pita! precept," as the same author ex- cellently observes, " is this, that the eye of the mind be never taken off from things themselves ; but receive their images truly as they are. And God forbid that we should ever offer the dreams of fancy for a model of the world ; but rather, through the divine favour, should write a revelation and real view of the stamps and signatures of the Creator upon the creatures." f [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 51.] * De Augment. Scient. vol, ii. p. 296. f Vol. I p. 30. 187 SECTION VI. Is it not to this Revelation that we owe our settled Opinions respecting the Origin arid Creation of the World ? * In our modern systems of Natural Theo- logy, it is usual to deduce our obligations to God from considering him as the intelli- gent Maker of the universe. That our earth was created within a definite period of time, is an hypothesis which is now generally admitted ; and no doubts are en- tertained by Theists that the present system of Nature has not existed from eternity. But the truth of this assumption was by no means generally acknowledged amongst the ancient Theists ; none of whom, according to Mosheim, admitted the possibility that even Almighty Power could create any thing without some pre-existing substance. Such being the result of their enquiries concerning the creation, we may reasonably * See Part I. Sect. *>. 188 deduce the necessity that some farther light was required, beyond what reason and phi- losophy could furnish, to ascertain the pri- mitive origination of mankind, together with the date and origin of the material world. This light could have been im- parted to us only through the medium of a Revelation from the Author of nature. With this aid, we not only can discern the credibility of this hypothesis, but we can demonstrate the absurdity of every other ; though, if we had been left to the mere deductions of reason, it would appear as if the conception of a creation ex nihilo 9 were too bold a speculation for the most lofty genius to entertain. So just is the opinion of an inspired writer, that it is " through faith we understand the worlds " were made by the power of God ; and "that the objects of the visible creation "were made out of things which do not " appear ;" L e. without any pre-existing matter, and solely by the will and wisdom of the Almighty Creator. Such being now the acknowledged basis of Natural Theology, it must be granted, as ii 189 no slight presumption in favour of Revela- tion, that it professes to have furnished us with the only sure and indubitable evidence on which such information can be founded ; viz. upon that testimony which proceeds immediately from the Divine Being. As to the internal credibility of this doctrine, it is apparent from its being generally re- ceived as an article of rational Theism. Query. May we not trace to this dis- covery of Revelation, much of that clear- ness and precision which distinguish our modern systems of natural and moral science from those mystical conceits which so uni- versally mingled with the speculations of the ancients, on account of their ignorance of those data on which all sound and intel- ligible interpretations of nature must pro- ceed ? Could any clear or definite concep- tions be entertained concerning the laws of nature, till it was ascertained that those laws were the operations of an intelligent mind ; not the blind results of necessity, nor the capricious evolutions of chance ? [See Notes ^nd Illustrations,. No. 52.] 190 SECTION VII. Is there not some Credibility derived to Chris- tianity from its Connection with an Account of our Creation in a State of Innocence ? * We have already had occasion to remark, that it seems extremely natural reasonable beings should have some account rendered to them of their origin, and of the first creation of that world in which they live. We have also remarked, that it is in a high degree probable, the whole human race should have sprung from a single pair of progenitors ; and that unless we suppose them to have been created in a state of in- nocence and virtue, we cannot clear up the moral attributes of the Deity, nor establish the obligations of natural religion on a sure and satisfactory foundation. Now, these are considerations which pos- sess some degree of abstract probability, previously to all enquiries into the authen- * See Part I. Sect. 6 and 7. 191 ticity of the Mosaic history. As an hypo- thesis, it is like that of Copernicus before its demonstration by Newton, deserving of some attention for its beautiful simplicity? and for its conformability to the operations of nature. But since it is notorious, that unless the Scriptural records of the creation be received as authentic, there are no others to which we can appeal with any appear- ance of truth ; then whatever force there be in the previous probability, — that some account of the creation would have been afforded to us, — this force is concentrated on the only account which is in any degree credible. That man was originally created inno- cent, is a doctrine not only admitted by Christianity, but it forms the substratum of its whole Revelation : whatever credi- bility therefore is contained in this abstract supposition, must be transferred to the ac- count of our religion. And thus the amount of all these probabilities is to be thrown into the scale of the Christian Revelation ; there being no other religion in the world, besides the Jewish, which presents us with 192 a credible history of the origin of our species* or of the creation of our world in such a state as would not appear derogatory to the divine attributes. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 53.] 193 SECTION VIIL Is there not some Credibility derived to Chris- tianity from its Connection with an Account of our Fall from a State of Innocence ? * If there be any credibility in the supposition that man was originally created innocent, there must also be an equal credibility be- longing to the Scripture doctrine of the Fall ; because, as it is matter of plain ex- perience that he is not now innocent, so, upon this supposition, he must have lost this innocence at some period subsequent to his original creation. But in addition to this argument, we have also remarked several plain intimations both of internal and external nature, that he is now in a fallen and degraded condition, f Perhaps the phenomenon of war would be alone sufficient to justify such a suspi- cion. Indeed, the fact, to whatever cause it might be attributed, seems always to have * See Part I. Sect. f. f See Part I. Sect. 8, 9, 10. 194 been taken for granted, under every form of natural religion. The worship of man, in all ages and countries, has been the worship of a creature conscious of having offended his Maker, and desirous to depre- cate his displeasure by cries for mercy and attempts to atone for his misconduct. But if man had been persuaded that God had originally created him sinful and inclined to evil, I know not how we could have ac- counted for such sentiments without a mani- fest absurdity. Can any creature repent of being what God had originally made him, and had intended him to be ? Now, Christianity, in connection with Judaism, gives us an intelligible history of that degraded condition in which we at pre- sent are. It furnishes us with a brief, yet consistent narrative, that man by the abuse of his free agency fell into vice and misery from a previous state of holiness and happi- ness. Whether this account, considered historically, be regarded as true or false, it must at least be granted to be a possible and intelligible explanation of things as we now find them. Nor is it any objection 195 against this account, that it proceeds on the supposition of an hereditary principle, since the same principle has been shown to be extensively active amidst all the operations of nature. * It should be considered, then, that apart from all considerations of historical truth, there appears to be something probable and consonant to reason in the Scriptural ac- count of the fall of man from a state of innocence. It brings before us the essential holiness of God, whilst it explains to us both the dignity and the debasement of our own nature. It offers us so plain an account of the origin of evil, that whether we receive it as fact or fiction, we must allow it to be a possible solution of a difficulty which is otherwise totally inexplicable. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 54,] * See Parti. Sect. 11. o 2 196 SECTION IX. Is not Man described in the New Testament according to his present Moral Charac- ter ? * Upon this question the whole application of our argument depends. If man be treated by Christianity either as better or worse than we actually find him, there can be no connection between natural and revealed theology, and we must contrast, rather than combine such opposite systems. It is matter of plain fact, however* that man is delineated in the New Testament just as we find him sketched by philoso- phers, exhibited by historians, and experi- enced by ourselves. A being neither fault- lessly good nor totally depraved ; one who has strong inclinations both towards vice and virtue; who has a civil war raging in his faculties, " the flesh lusting against the spirit,* and the spirit lusting against the flesh." * See Part I. Sect. 1 allied to the opinions of moralists and legislators respecting that situation in which we are placed. Since it cannot be denied that this is the usual language of Natural Theo- logy concerning our experience and situ- ations as men, it ought to be esteemed a presumptive argument in favour of Reve- lation, that it depicts us as Christians under similar colours ; that it not only admits the reality of* these delineations, but that in all its precepts and doctrines, its promises and threatenings, it is founded on the suppo- sition of their truth. [See Notes and Illustrations, No, 56.] 205 SECTION XI. Does not Christianity acquire some Credibility from its having established the Belief of the Divine Unity ? * That the Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament assert, in the most direct and positive manner, the strict unity of the Divine Being, is allowed by all Christians, however they may differ in their interpre- tations of particular passages. Whatever difficulties we may find in our conceptions of the doctrines of the Unity, we feel ob« liged to acknowledge this doctrine in per- fect consistence with the Unity of God. It cannot, then, be equitable to urge that as an objection against the Revelation itself, which arises entirely out of the imperfections of our own faculties. But what still further evinces the force of our argument is this, that Revelation hath # See Part I. Sect. 20. 206 in fact been the great medium, both in ancient and modern times, of upholding in the world the belief of the Unity of the Divine Being. That it was so in antiquity, is plain from the history of the Jews, when compared to that of all other nations, whe- ther barbarous or civilized. * And that the same effect hath followed from the publi- cation of Christianity, is still more appa- rent in consequence of its wider diffusion. In this respect, even those immense regions which own the doctrines of Mahomet are indirectly obliged to Revelation. And thus it cannot be doubted that, whether Christi- anity be true or false, it has proved the most efficacious instrument of establishing this great doctrine of Natural Theology; and that its influence on this subject has been fax superior to all the efforts of reason anci philosophy. But when a sincere Theist has made these admissions, it surely becomes him to en- quire into the credentials of such a dispen- sation. If he acknowledges the doctrine of a Providence, let him seriously consider whether, upon his own principles of reli- ii 207 gious belief, it is probable that the most important doctrine of Natural Theology would have been consigned to the protec- tion of a fable and imposture ? [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 57.] 208 SECTION XII. Is there not a Universal Agreement in Na- tural and Revealed Theology respecting the Attributes of God ? * Though we are furnished by Christianity with a far clearer and more consistent ac- count of the divine attributes than could have been drawn up by our natural facul- ties, yet it does not appear to discover to us any attribute which is altogether new and original, or any which was before entirely unknown. As the power, wisdom, mercy, and goodness of God had all in some de- gree been revealed to us by the works of creation, so the eternity of his nature, and the immutability of his justice, had been deduced from the principles of reason. Without dwelling needlessly upon each of these attributes, let us consider these observations as they respect the love and the justice of God. " That God is love," is asserted in Scrip- ture, and has been acknowledged by thou- * See Part t Sect. 20. 209 sands who never heard the tidings of Christ- ianity. It is the favourite attribute which beams throughout creation ; but it glows with still brighter majesty in the system of redemption. The views of Natural Theo- logy, as they respect that goodness of the Creator, which is over all his works, seem to tally and correspond with those deline- ations of his mercy which prompted him to rescue his creatures from eternal ruin. If we were treated always harshly and cruelly under Providence, there would not exist the same resemblance and connection that we are now pointing out. But, upon the other hand, neither the systems of nature nor grace will warrant us in depicting the character of the Deity as that of blind benevolence, devoid of rec- titude and of moral justice. In nature, He is evidently a moral governor, the re- warder of virtue and the punisher of vice. There is severity as well as mercy discover- able in the administration of Providence ; a severity which brings down the most tre- mendous penalties on those who will not conform to the moral laws of nature. 210 Now, marks of the same administration are clearly discoverable in the gospel, the whole scheme of which is built upon the mercy and the justice of God, acting in con- cert and conjunction. The pardon which is offered, is offered to those who truly re- pent of their sins ; but the severest denun- ciations are held out against the profligate and impenitent. Nay, the pardon which is granted, is granted through the medium of a suffering Redeemer ; and thus, as Bishop Porteus beautifully expresses it, " we trem- ble at God's justice, even while we are within the arms of his mercy." [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 58.] 211 SECTION XIII. Is it any Objection to Christianity thai it dis~ covers to us some new Viezvs of the Divine Nature ? We have remarked % that, on the supposi- tion of any Revelation, it was highly pro- bable we should be instructed in some new facts relating to the Deity, but which did not contradict our previous notions respect- ing his goodness, or any of the divine attri- butes. It was also observed, that, in all probability, these discoveries would be made with the utmost plainness, free from all metaphysical subtilties, and rendered, in some degree, tangible and intelligible by their effects. Now, that such is the fact Ivith respect to Christianity, is evident from considering that it is the leading object of this Reve- lation to describe the Deity by those r.ela- * See Part I, Sect. 2L p 2 212 lions in which he stands to us, rather than by attempting to lay before us his abstract and essential nature. As our Father, God was indeed, in some degree, the object of that worship which was already paid by na- tural religion ; but his relation to us, as Redeemer and Sanctifier, could not appa- rently have been made known to us, but through the medium of Christianity. As soon as these relations are made known, we perceive our obligations to be strictly of a moral kind, the whole difference, as Bishop Butler remarks, between these relations and the former, consisting in this, that the first are discoverable by our natural reason, whilst the others are not discoverable but by some extraordinary Revelation. " It is one of the advantages," says Paley, " of the Revelations which we acknowledge, that whilst they reject idolatry, with its many pernicious accompaniments, they in- troduce the Deity to human apprehensions under an idea more personal, more deter- minate, more within its compass, than the Theology of nature can do. And this they do, by representing Him exclusively under 213 the relation in which he stands to ourselves* and for the most part, under some plain character resulting from that relation, or from the history of his providences. This method suits the span of our intellect much better than the universality which enters into the idea of God, as deduced from the sources of nature. When, therefore, these representations are well founded, in point of authority, (for all depends upon that,) they afford a condescension to the state of our faculties, of which they who have most reflected on the subject will be the first to acknowledge the want and value." Na- tural Theology, ch. 23. p. 448. N. B. It is the object of these reflections to show that the Scriptures have represented God chiefly after a relative manner, not to insinuate, in any degree, that the doctrine of the Trinity may be understood as im- plying nothing more than the relative ma- nifestations of the Deity. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 59.] p 3 214 SECTION XIV. Is not the Deity made known to us in Revealed Theology, chiefly after a relative and ana- logical Manner ? We have remarked * that all our concep- tions of God, his nature, and his attributes, as made known by reason and as described in the language of natural religion, are symbolic analogies drawn from the reflec- tions of our own minds, and from the rela- tions in which we stand towards each other, and afterwards applied with a partial and yet real reference to the Divine perfections. Now, the Scriptures have not only adop- ted this language of natural theology, by commonly speaking of God after a similar manner, but Christianity has made use of the same relative and symbolical style, in those peculiar manifestations of the Deity upon which the distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel depend. When this Revela- * See Part I. Sect. 22. 215 tion describes the Godhead as consisting of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit — our Maker, our Redeemer, our Sanctifier — it employs the very same style which we have already remarked as pre- vailing over natural theology, only that this style is here rendered still more definite and precise. And thus all the offices of Christ are described after the same analogical man- ner. Whether He is mentioned as the Me- diator betwixt God and Man, or as an Advocate and Intercessor, our High-Priest, our Ransom and propitiatory Sacrifice, still there is the same reference to the facts and circumstances of human nature. These offices and characters are delineated under ideas which are borrowed from things be- low, and which there are made use of as " the patterns of the things in the Heavens. 5 ' If there be any force in these remarks, they will show how false and frivolous are those objections which are frequently brought against Christianity for its describing the Deity after a figurative and relative manner. Had there been no other answer, it would have been sufficient to reply, that it makes p 4 216 use of the very same language as that which is employed by natural theology, and that it appears to be the only channel by which such an imperfect creature as man could have been made acquainted with these di- vine mysteries. But when we are informed by Revelation, that man was made " after the image of God/' we can gain something like a glimpse into the foundations of this sublime philosophy ; we can conceive of the truth and reality of that connection be- tween things divine and human, on which these relative and analogical representations depend. Query. May we not from such views obtain a more clear and philosophic percep- tion of the typical representations of the Old Testament ? [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 60,} 217 SECTION XV. Does not Christianity derive some Credibility from its Appointment of a Mediator betwixt God and Man ? We have remarked, that, on the supposition of any Revelation *, the office and character of a Mediator seem to be almost necessarily implied. How this office and character should be supported, it might not be pos- sible to determine; but that some medi- ation, i. e. the intervention of some superior intelligence, should take place, this it seems natural to expect in any Revelation of God to reasonable beings. The same fact is also rendered highly probable from the whole course and con- struction of nature, in which there is a general mediation carried on ; so that we derive most of our advantages through the instrumentality of others. " There is a provision made in nature," says Bishop * See Part I, Sect. 23. 218 Butler *, " that all the bad consequences of a man's actions should not always inevitably follow. Persons may do a great deal them- selves towards preventing the bad conse- quences of their own follies, and still more may be done by themselves together with the assistance of others, their fellow-crea- tures ; which assistance nature requires and prompts us to do." In confirmation of this reasoning, it has been observed, that " the generality of the wisest heathens thought it agreeable to rea- son to make use of subordinate intelligences, demons, or heroes, by whom they put up their prayers to the superior gods, hoping, that by the mediation of those intercessors, the unworthiness of their own persons and the defects of their prayers might be sup- plied, and that they might obtain such merciful and gracious answers to their prayers, as they could not presume to hope for upon their own account." f To grant pardon to sinners through a Mediator is also far more humbling, and, * See Analogy, Part II. Sect. 5. f Clarke's Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 195, 219 therefore, more beneficial to the penitent, than to grant it immediately to himself. It appears also more for the honour of him who remits the punishment to remit it through the mediation of one who is inno- cent, than to grant it at once to the guilty. It impresses us with a far livelier notion of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, than if we had received this pardon simply in answer to our prayers. Indeed, if men would but look into the human mind, and consider the course which is generally pursued when one party of very inferior rank has given just cause of offence to another of superior dignity, they would cease to argue against the Christian doctrine of mediation, as if it bore no correspond- ence to the principles of reason and to the ordinary experience of human life. For this is the general method in which a recon- ciliation is usually effected. And though we are ready to grant that these illustrations by no means come up to parallel cases ; and that there is something in the mediation of Christ which far exceeds the range of our conceptions ; yet they are sufficient to 220 silence all objections to the principle of mediation abstractly considered. They ma- nifestly point out the connection of this doctrine with the ordinary operations of our minds ; and though they do not and cannot explain this mystery, yet they show that it is a mystery which retains a similitude to the course and constitution of nature. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 6L] 221 SECTION XVI. Does not the miraculous Incarnation of Christ, in some Degree, correspond to the Miracle which must have taken place at the First Creation of Man ? " Except we believe the world to have been eternal," says Ogden, " and the race of mankind to have been continued down to this day by an infinite succession, without any beginning at all ; we must be obliged to acknowledge that at least two human persons were brought into being in some way different from that which is now the established course of nature. All persons cannot have been born as men are now. The Redeemer of mankind, therefore, was not the only person who had not two human parents. What once was, might be again, or something equally different from that which is now the object of experience." Sermons, vol. i. p. 150. N. B. This observation is only intended to show, that upon the common principles 222 of natural theology, we admit a fact relating to the history of man, which bears some analogy to the miraculous birth of the founder of Christianity, as stated in the Scriptures. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 62.2 228 SECTION XVII. Does not the Mediatorial Character of Christ, as drawn in the Scriptures 3 correspond xvith the most rational Views which can be enter- tained concerning this Office ? If we allow the propriety of some Medi- ator being appointed between God and man, (a supposition which is almost neces- sarily included in the idea of any Revela- tion*,) it seems impossible for reason to suggest, or for imagination to feign, any character so complete and appropriate as that which is sustained by the Author of Christianity as He is represented in the New Testament. Here is a Being equally related to the Divine and the human natures, with power, excellence, and dignity, which might render his mediation effectual, considered as the work of Omnipotence and Independence; and yet so identified with those whom he • See Parti. Sect. 23- 224 came to rescue, that he might sympathise with all their infirmities, and be touched with the feeling of their wants. Now that this character comes up to our notions of a com- plete Mediator, is matter of self-evident certainty ; and it ought to be allowed to be a presumptive argument in its favour. If our ignorance of the manner in which this conjunction of the Divine with the human nature is effected, should be allowed to overturn our sentiments of its moral fitness, then I apprehend that by a parity of rea- soning we ought to become universally sceptical, because the " nexus" between cause and effect is universally unknown. The connection between mind and body is at least as mysterious as this connection between a supreme and subordinate intel- lect, and yet no man doubts of the reality of the former. The truth is, that upon subjects of this spiritual nature, we cannot look for any thing beyond moral evidence 3 that we have not faculties to discern any thing beyond the propriety and fitness of God's dealings with mankind. Thus, if the office of a 225 Mediator seems to us highly expedient in any Revelation ; and if this office appears to demand a mutual relationship to God and man, it ought not to be urged as any objection to Christianity, that we cannot comprehend the precise mode in which the divine and the human natures are con- nected. This objection, if pushed to its full extent, is an objection to all our re- searches into natural and moral science. The evidence which is within our compre- hensions is this, that we are in want of such a character ; that our necessities appear to demand it ; that it implies no direct contra- diction ; and that, consequently, it may be conceived within the limits of infinite power. It is precisely on subjects of this nature that it might be supposed we should have received some further information by a Di- vine Revelation. That mankind have always been disposed to feign some intermediate beings who might act as their intercessors, is a notorious fact ; for it is blended with the universal history of idolatry and Poly- theism. This fact, to whatever perverted consequences it may have led, is also a clear Q 226 manifestation of the tendencies of the hu- man mind. But these tendencies are the result of that constitution which hath been established by the Author of Nature. If, then, the same Author were to republish his will in the form of such a Revelation as that contained in the Scriptures, is it not probable that it would be addressed to those tendencies which he had implanted ? Nor is that infinite condescension of the Deity which is here pre-supposed, any ob- jection to the credibility of this doctrine respecting a Mediator. There are traces of the same condescension, though of far in- ferior magnitude, discoverable in all the works of Nature. His Providence watches over us at every moment. He takes care of the smallest insect and of the meanest reptile. These are the doctrines of Natural as well as of Revealed Theology. Why, then, should it seem incredible, if, to ac- complish certain great and important pur- poses, respecting man's salvation, He should have stooped to take our nature upon him ? Is it not the noblest picture which we c&n form of his love to represent him as the 12 227 Shepherd who came to * seek and to save his sheep which were lost ?" Is not there a presumptive argument in favour of these views of Christianity, arising out of the sen- timents of human nature ? If the very hairs of our head are numbered ; if not a single sparrow falls to the ground unheeded, (truths which we may learn from the microscope, not less than from the Scriptures,) why should we not believe, that if the union of the divine with the human nature were ex- pedient to save a world of sinners from perishing eternally, the same condescension might be exerted which Christianity assigns to its author ; and which, whether it be true or false, must be allowed to be congenial to the moral hopes and wishes of mankind ? [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 63.] Q 2 228 SECTION XVIII. Does not Christianity derive some Credibility from the singular Character of its Founder?* If any well-informed man who had never heard any thing of the Christian religion, were, for the first time, to take up the New Testament, the earliest supposition which would probably enter into his mind might be this — that the character of Jesus, as drawn by the Evangelists, was one of pure imagination, and entirely fictitious. He would conclude, I think, that the whole portrait was the result of a splendid and romantic fancy ; something like that of Cyrus as delineated by Xenophon, or of Telemachus, as feigned by Fenelon; and he would feel assured, that the writers were endued with the most extraordinary powers of moral judgment and poetical fancy. But if he had sufficient evidence laid before him that these writers were totally unequal to invent such a character, and if * See Part I. Sect 23. 229 from numberless coincidences he was ob- liged to admit this portrait to have beerl drawn from life, then, I think, that previous to all minute investigation of the historical evidence on which Christianity is founded, there would arise in his mind a preposses- sion in favour of that religion which had drawn its origin from such a unique and wonderful personage. The truth is this, that amidst all the variety of characters which historians and poets and philosophers have left us, there is not one for real originality which approaches to that of Jesus. His divine pretensions ; his manner of teaching ; his supernatural birth ; his profound knowledge of the hu- man mind ; his appeals to prophecy ; his elevated morality ; his sublime doctrines respecting a future life ; his numerous mi- racles ; the accounts of his death, resur- rection, and ascent into Heaven : these particulars are all set forth with an origin- ality, and yet with a plainness and sim- plicity, to which there is nothing second or similar in the annals of mankind. Let any man turn from the Gospels to the Koran, 0. 3 230 and he will perceive the force of these observations. Now, what we would observe is this, that according to the constitution of the human mind, we are compelled to view such phenomena as collectively forming a presumptive argument in favour of Chris- tianity. There is a bare possibility, no doubt, that all this may have been the result of artifice, imposture, and profound duplicity, but still, the probability lies on the other side, at least it gives that plausibility to these pretensions which demands inves- tigation. Where there is so much appear- ance of truth, we ought not to consider the subject as if it were undeserving of a serious and candid enquiry. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 64.] 231 SECTION XIX. Is it not a presumptive Evidence in Favour of Christianity that it professes to instruct Mankind by the Example of its Founder^ as well as by his Precepts ? * It has been thought the highest commend- ation of history, that it is philosophy teach- ing by example ; but it is not a less com- mendation of the Gospel, that it is piety taught after the same practical and personal manner. Christianity is the only religion which professes to offer its founder as a sinless and faultless pattern for all to imitate ; and I think the boldness and originality of such a profession, combined with the ac- knowledged utility of this mode of instruc- tion, supposing it to be real, and the appa- rent ease with which it might be detected, supposing it to be false, gives it on this account alone a fair claim to the attention of reflecting men. # See Part I. Sect. 24. Q 4 232 Allowing this pattern of its founder to be real, it must be granted to be the most striking and effectual of all methods to dis- cipline and improve its followers. There is, there can be, no authority equal to that of the example of the founder of a divine religion. This would be true, even if the author of Christianity had held no other office than that of a teacher sent by God ; but when it is connected with his divine pretensions, and with his character of a suffering Redeemer, one who professed ;c to die for our sins, and to rise again for our justification," then the force of this example transcends the utmost limit of our conceptions. But on the other hand, supposing it to be false, it is clearly the most daring and venturesome of all impositions; so much so, that I never recollect to have heard of any impostor who pretended that his life and actions were to be taken as an exact tran- script of his doctrines, and who proposed his own example as the test and criterion of his religion. Whilst that humility which consists in a sense of our numerous 233 imperfections, would prevent an honest man from making such presumptuous profes- sions ; the shame and terrors of conviction would operate to hinder hypocrisy from proposing such dangerous claims to inves- tigation. The faultless perfection which is claimed for the life and example of the author of Christianity, whether it be true or false, is a claim which ought to be investigated. If true, it is of inestimable value to human virtue, it is the shortest and readiest of all methods to eifect the purposes of a reve- lation. If false, it admits of plain and pal- pable detection. It is such a fair and equitable challenge for enquiry, that no man can refuse to examine it. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 65.] 234 SECTION XX. Does not Christianity acquire some Credibility from its proposing a Sacrifice and Atone- ment for our Sins f Since any Revelation, as we have remark- ed *, to become suitable and serviceable to mankind, must have contained some doc- trines relative to sacrifice and atonement, it ought to be esteemed a presumptive evi- dence in favour of the Christian Revela- tion, that it professes to furnish us with some extraordinary discoveries on this sub- ject. " If we consult our natural sentiments," says Adam Smith, " we are apt to fear lest, before the holiness of God, vice should ap- pear to be more worthy of punishment than the weakness and imperfection of human nature can ever seem to be of reward. Man, when about to appear before a being * See Part I. Sect. 25. 235 of infinite perfection, can feel but little con- fidence in his own merit, or in the imper- fect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow-creatures, he may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfections of others. But the case is quite different when about to appear before his Infinite Creator. To such a being, he can scarce imagine that his littleness and weakness should ever seem to be the proper object either of esteem or of reward. But he can easily conceive how the numberless violations of duty, of which he has been guilty, should render him the object of aversion and punishment. Nei- ther can he see any reason why the divine indignation should not be let loose without any restraint upon so vile an insect as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the justice, but that he must entreat it from the mercy of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thoughts of his past conduct, are upon this account the 236 sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means which he has left for ap- peasing the wrath which he knows he has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and naturally fears lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the crime by the most importunate lamentations of the criminal. Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement, he imagines must be made for him beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the divine justice can be reconciled to his manifest offences. " The doctrines of Revelation coincide in every respect with these original an- ticipations of nature ; and as they teach us how little we can depend on the imper- fection of our own virtues, so they show us, at the same time, that the most power- ful intercession has been made, and the most dreadful atonement has been paid for our manifold transgressions and iniquities." Such were the opinions of this eminent writer, when he first published his cele- 237 brated Theory of Moral Sentiments. (See Magee On the Atonement, vol. i. p. 209.) They are here cited as affording a fine illus- tration of the connection of Christianity with the philosophy of the human mind, and as pointing out the relation of its sacri- ficial doctrines to the principles of reason and the suggestions of conscience. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 66.] 238 SECTION XXL Is not the Doctrine of Spiritual Assistance? as contained in the Scriptures, upon the whole, congenial to the Sentiments of Rea- son? That good men are under the more imme- diate influence and protection of the Su- preme, and that our minds, not less than our bodies, are under the care of a super- intending Providence, has been the sup- port and persuasion of piety in all ages.* The most unlettered savage, who prays to God, virtually takes for granted in his prayers this doctrine of spiritual co-ope- ration. All that is peculiar to Christianity, on this subject, consists in its attributing such aid and assistance to the more immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, instead of leaving it, as in Natural Theology, to come from the Deity, as known to us by nature. But this, since it depends on a disco- * See Part I. Sect. 26. 239 very peculiar to Revelation, can form no difficulty whatever as to the doctrine itself; for if we admit the fact, that the minds of good men are under a divine influence, what difficulty can there be in confining this in- fluence to a particular character of the Deity, which could not have been discovered by reason ? Upon the supposition of any Revelation, it is clear that some discoveries would be made known to us, which we could not have gained from Natural Theology ; and it is also probable, as we have remarked, that some of these discoveries would relate more immediately to the Deity. If, then, the doctrine of spiritual aid be a doctrine of natural religion, what could be more likely, that in the event of such Revelation, this doctrine would have been confirmed with greater force, and delineated with greater exactness ? On this head, Christianity has made the smallest possible deviation from the senti- ments of natural reason. It is not a change of doctrine, but a discovery of the mode in which this doctrine is brought down to us. 240 A religious theist believes, that when he prays to God in affliction, he may derive help and consolation from the Author of his being. He believes that his virtues may be aided and strengthened by a divine influ- ence. The Christian acknowledges the same doctrine; but he attributes this aid more immediately to the Holy Spirit. Revelation has thus gathered up the scattered fragments of natural faith ; and has formed them into an edifice of higher beauty, of juster propor- tions, and of more solid stability. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 67»] 241 SECTION XXII. Is there not some Connection discoverable be~ tween the Sufferings of Christ and those ordinary Dealings of Providence which show that Adversity is the School of moral Excellence ? It is the doctrine of Scripture *that there was a certain propriety and fitness in those trials which Jesus underwent as the high priest and captain of our salvation, that it became him to pass through a suffering, ra- ther than a triumphant road, in his progress as the author and finisher of our faith. Now, as the fitness must have arisen from his relation to us, and not abstractedly on his own account, it may be allowed us, with all humility, to enquire wherein He was thus made conformable to his brethren. This conformability to human nature is discoverable, I apprehend, in the general principle that suffering and adversity is the * SeeHeb. ch.ii, v. 10 -18, 242 school of moral excellence ; " and that, as " the race of mankind being intended for " a higher station amongst the works of " their Creator, are trained up for it by the " trials and troubles of which the world is " full ; so also many a particular person, " whom God hath designed to raise up in " the present life to an extraordinary de- " gree of greatness, has in the wisdom of " his providence, been exercised by a series " of afflictions as remarkable as that ad- " vancement to which they have conducted " him." * It has been the observation of moralists in all ages, that some of the worthiest and best of mankind have passed through scenes of remarkable trial and suffering. " If the " Jews," says Bishop Leng f , " would have " consulted their own scriptures impartially, " they might have known, that many of " their own prophets and holy men, whom " they acknowledged to have been messen- " gers of God, were men of suffering and "grievously persecuted, sometimes even to * Ogden's Sermons, vol. I. p. 192. f Sermon XVI. p. 485—487. 243 " death ; and farther, they might have " known, from these very prophets who " foretold his coming, that he was to be a " man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. " This, therefore, ought not to have offend- " ed them. The Gentiles might have " learned, from some of their most esteemed " philosophers, that outward pomp and " greatness, power and riches of the world, " are rather to be despised than admired, by " a truly great man : that no good man is " the less beloved of God for being placed " in a state of poverty and contempt, as " Epictetus and other excellent persons " aver ; or for being hated and put to death " by their fellow-citizens, as Socrates, one "' of the brightest instances of heathen vir- " tue : that the most eminent examples, and " such as were fittest to teach and reform " the world, had been tried in the furnace " of affliction : that misery and suffering is " so far from being inconsistent with the " greatest virtue and goodness, that, accord- " ing to Plato's reasoning, to make the cha- " racter of a truly righteous man, he must " be stript of all things in the world, even of r 2 244 " the credit and reputation of being righteous, " because, if he be thought a just person by " the world, honour and worldly advantage " will be his portion ; and then it cannot be " known whether it be real virtue, or the ad- " vantages of it, which he pursues ; he must, " therefore, be reckoned wicked and unjust, " while he retains the strictest justice and 66 integrity unshaken, even to death; and then " the consequence will be, that such a just 66 man will be exposed to all manner of ill " treatment and suffering ; and at last will be "put to a cruel death, or crucified" * If the founder of Christianity had been * Tov Vikoujov Ig-cupev tcq koyco, aytga. u7r\8V x, yevvctiov, xa? Al<%6\ov, » Soxiiv aAX* avaj ctyo&ov s^sKovto., 'A)Aoi/ sv sirs tov dmetia, sire twv tioogeabv rs x, tjju.gov evexet 9 Toidr®* enj* yv^voirs^ dvj vraLvrm, -srA^v dixouovuvYis, x, woHjIe®' hvoa/llcos dictxsi(j,sv& roo iffgjlegop (jxllxw sc.) fjujtiev yoip aS ajxslas-al^ juv 8s S/xai^ — IgScn Ss TaSs on ovla) foctxsl- lhsv& 6 S/xai©' fut$-iya)