-bo^ ,f"o ^ ^ "^. ,\^'\^ .-Js a\^ oo^ rf- ■''''■; a"* V ^0O <=^0 \ ,-H. '/:, ^0 '% .0 o ■% C"^'^' o ■/■ r '^/. .■^^' s\.. N '. . -^^A / x° ■^. ^ V ' "/ '' U 1 '^/^/t^o^'.^O^^ %/ ■x^^, ,o>,.^'«* ■^o 0^' .>^^\s .^^- ■/ o. ,-0 ,\ o^^ ^^ % ,'0' ■^ ^.. •^..^' ■ v^'% ■ ' ^ " ' \ "^ / N 0^ - ■ ■■>■ > / •v-* ^^ . ..^' •\ ■^ /. . N ;./^c. > "b -OO ^^ A' .-^^^ 0°' x.^ S.X' ,s^ .^^ - oN > %. * " "" -li , \ I B ,, ■% ^^ .^-^ ■i,' '\, -7- " * ^^ ' ,#^-^^ ^ ■>:> .oq. V*'^> ^ -n^- V .% A .^X c^ <>_ ,^\ \0 ^^ ,:^^^^ 'V A-^ ■->. x\^ ". '^ /> ^% -. „ ,:'^ % . ^=K^" ^ ,A■■ .\^ ■X^^ -p S .i\' ^N.^ O. o A^ A V ^°... r '^C-, 'b „y' '^^ •".i- ,-^^ .^\^ .^.^^ . #'-^ V:. '.... ;./^: WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND COMMANDER C. C. GILL, U. S. NAVY WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE BY C. C. GILL COMMANDER, U. S. NAVY AUTHOR OF "naval POWBB IN THE WAB," ETC. WITH 26 DIAGRAMS NEW XBJr YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY COPYRIGHT. 1921. BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY ^ 5^^'"^ ^ PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA m -2 m\ g)CU608965 FOREWORD This work of Commander Gill, U. S. Navy, is a thoughtful, painstaking and thorough re- search into all the evidence bearing upon the now historic battle of Jutland and constitutes a valuable contribution to the list of publica- tions upon the Art of War on the Sea. H. B. Wilson, Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. U.S.S. Permsylvama, Flagship. [V] PREFACE A GREAT deal has already been written about the battle of Jutland. The most recent contribution is a 600-page official record of the original English reports and despatches. The British have pre- sented their side of the battle — the Germans have described the action as it appeared from the other point of view. Admiral Jellicoe, the British Com- mander-in-Chief, and Admiral Scheer, the German Commander-in-Chief, have both written books and explained their respective maneuvers fully and frankly. For these two books students of naval affairs should be deeply grateful. It should be recognized, however, that they are, necessarily, one- sided treatments. The subject, moreover, has be- come highly controversial, and, as a consequence, has been confused by somewhat misleading argu- mentative discussions. Important questions of present and future naval policy depend, in large measure, upon conclusions drawn from the experiences of Jutland. The study of this engagement is an urgent matter and does not admit delay. No apology, therefore, is made for this attempt to gather together in one narrative authentic information available from both British [vii] PREFACE and German sources, and to give, as accurately as may be, an unbiased analysis of the battle. Acknowledgment is made to officers of the War College and officers of the U. S. S. Pennsylvania for valued criticism and comment received dur- ing preparation of the manuscript. Acknowledg- ment is also made to Lieutenant G. J. Hazard, U.S.N.R.F., for his skill and courtesy in the work of making the diagrams. C. C. Gill. [viii] CONTENTS I THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 17 II FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE BATTLE . 32 Ill THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE 68 IV THE BATTLE First Phase 60 V THE BATTLE: Second Phase . 80 VI THE BATTLE: Third Phase . 117 VII THE BATTLE: Fourth Phase . 137 lUI THE BATTLE: Fifth Phase 150 IX CONCLUSION 165 APPENDICES: Losses and Damage .... . 171 Design of Wae Vessels as Affected by Jutland . , 175 [ix] LIST OF DIAGRAMS DIAGRAM NO. Chart of North Sea, Showing Strategic Dispositions 22 Battle Cruisers and Fast Battleships (Showing Tonnage, Speed, Armor, and Armament) . 33 German High Sea Fleet in Cruising Forma- tion (Showing Tonnage, Speed, Armor, and Armament) 35 British Battle Fleet of 24 Dreadnaughts (Showing Tonnage, Speed, Armor, and Armament) 39 Relative Positions of All Forces at 2:00 P.M., 31 May, 1916 43 Cruising Formation of Forces Under Imme- diate Command of Admiral Jellicoe and Rear Admiral Hood 47 Cruising Formation of Forces Under Imme- diate Command of Vice Admiral Beatty AND Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas . . 61 Cruising Formation of Reconnaissance Force Commanded by Vice Admiral Hip- per . . . . • 55 Track of the Battle Cruisers During Their Battle Approach (2:00 P.M. to 3:48 P.M., 31 May) 61 [Xi] LIST OF DIAGRAMS DTAGRAM NO, PAGE 10 Track of the Heavy Ships During the First Phase (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.) . 63 11 At 3:48 P.M. the Opposing Battle Cruisers Open Fire 67 12 At 4 :08 P.M. Admiral, Beatty Increases the Range and Admiral Evan-Thomas Closes Enough to Open Fire at Long Range . 71 13 At 4:45 P.M. Both Sides Deliver. Torpedo Attacks 75 14 At 4 :55 P.M. Admiral Beatty Takes North- west Course, and Admiral Scheer Joins IN Battle 81 15 Track of the Heavy Ships During the Second Phase (4:55 P.M. to 6:40 P.M.) 87 16 At 5 :45 P.M. Admiral Hood's Light Forces Engage Admiral Hipper's Advance Scouts. In the Meanwhile Scheer Slows Down and Reforms His Fleet ... 91 17 At 6 :16 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe Deploys the British Battle Fleet to Port and Slows Down, While Admiral Beatty Closes German Van at Utmost Speed ... 95 18 British Battleships in Approach Forma- tion with Destroyers in Position No. 1 for Deployment on Left Flank Division 101 19 At 6:35 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe Completes His Deployment and Admiral Scheer Executes a "Swing-Around" Withdrawing Maneuver . » , 107 [xii] LIST OF DIAGRAMS DIAGRAM NO. PAGE 20 Track of the Heavy Ships During the Third Phase (6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.) 119 21 At 7:17 P.M. Admiiial Scheer, After At- tacking THE British Center, Again Exe- cutes His Withdrawal Maneuver . . 125 22 Track of the Heavy Ships During the Fourth Phase (7:17 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. —Dark) ........ 139 23 At 8:30 P.M. Admiral Beatty Is Again Engaged. Admiral, Jellicoe Turns to the Southwest 143 24 Track op the Heavy Ships During the Fifth Phase (9:00 P.M. 31 May to 3:00 A.M. 1 June) 151 25 British Night Cruising Formation Signaled Shortly After 9 .00 P.M., 31 May . . 155 26 Maneuvers on June 1st After the Battle 159 [xiii] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE "Strategy" prepares battles ; "tactics" fights them. Strategy decides the force to be sent to any theater of operations, assigns the task or mission, arranges logistics — ^the supply of food, fuel and munitions, — coordinates effort by land and sea on all fronts, and in general deals with the larger considerations in the conduct of war. The decisions of strategy regarding the disposition and employment of fleets and armies are carried out by tactical maneuvers. It is thus seen that strategy and tactics are closely related. Tactics, in fact, is an instrument of strat- egy. There is no clear line of demarcation between the two, and confusion rather than clarity is likely to result if attempt is made to consider the one as quite distinct from the other. Tactics may be defined broadly as embracing that part of strategy which has to do with maneu- vers in the field. For instance, strategy decides to [17] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND move a fleet from one port to another, and the maneuvers used to carry out the decision are "tac- tical." Maneuvers in the face of the enemy, for approach, for battle, for chase, or for retirement, comprise battle tactics. Although the highest form of tactics is an aggres- sive offensive to destroy the fighting power of the enemy, it sometimes happens that a temporary de- fensive attitude by certain forces is essential to the success of the general plan. A premature attack, even if a local tactical victory is achieved, may be detrimental rather than helpful in the accomplish- ment of the principal objective; or the cost of a victory may be greater than it is worth ; or the situ- ation may be such that it is not prudent to risk a battle. War is a serious business in which quixotic motives, however worthy they may be from a senti- mental point of view, have no place. Strategy is the master of tactics and determines their character, which, according to the war objec- tive and the circumstances of the special situation, may be aggressive or evasive, offensive or defen- sive. Tactical decisions have to be made in the light of strategic considerations. With this brief digression to explain the term "tactics" and the relation of "tactics" to "strategy," we shall now turn to a study of the battle of Jut- land. Throughout the war the main Naval Battle [18] THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE Front was in the North Sea. Here the fleet of Great Britain, officially named the Grand Fleet, faced the German fleet, named the High Sea Fleet. In this area of about 120,000 square miles these two most powerful fleets in the world were continually engaged in a great strategic contest. The stake was absolute control of the seas and on this con- trol hinged ultimately the issue of the World War. In main features the strategy employed by both England and Germany followed normal lines. England's naval policy was to establish control of all the great ocean areas by destroying enemy ships abroad, and to stop Germany's ocean trade and con- tain her home fleets by a so-called "distant block- ade." The menace of off shore mine and torpedo operations covered by an inferior but powerful German battle fleet made a close blockade of Ger- man ports impracticable. The Grand Fleet, under Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, was ready to fight in the open sea, but the margin of superiority was not deemed sufficient to warrant seeking an engagement with the High Sea Fleet under conditions of Germany's own choosing, in the vicinity of her mine fields and submarine bases. Except for occasional excursions to the South, England's battleships were held on watch in the less dangerous waters to the northward, in the vi- cinity of Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands. An out- post detachment of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines operated from Harwich, the nearest [19] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND suitable port on the English coast to the enemy fleet base behind Heligoland, while the Dover patrol guarded the Straits. These outpost vessels were supported by Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser fleet based at Rosyth; and in April, 1916, an addi- tional support of eight predreadnaughts and four cruisers was stationed in the Humber to safeguard the coast against sudden invasion. Fast German cruisers could make sudden raids upon the coast or even the channel, but they always ran the risk of being intercepted by a superior force and could hardly expect to do damage of military signifi- cance. (Diagram I.) The war plan of Germany assigned her navy an offensive-defensive role. It was the objective of the High Sea Fleet to keep the Allied Naval forces at a distance from German shores ; to safeguard the North and West frontiers j oining the Army flanks in Russia and Belgiimi; to blockade Russia's Baltic ports ; and at the same time maintain open German sea communications with the northern neutrals. Germany did not wish to challenge the superior British fleet to decisive action on the high seas, but preferred to operate her battleships within re- stricted areas as a fleet in being, that is to say, hold- ing the High Sea Fleet as a continual menace, within supporting distance of shielding mine fields and submarines among which it would not be prudent for the British fleet to advance to attack. In addition it was the plan of Germany to institute [20] J^S> 1. Beatty at 3 2. " " 4 3. Scheer " 4 4. Jellicoe " 6 48 P.M. 5. Beatty at 6 6. Jellicoe " 7 7 40 " 55 " 14 " << (« 50 P.M. 41 " 00 " THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE raids for moral effect and also to endeavor to bring about such a division of the British Fleet as might permit a locally superior German force to engage and destroy a British detachment. By tactics of attrition Germany hoped to reduce Britain's supe- riority until her fleet could be engaged on more equal terms. Mines and submarines, always useful for the weaker naval power, were assiduously used by the Germans. When it was seen that the war was to be a long one, German strategists realized that the pressure of the sea blockade would fall heavily on German economic life. A counter naval offensive was necessary and the only weapon Germany could use was her submarines. The U-boat campaign against commerce was inaugurated and came peril- ously near to success. But it should be borne in mind that it was the protection of German dread- naught guns that released these U-boats from coast defense duties and permitted them compara- tive freedom of operation. It has been contended that Great Britain, by her North Sea blockade, enjoyed all the advantages which would have been gained by the destruction of the High Sea Fleet. This is not correct. Ger- many's fleet was an important factor throughout the war. It was the power of this fleet that made the Baltic practically a German Lake, maintained open the trade routes between Germany and the North European neutrals, closed Russia's chief [25] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND ports, and protected the German frontiers from the Gulf of Riga to Holland. It would be diffi- cult to overestimate the influence, both direct and indirect, which the German High Sea Fleet ex- erted in bringing about the collapse of Russia. And, finally it was the cover of the High Sea Bat- tle Fleet that permitted the U-boats freedom to come and go in the prosecution of their campaign against commerce. In estimating the tactical sit- uation in the North Sea there should be no mis- understanding as to the essential task performed by the German battleship fleet, and the great in- fluence a decisive British victory at Jutland would have had on the course of the war. Turning now to the particular strategy which culminated in the battle of Jutland, it will be re- called that in May, 1916, the general military situ- ation was not particularly pleasing for Germany. Russia was a powerful enemy. Her Baltic Fleet was then by no means negligible and had been co- operating in the Gulf of Riga with the right flank of the Russian Army. On the Western front the German offensive at Verdun had not succeeded. While the German General Staff did not, in all probability, feel any great anxiety as to the condi- tions on the land frontiers, still, the promise of victory made to the German people had not ma- terialized. Although the submarine campaign against commerce was in operation, it was re- [26] THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE stricted, and as yet no great amount of tonnage had been sunk. In 1916 Germany was not ready to risk an open rupture with America, and the vigor- ous protest of the United States against unlawful sinkings had resulted in a diplomatic humiliation damaging to German prestige. Under these cir- cumstances it was logical strategy for Admiral Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, to seek a successful naval demonstration in order to strengthen national morale. In studying the dispositions which led up to the battle of Jutland and the tactical decisions made by Scheer and Hipper during the engagement, it is important to understand the German point of view. The German people at this time were demanding greater activity on the part of their fleet in justi- fication of the vast sums spent for its creation and maintenance, and to make more distinctly manifest its war-time usefulness. In view of the general sit- uation, and further in view of this popular demand for greater fleet activity, in the spring of 1916, the German strategists had decided to launch a more aggressive naval campaign the object of which was to strike at England by sea in such a way as to deprive her of inclination to continue the war. Commander-in-Chief Scheer reasoned that this could be achieved by a successful blow at English sea power centered in the navy, or by a blow at British financial life centered in commercial ship- [27] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND ping, or — ^better yet — ^by a combination of both these courses.* Admiral Scheer, in estimating the situation, argued that if the High Sea Fleet was withheld on the defensive while the U-boats instituted a vigor- ous campaign against merchant ships, then, if the submarines were successful. Admiral Jellicoe might lead out the Grand Fleet on an aggressive offensive which might compel Germany to fight a fleet to fleet action at Admiral Jellicoe's selected time; that there was disadvantage in thus giving the initiative to the British, as Admiral Jellicoe might choose a time when part of the German forces were imder repairs, or otherwise unfit for service, or absent in the Baltic for exercises; and, therefore, that the wiser plan was for Germany to assume the initia- tive, and conduct definite, systematic operations to induce the British to send out forces and afford the High Sea Fleet opportunity to attack them under conditions favorable to Admiral Scheer, at his — not Admiral Jellicoe's — selected time.f The minor raids already conducted against Eng- land had made an impression. The successful bom- bardment of Lowestoft on April 25th, and the escape of the raiders, had caused public dissatis- faction, and Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had announcedHhat should the German ships again venture to show themselves off the Brit- * Reference, Admiral Scheer's book "The German High Seas Fleet in the World War." t Reference, Admiral Scheer's book. [28] THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE ish coast, measures had been taken to insure their being severely punished. (After this raid the 3rd Battle Squadron of predreadnaughts and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron were withdrawn from Scapa and stationed in the Humber to guard the English coast. ) Reasoning from these premises, Admiral Scheer planned operations to bring about a naval battle on terms advantageous to Germany during the pe- riod May 23rd to June 1st, 1916. It should be added that Admiral Scheer was not seeking a de- cisive fleet battle unless he could succeed in drawing the British fleet into a trap. What he sought was an opportunity to engage and destroy with superior force an inferior detachment of the British fleet before the main body could arrive in support. To do this Admiral Scheer was ready to risk a "tip and run" encounter with the British Main Fleet, and for this contingency he had a carefully re- hearsed maneuver of retirement by which he in- tended to withdraw the High Sea Fleet should it become involved against a superior British concen- tration. In brief, the German enterprise involved a cruiser bombardment of Sunderland to draw out British naval forces, and an endeavor to lead these British forces toward the supporting German Bat- tle Fleet so that Admiral Scheer might attack them under favorable conditions. During this week, May 23rd to June 1st, about 24 U-boats were sta- [29] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND tioned off the British ports of sortie and along the probable enemy routes of advance, to observe and attack. Also, a large number of Zeppelins were assigned to assist the enterprise by reconnaissance from the air. (Diagram 1.) The fact that the U-boats could not remain out longer than June 1st imposed this limit to the operation. The attack on Sunderland required clear weather. Of this Admiral Scheer states : "An extensive aerial reconnaissance was an imperative necessity for an advance on Sunderland in the northwest, as it would lead into waters where we could not allow ourselves to be forced into giving battle.'* If the weather continued unfavorable for scout- ing from the air, a substitute plan was provided by which, in place of the Sunderland bombardment, an advance against cruisers and shipping, in and near the Skaggerak, was to be employed in order to draw out the British forces. Operating in this direction made it possible to do without the air reconnaissance as the Jutland coast offered a cer- tain amount of cover against surprise, and also the distance to the British points of support was con- siderably greater. The order issued by Admiral Scheer on May 18th was as follows: "The bombardment of Sunderland by our cruisers is intended to compel the enemy to send [30] THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE out forces against us. For the attack on the ad- vancing enemy the High Sea Fleet forces to be south of the Dogger Bank, and the U-boats to be stationed for attack off the east coast of England. The enemy's ports of sortie will be closed by mines.* The Naval Corps will support the undertaking with their U-boats. If time and circumstances permit, trade-war will be carried on during proceed- ings. . . ." Each day proved unfavorable for airship obser- vation and on the 31st Admiral Scheer decided to use the modified plan by which the advance against shipping in the Skaggerak was substituted for the bombardment of Sunderland. That reconnaissance from the air could not be depended upon during the entire period from May 23rd to June 1st directs attention to one of the limitations of aircraft as scouts. * One of these mines later caused the loss of the Cruiser HampMre with Earl Kitchener and his staff. [81] II FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE BATTLE At early dawn of May 31st, Vice Admiral Hip- per, commanding the German advance reconnais- sance force of 5 battle cruisers attended by 5 light cruisers and 33 destroyers, left the Jade Basin and stood out to sea followed one half hour later by the supporting High Sea Battle Fleet. (Dia- grams 2, 3.) The "Third Squadron," 7 of Ger- many's most modern dreadnaughts, was in the van with the Flagship Koenig leading; then came Squadron One, 9 dreadnaughts of the Heligoland and Nassau type, led by the Fleet Flagship, Friedrich der Grosse, flying the flag of the Com- mander-in-Chief, Admiral Scheer; and bringing up the rear was the "Second Squadron," 6 predread- naughts of the Deutschland class. The entire fleet numbered 22 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light cruisers and about 78 destroyers. This second most powerful fleet in the world was a compar- atively new creation. Germany had almost no naval traditions. At this time, however. Admiral Scheer's force was in a high state of efficiency with [32] BEATTV. TIGER 28.500. 8-\3.5". 23K.,9>. LION ") QUEEN MARY ( 26.350 TONS. Z8K. PRINCESS ROYAL ]^''^-^"^^^-^^^°^ ^' NEW ZEALAND ") 16.800 TONS, ESK. INDEFATIGABLE J 6-l2'GUNS. ARMOR 6! HOOD. mVlNGBLE I n.2501t)NS.25>C INDOMITABLE L.^-^ij^s. ^rmOR6- INFLEXIBLE J IlVAN TH0MA5 BARHAM VALIANT WARSPITE MALAYA ^ 2T.5O0T0NS, 25 K., &-»5"GUNS, ARMOR is: HIPPBR I OERFFLINGER "i 26.180T0NS d LUTZOW J 8-12"GUNS. 26K,ARM0RI2' I 5EYDUTZ 24.6\0. lO-U" 26.75 K, 1 1.75" A. I MOLTKE 22.640. lO-ll" 27.25K., U"A • VONDERTANN 19.100. . 8-U" 2GIC,S.75'A. Diagram No. 2 battle cruisers and fast battleships (showing tonnage, speed, armor and armament) [33] m. I KONIG • GROSSER KURFURST I MARKGRAF I KRONPRINZ • KAISER I I PRINZ REGENT LUITPOLO I KAISERIN 1 25.390 TONS. I0-I2"GUNS. SPEED 23. ARMOR 14": 24.440 TONS. lO-t2"GUNS. SPEED 21. ARMOR 13.75' I. % FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE I OSTFRIESLAND I THURmGEM • HELGOLAND i OLDENBURG I POSEN I RHEINLAND I NASSAU I WESTFALEN 24.410, \0-\Z'\ 21K.»»3.76*^. 2Z.400TONS. I2-|2"&UNS, SPEED 20.5. ARMOR 11.75" 18.600 TONS. 12-M "GUNS. SPEED 20.^ ARMOR U.75: E. I DEUTSCHLAND I POMMERM I SCHLESIEN I SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN • HANNOVER # H ESSEN J3200TONS. 4-U"GUNS. SPEED 18. ARMOR ais: Diagram No. 3 german high sea fleet in cruising formation (showing TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR AND ARMAMENT) Distance between ships 760 yards. Distance between squadrons 3,800 yards. For battle formation distances were closed to: 550 yards between ships and 1,100 yards between squadrons [35] FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE a personnel as yet untainted by the sinister influ- ences which later broke down its morale and finally culminated in mutiny. Mine sweepers had cleared a way through the British fields and screening destroyers zig-zagged in and out to keep down any submarines that might be lying in wait. When west of Amrum Bank, the course was laid north, and Admiral Hipper with his advance force proceeded to carry out his orders, which were to pass out of sight of Horn Reefs and the Danish coast, show himself off the Skaggerak before dark, cruise in the Skaggerak during the night, and at noon of the next day join up with the Main Fleet. Groups of English cruis- ers had been reported off the Norwegian coast. It was expected that the presence of Hipper off the Skaggerak would be reported, that British forces would start from England soon after the receipt of this information, and that, in all probability, a battle would result on the following day, June 1st. On this day the British Grand Fleet was also at sea. It was part of British naval strategy to make periodic sweeps through the waters of the North Sea, and one of these sweeps was now in progress.* It appears that on the 30th the German Flag- * Admiral Jellicoe has stated : — "In accordance with instructions contained in their Lordship's telegram, No. 434-, of 30 May, the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for the purpose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea." [37] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND ship had been sending an unusually large number of messages. Although these code messages could not be deciphered, the sending ship was identified, and by directional radio instruments the British had determined a movement of the German Flagship of about 7 miles, indicating that she had shifted from the inner harbor of Wilhelmshaven to an outer anchorage in the Jade Basin. The British knew that the German fleet was ready for sea, and naval activity of some sort was inferred. Because of this inference and the consequent timely sailing of the British Grand Fleet, however, it does not follow that Admiral Jellicoe had fore- knowledge that a fleet to fleet action was pending. It is also to be remembered that a considerable force of British light cruisers and destroyers were held in port at Harwich. It is reasonable to suppose that had the British Admiralty been informed of the German plan this Harwich force would have been sent out to take part in the battle. On the evening of May 30th, the British battle fleet of 24 dreadnaughts, attended by 3 battle cruis- ers, 12 light cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, and 46 destroyers had sailed from the northern bases, and a few hours later Admiral Beatty's advance force of 4 fast dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 15 light cruisers, and 31 destroyers had set out from Rosyth. (Diagrams 2 and 4.) The entire British fleet formed a veritable armada totaling 28 dread- naughts, 9 battle cruisers, 27 light cruisers, 8 ar- [88] ■yi. I AGINCOURT ■27.5007. ZIK M-IZ'G. 9"A. I HERCUIXS iQOOOT. tiK. 10-IZ"S. II'A. I REVENGt 25.750T. U5H 6-l5"G. 13'^ I MARLBOROUGH ^5.000T. IIK. ioa5'& a'jc Y. @ ST VINCENT 19.Z50T ZIK. IO•l^•G. 10"A. NEPTUNt ^O.OOOT. 21 K 10-1^"G. lOK 6 COUUNGVroOD I9Z50T. 21 K. lO-li'd lO'A. 1 COLUSSUS 20.000T: aiK. 10- IZ'^ II'A. I VANGUARD I9.250T. 21 K. lO-ia-G lO'A. i TEMCRAIRE IRGOOT. ^lK. lO-ll'G. K». I BtLLEROPHON leiSOOT. 24 K. lo-iz-a io'Al I BENBOW ZiOOOT £1K. ^ EL CANADA 2,8.000T 22.1SK. lOWt 9'*. SUPERB \8.600T. UK. IO-12'G. lO'A. RCfVAl-OAK t5.7S0T. tL5K. 6i5-a Q-A. IRONOUKC to-t^sr^ tVK E. THUNDERER zzsaax an. 10-13 S'S. tl'A. 1 CONQUEROR ZZ500T 2114. 10-13.5U 12^ MONARCH Z1500T ZIK.. 10li5"S. 12'A. ORION 22.S00T ^lK. @ ERIN t3.000T 2JK. to-is.ra. 12-A. @ CENTURION Z3O0OT tilt lO-liB'a 12-A. @ AJAX. * ZTiOOOT. tIK. I0-155<1 iVK I KING GEORGE V. 23.000T ZIK. tO-l^'& Vi'K Diagram No. 4 british battle fleet of 24 dreadnaughts (show- ing tonnage, speed, armor and armament) [39] FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE mored cruisers, and 77 destroyers. It represented the acme of naval development. Never before in history had such a powerful array of fighting ships been grouped under one command. These ships were manned, moreover, by a personnel steeped in the traditions of England's long mastery of the seas, traditions epitomized in the names of Blake, Hawke, and Nelson. At this period of the war, no continuous British submarine observation was maintained off the Ger- man bases, and Admiral Jellicoe received no re- ports of the departure of the High Sea Fleet. The advantage of the initiative enabled Germany to send out observing U-boats which were stationed approximately as indicated on the chart (Diagram 1) : — Some off Scapa Flow; one off Moray Firth; a large number off the Firth of Forth ; several off the Humber; and the remainder north of Ter- schelling Bank watching the approaches to the Straits and Harwich. At 5:30 A.M., on the 30th, U-32, about 70 miles east of the Firth of Forth, reported two British battleships, two cruisers, and several destroyers making a southeast course. These were probably part of Sir David Beatty's force which had sailed from Rosyth. An hour later this same submarine reported that she had intercepted English radio messages to the effect that two battleships and groups of destroyers had sailed from Scapa. Shortly after this, U-66 reported from about 60 [41] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND miles east of Kinnaird Head, a squadron of eight British battleships, attended by light cruisers and destroyers, on a northeast course. These evi- dently belonged to Sir Martin Jerram's Squadron which was en route from Cromarty to rendezvous at sea with the rest of the battle fleet which had sailed from Scapa. From the above reports Admiral Scheer esti- mated that the diverging courses of the detach- ments sighted did not indicate a large operation such as an advance on the German bight; nor, to his mind, did they appear to have any connection with the German enterprise. To Admiral Scheer this information from his submarine scouts pre- saged, not a British fleet concentration, but rather a likelihood that his hope of meeting with separate British detachments might be fulfilled. He was, therefore, the more encouraged to carry out his plan. At 2 :00 P.M., on May 31st, the opposing forces were in the relative positions shown in Diagram 5. The main body of the British Grand Fleet, com- manded by Admiral Jellicoe, was about 70 miles off the Norway coast in Lat. 57° 57' N., Long. 3° 45' E. From JelHcoe Beatty bore S. 23° E. and was distant 77 miles, while Scheer bore about S. 40° E. and was distant about 150 miles. The Grand Fleet was disposed as indicated in Diagram 6. The 24 dreadnaught battleships were steaming in six col- umns of four ships each with a close anti-submarine screen of 4 light cruisers and about 34 destroy- [42] JELLICOE E/AN THOMAS i\\\ BEATTY German Des^roNers ei^amininq neulral steamer at^:^oRM. — 50 miles SCREEN Diagram No. 5 RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ALL FORCES AT 2:00 P.M. [43] FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE ers; 5 light cruisers covered the front of the capi- tal ships 3 miles in advance of the main body, 6 armored cruisers were spread 6 miles apart on a line 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet and a link- ing armored cruiser to relay signals was placed 6 miles toward the Commander-in-Chief's Flagship, the Iron Duke. Each armored cruiser was attended by one destroyer. The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, Hood's three Invincibles, with two light cruisers and four destroyers, was stationed 20 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. All this force had a fleet speed of 20 knots and was now zig-zagging, speed of advance 14 knots in the direction S. 50° E. The advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty, consisting of six battle cruisers and four 25-knot battleships with attending light cruisers and de- stroyers, was disposed as shown in Diagram 7. The 1st Squadron of four battle cruisers was in single line ahead, led by Admiral Beatty's Flagship, the Lion, and screened by the light cruiser Champion and ten destroyers of the 13th Flotilla. The 2d Squadron of two battle cruisers was 3 miles E.N.E. of the JLion and screened by six destroyers. The 5th Battleship Squadron, four dreadnaughts of the Queen Elizabeth class, was 5 miles N.N.W. of the Lion and screened by one light cruiser and nine destroyers of the 1st Flotilla.* A scouting and screening line of eleven light cruisers was eight * The name ship Queen Elizabeth was undergoing repairs after severe service in tie Dardanelles Campaign. [45] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND miles S.S.E. of the Liorij spread in a direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., distance between ships five miles. The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was also with these light cruisers. The link ship Yarmouth was midway between the line of light cruisers and the Lion. All this advance force had a fleet speed of twenty-five knots and was now advancing on a course north by east toward the rendezvous with the Battle Fleet, at a speed of nineteen and one half knots. By the plan of the sweep Jellicoe was to be at position "A," Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 4° 15' E. at 2:00 P.M. (Diagram 1.) The Battle Fleet had been delayed, however, to wait for a destroyer to examine some trawlers and was eighteen miles be- hind schedule. Beatty's 2:00 P.M. position, ac- cording to the plan, was Lat. 56° 40' N., Long. 5° 00' E. (Point "A"' in Diagram 1.) He actually was about twelve miles N. 64° W. from this point, Lat. 56° 46' N., Long. 4° 40' E., thus bringing the relative positions of Beatty and Jellicoe within six or seven miles of the plan, but geographically some twelve or fifteen miles to the westward. Ad- miral Beatty had been informed that Admiral Jel- licoe would sweep to the south from point *'A." Considerable criticism has been made of this dis- position of the British forces, to the effect that Beatty was too far away from Jellicoe. They were then operating seventy-seven miles apart. This is a matter of opinion, and depends upon the plan of [46] ^/JBLLI&E ^ / X^/ /4TH. LIGHT CRUISCR *=*» / ^^^ SQUADRON.' Cochrane 2nd. cruiser SaUADRON OuKe of Edinburqh / / 1ST CRUISER SQUADRON. Black Prino HOOD ^^ * Contcrbury Chester Diagram No. 6 cruising formation of forces under immediate command of admiral jellicoe and rear admiral HOOD [*7] FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE coordination. It will be noted later on that a dis- crepancy of twelve miles developed in the naviga- tional reckoning of Jellicoe and Beatty. This caused confusion at the critical juncture when Jelli- coe joined Beatty in action against the enemy. While it is not considered tactically unsound to operate a fast detachment this distance in advance of the supporting battle fleet, it is of utmost im- portance that proper touch be maintained by link- ing up ships or other means, and suitable precau- tions taken to assure that the detachment be not trapped and cut off by a superior enemy force. The main body of the High Sea Fleet, com- manded by Admiral Scheer, was now fifty miles west of Lyngvig on the Jutland coast. The twenty- two battleships were steaming in column with the seven most modern dreadnaughts in the van squad- ron, the eight older type dreadnaughts led by the Fleet Flagship, Friednch der Grosse, in the center, and the predreadnaught squadron of six ships bringing up the rear. The distance between ships was 763 yards and the interval between squadrons was 3,800 yards. (Diagram 3.) Six light cruisers with destroyers were spread ahead as a protective scout line, and the balance of the forty-four destroy- ers attending the battleships operated as a close-up anti-submarine screen. All this force had a maxi- mum fleet speed of seventeen knots and was now on course north, speed fourteen knots. Compar- ing the cruising formations of the two fleets, it is [49] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND seen from Diagram 6 that Jellieoe was in line of divisions with his strength fairly well distributed, favoring his left and center; the right center car- ried the weaker ships, while the right flank division was strengthened by the Marlborough and the Re- venge: on the other hand, Diagram 3 shows that S cheer was in extended column, his most powerful ships in the van, the intermediate strength in the center, and the weak predreadnaughts in the rear. Diagrams 2, 3 and 4 show the order of ships, their heavy gun strength, their main armor protection, and their speed. The advance German force, technically named the "Reconnaissance Force," under Vice Admiral Hipper, comprising 5 battle cruisers, 5 light cruisers and 33 destroyers, was about 50 miles ahead of Scheer and about 50 miles east of Beatty. (See Diagram 8.) The 5 battle cruisers were in column, attended by a close-up anti-submarine de- stroyer screen, while the light cruisers and other destroyers were spread out in a semicircle about ten miles ahead and on either flank. All this advance force had a fleet speed of about 26% knots and was proceeding on a northerly course at a speed of about 24 knots. Comparing the opposing battle cruisers, it is to be noted that the British were superior in gun power and the Germans in armor protection. German naval construction had, at a sacrifice in gun power, devoted a larger percentage of ship tonnage to armor protection. [50] ^EVAN THOMAS 'BEATTY Xo Phaeton \ 'OYofmouth % >falmouTn ) Inconstant 'o Cordelia BirKenhead ,. jy 0*- Enqadmt ^ oGioucester flNottinqham /o Dublin Southampton oBirminqham Diagram No. 7 cruising formation op forces under immediate command of vice admiral beatty and rear ad- miral evan-thomas [51] FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE TABLE COMPARING STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES Type. British. German. (Beatty) (Hipper) Dreadnaught Battleships 4 Battle Cruisers 6 5 Light Cruisers 15* 5 Destroyers . . . . f 31 S3 * Including one Sea-plane Carrier. Type. British. German. (Jellicoe) (Scheer) Dreadnaught Battleships 24 16 Predreadnaught Battleships .... 6 Battle Cruisers 3 Armored Cruisers 8 Light Cruisers 12 6 Destroyers 46 45 There is still some question as to the exact num- ber of destroyers present. Lieutenant Commander Frost in the Naval Institute Proceedings gives the following comparative table: — Dreadnaught Battleships 28 647,550 16 363,360 1.78 to 1 Battle Cruisers 9 196,900 5 118,710 1.66 to 1 Light Cruisers 26 108,290 11 44,726 2.42 to 1 Destroyers 78 77,200* 77 or less 60,300* 1.28 to 1 * Approximate Comparing the totals of the two fleets on a ton- nage basis, the British had an aggregate superiority of about 7 to 4 or 1.75 to 1. (The armored cruisers of the British and the predreadnaught s of the Germans are not included in this comparison. ) In- cluding the German predreadnaughts the aggre- gate tonnage of German capital ships was 561,110 as against the British 844,450. [53] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND The British had a total of 344 heavy guns: 48 15-inch, 10 14-inch, 142 13.5-inch, and 144 12-inch. The Germans had a total of 244 heavy guns: 144 12-inch, and 100 11-inch. A 15-inch shell weighs 1,950 lbs., a 14-inch shell weighs 1,600 lbs., a 13.5-inch 1,400 lbs., a 12-inch 850 lbs.,* and an 11 -inch 760 lbs. A single dis- charge of all British heavy guns in the battle of Jutland weighed 713,600 lbs. as compared with 217,264 lbs. for the German side.f In armor protection the German ships were bet- ter provided than the British. Tonnage is the fair- est basis of comparison, as it represents capital that can be invested at discretion for offense and de- fense. In the battle itself, submarines and aircraft took no actual part. The British had a sea-plane car- rier which flew some planes during the approach but they accomplished nothing of note. No British submarines were in the battle. The Germans had twenty-four submarines and ten airships which took part in the operations, but none of these were pres- ent on the field of action during the afternoon and * A 12-inch British weighs 850 lbs. The German 12-inch is heav- ier and Comdr. Bellairs gives its weight as 981 lbs. t All the British 15-inch, 14-inch and 13.5 inch, except the Erin's 13.5-inch, were in center line turrets bearing on both broadsides. All the 12-inch and 11-inch, however, were not capable of being fired on both sides. Tlie Germans suffered particularly in this respect. The four Heligolands lost four 12-inch guns each, and the four Nassans lost four 11-inch each. Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt gives the superiority of the Grand Fleet to the High Sea Fleet at Jutland as 175 per cent in weight of broadsides, or nearly 3 to 1. ("Naval Construction During the War" by Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt.) [54] kWiesbaden « Frankfurt- A xi nolf notiUa 8.61, hXIlHartFloJilto kPillou *»»Torpedo Boots » Dbinq • » » Torpedo BoQ^s (Bioj,iio.ui) iJteqensburq ••«»TorpfdoBoot» Screen v^ HIPPES Diagram No. 8 cruising formation of reconnaissance force com manded by vice admiral hipper [55] FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE evening of May 31st. Although between the hours of two and three P.M. five Zeppelins ascended for long distance reconnaissance in the sector north to west of Heligoland, they did not see their own fleet, nor the British fleet, nor did they hear any- thing of the battle.* * In speaking of U-boat enterprises and their tactical employment. Admiral Scheer states: — "Cooperation with separate units or with the entire Fleet could not be suflBciently well organized to prove dependable for certain opera- tions. Tactical cooperation would have been understood to mean that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of en- countering the enemy, numbers of U-boats would be present from the beginning in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as certain rules have been evolved for the employment of cruisers and torpedo boats in daylight battle to support the activity of the battle- ship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been done in that respect and it would have been a very risky experi- ment to take U-boats into battle without a thorough trial. The two principal drawbacks are their inadequate speed and the possibility of their not distinguishing between friend and foe. "Only temporary cooperation was possible in the case of enter- prises by the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when each unit had a special duty, to be mutually supplemented but without exacting any tactical union. If, for instance, there was the intention to bombard a certain coastal town, it might be assumed that English fighting forces would at once rush out from different harbors where they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers of their peace. If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where it was pre- sumed there were enemy ships, they would probably have a chance of attacking. "Consideration was given as to what would be the most desirable way to station U-boats off enemy harbors; how they could be used in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or other- wise render assistance. . . ." [57] Ill THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE The battle of Jutland is conveniently divided into the following five phases (each of these will be considered separately and in turn) : First Phase: (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.) Bj'itish Advance Force under Beatty encotmters German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action to the southeast and effects junc- ture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer, (Diagrams 9 and 10.) Second Phase: (4:55 P.M. to 6:40 P.M.) British Advance Force engaged with van of Ger- man High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jelli- coe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to the southwest. (Diagram 15.) Third Phase: (6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.) Scheer turns hack and attacks the British center with guns and torpedoes. After a brief engage- [58] THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE ment Scheer again withdraws to the west under cover of a smoke screen. {Diagram 20.) Fourth Phase: (7:17 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. Dark.) In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action, hauls around from west to southeast, and seeks to draw closer to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to re- gain touch on westerly courses, then turns to the southwest, and finally to south. (Diagram 22,) Fifth Phase: (9:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M.) During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south while Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British light forces are intermittently engaged with the High Sea Fleet. (Diagram 24.) The day of the battle was partly cloudy to over- cast, but the sun broke through in places most of the time. Except for a moderate swell the sea was smooth. There was very little wind. Visibility was reported as good in the first stages of the action, but later in the afternoon was considerably reduced by mist and smoke which hung low in the heavy atmos- phere. Note: The tracks of the heavy ships throughout the battle are shown in Diagrams Nos. 9, 10, 15, 20, 22, and 24 of the five phases. Important situations during these phases are portrayed in more de- tail by position diagrams which also show light forces. These dia- grams have been constructed by combining data gleaned from the writings of Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Scheer, Commander von Hase, Gunnery Officer of the Derringer, and other authoritative sources, both British and German. No attempt has been made to plot in all the light forces. The positions of these are given approximately to indicate how the destroyers and light cruisers entered as factors, influencing the major tactics of the battle. [59] IV THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE (2:00 P. M. to 4:55 P. M.) British Advance Force under Beatty encounters German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action to the southeast and effects junc- twe with the High Sea Battle Fleet wnder S cheer. (Diagrams 9, 10.) In the early afternoon of the day of the battle the western destroyers of Hipper's advanced scout- ing line were diverted to the left to examine a steamer. This proved a small incident carrying in its train large events. While so engaged these Ger- man destroyers made smoke contact with Beatty 's eastern scout. A few minutes before this contact, the British Advance Force had turned to the north and as Beatty and Hipper were then on about parallel courses they would have just cleared each other had it not been for the timely appearance of this neutral steamer. Both sides proceeded at once to develop this contact, and by 2:30 Beatty and Hipper knew by radio of the presence of enemy light forces. Jellicoe also received the report and directed Hood to proceed with the three battle cruisers under his command to head off the enemy [60] evAKTnoMAa J,* «s"^ mppea KATTf Diagram No. 9 TRACK OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS DURING THEIR BATTLE APPROACH (2:00 TO 3:48 p.m., 31 may) [61] BEATTf 4- S 6 V e d 10 MILES, SCftCER Diagram No. 10 track of the heavy ships during the first phase (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 p.m.) British Advance Force under Beatty encounters German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action to the southeast and effects juncture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer [63] THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE should he attempt to escape via the Skaggerak. Hipper headed to the west and northwest to inves- tigate. Beatty turned to the southeast to cut off the enemy in case he attempted to retire toward the Horn Reefs passage. Shortly after 2:30, Beatty was informed of the presence of Hipper's heavy ships. As the opposing battle cruisers ap- proached each other the light forces became en- gaged, and the battle had begim. In this approach (Diagram 9) Beatty maneu- vered at a speed of nineteen and one-half knots. When assured of bringing the German ships to action, he changed from southeasterly courses and steered to the northeast toward the enemy. One hour later, at 3:25, Hipper's battle cruisers were sighted to the east, distant fifteen miles. By this time Beatty had concentrated his six battle cruisers, but, although the British had been maneuvering at a speed of only 19.5 knots, the four fast battleships under Evan-Thomas were still five miles away to the northwest. Admiral Beatty evidently esti- mated his battle cruisers as a sufficiently powerful force to destroy Hipper's ships unassisted. The British Admiral now increased speed to twenty-five knots, took a line of bearing formation to clear the smoke, and attacked. Hipper turned to the south- east. This placed the two columns about twelve miles apart on converging courses. When a little over eight miles from each other both sides opened fire simultaneously at 3:48. (Diagram 11.) [65] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND Admiral Evan-Thomas with his slower squadron of four battleships was now endeavoring to close up. He was so far astern, however, that he was unable to take an effective part in this first phase of the battle, and failure to concentrate before at- tacking proved costly to the British. The German fire was rapid and accurate. The Lion was hit twice three minutes after fire was opened and within ten minutes the roof of one of her turrets was blown off and two guns put out of action. By this time the Tiger and Princess Royal had also been hit and in a few minutes the Indefatigable was overwhelmed by a salvo. She fell out of line, sinking by the stern, was hit by another salvo forward, turned over and sank at 4:04. The range was now opening. Beatty had altered course to the south to confuse the enemy's fire control, and also to give Evan- Thomas opportunity to get into action by cutting a corner. (Diagram 12.) At 4:08 the Derfflinger ceased firing. Her target ship was out of range. (The Derfflinger s limit of gun elevation was for 20,000 yds. ) There was now a brief lull in the en- gagement between the battle cruiser lines. At this time Evan-Thomas's battleships were able to open at the extreme range of 19,000 yards to 20,000 yards on the Von der Tann, Hipper's rear ship. At 4:16 the second ship from the rear was also taken under fire by the battleships, but, partly due to smoke, and partly to unfavorable light con- ditions to the eastward, difficulty was experienced [66] "^. \2nd Scouting tvM<-mcn\5 npoo BEATTY V. ^^ ntppKE N leooo JfOnfe. x/** V \ Diagram No. 11 at 3:48 the opposing battle cruisers open fire [67] THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. That the fire of Evan-Thomas's battleships was of slight effect is shown by the fact that the target ships of these battleships suffered little damage during this run to the south. Beatty and Hipper soon closed again, and, as the range decreased, the battle cruiser big gun action was renewed. Hipper's third ship was seen to be on fire. The gunnery officer of the Derfflinger re- ported that the Lion had temporarily left the line, and that this had caused him to shift his fire from the Princess Royal to the Queen Mary. The latter was thus under the concentrated fire of the Derf- flinger and the Seydlitz. At 4:26, after having been hit repeatedly, the Queen Mary sank in a ter- rific explosion, evidently caused by the blowing up of a magazine. The Tiger, following close astern, passed through a dense cloud of smoke and a great deal of debris fell on her decks, but except for this the Queen Mary had completely disappeared. This happened 38 minutes after the engagement started and 20 minutes after the loss of the Indefatigable. Eighteen of the Queen Mary's complement of 1,300 men*were subsequently picked up by a destroyer. At 4:15 about twelve British destroyers moved out to attack Hipper's line. At the same time about eleven German destroyers also advanced to attack the British line. These light forces met in close range action between the lines. A German light cruiser and several supporting destroyers [69] WHAT HAPI^ENED AT JUTLAND joined in this engagement. The Germans fired twelve torpedoes at British capital ships at dis- tances ranging from 10,000 to 8,000 yards. Evan- Thomas turned his battleships away to avoid them — ^two torpedoes were seen to cross his track. The British destroyers also fired torpedoes, for the most part at a range of about 7,000 yards, and Hipper turned his ships away to escape them. (Diagram 13.) Most of these torpedoes were fired between 4:30 and 4:45. It was reported that the swell handicapped the speed of the German destroyers. This may account for the fact that only about eleven of the thirty- three destroyers with Hipper took part in the at- tack. On the British side about twelve out of thirty-one took part. Also, the destroyers on both sides apparently did not get far enough ahead to push home an effective close range torpedo attack. Although no torpedoes hit, they exerted an impor- tant influence on the battle tactics at a critical part of the gun-fire action by causing ships of both sides to turn away and open the range just as S cheer's battleship fleet was effecting juncture with Hip- per's battle cruisers. At 4:30 Scheer sighted the fighting battle cruiser lines to the north by west. At 4:38 one of the British advance light cruisers, the Southampton, reported the High Sea Battle Fleet to Beatty. Jellicoe and Hood, now advancing at their best speed to reenforce Beatty, also received this report. [70] v\lst.L.C.* \ \3Td.LCS. \?,nd.Scovrt(nqt^ \ \ EVAN "monAa Copm5 uvu) \9000 ^ord^ \ mpptB \ t ^ lnCle,faVtgabl& • 5unk4-06 T V-ndLCS ^0.000 ^rd&. ; Diagram No. 12 AT 4:08 ADMIRAL BEATTY INCREASES THE RANGE AND ADMIRAL EVAN-THOMAS CLOSES ENOUGH TO OPEN FIRE AT LONG RANGE [71] THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE Beatty stood on until he sighted Scheer's van at 4:42, when he turned the battle cruisers sixteen points in succession to starboard. At this time Hip- per was about 20,000 yards away and Beatty was not under an effective fire, A few minutes later Hipper turned his ships around and took station ahead of Scheer's van. The German battle fleet was now on course N.N.W., in line of divisions north, engaging the British battle cruisers at a range of 19,800 yards. Hipper was ahead of Scheer to the north, also firing at Beatty's and Evan-Thomas's ships at a range of 15,400 to 16,400 yards. At 4 :49 five German destroyers tried, with- out success, to attack with torpedoes. A little after 5 :00, two British destroyers also fired torpedoes at Hipper's ships, but without effect. At 4 :53 Evan- Thomas's ships, after engaging Hipper on an op- posite course, also countermarched, and turned up astern of Beatty. This placed the heavier ships in a favorable position to fight a rear guard action against the van of Scheer's column. (Diagram 14.) Just before and during this turn, Evan-Thomas reported that the light was in favor of the enemy, and that the British battleships could only lay on and fire at the gun flashes, visibiUty being twelve miles to the west and six miles to the east. The smoke made by the destroyers during their attack hung between the lines and helped decrease the visi- bility. This, in addition to the opened range, due [73] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND to the "turn away" maneuvers to evade torpedoes, caused the gun-fire of both sides to be ineffective. Otherwise, this juncture with Scheer might have proved a critical period for Beatty's force. Upon the arrival of the High Sea Battle Fleet, Beatty had no alternative; he had to withdraw his ships. At the time he countermarched, had the Germans been pressing him closely, considerable damage might have been done the British force, as the maneuver is an awkward one to perform under heavy gun-fire. This marks the end of the first phase of the battle. Before turning to the second phase, it should be pointed out that Scheer had a plan to envelop Beatty's force between the German battleships and Hipper's battle cruisers. This plan was abandoned during the approach. The first contact with light forces had been re- ported to Scheer at 2:30. He had continued the German Battle Fleet on a north course until he received a second radio report from Hipper that British battle cruisers had been sighted. Scheer then closed his line into battle formation, 500 meters (545 yards) between ships and 1,000 meters (1,090 yards) between squadrons, cleared his ships for ac- tion, increased speed to fifteen knots, and changed course first to the northwest, then to the west. Scheer has explained his plan and estimate as follows : [74] V"*-- *'^, P) / JtVAMTHOMAS ..— >-' Vrippst?. turns Qwav/ to ^ "^ ^^ avoid torpeidioes. ,'(Tui-ns away to avoid torpedoes) ^ V 17000 V^5. \ tP^\^f Nomad crippled Nestor crjppled'* Nicafor 20000 ^ards HlPPEiR -^'' \ \ \ "4 \BBATTYs^ Diagram No. 13 4:30 TO 4:45 both sides, deliver torpedo attacks [75] THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE "The message received at 3:45 P.M. from the Chief of Recomiaissance that he was engaged with six enemy battle cruisers on a southeasterly course showed that he had succeeded in meeting the enemy, and as he fought was drawing him closer to our Main Fleet. The duty of the Main Fleet was now to hasten as quickly as possible to support the battle cruisers, which were inferior as to material, and to endeavor to hinder the premature retreat of the enemy. At 4:05, therefore, I took a north- westerly course at a speed of fifteen knots, and a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly course in order to place the enemy between two fires, as he, on his southerly course, would have to push through between our line and that of the battle cruisers." The plan to envelop Beatty was abandoned when Scheer received word that the six British battle cruisers were being supported by battleships. Of his new estimate and changed decision Scheer writes: "While the Main Fleet was still altering course, a message came from Scouting Division Two that an English unit of battleships, five ships, not four [Scheer then supposed that there were five instead of four battleships engaged], had joined in the fight. The situation thus was becoming critical for Scouting Division One (Hipper's battle cruisers), [77] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND confronted as they were by six battle cruisers and five battleships. Naturally, therefore, everything had to be done to get into touch with them and a change was made back to a northerly course. . . ." When Scheer made this estimate and decided to change his plan of approach, he had not heard of the destruction of the Indefatigable and Queen Mary. This news did not reach him until night. He evidently drew an erroneous picture of Hipper as hard pressed by the superior British force, whereas, in fact, as has been seen, he was doing very well. Under the altered plan the juncture was ef- fected in such a way that Beatty succeeded in ex- tricating his ships without further loss. In looking back at the positions of Hipper and Beatty at 2 :30, it would appear a fair criticism to observe that Hipper was then in grave danger of being cut up by the greatly superior force under Beatty and Evan-Thomas. The British, however, did not concentrate this superior force against Hip- per's command and, as a consequence, Evan- Thomas took no very effective part in the first phase of the action, and Hipper succeeded in getting well out of a difficult position. Again, viewing the 4 :30 situation in the light of S cheer's plan, the question may be raised as to whether or not the tables had then been turned. Had Beatty allowed himself to be drawn into a position where he might have been cut off and de- [78] THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE stroyed by Scheer and Hipper? Scheer's inten- tion, as above stated, was to lead the Battle Fleet west of Beatty, allowing him to proceed on to the south in pursuit of Hipper until the British could be pinched between two fires. It is interesting to speculate as to what might have happened had Scheer persisted in this plan. It cannot be denied that risks were taken, in the first place by Hipper, and in the second place by Beatty. But war can- not be waged without running risks. [79] THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE (4:55 to 6:40) 'British Advance Force engaged with van of Ger- man High Sea Fleet; B catty leads action to north and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jelli- coe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to the southwest. (Diagram 15. ) Sighting Scheer's battleships presented to Beatty an enlarged situation. Up to now, his objective had been to cut off and destroy Hipper's detach- ment. The unexpected advent of Scheer, however, made the destruction of the German battle fleet the primary objective. Henceforth, Beatty's es- sential mission was to maintain contact with Scheer and keep Jellicoe informed of the enemy's course, speed and formation, so that the Grand Fleet might be brought into action quickly and effectively. Admiral Jellicoe, at 2 :30, upon receiving the first report that enemy light cruisers and destroyers had been sighted, had directed Hood to proceed with his three battle cruisers to head off the enemy should he try to escape through the Skaggerak. The bat- tle fleet had ceased zig-zagging and had increased [80] :^ ^/fZfld.Scoutinq £)k HlPPbR. Diagram No. 14 AT 4:55 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY TAKES NORTHWEST COURSE, AND ADMIRAL SCHEER JOINS IN BATTLE [81] THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE speed. A little over an hour later Jellicoe heard of the presence of Hipper's battle cruisers. At 4 :00 P.M. Hood's orders had been changed and he had been directed to reenforce Beatty. By 4:00 P.M. the Battle Fleet was also closing the advance force at a speed of twenty knots. When Jellicoe received report that Beatty was in contact with the enemy battle fleet and retiring, the Grand Fleet was about 60 miles away to the N.N.W., and has- tening to the support of the battle cruisers at a speed of twenty knots. As Beatty was making twenty-five knots, the two forces, while on opposite courses, were coming together at the rate of forty- five sea miles an hour. (Diagram 15.) As Beatty hauled out of range at 5:15, Hipper shifted his fire to Evan-Thomas. This brought the four British battleships under the fire of Gve battle cruisers at about 16,000 yards, and also the van of the German battle fleet at about 18,500 yards. At 5:20 Scheer ordered all fighting forces "to give chase." The ships of the Koenig class were able to make twenty-three knots for a short period and Evan-Thomas reported that at his best speed he had difficulty in drawing ahead. The two leading British battleships fired at Hip- per's ships and the two rear battleships fired at Scheer's van. The British do not record any par- ticular damage received at this time. During this phase the weather became less clear, and the wind shifted from N.W. to S.W. Powder fumes and [83] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND smoke hung over the sea and cut off the view to the north and east. Only now and then could Seheer see Hipper's ships. The light, however, was in favor of the Germans, being clearer to the west than to the east. At 5:30 Beatty gradually changed course to the right, and at 5:42, after having been out of action for half an hour, again opened fire on Hipper at about 14,000 yards, and during the next ten minutes the Lion alone fired some fifteen salvoes. Hipper also turned to the eastward on an interior concentric curve. Turning now to Hood, we find that, due to the previously-mentioned 12-mile discrepancy in navi- gation, he had missed juncture with Beatty and, on a course S. by E., had passed to the eastward of the fighting area. At 5:30 Hood's western protective scout cruiser heard firing to the south- west and, in heading over to investigate, became engaged with Hipper's outpost light cruiser and destroyers. Hood then turned around to N.W. and at 5:55 opened an effective fire with his port bat- tery against the German light cruisers. During this cruiser fighting, four British destroyers at- tacked, and about the same time ten or twelve German destroyers advanced and fired torpedoes from within 60 h.m. (6,500 yards) of Hood's line. Hipper had turned his battle cruisers to starboard, away from the torpedo threat, and being further influenced by the poor visibility which made it dif- ficult to return Beatty's fire, Hipper continued to [84] THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE maneuver to close the distance which had opened between him and S cheer. Hood's battle cruisers saw the German torpedoes and evaded them by in- dividual ship maneuvers, two ships turning away and one toward the menace. No torpedoes hit. The German light cruiser Wiesbaden was disabled. The British destroyer Shark was disabled and later sunk. The Chester was damaged. The German light cruiser Pillau was also damaged. This con- tact with Hood gave the German command the im- pression that Jellicoe was approaching from the N.E. Almost simultaneously with Hipper's veer round to starboard, Admiral Scheer had observed that his leading battleships were turning to an easterly course in conformity to Beatty's change of direc- tion. The High Sea Fleet, during the chase to the north had opened out, and the faster divisions in the van had drawn ahead. Scheer now decided to re- form his line. The order "Leader in Front" was signaled at 5:45 P. M. (Diagram 16) and speed temporarily reduced to 15 knots to give the divi- sions a chance to get into position. Before Jellicoe arrived, therefore, Hipper had turned to close the High Sea Fleet, and had taken station just ahead of the battleships. Consequently Scheer had his fleet closed up and well in hand. This slow- ing down and maneuvering added to the difficulty Jellicoe and Beatty experienced in fixing the exact position of the High Sea Fleet. [85] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND The ensuing period was a crowded one. In addi- tion to the contacts between the light forces of Hood and Hipper, the outpost cruisers of Jellicoe had also become engaged. This juncture of forces on approximately opposite courses at high speeds caused events to follow in rapid succession. Both Jellicoe and S cheer had to do quick thinking and, in the midst of uncertainties, make important tactical decisions under a weight of responsibility as great as has ever been borne by any naval com- mander. In order to get a balanced conception of the tactics used, we shall try, fii*st, to look at them from the British Commander-in-Chief's point of view in the Iron Duke, and then transfer to the German flagship to get the other aspect of the situation as it appeared to Admiral Scheer. The British Commander-in-Chief, as he ap- proached the scene of action, was perplexed by meager and conflicting information. The plots on the chart from the reports of the JLion and South- ampton had led Jellicoe to expect contact ahead. There was, however, a discrepancy of at least 12 miles in the navigation. This had already caused Hood to miss Beatty and pass by him to the east- ward. Moreover, another message from the South- ampton, as received on board the Iron Duke, said that the German battle fleet was to the northeast of the battle cruisers. This was an unlikely forma- tion. It was apparent that Hood would have sighted Scheer's battleships had it been the case, so [86] >IAGKAM No. 15 lACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DUR- rG THE SECOND PHASE (4:55 P.M ) 6:40 P.M.) British Advance Force engaged with van of German High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jellicoe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to the southwest [87] THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE the report was discredited on the face of it as im- probable. Additional information was received by Jellicoe as follows: At 5:40 the Black Prince, the starboard wing armored cruiser, reported that battle cruisers were in sight bearing south, distant five miles. At 5 :45 the Comus, stationed three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, reported heavy gun-fire on a south bearing. Shortly after this, flashes of gun-fire were visible bearing S.S.W. At 5:50 Admiral Arbuthnot, com- manding the armored cruisers in the Defense, reported ships in action bearing S.S.W. and steer- ing N.E. At 5 -.55 the Marlborough reported gun flashes and heavy gun-fire on the starboard bow; at 5:56 strange vessels bearing S.S.W.; and at 6:00 British battle cruisers bearing S.S.W., three to four miles distant. Shortly after 6:00 the Iron Duke sighted these vessels under Admiral Beatty about five miles away on an easterly course. (Diagram 17.) The British tactics and the estimates that led to them are described by Admiral Jellicoe in the below-quoted passages: "At this stage, shortly after 6:00 P.M., there was still great uncertainty as to the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, and the noise was heavy and continuous. Our cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, but [89] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND the fact that they were not closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents could hardly be battleships. "In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to clearing up the situation without altering the formation of the Battle Fleet, a signal had been made to the Battle Fleet at 6:02 P.M. to alter course leaders together, the remainder in succession, to south (a turn of three points). Speed at the same time was reduced to 18 knots to allow of the ships closing up into station. "The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer. The con- viction was, however, forming in my mind that I should strike the enemy's Battle Fleet on a bearing a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to a southeast course, leaders together and the re- mainder in succession, and the destroyer flotillas were directed by signal at 6:08 P.M. to take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. (Diagram 18.) There was, however, a very short interval between this signal to the destroyers and the signal for deployment, and consequently the destroyers did not reach their positions before deployment. The subsequent alterations of course to the south- ward and westward added to their difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations at the van of the Fleet after deployment. . . . [90] f ■yChestw Diagram No. 16 AT 5:45 P.M. ADMIRAL HOOD's LIGHT FORCES ENGAGE ADMIRAL HIPPER's ADVANCE SCOUTS. — IN THE MEAN- WHILE SCHEER SLOWS DOWN AND REFORMS HIS FLEET [91] THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE "At 6:01 p.m., immediately on sighting the LioUj a signal had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at 6:10, and at 6:14 P.M. he signalled: 'Have sighted the enemy's Battle Fleet bearing south-southwest.' This report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment. . . . The enemy battle fleet position given placed it thirty degrees before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke, or fifty-nine degrees before the starboard beam of the Marlborough, and apparently in close proximity. There was no time to lose, as there was evident danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at 6:16 P.M. a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port wing column, on a course southeast by east, it being assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle cruisers. Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them." (Diagram 17.) Before considering the German point of view, in order more clearly to understand Admiral Scheer's decisions, it might be well to explain that the High Sea Fleet had been drilled to perform a [93] WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND certain withdrawing maneuver generally regarded in British naval circles as dangerously difficult if not quite impracticable to execute under gun-fire. This maneuver, by which Scheer hoped to retire the inferior High Sea Fleet whenever the superior British gun-fire became too hot, was a simultaneous "swing-around" of all ships under cover of a smoke screen made by cruisers and destroyers. Admiral Scheer had carefully exercised his fleet in this maneuver so that the ships could perform it, whether they were all on the same course in a straight battle line, or steering various courses dis- posed on a curved battle line.* In short the Ger- mans had a definite offensive-defensive plan of battle and the High Sea Fleet had been assiduously rehearsed in a novel method of attack and with- drawal. At this stage of the battle, shortly before 6:00, Admiral Scheer explains his estimate and decisions as follows: "While this encounter with the advance guard of the English Main Fleet was taking place, we, on our flagship, were occupied debating how much longer to continue the pursuit in view of the ad- vanced time. There was no longer any question of a cruiser campaign against merchantmen in the Skaggerak, as the meeting with the English fight- * Scheer himself says: "At our peace maneuvers great importance was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and every means employed to insure the working of the signals." [94] yjnucot: ,--'' **--^5>„J'«?^i 9\ |Black\ hebrtjammwi-' ^ \. efcnco siifik. \ Vord. ,6-