Rook vR 1^ 
 
MILITxlRY HISTORY 
 
 OF 
 
 ULYSSES S. GRANT 
 
 FROM APRIL, 1801, TO APRIL, 1865. 
 
 BY 
 
 ADAM BADEAU, 
 
 BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMS' 
 
 LATE MILITARY SECRETAKT.AND AIDE-DE-CAMP 
 
 TO THE OENEKAL-IN-CHIEF. 
 
 Polchrum est benefacere reipublicae,— Sallust. 
 
 VOLUME L 
 
 D. APPLETONi 
 
 1, 3, and 
 
 
 ^D STREET. 
 
 M 
 
EvTEREP, accortling to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by 
 
 ADAM BADEAU, 
 
 Id the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of the United States for the District 
 
 of Columbia. 
 
 By TraBsfsf 
 JA 12 »^*» 
 
PREFACE TO VOLUME I. 
 
 The fact that I became a member of General 
 Grant's personal staff, before he assumed command 
 of the armies of the United States, and tliat I have 
 since remained witli him, is tlie voucher that I oifer 
 for the correctness of tliis history. I have not meant 
 to state one fact, unless it came under my own per- 
 sonal observation, or has been told me by the gen- 
 eral of the aiTQv, or one of his important officers, 
 or unless I tnow it from official papers. When I 
 deviate from this rule, I make the deviation known. 
 
 The coiTespondence, telegraphic and written, of 
 the headquarters of the armies, is accessible to me. 
 I have also been allowed to examine all papers 
 under the control of the War Department ; and, as 
 many of the rebel archives are now in the posses- 
 sion of the government, I have seen the original 
 reports made by the rebel generals, of every l)attle 
 but two, which I have attempted to describe. 
 
 \ ^ -^ & 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 Those two are Corinth and luka, at neither of 
 wliich General Grant was present in person. The 
 orio-inal rebel field returns have also been closely 
 examined by me. No statement of rebel movements 
 or stren<-'t]i is made in this volume, unless taken 
 from these sources ; or, if otherwise, the source is 
 named. 
 
 Generals Sherman, Shei'idan, Ord, and Wilson, 
 and the officers of General Grant's staff, as well as 
 Admiral Porter, have afforded me much valuable 
 information, and given me all the assistance in 
 tlieir power, that I have desired. The Honorable 
 Edwin M Stanton has also furnished me with in- 
 formation which I could not otherwise have ob- 
 tained. 
 
 The present volume brings my narrative down 
 to the period when General Grant was made Lieuten- 
 ant-General, and assumed command of all the nation- 
 al armies. It refers to scenes and events, many of 
 which I did not personally witness, as I first reported 
 to him, in person, in February, 1864 His private as 
 Well a^ official correspondence, and daily conversa- 
 tion for years with himself and the officers who ac- 
 companied him in his earlier campaigns, are my prin- 
 cipal autliority. I have his permission now to make 
 known whatever I have learned from these various 
 sources. 
 
 My opinions, however, have not been submitted 
 to General Grant. For them I alone am responsible. 
 But, those opinions are based exclusively on the facts 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 presented to the reader, and, unless supported by 
 the evidence I offer, must fall to the ground. 
 
 I have striven to avoid unnecessary personality, 
 but the occasional danger of this fault has been an 
 insignificant consideration, when compared with the 
 importance of historical truth. In matters of so 
 much importance as those of which I write, there 
 should be no secrecy, when the emergency which 
 demanded secrecy is past . 
 
 Washington, 18G7. 
 
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. 
 
 Introduction, .... ... I 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Birth and parentage of Grant — His name — West Point — His army IHl — The 
 Mexican War — He marries — Leaves the army — Enters the leather trade — 
 Galena — Grant drills a company — Takes it to Springfield — Organizes volunteer 
 troops — Visits Cincinnati to see McClellan — Becomes colonel of Twenty-first 
 Illinois regiment — Marches it to Missouri — Is made brigadier-general of vol- 
 unteers — Takes command of District of Southeast Missouri — Seizes Padu- 
 cah — Sends a force to drive rebels into Arkansas — Makes a demonstration 
 upon Belmont — Demonstration converted into an attack — Battle of Belmont 
 — Grant's success — Enemy reenforccd — Grant cuts his way out — Results of 
 Belmont, ......... 7 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Rebel strategic line from Columbus to Bowling Green — Halleck in command of 
 Department of the Missouri — Gunboats at the West — Demonstration in favor 
 of BucU — Smith reports capture of Fort Henry feasible — Grant visits St. 
 Louis to suggest the operation — Movement against Fort Henry sanctioned by 
 Halleck — Attack by the fleet — Disposition of Grant's forces — Fall of Fort 
 Henry — Grant proposes capture of Fort Donelson — Halleck directs strength- 
 ening of Fort Henry — March to the Cumberland — Position and strength of 
 Fort Donelson — The siege — Unsuccessful attack py the fleet — Assault by 
 rebels on 15th of February — Counter-assault of national forces — Scene at 
 Floyd's headquarters on night of 15th — Escape of Floyd and Pillow — Buck- 
 
 1 ner proposes surrender — The capitulation — Buckner's headquarters — Hal- 
 leck's dispatches after the victory — Results of capture of Fort Donelson, 22 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Grant and Sherman — Beginning of their friendship — Grant goes to Nashville — 
 Is relieved from command by Halleck — Smith placed in charge of expedi- 
 tion up the Tennessee — Grant supplies Smith from Fort Henry — Grant rein- 
 
Vni C0NTE2fTS. 
 
 stated in command — Removes his headquarters to Savanna — Buell ordered 
 to reenforce him — Buell's delay — Skirmishing at Pittsburg Landing — Battlo 
 of Shiloh — Furious attack of rebels — National forces prepared — Grant ar- 
 rives on the field — Sherman's line breaks — Sherman's skill and personal 
 gallantry — Terrible fighting all over the field — National troops everywhere 
 forced back — Grant's anxiety for Nelson and Lewis Wallace's support — 
 Those commanders repeatedly ordered up, but do not arrive — Capture of 
 Prentiss — Buell's arrival in person — His conversation with Grant — Last at- 
 tack of rebels repulsed — Grant at Sherman's front — Situation at close of 
 Sunday — Arrival of Buell's army in the night — Also of Lewis Wallace — At- 
 tack by Grant on Monday — Rebels everywhere repulsed — Grant leads a regi- 
 ment — Rebels ask permission to bury their dead — Results of battle of Shi 
 loh — Reflections, . , . . • • . 67 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Incorrect reports of battle of Shiloh — Halleck assumes command in the field 
 — Disagreeable position of Grant — Siege of Corinth — Evacuation of Cor- 
 inth by rebels — Ineffectual operations of Halleck — Halleck made general- 
 in-chief — ^He offers command of Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen 
 — Allen dechnes it — Grant then placed agam in command — Military situation 
 in September, 1SG2 — Grant's force depleted — Enemy threatening — Price 
 seizes luka — Grant's preparations to fight — Orders to Rosecrans and Ord — 
 Battle of luka — Rosecrans neglects Grant's orders — Rebels escape in conse- 
 quence — Grant's headquarters at Jackson — Rebels threaten Corinth — Strat- 
 egy of Grant — Battle of Corinth — Rebels drive Rosecrans into Corinth — 
 Final victory of Rosecrans — Enemy struck in flank by Ord — Rosecrans docs 
 not follow up his success, although repeatedly ordered by Grant to pursue 
 — He finally obeys — Pursuit inefi'ectual — Return of Rosecrans — Results of 
 luka and Corinth — Rosecrans relieved and promoted — Relations of Grant 
 with other officers — Reflections — Grant suggests movement against Vicks- 
 burg, ........ 99 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Military importance of Mississippi river — Grant proposes movement into inte- 
 rior, against Yicksburg — Campaign begun — McClernand endeavors to obtain 
 command of an expedition against Yicksburg — Grant moves to Holly Springs 
 — Enemy retreats — Rebels desert their fortifications on the Tallahatchie — Co- 
 operative movement from Helena — Grant advances to Oxford — Sherman sent 
 to Memphis — McClernand assigned to command of river expedition by the 
 President — Sherman moves by river against Yicksburg — Grant's communi- 
 cations cut and Holly Springs captured — Grant lives off the country — Re- 
 opens his communications — Sherman's assault on Yicksburg — Repulse of 
 Sherman — McClernand takes command of river expedition — Capture of Ar- 
 kansas Post — Grant falls back to Memphis — Extraordinary behavior of Mc- 
 Clernand — Grant takes command of river expedition — Protest of McCler- 
 nand, . . . • . 122 
 
CONTENTS. IX 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Character of Mississippi vallej' — Position and strength of Vicksburg — Grant's 
 force on taking command of expedition — Problem of the campaign — The 
 Vicksburg canal — Continuous labor for months — Rise in river — Failure of 
 canal — Lake Providence scheme — Difficulties of this route — Abandonment of 
 the plan — Alarm and subsequent derision of rebels — The Yazoo pass — Cir- 
 cuitous route — Obstructions by rebels — Pass finally cleared — Troops enter 
 the pass — Rebel fort at Greenwood — Naval attack unsuccessful — Reijnforce- 
 ments ordered into the pass — Route found impractical)le— Steele's bayou ex- 
 pedition — Remarkable natural difiBcuhies — Sherman and Admiral Porter pro- 
 ceed to Deer creek — Porter gets into danger — Shermaa rescues the fleet — 
 Further and irremovable obstructions — Return of both expeditions to Milli 
 ken's bend — Concentration of Grant's forces — Impatience of the country and 
 government — Efforts to remove Grant — Grant's new plan — Opposition of 
 Sherman and other of Grant's subordinates — Grant inflexible — Movement of 
 Thirteenth corps to New Carthage — Difficulties of route — Trouble with Mc- 
 Clemand — Grierson's raid — Running of Vicksburg batteries — Cooperation of 
 Admiral Porter — Attack on Grand Gulf— Failure to silence batteries — Fur- 
 ther marches of troops — Running of batteries at Grand Gulf— Crossing of 
 Mississippi river by Grant's advance — Demonstration by Sherman against 
 Haine's bluff— Grant's confidence of success, . . . .156 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Preliminary orders for campaign — Passage of Mississippi river — Movement 
 to high land — Battle-field of Port Gibson— McClemand meets the enemy- 
 Battle of Port Gibson— Grant comes on the field in person — Arrival of 
 McPherson's command— Success on the right — ilcPherson's charge— De- 
 feat of rebels— Pursuit until dark — Rebels retreat beyond Port Gibson 
 —Pursuit to Big Black river— Bridges burnt by rebels and rebuilt by 
 Grant — Evacuation of Grand Gulf— New plan of campaign — Reasons for 
 change — Dispatches from Banks — New plan not divulged to Halleck — Efforts 
 to bring up troops and supplies — Demonstrations towards Vicksburg — In- 
 structions to Hurlbut— McPherson advances — Sherman arrives — Correspond- 
 ence with Sherman — Army moves — Position of troops — Grant's habit in 
 planning campaigns — Grant's force at outset of campaign— Headquarters ai 
 Cayuga — More dispatches from Banks — Final dispatches to Halleck — McPher- 
 son ordered to Raymond — Battle of Raymond — Capture of Raymond- 
 Enemy retreat to Jackson — Pemberton deceived by Grant's manoeuvres — 
 Advance of Sherman and McPherson— Pursuit of rebels towards Jack- 
 son — Johnston's arrival at Jackson — Pemberton ordered to attack Grants 
 rear McPherson arrives at Clinton — Battle of Jackson — Position of Mc- 
 Pherson and Sherman — Charge of Crocker's division— Capture of Jackson- 
 Retreat of Johnston towards Canton— Destruction of railroad and stores- 
 Frustration of Johnston's plans— Pemberton again ordered to join Johnston 
 —Grant intercepts Johnston's dispatches— Moves at once towards Bolton- 
 Grant converges while rebels diverge— Pemberton moves to cut Grant's com- 
 
X CONTENTS. 
 
 munications — Receives Johnston's orders and reverses his column — Battle 
 field of Champion's hill — McClemand's advance — Grant's arrival — Hovey'a 
 attack — Battle of Champion's hill — Hovey's success — Enemy masses on 
 Hovey — Grant reenforces Hovey — McClernand repeatedly ordered up, but 
 does not arrive — McPherson outflanks the enemy — Rebels finally driven from 
 the field — McClernand arrives when the battle is over — Reasons for McCler- 
 nand's delay insufficient — Pursuit of the rebels — Rout of the enemy com- 
 plete — Loring cut off — Losses on both sides — Hill of Death — Grant gets in 
 advance of column — Johnston loses a day — Sherman ordered to Bridgeport 
 with pontoon train — McClernand comes up with enemy at Black river bridge 
 — Battle-field of Black river bridge — Gallant charge of Lawler — DemoraUza- 
 tion of rebels — Firing of bridge — Capture of prisoners and cannon — Rapid 
 reconstruction of bridges — Passage of Black river by entire army — Pursuit 
 of the rebels to Yicksburg — Sherman strikes Walnut hills — Investment o^" 
 Vicksburg — Evacuation of Haine's bluff — Results of campaign — Rebel move- 
 ments during campaign — Reflections — Comparison with Italian campaign in 
 1796, . , . . , . . . .203 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Land defences of Vicksburg — Johnston orders Pemberton to evacuate — Pem- 
 berton determines to hold out — Position of Grant's army on 19th of May — 
 Partial and unsuccessful assault — Rebels recover their spirit — National 
 troops rested and supplies brought up — Orders for a general assault on the 
 22d — Reasons for this assault — Mortar bombardment — Heavy cannonade on 
 land front — Sherman assaults with Blair and Steele's divisions — Troops reach 
 the parapet, but are repelled — Ransom's assault — Difficult nature of the 
 ground — Failure of McPherson's attempt — McClemand's assault determined 
 and gallant, but completely repelled — Distmguished bravery of individuals — 
 Failure of assault all along the line — McClemand's dispatches — Grant's re- 
 plies — Renewal of the assault — Second failure — Grant's position during the 
 assault — Renewed dispatches from McClernand — Reenforcemcnts sent to 
 McClernand — Death of Boomer — Results of tlie assault— Comparison with 
 assaults in European wars, ...... 296 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Preparations for the siege— Grant orders troops from Memphis— Ilalleck sends 
 reiJnforccments from the East and West — Lack of siege material — Scarcity 
 of engineer officers— First ground broken 23d of May — Engineer operations 
 — Ingenuity of officers and men — Enemy's defence — Sorties — Wood's ap- 
 proach — Loss of the Cincinnati — Tuttle's approach— Blair's approach— Ran- 
 som's approach — Logan's approach — A. J. Smith's approach — Carr's approach 
 — Hovey's approach — Lauman's approach — Herron's approach — Menacing 
 attitude of Johnston — Correspondence with Banks— Osterhaus sent to the 
 Big Black— Blair sent to the Yazoo— Mower and Kimball sent to Mechanics- 
 burg— Attack on Milliken's bend— Arrival of Herron and Parke— Completion 
 of investment- Fortification of Haine's bluff— Corps of observation— Line 
 
CONTENTS XI 
 
 of counter vallation — Pembcrton prepares for escape — McClcrnand relieved 
 — Condition of garrison — Sufferings of inhabitants — Mine of Jane 25th 
 — Hardships of national troops — Persistency of Grant — Final assault fixed 
 for July 6th — Pemberton proposes surrender — Terms of capitulation — Inter- 
 view between commanders — Surrender of Yicksburg — Treatment of prison- 
 ers — Pemberton's headquarters — Garrison paroled and marched out of 
 Vicksburg — Fall of Port Hudson— Opening of Mississippi river— Sherman 
 sent against Johnston — Johnston retreats to Jackson — Sherman besieges 
 Jackson — Johnston evacuates — Destruction of railroads — Return of Sherman 
 — Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of the President and general- 
 in-chief— Grant made major-general in regular army — Joy of the country — 
 Dismay of rebels, . . . . . • .331 
 
 C HAPTER X. 
 
 Grant recommends Sherman and McPherson for promotion — Characteristics of 
 American soldiers — Army of the Tennessee — Organization of negro troops- 
 Trade with the conquered regions — Grant urges movement against Mobile — 
 Hallcck disapproves — Grant's army broken up — Condition of troops — Feel- 
 in^ of citizens — Thirteenth corps sent to Banks — Grant visits New Orleans — 
 Thrown from his horse — Reenforcements ordered to Rosecrans — A corps sent 
 to Rosecrans— Grant ordered to Cairo— Meets the Secretary of War — Pro- 
 ceeds to Louisville — Placed in command of Military Division of the Missis- 
 sippi, .....-••• 402 
 
 CHAPTER XI, 
 
 Natural features of Chattanooga — Strategical importance — Relations to East 
 Tennessee — Chickamauga campaign — Defeat of Rosecrans — Retreat into 
 Chattanooga — Abandonment of Lookout mountain — Investment of Chatta- 
 nooga — Sufferings of Army of the Cumberland — Hooker sent west to support 
 Rosecrans — Burnside's movement into East Tennessee — DiflBculties of sup- 
 ply- — Grant starts foi Chattanooga — Directions to his three armies — Arrival 
 at Chattanooga — Thomas's magnanimity — Lookout valley — Brown's ferry- 
 Plan of operations to recover Lookout valley — Seizure of Brown's ferry — 
 March of Hooker from Bridgeport — Battle of Wauhatchie — Repulse of reb- 
 els^Lookout valley secured — Communication reopened — Elation of soldiers 
 — Still great difficulties in supply — Sherman's march from Memphis — Long 
 lines of communication — Sherman's magnanimity — Grant hurries Sherman — 
 Alarming situation of Burnside — Anxiety of government — Grant's calmness 
 — Longstreet moves against Buraside — Grant's counter-plan — Dispatches of 
 Grant to Halleck and Burnside — Thomas ordered to attack Bragg — Thomas 
 not read}' — Movement postponed till Sherman's arrival — Great anxiety about 
 Burnside — Road from Nashville to Decatur opened— Supplies ordered to 
 Burnside by Cumberland river — Difficulties of Sherman's route — Critical 
 condition of Grant's armies — Extent of his operations— Halleck still anxious 
 about Burnside — Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding out — 
 
XU CONTENTS. 
 
 Confidence of Burnside — Arrival of Sherman at Bridgeport — Reconnois- 
 sance by Grant, Sherman, and Thomas — Orders issued for battle of Chatta- 
 nooga, ...... . . 426 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Reconnoissances — Orders for battle of Chattanooga — Anxiety of government 
 for Burnside — Difficulties and delays of Slierman — Battle-field of Chatta- 
 nooga — Movement of Granger and Palmer — Capture of Orchard knoU — Ad- 
 vance of Thomas's line — Preparations for bridging the Tennessee — Arrival 
 of Sherman at North Chickamaaga — Seizure of mouth of South Chicka- 
 mauga — Laying of pontoon bridge — Crossing of Sherman's army — Arrival 
 of Howard — Sherman moves on Missionary hills — Seizes first heights— In- 
 trenches — Position of rebels on Lookout mountain — Position of Hooker — 
 Difl5culty of ascent — Seizure of base — Ascent of mountain — Battle on moun- 
 tain — Capture of mountain — Thomas connects with Hooker — Grant's dis- 
 patches on night of 24th — Rebels evacuate Lookout point — Position ot 
 troops on 25th — Shei-man's battle-ground — Sherman's assaults — Bragg re- 
 enforces against Sherman — Weakening of rebel centre — Assault on rebel 
 centre — Thomas's troops scale Missionary ridge — Rebel centre pierced — 
 Missionary ridge carried — Rout of rebels — Large capture of men and guns — 
 Hooker turns rebel left — Further captures — Rebel flight to Chickamauga — 
 Sheridan's pursuit to Mission mills — Rebels withdraw from front of Sherman 
 — Grant pushes out on 2Gth — Demoralization of rebels — Pursuit to Ringgold 
 — Battle-field of Ringgold — Rebel resistance — Final retreat of rebels — Pur- 
 suit discontinued — Destruction of railroads and stores — Return of Thomas's 
 command to Chattanooga — Sherman ordered to the Hiawassee — Summary of 
 losses and gains — Character of battle of Chattanooga — Results, 478 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Enoxville still in danger — Granger sent to Burnside — Granger moves reluctantly 
 — Sherman sent to Burnside — Sherman moves with vigor — Burnside falls 
 back before Longstreet — Battle at Campbell's station — Retreat to Knoxville 
 — Defences of Knoxville — Siege of Knoxville — Aid from loyal Tennesseans — 
 Longstreet determines to assault — Strength and position of Fort Sanders — 
 Assault of Fort Sanders — Repulse of Longstreet — Approach of Slierman — 
 Raising of siege — Retreat of Longstreet — Burnside sends Sherman back to 
 Hiawassee — Parke's pursuit of Longstreet — Burnside relieved by Foster — 
 Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of President — Thanks of Con- 
 gress — Miscalculation of Burnside — Battle of Bean's station — Success of 
 Longstreet — Longstreet winters in Tennessee — Disappointment of Grant — 
 — Grant proposes movement against Mobile — Bragg relieved by Hardee — 
 Furloughing of veterans — Grant's visit to Knoxville — Impossibility of win- 
 ter campaign — Germ of Meridian raid — Distribution of forces for winter — 
 Sherman sent to Viclssburg — Grant's plan for ensuing pear — Mobile and At- 
 
C0NTEI4TS. XI 11 
 
 lanta ot'jective and intermediate points — Sooy Smith's orders — Sherman's 
 march from Vicksburg — Seizure of Meridian — Destruction of railroad — Fail- 
 ure of Smith to cooperate — Shemian returns to Vicksburg — Smith retreats 
 to Memphis — Results of Meridian raid — Cooperation of Thomas — Johnston 
 in command of rebel army — Movements in East Tennessee — Grant ordered 
 to Washington, . . . . , . . .531 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Military situation early in 1SG4 — Political situation — Need of one real head to 
 the army — Grant made lieutenant-general — His predecessors in that grade — 
 Action of the government — Grant's quiescence — Instructions to Sherman — 
 Private correspondence between Gnint and Sherman — Dispatches from Hal- 
 leck — Journey to Washington — Arrival — Presentation of commission — 
 Speeches of President and of Grant, ..... 565 
 
 Affkndix, . . ... IJ79 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The original thirteen states that composed the 
 American Union Lad "grown in the course of eighty 
 years to thirty-four ; the territory, whieli had at first 
 been limited to a narrow strip along the Atlantic 
 coast, had spread to the Pacific ocean, and embraced 
 a region as wide as the mightiest empires of the Old 
 World ; from the chain of great lakes on the north, to 
 the Gulf of Mexico on the south, the republic stretched 
 out a thousand miles across. Tliis land abounded in 
 untold agricultural and mineral wealth ; commerce 
 enriched the portions bordering on the sea, manufac- 
 tures thrived ; the taxes were inconsiderable, and a 
 national debt almost unknown, and a deo:ree of ma- 
 terial prosperity was attained entirely without pre- 
 cedent. Education was more widely diffused than in 
 any countiy since the invention of letters, the influ- 
 ence of religion was universally acknowledged, the 
 rich and the poor were equal before the law, and 
 every male citizen had a share in the government. 
 The nation was powerful abroad as well as prosperous 
 at home ; the title of American citizen was a passport 
 that secured protection in every foreign land ; peace 
 
2 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 had smiled on the territory of the Union for more 
 than half a century, and a generation had grown up 
 unused to war. The future of this people was even 
 more brilliant in promise than the present in fraition. 
 Made up, indeed, of different populations, with various 
 characters, and of separate origin, yet with so much 
 unity of interest and homogeneity of feeling ; allied by 
 so many memories of the past, and so many aspira- 
 tions for the future ; with the numerous peculiarities 
 of passion, and condition, and race, apparently so har- 
 moniously adjusted, it seemed as if no serious disaster 
 could ever occur to mar its greatness or interfere with 
 its prosperity. 
 
 But questions of a subtle political character arose, 
 about which the Northern and Southern states dif 
 fared widely and antagonistically. The institution 
 of African slavery existed at the South, but had been 
 abolished at the North ; and the destiny of four mil- 
 lions of slaves, as well as the extension of slavery 
 itself, was violently discussed. The independent 
 rights of the states, and the supremacy of the general 
 government, were asserted and denied by turns ; poli- 
 ticians, for personal or party reasons, promoted the 
 discord and exaggerated the antagonisms; and, after 
 years of controversy, the quaiTel was referred to the 
 decision of the polls. A presidential election ensued, 
 which resulted in the elevation of a Northerner to 
 power, who had received no electoral vote from any 
 Southern state, and Avho was pledged to resist, by all 
 lawfnl means, the extension of slavery. lie was also 
 pledged to allow no interference with the institution, 
 where it already existed ; but his success was looked 
 upon by the South as the inauguration of a direct 
 attack upon slavery, and became the signal for an 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 3 
 
 attempt to destroy tliat Union wbicli the South liad 
 done as much to establish and defend as the North. 
 Eleven Southern states claimed the right to secede 
 from what they called the federal alliance; but the 
 Northern states maintained that the bond of union 
 was indissoluble, and that secession was rebellion ; 
 and each party was ready to fight for the maintenance 
 of its views. 
 
 The Southerners began the war, without waiting 
 for any overt act from the North : they not only as- 
 sumed to secede, and set up a government for them- 
 selves, which they called a Confederacy, but they 
 seized the national forts and arsenals within their 
 territory ; and at Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, 
 before resistance was offei^ed, they fired on the national 
 flag and compelled the sui'render of the fort. This 
 circumstance united the North. Hitherto, there had 
 been many Northerners who thought that the South 
 had grievances, and who were anxious to redress 
 them ; many, who were willing to compromise all the 
 questions at issue, save only that of union ; and some, 
 who were even willing to allow the Southern states 
 to depart in peace. But the gun fired at Sumter put 
 an end to all such sentiments ; the government at 
 once determined to maintain its authority, and the 
 people unanimously seconded the government ; or, 
 rather, the people determined, and the government 
 executed their will. 
 
 The standing army of the United States, at this 
 time, numbered fifteen thousand, four hundred and 
 thirty- three men ; or ten regiments of infantry, four 
 of artillery, and five of cavalry. It was officered by 
 Southerners as well as Northerners; men educated 
 by the national government, at the national schools, 
 
4 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 and sworn to support the national authority ; out of 
 one thousand and seventy-four officers, two hundred 
 and seventy were of Southern birth, embracing a fair 
 share of the talent and distinction of the army. Two 
 hundred and two of these espoused the Southern 
 cause. When it became apparent that war was inev- 
 itable, they resigned their commissions, and offered 
 their swords to their own section, holding the au- 
 thority of a state paramount to that of the Union.'"* 
 They were followed into secession by fifty others from 
 Northern or border states, most of whom had mar- 
 ried Southern wives or acquired Southern property. 
 
 This defection of course greatly disorganized the 
 small force at the disposal of the government. But 
 even had these officers remained firm in their alle- 
 giance, the military power of the United States at 
 this time was insio-nificant. The President therefore 
 at once issued a proclamation, declaring the existence 
 of an armed rebellion, and calling for seventy-five 
 thousand volunteer troops to suppress it. They came 
 instantly, from every quarter of the North, more than 
 he called for. But the proclamation had an equally 
 remarkable effect upon the people of the South. 
 Many of these had been bitterly opposed to disu- 
 nion, although all concurred in deprecating any inter- 
 ference by the North or by the general government, 
 with the peculiar institution of the South ; but when 
 President Lincoln announced his intention of coer- 
 cing the states which attempted to secede, the una- 
 nimity of the South in resistance became a parallel 
 to that of the North in restraining:. Advantao-e of 
 this was taken at once by the Southern leaders, many 
 
 * One hundred and eighty resigned; tweuty-two were dismissed, or 
 dropped from the rolls. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 5 
 
 of whom had long been preparing for the very emer- 
 gency which now occurred; armies were organized 
 with extraordinary diligence and energy by the self- 
 styled Confederate government, and the American 
 civil war began. 
 
 From the intestine nature of the struggle and the 
 geographical formation of the continent, the principal 
 theatre of the w^ar, it was evident, must lie in the 
 states bordering on both sections. The belt of ter- 
 ritoiy reaching from the Atlantic westward, and 
 comprising Maryland and Virginia east of the Alle- 
 ghanies, and Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri west 
 of those mountains, constitutes this border region, 
 and was the stasre on which the first acts of the 
 drama were performed. The Potomac and the James, 
 at the east ; the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Cumberland, 
 and the Mississippi, at the west, are the great streams, 
 the control of which, and of the populations and re- 
 gions that lie in their valleys, is indispensable to a 
 mastery of the continent. The Ohio flows westward 
 from Pennsylvania to Missouri, a thousand miles ; the 
 prolific States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois lie along 
 its northern bank, while Virginia and Kentucky form 
 the southern shore ; it was the natural line of demar- 
 cation at the west between the slave states and the 
 free, the boundary between disaffection and loyalty. 
 The Tennessee and Cumberland, rising in the recesses 
 of the Alleghany mountains, flow southward into^the 
 state of Tennessee, and then run west for hundreds 
 of miles, the larger river making a vsdde detour into 
 Alabama and INIississippi ; when, turning to the north 
 again, they traverse Kentucky side by side, and 
 empty into the Ohio, near the point where that still 
 greater stream becomes itself a tributary, and pours 
 
6 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 the waters of its liundred affluents into the Missis- 
 sippi. The Mississippi, recipient and greatest of 
 them all, divides the continent for four thousand 
 miles; bounds ten different states, and enriches all 
 the region between the Kocky and the Alleghany 
 mountains. 
 
 In these regions, and for the mastery of these riv- 
 ers and states, the earliest battles of Ulysses S. 
 Grant were fought ; from this field, he was taken to 
 command the national armies. It will be my en- 
 deavor to show — first, why he was selected to com- 
 mand those armies, and afterwards how he performed 
 the task. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Birth and parentage of Grant— His name— West Point— His army lile— Tlie 
 Mexican War — He marries — Leaves tlie army — Enters tlie Icatlier trade — 
 Galena — Grant drills a company — Takes it to Springfield— Organizes volunteer 
 troops — Visits Cincinnati to see McClellan — Becomes colonel of the Twenty- 
 first Illinois regiment — Marches it to Missouri — Is made brigadier-general of 
 volunteers — Takes command of the District of Southeast Missouri — Seizes 
 Taducah — Sends a force to drive rebels into Arkansas — Makes a demonstra- 
 tion upon Belmont — The demonstration converted into an attack — Battle of 
 Belmont — Grant's success — Enemy reenforced — Grant cuts bis way out- 
 Results of Belmont. 
 
 HiEA3i Ulysses Geant was born on tlie 2 7 tit of 
 April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont county, 
 Ohio. His father was of Scotch descent, and a dealer 
 in leather. Ulysses was the eldest of six children. 
 He entered the Military Academy at West Point at 
 the age of seventeen, the congressman who procured 
 his appointment giving his name by mistake as 
 Ulysses S. Grant. Simpson was the maiden name of 
 his mother, and was also borne by one of his younger 
 brothers : this doubtless occasioned the error. Young 
 Grant applied to the authorities at West Point and 
 to the Secretary of War, to have the blunder cor- 
 rected, but the request was unnoticed ; his comrades 
 at once adopted the initials U. S. in his behalf, and 
 christened him Uncle Sam, a nickname that he never 
 
3 MILITAEY HISTORT OF 
 
 lost in the army; and wlien lie graduated in 1843, 
 twentj^-first in a class of thirty-nine, his commission 
 of brevet second lieutenant and his diploma, both 
 styled him Ulysses S. Grant, by which name he has 
 since been known. 
 
 His regiment was the Fourth infontry ; he re- 
 mained in the army eleven years, was engaged in 
 every battle of the Mexican War, except Buena Vista, 
 receiving two brevets for gallantry, and was after- 
 wards stationed at various posts on the Canada fron- 
 tier, and finally in California and Oregon. In 1848, 
 he married Julia T. Dent, eldest daughter of Fred- 
 erick Dent, a merchant of St. Louis ; and in 1854, 
 having reached the grade of captain, he resigned his 
 commission in the army, and removed to Gravois, 
 near St. Louis, where he owned and worked a farm. 
 Afterwards, in 1860, he entered the leather trade, 
 with his father and brother, at Galena, Illinois. 
 
 Thus, when the civil war broke out, Grant was a 
 private citizen, earning his bread in an insignificant 
 inland town. Lie was of simple habits and tastes, 
 without influence, and unambitious. Having never 
 been brought in contact with men of eminence, he 
 had no personal knowledge of great affairs. He had 
 never commanded more than a company of soldiers, 
 and althou2;li he had served under both Scott and 
 Taylor, it was as a subaltern,* and without any 
 opportunity of intercourse with those commanders. 
 He had never voted for a President but once ; he 
 knew no politicians, for his acquaintance was limited 
 
 * In 18G4, General Scott told me that lie thought be recollected a 
 young officer named Grant, who behaved gallantly in the Mexican War; 
 and General Robert E. Lee said to Grant at Appomattox Court House, 
 that he remembered their having met before. Grant must have been a 
 brevet second lieutenant at the time, and Lee a staff-officer of Scott. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 9 
 
 to army officers and Western traders ; evea in the 
 town where lie lived, lie Lad not met the member of 
 Congress who represented the district for nine succes- 
 sive years, and wlio afterwards became one of his most 
 intimate personal friends. Of his four children, the 
 eldest was eleven years old. He lived in a little 
 house at the top of one of the picturesque hills on 
 w^hich Galena is built, and w^ent daily to the ware- 
 house of his father and brother, w^here leather was 
 sold by the wholesale and retail. He was thirty-nine 
 years of age, before his countrymen became acquainted 
 with his name. 
 
 Foi-t Sumter fell on the 13th of April, 1861, and 
 the President's call for troops w^as made on the 15th. 
 On the 19th, Grant was drilling a company of volun- 
 teers at Galena, and four days afterwards went with 
 it to Springfield, the capital of Illinois. From there, 
 he Avrote to the adjutant-general of the army, offer- 
 ing his services to the government, in any capacity in 
 which he could be of use. The letter was not deemed 
 of sufficient importance to preserve: it stated that 
 Grant had received a military education at the pub- 
 lic expense, and now that the country was in danger, 
 he thought it his duty to place at the disposal of the 
 authorities, whatever skill or experience he had ac- 
 quired. He received no reply; but remaining at 
 Springfield, his military knowledge made him of ser- 
 vice in the organization of the volunteer troops of the 
 state ; and at the end of five weeks, the governor, 
 Honorable Richard Yates, offered him the Twenty-' 
 first regiment of Illinois infimtry. 
 
 Before receiving his colonelcy. Grant went to Cin- 
 cinnati to visit Mnjor-General JMcClellan, then in 
 command of Ohio volunteers. The two had known 
 
10 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 eacli other in tlie old army, and althougli Grant Lad 
 no intention of making any application, lie still lioped 
 that McClellan might ofter him a place on his staff. 
 He went twice to headquarters, but did not find 
 McClellan there, and returned to Illinois, witliout 
 mentioning his aspirations to any one. 
 
 Early in June, he took command of his regiment, 
 and marched at once to Missouri, reporting to Briga- 
 dier-General Pope, by whom he was stationed at 
 Mexico, about fifty miles north of the Missouri river. 
 
 On the Tth of August, he was commissioned by 
 the President, brigadier-general of volunteers, to date 
 from May 17th, his first knowledge or suspicion of 
 this rank coming to him from the newspapers of the 
 day. He had been unanimously recommended for 
 the promotion by the members of Congress from Illi- 
 nois, no one of whom had been his personal acquaint- 
 ance.* 
 
 During the war, the entire country was divided 
 by the United States authorities, into military depart- 
 ments, whose boundaries and organization were re- 
 peatedly changed. The state of Illinois, and the 
 states and territories west of the IMississippi river, 
 and east of the Rocky mountains, constituted at thi^ 
 time the Western Department, of which Major- 
 General Fremont was in command. On the 8th of 
 August, Fremont transferred Grant to L'onton, Mis- 
 souri, and a fortnight afterwards to Jefferson City, in 
 the same state. At both these places, he was occu- 
 pied in watching the movements of partisan forces. 
 On the 1st of September, by direction of Fremont, 
 
 * The Honorable Eliliu B. Wasliburne, of Galena, who had never 
 spoken to Grant until after the fall of Fort Sumter, suggested the 
 nomluation. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 11 
 
 he assumed command of the District of Southeast 
 Missouri, and on the 4th, made his headquarters at 
 Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio. Tlie district in- 
 cluded not only the region from Avhich it takes its 
 name, Lut the southern part of Illinois, and so much 
 of western Kentucky and Tennessee as miglit fall into 
 the possession of national forces; it comprised the 
 junction of the four great rivers, Tennessee, Cumber- 
 land, Ohio, and Mississippi. 
 
 Grant's first act was the seizure of Paducah, at the 
 mouth of the Tennessee. The governor of Kentucky 
 was at this time insisting that the state should main- 
 tain a position of armed neutrality, and all Kentuck- 
 ians who sympathized with the rebels, took the same 
 ground. This neutrality had never been recognized 
 by the United States authorities, but was first vio- 
 lated by General Polk, the rebel commander in that 
 region. He seized Columbus and Hickman, on the 
 Mississippi, and thi'eatened Paducah, w^ithiu three 
 days after Grant assumed his new command. All 
 these places were of military importance, and Padu- 
 cah completely commands the navigation of both the 
 Tennessee and the Ohio. Fremont had previously 
 ordered a movement in Missouri, which Grant was to 
 superintend, and had directed the construction of 
 Fort Holt on the Kentucky shore ; but on the 2d of 
 September, Grant arrived at Cairo, and on the 5th, 
 heard of the advance of Polk, which had occurred 
 the day before. He at once notified his commanding 
 officer, as well as the Kentucky legislature at Frank- 
 fort, and later in the same day, having received addi- 
 tional information, he telegraphed to Fremont at 
 St. Louis : " I am getting ready to go to Paducah. 
 Will start at six and a half o'clock." Still later on 
 
12 JIILITAEy HISTOEY OF 
 
 the 5tli, lie wrote : " I am now nearly ready for Pa- 
 ducah, should not telegram arrive preventing the 
 movement." 
 
 Getting no reply, he started at ten and a half 
 o'clock that night, with two regiments and a light 
 battery ; he also took two gunboats, the naval force 
 in that neighborhood being under his control. He 
 was delayed at Mound City, by an accident to one of 
 his transports, but arrived at Paducah at half-past 
 eight on the morning of the 6th. The city was seized 
 without a gun being fired, Brigadier-General Tilgh- 
 man and his staff, of the rebel army, with a company 
 of recruits, hurryiug ont of the town by the railroad, 
 south, while Grant was getting ashore. A force of 
 thirty-eight hundred rebels was reported to be six- 
 teen miles off, and rebel flags and stores were found 
 in the town ; but this movement saved Paducah and 
 the control of the Ohio river. Grant stayed in town 
 only until noon, when, leaving a sufficient garrison, 
 he returned to Cairo, where he received Fremont's 
 permission to take Paducah " if he felt strong enough." 
 The next day, Brigadier-General C. F. Smith was put 
 in command of the place, with orders to report direct 
 to Fremont, at St. Louis, and Grant was rebuked for 
 corresponding with the legislature ; * but that body 
 at once passed resolutions favorable to the Union, 
 
 " * Heasquabters 'Western Department, (. 
 St. Louis, Sepietnber 6, IStil, ' 
 
 Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo, Illinois : 
 
 I am directed by Major-General Fremont to inform you that brigade 
 and other commanders arc not to correspond with state or other high 
 authorities, in matters pertaining to any branch of the pubUc service, 
 cither in initiating such correspondence or replying thereto. 
 
 All such subjects are to be submitted to the major-general com- 
 manding the department, for his information and action. " 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 13 
 
 and the political position of the state was secured: 
 no more was heard of the neutrality of Kentucky. 
 The seizure of Paducah w\as violently criticised by 
 those whom it disappointed, and furnished an illus- 
 tration of traits destined afterwards peculiarly to 
 characterize the generalship of Grant. 
 
 For t^vo months afterwards, Grant was occupied 
 in holding the country at the junction of the great 
 rivers, near wdiich his headquarters were established, 
 and in organizing and disciplining his forces, which 
 by the 1st of November, were increased to nearly 
 twenty thousand men. He was kept strictly subor- 
 dinate by Fremont, and allowed to make no move- 
 ment of importance by that commander ; Smithland, 
 however, at the mouth of the Cumberland, was occu- 
 pied by C. F. Smith without opposition, a few weeks 
 after Paducah. Several times Grant suggested the 
 feasibility of capturing Columbus, an important posi- 
 tion on the east bank of the Mississippi, about twenty 
 miles below Cairo ; and, on the 10th of September, 
 he even asked permission to make the attempt : " If 
 it was discretionary with me, with a little addition 
 to my present force, I would take Columbus." No 
 notice was taken of this application. Belmont, on 
 the west bank, was a small post, fortified only by a 
 rude sort of abatis, and lying directly under the guns 
 of Columbus. The rebels were constantly crossing 
 troops between these points, and in time made Co- 
 lumbus one of the strongest works on the Mississippi 
 river, and one of their great depots of men and sup- 
 plies. It of course completely barred the navigation 
 of the stream, and was a constant menace to every 
 point in Grant's command. 
 
 On the 1st of November, Fremont ordered Grant 
 
14 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 to make demonstrations on botli sides of the Missis- 
 sippi, in tlie direction of Norfolk, Charleston, and 
 Blandville, points a few miles north of Coliunhus 
 and Belmont. He was not, however, to attack the 
 enemy. On the 2d, Fremont informed him that three 
 thousand rebels were on the St. Francis river, in 
 Missonri, about fifty miles southwest of Cairo, and 
 ordered him to send a force to assist in driving them 
 into Arkansas. Grant accordingly sent Colonel 
 Oglesby, on the night of the 3d, with four regiments 
 (three thousand men), from Commerce, Missouri, 
 towards Indian Ford, on the St. Francis river. On 
 the 5th, however, Fremont telegraphed him that 
 Polk, who commanded at Columbus, was sending re- 
 enforcements to Price, in southwest Missouri, by way 
 of the Mississippi and White rivers. Fremont had 
 a force at that time confronting Price, and it was of 
 vital importance to him that these reenforcements 
 should cease. Grant was accordingly directed to 
 make at once the demonstration towards Columbus 
 which had been previously ordered. He immediately 
 instructed Oglesby to turn his column in the direc- 
 tion of 'New Madrid, on the Mississippi, below Bel- 
 mont, and sent him an additional regiment. General 
 C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, was also re- 
 quested to move out from that place towards the rear 
 of Columbus, and " to keep the enemy from throw- 
 ing over the river much more force than they now 
 have there ; " Grant informing him that " the princi- 
 pal point to gain, is to prevent the enemy from send- 
 ing a force to fall in the rear of those now sent out 
 from this command." Two other and smaller dem- 
 onstrations for the same purpose, were ordered at the 
 same time, from Bird's Point and Fort Holt, near 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 15 
 
 Cairo, tLe commanders being instructed to return the 
 day after moving out. 
 
 On the evening of the 6th, Grant started down 
 the river in person, with thirty-one hundred and four- 
 teen men on transports, and under convoy of two 
 gunboats. Tlie force included a section of artillery, 
 two squadrons of cavalry, and five regiments of in- 
 fantry, to some of whom arms had been issued for 
 the first time only two days before. Grant had but 
 one general officer in his command, McClernand, who 
 at that time had never heard a hostile shot ; Logan, 
 who afterwards became so distinguished, also accom- 
 panied him, but as a colonel. Grant proceeded nine 
 miles, and made a feint of landing at a point on the 
 Kentucky shore, where he lay till daybreak, with a 
 view to distract the enemy, and, in conjunction with 
 Smith's demonstrations, to give the idea that an attack 
 on Columbus was contemplated. 
 
 At two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, he re- 
 ceived intelligence that the rebels had been crossing 
 troops from Columbus to Belmont, the day before, 
 Avith the purpose of cutting ojff Oglesby. He at once 
 determined to convert the demonstration against Bel- 
 mont into an attack, as it w-as now necessary to be 
 prompt in preventing any further effort of the rebels 
 either to reenforce Price or to interrui:)t Oglesby. He 
 still, however, had no intention of remaining at Bel- 
 mont, which is on low ground, and could not have 
 been held an hour under the guns at Columbus. His 
 idea was simply to destroy the camps, capture or dis- 
 perse the enemy, and get away himself before the 
 rebel garrison could be reenforced. 
 
 At six o'clock, the transports moved down the 
 river, and the troops were debarked at Hunter's 
 
16 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Point, on the Missouri side, just out of range of tlie 
 Columbus batteries. They marched direct towards 
 Belmont, about three miles off. Here, in an open 
 space, protected by fallen forest timber, the rebels 
 had pitched their camp. Grant moved by a flank, for 
 about a mile, then drew his troops up in line, and 
 ordered forward the whole force as skirmishers. On 
 the road, he met with serious opposition, and by nine 
 o'clock, his entire command was hotly engaged, except 
 one battalion held in reserve near the landinsf, as a 
 guard to the transports; the gunboats, although wood- 
 en, occasionally engaged the batteries at Columbus, 
 many of which had a plunging fire ; this action, howev- 
 er, was without result. The country on the Belmont 
 side was partially wooded, and cut up with sloughs 
 and swamps, and the rebels took advantage of these 
 difficulties. There was heavy fighting for nearly four 
 hours ; during all this time Grant was with the skir- 
 mish line ; his own liorse was shot under him, McCler- 
 nand lost three borses, and every colonel set an ex- 
 ample of gallantry to his command. Stimulated by 
 this behavior, the green soldiers fought like veterans, 
 and finally drove the rebels foot by foot, througli 
 sloughs and fields, and from tree to tree, to the river 
 ])ank, charged through the abatis, took several hun- 
 dred prisoners, captured all the artillery, and broke 
 up the camp. 
 
 They became, however, at once disorganized by 
 their victory, and instead of pursuing the enemy, as 
 he huddled and crouched under the river bank, set 
 about plundering, while their colonels, equally raw, 
 shouted and made stump speeches for the Union. 
 Grant, meanwhile, had observed the rebel transports 
 crossing the river from Columbus, and crowded with 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 17 
 
 troops on tlieir triple decks. He was anxious to get 
 back to his own steamers before these reenforcements 
 could arrive, and strove to re-form Lis men, Tjut in 
 vain ; tliey behaved like so many schoolboys, until, 
 finally, to stop the plundering, he ordered his staff 
 officers to set the camps on fire. This drew 
 the attention of the artillerists at Columbus, who 
 speedily opened on the national troops, when, per- 
 ceiving the necessity of discipline, the men returned 
 to the ranks, and the march to the transports began. 
 Meanwhile, the defeated rebels, finding no notice was 
 taken of them, had re-formed under the bank, and in 
 the woods on the point of land just above Belmont ; 
 three fresh reo:iments from Columbus had also arrived, 
 and the combined force, passing along under the 
 bank, interposed between Grant and his transports. 
 It was instantly cried : " We are surrounded ! " and 
 at first some confusion prevailed. An officer of 
 Grant's staff, lately from civil life, rode up, a little 
 flustered, with the intelligence. " Well," said Grant, 
 " //* tliat is so, tve must cut our icay out as we cut our 
 way in^ The men were brave enough, but it had 
 not occurred to them before, that being surrounded, 
 there was any thing to do but suiTender. Grant, 
 however, remarked: " IF^ liave iddpped them once, 
 and I till nh we can do it again;'''' and as soon as the 
 troops found that their leader meant to fight, the con- 
 fusion was past ; they promptly charged and dispersed 
 the rebel line, which made but a faint resistance, not 
 half so vigorous as that of the morning, and disap- 
 peared a second time over the banks. 
 
 It was necessary, however, to lose no time, for 
 reenforcements were still crossing the river in large 
 numbers. Grant pushed on to the landing, and 
 2 
 
18 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 getting most of liis force aboard, sent a detacliment 
 to gather up tlie wounded. He was occupied thus 
 for an hour, without disturbance, but owing to the 
 inexperience of his officers, not one of whom was a 
 professional soldier, he had nearly every thing to do 
 in person, and was obliged to superintend the execu- 
 tion of his own orders. The main body was nearly 
 embarked, when he rode back with a single staff 
 officer, to withdraw the battalion he had posted 
 in the morning, as a guard to the transports, and 
 which he supposed still covered the men who were 
 bringing in wounded. But the reserves were as raw 
 as the rest of the troops, and when the others were 
 drawn in, they too had thought proper to retire. With- 
 out any orders, and without reporting their action, 
 they had returned to the transports, not in alarm, for 
 their position was protected by the gunboats, but 
 simply out of ignorance and inexperience. 
 
 Grant was therefore completely outside of his own 
 troops. At this moment, he rode up on a knoll, and 
 discovered immediately in his front, the whole rebel 
 force, now greatly augmented, and advancing upon 
 him in line of battle. The enemy had formed a third 
 time, nearly parallel to the bank, and was extending 
 his own left so as to cut off the national transports, 
 by getting to tlieir rear, higher up the river. The bend 
 in the stream just here, makes a peninsula of the Mis- 
 souri shore, and rendered this manoeuvre easy to exe- 
 cute. The rebel line was in a corn-field, not fifty 
 yards from Grant, and already firing on his trans- 
 ports. He sat still for a moment to observe the 
 situation, and presented an easy mark to the rebel 
 rifles ; but the morning had been damp and chilly, 
 and he "wore a private's overcoat, and was not recog- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 19 
 
 nized for an officer. He saw at once tliat it \va^ im- 
 possible to save the parties who were still out in 
 search of the wounded, and completely cut off; so he 
 turned his horse, riding back to the transports 
 slowly, in order not to attract a fire. Getting nearer, 
 however, he put spui'S to his horse, and galloped hard 
 to the bank, the animal sliding over the brink on his 
 haunches. The rebel fire was now hot, and the 
 transj^orts were about pushing off, leaving Grant 
 ashore ; he however rode rapidly up, and a plank 
 was put out for him, over which he trotted his horse 
 aboard, under a heavy musketry fire. The convoy of 
 gunboats then opened on the rebel ranks, which had 
 by this time approached within fifty or sixty yards. 
 Grape and canister were poured into them with good 
 effect, mowing the men down in swaths.* The 
 enemy fortunately fired too high, and a storm of 
 shot passed over the hurricane deck, but wounded 
 only three men, and killed none. By five o'clock, 
 the last transport was out of range, officers and men 
 equally elated with the idea of having gained a vic- 
 tory. 
 
 The next day, under a flag of truce, Grant met an 
 old West Point comrade, who had become a rebel, 
 and was serving on Polk's staff. Grant mentioned 
 having ridden out and met the rebel line. " Was 
 that you ? " said the other ; " we saw you, and Gen- 
 eral Polk called to some of his troops : ' There, men, 
 is a Yankee, if you want to try your aim ; ' " but all 
 
 * " After nearly all the troops had reembarked, and wore about 
 ready to start, a sudden attack was made upon the transport vessels 
 by an apparently large reenforcement of rebels. Our boats being in 
 good position, we opened fire with our grape and canister, and five- 
 second shells, and completely routed them, we learn, with great 
 slaughter." — Bepart of Lieutenant Walker, commanding naval f<rrce. 
 
20 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 were intent on hitting tlie transports tlieu, and nobody 
 fired at Grant. 
 
 At Belmont, Grant lost four hundred and eiglity- 
 five men in killed, wounded, and missing ; one hun- 
 dred and twenty-five of his wounded fell into the 
 hands of the rebels ; he carried oft' one hundred and 
 seventy-five prisoners and two guns, and spiked four 
 other pieces : three of these last were left behind, 
 because drawn by hand, and the other had an ineffi- 
 cient team. About seven thousand rebels were en- 
 gaged, and Polk sustained a loss of six hundred and 
 forty-two men. By their own showing, the rebels 
 had twice as many troops as Grant, and lost one- 
 third more.* If any reinforcements were to be sent 
 to Price, they were by this operation detained, and 
 the movement of Oglesby was entu*ely protected. 
 The enemy also remained concentrated thereafter at 
 Columbus, lest another and more serious attack 
 should follow. 
 
 This battle confirmed Grant in the belief on which 
 he always afterwards acted, that when neither party 
 is well disciplined, there is nothing to gain in the 
 matter of discipline, by delay. The enemy organizes 
 
 * Pillow reported tliat, at the beginning of the figlit, he had five 
 regiments on the ground, but that these were greatly reduced by sick- 
 ness, and, in consequence, numbered only twenty-five hundred men. 
 Besides these, he had a battery of artillery aud a squadron of cavalry. 
 Polk reported rcenforcing Pillow with five more i-egimeuts, whose num- 
 bers are not said to have been reduced by sickness. This entii-e force, at 
 that period of the war, could hardly have been less than seven thousand 
 men. The rebel reports greatly overestimate Grant's strength and exag- 
 gerate his loss. Otherwise they difi"er but in one essential point from the 
 statements in the text. They all declare that Grunt's troojjs broke aud 
 fled to the transports in great disorder, and were hctly pursued. The 
 captured guns and the prisoners carried oflf by Grant, aud the fact that 
 men were sent back to gather up his wounded, disprove these assertions. 
 The hot pursuit was after the national troops had got aboard. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 21 
 
 and improves as rapidly as yourself, and all tlie ad- 
 vantages of prompt movement are lost. 
 
 The strategic results accomplislied by Belmont 
 mio-ht perhaps have been attained, had the oiiginal 
 design been carried out, and only a demonstration 
 made ; but the troops, who had volunteered "vvith the 
 idea of active campaigning, were getting restive during 
 the long delay at Cairo. When they found that they 
 were really starting out, the blood of officers and men 
 was up; had they been taken back then without 
 a fio-ht, their confidence in themselves and in their 
 commander, would have been impaii-ed. Grant no- 
 ticed this, and even if he had not received the infor- 
 mation on which his attack was based, would never- 
 theless have made the assault. The influence of the 
 fight upon the troops engaged was of the happiest 
 sort. It gave them a confidence and a fortitude 
 which they never lost, and long afterwards the " Bel- 
 mont men " were known as among the stanchest 
 soldiers in the army of the Tennessee. 
 
 The country, however, knowing none of the ob. 
 jects of the movement, and seeing only the fact that 
 troops had advanced and then retired, regarded the 
 affair as a disaster, while the enemy, of course, her. 
 aided it for a rebel victory. Long after, many who 
 looked upon Grant as one of the greatest of soldiers, 
 declared that he should be forgiven for Belmont, and 
 remained ignorant, not only that he accomplished 
 more than he was sent to do, but that the very traits 
 which contributed most materially to his later suc- 
 cesses, were displayed as signally at Belmont as on 
 any occasion during the war.* 
 
 * See Appendix for Grant's instructions and various papers relating 
 to the Belmont affair. 
 
22 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 Eebel strategic line from Columbus to Bowling Green — Halleck in command of 
 Department of the Missouri — Gunboats at the West — Demonstration in favor 
 of Bucll— Smith reports capture of Fort Henry feasible— Grant visits St, 
 Louis to suggest the operation — Movement against Fort Henry sanctioned by 
 Halleck — Attack by the fleet — Disposition of Grant's forces— Fall of Fort 
 Henry— Grant proposes capture of Fort Donelson — Halleck directs strength- 
 ening of Fort Henry — March to the Cumberland — Position and strength of 
 Fort Donelson — The siege — Unsuccessful attack by the fleet — Assault by the 
 rebels on the 15th of February — Counter-assault of national forces — Scene 
 at Floyd's headquarters on the night of the 15th— Escape of Floyd and Pil- 
 low — Buckner proposes surrender — The tapitulation — Buckner's headquar- 
 ters — Halleck's dispatches after the victory— Ecsults of the capture of Fort 
 Donelson. 
 
 Shortly after the battle of Belmont, tlie rebels 
 established a strong and well-selected line, reaching 
 from the Mississippi to the Big Barren river, in mid- 
 dle Kentucky. On their extreme left was Columbus, 
 where, they soon collected one hundred and forty 
 guns,* and a force sufficient to cover Memphis, and 
 hold the great Western river ; on the right was Bowl- 
 ing Green, at tlie junction of the Louisville and Kash- 
 ville, and the Memphis and Ohio railroads, and the 
 northernmost point then held by the rebels west of 
 the Alleghany mountains ; at this place, one of their 
 largest and best-appointed armies was concentrated, 
 
 * See Polk's reuort of evacuation of Columbus. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 23 
 
 threatening noi-theru Kentucky and protecting Nash- 
 ville and middle Tennessee. At the centre of this 
 important strategic line, the Tennessee and Cumber- 
 land rivers formed the natural avenues into all the 
 disputed territory north of the cotton states. About 
 fifty miles from the Ohio, and near the boundary be- 
 tween Kentucky and Tennessee, these two great 
 streams approach within twelve miles of each other, 
 and here, at a bend in each river, the reljels had 
 erected their strongholds. Fort Heniy, on the Ten- 
 nessee, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, com- 
 pletely commanded the navigation, and stood like 
 great barred gateways against any advance of the 
 national armies. Their sites had been selected with 
 care ; they had been elaborately fortified, and large 
 garrisons were stationed to defend them. They cov- 
 ered the great railroad line of communication from 
 east to west, through the border states, and their pos- 
 session determined the fate of Kentucky and Tennes- 
 see ; for Nashville and Memphis were not fortified, 
 and Bowlino; Green and Columbus would both be 
 turned, whenever the national arms subdued these 
 forts. 
 
 The battle of Belmont was fouQ-ht on the 7th of 
 November, and on the 9th, Major-General Henry AV. 
 Halleck, superseding Fremont, took command of the 
 new Department of the Missouri, including Arkan- 
 sas and the portion of Kentucky west of the Cum- 
 berland. The Department of the Ohio, consisting 
 of that part of Kentucky east of the Cuml)erland, 
 and the state of Tennessee, as well as certain portions 
 of the loyal states, was assigned to Brigadier-General 
 Don Carlos Buell, with headquarters at Louis^Hllle. 
 
 In all the operations at the West, during the first 
 
24 JULITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 two years of the war, tlie naval forces bore a conspic- 
 uous part. A new species of gunboat was impro 
 vised for inland navigation, out of tlie river steamers 
 in use before tlie rebellion, and whose occupation had 
 of course been interrupted by the breaking out of 
 hostilities. Many of these steamers were sheathed 
 with iron, and rendered in a great degree impervious 
 to the hea\dest rebel artillery. Other vessels, built 
 especially for this service, were speedily added to the 
 Western fleet, all of them of the lightest possible 
 draught, as the rise and fall in all the Western rivers 
 frequently leaves only a few feet of water in the 
 channels. Thus strangely constructed, and armored 
 as completely as a knight of the middle ages, manned 
 in general by inland crews, who skilfully piloted them 
 through the shallow but familiar streams, and com- 
 manded by officers of the national navy, these irreg- 
 ular flotillas were of great importance. They con- 
 voyed transports carrying troops and stores ; they 
 drove out guerillas from the river banks, and made 
 the landing of forces practicable; they covered many 
 important movements of troops "on shore, which oth- 
 erwise would have been impossible ; they steamed up 
 rivers and penetrated regions that fancied themselves 
 secure against invasion ; they shared direct assaults 
 on fortified places, and sometimes secured a victory 
 that could not have been won without their aid. 
 The novelty of their appearance added to the terror 
 they inspired, and these iron-clad monsters, rushing 
 rapidly along the interior, and sweeping the level 
 shores for miles with their heavy guns, were for a 
 long while more dreaded by the rebels, even than 
 their achievements warranted. In order to secure a 
 more effectual cooperation with the army, this gun- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 2) 
 
 boat force at the West, was placed under General 
 Halleck's orders. 
 
 Halleck confirmed Grant in tlie command to wliicli 
 Fremont liad assigned liim, but changed its designa- 
 tion to the District of Cairo, and placed Paducah 
 also within liis jurisdiction. lie kept Grant organ- 
 izing and disciplining his troops for nearly two 
 months, allowino; no forward movement in all that 
 time. But in the early part of January, 1862, in 
 pursuance of orders from McClellan, then general-in- 
 chief, Halleck sent directions to Grant, and the latter 
 at once moved a force of six thousand men under 
 McClernand, from Cairo and Bird's Point, towards 
 Mayfield and Murray, in west Kentucky ; he also 
 sent C. F. Smith, with two brigades from Paducah, in 
 the same direction, threatening Columbus and the 
 rebel line between that place and Bowling Green. 
 These movements were made in favor of certain op- 
 erations of Buell in the Department of the Cumber- 
 land. " The object," said Halleck, " is to prevent re- 
 enforcements being sent to Buckner," who was then 
 in command at or near Bowlins; Green.*^ Halleck 
 ordered the movement on the 6th, but, on the 10th, 
 he telegraphed directions for its delay ; Grant, how- 
 ever, had abeady started, and the expedition was not 
 recalled. 
 
 The troops were out for more than a week, and suf 
 fered greatly from cold and the effects of a violent 
 storm of rain and snow. There Avas no fighting, but 
 the object of the demonstration was accomplished, for 
 
 * Sec Appendix for McClellan and Halleck's instructions for this 
 raoyement, in full. They demonstrate very clearly the object of the 
 expedition, and that it had no connection -n-hatever -with any ulterior 
 operations. 
 
26 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 during its continuance, rebel reenforcements were de- 
 tained at Columbus, Nashville was tkreatened, and 
 Brigadier-General George H. Thomas, one of Buell'a 
 subordinates, fougbt and won the battle of Mill 
 Spring, in east Kentucky. 
 
 Smith, on his return, reported that the capture of 
 Fort Henry was feasible : " Two guns would make 
 short work of the fort." Grant received this report 
 on the 2 2d of January, and forwarded it at once to 
 Halleck ; the same day he obtained permission to 
 visit St. Louis, the headquarters of the department. 
 He had asked this leave as early as the 6th of the 
 month, before the I'ecent demonstration had been 
 ordered, and again on the 20th, before Smith's report 
 was made. On the 23d, he started for St. Louis. 
 The express object of his visit was to j^rocure Hal- 
 leek's permission to take Forts Henry and Donelson ; 
 but M'hen he attempted to broach the subject, Hal- 
 leck silenced him so quickly and sharply, that Grant 
 said no more on the matter, and went back to Cairo, 
 with the idea that his commander thought him guilty 
 of proj)osing a great military blunder."^' 
 
 * On the Gth of January, McClcllan wrote to Buell : " Halleck, 
 from liis own accounts, will not soon be in condition to sujDport prop- 
 erly a movement up the Cumberland ; " and again on the 13th : " Hal- 
 leck is not yet in condition to afford you the support you need, when 
 you undertake the movement on Bowling Green." 
 
 January Gth, jMcClellan wrote to Buell: "My own general plans for 
 the prosecution of the war, make the speedy occujjation of east Tennessee 
 and its lines of railway, matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green 
 and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance, at 
 the present moment." Again, January 13th : " It seems absolutely 
 necessary to make the advance on eastern Tennessee at once. I in- 
 cline to this as a first stej), for many reasons." It is evident from 
 these extracts, that on the 13th of January, neither McClellan nor Hal- 
 leck intended, or at any rate was ready for, the movement up the Ten- 
 nessee. Doubtless the propriety of the campaign was ai:)parent to all 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 27 
 
 Ou tlie 28tli of Januaiy, however, tlie idea Leiiig 
 still prominent in liis mind, Grant telegraplied to St. 
 Louis : " With permission, I will take and hold Fort 
 Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large 
 camp there ; " and on the next day, he wrote : " In 
 view of the large force now concentrating in this dis- 
 trict, and the present feasibility of the plan, I would 
 respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort 
 Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and 
 holding the position. If this is not done soon, there 
 is but little doubt that tlie defences on both the Ten- 
 nessee and Cumberland rivers will be materially 
 strengthened. From Fort Henry, it will be easy to 
 operate either on the Cumberland (only twelve miles 
 distant), Memphis, or Columbus. It will, besides^ 
 have a moral eifect upon our troops to advance 
 thence towards the rebel states. The advantao-es of 
 this move are as perceptible to the general command- 
 ing as to myself, therefore further statements are 
 unnecessary." 
 
 Commodore Foote, commanding the naval force 
 in this region, also wrote to Ilalleck on the 28th, 
 recommeudino; the movement,'^' and on the 30th of 
 January, that officer gave the desired permission, and 
 sent detailed instnictions.f These arrived on the 1st 
 of February, and on the 2d, Grant started from Cairo, 
 
 soldiers, but nobody ever ordered or suggested it to Grant, excei^t C. 
 F. Smith, in bis report. 
 
 • Caiko, January 23, 1S63. 
 
 Major-Oeneral H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo. : 
 
 Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion tbat Fort 
 Henry, on the Tennessee river, can be carried with four iron-clad gun- 
 boats and troops to permanently occupy. Ilave we your authority to 
 ■ move for that purpose when ready ? 
 
 A. II. Foote, Flag-Officer. 
 + See Appendix for Ilalleck's instructions in full. 
 
28 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 witli seventeen thousand men on transports. Foote 
 accompanied Mm with seven gunboats, and on the 
 4th, the debarkation began, at Bailey's ferry, on the 
 east bank, three miles below Fort Henry. 
 
 McClernand commanded Grant's advance, and had 
 selected a point for the landing, about eight miles be- 
 low the fort ; he even had his troops ashore at this 
 place, but Grant made a reconnoissance in person on 
 one of the gunboats, steaming up under the guns of 
 the fort, in order to draw their fire. In this he suc- 
 ceeded, for a shot passed through the steamer ; and 
 having: thus ascertained the rano;e of the rebel bat- 
 teries, he reembarked his troops, and brought them 
 up to Bailey's ferry, just out of reach of fire. 
 
 The rebels had erected works on both sides of 
 the river, and had a garrison in and around the two 
 forts, of nearly twenty-eight hundred men,* under 
 command of Brio-adier-General Tilo:hman. The main 
 fortification was on the eastern bank ; it was a strong 
 field-work, with bastioned front, defended by seven- 
 teen heavy guns, twelve of which bore on the river; f 
 embrasures also had been formed, by placing sand- 
 bags on the parapets, between the guns ; on the land 
 front there was an intrenched camp, and still outside 
 of this, an extended line of rifle-pits, located on com- 
 manding ground. The outworks covered the Dover 
 road, by which alone communication could be had 
 with Fort Donelson and the rest of the so-called Con- 
 federacy. The heights on the west side completely 
 command Fort Hemy, but the works on that bank 
 
 * Two thousand seven hundred and thirty -four. — TilgTimari's He- 
 port. 
 
 t See report of Colonel Gilmer, rebel engineer. General Tilghman's 
 report says eleven guns ; but the engineer is of course the more reliable 
 authority in a matter of this sort. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 29 
 
 were iinfiDislied. As soon as Grant's movements be- 
 came known to the rebels, skilful and diligent prepa- 
 rations were made to resist him ; new lines of iufantiy 
 cover were establislied, and additions to tlie fortifica- 
 tions on both sides of the river, commenced. Tilghman 
 at once ordered up reenforcements from Danville and 
 the mouth of Sandy river, as well as reserves from 
 Fort Donelson ; these last being directed to remain at 
 the Furnace, half way to Fort Henry, on the Dover 
 road. 
 
 The country was at this time almost entirely un 
 der w^ater, from the overflow of the Tennessee, the fort 
 itself being completely surrounded ; and the move- 
 ments of both rebel and national troops were very 
 much impeded. The rain, too, fell in torrents on the 
 night of the 5th, and Grant having an insufficiency 
 of transports, his steamers were obliged to return to 
 Cairo, to bring up a part of his command. He did 
 not, tlierefore, get his whole force ashore until eleven 
 o'clock on the night of the 5th. The original plan 
 was to invest Fort Heiman on the west bank simul- 
 taneously wdth Fort Henry, and not only prevent 
 further reenforcements, but all chance of the escape 
 of either gamson. The rebels, however, perceived 
 the impossibility of holding both works against such 
 a force as had been brought from Cairo, and on the 
 5th, before Grant had completed his landing, they 
 evacuated Fort Heiman. Ignorant of this withdrawal, 
 Grant, the same night, ordered two brigades, under 
 General C. F. Smith, to seize the heights on the west- 
 ern bank in the morning. The remainder of the na- 
 tional forces, under McClernand, were to move at 
 eleven on the Cth, to the rear of Fort Henry, to 
 ''take position on the roads to Fort Donelson and 
 
30 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Dover," wliere they could intercept either reenforce- 
 raents or fugitives, and " to hold themselves in readi- 
 ness to charge and take the work by storm, promptly 
 on the receipt of orders." * 
 
 Dispatches from Halleck. and coiToborating in- 
 formation received on the ground, that the rebels 
 were rapidly reenforcing, made it imperatively neces- 
 sary, in Grant's opinion, for the fort to be carried on 
 the 6th; otherwise he would have delayed another 
 day, to make the investment complete. His forces 
 were not up from Cairo in sufficient numbers to set 
 an earlier hour for the march : the orders Avere made 
 at ten o'clock at night, when the whole command had 
 not arrived, and McClernand was informed in writins", 
 that " success might dej)end very greatly upon the 
 celerity " of his operations. 
 
 Promptly at eleven o'clock, on the 6th, the march 
 began; the gunboats moved at the same hour, and 
 shortly before noon attacked the water-batteries, at a 
 distance of six hundred yards. After a severe and 
 rapid fire of an hour and a half, every gun was si- 
 lenced by the naval force, no vessel receiving serious 
 damage, except the Essex; she was struck in the 
 boiler by a shot which disabled her, killing and 
 wounding twenty-nine men by scalding. Her com- 
 manding officer, Porter, was among the wounded. 
 Nineteen soldiers were also injured on the same ship, 
 several of whom afterwards died. 
 
 The fort surrendered at discretion. Tilghman 
 was captured, with his staff, and sixty men who 
 had been retained to work the heavy guns in the 
 fort. The rest of the garrison had been stationed at 
 the outworks, about two miles off, to avoid the fire 
 
 * See Appendix for Grant's field order of the 5tb. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. .31 
 
 of tlie gunboats ; and before the figlit began, Tilgli- 
 man sent them orders to retreat upon Fort Donelson, 
 which they obeyed. 
 
 Grant's advance arrived in the rear of the place 
 about half an hour after the surrender, when the fort 
 and the prisoners were turned over to the army, but 
 the main rebel force had escaped. Pursuit was at 
 once made by the cavalry towards the Cumberland, 
 but the rebels had already got too far for this to 
 avail, and the troops were recalled. Two guns were 
 found, abandoned by the rebels in their retreat, and 
 thirty-eight prisoners were taken, probably straggler:^. 
 
 Neitlier Grant nor Foote had anticipated so rapid 
 a reduction of the fort, but if they had foreseen the 
 event, the movement of the national forces could not 
 have been hastened. There were eight miles to 
 march ; roads had to be cut through the woods, on 
 account of the ovei*flow, and several streams to be 
 bridged, the rains having rendered them too deep to 
 ford. During the delay of an hour or two thus oc- 
 casioned, the garrison had time to escape.* But even 
 had the attack been deferred another day, in order 
 first to complete the investment, the result would not 
 have been chan2:ed: for Tilarhnian had no idea of 
 holding the place longer than to enable his main force 
 to get away.f He posted his troops on the outer 
 
 * " Tlie plan of the attack, so far as tlie army reaching the rear of 
 the fort, to make a demonstration simultaneous with the navy, was 
 frustrated by the excessively muddy roads and the high stage of water, 
 preventing the arrival of our troops until some time after I liad taken 
 possession of the fort." — FooWs Report. 
 
 t "My infantry, artillery, and cavalry removed of necessity, to 
 avoid the fire of the gunboats, to the outworks, could not meet the 
 enemy there. My only chance was to delay the enemy every moment 
 possible, and retire the command, now outside the main work, towards 
 Fort Donelson, resolving to suffer as little loss as possible, I retained 
 
32 MILITAEY inSTOET OF 
 
 line, where tliey could start for the Cumberland at a 
 moment's notice, and they did start, before the fate 
 of the place was determined. After this, he fought 
 only for time. The defence, though short, was gal- 
 lant and soldierly. Tilghman staid mth his guns to 
 the last, and even worked one himself, Avhen the en- 
 durance of his men bes^an to fail. His casualties 
 were five killed and sixteen wounded. Foote lost 
 two men killed and thirty-seven wounded, besides 
 the nineteen soldiers already mentioned. The Cin- 
 cinnati was struck thii-ty-one times, and the Essex 
 fifteen; the other two armored boats received, one 
 six, the other seven shots.* 
 
 Grant at once telegraphed to Halleck : " Fort 
 Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries 
 before the investment was completed. *•»■»* 
 
 only the heavy artillery company to fight the guns, and gave the order 
 to commence the movement at once. * * * 
 
 " The enemy, ignorant of any movement of my main body, but 
 kno'W'ing that they could not engage them behind an intrenched 
 camp, until after the fort was reduced and the gunljoats retired, with- 
 out being themselves exposed to the fire of the latter, took a position 
 north of the forks of the Dover road, in a dense wood (my order being 
 to retreat by way of Stewart road), to await the result. At 11 A. m. 
 the flotilla assumed their line of battle. I had no hope of being able, 
 successfully, to defend the fort against such overwhelming odds, both 
 in point of numbers and in calibre of guns. My object was to save 
 the main body by delaying matters as long as possible, and to this end 
 I bent every eS"oi-t. * * * 
 
 "I ordered Colonel Heiman to join his command, and keep up the 
 retreat in good order, whilst I would fight the guns as long as one was 
 left, and sacrifice myself to save the main body of my troops." — Tihjli- 
 manh Report. 
 
 The report of Colonel Heiman, who commanded the rebel troops 
 that escaped, is to the same efl'ect. 
 
 * I have availed myself very fully in this chapter, of the rebel reports 
 of the battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donclson. Whatever statement 
 I make of the rebel strength or movements is taken from these sources, 
 unless otherwise stated. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 88 
 
 I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on tLe 8th, and 
 return to Fort Henry." This was the tirst mention 
 of Fort Donelson, whether in conversation or dis- 
 ])atches, between the two commanders. Ilalleck 
 made no reply, but notified Buell on the 7th, " Gen- 
 eral Grant expects to take Fort Donelson, at Dover, 
 to-morrow." "' 
 
 On the 7th, Grant's cavalry penetrated to within a 
 mile of Fort Donelson, and all the rebel pickets were 
 driven in, but no definite information was obtained 
 of the numbers of the enemy. It was ascertained, 
 however, that the force from Fort Henry had joined 
 the garrison on the Cumberland, and Grant informed 
 Halleck : " If any reenforcemeuts were on the way for 
 this place, no doubt they have gone or ^vill go there 
 also." On the same day, in pursuance of his intention 
 to take Fort Donelson on the 8th, all the infantry 
 and cavalry on the east bank of the Tennessee were 
 notified to be prej^ared to move at an early hour on 
 the 8th, with two days' rations intheir haversacks, 
 and " without encumbranceaJj^S^^^^^t^^^mpas- 
 sable state of the roads,'!^aH'lSant, '^fls^^^^iu 
 impracticable to move th* bag^^g^ Qld arli^ile^y.". , 
 
 But the heavy rains, ^kian uiuisiialiy hi^S'^ge 
 of water in the Tennesse^'^^^^9(|j^Q^jl^^^«mtry, 
 that he was prevented from actin^'^W^isrv^eiy for sev- 
 eral days. " At present," he wrote, " we are perfectly 
 locked in." " The banks are higher at the water's 
 edge than further back, leaving a wide margin of 
 low land to bridge over, before anything can be done 
 
 * Halleck congratulated Foote in tliese words : " I bave this mo- 
 ment received the official report of your capture of Fort Henry, and 
 hasten to congratulate you and your command for your brilliant suc- 
 
 CC&J." 
 
 3 
 
34 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 inland." On the Stli, lie wrote : " I contemplated 
 taking Foi-t Donelson to-day with infantry and cav- 
 aliy alone ; but all my troops may be kept busily 
 engaged in saving what we now have from the rap- 
 idly rising water." During this delay, every exer- 
 tion was made to secure reinforcements. These were 
 brou2:ht from Bu ell's command, and from that of 
 Major-General Hunter, in Kansas. Halleck also sent 
 Brigadier-General Cullum, his chief of staff, to Cairo, 
 to superintend the transportation of troops to the 
 front, and to do whatever should be necessary to 
 facilitate Grant's movements. 
 
 General Halleck, however, indicated to Grant no 
 wish that the latter should advance. His orders 
 were solely of a defensive character. On the 8th, he 
 telegraphed: "If possible, destroj'- the bridges at 
 Clarksville. Shovels and picks will be sent you to 
 strengthen Fort Henry. The guns should be trans- 
 ferred and arranged so as to resist an attack by land. 
 The redan on south bank should be arransred for 
 same ol)ject. Some of the gunboats from Fort Holt 
 will be sent up. Beenforcements will reach you 
 daily. Hold on to Fort Henry at all hazards. Im- 
 press slaves, if necessary, to strengthen your position 
 as rapidly as j)ossible. It is of vital importance to 
 strengthen your position as ra])idly as possible." On 
 the 10th, he continued in the same strain : " If possible, 
 destroy the bridges at Clarksville. Bun any risk to ac- 
 complish this. Strengthen land side of Fort Henry, 
 and transfer guns to resist a land attack. Picks and 
 shovels are sent. Large reenforcements will soon join 
 you." 
 
 Grant, however, did not wait for the reenforce 
 ments, and on the 10th, while Halleck was writing 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 35 
 
 jibout picks and shovels, lie informed Foote tliat he 
 was only delaying for the return of the gunboats, 
 which, after the fall of Fort Henry, had gone up the 
 Tennessee as far as Florence, Alabama. " I have been 
 waiting very patiently for the return of the gunboats 
 under Commodore Phelps to go around on the Cum- 
 berland, whilst I marched my land forces across, to 
 make a simultaneous attack upon Fort Donelson. I 
 feel that there should be no delay in this matter, and 
 yet I do not feel justified in going, without some of 
 your gunboats to cooperate. Can you not send two 
 boats from Cairo immediately up the Cumberland ? " 
 To expedite matters, he offered Foote any steamers 
 that might be at Cairo, to tow the fleet ; and, " should 
 you be deficient in men, an artillery company can be 
 temporarily detached to serve on the gunboats." 
 " Start as soon as you like," he said ; " I will be ready 
 to cooperate at any moment." News had now come 
 in that the rebels were reenforcing Fort Donelson, in 
 anticipation of an attack, and this promptness which 
 Grant urged, was a matter of vital importance. If he 
 delayed in order to strengthen Fort Henry " on the 
 land side," and" to " arrange the redan," Fort Donelson 
 might never be taken. On the 11th, Foote, with his 
 fleet, started by the Ohio and Cumberland rivers. 
 Six regiments of troops (all the reinforcements which 
 had yet arrived) were sent by the same route without 
 being debarked. They were to follow the gunboats 
 up the Cumberland, to effect a landing below Fort 
 Donelson, and as near the fort as practicable, to estab- 
 lish a base for supplies in the new campaign, and to be 
 in readiness to cooperate with the force that should 
 go across by land. 
 
 On the 11th, troops under McClernand moved out 
 
36 MILITAEY mSTOEY OF 
 
 tliree or four miles on the two roads leading to Fort 
 Donelson, and early on the morning of the 12tli, the 
 main column, fifteen thousand strong, marched from 
 Fort Henry, leaving a gamson of twenty-five hundi'ed 
 men ; eight light batteries accompanied the exj^edi- 
 tion. Neither tents nor baggage was taken ; there were 
 but few wagons, and no rations save those in haver- 
 sacks, all supplies having been ordered direct from 
 Cairo to the Cumberland. Brio-ade and rea'imental 
 commanders, however, were instructed to see that all 
 their men were supplied with forty rounds of am- 
 munition in their cartrido;e-boxes. The foremost 
 brigade was ordered to move by the telegraph road, 
 directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for further or- 
 ders at a distance of two miles from the fort. The 
 other brigades were to move by the Dover road, halt- 
 ing at the same distance, and form a continuous line 
 with the other wing. In order to cut off all retreat 
 by the Cumberland, one brigade was ordered to be 
 thrown into Dover, about two miles south of Donel- 
 son. The strength of the enemy was so variously re- 
 ported, that it was impossible to give exact details for 
 the attack, but Grant promised : " The necessary or- 
 ders will be given on the field." * The distance be- 
 tween the two forts was only twelve miles, and soon 
 after mid-day. Grant's little army appeared in front 
 of the rebel lines. No obstacle was opposed to the 
 march, although nothing would have been easier than 
 to prepare obstructions. 
 
 Donelson was one of the strongest works then 
 established in the entii*e theatre of war; it was sit- 
 uated on the west bank of the Cumberland, north of 
 the to^vn of Dover, on a peculiarly rugged and in- 
 
 * See Appendix for Grant's field order in full. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT '6*1 
 
 accessible series of hills, some of tliem rising abruptly 
 over a hundred feet ; every advantage had been taken 
 of the character of the ground; the country was 
 densely wooded, but the timber had l)een felled far 
 out in advnnce of the breastworks, the smaller trees 
 chopped till they stood about breast-high, and the 
 limbs left attached to the stumps, forming an un- 
 usually difficult abatis. Two streams set back from 
 the Cumberland, whose waters were now high, and 
 these streams formed the right and left defences of 
 the rebel line, which extended nearly three miles, and 
 was strongly intrenched. At intervals inside, were 
 secondary lines and detached works, commanding the 
 outer intrenchments, which were more than two miles 
 from the river, and covered the town of Dover. The 
 slashinjT was continued between the rifle-pits and the 
 main fortification; streamlets, gullies, and ravmes 
 added to the strength of the place, and light batteries 
 were posted on commanding heights, as well as along 
 the advanced line. 
 
 The main fort itself was built on a precipitous 
 height, or rather range, cloven by a deep gorge open- 
 ing to the south ; it was about three-quarters of a 
 mile from the breastworks, and overlooked both the 
 river and the interior. It covered a hundred acres 
 of ground, and was defended by fifteen heavy guns 
 and two carronades. Water batteries, admirably lo- 
 cated to control the river navigation, were sunken on 
 the hillsides towards the Cumberland, and the entire 
 amount of rebel ai-tillery, including the light bat- 
 teries, was sixty-five pieces. The garrison numbered, 
 as nearly as can be ascertained, twenty-one thousand 
 men * a great part of whom had been recently thrown 
 
 * Sec note to page 51 for my authority for this estimate. 
 
38 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 into tlie works, from Bowling Green and Cumberland 
 City ; for the rebels appreciated the imjDoi-tance of 
 the position as fully as the national commander, and 
 strained every nerve to retain it.'^ As soon as Foi-t 
 Henry fell, they began to enlarge and strengthen the 
 fortifications at Donelson, working day and night to 
 be ready for the attack which they foresaw was at 
 hand ; reenforcements were poured in, and Buckner, 
 Pillow, and Floyd w^ere successively sent to com- 
 mand, each ranking his predecessor, who remained to 
 serve under the new superior. 
 
 About noon of the 12th, the rebel pickets were 
 met by Grant's advance, and rapidly driven in ; and 
 the fortifications were from this time gradually ap- 
 proached and surrounded, with occasional skirmish- 
 ing. The first line was formed in open fields oppo- 
 site the enemy's centre. Grant threw up no intrench- 
 ments, for at this period of the war the science of 
 earthworks had not been brouo-ht to such a deo-ree 
 of perfection as was afterwards attained. " As yet," 
 he said, " I have had no batteries thrown up, hoping 
 with the aid of the gunboats to obviate the neces- 
 sity." His left that night rested at a point on Hick- 
 man creek, and the line ran around ^vell towards 
 Dover on the right ; on account of the overflow, it 
 did not, however, quite extend to the river on either 
 side, but Donelson was practically invested. The 
 advance to the right had to be made with extreme 
 caution, for the ground was very much broken, with- 
 out roads, and covered with an almost impenetrable 
 growth of small oak. On the left, however, Grant 
 
 * Pollard, a rebel historian, says, the rebel generals held a conference, 
 
 and decided to fight for Nashville, at Donelson, and accordingly sent 
 thither every thing they could spare fi'om Bowling Green. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 39 
 
 was able to communicate by tlie creek, ^vitli Lis trans- 
 Y)OTis and gunboats, while tlie enemy was completely 
 out off from escape in that direction. When tlie siege 
 began, General C. F. Smith had the left, and McCler- 
 nand the right, of the national line. Grant's head- 
 quarters were in the rear of Smith's division, on the 
 Fort Henry road. There ^vere l)ut three professional 
 soldiers in the entire command — Grant himself. Smith, 
 and Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of Grant's staff.* 
 
 The 13 th was occupied in selecting and still fur- 
 ther reconnoitring the ground, and getting into po- 
 sition; owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and 
 of the reenforcements sent by water, no attack was 
 made, but the investment was extended on both 
 flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works. 
 Skirmishers were thrown out actively in front, and 
 several smart fights occurred, but with no result of 
 importance. They were in no case intended for real 
 assaults, but simply as attempts to discover the force 
 and jiosition of the enemy, and to establish the na- 
 tional line. An attempt was made by McClernand 
 to capture a battery commanding the ridge road on 
 which Grant moved, but this was without orders, 
 and unsuccessful, though gallantly made ; three regi- 
 ments were engaged in the affair. On the first t^\-o 
 days, Grant lost al)out three hundred men, in killed 
 and wounded. The enemy, notwithstanding his 
 great superiority in numbers, made no effort to mo- 
 lest Grant, allowing him to continue the investment 
 at his leisure, a blunder almost equal to that of op- 
 posing no obstacle to the march from Fort Henry. 
 
 By the night of the 13th, Grant Avas established 
 
 * McPherson was at this time really on nalleck's staff, but detailed 
 as chief engineer for Grant dui'ing this campaign. 
 
10 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 on a line of lieiglits, in general parallel with the 
 enemy's outworks, and extending for a distance of 
 over three miles. Various spaces and elevations 
 afforded positions for artillery, and from these he 
 annoyed the enemy, but they were not of such a com- 
 manding character as to enable him to achieve de- 
 cided results. 
 
 At sunset on this day no reenforcements of im- 
 portance had yet arrived, and the gunboats were not 
 in sight. That night the weather became intensely 
 cold, the thermometer falling to ten degrees above 
 zero (Fahrenheit), and the troops, who were mostly 
 raw, and not yet inured to the hardships of war, suf- 
 fered extremely in consequence. They were obliged 
 to bivouac in line of battle, and "with arms in their 
 hands, for they lay within point-blank musket-range 
 of the enemy's breastworks. The rebel pickets were 
 out in strong force, and no fires could be built ; many 
 of the men had thrown away their blankets on the 
 march; they had insufficient rations, having been 
 careless of what they brought in their haversacks, and 
 the new supplies had not arrived. There were no 
 tents, and towards morning a drivins: storm of snow 
 and hail set in. Not a few of the soldiers on both 
 sides were frozen. An incessant firing was kept up 
 by the rebel pickets, and the groans of the wounded, 
 who lay shivering between the two armies, and call- 
 ing for help and water, were heard all night through 
 the storm. The force of the enemy at this time was 
 largely superior to Grant's, and that commander sent 
 across to Fort Henry for the garrison which had been 
 left there. 
 
 Before daylight of Friday, the 14th, however, 
 Commodore Foote came up the rivei-, and the troops 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 41 
 
 from Fort Henry -were landed, their advance having 
 arrived in the night. These, commanded by Briga- 
 dier-General Lewis Wallace, were at once put into 
 line. Grant added to them the other reenforcements, 
 now coming np the river, and gave them the centre, 
 between Smith and McClemand ; but one brigade 
 (jVIc Arthur's) of Smitli's division was moved to the 
 extreme right of the line. This day Grant, who had 
 received no word from Halleck, except orders to fortify 
 Fort Heniy, sent back a dispatch to his chief, dated : 
 " In the field, near Fort Donelson. We will soon want 
 ammunition for our ten and twenty-pound Parrott 
 guns. Already require it for the twenty-four pound 
 howitzers. I have directed my ordnance officer to 
 keep a constant watch upon the supply of ammuni- 
 tion, and to take steps in time to avoid a deficiency." 
 General CiiUum replied from Cairo : " The ammuni- 
 tion you want is not bere, and scarcely any ordnance," 
 Cullum, however, ^vrote encouragingly, " You are on 
 the great strategic line ; " and prophesied speedy suc- 
 cess. Durino; the whole of the 14th, a ramblina: and 
 irregular fire of sharpshooters was kept up, varied 
 with occasional discharges of artillery; the rebel 
 shells and round shot fell at times thickly within the 
 national lines, but the casualties Avere few. This 
 day, Grant ordered Colonel Webster, of his staff, to 
 make a reconnoissance, with a view to sending a force 
 above the town of Dover, to occupy the river bank. 
 
 At three o'clock on Friday, six gunboats, four of 
 which were iron-clad, attacked the fort at a distance 
 of four hundred yards. The elevation of the rebel 
 batteries was at least thirty feet, and gave them a 
 fine command of the river. Traverses secured them 
 a<2rainst an enfiladine: fire, and the task of attacking: 
 
42 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 tliem in front, was both dangerous and difficult. One 
 vessel alone received fifty-nine shots, and the others 
 about half that number each. The crash of heavy 
 iron falling on the metal armor, produced an unusual 
 and ringing sound, never heard in battle before. The 
 wheel of one iron-clad and the tiller of another, were 
 shot away, rendering the two boats unmanageable, 
 and they drifted do^^'n the stream. The two other ar- 
 mored V' essels were o-reatlv damasked between mnd and 
 water; and, during the attack, a rifled gun burst aboard 
 of one of them. The commodore was wounded, 
 fifty-four men were killed or wounded ; and, after an 
 engagement of an hour and a half, Foote was obliged 
 to withdraw, the enemy pouring a hot fire from all 
 the water batteries, while the fleet could reply with 
 only twelve guns. The gunboats were so disabled as 
 to be unfit to take any part of imi^oi^tance in the suc- 
 ceeding operations. Had this attack been successful, 
 Grant was to have assaulted on the land side ; but as 
 it failed, he remained in his lines. That day he 
 wrote : " Appearances now are that we shall have a 
 protracted siege here. -^ * * I fear the result of an 
 attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops. 
 I feel great confidence, however, of ultimately re- 
 ducing the place." 
 
 Another night of intense cold, and a furious storm 
 of sleet and snow came on, and the suflerings of the 
 night before were renewed. At two a. m. of the 
 15th, Grant was sent for by the wounded commo- 
 dore,* who could not get ashore ; and before daylight 
 
 * Flao-Ship St. Locis, February 14, 1S62. 
 
 General Grant, commanding United States Forces: 
 
 Dear Gekeral : Will you do me the favor to come on board at 
 your earliest conveuicncc, as I am disabled from walking by a contu- 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 43 
 
 lie went aboarel the flag-slilp, wliere Foote declared 
 that the condition of his fleet compelled him to put 
 back at once to Cairo, for repairs. He ui'ged Grant 
 to remain as quiet as possible, until the gunboats 
 could return and assist him, either by a new bom- 
 bardment, or in a j^rotracted siege. But Grant's 
 reenforcements had by this time begun to come in 
 heavily, and on the night of the 14th, his army 
 amounted to twenty-two thousand men. The rebels 
 had observed this increase of his strength, and felt 
 that his lines were being drawn closer around them 
 each hour; they determined not to wait fur the com- 
 pletion of the investment. 
 
 Accordingly, at early dawn on the morning of Sat- 
 urday, the 15th, massing heavily on their own left, 
 they came out of their works and made a fierce as- 
 sault on the right of the national line, where it did 
 not quite extend to the river. Grant had been 
 aboard the flag-ship but a short time, when McxVr- 
 thur's brigade, which held the extreme right, was at- 
 tacked ; all of McClernand's division, on Mci\j-thur's 
 left, was also soon ens-ao-ed. Tlie men fouofht stub- 
 bornly, and maintained the unequal struggle for hours, 
 but McArthur was finally obliged to give way with 
 heavy loss, and McClernand's command showed signs 
 of wavering. It held on, however, till Lewis Wallace 
 came up to the support from the centre, and made 
 the rebels pay dear fur what they had gained. 
 McClernand's men had not retreated until their am- 
 munition gave out, and then passing through the 
 ranks of the fresher troops, they halted within range 
 
 eion, and cannot possibly get to see you about tbc disposition of tlicso 
 vessels, all of which are more or less disabled. 
 
 A. S. FooTE, Flig-Ojjicer. 
 
44 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 of the enemy's miisketr}", to refill tlieir cartridge- 
 boxes. They liad been obliged, however, to leave a 
 batteiy in the hands of the rebels. The assault was 
 renewed upon Lewis Wallace with gi'eat vigor, and 
 he too was compelled to fall bade, though slowly and 
 fio-htincr hard ; and after several hours of incessant 
 combat, with both artillery and infantry, he was 
 able to check the rebel advance , but not until the 
 whole right wing had been pushed back upon his 
 division, and very nearly turned.* The behavior of 
 the troops in both IMcClernand and Lewis ^Yallace'3 
 command was all that could l^e desired. They only 
 gave way when their cartridge-boxes were emptv, 
 and after long hours of fighting that extorted unwill- 
 ing praise from their foes.f 
 
 Grant was returning to his headquarters from the 
 flag-ship, at about nine o'clock, when he met an aide 
 galloping up to inform him of the assault. This was 
 the first information he had of the battle : he next 
 met C. F. Smith, who had not yet been engaged, and 
 learning from him the position of affiiirs on the right, 
 at once directed him to hold himself in readiness to 
 assault the rebel risrht with his whole command. 
 Riding on, he soon reached the point where the hard- 
 est fighting had occurred. The rebels had failed to 
 make their way through the national lines, and were 
 doggedly retiring. Still, the national troops were 
 very much disordered ; most of them had never been 
 in battle before, and not a few were yet unfamiliar 
 
 * All the rebel reports explain the intention in the assault to have 
 been to destroy Grant's right wing, rolling it back on his left, and to 
 open a Tvay for themselves to Nashville. Pillow says : " We had 
 fought the battle to open the way for our army, and to relieve us from 
 his investment." 
 
 t See rebel reports, passim. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 45 
 
 ^vitll the use of their muskets. The giving out of the 
 ammunition in the cai-tiidge-boxes, and the unusually 
 heavy loss in field officers, had created great confusion 
 in the ranks. There was no pursuit, and the battle 
 was merely lulled, not ended. The men, like all raw 
 troops, imagined the enemy to be in overwhelming 
 force, and reported that the rebels had come out with 
 knapsacks and haversacks, as if they meant to stay 
 out, and fight for several days. Grant at once in- 
 quired : " Are the haversacks filled ? " Some pris- 
 oners were examined, and the haversacks found to 
 contain three days' rations. " Then they mean to cut 
 their Avay out ; they have no idea of staying here to 
 fight us ; " and looking at his own disordered men, 
 not yet recovered from the shock of battle. Grant 
 exclaimed: "Whichever party first attacks now, 
 will whip, and the rebels will have to be very quick, 
 if they beat me." 
 
 Putting spurs to his horse, he rode at once to the 
 left, where the troops, not having been engaged, were 
 still fresh, and ordered an immediate assault. As 
 they rode, the general and his staff reassured the men 
 with the news that the rebels were getting desperate, 
 and that the attack of the morning was an attempt 
 to cut their way out, not an ordinary and confident 
 assault. xVs soon as the troops caught this idea, they 
 took new courage. Scattered, until now, in knots all 
 over the field, they at once re-foi-med, and went tow- 
 ards the front. At this time. Grant sent a request 
 to Foote, to have all the gunboats make their ap- 
 pearance to the enemy. "A terrible conflict," he 
 said, " ensued in my absence, which has demoralized 
 a ],)ortion of my command, and I think the enemy is 
 much more so. If the gunboats do not appear, it 
 
46 MIUTARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 will reassure the enemy, and still further demoralize 
 our troops. I must order a charge to save appear- 
 ances. I do not expect the gunboats to go into 
 action." Two of the fleet, accordingly, ran up the 
 river, and threw a few shells at Ions; rano-e. ^VfcCler- 
 nand and Lewis Wallace were informed of Smith's 
 orders to assault, and directed to hold themselves in 
 readiness to renew the battle in their front, the mo- 
 ment Smith beo-an his attack. To McClernand, the 
 order was, " to push his column to the river if possi- 
 ble, otherwise to remain in statu quo, maintaining his 
 present position." 
 
 Smitk^s assaulting column was formed of Lau- 
 man's brigade, the Second Iowa infantry having the 
 lead. Smith formed the regiment in two lines, with a 
 front of five companies each, thirty paces apart. He 
 told the men what they had to do, and took his posi- 
 tion between these two lines. The attack was made 
 Avith great vigor and success. The ground was bro- 
 ken and diflScult, impeded with underbrush, as well 
 as extremely exposed ; but Smith, at the head of his 
 troops, charged directly on the rebel works. The ene- 
 my, having massed on his o^ti left, earlier in the day, 
 for the morning's assault, could not get reenforcements 
 around, in time to repel the national column, which 
 earned the rebel lines at the point of the bayonet, and 
 forced its way under a galling fire and up a steep hill, 
 inside the intrenchments, thus securing the key to Fort 
 Donelson. McClernand and Lewis Wallace, on the 
 right and centre, supported Smith by attacks on their 
 immediate front. The troops of tliese two officers, 
 although so hotly engaged earlier in the day, were 
 still able to act vigorously in the afternoon. They 
 found the enemy in position near his works, and, after 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4.1 
 
 a short and spirited contest, drove liini into tliem, ob- 
 taining possession of the ground and the guns that 
 had heen wruno* from themselves in the mornini;^. 
 They thus did important service, detaining a large 
 rebel force in their own front, and subtracting from 
 the enemy's strength at the key-point of the tight. 
 Night came on before the battle was decided, but 
 Smith maintained his position inside the rebel works, 
 and a half an hour more of daylight would have suf 
 ficed to carry the fort.* Grant perceived this, and 
 declared that the rebels were fighting only for dark- 
 ness.f 
 
 Grant slept in a negro hut that night, and Smith, 
 with his troops, on the frozen ground they had won ; 
 while inside the fort occurred one of the most remark- 
 able scenes of the war. Floyd summoned his highest 
 officers, to consult them about the propriety of a sur- 
 render. The opinion was greatly in favor of such a 
 course ; Buckner, whose troops were opposite Smith's, 
 and certain to be attacked at dawn, asserting that he 
 could not hold out half an hour after the fight l)egan. 
 Floyd then announced his determination to desert the 
 troops who had fought under him so well ; he declared, 
 however, that he had doubts of the military propriety 
 of this conduct, and asked the addce of his inferiors, 
 most of whom intimated very plainly their disappro- 
 bation of his recreancy. Buckner told him every man 
 must judge for himself in such matters; but Pillow 
 
 * See Buckner's report. 
 
 t " Having carried the advanced works on the enemy's right, and 
 effected a lodgment in his intrenchmcnts, -we had secured a key to his 
 position ; we had obtained a front having about as great an elevation 
 as any portion of his works, and where we could plant our artillery to 
 silence his, and enfilade a portion of his defences, at the same time 
 making -use of his rifle-pits to cover our men:'— ifcPherson'a Jiej^ort. 
 
48 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 declared that lie would follow Floyd's example, as 
 "there were no two men in the Confederacy the 
 Yankees would rather capture than themselves." Ac- 
 cordingly, Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, 
 and he in his turn transferred it to Buckner. The 
 last-named general was a soldier, by education and 
 feeling, and did not consider it consonant with his 
 military honor to avoid the fate reserved for his 
 troops ; Lut Floyd and Pillow confessed in so many 
 words, that "personal reasons controlled them." 
 
 Buckner at once sent a bugler and note to Grant, 
 asking terms. In the interim before receiving a re- 
 ply, he allowed Floyd to escape across the river, with 
 as many troojDS as could get aboard of two steamers 
 lying at the wharf. The men crowded to the shore 
 in the cold and darkness, and in great confusion, fill- 
 ing the steamers to their utmost capacity, those who 
 remained cursins; and hissinof the officers who were 
 leaving them to their fate. In all about three thou- 
 sand were ferried off on the transports ; finally, at 
 daybreak, one of Buckner's staff announced that the 
 capitulation had been concluded, and no more de- 
 partui'es could be allowed, and Floyd pushed off.* 
 Pillow escaped on a hand-flat, and Colonel Forrest, 
 commanding the cavalry, took his own men and about 
 two hundred more, and with these waded the stream 
 on the south side of the fort ; the water was too deep 
 
 * " Such was the ■want of all order and disciphne by tLis time on 
 shore, that a wild rush was made at the boat, which the cai:)taiu said 
 would swamp her unless he pushed oflf immediately. This was done, 
 and about sunrise the boat on wbich I was, the other having gone, left 
 the shore, and steered up the river. By this precise mode I effected 
 my escape, and after leaving the wharf, the Department will be pleased 
 to hear, that I encountered no dangers whatever from the enemy."— 
 Floyd's Sxq^2^Umentary Jiq)ort. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 49 
 
 for infantry, and intensely cold ; many of the fugi- 
 tives were frozen in crossing, but most of them found 
 their way to Nashville * f 
 
 Grant was preparing to storm the intrench ment-^, 
 when Buckner's messenger arrived, and the white flag 
 was hoisted on Foi-t Donelson. The rebel commander 
 proposed an armistice till twelve o'clock, and the ap- 
 pointment of commissioners to settle tenns of capitu- 
 lation, " in consideration of all the circumstances gov- 
 erning the present situation of affairs at this station ; " 
 but Grant replied : " No terms except unconditional 
 and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose 
 to move immediately upon your works." Whereupon 
 Buckner made haste to answer : " The disposition of 
 forces under my command, incident to an unexpected 
 chano-e of commanders, and the overwhelming force 
 under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the 
 brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to 
 accept the ungenerous and uuchivalrous terms which 
 you propose." J 
 
 Grant mounted his horse, and rode direct to 
 Buckner's headquarters. He told that general that 
 
 * The rebel official reports set forth these proceedings very fully, 
 and the opinion entertained by the junior officers, of Floyd and Pil- 
 low's behavior is clearly expressed. After their flight, these individ- 
 uals were called upon by their superiors for explanations, which were 
 pronounced unsatisfactory ; a decision in which history will concur. 
 See Appendix for a message of 3Ir. Jefferson Davis to the rebel Con- 
 gress, on this subject. 
 
 t " It is unbecoming in soldiers to criticise the conduct of superiors, 
 but, when, after rejecting the connsels of juniors, t\\e condition of af- 
 fairs is placed beyond the power of human nature to retrieve, the se- 
 nior endeavors to escape responsibility by throwing the same upon the 
 fanner, comment is unnecessary." — Report of Major Brown, Twentieth 
 Mississippi. (The italics are his own.) 
 
 I See Appendix for Grant and Buckner's correspondence in 
 fulL 
 
 4 
 
50 julitary history of 
 
 he had no desire to humiliate his prisoners, but would 
 allow the officers to retain their side-arms. Horses 
 and all public property must be given up, but the 
 officers and men might keep their personal baggage. 
 Grant and Buckner had been schoolmates at the 
 West Point Academy, and comrades afterwards, and 
 they breakfasted together at Buckner's quarters. 
 The latter acknowledged that it had been the inten- 
 tion of the rebel commanders to cut their way out, 
 the day before, but that Grant's operations had foiled 
 them. In the course of the conversation, he alluded 
 to Grant's, inferior force at the beginning of the siege, 
 and remarked : " If I had been in command, you 
 wouldn't have reached Fort Donelson so easily : " to 
 which Grant replied : " If you had been in command, 
 I should have waited for reenforcements, and marched 
 from Fort Henry in greater strength ; but I knew 
 that Pillow would not come out of his works to fight, 
 and told my staff so, though I believed he would 
 fight behind his works." * 
 
 Sixty-five guns, seventeen thousand six hundred 
 small-arms, and nearly fifteen thousand troops, fell 
 into the hands of the victor. On the morning of the 
 16th, as Grant was writing his report, aboard one of 
 the transports, Buckner entered his cabin, and the 
 former inquired how many troops had been surren- 
 dered. Buckner declared he could not exactly tell, 
 for his men had been deserting the fort all night, af- 
 ter it became known that a surrender would occur, 
 and no restraint had been placed on any who chose 
 to leave, until the capitulation had actually been 
 proj)osed. " You will not find," he said, " fewer than 
 
 * Pillow was iu command of Fort Donelson until the 13th, the 
 day after the siege began. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 51 
 
 twelve tliousand men, nor I tLink more tlian fifteen 
 thousand." 
 
 A few days afterwards, as the rel^cl prisoners were 
 leaving for the !North, on transports, it was announced 
 that General Buckner's steamer was ready. Ilis own 
 brigade of troops was aboard, and he invited Grant 
 to go with him and look at his soldiers, of whom he 
 was proud. Grant went with him, and the rebel 
 prisoners crowded around their captor, curiously but 
 respectfully. Buckner spoke to them, and told them 
 that General Grant had behaved with kindness and 
 magnanimity, and bade them remember this, if ever 
 the fortune of war allowed them to show him, or any 
 of his soldiers, the same treatment which they now 
 received. 
 
 On the last day of the fight. Grant had twenty- 
 seven thousand men, whom he could have put into 
 battle ; some few reiriments of these were not en- 
 gaged. Other reenforcements arrived on the 16th, 
 after the surrender, swelling his number still further. 
 Of artillery, he had but the eight light batteries which 
 started with him from Fort Henry, not near so many 
 guns as he captured. His entire losses during the siege 
 were two thousand and forty-one, in killed, wounded, 
 and missing ; of these, four hundred and twenty-five 
 were killed. No exact account of the rebel loss, other 
 than in captures, can be given ; but rations were 
 issued at Cairo, to fourteen thousand six hundred and 
 twenty-three prisoners, captured at Fort Donelson; 
 and Grant estimated that at least twenty-five hundred 
 rebels were killed or wounded during the siege.* 
 
 * There were rations issued at Cairo, to fourteen thousand six hun- 
 dred and twenty-three prisoners, captured at Fort Donelson. Buck- 
 ner, in his report, estimates that three thousand rebels got away with 
 
52 MTLITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 Ou tlie IGth, the day of the suiTeuder, General 
 Halleck's chief of staff cautioned Grant "not to be too 
 rash," and Halleck's first dispatch after the fall of 
 Fort Donelson was in these words : " Don't let gun- 
 boats go higher up than Clarksville. Even then, they 
 must limit their operations to the destruction of the 
 bridge and railroad, and return immediately to Cairo, 
 leaving one at Fort Donelson. Mortar-boats to be 
 sent back to Cairo as soon as possible." Halleck's 
 whole share in the desis-n or execution of this 
 campaign, was confined to forwarding reenforce- 
 ments, a duty which he performed with vigor and 
 alacrity.* 
 
 The rebels, in official reports, again and again de- 
 clared, that it was the assault on their right, ordered 
 at the crisis of the battle, when both sides were so 
 nearly exhausted, which turned the scale, and j^re- 
 vented them from cutting their way through the 
 
 Floyd ; and Pillow also says that several thousand infontry escaped 
 during the night of the 15th. According to Forrest's account, two 
 hundred got away with him besides his own cavahy, making at the 
 least one thousand with Forrest. Pillow reckons the rebel losses dur- 
 ing the siege at two thousand, which is doubtless an under estimate, 
 as the successful jiarty lost two thousand one hundred and forty, and 
 the heavy fighting was all done outside of the works, where the robela 
 could have had no advantage of cover. The calculation is therefore 
 simple : 
 
 Captured, 
 
 . 14,623 
 
 
 Escaped with Floyd, 
 
 3,000 
 
 
 Escaped with Forrest, 
 
 . 1,000 
 
 (A low estimate.) 
 
 Killed and wounded, . 
 
 3,300 
 
 (At least.) 
 
 Total rebel force at beginning 
 
 of siege, . . . 21,123 
 
 * It has been alleged that General Halleck planned the Donelson 
 campaign, and is entitled to the credit of its conception ; but it is only 
 just to say that I never heard that General Halleck himself put forth 
 any such claim. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 53 
 
 national lines.* General Cullum, Ilalleck's chief of 
 staff, wrote to Grant on the 20tli: "I received with 
 the highest gratification your reports and letters from 
 Fort Donelson, so gallantly captured under your bril- 
 liant leadership. I, in common with the whole coun- 
 try, warmly congratulate you upon this remarkable 
 achievement." Halleck, however, who was at St. 
 Louis throughout the siege, and received all his re- 
 ports of the campaign and capture, through General 
 Cullum, or direct from Grant, wrote no congratula- 
 tions to the victor.f On the contrar}', on the 19th of 
 February, three days after the fall of Fort Donelson, 
 he telegraphed to AYashington : " Smith, by his cool- 
 ness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle 
 was asrainst us, turned the tide and carried the 
 enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You 
 can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory, 
 and the whole country will applaud." J 
 
 On the morning of the surrender, when General 
 Buckner congratulated Smith on the gallant charge 
 which had carried the works the night before, the 
 old hero replied : " Yes, it was well done, considering 
 
 * Floyd, Pillovr, and Buckner, as well as their subordinates, agree 
 in this. 
 
 t He sent, however, the following dispatch to General Hunter, at 
 Fort Leavenworth : " To you, more than any other man out of this 
 department, are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my 
 strait for troops to reenforce General Grant, I applied to you. You 
 responded nol'ly, placing your forces at my disposition. This enabled 
 us to win the victory. Keceivc my most heart-felt thanks." 
 
 t On the 20th of February, the day after this dispatch was sent, 
 Halleck telegraphed to McClellan : " I must have command of the ar- 
 mies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden op- 
 portunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May 
 I resume (assume ?) the command ? Answer quick." 
 
 Compare these remarks about " hesitation and delay " with Halleck's 
 dispatch to Grant, of two days before, "limiting operations." p 53 
 
54 MTLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 the smallness of the force that did it. Ko cono-ratu- 
 lations are due me. I simply obeyed orders." * 
 
 Neither did the government agree with Halleck, 
 that Smith should receive the honors of this victory. 
 The Secretary of War at once recommended Grant 
 for a major-generalcy of volunteers, and the President 
 nominated him the same day. The Senate was in 
 session, and confirmed the nomination instantly, and 
 " the whole country applauded." f This was on the 
 19th of February, the day that Halleck recommended 
 C. F. Smith for the same grade. Mr. Stanton, who 
 had recently assumed the portfolio of the Secretary 
 of War, wrote a letter for print which was published 
 on the 20th of February, and in which the following 
 passage occurs : " We may well rejoice at the recent 
 victories, for they teach us that battles are to be 
 won now, and by us, in the same and only manner 
 that they were ever won by any people, or in any 
 age, since the days of Joshua — by boldly pursuing 
 and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of 
 Providence, I conceive to be the true organization 
 of victory and military combination to end this wai", 
 was declared in a few words, by General Grant's mes- 
 sage to General Buckner: 'I propose to move im- 
 mediately on your works.' " This was the beginning 
 of a support bestowed by the Secretary of War on the 
 Western general, which was never intermitted, while 
 the need of that support remained. 
 
 The consequences of the capture of Foi-t Donelsou 
 
 * See speech of Brevet Major-General Ra^vlins, chief of staff to 
 General Grant, before the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, No- 
 vember loth, 18G6. This speech Las afforded me much assistance. 
 Its record of dates is especially invaluable. 
 
 t Grant immediately recommended Smith for a major-generalcy, 
 for his behavior during the campaign. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 55 
 
 were greatly superior to any good fortune whicli Lad 
 at that time befallen tlie national arms, and were 
 Lardly surpassed, in a purely military point of view, 
 by tlie result of any operations of the war. The 
 great rebel line being penetrated at the centre, its ex- 
 tremities were both turned, while the reo-ion behind 
 was uncovered. The whole of Kentucky and Ten- 
 nessee at once fell into the possession of the national 
 forces; the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers were 
 opened to national vessels for hundreds of miles; 
 Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, and a place of 
 immense strategic importance, fell; Bowling Green 
 had become untenable as soon as Donelson was at- 
 tacked, and was abandoned on the lith, the day be- 
 fore the rebel works on the Cumberland were carried ; 
 while Columbus, at the other end of the line, was 
 evacuated early in March, thus leaving the Missis- 
 sippi free from the rebel flag, from St. Louis to Ar- 
 kansas. 
 
 The country was unacquainted at this time with 
 the principles of military science ; and as city after 
 city fell, and stronghold after stronghold was aban- 
 doned, all legitimate consequences of the capture of 
 Fort Donelson, the national amazement and gratifica- 
 tion knew no bounds. The effect on the spirits of the 
 soldiers and of the people, was indeed quite equal to 
 the purely military results. This was the first success 
 of any importance since the beginning of the war. 
 An inferior force had marched boldly up to a strongly 
 fortified post, and for three days besieged an army 
 larger than itself; then, after being reenforced, it had 
 not only defeated the enemy in the open field, con- 
 verting what had nearly been disaster into brilliant 
 victory, but compelled the unconditional surrender 
 
56 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 of one of the largest garrisons ever captured in war. 
 These were considerations which naturally enouo-h 
 elated and cheered the country, and absolutely in- 
 spired the army, depressed before by long delays and 
 defeats on many fields. The gratitude felt towards 
 Grant was commensurate with the success. He 
 stepped at once into a national fame. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 5V 
 
 CHAPTEK III. 
 
 Grant and Sherman — Beginning of their fiicndship — Grant goes to Nashville — • 
 Is relieved from command by Halleck — Smith placed in charge of expedi- 
 tion up the Tennessee — Grant supplies Smith from Fort Henry — Grant rein- 
 stated in command — Removes his headquarters to Savanna — Buell ordered 
 to reenforce him — Buell's delay — Skirmishing at Pittsburg Landing — The 
 Battle of Shiloh — Furious attack of the rebels — The national forces pre- 
 pared — Grant arrives on the field — Sherman's line breaks — Sherman's skill 
 and personal gallantry — Terrible fighting all over the field — The national 
 troops everywhere forced back — Grant's anxiety for Nelson and Lewis Wal- 
 lace's support — Those commanders repeatedly ordered up, but do not arrive — 
 Capture of Prentiss— Buell's arrival in person — His conversation with Grant 
 — The last attack of the rebels repulsed — Grant at Sherman's front— The sit- 
 uation at close of Sunday — Arrival of Buell's army in the night — Also of 
 Lewis Wallace— Attack by Grant on Monday — The rebels everywhere re- 
 pulsed — Grant leads a regiment — Rebels ask permission to bury their dead — 
 Results of the battle of Shiloh— Reflections. 
 
 OiT the 15tli of February, Grant was assigned to 
 the new military district of West Tennessee, with 
 " limits not defined." '* and Brisradier-General William 
 T. Sherman to the command of the District of Cairo. 
 Sherman had been at West Point with Grant, but 
 graduated three years earlier, and they had not since 
 
 * HEADQTTAKTERa, DlSTRTCT OF WeST Te.VSESSEE, 1 
 
 FoKT D0XEL8OS, February 1", 1602. f 
 
 General Orders, No. 1. 
 
 By virtue of directions from headquarters, Department of the Mis- 
 souri, dated February 15, 18G2, the undersigned has been assigned to 
 the command of the new mihtary district of West Tennessee. Limits 
 not defined. 
 
 (Signed) U. S. Gra>-t, Major- General Commanding. 
 
58 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 been intimate ; tlieir first official intercourse occurred 
 during the siege of Fort Donelson, when Sherman 
 forwarded troops and supplies to Grant with extraor- 
 dinary dispatch. Sherman was the senior, but, on the 
 13th of February, he wrote : " I will do every thing 
 in my power to hurry forward your reenforcements 
 and supplies ; and if I could be of service myself, 
 would gladly come, without making any question of 
 rank with you or General Smith." After the fall of 
 Fort Donelson, Sherman congratulated Grant warmly 
 on his success, and Grant replied : " I feel under many 
 obligations to you for the kind terms of your letter, 
 and hope that should an opportunity occur, you will 
 earn for yourself that promotion which you are kind 
 enough to say belongs to me. I care nothing for pro- 
 motion so long as our arms are successful, and no po- 
 litical appointments are made." 
 
 This was the beginning of a friendship destined 
 thereafter never to flag, to stand the test of apparent 
 rivalry and public censure, to remain firm under 
 trials such as few friendship's were ever subjected to, 
 to become warmer as often as it was souo;ht to be in- 
 terrupted, and in hours of extraordinary anxiety and 
 responsibility and care, to afford a solace and a sup- 
 port that were never lacking when the need arose. 
 
 On the 21st of February, General C. F. Smith, by 
 Grant's direction, took possession of Clarksville, about 
 fifty miles above Fort Donelson, and Grant wrote to 
 Cullum announcing the fact, and proposing the cap- 
 ture of Nashville, but said, " I am ready for any move 
 the general commanding may suggest." On the Slth, 
 he reported that Smith was at Clarksville, with four 
 small regiments, and added: "I do not purpose send- 
 ing more, until I know the pleasure of General Halleck 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 50 
 
 on tlie subject." On tlie 25tli, lie said : " I wrote you 
 that General Nelson's division (of Buell's army), liad 
 been sent to Nashville ; since then, I have learned that 
 the head of General Buell's column had arrived, on 
 Monday evening. The rebels have fallen back to 
 Chattanooo-a, instead of to Murfreesboro, as stated in a 
 former letter. I shall go to Nashville immediately 
 after the arrival of the next mail, should there be no 
 orders to j^revent it. I am getting anxious to know 
 what the next move is going to be." He went to Nash- 
 ville, accordingly, on the 27th. His object was to con- 
 sult with Buell about the disposition of their troops, 
 the jurisdiction of the two commands having become 
 somewhat confused during the recent movements. 
 On the 28th, he wrote: "I have just returned from 
 Nashville this morning. My impression is, from all I 
 can learn, the enemy have fallen back to Decatur or 
 Chattanooga. I have informed General Cullum that 
 General Buell ordered General Smith from Clarks- 
 ville, to join him at Nashville." On the 1st of March: 
 " I have informed the general commanding the de- 
 partment, generally through his chief of staff, every 
 day since leaving Cairo, of my wants, what infonna- 
 tion was obtained of the enemy," etc. The same dis- 
 patch contained a detailed declaration of the needs of 
 the command, for the information of General Halleck. 
 Up to this time, no hint of dissatisfaction had been 
 received by Grant. 
 
 The same day Halleck, with his usual caution, 
 wrote : " It will be better to retreat than to risk a 
 general battle. Avoid any general engagement with 
 strone forces." He then crave detailed instructions 
 to move the whole command from the Cumberland 
 back to the Tennessee, wdth a view to an expedition 
 
60 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 up the latter river to Eastport, and even to Corinth, 
 Mississippi.* Grant received these instructions on 
 the 2d, and on the 4th, the army was in motion for 
 the Tennessee, and he himself was as^ain at Fort 
 Henry. On the 3d of March, without a syllable of 
 previous explanation or intimation to Grant, Halleck 
 sent the following dispatch to the general-in-chief, at 
 Washington. "I have had no communication with 
 General Grant for more than a week. He left his 
 command without my authority, and went to Nash- 
 ville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by 
 the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Po- 
 tomac by the defeat of Bull Eun. It is hard to cen- 
 sure a successful general immediately after a victoiy, 
 but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no re- 
 turns, no reports, no infoimation of any kind from 
 him. Satisfied with his victoiy, he sits down and 
 enjoys it, without any regard to the future. I am 
 worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. 
 C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the 
 emergency." The next day, having probably received 
 authority from Washington, he telegraphed to Grant : 
 " You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in com- 
 mand of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort 
 Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report 
 strength and position of your command ? " 
 
 Grant replied on the 5th: "Your dispatch of 
 yesterday is just received. Troops will be sent under 
 command of Major-Genei-al Smith, as directed. T 
 had prepared a different plan, intending General 
 Smith to command the forces which should oo to 
 Pai'is and Humboldt, while I would command the 
 
 * Sec Appendix for Halleck's instructions in full for this expe- 
 dition. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 61 
 
 expedition upon Eastpoi-t, CorintL, and Jackson, in 
 person. . . I am not aware of ever having disobeyed 
 any order from yonr headquarters — certainly never 
 intended sucli a tiling. I liave reported almost daily 
 the condition of my command, and reported every 
 position occupied. . . In conclusion, I will say that 
 you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in 
 every particular to the best of my ability." 
 
 On the 6th, Ilalleck telegraphed to Grant: 
 *' General IMcClellan directs that you report to me 
 daily the number and position of the forces under 
 your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to 
 report the strength of your command, has created 
 great dissatisfaction, and seriously interfered with 
 military plans. Your going to Nashville without 
 authority, and when your presence with your troops 
 was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very 
 serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I 
 was advised to arrest you on your return." 
 
 On the 6th, Grant again telegraphed : " Your dis- 
 patch of yesterday just received. I did all I could to 
 get you returns of the strength of my command. 
 Every move I made was reported daily to your chief 
 of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly 
 posted. I have done my very best to obey orders, 
 and to cany out the interests of the service. If my 
 course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do 
 not wish in any way to impede the success of our 
 arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day 
 since leaving Cairo, to keep you informed of my posi- 
 tion, and it is no fault of mine if you have not re- 
 ceived my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly 
 intended for the good of the service, and not to 
 gratify any desire of my own. 
 
62 JIILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 " Believing sincerely that I must have enemies be- 
 tween you and myself, wlio are trying to impair my 
 usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from 
 further duty in the department." 
 
 After another rebuke from Ilalleck, of exactly the 
 same tenor, Grant replied, on the 9th : " You had a 
 better chance of knowing my strength, whilst my 
 command was suri'ounding Fort Donelson, than I bad. 
 Troops were reporting daily by your order, and Avere 
 immediately assigned to brigades. There were no 
 orders received from you till tbe 28tli of February, to 
 make out returns ; and I made eveiy effort to get 
 them in as early as possible. I renew my application 
 to be relieved from duty." On the 11th, Grant wrote 
 again to Halleck : " There is suck a disposition to find 
 fault with me, that I again ask to be relieved from 
 further duty, until I can be placed right in the esti- 
 mation of tkose hio-lier in authoritv." Other censures 
 were administered for alleged marauding allowed by 
 Grant, in answer to which he said : " I refer you to 
 my orders to suppress marauding, as the only reply 
 necessary." He had arrested officers for violation of 
 these orders, and sent them to St. Louis to report to 
 Halleck, more than a week previous. 
 
 On tbe 18th, Halleck replied : "You cannot be re- 
 lieved from your command. There is no good reason 
 for it. I am certain tkat all which the authorities at 
 Washington ask, is that you enforce discipline, and 
 
 punisb the disorderly Instead of relieving 
 
 you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the 
 field, to assume the immediate command, and lead it 
 on to new victories." Grant replied on the next day : 
 " After your letter, enclosing copy of an anonymous 
 letter, upon which severe censure was based, I felt as 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 63 
 
 tliougli it would be impossible for me to serve longer 
 without a coni-t of inqiiir3\ Your telegram, of yes- 
 terday, liowever, places such a different phase upon 
 my j^osition, that I will again assume command, and 
 give every effort to the success of our cause. Under 
 the worst circumstances, I would do the same." 
 
 A few days later, Halleck transmitted to Grant 
 copies of the following correspondence : 
 
 HEADQUAnTERS OF THE ArXTT, AdJUTANT-GeNEHAl's OfFICE, ) 
 
 Washington, March 10, 1862. ) 
 
 Major-General H. W. IIalleck, U. S. A., 
 
 Commanding Department of the Mississippi, St. Louis : 
 
 "It has been reported, that soon after the battle 
 of Fort Donelson, Brigadier-General Grant left his 
 command without leave. By direction of the Presi- 
 dent, the Secretaiy of War directs you to ascertain, 
 and report, whether General Grant left his command 
 at any time without proper authority, and if so, for 
 how long ; whether he has made to you proper re- 
 ports and returns of liis forces ; whether he has com- 
 mitted any acts which were unauthorized, or not in 
 accordance with military subordination or propriety, 
 and if so, what. 
 
 L. Thomas, Acljutant-Geneml. 
 
 Headquarters, Department of the Mississippi, ) 
 St. Louis, March 15, 1862. j' 
 
 Brigadier-General L. Thomas, 
 
 Adjutant-Gencralof the Army, Washing'.on : 
 
 In accordance with your instructions of the 10th 
 instant, I report that General Grant and several 
 officers of high rank in his command, immediately 
 after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to i^ashville, 
 without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, 
 however, from investigation, that General Grant did 
 
64 ]iIILITAEy HISTOEY OF 
 
 this from good intentions, and from a desii'e to sub- 
 serve the public interests. Kot being advised of 
 General Buell's movements, and learninsr that 
 General Buell had ordered Smith's di\asion of his 
 (Grant's) command to N'ashville, he deemed it his 
 duty to go there in person. During the absence of 
 General Grant, and a part of his general officers, nu- 
 merous irregularities are said to have occurred at 
 Fort Donelson. These were in vioLation of the orders 
 issued by General Grant before leaving, and probably 
 under the circumstances, were unavoidable. General 
 Grant has made the proper explanations, and has 
 been directed to resume his command in the field ; as 
 he acted from a praiseworthy although mistaken zeal 
 for the public service in going to Nashville, and leav- 
 ing his command, I respectfully recommend that no 
 further notice be taken of it. There never has been 
 any want of military subordination on the part of 
 General Grant, and his failure to make retui-ns of his 
 forces has been explained as resulting partly from 
 the failure of colonels of regiments to rej^ort to him 
 on their arrival, and partly from an interruption of 
 telegi-aphic communication. All these irregularities 
 have now been remedied. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, Major- General. 
 
 General Halleck, however, neglected to furnish 
 General Grant with a copy of the telegram of March 
 3d to Washington, and Grant replied to Halleck, on 
 the 24th of March : " I most fully appreciate your 
 justness. General, in the part you have taken, and 
 you may rely upon me to the utmost of my capacity 
 for carrying out all your orders." In the same letter 
 he remarked : "I do not feel that I have neo-lected a 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAIS^T. 65 
 
 single duty ; " and on tlie 31st of tlie month, Ilalleck 
 informed him : " General McClellan directed me to 
 place General Smith in command of the expedition, 
 until you were ordered to join it." * 
 
 It will be remembered that the limits of Grant's 
 command had never been defined, and it was thus for 
 overstepping the unknown boundaries of his district, 
 while in the legitimate discharge of his duties, that 
 on Ilalleck's report, the general-in-chief advised that 
 officer to place Grant in an-est. Smith took com- 
 mand of the expedition, and while the captor of Don- 
 elson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops 
 were pushed forward as far as Eastport on the Ten- 
 nessee. Grant, however, made every effort to secure 
 the success of the expedition, and on turning over the 
 command to Smith, congratulated him on his " richly 
 deserved promotion : " " Ko one " he said, " can feel 
 more pleasure than myself." On the 9th of March, 
 he wrote : " Any thing you may require, send back 
 transports for, and if within my power you shall have 
 it." On the 11th, referring to reenforcements that 
 were daily expected : *' General Halleck telegraphs 
 me . . . when they arrive, I may take the general 
 direction. I think it exceedingly doubtful whether 
 I shall accept; certainly not until the object of the 
 expedition is accomplished." Smith replied : " I wrote 
 you yesterday, to say how glad I was to find, from 
 your letter of the 11th, that you were to resume 
 your old conmiand, from which you were so uncer- 
 
 * General Halleck's telegram of the 3d of ^larch was not left on file 
 in the War Department, but was obtamecl by me after long research and 
 repeated efforts. I have not, however, been able to find General McClel- 
 lun's reply. The Honorable Edwin 'M. Stanton assured me that he never 
 heard that General Ilalleck had been authorized to place Grant in arrest 
 
Q6 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 emoniously, and, as I tliink, so unjustly strickeu 
 down." * 
 
 Halleck, meanwhile, continued his cautions to 
 Grant. On the 13th, he telegraphed : '' Don't bring on 
 any general engagement at Paris. If the enemy appear 
 in force, our troops must fall back." And on the 16th : 
 " As the enemy is evidently in strong force, my instruc- 
 tions not to advance, so as to brino; on a o-eneral en- 
 gagement, must be strictly obeyed. General Smith 
 must hold his position without exposing himself by 
 detachments, till we can strongly reenforce him." The 
 operations, however, were without result, and Smith 
 returned to Pittsburg Landing, on the western bank 
 of the Tennessee. It had been expected, that after 
 cutting the railroad near Eastport or Corinth, he 
 would establish himself at Savanna, a point about 
 nine miles lower down than Pittsburg: Landinsr, and 
 on the opposite side of the river; he, however, se- 
 lected the spot where the battle of Shiloh afterwards 
 occuiTed. 
 
 The object of the concentration of troo])s at these 
 places, was to secure positions which would command 
 the navigation of the Tennessee, and, at the same 
 time, form bases for operations in northern Alabama 
 and Mississippi; Corinth, especially, where the two 
 
 * The relations between Grant and Smith were of a peculiar char- 
 acter. When Smith was commandant at the !Aiilitary Academy, Grant 
 was there as a cadet ; he often told me of the awe he felt for his old 
 commander, and how difficult it was at first to give hun an order. 
 Smith, however, perceived this, and with great delicacy said to his 
 chief: " I am now a subordinate, and I know a soldier's duty. I hojie 
 you will feel no awkwardness about our new relations." Grant never 
 had a more subordinate officer, nor one more gallant, despite his age. 
 But Smith was sixty years old, and the exposure he underwent at 
 Fort Donelson produced an illness, which proved fatal before the next 
 summer. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 67 
 
 great railroads meet, that traverse the South, and con- 
 nect the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi with the 
 eastern paii; of the region then in rebellion, was a 
 position of the first strategic importance, sure to be 
 obstinately defended by the rebels, and the objective 
 point of any operations of the national commanders. 
 It was the key to the whole railroad system of com- 
 munication between the great states of Tennessee 
 and Mississippi, and, consequently, to the possession 
 of Tennessee itself, covering Memphis and the Missis- 
 sippi river from the national aimies. Pittsburg 
 Landino- is nineteen miles from Corinth. 
 
 The Tennessee, at this time, flooded all its shores, 
 except the two or three bluffs where landings had 
 been established (Savanna, Hamburg, Crump's, and 
 Pittsburg), so that no foothold could be obtained at 
 anv point on the river near Corinth, except at these 
 localities. The obvious advantage which the west 
 bank of the river presented was, that a rapid move- 
 ment could at any time be made from this base, with- 
 out the need of pontoons or transports for crossing 
 the troops ; of course, the same situation was pro- 
 portionately exposed to attack, but Smith was a good 
 soldier, and his selection of the site of Pittsburg 
 Landing, has been approved, under the light of all 
 succeedinor circumstances, bv both Grant and Sher- 
 man. 
 
 On the 13th of March, Grant was relieved from 
 his dissrrace: and on the l7th, he removed his head- 
 quarters to Savanna, and wrote to Sherman from that 
 place : " I have just arrived, and although sick for the 
 last two weeks, begin to feel better at the thought of 
 being again with the troops." The attention of the 
 rebels in this part of the country had now become 
 
68 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 concentrated upon Grant's forces, wliicli threatened 
 to obtain jDOSsession of the entire Southwest, unless 
 speedily opposed. Troops in great numbers were 
 accordingly hurried to Corinth, and the enemy was 
 evidently preparing in his turn to assume the offen- 
 sive. To counteract this. General Buell's command, 
 was included in that of Halleck, and Buell himself, 
 with five divisions, numbering nearly forty thousand 
 men, was ordered from Nashville, to the support of 
 Grant. And there was imminent need of such sup- 
 port. 
 
 The movements of Buell, however, were seldom 
 expeditious. As early as the 16th of March, Hal- 
 leck had informed Grant : " General Buell is march- 
 ing in this direction ; " and on the 20th, " Buell is 
 at Columbia, and will move on Waynesboro with 
 three divisions." On the 19th, Grant wrote to Buell: 
 "There is every reason to suppose that the rebels 
 have a large force at Corinth, and many at other 
 points on the road towards Decatur." On the 26th, 
 he informed Halleck: "My scouts are just in with a 
 letter from General Buell. The three divisions com- 
 ing this way are yet on east side of Duck river, de- 
 tained bridge-building." On the 2Tth: "I have no 
 news yet of any portion of General Buell's command 
 being this side of Columbia." On the 31st: "Two 
 soldiers from the head of McCook's command (of 
 Buell's army), came in this evening. Some of this 
 command crossed Duck river on the 29th, and estab- 
 lished guards eight miles out that night." On the 
 same day (the aist), he sent word to McCook : " I 
 have been looking for your column anxiously for 
 several days." On the 3d of April, he was finally 
 able to inform Halleck that " a dispatch from the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 69 
 
 telegraphic operator is just in. He states tliat Gen- 
 era! Nelson " (commanding BiielVs foremost division), 
 " is in sight. The advance will arrive prol^ably on 
 Saturday^" (April 5th). The distance Buell had to 
 march from Columljia, was ninety miles ; it took him 
 from the 19th of March to the Gth of April, seventeen 
 days ; he was delayed, bridge-building, and by bad 
 roads, and he had no knowledge that Grant was in 
 any extraordinary danger, or had any immediate in- 
 tention of attacking the enemy. His usual delibera- 
 tion was not more liable to criticism at this crisis, 
 than upon all other occasions. 
 
 When Grant reassumed immediate command, the 
 rebels were in force at Corinth, their strensfth va- 
 riously estimated, sometimes as high as a hundred 
 thousand men ; this, however, was an exaggeration. 
 Grant's army consisted of five divisions, under Major- 
 Generals MeClernand and C. F. Smith, and Brigadier- 
 Generals Le\Nds Wallace, Sherman, and Hurlbut. 
 The last two w^xa, at Pittsburs; Landinir, and Le^^-is 
 Wallace at Crump's Landing, on the left bank of the 
 rivei-, about five miles below ; while MeClernand and 
 Smith, with about half of the entire command, were 
 in camp at Savanna, or on transports near that land- 
 ing. The Tennessee river thus separated the two 
 portions of the army. Within an hour after his 
 arrival. Grant issued orders for the concentration of 
 the whole force, sending Smith and McClemand's 
 divisions as fast as boats could caiTy them, up to 
 Pittsburg. Lewis Wallace was considered to be 
 within sujDporting distance, at Crump's Landing, on 
 the same side of the river as the bulk of the com- 
 mand, and he was therefore left to guard the Purdy 
 road. McClei'nand was detained a day or two, by 
 
70 MILITARY inSTOEY OF 
 
 lack of transpoiiiatioii, and Grant himself remained at 
 Savanna, to superintend tlie organization of troops 
 constantly arriving from Missouri, and because from 
 there he could communicate more readily with Buell, 
 whose deliberate movements had not yet brought 
 him within supporting distance of the Army of the 
 Tennessee. But although his headquarters were thus 
 retained at Savanna, Grant visited the forces at Pitts- 
 burg Landing daily. 
 
 Brigadier- General Prentiss was ordered to report 
 to Grant at this time, and another division was or- 
 ganized for him, out of the new troops constantly 
 arriving. Six regiments were thus assigned, and sent 
 at once to join the main army, at Pittsburg. But a 
 question of rank was raised at the front, by McCler- 
 nand, who claimed command in the absence of Grant. 
 The latter was unwilling to trust McClernaud with 
 this responsibility ; and as the relative -rank of the 
 division generals was unsettled, he determined to 
 move his own headquarters to Pittsburg, and obviate 
 the difficulty by assuming command in person.* He 
 had made his arrangements to this effect, when a mes- 
 sage was brought him from Buell, dated the 4th of 
 April, requesting Grant to remain at Savanna, on the 
 5th, as he would arrive there on that day. " I shall 
 be in Savanna myself to-morrow, with perhaps two 
 divisions," said Buell ; " can I meet you there ? " 
 
 * March 2T, 1SC2. 
 
 " I visited tlie different divisions at Pittsburg to-day 
 
 ISIews having arrived of the promotion of General McClernand to the 
 rank of major-general, -witliout the date of promotion of either him or 
 General Smith being known, makes it necessary for me to move my 
 headquarters from this place to Pittsburg. I will not go up, however, 
 until something further is heard from General Buell's command, and 
 until full directions arc given for their transfer to this place." — Grant 
 to JIalleck, 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. ( 1 
 
 Grant replied on tlie 5tli: "Your dispatch just re- 
 ceived. I will be here to meet you to-morrow. The 
 enemy, at and near Corinth, are probaldy from sixty 
 to eighty thousand." Buell, however, did not arrive 
 till the 6th, or if otherwise, did not make it known 
 to his superior, and Grant remained to meet him.* 
 
 Halleck's instructions to Grant had continued 
 very positive, not to bring on a general engagement 
 until Buell should arrive; and several expeditions, 
 some suggested by Halleck, and others by Grant, 
 wtjre countermanded or forbidden by the former, lest 
 a battle should be provoked. In accordance with 
 tliese directions, Grant remained strictly on the de- 
 f(3nsive, although he did not concui' with the views 
 of his superior. On the 23d of March, he wrote to 
 Smith : " Cany out your idea of occupying, and par- 
 ticularly, fortifying. Pea Eidge. I do not hear one 
 word from St. Louis. I am clearly of the opinion 
 that the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth, 
 quite as rapidly as we are here, and, the sooner we 
 attack, the easier Avill be the task of taking the 
 place. If Kuggles is in command, it would assuredly 
 be a good time to attack." 
 
 There was skirmishing daily after the 2d of April, 
 and on the 4th, the enemy felt Sherman's front in 
 force, but nothing serious came of it, and the opinion 
 of that commander was decided that no probability 
 of an immediate enojafj-ement existed. Grant rode 
 out on the day after, to Sherman's lines, and con- 
 curred with him in this judgment. They were both 
 mistaken, fur the *skirmish was the reconnoissance 
 
 * General Buell's official report states that he amved at Savanna 
 on the 5th, but Grant was not notified of this, and consequently had 
 no suspicion of the fact. 
 
72 3IILITAB,Y HISTORY OF 
 
 of the enemy, preliminary to the battle of Shiloli. 
 This affair, however, awoke attention, and put both 
 officers and men on the alert.* As Grant was riding 
 back from tLe front to Pittsburg Landing, after dark 
 on the 4th, the night l)eing rainy, his horse slipped 
 in crossing a log, and fell on his rider, who received 
 in consequence a severe contusion. Tliis lamed him 
 for over a week, and also occasioned him acute pain 
 for several days.f 
 
 The same day, Lewis "Wallace reported eight regi- 
 ments of rebel infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry 
 at Purdy, and an equal if not larger force at Bethel, 
 four miles further from the river. Grant, accordino-ly, 
 notified W. H. L. Wallace (in command of Smith's 
 division), to hold himself in readiness to move his 
 entire command to the support of Lewis Wallace. 
 "Should you find danger of this sort, reenforce him 
 at once with your entire division." To Sherman he 
 wrote: " Liformation, just received, would indicate 
 that the enemy are sending a force to Purdy, and, it 
 may be, with a view to attack General Wallace at 
 Crump's Landing. I have directed W. H. L. Wal- 
 lace, commanding Second division temj^orarily, to reen- 
 force General L. Wallace, in case of an attack, with 
 his entire division, although I look for nothing of the 
 kind ; but it is best to be prepared. I should advise, 
 therefore, that you advise your advance guards to 
 keep a sharp lookout for any movement in that direc- 
 tion, and, should such a thing be attempted, give all 
 the support of your division, and General Hurlbut's, 
 
 * Tliore were several prisoners taken, v,\w threatened that '' the 
 Yankees would catch hell soon." 
 
 t This circumstance probably originated the newspaper report that 
 Grant was drunk and thrown from his horse at the battle of Shiloh. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 73 
 
 if Tiecessaiy. I will return to Pittsburg Landing 
 at an early Jiour to-moiTow, and ride out to your 
 camp." 
 
 On Saturday, April /jth, the enemy's cavalry was 
 again verv bold, coniinG; well down to Sherman's 
 front. This day, the head of Nelson's column ariived 
 at Savanna, and Nelson himself reported to Grant, 
 wlio in person directed him to march his command to 
 a position south of Savanna, and about live miles 
 from the point opposite Pittsburg Landing ; there, he 
 was to hold himself in readiness to reenforce the 
 army on the left bank, in case of need. The order 
 was obeyed, and Grant having made all his prepara- 
 tions for removing his headquarters to Pittsburg on 
 the morrow, remained to meet Buell, as that officer 
 had desired. 
 
 The battle-field of Shiloh is a thickly- wooded and 
 broken countiy, interspersed with patches of cultiva- 
 tion, and reaching back from the bluffs at Pittsburg 
 Landing, from two and a half to three miles. Snake 
 creek on the north, and Lick creek on the south, run 
 almost at right angles with the Tennessee, and empty 
 into it aljout three miles a2:)art. These were the right 
 and left defences of the national line, and between 
 them the battle was fought. Owl creek, a small stream 
 running north, and nearly parallel with the Tennes- 
 see, empties into Snake creek, about three miles from 
 the river, and covered part of the right front of the 
 national army. All these streams were flooded. The 
 line faced mainly to the south and southwest ; and 
 the enemy, coming from Corinth, was thus compelled 
 to attack almost whollv in front. Shenuan was 
 posted on the right, in advance of the rest of the 
 army, and near a log cha])el, kno\\Ti as Shiloh meet- 
 
76 mLITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 Grant stopped at Crump's Landing, to see Lems 
 Wallace, and notified Mm in person of tlie undoubted 
 fact, wliicli had not yet been officially reported, that 
 a general engagement had begun, and that Wallace 
 must hold himself in readiness to march to the sup- 
 port of the main army at Pittsburg, or if the attack 
 there should prove a feint, to defend himself against 
 a probable movement upon him, from the direction 
 of Purdy, his situation being isolated, and somewhat 
 exposed. Wallace replied, that he would be in read- 
 iness for any orders which he might receive. This 
 interview took jjlace on the transport. Grant then 
 hurried on to the landino; at Pittsburs:, arrivino; there 
 at about eight o'clock. He rode at once to the front. 
 The rebel onset had begun in force, and with tre- 
 mendous vigor. Prentiss was first attacked, and then 
 Sherman ; but Prentiss having been warned, had 
 doubled his grand guards the night before, and 
 pushed out his pickets a mile and a half; he formed 
 his division in advance of its camps, and there it re- 
 ceived the first assault.* Sherman, too, having been 
 skirmishing since the 4th, w^as promptly under arms ; 
 and the other division commanders, admonished by 
 the movements of the last few days, had their horses 
 saddled, and were break:^asting early to be ready in 
 case of an attack.f They at once put their com- 
 
 * See Prentiss's report and rebel reports. 
 
 t " It was well known the enemy were approaching our lines, and 
 there had been more or less skirmishing for three days preceding the 
 battle. The consequence was our breakfasts were ordered at an early 
 hour, and our horses saddled to be ready in case of an attack." — Ee- 
 port of Major- General McPherson, dated Lal-e Providence, La., March 
 26, 1803. 
 
 McPherson at this time was on Grant's staff; he was at W. H. L. 
 Wallace's headquarters on the night of the 5th, and on the morning of 
 the 6th. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 77 
 
 mands into line. Tlie entire national force on the 
 ground at the time of the assault, was thirty-three 
 thousand efteetive men. Lewis Wallace had about 
 live thousand more, at Crump's landing, making 
 Grant's whole force between fifty and sixty regiments. 
 Grant estimated the enemy's strength at sixty- 
 five thousand men, or one hundred and sixty- 
 two regiments and ])attalions. Beauregard after- 
 wards reported it at forty thousand, three hundred 
 and fifty-five.* The troops, though so furiously at- 
 tacked, as yet held their original ground. Word was 
 instantly sent to Nelson and Le\v^is Wallace, of the 
 state of aiiairs, and imperative orders given them to 
 advance at once, and with all speed. To Nelson, the 
 order was in writing : " You will hurry up youi' com- 
 mand as fast as possible. The boats will be in readi- 
 ness to transport all troops of your command across 
 the river. All looks well, but it is necessary for you 
 to push forward as fast as possible." A staff oflicer 
 was dispatched to General Wallace, with verbal 
 dii'ections for him to march by the nearest road 
 parallel to the river. 
 
 The engagement soon spread along the whole 
 line, from Sherman's right to the brigade of Stuart 
 on the extreme left. Prentiss's division being raw^ 
 was driven at once from its first position, but took a 
 new line inside its camps. Sherman's troops were 
 also new, and soon gave way; but McClernand 
 promptly moved up a poi'tion of his division to sup- 
 port Sherman's wavering left. Ilurlbut, too, was 
 marched forward to the support of Prentiss ; and W, 
 
 * Grant's estimate Avas made up from the reports of spies, deserters, 
 and prisoners, who, without exception, set the figures as high as sixty 
 cr seventy thousand. 
 
78 
 
 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 H. I^. Wallace was taken out of position in the rear 
 of Sherman, and moved to the support of the centre 
 and left of the line, where the assault was most de- 
 termined. Lewis Wallace was directed to come up 
 and connect with Sherman's right, hut never came ; 
 and ai'ter several hours of as desperate fighting as was 
 ever seen on the American continent, the national 
 troops were slowly pushed back from point to point, 
 the distance of one entire mile. Early in the battle, 
 part of Sherman's left brigade broke entirely, and fled 
 to the rear, in great confusion ; but the rest of his 
 command stood firm ; and he swung what was now 
 his left, around to the rear, movino: on his ri^ht as a 
 pivot, so that his new line stood almost at right 
 angles with its original direction ; and; as the remain- 
 der of the whole line was forced back, Sherman con- 
 nected with McClernand on the left, leaving his own 
 right far advanced, beyond any other portion of the 
 national front. The enemy was never able to get 
 around this flank, but it was eventually withdrawn ; 
 still maintaining, however, its relative position to 
 other parts of the command, and always covering the 
 important crossing of Snake creek bridge. 
 
 The men who behaved badly were on Sherman's 
 left and Prentiss's right ; most of them were entirely 
 raw, and not a few came on the field without car- 
 tridges. Prentiss's division had only been organized 
 since the 26th of March, eleven days; and none of it 
 had ever been in battle before. It was Shennan 
 and Prentiss's divisions which were most advanced, 
 and their breaking so easily, gave the enemy a con- 
 fidence early in the day, which inspired him for after- 
 efforts. Some of the regimental commanders were 
 cowards; and one colonel marched his regiment de- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 79 
 
 liberately off the field ; but, in otlier instances, gallant 
 officers were unable to re-form their yielding battal- 
 ions. These created a panic, which extended to as 
 many as six thousand or eight thousand men, who 
 fled, not retreated, to the landing, a distance of be- 
 tween two and three miles. Sherman's efforts to 
 restrain them were unceasing but unavailing ; he was 
 repeatedly wounded, yet remained at the front. His 
 exertions, however, were not confined to exhibitions 
 of gallantry ; his eminent qualities as a general, were 
 never more conspicuous than in this battle. He, in 
 reality, commanded McClernand's division, as well as 
 his own ; for McClernand, who possessed both energy 
 and cournire, was a novice at soldierins:, and ^vith 
 great good sense, sought and followed the advice of 
 the man who was his junior in rank, but his superior in 
 all military knowledge and experience ; and Sherman, 
 without stopping for any considerations of jealousy or 
 pique, advised McClernand constantly and efficiently. 
 At ten A. M., when the battle was raging fiercest, 
 Grant was at Sherman's front, and commended him 
 for so stubbornly opposing the enemy. When Sher- 
 man asked for cartridges. Grant replied that he had 
 anticipated this want, and given orders accordingly. 
 It was well that this precaution had been taken so 
 soon ; for everywhere on the line, the cartridges gave 
 out early in this furious fight, and amid the confusion 
 and heat of battle, the division generals could organ- 
 ize no means of supplying their commands ; but all 
 day long, a train of wagons was passing from the 
 landing to the front, carrying ammunition over the 
 narrow and ci-o^vded road.* 
 
 * Colonel Pride, of General Grant's staff, organized this important 
 train, and forced a way for it along the single narrow road that leads 
 
80 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 At intervals all day, Grant was engaged in send- 
 ing deserters back to their commands, and in forming 
 new lines out of tliose wLo had straggled too far to 
 rejoin their own regiments. This furnished a species 
 of reenforcement badly enough needed at the front: 
 the only use made of cavalry during the battle was 
 in urging stragglers back into the fight. Grant was 
 on every part of the field in person, constantly under 
 fire, and making unwearied exertions to maintain his 
 position, until Nelson and Lewis Wallace should get 
 up, but the national forces were slowly losing ground 
 each hour. In no place, had the line been pierced, 
 but in no place, had its original position of the morn- 
 ing been retained. The rebels were stunned and re- 
 tarded, here and there, and the battle raged zigzag 
 for a while, j^arts of the line being held with more 
 tenacity than others, brigades here, giving way, and 
 there, holding the enemy's advance. Still, if only 
 Nelson and Lewis Wallace would come up, the day 
 might even yet be saved. Messengers were again 
 sent to these delinquent commanders, but although 
 Nelson had been ordered to march at seven in the 
 morning, he did not start till half-past one, p. m.,* 
 while the sound of the enemy's cannon was constant 
 in his ears ; a reason for this delay has never been 
 assigned. Lewis Wallace, one of Grant's own divi- 
 sion commanders, was equally remiss ; but he, who 
 had been a month on the ground, excused himself by 
 stating that he had taken the wrong: road, marchins: 
 towards Purdy instead of to Pittsburg ; yet, his troops 
 had helped build the bridge over Snake creek, for 
 
 to tlie landing, swarming, as it was, with fugitives and wounded men, 
 and choked up with artillery and the mass of material that accumu- 
 lates in the rear of every battle-field. 
 * See Nelson and Buell's reports. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 81 
 
 just siicli emergencies as had now occurred. He 
 was, however, set right by Captain (afterwards Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel) Eowley and Colonel (afterwards Ma- 
 jor-Geueral) McPhersou, both at the time on General 
 Grant's staff; they put him in the right direction at 
 one o'clock, and it took him till seven that night, to 
 march five miles in the direction of battle, though 
 tlie cannonading was heard at Kashville, a hundred 
 miles away."* 
 
 During the morning. Grant sent the following 
 order to General Wood, another of Buell's division 
 commanders, who, he learned, had arrived at Sa- 
 vanna : " You will move your command with the ut- 
 most dispatch to the river at this point, where steam- 
 boats will be in readiness to transport you to Pitts- 
 burg;" and still later, another dispatch was sent: 
 " Commanding officer, advance forces, Buell's army, 
 near Pittsburg : The attack on my forces has been 
 veiy spirited from early this morning. The appear- 
 ance of fresh troops in the field now, would have a 
 powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and dis- 
 heartening the enemy. If you will get upon the 
 field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of 
 the river, it will be more to our advantage, and possi- 
 bly save the day to us. The rebel forces are estimated 
 at over one hundred thousand men. ]\[y headquarters 
 will be in the log building on the top of the hill, 
 
 * In a letter on this subject to the War Department, dated April 
 13, 18G3, General Grant says : " Had General Wallace been relieved 
 from duty in the morning, and the same orders communicated to Brig- 
 adier-General Morgan L. Smith, who would have been his successor, I 
 do not doubt but the division would have been on the field of battle and 
 in the engagement by one o'clock of that eventful 6th of April. There 
 is no estimating the difference this might have made in our casualties." 
 When Wallace was finally set right, he absolutely countermarched his 
 entire column, instead of facing it about. 
 6 
 
82 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 
 
 where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide 
 you to your place on the field." 
 
 Midway in the afternoon, General Buell arrived 
 in person. He had reached Savanna with another 
 division, and finding Grant had left, and a \dolent 
 battle was raging, came on at once to the front, in ad- 
 vance of his troops. Buell was the junior of Grant, 
 but had hitherto enjoyed a more iniportant com- 
 mand ; his directions did not make him subordinate 
 to Grant, except in the actual presence of the enemy. 
 He probably felt somewhat chagrined at being 
 obliged to receive orders from one whom he had 
 previously regarded as an inferior ; his manner was 
 cold and formal, but he spared no exertions to carry 
 out Grant's directions, and displayed commendable 
 alacrity and earaestness for success. All around the 
 Landing, lay the cravens who had s^varmed in from 
 the front, as many do in nearly every battle ; these, 
 however, were not stragglers nor laggards, but the 
 panic-stricken mob, who had fled from that danger 
 which so many of their fellows seemed to court. As 
 the two generals were conversing at the Landing, 
 Grant explained the situation of affairs, then appar- 
 ently at the worst ; and Buell inquired : " What 
 preparations have you made for retreating, General ? " 
 His remark may not have been concluded, for Grant 
 interrupted him at once, exclaiming : " / liavenH de- 
 spaired of xDliipiying them yetP Buell, perhaps, was 
 no more despondent than Grant, but, at that moment, 
 his own forces were a long way off, and his mind nat- 
 urally turned to considerations of a defensive sort, 
 while Grant's characteristic mode of defence was the 
 offensive. Buell then busied himself with hurrying 
 up his own army. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 83 
 
 Ilurlbut's command, on tlie left, was repeated!)'' 
 compelled to ftill back, but raked the rebels well, 
 eacli time when they charged. On Ilurlbiit's right, 
 W. H. L. Wallace made a gallant stand, repelling 
 four separate assaults, but was finally forced to give 
 ground. These two divisions, for a while, stood be- 
 tween the whole army and destruction. All portions 
 of the line were not constantly engaged, but there 
 was no time, from seven in the morning until dark, 
 without heavy firing in some quarters of the field. 
 The fierceness of the fight knew little variety; no 
 splendid tactical science was displayed, but a grim 
 determination on each side to stand up to the last ; 
 the rebels steadily driving in the national front, till, by 
 four or five o'clock, the left was within half a mile of 
 the Landing. But only in one instance, was the line 
 really pierced during all the eventful day. Hurlbut 
 and W. H. L. Wallace, being forced to give way, con- 
 nected on their outer flanks with the other portions 
 of the command; but Prentiss, whose division lay 
 between theii's, was more stubborn, and, although the 
 line had retreated on each side of him, refused to 
 yield his ground. His obstinacy was not good gen- 
 eralship, for he was thus left exposed, his two flanks 
 in the air; and the enemy quickly seeing this, sur- 
 rounded him ; he was taken prisoner himself, along 
 with four regiments. The men had behaved excel- 
 lently all day, and their misfortune reflects no dis- 
 credit on their gallantry. This happened at about 
 four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 A little later, a desperate attack was made on the 
 national left, now crowded back to cover the Landing; 
 the enemy had earned point after point, and ridge 
 after rido-e, had reached the river and crossed Lick 
 
84 MLLITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 creek, aud the ravine formed tlie last defence; but, 
 driven to bay, tlie national troops here offered a su- 
 perb resistance, and though the enemy ffung his lines 
 again and again upon the barrier, again and again 
 they broke, like the sea when it strikes the shore. 
 Had the national soldiers given way now, all would 
 have been lost ; but, with their backs to the river, 
 and no cover but the gunboats, discouraged doubtless 
 with the ill success of the day, but grim and resolute 
 still, they made here an unconquerable stand. The 
 rebels, flushed with their triumpli, and maddened at 
 the sight of their expected j^rey, at times almost 
 leaped the ravine, but their fury was all in vain ; the 
 assault was finally repulsed, and the disappointed 
 column withdrew, shattered and torn, from the fruit- 
 less straggle, like a wounded tiger, whose last fierce 
 onslaught has failed. 
 
 A battery of artiller}-, well posted by Colonel 
 Webster, of Grant's staff, did good service at this 
 juncture, and the gunboats also were of importance, 
 as they had been for some time 2:)revious, in checking 
 the advance of the enemy on the extreme left. Both 
 sides were no^v crippled and both fatigued, the ex- 
 traordinary efforts of the day telling hard on either 
 army. The rebel commander had fallen, and been 
 succeeded by Beauregard; "VY. H. L. AVallace had 
 been mortally wounded, on the national side ; Sher- 
 man was slightly wounded ; Grant had been struck, 
 but not hurt, and at least ten thousand men in each 
 army were eitlier killed or wounded. It was nearly 
 five o'clock, when the head of Nelson's column crossed 
 the river; but, after once starting his troops, this com- 
 mander was prompt in marching them, and the men 
 themselves were eager to get into battle and assist 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 85 
 
 tlieir hard-pushed comrades. Two of Nelson's regi- 
 ments were put in position by Grant, on the extreme 
 left ; and as a final spasmodic attack was made by the 
 rebels, these regiments fired two or tliree volleys, and 
 lost three men, but it was too late then to affect the 
 fortunes of the day. The exhaustion consequent upon 
 their earlier efforts told upon the rebels, as well as 
 upon the national troops, and no heavy fighting 
 occurred after the arrival of Buell's advance.* 
 
 AVhen it was apparent that the battle was waning, 
 Grant was at Sherman's front, and gave orders to re- 
 new the attack on the morrow. He considered that 
 the strength of the enemy ^vas nearly spent, and, 
 witli his usual tactics, determined in consequence to 
 be the first to assault. I have often heard him de- 
 clare, that there comes a time, in every hard-fought 
 battle, when both armies are nearly or quite ex- 
 hausted, and it seems impossible for either to do 
 more ; this he believed the turning-point ; whichever 
 after first renews the fight, is sure to a /in. He could 
 not urge his jaded troops that night into any further 
 assault, but his resolution was unshaken, and al- 
 though Buell's advance was not yet across the river, 
 he gave positive orders to take the initiative in the 
 morning. To Sherman, he told the story of the 
 Donelson battle ; how, at a certain period, he saw that 
 either side was ready to give way, if the other showed 
 a bold front ; and he determined, in consequence, to 
 do that very thing — to advance at once on the enemy ; 
 when, as he had foreseen, the enemy surrendered. At 
 four p. M., on the 6th of April, he thought the ap- 
 pearances the same.f 
 
 * See Appendix for extracts from reports of Buell'3 subordinatea, 
 corroboratory of tliis statement. 
 
 t See Appendix for letter of General Sherman. 
 
8G MILTTAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 AMit'ii night closed in, Grant's line was in j3art 
 perpendicular to the river ; Lis left protected by the 
 ravine at the Landing, and Lis rigLt covering Snake 
 creek bridge, ])y wLich it was still Loped that Lewis 
 Wallace might arrive. All tLe camps originally oc- 
 cupied by the national troops were in tLe Lands of 
 the enemy, but tLe rebel advance Lad been cLecked 
 at every point. TLe division organization was, Low- 
 ever, greatly broken up. SLennan Lad lost tLou- 
 sands by deseiiion and straggling ; Prentiss Lad been 
 (•aj)tured, witli twenty -two Lundred men; wliile W. 
 II. L. Wallace's command was nearly destroyed, by 
 casualties and tLe loss of its cLief. TLe line, as con- 
 stituted on Sunday nigLt, was simply a mass of brave 
 men, determined to Lold tLeir own against tLe ene- 
 my ; those who fought, fougLt wherever tLey found 
 a commander. TLe rebel line was equally confused,* 
 the battle Laving become one wLere brilliant manceu- 
 vres were impossible. It was tlie personal qualities 
 of oflicers and men on botL sides tLat told, for sol- 
 dierly traits are of more impoiiance tlian tactical skill, 
 even in commanding officers, wLen ten tLousand men 
 on a side are strajT^iJclinir. 
 
 In the niglit, the whole of Nelson's column, and 
 nearly all of McCook and Crittenden's divisions, of 
 Ikn-H's army, were ferried across the river, and put in 
 j)()sition on the L'ft of the line, relieving tLe sLat- 
 tered battalions tLat Lad bonie tLe brunt of Sun- 
 day ; this was a reiiuforcement of at least twenty thou- 
 
 • " Such was the nature of tlic fxround over which -we had fought, 
 and the heavy resistance it had uut, that the commands of the whole 
 aruiy were vcrj- much shattered. In a dark and stormy night com- 
 manders found it impossible to find and assemble their troops ; each 
 body or fragment bivouacking where night overtook them.''— Bragg'a 
 JirjHfrt. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAin'. 87 
 
 sand troops ; they were commanded next day by 
 Buell, wlio received ]iis orders from General Grant. 
 All night long, the gunboats dropped shells inside 
 the rebel lines, and the woods caught fire ; no attempt 
 could be made to care for the wounded, who lay on 
 the blazing battle-field, a mile away, and in possession 
 of the enemy ; only a merciful storm of rain allayed 
 the anguish of those whom no human help could 
 reach, and relieved them from the danger of being 
 burned alive. The troops slept on their arms, be- 
 neath the tempest, but the labor of re-fonuing some 
 commands, and ])Osting those newly arrived, contin- 
 ued all night. Grant visited each division com- 
 mander, including Nelson, after dark, directing the 
 new position of each, and repeating in person his or- 
 ders for an advance at early dawn. lie told each to 
 " attack with a heavy skii'mish line, as soon as it was 
 light enough to see, and then to follow up with his 
 entire command, leaving no reserves." Before mid- 
 night, he returned to the Landing, and lay on the 
 ground, with his head against the stump of a tree, 
 where he got thoroughly drenched by the storm, but 
 slept soundly, confident of victory on the morrow. 
 
 The violent rain rendered the s-round extremelv 
 unfavorable for the movements of Monday, but early 
 on the mornino; of the 7th, the attack was made bv 
 Grant, along his entire front, now newly composed. 
 W. H. L. Wallace and Prentiss's divisions, having 
 been so much broken up by the events of Sunday, 
 what was left of them was divided amons; the other 
 commanders of the Army of the Tennessee. Lewis 
 Wallace, too, was put in line on the second day, on 
 the extreme right, where he should have been, eigh- 
 teen hours before. Sherman, MeClernand, and Hurl 
 
88 JflLITAEY HISTOPwY OF 
 
 but were posted next, from right to left ; and ^McCook, 
 Crittenden, and Nelson's diN^isions of Buell's army, in 
 the same order, had the left of tlie new national line. 
 The l)attle began on Grant's left and centre, Nel- 
 son first striking the enemy, and the great accession to 
 tlie national strength told at once. The rebels had 
 not known of Buell's arrival,* but nevertheless had 
 not ventui'ed to attack ; Beauregard could bring only- 
 twenty thousand men into action on Monday,f and 
 these Ijecame disheartened at the discovery of the 
 national reenforcements ; they were fatigued, too, 
 with tlie tremendous exertions of the day before. 
 Still they fought well ; the odds ^vere turned, but 
 they displayed nearly the same desperate obstinacy 
 which had been so marked a trait of many of the 
 national troops of yesterday. Ground was lost and 
 won several times, and the rebel and national dead 
 lay side by side; but the enemy was pushed steadily 
 back, till eveiy inch that had been lost on Sunday 
 
 ♦ " I accordingly established ray headquarters at the church of 
 Sliiloli, in the enemy's encanipmeuts, with Major-Genoral Bragg . 
 hopiii'j, from news received by a special dispatch, that delays had been 
 encountered hj General Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his 
 main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle, in time to save 
 Qenenil Grant's scattered fugitive forces from capture or destruction 
 on the following day. . . About six o'clock on the morning of the 
 7th of April, however, a hot fire of musketry and artillery opened 
 from the eni-my's quarters on our advanced line, assured us of the junc- 
 tion of his forces.'''' — Beauregard' a lieport. 
 
 t " Our troops, exhausted by days of incessant fatigue, and want 
 of rest, and ranks thinned by Mhd, wounded, and stragglers, amounting 
 in the tehoU to nearly half our force, fought bravely, but with the want 
 of that animation and spirit which characterized them the precedino- 
 tliiy." — Itragg'a lieport. 
 
 Every statement made in this chapter in regard to the force of the 
 relwls, or such of their dispositions as were not from their vers' nature 
 apparent to the national commanders, is taken from the reports of either 
 IJeauregju-d or Bragg. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 89 
 
 was rcgamed. Lewis Wallace's men fought well, 
 on the extreme right, relieving themselves from any 
 responsibility for the laggard movements of the pre- 
 ceding da}'. Sherman renewed the fight for Shiloli 
 church, where Beauregard had slept on Sunday night, 
 and the camps and trophies won from the national 
 troops, were all reclaimed. Buell was constantly and 
 conspicuously engaged, and handled his troops with 
 <rreat abilitv, as he always did in the presence of the 
 enemy ; his forces behaved in every way worthy of 
 theii* great reputation as disciplined soldiers. There 
 was but little straggling anywhere on Monday. Still, 
 with tlie exception of one or two severe struggles, 
 the fighting of April 7tli was light, when compared 
 with that of Sunday. 
 
 As the day wore on, the national victory became 
 more decisive ; the enemy was repulsed more vigor- 
 ously, and his retreat became less orderly, altliougli 
 it was not at any time converted into a rout. By 
 two o'clock, however, the repulse was general, and 
 before night, Beauregard had withdra^vn nearly five 
 miles beyond the front which Grant had maintained 
 previous to the battle of Sunday.* 
 
 Near the close of the day, Grant met the First Ohio 
 regiment marching towards the northern part of the 
 field, and immediately in front of a position which it 
 was important to take at that particular juncture; 
 another regiment to tlie left was fiL:htinf>: hard, but 
 about to yield — had, in fact, given way. Grant saw 
 
 * " Brigadier-General Breckenridge "was left with his command as a 
 rear guard, to hold the ground we had occupied the night preceding 
 the first battle, just in front of the intersection of the Pittsburg and 
 Hamburg roads, about four miles from the former place, while the rest 
 of the aimj passed in the rear.'''' — BeauregarcVa Report. 
 
90 MILITAKY niSTOEY OF 
 
 the emergency, and instantly lialted the passing force 
 on the brow of a hill, the enemy lying in a wood at 
 its Lase ; he changed the direction of the First Ohio, 
 and himself ordered it to charge, in support of the 
 yielding battalion. The men recognized their leader, 
 and obeyed with enthusiasm, and Grant rode along 
 witli them in the line of battle, as much exposed as 
 any private in the ranks. The retreating troops on 
 the left took courage at this sight; they stopped 
 their baekward movement, closed up their wavering 
 ranks with cheers, and the two regiments swept the 
 enemy at once from the coveted spot, thus capturing 
 one of the last important positions in the battle of 
 Shiloh. 
 
 Gi'ant rode along in the piece of woods, towards 
 the left, where he met Generals McCook and Critten- 
 <h 11. The day was far spent, the rebels effectually 
 repulsed, and still retreating. Grant was anxious to 
 ])ress their broken legions further, and so told the 
 two division commanders of BueU's araiy. But those 
 officers at once protested. It must be their forces 
 which should pursue, for the men who had been disor- 
 ganized so greatly, as Sunday's iight would have dis- 
 organized the finest soldiers, were in no condition 
 to follow, even in the elation of victory. But McCook 
 and Crittenden declared that their troops, also, were 
 exliaustcd ; they had marched, if they had not fought, 
 the «lay before, and the two generals assured their 
 commander that the weariness of his reenforcements 
 allowed no pursuit. A heavy rain Avas falling; it 
 was diftieult to follow in the darkness and wet, and 
 the army, fatigued with its exertions, went into camp. 
 Two brigades of Wood's division, of the Army of the 
 Oliio, AN lii.h had just arrived, and a portion of Sher- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. ' 91 
 
 man's command, were sent out to ascertain the direc- 
 tion of Beauregard's retreat, wliicli did not cease till 
 the rebels got back to Corinth ; but the pursuit was 
 short and desultory, and the weary hosts, that had 
 been engaged in battle more than twenty hours, 
 rested from their labors. The national army encamped 
 on substantially the same ground it had occupied be- 
 fore the fight. 
 
 The rebels, in this encounter, had intended to 
 overwhelm Grant before the arrival of Buell's re- 
 enforcements, and their calculations were well made. 
 Only the tremendous obstinacy and determination 
 with which they were opposed on that first terrible 
 day, frustrated their hopes. As it was, they gained 
 nothing but defeat for their enterprise. They wasted 
 thousands of lives, and gave the prestige of victory 
 to their opponents, retreating to Corinth along the 
 same roads they had marched out on, not one week 
 before, and leaving their dead to be bui'ied by their 
 enemy. Beauregard made application to Grant, on 
 the 8th, for permission to bury his own dead, but 
 Grant had already performed that duty for his fallen 
 foes.* 
 
 Grant's loss, including that in Buell's aiTny, was 
 twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen ; of these 
 seventeen hundred were killed, seven thousand four* 
 hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand 
 and twenty-two missing.f Two thousand one hun- 
 dred and sixty-seven of the losses were in the Army 
 of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of ten 
 
 * See Appendix for correspondence between Grant and Beauregard. 
 
 t In consequence of the loss or destruction of their rolls, no com- 
 plete report could be prepared of the losses in McClemand and Pren- 
 tiss's divisions. The above is as nearly exact as can now be furnished. 
 The other statements are as officially reported to Grant at the time. 
 
92 MIUTAKY niSTOEY OF 
 
 thousand six liimdred and ninety-nine:* seventeen 
 hundred and twenty-eiglit killed, eight thousand and 
 twelve Avounded, and nine hundred and fifty-seven 
 miasing. 
 
 Grant had not anticipated the attack of the rebels 
 on Sunday; on the contrary, he had fully intended 
 to move against them, as soon as Buell should appear; 
 for although Halleck had cautioned him repeatedly 
 against biinging on a genera] engagement until he 
 was strong enough to beat the enemy, he had also 
 told Grant to go on and "win new victories," when 
 reenforcements should ariive. On this Grant meant 
 to act, and so informed his subordinates. The delay 
 of Buell, although not absolutf.dy inexcusable, was 
 undoubtedly greater than any necessity existed for. 
 A dozen commanders in the national army would have 
 built bridges, and moved their force with double the 
 rapidity and enei'gy that Buell displayed, especially 
 with troojis who knew so well how to march, and 
 were so eager to get into battle, as the Army of the 
 Oliio. But Buell, in his whole career, never got rid 
 (»f liis excessive deliberation. His ordinary charac- 
 tcri.stic« are sufiicient exjdanation of his tardiness in 
 this instance, without attributing it to any unwillino;- 
 ness to serve imder one who had hitherto been his 
 junior, 
 
 Tlii-re can be no doubt, however, of the immense 
 advantage that l^iieirs arrival, when it did occur, af- 
 f-'r(lc<l to Grant; no doubt that Grant looked long 
 and anxiously for Buell's advance, on that memorable 
 
 • Grant's estimate of Beaurofrard's loss was much larger. The bu- 
 rial parties ostiniated Beaiirefranrs dead at four thousand, which, ac- 
 rordinjr to tlic usual calculation, would make his entire casualties, at 
 least, twenty thousand; but this authority is not sufficiently reliable. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 93 
 
 Gtli of April; nor is it now possible to say wLat 
 result might have followed, had Biiell still longer 
 delayed. But this much is certain : the rebels were 
 repelled in their last attack, on Sunday, without any 
 assistance from Buell that turned the scale. They did 
 not attack, on Monday, although they were ignorant 
 of Buell's arrival ; while Grant gave his orders to re- 
 new the fight, before he was aware that the long- 
 looked-for reenforcements Jiad come. 
 
 A part of the Army of tlie Tennessee undoubtedly 
 misbehaved at Shiloh ; this, however, occurred only 
 in Sherman and Prentiss's divisions, where the 
 troops were entii'ely raw. These commands were the 
 most advanced, and received the first shock of the 
 assault. It probably would have been better had the 
 older troojDS been put in* the advance. Still, Sher- 
 man's presence at the key-point of the fight, almost 
 compensated for the conduct of his men. Ko other 
 division commander in Grant's army was a profes- 
 .sional soldier, and upon no other did Grant so rely as 
 upon Sherman. The aiTQy took tone from them 
 both, and the ignominy of a part only rendered more 
 conspicuous the gallantry and determination of those 
 who remained firm.* 
 
 The battle, however, decided little, except the 
 fighting qualities of both combatants. It was the 
 fiercest fight of the war, west of the Alleghanies, and, 
 in proportion to the numbers engaged, equalled any 
 contest during the rebellion. I have heard Sherman 
 
 * It is probable that the straggling on the rebel side Mas quite as 
 great. Beauregard states in his report, that his strength was forty 
 thousand on Sunday, and gives a loss of ten thousand on both days. 
 But he declares that, on Monday, he could put only twenty thousand 
 men into line. This leaves fifteen thousand, at least, for deserters and 
 stragglers on that day, unless he lost many more than he reported. 
 
94 MILITARY IIISTOET OF 
 
 say that lie never saw such terrible fighting after- 
 Avarcls, and Grant compared Shiloh only with the 
 Wilderness. The ground remained in the hands of 
 Grant, and, with the reenforceraents that Buell 
 l>rought, tlie national army was doubtless in vastly 
 better condition than the rebels, after the battle. But 
 Halleck arrived on the 9th, and at once took com- 
 mand of all the national forces, and he restrained any 
 advance except behind breastworks ; so that, what- 
 ever immediate results might have been reaped from 
 the repulse of Beauregard, were lost. The moral ef- 
 fect of the fight was also impaired by this course. In 
 the battle, each party was forced to respect the fight- 
 \n<y qualities of the other; the Northerners recognized 
 the impetuous vigor and splendid enthusiasm of the 
 rebels, and the latter found all the tenacity and de- 
 termination of the Kortli in those who opposed them. 
 Tliis mutual respect remained, but the bad effect of 
 Ilalleck's pf»licy was, that it caused in the army a de- 
 pression which should have 1)een known only to the 
 defeated, while it gave to the country an idea that 
 tiie army had suffered an overthrow. But, whatever 
 injury the s])irit of the troops sustained, was the re- 
 sult of the distrust manifested by Halleck, and not 
 of the victory of Shiloh. 
 
 Until this battle. Grant had supposed, as nearly 
 every one else did at the North, that one or two vic- 
 tories f<>r the Union a\««u1(1 induce the South to re- 
 tuin to its allegiance; but, when the rebels recovered 
 so soon from the crushing defeat of Donelson to make 
 the prodigious effort of Shiloh ; when even the loss of 
 Nashville, and Bowling Green, and Columbus, and 
 n«'arly all of Kentucky and Tennessee, appeared not 
 to lessen their cnercrv or overcome their determina- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRATH'. 95 
 
 tioD, be became certain tbat tbe contest was to be 
 prolonged and intense, beyond any thing tbat bad yet 
 been seen. Tliis belief developed bis peculiar views 
 of tbe manner in wbicb tbe war sbould be earned on. 
 He tbouofbt then, and remained firm in tbe conviction 
 ever afterwards, tbat it was not extended territory, nor 
 capital cities, nor fortified places, tbat sbould be tbe 
 prime object of any commander's strategy ; for it bad 
 been proven tbat all tbese could be dispensed witb 
 by beroic and determined foes ; but tbat armies and 
 men must become tbe points of attack; tbat tbese 
 sbould be pursued wberever tbey moved, regardless, 
 comparatively, of positions and forts ; tbat tbe armies 
 must not only be defeated, but destroyed ; and tbat, 
 tberefore, tbe policy of merely outwitting or out- 
 manoeuvring tbe enemy, or forcing tbe evacuation of 
 strongholds and tbe abandonment of territory, and 
 allowing bim tbus to concentrate bis real force, was 
 unwise ; tbat every eftbrt sbould be made to find and 
 fio-bt tbe rebel armies as-ain and a^-ain, and tbat onlv 
 wben those armies were either subdued or annihi- 
 lated, would the rebellion end. Upon this idea be 
 thereafter acted, so far as be had control. He did 
 not underrate the value of places, but be was always 
 willino; to sacrifice them for annies. He did not de- 
 predate the value of life, but be thought that even 
 life sbould be freely spent, if so tbe great object of 
 tbe war could be attained. He believed, indeed, that 
 life rapidly expended in a vigorous campaign, would 
 prove an econoni}' of life in the end. 
 
 This war, too, was fought witb a degree of deter- 
 mination and unanimity on the part of the rebels, 
 rarely shown in tbe history of the world. They 
 themselves rendered necessary tbe terrible nature of 
 
96 MILITAET niSTOKT OF 
 
 the bloAvs wliicli alone could overcome tliem. They 
 ivtused to yield l^ecause tliey had lost tlieir fortresses, 
 or because they liad abandoned their cities, or even 
 because one army Avas surrendered and, here and there, 
 other armies were repelled. There was no course 
 left, if the rebellion was to be suppressed, but to an- 
 nihilate its strength, and root out the resources that 
 supplied tliat strength. 
 
 From this time, therefore. Grant gave up the idea 
 of saving the resources and sparing the property of 
 the South ; the South had made the war avowedly 
 one of tlie people, and the people being a party must 
 suft'er, until the people as well as the soldiers were 
 conquered, llencefurth, he gave his subordinates 
 orders to live upon the resources of the country with- 
 out stint, whenever their necessities compelled ; and 
 he abandoned all desire to protect the institution of 
 slavery, although he himself had been a slaveholder, 
 and had no sympathy ^^^th the merely political idea 
 of abolition. Whatever opposed the effort to main- 
 tain the unity of the country, must be destroyed. 
 
 Until tliese views were adopted and carried out 
 firmly and persistently, in every part of the theatre 
 of WAY, the country was not saved. AVhatever per- 
 manent successes were anywhere achieved, were 
 achieved by acting on these principles.* 
 
 * It has lieen repcatcilly asserted that Grant was surprised at 
 Shiloh, but the evidence to the contrary is incontrovertible. The 
 l)rtliminnry fighting of the 3d and 4th of April, necessarily put di 
 vision and anny commanders on the alert. The movemenrs re- 
 j)orted by Lewis Wallace, on the 4th, had a similar ellVct. Sherman 
 bad been skirmishing for several days; Prentiss had doubled his i)ick- 
 et« the day before, and had a reconnoissance of a regiment out, at three 
 o'clock on the morning of the Gth ; he received the earliest assault 
 outside of his camj)s. W. II. I^. Wallace also breakfasted early and 
 had his horses saddled, " to bo ready in case of an attack." These are 
 
tJLYSSES S. GKANT. 97 
 
 not tlie indications of a camp that is surprised. Yet Prentiss, who 
 fought till four o'clock in the afternoon, is said to have been captured 
 at daylight and in his bed. Grant's dispatches of March 28th, 30th, 
 and 31st, as well as those of the 4th and 5th of April, all furnish proof 
 that he was intently watching the enemy. The fall that lamed him 
 on the 4th, was got in rctuniing from the front, whither he had gone 
 to investigate the rumor of an attack, after Sherman's fight. On the 5th, 
 he sent three dispatches to Ilalleck, reporting the skirmish of the day 
 before, and with one of them enclosed the following note to himself 
 from Sherman : " April 5th. I have no doubt that nothing will occur 
 to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the 
 worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be 
 drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not appre- 
 hend any thing like an attack upon our position." Grant remarked to 
 Ilalleck on the same date : " Our outposts had been attacked by the 
 enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went up, but 
 found all quiet. ... I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack 
 (general one) being made upon us, lut will le prepared should such a 
 thing take placed 
 
 Private soldiers and inferior officers, very probably, could not read 
 the signs that told so plainly to their commanders the necessity of 
 readiness ; such may, veiy likely, have been suri)rised at what occurred ; 
 but Grant and his division generals, although of course they could not 
 know at what hour or place the rebels might choose to assault, nor 
 indeed that they certainly would assault at all, although they did not 
 really expect an attack, yet knew the propinquity of a great army, 
 and, so far as could be, were prepared to receive it — except in the mat- 
 ter of defensive intrenchments. Up to this time the Western troops 
 had not availed themselves of the spade iu war ; but after Shiloh, both 
 generals and men, severely taught, resorted to the old Roman tactics, 
 and never failed to intrench themselves after every day's march. Some, 
 indeed, already over-cautious, were schooled into absolute timidity; 
 and in their anxiety to become secure against the enemy, forgot that 
 the first object in war is not safety to one's self, but destruction to the 
 foe. Those who wish to be entirely safe, should stay at home. 
 
 In connection with this question of surprise, it is curious to note 
 that Beauregard not only does not claim to have surprised Grant, but 
 says in his oflicial report : " At five A. M., on the 6th inst., a reconnoi- 
 tring party of the enemy having become engaged uith the advanced piclete, 
 the commander of the forces " (A. S. Johnston) " gave orders to begin 
 the movement." Bragg, also, thought the rebels were attacked on 
 Sunday, for speaking of the first day's fight, he says : " The enemy did 
 not give us time to discuss the question of attack, for soon, after dawn 
 he commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets." 
 
 Again : "The enemy was encountered ix force at the encampments 
 1 
 
98 jnXITART HISTORY OF 
 
 of Im advanced positions.'^ And still again : " In about one mile, we 
 encountered him in strong force along almost the entire line. His latter- 
 ies vere posted on eminences, with strong infantry supports." Now, Bragg 
 was in front of Sherman and McClemand, and it is Sherman who is 
 said to have been surprised. (See Appendix for Grant's correspond- 
 ence with Halleck, on the 5th, entire.) 
 
[JLYSSES S. GRANT. 99 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Incorrect reports of the battle of Shiloh— Halleck assumes command in the 
 field — Disagreeable position of Grant — Siege of Corinth— Evacuation of Cor- 
 inth by the rebels — Incfifectual operations of Halleck — Ilalleck made Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief— He offers command of Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen 
 — Allen declines it — Grant 'then placed again in command — Military situation 
 in September, 18G2 — Grant's force depleted — Enemy threatening — Price 
 seizes luka — Grant's preparations to fight — Orders to Rosecrans and Ord — 
 Battle of luka — Rosecrans neglects Grant's orders — Rebels escape in conse- 
 quence — Grant's headquarters at Jackson — Rebels threaten Corinth — Strat- 
 egy of Grant — Battle of Corinth — Rebels drive Rosecrans into Corinth — 
 Final victory of Rosecrans — Enemy struck in flank by Ord — Rosecrans does 
 not follow up his success, although repeatedly ordered by Grant to pursue — 
 He finally obeys — Pursuit ineffectual — Return of Rosecrans — Results of luka 
 and Corinth — Rosecrans relieved and promoted — Relations of Grant with 
 other officers — Reflections— Grant suggests movement against Vicksburg. 
 
 The results of tlie battle of Shiloh were not all 
 militar}^ Incorrect accounts were circulated through- 
 out the North ; those who had seen only what oc- 
 curred at the rear, misrepresented the actions at the 
 front ; others, who were in a single part of the field, 
 attempted to give accurate descriptions of the whole, 
 which they had no oppoi-tunities of knowing. Gen- 
 eral Buell and some of his officers, arriving late and 
 seeing only the fugitives at the Landing, thought and 
 said that the entire Army of the Tennessee was over- 
 whelmed and disgraced ; and for a long while the 
 
 LOFC. 
 
100 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 country was ignorant wlietLer or not a great disaster 
 liad occurred. Rumor^ Avere industriously sj)read 
 that Sherman had been surprised, tliat Prentiss was 
 captured early in the morning, and in his shirt ; that 
 Grant was drunk, and that Buell was purposely dila- 
 tory. The country believed many of these rumors, 
 and in the West especially, the outcry was fierce. 
 The newspapers took up the theme; congressmen 
 and politicians, some of them doubtless with pure 
 intentions, and believing that they were seeking the 
 best interests of the country, beset the President to 
 relieve Grant entirely from command, and the fame 
 that arose from Donelson was obscured by the un- 
 merited odium of Shiloh. 
 
 Even Grant's military superiors seemed affected 
 by the clamor. General Halleck, removing bis head- 
 quarters to the field, superseded Grant, who was left 
 second in command, it is true, but was quite ig- 
 nored in all the operations of the next two months. 
 The army was reenforced and divided into three 
 corps, the right, left, and centre, of which Thomas, 
 Pope, and Buell were placed in immediate command, 
 while McClernand had the reserve. Grant still os- 
 tensibly commanded the District of West Tennessee, 
 including his old army, which, however, was broken 
 up into the right wing and reserve, and was therefore 
 du-ectly under Th(^mas and McClernand. Although 
 tlie corps commanders were his subordinates, orders 
 were constantly sent direct to them without Grant's 
 being made acquainted with their contents, and 
 movements were even executed by his own troops 
 without liis knowledge. In the army his situation 
 w as universally regarded as one of disgrace.'^ This 
 
 ♦ I juinca tbe army before Corinth, in May, 18G3, as aide-de-camp 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 101 
 
 was by very far tlie most disagreeable period in his 
 entire career. 
 
 The national aiiny moved slowly up towards 
 Corinth from the battle-field of Shiloh, after Ilalleck 
 arrived, making no advance except when protected by 
 intrenchments. This ^vas greatly to the dissatisfac- 
 tion of both officers and men, to whom such opera- 
 tions were new, and seemed to savor of timidity. But 
 Hallcck had derived a lesson from the assaults of 
 Shiloh, and the outcry in consequence; he was de- 
 termined not to be attacked unawares, and collected 
 his forces from every quarter of his immense depart- 
 ment, concentrating a hundred and twenty thousand 
 bayonets ; " yet it took him six weeks to advance less 
 than fifteen miles, the enemy in all that while making 
 no offensive movement; on the contraiy, the rebels 
 constructed defences still more elaborate than those 
 behind which Halleck advanced. Beauregard's 
 strength was estimated at seventy thousand ; he him- 
 self reported it at forty-seven thousand, and the offi- 
 cers and men of the national army w^ere anxious to 
 avail themselves of their vast superiority in numbers. 
 They believed, correctly, as was afterwards proved, 
 that Beauregard was moving his troops from Corinth 
 wdth a view to divide, and not to concentrate them. 
 Grant shared this belief, and expressed it. Late in 
 May, he was at Halleck's headquarters, when the 
 probability of an evacuation of Corinth was discussed, 
 and then made the only suggestion he ventured to 
 offer during the siege. He recommended that an at- 
 tack should be made on the extreme right of the 
 
 to a division commfindcr, and at once noticed the general impressior 
 among officers that Grant was under a cloud. 
 
 * See field returns of Halleck's forces at Corinth. 
 
102 iinjTAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 national line, west of \V. T. Sherman's division. 
 The enemy's defences in front of this point, he 
 deemed defective, and urged an assault with a view 
 of turning the rebel line, and then moving to the 
 left and sweeping the entire field. But Halleck 
 scouted the idea, intimating that Grant's opinions 
 need not be expressed until they were called for. In 
 accordance with this intimation, Grant did not again 
 obtrude them. 
 
 On the 30th of May, Halleck announced to his 
 command : " There is every indication that the enemy 
 will attack our left this morning," * and the largest 
 anuy ever assembled west of the Alleghanies, was ac- 
 cordingly drawn out in line of battle, awaiting an as- 
 sault. But the rebels had already sli|)ped out of 
 Corinth, on the southern road, leaving wooden guns f 
 and barren defences to impose as long as possible on 
 theu" enemy. Early in the day, however, the naked- 
 ness of the woi'ks and the silence of the batteries 
 were discovered, and the national forces marched un- 
 molested into the town. Beaureirard's movement had 
 begun several days before ; his orders for the evacua- 
 tion were dated the 20th of i\[ay, and his plans for 
 the retre^it, picked up among the wrecks of his camps, 
 disclosed the fact that he had been striving to elude 
 Halleck since the 9th of the same month.J Soon 
 
 ♦ " Thcrt' is every indication that the enemy will attack our left 
 this mominjr, as troops have been moving in that direction for some 
 time. It will be well to make ijroparaliou to send as many of the re- 
 scrvi's as can be spared of the ri-rht wing in that direction, as soon as 
 an attack is made in force. At any rate be prepared for an order to 
 that clVect." 
 
 t I saw many wooden guns in the works at Corinth, when Beaure- 
 gard abandoned the place. 
 
 I On one of the first days of June, 18G'2, a paper was forwarded by 
 Brigadier-General Speed S. Fry, a brigade commander, to his immc- 
 
ULYSSES 8. GKANT. 103 
 
 after entering tLe works, Grant rode to the rebel left, 
 and satisfied himself beyond all doubt, that had an 
 assault on Sliennan's front been ordered, a good 
 general could have demolished the rebel army. This 
 was by fai- the weakest point of Beauregard's line, 
 and in exactly the position to be susceptible to such 
 an attack as Grant had recommended, in vain. 
 
 A great battle, which had been expected as the 
 result of the collection of two vast armies at an im- 
 portant strategic point, was thus avoided — a battle 
 which, if fought, could not have failed to prove fatal 
 to the rebels. The enemy, however, abandoned the 
 object of the campaign without the hazard of a fight, 
 not choosing to risk the position and the army too. 
 Sliiloh had, indeed, been fought for the salvation of 
 Corinth — fought and lost by the rebels, two months 
 l^efore, and the march of the national army from 
 Pittsburg, was nothing more nor less than the pursuit 
 of the rebel forces, beaten and demoralized during 
 the second day's fight at Shiloli. The enemy, how- 
 
 diate superior, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, commanding a di- 
 vision in the Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman the same day 
 sent it by me, to General Pope's headquarters in the field. It read as 
 follows : 
 " (Confidential.) 
 
 " Headquakters, Corinth, 3fay 9, 1862. 
 
 " Generax: In case we have to retire from this position, your army 
 will follow the best road in the direction of Kossuth, via the Female 
 College ; and when about two or three miles from that town, a part of 
 yoiur forces, say a corps, will move to Danville, and another corps will 
 move on the road to Kossuth, until it meets the one to Rienzi, when it 
 will move on to the latter place. Dejjots of provisions, etc., have been 
 made at Okolona and Columbus. 
 
 " One of your divisions or corps can continue to Ripley, thence to 
 Oxford, and thence to Grenada, for the protection of that depot. 
 
 " , General Commanding. 
 
 '• To General B. Bragg, Commanding Army of the Uississijjii. (For 
 
 the informatioa of Major- General Van Doru.) " 
 
104 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 ever, being unmolested in Lis retreat, had rallied in a 
 concentrated manner at Corinth, and in an order agree- 
 able to the best rules of the art. He was followed 
 by an army very materially reenforced after the vic- 
 tory of Aj)ril 7th. All the time was taken that a 
 new and unexplored country required, to develop its 
 facilities for successful combat ; every precaution was 
 observed, to avoid the evil results of any suddenly 
 offensive movement which the rebels might at any 
 moment be inspired to make; miles and miles of in- 
 trenchments were successively thrown up and occu- 
 pied ; roads were cut in every conceivable direction, 
 to facilitate the combined movements in the attack 
 of a lari>:e armv, or to secure a safe retreat in case of 
 reverse. 
 
 In the mean while, the enemy surrounded his 
 point of defence with an immense show of intrench- 
 ments and foi-tifications, and vaunted his readiness to 
 receive combat at any moment; when, in fact, his 
 parade of battenes, artillery, and magazines was little 
 more than counterfeit, and his immense lines of earth- 
 work remained as a mockery to his ability and his 
 industry, unless the alternative is accepted that he 
 never intended to defend them ; for the moment he 
 discovered Halleck ready to strike, he resumed his 
 retreat, more demoralized than when he commenced 
 it. The plan of his Avithdrawal seemed expressly 
 calculated to facilitate the national forces in a success- 
 ful ])ursuit: the roads were in admirable condition, 
 and the country al)0unded in water; the troops were 
 as anxious now to follow as they had been to fio-ht 
 during the siege. But the demoralized condition of 
 the rebels, mid the sej^aration of their retreatino- 
 forces, seemed not to be comprehended. The reports 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 105 
 
 of deserters and prisoners, daily coming inside the na- 
 tional lines, were apparently set at naught ; * nothing 
 but a vast offensive power seemed to loom up before 
 the magnified vision of the commander of this grand 
 army ; and an attack from the rebels was apparently 
 the one thing apprehended by Halleck, from the time 
 he set out from Pittsburg up to the final point of the 
 pursuit, f 
 
 To cap the climax, Pope and Buell were succes- 
 sively sent out after tlie enemy. Buell was the rank- 
 ing officer, and eventually took command. He formed 
 a solid defensive line of battle, seventy thousand 
 strong, reaching across the country from the vicinity 
 of Booneville towards Blackland, at a moment when 
 
 * In a report of the operations of Lis division during the siege of 
 Corinth, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman speaks thus of a reconnois- 
 sance in force made by his command on the loth of May : " The result 
 of this reconnoissance was reported to your headquarters " [those of 
 Major-General Thomas, commanding right wing], "together with the 
 information obtained from the prisoners, among which was the impor- 
 tant fact that the rebel commander had issued orders the day before, 
 that all baggage of the troops, except what could be carried in knap- 
 sacks, was to be immediately sent by the Mobile and Ohio railroad to 
 Okolona." 
 
 A private note from General Sherman, of October 18, 1866, states: 
 " My report is not sufficiently strong in the case of the information 
 obtained in my reconnoissance on the 15th of May. All the men 
 who were taken equally declared that General Beauregard had issued 
 an order the day before, for all property at Corinth, except the con- 
 tents of the knapsacks and a certain amount of provisions, to be sent 
 down to Okolona. A wiitten report was made to me of this fact, and 
 the prisoners were sent forward to confirm the statement." 
 
 t Many of the points in the criticism of this camjiaign were sug- 
 gested to me at the time by a report of Brigadier-General T. W. Sher- 
 man, on whose staff I was then serving in Halleck's army. The report 
 was forwarded through the regular channel, but returned to its author, 
 with a rebuke for indulging in criticism of his commanding officer. 
 If the rebuke was just, the criticism is equally so, and proves that from 
 various points of view the same conclusion was reached, in regard to 
 this campaign. 
 
IOC MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 it was obvious to liis entire command that tlie bulk 
 of the enemy's force liad passed on, leaving a river 
 beliind, protected by an insignificant rear-guard. The 
 seventy thousand remained two days, awaiting an as- 
 sault from the retreating twenty thousand, and then, 
 as it was discovered that the enemy had again es- 
 caped, the command w^as ordered back to Corinth, 
 having marched out about thirty miles. During all 
 these operations, Grant had been left in camp. 
 
 The ineffectual pursuit was terminated by the 
 10th of June, and Buell was then sent towards Chat- 
 tanooga, the great strategic point in East Tennessee. 
 Grant retained command of the District of West 
 Tennessee, and made his headquarters at Memphis, 
 which had fallen into the hands of the national forces, 
 on the 6th of June, as the result of a fierce naval 
 fight on the Mississippi river. At about the same 
 time, Beauregard was relieved by Bragg, who soon 
 afterwards started with a large force for Chattanooga, 
 to intercept Buell. 
 
 And thus the great and tangible success, which 
 was thrown so directly in General Halleck's path 
 that it seemed impossible for any one even to avoid 
 a victory, was allowed, nay, compelled, in his un- 
 skilful gi'asp, to dissolve away, like a shadow in the 
 hands of him who stretches out to embrace what is 
 not. Even after the rebels had eluded him at 
 Corinth, it ^vas possible, with Halleck's immense pre- 
 ])onderance of force, to follow up and destroy the re- 
 treating enemy; and wlien this opportunity was also 
 lost, by his subordinate and counterpart, the army 
 tliftt liad been concentrated with so much care and 
 hibor, was still available for a concentrated campaio-n. 
 Vicksburg was within reach, and comparatively de- 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 107 
 
 fenceless ; a force miglit easily have been sent direct 
 to its rear, and found no enemy of importance on tlie 
 road ; and the long expenditure of time and Llood, 
 the weary months spent in the amj^hibious siege, the 
 unsuccessful assaults, might all have been saved. If 
 Chattanooga was deemed the more important ob- 
 jective, Halleck had forces at his control sufficient 
 to secure its possession, besides retaining eveiy rood 
 he had abeady acquired. He might have sent with 
 Buell, men enough to place the seizure of that key 
 to Eastern Tennessee beyond a doubt, and so have 
 prevented the disasters both of Buell and Eose- 
 crans's Chattanooga campaigns, and forestalled those 
 other events, which, nearly two years later, made 
 Grant, Halleck's own successor in supreme command. 
 
 But the great army was broken up, without having 
 achieved any thing besides the occupation of a single 
 town, which was indeed a strategic and important 
 point ; but none of the positive strategic advantages 
 which its possession promised, were obtained. For a 
 while, Halleck interrupted the rebel communications, 
 and warded off attacks on his own rear ; but Corinth, 
 having once been acquired, never afterwards pre- 
 sented a single offensive advantage, which the general 
 who captured it suggested or procured. 
 
 In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 
 17th of that month, Halleck was assigned to the com- 
 mand of all the armies, superseding McClellan. He 
 repaired at once to Washington, and Grant was 
 dii-ected to establish his headquai-ters at Corinth. 
 Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by 
 the promotion of Halleck : on the contrary, the new 
 general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army 
 of the Tennessee to Colonel Kobert Allen, a quarter- 
 
108 MTLITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to 
 remain under Grant.* He was, however, left some- 
 what more independent than while Halleck had been 
 immediately present in the field. 
 
 Four diHsions of his army (including Thomas's 
 command), were within the next two months ordered 
 to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, 
 unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from 
 Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put 
 Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession 
 of Corinthjf the strategic point, but was obliged to 
 hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north 
 to Columbus, which last, on account of the low water 
 in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. 
 His task was a difficult one, in the face of an enemy 
 nearly his equal in numbers, and who, having no fear 
 of Grant's advance, was able to concentrate his own 
 forces so as to threaten either of three important 
 points, Corinth, Bolivar, or Jackson, in Tennessee. 
 
 * A letter from General Allen, dated July 9tli, 18GG, says : " I had 
 joined General Halleck a short time subsequent to the fall of Corinth, 
 nnd was attached to his immediate command, when he received his 
 appointment of general-in-chief, with orders to repair at once toTVash- 
 injfton. Shortly after he came to my tent. . . . After a somewhat 
 protracted conversation he turned to me and said : ' Now what can I 
 doforyoM?' I replied that I did not know that he could do any 
 thing. « Yes,' he rejoined, ' I can give you command of this army.' I 
 replied : ' I have not rank.' ' That,' said he, ' can easily be obtained.' 
 I do not rcmcmlier exactly what my reply was to this, but it was to 
 the effect that I doulttcd the expediency of such a measure, identified 
 as I was with the enormous business and expenditures of the quarter- 
 muster's department, from which it was almost impracticable to relieve 
 me at that time. Other reasons were mentioned, and he did not press 
 the subject. It is true that I was congratulated on the prospect of 
 Bucccedinp to the command, before I had mentioned the sulrject of this 
 interview." 
 
 f The n?ai)«)f Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee illustrates this 
 position. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 109 
 
 Mempliis was safe enougli under Sherman, but Grant 
 had to keep open his communication with that officer, 
 by way of Columbus and the Mississippi. I have 
 heard him describe his situation at this time, as quite 
 as difficult and annoying as any that he held during 
 the war. This w^as, indeed, the only period during 
 the war, when he was for any length of time obliged 
 to act on the defensive. 
 
 Jackson, in Tennessee, is at the junction of the 
 Mississippi Central and the Mobile and Ohio rail- 
 roads, and forms the apex of an irregular triangle, of 
 which Corinth may be considered another angle, 
 .while Bolivar, to the west, is the third. After leav- 
 ing a sufficient force for the defence of Memphis, 
 Grant concentrated at these three points, as many of 
 his troops as he could spare from guarding the rivers 
 and railroads in his command. He remained himself 
 eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the 
 enemy, w^ho, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, 
 harassed and threatened him continually. During 
 this time, he directed the strengthening and remodel- 
 ling of the fortifications of Corinth, w^hich, although 
 incomplete towards the west and north, were yet too 
 extensive for defence by any but an enormous garri- 
 son. New works, closer to the town, were accord- 
 ingly erected, under the supervision of Captain 
 Prime, Grant's engineer officer, Major-General Ord 
 beino- in command of the troops. Events rendered 
 these works of great importance before many weeks 
 had passed. 
 
 The attention of the country was, at this period, 
 turaed almost exclusively and with painful interest, 
 to operations further east. In Virginia, McClellan 
 and Pope were superseding each other and losing 
 
110 iriLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 "battles and campaigns by turns, under Halleck's su- 
 preme command ; while in Tennessee, Bragg, wlio 
 had outmarched and outmanoeuvred Buell, reaching 
 Chattanooga first, though starting last, Tvas now ra- 
 cing with the same rival for Louisville and the Ohio. 
 The North was thus threatened with invasion in Ma- 
 ryland and in Ohio at the same time. Every man 
 that it was thought possible to take from Grant, had 
 been sent to Buell, and the former was left to shift 
 for himself, almost without troops, and (fortunately 
 for the country), almost without orders. 
 
 Van Dorn at last deteiinined to move part of his 
 force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a. 
 view to crossinof the Tennessee, and reenforciua; Brafrs: 
 in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck 
 of the probability of such a movement, and of his 
 intention to prevent it, and was immediately warned 
 by his chief to leave nothing undone to avert the 
 catastrophe. Grant's dispatches at this time bear 
 witness to the constant anxiety the rebels occasioned 
 liim, and to the necessity for a sleepless and stub- 
 born vigilance. On the 0th of September, he said : 
 " Should the enemy come, I will be as ready as possi- 
 ble with the means at hand. I do not believe that a 
 force can be brought against us at present that can- 
 not be successfully resisted," 
 
 On the irJth, Price advanced from the south and 
 seized luka, twenty-one miles east of Corinth ; Colo- 
 nel ^Iiirphy, who was in command, making no re- 
 sistance, but evacuating the place on the approach 
 of tlie enemy. Grant telegraphed to Halleck on the 
 l.')th : " If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses 
 liear creek. If he can be beaten there, it will pre- 
 vent the design either to go north, or to unite forces 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. Ill 
 
 and attack here." Grant liad called in his forces 
 some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had re- 
 peatedly cautioned all his commanders to hold their 
 troops in readiness, and when the enemy's cavalry 
 moved towards luka, and cut the railroad and tele- 
 graph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven 
 miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. 
 Pj'ice was at luka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the 
 southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was 
 to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, 
 and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against 
 Van Dorn. 
 
 He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rose- 
 crans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to 
 move by way of Rienzi, along the south side of the 
 Memphis and Charleston railroad, and attack luka 
 from that direction ; while Mnjor-General Ord, with 
 a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jack- 
 son, was to push towards Burnsville, and from 
 there take roads on the north side of the raiboad, 
 attacking luka fi*om that quarter. Ord had eight 
 thousand men, and Eosecrans reported nine thou- 
 sand, a greater force combined than Price had, ac- 
 cordins: to Grant's estimate. Eosecrans suo:gested 
 that his force should move northward fi-om its east- 
 ern march in two columns, one on the Jacinto, the 
 other on the Fulton road, in order to occupy Price's 
 only line of retreat. To this Grant assented, and 
 remained himself at Burnsville, where he could di- 
 rect both wings of his army. He also kept Ord's 
 troops at Burnsville as long as possible, with a train 
 of empty cars, ready to hurry them back to Corinth, 
 in case Van Dom should attack that place, where all 
 the national supplies and munitions were stored. 
 
112 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 On the IStli of September, Ord was puslied for- 
 ward to witLiu four miles of luka, where lie found 
 tlie enemy in force, on the north side of the town ; 
 and the same day, Rosecrans reported to Grant his 
 readiness " to move up as close as we can to-night. . . 
 Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the at- 
 tack and draw their attention that way, while I move 
 in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing hea^^ly 
 on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cut- 
 ting off their retreat eastward. I proj)ose to move 
 in ten minutes for Jacinto." Grant ordered him to 
 advance rapidly, and " let us do to-moiTOW all we 
 can ; it may be necessary to fall back the day follow- 
 insr." The fallins: back was in the event of Van 
 Dorn's attacking Corinth. This dispatch was dated 
 fifteen minutes before seven p. m. ; but, after midnight, 
 Rosecrans sent word that he had been detained, and 
 was still twenty miles fi-om luka, and could not " be 
 in," before one or two o'clock the next afternoon, the 
 roads being in bad condition and the country thickly 
 wooded. Tliis greatly disappointed Grant, who had 
 expected to fight on the morrow, early, and had sup- 
 posed Rosecrans to be by this time far on his Avay to 
 Ink;i. lie consequently directed Ord, who was quite 
 readv to brino; on an eno-ai^ement in an hour's time, 
 not to attack from the north imtil Rosecrans arrived, 
 or until lie should hear firinc: to the south. Rose- 
 crans was notified, by his return messenger, of this 
 change in Ord's instructions; but owing to the density 
 uf the forests and the difiicultv of crossinir the small 
 streams and bottoms, all communication between 
 Grant and Rosecrans was cii'cuitous and delayed. 
 
 By half-past four, on the afternoon of the 19th, 
 Rosecrans, making a forced march, had arrived within 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 113 
 
 two miles of Iiika, moving only on the Jacinto or 
 western road. A little north of Barnet's, the rebels 
 were posted in force, and, unexpectedly to Eosecrans, 
 they attacked the head of his marching column, dri- 
 vino; it in, and checkinc: his advance. The front was 
 naiTow, interrupted by ravines, and covered with a 
 dense undergrowth ; the enemy's position, on a hill, 
 commanded the road by which the national forces 
 were moving, and Rosecrans, not being able to de- 
 velop his troops, lost a battery of artillery, the only 
 one he got into action, besides seven hundi-ed and 
 thii-ty-six men in killed and wounded. The fighting 
 was heav}', though confined almost entirely to Ham- 
 ilton's division. Rosecrans, however, held his own 
 until dark ; but at ten and a half that night, he sent 
 word to Grant, who was still at Burnsville, that it 
 would be necessary to " attack in the morning and 
 in force." " Push in on to them," he said, " until we 
 can have time to do something." * 
 
 Owing to the difficulties in communication. Grant 
 did not receive this dispatch until thirty-five minutes 
 past eight, on the morning of the 20th, but the same 
 moment he sent word to Ord, to attack as soon 
 as possible, saying : " Unless you can create a di- 
 version in Rosecrans's favor, he may find his hands 
 full." The wind had blown heavily to the south 
 
 ♦ " IlEADljrARTERS AkMT OF THK MISSISSIPPI, TWO MILES | 
 
 soniH OF luKA, September 19, 1S02 — 10>^ p. u. ) 
 
 '' Major- General U. S. Grant : 
 
 "General — We met the enemy iu force just above tliis point. 
 The engagement lasted several hours. We have lost two or three 
 pieees of artillery. Firing was very heavy. You must attack in the 
 morning and in force. The ground is horrid, unknown to us, and no 
 room for development. Couldn't use our artillery at all ; fired but few 
 shots. Push in on to them until we can have time to do something. 
 We will try to get a position on our right which will take luka. 
 
 " W. S. Rosecrans, Brigadier- General^ 
 8 
 
1]4 JCTLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 and east the clay before, and no sound of the filing 
 had reached Ord ; during the night, however, he 
 had got word of the battle fi-om negroes, and so 
 pushed on towards the town, in the morning, in ad- 
 vance of Grant's order. Soon afterwards, Grant 
 himself learned that the enemy was in full retreat ; 
 had in fact left luka during the night, on the Fulton 
 road, which it had been expressly arranged that 
 Ilosecrans was to occupy with Hamilton's division. 
 Getting up late, however, he had failed to do this, 
 and the rebels discovering how nearly they were sur- 
 rounded by the concentration of Grant's forces, held 
 Ilosecrans in check on one road and escaped by night 
 on the other, taking with them eveiy thing except 
 their wounded, and the artillery they had captured 
 the day before. When Grant arrived at luka, at nine 
 o'clock A. M., the pursuit was not yet begun. He at 
 once gave orders to follow, but the enemy had al- 
 ready got so far that it was found impossible now 
 to overtake him. This of course defeated Grant's 
 })lan of capturino; or destroying Price's entire force. 
 The Fulton road was the only avenue left open to 
 the rebels, and had it also been closed, the result 
 would have been complete. But if Price had in- 
 t('n(l(Ml to make his way across the Tennessee, or to 
 liold his own until Van Dorn could come up, and then 
 make a simultaneous attack on Corinth, he was foiled.* 
 
 * Since the close of the war, Colonel Thompson, late of the rebel 
 iimiy, has stated to General Ord, his brother-in-law, that the movement 
 of Itosecrans on a tiin<,'le road, his strength and the condition of his 
 force, and the fact that the Fulton road, south, was left open, were be- 
 trayed to Price, on the afternoon of the light, by Dr. Burton, a rebel 
 assistant surgeon of Claiborne's regiment. This doctor informed Colo- 
 nel Thompson that he had secured the confidence of Rosecrans, and 
 liccn employed by him as a scout and spy ; had remained with him on 
 the Iflth, until he saw the mute i)ursued by Rosecrans towards luka, 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 115 
 
 Rosecrans reported the rebel loss at luka at four- 
 teen hundred and thirty-eight.* 
 
 By the battle of luka, the enemy was simply 
 checked in his plans, not seriously crippled in his 
 force. Price moved around by a circuitous route 
 and joined Van Dorn, and the same state of affairs 
 continued, which had annoyed Grant for so many 
 weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, 
 and Ord at Bolivar, and on the 23d of September, 
 removed his o^\ti headquarters to Jackson, fi'om 
 which point he could communicate more readily with 
 all points of his district, including Memphis and 
 Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and 
 Ripley, and threatened both Bolivar and Corinth, 
 and Grant was oblio^ed to be in readiness at either 
 place. Troops were still being detached fi"om his 
 command, notwithstanding these emergencies, and, 
 on the 1st of October, he telegraphed to Washing- 
 ton : " My position is precarious, but I hope to get 
 out of it all right." 
 
 At last, it was rendered certain, by the removal 
 of Price's cavalry from La Grange to Ripley, that Cor- 
 inth was to be the place of attack. Grant there- 
 upon directed Rosecrans to call in his forces, and sent 
 Brigadier-General McPherson to his support from 
 Jackson, with a brigade of troops hastily got to- 
 gether. The enemy evidently intended to attack on 
 the northern side of the town, facing east and south, 
 and cutting: off Rosecrans from all reenforcements ; 
 
 and the condition of liis column. He then left the national army, and 
 hurried into town to give the information to Price. That general at once 
 withdrew all his force from Ord's front, and attacked and held Rose- 
 crans, coming up from the south on one road, while the rebels evacuated 
 the town, passing within a mile and a half of Rosecrans, on the other. 
 * I have seen no rebel official statement of Price's loss. 
 
JIG MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 SO Grant liurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Poca- 
 hontas from Bolivar, forty-four miles away, to be 
 ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear, as lie ad- 
 vanced, and at least to create a diversion, if tliey 
 could not get into the town. 
 
 On tlie 2d of October tlie rebel array, under Van 
 Dorn, Price, Lovell, Yillepigue, and Rust, appeared 
 in front of Corintk. Tkere was some preliminary 
 skii-misking on tkat day, and, on tke 3d, tke flgktiug 
 besan in earnest. Rosecrans bad about nineteen 
 tkousand men, and tke enemy kad collected tkii'ty- 
 eigkt tkousand* for tkis important movement, wkick 
 was to determine tke possession of nortkern Missis- 
 sippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pusked out 
 about five miles, towards Ckewalla, Grant kaving 
 ordered kim to attack, if opportunity offered ; but tke 
 enemy began tke figkt, and, on tke afternoon of tke 
 3d, tke battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rose- 
 crans was diiven back to kis defences on tke noi*tk 
 side of Corintk, and it was now found kow impor- 
 tant was tke labor bestowed on tkese fortifications, by 
 Grant's order, a montk previous. Tke enemy was 
 ckecked until morning; but, early on tke 4tk, tke 
 wkole rebel army, flusked witk tke success of tke day 
 before, assaulted tke works. Tke figkting was fierce ; 
 tke rebels ckaro-inGf almost into tke town, wken an 
 unexpected fire from tke foi-ts di'ove tkem back in 
 confusion. Again and again, tkey advanced to tke 
 works, but each time were received witk a determi- 
 nation ecpial to tkeir own. Once, tke national troops 
 came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied 
 
 * Rosecrans states the enemy's force to have been tliirty-cight thou- 
 sand "by their own accounts." I am unable to say how he Icarued 
 this. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAKT. 117 
 
 them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed 
 before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to 
 be double that of Rosecrans.* 
 
 The national loss was three hundred and fifteen 
 killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and 
 two hundred and thirty-two prisoners and missing. 
 Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at fourteen hun- 
 dred and tAventy-three, and took two thousand two 
 hundred and twenty-five prisoners, representing sixty- 
 nine regiments and thii'teen light batteries; many of 
 the prisoners were wounded. The disparity in losses 
 was doubtless occasioned by the fact that a portion 
 of the national troops fought behind intrenched bat- 
 teries. 
 
 McPherson arrived from Jackson during the fight, 
 coming up in the rear of the enemy ; and, being una- 
 ble to get to the support of the garrison in any other 
 way, made a brilliant march around the rebel flank, 
 brino-ins: in his brig-ade, at the close of the battle, on 
 the right of Rosecrans. His presence, then, was too 
 late to have more than a moral efi'ect, but the enemy 
 knew of his approach, and had also encountered the 
 advance of Hurlbut's column, the day before. The 
 knowledge of these reenforcements, however, seemed 
 only to stimulate Van Dorn to a more desperate ef- 
 fort. The repulse was complete, by eleven o'clock in 
 the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up 
 by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, 
 started off in haste and disorder immediately after 
 the fight ; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were 
 
 * In Van Dorn and Lovell's commands alone, the rebels lost five 
 thousand four hundred and twenty-eight men; of whom more than 
 three thousand were killed or wounded. I can find no return of Price's 
 loss ; and no complete rebel report of the battles of luka or Corinth is in 
 possession of the government. 
 
118 3IILITABY mSTOEY OF 
 
 struck iu flank, as Grant Lad planned, hj Huiibut 
 and Ord, and tlie disaster was rendered final. 
 
 This occurred early on tlie morning of the otli, at 
 the crossing of the Hatch ie river, about ten miles 
 I'ruui Corinth. The retreatino- force fell in with Ord's 
 column, four thousand strong, just beyond Davis's 
 bridge. The rebel advance got across the river with- 
 out resistance, but was speedily diiven back, and with 
 loss ; a battery of artillery and several hundred men 
 were captured, and the advance was dispersed or 
 drowned. Ord pushed on in pursuit, passed over 
 the bridge, and met the whole of Van Dorn's column, 
 on the other side ; but, thousrh not strons^ enous-h to 
 attack the entii-e rebel army even in retreat, Ord held 
 the crossing, and obliged the enemy, who had no 
 time to spare, to make a detoui* of six or seven miles, 
 before he could reach another brida'e. Ord was se- 
 riously wounded in the fight, and the command then 
 devolved on Ilurlbut, who did not attempt a pursuit. 
 
 Grant had notified Rosecrans, in advance, of the 
 movement of Ilurlbut and Ord, and, anticipating the 
 victory at Corinth, had directed that commander to 
 j)ush on instantly after his success, if necessary, even 
 to Bolivar ; for, if Ord's little force encountered the 
 whole rebel army, the danger would be great, unless 
 Kosecrans followed up rajiidly. But the troops were 
 fatigued ]>y two days' fight, and Rosecrans contented 
 himself with liding over the field to announce in 
 person his victory. At noon of the 4th, he gave di- 
 rections to ]-est tliat (lay, and move in pursuit on the 
 morrow.* AMien he rei)orted his action to Grant, 
 
 ♦ " I roilc all over our lima anuounciiijr the result of the fight in per- 
 son, and notilied our victorious troops that after two days' fightin'^, 
 two almost sleepless nights of preparation, movements, and march, I 
 

-r 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 119 
 
 the latter, greatly disappointed at tlie delay, again 
 issued peremptory orders to pusli on at once after 
 the enemy. 
 
 Rosecrans started out on the morninir of the 
 5th, but was misinformed or misled, and took the 
 road towards Chewalla, instead of that further south, 
 by which the enemy had moved. After marching 
 about eight miles out of the w^ay, he discovered his 
 blunder, and tui-ned his column towards the Hatchie. 
 Meanwhile, the tight with Ord for the crossing had 
 occurred, and the rebels had been driven six miles 
 away, to a second bridge higher up the stream. This 
 bridge, at Crum's mills, was narrow and long, and 
 stretched over a wide and swampy bottom, impassa- 
 ble for troops. It, in fact, formed a defile, along 
 which the entire rebel army was obliged to march. 
 Had Eosecrans moved promptly the day before, he 
 would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either 
 as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass 
 this defile. In either event, the destruction of the 
 rebels must have been complete; but the national 
 forces arrived at the Hatchie, just as the rear-guard 
 of the enemy had crossed. Rosecrans, from here, sent 
 word again to Grant of the condition of aftairs, and 
 Grant decided that the favorable oj^portunity had 
 been lost; Rosecrans, however, now urged that he 
 should be peiTnitted to advance, but Grant declined 
 to allow it. He considered that Van Dorn had got 
 too much of a start to leave any well-founded hope 
 of overtaking him, especially as heavy rains had set 
 in, rendering the roads almost impassable. The 
 
 wished them to replenish their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, and stom- 
 achs, take early sleep, and start in pursuit by daylight." — Itosecrans'i 
 Report. 
 
120 MILITARY HISTOKT OF 
 
 troops were without supplies, and, at that time, the 
 secret of living from an enemy's country had not 
 been learned. Rosecrans was therefore recalled, 
 having marched out from Corinth about thirty miles, 
 but not cauglit up with the enemy.* 
 
 In both the battles of luka and Corinth, Grant 
 directed the movements, until the troops arrived in 
 the actual presence of the enemy, although in the 
 fonner, he was about eight miles from the field, and 
 in the latter, nearly forty. As has been shown, he 
 was not always obeyed. 
 
 These t^vo fights relieved the command of West 
 Tennessee from all immediate danger, and recalled 
 the attention of the country and the government to 
 this portion of the theatre of war. The disasters at 
 the East were in a measure retrieved, by the Western 
 successes, and the public feeling was improved. 
 Grant, however, did not receive the credit which was 
 his due for conceiving and directing the movements ; 
 but Rosecrans was made a major-general of volun- 
 teers, and ordered to the command of the Army of 
 the Cumberland. This chano;e, thoug^h not suirsrested 
 T)y Grant, gave him great relief, as the subordinate 
 had disappointed the expectations of his superior. 
 
 The truth is, that Grant's extreme simplicity of 
 behavior and directness of expression imposed on 
 
 * An intcTcopttd letter from a spy of Van Dorn, a young A\oman 
 named Biuton, residing in Corintli, was written before tlie reconstruction 
 of the fortifications in September. This communication described the 
 weakness of the northwest front, and declared, what was then true, 
 that the principal works were too far out for defence, and that the 
 troops were all on the southern side. The letter was copied, and f»)r- 
 warded by General Ord to its original destination, and groat pains were 
 taken thereafter to prevent the transmission of further information. 
 The rebel attack, on the front indicated by !Miss IJurton, su^-gests that 
 Van Dorn may have acted on her reports, to his own destruction. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 121 
 
 \rarioiis officers, both above and below him. Thoy 
 thought him a good, j^lain man, who had blundered 
 into one or two successes, and, who, therefore, could 
 not be immediately removed; but they deemed it 
 unnecessary to regard his judgment, or to count upon 
 his ability. His superiors made their plans inva- 
 riably without consulting him, and his subordinates 
 sometimes sought to carry out their own campaigns, 
 in opposition or indifference to his orders, not doubt- 
 ing, that, with their superior intelligence, they could 
 conceive and execute triumphs w^hich would excuse 
 or even vindicate their course. It is impossible to 
 understand the early history of the war, without 
 taking it into account, that neither the government 
 nor its important commanders gave Grant credit for 
 intellectual ability or military genius. 
 
 His other qualities were also rated low. Because 
 he was patient, some thought it impossible to pro- 
 voke him ; and because of his calmness, it was sup- 
 posed that he was stolid. In battle, or in campaign- 
 ing, he did not seem to care or consider so much 
 what the enemy was doing as what he himself meant 
 to do ; and this trait, to enthusiastic and even bril- 
 liant soldiers, appeared inexplicable. A great com- 
 mander, it was imagined, should be nervous, excitable, 
 inspiring his men and captivating his officers; calling 
 private soldiers -by their names, making eloquent ad- 
 dresses in the field, and waving his di-awn sword in 
 battle. Great commanders had done all these thino-s, 
 and won; and many men, who could do all these 
 things, fancied themselves therefore great command- 
 ers. Others imagined wisdom to consist in science 
 alone; they sought success in learned and elaborate 
 plans, requiring months to develop when the enemy 
 
122 MILITAEY inSTOKY OF 
 
 was immediately before tliem; tliey manoeuvred 
 ■when it was tlie time to figlit ; tliey intrenched when 
 they should have attacked, and studied their books 
 when the field should have been their only problem. 
 
 Grant was like none of these. If he possessed ac- 
 quirements, he apj^eared unconscious of them; he 
 made no allusion to the schools, and never hesitated 
 to transgress their rules, when the occasion seemed 
 to him to demand it. So, he neither won men's hearts 
 by blandishments, nor affected theii- imaginations by 
 brilliancy of behavior; nor did he seem profound, 
 to those who are impressed only by a display of 
 learning. All these things should be appreciated by 
 those who seek to understand his character or career. 
 
 In the latter part of October, reenforcements hav- 
 ing been sent him from the Northwest, he suggested 
 to HaUeck a movement into the interior of Missis- 
 sippi, with a view to the capture of Vicksburg. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. \2^ 
 
 CHAPTEK V. 
 
 Military importance of the Mississippi river — Grant proposes movement into inte- 
 rior, against Yicksburg — Campaign begun — McClernand endeavors to obtain 
 command of an expedition against Vicksburg — Grant moves to Holly Springs 
 — Enemy retreats — Rebels desert their fortifications on the Tallahatchie — Co- 
 operative movement from Helena — Grant advances to Oxford — Sherman sent 
 to Memphis — McClernand assigned to command of river expedition by the 
 President — Sherman moves by river against Vicksburg — Grant's communi- 
 cations cut and Holly Springs captured — Grant lives oflf the country — Re- 
 opens his communications — Sherman's assault on Vicksburg — Repulse of 
 Sherman — McClernand takes command of river expedition — Capture of Ar- 
 kansas Post — Grant falls back to Memphis — Extraordinary behavior of Mc- 
 Clernand — Grant takes command of river expedition — Protest of McClernand. 
 
 The transcendent importance of tlie Mississippi 
 river tad been manifest from the be<>:inniuo; of the 
 war, to both belligerents. Fei-tiliziug an area of 
 thirteen hundred thousand square miles, or six times 
 as large as the empii-e of France, receiving the waters 
 of fifty-seven large, navigable streams, washing the 
 shores of ten different states, to one of which it gives 
 its name, forming at once the boundary and the con- 
 necting link between territory both free and slave, 
 the natural outlet through which the products of the 
 Northwest find their way to the sea — in a word, the 
 gi'andest water-course on either continent — its posses- 
 sion was by far the most magnificent prize for which 
 
124 JIILITABT niSTOEY OF 
 
 tlie nation and tlie rebels were contending. It com- 
 pletely divides tlie great region that formed the bat- 
 tle-ground of the rebellion, and was indispensable 
 alike to the political or military success of the enter- 
 prise. Without it, the so-called Confederacy was cut 
 in twain; with it, the rebellious states were allied by 
 a bond that must be broken, or the North was crip- 
 l)led almost to its ruin. 
 
 During the progress of the war, the Mississippi 
 acquired additional importance ; it afforded the 
 rebels, Ijlockaded by sea, and shut in by a cordon of 
 armies on the north, their only constant medium of 
 communication with the outside world (across their 
 southwestern frontier) ; and, more important still, the 
 only avenue by which supplies of cattle for their im- 
 mense armies, could be obtained. Texas is the only 
 ]ieefgrowing country of the entire Southwest, and 
 had thus far proved to the rebels an inexhaustible 
 resource; from no other portion of the attempted 
 Confederacy, could supj^lies of such consequence be 
 l)rocured. This tangible and practical advantage 
 -would be entirely lost, when the control of the Mis- 
 sissippi river was gone; and no consideration had 
 greater weight with the rebel leaders than this, in 
 the long and gallant defence they made for their 
 main artery of supply. 
 
 Accordingly, the insurgents early seized the most 
 important positions along the river, and, with a keen 
 ni)i)reciation of their natural advantages, fortified 
 ('(•himbus, Fort Pillow, Island Number Ten, Vicks- 
 l»urg, and later, Port Hudson. The first three of 
 these places had follen, in the spring of 1862 ; but 
 \'icksburg, situated at a remarkalde bend in the 
 river, and on one of the few bluffs that mark its 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 125 
 
 course, was rendered one of the strongest fortified 
 places in America. In June, 1862, after tlie capture 
 of New Orleans, a combined expedition moved up tlie 
 river, under Commodore Farragut and Brigadier- 
 General Thomas^ Williams, wlio found no difficulty in 
 making tlieir way as far as Vicksburg, five hundred and 
 tliii*ty miles from tbe sea ; tbere, kow^ever, tkey were 
 ckecked. A bombardment by tke naval force proving 
 ineftectual, part of tke fleet ran by tke batteries. Tke 
 troops did not attack tke town, but were occupied 
 for several weeks opposite Vicksburg in cutting a 
 canal across tke peninsula, formed by tke bend in tke 
 stream. It was koped by tkis canal to divert tke 
 waters of tke Mississippi from tkeir ordinary ckannel, 
 and leave the town several miles inland. Tke attempt 
 was unsuccessful ; and tke troops and seamen suffering 
 greatly from keat and tke diseases incident to tke 
 climate, tke expedition returned to New Orleans. 
 Since tken, tke rebels kad strengtkened tke fortifica- 
 tions of tke place, botk on tke land and water sides, 
 until tkey finally came to believe tkat Vicksburg 
 was impregnable ; and so indeed it proved, to every 
 actual assault. 
 
 Wken General Halleck was ordered to Waskins;- 
 ton, in July, 18G2, to assume command of all tke 
 armies, lie told Grant tkat ke would prefer to remain 
 in tke Department of the Mississippi; that ke kad 
 been working on a definite plan ever since ke kad 
 commanded tke department ; tkat all he kad done kad 
 been in pursuance of tkis plan, and if permitted, ke 
 would return to fulfil it. AMiat the jjlau was ke did 
 not disclose. Until after tke battles of luka • and 
 Corintk, Grant was too constantly on tke defen- 
 sive, to undertake any movement of an aggressive 
 
126 inLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 character. Those battles occuiTed in September and 
 October; and, on the 25th of the latter month, he as 
 sumed command of the Department of the Tennessee, 
 which included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, 
 northern Mississippi, and the portions of Kentucky 
 and Tennessee west of the Tennessee river. 
 
 The next day he wrote to Halleck : " You never 
 have suggested to me any plan of operations in this 
 
 department As situated now, with no more 
 
 troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions, 
 and I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them, 
 without first consulting you." He then proposed the 
 al)andonment of Corinth, the destruction of all the 
 raih'oads branching out from that place, the reopen- 
 ing of the road from Humboldt to Memphis, and the 
 concentration of the troops from Corinth and Bolivar, 
 and " with small reenforcements at Memphis, I think 
 I would be able to move do^vn tlie Mississippi Cen- 
 tral road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." 
 Tliis was the first mention, in the correspondence of 
 tlie two commanders, of the place destined afterwards 
 to become so renowned. Grant continued: "I am 
 ready, however, to do with all my might whatever 
 you may direct, without criticism." 
 
 Tlie plan here proposed implied relying exclu- 
 sively on tlie Mississippi, and the railroads leading 
 oast from that river, for all communication and sup- 
 ]>lif-s. It involved, also, the abandonment of lines 
 and ])laces that liad been carried and maintained 
 only by a lavish expenditure of time, and labor, and 
 livt<. Jiut General Halleck's strategy was always 
 l>a<«(l on a great appreciation of the value of places, 
 while Grant, as has been seen, made armies rather 
 than places the objects of his camjmigns. The minds 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 127 
 
 of the two soldiers were differently constituted ; they 
 looked at most military matters witli different eyes. 
 Ilalleck set so high a value on wliat had already been 
 obtained, especially after sacrifice, that he seemed un- 
 Avilling to risk the actual prize for the sake of securing 
 another. Grant believed that, in war, what is woii is 
 only a fidcrum on which to rest the lever for another 
 effort. One was essentially a defensive, the other an 
 offensive general ; one always prepared for defeat, 
 the other always expected to win. So, the day after 
 Grant's suggestion of an advance, Halleck telegraphed : 
 " Be prepared to concentrate your troops in case of 
 an attack," 
 
 This caution, however, was not in reply to Grant's 
 letter ; and receiving no answer, the latter announced 
 from Jackson, on the 2d of November: "I have com- 
 menced a movement on Grand Junction, with three 
 divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will 
 leave here to-morrow and take command in person. 
 If found practicable, I will go to Holly Springs, and, 
 may be, Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph 
 as I go." Holly Sj)rings is on the Mississij^pi Cen- 
 tral railroad, twenty-five miles from Grand Junction, 
 and about half way to the Tallahatchie river. The 
 distance to Grenada fi*om Grand Junction is one 
 hundred miles. General Pemberton, having super- 
 seded Van Dorn, who remained to serve under him, 
 was at this time in command of the forces opposed to 
 Grant, and had fortified strongly on the Tallahatchie, 
 his advance, however, reaching as far north as La 
 Grange and Grand Junction. When Ilalleck re- 
 ceived word that Grant had absolutely started south, 
 he telegraphed: "I approve of your plan of advan- 
 cing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong 
 
128 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 euougli for that purpose;" Lut lie did not authorize 
 tlie abandonment of any of Grant's positions, and tlie 
 latter was therefore obliged to hold them all. 
 
 On the 4th of Xovember, he had seized La Grange 
 and Grand Junction, and announced : " My moving 
 force will be about thirty thousand men." McPherson 
 commanded his right wing, and C. S. Hamilton the 
 left, while Sherman moved out from Memphis to 
 attract attention in that direction. Grant's head- 
 C[uartei's were with the main body. On the 8th, he 
 informed Sherman that he estimated the rebels at 
 thirty thousand, and felt "strong enougli to handle 
 that number without gloves ; " so tlie demonstration 
 from Memphis was countermanded. 
 
 At this time, Major-General McClernand, who had 
 been a subordinate of Grant since the battle of Bel- 
 mont, was at Washington, making every effort to 
 obtain an independent command in the AVest. He 
 had been a politician, and a member of Congress 
 from Illinois, as well as an old acquaintance and legal 
 associate of the President ; he was a man of moderate 
 ability, of energy and courage, but ignorant of the 
 meaning of military subordination. Ambitious and 
 vain, he expected to step at once to the highest 
 positions in the army, without the knowledge or ex- 
 I)erience Avliich alone could fit him for important 
 commjind. He had political and j^ersonal influence, 
 however, and made ample use of it. Having served 
 at Belmont, Donelson, and Shiloh, he declared he was 
 tired of furnishing l)raius for the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee, and 80 claimed the command, wliich he an- 
 nounced, and very possibly believed, was his right. 
 His claims were supported by not a few individuals 
 of consideration at the West; the President favored, 
 
TJLYSSES S. GRANT. 129 
 
 and McClernand was promised, if not that he should 
 supersede Grant, at least that he should be allowed 
 to raise troops for an inde2:)endent expedition, whose 
 object was the opening of the Mississippi river and 
 tlie capture of Yicksbui-g. He made his plans, and 
 suljmitted them to the President, who approved, and 
 directed McClernand to lay them before the general- 
 in-chief* 
 
 But Halleck was a soldier purely, and had not a 
 particle of sympathy with the personal or political 
 schemes of the ambitious aspirants M^ho swarmed into 
 Washington from every quarter of the North ; he was 
 solely and sincerely anxious for military results, and 
 refused to consider McClernand's plan. He told that 
 general that he had not time to waste on such mat- 
 ters, and if he had the time he had not the inclination. 
 So he fought the whole scheme as long and as hard 
 as he could. At this time, too, General Halleck had 
 more consideration with the government than a year 
 later, after his long series of defeats had occurred ; he 
 was therefore better able to carry out his own views. 
 The President, however, was the warm friend of 
 McClernand, and was accustomed to dictate in purely 
 military matters as often as in civil ones. It must 
 be said, that the civilians, who controlled military 
 movements, had at this time no warrant for sup- 
 posing that, even in military matters, their judgments 
 were not as reliable as those of any soldiers who had 
 been prominent. The generals who had enjoyed 
 almost arbitrary power had failed ; and it is not sur- 
 prising that members of the govei'ument, \\ho were in 
 a great measure responsible in the eyes of the country 
 
 * These assertions of fact are all based on statements capable of 
 verification, but not exclusively derived from official sources. 
 9 
 
130 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 for whatever occnrred, took it upon themselves to de- 
 cide questions which, for auglit that had been proven, 
 tliey were as capable of deciding as any officer of the 
 army. So the President indorsed McClernand, and 
 the Secretary of War tohl him to go out West and get 
 his troops together. 
 
 Grant as yet kne\v nothing of all this, except from 
 the gossip of the newspapers ; but, on the 5th of No- 
 vember, Halleck asked, evidently referring to the river 
 expedition : " Had not troops sent to reenforce you 
 better go to Memphis hereafter ? I hope to give you, 
 twenty thousand additional men in a few days." 
 About the same time, he also informed Grant : " I 
 liope for an active campaign on the Mississippi, this 
 fall ; a large force will ascend the river from New 
 Orleans." On the 9th, Grant telegraphed : " Reen- 
 forcements are arriving very slowly. If they do not 
 come in more rapidly, I will attack as I am." On the 
 1 0th, he got more restive, and inquired : " Am I to 
 understand that I lie here still, while an expedition 
 is fitted out from Memphis, or do you want me to 
 ])u^<ll as far south as possible ? x\m I to have Sher- 
 man suljject to my orders, or is he and his force re- 
 served for some special service?" Halleck replied 
 promptly: "You liave command of all troops sent 
 to yinir department, and have permission to figlit the 
 enemy when you please." This was on the 12th, and 
 on the 13th, Grant's cavalry entered Holly Springs, 
 driving the enemy south of the Tallahatchie. On the 
 14th, he informed Sherman: "I have now complete 
 control of my department," and accordingly ordered 
 him to " move with two divisions of twelve full reiri- 
 ments each, and, if possible, with three divisions, to 
 Oxfoidj or the Tallahatchie, as soon as possible. I 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 131 
 
 am now ready to move from here (La Grange), any 
 day, and only await your movements." Sherman 
 was to notify Grant when he couhl march, and to 
 which of the places mentioned, and Grant promised 
 to move so that they might arrive simultaneously. 
 " I am exceedingly anxious," said Grant, " to do some- 
 thing before the roads get bad, and before the enemy 
 can intrench and reenforce." He was evidently not 
 aware of the rebel worhs on the Tallahatchie. The 
 campaign now contemplated, was in pursuance of 
 Grant's original plan to advance along the Mississippi 
 Central railroad, until, by getting near enough to 
 threaten Vicksburg, he should compel the evacuation 
 of that place. A cooperative movement, by troops 
 from Helena, in Arkansas, which Halleck ordered, 
 was intended to cut the railroad in Pemberton's rear 
 and threaten Grenada. 
 
 On the 23d, Halleck again broached the subject 
 
 of the river expedition, doubtless urged on by the 
 
 President, who was beset by McClernand's political 
 
 friends, and who, in fact, Avas frequently unable to 
 
 withstand political or personal solicitations. Kow, 
 
 although Halleck fully agreed with Grant and every 
 
 other soldier, as to the impropriety of intrusting a 
 
 man like McClernand with important commands, he 
 
 -svas, of course, obliged to be subordinate ; and, when 
 
 directed by his superiors, inquu-ed of Grant how 
 
 many men he had in his department, and what force 
 
 could be sent down the river to Vicksburg. Grant 
 
 replied that he had in all seventy-two thousand men, 
 
 of whom eighteen thousand were at [Memphis, and 
 
 sixteen thousand of these could be spared for the 
 
 river expedition. He announced, on the 24th, that 
 
 he had sriven his orders for the advance of his entire 
 
132 JULITAKY mSTOEY OF 
 
 force, including Slierman; had written to Steele, in 
 Arkansas, to threaten Grenada; and had asked Ad- 
 miral Poi-ter, commanding the Mississippi squadron, 
 to send hoats to cooperate at the mouth of the 
 Yazoo. " Must I countermand the orders for this 
 move ? " The reply was : " Proposed move approved. 
 Do not go too far." Apparently, Halleck and Grant 
 both strove to expedite the movement, so that, if pos- 
 sible, it might get too far advanced to be recalled. 
 Nothing in war is more painful, than the spectacle of 
 soldierly men obliged to give up movements that 
 they know to be for the best interests of the country, 
 and cooperate in others planned by ignorant minds, 
 and committed to unskilful hands. Yet, their sol- 
 dierly principles and instincts compelled them to 
 cooperate heartily. So far, however, the soldiers had 
 it their own way. 
 
 On the 29th, Grant's cavalry crossed the Talla- 
 hatchie, and his headquarters were at Holly Springs ; 
 Sherman, too, was up, and would cross the Talla- 
 hatchie, at Wyatt. Grant telegraphed : " Our troops 
 wDl be in Abbeville " (on the Tallahatchie) " to- 
 moiTOw, or a battle will be fought." 
 
 Meanwhile the movement of troops fi*om Helena 
 was made, under Generals Hovey and Washburne. 
 Tliey marched across from the Mississippi, to cut the 
 railroad in Pemberton's rear, and accomplished that 
 object; but the damage done was slight and readily 
 repaii-ed, and the operation had but little effect upon 
 tlie campaign, unless, indeed, it hastened the evacua- 
 tion of the rel)el woiks on the Tallahatchie. For on 
 tlie 1st of Decem])er, the enemy deserted his fortifi- 
 cations on that river, a\ liiih were too stronsf to have 
 been stormed : Grant was making preparations to 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAIST. 133 
 
 flank them, when the evacuation occurred. Pursuit 
 was made to Oxford : there was no fighting other 
 than skirmisliing ; but deha^'s were indispensable, as 
 supplies for the entire army were brought along a 
 single line of railroad, which had to be repaired and 
 reconstructed as the troops advanced. The country 
 roads, too, were in bad condition, and rendered rapid 
 marches impossible. But on the 3d, Grant informed 
 Admiral Porter : " Our move has been successful, so 
 far as compelling the evacuation of the Mississippi 
 Central road as far as Grenada." Shortly after, he 
 reported taking twelve hundred prisoners. 
 
 Grant, however, had already begun to think that 
 the difficulty of supplying his army would be too 
 great to overcome, and on the same day that he wrote 
 to Porter, he asked Halleck, from Abbeville : " How 
 far south would you like me to go ? Would it not 
 be well to hold the enemy south of the Yallabusha" 
 (the next important stream south of the Tallahatchie), 
 " and move a force from Helena and Memphis on 
 Vicksburg ? With my present force it would not be 
 prudent to go beyond Grenada, and attempt to hold 
 present line of communication." On the 5th, he was 
 at Oxford, twenty-eight miles beyond Holly Springs, 
 with his cavalry at Coffeeville, only eighteen miles 
 from Grenada. This whole advance was made with- 
 out serious fighting, as the enemy fell back rapidly 
 before any show of pursuit. On the 5th, he again 
 suggested to Halleck : " If the Helena troops were 
 at my command, I think it would be practicable to 
 send Sherman to take them and the Memphis forces 
 south of the mouth of Yazoo river, and thus secure 
 Vicksburg and the state of Mississippi." * 
 
 * I beg the careful attention of the reader to the above extract, 
 
134 AULITABY HISTOE 
 
 The plan here sketched, and wliicn was eventually 
 adopted, had a double chance of success. Either 
 Sherman, going down the Mississippi to the moutli 
 of the Yazoo, could present a new base for Grant, 
 from which the latter could supply himself, when he 
 also struck the Yazoo, in tlie interior ; or, if this should 
 be found impracticable or less desirable, Grant could 
 hold the main body of the enemy at, or near Grenada, 
 confronting him, while Sherman might step in and 
 take Yicksburg. By this strategy, Grant assumed 
 wliat seemed the more ungrateful part of the under- 
 taking, leaving the prize of the campaign to be se- 
 cured by his subordinate. The same peculiarity was 
 also conspicuous in some of Ms later programmes, but 
 in each instance. Fortune overruled his arrangements 
 and brought about her own conclusions, apparently 
 resolved to dispose of her own favors. 
 
 On the 5th of the month, in reply to Grant's sug- 
 gestions, Ilalleck directed him not to attempt to hold 
 the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 
 twenty-five thousand troops at Memphis, by the 20th, 
 fur the Yicksburg expedition. On the 7th, Grant 
 answered that he would send two divisions to Mem- 
 phis in a few days, and asked : " Do you want me to 
 connnand the expedition to Yicksburg, or shall I 
 send Sliernum ?" To w^liich Ilalleck replied : " You 
 may move your ti'oops as you may deem best to 
 acconi])li>li the great object in view. . . . Ask 
 Poi-ter to c()6])erate. Telegi'ai)h what are your pres- 
 ent i)laiis;' Gi-aiit answered at once, on the Sth : 
 
 an.l to all that is quotoil iii reference to Sherman's movement and 
 <; rant's ])romiscd cooperation. There has been a misunderstand- 
 ing of this matter by some writers, which I shall endeavor to 
 rectify. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 135 
 
 " General Slierman uill coin m and the expedition 
 down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about 
 forty thousand men, will laud at Yicksburg, up the 
 Yazoo if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central 
 road, and the road running east from Vicksburg, 
 where they cross the Black river. I will cooperate 
 from here, my movements depending on tliose of the 
 enemy. With the large cavaliy force at my com- 
 mand, I will be able to have them show themselves 
 at diiferent points on the Tallaliatchie and Yalla- 
 busha, and where an opportunity occurs, make a real 
 attack. " After cutting the two roads, General Sher 
 man's movements, to secure the end desired, will ne. 
 cessarily be left to his judgment. I wdll occupy this 
 road to Coifeeville." 
 
 Written instructions conformalde to the above 
 dispatch were on the same day given to Sherman;'"' 
 
 * "IIeadquarteks Thirteenth Army Corps, Department of the) 
 Tennessee, Oxford, Mississippi, December 8, 1S62. ' 
 
 "■ Major-Generaiy\ . T. Sherman, commanding llight Wing: 
 
 " YouAvill proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Ten- 
 nessee, taking with jou one division of your present command. On 
 your arrival at Memphis, you will assume command of all the troops 
 there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the 
 Mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in 
 your own army. As soon as possible move with them down the river 
 to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and, with the cooperation of the gunboat 
 fleet under command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction 
 of that jjlace, in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment 
 may dictate. 
 
 " The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary 
 to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The quartermaster at St. 
 Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty thousand 
 men ; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will 
 be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may 
 come into the post of Memphis. 
 
 " On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Ad- 
 miral Porter, and ai-range with him for his cooperation. 
 
 " Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you 
 
136 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 and Grant Laving "been authorized, in compliance 
 with liis i-eqnest, to assume command of all the troops 
 then in Mississippi, belonging to the Department of 
 Arkansas, directed them to report to Sherman, whom 
 he dispatched on the 8th, to Memphis. Porter was 
 infoiTned of the plan, and was requested to cooperate. 
 Sherman was instructed to move with all celerity, 
 and informed, that " I will hold the troops here in 
 readiness to cooperate wdth you in such manner as 
 tlie movements of the enemy may make necessaiy." 
 This was the extent of Grant's promise of coopera- 
 tion. It was, however, understood in conversation, 
 that in case Pembei-ton retreated, Grant would fol- 
 low him up, between the Yazoo and the Big Black 
 rivers, to the Mississippi. 
 
 Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should 
 obtain the command of the river expedition, and 
 therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis, on the 
 very day that he received the authority, so that, if 
 possible, the latter might start before McClernand 
 could arrive. Ilalleck, too, sent tlie permission to 
 Grant to dispatch Sherman, without that delibera- 
 tion which he sometimes displayed ; but on tlie 9th, 
 he ti'legraphed : "The President may insist upon 
 sending a separate commander. K not, assign such 
 officer as you deem best. Sherman w'ould be my 
 fhoic-e as the chief under you." IS'othing could be 
 more genuine than the support which in this and 
 
 will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. Itcill Tiold 
 tJie forces here in n'tidiness to cooperate with yov. in such manner as the 
 movements of the enemy may male 7iecessary. 
 
 "Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient offi- 
 cer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the sieo-e "'uns 
 and whatever cavalry may be there. 
 
 "U. S. Grant, Major- General^ 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 137 
 
 nearly every other matter, Grant received from his 
 chief, after Halleck once assumed command of all the 
 armies. If any jealousy or unkindness had once 
 been apparent in Halleck's behavior to his subordi- 
 nate, neither was displayed again under relations of 
 extraordinary delicacy and difficulty. And, at this 
 time. Grant had not begun to regain his position in 
 the public esteem. 
 
 On the 14th, Grant informed Sherman, who was 
 still at Memphis, that " it would be well if you could 
 have two or three small boats suitable for navigating 
 the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look 
 to that base for supplies, before we get through." 
 On the 18th, came at last the unwelcome word from 
 Washington: "It is the wish of the President that 
 General McClernand's corps shall constitute a part of 
 the river expedition, and that he shall have the im- 
 mediate command under your direction." The first 
 part of this dispatch was an order to divide all the 
 troops in Grant's command, including those from 
 Arkansas, into four corps. 
 
 And thus a political general was foisted on Hal- 
 leck and his subordinate ; the influences brought to 
 bear on the President were too strong for the soldiers. 
 There was of course nothing to do but obey; and 
 Grant wrote on tlie same day to McClernand, who 
 was at Springfield, Illiuois : " I have been directed 
 this moment, by telegraph from the general-in-chief 
 of the army, to divide the forces of this department 
 into four army corps, one of which is to be com 
 manded by yourself, and that to form a part of the 
 expedition on Vicksburg. I have drafted the order, 
 and will forward it to you as soon as printed. . . . 
 Written and verbal instructions have been given to 
 
J 38 3IILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 General Sherman, wLicli Avill he turned over to you 
 on your aiTival at Memphis." 
 
 On the 20th, however, the enem}'s cavaby, under 
 Van Dorn, made a dash into Holly Springs, twenty- 
 eight miles in Grant's rear, and captured the garrison, 
 with all its stores. Forrest, another rebel raider, at 
 the same time pushed his cavalry into "West Tennes- 
 see, and cut the railroad to Columbus, at several 
 points between that place and Jackson. This com- 
 pletely severed Grant's only line of communication 
 with the North, and even with most parts of his own 
 command. It was a catastrophe which he had fore- 
 seen as possible, and had striven hard to avert. He 
 had received timely notice of the advance of Forrest, 
 and taken every precaution to meet it. General Sul- 
 livan, who commanded at Jackson, was reenforced 
 lapidly, and directed to move out towards the enemy. 
 All of the available cavalry of the Array of the Ten- 
 nessee was also sent after the raiders, and all command- 
 ers between Oxford and Bolivar were notified of the 
 rebel movements, and directed to hold their respec- 
 tive posts "at all hazards." Men and commanders 
 everywhere did their duty, except at Holly Springs ; 
 and the enemy was repulsed at Coldwater, Davis 
 Mills, Bolivar, and Middleburg; but Holly Springs 
 was captured ^\•hile the troops were in their beds. 
 The conunanding officer of the post. Colonel Murphy, 
 of the Eighth Wisconsin volunteers, had taken no 
 ste])s to ])rotecfc the place, not notifying a single officer 
 of the connr.and, of the approaching danger, although 
 lie himself had received early warning from Grant, 
 'i'he troops were blameless, for the first intimation they 
 had of an attack, was when they found themselves 
 sui-rounded ; and notwithstanding the surprise, many 
 
ULYSSES 8. GKANT. 139 
 
 of tliem behaved admirably, refusing to be paroled, 
 and after making their escape from the enemy, attack- 
 ino; him without reofard to their relative strencjth. 
 Colonel Murpliy was dismissed the service for his 
 conduct on this occasion. He was the same officer 
 who had abandoned luka to Pj'ice so readily. Fifteen 
 hundred prisoners were taken, and four hundred 
 thousand dollars' worth of property was reported de- 
 stroyed. The enemy estimated the loss of property 
 at four millions. The actual damage probably 
 amounted to a million of dollars. 
 
 Holly Springs, Grant had made a secondaiy base 
 of supplies, and the destniction of the ordnance, sub- 
 sistence, and quartermasters' stores there, was a serious 
 though temporary annoyance. The railroad, how- 
 ever, Avas not seriously damaged between La Grange 
 and Oxford, except at Holly Springs, and the enemy 
 had possession of that place only long enough to 
 complete the destruction of the stores ; but the cut- 
 tins; of the line between Jackson and Columbus at 
 once demonstrated what Grant had foretold, the impos- 
 sibility of maintaining so long a line of supply through 
 hostile territory. He commenced the next day to 
 fall back north of the Tallahatchie, and at the same 
 time expressed a wish to Halleck, to send two divi 
 sions to Memphis, and join the river expedition with 
 them in person. Since Sherman was not to command 
 it, he was anxious to do so himself, especially as he 
 knew its difficulties would now be enhanced by his 
 own inability to advance, or even to remain on his 
 present line. The promptness with which he came to 
 this conclusion ^sas not inspired by any apprehension 
 of the force in his front, for he telegraphed the same 
 day : " The enemy are falling back from Grenada." 
 
140 JIILITAEY mSTORY OF 
 
 General Grant Las told me, when discussing this 
 campaign, that had he known then, what he soon 
 afterwards learned — the possibility of subsisting an 
 army of thirty thousand men without supplies, other 
 than those drawn from an enemy's country — he could, 
 at that time, have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, 
 and probably have succeeded in capturing the place. 
 But no experience of former wars, nor of the war of 
 the rebellion, warranted him in supposing that he 
 could feed his army exclusively fiom the countiy. 
 The rainy season was setting in, when the roads 
 ^vould naturally very much impede his progress, of 
 course increasing the difficulty of subsistence, and he 
 determined at once to return. 
 
 He was, however, obliged from sheer necessity to 
 subsist on what he could find. For over a week, he 
 had no communication whatever with the North, and 
 for two weeks, no supplies. But the countiy was 
 found to be abundantly stocked. Every thing for 
 the subsistence of man or beast, for fifteen miles east 
 and west of the railroad, from Coffeeville to La Grange, 
 was appropriated to the use of the army. The fiimi- 
 lies of the farmers suft'ered, but the soldiers were fed; 
 and the lesson was taught which Grant afterwards 
 applied in the rear of Vicksburg, and which Sher- 
 man, having seen the application, practised on a still 
 lai-irer scale, in the marches throu2:h Geor2:ia and the 
 C arolinas — the lesson that an army may live, though 
 its comnuinications are desti'oyed. 
 
 It was a sorry tlay for the rebels when they burnt 
 Holly Spiings, and broke up Grant's communications 
 with Columl)Us; not only sorry in those grander 
 results to which allusion lias been made, but in the 
 more immediate effects, extending only to the people 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 141 
 
 of nortliem Mississippi. The women came with 
 smiling faces to Grant's headquarters, to see how he 
 bore the loss of Holly Springs. They asked him 
 civilly, but exultingly, what he would do, now that 
 his soldiers had nothinsj to eat. But their exultation 
 and smiles were of short continuance, when the quiet 
 general informed them that his soldiers would find 
 plenty in theii' barns and storehouses. They looked 
 aghast at this, and exclaimed : " You would not take 
 from non-combatants!" But a commander's first 
 necessity is to provide for his troops ; so the country 
 was st]*ipped bare, and the army was supplied. 
 
 Althouofh the soldiers found all that was neces- 
 sary, Grant was anxious until he discovered the suc- 
 cess of the experiment. It was one hitherto untried, 
 and, while uncertain as to its results, he moved his 
 army back to La Grange, abandoning the campaign, 
 which had been pressed to a distance of fifty or sixty 
 miles. On the 23d of December, the headquarters 
 were again at Holly Spiings. Forrest was sjieedily 
 chased out of West Tennessee, but the damage he had 
 done could not be so readily repaired. 
 
 Various reasons had induced Grant to select this 
 line of operations against Vicksburg, rather than that 
 of the Mississippi river. First of all, was a desire to 
 fight Pemberton. He appreciated fully the impor- 
 tance of Vicksburs^, and. was anxious enousrh to se- 
 cure its possession ; but, as has already been shown, 
 •he was always more anxious to destroy rebel armies 
 than to capture rebel cities, believing that, if the 
 armies were destroyed, the cities were sure to fall. 
 So, if Pemberton had by any possibility got around 
 towai'ds Columbus, Grant would undoubtedly have 
 moved in that direction, and let Vicksburg alone. 
 
142 SHLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 until be had beaten the enemy in the field. When 
 he started from La Grange, he indeed meant and 
 hoped to threaten Vicksburg, but liis prime object 
 was the defeat of PemV)erton. As soon as he dis- 
 covered that Pemberton would not fight, on the very 
 day that the national troops got inside the rebel 
 works on the Tallahatchie, and found the enemy 
 afain di>^appearing, Grant suggested the movement 
 direct against Vicksburg ; determined to secure the 
 destruction of the rebel force, whether it remained in 
 tlie interior of Mississippi, confronting him, or was 
 luirricd to Vicksburg to reenforce the garrison tliere. 
 There were, however, other, although secondary 
 considerations, which confirmed his judgment in this 
 matter, if they did not assist in determining it. 
 Taking the river route earlier, would have left all the 
 state of Mississippi free to the rebels, who could at 
 any time have attacked his communications on that 
 line, cutting him off more effectually and permanent- 
 ly than they did at Holly Springs ; while Mem2:)liis 
 itself would have been Avithin reach of Bragg, by 
 a rapidly executed movement. By moving towards 
 Grenada, however, Grant covered Memphis and the 
 country already acquired, besides threatening the 
 region on both sides of his line of march. These ad- 
 vantages recommended this route to accomplished 
 soldiers, even after the disaster at Holly Springs ; and 
 I have heard men of high militaiy reputation main- 
 tain, since the capture of Vicksburg, that Grant 
 should liave persevered in his original plan of cam- 
 l»aigii. He, however, had no idea of remaining in 
 the interior, or of returning to it, after this date, al- 
 though strongly urged to such a course, by some of 
 liis most capable and trusted ofticers. He considered 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 143 
 
 tliat, l)y llie destruction of tlie Mississippi Central 
 road and its bridges, and tlie devastation of tlie re- 
 sources of tlie country, lie had sufficiently protected 
 himself against attacks of any importance upon his new 
 line; and the event proved that the rebels were too 
 Inisy defending themselves, to take any initiative again, 
 during the long campaign and siege that followed. 
 
 McClernand's assumption of the command of the 
 river expedition was delayed by the break in com- 
 munication. Grant could not transmit the orders he 
 had received, although he ^vl'ote at once to McCler- 
 nand ; but, before the line was reopened, Sherman had 
 embarked at Memphis, with thirty thousand men, and 
 at Helena, was reenforced by twelve thousand more. 
 He arrived at Milliken's bend, on the Arkansas side, 
 and twenty miles above Yieksburg, on the 24th of 
 December ; here he spent two or three days, in at- 
 tempts to cut the Vicksburg and Shreveport railroad 
 (by which reenfbrcements could have been sent to 
 Vicksburg), and waiting to hear from Banks, who had 
 been ordered to move up the river from New Orleans 
 and cooperate in the attack on Vicksburg. The rebels 
 probably made use of these two or three days to pre- 
 pare for the attack which they knew must follow. 
 On the 2Gth, under convoy of Admiral Porter and his 
 fleet of gunboats, Sherman advanced on transports up 
 the Yazoo liver, which empties into the Mississippi, 
 aT)Out nine miles above the toAvn. He debarked his 
 troops on the 27th, on the south side of the river, 
 near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou.* 
 
 The long line of hills on which Vicksburg stands, 
 turns off from the Mississippi, just above the town, 
 
 * Tlic map of operations in Yazoo pass and Steele's bayou and map 
 I' Campaign against Vicksburg illustrate the operations here described. 
 
144 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 and runs parallel to the Yazoo for several miles. Be- 
 tween tlie latter river and tlie bluffs, lies a strip of 
 country peculiarly susce^^tible of defence ; covered with 
 a dense and tangled overgrowth, cut up with swamps 
 and intersected Avith streams, and at this time almost 
 entirely under water ; in fact, impracticable for in- 
 fantry, except along one or two narrow causeways ; 
 this strip of territory, some three miles wide, was 
 commanded by the guns on the bluffs, which were 
 strongly posted, and was besides completely within 
 range from the numerous trenches and rifle-pits along 
 the hills. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which 
 rendered it impossible for Sherman to avail himself at 
 any one time of half his force, he attacked the works 
 on the 29th, got his men across this difficult coun- 
 try, and into the rebel lines ; he even effected a lodg- 
 ment on the hard land at the foot of the bluff's, but 
 Avas finally driven back with severe loss. It was then 
 determined to attempt a landing higher up the Ya- 
 zoo, in the night, so as to attack the enemy's extreme 
 right in cooperation with the naval force, and thus 
 secure a base fi-om which communication with Grant 
 might be opened. The preliminary movements were 
 made, but a dense fog set in, so thick that the ves- 
 sels could not move, nor could the men see each other 
 at the distance of ten paces. This lasted till day- 
 break, when it was too late to start. A heavy rain 
 then set in, rendering the ground if possible still 
 more impracticable, and the attempt was abandoned. 
 Shennnn moved his troops out of the Yazoo, and at 
 the mouth of tlie Missi.-^si])])i, he was met by I\[cCler- 
 nand, on the '2d of January. lie at once relinquished 
 his command to that officer, assuming himself the com- 
 mand of a single corps. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. • 145 
 
 He had lost one hundred and seventh-five men 
 killed, nine hundred and thirty wounded, and seven 
 hundi-ed and forty-three missing.* In his report to 
 Grant, he attributed his failure " to the strength of 
 the enemy's position, both natural and artificial." 
 Grant, however, had no fault to find with him ; the 
 assault was made at the only point where there was 
 a chance of success, and was conducted with skill 
 and judgment ; the men behaved with a gallantry 
 not surpassed during the war, but the extraordinary 
 nature of the defences rendered the attempt unavail- 
 ino". The rebels had doubtless been reenforced from 
 Pemberton's command, but this contributed nothing 
 to the result, as Sherman had twice as many men as 
 he could use on the difficult gi-ound where he fought.f 
 
 * The rebels reported a loss of sixty-three killed, one hundred and 
 tliii'ty-four wounded, and ten missing. 
 
 t It has been supposed and stated by some, that Sherman's reverse 
 was the consequence of a failure on Grant's part to move south from 
 Grenada, and appear in the rear of Vicksburg at the time of the as- 
 sault. I have already explained what was the nature and extent of 
 the cooperation planned by Grant. He meant, if he could, to hold 
 Pemberton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman to enter Vicksburg 
 without any material opposition : but the strength of the works was 
 not fully appreciated when this arrangement was made ; they were so 
 strong that had Grant been able to keep Peraberton's entire force in 
 his own front, there would have been no different result to Sherman's 
 endeavor. Sherman himself declared that his failure was owing to 
 '•the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial;" 
 and he never could have anticii)ated a tactical cooperation from 
 Grant, for Grant had neither promised nor suggested it. The letters 
 from Grant to Halleck, and Grant's orders to Sherman, both given in 
 full above (in the text or in notes), are proof of this assertion. Sher- 
 man himself declared in his report of the operations : " I supposed 
 their" (the rebel) "organized forces to amount to about fifteen thou- 
 sand, which could be reenforced at the rate of about five thousand a 
 day, 2^1'ovided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemher- 
 tonh forces at Grenada.'''' Again, in the same report : " Not one word 
 could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing 
 10 
 
146 MixrrAKY history of 
 
 Tlie seljels were jubilant over the double issue 
 of tliis campaign, and tliey certainly succeeded in 
 deferring the result at which the national command- 
 er aimed. The success of Grant's plans was indeed 
 
 govth." " I proposed ... to attack tlie enemy's right, which, if suc- 
 cessful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo river, and 
 place V8 in communication with General Grant.'' " Of course I was sadly 
 disappointed, as it was the only remaining chance of our securing a 
 lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and the Black rivers, from 
 which to operate against Vicksburg and the railroad east, as also to 
 secure the navigation of the Y^'azoo river," " The rumor of General 
 Grant having fallen back behind the Tallahatchie, became confirmed 
 by my receiving no intelligence from him." " The effort was neces- 
 sary to a successful accomplishment of my orders, and the combina- 
 tions were the best possible under the circumstances. I assume all the 
 responsibility, and attach blame to no one." 
 
 In his orders to division commanders lefore the attacTc, dated Decem- 
 ber 23d, Sherman said : " Parts of this general plan are to cooperate 
 with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg, to secure pos- 
 session of the land lying between the Y^azoo and the Black, and to act 
 in concert with General Grant against Pemberton's forces, supposed to 
 have Jacl-son, Mississippi, as a point of concentration^ In the same pa- 
 per : " It may be necessary (looking to Grant's approach), before at- 
 tacking Vicksburg, to reduce the battery at Ilaine's bluif first, so as to 
 unable some of the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Y'a- 
 7.00, and communicate irith General Grant." Again : " Granfs left and 
 centre tcere at the last accounts approaching the Yallahusha, near Grenada, 
 and the railroad to his rear, by which he drew his supplies, was re- 
 ported to be seriously damaged. This may disconcert him somewhat, 
 but only makes more important our line of operations. At the Talla- 
 bttsha, General Grant mai/ encounter the army of General Pemherton, the 
 same which refused him battle on the line of the Tallahatchie, which 
 was strongly fortified; but as he" (Pemberton) "will not have time 
 to fortify the Yallabusha, he will hardly fortify there, and in that event 
 General Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge lying 
 })ctwecn the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on the 
 Yazoo, and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and which he 
 knows we carry along." Finally: " I purpose to land our whole force 
 on the Mississippi side, and then to reach the point where the Vicks- 
 burg and Jackson railroad crosses the Big Black, after which to attack 
 Vicksburg by land, whilst the gunboats assail it by water." 
 
 Of course those who think or have said that General Grant was to meet 
 
TLYSSES S. GRANT. 147 
 
 more tliaii once delayed ; sometimes by the skilful 
 movements of his antagonists, and quite as often by 
 the unskilful or unwilling operations of those whom 
 he commanded : for in war, tlie loyalty of his subor- 
 dinates is as important to the chief as tlie practica- 
 bility of his plans or the steadiness of liis soldiers. 
 In this instance, Grant could not complain of his gen- 
 erals ; nor indeed is it easy to say that the fault was 
 in his plans. The line he himself marched on, was 
 that dictated by the rules of the military art, and, 
 had he taken a larger force, his predicament would 
 only have been so much the worse ; he would have 
 had so many more men to feed. Sherman, too, had 
 more troops than he could use, so that a different 
 disposition of the forces could hardly have resulted 
 more favorably. Indeed, when Grant threw both his 
 
 Sherman at Vicksburg, or to cooperate with hira in the assault, never can 
 have seen these papers. It is evident that Sherman understood exactly 
 ■what his chief meant to do, and explained those intentions to his own 
 subordinates. It is plain that he felt the greatest anxiety to open up 
 the Yazoo river, so that Grant might descend, and in order to open 
 the Yazoo, he made the assault ; it is plain, not only, that he did not 
 expect Grant to be at Vicksburg, but that he had heard and believed 
 strong rumors of the disaster which had occurred to Grant's line of 
 communication ; that, knowing the probability of this disaster having 
 occurred, he was, like a good soldier and loyal subordinate, still more 
 anxious to assault, in order to relieve his commander from what might 
 be imminent stress ; that he know Grant's objective to be Pemberton, 
 and declared that Pemberton's point of concentration was Jackson, 
 fitly miles from Vicksburg ; that after the unsuccessful assault he still 
 made no ungenerous attempt to lay the blame on any shoulders but 
 his own, but assumed it all, if any blame there was in making a skil- 
 ful and courageous though unsuccessful effort to take a place of unu- 
 sual strength by storm. Sherman deserves all praise for his determi- 
 nation to attempt the assault, when he knew, not only, that Grant neve" 
 intended to support him in its tactical execution, but that he was prob 
 ably unable to render even the strategical support to the movement 
 which had originally been planned. 
 
148 jnUTAKY HISTOKY OF 
 
 armies on the Mississippi, success still fled before liis 
 advances, as coyly as in the interior. 
 
 As has heen shown, he had early foreseen the 
 especial difficulty which beset his army in this cam- 
 paign ; but marched on, trusting that in the manifold 
 chances of war, he might be able to overcome or 
 evade it. The rebels, however, saw plainly what 
 their game was, and played it well ; they withdrew 
 before Grant's advance without risking a fight, and, 
 then, suddenly cutting his communications, so as to 
 hold him from any further progress, hastened by their 
 interior lines to Yicksburg, to withstand Sherman ; 
 wlio, however, would have been equally unable to 
 carry his point of assault, if Pemberton had remained 
 in front of Grant. Had this been the end, it would 
 have been a defeat for Grant ; but nothing can be 
 styled defeat which eventuates in success; and the 
 idea of abandoning his aim was not even presented 
 to this general's mind. He was baffled at Oxford, 
 but before the rebel rear-guard was out of Holly 
 Springs, he had planned another campaign with all 
 his forces, by way of the Mississippi river. Delays 
 and tlifficulties with him had only the effect of in- 
 creasing his determination and provoking his obsti- 
 nacy. Some men need the excitement of slight suc- 
 cess to sustain their patience and inspire their hope ; 
 (i rant's only enthusiasm w\is that confidence which be- 
 comes serene when emergencies threaten and crowd. 
 
 Upon leaving the Yazoo river, Sherman at once 
 ])roposed to McClernand that, while waiting for fur- 
 ther orders from Grant, the expeditionary force should 
 be eni])loyed in the capture of Arkansas Post, a 
 stront; work on the Arkansas, fifty miles from its 
 mouth. The object was to occupy the troops, and 
 
ULYSSES 6. GRANT. 140 
 
 raise their spii'its, depressed by the recent failure, 
 and also to secure the Hue of communication "by the 
 Mississippi against attacks from the Arkansas side. 
 McClernand immediately acquiesced in Sherman's 
 proposition, and moved his force up the Arkansas, 
 the fleet under Poi-ter accompanying. A naval bom- 
 bardment, lasting several days, occurred ; and on the 
 11th, the troops assaulted the works, when the post 
 surrendered, after a tight of three hours, in which the 
 squadron bore a conspicuous part. Five thousand 
 prisoners and seventeen pieces of cannon fell into the 
 hands of the victors ; McClernand lost about a thou- 
 sand men, in killed, wounded, and missing. The guns 
 of the fort were silenced by the fleet, and Admiral 
 Porter received the sword of its commander, but the 
 troops were surrendered to the army. 
 
 This operation was planned and executed without 
 Grant's knowledge or consent, and he was at first dis- 
 pleased with the movement, whose effect on the con- 
 templated campaign was not perceptible. Lacking any 
 confidence in McClernand's military judgment, and 
 supposing that the plan emanated solely from that offi- 
 cer, he did not give it the same consideration it would 
 have received, had he known that Sherman first sug- 
 gested the idea. It seemed to him a mere side move, 
 contributing: in no desiree to the s-reat result at which 
 he was aiming ; and, throughout the war, he preferred 
 to engage in no enterprise that did not tend directly 
 to the accomplishment of his main object. He ex- 
 pressed his dissatisfaction in this instance both to 
 McClernand and to Halleck, but, subsequently, became 
 convinced that the reasons offered in favor of the 
 movement were sufficient to warrant McClernand in 
 making it. 
 
150 MILITAKY HISTOKY OF 
 
 Grant, mean while, Lad been extremely anxious on 
 account of Sherman. Cut off, for more than a week, 
 from all news from the North, and aware that the 
 impossibility of holding any troops in his own front, 
 might greatly increase Sherman's difficulties, he was 
 yet unable to do any thing to relieve his subordinate. 
 Even after communication with Memphis was re- 
 opened, it was long before he heard directly from the 
 river expedition. On the 4th of January, he had 
 news of the assault, but neither official nor definite, 
 and could not learn, for a week afterwards, whether 
 Sherman had fought his way into Vicksburg or not. 
 On the 4th, McPhei'son was ordered north from the 
 Tallahatchie; but the backward movement was a 
 slow one ; the roads were in miserable condition by 
 reason of the winter rains, and, as it had been deter- 
 mined to abandon northern Mississippi, the accu- 
 mulated quartermasters' and ordnance stores had to be 
 removed with the army. It was not until the 10th 
 of January, that the headquarters Avere established at 
 jNIemphis. 
 
 From there, Grant wrote at once to McClemand 
 that he had heard nothing official from the expedition 
 since Sherman left : " This expedition must not fail. 
 If there is force enough within the limits of my con- 
 trol to secure a certain victory at Vicksburg, they 
 will be sent there." Being urged by Ilalleck to send 
 every thing j)ossible down the river, he stated his 
 iradiness to reenforce McClernand with twenty thou- 
 sand troops. He also, at this time, sent an officer to 
 Admiral Porter, to survey the ground, and determine 
 the practicability (vf reopening the canal across the 
 tongue of land opi)osite Vicksburg. McClernand 
 was ordered to rendezvous at Milliken's bend, or 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 151 
 
 some other point convenient for cooperation with 
 Banks, who Avas daily expected below Viclvsburg. 
 
 It is necessary to a correct understanding of all 
 these operations, and due to General Ilalleck, to keep 
 constantly in mind that Major-General Banks had 
 been sent to New Orleans, by sea, with an army of 
 forty thousand men, and ordered to cooperate in the 
 opening of the Mississippi river, and especially in the 
 capture of Vicksburg.* He was to be supported by 
 Admiral Farragut's fleet, already so renowned, and 
 for months his arrival was constantly expected by 
 Grant. Circumstances, which it is not my province 
 to investigate or describe, delayed the movements of 
 General Banks, who arrived at New Orleans in De- 
 ceml)er, but did not start from there until Marcli, and 
 returned the same month. His movements afforded 
 no cooperation to Grant. 
 
 All this while, Grant \vas greatly annoyed by 
 McClernand's insubordinate behavior. That oificer 
 claimed to have been placed in command directly by 
 the President, and therefore to be independent of 
 his superior. He constantly appealed from Grant in 
 matters of military etiquette and law ; his language 
 was as intolerable as his actions were injudicious; his 
 official papers teemed with self laudation and grandil- 
 oquent fustian, assuming credit to which he was not 
 entitled, raising objections to the orders of his com- 
 manding officer, making suggestions contrary to all 
 the principles of military science, and fostering jeal 
 ousies among different portions of the army and with 
 
 * On the 2cl of Febmary, Halleck wrote to Banks: " General Grant's 
 forces have been for some time operating in the vicinity of Yicksburg, 
 and the President expects that you will permit no obstacle to prevent 
 you from cooperating with him bv some movement up the Mississippi 
 river." 
 
152 MILITAET mSTOKY OF 
 
 the naval officers.* All these peculiarities indicated 
 to Sherman, to McPherson, and to Admiral Porter the 
 same traits, and those three officers urged upon Grant, 
 in writing and in conversation, that the only chance 
 for the success of the enterprise was in his assuming 
 command of it in person. He finally received au- 
 thoiity from Washington to relieve McClernand, and 
 either appoint the next officer in rank in his place, or 
 to assume himself tlie immediate command.f 
 
 He, at first, desired to put Sherman in command ; 
 as that officer had started from Memphis witli the 
 expedition, and afterwai'ds been obliged to yield pre- 
 cedence to McClernand, it seemed but fair to restore 
 him. But Grant v^'as especially anxious to place 
 Slierman at the head of the expedition, because he 
 thought Sherman especially capable of directing its 
 movements. It was, however, represented by those 
 in his confidence, that as McClernand was the senior 
 of Slierman, to give the junior the higher command, 
 
 * On the 20th of January, Grant wrote to Halleck : " I regard it a3 
 my duty to state that I found there was not sufficient confidence felt 
 in General McClernand as a commander, eitlier by the array or navy, to 
 insure him success. Of course, all would cooperate to the best of their 
 aljilitics, but still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inqui- 
 ries al)0ut, but it was forced upon me. ... I want you to know 
 that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the course I had 
 alria<ly determined upon pursuing. Admiral Porter told me he had 
 written freely to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that what 
 he said might be shown to the Secretary of War." 
 
 On the 30th of January, McClernand wrote to Grant : " If different 
 views are entertained by yon, then the question should be immediately 
 rcfVrred to Washington, and one or other, or both of us, relieved. Ono 
 thing is certain : two generals cannot command this army, issuing in- 
 dependent and direct orders to subordinate officers." 
 
 t See Appendi.\ for original and important papers relating to this 
 expedition, and to :McClcrnand's command of it; also for further ex 
 tracts iiom McC'lernand's correspondence, confirmatory of assertions in 
 the U'.xt. 
 
FLYSSES S. GPvANT. 153 
 
 even by autliority of the government, would un- 
 doubtedly provoke feelings and conduct prejudicial 
 to tbe public interest, especially in an officer of Mc- 
 Clernand's peculiarities. Sherman, it is tnie, had 
 submitted promptly to be relieved by McClernand, 
 but he was a man with soldierly instincts, the iirst 
 of which is subordination, and this was a trait that 
 McClernand had seldom displayed, even towards 
 Grant, his legitimate superior. Grant was, besides, 
 the commander of the department, and entitled to 
 direct the campaign in person ; no one could complain 
 of this, for he ranked everybody in the West, and 
 his assumption of immediate command would, in 
 fact, relieve the question of all difficulty. 
 
 This reasoning was unanswerable, and Grant al- 
 lowed himself to be governed by it. He was loatli, 
 however, to deprive Sherman of the opportunity to 
 throw off the odium caused by his unsuccessful as- 
 sault ; and, besides, disliked to use his own position 
 as commander of the department, to claim the direc- 
 tion of a campaign originally intrusted to another. 
 But, Sherman was infonned of the reasons which led 
 to the decision, and manifested a complete apprecia- 
 tion of Grant's motives. During the tedious and 
 often discouraging campaign that ensued, he never 
 failed to display a zeal and loyalty towards his com- 
 mander equal to that commander's anxiety to support 
 and bring forward his subordinate, even at the risk 
 of his own chances for fiime. 
 
 On the l7th. Grant paid his first visit to the 
 transport fleet, then lying off jt^apoleon, at the mouth 
 of the Arkansas, with all the troops on board; from 
 there, he wrote to Halleck, what the experience 
 of many months eventually confirmed : '' Our troops 
 
154 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 must get below the city to be used effectually." On 
 the 18th, he ^n-ote: "Should Banks pass Port Hud- 
 son, this force Avill be ready to cooperate on Vicks- 
 burg, at any time." On the 20tli, he returned to 
 Memphis, and sent word to one of his subordinates : 
 "The Mississippi river enterprise must take prece- 
 dence of all others, and any side move must simply 
 be to protect our flanks and rear." On the 22d, he 
 said to McClernand : " I hope the work of cbanging 
 the channel of tlie Mississippi is begun ; " and on the 
 same day : " On the present rise, it is barely possible 
 that the Yazoo pass might be turned to good ac- 
 count in aiding our enterprise." These two ideas 
 were already prominent in his mind ; they were des- 
 tined to become fully developed ere long, and to be 
 prosecuted witli energy and persistency, but both to 
 prove unsuccessful. Although so persistently and 
 zealously followed up by Grant, he was not at any 
 time persuaded of their adequacy; but he thought it 
 his duty to give them a fair trial, and, at any rate, to 
 occupy the troops vigorously until he should be able 
 to get them below the city. On the 20th, after his 
 visit to Napoleon, he wrote : " The work of reducing 
 Vicksburg will take time and men, but can be ac- 
 comj)lislRMl." 
 
 lie determined, now, to abandon the railroad from 
 Jackson to Columbus, and to move all his troops 
 south, except those absolutely necessary to hold the 
 line from Memphis to Corinth. All heavy guns on 
 the east bank, between Memphis and Columbus, and 
 from Island Number Ten, as Avell as the floating bat- 
 tei-ies below there, were at once removed ; as their re- 
 maining only oflered inducements to the enemy to 
 attack from the Tennessee side ; and the expedition 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 15.1 
 
 was ordered to Young's ])oint, opposite tlie moiitli of 
 tlie Yazoo. Grant wrote to Halleck, tliat lie sliould 
 require a large force in tlie final ' struggle, but could 
 dispense with any furtlier reenforcements for the 
 present. He suggested, however, that it would Ije 
 well to have the men in readiness when they should 
 be needed. He also inquired if it would not be good 
 policy to combine the four departments at the West 
 — Kosecrans's, Steele's, Banks's, and his own — under 
 one commander, and remarked: "As I am the rank- 
 ing department commander in the West, I will state 
 that I have no desire whatever for such combined 
 command, but would prefer the command I now have, 
 to any other that can he given." This suggestion 
 was eventually acted upon, but not for many mouths, 
 and until after the fall of Vicksburg, and the battle 
 of Chickamauga, had demonstrated the sagacity of 
 the thought, and made the selection of the man inevi- 
 table. As much of the Department of Arkansas, 
 however, as he might desire, was placed under his 
 command at once, so that he had control of both 
 banks of the Mississippi. Forts Henry and Donel 
 son were at the same time transferred to the Depart- 
 ment of the Cumberland, leaving Grant the exclusive 
 task of opening and controlling the Mississippi river. 
 On the 29th of January, General Grant arrived 
 in person at Young's point, and, on the 30th, as- 
 sumed immediate command of the expedition against 
 Vicksburg. McClernand at once protested formally, 
 but in vain. 
 
156 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 Character of Mississippi valley — Position and strength of Vlcksburg — Grant's 
 force on taking command of expedition— Problem of the campaign — The 
 Vicksburg canal — Continuous labor for months — Rise in river — Failure of 
 canal— Lake Providence scheme— DiflRculties of this route — Abandonment of 
 the plan— Alarm and subsequent derision of rebels— The Yazoo pass— Cir- 
 cuitous route — Obstructions by rebels— Pass finally cleared — Troops enter 
 the pass— Rebel fort at Greenwood — Naval attack unsuccessful — Reenforce- 
 ments ordered into the pass — Route found impracticable— Steele's bayou ex- 
 pedition—Remarkable natural difficulties— Sherman and Admiral Porter pro- 
 ceed to Deer creek— Porter gets into danger— Sherman rescues the fleet- 
 Further and irremovable obstructions— Return of both expeditions to Milli- 
 ken's bend- Concentration of Grant's forces— Impatience of the country and 
 government- Efforts to remove Grant— Grant's new plan— Opposition of 
 Sherman and other of Grant's subordinates— Grant inflexible— Movement of 
 Thirteenth Corps to New Carthage— Difliculties of route— Trouble with Mc- 
 Clernand— Grierson's raid— Running of Vicksburg batteries— Cooperation of 
 Admiral Porter— Attack on Grand Gulf— Failure to silence batteries— Fur- 
 ther marches of troops— Running of batteries at Grand Gulf— Crossing of 
 Mississippi river by Grant's advance— Demonstration by Sherman against 
 Ilaine's bluff— Grant's confidence of success. 
 
 All the way from Cairo to New Orleans the Mis- 
 sissippi moanders througli a vast alluvial region, the 
 whole of Avliieh is annually overflowed, except where 
 the system of artificial emhankinents, called levees,* 
 has, of late years, afforded a partial barrier. This 
 great basin is nearly fifty miles in width, and extends 
 on the east to the upland pbiins of Tennessee and 
 
 ♦ The wf.rd lerce is in universal use at the Southwest. Breaks in 
 the embankments are caUcd crecasaes. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 157 
 
 Mississippi, while on tlie west it is bounded by tlie 
 lesser elevations of drift alone. The bluffs that form 
 the escarpment of the eastern plains are usually quite 
 steep, and 4:hickly overgrown with timber, under- 
 brush, and vines. At various points in its course the 
 river touches one extremity or the other of the bot- 
 tom-land, washing the base of the bluffs, and often 
 cutting deeply into the soft strata of which they are 
 composed. Columbus, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, 
 Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson are points 
 of this kind, and rise from eighty to two hundred 
 feet above the freshets. 
 
 The Mississippi is, j^erhaps, the most tortuous 
 stream in the world. Its course is frequently north, 
 east, south, and west, within a circuit of twenty miles. 
 Every few years it deviates from its channel here and 
 there, leaving the former bed for some new route, and 
 creating islands and peninsulas innumerable ; the flat 
 nature of the country and the soft quality of the soil 
 allowing these excursions, which occur whenever any 
 unusual obstacle is presented to the vast momentum 
 of the stream. Tlie alluvial region, throughout its 
 entire extent, is higher near the banks of the river, 
 and falls ofl* gradually till it reaches the line of 
 the blufts ; the drainage is, therefore, necessarily tow- 
 ards the hills, and is the source of the intricate net- 
 work of bayous * for which the basin is remarkable. 
 The Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, the Yazoo, the 
 Washita, the Red, and Atchafalaya rivers, besides 
 numerous other and smaller streams, are accordingly 
 nothing more than huge side drains. Dm'ing freshets, 
 
 * The streams that everywhere intersect these alluvial regions are 
 called bai/ous — a corruption of the French word bo^/au — a gut or chan- 
 nel. 
 
158 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the water tliat breaks over the Mississippi banks, or 
 tlirongli tlie crevasses, flows through c^'press-swamps, 
 and a hil)yrinth of bayous, till it reaches the bluffs, 
 and is again forced back into the parent 'stream. 
 
 Besides the bayous, crescent-shaped lakes, the sole 
 remains of the ancient meanderings of the river, 
 abound on both sides, often at considerable distances 
 from the present channel. The forests of the alluvial 
 region are extremely luxuriant and dense; cotton- 
 wood, tulip-trees, sweet gum, magnolia, sycamore, and 
 ash are found, with an almost impenetrable jungle of 
 cane and vine. The cypress-swamps that occupy the 
 lower portions of the bottom are nearly always under 
 water; and this, with the slimy character of the soil, 
 and the treacherous beds, and slippery, steep banks 
 of the bayous, renders the country almost impassa- 
 ble in summer, and entirely so, except by boats, in 
 winter.* 
 
 Winding through this abnormal region, the Mis- 
 sissippi makes a sudden bend below Young's point. 
 o|)posite the mouth of the Yazoo, and turning towards 
 the northeast, flows in that direction some four or five 
 miles, till it strikes the Yicksburg hills, when it turns 
 again, still more abruptly, and runs for almost the 
 same distance towards the southwest. By this curve 
 a narrow peninsula is formed of the Louisiana shore, 
 which stretches out in the shape of a tongue, not 
 more than a mile or two across. Opposite the lower 
 side of the peninsula, the city of Yicksburg rises, 
 leri'Mced <.n its i'ngL''<'<l site, and commanding the ap- 
 
 * Viiliiablc malcrial for tliis doscription of the Mississippi valley, 
 ns wi-H iis for this entire chapter, has been obtained from a manuscript 
 tnenioir of the canipaij,m and siepre of Yicksburg, placed at my dis- 
 posal by Brevet Major-General J. H. Wilson, lieutenant of engineers, and 
 lieutenant-colonel on Grant's staff at the period of these operations. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 159 
 
 proaclies from above and below, for a distance of 
 lono- cannon-ransfe. The bluffs extend along^ the east- 
 ern bank for nearly twenty miles. From Walnut hills 
 to Warrenton the Mississippi washes the foot of the 
 range. At few places is the interval between the river 
 and the bluff more than six hundred yards ; and at 
 the point where Vicksburg stands, the cliffs rise ab 
 ruptly from the Avater's edge two hundred feet. 
 
 Above the town the hills turn to the noi-theast ; 
 the point where the range strikes the Yazoo nearly 
 twenty miles from its mouth is known as Haine's 
 bluff, and was the extreme right of the rebel line. 
 It is very precipitous, and completely commands 
 the navigation of the Yazoo, as well as the opposite 
 shore. So long as this position was held by the 
 rebels, Vicksburg could not l)e approached from the 
 north. From Haine's bluff, which is twelve miles 
 above the town, to the Mississippi, the highlands 
 were completely and thoroughly fortified, and thence 
 along down, till they recede from the river, at War- 
 renton, seven miles below. Twenty-eight guns of 
 heavy calibre were mounted on the river front, all of 
 which had a plunging fire; they effectually baiTed 
 all progress by the stream, for no gun in the squad- 
 ron could be sufficiently elevated to be formidable to 
 batteries crowning cliffs two and three hundred feet 
 high. 
 
 At the foot of the ridge, and along the slopes, 
 rifle-pits were dug, that commanded the strip of 
 swamp land which sometimes intervenes between tlie 
 river and the bluffs. The Louisiana shore is swampy, 
 and impracticable for the transportation or occupa- 
 tion of troops. Rafts were moored, chains were 
 stretched across the Yazoo, to detain vessels under 
 
IGO MILITAKY lUSTOEY OF 
 
 fire, and tlms render any attempt at surprise imprac- 
 ticable, so that troops could not possibly be lauded 
 near enougli for an assault, except wliere Sherman's 
 bold attack, in January, liad been so unsuccessful. 
 
 In the rear of Vicksburg the range is rugged, 
 broken by precipitous ravines, and presenting almost 
 equally admii^able facilities for defence on the land 
 side. Creeks and bayous also abound, even in this 
 higher country, whose nearer slopes encircle the city 
 ^vith a parapet of hills. The region outside, between 
 the Big Black river and the Pearl, was an abounding 
 granary, from which the besieged could draw at will, 
 without danger of exhausting the supply. 
 
 This post was now the key to the Mississippi 
 river, and to the magnificent valley which it fertilizes. 
 At Grand Gulf, where the bluffs again approach the 
 shore, some fifty miles below, another fortification 
 was soon erected; and still another, of even greater 
 strength, at Port Hudson, a hundred and fifty miles 
 from the sea. Port Hudson and Grand Gulf were, in 
 reality, the outworks of Vicksburg, and between tkem 
 the mighty river was closed for a distance of four 
 hundred miles, within which the rebels were as com- 
 ]>h'ti'lv masters as thouii'h the national flac: had never 
 Ijeen supreme above its waters. But Banks, with an 
 army of forty thousand men, and Farragut, with the 
 iU'ct that had subdued New Orleans, were directed to 
 j)Ut forth every eftbrt against Port Hudson; while to 
 (J rant and his subordinates was assiccned the task of 
 unlocking the greatest barrier that vexed the waters 
 of the ^Iississi])pi on their way to the sea. 
 
 ( )n the L^Uth of January, the entire force in the 
 l)e});iiinient of the Tennessee amounted to one hun- 
 dred ami tliirtv thousand men. It was divided into 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. IGl 
 
 four army corps, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, 
 and Seventeenth, commanded by Major-Generals Mc- 
 Clernand, Sherman, Hiirlbut, and McPherson, respec- 
 tively. The Arkansas troops had been assigned to 
 the Thirteenth corps, which, in conjunction with the 
 Sixteenth, now at Memphis and in West Tennessee, 
 was required to protect Grant's rear, and keep open 
 tlie river to Cairo. St. Louis and Memphis were 
 made the depots for supplies. Porter's cooperating 
 fleet numbered sixty vessels of all classes, carrying 
 two hundred and eighty guns and eight hundred 
 men. 
 
 The troops composing the expedition were at 
 Young's point and Milliken's bend, and fifty thou- 
 sand in number ; they consisted of the Fifteenth and 
 Seventeenth, and part of the Thirteenth corps ; these 
 had already been disembarked, and put in camps 
 along the west bank of the river, on the low swamp- 
 land, overflowed this year to an unusual extent. 
 This protracted freshet, together with the extraordi- 
 naiy fall of rain, greatly increased Grant's difficulties, 
 as well as the hardships of his army. 
 
 The camps were frequently submerged, and the 
 diseases consequent to this exposure prevailed among 
 the troops; dysenteries and fevers made sad havoc, 
 and the small-pox even was introduced, but speedily 
 controlled. The levees furnished the only dry land 
 deep enough for graves, and for miles along the river 
 bank this narrow strip was all that appeared above 
 the water, furrowed in its whole length with graves. 
 The troops were thus hemmed in by the burial-places 
 of their comrades. 
 
 Every possible precaution, however, was taken to 
 secure the health and comfort of the command ; tents 
 11 
 
162 JflLITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 were supplied, medical stores provided, aud during 
 tlie long and tedious campaign that followed, the 
 sanitary condition of the army remained as tolerable 
 as inevitable emergencies and hardships would allow. 
 But exao-^erated rumors of disease and even pesti- 
 lence were circulated by the enemy, and at the North ; 
 these added to the anxieties of the country, as well as 
 to the difficulties of the commander. 
 
 Grant's problem now was, to obtain a footing on 
 the hio-hlands of the eastern bank, and a base from 
 which to operate against the city and its communica- 
 tions. A direct attack had already been tried by 
 Sherman, at the only point where a landing was 
 practicable, and failed, because of the character of the 
 country, and the strength of the fortifications, at a 
 time when those fortifications were much less elabo- 
 rate than now. It remained, then, either to discover 
 some means of reaching the Yazoo, at a point still 
 farther from its mouth than Haine's bluff, and so 
 secure a foothold in the rear of Vicksburg ; or, to get 
 below the works, at Warrenton, and thence operate, 
 on the eastern side, against the town. The rains had 
 filled the swamps and bayous, so that there was no 
 probal)ility of their drying again during the winter, 
 or a landing might have been effected opposite Milli- 
 ken's bend, and roads constmcted to the Yazoo, 
 above Maine's bluff, when the enemy's works would 
 have been turned. AVith Grant once back of the in- 
 trenchments on the crest of the hills, the rebels would 
 liave been compelled either to come out and irive him 
 battle in the open field, or submit to have all their 
 communications cut, and so be left to starve. The 
 rains, however, rendered this operation impractica- 
 ble 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 1G3 
 
 But if an attempt sLoiild be made to get below 
 tLe town, Vicksbiirg itself threatened tlie only line 
 by wbicli supplies could be obtained. Three means 
 of obviating this difficulty suggested themselves : 
 First, to turn the Mississippi river from its course, 
 and, by cutting a canal across the peninsula in front 
 of Vicksburg, create a new channel, through w^hich 
 the fleet might glide securely by the rebellious city, 
 and in full view from its disappointed batteries, to 
 the coveted position below. Second, by breaking 
 levees, opening canals, and connecting and widening 
 streams, a circuitous route, through bayous, and rivers, 
 and swamps, could be opened, from Lake Providence 
 on the Louisiana side, seventy miles above Vicksburg, 
 and a passage found, through the Red river, into the 
 Mississippi again, four hundred miles below. This 
 route, however, would, at best, be long and difficult, 
 and, if opened, would only afford an opportunity of 
 reenforcing Banks, as the mouth of the Red river is 
 just above Port Hudson. The third, and apparently 
 only other possible plan, was to march the whole 
 army along the western shore, to some point below 
 the town, and then cross the river, and combine with 
 Banks to operate against Port Hudson ; and, after 
 that place should fall, begin a new campaign against 
 Vicksburg, from Grand Gulf or Warrenton, depend- 
 ing on supplies from below. The roads in Louisiana 
 were, however, entirely under water, so that this plan 
 was not now feasible; and until Port Hudson was 
 taken and the river opened to New Orleans, the diffi- 
 culty of supplying the army, when thrown below the 
 town, appeared absolutely insuperable. 
 
 As early as the 20th of January, Grant had in- 
 structed McClernand to begin the enlargement of the 
 
164 iHLITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 canal. He had himself been ordered by Halleck to di- 
 rect his attention particularly to this undertaking, " as 
 the President attaches much importance to this." It 
 M-as a scheme of magnificent proportions, but more 
 likely to attract an imagination like IVIr. Lincoln's 
 than to stiike favorably a purely military mind. The 
 country, Noiih and South, watched its progress anx- 
 iously ; and, even in Europe, the plan of turning a 
 misfhtv river from its course attracted attention and 
 comment. The rebels loudly predicted failure, and the 
 gibes of those who opposed the war at the Xorth, were 
 incessant. Still Grant toiled on ; four thousand sol- 
 diers were constantly employed on the work, besides 
 negroes, who were comparatively of little use. On 
 the 4th of February, however, he I'eported to Halleck 
 that he had lost all faith in the practicability of the 
 scheme. "The canal," he said, "is at right angles 
 with the thread of the current at both ends, and both 
 ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under 
 bluffs comj^k'tely commanding it. AVarrenton, a few 
 miles below, is capable of as strong defences as Vicks- 
 burg; and the enemy, seeing us at work here, have 
 tui-ned their attention to that point." 
 
 The peninsula is about three and a half miles 
 long, and where the canal was located, only a mile 
 and a fifth in width. As constructed by General 
 Williams, the canal was ten feet wide and six deep, 
 but his excavation did not extend throuo;h the stra- 
 turn of black alluvial soil to tlie sandy substratum, 
 and in 18G2, when the water rose so as to run throusrh, 
 there was no enlargement. Grant's engineers at- 
 tempted to remedy this, by cutting a wing, from a 
 point two or three hundred yards further up the river, 
 where the current imj)inges more strongly against the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT 165 
 
 shore. It was hoped by the additional flow of water 
 thus secured, and by the use of dredging-machines * 
 to widen and deepen the main canal. The design 
 was, to allow a passage for vessels with a breadth of 
 beam of sixty feet, and a draught of eight or nine. 
 
 The troops who . were engaged for two months 
 on the canal, were encamped immediately on its 
 west bank, and protected from possible inundation by 
 a levee ; but the continued rise in the river made a 
 large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the 
 water out of the- camps and canal. The work was 
 tedious and difficult, and seemed interminable; and 
 towards the last it became also dano-erous, for the 
 enemy, well aware how important it was to thwart this 
 operation, threw shells all over the peninsula, and, 
 as Grant had predicted, erected batteries which com- 
 manded the lower end of the canal. But, at last, there 
 seemed some prospect of success; the dredge-boats 
 worked to a charm ; the laborers reached a sufficient 
 depth in the soil ; the wing was ready to connect with 
 the main artery, and the undertaking was apparently 
 all but completed ; when, on the 8th of March, an ad- 
 ditional and rapid rise in the river, and the consequent 
 increase of pressure, caused the dam near the upper 
 end of the canal to give way, and every attempt to keep 
 
 * The following correspondence contains the only suggestion made 
 by General Halleck to Grant during this ijortion of the Vicksburg 
 campaign : 
 
 " February 18. 
 " Cannot dredge-boats be used with advantage in the canal ? There 
 are four lying idle at Louisville, belonging to Barton, Robinson & Co., 
 contractors. " U. W. Hai^leck, General-in-chief." 
 
 " February 17. 
 " We have one drcdging-machine here, and another ordered. More 
 than two could not be advantageously used. 
 
 " U. S. Grast. Major- GeneraV 
 
166 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the rii.-li of water out proved abortive. The toiTent, 
 thus admitted, stmggled for a while with the obsta- 
 cles that sought to stay its course ; but finally, in- 
 stead of coming out below, broke the levee of the 
 canal itself, and spread rapidly across the peninsula, 
 overwhelming every barrier, and separating the 
 northern and southern shores as effectually as if the 
 Mississippi itself flowed between them. It swept far 
 and wide over the interior, submerging the camps, and 
 spreading into the bayous, even to the Tensas and 
 lower Eed. The troops w^ere obliged to flee for their 
 lives, horses were drowmed, implements were broken 
 and borne aAvay by the current, and all the labor of 
 many weeks was lost. 
 
 Attempts were made to repair the damages, but on 
 the 27th of March, Grant reported that all work ex- 
 cept repairing the crevasses in the canal levee had 
 been suspended for several days, the enemy having 
 driven the dredges entirely out. "The canal may be 
 useful in passing boats through, at night, but nothing 
 further." As he had foretold, the batteries erected on 
 the hills Ijclow Vicksburg completely enfiladed the 
 canal. The rebels declared that the Yankees had been 
 as im})ious as the Titans, in their audacity, and as im- 
 ])()trnt, and hoped that in future they would not 
 attempt to disturb the natural features of the globe. 
 
 ( )ii the ;5()tli of January, the day after he assumed 
 (oiiiiikiikI <»f the Vicksburg expedition,* Grant gave 
 ordei's for cutting a way from the Mississippi to Lake 
 Providence and went himself to that place on the 
 •Itli of February, remaining there several days. 
 
 * At this time (jrant wrote to llaileck: 
 
 " January 81. 
 "I iiin J)u^^lling every tiling to gain a passage, avoiding Vicksburg." 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 167 
 
 This sheet of water is a poi-tion of the old iDed of the 
 river, and lies about a mile west of the present 
 channel. It is six miles long, and connected by Bayou 
 Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream com- 
 municating in its turn with the Tensas, Washita, and 
 Red rivers. Through these various channels it was 
 thought possible to open a route by which transports 
 of light draught might reach the Mississippi again, 
 below, and thus enable Grant to reenforce Banks 
 (then on either the Bed river or the Atchafalaya), 
 and to cooperate with him against Port Hudson. 
 
 The levee was cut, and a canal opened between 
 the liver and the lake, through which the water 
 passed rapidly ; but peculiar difficulties were en- 
 countered in clearing Bayou Baxter of the overhang- 
 ing forests and fallen timber with which it was ob- 
 structed. The land, from Lake Providence, and also 
 from Bayou Magon, recedes until the lowest interval 
 between the two widens out into a cypress-swamp, 
 where Bayou Baxter is lost. This flat was filled with 
 water to the depth of several feet ; and the work of 
 I'emoving the timber, that choked the bayou thickly 
 for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles, was, in con- 
 sequence, exceedingly difficult and slow ; but if this 
 could have been accomplished, the channel, in high 
 water, would have been continuous, although intricate 
 and circuitous in a remarkable degree. So McPher- 
 son's corps was engaged in the undertaking for many 
 weeks. The impossibility of obtaining the requisite 
 number of light-draught steamers, however, would 
 have rendered this route useless, even had it been 
 thoroughly opened. But no steamer ever passed 
 through the tortuous channel, which served only to 
 employ the superfluous troo2:)S, and to demonstrate 
 
168 inLITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 the fertility and variety of devices developed during 
 tins anomalous campaign. Tlie Lake Providence 
 route was iinally rejected, in March, at about the 
 same time that all hope of effecting any thing by the 
 canal was abandoned. 
 
 This project excited attention and speculation, 
 esj^ecially in the rebellious states, where many ima- 
 gined that the whole torrent of the Mississippi might 
 be diverted, even into the Atchafalaya, and tlie old 
 bed of the former stream forever denuded, which 
 would have left Xew Orleans an inland town, far 
 away from the river that was the sole source and 
 cause of its prosperity. But no expectation of an}'- 
 such stupendous results was entertained by Grant. 
 He believed that Vicksburg was only to be won by 
 liard fighting, and by destroying armies; and al- 
 though he resorted to these various schemes for 
 placing his troops where a foothold for active opera- 
 tions could be maintained, and a route secured by 
 which the new base might be supplied, he neverthe- 
 less looked on them as in reality offering little prom- 
 ise, and simply affording occupation for his men, till 
 the subsidence of the waters should allow him to 
 move in the ordinary way. 
 
 At the same time that he bes^an these other under- 
 takings, Grant sent Lieutenant-Colonel AVilson, of his 
 Htaff, to Helena, to organize an expedition for open- 
 ing and examining the Yazoo pass. This was with a 
 view to destroying the rebel steamboats and embryo 
 gunboats on the Yazoo river, al)Ove Haine's bluff. 
 The pass is a narrow and tortuous bayou, sixty or 
 eighty feet wide, and from twenty to thirty feet deep, 
 running nearly east from a point on the Mississippi, 
 81X miles below Helena, into Moon lake, the forjner 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAin'. 169 
 
 "bed of the river. Issuing thence, it still flows east- 
 ward, and, fifteen miles beyond, connects with the 
 Coldwater. The latter stream, after fifty miles of 
 windings, enters the Tallahatchie, which joins the 
 Yallabusha to form the Yazoo, a hundred and fifteen 
 miles below. This route was used in former times, 
 as a roundabout way of reaching the Yazoo river 
 with small steamers and light trading craft ; but, as 
 the entire course lies in the alluvial region, the coun- 
 try between the two rivers was frequently overflowed ; 
 and, accordingly, the state of Mississippi constructed 
 a large and strong levee at the entrance to the pass, 
 so as to cut oft' all communication between its waters 
 and those of the parent stream. 
 
 This levee was cut on the 2d of February, and 
 the water let in by the explosion of a mine planted 
 at the mouth of the cut ; and, in two days, the tor- 
 rent carried away the levee so completely as to allow 
 the largest steamers to pass through the crevasse into 
 Moon lake, about a mile beyond. But in the mean 
 time, the rebels had bes^un to make obstructions 
 lower down, by felling huge trees into the pass. The 
 forest was extremely luxuriant, and the rafts and en- 
 tanirlements thus formed were obstacles of the most 
 formidable character, extending, with intervals, a dis- 
 tance of nearly four miles. A single one of these 
 barricades was a mile and a quarter in length, and 
 composed of no fewer than eighty trees, reaching 
 completely across the stream. Cottonwood, syca- 
 more, oak, elm, and pecan-wood was used, and none 
 of this timber, except the cottonwood, will float. 
 The removal, in consequence, was a tedious task. 
 Many of the trees, weighing at the least twenty tons, 
 had to be hauled out entire upon the shore by strong 
 
 Ik 
 
170 MILITAKT HISTORY OF 
 
 cables, ^vllile a few of tlie most buoyant were cut in 
 pieces and fastened along the banks. To add to the 
 difficulties, the rapid rise of the water, from the cre- 
 vasse at the entrance, submerged the entire country, 
 except along a very narrow strip of land near the 
 shore. The men, in parties of about five hundred, 
 were thus obliged to work in the water, as well as 
 during almost incessant rains. The barriers, however, 
 being removed, and a heavy growth of overhanging 
 timber cut away, the distance from Moon lake to the 
 Coldwater was finally cleared. But, while Grant's 
 forces were tlius diligently engaged in opening one 
 end of the pass, the enemy had gained time to se- 
 cui'ely fortify below. 
 
 On the 15th of February, however, a way was 
 open to the Tallahatchie, and Brigadier-General Ross, 
 \vith forty-five hundred men, was ordered into the 
 pass. He embarked on twenty-two light transports, 
 preceded by two ii-on-clad gunboats, and a mosquito 
 fiect, as the light-armored craft suitable for this navi- 
 2:ation was called. Lieutenant-Commander Watson 
 Smith commanded the naval force. The difficulty of 
 procunng light transports delayed Ross over a week, 
 but the combined fleet entered the pass on the 24th 
 of February, and reached the Coldwater, twenty-five 
 miles from the Mississippi, on the 2d of March. The 
 Coldwater is over a hundred feet wide, and runs 
 throutrh a dense wilderness, for nearly all its course. 
 The Tallahatchie is a stream of similar nature, and, 
 from its width and depth, no longer susceptible of 
 obstruction by the enemy. Thii'ty miles below the 
 moutli of the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie aftbrds free 
 iiaviLjatiou for boats two hundred and fifty feet long. 
 M'hen once the expedition reached these rivers, a great 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. I7l 
 
 part of its difficulties would, it was hoped, be past. 
 The naval commander moved cautiously, running but 
 little faster than the current by dayliglit, and tying his 
 boats to the shore after nightfall, so that the expedi- 
 tion did not reach the lower Tallahatchie till the 10th 
 of March. This long passage of two hundred and 
 fifty miles, through an almost unbroken forest, was 
 made without the loss of a man. The country being 
 overflowed, the river-banks could not be approached 
 in any force by guerillas or sharpshooters. 
 
 Wilson now reported the practicability of the 
 route as a line of important military operations, and 
 Grant deteimined to prosecute his entire campaign, if 
 possible, in this direction. The idea was to reach 
 the Yazoo river, above Haine's bluif, with the whole 
 army ; the distance from Milliken's bend would have 
 been nearly nine hundred miles. At first, only a 
 single division of troops, under Brigadier-General 
 Quimby, was sent to the support of lioss ; but, short- 
 ly afterwards, McPherson, with his whole corps, and 
 an additional division from Hurlbut's command (at 
 Memphis), was ordered into the pass, whenever suit- 
 able transportation could be procured. Great difficul- 
 ty, however, was found in obtaining light-draught 
 steamers fit for the navio-ation of these naiTow and 
 devious streams ; and the reenforcements were, in con- 
 sequenc<3, delayed at Helena. 
 
 Neai' where the waters of the Tallahatchie meet 
 those of the Yallabusha, the small town of Greenwood 
 is built; a little way above this point, the foiTuer 
 stream sweeps to the east for eight or ten miles, and 
 then doubles at the confluence ; while the Yazoo, 
 which is formed by the junction, flows back again to 
 within five hundred yards of the Tallahatchie. At 
 
172 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 the naiTowest part of the neck of land thus created, 
 the rebels had hastily constructed, of earth and cot- 
 ton-bales, a line of parapet, running irregularly across 
 from tlie Tallahatchie to the north bank of the Yazoo. 
 This work they called Fort Pemberton ; it was de- 
 fended by two heavy guns and a light battery, and so 
 located as to command both the land and the water 
 approaches, from the northwest ; it also guarded the 
 Yallabusha, and the road in the rear to Grenada, as 
 well as the Yazoo. It was built on ground so low 
 that the water spread along its entire front, across the 
 neck of land, and indefinitely towards the interior. 
 All approach being thus rendered impracticable for 
 infantry, the idea of a land attack was excluded, and 
 the expedition was compelled to rely entirely upon 
 the naval force for success. 
 
 Two attacks were accordingly made by the iron- 
 clads, on the 11th, and one on the 13th of March, 
 at a range of eight or nine hundred yards, and aided 
 by a battery erected on the shore. In these fights 
 one vessel was disabled, six men were killed, 
 and twenty-five wounded.* Neither of the attacks 
 was successful, and as every thing depended on 
 the ability of the gunboats to silence the rebel bat- 
 teries, and enable the transports to run down and land 
 troops immediately at or on the fort itself, operations 
 were apparently at an end ; unless, indeed, the flood 
 should drive out the occupants of the fort. As the 
 Bite of the work was so little above water, a rise of 
 two feet would accomplish this last object; and the 
 levee on the Mississippi, three hundred miles away, 
 was accordingly cut, at Austin, eighteen miles above 
 IIcloii.'i, with the hoj)e that so large a volume of water 
 
 ♦ The enemy lost one man killed and twenty woimded. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 173 
 
 might be induced to take the line of tlie Coldwater 
 and TallaliatcLie, as to flood the country around tlie 
 fort, The cut, however, did not prove large enough 
 to produce this effect.* 
 
 The rebels meanwhile had made haste to avail 
 themselves of the delay occasioned by the lack of 
 transportation for McPherson's corps, and Grant was 
 informed that they were hurrying troops from Vicks- 
 burg, over their shorter lines, to Greenwood. In 
 order to relieve Ross, who was now in imminent dan- 
 ger of being surrounded, isolated as he Avas, away off 
 in this tangled network of forest and bayou. Grant 
 devised still another scheme. 
 
 This was to hem in the enemy on the Yazoo, by 
 sending a force along another of these labyrinthine 
 routes, that leaves the Yazoo river below Haine's bluff, 
 and, after innumerable windings, reenters the same 
 stream sixty miles above that point, and in the rear of 
 Greenwood. The route was by way of the Yazoo liver 
 to Steele's bayou, up the latter to Black bayou, through 
 that to Deer creek, and alons^ Deer creek to the Roll- 
 ing Fork; thence, across to the Big Sunflower, and 
 down the Sunflower to the Yazoo ; in all, about a 
 hundred and fifty miles. On the 1 4th of March, Ad- 
 miral Porter made a reconnoissance of these streams, 
 as far as Deer creek, and informed Grant that, up to 
 the limit of exploration, they were navigable for the 
 
 * There is a discrepancy between some of the statements made by 
 subordinate army and navy officers about the Yazoo pass expedition. 
 Each arm of the service blamed the other for delays and mishaps, for 
 ■which, perhaps, neither was fairly blamable. The difficulties were 
 prodigious, and sufficiently account for the failure of the expedition, 
 without attributing it to a lack of energy, much less of earnestness or 
 courage in any concerned. When accounts differ, I have adopted the 
 etatcments which seemed to me best authenticated. 
 
174 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 smaller iron-clads. Grant, the next clay, accompanied 
 the admiral on a second reconnoissance, and satisfied 
 liimself that, so far as he had penetrated, the princi- 
 pal ohstruction was in the overhanging trees. He at 
 once returned to Milliken's bend, with the purpose 
 of hurrying up men and means for clearing the chan- 
 nel. " If we can get boats in the rear of them in 
 time," he wrote, " it will so confuse the enemy as to 
 save Ross's force. If not, I shall feel restless for his 
 fate until I know that Quimby has reached him." 
 Had this plan succeeded, it would, have left Green- 
 wood between the two national forces, and made 
 imperative the immediate abandonment of that strong- 
 hold ; about thirty steamers of the enemy would 
 thus have been destroyed, or have fallen into Grant's 
 hands. 
 
 On the 16th of IMarch, he sent Sherman with a 
 division of troops (Stuart's) up Steele's bayou ; five 
 iron-clads and four mortar-boats accompanied, under 
 Porter. Tlie object was, not only to liberate Ross, 
 but to find a ^practicable passage to the Yazoo, with- 
 out passing the enemy's batteries at Haine's bluff; 
 and to get possession of some point on the east 
 bank, from which Vicksburg could be reached by 
 <lrv land. Grant infonmed Quimby of Sherman's 
 cooperation, and urged him to the support of Ross 
 from the north, saying: "Sherman will come in below 
 the enemy you are now contending against, and, 
 between the two forces, you will find no further diffi- 
 culties before reaching the ground I so much desire." 
 In all these various operations, Grant never lost 
 sight of his principal aim — to obtain a footing and a 
 secure base from ^^•]^R•1^ to prosecute his campaio-n on 
 dry land. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 1Y5 
 
 Slierman's troops went up tlie Mississippi on large 
 transports, about tliirty miles, to Eagle bend, wliere 
 Steele's bayou runs within one mile of the river ; they 
 thus saved the distance from the mouth of the Yazoo, 
 and also the most difficult part of the navigation in 
 the bayou. They marched across the strip of land 
 between the river and the bayou, building floating 
 bridges over part of the way, whicli led through a 
 swamp called Muddy bayou. Small-class steamers 
 then ferried them up the stream. Porter having the 
 advance. The drift-timber soon began to ol>struct 
 the channel, and the gunboats got entangled, but 
 nevertheless forced a way through. The turns were 
 so short, that the admiral was obliged to heave his 
 vessels around the bends, having not a foot to spare. 
 It took him thus twenty-four hours to advance four 
 miles. 
 
 By this time, it had become evident that transpor- 
 tation for McPlierson, through the Yazoo pass, could 
 not be procured ; his previous orders to go to the as- 
 sistance of Ross were therefore countermanded. Grant 
 now intendino" to brins: him to the lower end of the 
 expedition. Quimby's orders, however, were not yet 
 revoked. 
 
 Poi-ter pushed along with his unwieldy iron-clads, 
 through the labyrinth, his way obstructed now far 
 more than in the earlier stages of the expedition. The 
 gunboats moved like snails, but with great power, 
 pushing all saplings, and bushes, and drift aside. The 
 bayous were narrow and crooked, the turns sudden, 
 the channel was half tilled with cypress and willows 
 growing in the bed of the stream ; a thicket of trees 
 overhead had to be thrust aside, but he broke the 
 branches of the forest with his heav^-^ iron-clad boats, 
 
176 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 and made a tortnous path in advance of the lighter 
 transports, which had still more difficulty than he 
 in forcing a passage.* Trees had to be pulled up by 
 the roots, and stumps sawn off below the surface of 
 the water; chimneys, and guards, and pilot-houses 
 were swept away by the wilderness of boughs that 
 reached down from above, and stretched out on either 
 side. 
 
 There was no dry land along the route as far as 
 Deer creek, and all the troops had finally to be re- 
 moved from the transports and conveyed on tugs and 
 coal-barges, the way having become impassable to 
 tlie steamers. The movement of the land forces was 
 therefore extremely slow, and the naval vessels got 
 some thii'ty miles in advance, near the Eolling Fork. 
 Here, on the 20th of March, Porter was attacked by 
 sharpshooters, to whom liis heavy ordnance could 
 render only ineffectual replies. The rebels had not 
 only impeded his progress, by hewing heavy trees in 
 his front, but begun doing the same in his rear. The 
 labor of removing these artificial obstructions was 
 prodigious ; it was prosecuted by night as well as by 
 day, and under artillery and musketry fire; and 
 Porter finally sent back for Sherman to huiTy up to 
 his assistance. 
 
 Sherman Mas then at the junction of the Big 
 Black bayou and Deer creek. lie at once sent for- 
 Mard all the troops which had arrived at that point; 
 and, when, in a few hours, reenforcements came up, 
 although it was night, lie marched at their head, 
 along the narrow and only track of hard land that 
 
 * " I never yet saw vessels so well adapted to knocking down trees, 
 hauling them up by the roots, or demolishing hndgcs."" —Admiral Por- 
 ttr^a liejiort. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 177 
 
 hud been found, leading his ti'oops by liglited can- 
 dles tlirougli tlie canebrake. They got up oppor- 
 tunely for Porter, whose irou-clads were three feet 
 below the banks of the river, and thus unable to re- 
 ply to the sharpshooters. He had in fact begun to 
 withdraw ; but the rebels had a force of about four 
 thousand men in the swamps, and w^ere compelling 
 negroes, at the muzzle of the musket, to fell trees all 
 around the fleet, in rear as well as in advance. A 
 battery of artillery was also established in front. 
 Sherman, however, speedily drove away the annoying 
 skirmishers, and saved the admiral with his fleet.* 
 
 But the imj^racticability of the campaign had been 
 demonstrated. So much time had been consumed, 
 that the enemy was now fully aw^are of the movement. 
 The creek was blockaded just where the boats would 
 leave it for the Rolling Fork, and the rebels occupied 
 the ground in force, from which they could prevent the 
 removal of the obstructions. The admii'al, therefore, 
 was forced to desist from any further effort to proceed, 
 when within a few hundred yards of clear sailing to 
 the Yazoo ; for, once in the Rolling Fork, there w^ould 
 have been no more difficulties. The character of the 
 country precluded the possibility of taking any land 
 route, and it w^as accordingly necessary to return, 
 without having accomplished any of the objects of 
 the expedition. 
 
 The troops had, however, been carried into the 
 heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg forces 
 were being fed, and great alarm had been caused to 
 the enemy. Rebel guns were removed from batteries 
 along the Mississippi, citizens in the interior fled fi'om 
 their plantations, several thousand bales of cotton 
 
 * The losses on both sides in this entire expedition did not amount 
 to half a score. 
 
 12 
 
178 MIUTARY HISTORY OF 
 
 were burnt, lest tliey should fall into the hands of 
 the national forces, and much of the bacon, Ijeef, and 
 poultry of the region was consumed. But these re- 
 sults were insignificant, when compared with those 
 wliich it had been hoped to attain. 
 
 The iron-clads had to back out of the stream into 
 naviga]>le water, as there was not room to turn, and, 
 with unshipped rudders, rebounded from tree to tree. 
 Sherman, on shore, protected them during this diffi- 
 cult and dangerous operation, and, on the 27th, he 
 was back in his original camps opposite Vicksburg. 
 
 Meanwhile, Ross had withdrawn from before Fort 
 Peraberton, and on his way back met Quimby, on the 
 2 2d of i\Iarch, near the head of the Yazoo pass. 
 Quimby being senior, decided to return, and ascer- 
 tain for himself the situation, but soon discovered 
 that nothing could be done to remedy it ; and, as 
 soon as Grant learned the failure of the Steele's 
 bayou expedition, he directed the concentration of 
 all his forces at Milliken's bend. 
 
 These various attempts and expeditions on both 
 sides of the Mississippi, although unsuccessful in 
 their main objects, were yet productive of beneficial 
 results. The national forces, so constantly employed, 
 became hardened by exposure, and of course im- 
 proved in spirits and health ; they obtained also a 
 thorough knowledge of the peculiar difficulties of the 
 country in ^\ hich they were operating, and were thus 
 better able to encounter those difficulties. The en- 
 emy, besides, was kept continually on the alert, and, 
 obliged to move his troops liurriedly and frequently 
 from ])lace to place ; not knowing in what quarter nor 
 from what direction the blow might fall, he was 
 forced to maintain large detachments at posts remote 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 179 
 
 from Grant's real ()l)jective point. Tlie men were 
 thus wearied and distracted, in advance of the great 
 trial of their spirit and strength which was sure to 
 come in the end. 
 
 While all these oj^erations had been going on. 
 Admiral Farragut, with a part of his fleet, had run 
 by the batteries at Port Hudson, and communicated 
 with Grant. For a while, he lay just below Warren- 
 ton, ha\ang even passed the foi-tifications at Grand 
 Gulf Through Farragut, Grant was enabled to com- 
 municate with Banks. All hope of receiving any 
 aid from that officer had long since been abandoned ; 
 he had found the capture of Port Hudson as difficult 
 a task as that of Yicksburg had proven to Grant; 
 and, the latter, when it became apparent that neither 
 the canal, nor the Lake Providence, nor the Yazoo 
 pass, nor the Steele's bayou scheme w\as likely to be 
 of any avail, now proposed to send an army corps to 
 cooperate with Banks."^ With this increased force, 
 Port Hudson could certainly be taken, and then 
 Banks's entire army might be combined with Grant's, 
 and, moving up from below, a cooperative attack be 
 made on Yicksburg. The great distance that sepa- 
 rated the two armies, however, between whom also 
 lay the two strongholds w^hich were the objective 
 
 * On the 2d of April, Ilallcck ^^•rote to Grant, using those words : 
 ..." What is most desired (and your attention is again called to 
 this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks should be 
 brought into cooperation as early as possible. K he cannot get up to 
 cooperate with you on Yicksburg, cannot you get troops down to help 
 him at Port Hudson, or at least can you not destroy Grand Gulf be- 
 fttre it becomes too strong ? " This and the dispatch of February 13th, 
 already quoted, are the only orders or suggestions relating to military 
 operations that were made to Grant by the general in-chief, from Jan- 
 nary 29th to May 11th. That of May 11th will be given in its place. 
 
180 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 points of tlie campaign of each, prevented tlie reali- 
 zation of tliis plan. 
 
 The country, meanwliile, and the government, 
 Lad become very impatient. Clamors were raised 
 everywhere against Grant's slowness ; tlie old rumors 
 about his personal character were revived ; his sol- 
 diers were said to be dying of swamp fevers and dys- 
 enteries, in the morasses around Vicksburg ; he was 
 pronounced utterly destitute of genius or energy; liis 
 repeatedly baffled schemes declared to emanate from 
 a brain unfitted for such trials ; his persistency was 
 dogged obstinacy, his patience was sluggish dulness. 
 McClernand, and Hunter, and Fremont, and McClel- 
 lan were spoken of as his successors ; senators and 
 governors went to Vicksburg, and from Vicksburg 
 to Washington, to work for liis removal. McCler- 
 nand's machinations at this time came very near suc- 
 ceeding, liis advocates were never so earnest nor so 
 hopeful, while some of Grant's best friends failed him 
 at the critical moment. But the President said : " I 
 rather like the man ; I think we'll try him a little 
 longer." * But for this persistency, Grant would un- 
 douljtedly have been relieved, and McClernand put 
 in command of the expedition against Vicksburg. 
 Grant was aware of all these efforts to supplant him, 
 and of the probalnlity of their success. His anxie- 
 ties as a commander were of course enhanced by the 
 near prospect of his removal. 
 
 On the 2d of April, Halleck informed him that 
 
 * A congressman, wlm had been one of Grant's warmest friends, 
 was found wanting at this juncture. He went to the President with- 
 out being sent for, and declared that tlie emergencies of the country 
 seemed to demand another commander before Vicksburg. To him ^h. 
 Lincoln replied: "I rather like the man. I think we'll try him a little 
 longer." 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 181 
 
 the President " seems to be ratlier impatient about 
 matters on the Mississippi," and inquired if Grant 
 could not cooperate with Banks against Port Hud- 
 son. On the 9th, also, he wrote : " You are too well 
 advised of the anxiety of the government for your 
 success, and its disappointment at the delay, to ren- 
 der it necessary to urge upon you the importance of 
 early action ; " but, added in his own behalf: " I am 
 confident that you will do every thing possible to 
 open the Mississippi river." And, indeed, it is not 
 surprising that tlie government should have urged 
 him on. Ko substantial victory had cheered the flag- 
 ging spirits of the North, since Grant's own successes 
 at Corinth and luka, of the preceding autumn. Banks 
 had achieved no military results, with his mammoth 
 expedition ; Burnside, in December, had suffered the 
 repulse at Frederick'feburg ; Rosecrans had not got 
 fui-ther than Mui'freesboro ; and, the great force of 
 sixty or seventy thousand men, at Grant's disposal, 
 had accomplished absolutely nothing, during six long, 
 weary months of effort and delay. 
 
 The rebels were confident of the security of their 
 strono-hold, and taunted Grant with his failures; 
 every new plan awoke ncAV demonstrations of con- 
 tempt, and Vicksburg was pronounced by Mr, Jef- 
 ferson Davis to be the Gibraltar of America. A 
 reconnoissance was made to Haine's bluff, but it only 
 demonstrated the impracticability of attacking that 
 place during tlie high stage of water. Whichever 
 way the national forces turned, nature seemed to 
 combine with art to render the rebel fortifications 
 impregnable. The elements were the strongest de- 
 fences of Vicksburg, stubborn and gallant as was the 
 couracre of her soldiers. 
 
182 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Still, Grant wi-ote, on the 4tli of April, after all 
 these failures: "The discipline and health of this 
 anny is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest 
 confidence of success prevails." In the following 
 words he described to Halleck the plan whicli he next 
 essayed. It was the last : 
 
 " There is a system of bayous running from Mil- 
 liken's bend, also from near the river at this point" 
 (Young's point), "that are na\'igable for large and 
 small steamers, passing around by Riclimond to New 
 Carthage. There is also a good wagon-road from 
 ]\Iilliken's bend to New Carthaofe. The dredires are 
 now engaged cutting a canal from here into these 
 bayous. I am having all the empty coal-boats and 
 other barges prepared for carrying troops and artil- 
 leiy, and have Avritten to Colonel Allen for some 
 more, and also for six tugs to tow them. With them 
 it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage, 
 and any ])oint south of that.* 
 
 " My expectation is for some of the naval fleet 
 to run the batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army 
 moves through by this new route. Once there, I 
 will move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the 
 latter. From either of these points, there ai-e good 
 roads to Jackson and the Black river brido^e, without 
 crossing Black river. I will keep my army together, 
 and see to it that I am not cut ofl:* from my supplies, 
 or beat in any other way than a fair fight." 
 
 Grant himself had long believed that he should 
 
 * As early as February 4tb, Grant bad written to Halleck about this 
 route : " There is no question but tbiit tins route is niucb more practi- 
 cable than the present undertaking, and would bave been accomplished 
 with nuich less lal)or. if commenced belbre the water had got all over 
 the ecuatrv." 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 183 
 
 eventually be compelled to adopt this plan ; but the 
 submerged condition of the roads on the Louisi- 
 ana shore had hitherto rendered it impracticable. 
 When the idea became known to those in his inti- 
 macy, to his staff, and to his corps commanders, it 
 seemed to them full of danger. To move his army 
 below Vicksburg was to separate it from the North, 
 and from all its supplies; to throw what seemed an 
 insurmountable obstacle between himself and his 
 own base ; to cut his own communications, and place 
 his army exactly where it is the whole object and 
 aim of war to get the enemy. In a word, it was to 
 hazard every thing, for if failure came, it was sure 
 to be overwhelming ; only the most complete and 
 speedy victory could insure him against absolute an- 
 nihilation. These considerations were ui'ged upon 
 Grant by the most accomplished soldiers of his com- 
 mand ; those who have since acquired reputations of 
 the most brilliant character, strove to divert their 
 chief from what they considered this fatal error. 
 Sherman, McPherson, Logan, Wilson, all opposed — 
 all of course within the proper limits of soldierly 
 subordination, but all with energy. 
 
 Even after the orders for the movement had been 
 issued, Sherman rode up to Grant's headquarters, and 
 proposed his plan. He asserted, emphatically, that 
 the only way to take Vicksburg was from the north, 
 selecting some high ground on the Mississippi for a 
 base. Grant replied that such a plan would require 
 him to go back to Memphis. "Exactly so," said 
 Sherman, " that is what I mean ; " and he developed 
 the reasons, which seemed to him unanswerable, in 
 favor of such a course. Grant, however, believed 
 that a retrograde movement, even if temporary, would 
 
184 MILITARy HISTORY OF 
 
 be disastrous to tlie country, which was in no temj^er 
 to endure another reverse ; he was determined to 
 take no step backward, and so declared. Sherman 
 tliereupon returned to his own headquarters, and, on 
 the 8th of April, addressed a formal communication 
 to Lieutenant-Colonel Eawlins, Grant's chief of staff, 
 in which he ao-ain set forth the advantas^es of the 
 route he had recommended, and su^o-ested that Grant 
 should call on all his corps commanders for their 
 views. 
 
 " Let the line of the Yallabusha be the base," he 
 said, " from which to operate against the points where 
 the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Can- 
 ton, and lastly where the Vicksburg and Jackson 
 railroad crosses the same river. The capture of 
 Vicksburg would result." * The letter was able, and 
 in strict accordance with the established principles 
 of military science; it was respectful and subordi- 
 nate in tone, and concluded in these words : " I make 
 these suggestions with the request that General Grant 
 simply read them, and give them, as I know he will, 
 a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should 
 not answer them, but merely give them as much or 
 as little weight as they deserve ; whatever plan of 
 action he may adopt will receive from me the same 
 zealous cooperation and energetic support as though 
 conceived by myself." 
 
 Colonel Eawlins handed the paper to Grant with- 
 out saying a word ; Grant read it carefully but in si- 
 lence, and after the perusal was finished made no 
 comment. The orders were not revoked, the council 
 of war was not called, and the letter has never since 
 been mentioned between the two conmianders. Its 
 
 * See Appendix for ShL::r,an's letter in full. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 185 
 
 existence was not disclosed "by Grant, until Sherman 
 himself publicly related tlie incident, after the invest- 
 ment of Vicksburg, when several prominent men were 
 attributing to him the conception of tlie campaign 
 which resulted in oj^ening the Mississippi river. 
 
 Sherman, doubtless, was induced to take this 
 step by his anxiety for the success of the cam- 
 paign, as well as for the reputation of his cliief, be- 
 tween whom and himself relations of such peculiar 
 intimacy had long existed ; but Grant was firmly de- 
 teimined to make the movement, and the disapproval 
 of his ablest generals had no effect to deter him. 
 Sherman, thinking the plan almost certain of defeat, 
 for that reason felt the greater need of making the 
 greater effort to insure its success. He did not fail, 
 nor did any of those officers whose faith in the enter- 
 prise was least, to do their utmost to falsify their 
 own opinions. Indeed, had Grant's subordinates 
 been less thoroughly subordinate, had they done less 
 than their best to attain a result which they believed 
 almost, if not quite unattainable, no determination^ 
 nor daiing, nor energy in their commander could 
 have availed. But, not a word of dissatisfaction or 
 criticism escaped from these true soldiers, after it 
 once became evident that Grant was immovable. 
 
 At this time, however, he had not himself deter- 
 mined to do all that he afterwards attempted. His 
 plans, indeed, were always ripened into their full fru- 
 ition by the emergencies and opportunities of a bat- 
 tle or campaign ; his judgment was always sharpened 
 by events, his faculties were always brighter at a cri- 
 sis ; his decisions were most unerring when compelled 
 to be most sudden and irrevocable. Then, words, if 
 few, were not laggard, and always to tlie point ; and 
 
186 3IILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 action followed as fast on tliought as a strong man's 
 movements on liis will. 
 
 His design, now, was to move liis anny to some 
 point below Vicksburg, where lie might be able to 
 supply himself by the roads and bayous in Louisi- 
 ana, and thence send a cor]3S to cooperate with Banks 
 in the reduction of Port Hudson. After that place 
 should have fallen, Banks, with his whole anny and 
 the corps from Grant, was to march up and unite in 
 the campaign against Vicksburg. As the Mississippi 
 would then be open from New Orleans, supplies 
 could reach the army from below. In order to ac- 
 complish this movement, it was necessary for Grant 
 to throw his whole force simultaneously south of 
 Vicksburg, as a single corps would be exposed to the 
 I'isk of attack from the garrison, as well as from the 
 rebel army in the interior. Banks was the senior of 
 Grant, and upon a junction of their forces must have 
 assumed command. 
 
 Accordingly, in the last week in March, orders 
 were issued for the concentration of all the forces of 
 the expedition at Milliken's bend ; McPherson was 
 brought from Lake Providence and the Yazoo pass, 
 and Sherman from Steele's bayou ; Hmibut was 
 stripped of every man that could be spared from the 
 rear; yawls and flat-boats were collected from St. 
 Louis and Cliicago, and, on the 20th of March, Mc- 
 Clernand was sent by the circuitous roads that lead 
 fi-om Milliken's bend, by Wciy of Bichmoud and west 
 of Roundaway bayou, to New Carthage, twenty-seven 
 miles below. McPherson and Sherman were to follow 
 ]\rc-Clernnnd, as rapidly as ammunition and rations 
 could be forwarded. The movement was necessarily 
 Blow; the roads though level, were intolerably bad, 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 187 
 
 tlie effects of the long ovei-flow having not yet disap- 
 peared. A new canal was being constructed at Duck- 
 port, to connect the Mississippi with Roundaway 
 bayou, and there was danger of McCleruand's route 
 becoming overflowed from this canal. The wagon- 
 road, even w^here built up, was only twenty inches 
 above water in the swamp ; and the river was four 
 and a half inches higher than the land, at the point 
 where the water was to be let into the canal. Grant, 
 at this time, wrote to Halleck : " The embarrassment 
 I have Lad to contend against, on account of extreme 
 high watei", cannot be apji^reciated by any one not 
 present to witness it." 
 
 New Carthage, however, was occupied on the 6th 
 of April, but the levee of Bayou Vidal, which emp- 
 ties into the Mississippi at that point, was broken in 
 several places, and the country deluged for a distance 
 of two miles ; boats were accordingly collected from 
 all the bayous in the vicinity, and others were con- 
 structed of such material as was at hand. One di- 
 vision, with its artillery, was thus conveyed across 
 Vidal bayou, and through the overflowed forest to 
 the levee at New Carthage ; but, the feriiage of an 
 entire army in this way would have been exceedingly 
 tedious, and a new route was found from Smith's 
 plantation, where the crevasse had occurred, to 
 Perkins's, twelve miles below. This made the march 
 from Milliken's bend to the new point from which it 
 was now proposed to operate, about thuiy-five or 
 forty miles. Four bridges, two of them six hundred 
 feet long, had to be laid across the swollen bayous 
 which interrupted this route. These were built of 
 the barges and flats previously used at Smith's plan- 
 tation, and of forest timber found near the crossincr. 
 
188 jnLITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 The transport route, ttrougli Duckpoii; canal and 
 the bayous, had just become practicable, when a fall 
 in the waters of the Mississippi occurred, and one 
 steamer only got through this passage. Afterwards, 
 the depth of water was insufficient to allow trans- 
 ports of the smallest draught to make their w\ay, and 
 all supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to 
 be hauled by land over the miserable, muddy roads. 
 
 As early as the 13th of February, Grant had 
 ■written to Ilurlbut : " It seems to me that Grierson, 
 with about five hundred picked men, might succeed 
 in cutting his way south, and cut the railroad east of 
 Jackson, Mississippi. The undertaking would be a 
 hazardous one, but it would pay well if carried out." 
 This road was the principal avenue of communica- 
 tion for the rebels with Vicksburg. Circumstances 
 prevented the execution of the plan until the 9th of 
 March, when full instnictions were issued to Hui'l- 
 but to send Grierson on such an errand; but obsta- 
 cles again intervened, and it was not till the middle 
 of April that a cavalry force, seventeen hundred 
 strong, was organized at La Grange, and the command 
 given to Colonel B. H. Grierson, of the Sixth Illinois 
 cavalry. This force was ordered to make its way 
 south, from La Grange, through the state of Missis- 
 sippi, to some point on the river below Vicksburg, 
 destroying I'ailroads and cutting off supplies in every 
 ^\•ay possilde from the besieged city. The move- 
 ment was also inti-nded to act as a diversion in favor 
 of Grant's new campaign, as well as to test the idea 
 he entertained, that the fortunes of the rebellion 
 were Avaning, its armies l)ecoming exhausted, and its 
 supplies rapidly decreasing; tbat, in fact, men and 
 stores were alike drawn to the outside, and the so- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 189 
 
 called Confederacy itself was only a " hollow sLell." 
 Tills " shell " Grierson was to penetrate. He started 
 on the l7th of April, and made one of the most 
 memorable cavalry expeditions of the war, traversing 
 the entire state of Mississippi, without meeting any 
 large force to oppose him ; destroying stores, bm*ning 
 bridges, tearing up railroads, and having a moral 
 effect u2:)on the population of the interior altogether 
 unprecedented. Larger cavalry forces often moved, 
 far greater cavalry campaigns were made, but this 
 was the most remarkable which had then occurred, 
 and therefore produced a greater effect upon the im- 
 aginations of the rebels than any that came after. 
 Grierson emerged out of the unknown and hostile 
 territory, at Baton Rouge, on the 2d of May. He 
 had caj^tured five hundred prisoners, killed and 
 wounded one hundred rebels, destroyed fifty miles 
 of raili'oad and telegraph wire and three thousand 
 stands of arms, and marched six hundred miles, in 
 less than sixteen days. His loss was three killed and 
 seven wounded. Five men were left on the road, 
 sick, and nine straggled.* 
 
 While Grant had been prosecuting his different 
 campaigns, by land and river and s^vamp, above the 
 city, several of the vessels in Porter's command had 
 run by the Vicksburg batteries, with various fortune. 
 One was captured, two were sunk, and one, the Queen 
 of the West, passed by without serious injury. For 
 several reasons it had now become indispensable to 
 have a supply of boats below Vicksburg. Barges 
 were needed to feny the troops across the river, to 
 the point from which the new campaign was to com- 
 mence ; and the transportation of supplies by land 
 was so tedious, that Grant determined to risk send- 
 
 * For Grierson's raid, see Map of Theatre of War. 
 
190 IIILITAEY HISTOKY OF 
 
 ing three steamers and ten barges past tTie batteries, 
 loaded witli rations and forage. The cooperation of 
 Admiral Porter was necessary in this part of the un- 
 dertaking ; and, whenever, in all this long and varied 
 campaign, such cooperation was needed, Grant never 
 applied in vain. On the 26th of April, he wrote : 
 '• I am happy to say the admiral and myself have 
 never yet disagreed upon any policy." 
 
 Only two of the steamboat masters were willing 
 to encounter the danger ; the crew of one transport 
 also remained aboard, but all the others shrank. 
 When, however, it became known in the army that 
 volunteers were wanted for the dangerous task, men 
 enough to man a hundred steamers pressed them- 
 selves uj)on the commanders ; pilots, masters, engi- 
 neers, and men, all were found in the ranks and 
 among the officers on shore, and from these, crews 
 were speedily improvised for the transport fleet. 
 While seven of Porter's iron-clads ens^asred the bat- 
 teries, the river steamers, protected by bales of cot- 
 ton and wet hay, and towing the barges, were to run 
 the gantlet of twenty-eight heavy guns that com- 
 manded the river for over fifteen miles. 
 
 The night of the 16th of April was selected for 
 the undertaking. There was no moon, and by ten 
 o'clock all was ready. One after another, and as si- 
 lently as possible, the venturous fleet steamed down 
 the river to the bend. From this point they pro- 
 ceeded more leisurely, drifting ^vitll the current, the 
 gunboats in advance. Porter led the way, on the 
 Benton, and reached the first l^atteries without beino- 
 discovered; but, at sixteen minutes past eleven, the 
 artillery opened from the bluft's; the admiral at once 
 responding with a rapid fire. The vessels of the 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 191 
 
 squadron, all in line, followed Lis example, while the 
 transports lingged tlie Louisiana shore, and sought 
 to hurry by under cover of the smoke. Grant re- 
 mained on a transport just above the bend, where he 
 could watch the operations, within range. Shot and 
 sliell fell thick around him. 
 
 The night was dark, but houses were speedily set 
 on tire by the rebels along the shore on either side, 
 and the bright glare thrown across the water made it 
 light as day. AVhen the fleet got opposite the city, 
 the men at the batteries and in the streets of Vicks- 
 burg, could be plainly seen. The first transports ar- 
 rived opposite the court-house at twenty minutes past 
 twelve. It was here they received the heaviest fire ; 
 each vessel became a target to the rebel shot, and a 
 storm of projectiles of every variety and size came 
 crashing over them, cutting the roj^es and chimney- 
 guys, bursting in the pilot-houses, and shivering the 
 machinery. Men were stationed in the holds, to put 
 cotton-bags into such openings as were made by the 
 rebel shot; and, soon after getting under fire, the 
 barges were cut loose, some of them sweeping down 
 in the current, even below New Carthage. 
 
 Every transport was struck, and two were drawn 
 into the eddy, and ran over a part of the distance in 
 front of Vicksburg no less than three times. The 
 Forest Queen was disabled by a round shot, and 
 drifted down opposite the lower picket stations, 
 where the gunboat Tuscumbia took her in tow, and 
 landed her just above the crevasse at New Carthage. 
 The Henry Clay also became disabled, and was in a 
 sinkiuo; condition soon after comino; within rano-e of 
 the upper batteries ; she had in tow a barge with 
 soldiers aboard, which was cast loose, and floated 
 
192 MILITAET niSTOEY OF 
 
 down the stream. Not lonsr afterwards tlie boat it- 
 self took fire, from the explosion of a shell, and 
 "burned to the water's edge, drifting along witli tlie 
 cm-rent, a flaming mass. General Sherman was in a 
 small boat, watching the bombardment, and picked 
 up tlie pilot as lie floated from the wreck. The crew 
 pushed off in yawls to tlie Louisiana side, where 
 they landed, and hid themselves behind an old levee, 
 during the cannonade. After it had ceased, they 
 made their way back through the submerged swamps, 
 to camp. 
 
 The light streamed up from the blazing bull of 
 the Henry Clay, and threw into strong relief against 
 the shadows of night tbe other transports, and the 
 gunboats at their fiery work. The currents were 
 strong, and dangerous eddies delayed tbe vessels; 
 the lights glaring in every direction, and tbe smoke 
 enveloping the squadron, confused the pilots; the 
 bulwarks, even of the iron-clads, were crushed; and 
 the uproar of artillery, reechoing from the hills, was 
 incessant. One of the heaviest guns of tbe enemy 
 was seen to burst in tbe streets of Vicksburg, and 
 the whole population was awake and out of doors, 
 watching the scene on which its destinies depended. 
 For two hours and forty minutes, the fleets were un- 
 der fire. But, at last, the transports and the gun- 
 boats had all ijot out of rano-e, the blazins: beacons 
 on the hills and on the stream burned low, the array 
 of batteries belchino; flame and noise from the embat- 
 tied bluffs had ceased their utterance, and silence and 
 dai'kness resumed their sway over the beleaguered city, 
 and the swamps and rivers that encircle Vicksburg. 
 
 Oil the gunboats, no one was killed, and only 
 eight ^vounded ; all of Porter's vessels were ready for 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 193 
 
 sei-vice witliiu lialf an hour after passing t) -^ batter- 
 ies. No casualties were re2:>orte(l on tlie tran. ^:)orts, 
 but l)oth tlie steamers and barges were mater, vlly 
 damaored. 
 
 Meanwhile, McClernand's advance had ariived at 
 New Carthage, and was switching anxiously the issue 
 of the operation. At first, only the burning frag- 
 ments of the Henry Clay, and the barge that had 
 been cut loose, came floating down ; and an old rebel, 
 on wdiose estate McClernand's headquarters were es- 
 tablished, was jubilant at what he supposed the de- 
 feat of the Yankees. " Where are your gunboats 
 now ? " he exclaimed ; " Vicksburg has put an end 
 to them all ; " and the national oflScers feared lest his 
 elation might prove well-founded. By daylight, hoAv- 
 ever, the wrecks had all passed by ; and, after a Avhile, 
 a gunboat appeared below -the bend; and then, a 
 transport ; then, one after another, the whole fleet of 
 iron-clads and army steamers hove in sight, from their 
 2:)erilous passage. The "Yankees" now had their 
 turn of rejoicing, and thanked the rebel for teaching 
 them the word. " Where are your gunboats now ? " 
 they said. " Did Vicksburg put an end to them all ? " 
 But the old man was too much exasperated at the 
 national success, to endure the taunts he had himself 
 provoked, and rushed away in a rage. The next day 
 he set fire to his own house, rather than allow it to 
 shelter his enemies. 
 
 Ilis plantation was one of the loveliest in Loui 
 siana ; high enough to be secure from inundation,, it 
 overlooked the meanderings of the Mississippi for 
 nearly fifty miles; wide savannas teemed with the- 
 wealth of the corn and the cotton-plant, while the- 
 spacious lawns were clad in all the charms of precot- 
 
 13 
 
194 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 cious summer in this balmy clime. Japan plums 
 and fig-trees grew in tlie open air, and groves of 
 magnolia and oleander bloomed. The softness of the 
 atmosi)here, redolent with unfamiliar fragrance, and 
 the aspect of the landscape, brilliant with blossoms 
 and verdure, enchanted the soldiers. " Here, at last," 
 they cried, " we have found the sunny South." But 
 desolation and destruction fell like a storm-cloud over 
 the scene. In a few hours a blackened pile was all 
 that remained of the stately mansion; the broad 
 2)lantation became a camping-ground ; the venerable 
 trees in which it was embosomed were hewn down 
 for firewood, and the secluded fields were speedily 
 transformed into a confused and bustlino- bivouac."^ 
 
 Grant's orders to McCleruand had been explicit 
 and urgent, to seize and occupy Grand Gulf. In or- 
 der to appease the unappeasable ambition and con- 
 ceit of his subordinate, he had given him command 
 of the advance, and charged him with an operation, 
 which, if successful, would have rendered McCler- 
 nand famous at once. On the 12tli of April, he 
 wrote to that officer: "It is my desire that you 
 should get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest 
 practicaljle moment. ... I wanted particularly to see 
 you about the facilities for getting troops from Smith's 
 
 • " Tlie movement of troops from Milliken's bend to New Carthage 
 will ))e so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply 
 of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance required by pre- 
 vious orders. Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all 
 the beef cattle, corn, and other necessary supplies for the army, on the 
 line of march, but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles 
 useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and search- 
 ing houses without proper orders from division commanders, are posi- 
 tively prohibited. All such irregularities must be summarily pun- 
 ished."— ^j^racf from Grant's General Order for this movement. (See 
 ApjicndU for order, entire.) 
 
i 
 
 ULYSSES S. GRANT. 105 
 
 plantation to New Carthage, and the chances for em- 
 barking there." On the 13th; "It is not desirable 
 that you should move in any direction from Grand 
 Gulf,' but remain under the protection of the gun- 
 boats. The present plan, if not changed by the 
 movements of the enemy, will be to hold Grand 
 Gulf." On the 18th: "I would still repeat former 
 instructions, that possession be got of Grand Gulf at 
 the earliest possible moment." Again : " I vnll be 
 over here in a few da}'s again, and hope it will be 
 my good fortune to find you in safe possession of 
 Grand Gulf" 
 
 But McClernand's inefficiency in conducting the 
 movements of his corps was such, that Grant was 
 obliged to instruct him in the most minute details."* 
 Instead of appreciating this, McClernand resented it 
 as inteiference. Admiral Porter, after the running 
 of the batteries, also endeavored to make suggestions 
 to the intractable and incompetent commander of the 
 advance. He informed McClernand of opportunities 
 for attacking Grand Gulf, and urged him to make a 
 combined assault with the navy, on that place. But 
 all in vain. 
 
 Finally, Porter wrote to Sherman, with whom he 
 was intimate, and begged him to induce General 
 Grant at once to come down in person to the front, 
 and examine the situation for himself, as the favora- 
 able opportunity was fast slipping by. Grant was 
 suffering from boils at the time, and almost unable 
 to mount a horse; but, the day after receiving this re- 
 quest, he rode forty miles, from Milliken's bend to 
 Perkins's landing, and there gave McClernand further 
 
 • See Appendix for Grant's letter to McClernand of April 18th. 
 
196 illLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 instructions. The time tliat had been wasted, how- 
 ever, was irrecoverable ; the rebels had used it to ad- 
 vantaf^e, and Grant became convinced that nothing 
 would be accomplished until he took command in 
 person, and remained with the advance. He returned, 
 therefore, to Milliken's bend, to hasten the transpor- 
 tation of McPlierson's corps. 
 
 In fact, during this entire campaign, Grant con- 
 stantly directed the quartermasters and commissaries, 
 the movements of troops and the transportation of 
 stores and ordnance, the plans of reconnoissances and 
 the positions of important batteries. Not only was 
 there no movement of a division, from the time he 
 took command, in January, that was not expressly 
 ordered by himself, but his instructions, even to regi- 
 mental commanders, when these commanded detached 
 posts, were numerous, and constant, and detailed. 
 This course was indispensable, because of the compli- 
 cated character of the campaign, the vast distances 
 over which he was operating, and the extreme diffi- 
 culties in transportation, against which he was obliged 
 to contend. In no other way could he harmonize 
 these various movements, and evoke unity out of the 
 confused and apparently conflicting combinations. 
 A commander who had not supervised every thing, 
 at this emergency, would have failed.* 
 
 On the 2Gth of April, six other transports at- 
 temj)ted to run by the Vicksburg batteries; five of 
 them succeeded, although in a damaged condition ; one 
 was sunk, being struck in the hull by a solid shot. 
 The crews of all these transports, like those of their 
 
 • See Appendix for Grant's ordcra to Sherman, of April 24tb, 
 Grant's letter-book to subordinates at this time is probably one of the 
 wost curious in the history of war. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 197 
 
 predecessors, were composed of volunteers for the 
 piu-pose, from tlie army. Twelve barges, laden with 
 forage and rations, were sent in tow of the last six 
 steamers, and half of them got safely by. On this 
 occasion, but one man was killed, and six or eight 
 were wounded ; about five hundred shots were fired. 
 Immediately after the running of the batteries, 
 the vaiious vessels and barges were repaired, by order 
 of Admiral Porter, who furnished the material. Me- 
 chanics were found in the army to do the work ; for 
 it was a striking feature of the volunteer service, 
 throughout the war, that no mechanical or profes- 
 sional need arose, when accomplished adepts could 
 not be found in almost any regiment to perform the 
 duty required. The anny craft was soon in a condi- 
 tion to be of use in moving troops ; but, the destruc- 
 tion of two transports and six barges, reduced the 
 number so that it was found necessaiy to march the 
 men from Perkins's plantation to Hard Times, twenty- 
 two miles fui-ther, and a distance of seventy miles 
 from Milliken's bend. The new road lay along the 
 west bank of Lake St. Joseph, and across three large 
 bayous, over whicb bridges were built by the troops, 
 the materials being taken from plantation-houses 
 near by. 
 
 The whole route was in miserable condition, and 
 after the march was once begun, the roads became 
 intolerable. But, on the ' 29th of April, the entire 
 Thirteenth corps had arrived at Hard Times, ten 
 thousand men having moved from Perkins's planta- 
 tion on transports. Grant's headquarters, on the 
 24th, were with the advance. 
 
 Reconnoissances of the eastern shore had mean- 
 while been ordered by Grant, and resulted in the dis- 
 
198 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 coveiy that there was but one point between War- 
 rentou and Grand Gulf, where a good road existed 
 from the river to the bluffs, the whole country being 
 still overflowed on the left bank of the river. This 
 dry point was at a place called Congo Island, and was 
 so strongly protected by natural defences, that it was 
 not judged advisable to attempt a landing there. The 
 road led to Cox's farm on the Big Black i*iver, and 
 to use this landino^ would have necessitated crossinor 
 the Big Black in the face of the enemy. 
 
 The Seventeenth corps, under McPherson, had 
 followed McClernand closely, and Grant, after con- 
 sulting with Admiral Porter, now determined to at- 
 tack the works at Grand Gulf. The Mississippi, at 
 this place, has cut away the alluvium to the foot of 
 the highland, and forms a large semi-circular bay or 
 " gulf." The bluff rises into a bold promontory, and 
 commands a full view of the river for five or six 
 miles above. The fortifications consisted of a series 
 of rifle-trenches, and of two batteries, mounting thir- 
 teen heavy guns. The plan w^as, for the naval force 
 to bombard and silence the batteries, and, immediately 
 afterwards, the troops were to land at the foot of the 
 bluff, and carry the works by storm. Accordingly, 
 ten thousand troops of the Thirteenth corps were 
 crowded aboard the transports and barges, and moved 
 down the stream, to the front of Grand Gulf, at a 
 point just out of range. 
 
 Giant, however, had foreseen that a necessity for 
 running by the batteries might again arise. In his 
 order to McClernand for the attack, dated the 27th 
 of April, he remarked : " It may be that the enemy 
 will occupy positions back from the city, out of range 
 of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 199 
 
 past Grand Gulf and land at Kodney, ... or, 
 it may be expedient for tlie boats to run past, but 
 not the men. In this case, tlien, the transports would 
 have to be brouo-ht back to where the men could 
 land, and move by forced marches to below Grand 
 Gulf, reembark rapidly, and proceed to the latter 
 place." * Witli tbe exception of the march to Grand 
 Gulf, this is "what actually occurred, two days after- 
 wards. On the same day, Grant instructed McCler- 
 nand: "The amount of transportation being limited 
 for the number of men it is desirable to take to Grand 
 Gulf, I especially intended that no horses, except 
 what was necessary for drawing the artillery, should 
 be taken." 
 
 At eio^ht o'clock on the mornino; of the 29th, For- 
 ter began the bombardment witli all his iron-clads, 
 seven in number, and one ordinary gunboat. For 
 five hours and twenty minutes, he kept up a vigor- 
 ous fire, without intermission, running his vessels at 
 times almost within pistol-shot of the batteries. The 
 cun'ent of the Mississippi at this place is quite swift, 
 and the stream too deep for anchorage, so that the 
 gunboats were compelled to keep continually in 
 motion ; they were turned round and round in thie 
 eddies, exposed of course at every turn. The vessels 
 "were handled witli skill and boldness, but the rebel 
 batteries were too elevated for Forter to accomplish 
 any thing ; he was not able to dismount a solitary 
 piece, and it would have been madness to attempt a 
 landing, under unsilenced guns like these. No se- 
 rious injury was sustained by any of the fleet, but, at 
 twenty minutes past one o'clock, the admii'al with- 
 
 ♦ See Appendix for Grant's orders to McClemand for the attack in 
 full, April 27th. Also Grunt's orders of April 24th. 
 
200 jnLITART HISTORY OF 
 
 drew, the utter futility of Ms effort having been am- 
 ply demonstrated ; the enemy also suspended fire. 
 Porter's loss was eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. 
 One of his vessels was stnick as many as forty-seven 
 times. 
 
 Grant had witnessed the bombardment from a 
 tug in the stream, and, immediately upon its close, he 
 signalled the admiral, who took him aboard the flag- 
 ship, There, he at once requested Porter to run by tbe 
 batteries at Grand Gulf that night, with his entire 
 fleet, as a cover to the transports, wdiile the troops 
 should be disembarked at Hard Times, and marched 
 to De Shroon's, a point on the western shore, three 
 miles below Grand Gulf. Porter promptly acqui- 
 esced, and that night the gunboats again engaged the 
 batteries, while all the transports ran b}^, receiving 
 no damage in the passage, only one or two being 
 struck. They were thus ready, on the morning of the 
 30th, to take the troops aboard at De Sliroon's. Dur- 
 ing the night, the Thirteenth corps marched around 
 to that place, on the levee. The gunboats also passed 
 below the batteries. 
 
 Grant liad previously ordered the eastern shore 
 below Grand Gulf explored, to find a landing-place, 
 and hardly hoped to get a footing anywhere north of 
 llodney ; but, that night, information was procured 
 from a negro, that a good road led from Bruinsburg, 
 six miles below Grand Gulf, to Port Gibson, twelve 
 miles in the interior, and on high ground. AVheu the 
 embarkation began in the morning, it was with a 
 view to steam down the liver, until hard land should 
 1)6 found, but, this information being relied on, the 
 first transports went direct to Bruiusbui'g, and found 
 the negro's story correct; a good dry road leading to 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 201 
 
 the bluffs, whicli were at least two miles from the 
 river. 
 
 At the same time that the attack on Grand Gulf 
 was ordered, Grant ^n'ote to Sherman, who had not 
 yet started from Milliken's bend, to make a demon- 
 stration against Haine's bluff, which should serve as a 
 diversion merely, in favor of the assault below. 
 " The effect of a lieav^y demonstration in tliat direc- 
 tion," said Grant, " would be good, so far as the ene- 
 my are concerned ; but I am loath to order it, because 
 it would be so hard to make our own troops understand 
 that only a demonstration was intended, and our peo- 
 ple at home would characterize it as a repulse." Sher- 
 man had been so unfortunate, and the comments of 
 the newspaper press on his career had been so un- 
 justly harsh, that Grant felt an especial unwilling- 
 ness to place him and his command in a position that 
 would subject them to unpleasant criticism. Still, he 
 preferred Sherman to any other commander, for this 
 separate and important part of the entei'prise. But 
 Sherman replied : " I believe a diversion at Ilaine's 
 bluff is proj)er and right, and will make it, let what- 
 ever reports of repulses be made." On the ?.9th of 
 April, accordingly, he moved ten regiments up the 
 Yazoo on transports, while the gunboats which had 
 been left by Porter north of Vicksburg (eight in 
 number), also appeared in sight of the bluff*, and en- 
 gaged the batteries. The troops were landed, and 
 mock dispositions made for attack; reconnoissances 
 were sent out, and the enemy opened liea\'y^ fire both 
 upon the naval and the land forces. This lasted for 
 two days, and Grant afterwards learned that the 
 movement caused great anxiety and many changes of 
 troops, in the command at Vicksburg. Not a man of 
 
202 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 Sherman's force was Lurt, nor were there any losses in 
 the squadron. On the 1st of May, Sherman got or- 
 ders from Gi-ant to withdraw from before the bluff, 
 and follow as rapidly as possible, on the heels of 
 MoPliersou's corps. " Move up to Perkins's planta- 
 tion, witli two divisions of your corps, as rapidly as 
 possible." 
 
 On tlie 29th, after passing Grand Gulf, Grant 
 wrote to Halleck : " I feel now that the battle is more 
 than half over." During this tedious month, his con- 
 fidence had never failed. On the 2d of April, he 
 said to Ilalleck : " In two weeks I expect to be able 
 to collect all my forces and turn the enemy's left." 
 AVhen Sherman returned, unsuccessful, from Steele's 
 bayou. Grant consoled himself by saying that "the 
 expedition has at least pushed our troops into the 
 heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg 
 forces are now being fed." On the 11th, he an- 
 nounced : " My force in a few days will be all concen- 
 trated ; I expect to take Grand Gulf." On the 17th : 
 "I go to Kew Carthage to-night; if it is possible, I 
 will occu])y Grand Gulf in four days." On the 18th : 
 " I hope very soon to be able to repoi-t my possession 
 of Grand Gulf." On the 21st: "My force is abun- 
 dant, with a foothold once attained, to do the work." 
 On the 24th, to Sherman : " I foresee great difficul- 
 ties in our present position, but it will not do to let 
 these retard any movements." Again : " Once at 
 Grand Gulf, I do not feel a doubt of success in the 
 entire clearing out of the enemy from the banks of 
 the river." "Every effort will be exerted to get 
 speedy possession of Grand Gulf, and from that point 
 to open the Mississippi." 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 203 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Preliminary orders for the campaign — ^Passage of the Mississippi river — Move- 
 ment to the high land— Battle-field of Port Gibson— McClernand meets the 
 enemy— Buttle of Port Gibson— Grant comes on the field in person— Arri- 
 val of MePherson's command— Success on the right— McPherson's charge- 
 Defeat of the rebels— Pursuit until dark— Rebels retreat beyond Port Gibson 
 —Pursuit to Big Black river- Bridges burnt by rebels an 1 rebuilt by Grant 
 — Evacuation of Grand Gulf— New plan of campaign— Reasons for the 
 change — Dispatches from Banks — New plan not divulged to Ilalleck— EDforts 
 to bring up troops and supplies — Demonstrations towards Vicksburg— In- 
 structions to Hurlbut— McPherson advances — Sherman arrives — Correspond- 
 ence with Sherman — ^Army moves— Position of troops — Grant's habit in 
 planning campaigns — Grant's force at outset of campaign— Headquarters at 
 Cayuga— More dispatches from Banks — ^Final dispatches to Halleck — McPher- 
 son ordered to Raymond— Battle of Raymond— Capture of Raymond — 
 Enemy retreat to Jackson — Pemberton deceived by Grant's manoeuvres- 
 Advance of Sherman and McPherson — Pursuit of the rebels towards Jack- 
 son — Johnston's arrival at Jackson — Pemberton ordered to attack Grant's 
 rear — McPherson arrives at Clinton — Battle of Jackson — Position of Mc- 
 Pherson and Sherman — Charge of Crocker's division — Capture of Jackson — 
 Retreat of Johnston towards Canton — Destruction of railroad and stores- 
 Frustration of Johnston's plans — Pemberton again ordered to join Johnston 
 — Grant intercepts Johnston's dispatches — Moves at once towards Bolton- 
 Grant converges while rebels diverge — Pemberton moves to cut Grant's com- 
 munications — Receives Johnston's orders and reverses his column — Battle- 
 field of Champion's Hill — McClernand's advance — Grant's arrival — Hovey's 
 attack — Battle of Champion's Hill — Hovey's success — Enemy musses on 
 Hovey — Grant reentorces Hovey — McClernand repeatedly ordered up, but 
 does not arrive — McPherson outflanks the enemy — Rebels finally driven from 
 the field — McClernand arrives when the battle is over — Rea.sons for McCler- 
 nand's delay insufficient — Pursuit of the rebels — Rout of the enemy com- 
 plete — Loring cut ofiF— Losses on both sides — Hill of Death — Grant gets in 
 advance of column — Johnston loses a day — Sherman ordered to Bridgeport 
 with pontoon train — McClernand comes up with enemy at Black river bridge 
 Battle-field of Black river bridge — Gallant charge of Lawler— Demoraliza- 
 tion of rebels — Firing of bridge — Capture of prisoners and cannon — Rapid 
 
-204. MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 reconstruction of bridges — Passage of Blacic river by entire army— Pursuit 
 of the rebels to A''icksburg— Sherman strikes Walnut hills— Investment of 
 Vicksburg— Evacuation of Haine's bluff— Results of campaign — Rebel move- 
 ments during campaign — Reflections — Comparison with Italian campaign in 
 1T96. 
 
 The orunboats beino: now all below Grand Gulf, 
 it was possible that tlie rebels miglit send armed 
 steamers down tlie Big Black river, and up tlie Mis- 
 sissippi as far as Perkins's plantation, where Grant 
 had established a depot of supplies. In order to pre- 
 vent any damage to this depot by the enemy, Grant, 
 on the night of April 29th, ordered McPherson, who 
 had arrived at Hard Times, to improvise a gunboat 
 l)y putting a section of light artillery aboard one of 
 the transports, and to send it up to guard the planta- 
 tion. He also directed four thirty-pound Parrott guns, 
 which he was taking with him on this campaign, to 
 be hauled by oxen to the bank of the river at Per- 
 kins's, and put in battery there. These arrangements 
 effectually protected the position. 
 
 On the 30th, orders were issued to the chief com- 
 missary and quartermaster of the command, to pre- 
 pare two more tugs to run the blockade, each with 
 two barges in tow, and to load them to nearly their 
 full capacity with rations. "Do this," said Grant, 
 " with all expedition, in forty-eight hours from receipt 
 of orders, if possible. Time is of immense impor- 
 tance. Sliould their crews decline running through, 
 call on tlie commanding officer for volunteers, and 
 discharge the crews." The same day, the chief com- 
 missary of the Thirteenth corj)s received the fol- 
 lowing directions: " You will issue to the troops of 
 this command, without provision returns,* for their 
 
 ♦ ProtUion returns are the vouchers invariably required of officers 
 drawing rations for troops. They are minute in character, and to de- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 205 
 
 subsistence during the next five days three rations ; " 
 and corps commanders were instnicted to direct their 
 " chief quartermasters to seize, for the use of the army 
 in the field during the ensuing campaign, such land 
 transportation as may be necessary, belonging to the 
 inhabitants of the country through which they may 
 pass." 
 
 These orders and dispatches were all written in 
 Grant's own hand, and nearly all signed with liis own 
 name. Like most of the important papers emanating 
 from his headquarters during the war, they were his 
 own composition, struck out at the moment they 
 were needed by the emergency of the moment, and 
 sent off without emendation or change. Dates and 
 names, and matter of that description in the largei' 
 reports were, of course, often supplied by others, but 
 the gist and the text were Grant's own. None of his 
 staff-ofiicers ever attempted to imitate his style.* 
 
 On the 30th of April, as soon as the troops could 
 be supplied witli three days' rations in their haver- 
 sacks, the advance of McClernand's corps was marched 
 from Bruinsburg, at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, 
 towards the high ground, two and a half miles in- 
 land. The road runs close to the south side of the 
 bayou, entering the hills through a defile which might 
 easily have been defended. The remainder of the 
 Thirteenth, and two divisions of the Seventeenth corps 
 were ferried across the river as rapidly as possible, 
 fi'om De Shroon's. Kot a tent nor a wagon accom- 
 panied them, nor was any personal baggage trans- 
 lay at this time for their preparation would have retarded the movement 
 of the army, 
 
 * The quotations in this history are invariably given in Grant's origi- 
 nal language, and from papers not touched up by any subordinate. 
 
206 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 ported until all the troops were over. Grant and his 
 staff crossed in the early morning, and in advance of 
 theii' horses, which did not reach them again for 
 several days. Not only was every bai-ge and tug 
 crowded to its utmost capacity, but the gunboats 
 were offered for the ferriage of artillery and troops, 
 by Porter, who fully appreciated the value of every 
 moment. The Mississippi here is over a mile wide ; 
 the distance from De Shroon's to Bruinsburg is six 
 miles. 
 
 What was necessary now was to gain the high 
 land and establish a base, before the enemy should 
 become aware of the movement. This Grant deemed 
 a matter of vast importance. But as soon as the 
 march of troops should be discovered, his purpose of 
 reaching the interior would of course become appar- 
 ent. The means of ferriage were limited, and the 
 weather was intensely hot; but within twenty-four 
 hours from tlie first landing, the infantry and artillery 
 of the Thirteenth corps, and one division of McPher- 
 son's command were firmly established on the main 
 land of Mississippi. The bluffs were reached an 
 hour before sunset, and McClernand pushed on at 
 once, in the direction of Port Gibson, hoping to sur- 
 prise the rebels if they attempted to defend that 
 place, as well as to prevent their destroying the 
 bridges across the Bayou PieiTe. Port Gibson is 
 twelve miles from Bruinsburg, and at the junction of 
 the road from the latter place with that from Grand 
 Gulf; it is besides on the direct route from the Mis- 
 sissippi to Jackson, the capital of the state, as well 
 as t<^ Vicksburg. Its possession would turn Grand 
 Gulf, and compel the evacuation of that stronghold. 
 
 At two A. M., on the 1st of Mav, McClernand's 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 207 
 
 advanced division came in contact with the enemy, 
 about eight miles out from Bruinsburg. Some little 
 skirmishing took place, and as fast as the troops got 
 up they became engaged. No heavy fighting, how- 
 ever, occurred before daybreak, when the enemy was 
 discovered in position, and evidently determined to 
 accept battle. His force was composed of the garri- 
 son of Grand Gulf, which had marched out promptly 
 under General Bowen, with the idea of holding Grant 
 in check near the Bayou Pierre, until reenforcements 
 could arrive from Vicksburg.* Including these last. 
 Grant estimated the number of the enemy at eleven 
 thousand, f His own force engaged was composed 
 of the Thirteenth corps and two brigades of the 
 Seventeenth, amounting in all to nearly nineteen 
 thousand men. J 
 
 The country at this place is admirably adapted 
 for defence ; a series of irregular ridges is divided by 
 
 * All the unqualified statements of rebel movements or forces made 
 in this chapter are taken from the rebel official reports. I have exam- 
 ined Johnston's, Pemberton's, Bowen's, Loring's, and all the sub- 
 reports, having had access to the original documents, now in the pos- 
 session of the government. 
 
 t Bowen himself reported that he had fifty-five hundred men en- 
 gaged, but Loring reports that, after the battle, Bowen told him he had 
 still about seven thousand. This was exclusive of the reenforcements 
 brought by Loring. After careful examination of all data, rebel and 
 national, I am inclined to estimate Bowen's force at between seven and 
 eight thousand. 
 
 I Throughout this work I am indebted to Brevet Major-General Raw- 
 iins, chief of staflf to the General of the Army, for estimates of both na- 
 tional and rebel forces and losses. General Rawlins was with Grant from 
 the outset of his career, and always in his confidence. lie knew, as 
 well as anybody could, the exact number of troops brought into the 
 field on each occasion; and every oflicer of experience is aware how 
 frequently such numbers diflfer from those borne on the rolls. General 
 Rawlins has entered into minute calculations of regiments and bat- 
 teries, so that my statements may be taken without qualification. I 
 
208 MTLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 deep and difficult ravines, and the ground, where not 
 opened for cultivation, is grown up with heavy tim- 
 ber and an underbrush of cane ; the roads are few, 
 and run along the lidges, making it impossible to de- 
 ploy any considerable portion of the troops at once. 
 The road to Port Gibson divides upon the battle- 
 field, branching in exactly opposite directions, but the 
 branches soon converge again, a little west of the 
 town. The enemy was in position across both these 
 roads (never more than two miles apart), and the at- 
 tacking party was thus obliged to follow, separated 
 by steep ravines, that were choked up with magnolia- 
 trees and tangled with bamboo and vine. A very 
 small force could in this way retard the progress of a 
 much larger one for hours. 
 
 McClernand, however, bringing up his rear divi- 
 sions, developed his whole force as rapidly as the 
 country allowed. On the right, were the divisions of 
 Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith, and on the left, the 
 division of Osterhaus, all in the Thirteenth corps. 
 The national troops faced east, and as soon as the 
 oiimmerino; of the risiuo; sun and the smoke of the 
 previous skirmishing had ceased to blind theii* eyes, 
 the battle began. In less than an hour, nearly the 
 whole command was engaged. The artillery fire was 
 heard at the landing, eight miles off, and Grant started 
 at once for the front, arriving on the field at ten a. m., 
 on a borrowed horse, and with no escort but his staff. 
 lie immediately assumed direct command. 
 
 liave especially striven to avoid under-estimates of national strength 
 and losses, and exagnferation of those of the rebels. 
 
 I shall owe much of whatever accuracy and authenticity this vol- 
 ume n)ay possess, in other departments besides that of statistics, to 
 the remarkable memory of General Rawlins — a memory almost never at 
 fault, and which my researches have corroborated hundreds of times. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 209 
 
 At tLis time, McClernand was pressing the rebels 
 vio-orously on the right with tlie bulk of his force, 
 and slowly but steadily gaining ground; but Oster- 
 haus's division on the left had not been so successful. 
 The enemy's troops in his front were posted on a 
 ridge admirably chosen ; their left in a sunken road, 
 and the right protected by an almost impassable 
 ravine. Osterhaus made repeated efforts to dislodge 
 them, but was foiled, until two brigades of Logan's 
 division in McPherson's corps appeared. 
 
 The battle had now been going on for several 
 hours, and McPherson pushed his men as rapidly as 
 possible, coming on the ground in person, with his 
 advance, as soon as the last of the Thirteenth corps 
 was out of the road. This was about noon. Grant 
 at once directed him to throw John E. Smith's bri- 
 o-ade to the support of Osterhaus, with instructions to 
 advance on the left, and, if possible, outflank the 
 enemy. Grant and McPherson accompanied this 
 brigade, and the movement was perfectly successful. 
 As soon as the position of the enemy could be defi- 
 nitely ascertained, and the ground sufficiently recon- 
 noitred, a charoje was made across the ravine and on 
 the rebel flank, simultaneously with a direct attack 
 by Osterhaus in front. This combined effort soon 
 dj'ove the rebels fi'om their position on Grant's left, 
 and sent them in precipitate retreat towards Port 
 Gibson. Before sunset, their right was completely 
 turned, and the entire line broken and swept away. 
 
 McClernand, meanwhile, notwithstanding the de- 
 termined gallantry and steady progress of Hovey, 
 Carr, and A. J. Smith, was sending repeated mes- 
 sages to Grant for reenforcements on the right; but 
 his wishes were only partly gratified. Grant had 
 
 14 
 
210 mUTARY HISTORY OF 
 
 been on that part of tlie field in person, and did not 
 see how additional troops could be used to advan- 
 tao-e. The three divisions there had been steadily 
 driving tlie enemy from position to position, all day. 
 Early in the action, Ilovey pushed boldly forward, 
 and caj^tured a four-gun battery. But, later, the 
 enemy held his ground with more tenacity, encour- 
 aged doubtless by reenforcements which arrived from 
 Vicksburg during the fight, having marched more 
 than twenty miles. Although in the face of greatly 
 superior numbers, the rebels now obstinately disputed 
 every inch of the field ; they had, however, every pos- 
 sible advantage of position, the ridges commanding 
 the approaches on every side. 
 
 McClernand had asked for two more divisions, 
 and Grant finally sent him one brigade of Logan's 
 troops, under Stevenson, at the same time that he 
 ordered McPherson to the left, with Smith's brigade 
 of Logan's division, and Logan in person. But, be- 
 fore Stevenson's brigade appeared on the light, the 
 rebels had begun to withdraw, and the sight of fresh 
 national troops probably added to their demoraliza- 
 tion, although not to their discomfiture, as Stevenson 
 did not really become engaged. Finding himself 
 outnumbered, and, in spite of his strenuous exertions, 
 beaten on every part of the line, Bowen finally gave 
 way, and fell back rapidly towards Port Gibson, leav- 
 ing his dead and wounded on the field. 
 
 The pursuit was continued from point to point, 
 till night closed in, and as long as possil)le after 
 dark. It reached to within two miles of Port Gib- 
 son, but the nature of the country was such that fur- 
 ther advance in the dark was not deemed prudent 
 or desirable. The enemy making the appearance of 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 211 
 
 anotlier stand, the troops slept on their aims till day- 
 lio-ht. Grant thought it evident that the rebels would 
 attemj)t a retreat under cover of the night, and his 
 last order to McClernand was : " Push the enemy with 
 skirmishers well thrown out, until it gets too dark 
 to sec him; then place your command on eligible 
 ground wherever night finds you. Park your artil- 
 lery so as to command the surrounding country, and 
 renew the attack at early dawn. If possible, push 
 the enemy fi'om the field or capture him. No camp- 
 fires should be allow^ed, unless in deep ravines and to 
 the rear of troops." 
 
 In the battle of Port Gibson, Grant's loss was one 
 hundred and thirty killed, and seven hundred and 
 eighteen wounded. He took six hundred and fifty 
 prisoners, and estimated the enemy's loss in killed 
 and wounded as about equal to his own.* Six field- 
 guns were captured. Bowen's advance to Port Gib- 
 son was bold, and his defence a good one, but the 
 national forces were too heavy for the rebels, and the 
 movement l»y Bruinsburg was undoubtedly a surprise. 
 
 Pi'isoners stated that Bowen had taken up his 
 position on the battle-ground of Port Gibson, late in 
 the night of the 30th, having made a forced march 
 from Grand Gulf, as soon as Grant's movement was 
 discovered. He had expected reenforceraents of five 
 thousand men from Vicksburg, and others from Jack- 
 son, under Loring ; but the national troops were too 
 quick for him, and only two brigades arrived from 
 Vicksburg to participate in the fight. General Tracy, 
 of the rebel army, was killed, and many evidences of 
 demoralization appeared. Pemberton, who was in 
 command of the rebel department of Mississippi, that 
 
 * Bowen reported four hundred and forty-eight killed and wounded, 
 and three hundred and eighty-four missing I 
 
212 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 
 
 niglit telegraphed to General Josepli E. Johnston, his 
 immediate superior: "A furious battle has been 
 going on since daylight just below Port Gibson. 
 Enemy can cross all his army from Hard Times to 
 Bruinsburg. I should have large reenforcements. 
 Enemy's movements threaten Jackson, and, if success- 
 ful, cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson." 
 
 During the night, as Grant had foreseen, the 
 rebels evacuated Port Gibson, and Avithdrew across 
 the two forks of the Bayou Pierre, destroying the 
 bridges in their rear. They left a battery and several 
 regiments of infantry to prevent the reconstruction 
 of the bridge over the North fork. Early on the 
 morning of the 2d,McClernand's troops, flushed with 
 tlie success of the day before, and elated at the idea 
 of being at last on dry land, with plenty of open 
 country for operations, pushed into the town, finding 
 no enemy but the wounded. Grant immediately de- 
 tached one briojade of Lo2:an's division to the left, to 
 engage the attention of the rebels there, while a 
 heavy detail of McClernand's troops was set to work, 
 rebuilding the bridge across the South fork. The 
 break was more than a hundred and twenty feet 
 long, but was repaired with extraordinaiy rapidity, 
 officers and men working up to their waists in the 
 water, and the houses in tlie neis-hborhood beino; 
 torn down for timber. While this was doing, two 
 brigades of Logan's division forded the bayou and 
 marched on. 
 
 Meanwhile, another division (Crocker's), of Mc- 
 Pherson's corps, had been ferried across the Missis- 
 sippi, and, stopping only to fill their haversacks with 
 three days' rations, which they were ordered to make 
 last five, had come up with the command. McArthui*'s 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 213 
 
 division of this corps had been left to guard the lines 
 of communication from Milliken's bend to Perkins's 
 plantation, until relieved by Sherman. Grant now 
 ordered McPherson to "push across the bayou and 
 attack the enemy in flank, and in full retreat through 
 Willow Springs, demoralized and out of ammuni- 
 tion." 
 
 McPherson started at once, and before night his 
 two divisions had crossed tlie South fork and marched 
 to the North fork, eight miles farther on. They 
 found the bridge at Grindstone ford still burning, 
 but the fire was extinguished and the bridge repaired 
 in the night, the troops passing over as soon as the 
 last plank was laid. This was at five a. m. on the 3d. 
 Before one brigade had finished crossing, the enemy 
 opened on the head of the column with artillery ; but 
 the command was at once deployed, and the rebels 
 soon fell back, their movement being intended only 
 to cover the retreating force. McPherson followed 
 rapidly, driving them through Willow Springs, and 
 gaining the cross-roads. Here Logan was directed 
 to take the Grand Gulf road, while Crocker continued 
 the direct pursuit. Skirmishing was kept up all day ; 
 the broken country, the narrow, toi-tuous roads, and 
 impassable ravines offering great fiicilities for this 
 species of warfare : the enemy availed himself fully 
 of every advantage, contesting the ground with great 
 tenacity. This continued all the way to Hankin- 
 son's feri-v, on the Bis: Black river, fifteen miles 
 from Port Gibson. Several hundred prisoners were 
 taken in the pursuit. 
 
 At four o'clock in the afternoon, McPherson came 
 up with the rebels, in force, and Logan at the same 
 time appearing on their right flank, caused them to 
 
214 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 move precipitately towards tlie liver. McPliersoD 
 followed bard, and arrived just as the last of the rebels 
 were crossing, and in time to prevent the destniction 
 of the bridge. It being now dark, and the enemy- 
 driven across the Big Black, the command w^as rested 
 for the night. McPherson was ordered to hold the 
 position with one division, from the Big Black river 
 to Willow Springs, and McClernand, on his arrival, 
 to join in this duty. 
 
 McClernand was also directed to guard the roads 
 to the rear, especially towards Grand Gulf, and to 
 " watch the enemy's movements far dow^n the Bayou 
 PieiTe." "Make a reconnoissance in that direction 
 with one division; the enemy may be practising a 
 sharp game to get in our rear with a force to destroy 
 all we have hano^insr behind." 
 
 At this time, Grant learned the success of Grier- 
 son's raid, and the timely effect it was producing on 
 the Southern people. The rebel newspapers were 
 filled with accounts of the damage done; and this 
 really daring exploit, unexampled at that period of 
 the war, was magnified into proportions and impor- 
 tance greatly superior even to what Grant had hoped.* 
 Nothing could have been more opportune. On the 
 2d, also, telegi-ams between Bowen and Pemberton 
 were interce})ted, in which the former announced that 
 he had been compelled to fall back, after a deter- 
 mined effort to hold his own, his ammunition having 
 become exhausted. Pemberton, in reply, promised 
 that "ammunition should be sent in due time." 
 
 * " So great was the consternation created by this raid, that it waa 
 impossible to obtain any reliable information of the enemy's move- 
 ments, rumor ijlaciug him in various places at the same time." — P<;7»- 
 btrtoii^a lieport. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 215 
 
 Grant's army was now in fine condition, although, 
 since leaving Milliken's bend, it had marched by- 
 night as well as by day, through mud and rain, with- 
 out tents, and on irregular rations. There was no 
 murmuring, and almost no straggling. Grant had, in 
 McClernand and McPherson's command, five divi- 
 sions, amounting in all to nearly thirty thousand 
 men. " My force," he said, " is composed of hardy 
 and disciplined men, who know no defeat, and are 
 not willino: to learn what it is." 
 
 By this time, it was evident that the rebels were 
 evacuating Grand Gulf, which, indeed, tliere was noth- 
 ing more to gain by holding ; * and their movements, 
 since the battle, had all been made to cover the escape 
 of the garrison. Accordingly, on the morning of the 
 3d, Grant started from Willow Springs in person, 
 with one brigade of Logan's division, and a cavalry 
 escort of twenty men. for the town. On the way, he 
 learned that the rebels had already abandoned all the 
 country between the Big Black river and the Bayou 
 Pierre. He determined, therefore, not to detach any 
 troops from his main column ; and the brigade which 
 accompanied him was turned off, where the road to 
 Grand Gulf forks, about seven miles out, the last of 
 the retreating force having already passed on, towards 
 Hankinsou's ferry. Grant then rode into the town, 
 with his staff and cavalry escort, to make the neces- 
 sary arrangements for removing his base of supplies 
 from Bruinsbursr to Grand Gulf 
 
 He found the naval force in possession. Porter 
 
 * " Grand Gulf was not selected as a position for land defence, but 
 for the protectiou of the mouth of the Big Black, and also as a pre- 
 cautionary measure against the passage of transports." — Peniberton'a 
 Jieport. 
 
216 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 having landed early in the day ; but the magazines 
 liad been blown up in the night, the cannon buried 
 or spiked, while the garrison had begun its retreat at 
 ei«'-ht o'clock the evenins; before. Grant's movements 
 were so rapid that it was impossible to withdraw the 
 heavy guns, and thirteen pieces fell into the hands of 
 the victors.* On the water front, works were found 
 elaborate and extensive even beyond expectation, 
 while on the land side the place was susceptible of as 
 complete defence as Vicksburg ; but, cut off from all 
 reenforcements or relief, it was sure to fall, and a de- 
 lay in the evacuation would only have sacrificed the 
 srarrison. 
 
 Grant had not been abed, nor had off his clothes, 
 since leaving Bruin sburg, three days before, and went 
 aboard one of the gunboats, where he borrowed a 
 change of linen, and wrote dispatches till midnight. 
 He sent long letters to Halleck, announcing the suc- 
 cess of his operations, and detailing tlie movement 
 against Grand Gulf, tlie march to the interior, and 
 the battle of Port Gibson. Sherman, now on the 
 march from Milliken's bend, was informed : " My 
 base is now at this place, and in executing j^our or- 
 ders fur joining me you w^ill govern yourself accord- 
 ingly. . . . Logan is now on the main road from here 
 to Jackson, and "McPherson, closely followed by Mc- 
 Clernand, (»n tlio branch of tbe same road from V/il- 
 low Springs. . . . The road to Vicksburg is open. . . ." 
 
 It had already become apparent that " the coun- 
 try would supply all the forage recpiired for an active 
 campaign, ns wvW as tlie necessary beef; all other 
 
 * " So grcsit wcro his" (Grant's) " facilities for transportation, and «o 
 rapid his monemenls, that it was impracticable to withdraw the heavy 
 guns." — PeinJiertohi Report. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAIST. 217 
 
 supplies would have to be drawn from Milliken's 
 bend, a long and precarious route;" but Grant de- 
 clared: *'I have every confidence of succeeding in 
 doing it." Accordingly, lie wrote tliat night to Sulli- 
 van, who commanded the district between Milliken's 
 bend and Smith's plantation : "You will give special 
 attention to the matter of shortening the line of land 
 transportation from above Vicksburg to the steamers 
 below. As soon as the river has fallen sufficiently, 
 you will have a road constructed from Young's point 
 to a landing just below Warrenton, and dispose of 
 your troops accordingly. Every thing depends upon 
 the promptitude with which our supplies are for- 
 warded." To Sherman he said : " I wish you to col- 
 lect a train of one hundred and twenty wagons at 
 Milliken's bend and Perkins's plantation, send them 
 to Grand Gulf, and there load them Mith rations, as 
 follows : one hundred thousand j^ounds of bacon, the 
 balance, coffee, sugar, salt, and hard bread. For your 
 own use on the march fi'om Grand Gulf, you will 
 draw five days' rations, and see that they last five 
 days. It is unnecessary for me to remind you of the 
 overwhelming importance of celerity. . . . All we 
 want now are men, ammunition, and hard bread ; we 
 can subsist our horses on the countiy, and obtain 
 considerable supplies for our troops." 
 
 It has been seen that, up to the time of crossing 
 the Mississippi, Grant's intention was to collect all 
 his " forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good 
 supply of provisions and ordnance stores, and, in the" 
 mean time, to detach a corps to cooperate with Banks 
 against Port Hudson, and so effect a junction of their 
 forces." But, having beaten the enemy at Port Gib- 
 son, and followed him to the Big Black river, Grant 
 
218 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 was now fifteen miles on the road from Grand Gulf 
 either to Jackson, Black river bridge, or Vicksburg. 
 He could not afford to delay, much less to retrace his 
 steps. Many days could not elapse before the battle 
 must be fought on ^vhich the fate of Vicksburg would 
 depend, and it was impossible to predict how long 
 the contest misrht last. Grant had also certain infor- 
 mation that the rebel General Joseph E. Johnston 
 was on his way to Jackson, and that reenforcements 
 Avere constantly arriving at that place from Port 
 Hudson and other Southern cities. Instead of reen- 
 forcing Banks, there was need of Banks to come to 
 the sujjport of Grant. 
 
 But, at this crisis, he received a letter from Banks, 
 who was now west of the Mississippi, near Alexan- 
 dria, and who declared that he could not reach Port 
 Hudson before the 10th of May, and that, even after 
 the reduction of that place, he could reeuforce Grant 
 with only twelve thousand men. Grant at once de- 
 termined to turn all his forces against Vicksburg. 
 To delay until the 10th of May, and after that for 
 the reduction of Port Hudson, would be fatal; it 
 would not leave him relatively as strong as if he 
 moved promptly with what force he already had at 
 his command. The losses he would undoubtedly 
 suffer during the Port Hudson campaign, from sick- 
 ness and strao:o:linQ:, and in battle and durinsj the 
 siege, would reduce his numbers so, that with the 
 added strength the enemy was daily receiving, no 
 actual reenforcement would be gained. These were 
 the negative considerations which influenced him. 
 
 But the positive ones were of greater force, as 
 they always were with this commander. He had 
 won a victory, had gained a foothold on the high 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 219 
 
 land and on the east bank, that he had been five 
 months striving to obtain ; he had captured Grand 
 Gulf, one of the rebel strongholds, and an outwork 
 of Vicksburg ; his troops were encouraged, and the 
 enemy demoralized. He, doubtless, himself felt the 
 inspiration of success, and it was his nature, in war, 
 always to prefer the immediate aggressive. He de- 
 termined, that night, to detach no force to Banks, but 
 to begin operations at once against Vicksburg. 
 
 But there was still a point of vital impoi-tance to 
 decide, upon which, indeed, hinged all that gave this 
 campaign its distinctive character. Having obtained 
 that for which he had been all winter struggling, 
 having at last reached high dry ground upon which 
 to operate, apparently Grant's most natural course 
 was to march direct upon Vicksburg, and at once 
 begin the siege, or, at least, attack its garrison, should 
 that come out to meet him. He was not more than 
 twelve miles from Warrenton, and had only one for- 
 midable natural obstacle to encounter, the Big Black 
 river, the line of \yhich would probably be taken by 
 any enemy opposing him. Pemberton was in Vicks- 
 burcr and alons: the Vicksburi^ and Jackson railroad, 
 with, as afterwards proved, fifty-tw^o thousand men,* 
 but as Grant then supposed, witli thirty thousand. 
 Another force, about equally distant, was collecting 
 towards the east and north, and supposed to be com- 
 manded by Gregg, of whose strength Grant was not 
 w^ell informed. This force would, of course, endeavor 
 to unite with the garrison of Vicksburg, and the two 
 would be able to outnumber, and, perhaps, over- 
 power the national commander. Grant determined 
 to prevent this ; to push between the two armies be" 
 
 * Pembcrton's field return for his entire command on the 31st of 
 March showed a force, present, of 59,411 men. 
 
220 MELITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 fore tliey could comloine ; to drive eastward the 
 weaker one ; attack and beat Gresrs- "before Peniber- 
 ton could come to the rescue ; and to seize Jackson, 
 the capital of the state, situated fifty miles in the 
 rear of Vicksburg, and at the junction of the rail- 
 roads by which Vicksburg is supplied. "When once 
 the roads that centre there were destroyed, troops 
 as well as stores would be cut off, and Vicksburg 
 with its garrison isolated from the would-be Confed- 
 eracy. 
 
 This movement presented the most absolute and 
 splendid advantages, but it also presented difficulties 
 and dangers sufficient to deter any but the most con- 
 fident of commanders. To undertake it. Grant must 
 not only advance between two ai-mies, either of which 
 was a formidable opponent, and run the daily risk 
 of their combining to crush him ; but, more daring 
 still, by moving towards Gregg, he would expose his 
 only line of communication with the Mississippi to 
 attacks from Pemberton. If he attempted to guard 
 that line, he must weaken his moving column, so 
 that it would be unsafe to cope with Gregg, now 
 daily expecting reenforcements from the south and 
 east. He at once decided to abandon his base alto- 
 gether, to plunge into the enemy's country with three 
 days' rations, trusting to the region itself for forage 
 and supplies, and to the chances of victory to enabde 
 him to regain some point on the Mississippi, in spite 
 of all the opposition of two hostile armies. In doino- 
 this, he risked greatly to gain greatly. If the rebel 
 forces were able to combine, they were almost certain 
 to crush him ; if he could be kept from his base he 
 was ruined. The utmost celerity of movement, as 
 well as a series of victories over both armies, ^ras 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 221 
 
 indispensable, not only to Lis success, but to Ms sal- 
 vation. 
 
 Believing tliat he would not be allowed to make 
 tlie campaign if he announced his plan beforehand, 
 Grant did not now inform the general-in-chief of what 
 he contemplated. It was fortunate that he took this 
 precaution. Kot one syllable of encouragement had 
 reached him since starting from Milliken's bend, and 
 the President wrote, after all was over : " When you 
 got below, and took Poi-t Gibson, Grand Gulf, and 
 vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and 
 join General Banks; and when you turned north- 
 ward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mis- 
 take." "' This disapprobation was not confined to the 
 President. When Grant's plan of campaign was in- 
 dicated, a few days later, Halleck at once sent him 
 orders to return and cooperate ^vith Banks : " If pos- 
 sible, the forces of yourself and Banks should be 
 united hetween Vicksburg and Port Hudson^ so as to 
 attack these ]:)laces separately wdth the combined 
 forces." This dispatch was dated the 1 1th of May, 
 ten days after the battle of Port Gibson. Hooker 
 had just been defeated at Chancellorsville, and the 
 government must have been aghast at the news that 
 Grant had plunged into the hostile region of Missis- 
 sippi, confronting two armies, and cutting loose from 
 all communication. But there was no telegraphic line 
 in operation from Washington, further than Cairo, 
 and nearly a ^veek elapsed before the counter- 
 manding dispatch was received. Had the general-in- 
 chief, however, been able to reach his subordinate, 
 the Yicksburg campaign would never have been 
 fought. 
 
 * This letter is given in full on page 399. 
 
222 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 So Grant was alone ; his most trusted subordinates 
 besought him to change liis plans, while his superiors 
 were astounded at his temerity and strove to inter- 
 fere. Soldiers of reputation and civilians in high 
 place condemned, in advance, a campaign that seemed 
 to them as hopeless as it was unprecedented. If he 
 failed, the country would concur with the govern- 
 ment and the generals. Grant knew all this, and ap- 
 preciated his danger, but was as invulnerable to the 
 apprehensions of ambition as to the entreaties of 
 friendship, or the anxieties, even of patriotism. That 
 quiet confidence in himself which never forsook him, 
 and which amounted indeed almost to a feeline of 
 fiite, was uninterrupted. Having once determined in 
 a matter that required irreversible decision, he never 
 reversed, nor even misgave, but was steadily loyal to 
 himself and his plans. This absolute and implicit 
 faith was, however, as far as possible from conceit or 
 enthusiasm; it was simply a consciousness, or con- 
 viction, rather, which brought the very strength it 
 l)elieved in ; which was itself strength, and which in- 
 spired others with a trust in him, because he was 
 able thus to trust himself. 
 
 At midnight of the 3d, he turned his back on 
 the Mississippi river, and started for Hankinson's 
 ferry. 
 
 Directions were given at once, for the supply of the 
 entire force with three days' rations, and several days 
 were spent in bringing Sherman's corps across the 
 river to Grand Gulf, and preparing for the march. 
 Supplies liad to l^e liauled sixty miles, from Milliken's 
 btnd to Hard Times, and then ferried across the river 
 and hauled eighteen miles further, to Hankinson's 
 ferry, or wherever else the army lay. Every hour 
 
ULYSSES S. GRA]NT. 223 
 
 now was invaluable. Grant's dispatches teem with 
 indications of the efforts tliat were made to save 
 time. 
 
 To Sherman, who had left Blair's division at ]\Iil- 
 likcn's bend, to guard that place, he wrote : " Order 
 forward immediately your remaining division, leaving 
 only two regiments (to guard Richmond), as required 
 in previous orders. Have all the men leave the west 
 bank of the river, with three days' rations in haver- 
 sacks, and make all possible dispatch to Grand Gulf" 
 In order that Blair might be brought forward, Hurl- 
 but, who was still at Memphis, was directed to order 
 four redments of his command to Milliken's bend, 
 " with the utmost dispatch." " Take them from the 
 troops most convenient to transportation." On the 
 5th, Grant also ordered Hurlbut to " send Lauman's 
 division to Milliken's bend, to be forwarded to this 
 ai-my with as little delay as practicable. . . . Let 
 them move by brigades, as fast as transportation can 
 be o-ot. . . . This order for Lauman's division is in 
 addition to the four regiments ordered a few days 
 since.'' 
 
 The commissary of subsistence at Grand Gulf was 
 instmcted: "You will load all teams presenting 
 themselves for rations with promptness and dispatch, 
 regardless of requisitions or provision returns. There 
 must be no delay on account of either lack of energy 
 or fonnality." To an officer of his staff, who had been 
 left at Grand Gulf to hurry up supplies and superin- 
 tend transportation, Grant wrote : '' See that the com- 
 missary at Grand Gulf loads all the wagons present- 
 ing themselves for stores, ^ith great promptness. Is- 
 sue any order in my name that may be necessary to 
 secure the greatest promptness in this respect. . . . 
 
224 inLITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Every day's delay is worth two thousand men to the 
 enemy." 
 
 To the same officer he said, on the 6th : " Send 
 me a report of about the number of rations on hand 
 and sent forward to Grand Gulf. Send also to McFeely 
 and Bingham,"' and remind them of the importance 
 of rushing forward rations with all dispatch. The 
 road to below Warrenton ought now to be completed. 
 If so, rations can be got over by that route very rap- 
 idly. . . . How many teams have been loaded with 
 rations and sent forward ? I want to know as near 
 as possible how we stand in every particular for sup- 
 plies. How many wagons bave you ferried over the 
 river ? How many are still to bring over ? What 
 teams have gone back for rations ? " 
 
 On the morning of tbe 3d, Admiral Porter had 
 started with a part of his fleet for tbe Ked river, to 
 cooperate with Banks, and left orders with Captain 
 Owens, the naval officer next in command, to obey 
 the directions of Grant. Accordingly, on the 5th, 
 Grant instructed Owens to "place his flag-ship in the 
 mouth of Black river, to watch any movement of the 
 enemy in that direction. Leave Captain Murphy's 
 vessel in front of Grand Gulf, to guard the stores and 
 to convoy any steamer that may require it. ... Send 
 the remaining iron-clads to the vicinity of Warrenton, 
 to watch the movements of the enemy there, and pre- 
 vent them fi'om sending troops across the I'iver to in- 
 terrupt our lines from Milliken's bend and Young's 
 l)oint." 
 
 On the 4tli, while the troops were resting on the 
 Big Black, waiting for Sherman and supplies, Grant 
 
 * The chief cominissary of subsistence and chief quart cnnastcr of 
 the commaiKl. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 225 
 
 said to McClernand : " There will be no general move- 
 ment of the troops before the cool of the evening, if 
 at all to-day. You can tlierefore collect for your 
 command such supplies as the country affords. Ke- 
 connoitre the Jackson road, and ascertain if the 
 enemy has retreated in that direction, and if so, 
 whether any considerable portion of them." And to 
 McPherson, on the same day : " I wish you would 
 have a reconnoissance made of the roads near the 
 river, np and down." These demonstrations were 
 made, partly, to induce the enemy to suppose that the 
 short route to Vicksburg was the one Grant now con- 
 templated taking. They reached to within six miles 
 of Vicksburg, on the west side of the Big Black 
 river, and it was believed that their object of conceal- 
 ing Grant's real intention was accomplished. Pem- 
 berton, at any rate, made no show of approaching on 
 the right, nor any attempt to get between Grant and 
 Jackson, much less to combine with the force cover- 
 ing that place. On the contrary, these movements 
 demonstrated that Bowen had retreated across the 
 Big Black at llankin son's ferry, and was now con- 
 centrating with the main portion of the enemy, at 
 Bovina station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson rail- 
 road. 
 
 Hurlbut was to remain at Memphis, and, on the 
 5th, Grant sent detailed instructions to govern him 
 during the campaign.* " You will have a large force 
 
 * " I am ordering to you all the cavalry at Helena except two regi- 
 ments. You can further strengthen your southern line by bringing 
 troops from the District of Columbus. The completion of the road 
 from Grand Junction to Corinth v,i\\ enable you to draw oflf all the 
 troops north of that road. Make such disposition of the troops within 
 your command as you may deem advisable for the best protection of 
 your lines of communication. When the road to Corinth is completed, 
 15 
 
226 MILITAEY IIISTOKY OF 
 
 of cavalry ; use it as mucli as possible in attracting 
 attention from tLis direction. Impress upon the cav- 
 alry tlie necessity of keeping out of people's houses, 
 or takincr what is of no use to them in a military 
 point of view ; " and, in conformity with the views 
 entertained by him, since Shiloh, he said : " They must 
 live as far as possible off the country through which 
 they pass, and destroy corn, wheat-crops, and every 
 thing that can be made use of by the enemy in pro- 
 longing the war. Mules and horses are to be taken 
 to supply all our own wants, and, when it does not 
 cause too much delay, agricultural implements may 
 be destroyed. In other words, cripple in every way, 
 without insulting women and children, or taking theii* 
 clothes, jewelry, etc." 
 
 While he was lying at Hankinson's feriy, the 
 horses and personal luggage of Grant and his staff 
 arrived at headquarters. Up to this time, he and his 
 officers had messed with any general near whose camp 
 they liappened to halt, riding borrowed horses, and 
 sleeping in the porches of houses on the road. When 
 he left Hard Times, Grant took no bas^srao-e with him 
 but a tooth-brush. 
 
 On the 6th, he informed Halleck : " Ferrying land 
 transportation and rations to Grand Gulf is de- 
 taining me on the Black rivei". I will move as soon 
 as three days' rations are secured, and send the 
 wagons back to the Gulf for more to follow. Infor- 
 mation from the other side leads me to believe the 
 
 put in there, as speedily as possible, sixty clays' supply of provisions and 
 forage. . . . Telegraph to General Halleck direct, the forces I have 
 drawn from you, and should rceuforcements be found necessary to hold 
 your district, let him know it. Whilst headquarters are so distant, 
 communicate direct with Washington in all important matters, but 
 keep mc advised at the same time of what is going on." 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 227 
 
 enemy are bringing forces from Tullalioma" (in Ten- 
 nessee). *' Should not Kosecrans at least make a dem- 
 onstration of advancing ? " The only answer to this 
 was the dispatch recalling Grant. 
 
 On the 6th, Grant ordered McPherson : " Move 
 one of your divisions to Rocky Springs to-morrow, 
 leaving the other to occupy from your present head- 
 quarters to the ferry. On the approach of Sherman's 
 advance, order up tlie second." Accordingly, at ten 
 A. M. on the 7th, McPherson's troops were again in 
 motion, Logan's division in the advance, followed 
 closely by Crocker. They marched to Rocky Springs, 
 about ten miles distant, where they remained in 
 camp till the 9th. On the 8th, Grant's headquarters 
 were removed to Rocky Springs. 
 
 After making his demonstration against Haine's 
 bluif, Sherman had left Blair's command at Milli- 
 ken's bend, and, on the morning of the 2d of May, 
 started witb Steele and Tuttle's divisions for Hard 
 Times. He reached there by noon of the 6th, crossed 
 the Mississippi during that night and the following 
 day, and, on the 8th, after filling his haversacks with 
 three days' rations, pushed on to the front, marching 
 from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry, eighteen 
 miles ; at the latter place, he relieved Crocker's divi- 
 sion, of McPherson's corps. 
 
 This day. Grant announced to Halleck : " Our ad- 
 vance is fifteen miles from Edward's station, on 
 Southern railroad.* All looks well. . . ." 
 
 One staff ofi&cer, Captain Bowers, had been left 
 at Milliken's bend, and to him Grant wrote on the 
 9th; "What I have A\-ished to impress upon the gen- 
 
 * This estimate was incorrect. 'Rocky Springs is full twenty-five 
 miles from Edward's station. 
 
228 MILITAEY niSTOEY OF 
 
 erals remaining upon tlie Louisiana side of the Mis- 
 sissippi is, that the wagon road from Milliken's bend 
 to Perkins's plantation should be shortened by every 
 practicable means, and that, when circumstances will 
 admit of it, it shall run from Young's point to a 
 point below "Warrenton. Meanwhile, all possible 
 exertions should be made to keep the ai-my supplied 
 by the present route. Hard bread, coffee, and salt 
 should be kept up anyhow, and then the other arti- 
 cles of the ration as they can be supplied." On this 
 point his anxiety was unabated, for it was of para- 
 mount importance ; and, on the same day, he informed 
 Captain Owens of the navy: "A road is now about 
 complete across the point from Young's point to be- 
 low the Warrenton batteries. This will shorten the 
 route over which supplies have to be drawn, to about 
 eight miles, and enable me to abandon the route 
 across to Richmond. I would request that you keep 
 the Tuscumbia at the depot below Warrenton ; keep 
 one of the other gunboats at Grand Gulf, and with 
 the other two, keerp the river clear between the two 
 points." 
 
 Sherman was still uneasy about the success of the 
 campaign. Tie did not, as yet, undei*stand that Grant 
 contemplated marching without any base at all, and 
 vn'ote to his superior from Haukinson's ferry, de- 
 scribing the confusion among troops and trains, and 
 urging him to " stop all troo2)s till youi* army is par- 
 tially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick 
 as possible. For this road will be jammed, as sure 
 as life, if you attempt to supply fifty thousand men 
 by one single road." To this. Grant replied : " I do 
 not calculate upon the possibility of suj^plying the 
 ai-my with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 220 
 
 will be impossible without constructing additional 
 roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what 
 rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and 
 make the country fiiruish the balance. We started 
 fi'om Bruinsburg with an average of about two day^ 
 rations, and received no more from our own supplies 
 for some days; abundance was found in the mean 
 time. Some corn-meal, bacon, and vegetables were 
 found, and an abundance of beef and mutton. A 
 delay would give the enemy time to reenforce and 
 fortify. If Blair was up now, I believe we could be 
 in Vicksburg in seven days. The command here lias 
 an average of about three days' rations^ ichich coxdd 
 he made to last that time!^ You are in a country 
 where the troops have already lived oif the people 
 for some days, and may find provisions more scarce ; 
 but, as we get upon new soil, they are more abun- 
 dant, particularly in com and cattle. Bring Blair's 
 two brigades up as soon as possible. . . ." 
 
 "V\Tien the march from Hankin son's ferry began ^ 
 McPherson's corps had the left, on the Rocky Springs 
 road, nearest Black river ; McClernand kept to the 
 right, and moved direct by the road from Willow 
 Springs, while Sherman followed with his corps di- 
 vided on the two roads, and closely guarding the fei'- 
 ries across the Big Black, against Pemberton. But, 
 at Rocky Springs, Grant heard that the rebels were 
 foi-tifS'ing and concentrating at Edward's station, 
 about twenty-five miles off, on the Vicksburg and 
 Jackson railroad, and he at once determined to 
 change the relative positions of the corps. It was 
 his intention now to hug the Black river as closely 
 as possible, with McClernand and Sherman's corps, 
 
 * These italics are not Grant's. 
 
230 MILirAEY IIISTOBY OF 
 
 and strike the railroad with them beyond Edward's 
 station, somewhere between that place and Bolton, 
 forty or fifty miles from Hankinson's ferry. Mean- 
 while, McPlierson was to move by way of Utica to 
 Kaymond, thirty-five miles from the ferry, and thence 
 into Jackson, twenty miles further, destroying the 
 railroad, telegraph, and public stores there ; he was 
 then to push west and rejoin the main force. By 
 these dispositions, Grant would avoid a battle with 
 the main rebel army on the ground selected by Pem- 
 berton; he could also protect McPherson in his east- 
 erly movement, and keep all his own troops within 
 supporting distance of each other, no matter on which 
 side they might be attacked ; while, at the same time, 
 he divided the enemy, interposing between Pember- 
 ton and the rebel forces at Jackson. 
 
 Sherman and McPherson understood this arrange- 
 ment ; the latter especially was aware that, if possi- 
 ble, he was to push on towards Jackson, though, of 
 course, not mthout express orders. These Grant 
 never gave in advance ; it was his custom always to 
 await the contingencies of a campaign. None of his 
 plans Avere so precise that he could not vaiy them ; 
 all allowed for the uncertain and unexpected move- 
 ments of the enemy. After the great features of a 
 campaign, or the principal object of a battle \vas 
 indicated, and the position of troops at the outset 
 determined, he contented himself beforehand with 
 giving orders for the earliest movements ; always 
 expecting to be governed afterwards by the emer- 
 gencies that were sure to arise. Many of his most 
 notable successes were ins])ired at the moment, like 
 the advance of Smith, at Donelson, or the move to 
 the interior, in the Yicksburg campaign. Yet these 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 231 
 
 sudden and unforeseen determinations tended essen- 
 tially to tlie consummation of objects long before and 
 patiently souglit. So, now, McPlierson only knew 
 tliat it was probable lie should go to Jackson, and 
 McClernand was not informed of this intention at 
 all ; Grant feared to intrust McClernand with an in- 
 dependent expedition, wliicli the movement against 
 Jackson seemed likely to prove ; and therefore put 
 him on the left. McClernand was sure always to 
 claim the most important position or command, but 
 as he was now really nearer the great bulk of the 
 rebel army, he had no reason to complain, supposing 
 himself to be in the advance. 
 
 McPherson marched, accordingly, on the 9th of 
 May, to a point seven miles west of Utica, and Mc- 
 Clernand to the Big Sandy river. That evening, 
 McPhei-son was directed : " March your command to- 
 morrow to water beyond Utica, provided you find it 
 within six or seven miles of the place, on the direct 
 Raymond road." The only regiment of cavalry in 
 the command was now given to McPherson, and, by 
 Grant's orders, it reconnoitred vigorously on the right 
 flank and fi'ont of the Seventeenth corps. The same 
 day (May 9th), McClernand was ordered : " Move 
 your command to-morrow, on the telegraph road, to 
 ri\'e-mile creek. Instructions have been given to 
 Generals Sherman and McPherson to move so as to 
 continue on the same general front with you. Have 
 all the lateral roads leading from your line of march 
 carefully examined, to facilitate communication with 
 the other corps in case of necessity." All the move- 
 ments, thus far, were preliminary merely, or of the 
 nature of developments, the necessary supplies and 
 ammunition for the march not having yet ariived. 
 
232 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 On the 10th, liowever, the headquarters were re- 
 moved to Cayuga, eight miles beyond Rocky Springs, 
 and, in accordance with the plan already described, 
 McPherson moved to the north and east of the rest 
 of the ai-my ; Sherman had the centre, while McCler- 
 nand, further west, kept one division as far to the left 
 as the Big Black river, and, in his turn, was ordered 
 to watch the ferries, and thus secure the rear against 
 Pemberton. Grant's position now w^as with the cen- 
 tre, Sherman's corps. He had at this time about 
 forty-three thousand men in motion, besides an ar- 
 tillery force of one hundred and twenty guns; but 
 these numbers include Blair's division, as well as Mc- 
 Arthur's, of the Seventeenth corps, neither of which 
 had yet crossed the river. The column absolutely in 
 march on the east side of the Mississippi, on the 10th 
 of ^lay, did not number more than thirty-five thou- 
 sand men, and twenty light batteries.* 
 
 "When I crossed tlie Mississippi river," said 
 Grant, "the means of ferriage were so limited, and 
 time so important, that I started without teams, and 
 an average of two days' rations in the haversacks. . . . 
 We picked up all the teams in the country, and free 
 Africans to drive them. Forasce and meat were found 
 
 * There were not more than sixteen thousand men in any one of 
 tlie thri'C corps at any time during the campaign, even if the whole 
 force had comeuj); but Bhiir's division of Sherman's command did 
 not reach the army until after the capture of Jackson, on the 14th of 
 May ; while, of McArthur's division in the Seventeenth corps, one bri- 
 gade only had arrived, at the battle of Champion's Hill, on the 16th; 
 another joined the conuuand about the time of the battle at Black 
 River bridge, on the 17th ; and the third brigade did not get up at all, 
 until the siege of Vicksburg. Besides these subtractions, McClernand's 
 command was reduced, after the battle of Port Gibson, by casualties} 
 sickness, and other contingencies, to fifteen thousand men, so that the 
 estimate in the text is not too small. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAISTT. 233 
 
 in jrreat abundance tlirouirli the countrv." AATiat Lis 
 expectations were at this time, may be gathered from 
 a dispatch to Sullivan : " Keep all prisoners sent to 
 Milliken's bend until further orders. If they are sent 
 north, the}' will be sent east for exchange. I prefer 
 keeping them where they are, until the fate of Vicks- 
 hurg is decided, and then iJaroling them.^'' 
 
 On the 10th of May, Grant heard again from 
 Banks, who was now earnestly demanding reenforce- 
 ments on the Red river. But Grant wrote at once 
 to that commander, explaining the situation in rear 
 of Vicksburg. "My advance will occupy to-day 
 Utica, Auburn, and a point equally advanced towards 
 the Southern Mississippi railroad, between the latter 
 place and the Big Black.* It was my intention, on 
 gaining a foothold at Grand Gulf, to have sent a suffi- 
 cient force to Port Hudson to have insured the fall 
 of that place with your cooperation, or rather to have 
 cooperated with you to secure that end." He then 
 set forth the reasons for the change in his plaus,f and 
 
 * On the 10th, Grant said to McCIernand, from Cayuga: "My head- 
 quarters will remain here to-night, and be removed to Auburn in 
 the morning. You need not move to-morrow, except to better your 
 I^osition on Five-mile creek." To McPherson, he wrote : " General 
 McCIernand is now on Five-mile creek, on the Telegraph road to 
 Edward's station. He is directed to move no farther to-morrow, but 
 to reconnoitre the road to Fourteen-mile creek. Sherman will not get 
 much past this place to-night. In the morning, he will move forward 
 to Auburn, and if he meets with no resistance, will throw his advance 
 forward to Fourteen-mile creek, on the Raymond road. Move your 
 command forward also, so as to occupy something near the same east 
 and west line with the other army corps. Let me know what point 
 you move to. Send your cavalry out to watch the enemy as far to the 
 southeast as you can." These orders were obeyed. 
 
 t " Meeting the enemy as I did below Port Gibson, however, I fol- 
 lowed him to the Big Black, and could not afford to retrace my steps. 
 I also learned, and believe the information to be reliable, that Port 
 
234 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 concluded : " I would urgently request, therefore, that 
 you join me, or send all the force you can spare, to 
 cooperate in the great struggle for opening the Mis- 
 sissippi river." 
 
 On the 11th of May, Grant finally wrote to Hal- 
 leck, from Cayuga : " My forces will be this evening 
 as far advanced towards Jackson as Fourteen-mile 
 creek, the left near Black river, and extending in a 
 line as nearly east and west as they can get without 
 brino-insr on a battle. As I shall communicate with 
 Grand Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to 
 send a train with heavy escort, you may not hear 
 from me again for several days." Singularly enough, 
 this was the date of Halleck's dispatch to Grant, to 
 return and cooj)erate with Banks. While the gen- 
 eral-in-chief, at Washington, w^as issuing his orders 
 forbidding the campaign, Grant, of course in igno- 
 rance of these commands, sent word to his superior: 
 " I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more." 
 
 On the same day, he ordered McPherson, who was 
 now beyond Utica: "Move your command to-night 
 to the next cross-roads, if there is water, and to-mor- 
 row, with all activity, into Raymond. . . . We must 
 fight the enemy before our rations fail, and we are 
 equally bound to make our rations last as long as 
 possible. Upon one occasion you made two days' 
 rations last seven. We may have to do the same 
 thing again. . . . Sherman is now moving out on the 
 Auburn and Raymond road, and will reach Fourteen- 
 mile creek to-night. When you arrive at Raymond, 
 
 Hudson is almost entirely evacuated. This may not be true, but it ia 
 the concurrent testimony of deserters and contrabands. Many days 
 cannot elapse before the battle will begin, which is to decide the fate 
 of Vicksburg, but it is impossible to predict how long it laay last. I 
 would urgently request, therefore," etc. 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 235 
 
 lie will be in close supporting distance. I sliall move 
 McClernand to Fourteen-mile creek, early to-mon'ow, 
 so that lie will occupy a place on Slierman's left." * . . . 
 Accordingly, on the 12th, at three and a half a. m., 
 Logan's division moved towards Raymond, followed 
 by Crocker, at four. The rebel videttes showed them- 
 selves fi-equently soon after the march began, and 
 three miles out, McPherson ordered two regiments to 
 be deployed on each side of the road, Avith skirmish- 
 ers in advance ; these were followed by the remainder 
 of the column, the cavalry being called in and placed 
 on the flanks. At eleven o'clock, McPherson came 
 upon the enemy, about five thousand strong, within 
 two miles of Eaymond. This body was a part of the 
 I'eenforcements from Poii; Hudson, and under the 
 
 * Tlie following instructions were also sent on tlie 11th, to Sherman : 
 " It will be necessary to guard Hall's ferry with a regiment of infantry 
 and a company of cavalry, until our positions are fully taken, after 
 which cavalry alone can watch the rear. McClernand is directed to 
 guard Baldwin's ferry. I will direct Tuttle to send a regiment for this 
 duty, so that you need not make any further detail until you want his 
 relieved by some other troops." And at fifteen minutes past eight 
 r. M. : " McClernand is ordered to move up by the Telegraph road, also 
 a road to the left of that, to Fourteen-mile creek, starting at day- 
 light. McPherson is ordered to move on to Raymond. I will go 
 forward to-morrow, probably as far as Raymond, and return in tho 
 evening to near Fourteen-mile creek for headquarters." 
 
 At the same hour, Grant wrote to McClernand : " In accordance 
 with my verbal instructions this afternoon, you will move your com- 
 mand at daylight to-morrow, on the Auburn and Edward's station 
 road, and if practicable, a part of one division by the road to the 
 westward of the one just mentioned. Move cautiously, but rapidly as 
 convenient, and so that your entire corps will arrive on the Fourteen- 
 mile creek simultaneously and in a comi^act line. It is also important 
 that your corps reach the creek at or about the time that Sherman 
 does, he having to move only about seven miles. I shall pass to the 
 front early to-morrow, and go to Raymond if I can, from that place. 
 I shall return on the road to a convenient point for headquarters in 
 the vicinity of Fourteen-mile creek." 
 
236 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 command of Gregg. It was judiciously posted, with 
 two batteries of artillery so placed as to sweep the 
 road, as well as a Lridc-e which McPherson had to 
 cross. The greater portion of the rebel infantry was 
 posted on a hill to the left of the road, and in the 
 timber and ravines in front of the hill. The fig-ht for 
 RajTiiond, it was evident, must take place here. 
 
 Orders were immediately sent back to move all 
 trains out of the road, and for the remainder of Lo- 
 gan's division to advance as rapidly as possible, fol- 
 lowed by Crocker, who was to form the reserve. 
 Both sides of the road were occupied, and at two p. m. 
 the whole line Avas ordered forward. Scarcely had 
 the advance begun, when the battle opened vigor- 
 ously on the centre and left centre, where, under 
 cover of woods and ravines, the rebels had massed a 
 large portion of their force. McPherson, however, 
 outnumbered Gregg by two to one, and before Crock- 
 er's division had reached the field, the enemy was 
 beaten, and in full retreat towards Raymond. A 
 battery of artillery was moved to an open space on 
 the right, and played vigorously on the rebel flanks 
 during their retreat. They made one attempt to 
 charge and capture this battery, but were met with a 
 fire of grape and canister, under which they speedily 
 broke and fled from the field. 
 
 Pursuit was made at once, and Raymond was en- 
 tered by the national troops at five p. m., the rebels 
 liaving passed through, without stopping, on the 
 Mississippi Sj^rings road, towards Jackson. The 
 rough and impracticable nature of the country, filled 
 with ravines and a dense undergro^^iih, prevented 
 very rai)id pursuit, and McPherson followed no fur- 
 ther than Raymond. In this short but spirited en- 
 
ULYSSES S. GEAJS-T. 237 
 
 gagement he lost sixty-nine men killed, three hun- 
 dred and foi-ty-one wounded, and thii'ty missing. 
 The enemy's loss was one hundred killed, and three 
 hundred and five wounded, besides four hundred and 
 fifteen prisoners; two pieces of cannon were disabled 
 and. a quantity of small-arms fell into McPherson's 
 hands. Many rebels threw down their arms and 
 deserted. 
 
 Pemberton had been completely deceived by 
 Grant's manoeuvres ; supposing the object of the lat- 
 ter to be Edward's station, he remained at that 
 place with the bulk of his force, awaiting an attack, 
 and sent word to Gregg to strike the national forces 
 in flank and rear, as soon as they became engaged.* 
 Reenforcements under Walker were also ordered up 
 from Jackson to the suppoi-t of Gregg. But Grant, 
 instead of assaulting the main rebel force concentrat- 
 ing to meet him on his left, pushed out with his right 
 under McPherson, and destroyed the opposition at 
 Raymond, where he met only a detachment of the 
 enemy. He thus completely opened the road to 
 Jackson, avoided a battle where he did not care to 
 fight, in order to fight where the enemy was unpre- 
 pared, and, for the second time since the campaign 
 
 * " On the 12th, the following was addressed to Major-General Ste- 
 venson : ' From information received it is evident that the enemy is 
 advancing in force on Edward's depot and Big Black bridge. . . . 
 You must move up your whole division to the support of Loring and 
 Boweu at the bridge.' ... In consequence of this information Briga- 
 dier-General Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was 
 engaged at Edward's or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear 
 or flank at any moment." — Femlertoii'a Report. 
 
 Pemberton also sent telegrams, on the 12th, to Johnston and ]Hr. Jef- 
 ferson Davis, announcing: "The enemy is apparently moving his heavy 
 force towards Edward's depot on Southern railroad. With my limited 
 force I will do all I can to meet him. That will he the lattle-^lacej''' 
 
238 MILIT ART HISTORY OF 
 
 bad begun, divided the rebels and beat them in de- 
 tail. 
 
 During tliis engagement Grant in person was with 
 Sherman, who had gained the crossing at Fourteen- 
 mile creek, after slight skirmishing, the enemy first 
 destro}nng the bridges. McClernand was west of 
 Sherman, on the Telegraph road, with three divisions, 
 one Ijeing thro^vn around by Baldwin's ferry. At 
 forty-five minutes past ten a. m., Grant sent word to 
 McPherson, from Fourteen-mile creek, announcing 
 the situation there, and said : " If you have gained 
 Raymond, throw back forces in this direction, until 
 communication is opened with Sherman. Also feel 
 to tLe north towards the railroad, and, if possible, 
 destroy it and the telegraph. If the road is opened, 
 I will ride over to see you this evening, but I cannot 
 do so until I know McClernand is secure in his posi- 
 tion." To McClernand, he said : " Sherman wiU prob- 
 ably succeed in following out original intentions of 
 going in advance of this place (Fourteeitmile creek) 
 to the cross-roads. Gain the creek with your com- 
 mand, if possible, and hold it, with at least one divi- 
 sion throvv^n across. Reconnoitre the roads in ad- 
 vance, and also in this direction, so as to open com- 
 munication with General Sherman and myself. If 
 bridges are destroyed, make fords." 
 
 The marching over this rugged country was hard, 
 and the troops were obliged to forage on the road.* 
 They seized all the flour-mills, grinding whatever 
 
 * " Durin£T these thirteen days" (up to May 12th), " my corps sub- 
 sisted on six days' rations, and what scanty supplies the country in the 
 immediate vicinity of the route afforded; were wholly without tents 
 and reprular trains, and almost without cooking utensils, yet they were 
 cheerful and prompt in the discharge of d\xtj."—MeCleniand'a B&- 
 
ULYSSES S. GTIANT. 239 
 
 corn was found in store-liouses. Tlie ambulances 
 were used as ammunition wagons. 
 
 Later on tlie 12tli, Grant said to McClemand, 
 from Dillon's plantation: "Edward's station is evi- 
 dently tlie point on the railroad the enemy have most 
 prepared for receiving us ; I therefore ^^'ant to keep 
 up appearances of moving upon that place, but want 
 to get possession of less guarded points first. You 
 will then move to-morrow, to keep up this appear- 
 ance, a short distance only from where you now are, 
 with the three advanced di\dsions, leaving the fourth, 
 or Smith's, in about its present position." McCler- 
 nand had some skinnishing before he was able to 
 cross Fourteen-mile creek. But, on the evening of 
 the 12th of May, the Army of the Tennessee occupied 
 a line almost parallel with the Vicksbui'g and Jack- 
 son railroad, and about seven miles south of it. Mc- 
 Pherson was on the right, at Raymond; Sherman 
 seven miles to the west, at Dillon's plantation ; and 
 McClernand, four miles to the left, at Montgomery 
 brido-e, on Fourteen-mile creek, with a detachment 
 guarding Baldmn's feriy. Grant's headquarters were 
 at Dillon's. 
 
 The rebels retreated direct through Raymond to 
 Jackson, where Johnston next day took command, 
 having just amved in the state from Tullahoma, 
 Tennessee. He was still expecting reenforcements 
 from the south and east, of which Grant was fully 
 aware. It was necessary, indeed, for the enemy to 
 collect his forces at once, or the control of the Missis- 
 sippi river was forever gone. 
 
 The battle of Raymond, and the flight of the 
 rebels to Jackson, confirmed Grant in the idea that a 
 strong hostile force was on his right flank, and he at 
 
240 MELITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 once determined to move his entire army in that di- 
 rection, deflecting McClernand and Sherman from the 
 course he had previously ordered them to pui'sue. 
 McPherson alone might not have been able to dis- 
 lodge Johnston from Jackson, which was strongly 
 foi-tified ; and the destruction of that place as a rail- 
 road centre was absolutely necessary, in order to de- 
 prive the rebels of its use in concentrating a force to 
 interfere with Grant's future operations. He there- 
 fore determined to make sure of Jackson, and leave 
 no enemy in his rear. 
 
 At a quarter past nine, on the evening of the 
 12th, he directed McPherson to " move on to Clinton 
 and Jackson, at daylight in the morning." Sherman's 
 orders were changed at the same hour : " After the 
 severe fight of to-day at Raymond, and repulse of the 
 enemy towards Clinton and Jackson, I have deter- 
 mined to move on the latter place, by way of Clin- 
 ton, and take the capital of the state, and work from 
 there westward. McPherson is ordered to march at 
 da}light to Clinton. You will march at four a. m. 
 in the morning, and follow McPherson. McClernand 
 will follow you with three divisions, and send his 
 fourth back to Old Auburn, to await the arrival of 
 trains now on the road, and Blaii''s division to con- 
 duct them to the army." Instructions conformable 
 to this dispatch were sent at once to McClernand: 
 " Start with three of your divisions as soon as pos- 
 siljle, by the road north of Fourteen-mile creek, to 
 this place " (Dillon's), " and on to Raymond." It was 
 fortunate that Grant acted with such promptness, for, 
 on the night of the 13th, Johnston arrived at Jack- 
 eon, and took supreme command of all the rebel 
 forces in the state ; and he was a man of far more 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 241 
 
 genius aud energy tlian liis subordinate. A^Tien 
 Johnston reached Jackson, he found a force there, re- 
 ported at six thousand men, pai-t of which had been 
 driven from Raymond the day before ; Maxcy, with 
 a brigade from the south, was expected on the 14th, 
 as well as other reenforcements under Gist, so that 
 Johnston estimated his whole available force would 
 amount to eleven thousand men. In addition to 
 these, twelve thousand or thirteen thousand more 
 were on the road to join him from the east; for he 
 had urged the rebel government to make every ef 
 fort, if they hoped to retain Vicksburg and the com- 
 mand of the Mississippi. 
 
 Ascertaining, on the 13th, the approach of the na- 
 tional anny, Johnston that night ordered Pemberton, 
 who was now at Edward's station,* with all his force 
 except the garrison of Vicksburg, to come up in the 
 rear of Grant, and attack him at once at Clinton.f 
 Johnston's hope, undoubtedly, was to detain his an- 
 ta2:onist in front of Jackson until the reenforcements 
 from the south and east could arrive, and then to 
 unite with Pemberton and his whole force in an at- 
 tack both in front and rear of Grant. But the move- 
 ments of the national commander were not coopera- 
 tive with those of the enemy. 
 
 On the 13th, in obedience to orders, McPherson 
 moved cautiously but rapidly towards Clinton, for it 
 
 * Pemberton did not arrive in person at Edward's till the 14tb, 
 but his troops were there the day before. 
 
 t " I have lately arrived, aud learn that Major-General Sherman is 
 between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is- important to reestab- 
 lish communications, that you may be reenforced. If practicable, 
 come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of 
 immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be 
 brought. Time is all-important." — Johnston to Pemberton, May I'dth. 
 16 
 
242 MILITAEY niSTOEY OF 
 
 was important to deprive the rebels as speedily as 
 possible of the use of the railroad. He reached the 
 town by two o'clock in the afternoon, without oppo- 
 sition, and at once set about tearing up railroad track 
 and ties, bending the iron, burning bridges, and de- 
 stroying culverts and telegraph poles and wires. Im- 
 portant dispatches from Pemberton to Gregg were 
 also captured at this time, from which it was evi- 
 dent that Pemberton still expected an attack at Ed- 
 ward's station, and was remaining on the defensive 
 there. 
 
 Sherman had arrived at Raymond before McPher- 
 son left the town, and Grant immediately ordered 
 him to take the direct or southern road to Jackson. 
 By night, he had reached a position near Mississippi 
 Spiiugs, and parallel with McPherson's corps. During 
 this day, McClernand withdrew from his position near 
 Edward's station, where his pickets had been within 
 two miles of Pemberton's army. One division of the 
 Thirteenth corps was drawn up in line of battle ; and, 
 behind this cover the remainder of the command re- 
 tired without embarrassment, the enemy discover- 
 ing the movement too late to interfere ; McClernand's 
 troops then marched to a point near Rajmiond, where 
 they were in a position to cooperate ^^dth either of 
 the two corps in the advance ; one division lay at the 
 point of divergence between Sherman and McPher- 
 son's commands, and the remainder of the corps was 
 left in Raymond, or still further to the rear. Clinton 
 is only ten or twelve miles from Raymond, so tliat 
 the entire command was now well in hand. Grant 
 remained that night in Raymond, equally near to 
 either corps. It was at this time that Johnston sent 
 his order to Pemberton to attack tlie national forces, 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 243 
 
 supposing Sherman to he alone at Clinton, unsup- 
 ported by any other portion of Grant's command. 
 
 Durino- the evening, MePherson was ordered to 
 " move at early dawn upon Jackson," ten miles from 
 Clinton, and Sherman also to "move directly tow- 
 ards Jackson, starting at early dawn in the morning." 
 At thirty minutes past seven. Grant directed McCler- 
 nand: "Move one division of your corps through 
 this place" (Raymond) "to Clinton, charging it with 
 destroying the railroad as far as possible to a point 
 on the direct Raymond and Jackson road. Move 
 another division three or four miles beyond Missis- 
 sippi Springs, and eight or nine miles from this place, 
 and a third to Raymond, ready to support either of 
 the others. Also, direct your thirty-pound siege- 
 guns to follow close behind the advance guard of 
 the division which takes post beyond Mississippi 
 Springs, on the main Jackson road. You will begin 
 your movements at four a. m. to-morrow." 
 
 Early on the morning of the 14th, Grant sent word 
 to Halleck : " I will attack the state capital to-day." 
 A coui'ier carried the message to Grand Gulf, through 
 a country unprotected by national troops. This was 
 the first report Grant had made since severing com- 
 munication with the government.* 
 
 Sherman and MePherson communicated before 
 morning, so as to arrive at Jackson at the same hour ; 
 
 * " Ratmoxd, 3faij 14^^.— MePherson took this place on the 12th, 
 after a brisk fight of more than two hours. Our loss fifty-one killed, 
 and one hundred and eighty wounded ; enemy's loss seventy-five killed, 
 and buried by us. One hundred and eighty-six prisoners, besides 
 wounded. MePherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jack- 
 son road, and MeClemand bringing up the rear. I will attack the 
 state capital to-day." The losses were larger on both sides than Grant 
 was aware of when this dispatch was written. 
 
244 jnLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 and tbeir combined forces moved at daylight. The 
 rain had fallen in torrents during the night, making the 
 roads at first slippery, and then miry; but the troops 
 marched in excellent order, without straggling, and in 
 the best of spirits. At nine o'clock, the pickets of 
 Crocker's division, which had the advance of Mc- 
 Pherson's corps, engaged the enemy, about five miles 
 out from Jackson. The rebel outposts were speedily 
 driven in, and Crocker pushed on till within two and 
 a half miles of the city, where the enemy was found 
 in position, outside of the defences, and under the 
 command of Johnston. This force was composed of 
 the troops that had been driven from Ra}inond two 
 days before, as well as the garrison of Jackson. Be- 
 sides these, reenforcements from South Carolina and 
 Georgia regiments amving in the night, had been 
 immediately marched out and put into position at 
 the rebel front.* Reconnoissances were made at once, 
 and artillery brought up to reply to the rebel guns, 
 which had already opened on the national advance. 
 
 McPherson now had the left, on the Clinton road, 
 and Sherman was deployed to the right, on the south 
 and south^vest of Jackson, where he met a small force 
 of infantiy and artilleiy at about the same distance 
 from the city as the troops in McPherson's front. 
 There was a gap of nearly two miles between the 
 Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps, but Grant had esti- 
 mated the rebel strength, and calculated that either 
 part of liis command was more than a match for 
 Johnston's entire force, in case the enemy assumed 
 tlie offensive ; he made no effort, therefore, to connect 
 the ^^■ings, thinking it more important to hold the 
 
 * I state this on the authority of McPherson. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 245 
 
 soutliern road, and prevent the escape of the gar- 
 rison in that direction. 
 
 In conformity with his orders, McClernand now 
 occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Si:)ring3 
 with another, and Raymond with a third ; his fourth 
 division was at Auburn. Blair's division, of Sher- 
 man's corps, had come up witli a wagon-train from 
 Grand Gulf, and was also at New Auburn ; * while 
 McArthur, with one brisrade of his division of Mc- 
 Pherson's corps, had also arrived from the river, and 
 was moving towards Raymond, on the Utica road. 
 These forces were all held in reserve: it was not 
 Grant's intention to move them any nearer to Jack- 
 son, but simply to have them within supporting dis- 
 tance, if the resistance at that place should prove 
 more obstinate than there seemed reason to antici- 
 pate. 
 
 "^^^lile dispositions for the attack were making 
 at the front, a very heavy shower set in, which de- 
 ferred the battle for an hour and a half; the rain 
 coming down in such torrents that tliere was great 
 danger of the ammunition being spoiled, if the men 
 opened their cartridge-boxes. The time, however, 
 was well employed, putting the troops in position ; 
 and McPherson brought up Logan's division as a re- 
 serve. The enemy in McPherson's front occupied a 
 a semicircular rids-e stretchinor across the main Clin- 
 ton road, his right holding a piece of woods, and his 
 centre and left commanding a rolling ground in front, 
 over which it was necessary for McPherson to pass, in 
 order to make an assault. Two rebel batteiies were 
 
 * Blair started from Grand Gulf on the 12th of :\ray, and guarded 
 a train of two hundred wagons, the only supplies that Grant received, 
 after cutting loose from his base, during this campaign. 
 
246 5IIL1TARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 also in position, one covering the road, and the other 
 having a good range across the open field. The na- 
 tional troops were deployed on both sides of the 
 road, in the timber, and in the open field ; and Ste- 
 venson's brio-ade of Loo-an's division was thi'own 
 across a ravine, to the extreme left, with orders to ad- 
 vance and gain a road which enters the city from the 
 northwest. 
 
 At eleven o'clock, the rain having partially ceased, 
 McPherson ordered an advance, preceded by a heavy 
 line of skirmishers, which soon became warmly en- 
 gaged. These drove the pickets of the enemy back 
 towards his main line, and into a ravine filled with 
 willows. Here the national skirjnishers halted for a 
 few moments, when the rebel fire becoming heavy, 
 they were recalled to their regiments, and a charge 
 was ordered. Crocker's whole line at once swept 
 forward with cheers, and in perfect order, drove the 
 enemy out of the ravine, and charged gallantly up 
 the hill.'^ The rebels did not wait to receive the full 
 force of the assault, but broke and fled precipitately, 
 behind their Avorks. 
 
 McPherson followed for a mile and a half, till he 
 came within range of the artillery of the defences 
 of Jackson. Here he wheeled two batteries into 
 tlie first advantageous position, and opened a well- 
 directed and effective fire on the retreating enemy. 
 When the troops reached this point, they were halted, 
 and the line was re-formed, havins^ become somewhat 
 broken in marching over the uneven ground. Skir- 
 mishers wei'c immediately thi'own out, and oflicers 
 
 * I have often licard General Grant say, tliat except Sherman 
 and Sheridan, he never knew a better division commander than 
 Crocker. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 247 
 
 sent forward to reconnoitre tlie enemy's position and 
 defences. 
 
 In tliese operations, McPLerson had occupied 
 nearly three hoiu-s; and Sherman, meanwhile, ad- 
 vancing on the Mississippi Springs road, had forced a 
 rebel battery from its position, where it commanded 
 the road, as well as a bridge and stream over which 
 he was obliged to pass. A determined advance of 
 his skirmishers soon drove the small infantry force in 
 his front into a skirt of woods, in front of the in- 
 trenchments at Jackson. Tuttle's division followed, 
 and the enemy took refuge behind his rifle-pits, not 
 attempting to destroy the bridge. The Fifteenth 
 corps at once emerged from the woods, and occupied 
 the ground beyond the stream, and on both sides of 
 the road. In front, and as far to the left as could be 
 seen, appeared a line of intrenchments; and the en- 
 emy kept up a brisk fire of artillery from the points 
 enfiLadino- Sherman's road. 
 
 Grant had been with Sherman all the morning, 
 and finding the obstacles important, he now ordered 
 that commander to send a force to the extreme right, 
 as f'dv as the Pearl river, and reconnoitre the flanks 
 of this line of intrenchments. The party not returning 
 promptly, and Sherman being still detained. Grant 
 rode to the right himself, escorted only by his staff, 
 and found a clear road into Jackson. The enemy 
 had evacuated the town, and Grant, with his party 
 of about a dozen oflicers, was the first to enter the 
 works. His son, a lad of thirteen years, accompanied 
 liim on this campaign, and as they rode up to the 
 limits of the town, the boy spurred on his horse, and 
 galloped, ahead of the army, into the capital of Mis- 
 sissippi. 
 
248 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 
 
 The detacliment sent to the right by Sherman 
 soon discovered the weakness of the enemy ; and their 
 appearance caused the rebels to retire from that part 
 of the line. Tuttle's troops at once advanced to the 
 rear of the guns which had been playing on them 
 in front, caj^turing ten pieces of artillery, together 
 with all the gunners, a hundred and fifty in number ; 
 and the Fifteenth corps advanced into Jackson. At 
 about the same time, McPherson also learned that 
 the rebels had abandoned the place, and his troops 
 moved forward inside the defences simultaneously 
 with those of Sherman. Crocker captured seven 
 guns, which the enemy in his haste had neither in- 
 jured nor attempted to withdraw. By three o'clock, 
 the two corps were in possession of Jackson. Crock- 
 er's troops raised the national flag over the capi- 
 tol. 
 
 It was now apparent that McPherson had en- 
 gaged the bulk of Johnston's command, without fur- 
 ther aid than the moral support afforded by the ene- 
 my's knowledge of Sherman's presence on the south 
 side of the works. Only a small infiintry and artil- 
 lery force had been stationed to impede Sherman's 
 progress ; but, as has been seen, it was impossible to 
 ascertain the strength of the enemy, at this part of 
 the line, in time to justify an immediate assault. 
 WJicn the troops in McPherson's front were di-iven 
 in, those opposing Sherman of course retired; a few 
 of the ai-tillerists, however, remained in position till 
 the last moment, evidently instructed to delay the 
 advance as long as possible, and expecting, no doubt, 
 CO be captured in the end. It was these that Tuttle 
 had taken prisoners. AVhile this show of opposition 
 was iH'ini; made in Sherman's front, McPherson was 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 249 
 
 held long enougli for tlie main body of the enemy to 
 escape by the Canton road, on the northern side of 
 the town, by which alone Johnston could effect a 
 junction with Pemberton. McPherson immediately 
 dispatched Stevenson's brigade to cut off the retreat, 
 but the troops arrived too late, and the rebels re- 
 ceived no further injury. McPherson considered 
 Stevenson's delay unnecessary, and blamed his sub- 
 ordinate. 
 
 The rapidity of the march from Raymond, how- 
 ever, had frustrated Johnston's plans ; he was unable 
 to hold Grant until the rebel reenforcements could 
 come up from the east ; and the same celerity also 
 took Grant out of the reach of Pemberton, who had 
 been ordered to attack his rear. The visjor of Mc- 
 Pherson's assault had been such that Johnston was 
 unable to save his artillery. Seventeen cannon fell 
 into the hands of the victor. In this battle, McPher- 
 son lost thirty-seven men killed, and two hundred 
 and twenty-eight wounded. He reported the ene- 
 my's loss at eight hundred and forty-five, in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners.* Sherman was but lightly 
 eno-ao-ed; his loss was four killed and twentv-one 
 wounded. 
 
 That night Grant slept in the house occupied by 
 Johnston the night before. There was proof that 
 the rebel party had been a gay one ; probably anti- 
 cipating the destruction of their enemy on the mor- 
 row. 
 
 Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 Grant sent for his corps commanders, and gave them 
 their orders at the state-house. McPherson was to 
 
 * Johnston's ofScial report contains no statement of kis losses at 
 Jackson. 
 
250 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 encamp one division inside the iutrencliments, and 
 tlie other between the battle-field and the city. 
 Sherman was directed to occupy the line of rifle-pits 
 at once, and, on the following day, to destroy eftect- 
 ually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and 
 all the propei-ty belonging to the enemy * He set 
 about his work in the morning, and utterly destroyed 
 the railroads in every direction, north, east, south, 
 and west, for a distance in all, of twenty miles. All 
 the bridges, factories, and arsenals were burned, and 
 whatever could be of use to the rebels, destroyed.f 
 The importance of Jackson, as a railroad centre and 
 a depot of stores and military factories, was annihi- 
 lated, and the principal object of its captui'e attained. 
 A hotel and a churck in Jackson were burned with- 
 out orders, and there was some pillaging by the sol- 
 diers, ^vllich their officers sought in every way to re- 
 st rain. J 
 
 * " Designate a brigade from your command to guard the city. 
 Collect stores and forage, and collect all public property of the enemy. 
 The division from which such brigade may be selected will be the last 
 to leave the city. You will direct them, therefore, to commence im- 
 mediately the effectual destruction of the river railroad bridge, and 
 the road as far east as practicable, as well as north and south. The 
 Fourth Iowa cavalry and a brigade of iufimtry should be sent east of 
 the river, with instructions for the cavalry to go on east as far as possi- 
 ble. Troops going east of the river should burn all C. S. A. cotton and 
 stores they find." 
 
 t The owners of a valuable cotton factory protested against its 
 destruction, on the ground that many females and poor families were 
 employed in the workshojis; but Sherman decided that the machinery 
 could so easily be converted to hostile purposes, that the buildings 
 must be burned. He offered, however, to take the poor back to the 
 Mississippi, and feed them there, till they could find employment or 
 seek refuge elsewhere, 
 
 I The hotel was called the Confederate Ilotel, and the men who 
 l)unicd it had been led prisoners through the streets of Jackson some 
 months before. The cattle-cars on which prisoners were transported 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 251 
 
 On tlie 14tli, Jolinston marclied six miles on the 
 Canton road, and tlien went into camp. He sent 
 Gist forty or fifty miles to tlie east, and ordered 
 Maxcy to " return to liis wagons and provide for tlie 
 security of his brigade, for instance, by joining Gist." 
 It was hoped thus to prevent Grant from drawing 
 supplies from the nortli and east.* From his new 
 camp, Johnston also sent dispatches to Pemberton, 
 announcino; the loss of Jackson, and said : " As soon 
 as tlie reenforcements are all up, tliey must be nnited 
 to tlie rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force 
 assembled tliat may be able to inflict a heavy blow 
 upon the enemy." In the same dispatch, he inquired 
 if Grant could " supply himself from the Mississippi. 
 Can you not cut liim off from it, and above all, 
 should he be compelled to fall back for want of sup- 
 plies, beat him?" It had not occurred to either 
 Johnston or Pemberton that Grant had cut Hs own 
 communications a week before, and was at this time 
 drawing all his supplies from the country where he 
 moved. 
 
 It was apparent now that a concentration of the 
 rebels was imminent, and, before dark, Grant got pos- 
 
 were halted in front of tbis building, and tlae captives asked for a cnp 
 of cold water only. This was refused them, with scurrilous taunts, by 
 the inmates of the hotel. The prisoners were soon afterwards exr 
 changed; and returning to Jackson as conquerors, they remembered 
 the house where this indignity had been offered them, and burned it 
 to the ground. 
 
 * '• Telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was near, directing 
 General Gist to assemble the approaching troops at a point forty or 
 ffty miles from Jackson, and General Maxcy to return to his wagons, 
 and provide for the security of his brigade— for instance, by joining 
 General Gist. That body of troops will be able, I hope, to prevent 
 the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from the east, and this 
 one may be able to keep him fi'om the country towards Panola." — Johii^ 
 Stan's Heport. 
 
252 MILITARY HISTOKY OF 
 
 itive information of Johnston's orders to Peinbei*ton, 
 of the nio^Lt before, to attack his rear.* Accord- 
 ingly, that afternoon, McPherson was directed to re- 
 trace his steps, marching early in the morning, on the 
 Clinton road, towards Bolton, about twenty miles 
 west of Jackson, and the nearest point where John- 
 ston could strike the railroad. Grant also informed 
 McClernand of the capture of Jackson, and of John- 
 ston's line of retreat, and ordered him to face all his 
 troops towards Bolton. " It is evidently the design 
 of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Black 
 river, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not 
 allow them to do this. Turn all your forces towards 
 Bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting 
 there. Move troops by the most direct road from 
 wherever they may be on the receipt of this order.'' 
 General Frank Blair had, by this time, got up near 
 Aubuni, with his division of the Fifteenth corps, and 
 lie also was instructed to move in the direction of 
 the enemy. " Their design is evidently to cross the 
 Big Black, and pass down the peninsula between the 
 
 * Johnston sent the order to Pemberton in triplicate, and one of 
 the originals reached Grant. Some months before these events, a 
 loyal man in Memphis, anxious to serve the national cause, had been 
 drummed out of that place by Hurlbut with a great show of disgrace, 
 for uttering seditious language and communicating with the enemy. 
 He was furnished with papers indicating the cause of his expulsion, 
 and went south beyond the national lines. With such evidence of his 
 fealty to the rebellion, he had been able to obtain accurate informa- 
 tion, and on several occasions furnished it opportunely to Hurlbut. 
 Tliis man was in Jackson when Grant came up from Raymond ; he of- 
 fered to carry the dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton; a dangerous 
 task, as the national army lay between the two rebel commanders. 
 One so noisy in his professions was of course regarded as safe; the dis- 
 patch was intrusted to the national spy, who brought it direct to Mc- 
 Pliersou, and McPherson fonvarded both dispatch and messenger to 
 Grant. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 253 
 
 Black and Yazoo rivers. We must "beat them. 
 Turn your troops immediately to Bolton ; take all 
 the trains ^vitll you. Smith's division, and any other 
 troops now with you, will go to the same place. If 
 practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide youi' 
 troops and train." 
 
 By these dispositions, Grant's whole command 
 would converge at Bolton, marching by different 
 roads. The troops were admirably located for such 
 a move. The heavy rains, however, had impeded the 
 march, and pioneers had sometimes to drain the roads 
 before artillery or wagons could pass. These rapid 
 movements taxed the strength of the troops, but no 
 one murmured. Officers and men seemed inspired to 
 extraordinary efforts, and finding that every time 
 they met the enemy they outnumbered and beat him, 
 beo-an to understand that life was saved and success 
 secure<l by the rapidity which cost them only tempo- 
 rary fatigue. " Better weary our legs in marching, 
 than lose them altogether in battle," said the soldiers, 
 and moved on cheerfully. 
 
 When Grant's orders reached McClernand, that 
 commander had Ilovey's division on the Clinton 
 road, four miles in rear of McPherson, and facing 
 Jackson; another division (Carr's) was within six 
 miles of Sherman, near Mississippi Springs, and a 
 third, under Osterhaus, was at Eaymond. Smith s 
 division was back near Auburn, with Blaii', guarding 
 the only train of supplies that Grant received from 
 Grand Gulf during this campaign. McClernand 
 faced about his troops jiromptly, and moved, on the 
 15th, at an early hour. By nine and a half o'clock, a 
 detachment of cavalry in Osterhaus's command had 
 seized Bolton, driving out the enemy's pickets, and 
 
254 3nLITARY IIISTOEY OF 
 
 capturing several prisoners, Hovey came np soon 
 after from Clinton, and occupied tlie town. By dark, 
 Carr and Osterhaus were posted nearly parallel with 
 Hovey, but three miles to the left, on the middle 
 road from Raymond to Edward's station ; and Smith, 
 arriving from Auburn in the night, bivouacked north 
 of Eaymond. Blair, too, was at Raymond, in Smith's 
 rear. 
 
 At five o'clock on the morning of this day, Lo- 
 gan's division of McPherson's corps, had started for 
 Bolton from Jackson, followed by Crocker, at seven. 
 They were instructed to march as far as possible by 
 four p. M., and then go into camp. Passing through 
 Clinton, the advance came up with Hovey, shortly 
 before four o'clock, about a mile and a half from Bol- 
 ton ; and Logan went into camp on Baker's creek, 
 within supporting distance of Hovey. Crocker bi- 
 vouacked on the Clinton road, in rear of Logan."^ 
 At forty-five minutes past four, Grant reached Clin- 
 ton in person, and immediately ordered McClernand : 
 *' Move your command early to-morrow morning 
 towai-ds Edward's depot, marching so as to feel the 
 enemy's force if you encounter him, and without 
 bringing on a general engagement, unless you feel 
 
 * On the loth, Grant reported to Ilalleck, sending the dispatch as 
 before, by coiirier, to Grand Gulf. "Jackson, May 15;;/;.— This place 
 fell into our hands yesterday, after a fight of about three hours. Jo. 
 Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently 
 with the design of joining the Vicksburg force. I am concentrating 
 my forces at Bolton, to cut them off if possible. A dispatch from 
 Banks showed liim to be off in Louisiana, not to return to Baton Rouge 
 until the 10th of May. I could not lose the time. I have taken many 
 prisoners from Port Hudson, who state that it will be evacuated on 
 the appearance of a force in the rear. I sent a special message to 
 Banks, giving him the substance of the information I had, and asking 
 him to join me as soon as possible. The message was sent on the 10th." 
 
FLYSSES S. GRAKT. 255 
 
 entirely alDle to contend ^vitli liim. Communicate 
 this order to Major-General Blair, who will move 
 with you." 
 
 On the 14th, Pemberton, still at Edward's station, 
 liad received Johnston's orders of the day before, to 
 attack Grant at Clinton, but disobeyed them * He 
 held a council of war while Grant was attacking 
 Jackson, and declared that the movement indicated 
 by Johnston was extremely hazardous. A majority 
 of liis officers, notwithstanding, advised obedience ; 
 but he decided, instead, to marck against Dillon's, and 
 cut Grant's communications with the Mississij^jjl.t 
 He had been informed that Grant had an army corps 
 at Dillon's. As Johnston had fled towards Canton, 
 after the fall of Jackson, and scattered his forces fifty 
 miles away, the rebels were now actually moving in 
 three different dii^ections — Pemberton south, John- 
 ston north, and Gist to the east — wdiile Grant was 
 converfrino: between tkem ; Pemberton seeking to cut 
 Grant's communications with the Mississippi, while 
 Grant, with kis whole command, flushed with another 
 
 * Johnston renewed these orders on the 15th, but in a qualified 
 form : " Would it not be better to place the forces to support Vicks- 
 burg between General Loring and that place, and merely observe the 
 ferries, so that you might unite, if opportunity to fight presented it- 
 self? . . . General Gregg -will move towards Canton to-morrow. If 
 prisoners tell the truth, the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's 
 army. It would decide the campaign to beat it, which can be done 
 only by concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern 
 troops arrive. They are to be twelve thousand or thirteen thousand." 
 — Johnston's Report. 
 
 t At forty minutes past five P. M. on May 14th, Pemberton sent 
 word to Johnston from Edward's depot : " I shall move as early to- 
 morrow as practicable a column of seventeen thousand on Dillon's. 
 The object is to cut the enemy's communications, and force him to at- 
 tack me, as I do not consider my force sufiicieut to justify an attack 
 on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson." 
 
256 MILITAEY IIISTOEY OF 
 
 victory, was returning to Yicksburg, and beaidng 
 down from three several directions on Pemberton. 
 
 At one o'clock on the 15th, in open disobedience 
 of his orders, Pemberton moved his entire force from 
 Edward's station towards Dillon's; but the heavy 
 rains had made Baker's creek imj^assable by the or- 
 dinary ford on the main Raymond j'oad, and the 
 bridge had been washed away by previous freshets : 
 the column was, therefore, marched by the northern 
 or Clinton road, on which there was a good bridge; 
 and after crossing the creek, it filed to the right on a 
 neighborhood road, so as to strike the Raymond road, 
 about three and a half miles from Edward's depot ; 
 a short distance beyond this junction Pemberton 
 went into camp. He was anxious to reconnoitre in 
 front, and his troops were in motion till midnight ; 
 he, therefore, did not issue orders to continue the 
 movement on the 16th.* 
 
 At about six and a half o'clock of the next day 
 (the 16th), however, he received positive orders from 
 Johnston to join him at Clinton. " May 15th, 1863, 
 8.30 A. M. Our being compelled to leave Jackson 
 makes your plan impi'acticable. The only mode by 
 which we can unite is by your moving directly to 
 Clinton, and informing me that we may move to that 
 point with about six thousand men." Pemberton, 
 no longer daring to disregard his sujierior, imme- 
 diately directed a retrograde movement, reversing Ins 
 column as it stood. His purpose was to return 
 
 * " The divisions of Generals Stevenson and Bowen having been 
 on the march until past midnight, and the men considerably fatigued, 
 desiring also to receive reports of reconnoissances made in my front 
 hclbrc proceeding farther, I did not issue orders to continue the move- 
 ment at an early hour the following morning" (May IGth). — Pember- 
 ton''t Report. 
 
T3XYSSES S. GRANT. 257 
 
 towards Edward's depot, and take tlie Brownsville 
 road, and then proceed nortli of tlie railroad towards 
 Clinton. He notified Johnston in liaste that his 
 communication had been received, and informed him 
 of the route of march. 
 
 At about five o'clock on this morning, two men 
 employed on the Jackson and Yicksburg railroad, 
 and who had passed through Pemberton's army the 
 night before, were brought into Grant's headquarters 
 at Clinton. He was wakened at once to receive the 
 news. The men stated that Pemberton was at Ed- 
 ward's station, fifteen or eighteen miles off, with 
 eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries of ar- 
 tillery. They estimated his whole force at twenty- 
 five thousand troops, still advancing. From them, 
 also. Grant heard again of the enemy's design to at- 
 tack his rear. Until this time, it had been his inten- 
 tion to leave one division of Sherman's corps still 
 another day in Jackson, to complete the destruction 
 of roads and stores ; but this information detennined 
 him to bring up his entire command at once ; and, at 
 five and a half o'clock, he dispatched to Sherman, 
 to move promptly to the support of the main army, 
 at Bolton or beyond : " Start one of your divisions 
 on the road at once with their ammunition wao-ons, 
 and dii'ect the general commanding the division to 
 move with all possible sj)eed, until he comes up with 
 our rear, beyond Bolton. It is important that the 
 greatest celerity should be shoAvn in carrying out this 
 movement, as I have evidence that the entire force of 
 the enemy was at Edward's depot at seven p. m. last 
 night, and was still advancing. The fight may there- 
 fore be brought on at any moment ; we should have 
 every man in the field." The other division of the 
 17 
 
258 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 Fifteenth corps ^vas to follow as speedily as possible. 
 This dispatcli reached Shennan at ten minutes past 
 seven, and his advance division (Steele's) was in mo- 
 tion, in one hour from that time. At half past five 
 Grant also ordered Blair, who was near Auburn, to 
 push forward his division in the direction of Ed- 
 ward's station, with all dispatch : " The enemy have 
 moved out to Edward's station, and are still pushing 
 on to attack us with all their force. Push your 
 troops on in that direction as rapidly as possible. If 
 you are already on the Bolton road, continue so ; but 
 if you still have a choice of roads, take the one lead- 
 ing to Edward's depot. Pas-9 your troops to the front 
 of your train., except a rear-guard, and heep tlie am- 
 munition ivagons in front of all others.^'' This last 
 injunction was very necessary, as Blair was obliged 
 to reverse his command, which would bring the 
 wagon-trains in front. 
 
 McClernaud was now directed to assume com- 
 mand of Blair, and establish communication between 
 him and Osterhaus at once, and to keep it up, moving 
 forward cautiously: "Direct Major-General Blair to 
 move with his di\'ision to the support of General 
 Osterhaus, as soon as possible, moving on the same 
 line, by the first lateral road leading into the one on 
 which Osterhaus is now marching." At forty-five 
 minutes past five, McPherson was also ordered for- 
 ward to the support of Hovey: "The enemy has 
 crossed Big Black, with the entire Vicksburg force, 
 lie was at EdNvard's depot last night, and still ad- 
 vancing. You Avill, therefore, pass all trains and 
 move forward to join McClernand " (Hovey's divi 
 sion). " I have ordered your rear brigade to move at 
 once, and given such dii'ections to other commanders 
 
ULYSSES s. GEAirr. 25(T 
 
 as will secure a prompt concentration of your forces." 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of Grant's staff, ^yas at 
 this time sent forward to communicate to McClernand 
 the information received, and with verbal instnictions 
 for tlie disposition of his forces. 
 
 Three roads lead to Edward's station from the 
 Eaymond and Bolton road, one diverging a mile 
 and a half north of Raymond, a second three miles 
 and a half farther north, and on the third, which is 
 seven and a half miles from Eaymond, Hovey and 
 McPherson were movincr. Tliese were known as tlie 
 southern, middle, and northern roads to Edward's 
 station. McClernand was ordered to move Blair and 
 A. J. Smith hy the southern road, to put Carr and 
 Osterhaus on the middle road, converging to the 
 same point, and to advance Hovey on the direct road 
 from Bolton to Edward's station ; and, finally, to es- 
 tablish communications between all parts of his line. 
 When these dispositions were made, he was to feel 
 the enemy with a heavy line of skirmishers, but not 
 to bring on a general engagement unless certain of 
 success. 
 
 He advanced slowly ; and, at seven o'clock, just as 
 Pemberton's reverse movement began, the rebel skir- 
 mishers were met by Smith's division, on the south- 
 em road, about five and a half miles from Edward's 
 station. The enemy's pickets at once retired, and 
 Smith, advancing about half a mile, delivered a brisk 
 artillery-fire, which was immediately returned. Hear- 
 ing the report of guns on his left, Osterhaus now 
 pushed forward on the middle road, as far as a thick 
 wood covering a chaos of hills and aV)rupt ravines. 
 He drove a line of rebel skirmishers from the skirt of 
 this wood, and uncovered a large body of the enemy. 
 
260 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 Not knowing yet whether these movements in- 
 dicated an attack in force, or simply an armed recon- 
 noissance, and, indeed, utterly ignorant that Grant's 
 entire army was in this neighborhood,* Pemberton at 
 first continued his backward movement ; but, the dem- 
 onstrations soon becoming serious, he directed his 
 division commanders to form a line of battle on the 
 cross-road from the Clinton to the Raymond road, 
 with Loring on the right, Bo wen in the centre, and 
 Stevenson on the left. This AYas the line with which 
 Grant had to contend in the battle of Champion's 
 hill. Pemberton declared in his official report that 
 it included only seventeen thousand five hundred 
 men.f Grant estimated it at least as high as twenty- 
 five thousand. 
 
 McClernand had notified McPherson of the move- 
 ments of his command ; and McPherson, anticipating 
 Grant's directions, at once ordered Logan to follow 
 Hovey, and Crocker, who was in column further 
 back, to come uj) as rapidly as possible with his divi- 
 sion. After proceeding about five miles, Hovey sent 
 
 * " When General Johnston, on the 13th of May, informed me that 
 Sherman was at Clinton, and ordered me to attack him in the rear, 
 neither he nor I knew that Sherman was in the act of advancing on 
 Jackson, which place he entered at twelve o'clock on the next day ; 
 that a corps of the enemy was at Raymond, following Sherman's march 
 upon Jackson ; and that another corps was near Dillon's, probably 
 moving in the same direction ; and, consequently, that the orders to at- 
 tack Sherman could not be executed. Nor was I myself aware until 
 several hours after I had received and promised to obey the order, that 
 it could not be obeyed without the destruction of my army; but on 
 my arrival at Edward's depot, two hours after I received the order, I 
 found a large force of the enemy at Dillon's, on my right flank, and 
 ready to attack me in the flank or rear if I moved on Clinton." — Pem- 
 hertoii'a additional Jieport. 
 
 t I shall take occasion, furtbftr on, to tU>pute this assertion of 
 Pemberton. Sue page 399. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 2G1 
 
 word to McPlierson that he had met the enemy in 
 force, strongly posted on the northern or Bolton 
 road. 
 
 At six and a half o'clock, McPherson dispatched 
 to Grant : " I think it advisable for you to come for- 
 ward to the front as soon as you can." * Grant 
 started at once, at forty minutes past seven, for the 
 advance. On the way, he found Hovey's division at 
 a halt, and the road blocked up with wagon-trains at 
 the crossing, and himself ordered all quartermasters 
 and wagon-masters to draw their teams to one side, 
 and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson 
 was brought up by the road thus cleared. Passing 
 to the front. Grant found Ilovey's skirmishers near 
 the enemy's pickets. The troops were rapidly getting 
 into line, and Hovey could have brought on an en- 
 gagement at any moment. 
 
 The enemy was strongly posted, with his left on 
 a high wooded ridge, called Champion's hill, over 
 which the road to Edward's station runs, making 
 a sharp turn to the south, as it strikes the hills. This 
 ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surround- 
 ing country, and is the highest land for many miles 
 around; the topmost point is bald, and gave the 
 rebels a commanding position for their artillery ; but 
 the remainder of the crest, as well as a precipitous 
 hillside to the east of the road, is covered by a 
 dense forest and undergrowth, and scarred with deep 
 i-avines, through whose entanglements troops could 
 pass only with extreme difficulty. To the north, the 
 
 * 3IcPherson saw that a battle was imminent, and ^rcClcrnand was 
 the ranking officer at the front. McPherson was unwilling to risk his 
 troops under that general, unless it became unavoidable, and therefore 
 eent the dispatch given above. After the battle, he explained this to 
 Grant. 
 
2(52 MILITAKY niSTOEY OF 
 
 timber extends a slioi-t distance down tlie Lill, and 
 tlien opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope 
 towards Bakers creek, almost a mile away. Tlie 
 rebel line ran southward along the crest, its centre 
 coverino; the middle road from Raymond, while tlie 
 extreme right was on the direct or southern road. 
 The whole line was about four miles long. Midway,* 
 or Champion's hill, on the rebel left, was evidently 
 the key to the whole position. 
 
 Hovey's division was disj^osed for attack on the 
 Bolton road, and reached to the hill-side and into the 
 wooded ravine; two brigades of Logan's division 
 were thrown to the right of the road, and almost 
 to the rear of the enemy; w^hile Crocker "was still 
 coming up in column on the road. But Grant would 
 not permit the attack to begin until he could hear 
 from McClernand, now advancing wdth four divisions 
 from Eaymond. McClernand, in person, was with 
 Osterhaus and Carr, on the middle road. Staff" offi- 
 cers were sent to him at once, and successive mes- 
 sages dispatched, for him to push forward wdth all 
 rapidity; but, by the nearest practicable route of 
 communication, he was at least two and a half miles 
 off. At fifteen minutes past ten, Grant sent him 
 written orders : " From all information gathered from 
 citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are 
 south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up 
 with Ilovey, and can support him at any point. 
 Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible, 
 but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to 
 get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair 
 
 * Midway hill was so called from being midway between Jackson 
 and Vicksbnrg. CLampion was the name of the piincii)al proprietor 
 of the neighborhood. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 263 
 
 and Ransom, do so, and direct tliem to come np to 
 your support by the most expeditious route." 
 
 Eansom's brigade, of McArtliur's division, in 
 McPlierson's corps, was marcliing up on the road 
 from Grand Gulf, and supposed to be now within 
 supporting distance of the left of the army. Grant, 
 therefore, directed Ransom to move his command so 
 as to join the forces north of him, by the first road 
 leading northward. " Enemy are reported as having 
 sent a column to our left and rear ; avoid being cut 
 
 off." 
 
 Continuous firing had been kept up all the morn- 
 ino- between Hovey's skii'mishers and the rebel ad- 
 vance ; and, by eleven o'clock, this grew into a bat- 
 tle. At this time, Hovey's division w^as deployed 
 to move westward, against the hill, the two brigades 
 of Logan supporting him. Logan was formed in the 
 open field, facing the northern side of the ridge, and 
 only about four hundred yards from the enemy ; Lo- 
 gan's front and the main front of Ilovey s division 
 being nearly at right angles with each other. As 
 Hovey advanced, his line conformed to the shape of 
 the hill and became crescent-like, the concave towards 
 the hill. McPherson now posted two batteries on 
 his extreme right, and well in advance ; these poured 
 a destructive enfilading fire upon the enemy, under 
 cover of which the national line began to mount the 
 hill. The enemy at once replied with a murderous 
 discharge of musketr}-; and the battle soon raged 
 hotly all along the line, from Hovey's extreme left to 
 the light of Logan ; but Hovey pushed steadily on, and 
 drove the rebels back six hundred yards, till eleven 
 guns and three hundred prisoners were captured, 
 and the brow of the height was gained. The road 
 
264 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 here formed a natural fortification, whicL the rebels 
 made liaste to use. It was cut through the crest of 
 the ridge at the steepest part, the bank on the upper 
 side commanding all below ; so that even when the 
 national troops had apparently gained the road, the 
 i-ebels stood behind this novel breastwork, covered 
 from every fire, and masters still of the whole de- 
 clivity. These were the only fortifications at Cham- 
 pion's hill, but they answered the rebels well. 
 
 Finding himself, however, in spite of this advan- 
 tage, losing ground on a point so vitally important, 
 the enemy now pushed reenforcements rapidly ; and, 
 when these arrived, rallied, under cover of the woods, 
 and poured down the road in great numbers on the 
 position occupied by Hovey. For a while, Ilovey 
 bore the whole brunt of the battle, and, after a des- 
 perate resistance, was compelled to fall back, though 
 slowly and stubbornly, losing several of the guns he 
 had taken an hour before. But Grant was watching 
 the fight on the first spur of the hiiy"' under fire, and 
 seeing that the enemy was getting too strong for 
 Ilovey, he sent in a brigade of Crocker's division, 
 which had just arrived. These fresh troops gave Ho- 
 vey confidence, and the height, that had been gained 
 with fearful loss, was still retained. The preponder- 
 ance, however, was even yet in favor of the enemy, 
 for ]\rcClernand's advance divisions had not arrived. 
 
 Meanwliile, the rebels had made a desperate at- 
 tempt, on their left, to capture the battery in Mc- 
 Pherson's corps which Avas doing them so much 
 damage ; they were, however, promptly repelled by 
 Sniitli's brigade of Logan's division, which drove 
 them back with great slaughter, capturing many 
 
 * Ilis son, tliirtecn years old, was close by liis side all day. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 265 
 
 prisoners. Discovering, now, tliat liis own left was 
 nearly turned, tlie enemy made a determined effort to 
 turn the left of Hovey, precipitating on that com- 
 mander all his available force ; and, while Logan was 
 carrying every thing before him, the closely-pressed 
 and nearly exhausted troops of Hovey were again 
 compelled to retire. They had ])een fighting nearly 
 three hours, and were fatigued and out of ammuni- 
 tion ; but fell back doggedly, and not far. The tide 
 of battle, at this point, seemed turning against the na- 
 tional forces, and Hovey sent back repeatedly for 
 support. Grant, however, was momently expecting 
 the advance of McClernand's four divisions, and never 
 doubted the result. At thirty minutes past twelve, 
 he had again disjDatched to McClernand: "As soon 
 as your command is all in hand, throw forward skir- 
 mishers and feel the enemy, and attack him in force, 
 if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and Mc- 
 Pherson, and will see that they cooperate." 
 
 That commander, however, did not arrive; and 
 Grant, seeing the critical condition of affairs, now di- 
 rected McPherson to move what troops he could, by 
 a left flank, around to tlie enemy's right front, on the 
 crest of the ridge. The prolongation of Logan to the 
 right had left a gap between him and Hovey, and 
 into this the two remainino; brio^ades of Crocker were 
 throAvn. The movement was promptly executed ; 
 Boomer's brigade went at once into the fight, and 
 checked the rebel advance, till Holmes's brigade came 
 up, when a dashing charge was made, and Hovey' 
 and Crocker were hotly engaged for forty minutes, 
 Hovey recapturing five of the guns he had already 
 taken and lost. But the enemy had massed his forces 
 on this point, and the irregularity of the ground pre- 
 
266 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 vented the use of artillery in enfilading him. Though 
 baffled and enraged, he still fought with courage and 
 obstinacy, and it was apparent that the national line 
 was in dire need of assistance. In fact, the position 
 was in dano;er. , 
 
 At this crisis, Stevenson's brigade of Logan's divi- 
 sion was moved forward at a double quick into a 
 piece of wood on the extreme rigbt of the command ; 
 the brigade moved parallel with Logan's general line 
 of battle, charged across the ravines, up the hill, and 
 through an open field, driving the enemy from an im- 
 portant position, where lie was about to establish his 
 batteries, capturing seven guns and several hundred 
 prisoners. The main Vicksburg road, after following 
 the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, to 
 the point of intersection with the middle Raymond 
 road, turns almost to the west again, running down 
 the hill and across the valley where Logan was now 
 operating, in the rear of the enemy. Unconscious of 
 this immense advantage, Logan swept directly across 
 the road, and absolutely cut off the rebel line of re- 
 treat to Edward's station mthout being aware of it. 
 At this very juncture, Grant, finding that there was 
 no prospect of McClernand's reaching the field, and 
 that the scales were still balanced at the critical 
 point, thought himself obliged, in order to still fm-ther 
 reenforce Ilovey and Crocker in front, to recall Logan 
 from the right, ^vhere he ^\as overlap] )ing and out- 
 ilanking the rebel left, nad the national commander 
 been acquainted with the country, he would, of course, 
 liave ordered Logan to push on in tke rear of the 
 enemy, and thus secured the capture or annihilation 
 of tlui whole rebel army. But the entire region was 
 new to the national troops, and this great oppor- 
 
ULYSSES 3. GEA^^T. 267 
 
 tunity unknown. As it was, however, the moment 
 Logan left the road, tlie enemy, alarmed for his line 
 of retreat, finding it, indeed, not only threatened, but 
 almost gone, at once abandoned his position in front ; 
 at this crisis a national battery opened from the 
 right, pouring a well-directed fire, and the victorious 
 troops of Hovey and Crocker pressing on, the enemy 
 once more gave way ; the rebel line was rolled back 
 for the third time, and the battle decided. 
 
 Before the result of the final charge was known, 
 Logan rode eagerly up to Grant, declaring that if one 
 more dash could be made in front, he would advance 
 in tlie rear, and complete the capture of the rebel 
 army. Grant at once rode forward in person, and 
 found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged 
 for hours withdrawn from their most advanced posi- 
 tion, and refilling their cartridge-boxes. Explaining 
 the position of Logan's force, he directed them to use 
 all dispatch and push forward as rapidly as possible. 
 He proceeded himself in haste to what had been 
 Pemberton's line, expecting every moment to come 
 up with the enemy, but found the rebels had already 
 broken and fled from the field. Logan's attack had 
 precipitated the rout, and the battle of Champion's 
 hill was won. This was between three and four 
 o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 Arriving now at the Raymond road. Grant saw on 
 his left, and along the next ridge, a column of troops 
 approaching, which proved to be Carr's division : Mc- 
 demand was with it in person. To the left of Carr, 
 Osterhaus soon afterwards appeared, with his sku*- 
 mishers well in advance. Grant at once sent word to 
 Osterhaus that the rebels were in full retreat, dii'ect- 
 ing him to press forward with all speed. The situa- 
 
2G8 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 tionwas soon explained, and Carr also was ordered 
 to pursue as rapidly as possible to Black river, and 
 cross it if he could. Osterliaus was to follow Carr. 
 Some of McPlierson's troops Lad already got into the 
 road in advance, but, havina^ marched and ensfaGfed. 
 the enemy all day, they were fatigued, and gave way 
 to Carr, who continued the pursuit until after dark. 
 
 While the day had been so obstinately contested 
 on the right, Grant, as has been seen, repeatedly sent 
 orders to McClernand to push the divisions of Carr 
 and Osterhaus into the fight, and. to communicate 
 similar orders to Blair and A. J. Smith. These four 
 divisions were admirably situated for attack, and, by 
 ten o'clock, were so close as to have their skirmishers 
 engaged. Ransom's brigade of McArthur's division 
 had also arrived, and moved to their support ; but, 
 notwithstanding all this, and Grant's urgent and re- 
 peated orders, they were not so directed as to take 
 any important part in the action; indeed, their influ- 
 ence was altogetlier inadequate to their strength or 
 oppoi-tunities. Had McClernand caused them to act 
 with any degree of vigor, to do only half so much as 
 Ilovey and McPlierson performed, it is difficult to 
 perceive how any portion of the rebel army could 
 have l)een witlidrawn as an organized force. At 
 half-past three or four o'clock, the enemy was broken 
 and flying from the field, but a vigorous eflfort on tlie 
 part of McClernand would have accomplished the 
 defeat by noon. The rebel right might have been 
 destroyed, and tlie massing on their left prevented ; 
 or, later in the figlit, Logan could have been kept in 
 their rear, if McClernand had come up in time; and, 
 Avith all retreat cut ofl*, the enemy might have been 
 forced to surrender on the field, in mass. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 269 
 
 But tlie battle Wcas fouglit witli McPhersou's com- 
 mand and Ilovey's division of the Thirteentli corps, 
 Grant directing all of Hovey's movements liiraself, in 
 tlie absence of McClernand.* Immediately after the 
 retreat began, Kansom arrived on tlie field, where the 
 main battle had been fought ; and Blair also was up, 
 in time to engage in the j^ursuit. McClernand's delay 
 was occasioned by an excess of caution ; the country 
 he marched through was broken and densely wooded, 
 as Avell as unknown to him, and a comparatively 
 small force of the enemy had detained him. While he 
 was developing and manoeuvring, instead of attacking, 
 the battle was fought elsewhere. Fifteen thousand 
 men thus lingered under his command, in the vicinity 
 of the field, though moving on roads converging to 
 the front. The force opposed to him was probably 
 not greater than six or seven thousand. The rebels 
 were not intrenched, and a good soldier would at once 
 have tested their opposition, especially after the per- 
 emptory orders of his chief, and within sound of a 
 critical battle, not three miles off. Even during the 
 pursuit, when the beaten enemy came headlong across 
 his front, McClernand, supposing this an assault, de- 
 veloped his troops, and prepared to receive a flank 
 attack from the pell-mell fugitives.-)- 
 
 Grant had, in Hovey and McPherson's command, 
 about fifteen thousand men engaged : every man in 
 the three divisions was under fire. This hardest- 
 fought battle of the campaign cost him four hundred 
 and twenty-six men killed, eighteen hundred and 
 
 * During the battle McCleruand sent positive directions to Hovey to 
 connect with the right of Carr ; in order to obey, Hovey would have 
 had to fall back two miles. But Grant was with Hovey at the time, 
 and of course forbade the movement. 
 
 * See Osterhaus's Report, 
 
270 illLITARY IIISTOET OF 
 
 forty-two TTOunded, and one hundred and eighty-nine 
 missing. Hovey, alone, lost in killed, wounded, and 
 missing, twelve hundred men, one-tbii\l of his com- 
 mand. McPherson lost about one thousand men ; 
 and McClernand fifteen killed, and one hundred 
 wounded. The losses were thus heavy from the na- 
 ture of the ground ; Grant was compelled to mass his 
 men in order to charge ; and, in the ascent of the hill, 
 the fire from the rebel infantry into the serried ranks 
 of the assaihmts was murderous. 
 
 The enemy's loss was estimated at between three 
 and four thousand men, in killed and wounded ; and 
 nearly three thousand prisoners were captured on the 
 field, or during the pursuit.* Hovey alone captured 
 three hundred under fire, and four hundred after the 
 battle ceased, besides paroling five hundred and 
 sixty-nine sick and wounded, and burying two hun- 
 dred and twenty-one rebel dead. Logan captured 
 eleven guns and thirteen hundred prisoners. Besides 
 these, Loring's entire division, which had held the 
 right of the rebel line, on the direct Eaymond road, 
 had become separated from the main army by the 
 rai)idity of Grant's advance after the battle, and 
 found no chance in the flight to unite with the rest 
 of the command. Abandoning all his artillery, 
 Loring, therefore, determined to make an efibrt to 
 join Johnston, nnd set out in the darkness of the 
 
 ♦ The oflicial reports of Pcmberton and Johnston, contain no state- 
 ment of the losses in this battle, or in any battle of the caniixiign. I 
 have, liowovcr, found a rebel pamphlet published in 18G3, and pur- 
 porting to have been written by one engaged iu the siege of Vicks- 
 burg ; this gives the rebel loss at Champion's hill as six thousand men 
 and thirty cannon. Two of the brigade commanders reported their 
 losses; in one case these were six hundred, and in the other nine 
 hundred and ninety-five men. 
 
ULYSSES B. GRANT. 271 
 
 niglit, towards Utica. In order to avoid capture or 
 destruction, lie was forced to make a wide detour to 
 the south and east, losing hundreds if not thousands 
 of his men by desertion and straggling; but, after 
 several days, he succeeded in making a junction with 
 Johnston near Jackson, having suffered greatly on 
 the road. One whole division was thus cut off from 
 the garrison of Vicksburg ; for this force never was 
 able to rejoin Pemberton.* Grant estimated Loring's 
 strength, after the battle, and exclusive of desertions, 
 at four thousand men.+ Havins: been in McClernand's 
 front, it had not been seriously engaged. 
 
 The rout of the rebels was complete. Large 
 numbers of men on Pemberton's left had abandoned 
 the field without orders, even before the battle was 
 over, and made their way to the rear in haste and 
 confusion. J General Tilghman was killed, Loring 
 cut off, and the separation from Johnston final. 
 Many of the men threw away their small-arms and 
 gave themselves up as prisoners, unasked. Two bat- 
 teries, of six guns each, were left in the swamps, and 
 every step of the pursuit was strewn with the wrecks 
 of the dissolving army. Pemberton himself fled that 
 night to Smith's ferry, where the railroad bridge 
 
 * Pemberton had the same trouble with Loring that Grant had found 
 with iMcClernand. Ue reijeatedly ordered Loring to come to the as- 
 Bistance of the left, where the battle raged, but was unable to move 
 him. The consequence was. that when the fighting ceased, and Pem- 
 berton was driven towards Vicksburg, Loring, unable to join \us chief, 
 was cut off by the advancing columns of Grant. 
 
 t ^lay 24th, Loring reported 5,778 men at Jackson. 
 
 t "A part of Stevenson's division broke badly, and fell back in 
 great disorder." 
 
 " Large numlicrs of men were abandoning the field on Stevenson's 
 left, deserting their comrades." 
 
 " Although a large number of men had shamefully abandoned their 
 commands, and were making their way to the rear, the main body of 
 the troops retired in good order." — Pemherton'a Report. 
 
272 MILITAKY niSTORY OF 
 
 crosses the Big Black, about fifteen miles distant; 
 and a pait of his command bivouacked at Bovina, 
 marching: till after midnis^ht. One division remained 
 at tlie bridge to hold it for Loring's crossing. But 
 Loring never came.* 
 
 As soon as McPherson's cartridcre-boxes could be 
 refilled, the Seventeenth corps continued the pursuit, 
 and kept it up until dark, the troops bivouacking 
 from two to five miles in advance of the battle- 
 field; one brigade, however, remained to guard the 
 wounded, and assist in burying the dead, and secur- 
 ing tlie spoils of the enemy. These amounted to no 
 less than thirty cannon, besides numerous stands of 
 colors, and large quantities of small-arms and am- 
 munition. Carr reached Edward's station at eight 
 o'clock p. M., where his command, with tliat of 
 Osterhaus, remained during the night. Blair cap- 
 tured three hundred prisoners, and rested three 
 miles southeast of Edward's station ; Logan readied 
 a point within three miles of Black river bridge; 
 while Ilovey was left at Midway, to care for the 
 wounded and buiy the dead. The heroes slept on 
 tlie field they had won so dearly. Men, horses, can- 
 non, and all tlie ^vrecks of tlie battle, were scattered 
 around in wild confusion ; rebels and Union men 
 heaped upon each other; dead and dying; their 
 struggles ended, their hot rage all chilled. The sol- 
 diers called the spot the " Hill of Death." 
 
 Grant and his stafi' pushed on at the head of the 
 column of pursuit until long after dark ; and, in the 
 
 * " I awaited in vain intelligence of General Loring. It was neces- 
 sary to hold the position to enable him to cross the river, should the 
 enemy, which was probable, follow him closely up. For this purpose 
 alone I continued the troops iu position." — Pemherton. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 273 
 
 ardor of victory, got so far aliead of tlie main body 
 that it Avas thoiiglit advisable to halt for tlie night. 
 The house where they stopped was lonely, and, be- 
 fore long, they discovered that their position was un- 
 safe, in fact, a mile or more in advance of the troops, 
 and they returned to the vicinity of the column, 
 which was just going into bivouac on the road. The 
 headquarters' tents and wagons had not come up, and 
 they stretched themselves under the porch of a house 
 used as a rebel field hospital. The bleeding and the 
 dying from the battle were crowded close inside, and 
 the slumbers of the men who had conquered were 
 disturbed by the groans of their wounded foes. 
 
 That night. Grant received Ilalleck's dispatch of 
 the 11th of May, ordering him to return and cooper- 
 ate with Banks; but the campaign that seemed so 
 darino: had been won. The subordinate was indeed 
 retracing his steps, but with victorious banners; no 
 danger now of rebuke; no more countermands, no 
 more recalls. 
 
 Only the celerity of the movements which have 
 been described prevented the junction of the rebel 
 armies ; for, as has been seen, Pemberton was actually 
 moving to join Johnston when Grant came up and 
 attacked him. Pemberton had even sent word to 
 Johnston of the route he was taking, saying : " I am 
 thus particular, that you may be able to make a junc- 
 tion with this army ; " but, in a postscript, he added : 
 "Heavy skirmishing now going on in my fi'ont." 
 This was the preliminary firing of the battle which 
 forever prevented any junction between the two 
 rebel armies. The next dispatch from Pembei-ton 
 announced to his commander that he had been " com- 
 pelled to full back with heavy loss." 
 18 
 
274 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 On the 16th, while this furious battle was being 
 fouirht, Jolmston, who had marched ten miles and a 
 half the day before, rested his troops, and lost a day * 
 
 Sherman liad evacuated Jackson by noon of the 
 16th, paroling his prisoners, and leaving his wounded 
 on account of the hasfe of the movement.f He 
 marched twenty miles, reaching Bolton with his en- 
 tire command the same day, and was that night in- 
 formed of the victory of Champion's hill, and ordered 
 to turn his corps northward to Bridgeport, pressing 
 forward without delay. His rear-guard arrived at 
 Bolton at two a. m. on the morning of the 17th, and 
 the same troops started for Bridgeport at four and a 
 half 
 
 Blair was informed : " Sherman is ordered to 
 Bridgeport with his corps. He will probably arrive 
 there this morning " (May 17th). '• Move to the same 
 point with your division, and take the pontoon train 
 with you." Blair was to move by way of Edward's 
 station. This arranoement brou2;ht Sherman's whole 
 corps together at the most favorable position for 
 crossing the Big Black river, and turning the enemy's 
 left flank, or, if it became more desirable, for stri- 
 king the important position of Haine's bluff. It had 
 
 * " The brigadier-generals reporting that their troops required rest, 
 after the fatigue tlicy had undergone in the skirmishes and marches 
 preceding the retreat from Jackson, and having yet no certain intelli- 
 gence of General Pemberton's route or General Gist's position, I did 
 not move on Saturday." — JoJi>iii(o7i's Report. 
 
 " It is a matter of great anxiety to me to add this little force to your 
 army, hut the enemy being exactly between us, and consultation by 
 correspondence so slow, it is difficult to arrange a meeting." — Johnston 
 to Pivilwrton , May l(jth,from Calhoun. 
 
 t On the 17th, Grant sent back an officer under flag of truce with 
 provisions for these wounded, necessarily left to tlie tender mercies of 
 the rebels. He sent supphes for his wounded enemies as well. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 275 
 
 now become a matter of the highest consequence to 
 secure a base of supplies. None of importance had 
 been received since leaving Grand Gulf, and, although 
 in this rich and fertile country where he was operat- 
 ing. Grant had found forage and beef in abundance, 
 all other supplies were getting short. Two hundred 
 wagons had come up from Grand Gulf, with Blair, 
 but no other reojular rations were received after leav- 
 ing Hankinson's ferry. The only pontoon train with 
 the army was therefore sent with Sherman, to Bridge- 
 port, and the other two corps pushed on to the Black 
 river, lower down, to force a passage. The main col- 
 umn, moving on the direct road to Vicksburg, could 
 thus operate favorably on the flank of any force at- 
 tempting either to confront Sherman, or to defend 
 Haine's bluff; wdiile, if the rebels still remained in 
 force before Grant, Sherman was in a position to 
 threaten their line of retreat, interposing between 
 them and Vicksburg. To Sherman, Grant said : " I 
 will endeavor to hold the enemy where he is, to give 
 you time to cross the river, if it can be effected. The 
 moment the enemy begins to give w^ay, I will en- 
 deavor to follow him so closely that he wdll not be 
 able to destroy the bridge. Let me hear from you 
 the hour you expect to arrive at Bridgeport." 
 
 At three and a half o'clock, on the morning of the 
 l7th, McClernand's corps resumed the pursuit, Carr's 
 division in the advance, followed closely by Oster- 
 haus. Six miles to the west, the enemy was dis- 
 covered in force, strongly posted at Big Black river 
 brido-e. The river at this crossins; makes a bend 
 somewhat in the shape of a horse-shoe, open towards 
 the east. Hio-h bluffs extend on the western shore 
 to the water's edge ; on the eastern side, is an open 
 
276 SnLITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 bottom nearly a mile in width, and surrounded by a 
 stagnant bayou, two or three feet deep and nearly 
 twenty feet across. At the narrowest part of this 
 bend, and immediately inside of the bayou, the rebels 
 had constructed a strong line of infantry parapet, 
 and, at intervals, dispositions were made for artillery. 
 The line was about a mile in length, abutting north 
 on the river, and south on a cypress-brake that ex- 
 tends to the bank of the river below. The bayou 
 was parallel to the works, making a natural wet ditch 
 of a formidable character ; the trees and brush grow- 
 ino- in its bed had been felled, and left to obstruct the 
 national advance; while the intrenchments behind 
 were commanded by the bluffs on the right bank of 
 the river ; the open space between, however, afforded 
 no cover for the rebels, if once driven from the 
 trenches. This tete-de-pont was defended by twenty 
 pieces of artillery, and a garrison of four thousand 
 men — as many as could be advantageously used on 
 the line. The main rebel army had already crossed 
 on boats and bridges, but Pemberton said : " I de- 
 termined not to abandon so strong a front while 
 there was a hope of Loring's arrival." * 
 
 The exterior of the bridge-head was situated in 
 the bottom land, with open fields in front, excej)t on 
 the extreme left of the enemy, where a thick copse 
 reached from the road to the river. Carr's division 
 occui)ied the right in investing the place, and Law- 
 k'r''s bricjade had the rii-'ht of the division. Osterhaus 
 was on Carr's left, extending to the river below. Mc- 
 Pherson remained in roar and in column, on the road, 
 
 * " So strong was the position, that my greatest, almost only appre- 
 hension, was a Hank movement by Bridgeport or Baldwin's ferry, 
 which would have endangered my communications with Yicksburg."— 
 Pemherton. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 277 
 
 ready eltlier to support McClernand, if necessary, or 
 to effect a crossing Liglier up, and, in conjunction 
 with Sherman, drive the enemy from the position at 
 the bridge, by marching on his left flank. 
 
 Artillery-flre and skirmishing continued for several 
 hours. The day was hot, and Lawler, who was rush- 
 ing around without a coat, discovered that by moving 
 one portion of his brigade througli the copse, under 
 cover of the river-bank, and the remainder directly 
 against the left flank of the enemy, he could reach a 
 position from which he might be able to carry the 
 work by storm. Accordingly, he marched eleven 
 hundred men, the rest of the command supporting, 
 across the open ground, exposed to a destructive fire 
 of musketry, up to tlie very edge of the ditch. The 
 supports charged as soon as they saw Lawler start, 
 for the troops were inspired by their continued suc- 
 cess, and emulous of each other's glory. The head 
 of the assaulting column arrived opposite the end of 
 the rebel parapet, and discovered that the trees and 
 brushwood had not been felled in the stream at this 
 point, so that there was a narrow and unobstructed 
 defile, through which four men could pass abreast. 
 Through this the entire party rushed, crossed the 
 ditch in a moment of time, and before the enemy 
 could make any disposition to resist the attack, the 
 whole rebel line in front of Lawler was driven from 
 the parapet. The remainder of Carr's division and 
 Osterhaus's command, heanng the cheers of Lawler's 
 men, moved forward on a run, but met no opposition. 
 The enemy had fled before Carr and Osterhaus could 
 reach the ditch.* Tlie unexpected success of the 
 
 * " Our troops on their front did not wait to receive thera, but 
 broke and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being broken, 
 it very soon became a matter of sauve qui pent." — Peniberton. 
 
278 MLLITAEY HISTOKY OF 
 
 charge completely demoralized the rebels, already 
 disheartened by the great defeat of the day before. 
 They fled at once to the crossing, abandoning their 
 guns without a struggle. The panic spread to the 
 troops on the western bank, who set fire to the 
 brido^e before half of those on the eastern side had 
 crossed. Then began a Avild struggle to reach the 
 river; some few rebels succeeded in swimming across, 
 among them General Green, but many were drowned. 
 No regard for rank was observed ; officers and men 
 made up one mass of fugitives. Some were too timid 
 to expose themselves to the fii^e of the pursuing 
 enemy, and remained in the trenches to surrender. 
 One entire brigade was thus surrounded and cap- 
 tured. Grant's loss in this engagement was twenty- 
 nine killed and two hundred and forty-two wounded. 
 Seventeen hundred and fifty-one prisoners fell into 
 his hands, and eio'hteen cannon and five stands of 
 colors were also trophies of this brilliant movement. 
 The number of killed and wounded among the rebels 
 is not known ; it was, however, small. 
 
 Without any delay, or any further attempt to re- 
 sist the crossing of the national troops, Pemberton now 
 stai-ted at once for Vicksburg, with his depressed and 
 discomfited followers. Strag^srlers in larsre numbers 
 had already abandoned his aimy, whose spirit seemed 
 absolutely destroyed ; he was ignorant of the fate of 
 Loring's division, and was alarmed lest Grant, by a 
 flank movement on Bridgeport or Baldwin, might 
 even reach Vicksburg before him. The rapidity and 
 strangeness of the latter's manoeuvres had evidently 
 aftected the imasrination of his antasjonist, for he said : 
 "The enemy, by a flank movement on my left at 
 Bridgeport, and on my right by Baldwin's or other 
 
FLYSSES S. GRANT. 279 
 
 ferries, miglit reacli Vicksburg almost simultaneously 
 with myself, or perliaps interpose a heavy force be- 
 tween me and that city. I myself proceeded at once 
 to Yicksbiirg to prepare for its defence." Grant, in- 
 deed, could have gone into Vicksburg, that night, if the 
 bridges had not been destroyed. The battle of Black 
 river bridge was over by ten o'clock in the morning. 
 Lawler bad received no orders to make bis gallant 
 charge ; be and his men deserve all the credit of its 
 success.* Of course, it greatly facilitated the advance 
 of tbe national anny, entirely uncovering every road 
 to Vicksburo;. 
 
 Grant at once directed the construction of bridges, 
 for at this place the Big Black is vride and deep, and 
 the rebels had secured at least twelve hours' advance, 
 by the destruction of the crossing. He also ordered 
 all the cavalry at bis disposal to move out as far as 
 Brownsville, and ascertain if possible the position 
 and intentions of Johnston. During the day, he sent 
 word to Sherman: "Secure a commanding position 
 on tbe west bank of Black river, as soon as you can. 
 If tbe information you gain after crossing warrants 
 you in believing you can go immediately into the 
 city, do so. If there is any doubt in this matter, 
 throw out troops to the left, after advancing on a 
 line with the raili-oad bridge, to open your communi- 
 cations with the troops here. We will then move in 
 tbree columns, if roads can be found to move on, and 
 either have Yicksbiu-g or Haine's bluff to-morrow 
 nigbt. The enemy liave been so terribly beaten yes- 
 terday and to-day, that I cannot believe that a stand 
 
 * Colonel Kinsman, of the Twenty- Third Iowa, who was killed at 
 the head of his regiment, is said to have suggested the charge. 
 
280 JULITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 will be made, unless tlie troops are relying on John- 
 ston's arriving witli large reenforcements ; nor that 
 Johnston would attempt to reenforce with any thing 
 at his command, if he was at all aware of tlie present 
 condition of things." 
 
 McPherson and McClernand constructed floatinsf 
 bridges out of the dry timber taken from the trestle- 
 work of the railroad, and from cotton-gins and faim- 
 houses in the neighborhood. One was built of cot- 
 ton bales, fastened together by boards, and covered 
 with a roadway of plank obtained from adjacent 
 houses. Eansom built a bridge by simply felling 
 large trees on either bank, and bending them so as 
 to meet in the middle of the stream. Planks were 
 then laid across, and the troops marched over. These 
 labors continued all night, and by eight o'clock on 
 the morning of the 18th of May, the Thirteenth and 
 Seventeenth corps were again in motion for Vicks- 
 burg. 
 
 Sherman reached Bridgeport by noon of the 17th, 
 and found Blair already there, witli his pontoon- 
 train. The enemy's bridge of boats had been de- 
 stroyed, and a body of rebels was intrenched to de- 
 fend tlie crossing ; but, on the appearance of nation- 
 al troops, they at once displayed a white flag, 
 and the pontoon bridge was laid. Blair and Steele 
 passed over that night, Tuttle following in the morn- 
 ing. 
 
 On tlie l7th, Johnston marched fifteen miles, 
 towards the point indicated in Pemberton's dispatch 
 of the lOtli, for their junction; but, Pemberton had 
 already been ])eaten at Champion's hill, and was then 
 beinrr beaten again at the Big Black bridge. That 
 night, he retired within the lines at Vicksburg, and 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAITT. 281 
 
 Jolinston marcliea, on tlie 18th, to Vernon, where he 
 hoped to form a junction with his unlucky subor- 
 dinate, if the latter should ever succeed in cutting his 
 way out of the town. 
 
 Starting at break of day, on the 18th, Sherman 
 pushed rapidly on, and, by nine and a half o'clock, 
 the head of his column had struck the Benton road, 
 three miles and a half from Vicksburg ; he thus com- 
 manded the Yazoo river, interposing a superior force 
 between the rebels in the town and their forts on the 
 Yazoo. His advance now rested till the whole com- 
 mand should close up. 
 
 Grant was with Sherman when his column struck 
 the Walnut hills. As they rode together up the 
 farthest heig^ht, where it looks down on the Yazoo 
 river, and stood upon the very bluif from which 
 Sherman had been repulsed six months before, the 
 two soldiers gazed for a moment on the long-wished- 
 for goal of the campaign, — the high dry ground on 
 the north of Vicksburg, and the base for their sup- 
 plies. Sherman at last turned abruptly round, and 
 exclaimed to Grant: "Until this moment, I never 
 thought your expedition a success. I never could 
 see the end clearly, until now. But this is a cam- 
 paign ; this is a success, if we never take the town.'' 
 The other, as usual, smoked his cigar and made no 
 reply. The enthusiastic subordinate had seen the 
 dangers of this venturesome campaign so vividly, that 
 his vision was dimmed for beholding success, imtil it 
 lay revealed on the banks of the Yazoo ; but then, 
 with the magnanimity of a noble nature, he rejoiced 
 in the victories whose laurels he could not claim. 
 His chief had believed all alono^ that he should ac- 
 complish what was now performed, and the realiza- 
 
282 MILITARY HISTOPvY OF 
 
 tion of this belief neither surprised nor elated the 
 most equable of commanders * 
 
 Grant now directed Sherman to operate on the 
 rio-ht, and irave McPherson the centre, while McCler- 
 nand had the left of the command. Sherman pushed 
 the head of his column till the sldrmishers were 
 within musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg ; 
 and, by dark, he had reached the bluffs on the Mis- 
 sissippi river. Early next morning, possession was 
 obtained of the enemy's outer works ; his camps, and 
 many prisoners, left behind in the hasty evacuation, 
 were also captured ; and Steele's pickets were within 
 easy range of the new rebel line. At eight a. m. on 
 the 19th of May, the enemy was compassed on the 
 north side of Vicksburg ; Grant's right resting on the 
 Mississippi river, within full view of the national 
 fleet at the mouth of the Yazoo. Vicksburg itself 
 was in plain sight, and nothing separated Sherman 
 from the enemy but a space of about four hundred 
 yards, cut up by almost impassable ravines, and the 
 rebel line of intrenchments. 
 
 McClernand and McPherson also moved, at the 
 earliest practicable moment on the ISth, Grant 
 liavino; ordered: "No teams allowed to cross the 
 river until all the troops are over, except ambulances 
 and ammunition-wagons." f McPherson crossed the 
 
 ♦ Sherman had not been present at any of the victories in this cam- 
 paign, except Jackson. It so chanced that his corps had done more 
 than its share of the marching, and none at all of the heavy lighting, 
 fluring the twenty days ; he therefore had not felt that splendid confi- 
 dence which only those who engage in successful battle know, 
 
 t " Move your corps as early as possible, taking the direct road as 
 far as Mount Albans. From that point reconnoitre well as you advance. 
 If a parallel road can be found within three miles of the direct road, 
 take it. Ko trains will be allowed to cross the river until all the troops 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 283 
 
 Big Black, above tlie Jackson road, early in the day, 
 and came into the same road ^vitll Slierman, but in 
 the rear. His advance arrived after nightfall, at the 
 place where Sherman had turned to the right, and 
 took a position on Sherman's left. The remainder of 
 the Seventeenth corps bivousccked, that night, further 
 back on tlie road, where there was water, and came 
 into line in the morning. McClernand marched, by 
 the Vicksburg and Jackson road, to Mount Albans, 
 and then turaed to the left, to the Baldwin's ferry 
 road. At sunset, he had reached a point about 
 four miles from Vicksburg. By these dispositions, 
 the three army coi'ps covered all the gi'ound their 
 strength would allow, and on the morning of May 
 19th, the siege of Vicksburg began. 
 
 Communication was at once opened with the 
 fleet, and a force was sent to take possession of 
 Haine's bluff; for the enemy had abeady abandoned 
 that sti'oughold, wdiich had so long opposed the na- 
 tional commanders, and its garrison was withdrawn 
 into Vicksburg. It was, of course, impossible" for 
 Pemberton to hold the place after Grant had got 
 between Haine's bluff' and Vicksburg. Fourteen 
 heavy guns had been abandoned, for there was not 
 time to remove them ; these were taken possession of 
 by the navy, before the troops arrived. Chickasaw 
 landing, at the foot of Walnut hills, was at once 
 made the base for supplies during the siege ; bridges 
 and roads were built, to bring up ammunition and 
 provisions ; and the very post that had so long ob- 
 structed Grant was thus compelled to minister him 
 
 are over, except ambulauces and ammunition-wagons. One brigade 
 will be left to guard the bridge and trains, and to bring the latter over 
 after the troops have all passed.''— Grant to McClernand. 
 
284 iraJTAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 strength, while he prosecuted his efforts against the 
 city of which it had been so formidable an outwork. 
 But, the rebels had now given up all outworks, and, 
 discomfited in the open field, the relieving army 
 driven away, all communication destroyed, all sup- 
 plies cut off, the garrison had retired within the de- 
 fences of Vicksburg. 
 
 It was just twenty days since the camj)aign be- 
 gan. In that time. Grant had marched more than 
 two hundi'ed miles, beaten two armies in five several 
 battles, captured twenty-seven heavy cannon and 
 sixty-one pieces of field-artillery, taken six thousand 
 five hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded at 
 least six thousand rebels more. He had forced the 
 evacuation of Grand Gulf, seized the capital of the 
 state, destroyed the railroads at Jackson for a dis- 
 tance of more than thirty miles, and invested the 
 principal rebel stronghold on the Mississippi river. 
 Separating forces twice as numerous as his own, 
 he had beaten first, at Port Gibson, a portion of 
 Perabei-ton's army; then, at Kaymond and Jackson, 
 the troops under Johnston's immediate command ; 
 Mnd again, at Champion's hill and the Big Black 
 river, the whole force that Pemberton dared take 
 outsitle of the works of Vicksburg. Starting with- 
 out teams, and with an average of two days' ra- 
 tions in haversacks, he had picked up wagons in the 
 country, and sul)sisted principally on forage and 
 rations that he found on the road. Only five days' 
 rations had been issued in the twenty days, yet 
 neither suffering nor comj^laint was witnessed in 
 the command. Ilis losses were six hundred and 
 ninety-eight killed, three thousand four hundred and 
 seven wounded, and two hundred and thirty miss- 
 
ULYSSES S. GP»ANT. 285 
 
 ing ; in all, four tliousand three hundred and thirty- 
 five.^' 
 
 The rebel movements in this campaign could 
 hardly have been better contrived to facilitate the 
 movements and objects of the national commander. 
 When Grant moved south of Vicksburg, Pemberton 
 was at once apprised of the fact by Bowen, and made 
 what lie supposed ample dispositions to meet the na- 
 tional forces.f The demonstration at Haine's bluff, 
 however, distracted the rebel general, who repeated- 
 ly alludes to it in his official reports. But he sent 
 orders for Loring, who was at Jackson, to huny with 
 two regiments to the support of Bowen, and also di 
 rected Stevenson, in command at Vicksbui'g, to have 
 five thousand men ready to reiinforce the garrison at 
 Grand Gulf J "When it was discovered that Grant 
 
 * The following extracts from NaiDolcoii's proclamation to liis sol- 
 diers after Lis first great Italian campaign, illustrate liow curiously 
 Uistory repeats itself: " Soldiers ! in a fortnight you have gained six 
 victories, taken twenty-one pairs of colors, fifty-five pieces of cannon, 
 several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont ; you 
 have made fifteen thousand prisoners, and killed or wounded more 
 than ten thousand men. . . , Destitute of every thing, you have sup- 
 plied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon, crossed 
 rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked 
 without brandy, and often without bread. The republican i^halanxes, 
 the soldiers of liberty alone, could have endured what you have en- 
 dured. . . . The two armies wliich so lately attacked you boldly are 
 fleeing aflrighted before you ; the perverse men who laughed at your 
 distress, and rejoiced in thought at the triumphs of your enemies, are 
 confounded and trembling." 
 
 t Pemberton had anticipated an attack on Grand Gulf as early as 
 April 23d, immediately after the passage of the batteries by Grant. 
 
 X On the 28th of April, Pemberton ordered Stevenson, "All troops 
 not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg, should be 
 held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf; " and ou 
 the 29th he informed Johnston: "The enemy is at Ilard Times, in 
 large force, with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack 
 Grand Gulf, with a view to Vicksburg." 
 
286 Jin.ITAKY HISTOKY OF 
 
 had absolutely landed, these forces were all ordered 
 forward; but the rebels did not move with the 
 celerity of their antagonists; before Loring anived, 
 and when about half of the troops from Vicksburg 
 were on the field, the bat'tle of Port Gibson was lost 
 and won. Had the reenforcements all got np, how- 
 ever, the result would probaldy have been unchanged. 
 The fragments of his army, that Pemberton sent for- 
 ward, were mere mouthfuls to Grant, who was ad- 
 vancing with all his disposable force. Port Gibson 
 was lost as a matter of course, and Grand Gulf fell, 
 before the rebels had time to carry off their heavy 
 guns. 
 
 Johnston, although so far away, saw this emer- 
 gency more clearly than his subordinate. He tele- 
 graphed from Tullahoma, May 1st, after the battle of 
 Port Gibson : " If Grant's army lands on this side of 
 the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beat- 
 ing it. For that object you should unite your whole 
 force." And again on the 2d: "If Grant crosses, 
 nnite your whole force to beat him ; success will give 
 back what was abandoned to win it." Very good 
 advice, but easier to give than to execute ; and, at any 
 rate, written after the events had occurred which 
 rendered obedience impossible; for Grant was, at 
 this moment, in possession of Grand Gulf and in pur- 
 suit of Bowen.* 
 
 In his report he dechires : "It was the hope of being able to hold 
 the position on Bayou Pierre, upon which the safety of Jackson de- 
 pends, tlint made me most anxious to rei'nforce General Bowen." 
 
 * Pemberton thus explains his failure to move against Grant at this 
 time : "The only means of subsisting an army south of Big Black are 
 from Vicksl)urg or Jackson, the former requiring a transportation by 
 dirt road of forty, and the latter of forty-five miles, in addition to that 
 by rail. Without cavalry, I could not have protected my own com- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 287 
 
 He did Dot give Pemberton time to develop any 
 plan of liis own, but pushed on to tlie Big Black 
 river, threatening Vieksburg, and, by liis demonstra- 
 tions towards the west, probably prevented the reb- 
 els fi'om detecting his real design of attacking Jackson. 
 Pemberton at any rate made no effort to interfere, 
 but remained carefully in Vieksburg, or near it, while 
 Grant ^vas bringing up reenforcements and supplies. 
 When the eastern movement at length began, Pem- 
 berton still seemed not to comprehend it ; apparently 
 not dreaming that Grant would dare move so far 
 from a base, he saw him start to the interior without 
 alarm, thinkino; himself sure of cuttina: the communi- 
 cations of the national army. But, even yet, he did 
 not attempt to accomplish his own designs, until 
 Grant reached Raymond. Then, indeed, he fell into 
 the snare designed; supposing Edward's station to 
 be the objective of Grant, he waited there securely 
 to receive an attack ; and, in his foolish confidence, 
 even ordered troops from Jackson and Raymond to 
 fall on the flank and rear of his antagonist. These 
 unfortunates accordingly came up to Raymond and 
 met their own destruction ; for Grant, instead of as- 
 saulting the mass of the rebels at Edward's station, 
 where they were prepared, reached out after this de- 
 tachment at Raymond, falling upon it once more 
 with a superior force, which left no doubt of the re- 
 sult. 
 
 Johnston now appears upon the scene in person. 
 
 municatioua, mucli less have cut those of the enemy. To have marched 
 an army across Big Black with sufficient strength to warrant a reason- 
 able hope of successfully encountering his very superior forces, would 
 have stripped Vieksburg and its essential flank defences of their garri- 
 sons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager 
 hands of the enemv." 
 
288 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 He amved at Jackson the day after the defeat at 
 Raymond, and, finding a corps of Grant's army ad- 
 vanced as fir as Clinton, supposed it to be entirely 
 detached from the rest of the national command, that 
 command being only ten miles off. Johnston ordered 
 Pemberton to fall at once on the rear of this detached 
 eor])S, while the troops at Jackson should come out 
 in its front, and the corps would be annihilated. 
 Again, a very pretty plan to conceive, but again a 
 difficult one to execute. In the first place. Grant's 
 entire army was within supporting distance, and had 
 Johnston's orders been literally obeyed, the result 
 would hardly have been more fortunate. But John- 
 ston's orders were set at nausjht. Pemberton did 
 not like risking his communications mth Vicksburg, 
 and remained quiet for a day, after receiving this 
 order; while Grant moved with two corps against 
 Johnston, a third time beating the enemy in detail ; 
 but, this time, meeting other troops and a new and 
 greater general. 
 
 Jackson fell, the railroads were destroyed, and 
 Pemberton's real communications cut, if he had had 
 but the wit to know it; for he could not live in 
 Vicksburg, with a hostile army between himself and 
 Jackson. Pemberton was besieo:ed ^vhen Jackson 
 fell. But Johnston now, in his turn, beo-an scatter- 
 ing his troops; he went himself with one division 
 towards Canton, and ordered another body coming 
 up, to remain forty or fifty miles to the east, out of 
 tlie reach of this army of Grant, that was falling 
 upon every scattered detachment in the state. If he 
 could not unite his forces, at least he would disperse 
 and save them. So Johnston went north and Gist 
 went east, while Grant converc^ed. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 289 
 
 At tliis time, Pemberton, not dreaming that Grant 
 bad readied and captured Jackson, proposed to fall 
 on tlie communications of Lis antagonist, supposing 
 tliese could be cut at Dillon's. But what communica- 
 tions Grant now bad were witb Jackson, and liis face 
 was turned tow^ards Vicksburg, wben Pemberton set 
 out to attack bis rear at Billon's. Slowly moving, 
 Pemberton bears of Johnston's defeat, and gets re- 
 newed orders to unite witb bis commander. At last 
 be obeys ; reverses bis column, to form a junction witb 
 Johnston, and is struck in the act by the whole anny 
 of Grant, already back from Jackson, and moving up 
 in three columns to the assault. Pemberton falls 
 into position in which to receive the national attack ; 
 a position strong by natui-e, and defended by twenty- 
 five thousand troops, who as yet bad not been de- 
 feated by Grant. Here he fights well, and, at last, 
 is in numbers a match for bis foe; but neither num- 
 bers nor position avails ; he is driven in utter confu- 
 sion from bis lofty height, and the garrison of Vicks- 
 buro; is fusfitive. 
 
 O CD 
 
 Demoi-alization now begins. The rebel troops are 
 disheartened at their series of reverses; whichever way 
 they turn, this omnipresent enemy falls upon them. 
 They flee to the Big Black river, but be is already on 
 their left, and they fear be will soon he in their rear; 
 wben he attacks in front, they lose their wonted 
 courage, which had stood them so well in many a 
 gallant fight, and ignominiously succuml). Large 
 numbers are captured without resistance; and the 
 army that set out from the stronghold of Mississippi 
 so proud and so terrible, returns a cowering, dis- 
 comfited mob; many of its numbers left dead and 
 wounded on a well-contested field, thousands cut oft" 
 
 19 
 
290 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 none knew how nor wliere, thousands prisoners in 
 the hands of the enemy — thousands straggling, de- 
 sertin<^ — all flying before a flushed and victorious 
 foe; their banners captured, their guns left in the 
 hands of the enemy. Three cannon only are said to 
 have been carried back into Vicksburg by Pemberton. 
 
 Grant followed up rapidly, and shut the rebels in 
 on every side ; the day of their arrival, the hostile 
 lines were formed, and Vicksburg was besieged. 
 
 The campaign in the rear of Vicksburg was re- 
 markable, not only for the rapidity with which it was 
 executed and the success which attended its move- 
 ments, but for the originality of its conceptions, both 
 in their general plan and in detail. The war of the 
 rebellion was not like wars on European battle-fields, 
 where the opposing generals can overlook the con- 
 tending armies as two chess-players do their board. 
 The extensive forests w^hich cover the Southern coun- 
 try gave the rebels the advantage of a great natural 
 defence, and afforded a cloak to all their movements 
 to sui'prise or outflank an invading army. In this 
 wilderness, good common roads were almost unknown, 
 and military roads, like those in Europe, unheard of; 
 heavy rains often converted the rivulets into rivers, 
 and tlie highways into impassable canals. Railroads, 
 therefore, became the vital lines of support to all de- 
 fensive armies, and the object of attack to every in- 
 vading column. All the strategy of the war was 
 based on the importance and applicability of this 
 principle. The rapid concentration of troops and 
 the transportation of supplies, the relief of beleag 
 uered gan-isons, the separation of supporting armies, 
 often depended solely on the security or destruction 
 of railroad lines. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 291 
 
 It was this wliicli induced commanders to risk 
 raids and raarcliing columns far into the wilderness, 
 leaping from one base of supx)lies to another, hun- 
 dreds of miles away. Grant's march tli rough the 
 forest till he passed below Vicksburg, his crossing 
 the almost impassable Mississippi, an enterprise 
 deemed so difficult that the rebels hardly considered 
 it in their arrangements for defence, his throwing his 
 columns into the wilderness in the rear of the city, 
 and suddenly appearing before Johnston and beating 
 him in detail, then driving Pemberton into Vicks- 
 burg, and striking for a new base on the Yazoo — 
 were all due to the conclusion he arrived at, that the 
 rules of strategy laid down in the books and applica- 
 ble in a champaign country, should be violated in 
 the wilderness. The condition of things was unpre- 
 cedented in the wars we read of; his mode of over- 
 coming such unknown obstacles had to be, and was, 
 orio-inal. His mind, indeed, was never much inclined 
 to follow precedents, or to set store by rules. He 
 was not apt to study the means by which other men 
 had succeeded; he seldom discussed the campaigns 
 of crreat commanders in European wars, and was ut- 
 terly indifferent to precept or example, whenever 
 these seemed to liim inapplicable. He thus disap- 
 pointed his greatest subordinates, and, indeed, even 
 the general-in-chief and the government, as well as 
 the enemy, none of whom anticipated the success of 
 his plans, or foresaw the means by which that suc- 
 cess was to be accomplished. 
 
 But Grant remembered and applied the lesson 
 taught him at Holly Springs. He had learned there 
 that an army could live ^vithout a base; and now 
 with a larger army, and for a longer penod, and amid 
 
292 MELrrAKY history of 
 
 tenfold greater dangers, lie put tlie principle to tlie 
 test. No anny in modern times had ever made a 
 similar attempt. Napoleon, indeed, as lie tersely 
 said, made war support war, but it was on a different 
 plan from Grant's. Tlie great Corsican forced the 
 cities and towns tliat lie conquered to furnisli liim 
 supplies ; but lie did it deliberately, and in advance ; 
 lie made Lis arrangements according to a system of 
 forced requisitions, and tlirough tlie authorities; be 
 never plunged into a hostile region Avith no more 
 supplies than his army carried in their haversacks. 
 This may, indeed, have been done for a day or two, 
 on a forced march, or for a special object, but never 
 at the outset of a campaign which was expected to 
 endure for weeks, and in which a force greater than 
 his own was sure to be encountered. Yet such op- 
 erations were infinitely more feasible in the rich and 
 cultivated plains of Europe, than among the sparsely 
 settled wilds of Mississippi. 
 
 The people of the country, of course, suffered 
 greatly in this campaign. The system of foraging 
 was veiy simple. There was no time for elaborate 
 requisitions. Parties of men were disj^atched each 
 night, as well as often during the march by day, who 
 scoured the country for miles on each side of the 
 main column of march; these visited every planta 
 tion and fanuhouse, ransacked every barn, worked 
 every mill, seized every animal; they were always 
 siipi)osed to l)e under command of officers, but it 
 often happened that squads of men were without 
 tliis restraint. There was, however, not much time 
 lor pillage; the movements were too rapid, and the 
 tlanger of capture to stragglers too imminent, for any 
 great amount of plundeiing : indeed, the constant 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 293 
 
 motion of the troops gave less time for even the col- 
 lection of supplies, than might otherwise have been 
 tlionght indispensable. What was endured was 
 doubtless hard enough, but instances of outrage and 
 insult were rare. The rebels, too, were as merci- 
 less in their demands upon the country as the na- 
 tional troops, and lived oif the people quite as 
 closely,* so that the inhabitants had small choice 
 between friend or foe. They were stripped bare of 
 supplies. 
 
 The Vicksburg campaign has frequently been 
 compared with that of Napoleon at Uhu ; f but, how- 
 ever much it may resemble that wonderful series of 
 operations in some of its results, it will be seen, upon 
 closer study, to bear still more resemblance to the first 
 fifteen days of the same great warrior in Italy in 1796, 
 than to any other campaign in modern times. In 
 each, the invader was opposed by two armies, se[)a- 
 rated by a distance of thirty or forty miles; in each, 
 the natural obstacles were prodigious; Napoleon 
 crossed the Appenines, Grant the Mississippi; in 
 each, the invader penetrated between the two armies 
 that should have combined to crush him. In both 
 campaigns the successful soldier massed his forces each 
 time upon a smaller body of the enemy, and, although 
 with fewer troops in all, contrived to be the superior 
 
 * " Instructions had been given from Bovina that all cattle, sheep, 
 and bogs belonging to private parties, and likely to fall into the hands 
 of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. A large amount of 
 fresh meat was secured in this way. The same instructions were given 
 in regard to corn, and all disi)osable wagons applied to this end." — 
 Peiribertoti'a lieport. 
 
 t"In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of 
 routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of 
 Napoleon about Ulm." — HaUecJc to Grant, July 31, 1863. 
 
294 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 wherever Le met tlie foe ; in both, tMs was accom- 
 plislied by a celerity wliicli left the enemy no time 
 to recover from tlie effect of one blow' before another 
 fell; in both, the rapidity of the marching, and the 
 unexpected novelty of the combinations, made the 
 strategy more imj^ortant than the fighting ; in both, 
 tlie results were still more remarkable than the man- 
 ner of the achievements. Napoleon secui'ed Genoa, 
 and divided the kingdom of Sardinia fi'om the Aus 
 trian alliance; while he created a new base for the 
 splendid operations which speedily followed in Par- 
 ma and Lombardy. Grant, besides the immediate 
 successes of the campaign itself, won Vicksburg, 
 opened the Mississipj)! river, and dealt the rebel- 
 lion a blow from which it was destined never to 
 recover. 
 
 Grant's disadvantages were enhanced by his uu- 
 familiarity with the country, and by the broken, 
 rugged natui-e of the hills, which gave the rebels in- 
 numerable and splendid opportunities for defence, of 
 which they never foiled to avail themselves. Every 
 hillside was a fortification, every creek a ditch, every 
 forest an al)atis. Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, 
 Champion's hill, and the Big Black — each battle illus- 
 trates this, and added to the losses and difiiculties of 
 the national conmumder. But Napoleon had more 
 mobile and better-trained troops to contend with, 
 and found the lastnesses of the Appenines as diflicult 
 as the ravines of Mississippi were to the American ; 
 so that their difiiculties were probably equalized. 
 Finally, although Napoleon had conquered a kino-- 
 doin when he ended the campaign, he had still other 
 states to master, which it took him a whole year to 
 subdue ; while Grant, too, was only ready to begin a 
 
ULYSSES S. GEAXT. 295 
 
 siege when the field-fighting and the marching were 
 concluded; success to each was but the stepping-stone 
 to other struggles, the vestibule to other and greater 
 victories/^ 
 
 * See Appendix for Grant's correspondence with the government, in 
 regard to the Vicksburg campaign, entire. 
 
296 MILITAEl HISTORY OF 
 
 CHAPTEK VIII. 
 
 Land defences of Vicksburg — Johnston orders Pemberton to evacuate — Pem- 
 berton determines to hold out — Position of Grant's army on 19th of M;iy — 
 Partial and unsuccessful assault — Rebels i-ecover their spirit — National 
 troops rested and supplies brought up — Orders for a general assault on the 
 22d — Reasons for this assault — Mortar bombardment — Heavy cannonade on 
 land front — Sherman assaults with Blair and Steele's divisions — Troops reach 
 the parapet, but are repelled — Ransom's assault — Difficult nature of the 
 ground — Failure of McPherson's attempt — ^McClernand's assault determined 
 and gallant, but completely repelled — Distmguished bravery of individuals — 
 Failure of assault all along the line — McClernand's dispatches — Grant's re- 
 plies — Renewal of the assault — Second failure — Grant's position during the 
 assault — Renewed dispatches from McClernand — Reenforcements sent to 
 McClernand — Death of Boomer — Results of the assault — Comparison with 
 assaults in European wars. 
 
 The ground on Avliicli the city of Vicksburg 
 stands is supposed by some to have been originally a 
 plateau, four or five miles long and about two miles 
 wide, and two or three hundred feet above the Mis- 
 sissippi river.'*' This plateau has been gradually 
 washed away by rains and streams, until it is trans- 
 formed into a labyrinth of sharp ridges and deep ir- 
 regular ravines. The soil is fine, and when cut verti- 
 
 '•' The Dllicial rqiort of engineer operations at the siege of Vicksburg, 
 by Captains Prime and Comstock, U. S. Engineers, and the manuscript 
 memoir, already referred to, of Lieutenant (now Brevet Major-General) 
 Wilson, have furnished most of the details of engineer operations for this 
 and the following chapter. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAITT. 297 
 
 cally "by the action of the Avater, remains in a per- 
 pendicular position for years; and the smaller and 
 newer ravines are often so deep that their ascent is 
 difficult to a footman, unless he aids himself with his 
 hands. The sides of the declivities are thickly 
 wooded, and the bottoms of the ravines never level, 
 except when the streams that formed them have been 
 unusually large. 
 
 At Vicksburg, the Mississippi runs a little west of 
 south, and all the streams that enter it from the east 
 run southwest. One of these empties into the river 
 five miles below the city, and the dividing ridge 
 that separates two of its branches was that on 
 which the rebel line, east of Vicksburg, was built. 
 On the northern side of the town, the line also ran 
 alono; a dividing: rido^e, between two small streams 
 that enter the Mississippi just above Vicksburg: 
 these ridges are generally higher than any ground in 
 their vicinity. Leaving the Mississippi on the north- 
 ern side of Vicksburg, where the bluffs strike the 
 river, the line stretched back two miles into the in- 
 terior, crossed the valleys of two small streams, and 
 reached the river again below, at a point where the 
 bluff falls back from the Mississippi nearly a mile. 
 Here, the works followed the bluff up the ri\er for a 
 mile or more, so as to give fire towards the south on 
 any troops that might attempt an attack from that 
 direction, by moving along the bottom-land between 
 the bluff and the Mississippi. 
 
 The whole line was between seven and eight miles 
 long, exclusive of the four miles of rifle-trench and 
 heavy batteries on the water-front. It consisted of a 
 series of detached works, on prominent and com- 
 manding points, connected by a continuous line of 
 
298 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 trench or iille-i)it. The works were necessarily ir- 
 regular, from the shape of the ridges on which they 
 were situated, and, in only one instance, closed at 
 the gorge. They were placed at distances of from 
 seventy-five to five hundred yards from each other. 
 Tlie connecting rifle-pit was simple, and generally 
 about breast - high. The ravines were the only 
 ditches, except in front of the detached works, but 
 no others were needed, trees being felled in fr-ont of 
 the Avhole line, and forming, in many places, entan- 
 glements which, under fire, were absolutely impas- 
 sable. In military j^arlance, Vicksburg was rather 
 an intrenched camp than a fortified place, owing 
 much of its extraordinary strength to the difficult 
 nature of the ground, which rendered rapidity of 
 movement and unity of efFoi*t in an assault, impos- 
 sible. 
 
 North of the Jackson road, the hills are higher, 
 and covered ^vith a denser growth of timber, and 
 here, in consequence, the enemy had been able to 
 make his line exceedingly strong, and difficult of ap- 
 proach. But, from the Jackson road to the river, on 
 the south, the country was cleared and cultivated ; 
 the ridges also were lo^^'er, and the slopes more gen- 
 tle, though the ground was still rough and entirely 
 unfitted for any united tactical movement. What 
 the enemy kicked on this side, in natural defences, he 
 liad supplied by giving increased strength to his 
 works. Tlie whole aspect of the rugged fastness, 
 bristling with bayonets, and crowned with artillery 
 that swept the narrow defiles in every direction, was 
 calculated to inspire new coiu*age in those who came 
 thronging into its recesses and behind its bulwarks, 
 from their succession of disasters in the oj^en field. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 299 
 
 Here, too, were at least eight thousand fresh troops, 
 who as yet liad suffered none of the demoralization 
 of defeat ; and, with his thirty thousand men, and 
 nearly two hundi^ed cannon, the rebel leader thought 
 himself well able to stand a siege. If he had sup- 
 plies enough to feed his army, he could surely hold 
 out till another force, under Johnston, could be col- 
 lected for his relief 
 
 But, as soon as Johnston learned that Pemberton 
 had been driven into Vicksburg, he dispatched to 
 that commander: "If Haine's bluff be untenable, 
 Vicksburs: is of no value, and cannot be held. K, 
 therefore,^ you are invested at Vicksburg, you must 
 ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, in- 
 stead of losing both troops and place, you must, if 
 possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evac- 
 uate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to 
 the northeast." This order reached Pemberton on 
 the 18th of May, while Grant was still advancing on 
 the Jackson road. Pemberton, as usual, called a 
 council of war, to deliberate on the propriety of obe- 
 dience. The council ^vas composed of all his general 
 officers, and their opinion was unanimous, that " to 
 withdraw from Vicksburg, with such morale and 
 materiel^ as to be of further service to the Confed- 
 eracy, would be impossible." Before the council 
 broke up, the guns of the advancing army were 
 heard, as they opened on the works of Vicksburg, 
 and reports came in, that Grant's troops were (»'Oss- 
 ino: the Yazoo river, above Ilaine's bluff. Pember- 
 ton at once replied to his commander : " I have de- 
 cided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, with 
 the firm hope that the government may yet be able 
 to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's 
 
300 julitaey history of 
 
 free navigation of the Mississippi." He was deter- 
 mined to be besieged. 
 
 Pemberton was now, according to bis own state- 
 ment, able to liring into the trenches eighteen thou- 
 sand live hundred muskets; from these, however, his 
 reserves were to be deducted, which, he said, would 
 reduce the force in tlie trenches to fifteen thousand 
 five hundred men.'* Stevenson was put on the right, 
 his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the 
 railroad, a distance of nearly five miles ; Forney had 
 the line between the raib-oad and the Graveyard 
 road ; and Smith, with his own troops, and some rem- 
 nants of Loring's fugitive command that had strag- 
 Med back into Vicksburo^, had the extreme left, from 
 the Graveyard road to the river on the north. Bowen 
 was held in reserve, ready to strengthen any portion 
 of the line most threatened. In addition to the guns 
 on the water-front, one hundred and two pieces of 
 artillery of different calibre, principally field, were 
 placed in position on the land side, and details of 
 men were set to work strengthening the fortifications. 
 All cattle, sheep, and hogs belonging to private par- 
 ties, as far as Bovina, had been driven into the 
 Avorks several days before, and all corn on the road 
 also collected. " With proper economy of subsistence 
 and ordnance stores," said Pemberton, "I knew I 
 could stand a siege." 
 
 The steep hills and deep gullies in the rear of 
 Vicltsburg extended beyond the rebel fortifications 
 aiul into the region occupied by Grant. The stiff 
 
 * Althougb Pemberton said that he had only eighteen thousand 
 five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand 
 nearly seven weeks later, and received no reentbrccmcnts in the mean 
 while. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 301 
 
 hard day of wLicli the soil is comj)osed was mucli 
 cut up by the wasli of streams, and covered with, as 
 dense a forest, here, as inside the works ; the valleys 
 were filled with cane and willow, and accessilde only 
 by two or three tolerable roads. In the diy season, 
 which was now approaching, water is very scarce, 
 and found only in pools or ponds made by damming 
 up the little gullies. It was through this broken 
 country, and across these wooded cliffs and rugged 
 chasms, that the national line was formed. Sher- 
 man's corps was on the right, McPherson had the 
 centre, and McClernand the left of the command. On 
 the northern and eastern sides of the city, the invest- 
 ment was complete, but the line did not reach to the 
 river again on the south, there being more ground 
 along McClernand's front than he had troops to cover 
 it with. The investment was made close on the north- 
 ern rather than the southern side, in order to ja'event 
 any junction between Johnston's army and the garri- 
 son, before Grant could make an assault, as well as 
 to cover the new base of supplies at Chickasaw 
 bayou. Grant had, at this time, about thirty thou- 
 sand men in line. 
 
 The troops w^ere buoyant with success and eager 
 for an assault, and tlieir commander believed himself 
 justified in an attempt to carry the works by storm. 
 The conduct of the rebel army at the Big Black 
 bridge, and the precipitate flight into Vicksburg af- 
 terwards, had sufficiently proved the demoralization 
 of his antagonists; he also underestimated Pcmber- 
 ton's numbers, supposing them to be about tweh'e 
 thousand or fifteen thousand effective men. Accord- 
 ingly, on the first day of the investment, the 19th 
 of May, Grant ordered his corps commanders to 
 
302 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 " push forward carefully, and gaiu positions as close 
 as possible to the enemy's works, until two o'clock 
 p. M. ; at that hour, they will fire three volleys of ar- 
 tillery from all the pieces in position. This will be 
 the si2:nal for a 2:eneral charsre alono; the whole line." 
 There was slight skirmishing on various parts of 
 the line from early morning, and everywhere the 
 troops were deployed and put into position ; on the 
 right, important ground was gained, and Sherman 
 moved forward Blair's division on the right and left 
 of the road leading to the enemy's intrenchments, dis- 
 posing his artillery so as to cover the point where the 
 fortifications were to be entered. At the appointed 
 hour, Blair advanced in line, but the ground on both 
 sides of the road was so impracticable, cut up in deep 
 chasms, and filled w^ith standing and fallen timber, 
 that it was impossible for the assaulting parties to 
 reach the trenches in any thino; like an ors-rmized con- 
 dition. The Thirteenth United States infantry was the 
 first to strike the works, and planted its colors on the 
 exterior slope ; its commander, Captain Washington, 
 was mortally wounded, and seventy-seven men out of 
 two hundred and fifty, were either killed or wounded. 
 Two volunteer regiments reached the same position 
 nearly as soon, and held their ground, firing upon 
 every head that presented itself above the parapet, 
 but failed to eftect a lodgment or even penetrate the 
 line. Other troops also gained positions on the right 
 and left, close to the parapet, but got no further than 
 the counterscai-p. The rebel fire was hot, and the 
 national loss severe. Steele's division, on Sherman's 
 extreme right, was not close enough to attack the 
 mam line, but carried a number of outworks and cap- 
 tiiicil a few prisoners. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 303 
 
 McPlierson had arrived in front of Vicksburg 
 after niglitfall of the 18th, bivouacking on the road; 
 but, early on the 19th, he moved forward into posi- 
 tion, in the ravines and along the ridges ; his line 
 was well protected by the nature of the ground, but 
 the roughness of the countiy prevented any decided 
 advance, except by Eansoni's brigade, Avhich made 
 a brief and unsuccessful attempt to carry the works 
 in its front. McClernand, having more ground to 
 march over than either of the other corps, was still, 
 at early dawn, four miles from Vicksburg ; but his 
 troops were deployed at once, batteries were put in 
 position, and opened on the rebel line, and, by two 
 o'clock, the whole coi^s was advanced as close to the 
 enemy's works as the irregular ground allowed. The 
 extreme steepness of the acclivities, the strength of 
 the works, and the vigorous resistance everywhere 
 made, all rendered it necessary to move with circum- 
 spection ; so that without any fault or hesitation on 
 the pai-t of either troops or commanders, night had 
 overtaken the national forces before they were really 
 in a condition to obey the order of Grant, except at 
 the point where Sherman had readied the works, but 
 failed to make any serious impression. Blair, how- 
 ever, held his advanced position with tenacity until 
 dark ; and, as soon as night closed in, Sheraian or- 
 dered him back a short distance, to a point where the 
 shape of the ground gave partial shelter and the 
 troops could bivouac. The result of the assault was, 
 therefore, unsuccessful. The Fifteenth corps was the 
 only one able to act vigorously ; the other two having 
 succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, 
 covered from the iire of the enemy.* 
 
 * No report was made to Grant of the losses in this assault. They 
 
304 MILITAEY HISTOPwY OF 
 
 The rebels Lad evidently begun to recover tlieii 
 spirits. Driven to their last strongliold, like wild 
 beasts at l)ay, they still held off tlie pursuers who 
 had chased them so far and hard amoug the hills. 
 It often happens that a panic-stricken army, after 
 long flight and apparently irremediable disaster, 
 suddenly recovers its tone and makes the new mettle 
 more conspicuous by comparison with former recre- 
 ancy. Something like this occurred at Vicksburg. 
 The re])el3 had reached the works in a condition 
 which their own records prove to have been as mis- 
 erable as any in which an army ever fled towards its 
 citadel. Late on a Sunday night, the main body of 
 the vanquished forces began j^ouring into the town. 
 Neither order nor discipline had been maintained on 
 the march ; the men were scattered for miles along 
 the road, declaring theii' readiness to desert rather 
 than serve again under Pemberton. The planters 
 and population of the country, fleeing from the pres- 
 ence of the victorious enemy, added to the crowd and 
 the confusion ; and the inhabitants of the city awoke 
 in terror, to find their streets thronged ^vith fugi- 
 tives — one vast, uproarious mass, in which, with 
 shrinking citizens and timid women and children, 
 were mingled the remnants of Pemberton's dismayed 
 and disorganized army. And these were the troops 
 that were now the reliance of Vicksburg." But, 
 comforted by the sight of the formidable hills. Na- 
 ture's own fortress, and looking up at the works 
 which had already withstood so many sieges and as- 
 
 were estimated by liini at fewer than five liimdi'ed; of these about one 
 hundred •were killed or severely wounded. 
 
 * Sec a rebel narrative of the siege of Vicksburg, by H. S. Abrams, 
 published in 18G3, at Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 305 
 
 saults, the rebels, who were good enougli soldiers, as 
 full of courage and endurance as any men that ever 
 fought, grew ashamed of their strange unmanliness ; 
 and, when Sherman's troops ruslied up, thinking to 
 march easily into Vicksburg, they found not only the 
 ramparts were difficult, but the defenders had got 
 new spirit, and were once more the men who had 
 fought at Donelson, and Shiloh, and at Champion's 
 hill. 
 
 But, although unsuccessful, the operations of this 
 day were important to Grant. The nature of the 
 enemy's works and their approaches, the character of 
 the ground, and the unusual obstacles by which it 
 was encumbered, together with the policy of the de- 
 fence, all became known ; while the national lines 
 were advanced, j)ositions for artillery selected, and 
 the relations of the various parts of the army were 
 fully established and understood. It was clearly 
 seen, from the knowledge thus obtained, that to carry 
 the works of Vicksburg by storm was a more serious 
 undertaking than had been at first supposed. 
 
 The troops having been constantly on the march 
 from the middle of April, and for the most of the 
 time with short supplies, were now greatly fatigued ; 
 the weather was warm and dusty; a change of 
 clothing, as well as a supply of rations, was required. 
 Plenty of meat had at all times been obtained during 
 the march, but bread had been more scarce, and the 
 men began seriously to feel its need. The camp and 
 garrison equipage had been left behind, as well as all 
 extra clothing; and it was imperative to look, in 
 some degree, after the comfort of tlie army, before 
 any thing further was attempted. 
 
 The 20th and 21st of May were devoted to the 
 
 20 
 
306 MILITARY KESTOEY OF 
 
 accomplii;=hment of these objects; communications 
 were opened, from the right and rear of the lines, 
 with the steamboat landing near Chickasaw bayou ; 
 new roads were made, so that the trains going and 
 comino- might not interfere with each other ; bridges 
 of flat-boats were laid across the bayou ; steamboats 
 were brought to the landing, loaded with supplies of 
 subsistence, forage, and ordnance stores, and served 
 as store-houses until their cargoes should be needed. 
 In case of disaster, they were thus ready to move off 
 without the sacrifice of their vast quantity of stores. 
 McClernand was directed to open communication 
 with Warrenton, and for a while drew his supplies 
 from that point; trains on the west bank moving 
 from Milliken's bend to a point opposite Warrenton, 
 whence stores were ferried to the eastern shore. The 
 hospitals and supplies at Grand Gulf were also or- 
 dered up to Warrenton. Hard bread, coffee, and 
 sugar were hauled out to the fr-ont ; and the troops 
 rested for two days, clearing the ground on which 
 they were to encamp, and acquiring a more distinct 
 idea of that over which they were to advance. Lau- 
 man's division was now arriving at Chickasaw bayou, 
 and the rest of McArthur's command at Warrenton. 
 
 Pickets were pushed forward, in the mean time, 
 and positions selected for the artillery. On the 20th, 
 also, Grant sent Admiral Porter word : " A gunboat 
 playing on the second water-battery would materially 
 help us ; " and, at noon of that day, the moriar-fleet 
 took jwsition on the west side of the peninsula, and 
 commenced the bombardment of the city. This fii'e 
 continued without intermission on the 21st, accom- 
 panied by occasional musketry and artillery attacks 
 from the land side, to which but slight response was 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 307 
 
 made. Several rebel guns were dismounted, the 
 works were ploughed up in one or two instances, and 
 a number of officers and men killed and wounded.* 
 Pemberton, however, liad determined to be economi- 
 cal in the use of ammunition, and forbade both picket 
 skirmishing and artillery combats. In consequence of 
 this, Grant was able to push forward his oavu sharp- 
 shooters, and obtain better positions for his guns. 
 The mortar bombardment was so heavy that the citi- 
 zens be2:an di^o-ino- caves in the sides of the hills, to 
 which they retreated for shelter. Pembei-ton had de- 
 sired them to leave the toAvn, but in vain ; they de- 
 clared themselves availing to risk the horrors of a 
 siege rather than quit their homes. At this time, 
 also, it was found impossible to feed the large num- 
 bers of horses and mules in Yicksburg, and they were 
 driven beyond the lines for pasturage. This relieved 
 Pemberton of a serious encumbrance, which would 
 otherwise have made heavy demands upon his limited 
 supplies of forage. 
 
 On the 21st, the arrangements for drawing sup- 
 plies of eveiy descrij)tion being complete, Grant de- 
 cided to make another attempt to carry Vicksburg 
 by storm. There were many reasons which deter- 
 mined him to adopt this course. Fii'st of all, and 
 most important, he felt that a resolute assault from 
 the advanced positions obtained on the 19th, would 
 succeed, if made with the proper vigor and coopera- 
 tion. He believed that if he formed his columns of 
 attack on the main roads, he could reach the rebel 
 works in sufficient order and with weiii'ht enouirh to 
 break through, before any serious loss could be inflict- 
 ed by the enemy. The distance to be passed over iu no 
 
 * See rebel reports. 
 
308 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 case exceeded four liundred yards, and in almost 
 every instance partial cover could be obtained, up to 
 witliin one hundred yards of the rebel line. 
 
 In addition to these tactical considerations, it was 
 known that Johnston was at Canton, with the troops 
 tliat had escaped from Jackson, reenforced by others 
 from the east and south ; that accessions were daily 
 reaching him, and that every soldier the rebel gov- 
 erament could gather up, in all its territory, would 
 doubtless soon be sent to Johnston's support. In a 
 short time he might be strong enough to attack Grant 
 in the rear, and, possibly, in conjunction with the 
 garrison, be able to raise the siege. Possession of 
 .Vicksburg, on the contrary, would enable Grant to 
 turn upon Johnston and drive him fi'om the state ; to 
 seize all the raiboads and practical military high- 
 ways, and effectually secure all the territory west of 
 the Tombigbee river, before the season for active 
 campaigning in this latitude should be past ; the gov- 
 ernment would thus be saved all necessity of send- 
 ing him reenforcements, now. so much needed else- 
 where. 
 
 Finally, the troops themselves were impatient to 
 possess Vicksburg, the prize of all their battles, and 
 bivouacs, and marches. The weather was growing 
 extremely hot, the water among the hills was getting 
 scarce, and likely to fail entirely during tlie summer. 
 The temper of the army, after its triumphant march, 
 was such that neither officers nor men would have 
 worked in the trenches with any zeal, until they be- 
 came certain that all other means had failed. The 
 capture of the works on the Big Black river was too 
 recent in their memories for them yet to tolerate the 
 tedious processes of a siege. " They felt," said one 
 
ULYSSES S. GKAIO'. 309 
 
 wlio was witli them, " as if they could march straight 
 througli Vicksburg, and up to their waists in the 
 Mississippi, without resistance." So, although Grant 
 certainly expected to succeed, he felt now, as lie did 
 at Belmont, that there was a moral as Avell as a mili- 
 tary necessity for the assault. The spirit of the men 
 demanded it, and to this spirit every real com- 
 mander will defer ; or rather, with this spirit his own 
 is sure to be in unison. Either he feels the same 
 causes, and recognizes the same effects as they ; or he 
 infuses into his men the passion, or temper, or idea 
 with which he himself is animated. It takes both 
 troops and commander to make an army ; consciously 
 or not, they sympathize, like the soul and body of a 
 livins: man. 
 
 On the 21st of May, accordingly. Grant issued his 
 orders for a general assault along the whole line, to 
 commence at ten a. m. on the morrow. Corps com- 
 manders were directed to examine thoroughly all the 
 ground over which troops could possibly pass, to put 
 in position all the artillery that could be used, and 
 to advance their skirmishers as close as possible to 
 the enemy's works. The ai-tillery was to make a 
 vigorous attack at an early hour ; while the infantry, 
 with the exception of reserves and skii*mishers, was 
 to form in columns of platoons, or by a flank, if the 
 ground would not admit of a wider front. The col- 
 umns of attack were to move at quick time, with 
 fixed bayonets, caiTjHng only canteens, ammunition, 
 and one day's rations, and not to fire a gun till the 
 outer works were stormed ; the skirmishers to ad- 
 vance as soon as possible after the heads of columns, 
 and scale the walls of any works that might confront 
 them. "If prosecuted with vigor, it was confidently 
 
310 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 believed that tliis course would carry Vicksburg in a 
 slioi-t space of time, and with very much less loss of 
 life than would result from a protracted siege." 
 " Every day's delay," said Grant, " enables the enemy 
 to streno-then his defences and increase his chances 
 for receiving aid from outsiders." Grant also wrote 
 to Admiral Porter, on the 21st : "I expect to assault 
 the city at ten a. m. to-morrow. I would request and 
 urgently request that you send up the gunboats be- 
 low the city, and shell the rebel intrenchments until 
 that hour, and for thirty minutes after. If the mor- 
 tars could all be sent down to near the point on the 
 Louisiana shore, and throw in shells during the 
 night, it would materially aid me." Mc Arthur's di- 
 vision, not having yet arrived in line, was to act in- 
 dependently, moving up from Warrenton by the 
 direct road, and striking Yicksburg on the left of 
 McClernanil, beyond the line of investment. " Move 
 cautiously," said Grant, " and be prepared to receive 
 an attack at any moment. Penetrate as far into the 
 city as you can. Should you find the city still in 
 possession of the enemy, hold as advanced a position 
 as you can secure youi'self upon." 
 
 The mortars wei-e mounted on large rafts and 
 lashed to the further side of the peninsula. Porter 
 kept six of them playing rapidly all night on the 
 town and works, and sent three gunboats to shell the 
 water-l)atteries and any places where rebel troops 
 could be rested during the night; and, at three 
 o'clock on the morning of the 2 2d, the cannonade be- 
 gan from the land side. Every available gun was 
 l)rought to bear on the works ; sharpshooters at the 
 same time began their part of the action ; and nothing 
 could be heard but the continued shrieking of shells. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 311 
 
 the heavy booming of cannon, and the sharp whiz of 
 the Minie balls as they sped with fatal accuracy tow- 
 ards the devoted town. Vicksburg was encircled by 
 a girdle of fire; on liver and shore, a line of mighty 
 cannon poured destruction from their fiery throats, 
 while the mortars played incessantly, and made the 
 heavens themselves seem to drop down malignant 
 meteors on the rebellious strono-hold. The bombard- 
 ment was the most tenible durins: the sieg-e, and 
 continued without intermission until nearly eleven 
 o'clock, while the sharpshooters kept up such a rapid 
 and galling fire that the rebel cannoneers could seldom 
 rise to load their pieces ; the enemy was thus able to 
 make only ineffectual replies, and the formation of 
 the columns of attack was undisturbed. 
 
 All the corps commanders had set their time by 
 Grant's, so that there might be no difference between 
 them in the movement of the assault. Grant himself 
 took a commanding position near McPherson's front, 
 from which he could see all the advancinc: columns of 
 the Seventeenth, and a part of those of the Thirteenth 
 and Fifteenth corps. Promptly at the appointed 
 hour the three corps moved to the assault. Xo men 
 could be seen on the enemy's works, except that oc- 
 casionally a sharpshooter would show his head and 
 quickly discharge his piece. A line of select skir- 
 mishers was placed to keep these down. 
 
 As on the 19th, Sherman's main attack was along 
 the Graveyard road. Blair was placed at the head 
 of this road, with Tuttle in support, while Steele was 
 left to make his attack at a point in his own front, 
 about half a mile further to the right. The troops 
 were grouped so that, as far as the ground would al- 
 low, the movement might be connected and rapid. 
 
312 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 
 
 The Graveyard road ruus along tLe crown of an in- 
 ferior ridge, over comparatively smooth ground. Its 
 general direction was perpendicular to the rebel line ; 
 but, as it ajiproaclied the works, it bent to the left, 
 passing along tlie edge of tlie ditch of the enemy's 
 bastion, and euterino; at the shoulder of the bastion. 
 The timber, on the sides of the ridsre and in the 
 ravine, had been felled, so that an assault at any 
 other point in front of the Fifteenth corps was almost 
 impossible. The rebel line, rifle-trench as well as 
 small works for artillery, was higher than the ground 
 occupied by the national troops, and nowhere, be- 
 tween the Jackson road and the Mississippi on the 
 north, could it be reached without crossing a ravine 
 a hundred and twenty feet below the general level 
 of the hills, and then scaling an acclivity, whose nat- 
 ural slope Avas everywhere made more difficult by 
 fallen trees and entanglements of stakes and vines. 
 
 A forlorn hope was formed of a hundi-ed and fifty 
 men, ^vho carried poles and boards to cross the ditch. 
 This i:»arty Avas follo^ved closely by Ewing's brigade ; 
 Giles Smith and Kilby Smith's brigades bringing up 
 the rear of Blair's division. All marched by the 
 flank, following a road selected the night before, on 
 which the men were partially sheltered, until it be- 
 came necessary to take the crown of the ridge, and 
 ex])ose themselves to the full view of the enemy, 
 known to be lying concealed behind his well-planned 
 ])arapet 
 
 At the very moment named in Grant's orders, the 
 storming Jiarty dashed up the road, at the double 
 quick, followed by Ewing's brigade, the Thii-tieth 
 Ohio leading. Five batteries, of six pieces each, sta- 
 tioned on tlie ridge, kept up a concentric fire on the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 313 
 
 bastion, wliicli was doubtless constructed to com- 
 mand the very approach on wliicli Sherman was 
 moving. The storming party reacted the salient of 
 the bastion, and passed towards the sally-port, when 
 rose from every part along the line commanding 
 it, a double rank of the enemy, and poured on the 
 bead of the column a terrific fire. The men halted — 
 wavered — sousrht cover. But the column behind 
 pressed on ; it crossed the ditch on the left face of 
 the bastion, clambered up the exterior slope, and 
 planted its colors on the outside of the parapet ; the 
 fire, however, was too hot to bear them further. The 
 briirade broke, and the men burrowed in the earth to 
 shield tlieraselves from a flankin2^ fire. 
 
 Ewing being thus unable to carry this point, the 
 next brigade, Giles Smith's, was turned down a ra- 
 vine, and, making a circuit to the left, found cover, 
 formed line, and threatened the parapet at a point 
 three hundred yards to the left of the bastion ; while 
 the brigade of Kilby Smith was deployed on the off- 
 slope of one of the spurs, where, wdth E wing's bri- 
 gade, it kept up a constant fire against any object 
 that presented itself above the parapet. At about 
 two o'clock, Blair reported that none of his brigades 
 could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific 
 fire which Ewing had encountered, but that Giles 
 Smith had got a position more to the left, where, in 
 connection with Ransom, of McPherson's corps, he 
 was ready to assault. Sherman thereupon ordered a 
 constant fire of artillery and infantry to he main- 
 tained, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy 
 in front, while Ransom and Giles Smith charged up 
 against the parapet. 
 
 The ground over which they passed is the most 
 
314 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 difficult about Vicksburg. Three rapines cover the 
 entire distance between the Graveyard and the Jack- 
 son roads, and, opening into one still larger, rendered 
 this portion of the line almost unapproacliable, ex- 
 cept for individuals. Nowhere between these points 
 could a company march by the flank in any thing 
 like order, so broken is the ground, and so much was 
 it obstructed by the slashing which had been made 
 by felling forest-timber and the luxurious vines along 
 the sides of the ravines. But, although these ob- 
 structions were thus almost insurmountable, they yet 
 afforded effectual cover to the assailants till they got 
 within eighty yards of the enemy; and, even then, 
 they rendered the rebel fire much less destructive 
 than it would have been on the open ground. The 
 troops pushed on, and struggled in the blazing sun 
 to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like the col- 
 umn of E^^'ing, they became hopelessly broken up 
 into small parties, and only a few, more daring than 
 the rest, succeeded in getting close enough to give the 
 rebels any serious cause for alarm. But these were 
 met by a staggering fire, and recoiled under cover of 
 the hillside. Many a brave man fell after he had 
 passed through the difficulties of the approach and 
 reached the rebel line. The foremost Avere soon com- 
 pelled to crawl behind the logs and under the brow 
 of the hills, where they waited for single opportuni- 
 ties to bring down the enemy, as he showed himself 
 along the parapet or in the rifle-trench. 
 
 Steele's artillery had been placed in position on 
 the abandoned outworks of the enemy, along a ridge 
 on the north side of a creek which separated the bel- 
 ligerents at this point. His infantry was on the 
 ]-()ad, under the bluffs and behind the hills. The val- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 315 
 
 ley between had been cleared and cultivated ; it was 
 wider near Ewing's right, and exposed, for tliree- 
 -juarters of a mile, to a plunging fire from every point 
 of the adjacent rebel line. The distance to pass un- 
 der fire was not less than four hundred yards; and, 
 thouo-h the obstacles to overcome were less, the ex- 
 posure to fire being greater, made the result here the 
 same as in the assault on Sherman's left. The 
 main effort of Steele's rii>:ht was directed ao;ainst a 
 water-battery, at the mouth of a creek which emp- 
 ties into the Mississippi, above Vicksburg. But, by 
 two o'clock, it ^vas evident that the national forces 
 could not reach the rebel fortifications at any point 
 in Sherman's front in numbers or order suflicient to 
 carry the line, and all further operations were sus- 
 pended.* 
 
 In the mean time, the troops of McPherson and 
 McClernand's corps had advanced promptly at ten 
 o'clock. McPherson's line extended from Sherman's 
 left to within half a mile of the railroad. Ransom on the 
 rio-ht and in the ravines, Lo2:an on the main Jackson 
 road, and Quimby in the valleys towards the south. 
 The rebel works here followed the line of the ridge, 
 I'unning nearly north and south ; they were about 
 two miles from the river, and three hundred and 
 twenty-nine feet above low-water mark. Tliey were 
 strongly constructed, and well arranged to sweep the 
 approaches in every dii*ection. The road follows the 
 tortuous and uneven ridge separating two deep ra- 
 
 * General Sherman's report of this assault is very full and viviil. I 
 have not hesitated to avail myself of his language whenever it suited 
 my purpose. General Sherman, indeed, has offered me unrestricted 
 access to all his papers, and in conversation often thrown light en 
 points that could not otherwise have been made clear. 
 
316 MiLrrAEr history of 
 
 vines, and was completely swept at many points by 
 direct and cross fires from tlie enemy's line. In Lo- 
 gan's division, John E. Smith's brigade, supporting 
 Lesrs-ett's, was on the road, and Stevenson in the ra- 
 vines and on the slopes to the south ; all moved for- 
 ward under cover of a heavy artillery fire. 
 
 Their order of battle, however, was weak, from 
 the nature of the ground — columns of regiments not 
 greater than platoon front, battalions by the flank, in 
 columns of fours, or regiments in single line of battle, 
 supported by troops in position, and covered l)y 
 skirmishers. Notwithstanding the bravery of the 
 troops, they became broken and disorganized by the 
 diflScult ground and the fire of the enemy from trench 
 and parapet; and they, too, were compelled to seek 
 cover under the brows of the hills along which they 
 had advanced. John E. Smith was thus checked by 
 the cross-fire of artillery commanding the road, and 
 it soon became apparent that nothing favorable could 
 be expected from efforts in this quarter. Stevenson, 
 however, was somewhat protected by the uneven 
 ground, and, although compelled to advance into a 
 reentrant of the enemy's line, he had a better oppor- 
 tunity to assault. His advance was bold, and nearly 
 reached the top of the slope in his front, but being 
 only in line, and therefore without any great weight, 
 unsuppoi-ted by columns or heavy bodies of troops 
 to give it confidence or momentum, it also failed. 
 Quimby's troops moved out, but the enemy's line in 
 their front being a strong reentrant, no great eflPort 
 was made by them. At this time, they were simply 
 useful from the menacing attitude they held. 
 
 IMcCleraand's corps occupied the extreme left of 
 tlie line ; A. J. Smith on the right of the raih'oad, 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAIfT. 317 
 
 in and across tlie ravines, on Quimby's left. Tlie 
 gully nearest the railroad afforded excellent cover, 
 and led to within twenty yards of the enemy's line. 
 Carr's division joined Smith's left, on the railroad, and 
 extended south, along and behind a narrow ridge. 
 Osterhaus was still further to the south, with an in- 
 terval of about two hundred yards between his right 
 and Carr's left, in a ravine, the general direction of 
 which was towards the point where the railroad en- 
 ters the rebel line. This ravine was well swept by 
 musketry, as well as by the guns of the rebel bat- 
 teries. The side ravines were extremely difficult and 
 intricate, though not encumbered, as in Sherman's and 
 part of McPherson's front, by fallen timber. Ho- 
 vey's division was stiU further to the left, and some- 
 what more distant from the enemy's line; the ground 
 in his front was more difficult, being still more un- 
 even, and covered with a heavier growth of timber. 
 
 The only heavy artillery with the army, con- 
 sisting of six thirty-pound Parrott rifles, had been 
 placed in battery, just to the left of the railroad, on 
 a prominent point close in rear of Carr's right. The 
 field-batteries of the Thirteenth corps, numbering 
 thii-ty-three guns, were also posted advantageously 
 along the ridges and prominences in the rear. These 
 opened early, and McClernand succeeded in breach- 
 ing several points of the enemy's works, temporarily 
 silencing one or two guns, and exploding four rebel 
 caissons.* At the precise time appointed, the bugles 
 sounded the charge, and, with all the alacrity of Poi-t 
 Gibson and the Big Black bridge, McClernand's col- 
 umns moved to the assault ; but, as in the case of 
 McPherson and Sherman, by brigade, regiment, or 
 
 * See rebel reports. 
 
318 MILITAET mSTOKY OF 
 
 "battalion front, in weak order, and without coopera- 
 tion or unity. The right, under Smith, succeeded in 
 pushing close to the enemy's works, but was met by 
 the destnictive fire of musketry, and unable to get 
 further. Lawler's brigade, in Carr's division, which 
 had carried the tete-de-pont on the Big Black river, 
 dashed forward with its old impetuosity, supported 
 by Landrum's brigade of Smith's division ; and, in less 
 than fifteen minutes, a part of one regiment, the 
 Twenty-second Iowa, succeeded in crossing the ditch 
 and parapet of a rebel outwork ; but, not receiving 
 the support of the rest of the column, could not push 
 further, nor drive the enemy from the main work 
 immediately in rear. A hand-to-hand fight here en- 
 sued, lasting several minutes ; hand - grenades also 
 were thrown by the rebels in rear, while the national 
 troops still commanded the outer parapet. Ev^ery 
 man in the party, but one was shot down. Sergeant 
 Joseph Griffith, of the Twenty-second Iowa, fell at 
 the same time with his comrades, stunned, but not 
 seriously luirt. On his recovery, he found a rebel 
 lieutenant and sixteen men lying in the outwork, 
 still unwounded, though exposed to the fire of both 
 friend and foe. He rose, and bade them follow him 
 out of the place, too hot for any man to stay and 
 live. The rebels obeyed, and, calling to the troops 
 outside to cease their firing, Griffith brought his i)ris- 
 oners over the parapet, under a storm of rebel shot 
 tliat killed four of those so willing to surrender* 
 
 * For this act of gallantry, Griffith was next day promoted hy Grant 
 to a lirst lieutenancy, thus literally, like a knight of the middle ages, 
 winning his spurs on the field. He was not twenty years old, and 
 .shortly afterwards received an appointment to the Military Academy at 
 West Point, where he was known as " Grant's cadet," and graduated in 
 18G7, fifth in his class. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 319 
 
 The colors of the One Hundred and Thirtieth 
 Illinois were now planted on the counterscarp, and 
 those of two other regiments were also raised on the 
 exterior slope of the parapet. The work, however, 
 was completely commanded by others in rear, and no 
 real possession of it was obtained by the national 
 soldiers. But the troops remained in the ditch for 
 hours, although hand-grenades and loaded shells were 
 rolled over on them, from the parapet. The colors 
 were not removed ; as often as a rebel attempted to 
 grasp the staff, he was shot down by soldiers in the 
 ditch; and the national flags waved all day on 
 the rebel work, neither party able to secure them, 
 but each preventing their seizure by the other. After 
 dark, a national soldier climbed up stealthily and 
 snatched one of the flags away ; the other was cap- 
 tured by a rebel, in the same manner, leaning over 
 suddenly from above. 
 
 Fired by the example of Lawler and Landrum's 
 commands, Benton and Burbridge's brigades, the 
 former in Carr's, the latter in Smith's division, now 
 rushed forward, and reached the ditch and slope of 
 another little earthwork, planting their colors also 
 on the outer slope. Captain White, of the Chica- 
 go Mercantile battery, rivalling Grifiith's gallantry, 
 dragged forward one of his pieces, by hand, quite to 
 the ditch, and, double-shotting it, fired into an em- 
 brasure, disabling a gun just ready to be discharged, 
 and scatterino^ death amono^ the rebel cannoneers.* 
 
 * General A. .7. Smith had been ordered by McClernand to get two guns 
 up to this position, and called upon five or six batteries successively; 
 but the captains all protested that it was impossible to drag guns, by 
 hand, down one slope and up another, under fire. Smith, however, ex- 
 claimed : " I know a battery that will go to if you order it there." 
 
 So he sent for Captain White, of the Chicago MercanUle battery, and 
 
320 MELITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 A defcachment liere got into tlie work, but tlie rebels 
 rallied and captured every man. These were tbe 
 only troops that actually earned or gained posses- 
 sion, even for a moment, of any portion of the enemy's 
 line. 
 
 Hovey and Osterhaus liad also pushed forward 
 on the left, under a withering fire, till they could 
 hear the rebel words of command. They reached 
 the top of the hill, and advanced along the naked 
 brow, through a storm of grape, canister, and mus- 
 ketiy, under which they also broke, seeking cover 
 behind the irregularities of the gTound, but not re- 
 tiring. Indeed, they had gone on so far, that retreat- 
 ing was as dangerous as to advance. But, from 
 eleven till two, a desultory and aimless skii-mish was 
 maintained. 
 
 In the mean time, McArthur's division, of the 
 Seventeenth corps, had crossed the Mississippi, at 
 Warrenton. It went into position, on the extreme 
 left, on the 21st, extending from the Hall's ferry road 
 to the crest of the hill immediately on the river. 
 The naval forces had moved at seven o'clock, and 
 four gunboats engaged the Avater-batteries ; they ad- 
 vanced in some instances within four hundred and 
 fifty yards of the enemy, inflicting severe damage, 
 dismounting several guns, and bursting one ; but re- 
 ceived in return the hottest fire they ever yet had 
 
 tol.l liim what he wanted. White replied: "Yes, sir, I will take my 
 crvms tliere." And his men actually dragged the pieces over the rough 
 ground, by hand, carrying the ammunition in their havei-sacks. One 
 gun was stuck on the way, but tlie other thoy hauled up so near the 
 rebel works, that it was difficult to elevate it sufficiently to be of use; 
 finally, however, White succeeded in firing into the embrasure. The 
 gun was then dragged off down the ravine, and, after nightfoll, hauled 
 away; but the ammunition being heavy, was left on the tield. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 321 
 
 known ; one vessel was severely damaged, "but not a 
 man was killed. Doubtless, the sliare in the bom- 
 bardment, taken by the fleet, served materially to dis- 
 tract and annoy the garrison, but tlie distance of the 
 lower works from the river, and their elevation, were 
 too great for any permanent effect to be accomplished 
 by the gunboat fire. McArthur, however, was pre- 
 paring to take advantage of the temporary silence of 
 the rebel works in this quarter, when he received 
 other orders. 
 
 Thus, all along the line, the assault, though made 
 by heroes,^ had completely failed. Each corps had 
 advanced, had met the shock, and then recoiled. The 
 rebel position was too strong, both naturally and 
 artificially, to be taken by stonn. At every point 
 assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the 
 enemy was able to show all the force his works could 
 cover ; while, the difficulties of the ground rendered 
 an attack in column, or indeed almost any tactical 
 movement by the national troops, utterly impossible. 
 Each corps had many more men than could possibly 
 be used, on such ground as intervened between it 
 and the enemy. Grant's loss had been great, both in 
 killed and wounded. The hillsides were covered 
 with the slain, and with -unfortunates who lay pant- 
 ino- in the hot sun, cryino; for w^ater which none could 
 biing them, and writhing in pain that might not be 
 relieved ; while the rebels, ensconced behind their 
 lofty parapets, had suffered but little in comparison. 
 The national troops had everywhere shoAvn the great- 
 est individual braveiy. Regiments, in all three 
 corps, had planted their flags on the enemy's works, 
 where they still waved, the rebels unable or afraid to 
 remove them ; national detachments, after ineffectual 
 21 
 
322 MTLITAEY HISTORY OP 
 
 efforts to penetrate further, liad sheltered themselves 
 on the outer slopes of the parapets, and behind the 
 brows of the ridges, watching for opportunities to 
 injure the enemy ; while the main body of the troops, 
 at a greater distance and along the hills in rear, kept 
 the rebels down by an incessant fire of musketiy, 
 whenever an object exposed itself for a moment on 
 the works.* The brunt of the battle incident to the 
 first assault was over in less than an hour, and no 
 substantial result had been obtained. It was plain 
 that Grant could not hope to succeed by assault. 
 
 At about twelve o'clock, while near McPherson's 
 headquarters, Grant had received a dispatch from Mc- 
 Clernand, that lie was hard pressed at several points : 
 " I am hotly engaged with the enemy. He is massing 
 on me from the right and left. A vigorous blow by 
 McPherson would make a diversion in my favor." 
 Grant replied : " If your advance is weak, strengthen 
 it by drawing from your reserves or other parts of 
 the line." He then rode around to Sherman's fi-ont, 
 and had just reached that point, W'hen he received a 
 second dispatch from McClernand: "We are hotly 
 engaged with the enemy. We have part possession 
 of two forts, and the stars and stripes are floating 
 over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all 
 along the line." This note reached Grant, after the 
 repulse of both Sherman and McPherson. He showed 
 it to Sherman and to his own staff. He and his staff 
 had witnessed, from a high and commanding point, 
 the assault of McClernand's corps ; had seen a few 
 
 * In many instances, the riflemen who had got too near to with- 
 draw with safety, stood up, exposed from head to foot, facinjr the rehel 
 parapet, and held their pieces at a ready, to fire on any head that 
 showed itself. The fire of the works was invariably kept down where 
 the national soldiers had nerve enough for this desperate defence. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 323 
 
 men enter the works, and the colors planted on the 
 exterior slopes ; but had also seen the whole column 
 repelled. Grant was disinclined to renew the as- 
 sault wliich had been so unsuccessful ; yet he could 
 not disregard these positive assertions. Sherman 
 was, therefore, immediately ordered to repeat the at- 
 tack in his front, and McClernand was directed to 
 order up McArthur to his assistance. " McArthur is 
 on your left; concentrate with him and use his forces 
 to the best advantage." 
 
 Grant himself started at once for McPherson's 
 front, to convey to him the information contained in 
 this last dispatch, so that he, too, might make the di 
 version required. But, before he reached McPherson 
 he met a messenger with a third dispatch from Mc 
 demand: "We have gained the enemy's intrench 
 ments at several points, but are brought to a stand 
 I have sent word to McArthur to reenforce me if he 
 can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole 
 or a part of his command on this point ? P. S. — I have 
 received your dispatch ; my troops are all engaged, 
 and I cannot withdraw any to reenforce others." 
 
 The position occupied by Grant, during most of 
 the assault, gave him a better opportunity of seeing 
 what was going on, in front of the Thirteenth corps, 
 than it was possible for its commander to enjoy. He 
 had not perceived any possession of forts, nor any 
 necessity for reenforcements, up to the time when he 
 left this place, between twelve and one o'clock. He 
 again expressed doubts of the accuracy of the reports; 
 but these reiterated statements could not be unheed- 
 ed, for they might possibly be correct : and that 
 no opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold 
 should be allowed to escape, through fault of his, 
 
324 MILITAKY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Grant now sent liis clilef of staff, with McClernand's 
 note, to McPherson. indorsing on it an order for 
 Quimby's division (all of McPherson's corps tlien 
 available, except one brigade), to report to McCler- 
 naud. The dispatch was sent to McPherson, to satisfy 
 him of the necessity of an active diversion on his 
 part, so that as great a force as possible might be 
 held in his and Sherman's fronts. IVIcPherson sent 
 the dispatch and order to Quimby, who forwarded it 
 at once to Colonel Boomer, commanding his left bri- 
 gade, with orders to move promptly to McClernand's 
 support. Grant notified McClernand of these ar- 
 rangements ; that Quimby was to join him, and that 
 McPherson and Sherman would renew their assaults 
 by way of a diversion in his favor. 
 
 Sherman and McPherson, accordingly, made their 
 advance, which was prompt and vigorous. Sherman 
 now put into battle IMower's brigade, of Tuttle's di- 
 vision, which had as yet been in reserve, while Steele 
 was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing 
 was going on, all- down the line on Shei-man's left. 
 Mower's charge was covered by Blair's division, de- 
 ployed on the hillside, and the artillery posted be- 
 hind parapets, within j^oint-blank range. Mower 
 carried his brigade up, bravely and well, but again 
 arose a fire, if possible, more severe than that of the 
 first assault, with an exactly similar result. The 
 colors of the leading regiment were i:)l anted by the 
 side of those of Blair's storming party, and remained, 
 but the column was shattered and repelled. Steele, 
 too, passed through a scathing fire — clouds of mus- 
 ket-balls descendino* on the uncovered ground over 
 whith he had to cross, and beating down his men as 
 a rain-storm does the grass; still, he reached the para- 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 325 
 
 pet, but could not carry it ; lie held possession of tlie 
 hillside, however, till nightfall, when, by Sherman's 
 order, he was withdrawn. 
 
 McPherson's advance, likewise, had no result ex- 
 cept to double the number of killed and wounded. 
 His position was not advanced, nor any other advan- 
 tage gained. His efforts continued until dark, though 
 in a desultory manner, but clearly revealing his pres- 
 ence and power to the enemy. 
 
 At half-past three o'clock, Grant received a fourth 
 dispatch from McClernand : "I have received your 
 dispatch in regard to General Quimby's division and 
 General McArthur's division. As soon as they ar- 
 rive, T will press the enemy with all possible speed, 
 and doubt not I will force my way through. I have 
 lost no ground : my men are in two of the enemy's 
 forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the 
 rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who inti- 
 mate that the rear is strong. At this moment, I am 
 hard pressed." 
 
 McArthur did not arrive till the next morning, 
 and it was nearly sundown, before Quimby's division 
 reached McClernand ; it had been on the field all dnj, 
 marching or fighting, but was immediately moved to 
 the front, where it was required to relieve a part of 
 A. J. Smith's division from an exposed position in 
 line of battle. The enemy now made a show of ad- 
 vancing, and the lines being so close, the action, 
 which had for some time been lulled, was renewed 
 with the greatest fury. For a few minutes, the fire 
 of musketry was murderous. The third brigade, of 
 Quimby's division, lost many men and some of its 
 most valuable officers, including its commander, the 
 gallant Boomer. He bore on his person the dispatch 
 
326 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 from McClernand, wliich had occasioned all this add- 
 ed loss, and which proved as fatal to Boomer as the 
 wound of w^hich he died. No other attack was made 
 by McClernand. 
 
 The battle was thus prolonged, many lives were 
 sacrificed, and no advantage was gained, all owing to 
 the incorrect accounts forwarded by McClernand. No 
 part of any fort had been carried or held by him ; his 
 men had displayed extraordinary gallantry, his corps 
 had accomplished quite as much as either Sherman 
 or McPherson's, but, like all the troops along the 
 line, it was repelled disastrously. The fact that a 
 dozen men, at one place, got inside the tebel lines and 
 wevo killed, and that elsewhere, others reached the 
 ditch and were captured, was magnified by him into 
 the capture of a fort. His repeated calls for assist- 
 ance cost the army hundreds of lives.* 
 
 Three thousand national soldiers were killed or 
 wounded in this disastrous fight ; and the army was 
 now made sadly sure that over ground so rough, and 
 so much obstructed, with formations necessarily so 
 weak, it could not hope to carry Vicksburg by storm. 
 But the quality of the troops was proven. There 
 was no murmuring, no falling back, no symptom of 
 demoralization. Detachments remained, till night- 
 fall, close up to the advanced positions reached during 
 the day, and then dug their way back out of the 
 ditches. Save in one or two instances, they bore off 
 the national flags that had waved over the works of 
 Vicksburg, prematurely but prophetically. One, that 
 could not be carried away, was buried in the eai'th 
 of the ditcli, with the soldier who bore it thither; 
 
 * See Appendix, for official letters of Generals Sherman and ]\Ic- 
 Pherson, concerning this assault. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 32 Y 
 
 tlieii* most glorious resting-place was tlie spot where 
 they fell together. 
 
 This assault was, in some respects, unparalleled 
 in the wars of modern times. No attack on fortifica- 
 tions of such strength had ever been undertaken by 
 the great European captains, unless the assaulting 
 party outnumbered the defenders by at least three to 
 one. In the great sieges of the Peninsular war, the 
 disproportion was even greater still. At Badajos, 
 AYelliugton had fifty-one thousand men, eighteen 
 thousand of whom were in the final assault, while 
 the entire French garrison numbered only five thou- 
 sand ; the British loss, in the assault alone, was thirty- 
 five hundred. At Ciudad Eodi-igo, Wellington had 
 thirty-five thousand men, and the French, less than 
 two thousand, not seventeen hundred being able to 
 bear arms; the British loss was twelve hundred and 
 ninety, seven hundred and ten of these at the breaches ; 
 while only three hundred Frenchmen fell. But Bada- 
 jos and Rodrigo were carried. 
 
 In the second assault on Vicksburg, Grant had, in 
 his various columns, about thirty thousand men en- 
 gaged ; of these, he lost probably three thousand, in 
 killed and wounded. He, however, was met by an 
 army, instead of a garrison. Pemberton, according 
 to his own statement, put eighteen thousand five hun- 
 dred men in the trenches.'^ It was, therefore, no re- 
 proach to the gallantry or soldiership of the xVrmy of 
 the Tennessee that it was unable to carry works of 
 the strength of those which repelled it, manned by 
 
 * The rebel pamphlet, to wliicli I have before alluded, gives the 
 rebel loss as eight hundred. Pemberton said, on the 29th of May : 
 " Since investment we have lost about one thousand men, many offi- 
 cers." I can find no other official statement of his losses on this occa- 
 sion. 
 
328 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 troops of the same race as themselves, and in Dum 
 bers so nearly equal to their own. Neither can the 
 generalship which directed this assault be fairly cen- 
 sured. The only possible chance of breaking through 
 such defences and defenders was in massing tlie troops, 
 so that the weight of the columns should be abso- 
 lutely irresistible. But, the broken, tangled ground, 
 where often a company could not advance by flank, 
 made massing impossible; and this could not be 
 known in advance. The rebels, too, had not shown, 
 in the week preceding the assault, any of the deter- 
 mination which they displayed behind their earthen 
 walls at Vicksburg; the works at the Big Black 
 river also were impregnable, if they had been well 
 defended; and Grant could not know, beforehand, 
 that Pemberton's men had recovered their former 
 mettle, any more than he could ascertain, without a 
 trial, how inaccessible were the acclivities, and how 
 prodigious the difficulties which protected these re- 
 invigorated soldiers. But, Badajos was thrice be- 
 sieged, and oftener assaulted, ere it fell; and the 
 stories of Saguntum and Saragossa prove, that Vicks- 
 burg was not the only citadel which long resisted 
 gallant and determined armies. 
 
 On the night of the 22d, the troops were with- 
 drawn from the most advanced positions reached 
 (luring the assault, still retaining, however, ground 
 that was of importance during the siege. They took 
 back many of their wounded with them, but the 
 dead remained unburied. There was not time enough 
 to remove the bodies before daybreak, when tlie rebel 
 lire commanded all the ground where they lay. For 
 two days, the unburied corpses were left festering be- 
 tween the two armies, when the stench became so in- 
 
CTLYSSES S. GRAITT. 329 
 
 tolerable to the garrison, that Pemberton was afraid 
 it might breed a pestilence. He, therefore, proposed 
 an armistice for two and a half hours, to enable Grant 
 to remove his dead and the few wounded wlio had 
 not yet been cared for * The offer was promptly ac- 
 cepted, and tlie rebels also availed themselves of tlie 
 opportunity to carry off the dead horses and mules 
 that lay in their front, and were becoming very of- 
 fensive to the besieo-ed. These were tbe animals that 
 Pemberton had turned loose from tbe city and driven 
 over the lines, from want of forage. They were shot 
 wherever they were seen, by the sharpshooters of the 
 besieging army, that the stench arising from their 
 putreftiction might annoy the enemy. 
 
 The suspension of hostilities lasted several hours, 
 during which time, many exchanges of civilities took 
 place between the officers and meu of the two armies. 
 There was an utter absence of insulting language, as 
 well as of any manifestations of malice or animosity. 
 The belligerents had too much reason to respect each 
 other's prowess to indulge in petty exhibitions of 
 spite or spleen. Soldiers, indeed, are apt to get rid 
 of their bad blood in battle, and leave ^\Tangling and 
 revenge to those who stay a good way off in time of 
 danger.f 
 
 * Pemberton accused Grant of inhumanity, in not sooner burying 
 his dead and caring for liis wounded. But, as stated in the text, most 
 of the wounded had already been removed, and the impossibility of 
 relieving the others was occasioned by Pemberton's own troojjs, of 
 which, however, Grant had no right to complain. The wounded suf- 
 fer frightfully after every battle, and the party which is repelled is 
 always unable to bestow attention on those whom it leaves on the 
 field." 
 
 t During the war of the rebellion, the women and clergymen, at 
 the South, were everywhere more oflensive in their behavior and lan- 
 guage to national soldiers, than those who bore arms, relying on their 
 
330 jnLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 On the 22d, Grant reported to Halleck his arrival 
 at the Mississippi, and the investment of Vicksburg. 
 In narrating the events of the assault, lie said : " Gen- 
 eral McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the 
 facts, and caused mucli of this loss. He is entirely 
 unfit for the position of coi-ps commander, both on 
 the march and on the battle-field. Looking after his 
 cor23s gives me more labor and infinitely more un- 
 easiness than all the remainder of my department." 
 On the 24th, also, Grant made his first report of the 
 battle of Champion's hill, whick had been fought 
 eight days before. After leaving Jackson, he had no 
 opportunity of communicating with tke government 
 until he arrived before Vicksburg ; and, since then, 
 he had been too busy to ^vrite reports. 
 
 sex or their cloth to shelter them from punishment, Next to them, 
 the politicians, who brought on the war which the people did not 
 desire, were universally inclined to fight with tongue or pen, rather 
 than with more warlike weapons. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 331 
 
 CHAPTEK IX. 
 
 Preparations for the siege — Grant orders troops from Memphis — Halleck sends 
 reenforeements from the East and West — Lack of siege material — Scarcity 
 of engineer officers — First ground broken 23d of May — Engineer operations 
 — Ingenuity of officers and men — Enemy's defence — Sorties — "Wood's ap- 
 proacli — Loss of the Cincinnati — Tuttle's approach — Blair's approach — Ran- 
 som's approach — Logan's approach — A. J. Smith's approach — Carr's approacli 
 — Hovey's approach — Lauman's approach — Herron's approach — Menacing 
 attitude of Johnston — Correspondence with Bunks — Osterhaus sent to the 
 Big Black — Blair sent to the Yazoo — Mower and Kimball sent to Mechanics- 
 burg — Attack on Milliken's bend — Arrival of Herron and Parke — Completion 
 of investment — Fortification of Haine's blufif — Corps of observation — Line 
 of countervallation — Pemberton prepares for escape — ilcClernand re- 
 lieved — Condition of garrison — Sufferings of inhabitants — Mine of June 25th 
 — Hardships of national troops — ^Persistency of Grant — Final assault fixed 
 for July 6th — Pemberton proposes surrender — Terms of capitulation — Inter- 
 view between commanders — Surrender of Vicksburg — Treatment of prison- 
 ers — Pemberton's headquarters — Garrison paroled and marched out of 
 Yicksburg — Fall of Port Hudson— Opening of Mississippi river — Sherman 
 sent against Johnston — Johnston retreats to Jackson — Slieiinan besieges 
 Jackson — Johnston evacuates — Destruction of railroads — Return of Sherman 
 — Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of the President and general- 
 inchief— Grant made major-general m regular army — Joy of the country — 
 Dismay of the rebels. 
 
 The assaults on Vicksburg Laving failed, Grant 
 at once set about his preparations for a siege. The 
 three corps retained the same relative positions tliey 
 ali-eady occupied, Sherman having the right, McPher- 
 son the centre, and McClernand the left of the line ; 
 but Lauman's division, arriving on the 24th of May, 
 was put on the left of McClernand, where it guarded 
 
332 MELITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 tlie HalFs ferry and Warrenton roads ; wliile Mc Ar- 
 thur's entire command had, by this time, joined the 
 Seventeenth corps. Grant now ordered Prentiss and 
 Hurlbut to send forward " every avaihible man that 
 could possibly be spared." " The siege of Vicksburg 
 is going to occupy time, contrary to my exj^ectations 
 when I arrived near it. To watcb the enemy, and 
 to prevent Wm from collecting a force outside, near 
 enough to attack my rear, I requii'e a large cavalry 
 force. Contract every thing on the line of the route 
 from Memphis to Corinth, and keep your cavalry well 
 out south of there ; by this means, you ougkt to be 
 able to send here quite a large force." 
 
 But even these reenforcements would be insuffi- 
 cient. It was certain that the rebel government 
 would still make strenuous efforts to rescue Vicks- 
 burg, and, if possible, drive the besieging force from 
 the advantaojeous footino* it had obtained, at the ex- 
 pense of so muck blood and labor and time; and, 
 should this prove impossible, Johnston would un- 
 doubtedly endeavor to raise tke siege, at least long 
 enough to extricate the garrison. The remnants of 
 the rebel array outside of Vicksburg, with reenforce- 
 ments already i-eceived from the East, were collected 
 at Canton — sui'e earnest of a determination to strike 
 one more blow ; while the inactivity of Eosecrans, in 
 Tennessee, gave ground for fears that, rather than lose 
 all on the INIississippi, the rebels, in order to reen- 
 force Johnston heavily, might withdraw a heavy 
 force from Brag-or ^yJio was in front of Eosecrans. 
 
 OCT' 
 
 Grant wa^ thus obliged, not only to assemble a force 
 sufficient to conduct the operations of the siege, but 
 at the same time to hold the line of the Bis: Black 
 river, keep Johnston in check, and to cover the Y 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 333 
 
 ZOO, from tlie mouth of tliat stream to Haine's bluff. 
 The resources of his owu department, although con- 
 siderable, were insufficient for these emergencies. But 
 the general-in-chief appreciated tlie importance and 
 character of the crisis, and made every exertion to 
 supply Grant's necessities. He did not even wait to 
 be asked, but, as soon as he learned the situation, 
 telegraphed : " I will do all I can to assist you. I 
 have sent dispatch after dispatch to Banks to join 
 you." In such matters Ha,lleck w^as never lacking; 
 his patriotism was pure, and his anxiety for success 
 never flagged. If he neither planned victories, nor 
 achieved them, he was always ready to further the 
 plans of others, as soon as it became evident that 
 only through those plans could victory be achieved. 
 
 Grant had now abqut forty thousand men for 
 duty, and on the 23d, orders were given for the axe 
 and the shovel to support the bayonet. The hot season 
 was at hand, the troops had already endured many 
 hardships, they were almost altogether unprovided 
 with siege material, so that the difficulties before the 
 national army were not only formidable, but peculiar. 
 The engineer organization was especially defective; 
 there were no engineer troops in the entire command, 
 and only four engineer officers, while twenty would 
 have found ample opportunity for all their skill.* 
 Several pioneer companies of volunteers were, how- 
 ever, used for engineering purposes, and, although 
 raw at first, became effective before the close of the 
 siege. Tliere were no permanent depots of siege 
 
 * Captain Prime, of the corps of engineers, was at first in charge 
 of the engineer operations, but he fell sick, and was obliged to Ipave 
 the field ; and, late in the siege, his place was supplied by Captain 
 (now Brevet Brigadier-General) C. B. Comstock, of the same corps. 
 
334 JIILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 material ; ppades and picks were kept at the steam 
 l)oat landing, on the Yazoo, and in the camps near 
 the trenches; gabions* and fascines were made as 
 they were needed, by the pioneer companies, or by 
 details of troops from the line. Grant's artillery was 
 simply that nsed during the campaign, with the ad- 
 dition of a battery of naval guns of larger calibre, 
 loaned him by Admiral Porter. Thei-e was nothing 
 like a siege train in all the West, no light mortars, 
 and very few siege-howitzers nearer than "Washing- 
 ton ; and there was not time to send to northern ar- 
 senals for supplies. With such material and means 
 the siege of Vicksburg was begun. 
 
 Each commander was at once set to work putting 
 his men into as comfortable camps as could be estab- 
 lished in the woods and ravines, and as close to the 
 enemy's works as shelter could be found. Most of 
 the camps were within six hundred yards of the rebel 
 parapet. Camp equipage and working utensils were 
 l)rought up, and large quantities of quartermaster's 
 and subsistence stores accumulated at the landing, to 
 be hauled to the front whenever required. TJie 
 numlier of wagons on hand M'as limited, and it was 
 not tliought desirable to establish large depots of 
 supplies near the lines, to be abandoned in case of an 
 attempt to raise the siege ; only three or four days' 
 rations, therefore, were kept at the front for issue. 
 
 As soon as the troops were well settled in camp, 
 and their wants supplied, the ground meanwhile 
 having been accurately examined, details were made 
 to ojien roads and covered ways from one camp to 
 another ; while other details were slowly cutting out 
 the fallen timber, and constructinof the rec^ular ap- 
 
 * See Appendix, page GTo for glossary of siege terms. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 335 
 
 proaclies of the siege. Tlie first ground was broken 
 on the 23d of May, and batteries placed in the most 
 advantageous positions to keep do\vn the rebel fire. 
 Lines of parapet, rifle-trench, and covered way were 
 then constructed to connect these T»atteries. The 
 enemy seldom showed his guns, hardly attempting, 
 indeed, to prevent the l^esiegers from getting their 
 artillery into position ; for, the slightest exposure or 
 demonstration on the part of the rebels excited the 
 liveliest fire from the national batteries, and the ad- 
 vantage was always in favor of the latter, as they 
 could brins: to bear a much larger number of guns 
 than the enemy. This, and the remarkable activity 
 and vigilance of Grant's sharpshooters, in a great 
 measure kept down the fire of the besieged. The 
 enemy, however, was undoubtedly scant of ammuni- 
 tion, and anxious to husband what he had, for more 
 effective use at closer quarters. 
 
 The connecting parapets, as well as all other 
 available positions within rifle range, were kept oc- 
 cupied by a line of sharpshooters during daylight, 
 and by trench-guards and advanced pickets, after 
 dark. Wherever an approach gave opportunity, 
 loopholes were formed, by piling sand-bags and pieces 
 of square timber on the parapet, or logs and stumps, 
 when these were more convenient ; the men were 
 thus enabled to shelter themselves completely. This 
 timber was rarely displaced by the enemy's fire ; but, 
 had the rebel artillery opened heavily, splinters must 
 have become dangerous to tlie besiegers. The posi- 
 tions of the national sharpshooters were generally 
 quite as elevated as those occupied by the rebels; 
 and the approaches, running along the hillsides and 
 up the slopes in front of the enemy's works, were 
 
336 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 lower tlian the besieged, so that the sappers and 
 working-parties could not be molested by the rebels, 
 Avithout very great exposure on their own part to 
 sharpshooters of the attacking force. So effective 
 was this system, that, by the end of the first fortnight, 
 nearly all the artillery of the enemy was either dis- 
 mounted or withdra^vn, and the rebels scarcely ever 
 fired. 
 
 The style of work in the batteries was varied, 
 depending entirely on the material that could be 
 obtained at the time. In some cases, the lines were 
 neatly revetted with gabions and fascines, and fur- 
 nished with substantial plank platforms ; while, in 
 others, a revetting of rough boards or cotton bales 
 was used, and the platfonns were made of timber 
 from the nearest bam or cotton-gin house. The em- 
 brasures were sometimes revetted with cane, and 
 sometimes lined with hides taken from the beef-cattle. 
 The parapets were not often more than six or eight 
 feet thick, as the enemy's artillery-fire was feeble; 
 but, in all close batteries, the gunners soon found the 
 necessity of keeping the embrasures closed against 
 rifle-balls, by plank shutters, sometimes swung from a 
 timber across the top of the embrasure, sometimes 
 merely placed in the embrasure, and removed in 
 firing. In close approaches, the sap was generally 
 revetted with gabions, empty barrels, or cotton bales, 
 but sometimes left entirely unrevetted ; for, when the 
 enemy's fire was heavy, it became difficult to prevent 
 the working-parties from sinking the sap as deep as 
 five or even six feet, when, of course, revetting be- 
 came unnecessary. 
 
 ^Material for gabions was abundant, grape-vine 
 being chiefly used, though this made the gabions in- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 337 
 
 conveniently heavy, tlie vines being too large. Cane 
 was also used for wattling, the joints being crushed 
 with wooden mallets, and the rest of the cane split, 
 and interwoven between the stakes of the gabion. 
 The cane made excellent fascines, and was frequently 
 used in this way. At first, some difficulty was found 
 in making sap-rollers, which should be imj^ervious to 
 Minie balls, and yet not too heavy for use on the 
 rough ground over which the sap must run. Two 
 barrels, however, were placed head to head, and the 
 sap-roller was then built of cane f^iscines, wound 
 around this hollow core. At one point, the enemy's 
 salient was too high for the besiegers to be able to 
 return the hand-grenades which were thrown into the 
 trenches so freely. There were no Cohorn-mortars 
 with the army, and wooden mortars were therefore 
 made, by shrinking iron bands on cylinders of tough 
 wood, and boring them out for six or twelve pound 
 shells. These mortars stood firing well, and gave 
 sood results at a distance of one hundred or one 
 hundred and fifty yards. 
 
 The labor in the trenches was performed either 
 by men of the pioneer companies, by details from the 
 line, or by negroes. Several of the pioneer com- 
 panies had negroes attached to them, who had come 
 within the national lines, and were paid according to 
 law. These proved very efficient, when under good 
 supervision. The labor performed by details from 
 the line was light, in comparison with that done by 
 the same number of pioneers or negroes ; without the 
 stimulus of danger, or pecuniary reward, troops of 
 the line would not work so efficiently, especially at 
 night, and after the novelty of the labor had worn oif. 
 
 The lack of engineer officers gave the siege one 
 
 22 
 
338 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 of its peculiar characteristics ; at many times, and at 
 different places, the work to be done depended on offi- 
 cers and men without either theoretical or practical 
 knowledo-e of siege operations, and who had, there- 
 fore, to rely, almost exclusively, on their native good 
 sense and ingenuity. Whether a battery was to be 
 constructed by men who had never built one before, 
 or sap-rollers made by those who had never heard 
 the name, or a ship's gun-carriage put together by in- 
 fantry soldiers, it was always done, and, after a few 
 trials, well done. This fertility of resource and power 
 of adaptation to circumstances, possessed in so high a 
 degree by the volunteers, was, however, displayed 
 while a relieving force was gathering in Grant's rear. 
 Officers and men had to learn to be engineers while 
 the siege was going on. Much valuable time was in 
 this way lost, and many a shovelful of earth was 
 thrown that brouo-ht the sieo;e no nearer to an end. 
 
 One result of this scarcity of engineers was, that 
 Grant gave more personal attention to the super- 
 vision of the siege than he would otherwise have 
 done. His militarv education fitted him for the 
 duty, and he rode daily around the lines, directing 
 the scientific operations, infusing his spirit into all 
 his subordinates, pressing them on with energy to 
 the completion of their task, and, ^vith imflagging 
 persistency devising and employing every means to 
 l)ring about the great end to which all labor, and 
 skill, and acquirement was made to tend.* 
 
 There were eight principal points of approach, all 
 on the main roads leadino; into Vicksburo;. These 
 roads had originally been built on the most suitable 
 
 * At one time every graduate of the ^Military Academy, m Grant's 
 army, below the rank of general, was on engineer duty. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 339 
 
 and even ground for ingress to tlie city; in almost 
 every case, they followed tlie back of a narrow trans- 
 verse rid ire, between ravines on either side, more or 
 less ruo-sied and tortuous in character. The nature 
 of the ground gained in the assaults allowed the na- 
 tional forces to dispense with the first and second 
 parallels, generally necessary in a siege ; the natural 
 surface, undefended by either artillery or skirmishers, 
 affording ample protection in all cases, up to within 
 six hundred yards, and often within four hundred 
 yards of the works. Thus, the reverse side of the 
 hills corresponded to the first and second parallels in 
 an ordinary siege. The approaches to these were 
 thi'ough the transverse ravines, by roads cut into the 
 hillsides, the fallen timber being first cleared away. 
 Whenever it became necessary to cross a ravine com- 
 manded by the enemy's sharpshooters or artillery, ad- 
 vantage was taken of the night, to build a parapet 
 of logs entirely across the unprotected space, and of 
 sufficient height to cover the advance. The enemy 
 dared not open on such a work as this, as for each 
 shot fired he would have received twenty in return.* 
 The ao-o-recrate lenoih of the trenches was twelve 
 miles. Eighty-nine batteries were constructed dui'ing 
 the siege, the guns from those in rear being moved 
 forward as the siege advanced. The troops were 
 moved on at the same time, and encamj^ed in the 
 rear of batteries, at the heads of ravines. On the 
 30th of June there were in position two hundred and 
 twenty guns, mostly light field-pieces; one battery 
 
 * " A novel reconnoissance of the rebel ditch was made, one morn- 
 ing, by means of a mirror attached to a pole; this was raised above 
 the sap-roller, a little to the rear, and then inclined forward. A per- 
 fect Niew of the ditch was thus obtained."— ^n^i«^r'« Report. 
 
340 JUUTAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 of heavy guns, on the right, was manned and offi- 
 cered by the navy. 
 
 After the assault of May 2 2d, the enemy's defence 
 was feeble. As the national batteries were built and 
 opened, the rebel artillery-fire slackened, until, tow- 
 ards tlie close of the siege, it was hardly employed at 
 all ; the enemy contenting himself with occasionally 
 running a gun into jDOsition, firing two or three 
 rounds, and withdrawing the piece again as soon as 
 the national fire was concentrated in reply. At al- 
 most any point, if the rebels had put ten or fifteen 
 guns into position, instead of one or two, which 
 merely invited concentration of the besiegers' fire, 
 they might have seriously delayed the approaches. 
 This silence of the artillery was attributed to a lack 
 of ammunition ; but a judicious use of the ordnance 
 which the rebels really possessed would have inter- 
 fered greatly with Grant's operations. As it was, he 
 had little but musketry-fire to contend with in the 
 more distant approaches and parallels, and even this 
 was sparingly used, in comparison with that of the 
 besiegers : a deficiency in percussion caps probably 
 accounts in some measure for this fact. 
 
 The enemy sometimes resorted to mines, to delay 
 the approaches of Grant ; but they were feeble, their 
 charges always light, and they rarely did other dam- 
 age than to make the ground where they had been 
 exploded, impracticable for mining by the besiegers. 
 Occasional sorties were also made, sometimes delay- 
 ing operations for a day or two. At one point, the 
 enemy opened ninety yards of trench, as a co\m- 
 ter-work, running down the ridge from a rebel sa- 
 lient, and quite up to the parallel of the besiegers. 
 But the position was recovered the next night by a 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 341 
 
 bayonet cliarge, tlie enemy routed from liis own 
 trencli, twelve muskets captured, a portion of the 
 rebel trench then filled vip, and the rest easily guard- 
 ed. Once or twice, the rebels succeeded in throwing 
 fire-balls, until one lodged under the edge of a sap- 
 roller. Hand-o-renades were next thrown into the 
 fire made by the spreading of the inflammable fluid 
 contained in the ball ; the grenades bursting, threw 
 fragments all around, tearing the sap-roller, and the 
 enemy then kept up an incessant musketry-fire, until 
 the roller was destroyed and the trench exposed. 
 None of these efforts, however, made any remarkable 
 change in the operations of Grant. 
 
 The aim of the rebels seemed to be to await 
 another assault, losing in the mean time as few men 
 as possible. This indifference to Grant's approach 
 became, at some points, almost ludicrous. The be- 
 sieo-ers were accustomed to cover the front of their 
 night-working parties by a line of pickets, or by a 
 covering party ; and, while these were not closer than 
 a hundred yards, the enemy would throw out his 
 pickets in front. At one point, the rebel pickets 
 entered into a reo:ular asfreement with those of the 
 besiegers, not to fire on each other at night ; and, as 
 most of the work in a siege is done at night, this ar- 
 rangement w'as eminently satisfiictory to the working- 
 parties. On one occasion, the picket-oflacer was di- 
 rected to crowd his pickets on the enemy's, so as to 
 allow the working party to push on another parallel. 
 In doing this, the two lines of pickets became inter- 
 mixed, and, after some discussion, the opposing offi- 
 cers arranged their lines by mutual compromise, the 
 pickets, in places, not being ten yards apart, and in 
 full view of each other. A working party was then 
 
342 MILITAEY HISTOKY OF 
 
 Btretclied out in rear of the national line, and tlie 
 work was begun. The enemy's out-guard could see 
 all that was going on, but made no effort to interfere, 
 and a trencli was opened within sixty yards of the 
 rebel salient. The ground was such that it would 
 have been difficult to carry on the Avork in any other 
 way; by merely remaining in his fortifications, and 
 firing an occasional volley, the enemy could have 
 easily stopped the approach. The advantage of this 
 arrangement, novel in war, was entirely on one side. 
 The rebels, however, allowed it at no other point on 
 the line. 
 
 The armament of the rebels, on the land front, was 
 field-ai-tillery, and one ten-incb mortar ; the batteries 
 on their extreme left, being also used against the ves- 
 sels in tbe river, mounted heavy guns, and were able 
 to sweep a small section of the land approaches. One 
 gun in the water-battery, in front of Wood (v/lio had 
 the right brigade of Steele's division, of Sherman's 
 corps), was particularly troublesome, though it did 
 but little actual damage. Against this gun, and the 
 battery in whicli it was situated. Wood's first opera- 
 tions were directed. A line of emj)ty rifle-trench, on 
 the hill opposite the enemy's left, was occupied, and 
 in a few days converted into good cover for infantry 
 and batteries for artillery. One field-battery of howit- 
 zers and rifles was stationed on tbe extreme point, 
 and, near it, arrangements were made for the battery 
 of ship's guns sent ashore by Porter, and manned 
 and ofiicered by the navy. A line of simple trench 
 running down the hillside, from the point of the 
 ridge to the mouth of a creek that empties into the 
 Mississippi here, was the first and only approach 
 made on this road. The workmen were often an- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 343 
 
 noyed during tlie day, being within easy rifle-range, 
 while the rebels were but little exposed to the fire 
 of the assailants. 
 
 This trench was pushed on rapidly, under the 
 personal supervision of Wood, till it reached the 
 plateau and terrace of a farm-house in its front. The 
 plateau, although overlooked by the rebels, and in 
 close range, was occupied by a line of trench running 
 around the outer part of the crest, for the purpose of 
 keeping the enemy out of the part of the valley im- 
 mediately below. From the terrace, the approach 
 was continued down the slope, towards the mouth of 
 the creek, and then directed upon a small mound on 
 the noi-th side of the stream, fi'om the top of which it 
 was thought the guns of the water-battery might be 
 seen and silenced by sharpshooters. The work was 
 completed, and the result all that had been hoped 
 for. The enemy spiked his guns and abandoned the 
 work. But, although unable to occupy the position 
 during the day, he still continued to make it a picket- 
 station at night. This could not well be prevented, 
 as the banks of the stream, between the approach 
 and the rebel work, were both steep and high ; and 
 the water here had cut the bed of the stream into an 
 almost impassable chasm. There being no available 
 means of getting across the creek, or driving the sap 
 closer, there was an end to all approaches on this 
 road. But the troops were not allowed to remain 
 idle. The batteries were completed, and the naval 
 guns put into position. The fleet-battery consisted 
 of two eight-inch ship-howitzers ; it opened, on the 
 7th of June, and did excellent ser^4ce, completely 
 Bilencing all the guns within its range. 
 
 On the 27th of May, in compliance wdth a request 
 
344 MILITARY HISTOKY OF 
 
 of Grant, Porter sent the iron-clad Cincinnati from 
 above, Lieutenant-Commander Bache commanding, to 
 attack the water-battery, and enfilade the left of the 
 rebel line. The vessel vs^as packed with logs and 
 hay, for protection; and, at half-past eight o'clock, 
 with a full head of steam, she stood for the position as- 
 signed her. No sooner had she got within range, than 
 the rebels opened rapidly with heavy guns from dif- 
 ferent batteries. Their shots at first went wild, but, 
 as the iron-clad was rounding, broadside to, abreast 
 of a battery, she received a shot in her magazine, 
 flooding it almost immediately. Shortly after this, 
 the starboard tiller was carried away, the enemy now 
 firing Avith greater accuracy, and hitting almost every 
 time; his shots passed entirely through the triple 
 protection of hay, wood, and iron. The national 
 batteries, and all of Sherman's musketry within range, 
 opened in support of the gunboat ; but, the current 
 being very swift, the Cincinnati was compelled to lay 
 head to the stream, exposing her stern, which w^as 
 unprotected by plating. She was especially annoyed 
 by plunging shots from a ten-inch columbiad and a 
 heavy rifle on the hills, two hundred feet above the 
 decks. Iler stern was repeatedly struck, and the 
 flag-staff shot away, but the colors were nailed to the 
 stum]x Officers and men behaved admirably. The 
 enemy's metal, however, was too heavy ; and the leak 
 in the magazine, with the shot-holes in the stern, 
 compelled the commander to withdraw. lie ran the 
 vessel up stream, as near the right-hand bank as his 
 damaged steering aj)paratus would allow, got out a 
 plank, and put the wounded ashore. Next, he at- 
 tempted to make his vessel fast to a tree, but before 
 the hawser could be tied, the boat beccan driftins: 
 
ULYSSES S, GRANT. 345 
 
 out, and, wliile near tlie shore, and under rebel fire, 
 tlie Cincinnati filled and sank, lier flag still flying 
 from the shattered mast. Fifteen of her crew were 
 drowned, and twenty -five killed or wounded ; several 
 others floated down the stream, opposite the city, 
 where they were taken prisoners. For some weeks, 
 the vessel lay near the shore, about a mile from 
 Steele's position ; but, during the siege, the river sub- 
 sided, leaving her nearly out of water. The guns 
 were then taken out, and two of them placed in bat- 
 tery, by Wood, in the latter pai-t of June, 
 
 The point selected for this battery was near the 
 bank of the Mississippi, and a few yards above the 
 mouth of the creek. A trench leading to it was con- 
 structed down the hillside, giving concealment to the 
 working-parties. It was hoped that, by using the 
 heavy guns of the Cincinnati, the town might be 
 reached from this point, and much damage done, 
 while the enemy's heavy batteries could at the same 
 time be effectually annoyed. The rebel fire was 
 several times drawn upon the battery, but no injury 
 received. The completion of the work was, however, 
 delayed by the want of sling-carts, and means of 
 transporting the guns through the bottom to the 
 point where they were to be used, and the siege ter- 
 minated before the battery was ready to open. The 
 other operations of Steele's division were of no great 
 importance. The approach along the ridge road was 
 not pushed with vigor, and was exposed to a long 
 line of plunging fire. 
 
 Tuttle's advance, on the left of Steele, was begun 
 behind a spur, through which a deep cut was made. 
 It led down the slope, in plain view of the rebels, 
 and was directed perpendicularly on their line. The 
 
346 MiLrrAEr history of 
 
 approacli was a full sap, covered on both sides by 
 gabions, and, on the top, by a roof of cane gabions. 
 This protection was necessary till it reached the foot 
 of the hills, on the crest of which the enemy's line 
 was situated ; the hills, however, were so steep as to 
 afford perfect shelter from the hostile fire, up to with- 
 in thirty yards of the parapet. At this part of the 
 line, the timber had been cleared some time before, 
 but the ground, in front of the rebel trench, was ob- 
 structed by an entanglement of posts and vines. 
 
 The principal position, however, for Sherman's 
 batteries was on the ridge, about four hundred yards 
 from the enemy's line, and at a point near the head 
 of the stream, on the north side of the rebel defences. 
 Four batteries, of six guns each, were disposed on 
 Blair s front. Ilis approach started from the left of 
 the principal battery, near the Graveyard road, and 
 was directed against the salient of the work com- 
 manding this road, the same which he had assaulted 
 on the 22d of May. It was carried steadily forward, 
 till it reached a large oak-tree, standing alone, about 
 one hundred and twenty yards from the rebel works. 
 Tliis tree was subsequently known as the " Lone 
 Tree," and gave name to a battery erected here^ or 
 rather to a parapet and place of arms. The place o± 
 arms was fm-nished witli communications with both 
 flanks, l)y boyaux leading down into the ravines, and 
 was well revetted, and prepared with a banquette for 
 shaii^sliooters. From its right, a new double sap was 
 started, following around the hillside ; this was, at first, 
 directed just outside the enemy's line, but then, turn- 
 ing, it ran up-hill in the du-ection of the rebel salient. 
 At the turn, it was defiled, by excavating it till the 
 part of the hillside towards the enemy became a com- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 347 
 
 plete protection. When tlie sap reached the axis of 
 the ridge upon wliich the road was located, a sap- 
 roller was used, and the sap carried steadily on, with- 
 out important interruption, to within fifteen feet of 
 the rebel ditch. The enemy's pickets, at night, seemed 
 to watch its progress with great interest, but attempt- 
 ed no serious disturbance. The work was generally 
 suspended during the day, except for widening and 
 finishing tlie approaches and communications. The 
 situation of the sharpshooters, on the different ridges, 
 was the best protection for the working-parties. 
 
 From the right of the place of arms, at the " Lone 
 Tree," a half parallel was constructed to the foot of 
 the hill in front. This was a very laborious piece of 
 side-cutting, but allowed the construction of a para- 
 j^et on the brow of the hill, and within eighty yards 
 of the enemy's work, from which Grant's sharp- 
 shooters were able to give the rebels serious annoy- 
 ance. 
 
 Ransom's brigade, in McArthur's division, was on 
 the left of Blair. Beins: camped in a ravine, the bri- 
 gade was compelled to employ its entire strength, for 
 several days, in clearing out a road down the ra- 
 vine, to the hill just in front of the enemy's line, and 
 in the construction of batteries on the rio-ht and 
 
 O 
 
 left of the ravine. Ransom's works were well built, 
 the entrance to the main advance being by a broad, 
 well - constructed, and completely defiladed road, 
 through the ravines. The trenches themselves were 
 well located in the hillside, which here was very 
 steep and difficult of ascent. The obstructions of 
 fallen timber were removed, and roads or heads of 
 gap constructed up the slope. The road or parallel 
 continued around the foot of the hill, so as to allow 
 
348 MHJTAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 the assembling of an entire brigade, and a deboucLe 
 for eacli regiment, wide enough for columns of fours 
 to rush up the hills and assault the enemy's line, in 
 strong support of SheiTuan's columns, along the 
 Graveyard road. 
 
 A high and precipitous ridge, pointing towards 
 the enemy, separated the camp of Blair's di^dsion 
 from Ransom's, and the water from different branches 
 of the stream, here, flowed by each division. The 
 communication by the ravine was tortuous, in some 
 places exposed to a raking fire of the enemy, and 
 everywhere obstructed by fallen timber or difficult 
 gi'ound. For these reasons, the two covered ap- 
 proaches, through the main branches of the ravines, 
 were connected by a road leading over tlie point of 
 the ridge, instead of around it. By this means, com- 
 munication was shortened and rendered much less 
 difficult. 
 
 As early as the 19th of May, a position for artillery 
 had been selected on the Jackson road, by Logan's 
 division, but the guns were not put in position till 
 the 21st. On that day, another battery was posted 
 near the same point. When the regular approaches 
 began, these positions, being favorable, were retained 
 for artillery. McPherson commenced systematic oper- 
 ations on the 24th, by completing these batteries, 
 and preparing the road, so as to allow the yard of a 
 house, near by, to be reached without exposure. This 
 was done by excavating along the hillside, so that its 
 crest would defile the advance of troops until they 
 reached the ridge where the battery was posted. Al- 
 thou2;h this ridg-e was within a few hundred yards 
 of the rebel work, its reverse side and the ravine near 
 it were used for camps, the men constructing huts by 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 349 
 
 digging into tlie hills, and tLatching the huts with 
 brush and cane. On the 26th, these roads were made 
 passable, and the trenches were begun. Tlie trench 
 was constructed five feet deep and eight feet wide, 
 with a parapet and banquette for infanti-y. The 
 parapet ^vas surmounted by square logs and sand- 
 bags, through w^hich apei"tures were made for the 
 marksmen. Three hundred men were kejit at work 
 both night and day, but the heads of saps advanced 
 only under cover of darkness. During the day, the 
 details were employed in widening the trenches and 
 finishino; them for defence. 
 
 The most important approaches to the enemy's 
 line were, thus, the two by trench', along the Grave- 
 yard and Jackson roads, and the two covered ap- 
 proaches of Blair and Hansom, through the ravines. 
 By these approaches and covered ways, and the sec- 
 ondary approaches of Tuttle's division, Grant was 
 able to move two divisions, under cover, to Avithin an 
 average distance of two hundi-ed yards from the 
 works, and with means of debouching upon compar- 
 atively good ground with the heads of columns. Bat- 
 teries on Logan's, Ransom's, Blaii-'s, Tuttle's, and 
 Steele's fronts were able to brinor a convero-ino-, direct, 
 enfilading, and reverse fire on all that part of the rebel 
 line lying in their front. These batteries were contin- 
 ually being strengthened, or changed in position, in or- 
 der to obtain greater advantages of aim. The one on 
 the high ridge of the Graveyard road was raised six or 
 eight feet, so as to give as great a view of the ground 
 inside and behind the enemy's works as possible. Its 
 height, above the level of low water in the Missis- 
 sippi, was over two hundred feet. 
 
 Quimby's division retained its old position, aftei 
 
350 jnXITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 the assault of the 22d; it lay on tlie lower ground 
 and in the ravines, on the left of Logan, and was 
 employed erecting batteries and constructing rifle- 
 trenches, along the ridges parallel to the enemy's 
 woi'ks. These were intended to streno;then the main 
 approach along the Jackson road, and to prevent 
 sorties. 
 
 The positions occupied by McClernand's infantry 
 and ai'tilleiy, at the beginning of the siege, were sub- 
 stantially those of the 2 2d of May. Two of the thirty- 
 pound Parrott guns had been sent to McPherson, but 
 the others remained in battery, as before. This battery 
 was strengthened by increasing the height and thick- 
 ness of the parapet, and a large magazine was con- 
 structed, just in rear. A. J. Smith's approach fol- 
 lowed the line of the Baldwin's ferry road. He 
 pushed forward during the night, and constructed a 
 rifle-trench in his fi'ont, so as to annoy the rebels and 
 keep tliem on the alert. From the broken nature of 
 the ground, his trench could not be connected either 
 with those on his left, in front of Carr, or ^nth 
 Quimby's, on the right. The rear communications, 
 however, with both these divisions were good. They 
 Avere by roads running along the reverse sides of the 
 ridges, or across the back of the inferior ravines, so 
 that a sortie upon any portion of the line could have 
 been promptly met by troops from other points. 
 AVhen Smith's approach reached the immediate vi- 
 cinity of the salient against which it was directed, its 
 progress was much impeded by the rebel artillery 
 fire, and the sappers were greatly annoyed by hand- 
 grenades. The rebels threw fire-balls constantly, and 
 attempted to blow up the sap-roller with mines. 
 
 Carr's approach followed the railroad cut for a 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 351 
 
 liunclrecl yards, and was directed upon one of the 
 largest rebel works; it was pushed to within ten 
 yards of the enemy's ditcli ; one parallel was made 
 at the distance of sixty yards, from wMcli the salient 
 was to have been stormed. A burnt house near the 
 railroad was selected as a position for field artillery ; 
 it was seized in the niglit, and a rifle-pit hastily con- 
 structed, parallel to tlie enemy's works. To the right, 
 tlie trench extended down the bill, into the ravine, 
 and, to the left, along the line of ridges as fur as Carr's 
 left. It was, however, extremely difficult to induce 
 McClernand to give the necessary orders to widen 
 and strengthen this parallel sufficiently to allow free 
 communication. The engineers, supervising opera- 
 tions in his front, repeatedly requested him to extend 
 the trench from Carr's front, across the ridge, to 
 Hovey's right, a distance of two hundred yards ; but 
 McClernand objected to this, that he could go around 
 by one of the valleys in the rear, a distance of not far 
 from a mile. At last, however, he reluctantly yield- 
 ed, and gave the necessary orders, but the work still 
 made slow progress.'^ The trench was pushed for- 
 ward on the main road, till within a few feet of the 
 enemy's works, where, as in the cases on the right 
 and left, the sappers Avere greatly annoyed by hand- 
 grenades thrown from the rebel works. 
 
 Hovey's approach, directed on a redoubt, was not 
 beo;un until late in the sies-e, althou2:h the o-round o;ave 
 
 O 7 
 
 cover here to within a short distance of the rebel 
 line. This was one of the many instances where the 
 need of engineer officers was apparent. AVith a 
 proper number of officers, the ground, in all its de- 
 
 * This statement is taken from the manuscript memoir of General 
 Wilson. 
 
352 JIILITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 tails, would have been tliorouglily examined, and the 
 best positions chosen for approach, instead of wasting 
 work, as in this case, where the best apj)roaches were 
 only selected when the siege was nearly half over. 
 The quality of the work on this front was not so 
 good as that done by Sherman or McPherson ; but 
 this arose from no lack of capacity or zeal on the part 
 of the men, but from the peculiarities of theu' com- 
 mander. The engineer officer in charge, here, was ex- 
 tremely fortunate in accomplishing as much as he 
 did, in the face of such negative support as he re- 
 ceived. 
 
 Lauman's division arrived on the 24th of May, 
 and was put in position on the south side of the city, 
 effectually guarding the Hall's ferry and Warrenton 
 roads. At first, Lauman was not required to push 
 forward a system of approaches, so much as to main- 
 tain a strong position on this part of the line, for the 
 purpose of preventing egress, and to hold the rebels 
 in check until assistance could be sent, should an at- 
 tempt to escape be made. Herron's division, from 
 the Army of the Frontier, Department of Missouri, ar- 
 rived on the 11th of June, and was assigned a posi- 
 tion on the extreme left of the besieoinor force, ex- 
 tending from the Hall's ferry to the Warrenton road. 
 Lauman was then moved furtlier to the right, extend- 
 ing to tlie left of Hovey; and, for the first time, the 
 investment became complete, all possibility of Pem- 
 l)erton's escape, without assistance from outside, be- 
 ing effectually cut oft*. 
 
 Lauman now began an approach, near the en- 
 trance of the Hall's ferry road, where a battery of 
 naval guns was placed in position. The approach, at 
 fii-st, was on a ridge which ran out from the enemy's 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 353 
 
 line, east of tlie Hall's ferry road ; but this was after- 
 wards abandoned for tlie road itself, the ravines there 
 giving cover, np to within three hundred yards of the 
 rebel line. This approach was directed against a 
 work very salient, and therefore very weak. The 
 rebels, conscious of this weakness, made repeated 
 sorties, driving off the working-parties, and taking a 
 few prisoners. In one case, they filled up fifty yards 
 of trench, from which they were driven the follow- 
 ing night with loss. In spite of serious opposition, 
 the head of this sap was pushed to within a few feet 
 of the rebel line. 
 
 In Herron's front a strong line of trench was be- 
 gun on the 11th of June, running along the "Warren- 
 ton road. Little was done here until late in the 
 siege, except driving in the enemy's pickets and 
 erecting three batteries. The approach was directed 
 ao-ainst the extreme southern limit of the defences of 
 Vicksburo;. It afforded safe and convenient shelter 
 to the troops guarding the left, and allowed an ad- 
 vance, by a defiladed trench, upon the rebel work 
 guarding the entrance of the Warrenton road. Saps 
 were driven towards this work, and, notwithstanding 
 the ground over which they were conducted was 
 swept by the fire of a ten-inch columbiad and smaller 
 guns, they were pushed with vigor. Guns were 
 placed in position on the bro^v of the hills, at the ex- 
 treme left, troops were sent into the bottom, and 
 around the head of the swamp as far as the river-bank, 
 and all communication by courier, in this direction, 
 was completely intercepted. The Hall's ferry road was 
 tortuous, and afforded good means of approach tow- 
 ards the city. An approach, here, reached to within 
 two hundred yards of the rebel line, and, at other 
 
 23 
 
354 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 points, tlie lines ran so near tliat the enemy was 
 greatly annoyed by Herron's sharpsliooters. 
 
 While the investment of Yieksburg was thus pro- 
 ceeding, the menacing attitude of Johnston bad early 
 attracted Grant's attention, and made it necessary to 
 establish a strong corps of observation in the rear. 
 Immediately after the assault of the 22 d of May, the 
 small cavalry force attached to the command was 
 sent out, to interruj^t the enemy's communications, 
 and to obtain accm'ate information as to the move- 
 ments of the relievino; force. It was soon learned 
 that Johnston had been joined by at least ten thou- 
 sand fresh troops ; and Grant was thus made reason- 
 ably certain that the rebels would endeavor to raise 
 the siege, attacking from the northeast, with all the 
 men they coidd command. He, therefore, wrote to 
 Banks, on the 25th: "I feel that my force is abun- 
 dantly strong to hold the enemy where he is, or to 
 whip him if he should come out. The place is so 
 strongly fortified, however, that it cannot be taken 
 without either a great sacrifice of life, or by a regular 
 siege, I have determined to adopt the latter course, 
 
 and save my men The great danger now to be 
 
 apprehended is that the enemy may collect a force 
 outside, and attemj^t to rescue the garrison. ... I 
 deem it advisable that as larsre a force be collected 
 here as possible. Having all my availal)le force that 
 can be spared from West Tennessee and Helena here, 
 to get any more I must look outside of my own de- 
 partment. You l)eing engaged in the same enter- 
 l)rise, I am compelled to ask you to give me such as- 
 sistance as may be in your power. ... I would be 
 pleased, general, to have you come, with such force as 
 you may be able to spare." 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 355 
 
 Osterhaus's command was, at this time, sent out as 
 far as the Big Black river, to obstruct tlie approaches 
 to Vicksburg from the east, and to destroy all the 
 raib'oad bridges and forage that could be reached. 
 "All trains and cattle should be brous-ht in, and 
 every thing done to prevent an army supplying itself 
 coming this way. Wherever there is a bridge or 
 trestle-work, as far east as you send troops, have them 
 destroyed." On the 26th, Grant also sent a force of 
 twelve thousand men, under Blair, to drive off a 
 body of the enemy supposed to be collecting between 
 the Big Black river and the Yazoo. This command 
 was not expected to fight Johnston, but simply to 
 act as a corps of observation, and to destroy all stock, 
 forage, roads, and bridges as it returned. Blair moved 
 along the Yazoo about forty-five miles, and efi'ectually 
 accomplished the pui'pose of his expedition, preventing 
 Johnston from moving upon Vicksburg in that direc- 
 tion, and also from drawing supplies in the fertile re- 
 gion between the two rivers. He was absent nearly a 
 week, and reconnoitred the whole region thoroughly. 
 
 On the 31st, Grant Avrote : " It is now certain that 
 Johnston has already collected a force from twenty 
 thousand to twenty-five thousand strong, at Jackson 
 and Canton * and is usinsr everv efibrt to increase it 
 to forty thousand. With this he will undoubtedly 
 attack Haine's blufi", and compel me to abandon the 
 investment of the city, if not reenforced before he can 
 get here." Admiral Porter was accordingly requested 
 to direct a brigade of amphibious and usefid troops 
 at his disposal, known as the Marine brigade, to de- 
 bark at Haine's bluff and hold the place until re- 
 
 * On tbe 4th of June, Johnston had twenty-four thousand infantry 
 and two thousand eight hundred cavahy, (See his ofiScial report.) 
 
356 MILITAKY HISTOEY OF 
 
 lieved by otlier forces. Hurlbut was directed to 
 hurry up tlie reenforcements already ordered from 
 his command. " No boat will be permitted to leave 
 Memphis, going north, until the transportation is 
 
 fully provided for all trooj^s coming this way I 
 
 want your district stripped to the very lowest po-s- 
 
 sible standard The entire rebel forces heretofore 
 
 against me are completely at my mercy. I do not 
 want to see them escape by being reenforced from 
 elsewhere." 
 
 On the same day, Grant received a letter from 
 Banks, setting forth the necessity of concentration, 
 and callino; for ten thousand men. To this he re- 
 plied : " Concentration is essential to the success of 
 the general campaign in the West, but Vicksburg is 
 the vital point. Our situation is, for the first time 
 during the entire Western campaign, what it should 
 be. We have, after great labor and extraordinary 
 risk, secured a position which should not be jeopard- 
 ized by any detachments whatever. On the con- 
 trary, I am now, and shall continue to exert myself 
 to the utmost to concentrate. I have ample means 
 to defend my present position, and effect the reduc- 
 tion of Vicksburg within twenty days, if the relation 
 of affairs which now obtains remains unchanged. But, 
 detach ten thousand men from my command, and I 
 
 cannot ans\ver for the result I need not describe 
 
 the severity of the labor to which my command must 
 necessarily be subjected, in an operation of such mag- 
 nitude as that in which I am now engaged. Weak- 
 ened by the detachment of ten thousand men, or even 
 half that number, with the circumstances entu'ely 
 changed, I should be crippled beyond redemj)tion. 
 ISIy arrangements for supplies are ample, and can be 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 357 
 
 expanded to meet any exigency. All I want now is 
 men." 
 
 On Blair's return, Grant sent a brigade of troops 
 under Brigadier-General Mower, and nearly t\velve 
 hundred cavalry, up the Yazoo to IMeclianicsburg, to 
 watch the crossings of the Big Black, from Bridgeport, 
 and obstruct the roads. On the 3d of June, one division 
 from Hurlbut arrived, under Brigadier-General Kim- 
 ball, and was sent at once after Mower to Mechanics- 
 burg, with the same instructions that Mower had al- 
 ready received. Grant himself went up to Satartia, on 
 the 8th of June, to inspect the condition of affiiirs there, 
 and became still further convinced that the enemy was 
 collecting a large force at Canton, of course with a 
 view to raise the siege. To Kimball, he said : " It 
 is important that the country be left so that it cannot 
 subsist an army passing over it. Wagons, horses, and 
 mules should be taken from the citizens, to keep them 
 from being used with the Southern army." 
 
 On the Yth, the enemy, nearly three thousand 
 strong, attacked IMilliken's bend, which, however, 
 was successfully defended by black and white troops 
 under Brigadier- General Dennis, ably assisted by the 
 gunboats Choctaw and Lexington. Grant at once 
 ordered Mower's brio^ade to reenforce Dennis, with 
 instructions to drive the rebels beyond the Tensas 
 river. " Every vestige of an enemy's camp ought to 
 be shoved back of that point " (Richmond). 
 
 On the 8th of June, anotlier division of troops^, un- 
 der Brigadier-General Sooy Smith, arrived from jMem- 
 phis, and was ordered to Haine's bluff, where Wash- 
 burne was now placed in command. This place had 
 again become of vital importance ; for, if the national 
 forces should be compelled to raise the siege, and yet 
 
358 JIILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 remain in possession of Haine's bluff, with undis- 
 puted control of tlie Mississippi river, they could still 
 concentrate resources for a new effort, either against 
 the city itself or its means of supply. The orders were 
 to fortify it, so that it could be held against a sudden 
 movement by ten thousand men, and be capable of 
 giving protection to at least forty thousand. The 
 position, naturally strong, was defended, on the south 
 and east, by a line of continuous rifle-trench, with 
 live small batteries on commanding points, situated 
 so as to sweep the ground exterior to the rest of the 
 line, while a parapet of weak profile was constructed, 
 from the foot of the bluff, across the bottom-laud to 
 the river. The entire position was enclosed, after 
 three days' labor, and rendered practically defensible 
 against any force likely to attack it. The strange 
 anomaly was thus presented of a work against which 
 the national efforts had so long been spent in vain, 
 now fortified by national efforts against the very 
 po^ver for whose protection it had originally been 
 built. Even while Grant was prosecuting the siege 
 of Vicksburg with all his might, he was preparing to 
 defend the strongest outwork of Vicksburg against a 
 reV)el army. 
 
 lleenforcements, meanwhile, continued to arrive. 
 Since the beginning of the siege. Grant had received 
 twenty-one thousand additional troops from his own 
 department; Ilerron's division, the strongest in the 
 combined army, arrived from Schofield's command, on 
 the 11th of June; and, by the wise prevision of the 
 general-in-chief, two divisions of the Kinth corps, un- 
 der Major-General Parke, were diverted from their 
 march to East Tennessee, and amved before Vicks- 
 burg, on the 14th of the same month. Herron was 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 359 
 
 put on the left of the line of circumvallation, and 
 Parke was sent to Haine's bluff. By this time, Grant's 
 force amounted to seventy-five thousand men, about 
 half of whom remained in the trenches till the end 
 of the siege. The others formed an army of observa- 
 tion, and closely watched all the movements of the 
 relievino* force. 
 
 On the 11th, Grant informed Sherman that reen- 
 forcements were expected, and told him, if Ilaine's 
 bluff should be besieged, "You will be detached 
 temporarily from the command of your corps here, to 
 take command of Haine's bluff." On the same day, 
 Grant said : " It is evident the enemy have brought 
 large reenforcements from Bragg's army, and I can- 
 not think it is with any other design than to raise 
 the siege of Vicksbu'rg." He had now ten thousand 
 or twelve thousand men at Ilaine's bluff, but ordered 
 both Mcpherson and Sherman to hold part of their 
 forces in readiness, in case that place should be be- 
 sieged. Detailed instructions w^ere at the same time 
 given to McClernand, to govern him if the garrison 
 should attempt to take advantage of the expected 
 arrival of a relieving army, and the consequent weak- 
 ening of the besiegers. The most constant watchful- 
 ness was required on the front towards the city, 
 w^hile, at the same time. Grant's dispatches were in- 
 cessant and anxious to all the commanders in the 
 corps of observation, especially to Washburne, who 
 was yet in command at Haine's bluff. 
 
 On the 21st of June, Grant received curious infor- 
 mation through the rebel pickets ; the national works 
 had now approached so close to those of the besie- 
 gers, that the two picket-lines were within hail of 
 each other ; and, one of the rebels made an agi-eement 
 
360 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 with a national sentinel, that they should lay down 
 their arms and have a talk. The rebel declared that 
 Grant's cannonading had killed and wounded a great 
 many in the rifle-pits; tliat the besieged had fully 
 expected another assault, and been prepared to meet 
 it ; but, as no assault was made, the troops had been 
 canvassed by their officers, to see if they could not 
 be got outside to attack the " Yankees." ]S'ot only 
 was this declined, but many were ready to mutiny, 
 because their officers would not surrend-er. The men, 
 however, were reassured, and told that provisions 
 enough remained to last them seven days more ; in 
 that time, two thousand boats would be built, and 
 the besieged could escape by crossing the Mississippi 
 river. The rebel finished by announcing that houses 
 in Vicksburo; were now beino; torn down to fret ma- 
 
 o o o 
 
 terial for the boats.* 
 
 This singular story excited attention, and prepa- 
 rations were made to render abortive any such at- 
 tempt at escape as had been described. Admiral 
 Porter was warned, the pickets were redoubled at 
 night, and material was collected to light up the river, 
 should a large number of boats attempt to cross. 
 Batteries also were got ready behind the levee on the 
 western bank, but the attempt was never made. 
 
 On the 22d, positive information was received 
 that Johnston was crossing the Big Black river, and 
 intended marching immediately against Grant. Sher- 
 man was at once directed to assume command of the 
 force in the rear. Troops were taken from his corps 
 
 * On the 22d of June, Johnston -wrote to Pemberton : " If I can do 
 nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to 
 cross the river at the last moment ; " and, vrhen Vicksburg fell, a large 
 number of badly-constructed boats was found in the town, evidently 
 intended for some such purpose as that spoken of in the text. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 361 
 
 and that of McPherson, in tlie line of intrenchments, 
 and added to the force which was to meet Johnston ; 
 the four divisions of Washburne and Parke were also 
 included in tliis new command, which amounted to 
 nearly half of Grant's army. Besides these, Herron 
 and A. J. Smitli were notified to he in readiness to 
 move at a moment's notice. " Should Johnston 
 come, we want to whip him, if the siege has to he 
 raised to do it." To Sherman, Grant said : " Use all 
 the forces indicated, as you deem most advantageous, 
 and, should more he required, call on me, and they 
 will be furnished to the last man here and at Young's 
 Point." To McPherson, he said : " Sherman goes out 
 to meet Johnston. If he comes, the greatest vigi- 
 lance will be required on the liue, as the Vicksbui'g 
 garrison may take the same occasion for an attack 
 also. Batteries should have a good supply of grape 
 and canister." To Parke : " We want to whip John- 
 ston at least fifteen miles off, if possible." 
 
 A line of works was now constructed from the 
 Yazoo to the Big Black river, quite as strong as those 
 which defended Vicksburg, so that the city was not 
 only circumvallated, but counter- vallated, as welL In 
 case of an attack, Johnston would have been obliged 
 to assault Grant's rear, under the same disadvantages 
 that Grant himself had encountered in attacking 
 Vicksburg. Grant's position, however, was at this 
 time peculiar, if not precarious. He was again be- 
 tween two large rebel armies : besieging one, he was 
 himself threatened with a siege by the other ; while,' 
 if both combined to assault him from different sides, 
 it seemed quite possible that the garrison of Vicksburg, 
 that splendid prize for which he had been so long strug- 
 gling, might even yet elude his grasp. He might be 
 
862 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 compelled to tlirow so mucli strength on his eastern 
 front, that the besieged could succeed in effecting 
 their escape by some opposite and comparatively un- 
 guarded avenue. To prevent this contingency was 
 tlie object of unceasing vigilance. It would not do 
 to go out after Johnston, lest the prey inside should 
 evade the toils that had been spread so carefully; 
 and yet, while Grant remained in his trenches en- 
 veloping the city, his own communications and base 
 were threatened from outside. Haine's bluff was 
 once more an object of immense solicitude, and the 
 Big Black had again become the line of defence ; but, 
 this time, it was a defence to national troops against 
 the rebels; for Grant now, in part, faced east, and 
 the men of the South were striving to fight their way 
 to the Mississij)pi. 
 
 On the 17th of June, Grant received formal and 
 official communications from both Sherman and Mc- 
 Pherson, couched in the strongest and most indig- 
 nant language, and complaining of a congratulatory 
 order issued by McClernand to his corps, on the 
 30th of May. The order had never been seen by 
 Grant, although army regulations and the orders of 
 tlie department both required subordinates to for- 
 ward copies of all such papers to their superiors. It 
 was unmilitary and offensive in tone, magnifying Mc- 
 Clemand's services and importance, and full of in- 
 sinuations and criminations ao-ainst the officers and 
 soldiers of the rest of the army. It had been pub- 
 lished in a Northern newspaper, copies of which 
 were sent to Sherman and McPherson, who at once 
 resented the assertions it contained, brand ins; them 
 in so many words as *'fjilse," and calling on their 
 commander to inteifere. Grant immediately wrote 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 363 
 
 to McCleniand :is follows: "Enclosed I send you 
 AvLat purports to be your congratulatory address to 
 the Thirteentli array corps. I would respectfully ask 
 if it is a true copy. If it is not a correct copy, fur- 
 nish me one by bearer, as required both by regula- 
 tions and existing orders of the department." A copy 
 of the address was sent at once to his headquarters, 
 and, the next day, McClernand was relieved of the 
 command of his corps, and ordered home. Major- 
 General Ord was appointed in his stead, subject to 
 the approval of the President.* 
 
 This was the termination of the troublesome con- 
 nection with McClernand. It had begun at Cairo, in 
 1861. McClernand had served under Grant, at Bel- 
 mont, and Donelson, and Shiloh, but early developed 
 the qualities which afterwards insured his downfall. 
 At first, he had been willing to learn from men versed 
 in their profession and experienced in war; but he 
 soon set about accomplishing his advancement by 
 political means. His efforts, partially successful, to 
 obtain a high command ; his protracted machinations 
 to supersede Grant, which were only defeated by the 
 wise counsels of the general-in-chief, and the practi- 
 cal good sense of the administration ; his insubordina- 
 tion, incompetency, and restless ambition, disj^layed 
 on so many occasions during the Vicksburg cam- 
 paign, gave Gi'ant the only real embarrassment pro- 
 ceedins: from the conduct of subordinates that he ex- 
 perienced for more than a year. 
 
 The commander was long - suffering indeed. 
 Though repeatedly urged to relieve McClernand, 
 when that officer wrote letters such as no soldier 
 
 * See Appendix for McClernaad's order, and the letters of Generals 
 Sherman and McPherson. 
 
364 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 slioiild receive from a subordinate ; or, wlien lie suff. 
 gested in writing the plans wliieb Grant Lad already 
 dictated in conversation; or when, with intolerable 
 assumption, he claimed the credit of operations which 
 his own inefficiency had nearly marred, Grant's only 
 answer was : " I cannot afford to quarrel ivith a man 
 xcliom I am obliged to command^ He constantly 
 gave McClernand as important positions as it was 
 possible to intrust him with, having any reference to 
 the safety or success of the enterprise; he regarded 
 his rank, and disregarded his military character, 
 although constantly informing the government of 
 his own ^news of that character. Finally, about the 
 14th of May, he received " authority to relieve any 
 person who, from ignorance in action, or for any 
 cause, interfered vnth or delayed his operations." He 
 was even informed that the government expected 
 him to enforce his authority, and would hold him re- 
 sponsil)le for any failure to exert his powers. When, 
 after this, the congratulatory order was brought to 
 his notice, the interests of the service forbade any 
 longer delay, and action was summary.* 
 
 As early as the 29th of May, Johnston had sent 
 word to Pemberton : " I am too weak to save Yicks- 
 burg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and 
 your garrison. It ^ill be impossible to extricate 
 
 * " A disposition and earnest desire on my part to do the most I 
 could with the means at my command, without interfering with the 
 assignment to command which the President alone was authorized to 
 make, made me tolerate General McClernand long after I thought the 
 good of the service demanded his removal. It was only when almost 
 tbe entire army under my command seemed to demand it, that he was 
 relieved. . . . The removal of General McClernand from the command 
 of tlie Thirteenth army corps has given general satisfaction; the 
 Thirteenth army corps sharing, perhaps, equally in the feeling with 
 other corps of the army."— G7-a«« to Uallecl; June 26, 1863. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 365 
 
 you unless you cooperate." On tlie 14tli of June, lie 
 said to Lis subordinate: "By fighting the enemy 
 simultaneously, at the same points of his line, you 
 may be extricated ; our joint forces cannot raise the 
 sieo-e of Vicksburj?." On the 18th, Johnston in- 
 formed the rebel Secretary of War: "Grant's posi- 
 tion, naturally very strong, is intrenched and pro- 
 tected by powerful artillery, and the roads obstructed. 
 . . . The BiiT Black covers him from attack, and would 
 cut off our retreat if defeated." 
 
 The garrison, meanwhile, was suffering for sup- 
 plies. Pemberton was particularly short of percus- 
 sion caps, and his scouts contrived, occasionally, to 
 elude the pickets of Grant, and transmit this infor- 
 mation to Johnston, Supplies, in consequence, were 
 sent as far as Grant's lines, but were generally cap- 
 tured ; in several instances, how^ever, caps were success- 
 fully conveyed to the besieged, sometimes two hun- 
 dred thousand at a time ; canteens full of caps being 
 carried by rebel scouts in the national uniform, and 
 suddenly thrown across the picket line. After the as- 
 saults in Muy,the ammunition scattered in the trenches 
 was collected by the rebels, and even the cartridge- 
 boxes of the dead, in front of the works, were emptied. 
 
 The meat ration was reduced by Pemberton at 
 first to one-lialf, but that of sugar, rice, and beans, at 
 the same time, largely increased. Tobacco for chew- 
 ing was impressed, and issued to the troops. After 
 a while, all the cattle in Vicksburg was impressed, 
 and the chief commissary was instructed to sell 
 only one ration a day to any officer. At last, four 
 ounces of rice and foui' of flour were issued for 
 bread — not half a ration. Still, on the 10th of 
 June, Pemberton sent word to Johnston: "I shall 
 
366 MILITAEY niSTOKY OF 
 
 endeavor to hold out as long as we Lave any 
 tiling to eat. Can you not send me a verbal mes- 
 sage by carrier, crossing tlie river above or below 
 Vicksburg, and swimming across again, opposite 
 Vicksburg? I have heard nothing of you or from 
 you since the 25th of May." In the same dispatch, 
 he said : " Enemy bombard day and night J&*om seven 
 
 moi-tars He also keeps up constant fire on our 
 
 lines with artillery and musketry." On the 15th: 
 " We are living on greatly reduced rations, but I 
 think sufficient for twenty days yet. . . . Our men, 
 having no relief, are becoming much fatigued, but are 
 still in pretty good spirits." On the 19th: " On the 
 Graveyard road, the enemy's works are within twenty- 
 five feet of our redan, also very close on Jackson and 
 Bakhvin's ferry roads. I hope you will advance with 
 the least possible delay. My men have been thirty- 
 four days and nights in the trenches mthout relief, and 
 the enemy within conversation distance. . . . We are 
 living on very reduced rations, and, as you know, are 
 entirely isolated. What aid am I to expect from you ? " 
 The prices of food in the town had, by this time, 
 risen enormously. Flour was five dollars a pound, 
 or a thousand dollars a barrel (rebel money) ; 
 meal was one hundred and forty dollars a bushel; 
 molasses, ten and twelve dollars a gallon; and beef 
 (very often oxen killed by the national shells and 
 ])icked up by the butchers) was sold at two dollars 
 and two dollars and a half, by the pound. Mule-meat 
 sold at a dollar a pound, and was in great demand. 
 IMany families of ^^•ealth had eaten the last mouthful 
 of food they possessed, and the poorer class of non- 
 combatants was on the verge of starvation. There 
 was scarcely a building that had not been struck 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 367 
 
 by shells, and many were entirely demolished. A 
 number of women and cliildren had been killed or 
 wounded by mortar-shells, or balls; and, all who did 
 not remain in the damp caves of the hillsides, were in 
 dano-er.* Even the hospitals where the wounded 
 lay were sometimes ■ struck, for it was found impos- 
 sible to prevent occasional shells falling on the build- 
 mgs, which of course would have been sacred from 
 an intentional fire. 
 
 Fodder was exhausted, and the horses were com- 
 pelled to subsist wholly on corn-tops, the corn being 
 all ground into meal for the soldiers. In the conver- 
 sations that nightly occurred between the pickets, 
 the rel)el3 were always threatened with starvation, 
 even if another assault should fail. For, the pickets 
 of both armies were good-natured enough, and often 
 sat down on the ground together, bragging of their 
 ability to whip each other. Sometimes, they dis- 
 cussed the merits of the war; the debates would be 
 carried on ^vith vehemence, till argument failed on 
 one side or the other, when the parties separated, 
 as one of them said, " to avoid a fight on the subject." 
 Incidents like these relieved the tedium of the siege 
 to those outside, and lessened some of its horrors for 
 the rebels. A favorite place for the meetings was at 
 a well, attached to a house between the lines; hither, 
 after dark, the men from both sides repaired, slipping 
 outside their pickets in search of the delicious draught ; 
 for water was scarce, and, at this point, there was none 
 other within a mile. The house was unoccupied, 
 
 * The sufTcrincrs of the inhabitants are very fully described in the 
 pamphlet of A. S. Adams, who was an eye-witness and participant. 
 All my statements of what occurred in the town during the siege, are 
 taken from this narrative, or from the rebel official reports. 
 
368 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 having been riddled with shot from both besiegers 
 and besieged, and, over the broken cistern, the rebel 
 and national soldiers held their tacit truce, a truce 
 which neither ever violated. 
 
 Meanwhile, the heads of sap had reached the 
 enemy's lines, on the Graveyard and Jackson roads 
 and in Kansom's front, as well as on the Baldwin 
 and Hall's ferry roads. Mining had been resorted to 
 by both besiegers and besieged, and, on the Jackson 
 road. Grant fired a heavy mine on the 25th of June. 
 It extended thirty-five feet from the point of start- 
 ing : fifteen hundred pounds of powder were depos- 
 ited in three difi^erent branch mines, and seven hun- 
 dred in the centre one; fuses were arranfred so as 
 to explode tliem all at the same instant, and the 
 mine Avas tamped with cross-timbers and sand-bags. 
 Troops were disposed so as to take advantage of 
 any result. At three and a half p. m. the explo- 
 sion took place, and a heavy artillery-fire opened 
 along the line at the same moment. Huge masses 
 of earth were thrown up in the air, and the ground 
 was shaken as if by a volcano. As soon as the earth 
 was rent, a bright glare of fire issued from the bm-n- 
 ing powder, but quickly died away, as there was 
 nothing combustible in the fort. A fe^v rebel sol- 
 diers were hurled into the air, one or two of whom 
 came down alive, inside the national lines. The 
 enemy, however, had detected the building of the 
 mme, and, in anticipation of the explosion, removed 
 most of his troops behind a new line in the rear. 
 Counter-mining had also been resorted to by the 
 rebels, and several sappers, who were in the lower 
 shaft, were bmied : all the troops in the neighbor- 
 hood were jarred by the shock. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 369 
 
 The cavity made was large enoiigli to hold two 
 reghnents, and, as soon as the partial destruction of 
 the parapet was discovered, a column of Grant's in- 
 fantry, which had been concealed in a hollow beneath 
 the tort, rushed forward with loud cheers to gain 
 possession of the breach. The ditch and slope were 
 gained, and a desperate struggle ensued in the crater, 
 but the rebels soon retired to their interior line, only 
 a few feet back. Pioneers went to work at once, clear- 
 ing an entrance to the crater, but both sides were reen- 
 forced i)romptly, and no further result was attained. 
 The loss on the national side was thirty men in killed 
 and wounded, and to the besieged about the same.* 
 
 The crater was cone-shaped, and entirely exposed 
 to field projectiles or loaded shells thrown by hand, 
 but McPherson's men rushed into this gulf, light- 
 ing and throwing grenades in return. The enemy, 
 however, from his higher position, could throw ten 
 shells to their one, and, in nearly every case, could 
 see to direct them with deadly effect; indeed, the 
 rebels had only to lay the lighted missiles on the 
 parapet and roll them down. But, on the night after 
 the exi3losion, details from Leggett's brigade relieved 
 each other in the attempt to hold the crater. Xo sys- 
 tematic attempt could be made to carry the enemy's 
 work, or to take possession of his parapet and run 
 boyaux along the exterior slope; yet, all night long, 
 parties of men, fifty, sixty, or eighty at a time, stood 
 in the crater, along its sides not shaped into ban- 
 quettes, and fired at an enemy tliey could not see; 
 for, after the first hour, the rebels ceased to appear- on 
 the parapet at all, contenting themselves witk the 
 use of the grenades. 
 
 * The statement of the rebel loss is merely an estimate. 
 24 
 
370 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 After aAvliile, feathered grenades were given to the 
 national troops, and thrown inside the rebel line, with 
 some effect ; but many of these failed to explode, and 
 were hurled back by the rebels, with terrible results. 
 Boxes of field-ammunition were also brought out by 
 the enemy, who lighted them with port-fires and 
 threw them by hand into the crater. Nearly every 
 one took effect, killing and wounding sometimes half 
 a dozen men. The crater was called by the soldiers 
 "the death-hole;" bnt the ground that had been 
 gained was held through all the horrors of the night, 
 and rifle-pits next day were built across the aperture. 
 A covered gallery was also at once commenced, from 
 which further mines or counter-mines could lead. 
 
 As it was found impossible to continue the work, 
 until the rebels were driven from the outer face of 
 the opposing parapet, another mine was at once be- 
 gun. This was sprung on the 1st of July. The re- 
 sult was the demolition of an entire redan, leaving 
 only an immense chasm where the rebel Avork had 
 stood. The greater portion of the earth was thrown 
 towards the national forces, the line of least resist- 
 ance being in that direction. The rebel interior line, 
 however, was much injured, and many of those man- 
 ning the works were killed or wounded.* But no 
 serious attemj)t to charge was made, the result of 
 the assaults, on the 25th, having been so inconsid- 
 erable. 
 
 From this time forward, the engineers were kept 
 constantly and busily employed, mining and countei- 
 mining on different portions of the line. Demonstra- 
 tions were made by Johnston, and some of his dis- 
 patches were intercepted, from which it was dis- 
 
 * Pemberton's report. 
 
tJLYSSES S. GRANT. 371 
 
 covered that lie intended immediately to attempt the 
 forcible relief of the garrison. The works on the Big 
 Black, extending from that river to the Yazoo, a dis- 
 tance of eight miles, were strengthened, in anticipa- 
 tion of such a movement. The troops on the west 
 side of the Mississippi also were on the alert, as there 
 was danger that the rebel general, Eichard Taylor, 
 might move up from Louisiana against them."^ Grant 
 was constantly warning and directing his officers on 
 the western shore. 
 
 A continuous siege, and a mighty battle immi- 
 nent. A citadel sun-ounded by land and water. The 
 bombardment almost incessant. The beleaguered 
 garrison reduced to quarter rations ; living on mule- 
 meat, and thinking it good fare. The population of 
 the town hiding in caves to escape the storm of mor- 
 tar-shells exj^loding in their streets. A squadron 
 thundering at their gates, by night as well as day. 
 Mines tremblinor beneath their feet. What rare news 
 came fi'om Johnston, far from cheering ; all hope in- 
 deed of succor quite cut off. Ammunition almost ex- 
 pended. The lines of the besieger contracting daily ; 
 his approaches getting closer, his sharpshooters more 
 accurate; his sap-rollers steadily rising over the hills 
 that Vicksburg had proudly declared impassable. 
 Every day some new battery opening from an unex- 
 pected quai-ter ; every day the position detected from 
 which to-moiTow still another battery would sm-ely 
 begin its tire. To crown all, after a few more con- 
 tractions of the coil, another mighty assault would 
 
 * " General Taylor is sent by General E. Kirby Smith to cooperate 
 witb you from the west bank of the river, to throw in supplies, and to 
 cross with his force, if expedient and practicable." — Johiston to Pern- 
 l)erton, June 2'2d. 
 
372 JIILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 bring the enemy immediately beneatli the walls, 
 wlien, covered by tlieir works, and more numerous 
 than the besieged, the assailants, in every liuman 
 proljabillty, would storm the town, and all the un- 
 utterable horrors to which fallen cities are exposed, 
 might come upon the devoted fortress. 
 
 Even if the gamson held out, it was only to pro- 
 lono' its miseries : starvation must come at last. The 
 privations and exposures of the men were telling on 
 their strength and sj)ii'its. The miasmatic exhala- 
 tions of the swamps, rising through the liot atmos- 
 phere of June, enYelo2:)ed and penetrated their weary 
 ti'ames, exhausted by the long series of disastrous 
 battles, and protracted marches, and incessant biv- 
 ouacs; debilitated, too, by the alternate fevers of 
 anxiety and the still more terrible chills of despair. 
 Their numbers were reduced by casualties, but far 
 more by disease. Thousands were tossing and groan- 
 ing in the hospitals, with none of the delicacies and 
 little of the attention that the sick require; Avhile 
 those in the trenches were hardly better oif. Foi-ty- 
 seven long days and nights they lay there \\itliout 
 intermission, for Pemberton had not men enough to 
 relieve his commands. Scorched by the sun, drenched 
 l)y the rain, begrimed with dirt, unable to wash tlieir 
 liodies or their clothes, for water was far off, and time 
 more precious still; pinched with hunger, anxious 
 every moment for tlieir lives, these weary but heroic 
 i-ebels defended the citadel, whose fall, they believed, 
 would be the fall of their confederacy. Those who 
 fought them hardest could not and did not fail to 
 recognize their splendid gallantly, and thorough de- 
 votion to an unrio-hteous cause. 
 
 Perhaps, to some among them, the suffering was 
 
ULYSSES S.GEANT. 373 
 
 rendered bitterer by the recollection of its needless- 
 ness. Had tlipy but remained true to tlieir country, 
 these trials had not come. The simple soldier might 
 have been sharing the joys of home with tender wife 
 and prattling child ; or the eager youth, telling the 
 oft-told tale to some bashful but lingering girl, in the 
 very haunts where now his dreams were disturbed 
 by the thunder of hostile cannon, or the horrid scream 
 of the shell — ^had they only not rebelled. 
 
 But the sufferino; was not all on the side of the 
 besieged. The long marches and exposures, and the 
 bloody battles had been shared by the national troops, 
 as well. They were unused to the dampness of the 
 Southern night and the heats of the Southern day ; 
 they were, it is true, inspired by the recollection of 
 their victories, and the confidence of eventual success, 
 which was felt by soldiers as well as commanders, but 
 their labors in the trenches were incessant, their 
 watchings continuous, their hardships not few. Food 
 was plenty, but water scarce ; and the men dug wells 
 among the hills. The picket duty was hard, and the 
 sharpshooters wei-e kept constantly on the alert.'^ 
 
 jSTothing, however, wearied the patience or de- 
 pressed the hope of the commander. On the 23d of 
 May, the day after the unsuccessful assault, he said : 
 " There is no doubt of the fall of this place, ulti- 
 mately;" and, on the 24th, to Halleck: "The enemy 
 are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of 
 Vicksburg, and the capture of most of the garrison, 
 can only be a question of time." Without a particle 
 
 * Tlio sharpshooters occupied positions behind the chimneys left 
 standing -where houses had been destroyed ; or, sometimes, shrouded 
 themselves in the abundant Spanish moss that hangs from the Southern 
 trees; concealed in this, they remained in the branches all day, like 
 leopards waiting to bring down their prey. 
 
374 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 of \Yliat is ordinarily called eDtliusiasm, lie yet was 
 tlie most confident man in Ms army. On the 3d of 
 June, he said : " Tlie apj)roaclies are gradually nearing 
 tlie enemy's fortifications. Five days more .should 
 plant our batteries on their parapets. Tlie best of 
 health and spirits prevail among the troops." On the 
 IGth: " Every thing j^rogresses well here. I am for- 
 tifying at Haine's bluif, to make my j)Osition certain, 
 but I believe I could go out with force enough to 
 drive the rebels from between the two rivers." On 
 the 26th, he reported the exj^losion of the mine in 
 Logan's front, and said : " The fight for it has been 
 incessant, and thus far we have not been able to es- 
 tablish batteries in the breach. Expect to succeed. 
 .... I will use every effort to learn any move John- 
 ston may make, and send troops from here to coun- 
 teract any change he may make, if I can." On the 
 27tli, he rej)orted that Johnston expected ten thou- 
 sand reenforcements from Bragg. " They are expected 
 next week. I feel strons; enouo-li as-ainst this in- 
 
 O CD CD 
 
 crease, and I do not despair of having Vicksburg be- 
 fore they arrive. This latter, however, I may be dis- 
 appointed in." On the 30th of June, after the siege 
 had lasted more than forty days, he WTote : " The 
 troops of this command are in excellent health and 
 spirits. There is not the slightest indication of de- 
 spondency, either among ofiicers or men." To Banks, 
 on this date, he said, evidently contemplating speedy 
 success: "Should it be my fortune, general, to get 
 into Vicksburg while you are still investing Port 
 Hudson, I ^A'ill commence immediately shij^ping 
 troops to you, and will send such number as you 
 may indicate as being necessary." 
 
 This confidence, however, was built upon deter 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 375 
 
 mination. It was a knowledge of his own traits and 
 his own acts tliat made liim so secure. He was one 
 day riding around his lines, and stopped for water 
 at the house of a rebel woman, who liad remained 
 mthin her shattered walls, not changing her disloyal 
 sentiments. She asked Grant, tauntingly, if he ex- 
 pected ever to get into Vicksburg. '' Certainly," he 
 replied. " But when ? " " I cannot tell exactly when 
 I shall take the towm, hut / mean to stay here till 1 
 do^ if it tahes me thirty years^ The Avoman's heart 
 seemed to fail her at the reply. Apparently, she had 
 hoped that her friends might be able to tire out the 
 besieo-ers, even if they could not drive them off; but 
 this waiting thirty years, if necessary, was a greater 
 persistency than she had contemplated. 
 
 His orders to subordinates completely express this 
 side of Grant's character, and reveal the means by 
 which he accomplished his results. To Dennis, on 
 the west bank of the Mississippi, he said, on the 13th 
 of June : ^' Drive the enemy from Eichmond. lleen- 
 force Mower all you can, and send him to do it." 
 This is the entire dispatch. To McClernand, June 
 loth: "Should the enemy attempt to get past your 
 left, with the view of forming a junction with John- 
 ston's force, he must be defeated AVe should hold 
 
 and fight the enemy wherever he presents himself, 
 
 from the extreme right to your extreme left " In 
 
 the same dispatch, but on another subject, he said : 
 " This is given only as a general plan, to be adopted 
 •under certain circumstances. The movements of an 
 enemy necessarily determine counter-movements " — a 
 principle that Grant never forgot, either in his in- 
 structions to others, or in his own plans of l)attle or 
 campaign. 
 
376 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 To Parke, on the IStli, he said: ''I want tlie 
 work of intrenching your position pushed with all 
 dispatch ; be ready to receive an attack, if one should 
 ])e made, and to leave tlie troops free to move out, 
 should the enemy remain where lie is." To Ord, on 
 the 19th: "Get batteries as well advanced. as possi- 
 ble, during the day and night/' To Parke, when that 
 commander was ordered to join Sherman : " An at- 
 tack is contemplated, evidently by way of Bear 
 creek, and tliat within two days. Move out four 
 brigades of your command to support your cavalry, 
 and olistruct tlieir advance as near Black river as 
 possible, until all the forces to spare can be brought 
 against them. Travel with as little baggage as pos- 
 sible, and use your teams as an ordnance and supply 
 train, to get out all you may want from the river. . . . 
 Move out early to-morrow morning, or sooner if you 
 can." To Dennis : " An attack upon you is not at 
 all impossible. You will therefore exercise unusual 
 vigilance in your preparations to receive an attack. 
 Keep your cavalry out as far as possible, to I'eport 
 any movement of the enemy, and confer witk Admiral 
 Porter, that tkere may be unanimity in your action." 
 To Parke : " Certainly, use the negroes, and every 
 thing within your command, to the best advantage." 
 To Ilerron : " Be ready to move with your division 
 at the shortest notice, witli two days' cooked rations 
 in their haversacks." To McPherson : " There is in- 
 dication that the enemy will attack within forty-eight 
 liours. Kotify McArthur to Ije ready to move at a 
 moment's notice, on Sherman's order. The greatest 
 vigilance will be required on the line, as the Vicks- 
 burg garrison may take the same occasion for an at- 
 tack also." 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 377 
 
 To McPlierson, on tlie 23d : " Have your forces in 
 readiness for any action." To Ord : " The utmost 
 vigilance should be observed in watching the cross- 
 ings of the Big Black." To Sherman, on the 25th : 
 " Should you discover a change of plans on his (John- 
 ston's) part, counteract it." To a junior officer, on a 
 certain occasion : " Use every effort to effect the ob- 
 ject of the expedition. Should they retreat, and 
 vour force prove sufficient to compete with them, fol- 
 low them as long as there is a hope of capture." To 
 Ord, on the 26th: "Keep Smith's division sleeping 
 under arms to-night, ready for an engagement. There 
 should be the greatest vigilance on the whole line." 
 Again : " Hold your trooj^s in readiness to threaten 
 an assault, to keep the enem}^ from massing on Mc- 
 Pherson." And again : " Notify General Lauman to 
 be in readiness all night," To Washburne : " Make 
 the detail with reference to the competency of the 
 colonel who will command the expedition. He must 
 be a live and active man." To Ord, on another oc- 
 casion: "Prepare to march this evening." This is 
 the whole dispatch.'^ 
 
 By the 1st of July, tlie approaches in many places 
 had reached the enemy's ditch. At ten different 
 points. Grant could put the heads of regiments under 
 cover, within distances of from five to one hundred 
 yards of the rebel works, and the men of the two 
 armies conversed across the lines. The hand-to-hand 
 character of the i-ecent fighting showed that little 
 
 * It is unnecessary to call the attention of a military reader to the 
 clearness of these dispatches. A distinguished officer, who had wide 
 experience in studying and obeying confused dispatches, declared that 
 there never was any difficulty about knowing what Grant meant ; a 
 child could understand his orders. 
 
378 anLiTARY histoey of 
 
 fui'tlier progress could be made by digging alone, and 
 Grant accordingly determined to make the final as- 
 sault on the morning of the 6th of July. Orders 
 were issued to prepare the heads of approaches for 
 the easy debouche of troops, to widen the main ap- 
 proaches so that the men could move easily by fours, 
 and to prepare planks and sand-bags filled with 
 pressed cotton, for crossing ditches. 
 
 Johnston was moving up at the same time. On 
 the nio'ht of the 1st, lie encaniDed between Browns- 
 ville and the Big Black river, and, on the 3d, sent 
 word to Pemberton, that about the Ttli of the month, 
 an attempt to create a diversion would be made, to 
 enable the garrison to cut its way out." This attack, 
 however, was never made. The movement to Bro^^Tis 
 ville was the last operation undertaken for the relief 
 or the defence of Vicksburg. 
 
 On the 22d of June, Pemberton had suggested to 
 Johnston that the latter should make propositions to 
 Grant to pass the garrison out, "with all its arms and 
 equipages;" but Johnston replied: "Negotiations 
 with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they 
 become necessary, must be made by you. It would 
 be a confession of weakness on my part, ^^'hich I 
 ought not to make, to propose them. When it be- 
 comes necessary to make terms, they may be con- 
 sidered as made under my authority." 
 
 On the 1st of July, therefore, Pemberton hav- 
 ing become satisfied that the time liad arrived when 
 he must either capitulate or evacuate the city, ad- 
 dressed the following communication to each of his 
 four division commanders, Stevenson, Forney, Smith, 
 
 * This dispatch did not reach Pemberton till the 10th of July, 
 when both he and the messenger were ijrisoners. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEA^'T. 379 
 
 and Bowen : " Unless the siege of Vicksburg is icaised, 
 or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary, 
 very shortly, to evacuate the place. I see no pros- 
 pect of the former, and there are many great if not 
 insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. You 
 are, therefore, requested to inform me, wath as little 
 delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops, 
 and their ability to make the marches and undergo 
 the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evac- 
 uation." 
 
 Two of these officers recommended a suiTender, 
 and the others declared the chances were that an at- 
 temj^t at evacuation would not succeed ; accordingly, 
 on the morning of the 3d of July, Pemberton dis- 
 patched the following letter to Grant : 
 
 " I have the honor to propose to you an armistice 
 of — hours, with a view to arranging terms for the 
 capitulation of Yicksburg. To this end, if agreeable 
 to you, I Avill appoint three commissioners, to meet a 
 like number to be named by yourself, at such place and 
 hour as you may find convenient. I make this prop- 
 osition to save the further effusion of blood, which 
 must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling 
 myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet 
 indefinite period. This communication will be hand- 
 ed you, under a flag of truce, by Major-General John 
 S. Bowen." 
 
 The white flag was hoisted at about ten o'clock in 
 the morning. Hostilities in that quarter ceased at 
 once, and Bowen and Colonel Montgomeiy, an aide- 
 de-camp of Pemberton, were soon seen wending their 
 way from the works of Yicksburg towards the na- 
 tional liues. The rebel soldiers instantly became ex- 
 cited, conjecturing that a surrender was contemplated ; 
 
380 MELITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 but, to counteract tliis, a story was circulated tliat 
 Pemberton was sending' to ask Grant's permission for 
 the removal of the sick and wounded to some point 
 outside the lines. Bowen was received by General 
 A. J. Smitli, and expressed a strong desire to con- 
 verse with Grant ; this, however, was not allowed ; 
 lie then suggested that it would be well if Grant and 
 Pemberton could meet. Grant, therefore, sent a ver- 
 bal message that, if Pemberton wished to see him, an 
 interview could be had between the lines, in McPher- 
 son's front, at three o'clock that afternoon. The 
 written reply to Pemberton was as follows : 
 
 "Your note of this date is just received, proposing 
 an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of ar- 
 ranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, 
 to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood 
 you propose stopping by this course can be ended at 
 any time you may choose, by the unconditional sur- 
 render of the city and garrison. Men who have 
 shown so much endurance and courage as those now 
 in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an 
 adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with 
 all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not fo- 
 vor the proposition of appointing commissioners to 
 arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no 
 terms other than those indicated above." 
 
 At three o'clock in the afternoon, Pemberton pro- 
 ceeded to the front, accompanied by Bowen and Colo- 
 nel Montgomery. AVith Grant were Generals Ord, 
 McPherson, Logan, and A. J. Smith, and several mem- 
 bers of Grant's staff. The two commanders met un- 
 der a tree on a hillside, within two hundred feet of 
 the rebel line. The works on both sides were crowd- 
 ed with unarmed men, lying on their faces, or hanging 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 381 
 
 over tlie parapet, and looking eagerly on. The day was 
 sultry ; there was no I'aln, but the clouds hung heavily 
 down, as if to watch the interview. The loud-mouthed 
 cannon held their peace, and the strange cessation of 
 artillery and musketry fire made the silence oppres- 
 sive. Tlie two generals sliook hands, and Pemberton 
 inquired what terms of caj^itulation would be allowed 
 him. Grant rej)lied, "Those that had been expressed 
 in his letter of the morning ; " whereupon Pemberton 
 haughtily declared, " If this were all, the conference 
 might terminate, and hostilities be resumed imme- 
 diately." '* Very well," said Grant, and turned away. 
 
 But General Bo wen then proposed that two of 
 tlie subordinates present should retire for consulta- 
 tion, and suggest such terms as they might think 
 proper for the consideration of theii' chiefs. Grant 
 had no objection to this, but would not consider him- 
 self bound by any agreement of his subordinates. He 
 must himself decide what terms ^vere to be allowed. 
 Smith and Bowen accordingly went a little way 
 apart, while Grant and Pemberton walked up and 
 dowm, between the parapets, conversing. After a 
 few minutes, all returned to the tree of rendezvous, 
 and Bowen proposed that the rebels should march 
 out of Yieksburg with the honors of war, carrying 
 theii' muskets and field-guns with them, Init leaving 
 their heavy artillery. Grant smiled at this proposal, 
 which was promptly rejected. After some discus- 
 sion, it was then ao-reed that Grant shouhl send his 
 terms to Pemberton before ten o'clock that night, 
 and the interview was at an end, having lasted a 
 little more than an hour. Hostilities were not to be 
 resumed until the correspondence had terminated. 
 
 Grant returned to his quarters, and, for the only 
 
382 MTLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 time in his life, lield what might be called a council of 
 war. He sent for all his corps and division generals 
 on the city fi'ont, and received their opinions as to 
 the terms -which should be allowed to Pemberton. 
 "With one exception (General Steele), they suggested 
 terms that Grant was unwolling to sanction, and 
 their judgment was not accepted. The following 
 letter was written instead, and forwarded to Pem- 
 berton : 
 
 " In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, 
 I A^•ill submit the following proposition for the sur- 
 render of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. 
 On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march 
 in one division as a guard, and take possession at 
 eight A. sr. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made 
 out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will 
 1)0 allowed to march out of our lines, the officers 
 taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and 
 the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. 
 The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, 
 but no other property. If these conditions are ac- 
 cepted, any amount of rations you may deem neces- 
 sary can be taken from the stores you now have, and 
 also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. 
 Thirty wagons also, counting two horse or mule 
 teams as one, will be allowed to transport such arti- 
 cles as cannot be carried alono^. The same conditions 
 will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and 
 soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The 
 paroles for these latter must be signed, however, 
 ^vhilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll 
 of prisoners." 
 
 By the tei-ms of a cartel, then existing between 
 the national and rebel authorities, all officers and 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 383 
 
 men of either army, captured or surrendered at any 
 point in tlie entire theatre of war, were to be de- 
 livered up to their respective authorities within ten 
 days after capture ; those taken east of the Allegha- 
 nies, at Kichmond, and those west, at Vicksburg. At 
 these places they were to be exchanged, or paroled 
 until exchano-ed. Grant was therefore oblio-ed to 
 parole and discliarge his prisoners * 
 
 Pembei-ton submitted Grant's letter to a council 
 of general officers, all of whom, except Baldwin, rec- 
 ommended acceptance of the propositions it contained ; 
 and, late at night, the following reply was made : " I 
 have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 
 • Wae Dbpaktsten-t, Adjtjtakt-Gext.ral's Office, ) 
 "Washingtos, September 25, 136-2. S 
 General Orders, Ko. 142. 
 
 The following is tlic cartel under which prisoners are exchanged in 
 the existing war with the Southern states : . . . . 
 
 Article 1. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of 
 war held by either party, including those taken on private armed ves- 
 sels, known as privateers, shall be discharged ui^ou the conditions and 
 terms following : . . . . 
 
 Abticle 4. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole, in ten 
 days after their capture, and the prisoners now held, and those here- 
 after to be taken, to be transported to the points mutually agreed 
 upon, at the expense of the capturing party 
 
 Article 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all pris- 
 oners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch to A. 
 M. Aiken's, below Dutch Gap, on the James river, Virginia, or to 
 Vicksburg, on the Mississippi river, in the state of ^Mississippi, and 
 there exchanged, or paroled until such exchange can be effected 
 
 Was Depaktment, ADJCTAST-GESEP.At,'s Office, i 
 ■Washikgton, July 3, 1S63. j 
 General Orders, yo. 207. 
 
 The attention of all persons in the military service of the United 
 States is called to Ai-ticle 7 of the cartel agreed upon on the 22d of 
 July, 18G3, and published in General Orders Xo. 142, September 25, 
 18G2. According to the terms of this cartel, all captures must be re- 
 duced to actual possession, and all prisoners of war must be delivered 
 at the places designated, there to be exchanged, or paroled until ex- 
 change can be effected. 
 
384 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 communication of this date, proposing terms of capit- 
 ulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your 
 tenns are accepted; but, injustice both to the lionor 
 and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defence of 
 Yicksburg, I have to submit the following amend- 
 ments, which, if acceded to by you, will j^erfect the 
 aoreement between us. At ten o'clock a. m. to-mor- 
 row, I propose to evacuate the works in and around 
 Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison 
 under my command, by marching out with my colors 
 and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, 
 after Avhich you will take possession. Officers to re- 
 tain their side-arms and personal property, and the 
 rights and proj)erty of citizens to be respected." 
 
 Tliis was received after midnio;ht. The answer 
 was immediate, and in these words : " I have the 
 honor to acknowledge tbe receipt of your communi- 
 cation of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you 
 cannot be acceded to in full. It mil be necessary to 
 furnisb every officer and man with a parole signed 
 by himself, which, with the comj^letion of the roll of 
 prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I 
 can make no stipulations with regard to the treat- 
 ment of citizens and tbeir private property. While I 
 do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance 
 or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any 
 restraint by stipulations. The property which offi- 
 cers will be allowed to take with them will be as 
 stated in my proj^osition of last evening : that is, offi- 
 cers will l)e allowed their jirivate baggage and side- 
 arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you 
 mean by your proposition for each brigade to march 
 to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and 
 stack amis at ten o'clock a. m., and then return to the 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 385 
 
 inside and there remain as prisoners until properly 
 paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no 
 notification be received of your acceptance of my 
 terms by nine o'clock a. m., I shall regard tbem as 
 having been rejected, and sliall act accordingly. 
 Should these terms be accepted, white flags should 
 be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my 
 troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon 
 your men." 
 
 The following from Pemberton concluded the cor- 
 respondence: "I have the honor to acknowledge the 
 receipt of your communication of this day, and in re 
 ply, to say that the terms proposed by you are ac- 
 cepted." 
 
 Meanwhile, as soon as Grant had received Pem 
 berton's first communication, he had given Sherman 
 directions to march out against Johnston, the moment 
 the surrender should be consummated. "There is 
 but little doubt," he said, on the 3d, " but the enemy 
 will surrender to night or in the morning. Make 
 yoiu' calculations to attack Johnston and destroy 
 the road north of Jackson." Again, on the same 
 day : " 1 have dii-ected Steele and Ord to be in readi- 
 ness to move as you suggested, the moment Yicks- 
 buro- is surrendered. I want Johnston broken up as 
 eftectually as possible. You can make your own ai-- 
 rano-ements, and have all the troops of my command 
 except one corps." 
 
 Durino- that nioht, Grant sent instructions to 
 Ord and McPherson to put discreet men on picket, 
 and allow them to communicate to the enemy's pick- 
 ets the fact, that in case of surrender, both officers 
 and men would be paroled, and allowed to return to 
 theii- homes. A close watch was kept lest any should 
 
386 jinjTAEr history of 
 
 attempt to escape on Herron's front, and no more de- 
 serters were received. 
 
 At ten o'clock of Saturday, tlie 4tli of July,* the 
 anniversary of American independence, the gan-ison 
 of Vicksbure marched out of the lines it had defended 
 so Ions:, and stacked its arms in front of the con- 
 querors. All along the rebel v^orks they poured out, 
 io gray, through the sally-ports and across the ditches, 
 and laid down their colors, sometimes on the very 
 spot where so many of the besiegers had laid down 
 their lives ; and then, in sight of the national troops, 
 who were standing on their own parapets, the rebels 
 returned inside the works, prisoners of war. Thirty- 
 one thousand six hundred men were surrendered to 
 Grant. Among these were two thousand one hundred 
 and fifty-three officers, of whom fifteen Avere gen- 
 erals, f One hundred and seventy-two cannon also 
 fell into his hands, J the largest captiwe of men and 
 material ever made in war. § 
 
 * " K it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the 
 day for surrender ? the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that 
 day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I 
 knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th 
 of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their 
 national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted 
 from them at any other time." — PenibertorC s report. 
 
 t The number actually paroled was twenty-eight thousand eight 
 hundred and ninety-two ; in addition to these, seven hundred and nine 
 refused to be paroled, and were sent north as prisoners ; many hundreds 
 died in the hospitals before the paroling could be completed, and 
 over a thousand escaped, or concealed themselves, or, disguised as 
 citizens, avoided being paroled. 
 
 \ There were one hundred and five field-jneces captured at Vicks- 
 burg, and sixty-seven garrison-guns. During the previous campaign, 
 seventy-four guns were taken, of which twenty-five were heavy pieces, 
 captured at Grand Gulf and naiue's bluff, making a total of two hun- 
 dred and forty-six cannon captured during the campaign and siege. 
 
 § " A spectacle took place on the following day unparalleled in mod- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 387 
 
 Logan's division was one of those wliicli liad ap- 
 proached nearest the rebel works, and now was the 
 first to enter the town. It had been heavily engaged 
 in both assaults, and was fairly entitled to this honor. 
 The Forty-fifth Illinois infantry marched at the head 
 of the column, and placed its battle-torn flag on the 
 court-house of Vicksburg. 
 
 Grant rode into the town, with his staff, at the 
 head of Logan's division. The rebel soldiers gazed 
 curiously at their conqueror, as he came inside the 
 lines that had resisted him so valiantly, but they paid 
 him no sign of disrespect. He went direct to one of 
 the rebel headquarters ; there was no one to receive 
 him, and he dismounted and entered the porch, where 
 Peml)erton sat with his generals ; they saluted Grant, 
 but not one offered him a chair, though all had 
 seats themselves. Neither the rank nor the reputa- 
 tion of their captor, nor the swords he had allowed 
 them to wear, prompted them to this simple act of 
 courtesy. Pembertou was especially sullen, both in 
 conversation and behavior. Finally, for very shame, 
 one of the rebels offered a place to Grant. The day 
 was hot and dusty ; he was thii-sty from his ride, and 
 asked for a di-iuk of water. They told him he could 
 find it inside ; and, no one showing him the way, he 
 groped in a passage until he found a negro, who gave 
 him the cup of cold water only, which his enemy 
 had almost denied. AYlien he retiu-ned, his seat 
 had been taken, and he remained standing during 
 the rest of the interview, which lasted about half 
 an hour. 
 
 ern tear/are, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that 
 memorable morning the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with 
 sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay 
 down its arms." — Alison's Histart/ of Europe, chap. xL 
 
388 MILITAKY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Pemberton now requested Grant to supply the 
 gamson with rations; to tliis he immediately con- 
 sented, and inquired how many would be needed. 
 "I have thirty-two thousand men," was the reply; 
 and, for the first time, the victor was aware of the ex- 
 tent of his victory. He had not imagined the garri- 
 son to be greater than fifteen or twenty thousand 
 men. But he expressed no surprise. 
 
 Grant afterwards rode to the wharf, and exchanged 
 congratulations with Admiral Porter on the flagship, 
 but returned to his old camp at dark. His quarters 
 were not removed into Vicksburg until the 6tli. 
 
 On the night of the 4th, he announced his capture 
 to the government, in these words : " The enemy sur- 
 rendered this morning:. The onlv terms allowed is 
 their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a 
 great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, 
 probably, several days in the capture, and leaves 
 troops and transports ready for immediate service. 
 Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on 
 Johnston, to drive him from the state. I Mill send 
 troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth 
 army corps to Burnside." He also notified Banks of 
 the capture of Vicksburg, and, a few days afterwards, 
 offered to send him an army corps of " as good troops 
 as ever trod American soil ; no better are found on 
 any other y 
 
 The men of the two armies afliliated at once. The 
 rebels were fed, and treated with great kindness, and 
 appreciated the consideration of their victors. Rebel 
 and national soldiers were often seen walking arm- 
 in-arm; they felt that they were countrymen, for 
 all the strife. Seven hundred of the garrison re- 
 fused to be paroled, preferring to be sent north as 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 389 
 
 prisoners. Pemberton protested against tliis, and 
 wanted Grant to compel tliese men to return to the 
 Southern aimy, but Grant tliouglit liis soldiers could 
 be better employed than in forcing men back into tlie 
 ranks of the rebellion. Pemberton also wanted 
 Grant to allow liim arms for a few of Lis troops, so 
 that they might guard the others on their march to 
 the interior, as, otherwise, many might desert. This, 
 however, was exactly what Grant desired, and he de- 
 clined assisting Pemberton to guard the paroled 
 prisoners on their way home. 
 
 In a week, the paroles were completed, and on 
 Saturday morning, July 11th, about half an hour 
 before noon, the rebel garrison took up its line of 
 march. As they reached the fortifications, each man's 
 name was called and checked off on the rolls. Na- 
 tional troops were placed as guards on both sides of 
 the road, for some distance beyond the intrench- 
 ments ; and, in all the bitterness of defeat, the pris- 
 oners marched by. All that had passed was as noth- 
 ing to this. Amid the thickest storm of battle, there 
 had always been the expectation of succor or success; 
 while they lay on the weary picket, or in the hot 
 trenches, they had still hoped on, though hope was 
 long deferred. But now all hope was gone ; tlie 
 rebel yell of defiance,* so often raised in battle, oj)- 
 posed to the national cheer, miglit not be heard ; 
 
 * Those who ever heard either of these battle-cries never mistook 
 them afterwards. The national troops always cheered, the rebels al- 
 ways yelled. The very terms, " cheer " and " yell," were adopted by 
 both armies, and writers on either side discriminate thus between 
 them. The rebel yell was usually given in advance of a charge, or at 
 the moment of making or receiving it ; the national cheer more often 
 after victory. One was used to produce, the other to annoimce suc- 
 cess. 
 
390 ]\riLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 their willing liands no longer grasped familiar weap- 
 ons ; the standards, under which they had fought so 
 proudly, were in the keeping of then* conquerors. 
 Large tear-drops fell on many a weather-beaten face, 
 and ever and anon they paused, and, turning back, 
 took one last look at the city they had striven so 
 hard to retain.* The national army gazed on in si- 
 lence; proud as was the sight to them, exultant as 
 were the emotions with which they contemplated a 
 spectacle that repaid them a thousand-fold for all their 
 toils, and wounds, and sufferings, they yet could not 
 but pity the humiliation of their foes. No insulting 
 taunt was heard, no cheer of triumph nor mocking 
 cannon saluted the ears of the departing prisoners.f 
 Silently and sadly they marched on, and, in a few 
 hours, Vicksburg was again free from the taint of 
 treason. 
 
 The parallel between Ulm and Vicksburg is prin- 
 cipally in results. Napoleon had twice as many men 
 as Mack in his great campaign, while the rebels had 
 twice as many men as Grant, when the latter crossed 
 the Mississippi ; although, at the close of the siege. 
 Grant's numbers were more than equal to those of 
 Pemberton and Johnston combined. Napoleon's 
 achievement was accomplished solely by his own 
 splendid strategy and the amazing stupidity of his 
 antagonist; there was not a battle fought in the 
 Uhu campaign. Grant won his results by fighting 
 
 * See parai)lik't of Abrams. 
 
 t Grant's orders were : " Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here 
 to-morrow. Tliey -will be authorized to cross at the railroad-bridge, 
 and move from there to Edward's ferry, and on by way of Raymond. 
 Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, 
 to make no ofl'ensive I'emarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of 
 ranks after they have j)assed." 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 891 
 
 as well as by strategy, aided, doubtless, by Peml^er- 
 ton's repeated blunders ; but be fought five battles, 
 and made two assaults, and prosecuted a siege for 
 over forty days, before be opened the gates of Vicks- 
 burg. Besides tbis, Napoleon's army w^as composed 
 of veterans, tbe pride of France, inspirited with long 
 success, selected and controlled by bimself alone. 
 Grant's men, on tbe contrary, were volunteers, many 
 of tbem entirely raw, all sent to bim by others ; and, 
 instead of moving fresh from a camp like that of Bou- 
 logne, the Army of the Tennessee had spent months 
 amid the swamps and fevers of the Mississippi ; while 
 its enterprise w^as derided as hopeless, and its leader 
 declared incompetent by half the Korth. The abso- 
 lute captures at the fall of the two cities were, how- 
 ever, not dissimilar. Napoleon took thirty thousand 
 prisoners, and sixty guns; Grant, as has been seen, 
 nearly thirty-two thousand men, and a hundred and 
 seventy cannon. In each case the prisoners were 
 paroled. Napoleon, sun-ounded by a numerous and 
 magnificent staff, witnessed the march of the imperial 
 troops as they defiled before him to lay down their 
 arms. Grant was not present when his prisoners 
 marched out of Yicksbui'g, and only saw Peniberton 
 when it was necessaiy to arrange the terms of the 
 capitulation, or on other indispensable business. 
 
 Halleck's first dispatch to Grant, after the fall 
 of Vicksburg, was a rebuke and a counteiTuand. 
 "July 8th. I fear your paroling the prisoners at 
 Vicksburg, without actual deliveiy to a propei 
 agent, as required by the seventh article of the 
 cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and 
 that these men will immediately be placed in the 
 ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case else- 
 
392 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 where. If these prisoners have not been allowed to 
 depart, you will retain them until further orders." 
 The countermand, however, came too late ; the pris- 
 oners had ali'eady left Vicksburg. The entire gar- 
 rison, officers and men, had been paroled not to take 
 up arms against the United States until exchanged 
 by the proper authorities ; teims which Mere really 
 more favorable to the government than an uncon- 
 ditional surrender, as Grant thus secured his troops 
 and transports for immediate use, and saved the ex- 
 pense of subsisting thirty thousand prisoners. Had 
 he acted otherwise, the movement as-ainst Johnston 
 could not have been so promptly undertaken, and all 
 the steamers on the Mississip23i would have been 
 occupied for weeks, conveying the prisoners else- 
 where. Besides this, Grant hoped to demoralize the 
 whole interior country still in rebellion, by spreading 
 this dispirited mass of men among the yet uncon- 
 quered remainder. Having treated them well after 
 capture, he believed that they would lose heart and 
 hate together, and that the leaven of their disaffection 
 might leaven the whole lump of treason. 
 
 The consequences of this victory were not long de- 
 layed. On the 8th of July, Port Hudson surrendered. 
 As soon as its commander, General Gardner, heard 
 of the fall of Vicksburg, he sent a communication 
 to Banks, who was besieo-ino* him : " Havins; re- 
 ceived information from your trooj^s that Vicksburg 
 has been surrendered, I make this communication to 
 ask you to give me the official assurance whether this 
 is true or not ; and if true, I ask for a cessation of. 
 hostilities with a view to the consideration of terms 
 for surrendering this place." Banks thereupon for- 
 warded to Gardner a copy of Grant's dispatch an- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 393 
 
 nouncing the capture of Vicksburg, and Gardner at 
 once proposed tlie surrender of Poi-t Hudson and its 
 garrison. This event took place the next day. The 
 attempted confederacy was thus cut in twain, and, in 
 the forcible lansruas^e of Lincoln, the Father of Waters 
 rolled " un vexed to tlie sea." 
 
 On the nio-ht of the 4th, Ord and Steele were 
 moved out to join Sherman, and that commander, 
 with about forty thousand men, set out to retrace the 
 route along: which Grant had led his soldiers from 
 Jackson to the Mississippi. Champion's hill and the 
 Bio- Black brido-e were the fittin^^ landmarks for the 
 march. " The route travelled by your corps, on com- 
 ing to Vicksburg," said Grant, " is exactly the route 
 they will travel back. They came by Black Kiver 
 bridge, Edward's station, and Champion's liilL That 
 is the route they now go." 
 
 The instructions to Sherman were : " I want you 
 to drive Johnston fi'om the Mississippi Central rail- 
 road. Destroy the bridges as far north as Grenada 
 with your cavalry, and do the enemy all the harm 
 possible." Again : " Make youi- calculations to attack 
 Johnston and destroy the road north of Jackson. I 
 cannot say w^here you will find the most effective 
 places to strike. I would say, move so as to strike 
 Jackson or Canton, whichever might seem most de- 
 sirable." 
 
 On the 4th, Sherman was informed : " The orders 
 ■^Tdl be made as you suggest, the moment Vicksburg 
 is ours. Ord and Steele have both been notified to 
 move, the moment Vicksburg falls. I will let you 
 know, the moment Pemberton's answer arrives. I 
 have no suggestion or orders to give. I want you to 
 drive Johnston out in youi- own way, and inflict on 
 
394 MTLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 the enemy all tlie punishment you can. I will sup- 
 port you to the last man that can be spared." 
 
 It was the night of the 5th, before all of SheiTQan's 
 force reached the Bio; Black river. Brido-es were 
 constructed at once, and on the 6th, the troops were 
 all across. On the 7th and 8th, they marched by 
 separate roads to Clinton. The weather was intensely 
 hot, the dust stifling, but the enemy made no serious 
 opposition to their j)rogress. Evidence accumulated 
 at every step that Johnston, with four divisions of 
 infantry, and a large cavalry and artillery force, was 
 now falling back on Jackson. He reached that place 
 on the 7th, and on the 9th, Sherman came up to the 
 familiar ground. 
 
 The works had been strengthened since May, and 
 the lines extended so as to reach the Pearl river, both 
 above and below Jackson. 'No sooner did Sherman 
 become satisfied that the rebels had taken refuQ-e in 
 the place, than he determined to hold them there, 
 while, with cavalry and light columns of infantry, he 
 fulfilled one part of Grant's orders, destroying the 
 railroad north and south, not only for the present, 
 but for all future operations ; at the same time, he 
 meant to work gradually around by one flank or the 
 other, threatening to cross Pearl river, and operate on 
 the enemy's only line of communication with the 
 rear. Ord was given the right, Steele the centre, and 
 Parke the left of the line: Lauman was now with 
 Ord, and Sooy Smith, of Washburne's command, with 
 Parke. Both the wiuo- commanders were instructed 
 to approach the Pearl river. The work of railroad 
 destruction went on vigorously, while regular para- 
 pets of earth and cotton were constructed in front of 
 the lines. It was no part of the plan to assault the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAIO'. 395 
 
 enemy's fortifications, but skirmisliers were pushed 
 close up, and cannonading Avas continuous. 
 
 At first, Johnston hoped tliat the scarcity of water 
 would compel Sherman to assault, but when he found 
 that Sherman would not gi*atify this hope, he tele- 
 graphed to the rebel president that it was impossible 
 to stand a siege. " If the enemy will not attack, we 
 must, or, at the last moment, withdraw. AVe cannot 
 attack seriously without risking the army." Brisk 
 skirmishing and light cannonading continued for 
 several days; and on the 12th, an aifair occurred in 
 which Lauman's division only was engaged; it re- 
 sulted in the loss of nearly five hundred men to Sher- 
 man, and was occasioned by Lauman's misinterpreta- 
 tion of his orders. On the lath, both flanks of the 
 army extended to the Pearl river, and Sherman sent 
 back for ammunition for a siecre. On the 12tli and 
 13th, three thousand rounds of ammunition were 
 thrown into Jackson, and on the 14th, Johnston tele- 
 graphed that he should be comj^elled to abandon the 
 place. " It would be madness to attack." 
 
 Meanwhile, Sherman sent out expeditions to the 
 right and left, destroying the railroads in every direc- 
 tion — cars, locomotives, turn-tables, and shops, as well 
 as tracks and bridges — and driving ofl:' various bodies 
 of cavalry. Some of his troops travelled as far as 
 sixty miles, marking their whole route with devasta- 
 tion. The parapets and rifle-pits, in fi-ont of Jackson, 
 were strengthened, to be ready for a general attack, 
 as soon as the ammunition train should an-ive from 
 the rear. This did not reach camp till late in the 
 night of the 16th, too late to distribute the ammuni- 
 tion. Information of its apj^roach was obtained by 
 Johnston during the 16th, and he at once determined 
 
39G MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 to evacuate the place. All niglit, Sherman heard the 
 sound of wagons, but nothing that indicated evacua- 
 tion, for the picks and shovels were at work till 
 midnight; but, at dawn of day, it became evident 
 that the enemy had withdrawn across the Pearl river. 
 The rebels had burned all the bridges in retreating, 
 and placed loaded shells and torpedoes on the roads 
 leadino; out from the river. All the material of war 
 had been removed, in advance of the retreat, by means 
 of the railroad running east. 
 
 Sherman was convinced that pursuit across a 
 country ninety miles in extent, destitute of water, 
 and under the intense heat of a July sun, would 
 be more destructive to his own command than 
 fruitful in results; he therefore determined not to 
 follow Johnston auy farther. He remained two or 
 three days completing the work of destruction, and 
 on the 20th, sent part of his force back to Yicksburg. 
 Two days more were spent in attempting to relieve 
 the condition of the inhabitants, whose homes had 
 been ruined by the war, and whose supplies were ut- 
 terly exhausted by the demands of two hostile armies. 
 Sherman shared his stock of provisions freely with 
 them ; and, with Grant's approval, issued orders for 
 the distribution of two hundred barrels of flour and 
 one hundred barrels of pork. On the 23d, he moved 
 to Clinton, where ao-ain the utter exhaustion of the 
 provisions of the country compelled him to supply 
 the hospitals of the enemy, as well as the country 
 people. Supplies for Ave hundred people for thirty 
 days were left here, in charge of responsible citizens, 
 who pledged themselves that these provisions should 
 be kept sacred to the use of the impoverished inhab- 
 itants. On the 24th, he moved to Champion's hill, 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 397 
 
 and on the 25tb, recrossed the Big Black river, and 
 once more went into camp near Vicksburg. 
 
 On the 4th of July, the great mass of troops em- 
 ployed on this expedition were in the trenches before 
 Vicksburg, where for two months they had been toil- 
 ing under a hot sun in close and stifling rifle-pits. 
 Without stopping to enjoy for a moment the great 
 success which there had crowned their labors, they 
 marched again, in heat and dust, for fifty miles, ^vith 
 no water, save that they found in muddy creeks, or 
 cisterns already once exhausted, or in the surface- 
 ponds, which the enemy in his retreat had purposely 
 tainted with dead cattle and hogs. They crossed the 
 Big Black river on bridges of their own constniction, 
 and then had to deal with an army under a leader 
 of great renown — an army specially formed to raise 
 the sieire of Vicksbursj, little inferior to Sherman's in 
 infantry or artillery, and far superior to his m cavalry 
 They drove Johnston fifty miles, and left him in full 
 retreat ; they destroyed the great arteries of travel 
 which alone could enable him to reassemble troops 
 and molest Grant's possession of the Mississippi ; and 
 they so exhausted the country through which they 
 passed that no army could exist there again, during 
 that season, without hauling all its supplies. Tlie 
 campaign was a fitting supplement to the conquest 
 of the Mississippi, and, indeed, was necessary to per- 
 fect the achievements of Grant. 
 
 Shei-man's whole lose was less than a thousand 
 men. He took more than that number of piisoners ; 
 and Johnston lost, according to his own account, 
 during the siege alone, seventy-one killed and five 
 hundred and four wounded, besides large numbers 
 by desertion and straggling. 
 
398 MILITAEY HISTOET OF 
 
 The result of the entire Vicksburg campaign was, 
 the defeat of the rebels in five battles outside of 
 Vicksburg, the occupation of Jackson, and the caj^ture 
 of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of war; 
 a loss to the enemy of forty thousand prisoners, at 
 least twelve thousand killed and wounded, and thou- 
 sands of stragglers, who were never collected and re- 
 organized; in all an army of sixty thousand soldiers.* 
 
 * The records of tlie commissary-general of prisoners show a total 
 of forty-two thousand and fifty-nine prisoners captured during the 
 Vicksburg campaign, after the 1st of May. As Grant lost in that time 
 nearly nine thousand men in killed and wounded, it is fair to suppose 
 that Pemberton and Johnston, so repeatedly and disastrously beaten, 
 lost twelve thousand. Any one who has seen war is aware how small 
 an estimate six thousand is for the stragglers in an unsuccessful cam- 
 paign. The calculation is simple. 
 
 42,000 Prisoners. 
 
 12,000 Killed and wounded. 
 6,000 Stragglers. 
 
 60,000 Total 
 This estimate is proof of Pemberton's force at the beginning of the 
 campaign. He surrendered thirty-two thousand men at Vicksburg; 
 three thousand were captured at Champion's hill; nearly two thousand 
 at the Big Black bridge, and at least two thousand others at Port 
 Gibson and Raymond, and during the campaign and siege; while 
 those who escaped with Loring, from Champion's hill, could not have 
 been fewer than four thousand. 
 
 32,000 Surrendered at Vicksburg. 
 3,000 Captured at Champion's hill. 
 2,000 " " Big Black bridge. 
 
 2,000 " " Port Gibson, etc. 
 
 4,000 Loring. 
 10,000 Killed and wounded in Pemberton's command. 
 3,000 Stragglers. 
 
 50,000 Total. 
 There can no longer be a doubt that many rebel officials persis- 
 tently and designedly misstated the numbers and losses in their armies. 
 Doubtless, in this, they persuaded themselves that the end justified 
 the means. But the j)ossession of the records of both parties to the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 399 
 
 A large amount of public property, consisting of rail- 
 roads, locomotives, cars, steamers, cotton, etc., fell into 
 Grant's liancls, and mucli was destroyed to prevent 
 its capture; wliile arms and munitions of war for a 
 hundred thousand men departed from the rebellion 
 forever. 
 
 Grant's loss in the entire series of battles and as- 
 saults, including the casualties of the siege, was 
 twelve hundi'ed and forty-three killed, seven thou- 
 sand and ninety-five wounded, and five hundred and 
 thirty-five missing ; total, eight thousand eight hun- 
 dred and seventy-three. Of the wounded, many were 
 but slightly hurt, and continued on duty ; many more 
 required but a few days or weeks for their recovery : 
 not more than half of the wounded were perma- 
 nently disabled. 
 
 When this success became known, the satisfoction 
 of the government was supreme, and the joy of the 
 loyal people knew no bounds. On the 13th of July, 
 the President ^^Tote the following characteristic and 
 mao'nanimous letter to Grant : 
 
 " My dear General : I do not remember that you 
 and I ever met personally. I write this now as a 
 grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable 
 service you have done the country. I wish to say a 
 word further. "When you first reached the vicinity 
 of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you 
 finally did — march the troops across the neck, run 
 
 contest, makes tbe foct plain. In this very instance, Pemberton stated, 
 in his official report, that his eflfective strength, at the beginning of 
 the siege, was eighteen thousand five hundred men ; and play 14) that 
 his whole available force, at the time of the battle of Champion's hill, 
 ■was sixteen thousand in the field, while seven thousand eight hundred 
 were left to hold Vicksburg. He lost at least fifteen thousand men 
 after this, and had thirty-two thousand to surrender, two months later. 
 
400 MIUTAEY HISTOET OF 
 
 the "batteries with the transports, and thus go below ; 
 and I never had any faith, except a general hope that 
 you knew better than I, that the Yazoo pass expedi- 
 tion and the like could succeed. When you got be- 
 lo^v and took Poii: Gibson, Grand Gulf and vicinity, 
 I thought you should go down the river and join 
 General Banks; and when you turned northward, 
 east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I 
 now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that 
 you were right and I was wrong." 
 
 Halleck was almost equally generous in his praise 
 of a campaign which he had once disapproved. The 
 following: letter reflects as much credit on the writer 
 as it can possibly confer on the recii^ient : " Your re- 
 port, dated July 6th, of your campaign in Mississippi, 
 ending in the capitulation of Vicksburg, was received 
 last evening. Your narration of the campaign, like 
 the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly, and in 
 every respect creditable and satisfactory. In bold- 
 ness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of 
 routes, these operations will compare most favoraljly 
 with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your 
 army have well deserved the gratitude of your coun- 
 try, and it wiU be the boast of your children that 
 their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened 
 the Mississippi river." 
 
 The grade of major-general in the regular army 
 was immediately conferred on the successful soldier, 
 and other honors, votes of thanks, and costly gifts 
 were showered upon him. The country rang with 
 applause, and the victory of Gettysburg occurring on 
 the same day, the spirit of the people rose at once 
 from the gloom and depression into which it had 
 fallen, to an elation and confidence like that it had 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 401 
 
 known after the capture of Donelson. No sucli suc- 
 cess, indeed, had slione on tlie national cause in all 
 the weary interval of nearly seventeen months. 
 
 The rebellion never fully recovered from the blow 
 that was dealt it at Vicksburg ; communication thus 
 severed, between the trans-Mississippi region and 
 the eastern bank of the mighty river, was never 
 again uninterrupted or secure. The demoralized and 
 dispirited soldiers who straggled all over the South 
 from the captured stronghold, could not be got to- 
 gether again as one army ; they were depressed with 
 their long series of sufferings, diseased and weakened 
 in body and mind, and their depression w^as con- 
 tao-ious. The exultin£c confidence the rebels once had 
 known did not return, but there came instead a grim 
 determination not to lose all. For the contest lasted 
 long, and many furious battles were fought after 
 Vicksburg fell. 
 26 
 
402 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Grant recommends Sherman and McPherson for promotion — Characteristics of 
 American soldiers — Army of the Tennessee — Organization of negro troops — 
 Trade with the conquered regions — Grant urges movement against Mobile— 
 Halleck disapproves — Grant's army broken up — Condition of troops — ^Feel- 
 ing of citizens — Thirteenth corps sent to Banks — Grant visits New Orleans- 
 Thrown from his horse — Reenforcements ordered to Rosecrans — A corps sent 
 to Rosecrans — Grant ordered to Cairo — Meets the Secretary of War — Pro- 
 ceeds to Louisville — Placed in command of Military Division of the Missis- 
 sippi. 
 
 IiMSEEDiATELY after the second capture of Jackson, 
 Grant recommended both Sherman and McPherson 
 for the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army.* 
 " The first reason for this," he said, " is their great fit- 
 ness for any command that it may ever become neces- 
 sary to intrust to them. Second : their great purity of 
 character, and disinterestedness in any thing except 
 the faithful performance of their duty and the success 
 of every one engaged in the great battle for the pres- 
 ervation of the Union. Third : they have honorably 
 
 * During tlie entire war, tlic regular and volunteer armies of the 
 United States remained distinct organizations, many officers holding 
 commissions in botli services. Promotion in the regular army was 
 more prized by professional soldiers, because it was permanent, 
 while the volunteer organization, it was known, would cease with 
 the war. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 403 
 
 won tliis distinction upon many well-fouglit Ijattle- 
 fields. The promotion of such men as Sherman and 
 McPherson always adds strength to our army." These 
 promotions were promptly made. Grant also recom- 
 mended other officers for advancement, both in the 
 regular array and in the volunteers. The general-in- 
 chief was favorable, and most of the recommendations 
 were approved. The government, indeed, seemed 
 anxious to fully reward all who had been conspicuous 
 in the great campaigns wliich resulted in opening the 
 Mississippi river. 
 
 This approbation was not confined to corps com- 
 manders, nor to officers who were graduates of the 
 Military Academy. There were only seven general 
 officers in tlie army of the Tennessee who had studied 
 their profession at West Point ; * all the others had 
 entered the volunteer service without the advantage 
 of a military education, or the spur of a lifetime am- 
 bition ; they went to war, as the soldiers of the whole 
 army did, because the country was in danger. These 
 men studied hard in tlie school of experience; Bel- 
 mont, Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and luka were their 
 instructors ; their lessons were learned under the eyes 
 of Grant and Sheiman and McPherson : and, at the 
 fall of Vicksburg, the commanders of divisions and 
 brigades, wliether on the march or the battle-field, in 
 siege operations or in garrison, were equal to tlie 
 emergency. Their practical knowledge of a com- 
 mander's duties was gained ; their energy, prompt- 
 ness, subordination, and gallantry were qualities 
 
 * Besides Grant, Sherman, and McPherson, these were Ord, who 
 commanded the Thirteenth corps after the 26th of June, and Steele, 
 Carr, and A. J. Smith, commanding di^■i^ion3; all of whom distin- 
 guished themselves, and did good service to the country 
 
404 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 without wliicL, neitlier their own advancement, nor 
 the continued and brilliant successes of the army 
 to whicli they belonged, could ever have been at- 
 tained. 
 
 The same spirit that animated them extended to 
 regimental officers, and even to private soldiers. The 
 rank and file, especially, were not fighting for fame. 
 They knew that most of them could have no chance 
 for promotion. Although, here and there, those who 
 distinguished themselves might rise, and did rise, yet, 
 doubtless, gallant deeds were constantly done that 
 never found a chronicler ; doubtless, undeveloped tal- 
 ent lay hidden, during all these campaigns, under 
 many a private's coat; doubtless, glory was often 
 won, and the costly price not paid. This the soldiers 
 knew had been, and felt must be again; yet they 
 fought, and marched, and worked, and died, as wil- 
 lingly as those to whom the great prizes were the 
 incentives. They did this, not only under the stimu- 
 latinj? enthusiasm which drove them to the field in 
 tlie first days of the war, but in the weary months of 
 that long spring of 1863, under the piercing blasts 
 and pelting storms of Donelson, and in the scorching 
 heats and sickening atmosphere of Vicksburg. With- 
 out the excitement of danger, as well as in the very 
 presence of quick-coming death, they persisted in 
 doing all that was necessary to accomplish the end 
 they set out to gain. 
 
 Nor was this simply what every soldier does in 
 war. It is not national partiality which declares 
 that the combination of traits that made this army 
 what it was, and enabled it to do what it did, was 
 essentially American. The mingling of stui'dy inde- 
 pendence with individual intelligence, of patriotic 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 405 
 
 feeling with practical talent was American. These 
 men were not more gallant, nor more devoted than 
 the misguided countrymen they fought ; nor do I be- 
 lieve tliat their courage or endurance was greater 
 than has often been displayed on European fields. 
 But it is seldom in the history of war that a race has 
 sprung to arms like that which won the l^attles of 
 the Union. Not, indeed, a highly-cultivated people, 
 but one in whom general education was more widely 
 diffused than in any that ever fought. It was the 
 appreciation each man had of the objects of the war, 
 and his determination to accomplish them ; his intelli- 
 gent love for the Union, inspiring an adventurous 
 manliness often acquired in the "Western woods and 
 on the Indian frontier, and combined with tlie Amer- 
 ican practicalness — itself often the result of a frontier 
 life — that produced the American soldier. 
 
 That soldier had a devotion and a gallantry which 
 equalled any displayed on the most famous fields in 
 Avar ; but to these were added a peculiar ficulty of 
 applying his intelligence to the every-day means and 
 the ordinary events of a campaign or a siege, enabling 
 him to persevere amid extraordinary difficulties as 
 well as dangers, and, when one means failed to try 
 anotlier, and, when all means seemed lacking, to 
 create means himself, and with these to achieve vic- 
 tory. This quality was conspicuous in the men who 
 conquered Vicksburg. This made soldiers and offi- 
 cers, and division generals and corps commanders all 
 act as one, all cooperate with their chief, hold up his 
 hands, cany out his plans, act, indeed, as the body 
 of which he was the head ; he, the brain to conceive 
 and the will to direct, while they were the means, 
 the liml)s and nerves and muscles, to execute. 
 
406 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 For Grant liimself shared this same combination 
 of traits. His military character was thoroughly tlie 
 result of American life and American institutions. 
 The same devotion to an idea, which was manifest, 
 not in Avords nor in enthusiastic expression, but in 
 the deeds of every day ; the same intensity of pur- 
 pose, that was betrayed more in achievement, even 
 than in effort; the practical determination, the self- 
 reliance, rather than self assertion ; the heating of the 
 iron white-hot, rather than red — to blaze not, but to 
 burn more ; all these traits he shared with the sol- 
 diers whom he led to victory. He was a fitting chief 
 for the Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 His child, almost his creation — bone of his bone 
 and flesh of his flesh, growing with his growth and 
 strengthening with his strength, sharing his trials, and 
 dangers, and difficulties, and victories; his spirit had 
 infused it, in return its successes had inspired him, and 
 urged him on to greater effort and more complete ful- 
 filment. He was to leave that army soon, to assume 
 more difficult positions, to direct grander operations, 
 but he never for2:ot his old associates. For he still 
 commanded them, though further off; he directed 
 whither they should march, and where they should 
 conquer, as long as they were an army. And amid 
 all the varied chances and splendid successes that 
 afterwards befell that army, he watched its career 
 'with a solicitude that was prompted by the early 
 trials and triumphs they had shared together. 
 
 On the 1st of January, 1863, the President had 
 issued his proclamation declaring the slaves in the 
 rebellious states, with some few exceptions, " thence- 
 forward, forever free." Emancipation, however, had 
 practically begun with the war : wherever the na- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 407 
 
 tional armies appeared, tlie slaves were really freed. 
 The measure of arming the blacks followed hard 
 upon that of emancipation, and, in April, the adju- 
 tant-general of the aiTuy was sent to the Department 
 of the Tennessee, for the purpose of organizing negro 
 troops. The proposition, however, met with serious 
 opposition from many warm adherents of the national 
 cause at the North, and Avas violently discussed even 
 in the armies. 
 
 At the outbreak of the rebellion. Grant was not 
 an abolitionist.* His object was simply the salva- 
 tion of the Union; the question of slavery he re- 
 garded as subordinate and incidental, not paramount. 
 But slavery was, in his eyes, completely and really 
 subordinate; its interests, like all other interests, 
 were inconsiderable, in comparison with those of the 
 Union ; and when the government determined first 
 to free, and then to arm the blacks. Grant was ready 
 to cooperate. Like most of the successful soldiers of 
 the war, he avoided all political action or even dis- 
 cussion ; but, as soon as he received orders to arm 
 and organize the slaves, he set about obeying. His 
 pui-poses were military, and, from this time, he never 
 hesitated to use this means to accomplish his pur- 
 poses, as freely as any other that was put into his 
 hands. At first, the negroes were employed princi- 
 pall}^ in guarding places that had already fallen into 
 his hands. He believed, at that time, that they would 
 prove more effective for defence than in the open 
 field. The influences, whether of race or of their re- 
 cent condition, seemed to cling to them in some de- 
 gree; and, apparently, they fought better behind 
 
 * Tliose in favor of the abolition of slavery had long been known 
 to the United States as abolitionists. 
 
408 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 
 
 bulwarks. It lias often happened tliat wliite meu 
 did the same.* 
 
 On tlie nth of July, he said to the adjutant-gen- 
 eral of the army: "I am anxious to get as many of 
 tliese negro regiments as possible, and to Lave them 
 
 full, and completely equipped I am particularly 
 
 desirous of organizing a regiment of heavy artillerists 
 from the negroes, to garrison this place, and shall do 
 so as soon as possible." On the 24th of July: "The 
 negro troops are easier to preserve discipline among 
 than our white troops, and I doubt not will prove 
 equally good for garrison duty. All that have been 
 tried have fought bravely." 
 
 The rebels at first refused to recognize black 
 troops as soldiers, and threatened that, if captured, 
 neither they nor their white officers should receive 
 the treatment of prisoners of war ; the former were 
 to be regarded as runaway slaves, the latter as 
 thieves and robbers, having stolen and appropriated 
 slave property. Grant, however, was determined to 
 protect all those whom he commanded ; and, when it 
 was reported to him that a white captain and some 
 negro soldiers, captured at Milliken's bend, had been 
 hung, he "wrote to General Kichard Taylor, then com- 
 manding the rebel forces in Louisiana: "I feel no 
 
 * On the 9th of August, the President wrote to Grant : " General 
 Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi valley, with the view of 
 raising colored troops. I have no doubt th^t you are doing what you 
 reasonably can upon the same sul)jcct. I believe it is a resource which, 
 if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works 
 doubly; weakening the enemy, and strengthening us. We were not 
 fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now, I think, at least one 
 hundred thousand can, and ought to be organized along its shores, 
 relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Davis under- 
 stands you as believing that the emancipation proclamation has helped 
 some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so." 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 409 
 
 inclination to retaliate for tlie offences of irrespon 
 sible persons, but, if it is the policy of any general 
 intrusted with the command of troops to show no 
 quarter, or to punish with death prisoners taken in 
 battle, I will accept the issue. It may be you pro- 
 pose a different line of policy towards black troops 
 and officers commanding them to that practised tow- 
 ards white troops. If so, I can assure you that these 
 colored troops are regularly mustered into tlie service 
 of the United States. The government, and all offi- 
 cers under the government, are bound to give the 
 same protection to these troops that they do to any 
 other troops." * 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury, Honorable Salmon 
 P. Chase, was strongly in favor of allowing trade to 
 be carried on in the conquered regions. On the 4th 
 of July, he wrote to Grant : " I find that a i-igorous 
 line within districts occupied by our military forces, 
 from beyond whicli no cotton or other produce can 
 be brought, and within which no trade can be carried 
 on, gives rise to sei'ious and to some apparently well- 
 founded complaints." The secretary, therefore, urged 
 the propriety of "substituting bonds, to be given by 
 all persons receiving permits, for the rigorous line 
 noAV established ; or, at least, of substituting them 
 partially." Grant, however, had always been averse 
 to the policy of trading with tlie rebellious states, 
 and replied at once: "No matter M'hat the restric- 
 tions thrown around trade, if any whatever is al- 
 
 * General Taylor replied that he would punish all such acts, "dis- 
 graceful alike to humanity and the reputation of soldiers;" but de- 
 clared that officers of the " Confederate states' army " were required to 
 turn over to the civil authorities, to be dealt with according to the 
 laws of the states wherein such were captured, all negroes captured in 
 arms. 
 
410 JULITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 lowed, it ^vill "be made tlie means of supplying tlie 
 enemy with all they want. Eestrictions, if lived up 
 to, make trade unprofitable, and hence none but dis- 
 honest men go into it. I will venture that no honest 
 man has made money in West Tennessee in the last 
 year, whilst many fortunes have been made there 
 during that time. The people in the Mississippi val- 
 ley are now nearly subjugated. Keep trade out but 
 for a few months, and I doubt not but that the work 
 of subjugation will be so complete that trade can be 
 opened freely mth the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, 
 and Mississippi." He concluded : " No theory of my 
 own will ever stand in the way of my executing in 
 good faith any order I may receive from those in au- 
 thority over me; but my position has given me an 
 opportunity of seeing what could not be known by 
 persons away from the scene of wai', and I ven- 
 ture, therefore, great caution in opening trade with 
 rebels." 
 
 Throughout the war these views were urged upon 
 the government, whenever there seemed occasion for 
 Grant to express an opinion on the subject. He be- 
 lieved that trade supxdied the enemy with the means 
 of carrying on the war, offered opportunities for spies 
 and scouts to obtain contraband information, demor- 
 alized the army itself, by inviting officers to pervert 
 their positions and introducing among them unprin- 
 cipled civilians, and protracted the operations which 
 alone could produce the object at Avhich the nation 
 was aiming. He was firm in the conviction that only 
 military success could end the war, and that, there- 
 fore, no political or commercial considerations should 
 at any time be paramount to military ones. For 
 these reasons, Grant was invariably and inflexibly op- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 411 
 
 posed to any extension of commercial facilities, any 
 relaxation of tlie restrictions on trade. 
 
 On the 26tli of July, lie said : " I am very mucli 
 opposed to any trade wliatever, until tlie rebellion in 
 this pai-t of the country is entirely crushed out. Sec- 
 retary Chase difters, however." On the 13th of Au- 
 gust : " My opinion is, that all trade with any enemy 
 with whom we are at war is calculated to weaken us 
 indirectly. I am opposed to selling or buying from 
 them whilst war exists, except those within our 
 lines." And, on the 26th of August, he addressed 
 the Secretary of War : '* K trade is opened under any 
 general rule, all sorts of dishonest men will engage 
 in it, taking any oath or obligation necessary to se- 
 cure the privilege. Smuggling mil at once com- 
 mence, as it did at Memphis, Helena, and every other 
 place where trade has been allowed within the dis- 
 loyal states, and the armed enemy Avill be enabled to 
 procure from Northern markets every article they re- 
 quire." Notwithstanding these arguments, a lunited 
 trade was opened with the rebels, and the conse- 
 quences predicted by Grant followed raj^idly. During 
 the whole war, he was hamj)ered by the operations 
 of civilians, some of them, intent only on their own 
 gains, others using trade merely as a cloak, under 
 which they could carry on communication with tin* 
 enemv. In this matter the 2:overnment never oouhl 
 be induced to carry out his views.* 
 
 * " The moment purchasers of cotton arc allowed in the market, 
 that moment all the cotton in the Southern states becomes the prop- 
 erty of that class of persons who are authorized to sell and receive 
 pay. More than half of the cotton now in the South is the property 
 of the so-called Southern Confederacy, for their benefit. This, of all 
 others, will find its way to market, and will be sold by actual agents 
 of the so-called Confederate ffovemment for their benefit. Thus, while 
 
412 3IILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 On tlie 18tli of July, Grant announced to Halleck 
 tlie fall of Jackson and the completion of tlie Vicks- 
 burg campaign. In tke same dispatch, he said : " It 
 seems to me, now, that Mobile should be captured, 
 the expedition starting from Lake Ponchartrain." 
 But Halleck had other plans, and, on the 22d, he re- 
 ]:)lied : " Before attempting Mobile, I think it will be 
 best to clean up a little. Johnston should be dis- 
 posed of, also Price and Marmaduke, so as to hold 
 line of Arkansas river. This will enable us to with- 
 draw troops from Missouri. Vicksburg and Port 
 Hudson should be repaired, so as to be tenable by 
 small garrisons; also, assist Banks in clearing out 
 western Louisiana. When these things are accom- 
 plished, there will be a large available force to oper- 
 ate either on Mobile or Texas. Navy is not ready 
 for cooperation ; should Sumter fall, then iron-clads 
 can be sent to assist at Mobile." 
 
 This strategy was in accordance with Halleck's 
 habit of scattering his forces and energies upon com- 
 paratively unimportant objects, leaving the great and 
 decisive aims to be accomplished last. He seemed 
 unable to aj^preciate the fact, that if the main objects 
 of the war were gained, the lesser ones were sure to 
 follow; or even the purely military maxim, that 
 strategic points of the highest consequence should be 
 first secured. Had Grant's suggestion been acted on, 
 and a campaign against Mobile promptly authorized, 
 before the rebels had time to recover from the stun- 
 
 we are making such efforts to close their ports, we will be opening a 
 better market for them. Our money, being always worth a known 
 price in New York city, will have a commercial value in Europe. 
 This will enable the South to ship at much less risk the means of 
 exchange for imported articles, than by sending the bulky article of 
 cotton." — Gratit to Mr. Mellen^ Treasury Agent, August 13, 18G3. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 413 
 
 ning effects of the blow dealt them at Vicksburg, the 
 only port then closed to national vessels in the Gulf 
 of Mexico would undoubtedly have fallen at once, 
 and a base have been secured for important opera- 
 tions towards the north. It is not improbable that 
 the capture of Mobile, at that time, would have short- 
 ened the war by a year. But this was not allowed. 
 
 On the 24th of July, Grant renewed his sugges- 
 tion : " It seems to me that Mobile is the point de- 
 serving the most immediate attention." And, on the 
 1st of August, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Mobile 
 can be taken from the Gulf Department, with only 
 one or two gunboats to protect the debarkation. I 
 can send the necessary force. With your leave I 
 would like to visit New Orleans, particularly if the 
 movement ao;ainst Mobile is authorized." The leave 
 was not granted, the movement was not authorized, 
 and the golden opportunity was slipping by. Grant 
 got restive under this restraint, and, on the 25th of 
 September, he returned to the subject : " I am confi- 
 dent that Mobile could now be taken, with compara- 
 tively a small force. At least, a demonstration in 
 that direction would either result in the abandon- 
 ment of the city, or force the enemy to weaken 
 Bragg's army to hold it." On the 30th, he once 
 more urged : " I regret that I have not got a mov- 
 able force with which to attack Mobile or the river 
 above. As I am situated, however, I must be con- 
 tent with guarding territory already taken from the 
 enemy. I do not say this complainingly, but simply 
 regret that advantasre cannot be taken of so fine an 
 opportunity of dealing the enemy a heavy blow." 
 
 Halleck replied to this, on the 11th of October: 
 " I regret equally with yourself that you could not 
 
414 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 Have forces to move on Mobile, but there were cer- 
 tain reasons, wliicli I cannot now explain, wliicli pre- 
 vented sucli an attempt." The President himself had 
 written to Grant on the subject somewhat earlier : 
 ^'I see by a dispatch of yours that you incline strongly 
 towards an expedition against Mobile. This would 
 appear tempting to me also, were it not that, in view 
 of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed 
 with the importance of reestablishing the national 
 authority in western Texas as soon as possible. I 
 am not making an order, however ; that I leave, for 
 the present at least, to the general-in-chief." 
 
 As Grant's views were not accepted, he conformed 
 to those of his superiors, and, immediately after the 
 fall of Jackson, sent Banks a division of troops num- 
 bering four thousand men ; live thousand others were 
 ordered to Schofield, to operate against Price, in Ar- 
 kansas, and the Ninth corps was returned to Burn- 
 side, in East Kentucky. Troops were also sent to 
 Natchez, and that place was permanently occupied ; 
 large quantities of ammunition and five thousand 
 head of cattle, for the rebel armies, here fell into pos- 
 session of the national commander ; the latter was a 
 serious loss to the enemy. 
 
 The troops which had been engaged in the various 
 operations of tlie campaign and siege of Vicksburg 
 were now greatly exhausted, and " entirely unfit for 
 any duty requiring much marching," but " by select- 
 ing any duty of immediate pressing importance," said 
 Grant, "it could be done." lie had already sent 
 troops and transports to Banks, with which that offi- 
 cer "could find no difficulty in keeping the river 
 open from Port Hudson down. Above that," said 
 Grant, " I will take care of the river." Various ex- 
 
ULYSSES S. GEATfT. 415 
 
 pedltions were sent out to drive away and break up 
 the guerrilla bands tliat infested tlie Mississippi banks, 
 and others to destroy the rolling-stock of the rail- 
 roads outside of the command. These expeditions 
 were all successful, meeting with little organized op- 
 position. 
 
 Grant at this time sent supplies of medicine and 
 provisions to the rebel sick at Raymond, at their 
 own request, and informed Sherman, when families 
 had been deprived of all their subsistence by national 
 troops, it was only fair the same articles should be 
 issued in return. " It should be our policy now," he 
 said, " to make as favorable an impression ujDon the 
 peoj^le of this state as possible. Impress upon the 
 men the importance of going through the state in an 
 orderly manner, refraining from taking any thing not 
 absolutely necessary for their subsistence while trav- 
 elling. They should try to create as favorable an im- 
 pression as possible upon the people, and advise 
 them, if it will do any good, to make efforts to have 
 law and order established within the Union." The 
 country in the rear of Vicksburg was full of paroled 
 prisoners, swearing that they would not take up arms 
 again if they were exchanged. Pemberton was re- 
 ported to have but four thousand men left together. 
 " The army that was paroled," said one, " was virtu- 
 all v dischar2:ed from the rebel service." Thousands 
 crossed the Mississippi and went west ; many begged 
 a passage to the north, and quite a number expressed 
 a strong anxiety to enter the national service ; but 
 this, of course, was not allowed. Johnston's army 
 also was greatly demoralized, and the men deserted 
 by thousands. Even a political movement was started 
 by citizens, west of Pearl river, to bring Mississippi 
 
416 3IILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 back into the Union. This state of affairs, however, 
 was not destined to last long. 
 
 On the Yth of August, in obedience to orders from 
 Washington, Grant sent Ord's entire command, the 
 Thirteenth corps, to Banks, and was himself directed 
 to cooperate with that commander, by sending a 
 small force from Natchez into Louisiana. Banks was 
 to ascend the Bed river to Shreveport, and to move 
 thence into Texas, or from Natchitoches against Na- 
 coo-doches. Grant was informed: "General Banks 
 has been left at liberty to select his own objective 
 point in Texas, and may deteraiine to move by sea. 
 If so, your movement will not have his support, and 
 should be conducted with caution. You will confer 
 on this matter freely with General Banks. The gov- 
 ernment is exceedingly anxious that our troops should 
 occupy some points in Texas with the least possible 
 delay." ^■ 
 
 On the 30th of August, accordingly, Grant started 
 in person for New Orleans, notifying Halleck of his 
 departure : " General Banks is not yet off, and I am 
 desirous of seeing him before he starts, to learn Ms 
 
 * This anxiety for an early occupation of Texas arose from the hos- 
 tility towards the United States, evinced early in the war by the French 
 and English governments, and the extraordinary steps taken by those 
 governments in consequence. The accordance of belligerent rights to 
 the rebels, almost before there was a rebellion, the proposition to me- 
 diate between a sovereign state and its insurgent citizens, and, above 
 all, the invasion of Mexico with the avowed purpose of reestablishing 
 the Latin race in power on the American continent— all these indi- 
 cated a complete sympathy on the part of foreign powers with those 
 who were seeking the overthrow of the Union, and threatened active 
 interference in behalf of the rebellion. It was because of the immi- 
 nence of this danger that the American government was so anxious to 
 obtain a footing in Texas, which borders on Mexico, and presented 
 the only probable avenue through which foreign armies would attempt 
 to invade the Union. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 417 
 
 plans and see how I may LeljD him." Sherman was 
 next in rank, and Grant proposed, of course, to leave 
 him in command ; but Sherman suggested that it 
 might facilitate public business if the routine of 
 headquarters remained unchanged. During Grant's 
 absence, therefore, all orders were issued in his name 
 and by his chief of staff, but with the advice and con- 
 currence of Sherman. One of tliese orders happened 
 to be of importance. Directions were received from 
 Halleck for the immediate reenforcement of Steele, 
 then commanding the movement in Arkansas, in- 
 tended to cooperate with Banks's campaign. General 
 Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, there uj)on consulted 
 with both Sherman and McPherson, and John E. 
 Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps was sent 
 to the assistance of Steele. This was but one amons" 
 many instances of the remarkable harmony which 
 prevailed in the command. " With such men," said 
 Grant, as Sherman and McPherson, 'commandimr 
 corps or armies, there will never be any jealousies 
 or lack of hearty co6]3eration. Between the two I 
 would have no choice, and the army does not afford 
 an officer superior to either, in my estimation." 
 
 While at New Orleans, Grant was thrown from 
 his horse, at a review, and severely injured. He was 
 twenty days confined to one j^osition, and could not 
 return to Vicksburg until the 16th of September. 
 On the 19th, he wrote: "I am still confined to my 
 bed, being flat on my back. My injuries are severe,, 
 
 but still not dangerous I will still endeavor to 
 
 perform my duties, and hope soon to recover, that I 
 may be able to take the field at any time I may be 
 called upon to do so." He was, however, compelled 
 to keep his bed until the 25th of September, and for 
 27 
 
418 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 two montlis afterwards Avas unable to walk without 
 tlie aid of crutches. 
 
 On tlie 13tli of SeptemlDer, Halleck telegraphed: 
 '' All of Major-General Grant's available force should 
 be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscum- 
 bia, to cooperate with General Rosecrans." Rose- 
 crans, with an army of about sixty thousand men, 
 was at this time operating in Tennessee and northern 
 Georgia, where he had just obtained possession of 
 Chattanooga, the most important strategic position 
 between Richmond and the Mississippi river ; while 
 the rebels, under Bragg, were apparently attempting 
 to move west of him through northern Alabama, and, 
 by turning the right wing of the national army, to cut 
 off all communication with Nashville, the base of his 
 supplies. Halleck's dispatch, ordering reenforcements 
 from Grant, was delayed ten days on the Mississippi, 
 bet^veen Cairo and Memphis. Communication was 
 l)y telegraph from Washington to Cairo, and thence 
 dispatches were conveyed by steamer to Memphis 
 and Vicksburg. The messenger to whom this pack- 
 age was intrusted failed to deliver it promptly. 
 
 On the loth, Halleck telegraphed again: "All 
 the troops that can possibly be spared in West Ten- 
 nessee and on the Mississippi river should be sent, 
 without delay, to assist General Rosecrans on the 
 Tennessee river Information just received indi- 
 cates that a part of Lee's army have been sent to 
 reenforce Bragg." This was sent to Hurlbut, in the 
 absence of Grant; but, when it reached Vicksburg, 
 on the 22d, Grant had returned. lie still kept his 
 bed, but instantly directed Sherman : " Order at once 
 one division of your army corps to proceed to reen- 
 force Rosecrans, moving from here by brigade as fast 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 419 
 
 as transportation can be had." Orders were also is- 
 sued to detain all steamers tlien at Vicksburg-, or that 
 might arrive there, until a sufficient number should 
 be collected for this purpose. The division from Mc- 
 Pherson's corps, which had started for Steele, was 
 recalled, and ordered to Rosecrans. It w'as already 
 aboard transports and on its way to Helena, but a staff- 
 officer was dispatched to turn these troops northw^ard ; 
 they were directed to move at once to Memphis and 
 report to Hurlbut. The last-named officer was in- 
 structed to forw^ard not only this division of Mc- 
 pherson's corj^s, but two divisions from his oAvn com- 
 mand, and whatever troops might return from the 
 expedition to Arkansas, which had now" ended. Gen- 
 eral Halleck was notified of these movements, and in- 
 formed : " Should more trooj)s be required from here 
 for Rosecrans, there is sufficient time for orders to 
 reach me before transportation can be had." 
 
 Banks had just applied to Gi'ant for another di- 
 vision of troops, but he was furnished with a copy of 
 Halleck's dispatch, and informed : '' This will neces- 
 sarily prevent further reenforcements being sent from 
 here to you, until word is heard from the general-in- 
 chief: We must make no disposition of troops that 
 will endanger tlie success of Mosecransy All of these 
 orders were made on the 22d, the day that Halleck's 
 dispatch arrived. His orders were received on the 
 morning of the 22d; Osterhaus's division of Sher- 
 man's corps was then at the Big Black bridge, fifteen 
 miles off, but the whole command reached Vicksburg 
 during the night of the same day; most of it was 
 embarked within twenty-four hours, and all of it was 
 sailing up the river, within forty-eight hours from the 
 receipt of the order. On the 25tli, Grant wrote: "I 
 
420 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 am just out of bed, and find tliat I can write only 
 witli great difficulty. During tlie twenty days that 
 I have been confined to one position on my back, I 
 have ap23arently been in the most perfect health, but 
 now that I am up on crutches I find myself very 
 weak." 
 
 On the same day, Halleck's dispatches of the 13th 
 arrived, and Grant replied : " I will now send Sher- 
 man to West Tennessee, with two more divisions of 
 his corps. This leaves one division of Sherman's 
 corps here, but it is replaced by one of McPherson's, 
 already above." Sherman was accordingly notified 
 to hold his command in readiness to move to the 
 support of Rosecrans. It w^as some days before the 
 requisite transportation could be obtained, although 
 every steamer on the river was again detained for the 
 purpose; but, on the 27th, Sherman embarked in 
 person for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats, con- 
 veying Morgan L. Smith and Hugh Ewings divi- 
 sions. Tuttle s division of the Fifteenth corps was 
 to remain with McPherson, in exchange for that of 
 John E. Smith, which had already started for Mem- 
 phis, from Helena, and of which, also, Sherman was 
 to assume command. 
 
 As it w^as certain that the rebels would soon be- 
 come aware of the movement of Sherman's column, 
 and in all probability attempt at once to prevent or 
 obstruct it, Grant now ordered McPherson to send 
 an expedition to Canton and Jackson. This was de- 
 signed to distract the enemy, and threaten other 
 points still further east, so that, if possible, all 
 the hostile force in Mississippi might be recalled to 
 McPherson's front, and the march of Sherman from 
 Memphis l)y way of Corinth, Tuscumbia, and Deca- 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 421 
 
 tur left undisturbed.* Slierman was informed of 
 tLese operations in his favor. He readied Mempliis 
 on the 2d of October, and, by the 4th, his entire com- 
 mand had arrived there. 
 
 Meanwhile, the blow which Halleck had foreseen, 
 and striven to avert, had fallen heavily. On the 
 19th and 20th of September, Rosecrans suffered a 
 severe repulse on the Chichamauga river, nine miles 
 from Chattanooga, and was compelled to retire into 
 the latter place, with a heavy loss of artillery and 
 the sacrifice of immense strategic advantages. In 
 Chattanooga, he was nearly surrounded by a superior 
 rebel army, and his only line of communication al- 
 most entirely cut off. On the 29th, Halleck tele- 
 graphed to Grant : " The enemy seems to have con- 
 centrated on Rosecrans all his available force from 
 every direction. To meet him, it is necessary that all 
 the forces that can be spared in your department be 
 sent to Rosecrans's assistance An able com- 
 mander like Sherman or McPherson should be se- 
 lected. As soon as your health will permit, I think 
 you should go to Nashville, and take the direction 
 of this movement. On the 28th, Grant wrote: "I 
 am now ready for the field, or any duty I may be 
 called on to perfonn." On the 30th, he said : " All I 
 believe is now moving according to your wishes. I 
 have ten thousand five hundred men to hold the 
 river from here to Bayou Sara " (near Port Hudson). 
 
 The same day he said: "I regret that ther^ 
 should be an apparent tardiness in complying with 
 your orders ; but I assure you that, as soon as your 
 wishes were known, troops were forwarded as rapidly 
 as transpoi-tation could be procured." To this Hal- 
 
 * For Sherman's route, see Map of the Theatre of War. 
 
422 MILITAEY HISTOKY OF 
 
 leek replied: "Although the reenforcements from 
 your army for General Eosecrans did not move as 
 soon or as rapidly as was exj)ected, no blame what- 
 ever attaches to you. I know your promptness too 
 well to think for a moment that tliis delay was any 
 fault of yours." The delay was occasioned by the 
 confusion occurring in the transmission of Halleck's 
 orders, as already explained. 
 
 In consequence of this confusion, Grant now sent 
 a staif-officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, to Cairo, to 
 communicate direct with the government, and, on the 
 3d of October, the following dispatch was received : 
 " Convey, as soon as possible, to General Grant the 
 following : ' It is the wisli of the Secretary of War 
 that, as soon as General Grant is able to tiike the 
 field, he will come to Cairo, and report by telegraph.' " 
 Grant replied from Columbus, Kentucky: "Your 
 dispatch from Cairo of the 3d, directing me to report 
 trom Cairo, was received at eleven thirty, on the 10th. 
 Left the same day with staif and headquarters, and 
 am here, en route for Caii'o." On the 16th, he tele- 
 graphed from Cairo : " I have just arrived, and report 
 in pursuance with your instructions of the 3d instant. 
 My staff and headquarters are with me." Halleck 
 answered: "You will immediately proceed to the 
 Gait House, Louisville, Kentucky, where you will 
 meet an officer of the War Department with your 
 orders and instructions. You will take with you 
 your staff, etc., for immediate operations in the field." 
 This was received on the 17th, and Grant started im- 
 mediately for Louisville, by rail. 
 
 At Indianapolis, he was met by the Secretary of 
 War, Honorable Edwin M. Stanton, who brought 
 with him from Washington an order creating for 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 
 
 423 
 
 Grant a new command — tlie Military Division of the 
 Mississippi ; this was to include all tlie territory be- 
 tween the Alleglianies and the Mississippi river, ex- 
 cepting such as might be occupied by Banks: the 
 three departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, 
 and the Ohio were all to be subordinate to Grant. At 
 this time, Rosecrans was in command of the Depart- 
 ment of the Cumberland, and Bm^uside of that of the 
 Ohio. The imperative necessity for cooperation be- 
 tween these various commands had been made pain- 
 fully manifest to the government. Hitherto, each army 
 had seemed to have a separate object, and apparently, 
 in each department, a campaign was carried on with- 
 out reference to the operations of the others. AVithin 
 the last few months, indeed, Halleck had striven hard 
 to compel Rosecrans to cooperate with Grant, but 
 found himself utterly unable to accomplish the task ; 
 and it was now determined to cut the knot of Rose- 
 crans's obstinacy and insubordination, by giving to 
 Grant almost absolute control of the forces and oper- 
 ations west of the Alleghanies. The disaster which 
 Rosecrans had suffered at Chickamauga hastened 
 this decision, and the course suggested by Grant, 
 nearly a year before, was at last forced upon the gov- 
 ernment — the concentration and combination of all 
 the western armies under a single head, and for a sin- 
 gle aim. Grant was to be allo^ved to make his own 
 campaigns, to use the troops to accom|)lish his own 
 purposes. It was a great responsibility to put upon 
 him, but there was nothing better to do ; no other 
 general had accomplished as much as he ; his past 
 successes were the best guaranty for future ones; the 
 danger at Chattanooga was imminent, and increasing 
 daily; it was necessary to act at once; and trem- 
 
424 MTLITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 bliiiglVjCloubtless, but still almost liopefully, tlie great 
 trust was committed to liis liancls. 
 
 Tlie Secretary of War brouglit also two other 
 orders wliich lie showed to Grant. One of these left 
 Rosecrans in his previous command, of the Army and 
 Department of the Cumberland; the other relieved 
 him. and substituted Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, 
 the next in rank in that army. Grant was offered 
 his choice of the orders, and did not hesitate a mo- 
 ment ; his past experience with Eosecrans made him 
 certain that he could get no complete cooperation 
 from that officer, and he asked at once for his re- 
 moval. The government, indeed, preferred this. Tke 
 defeat of Rosecrans had been so disastrous, and its 
 results were so alarming, that the confidence felt in 
 his talent and military character was shaken, perhaps, 
 even more than was deserved. Intense anxiety was 
 entertained lest he should abandon Chattanooga, or 
 even suiTender his army, now in the closest straits ; 
 and Grant's action was fully approved. He was di- 
 rected to proceed at once to his new command. 
 
 The Secretary of War accompanied liini as far as 
 Louisville ; there both remained a day, discussing the 
 situation of aifairs, and Grant gathering the views of 
 the government. During this day, the minister re- 
 ceived a dispatch from ^Ir. C. A. Dana, his subordi- 
 nate * at Chattanooga, intimating that the danger of 
 an abandonment of Chattanooga was instant ; that 
 Rosecrans was absolutely preparing for snch a move- 
 ment. The secretary at once directed Grant to im- 
 mediately assume his new command, and to relieve 
 Rosecrans l^efore it was possible for the apprehended 
 mischief to be consummated. Grant accordingly 
 telegraphed to Rosecrans and Thomas, from Louis- 
 
 * Afterwards Assistant Secretary of War, 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 425 
 
 ville, assuming command of the military division. 
 He sent also, at the same time, an order assigning 
 Thomas to the Department of the Cumberland. On 
 the 19th of October, he started, by rail, for Chatta- 
 noosra. 
 
426 AULITARY mSTORY OF 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Natural features of Chattanooga — Strategical importance — Relations to East 
 Tennessee — Ciiickaraauga campaign — Defeat of Rosecrans — Retreat into 
 Chattanooga — Abandonment of Lookout mountain — Investment of Chatta- 
 nooga — Sufferings of Army of the Cumberland — Hooker sent west to support 
 Rosecrans — Burnside's movement into East Tennessee — Difficulties of sup- 
 ply — Grant starts for Chattanooga — Directions to his three armies — ^Arrival 
 at Chattanooga — Thomas's magnanimity — Lookout valley — Brown's ferry — 
 Plan of operations to recover Lookout valley — Seizure of Brown's ferry- 
 March of Hooker from Bridgeport — Battle of Wauhatchie — Repulse of reb- 
 els — Lookout valley secured — Communication reopened — Elation of soldiers 
 — Further difficulties in supply — Sherman's march from Memphis — Long 
 lines of communication — Sherman's magnanimity — Grant hurries Sherman — 
 Alarming situation of Burnside — Anxiety of government — Grant's calmness 
 — Longstrect moves against Burnside — Grant's counter-plan — Dispatches of 
 Grant to Halleck and Burnside — Thomas ordered to attack Bragg — Thomas 
 not ready — Movement postponed till Sherman's arrival — Great anxiety about 
 Burnside — Road from Nashville to Decatur opened — Supplies ordered to 
 Burnside by Cumberland river — Difficulties of Sherman's route — Critical 
 condition of Grant's armies — Extent of his operations — Halleck still anxious 
 about Burnside — Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding out — 
 Confidence of Burnside — Arrival of Sherman at Bridgeport — Reconnoissance 
 by Grant, Sherman, and Thomas — Orders issued for battle of Chattanooga. 
 
 The Cumberland inouiitains constitute tlie natural 
 boundary between wliat are called tlie cotton states 
 — tlie semi-tropical region of the American Union — 
 and tlie vast grain-growing plains of Kentucky and 
 Tennessee. Several important ranges cluster iust 
 where the three great states of Tennessee, Georgia, 
 and Alabama approach nearest to each other; the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 42*7 
 
 mountains crowding close, as if to watch tlie scene 
 wliere tlie destinies of mountains and states were 
 both to be decided. From some of the highest points 
 in this vicinity the territory of seven different states 
 can be distinctly seen. Here, also, the Tennessee 
 river breaks through from the east, hemmed in at 
 times on every hand, but making the mountains give 
 it room, and, forcing its way in a hundred windings, 
 until, at last, it eludes or overcomes eveiy barrier, 
 and finds a passage to more western fields. 
 
 At one of the most abrupt of all its angles, the 
 hills recede so as to leave an open but uneven space, 
 not more than five or six miles square, bounded on 
 the north by the Tennessee, begirt on eveiy side 
 with rugged peaks, and guarded on the west by a 
 grim and almost perpendicular height, that rises di- 
 rectly from the water s edge jnore than two thou- 
 sand feet. This point w^as once the boundary and 
 the barrier of the Indian country. The southern 
 limit of the field is known as Missionary ridge, called 
 so by the Indians, who allowed the missionaries to 
 pass no further ; a gorge in the mountains, opening 
 south, is stiU named Rossville gap, after the famous 
 Cherokee chief, John Ross ; while the lofty crest that 
 looks out over the rugged valley was called Chatta- 
 nooga — the Eagle's Nest. The whole region was a 
 mighty bulwark, covering one of the most important 
 avenues for access to the South, between the Missis- 
 sippi and the Atlantic coast. 
 
 Away, at the centre of the continent, these pre- 
 cipitous heights, this lonely valley, and this tortuous 
 stream seemed the very spot wdiere the eagles might 
 buUd their nests, and the aborigines pitch their 
 camps, secure from the intruding step of the white 
 
428 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 man. But, first, tlie Tennessee river itself tempted 
 tlie adventurous pioneer ; and, wlien tlie tide of trade 
 and the growth of the republic could no longer be 
 staj^ed, even the mountains were forced to open their 
 gates. A railroad must be built, connecting the Mis- 
 sissippi with the Atlantic, and the only route through 
 these almost inaccessible hills was along the valley 
 of the Tennessee. Then, the South must be connect- 
 ed with its brother North; and the line of travel 
 stretched out from Mobile, and all the gi-eat railways 
 from the interior of the cotton region, from Mississip- 
 j)i, and Georgia, and Alabama, and South Carolina, 
 centred at Atlanta, and reached up along one line, 
 through ridges and ranges, penetrating them by tun- 
 nels when Nature aftbrded no pathway, until, under 
 the shadow of the Chattanooga mountain, the junc- 
 tion witb the great eastern line was formed. Where 
 the railroads from Memphis and Charleston and 
 Richmond and Nashville and Atlanta meet, a town 
 S2:)rang up, of course, and was named from the moun- 
 tain at whose base it was built, Chattanooga; while 
 the acclivity itself now received an English name, and 
 was henceforth known as the Lookout mountain. 
 
 When the rebellion broke out, it was at once per- 
 ceived by military men that Chattanooga must be- 
 come one of the important strategic positions of the 
 war. The great railway lines converging here af- 
 forded the rebels immense opportunities for concen- 
 trating and supplying their armies — opportunities 
 which were seized and enjoyed to their full extent. 
 Connecting the extreme eastern and the western por- 
 tions of the would-be confederacy, tliese roads enabled 
 its authorities, again and again, to move troops with 
 facility and promptness from one part of the theatre 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 429 
 
 of war to aDotlier, at some critical moment ; and, for 
 years, they furnished the principal route by which 
 the eastern armies received their revenues of grain 
 and beef, from the prolific regions of Georgia, Florida, 
 and Alabama. In a word, they became interior strat- 
 egic lines for all important military operations, and 
 were absolutely vital to the interests of the rebellion. 
 As long as the rebels held Chattanooga, these lines 
 were secure ; ^vhen it passed into national hands, all 
 this internal communication ceased, or was rendered 
 infinitely more difficult, and the door was thrown 
 open for an advance into the very heart of the so- 
 called Confederacy. 
 
 But, there was still another consideration which 
 made possession of this region important to the na- 
 tional cause. The inhabitants of the mountain coun- 
 try were strongly loyal; like mountaineers all over 
 the world, their love of liberty and independence and 
 republicanism was intense. Their rough hillsides 
 and sterile soil w^ere unfitted for slave-labor, and the 
 institution whicli was the origin and cause of the re- 
 bellion had never flourished among these beetling 
 clifi*s, nor in the rugged valleys that lay between. 
 The masses all through East Tennessee and West 
 Virginia, in the western part of North Carolina, and 
 the northern portions of Georgia and Alabama, were 
 never false to the Union. They were hunted by 
 rebel mobs and proscribed by rebel authorities, were 
 persecuted and driven to caves, imprisoned, starved, 
 tortured, put to death, but remained firm in their al- 
 legiance. It was a sacred duty of the government to 
 go to the rescue of these people, as well as its plainest 
 policy to reestablish among them the authority, which, 
 it was asserted, the whole South w^as so anxious to 
 
430 MILITAEY HISTOEY OP 
 
 overthrow. Here would be a nucleus for loyalty, 
 here was a population ready to defend and support 
 and assist the national armies, instead of what was 
 found everywhere else at the South, one determii^ed 
 to oppose and obstruct and betray. 
 
 Chattanooo-a was in the heart of this reacion and 
 in the midst of this population. Its possession would 
 protect these people, and secure these advantages. 
 Next after Richmond, the great political focus of the 
 rebellion, and Vicksburg, that fortress and menace of 
 the Mississippi valley, Chattanooga loomed up before 
 the nation and the military authorities, as absolutely 
 indispensable to success, and, Avhen once gained, the 
 foundation and forerunner of final victories. 
 
 As early as Januar}^, 1862, McClellau, then gen- 
 eral-in-chief, wrote to Buell, who was in command in 
 Kentucky : " There are few things I have more at 
 heart than tlie prompt movement of a strong column 
 into Eastern Tennessee. . . . My own general plans 
 for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occu- 
 pation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway, mat- 
 ters of absolute necessity." And again : " Interesting 
 as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it 
 strikes me that its possession is of very secondary im- 
 portance, in comparison with the immense results 
 that would arise from the adherence to our cause of 
 the masses in East Tennessee, North Carolina, South 
 Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama — results 
 that I feel assured would ere Ion 2: follow from the 
 movement alluded to." 
 
 No positive movement, however, was made in this 
 direction, until after tlie evacuation of Corinth, in 
 May, 1862, when Ilalleck sent Buell, with more than 
 foi-ty thousand men, across the states of Alabama and 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAKT. 431 
 
 Tennessee, to Chattanooga. But, Bracfg starte<l for 
 the same point, nearly as soon as Buell, and, Ly a 
 series of skilful manoeuvres, compelled that general 
 to fall back to the Oliio ; after months of marching 
 and fiirhtino*, Buell "was further from his 2:<*«d than 
 when he set out from Corinth, and, accordingly, was 
 relieved. Rosecrans then took command of the Army 
 of the Cumberland, with Chattanooga still as tlie ob- 
 jective point, He manoeuvred from summer till win- 
 ter, and from January again until June, fighting the 
 battle of Murfreesboro on the first days of 18G3, when 
 the national troops were left in possession of the field ; 
 but, thereafter, he remained immovable for months. 
 
 While Grant was operating behind Vicksburg, he 
 had urged that Rosecrans should be directed to make 
 some movement in his favor, to distract the enemy, 
 and. at least prevent the troops of Bragg, who was in 
 front of Rosecrans, from being sent to reenforce John- 
 ston.""" But, although he was greatly superior to 
 Brasfsr in numbers, Rosecrans refused to budge, f 
 When Halleck gave him orders to advance, he held a 
 council of war, and replied that it was a military 
 maxim not to fio-ht two decisive battles at the same 
 time. So Bragg was depleted and Johnston reen- 
 forced, and the siege of Vicksburg prolonged. When 
 Vicksburg fell, the reljels of course brought back to 
 Bragg the troops that they were no longer able to 
 use in front of Grant.J They were good strategists. 
 Havinix fewer forces and resources than the govern- 
 
 * See page 227. 
 
 t See Ilalleck's report, as gcneral-in-chief, for 1863. 
 
 + The fact of these movements was shown conclusively at the time, 
 by the reports of prisoners, as well as by scouts and spies from the va- 
 rious national armies. 
 
432 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 ment, they earlier learned to husband and concen- 
 trate the means which were at their command. 
 
 On the 24th of June, Roseerans finally started 
 from Murfreesboro, with about seventy thousand 
 effective men ; * Bragg was still in his front witli an 
 inferior force, and retreated before him. Roseerans 
 crossed the Tennessee at Stevenson, and marched 
 south among the mountains, threatening to isolate 
 Bragg, who was thus compelled to follo\v. The 
 Ai-my of the Cumberland was absolutely thrust be- 
 tween Bragg and Geoi'gia, and, unless intercepted, 
 would have surrounded tlie rebel general, who had 
 fallen back to Chattanooga. In order to prevent this 
 disaster, Bragg was obliged to give up the prize 
 of the campaign, having been faii'ly outgeneralled. 
 Chattanooga was occupied by the national troops, 
 on the 9th of September. 
 
 Bragg, however, meant that this occupation should 
 he temporary only, and having been largely reeuforced, 
 determined to give battle to Roseerans. The rebel 
 ai-my was now at least sixty thousand strong; f while 
 that of Roseerans was reduced to about forty-five thou- 
 sand eflective men.J The Army of the Cumberland 
 
 * Rosecrans's strength when he started for Chickamauga was 
 probably seventy thousand men ; but he was obliged to leave garri- 
 sons at the various towns he took, as well as to guard the railroads as 
 he advanced. This sjjeedily reduced his moving column. 
 
 t On the 31st of August, 18G3, Bragg's effective strength was ofli- 
 cially rcj^orted as forty-five thousand and forty-one men. This did 
 not include Longstreet's corps, which, on the 20th of October, was re- 
 ported at fifteen thousand "two hundred and twenty-one (effective), nor 
 Buckner's, which numbered nine thousand two hundred and seven ; both 
 of these forces participated in the battle of Chickamauga, so that Bragg's 
 active force in that battle must have been fully sixty tliousand men. " 
 
 t No formal return of the troops engaged under Roseerans in this 
 battle was made to the adjutant-general's office. One was compiled 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 433 
 
 liad been widely separated in tlie movements tliat pro- 
 cured possession of Chattanooga. It was composed of 
 tliree corps, under Major-Generals Tliomas, McCook, 
 and Crittenden. Crittenden held Chattanooga, while 
 the other corps were moving east and south, through 
 the mountains, separated by intervals of nearly 
 twenty miles ; the extreme right of Rosecrans was 
 forty miles from the left of his army, with almost im- 
 penetrable mountains between. While in this posi- 
 tion, he was threatened by Bragg, but got his forces 
 together at Chickamauga creek by the 19tli of Sep- 
 tember, although with infinite difficulty. Here Bragg 
 attacked, and after two days' fighting, succeeded iu 
 piercing the national centre, and demolishing the right 
 wing of the army. Rosecrans himself hurried to Chat- 
 tanooga, to prepare for its defence, and McCook and 
 Crittenden also left the field. But Thomas held on, 
 and althougli the whole bulk of the rebel army was 
 now precipitated upon his single corps,* in the hope 
 of getting between him and Chattanooga, Bragg was 
 unable to accomplish this object, and finally aban- 
 doned the attempt. In the battle of Chickamauga, 
 Rosecrans lost thirty-six cannon, and more than six- 
 teen thousand men. But for the gallantry and de- 
 
 for me, from other returns, to cover this date, according to wliicb Rose- 
 crans had over eighty-two thousand men present ; deducting one- 
 third, the usual allowance for sick, extra-duty men, etc., would leave 
 about sixty thousand. This statement, however, must be inaccurate, 
 as it conflicts with the returns of Thomas, made a month later, and 
 with the positive recollection of various officers of rank, Avhu would 
 have been likely to know. 
 
 * Major-Gencral Gordon Granger came upon the field with a divis- 
 ion of about five thousfuid men, during the battle, and went at once, 
 without orders, to the critical point, where his troops were of great use 
 in resisting the onslaught of the rebels. His numbers are included in 
 the estimate of forty-tive thousand men as Rosecrans's strength in this 
 
 fight. 
 
 28 
 
434 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 termination of Thomas and Ms command, the army 
 would have been absolutely destroyed, and Chatta- 
 nooga lost. The position, However, was saved. 
 
 But the position alone. When Rosecrans dis- 
 covered tlie extent of his misfortune, he deter- 
 mined, if possible, to hold Chattanooga, but tbought 
 himself unable to do more. The whole army was at 
 once withdrawn into the town, and, in two days, a 
 formidable line of works was thrown up, so close 
 that some of the houses were left outside. Missionary 
 ridge, immediately south and east of Chattanooga, 
 is about four hundi*ed feet high, and three miles 
 from the Tennessee. This was instantly occupied 
 by Bragg, who followed Thomas rapidly on the 
 21st. Lookout mountain, on the west, is twenty-two 
 hundred feet high, and about three miles off. It is a 
 rugged, narrow ridge, a hundi-ed and fifty miles long, 
 but not more than a mile or two across. Its north- 
 ern and eastern front looks down on Chattanoosra, 
 while on its western side lies a narrow valley, hardly 
 two miles wide, the bed of Lookout river. Still west 
 of this valley, Raccoon mountain rises, another lofty 
 and Avooded ridge, reaching far off into Alabama. 
 The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, by which 
 all supplies were brought to the national army, runs 
 along the southern bank of the Tennessee, and imme- 
 diately under the Lookout mountain, then crosses the 
 entrance to Lookout valley, and turns south and west 
 towards Stevenson. 
 
 This valley and mountain, in an evil hour, Rose- 
 crans determined to abandon. lie supposed that it 
 would be impossible to maintain communication with 
 the troops that were stationed there, and of course 
 impossible for troops to exist without communication 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 435 
 
 and supplies. Bragg was already closing around 
 Mm in a semicircle; and, unmindful or neglectful of 
 its extreme importance, Kosecruns withdrew the force 
 on Lookout mountain. From that moment the Army 
 of the Cumberland was besieged. The rebels in- 
 stantly occupied the point so unwisely yielded, per- 
 ceiving it to be the key to the w^hole position ; they 
 placed batteries so as to command the railroad and 
 the river; they seized the railroad itself, and all 
 suj)plies W'Cre at once cut off. Rosecrans could only 
 maintain communication with Nashville, by wagon- 
 ing sixty miles over the rough mountain-roads, and 
 through the rugged gaps on the north side of the 
 Tennessee. The country there is as impracticable as 
 on the southern side. Walden's ridge is steep and 
 wild ; there is but one road, and that circuitous and 
 bad. The route was from Chattanooga to Anderson, 
 from Anderson back again to Jasper, and from Jas- 
 per to Bridgeport. Thence the railroad was open to 
 Nashville. To supply an army of forty thousand 
 men by such a route, for any length of time, was an 
 impossibility; and there seemed no other possible 
 mode. 
 
 Brao-cr's line now extended from the river above 
 the town to the river again below, so that Chatta- 
 nooga w^as practically invested. Securely seated on 
 Missionary ridge, the rebel general w\atched everj' 
 movement of the national army, and from the point 
 of Lookout mountain, threw shells into Rosecrans's 
 camp. He fortified himself upon the hills, and his 
 outworks reached a mile from their base, where the 
 pickets of the two armies were within hail of each 
 other ; both di'a^\iug water from Chattanooga creek. 
 After the first few davs, the roads on the north side 
 
436 MILITARY IIISTOEY OF 
 
 of the Tennessee became so bad, by reason of thy 
 fall rains, that it was impossible for the supply-trains 
 from Bridgeport to cross the mountains. The whole 
 command was put on half rations; three thousand 
 wounded soldiers * lay in the camps and hospitals, 
 suffering and dying from lack of proj^er sustenance ; 
 forage for the animals could not be procured, and ten 
 thousand mules and horses died in and around Chat- 
 tanooga. All officers were reduced to half an allow- 
 ance of forage for a single horse ; all the ai-tillery- 
 horses Avere sent back to Bridgeport, over the moun- 
 tain, one-third dying on the road. Eetreat itself thus 
 became impossible, unless the artillery was aban- 
 doned. Every few days, between the rain-storms, an 
 attempt would l^e made to get a supply-train through ; 
 but Bragg sent a cavalry expedition around, over 
 Walden's ridge, north of Chattanooga, and cut off a 
 train bringing medical supplies and stores for the 
 wounded, and another with ordnance stores. The 
 stock of ammunition, after this, was just large enough 
 to supply each man for one more battle — not half the 
 ordinary allowance for an army. 
 
 And here the Army of the Cumberland lay, in 
 the hot sun and chilly nights of September, and un- 
 der the heavy rains of autumn; without sufficient 
 food, with few tents, half supplied with ammunition ; 
 the camp-streets filled with dead and dying animals ; 
 with few blankets, and no extra clothing, for when 
 Roseci-ans started on his campaign he expected it to 
 
 * About nine thousand national soldiers Lad been wounded at the 
 battle of Chickamauga. There was no water on the battle-field, and 
 the wounded were all taken six miles to the reai-, to Crawfish sprino-s 
 where they were laid on the uround, as near the spring as j^ossible. 
 The enemy broke through, near here, and capture<l thousands of these, 
 'onable to defend themselves. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 437 
 
 be a sliort and successful one, and ordered the men 
 to take but one blanket apiece, and no overcoats. In 
 tke battle and fligbt, blankets were thrown aside ; 
 and after Chattanooga was besieged, it was a ques- 
 tion whether food could be procured ; there was no 
 thought of brinoins: blankets over the mountain-roads. 
 The enemy only refrained from attacking because he 
 thought his prey already caged.* It was unnecessary 
 to assault and lose life in the attempt to take what 
 was secure. All Brairo; had to do was to wait, and 
 Chattanooo;a would Ml without a battle ; starvation 
 would soon reduce the besieged, and retreat or reen- 
 forcement was impossible. This was the situation of 
 the Army of the Cumberland, when Grant took com- 
 mand of it, on the 19th of October, 1863. No other 
 of the national armies was reduced to such straits 
 during the war. 
 
 But Chattanooga was only the centre of Grant's 
 new front ; his operations must necessarily extend to 
 Bridgeport, aboiit thirty miles to the right, where 
 the railroad from Nashville strikes the Tennessee, 
 and formed his solitary line of communication with 
 the North; while, on the left, the whole region 
 watered by the Tennessee was to be defended. This 
 important valley is forty or fifty miles wide, and runs 
 in a southwesterly direction, ft-om Virginia through 
 East Tennessee. Above Chattanooga, the river itself 
 formed one of the main defences of the national 
 forces, in fact, the ditch to their fortifications, for their 
 line was established behind it. Holding the Tennes- 
 
 * "These dispositions faithfully sustaiucd, insured the enemy's 
 speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for want of food and forage. Pos- 
 sessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which rcen- 
 forcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruc- 
 tion was only a question oiiime.''''— Bragg' s Report. 
 
438 :military history of 
 
 see and its branches, they effectually closed the rich 
 valley to the rebels, who were greatly in need of its 
 abundant supplies of grain and beef, and who, be- 
 sides, had more than once issued through this sally- 
 port on devastating raids, as far north even as the 
 Ohio. Chattanooga, therefore, was an immense bas- 
 tion at the centre of Grant's line, flanked on one side 
 by the Tennessee valley, and on the other by the 
 mountains of northern Georgia and Alabama. In its 
 front, but a hundred and fifty miles south, lay At- 
 lanta, at the junction of as many important railroads 
 as Chattanooga; and, covered by Atlanta, were Sel- 
 ma, with its arsenals, Montgomery, with its great 
 stores of cotton, Macon, Mobile, and all the rich cen- 
 tral valley that extends from the Cumberland moun- 
 tains to the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
 On the 23d of Sej^tember, immediately after the 
 defeat of Rosecraus, Halleck detached the Eleventh 
 and Twelftli corps from the Army of the Potomac, 
 and sent them by rail, under command of Major- 
 General Hooker, to protect Rosecrans's railroad line 
 of communication between Bridgeport and Nashville. 
 These troops, however, were not ordered fui'ther than 
 Bridgeport, as their presence at Chattanooga would 
 only have increased the embarrassment of those who 
 could not themselves be fully supplied. The Army 
 of the Cumberland, therefore, knew that two corps 
 of national troops lay within fifty miles, but unable 
 to afford them succor; indeed, that the arrival of 
 reenforcements would only aggravate their diffi- 
 culties. 
 
 At this time, Major-General Burnside was in com- 
 mand of the Department of the Ohio, which included 
 Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. Early in August, 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 439 
 
 he liad been directed to begin a campaign in East 
 Tennessee, and cooperate with the movements of Rose- 
 crans ; and, before the Ninth corps was returned to 
 him by Grant, Burnside had taken the field, moving 
 by three roads, upon Kingston and Knoxville. On 
 the 2d of September, he seized Knoxville, a hundred 
 and ten miles from Chattanooga, where the Tennes- 
 see river, the railroad, and many important country 
 roads converge. Possession of the entire region of 
 East Tennessee, from Cumberland gap to Loudon, 
 was speedily secured, without any heavy fighting. 
 Burnside was then ordered to concentrate his troops 
 on the Tennessee, west of Loudon, and to connect 
 with Rosecrans. This junction was repeatedly urged 
 upon him by Halleck, but although the Ninth corps 
 joined him by the 1st of October, the movement was 
 never made. Burnside was threatened by a rebel 
 force in West Virginia, and replied that he thought 
 the cooperation with Rosecrans unnecessary. After 
 Chickamauga, the enemy pushed a column into East 
 Tennessee, driving Burnside back as far as Loudon. 
 
 On the 20th of October, Halleck ^vrote to Grant, 
 at lengtli, informing him of the objects aimed at in 
 the movements of Rosecrans and Burnside, and of the 
 measures directed by himself in order to attain those 
 objects. "Your difficulty," he said, "will not be in 
 the want of men, but in the means of supplying them 
 
 at this season of the year If you reoccupy the 
 
 passes of Lookout mountain, wliich sliould never 
 have been given up, you will be able to use the rail- 
 road and river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. 
 This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and 
 
 should receive your early attention A\Tiatever 
 
 measures you may deem proper to adopt und^r exist- 
 
440 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 ing circumstances, will receive all possible assistance 
 from the aiitlioiities at Washington." This promise 
 of cooperation and siip]30i*t, from the government and 
 the general-in-chief, was kept to the letter, in the oper- 
 ations which ensued. 
 
 Grant himself, however, never asked for rein- 
 forcements. He was accustomed to state his condition 
 fully, and then to leave it for his superiors to decide 
 whether they would supply' his wants. I have not 
 been able to find a single request from him for troops, 
 unless he had been previously directed to state his 
 needs. If, after he had made known his condition 
 and plans, the government did not see fit, or was un- 
 able to supply him further, he went to work with 
 whatever means he had, and did the best he knew 
 how. But there never had been any lack of material 
 assistance, when it was possible to be bestowed; 
 and, as has been seen, the moral suppoit afforded him 
 had almost always been cordial. Halleck seldom 
 frustrated any of Grant's schemes, and never did 
 more than, as commanding officer, he had a perfect 
 right to do. When he did interfere, it was doubtless 
 with good intentions, and supposing his own judg- 
 ment to be better than that of his subordinate. His 
 judgment, indeed, was often at fault, but the patriot- 
 ism of his motives was unquestioned by Grant. From 
 this time, however, the chief deferred to the judg- 
 ment of his successful subordinate. 
 
 At the same time that Grant telegraphed to 
 Thomas the order to assume command of the De- 
 partment of the Cumberland, he sent him the fol- 
 lowing dispatch from Louisville: "October 10, 11.30 
 p. M. Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be 
 there as soon as possible." Thomas replied at once : 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 441 
 
 " I will hold the town till we starve ! " — an answer 
 worthy of the soldier whose individual energy had 
 infused his own corps, and saved an entire army from 
 annihilation, at the battle of Chickamauga. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th, Grant started fi*om 
 Louisville, by rail. lie arrived at ISTashville the 
 same night, and, at half-past eleven, he telegi'aphed 
 to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville : " Have you 
 tools for fortifying ? Important j^oints in East Ten- 
 nessee should be 25ut in condition to be held by the 
 
 smallest number of men, as soon as possible I 
 
 will be in Stevenson to-morrow night, and Chatta- 
 noosra the next nio^ht." From Nashville, he also tele- 
 graphed to Admiral Porter, at Cairo : " General Sher- 
 man's advance was at Eastport, on the loth. The 
 sooner a gunboat can be got to him the better. Boats 
 must now be on the way from St. Louis, with sup- 
 plies to go up the Tennessee, for Sherman." Of 
 Thomas, he asked : " Should not large working-parties 
 be put upon the road between Bridgej)ort and Chat- 
 tanooo^a, at once ? " At Stevenson, he met Kosecrans, 
 who had received the order relieving him, and was 
 now on his way to the North. Their interview was 
 short ; but Rosecrans was cordial, and volunteered in- 
 formation about the condition of affairs. At Bridge- 
 port, Grant telegraphed for the commissary of sub- 
 sistence at Nashville, to " send to the front, as speed- 
 ily as possible, vegetables for the army. Beans and 
 hominy are especially required." 
 
 From this point, the party started by horse, for 
 Chattanooga : the roads were almost impassable, by 
 reason of the rain, which rolled in toiTcnts, sometimes 
 a foot deep, down the sides of the mountain. Great 
 precipices rose and descended on either hand; the 
 
442 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 ground was slippery, aud tlie liillsides were strewn 
 vriih the wrecks of wao-ons, and tlie carcasses of ani- 
 mals tliat liad fallen over the bluffs, or died on the 
 road. Frequently, the whole party had to dismount 
 and lead their horses across difficult places ; and 
 Grant, who was still lame and suffering, was carried 
 in the arms of soldiers, over the spots unsafe or im- 
 possible to cross on horseback. At Jasper, there was 
 a halt, and, from there, he telegraj^hed to Burnside, by 
 way of Louisville and Lexington: "Every effort 
 should be made to increase your small-arm ammuni- 
 tion to five hundred rounds per man, and artillery to 
 five hundred rounds." And thus the crippled com- 
 mander travelled to the fi'out, by steam and horse, and 
 carried in the arms of his soldiers; telegraphing to 
 Halleck, and to Sherman, to Porter, and to Thomas, and 
 to Burnside, on the way ; attending to the supplies, and 
 directing the movements of his three armies ; order- 
 ing vegetables to Chattanooga, and ammunition to 
 Knoxville, seeming gunboats to protect Sherman, and 
 directing working-parties to remake Thomas's roads. 
 
 A\Tien the party reached Chattanooga it was 
 just dark. The rain still fell in torrents; they 
 were cold, and hungry, and di-enched, and tired; 
 the rebel lines absolutely enclosed the national 
 camp, and Lookout mountain, like a gigantic jailer, 
 stood guard below the town, preventing all egress by 
 the beleaguered army. The officers and soldiers they 
 met were downcast, if not desponding ; hemmed in 
 on every side by the enemy, whose pickets came so 
 close upon their own ; without the possibility either 
 of holding out much longer, or of escaping through 
 the impassable defiles in their rear ; a river at their 
 back, in case tliey were attacked, and short supplies 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 44:3 
 
 of ammunition ; in front, a rebel force larger than tlieir 
 own, fortified on wliat seemed imi^regnalde ridges, 
 and mountains formed by Nature to resist assault. 
 Theii- strength and spirits were de^^leted by tlie lack 
 of food ; they could not use artillery, for the horses 
 were all dead or sent away ; and they could not even 
 be reenforced, for, with no means of supplying them- 
 selves, it was worse than mockery to send more troops 
 to consume the scanty rations that ^^'ere now doled 
 out. The gloom of that night seemed impenetrable. 
 
 Grant went at once to Thomas's headquarters, and 
 at half-past nine p. :^r. on the 23d, he telegraphed to 
 Halleck : '' Have just arrived. I will write to-mor- 
 row. Please approve order placing Sherman in com- 
 mand of Department of the Tennessee, with head- 
 quarters in the field." This request was promptly 
 acceded to, and Sherman was placed in Grant's old 
 command. Thomas behaved with great magnanim- 
 ity; he said there had been rumors that an inde- 
 pendent command was intended for him when Kose- 
 crans should be relieved, but that he would not have 
 accepted it ; he thought it should be given to Grant, 
 or to some one else whose name w\as connected with 
 success. The arrangement that had been made, how- 
 ever, giving him the Army of the Cumberland, but 
 making Grant supreme, was perfectly satisfactory. 
 
 That night. Grant learned that Thomas had al- 
 ready ordered the concentration of Hooker's command, 
 at Bridgeport. This was with a view to securing the 
 Tennessee river, and the main wagon-road on its 
 northern bank, between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. 
 At present, this road was commanded by rebel sharp- 
 shooters, and unsafe even for couriers. The next 
 morning, Grant rode out in company with Thomas 
 
444 ]\IILITART HISTORY OF 
 
 and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer 
 of the Department of the Cumberland, and made a 
 reconnoissance on the north side of the river and at 
 the mouth of Lookout valley, as well as of a crossing 
 of the Tennessee, known as Brown's ferry. 
 
 A bend in the Tennessee, just below Chattanooga, 
 shapes the northern shore into a singular peninsula, 
 called Moccasin point, from its resemblance to an In- 
 dian moccasin. This point runs out immediately un- 
 der Lookout mountain ; and, at its narrowest part, 
 about three miles below the mouth of Lookout 
 creek, Brown's ferry is situated. Moccasin point was 
 still in the hands of the national army, but the oppo- 
 site bank, from Chattanooga creek to Kelly's ferry, 
 was occupied by the rebels. A sharp range of hills, 
 whose base is washed by the Tennessee, extends along 
 the southern shore, below the mouth of Lookout river, 
 and is broken at Brown's ferry by a narrow gorge, 
 through w^hich a road runs to Kelly's ferry, on the 
 western side of Raccoon mountain. The valley be- 
 tween this rido;e and the Baccoon mountain is nar- 
 row, and a lodgment effected there would seriously 
 interrupt the communications of the enemy up Look- 
 out valley, as 'well as give complete command of the 
 Kelly's ferry road. Now, from Kelly's ferry to Bridge- 
 port, the river was free from the rebels. The ridge 
 was thinly picketed, and tlie valley apparently unoc- 
 cupied l)y any large force of the enemy. It seemed, 
 therefore, quite practicable to take by surprise what, 
 if strongly defended, could not have been carried by 
 assault. 
 
 It was proposed that Hooker should concentrate 
 at Bridgeport, and move east, while a force from Chat- 
 tanooga, cooperating, was to establish a bridge across 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 445 
 
 the river at Bro\\Ti's ferry, and seize the lieiglits on 
 tlie soiitliern side, thus giving Hooker an open road 
 to Chattanooga, wlien his forces should arrive in Look- 
 out valley. As the rebels held the north end of Look- 
 out valley with a brigade of troops, as well as the 
 road leadino; around the foot of the mountain from 
 their main camp in Chattanooga valley, they would 
 have had but little difficulty in concentrating a suffi- 
 cient force to defeat Hooker and drive him back. To 
 prevent this, the seizure of the range of hills at the 
 mouth of Lookout valley, and covering the Brown's 
 ferry road, was deemed of the highest importance. 
 By the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and 
 Brown's ferry, and of the north bank of the river 
 across Moccasin point, a shorter line could be secured 
 to reenforce the troops in Lookout valley, than was 
 afforded to the rebels by the narrow and tortuous 
 road around the foot of Lookout mountain. 
 
 Accordingly, Grant directed that Hooker should 
 cross, at Bridgeport, to the south side of the Tennes- 
 see, with all the force that could be spared from 
 guarding the railroad in his rear, and move along tlie 
 main wagon-road, by way of Whitesides, to Wauhat- 
 chie, in the Lookout valley. Major-General John M. 
 Palmer, commanding a division of the Fourth corps, 
 in the Army of the Cumberland, was moved to a posi- 
 tion opposite Chattanooga. From there, he was to 
 march by the Jasper road, the only practicable route 
 north of the Tennessee, to a point on the north bank, 
 opposite Whitesides ; then, to cross to the south 
 side and hold the road passed over by Hooker. 
 In the mean time, and before the enemy could be ap- 
 prised of the intention, a force under W. F. Smith 
 was to be thrown across the river, at Brown's ferry. 
 
446 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 and to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Look- 
 out valley, covering the Kelly's ferry road. 
 
 In these operations, the absolute necessity of gain- 
 ing some means of supporting the army was the first 
 and paramount consideration with Grant. This, every 
 one saw, must demand the first attention. Every 
 one also saw that the means now to be attempted 
 was that which promised relief, if relief was to be 
 secured at all. In case of success, the river would be 
 open from Kelly's ferry to Bridgeport, and the road 
 on the north side clear ; so that either steamboats or 
 wagons could be used to bring up supplies. Rose- 
 crans had contemplated some movement of this sort, 
 and had ordered a pontoon bridge to be prepared, but 
 had been content with such remote preliminaries.* 
 Smith, too, had suggested the plan, which, however, 
 suggested itself to every soldier ; Halleck had pro- 
 posed it, and Thomas had determined on it, and even 
 given some directions in the matter, before Grant ar- 
 rived. "When Grant visited the ferry, the importance 
 of the position was at once evident to him, and, that 
 day, he issued positive orders for the movement. 
 
 Smith was instructed to make all necessary ar- 
 rangements for the expedition which was to effect a 
 lodgment at Brown's ferry. Four thousand men were 
 detailed, and the force to throw the bridge was organ- 
 ized on the 24th, the day of Grant's reconnoissance ; 
 the pontoon bridge was ready in two days more ; and 
 Smith, meanwhile, examined the ground ^vith his 
 brigade commanders, and gave the, requisite orders. 
 Eighteen hundred men, under Brigadier-General Ila- 
 zen, were to embark in boats, and pass down the 
 
 * Rosccrans liad begun the construction of a steamboat, to be used 
 in case the river was ever reopened. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 447 
 
 river about nine miles, seven of wliicli would be un- 
 der fire of tlie rebel pickets. Tliis risk was taken ra- 
 ther than launch the pontoons near the ferry, because 
 the boats would move more rapidly than intelligence 
 could be carried by the infantry pickets of the enemy ; 
 and, although the rebels might be alarmed, they could 
 not know where the landing was to be attempted, 
 and therefore coald not concentrate with certainty 
 against the landing. 
 
 By sundown on the 2Gth, all Avas ready. The 
 night was dark and foggy, and at three a. m., on the 
 27th, sixty pontoon boats, each containing thirty 
 armed men, floated quietly fi'om Chattanooga. The 
 current was so strong, that there was no need of oars, 
 and by keeping well under the opposite shore, they 
 passed the rebel pickets undiscovered ; then rounded 
 the foot of Lookout mountain, and landed on the south 
 side of the river, at Brown's ferry. Here, a volley was 
 fired by the rebel pickets, who had now taken the 
 alarm ; some sliglit skirmishing ensued, but, by five 
 o'clock, Smith had seized the hills covering the feny, 
 without the loss of a man killed, and but four or five 
 wounded. The remainder of the troops and the ma- 
 terial for a bridge were moved, by the north bank 
 of the river, across Moccasin point to Brown's ferry, 
 without attracting the attention of the enemy; and, 
 before day dawned, the whole force was ferried to the 
 south bank of the stream, and the almost inaccessible 
 heights rising from Lookout valley, at its outlet to 
 the river, were secured. The men carried axes, to be 
 used in cutting an abatis for defence, as soon as the 
 ridge was gained ; and, in two hours, the command 
 was sufficiently protected to withstand any attack 
 likely to be made. As soon as the last of the troops 
 
448 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 were over, tlie bridge was begun, and, by ten o'clock, 
 an excellent pontoon bridge was laid, thus securing 
 tlie end of the desired road nearest tlie enemy's forces, 
 and a shorter line than the rebels could have, by 
 which to move reeuforcements, if a battle became 
 inevitable. Positions were taken, from which the 
 troops could not have been driven except by vastly 
 superior forces ; and artillery was placed to command 
 the roads leading, around Lookout mountfjn, to the 
 enemy's camps in Chattanooga valley. 
 
 On the morning of the 26th, Hooker crossed the 
 Tennessee, by the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, with 
 the greater part of the Eleventh corps, under Major- 
 General Howard, and a portion of the Twelfth corps, 
 under Brigadier-General Geary. He took up his line 
 of march along the railroad, by way of Whitesides to 
 Wauhatchie. The rebel pickets fell back as he ad- 
 vanced ; and, marching along the western base of 
 Kaccoon mountain, he finally descended throuo-h a 
 narrow gorge into Lookout valley, leaving troops to 
 protect the passes along the route. As the column 
 emerged into the valley, its advance was arrested by 
 an irregular fire of musketry ; but Hooker at once 
 deployed his troops, and all 023position ceased, the 
 enemy flying before him. The rebels now detected 
 the movement, fi'om their signal-stations on Lookout 
 mountain, and threw shells into the column as it 
 marched below. This, however, caused no serious 
 interruption ; and Hooker kept on down the valley. 
 He met no further resistance; and at six o'clock, 
 P.M., on the 2Sth, the command was halted for the 
 night, and went into camj:) within a mile of Brown's 
 ferry. Howard had the advance, and, as it was ne- 
 cessarv to hold both the roads to Kelly's ferry, Geary 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 449 
 
 was encamped at Wauliatcliie, about three miles from 
 the position occuj^ied by Howard's corps. 
 
 The rebels, however, were fully aware of the con- 
 dition of affairs in Chattanooga, and of the necessity 
 for Grant's establishing a new and sliorter line of suj:)- 
 plies. They knew, also, the importance, to themselves, 
 of keeping him from this line ; and, when it was sud- 
 denly snatched from them, in a manner they had never 
 dreamed of, an attempt w\as instantly made to regain 
 possession of the vital jDoiut. The night after Hooker's 
 arrival, Longstreet's corps attacked him in force.* 
 The battle began at one o'clock, with a fierce assault 
 on Geary, at Wauhatchie. Howard was at once 
 directed to move his nearest division to the support 
 of Geary. He moved promj)tly ; but, before reaching 
 Geary, found a rebel force strongly posted on a range 
 of hills on the left, which commanded his line of 
 march. His second division soon came uj), and an 
 assault was made in the night, against these hills. 
 They were steep and wooded, and entirely unknown 
 to the national soldiers; but Howard scaled them 
 under a heavy fire, and carried them by storm, cap- 
 turing many prisoners. Tlie rebels had already be- 
 gun to build works on the summit, evidently intend- 
 ing to hold the position permanently. 
 
 Geary, meanwhile, had been fighting for three 
 hours, without assistance, and, although at one time 
 almost envelo^^ed on three sides, finally succeeded in 
 completely repelling the assault on his front. The 
 moon shone fitfully into the valley, and the com- 
 mands could often distinguish each other only by 
 
 * The rebel prisoners universally stated that all of Longstreet's 
 corps was engaged. I have no other authority for the statement, as 
 no rebel report of this battle is in possession of the government. 
 29 
 
450 ]\[ILITAEY HISTOKY OF 
 
 tlie flaslies of their fire-arms. The strange echoes of 
 the cann'jii among the hills, and the muttering of 
 musketry from every quarter, alarmed the teamsters 
 of Geary's wagon-train, who deserted their mules, 
 and in the darkness and noise, the animals became 
 more friditened than their drivers ; they soon broke 
 loose, and, with their tackle dangling and rattling 
 about their heels, rushed in a body directly towards 
 the enemy. This augmented the confusion of the 
 rebels, who supposed it to be an attack of cavalry, 
 and their rout was rendered inglorious by the assist- 
 ance of a pack of mules. 
 
 By four o'clock, the battle was over, and the ene- 
 my repelled at every point. Hooker had nearly ^ 
 seven thousand men engaged ; his loss was four hun- 
 dred and sixteen, in killed and wounded ; he took 
 more than a hundred prisoners. Geary buried one 
 hundred and fifty-three rebels, on his front alone ; 
 but the whole loss of the enemy is not certainly 
 known.f The heights which had been carried by 
 Howard were fortified at once, and the entire position 
 made secure against any further assault. Hooker, 
 thereafter, remained undisturbed. Flanked as he was 
 by mountain and river, on either hand, it was useless 
 for the rebels to repeat the attempt at surprise. 
 Every advantage they could hope for in an assault, 
 they had already enjoyed at Wauhatchie— the night, 
 the surprise. Hooker unfortified, and unfamiliar with 
 the country ; and yet they had fidled ; while, in case 
 of another effort, Grant had a shorter line by which 
 
 * Hooker's force was ten thousand one hundred and eightj", present 
 for duty ; but not all of this was engaged. 
 
 t Hooker estimates Longstreet's loss at fifteen hundred. I have no 
 means of verifying or disputing this. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 451 
 
 to reenforce liis subordinate, than the rebels them- 
 selves possessed around the base of the mountain. 
 The fate of Lookout valley was decided. 
 
 The force which had started for Whitesides, un- 
 der command, of Palmer, reached its destination at 
 the appointed time, and took up the position intended 
 in the original plan of the movement ; so that two 
 good lines were now secured, by which to obtain sup- 
 plies from the railroad at Bridgeport ; namely, the 
 main wagon-road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, 
 and Brown's ferry, a distance of twenty-eight miles ; 
 and the Kelly's ferry and Brown's ferry road, by 
 use of which, and of the river from Bridgeport to 
 Kelly's ferry, the distance for wagoning was reduced 
 to eight miles. 
 
 The road to Nashville was thus opened in five 
 days after Grant's arrival at the front, and the com- 
 mand rescued from all immediate danger. The rebel 
 authorities were greatly chagrined at this achieve- 
 ment, and their newspapers were full of lamentations. 
 Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Lookout mountain 
 only a week before, and feasted his eyes with the 
 sight of the national army, shut up among the hills, 
 like an animal ready for slaughter; and now, at a 
 single stroke, the prey had been snatched from his 
 grasp. The door for relief was opened, and, from a 
 besieged and isolated army, the force in Chattanooga 
 had suddenly become the assailant. It was Bragg 
 who was now on the defensive. Not only were sup- 
 plies of rations and ammunition brought in, but two 
 corps had been added to the strength of the national 
 army, and Hooker threatened the rebel position on 
 Lookout mountain. Horses and ammunition were 
 hurried at once to Chattanooga; steamboats were 
 
452 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 constantly conveying stores from Bridge]3ort to Kel- 
 ly's ferry, and full rations were speedily issued once 
 more. 
 
 The army felt as if it had been miraculously re- 
 lieved. Its S23irit revived at once ; the depression of 
 Chickamauga was shaken off, and the unshackled 
 giant stood erect. The soldiers saw that they had a 
 commander who could perceive and relieve their ne- 
 cessities. They became buoyant and hopeful, and 
 the very men ^vho had dragged themselves sick and 
 half-despairing around their camps only two days be- 
 fore, were now quite ready, at Grant's command, to 
 assault the rebels on Missionary ridge. On the 28th, 
 Grant said: "If the rebels give us one week more 
 time, I think all danger of losing territory now held 
 by us will have passed away, and preparations may 
 commence for active operations." 
 
 But, although the immediate emergency was met 
 at Chattanooga, there were still other and instant 
 needs which required the attention of the new com- 
 mander. Ilis military division reached from JSTatchez 
 to Knoxville, more than a thousand miles, and in- 
 cluded two hundred thousand soldiers. Burnside's 
 army, numbering nearly twenty-five thousand men, 
 was more than a hundred miles from any navigable 
 river by "which it could be supplied, and still further 
 from a railroad. He needed rations and ammunition 
 and clothing at once, and the problem of providing 
 these was difficult. They were ordered from St. 
 Louis, u-p the Mississippi and the Ohio livers, to the 
 mouth of the Cumberland, and thence, convoyed by 
 gunboats five hundred miles, up the Cumberland to 
 Big South folk ; there Burnside was to meet them, 
 and transport them, in wagons, a hundred miles 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 453 
 
 further, to tlie ffont of operations in East Tennessee. 
 This varied and complicated business was superin- 
 tended directly by Grant. He first ordered the 
 stores, on Burnside's demand ; then wrote to Admiral 
 Porter for the gunboat convoy; then instructed Burn- 
 side when and where to meet the supplies, and all the 
 while was urging his subordinates to greater dili- 
 gence, in order to secure the speedy transportation 
 of material, without which he could not even begin 
 his triple campaign. 
 
 For, while Thomas was to be relieved from the 
 danger which threatened to engulf his army at Chat- 
 tanooga, and Burnside was to be made ready to pro- 
 tect East Tennessee, and cooperate in the strategy 
 which should direct the Army of the Cumberland, 
 Sherman was marching across the continent, four 
 hundred miles, from the Mississippi valley. He 
 started from Yicksburg on the 27th of September, 
 and arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October. It 
 was then his duty to conduct the Fifteenth army 
 corps, and such other troops as could be spared from 
 Hurlbut's command, to the support of Rosecrans, 
 marching by way of Corinth, Tuscumbia, and Deca- 
 tur, to Athens, Alabama. During this long and te- 
 dious marcli, he was to look to Rosecrans for no 
 supplies, and was, therefore, obliged to repair the 
 raiboad fi'om Memphis east, as he advanced: so 
 Halleck had ordered. But, when Grant assumed 
 command of the military division, he at once ordered 
 supplies from St. Louis to meet Sherman at Eastport, 
 on the Tennessee. These were sent up the river on 
 transports. Grant requesting Admiral Porter to con- 
 voy the steamers which conveyed them. 
 
 Durino- all these campaigns, the national forces 
 
454 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 were operating amidst a hostile jDopulatioii. At this 
 stage of the war, the rebellious spirit was rampant 
 over almost the entire South ; and, even when armies 
 were conquered and territory was occuj^ied, partisan 
 bands were formed, which constantly threatened the 
 long lines by which the national armies were obliged 
 to advance. Guerillas and sharpshooters infested the 
 rivers and roads on every I'oute. The railroads in 
 rear were torn up, bridges were destroyed, steam- 
 boats were burned or attacked, whenever they touched 
 the shore ; and no difficulty, that beset the loyal com- 
 manders during the war, was more constant or more 
 momentous than that of protecting their extended 
 lines of supply. As they penetrated further into the 
 rebellious region, these difficulties increased, so that 
 success itself seemed to enhance their dangers ; and 
 now, when Grant's three armies had advanced many 
 hundred miles from their bases, into a region bitterly 
 hostile to the government, ever}^ mile of that advance 
 had to be guarded, while his supplies of food and 
 clothing and ammunition were pushed on. But when 
 Sherman's advance reached Eastport, he found that 
 Grant's prevision had secured supplies. 
 
 The same remarkable relations which had so lons^ 
 existed between Grant and his great subordinate 
 were displayed at this juncture, as they had been on 
 every otlier occasion when their display was proper, 
 during the war. When Grant sent Sherman north, 
 from Yicksburg, he said : " I hope you will be in time 
 to aid in ixivinic the rebels the worst, or best thrash- 
 ing they have had in this war. I have constantly 
 had the feeling that I shall lose you from this com- 
 mand entirely. Of course I do not object to seeing 
 your s])here of usefulness enlarged, and think it 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 455 
 
 sliould have been enlarged long ago, lia\ing an eye 
 to the public good alone. But it needs no assurance 
 from me, general, that, taking a more selfish view, 
 while I would heartily apj)rove such a change, I 
 would deeply regret it on my owu account." Grant, 
 at this time, supposed that Sherman was to relieve 
 Kosecrans of the command of the Army of the Cum- 
 berland ; and, although Ilalleck had previously inti- 
 mated that Grant himself might be sent to Nashville, 
 this apparent substitution of his subordinate gave 
 him no pain. His only regret was in parting with 
 his friend and faithful coadj utor.'' 
 
 At Memphis, however, Sherman heard that Grant 
 also had been ordered north, and, -with the wonderful 
 imselfishuess he had always manifested towards his 
 chief, he wrote, on the 14th of October, nearly a week 
 before the Military Division of the Mississippi was 
 created : " Accept the command of the great army 
 of the centre ; don't hesitate. By your presence at 
 Nashville you will unite all discordant elements, and 
 impress the enemy in proportion. All success and 
 honor to you ! " And again, on the 15th : " I am very 
 anxious you should go to Nashville, as foreshadowed 
 by Halleck, and chiefly as }0U can harmonize all con- 
 flicts of feeling that may exist in that vast crowd. 
 Rosecrans and Burnside and Sherman, with their 
 subordinates, would be ashamed of petty quarrels, if 
 you were behind and near them, between them and 
 Washington. Next, the union of such armies, and 
 the direction of it, is Avorthy your ambition. I shall 
 await news fi-om you with great anxiety." 
 
 At one or two points on the route, Sherman had 
 
 * In fact, Grant bad not been ordered to send Sbcrman in person, 
 but preferred to place bim tbus in tbe May of advancement. 
 
456 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 encountered severe opposition ; not enoiigli to over- 
 throw him, or really turn him from his course, but 
 ([uite enough to dehiy him seriously. Rebel forces 
 were assembled at various stations, and, at Colliers- 
 ville, Mississippi, a heavy attack w^as made on the 
 body of troops wdth which Sherman himself was 
 moving. This, however, was repulsed ; a bridge was 
 built over Bear creek, and at Tuscumbia, whither 
 Sherman sent Blair's division in advance, still another 
 rebel force was dispersed. Skirmishing continued all 
 along the route, but, about the middle of October, 
 Sherman struck the Tennessee, at Eastport, where the 
 river is nearly a mile wide. The gunboats Grant had 
 asked for, and a coal-barge, at first were used for fer- 
 riage ; but, in a day or two, the steamers also arrived 
 with rations, and, as the various detachments of the 
 army came up, they were successively fed, and ferried 
 across. 
 
 Up to this time, Sherman had literally obeyed the 
 instructions of Halleck, and pushed forward the re- 
 pairs of the railroad in his rear. But, after assuming 
 command, on the 19th of October, Grant's first orders 
 to Sherman were : " Increase to the greatest possible 
 strength your moving column, and, at the same time, 
 secure your communications to your base of supplies. 
 Communicate with Steele, and urge the necessity of 
 his sending you the division of Kimball, of the Six- 
 teenth corps." Sherman was also ordered to bring 
 forward the troops at Paducah, and any that could 
 be spared from guarding the line of railroad from 
 Memphis to Corinth : " Assign them to strengthen 
 divisions already at the front," On the 24th, the day 
 after he arrived at Chattanooga, Grant telegraphed to 
 Sherman : " Drop every thing east of Bear creek, and 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 457 
 
 move witli your entire force towards Stevenson, until 
 you receive further orders, Tlie enemy are evidently 
 moving a large force towards Cleveland, and may 
 break throu2:li our lines and move on Nashville, in 
 which event your troops are the only forces at com- 
 mand that could beat them there." The dispatch was 
 sent by a messenger, who floated down over the Mus- 
 cle shoals, in the Tennessee river, landed at Tuscum- 
 bia, and was sent on to Sherman, at Inka. He re- 
 ceived the order on the 27th, and instantly proceeded 
 to obey. 
 
 In compliance mth Halleck's previous instruc- 
 tions, Blair had been advanced as fiir as Tuscumbin, 
 on the south side of the Tennessee, repairing the rail- 
 road ; but, " dropping every thing," Sherman now re- 
 versed this column, and turned all his troops to East- 
 port, the only place where he could cross the Tennes- 
 see. The work of crossing was pushed with all the 
 vigor possible, and on the 1st of i^ovember, Sherman, 
 in person, passed to the head of the column, at Flor- 
 ence, leavino; Blair to follow with the rear di\'ision. 
 Grant now ordered Tuttle's division, of McPherson's 
 corps, to be sent forward to report to Sherman. De- 
 lays were occasioned by the destruction of bridges 
 across the Elk river, and long detours were made; 
 for there was not time either to ferry, or to build new 
 bridges ; and, on the 5th, Grant again dispatched to 
 Sherman : " Leave Dodge's command " (of Hurlbut's 
 corps) " at Athens, until further orders, and come 
 with the remainder of your command to Stevenson, or 
 until you receive other instructions." Again, on the 
 7th : " The enemy have moved a great part of their 
 force from this front towards Burnside. I have to 
 make an immediate move from here towards their 
 
458 JIILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 lines of communication, to bring tliem back if possi- 
 ble. I am anxious to see your old corps liere at the 
 earliest moment." A\Tien Sherman reached Fayette- 
 ville, he received still further instructions : " Come 
 on to Stevenson and Bridgeport, with your four divi- 
 sions. I want your command to aid in a movement 
 to force the enemy back from their present position, 
 and to make Bui'nside secure in his." He proceeded 
 at once Avith his four divisions, along different roads, 
 and, on the 13th, at night, arrived at Bridgeport. 
 From that point, he immediately telegraphed his ar- 
 rival to the commanding general, and was summoned 
 in person to Chattanooga. 
 
 This urgency of Grant had been caused by the 
 movements of Bragg. As soon as the rebel general 
 discovered that his negligence had allowed Grant to 
 secure communications with Nashville, he turned his 
 attention towards Burnside, who was isolated among 
 the mountains aud rivers of East Tennessee, a hun- 
 dred miles from Chattanooga. Bragg held tlie rail- 
 road as far as Loudon, and, of course, had a much 
 shorter line than Grant, for communication with East 
 Tennessee ; he fii'st moved one division, under Steven- 
 son, as far as Cleveland and Sweetwater. At the 
 same time, Halleck, who had always felt the greatest 
 uneasiness about Burnside, telegraphed to Grant that 
 the rebels liad sent a corps of twenty thousand or 
 twenty-five thousand men into East Tennessee, b}^ way 
 of Abingdon, Virginia. " As Burnside will be obliged 
 to move all his forces uj) the valle}-, you must guard 
 against Bragg's army getting into East Tennessee, 
 above Chattanooga." But, Grant had alread}" fore- 
 seen this emergency, and replied : " I have sent ordei-s 
 to Sherman to move east towards Stevenson, leaving 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAXT. 459 
 
 every tiling unguarded, except Ly tlie cavalry of tlie 
 Army of the Cumberland, east of Bear creek. The 
 possibility of tlie enemy's breaking tlirougli our lines 
 east of tliis, and present inability to follow lilm from 
 here, if he should, is the cause of this." 
 
 The rebel movement from Abingdon proved not 
 to be important, but that from Bragg was more 
 threatening; the column dispatched to Cleveland and 
 towards Loudon was promptly reported to Grant, who 
 announced it to Halleck, on the 1st of November, and 
 at the same time remarked : " At present, lack of for- 
 age and provisions entirely precludes the idea of mov- 
 ino- from here, in that direction ; but I w^ill endeavor 
 to make an advance up Lookout valley, and threaten 
 the enemy from here, in front, at the same time, to 
 force a return of these troops. If Sherman gets here," 
 he said, " before the enemy disturbs Burnside's posi- 
 tion, I think I will be able to make him take a re- 
 spectful distance south of us." 
 
 At the same time, he infonned Halleck : '' Steam- 
 ers ply regularly between Kelly's ferry and Bridge- 
 port, thus nearly settling the rations and forage 
 question." This, however, did not satisfy the gen- 
 eral-in-chief, who telegraphed the next day : '' I have 
 serious fears about concentrating more troops near 
 Chattanooga, lest they perish for want of supplies. 
 This matter requii'es the most serious consideration." 
 He was anxious about Burnside, too, and said : 
 "Burnside cannot receive any more troops in East 
 Tennessee, and has great a])prehensions about feed- 
 ing his present army." Grant, however, had already 
 given orders to open the road from Nashville to De- 
 catur, and soothed the fears of his chief by informing 
 him : " A portion of Sherman's command will remain 
 
460 ]\[rLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 on the Nasliviile and Decatur road, till tliat is fin- 
 ished. With two roads from Xashville, I think there 
 can be no difficulty about supplies." He now di- 
 rected Burnside to collect all the stores he could 
 from the country, and the loyal Tennesseans gladly 
 brouo-ht in corn, and beef, and foras-e. 
 
 The rebels, meanwhile, were not idle. On the 3d 
 of November, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, one of 
 the ablest officers of the enemy, and who at this time 
 commanded the most famous corps in Bragg's army, 
 was summoned to a council of war, where he received 
 instructions to move his command at once against 
 Burnside. Accordingly, on the morning of the 4th, 
 lie marched to Tyner's station, there to take cars for 
 Sweetwater. His orders were, to drive Burnside out 
 of East Tennessee, or, if possible, to capture or de- 
 stroy him.""' Longstreet's effective force was a little 
 more than fifteen thousand men, besides Wheeler's 
 cavalry, perhaps five thousand strong ; f eighty guns 
 were also ordered to accompany him. The rebel 
 leaders were confident of success. On the 11th, 
 Longstreet said to Bragg, from Sweetwater : " There 
 are many reasons for anticipating great results from 
 the exjDedition against General Burnside's army. His 
 force should not be allowed to escape without an 
 effort to destroy it. Witli the balance of my corj^s, 
 or any good marching division, I think we may make 
 a great campaign." Bragg, however, refused to give 
 Longstreet more than the t\vo divisions of Hood and 
 
 * See ^Vppendix, for Bragg's instructions to Longstreet entire. 
 
 t Longstreet reported bis cfTective strength as about fifteen thou- 
 sand. On the 31st of August, Wheeler's cavah-y numbered ten thou- 
 sand six hundred and twenty-two effective men. Wheeler stated in 
 his report that he took with him on this campaign, "portions of five 
 brigades." 
 
ULYSSES S. GEA^'T. 461 
 
 McLa'ws, altlioiigli fclie corps commander begged Lard 
 for an increase, and said: " I think you greatly over- 
 estimate the enemy's force at and around Chatta- 
 nooga. I have seen the force every day for the time 
 it lias been here, and cannot tJdnJc it exceeds your 
 force^ xvitliout Stevenson^s division^ 
 
 But these arguments were urged in vain, and 
 Longstreet finally remarked : " As my orders were to 
 drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, or if possible 
 capture him, I determined that the only possible 
 chance of succeeding in either or both, was to move 
 and act as though I had a sufficient force to do either. 
 I endeavored, therefore, to Mo as I should have done, 
 had the twenty thousand men that I asked for been 
 given me." 
 
 Owing to some of the thousand delays and disap- 
 pointments of war, although this force started 
 promptly from Missionary ridge, on the 4th of No- 
 vember, it was unable to leave Sweetwater, until the 
 13th of the month. Grant, however, was instantly 
 informed of the movement, and, on the Vth, he tele- 
 graphed to Halleck: "In addition to the forces 
 threatening Burn side from the east, there is but 
 little doubt that Longstreet is moving to join them. 
 I have ordered Thomas to attack the north end of 
 Missionary ridge, and, when that is carried, to 
 threaten or attack the enemy's line of communica- 
 tions between Cleveland and Dalton. This move- 
 ment will be made by Monday morning. I expect 
 Shei-man will reach Huntsville to-day." Cleveland 
 and Dalton are on the railroad l)etw?en Tennessee 
 and Georgia. 
 
 As early as the 26th of October, three days after 
 his arrival at the front. Grant had foreseen the chance 
 
46:i JMILITAKV lliSTUKV OF 
 
 of such a movement as the enemy had now under- 
 taken, and telegraphed to Burnside : " Do you hear 
 of any of Bragg's army threatening you from the 
 southwest ? Thomas's command is in bad condition 
 to use, for want of animals of sufficient strength to 
 move his ai-tillery, and for want of rations. If you 
 are threatened with a force beyond what you can 
 compete with, efforts must be made to assist you. 
 Answer." On the 28th, he said to Burnside: "It is 
 particularly desirable that all the territory you now 
 have should be held ; but, if any portion must be 
 given up, let it be to the east, and keep your army 
 so that it and Thomas's army can support each other. 
 It is better that you should be forced from the east- 
 ern end of the valley than from the west. Thomas 
 is in no condition to move from his present position." 
 On the 31st, three days before the movement was 
 suggested to Longstreet, Grant informed Burnside : 
 " It is reported, on the authority of a Union man, that 
 a large force of Bragg's army is moving towards 
 you." Again, on the 1st of November : " Should the 
 enemy break through below Kingston, move in force 
 to Sparta and McMinnville, and hang on to him with 
 all your force, and such as I can send you from Bridge- 
 port and Stevenson, until he is beaten and turned 
 back." On the 5th, Longstreet's movement having 
 actually begun the day before, Grant said to Burn- 
 side : " I will endeavor, from here, to brino; the ene- 
 my back from your right flank as soon as possible. 
 Should you discover him leaving, you should annoy 
 him all you can with your cavalry, and in fact with 
 all the troo23S you can bring to bear. Shennan's ad- 
 vance will be at Bridgeport about Monday next. 
 Whether Thomas makes any demonstration before 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4G3 
 
 Ills arrival, will depend upon advices of the enemy's 
 movements." 
 
 On the 7th, the orders were issued to Thomas to 
 attack Bragg's army. " The news," said Grant, " is 
 of such a nature, that it becomes an imperative duty 
 for your force to draw the attention of tlie enemy 
 from Burnside to your own front. I deem the best 
 movement to attack tlie enemy to be, an attack on 
 the northern end of Missionary ridge, ^vitli all the 
 force you can bring to bear against it; and, when 
 that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possi- 
 ble, the enemy's line of communication between Dal- 
 ton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue 
 a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary 
 ridge is in our possession ; rations to be carried in 
 haversacks. Where there are not horses to move the 
 artillery^ mules must he taken from the teams ^ or 
 horses from amhulances / or^ if necessary^ officers 
 dismounted^ and their horses taJcen. Immediate pre- 
 parations should be made to carry these directions 
 into execution. The movement should not be made 
 a moment later than to-morrow mornino;." On the 
 same day, Grant said to Burnside : " I have ordered 
 an immediate move from here to carry Missionary 
 ridire, and to threaten or attack the railroad between 
 Cleveland and Dalton. This must have the effect to 
 draw the enemy back from your western front." 
 
 But Thomas announced that he had not horses to 
 move his artillery, and declared himself entirely and 
 absolutely unable to move, until Sherman should 
 airive to cooperate. Grant was, therefore, forced to 
 leave Burnside to contend against superior forces, 
 until the arrival of SheiTuau with his men and means 
 of transportation. In the mean time, reconnoissances 
 
464 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 were made and plans matured for operations ; dis- 
 patches were sent to Sliermau, informing Lim of tlie 
 movement of Longstreet, and of the necessity of his 
 immediate presence at Chattanooga. Grant, however, 
 did not desj^air, and said, at this juncture : " Although 
 a large force has gone up the Tennessee valley that 
 may annoy us, I feel that a decisive movement of the 
 enemy must prove a disaster to them." 
 
 Nevertheless, Thomas's delay was a great disap- 
 pointment. A prompt movement on the part of that 
 commander would undoubtedly have had the effect 
 to recall Longstreet ; but, now, it was possible that 
 the troops sent into East Tennessee might succeed in 
 overthrowing the occupation which was so important. 
 The greatest possible anxiety existed for the safety 
 of Burnsiile. He was so far off, and so inaccessible, 
 that he might be cut off and surrounded, or perhaps 
 destroyed, before he could be relieved. Longstreet 
 could reach him, long before assistance could get to 
 Knoxville fi'om Grant's army ; indeed, tliere was no 
 way whatever of sending reinforcements to Burn- 
 side, and no possibilit}' of supplying them, if they 
 were sent. It was not known how large a force 
 Longstreet had taken with him, but supposed that 
 his whole corps of twenty thousand men had started, 
 as well as Wheeler's cavalry ; besides which, Steven- 
 son's di\asion of the rebel army had certainly been at 
 Cleveland, for more than a week, in advance. In ad- 
 dition to all this, indications were not wanting that 
 a large force was moving from Virginia, on the left 
 flank of the Army of the Ohio, ^vhich thus seemed 
 likely to be overwhelmed. 
 
 The government felt even an acuter anxiety, in 
 this matter, than Grant ; partly, because Grant was 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4G5 
 
 always sanguine, amid the greatest difficulties and 
 dangers; and partly, perhaps, because tlie authorities 
 at Washington had an especial distrust of Burnside. 
 It was not a year since the battle of Fredericksburg, 
 and the memoiy of that disaster was still fresh with 
 the general-in-chief. The dispatches from the Presi- 
 dent and from Halleck alike indicate the greatest 
 alarm, lest Burnside should be destroyed, or even 
 surrender. Grant at once sent a staff-officer to East 
 Tennessee, to learn exactly the condition of affairs, 
 and to impress his own vie^vs and wishes upon the 
 commander of the Army of the Ohio. 
 
 Meanwhile, he was vigorously at work, repairing 
 and reconstructing railroads and bridges, ordering 
 and forwarding supplies, first to one and then to an- 
 other of his wddely-separated departments. A\Tien 
 the line was first opened from Brown's ferry, he said 
 to Thomas : " Tlie steamer Point of Kocks should by 
 all means be got down to Brown's ferry, before mom- 
 ino-, even if a house has to be torn down to get the 
 necessary fuel." He directed the superintendent of 
 military railroads, to send " thirty, and, if possible, 
 more cars through to Stevenson and Bridgeport, daily, 
 loaded with rations. The road should be run to its 
 utmost capacity." The chief commissary of subsist- 
 ence, at St. Louis, was asked : " Have you sent any 
 stores via river, to Nashville ? I wish you to send all 
 you can, while the river is navigable." On the 3d, 
 he said again to the manager of the railroad : " Com- 
 plaints are made of stores not coming fost enough 
 over Louisville and Nashville road. If stores do not 
 come up the Cumberland in steamers, the Louisville 
 road must send at least forty car-loads of provisions 
 daily, besides quartermaster's stores." 
 
 30 
 
466 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 There was a deficiency of steamers aud of locomo- 
 tives, and, accordingly, Grant said to Burnside : "If 
 you have any steamers, I think you had better pro- 
 tect the pilot and engine from sharjD-shooters, by case- 
 mating with oak plank, and send them down here ; " 
 while, to McPherson, now in command at Vicksburg, 
 he said : " Send Tsathout delay, via the Tennessee 
 river to Danville, Tennessee, all the locomotives at 
 Vicksburg, with the exception of two, and all the 
 cars, with the exception often. Let the locomotives 
 and cars be the best you have. They are requu-ed 
 for immediate use." To Anderson, the railroad su- 
 perintendent : " There are now six bridges at Louis- 
 \alle, belonging to government, ready made, that can 
 be brouo-ht forward. I have ordered three locomo- 
 tives and all the cars, but ten, from the southern road, 
 Vicksburg ; " and again : "Those ordered by Colonel 
 Parsons, for Memphis, can also come. There are 
 more cars now on the West Tennessee roads than are 
 required." 
 
 But all this was not sufficient, and, on the 4th, 
 Grant declared : " The road from Nashville to De- 
 catur will have to be put in running order." Sher- 
 man was ordered to leave Dodge's division, of Hurl- 
 but's command, at Athens. " I have given directions 
 for putting the railroad from Nashville to Decatur in 
 running order. That road is now only guarded to 
 Columbia, and the force left by you will have to 
 guard the balance, with the aid of Thomas's com- 
 mand, until further arrangements can be made." 
 Sherman was informed, however : " It is not my in- 
 tention to leave any portion of your army to guard 
 roads in the Department of the Cumberland, when an 
 advance is made." At the same time, Grant ordered 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4G7 
 
 the discontinuance of the railroads and telegraphs be- 
 tween Memphis and Columbus, in order to avail him- 
 self of the material on the roads, and, especially, of 
 the troops who were compelled to guard them. 
 
 He contemplated supplying all three of his armies 
 from Chattanooga, when the concentration should 
 take place, and said to Burnside : " With the Nash- 
 ville and Decatur road built, and full possession of 
 the river, you can be supplied by this line. It will 
 be impossible, however, for a single-track railroad to 
 supply your army and this. I mil telegraph imme- 
 diately, to find if rations can be sent up the Cumber- 
 land." Three hundred thousand rations of salt meat, 
 and a million of all other rations, were, accordingly, 
 directed to be sent, in barges, towed by light-draught 
 steamers, up the Cumberland, to the Big South fork, 
 Admiral Porter promising to send gunboats to con- 
 voy them. Every exertion was made to hasten the 
 transportation of these supplies. " Make any order," 
 said Grant to his adjutant-general, at NashviUe, 
 "make any order necessary to secure this result in 
 the promptest manner." At the same time, he re- 
 peated his injunctions to Anderson : " It is of vast 
 importance that the railroad from Nashville to Deca- 
 tur should be opened as soon as possible. Make 
 contracts with different bridge-builders, so as to get 
 this work done in the shortest possible time. Extra 
 bridizes should also be in readiness at all times, to 
 replace any that may be destroyed. Keep me ad- 
 vised of what you do in this matter." 
 
 On the 7th, he got word from Shcnnan, and tele- 
 graphed at once, to send a train loaded with provi- 
 sions for him, to Fayetteville : " General Sherman will 
 reach Fayetteville, to-moiTow, without any thing to 
 
468 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 eat. See the shipping commissary, and direct Lim to 
 secure transportation, and send one hundred thousand 
 rations to-morrow mornins;." He watched over Sher- 
 man carefully, not only providing supplies to meet 
 him along the route, and sending him ferry-boats with 
 which to cross the Tennessee, and requesting Admiral 
 Poi*ter to order up gunboats to protect the crossing, 
 but even studying and directing the routes by which 
 he wished Sherman to march. On the 10th, he in- 
 structed that commander : " I learn that, by the way of 
 Xewmarket and Maysville, you will avoid the heavy 
 mountains, and find abundance of forage. If a part 
 of your command is now at Winchester and a part 
 back, that portion behind had better be turned on 
 the Newmarket route." 
 
 It was important indeed to him that Sherman 
 should arrive in good condition, and as speedily as 
 possible. He could not move Thomas, the wheels 
 of whose cannon were heavy and held him fast; 
 Bui'nside could not be relieved until Sherman came 
 up ; and the completion of the design which Grant 
 had entertained ever since his arrival at Chattanooo;a, 
 was also necessarily deferred, till the Army of the 
 Tennessee should be present. Then, the general of 
 the three armies meant to make them cooperate, in 
 a movement which should realize the advantaofes 
 which Chattanooga had so long promised to the na- 
 tional armies. He wanted to convert it into a base 
 for offensive operations ; to drive off the enemy wdio 
 ventured to threaten him from Lookout mountain 
 and Missionary ridge ; and, not only to relieve Burn- 
 side, but to throw open the door for grander opera, 
 tions into the interior of Georgia. All this he was 
 waiting and planning to do. He deemed it nothing 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 469 
 
 tliat be should have lifted the Army of the Cumber 
 land out of the sloughs and straits in which he 
 found it struggling ; he chafed at being confined by 
 hostile mountains and impassable rivers ; he was all 
 unused to these defensive lines. 
 
 But Thomas's artillery must be furnished with 
 horses ; and Burnside, instead of moving offensively, 
 was himself threatened with destruction. And, what 
 was most tantalizing of all, the opportunity, Avhich a 
 confident enemy had offered to his watchful antag- 
 onist, could not be seized. Bragg had dared to de- 
 tach an entire coi-ps from his army, in the very face 
 of Grant ; and Grant, beholding this blunder, could 
 not avail himself of the chance. This galled him ; he 
 was anxious indeed for Burnside, but still more anx- 
 ious lest Sherman should not arrive in time to take 
 advantage of Bragg's foolhardiness. Every day it 
 seemed as if Sherman must arrive; every day he 
 feared lest Longstreet might return. Pent up behind 
 the mountains, like a lion in its cage, he watched the 
 weakness of his prey, almost within his grasp ; and yet, 
 chained by necessities that would not let him strike, 
 he could only wait till those necessities were past. 
 
 Yet Sherman was doing splendidly. There was 
 no thouccht of censure for him. lie had steamed four 
 hundred miles, and was now marching four hundred 
 more, along a hostile country. Fighting, skirmishing, 
 brid'T-inor rivers, wading^ creeks, climbing mountains 
 building railroads, the army that had taken Vicks- 
 hurcr hurried to the relief of its old commander; 
 ready to come at his call, anxious to fight again un- 
 der his banners: while the Army of the Cumberland, 
 conscious of its real courage and soldierly qualities, 
 and aware that it had never yet been able to win all 
 
470 MILITAEY HISTOFcY OF 
 
 the reuown wliieh it had faii'ly earned, was waiting 
 for tlie moment to show these men from the further 
 West, that it too could achieve victories and conquer 
 difficulties. Eastern troops also were gathering, un- 
 der the command of this captain from Illinois. Two 
 corps from the Army of the Potomac had abeady 
 watered with their blood the Western battle-fields ; 
 their mettle had been tried at Wauhatchie, and in 
 the depths of the forest and of the night, they had 
 resisted surprise and scaled the unfamiliar hills. 
 
 The continent shook with the tramp of advancing 
 armies. Bridges were built in Eastern cities, for these 
 soldiers to march over; engines were brought from 
 Western towns, to transport their supplies. The 
 greatest rivers of the republic — the Tennessee, and 
 the Cumberland, and the Mississippi, and the Ohio — 
 were crowded with steamers bringing clothes and 
 shoes to those who were wearing out their garments 
 in mighty marches ; and ammunition and food to re- 
 place what liad already been expended in the cam- 
 paigns for Cliattanooga. Over half the territory in 
 rebellion, tlirough these great mountain-ranges, and 
 by the side of these rushing streams, along the deso- 
 lated corn-fields, and amid the startled recesses of pri- 
 meval forests, the bustle and the stir of war were rife. 
 Two hundi'ed thousand soldiers were concentrating 
 from the East and the West, either in motion for this 
 one battle-field, or guarding its approaches, or bring- 
 ing up supplies, or waiting anxiously for those who 
 were, with tliem, to fight the battle of Chattanooga. 
 And over all these preparations, and all these armies, 
 the spii'it of one man was dominant. 
 
 On the 14th of November, Halleck telegraj^hed : 
 •' Advices received from East Tennessee indicate that 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 47 1 
 
 Burnside intends to abandon the defence of Little 
 Tennessee river, and fall back before Longstreet, tow- 
 ards Cumberland gap and tlie npper valley. Long- 
 street is said to be near the Little Tennessee, "vvith 
 from twenty to forty thousand men; Burnside has 
 about thirty thousand in all, and can hold his posi- 
 tion ; he ought not to retreat. I fear further delay 
 may result in Burnside's abandonment of East Ten- 
 nessee. This would be a terrible misfortune, and 
 must be averted if possible." To this Grant replied, 
 reassuringly: "Burnside certainly can detain Long- 
 street in the Tennessee valley, until we can make such 
 moves, here, as will entirely free him fi'om present 
 danglers. I have asked him if he could hold the 
 Knoxville and Clinton line for one week ; if so, we 
 can make moves here, that will save all danger in 
 East Tennessee. Sherman is now at Bridgeport. He 
 will commence moving to-morrow or next day.* .... 
 If Burnside can hold the line from Knoxville to Clin- 
 ton, as I have asked him, for six days, I believe 
 Braoffc will be started back for south side of Oosta- 
 naula, and Longstreet cut off" 
 
 On the 16th, Ilalleck telegraphed that Buraside 
 was hesitatincr whether to iidit or retreat. " I fear 
 he will not fight, although strongly urged to do so. 
 Unless you can give him immediate assistance, he 
 
 * " Sherman is now at Bridgeport. lie will commence moving to- 
 morrow or next day, throwing one brigade from Whiteside into Tren- 
 ton, thus threatening the enemj's left flank. The remainder of his 
 force will pass over by Kelly's ferry, evading view from Lookout, and 
 march up to the mouth of Chickamauga. Pontoons are made and 
 making, to throw across at that point, over which it is intended that 
 Sherman's force, and one division of Thomas's, shall pass. This force 
 will attack Missionary ridge, with the left flank of Thomas supporting, 
 from here. In the mean time, Hooker will attack Lookout, and carry 
 it if possible. If Burnside can hold the line," etc. 
 
472 MILITAEY inSTORY OF 
 
 will surrender his position to the enemy. I have of- 
 fered to give him more troops from Kentucky, but he 
 says he cannot supply them. Immediate aid from 
 you is of vital importance." The reply to this was 
 on the same day : " I am pushing every thing to give 
 Bui'nside early aid. I have impressed on him in the 
 strongest terms, the necessity of holding on to his 
 position. Sherman's troops are now at Bridgeport. 
 They will march to-morrow, and an effort will be 
 made to get a column between Bragg and Longstreet, 
 as soon as possible." 
 
 Halleck's distrust of Burnside was not deserved. 
 That officer's dispatches all indicate an intention to 
 defend himself On the 3d, he said : " The season is 
 so far advanced, that I fear there must be great suf- 
 fering in this command, unless we are fortunate 
 enough to occupy Cleveland, and the line of railroad 
 from here to Chattanooga." This did not look like 
 falling back. " We will endeavor to check them, if 
 
 they attempt to cross the Tennessee river It is 
 
 clear to me that it will be a hard task to hold East 
 Tennessee, with the enemy's forces as they are now 
 situated, unless he is constantly occuj^ied by forces 
 immediately in his front. There are reports of very 
 large bodies of troops concentrating against me, but 
 I believe them all exaggerated." Burnside, indeed, 
 was always sanguine ; his fault was rather to under- 
 rate difficulties, and to overestimate his own powers 
 or means of conquering them, than to be cowed by 
 what opposed him. He was more likely to risk too 
 much, than to withdraw. 
 
 On the 12th, he said: "AVe will endeavor to 
 hold in check any force that comes against us, until 
 Thomas is ready This country certainly ought 
 
rLYSSES S. GRANT. 473 
 
 to be lielcl, if possible, until Tlioma3 can force the 
 enemy back." Just at this time, the telegraph lines 
 were cut between Grant and Biirnside, so that com- 
 munication was interrupted for a day or two ; it was, 
 however, soon renewed. Burnside now held as far 
 east as Bull's gap, and, south of that, he picketed the 
 Tennessee river, from Washington to Kingston. His 
 main force was stationed between Kingston and 
 Knoxville, and all the country south of the Holston 
 was occupied. " The command," said Burnside, " is 
 in good health and spirits; very shoi-t of clothing, 
 and on quarter rations of every thing but meat and 
 bread. By running the mills in our possession, we 
 keep a few days' supply of flour on hand, and have 
 plenty of beef cattle. Unless our forces succeed in 
 getting the railroad from Bridgeport to this place, we 
 will probably suffer very much during the winter, 
 even if we are able to keep possession of the country. 
 We are threatened by a considerable force of the 
 enemy on each flank, but I have no serious apprehen- 
 sion of immediate trouble." 
 
 On the 13th, he informed Grant that Longstreet 
 was certainly on the Tennessee, opposite Loudon, 
 with Wheeler's cavalry, and intending to cross the 
 river. Burnside, accordingly, proposed to concentrate 
 his forces and fall back, so as to draw Longstreet as 
 far as possible from Bragg. " If we concentrate in 
 the neighborhood of Loudon," he said, " the enemy 
 will have the advantage of being able to reenforce 
 from the rear ; whereas, if we concentrate near this 
 place" (Knoxville), "not only the present force of 
 the enemy, but all reenforcements would have to 
 march forty miles" (from Loudon) "before fighting.* 
 
 * The rebels held the railroad as far as Loudon. 
 
474 MILITAIJI IIISTOEY OF 
 
 Sliould lie cross either ris^er, and move to attack us in 
 tliis neighborliood, lie will he so far from the main 
 body of Bragg's army, that he cannot be recalled in 
 time to assist it, in case Thomas iinds himself in con- 
 dition to make an attack, after Sherman gets up." 
 
 On the 14th, Grant telegraphed him : " Sherman's 
 advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force 
 will be ready to move from there, by Tuesday at fui^- 
 thest. If you can liold Longstreet in chec\ until lie 
 gets up^ or^ hy shirmisliing and falling haclc^ can avoid 
 serious loss to yourself^ and gain time^ I will he ahle 
 to force the enemy hach from liere^ and jylace a force 
 between Longstreet and Bragg tliat must inevitaMy 
 malce tlie former talce to the mountain-])asses hy every 
 availahle road^ to get to his siijp'plies?' Sherman 
 would have been here before this, but for high water 
 in Elk river, driving him some thirty miles up that 
 river, to cross." On the same day, he again telegraphed 
 to Burnside : " Can you hold the line from Knoxville 
 to Clinton, for seven days ? If so, I think the whole 
 Tennessee valley can be secured from present dan- 
 ger." And again, at ten o'clock that night : " It is of 
 the most vital importance that East Tennessee should 
 be held. Take immediate steps to that end. Evac- 
 uate Kingston, if you think best. As I said in a pre- 
 vious dispatch, I think seven days more will enable 
 us to make such movements as to make the whole 
 valley secure, if you hold on that time." On the 15th, 
 he said again : " I do not know how to impress on 
 you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee, in 
 strong; enou^rh terms. Hold on to Knoxville, and 
 that portion of the valley which you will necessarily 
 
 * Tlie -whole campaign which followed could hardly be better de- 
 scribed than it was thus mapped out in advance. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 
 
 47^ 
 
 possess, liolding to tliat point. Should Longstreet 
 move Lis wliole force across tlie Little Tennessee 
 river, an effort sliould be made to cut his pontoons 
 on tlie stream, emn if it sacrificed half tlie cavalry of 
 the Ohio army. By holding on, and placing Long- 
 street between tlie Little Tennessee and Knoxville, 
 lie sliould not be allowed to escape with an army ca- 
 pable of doing any thing this ^vinter. I can hardly 
 conceive the necessity of retreating from East Ten- 
 nessee. K I did so at all, it would be after losing 
 most of the army. I xoHl not attempt to lay out a line 
 of retreat. I would harass and embarrass progress 
 in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that tlie 
 Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist tlie 
 onivard progress of the eneimjr 
 
 On the 17th, he said : " I have not heard from you 
 since the 14:th. What progress is Longstreet mak- 
 ing, and what are your chances for defending your- 
 self ? Sherman's forces have commenced their move- 
 ment from Bridgeport, threatening the enemy. This 
 alone may turn Longstreet bach, and if it does not, 
 the attack Avill be prosecuted until we reach the 
 roads over which all their supplies have to pass, 
 while you hold East Tennessee." Later on the same 
 day: "Your dispatch received. You are doing ex- 
 actly what appears to me to be right. I want the 
 enemy's progress retarded at every point, all it can 
 be, only giving up each place when it becomes evi- 
 dent that it cannot longer be held, without endan- 
 gering your force to capture. I think our movements, 
 here, must cause Longstreet's recall ^vithin a day or 
 two, if he is not successful l)efore that time. Shennan 
 moved this morning from Bridgeport, with one diW- 
 sion. The remainder of his command moves in the 
 
476 MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 morning. There will he no lialt until a severe hattle 
 is foiigld., or tLe railroads cut supplying tlie enemy." 
 
 On the night of the 14th, Sherman took the first 
 boat from Bridgeport for Kelly's feny, and rode into 
 Chattanooga on the 15th, reporting to Grant. He 
 then learned the part assigned to him in the coming 
 drama; and, on the 16th, he rode out in company 
 with Grant, Thomas, and other officers, to the hills 
 on the north bank of the Tennessee, from which could 
 be seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chatta- 
 nooga, and the line of Missionary ridge, with its east- 
 ern terminus on Chickamauga creek, the point which 
 Sheiman was expected to take, and hold, and fortify. 
 A mighty amphitheatre, where the actors were nearly 
 ready to assume their parts, with distant mountains 
 for spectators, while cloud-capped hills, and valleys 
 shrouded in mist that was lifted to display the move- 
 ments of armies, formed the stage. 
 
 All in Chattanooga were impatient for action ; the 
 apprehension for Burnside's safety had become acute, 
 and the long expectation of Sherman's arrival was 
 at last almost painful. The Army of the Tennes- 
 see had marched from Memphis, and been pushed as 
 fast as the roads and the distance would permit ; it 
 was fatigued with its extraordinary exertions ; many 
 of the troops were shoeless ; but Sherman saw enough 
 of the condition of men and animals in Chattanooga, 
 to inspire him with renewed energy. He returned 
 at once to Bridgeport, to bring up his army, rowing a 
 boat himself from Kelly's ferry. 
 
 On the 18th, Grant telegraphed to Halleck : "Dis- 
 patches from General Burnside received at ten p. m. 
 yesterday. Troops had got back to Knoxville. Sher- 
 man's advance reached Lookout mountain to-day. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRA^^T. 477 
 
 Movements will progress, threatening enemy's left 
 flank, until forces can be got up, and thrown across 
 the river to attack their right flank and Missionary- 
 ridge. A battle or a falling back of the enemy is 
 inevitable, by Saturday, at the furthest. Burnside 
 speaks hopefully." 
 
 That day, the written orders were issued to Sher- 
 man and Thomas, for the battle of Chattanoojja. 
 
478 JnLITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 CHAPTEK XII. 
 
 Reconnoissances — Orders for battle of Chattanooga — Anxiety of government 
 for Bumside — DifBculties and delays of Slierman — Battle-field of Chatta- 
 nooga — Movement of Granger and Palmer — Capture of Orchard knoll — Ad- 
 vance of Thomas's line — Preparations for bridging the Tennessee — Arrival 
 of Sherman at North Chickamauga — Seizure of mouth of South Chicka- 
 mauga — Laying of pontoon bridge — Crossing of Sherman's army — Arrival 
 of Howard — Sherman moves on Missionary hills — Seizes first heights— In- 
 trenches — Position of rebels on Lookout mountain — Position of Hooker — 
 DiflBculty of ascent — Seizure of base — Ascent of mountain — Battle on moun- 
 tain — Capture of mountain — Thomas connects with Hooker — Grant's dis- 
 patches on night of 24th — Rebels evacuate Lookout point — Position of 
 troops on 25th — Sherman's battle-ground — Sherman's assaults — Bragg rc- 
 enforces against Sherman — Weakening of rebel centre — Assault on rebel 
 centre — Thomas's troops scale Missionary ridge — Rebel centre pierced— 
 Missionary ridge carried — Rout of rebels — Large capture of men and gims — 
 Hooker turns rebel left — Further captures — Rebel flight to Chickamauga — 
 Sheridan's pursuit to Mission mills — Rebels withdraw from front of Sherman 
 — Grant pushes out on 2Gth — Demoralization of rebels — Pursuit to Ringgold 
 — Battle-field of Ringgold — Rebel resistance — Final retreat of rebels — Pur- 
 suit discontinued — Destruction of railroads and stores — Return of Thomas's 
 command to Chattanooga — Sherman ordered to the Hiawassee — Summary of 
 losses and gains — Character of battle of Chattanooga — Results, 
 
 Grant had fully reconnoitred the country opposite 
 Chattanooga, and north of the Tennessee, as far east 
 as the mouth of the South Chickamauga ; he had thus 
 discovered that good roads existed from Brown's ferry 
 up the river, and back of the first range of hills oppo- 
 site Chattanooga, out of view of the rebel positions. 
 Troops, crossing the bridge at Brown's ferry, could 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT, 4Y9 
 
 be seen, and tlieir numbers estimated, by the enemy ; 
 but, as soon as they passed in rear of the hills, Brairg 
 must be at a loss to know whether they were moving 
 to Knoxville, or were held on the north side of the 
 river, for further operations at Chattanooga, It was 
 also known that the north end of Missionary ridge 
 was imperfectly guarded; and, tliat the left bank of 
 the Tennessee, from the mouth of South Chickamauira 
 creek westward, to the main rebel line in front of 
 Chattanooga, was watched by a small cavaliy picket 
 only. These facts determined Grant's plan of opera- 
 tions. As his main object was to mass all the forces 
 possible against Missionary ridge, converging towards 
 its northern end, which covered Chickamauga station, 
 Bragg's depot of supplies. Grant finally deemed it 
 best to countermand Hooker s attack on Lookout 
 mountain, and bring most of the troops intended for 
 that operation, to the other end of the line. 
 
 The instructions to Thomas were in these words : 
 "All preparations should be made for attacking the 
 enemy's j)Osition on Missionary ridge, by Saturday 
 morning, at daylight The general plan is for Sher- 
 man, with the force brought with him, strengthened 
 by a division from your command, to effect a cross- 
 ing of the Tennessee river, just below the mouth of 
 the Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by 
 artillery from the heights of the north bank of the 
 river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and 
 to secure the heights" (Missionary ridge) "from the 
 northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, be-* 
 fore the enemy can concentrate against him. You 
 will cooperate with Sherman. The troops in Chatta- 
 nooga valley should all be concentrated on your left 
 flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend for- 
 
480 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 tifications on the riglit and centre, and a movable 
 column of one division, in readiness to move wherever 
 ordered. This division should show itself as threat- 
 eningly as possible, on the most practicable line for 
 making an attack up the valley. Your effort, then, 
 will be to form a junction with Sherman, making 
 your advance well towards the northern end of Mis- 
 sionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously 
 with him as 2:)ossible. The junction once formed, 
 and the ridge carried, connection will be at once es- 
 tablished between the two armies, by roads on the 
 south bank of the river. Further movements will 
 then depend on those of the enemy. 
 
 " Lookout valley, I think, will be easily held by 
 Geary's division, and what troops you may still have 
 there, of the old Army of the Cumberland. How- 
 ard's corps can then be held in readiness to act, either 
 with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It 
 should be marched, on Friday night, to a position on 
 the north side of the river, not lower down than the 
 jSrst pontoon bridge " (at Chattanooga) ; " and then 
 held in readiness for such orders as may become 
 necessary. All these troops will be provided with 
 two days' cooked rations, in haversacks, and one hun- 
 dred rounds of ammunition, on the person of each in- 
 fantry soldier. . . ." 
 
 A copy of these instructions was forwarded to 
 Sherman, for his guidance, and he was also infonned : 
 " It is particularly desirable that a force should be 
 got through to the railroad, between Cleveland and 
 Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communica- 
 tion with the south; but, being confronted by a 
 large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell 
 how this is to be effected, until the result of our first 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 481 
 
 effort is known." Givant always refused to hamper 
 eitlier himself or his subordinates with complicate*! 
 plans of battle, in advance. lie knew too well the 
 constant and unexjoected chances of war, and had 
 too often availed himself of these, to do more than 
 direct the positions and opening movements of his 
 troops. He got his machinery in order, and touched 
 the springs ; but, after that, he expected to guide its 
 action by the light and aid of events, as they oc- 
 curred. 
 
 As soon as Sherman reached Bridgeport, he set 
 about moving his army to the front. As Bragg 
 seemed to be looking for an attack on his left flank, 
 Grant attempted to confirm this notion, and ordered 
 Sherman to march his leading division direct from 
 ^ATiiteside to Trenton. From there, its position was 
 advanced each day, the old camp-fires being kept up 
 at nio-ht, and new ones built wlien the command 
 rested, so as to give the appearance of concentratmg 
 a large force in that direction. A portion of the 
 division even ascended the western slope of Lookout 
 mountain. The remainder of Sherman's force was 
 ordered to pass over a new road just made, from 
 Whiteside to Kelly's ferry ; this was concealed from 
 the rebels, and it was hoped they Avould suppose 
 that Sherman's w^hole force was moving up Lookout 
 valley. 
 
 On the 21st, Halleck telegraphed that dispatches 
 from Tennessee, east of Knoxville, contained rumors 
 that Burnsidewas surrounded. "At any rate, we 
 have no communication with him. The President 
 seems very anxious that some immediate move shouhi 
 be made for his relief. You, however, as fully un- 
 derstand the exigencies of the case as any one here 
 
 31 
 
482 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 
 
 possibly can. Longstreet's force may be larger tlian 
 was supposed." Communication witli Burn side was, 
 indeed, quite cut off ; Grant knew, from other sources 
 than Halleck, that fio-htino; had besrun in East Ten- 
 nessee, and that Burnside had been driven into 
 Knoxville, and attacked there ; but this was all he 
 could learn. 
 
 Troops had been moving night and day, ever 
 since Sherman's arrival at Bridgeport, but the bridge 
 of boats at Brown's ferry was frail, and, although it 
 was used without the intermission of an hour, Sher- 
 man's passage was slow. The roads from the ferry 
 to Chattanooga were greatly cut up, as well as en- 
 cumbered with the wagons of other troops, stationed 
 along the road ; but on the afternoon of the 20th, 
 Sherman reached Hooker's headquarters, and there 
 met Grant's orders for a general attack on the follow- 
 ing day. It was simply impossible for him to obey. 
 Only one division, John E. Smith's, was in position. 
 Ewing was still in Trenton, and the other two were 
 toilino; alons: the miserable roads from Shell-mound 
 to Chattanooga. No troops were ever in better con- 
 dition or labored harder to fulfil their part. But 
 Sherman was obliged to notify Grant of the impossi- 
 bility of performing it, and the attack was again j)Ost- 
 poned. 
 
 To Ilalleek, Grant said: "I ordered an attack 
 here, two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move 
 artillery ; " and, now, Thomas had to borrow teams 
 from Sherman, in order to move a portion of his ar- 
 tillery to the places where it was to be used. Sher- 
 man had used almost superhuman efforts to get up, 
 and still was delayed ; and Thomas could take only 
 about one gun with each battery. " I have never 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 483 
 
 felt," said Grant, " such restlessness "before, as I have 
 at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of 
 the Cumberland. The quartern! aster-ireneral states 
 that the loss of animals here will exceed ten thousand. 
 Those left are scarcely able to carry themselves." 
 
 It looked, indeed, as if Burnside was to be lost. 
 These unavoidable delays and difficulties still chained 
 Grant to his position, v^hile the Army of the Ohio 
 had begun the battle for its existence. The supplies 
 that had at last reached Kashville, for Burnside, 
 were stopped, as they might never be needed : 
 " General Burnside is now engaged with the enemy. 
 You need not start the clothing for him, until the re- 
 sult is known." . . . . " The rations for General Bum- 
 side could not be sent, now, even if there was water 
 enough in the Cumberland, until the result of present 
 movements by Longstreet is known. I think it bet- 
 ter, therefore, to let the boats now loaded, discharge 
 and return." 
 
 On the 20th, Grant wi'ote to Shemian : " To-mor- 
 row morning, I had first set for your attack. I see 
 now it cannot possibly be made then ; but can you 
 not get up for the following morning ? Order Ew- 
 ino" down " (from Trenton), " immediately, fixing the 
 time for his starting so that the roads and bridges 
 may be full all the time. Every eftbrt must be made 
 to get up in time to attack, on Sunday morning." 
 
 A heavy rain-storm occurring on the 20th, and 
 lasting all of the 21st, still further delayed Slierman. 
 On the 21st, he got his second division over Brown^s 
 feiTy bridge, and Ewing was up from Trenton ; but, 
 the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred 
 which no human sagacity could have prevented or 
 foreseen. All labored, night and day ; and, on Sun- 
 
484 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 day, wliile Sherman was bringing up Lis troops, be- 
 hind the hills on the north side of the Tennessee, 
 Thomas, in order to conceal the real nature of this 
 movement, brought Howard's corps, which had come 
 up from Lookout valley in advance of Sherman, 
 across into Chattanooga. This was done that the 
 rebels might suppose the troops at Brown's ferry 
 were reenforcing Chattanooga. Howard, accord- 
 ingly, crossed on Sunday, and took up a position in 
 full view of the enemy, who, from his commanding 
 position on Missionary ridge, looked down on all of 
 the movements in the valley. Those, however, which 
 affected him most closely, Avere made behind the 
 hills. The operations of this day, at Chattanooga, 
 were like those scenes in a play, which fill up the 
 time and distract the attention of the audience, while 
 preparations for the real climax are going on in the 
 rear. 
 
 At this crisis, Brigadier-General Wilcox, who 
 was in the eastern part of the Tennessee valley, dis- 
 patched to Grant that he too was in trouble, threat- 
 ened by movements from Virginia, and unable to get 
 orders or aid from Burnside, his immediate command- 
 er. Grant replied, on the 20th: "If you can com- 
 municate with General Burnside, say to him that our 
 attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If 
 successful, such a move will be made as, I think, will 
 
 relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out If you 
 
 receive no further instructions from General Burn- 
 side, follow those he has given you. Eetreat should 
 
 not be allowed Can you not concentrate your 
 
 forces and raise the siesre at Knoxville ? " 
 
 Once more, on the 21st, Grant was obliged to say 
 to Thomas : " I have just received a report of the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 485 
 
 position of Slierman's forces. The rain, last night, 
 has thrown them back so much, that it will be im- 
 possible to get into position for action to-raorro\v^ 
 morning. He W'ill be up, however, against all 
 calamities that can be foreseen, to commence on Mon- 
 day morning." But the very elements conspired to 
 protract Grant's anxiety. The heavy rains caused a 
 rise in the Tennessee, and the bridges at Chattanooga 
 and Brown's ferry were swept away; and, on the 2 2d, 
 yet once more. Grant said to the commander of the 
 Army of the Cumberland : '' The bridges at Brown's 
 ferry being dowm to-day, and the excessively bad 
 roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for 
 Sherman to get up either of his remaining two divi- 
 sions, in time for the attack to-morrow morning. 
 You can make vour arrangements for this de- 
 
 lay." 
 
 In his dispatch to Sherman, on this day. Grant 
 said :".... Let me know, to-morrow, at as early an 
 hour as you can, if you will be entirely ready for 
 Tuesday morning." At this juncture, he violated 
 militaiy etiquette, and sent a dispatch direct to 
 Wood, who commanded a division in Sherman's 
 army : " You must get up with your force to-morrow^, 
 without fail. Pass the wagon-train, and leave it to 
 follow Avith rear-guard. If you cannot get up \\ith 
 your artillery, come without it, leaving it to follow. 
 I will expect the head of your column at Brown's 
 ferry, by ten a. m. to-moiTOw, without tail." 
 
 But there proved to be compensations for all this 
 anxiety and all these postponements. On the night 
 of the 22d, a deserter came in from tlie rebel army, 
 and reported that Bragg was falling back from Mis- 
 sionary ridge. Grant had received a letter from 
 
48 G MILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Bragg, on the 20tli, wliicli seemed to coiToborate 
 this : " As tliere may still be some non-combatants 
 in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that 
 prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." 
 The artifice was too palpable : no general would so 
 ostentatiously notify an antagonist of his intention 
 to attack. But the news brought by the deserter 
 precipitated the battle that had been trembling on 
 the verge so long. Grant was unwilling to allow 
 Bragg to withdraw in good order ; and, early on the 
 morning of the 23d, he instructed Thomas to " ascer- 
 tain at once the truth or falsity of this report. If 
 Bragg is really falling back, Sherman can commence 
 at once laying his pontoon trains " (at the mouth of 
 the South Chickamauga), " and we can save a day." 
 Thomas, accordingly, directed a demonstration, in or- 
 der to drive in the rebel pickets, and develop the 
 enemy's real line. 
 
 Four streams empty into the Tennessee, near 
 Chattanooga, bounding and dividing what was des- 
 tined to be the battle-field. Lookout creek was 
 near the extreme right of Grant's line, and west of 
 Lookout mountain ; about half a mile east of the 
 mountain, runs Chattanooga creek ; then, Citico 
 creek, some two miles further east ; and, away at the 
 northern end of Missionary ridge, the South Chicka- 
 mauga. Still north and east of this, but on the north 
 side of the Tennessee, the North Chickamauira min- 
 gles its waters with those of tlie great stream which 
 receives all the affluents of this region. Missionarv 
 ridge runs nearly north and south, and these vari- 
 ous currents, breaking tli rough its gorges or those of 
 Lookout mountain, flow north and west. The course 
 of the North Chickamauga, however, is directly oppo 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 487 
 
 site to that of the rivers on the south side of the Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 Thomas's line, in front of Chattanooga, readied 
 from the Chattanooga creek to the Citico, and was 
 about a mile out from the town. It had been ren- 
 dered formidable, during the two months which had 
 elapsed since the defeat of Rosecrans ; advantage had 
 been taken of various hills in Chattanooga valley ; 
 and, at the hig^hest and most advanced point on the 
 line, a stronir redoubt had been erected, called Fort 
 Wopd. Twenty-two heavy guns were in position 
 along this line. The rebel pickets in front of Fort 
 Wood came into close contact with the national out- 
 guards, and nearly a mile beyond them, was the first 
 rebel line.* 
 
 In obedience to Grant's instructions, Thomas 
 ordered Major-General Gordon Granger, command- 
 ing the Fourth corps, to form his troops, and advance 
 directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the 
 strength of the enemy. Major-General Palmer, com- 
 manding the Fourteenth corps, was directed to sup- 
 port Granger's right with Baird's division, refused 
 and in echelon ; and Johnson's division, of the same 
 corps, was held under arms, in the intrenchments, in 
 readiness to reenforce at any point. Howard's corps 
 was formed in mass, behind the centre of Granger. 
 
 * Grant often rode out on the picket line, and once was on the 
 eastern bank of Chattanooga creek, when a party of rebel soldiers 
 were drawing water on the other side. They wore blue coats ; and, 
 thinking they were his own men, Grant asked them to whose command 
 they belonged. They answered, " Longstreet's corps;" whereupon 
 Grant called out : " What are you doing in those coats, then ? " The 
 rebels replied: "Oh! all our corps wear blue." This was a fact, 
 which Grant had forgotten. The rebels then scrambled up on their 
 own side of the stream, little thinking that they had been talking 
 with the commander of the national army. 
 
488 JULITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 The two divisions of Granger's command, Sheridan * 
 and Wood's, were accordingly formed in front of 
 Fort Wood, Sheridan on the right, AVood on the left, 
 with his left extending nearly to Citico creek. The 
 formation was complete by two p. m. 
 
 At an early hour, the heavy guns in Fort Wood 
 and the smaller works, began to wake the echoes of 
 the valley; the national cannon on Moccasin point 
 also opened on the enemy, who replied from the top 
 of Lookout mountain, and from his formidable line 
 along the crest of Missionary ridge. The idlest 
 looker-on in Chattanooga could perceive that the 
 long-expected drama was about to open, and the day 
 be made historical. 
 
 At a given signal. Granger moved forward into the 
 plain, in front and on the right of Foil; Wood. The 
 fog that had lain in the valley all day was lifted, 
 and the rays of the sun glanced back from twenty 
 thousand bayonets. The superb pageant went on, 
 under the eyes of curious crowds on Missionary 
 ridge ; but the trooj^s moved with such j^recision, 
 that the enemy mistook their evolutions for a parade. 
 The rebel pickets leaned on their muskets, and quietly 
 watched the advance of Thomas's battalions. This 
 unmeant deception was heiglitened by the troops 
 remaining nearly half an hour in jDOsition, and in full 
 view of the rebel army, before they received the 
 final order to advance. x\t last, a dozen shots of the 
 national skiimishers scattered the rebel pickets, who 
 fled in haste through a strip of timber, lying between 
 the open ground and some secondary eminences, oi' 
 which the first line of rebel rifle-pits was built. 
 
 * Major-General P. H. Sheridan, who in this battle, for the first time, 
 fought a division iminediatelv under the eve of Grant. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 4S0 
 
 Wood followed rapidly, directly towards the front, 
 driving, not only tlie rebel pickets, but their reserves. 
 A heavy fire of musketry was poured upon the ad- 
 vancing troops as they entered the strip of woods ; 
 but they fell rapidly upon the grand guards stationed 
 on the first line of Bragg's rifle-pits, captiu'ed about 
 two hundred men, and secured themselves in their 
 new positions, before the enemy had sufficiently re- 
 covered from his surprise to attempt to send reen- 
 forcements from his main camj? on the ridge. Sheri- 
 dan now moved up rapidly on Wood's right, and in 
 fifteen minutes, the rebels had abandoned their whole 
 advanced line : nothing remained to them west of 
 the ridge, but the rifle-pits at its foot. This secured 
 to Grant a mound of some importance, known as 
 Orchard knoll, and a low range of hills running 
 south, about half way between Chattanooga and 
 Missionary ridge. These points were fortified dur- 
 ing the night ; breast-works were erected, and 
 artillery was put in position ; strong pickets were 
 thrown out to the front, and Howard's corps was 
 moved up, in line with Granger's left, and his position 
 also fortified. Twenty thousand men of the national 
 army were thus in line of battle, a full mile in ad- 
 vance of the outposts which, at noon of that day, 
 had been occupied by the enemy. One hundred and 
 eleven men had been killed or wounded ; perhaps as 
 many of the enemy fell,* and over two hundred pris- 
 oners were left in Thomas's hands. 
 
 But the eftect of this day's fighting cannot be 
 measured by the casualties. The enemy had been 
 driven from his front line of intrenchments ; his 
 
 * I have beea unable to find any rebel report of the losses on this 
 day. 
 
490 jnLITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 prestige was sliaken ; Ms demoralization was begun ; 
 while, on tlie other hand, a wonderful confidence was 
 diffused throughout the Army of the Cumberland, 
 which had met once more and driven back its 
 earliest antagonist ; the spot on ij:s escutcheon was 
 already cleared ; and the men lay down upon their 
 arms, anxious for the renewal of the combat, when 
 their old and splendid reputation should be fully 
 redeemed. Until nightfall, the cannon on Missionary 
 ridge vied with the artillery of Fort Wood ; but at 
 last the uproar ceased, and the great hosts slept 
 calmly among the hills. 
 
 The report of the deserter was evidently not in- 
 tended to deceive: but he had mistaken Brag^o-'s 
 movements. Buckner's division had gone to join 
 Longstreet on the 2 2d, and another had started, but 
 was brought back in consequence of this attack."^ 
 
 Meanwhile, Sherman was still laboring up amid 
 almost impassable difficulties. His rear division, 
 Osterhaus's, was entirely cut off by the broken 
 bridge; but Grant ordered him to go into battle 
 ^vith the other three, suj^ported by Jefferson C. 
 Davis's division, of the Fourteenth corps, which was 
 sent to Sherman, from TJiomas's army. Osterhaus, 
 being detained on the south side of the Tennessee, 
 was ordered, unless he could get across by eight 
 o'clock on the morning of the 2-ii\\, to report to 
 Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack 
 Lookout mountain, as contemplated in the original 
 plan. All these various orders emanated from Grant. 
 Sometimes, merely verbal instructions were given by 
 him to Thomas or Sherman ; but no movement of a 
 
 * See General B. R. Johnson's (rebel) report of operations of Buck- 
 ner's division. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 491 
 
 division was made, during the campaign, wliicli was 
 not expressly dii'ected by tlie commander of tlie 
 triple army. He was on every part of the field, at 
 the immediate front; and from Fort AVood, the 
 highest point in the national fortifications, had 
 watched the assault of Granger's corps. lie was so 
 frequently exposed to fire, that great anxiety was felt 
 for his safety. 
 
 At last, on the night of the 23d, Sherman's third 
 division arrived opposite the moutli of the South 
 Chickamauga, about four miles above Chattanooga. 
 Davis's division was waiting for him on the north 
 bank of the Tennessee, where the crossing was to be 
 effected. Pontoons were necessary for bridging the 
 river here; and, as it was intended to occupy the 
 north bank of the Soutli Chickamauga, that stream 
 also must be bridged, as well as the Tennessee. The 
 South Chickamauga is a hundred and eighty feet 
 wide, with a sluggisli current ; and the Tennessee, at 
 the point designated for crossing, is fourteen hundi-ed 
 feet across. At this time, there was, in tlie whole 
 Department of the Cumberland, only one bridge- 
 train, and that was scattered from Bridgeport to 
 Chattanooga. Saw-mills, however, were kept run- 
 ning night and day; and boats were collected or 
 made, and brought up through the woods, not ex- 
 posed to the view of the enemy at any point on the 
 route. 
 
 By Friday night, November 20th, a liuii<lrcd and 
 sixteen pontoons were hidden in jf^orth Cliickamauga 
 creek, whicli empties into the Tennessee, five miles 
 above the mouth of the South Chickamauga. This 
 stream oftered suck facilities for launching the boats, 
 that it was determined to put the pontoons in the 
 
492 MILITAKY HISTOKY OF 
 
 water there, and float them down, loaded witli sol 
 diers, to the point of crossing — a quicker and quieter 
 operation than that of launching tliem. at the place 
 of passage. The creek was cleared of snags, and all 
 tlie citizens of tlie vicinity were put under strict 
 guard, to prevent the transmission of information to 
 the enemy. The remainder of the bridge material 
 was packed behind the river ridge of liills, and 
 witkin four hundred yards from the place of crossing, 
 entirely concealed from the rebels.* Seven hundred 
 and fifty oarsmen were selected from the two armies ; 
 and these, witli Giles A. Smitk's brigade, were placed 
 at tke head of Sherman's column, and marcked, 
 under cover of the hills, to the mouth of tke Nortk 
 Ckickamauga. 
 
 Before midnigkt of tke 28d of ]^ov ember, tke 
 pontoons were loaded witk tkii-ty armed men eack ; 
 and at two o'clock on tke morning of tke 24tk, tke 
 wkole fleet, carrying Giles Smitk's brigade, pusked 
 carefully out of tke ISTortk Ckickamauga, and tken 
 drojiped silently down tke Tennessee. So perfect 
 were tke arrangements, tkat even tke national pickets 
 along tke bank of tke river did not know wken tke 
 boats kad passed. Floating quietly by tke rebel 
 sentinels, before dayligkt they reached their destina- 
 tion, a point just above tke moutk of tke Soutk 
 Chickamauga. A small force tken jumped ashore, 
 and advancing rapidly, captured the enemy's out- 
 guard, twenty in number, before the rebels were 
 aware of the presence of a foe. Smitk tken pusked 
 
 * All tlxe engineer operations during tliis entire campaign were 
 under the direction and personal supervision of Brigadier-General W. 
 F. Smith, whom Grant had promoted to be chief engineer of the Mili- 
 tary Division of the Mississippi. 
 
U-LYSSES S. GRAIfT. 493 
 
 rapidly below the mouth of the Chickanitaiiga, dis- 
 embarked the rest of his brigade, and dispatched the 
 pontoons back for other loads. The remainder of 
 Morgan L. Smith's division was quickly ferried 
 across, that of John E. Smith following. The men 
 at once set to work intrenching themselves, with the 
 industry of beavers ; and, by daylight, two divisions, 
 of about eight thousand men, were landed on the 
 south bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a 
 good tete de pont. 
 
 As soon as day dawned, the building of the 
 brid(>-e bef^-an. The rise in the river had increased 
 its width, and there were not boats enough for more 
 than one brids-e across the Tennessee. Pontoons 
 had to be taken from the ferry, as fast as they were 
 needed for the bridge ; but a steamer was also sent 
 up from Chattanooga, which assisted in carrying 
 troops across. All these operations took place under 
 cover of an artillery force from Thomas's army, 
 posted on the northern shore, and the horses for 
 which had been furnished by Sherman.* Sherman's 
 batteries were first brought up to the point of cross- 
 ing, and the horses then detached and sent back to 
 bring up Thomas's artillery; after which, the same 
 horses were again harnessed to their own guns, and 
 made ready to join the advance of Sherman. 
 
 Fourscore boats were plying back and foiih 
 across the swollen stream, each one carrying from the 
 northern to the southern shore, from thirty-five to 
 forty soldiers. The pontoon bridge already stretched 
 half way across the river, and the engineers were 
 beo-innino- work on the southern end. Forty pieces 
 
 o o 
 
 * Brisaclier-General J. M. Brannan, Thomas's chief of artillery, had 
 charge of all the artillery operations of importance in this battle. 
 
494 3IIL1TARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 of artillery * ranged along the northern bank, some 
 on the hills, and others at the edo^e of the stream, 
 guarded the crossing; and ten thousand soldiers 
 were massed on either shore, waiting to march, or to 
 cross. A column was still coming up over the west- 
 em hills, and the troops from the North Chicka- 
 mauga, having protected the pontoon fleet while it 
 lay hidden in that distant stream, were also advan- 
 cing to the rendezvous. Sherman stood at the centre 
 of the bridge, directing its completion. Just at this 
 moment, Howard appeared in person ; having come 
 up with three regiments from Chattanooga, along the 
 southern bank of the Tennessee. The last boat of 
 the bridge was being placed in the centre of the 
 stream, as Howard amved and introduced himself, 
 across the slight gulf which yet intervened. Sher- 
 man was on the northern end, gesticulating and 
 talking eagerly, as was his wont ; and, as soon as the 
 boat was put in its place, he sprang across and shook 
 the hand of Howard. The junction between the 
 Ai'mies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland was 
 formed. 
 
 At twenty minutes past twelve, the bridge was 
 complete; that across the Chickamauga had been 
 finished a little while before, giving communication 
 with the regiments left on the northern shore. Soon 
 after mid-day, Sherman's thii'd division was on the 
 south side of the Tennessee, with men, horses, and 
 artillery; and the whole command was ready to 
 attack the Missionary hills. By three o'clock, a bri- 
 gade of cavalry (Long's) had crossed both bridges, 
 and was on its march to cut the rebel communication 
 with Chickamausra station. 
 
 * Ten batteries. — See Brannan's report. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 495 
 
 At one p. M., Slierman marclied from the river in 
 three columns, in echelon ; the left under Morgan L. 
 Smith, was the column of direction, and followed 
 substantially the course of Chickamauga creek; the 
 centre, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the 
 centre, at full brigade intervals, moved to the right 
 and rear ; and the right, under Ewing, was in column 
 at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared 
 to deploy to the right, on the supposition that an 
 enemy would be met in that direction. Each head 
 of column was covered by a good line of skirmishers, 
 with supports. A light di'izzling rain prevailed, and 
 the clouds hung low, covering Sherman's movements 
 from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout 
 Mountain; for, fi*om Hooker's position at Wauhat- 
 chie to the mouth of the ^N'orth Chickamauga, a dis- 
 tance of thirteen miles, was now one battle-field. 
 
 Sherman soon gained the foot hills ; his skirmish- 
 ers pushed on up the foce of the hill, followed by 
 their supports; and by half-past three p. m., the 
 desired point was reached, without loss. A brigade 
 of each division was pushed up rapidly, to the top 
 of the hill ; and the enemy, for the first time, seemed 
 aware of the movement. He oj^ened with artillery, 
 but too late, for Sherman was already in possession. 
 Several guns were soon dragged up the steep accliv- 
 ity, and answered the rebel defiance. The enemy's 
 skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes, and, 
 about four, a sharp engagement ensued with musketry 
 and artillery ; but, at last, the rebels drew off, leaving 
 Sherman to fortify what he had gained. He had 
 possession of two high points, with a deep depression 
 immediately in his front, between him and the hill 
 over the tunnel, which w^as his chief objective point. 
 
496 MILITAEY HISTOKY OF 
 
 Until now, lie had supposed that Missionaiy ridge 
 was a continuous hill, but this aperture intervening 
 was sure to cost him dear to cross. A brigade of 
 each division was left on the hill ali'eady gained, one 
 closed the gap to Chickamauga creek, two were 
 drawn back to the base of the hill, in reserve; and a 
 division on the right was extended down into the 
 plain. Sherman's line thus crossed the ridge in a 
 general direction, facing southeast. 
 
 The Army of the Cumberland, having done, on 
 the 23d, what Grant had intended should be done on 
 the 24th, was now in advance of the movements of 
 Sherman. Thomas, therefore, simply bettered and 
 strengthened his position during Tuesday, and 
 pushed the Eleventh corps forward, across Citico 
 creek, and along the south bank of the Tennessee. 
 Howard had some fisfhtino;, but none of a serious 
 character; and, before night, he connected Sherman's 
 new position with the main army at Chattanooga ; a 
 brigade was left for this purpose with. Sherman, and 
 Howard himself returned to his own corps, further 
 to the right. The next day he reported to Sherman, 
 and remained under his orders durins; the J'est of the 
 campaign. 
 
 As night closed in, Sherman ordered Da\ns to 
 keep one of his brigades at the bridge ; another close 
 up to Sherman's main position ; and still another 
 intermediate. Thus they passed the night, heavy 
 details being kept at work in the intrenchments on 
 the hill. The thick mist that had overspread Look 
 out, and rolled in immense masses up the river, had 
 gi'adually filled the entire basin of Cliattanooga ; 
 80 that Shennan, while slowly extending his lines to 
 the right, till at last they came into communication 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 407 
 
 witli tl\e left wing of Howard's corps, liad 1)een 
 veiled entirely from tlie watcliful eyes of friend and 
 foe. But, during the niglit, tlie clouds cleared away, 
 and a cold frost filled the air; the sky was bright, 
 and his camp-fires now revealed both to the enemy 
 and to the army in Chattanooga, that Sherman was 
 in position on Missionary ridge. 
 
 But, while these important operations had been 
 going on all day on the left, others full as interesting 
 were transpiring on Lookout mountain. Since the 
 battle of AVauhatchie, Hooker had remained in 
 Lookout valley, with the Eleventh and a part of the 
 Twelfth corps, opposite the left of the rebel line. 
 The Eleventh corps, however, as has been seen, had 
 been ordered to the national left, on the 2 2d; and 
 Osterhaus's division was to have followed. But, when 
 it was finally found impossible to rebuild the bridge 
 at Brown's ferry, in time for Osterhaus to cross, 
 Hooker was instructed to attack the point of Look- 
 out mountain, as had been originally intended. His 
 command, now, consisted of Osterhaus's division of 
 the Fourteenth corps, Cruft's of the Fourth, and 
 Geary's of the Twelfth; making an aggregate of 
 about ten thousand men. No one of these divisions 
 had ever fought near the others. Geary was from 
 the Army of the Potomac, Cruft from the Army of 
 the Cumberland, and Osterhaus from the Arm}' of 
 the Tennessee. 
 
 At this time, the enemy's pickets formed a con- 
 tinuous line alons: the rio-ht bank of Lookout creek, 
 with his reserves in the valleys, while the main rebel 
 force was encamped in the hollow, half way up tlie 
 slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held 
 by three brigades of Stevenson's division ; and these 
 
 32 
 
498 MnJTAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 were comparatively safe, as the only means of access 
 from the west, was by trails allowing tlie passage 
 of but a single man at a time, and these trails were 
 held, at the top, by rebel pickets. On the Chatta- 
 nooga side of the mountain, which is less precipitous, 
 a good mountain-road exists, communicating with 
 the summit by zigzag lines. Hooker believed, if he 
 could gain this road, the rebels must evacuate their 
 position, as it was their only line of communication 
 with Bragg. 
 
 The ascent of the mountain is steep and thickly 
 wooded; beetling crags peer out all over its sides 
 from the masses of heavy foliage, and, at the summit, 
 a lofty palisaded crest rises perpendicularly, as many 
 as sixty or eighty feet. On the northern slope, about 
 midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a 
 plateau of open and arable land belts the mountain. 
 There, a continuous line of earthworks had been 
 thrown up ; wliile redoubts, redans, and rifle-pits 
 were scattered lower down the acclivity, to repel 
 assaults from the direction of the river. On each 
 flank were epaulements, walls of stone, and abatis ; 
 and, in the valley itself, at the foot of the mountain, 
 long lines of earthworks, of still greater extent. 
 The entire force, for the defence of the mountain, 
 consisted of six brigades, or about seven thousand 
 men. 
 
 Hooker's camps were all on the western side of 
 Lookout creek, at the base of Raccoon mountain. 
 Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade 
 of Cruft's division, was ordered to proceed up the 
 valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie, and then 
 march down, sweeping the rebels from the right 
 bank of the stream. The other brigade (Grose's) 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 409 
 
 from the Fourtli corps, was to seize and repair the 
 bridge across Lookout creek, just below tlie rail- 
 road ; while Osterhaus was to march up, from Bro\\ii's 
 feiTy to the place of crossing, and then support the 
 movement of Geary, or furnish support for the bat- 
 teries. 
 
 Grose advanced promptly to the bridge, di'ove 
 the enemy away, after some slight skirmishing, and 
 set about repairs. The rebels were attracted by these 
 operations, and did not observe the movements of 
 Geary, which were also concealed by a heavy mist 
 that overhung the mountain. Geary, therefore, 
 crossed the creek at eight o'clock, captured the entire 
 picket of forty-two men stationed to defend it, and 
 commenced to climb directly up the mountainside. 
 At this very moment, the rebels could be seen from 
 the valley, filing down from their camps on the 
 northern side of the mountain, and moving into their 
 rifle-pits, to resist the movements of Grose. Oster- 
 haus now came up, and skirmished briskly for a 
 while. By eleven o'clock, the bridge was completed ; 
 Osterhaus's artillery was in excellent position, and 
 the rebel force at the foot of the hill either fled, or 
 was killed or captured. 
 
 Simultaneously with these operations, the troops 
 of Geary were pushing up the mountain ; his right 
 passed directly under the muzzles of the enemy's 
 guns on the smnmit, climbing over ledges and bould- 
 ers, up hill and down, dislodging the enemy wher- 
 ever he attempted to make a stand. Finding them- 
 selves vigorously pushed by a strong column on 
 their left and rear, the rebels began to fall back ; but 
 their resistance was obstinate. Wood and Grose, by 
 this time, had crossed Lookout river, and joined the 
 
500 JULITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 left of Geary, as he foced down tlie valley ; and the 
 "wliole line pressed on, over obstacles of the most ex- 
 traordinary character. It was twelve o'clock, when 
 Geary's advance rounded the peak of the mountain, 
 and emerged on the plateau of open land where the 
 I'ebel fortifications were strongest. 
 
 The whole column now coming up. Hooker's line 
 was extended from the base of the palisade rock on 
 his right, to the foot of Lookout, near the mouth of 
 Chattanooga creek. The countiy, here, was so rugged 
 that the fighting was in reality only skirmishing, but 
 continuous fire was kept up for hours. After two or 
 three sharp conflicts, the plateau was cleared, and 
 tlie enemy driven from his walls and pits, near the 
 only house on the mountain-side. At two o'clock, 
 operations were arrested by the darkness. The 
 clouds, which had hovered over and enveloped the 
 summit, and favored the movements of Hooker, had 
 been gradually settling, lower and lower, and from 
 the moment that the peak of the mountain was 
 rounded, it was only from the rattle of musketry, and 
 the flashes of fire through the clouds, or the occa- 
 sional glimpses of lines and standards, as the fog rose 
 or fell, that those in the valley could trace the prog- 
 ress of the battle. At four. Hooker informed his 
 immediate superior, that liis line was impregnable, 
 and commanded the enemy's defences with an enfilad- 
 inc: fire. Lookout mountain was earned. 
 
 At a quarter-past five, direct communication was 
 opened with Chattanooga, and Carlin's brigade, from 
 the northern valley, was sent to Hooker's support. 
 Carlin had to cross Chattanooga creek, and did not 
 eftect the junction without serious fighting, but finally 
 reported to Hookei', and was assigned to duty on the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 501 
 
 left of his line. TLiis, on the night of the 24th, the 
 national forces maintained one unbroken line, Avitli 
 open communications from the north end of Lookout 
 mountain, through Chattanooga valley, to the farther 
 end of Missionary ridge. 
 
 Still, the firing continued in the night, on the 
 mountain. The rebels, at dark, had not left the top- 
 most crest, and their signal-light on the extreme 
 summit, waving to and fro, revealed to the luckless 
 chief on Missionaiy ridge the extent of his calamity. 
 Every now and then, splutteiing discharges of mus- 
 ketry, mutfled by distance, could be heard in the val- 
 ley, and tierce jets of flame, like those once seen on 
 Sinai, seemed to issue from the mountain-side. The 
 long lines of camp-iires marked the advance or re- 
 treat of the combatants, and cries of defiance or 
 suffering came down from the clouds, as if super- 
 natural armies were contending in the air. But, 
 finallv, all the noise of battle ceased ; the wounded, 
 writhing in pain, and the sentinels walking their 
 rounds, were almost the only ones not reposing from 
 the fatigues and excitements of the day, and an unu- 
 sual quiet settled over the whole long line. 
 
 The generals, however, had little time for repose. 
 At midnight, Sherman got his orders from Grant to 
 attack the enemy at dawn, and notice that Thomas 
 also would attack right early. Hooker was in- 
 structed to advance in the morning, and endeavor to 
 intercept the rebel retreat from the mountain ; if, in- 
 deed, the enemy should not have already Avithdrawn. 
 In that event, Hooker was to move on the Rossville 
 road, carry the pass at Rossville, and operate on the 
 enemy's left and rear. To AVilcox, on the night of 
 the 24th, Grant said : " Fighting has been go- 
 
502 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 ing on here for two days ; and, as soon as possible, I 
 shall send a force up the valley, sufficient to relieve 
 Burnside, if he holds out. If you can communicate 
 this fact to him, do so." 
 
 At half-past five, on the 24th, Grant telegraphed 
 to Washington : " The fight to-day progressed favor- 
 ably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary ridge, 
 and his right is now at the tunnel, and left at Chicka- 
 mauga creek. Troops from Lookout valley carried 
 the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern 
 slope and point, high up. Hooker reports two thou- 
 sand prisoners taken, besides Avhich, a small number 
 have fallen into our hands, from Missionary ridge." 
 The President replied, in person, to this, on the 
 morning of the 25th : " Your dispatches as to fight- 
 ing on Monday and Tuesday, are here. Well done. 
 Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." Hal- 
 leck also telegraphed : " I congratulate you on the 
 success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside 
 is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove 
 fatal. I know that you will do all in your power to 
 relieve him." 
 
 During the night of the 24th, the rebels evacu- 
 ated Lookout mountain, crossing Chattanooga creek, 
 burning the bridges, and retreating, by Bossville gap, 
 to Missionary ridge. When the fog rose, nothing 
 was to be seen in the valley, but the deserted and 
 burning camps of the enemy. On the summit, the 
 national flag was waving; the Eighth Kentucky vol- 
 unteers had been foremost to reach the crest, and dis- 
 played their colors there at sunrise. Hooker ordered 
 two regiments to hold the mountain, and, at ten 
 o'clock, his main column, with Osterhaus leading, 
 was on the march for Kossville, and sweeping across 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAl^T. 503 
 
 Chattanooga valley, now abandoned by the enemy. 
 The destiiiction of the bridges delayed him, however, 
 for four hours, and Thomas was not to attack until 
 Hooker got into position. 
 
 The morning of the 25th of November broke raw 
 and cold, but the sun shone Ijrilliantly from a cloud- 
 less sky, and the great battle-field was all disclosed. 
 To the north and east, was the railroad junction of 
 Chattanooga, which gave the position so much of its 
 value ; the roads by which Grant sought communica- 
 tion with Burnside, and those along which the rebel 
 general was drawing his supplies. Behind the na- 
 tional forces, the impetuous river made its tortuous 
 way, never for a mile pursuing the same course ; 
 while the Cumberland mountains and Walden's 
 rido-e formed the massive backs-round. Grant's main 
 line faced south and east, towards Missionary ridge, 
 now not a mile away. Lookout mountain, on the 
 national right, bounded the view. Hooker marching 
 down its sides, and through the valley of Chatta- 
 nooga creek, to Rossville gap. Sherman had gained 
 the extreme left of the ridge, but immense difficulties 
 in his front were yet to overcome ; and, all along the 
 crest, w^ere the batteries and trenches tilled with 
 rebel soldiers, in front of the Army of the Cumber- 
 land. Bragg's headquarters were plainly visible, on 
 the ridge, at the centre of his now contracted line, 
 while Grant's own position was on the knoll that had 
 been wrested from the rebels, the day before. From 
 this point, the whole battle-field was displayed ; trees, 
 houses, fences, all landmarks in the valley had been 
 swept away for camps ; and the t\\o antagonists, 
 each from his high position, looked down upon the 
 board where the great game was playing. Thomas, 
 
504: IMILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 and various of tlie corps and division generals of the 
 Army of tlie Cumberland, were witli Grant, on Or- 
 chard knoll. 
 
 Before dawn, Sherman was in the saddle, and, 
 attended by his staff, rode to the extreme left of his 
 position, near Chickamauga river, and thence up the 
 hill which he had seized the day before. In the dim 
 light of morning, the line of attack lay before him, 
 towards Missionary ridge, his wings supporting him 
 on either flank ; but quite a valley yawned between 
 his trooj^s and the next hill of the series. This next 
 hill presented steep sides, the one to the west par- 
 tially cleared, but the other covered with the native 
 forest. Tlie crest was narrow and wooded. The 
 further point of the hill was held by the rebels, with 
 a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, the breastwork 
 filled with men ; and, on a still higher hill, beyond 
 the tunnel, the enemy was seen in yet greater force. 
 From the last-named point, the rebels had a plun- 
 ging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorge between, 
 through which several roads as well as the railroad 
 tunnel pass, could not be seen from Sherman's posi- 
 tion ; but it formed a natural place of arms, where 
 the enemy covered his masses, to resist the con- 
 templated movement of turning his right and en- 
 dangering communication with his depot at Chicka- 
 mauga. 
 
 The sun had already risen before the prepara- 
 tions were complete, and the bugle sounded forward. 
 The three brigades of Cockrell, Alexander, and Light- 
 l)urn were to hold the hill already gained, as a key- 
 point ; Corse, with as much- of his brigade as could 
 operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from 
 the right centre; Morgan L. Smith was to move 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAiS^T. 505 
 
 along the east base of Missionary ridge ; and Loomis, 
 in like manner, along the west base, snj^ported by 
 two reserve brigades, under John E. Smith. 
 
 The assaulting force advanced in a deployed line, 
 preceded by strong skinnishers, and moved up the 
 face of the hill to the very rifle-pits of the enemy. 
 About eighty yards from the rebel intrenchments, 
 was a secondary ridge, Avhich was gained at once, 
 and firmly held. The extreme end of the rebel ^vork 
 was also carried, and a strong point made, on the 
 crest of the nearest ridge. Sherman then pressed his 
 attack to within pistol-shot of the main rebel line, 
 and advanced his left division, under Morgan L. 
 Smith, so as to cut off the enemy from the railroad 
 bridge to Chickamauga; but no further advantage 
 was secured. The contest was close, lasting several 
 hours ; ground was given and lost, but the first posi- 
 tion was all that was attained. Neither, however, 
 could the most determined efforts of the enemy dis- 
 lodge the national troops from the important point 
 they had gained. Persistently, stubbornly, and well, 
 they fought. Corse was wounded at ten o'clock. 
 
 Sherman, at this time, threatened not only the 
 right flank of the enemy, but his rear and stores at 
 Chickamauga station; and Grant's real object was 
 completely gained, for Bragg was forced to weaken 
 his centre to support the rebel right.* Column 
 
 * General Sherman told me that he did not consider the hill for 
 which he fought on Xovcmber 23d, as very important i n itself, and there- 
 fore used only three regiments, in the original attack ; but he made as 
 much noise and show as he could, to alarm Bragg for the safety of 
 that flank, and of the railroad bridge, just in rear. Ills effort was, to 
 induce Bragg to detach as much as possible from the centre, and so to 
 ■weaken that, which Sherman knew, from Grant, would be the critical 
 point of the battle. It was, at fii-st, supposed that Bragg, finding Sher- 
 man on the end of Missionary ridge, would at once draw from his centre, 
 
506 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 after column of the rebels was soon streaming tow- 
 ards Sherman ; gun after gun poured a concentric 
 fire from every hill and spur that gave a view of his 
 ground. But Loomis and Corse's commands pressed 
 forward ; and, as the right of the assaulting column 
 became exposed, the two brigades of John E. Smith 
 were sent to its support. They moved over an open 
 field, on the mountain-side, and under a hea^y fire of 
 musketry and cannon, close up. to the works of the 
 enemy. The crest was so narrow that they neces- 
 sarily occupied tlie Avest face of the hill, and, there, 
 for some time, they lay, partially covered from fire. 
 Their right, however, rested near the head of the 
 ravine; and the enemy took advantage of this. 
 Having massed in great strength, at the tunnel 
 gorge, he moved a large force, under cover of the 
 ground and the thick buslies, and suddenly appeared 
 on the rifrht and rear of Smith's command. Un- 
 expectedly attacked from this quarter. Smith fell 
 back across the open field, about two hundred yards, 
 but formed in good order, on the edge of the tim- 
 ber ; while the column which had attacked him was 
 speedily driven back to its own intrenchments, by 
 the assaulting column proper. This occurred at 
 about' three o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 Grant was watching the progress of the fight 
 from Orchard knoll, and, seeing the danger to which 
 Sherman was exposed, lie now ordered Baird's divi- 
 sion, of the Fourteenth coi-ps, to support the extreme 
 left; but Sherman sent word that he had all the 
 
 to attack vehemently on the right ; but this Bragg did not do ; and then 
 Grant ordered Sherman to attack Bragg, which evidently produced 
 the same effect — weakening the enemy's line, and fiicilitating Grant's 
 real object — to break the rebel centre. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 507 
 
 force necessary, and Baird was put in position on 
 Thomas's left. Baird, accordingly, marclied by the 
 flank, in front of Fort Wood, to take position on 
 Howard's right. This movement was plainly per- 
 ceived by the enemy, and impressed him with the 
 idea that Grant's main assault was to be made on 
 the rebel risfht ; a massive column of Braii^ix's forces 
 soon was seen to move northward along the crest of 
 the rids^e, resriment after res-iment filinsj towards 
 Sherman. 
 
 Meanwhile, the day was waning, and Thomas's 
 attack, which was to relieve Sherman, had not been 
 made. Grant looked eagerly for the advance of 
 Hooker, moving north along the ridge, with his left 
 in Chattanooga valley and his right thrown east of 
 the ridge. This approach was to be the signal for 
 stormins: the rido-e, at the centre, with Thomas's 
 columns. But Hooker was necessarily detained in the 
 construction of the bridges over Chattanooga creek. 
 
 Grant had marked the movement of the rebel col- 
 umns towards his left, and instantly perceived his 
 opportunity. Bragg was attempting the most diffi 
 cult manoeuvre that can be executed in war. He 
 was weakening his centre and making a flank move- 
 ment in the presence of an enemy. Grant meanwhile 
 had got information from Hooker, and was satisfied 
 that he must be on his way from Kossville, although 
 not vet in s'vAit. He determined to order the 
 assault. 
 
 At first, he simply directed Thomas to order the 
 advance ; but, seeing the corps commanders near 
 him, Grant repeated to them in person the command. 
 Thomas's force now consisted of four divisions, un- 
 der Johnson, Sheridan, Wood, and Baird. A double 
 
508 MILITAET IIISTOEY OF 
 
 line of skirmisliers was thrown out, followed in easy 
 supporting distance by the whole force. The orders 
 were to cany the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary 
 ridge ; and, when this was done, to re-form the lines, 
 in the rifle-pits, with a view to carrying the top of 
 the ridsre. 
 
 o 
 
 The ground immediately in front was open tim- 
 ber ; then, a smooth and open plain ; the distance, to 
 the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits, varying from 
 four hundred to nine hundred yards. Next, was a 
 steep ascent of about five hundred yards, to the top 
 of the rido^e, the face of which was ru2:2:ed and cov- 
 ered with fallen timber. About half way up the 
 hill, or two hundred and fifty yards from the fii'st 
 rifle-pits, was a second but imperfect line of works ; 
 and, last of all, the rifle-pits on the crest. 
 
 The two corps had been restless and eager all 
 day, and the instant that Grant gave the second 
 order. Granger and Palmer moved their forces down 
 the slope of the hill where they had been posted, 
 and across the lower ground to the left. They 
 marched steadily on, under a tremendous fire of 
 artillery from the ridge; and emerging from the 
 timber, took up the double quick, dashing over the 
 open plain, and at the enemy's first line, with a mass 
 of glistening bayonets that was irresistible. The 
 four divisions reached the foot of the ridge almost 
 simultaneously ; not a gun was fired, but the bayo- 
 nets fairly blazed in the bright afternoon sun ; * and 
 
 * I asked General Sheridan how he accounted for the ease with 
 which the first line of rifle-pits was carried. He said that he hap- 
 pened to be in advance of his own line as it charged, and, looking 
 back, was impi'essed with the terrible sight presented by the mass of 
 approaching bayonets. The men were on a run, and the line had be- 
 come almost a crowd ; and the rebels appeared unable to resist the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 509 
 
 as tlie line came closer and closer, the rebels flunof 
 themselves prostrate in the trenches, and the national 
 troops rnslied over. A thousand prisoners at once 
 were ordered to the rear, and hurj-ied back across tlie 
 open plain, croucliing from the fire of tlieir own com- 
 rades on the crest. Others retreated rapidly up tlie 
 hill. 
 
 At this time, according to orders, there should 
 have been a halt, but the men were uncontrollable; 
 shouts of triumph rang along the line, and everywhere 
 the troops began to climb the mountain, waiting for 
 no further orders. The rebel fire now chano-ed from 
 shot and shell to canister and musketry, and the men 
 lay on their faces to avoid the storm, working their 
 way thus up the front of the mountain. Com- 
 manders could not order back the troops who were 
 step by step ascending, in this way, and fast ap- 
 proaching the second line of rifle-pits.* First, one 
 flao: would be advanced a few feet, then another was 
 thrust forward on a line with this, each striving for 
 the advance. As many as five or six color-bearers 
 were successively shot down, carrying a single flag; 
 but, at last, all along the ridge, the colors were planted 
 on the second line. 
 
 Thirty pieces of artillery now opened on the 
 assailants with direct, plunging, cross, and enfilading 
 fires; and a storm of musketry, from the still well- 
 effect upon their imagination or their nerves of this waving, glittering 
 mass of steel. 
 
 * When they had got a third of the way up. an aide of Granger's 
 ordered one of Sheridan's brigades down the hill, in conformity with 
 the original plan; but Sheridan soon came up, and saw that the flags 
 were advancing steadily, and that two of his brigades were still mount- 
 ing the hill. He at once ordered back the troops which had begun 
 to descend. " When I saw those flags going up," he said, " I knew 
 we should carry the ridge, and I took the responsibility." 
 
510 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 filled rifle-pits on tlie summit, was flung into tlieir 
 very faces. But not a break was seen in all tlie line ; 
 neither the toil of the ascent that exhausted tlieir 
 strength, nor the fire of the enemy that thinned their 
 ranks, retarded them. Steadily, rapidly, on they 
 pushed, the enemy in desperate flight before them ; 
 until at last the tide reached the hio-hest crest, 
 poured over the works, and carried the hills simulta- 
 neously at six different points, so close upon the 
 rebels that crowds were captured in the very 
 trenches. Whole regiments threw down their arms ; 
 others fled headlong down the eastern slope, the na- 
 tional soldiers not waiting to reload their pieces, but 
 driving the enemy with stones. Artillerists were 
 bayoneted at their guns, and the cannon were cap- 
 tured before they could be removed or destroyed. 
 The very pieces which a moment before had been 
 thundering against the national army, were turned 
 at once uj)on the rebel line, enfilading it right and 
 left, and rendering it perfectly untenable. It was 
 fifty-five minutes since the troops had left theii' places 
 on the plain.* 
 
 Such had been the strength of Bragg's posi- 
 tion, that he entertained no doubt of his ability to 
 hold it against far superior numbers, and had made 
 every disposition for this purpose. " It was a posi- 
 tion,'' he said himself, " Avhich a line of skirmishers 
 ought to have maintained against any assaulting 
 column." Tliose Avho reached the crest were in a 
 condition of exhaustion from the great physical exer- 
 tion in climbing, which alone ought to have rendered 
 
 * Sheridan lost, in this charge, eleven hundred and seventy-nine 
 men, and one hundred and twenty-three officers, out of a force of six 
 thousand. This was nearly half the loss in Thomas's command. 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 511 
 
 the enemy irresistible. Bragg, indeed, at first 
 tbouglit that the attack had been repulsed ; and was 
 riding along the ridge, congratulating his troops, 
 when intelli2:ence was brous^ht him that the line was 
 broken on the right, and the national troops had 
 actually crowned the ridge. He proceeded at once 
 to the rear of the broken line, to rally his retiring 
 soldiers, and return them to the crest ; but the dis- 
 aster was too great to be repaired. At the same 
 moment, the rebel general learned that his extreme 
 left had also given way, and that his position was 
 almost surrounded. 
 
 A second line was immediately ordered to be 
 formed in rear, where, by the efforts of Bragg's staff, 
 a nucleus of stragglers had been created, upon which 
 he hoped to rally the fugitives ; but firing was again 
 heard in the direction of the left, and another divi- 
 sion came tumblins: in: the entire rebel left was 
 routed and in raj^jid flight. Every effort that could 
 be made by Bragg and his staff availed but little ; 
 the guns were abandoned by the infantry supports ; 
 a panic had seized both oflicers and men, and each 
 seemed merely struggling for his own personal safety. 
 Orders were given for Hardee on the right, and 
 Breckinridcre ou the left of the rebel line, to retire 
 their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. It was 
 now near night, and, fortunately for Bragg, the coun- 
 try and roads in his rear were familiar to him, and 
 equally unknown to his pursuers. His routed left 
 made its wav back in s^reat confusion, but the other 
 portions of his command still offered opposition.* 
 
 * Sec Appendix, for Bragg's report in full, from which all my 
 statements in regard to the rebel movements and condition are taken 
 almost verlatim. 
 
512 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 After halting a few moments, to reorganize tlie 
 troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the 
 assault, Sheridan pushed forward in pui'suit. Bragg 
 himself had barely escaped capture, and his disorgan- 
 ized troops, with a large wagou-train and several 
 pieces of artillery, could be distinctly seen, flying 
 through the valley below, within a distance of half a 
 mile. Sheridan pressed on, to capture the prize. 
 About a mile in rear of Missionary ridge, the road 
 runs along another high and formidable hill, on 
 which the enemy had posted artillery, supported by 
 a heavy force of infantry. The men, however, charged 
 again, clinging to the face of the mountain, as they 
 had done a few hours before, on Missionary ridge. 
 Meanwhile, Sheridan sent regiments on either side to 
 flank the enemy. It was now dark, and, just as the 
 head of one of these columns reached the summit of 
 the hill, the moon rose from behind, and a medallion 
 view of the column was disclosed, as it crossed the 
 disk of the moon, and attacked the enemy. Out- 
 flanked on right and left the rebels fled, leaving the 
 coveted artillery and trains. Those who escaped cap- 
 ture were driven across Chickamauo-a creek, where 
 they burned the bridges, almost while they passed. 
 
 Wood and Baird were more obstinately resisted, 
 by reenforcements from the rebel right, and continued 
 flghting till darkness set in, slowly but steadily driv- 
 ing the enemy before them. 
 
 In the mean time. Hooker had completed his 
 bridges, crossed the Chattanooga, and moved north, 
 i:>arallel with the ridge; Osterhaus on his right, 
 Geary on the left, and Cruffc having the centre. The 
 rebels had selected for their line of defence, in front 
 of Hooker, the breastworks thrown up by the na- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 513 
 
 tional troops in tlieir retreat from Chickamauga ; 
 but, sucli was the impetuosity of Hooker's advance, 
 that their front line was routed before an opportu- 
 nity was allowed even to prepare a determined resist- 
 ance. The bulk of the rebel left now sought refuge 
 behind a second line, and thence was ao-ain driven 
 out, till the flight became almost a runnino- one. As 
 he moved upon Eossville, Hooker eucountei-ed a di- 
 vision under Stuart, which was attempting to escape 
 towards Greysville ; but, some of this force, finding 
 their retreat threatened in that quarter, retii-ed in 
 disorder towards their own rio-ht, alons: the crest of 
 the ridge ; there they were met b}' another portion 
 of Hooker's command, and driven by these troops 
 into the very face of Johnson's division, of Palmer's 
 corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners. 
 Thus, with the centi-e pierced, and the left wing 
 rolled in, the whole rebel army was in inextricable 
 confusion. 
 
 Grant rode up at once on the ridge, to direct 
 the pursuit, and himself followed, for a mile or two, 
 beyond the hills which so long had obstructed his 
 armies. But, the near approach of night, and igno- 
 rance of the roads, prevented any further effective 
 movements, except by Sheridan, who pushed as for 
 as Mission mills, seven miles. The business of the 
 day, however, was ended, and the troops went into 
 bivouac, with, cheers which were caught up by other 
 troops, and carried along the ridge for miles, until lost 
 in the distance. Chickamauija was aveni:jed. 
 
 As soon as the resistance on Thomas's left was 
 overcome, the enemy, of course, abandoned his posi- 
 tion near the railroad tunnel, in front of Sherman, 
 who, hoAvever, did not know, until night closed in, 
 
 33 
 
514 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 that tlie troops in Cliattanooga had swept across 
 Missionary ridge and broken the enemy's centre. 
 Pursuit was then ordered by him, at once. Morgan 
 L. Smith was directed to feel the tunnel, wliich was 
 found vacant, save by the rebel and national dead, 
 who lay stark and still, commingled. Davis's reserve 
 was ordered to march at once to the pontoon bridge, 
 across the Chickamauga, at its mouth, and push for- 
 ward for the depot. Howard had been posted to 
 connect Sherman's left with Chickamauga creek. 
 He was now ordered to repair an old broken bridge, 
 about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow 
 Davis at four a. m. on the morrow, while the Fif 
 teenth corps was to march at daylight. 
 
 All of the strong positions of Lookout mountain, 
 Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge were thus 
 in Grant's possession, together with forty rebel can- 
 non, and six thousand prisoners. Success had been 
 complete on every part of the field. In Sherman's 
 front the results had not been so brilliant, but it 
 was simply because of the stubborn fight made there, 
 that the rebels massed upon him, weakening their 
 left and centre, and giving Grant the coveted ojipor- 
 tunity. That night, Grant wrote to Sherman : " No 
 doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which 
 Thomas's troops carried Missionary ridge, this after- 
 noon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken 
 by the forces under your command, in taking, first, 
 so much of the same range of hills, and, then, in at- 
 tracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to 
 make Thomas's part certain of success. The next 
 thiuo; now will be to relieve Burnside." 
 
 To Wilcox, the same night, he said : " The great 
 defeat Bragg has -sustained in the three days' battle 
 
ULYSSES S. GEANT. 515 
 
 terminating at dusk this evening, and a movement 
 which I will immediately make, I think, will relieve 
 Burnside, if he holds out a few days longer. I shall 
 pursue Bragg, to-morro^v, and start a heavy cohimn 
 up the Tennessee valley the day after." 
 
 At seven o'clock. Grant was aide to report to the 
 general -in-chief: "Although the battle lasted from 
 early dawn until dark this evening, I believe I am 
 not j)remature in announcing a complete victoiy over 
 Bragg. Lookout mountain-top, all the rifle-pits in 
 Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge entire, have 
 been carried, and are now held by us. I have no 
 idea of findino; Brairsf here to-morrow." A half hour 
 later, he dispatched again : " I have heard from 
 Burnside, to the 23d, when he had rations for ten or 
 twelve days, and expected to hold out that time. I 
 shall move a force from here, on to the railroad be- 
 tween Cleveland and Dalton, and send a column of 
 twenty thousand men up the south side of the Ten- 
 nessee, without wagons, carrying four days' rations, 
 and taking a steamer loaded with rations, from whicli 
 to draw, on the route. If Burnside holds out until 
 this force gets beyond Kingston, I think the enemy 
 will fly, and with the present state of the roads, 
 must abandon almost every thing. I believe Bragg 
 will lose much of his army by desertion, in conse- 
 quence of his defeat in the last tliree days' fight." 
 On the 26th, Halleck replied to Grant's announce- 
 ment of success : " I congratulate you and your army 
 on the victories of Cliattanooga. This is truly a day 
 of thanksQ-ivino;." 
 
 To Sherman, on the night of the 2r)tli, Grant 
 said: "My plan is to move your forces out 
 gradually, until they reach the railroad between 
 
516 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the 
 
 south side of the Tennessee We will push 
 
 Bragg with all our strength, to-morrow, and try if 
 we cannot cut off a good portion of his new troops 
 and trains. His men have manifested a strong 
 desire to desert for some time past, and we will now 
 
 give them a chance Move the advance force on 
 
 the most easterly road taken by the enemy." The 
 same night, Thomas was ordered : " You will start a 
 strono; reconnoissance in the morninor at seven a. m., 
 to ascertain the position of the enemy. If it is ascer- 
 tained that the enemy are in full retreat, follow them 
 with all your force, except that which you intend 
 Granger to take to Knoxville Four days' ra- 
 tions should be got up to the men, between this and 
 morning, and also a supply of ammunition. I shall 
 want Granger s expedition to get off by the day after 
 to-morrow." 
 
 On the morning of the 26th, accordingly, Sher- 
 man advanced by way of Chickamauga station ; 
 and Thomas's force (Hooker and Palmer) moved on 
 the x\tlanta road towards (Irevsville and Rina;- 
 gold, while Granger's conmiand retm^ned to Chatta- 
 nooira, -with instructions to hold itself in readiness 
 for orders to reenforce Burnside. Grant was with 
 the pursuing column ; but, on the night of the battle, 
 Thomas returned to Chattanooga, and did not rejoin 
 his troops. By eleven a. m., Jefferson C. Davis, of 
 Sherman's command, arrived at Chickamauga depot, 
 just in time to see it in flames. He entered Avith 
 one l)rigade, and found the enemy partially in- 
 trenched, on the hills beyond the depot. This force, 
 however, was soon driven away. The depot pre- 
 sented a scene of desolation such as war alone ex- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 517 
 
 liiljits. Corn and meal in liuge burning piles, broken 
 wagons, abandoned caissons, rifled guns with tlieir 
 carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks, chesses, 
 all one mass of flame and destruction. Halting a 
 short time only, the column passed on, over a road 
 lined with the wrecks of the retreating anny. Just 
 as the head of the division emerged from a dark and 
 miry swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the 
 enemy. The fight was sharp, but night closed in so 
 dark that Sherman could not advance. Grant came 
 up with Sherman's column here. 
 
 Hooker, meanwliile, had arrived at Chickamauga 
 creek, and found the bridge destroyed; his j)ontoons 
 were not up, and it was three o'clock before the regi- 
 ments could beo:in to cross ; the officers swam their 
 horses, and the artillery and ambulances were left 
 behind, to follow as soon as practicable. Palmer, 
 who now reported to Hooker, was sent to Greysville, 
 by the Lafayette road, and the rest of the command 
 proceeded to Ringgold, Cruft's division leading. 
 Palmer came up with the rear of the enemy, on the 
 road from Greysville to Ringgold, and captured three 
 pieces of artilleiy, with a small number of prisoners. 
 Cruft also advanced, and took possession of the 
 Chickamauga hills, on whose sides the abandoned 
 camp-fires of the enemy were brightly burning. It 
 was now ten o'clock, and Hooker went into bivouac, 
 his artillery not having yet arrived. 
 
 llingo-old was five miles oft', and the pursuit was 
 renewed at daylight, Osterhaus in the advance. Evi- 
 dences of the precipitate flight of the rebels were 
 everywhere apparent; the road was strewn with 
 caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms and ammunition, 
 abandoned in the huny and confusion of flight, and 
 
518 IVnLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 before the east fork of Chiekamauga creek was 
 reached, a large number of prisoners had been taken. 
 Soon the advance came up with the camps that had 
 been occupied the night before, by the rebels ; here, 
 also, the fires of the bivouac were still ablaze. The 
 ford, and a bridge south of Ringgold,- were both held 
 by rebel cavalry. These discharged their pieces, 
 and quickly gave way before a handful of Hooker's 
 men, who pursued them closely into the town. 
 
 Clebui'ne's division was covering the retreat of 
 Hardee's corps, of the rebel army, and had aiTived at 
 the west bank of the East Chiekamauga, at ten o'clock 
 on the night of the 26th. At this point he had to 
 ford the river; it was nearly waist-deep, and the 
 night was freezing cold, so the crossing was post- 
 poned until morning. But, in the night, Cleburne 
 received orders to take a strong position in the gorge 
 of the mountain, and attempt to check the advance 
 of Hooker. The main rebel force had just passed 
 through Ringgold, sorely pressed, the animals ex- 
 hausted and the men demoralized. Regimental and 
 company formations were destroyed, and many of the 
 men had thro^vn away their arms. 
 
 Ringgold is a place of two or three thousand in- 
 habitants, and stands on a plain between the East 
 Chickamauo:a river and the rano-e of hills kno^vn as 
 Taylor's ridge ; it is on the Western and Atlantic 
 railroad, and about twenty miles southeast of Chat- 
 tanooga. Taylor's ridge runs north and south, and, 
 immediately back of the town, is a break in the 
 ridffe, wide enou2:h to admit the raih'oad, a wai^'on- 
 road, and a tributary creek of the Chiekamauga. The 
 creek hugs the southern side of the gorge, and the 
 wagon-road and railroad run close to the bank of the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. HI 9 
 
 stream. The ridge rises abruptly on either hand, 
 four or five hundred feet, and at its western moutli 
 the gap widens to the breadth of a hundred yards, 
 leaving room for a patch of level wooded land, on 
 either side of the roads. The gap is about half a 
 mile long, and the plain in the rear is so cut up by 
 the windings of the stream, that three bridges or fords 
 have to be crossed, in the first half-mile beyond, on 
 the Dalton road. 
 
 Cleburne had been ordered to use the great natu- 
 ral advantages presented by this gap, to clieck the 
 pursuit of the national army, till the trains and rear 
 of the main column could get well advanced beyond 
 the entanglements, on the other side of the ridge. 
 He accordingly posted some of his troops on the 
 mountain-top ; and, behind the fringe of trees at its 
 base, four short lines were formed across the gap. 
 Skirmishers were thrown out as far as the creek, and 
 a battery was placed in the mouth of the gap, 
 screened by wittered branches built up in front of 
 the guns ; a ravine near by sheltered the artillerists. 
 Cleburne had over four thousand bayonets. 
 
 The rebel line of skirmishers was feeble, and 
 Hooker deployed a l)rigade, under cover of the em- 
 bankment of the railroad. Soon, a brisk musketiy-fire 
 began between the skirmishers. The rebel cavalry at 
 once retreated through the gap on a trot, and the 
 valley in front was clear of Cleburne's troops ; but, 
 close in rear of the ridge, an immense wagon-train 
 was still struggling through the fords of the creek, 
 and the deeply cut up roads leading to Dalton. 
 Cleburne's division was the only barrier between 
 the train and the eager advance of the pursuing 
 army. 
 
520 JIILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 Sliortly after eiglit o'clock a. m., altliougli his 
 artillery Lad not yet arrived, Hooker moved kis line 
 of battle np, under cover of tke skirmisk fire. Tke 
 troops advanced witk decision and celerity, but soon 
 became exposed to tke rebel artillery, and, after five 
 or six rapid disckarges, the rigkt was compelled to 
 retire. Tke left, kowever, continued to advance, and 
 made a keavy attack on tke ridge. Four regiments 
 were detacked kalf a mile to tke left, to ascend tke 
 kill, and turn tke enemy's right. As they were 
 tkrown forward, tke rebels appeared in force on tke 
 crest, kaving detected tke movement. Four otker 
 regiments were tken tkrown still furtker to the left, 
 but tkey also found a large force ready to receive 
 tkem. Vigorous attacks were made by botk these 
 columns, but tke advantage of position was too great 
 to overcome. One column took skelter in a depres- 
 sion on the side of the ridge, about fifty paces in rear 
 of its most advanced position ; and several renewed 
 attempts were made to carry the ridge, botk sides 
 figkting keroically. Tke rebels tkrew rocks from 
 tkeir kigher position, and in this way sometimes 
 loiocked the assailants down the ridge. 
 
 Finding himself entirely unable to accomplish his 
 purj^ose. Hooker at last desisted from the attack, and 
 determined to await the arrival of his artillery. He 
 could not, kowever, witkdraw, witkout becoming 
 still more exposed, and tke men remained in tkeir ad- 
 vanced positions on the mountain-side ; but it was 
 deemed imwise to bring up any more troops until 
 the artillery should arrive, as the slaughter would 
 have been great, witkout the possibility of inflicting 
 on the enemy a loss at all comparable with that re- 
 
ULTSSES S. GRANT. 521 
 
 ceivecl. The rebels tlirew up slight defences, and 
 some desultory fighting occurred, near the mouth of 
 the gap, but without important results. 
 
 Between twelve and one o'clock, tlie artillery 
 came up, not having been able to cross the west fork 
 of the Chickamauga, until eight o'clock that day. A 
 section of howitzers was at once brouo-ht to bear on 
 the enemy, in front of Hooker's right, and enfiladed 
 the gap ; another section was assigned to silence the 
 rebel battery ; and troops and ai-tillery ^vere sent to 
 gain the heights on the southern side of the river, 
 which would give a plunging fire on the enemy in 
 the gorge. 
 
 Just as the artillery was opening, Grant arrived 
 on the field. He at once sent orders to Sherman to 
 move down a force on the east side of the ridge, and 
 turn the enemy's position. " It looks as if it will be 
 hard to disloclo-e them." But the rebels did not wait 
 for this new disposition to be concluded ; the artil- 
 lery had opened with marked eftect, the enemy's guns 
 were hauled to the rear, his troops seen moving, and, 
 before one o'clock, Cleburne was in full retreat. 
 One brigade of Hooker pursued across the mountain, 
 and others followed tlirough the gap. The rebels 
 attempted to burn the bridges, but were speedily 
 driven away, and the fires were extinguished. Three 
 pieces of artillery and two hundred and tliirty 
 prisoners were captui'cd. Hooker's loss was sixty- 
 five killed, and three hundred and seventy-seven 
 wounded; only al)Out half of the latter so severely 
 as to go into hospital. In the early part of the bat- 
 tle, a few of his wounded had fallen into the enemy's 
 hands, but they were soon recaptured. One hundred 
 and thirty rebels were left dead on the field; Cle- 
 
522 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 
 
 burne, however, reported only twenty killed, a hun- 
 dred and ninety wounded, and eleven missing. But 
 the rebels secured the escape of their train, which 
 was all they were fighting for. 
 
 Sherman had resumed his march at daylight, and, 
 at Greysville, came up with Palmer's corps. The 
 roads, in advance, were filled with as many troops as 
 they could accommodate, and, in obedience to Grant's 
 order, Sherman now turned east, to break up all com- 
 munication between Brao-o- and Lono-street. Howard 
 was directed to move to Parker's gap, and thence to 
 Red Clay, and destroy a large section of the railroad 
 connectino' Dalton and Cleveland. This work was 
 completely performed, that day, and Davis's division 
 was moved up close to Ringgold, to be ready to 
 assist Hooker, if need should arise. About noon, 
 Sherman got a message from Hooker, saying that he 
 had had a pretty hard fight, and wanted Sherman to 
 come up and turn the position of the enemy. How- 
 ard, however, by moving through Parker's gap to 
 Red Clay, had already turned Ringgold; but, of this, 
 neither Grant nor Hooker was as yet aware. So, 
 Sherman rode on to Ringgold, and found the rebels 
 had already fallen back to Tunnel hilL The enemy 
 was out of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on 
 ground where the waters flow to the Coosa. He was 
 driven from Tennessee. 
 
 Grant now directed the pui'suit to be discontin- 
 ued, and, at one p. m., he dispatched to Thomas: 
 " Direct Granger .... to start at once, marching as 
 rapidly as possible to the relief of Burnside." Had 
 it not been for this im^^erative necessity of relieving 
 Burnside, Grant would have pursued the demoralized 
 and retreating enemy, as long as supplies could have 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 523 
 
 been found in tlie country. But, his advices were 
 that Burnside's supplies could only last till tlie 3d ot 
 December. It was already getting late to afford the 
 necessary relief; so, Grant directed Hooker to hold 
 the position he then occupied, until the night of the 
 80th, but to go no further south at the expense of a 
 iischt. Sherman was instructed to march to the rail- 
 road crossing of the Iliawassee, to protect Granger's 
 ilank until he should get across that stream ; and to 
 prevent further reenforcements being sent, by that 
 route, into East Tennessee. 
 
 A reconnoissance was made by Hooker, in the 
 direction of Tunnel hill, the rebel line of retreat ; 
 and caissons, wagons, dead and dying men were 
 found strewn along the way, to a horrible extent. 
 The reconnoitrino; force returned on the nio-lit of the 
 27th, and then went into bivouac. The railroad at 
 Ringgold was thoroughly destroyed, for a distance of 
 two miles ; also, the depot, tannery, mills, and all the 
 military material. On the 29th, Palmer returned to 
 Chattanooga, with his command, and the prisoners 
 taken at fiinggold. On the oOth, the enemy sent a 
 flag of truce to Hookers advanced position at 
 Catoosa, requesting permission to bur\' the rebel 
 dead and care for the wounded, abandoned in the 
 flight from Ringgold ; during that day and the next, 
 the remaining infantry and cavalry of Hooker's com- 
 mand left Ringgold; Geary and Cruft to return to 
 their old camps, in Lookout valley, and Osterhaus, 
 to encamp near Chattanooga. 
 
 On the 28th, the Fifteenth corps destroyed the 
 railroad absolutely and effectually, from a point half- 
 way between Greysville and Ringgold, back to the 
 Georgia state line; and, on the 29th, Howard's com- 
 
524 MILITARY mSTO'RY OF 
 
 mand, witli two divisions of tlie Fifteentli corps and 
 Davis's division, moved by different mountain-gorges, 
 and all met at Cleveland, where they again set to 
 work destroying tlie railroad. On tlie SOtli, Sher- 
 man's army marched to Charleston, Howard ap- 
 proaching so rapidly that the rebel force there evacu- 
 ated in haste, leaving the bridge only partially dam- 
 aged, and large loads of flour and provision fell into 
 the hands of the national soldiers. 
 
 Grant's losses, in these battles, were seven hun- 
 dred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five hun- 
 dred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred 
 and thirty missing ; total, five thousand six hundred 
 and sixteen. The enemy's losses were fewer in 
 killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was 
 protected by intrenchments,* while the national sol- 
 diers were without cover. Grant captured six thou- 
 sand one hundred and forty-two prisoners, forty 
 pieces of artillery, sixty-nine artillery carriages and 
 caissons, and seven thousand stands of small-arms ; 
 by far the greatest capture, in the open field, which 
 had then been made during the war. 
 
 The battle of Chattanooga was the grandest ever 
 fought west of the Alleghauies. It covered an extent 
 of thirteen miles, and Grant had over sixty thou- 
 sand men engaged. Hooker's force amounted to 
 about ten thousand ; Sherman's, including Howard's, 
 to over twenty thousand ; and Thomas's command 
 included aJmost thirty thousand soldiers. The rebels 
 
 * The rebel losses were reported at tlu'ce hundred and sixty-one 
 killed, two thousand one hundred aod eighty Avounded, and four 
 thousand one hundred and forty-six missing. This statement is cer- 
 tainly inaccurate in one particular, as Grant captured two thousand 
 more men than the rebels reported missing. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 525 
 
 numbered only forty-five tliousand men,* but tliey 
 enjoyed immense advantages of position on every 
 part of tlie field, and, according to all tlie rules of tbe 
 military art, a strong defensive position is equivalent 
 to five times an equal number of assailants. 
 
 At Vicksburg, it had been the strategy, at 
 Shiloh, the hard fighting, but, at Chattanooga, it 
 was the manoeuvring in the presence of the enemy 
 that brought about the result ; aided, of course, in 
 the highest possible degree, by the gallantry of the 
 soldiers, without which the greatest of generals is in 
 fact unarmed. Few battles have ever been won so 
 strictly according to the plan laid dovra ; certainly, 
 no battle, during the war of the rebellion, was 
 earned out so completely according to the pro- 
 gramme. Grant's instructions in advance would 
 almost serve as a history of the contest. Changes 
 Avere indeed made in the orders; but, before 
 the battle began, the original plan was resumed. 
 Hooker w^as to draw attention to the right, to seize 
 and hold Lookout mountain ; Avliile Sherman, attack- 
 ing Missionary ridge on the extreme left, was still 
 fuiiiher to distract the enemy ; and, then, when reen- 
 forcements and attention should be drawn to both 
 the rebel flanks, the centre was to be assaulted by 
 the main body of Grant's force under Thomas. 
 Every thing happened exactly as had been foreseen. 
 
 * On the lOtb of December, Bragg reported fifty-eight thousand 
 seven hundred and fifty-five men present, of whom forty-three thousand 
 and ninety-four were " effective." Of these, however, ten thousand six 
 hundred and twenty-two (effective) belonged to Wheek-r's cavalry ; 
 and "portions of five brigades" of Wheeler were with Longstreet. 
 Still, the six thousand prisoners, to say nothing of the killed and 
 wounded and stragglers, would bring up Bragg's numbers, on the days 
 of the battle, to at least those stated in the text. 
 
526 MTLITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Disturbed, at tTie start, by tlie continuous marsL ai- 
 ling of vast forces beneath his very eye, Bragg seemed 
 to have lost all ordinary sagacity ; and, on the night of 
 the 22d of November, absolutely sent Buckner's divi- 
 sion to Longstreet, who was lustily calling for aid, in 
 East Tennessee. A second division had even started 
 on the morning of the battle, but was recalled, by 
 the movement of the 23d. Still, Bragg appeared con- 
 fused by the manifold manceuvres of Grrant. He 
 knew of the arrival of Sherman, one of whose divi- 
 sions had been advanced far up Lookout valley ; he 
 saw the crossing at Brown's ferry, but doubtless 
 hoped that the rains and the rise in the river, and 
 the consequent destruction of the bridges, would 
 delay any rapid operations of his antagonist. Losing 
 sight, too, of Sherman, as soon as that commander 
 crossed at Brown's ferry, it was impossible to know 
 whether he had been sent to the aid of Burnside, or 
 was detained for an assault at Chattanooga. Bragg 
 must have finally concluded that the Army of the 
 Tennessee had gone on to Knoxville ; on no other 
 supposition can the subtraction from his own force 
 of two divisions, at this critical juncture, be accounted 
 for. 
 
 But, the very next day, occurred the operations 
 which resulted in the capture of Orchard knoll. 
 Grant heard of the dispatch of Buckner's force, and 
 immediately attacked Bragg's centre, lest the whole 
 rebel army should escape. He thus brought back one 
 of the departing divisions, while the other got off 
 just far enough to be out of reach of recall, during the 
 crisis of the next two days. The rebel chief became 
 still more bewildered, and the sight of the immense 
 masses moving in the valley below them, affected the 
 
ULYSSES S. GRAin'. 527 
 
 imaginations and depressed tlie spirits of his sol- 
 diers.* The very openness of the display was a proof 
 of audacity, that confounded them. 
 
 Bra2:Qr had now to decide whether or not he 
 would maintain both flanks with equal deteiTuina- 
 tion. Lookout mountain, it is true, commanded the 
 river, and was the key to all operations on the rebel 
 left ; but, Missionary ridge, at its northern extremity, 
 covered his base and line of supplies. The demon- 
 stration of the 23d boded an attack, and he must 
 make his election, in case the attack occurred. If he 
 decided to hold Chickamauga, he must yield the 
 mountain, and throw his whole force between the en- 
 croaching wing of Grant's army and the southern 
 raib'oad. If he gave the preference to Lookout, then 
 the railroad in his rear, and the depot of his supplies, 
 must be abandoned. In tliis emergency, he acted 
 with indecision, and weakened his left, without suffi- 
 ciently strengthening the right ; withdrawing one 
 division (Walker's) from Lookout, on the night of 
 the 23d, but leaving still six brigades on the moun- 
 tain ; enough to make a struggle on the left that 
 could only end in failure, while he did not add 
 enouo;h. to his ri^jht to make that flank secure. He 
 probably could not bring himself to admit that Look- 
 out mountain must really be al )andoned ; he could 
 not acknowledo-e to himself and his armv, that he 
 was now really on the defensive, before the antago- 
 nist whom he had threatened so long. 
 
 But the o:reat drama went on. Sherman airived 
 
 * " They had for two clays confronted the enemy marshalling bis 
 immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their siijht such a 
 superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak minds and un- 
 tried soldiers." — Bragg's Report. 
 
528 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 from beliind Waldeu's ridge, at tlie apj^oiDtecl cross- 
 ing of the Tennessee ; bridges were built like magic, 
 and the army passed on to its position. Meanwhile, 
 Hooker s veterans scaled tke lofty peak that domina- 
 ted over all the landscape, and, all day, they held in 
 their front the six brigades so much needed else- 
 where. Sherman's assault began, and was so deter- 
 mined and at so critical a point, that Bragg tlirew 
 battalion after battalion to resist tke Arni}^ of the 
 Tennessee. That army was indeed resisted, was 
 unable to make its way ; but this was accomplished 
 only by the sacrifice of all that Bragg was fighting 
 for. The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was 
 weakened to save the right ; and then, the whole 
 mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipita- 
 ted on the weakened point ; the centre was pierced, 
 the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga 
 won. Hooker threw his soldiers, flushed with success, 
 on the left of Bras;":, and rolled in that flank, and 
 nothing but rout remained. 
 
 In all these operations, the enemy had been com- 
 pelled to do his part almost as if under Grant's con- 
 trol Braofs: had no choice of movements left him : 
 he ^\■as forced to weaken his left ; he was forced 
 afterwards to defend Mmself on the riglit ; he was 
 forced to make tbe very opportunity at his centre 
 which Grant desired. And, although this battle had 
 not been planned according to any immutable de- 
 sign, nor the commanders directed by any orders 
 that ^vere irreversible, yet each event proceeded 
 regularly according to the calculation ; each subordi- 
 nate carried out his part exactly as he had been 
 ordered ; eacli army, brought from a distance, came 
 upon the spot intended, crossed a river, or climbed a 
 
ULYSSES S. OH ANT. 529 
 
 mouutain, at the precise nionieiit ; aud even the un- 
 expected emergencies of the fight contributed to the 
 result, as if anticipated and arranged. In tliis re- 
 spect, Chattanooga was one of the most notable bat- 
 tles ever fought. 
 
 There were, however, other considerations which 
 rendered it extraordinary. Not only was it one of the 
 grandest spectacles in modern war ; not only was it 
 so peculiar in plan and development, and so impor- 
 tant in results, but it had a remarkably fortunate 
 effect upon the armies engaged. Three hosts com- 
 bined: one, coming from the valley of the Mississip- 
 pi, loaded with laurels ; another, fresh from the 
 famous fields of the Potomac; and the third was the 
 great Army of the Cumberland, whose foot was on its 
 native hills, but which, through two long years that 
 it had been struggling for this veiy advantage, had 
 met with only incomj^lete success. Once or twice, 
 after bloody battle, it had indeed remained master of 
 the field, but the full advantages of victory it had 
 never reaped ; for, although it had really won Chat- 
 tanooga, the possession of the prize had remained in- 
 secure ; the fruits of its labor had been turned into 
 ashes before they could be enjoyed. But, now. For- 
 tune's bandage seemed to have fallen from her eyes, 
 and she distributed rewards with an impartial hand. 
 The Eastern troops had carried the most conspicuous 
 position on the field, and won a strange and i)ic- 
 turesque renown, forever associating their names 
 with the mighty mountain that stands at the gate 
 of the South ; the AVestern army had fought harder 
 and longer, and with less brilliant results than either 
 of the others, but, by its persistent gallantry, had 
 rendered possible the great success of tlie day ; while 
 
 34 
 
530 MILITAET HISTOKY OF 
 
 it was fitly reserved for the Army of the Cumber- 
 land to Min the crowning victory over its old enemy, 
 to carry the heights that had confronted it so long, 
 and, in sight of Chickamauga, to accomplish that 
 which Chickamauga had disastrously delayed. 
 
 For, the way was now thrown open to Atlanta, and 
 all the rich country in its rear ; the very heart of the 
 rebellion was laid bare ; the great bulwark of the 
 would-be Confederacy was broken down, was become, 
 instead, a sally-port for the national armies ; the 
 rebel hosts, that had stood in the way, were thrust 
 aside, and Chattanooga, thenceforth, was as terrible 
 a menace to rebellion, as in times past it had been 
 defiant to loyalty. 
 
ULYSSES 8. GRANT. 531 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Knoxville still in danger — Granger sent to Burnside — Granger moves reluctantly 
 — Sherman sent to Burnside — Sherman moves with vigor — Burnside falls 
 back before Longstreet — Battle at Campbell's station — Retreat to Knoxville 
 —Defences of Knoxville — Siege of Knoxville — Aid from loyal Tennesscans — 
 Longstreet determines to assault — Strength and position of Fort Sanders — 
 Assault of Fort Sanders — Repulse of Longstreet — Approach of Sherman — 
 Raising of siege — Retreat of Longstreet — Burnside sends Sherman back to 
 Biawassee — Parke's pursuit of Longstreet — Burnside relieved by Foster — 
 Results of entire campaign — Congratulations of President — Thanks of Con- 
 gress — Miscalculation of B\irnside — Battle of Bean's station— Success of 
 Longstreet — Longstreet winters in Tennessee — Disappointment of Grant — 
 — Grant proposes movement against Mobile — Bragg relieved by Hardee — 
 Furloughing of veterans — Grant's visit to Knoxville — Impossibility of win- 
 ter campaign — Germ of Meridian raid — Distribution of forces for winter — 
 Sherman sent to Vicljsburg— Grant's plan for ensuing year — Mobile and At- 
 lanta objective and intermediate points — Sooy Smith's orders — Sherman's 
 march from Vicksburg— Seizure of Meridian— Destruction of railroad— Fail- 
 ure of Smith to cooperate — Sherman returns to Vicksburg— Smith retreats 
 to Memphis— Results of Meridian raid— Cooperation of Thomas— Johnston 
 in command of rebel army — Movements in East Tennessee — Grant ordered 
 to Washington. 
 
 But the task that liad been set for Grant was 
 even yet not fiiUy performed. Bragg had indeed 
 been driven back, and Chattanooga made secure, but 
 Burnside was still threatened by a redoubtable force, 
 and the capture of Knoxville was imminent. On the 
 28th of Novenil)er, Grant returned from the front, to 
 Chattanooga, and found that Granger's corps had not 
 yet started for the relief of Burnside. A whole day 
 
532 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 had tlius been lost, when every Lour was invaluable, 
 and Grant at once liurried off to Knoxville tbe reen- 
 forcements so much needed there. 
 
 Meanwhile, Major-General John G. Foster had 
 been sent from Washington, to supersede Burnside, 
 and went direct to Cumberland gap, where there 
 were about three thousand national soldiers. He 
 could not, however, approach nearer to Knoxville, 
 now so closely besieged. On the 28th, Grant tele- 
 graphed to Foster : " The Fourth corps, Major-Gen- 
 eral Granger commanding, left here to-day, with 
 orders to push with all possible speed through to 
 Knoxville. Sherman is already in motion for Hia- 
 wassee, and will go all the way, if necessary. . . . Com- 
 municate this information to Burnside, as soon as 
 possible, and at any cost ; with directions to hold to 
 the very last moment, and we shall not only relieve 
 him, but destroy Longstreet." The next day, he 
 wrote to Granger, at length: ". . . . On the 23d in- 
 stant, General Burnside telegraphed that his rations 
 would hold out ten or twelve days ; at the end of 
 this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must 
 surrender or retreat. The latter will be an impossi- 
 bility. You are now going for the purpose of reliev- 
 ino; this i>;arrison. You see the short time in which 
 relief must be afforded or be too late, and hence the 
 necessity for forced marches. I want to urge upon 
 you, in the strongest possible manner, the neces- 
 sity of reaching Burnside in the shortest possible 
 time " 
 
 But Gransrer moved Avith reluctance and com- 
 plaint, and, on the 29th, Grant said to Sherman : 
 " Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I 
 have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to 
 
ULYSSES S. GKAXT. ;j33 
 
 mana2:e an ex2:)edition of the importance of this one. 
 I am inclined to think, therefore, that I sliall have to 
 send you. Push, as rapidly as you can, to the Ilia- 
 wassee, and determine for yourself what force to take 
 with you from that point. Grancrer has his corps 
 Avith him, from which you will select, in conjunction 
 with the forces now with you. In plain words, you 
 will assume command of all the forces now movinsr 
 up the Tennessee." 
 
 At the same time, he sent a disjiatch, in dupli- 
 cate, to the officer in command at Kingston ; one 
 copy was to be let " fall into the hands of the enemy, 
 without fail." The other " you must 2:et to General 
 Burnside, at all hazards, and at the earliest possible 
 moment." The dispatch was in these words : " I con- 
 gratulate you on the tenacity with which you have 
 thus far held out against vastly superior forces. Do 
 not be forced into a surrender by short rations. 
 Take all the citizens have, to enable you to hold out 
 yet a few days longer. As soon as you are relieved 
 from the presence of the enemy, you can replace to 
 them every thing taken from tliem. AVithin a few 
 days you will be relieved. There are now three col- 
 umns in motion for your relief. One, from here, 
 moving up the south bank of the river, under Sher- 
 man ; one from Decherd, under Elliott,* and one from 
 Cumberland gap, under Foster. These three col- 
 umns will be able to crush Longstreet's forces, or 
 drive them from the valley, and must all of them be 
 within twenty-four hours' march of you, l)y the time 
 this reaches you, supposing you to get it on Tuesday, 
 the 1st instant." 
 
 * The movements of Elliott were delayed, and had no efTect upou 
 the subsequent operations. 
 
584 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 Sliennan had hardly entered the town of Charles- 
 ton, when he received Grant's letter of the 29th, 
 directing him to take command of all troops moving 
 to the relief of Burnside. Seven days before, the 
 Fifteenth corps had left its camps on the other side 
 of the Tennessee, with two days' rations, andstrij)ped 
 for the fight ; with but a single blanket or coat 
 apiece, from the commander down to the private sol- 
 dier. They had no provisions, save what they gath- 
 ered on the road ; a poor supply for such a march. 
 But, twelve thousand of their brethren were belea- 
 guered in the mountain town of Knoxville, eighty 
 miles away ; relief was needed, and within three days ; 
 and no man murmured. 
 
 Til at night, Howard repaired and planked the 
 railroad bridge, and, at daylight, the army passed the 
 Hiawassee, and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. 
 On the 1st of December, Sherman sent word to Gran- 
 ger, who was a day in advance, and had arrived at 
 Decatur, that he must strike across to Philadelphia, 
 with his command, and form a junction there. On the 
 2d, the army moved rapidly north towards Loudon, 
 twenty-six miles further. The cavalry passed to the 
 head of the column, in order to save, if possible, a 
 pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, at that place ; 
 but, a rebel brigade with artillery in position pre- 
 vented this, and darkness closed in, before the infan- 
 try arrived. The rebels, however, deserted the place 
 in the night, destroying the pontoons, and running 
 three locomotives and forty-eiglit cars into tlie Ten- 
 nessee ; they also abandoned four guns and large 
 stores of material, which Howard seized at daylight. 
 But the river is seventeen hundred feet across, at 
 Loudon, and the bridge was gone. Sherman was 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. .535 
 
 forced to turn liis column east, and trust to Burn- 
 side's bridge at Knoxville. 
 
 Only one day remained of the time wlilcli Burn- 
 side Lad promised to hold out, and it was now all- 
 important that he should be notified of Sherman's 
 approach. A cavalry force under Long was, there- 
 fore, ordered to start at once, and to ford the Little 
 Tennessee, and push into Knoxville, at whatever cost 
 of life or horse-flesh. The distance was forty miles, 
 and the roads execrable. 
 
 Before dawn, the cavalry was off, and at daylight, 
 the Fifteenth corps turned from Philadeli)liia to the 
 Little Tennessee, at Morgantown, expecting to find a 
 ford. But the river was too deep, and tlie water 
 freezing cold ; the width was two hundred and forty 
 yards. A bridge was indispensable. There were no 
 pioneers, and only such tools as axes, picks, and 
 spades ; but a bridge was constructed, with crib- 
 work and trestles made of the houses of the late 
 town of Morgantown ; and, by dark, of December 
 4th, troops and animals were passing. The Fifteenth 
 corps was across before daylight ; but the bridge 
 broke, and Granger's corps ^vith Davis's division was 
 left on the western side. 
 
 At this juncture, word was received from Burn- 
 side. On the 14th of November, the bulk of his 
 force was distributed between Kingston, Knoxville, 
 Loudon, and Lenoir. He now knew, certainly, that 
 Longstreet's corps was moving up against him ; he 
 had conferred with General "Wilson, of Grant's staff, 
 and with Mr. Dana, of the War Department, whom 
 Grant had sent to him for this purpose ; and decided 
 that he could better carry out Grant's views, by draw- 
 ing Longstreet further away from the rebel army 
 
536 3IILITAr.Y HISTORY OF 
 
 at Cliattauooga, tlian by checking liim at Loudon. 
 Early on the morning of the 15th, therefore, Burn- 
 side "withdrew from Loudon, and fell back leisurely 
 in the direction of Knoxville, the trains being sent in 
 advance. That night, lie encamped at Lenoir ; on 
 the 16th, he again started for Knoxville, by way of 
 Campbell's station. But, by this time, Longstreet 
 had crossed the Tennessee, on a pontoon bridge 
 brought up to Loudon ; and, taking a shorter road, 
 which Burnside ought to have held, endeavored to 
 reach Campbell's station first, and thus cut off the 
 national forces from Knoxville. Burnside had, with 
 him, only about five thousand troops, and, making a 
 forced march, he succeeded in reaching Campbell's 
 station first ; and at once took steps to hold the forks 
 of the roads, while the trains passed on. A serious 
 fight occurred here, the rebels numbering at least ten 
 thousand men ; and Burnside was driven back about 
 a mile, but no other damage was sustained. He held 
 the important point, and most of his wagons were 
 secured. His loss, in killed, wounded and missing, 
 was about three hundred. That of the rebels is not 
 known.* During the night, tlie national troops fell 
 back, to Knoxville, fourteen miles; but Longstreet 
 did not advance until daylight. 
 
 A line of works was at once established at Knox- 
 ville ; and the troops were called in from all the sur- 
 rounding country. Of these, however, many were 
 raw, and many others were simply loyal Tennesseans, 
 without organization or discipline, who crowded in to 
 defend their mountain fortress. The defensive line 
 extended from the Holston river on the left, across 
 
 * Longstreet does not mention his losses in this battle, in his official 
 report. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 537 
 
 the railroad, to the river again, on the right. De- 
 tached works were also built on the hills on the 
 southern side of the Holston. The rebel front ex- 
 tended only on the north side of the Holston, though 
 Lougstreet's cavalry made excursions to the rear of 
 the town. The enemy, however, could not move 
 across the Holston, without exposing his own line of 
 communication with Loudon. Still, Burnside was 
 practically besieged. His force was now about 
 twelve thousand effective men, exclusive of the loyal 
 Tennesseans, who amounted to at least three thou- 
 sand more. Before the end of the siege, Longstreet 
 had between twenty and twenty-three thousand men, 
 including cavalry. 
 
 Many of the citizens and farmers, who had been 
 driven in by the enemy, volunteered to work in the 
 trenches, and did good service; while those who, 
 from disloyalty, were disinclined, were compelled to 
 the unwelcome task. The negroes were particularly 
 willing, during the entire siege. All the beef-cattle 
 and hogs belonging to the commissary department, 
 and many belonging to citizens, were driven into the 
 town, Avhere they were slaughtered and salted. Or- 
 ders were issued reducing the rations; and, within 
 three or four days, the issue of small rations was 
 entirely discontinued ; * the supply being so small 
 that it was necessary to reserve it exclusively for 
 the hospitals. All useless animals were killed and 
 thrown into the river, to save forage. Efforts were 
 made to collect forage and supplies, along the French 
 Broad river and the Seviersville road, whicli remained 
 open to the besieged ; and loyal farmers sent «lo^vn 
 
 * The essential part of a ration is meat ami brca<l ; whatever else is 
 issued is called the mall ration, though no such name is known to the law. 
 
538 3IILITARY HISTOEY OF 
 
 the river, on flats, large amounts of grain and meat, 
 under cover of the dense fogs which prevailed at 
 night, at that period. Nothing else saved the garri- 
 son from absolute want. 
 
 By the 20th of November, the line was in such 
 condition that entire confidence was felt by both 
 commander and troops in their ability to hold it. 
 Every possible means of strengthening the defences 
 was still, however, resorted to. Creeks were dam- 
 med, and the back water from them created for- 
 midable ditches, in front of a large portion of the 
 line ; abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and wire entanglements 
 were constructed, wherever necessary. A pontoon- 
 bridge across the Holston facilitated all of Burnside's 
 movements ; and when the rebel cavalry, above, 
 floated rafts down the Holston, to break this bridge, 
 the engineers biult a boom which effectually defeated 
 the attempt. Longstreet, meanwhile, did nothing 
 but establish his own line, make reconnoissances, feel 
 Burnside's force, and fight various skirmishes. More 
 than a week elapsed without any movement of im- 
 portance, excej)t a feeble attempt to gain the heights 
 on the southern side of the river, which was easily 
 repulsed. During this time, Burnside continued to 
 strengthen his fortifications ; especially a work at 
 the northwest angle of his line, known as Fort San- 
 ders. His problem was simple. He had only to 
 hold out until his fate was decided at Chattanooofa. 
 There, the battle was to be fought which should save 
 or destroy the Army of the Ohio. 
 
 Longstreet, at last, got word from Bragg, that 
 Grant was about to attack him, on Missionary ridge. 
 After this, two brigades of cavalry reenforced Long- 
 street, from the rebel command in the eastern part of 
 
ULYSSES S. GliANT. 539 
 
 tlie valley; and, on the 27tli, two l^rigades of Buck- 
 ner's force reached liim from Bragg's army. Tlien, 
 rumors came tliick, to the rebel leader, of a battle at 
 Chattanooga, and, finally, reports that Bragg had 
 fallen back to Tunnel hill. Longstreet at once 
 determined to assault the works of Knoxville. He 
 considered, that in the event of Bragg's defeat, the 
 only safety for the i-ebels was to achieve success in 
 Tennessee. His generals protested, and wished to 
 withdraw towards Virginia; but Longstreet was 
 firm, and said : " Our only safety is in making the 
 assault upon the enemy's position. ... It is a great 
 mistake in supposing that there is any safety for us 
 in going to Virginia, if General Bragg has been de- 
 feated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors ; 
 and, with his army destroyed, our own had better be 
 also, for we must not only be destroyed, but dis- 
 graced. There is neither safety nor honor in any 
 other course than the one which I have already 
 chosen and ordered." In this magnificent spirit, 
 which it is impossible not to admire, even in an 
 enemy, Longstreet ordered an assault on Fort San- 
 ders.'^' 
 
 This fort stood on high ground west of Knoxville, 
 between the Holston river and the raih'oad. The 
 location had been originally selected by the rebels, 
 but a new work was^ perfected, after tlie national 
 occupation, by the efibrts of the engineers ; and 
 named after a gallant ofticer who fell on the second 
 day of the siege. Fort Sanders was chosen as the 
 
 * Longstreet's correspondence, both with Bragg and with his in- 
 feriors, breathes everywhere the truest soldierly spirit, and makes one 
 regret that so fine a nature should have been enlisted in an unworthy 
 cause. 
 
540 -UILITAEY IIISTOKY OF 
 
 point of attack by Longstreet, because success, here, 
 involved tlie destruction, if not the capture, of Knox- 
 ville ; wliile, to assault any wliere else, would leave 
 Lis line of communication exposed to counter-attack. 
 Besides this, Burnside had a double line of works 
 extending from the fort to the Holston ; and, on the 
 north side of the town, the dammius: of the creeks 
 and consequent overflow had rendered the country 
 impracticable. So, although Foii; Sanders was in 
 reality the strongest point on Burnside's line, it also 
 offered great advantages to the attacking party. 
 
 At dark, on the 28th, the rebel line of sharpshoot- 
 ers was advanced to within rifle-rano-e of the national 
 line, and ordered to sink rifle-pits during the night, 
 in this advanced position, so that, all along the line, 
 the enemy might engage on an equal footing with the 
 besieged, while the columns were making the assault 
 on the fort. Sixty or seventy prisoners fell into the 
 hands of the rebels, before morning ; and, this, with 
 other developments, made the besieged fully aware 
 that an assault was contemplated. Preparations 
 were accordingly made to resist. 
 
 At about half-past six, a. x., on the 29th, the enemy 
 opened a furious artillery fire on the fort ; the national 
 batteries remained silent, the men quietly awaiting 
 the assault. The fort was so protected by traverses, 
 that only one man was injured during this heavy fii'e. 
 Two comjianies of the Second Michigan infantry were 
 stationed in the ditch, at the salient, to pick off the reb- 
 els ^vhen they approached. In about twenty minutes, 
 the cannonading ceased, and a fire of musketry was 
 opened by the enemy ; at the same time, a heavy col- 
 umn, which liad been concentrated durinir the niirht, 
 charged on the bastion, at a run. Great numbers 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 541 
 
 fell, in passing over tlie entanglements ; Lut the weight 
 of the column was such as to force forward the ad- 
 vance ; and, in two or three minutes, it had reached 
 the ditch and attempted to scale the pai-apet. The 
 Michigan soldiers, in the ditch, at once ran back on 
 each side of the salient ; and the national guns opened 
 on the rebels with triple rounds of canister; while 
 the infantiy either shot or knocked back with their 
 muskets, all tliose whose heads appeared above the 
 parapet. The forces placed on the flanks of the fort 
 had also a cross-fii-e on the ground over which the 
 enemy approached. 
 
 The rebels, in utter confusion, strove to return, 
 but the fii'st column of attack was speedily reenforced 
 by a second, which pushed up to the foi-ts as desper- 
 ately as the other. It also was driven. back, and with 
 equal slaughter. Most of those who reached the ditch 
 were killed, or mortally wounded; and such as could 
 not retreat, surrendered; of these last, as many as 
 five hundred. Only one rebel got over the parapet 
 alive. The ground between the fort and the rebel 
 line was strewm with the dead, and the wounded 
 crying for help ; and, after the repulse was fully estab- 
 lished, Burnside tendered to the enemy a flag of 
 truce, for the purpose of burying the dead and caring 
 for the wounded. The rebels lost over a thousand 
 men," and Burnside only thirteen. 
 
 In this assault, Longstreet had at first three bri- 
 gades actually engaged, and, subsequently, a fourth ; 
 besides the two brigades of Buckner's division, ^vliich 
 
 * I have bccu obliged to take my estimate of rebel losses from 
 Burusidc's report, as Longstreet's contains no statement of Lis losses. 
 The description of the assault is made up from both reports, between 
 which there is no discrepancy. 
 
542 MILITAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 were in support, but not actually put into battle. 
 These were, however, exposed to the artillery fire 
 from the fort. Burnside's force was two hundred and 
 twenty men, and eleven guns. The infantry was 
 composed of portions of the Seventy-ninth New York 
 and the Second Michigan volunteers, under Brigadier- 
 General Ferrero ; the artillery, consisting of Benjamin's 
 light battery, Second United States artillery, and a 
 part of Buckley's volunteer battery, was commanded 
 by Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin, who in reality in- 
 spired and directed the whole defence of the fort. The 
 coolness of the men, however, was admirable. To 
 this, in a great measure, was due the remarkable dis- 
 parity in losses. The rebels were obliged to advance 
 about t\YO hundred and fifty yards, without cover; 
 and tlie defendants waited until they were absolutely 
 at the ditch, before deliverins: fire. All the ensrineer 
 operations, during the siege, were under the charge of 
 Captain (now Brevet Brigadier-General) O. M. Poe.* 
 About half an hour after the repulse, Longstreet 
 received a dispatch from ]\Ir. Jefi:erson Davis, the 
 pretended rebel president, announcing the defeat of 
 Bragg, and directing Longstreet to cooperate with the 
 retreating columns from Chattanooga. He at once 
 ordered his trains to be put in motion for Loudon, so 
 that his army might follow as soon as possible, to 
 rejoin Bragg. But, getting reports, soon after, of an 
 advance of national troops from Cleveland, to interrupt 
 this junction, Longstreet recalled his trains, and deter- 
 mined to continue the siege, until heavy" reenforce- 
 
 * Captain Poe was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Brevet- 
 Brigadicr-General) O. E. Babcock, captain of engineers, who, although 
 on duty as iuspector-general, performed important service as en- 
 gineer. 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 543 
 
 ments should arrive for Burnside. He reasoned that 
 Grant would tlius be obliged to desist from the pur- 
 suit of Bragg, in order to save Knoxville; and lie 
 reasoned vrelh 
 
 On the 1st of December, Grant's dispatch to 
 Burnside, wliicli had been intended to fall into Lone:- 
 street's hands, was captured by the rebel scouts, and 
 the enemy thus got information of tlie advance of 
 Sherman. Lon2:street himself was now cut off from 
 all supplies, and driven to subsist off the countr}-. 
 The rebel command at Loudon was at once ordered to 
 fall back on Knoxville. 
 
 On tlie 2d, Burnside got information of Sherman's 
 approach ; and, the same day, Longstreet determined 
 to abandon the sieo-e, and retreat in the direction of 
 Virginia; his trains were put in motion on the 3cl, 
 to cross the Holston, at Strawberry plains ; and, on 
 the nigbt of the 4th, the troops withdrew from the 
 Tvest side of Knoxville, and marched around to the 
 east side, where they took up a line of march along 
 the north bank of the Holston. This movement was 
 unmolested by Burnside, and ^vas made in remark- 
 ably good order. 
 
 Sherman, meanwhile, had repaired the bridge at 
 Morgantown, and marched to Marysville; Howard 
 constructinc: a brids^e out of the rebel waj^ons left at 
 Loudon, over whicli he crossed his men. On the 5th, 
 all the heads of columns communicated, at ^larysville, 
 where Shennan received word from Burnside that 
 Longstreet had raised the siege, and was in full retreat 
 to Virginia. Sherman had previously sent the follow- 
 ing note to Burnside, who was his senior : " Marj'S- 
 ville, December 5, 1863. I am liere, and can bring 
 twenty-five thousand men into Knoxville to-morrow ; 
 
544 :^riLiTAET histoey of 
 
 but Longstreet having retreated, I feel disposed to 
 stop, for a stern cliase is a long one. But I will do 
 all that is possible. Without you specify that you 
 want troops, I will let mine rest to-mon-ow, and ride 
 to see you " 
 
 On the 6th, accordingly, Sherman rode over to 
 Burnside's headquarters, ordering all his troops to 
 halt, exce]3t the two divisions of Granger, which were 
 directed to move forward to Little river, and Granger 
 to report in person to Burnside, for orders. 
 
 Burnside declared that he needed nothino- from 
 Sherman but Grano;er's command, which had been 
 originally designed to reenforce him ; and suggested 
 that Sherman should return to the Hiawassee, with 
 the rest of his army, lest Bragg should take advan- 
 tage of the absence of so large a force, to assume the 
 offensive."' Accordingly, having seen Burnside move 
 out of Knoxville, in pursuit of Longstreet, and Gran- 
 ger move in, Sherman put his own command in mo- 
 
 * Major- General W. T. Shekman, commanding, etc. 
 
 Ge^^eral: I desire to express to you and your commanci, my most 
 hearty thanks and gratitude, for your i^romj^tness in coming to our 
 relief during the siege of Knoxville; and I am satisfied your ai> 
 proach served to raise the siege. 
 
 The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the ijresent any 
 other portion of your command, but the corps of General Granger, 
 necessary for operations in this section ; and, inasmuch as General 
 Grant has weakened the force immediately with him, in order to re- 
 lieve us, thereby rendering the position of General Thomas less secure, 
 I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those command- 
 ed by General Granger, should return at once to within sujiporting 
 distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army. 
 
 In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your 
 command for the kindness you have done us. 
 
 I am, general, very respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 A. E. BURNSIDE, 
 Major- General commanding. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 545 
 
 tlon to return. His approach had served to raise the 
 siege. 
 
 On tlie morning of the 7th, the commands of 
 Potter and Manson started out in pursuit of Lono-- 
 street, under Major-General Parke, Burnside's chief 
 of staff; and, on the 10th, Foster arrived at Knox- 
 ville, from CumherLand gap. On the 11th, he 
 assumed command of the Department of the Ohio. 
 Burnside left Knoxville, on the 12th, for Cincin- 
 nati. 
 
 On the 8th, the President sent the followin<r dis- 
 patch to Grant : " Understanding that your lodg- 
 ment at Chattanooga and at Knoxville is now secure, 
 I wish to tender you and all under your command 
 my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for 
 the skill, courage, and perseverance, with which you 
 and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that 
 im23ortant object. God bless you all." 
 
 And so, at last, the work was really achieved. 
 The occupation and liberation of Tennessee were 
 accomplished ; the whole rebel line was driven back ; 
 the rebel communication between the Atlantic and 
 the Mississippi forever broken ; the mountains and 
 rivers which had been the fortress and defences of 
 the would-be confederacy were captured or turned ; 
 the fertile plains, which had yielded it supplies, 
 were converted into granaries for the government ; 
 the besie2:ed towns were relieved ; the endaniicered 
 armies rendered in their turn formidable to the 
 enemy ; and the loyal j^opulation of East Tennessee 
 made henceforth safe from the persecutions of dis- 
 loyalty. 
 
 Again the nation's heart was lifted up in hope 
 and gratitude. On the 7th of December, the Presi- 
 
 35 
 
546 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 dent issued a proclamation, recommending all loyal 
 people to assemble in their places of worship, and 
 return thanks to God for this great advancement of 
 the national cause. On the l7th of the same month, 
 Congress unanimously voted a resolution of " thanks 
 to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and the officers 
 and soldiers who have fought under his command, 
 during this rebellion ; " and a gold medal ^vas struck, 
 which it was provided that the President should pre- 
 sent to Grant, "in the name of the people of the 
 United States of America." Grant declared, in his 
 official report, that "the Armies of the Cumberland 
 and the Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpassed 
 braveiy in the three days' battle of Chattanooga, 
 their patient endurance in marching to the relief of 
 Knoxville; and the Army of the Ohio, for its mas- 
 terly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of 
 Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving 
 of the gratitude of their country;" a meed which 
 their country did not fail to bestow. 
 
 Grant had given all his generals in East Tennes- 
 see repeated and positive ordei's to drive Longstreet's 
 army completely out of the state. His whole plan 
 was, either to annihilate that command, or to place 
 it where it could do no further mischief to any part 
 of his military division. On the 30th of November, 
 he said to Foster, then at Cumberland gap : " If 
 Longstreet is retreating up the valley, would it not 
 l)e well to strike for Abingdon ? " To Sherman, on 
 the 1st of December, he wrote : " When you start 
 upon your return to this place, after it is known that 
 East Tennessee is cleared of all formidable bodies of 
 the enemy," etc. To Foster, on the 2d : " Sherman 
 will reach Knoxville to-morrow, or the day following. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 547 
 
 His force is large, and Longstreet must retreat baton' 
 it, without much fi<2;]itin2:. I do not see how his 
 route can be any other than up tlie valley. You 
 will, no doubt, be able to inflict a heavy blow upon 
 his retreating column." Again, on the Gth, to Fos- 
 ter : " Instruct your cavaliy to follow Longstreet to 
 the last minute. It is not necessary that they should 
 attack the main force, but follow up the rear, hasten 
 the retreat, pick up stragglers, and destroy the road 
 as far east as possible. If your troops can get as tar 
 as Saltville " (in Virginia) " and destroy the works 
 there, it will be an immense loss to the enemy." 
 And on the 8th, to Sherman : " Keep your troops in 
 the valley of the Tennessee, until it seems clear that 
 the enemy have entirely aT)andoned the state." To 
 Foster, on the 12th: "Drive Longstreet to the far- 
 thest point east you can." And on the 14th : "Do 
 all you can to harass the enemy and drive him as far 
 to the east as possible." Verbal instructions to the 
 same effect were sent to Burnside, by a staff officer. 
 
 But Burnside miscalculated entirely the needs of 
 his own command, and the intentions and abilities 
 of the enemy. Supposing that Longstreet would 
 evacuate the state, he sent Sherman back to the 
 Hiawassee, retaining only Granger's command, f<^r 
 pursuit of Longstreet; and the opportunity for de- 
 stroying that commander was lost. Longstreet was 
 too able, not to perceive the mistake of his antago- 
 nist ; and, before the mistake could be rectified, the 
 mischief was irremediable. Sherman moved back 
 towards Chattanooga, under the instructions of Burn- 
 side; and, on the Tth, after three days' delay, Parke 
 was sent out after the fleeing enemy. 
 
 Longstreet had Ijeen ordered, some days before, to 
 
548 3IILITARY niSTOEY OF 
 
 send back Wheeler's cavalry to Bragg's army ; but, 
 at the moment of raising tlie siege, he judged it un- 
 safe to obey ; finding, however, that he was not hard 
 pressed, he dismissed his cavalry, on the 8th, to 
 Georgia, and marched himself for Rogersville. His 
 column reached that place on the 9th. Here, he dis- 
 covered that the resources of the country were abun- 
 dant to subsist him for the winter, and sent out his 
 trains to collect provisions. Receiving discretionary 
 orders, he, next day, recalled one brigade of Wheeler's 
 cavalry. On the 12th, he learned that a portion of 
 Burnside's force had returned to Chattanooga, and that 
 a small body of troops, principally cavalry, was scat- 
 tered between Rutledge and Bean's station ; Parke's 
 main force being as far off as Blain's cross-roads, twenty 
 miles. He, accordingly, fell upon the national cavalry 
 at Bean's station, with a superior force, and compelled 
 it to retreat, handling it roughly, and capturing a 
 wagon-train loaded with supplies. The troops were 
 thus subjected to the mortification of retreat, at the 
 very moment when they sliould have been pushing 
 the enemy into Virginia. Parke's advance fell back 
 as far as Blain's roads. 
 
 Lono-street then moved to the south side of the Hoi- 
 ston, at Russelville, and ordered his command to make 
 shelters for the winter. The country was rich, abound- 
 ing in grain and meat. The rebels had suffered 
 greatly for want of rations and forage, and nothing 
 more fortunate for them could have occurred, than 
 that this corps should remain in East Tennessee. 
 There, all winter, Longstreet did remain, threatening 
 Foster, and subsisting off of a population for the most 
 part loyal. His position occasioned great anxiety to 
 the government and to Grant. It rendered posses- 
 
rLTSSES S. GEANT. 549 
 
 sion of Knoxville, if not insecure, at least less certain; 
 and the season, Avliicli is extremely inclement among 
 these mountains, was now too far advanced fur further 
 military operations. It was useless to send other 
 troops to Knoxville, as the advantage that had been 
 lost could not be regained, before spring ; and the 
 rebels were left with this fulcrum for movements 
 whenever the campaign of next year should begin. 
 The retention of Sherman's column a week or two 
 longer in East Tennessee would, undoubtedly, have 
 obviated this disarrangement of Grant's plans.'^' 
 
 On the 'Tth of December, Grant announced: "It 
 may now safely be assumed that the enemy are driven 
 fi'om the front, or, at least, that they no longer threaten 
 it in formidable numbers." He, therefore, that day, 
 renewed his suggestion of a campaign against Mol )ile. 
 "The country south of this is extremely mountainous, 
 affording but little for the support of an army ; the 
 roads are bad, at all times, and the season is so far 
 advanced that an effective campaign from here, this 
 winter, may be looked upon as impossible. Our sup- 
 plies and means of transportation would not admit 
 of a very early campaign, if the season did. ... I pro- 
 
 * On the 20tli of January, Grant said to llallcck : " It was a jrrcat 
 oversigbt, in the first place, to have ever permitted Longstreet to come 
 to a stop within the state of Tennessee, after the siege was raised. 
 My instructions were full and complete on this subject. Sherman was 
 sent with forces sufficient alone, to defeat Longstreet ; and, notwith- 
 standing the long distance the troops had marched, proposed to go on 
 and carry out my instructions in full. General Bumside was sanguine 
 that no stop would be made by the enemy in the valley. Sherman 
 then proposed to leave any amount of force Bumside thought might be 
 necessary to make his position perfectly secure. He deemed two divis- 
 ions ample. ... I write this now particularly to show that the latter 
 named officer " (Sherman) " is in no wise to blame for the existing state 
 of affiiirs in East Tennessee." 
 
550 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 pose, with tlie concurrence of liiglier autliority, to 
 move by way of Kew Orleans and Pascagoula, on 
 Mobile. I would hope to secure that place, or its in- 
 vestment, by the last of January." 
 
 The government, however, did not see fit to author- 
 ize the movement, and Grant himself ceased to urge 
 it, when he discovered tliat Longstreet was likely to 
 winter in Tennessee. On the 17th, he said : " I feel 
 deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Salt- 
 vills, this winter, so as to be able to select my own cam- 
 paign in the spring, instead of liaving the enemy dictate 
 it for me." This was in harmony with the constant 
 habit and purpose of Grant. In all his campaigns, 
 he strove to take the initiative ; experience had taught 
 him that thus he was far more likely to succeed ; but, 
 before his experience began, he had acted on the same 
 principle; his instincts prompted this coui'se. His 
 philosophy, like that of most men, was in accord with 
 his character and temperament, and, 2~)robably, as 
 much the result of these as the product of thought or 
 experience. At Paducah, Belmont, Donelsou, Vieks- 
 burg, and Chattanooga, he had been able to act on 
 this plan ; at Shiloh, Corinth, and luka, the enemy 
 had taken the initiative. In the first cases, success 
 amply confirmed his views ; and, in the latter, the 
 added difiiculties which the course of the rebels im- 
 posed, were fully as strong corroboration. 
 
 Immediately after the battle of Chattanooga, 
 Bragg was relieved from the command of his anny, 
 and temporarily succeeded by Lieutenant-General 
 Hardee. It is a little singular to remark how often 
 this fate befell the rebel commanders who were op- 
 posed to Grant. In diff'erent parts of the theatre of 
 war, he had been met by Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, 
 
ULYSSES S. OllANT. Ijol 
 
 Van Dorn, Price, Pembertoii, and Bragg ; every one 
 of whom was either superseded soon after an impor- 
 tant battle, or captured. The parallel was destined 
 not to cease at Chattanooga. 
 
 During the autumn and winter of 18G3, the terms 
 of service of most of the volunteer troops exi)ired ; 
 and, in order to induce the men to reenlist, large 
 bounties were offered them, and a furlough of sixty 
 days. The consequence was, that a very large propor- 
 tion renewed their engagement with the government ; 
 but the immediate effect experienced by commanders 
 in the field was unfavorable. The great deduction 
 made from their forces, by the furloughing, reduced 
 the effective strength, sometimes, ten or twenty 
 thousand men at a time, in a single army. Grant, 
 commanding so many armies, was of course propor- 
 tionately hampered by w^hat, however, was sure to 
 be a benefit in the end. Still, the season for active 
 operations, except at the extreme south, was in reality 
 past. 
 
 About Christmas, Grant went in person to Knox- 
 ville, to inspect the country and the command, and 
 intending to take such steps as would effectually drive 
 out Longstreet from the valley. lie found, however, 
 a large part of Foster's command suffering for clotli- 
 in<^, especially shoes; so that not more than two- 
 thii'ds of the men could be taken in any advance. 
 The weather was extremely inclement, and many of 
 the troops stood in line with only a blanket to cover 
 their nakedness. The difficulties of supplying the 
 command were so prodigious that great suffering 
 ensued. Ko railroad could be built under two months, 
 at soonest ; the fall in the rivers frequently interfered 
 with the transportation of supplies ; and, now, that the 
 
552 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 roads Lad become well-nigli impassable, by reason of 
 snow and ice, to send reenforcements would only be 
 to put more men on insufficient rations. Under these 
 circumstances, Grant made only such changes in the 
 position of troops as would place Foster nearer the 
 rebels, Avhenever he should be in a condition to move, 
 and as would open to the national foi'ces new fora- 
 ging-grounds, at the same time reducing those of the 
 enemy. " Troops, " he said to Halleck, " must depend 
 for subsistence on what they can get from the country, 
 and the little we can send from Chattanooga. " 
 
 Soon after this, Foster was relieved from duty at 
 his own request, an old wound received in the Mexi- 
 can war having reopened; and Major-General John M. 
 Schoiield was, at Grant's desire, appointed to the 
 command of the Department of the Ohio. Schofield, 
 however, did not arrive at Knoxville till the 9th of 
 February. 
 
 On the 11th of December, Grant wrote to McPher- 
 son, who had been left in command at Vicksburg : 
 " I shall start a cavalry force through ^Mississippi, in 
 about two weeks, to clean out the state entirely of all 
 rebels. " This was the germ of what has been known 
 as the Meridian raid. On the 23d, he said to Halleck : 
 " I am now collecting as large a cavalry force as can 
 be spared, at Savannah, Tennessee, to cross the Ten- 
 nessee river, and cooperate with the cavalry from 
 Hurlbut's command, in clearing out entirely the 
 forces now collecting in West Tennessee, under For- 
 rest. It is the design, that the cavalry, after finish- 
 ing the work they first stai-t upon, shall push south, 
 through East Mississippi, and destroy the Mobile 
 road, as far south as they can. Sherman goes to Mem- 
 phis and Vicksburg, in person, and will have Gre- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 553 
 
 nacla visited, and sucli other points on tlie Mississippi 
 Central railroad as may require it. ... I want the state 
 of Mississippi so visited tliat large armies cannot trav- 
 erse there, this winter. " 
 
 The force which Sherman had hrouglit from Vicks- 
 burg, was now distributed, under Logan, between Ste- 
 venson and Decatur, guarding tlie railroad, while 
 Dodge's division, of Hurlbut's command, was posted 
 west of Decatur and along tlie line of the Xasliville 
 and Decatur road. Sherman in person started for 
 his new campaign. Howard's corps and Davis's 
 division having been returned to the Army of the 
 Cumberland, tlie Eleventh and Twelfth corps were 
 ordered to guard the railroad from Nashville to 
 Chattanooga ; the Fourteenth corps w^as left at Chat- 
 tanooga; and Granger's force remained all winter, 
 stretched out between Cleveland and Knoxville. 
 
 On the 13th of January, Grant returned from his 
 toui' to Knoxville, by way of Cumberland gap and 
 Lexington, to ISTashville, where his headquarters were 
 now established. On the 15th, he said to Halleck: 
 " Sherman has gone down the Mississippi to collect, at 
 Vicksburg, all the force that can be spared for a 
 separate movement fi*om the Mississippi. He will 
 probably have ready, by the 2-4th of this month, a 
 force of twenty thousand men I shall direct Sher- 
 man, therefore, to move out to Meridian, with his 
 spare force, the cavalry going from Corinth ; and de- 
 stroy the roads east and south of there so eti'ectually, 
 that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them 
 during the rebellion. He will then return, unless 
 opportunity of going into ]\rol)ile with the force he 
 has, appears perfectly plain. Owing to the large 
 number of veterans furloughed, I will not be able to 
 
554 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 do more, at Chattanooga, than to threaten an advance, 
 and try to detain the force now in Thomas's front. 
 Sherman will he instructed, whilst left with these 
 large discretionary powers, to take no extra hazard of 
 losing his army, or of getting it crippled too much for 
 efficient service in the spring. " 
 
 The same letter contained an exposition of Grant's 
 plan of campaign for the following spring. " I look 
 upon the next line for me to secure to be that from 
 Chattanooga to Mobile; Montgomery and Atlanta 
 being the important intermediate points. To do this, 
 large supplies must be secui^ed on the Tennessee 
 river, so as to he independent of the railroad from 
 here'''' (Nashville)'' to the Tennessee^ for a consider- 
 aJjle length of time. Mobile would be a second base. 
 The destruction which Sherman will do to the roads 
 around Meridian will be of material importance to us, 
 in preventing the enemy fi^om drawing supplies from 
 Mississippi, and in clearing that section of all large 
 bodies of rebel troops. ... I do not look upon any 
 j)oints, except Mobile in the south, and the Tennessee 
 liver in the north, as presenting practicable starting- 
 points from which to operate against Atlanta and 
 Montgomery." * 
 
 The oTand movements dictated to Sherman, months 
 
 * Grant then went on to say : '• Tboy are objectionable as starting- 
 points, to be all under one command, from the fact that the time it 
 will take to communicate from one to the other will be so great. But 
 Sherman or McPherson, either one of whom could be intrusted with 
 the distant command, are officers of such experience and reliability, 
 that all objections on this score, except that of enabling the two 
 armies to act as a unit, would be removed." Further and interesting 
 discussions occurred, at this time, between Grant and the general-in- 
 chicf, relative to Banks's Red river campaign, ihen in contemplation, 
 and to the operations east of the Allcghanios. But I omit these subjects 
 Bt present, as they pertain so closely to the themes of a future volume. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEA^'T. 000 
 
 afterwards, and by him so grandly executed, Mere 
 already marked out by the chief for liimself, thus 
 lonq: in advance. 
 
 A copy of this letter was sent to Sherman, witli 
 the remark: " The letter contains all the instructions 
 I deem necessary in your present move .... Nearly 
 all the troops in Thomas's and Dodge's command, 
 having less than one year to serve, have reenlisted, 
 and many of them have been furloughed. This, -with 
 the fact that Loni?street's force in East Tennessee 
 makes it necessary for me to keep ready a force to 
 meet them, ^vill prevent my doing much more than 
 is indicated in my letter to General Ilalleck. I will 
 have, however, both Dodge and Logan ready, so that, 
 if the enemy should weaken himself much in front, 
 they can advance. " 
 
 On the 19th, Thomas also was informed of Sher- 
 man's contemplated movement, and of the probability 
 that no active operations in East Tennessee would 
 be undeiiaken before the opening of spring. " To 
 cooperate wdth this movement," said Grant, ''you 
 want to keep up the appearance of preparation for an 
 advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary 
 even to move a column as far as La Fayette. . . . 
 Logan will also be instructed to move at tlie same 
 time what force he can from Bellefontaine towards 
 Eome. AVe will want to be ready at the earliest 
 possible moment in the spring, for a general advance. 
 I look upon the line for this aimy to secure, in its 
 next campaign, to be that from Chattanooga to 
 Mobile; Atlanta and Montgomery being the impor- 
 tant intermediate points." 
 
 The complicated movements of Grant's three 
 armies now reached over an extent of more than a 
 
556 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 thousand miles. Thomas, at the centre, was confront- 
 ing Johnston, Schofield was baLancing Longstreet ; and 
 in order to distract the rebels, and thus relieve East 
 Tennessee, as well as to secure the safety of the con- 
 templated movement into Georgia, during the ensuing 
 spring, Sherman was ordered to advance into the 
 interior of Mississippi, hundreds of miles from either 
 of the armies that were cooperating with liim. 
 
 Brigadier-General William Sooy Smith was at this 
 time placed in command of seven thousand cavalry, 
 at Memphis, and ordered to move out by the 1st of 
 February, marching by way of Pontotoc, Okalona, 
 and Columbus junction, to Meridian, a distance of 
 two hundred and fifty miles ; Sherman instructed Lira 
 to disregard all minor objects, but to destroy rail- 
 roads, bridges, corn not wanted, and to strike quick 
 and well every enemy that should offer opposition. 
 He was to reach Meridian by the 10th of February. 
 Sherman himself was to move at the same time, with 
 four divisions of infantry and artillery, on the road 
 from Vicksburg to Meridian, one hundred and fifty 
 miles. 
 
 Sherman left Vicksburg, on the 3d of February, 
 with two columns under Hurlbut and McPherson; 
 he reached Jackson on the 5th, after continuous skir- 
 mishing for eighteen miles, driving a force estimated 
 at twelve thousand soldiers, under Loring and French. 
 This command was marching to form a junction at 
 Jackson* with Lee's cavalry, supposed to be four 
 thousand strong ; but the rapidity of Sherman's move- 
 
 * All my statements of tlie rebel strength and movements, as -well 
 as of Sherman's operations, during the Meridian raid, are taken from 
 Sherman's report. I have seen no rebel official report of the cam- 
 paign. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 557 
 
 ment prevented tlie junction. He then pushed on at 
 once, by the direct road to Meridian ; the enemy's cav- 
 alry hanging on his flanks, but giving him no concern. 
 About twenty miles from Meridian, the road was 
 obstructed with fallen timber, in order to afford the 
 rebels time to cover the removal of raih'oad property 
 from Meridian. Sherman at once left his trains^ 
 guarded with good escorts, and pushed on, over all 
 obstructions, straight for the Ocktibbeha, where he 
 found the bridge already burning. A gin-house, near 
 by, supplied material for a new bridge, and at half 
 past three p. m. on the 14th, he entered Meridian with 
 but little opposition. The retreat of the rebels was 
 covered by their cavalry. The rolling-stock had 
 been removed to Selma, or Mobile. 
 
 Sherman could not have overtaken the enemy, 
 before reaching the Tombigbee river, and, in fact, 
 was willing to gain his point without battle, at so 
 great a distance from the Mississippi, where the care 
 of the wounded would have so taxed his ability to 
 provide for them. He, therefore, rested his army, on 
 the 15th, and, on the 16th, began a systematic and 
 thorough destruction of the railroads centering at 
 Meridian. Axes, crowbars, sledges, claw^bars, ^vere 
 used, with fire ; and the depots, storehouses, arsenals, 
 hospitals, oflices, hotels, and cantonments of Meridian 
 were soon no more. For five days, ten thousand men 
 were enf^ao-ed in this work. Sixty miles of railroad 
 were destroyed, on the north and east of the town, 
 ties burned and iron bent; and on the south and 
 west, fifty-five miles. Sixty-one bridges and culverts 
 were burned ; also six thousand feet of trestle-work 
 across a swamp. Twenty locomotives, twenty-eight 
 cars, and three saw-mills were destroyed. The enemy 
 
558 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 could not use tliese roads to the same advantage 
 a2:ain, durino; tlie war.* 
 
 The rebels had crossed the Tombigbee, and were 
 in great alarm lest Sherman intended a march 
 on Mobile. His numbers were magnified ; and. 
 Admiral Farrao-ut, at the same time makins: a dem- 
 onstration against the forts at the entrance of 
 Mobile harbor,f immense excitement was produced. 
 Two brin-ades were sent from Mobile to the Tom- 
 bigbee, and a force was withdrawn from Johnston's 
 army, in front of Thomas. Never before had a na- 
 tional army penetrated so far into the interior of 
 the so-called confederacy. The places that had 
 fancied themselves perfectly secure were entirely 
 exposed, and the inmost lines of communication of 
 the rebels were attacked and destroyed. Still, Sher- 
 man had moved without a base, and the rebels had 
 great hopes of being able to cut him ojQT, if he pro- 
 ceeded further. Thus far, his force had been too large 
 for them to have any hope of withstanding it ; but, 
 if he advanced, they determined to bring troops 
 from all parts of their territory, and, if possible, de- 
 stroy him. 
 
 He did not give them the chance; but, on the 
 20tl], ordered McPherson to march slowly back on the 
 main road ; whilst he himself proceeded northward, 
 with Hurlbut's column, to feel for Sooy Smith, who 
 had failed to make the junction ordered. Sherman 
 marched as far as Union, and then sent a cavaliy force 
 
 * In 18C5, the time consumed liy the enemy in wagoning around 
 those breaks, detained Hood, at Florence, nearly a month ; giving 
 Thomas time to bring his reenforcoments up from every point, even 
 from Missouri ; and thus materially aided in the great success 
 achieved at Nashville. 
 
 + This demonstration was made at the request of Sherman. 
 
ULYSSES S. GEAXT, 559 
 
 of three regiments, under Colonel Winslow, to scour 
 the whole reo-ion in search of Smith. On the 23(1, 
 the two infantry columns came together, at Ilills- 
 boro, after which, they marched, by separate roads, 
 to tlie Pearl river. On the 2Gth, they bivouacked at 
 Canton, to which place Winslow had l)een directed 
 to lead Sooy Smith's command. AVinslow was tliere, 
 but had got no tidings of Smith. The rebels had not 
 troubled Sherman, on the march from Meridian to 
 Canton, and, on the 28th, he rode into Yicks])nrg. 
 His arai}^ remained at Canton till the 3d of March. 
 
 Smith had not started from Memphis till tlie 11th 
 of Februar}', a delay which Sherman pronounced un- 
 pardonable ; he advanced only as far as West Point, 
 and turned back on the 22d, before a force inferior to 
 his own ; his orders having been peremptory to fight 
 any cavalry he met. His march back to Memphis 
 w^as too rapid for a good effect, and he was closely 
 followed by Forrest's cavalry, before wdiom he had 
 retreated at West Point. He reported having de- 
 stroyed thirty miles of railroad, and great stores of 
 cotton and corn ; also the capture of two hundred 
 prisoners and three thousand horses ; but he entirely 
 failed to accomplish the oV)ject of liis expedition, or to 
 satisfy his commanders.* His losses were not re- 
 ported, but were probably slight. 
 
 Sherman, however, had di'iven the enemy out of 
 Mississippi, destroyed the only remaining railroads 
 in the state, the only roads by which the rebels could 
 maintain an army in i\[ississippi, or threaten the 
 
 * Sherman dismissed Smith's part of the operation with these 
 words : " General Smith had not started from Memphis at all, till the 
 11th of February, had only reached West Point, and turned back on 
 the 2'2d, the march back to Memphis bein^ too rapid for a good 
 
 effect." 
 
560 MILITAEr HISTORY OF 
 
 national forces on the main river. He had subsisted 
 his army and animals chiefly on the rebel stores, 
 brought a^vay four hundred prisoners and five thou- 
 sand negroes, about a thousand white refugees, and 
 three thousand animals. He had marched between 
 three hundred and fifty and four hundred and fifty 
 miles, in the shortest mouth of the year, and his 
 men were in better condition and health than when 
 they started from Vicksburg. His losses were 
 twenty-one men killed, sixty-eight wounded, and 
 eighty-one missing. 
 
 On the 24th of January, Grant got permission to 
 visit St. Louis, where his eldest son was lying dan- 
 gerously ill. He was directed, however, by the Sec- 
 I'etary of War, to retain direct command of all his 
 forces, and communication both with them and with 
 the government, during his absence from the front. 
 On the 24th, he was at Chattanooga, and gave orders 
 to Thomas, and to Logan, who was at Scottsboro, 
 Alabama, to keep up a threatened advance on Eome, 
 with the view of detaining as large a force of the 
 enemy as possible in their fronts, and thus favor the 
 operations of Sherman. " It is not expected to move 
 forward at this time, but the movements of the 
 enemy might change this." ... To Logan he said : 
 " Should General Thomas inform you, at any time, 
 that he is going to make a reconnoissance to the 
 front, and ask you to move in tlie cooperation, do so, 
 without waiting further orders from these headquar- 
 ters. KejDort the fact, however." 
 
 Thomas moved out on the 29th, and caused the 
 enemy, now commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, 
 who had succeeded Hardee, to fall back from Tunnel 
 hill. On the 1st of February, it was learned that a 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 561 
 
 whole division and a brigade liad been sent from 
 Jolinston, in the direction of Mobile. On the 5th, 
 Grant was back at Nashville ; and, the next day, re- 
 ceiving reports that two divisions from Johnston had 
 been sent to Longstreet, he directed Thomas to send 
 at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division, 
 into East Tennessee. Logan was also ordered to 
 hold himself in readiness to move, with all the force 
 in his command that could be spared. Schofield was 
 now in command of the Department of the Ohio, and 
 Grant at once informed him of these preparations, 
 and that he wanted " to drive Lono-street out imme- 
 diately, so as to. . . . prepare for a spring campaign 
 of our own choosing, instead of j)ermitting the enemy 
 to dictate it for us." At the same time, he wi'ote : 
 " We will have some sharp fighting, in the spring, 
 and, if successful, I believe the war will l)e ended 
 within the year." 
 
 Further news from Schofield decided Grant that 
 it would be unadvisable to make the contemplated 
 campaign against Longstreet. The reasons for this 
 change in his plan were suggested by Foster, who re- 
 turned home by way of Nashville, and urged them 
 uj^on Grant. Scholield's possession of that portion 
 of East Tennessee now held, was perfectly secure ; 
 and the condition of the loyal j^eople within the 
 rebel lines could not be much improved, even by a 
 change, for they had already lost all. If Grant sent 
 an overwhelming force against Longstreet, the enemy 
 would simply fall back towards Virginia, until he 
 could be reenforced or take an impregnable position. 
 The country was exhausted, and all the national sup- 
 plies would have to be carried, from Knoxville, the 
 whole distance advanced ; so that, whether the ob 
 36 
 
562 MILITARY HISTORY OF 
 
 ject of the expedition was accomplislied or not, the 
 troops must advance rapidly, and return soon ; Long- 
 street could then retui^n with impunity, on the heels 
 of the national column, at least as far down the 
 valley as he could supply himself from the road 
 in his rear. Schoiield ao-reed in these views of Fos- 
 ter ; and Grant, thinking the reasons sufficient, gave 
 orders to suspend the movement. He directed, how- 
 ever, that the troops should be turned against Dal- 
 ton, which he hoped to gain and hold, as one step 
 towards a spring campaign. 
 
 On the 12th, accordingly, Thomas was ordered to 
 " make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, 
 and, if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy 
 that place and complete the railroad up to it, this 
 winter. Start at the earliest practicable moment." 
 On the 17th, Grant said again to Thomas : "Make 
 your contemplated movement, as soon as possible." 
 And, on the 18th : "By all means, send the expedi- 
 tion. I think it of vast importance it should move 
 as early as possible, for the eifect it will have in favor 
 of Sherman, and also on aftairs in East Tennessee. I 
 regret you cannot go." On the 21st: "Do your 
 troops move to-morrow ? It is important that at 
 least a demonstration be made, at once." 
 
 On the 25th, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Thom- 
 as's forces left Chattanooga, last Monday, to demon- 
 strate against Dalton, to prevent forces being sent 
 from there against Sherman. Our troops have Tun- 
 nel hill." Longstreet, at the same time, made a retro- 
 grade movement, and Schofield started immediately 
 in pursuit. On the 25th, Thomas reported to Grant, 
 from Tunuel hill: "Davis and Johnson" (two of 
 his division commanders) " occupy the pass at Buz- 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 563 
 
 zard's roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their 
 front, who outnumber them in artillery. It is not pos- 
 sible to carry the place by assault. Palmer made the 
 attempt to turn it yesterday with Baird's and Graft's 
 divisions, but was met by an equal force, and in an 
 equally strong position as at Buzzard's roost. After 
 expending nearly all his ammunition, he retired, dur- 
 ing the nigbt, to Catoosa platform. Our transpor- 
 tation is poor and limited. We are not able to carry 
 more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery-horses 
 so poor that General Palmer could bring but sixteen 
 pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsist- 
 ence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much 
 superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report 
 that a portion of Cleburne's division *....! will 
 wait the developments of this day, and advise you 
 further." 
 
 To this, Grant sent the following reply : " It is 
 of the highest importance that the enemy should 
 be held in full belief that an advance into the heart 
 of the Soutb is intended, until the fate of Sherman 
 is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can 
 be overcome by keeping your trains running be- 
 tween Chattanooga and your position, . . .'' Thomas, 
 accordingly, remained in force near Dalton, as long 
 as lie could supply himself On the 29th, Grant 
 reported to Halleck : " lie is back now to Dalton, 
 where he hopes to be able to haul supplies until 
 the railroad can be completed to him." Schofield 
 could not follow Lonsjstreet further than Straw- 
 berry plains, because every step took him from 
 
 * The MS. here is imperfect. Probably the worJs " has returned " 
 should be supplied. 
 
564 MILITAET HISTOEY OF 
 
 his supplies, wliile Longstreet was falling back on 
 his. 
 
 On the 2d of March, Grant got word through 
 rebel sources of Sherman's success, but not of his re- 
 turn ; and, on the 3d of March, Grant was ordered to 
 \Yashington. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 565 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Military situation early in 1864 — Political situation — Need of one real head to 
 the army — Grant made lieutenant-general — His predecessors in that grade — 
 Action of the government — Grant's quiescence — Instructions to Sherman^ 
 Private correspondence between Grant and Sherman — Dispatches from Hal- 
 leck — Journey to Washington — Arrival — ^Presentation of commission — 
 Speeches of President and of Grant. 
 
 Eaely in 1864, the civil war in America had 
 readied one of its most important crises. The politi- 
 cal and the militaiy situation of affaii's were equally 
 grave. The rebellion had assumed proportions that 
 transcend comparison. The Southern people seemed 
 all swept into the current, and whatever dissent had 
 originally existed among them, was long since, to 
 outside apprehension, swallowed up in the maelstrom 
 of events. Ten states resisted with all their force, 
 civil and military, and apparently with the additional 
 armament of unanimity and popular enthusiasm, the 
 whole streno'th of the national jrovernment. Xew 
 Orleans, the greatest city of the would-be Confed- 
 eracy, had, indeed, early fallen into the hands of the 
 government ; but Mobile, Wilming-ton, and Charles- 
 ton, the next three commercial towns of importance, 
 although blockaded and besieged by sea, held out as 
 bravely and as stubbornly as ever. The Mississippi 
 
566 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 had been opened to national vessels, though hardl\ 
 yet to national trade, and the severest blow the rebel 
 lion had sustained was undoubtedly dealt when 
 Vicksburg fell. Still, the snake, if scotched, was not 
 killed ; it had been cut violently in twain, but the 
 severed ]3arts retained each a convulsive life, while 
 the more important portion, though shorn of its 
 strength and resources, seemed to have lost none at 
 all of its vitality. Kentucky and Tennessee, although 
 in the possession of national forces, were yet debata- 
 ble ground, and suffered all the ills of border terri- 
 tory in time of civil war ; and Grant, ordered to the 
 command of the entire reo-ion between the Missis- 
 sippi and the Alleghanies, had checked the advance 
 of Bragg, it is true, but even he had not yet driven 
 the great rebel army of the West fixr beyond the 
 northern boundaries of Georgia ; for Johnston, the 
 successor of the unlucky Bragg, still confronted the 
 most formidable force that the government could 
 accumulate in all its Western territory, and Long- 
 street occasionally threatened to assume the offensive 
 in East Tennessee. 
 
 In the Eastern theatre of war, no real progress 
 had been made during three disastrous years. The 
 first Bull Run early taught the nation that it had to 
 contend with skilful, brave, and determined foes. 
 Then came McClellan's labors in the oro-anization of 
 an army, and his sad campaign on the Eichmond 
 Peninsula; after this, the still heavier reverses of 
 Pope's career — heavier, because they followed so close 
 on the heels of earlier defeats. Antietam saved the 
 North from the perils of invasion, but, although a 
 positive victory, it had only negative results. Fred- 
 ericksburg and Chancellors ville were ]30sitive enough, 
 
ULYSSES S. GKANT. 567 
 
 but made terrible drafts on tlie endurance of tlie 
 nation, as well as on the life-blood of its soldiers. 
 Gettysburg again stayed tlie tide of invasion ; and, 
 on the soil of tlie Northern states, a battle was fouglit, 
 in the third year of the war, on whose result dej^ended, 
 for three long summer days, the fate of the second 
 city in the laud. This hardly seemed like the easy 
 progress that had been anticipated for the national 
 arms. Gettysburg sav^ed Washington and Philadel- 
 phia; but even this victory had not resulted in the 
 destruction of Lee ; for, in the succeeding January, 
 the rebel chief, with undiminished legions and auda- 
 city, still lay closer to the national capital than to 
 Richmond ; and Washington was in nearly as great 
 dano^er as before the first Bull Run. 
 
 Halleck, succeeding McClellan in the ostensi- 
 ble command of all the armies, if he really exercised 
 supreme control, had failed. It seemed as if, when 
 successes* came, they were oftener the result of blind 
 courage on the part of the troops, than of brilliant 
 combinations on the part of their commanders ; and 
 that the victories of a great general in one theatre 
 of operations were sure to be neutralized by the dis- 
 asters of an unsuccessful one on the other side of the 
 continent. Success, it was evident, could only come 
 from greater unity of plan and greater concentration 
 of effort. The veriest tyro, or the stupidot critic, 
 could see that all the strength of the national armies 
 must be made cooperative, and that tins had never 
 yet been done. The need of one head, of a master- 
 mind, to perceive and to do, to grasp all the varied 
 necessities, to control all the varied operations, to 
 evolve order out of chaos, to make generals and 
 armies and marches and l)attles all tend to tlie ac- 
 
568 MILITAEY HISTOEY OF 
 
 complisliment of one great and decisive object, this 
 need was universally felt and acknowledged. But 
 tLere was no such Lead ; no sucli master-mind con- 
 trolled the military policy. 
 
 It is not to be denied that the spirit of the 
 nation was sorely tried by all these misfortunes. Po- 
 litical dissensions were rife, and those in oj)position to 
 the administration did not fail to exao-o-erate the dis- 
 asters in the field. Accusations of political or personal 
 interference with the movements of troops and the 
 dispositions of generals, abounded, and were listened 
 to by many; the frequent changes in important 
 commands gave color to such charges, and were cer- 
 tainly discouraging ; a large number of the political 
 sympathizers with the administration were personally 
 hostile to the President, or to members of his govern- 
 ment ; a presidential election was at hand, and even 
 the jDresence of a terrible and still uncertain civil 
 war, was insufficient to calm the outcries of par- 
 tisans or suppress the aspirations of place-seekers. It 
 was said that in the very cabinet of the President, 
 cabals and dissensions found j)lace; that he had his 
 rivals among his own ministers; while, among his 
 generals, whether off duty or on, not one of promi- 
 nence but was mentioned, in some quarters, as the prob- 
 able successor of the head of the government. The 
 grave questions of the rights of states and the freedom 
 of the person, of the abolition of slavery, and of 
 finance, as well as those of a purely military character, 
 were violently debated all over the North; great 
 anxiety was felt as to the ability or disposition of 
 the country to continue the supply of its resources ; 
 the draft was unpopular, and the temper of foreign 
 nations unfavorable, if not hostile. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 5G9 
 
 It was true, tlie Soutli must he approaching 
 exhaustion, but its devotiou and heroism seemed to 
 supply the lack of all resources. It is true, the nation 
 was really as determined as ever, but all these con- 
 sideratious that have been mentioned, were gloomy 
 in their character, and seemed to defer indefinitely 
 the wished-for consummation. 
 
 Under these circumstances, a bill was introduced 
 in the House of Representatives, by the Honorable 
 Elihu B. Washburne, to revive tlie grade of lieuten- 
 ant-general in the armies of the United States, with 
 the idea of conferring this rank upon Grant, and giving 
 him command of all the military forces of the countr}'. 
 The proposition was debated for several months, 
 but finally, on the 26th day of February, 18G4, it re- 
 ceived the sanction of both Houses of Congress. On 
 the 1st of March, the President approved the bill, 
 and nominated Grant to the office ; and on the 2d, 
 the Senate confirmed the most irapoi-tant appoint- 
 ment ever made in America, 
 
 By this bill it was provided that " the grade of 
 lieutenant-general be, and the same is hereby, revived 
 in the Army of the United States of America ; and 
 the President is hereby authorized, whenever he 
 shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and w iih the 
 advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of 
 the army, to be selected during war, from among 
 those officers in the military service of the United 
 States, not below the grade of major-general, most 
 distinguished for courage, skill, and ability; and who 
 being commissioned as lieutenant-general, shall be 
 authorized, under the direction of the President, to 
 Gomuiaml tlie armies of tlie United States. " 
 
 Grant had but two predecessors in this exalted 
 
f 
 
 570 MILITAEY HISTORY OF 
 
 rank. In 1798, the grade was created for "Wash 
 ington, who held it but one year; and upon his 
 death, it was discontinued, but conferred by brevet, 
 in 1855, upon Major-General Winfield Scott. 
 
 The government had neither favored nor opposed 
 the bill. During the long debate, its influence had 
 been entirely passive. Apparently, the administra- 
 tion had become convinced that, in purely military 
 matters, it was better for civilians not to attempt to 
 interfere ; and, the terrible responsibility thus sought 
 to be laid on a sinsfle man, neither the President nor 
 his cabinet assisted to impose. They simply left the 
 matter in the hands of the representatives of the 
 people, and these, after full consideration, decided by 
 a majority that raised the measure entirely out of the 
 domain of politics.* 
 
 Grant himself used no influence, wrote no line, 
 spoke no word to bring about the result. I was with 
 him while the Tjill was being debated, and spoke to 
 him more than once on the subject. He never mani- 
 fested any anxiety or even desire for the success of 
 the bill; nor did he ever seem to shrink from the 
 responsibilities it would impose upon him. If the 
 country chose to call him to higher spheres and more 
 important services, whatever ability or energy he pos- 
 sessed he was willing to devote to the task. If, on the 
 contrary, he had been left at the post which he then 
 held, he would not have felt a pang of disappointed 
 pride. 
 
 The Honorable Mr. Washburne said of him, during 
 the debates on the bill : " No man with his consent 
 has ever mentioned his name in connection with any 
 
 * The vote in the House of Representatives, where the bill origi 
 nated, was one hundred and seventeen to nineteen. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 571 
 
 position. I say wliat I know to he tnio, when I al- 
 lege that every promotion he Las received since he 
 fii'st entered the service to put down this rel)ellion, 
 was moved without his knowledge or consent. And 
 in regard to this very matter of lieutenant-general, 
 after the bill was introduced and his name mentioned 
 in connection therewith, he wrote me, and admonished 
 me that he had been highly honored by tlie govern- 
 ment, and did not ask or deserve any thing more in 
 the shape of honors or promotion ; and that a success 
 over the enemy was what he craved above everything 
 else ; that he only desired to hold such an influence 
 over those under his command, as to use them to the 
 best advantage to secure that end." 
 
 On the 3d of March, Ilalleck sent the following 
 dispatch to Grant : " The Secretary of War directs 
 that you will report in person to the War Depart- 
 ment, as early as practicable, considering the condi- 
 tion of your command. If necessary, you will keep 
 up telegraphic communication with your command, 
 while en route to Washington." The next day Grant 
 stai-ted for the capital. 
 
 At the same time he sent instructions to Sher- 
 man, now on his return from Meridian. That com- 
 mander was directed to use the negro troops, as far 
 as practicable, to guard the Mi>^sissippi river ; and, 
 adding to this element what he deemed necessary for 
 the protection of the river, to assemble the remainder 
 of his command at Memphis. " Have ihom in readi- 
 ness to join your column on this front, in the spring 
 campaign." This was with a view to the movement 
 against Atlanta and Mobile, which, notwithstanding 
 his promotion. Grant still intended to lead in person. 
 This operation had now been fi-equently explained 
 
572 MILITAEY inSTOEY OF 
 
 by liim to liis staff. It was his plan, at this time, to 
 fight his way to Atlanta, and then, holding that place 
 and the line between it and Chattanooga, to cut loose 
 with his army, either for Mobile or Savannah, ^vhich 
 ever events should designate as the most practi- 
 cable objective point. He meant to concentrate Sher- 
 ■" man, Thomas, and Sehofield's armies for this purpose, 
 and entertained no doubt whatever of entire success. 
 When he started for Washington, it was his firm in- 
 tention to return to Chattanooga, and, while he re- 
 tained control of all the armies, to lead in person 
 those which moved towards the sea. On the 3d of 
 March, he said to Sherman, " I am ordered to Wash- 
 ington ; but as I am directed to keep up telegraphic 
 communication with this command, I shall expect, in 
 the course of ten or twelve days, to return to it." 
 
 I carried these instructions to Sherman, and with 
 them, also, the following extraordinary private letter : 
 
 Dear Shekjian, — Tlie bill reviving the grade of 
 lieutenant-general in the Army has become a law, and 
 my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. 
 I now receive orders to report to Washington imme- 
 diately, in person, which indicates a confirmation, or a 
 likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to 
 comply with the order. 
 
 " Whilst I have been eminently successful in this 
 war, in at least gaining the confidence of the j)ublic, no 
 one feels more than I, how much of this success is due 
 to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth 
 of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been 
 my good fortune to have occupying subordinate po- 
 sitions under me. 
 
 " There are many officers to whom these remarks 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 573 
 
 are a2:)plicable to a greater or less degree, propoi-tion- 
 ate to their ability as soldiers; but ^vllat I want i^, 
 to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the 
 men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for 
 whatever I have had of success. 
 
 " How far your advice and assistance have been 
 of help to me, you know. How far your execution 
 of whatever has been given to you to do, entitles you 
 to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as 
 well as I. 
 
 " I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, 
 giving it the most flattering construction. 
 
 "The word you I use in the plural, intending it 
 
 for McPherson also. I should write to him, and 
 
 Avill some day, but starting in the morning, I do not 
 
 know that 1 will find time just now. 
 
 " Your friend, 
 
 "U. S. GRANT 
 
 " Major- GeneraV 
 
 Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on 
 the 10th of March, and immediately replied : 
 
 " Dear Gej^eral, — I have your more than kind 
 and characteristic letter of tlie 4th instant. I will 
 send a copy to General McPherson at once. 
 
 "You do yourself injustice, and us too much 
 honor, in assigning to us too large a share of the 
 merits which have led to your high advancement. 
 I know you approve the fi'iendship I have ever 
 professed to you, and will permit me to continue, 
 as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions. 
 
 "You are now Washington's legitimate successor, 
 and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation ; 
 
574 MnJTAKY HISTORY OF 
 
 "but, if you can continue, as Heretofore, to be your 
 self, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will 
 enjoy through life the respect and love of friends 
 and the homage of millions of human beings, that 
 will award you a large share in securing to them 
 and their descendants a government of law and 
 stability. 
 
 *'I repeat, you do General McPherson and my- 
 self too much honor. At Belmont, you manifested 
 your traits — neither of us being near. At Douelson, 
 also, you illustrated your whole character. I w^as 
 not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate 
 a capacity to influence you. 
 
 " Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was 
 almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical 
 elements that presented themselves at every point; 
 but that admitted a ray of light I have followed 
 since. I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and 
 just, as the great protot^q^e Washington — as unselfish, 
 kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be — ^but 
 the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success 
 you have always manifested, which I can liken to 
 nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the 
 Saviour. 
 
 "This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and 
 Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your 
 best preparations, you go into battle without hesi- 
 tation, as at Chattanooga — no doubts — no reserves; 
 and I tell you, it was this that made us act with 
 confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you 
 thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you 
 would help me out, if alive. 
 
 " My only point of doubt was, in your knowledge 
 of grand strategy, and of books of science and his 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 575 
 
 tory ; but, I confess, your common-senso suoiiis to 
 liave supplied all tliese. 
 
 " Now, as to the future. Don't stay in Wasliing- 
 ton. Come West : take to yourself the whole Mis- 
 sissij^pi valley. Let us make it dead-sure — and I tell 
 you, the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will fol- 
 low its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or 
 die with the main trunk. We have done much, but 
 still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are 
 with us. We could almost afford to sit still, and let 
 these influences work. 
 
 " Here lies the seat of the coming empire ; and 
 from the AYest, when our task is done, we will make 
 short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the im- 
 poverished coast of the Atlantic. "' 
 
 " Your sincere friend." 
 
 Before Grant reached Washington, he received 
 the following magnanimous dispatch from the man 
 whom he was about to supersede : " The Secretaiy 
 of War directs me to say that your commission as 
 
 * On the 29tli of December, Sbcrman had written to Grant : " In 
 relation to the conversation wc had in General Granger's office, the day 
 before I left ISTashville, I repeat, j'ou occupy a position of more power 
 than Halleck or the President. There are similar instances in Euro- 
 pean history, but none in ours. For the sake of future generations, 
 risk nothing. Let us risk — and when you strike, let it be as at Vicks- 
 burg and Chattanooga. Your reputation as a general is now far 
 above that of any man living, and partisans will manoeuvre for your 
 influence ; but, if you can escape them, as you have hitherto done, you 
 will be more powerful for good than it is possible to measure. You saiil 
 that you were surprised at my assertion on this point, but I repeat that 
 from what I have seen and heard here, I am more and more convinced 
 of the truth of what I told you. Do as you have heretofore done, pre- 
 serve a plain military character ; and let others manoeuvre as they will, 
 you ^vill beat them, not only in fame, but in doing good in the closing 
 scenes of this war, when somebody must heal and mend up the breacbea 
 made by war." 
 
576 MILITAET HISTORY OF 
 
 lieuteD ant-general is signed, and will be delivered to 
 you, on your arrival at tlie War Department. I sin- 
 cerely congratulate you on tliis recognition of your 
 distinguislied and meritorious services." His journey 
 to Washington was made as rapidly as possible, and 
 by special trains ; but wherever the people knew of 
 his approach, they thronged around the railway sta- 
 tions in prodigious crowds ; cheering, and struggling 
 to catch a glimpse of the new commander of their 
 armies. 
 
 On the 8th of March, he arrived at the capital, 
 where he had never spent more than one day before. 
 The President had never seen his face, and the Secre- 
 tary of AVar had met him, for the first time, at Louis- 
 ville, in the October preceding. 
 
 At one o'clock, on the 9th of March, Grant was 
 formally received by the President, in the cabinet 
 chamber. There were present all the members of his 
 cabinet, Major-General Halleck, general-in-chief, two 
 members of General Grant's staff,* the President's 
 secretary, a single member of Congress, and Grant's 
 eldest son, who had been with him at Jackson, and 
 Vicksburg, and at Champion's hill. 
 
 After Grant had been j^resented to the members 
 of the cabinet, Mr. Lincoln read the following words : 
 " General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what 
 5'OU have done, and its reliance upon you for what 
 remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are 
 now presented, -with this commission constituting 
 you lieutenant-general in the Anny of the United 
 States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, 
 also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country 
 herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. 
 
 * Brigadier-General Rawlins and Licuteuant-Coloncl Comstock. 
 
ULYSSES S. GRANT. 577 
 
 I scarcely need to add, that, witli wluit I here speak 
 for the nation, goes my own hearty personal con- 
 currence." 
 
 Grant read, from a paper, this reply : " Mr. Presi- 
 dent, I accept the commission, with gratitude, for 
 the hijzli honor conferred. With the aid of the noble 
 armies that have fought in so many fields, for our 
 common country, it 'n^ ill be my earnest endeavor 
 not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the 
 full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on 
 me ; and I know that if they are met, it will be 
 due to tkose armies, and above all, to the fiivor of 
 that Providence which leads both nations and men." 
 37 
 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTEE I. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE IN RELATION TO THE BATTLE OF BELMONT 
 
 St. Louis, Xovcmber 1, 1861. 
 General Graxt, commanding at Cairo : 
 
 You are hereby directed to bold your wbole command ready 
 to march at an hour's notice, until further orders ; and you will 
 take particular care to be amply supphed with transportation 
 and ammunition. You are also directed to make demonstra- 
 tions with your troops along both sides of the river towards 
 Charleston, Norfolk, and Blandville, and to keep your columns 
 constantly moving back and forward against these places, with- 
 out, however, attacking the enemy. 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 CIIAUNCEY McKEEVER, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 
 St. Loiis, Kovemier 2, 18G1. 
 To Brigadier- General Grant : 
 
 Jeff Thompson is at Indian ford of the St. Franyois river, 
 twenty-five miles below Greenville, with about three thousand 
 men. Colonel Carlin has started with force from Pilot Knob. 
 Send a force from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist 
 Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas. 
 By order of 
 
 Major- General FREMONT. 
 C. McKEEVER, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 
580 APPENDIX. 
 
 Headquarters, District Southeast Missouri i 
 Cairo, November 3, 1861. \ 
 
 Colonel R. J. Oglesby, commanding, etc., 
 
 Bird^s Point, Missouri : 
 
 You will take command of an expedition, consisting of your 
 regiment, four companies of the Eleventh Illinois, all of the 
 Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, three companies of cavalry from 
 Bird's point (to be selected and notified by yourself), and a 
 section of Swartz's battery, artillery, and proceed by steam- 
 boats to Commerce, Missouri. From Commerce you will strike 
 for Sikeston, Mr. Cropper acting as guide. From there you 
 Avill go in pursuit of a rebel force, understood to be three thou- 
 sand strong, under Jeif Thompson, now at Indian ford, on the 
 St. Francis river. 
 
 An expedition has already left Ironton, Missouri, to attack 
 this force. Should they learn that they have left that place, it 
 will not be necessary for you to go there, but pursue the enemy 
 in any direction he may go, always being cautious not to fall 
 in with an unlooked-for foe, too strong for the command under 
 you. 
 
 The object of the expedition is to destroy this force, and the 
 manner of doing it is left largely at your discretion, believing 
 it better not to trammel you with insti-uctions. 
 
 Transportation will be furnished you for fourteen days' ra- 
 tions and four or five days' forage. All you may require out- 
 side of this must be furnished by the country through which 
 you pass. In taking supplies, you will be careful to select a 
 proper officer to press them, and require a receipt to be given, 
 and the articles pressed accounted for in the same manner as if 
 purchased. 
 
 You are particularly enjoined to allow no foraging by your 
 men. It is demoralizing in the extreme, and is apt to make 
 open enemies where they would not otherwise exist. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Brigadier- General. 
 
 Headquarters, District Southeast Missouri, i 
 Cairo, November 5, 18G1. S 
 
 Brigadier- General C. F. Smith, commanding, etc., 
 Paducah, Kentucl-y : 
 
 In pursuance of directions from headquarters. Western De- 
 partment, I have sent from here a force of about three thou- 
 
APPENDIX. 581 
 
 sand men, of all arms, towards Indian ford, on the St. Francis 
 river, and also a force of one regiment from Cape Girardeau in 
 the same direction. 
 
 I am now, under the same instructions, iitting out an expe- 
 dition to menace Belmont, and will take all the force proper to 
 spare from here, pi'obably not more tliaii three thousand men. 
 
 If you can make a demonstration towards Columbus at the 
 same time with a portion of your command, it would probably 
 keep the enemy from throwing over the river much more force 
 than they now have there, and might enable me to drive those 
 they now have out of Missouri. The principal point to gain is, 
 to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear of 
 those now out fi'om this command. I will leave here to-mor- 
 row night, and will land some twelve miles below. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Brigadier- General commanding. 
 
 Cairo, November (,, 1861. 
 Colonel R. J. Oglesbt, commanding expedition : 
 
 On receipt of this, turn your column towards New Madrid. 
 When you arrive at the nearest point to Columbus, from whicli 
 there is a road to that place, communicate with me at Bel- 
 mont. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Brigadier- General. 
 
 Cairo, Xiwanhcr fi, 1861. 
 Cohnel "W. H. L. Wallace, Bird's Point, ^fissouri : 
 
 Herewith I send you an order to Colonel Oglesby, to change 
 the direction of his column towards Xew Madrid, halting to 
 communicate with me at Belmont from the nearest )">nir ,,u 
 his road. 
 
 I desire you to get up the Charleston expediti<»ii ordcnil 
 for to-morrow, to start to-night, taking two days' rations with 
 them. You will accompany them to Charleston, and get 
 Colonel Oglesby's instinictions to him by a messenger, if prac- 
 ticable, and when he is near enough you may join him. For 
 this purpose you may substitute the remainder of your regi- 
 ment in place of an equal amount from Colonel Marsh's. The 
 two davs' rations carried with vour men in haversacks will en- 
 
582 APPENDLX. 
 
 able you to join Colonel Oglesby's command, and there yon 
 will find rations enough for several days more should they be 
 necessary. You may take a limited number of tents, and at 
 Charleston press Avagons to carry them to the main column. 
 There you will find sufficient transportation to release the 
 pressed wagons. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Brigadier- General. 
 
 On board Steamer Belle of Memphis, \ 
 Xovemhcr 1, 1861, 2 o'clock a. m. ) 
 Special Order. 
 
 The troojis composing the present expedition from this 
 place will move promptly at six o'clock this morning. The 
 gunboats will take the advance, and be followed by the First 
 brigade, under command of Brigadier-General John A. Mc- 
 Clernand, composed of all the troops from Cairo and Fort 
 Holt. The Second brigade, comprising the remainder of the 
 troops of the expedition, commanded by Colonel John Dough- 
 erty, will follow. The entire force will debark at the lowest 
 point on the Missouri shore, Avhere a landing can be effected in 
 security from the rebel batteries. The point of debarkation 
 will be designated by Captain "Walke, commanding naval 
 forces. 
 
 By order of 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Brigadier- General 
 John A. Rawlins, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER U 
 
 MAJOK-GENEEAL MoCLELLAN TO MAJOR-QENEEAL HALLECK. 
 
 Headquarters of hie Army, 
 WAsniSGTOX, D. C, January 3, 1S6 
 
 Major- General II. W. Hali.eck, 
 
 commanding Department of Jlissouri: 
 Gexeral: It is of the greatest imi^ortance that the rebel 
 troops in western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the 
 support of the force in front of General Bucll. To accomplish 
 this, an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland river (to 
 act in concert with General Bucll's command), of sufficient 
 strength to defeat any force that may be brought against it. 
 Tlie gunboats should be supported by at least one, and perhaj)s 
 two, divisions of your best infantry, taken from Paducah and 
 other points from which they can best be spared ; at the same 
 time, such a demonstration should be made on Columbus as 
 will prevent the removal of any troo])3 from that place; and if 
 a sufficient number have already been withdrawn, the place 
 should be taken. It may be well, also, to make a feint on the 
 Tennessee river, with a command sufficient to prevmt disaster 
 under any circumstances. 
 
 As our success in Kentucky depends in a great raeasnre on 
 our preventing reenforcements from joining Buckncr and John- 
 ston, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these 
 expeditions. 
 
584 APPENDED. 
 
 I desire that you give me at once your views in full as to 
 the best method of accomplishing oiir object, at the same time 
 stating the nature and sti-ength of the force that you can use 
 for the purpose, and the time necessary to prepare. 
 Very respectfully, 
 G. B. MoCLELLAlSr, Major- General commanding. 
 
 MAJOE-GENEEAL HALLECK TO BEIGADIEEGENEEAL GEAKT. 
 
 Headquarters, Department of the Missouri, ) 
 St. Louis, January 6, 1862. \ 
 
 Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo^ III. : 
 
 I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield, 
 and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and 
 Fort Holt should meet it and threaten " Camp Beauregard" and 
 Murray, letting it be understood that Dover is the object of 
 your attack. But don't advance far enough to expose your 
 flank or rear to an attack from Columbus, and by all means 
 avoid a serious engagement. 
 
 Make a great fuss about moving all your force towards 
 Xashville, and let it be so reported by the newspapers. 
 
 Take proper precautions to deceive your own men as well 
 as the enemy. Let no one, not even a member of your own 
 staff, know the real object. I will send you some forces from 
 this place to increase the deception. Let it be understood that 
 twenty or thirty thousand men are expected from Missouri, and 
 that your force is merely the advanced guard to the main col- 
 umn of attack. The object is to prevent reenforcements being 
 sent to Buckner. Having accomplished this, you will slowly 
 retire to your former positions, but if possible keep up the idea 
 of a general advance. Be very careful, however, to avoid a 
 battle. We are not ready for that. But cut off detached par- 
 ties, and give your men a little experience in skirmishing. 
 
 If Commodore Foote can make a gunboat demonstration at 
 the same time, it will assist in carrying out the deception. 
 
 H. W. HALLECK, JIajor- General 
 
APPENDIX. 585 
 
 TWO LETTERS OF IXSTPvUCTIONS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL HAI.EECK TO 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT, FOR MOVEMENT AGAINST FORT HENRY. 
 
 IIeadqcartkrs, Department of the Missouri, ) 
 St. Louis, January 30, 1862. ) 
 
 Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo, III.: 
 
 You -will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort 
 Henry, on the Tennessee river, all your available force from 
 Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort ITolt, Bird's Point, etc. Suffi- 
 cient garrisons must be left to hold these places against an 
 attack from Columbus. As the roads are now almost im- 
 passable for large forces, and as your command is very deficient 
 in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the 
 Tennessee river as far as practicable. Supplies will also be 
 taken up in steamers as far as possible. Flag-Officer Foote 
 will protect the transports with his gunboats. The Benton, 
 and perhaps some others, should be left for the defence of 
 Cairo. Fort Henry should be taken and held at all hazards, I 
 shall immediately send you three additional companies of ar- 
 tillery from this place. The river front of the fort is armed 
 with 20-pounders. It may be necessary for you to take some 
 guns of large calibre, and establish a battery on the other side 
 of the river. It is believed that the guns on the land side are 
 of small calibre, and can be silenced by our tield artillery. It 
 is said that the north side of the river, below the fort, is favor- 
 able for landing. If so, you will land and rapidly occupy the 
 road to Dover, and fully invest the place, so as to cut otf the 
 retreat of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel MclMierson, U. S. 
 Engineers, will immediately report to you, to act as chief en- 
 gineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt 
 will be made from Columbus to reenforce Fort Henry, also 
 from Fort Donelson at Dover. If you can occupy the road to 
 Dover, you can prevent the latter. The steamers will give you 
 the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. 
 It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island, 
 below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned, it 
 must be taken. 
 
 Having invested Fort Henry, a cavalry for:-e will be sent 
 forward to break up the railroad from Paris to Dover. The 
 brido-es should be rendered impassable, but not destroyed. 
 
586 APPENDIX. 
 
 A telegram from Washington says that Beauregard left 
 Manassas four days ago, Avith fifteen regiments for the line of 
 Columbus and Bowling Green. It is, therefore, of the greatest 
 importance that we cut that line before he arrives. You will 
 move with the least delay i^ossible. You will furnish Commo- 
 dore Foote with a copy of this letter. A telegraph line will 
 be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah, east of Ten- 
 nessee river, to Fort Henry. Wires and operators will be sent 
 from St. Louis. 
 
 H. W. HALLECK, Major- General. 
 
 Headquarters, Department of the Missouri, ) 
 St. Louis, February 1, 1862. \ 
 
 Brigadier- General U. S. Grant, Cairo ^ HI.: 
 
 You are authorized to withdraw Colonel Ross's regiment, 
 Seventeenth Illinois volunteers, from Cape Girardeau for the 
 Tennessee expedition as soon as they are wanted. The remain- 
 ing forces are sufficient for tliat place. Your requisitions for 
 horses, mules, wagons, etc., cannot be filled immediately. By 
 using steamers on the river, and as the troops will not move far 
 from their supplies and Avater ti-ansportation, much of the 
 usual trains can be dispensed with for several weeks. Don't 
 cumber up the expedition with too large a train. The object 
 is to move rapidly and promptly by steamers, and to reduce 
 the place before any large reenforcements can arrive. 
 
 H. W. H ALLEGE, Major- General. 
 
 FIELD ORDER FOR ATTACK ON FORT HEXRT. 
 
 Hfadquarters, District of Cairo, ) 
 
 Camp is Field near Fort Henry, February 5, 1862, S 
 
 General Field Orders, Ko. 1. 
 
 The First division. General John A McClernand command- 
 ing, will move at eleven o'clock a. m. to morrow, under the 
 guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, and take a position 
 on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover. 
 
 It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all 
 reenforcements to Fort Henry or escape from it. Also, to be 
 
APPENDIX. 587 
 
 held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm, 
 promptly, on the receijit of orders. 
 
 Two brigades of the Second division, General C. F. Smitli 
 commanding, will start at the same hour from the west bank 
 of the river, and take and occupy tlie heiglits commanding Fort 
 Henry. This point will be held by so much artillery as can 
 be made available, and such other troops as in the opinion of 
 the general commanding Second division may be necessary for 
 its protection. 
 
 The Third brigade. Second division, will advance up the 
 east bank of the Tennessee river, as fast as it can be securely 
 done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort, or move to 
 the support of the First division, as may be necessary. 
 
 All of the forces on the west bank of the river, not required 
 to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry, will return to 
 their transports, cross the river, and follow the First division as 
 rapidly as possible. 
 
 The west bank of the Tennessee river not having been re- 
 connoitred, the commanding officer intrusted with taking pos- 
 session of the enemy's works there, will proceed with great 
 caution, and such information as can be gathered, and such 
 guides as can be found in the time intervening before eleven 
 o'clock to-morrow. 
 
 The troops will move with two days' rations of l)rcad and 
 meat in their haversacks. 
 
 One company of the Second division, armed with ritlcs, will 
 be ordered to report to Flag-Officer Foote, as sharpshooters, 
 on board the gunboats. 
 
 By order : U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General commanding. 
 
 GRAKTS REPORT OF CAPTURE OF FORT HEN'RT. 
 
 \ 
 
 Headqcarters, District or Cairo, 
 Fort IIexry, February 6, 1802. 
 
 Captain J. C. Keltox, St. Louis.^ Mo.: 
 
 Enclosed I send you my orders for the attack upon Fort 
 Henry. 
 
 Owing to dispatches received from Major-Gencral Ilalleck, 
 and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy 
 were rapidly rcenforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary 
 
588 APPENDIX. 
 
 that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not aip at 
 eleven o'clock last night, when my orders Avere written, there- 
 fore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than 
 eleven o'clock to-day to commence the investment. The gun- 
 boats started the same hour to commence the attack, and en- 
 gaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards. 
 
 In a little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and 
 the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-Officer Foote, giving 
 us all their guns, camp equipage, etc. The prisoners taken 
 were General Tilghman and staff. Captain Taylor and company, 
 and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced the 
 retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning. Had I 
 not felt it an imperative duty to attack Fort Henry to-day, I 
 should have made the investment complete, and delayed until 
 to-morrow, so as to have secured the garrison. I do not now 
 believe, however, that the result would have been any more 
 satisfactory. 
 
 The gunboats have proved themselves well able to resist 
 a severe cannonading. All the iron-clads received more or 
 less shots — the flag-ship some twenty-eight — ^yithout any 
 serious damage to any except the Essex. This vessel received 
 one shot in her boilers that disabled her, killing and wounding 
 some thirty-two men. Captain Porter among the wounded. 
 
 I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and re- 
 turn to Fort Henry with the forces employed, unless it looks 
 possible to occupj^ the place with a small force, that could re- 
 treat easily to the main body. I shall regard it more in the 
 light of an advanced grand guard than as a permanent post. 
 
 For the character of the works at Fort Henry, I will refer 
 you to reports of the engineei's, which will be required. 
 
 Owing to the intolerable state of the roads, no transporta- 
 tion will be taken to Fort Donelson, and but little artillery, 
 and that with double teams. 
 
 Hoping that what has been done will meet with the ap- 
 proval of the major-general commanding the department, I 
 remain, etc. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Brigadier- General 
 
APPE2IDIX. 589 
 
 FIELD OKDER FOP. MARCH TO FOUT DOSElJSOX. 
 
 TlEADQrARTEns, DismicT OF CAinn, ) 
 
 Fort ITKNnr, FJimuini 10, 1862. J 
 
 General Field Orders^ Xo. 7. 
 
 The troops from Forts Henry and Ileiman will lioM thcni- 
 selves in i-eadiness to move on "Wednesday, the 12lh instant, at 
 as early an hour as practicable. Neither tents nor baijijairc 
 will ha taken, except such as the troops can carry. Brigade 
 and regimental commanders Avill see that all their men arc su|>- 
 plied with forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, 
 and two daj's' rations in their liaversacks. Three days' a<ldi- 
 tional rations may l»e put in wagons to follow the expeiliti<»n. 
 but will not impede the progress of-the main column. 
 
 Two regiments of infantry will remain at Fort Henry, to be 
 designated from the First division, and one brigade at Fort 
 Heiman, Kentucky, to be designated by General Smith com- 
 manding. 
 
 By order of Brigadier- General GRANT. 
 
 JOnX A. 'RX'^Ll^?,, Assistant Adjutant- GiiieraJ. 
 
 SECOND FIELD ORDER FOR MARCH TO FORT D0NEL.-0 v 
 
 Headquarters, District of Cairo, ) 
 Fort IIexry, Tennessee, February 10, 1862. J 
 
 General Field Orders^ Xo. 11. 
 
 The troops designated in General Field Orders, No. 7, will 
 move to-morrow as i-apidly as possible in the following order: 
 
 One brigade of the First division will move by the Tele- 
 graph road, directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for furllier 
 orders, at a distance of two miles from the fort. The other 
 brigades of the First division will move by the Dover or Kidgc 
 road and halt at the same distance from the fort, and throw 
 out troops so as to form a continuous line, between the two 
 wings. 
 
 The two brigades of the Second division, now at Fort 
 Henry, will follow as rapidly as practicable, by the Dover roa<l 
 and will be followed by the troops from Fort Heiman. as fast 
 as they can be ferried across the river. 
 
 One brigade of the Second division should be thrown into 
 
590 APPENDIX. 
 
 Dover to cut off all retreat by the river, if found practicable to 
 do so. 
 
 The force of the enemy being so variously reported, it is 
 impossible to give exact details of attack, but the necessary 
 orders will be given on the field. 
 
 By order of Brigadier- General U. S. GRANT, commanding. 
 
 JOHN A. EAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 
 GENERAL BTJCKNEB TO GENERAL GEANT. 
 
 Headquarters, Fokt Dokelson, } 
 February 16, 1862. ) 
 
 Sir : In consideration of all the circumstances governing the 
 present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the com- 
 manding officer of the Federal forces, the appointment of com- 
 missioners, to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and 
 post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice 
 until twelve o'clock to-day. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. B. BUCKKER, Brigadier- General 0. S. A. 
 
 To Brigadier- General IJ. S. Grant, 
 
 commanding United States Forces near Fort Donelson. 
 
 ORDER OF GENERAL BUCKNER. 
 
 IIeadquarters, Fort Donelson, ) 
 February 16, 1862. ^ 
 
 Major Crosby will take or send by an officer to the enemy 
 the accompanying communication to General Grant, and request 
 information of the point where further communications will 
 reach him. Also inform him that my headquarters will be for 
 the pi-esent in Dover. 
 
 Have the white flag hoisted on Fort Donelson, not on the 
 batteries. 
 
 S. R. BUCKNER, Brigadier- General. 
 
APPENDIX. 501 
 
 GEKEEIL GRANT TO GENERAL BUCKNER. 
 
 IlEADQCAnTF.nS, AUMY IN THE FlELP, | 
 
 Fort Donelsox, February 16, 18r>2. J 
 General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army : 
 
 Sir: Yours of this date proposing armistice and appoint- 
 ment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just 
 received. Ko terms except unconditional and immediate sur- 
 render can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon 
 your works. I am, sir, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 U. S. GRANT, Brigadier- General eommanding. 
 
 general BTJCKlfER TO GENERAL GRANT. 
 
 Headqcarters, Dover, Ten.vesske, ) 
 February 16, 1862. ) 
 
 To Brigadier- General Grant, United States Army : 
 
 Sir : The distribution of the forces under my command, 
 incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the over- 
 whelming force under j-our command, compel mc, notwithstand- 
 ing the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to 
 accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms wliich you pro- 
 pose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, 
 
 S. B. BUCK>rEE, Brigadier- General commanding C. S. A. 
 
 MESSAGE FROM MR. JEFFERSON DAVIS TO HIS CONGRESS. 
 
 Executive Departmest, .}farch 11, 1862. 
 To the Spcalcr of the House of Bepresentatins : 
 
 I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have 
 been received at the War Department of the dtCence and tail 
 of Fort Donelson. 
 
 They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instruc- 
 tions have been given to furnish further information upon the 
 several points not made intelligible by the reports. It is not 
 stated that reenforcenients were at any time .".skcd (or; nor is 
 it demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the 
 army by evacuating the position ; nor is it known by what 
 
592 APPENDIX. 
 
 means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garri- 
 son, leaving the remainder to surrender; nor upon what au- 
 thority or principles of action the senior generals abandoned 
 resj^onsibility by transferring the command to a junior oiRcer, 
 
 In a former communication to Congress, I presented the 
 propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the dis- 
 aster at Fort Done! son, until official reports could be received. 
 I regret that the information now furnished is so defective. In 
 tlie mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be 
 made, I have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as pre- 
 sented by the two senior generals, that they should be relieved 
 from command, to await further orders whenever a reliable 
 judgment can be rendered on the merits of the case. 
 
 JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 GEAJTT'S REPORT OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 
 
 Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
 Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862. ) 
 Brigadier- General Geoege W. CtrLLTiM, 
 
 Chief of Staff] Department of the Missouri: 
 
 I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surren? 
 der, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen 
 thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large 
 amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property. 
 
 I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about 
 fifteen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the 
 command of Generals McClernand and Smith. Six regiments 
 were sent around by water the day before, convoyed by a gun- 
 boat (or boats), and with instructions not to pass it. 
 
 The troops made the march in good order, the head of the 
 column arriving within two miles of the fort at twelve o'clock ii. 
 At this point the enemy's pickets Avere met and driven in. The 
 fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually ap- 
 proached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishifig on the 
 line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gun- 
 boats and reenforcemcnts sent by water, no attack Avas made, 
 but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, 
 and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On 
 the evening of the 13th, the gunboats and recnforcements 
 
APrENDix. 503 
 
 arrived. On the 14lh, a gallant attack was made by Flai;- 
 Officer Foote upon the enemy's river batteries with his fleet. 
 The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and 
 bid fair to result favorably, when two unlucky shots dis- 
 abled two of the armored boats, so that they were carried back 
 by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled 
 also, having received a number of heavy shots about tlie pilot- 
 houses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps, I 
 concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect 
 as possible, and partially fortify, and await repairs to the gun- 
 boats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the enemy 
 making a most vigorous attack upon our right wing, com- 
 manded by Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand, and which 
 consisted of his division and a portion of the force under Gen- 
 eral L. "Wallace. 
 
 The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of 
 several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The ofl5cers suf- 
 fered out of proportion. I have not the means of determining 
 our loss, even approximately, but it cannot fall fiir short of 
 twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Of the latter, 
 I understand, through General ]>uckner, about two hundred 
 and fifty were taken piisoncrs. I shall retain here enough of 
 the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately 
 shipped off, and not left for recapture. 
 
 About the close of this action the ammunition and car- 
 tridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of m:iny of the 
 field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing 
 that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that 
 equal confusion, and, consequently, great demoralization, ex- 
 isted with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I orden-d a 
 charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under 
 General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and 
 gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle Lasted 
 until dark, and gave us possession of part of the intrenchment. 
 An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by 
 General Smith was commenced, by the divisions under McCler- 
 nand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hour« of exposure 
 to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was gallantly m.ade, 
 and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, 
 night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, 
 feeling that a complete victory would crown their cflbrts at an 
 3S 
 
594 APPENDIX. 
 
 early hour in the morning. Tbis morning, at a very early 
 hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a flag 
 of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the correspond- 
 ence which ensued is herewith enclosed. 
 
 I could mention individuals who especially distinguished 
 themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade com- 
 manders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received. 
 
 Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith, Mc- 
 Clernand, and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of 
 them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and 
 were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the 
 exposure to themselves. 
 
 At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's 
 command, I was absent, having received a note from Flag- 
 Officer Foote, requesting me to go and see him, he being unable 
 to call on me, in consequence of a wound received the day 
 before. 
 
 My staff. Colonel J. D. Webster, First Illinois artillery, 
 chief of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant- 
 general ; First Lieutenants C. B. Lagow and William S. Hill- 
 ycr, aides ; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief 
 engineer, and Colonel John Kiggin, junior, volunteer aide, 
 are all deserving of personal mention for their gallantry and 
 services. 
 
 For details, see reports of engineers, medical director, and 
 commanders of divisions and brigades, to follow. 
 
 TJ. S. GRANT, Br ir/adier- General 
 
 GEANTS CONGEATt-LATOET OEDEE AFTEE THE CAPTUEE OF FOET DON- 
 
 ELSON. 
 
 Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
 Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862. ) 
 
 Oencral Orders, Ko. 2. 
 
 The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratu- 
 lating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebel- 
 lion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th inst. 
 
 For four successive nights, without shelter during the most 
 inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy 
 in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly 
 fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were 
 
APPENDIX. 'iO') 
 
 added. Without a murmur this was borne, proparcfl at all 
 times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishinLT l)v 
 day, resultino: ultimately in forcincj the enemy to surrender 
 without conditions. 
 
 The victory acliieved is not only great in breakinrr down 
 rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of 
 war ever taken in one battle on this continent. 
 
 Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the 
 maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle 
 will live in the memory of a grateful people. 
 
 C. S. GRANT, Major- General commanding. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTEE UI. 
 
 TELEGRAM FEOM GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT. 
 
 St. Louis, March 1, 1862. 
 General U. S. Grant, Fort Henry : 
 
 Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move 
 your column up the Tennessee river. The main object of this 
 expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear 
 creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at Corinth, 
 Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects 
 be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cav- 
 alry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid 
 movements reach these points from the river without very 
 serious opposition. Avoid any general engagement with strong 
 forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. 
 This should be strongly impressed upon the officers sent with 
 the expedition from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some 
 very discreet officer, should be selected for such commands. 
 Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be 
 practicable, you will return to Danville and move on Paris. 
 Perhaps the troops seyt to Jackson and Humboldt can reach 
 Paris as easily by land as to return to the transports. This 
 must depend on the character of the roads and the position of 
 the enemy. All telegraph lines which can be reached must 
 be cut. The gunboats will accompany the transports for their 
 
APPENDIX, 597 
 
 protection. Any loyal Tenncssccans, who desire it, may }>o 
 enlisted and supplied with arms. 
 
 Competent officers should he left to command the trarrisrin-i 
 of Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. T lia\ e indicated 
 in general terms the object of this. 
 
 II. W. IIALLECK, Major- G aural. 
 
 CORRESPOXDENCE BETWEEN GEXEltALS BEAITJEGARD AXD GRANT. 
 IlEAPQCARTEnS, ArMT OF Tm: MlS5IS.<!irP!, ) 
 
 Monday, Jpril 8, 1862. ) 
 
 Sir: At the close of the conflict yesterday, my forces beinjr 
 exhausted by the extraordinary length of time during -svhich 
 they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, 
 and it being apparent that you had received and were still re- 
 ceiving reenforceraents, I felt it my duty to withdraw my 
 troops from the immediate scene of conflict. 
 
 Under these circumstances, in accordance with usages of 
 war, I shall transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permis- 
 sion to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh, for 
 the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead. 
 
 Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this to 
 remove the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for 
 them the privilege of accompanying the burial party ; and in 
 this connection, I deem it proper to say, I am asking only what 
 I have extended to your own countrymen, under similar cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genial commanding. 
 To Major- General U. S. Grant, commanding 
 
 United States forces near Pittslurg, Tennessee. 
 
 HEADQrARTERS, ArMT IS TnE FlELP, [ 
 
 PinsBrRO, Jpril 9, 1862. ' 
 
 General G. T. BF.\rp.Er.ARD, commanding ConAJtrafc Army 
 of the Mississippi, Monterey, Tenn. : 
 General: Your dispatch of yesterday ju<t received. Ow- 
 ing to the warmth of the weather, I deemed it advisable to 
 ha^ve all the dead of both parties buried immediately. Heavy 
 details were made for this purpose, and it is now accomplished. 
 
598 APPENDIX. 
 
 There cannot therefore be any necessity of admitting within 
 our lines the parties you desire to send on the grounds asked. 
 I shall always be glad to extend any courtesy consistent with 
 duty, especially so when dictated by humanity. 
 I am, General, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General 
 
 GEANT'3 CONGEATULATOEY OEDEB AFTEE SHILOH. 
 
 Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
 Pittsburg, April 8, 1862. ) 
 
 General Orders^ No. 34. 
 
 The general commanding congratulates the troops who so 
 gallantly maintained their position, repulsed and routed a 
 numerically superior force of the enemy, composed of the flower 
 of the Southern army, commanded by their ablest generals, and 
 fought by them with all the desperation of despair. 
 
 In numbers engaged no such contest ever took place on this 
 continent. In importance of result but few such have taken 
 place in the history of the world. 
 
 Whilst congratulating the brave and gallant soldiers, it 
 becomes the duty of the general commanding to make special 
 notice of the brave wounded and those killed upon the field. 
 Whilst they leave friends and relations to mourn their loss, they 
 have won a nation's gratitude and undying laurels not to be for- 
 gotten by future generations, who will enjoy the blessings of the 
 best government the sun ever shone upon, preserved by their 
 valor. 
 
 By command of Major- General GRAWT. 
 
 John A. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 GEITEEAI, GEANT TO GEXEEAL BUELL. 
 
 Headquarters, District of "West Tennessee, ) 
 Pittsburg, April 1, 1862. ) 
 
 Major- General D. C. Buell, commanding Army of the Ohio: 
 
 When I left the field this evening, my intention was to oc- 
 cupy the most advanced position possible for the night with 
 the infantry engaged through the day, and follow up our suc- 
 cess with cavalry and fresh troops, expected to arrive during 
 
APPENDIX. 500 
 
 my last absence on the field. The great fatigue of our men, 
 tliey having been engaged in two days' fight, and subject to a 
 march yesterday and fight to-oay, -would preclude the idea of 
 making any advance to-night without the arrival of the ex- 
 pected reenforceraents. My plan, therefore, will be to feel on 
 in the morning with all the troops on the outer lines, until our 
 cavalry force can be engaged. One regiment of your army will 
 finish crossing soon, and a sufficient artillery and infantry sup. 
 port to follow them arc ready for a move. 
 
 Under the instructions which I have previously received, 
 and a dispatch also of to-day from ^Major-General Ilallcck, it 
 will not then do to advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point 
 which we can reach and return in a day. General Halleck will 
 probably be here himself to-morrow. Instructions have been 
 sent to the different division commanders not included in your 
 command, to be ready in the morning either to find if an enemy 
 was in front, or to advance. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General 
 
 GENERAL GBANT TO GENERAL BUELL. 
 
 Headqcarters, District of Wkst Tesxesmi, ) 
 PiTTSBcno, April 8, 18C2. ) 
 
 Major- General D. C. BrELL, commanding Army cf the Ohio: 
 
 In making the rcconnoissance ordered for this morning, 
 none of the cavalry belonging to your command were directed 
 to take part. I have directed, if the enemy are found retreat- 
 ing, information will be at once sent to Generals McClcmand 
 and Sherman, who will immediately advance with a portion of 
 their forces in support of the rcconnoissance. It will not be 
 practicable to move artillery. If the enemy are retreating, and 
 can be made to hasten across the low land between here and 
 Pea Ridge, they will probably be forced to abandon their artil- 
 lery and baggage. Will you be good enough to order your 
 cavalry to foHow on the Corinth roads, and give two or three 
 of your fresh brigades to follow in support ? 
 
 Information has just reached me that the cneray Lave re- 
 treated. 
 
 U. S. GB^VNT, Major- General. 
 
600 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENEEAL GEANT TO GENERAL nALLECK, "WITH TXCLOSUEES FROM 
 GENERAL SHERMAN TO GENEEAL GRANT. 
 
 Savanna, April 5, 1862. 
 Major- General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Mo. : 
 
 The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at 
 different points east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jack- 
 son, and Humboldt. The number at these places seems con- 
 stantly to change. The number of the enemy at Corinth, and 
 within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from eighty 
 thousand men. Information, obtained through deserters, places 
 their force west at two hundred thousand. One division of 
 Buell's column arrived yesterday. General Buell will be here 
 himself to-day. Some skirmishing took place between our out- 
 guai'ds and the enemy's yesterday and the day before. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General 
 
 Savanna, April 5, 1862. 
 Major- General H. W. Halleck, St Louis, Mo. : 
 
 General Nelson, of Buell's column, has just arrived. The 
 other two divisions will arrive to-morrow and next day. Some 
 skirmishing took place last night between our advance and the 
 enemy, resulting in four wounded, and four or five men and 
 two officers (of our side) taken prisoners. The enemy lost 
 several killed, and eight prisoners taken. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 
 
 Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, ) 
 Savanna, April 5, 1862. ) 
 
 Major-General II. "W. IIalleok;, St. Lovis, Mo. : 
 
 Just as my letter of yesterday, to Captain McLean, Assist- 
 ant Adjutant-General, was finished, notes from Generals Mc- 
 Clernand and Sherman's Assistant Adjutants-General were re- 
 ceived, stating that our outposts had been attacked by the 
 enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went 
 up, but found all quiet. The enemy took two officers and four 
 or five of our men prisoners, and wounded four. We took 
 
ArPENDIX. <')0l 
 
 eight prisoners, and killed several. Xuniber of the enemy's 
 wounded not known. 
 
 They had with them three pieces of artillery, and cavalry 
 and infantry. How much, cannot of course be estimated. I 
 have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being 
 made upon us, but icill be prepared should such a thing take 
 place. 
 
 General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two, of 
 Buell's column, will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my 
 present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four miles 
 above Pittsburg, when they all get here. From that point to 
 Corinth the road is good, and a junction can be formed with 
 the troops from Pittsburg at almost any point. 
 
 Colonel McPhcrson has gone with an escort to-day to exam- 
 ine the defensibility of the ground about Hamburg, and to lay 
 out the position of the camps, if advisable to occupy that 
 
 place. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 'Major- General. 
 
 PrrrsBmo Laspino, Tesskssee^ \ 
 April 5, 1802. S 
 
 General Grant : 
 
 Sir,— All is quiet along my lines now. "NVe are in the act 
 of exchanging cavalry according to your orders. The enemy 
 has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regimente 
 of infantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. I 
 will send you in ten prisoners of war, and a report of last 
 night's affair, in a few minutes. 
 
 W. T. SIIEPwMAN, BrigadUr-Gfnfral 
 
 Your note is just received. I have no doubt that nothing 
 will occur to-day more than some picket-tiring. The enemy is 
 saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our 
 pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with certainty 
 of advantage; and I do not apprehend any thing like an attack 
 upon our position. 
 
602 APPENDIX. 
 
 LETTER FEOM GENERAL SHERMAN TO TEE EDITOR OF THE UNITED 
 STATES' SERVICE MAGAZINR— (Published Jantjakt, 1865.) 
 
 Headquarters, Military Diyisiox of the Mississippi. 
 Prof. Heney CoppfE, PhiladelpJiia : 
 
 Dear Sir, — In the June number of the United States' Ser- 
 vice Magazine, I find a brief sketch of Lieutenant-General IJ. 
 S. Grant, in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error, 
 which General Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to 
 correct. To General Buell's noble, able, and gallant conduct 
 you attribute the fact that the disaster of April 6th, at Pitts- 
 burg Landing was retrieved, and made the victory of the fol- 
 lowing day. As General Taylor is said in his later days to 
 have doubted whether he was at the battle of Buena Vista at 
 all, on account of the many tilings having transpired there, ac- 
 cording to the historians, which he did not see, so I begin to 
 doubt whether I was at the battle of Pittsburg Landing, of 
 modern description. But I was at the battles of April 6th and 
 Tth, 1862. General Grant visited my division in person about 
 ten A. M., when the battle raged fiercest. I was then on the 
 right. After some general conversation, he remarked that I 
 was doing right in stubbornly op])Osing the progress of the 
 enemy ; and, in answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, told me 
 he had anticipated their want, and given orders accordingly ; 
 he then said his presence was more needed over at the left. 
 About two p. M. of the 6th, the enemy materially slackened his 
 attack on me, and about four p. m. I deliberately made a new 
 line behind McAjfthur's drill-field, placing batteries on chosen 
 ground, repelled easily a cavalry attack, and watched the cau- 
 tious approach of the enemy's infantry, that never dislodged 
 me there. I selected that line in advance of a bridge across 
 Snake creek, by which we had all day been expecting the ap- 
 proach of Lewis Wallace's division from Crump's Landing. 
 About five p. M., before the sun set. General Grant came again 
 to me, and after hearing my report of matters, explained to 
 me the situation of aflairs on the left, which were not as favor- 
 able ; still, the enemy had failed to reach the landing of the 
 boats. We agreed that the enemy had expended the furore 
 of his attack, and we estimated our loss, and approximated our 
 then strength, including Lewis Wallace's fresh division, ex- 
 
APPEiSDIX. C03 
 
 pected each minute. He then ordcrcil mc to get all things 
 ready, and at daylight the next day to assume the offensive. 
 That was before General Buell had arrived, but he was known 
 to be near at hand. General Buell's troops took no essential 
 part in the first day's fight, and Grant's army, though collected 
 together hastily, gi'een as militia, some regiments arriving 
 without cartridges even, and nearly all hearing the dread sound 
 of battle for the first time, had successfully withstood and re- 
 pelled the first day's terrific onset of a superior enemy, well 
 commanded and well handled. I know I had orders from Gen- 
 eral Grant to assume the offensive before I knew General Buell 
 Avas on the west side of the Tennessee. I think General Buell, 
 Colonel Fry, and others of General Buell's staff rode up to 
 where I was about sunset, about the time General Grant was 
 leaving me. General Buell asked me many questions, and got 
 of me a small map, which I had made for my own use, and told 
 me that by daylight he could have eighteen thousand fresh 
 men, which I knew would settle the matter. 
 
 I understood Grant's forces were to advance on the right 
 of tlie Corinth road, and Buell's on the left ; and accordingly, 
 at daylight, I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance 
 being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the bat- 
 tle had been most severe, and then waited till near noon fur 
 Buell's troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced 
 and recovered all the ground we had ever held. I know that, 
 with the exception of one or two severe struggles, the fighting 
 of April Vth was easy as compared with that of April Cth. 
 
 I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question any thing 
 done by General Buell and his army, and know that approach- 
 ing our field of battle from the rear, he encountered that sick- 
 ening crowd of laggards and fugitives that excited his con- 
 tempt, and that of his army, wno never gave full credit to 
 those in the front line, who did fight hard, and who had, at four 
 p. M. checked the enemy, and were preparing tlie next day to 
 assume the offensive. I remember the fact the better from 
 General Grant's anecdote of his Donelson battle, which ho told 
 me then for the first time — that, at a certain period of the bat- 
 tle he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other 
 showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, 
 to advance on the enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the 
 enemy surrendered At four r. m. of April Gth, he thought 
 
G04 APPEISTDIX. 
 
 the appearances the same, and he judged, with Lewis Wallace's 
 fresh division and such of our startled troops as had recovered 
 their equilibrium, he would be justified in dropping the defen- 
 sive and assuming the offensive in the morning. And, I re- 
 peat, I received such orders before I knew General Buell's 
 troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad Buell was 
 there, because I knew his troops were older than ours, and bet- 
 ter systematized and drilled, and his arrival made that certain, 
 which before was uncertain. I have heard this question much 
 discussed, and must say, that the officers of Buell's army dwelt 
 too much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave 
 us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weak- 
 ened as we were by the absence of BuelFs army, long expected, 
 of Lewis Wallace's division, only four miles off, and of the fu- 
 gitives from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the 
 time. At the same time, our Army of the Tennessee have in- 
 dulged in severe criticisms at the slow approach of that army 
 which knew the danger that threatened us from the concen- 
 trated armies of Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, that lay 
 at Corinth. In a war like this, where opportunities for per- 
 sonal prowess are as plenty as blackberries, to those who seek 
 them at the front, all such criminations should be frowned 
 down; and were it not for the military character of your jour- 
 nal, I would not venture to offer a correction to a very popular 
 error. 
 
 I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct another 
 very common mistake, in attributing to General Grant the se- 
 lection of that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran sol- 
 dier, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division 
 to disembark there, and strike for the Charleston railroad. 
 This order was subsequently modified, by his ordering Ilurl- 
 but's division to disembark there, and mine higher up the Ten- 
 nessee, to the mouth of Yellow creek, to strike the railroad at 
 Burnsville. But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, 
 when General Smith ordered me in person also to disembark 
 at Pittsburg Landing, and take post well out, so as to make 
 plenty of room, with Snake and Lick creeks the flanks of a 
 camp for the grand army of invasion. 
 
 It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and 
 it was Avell chosen. On any other we surely would have been 
 overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake creeks forced the enemy 
 
APPENDIX. OU.J 
 
 to confine his movement ^o a direct front attack, which new 
 troops are better qualified to resist than where the flanks aro 
 exposed to a real or chimerical danger. Even tlie divisions of 
 that army were arranged in that camp hy (General Smith's or- 
 der, my division forming, as it were, the outlying picket, whilst 
 McClernand and Prentiss's were the real line of battle, with 
 W. H. L. "Wallace in support of the right wing, and Ilurlbut 
 of the left ; Lewis Wallace's division being detached. All 
 these subordinate dispositions were made by the order of Gen- 
 eral Smith, before General Grant succeeded him to the com- 
 mand of all the forces up the Tennessee — headquarters, Savan- 
 na. If there were any error in putting that army on the 
 •west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of 
 the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not 
 General Grant's ; but there was no mistake. It was necessary 
 that a combat, tierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the 
 two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as 
 any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, 
 but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life 
 lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at 
 Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resist- 
 ance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored 
 as we then were, we could fight as well as they. 
 
 Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual from me ; 
 but of course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I 
 happen to be a witness to certain truths which are now l)egiu- 
 ning to pass out of memory, and form what is called historj'. 
 
 I also take great pleasure in adding, that nearly all the 
 new troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure, have 
 more than redeemed their good name ; among them, that very 
 regiment which first broke, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appcn, 
 Under another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every cam- 
 paign and expedition of mine since, ia with me now, and can 
 march, and bivouac, and fight as well as the best regiment in 
 this or any army. Its reputation now is ciual to that of any 
 
 from the state of Ohio. 
 
 I am, with respect, yours truly, 
 
 W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General 
 
606 APPEinoix. 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS OF GENERALS BUEI.L AND NELSON, AND COLO- 
 NELS AMMEN, GROSE, ANDERSON, AND JONES, OF THE BATTLE OF 
 6HIL0H. 
 
 " General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at 
 this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet 
 the attack at that point, and, with a battery of artillery which 
 happened to be on the ground and was brought into action, 
 opened fire upon the enemy and repulsed him. The action of 
 the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The 
 attack at that point was not renewed, night having come on, 
 and the tiring ceased on both sides." — General BuelVs Report. 
 
 " At five, the head of my column marched up the bank of 
 Pittsburg Landing and took up its position in the road under 
 the fire of the rebel artillery, so close had they approached the 
 landing. I found a semicircle of artillery totally unsupported 
 by infantry, whose fire was the only check to the audacious ap- 
 proach of the enemy. The Sixth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana 
 regiments had scarcely deployed when the left of the artillery 
 was completely turned by the enemy, and the gunners fled from 
 their pieces. The gallantry of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, sup- 
 ported by the Sixth Ohio, under tlie able conduct of Colonel 
 Ammen, commanding Tenth brigade, drove back the enemy, 
 and restored the line of battle. This was at 6.30 p. m., and 
 soon after, the enemy withdrew, owing, I suppose, to the 
 darkness." — General N'elson's Report. 
 
 So much for Buell and Nelson. Now read what their sub- 
 ordinates, who were actually engaged, reported : 
 
 "Reaching the top of the bank with the Thirty-sixth Indi- 
 ana, General Grant directed me to send the regiment to support 
 a battery less than a quarter of a mile from the landing. The 
 Thirty-sixth marched promptly, and had been placed in position 
 but a few minutes, when the enemy attacked the battery, and was 
 repulsed. The enemy continued to assail the battery until the 
 close of the day with a large force, but was repulsed by the 
 Thirty-sixth with great coolness and gallantry. The Twenty- 
 fourth and Sixth Ohio crossed the river as speedily as possi- 
 ble, and arriving at the top of the bank, the Twenty-fourth 
 was ordered by General Grant to repair to a point one-half 
 mile to the right, on a part of the line threatened by the 
 
APPEISTDIX. 607 
 
 enemy. The Sixth Ohio was held in reserve. During the 
 night," etc. — Colonel Ammen^s B.eport. 
 
 " On arriving on the south side of the river, under circum- 
 stances that looked discouraging to new troops, my regiment 
 was formed (the eight companies ahont fovr hundred strong), 
 amid great commotion and excitement. While forming the 
 regiment one of my men was killed by a ball of the enemy. 
 As soon as formed, I was ordered to advance to support Cap- 
 tain Stone's battery, about one hundred and fifty yards dis- 
 tant from my place of forming, which was done in tolerable 
 order, and as soon as the regiment was in place the firing com- 
 menced, and continued until near dark. I there lost another 
 man killed, and one icounded. During the first part of the 
 night," etc. — Report of Colonel Grose, Thirty-sixth Indiana 
 Volunteers. 
 
 " I formed line of battle, under your directions, some two 
 hundred yards from the river to support a battery then in 
 danger of being charged by the enemy. The regiment laid on 
 arms all night," etc. — Report of Colonel Anderson, Sixth Ohio 
 Volunteers. 
 
 " We landed at this place about five and a half o'clock, p. m., 
 of the 6th, and Avere immediately formed in line of battle on 
 the river hill. After the repulse of the enemy at this point, the 
 regiment was moved by your direction about three-quarters of 
 a mile to the right, and were then ordered by General Grant 
 to advance into the woods a short distance, to ascertain, if pos- 
 sible, the position of the enemy's lines. Having scoured the 
 woods for half a mile to the front, and finding no enemy, and 
 the shells from our gunboats falling but a few feet in front of 
 us, we halted and remained in position until about midnight." 
 — Report of Lieutenant- Colonel Jones, Twenty-fourth Ohio 
 Volunteers. 
 
 From all which it will be seen that Grant put two of 
 Buell's regiments in support of a battery, and that one of these 
 regiments lost two men killed and one wounded ; and that this 
 was the amount of fighting done by Buell on the 6th of April. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V. 
 
 EXTRACT OF A CONFIDEXTIAL OEDEK, ISSUED ON OCTOBEK 21, 1S63, BY 
 EDWIN M. STANTON, SECEETAKY OF WAE. FKOM THE WAE DEPARTMENT 
 AT WASHINGTON CITY. 
 
 " Ordered, that Major-General McClernand be, and he is 
 directed to proceed to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, 
 to organize the troops remaining in those states and to be 
 raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all 
 dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may here- 
 after be designated by the General-in-cliief, to the end that, 
 when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of Gen- 
 eral Grant's command, shall be raised, an expedition may be 
 organized under General McClernand's command, against 
 Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi river and open naviga- 
 tion to New Orleans." 
 
 Indorsement: "This order, though marked 'confidential,' 
 may be shown by General McClernand to governors, and even 
 others, when, in his discretion, he believes so doing to be indis- 
 pensable to the progress of the expedition. I add, that I feel 
 deep interest in the success of the expedition, and desire it to 
 be pushed forward with all possible dispatch, consistently with 
 the other parts of the military service. 
 
 "A. LINCOLN." 
 
 In his letter of January 30, 1862, to General Grant, General 
 McClernand remarks that the above order of the Secretary of 
 War was made " under the personal du-ection of the President." 
 
APPENDIX. (JQQ 
 
 EXTRACT FROM A LETTER PROM TUE SECRETARY OF WAR TO MA TOP 
 GENERAL JOHN A. McCLERNAND, UNDER DATE OCTOBER 29 ,862 
 
 "General: The importance of the expedition on the Mk- 
 S1SS1P131 IS every day becoming more manifest, and there will be 
 the utmost endeavor, on the part of the Govenimenf, to -ive 
 ]t aid and strength. "^ 
 
 " In conversing with you, I indicated the importance of a 
 coastwise expedition against Texas to aid you, and create a 
 diversion of the enemy's force. 
 
 "Major-General Banks is now organizing an expedition for 
 that purpose, which will be in condition to cooperate with any 
 movement that may be made, after you have succeeded in 
 clearing the Mississippi river." 
 
 general Mcclernand to general grant. 
 
 Headquartkrs, Army of the Tennessee, ) 
 Post Arkansas, January 16, 1863. ) 
 Major- General U. S. Grant, 
 
 commanding Department of the Tennessee: 
 
 Gejteeal,— Your dispatch of the 16th inst. came to hand 
 at six o'clock p. M. this day, and I hasten, at the same moment, 
 to answer it. 
 
 I take the responsibility of the expedition against Post 
 Arkansas, and had anticipated your approval of the complete 
 and signal success which crowned it, rather than your condem- 
 nation. 
 
 ^ In saying that I could not have effected the reduction of 
 Vicksburg with the limited force under my command, after its 
 repulse near that place under General Sherman, I only repeat 
 what was contained in a previous dispatch to you. Trom the 
 mornent you fell hack from Oxford, and the purpose of a front 
 attack upon the enemy's works near Vicksburg was thus de- 
 prived of cooperation, the Mississippi river expedition was 
 doomed to eventuate in a failure. 
 
 I had heard nothing of General Banks when I left Mil- 
 liken's Bend on the 4th inst. ; and if as i/ou saiy, Port Hudson 
 has been made "very strong," it will be some time before he 
 39 
 
610 APPENDIX. 
 
 will be in a situation to receive the cooper^ation of the Missis- 
 sippi river expedition, unless he should prone more successful 
 than the latter. 
 
 Had I remained idle and inactive at Milliken's Bend with 
 the army under my command until now, I should have felt my- 
 self guilty of a great crime. Rather had I accepted the conse- 
 quences of the imputed guilt of using it profitably and success- 
 fully upon my own responsibility. 
 
 The officer who, in the present strait of the country, will 
 not assume a proper responsibility to save it, is unworthy of 
 public trust. 
 
 Having successfully accomplished the object of this expedi- 
 tion, I will return to Milliken's Bend, according to my intention, 
 communicated to you in a previous disjDatch, unless otherwise 
 ordered by you. Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JOHN A. McCLEPvN'AND, 
 
 Major- General commanding. 
 
 GENEEAL McCLEENAND TO GENERAL GEANT. 
 
 Headquarters, Abmy of the Mississippi, 
 Department of the Tennessee, 
 Before Vicksburg, Miss., January 30, 1863. 
 Major- General U. S. Grant, 
 
 commanding Department of the Tennessee : 
 
 Your order directing me to move the camp of the Fifly- 
 fourth Indiana volunteers outside the limits of the camp hos- 
 pital, and to furnish guards for said hosj)ital, is received. 
 
 The officer M^ho brought you a complaint ujDon this subject, 
 should not have troubled you, but should have come to me, or, 
 having come to you, I think ought, regularly, to have been re- 
 ferred to me. 
 
 I denounce his complaint as an act of insubordination. 
 Please advise me who made the complaint. 
 
 If I am to be held, responsible for the safety of this camp, I 
 must be permitted to dispose of the forces within it as I may 
 think proper. The internal organization of the camp, and the 
 disposition of its forces, are matters that properly belong to 
 me as their immediate commander. 
 
 The Fifty-fourth Indiana was assigni'd to the position, 
 coveted by the medical director or hospital surgeon, for strate* 
 
APPENDIX. 611 
 
 gic reasons, before the camji hospital was located. Those 
 reasons are, in part, explained by the correspondence, a copy 
 of which is herewith enclosed. Nevertheless, upon the applica- 
 tion of the medical director, or rather upon my own sufjges- 
 tion, the huts occupied by the Fifty-fourth were vacated by 
 them, and assigned for hospital uses, and the regiment ordered 
 to encamp as far away as was consistent with strategic con- 
 siderations. This they did. 
 
 Still complaint came. The surgeon objected to the neigh- 
 borhood of the regiment ; the colonel complained of the inso- 
 lence of the surgeon, and stated that his men had voluntarily 
 cared for the sick, who had been brought out and left on the 
 ground uncared for. I settled the question, as already men- 
 tioned, by giving the huts and necessary space to the surgeon, 
 and moving the regiment as far away as was considered proper. 
 
 With this statement, it remains for you to decide what 
 ought to be done in the premises. The enforcement of your 
 order will be the subversion of my authority at the instance 
 of an inferior, who deserves to be arrested for his indirection 
 and spirit of insubordination. 
 
 And having said this much, general, it is proper that I 
 should add one or two other words. I understand that orders 
 are being issued from your headquarters directly to army corps 
 commanders, and not through me. As I am invested, by order 
 of the Secretary of War, indorsed by the President, and by 
 order of the President communicated to you by the General- 
 in-chief, with the command of all the forces operating on the 
 Mississippi river, I claim that all orders affecting the condi- 
 tion or operation of those forces should pass through these 
 headquarters. Otherwise I must lose a knowledge of current 
 business, and dangerous confusion ensue. If different views 
 are entertained by you, then the question should be imme- 
 diately referred to Washington, and one or other, or both of us, 
 relieved. 
 
 One thing is certain : two generals cannot command this 
 army, issuing independent and direct orders to subordinate 
 officers, and the public service be promoted. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 JOHN A. McCLEKNAND, Major- General commanding. 
 
612 APPEliTDIX, 
 
 GENEEAL McCLEKNAlfD TO GENERAL GKA^T. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Mississippi, 
 Department of the Tennessee, 
 Before Yicksburg, January 30, 1863. 
 Major- General V). S. Geaxt, 
 
 commanding Department of the Tennessee: 
 
 General Orders, No. 13, is this moraent received. I hasten 
 to inquire whether its purpose is to relieve me from the com- 
 mand of all, or any jiortion of the forces composing the Missis- 
 sippi river expedition, or, in other words, whether its purpose 
 is to limit my command to the Thirteenth army corps. 
 
 I am led to make this inquiry, "because, while such seems to 
 he the intention, it conflicts with the order of the Secretary of 
 War, made under the personal direction of the President, bear- 
 ing date October 31, 1862, of which the following is an ex- 
 tract : 
 
 " Major-General McClernand is dii-ected to proceed to the 
 states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops 
 
 remaining in those states and forward them to 
 
 Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be des- 
 ignated, to the end that, when a sufficient force, not 
 
 required by the operations of General Grant's command [then 
 in "West Tennessee], shall be raised, an expedition may be or- 
 ganized, under General McClernand's command, against Yicks- 
 burg, and to clear the Mississippi to New Orleans." 
 
 Also, with the order of the General-in-chief to you, dated 
 December 18, 1862, of which the following is an extract: 
 
 " It is the wish of the President, that General McClernand's 
 corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that 
 he shall have the immediate command under your direction.'''' * 
 
 Also, with your communication of the same date, based on 
 the preceding order, and giving me command of the expedition ; 
 and with your verbal assurance of yesterday, that my relations 
 to the forces here would continue undisturbed. 
 
 I repeat that I respectfully ask for an explanation of this 
 seeming conflict of authority and orders, that I may be enabled 
 to guide my action intelligently. By General Orders, Xo. 22, 
 you extend your command as fir west from the Mississippi river 
 as your orders may reach. By General Orders, No. 13, you 
 
 * The italics are McClernand's. 
 
APPENDIX. 613 
 
 cliarge the Tliii-teenth army corps with garrisoning Helena and 
 other points south. Is it to be understood that my command 
 west of the JSIississippi is coextensive with the purview of 
 General Orders, No. 22 ? 
 
 Again, you charge the Thirteenth army corps with garri- 
 soning the west bank of the Mississij)pi. Am I to understand 
 that I am to act on my own judgment in fixing the number, 
 strength, and location of those garrisons, or simply by your 
 dii-ections ? 
 
 It is quite obvious that the whole, or a large portion of the 
 Thirteenth army corps must be absorbed by these garrisons, 
 if the purpose is to afford complete protection to all lawful 
 vessels navigating the river ; and thus, while having projected 
 the Mississippi river expedition, and having been by a series 
 of orders assigned to the command of it, I may be entirely 
 withdrawn fi*om it. 
 
 For the reason last stated, and because the portion of the 
 Thirteenth army corps taking part in this expedition is very 
 much smaller than any other corps of your command, and be- 
 cause my forces are here, and those of others have yet to 
 come ; why not detach from the latter to garrison the river 
 shore, and relieve all those here from liability to that charge ? 
 Your obedient servant, 
 JOHN" A. McCLERN'A]SrD, Major-General commanding. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL McCLERNAND. 
 
 Yocng's Poixt, La., January 31, 1863. 
 Major- General J. A. McCleknand, commanding 
 TMrteentTi Army Corps: 
 The intention of General Order, No. 13, is that I Avill take 
 direct command of the Mississippi river expedition, which 
 necessarily limits your command to the Thirteenth array corps. 
 ****** 
 
 I regard the President as Commander-in-chief of the army, 
 
 and will obey every order of his; but as yet I have seen no 
 
 order to prevent my taking immediate command in the field ; 
 
 and since the dispatch referred to in your note, I have received 
 
 another from the General-in-chief of the amiy, authorizing me 
 
 directly to take charge of this army. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 
 
614 APPENDIX. 
 
 EXERAL MoCLERNAND TO GENERAL GEA2fT. 
 
 Headquarters, Thirteenth Army Corps, ) 
 Before YicKSBURG, jPt'S^-Ma/-^/ 1, 1863. ) 
 
 Geijeeal : Your dispatch of this date, in answer to mine 
 of yesterday, is received. 
 
 You announce it to be the intention of General Orders, No. 
 13, to relieve me from the command of the Mississippi river 
 expedition, and to circumscribe my command to the Thirteenth 
 army corps ; and undertake to justify the order by authority 
 granted by the General-in-chief. 
 
 I acquiesced in the order for the purpose of avoiding a con- 
 flict of authority in the presence of the enemy, but for reasons 
 set foi'th in my dispatch of yesterday (which, for any thing dis- 
 closed, I still hold good) I protest against its competency and 
 justice; and respectfully request that this ray protest, together 
 with the accompanying jjaper, may be forwarded to the General- 
 in-chief, and through him to the Secretary of War, and the 
 President. 
 
 I request this not only in respect for the President and the 
 Secretary, under whose express authority I claim the right to 
 command the expedition, but in justice to myself as its author 
 and active promoter. Your obedient servant, 
 
 JOHN" A. McOLERXAND, 
 
 Major- General commanding. 
 Major- General U. S. Grant, 
 
 commanding Department of the Tennessee. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK. 
 
 Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, I 
 Before Vicksburg, February 1, 1863. J 
 
 Herewith I enclose you copy of General Orders, No. 13, from 
 these headquarters, and the correspondence between General 
 McClernand and myself growing out of it. 
 
 It is due to myself to state that I am not ambitious to have 
 this or any other command ; I am willing to do all in my power 
 in any position assigned me. General McClernand was as- 
 signed to duty in this department, with instructions to me to 
 assign him to an army coi'ps on the Mississippi river, and to 
 
APPENDIX. 615 
 
 give him the chief command under my direction. This I 
 did ; but subsequently receiving authority to assign the com- 
 mand to any one I thought most competent, or to take it myself, 
 I determined at least to he present with the expedition. 
 
 If General Sherman had been left in command here, such is 
 my confidence in him that I would not have thought my pres- 
 ence necessary. But whether I do injustice to General ]McCler- 
 nand or not, I have not confidence in his ability as a soldier to 
 conduct an expedition of the magnitude of this successfully. In 
 this opinion I have no doubt but that I am borne out by a ma- 
 jority of the officers of the expedition, though I have not 
 questioned one of them on the subject. 
 
 I resj)ectfully siibmit this whole matter to the General-in- 
 chief and the President. Whatever the decision made by them, 
 I will cheerfully submit to and give a hearty support. 
 
 GEXEKAX McCLEENAND TO GENEEAL GRANT— (Extract.) 
 
 " Jamiary 24. 
 
 ..." Great prudence needs to be exercised in detaching 
 transports fi-om this fleet to return to Memphis, as the ISIissis- 
 sippi river is rising rapidly, and may deluge our troops at any 
 time. You will at once perceive the great importance of this 
 caution, as it involves the very existence of the army here. . . . 
 
 "Before closing this dispatch, I wish to say that the tran- 
 sports ordered back to Memphis should be returned here at the 
 earhest possible moment, if the Mississippi river continues to 
 rise." 
 
 These letters, it will be remembered, are addressed by a 
 subordinate to his commanding ofScer. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI. 
 
 [I AM indebted to General Sherman for a co-pj of the fol- 
 lowing interesting letter, the original not having been preserved 
 by General Grant. I give it entire, with the exception of the 
 concluding paragraph, which adds nothing to the elucidation 
 of General Sherman's views, and contains simply a confidential 
 remark, entirely distinct from the remainder of the letter.] 
 
 \ 
 
 GEKEEAL SHERMAN TO COLONEL EAWLINS. 
 
 Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Corps, 
 
 Camp near Vicksburg, Api-U 8, 1863. 
 Colonel J. A. Rawi.ins, A. A. G. to General Geant : 
 
 SiE, — I would most respectfully suggest, for reasons which 
 I Avill not name, that General Grant call on his corps command- 
 ers for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best gen- 
 eral plan of campaign. Unless this be done, there are men 
 who will, in any result foiling below the popular standard, 
 claim thiit their advice was unheeded, and that fatal conse- 
 quences resulted therefrom. My own opinions are : 
 
 1. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of the 
 other grand armies. 
 
 2, That a cor{)S from Missouri should forthwith be moved 
 
APPENDIX. 017 
 
 from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas, sup- 
 plies collected while the river is full, and land communication 
 with Memphis opened via Des Ark on the White, ajid Madison 
 on the St. Francis rivers. 
 
 3. That as much of Yazoo pass, Coldwater, and Talla- 
 hatchie rivei's as can be gained and fortified he held, and the 
 main army be transported thither by land and water ; that the 
 road back to Memphis be secured and reopened ; and as soon 
 as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp 
 road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry. 
 
 4. That tlie line of the Yallabusha be the base from which 
 to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central 
 crosses Big Black above Canton, and lastly where the Yicks- 
 burg and Jackson railroad crosses the same river. 
 
 The caj^ture of Vicksburg would result. 
 
 5. That a force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed ten 
 thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and trans- 
 port them to any direct point. This force to be held always 
 near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main army is 
 known to be near Yicksburg, Haine's bluff, or Yazoo City. 
 
 6. I do doubt the capacity of Willow bayou (which I es- 
 timate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) for a military 
 channel, capable of supporting an army large enough to op- 
 erate against Jackson, Mississippi, or Black river bridge ; and 
 such a channel will be very valuable to a force coming from 
 the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal Avill be most 
 useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a fleet that 
 should navigate the reach between Vicksburg and Red river. 
 
 7. The chief reason for operating soMi/ by water, was the 
 season of the year and high water in Tallahatchie and Yalla- 
 busha. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be 
 no serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of the forest, and 
 whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Gre- 
 nada. Korth Mississippi is too valuable to allow them to hold 
 and make crops. 
 
 I make these suggestions, with the request that General 
 Grant simply read them, and give them, as I know he will, a 
 share of his thoughts. I would prefer ho should not answer 
 them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they 
 deserve. 
 
 Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from 
 
618 APPENDIX. 
 
 me the same zealous cooperation and energetic support, as 
 though conceived by myself. 
 
 ****** 
 
 I am, etc., 
 
 W. T. SHERMAN, Maoor- General. 
 
 Headqttartkrs, Department of the Tennessee, ) 
 Milliken's Bend, La., Api-il 20, 1863. f 
 Special Orders, No. 110. 
 
 ****** 
 
 VIII, The following orders are published for the informa- 
 tion and guidance of the " Army in the Field," in its present 
 movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the Missis- 
 sippi river, from which Vicksburg can be approached by prac- 
 ticable roads : 
 
 1. Tlie Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. 
 McClernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. 
 
 2. The Fifteenth army corps, IMajor-General W. T. Sher- 
 man commanding, will constitute the left wing. 
 
 3. The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James E. 
 McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre. 
 
 4. The order of march to New Carthage will be from right 
 to left. 
 
 5. Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army 
 corps, or an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as ne- 
 cessity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions, 
 each division will remain under the immediate command of its 
 respective corps commanders, unless otherwise specially or- 
 dered, for a particular emergency. 
 
 6. Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities 
 can be afforded lor the transportation of camp equipage. 
 
 v. In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to 
 each company for the protection of rations from rain ; one wall 
 tent for each regimental headquarters ; one wall tent for each 
 brigade headquarters, and one wall tent for each division head- 
 quarters. Corps commanders having the books and blanks of 
 their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to 
 take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed 
 the number allowed by General Orders, No. 160, A. G. O., 
 Series of 1862 
 
APPENDIX. 01 
 
 8. All the teams of the three army corps, under the imme- 
 diate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their re- 
 turns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance, 
 and the authorized camp equipage of the army, 
 
 9. As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Sev- 
 enteenth army corps will take its place ; and it, in turn, will be 
 followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army corps. 
 
 10. Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed 
 by corps commanders, to guard tlie lines from Richmond to 
 New Carthage. 
 
 11. General hospitals will be established, by the medical 
 director, between Duckport and Milliken's bend. All sick and 
 disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in 
 charge of hospitals will report convalescents, as fast as they 
 become fit for duty. Each corps commander will detail an in- 
 telligent and good drill ofiicer, to remain behind to take charge 
 of the convalescents of their respective corps ; officers so de- 
 tailed will organize the men under their charge into squads 
 and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong 
 to ; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers 
 to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or 
 privates. The force so organized will constitute the guard of 
 the line from Duckport to Milliken's bend. They will furnish 
 all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and 
 with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will fur- 
 nish all the details for loading and unloading boats. 
 
 12. The movement of troops from Milliken's bend to Xew 
 Carthage will be so conducted as to allow tlie transportation 
 of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of 
 ordnance requii-ed by previous orders. 
 
 13. Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all 
 the beef cattle, corn, and other necessary supplies on the line 
 of march ; but wanton destruction of property, taking of arti- 
 cles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into 
 and searching houses without proper orders from division com- 
 manders, are positively prohibited. All such irregularities 
 must be summarily punished. 
 
 14. Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to the 
 command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the 
 line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is 
 
620 appejStdix. 
 
 called to General Orders Xo. 69, from Adjutant-General's of- 
 fice, Washington, of date March 20, 1863. 
 By order of 
 
 Major-Gmeral U. S. GRANT. 
 JOnX A. RAWLINS, Assistant-Adjutant General. 
 
 Smith's Plantation, La., April 18, 1863. 
 Major- General J. A. MoCleexa>t), 
 
 commanding Tldrteenth Army Corps : 
 
 I -would still repeat former insti'uctions, that possession be 
 got of Grand Gulf at the very earliest possible moment. Once 
 there, no risk should be taken in following the enemy until our 
 forces are concentrated. Troojis first there should intrench 
 themselves for safety, and the whole of your corps be concen- 
 trated as rapidly as our means of transj^ortation will permit. 
 General McPherson will be closing upon you as rapidly as 
 your troops can be got away, and rations supp)lied. 
 
 I see that great caution will have to be observed in getting 
 barges past the crevasse near Carthage, and I apprehend a loss 
 of some artillery may be encountered. 
 
 I M'ill send over at once the pontoon train, with men to lay 
 it. It can, at least, be thrown across Bayou Vidal, opposite 
 your headquarters, to enable troops and artillery to march a 
 good portion of the Avay to Carthage. If it can possibly be 
 laid so as to cross the levee crevasse near Carthage, it would 
 be of much greater service. Should we succeed in getting 
 steamers past Vicksburg, they will bring you a further supply 
 of rations. In the mean time, all the wagons, including all the 
 regimental trains, should be kej^t constantly on the road be- 
 tween here and Milliken's bend. The number of wagons avail- 
 able is increasing daily. Troops guarding the different points 
 between here and Richmond, should gather all the beef cattle 
 and forage within reach of them, and destroy no more than 
 they can use. 
 
 I will be over here in a few days again, and hope it will be 
 my good fortune to find you in safe possession of Grand Gulf 
 
 You do not want to start, however, without feeling yourself 
 secure in the necessary transportation. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 
 
APPENDIX G21 
 
 In the Field, April 24, 1B63. 
 Major- General W. T. Shermax, 
 
 commanding Fifteenth Army Corps: 
 
 In company with Admiral Porter I made to-day a recon- 
 noissance of Grand Gulf. My impressions are, that if an at- 
 tack can be made within the next two days, the place will 
 easily fall. But the difficulties of getting from here (Smith's 
 Plantation) to the river are great. 
 
 I foresee great difficulties in our present position, hut it will 
 not do to let these retard any movements. In the first place, 
 if a battle should take place, we are necessarily very destitute 
 of all preparations for taking care of wounded men. All the 
 little extras for this purpose were put on board the Tigress, 
 the only boat that was lost. The line from here to oNIilliken's 
 bend is a long one for the transportation of supplies, and to 
 defend, and an impossible one for the transportation of wounded 
 men. The water in the bayous is falling very rapidly, out of 
 all proportion to the fall in the river, so that it is exceedingly 
 doubtful whether they can be made use of for the purposes of 
 navigation. One inch fall in the river diminishes the supply 
 of water to the bayous to a very great extent, while their 
 capacity for carrying it away remains the same. Should the 
 river fall sufficiently to draw off all the water on the point 
 where you are encamped, our line will have to be by wagons 
 across to below the Warrenton batteries. 
 
 Whilst there I wish you would watch matters, and should 
 the water fall sufficiently, make the necessary roads for this 
 purpose. You need not move any portion of your corps more 
 than is necessary for the protection of the road to Richmond 
 until ordered. It may possibly happen that the enemy may so 
 weaken his forces about Yicksburg and IIainc*s bluff, as to 
 make the latter vulnerable, particularly with a i'all of water to 
 give an extended landing. I leave the management of affiiirs 
 at your end of the line to you. 
 
 I shall send Surgeon Hewitt to the bend to-morrow, to con- 
 sult with the medical director about the best policy to pursue 
 for caring for our sick and wounded. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 
 
622 APPENDIX. 
 
 ITeadquaeters, Department of the Tennessee, ) 
 In the Field, April 24, 1863. ) 
 
 Meteor- General J. A. McOleenand, 
 
 commanding Thirteenth Army Corps : 
 
 I would like to have General Osterhaiis make a reconnois- 
 sance, in person, to a point on the Mississippi, opposite the 
 mouth of Bayou Pierre, and a short distance below, to where 
 there is a road leading from the river to Grand Gulf. The 
 map shows such a road. 
 
 It is desirable to learn if there is a landing at that point, 
 and, if it can be done by inquiry, to learn also the condition of 
 the road on the opposite side. If a landing cannot be made in 
 front at Grand Gulf, it may be necessary to reach there by this 
 route. The map shows this road, and also a good road from 
 the same point to Port Gibson. 
 
 It is also important to know if there is a road on the west 
 bank of the river from here to a point below Grand Gulf. 
 Should any of our gunboats get below the Gulf, and not be 
 able to return, it could be used in communicating with them. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General. 
 
 Perkins's Plantation, La., April 27, 1863. 
 Major- General J. A. MoOleenani>, 
 
 commanding Thirteenth Army Corps : 
 
 Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or 
 so much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard 
 die artillery, and every article authorized in orders limiting 
 baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with 
 their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. 
 
 All the troops you may have, except those ordered to re- 
 main behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where 
 you will see, by special orders of this date. General McPher- 
 son is ordered to send one division. 
 
 The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and 
 silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps 
 will be in the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest 
 eligible land below the promontory first brought to view pass- 
 insj down the river. Once on shore, have each commander in- 
 
APPENDIX. 623 
 
 structed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will 
 admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, 
 but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support 
 itself. The first object is to get a foothold where our troops 
 can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be 
 made and troops collected for a forward movement. 
 
 Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the posi- 
 tion indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with 
 them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the 
 enemy are silenced. 
 
 It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from 
 the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable 
 to run past Grand Gulf, and land at Rodney. In case this 
 should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged, and you duly 
 informed, when the transports are to start with this view. Or, 
 it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. 
 In this case, then, the transports would have to be brought 
 back to where the men could land, and move by forced marches 
 to below Grand Gulf, reembark rapidly and proceed to the lat- 
 ter place. There will be required, then, three signals ; one, to 
 indicate that the transports can run down and debark the 
 troops at Grand Gulf; one, that the transports can run by 
 without the troops ; and the last, that transports can run by 
 with the troops on board. 
 
 Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery 
 will be left to run the blockade. 
 
 If not already directed, require your men to keep three 
 days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a 
 movement commences. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, Major- General 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII 
 
 [At the risk of some repetition, I have determiued to furnish 
 complete copies of all the dispatches that passed between Gen- 
 eral Grant and General Halleck, or any member of the Govern- 
 ment, during the entire Yicksburg campaign, from the day 
 that Grant first visited the fleet at the mouth of the Arkansas, 
 to the date of the second capture of Jackson. The only omit- 
 ted portions of this correspondence are the dispatches referring 
 to mere routine business, and a few extracts having no refer- 
 ence whatever to military operations. Whenever a dispatch is 
 not given in full, the omission is indicated by points. I have 
 not given General Grant's formal report, which is already pub- 
 lished, and is for the most part a synopsis or repetition of the 
 dispatches that were sent from day to day during the campaign.] 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GEXEEAL HALLECK.— (CrPHEK Telegkam.) 
 
 Memphis, Texn., January 16, 1863. 
 I Start immediately for the fleet. My design is to get such 
 information from them as I find it impossible to get here. I 
 I will return here in a few days, and in the mean time reen- 
 forcements will be forwarded with all dispatch. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 Napoleon, Ark., Jamiaty 18, 1863. 
 General McClernand's command is at this place. Will 
 move down the river to-day. Should Banks pass Port Hudson, 
 this force will be ready to cooperate on Vicksburg at any time. 
 
APPENDIX. C25 
 
 What may be necessary to reduce the place I do not yet know, 
 but since the late rains I think our troops must get below the 
 city, to be used effectively. 
 
 GENEEAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 Memphis, Jamiary 20, 1863. 
 I found the Mississippi expedition at mouth of Arkansas 
 river, and started them immediately to Young's point. A ca- 
 nal will be at once surveyed and cut. The weather is highly 
 unfavorable for operations. Streams are all very high, and it 
 is still raining. The work of reducing Yicksburg will take 
 time and men, but can be accomplished. Gorman has gone up 
 "White river with a great part of his force. So many boats 
 being kept there makes it almost impossible to get transporta- 
 tion for troops. Both banks of the Mississippi should be under 
 one commander, at least during present operations. 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL IIALLECK.— (Letter.) 
 
 Memphis, Tknn., January 20, 1863. 
 
 I returned here last night fi'om a visit to the expedition un- 
 der General ]McClernand. 
 
 I had a conversation with Admiral Porter, General MoCler- 
 nand, and General Sherman. The former and latter, who have 
 had the best opportunity of studying the enemy's position and 
 plans, agree that the work of reducing Vicksburg is one of 
 time, and will require a large force in the final struggle. With 
 what troops I have already designated from here, no more 
 forces will be required for the present, but I will suggest 
 whether it would not be well to know beforehand Avliere they 
 are to come from when required, if required at all. 
 
 The enemy have the bluffs from Ilaine's bluff, ou the Yazoo 
 (this is where the raft across the river is constructed), to the 
 Mississippi, and down until they recede fronx the river, com- 
 pletely and thoroughly fortified. 
 
 I propose running a canal tlirough, starting far enough 
 
 above the old one commenced last summer, to receive the 
 
 stream where it impinges agamst the shore with the greatest 
 
 velocity. The old canal left the river in. an. eddy, and in a Une 
 
 40 
 
626 APPENDIX. 
 
 perpendicular to the stream, and also to the crest of the hills 
 opposite with a battery directed against the outlet. This new 
 canal \rili debouch beloTT the bluffs on the opposite side of the 
 river, and give our gunboats a fair chance against any fortifi- 
 cations that may be placed to oppose them. 
 
 But for the intolerable rains that we have had, and which 
 have filled the swamps and bayous so that they cannot dry up 
 again this winter, a landing might be efiected at Milliken's 
 bend ; and roads constructed through to the Yazoo above the 
 ]-aft or Haine's bluff, and the enemy's works turned from that 
 point. Once back of the intrenchments on the crest of the 
 bluffs, the enemy would be compelled to come out and give us 
 an open field fight, or submit to having all his communications 
 cut and be left to starve out. 
 
 I would make no suggestions unasked, if you were here to 
 see for yourself, or if I did not know that as much of your 
 time is taken up with each of several other departments as 
 with this. As, however, I control only the troops in a limited 
 department, and can only draw reenforcements from elsewhere 
 by making application through Washington, and as a demon- 
 stration, made upon any part of the old District of West Ten- 
 nessee, might force me to Avithdraw a large pai*t of the force 
 from the vicinity of Vicksburg, I would respectfully ask if it 
 would not be policy to combine the four departments in the 
 West under one commander. As I am the senior department 
 commander in the West, I will state that I have no desire what- 
 ever for such combined command, but would pi-efer the com- 
 mand I now have to any other that can be given. 
 
 I regard it as my duty to state that I found there was not 
 sufficient confidence felt in General McClernand as a com- 
 mander, either by the army or navy, to insure him siiccess. 
 Of course all would cooperate to the best of their ability, but 
 still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inquiries 
 about, but it was forced upon me. As it is my intention to 
 command in person, unless otherwise directed, there is no spe- 
 cial necessity of mentioning this matter ; but I want you to 
 know that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the 
 course I had already determined upon pursuing. Admiral 
 Porter told me he had written freely to the Secretary of the 
 Navy, with the request that what he said might be shown to 
 the Secretary of War. 
 
APPENDIX. G27 
 
 General Gorman had gone np "White river, with most of 
 his force, taking a great deal of the river transportation witli 
 him. I find great difficulty in getting boats to transport the 
 troops. With the orders I gave, however, to release boats aa 
 fast as they can be dispensed with, I hope to remedy all diffi- 
 culty of this kind. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Letteb.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, January 21, 1863. 
 
 The President has directed that as much of Arkansas as 
 you may desire to control, be temporarily attached to your de- 
 partment. Tliis will give you control of both banks of the 
 river. 
 
 In your operations down the Mississippi, you must not rely 
 
 too confidently upon any direct cooperation of General Banks 
 
 and the lower flotilla, as it is possible that they may not be 
 
 able to pass or reduce Port Hudson. They, however, will do 
 
 every thing in their power to form a junction with you at 
 
 Vicksburg. If they should not be able to effiact this, they will 
 
 at least occupy a portion of the enemy's forces, and prevent 
 
 them from reenforcing Vicksburg. I hope, however, that they 
 
 will do still better, and be able to join you. 
 
 ****** 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-(Telegram.) 
 
 ^YAS^INGTON, D. C, January 25, 2.40 p. m. 
 Forts Henry and Donelson have been transferred to the 
 Department of the Cumberland. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL nALLECK.-{GiPUEB Telegram.) 
 
 ilEXtPHiS, Tenn., January 25, 1863. 
 
 I leave for the fleet at Vicksburg to-morrow. Since leaving 
 there (one week ago) I liave not heard one word from them. 
 The constant rains and tremendous rise in the river may oper- 
 ate a2:ainst us for the time being. 
 
628 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENEEAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Ciphkk Telegram.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, January 25, 1863, 10.40 p. m. 
 Direct your attention particularly to the canal proposed 
 across tbe point. The President attaches much importance to 
 this. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 Near Vicksbueg, Miss., January 29, 1863. 
 Water in the canal is five feet deep, and river rising. There 
 IS no wash, however, and no signs of it enlarging. I will let 
 the water in from higher up and try the effect. I have ordered 
 troops from Helena, escorted by a gunLoat, the wliole in charge 
 of Colonel Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to cut the levee 
 across Yazoo pass, and to explore through to Coldwater, if 
 possib 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 Near Vicksbukg, January 31, 1863. 
 I am pushing every thing to gain a passage, avoiding Yicks- 
 burg. Prospects not flattering by the canal of last summer. 
 Other routes are being prospected, and work in the mean time 
 progresses in the old canal. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— {Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 Before Vicksburg, Fch-uary 3, 1863. 
 One of the rams ran the blockade this morning. This is of 
 vast importance, cutting off the enemy's communication with 
 the west bank of the river. One steamer lying at Ticksburg 
 was run into, but not sunk. AVoik on the canal is i^rogressing 
 as rapidly as possible. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— {Telegea.m.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, February 3, 1863. 
 Send any reliable information you may have received in 
 regard to the steamer Indianola. Was she sunk or not ? 
 
APPENDIX. 629 
 
 GEXEEAL .GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (LetteeO 
 
 Before Vicksbcrg, February 4, 18C3. 
 
 Herewith I enclose you reports from Colonel Deitzler and 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Duff, from Lake Providence, fifty odd miles 
 above here. 
 
 On examining the route of the present canal, I lost all flxith 
 in its ever leading to any practical results. The canal is at 
 right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and 
 both ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under bluffs 
 completely commanding it. Warrenton, a few miles below, is 
 capable of as strong defences as Yicksburg, and the enemy, 
 seeing us at work here, have turned their attention to that 
 point. Oar labor, however, has had the effect of making the 
 enemy divide his forces, and spread their big guns over a great 
 deal of country. They are now fortified from Ilaine's bluff to 
 Warrenton. 
 
 Taking the views I did, I immediately, on my arrival here, 
 commenced or ordered other routes prospected. One of these 
 is by the way of Yazoo pass into Coldvvater, the Tallahatchie, 
 and Yazoo rivers. This is conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Wilson, from whom no report is yet received. This route, if 
 practicable, would enable us to get higher ground above 
 Haine's bluff, and would turn all the enemy's river batteries. 
 Another is by Lake Providence, and the network of bayous 
 connecting it with Pted river. The accompanying reports show 
 the feasibility of this route. A third is by the way of Willow 
 and Roundaway bayous, leaving the Mississippi at Milliken's 
 bend and coming in at Carthage. There is no question but 
 this route is much more practicable than the present under- 
 taking, and would have been accomplished with much less 
 labor^if commenced before the water had got all over the 
 
 country. 
 
 The work on the present canal is being pushed New inlets 
 and outlets are being made, so that the water will be received 
 where the cxrrrent strikes the shore, and will be carried through 
 in a current. 
 
630 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (LBrrra. 
 
 Before Yicksbueg, Feh-uary 6, 1863. 
 
 Enclosed I send you report Toy Lieutenant-Colonel Wilsou, 
 of the prospect of effecting a safe passage into the Yazoo river 
 by the way of Yazoo pass. Admiral Porter "will have this 
 pass thoroughly explored by light-draught gunboats, upon 
 which I am putting six hundred riflemen from the army. 
 
 It is to be hoped that this expedition will be able to cap- 
 tui*e all the transports in the Yazoo and tributaries, and destroy 
 two gunboats said to be in course of construction. They will 
 also attempt to ascend the Yallabusha to Grenada, and if pos- 
 sible destroy the railroad bridges. 
 
 The ram that ran the blockade on the 2d inst. has returned 
 to the lower end of the peninsula, opposite Yicksburg. She 
 went as far as Red river, and some miles up it, capturing and 
 destroying three steamboats loaded with commissary stores, 
 and about sixty prisoners. 
 
 I send dispatches every day or two, to be telegraphed from 
 Memphis, but as I do not know that they get through, think it 
 necessary to notify you of the fact. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegeam.) 
 
 Before Yicksbueg, February 9, 1863. 
 The continuous rise in the river has kept the army busy to 
 keep out of the water, and much retarded work on the canal. 
 I hope to be able to say something definite, in a day or so, of 
 the practicability of the other routes mentioned in previous dis- 
 patches. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Telegeam.) 
 
 Wasiiixgtox, D. C, Fchriiary 13, 18G3. 
 Cannot dredge-boats be used with advantage in the canal ? 
 There are four lying idle at Louisville, belonging to Barton, 
 Robinson & Co., canal contractors. 
 
 1 
 
APPENDIX. 081 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL nALLECK.-(TELEOB\u.) 
 
 Young's Point, La., Fehruary 17, 1863. 
 We have one clredging-machine hei-e, and another ordered. 
 More than two could not be advantageously used. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL UALLECKL— (Letter.) 
 
 Before Ticksburg, February 18, 18C3. 
 
 The work upon the canal here is progressing as well as 
 possible, with the excessively bad weather and high water we 
 have had to contend, against. Most of the time that troops 
 could be out at all, has been expended in keeping water out of 
 our camps. Five good working days would enable the force 
 here to complete the canal sixty feet wide, and of sufficient 
 depth to admit any vessel here. Judging from the past, it is 
 fair to calculate that it will take from ten to twelve days to 
 get those iive days. Three more, perhaps, should be allowed, 
 from the fact that the work is being done by soldiers, the most 
 of whom, under the most favorable circumstances, could not 
 come up to the calculations of the engineer officers. 
 
 McPherson* s army corps is at Lake Providence, prosecuting 
 the work there. They could not be of any service in helping 
 on the work here, because there are already as many men as 
 can be employed on it ; and then, he would have to go five or 
 six miles above, to find land above water to encamp on. 
 
 I am using a few hundred contrabands on the work here, 
 but have been compelled to prohibit any more coming in. 
 Humanity dictates this policy. 
 
 Planters have mostly deserted their plantations, taking 
 with them all their able-bodied negroes, and leaving the old 
 and very young. Here, they could not have shelter, nor means 
 of transportation Avhen we leave. 
 
 I have sent a division of troops from Helena to join the 
 Yazoo expedition, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson. His last 
 report was sent you a few days ago. If successful, they wUI 
 destroy the railroad bridges at Grenada, and capture or destroy 
 all the transports in the Yazoo and tributaries. 
 
 The health of this command is not what is represented in 
 the public journals. It is as good as any previous calculations 
 
632 APPEISTDIX. 
 
 could have prognosticated. I believe, too, that there is the 
 best of feeling and greatest confidence of success amongst 
 them. The greatest drawback to the sjDirits of the troops has 
 been the great delay in paying them. Many of them have 
 families at home, who are no doubt in a suffering condition for 
 want of the amount due them, and they are bound for their 
 Buppor* 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK— (Cipiiek Telegeasi.) 
 
 Before Vicksburg, February 23, 1863. 
 The Queen of the ^Yest is now at Warrenton, with the 
 rebel flag flying. Distant firing was heard, lasting from four 
 p. M. yesterday until one this morning. It is supposed to have 
 been between the Queen and Indianola. Apprehension is felt 
 for the safety of the Indianola, 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (CipnES Teleqbam.) 
 
 Young's Point, La., February 27, 1863. 
 News is just received that the Queen of the "West and 
 Webb attacked the Indianola about thirty-five miles below 
 Vicksburg, on the night of the 24th, and, after an engagement 
 of about forty minutes, captured her, with the most of her 
 crew. It is said the Indianola afterwards sunk. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (CirnEE Teleoram.) 
 
 Before Vicksburg, I/arch 2, 1863. 
 I have received no forces from the Department of the Mis- 
 som-i, exccjit those at Helena. Are any more to come ? 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-CCithee Telegeam.) 
 
 Washington, 2 p. m., March 5, 1863. 
 It is of great importance to your command that transports 
 be returned from you so far as possible, otherwise you will be 
 short of supplies. Steam vessels on the upper rivers are very 
 
APPENDIX 033 
 
 scarce. Vessels in the fleet, between Memphis and Vicksburg, 
 should go in fleets, i;nder convoy. Make your requisition on 
 Admiral Porter for convoys. The necessary detention of con- 
 voy down the Mississippi river is a matter of the most serious 
 importance, and requires immediate attention. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipitep. Telegbam.) 
 
 Young's Point, La., March 6, 1863. 
 The dredge-boats are here. They work to a charm, doing 
 the work of three hundred men per day each hour. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (LettepO 
 
 Before ViCKSBtTRO, March *?, 18C3. 
 
 I telegraphed you yesterday the near approach to comple- 
 tion of the canal. The water is extremely high, several feet 
 above the highest ground inside the levee. Last night one of 
 the dams across the upper end of the canal gave way, filling up 
 where men were at work getting out stumps, and thus setting 
 back the work for several days. I hope yet, however, to have 
 this work completed as early as I could possibly take advan- 
 tage of it if it was already done. 
 
 The troops expected from St. Louis are not yet heard from, 
 and all that I am bringing from West Tennessee are not yet 
 down. 
 
 The work of getting through Lake Providence and Bayou 
 Ma9on there is but little possibility of proving successful. If 
 the work had been commenced in time, however, there is but 
 little question of the success of the enterprise. The land from 
 Lake Providence and also from Bayou Ma9on recedes until the 
 lowest interval between the two widens out into a cypress 
 swamp, where Bayou Baxter, which connects the two, is lost. 
 This flat is now filled to the depth of several feet with water, 
 making the work of clearing out the timber exceedingly slow, 
 and rendering it impracticable to make an artificial channel. 
 
 The Yazoo pass expedition is a much greater success. Ad- 
 miral Porter sent in four gunboats, andl sent a fleet of trans- 
 ports with about six thousand men. They were to clear the 
 
634 APPENDIX. 
 
 Yazoo and tributaries of all steamboats and embryo gunboats, 
 and if possible destroy the railroad bridge at Grenada. The 
 gunboats were to approach as near Haino's bluff as possible, 
 and fire signal-guns to warn the squadron in the mouth of the 
 Yazoo of their presence. Last night Admiral Porter sent me 
 word that the signal agreed upon had been heard. 
 
 I am now sending General McPberson with his army corps, 
 and enough other troops to make full twenty-five thousand 
 effective men, to effect a lodgment on tlie high ground on the 
 east bank of the Yazoo. Once there, he will move down in 
 transports and by land to the vicinity of Haine's bluff. Before 
 moving down, however, below Yazno City, General McPherson 
 will be made acquainted with the full plan of attack that may 
 then be determined upon, and the time will be so arranged 
 that there will be full cooperation of my entire force. Our 
 movements have evidently served to distract the enemy and 
 make him scatter his heavy guns. His forces are also scattered, 
 but they, with the light artillery, can be got to any one point. 
 
 The health of this command is good, and the greatest confi- 
 dence is felt by officers and men. The most ample provision I 
 ever saw has been made for the comfort of the sick. 
 
 The dredging-machines, brought here by Colonel G. G. 
 Pride, work to a charm. After the accident of last night all 
 work would have had to be suspended until there was a fall of 
 at least three feet, (the river is yet rising), but for these machines. 
 Much credit is due Colonel Pride for his selection of them. 
 But for his personal attention, old and worn-out ones would 
 have been sent, and the result, probably, w^ould have been that 
 they would have given out before their work was half done. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO SURGEON-GEXERAL nAMMOXD.-(LETTER.) 
 
 Bkfore Yicksdcrg, 2farch 12, 1863. 
 Surgeon J. R, Smith's letter of the 20lh February is just re- 
 ceived, inquiring into the sanitary condition of this command, 
 and asking for suggestions for its improvement. I know a 
 great deal has been said to impress the public generally, and 
 all officials particularly, with the idea that this army was in a 
 . uffering condition, and mostly from neglect. Tliis is most er- 
 roneous. Tlic health of this command will compare favorably 
 
APPENDIX. G35 
 
 ■with that of any army in the field, I venture to say, and every 
 preparation is made for the sick that could be desired. I ven- 
 ture the assertion that no army ever Avent into the field with 
 better arranged preparations for receiving sick and wounded 
 soldiers than this. "We have hospital-boats expressly fitted ujj, 
 and with the Government and volunteer sanitary supplies, it is 
 a great question whether one person in ten can be so well taken 
 care of at their homes as the army can here. 
 
 I will refer Surgeon Smith's letter to my medical director 
 for a full report of the condition of the medical department 
 here. 
 
 GENEEAL GEAiTT TO GEXEEAL HALLECK.— (Lettek.) 
 
 Before Vicksburg, March 17, 1S63. 
 Since the giving way of the dam at the upper end of the 
 canal, work with the dredges has progressed favorably, but all 
 attempts to stop the. rush of water into the canal have proved 
 abortive. If required, however, the canal can be made to pass 
 boats of ordinary size in a few days. 
 
 The enemy were busily engaged firing from the opposite 
 heights yesterday, and last night at the dredge-boat nearest 
 the lower end of the canal. Their shots did no damage, though 
 many of the large ones reached half way across the poijit. 
 
 Ordinary Ohio river boats can now pass from Lake Provi- 
 dence into Bayou Ma5on, and thence by easy navigation to 
 the mouth of Red river. I make no calculations upon using 
 this route for the present, but it may be turned to practical use 
 after efiecting present plans. The same may he said of tha 
 canal across the jyoint. 
 
 I learn from Jackson (Mississippi) papers of the 14th, that 
 one of our gunboats had run down to Grenada, and exchanged 
 a few shots with the fort at that point. Further infonnation 
 from the enemy shows that several thousand troops have gone 
 from Vicksburg up the Yazoo river. Besides four gunboats 
 (one iron-clad), I have a division of troops there now, and 
 Quimby's division in the pass, on their way down. One divi- 
 sion from Memphis should also be on their v,ay now. The 
 great difiiculty of getting small-class steamers, adapted to this 
 service, has retarded movements by the way of Yazoo pass 
 materially. 
 
636 APPENDIX. 
 
 To hem in the enemy on the Yazoo, Admiral Porter has 
 gone into Deer creek by the way of Steele's bayou and Little 
 Black bayou. From there he can get into Yazoo either by 
 running up Deer creek to Eolling Fork, thence through the 
 fork and down the Big Sunflower, all of which is navigable, or 
 down Deer creek to the Yazoo. 
 
 Admiral Porter and myself went up Steele's bayou to 
 Little Black bayou on the 15th. With the exception of over- 
 hanging trees in some places, the navigation was good for the 
 gunboat General Price, I am having those obstructions re- 
 moved. We were preceded by four of the old iron-clads that 
 found no difficulty in the navigation. I returned in the even- 
 ing for the purpose of hurrying up men and means for clearing 
 the channel. I also sent Sherman to make a reconnoissance in 
 company of the gunboats, with the view of effecting a landing 
 with troops on high ground, on the east bank of the Yazoo, 
 from which we may act against Haine's bluff". 
 
 Last night I received a dispatch from Admiral Porter, say- 
 ing that the iron-clads had pushed into Black bayou, and had 
 reached to within a fourth of a mile of Deer creek, where they 
 had become entangled in the timber, and could not move until 
 it was cut out, and asking me for a force of three thousand 
 men to act with him. Fortunately, I had already sent all that 
 the boats at hand, siiitable for that navigation, and imme- 
 diately available, could carry. I am now sending the remainder 
 of Sherman's old division, and will push troops through, if 
 Sherman reports faA^orabh'', as fast as our means Avill permit. 
 These troops go up the Mississippi river in large transports 
 about thirty miles, and to where Steele's Bayou comes within 
 one mile of tlie Mississippi. The small-class boats can ferry 
 them from that point, and thus save the distance from the 
 mouth of the Yazoo to, and also the most difficnilt pai't of the 
 navigation in, Steele's bayou. 
 
 There is evident indication of considerable excitement in 
 Vicksburg, I think thoy are removing many of their troops, 
 but cannot satisfy myself to what points. Some, we know, 
 have gone up the Yazoo, and it may be that others are going 
 to Port Hudson. I have no means of learning any thing from 
 below, excejit M-hat is occasionally learned through Southern 
 papers. 
 
APPENDIX. 037 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— {Cipher Teleop.am.) 
 
 Before Yicksdcrg, March 24, 130^. 
 At last accounts Yazoo pass expedition was yet at Green- 
 wood. Porter and Sherman are attempting to get into the 
 Yazoo below Yazoo City. No news from there for several 
 days. Admiral Farragut holds the river above Port Hudson. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Teleokam.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, J/a?-c/j 24, 1863. 
 I must again call your attention to the importance of your 
 not retaining so many steamers in the Mississippi river. It is 
 absolutely necessary that some of those boats be returned. "We 
 cannot otherwise supply our armies in Tennessee and Ken- 
 tucky. This matter must be attended to at once. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipueb Telegeam.) 
 
 Before Vicksburg, March 25, 18G3. 
 Two rams attempted to run the blockade this morning ; 
 one succeeded in a damaged condition. They were intended 
 to strengthen Admiral Farragut, Admiral Porter is returning. 
 Did not succeed in reaching the Yazoo. 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Letter.) 
 
 Before Yicksbcrg, March 27, 18G3. 
 
 All work, excepting repairing the crevasse in the canal 
 levee, has been suspended for several days, the enemy having 
 driven the dredges entirely out. The canal may be useful in 
 passing boats through at night, to be used below, but nothing 
 further. 
 
 Admiral Porter lias returned from his attempt to reach the 
 Yazoo river below Yazoo City. The difficult navigation of the 
 bayous from the Yazoo river, through Black bayou and Deer 
 creek, caused so much time to be consumed, that the enemy 
 got wind of the movement in time to blockade the creek just 
 
638 APPEISTDIX. 
 
 where the boats Avonld leave it. As the enemy occupied the 
 ground in considerable force, where they could prevent the 
 clearing out of these obstructions, the admiral was forced to 
 desist from further efforts to proceed when within a few hun- 
 dred yards of clear sailing to the Yazoo. Rolling Fork and 
 Sunflower are navigable, steamers having come by this route 
 to within sight of our gunboats whilst they were in Deer 
 creek. 
 
 The moment I heard that Admiral Porter had started on 
 his return, I sent orders for the return of the Yazoo pass expe- 
 dition from Fort Greenwood. From information I have, otlier 
 and greater difficulties would be founci in navigating the Yazoo 
 below Greenwood. Considerable preparation has been made 
 to receive our forces coming by that route. 
 
 I get papers and deserters frequently from Vicksburg, but 
 am not able to arrive at any definite conclusion as to their 
 numbers. I do not anticipate any trouble, however, if a land- 
 ing can be effected. 
 
 On the morning of the 2oth, General Ellet sent two rams, 
 the Switzerland and the Lancaster, to join Admiral Farragut. 
 The last-named ram received a shot in the boiler long before 
 reaching the front of the city. She floated down, however, 
 receiving many more shots, but without materially further dis- 
 abling her. She will be ready for service before to-morrow 
 night, and is a fine vessel. The other boat received a shot, and 
 immediately went to pieces. A large part, containing the ma- 
 chinery, tipped over, spilling it in the river ; the wreck floated 
 down, and lodged at our lower pickets, bottom up. She was 
 very rotten and worthless. The shot received would not have 
 damaged a sound vessel seriously ; this is what Admiral Farra- 
 gut, and army officers who have examined the wreck, report 
 to me. Since no casualties occurred, it was fortunate that she 
 was lost, for had she not been at this time she might have 
 been at some other time, when moi-e valuable vessels might 
 have been risked, relying on this boat for assistance. It is 
 almost certain that had she made one run into another vessel, 
 she would have closed up like a spy-glass, encompassing all on 
 board. 
 
 I have just learned from a reliable source, that most of the 
 forces from Vicksburg are now up the Yazoo, leaving not to 
 exceed ten thousand in the city to-day. The batteries are the 
 
APPENDIX. 639 
 
 same, however, and would cause the same difficulty in hinding 
 that would be experienced against a heavy force. Besides, the 
 very cause of the absence of so many troops from Vicksburg, 
 our gunboats and troops in and towards the Yazoo, prevents 
 our taking advantage of the circumstance. I have no doubt of 
 the truth of my information, because it is substantiated by 
 Southern papers and by deserters, so far as the sending of a 
 large force up the Yazoo is concerned. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Lettbk.) 
 
 Before Ticksburg, March 29, 1863. 
 
 A dispatch to release boats, and letter on the subject of the 
 Yazoo expedition, are both just received, the letter also enjoin- 
 ing me to keep you constantly informed of the situation by 
 telegraph. I have been very particular to Avrite and telegraph 
 often, even when there was nothing important to say, knowing 
 that you would feel anxious to be constantly posted. The 
 letters I suppose reached, but the dispatches in many instances 
 have failed. 
 
 In regard to sending back boats from here, I gave and re- 
 iterated the order to General McClernand to do so, before leav- 
 ing Memphis. On my arrival, however, I found the river rising 
 so'i-apidly, that there was no telling at what moment all hands 
 might be driven to the boats. As soon as this danger was 
 passed so many boats were released, that I could have moved 
 but a small force at one time. 
 
 I wrote you fully on the subject of the Yazoo expedition a 
 
 few days ago. 
 
 If you do not receive at least one letter and two dispatches 
 per w^eek from me, general, be assured that some of them mis- 
 carry. In addition, I will telegraph as often as any thing may 
 occur of importance. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL Hi.LLECK.-CrELEQEAM.) 
 
 Young's Point, La., ilarch 31, 1863. 
 I have ordered the release of all boats that can be spared, 
 for General Kosecrans. 
 
640 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL IIALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegeam.) 
 
 Young's Point, La., April 2, 1863. 
 In two weeks I expect to be able to collect all my forces 
 and turn the enemy's left. With present high water the extent 
 of ground upon which troops could land at Haine's bluff is so 
 limited that the place is impregnable, I reconnoitred the place 
 yesterday with Admiral Porter and General Sherman. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Letter.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, April 2, 1863. 
 
 Your disj)atch of March 17th, and also your telegrams of 
 March 24th and 25th, were received yesterday. 
 
 While Avorking upon the canal, the division of your forces 
 into several eccentric operations may have been very proper, 
 for the purpose of reconnoitring the country; but it is very 
 important that, when you strike any blow, you should have 
 troops sufficiently concentrated to make that blow effective. 
 The division of your army into small expeditions destroys your 
 strength, and that, when in the presence of an enemy, is very 
 dangerous. 
 
 What is most desired (and your attention is again called to 
 this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks 
 should be brought into cooperation as early as possible. If he 
 cannot get up to cooperate with you on Vicksburg, cannot you 
 get troops down to help him on Port Hudson ? Or at least can 
 you not destroy Grand Gulf before it becomes too strong? 
 
 I know that you can judge of these matters there much 
 better than I can here ; but as the President, who seems to be 
 rather impatient about matters on the Mississippi, has several 
 times asked me these questions, I repeat them to you. 
 
 As the season when we can do very little on the lower Mis- 
 sissippi is rapidly advancing, I hope you will push matters 
 with all possible disj)atci. 
 
APPEIOHX. 641 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— aFrruR.; 
 
 Before Vicksburo, AprH 4, 18C3. 
 
 From information from the south by way of Corinth, I learn 
 that the enemy in front of Rosecrans have been rconforced from 
 Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from Vicks- 
 burg. They have also collected a cavalry force of twenty thou- 
 sand men. All the bridges eastward from Savanna, and north 
 from Florence, are being rapidly repaired. Clialmers is put in 
 command of north Mississippi, and is collecting all the partisan 
 rangers and loose, independent companies of cavalry that have 
 been operating in this department. He is now occupying the 
 line of the Tallahatchie. This portends preparations to attack 
 Rosecrans, and to be able to follow up any success with rapidity. 
 Also, to made a simultaneous raid into West Tennessee both 
 from north Mississippi and by crossing the Tennessee river. 
 
 To counteract this, Admiral Porter has consented to send 
 the marine brigade n\y the Tennessee river, to cooperate with 
 General Dodge at Corinth. I have also ordered an additional 
 regiment of cavalry from Helena to West Tennessee. 
 
 I enclose with this a letter from Major-General Ilurlbut, 
 giving a programme which he wishes to carry out; and so 
 much of it as to drive the enemy from the Tallahatchie, and 
 cutting the roads where they have been repaired, I think can 
 be successfully executed. I will instruct him not to scatter his 
 forces so as to risk losing them. 
 
 I have placed one division of troops on Deer creek, with com- 
 munication back to the Mississippi river just above Lake Wash- 
 ington. The object of this move is to keep the enemy from 
 drawing supplies from that rich region (and use them our- 
 selves), and to attract the attention of the enemy in that direc- 
 tion. The navigation is practicable for our iron-clads and small 
 steamers through to the Yazoo river, by the route lately tried 
 by Admiral Porter, with the exception of a few hundred yards 
 in Deer creek, near Rolling Fork. This was obstructed by the 
 enemy, and they are now guarding and fortifying there. This 
 move will have a tendency to make them throw in an addition- 
 al force there, and move some of their guns. My force had as 
 well be there as here, until I want to use them. 
 
 A reconnoissance to Maine's bluflf demonstrates the imprac- 
 41 
 
642 APPENDIX. 
 
 ticability of attacking that place during the present stage of 
 water. The west bank of the river is densely wooded and 
 under water; the east bank only runs up to the bluff for a 
 short distance below the raft, then diverges, leaving a bottom 
 widening all the way down, in most parts covered by water 
 and next to the bluffs, all of it so covered. The hill-sides are 
 lined with rifle-pits, with embrasures here and there for field, 
 artillery. To stoi-m this but a small force could be used at the 
 outset. "VVilh the present batteries of the enemy, the canal 
 across tlie point can be of but little use. There is a system of 
 bayous running from Milliken's bend, and also from near the 
 river at this point, that are navigable for large and small 
 steamers passing around by Richmond to New Carthage. There 
 is also a good wagon-road from Milliken's bend to New Carthage. 
 The dredges are now engaged cutting a canal from here into 
 these bayous. I am having all the empty coal and other barges 
 prepared for carrying troops and artillery, and have written to 
 Colonel Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to tow these. 
 With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Car- 
 thage and any point south of that. 
 
 My expectation is, for some of the naval fleet to run the 
 batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army moves through by this 
 new route. Once there, I will move to Warrenton or Grand 
 Gulf, probably the latter. From either of these points there 
 are good roads to Jackson and the Black River bridge, without 
 crossing Black river. 
 
 This is the only move I now see as practicable, and I hope 
 it will meet your approval. I will keep my array together, and 
 see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beat in any 
 other way than a fair fight. The discipline and health of this 
 army is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest confidence 
 of success prevails. 
 
 I have directed General Webster to commence the recon- 
 struction of the railroad between Grand Junction and Corinth. 
 The labor will be performed by the engineer regiment and con- 
 trabands, thus saving additional expense. The streams will be 
 crossed on piles. In this way the work should be done by the 
 first of May. 
 
APPENDIX. G43 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (Letter.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, April 9, 1863. 
 
 Yours of March 29th is just received. Your explanation 
 in regard to sending back steamers is satisfactory. I hope you 
 will keep in mind the great importance of not unnecessarily 
 detaining them, on account of the great entanglement it causes 
 the quartermaster department in supplying our Western armies. 
 
 In regard to your dispatches, it is very probable that many 
 fail to reach here in time. It is exceedingly important that 
 General Banks should be kept advised of every thing that is 
 done in your vicinity, and the only way he can get this infor- 
 mation is through these headquarters. 
 
 You are too well advised of the anxiety of the Government 
 for your success, and its disappointment at the delay, to render 
 it necessary to urge upon you the importance of early action. 
 I am confident that you will do every thing possible to open 
 the Mississippi river. In my opinion this is the most impor- 
 tant operation of the war, and nothing must be neglected to 
 insure success. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphm Telbqbam.) 
 
 Milliken's Bend, La., April 11, 1863. 
 The Yazoo expedition has reached the Mississippi. :My 
 forces in a few days will be all concentrated here. Grand 
 Gulf is the point at which I expect to strike, and send an array 
 corps to Port Hudson, to cooperate with Banks. Will reach 
 the Mississippi at New Carthage, now in ray possession, with 
 wagon road, and canal, and bayous navigable for tugs and 
 barges, between here and there 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL nALLECK.-(LETrEK.) 
 
 Milliken's Bend, La., April 12, 1863. 
 There is nothing in the way now of my throwing troops into 
 Grand Gulf, and destroying the works there, and then sending 
 them on to Port Hudson to cooperate with General Banks m 
 
644 APPENDIX. 
 
 the reduction of tbat place, but the danger of overflowing the 
 road from liere to New Carthage, where the water is let into 
 the new canal, connecting the river there with the bayous com- 
 ing out at Carthage. One division of troops is now at Car- 
 thage and another on the way. By turning the water into the 
 canal, water communication can be opened between the two 
 places in a very few days for barges and tugs. Of the former 
 I have but fifteen as yet, and of the latter but three, suitable 
 for this navigation. To use this route, therefore, it is abso- 
 lutely necessary to keep open the wagon-road to take the artil- 
 lery and to march the troops. 
 
 In about three nights from this time Admiral Porter will 
 run the Vicksburg batteries, wnth so much of his fleet as he 
 desires to take below, and I will send four steamers (the ma- 
 chinery protected from shot by hay-bales and sand-bags), to be 
 used in transporting troops and in towing barges. 
 
 The wagon-road (this work must now be early completed), 
 by filling up the lowest ground, will be about twenty inches 
 above the water in the swamps. The river, where it is to be 
 let into the canal, is four and eight-tenths feet above the land. 
 This, however, is fifteen miles by river below where the dirt- 
 road starts out. Had I seen nothing of the effect of crevasses 
 in the back country, I should not doubt the effect would be to 
 overflow the whole country through which we pass. But there 
 has been a large crevasse just below where the canal leaves 
 the river for a long time, through which the water has been 
 pouring in great volume. I cannot see that this additional cre- 
 vasse is going to have much other effect than to increase the 
 breaks in the bayou levees, so as to make the discharge equal 
 to the supply. 
 
 I will have a map of this section made to send to you by 
 next mail, which will make this move intelligible. The embar- 
 rassment I have had to contend against, on account of extreme 
 high water, cannot be appreciated by any one not present to 
 witness it. I think, however, you will receive favorable re- 
 ports of the condition and feeling of this army from every im- 
 partial judge, and from all who have been sent from Washing- 
 ton to look after its welfare. 
 
APPENDIX. 645 
 
 GENEEAL GEAKT TO GENEEAL HALLECK.- (Lettee.) 
 
 MiLLiKEs's Bekd, La., April 12, 1863. 
 Herewith I send you reports of Major-General Sherman, 
 and the division and brigade commanders under him, of the 
 late reconnoissance through Steele and Black bayous and Deer 
 creek, made by them in conjunction with a portion of Admiral 
 Porter's fleet, commanded by himself in person. The object 
 of the expedition was to find a practicable passage to the 
 Yazoo river, without passing the enemy's batteries at Haine's 
 bluff; to liberate our fleet and troops then held above Green- 
 wood ; and, if found sufficiently practicable, to enable me to 
 land most of my forces east of the Yazoo, at some point from 
 which Haine's bluff" and Vicksburg could be reached by high 
 land. The accompanying reports show the impracticability of 
 the route. This expedition, however, was not without its re- 
 sult. It carried our troops into the heart of the granary from 
 which the Vicksburg forces are now being fed. It caused 
 great alarm among the enemy, and led them to move a num- 
 ber of their guns from batteries on the river. The citizens 
 fled from their plantations, and burnt several thousand bales 
 of cotton ; some not burnt was brought away by the gunboats. 
 Much of their beef, bacon, and poultry was consumed by our 
 troops, and distributed by the negroes. A scow, loaded with 
 bacon for the enemy, was destroyed, and probably two hundred 
 thousand bushels of corn was burned up. Several hundred 
 negroes also returned with the troops. 
 
 The recent expedition of General Steele to the neighbor- 
 hood of Rolling Fork, shows that the enemy is still holding 
 that position. He also destroyed several hundred thousand 
 bushels of corn, and brought off" about a thousand head of 
 stock and a number of the laboring class. 
 
 GENERAL GRAXT TO GENERAL BAKKS.-(C!pnER TELEGRiM.) 
 
 Milliken's Bexd, La., April 14. 1S63. 
 I am concentrating my forces at Grand Gulf Will send 
 an army corps to Bayou Sara by the 25th, to cooperate with 
 you on Port Hudson. Can you aid me and send troops after 
 the reduction of Port Hudson to assist at Vicksburg ? 
 
64:6 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL GBA^T TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (TELEGEAii.) 
 
 MiLLiKEJi's Bend, La., April 17, 1863. 
 Seven gunboats and three transports ran the Yicksburg 
 batteries last night. The crew of steamer Henry Clay, except- 
 ing the pilot, deserted soon after getting under lire. The 
 boat took fire and burned up ; one other transport slightly 
 damaged. One man killed and thx-ee wounded on the Benton. 
 No further casualties reported. A number of barges were also 
 sent down. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLE CK.—(Cn>HEE Teiegkam.) 
 
 Milliken's Bend, La., April 11, 18G3. 
 1 go to Carthage to-day. If it is possible, I will occupy 
 Grand Gulf within four days. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL RALLECK.— (Lettee.) 
 
 Millikkn's Bend, La., April 19, 1863. 
 
 I returned last night from New Carthage, at and near which 
 place Admiral Porter's fleet is lying (six iron-clads and the 
 ram General Price, together with two divisions of General 
 McClemand's corps). The whole of his corps is between Rich- 
 mond and New Carthage. 
 
 I had all the empty barges here prepared for the transpor- 
 tation of troops and artillery, and sent ten of them by the 
 Vicksburg batteries with the fleet. Whilst under the guns of 
 the enemy's batteries they were cut loose, and I fear that some 
 of them have been permitted to run i)ast New Carthage undis- 
 covered. They were relied upon to aid in the transportation 
 of troops to take Grand Gulf. 
 
 The wagon-road from here to Avithin two miles of New 
 Carthage is good for artillery. From that point on the bayou 
 the levee is broken in a number of places, making cross-currents 
 in the bayou; hence it is difficult to navigate with barges. I 
 think, however, steamers will be able to run from where the 
 wagon-road ends to the river. By clearing out the bayous 
 
APPENDIX. G47 
 
 from timber, there will be good navigation from here to New- 
 Carthage for tugs and barges, also small stern-wheel steamers. 
 This navigation can be kept good, I think, by using our dredges 
 constantly, until there is twenty feet fall. On this subject, 
 however, I have not taken the opinion of an engineer officer, 
 nor have I formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant 
 me in speaking positively. 
 
 Our experiment of running the batteries at Vicksburg, I 
 think has demonstrated the entire practicability of doing so 
 with but little risk. On this occasion our vessels went down 
 even slower than the current, using their wheels principally for 
 backing. Two of the steamers were drawn into the eddy, and 
 ran over a part of the distance in front of Vicksburg three 
 times. I shall send six more steamers by the batteries as soon 
 as they can possibly be got ready. 
 
 I sent a dispatch to General Banks that I thought I could 
 send an army corps to Bayou Sara, to cooperate with him ou 
 Port Hudson by the 25th. This now will be impossible. 
 There shall be no unnecessary delay, however, in my move- 
 ments. I hope very soon to be able to report our possession 
 of Grand Gulf, with a practicable and safe route to furnish 
 supplies to the troops. Once there, I do not feel a doubt of 
 success in the entire clearing out of the enemy from the banks 
 of the river. 
 
 At least three of my army corps commanders take hold of 
 the new policy of arming the negroes, and using them against 
 the enemy with a will. They at least are so much of soldiers 
 as to feel themselves under obligations to carry out a policy 
 (which they would not inaugurate), in the same good faith and 
 with the same zeal as if it was of their own choosing. You 
 may rely on me carrying out any policy ordered by proper 
 authority, to the best of my ability. 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO QENEEAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telkgeau.) 
 
 Before Vicksburg, April 21, 1803. 
 I move my headquarters to Carthage to-morrow. Every 
 effort will be exerted to get speedy possession of Grand Gulf, 
 and from that point to open the Mississippi. 
 
648 APPEISTDIX 
 
 If I do not underestimate the enemy, my force is abundant, 
 with a foothold once obtained, to do the work. Six transports 
 will run the Vicksburg batteries to-night. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegeam.) 
 
 Milliken's Bexd, La., April 23, 1863. 
 Six boats and a number of barges ran the Vicksburg bat- 
 teries last night. All the boats got by, more or less damaged. 
 Tlie Tigress sank at three a. m., and is a total loss — crew all 
 saved. The Moderator was much damasfed. Ithinkallthebarsfes 
 went through safely. Colonel Lagow, of my staff, was on the 
 Tigress, in command of the fleet. Casualties, so far as reported, 
 two men mortally wounded, and several (number not known) 
 more or less severely wounded. About five hundred shots 
 were fired. I look upon this as a great success. At the War- 
 renton batteries there was heavy firing, but all the boats were 
 sure to go past. What damage was done there is not known. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegram.) 
 
 Near Grand Gclf, Miss., April 27, 1863. 
 Moving troops from Smith's plantation to the Mississippi 
 has been a tedious ojieration, more so than it should have 
 been. I am noAV embarking troops for the attack on Grand 
 Gulf Expect to make it to-morrow. 
 
 GENEEAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipeee Telegbam.) 
 
 Near Grand Gulf, April 29, 1863. 
 The gunboats engaged Grand Gulf batteries from eight this 
 morning until one p. M., and from dusk till ten. The army 
 and transports are now below Grand Gulf A landing will be 
 effected on the east bank of the river to-morrow. I feel now 
 that the battle is more than half over. 
 
APPENDIX. 040 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Letter.) 
 
 Grand Gulf, Miss., ^fay 3, ISfiS. 
 
 On the 29th of April, Admiral Porter attacked the fortifica- 
 tions at this place with seven iron-clads, commencing at eight 
 o'clock A. M., and continuing until half-past one, engaging them 
 at very close quarters, many times not being more than one 
 hundred yards from the enemy's guns. During this time, I 
 had about ten thousand troops on board transports and barges, 
 ready to land them, and carry the place by storm the moment 
 the batteries bearing upon the river were silenced, so as to 
 make the landing practicable. From the great elevation the 
 enemy's batteries had, it proved entirely impracticable to 
 silence them from the river; and when the gunboats were 
 drawn off, I decided immediately upon landing my forces on 
 the Louisiana shore, and march them across the point below 
 Grand Gulf. 
 
 At night the gunboats made another vigorous attack, and in 
 the mean time, the transports safely ran the blockade, and on the 
 following day, the whole force with me was transferred to 
 Bruinsburg, the first point of land below Grand Gulf from 
 where the interior can be reached, and the march immediately 
 commenced for Port Gibson. General McClernand was in the 
 advance, with the Thirteenth army corps. About two a. h., on 
 the 1st of May, when about four miles from Port Gibson, he 
 met the enemy. Some little skirmishing took place before day- 
 light, but not to any great extent. The Thirteenth corps was 
 followed by Logan's division of McPherson's corps, which 
 reached the scene of action as soon as the last of the Thirteenth 
 corps was out of the road. The fighting continued all day, and 
 until after dark, over the most broken country I ever saw. The 
 whole country is a series of irregular ridges, divided by deep 
 and impracticable ravines, grown up with heavy timber, under- 
 growth, and cane. It was impossible to engage any con- 
 siderable portion of our force at any one time. The enemy 
 were driven, however, from point to point towards Port Gib- 
 son, until night closed in, under which, it was evident to me, 
 they intended to retreat. The pursuit was continued after 
 dark, until the enemy was again met by Logan's division, 
 about two miles from Port Gibson. The nature of the country 
 
650 APPENDIX. 
 
 is such that further pursuit, in the dark, was not deemed pru- 
 dent or advisable. On the 2d, our troops moved into the 
 town, without finding any enemy except their wounded. The 
 bridge across Bayou Pierre, about two miles from Port Gibson, 
 on the Grand Gulf road, had been destroyed, and also the 
 bridge immediately at Port Gibson, on the Vicksburg road. 
 The enemy retreated over botli these routes, leaving a battery 
 and several regiments of infantry at the former, to prevent a 
 reconstruction of the first bridge. One brigade, under General 
 Stevenson, was detached to drive the enemy from this posi- 
 tion, or occupy his attention, and a heavy detail set to work, 
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson and Captain Tresillian, to 
 reconstruct the bridge over the other. This work was accom- 
 plished, a bridge and roadway (over a hundred and twenty 
 feet long) made, and the whole of McPherson's two divisions 
 marched over before night. This corps then marched to the 
 north fork of Bayou Pierre, rebuilt a bridge over that stream, 
 and was on the march by five and a half a. m. to-day. Soon 
 after crossing the bayou, our troops were opened on by the en- 
 emy's artillery. It was soon demonstrated that this was only 
 intended to cover the retreat of the main ai-my. On arriving 
 at Willow Springs, General McPherson was directed to hold 
 the position from there to the Big Black with one division, and 
 General McClernand, on his arrival, to join him in this duty. 
 I immediately started for this place with one brigade of Logan's 
 division and some cavalry (twenty men). The brigade of in- 
 fantry was left about seven miles fi-om here ; contrabands and 
 prisoners taken having stated that the last of the retreating 
 enemy had passed that point. The woods, between here and 
 the crossing of the Big Black, are evidenily filled yet with the 
 detachments of the enemy, and some artillery. I am in hopes 
 many of them will be picked up by our forces. 
 
 Our loss will not exceed one hundred and fifty killed and 
 five hundred wounded. The enemy's loss is probably about 
 the same. We have, however, some five hundred of their men 
 prisoners, and may pick up many more yet. Many stragglers, 
 particularly from the Missouri troops, no doubt have fallen out, 
 and will never join their regiments again. 
 
 The move by Bruinsburg undoubtedly took the enemy 
 much by surprise. General Bowen's (the rebel commander) 
 defence was a good one, and well carried out. My force, how- 
 
APPENDIX. 651 
 
 ever, was too heavy for his, and composed of well-disciplined 
 and hardy men, who know no defeat and are not willing to 
 learn what it is. 
 
 This army is in the finest health and spirits. Since leaving 
 Milliken's bend they have marched as much by night as by 
 day, through mud and rain, without tents or much other bag- 
 gage, and on irregular rations, without a complaint, and with 
 less straggling than I have ever before witnessed. "Where all 
 have done so well, it would be out of place to make invidious 
 distinction. 
 
 The country will supply all the forage required for any 
 thing like an active campaign, and the necessary fresh beef; 
 other supplies will have to be drawn from Milliken's bend. 
 This is a long and precarious route, but I have every confidence 
 in succeeding in doing it. 
 
 Admiral Porter left here this morning for the mouth of Red 
 river. A letter from Admiral Farragut says that Banks has 
 defeated Taylor, and captured about two thousand prisoners. 
 
 Colonel Grierson's raid from La Grange through Mississippi 
 has been the most successful thing of the kind since the break- 
 ing out of the rebellion. He was five miles south of Pontotoc 
 on'' the 19th of April. The next place he turned up at was 
 Newton, about thirty miles east of Jackson. From there he 
 has gone south, touching at Hazlehurst, Bahala, and various 
 places. The Southern papers and Southern people regard it as 
 one of the most daring exploits of the war. I am told the 
 whole state is full of men paroled by Grierson. 
 
 GE>T:EAL GEi^'T TO GEXEEAL nXhLECK,-(Tzi.zai±iL) 
 
 Grand Gulf, Miss, Mat/ 3, 1863. 
 We landed at Bruinsburg, April 30th, moved immediately 
 on Port Gibson, met the enemy, eleven thousand strong, four 
 miles south of Port Gibson at two a. m., and engaged him all 
 day, entirely routing him, with the loss of many killed and 
 about five hundred prisoners, besides the wounded. Our loss 
 about one hundred killed and five hundred wounded The 
 enemy retreated towards Vicksburg, destroying the bnagefl 
 over the two forks of Bayou Pierre. These were reDuilt, and 
 pursuit continued till the present time. Besides the neavj 
 
652 APPEKDIX. 
 
 artillery at tbis place, four fieldpieces were captured certain, 
 Bome stores, and the enemy driven to destroy much more. The 
 country is the most broken and difficult to operate in I ever saw. 
 Our victory has been most complete, and the enemy thorough- 
 ly demoralized. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL L. THOMAS. 
 
 Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., May 5, 1863. 
 I have the honor to request that Captain Adam Badeau, 
 A. A. D. C, be ordered to report to me for duty on my staff. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipitee Tblegeasi.) 
 
 Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., May 6, 1863. 
 Ferrying land transportation and rations to Grand Gulf is 
 detaining me on the Black river. I will move as soon as three 
 days' rations ai"e secured, and send the wagons back to the Gulf 
 for more to follow. Information from the other side leads me 
 to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma. 
 Should not Rosecrans at least make a demonstration of advan- 
 cing:? 
 
 HON. E. M. STANTON TO C. A. DANA, ESQ.— (CirireR Telegkam.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, May 6, 18G3. 
 General Grant has full and absolute authority to enforce 
 his own commands, and to remove any person who by igno- 
 rance in action or any cause interferes with or delays his opera- 
 tions. He has the full confidence of the Government, is ex- 
 pected to enforce liis authority, and will be firmly and heartily 
 suppoited, but he will be responsible for any failure to exert 
 his powers. You may communicate this to him. 
 
 HON. E. M. STANTON TO GENERAL GRANT. 
 
 Washington, D. C, May Y, 18S3. 
 The President and general-in-chicf have just returned from 
 the Army of the Potomac. The principal operation of General 
 
APPENDIX. G53 
 
 Hooker failed, but there has "been no serious disaster to the or- 
 ganization and efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its 
 former position on the Rappahannock, having recrossed the 
 river without any loss in the movement. Not more than one- 
 third of General Hooker's force was engaged. General Stone- 
 man's operations have been a brilliant success. A part of his 
 force advanced, to within two miles of Richmond, and the 
 enemy's communication has been cut in every direction. The 
 Army of the Potomac will very soon resume offensive opera- 
 tions. 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipheb Teleobam.) 
 
 Rocky Springs, Miss., May 8, 1863. 
 Our advance is fifteen miles from Edward's station, on 
 Southern railroad. All looks well. Port Hudson is evidently 
 evacuated, except by a small garrison and their heavy ar- 
 tillery. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (CirnEii Telegbasj.) 
 
 Cayuga, Miss^ May 11, 1863. 
 My forces will be this evening as far advanced towards 
 Jackson as Fourteen-mile creek, the left near Black river, and 
 extending in a line as nearly east and west as they can get with- 
 out bringing on a battle. As I shall communicate with Grand 
 Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to send a train with 
 heavy escort, you may not hear from me again for several 
 days. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-(CrrnEE. Teleobam.) 
 
 WAsni.NGTON, D. C, 11 a. m.. May 11, 1863. 
 If possible, the forces of yourself and Banks should b<3 
 united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack 
 these places separately with the combined forces. The same 
 thino- has been urged on Banks. Hooker recrossed to the 
 north side of the river, but he inflicted a greater loss upon the 
 enemy than he received. 
 
654 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegeam.) 
 
 Raymond, Miss., May 14, 1863. 
 
 McPherson took this place on the 12th, after a brisk fight 
 of more than two hours. Our loss, fifty-one killed, and one 
 hundred and eighty wounded ; enemy's loss, seventy-five killed, 
 and buried by us. One hundred and eighty-six prisoners, be- 
 sides wounded. 
 
 McPherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jack- 
 son road, and McClernand bringing up the rear. I will attack 
 the state capital to-day. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphee Telegram.) 
 
 Jackson, Miss., May 15, 1863. 
 This place fell into our hands yesterday after a fight of 
 about three hours. Jo. Johnston was in command. The enemy 
 retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicks- 
 burg force. I am concentrating my force at Bolton to cut 
 them ofiTil possible. A dispatch from Banks showed him to be 
 off in Louisiana, not to return to Baton Rouge until the 10th 
 of May. I could not lose the time. I have taken many pris- 
 oners from Port Hudson, who state that it will be evacuated on 
 the appearance of a force in the rear. I sent a special messen- 
 ger to Banks, giving him the substance of the information I 
 had, and asking him to join me as soon as possible. This mes- 
 sage was sent on the 10th. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Letter.) 
 
 Near Vicksburg, May 22, 1863. 
 Vicksburg is now completely invested. I have possession 
 of Maine's bluff and the Yazoo, consequently have supplies. 
 To-day an attempt was made to carry tlie city by assault, but 
 was not entirely successful. We hold possession, however, of 
 two of the enemy's forts, and have skirmishers close under all 
 of them. Our loss was not severe. The nature of the ground 
 about Vicksburg is such that it can only be taken by a siege. 
 It is entirely safe to us in time — I would say one week — if the 
 
APPENDIX. 655 
 
 enemy do not send a large army upon my rear. With the 
 railroad destroyed to beyond Pearl river, I do not see tbc hope 
 that the enemy can entertain of such relief. I hear that Davis 
 has promised that if the garrison can hold out for fifteen days 
 he will send one hundred thousand men, if he has to evacuate 
 Tennessee. AVhat shall I do with the prisoners I have? 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL IIALLECK.— (Letter.) 
 
 Near Vicksburo, May 24, 1863. 
 
 My troops are now disposed with the right (Sherman's 
 corps) resting on the Mississippi river, where the bluff strikes 
 the water, we having the first crest and the upper of the 
 enemy's batteries. McClernand is on the left with his corps, 
 his right having one brigade north of the railroad, the rest 
 south of it. One division occupies the roads leading south and 
 southeast from the city. 
 
 The position is as strong by nature as can be possibly con 
 eeived of, and is well fortified. The garrison the enemy have 
 to defend it I have no means of knowing, but their force is 
 variously estimated at from ten to twenty thousand. I at- 
 tempted to carry the place by storm on the 22d instant, but 
 was unsuccessful. Our troops were not repulsed from any 
 point, but simply failed to enter the works of the enemy. At 
 several points they got up to the parapets of the enemy's 
 works, and planted their flags on the outer slope of the em- 
 bankments, where they still have them. The attack was made 
 simultaneously by the three army corps at ten a. >r. The loss 
 on our side was not very heavy at first, but receiving repeated 
 dispatches from Major-General i\IcClernand, saying that he 
 was hard pressed on his right and left, and calling for reen- 
 forcements, I gave him all of McPherson's corps but four bri- 
 gades, and caused Sherman to press the enemy on our right, 
 which caused us to double our losses for the day. They will 
 probably reach fifteen hundred killed and wounded. General 
 McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the facts, and caused 
 much of this loss. He is entirely unfit tor tlie position of cor|i3 
 commander, both on the march and on the battle-fichl. Look- 
 ing ofter his corps gives me more labor and infinitely more un 
 easiness than all the remainder of my department. 
 
656 APPENDIX. 
 
 The enemy are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of 
 Vicksburg, and the capture of most of the garrison, can only 
 be a question of time. I hear a great deal of the enemy's 
 bringing a large force from the East, to effect the raising of the 
 siege. They may attempt something of the kind, but I do not 
 see how they can do it. 
 
 The railroad is effectually destroyed at Jackson, so that it 
 will take thirty days to repair it. This will leave a march of 
 fifty miles over which the enemy will have to subsist an army, 
 and bring their ordnance stores with teams. My position is so 
 strong that I could hold out for several days against a vastly 
 superior force. I do not see how the enemy could possibly 
 maintain a long attack under these circumstances. I will keep 
 a close watch on the enemy, however. 
 
 There is a force now at Calhoun station, on the Mississippi 
 Central, about six miles north of Canton. This is the force 
 that escaped from Jackson, augmented by a few thousand men 
 from the coast cities, intending to reach the latter place before 
 the attack, but who failed to reach in time. 
 
 In the various battles, from Port Gibson to Black river 
 bridge, we have taken near six thousand prisoners, besides 
 killed, wounded, and scattered a much larger number. The 
 enemy succeeded in retreating to Vicksburg, with only three 
 pieces of artillery. The number captured by us was seventy- 
 ibur guns, besides what was found at Ilaine's bluff. 
 
 From Jackson to this place I have had no opportunities of 
 communicating with you. Since that, this army fought a heavy 
 battle near Baker's creek on the 16th, beating the enemy badly, 
 killing and capturing not less than four thousand of the enemy, 
 besides capturing most of his artillery. Loring's division was cut 
 off from retreat, and dispersed in eveiy direction. On the 17th, 
 the battle of Black river bridge was fought, the enemy again 
 losing about two thousand prisoners and seventeen pieces of ar- 
 tillery, and many killed and wounded. The bridges and ferries 
 were destroyed. The march from Edward's station to Black 
 river bridge was made, bridges for crossing the army constructed, 
 and mueli of it over in twenty-four hours. On the 1 9th, the march 
 to this place was made, and the city invested. When I crossed 
 the Mississippi river, the means of ferriage were so limited and 
 time so important, that I started without teams, and an aver- 
 age of two days' rations in haversacks. Our supplies had to be 
 
APPENDIX. 657 
 
 hauled about sixty miles, from Milliken's bend to opposite 
 Grand Gulf, and from there to wherever the army marched. 
 We picked up all the teams in the country, and free Africans 
 to drive them. Forage and meat were found in great abun. 
 dance through the country,, so that, although five days' rations 
 were issued in twenty days, yet there was neither sufiering 
 nor complaint witnessed in the army. 
 
 As soon as reports can be got from corps commanders, I 
 will send in a report, embracing the campaign from Milliken's 
 bend to the investment, if not the capture, of Vicksburg. 
 When I crossed the Mississippi river, it was my intention to 
 detach an army corps, or the necessary force, to cooperate with 
 General Banks, to secure the reduction of Port Hudson and the 
 union of the two armies. But I received a letter from General 
 Banks, stating that he was in Louisiana, and would return to 
 Baton Rouge by the 10th inst. By the reduction of Port Hud- 
 son, he could add only twelve thousand to my force. I had cer- 
 tain information that General Jo. Johnston was on his way to 
 Jackson, and that reenforcements were arriving there constantly 
 from Port Hudson and the Southern cities. Under this state of 
 facts I could not afford to delay ; beating the enemy too, near 
 Port Gibson, I followed him to Hankinson's ferry on the Black 
 river. This placed my forces fifteen miles on their way from 
 Grand Gulf to this place. Black river bridge, or Jackson, which- 
 ever 1 might turn my attention to. 
 
 Altogether, I am satisfied that my course was riglit, and 
 has given us with comparative ease what would have cost seri- 
 ous battle by delay. 
 
 The army is in the finest health and spirits. 
 
 GENERAL IIALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.— (CiriiEB Telegeam.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, 12.30 p. m., June 2, 1863. 
 Tours of 24th is received. I will do all I can to assist you. 
 I have sent dispatch after dispatch to Banks to join you. Why 
 he does not, I do not understand. His separate operating on 
 Port Hudson is in direct violation of his instructions. If possi- 
 ble, send him this dispatch. 3Iy last dispatch froni him was 
 May 4th. 
 
 42 
 
658 appejs^dix. 
 
 PRESIDENT A. LINCOLN TO GENERAL GEANT.— <Ciphbr Telegram.) 
 
 Washington, D. C, 6.30 f. m., June 2, 1863. 
 Are you in communication with General Banks? Is he 
 coming towards you, or going farther oflf? Is there or has 
 there been any thing to hinder his coming directly to you by 
 water ? 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 Near ViCKSBxmG, Jtine 3, 1863. 
 
 The approaches are gradually nearing the enemy's fortifica- 
 tions. Five days more should plant our batteries on their 
 parapets. Johnston is still collecting troops at Canton and 
 Jackson. Some are coming over the raili'oad, and all the coun- 
 try is joining his standard. The destruction of the enemy's 
 artillery and ordnance stores was so complete, that all these 
 must be brought in from a distance. I sent a large force up 
 between the Yazoo and Black rivers. Forage, beef, and bacon 
 was destroyed by our troops, and .the stock brought to camp. 
 I am now placing all my spare force on the narrowest part of 
 the land between the rivers, about forty-five miles northeast, 
 with the cavalry watching all the crossings of Black river. 
 
 We shell the town a little every day, and keep the enemy 
 constantly on the alert. We but seldom lose a man now. 
 The best of health and spirits prevail among the troops. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO A. LINCOLN, PRESIDENT U. S.— (Telegram.) 
 
 Near Vicksburg, June 8, 1863. 
 I send by mail letter from General Banks of June 4th. I 
 am in communication with him, he having Port Hudson closely 
 invested. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK— (Telegram.) 
 
 Near Vicksburg, June 8, 1863. 
 It is reported that three divisions have left Bragg's army to 
 join Johnston. Breckenridge is knoAvn to have arrived 
 
APPENDIX. 651» 
 
 GENERAL GKANT TO GENEEAL nALLECK.— (CrrnER Tei.eobam.) 
 
 Near Yicksburg, June 8, 18G3. 
 Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about 
 thirty thousand men with which to repel any thing from the 
 rear. This includes all I have ordered from West Tennessee. 
 Johnston is concentrating a force at Canton, and now has a 
 portion of it west of Big Black. My forces have been north 
 as far as Sartartia, and on the ridge back. To that point there 
 is no force yet. I will make a waste of all the country I can 
 between the two rivers. I am fortifying Ilaine's bluflf, and will 
 defend the line from here to there at all hazards. 
 
 GElirEEAI, GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Teleobau.) 
 
 Near Vicksburg, June 11, 1863. 
 
 Reenforcements, other than from my own command, are 
 beginning to arrive. There is every indication that they may 
 be needed. The enemy occupy Yazoo City and Canton with 
 an entire division of cavalry, on the ridge between the two 
 rivers. I am fortifying Haine's bluff, and will have a garrison 
 there of thirteen thousand men, besides the ability to throw an 
 equal amount more there in case of an attack, and still keep up 
 the investment of Vicksburg. 
 
 Kirby Smith is showing signs of working to this side of the 
 river, either to operate against Banks or myself He may find 
 difficulty in crossing the river, but the great number of bayous 
 and little lakes wnthin a short distance of shore in this region, 
 afford sucb facilities for concealing boats, that the means of 
 crossing an army may still be left the rebels ; particularly this 
 may be the case about Katchez. I now fear trouble on the, 
 other side of the river between Lake Providence and Milliken s 
 bend. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL IIALLEdC-KCirmB Telkor-vm.) 
 
 Near Yicksbcro, June 11, 1863. 
 I have reliable information from the entire interior of the 
 South. Johnston has been reonforced by three thousand men 
 
G60 APPENDIX. 
 
 tVom Mobile and parts of Georgia ; by McGowan and Brecken- 
 ridge's divisions (nine thousand men) ; and four thousand of 
 Forrest's cavalry from Bragg's army ; nine thousand men from 
 Charleston, and two thousand two hundred from Port Hudson. 
 Orders were sent the very day Banks invested Port Hudson, to 
 evacuate it. Garrison there now, eight thousand. Lee's army 
 has not been reduced. Bragg's force now, forty-six thousand 
 infantry and artillery, and fifteen thousand cavalry. Every 
 thing not required for daily use has been removed to Atlanta, 
 Georgia. His army can fall back to Bristol or Chattanooga at 
 a moment's notice, which places, it is thought, he can hold, and 
 sjDare twenty-five thousand men. Mobile and Savannah are 
 now almost entirely without garrisons, further than men to 
 manage large guns. No forces left in the interior to send to 
 any place. All further reenforcements will have to come from 
 one of the great armies. Thei-e is about thirty-two thousand 
 men west of the Mississij^pi river, exclusive of the forces in 
 Texas. Orders were sent them one week ago by Johnston, 
 The purport of orders not known. Herron has arrived here, 
 and troops from Burnside are looked for to-morrow. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.— (Leitek.) 
 
 Near Vicksbitrg, June 16, 1863, 
 Herewith I have the honor of enclosing Brigadier-General 
 E. S. Dennis's report of the battle of Milliken's bend, fought 
 on the Vth of June, 1863, together with the list of casualties. 
 
 In this battle most of the troops engaged were Africans, 
 who had but little experience in the use of arms. Their con- 
 duct is said, however, to have been most gallant, and I doubt 
 not but with good officers they will make good troops. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.-<Ciphek Telegram.) 
 
 Near Vicksburg, June 16, 1863, 
 
 Every thing progresses well here. Johnston's force is at 
 
 Yazoo City, Benton, Brownsville, and Clinton. I am fortifying 
 
 at Haine's bluff to make my position certain, but believe I 
 
 could e:o out with force enousfh to drive the rebels from be- 
 
APPENDIX. GGl 
 
 tweeu the two rivers. Deserters come out daily. AH report 
 
 rations short. We scarcely ever lose a man now. Ileallli and 
 condition of troops most excellent. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (TELEaEAM.) 
 
 Near Yicksburg, June 19, 1868. 
 I have found it necessary to relieve General McClemand, 
 particularly at this time, for his publication of a congratula- 
 tory address, calculated to create dissensions and ill-feeling in 
 the army. I should have relieved him long since, for general 
 unfitness for his position. General Ord is appointed to his 
 place, subject to the approval of the President. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (TELECP.AM.^ 
 
 Before Vicksbitrg, June 26, 1863. 
 
 Yesterday a mine was sprung under the enemy's most com- 
 manding fort, producing a crater sufficient to hold two regi- 
 ments of infantry. Our men took immediate possession and 
 still hold it. The fight for it has been incessant, and thus far 
 we have not been able to establish batteries in the breach. 
 Expect to succeed. 
 
 Johnston has removed east of Black river, Ilis movements 
 are mysterious, and may be intended to cover a movement from 
 his rear into East or West Tennessee, or upon Banks. I have 
 Sherman out near his front on the Black, with a large force, 
 watching him. I will use every effort to learn any move John- 
 ston may make, and send troops from here to counteract any 
 change he may make, if I can. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. TU0MA9.— (Lettke.) 
 
 Near Yicksburg, June 26, 1863. • 
 
 Enclosed I respectfully transmit the letters of ^Nlajor-Gencr- 
 als W. T. Sherman, commanding the Fifteenth anny corps, and 
 James B. McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth anny 
 corps, of dates respectively the 17th and ISth inst., relative to 
 the congratulatory order of Major-General John A. McCler- 
 
662 APPENDIX. 
 
 nand to his troops, a copy of which order is also transmitted, 
 together with copies of the correspondence relating thereto ; 
 and my order relieving General McClernand from the command 
 of the Thirteenth army coi'ps, and assigning Major-General E. 
 O. C. Ord to the command thereof, subject to the approval of 
 the President. 
 
 A disposition and earnest desire on my part to do the most 
 I could with the means at my command, without interfering 
 with the assignment to command, which the President alone 
 was authorized to make, made me tolerate General McClernand 
 long after I thought the good of the service demanded his 
 removal. It was only when almost the entire army under 
 my command seemed to demand it that he was relieved. The 
 enclosed letters show the feelings of the army corps serving in 
 the field with the Thirteenth. 
 
 The removal of General McClernand from the command of 
 the Thirteenth army corps has given general satisfaction, the 
 Thirteenth army corps sharing perhaps equally in the feeling 
 with other corps of the army. 
 
 My action in the relieving of General McClernand from the 
 command of the Thirteenth army corps, and the assignment of 
 Major-Geueral E. O. C. Ord to that command, I trust, will meet 
 the approval of the President. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Teleqbam.) 
 
 Near Yicksbukg, Jutie 27, 1863. 
 Johnston has postponed his attack until he can receive ten 
 thousand reenforceraents, now on their way from Bragg's army. 
 They are expected next week. I feel strong enough against 
 this increase, and I do not despair of having Vicksburg before 
 they arrive. This latter, however, I may be disappointed in. 
 I may have to abandon protection to the leased plantations 
 from here to Lake Providence, to resist a threatened attack 
 from Kirby Smith's forces. The location of those leased plan- 
 tations was most unfortunate, and against my judgment. I 
 wanted them put north of "White river. 
 
APPENDIX. 0G3 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAX HALLECK. 
 
 ViCKSBCRO, Juhj 4, 1863. 
 
 The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terras 
 allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a 
 great advantage to lis at this juncture. It saves probably 
 several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports 
 ready for immediate service. 
 
 Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on John- 
 ston to drive him from the state. I will send troops to the 
 relief of Banks, and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Ciphxb Telegeam.) 
 
 ViCKSBURG, July 6, 1863. 
 
 The number of prisoners and pieces of artUleiy taken with 
 Vicksburg is greater than was at first supposed. The number 
 proves to be over thii'ty thousand prisoners, and over one hun- 
 dred and seventy pieces of artillery. "We have found consid- 
 erable ammunition and about four days' rations of flour and 
 bacon, and two hundred and fifty pounds of sugar. The small- 
 arms are of good quality and over fifty thousand in number. 
 
 Sherman is after Johnston, but no news from him to-day. 
 
 GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.-(TEtKGnAM.) 
 
 Washington, 4 p. m., July 8, 1803. 
 I fear your parolling the prisoners at Vicksburg Avithout ac- 
 tual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh 
 article of the cartel, may be construed into an alisolute release, 
 and that these men will immediately be placed in the ranks of 
 the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these pris- 
 oners have not been allowed to depart, you will retain them 
 until further orders. 
 
6G4 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.-(Tbleqbam.) 
 
 VicKSBTTKG, My 10, 1863. 
 The following dispatch is just received from General Banks : 
 
 " Before Port Hudson, July 8, 1863. 
 " To Major- General U. S. Geant, 
 
 commanding Department Tennessee^ Viclcsburg : 
 
 " Geneeal : The Mississippi is now opened. I have the 
 honor to inform you that the garrison of Port Hudson fiurren- 
 dered unconditionally this afternoon. We shall take formal 
 possession at seven o'clock in the morning." 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.— (Lettee.) 
 
 ViCKSBiTRG, Miss., July 11, 1863. 
 ***** 
 
 The long line of plantations from Lake Providence to Mil- 
 liken's bend, it has been perfectly impossible to give perfect 
 protection to, during the siege of Vicksburg. Besides the gun- 
 boats, negro troops, and six regiments of white troops, left 
 west of the Mississippi river in consequence of these planta- 
 tions being there, I sent an additional brigade from the invest- 
 ing army, and that at a time when Government was strain- 
 ing every nerve to send me troops to insure the success of the 
 enterprise against Vicksburg. All has not been availing. I 
 can now clean out the Tensas and Bayou Ma9on country, so 
 that there will be but little difficulty in j^rotecting wliat is left 
 
 of the plantations. 
 
 ***** 
 
 The capture of Vicksburg has proved a bigger thing than I 
 supposed it would. There were over thirty thoiisand rebel 
 troops still left when we entered the city. The number of small- 
 arms will reach fifty thousand stand, I think, and the amount 
 of ordnance and ordnance stores is enormous. Since crossing 
 the Mississippi, an army of sixty thousand men has in the va- 
 rious battles been killed and wounded, captured and scattered, 
 so as to be lost to the Confederacy, and an armament for an 
 army of one hundred thousand men has departed from them 
 forever 
 
APPEliTDIX. 665 
 
 My surplus troops were held in a position menacincf John- 
 ston, ready to move at a moment's notice when Vicksburr; 
 should fall. The moment a surrender was agreed upon, the 
 order was given. I hope to hear to-day that Jolinston's forces 
 have been broken to pieces, and much of his munitions of war 
 abandoned. I have not heard from Sherman since the morn- 
 ing of the 9th. He was then near Jackson, skirmishing with 
 the cavalry of the enemy. * * » * 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— {Cipher Teleoeam.) 
 
 YiCKSBURG, Juhj 11, 1863. 
 
 General Banks writes me that he wants from ten to twelve 
 thousand men to enable him to follow up the enemy and to 
 move into Texas. Shall I send them? All my spare troops 
 are now with Sherman, following Johnston. I have had no 
 news since the morning of the 9th. Sherman was then at 
 Clinton, his advance skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. 
 
 GENERAL GEANT TO GENERAL H ALLEGE.— (Ciphee Telegeam.) 
 
 YiCKSBURO, July 15, 1863. 
 
 Sherman has Jackson invested from Pearl river, on the 
 north, to the river on the south. This has cut off many hun- 
 difed cars from the Confcderac3\ Sherman says he has force 
 enough, and feels no apprehension of the result. 
 
 Finding Tazoo City was being fortified, I sent Ilerron there 
 with his division. He captured several hundred prisoners on 
 steamers; five pieces of heavy artillery and all the public 
 stores fell into our hands. The enemy bunit three steamboats 
 on the approach of the gunboats. The De Kalb was blown, 
 up and sunk in fifteen feet of water by the explosion of a tor 
 pedo. Finding that the enemy were crossing cattle for the 
 rebel array at Xatchez, and were said to have several thousand 
 there now, I have sent steamers and troops to collect them, 
 and to destroy their boats and all means for making more. 
 
 General Banks has made requisition on me for steamers, 
 coal, and forai-e, which I have sent. ShaU 1 send the Ninth 
 army corps back to Burnside as soon as Johnston is driven 
 from Jackson ? 
 
666 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.— (Cipher Telegram.) 
 
 ViCKSBURG, July 18, 1863. 
 
 Johnston evacuated Jackson the night of the 16th inst. 
 He is now in full retreat east. Sherman says most of his army 
 must perish from the heat, lack of water, and general discour- 
 agement. The army parolled here has to a great extent de- 
 serted, and are scattered over the country in every direction. 
 Learning that Yazoo City was being fortified, I sent General 
 Herron there. Five gims were captured, many stores and 
 about three hundred prisoners. 
 
 General Ransom was sent to Natchez, to stop the crossing 
 of cattle for the eastern army. On arrival he found that a 
 large number had been driven out of the city, to be pastured. 
 Also, that munitions of "war had recently been crossed over to 
 the west for Kirby Smith. He mounted about two thousand 
 of his men and sent them in both dii-ections. They caj)tured a 
 number of prisoners and five thousand head of Texas cattle, 
 two thousand head of which were sent to Banks. The balance 
 have been and will be brought here. In Louisiana they cap- 
 tured more prisoners, and a number of teams loaded with am- 
 munition. Over two hundred thousand rounds of musket 
 ammunition were brought back to Natchez, with the teams cap- 
 tured, and two hundred and sixty-eight thousand rounds, be- 
 sides artillery ammunition, destroyed. It seems to me now 
 that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from 
 some point on Lake Pontchartrain. There is much sickness in 
 my command now, from long and excessive marching and la- 
 bor. I will cooperate with General Schofield as soon as possi- 
 ble, so as to give him possession of the line of the Arkansas. 
 Sliall I retain or send back the Ninth army corps ? 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CONGEATULATOPvT ORDER OF GENERAL McCLEENAND. 
 
 Headquarters, Thirteesth Army Corps, ) 
 Battle-Field in rear of Vicksburg, May 30, 18G3. J 
 
 General Orders, Ko. 72. 
 
 Comrades: As your comtnander, I am proud to congrat- 
 ulate you upon your constancy, valor, and successes. Ilistory 
 affords no more brilliant example of soldierly qualities. Your 
 victories have followed in such rapid succession that their 
 echoes have not yet reached the country. They will challenge 
 its grateful and enthusiastic applause. Yourselves striking out 
 a new^ path, your comrades of the Array of the Tennessee fol- 
 lowed, and a way was thus opened for them to redeem previous 
 disappointments. Your march through Louisiana, from Milli- 
 ken's bend to New Carthage and. Perkins's i>lantation, on the 
 Mississippi river, is one of the most remarkable on record. 
 Bayous and miry roads, threatened with momentary inunda- 
 tion, obstructed your progress. All these were overcome by 
 unceasing labor and unflagging energy. The two thousand 
 feet of bridging which was hastily improvised out of materials 
 created on the spot, and over which you passed, must long be 
 remembered as a marvel. Descending the ]Mississipi>i slill 
 lower, you were the first to cross the river at Bruin's landing, 
 and to plant our colors in the state of ^Mississippi below War- 
 renton. Resuming the advance the same day, you pushed on 
 until you came up to the enejny near Port Gibson, only re- 
 
668 APPENDIX. 
 
 strained by the dai-kness of night. You hastened to attack him 
 on the morning of the 1st of May, and, by vigorously pressing 
 him at all points, drove him from his position, taking a large 
 number of prisoners and small-arms, and five pieces of cannon. 
 General Logan's division came ujj in time to gallantly share in 
 consummating the most valuable victory won since the capture 
 of Fort Donelson. 
 
 Taking the lead on the morning of the 2d, you were the 
 first to enter Port Gibson, and hasten the retreat of the enemy 
 from the vicinity of that place. During the ensuing night, as 
 a consequence of the victory at Port Gibson, the enemy spiked 
 his guns at Grand Gulf, and evacuated that place, retiring upon 
 Yicksburg and Edward's station. The fall of Grand Gulf was 
 solely the result of the victory achieved by the land forces at 
 Port Gibson. The armament and public stores captured there 
 are but the just trophies of that victory. 
 
 Hastening to bridge the south branch of Bayou Pierre, at 
 Port Gibson, you crossed on the morning of the 3d, and pushed 
 on to Willow springs, Big Sandy, and the main crossing of 
 Fourteen-mile creek, four miles from Edward's station. A de- 
 tachment of the enemy was immediately driven away from the 
 crossing, and you advanced, passed over, and rested during 
 the night of the 12th, within three miles of the enemy in large 
 force at that station. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, the objective point of the 
 army's movement having been changed from Edward's sta- 
 tion to Jackson, in pursuance of an order from the commander 
 of the department, you moved on the north side of Fourteen- 
 mile creek towards Raymond. 
 
 This delicate and hazardous movement was executed by a 
 portion of your numbers under cover of Hovey's division, 
 which made a feint of attack, in line of battle, upon Edward's 
 station. Too late to harm j^ou, the enemy attacked the rear 
 of that division, but was promptly and decisively rej^ulsed. 
 
 Resting near Raymond that night, on the morning of the 
 14th, you entered that place — one division moving on to Mis- 
 sissippi springs, near Jackson, in support of General Sherman, 
 another to Clinton, in supj^ort of General McPherson — a third 
 remaining at Raymond, and a fourth at Old Auburn, to bring 
 up the army-trains. On the 15th, you again led the advance 
 towards Edward's station, which once more became the objec- 
 
APPENDIX. GG9 
 
 tive point. Expelling the enemy's pickets from Bolton the 
 same day, you seized and held that important position. 
 
 On the 16th, you led the advance in three columns upon 
 three roads, against Edward's station ; meeting the enemy on 
 the way in strong force, you heavily engaged him near Cliain- 
 pioa hills, and, after a sanguinary and obstinate battle, with 
 the assistance of General McPherson's corps, beat and routed 
 him, taking many prisoners and small-arms, and several pieces 
 of cannon. 
 
 Continuing to lead the advance, you rapidly pursued the 
 enemy to Edward's station, capturing that place, a large 
 quantity of public stores, and many prisoners. Night only 
 stoj)ped you. 
 
 At day-dawn, on the iTth, you resumed the advance, and 
 early coming upon the enemy strongly intrenched in elaborate 
 works, both before and behind Big Black river, immediately 
 opened with artillery upon him, followed by a daring and 
 heroic charge at the point of the bayonet, whicli put him to 
 rout, leaving eighteen pieces of cannon ajid more than a thou- 
 sand prisoners in your hands. 
 
 By an early hoii'r on the morning of the 18tb, you ha 1 con- 
 structed a bridge across the Big Black, and had commenced 
 the advance upon Vicksburg. 
 
 On the 19th, 20th, and 21st, you continued to reconnoitre 
 and skirmish until you had gained a near approach to the ene- 
 my's works. 
 
 On the 22d, in pursuance of the order of the commander ot 
 the department, you assaulted the enemy's defences in front, at 
 ten o'clock a, m., and within thirty minutes had made a lodg 
 ment, and planted your colors upon two of his bastions. This 
 partial success called into exercise the highest heroism,^ and 
 was only gained by a bloody and protracted struggle. Yet it 
 was gained, and was the first and largest success achieved any- 
 where along the whole line of our army. 
 
 For nearly eight hours, under a scorching sun and destruc- 
 tive fire, you firmlv held your footing, and only withdrew 
 when the enemy had largely massed their forces an.l concen- 
 trated their attack upon you. 
 
 How and whv the general assault faUcd, it would be useless 
 now to explain.' The Thirteenth army corps, acknowledging 
 the good intention of all, would scorn indulgence in weak re- 
 
670 
 
 APPEISTDIX. 
 
 grets and idle criminations. According justice to all, it would 
 only defend itself. If, while the enemy was massing to crush 
 it, assistance was asked for, by a diversion at other points, or 
 by reenforcement, it only asked what in one case General 
 Grant had specifically and peremptorily ordered, namely, simul- 
 taneous and persistent attack all along our lines until the ene- 
 my's outer works should be carried ; and what, in the other, by 
 massing a strong force in time upon a weakened point, would 
 have probably insured success. 
 
 Comrades, you have done much, yet something more re- 
 mains to be done. The enemy's odious defences still block 
 your access to Vicksburg. Treason still rules that rebellious 
 city, and closes the Mississippi river against rightful use by the 
 millions who inhabit its sources and the great Northwest. 
 Shall not our flag float over Vicksburg ? Shall not the great 
 Father of Waters be opened to lawM commerce ? Methinks 
 the emphatic response of one and all of you is, " It shall be 
 so ! " Then let us rise to the level of a crowning trial ! Let our 
 common sufierings and glories, while uniting us as a band of 
 brothers, rouse us to new and surpassijig efforts ! Let us re- 
 solve upon success, God helping us ! I join with you, com- 
 rades, in your sympathy for the wounded and sorrow for the 
 dead. May we not trust — nay, is it not so — that History will 
 associate the martyrs of this sacred struggle for law and order, 
 liberty and justice, with the honored martyrs of Monmouth 
 and Bunker Hill ! 
 
 JOHN A. McCLERXAXD, 
 
 Major-General commanding. 
 
 GENERAL SHEEMAN TO COLONEL EAWLINS. 
 
 Hkadqtjakters Fifteenth Army Corps, ) 
 
 Camp ox Walsct Hills, June 17, 1863. ) 
 Lieutenant- C'olonelJ. A. Eawlins, 
 
 A. A. General, Department of the Tennessee : 
 Sir: On my return last evening from an inspection of the 
 new works at Snyder's bluff'. General Blair, who commands 
 the second division of my corps, called my attention to the en- 
 closed publication in the MemiJhis Evening Bulletin of June 
 T3th instant, entitled "Congratulatory Order of General Mc- 
 Clernand," with a request that I should notice it, lest the 
 
APPEITOIX. 071 
 
 statements of facts, and inference contained tlierein, might re- 
 ceive credence from an excited public. 
 
 It certainly gives me no pleasure or satisfaction to notice 
 such a catalogue of nonsense, such an effusion of vain-glory 
 and hypocrisy; nor can I believe General McClernand ever 
 published such an order officially to his corps. I know too 
 well that the brave and intelligent soldiers and officers who 
 compose that corps will not be humbugged by such stuff. 
 
 If the order be a genuine production, and not a forgery, it 
 is manifestly addressed, not to an army, but to a constituency 
 in Illinois, far distant from the scene of the events attempted 
 to be described, who might innocently be induced to think 
 General McClernand the sagacious leader and bold hero he so 
 complacently paints himself. 
 
 But it is barely possible the order is a genuine one, and was 
 actually read to the regiments of the Thirteenth army corps, in 
 which case a copy must have been sent to your office for the 
 infoi-mation of the commanding general. I beg to call his at- 
 tention to the requii-ements of General Orders Xo. 151, of 1862, 
 which actually forbids the publication of all official letters and 
 reports, and requires the name of the writer to be laid before 
 the President of the United States for dismissal. 
 
 The document under question is not technically a letter or 
 report, and, though styled an order, is not an order. It orders 
 nothing, but is in the nature of an address to soldiers, mani- 
 festly designed for publication for ulterior political purposes. 
 It perverts the truth, to the ends of flattery and selt-gloritiea- 
 tion, and contains many untruths, among which is one of mon- 
 strous falsehood. 
 
 It substantially accuses General :McPherson and myself 
 with disobeying the orders of General Grant, in not assaultitig 
 on the 19th'and 22d of May, and allowing, on the latter day, 
 the enemy to mass his forces against the Thirteenth army corps 
 alone. General McPherson is fully able to answer f .r himself; 
 and for ^he Fifteenth army corps I answer, that on the lOih 
 and 22d of May, it attacked furiously at three distinct points 
 the enemy's works, at the very hour and minute fixed in Gen- 
 eral Grant's written orders; that, on both duys, we j.lanted our 
 colors on the exterior slope and kept them there till niglitfail ; 
 that from the first hour of the investment of Vicksburg until 
 now, my corps has been fiir in advance of General McClcr- 
 
672 APPENDIX. 
 
 nand ; that tlie general-in-chief, by personal inspection, knows 
 this truth ; that tens of thousands of living witnesses beheld 
 and participated in the attack ; that General Grant visited 
 me during both assaults, and saAV for himself, and is far better 
 qualified to judge whether his orders were obeyed than Gen- 
 eral McClernand, who was near three miles off; that General 
 McCleruand never saw ray lines ; that he then knew, and still 
 knows nothing about them, and that from his position he had 
 no means of knowing what occurred on this front. 
 
 Not only were the assaults made at the time and place, and 
 in the manner prescribed in General Grant's written orders, 
 but about three p. m., five hours after the assault on the 22d 
 began, when my storraing-party lay against the exterior slope 
 of the bastion in my front, and Blair's whole division was de- 
 ployed close up to the parapet, ready to spring to the assault, 
 and all my field-artillery were in good position for the work. 
 General Grant shewed me a note from General McClernand, 
 that moment handed him by an orderly, to the effect that " he 
 had cariied three of the enemy's forts, and that the flag of the 
 Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg," asking that 
 the enemy should be pressed at all points, lest he should con- 
 centrate on him. Not dreaming that a major-general would at 
 such a critical moment make a mere buncombe communication, 
 I ordered instantly Giles A. Smith and Mower's bi'igades to 
 renew the assault, under cover of Blair's division, and the ar- 
 tillery deployed as before described, and sent an aide to General 
 Steele, about a mile to my right, to convey the same mischiev- 
 ous message, whereby we lost needlessly many of our best offi- 
 cers and men. 
 
 I would never have revealed so unwelcome a truth had 
 General IMcClernand, in his process of self-flattery, confined 
 himself to facts in the reach of his own observation, and not 
 gone out of his way to charge others for results which he seems 
 not to comprehend. 
 
 In cases of repulse and failure, congratulatory addresses by 
 subordinate commanders are not common, and are only re- 
 sorted to by weak and vain men to shift the burden of respon- 
 sibility from tlieir own to the shoulders of others. 
 
 I never make a practice of speaking or writing of others, 
 but, during our assault of the 19th, several of my brigade com- 
 manders were under the impression that McClernand's corps 
 
APPENDIX. 073 
 
 did not even attempt an assault. In the congratulatory ordei 
 I remark groat silence on that subject. Merely to satisfy in- 
 quiring parties, I should like to know if McClcrnand's cor|)S 
 did or did not assault at two r. m. of May lOtli, as ordered. I 
 don't believe it did, and I tliink General ^IcCk'niand n'Spoii- 
 sible. 
 
 With these remarks I leave the matter where it properly 
 belongs, in the hands of the commanding general, who knows 
 his plans and orders, sees with an eye single to success and his 
 country's honor, and not from the narrow and contracted circle 
 of a subordinate commander, who exaggerates the importance 
 of the events that fall under his immediate notice, and is filled 
 with an itching desire for "fame not earned." 
 With great respect, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 Major- General commanding. 
 
 GEKEKAL McPHERSON TO GEXER.VL GUXST. 
 
 Headquarters Setesteesth Army Corps, 
 
 Departmext of the Tennessee, 
 Near Yicksburg, Miss., June 18, 1863. 
 
 Major- General Gbant, 
 
 commanding Department of the Tcnneme : 
 
 General : My attention has just been calkd to an article 
 published in the Jlissouri Democrat of the 10th instant, pur- 
 porting to be a congratulatory order from Major-Goneral John 
 A. McClernand to his command. 
 
 The whole tenor of the order is so ungenerous, and the 
 insinuations and criminations against the other corps of your 
 army are so manifestly at variance with the facts, that a sense 
 of duty to my command, as well as the verbal protest of every 
 one of my division and brigade couimanders against allowing 
 such an order to go forth to the public unanswered, require 
 that I should call your attention to it. 
 
 After a careful perusal of the order, I cannot help arriving 
 
 at the conclusion that it was written more to intlueuce public 
 
 sentiment at the Xorth, and impress the pubhc mmd with the 
 
 magnificent strategy, superior tactics, and brilliant deeas of 
 
 43 
 
674 APPE^SDIX, 
 
 the major-general commancling the Thirteenth army corps, than 
 to congratidate his troops upon their well-merited successes. 
 
 There is a vain-gloriousness about the order, an ingenious 
 attempt to write himself down the hero, the master-mind, giv- 
 ing life and direction to military operations in this quarter, in- 
 consistent with the high-toned principle of the soldier sans 
 peiir et sans r'eproclie. 
 
 Though " born a warrior," as he himself stated, he has evi- 
 dently forgotten one of the most essential qualities, viz., that 
 elevated, refined sense of honor, which, while guarding his own 
 rights with jealous care, at all times renders justice to others. 
 
 It little becomes Major-General McClernand to complain 
 of want of coojjeration on the part of other corps, in the as- 
 sault on the enemy's works on the 22d ultimo, when twelve 
 hundred and eighteen men of my command were placed hors 
 dii combat in their resolute and daring attempt to carry the 
 positions assigned to them, and fully one-third of these from 
 General Quimby's division, with the gallant and accomplished 
 Colonel Boomer at their head, fell in front of his oicn lines, 
 where they were left, after being sent two miles to support him, 
 to sustain the whole brunt of the battle, from five p. m. until 
 after dark, his oicn men being recalled. 
 
 If General McClernand's assaulting columns were not im- 
 mediately supported when they moved against the enemy's in- 
 trenchments, and few of the men succeeded in getting in, it 
 most assuredly was his oion fault, and not the fault of any 
 other corps commander. 
 
 Each corps commander had the positions assigned to him 
 which he was to attempt to carry, and it remained with him to 
 dispose his troops in such a way as to support promptly and 
 efiiciently any column which succeeded in getting in. 
 
 The attack Avas ordered by the major-general commanding 
 the department to be simultaneous at all the points selected; 
 and precisely at the hour, the columns moved, some of them 
 taking a little longer than others to reach the enemy's works, 
 on account of the natural and artificial obstacles to be over- 
 come, but the difterence in time was not great enough to allow 
 of any changing or massing of tlie enemy from one part of the 
 line to the other. 
 
 The assault failed, not in my opinion from any want of 
 cooperation or bravery on the part of our troops, but from the 
 
APPENDIX. ()(.i 
 
 strength of the works, the difficulty of getting close up to them 
 under cover, and the determined character of the assailed. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 JAMES B. McPUERSON, 
 Major- General. 
 
 GLOSSARY OF SIEGE TERMS. 
 
 Approach. — A ditch dug by the besiegers in their advances, 
 the earth of the ditch being thrown up towards the enemy, 
 as a cover. 
 
 Banquette. — A small terrace behind a parapet, on which the 
 soldier stands to deliver his fire. 
 
 Bastion. — A projecting part of the main fort, consisting of a 
 face and two flanks. 
 
 BoTAU. — A small trench leading direct to a mai^azine, or any 
 particular point ; generally, the boyaux run zigzag, and be- 
 tween the parallels. 
 
 C0HOKN-31ORTAR. — A small mortar used in sieges ; so small that 
 it can be carried by hand. 
 
 CouxTEK-MiNE. — A gallery under ground, by means of which 
 the mine of the enemy may be watched and destroye<l. 
 
 CovERED-wAY. — A Toad, or way, covered from the fire or view 
 of an enemy, by a parapet. 
 
 Debottche. — To issue from a defile. 
 
 Defile. — To arrange fortifications so as to protect a space on 
 the interior from the fire or view of an enemy. 
 
 Defilade. — Same as defile. 
 
 Double-sap. — A sap, protected on both sides by a parapet. 
 
 Embrasure. — An opening in a parapet, througli which cannon 
 are pointed and discharged. 
 
 Fascine. — A bundle of twigs closely bound, ten or twenty 
 inches in diameter, and from ten to twenty feet long, used 
 for revetting, or for filling ditches. 
 
 Feathered-grenade. — A percussion hand-grenade, with paste- 
 board wings to keep the point of percussion Ibrcmost. 
 
616 APPEOT)IX. 
 
 FiBE-BALL, — A ball filled -vritli powder or other combustibles, 
 to be thrown at the enemy, to light up his works. 
 
 Gabion. — A basket, cylindrical in form and open at both ends, 
 usually about nine feet long by two wide. It is generally 
 made of twigs or saplings, and, when filled with earth, used 
 to shelter men from an enemy's fire, or in i-evetting. 
 
 Half-parallel. — A parallel covered only towards the enemy, 
 and open in rear. 
 
 Hand-grenade. — A small shell, intended to be thrown by hand 
 into the head of a sap. 
 
 Head of Sap. — The part of the sap nearest the enemy. 
 
 IMiNE. — A cavity under fortifications, filled with powder, so as 
 to explode it when fired. 
 
 Parallel. — A wide trench, for communication between the 
 batteries and approaches of the besiegers. 
 
 Parapet. — A wall or rampart, breast-high, covermg soldiers 
 from a front attack. 
 
 Place of Arms. — A portion of a work protected from the 
 enemy, and suitable for the assembling of troops. 
 
 Platform. — The floor of wood, on which cannon are mounted 
 during a siege, to fire on an enemy. 
 
 Profile. — A vertical section of a work, generally at right an- 
 gles with the line of the work. 
 
 Reentrant. — Pointing or directing inwards — sometimes used 
 as a noun, when it signifies a reentrant angle. 
 
 Revet. — To face or line with masonry or wood, or other ma- 
 terial. 
 
 Salient. — A projecting angle of a fort. 
 
 Sap. — A near approach to a fortified place, made by digging 
 
 under cover of gabions and sap-rollers. 
 Sapper. — One employed in digging sajos ; the sappers usually 
 
 Avork on their knees. 
 Sap-roller. — A large gabion stufled with fascines, and rolled 
 
 forward before the sapper, to protect him at his work. 
 Shoulder. — Tlie angle of a bastion between the face and the 
 
 flank. 
 
 Side-cutting. — A road branching out from the main one. 
 Sling-cart. — A large cart used to transport cannon short dis- 
 
APPENDIX. G77 
 
 lances, the cannon being slung or suspended, by a diain at- 
 tached to the axle-tree. 
 
 Tamp. — To pack earth or other material in a mine, in order to 
 confine the effects of an explosion. 
 
 Trench. — An excavation made in a siege, for the purpose of 
 covering troops as they advance. The term includes paral- 
 lels and approaches. 
 
 Thexch-guabds. — Soldiers placed in the trenches to guard the 
 working-parties. 
 
 "Wattling. — A platting of twigs. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI. 
 
 mSTEUCTIOXS OF GENERAL BEAGG TO GENERAL LONGSTEEET. 
 
 nEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT TeNXESSEE, ) 
 
 Missionary Ridge, 4th Nov., '63. f 
 General : You Avill move with your comiTiaad(McLa"w's and 
 Hood's divisions, and Alexanders and Lyden's artillery battal- 
 ions), as indicated in our conference yesterday. Major-General 
 Wheeler will make the necessary arrangements for the cav- 
 alry, and probably accompany it — at least for a time. He is 
 thoroughly acquainted with Middle Tennessee, and many of the 
 officers with him will know the route there, as well as all parts 
 of East Tennessee. Every preparation is ordered to advance 
 you as fast as possible, and the success of the plan depends on 
 raj^id movements and sudden blows. The country through 
 which you move, until you strike the mountains, will subsist 
 your command, and forage your animals, besides giving a large 
 supply of breadstuffs. Your object should be to drive Burn- 
 side out of East Tennessee first ; or, better, to capture or de- 
 stroy him. Major-General Samuel Jones will be urged to press 
 on him from Northeast Tennessee. 
 
 You will please keep open the telegraphic communication 
 with us here, and see to the repair and regular use of railroad 
 to Loudon. The latter is of the first importance, as it may be- 
 come necessary in an emergency to recall you temporarily. 
 
 I hope to hear from you fully and frequently, general, and 
 sincerely wish you the same success which has ever marked 
 your brilliant career. 
 
 I am, general. 
 
 Very respectfully and truly yours, 
 
 BKAXTON" BRAGG, General 
 General James Loxgstreet, commanding corps. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII. 
 
 BKAGGS EEPORT OF BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 Headqcarters, Army of the Tesxessee, |_ 
 
 Dalton, Ga., Novemhcr 30, 1863. \ 
 
 Sir : On Monday, the 23 J, the enemy advanced in heavy 
 force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary ridge, 
 but made no further effort. On Tuesday morning early, they 
 threw over the river a heavy force opposite the north end of 
 the ridge, and just below Ihe mouth of the Chickamauga, at 
 the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front. 
 
 After visiting the right and making dispositions tlierc for 
 the new development in that direction, I returned towards the 
 left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's 
 batteries on our forces occupying tlie slope of Lookout moun- 
 tain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force 
 soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only 
 — Walthall's, which made a desperate resistance, but was 
 finally compelled to yield ground— \vhy this command was not 
 sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that i)art of 
 the field, Major-General Stevenson, had six brigades at his dis- 
 posal. Upon his urgent ai)peal, another brigade was dis- 
 patched in the afternoon to his support, though it appeared his 
 own forces had not been brought into action, and I proceeded 
 to the scene. 
 
 Arriving just before sunset, I found we had lost all the .ad- 
 vantages of the position. Orders were immediately givi'u for 
 the ground to be disputed untU we could withdraw our furces 
 across Chattanooga creek, and the movement was commenced. 
 
680 APPENDIX. 
 
 This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces 
 were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to 
 meet the movement in that direction. 
 
 On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, 
 now under Lieutenant-General Hardee, and threatened by a 
 heavy force, whilst strong columns could be seen marching in 
 that direction, A very heavy force in line of battle confronted 
 our left and centre. 
 
 On my return to this point, about eleven a. m., the enemy's 
 forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout, and 
 beyond to our front, whilst those in front extended to our 
 right. They formed their lines, with great deliberation, just 
 beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our posi- 
 tion. 
 
 Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our 
 position, that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold 
 it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. 
 
 During this time they had made several attempts on our 
 extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed with very 
 heavy loss, by Major-General Cleburne's command, under the 
 immediate direction of Lieutenant-General Hardee'. 
 
 By the road, cross (sic) the ridge at Rossville, far to our 
 left, a route was open to our rear. Major-General Breckin- 
 ridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two 
 regiments, and a battery. It being reported to me that a force 
 of the enemy had moved in that direction, the general was 
 ordered to have it reconnoitred, and" to make every disposi- 
 tion necessary to secure his flank, which he proceeded to do. 
 
 About three and a half p. m., the immense force in the front of 
 our left and centre advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy 
 skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much 
 confusion was produced, before they reached musket range. 
 
 In a short time the war of musketry became very heavy, 
 and it was soon apparent the enemy had been repulsed in my 
 immediate front. 
 
 Whilst riding along the crest, congratulating the troops, 
 intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, 
 and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was 
 promptly dispatched to that point under Brigadier-General 
 Bate, who had so successl'ully maintained the ground in my 
 fiont, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally 
 
APPENDIX. G81 
 
 our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the 
 enemy back. General Bate found tlic disaster so great, that 
 his small force could not repair it. 
 
 About this time I learned that our extreme left had also 
 given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. 
 Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the 
 rear, where by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers 
 had been formed upon which to rally. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cle- 
 burne in command on the extreme right, moved towards tlie 
 left, when he heard the heavy tiring in that direction. He 
 reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it 
 had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left where the 
 enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judi- 
 cious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division 
 directly across the ridge, facing the enemy, who was now mov- 
 ing a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided 
 stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion 
 of our force to the right remained intact. 
 
 All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division 
 was entirely routed, and in rapid flight— nearly all the 
 artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry 
 support. 
 
 Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and 
 by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, 
 which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized 
 upon ofiicers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for 
 his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. 
 
 In this distressing and alarming state of affairs. General 
 Bate was ordered toehold his position, covering the road for 
 the retreat of Breckinridge's command; and orders were im- 
 mediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire 
 their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. 
 
 Fortunately, it Avas now near nightfall, and the country 
 and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally un- 
 Known to the enemy. 
 
 The routed left made its way l)ack in great disorder, effect- 
 ually covered, however, by Bate's small comman.l, which had 
 a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. 
 After nii^ht, all being quiet. Bate retired in good ordrr— the 
 enemy attempting no pursuit. 
 
682 APPEKDIX. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Hardee's command, under his judicious 
 management, retired in good order and unmolested. 
 
 As soon as all troo2)s had crossed, the bridges over the 
 Chickamauga were destroyed to impede the enemy, though the 
 stream was fordable at several places. 
 
 Ko satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shame- 
 ful conduct of our troops on the left, in allowing their line to 
 be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have 
 been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting col- 
 umn ; and wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in 
 disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the 
 ridge, did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physi- 
 cal exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless ; and 
 the slightest effort would have destroyed them. 
 
 Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed 
 themselves of our panic, and turning our guns upon us, enfila- 
 ded the lines both right and left, i-endering them entirely un- 
 tenable. 
 
 Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gal- 
 lantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged 
 us ; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind, in 
 explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, Avho had 
 never before failed in any duty assigned them, however diffi- 
 cult and hazardous. 
 
 They had, for two days, confronted the enemy, marshalling 
 his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight 
 such a superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak 
 minds and untried soldiers. 
 
 But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts, 
 when the strength of position was against us, and with, perfect 
 success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. 
 
 As yet I am not fully informed as to the commands which 
 first fled, and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon 
 our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however, 
 and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad. 
 
 x\fter arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of 
 the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in 
 motion for a point further removed from a powerful and vic- 
 torious army, that we might have some little time to replenish 
 and recuperate for another struggle. The enemy made pui'- 
 Buit as far as Ringgold, but was so handsomely checked by 
 
APPENDIX. G83 
 
 Major-General Cleburne and Brigadier-General Gist, in com- 
 mand of their respective divisions, that be gave us but little 
 annoyance. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Ilardoe, as usual, is entitled to my 
 warmest thanks and high commendation for liis gallant and 
 judicious conduct during the whole of tiie trying scenes 
 through which we passed. 
 
 Major-General Cleburne, whose command defeated the 
 enemy in every assault on the 25th, and who eventually 
 charged and routed him on that day, capturing several stands 
 of colors and several hundred prisoners, and who afterwards 
 brought up our rear with great success, again charging and 
 routing the pursuing column at Kinggold, on the 27th, is 
 commended to the special notice of the government. 
 
 Briga*dier-Generals Gist and Bate, commanding divisions, 
 Cumming, Walthall, and Polk, commanding brigades, were 
 distinguished for coolness, gallantry, and successful conduct, 
 throughout the engagements, and in the rear-guard on tlu- 
 
 reti'eat. 
 
 To my staff, personal and general, my thanks are specially 
 due for their gallant and zealous efforts, under fire, to rally the 
 broken troops and restore order; and for their laborious ser- 
 vices in conducting successfully the many and arduous duti.s 
 of the retreat. 
 
 Our losses are not yet ascertained ; but in killed and wound- 
 ed, it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and 
 stragglers, I fear it is much larger. 
 
 The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty pieces. 
 I am. sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 BRAXTOX BKAGG, General commanding. 
 
 General S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant- General, C. S. A., Eiclmond. 
 

 t -; 
 
COMPLETE IN SIX VOLUMES, OCTAVO. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES, 
 
 From the Discovery of the Continent. By George Banxroft. 
 
 An entirely new edition, partly rewritten and 
 
 thoroughly revised. 
 
 The author has made extensive changes in the text, condensing in places, en- 
 larging in others, and cctrefully revising. It is practically a new work, embody- 
 ing the results of the latest researches, and enjoying the advantage of the author's 
 long and mature experience. 
 
 The original octavo edition 7vas in twelve volumes. The present edition is 
 complete in six volumes, octavo, the price being co)-respondingly reduced. 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS. 
 " The merits of Bancroft's ' History of the United States ' are so well known that 
 little need be said of the new edition, the first volume of which, reaching to 1688, has 
 just been pubhshed in very handsome form, except to point out the changes since the 
 revision of 1876. One of the most prominent is the introduction of a division into 
 three parts, beginning respectively at 1492, 1660, and 1688. With each part begins a 
 new numbering of the chapters, and the difference thus created between the editions is 
 increased by the frequent separation of one chapter into two or three. Thus what 
 was chapter two in 1S76 becomes chapters two, three, and four, in 1883, and what was 
 chapter twenty-two becomes chapters twelve, thirteen, and fourteen, of part second. 
 In all, instead of twenty-seven chapters there are thirty-eight. The total length is not 
 increased, but rather diminished, since there are many omissions, for instance, of Capx- 
 tain John Smith's apocrj'^phal adventures in Hungarj', the e\ndence for which, coming 
 solely from the hero himself, probably seems weaker than ever to Mr. Bancroft. 
 Among passages which will not be missed is this about the Quaker martjTS : ' They 
 were Uke those weeds which were unsightly to the eyes, and which only when tram- 
 pled give out precious perfumes.' Another expunged remark is that Episcopalianism 
 ' separating itself from Protestantism could acknowledge no equal except the Orthixlox 
 Greek Church and that of Rome.' With these sentences have been rejected many 
 whose meaning was given in the context, such curtailment being especially common at 
 the beginning and end of chapters. The account of the character of James I is greatly 
 abridged, and made somewhat less severe. In the place of the charge that Oliver 
 Cromwell's ruling motive was ambition, is the acknowledgment that in his foreign 
 pohcy he was most certainly faithful to the interests of England. The notice of 
 Luther is rewritten and enlarged, mainly by apt quotations of his own words. There 
 has been less change in the accounts of American than of European. matters, but the 
 most important addition, anywhere, is that of two pages describing and praising Cop- 
 Uin Smith's government of Virginia. Often, when there appears to be an addition or 
 omission, there is in reality only a transposition. The whole class of changes may be 
 attributed to greater maturity of judgment, rather than to discoveo' of "««• material. 
 
2 Bancroft's History of the United %ta.tzs.— {Continued.) 
 
 especially as no notice is taken of recent controversies ; for instance, whether Colum- 
 bus really lies buried at Havana or San Domingo ; whether the Pilgrims landed ex- 
 actly on the day of the winter solstice, as is apparently Bancroft's opinion, and whether 
 ' The King's Missive ' was ever sent, as told by Whittier. Other changes aim simply 
 at improvement of style. The volumes are printed in the stately octavo style of the 
 first edition, which seems more appropriate to such a standard work than the cheaper 
 form of the other revision." — Boston Advej-tiser. 
 
 "On comparing this work with the corresponding volume of the ' Centenar>' ' 
 edition of 1876, one is surprised to see how extensive changes the author has found 
 desirable, even after so short an interval. The first thing that strikes one is the in- 
 creased number of chapters, resulting from subdivision. The first volume contains 
 two volumes of the original, and is divided into thirty-eight chapters instead of eight- 
 een. This is in itself an improvement. But the new arrangement is not the result 
 merely of subdivision : the matter is rearranged in such a manner as vastly to increase 
 the lucidity and continuousness of treatment. In the present edition Mr. Bancroft re- 
 turns to the principle of division into periods, abandoned in the ' Centenary ' edition. 
 His division is, however, a new one. As the permanent shape taken by a great histor- 
 ical work, this new arrangement is certainly an improvement." — The Nation {Ncm 
 York). 
 
 " In modifying the narrative, Mr. Bancroft tells us that his chief aims were accuracy 
 and lucidity, and that 'no well-founded criticism that has been seen, whether made here 
 or abroad, with a good will or a bad one, has been neglected.' Apparently no new 
 material of particular moment has been inserted, although several sketches of famous 
 characters have been rewritten either entirely or in part. The work as a whole is in 
 better shape, and is of course more authoritative than ever before. This last revision 
 will be without doubt, both from its desirable form and accurate text, the standard 
 one." — Boston Traveller. 
 
 " It has not been granted to many historians to devote half a century to the history 
 of a single people, and to live long enough, and, let us add, to be willing and wise 
 enough, to revise and rewrite in an honored old age the work of a whole lifetime. 
 This good fortune has been granted to Mr. Bancroft, and he has largely profited by it, 
 as have also the majority of readers among his own countrymen, who, when American 
 history is in question, go at once to his volumes as to an authoritative tribunal, and 
 abide by his decisions, which in no case of any consequence, we believe, have ever 
 been seriously or for long disturbed." — New York Mail and Express. 
 
 " The extent and thoroughness of this revision would hardly be guessed without 
 comparing the editions side by side. The condensation of the text amounts to some- 
 thing over one third of the previous edition. There has also been very considerable 
 recasting of the text. On the whole, our examination of the first volume leads us to 
 believe that the thought of the historian loses nothing by the abbreviation of the text. 
 A closer and later approximation to the best results of scholarship and criticism is 
 reached. The public gains by its more compact brevity and in amount of matter, and 
 in economy of tihie and money."— 77/^ Independent {N'ew York). 
 
 " We have made a comparison of the first volume with the edition of 1S76, and find 
 that the work has been largely recast, the arrangement of the chapters and the minor 
 divisions has been changed, many portions have been rewritten, and no pains have 
 been spared in making necessary corrections as the result of criticism on the work or of 
 
Bancroft's History of the United States. — {Continued.^ 3 
 
 further investigation. Many who purchased the last edition will regret that they did 
 not wait for the author's final revisions ; but we presume that he had no intention at 
 the time it was issued of going over his work again, even if he had the hope of living 
 so long. It is a matter of general congratulation that his life and vigor have been 
 spared, and that he is still engaged with all the energy of youth in his important lit- 
 erary works. The octavo volume, just issued, is a fine specimen of book-making, in 
 clear type, on good paper, and is neatly bound." — Neiv York Observe?-. 
 
 ' ' During the half -century, or almost that time, since the issue of Mr. Bancroft's 
 first volume, much new light has been shed upon the characters and events of the 
 period covered by the ' History,' and no small proportion of it is due to the con- 
 troversies aroused by the volumes as they successively appeared. Mr. Bancroft stood 
 stoutly by his original text until the time came for the issue of the revised edition of 
 1876, when it was evident that he had carefully studied the criticisms his work had 
 received during the preceding forty-two years and had profited by them. Now comes 
 the announcement that he is engaged in a thorough and last revision of the whole 
 work. The ten volumes of the original edition, and the two volumes issued last year, 
 are to be wholly revised, rewritten where necessary, and the twelve volumes of the 
 former issues comprised in six handsome octavo volumes. The entire work will thus 
 be given at exactly half the price of the original edition, while, judging by the first 
 installment, it will certainly lose nothing by comparison so far as appearance goes, and 
 will be more valuable as embodying the latest information and containing the last 
 touches of the author's hand." — Cleveland (Ohio) Herald. 
 
 " There is nothing to be said at this day of the value of ' Bancroft.' Its authority 
 is no longer in dispute, and as a piece of vivid and realistic historical writing it stands 
 among the best works of its class. It may be taken for granted that this new edition 
 will greatly extend its usefulness." — Philadelphia North American. 
 
 " While it is not quite true that the marks of Mr. Bancroft's revision of his great 
 history of the United States are visible on every page, a careful comparison of the 
 earlier editions and this shows that the claim to improvement is by no means ill-found- 
 ed. Sometimes whole paragraphs have been cut out ; still oftener the extravagances 
 of a youthful style have been carefully pruned, and the gain has been manifest in 
 sobriety and effect." — Philadelphia Press. 
 
 " The merits of this standard work are too well known to need recapitulation, and 
 the present edition will comprise the entire original work, complete in six volumes, 
 and published at half the price of the original edition. The type is somewhat smaller, 
 but in general style is not inferior. The first volume reaches to 16SS, and the changes 
 made by the author are numerous, and some of them important. This volume, for 
 instance, is divided into three parts, beginning respectively at 1492, 1660, and 1668, 
 and with each part begins a new numbering of chapters. There are many omissions 
 in the text — as-of Captain John Smith's adventures in Hungarj'. Some sentences in 
 the text have been left out ; the character given to James I toned down, and the notice 
 of Luther enlarged, while pages have been added describing Captain Smith's rule in 
 Mrginia. Other changes are chiefly improvements of style and the incorporation of 
 the dates into the text. On the whole, the work is much improved in its new dress 
 and revised form, and will be welcomed by all, for Bancroft's history of our country is 
 st\\\ facile princeps among histories of our land." — Chicago Tribune. 
 
 " Mr. Bancroft's first volume appeared in iSj;4, and he has been engaged upon the 
 
4 Bancroft's History of the United S>ta.t-es.— {Continued.) 
 
 history almost ever since he was a student at Gottingen. The re-issue of the work, so 
 that each part should be what his later opinion approved, can hardly be more satis- 
 factory to the venerable historian than it is to the generation which first approaches 
 his great work in the final forms of its hterary execution. In this final revision Mr. 
 Bancroft has not only corrected all mistakes and errors of fact, so far as they have 
 been ascertained, but has revised the style, taken the wind out of pompous sentences, 
 and brought the whole work within the laws of good writing and within the unity of 
 plan with which he had set out at the beginning. Thus far he has removed many of 
 the objections which stood against his history as a work of permanent value ; and 
 there is a certain solid, thorough, substantial character to his great historj' which gives 
 it a permanent weight in the world of letters. The work now takes rank with the 
 best histories of the school of philosophical narrative to which the author belongs." — 
 Boston Herald. 
 
 " The marvelous industry and the earnest conscientiousness which the venerable 
 historian exhibits in revising, recasting, and in part rewriting the great work of his 
 life, not only compel respect and admiration on their own account, but they become 
 also the strongest guarantees of the accuracy of his scholarship, of his fidelity to truth, 
 of the exalted conception which he entertains of his task, and therefore of the sub- 
 stantial excellence of his history. The edition of 1876 exhibited no httle pruning and 
 correction ; but the author has again gone over the entire field, and, with a care and 
 devotion worthy of the theme and of his reputation, has wrought what he says must 
 be his last revision. This latest edition will be sought by many who have for years 
 been familiar with its predecessors. The publishers deser\-e credit for presenting so 
 great a work in such excellent guise, and the author may accept it as a noble monu- 
 ment to perpetuate his fame. But may he be spared to add many chapters to his 
 history, and bring it down to a later period ! " — Utica {N. Y.) Herald. 
 
 With Portrait of the Author. 
 
 Completi! in six volnmes, octavo, handsomely printed from new type. Clutli, nncuf, witii gilt top, §2.50; 
 sheep, $3.50; and half calf, J4.50 per volume. 
 
 D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers, i, 3, & 5 Bond Street, Ne\y Vork. 
 
 LBJe?9 
 
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