m I ■ •**. '• LIBRARY- OF CONGRESS, WE '■"&' -»- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: JR Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/unitedstatesgoveOOnewy LES ETATS-UNIS Gouvernement da G6n. F. D. Legitime. -•♦--« •*^»>--«- THE UNITED STATES AND THE Government of Gen. F. D. Legitime. Ff^ New-York : NAPOLEON THOMPSON & Cie., Impru Nos. 33 a 43 Gold Street. THE l/ United States AND THE Government OF Gen. F. D. Legitime 2> H NEW YORK : NAPOLEON THOMPSON & CO., Printers, Nos. 33 to 43 Gold Street. X • LES Etats-Unis ET LE Gouvernement DU Gen. F. D. Legitime NEW YORK : NAPOLEON THOMPSON & Cie., Imprimeurs, Nos. 33 A 43 Gold Street. >' The United States and the Govern- ment of Gen. F. D. legitime. Civil war lias been desolating the Republic of Hayti for nearly the last six months. The foreign press, and especially the American press, has given to the public information sometimes true but more often untrue with respect to the events of that war. In regard to the causes and motives which gave birth to that war, no paper has yet truthfully revealed them to the public: the aim of the author of this work is to correctly present these to the reader. His work, short and precise is published in French and English, in order that Americans whose attention is specially solicited, should not experience any difficulty in understand- ing by themselves the nature and character of Haytian events. While narrating facts in their chronological order, the writer has discussed and refuted the principal arguments used by the authors of the counter-revolution of Cape Haytien, in the hope of covering themselves with legitimate appearances and conquering sympathies to their cause. Conviction will result from the reading of this work to the effect that right and national interest stand on the side of G-en'l F. D. Legitime and that the cause of the secessionists of Hayti is destined to certain ruin. The patriots of any country, indeed, could not entertain any confidence or any sympathy towards a party aiming at the dismemberment of their country. I. On the tenth of August, 1888, the city of Port-au-Prince, Capital of Hayti, rose up in arms under the impulse and direc- ,& s Les Etats-Unis et le Gouvernement du G6n. F. D. Legitime. Depuis pres de six mois la guerre civile desole la Kepu- blique d'Haiti. La presse etrangere, la presse americaine sur- tout, a livre au public sur les peripeties de cette guerre des renseignements parfois vrais, le plus sou vent inexacts. Quant aux causes et motifs qui l'ont fait naitre aucun journal ne les a encore fldelement reveles au public : c'est la le but que se propose l'auteur de cet opuscule. Son travail, court et precis, parait en f rancais et en anglais pour que le lecteur americain, dont il reclame particulierement 1' attention, n'eprouve aucune difficulte a se rendre compte par lui-meme de la nature et du caractere des evenements d'Haiti. Tout en exposant les faits dans leur ordre cbronologique, il a discute et refute les principaux arguments dont les auteurs de la contre-revolution du Cap-Ha'itien se sont servis pour se couvrir d'une apparence de legitimite et gagner des sympa- thies a leur cause. On se convaincra, par la lecture de cet opuscule, que-le droit et l'interet national sont du v cote du Gouvernement du Gen. F. D. Legitime et que la cause des separatistes du Nord d'Ha'iti est vouee a une ruiue certaine. Les patriotes de tous les pa^s ne sauraient en effet accorder aucune contiance, ni aucune sympathie a un parti qui reve le demembrement de la patrie. Le 10 du mois d'aout, 1888, la ville de Port-au-Priuce, capitale d'Haiti, sous l'impulsion et la direction du Gen. Boisrond-Canal, se nrit en armes et renversa du pouvoir le — 4 tion of General Boisrond-Canal, and overthrew the power of General Salomon, against whom some cities of northern Hayti had already pronounced. General Salomon, in the latest stage of his administration, had shown himself powerless to maintain order and to guar- antee public security and protect the properties of the citi- zens. His fall had been foreseen and expected for several months ; and patriots of all parties and localities had clustered around General F. D. Legitime; whom they considered as the most capable to constitute and maintain a republican and democratic government, on the basis of Progress and Honesty. General F. D. Legitime had been banished from the country, in the month of June, 1888, by General Salomon, who was very suspicious and excessively jealous in regard to his per- sonal influence. The sympathy shown to General F. De Le- gitime and the hopes based upon him disturbed and irritated General Salomon. It is the very banishment of his strongly popular and much loved rival, which warmed up popular exasperation to such a degree, that the late President Bois- roud-Canal, surrendering to the pressing solicitations of all, was led to assume the direction of the revolutionary move- ment. But before acting, he had advised and instructed Gen- eral Seide Thelemaque, military commandant of Cape Haytien, to begin in that town a military movement against General Salomon. This is granted and formally acknowledged by General Seide Thelemaque's partisans. The two revolutionary risings of the 5th of August at Cape Haytien, and of the 10th of August at Port-au-Prince are therefore connected facts un- able to be separated from each other, in view of establishing, in favor of the rising of the 5th of August, a right of ante- cedents, carrying with it an apparently exclusive right to the Gen. Salomon contre lequel s'etaient deja soulevee une partie des villes du JSTord d'Haiti. Le Gen. Salomon, dans les derniers temps de son admi- nistration, s'etait montre impuissant a maintenir l'ordre et a garantir la securite et les biens des citoyens. Sa chute, depuis plusieurs mois, etait chose prevue et attendue, et deja les pa- triotes, sans distinction de partis et de localites, se groupaient autour du Gen. F. D. Legitime comme l'homme le plus propre a constituer et a maintenir un Gouvernement republi- cain et democratique, a la fois progressiste et honnete. Le Gen. F. D. Legitime avait ete banni du pays au mois de juin 1888 par le Gen. Salomon tres ombrageux et excessivement jaloux de son influence personnelle. Les sympathies temoignees au Gen. F. D. Legitime et les esperances qu'on fondait sur lui inquietaient et irritaient le Gen. Salomon. C'est le bannis- sement meme de son rival, tres populaire et tres aime, qui excita 1' exasperation populaire a. ce point que l'ancien pre- sident Boisrond-Canal, cedant aux pressantes sollicitations de tous, dut se decider a prendre la direction du mouvement revolutionnaire. Mais avant d'agir il avait conseille et fait dire au Gen. Seide Thelemaque, commandant militaire du Cap-Haitien, de commencer en cette ville Paction militaire contre le Gen. Salomon. Ce point est avoue et formellement reconnu par les partisans du Gen. Seide Thelemaque. Les deux prises d'armes du 5 aoiit au Cap-Haitien et du 10 aout au Port- au-Prince, sont done des faits connexes qu'on ne saurait separer pour etablir en faveur de la prise d'armes du 5 aoiit un droit de priorite d'ou. aurait semble decouler un droit ex- clusif a la presidence pour le Gen. Seide Thelemaque, et a la prepotence politique pour la ville du Cap-Haitien. Le Gen. Seide Thelemaque, il est vrai, reconnaissait au Gen. Legitime ou a tout autre citoyen le droit de poser sa can- — 5 — presidency for General Seide Thelemaque, and to the political supremacy for the town of Cape Haytien. It is true that General Seide Thelemaque admitted the right of General Legitime, as of any other citizen, of presenting himself as candidate for the presidency. But, in fact, he de- nied such a right and attempted to annihilate it by his marching on Port-au-Prince, the capital of the Republic and the seat of the central government ; and by entering it with an army of 10,000 men, on the 24th of August, 1888, that is 13 days after Salomon's fall. Moreover he had caused all the stra- tegic points and all the important townships of the north and the Artibonite to be occupied by strong garrisons under the command of generals devoted to him. "What was the motive of such military precautions, immediately after the fall of the regime against which an armed revolution had taken place ? General Legitime having only returned from exile on the 15th of August, had at his disposal nothing but the strength of public opinion and the bulletin vote. He had no direct influence whatever, neither on the army nor on the mobilized national guards, since, in the provisional government instituted at Port- au-Prince on the 24th of August, he had been given charge of the Departments of Foreign Relations and of Public Worship whilst Seide Telemaqne held the portfolios of War and Navy. The other members of the provisional government were C. Archin, Minister of the Interior, H. Claude, Minister of Jus- tice, S. U. St. Amand, Minister of Finance and Commerce, F. Hippolyte, Minister of Agriculture and General Police, and General Boisrond-Canal without portfolio but with the Pres- idency of the government : all chosen by the Revolutionary Committee of Port-au-Prince, of Artibonite and of the North. The South had no representatives in the meeting of the com- mittee. didature a la presidence, mais en fait il niait an tel droit qu'il s'efforcait d'annuler en marchant sur le Port-au-Prince, capi- tale de la Republique et siege du Gouvernement central, et en y entrant, le 23 aout 1888, c'est-a-dire treize jours apres la chute et le renversement de Salomon, avec une armee de 10,000 hommes, apres avoir en outre fait occuper tous les points strategiques et toutes les communes importantes du Nord et de l'Artibonite par de fortes garnisons commandees par des generaux devoues a sa personne. Pourquoi de telles precautions militaires en presence de replacement du regime contre lequel on s'etait mis en armes ? . . . Le Gen. Legitime, revenu de l'exil le 15 aoiit, n'avait a sa disposition que la force de l'opinion publique et le bulletin de vote. II n'avait aucune action directe sur 1' armee ni sur les gardes nationales mobilisees, puisque, dans le gouvernement provisoire institue a Port-au-Prince le 24 aout, il etait charge des departements des Relations exterieures et des cultes, tan- dis que le Gen. Seide Thelemaque ten ait les portefeuilles de la Guerre et de la Marine. Les autres membres du Gouverne- ment provisoire etaient : C. Archin, charge du portefeuille de l'Interieur, H. Claude, charge du portefeuille de la Justice, S. U. St. Amand, charge des finances et du Commerce, F. Hip- polyte, charge de l'Agriculture et de la Police generale, puis le Gen. Boisrond-Canal, sans portefeuille, avec la presidence du gouvernement, tous choisis par les comites revolution- naires de Port-au-Prince, de l'Artibonite et du Nord. Le Sud n' etait pas represente dans la reunion des Comites. II a done fallu que le Gen. Legitime jouit d'une grande et reelle influence, non seulement dans le pays mais dans l'ar- mee meme pour que le conflit sanglant du 28 septembre 1S88 n'entrainat pas sa defaite. Ce conflit eut lieu le 28 septembre au soir entre les troupes amenees par le Gen. Seide Thelema- — 6 — General Legitime must have wielded a great and real in- fluence, not only over the country but also over the army, not to have been defeated and ruined in the bloody conflict of the 18th of September, 1888. That conflict on the 28th of September in the evening, between the troops brought by General Seide Thelemaque to Port-au-Prince, massed in the neighborhood of the Presidential Palace, and the soldiers of the Port-au-Prince garrison, barracked in the Palace yards under the orders of General Anselme Prophete, then com- manding the body guard of the President of Hayti. Political parties, through their blind excitement, will always discuss the question to ascertain who has taken the initiative of the aggression on the 28th of September. A simultaneous inquest made by the editors of two independent journals has given on this lamentable affair, valuable informa- tion which has located the responsibilities and enlightened general opinion. That inquest, through the importance of the testimonies received, has obtained, despite its private character, a considerable political value in the country ; and it is proper, while mentioning the numbers of the 5th and 12th October, 1888, of the paper Z' Union, and the numbers of the 6th and 13th of the same month of the paper La Verite,. which published it ; written in the following words : " The undersigned editors of La Verite and Z' Union, " after an inquiry undertaken by the two papers relative to " the events of the 28th of September, have, according to " their conscience and the received testimony, agreed upon the " following declaration : " " The struggle which occurred on Friday, 28th of Sep- " tember, at 7 o'clock in the evening, between the Northern " troops camped around the National Palace, has been ordered " neither by General Seide Thelemaque, commandant of the — 6 — que a Port-au-Prince efc massees dans le voisinage du palais presidentiel, et des soldats de la garnison de Port-au-Prince casernes dans la cour de ce palais sous les ordres du Gen. An- sel me Prophete, alors commandant des corps de la garde du President d'Haiti. Les partis, dans leur excitation et leur aveuglement, dis- cuteront toujours sur la question de savoir qui a eu l'initiative de l'agression au 28 septembre : une enquete collective, pour- suivie par les redacteurs de deux journaux independants, a f ourni sur cette deplorable affaire des renseignements precieux qui ont fixe les responsabilites et eclaire l'opinion generale. Cette enquete, par l'importance des depositions qui y sont faites, a acquis, malgre son caractere prive, une valeur politi- que considerable dans le pays, et il y a lieu, tout en mention- nant les numeros du 5 et du 12 octobre 1888 du journal P Union et les numeros du 6 et du 13 du meme mois du jour- nal la Verite qui la contienuent, d'en reproduire ici la conclu- sion, redigee dans les termes snivants : a Les soussignes, redacteurs de la Verite et de 1' Union, » a la suite d'une enquete entreprise par les deux journaux sur » les evenements du 28 septembre, ont, en toute conviction, » arrete, d'apres les temoignages recueillis, le proces-verbal » suivant : » La lutte qui s'est engagee le vendredi, 28 septembre, a » sept heures du soir, entre les troupes du Nord, campees aux J abords du Palais National, et la garde du Palais, n'a ete j> ordonnee ni par le Gen. Seide Thelemaque, de qui relevaient b les divisions du Nord, ni par le Gen. Ansel me Prophete, j commandant des quatre corps de la Garde. » Cette lutte a eu pour cause premiere l'agitation qui a d existe, pendant toute la journee du vendredi, dans le camp j> du Gen. Thelemaque, et qui, a pa'rtir de midi, gagnant de — 7 — " Northern Divisions, nor by General Anselme Prophete, '• commandant of the four corps of the guard." " The primary cause of that struggle laid in the excite- " ment which had predominated during the whole of Friday, " in General Thelemaque's camp ; and which spreading far and " near, prevailed throughout the whole city of Port-au-Prince. " The immediate cause was in isolated firing of muskets on " two or three points of the city, as it was customary since " the 10th of August, during the evenings, and at some " distance from the Palace and the divisions of General " Thelemaque." " The Northern soldiers, already much excited, improved " the occasion, and fired upon the positions of General "Anselme Prophete, who was compelled, of course, to defend " himself." " In investigating the causes of the excitement itself, " which w T e consider as having brought about the conflict, we " find them : " " 1st. — In the antagonism existing, since the entrance of " the Northern troops, between these troops and the garrison " of Port-au-Prince." " 2d. — In the plottings and intrigues, and in the malici- " ous advices of interested parties." " 3d. — In the moving of a portion of General Thele- " maque's volunteers who, in violation of the usual custom, " left their quarters towards noon time. They went " to the Ministry of War, then the seat of the Government, " with the purpose of escorting their General to his residence." "4th.— In the fact that General Thelemaque went around " the city, about at 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon, accompa- " nied by an escort of mounted men and of numerous foot " soldiers (volunteers and regulars), some of them went so far 7 — » proche en proche, s'est etendue sur toute la ville de Port-au- » Prince. Elle a eu pour cause immediate, des coups de feu iso- b les, partis comme c'etait l'habitude depuis le 10 Aout, vers le b soir, de deux ou trois points de la ville, a nne certaine dis- b tance du Palais efc de& divisions du Gen. Thelemaque. b Les soldats du Nord, deja tres surexcites, en ont pris b occasion pour tirer sur les positions du general Anselme b Prophete, qui a du naturellement se defendre. b Recherchant maintenant les causes de l'agitation elle- » meme, que nous signalons comme ayant suscite la lutte, nous » les trouvons : » 1° Dans l'antagonisme existant depuis l'entree des troupes b du Nord, entre ces troupes et la garnison de Port-au-Prince. b 2° Dans les intrigues et les machinations, dans les per- b nicieux conseils de gens interesses. b 3° Dans le deplacement d'une partie des volontaires du b Gen. Thelemaque qui, contrairement aux habitudes prises, b quitterent vers midi leurs cantonnements, se rendirent au b ministere de la Guerre, siege du gouvernement provisoire, b avec l'intention d'escorter jusqu'a sa demeure leur general. b 4o Dans la tournee que fit ensuite en ville, vers 2 ou 3 b heures de i'apres-midi, le general Seide Thelemaque, accom- b pagne d'une escorte a cheval et d'une troupe nombreuse de b militaires a pied (soldats et volontaires), dont quelques-uns b se laisserent aller a des provocations et meme a des voies de b fait contre des habitants de Port-au-Prince. b II n'y a done pas eu, d'un cote ni de l'autre, de preme- b ditation d'attaque pour l'heure ou le combat a commence^ ! b Des deux parts on etait en eveil. b II ne peut etre question d'assassinat ! " as to provoke and even maltreat the inhabitants of Port-au- " Prince." u Therefore, neither on one side or on the other, there " was any premeditation of an attack, for the hour at which " the fight actually began." " On both sides, they were on the alert." " The question of assassination cannot be sustained." " There was a military action, in which General Seide " Thelemaque has met with his death, 10th of October, 1888." The signatures of the committee of inquest follow the above document. No matter how different may be the opinions expressed in regard to the occurence, the death of General Seide Thele- maque could not justify a civil war. That death was merely a pretext by which some partisan politicians have attempted to cover their efforts for breaking national unity and provoking a scission. They did not dare to openly proclaim their seces- sionist ideas, repudiated by the general sentiment of the cQuntry ; they proclaimed - therefore in the North and the Artibonite, that General Seide Thelemaque had been assassin- ated in the capital, and that his death was to be avenged in the blood of the Port-au-Prince people. Everywhere, in the arrondissement of the North and the Artibonite, they deceived the good faith of some by exaggerated and even mendacious stories, while they cowered others by the armed forces they found at their disposal, thanks to the military measures taken by Seide Thelemaque, as mentioned above. In order to operate a diversion in the West, they prevailed upon a dan- gerous agitator of the rural masses, by the name of Merisier Joannis, to take by surprise the town of Jacmel, with the assistance of a band of three hundred rascals, formerly re » II y a eu action militaire, dans laquelle le general Seide » Thelemaque a trouve la mort. » 10 octobre 1888. » Suivent les signatures. Quelques opinions divergentes que l'on professe en cette matiere, la mort du general Seide Thelemaque ne pouvait legi. tinier une guerre civile ; elle n'a ete que le pretexte dont se sont cou verts quelques hommes de parti pour essay er de rom- pre l'TJnite Rationale et operer une scission. ]SPosant avouer tout haut leurs idees separatistes, si contraires au sentiment general du pays, ces hommes proclamerent dans le ]S"ord et l'Artibonite que le Gen. Seide Thelemaque avait ete assassine a la capitale et qu'il fallait venger sa mort dans le sang des Port-au-Princiens. Partout, dans les arrondissements du ISTord et de l'Artibonite ils surprenaient la bonne foi des uns par des recits exageres et meme mensongers, tandis qu'ils s'imposaient a d'autres par la force armee dont ils disposaient, grace aux mesures militaires ci-dessus rappelees, prises par Seide Thele- maque. Pour tenter une diversion dans l'Ouest, ils pousserent un dangereux agitateur de la masse rurale du nom de Merisier Joannis a surprendre la ville de Jacmel a l'aide d'une bande de trois cents mauvais sujets deja recrutes de longue main, sous le President Salomon, dans les bas-fonds sociaux, et sur- nommes a les trois cents rasoirs.» L'honneur national, la securite du foyer domestique, la protection de la famille et de la propriete, le sentiment intime et prof on d du peuple ha'itien que le demembrement de la patrie c'est la decheance, et la perte de l'independance, tout ce qu'il y a de plus respectable et de plus sacre dans une na- tion justement fiere de son origine et de ses traditions, com- mandait aux vrais patriotes l'adoption des mesures a la fois les — 9 — cruited purposely, under President Salomon, in the slums of society, and nicknamed « the three hundred razors. » National honor, the security of family homes, the protec- tion of family and property, the inner and deep sentiment of the Haytian people understanding that the dismemberment of the country amounts to its death and the loss of independence ; all that is the more respectable and sacred to a nation, right- fully proud of its origin and traditions, commanded the true patriots to adopt measures both energetic and wise, in view of saving the country from anarchy, and protecting its dearest interests, material and moral. They determined therefore upon action ; but in conforming themselves, despite the press- ing dangers of the situation, to the rules which are the best calculated for inspiring consideration and respect, as well in Hayti as in foreign lands. The provisional government of the 24th of August was dismembered by the death of General Seide Thelemaque and the retreat of two of its members, Messrs. F. Hippolyte and C. Archin. Notwithstanding the general respect enjoyed by the former President Boisrond-Canal, and his great influence in the country, the moral authority of the provisional gov- ernment seemed to require a new consecration, as the very consequence of that dismemberment. The National Consti- tuant Assembly, elected by the people previous to the event of the 28th September and representing national sovereignty, was more able to solve the grave pending questions than counter-revolutionary committees, formed later on. Those committees, drawing their mandate from themselves, or rather from the chiefs of a counter-revolution, made themselves the organs of the people of their localities, when the latter, by the bulletin vote and the exercise of their right of suffrage had already chosen their representatives. Out of 84 9 — plus energiques et les plus sages pour preserver le pays de l'anarchie, et sauvegarder ses plus chers interets materiels et moraux. Us se resolurent done a. agir, mais en observant, mal- gre le peril pressant, les formes les plus propres a inspirer la consideration et le respect, tant en Haiti qu'a l'etranger. Le Gouvernement provisoire du 24 aotit etait disloque par la mort du Gen. Seide Thelemaque et par la retraite de deux de ses membres, MM. Hippolyte et C. Archin. Malgre l'estirae generale qui entoure l'ancien President Boisrond-Canal et sa grande influence dans le pays, l'autorite morale du Gouverne- ment provisoire semblait exiger une nouvelle consecration, par suite meme de cette dislocation. Or l'Assemblee Rationale Constituante, elue par le peuple avant l'evenement du 28 septembre et representant la souverainete nationale, etait plus habile a resoudre les graves questions pendantes, que des comites revolutionnaires, formes apres-coup, et qui, tirant leur mandat d'eux-memes, ou plutot des chefs d'une con tre-re volu- tion, s'improvisent des organes du peuple de leurs localites, quand ces localites, par le bulletin de vote et en exercant leur droit de suffrage, ont deja nomme leurs mandataires. Sur 84 constituants a elire, 81 avaient ete elus et 35, a la date du 12 octobre, etaient deja rendus a la Capitale. Un certain nombre allaient se reunir dans la ville des Gona'ives sous la pression des contre-revolutionnaires du Nord et quatre de l'arrondissement de Jacmelse voyaient forces de faire un simu- lacre d'adhesion au farouche Merisier. En l'absence de toute constitution qui iixat un quorum, la derniere ayant ete aneantie par le decret meme des comites revolutionnaires instituant le Gouvernement provisoire, les 35 constituants presents a la Capitale se constituereut pour statuer, non pas sur toutes les questions entrant dans leur mandat comme, par exemple, l'elaboration et le vote d'une nouvelle constitution, — 10 — constituents to be elected, 81 had been elected and 35, on the date of October 12th, had already arrived at the capital. A certain number was to meet in the city of Gonaives under the pressure of the northern counter-revolutionists, and four of the Jacmel arrondissement were compelled to simulate adhe- sion to the brutal Merisier. There being no Constitution determining a quorum, the latter Constitution having been annihilated by the decree of the revolutionary committees in- stituting a provisional government, the 35 constituents present in the Capital, constituted themselves in order to decide, not upon all the questions pertaining to their mandate, as, for in- stance, the preparation and the vote of a new Constitution, and the nomination of the President of Iiayti, but only upon the questions having for their object to consult, — leaving the decision of essential matters to the country itself, as re- presented by its mandatories the majority of whom had met at the Capital. Such method of action was justified by the absence of any power, and anterior and superior to that given by the mandate of constituents, and by the impossibility to arrive by any other means more regular to the formation de jure of a power whatsoever, capable of assuming the necessary measures obtaining the majority of the assembly. The Provisional Government having deposed its powers, the thirty-five constituents named therefore as a consequence General F. De Legitime chief of the executive power. That title which designated a provisional power was disputed by the northern counter-revolutionists, whose doings however were soon to reveal a thorough contempt of legality. Individuals without mandate, or rather receiving their mandate but from the leader of the counter-revolution, as- % sumed the right to name General Florvil Hippolyte, Provi- — 10 — la nomination du president d'Haiti, raais senlement sur celles de ces questions ayant pour but de donner la parole et de laisser la decision des choses essentielles au pays tout entier represente par ses mandataires reunis en majorite a la Capitale. Une telle facon d'agir trouve sa justification dans Tabsence de tout pouvoir anterieur et superieur a celui que donne le mandat de constituant, et dans l'impossibilite d'arriver par tout autre moyen plus regulier a la formation de jure d'un pouvoir quelconque, capable de prendre les mesures necessaires pour obtenir la majorite de l'ssemblee. Le Gouvernement provisoi re ayant depose ses ponvoirs, les 35 constituants nommerent en consequence le Gen. F. D. Legitime chef du pouvoir executif. Ce titre qui desiguait un pouvoir provisoire, fut conteste par les contre-revolutionnaires du Nord dont les actes allaient cependant reveler un profond mepris de la legalite. Des individus sans mandat, ou plutot ne recevant leur mandat que des cliefs de la contre-revolution, s'octroyerent le droit de nommer le Gen. Florvil Hippolyte President provi- soire de la Republiqne. lis faisaient ainsi fi des constituants qu'ils empechaient d'aller sieger au Port-au-Prince, qu'ils empeeherent meme de sieger aux Gonaives apres les y avoir convoques, et dont pourtant ils invoquaient l'absence pour arguer de nullite les actes des constituants reunis a la Capitale. Le Gen. F. D. Legitime charge de pourvoir a toutes les necessites de la situation, se mit resolument a l'oeuvre. La marche de la contre-revolution fut immediatement enrayee par 1' unite d'action et la rapidite des mesures. Et tout d'abord une armee fut envoyee devant Jacmel. Elle y entra presque sans coup ferir, le l er novembre, avec le concours de la population elle-meme qui tremblait sous Merisier. Celui-ci avait eu le temps d'envoyer dans le Nord quatre constituants de l'arron- — 11 — sional President of the Republic. Thus they showed their contempt of the constituents whom they prevented from go- ing to occupy their seats at Port-au-Prince, whom they pre- vented even from sitting at Gonaives after having called them there, and whose absence they invoked however to charge with nullification the acts of the constituents congregated in the capital. General F. De Legitime entrusted with the care of pro- viding for all the necessities of the situation, put himself res- olutely at work. The progress of the counter-revolution was immediately stopped by unity of action and quick measures. An army was first sent before Jacmel. It entered that city almost without any struggle on the 1st of November, with the very consent of the population, which feared Merisier. The latter had time to send to the North four constituents of the Jacmel arrondissement, and a delegation of citizens, but the American steamer Haytien BepuMie, aboard of which they were, was captured and taken to Port-au-Prince. The constituents of the arrondissement of Jacmel, and one from Cape Haytien, together with the delegates who were on board demanded to be landed, and they then rallied to the Government as constituted in the Capital. Their adhesion had so much more significance as it resulted from intimidation, for they could have easily left Port-an-Prince and go to the North, but they never thought of doing so. The adjunction of these five constituents, the arrival at Port-au-Prince of other constituents from Southern cities, and three complementary elections, furnished forty-seven members to the National Constituant Assembly. That .was more than an absolute majority, being one more than one-half of the legal number of the eighty-four constituents. The — 11 — dissement de Jacmel, et une delegation de citoyens, mais le vapeur americain VHaytian-Rej?ublic,%uv lequel ils etaient embarques fut capture et conduit an Port-au-Prince. Les constituants de l'arron dissement de Jacmel, un constituant du Cap Ha'itien et les autres delegues qui etaient a Lord, demanderent eux-meme a debarquer et a se rallier au gouver- nement constitue a la Capitale. Leur adhesion est d'autant plus significative qu'elle n'a pas ete le resultat de l'intimidation et que, pouvant facilement se sauver de Port-au-Prince et aller dans le N ord, ils n'ont jamais songe a le faire. L'adjonction de ces cinq constituants, l'arrivee au-Port- Prince d'autres constituants des villes du Sud et trois elections complementaires donnerent 47 membres a l'Assemblee natio- nale constituante. Cetait plus que la majorite absolue, la rnoitie plus un du nombre legal des constituants qui est de 84. L'Assemblee avait ainsi atteint et meme depasse le quorum determine par les constitutions ou les us et coutumes de presque tous les peuples civilises. N'etant liee par aucune cons- titution, elue precisement pour en elaborer une, elle pouvait adopter ce quorum avec d'autant plus de raison et de force que nos precedents parlementaires l'y autorisaient egalement. En effet, de 1806 a 1867, toutes les assemblies deliberantes ont legifere avec le quorum d'Ha'iti la moitie plus un du nombre legal des legislateurs. Le quorum des deux tiers si souvent invoque, mais a tort, avait ete introduit pour la pre- miere fois dans la Constitution de 1843, qui ne fut pas mise en ceuvre; il reparut a partirde 1867 dans la Constitution d'alors et dans les deux suivantes (74 et 79), mais pour etre la source de toutes sortes de difficultes et de graves conflits. Cependant, avant d'elaborer la nouvelle constitution et de proceder ensuite a l'election du chef de TEtat, l'Assemblee nationale consti- tuante chargea le Gen. F. D. Legitime de tenter aupres des — 12 — Assembly, thus, had obtained, and over, the quorum required by the constitution and the customs of nearly all civilized countries. Not being bound by any constitution, but having been elected solely for the purpose of framing one, the Assem bly could fix its quorum with so much more reason and force since our parliamentary precedents also authorized the Assem- bly to do as it did. In fact, from 1806 up to 1867, all deliberating assemblies in Hayti, did legislate with the quorum of one more than half of the legal members of the legislature. The two-thirds quorum which is so often invoked, but wrongly, was introduced for the first time in the constitution of 1843, which was never inforced; it again appeared from 1867 in the constitution of that time and in the two following 1874- '79, but only to be the source of all kinds of difficulties and grave conflicts. However, before elaborating the new con- stitution and proceeding afterwards to the election of the chief of State, the National Constituent Assembly requested General F. De Legitime to enter into negotiations with the counter-re- volutionists of the North, one of the results of which should have been that the minority of the so-called dissident consti- tuents would have participated to work required by their mandate. But every attempt failed on account of the intransigeance of the leader of the counter-revolution. They went so far as to decline to listen to the propositions carried to them ; and they did not make any other. * And later, in the way of de- * Doctor Nemours Auguste, the agent of the counter revolutionists in New York, says however in a communication to Mr. Bayard-, which we copy from the Record of Diplomatic Documents, submitted to the 50th Congress of the United States, 2d Session : " We have accepted that " the election (of a President of Hayti) be held in any city of the Republic, " of Hayti, provided it be not in the city of Port-au-Prince. We accept " also that the city chosen be one of those submitted to the power of — 12 — contre-revolutionn aires du Nord une d-marche dont l'uii des resultats eut ete que la minorite de constituants, pretendus dissidents, iraierit prendre part aux travaux que leur impose leur mandat. Mais tout echoua devant l'intransigeance des chefs de la con tre-re volution. Us ne voulurent pas raeme ecouter les propositions qu'on leur apportait et ils n'en firent aucune. * Et plus tard comme une sorte de deti jete a 1' As- sembled Rationale, ils renoncerent a parler au nom de la Republique et afficherent la pretention de former un Etat Septentrional d'Haiti, manifestant cette fois ouvertement leur intention separatists L'Assemblee nationale constituante, convaincue que les chefs de la contre-re volution vont a l'encontre des sentiments des populations qu'ils retiennent encore sous leur dominations et forte de son droit de parler et d'agir au nom de la majorite du peuple harden, resolnt de ne plus diflerer le vote de la * Le Dr. Nemours Auguste, agent des contre-revolutionnaires a New-York, dit cependant dans une note a Mr. Bayard, extraite du recueil des documents diplomatiques soumis au 50^ me Congres des Etats-Unis geme Session : « Nous avons accepte que l'election (d'un president d'Haiti) se tienne b dans une ville quelconque de la Republique, pourvu que ce ne soit pas » a Port-au-Prince. Nous acceptons aussi que la ville choisie, soit une de » celles soumises au pouvoir du Gen. Legitime. Le parti au pouvoir a b Port-au-Prince refuse d'accepter ces conditions.* Les contre-revolutionnaires, en prenant les armes, ont demande peremptoirement que le Gen. T. D. Legitime s'effagat, c'est-a-dire renoncat a sa candidature a la presidence, et cela, avant m^me qu'il fut investi de la presidence provisoire sous le titre de Chef du Pouvoir Exe- cutif. Les propositions dont parle le Dr. Nemours Auguste ont ete pensees dans son imagination pour les besoins de la cause : elles n'ont jamais ete faites ni consignees dans aucun document quelconque. Les journaux des contre-revolutionnaires ne les ont jamais reproduites. — 13 — fying the National Assembly, they declined to speak in the name of the Republic, and pretended to form the Northern State of Hayti, showing this time openly their secessionist intentions. The National Constituant Assembly, being convinced that the leaders of the counter-revolution were acting against the sentiments of the population, which they still kept under their domination, and leaning upon its right to speak and act in the name of the majority of the Haytian people, resolved not to delay any longer the voting of the Constitution and the election of the President of the Republic. The Consti- tution was therefore finally voted, and General F. D. Legitime was elected President of the Republic on the 16th of Decem- ber, 1888. It is useless to remark that in case the 84 constituents had assembled in the Capital, General F. D. Legitime would have been, just as well the triumphant candidate, since he ob- tained 44 votes. II. The National Constituant Assembly and the president elected on the 16th of December have the right on their side evidently, and facts are sanctioning that right. The consti- tutional majority, as it is easy to prove, is the representation " General Legitime. The party in power at Port-au-Prince refuses to " accept these conditions." The counter-revolutionists, on their rising, have peremptorily demanded that General F. D. Legitime should with- draw his candidature to the presidency; and that was demanded even before he was put in charge of the provisional presidency under the title of chief of the executive power. The propositions mentioned by Doctor Nemours Auguste are the product of his imagination, and in- vented for the wants of his cause ; they were never made any more than reported in any document. The newspaper of the counter-revolutionists have never published them. — 13 — Constitution et P election du President de la Republique. La Constitution fut done definitivement votee et le Gen. F. D. Legitime em President de laJRepublique, le 16 decembre 1888. II n'est pas inutile de faire ressortir que les 85 consti- tuants, fussent-ils reunis a la Capitale, le Gen. F. D. Legitime n'eut pas moins ete le candidat triomphant, puisqu'il a obteuu 44 suffrages. II. Le droit est incontestablement du cote de l'Assemblee nationale cpnstituante et de l'elu du 16 decembre, et les faits viennent apporter leur sanction au droit. La majorite consti- tutionnelle est, ainsi qu'il est facile de s'en convaincre, la repre- sentation reelle, visible et tangible de la majorite du peuple ha'itien. Les contre-revolutionn aires du Nord ont avance que trois departements sur cinq, ceux du Nord, du Nord-Ouest et de l'Artibonite,etant tombes sous leur autorite,lestrois-cinquiemes du pays protestent avec eux contre le Gouvernement etabli dans les deux departements de l'Ouest et du Sud. Le departement en Haiti n'est pas une personne morale ayant des organes constitues comme le departement en France ; ce n'est pas non plus une division administrative et judicial re comme le canton ; e'est une simple denomination geographique qui n'a pas meme le merite d'etre juste, car le departement de l'Ouest comprend les arrondissements du Mirebalais et de Las Cahobas, qui pourraient bien former comme les deux arron- dissements du Nord-Ouest un departement du Nord-Est. Du reste ce qu'il faut plutot considerer e'estretendue de territoire, la population et la force productive des departements ocenpes par le gouvernement constitutional et la contre-revolution. — 14 — real, visible, tangible, of the majority of the Haytian people. The counter-revolutionists of the North have alleged that three departments out of five, those of the North, North- West and Artibonite, having fallen under their domination, three-fifths of the country were protesting with them against the government established in the two departments of the West and the South. The department in Hayti is not an entity, possessing con- stituted organs like French departments ; it is not either an ad- ministrative and judicial division like a Canton ; it is a simple, geographical denomination which has not even the merit of being correct ; for the department of the West comprises the arrondissement of Mirebalais and of Las Cahobas, which could form easily, like the two arrondissements of the north-west, a department of the north-east. Moreover, what should be consid- e red above all, is the extent of territory and the productive cap- acity of the departments occupied by the constitutional govern- ment and by the counter-revolution. From the stand- point of acreage, the North, the North- West and the Artibonite cover a territory not quite so extensive as the South and the West, which touches the Dominican border on the East by the ar- rondissements of Mirebalais and Las Cahobas. From the stand-point of population, the inferiority of the three so-called departments is still further demonstrated. It is shown by the statistical information of the Church registers of Hayti. From the stand-point of the productive capacity, we have no statistics to rely upon to ascertain it ; the only way to arrive at it is through the customs revenue, which consist almost entirely in duties levied upon importations as well as exportations. According to the budget report of the year '85-'86, which comprises the interim from " October 1st '85 to — 14 — All point de vue de la superficie, le Nord, le ISTord-Ouest et l'Artibonite occupent un peu moins de territoire que le Sud et l'Ouest qui touclie a la frontiere dominicaine a l'Est, par ies arrondissements du Mirebalais et de Las Cahobas. Au point de vue de la population, l'inferiorite des soi- disant trois departements est encore etablie. Elle ressort des seules donnees statistiques que l'on possede et qui sont four- nies par le bulletin religieux d'Ha'iti. Au point de vue de la force productive, le seul moyen de la calculer, a defaut d'une statistique de la production, c'est de savoir quel est le rendement des i m pots qui consistent, a peu de chose pres, en droits de douane assistant a l'importa- tionqu'a l'exportation. Or, voici pour l'exercice budgetaire de l'annee 1885-1886 (du ler octobre 1885 au 30 septem- bre 1886) des chiffres tires du rapport officiel de la Chambre des Comptes : Les departements du Nord, du Nord-Est et de l'Artibonite figurent pour : Droits percus $1,977,329 40 Les departements du Sud et de l'Ouest figu- rent pour : Droits percus 3,114,082 46 D'oii, en faveur du Sud et de l'Ouest, une difference de 1,136,753 00 Le Journal Officiel, dans ses numeros des 9 et 28 fevrier 1889, vient de publier le rendement de deux trimestres de l'exercice 1887-1888, des- quels on peut tirer des indications encore plus interessantes. Ainsi le deuxieme trimestre, du ler Janvier au 31 mars 1888, presente les chiffres suivants : Droits d'importation dans toute la Republique . 1,167,653 33 — 15 — September 30th, '86 » the official figures of the Chamber of Accounts were as follows: Duties collected in all the Republic . . $ 5,091,411 08 The Department of the North, of the North- East and Artibonite amount in collected duties. . . ... . . . 1,977,329 47 The Department of the South and West, amount in collected duties ... . 3,144,089 49 Therefore in favor of the South and "West a dif- ference of 1,136,753 09 The Journal Officiel in its numbers of the 9th and 28th of February, 1889, has just pub- lished a full account of the two quarters in the year '87-'88, from which one can draw indications still more interesting. Thus the second quarter, from January 1st, up to March 31st, 1888, shows the following figures : Duties on importation collected in all the Re- public 1,167,653 33 Analyzed as follows : The seven financial arrondissement of the West and South (Port-au-Prince, Cayes, Jacmel, Jeremie, Petit Goave, Aquin, Miragoane :) 742,344 24 The four financial arrondissements of the North, North-West and the Artibonite (Cape Hay- tien, Port-de-Paix, Gonaives, St. Marc :) . 425,289 43 Duties of exportation in total .... 1,248,676 71 Analized as follows: The seven financial arrondissments of the West and South 777,901 79 The four financial arrondissements of the North, North-West and the Artibonite . . . 470,774 98 THIRD QUARTER. (April, May, June, 1888.) Importation in total. 1,123,386 15 — 15 — Decompose comme suit : Xes sept arrondissements financiers de l'Ouest et du Sud (Port-au-Prince, Cayes, Jacinel, Je- rennie, Petit-Goave, Aquin, Miragoane) . $742,344 24 Les quatre arrondissements financiers du Nord, du Nord-Ouest et de l'Artibonite (Cap-Hai- tien, Port-de-Paix, Gonaives, St. Marc) . 425,289 43 Droits d'exportation, en total, . . . 1,248,676 71 Decomposes comme suit : Les sept arrondissements financiers de l'Ouest etduSud 777,901 79 Les quatre du Nord, du Nord-Ouest et de l'Arti- bonite 470,774 98 3me trimestre (avril, mai, juin 1888). Importation, en total 1,123,386 15 Decompose comme suit : Les sept arrondissements financiers de l'Ouest et du Sud 756,438 33 Les quatre arrondissements financiers du Nord, du Nord-Ouest et de l'Artibonite . . 366,947 82 Exportation, en total . . . - . . 874,875 30 Decompose comme suit : Les sept arrondissements financiers de l'Ouest et du Sud 510,729 21 Les quatre du Kord, du Nord-Ouest et de l'Arti- bonite 364,156 09 D'ou. une proportion environ de f pour le Nord, le JSTord-Ouest et l'Artibonite, et de f pour l'Ouest et pour le Sud. . La meme proportion se fait voir dans le commerce d'importation d'Haiti avec les Etats- Unis. — 16 — Analyzed as follows : The 7 financial arrondissements of the West and the South $ 756,438 33 The 4 financial arrondissements of the North, Northwest and the Artibonite ... . 366,947 82 Total in Exportation 874,875 30 Analyzed as follows : The 7 financial arrondissements of the West and the South 510,729 21 The 4 of the North, Northwest and Artibonite, 364,146 09 Hence a proportion of about f for the North, Northwest and the Artibonite, and of f for the West and the South. The same pro- portion is maintained in the importation trade of Hayti with the United States. The West and the South imported during the two quarters, merchandise, aggregating . 1,676,361 74 The North, Northwest and Artibonite . . 854,622 88 In order to complete that information, it can be added that, notwithstanding the civil war, the West and the South continue to be the only ones to pay the internal and external public debt ; and that such a heavy load did not incline the government of F. D. Legitime to have recourse to issuing paper money, whilst the North has already issued a paper ' money, which has lost, as soon as it made its appearance, 40 per cent, on its face value. All these facts combined therefore in demonstrating — from the three fold stand-point, political, economical and financial — the superiority of the West and the South, over the North, Northwest and the Artibonite. And yet, in the comparison just made between the producing capacity 'and the resources of these two sections of the country, no account has been taken of the territory lost by the counter-revolutionists of the North, since — 16 — L'Ouest et le Sud out importe pour les 2 trimestres, des marchandises s'elevant a . $ 1,676,361 74 # Le Nord, le Nord-Ouest et l'Artibonite . 854,622 88 On peut ajouter, pour completer ces reuseignements, que malgre la guerre civile, l'Ouest et le Sud continuent a payer seuls la dette publique interieure et exterieure et que de si fortes charges n'out pas porte le gouvernement du Gen. P. D. Legitime a recourir a des emissions de papier-monnaie, tandis que le Nord a deja emis un papier-monnaie qui a perdu, des son apparition, 40 pour cent de sa valeur. Tous ces faits concourent done a demontrer la superiorite, au triple point de vu.e politique, economique et financier, de l'Ouest et du Sud sur le Nord, le ISTord-Ouest et l'Artibonite. Et cependant dans les comparaisons qui viennent d'etre f aites des forces et des ressources de ces deux portions du pays, il n'a pas ete tenu compte du territoire perdu par les contre-revo- lutionnaires depuis que les armees du Gouvernement Constitu- tionnel ont penetre dans le ISTord et l'Artibonite. Une simple enumeration des succes obtenus suffira a eclairer ce point. Dans l'Artibonite les troupes du Gouvernement occupent la commune de la Grande Saline, a 1'embouchiire de l'Artibonite et les communes de Dessalines, de Petite Riviere et Verrettes, dans l'interieur de la plaine de meme nom dont elles sont entierement maitresses, ce qui coupe les communicatious de la place forte de St. Marc avec Gonai'ves et le Nord. La ville des Gona'ives elle-meme est investie. Dans le Kord les communes de St. Michel, Hi n eke, la Marmelade, St. Eaphael (arrondissement de la Marmelade) Yalliere, Ste. Suzanne, le Trou (arrondissement du Nord), sont egalement occupees. Par la prise du Trou, Fort Liberte est menace. L'impuis- — 17 — the armies of the constitutional government have penetrated into the North and the Artibonite. A simple enumeration of the success obtained, will suffice in enlightening this point. In the Artibonite the government's troops occupy the township of La Grande Saline at the mouth of the Artibonite River, and the townships of Dessalines, Petite Riviere and Verrettes, in the interior of the plain of the same name, which they are entirely masters of, thus cut- ting the communications between the fortified city of St. Marc; Gonaives and the North. The town of Gonaives itself, is invested. In the North the township of St. Michel, Hinche, La Marmelade, St. Raphael (arrondissement de la Marmelade), Valliere, Ste. Suzanne, Le Trou (arrondissement of the Trou, are also occupied. By the taking of the Trou, Fort Liberte find itself threatened. The inability of the counter-revolution in defending and keeping all the territory which it possessed, the defeats which it has experienced, while proving the valor of the armies of the constitutional Government and the strength of the con- victions which animate them, demonstrates still better to what a degree this civil war is opposed to the sentiments of the citizens in the great majority of the insurgent localities. They hate the scission which is now the ostensible aim of the leaders of the counter-revolution ; and they display their disapproval and their repugnance, by refusing their support to a criminal and anti-patriotic cause. So it is that Valliere and Ste. Suzanne had risen against the Cape even before the troops of the Government had penetrated into the North. — 17 — sance de la contre-revolution a defendre et a garder tout le territoire qu'elle possedait, les revers qu'elle a essuyes, s'ils attestent la valeur des arrnees du Gouvernement Constitu- tionnel et la force de conviction qui les anime, attestent encore davantage combien cette guerre civile est contraire aux sentiments des citoyens de la tres grande majorite des localites insurgees. lis abhorrent la scission qui est maintenant le but ostensible des chefs de la contre-revolution, et ils mani- festent leur disapprobation et leur repugnance en refusant leur concours a une cause criminelle et anti-patriotique. C'est ainsi que Valliere et Ste. Suzanne s'etaient soulevees contre le Cap avant meme que les troupes du Gouvernement eussent penetre dans le Nord. III. La contre-revolution qui ne trouve plus aucun secours ni aucun encouragement a l'interieur, ne se soutient plus que par les secours et les encouragements prodigues de l'exterieur. On n'aura fait par la que prolonger une lutte inutile et retarder de quelque temps encore une chute inevitable, mais on aura eu le triste privilege d'avoir contribue a desoler un pays deja eprouve et a rendre plus aigiies les souffrances d'un jeune peuple qui ne s'est jamais lasse de hitter pour maintenir son unite et son independance. II n'est pas indifferent a la Republique des Etats-Unis que les sentiments du peuple ha'itien lui soieut parfaitement connus. Le Gouvernement qui les represente a la bonne foi de ne pas s'en cacher et d'affirmer son vrai caractere sans forfan- terie et sans faiblesse, devant la justice du Gouvernement et du peuple des Etats-Unis. Dans le monde politique comme dans le grand public americain, on ne manquera pas d'apprecier une franchise — 18 — III. The counter-revolutions which does not find any longer any assistance or encouragement in the interior, is only support- ed by the help and the encouragement so prodigally sent from the exterior. This will result only in prolongating a useless strug- gle, and delay yet for sometime an unavoidable fall ; thus for- eign contributors may enjoy the satisfaction of aiding to the desolation of a country already so sorely tried, and in rendering more acute the sufferings of a young people that never become tired of fighting for the maintenance of its unity and its inde- pendence. The Eepublic of the United States cannot afford to be misinformed as to the sentiments of the Haytian people. The Government represents the latter, in and good faith, and without boasting and without flinching, asserts its true charac- ter before the justice of the Government and of the people of the United States. Political circles as well as in the great American public will not fail to appreciate a frankness which rests upon the conviction that the Republic of the United States has been since the presidency of the lamented Abraham Lincoln, the sympathetic and benevolent friend of Hayti. The Govern- ment of the United States will feel perhaps disposed to exam- ine whether the moment has not arrived to adopt a policy in accordance with the facts herein presented in their true light. It was for such a reason that, not ignoring their duties as to neutrality, but, on the contrary, fulfilling them in accordance with international right and the mutual respect which States owe each other, several foreign powers have not hesitated to recognize the Government of General F. D. Legitime, the immediate consequence of such a step went far to dissuade their respective citizens from giving encouragment to the counter-revolution. 18 qui repose sur cette conviction que la Republique des Etats- Unis a ete, depuis la presidence du regrette Abraham Lincoln, l'ami sympathique et bienveillant d'Haiti ; et peut-etre alors le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis sera-t-il dispose a exami- ner si le moment n'est pas arrive pour lui d'adopter une politique en accord avec les faits qui sont ici exposes et etablis dans leur vrai sens. C'est ainsi que, sans manquer aux devoirs de la neutralite, au contraire en les remplissant d'une facpn conforme au droit international et au respect mutuel que se doivent les Etats, d'autres puissances etrangeres n'ont pas hesite a reconnaitre le Gouvernment du Gen. F. D. Legitime, et k entretenir avec lui des relations de bonne amitie dont la consequence immediate a ete d'empecher leurs nationaux d'encourager la contre-re volution. La reconnaissance formelle du Gouvernment du Gen. Legitime par le Gouvernment federal produirait les memes salutaires effets en Haiti comme aux Etats-Unis ; elle serait, du reste, conforme aux traditions juridiques du peuple americain qui a toujours professe le principe de l'obeissance de la minorite a la majorite et n'a jamais souffert qu'on ebranlat l'autorite attribute aux decisions souveraines des assemblies legislatives. Mais ce n'est pas seulement le droit, la justice et requite qui reclament la reconnaissance du gouvernement du Gen. F. D. Legitime, l'interet bien entendu du peuple des Etats-Unis j con vie egalement le gouvernement federal. Haiti fait, avec le peuple des Etats-Unis, un commerce important qui est de plus de 60 pour cent, du commerce general qu'elle fait avec l'etranger. Elle s'appauvrit par la guerre civile qui diminue sa production, partant sa consommation, outre que la vente des articles de contrebande de guerre se substitue en grande partie a celle des prodnits industriels et 19 — The formal recognition of the Government of General Legitime by the Federal Government would bring beneficent effects in the United States as well as in Hayti. Moreover it would be in conformity with the judicial traditions of the American people, which always advocated the principle of the obedience of the minority to the majority, and which never suffered that the authority attributed to the sovereign deci- sions of legislative assemblies should be shaken up. But right, justice and equity are not alone demanding the recognition of the Government of General F. D. Legitime ; the Federal Government is invited to take the step by a sound comprehension of the interest of the people of the United States. Hayti has with the people of the United States an im- portant trade which amounts to more than 50 per cent, of her general commerce with all foreign countries. She becomes im- poverished by the civil war which diminishes her production and consequently her consumption without taking into account the fact that the sale of war contraband articles is substituted on a large scale to that of industrial and agricultural products. It would be useless to demonstrate that agriculture and in- dustry in the United States, through the multiplicity of ex- changes with Hayti, derive from them a larger and especially more honest profit than that acquired by the trade in war contraband articles, which is the only motive of the sympathies shown by some foreigners to the counter-revolution. It is also proper to consider — and this is demonstrated by the records of the Custom House — that the West and South, on account of their seven ports, have with the United States a larger trade than the North, North- West and Artibonite, and that commercial questions of a somewhat complicated and delicate character may occur, which an official recognition of — 19 — agricoles. II n'est pas besoin de demontrer que l'agriculture et l'industrie des Etats-Unis, par la niultiplicite des echanges avec Haiti, en tirent des profits plus considerables, surtout plus honnetes, que ceux que rapporte le commerce de la contre- bande de guerre qui est la seule raison des sympathies de quelques etrangers pour la contre-re volution. II faut encore considerer, ce qui est demontre par le tableau des droits de douane, que l'Ouest et le Sud ont, par leurs sept ports, un commerce plus etendu avec les Etats-Unis que le Nord, le Nord-Ouest et l'Artibonite, et qu'il en surgit souvent des questions commerciales, parfois dedicates et com- plexes, que la reconnaissance officielle du gouvernement du Gen. Legitime permettrait seule de resoudre a la commune satisfaction des deux Republiques. Le gouvernement du Gen. F. D. Legitime n'a eprouve aucun embarras a declarer qu'il n'a promis a aucune puissance quelconque la cession d'une partie, si minime qu'elle soit, du territoire national, et qu'il repousse, en outre, toute idee de protectorat. Les adresses qui arrivent a la capitale des com- munes de la Republique et qui sont reproduces dans le Journal Officiel, prouvent combien, sur ces deux points, le gouverne- ment est en parfaite communion d'idees avec le peuple harden. Dans les circonstances actuelles, la declaration du gouverne- ment et du peuple d'Haiti aura toute l'attention et meme 1' ap- probation du gouvernement federal, car elle repond suffisaru- ment aux legitimes preoccupations de la politique exterieure des Etats-Unis, laquelle vise constamment a preserver de toute atteinte l'independance des republiques du nouveau monde. IY. L'examen impartial des faits ci-dessus relates et expliques conduit sans effort a cette premiere conclusion que les contre- — 20 — the Government of General Legitime solve to the mutual satis- faction of the two Republics. The government of General F. D. Legitime does not hesi- tate to declare that no promise has been made to any power for the cession of any portion — no matter how small — of the national territory ; and he also disproves any idea of a protec- torate. The addresses sent to the Capital, from the towns of of the Republic, published in the Journal Officiel, show how truly the government is in perfect accord with the Haytian people on those two points. Under the circumstances, such a declaration by the government and the people of Hayti, is deserving of the attention and even of the approbation of the United States Government ; because such a declaration should be a satisfactory answer to the legitimate preoccupations of the State Department of the United States, ever jealous to pre- serve the independence of the republics of the New World. IV. An impartial examination of the facts above related and explained, leads forcibly to a first conclusion, namely : that the Northern counter-revolutionists have not established even de facto, a situation calculated to allow the recognition of their belligerency, much less of the Northern State they allege to have formed. In regard to this we may be permitted to invoke the principles professed in many circumstances by the Republic of the United States, notably when she had to decide upon the recognition of the independence of the Spanish- American Republics from 1818 to 1835, and that of Texas in 1838. The question of the recognition of the Spanish colonies — 20 — revolutionnaires du Nord n'ont pu eonstituer, meme de facto, tin ordre de choses qui permette la reconnaissance de leur bel- ligerance, encore moins de l'Etat septentrional qu'ils ont pro- clam e. A cet egard il est permis d'invoquer les principes pro- fesses par la Republique des Etats-TInis, notamment quand il fut question, pour elle, de l'independance des republiques his- pano-americaines de 1818 a 1835, et celle du Texas en 1838. La question de la reconnaissance des colonies espagnoles de l'Amerique du Sud, introduite au Congres en 1818 par M. Clay, ne recut une solution favorable qu'en 1831, devant l'im- puissance de l'Espagne a ressaisir ces colonies et apres qu'on avait eu la preuve que leur situation de fait presentait une certaine stabilite leur permettant de remplir les obligations et d'exercer les droits des Etats libres. Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis usa des memes precautions et de la meme prudence en 1838 relativement au Texas. Et a ce propos, avec une sa- gesse qu'on ne saurait trop admirer, le President Jackson for- mula encore une fois les principes internationaux qu'on est heureux dans toutes ces circonstances — assurement fort dedicates — de retrouver a la base de la politique exterieure du peuple Amencain ; il rappeJa que la reconnaissance de l'independance d'un etat nouveau, qui avait droit de figurer dans la grande famille des nations, avait toujours ete une question delicate impliquant une grave responsabilite, mais que cette responsabilite etait plus grave encore lorsqu'il s'agi?. sait d'un etat qui avait fait jpartie integrante d'wn autre Hat dont il s' etait separe violemment. Ces vues ainsi exprimees viennent renforcer toutes les parties de cet expose ou sont combattues les pretentions des contre-revolutionnaiies d'Uaiti, 21 of South America, introduced into Congress in 1818 by Mr. Clay, did not receive a favorable solution, but in 1832, only after demonstration had been made that Spain was powerless for recapturing those colonies, and that their situation de facto offered a certain amount of stability, allowing them to fulfill the obligations and exercise the rights of free states. The United States government employed similar precautions and prudence in 1838, in regard to Texas. And, d propos of that, let us say that President Jackson, with a wisdom never too much admired, formulated once more the international principles, which are fortunately to be found, under all those circumstances — certainly of a very delicate nature — at the basis of the foreign policy of the American people. He re- called that the recognition of the independence of a new State, entitled to figure in the great family of nations, had ever been a delicate question, implicating grave responsibilities; but that these latter were still graver, when the question related to a State having heen an integrant portion of another State, from which it had violently seceded. These views, so well expressed, strengthen every part of this expose, in which the pretenses of the counter-revolutionists of Hayti, are fought against. And yet, their case is still more precarious and con- sequently less worthy of attention, from all points of view, than was the case of the States just alluded to. It might be possible, through greatly exaggerating the power of the Haytian secessionists, to establish some analogy between their situation and that of the Southern Confederates, during the war of Secession, from 1801 to 1864. The Republic of the United States has, then and there, again asserted and energetically supported principles of international right, the benefit of which General Legitime would be entitled to claim in his favor. — 21 — dont le cas est certainement plus precaire et par consequent moins digne d'attention, a tous les points de vue, que ceux des etats auxquels il vient d'etre fait allusion. Peut-etre pourrait-on, en exagerant de beaucoup la puis- sance des separatistes hardens, etablir quelque analogie entre leur situation et celle des confederes du Sud lors de la guerre de secession, de 1861 a 1864. Ici encore la Republique des Etats-Unis a affirm e et energiquement soutenu des principes de droit international dont le gouvernement du Gen. Legitime serait f onde a reclamer le benefice. Une autre conclusion qui se degage non moins rigou- reusement des memes faits, qu'on retrouve presque a chaque page de cet opuscule et qui est, du reste, avec la premiere conclusion, dans une etroite connexion, c'est que le gouverne- ment du Gen. F. D. Legitime reunit toutes les conditions requises, de jure et de facto, pour sa reconnaissance officielle par toutes les puissances etrangeres. Le gouvernement de M. Harrison, qui tient a cceur de reparer les injustices ou les erreurs du gouvernement de M. Cleveland, reconnaitra sans hesitation le gouvernement du Gen. F. D. Legitime, car ce chef d'Etat haitien represente, en Haiti, le principe de l'Unite Nationale comme le regrette Abraham Lincoln representa, aux Etats-Unis, le principe de l'Union, du maintien du pacte federal. Quoiqu'il puisse advenir, le peuple haitien est dispose a prodiguer son sang et ses ressources pour maintenir cette Unite a l'exemple du peuple des Etats-Unis qui ne recula devant aucun sacrifice d'hommes et d'argent pour maintenir l'Union. Le gouverne- ment voudra bien apprecier et encourager, dans le peuple haitien, ce qui a fait la force du parti republicain et la gloire du peuple des Etats-Unis. Un Ami d'Haiti et des Etats-Unis. — 22 — Another conclusion, which results just as vigorously from the same facts, and to be found almost at every page of this work, and which is also intimately connected with the first conclusion, is that the government of General F. D. Legi- time possesses all the required conditions de jure and de facta for its official recognition by all foreign powers. The government of Mr. Harrison, which is heartily anxious to make up for the unjust and erroneous conduct of Mr. Cleveland's administration, will recognize unhesitatingly the government of General F. D. Legitime ; for, that chief of the Haytian State represents in Hayti the principle of national unity, exactly as the lamented Abraham Lincoln re- presented, in the United States, the principle of the Union and the maintenance of the federal covenant. "Whatever happens, the Haytian people are determined to shed their blood and exhaust their resources in order to maintain their unity, thus taking example from the people of the United States, who were not deterred by any sacrifices of men and money, from maintaining the Union. The administration of Mr. Harrison will certainly appreciate and encourage, in the Haytian people, those principles and aspirations which have made the strength and redounded to the glory of the people of the United States. A Friend of Hayti and the United States. LIBRARY OF CUNUHtsa 015 813 421 4 •