Class 
 
 D -k 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
A PLEA FOR HEDONISM 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 John C. Palmer, Jr., A. M., Ph. D., 
 
 it 
 
 Wellsburg, W. Va. 
 
 For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, on Examination, in Course A. Philosophy, in 
 
 the Po8t-Oraduate Department of the University of Wooster, 
 
 June, 1903. 
 
 Reprinted from the Post-Graduate and Wooster Quarterly for July, 1903. 
 
 Herald Printing Co., 
 Wooster, Ohio. 
 
• 
 
 
» * 
 
 * 
 
 * * 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 Or CONGRESS 
 
 '* IwASHINGXON 
 
 
 Joto C. Palmer, Jr., P,h. D., Wellsburg, W. Va. 
 
 A Graduating Thesis;. Course A, Philosophy. 
 
 I.. INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 It is the purpose of this essay to show that the ulti- 
 mate ethical question is the question, of the consequences 
 of our actions. Ethics has to deal with human conduct 
 and its consequences. The consequences of conduct 
 determine the permissibility or advisability of the 
 conduct. I expect further to show that it is the pleasant 
 or painful consequences of our acts in which we are inter- 
 ested. If we were not sentient creatures, that is, if we 
 merely had knowledge without any feeling of pleasure or 
 pain in that knowledge, with that knowledge there would 
 be no problem of conduct, for there would be no conduct. 
 In other words, our sentience lies at the base of our activ- 
 ity. 1 To put the matter in terms of mechanics, it is 
 because we find ourseves in unstable equilibrium, in a 
 state of unrest or discomfort, that we act. Our actions 
 are for the sake of establishing a new equilibrium in our 
 sentient consciousness. 
 
 *See Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, Page 338. 
 
9 
 
 
 A Plea for Hedoi&Bin: 
 
 •f 
 
 In the following discussion, Iassupadthat a man is a per- 
 sonality , a center of * intelligent activity. He is different 
 from the brook ap,^ the growing tree, even though we can- 
 not state the difference "in terms of human speech. He is 
 different again from a meracreature of instinct and impulse. 
 His intelligence makes him an original center of force, 
 even though we, cannot explain the nature of voluntary 
 activity, or conduct.. These assumptions are not 
 intended to settle any metaphysical controversy. But 
 unless we make such assumptions, man becomes a mere 
 machine, an irresponsible and delusive mechanism. 
 Ethics, from her place as the queen of science, is degraded 
 to a subordinate place among the mechanical sciences. 
 Such a conclusion would involve consequences too serious 
 to be lightly accepted. If man is a machine, political 
 science and theology are as meaningless as astrology and 
 magic. 3 
 
 Hedonism does not require the assumption of a pur- 
 pose in the universe, yet it welcomes such an assumption, 
 so long as one takes all the facts of human existence into 
 account. Neither does Hedonism assume the immor- 
 tality of the human soul,, nor even its existence after 
 death. But here again it welcomes any light which re- 
 ligion or theology can throw upon the subject of man's 
 destiny. Starting with man as a sentient, intelli- 
 gent consciousness, Hedonism seeks to determine his re- 
 lation to the rest of Universe, and what share he has in 
 the evolution of his destiny. We begin neither on the side 
 of the Optimist nor the Pessimist, neither with the Stoic 
 nor the Epicurean. With whom we shall end depends on 
 evidence which shall be forthcoming. 
 
 As one reads treatise after treatise on the subject of 
 ethics, he feels that [the writers are, after all, consciously 
 or unconsciously, striving to answer the same question and 
 that question is: How may Human Welfare be Advanced? 
 It does not matter that the real questionis lost sight of in 
 the midst ofmetaplrpsicaland psychological meanderings. 
 It is ever present, like the theme in a technical musical com- 
 
 2 Cf. W. Wallace, Lectures aud Essays, pages 250 and 251. 
 
'A Eleafor Hedonism. 8 
 
 position. Metaphysical, psychological-, and phygiological 
 discussions interest us, because^ we* nope that they will 
 throw some light on the ultimate .question of human 
 welfare and human destiny. 
 
 Ethics, is then, essentiaflyva science of man, his wel-. 
 fare and his destiny. If ethics puts to itself the question, 
 why should this thing be done, and that omitted, it is 
 because the former tends to promote human welfare, 
 while the latter would retard or prevent it. 
 
 But the term welfare is a broad, abstract term, 
 about whose content and meaning there maybe difference 
 of opinion. Welfare is equivalent to doiog or faring well. 
 But what is "well"? The ethical problem, then, is 
 merely stated when reduced to terms of human welfare. 
 Before we can decide finally what is "well" for a man or for 
 the human race, we should know something of the origin 
 and nature of the individual and the race. We ought to 
 know the place of man the individual, and man the species 
 in the universe. From the standpoint of Hedonism, the 
 problem of human conduct cannot receive a final solution 
 till we are aware of every fact which can affect the conse- 
 quences of human activity. But at the seme' time, the 
 Hedonist insists on our making the best of such facts as 
 are available. Because we are not aware of all the conse- 
 quences of our acts, we are by no means justified in 
 neglecting such consequences as are now familiar. Uncer- 
 tainty as to the ultimate purpose or destiny of the race 
 should not diminish my interest in my own personal 
 destiny and welfare. 
 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, ignorance of man's 
 nature and origin and his relation to the rest of the uni- 
 verse greatly hindered any intelligent answer to the ques- 
 tion as to his place and function in the universe at large. 
 So long as each individual was looked upon as a special 
 piece of workmanship, shaped according to a set pattern, 
 like a statue or a piano, it was impossible to arrive at a 
 correct idea of man's place in Nature. But when the doc- 
 trine of evolution made it possible to study man as a 
 growth, a mind among minds, an animal among animals 
 and a living organism among living organisms, subject 
 
4 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 to definite laws and principles, his present character and 
 future possibilities became a matter of supremest interest. 
 When we apply the doctrine of natural selection to man, 
 every trait of character and shade of temperament is 
 pregnant with meaning; every institution, past or pre- 
 sent, is worthy of study as having been a help or hindrance 
 to human progress. But in our study of man and his en- 
 viroment, we must not forget an important distinction, 
 which is frequently overlooked. Nature, so far as 
 we can learn, is the product of a single system of 
 forces, working apparently according to a harmonious 
 plan. (Whether nature is the product of mere chance, of 
 preordained pupose, or of other Power, this is not the 
 place to inquire. ) Man, on the other hand, according to 
 our previous assumption, is a center of force within a 
 force, a plan within a plan. His evolution is the combin- 
 ed product of nature and his own intelligence, and the 
 share of each of these forces, in the product-, is at this 
 moment a warmly disputed question, as the recent works 
 of such men as Benjamin Kidd, A. E. Taylor, and others 
 bear evidence. I shall have more to say on the subject in a 
 later part of this essay; at present it will suffice to say 
 that in my opinion the part played by intelligence in the 
 development of man and human institutions has been 
 much larger than evolutionary philosophers are inclined 
 to admit. Most of our ethical concepts and beliefs, it 
 seems to me, are the result of the perception or the sup- 
 posed perceptions of the consequences of actions. Even 
 our ethical emotions are to a. considerable extent, altho 
 by no means altogether, the product of individual and 
 racial experience. By means of intelligence and its in- 
 strument, language, the individual and the society of to- 
 day are the heirs of a rich estate in experience. Our con- 
 cepts and beliefs have come down to us like precious heir- 
 looms, well tested and ready for use; not, however, thro' 
 inherited brain and nerve tissue, but by example, train- 
 ing, custom, institutions, and word of mouth. This view, 
 I am well aware, is in opposition both to those of the in- 
 tuitionists, led by such men as James Martineau and 
 Henry 6alderwood, on the one hand, and to those of the 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 5 
 
 evolutionists, led by Herbert Speneer, A. Sutherland, 
 and Leslie Stephen, on the other. 
 
 The intuitionists go too far in making our ethical 
 emotions, concepts, and beliefs, purely innate or intuitive, 
 and hence inexplicable, and not to be tampered with. On 
 the other hand, the evolutionists go too far in trying to 
 explain the origin of all our emotions, concepts and 
 beliefs by means of evolution alone. While we all admit o 
 that the civilized man of today is somewhat superior to 
 the savage of six thousand years ago in ethical emotions, 
 yet when we reflect, on the one hand, on the immense prog- 
 ress in emotional and ethical development which the negro 
 has undergone during the three hundred years of his sojourn 
 in America, and on the other hand on the fact that the 
 child of refined parents, thrown by chance among savages 
 (a very common occurrence in colonial days in America) 
 exhibits no higher ethical emotions, concepts and beliefs 
 than his savage fellows, we are forced to the conclusion 
 that most of the ethical emotions, concepts and beliefs are 
 institutional in origin, that is, the results of the accumu- 
 lated experience of the race, gathered and transmitted in 
 maxims, proverbs, institutions and even in the very 
 words of the language itself. Suppose, for instance, that 
 a million infants were selected from the most 
 refined homes in the world and transported to a deserted 
 island unfrequented by men, and sustained by ravens 
 until they were old enough to care for themselves; is it 
 not almost certain that the children would in time become 
 the most degraded savages? Indeed, unless the island 
 were entirely free from noxious animals and poisonous 
 plants, it is very probable that the whole colony would 
 perish in a very few years. Be this as it may, I cannot 
 conceive that the rapid development of ethical concepts 
 in western Europe within the last few centuries could be 
 the result of so slow a progress as evolution. Leslie 
 Stephen, in his English Utilitarians, remarks "the sudden 
 awakening of the public conscience" 3 in England on the 
 slave trade just prior to the French Revolution. Before 
 
 3 The Eng. Util. Vol. I, page 1 13-14. 
 
6 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 that awakening, the most respectable people engaged in 
 the trade without a qualm of conscience. The generation 
 which is just passing in America can recall a like awaken- 
 ing hereon the slave question. Even the time which has 
 elapsed since the days of Socrates, Plato, and Ariostotle 
 is not sufficient to account for the marked advance on 
 Grecian ethical concepts which is so strikingly depicted 
 in T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics. Much less could 
 the slow progress of mental evolution account for the 
 wonderful changes in ethical concepts which A. Suther- 
 land has so masterfully pictured in his Origin and Growth 
 of the Moral Instinct. But when we note the strides 
 which the sciences have made since the days of Socrates, 
 and particularly within the last three centuries, when we 
 recall the progress of the arts and of our knowledge of all 
 that relates to man's physical and social well-being, we need 
 not be surprised at the rapid changes which have taken place 
 in men's ethical notions. And when we refleet upon the 
 force of habit, the strength of custom, the tenacity of inher- 
 ited beliefs, and the universal ignorance of the ultimate 
 foundation of institutions in general, we can only be sur- 
 prised that opinions have yielded as rapidly as they have 
 to the wave of progress 4 . But if the evolutionists have in 
 their zeal gone too far in ascribing the whole of man's prog- 
 ress to the power of evolution, they have, until the last few 
 years, failed to emphasize sufficiently the importance of 
 the part which nature plays in developing the anti-selfish 
 or altruistic emotions. So far as I know, Benjamin Kidd, 
 in his social evolution, was the first to call attention to 
 this remarkable fact. I shall discuss the subject. 
 At present I need only say that I regard this peculiar fact, 
 that nature develops the race in opposition to the indi- 
 vidual's development of himself, as one of the greatest 
 marvels in science and at the same time the solution of 
 the apparent contradiction which runs all through human 
 life and activity. I believe it offers the only solution of 
 the ethical problem, the only basis for harmonizing con- 
 flicting ethical theories. In this brief essay I can do no 
 
 *See I<eslie Stephen, the Kng. Util. Vol. I, page 5. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. f 
 
 more than blase a lew trees along the rojate, leaving 
 to others the work of clearing a broad highway. 
 
 II. THE CRITERION OF CONDUCT. 
 
 1. Evolution and Ethics. 
 
 As I stated in the preliminary section, ethics was still 
 in need of an element in the form of evolution, before it 
 could give a satisfactory .and rational account of human 
 activity and conduct. So long as human instincts and 
 human prejudices had to be accepted as inexplicable facts, 
 it was impossible to distinguish instinctive and impulsive 
 activity from voluntary conduct. No one could gainsay 
 the arguments of the intuitionist, no matter how absurd 
 his pretensions might be. The claim of the Morman and 
 Mohammedan of the right to enjoy more than one wife, 
 the claim of the cannibal to eat his enemy, and the claim 
 of the hermit to the right to live an isolated life were 
 equally unassailable. But since evolution has pointed 
 out the probable origin and the growth of not only 
 nearly every human institution, but of the very moral 
 sentiments themselves, intuitionism is, in the words of 
 Professor Muirhead, "entirely out of court." 6 The ideas 
 of law and gradual development throw a new light on 
 every phase of human nature and human institutions. 
 According to the doctrine of evolution, the individual 
 man, as well as man the species, is the product of a 
 gradual development; and this development is largely 
 by means of natural selection through the survival of the 
 fittest in the struggle for existence. When the facts of the 
 struggle for existence are first presented to us, they are 
 apt to produce quite a shock to our moral feelings. The 
 amount of suffering involved in the process is simply 
 inconceivable and inexplicable. It was these facts that J. 
 S. Mill had in mind when he wrote his scathing essay on 
 Nature. The startling and yet unquestionable details 
 given in the first few chapters of Sutherland's Origin and 
 Growth of the Moral Instinct show conclusively that 
 nature does not have much regard for the individual. 
 
 6 Elements of Ethics, p. 134. 
 
8 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 She is apparenty Working for the benefit of fhe race, and 
 seems utterly indifferent bo the sufferings and destruction 
 of individuals. If we were permitted to judge nature 
 from the human standpoint, it might be pretty hard to 
 determine whether she is benevolent or malevolent. 6 But 
 the ultimate purpose of conscious existence is still a 
 mystery to us, unless we accept revealed religion. The 
 problem of evil is no nearer solution than in the days of 
 Job. It is the Pons Asmorum of theological ethics. We 
 have no right, therefore, to judge nature by human 
 standards. It is evidect, however, that nature is gradu- 
 ally developing higher (in the sense of more complex) 
 forms of animal life; and in man, the highest animal, of 
 sentient intelligence. But the individual is short-lived, 
 while the race continues. Consequently, one of tne most 
 difficult problems of eth'es is the question: What interest 
 has the individual in the persistence of the race? It is 
 evident that Hedonism has no object in evading facts or 
 denying the truth. It frankly admits, therefore, that at 
 present the interest of the individual and that of society 
 at large do not, so far as we can judge, exactly tally or 
 correspond. 7 That the time will come to which Herbert 
 Spencer looks forward, in which society will be in such 
 perfect equilibrium that each individual will find his 
 own greatest good in working for the greatest good of all 
 other men is a possibility, an ideal at which the wise 
 hedonist will aim as a final goal. But in the meantime, 
 the individual, as the body politic, must have rules of 
 action. We must not prepare our vehicles for the smooth 
 tableland of human perfection till we have scaled the 
 mountains of human frailty, ignorance and error. So 
 far as social welfare coincides with individual welfare the 
 question presents no difficulties. And as we show else- 
 where, the margin of conflict is at present very narrow 
 and tends gradually to disappear. Hadley says, 8 "Rat- 
 
 6 See Paulsen, Introd. to Phil., p. 153. 
 
 7 See B. Kidd, Western Civilization, Chap. II, 1; Stephen, Science of 
 Chap. VII; Spencer, Data of Ethics, Chap. 12. 
 8 Economics, p. 14. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 9 
 
 ional egotism and rational altruism tend to coincide." 
 But a margin of conflict there undoubtedly is at present. 
 And if the race is to be maintained, nature must some- 
 how win the day and compel the individual to act against 
 his own interest and in favor of the social interest. This, 
 as I show later, she does by means of the instincts and 
 emotions. Mr. Huxley, in his lecture on Evolution and 
 Ethics, insists that the "ethical process" and the "evolu- 
 tionary process" are in- direct conflict. Benevolence, al- 
 truistic conduct and sympathy are, according to him, in 
 direct contravention to the struggle for existence, which 
 is the evolutionary process. But I am forced to disagree 
 with him. (Huxley makes a recantation in the appendix 
 to this lecture. ) The social instincts are direct products 
 of evolution. And so far as disinterested activity, so 
 called, rests on a religious sanction, it is not really dis- 
 interested, as I showed above. 
 
 The practical difficulty raised by Nietzsche and his 
 followers is much more serious. Are we to let the sympa- 
 thetic impulses act to the extent of reversing the work of 
 evolution and preventing the survival of the fittest? 
 Our institutions for preserving the weak, the defective, 
 and the degenerate certainly make the question of serious 
 importance, especially as the religious and ethical 
 opinions of the present day tend to encourage the senti- 
 ment in favor of the preservation of the classes which 
 would otherwise perish. 9 Taylor points out the difficulty 
 referred to above and calls it the "Paradox of Benevo- 
 lence." (See below the problem of altruism.) The only 
 answer which Hedonism can give, aside from one based 
 on religious doctrines, is that nature must solve the 
 question for herself. Our sentiments for the weak may be 
 illogical, but they are facts; and Hedonism sticks to the 
 facts of human nature. Nor does it seem possible to 
 reason ourselves away from these sentiments, even if we 
 disregard religion. Huxley insists as strongly on the 
 validity of the ethical process as do Benjamin Kidd and 
 Dr. Martineau. 
 
 9 See E. A. Taylor, Prob. of Conduct, p. 272 et seq. 
 
10 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 But while the Hedonist admits that social welfare 
 and individual welfare do not precisely tally, he denies 
 that there is any serious decrepancy between them even 
 at present. The apparent discrepancies are largely due to 
 our ignorance either of the real welfare of the society or 
 that of the individual. Only too often in the past, the 
 welfare of the individual has been sacrificed to the sup- 
 posed welfare of the state. So wise a philospher as Aris- 
 totle, for example, seemed to think that slavery is a part 
 of the plan of nature. He did not think that slaves could 
 be dispensed with until shuttles ceased to be thrown. 
 Nearly every nation, past and present, has put more 
 or less restraint upon the women. Yet those nations 
 which have put confidence in her find that most, if not all, 
 the restraints of the past were uncalled for. Perhaps in 
 no distant age the enforced military service of today will 
 seem as barbarous to those nations that still practice it 
 as the crudities of the feudal system now seems to expert 
 political scientists. On the other hand, the welfare of the 
 state has been at times as clearly sacrificed to the 
 supposed rights of the individual. For example, when the 
 individual was allowed to be lord of his own domain to 
 the extent of making it a place for germs of disease to 
 grow and spread; or when each parent was left to educate 
 or not educate his children as he saw fit; or when favored 
 individuals were allowed to monopolize the land, water, 
 or other means of producing a living. 10 Only in recent 
 years have the laws of social growth and decay been 
 studied in a truly scientific way. And what a fund of 
 information has already been brought to light. The 
 works of Sohm, Mommsen and others on Roman history 
 and institutions; the works of Maine, Spencer, Tyler and 
 others in England, and Wundt, Waitz and others in 
 Germany on the early history and institutions of man- 
 kind generally; and the special works on sociology and 
 social evolution of Spencer, Kidd, Lombroso and others 
 
 i°These lines were written before the great coal strike of 1902 in 
 Pennsylvania brought this particular instance strongly before the mind 
 of everyone. 
 
A Plea tor Hedonism. 11 
 
 demonstrate beyond anj possible doubt how small a 
 share the men in the past had in their own development, 
 or rather, how unconscious a share. For nature requires 
 every creature to work out his own salvation. She 
 neither increases nor dimishes the effects of a creature's 
 own acts. She establishes the laws of progress, and those 
 who conform to them will survive; the rest will perish. 
 It is not my purpose, however, to show why the laws of 
 nature are as they are, but rather to point out what some 
 of them are. Those who wish to see nature rebuked may 
 read J. S. Mill's essay on Nature, those on the other hand 
 who wish to hear her praises sounded may read their 
 Bridgewater Treatise, their Emerson or their Spencer. 
 The Hedonist prefers to accept the laws of nature as facts 
 and to spend his strength in adapting himself to those 
 laws. 
 
 This much then is certain; before man could become a 
 social creature, Nature must have developed in him a 
 social impulse or social pleasure strong enough to over- 
 come his objections to yielding up the liberties he could 
 enjoy as an independent individual. But these liberties 
 could not conceivably have been either very great or very 
 valuable. The primitive man had almost nothing to 
 gain, and very much to lose by living alone. But as 
 society gradually advances, numerically, economically, 
 and otherwise, the margin of temptation to evade the 
 requirements of social order would naturally increase. 
 There must be a corresponding increase, therefore, in the 
 social cohesiveness. Mere increase of experience and 
 reasoning power would, perhaps, only increase the temp- 
 tations of the individual to evade the social law. Nature 
 filled the breach by preserving the individuals who were 
 slightly more gifted with the social impulse or pleasure. 
 Thus generation after generation, little by little nature 
 built up man's sympathetic nature. Much of it she built 
 up for him no doubt, before he became man at all. For 
 we find the social and domestio instincts well developed in 
 many of the lower animals. 11 Primitive man had still a 
 
 "Sutherland, Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, Vol. I. 
 
12 A Plea lor Hedonism. 
 
 vast amount of social impulse and sympathy to develop 
 before he could live in large societies, under elaborate 
 institutions. But this is not the place to pursue this sub- 
 ject further. Those who wish to read a full discussion of 
 the subject of the origin and growth of the moral instincts 
 are referred to the elaborate as well as interesting work of 
 Sutherland. My wish is only to show the attitude of He- 
 donism toward nature and her laws. The man with whom 
 ethics has £o deal is not, therefore, a purely self-centered 
 being. His very constitution makes him to a greater or 
 less extent ¥ interested in the welfare of his fellow beings. 
 If this were not so, mankind would never have been drawn 
 into group life. 
 
 .2. The Canon of Consequences. 
 
 Every ethical theory must sooner or later find itself 
 driven to answer the question, What constitutes the 
 moralty of an act? Wherein does one act differ from 
 another? Why may I do this and not do that? The 
 terms, "Ought," "Right," "Good," "Approval" and their 
 opposites imply the existence of an answer to these ques- 
 tions. Many answers may have been given to the above 
 questions. One group of moralists state in effect that the 
 morality of an act is something ultimate, eternal, immut- 
 able and inexplicable; that right and wrong are like right 
 and left, up and down, round and square. Those who 
 give this answer become hopelessly confused when we ask 
 them how they know what acts fall in one class and what 
 in the other. The well known conflict in the actual 
 judgments of men as to the classification of acts morally, 
 proves conclusively that we have no sense or intuition 
 which will infallibly guide us in this matter. And even if 
 such a sense actually existed in each of us, we might still 
 question its authority as a guide to action. I might still 
 say: granted that intuition tells me this act is what you 
 call right, yet why must I perform it! Thus the intuition - 
 ist must at last fall back on some more ultimate reason 
 for his ethical classification. This is usually done by 
 saying the right act is so commanded by Grod. But this 
 assertion still permits me to ask, Why must I obey the 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. IB 
 
 will or command of my fellow men, or my own will? The 
 only conclusive answer to this query is that God has 
 power to reward me if I obey, and punish me if I 'disobey, 
 and will do so. That answer gives the terms right and 
 wrong and intelligible, because sentient, content.. 
 
 Another group of moralists, at whose head is Imman- 
 uel Kant, answer the ultimate ethical question by saying 
 that the morality of an act is its fitness -to become a 
 universal law or maxim of conduct. A moral act is one 
 which we can wish anybody and everybo9y to perform. 
 But it is evident that this answer is purely formal.. We 
 must still experience the various consequences of the 
 various kinds of acts before we can say whether we are 
 willing for all men to perform them. 12 In other words," we 
 must fall back on the consequences of actions. Those 
 acts which benefit us we will want other men to perform. 
 Those acts which pain or injure us we shall want them to 
 omit. 13 
 
 Another group of moralists argue that the morality 
 of an act lies in its tendency to promote the perfection of 
 an action. But the term ''perfection" is empty until we 
 have formed an idea of perfection. Perfection relates 
 rather to the means than to the end. 14 The means are 
 perfect when they are best adapted to accomplish the 
 given design or purpose. Perhaps we are not yet pre- 
 pared to define the perfect man; but a tentative definition 
 must certainly include his sentient nature, that is, his 
 capacity to suffer and enjoy; the perfect man will be least 
 subject to pain and best equipped for enjoyment. Those, 
 such as Dr. Paul Carus, 15 who make work the ideal of 
 conduct overlook the fact that work is a means, not an 
 end. I, as a free creature, live, keep healthly, and work, 
 for the sake of carrying out my ideal. The work, the life, 
 and the health themselves I care nothing about. It is the 
 fullest sentient consciousness that I desire; and because 
 
 12 See Caird, Crit. Philos. of Kant, II. p. 290. 
 "Taylor, op. cit.,p. 351. 
 
 Alexander, Moral Order ami Progress, p. 190. 
 ^The HI Weal Problem, 2m3 ed. 
 
14 A Plea tor Hedonism. 
 
 life, health and work make this possible, I care for them as 
 means. 16 Experience reveals to us the laws of cause and 
 effeet, the unity of Nature and the conservation of force. 
 The whole universe, so far as we know it, is subject to 
 universal laws. Man, along with his fellow animals, 
 has been developed from lower creatures by means of the 
 natural selection of advantageous variations in form and 
 character (together with other forces yet unknown, no 
 doubt). After the appearance of intelligence and volition, 
 animals have some share in the shaping of their own lives. 
 Man has far outstriped his fellow animals in intelligence, 
 as to memory, power of attention, observation, associa- 
 tion of ideas and reason. With the dawn of reason, man 
 began to observe the consequences of his actions. Those 
 actions which conduced to his pleasure or preservation, 
 and especially to the latter, were repeated. Those men 
 who were luckiest in hitting upon the most preservative 
 acts succeeded in the race for existence, (or rather persis- 
 tence) while their less fortunate neighbors perished. 
 As intelligence continued to develop, men began to study 
 the consequences of their actions with more care. In time 
 certain consequences became so well known that every 
 man knew how to bring them about and they were 
 accepted as a matter of course. But there was always a 
 margin, and a large margin of acts the utility of whose 
 consequences was disputed. Men could not agree as to 
 whether these acts should be done or not. This was 
 especially true of acts whose consequences were complex 
 or remote. But whenever the consequences, (that is, the 
 aggressive or approximately total consequences) of an 
 act were well known or supposed to be known, men gener- 
 ally agreed as to its morality, that is, as to whether it 
 should be done or omitted. The desired consequences 
 have usually been the escape from bodily or mental pain, 
 from disease, suffering and torment, in this life and the 
 next, as might be within reach. A study of the actual 
 systems of morality and the actual desires, fears, hopes 
 and ambitions of men, past and present, will, I believe, 
 
 l6 Taylor, Problem of Conduct, p. 333, 
 
A Plea tor Hedonism, 10 
 
 show the correctness of this analysis. The consequences 
 of an act, in terms of pleasure and pain, are and must be 
 the ultimate criterion of its morality or permissibility. 
 Any other criterion must, sooner or later, resolve itself 
 into this one. Every formal criterion of activity must 
 have a content of sentience before it is of any practical 
 value. A sentient consciousness is never satisfied with a 
 formal answer to the query, Why must I do this? But 
 an answer in terms of pleasure and pain gives immediate 
 and complete satisfaction. When I direct an intelligent 
 creature not to do a thing because the consequences of 
 doing it are thus and so, he can determine for himself 
 whether I have pointed out a sufficient sanction for the law 
 I have asserted. I trespass neither on his freedom of 
 judgment nor on his freedom of action. The law is not 
 categorical or imperative. It is disjunctive. Each person 
 may determine for himself whether to accept or reject the 
 consequences of an act. 
 
 This Hedonism, which is based on the canon of conse- 
 quences, is the only logical doctrine of ethics. 
 
 3. The Province of Intelligence. 
 
 One more point and I shall have finished the outline 
 of what I regard as the essentials of Hedonism. I have 
 pointed out that most of the human suffering and error 
 of the past was the result of ignorance and imperfection. 
 We have further seen that even the well-meant efforts of 
 men acting together in society to better their condition 
 have very often produced the reverse of the intended 
 effects. The question will now occur: Would it not be 
 better to abandon ourselves entirely to the care of nature, 
 and not attempt to guide men by human laws and 
 human institutions? More than one leading thinker has 
 advocated such a course. Long before any one thought 
 of applying the laws of evolution to the growth of 
 society, Kousseau proposed that men should go back to a 
 state of nature. Many of the leading economists of the 
 last century advocated to some extent a similar view in 
 their "laissez faire" doctrine. Even Herbert Spencer and 
 his followers take the same position, apparently, at times 
 
16 A Plea for Hedonism* 
 
 when denouncing the legislation of the past and present. 
 But after all, men's disposition to form these institutions 
 is also a natural disposition, arid a wise second thought 
 shows us that, in spite of all bis mistakes, the man of 
 today has survived by means of his institutions. Those 
 tribes and races whose Jaws and institutions were anti- 
 social decayed and disappeared; while those who were 
 fortunate enough or wise enough to adopt beneficial insti- 
 tutions and laws survived and progressed. 
 
 The mere fact of survival shows that the peoples that 
 survived had either internal or external qualities, or both 
 combined, that enabled them to outstrip their com- 
 petitors in the race for existence. The latter alternative 
 seems the more probable: there was a combination of 
 mental traits and external institutions which carried the 
 victorious races to the goal. But this does not amount 
 to the assertion that existing institutions cannot be 
 improved upon. Other institutions might have been 
 devised which would have proved infinitely superior to 
 those actually adopted. Had the Athenians, for example, 
 with all their intellectual keenness, their artistic insight 
 and their executive ability, devised a form of federal gov- 
 ernment similar to that of the United States at the 
 present day, or had they even developed the genius for 
 law and government which the ancient Romans mani- 
 fested, no one can say to what degree of civilization they 
 might have attained. Or had the Chinese in the days of 
 Confucius combined with their industry, sobriety and 
 inventive cleverness the flexibility of character which 
 encourages change and progress, they, too, might have 
 become a world power. Going still further back into the 
 past, had the ancient Egyptians combined with their 
 marvelous mechanical skill, their architectural talent and 
 their knowledge of the sciences of geography, astronomy 
 and writing the inclination to educate the whole people 
 instead of a favored class, and the disposition to build 
 monuments economically useful instead of pyramids and 
 spynxes, they, too, might still be the leading nation of 
 the world. But what has been, has been; our business is 
 to study the past for the purpose of improving the future. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 1 7 
 
 We have much to learn from the attempt of past genera- 
 tions to solve the problems of conduct, both individual 
 and social. And we may profit as much, if not more, by 
 their mistakes than by their successes. The science of 
 government is yet far from perfect; it will continue to 
 present new difficulties to each succeeding generation. 
 But men who can live peaceably together in societies 
 aggregating from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 are surely 
 much in advance of savages who straggle about in groups 
 of from ten to fifty. The institutions of the larger 
 groups are, to a very great extent, based on dear-bought 
 experience. They are the result of the accumulated exper- 
 ience and wisdom of the past. By means of language, 
 oral and written, each generation was able to start 
 nearly where the preceding left off. The wisdom of the 
 group is infinitely beyond that of any of the individuals 
 composing it. For the division of labor and knowledge 
 make it impossible as well as unnecessary and unprofit- 
 able for any one man to carry all the knowledge of the 
 age in his head. One must not be too positive, however, 
 touching the social value of any institution. The laws of 
 soeial existence and progress are so complex that we can 
 only make provisional statements concerning any insti- 
 tution and wait for time to demonstrate whether we are 
 correct or not. The germs of destruction may be devel- 
 oping in institutions which we look upon as the most 
 precious. It follows, then, that both nature and intelli- 
 gence must take part in the evolution of human destiny. 
 Much of the work only nature can perform. But there is 
 also a place for intelligence, for human reason and 
 endeavor. If I had time, it would be easy to show that 
 Mr. Sutherland, in his otherwise excellent book, 17 has 
 committed the fault of overlooking the share of intelli- 
 gence, as taught by experience, in altering human 
 institutions and human ways of looking at things and 
 conduct. 18 But I cannot agree with the conclusion of 
 Taylor that biological evolution would not have carried 
 
 ^he Origia and Growth of Moral Instinct. 
 
 18 See the strong statement of Taylor, Prob. of Conduct, p. 235 et seq. 
 
18 A Plea tor Hedonism. 
 
 the human race beyond the agricultural stage. Nature is 
 not satisfied with the mere maintenance of the race. The 
 law of evolution still holds good, and those individuals 
 who happen to be more sympathetic and to derive more 
 pleasure from sympathetic activity will tend to survive 
 the less sympathetic. Thus self-interest and social interest 
 will tend, through natural selection, to become identical. 19 
 
 It is the dawning perception of the relation of things 
 that changes our opinions as to the value of conduct, and 
 not, as Mr. Sutherland insists, altogether the evolution 
 of sympathy in us by the secret force of nature. 20 
 
 Whatever Hedonism may have meant, therefore, in 
 the days of Aristippus and Epicurus, in the days of 
 Hobbes and Locke, or even in the days of Jeremy Ben- 
 tham and the two Mills, at the present day evolutionary 
 Hedonism, when it is careful not to fall into the vice of 
 mere mechanism, means that each of us has the right to 
 the fullest realization of himself which is consistent with 
 the same right on the part of other intelligent beings; 21 
 that as man is not only a conscious but also a sentient, 
 or pleasure-pain creature, he is entitled to the fullest 
 development of his whole nature; that pleasure and 
 health or welfare go hand in hand, while pain is the 
 index of disorder, maladjustment, lack of equilibrium, or 
 decay; that pain in itself can never be a good; at most 
 it can only be the negative means of leading to something 
 else as a good or end; 22 while pleasure, if not the end 
 itself, is at least the inseparable accompaniment of the 
 end, and in the long run the only safe criterion to the end; 
 that nature (which may mean the Creator acting through 
 nature if you like) takes care of intelligent creatures by 
 means of instincts and impulses until their reason is 
 sufficiently developed to perceive the purpose of pain and 
 X>leasure in the economy of life and their knowledge suffi- 
 ciently great to realize the laws of nature and their rela- 
 
 19 See Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, Note 20, p. 114. 
 
 ^Stephen, op. cit., p. 103. 
 
 ^Spencer, Prin. Ethics, p. 46. 
 
 22 Alexander, Moral Order, etc., p. 225. 
 
A Plea for Hedomism. 19 
 
 tion to the sentient creature. Hedonism takes man as 
 the partially developed product of evolution and seeks to 
 show him as an individual and as a race what possibil- 
 ities nature has in store for him; and if there be an after 
 life, how the present life may be best lived as a prelimi- 
 nary to that. Hedonism is obliged to draw upon all the 
 other sciences for its material. 23 In fact all the sciences 
 are but the more or less systematic efforts of man to find 
 his place in the universe. 24 Among the sciences which 
 Hedonism will draw most from are the sciences of the 
 human body, its health and ailments, the economic 
 sciences, or the sciences of satisfying man's needs, and the 
 political and legal sciences, or the sciences which govern 
 man's actions in society, For evolutionary Hedonism 
 recognizes that man is by nature a sociable creature; 
 that each tribe, nation or people, in fact, is a sort of 
 organism, subject to definite laws of growth and decay. 
 The welfare of the individual is, therefore, largely a func- 
 tion of the organism of which he is a part; thus while a 
 wise man like Socrates or Confucius might be happy 
 among miserable associates he could be much happier, if 
 his associates were also wiser and happier. Altruism, or 
 interest in the welfare of others, is thus to a large ex- 
 tent an element of Hedonism. 
 
 III. The Strength of Hedonism. 
 
 The chief theory of conduct which is opposed to 
 Hedonism is intuitionism, the theory of duty or con- 
 science. This theory looks to the human sentiments for a 
 basis for activity. We are to be guided in our actions, 
 not by their experienced consequences on ourselves and 
 others, but by the approving or disapproving voice of 
 this inward monitor. 
 
 Without stopping to inquire at present into the 
 origin and nature of this inward monitor, we find on 
 investigation that it has varied enormously in different 
 ages, races, localities and individuals. Thus we find that 
 slavery has met with almost universal approval in times 
 
 ^%ulsen, System of Bt&fes, Introd. 
 ^Weber, Hist Philos., p. i. 
 
20 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 past, being recognized in the sacred books of the Hebrews, 
 Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Egyptians, and being prac- 
 ticed to a greater or less extent by all nations. At the 
 present time it is condemned by nearly all civilized men. 
 The subjection of women has been likewise generally 
 approved and practiced. Only in the most recent times 
 and among the most developed nations has woman 
 begun to receive the same treatment as man. Even at 
 the present day our sense of duty does not urge us to give 
 her the same political and social rights that men possess. 
 Custom keeps her wages lower than those of men engaged 
 in precisely the same work. 25 Again, the sense of duty has 
 not prevented the basest treatment and neglect of 
 children, even among people who were the most scrupu- 
 lous, such as the Puritans. 
 
 Once more, the caste system prevails among a large 
 proportion of mankind. The sense of duty not only does 
 not require members of the higher caste to treat those of 
 a lower caste as their equals, but on the contrary pos- 
 tively forbids such treatment. Nor is the caste system 
 by any means confined to Asia. The young woman who 
 marries below her station in Europe or America loses 
 caste almost as surely as does the Hindu belle. The very 
 word friendship implies a broader form of selfishness. 
 One is expected to do for a friend what he would not do 
 for a stranger or an enemy. Our consciences call on us to 
 help a friend who is in trouble; while they are not much 
 stirred by the sufferings of Hindus and Chinese, unless 
 their sufferings become widespread and excessive. The 
 word patriotism likewise implies that our country is to 
 be preferred to other countries. Even if we do not accept 
 the maxim, "Our country, right or wrong," we are apt to 
 be strongly biased in her favor in case of rivalry or 
 conflict with other countries. 
 
 In opposition to the above illustrations, 26 Paul Janet 
 and others seek to demonstate a general uniformity of 
 opinion in all ages and nations on moral questions. But 
 
 ^ee Report of Com. of L^bor, V©1. XI. 
 ^Theory of Morals, Bk. Ill, ch. 4, 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. Ml 
 
 the cases cited by them seem to show simply that the 
 universal reasoning and sentient, pleasure-pain faculties 
 of mankind have led them gradually to learn the same 
 facts regarding human and physical nature, and to adapt 
 themselves to these facts. The activities necessary to 
 maintain the individual and the race, after making the 
 necessary allowances for differences in the environment, 
 must be more or less similar everywhere; and if men desire 
 to live in society, certain general and evident rules of con- 
 duct must be established and followed. But beyond these 
 apparent and fundamental cases, it seems impossible to 
 harmonize the moral views of mankind. For in 
 addition to the cases of conflicting consciences 
 which we have already given, we have other 
 cases of a much more radical kind. In the sexual re- 
 lations we find differences in opinion the most remote. To 
 say nothing of monogamy, polygamy and polyandry, such 
 writers as Spencer, Westermark and Sutherland give 
 instances of what we regard as looseness of sexual prac- 
 tice, which are almost inconceivable. So in matters of 
 honesty and veracity, we find that among many nations, 
 honesty and veracity are not supposed to be due to a 
 foreigner. Theft from a stranger and even from a neigh- 
 bor was applauded not only in ancient Sparta, but in 
 many other countries. And even in civilized countries 
 clever dishonesty and deception are too often approved 
 where the parties are very unequally situated: for 
 example when one outwits and cheats an employer, a 
 great corporation, or the public officers. There is often a 
 feeling of approval of the clever urchin, who deceives his 
 teacher. And I have heard old soldiers of high standing 
 tell with evident self-satisfaction how they deceived and 
 defrauded their officers, and their stories were approved 
 by their audience. The most intelligent people sometimes 
 will be found to distinguish between lying and deceit. 
 Many a man who would suffer torture rather than lie 
 verbally, will not hesitate to deceive by actions. 27 
 
 But a closer examination shows us that the sense of 
 
 "See H. Spencer, Ethics II, li&\ also The Outlook, Vol. 73, p. 262-3. 
 
22 A Plea ior Hedonism. 
 
 duty, or conscience is exceedingly compliant and flexible. 
 It gives way in nearly every instance to the accepted 
 religious code. Whatever is prescribed by the accepted 
 religion is approved by the sense of duty. This accounts 
 for the child-murders so common among heathen tribes. 
 The tribes of ancient Palestine laid their infants in the 
 red-hot arms of a metallic god. The Hindu mother 
 throws her babe to the crocodile and even Abraham was 
 ready to sacrifice his only son at the supposed call of 
 deity. But the sense of duty bends not only at the dic- 
 tate of religion, but at the dictate of custom, where 
 custom and religion d ) not conflict. Hence the most 
 absurd costumes are worn, the most absurd rites 
 observed, and the most absurd practices maintained, 
 simply because custom has established them. In this case 
 the sense of duty requires one to respect public opinion. 
 This opinion is vastly stronger among the uncivilized 
 than among ourselves. But even the best of us feel 
 impelled by the sense of duty to comply with the customs 
 in force around us. 
 
 Once more, the sense of duty usually complies with the 
 existing laws, in so far as they do not conflict with our 
 religious beliefs. 
 
 In any age and nation, therefore, we may expect to 
 find the general conscience or sense of duty pretty clearly 
 defined by the prevailing religious code, together with the 
 accepted customs and political laws in force. If the relig- 
 ion is false and maintains pernicious rites and doctrines, 
 the sense of duty will be accordingly perverted. If the 
 customs are absurd and injurious, the political laws illog- 
 ical and narrow, the keener intellects will probably strive 
 very gradually to modify them in the direction of 
 improving the social welfare, but the sense of duty of the 
 multitude will always lag far in the rear of the car of 
 progress. For progress is usually the work of a select 
 few; and the multitude are very slow to perceive the 
 advantages of a change in well established institutions. 98 
 
 We are forced to the conclusion, therefore, that the 
 
 28 See Bryce, Studies in Hist, and Jurist.— Obedience, p. 463. 
 
A Plea wr Hedonism. 28 
 
 sense of duty, or conscience is not a safe and sufficient 
 guide to human conduct. 
 
 The sentiments play an extremely important part in 
 human affairs; but we cannot safely rely on them as the 
 ultimate criterion of the rectitude of an action or course 
 of conduct. What habit does for one in matters of bodily 
 action, the sentiments do for him in matters of volition. 
 Habit permits us to devote the mind to other matters 
 while the body carries out a given line of conduct. So 
 the sentiments dispense with the necessity of going back 
 to first principles before deciding on every act. They are 
 moral habits, nothing more. 
 
 If, then, intuitionism, with its reliance on an inward 
 monitor, is unable to provide an ultimate basis for human 
 activity, a philosophy of conduct, what has Hedonism to 
 offer in its stead? Wherein lies the strength of Hedonism? 
 We must admit at the start that Hedonism has a bad 
 name. Any doctrine which advocates selfishness must 
 expect to be frowned upon. And among Christian 
 peoples, at any rate, any doctrine based on pleasure must 
 likewise expect to meet strong opposition. Unless, there- 
 fore, the Hedonist can make out a strong and clear case 
 in its favor, he must not expect any mercy at the hands 
 of his opponents and critics. More than this, I realize 
 only too clearly that a misunderstood theory of pleasure 
 might cause a vast deal of harm. It would perhaps be 
 better to let men blunder along after their old guides than 
 to have them think they need no guide at all; that they 
 are at liberty to do as they please, and to gratify every de- 
 sire and passion as it arises. It is incumbent on the Hed- 
 onist to guard by eYery possible precaution against any 
 such misconception of his doctrine. Hedonism, as I under- 
 stand the doctrine, seeks to establish a philosophical basis 
 for conduct, not a stronghold for the libertine. It is not 
 intended to work any sudden revolution in the morals 
 and manners of civilized men, and this for the simple 
 reason that in spite of their erroneous theories of the 
 ultimate bases of conduct and of certain details of 
 activity, civilized peoples have unconsciously followed 
 hedonistic principles in their development. They have 
 
24> A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 builded better than they knew. The canon of conse- 
 quences has been accepted and followed to some extent in 
 all ages and nations, But other theories have often 
 greatly retarded its application, even to the extent of 
 destroying great nations. The nations which have sur- 
 vived and progressed are, I believe, those which have 
 grasped most firmly and applied most faithfully the canon 
 of consequences. As I hive tried to point out in the first 
 section, it was largely because the ancient Greeks were 
 untrammelled by any religious code that they were able to 
 make the freest use of the canon of consequences. Thus 
 they were able to develop the most accurate and valuable 
 moral theory which the world knew before the present 
 age, and by its use to re;ich the highest pinnacle of civili- 
 zation. I cannot agree with Mr. Spencer in his indictment 
 of Greek civilization. 29 The Hindu and the Chinaman, on 
 the contrary, tied themselves hand and foot with strin- 
 gent religious and social codes. 
 
 Hedonism, therefore, is evolutionary, rather than 
 revolutionary. It conceives that there are vastly higher 
 and broader stages of civilization yet in store for human- 
 ity; but it does not hope to attain these by any sudden 
 leap. It will have done enough if it enables the car of 
 civilization to move steadily onward and Upward. 
 
 Yet at the present time, when the ethical problem, 
 that is, the question as to the ultimate foundation of 
 moral conduct, is studied and discussed as it never was 
 before, it seems well worth while to help all one can in 
 reaching a solution of tne problem. 
 
 In the first place, then, Hedonism is irreconcilably 
 opposed to every form of asceticism, that is, to pain for 
 the sake of pain. Nearly all the religious and ethical 
 systems of the past have been vitiated by the taint of 
 asceticism. This is not the place to inquire into the 
 origin of the monstrous notion that the Deity could take 
 delight in the sufferings of his creatures. It is sufficient 
 for our purpose to call attention to the important place 
 which this belief occupies in most religious systems. The 
 
 ^Ethics, II, I 58. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 25 
 
 refrgious and ethical systems of western Asia and Europe 
 seem to have drawn their ascetic element from Egypt, 
 where, according to Schaff, 30 a pessimistic atmosphere 
 seems always to have prevailed. Christianity has not 
 escaped the taint. In spite of the humane teachings of 
 Jesus, the Egyptian influence was strong enough to fill 
 the symbols of the church with ascetic doctrines and all 
 Europe with monks and monasteries. 
 
 Hedonism insists that men have a right to be happy, 
 that pain is intended to benefit and not to torture, that 
 the religious or ethical doetrine demanding suffering or 
 sacrifice that does not result in a greater compensating 
 good to the sufferer or some other sentient creature, is 
 oertainly erroneous. 
 
 Asceticism is unreasonable and cannot justify itself. 
 Yet the ascetic element in various guises is really what 
 makes most other ethical systems different from Hedonism. 
 Thus it is this element of asceticism which, sometimes 
 drawing strength from the doctrine of self-discipline or 
 stoicism, constitutes the essence of all the doctrines of 
 despair, such as Buddhism. The ethics of despair may be 
 hedonistic if it avoids this ascetic element. For if the 
 powers of evil really are stronger in the universe, then 
 doubtless we are justified in seeking Nirvana or some 
 other escape into non-existence. But we are still at 
 liberty to reinvestigate the facts of nature for the pur- 
 pose of deciding whether existence is on the whole (500 
 painful to be endurable. There was but little of the 
 ascetic element in the stoicism of Greece and Rome. But 
 when the current of orientalism struck the philosophy of 
 Greece, the ascetic element mingled with the philosophic 
 and pain for the sake of pain became a prominent element 
 in the ethical doctrines of the middle ages. 
 
 Preserved by the religious orders against the strong 
 reaction of German common sense which swept over 
 western Europe with the spread of German civilization, 
 asceticism sprang again into prominence at the reforma- 
 tion in the Puritanism of England and Germany. During 
 
 ^Church History. 
 
26 A Plea tor Hedonism. 
 
 the last three centuries men have been gradually elimi- 
 nating the ascetic element from the religious and ethical 
 systems of Europe. The reaction probably reached flood 
 tide in the.days of William Paley and Jeremy Bentham. 
 Since their day there has been a slight disposition to 
 revert toward asceticism, owing partly to the writings of 
 Thomas Carlyle and partly to disappointment of the 
 hopes placed in the political and social reforms of the 
 nineteenth century. 
 
 Asceticism draws a certain amount of strength from 
 the evident value of self-discipline. But asceticism, or 
 pain for its own sake, and self-discipline, or pain for the 
 sake of compensating good to self or others are radically 
 different. Self-discipline is a hedonistic doctrine. Exper- 
 ience teaches the value of discipline as clearly as it teaches 
 the absurdity of asceticism. But too often the one is 
 taken for the other. Suffering to produce good for 
 another is confused with suffering that another is sup- 
 posed to enjoy as suffering. It is a curious fact in nature 
 that sentient creatures are unquestionably able to enjoy 
 the agony of their fellow creatures. By a natural infer- 
 ence, one's deity is supposed to possess this same abnor- 
 mal characteristic. But of all illogical and abhorrent 
 emotions, this one seems to be unquestionably the worst. 
 Hedonism insists that no being, be he creator or creature, 
 has the right to enjoy the pain of another. 
 
 Whatever destiny the powers of the universe have in 
 store for me, I have certainly the right, in so far as I have 
 the power, to make that destiny as little painful and as 
 fully pleasant as possible. And the same right which I 
 insist upon for myself, I insist upon with equal emphasis 
 for my fellowmen. 
 
 In the next place, Hedonism is the natural doctrine of 
 conduct. All sentient creatures seek pleasure and avoid 
 pain as naturally and as certainly as water seeks its level. 
 Indeed, the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain is so 
 strong and natural that an opposite doctrine seems 
 almost inconceivable. Hence not only many philosophers 
 but even whole nations, as the Hindus, believe that sen- 
 tience and activity are inseparably connected by the law of 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 27 
 
 cause and effect. But without admitting this extreme view, 
 we must concede a natural disposition or tendency in all 
 conscious beings to seek pleasure and avoid pain. More- 
 over, science seems to indicate that pleasure and pain are 
 teleological, that is, they play an important part in the pres- 
 ervation and evolution of both the individual and the 
 race. No one will deny that without the faculties of 
 pleasure and pain no living creature could maintain its 
 existence very long. Sentience, or pleasure-pain is the 
 faculty which enables a living creature to maintain the 
 equilibrium with its environment which is essential 
 to life. And pleasure, usually, if not always indicates 
 that the equilibrium is satisfactory, while pain, 
 usually, if not always, indicates that something 
 is wrong. If one were disposed to argue, therefore, 
 that man is the creation of an intelligent being, the exis- 
 tence of these wise provisions for his persistence among the 
 struggling forces of the universe would certainly be a 
 strong point in his favor. But whether the gift of an 
 intelligent Creator, or the product of chance, pleasure and 
 pain are certainly indispensible faculties of all sentient 
 creatures. And even if we can never demonstrate that 
 conscious existence was intended to be as pleasant as poss- 
 ible, or that the individual may strive to make it as 
 pleasant as possible, we are at least certain that without 
 the pleasure-pain apparatus, conscious creatures could 
 not subsist at all. Pleasure being, then, such an insepar- 
 able accompaniment of healthy, normal consciousness, 
 and pain as clearly the index of the abnormal and defec- 
 tive, is not the burden on the opponents of Hedonism to 
 show that sentience should not be taken as the ultimate 
 guide to conduct? As we have repeatedly indicated 
 above, sentience alone would not be a sufficient guide to 
 conduct, from the fact that man is an exceedingly com- 
 plex being, full of conflicting desires and emotions. 
 Reason, therefore, must stand as judge among the pleas- 
 ure-pains and determine which are entitled to recognition 
 as components of the sum total of pleasurable conscious- 
 ness and which should be rejected as injurious to the 
 sentient community. 
 
28 A Plea tor Hedonism. 
 
 To the question: Why has Hedonism a bad name? 
 we answer: Because men see that the pleasure seeker so 
 often comes to grief and makes himself and others miser- 
 able. Ignorance and folly too often misguide men in the 
 search for happiness. Hence the advocate of Hedonism 
 cannot repeat too frequently that sentience alone cannot 
 be relied upon as a guide to conduct. But neither must 
 this statement be misconstrued or misquoted. For after 
 all, reason must rely on sentience as the test. But it is the 
 course of sentience, the sum of pleasures or whatever one 
 may call the total make-up and summary of a complete 
 conscious existence, considering both its quality, or 
 breadth, its intensity or depth and its duration or length 
 which reason must direct and govern. The reader will see 
 the difficulty of translating sentient ideas into terms of 
 space and quantity. Yet I doubt not that he will under- 
 stand what I mean. Another reason for this ill-repute of 
 Hedonism is the fact that it is often mistakenly supposed 
 to be opposed to self-restraint and self-discipline. But 
 philosophic Hedonism, as we have said again and again, is 
 in the fullest accord with all legitimate self-discipline. 
 If we always remember therefore that the aim and end of 
 Hedonism is to secure the richest, fullest, deepest, purest, 
 longest, pleasant consciousness for the individual, we 
 shall not be confused or misled by instances of blind and 
 foolish pleasure-seeking, with their calamitous and repul- 
 sive results nor by any unfair comparisons with self-dis- 
 ciplining ethical regimes. Every sentient creature desires 
 pleasure, or happiness as well as escape from pain and 
 evil. Hedonism endeavors to help him obtain these 
 results in the fullest degree, it may be by self-restraint or 
 it may be by self-culture or indulgence. It does not tell 
 men: You must do thus and so; it simply says: If you 
 wish a given result you may obtain it in a certain way. 
 The man who breaks the law of hedonism will call himself 
 a fool. And most men would rather be anything else 
 than fools. 
 
 Hedonism, then, is the only natural ethics, the only 
 ethics which seeks to lead and guide men rather than 
 drive them, the only ethics which appeals to both their 
 
A Plea, tor Hedonism. 29 
 
 emotions and their reason, their whole nature, instead of 
 commanding and compelling them. 
 
 But man is by nature a social creature*. He prefers 
 with the ant and many higher animals to live in groups. 
 And the greater his development and intelligence the 
 larger become the groups in which he lives. But group- 
 life, or social-life is only possible under certain conditions 
 and only enjoyable to those endowed with the social or 
 sympathetic emotions. The individual must consent to 
 give up certain pleasures and liberties, must submit to 
 certain rules and restraints. I care not whether you pre- 
 fer Hobbes' theory of the Original State of War, which 
 drove reasonable men into society as the lesser of two 
 evils, or Kousseau's theory of the Social Contract, entered 
 into by mutual consent for the sake of its advantages, or 
 the theory of a divinely instituted state with the place of 
 each member eternally fixed for him, or the theory of a 
 state slowly evolved by natural processes. The result is 
 the same in the end. Social life means the yielding up of 
 certain liberties and pleasures by the individual which he 
 might enjoy if he lived alone, and the acquisition of cer- 
 tain joys and comforts which the anchorite must forego. 
 
 Hedonism can be applied to several of these political 
 theories. But in any given society the thoughtful indivi- 
 dual submits to the social law, be it political, economical 
 or etiquetical, because the advantages to himself of such 
 submission are greater than the disadvantages. I am 
 aware that the multitude submit to social rules largely 
 from the force of habit, indolence, reverence, fear and 
 affection. 31 But even the most ignorant man has a vague 
 idea of the reasons for social laws. The most stupid man 
 has an occasional brilliant idea, and the ferment of ideas 
 in the multitude will in time seize upon the beneficial 
 social principles and throw out the defective ones, much 
 as the fermentation of cider throws extraneous matter to 
 the top of the cask. The popular wisdom is thus not 
 
 3: See Bryce, Studies, etc., IX Obedience, and X, The Nature of 
 Sovereignty. 
 
SO A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 entirely to be despised, especially among a progressive 
 people. 
 
 Hedonism, then, is the logical basis of all prudent 
 conduct, whether in the pursuit of knowledge, of health 
 and comfort, of family affairs, of friendly intercourse 
 with our neighbors, of art and culture, or in the greater 
 intercourse which makes up the nation and the family of 
 nations. There can never be any conflict between Hedon- 
 ism and the sciences and arts. All the sciences and arts 
 are the hand-maidens of Hedonism. Whatever makes 
 men wiser, stronger, healthier, richer, more industrious, 
 more friendly, more practical and enduring, better trained 
 and educated for the struggle with nature, their environ- 
 ment and their own character will be welcomed by the 
 hedonist. Whatever on the other hand, makes men 
 ignorant, weak, sickly, poor, lazy, ill-natured, stupid, 
 boorish, narrow, mean, unfriendly, harsh, reckless or in 
 any other way retards progress and enlightenment is 
 condemned by Hedonism. Nor is there anything incon- 
 sistent in this position. In case of the drunkard and the 
 opium fiend, everybody can see the folly of his course of 
 action. But in these other cases of a narrow selfishness 
 or willfulness, the perversity and disadvantage of the 
 course is only not so apparent. Every man desires health 
 and strength, vigor and skill. If men disregard the laws 
 of health, therefore, it is either through ignorance or 
 though a weakness of the will brought on by various 
 causes. Even while indulging the craving for drink or for 
 morphine the drunkard does not cease to regret the prob- 
 ably ultimate results of his folly. It is the business of 
 Hedonism to persuade men to discipline themselves not 
 for the sake of discipline, nor to gratify the whim of a 
 superior, but for their own good and greater pleasure in 
 the end. 
 
 If every man has an equal right to seek happiness in 
 his own way, certain logical results follow which it is 
 important to consider in this place. In the first place, it 
 follows that in one sense might makes right. A man may 
 do what he likes and what he can. But other men may 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 31 
 
 do the same; and it follows that by combination the 
 superior number may restrain the inferior. But if we 
 were to stop here Hedonism would be the most pernicious 
 of all doctrines. We hasten to add, therefore, with the 
 apostle, that all things are not expedient. What one 
 may do, and what, all things considered, he will prefer to 
 do are very different. Thus, it is in my power to destroy 
 my furniture, to mistreat my dog and my child, to be 
 harsh with my wife and surly with my friends; but exper- 
 ience teaches me that these things are not expedient. 
 And if my nature has been properly developed, they are 
 undesirable and repugnant to me. Kindness, affection 
 and friendliness pay better in the long run. Hedonism 
 urges men, therefore, to the most careful study of the 
 whole situation. Right is not what one is able to do, but 
 rather what one who is normally developed prefers to do 
 and must do to attain his greatest welfare, that is, his 
 fullest sentient consciousness. 
 
 It also follows from the principle of the equal right of 
 all to strive for their own greatest good, that each man 
 may join in the restraint of his fellow-men where their 
 actions interfere with his welfare. But this doctrine is 
 also likely to be misunderstood. As stated above, it is an 
 empty formula. The individual should still inquire into 
 ultimate results. Such an inquiry, the Hedonist claims, 
 will show that the welfare of the normal individual is 
 nearly always identical with that of the group. Admit- 
 ting that there are rare cases where social welfare and 
 individual welfare appear not to coincide as the world and 
 the individual are now made up, yet the hedonist insists 
 that in the long run the good of the state and that of the 
 individual are identical. Thus utilitarianism is a branch 
 of Hedonism. For in striving for the greatest good of the 
 greatest number (the formula of utilitarianism), the 
 individual feels sure that indirectly he is promoting his 
 own welfare. 
 
 It will readily be seen from what has already been 
 said that Hedonism is not only superior to other ethical 
 systems in its appeal to men's natural inclinations and 
 
32 A Plea for Hedonism, 
 
 emotions, but that it has the advantage of appealing to 
 their reason and experience as well, and is thus the only 
 progressive ethics. A moral system which rests on men's 
 sentiments, on custom or on some vague metaphysical prin- 
 ciple, such as the doctrine of the everlasting and immut- 
 able right, tends to become more and more rigid and 
 stationary. Thus the Hindus, with their complicated Brah- 
 minical law, are shut off from all opportunity of advance 
 in civilization. The Chinese, likewise, with the Confucian 
 doctrines and customary morality have been stationary 
 in civilization for two thousand years. The ancient Jew, 
 through a misinterpretation of the Mosaic law, or a 
 defect in that law, w T as excluded from all progress in art 
 and culture. So during the middle ages theological ethics 
 hindered the progress of art, science and commerce in end- 
 less ways. Who can say how much higher civilization 
 would be now if women had enjoyed the same freedom 
 since the beginning of the christian era that they enjoy in 
 America today? 
 
 These instances will show the importance of having a 
 moral principle which encourages instead of retarding 
 science and culture. That other moral theories have con- 
 structed lofty ideals, the hedonist is ready enough to 
 admit. Buddha, Confucius, Zarathustra, and Kant were 
 all high-minded and noble men. But in so far as they 
 based their moral systems on false principles, they were 
 the means of retarding rather than improving the condi- 
 tion of the people. 
 
 Buddhism is rich in noble maxims of conduct. But as 
 a whole it is probably worse that no system at all. 
 Zarathustra and Confucius taught many wholesome doc- 
 trines, but taken as a whole, their systems have retarded 
 civilization. 
 
 So the formalism of Kant might be safe enough in an 
 age where each of the virtues had a well settled, practical 
 meaning for the individual; and where the duty to 
 parents, to children, to neighbors and to the state were 
 well recognized. But the fact that they were settled 
 would make change all the more difficult if any formal 
 theory of ethics were adopted. "So act that the maxim 
 
A Plea iov Hedonism. 33 
 
 of your conduct may be adopted as a universal law" 
 becomes dangerous among a people who are settled 
 in their customs. For, as was pointed out above, the 
 sentiments of the individual are almost certain to 
 approve the existing regime. And when a more vigorous 
 thinker appears, who sees the injurious effects in terms of 
 welfare, of existing practices, he meets with universal 
 opposition from all the advocates of formalism. 
 
 In the next place, we notice that Hedonism is not only 
 the natural, logical and progressive ethics. We find that 
 it has been the actual element of value in all the great 
 ethical systems of the past. From the very awakening 
 of intelligence, sentient, conscious beings must have 
 begun to study the consequences of actions, along with 
 the laws of nature and of the human constitution. 
 Conduct which is guided by consequences is called 
 prudent. Most conduct of this kind has become so much 
 a matter of course that we have long since ceased to 
 think of it as having any ethical quality whatever. And 
 it is very common for moralists to exclude all prudent 
 activity from the field of ethics, or at the most to give 
 it but a passing glance. Thus Kant insists repeatedly 
 that all conduct which is induced by prudence or self- 
 interest must be excluded from the field of ethics. Me 
 would investigate the field of disinterested or altruistic 
 conduct alone. But the hedonist maintains not only 
 that prudent activity is a very important branch of 
 ethics but that in the actual systems of the past, prudence 
 has been the vital element. Thus every moral maxim 
 which appeals to one's judgment of value must be classed 
 as hedonistic. When Jesus said: "Come unto me, all ye 
 that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest", 
 he was appealing to the sentient nature of mankind. So 
 when he said, "He that believeth on me shall be saved; 
 and he that believeth not shall be damned". So, when he 
 said, "In my father's house are many mansions". So 
 the whole sermon on the mount, his most complete dis- 
 course, is entirely hedonistic. 83 For even after command- 
 
 32 See Matth, V; 3: VII; 27. 
 
84 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 ing the most complete systems of non-resistance and 
 altruism which has ever been known 33 he adds in verse 45, 
 "That ye may be the children of your Father which is in 
 heaven". The sermon opens with the blessings which are 
 to fall on those who accept and follow the doctrines of the 
 sermon. And then it closes 34 with the remarkable parable 
 of the wise man who built his house upon a rock and the 
 foolish man who built on the sand. Wisdom and folly 
 are the watchwords of Hedonism. Whether we hold that 
 accepting the doctrines of Jesus makes a man happier or 
 not in this life, there is no question that Jesus meant to 
 to teach that his followers should have an exceeding great 
 reward when He came in His glory. He went about doing 
 good, not merely good in the abstract, not merely preach- 
 ing good sermons, but practical, hedonistic good. He 
 healed the sick, made the blind see; caused the lame to walk, 
 cured insanity, raised the dead, and even gladdened the 
 hearts of the wedding guests with excellent wine. All 
 through his ministry, Jesus appealed to men's sentient na- 
 ture. He reasoned with them; he pointed to their misery, 
 discord and empty formalism, and urged them to turn to a 
 reasonable course of life. And whether we accept his 
 teaching as divine or merely human, we must admit that 
 he points out the value of altruistic conduct for the indi- 
 vidual as no one else has done before or since. I do not 
 mean to say that there were no other important elements 
 in the teaching of Jesus. That teaching was religious as 
 well as ethical. We must also admit that an element of 
 asceticism is to be found in the doctrines of Jesus as they 
 come down to us. 
 
 More tender than stoicism and more vigorous than 
 epicureanism, the ethical doctrines of Jesus have done a 
 great deal toward the spreading of Christianity through- 
 out the world. 
 
 The whole Jewish system of ethics is hedonistic. Even 
 where its demands are given as the dictates of God, they are 
 coupled more or less directly with the threats and prom- 
 
 3T v. 33-44- 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 35 
 
 ises of Jahveh. It is true that the philosophic element was 
 not prominent in the Jewish code. The rites and cere- 
 monies are to be observed and performed because God has 
 so commanded. The reward was to be directly bestowed 
 by him, not as the natural consequence of obedience, but 
 as a token of merit. But the formal code of conduct was 
 too firmly instated by priest, levite and people to be 
 shaken by the thundering arguments of Isaiah or the 
 plaintive discourses of Jeremiah. But after all the Law of 
 Moses was full of wise, hedonistic principles; with some ex- 
 ceptions it was equitable, just and wise. The land-owner, 
 the debtor, the widow, the orphan, the criminal, and even 
 the stranger were wisely dealt with. The criminal law T was 
 comparatively mild, the law of torts not too severe. The 
 laws of marriage and divorce were among the best of 
 ancient times and we know from history that Jewish 
 family life was remarkably clean and high-toned. 
 
 Confucius, too, adopted a hedonistic theory of ethics. 
 His theory was more philosophical than that of the early 
 Jews. He gave more reasons for the conduct which he 
 prescribed; that is, he pointed out the value of the con- 
 duct. Confucius, like Socrates, taught that morals and 
 manners must begin with self knowledge. And while pre- 
 scribing a minutely detailed code of action for the indi- 
 vidual, which in the end became an incubus on Chinese 
 civilization, yet his studies led him to see that altruism is 
 only a wiser Hedonism; and while rejecting all religion he 
 announced the same fundamental rule of conduct which 
 Jesus prescribed, 500 years later, in the .Golden Rule. 
 Had Confucius been succeeded by thinkers as broad as 
 himself, who could have put life into his moral system, 
 China might have made wonderful progress in civiliza- 
 tion. Unfortunately, no ruler would accept his system of 
 government; his disciples devoted themselves to the letter 
 of the law, and China became ensnared in an impenetrable 
 wilderness of formalism. 
 
 Zarathustra, too, the moral and religious law-giver of 
 the Persians, adopted hedonistic principles. Two great 
 beings, the one li^ht or good, and the other darkness, or 
 evil, have been engaged in a struggle for supremacy from 
 
86 A Tha, tor Hedonism. 
 
 all eternity. But the good being is on the side of the 
 welfare, or good of the individual; the evil or dark being 
 is constantly endeavoring to injure mankind. In the end 
 the good will triumph and those who are on his side will 
 receive their reward. Zoroastrianism has many wise 
 hedonistic maxims and principles, tending to promote the 
 welfare of the individual and society. 
 
 Buddha, likewise, was a moral reformer. And like 
 most moral reformers, he was stirred to thought and 
 activity by the misery and wretchedness which he saw 
 around him. After devoting many years to the study of 
 the problem of evil, he reached the conclusion that happi- 
 ness consists in Nirvana, or perfect peace. But the peace 
 of Buddhism, while it frees one from suffering and is thus 
 hedonistic, is almost the peace of non-existence. Never- 
 theless, all the doctrines of Buddha are based on the 
 fundamental idea of escaping from sentient evil. The 
 prescibed course of conduct is directed entirely toward the 
 attainment of Nirvana, or escape from suffering. The 
 fact that Buddha and Confucius were unable to point to a 
 larger hope in the life beyond, as did Socrates and Jesus, 
 does not militate against our argument. Their doctrine 
 was negatively hedonistic, while the doctrines of Jesus and 
 Socrates are both positively and negatively hedonistic. 
 
 Buddha, like Confucius and Zarathustra, studied the 
 consequences of actions and with an endless prolixity of 
 formal details, he mingles wise, hedonistic principles of 
 conduct, based on the observation of human society, 
 human greed and human frailty. Overburdened with the 
 sense of the wretchedness which all the watchfulness ©f his 
 guardians could not conceal from him, he left his princely 
 home to study in peace and quiet the problem of evil. 
 Like Moses and Confucius, he returned, fertile in plans for 
 improving the welfare of his fellowmen. His theory of life 
 was more spiritual than that of Confucius, but the prob- 
 lem which he was trying to solve was precisely the same: 
 to wit, the problem of human misery and human happi- 
 ness. 
 
 I spoke above of popular wisdpm. This wisdom is set 
 forth among every people in the form of proverbs and 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 87 
 
 fatto. These proverbs and fables embody the condensed 
 and pithily expressed experience of the race. Prof. Legge 
 says that for centuries * the Chinaman has been largely 
 guided in the conduct of his life by the excellent maxims 
 of Confucius. Jewish literature, too, is rich in proverbs. 
 The same is true of the Arabic, a near relative of the 
 Hebrew. Among savage tribes the philosophy of life is 
 usually embodied in familiar proverbs, which are passed 
 from mouth to mouth and from father to son. Originat- 
 ing as they do and passing from country to country, 
 these s-ayings are often couched in the most 
 contradictory terms, and embody the most conflicting 
 theories of life. But a careful study of them will show 
 that they are drawn from a more or less rich experience, 
 and that they are all based on hedonistic principles. 
 Frequently they prescribe rules of conduct for the indi- 
 vidual which are apparently injurious to him, and yet 
 they are accepted as a part of the prudential philosophy 
 of the tribe. For example, ' 'Honesty is the best policy," 
 announces the result of a large experience in dishonesty by 
 the whole race. Its truth is often hard to realize, yet 
 many a man has been governed by this simple maxim 
 when conscience, the sense of duty, and the fear of Grod 
 were unable to control his actions. Men who were unable 
 to comprehend the reasonings of Isaiah and Socrates 
 could lay up in memory the maxims of Solomon and the 
 fables of iEsop. And there is reason to believe that the 
 modern Englishman, German, or American is more influ- 
 enced by the proverbs in which our languages are so rich, 
 than he is by the subtle, metaphysical doctrines of Kant 
 and Martineau, Luther and Edwards. 
 
 But all proverbial philosophy is professedly a pruden- 
 tial philosophy. It tells the individual what his prede- 
 cessors have found most profitable in life. It gives him 
 the benefit of their experiences; condenses into a line for 
 him the biography of a race. Proverbial philosophy is 
 often trustworthy, too. It comes with no ax to grind, 
 no system to maintain, no party to support. Like the 
 pebble on the river beach, it comes from no man knows 
 where; and, like the pebble, it has been tossed and tried 
 
38 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 until it is worn smooth and perfect. Hence the proverb- 
 ial philosophy of any people is well worthy of study. 
 These gems of thought, these heirlooms of experience 
 which have survived the mutations of kingdoms and 
 peoples are more priceless than the treasures of princes. 
 And what is the burden of their tale? Is not their united 
 voice to the effect that, "Experience is the best teacher;" 
 that "your sin will find jou out;" that "The thief will 
 be caught in his own trap;" that "One lie makes two 
 more necessary;" that "If you cast your bread upon the 
 waters it will return to you after many days;" that "He 
 who sows the wind, will reap the whirlwind"? Chastity, 
 honesty, veracity, mercy, bravery, modesty, industry, 
 patience, friendliness, shu, or reciprocity, (the golden 
 word of Confucius), are all based on sound prudential 
 reason. The experience of the race has demonstrated and 
 in these proverbs embodied the fact that these virtues are 
 not empty forms, not incomprehensible principles, not the 
 dictates of a whimsical deity, not the froth of an evanes- 
 cent sentiment, but that they are the rational maxims of 
 a happy life, the fundamental principles of a moral sciene 
 base on human nature and solicitous for human welfare. 
 
 But not only have the professedly ethical theories 
 which have had the most widespread influence among 
 mankind drawn their main strength from their hedonistic 
 principles, teachings, threats and promises; not only have 
 the popular principles of conduct and theories of the 
 destiny of man, as embodied in proverbs, maxims and 
 omens, accepted Hedonism as the ultimate desffrry of the 
 race, but the great religious systems of the race, which 
 have been already more or less closely associated with their 
 ethical principles and moralmaxims, have likewise rested 
 on a similar basis. Fear and hope are the sentiments to 
 which religion has always appealed, fear of present or 
 future evil or suffering, hope of future peace or bliss. 
 Sometimes the evil to be escaped and the reward to be 
 obtained was expected in the present life, sometimes in 
 a more or less definite life in another world, sometimes, as 
 among the Buddhists, the Egyptians and some of the 
 Greeks, in a future earthly life (Karma transmigration); 
 
A Plea wr Hedomism. 89 
 
 and sometimes, as among the ancient Jews, in th§ lives of 
 one's descendants. 
 
 Ancestor worship certainly sprang from hedonistic 
 motives. A man believed in a more or less vague way 
 that the spirits of the departed still retained power for 
 good and evil. It was important, therefore, to keep in 
 their good graces by offerings, sacrifices and ceremonial 
 attentions. Where ancestor worship prevails, a man's 
 good fortune and evil fortune, his health and his sickness, 
 his rich harvests and his famines, his good luck and his 
 accidents are attributed to the good or ill will of these 
 ancestors. Hence ancestor worship, especially among 
 people who show no great love for their kindred while 
 they are on earth, is purely a prudential affair, almost a 
 matter of business. 
 
 And among the idol worshipers it is very common to 
 reproach the god for not performing his part of the 
 contract. Sometimes he is even beaten, or mistreated in 
 other ways to awaken him to the fact that where he has 
 received the stipulated offerings and sacrifices, he should 
 send the needed blessings, rain, health, good crops, game, 
 or whatever it may be. 
 
 Even among the most highly civilized Christians this 
 feeling still lingers. The man who goes to church 
 regularly, is kind to his family, gives to the poor, treats 
 his neighbor squarely, is apt to think that the Lord 
 should prosper him and to feel abused if his crops are 
 bad, his children are sick, or especially if a .serious acci- 
 dent or misfortune befall him. 
 
 Hero worship is even more clearly hedonistic than 
 ancestor worship. For the affection which might lead 
 one to perform certain rites in memory of a beloved 
 parent does not exist toward a departed king or ruler. 
 One may be devoted to a good ruler, but it is because 
 that ruler has proven serviceable, has lightened the bur- 
 den of taxes, driven off the public enemy, punished inter- 
 nal disorder, enforced law and equity among his subjects, 
 and broadened the opportunities of the individual to lead 
 a happy and undisturbed life. It is the belief that the 
 wise ruler can still do something for his subjects that 
 
40 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 leads them to curry favor with Ms departed spirit. It is 
 fear of the despotic ruler that leads to the effort to 
 appease the wrath of his departed spirit. 
 
 I have already spoken of Confucianism, the ethical 
 religion of the Chinese, of Buddhism, the religion accepted 
 by so many millions in India and China, and of the 
 system of Zoroastrianism, the religion of Persia. All of 
 these were seen to rest on hedoDistic doctrines and prin- 
 ciples. Judaism, too, v. as a hedonistic religion. The Old 
 Testament is full of threats and promises. Ajid the most 
 frequent argument of the religious leaders was to point 
 to the hedonistic results of obedience and disobedience. 
 The Jew firmly believed that the conquests and other 
 national disasters were the direct result of unfaithfulness 
 to the Mosaic law, and that the restoration and preserva- 
 tion of the remnant was due to their repentance and 
 reformation. Although they believed themselves to be 
 God's favorite and peculiar people, they did not expect 
 him to favor them unless they faithfully obeyed his com- 
 mands; and conversely, if they were obedient, they 
 expected the favor of heaven. 
 
 The Mohammedans are, if possible, even more hedon- 
 istic and practical in their religious beliefs and observances 
 than the ancient Jews. Their Gfod is a just Grod; and by 
 a just God, they mean a Grod who stands strictly by his 
 contract^ Worship him according to his commands and 
 he will bless you in this world and the next. Disobey him 
 and he will punish you in this life and damn you eternally 
 in the next. Grod has revealed his will, his promises and 
 his punishments in the Koran. Follow the Koran, and 
 your welfare for time and eternity is assured. 
 
 I have already spoken of the ethical system of Jesus. 
 Christianity, which sprang from his teachings is com- 
 monly supposed to be opposed to all hedonistic systems. 
 It is supposed to be a religion of self-denial, of unselfish- 
 ness, of altruistic conduct. But Christianity is the child 
 of Judaism, and, as I showed above, Jesus based all 
 his arguments on hedonistic principles. The selfishness 
 which Jesus and his followers condemn is the narrow 
 selfishness which in the end is net truly self-beneficial. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 41 
 
 Christianity claims to save men not only from the eternal 
 penalties of their sins, but it as distinctly offers eternal 
 happiness to those who accept the simple plan of salva- 
 tion, and peace that passeth understanding throughout 
 the earthly life. The self-denial which the Christian advo- 
 cates can be accepted by the consistent hedonist, — at any 
 rate when coupled with the blessings held out by Chris- 
 tianity. If those blessings are guaranteed, the most 
 ardent hedonist will admit that the self-denial is worth 
 while. It is true that the more spiritual Christians profess 
 to base their doctrines on love and not on the hope of 
 reward. But if heaven and hell were cancelled from the 
 doctrines of Christianity, there is reason to fear that 
 there would be a great falling off in the number of Chris- 
 tians. A few high spirits may find Kant's doctrine of 
 duty and the doctrine of love sufficient sanctions of con- 
 duct. But for the great majority of mankind duty in the 
 abstract and love in the abstract would prove almost 
 totally worthless as sanctions of conduct. Common men 
 must have a sanction of a more practical kind. The con- 
 sequences of conduct must be kept before their eyes. 
 
 Even the force of habit, even the strongest religious 
 beliefs, will not hold men to conduct which they plainly 
 see it is to their interest to avoid. And if the promise of 
 inconceivably rich rewards and the threats of inconceiv- 
 ably awful punishments have not been able to constrain 
 men to obey the rules of Christianity with even plausible 
 strictness, how much more would these rules be neglected 
 if these terrible sanctions were abolished? 
 
 One feels safe in saying that even if the negative 
 sanctions, the punishments, were abolished, the neglect of 
 Christianity would increase in a marked degree. This, too, 
 not only in spite of a future reward but in the face of the 
 fact that Christianity is largely based on philosophical 
 hedonistic principles. The reaction would be due to the 
 fact that too many people accept Christianity through 
 fear. They are afraid to disobey. They have not grasped 
 the philosophy of conduct. They do not perceive that 
 Christianity is pointing out the line of conduct which is 
 best for the individual. They feel that they must be 
 
42 A Plea tor Hedonism. 
 
 "good" in order to escape bell and consequently "good- 
 ness" is always a burden to them. Because it Is forced on 
 them they dislike it, just as a school boy dislikes his 
 studies. The same state of facts doubtless exists among 
 the followers of all religions. Fear and not reason holds 
 them to the mark. Here and there a thoughtful individ- 
 ual catches a glimpse of the beauty of holiness, of the 
 reasonableness of the philosophy of the prescribed con- 
 duct, (if it happens to be reasonable or philosophical, 
 which too often is not the .case.) But the masses obey 
 blindly and doggedly, because they think they must. 
 
 But if the ethical and religious thinkers who have had 
 the greatest influence on the lives and conduct of their 
 fellowmen have attained this result by an appeal to the 
 sentience of their hearers, and by a demonstration of the 
 personal advantage of accepting their doctrines, the 
 political and economic thinkers have still more plainly 
 and emphatically appealed to prudential reasons. 
 Even those statesmen who have insisted most strongly on 
 the divine origin of kings and other institutions, have 
 felt compelled to bolster up their claims by sanctions of 
 a sentient nature, that is, by a system of rewards and 
 punishments. But the true statesman, the wise ruler, in 
 all ages and nations has had the welfare of the people at 
 heart and has sought to provide the political and eco- 
 nomic institutions which would best promote the general 
 welfare. Whatever additional prerogatives have been 
 claimed for the state, the protection of the citizen from 
 external enemies, the suppression of crime, the mainten- 
 ance of good order and justice have always been recog- 
 nized as falling within the sphere of duties or rights of the 
 ruler. Moses and Manu, Solon and Lycurgus, Murna and 
 Justinian, Washington and Gladstone all had the welfare 
 of the people at heart. It is true that the glory of the 
 state has sometimes blinded men's eyes to the needs of 
 the people. But however this may have been, it is now 
 universally admitted that the ruler should constantly 
 have in mind the welfare of the people. 
 
 Utility, not consistency with any abstract theory, is 
 the modern test of political and economic science. And 
 
A Plea lor Hedonism. 43 
 
 in the political systems of the past, it was the useful 
 institutions which preserved the systems and made them 
 acceptable. Take the Common and Statue Law of 
 England. It was not its theory of the divine rights of 
 kings, its subjection of women, its descent by primogeni- 
 ture, its aristocratic electoral system, or its state- 
 supported church which made it so strong and so 
 valuable. Its admirable system of justice, its Magna 
 Charta and Habeas Corpus, its Court of Equity and House 
 of Commons, and above all its constant appeal to 
 sentient facts and common sense were its real strength 
 and grandeur. 
 
 The same is true of the Roman law, from which 
 English law drew far more than its admirers like to 
 admit. The exceeding flexibility of both these systems, 
 where flexibility permitted improvement in the interests 
 of the general welfare, and their stern inflexibility where 
 there would have been danger to the public or the 
 individual good, is the secret of their inestimable value. 
 Unconsciously resting on the sound good sense of practi- 
 cal men, Roman and English law are living monuments of 
 the value of hedonism . 
 
 But the case for Hedonism grows clearer and stronger 
 as we proceed. If the political and economic systems of 
 the world which have proved the most durable and excel- 
 lent are more obviously hedonistic than the religious and 
 ethical systems, the social systems of the progressive 
 nations show still more clearly the marks of hedonism. 
 This subject is so vast that one can do little more than 
 call attention to its more salient features. 
 
 Questions of family life, of education, of pauperism, of 
 the helpless and disabled, of marriage and divorce, of the 
 prevention and suppression of vice, of amusements, of 
 health and disease, trade, commerce and science, must be 
 determined by hedonistic rules. 
 
 The first requisite of the continued existence of the 
 individual and of the race is the observance of the rules of 
 health. No one will claim that these rules can be deter- 
 mined otherwise than by experience, that is, by the canon 
 of consequences. The final purpose of man's earthly 
 
44 A Plea tor Hedonism . 
 
 sojourn is not yet positively known, unless we accept the 
 evidence of- revealed religkm. Unless, therefore, conduct 
 which conduces to the* pleasan test possible life is clearly 
 forbidden by an authoritative revelation, the hedonist 
 insists that that conduct is legitimate. More than this, 
 a revelation which ran counter to the laws of health would 
 have to be very clear and positive or intelligent men would 
 refuse to accept it. Such practices as self mutilation, 
 self torture, excessive fasting, celibacy, asceticism, and 
 deliberate poverty have gradually become discounte- 
 nanced by intelligent man. They belong to a philosophy 
 of pain, which, however strong a hold it may once have 
 held on the religious consciousness of mankind, has grad- 
 ually fallen into disfavor. The number of men who 
 believe that Grod takes delight in the sufferings of any of 
 his creatures is rapidly decreasing and the sooner they 
 have all disappeared the better it will be for the race. 
 The religion which attempts to retard the wheels of 
 progress will certainly and deservedly be crushed in the 
 attempt. But progress means increase in intelligence, 
 strength, health, skill and happiness; increase in the 
 knowledge of the laws of nature and of the human con- 
 stitution; and increase in skill in the application of the 
 knowledge for the benefit of humanity. Progress means 
 an elevation of the ideal of human destiny and an increase 
 in the effort to attain that ideal. Progress means the 
 discovery of the causes of human misery and wretched- 
 ness, and the removal of those evils, in so far as it lies 
 within human power to remove them. Progress means 
 faithfulness to truth and honesty about facts, though all 
 our preconceived notions and theories must be sacrificed. 
 
 IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF HEDONISM. 
 
 A Plea for Hedonism which should neglect to examine 
 the many objections which have been made t© the doctrine 
 would be a very one sided argument. The attempt to 
 answer all the objections which have been put forward in 
 opposition to our theory would be to write a book as 
 large as those of Thomas Aquinas and Kichard Cumber- 
 land. But a glance at some of the chief objections will 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. * 45 
 
 serye to strengthen the position of Hedonism as the real 
 guide to conduct. 
 
 1. The "Sum of Pleasures." 
 
 Among the objections most frequently advanced 
 against our theory is that which the late Professor T. H. 
 Green dwelt most upon, to wit: that there can be no "sum 
 of pleasures" and that therefore it is not possible to 
 strive for "the greatest possible sum of pleasures". 
 
 That pleasure cannot be gathered like black-berries 
 and heaped up in baskets, everyone will admit. But that 
 one may enjoy a greater amount of pleasure or happiness 
 than another, everyone knows to be the case. In matters 
 of food, two loaves are better than one; in matters of 
 clothing, two blankets are better than one; in matters of 
 senses, two eyes are better than one; two ears better than 
 one; in matters of activity, two hands and two feet are 
 better than one hand and one foot. In matters of 
 education, two years of schooling are better than one, 
 two hundred volumes more serviceable than one hundred; 
 in matters of agriculture, two horses are better than one, 
 two cows better than one, a two story house better than 
 a one story house. So in matters of pure enjoyment, a 
 two days vacation is preferable to one day, two chickens 
 go farther at a picnic than one, two pounds of candy than 
 one, two bottles of wine than one. If those who argue 
 that there can be no summation of pleasures mean to say 
 that there is no such thing as varying the. amount of 
 one's pleasures, they are talking against facts. If they 
 mean anything else they do not interest either;,the Hedon- 
 ist or the practical man. 35 
 
 2. The Problem of Responsibility. 
 
 It is sometimes objected to the doctrine of Hedonism 
 that it destroys human responsibility. For if each indi- 
 vidual is his own judge as to what will promote his great- 
 est happiness, other men have no ground for interference, 
 even if he is mistaken. The contented swine knows his 
 own mind better than any one else can know it, and if 
 
 35 See Taylor, Prob of Conduct, p, 530, 
 
46 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 the wallow furnishes him the means of the purest enjoy- 
 ment, creatures who do not care for the mire should not 
 interfere. 
 
 There is an element of truth in this contention. We 
 must not try to force upon a nature interests which are 
 wholly alien to it. By no possible contrivance can the 
 pig be made to enjoy the parlor as much as he enjoys his 
 wallow. And if it were necessary to take pig natures into 
 account in the state and in society, it would be necessary 
 to make allowance for this fact. 36 But while human tem- 
 peraments vary greatly, they do not vary so greatly as 
 do the temperament of a man and a pig. There are cer- 
 tain general traits which are found in all men's natures, 
 certain likes and dislikes, certain sympathies and antip- 
 athies. It is on the basis of these traits that society and 
 the state are constructed. 37 Within certain limits we 
 encourage individuality, but certain bounds must not be 
 passed by the individual. He must not commit murder, 
 arson, theft, slander, assault and battery, adultery or 
 nuisance. Every intelligent man is presumed to know 
 the evil consequences of such acts, in terms of welfare 
 (pleasure and pain), upon his neighbors. Their effects are 
 so uniformly evil that the state itself attends to their 
 punishment. There is an implied agreement among all 
 moral citizens not to commit such deeds. Other acts, 
 such as drunkenness, lying and rudeness the state does 
 not attempt to punish unless accompanied by acts of 
 interference with the rights of others. The child and the 
 lunatic are 'excused from responsibility for the same 
 reason that the dumb beast is excused. They lack the 
 intelligence necessary to link cause and effect. The prob- 
 lem at which criminologists are now working is whether 
 the criminal has that degree of intelligence which should 
 enable him to see the results of his act as they are seen by 
 the normal man. 88 But even if a man is lacking in intelli- 
 
 ^Hoffding, Ethik., p. 109. 
 
 37 See W. Wallace, lectures and Essays, pp. 250 and 261 et seq. 
 38 Whar4:on, Crim. Law, I. ch. 2; WbVs Pollock on the Iyaw of 
 Torts, ch. 2,- p. 23. See WV Wallace, op„ cit f 310, 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 47 
 
 gence, the sanctions of law and morals are sometimes 
 binding upon him. If he knows that an act is forbidden 
 under a given penalty, he should be punished, even if he 
 is not able to reason out the full consequence of his act. 39 
 For only thus can society maintain its existence. Luna- 
 tics and small children are greatly restrained by the 
 certainty of punishment, although they are unable to 
 appreciate the reason for the establishment of punish- 
 ment. In fact, the philosophers themselves have not yet 
 come to an agreement as to the basis and grounds of 
 punishment. 
 
 The limits, also, within which society shall restrain 
 the actions of the individual are still a matter of dispute. 
 The Socialist would have the state take charge of almost 
 the whole human life, while the individualist would limit 
 state control to the enforcement of the criminal law. 
 This is not the place to follow up the discussion; suffice it 
 to say that in our opinion the question is purely one of 
 utility. If the majority of the citizens within a given area 
 prefer socialism, it seems to me that they are justified in 
 adopting such a mode of government. The individual 
 who dislikes such a course can move away or exert his 
 influence to reform the law. What I have said above does 
 not amount to saying that might makes right. At least, 
 if by right is meant the greatest welfare of the individuals 
 of the society. For the action of the majority may really 
 prove injurious or even destructive to the society. Such 
 a course makes only a relative right or political right. 40 
 Conformity to the social law, whatever it may be, entitles 
 one to the social approval and the escape from the sanc- 
 tions of the social law. Rut such conformity does not 
 ensure the actor his greatest happiness or welfare. Nor 
 has any society more than a relative justification in 
 adopting a law which is not for the welfare of the society. 
 An independent people is responsible to.no other earthly 
 
 39 Sidgwick, Meth. of Eth., Bk. I, ch. 5; Maudsley, Responsibility in 
 Xvlental Disease. 
 
 4<> Herein ljes the fallacy of F|obbes v who made the political sanction 
 to conduct absolute. Leviathan, ch. 26, 
 
48 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 power for its acts, but that does not make its acts abso- 
 lutely right. Only correspondence with the greatest wel- 
 fare of the society can make a law absolutely right. 41 As 
 A. E. Taylor says, "When the evolution of ethical senti- 
 ment is complete, I am responsible to myself for obedience 
 to a law which I impose on myself, for the discharge of 
 duties which I expect of myself, and should continue to 
 expect, though God and man were to agree to connive at 
 my disregard of them 48 . In other words, when I have 
 adopted my ethical ideal, no matter what it may be, I 
 have become a law unto myself, the judge of my own 
 action." 4 * 
 
 3. The Variability of Human Nature. 
 
 Another objection which has been often urged against 
 Hedonism is that human nature is so variable as to make 
 any standard of action based thereon of little if any value. 
 This objection is not substantially different from the last 
 preceding. What pleases my taste may be disgusting to 
 my neighbor. What he likes may be repulsive to me. 
 The tastes of youth vary from the taste of old age. The 
 young love activity, noise, strife, opposition. The old 
 love quiet, peace, unanimity, concordance. One man 
 loves self-assertion, boldness, courage, coolness, nerve 
 and skill. Another prefers humility, meekness, kindness, 
 affection and grace. One man prefers wealth and pomp, 
 praise and prominence. Another prefers a quiet nook 
 with his pipe and his book, or independence and rags like 
 Huckleberry Finn. One man is self-contained and prefers 
 his own company to that of any one else. Another lives 
 in the conversation and opinions of other men. One man 
 never loses sight of his own interests; his every act is a 
 move to promote his own welfare. Another is naturally 
 sympathetic. He seldom thinks of his own welfare, but is 
 
 "Since the above was written I find that Prof. William Wallace 
 has already expressed the same idea in much better terms. See Essays 
 and Lectures, pp. 253-4. 
 
 42 A. B. Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, p. 153. 
 
 * 3 Kant no doubt had this evolutionary product in mind when he 
 declared for the famous "categorical imperative." 
 
A Plea tor Hedonism. 49 
 
 always studying how he can do more to make his fellow- 
 men happier. One man spends all his substance for the 
 good of others. Another wears himself out devising 
 methods for getting possession of the goods of others. 
 Differences of temperament are familiar to us all. 44 How 
 will the hedonist reconcile all this variability? 
 
 The hedonist will not reconcile it at all. He takes 
 men as they are. When he finds that the benevolent dis- 
 position is for the social good, he will join with nature in 
 encouraging such men. But the greater part of the 
 problem nature must solve. She has probably found use 
 for courage, anger, covetousness, and pugnacity in the 
 past, or she would have rooted them out of human 
 nature before this. 45 "This variability of sentiment is but 
 the concomitant of the transition from the aboriginal 
 type of society fitted for destructive activities, to the civi- 
 lized type fitted for peaceful activities." But so long as 
 this variability exists, of course the line of conduct of 
 differently constituted individuals could not be expected 
 agree in all respects. 
 
 The hedonist is not bound to lay down any hard and 
 fast rules of conduct. He insists, on the contrary, on the 
 greatest freedom for all in the formation and pursuit of 
 these ideals. Certain general rules all must observe; but 
 beyond these, there is a wide field left open for the individ- 
 ual choice and preference. 
 
 4. The Paradox of Hedonism. 
 
 One of the most frequently mentioned objections to 
 Hedonism is the so-called "Paradox of Hedonism". In 
 the briefly worded phrase of Prof. Sidgwick, "To get 
 pleasure, one must forget it." Sidgwick and others urge 
 that pleasure cannot be the end or aim of conduct from 
 the fact that when we fix our thoughts too closely on 
 the pleasure which our activities are to bring us, the 
 result is generally disappointing. The pleasure seeker is 
 by no means the happiest of mortals. Men who fix their 
 
 ^ee Lotze, Micrososmus, Bk. VI., ch. 2. 
 
 4 ^See Spender, Prin. Peyc.,,11, §524. 
 
50 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 minds on the attainment of other objects than their own 
 pleasures are usually the most contented and happy. 
 
 Those who raise this objection neglect, it seems to me, 
 several important psychological phenomena. The first 
 of these is the law of attention. The human mind is so 
 constituted that the field of clear consciousness is always 
 narrow. And owing to the fact that human ideals must 
 be attained by more or less elaborate means or processes, 
 it is generally necessary to concentrate tke attention so 
 closely on the means and details, that the ideal or ulti- 
 mate purpose of the conduct is for the time shut out from 
 the field of consciousness; just as the top of the hill is 
 shut off by the windings of the road. These facts are so 
 familiar that it appears stranger that a psychologist 
 with the penetration which Sidgwick possessed should 
 overlook them. But while our ideal may be forgotten 
 while we are devoting attention to the means, it has not 
 really passed into oblivion. Jacob, for instance, during 
 the seven years of his service for the hand of Rachel must 
 have found it constantly necessary to devote his whole 
 attention to his work. But the ultimate reward was 
 before him all the time. Had Rachel died, his course of 
 life would have been instantly changed. Young Hanni- 
 bal, too, as he underwent the weary exercises necessary 
 to train him for the hardy life of a soldier, must have 
 frequently forgot his oath to destroy Rome, yet that 
 oath spurred him on through all trials and hardships. So 
 the man who devotes his life to art, science or literature 
 must frequently lose himself in the drudgery of essential 
 preparation and discipline, yet he expects the attainment 
 of his ideal to bring a great satisfaction and pleasure. 
 
 Once more, those who insist upon the paradox of 
 Hedonism, as well as those who hold that pleasure is not 
 the only object of desire 46 forget the sources and nature of 
 pleasure. For our present purposes, it is only necessary 
 to point out that activity as such is usually agreeable. 
 Compulsory inactivity is the severest punishment to most 
 men. For this reason the pursuit of aa iieal is often as 
 
 ^Especially Green, Prolog, to Ethics, p. 186 et seq. 
 
A Plea lor Hedonism. 51 
 
 pleasant or even pleasanter than the attainment thereof. 
 Thus all kinds of games afford amusement, the end to be 
 accomplished being quite subordinate. Once more, the 
 mere contemplation or the accomplishment of success is 
 often a sufficient motive to justify much toil and trouble, 
 regardless of the importance of the success itself. 
 
 Some men are willing to devote a lifetime of drudgery 
 to accomplish an ideal, which other men would regard as 
 trivial. Others again derive their enjoyment from the 
 struggle in which they engage, from the victories and 
 triumphs which they secure, regardless of the actual ulti- 
 mate value to themselves or others of these achievements. 
 Again, some men prefer the enjoyment of as much inactiv- 
 ity as possible. Such natures would prefer an eternity of 
 Nirvana to one of "playing on a golden harp" or other 
 activity. 
 
 Lastly, the pleasures of some men are intellectual, 
 those of others, emotional, and those of others, sensual. 
 The intellectual and sensual pleasures relate more closely 
 to the self than do the emotional. MaDy of the emotional 
 pleasures arise from altruistic activities. Some men are 
 so constituted that activity for the benefit of others is 
 always more enjoyable to them than self-beneficial activi- 
 ties. For a mind so constituted, no doubt it is true that 
 the best way to get a pleasure is to forget it. And in all 
 the cases above mentioned, it is evident that the ideal is 
 either a purely pleasant or agreeable one or else involves 
 sufficient pleasure or satisfaction in its attainment to 
 make it come under the category of Hedonism. The 
 course of life which one prefers to follow and would 
 willingly pursue a second time is hedonistic, whether the 
 goal of that life or only the struggle toward that goal is 
 the ground of that satisfaction and desirability. Un- 
 trammeled preferability is the real hedonistic test. Hence 
 those, such as Green, 47 who attempt to distinguish 
 between "pleasure' ' and "self-satisfaction" are making a 
 limitation which Hedonism refuses to recognize. Men's 
 prefeianees lie at the base of their activities. Hedonism 
 
 * 7 op. cit. p. 187, 
 
52 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 seeks to reach and guide through these preferences. In 
 some cases the preferences themselves need enlightenment. 
 That is the business of the scienes. In other cases new 
 preferences are needed. This is never strictly the business 
 of ethics— assisting nature. 
 
 V. THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM. 
 
 1. Pseudo Altruism. 
 
 Our purpose, then, is to outline, if possible, a philos- 
 ophy of conduct; that is, to show what line of conduct is 
 most desirable or preferable, under the circumstancs of a 
 particular environment. So much of conduct, therefore, 
 as can be shown to be desirable to the individual as an 
 individual, whether it is also conducive to social welfare 
 or not, that is, whether it is socially desirable or not, need 
 not concern us in the present section. (Kant ruled self- 
 benefitting acts out of the province of ethics. ) For, if 
 under every possible view of the environment, present and 
 future, the proposed line of conduct is desirable or prefer- 
 able for the individual, we must assume that the individ- 
 ual will follow that line of conduct if possible, as soon as 
 he becomes aware of this fact. The trouble in the past 
 has been that the individual took too narrow a* view of 
 the environment and was unable to see that conduct 
 which was socially desirable was also individually desir- 
 able. Thus the advantage of association in the largest 
 possible groups under similar laws did not become 
 apparent to men for thousands of years. But the destruc- 
 tion of tribes who failed to see the advantage of larger 
 unions, and the gradual development of the more fortu- 
 nate tribes and nations which combined their strength 
 has at last developed the idea of world empires. The 
 advantages of universal education, of faithful fulfillment 
 of contracts, of veracity and honesty, of chastity and 
 sobriety, of politeness, neighborliness, considerateness 
 and respectfulness have only gradually dawned on the 
 human mind. That a perfectly selfish and unsympa- 
 thetic man may contribute largely to the social welfare in 
 all these and many other ways is apparent. T^hus a wise 
 man might so act among a savage tribe as to gain the 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 58 
 
 credit of \ being exceedingly altruistic, and yet be act- 
 ing all the time in his own interest. This policy is now 
 very commonly pursued among enterprising merchants 
 and traders, not only among savages, but in the midst of 
 the highest .civilization. From what we have, 
 sad, it is apparent that a vast amount of con- 
 duct is credited as altruistic or disinterested which 
 is not so in reality. It is further apparent that much 
 activity is called disinterested which would not be so called 
 if we were well enough informed to see that the actor is 
 really working for his own benefit, that is, that in addi- 
 tion to the altruistic results of his actions they have also 
 self-beneficial results which amply justify them. In many 
 eases, too, the actor looks on these self-beneficial results 
 as a sort of reward for the altruistic consequences of his 
 acts, and is thus further supported in his action by the 
 consciousness of a supposed merit, a merit which would 
 disappear could all men clearly perceive the self-beneficial 
 consequences of the acts. For we do not ascribe merit to 
 acts whose beneficial consequences to the actor are clearly 
 and certainly foreseen. But these concepts of equity and 
 justice, which lead us daily to a thousand acts without a 
 thought o ftheir having any moral quality whatsoever are 
 the product of age— any training of the race in social 
 experiences. By means of the canon of consequences, we 
 have become so thoroughly drilled in the more common 
 matters of social intercourse, that it is only with an 
 effort that we can perceive their moral quality. Hence 
 the line between pseudo-altruism and prudence is gradually 
 being pushed back, as men perceive the prudential advan- 
 tage of a given course of action— that it is clearly to the 
 advantage of the actor to follow it, one ceases to attrib- 
 ute merit to the act. As we show in the next section, 
 there is reason to believe, and it is the object of Hedonism 
 to point out to all men, that the field of prudence will in 
 time cover the entire field of human voluntary activities. 
 
 2. Eational Altruism. 
 
 There is another important group of activities which 
 are commonly classed as disinterested, which on closer 
 
54 A Plea lor Hedonism. 
 
 examination turn out to be only a sUlbffci&r l&em of 
 interested activities. Take the familiar tfase of a tfaan 
 who enters an arm y. If uninstructed, the n&tupal impulse 
 would be to run when danger appears. But the wise 
 general will explain to his soldiers that a bold front often 
 frightens the enemy away, that even where this does not 
 happen, that by standing firmly together each individual 
 is really much safer than if he attempts to retreat. 
 Following such instruction the soldier learns to face the 
 danger and stand by his comrades when they are in 
 danger. The importance of keeping watch is appreciated 
 by all, and therefore when the turn of any individual 
 comes to stand sentinel, he takes the chances of being shot 
 for the sake of preserving himself and others, and also for 
 the sake of having others stand sentinel when their turn 
 comes. 
 
 Take now a more intricate case. We Mave Indicated 
 above that the wise man learns the value in the long run 
 of veracity, honesty, chastity, kindness, politeness and 
 the many other social virtues. But he also finds that 
 these virtues can only be acquired by eonstant exercise. 
 This constant exercise forms a habit. Now, when a case 
 comes where a lie would possibly be advantageous, the 
 habit of veracity has become so strong that the truth 
 comes out, even while the speaker realizes that it may 
 cost his fortune or his life. A thoughtful man may have 
 reflected on the possibility of such an occurrence early in 
 life. But it was only a possibility and the chances in 
 favor of its not occurring, or the net gain of truth telling 
 may have been such as to lead him consciously to take 
 the chances, or to take the smaller evil with the greater 
 good. Where the whole course of conduct is profitable, 
 then the particular instance where the course proves dis- 
 advantageous should not be classed as disinterested, 
 especially where it was necessary to form a habit of acting 
 in the given way in order to attain the best results. But 
 experience teaches that all the common virtues, which on 
 the whole are recognized by intelligent people as profit- 
 able to the actor, but which in particular instances could 
 be departed from with advantage by the ack>r, can attain 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 66 
 
 their fullest usefeikkeas only by constant and unremitted 
 practice all through life, thereby making them ataost 
 mechanical by habitual practice. Thus the habit? of 
 veracity may become so fixed as to make death easier 
 than falsehood. While frequent departure from the truth 
 makes lying so easy as to give no sting of conscience 
 whatever. The same is true as to faithfulness to promises. 
 To a man like Regulus, death by torment is preferable to 
 breach of promise. A man who has not trained himself 
 to this habitual fidelity to promises would feel amply 
 justified in breaking a promise extorted as was the 
 promise of Regulus. The same rule holds good as to pro- 
 fanity, to abstinence from intoxicants and sexual indul- 
 gence, and to honesty. 48 Self-culture, which is the aim of 
 self- discipline, is the contradictory of social justice, which 
 is the aim of true altruism. This self-cultivating activity 
 I have called rational altruism. When two habitual 
 virtues come into conflict, we have a curious altruistic 
 puzzle, such as the problem of veracity when in conflict 
 with the habit or impulse of kindness. Shall I lie to 
 prevent the wrongful death or injury of a friend? This 
 question has puzzled philosophers from the days of Aris- 
 totle, to those of James Martineau. Rational altruism 
 would apparently solve the problem in favor of veracity; 
 but pure altruism, submitting to the power of the altru- 
 istic sentiment, will probably always solve it in favor of 
 kindness. 
 
 The foregoing remarks are intended to show the 
 reader how narrow the margin of conflict is between 
 activity which is socially beneficial and that 
 which is beneficial for the individual but injurious 
 to society. The narrower this margin can be made to 
 appear, the easier it will be to persuade men to live 
 morally. For so long as you can point out to a man 
 that the line of conduct which you suggest is really prefer- 
 able for him, is in fact that which he would follow if he 
 knew his own interest, you may expect that he will listen 
 
 48 Taylor brings the above distinction out very clearly in Chap. V. of 
 his Problem of Ethics. 
 
56 A Plea tor Hedonism. 
 
 to you. But if you appeal to a man's conscience, to his 
 sense of duty, to the social welfare, or the happiness of 
 posterity, you may' feel sure that he will listen to you 
 unwillingly. No one can calculate the amount of misery 
 which exists because men are either following unwillingly 
 a course of action which they feel in duty bound to 
 follow, but would prefer not to follow, or are living for self, 
 while feeling that t hey ought to be doing something else. 
 An ethical theory, therefore, which can convince men, even 
 in a small degree 1 hat what they think duty is really self- 
 interest, and what they think self-interest is really often 
 injurious will conf * r a great boon on mankind. There is 
 misery and wretchedness in life at best, without any mpre 
 of it based on unnecessary grounds. 
 
 3. Pure Altru ism. 
 
 But after all has been said that it is possible to say in 
 the way of narrow ing the margin of conflict between self- 
 interest and altruism, we must acknowledge that there is 
 still a margin left. The welfare of the individual, at the 
 present day, does not quite correspond, so far as we can 
 see, with the welfare of humanity. More than this, 
 individuals are found who are consciously acting in ehe 
 interest of society to the detriment of their own interests. 
 Real self-sacrifice is a fact so familiar that we cannot 
 shut our eyes to it. Heroism is a word to be found in 
 most languages, and heroes are to found in all ages and 
 among all peoples. Maternal love, social sympathy and 
 pity are too well known to be denied. Moreover, the 
 efforts of Bentham, James Mill and others to reduce 
 altruism to terms of self-interest were not successful. 49 
 No doubt they had in mind the instances we have given 
 above of pseudo-altruism and rational altruism. But we 
 must admit many cases of true self-sacrifice, conscious, 
 deliberate self-sacrifice. How shall we account for these 
 cases? That self-sacrifice is not logically justifiable on 
 hedonistic principles we must continue to assert. But if 
 it is not logically justifiable, how can it be accounted for? 
 
 * 9 Stephen, the Eng. Util., I. p. 313 et seq; II. 321. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 57 
 
 Leslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer and S. Alexander, 
 three of the leading evolutionary becUmkts, answer the 
 question by pointing out that our activity is determined 
 by the ideas and emotions present at the moment of 
 decision. Now the present idea of a future pleasure or 
 pain may be very different from the actual pleasure or 
 pain, when it arrives. While the idea of the suffering 
 which another will endure, together with our own after 
 recollections of the same, may present a very vivid motive 
 to perform the act. Thus our own good is the motive 
 after all. As Spencer points out, the pains of another 
 may be as clear to us as our own future pains. Our sym- 
 pathies are strongest where we have ourselves experienced 
 the sufferings which we now see in another. And with 
 sufferings which we have never experienced our sym- 
 pathies are correspondingly weak. The actual pain or 
 pleasure of another is not, therefore, our motive in altru- 
 istic activity, but the ideas of those pains and pleasures 
 which exist in our own minds. 
 
 There is no doubt considerable force in this line of 
 reasoning. Yet A. E. Taylor, in his Problem of Conduct, 
 denies that it has any validity; taking the ground that 
 we have no present idea of future pleasures and pains at 
 all. But this view is certainly erroneous. I have said 
 above that from the standpoint of Hedonism altruistic 
 conduct is illogical. But because it is illogical, it by no 
 means follows that it cannot be accounted for. There are 
 other impulses of the same kind. Superstitious feelings 
 are also illogical, but one cannot for that reason free him- 
 self from them. The child shrieks with terror when his 
 little brother plays bear, knowing all the while that there 
 is no real danger. Adults will do the same at the sight of 
 an artificial snake, or even a jaek-in-the-box. Many 
 people do not like to start on a journey on Friday, or to 
 sit at a table with twelve others, or to break a looking- 
 glass, or to give or receive an edged present. They laugh 
 at their own feelings, but cannot shake them off. Some 
 people dare not stand near a precipice because the 
 impulse to leap over is too strong to be resisted. Some 
 
68 A Plea tor Hed&atem. 
 
 children cannot resist the impulse to handle or crush 
 certain objects, knowing full well that they are obswved 
 and will be punished. A man will often ftad it Impossible 
 to resist the impulse to swear, or to tell some one what he 
 thinks of him, even while he knows that the penalty will 
 be heavy. Again, the impulse to laugh often comes on us 
 at the most inopportune moments. We would give our 
 right hand to hold it back, but on it comes. The impulse 
 to take revenge or to wreak spite Is likewise often irresis- 
 tible in the face of penalties. The impulse to play tricks 
 is another instance. Everyone will recall children and 
 even adults who could not resist the opportunity to play 
 a practical joke, even though regretting the consequences 
 at the very moment of acting. Now all these are really 
 cases of disinterested, although not altruistic, activity. 
 It is irresistible. Nature has implanted certain impulses 
 in us which all our reason is not strong enough to over- 
 come. Many of our impulses can in time be brought 
 under control. When we perceive their evil consequences, 
 we make a constant effort to rid ourselves of them. But 
 in the case of altruistic impulses, the advantage to 
 society leads men to approve the acts inspired by fehem, 
 and thus they tend rather to become confirmed, because 
 the approval tends to make them self-interested acts. 
 Besides, as I have indicated above, nature selects for sur- 
 vival the individuals who are strongly gifted with altru- 
 istic impulses. 80 Thus these impulses tend to become 
 stronger from generation to generation. But the indi- 
 viduals who have the most vivid imaginations and can 
 picture the pains and pleasures of others most readily 
 will be those who will have the strongest sympathies. So 
 nature will continue to select those individuals who find 
 the most pleasure in promoting the pleasures of others, 
 and who will do the most to lessen the pains of others. 
 The activities inspired by these impulses are not then, 
 strictly speaking, a part of voluntary conduct at all. 
 
 50 Duhring, Der Wert des Lebens, cited by Hdffding, Hist. Mod. 
 Philos., II., p. 560. 
 
A Plea wr Hedonism. 99 
 
 They belong to the class of activities which nature takes 
 care of— the instincts and reflex actions. 81 
 
 As I have already indicated, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, in 
 his Social Evolution and his Western Civilization, has 
 emphasized more strongly than any other writer the share 
 which nature takes in human evolution, by means of the 
 evolution of the ethical and religious impulses. He brings 
 a large array of facts to show that not intellectual devel- 
 opment but moral and religious development have been the 
 characteristics of the races which have won in the struggle 
 for existence. The chief reason for this is that intellectual 
 families die out. They are anxious to have their child- 
 ren occupy as high a grade in society as they themselves 
 occupy, and this desire retards marriage. Thus only 
 five out of the five hundred noble families in England can 
 trace back their ancestry in the male line to the fifteenth 
 century. The same is true in France and probably in all 
 other countries. The aristocracy is constantly dying out 
 and being replaced by a new aristocracy. 52 Mere intellec- 
 tual development, however high, is not sufficient to secure 
 the persistence of the race. It is generally conceded, for 
 instance, that the Greeks were the most highly, developed 
 intellectually of any people who ever lived. Yet while 
 they are still in existence, nominally, they were long 
 ago outstripped in the race for existence, and there is 
 probably very little if any of the blood of the ancient 
 Atheneans now flowing in the veins of the Grecians. The 
 old stock has entirely disappeared. They lack those 
 traits of character which insure posterity or racial persis- 
 tence. The same thing happened among the Romans. 
 In the days of the empire the old families disappeared and 
 were replaced by foreigners. Spain, France and England 
 have had a similar experience. Nature, then, is constantly 
 selecting for race preservation those individuals who 
 have the social sentiments, love of offspring, devotion to 
 family life, loyalty to clan, tribe, or city, pity for the weak 
 and mit freude with the strong, most strongly developed. 
 
 51 See Calkins, Introd. to Psyc, p. 333, et seq. 
 52 See especially Soc. Evol. Chap. IX. 
 
60 A Pirn for Hedonism. 
 
 The variation of social sentiment may be very slight, is in 
 fact slight; but nature never overlooks these slight varia- 
 tions. They may also be what we call accidental. (And 
 that may mean mere blind chance, or the work of an 
 unseen artificer working out a great design.) But so long 
 as they are hereditary they answer the purpose of nature. 
 Neither is it necessary that they be intellectually justifiable. 
 To sacrifice self for others may seem unreasonable, but if 
 nature impels us to do it, we must submit just as we 
 submit to the trouble of finding food and drink when we 
 are hungry or thirsty. 
 
 But it will be objected that this view fails to account 
 for the high esteem which is universally accorded to self- 
 sacrifice. Let us see. In the first place, it is natural for 
 the recipient to approve the beneficial act. This approval 
 is not based on the personality of the act, that is, on the 
 fact that it was voluntarily and consciously performed 
 by an intelligent being. For we approve the beneficial 
 acts of nature. When the stone we throw brings down 
 the fruit or the game, when the seed we plant grows, and 
 when the experiment we try succeeds, we have this 
 feeling of approval. In the next place, experience teaches 
 us that the man who is capable of self-sacrifice is 
 a desirable companion. The sacrificial act is an index to 
 the character fit for society. It indicates the presence of 
 of a "good" man, one who will not break promises, lie, 
 steal nor in other ways prove himself unsocial. It indi- 
 cates what we call a "good-natured" man. But we 
 approve and love good-natured animals as well as good- 
 natured men. Animals which are affectionate, tameable, 
 not given to treachery nor to fits of anger, which are 
 obedient and tractable, which are playful and good- 
 humored are taken up as companions by men and loved. 
 And who will undertake to draw a line between the 
 altruistic activity of a brute and that of a man? The 
 maternal instinct is as strong, if not stronger, in the 
 former as in the latter; the gregarious or social instinct is 
 as strong if not stronger, for man is by no means so 
 gregarious as the herbivorous animals and certain birds. 
 Nor is the social instinct equally developed in all men. 
 
A Plea for Hedonism. 61 
 
 Even those who live in large cities often confine their 
 lives largely to the family. And many men prefer the 
 seclusion of family life on a farm, far from the crowd. 
 Seme even prefer solitary life. The instincts of pity* and 
 generosity are perhaps more prominent in men than in 
 brutes because men can perceive the consequences of 
 actions more clearly. And yet the instinct of pity, or 
 a£f< ction for the weak is certainly highly developed in 
 many brutes. 
 
 Again, we must remember that altruistic individuals 
 oiiten cannot realize their own merits. The true hero can 
 not understand the admiration of others. To the affec- 
 tionate mother it seems only natural for mothers to love 
 and care for their offspring. Her disapproval of unsym- 
 pathetic parents arises from a feeling that they are lack- 
 ing in "natural" traits. There is an instinctive dislike for 
 defective or deformed people. (Hence we call an unsym- 
 pathetic parent "unnatural.") And the sympathetic feel 
 that the unsympathetic are defective. But to the sym- 
 pathetic mother there is no feeling of special approval of 
 other affectionate mothers; such conduct seems "natur- 
 al." 68 The same is true in even a greater degree with the 
 true hero. He does not feel that he has done anything 
 extraordinary. 54 He has simply done what his nature 
 called him to do. There is no sense of effort or strain, 
 because there is in fact no unnatural strain. The hero is 
 humble, because he is not conscious of having done any- 
 thing to be proud of. The proud hero (and they are 
 numerous enough) is one who perceives the advantage of 
 heroism. He knows that people admire strength, beauty, 
 skill, endurance, energy and success, and having one or 
 more of these traits he admires himself and enjoys by 
 anticipation the pleasures of admiration and praise. He 
 knows that people admire and approve self-discipline as 
 well as self-sacrifice, aud he is willing to pay the price for 
 the popular admiration and approval. This admiration 
 and approval of power, whether in form of strength, 
 
 ^epken, Science of Bthie& p. 26£ %n& Ut&,» X, P- 259- 
 M Jacob A. Riis, The Making of an American, pi 423. 
 
62 A Plea, for Hedonism. 
 
 beauty, skill, eloquence, endurance, energy, cunning, or 
 of training and self-discipline, is partly hereditary and 
 partly institutional. 86 The advantages of power, both 
 for the individual and for the race, is so apparent that we 
 should expect it to be approved and encouraged. Train- 
 ing and self-discipline are especially valuable both for the 
 individual and for the race. And the step from self-dis- 
 cipline to altruistic self-sacrifice is so short that it is 
 taken unconsciously. In our admiration for the trained 
 man, we usually fail to distinguish between the two. And 
 even the philosopher finds it hard to draw the line. 56 
 
 4. Abnormal Altruism. 
 
 That the altruistic impulses are of natural origin is 
 further shown by the fact that, like selfish impulses, they 
 are liable to be abnormally and hence injuriously developed. 
 The mother may be so affectionate as to "spoil" her child, 
 or break down her own health. 57 The generous man may 
 give away all his property, thereby injuring himself and, 
 what is of more importance, those who are dependent on 
 him for a living, especially his immediate family. The 
 patriot usually neglects those who are immediately depend- 
 ent on him. 58 The reformer is apt to do the same. The man 
 who is gifted with too much pity cannot be just. Rogues 
 and rascals constantly impose on his good-nature. This 
 is why it is said that women would not make good judges 
 or jury-men. They could not render a fair decision or 
 verdict. (I do not make this assertion myself, but quote 
 the common opinion.) The hero is not so cautious as the 
 selfish man, and is more apt to lose his life. Bravery 
 often becomes reckless daring, if not foolhardiness. The 
 over-sympathetic man finds it hard to tell the truth when 
 the truth will hurt a friend, hard to be honest when dis- 
 
 55 Comp. Ladd, Phil, of Conduct, Chap. XI, p. 231. 
 
 S6 See, for instance, Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chapter on 
 "Goodness." 
 
 S7 6ee Spencer, Ethics, I, $72. 
 
 •"Tel soulage le miserable, qui neglige sa famille et laisse son fils 
 tfaflsl'indigence."— I^a Bruyere, Characteres, Ch. XII, p. 375.' (Ed. 
 1890.) 
 
A Plea tor Hedonism. 68 
 
 honesty will help a neighbor at the expense of a stranger. 
 The Japanese are said to be so polite that they will com- 
 mit almost any crime rather than hurt the feelings of 
 other people. 
 
 Thus altruism presents a problem within a problem. 
 Traits of character which were intended to preserve the 
 race, tend when excessive to destroy the social order, and 
 thereby the race itself. But as all altruistic activity is 
 illogical, how shall excessive altruism be curbed? We can 
 nob reason with the altruistic person. He is acting 
 according to his nature. All that is left to do is to dis- 
 approve such conduct so strongly that in time this disap- 
 proval will act on his feelings. Nature herself will also 
 tend to weed out the excessively altruistic. It is this 
 excessive altruism which Nietzsche and his followers object 
 to. 59 Nietzsche would apparently have us select and breed 
 men as we select and breed horses, cattle and sheep. But 
 assuming the possibility of doing so, we must still deter- 
 mine the ideal character for man; and the question then 
 arises whether the emotional or sympathetic character is 
 not the ideal, and if so, how it may best be secured? 
 They argue that our sympathy interferes with race evo- 
 lution, and their argument is apparently just. Too much 
 sympathy, pity and generosity tend to make the idle and 
 shiftless more so. But Nietzsche goes too far in his 
 demands. Even among animals, where the struggle for 
 existence has full play, it is not the strongest and most 
 cunning individuals that survive, but the most sympa- 
 thetic. Any attempt, therefore, to lend a hand in the 
 struggle for existence by helping the strong to survive 
 against the weak would probably result either in the 
 destruction of the whole race, or the nation that tried the 
 experiment. 
 
 5. Moral Education. 
 
 It is well known that to a certain extent we can 
 educate or repress either the selfish or the altruistic 
 impulses in oausselves or others, Shall we educate the 
 
 59 The Twilight of the Godp\ ' 
 
64 A PJea wr Hedonism. 
 
 selfish and repress the altruistic emotions or the reverse? 
 Here again it seems to me that we must resort to,the 
 canon of consequences. We have pointed out above 
 that the most altruistic impulses are at the same time 
 beneficial to self. I believe that science will show in time 
 that those pseudo-altruistic impulses are inextricably 
 united with the altruistic impulses which are beneficial to 
 the race but prejudicial to the individual, when considered 
 by themselves. If this is the case, no one will want to rid 
 himself of those socially beneficial impulses. Thus if my 
 neighbor's vine has overgrown my fruit tree, I will not tear 
 down the vine to preserve my fruit if by tearing it down 
 I shall at the same time kill my tree. So in a case where 
 the individual interests clearly conflict with those of 
 society and the individual lacks the sympathetic 
 impulses necessary to make him strive for the social 
 interest rather than his own, he must still inquire whether 
 he should not seek to cultivate the lacking impulses for 
 the sake of other impulses which will accompany them. 
 As we pointed out above the altruistic impulses which are 
 beneficial to self can only be acquired by a self-discipline 
 that will make them practically mechanical, and when 
 they have become so habitual as to be reflex, or mechan- 
 ical, they will act in cases which will be injurious to self as 
 well as in cases which are beneficial to self. In other 
 words, the character which wisdom requires in order to 
 secure the greatest possible happiness to the individual in 
 his environment on earth is an organic unit of an altru- 
 istic nature. He who seeks to reach the highest possible 
 earthly happiness by the strictly selfish road will not 
 succeed. The so-called paradox of Hedonism is one of the 
 deepest and most wonderful laws of human nature. One 
 must build up an altruistic character to attain such 
 peace on earth as is given to men to enjoy. As Maeter- 
 link so beautifully points out, 60 "The true sage must 
 suffer. He suffers, and suffering forms a constituent part 
 of his wisdom. He will suffer, perhaps, more than most 
 men, for his nature is far more complete. And being 
 
 ^Wisdom and Bestiny, Sec, 39 
 
A Plea tor Hedonism. 65 
 
 nearer to all mankind, as the wise must ever be, his suffer- 
 ings will be the greater, for the sorrows of others are his." 
 And yet the true sage enjoys a peace that passeth under- 
 standing. At the end of life he can say with Paul: 
 "I have fought a good fight." His cup of sorrow may be 
 fuller, but he will drink it willingly. The path of wisdom 
 is so sweet and peaceful, that no one would exchange it 
 for all the paths of temporal pleasure. Thus the 
 apparent conflict between self-culture and social justice is 
 resolved into a higher unity, just as all the apparent 
 conflicts in the universe resolve themselves into higher 
 unities when our knowledge has widened sufficiently to 
 perceive the broader laws. The world is full of conflicts 
 and contradictions for the ignorant, but as knowledge 
 widens, the conflicts disappear one by one, until at last 
 we grasp the conception of the unity of nature. 
 
 Thus pure disinterested altruism is an ineradicable 
 accompaniment of self-interested altruism, and hence of 
 Hedonism itself. Not only so, but experience proves that 
 purest hedonistic results may be best attained by direct- 
 ing the thought to the social or unselfish aspect of 
 conduct than by the reverse process. Yet so long as one 
 clearly realizes from the start that his own greatest 
 happiness will follow the former course, he is a consistent 
 hedonist. And with that knowledge constantly before 
 him, he will not be apt to fall into the excesses of an 
 abnormal altruism. Justice to self will regulate justice to 
 others. The ideal of self-culture will serve as a model for 
 social culture. 
 
 VI. CONCLUSION. 
 
 A few words will suffice by way of conclusion. Glan- 
 cing back over the line of our argument it will be seen that 
 we tried to show first that "Man's Place in Nature" has 
 been determined by the general course of universal evolu- 
 tion and is largely independent of his own desires and 
 wishes. We might have gone further and shown that so 
 far as "Man's Place in Nature" is concerned, the problem 
 of conduct is only a temporal problem. The evidence 
 points very clearly to the recent origin of the human race 
 
66 A Plea for Hedonism. 
 
 on earth; and it points almost as clearly to the rather 
 early termination of man's earthly existence, speaking in 
 terms of the infinite ages of eternity. In view of these 
 facts, we recognized the importance for the problem of 
 conduct of any light which either science, theology or re- 
 velation can throw on the problem of man's nature and 
 ultimate destiny. 
 
 For the philosopher, the problem of earthly existence 
 can never seem supremely important, unless that exist- 
 ence is in some way related to an after life. If the earthly 
 life be all, the ethical problem at times seems hardly 
 worth the solving. And yet while this is true, there is no 
 ground for despising the earthly life. Moral science is 
 still at least as important as any of the other sciences. 
 As a sentient creature, man may as well make the most 
 of the earthly life which science and revelation will permit. 
 The strength of Hedonism lies in its insistance on the 
 worth and dignity of the earthly life, even while we are 
 still in uncertainty as to the after-life. It would be idle 
 here to attempt to force conclusions upon the reader. 
 The most learned men have differed in opinion as to the 
 nature of the evidence in favor of an after-life. Some men 
 find in man's moral nature satisfactory proofs of immor- 
 tality. Others find the evidence insufficient and unsatis- 
 factory. This much is certain, however. Some myster- 
 ious power, which for convenience we have called nature 
 in this essay, is shaping man's nature in a marvelous way, 
 so as to adapt him more fully for social life. The human 
 sentiments, and particularly the altruistic and sympathe- 
 tic sentiments have always played and will always con- 
 tinue to play a very important part in the development 
 of the human race. One of the objects of this essay has 
 been to discover just what part the involuntary part of 
 man's nature and what part his intelligence plays in the 
 matter of conduct. Our conclusion was, that the province 
 of intelligence tends constantly to encroach upon the 
 domain of the emotions. But we also found that certain 
 emotions, by their very nature were safe against the en- 
 croachments of intelligence and that as to these emotions, 
 to-wit: the altruistic, there is a tendency toward their 
 
A Plvn lor Hedonism. 67 
 
 coincidence with the dictates of intelligence. When this 
 point is reached man's character will have become ideal. 
 Whether such a character is destined by nature to fit 
 man for the earthly life alone or for a larger, broader, 
 higher sphere of activity is a question which the writer 
 will leave to the reader's own further consideration. 
 From the stand-point of Hedonism, the earthly life, even 
 if we concede that in some cases it is not under the present 
 regime, will in the course of time become valuable in itself 
 to humanity. In the mean time, ethics must ever remain 
 the queen of all sciences. In the scale of interest and im- 
 portance, ethics must ever rank above all the other intel- 
 lectual inquiries of the scholar. But in thus speaking of. 
 ethics, it must be taken to include the whole problem of 
 human destiny.