Class MsSTJj Book . Gr $— Copyright N?_ COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. .'""% ' *y\ .J^w A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR COMPILED AND WRITTEN BY IRWIN SCOFIELD GUERNSEY, M.A. WITH A PREFACE BY FRANK MOORE COLBY EDITOR OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA NEW YORK DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY r ^^^^r^ ua J 5 &' Copyright, 1920, by Dodd, Mead and Compant, Inc. 1 1320 ©CI.A601548 PREFACE This volume has been prepared in order to meet the ever increasing de- mand for a reliable authentic history of the war in all its phases in one volume. Almost all the histories of the war that have been published to date have been written on specific aspects of the tremendous struggle. Those that cover the entire subject have been set before the public in many volumes, and, as a con- sequence, demand a large amount of time on the part of the reader. After the armistice was signed and the Peace Conference finished, the publishers of this volume determined to offer the reading public a compact history of the war in a single volume. This has been done with the result that a compre- hensive but not detailed history of the war has been produced. It is nar- rated in an entertaining, scholarly style. The various chapter headings, War in Brief, Underlying Causes of the War, Military Operations, Naval Opera- tions, Aerial Operations, Destruction of Art and Architecture, Alleged Atroci- ties, Peace Terms and War Aims, Neutral Nations, Economic and Financial Aspects, Peace Conference and Peace Treaties, etc., will show at a glance the scope of the volume. An index and bibliography of the most accessible books on the war have also been included. The material for the history of the war was gathered from the most reliable contemporary sources, and was edited from time to time in order to include new facts that were unearthed or to delete material that had been assumed true at the time it was incorporated but later proved contrary to fact. The basic material presented for the first two years was contributed by several members of the staff of the New In- ternational Encyclopaedia, namely, Colonel Cornells De Witt Wilcox, U. S. A. ; Professor F. H. Hankins ; Professor Nelson P. Mead ; Captain Lewis Sayre Van Duzer, U. S. N. ; Mr. Herbert T. Wade; and Mr. Irwin Scofield Guernsey. The bulk of the work has been done by Mr. Irwin Scofield Guernsey. Frank Moore Colby, Editor-in-Chief, New International Encyclopaedia. CONTENTS I. The War in Brief II. Underlying Causes of the War 5 National Antagonisms; Pan-German- ism; Military Alliances; Economic Causes. III. Outbreak of the War . . 18 Austria's Demands; the Serbian Re- ply; Germany and Russia; Ger- many and France; Great Britain and Germany; Question of Belgian Neutrality; Italy's Position; Ja- pan's Position; The Balkan States, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania; Por- tugal ; Czecho-Slovakia. IV. Military Operations . . 39 Mobilization and Concentration; Gen- eral Strategy and Resources; Equipment of the Armies; West- ern Theatre; American Expedition- ary Force; Eastern Theatre; Rus- sian Revolution; The Bolsheviki; Southern Theatre; Southeastern Theatre; Colonies. V. Naval Operations . . . 177 Operations in the North Sea and the Waters about Great Britain; Oper- ations in the Mediterranean; Opera- tions in the Black Sea and Darda- nelles; Cruiser Operations in the At- lantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans; Naval Strategy of the War; Some Naval Lessons of the War. VI. Aerial Operations . . . 207 Estimated Participants and Casual- ties. VII. Alleged Atrocities . . 219 Belgium; Armenia; Poland; Serbia; France. VIII. Destruction of Art and Architecture . . 225 IX. Neutral Nations at Beginning of War .... 227 United States; Scandinavian Coun- tries; Netherlands; Switzerland; South American Countries; Other Countries. X. Peace Proposals and State- ments of War Aims 273 XI. Relief Measures . . . 2,98 Commission for Relief in Belgium; Belgium Relief Fund; Jewish Re- lief; Other Funds; Red Cross. XII. Financial and Economic As- pects 304 International Exchange and Banking Problems; Currency; Employment and Wages; American Foreign Trade; World Trade; Foreign Credits; Prices and Food Supplies; Cost of the War. XIII. Peace Conference and Treaties of Peace 331 XIV. Bibliography .... 386 Historical Background; Military Operations; Naval Operations; Aerial Operations; Economic As- pects; Finances. A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR I. THE WAR IN BRIEF On June 28, 1914, the Austrian heir- apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated at Sara- jevo, the capital of Bosnia. Accusing Serbia of complicity in the crime and alleging that the anti-Austrian machi- nations of Serbian patriots menaced the integrity of the Hapsburg Em- pire, Austria-Hungary on July 23, 1914, delivered an ultimatum contain- ing demands with which the Serbian government would only partially com- ply. Despite the diplomatic remon- strances of other powers, Austria- Hungary refused to submit the mat- ter to peaceful arbitration and declar- ed war on Serbia, July 28, 1914. The Russian government, frankly sympa- thetic with Serbia, ordered the mobili- zation of the Russian army and de- clined to countermand the order, whereupon the German government de- clared what it considered to be a de- fensive war against Russia, August 1, 1914. Two days later Germany de- clared war against Russia's ally, France. Preparatory to an invasion of France, German troops had al- ready occupied Luxemburg, August 2, and begun to invade Belgium, August 4, notwithstanding Belgium's opposi- tion. The British government con- strued the German violation of Bel- gian neutrality as a casus belli and declared war against Germany, August 4. Serbia and the "Allies," or En- tente Powers — Russia, France, and Great Britain — were subsequently joined by Montenegro (August 7, 1914), Japan (August 23, 1914), Italy (May 23, 1915), San Marino (May 24, 1915), Portugal (March 9, 1916), Rumania (August 27, 1916), United States (April 6, 1917), Pana- ma and Cuba (April 7, 1917), Greece (July 2, 1917), Siam (July 21, 1917), Liberia (August 4, 1917), China (Au- gust 14, 1917), Brazil (October 26, 1917), Guatemala (April 22, 1918), Costa Rica (May 23, 1918), Nicara- gua (May 24, 1918), Haiti (July 15, 1918), and Honduras (July 19, 1918). The "Teutonic" or Central Powers — Austria-Hungary and Germany — on the other hand, while they failed to re- ceive the support of their former ally, Italy, succeeded in enlisting the aid of Turkey ("state of war" with Rus- sia, October 30 ; attacked by Great Britain and France, November 5, 1914) and Bulgaria (October 14, 1915). From the outset the Allied navies controlled the seas, putting an end to German overseas commerce and com- pelling the German battleships for the A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR most part to remain in home waters under the protection of coast defenses and mines, although the main German battle fleet ventured out to fight an indecisive battle, off Jutland, May 31, 1916, and swift German battle cruisers repeatedly raided the British coast. The naval engagements in the Bight of Heligoland (August 24, 1914), off Coronel (November 1, 1914), near Dogger Bank (January 24, 1915), and in the Gulf of Riga (October, 1917) were of secondary importance. A few daring German commerce raiders and the surprisingly effective German sub- marines were able to inflict consider- able damage upon the Allied and neu- tral merchant marines, but not to break the virtual blockade by means of which Great Britain hoped to starve out her principal enemy. By the terms of the armistice which ended the war the greater part of the battle fleets and submarines of the Central Powers had to be turned over to the Allies (November, 1918). The military operations may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) In the Franco-Belgian theatre, the gallant defense of Liege (August 4-5, 1914), the stand at the Mons-Namur-Char- leroi (August 21-24, 1914), and a counter invasion of Alsace-Lorraine (August, 1914) failed to stop the on- ward sweep of the German armies through Belgium, Luxemburg, and Lorraine toward Paris. The high tide of the German invasion was reached in the Battle of the Marne (Septem- ber 6-10, 1914), after which the Ger- man right wing fell back upon the Aisne River and extended itself north- ward through Picardy, Artois, and Flanders to the Belgian coast. From October, 1914, to July, 1918, the long intrenched battleline from the coast to Switzerland remained almost sta- tionary, although terrific attempts to break through were made by the Ger- mans in Flanders (October-November, 1914), again at Ypres (April-May, 1915), in the Argonne (July, 1915), at Verdun (February- July, 1916), be- tween St. Quentin and La Fere toward Amiens (March, 1918), in the Ypres sector (April, 1918), at the Chemin des Dames (May-June, 1918), be- tween Rheims and Soissons (June- July, 1918), and at the Marne (July, 1918) ; as well by the Allies at Neuve Chapelle (March 10, 1915), in the region just north of Arras (May- June, 1915), in Champagne (September-Oc- tober, 1915), in Artois, near Lens (September-October, 1915), in the Valley of the Somme (July, 1916- March, 1917), near Arras (April- June, 1917), on the Aisne (April-No- vember, 1917), in Flanders (July-De- cember, 1917). After the failure of the five great German attempts be- tween March and July, 1918, the Al- lies found themselves in a position to take the offensive. They did not de- pend upon the customary single huge blow but struck a series of smaller blows which set the whole line rocking from the sea to the Swiss border. The second Marne was won in July, the third Somme in August and by Sep- tember the whole German line from Rheims to Ypres was in a backward movement. In September the St. Mihiel salient was wiped out and an advance on both sides of the Argonne forest begun. Toward the end of the same month Foch struck in Flanders and so on. By the end of the month the Germans were back to the starting place of March 21. In October the Allies smashed the Hindenburg line, cleared the Belgian coast, and ad- vanced along the Meuse, threatening all communications, and compelling the THE WAR IN BRIEF 3 Germans to ask for an armistice which was granted on November 11, 1918. (2) In the East the initial Russian of- fensive in East Prussia was shattered by Hindenburg at Tannenberg (Au- gust 26-31, 1914) ; an Austro-German counter-invasion of Russian Poland was checked before Warsaw (Febru- ary, 1915) ; the Russian armies invad- ing Galicia attained the passes of the Carpathians early in 1915, but were completely expelled from Austrian ter- ritory by "Mackensen's Drive" (May- June) ; and an Austro-German inva- sion of Russia under the masterly di- rection of Hindenburg, after conquer- ing Warsaw (August 4, 1915), Brest- Litovsk (August 25), and Vilna (Sep- tember 18, 1915) was halted only by the swamps before Riga, the lakes around Dwinsk, and the Pripet marshes. The Russians returning to the attack in 1916 (June-August) re- captured the Volhynian fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno, conquered the Bukowina, and penetrated up the Dniester River as far as Halicz. The Russian revolution brought opera- tions on the East Front to a stand- still, the only outstanding feature be- ing the unsuccessful Russian offensive (July) and the fall of Riga (Septem- ber-October, 1917). Ater the Bolshe- viki came into power they evinced a strong desire to make peace and ulti- mately signed the treaty of Brest- Litovsk (March, 1918). The Allies determined to save Russia from herself and from Germany and sent an army into Siberia (to aid the Czecho-Slo- vaks) and landed two small forces at Archangel and Murman (July, 1918). They hoped by these means to re-es- tablish an Eastern Front. After vary- ing success the fighting in Russia was still continuing after all the Central Powers had signed an armistice. (3) After two important Austro-Hungar- ian attempts to "punish Serbia" had failed (in August and December, 1914), a new Austro-German inva- sion of Serbia was undertaken in Oc- tober, 1915, with the aid of Bulgaria, and by December 5, 1915, Serbia was completely conquered. Anglo-French forces endeavoring to succor Serbia were defeated in the battle of the Var- dar (December, 1915), and driven back on their base at Saloniki, in Greek territory. Montenegro and northern Albania were overrun by Austrian and Bulgar armies (Janu- ary-February, 1916). In the summer of 1916, the Allied army at Saloniki assumed the offensive and wrested the iSerbian town of Monastir from the Bulgarians (November 19), but were unable to advance very much beyond that point in 1917, owing to the com- plete downfall of Russia and Rumania. During July, 1918, after initial suc- cesses an Allied offensive in Albania failed. During the succeeding months after careful preparation, the Allies broke the Bulgarian defenses and aft- er a series of remarkable victories com- pelled them to accept an armistice (September, 1918), which amounted to an unconditional surrender. (It.) Rumania, entering the war on August 27, 1916, too rashly sent her armies to "emancipate" Transylvania, leaving the Dobrudja undefended against Mackensen; the Rumanian in- vaders of Transylvania were thrown back by Falkenhayn; and all of Ru- mania, excepting a small part of Mol- davia, was conquered by the Central Powers. Disclosures made by the Rus- sian revolutionists show that Rumania was betrayed by the Germanophile Russian premier, Sturmer, who failed to send the promised army to protect Rumania's flank. She was compelled 4 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR to sign a humiliating peace with the Central Powers in March, 1918. (5) Turkish armies held the Dardanelles against Anglo-French attacks (Febru- ary, 1915, to January 8, 1916) ; de- livered futile attacks upon the Suez Canal; captured a British army under Gen. Townshend in Mesopotamia (April 28, 1916); and expelled the Russians from Kermanshah (July 5, 1916) and Hamadan (August 10, 1916), but were unable to defend the important Armenian cities of Erzerum (February 16, 1916), Trebizond (April 18), and Erzingan (July 25) against Grand Duke Nicholas's ad- vance. Assuming the offensive in 1917 the Allies took Kut-el-Amara (Febru- ary 24), Bagdad (March 10) and Jerusalem (December 10). During 1918 the Allies continued their offen- sive against the Turko-German forces in Asia Minor and succeeded in prac- tically wiping them out. The capitu- lation of Bulgaria placed Turkey in a precarious position and compelled her to sue for an armistice (October, 1918). The conditions granted her also amounted to an unconditional sur- render. (6) The Italians, having pain- fully penetrated into the Trentino a few miles, were rudely repulsed in May, 1916; towards Trieste the Italians made slow progress and finally cap- tured Gorizia, August 9, 1916. Strik- ing out on the Carso and Bainsizza plateaus in the summer of 1917, the Italians were making substantial prog- ress towards Laibach and Trieste, when they were again rudely repulsed by a German-Austro force and hurled back to the Piave River (October- December, 1917). Contrary to expec- tations the Central Powers did not at- tempt to force the Piave when the fighting season of 1918 opened. The* attempt was not made until June and then it was severely checked. Assum- ing the offensive in August and Sep- tember, 1918, the Allies completely broke through the enemy lines and threw them back in a disorderly rout. Austria-Hungary sued for an armis- tice and received terms amounting to unconditional surrender (November, 1918). (7) All of the German colon- ies were taken: Kiaochow (in China) by the Japanese (November 6, 1914) ; the German island possessions in the Pacific by British and Japanese expeditions; Togoland (August, 1914), Kamerun (February, 1916), German Southwest Africa (July, 1916), and German East Africa (November, 1918). II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR In July, 1914, the murder of Fran- cis Ferdinand, a member of the Aus- trian royal family, set in motion a train of events which culminated in the terrible catastrophe of a great European war. It was clear, however, that this crime was not the real cause of the tremendous struggle which many of the statesmen and diplomats of Europe had anticipated and all had feared for many years. The under- lying causes of this great War of the Nations reach far back into the past and cannot be reduced to any simple formula. Some knowledge of the im- portant political and economic forces which have shaped the history of Europe during the past century is nec- essary for an adequate appreciation of the causes of the great cataclysm. Among the many and complex influ- ences which have been suggested as causes of the war, there are three forces which appear to have contrib- uted most directly in bringing about the critical situation in Europe in 1914. These were (1) the clashing of national interests and ideals, (2) the maintenance of a system of military alliances, and (3) the economic rivalry among the nations of Europe. National Antagonisms. Viewed broad- ly, the political history of Europe in the nineteenth century centres about two movements which were the in- heritance of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, (1) the growth of democracy and (2) the realization of national liberty. When the diplomats of the Great Powers met at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 5 to readjust the map of Europe, many- expressed the hope that the Congress would be guided in its work by these two principles. There was much talk of "the reconstruction of the moral order," "the regeneration of the po- litical system of Europe," of the es- tablishment "of an enduring peace founded on a just distribution of po- litical forces," and of the formation of an effective and permanent in- ternational tribunal. Unfortunately these fair promises were not realized and the Congress, instead of establish- ing a new era, did its utmost to re- store the old one. The principles of popular freedom and national liberty were ignored wherever it was neces- sary to do so to satisfy the dynastic and personal influences which domi- nated the Congress. In the first place, as an inheritance of the French Revolution these prin- ciples were anathema to the reaction- aries and, in the second place, Met- ternich,* the reactionary Austrian Chancellor who dominated the Con- gress, realized that encouragement of * Metternich, Clemexs Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince (1773-1859). A noted Austrian diplomat, born at Coblenz. Educated at Uni- versity of Strassburg and studied law at Mainz. Diplomatic career commenced at Congress of Rastadt (1797-1799). Became Austrian Am- bassador at Dresden (1801). Two years later became ambassador to Prussia where he nego- tiated treaty of alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia against France in 1805. Went to Paris in 1806 as ambassador. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1809. Opposed dismember- ment of France for fear Russia and Prussia would become too powerful. Presiding officer of Congress of Vienna. Inspiring genius of reactionary policy of Restoration period. Aus- trian Chancellor, 1821. Aimed to restore old order as far as possible. 6 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the nationalist principle would endan- ger the heterogeneous Austrian domin- ions. Consequently the work of the Congress of Vienna was an effort to establish the status quo ante bellum. The consummation of this aim caused numerous violations of the principle of nationality. The history of the nineteenth century shows a number of revolutionary periods such as 1830, 1848, 1866, and 1870 which were caus- ed by the determined efforts of the liberals and radicals of Europe to put into effect the three cardinal prin- ciples of the French Revolution, lib- erty, equality, and fraternity. The last term is praetically synonymous with the term nationality. Some of the cruder violations of the principle were done away with in the course of the century. For example, Belgium was separated from Holland and Ve- netia and other Italian-speaking sec- tions were taken away from Austria and joined to the newly created Ital- ian kingdom. There remained, how- ever, at the close of the nineteenth cen- tury, a number of situations which clearly violated the principle of na- tional sovereignty. The completion of German unity in 1871 was accom- panied by the violation of the prin- ciple of French nationality in the an- nexation of the territories of Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prus- sian War. The reasons for the an- nexations of these territories were partially economic and partially po- litical. The Germans wished to wipe out the memories of French aggression after the Battle of Jena during the Napoleonic period. They also wished to obtain the extremely valuable coal and iron mines which were in these territories. It was an ever present challenge to the French people to at- tempt to regain these lost provinces and a constant reminder of the hu- miliation which they had suffered at the hands of Germany. On the other hand it was used by Bismarck * and the Prussian military party to justify their programme of huge military armaments in Germany. Nowhere else in Europe was the problem of nationality so acute dur- ing the nineteenth century as in Aus- tria-Hungary. The very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been a constant challenge to the prin- ciple of nationality. Logically car- ried out this principle would mean the disappearance of Austria-Hungary and the distribution of its territory among the surrounding nations. The appreciation of this fact by the Aus- trian authorities made them apprehen- sive of all nationalist movements, and especially that of the southern Slavs. As will be seen it was the outgrowth of one of these movements which pre- cipitated the crisis which led to the outbreak of the war. The Balkan states presented a pe- culiarly vexing problem in the realiza- tion of the principle of nationality. The intricate mixture of racial groups in this region made it an almost hope- * BlSMAHCK-SCHONHATJSEN, KARL OtTO Eduard Leopold vox, Prince (1815-98). A famous Prussian diplomat and statesman, born in the district of Magdeburg, Prussia. From 1832-33 he was a student of jurisprudence and political science. Entered First General Diet of Prussia (1847). Champion of ultra-con- servative measures. Advocated increased pow- ers of monarchy in Erfurt Parliament (1850). As Prussian Ambassador to Germanic Diet at Frankfort adopted policy of hostility to Aus- tria. Head of Prussian cabinet and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1862). Governed without a budget and parliamentary majority. To unify Germany under Prussia adopted ruth- less policy, "mighty problems of age to be solved by blood and iron." Forced out Austria and in 1871 Germanic states formed an empire with Prussian King as Emperor. Introduced state socialism as a means of fighting social- ism. He was a bitter opponent of the Roman Catholic church, being the author of the famous "May Laws," of 1873-74-75. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR less task to arrange geographical boundaries to correspond with na- tional lines. The problem was com- plicated, moreover, by the clashing of the interests of the great European Powers, especially Austria and Rus- sia, in this territory. The condition of chronic disorder and strife in this region during the nineteenth century was a source of almost constant con- cern to the diplomats of the great European states. While the triumph of the ideal of nationality has done much to advance European civilization, it has not been an unmixed blessing. Too often na- tional patriotism became a fetish. Love of one's country meant a lack of ap- preciation of or a contempt for the people of other countries ; a feeling that the "kultur" of one's country was not only different from but distinctly superior to that of any other country. From this it naturally followed that it was a laudable ambition to wish to im- pose one's superior civilization upon an inferior people. "If it were possible," says Prince Bernhard von Biilow * in his book on Imperial Germany, "for members of different nationalities, with different language and customs, and an intel- lectual life of a different kind, to hve side by side in one and the same state, without succumbing to the temp- tation of each trying to force his own * Bulow, Bernhard, Prince von. A former German Chancellor, born (1849) at Klein- Flottbeck, Holstein. Studied at Lausanne, L,eipsic, and Berlin. Served in Franco-Prus- sian War and entered German Foreign Office in 1874. Served as secretary of legations at various capitals and also ambassador. Ap- pointed Foreign Secretary in 1897 and Chancel- lor of the German Empire and Prime Minister of Prussia in 1900. His diplomacy shaped by emperor. Against ambition of France in Mo- rocco and led to Algeciras conference (1906). Able to control majority in Reichstag until 1909 when failure of budget led to resigna- tion. nationality on the other, things on earth would look a good deal more peaceful. But it is a law of life and development in history that where two national civilizations meet they fight for ascendancy. In the struggle be- tween nationalities, one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is the victor and the other the van- quished." Prince von Billow's words really go to the root of the whole trouble in European politics. They show clearly that exaggerated idea of the inevitable antagonism of national interests which dominated European politics during the nineteenth cen- tury. In its extreme form this national spirit has found expression in move- ments . to unite various related ethnic and racial groups into one political group. Such movements have been more or less prominent in Germany, Russia, and the Balkan states under the names Pan-Germanism, Panslav- ism, Pan-Serbianism, etc. It is doubt- ful whether any of these movements had passed beyond the state of vague aspirations held by a comparatively small group of people. As a con- tributing cause of the war the Pan- slavic and Pan-Serbian movements were of some importance. The growth of such propaganda was a source of concern to Austria-Hungary, with its large Slavic population. Pan-Germanism. — The Pan-German movement was an outgrowth of Ger- man imperialism and of the exag- gerated race consciousness of the Ger- mans. Roughly stated, this movement conceives the German people wherever located as forming one great nation- ality. Some Pan-Germanists deny any political or territorial ambitions and assert that they wish merely to spread the knowledge of German culture 8 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR throughout the world. Others, more 1 radical, proclaimed the ultimate domi- nation of the world by the German race. The German authorities re- peatedly stated that the Pan-German movement had no official sanction and that it was the work of only a very small part of the German people. How- ever, what the movement has lacked in numbers it has made up in activity. Prominent historians, scientists, and other writers expounded its views, while numerous societies had been formed to advance German ideas of culture and civilization throughout the civilized world. One or two quotations will serve to show the attitude of some of the lead- ers of the Pan-German movement. Von Bernhardi said on one occasion: "Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with im- portance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall !' will be our rallying cry. "Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confi- dent intention of conquering and with the iron resolve to persevere to the end, come what may." The French Yellow Book quotes from an official secret report the fol- lowing: "Neither ridiculous shriek- ings for revenge by French chauvin- ists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutschtum (German influence) all the world over." The Kaiser said in the course of a speech in July, 1900: "Germany's greatness makes it impossible for her to do without the ocean, but the ocean also proves that even in the distance, and on its farther side, without Ger- many and the German Emperor no great decision dare henceforth be taken. "I do not believe that thirty years ago our German people, under the leadership of their princes, bled and conquered in order that they might be shoved aside when great decisions are to be made in foreign politics. If that could happen, the idea that the Ger- man people are to be considered a world power would be dead and done for, and it is not my will that this would happen. To this end it is only my duty and my finest privilege to use the proper and, if need be, the most drastic means without fear of conse- quences. I am convinced that in this course I have the German princes and the German people firmly behind me." In another speech in October, 1900, the Kaiser said: "Our German Fath- erland, (to) which I hope will be granted, through the harmonious co- operation of princes and peoples, of its armies and its citizens, to become in the future as closely united, as power- ful, and as authoritative as once the Roman world-empire was, and that, just as in the old times they said 'Civis romanus sum,' hereafter, at some time in the future, they will say 'I am a German citizen.' " Military Alliances. The obsession of national jealousy led inevitably to the view that it was necessary to de- fend nationalism with huge armaments. The remarkable success of Bismarck in uniting Germany by a policy of blood and iron was used as an object lesson by the militarists of Germany and oth- er nations. War was glorified as an institution in itself, not simply as a means to an end. Says Bernhardi,* * Friedrich von Bernhardi, born (1849) at St. Petersburg, son of a German diplomat; served in Franco-Prussian War; general of cavalry and commander of the Seventh Army UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 9 one of the leading exponents of this school, "War is in itself a good thing. It is a biological necessity of the first importance." And again, "The in- evitableness, the idealism, the blessing of war as an indispensable and stimu- lating law of development must be re- peatedly emphasized." John Adam Cramb,* an English historian, pre- dicted a war between Germany and England and warned England to pre- pare for it. Everywhere the doctrine of military preparedness was advocat- ed and it bore fruit in the tremendous standing armies and huge navies of the different European countries. It led also to the grouping of the great European Powers into two hostile mili- tary alliances. When the representatives of the European Powers met at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, there was organized the so-called Concert of Europe, by which it was hoped that the problems of European politics would be adjust- ed. For some years congresses rep- resenting the Great Powers were held at which international questidns were considered and efforts made to main- tain the balance of power in Europe. After the middle of the nineteenth cen- tury, however, the influence of this Corps (1908); retired (1909), but in 1915, dur- ing the European War, assigned to field com- mand at his own request. His writings, for which he is known internationally, are con- cerned with German military progress and with an expected war for the advancement of Pan- Germanism and expansion. In English have appeared: Cavalry in War and Peace (1910); On War of To-Bay, Britain as Germany's Vas- sal, and Germanv and the Next War (all 191-1) ; The New Bcrnhardi: "World Power or Borcnfall" (1915), a collection of articles writ- ten during the European War. *John Adam Cramb (1862-1913), educated at Glasgow and Bonn; from 1893 to his death professor of modern history at Queen's College, London: also lectured at other institutions and gave private courses; author of Germany and England (1914) and The Origins and Bestiny of Imperial Britain and Nineteenth Century Europe (1915). Concert was materially weakened. A political transformation of Europe occurred in the decade between 1860 and 1870, culminating in the creation of two new European states, Germany and Italy. The appearance of these two states in the family of European nations seriously disturbed the old political relations. Bismarck, who had been largely instrumental in the creation of the German Empire, adopted as his guiding principle a sys- tem of firm alliances rather than de- pendence upon the more loosely consti- tuted European Concert. In an effort to isolate France, he first strove to unite Russia, German}^, and Austria in a defensive alliance. When Russia with- drew from this alliance on account of antagonism to Austria, Bismarck de- voted his efforts to binding together more closely the two Teutonic Pow- ers. Italy later (1882) joined with the Central Powers to form the Triple Alliance. Italy's alliance with the Teutonic Powers was largely a result of her re- sentment against France because of the latter's acquisition of Tunis in 1881. Checkmated by France, Italy turned to the Germanic Powers and joined an unnatural alliance. It was unnatural because Austria had con- sistently opposed Italian unity as well as on account of clashes of economic interests in the Balkan peninsula. This organization of the states of central Europe into a strong military alliance was an invitation to the other states of Europe to create an oppos- ing alliance in order to maintain the balance of power. First France and Russia, drawn together by mutual hos- tility to Germany, formed a Dual Al- liance (1895) and finally Great Brit- ain, aroused by the threatening naval policy of Germany, abandoned her pol- 10 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR icy of "splendid isolation," and joined with France and Russia to form a sec- ond diplomatic group known as the Triple Entente. England was com- pelled to smooth over difficulties which existed between herself and her two allies. She clashed with France in Northern Africa, in Siam, and over the Newfoundland fisheries. She was opposed to the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans as well as to the advance towards India in Asia. Due largely to the efforts of Sir Ed- ward Grey, these misunderstandings were cleared up and a "diplomatic group" was established. The precise nature of this understanding was in- definite, there being no treaty agree- ment specifying its scope. The for- mation of these two rival military groups created a situation in Europe where every disturbance of the po- litical or diplomatic status quo brought on a crisis. Since 1905 Europe has passed through several such crises, each one increasing the tension among the Great Powers and each making the maintenance of peace more difficult. The first of these crises came in 1905 in a dispute over Morocco. A part of the understanding reached be- tween England and France in 1904 provided that France should have a free hand in Morocco, while England was given a free hand in Egypt. Ger- many, which had abandoned Bis- marck's policy of opposition to co- lonial expansion, was looking about for such stray portions of undeveloped land as had not been appropriated by England and France. Germany had to choose between two courses. Eith- er she could frankly recognize the in- evitable consequences of her geograph- ical position and her late entrance in- to the field as a colonial power, which handicapped her development as a world state, or she might determine to challenge the more fortunately sit- uated and longer established world powers and create for herself a larger "place in the sun." She chose the lat- ter alternative. With a rapidly in- creasing population, it became a ques- tion whether even her remarkable in- dustrial development would accommo- date the added millions of population. It is true that at this time Germany imported unskilled agricultural labor from Russia, and that there was no alarming emigration from Germany. But the future held out the prospect of a large emigration of Germans to other countries, and the Germans re- sented the loss of this good German stock to the Fatherland. Colonies where Germans might be kept under German control were felt to be the great need. Germany therefore deter- mined not to stand quietly by and al- low further colonial acquisitions by the other great European Powers with- out making an effort to share in the spoils. The Russo-Japanese War (1904- 1905) had revealed the military weak- ness and inefficiency of Russia. This situation made Russia's support of France much less valuable and Ger- many felt that it was an opportune time to assert her position in regard to Morocco. On March 21, 1905, the German Emperor, while on a voyage to Constantinople, disembarked at Tangier and encouraged the Sultan to reject the scheme of reforms pro- posed by France. He, moreover, suc- ceeded in forcing France to submit the whole Moroccan question to a con- ference of the Powers held at Algeciras in January, 1906. England firmly supported France and let it be known that any interference with France's UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 11 predominant position in Morocco would be resisted by her. Italy, more- over, refused to support her ally, with the result that France scored a dis- tinct diplomatic victory. One phase of Germany's policy of colonial and commercial expansion contemplated the extension of Teu- tonic commercial and political inter- ests in the Balkans and Turkey. In this "Drang nach Osten" Germany, in conjunction with Austria, hoped to create a great economic, if not politi- cal, sphere of influence extending through the Balkans to Constantino- ple and thence through Turkey in Asia to the Persian Gulf. German engineers and German capitalists began to de- velop Turkish resources. German mili- tary officials trained the Turkish forces. As an example of the importance that the Pan-Germanist element placed upon the movement toward the south- east, the following quotation is given from a book entitled, Asia, by Fried- rich Naumann (1900): "All weaken- ing of German national energy by pacifist associations or analogous ac- tivities reinforces the formidably in- creasing power of those who rule to- day from the Cape to Cairo, from Ceylon to the Polar Sea. . . . No truce with England. Let our policy be a national policy. "This must be the mainspring of our action in the eastern question. This is the fundamental reason which ne- cessitates our political indifference to the sufferings of Christians in the Turkish Empire, painful as these must be to our private feelings. If Turkey were disintegrated to-day, the frag- ments of her empire would become the sport of the great powers, and we would be left with nothing, as has happened so often in the past. We must retard the catastrophe. Let Turkey have any constitution she likes, so long as she can keep herself afloat a while longer. "Bismarck taught us to make a dis- tinction between our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The same thing applies to the Christian mis- sions. As Christians we desire the propagation of the faith by which we were saved. But it is not the task of our policy to concern itself with Chris- tian missions. "The truth here, as elsewhere, is that we must find out which is the greatest and morally the most impor- tant task. When the choice has been made, there must be no tergiversation. William II has made his choice; he is the friend of the Padishah, because he believes in a greater Germany. . . . "Imagine a few firm, rigid, incor- ruptible officials at the head of a ter- ritory like Palestine scouring the coun- try on horseback with European promptitude. They would be as much abused as Satan, but as useful as angels. . . . "A sort of amicable dictatorship would be set up, which would often address Turkey as the bird of the proverb was addressed, 'Eat or die.' . . . Meanwhile Germans would be set- tling upon all the shores of the Medi- terranean. Good luck to you, my brethren. Work hard. Bestir your- selves. The old sea will yet behold many things. You hold in your hands a morsel of Germany's future life." In July, 1908, a revolution, led by the Young Turks, broke out in Con- stantinople. Taking advantage of this situation Bulgaria annexed eastern Rumelia and declared her complete in- dependence of Turkey. Austria felt the time opportune to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been 12 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR placed under her administration in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin, main- ly through the efforts of Bismarck. This action of Austria irritated Italy and aroused Serbia, which latter had hoped to bring these provinces, closely related to her in blood, into a Greater Serbia. Russia protested against Aus- tria's violation of the Treaty of Ber- lin, but Germany stood by her ally, and Russia, unprepared for war, was forced to submit. The Teutonic al- lies had scored a distinct diplomatic success and another European crisis was passed. Once again in 1911, the Moroccan question brought Europe to the verge of war. Germany had not accepted with good grace her diplomatic defeat at Algeciras, and watched with an in- creasing irritation the extension of French influence and control in Mo- rocco. Germany complained that France was not observing the policy of equal commercial opportunity for all nations and on July 1, 1911, the German cruiser Panther appeared off Agadir with the avowed purpose of protecting German interests. Both England and France likewise sent ships there, and for several months European peace hung in the balance. A compromise was finally reached whereby Germany recognized France's predominant position in Morocco while in return Germany received 100,000 square miles of the French Congo. Hardly had this second Moroccan crisis been passed when the delicate balance in European politics was dis- turbed by the Turco-Italian War. Dis- appointed in her desire to obtain Tunis, Italy turned her attentions to the neighboring Turkish province of Tripoli and gradually extended her economic interests there. Friction de- veloped with the corrupt and inefficient Turkish authorities and in September, 1911, the Italian government demand- ed that Turkey place the provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica under Italian control. Upon Turkey's refusal Italy declared war and after a long cam- paign succeeded in occupying the ter- ritory. Germany was placed in the difficult position of seeing her protege Turkey despoiled by her ally Italy. She was, however, powerless to prevent Italy from carrying through her de- signs for fear that the latter might desert the Triple Alliance and join the Entente. The Turco-Italian War was a pre- lude to a much more serious and far- reaching upheaval in the Turkish do- minions. The policy of the Young Turks after the revolution of 1908, in attempting to build up a strong, uni- fied Ottoman nation, stirred the smol- dering embers of the rival nationalities in the Balkans. The Greeks, Bulgar- ians, Serbs, and Montenegrins resented the attempt to Ottomanize their fellow nationals in Macedonia and Albania. Putting aside for the moment their own rivalries these four Powers or- ganized the Balkan League, and sub- mitted to Turkey a demand for far- reaching reforms in Macedonia. The European Powers quickly saw the dan- ger of a European war if the Balkan situation was disturbed and they served notice on the Allies that under no conditions would they allow a modi- fication of the territorial status quo in the Balkans. Undeterred by this threat of European intervention the Allies declared war on Turkey in Oc- tober, 1912, and after a series of bril- liant campaigns, completely routed the Turks and drove them to the gates of Constantinople. As the Allies had an- ticipated, the European Powers did not make good their threat to restore UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 13 the status quo. When it came to a di- vision of the spoils the old rivalries among the Allies once more appeared. Serbia had been thwarted in her de- sire to obtain Albania by the opposi- tion of Italy and Austria. This led to a demand by Serbia for a modifica- tion of the agreement for the divisions of the territory made by the Allies before the war. To this Bulgaria would not consent and Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro combined against their former ally. Rumania and Tur- key also joined Bulgaria's enemies with the result that Bulgaria's forces were quickly overwhelmed. The strug- gle closed in August, 1913, and Bul- garia was forced to give up a large part of the conquered Turkish terri- tory. As a result of interference by the great Powers of Europe an autonom- ous Albania was established under the kingship of William Frederick of Wied, a German mediatized prince. This effectively thwarted Serbia's de- sire for a seaport on the Adriatic. The outcome of the Balkan wars was a bitter disappointment to Ger- many and Austria. Not only had their protege Turkey been practically driven from Europe, but the creation of a greater Serbia and the strength- ening of Greece and Bulgaria checked the plans of Austria to reach the ^Egean Sea at Saloniki. Russian in- fluence, too, had been greatly in- creased in the Balkans by the strengthening of the Slavic states. That Germany appreciated the seri- ous blow which had been dealt to Teu- tonic influence in the Balkans was in- dicated by the introduction in Febru- ary, 1913, of a new army bill. This was defended on the ground that the outcome of the Balkan wars had seri- ously disturbed the balance of power in central Europe to the detriment of Austria and Germany. To the peace footing of the German army were added 117,000 men and 19,000 officers, bringing the total strength of the peace army, including auxiliary services, up to 870,000. Im- mediately the Superior Council of War in France replied to the German chal- lenge by proposing March 4, that the term of military service be increased from 2 to 3 years, in order to aug- ment the strength and improve the or- ganization of the French army. It should be noted that the German in- crease was proposed first, that it was approved by the Bundesrath on March 28, and that it was finally passed by the Reichstag on June 30, 1913, three weeks before the French Three- Year Law was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, July 19. Russia, the ally of France, and Austria-Hungary, the ally of Germany, likewise made war- like preparations. In July the Duma authorized a new army budget and the lengthening of military service from 3 to 3y± years ; General Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, vis- ited Russia in August, 1913, to con- fer on the reorganization of the Rus- sian army. Austria-Hungary intro- duced a new scheme whereby her peace army was increased from 463,000 to 560,000 ; and enormous sums were ap- propriated for the provision of artil- lery. Even the smaller states of the Balkan, Iberian, and Scandinavian peninsulas caught the contagion of the army fever. The most ominous fea- ture of all this military preparation was the fear and hatred it inspired. France introduced three-year service because she feared the German army, with its corps at Metz, Saarbriicken, and Strassburg. When little Belgium introduced universal military service 14 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR and planned to create a field army of 150,000 in addition to garrisons of 130,000 men, the explanation was frankly made that the recent construc- tion of German railways leading to the Belgian frontier, without obvious eco- nomic purpose, signified that Germany was preparing to transport troops in- to and through Belgium in case of a Franco-German war. Similarly Ger- many was alarmed by the projected construction of new Russian railways, which would facilitate Russian mobili- zation against Germany. And in the spring of 1914 a veritable panic was created in the German and Austro- Hungarian press, by articles in the Cologne Gazette, Germania, the Post, and the Berliner Tageblatt, comment- ing on the Russian preparations, which would be perfected in a year or two. Bernhardi, in the Post, warned Germany to be ready for a war in the near future. On the other hand, the St. Petersburg (Petrograd) Bir- shewija Wjedomosti on June 13, 1914, declared that, "France and Russia do not desire war, but Russia is pre- pared, and hopes that France will likewise be prepared." Thus national militarism created the situation out of which grew the War of the Nations — the nations of Europe armed to the teeth, regarding each other with in- sane fear, awaiting the inevitable con- flict. Economic Causes. Some advocates of the economic interpretation of his- tory seek to place all historical facts on an economic basis. To this school of historical writers this war is ex- plained almost entirely on economic grounds. While it is quite possible to exaggerate this economic motive, there is no question that economic consid- erations played an important part in bringing about the situation which precipitated the European crisis. Some of these economic influences may be briefly stated. At the close of the eighteenth cen- tury there occurred in Europe a com- plete transformation of industrial con- ditions known as the industrial revolu- tion. The invention of improved methods of spinning and weaving, the application of steam power, the sub- stitution of the factory system for the former method of cottage industry, and the appearance of distinct cap- italist and laboring classes were the most striking features of this revolu- tion in industrial life. England was the first country to feel the effects of this change. Fac- tories began to turn out large quan- tities of manufactured commodities, more than enough to supply the home market. For a time England had a practical monopoly of the field, and had no difficulty in disposing of her surplus products in the markets of the world. But the industrial revolution in time reached other countries ; France in the period after 1830, the United States in the period following the Civil War, and Germany in the period after 1880. The great indus- trial interests in these countries began to compete with those of England for the control of the markets of the world. England had the advantage of having vast colonial possessions which might serve both as a market for her manufactured products and as a field for the investment of surplus capital in the development of their natural resources. France and the United States, in a lesser degree, also enjoyed this advantage. Germany, on the other hand, because of her late ap- pearance as a great power, was prac- tically without colonial possessions of any potential value. She felt that her UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 15 industrial development was being ham- pered through no fault of her own, but simply because the best parts of the world had been appropriated by other countries. It has been argued, with consider- able force, that a nation does not bene- fit commercially by the control of col- onies or weak states. The case of Ger- many is cited to show how marvel- ously a state may expand commercial- ly without colonies. But there is no doubt that certain economic interests within a nation do gain by national control of undeveloped parts of the world. There are government con- tracts to be let, franchises to be given, concessions to be granted, and pos- sibly preferential tariffs to be estab- lished. The financial interests in close touch with the governmental author- ities of a great power undoubtedly have a great advantage. In the German apologies for the war, Great Britain is bitterly accused of envying German prosperity and of welcoming the war as an opportunity to crush German commercial and in- dustrial competition. The strenuous efforts of British business men during the war to capture German trade are cited as proof. The British apologists reply that Great Britain entered the war only after extreme hesitation, aft- er warning Germany not to violate Belgian neutrality ; that Great Britain had not welcomed the war, far less caused it ; and that the war on Ger- man trade was a result rather than the purpose of the armed conflict. On the other side, Germany is ac- cused of waging war for economic ag- grandizement. In explanation, let us refer to the origin of the German Em- pire. Besides a sentimental yearning for national unity, two factors worked together to weld the many petty Ger- man States into a united nation. The spectacular part was played by the Prussian army, under the control of domineering, landowning aristocrats, like Prince Bismarck. Equally impor- tant, if less striking, was the work of the industrial capitalists. They had built railways binding the Germanies together with bands of steel; they had economically federated the Germanies in the Tariff League (ZoUverem), preparing the way for political union. After the formation of the German Empire (1871), the influence of the two elements, the landed aristocracy of army officers and the business aris- tocracy of wealth, was manifested in the demand for a protective tariff. The former demanded a high tariff on imported foodstuffs to raise the price of their own farm products ; the latter required a tariff wall to keep foreign manufacturers from entering into com- petition with German articles in the home market. Bismarck adopted the protective tariff policy in 1879. It is easy to see how such a policy might endanger peace. For example, consid- er Russo-German relations. In 1904 Russia and Germany signed a commer- cial treaty whereby each country made certain reductions in its tariff duties on imports from the other country. The Russians felt that Germany had the best of the bargain. In 1914, as the date approached for the renewal or modification of the treaty, fear was expressed in the German press lest Russia's improved army would enable her to demand more favorable terms. In this fashion the desire of each na- tion to tax foreign imports and at the same time to obtain free admission of its own products into foreign coun- tries, stimulated militarism and pro- voked warlike sentiments among the Powers. The United Kingdom, it 16 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR should be observed, adhered to its free trade policy, and, with few exceptions, admitted the products of all lands on an equal footing. The British self- governing colonies, however, had adopted protection. Whether it was due to the protec- tion of the tariff wall, or to the Ger- man genius for applying natural science to industry, or to German thoroughness, or to aggressive com- mercial methods, the business inter- ests prospered mightily under the aegis of the German Empire. Mills and mines multiplied wealth. Titanic ocean steamships carried German wares to the ends of the earth. By 1912, British excelled German foreign commerce by about $1,300,000,000; but German commerce had trebled it- self since 1883, while British commerce had not quite doubled. The German government derived rich revenues from the customs duties on an expanding commerce, and viewed with satisfac- tion the prodigious increase in wealth and population (population increased from 41 to 66 millions between 1871 and 1912) which furnished men and money for an ever-growing army. And on the other hand, the industrial and landowning classes considered the army as protection and insurance for their interests. In one respect, how- ever, the German business community was dissatisfied. The German mer- chant marine, although it had rapidly expanded, was still four times out- weighed by British shipping. Great Britain's superiority was ascribed to her earlier economic development, to the fact that Germany had very little Atlantic sea-coast, to the superiority of the British navy. Germany, there- fore, set herself to overcome these handicaps. And without imputing ag- gressive motives to the German gov- ernment, the historian may and should affirm that certain German business men consciously hoped for the over- throw of British naval power and for the annexation of an Atlantic port by Germany. The open confession of such desires by German journalists like Maximilian Harden and by Ger- man shipping magnates like Herr Bal- lin, explains why the Belgians feared the loss of Antwerp and Ostend, and the British the loss of the sea. In parenthesis, it may be observed that similar desires for advantageous sea- ports were urging Russia on to Con- stantinople and to the Southern Bal- tic, Serbia on to the Adriatic, and Austria-Hungary on to Saloniki. In a third respect the economic am- bitions of Germany conflicted with those of other nations. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century cer- tain groups of business men awoke to the opportunities which the vast un- civilized areas of Africa and Oceanica offered for the sale of cheap cotton goods, cheap liquors, and other manu- factures, for the highly remunerative investment of money in the construc- tion of railways, the development of mines, and the traffic in rubber, ivory, and oil. King Leopold of Belgium, one of the first to realize the oppor- tunity, acquired control of the Congo region in the heart of Africa. France carved out a mighty colonial empire, and Great Britain added to hers. Ger- many, a belated arrival in the field, was permitted, even encouraged by the British government, to acquire ter- ritories in Africa. But when Ger- many, becoming aggressive in world politics, and demanding an ever larg- er "place in the sun," challenged the French in Morocco and appeared en- vious of the British and French pos- sessions, the prospect of a war for UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 17 world-empire began to fill Europe with uneasy forebodings. Concessions as well as colonies were contended for by Germans as against British and French capitalists. For example, when in 1914 Bulgaria ar- ranged in return for a loan to concede to German capitalists valuable railway and mining privileges in Bulgaria, a rival bid was unsuccessfully made by the French. The financing of the Bagdad railway occasioned consider- able rivalry between France and Ger- many, until an agreement was reached. In 1914 the envious cry was raised in Germany that German interests were being outstripped by the other Pow- ers ; that the English were greedily helping themselves to the oil product of Persia and striving to secure the oil fields of Latin America ; that the French capitalists were securing new railway contracts in China, in Russia, and in Greece. Of all the economic interests inimic- al to peace, the most dangerous was the arms-manufacturing business. It is commonly known that in 1913 Karl Liebknecht * horrified the German Reichstag by alleging that the Krupps, the world-famous makers of guns and armor, systematically * Liebknecht, Karl (Paul August Ferdin- and) (1871-1919). Born at Leipsic, where he studied law. Became practicing attorney in Berlin. Chosen Selectman of City of Berlin (1902); member Prussian House of Deputies (1908), and elected to Reichstag (1912) and soon recognized as a leader among Socialist deputies. In 1913 made charges leading to reve- lation of Krupp scandals and in 1914 only member to vote against war credits. His work Militarisms und Antimilit (trismus (1907) for- bidden circulation and led to charge of high treason, for which he was convicted. Despite protests, mustered into army (1915). Arrested (1916) for making a speech at May Day dem- onstration. On signing of armistice and flight of Emperor became leader of extreme Socialist group known as Spartacides. Killed (Janu- ary 15, 1919) by military officers while under arrest. stirred up hostility between France and Germany in order to obtain larger orders for arms. Every Army Bill, every dreadnought, every war, meant profits for the armament firms. The Balkan Wars were fought with weap- ons forged in Germany and France. As the Krupps had made the Turkish guns, the defeat of Turkey meant di- minished prestige and smaller sales for Krupp wares, unless another war should reestablish the fame of can- non "made in Germany." English firms — Armstrong & Vickers, and Wit- worth — were engaged to build an ord- nance factory in Russia, and to con- struct battleships for Spain, for Bra- zil, for Turkey. For Krupps, as well as for their rivals, the War of the Nations was a golden opportunity. The Belgian armament manufacturers at Liege alone were unfortunate, for Liege was captured by German troops. Finally, a word may be added re- garding the banking interests and the war. Articles have appeared in sup- port of the argument that the panic and consternation in financial circles at the outbreak of the war proved con- clusively that "capital" did not want the war. While there is doubtless much truth in this reasoning, the fact must not be overlooked that in panics large fortunes are won as well as for- tunes lost. The huge war loans, more- over, offered unexampled opportuni- ties for financial speculation. The statement is also made that the cap- italists welcomed the war as a relief from the intolerable burden of mili- tarism ; for by means of income-, prop- erty-, and inheritance-taxes, Socialist- ically-inclined legislators were shifting the burden of militarism so as to bear more and more heavily on the wealth- ier classes. III. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand,* nephew of Em- peror Francis Joseph and heir to the Hapsburg throne, and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg, were assassinated by Serbian sympathizers while on an official visit to the town of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. It was generally believed in Austria that the crime was instigated by Pan-Ser- bian agitators, who had maintained a persistent propaganda for the ac- quisition of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina ever since they had been annexed by Austria in 1908. These provinces had once formed part of the old Serbian Empire, and about half of the population was related to the Serbs in race and speech. Despite the fact that Serbia had agreed in 1909 to recognize the annexation of these provinces by Austria as a fait accompli, the Pan-Serbian movement was allowed to continue in Serbia, un- hampered by the government author- ities. In Austria this movement was re- sented for two reasons. In the first place, Serbia had emerged from the second Balkan war doubled in size, and any further strengthening of this country ran counter to Austria's com- mercial interests in the Balkans. As it was, Serbia stood in the way of Austria's realizing her ambition of * Francis Ferdinand (1863-1914). Arch- duke of Austria-Este. Born at Graz. On death of Crown Prince Rudolph (1889) and his own father, became heir apparent to crowns of Austria and Hungary. Assassinated with his wife at Serajevo, Bosnia (June 28, 1914), as result of political plot due to absorption of Bosnia into Austro-Hungarian Empire (1908). reaching the ^Egean Sea at Saloniki as well as obstructing the Berlin to Bagdad route. In the second place, the Pan-Serbian movement was a posi- tive danger to the integrity of the Austrian Empire. If successful, it might encourage other racial groups within the Empire to disrupt com- pletely the Hapsburg dominions. Aus- tria had therefore good reasons for regarding the Pan-Serbian propagan- da with fear and resentment. Inves- tigations carried on by the Austrian officials at Serajevo led to the conclu- sion that the assassination of the Archduke had been planned by the conspirators at Belgrade and that the pistols and bombs used had been smuggled into Bosnia from Serbia with the connivance of Serbian officials. Having established these alleged facts, the Austrian government felt justified in proceeding in the most summary manner to crush once and for all the Pan-Serbian movement. With this in view there was presented to Serbia, by Austria, on July 23, 1914, an ulti- matum couched in the most vigorous language. Count Berchtold * was the Austrian Foreign Minister. The note began by recalling the dec- laration made by Serbia on the 31st of March, 1909, wherein Serbia recog- nized the fait accompli regarding Bos- nia and agreed to renounce any atti- * Berchtold, Leopold Anthony Johann Sigmund, Count von. Born (1863) in Vienna. Entered diplomatic service at early age, and in 1895 appointed secretary of Austrian Em- bassy in Paris. In 1899 appointed counselor of Embassy in London and in 1903 same position in St. Petersburg. 1912 became Foreign Minis- ter of Dual Monarchy. 18 OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 19 tude of protest or opposition to the annexation of Bosnia by Austria. The Austrian note then went on to com- plain that Serbia had not lived up to this undertaking, and had made it nec- essary for Austria to take action to protect herself against the Pan-Ser- bian propaganda. Austria insisted that Serbia should make an official and public condemnation of this propa- ganda and express regret at its conse- quences. The note then submitted ten specific demands and required an answer from Serbia by six o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25, within 48 hours of its presentation. These demands required that Serbia should suppress every publication which excited hatred of the Dual Mon- archy; that the Serbian government dissolve certain societies accused of fomenting the propaganda hostile to Austria; that teachers guilty of insti- gating hatred of Austria be dismissed and that objectionable matter in the textbooks be eliminated ; that Serbia dismiss from her army and govern- mental employ all officers and officials found taking part in the propaganda ; that Serbia accept the collaboration of agents of the Austro-Hungarian government in suppression of the sub- versive movement against Austria ; that Austro-Hungarian representa- tives be allowed to take part in the in- vestigation of persons in Serbia ac- cused of complicity in the murder of the Archduke; that Serbia take action against two specified officials, who were accused of complicity in the crime at Serajevo; that Serbia take effective measures to stop the smuggling of arms and ammunition across her bor- der; and finally that Serbia give ex- planation of the expressions of hos- tility toward Austria-Hungary on the part of certain high Serbian officials. The publication of this note imme- diately aroused great apprehension in the chancelleries of the European Pow- ers. It was clear that Europe was confronted with another serious crisis. It is a striking fact that each of the Powers of the Triple Entente was con- fronted by serious internal difficulties at this most critical time. Great Brit- ain was threatened by serious disturb- ances in Ireland resulting from the passage of the Home Rule Bill; St. Petersburg was involved in a great strike; in France the Caillaux affair had affected seriously the prestige of the government and the Minister of War declared that the army was in a deplorable state of unpreparedness. The first move of Sir Edward Grey,* the British Foreign Secretary, was to urge upon Austria-Hungary the necessity of extending the time lim- it of the ultimatum. In this he was strongly supported by M. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister. Ger- many, however, was not inclined to bring pressure upon her ally in this matter and Austria flatly refused any extension of time. Failing in this move, the British and Russian Ministers turned their efforts to persuading Serbia to accept, as far as possible, the demands made by Aus- tria. In this they were largely suc- cessful. The Serbian Reply. Serbia's reply * Grey, Sir Edward. Born (1862) in North- umberland. Educated at Winchester and Bal- liol College, Oxford. Entered Parliament, 1885. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95. Made "Privy Councillor 1902. In 1905 became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and soon became most commanding figure in European diplomacy. Consummated Triple Entente, uniting Great Britain, France, and Russia. Opposed German expansion in North Africa. In Balkan crisis of 1912 brought about conference in London and presided over its deliberations. Unable to prevent the great world war, despite strenuous efforts. 20 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR to the Austrian ultimatum was handed to the Austrian Minister at Belgrade on July 25, only two minutes before the expiration of the time limit. The reply began by stating that the Ser- bian government was not aware of any official action since 1909 protesting against the political status of Bosnia- Herzegovina, and that the only rep- resentation made by Austria, that con- cerning a school book, had been ex- plained to the satisfaction of the Aus- trian government. To this the Aus- trian government replied in an of- ficial rejoinder that it was not sufficient to indicate that there had been no of- ficial action against Austria. It was the failure of Serbia to use energetic measures to suppress unofficial agita- tion directed against the territorial in- tegrity of Austria of which complaint was made. The Serbian reply further stated that the Serbian government did not consider that they could be held re- sponsible for the opinions expressed by private individuals, such as articles appearing in the press and the peace- ful proceedings of societies. Serbia agreed, however, to amend her consti- tution to permit the enactment of leg- islation to suppress such publications. Most of the other demands were agreed to by Serbia with slight verbal changes. There were two points, however, with which Serbia did not comply. In the first place, to the demand that Serbia accept the colla- boration of agents of the Austrian government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy, Serbia replied that she did not understand exactly the meaning of the demand, but that she was ready to accept such collaboration as should conform to the principles of interna- tional law and criminal procedure. The Austrian rejoinder stated that it was not a question of international law but of the exercise of police powers which could be settled by agreement between the parties concerned. In the second place the demand made by Austria that Austrian officials be permitted to take part in the investigation relating to the judicial proceedings in Serbia against persons involved in the Sera- jevo crime, the Serbian government would not concede on the ground that such action would violate the Serbian constitution. The Austrian rejoinder accused the Serbian government of de- liberately misrepresenting the Aus- trian demand, which contemplated sim- ply a participation in the preliminary investigation to the judicial proceed- ings. Finally the Serbian government agreed, in case the Austrian govern- ment should find the reply unsatisfac- tory, to submit the disputed questions to The Hague Tribunal or the Great Powers for decision. The representatives of the Entente Powers were satisfied that Serbia's re- ply was a substantial agreement to the Austrian demands. Austria, however, claimed to find the reply wholly unsat- isfactory and in this view she was ap- parently supported by Germany, which country adopted the view that she could not infringe on Austria's sov- ereignty. From the time of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum, it was rec- ognized on all sides that the great dan- ger was that any move on the part of Austria would precipitate a general European war. The delicate balance of interests in the Balkans could not be disturbed without involving serious consequences. Russia in particular felt that she was deeply interested in the fate of the small Slav nations in OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 21 the Balkan Peninsula. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna stated on July 24 that "any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent." (B.W.P. No. 7.) At Berlin, too, it was clearly recog- nized that Austria's action would prob- ably involve Russia. The German memorandum states that Germany was fully aware that "warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Ser- bia, would bring Russia into the ques- tion and might draw Germany into a war in accordance with her duty as Austria's ally." (G.W.B. p. 4.) * Despite Austria's assurance that she had no intention of annexing Serbian territory or disturbing the balance of power in the Balkans, Russia felt that, apart from the acquisition of territory, the crushing of Serbia would reduce her to a vassal state of Austria, and that this would imperil the balance of power in the Balkans. In view of this situation the Russian Foreign Minister stated that Russia would mobilize against Austria on the day that the Austrian army crossed the Serbian frontier. (B.W.P. No. 72.) This determined attitude of Russia made any efforts which the Powers might make to localize the struggle futile. The next question of vital in- terest was the attitude which Germany would take. How far was she prepared to support her ally Austria in her un- compromising position towards Serbia? In defining its position the German gov- ernment declared "The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation car- ried on by the Pan-Slavs in Austria- * In referring to the official documents, the following abbreviations are used: British White Paper, B.W.P.; German White Book, G.W.B. ; Austrian Red Book, A.R.B.; Russian Orange Book, R.O.B.; French Yellow Book, F.Y.B.; Belgian Gray Book, B.G.B.; Italian Green Book, I.G.B. Hungary has for its goal the destruc- tion of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy, which carries with it the shat- tering or weakening of the Triple Al- liance and, in consequence, the complete isolation of the German Empire. Our nearest interests, therefore, summon us to the support of Austria-Hungary." (G.W.B. exhibit 2.) And further "A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Pan-slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, such as we must have, in view of the increasingly menacing attitudes of our neighbors on the east and west." (G. W.B. memo. p. 5.) It is clear there- fore that Germany felt that her inter- ests as well as those of Austria were vitally affected. It was generally be- lieved, and openly stated, that Ger- many knew the nature of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was sent and had urged Austria to precipitate a crisis by presenting demands which Serbia would not accept. This was categorically denied by the German au- thorities. (B.W.P. No. 25.) Never- theless Germany thoroughly approved of the Austrian demands and insisted that the quarrel should be considered simply as an affair between Austria and Serbia. Obviously it was of the utmost im- portance to prevent, or at least delay, the first hostile move by Austria against Serbia. On July 26, Sir Ed- ward Grey suggested a conference of the representatives of the four Powers, England, France, Germany, and Italy, for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications be- tween Austria and Russia. (B.W.P. No. 36.) To this suggestion France and Italy agreed. Germany, however, declined to fall in with this plan. The German Foreign Minister stated that 22 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR "a conference such as Sir Edward Grey suggested would amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia'* (B.W.P. No. 43) ; and furthermore that "he did not think it [the confer- ence] would be effective, because such a conference would in his opinion have had the appearance of an Areopagus consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two re- maining Powers." (B.W.P. No. 71; G.W.B. memo. p. 8.) Direct negotiations between Russia and Austria were unsuccessful, Austria refusing to consider a modification of the terms of her ultimatum to Serbia. (B.W.P. No. 93; R.O.B. No. 45.) Fur- ther efforts on the part of England to have Germany propose some formula which would be acceptable proved un- availing (B.W.P. No. Ill), and on July 28, 1914, Austria declared war on Serbia. This action on the part of Austria appears explicable on one of two grounds. Either she was con- vinced that Russia was bluffing and would back down as she did in 1908, or else that Austria was prepared de- liberately to precipitate a European war. Germany and Russia. The Russian government had very definitely declared that Russia could not remain indiffer- ent to the fate of Serbia. It was gen- erally believed in Russia that Austria's action was directed against her quite as much as against Serbia. (R.O.B. No. 75.) Consequently on July 29, 1914, Russia declared partial mobili- zation against Austria-Hungary. At the same time the Russian Foreign Minister stated that this action was in no way directed against Germany. (R. O.B. No. 49.) These military prepa- rations stimulated the diplomats in their final efforts to find some solution which would prevent a European con- flagration. Various formulas were sug- gested but none was acceptable. On July 29, Sir Edward Grey urged that "the German government should sug- gest any method by which the influ- ence of the four Powers could be used to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediat- ing influence was ready to be put in operation by any method that Ger- many thought possible, if only Ger- many would press the button in the interests of peace." (B.W.P. No. 84.) Germany did press the button to the extent of urging Austria to renew ne- gotiations with Russia. At the same time Russia was requested to prepare a formula which would be satisfactory to her. M. Sazonov accordingly sub- mitted the following suggestion: "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, de- clares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations." This formula was whol- ly unsatisfactory to Germany and Aus- tria, and at the suggestion of Sir Ed- ward Grey the Russian formula was modified to read : "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recog- nizing the fact that the dispute be- tween Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hun- garian government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 23 One final effort was made by Eng- land and Germany to prevent a break between Austria and Russia. Sir Ed- ward Grey, on July 31, said that if Germany would suggest any reason- able proposal which would preserve peace, and if France and Russia re- jected such a proposal, Great Britain would not support them, but on the other hand if no such proposal were made and France became involved, Great Britain would be drawn in. (B. W.P. No. 111.) Germany, on her part, brought pressure on Austria to agree to discuss with Russia the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, and at the last moment, on July 31, Austria agreed to do so. (A.R.B. Nos. 49-50.) This slim chance of preventing a break at the eleventh hour was nullified by the demand made by Germany that Russia should cease her military prepa- rations and demobilize her army. At midnight on July 31, 1914, the Ger- man Ambassador delivered an ultima- tum to Russia demanding that she de- mobilize her forces not only against Germany but also against Austria- Hungary. (R.O.B. No. 70.) As Rus- sia returned no reply to this demand the German Ambassador was ordered on August 1, at 5 p.m., to notify the Russian government that Germany considered that a state of war existed between the two countries. (G.W.B. exhibit 26; R.O.B. No. 76.) Germany and France. At the same time that Germany presented the ulti- matum to Russia, a communication was sent to France informing her of Ger- many's action and asking what atti- tude France would take in the event of war between Germany and Russia. An answer was demanded within 18 hours. (F.Y.B. No. 116; G.W.B. ex- hibit 25.) To this demand the French Premier replied on August 1, that "France would take such action as her interests might require." (G.W.B. ex- hibit 27.) Despite this unsatisfactory answer the German Ambassador did not leave Paris until August 3. In the meantime charges and countercharges were made by the French and German authorities that warlike moves had been made on the frontier. A document which was purported to be instructions from the Imperial Ger- man government to its ambassador at Paris was published about the middle of 1918 in the French press at the in- stance of the government. The Ger- man Ambassador was to ask the French Government if it would remain neutral in case of war between Rus- sia and Germany. If the answer was "Yes," the German Ambassador was to demand the surrender of Verdun, Nancy, Toul, and Belfort and other strategic points as a guarantee that France would keep her word and re- main neutral. Inasmuch as this would be a severe infringement upon the sov- ereignty of France and would likely be met by a flat refusal, the inference is drawn that Germany did not want France to remain neutral, but wished to draw her into a world conflict. Great Britain and Germany. From the first it was evident that the ques- tion of England's attitude in the face of the great European crisis was of the most vital importance. In that most critical week following the presen- tation of the Austrian ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey worked early and late to arrive at some peaceful solution of the difficulty. From the very begin- ning France and Russia had urged Great Britain to come out with a def- inite statement that if war was pre- cipitated she would support them, pointing out that such a stand by Great Britain would deter Germany 24 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR from entering the war. M. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said "he did not believe that Germany realty wanted war, but her attitude was de- cided by England's. If she took her stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war." (B.W.P. No. 17.) The President of France, M. Poincare,* went so far as to appeal directly to King George stating "I am profoundly convinced that at the pres- ent moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible it will be to count upon the preservation of peace." Sir Edward Grey did not accept their suggestions. It was his view that Great Britain could work most effectively for peace by playing the part of mediator. At the same time he made it clear to the German Ambassador that if Germany and France became involved "the issue might be so great that it would in- volve European interests and he did not wish him to be misled into think- ing that Great Britain would stand aside." (B.W.P. No. 89.) Germany fully appreciated the importance of keeping Great Britain neutral, if pos- sible. With this end in view the Ger- man Chancellor proposed that if Great Britain would remain neutral Germany Poixcare, Raymond. Born (1860) in Bar- le-Duc, Lorraine. Educated early at lycees of Bar-le-Duc and Louis-le-Grand. Later made brilliant record as law student in Paris. Prac- ticed law for short time. At age of 27 elected to Chamber of Deputies. Opposed separation of church and state. Made Minister of Public Instruction (1893); Minister of Finance (1894). Held various ministries. Elected to Senate (1903). Prime Minister (1912) and took portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Vigorous supporter of alliance with Russia and of the entente with England. Elected President (1913). Believed" President should not be figurehead and made himself influential. Fa- vored three-year military service bill. Admit- ted to French Academy (1909). Author of several books. would guarantee that no territorial ac- quisitions would be made at the ex- pense of France. He was unwilling, however, to make a similar undertak- ing in regard to the French colonies. (B.W.P. No. 85.) This suggestion was declined by Great Britain on the ground that France might be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power, without having territory taken from her. Furthermore that other contingencies might arise which would justify Great Britain's entrance into the war. (B.W.P. No. 101.) A further request from Germany that Sir Edward Grey formulate conditions on which Great Britain would remain neu- tral was declined. He stated that "he could only say that they must keep their hands free." (B.W.P. No. 123.) The British government, therefore, up to the very last day of European peace refused either to bind herself to come to the aid of France and Russia or to remain neutral. Question of Belgian Neutrality. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 turned over the Austrian Netherlands, or Bel- gium, to Holland in compensation for certain Dutch colonial possessions re- tained by Great Britain. This union was opposed by the Belgians and at the first favorable opportunity (1830) they revolted. France was anxious to annex the provinces but Great Britain, following her traditional policy, op- posed their union with any great pow- er. This opposition was due to the proximity of the Belgian coast to her shores and also because of the impor- tant commercial interests of Great Britain in these rich provinces, which might suffer if they passed into the hands of some great European power. Great Britain's interests would be best served by erecting Belgium into an in- dependent state and by guaranteeing OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 25 the permanence of this independent status by making the country perpet- ually neutral. Accordingly in 1831 the principal European Powers, Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia, joined in guaranteeing the indepen- dence and perpetual neutrality of Bel- gium. This treaty was replaced by treaties signed in 1839 after Holland had agreed to recognize Belgian inde- pendence. When in 1870, at the out- break of the Franco-Prussian War, it seemed possible that one or both of the combatants might violate the neutral- ity of Belgium, a separate treaty was signed between Great Britain and each of the belligerents, by which Great Britain agreed that if either belliger- ent should violate Belgian neutrality the other could rely upon England as an ally in defense of the treaty of 1839. When on July 31, 1914, the out- break of a European war seemed un- avoidable, Sir Edward Grey tele- graphed the British ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to request the French and German governments to state whether they were prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violated it. To this the French authorities returned an affir- mative answer. The German Secre- tary of State, however, stated that it was doubtful if Germany could return any reply without disclosing a certain amount of her plan of campaign. On August 2, 1914, the German Minister presented to the Belgian Foreign Min- ister an ultimatum which stated that Germany had "reliable information ... of the intention of France to march through Belgian territory," that it was "an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack." Germany agreed to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as the war was over and to indemnify Bel- gium for all damages if she would maintain an attitude of "friendly neu- trality." In case of refusal Germany stated that Belgium would be consid- ered as an enemy and the question would be left "to a decision of arms." (B.G.B. No. 20.) To this demand the Belgian government returned a flat re- fusal and stated that they were "firmly resolved to repulse by every means within their power any attack upon their rights." (B.G.B. No. 22.) At the same time Belgium called upon Great Britain, France, and Russia, as signatories of the treaty of 1839, to carry out the guarantee of Belgian neutrality. In response to this request Sir Edward Grey on August 4, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Germany demand- ing a satisfactory reply to her request that Belgian neutrality be respected and requiring an answer by midnight of the same day. Upon Germany's re- fusal to give such a guarantee Great Britain declared war on Germany. While the violation of Belgian neutral- ity was the ostensible reason for Great Britain's declaration of war, she had, as a matter of fact, intervened in the war two days before the dispatch of her ultimatum to Germany. In a speech made in the House of Commons on August 2, 1914, Sir Edward Grey stated that he had on that day assured the French government that the Brit- ish fleet would protect the northern coast of France from any attack by the German fleet. By this act Great Britain had tentatively intervened in the war, and the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany changed this partial and tentative intervention into full participation in the war. German authorities clearly appre- ciated that Germany's action in invad- ing Belgium would arouse public sen- 26 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR timent in most neutral countries and strenuous efforts were made subse- quently to justify their action. In a speech in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, the German Chancellor, Theo- bald von Bethmann-Hollweg,* said: "Gentlemen, we are now acting in self- defense. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Bel- gian soil. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law." But other grounds than that of bald necessity have been advanced by German apol- ogists to justify their action. It has been claimed that Prussia, and not the German Empire, signed the treaty of 1839 and hence the latter was not bound by its provisions. To this it has been answered that the German Empire succeeded to the obligations of its component parts and that all treaties survived that were not for- mally renounced. It has also been stated that the treaty of 1839 was superseded by the treaties of 1870 which latter had lapsed. From the debates in the British Parliament at the time of the proposal of the treaties of 1870 there is no indication that the treaty of 1839 was to be superseded but rather to be strengthened. Ger- many furthermore claimed that certain secret documents which were discovered among the papers of the Belgian gov- ernment at Brussels go to prove that Belgium had by its own acts relieved Germany of the obligation to respect * Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald Theodore Frederic Alfred von. Born (1856) in Bran- denburg, Germany. Educated at College of Pforta and at universities of Strassburg, Leipsic and Berlin. Appointed Landrat of Oberbarnim, Brandenburg. President Province of Brandenburg (1901), Minister of Interior (1905), appointed Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior and Vice President of the Prussian Council (1907), and Chancellor of the German Empire (1909). A mild conserva- tive, but non-partisan in domestic affairs. her neutrality. These documents con- tain an account of certain conversa- tions between the Chief of the Belgian General Staff and the British Mili- tary Attache at Brussels, relative to the sending of British military forces to Belgium in case of an invasion of the latter by Germany. The German authorities claim that this amounted to an Anglo-Belgian alliance against Germany. In answer to this charge King Albert * of Belgium stated, ac- cording to an interview in the New York World (March 22, 1915), that the conversations referred to had been long known to the German authorities, having been communicated to the Ger- man Military Attache at Brussels so as to avoid any semblance of entering into an unneutral agreement. Germany also complained that Belgian military preparations for the defense of her neutrality, instead of being impartially directed against the possibility of an attack from any of the Powers, were made entirely against Germany. To this it is answered that the fortress of Namur was directed against France as Liege was directed against Germany. Furthermore that if greater energy had been directed towards fortifying the German than the French frontier, this was but natural in view of the German activity in building military railways leading up to the Belgian frontier. Finally Germany declared that her invasion of Belgium was in response to violations of Belgian neu- trality by France. But of this no satisfactory evidence has been pro- * Albert I., King of the Belgians. Born in 1875. Carefully educated. Democratic and firiendly in manner. Traveled widely and student of economics and politics. Made tour of Belgian Congo and advocated reform in the treatment of natives. When he became King (December, 1909) many improvements were made in the administration of the colony. One of the heroic figures of the great war. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 27 duced. To the impartial observer, therefore, it would appear that Ger- man justification for the violation of Belgian neutrality must rest entirely on the ground of military necessity. The Lichnowsky Memorandum. Notes taken by Prince Lichnowsky, formerly German Ambassador in Lon- don, were made public early in 1918 and caused a sensation in the press of the belligerent powers by their revela- tion of the friendly attitude of Eng- land and her desire to maintain peace in the period just preceding the war. The memorandum, which bears the title My London Mission, 1912-H, was dated August 16, 1916. When called to account by his government the prince said that the document was meant for the family archives and that it had found its way outside that circle as a result of a breach of con- fidence. He expressed his regret and resigned his rank as ambassador. The government forbade the prince to write articles for the press. Space is lack- ing for the quotation of the letters, but the following summary indicates his general attitude. In the first place he emphasized the conciliatory attitude of the British statesmen, especially Sir Edward Grey. Reviewing the policy of the German government just before the war, he said that although it had made repeated errors there, everything was still open as late as July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. If a representative of aver- age ability had been sent to St. Peters- burg he might have convinced Russia of Germany's peaceful intentions. The German government could have proven to Russia that it had no desire to seize the Dardanelles or to destroy the Serbs. At this time M. Sazonov was saying, "Leave Austria and we will leave the French," and the French ambassador was saying, "You need not follow Austria everywhere." He said that there was no need then of either alliances or wars, but only of treaties that would protect Germany and others and guarantee Germany an economic development. After Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west she would have turned again to the east which would have saved the situation. He said that Germany might also have taken up the matter of the limitation of armaments. He summed up the case against his own government as follows : "As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation: (1). We encouraged Count Berchtold to at- tack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us — whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of com- plete indifference. (2). In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonov emphatically de- clared that Russia could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian re- ply- (3). On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria's hav- ing attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobili- zation by sending an ultimatum to St. Peters- burg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march — so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settle- ment. In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world out- side Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world's war." In one of his papers the prince asks the following questions : "Is it not in- telligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is de- stroyed which constitutes a perma- 28 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR nent threatening of our neighbors?" . . . "Were those people not right who declared that it was the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi which domi- nated the German people — the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil?" Italy's Position. At the outbreak of the European War, Italy found her- self in a most trying position. To Austria and Germany she was bound by the defensive treaty of the Triple Alliance. Her position as a member of this alliance had from the beginning been unnatural. Ever since Italy ob- tained national unity in 1870, there has been a strong movement to obtain the Italian-speaking provinces of Tri- este and Trentino, still held by Aus- tria. This aspiration in Italy for what is called "Italia Irredenta," or unre- deemed Italy, has been a source of fric- tion between Italy and Austria. The first indication of Italy's waver- ing in the support of her allies was when she threw her influence against Germany at the Algeciras Conference in 1906. Again in 1908 Italy was much irritated when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby strengthening her position on the Adriatic Sea. But the most serious blow to the diplomatic group of the Triple Alliance was given by Italy in 1911 when she declared war on Tur- key, a country which had come to be regarded as a member of the Triple Alliance group. Germany and Aus- tria were forced to stand by and allow Italy to weaken the influence of the Triple Alliance by dismembering Tur- key. All of these events indicated that Italy's attitude at the outbreak of a European war would be uncertain. Her position was made more precarious by her extensive coast line. Any war which involved Great Britain as an enemy would expose Italy to attack by the powerful British navy. Apart, however, from questions of vital self-interest, Italy maintained that under the terms of the Triple Al- liance she was not bound to come to the aid of Germany and Austria-Hun- gary, because, in her view, Austria- Hungary had been the aggressor and Italy's obligations under the treaty contemplated only a defensive war. Ac- cordingly on August 1, 1911, Italy de- clared that she would remain neutral. Italy's declaration of neutrality did not, as the Italian Foreign Minister stated, "signify the relinquishment of Italian interests in the Balkans and in the Adriatic, but, on the contrary, the persuasion that such interests and as- pirations shall be validly supported while the neutrality be maintained." (I.G.B. No. 2.) Italy's next step was a most dif- ficult one to determine. Should she - remain neutral she could expect to gain little from either side, and she had to fear from her former allies, Germany and Austria, in case of their military success, a revengeful attitude. On the other hand to join the Entente allies was a difficult policy to pursue. In the first place it involved the moral question of turning against her former allies. In the second place the Rus- sian and Serbian policy in the Balkans was not certain to be in agreement with Italy's ambition to control the Adriatic. Other considerations also caused Italy to hesitate before casting in her lot with the Entente allies. Such were the unfavorable financial condi- tion of the country, the pro-German sympathies of the royal family, and the opposition of ex-Premier Giolitti,* * Giolttti, Giovanni. Born (1843) at Mon- dovi in Province of Cuneo. Educated at Turin. Served in a department of Ministry of Finance. Elected to Chamber of Deputies. 1889 became OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 29 who, with a strong personal following in the Italian Parliament, maintained that Italy should not enter the war. For 10 months the contest between the neutralists and the interventionists went on in Italy. Great efforts were made by Germany and Austria, espe- cially through Prince von Biilow and his Italian wife, to influence public opinion in Italy. It was clear, how- ever, that there was a steady drift of popular sentiment in favor of the En- tente. This movement was strength- ened, too, by the death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in October, 1914, who was popularly regarded as a strong sym- pathizer with Germany and Austria- Hungary. Baron Sidney Sonnino,* who succeeded him, is regarded as one of the most astute Italian statesmen since Cavour. In the meantime the Italian government had entered upon a series of communications with Austria- Hungary looking to a satisfaction of Italian aspirations and interests in the Balkans. The Italian Foreign Minis- ter began by setting forth that, under Article VII of the Triple Alliance, Italy was entitled to compensations, in the event of any occupation of Serbian territory, even temporarily, by Aus- tria-Hungary. The Austrian officials Minister of the Treasury and following year Minister of Finance. Forced to resign because of his policy of extreme economy. Became President of Ministry in 1892. Introduced many reforms in favor of lower classes. In 1893 compelled to resign because of bank scan- dals. Became Minister of the Interior in 1901, resigned May, 1903. Prime Minister several times. Resigned last time in 1914 on veto of colonial budget. * Sonnino, Sidney, Baron. Born (1847) at Pisa. Graduated from university there (1865). In diplomatic service (1867-72), and after 1880 deputy in Italian legislature. Minister of Finance (1893-94). Minister of Treasury, Pre- mier and Minister of the Interior in 1906 and 1909-10. Accepted portfolio of Foreign Af- fairs December, 1914, when Italy made prep- arations to enter European war. Author of works on social and political topics. were not inclined to admit, at first, that Italy had any valid claim to com- pensations under the terms of the treaty of alliances. From this stand, however, Austria soon receded, probably under pressure from Germany, and conceded the prin- ciple that Italy was entitled to com- pensations. There followed several months of protracted negotiations. Italy demanded as the minimum that she would accept in the way of com- pensations "the district of the Tren- tino, a new district on the Isonzo, the special treatment of Trieste, the ces- sion of some islands of the Curzolari Archipelago, a declaration of Aus- tria's disinterestedness in Albania, and the recognition of our possession of Valona and Dodecanesia." To these demands Austria was willing to con- cede only a portion of the Trentino and was unwilling to make any cession before the end of the war. These fruitless negotiations culmi- nated in the declaration by Italy, on May 4, that she no longer considered herself bound by the provisions of the Triple Alliance. After three weeks of hesitation during which public excite- ment in Italy reached a high pitch, Italy finally declared war on Austria, May 24, 1915. Just before the final break, according to a statement made by the German Chancellor, Austria- Hungary made a last attempt to pur- chase Italy's neutrality offering (1) the Italian part of the Tirol; (2) the western bank of the Isonzo "in so far as the population is purely Italian," and the town of Gradisca; (3) sov- ereignty over Valona and a free hand in Albania; (4) special treatment of Italian nationals in Austria and am- nesty for political prisoners who were natives in the ceded provinces; (5) Trieste to be made an Imperial free 30 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR city, and to have an Italian University. Furthermore, it was stated that Aus- tria would make these concessions at once and not wait for the conclusion of the war. Japan's Position. Japan's entrance into the European War was due to her treaty of alliance with Great Brit- ain. After the Chinese-Japanese War Japan was deprived of the fruits of her victory, when Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula had to be returned to China at the demand of Russia, France, and Germany. Smarting un- der this humiliation, Japan turned to Great Britain and in 1902 negotiated a treaty of alliance, according to the terms of which Japan agreed to come to the defense of Great Britain's east- ern possessions if she were attacked by more than one Power. Great Britain on the other hand insured Japan against a European coalition such as had intervened at the conclusion of the Chinese-Japanese War. At the outbreak of the European War Japan saw her opportunity to re- venge her humiliation at the close of the Chinese War. Actuated also by a determination to carry out her obliga- tions to Great Britain, the Japanese representative in Berlin presented an ultimatum on August 19, 1911, "ad- vising" Germany to withdraw all war- ships from Asiatic waters and turn over to Japan the territory of Kiao- chow before September 15, 1911, which territory Japan promised eventually to restore to China. This port and surrounding territory had been ob- tained by Germany from China in 1897 as a compensation for the mur- der of two German missionaries. The Germans had fortified the harbor strongly and had made it a fine naval base. As Germany refused to reply to the Japanese demand, Japan declared war on August 23, 1914. The Japa- nese Foreign Minister defended this action on the ground that Japan was bound by treaty obligations to come to the aid of her ally, Great Britain, and that Germany's position at Kiaochow gravely threatened the maintenance of peace in the Far East and the inde- pendence and integrity of China which Japan had bound herself to maintain. Turkey. Germanic influence had for a number of years prior to the out- break of the war been predominant in Turkey. It was natural, therefore, that Turkish sympathies would be with the Teutonic allies. But Turkey hesi- tated, at first, to make common cause with Germany because of her exposed position and the fact that her recent experiences in the Balkan wars had left her exhausted. Events, however, rapidly forced Turkey to abandon her attitude of quasi-neutrality. Shortly after the outbreak of the war two Ger- man warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, in order to escape capture by the British and French fleets, sought refuge in the Dardanelles. The de- mand of England and France that these ships should either be forced to put to sea or be interned was answered by Turkey stating that she had pur- chased the ships from Germany. Tur- key also refused to remove the German crews of the two vessels. The Triple Entente also resented the action of Turkey in closing the Dardanelles and in serving notice that the "capitula- tions," under the terms of which the national subjects of various Powers were given special privileges in Turkey, would be revoked on October 1, 1914. When on October 29 the former Ger- man warship, the Breslau, bombarded the Russian Black Sea port of Theo- dosia, Russia accepted this as a dec- laration of war and the following day OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 31 the Russian Ambassador at Constanti- nople demanded his passports. This action of Russia was followed by France and England declaring war on Turkey, November 5, 191-1. Turkey's entrance into the war aroused the hope in Germany and some fear in Great Britain and France that a Holy War would be proclaimed by the Sultan which would arouse the Moslem popu- lations in India, Egypt, and Morocco. The Sultan's efforts in this direction proved unavailing, and no serious up- rising occurred among the Moham- medan subjects of Great Britain and France. The Balkan States. The opening of the European War found the Balkan Peninsula in the political shape given to it by the Treaty of Bucharest, Au- gust 10, 1913, which closed the second Balkan War. This treaty, which rep- resented the latest effort on the part of the European Powers to adjust the Balkan situation, proved unsatisfac- tory to nearly all of the parties con- cerned. Turkey did not accept with good grace the loss of nearly all of her European territory. Bulgaria was bit- ter towards her former allies, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, who she felt had treacherously combined to deprive her of her just rewards. Serbia re- sented the action of Austria, Italy, and Germany in depriving her of an outlet to the Adriatic. Montenegro was dis- appointed in being forced to surrender Scutari. Finally Albania, the new state created by the Powers to thwart Serbia's ambition to reach the Adri- atic, was in a state of ill-disguised an- archy under the shadowy control of Prince William of Wied.* * William of Wied, Prince (Wilhelm Fried- rich Heinrich). Born (1876) at Neuwied, Prussia. Studied law and political science at Jena. Later graduated with distinction at the Kriegsakademie. Accepted throne of Albania As has been seen, Serbia had been involved in the war from the beginning and Montenegro soon threw in her lot with her neighbor. The attitude of the other Balkan states was a matter of great concern to the diplomats of the allied groups. During the months suc- ceeding the outbreak of the war, a dip- lomatic struggle ensued in these states, with the aim of winning their support to one or the other side. In this struggle the diplomats of the Teutonic Powers had certain distinct advantages. In the first place the mon- archs (Constantine I,* Ferdinand I,f Charles I $) of the three states, offered to him by great Powers of Europe (1914). Reign troubled and forced to leave country September, 1914. Albanian Senavte elected as ruler Burhan Eddin, the son of the former sultan of Turkey. His bitter opponent and rival for the throne was Essad Pascha. * Constantine I., King of Greece, born (1868) in Athens, son of King George I. and Olga, niece of Czar Nicholas I. Studied at the Universities of Berlin and Leipsic. Mar- ried (1889) a sister of Emperor William II. of Germany. Received careful military training. Commander in chief of Greek forces in Turk- ish War of 1897. In the Balkan War (1912-13) acquitted himself so well, he was hailed as na- tional hero. Became King of the Hellenes on March 21, 1913. Continued campaigns against Turks and Bulgarians and doubled area of country. During the European war he main- tained a strong pro-German attitude as a re- sult of which he was compelled to abdicate by the Entente Allies. He was succeeded by his second son Alexander. f Ferdinand I. Born (1861) in Vienna. Re- ceived excellent education. Offered throne of Bulgaria (1886) and took oath to constitution and title of Prince (1887). Not recognized by Great Powers or Turkey until 1896. In 1908 proclaimed full independence of Bulgaria and assumed title of King. Royal title recognized by Powers and Turkey in 1909. Favored form- ation of Balkan League and prosecution of Balkan War (1912-13). As a result of this war territory increased, but not sufficiently to satisfy Ferdinand. $ Charles I. Born (1839). Served in Prus- sian army. Elected Prince of Rumania (1866). Country in wretched condition. Showed tact and statesmanship in work of reorganization. Helped Russia in Russo-Turkish War (1877). Declared independence of Rumania shortly after beginning of war. In 1881 crowned King. Country developed, education advanced. Held aloof from recent war in Balkans. Be- loved by peasants, but opposed by landowning Boyards (lower nobility). 32 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, were related by blood and marriage with the Teutonic royal families. Moreover, as the British Prime Minister (H. H. As- quith *) indicated in a speech in the House of Commons, Germany had a distinct advantage in that she could conduct her negotiations with a single- ness of purpose, as her interests and those of Austria-Hungary were identi- cal. On the other hand, the Entente diplomats had to consider the interests, not always identical, of three and, later, four Powers. Finally the En- tente allies were handicapped by the fact that Russian ambitions in the Bal- kans conflicted with the national aspi- rations of the smaller Balkan states; that Italy's territorial ambitions in Al- bania ran counter to the legitimate as- pirations of Serbia, and that Greece resented the attempt of Itah T to gain a foothold on the coast of Asia Miner, which was racially and historically Greek. In view of these conditions it is not surprising that the efforts of the En- tente diplomats, even had they been conducted more skillfully than they ap- pear to have been, should have failed. Bulgaria. — The second Balkan War left, as has been noted, a heritage or bitterness and hatred among the former Balkan allies. The Bulgars, smarting under the humiliation of the Treaty of Bucharest, welcomed the opportunity * Asquith, Herbert Henry. Born (1852) in Yorkshire. Admitted to bar after gradua- tion from Oxford. Became member of Par- liament and won favor of Gladstone. Made Home Secretary (1882). Favored free trade. Helped turn Conservatives out of office (1905) and became Chancellor of the Exchequer under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and because of feeble health of Prime Minister, virtual head of government. Favored old-age pension bill, which was passed. Became Prime Minister (1908) and a liberal programme accelerated. House of Lords sheared of power of veto, be- cause opposed to social legislation and defeat of budget. He resigned on December 5, 1916, and was succeeded by David Lloyd George. to revenge themselves upon their for- mer allies. Completely disillusioned by their experiences of the past few years, they put aside all feeling of generosity or gratitude and frankly adopted a programme of "real politik." To the diplomats of the Entente and the Teutonic allies the Bulgarian au- thorities made it clear that all ques- tion of sentiment, so far as Bulgaria was concerned, was to be disregarded and that they were prepared to sell out to the highest bidder. Great Britain and France brought pressure to bear on Rumania, Serbia, and Greece to sat- isfy, in part, the territorial demands of Bulgaria. The Teutonic Powers made counter proposals promising Bulgaria a large part of Serbian territory in case of the success of the Central Pow- ers. For more than a year Bulgaria hesitated, apparently weighing the rela- tive advantages of the rival proposals. In the meantime the Bulgarian army was mobilized, in order to be prepared when the final decision was reached. It became increasingly evident as the months passed that the attitude of King Ferdinand and the military leaders was favorable to the Teutonic allies. Mat- ters were brought to a head when, on Oct. 3, 1915, Russia notified Bulgaria that if she did not, within 24 hours, break with the Teutonic Powers, the Russian Minister would withdraw from Sofia. A similar demand was made by France, while Great Britain stated that if Bulgaria precipitated hostilities in the Balkans she would break off rela- tions with her. On Oct. 8, 1915, Bul- garia replied, rejecting these demands and throwing her support to the Teu- tonic Powers. In a manifesto issued by M. Radoslavoff,* the Bulgarian Pre- * Vaseil Radoslavoff, born in Lowatsch; stud- ied law at Heidelberg; at various times served as Minister of Justice, Minister of the Interior, OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 33 mier, there was set forth the reasons for Bulgaria's decision. He stated frankly that considerations of self-in- terest had dictated the step. He pointed out that Bulgaria's chief eco- nomic interests were with the Teutonic Powers and Turkey, and that these in- terests would be seriously menaced if Constantinople fell into the hands of Russia. In reviewing the proposals of concessions made to Bulgaria by the opposing groups, he held that the Teu- tonic proposals were more advanta- geous to Bulgaria. And finally he had reached the conclusion that the pro- gress of the war indicated the probable success of the Central Powers, and it was vital to the interests of Bulgaria to be on the side of the victors. Greece. — Conflicting influences and interests complicated the situation in Greece at the outbreak of the war. On the one hand, the royal family was closely related to the Hohenzollerns, the Greek Queen Sophia being a sister of the German Emperor, William II. On the other hand, the Premier Venizelos * felt that the best interests of Greece would be served by joining the Entente allies. Popular sympathy in the coun- try appeared to be with the Entente group, and especially with France. In addition, Greece was bound by a treaty of alliance with Serbia which obligated her to come to the aid of Serbia if she and Premier; did much as Premier in 1913 to bring Balkan War to an end; became Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs (October, 1915) during European War; made important declarations of Bulgarian policy; shot at twice (March, 1916). * Vexizelos, Eleutherios. Born (1864) on island of Crete. Graduated (1886) from Uni- versity of Athens in law. Made brilliant repu- tation as a lawyer. At 25 chosen to Cretan legislature. Minister of Justice in 1899. Fa- vored political union of Crete and Greece. Chosen Premier of Crete (1910). Central fig- ure in events in the Balkans. Greek premier in 1910. Had prominent part in revising Greek constitution. Championed side of Triple En- tente. were attacked by Bulgaria. During the first months of the war the diplomats of France and Great Britain directed their efforts to winning all of the Bal- kan states to the support of the En- tente. With this end in view both Greece and Serbia were urged to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria. These efforts were seconded by M. Venizelos, but the Greek King flatly opposed any territorial concessions and maintained that the best interests of Greece would be served by the observ- ance of strict neutrality. The break between the King and his chief Minis- ter led to the resignation of the latter in March, 1915. His return to office shortly after as a result of popular ap- proval expressed in the elections to the new Chamber was hailed as a victory for the Entente, and it was generally expected that Greece would soon enter the war. The situation became acute when, in September, 1915, Bulgaria mobilized her army and Greece did like- wise. Bulgaria's entrance into the war on the side of the Teutonic Powers raised the question of Greece's obliga- tion under the treaty of alliance with Serbia. M. Venizelos maintained that Greece was bound to come to Serbia's aid, but the King once more interposed his objections, holding that the treaty contemplated only a local Balkan war and not one in which the Great Powers were involved. Again M. Venizelos re- signed. In the meantime arrangements had been made by the Greek Premier with the Entente allies for the landing of French and English troops at the Greek port of Saloniki, which troops were to be used to aid Serbia. This use of a Greek port was a clear viola- tion of Greek neutrality and the Greek government entered a formal protest. It was understood on all sides that this protest was purely formal, and the 34 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR landing of troops continued. The resig- nation of M. Venizelos aroused some ap- prehension in France and England and pressure was brought to bear upon the new Premier, M. Zaimis,* to define his position. He stated that the attitude of Greece would be "neutrality, with the character of sincerest benevolence towards the Entente Powers." King Constantine, however, vigorously pro- tested against the violation of Greek territory by Great Britain and France. He maintained that it was the sheerest hypocrisy for these countries to pro- test against the violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans, while they themselves were violating Greek neu- trality. He was strongly supported in these views by Stephanos Skouloudis, who succeeded Zaimis as Premier and who also took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The period of the premiership of Skouloudis was very stormy. The Al- lies seemed to fear that their Saloniki expedition was threatened from the rear by the Greek army. This fear of an attack compelled General Sarrail to keep a strong force on the Macedonian front. In order to remove this threat the Allies from time to time made de- mands on the Greek government which weakened the latter's military posi- tion. The Allies desired the use of the Peloponnesian railway to transport the regenerated Serbian army from Corfu to Saloniki. This was refused on the ground that it would be a violation of neutrality. After some hesitation the British Foreign Office announced that the troops would be transported by water. * Zaimis, Alexander. Born (1855) in Athens. Educated at universities of Athens, Leipsic, Berlin (Ph.D.), and Paris. Elected deputy (1885); Minister of Justice, (1890-93); presi- dent of Chamber of Deputies (1895-97); Pre- mier (1897-99 and 1901-02). Brought about annexation of Island of Crete to Greece (1913). This demand was only a preliminary to those which were to follow. In June, 1916, the Bulgarians crossed the Mace- donian frontier and seized several Greek forts. When war was not immediately declared on Bulgaria, the Allied Pow- ers demanded that the Greek army be demobilized. To enforce their demands, they blockaded the Greek ports and seized vessels and supplies in the har- bors. Martial law was declared in Sa- loniki and the Greek military com- mander was superseded by a French- man. The Greek government sent iden- tical notes of protest against interfer- ence with her trade by the Entente Pow- ers to the United States and to all the South American governments. Never- theless the result of the blockade was the demobilization of the 12 senior classes on June 9th. As soon as order was restored a new set of demands was made on the Greek government. Before they were officially received, however, the Skouloudis gov- ernment resigned. Former Premier Alexander Zaimis was again called upon to head the cabinet. The first act of his government was to accept uncondi- tionally the demands of the Allies, which included briefly, (1) demobiliza- tion of the rest of the Greek army, (2) replacing of the Skouloudis cabinet with a business cabinet favorable to the Allies, (3) dissolution of the chamber and the holding of new elections, and, (4) replacement of certain police func- tionaries who had permitted insults against the Allied legations. Upon the acceptance of these demands the Allied blockade was withdrawn. During this period of national un- rest there was gradually springing up a strong anti-German party. The seiz- ure of the garrison at Kavala by the Bulgarians, the abandonment of the Macedonian forts without a struggle OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 35 and the entrance of Rumania into the war, brought the move to a head. A Committee of National Defense was es- tablished by those who were opposed to the supine attitude of the Greek gov- ernment. It set up a provisional form of government for Macedonia and de- manded that the Bulgarians be driven out. In order to aid this movement to succeed the Allies took an active part in it. They seized enemy merchant- men in the Piraeus, the port of Athens. They also demanded and received all Greek ports and the use of the tele- graph system. On account of inabil- ity to handle the situation the Zaimis ministry resigned. The pro-Ally movement reached its height when a formidable revolution broke out in Crete during the third week in September. Venizelos immedi- ately left Athens with a number of sup- porters for the seat of the revolution. One of his chief followers was Admiral Coudouriotis, whose desertion of the King left the latter in a very serious predicament. A proclamation estab- lishing a provisional government was issued by Venizelos and Admiral Cou- douriotis, and within a very short time Macedonia and all of the Greek islands were under their control. The provi- sional government declared war on Ger- many and Bulgaria on Nov. 25, 1916. The Allies heartily approved the new Venizelos government and proceeded to make further demands on the new Greek government, headed by Spyridon Lam- bros. The new demands included the turning over to the Allies of the Greek navy, certain strategical railways, forts, mails, telegraphs, police service, naval material and the Piraeus. They further demanded that any Greek who so desired be permitted to join the new government. All these demands were acceded to as a result of necessity. Apparently still fearing an attack in their rear, the Allies demanded that all the arms and munitions belonging to the Greek army and navy be turned over to them. The Greek government was given until Dec. 1, 1916, to grant this last request. King Constantine re- fused to agree, marines were landed from the Allied fleet, and a scene simi- lar to the days of the French Revolu- tion occurred in Athens. True to his promise, Vice Admiral du Fournet fired upon royalist troops, when the time of his ultimatum expired. Thereupon a regular civil war broke out in Athens. Royalist troops fired upon Venizelists and vice versa. As a result of a truce King Constantine agreed to surrender all the mountain guns of the Greek army. When this was accomplished all the Allied marines were withdrawn to the fleet with the exception of a small guard. The Entente nations continued to exert a political and economic pressure upon the Greek government. King Con- stantine adopted a passive attitude of submission to the demands of the Allies and determined to rely on the ultimate recognition by the world that his treat- ment had been unjust. The long con- flict between King Constantine and the Entente came to an end on June 12, 1917, when the King abdicated in favor of his second son Alexander. This step was taken at the dictation of the Allies, who decided, after investigation, that the King and his elder son George were strongly pro-German. Zaimis, the prime minister, resigned and was suc- ceeded by Venizelos, the staunch friend of the Entente. One of the first acts of the new ministry was to declare war on Bulgaria and Germany (July 2). Al- lied control was withdrawn with the ex- ception of that over telegraphs and press censorship. Immediate steps 36 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR were taken to actively join the Entente army around Saloniki. This removed the continual threat of an attack by Greek forces in the rear of General Sarrail's army. See Southeastern Theatre, Rumania. — Somewhat the same di- vision of sentiment obtained in Rumania as in Greece at the outbreak of the European War. The King, Charles I, was a member of the Hohenzollern fam- ily, and it was rumored that there was a secret treaty between Rumania, Ger- many, and Austria-Hungary. The mass of the Rumanian population is composed of illiterate peasants, but among the educated classes there was a strong pro-French and especially pro- Italian sentiment. The Rumanians claim descent from Roman colonists ; and there has always been a strong sen- timental attachment to Italy among the Rumanians. Apart from conflicting sentimental influences, the question of the wisest policy for Rumania to pur- sue to advance her material interests was not easy to determine. On the one hand a large Rumanian population was included in the Austrian dominions in Transylvania, while on the other hand the Russian province of Bessarabia was equally Rumanian in nationality and more valuable economically than Tran- sylvania. At the head of the Rumanian minis- try was John Bratianu, one of the shrewdest statesmen in the Balkans. He advocated a policy of w r aiting, with the intention of entering the war at the proper time when the greatest reward could be obtained by the least fighting. The death of King Charles in October, 1914, and the entrance of Italy into the war, were expected to influence Ru- mania to join forces with the Entente allies. But the failure of the Russian campaign in Galicia and Bulgaria's alliance with the Teutonic Powers caused Rumania to continue her policy of watchful waiting. She continued this policy until April 28, 1916, when the Rumanian minister at Vienna presented a note to the Aus- tro-Hungarian Foreign Minister which said that Rumania considered herself at war with Austria-Hungary since nine o'clock the previous evening. She maintained that her treaties with the Central Powers had been continually broken since the war began and that Rumanians in Austria-Hungary were being persecuted. She intervened to prevent these persecutions, to shorten the war if possible, and to realize her national ideal. She thought an alli- ance with the Entente allies would best enable her to accomplish the last pur- pose. Portugal. Portugal was bound by a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, and at the outbreak of the European War Portugal stated that she was pre- pared to carry out her treaty obliga- tions whenever Great Britain desired her to do so. However, Portugal did not enter the war until more than a year after the beginning of hostilities, although there were clashes between Portuguese and German troops in Af- rica. On Feb. 24, 1916, at the request of Great Britain, Portugal seized a number of German and Austrian ships lying in Portuguese harbors. On March 8, 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal, stating that the seizure of German vessels was done at the dicta- tion of Great Britain, and could be re- garded in no other light than as a hos- tile move against Germany. Czecho-Slovakia. This is the name of a new nation which was born as a result of the war. It comprises the former Austrian states of Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia, and the dis- OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 37 trict of Hungary known as Slovakia. It has a population of about 13 mil- lions with an area of 52,000 square miles. The natural wealth is estimated at 15 billions of dollars. Its declara- tion of independence was published at Paris October 18, 1918; the local gov- ernment was taken over in Prague Oc- tober 28, 1918, and the republic for- mally proclaimed the next day. The republic had maintained four armies, one in Bohemia, one in France, one in Italy, and a force of approximately 75,000 men operating in Russia and Siberia partially at the request of the Allied governments. The first presi- dent of the republic was Thomas Gar- rigue Masaryk, who was also one of the chief leaders in the movement for an independent Czecho-Slovakia. In the first part of August, 1918, the British government formally recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied nation. The Italian and French governments had made special agreements with the Czecho-Slovak National Council in re- gard to the Czecho-Slovak army which had been formed in each of those coun- tries {see below). The British govern- ment definitely recognized the unity of that army and said that in considera- tion of their efforts to achieve inde^ pendence, Great Britain regarded the Czecho-Slovak armies as constituting an Allied and pledged army waging regular warfare against Austria-Hun- gary and Germany. It also recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the representative of the future gov- ernment. At the beginning of Sep- tember the United States government also recognized the Czecho-Slovak Na- tional Council as a belligerent govern- ment clothed with proper authority and recognized the state of war between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. At this time the Czecho-Slovak forces were in the neighborhood of Chita and the com- posite Allied force was advancing in the Ussuri Province from Vladivostok. For an account of their military cam- paigns see Military Operations, Eastern Front. For the purposes of convenience the following dates of the declaration of war are given: CENTRAL POWERS Austria against Serbia — July 28, 1914. Austria against Russia — August 6, 1914. Austria against Montenegro — August 9, 1914. Austria against Japan — August 27, 1914. Austria against Belgium — August 28. 1914. Bulgaria against Serbia — October 14, 1915. Germany against Russia — August 1, 1914. Germany against France — August 3, 1914. Germany against Belgium — August 4, 1914. Germany against Portugal — March 9, 1916. Germany against Rumania — September 14, 1916. ' Turkey against the Allies — November 23, 1914. Turkey against Rumania — August 29, 1916. ENTENTE ALLIES Brazil against Germany — October 26, 1917. China against Austria and Germany — August 14, 1917. Costa Rica against Germany — May 24, 1918. Cuba against Germany — April 7, 1917. France against Germany — August 3, 1914. ' France against Austria — August 13, 1914. France against Turkey — November 5, 1914. France against Bulgaria — October 16, 1915. Great Britain against Germany — August 4, 1914. Great Britain against Austria — August 13, 1914. Great Britain against Turkey — November 5, 1914. Great Britain against Bulgaria — October 15, 1914. Greece (provisional government) against Ger- many and Bulgaria — November 28, 1916. Greece (Alexander's government) against Ger- many and Bulgaria — July 2, 1917. Guatemala against Germany — April 23, 1918. Hayti against Germany — July 15, 1918. Honduras against Germany — July 19, 1918. Italy against Austria — May 24, 1915. Italy against Turkey — August 21, 1915. Italy against Bulgaria — October 19, 1915. Italy against Germany — August 28, 1916. Japan against Germany — August 23, 1914. 38 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Liberia against Germany — August 4, 1917. Montenegro against Germany — August 9, 1914. Nicaragua against Germany — May 7, 1918. Panama against Germany — April 7, 1917. Panama against Austria — December 10, 1917. Portugal against Germany — November 23, 1914. (Passed resolutions authorizing military in- terventions as treaty ally of Great Britain.) Portugal against Germany — May 19, 1915. (Military aid granted.) Rumania against Austria — August 27, 1916. (Allies of Austria also considered it a dec- laration against them.) Russia against Turkey — November 3, 1914. Russia against Bulgaria — October 19, 1915. San Marino against Austria — May 24, 1915. Serbia rgainst Germany — August 6, 1914. Serbia against Turkey — December 2, 1914. Serbia against Bulgaria — October 19, 1915. Siam against Germany and Austria — July 22, 1917. The Hedjaz (Arabia) against Central Powers —June 9, 1916. United States against Germany — April 6, 1917. United States against Austria — December 7, 1917. IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS The military operations of the great war, in which the Central Powers were by turns on the offensive and on the defensive, hinge on the plan of the German general staff according to which Austria, with a small German force, was to hold Russia in check, while Germany crushed France, both Central Powers uniting for the subse- quent Russian campaign. The strategy of the war from this viewpoint falls easily under the follow- ing main divisions : I, Introduction and discussion of mobilization and re- sources ; II, Western theatre, or cam- paign against France; III, Eastern theatre, or campaigns against Russia; IV, Southern theatre, or campaigns against Serbia (involving Bulgaria's entry into the war) and Italian cam- paign ; V, Southeastern theatre, or Turkish campaigns, including Suez, Gallipoli, and Caucasus. In no theatre of the war was the strategy unconnect- ed with events taking place or about to take place on other fronts. I. Introduction. The war that broke out in 1914 involved three continents and the seven seas. Not only its com- batants, but the killed and wounded, were to be numbered by millions. Every known resource of mechanical ingenuity was drawn upon, and old and forgotten methods of warfare were brought into play side by side with the most power- ful modern artillery, while aeronautics for the first time had occasion to show its worth. (See section Aerial Opera- tions.) The edifice of international law, of the conventions of warfare, so painfully built up after centuries of struggle, was toppled over as a thing of no account. With these considera- tions before us we must remark that in the space here available nothing but a statement of the principal facts can be attempted. But even so, the nature of the struggle on one front, the west- ern, calls for a word or two. When both sides simultaneously reached the sea there began a siege over the whole front that gave the struggle in this theatre a character unique in military history. At certain places in the "line" 32 parallel lines of German trenches were discovered by reconnoissance. The trench systems of this front were esti- mated, after including communication trenches, to be 25,000 miles long. Frontal attack became a necessity, since flanks there were none, and yet these attacks all proved failures, for the experience gained under the new conditions had not as yet led to such a disposition of forces and resources as to carry them through to a decision. The most desperate efforts were made, first by one and then by the other side, to raise the siege, so to say, by a con- centration at some selected point, and thus break through and end a situa- tion that only a few years ago would have been deemed intolerable. The war was finally won as a result of a series of brilliant flank attacks after the failure of major German frontal attacks. On the other fronts the phenomena of what may well now be called old- fashioned warfare were more or less reproduced, but even in their case a marked tendency to approximate to the 39 40 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR conditions in France manifested itself — indeed may be said to have estab- lished itself on a part of the Russian lines and to a certain extent on the Italian. A marked feature of this war was the so-called mobilization of in- dustries. So great was the draft made on the industrial resources of the coun- tries involved that the struggle, other conditions equal, may be said to have resolved itself into a competition by each side to outstrip the other in sup- plies and munitions. Mobilization and Concentration. When it became evident that the gen- eral European situation was becoming more and more serious, covering troops {troupes de couierture) were sent by the French government to the eastern frontier. These troops, five corps in all, or 200,000 men, with cavalry, began their movement on July 31 at 9 p. m., and had completed it on August 3 at noon. They were not to cross a zone 8 kilometers wide along the frontier, in order to prevent any clash with the Germans, so long as war was unde- clared. On the German side the Em- peror, on July 31, decreed the Kriegs- gefahrzustand, or a sort of state of martial law, under which certain mili- tary measures could be adopted on the frontier, and the telegraph and railway services taken over by the military au- thorities. Mobilization proper, however, began in both Germany and in France on August 2, in France at midnight. It was asserted that in Germany the op- eration was set afoot well before the formal date given above. In both coun- tries it was carried on with the preci- sion that the whole world had learned to expect of Germany, but of which, as regards France, it was somewhat doubt- ful. The purpose of mobilization, it may be recalled here, is to pass from peace to war footing. Each man liable to service reports on a given date at a specified point, draws his arms, uni- form, and equipment, and joins a designated organization. Companies, battalions, regiments, etc., are thus brought up to war strength; transport material is requisitioned and train ser- vice prepared. The French mobiliza- tion, in two periods of ten and six days respectively, closed on August 18; the German, according to the French, on the 16th. German authorities, how- ever, give the closing date as the 20th. Mobilization was followed by concen- tration. The French armies began their con- centration in the east of France from Belfort to the Belgian frontier, thus respecting the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg. By this course the French, incidentally, gave the Germans choice of ground and freedom of man- oeuvre. It should be recollected, how- ever, that the exact intentions of the German general staff were unknown; they might attack either on the right or the left bank of the Meuse, or attempt a demonstration by the Oise, or even risk a break from Nancy on to Verdun. Further, the possibility of the offensive had. to be kept in view, and the offen- sive, for the French, was possible only in Alsace and Lorraine. In other words, the concentration of the French w r as both offensive and defensive ; while guarding the approaches on the east, they would be ready to face in any di- rection. As a matter of fact, the plan of concentration could not be fully car- ried out ; it had to be modified because of the German advance through Bel- gium. Hence, in general terms, the French armies were stretched out from Belfort north and then northwest towards the Sambre, to join hands, if possible, with the English and Belgians. MILITARY OPERATIONS 41 Certain corps even pushed their way into Belgium itself. The German problem of concentra- tion was simpler, if, as there is reason to believe, their intention from the first was to smash their way through Bel- gium. They contented themselves with merely observing the strong eastern (French) frontier, and disposed their other armies northward through Treves, etc., to Aix-la-Chapelle, in position to inaugurate and carry through a vast sweeping movement through Belgium. They crossed the frontier of this coun- try without waiting for either mobiliza- tion or concentration, using for this purpose troops kept immediately avail- able near the frontier. On the periods of mobilization and concentration of the other combatants it is not necessary to dwell. In Aus- tria-Hungary the operation was merely a repetition of the German process, and, like that, carried out with prompt- ness and accuracy. Russia was ex- pected to be slow, but on the contrary was so energetic as to suggest a belief that she began before the formal dec- laration of war. England had no army to mobilize, but she prepared her "ex- peditionary force," crossed it over to the Continent, and got into position op- posite the German right in time to offer a resistance that was invaluable to the Allied cause. General Strategy and Resources. The War of the Nations originated as a struggle on the part of Austria-Hun- gary and Germany against the "Slavic Peril" — against the huge Slav empire of Russia and the small Slav kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. But from the very beginning of the conflict, de- fense against Russia was of minor in- terest as compared with the attack on Belgium, Britain, and France. The reason was quite simple. The German General Staff * had planned, so said the military experts, that the bulk of the German army should be hurled first against France, and then, having crushed France, be transferred to the east to turn back the tide of Russia's slow-mobilizing multitudes. For Rus- sia, with all her 171 millions of inhabi- tants in Europe and in Asia, was spread over so vast an area, and was so defi- cient in railways that 10 of her 36 army corps (an army corps may be counted as 50,000 men) could not be expected to arrive on the scene in the first month, and the remaining 26 could not begin a serious attack within the first few weeks of the war. Germany could leave 5 of her 25 army corps to coop- erate with 12 Austrian corps in hold- ing back the Russian advance guard, while 2 Austrian corps "punished" Serbia, and the remaining 2 Austrian and 19 German corps crushed France. The German armies in the west would isweep across Belgium — with its net- work of convenient railways and smooth highways — turning the flank of the strong line of French fortifications along the Franco-German frontier, and swoop down upon Paris with irresistible might. The French army annihilated, the German troops could be shifted from the west to the east (it is only a little more than 500 miles from Bel- gium to Russia, that is, twice the dis- * At the outbreak of the war, the Chief of the German General Staff was Helmuth von Moltke, who was born in Mecklenburg- Schwerin in 1848, served in the Franco-Prus- sian War of 1870-1871, was attached to the General Staff as adjutant under his famous uncle, Field Marshal von Moltke, and was ap- pointed Chief of the General Staff and general of infantry in 1906. During the course of the War of the Nations, he was superseded in chief command of the German forces by General Erich von Falkenhayn, who was born at Burg Belchau in 1861, served in China several years, acted as chief of staff of the 16th, and later of the 4th Army Corps, and was appointed minister of war in 1913. 42 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR tance from Albany to Buffalo) and reserves could be brought up to defeat the advancing Russians. The attack on France and Belgium, however, met with such fierce resistance that al- though 13 reserve corps were sent into France on the heels of 21 active corps, in August, followed by 4 substitute re- serve corps at the end of August, 8 Landwehr corps in September, and 5 semi-corps of reserves in October, in addition to 10 cavalry divisions, the German forces in France and Belgium had to fall back after their first swift stroke and could then do little more than hold a long intrenched battle line against the enemy. This delay in the west ffave the dreaded "Russian hordes" time to mass in Poland for an invasion of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Austro-Hungarian armies, more- over, began to show alarming weakness, and were unable either to conquer the Serbs in the south or to hold back the Russians in the north of the Hapsburg Empire. Germany was now compelled to fight the war on two fronts, shifting her troops back and forth as occasion required, and finding her magnificent strategic railways of incalculable value. Skillful distribution of forces, able gen- eralship, and superior equipment en- abled the Germans, with Austrian as- sistance, to hold back the Russian in- vaders, and even to take up an advance position in Russian Poland. After five months of the war, Germany was cer- tainly holding her own. Most of Bel- gium, Northeastern France, and part of Russian Poland were occupied by German troops, whereas only a small corner of Alsace and a bit of East Prussia had been lost to French or Russians. The prospect of ultimate victory for the German arms was, how- ever, becoming rather uncertain. To be sure, the danger of a Russian "tidal wave" sweeping over Germany from the east was no longer feared ; but in a long war, where endurance rather than speed of mobilization wins the victory, Ger- many would labor under great difficul- ties. Germany, with a total population of 65,000,000, Austria-Hungary with less than 50,000,000, and later Turkey with about 21,000,000 and Bulgaria with 5,000,000, aggregating 141,- 000,000, were confronted by a coali- tion representing 252,000,000 of Euro- peans, not to speak of Russia's 20,000,000 in Siberia and the vast transmaritime empires of Great Britain and France and later the 110,000,000 inhabitants of the United States. Ac- cording to the best information ob- tainable, Germany had placed between 4 and 5 million men in the field by the end of 1914, that is, for every 16 Ger- mans there was 1 soldier. Germany still had second-rate fighting men and fresh- ly matured 3 T ouths to call upon, but ob- viously the number was limited. France likewise was limited ; an army of 5,000,- 000 would be one-eighth the population. But Russia boasted, in addition to 5^- 000,000 trained warriors, a reserve of population which could furnish 5,- 000,000 more if they could be mus- tered, trained, and equipped. Great Britain, with a population of over 45,- 000,000 to draw upon, was already drilling 1,000,000 or more recruits to take part in the battles of France. From the 15,000,000 white inhabitants of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 100,000 or more sol- diers might be sent to the battlefields of western Europe. The contingents of "native" soldiers brought from Af- rica by Great Britain and France, and the British Indians, were picturesque, but hardly numerous enough to exert an appreciable influence on the final issue. In short, the allies appeared to MILITARY OPERATIONS 43 possess superior resources of men and munitions for the conduct of a pro- tracted war. If joined by Italy, or by one of the Balkan States, the Allies would enjoy a still more marked ad- vantage. Or again, if Austria-Hun- gary should be rent by internal dissen- sions, Germany would be left to fight against overwhelming odds. On the other hand, one of the Allies might con- ceivably refuse to make further sacri- fices, and either make peace or carry on the war in a half-hearted fashion. Or German generalship might win a brilliant victory and destroy part of the Allied army. Into any forecast to the war's outcome, these and similar considerations were bound to inject a considerable amount of uncertainty. The possibility that the Allies would capitulate separately, however, ap- peared very slight indeed after the agreement signed in London, September 5, by Russia, France, and Great Brit- ain, binding themselves not to make terms with Germany until they could do so jointly. Equipment of the Armies. No less perfect than the organization of the enormous armies was the equipment with which they fought. The War of the Nations was a battle of machines, waged with the help of every deadly device science could invent. The fea- ture of the conflict in the Franco-Bel- gian theatre was the new Krupp 11-inch howitzer. (A "gun" throws its pro- jectile in almost a straight line; a "howitzer" discharges its shell at an angle of elevation varying from 15° to 45°; a "mortar" is fired at a still greater angle of elevation, the object being to drop a shell on the top of a fortification or behind the earth-works of the enemy.) The new Krupp how- itzer, weighing nearly 40 tons, was hauled by powerful motors on two heavy motor trucks whose "caterpillar" wheels were shod with great flapping feet so as not to sink in soft ground. Arriving at the scene of action, two trucks were backed up together and the howitzer was ready to throw 11 -inch shells at any object within a radius of six miles. The heaviest portable French siege piece had been the 10.7- inch howitzer, drawn in four parts, and difficult to move, assemble, and mount. Still more formidable than the Krupp "11" was the Austrian 12-inch howit- zer, built at the Skoda works. But the surpassing achievement of the Krupp gun factory at Essen was the produc- tion of a 16-inch (42-centimeter) siege piece which could be transported by rail and readily emplaced on a concrete foundation. From this gun, discharged by electricity, a shell one meter in length, weighing almost a ton, and filled with high explosive, could be hurled some 15 miles. Skilled mechanics from the Essen works accompanied each of the 7 or 8 of these 16-inch pieces which Germany was said to have put in the field. Two of these gigantic howitzers, stationed 10 miles from the inner forts of Antwerp, rendered the elaborate de- fenses of that city worthless. Even the smaller German howitzers were capable of demolishing the forts at Liege and Namur and wrecking the steel-domed cupolas which had been the pride of Belgium's forts. In the field, much smaller guns were ordinarily used. The German army employed a 3-inch gun capable of throwing 20 15-pound shells per minute at an enemy three miles away. The shell was timed to explode just before striking, and would scatter 250 steel bullets in the ranks of the enemy. Gun and carriage together weighed about a ton. Aeroplanes, whose value in warfare had long been discussed, now rendered service in lo- 44 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR eating the enemy, so that the artillery officers could instruct their gunners at what angle to fire at the unseen enemy. The French field gun was of slightly smaller bore than the German, but of greater power and weight. Machine guns or mitrailleuses were also used with telling effect. A machine gun is light enough to be packed on the back of a horse or drawn on a light carriage by a pair of dogs (as in the Belgian army) and even by the individual sol- dier ; it fires from 400 to 500 ordinary rifle bullets per minute. The regular arm of the infantry was the rifle, tipped with the bayonet -for hand-to-hand en- counters. England used the excellent Lee-Enfield rifle, France the Lebel, Rus- sia the Nagant, Belgium the Mauser, Germany the Mauser, and Austria the Mannlicher; of these various makes, the German Mauser possessed the greatest muzzle velocity, although the French had the longest effective range. Almost as important as artillery or fire-arms was the automobile. Motor cars encased in steel and armed with rapid-fire guns accompanied Von Kluck's cavalry on its swift advance. Speedy automobiles and motorcycles were invaluable for reconnoissance and communication where telephone, wire- less telegraph, or aeroplane was not available. Monster searchlights mounted on motor cars illuminated the field of battle by night. The greatest service of the motor, however, was be- hind the firing lines. An army cannot fight unless it is fed. To feed the mil- lions of fighting men, many thousands of motor trucks were ceaselessly em- ployed in conveying incalculable quan- tities of foodstuffs. Finally, some of the most brilliant successes of the Ger- mans were won by hurrying troops in motor trucks to the most effective point on the battle line. Other new devices invented and used during the war will be treated in the subsequent military history. II. Western Theatre. The German armies, by a surprise thrust through Belgium in August, 1914, sought to paralyze the French army. This op- eration failed at the Marne (Septem- ber). Trench warfare resulted in the West, and from the North Sea to the Swiss border the line remained substantially unchanged to July, 1916, the battle of Verdun and the joint Allied offensive (July, 1916) forming the high-water marks of this fighting until the cam- paigns carried out on a grand scale in 1918. The detailed account of military op- erations on this front has seven main steps: (1) The fortunes of the Belgian army up to its escape from Antwerp and safe retreat to the Yser Canal; (2) The relative dispositions of the rival armies of the French and German high commands up to and including the battle of the Marne; (3) The race to the seacoast which resulted in the es- tablishment of the intrenched lines from Dixmude to Belfort ; (4) The attempts of either side to break the intrenched line, including the battles of Ypres, Lille, Lens, and the Champagne drive inaugurated by Joff re to aid the hardly pressed Russians; (5) The battle for Verdun, in which the Germans sought a decision hoping not so much to shat- ter the French line as to shatter the morale of the French people and make a breach in Allied solidarity; (6) The Allied offensive in Picardy, in conjunc- tion with the Russian and Italian ac- tivities in the East and South. (7) The final attempt made by the Ger- mans to break through in 1918 and the successful Allied counter attack. It seems clear that Germany's plan of ac- MILITARY OPERATIONS 45 tion was first to crush France and then to fall upon Russia. What was the shortest road to France? The frontier was heavily fortified; but even other- wise it would have left too narrow a front for the overwhelming armies which Germany intended to set in the field. Hence the shortest road lay through Luxemburg and Belgium. Of natural obstacles there were none; the three fortresses, Liege, Namur, and Maubeuge, were not in supporting re- lation to one another, the Belgian fron- tier was only 120 miles from Paris, and the way lay through the easy valleys of the Oise and of the Meuse. Accordingly the Germans, violat- ing the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, undertook a vast sweeping movement, with its pivot at Mont Donon and its marching flank flung be- yond the Sambre and the Oise. The French, on the other hand, respecting the neutrality of the countries just mentioned, had planned to attack the Franco-German frontier directly, under the following distribution of armies: first army (Dubail) * from the Swiss frontier to Donon; second (de Castel- nau) f from Donon towards Metz; third (Ruffey) in the Woevre, facing the Metz-Thionville frontier region ; * Augustin Yvon Edmond Dubail, born (1851) at Belfort; educated at Saint-Cyr, served in Franco-Prussian War, and later at- tended the Ecole de Guerre; general of brigade (1904); at Saint-Cyr was adjunct professor of geography (1874-76) and of military art and history (1880-85) and then commandant; wrote on his specialties; Commander of the Legion of Honor and possessor of various decorations; Military Governor of Paris during European War. f Edottard de Curieres de Castelnau, born in 1851; served in Franco-Prussian War; col- onel attached to general staff (1896); served in Cochin-China and Algeria; commander of "Iron Division" at Nancy (1899); early in Eu- ropean War commanded Second Army of Lor- raine and came to be known as the "savior of Nancy"; after battle of the Marne took com- mand of the Army of the Somme; chief of the general staff (December, 1915); went to Greece and helped plan defenses of Saloniki. fourth and fifth (Langle de Cary and Lanrezac) on the Belgian frontier. Germany placed in line the following armies: first (Von Kluck) the march- ing flank; second (Von Biilow) ; third (Von Hausen) ; fourth (Duke of Wiirt- temberg) ; j fifth (Crown Prince of Prussia) ; sixth (Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria) ; § seventh (Von Heeringen) ; eighth (Von Deimling), to remain on the defensive in Alsace. What may be counted as a ninth army, under Von Emmich, made up of ele- ments in immediate readiness, was to act as advance guard to the right wing, and carry Liege, on the expiration of the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian government. As has been implied, Belgium declined to agree to the demand made by Ger- many to allow German troops to cross Belgian territory to the French fron- tier. August 3 and 4, all doubt as to German intentions having been re- moved, the Belgian authorities ordered bridges destroyed on all probable lines of advance, and the Belgian forces to move forward as follows : the first di- vision from Ghent to Tirlemont; the second, Antwerp to Louvain ; the fifth, t Albrecht, Duke of Wiirttemberg, born (1865) in Vienna, son of Duke Philip of Wiirttemberg and heir presumptive to the throne of the Kingdom; married (1893) the Archduchess Margareta Sophia of Austria; held commands in regiments of Uhlans, Grena- diers, Dragoons, cavalry, and infantry, rising to be general in command of the Thirteenth Army Corps; in command of German forces in Belgium (October, 1914) after its invasion and temporarily took over command of Crown Prince's army (February, 1916); received Order Pour le Merite from the Kaiser. § Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, born (1869) in Munich, eldest son of Ludwig (Louis) III, who became King in 1913; mar- ried the Duchess Marie Gabriele of Bavaria (1900); had a university education and mili- tary training in the Kriegsakademie; traveled extensively in India, Japan, China, etc. (1902- 03); general, commanding the First Army Corps (1906); led Bavarian army in Euro- pean War and received from the Kaiser the Order Pour le Merite. 46 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Mons to Perwez; the sixth, Brussels to Wavre. The fourth was to remain at Naraur, and the third in its position, Hasselt-Liege-Verviers. These move- ments were covered by the cavalry di- vision (Waremme), by a mixed brigade at Tongres, and by another at Huy. The strength of this army was about 117,000 men, increased later by 18,500 volunteers, with the King in command. It was, if opposed by superior numbers, to hold good defensive positions barring the enemy's advance, and to await in these positions the arrival of troops from the British and French armies. But if this junction were impossible, then the Belgian army was not to run the risk of severe loss, but was to guard against being enveloped, and act so as to secure its communications, for the purpose ultimately of joining hands with the Allies. Opposed by equal num- bers, it was to attack, if conditions were favorable. In any case, Liege, Namur, and Antwerp were to be defended. Invasion of Belgium. — On August 4 two cavalry divisions crossed the fron- tier, advanced upon Vise, and there found the bridge destroyed. Behind the cavalry forces came an army composed of the seventh, eighth, ninth, and elev- enth corps. At the same time two other corps were concentrated at and near St. Vith — thus making a force of about 300,000 men on the roads lead- ing into Belgium and converging on Liege. On the 5th a demand was made on the governor of the fortress of Liege, General Leman, to allow an unopposed passage to the German army. This de- mand refused, the forts east and north- east of the town were attacked, but the Germans were repulsed. On the night of August 5 and 6 an attempt was made to break the Belgian line between the Meuse and the Ourthe, and succeeded in forcing the troops between the in- tervals of the forts to fall back. The mobile troops of the defense were now withdrawn to join the main army, leav- ing their garrisons in the forts. On the 12th large calibre fire was opened on the forts of the right bank, and by the 17th the last one had fallen to the Germans. During this time the main Belgian army had taken up a position on the Gette. On the 12th this stream was forced at Hselen, but an attempt to pass on was repulsed. Fresh troops came up and threatened to turn the Belgian left ; on the south they occu- pied Tirlemont; on the 18th the Bel- gian position was critical. Hence but one course was open to the Belgians: they retired on the 18th at dusk to take a position on the left bank of the Dyle. But the Germans advanced so rapidly that the Belgians could not safely stop, and were forced instead to continue their way to Antwerp, which they reached on the 20th. The Ger- mans entered Louvain on the 10th, Brussels on the 20th, and crossed the French frontier on the 24th. Namur was taken under fire on the 20th and 21st of August; on the 25th the last fort, Suarlee, fell. Here, as at Liege, heavy calibres were used. The commander of the 4th (Belgian) di- vision withdrew his forces on the night of the 23d and 24th of August, and succeeded 10 days later in entering Ant- werp. A new part now fell to the Belgian army. August 20 it had taken up a position resting on the forts of Antwerp with a detachment at Termonde. Its business now was to detain as large a force as possible, to take the offensive whenever an important engagement, took place elsewhere, and to attack in the neighborhood of Antwerp whenever there was any chance of success. Ac- cordingly a sortie was made August 25 MILITARY OPERATIONS 47 and 26 ; on September 4 a German force that had driven its garrison out of Ter- monde crossed the Scheldt, but on the appearance of Belgian forces on the left bank crossed back, leaving Termonde once more in Belgian hands. After this date all hostile efforts to cross the river were checked and the line of retreat to the west kept open. Other operations took place, as on September 9, when the Belgians got as far as Louvain and forced the recall of a division from France to Antwerp. One effect of these operations was to delay for two days the march southward of a German corps, at the time when the retreat from the Marne had begun. The fall of Antwerp was, however, only a question of time ; the siege began on September 28, and in a very short time it became clear that the place could no more resist the German ar- tillery than had Liege and Namur. A delicate question then presented itself: to hold Antwerp as long as possible without compromising the retreat. Day by day the Germans continued their work of demolishing the detached forts of the place and drew closer and closer. On October 5 Lierre was occupied and the river crossed below the town. On the 3d and 6th of October they tried without success to cross the Scheldt. Furthermore, in France, the German right was steadily approaching the sea ; if they could reach it before the Bel- gians had made good their retreat these latter might be entirely cut off. The better to secure this retreat Ghent was occupied on the 9th by the French and British (7th division). The retreat, however, began on the evening of the 6th, and by the morning of the next day the entire Belgian army was across the river. The Germans had indeed crossed the Scheldt themselves, on the 6th at Schoonasrde, but were unable to inter- rupt the retreat. On October 10 Ant- werp capitulated, and on the 15th the Belgian army took its stand on the Yser, 82,000 strong. The subsequent fortunes of this army are bound up with those of the Franco-British forces on this front. Invasion of France. — When it be- came evident that France was to be in- vaded from Belgium, the 3d (French) army moved up (August 10) to Longwy, with the 4th army taking a position further west, and the 5th sta- tioning itself between the Sambre and the Meuse. General French (August 23) stood between the Sambre and the Scheldt, on the line Conde-Binche, with so much of the British expeditionary force, two corps and a cavalry division, as had crossed to the Continent. The German armies that had concentrated on the line Aix-la-Chapelle-Malmedy- Treves-Metz-Strassburg now moved out, Von Kluck through Belgium, Von Bulow to the Sambre (Namur-Char- leroi) ; Von Hausen and the Duke of Wiirttemberg across the Ardennes on Dinant and Neufchateau. The Crown Prince crossed Luxemburg. The Crown Prince of Bavaria marched against de Castelnau and in this region the general action opened on August 20, with the driving back of de Castelnau (invasion of Lorraine), who, however, brought up firm before Nancy, September 7. As early as August 15 some French troops had crossed the Belgian frontier and had engaged the Germans in minor af- fairs (e.g., Dinant). On the 22d Charleroi was taken by the Germans, who on the 23d attacked the French at this place and the British at Mons. As the 3d and 4th (French) armies were compelled to withdraw before an attack coming from Belgian Luxem- burg, the right flank of the fifth army extending almost up to Namur was ex- 48 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR posed, and that army withdrew. This in turn compelled the withdrawal of the English from Mons, and so the whole Allied army now retreated, vigorously pursued by the Germans, on the line Paris-Verdun. In spite of one or two checks suffered in the advance, as at Guise, it may be said that on the whole this movement was up to a certain point irresistible. That point was reached when the Allies turned on crossing the river Marne, and not only defeated the Germans, but forced them to retreat to the Aisne. The French generalissimo, Joffre, had constantly kept before him the plan of so turning in the retreat from the Belgian frontier, and had se- lected the line Paris-Marne-Verdun as the proper place, and Sept. 6, 1914, as the proper date. On Aug. 20, 1914, General Joffre * assumed command of the Allied armies in France. He had before him the in- finitely grave problem of developing suitable powers of resistance, mostly out of beaten and retreating armies, and of selecting the time, place, and manner of applying these powers, which he did at the Marne (to be described later). After that battle the Allied armies under his command successfully held off the Germans, thus upsetting their plans of crushing France before proceeding to conquests elsewhere. The Approach to Paris. — During the retreat two new armies had been formed: one under General Foch f (the * Joffre, Joseph Jacques Cesaire. Born (1852) in Rivesaltes, Pyrenees. Student of military engineering at Ecole Polytechnique. Entered active service (1870) in Franco-Prus- sian War after which returned to Polytechnique. Became captain (1874) ; fought in Tonkin (1883-84); in Dahomey (1893). Professor in Higher War School for a time and then pro- moted brigadier general of division. Became chief of general staff (1911). Helped pass the three years' military service law. f Ferdinand Foch, born (1851) at Tarbes, Hautes Pyrenees, of a Basque family; served in the Franco-Prussian War as a subaltern; ninth), which took position between d'Esperey's (formerly Lanrezac's) and Langle de Cary's ; and another (the sixth) under Manoury from Paris. This last army was to rest on the intrenched camp of the capital, face east on the right bank of the Ourcq, and attack Von Kluck's right. It is a sound prin- ciple of warfare that victory may be obtained only by beating the hostile army. When therefore the Allied armies passed into the Paris-Verdun gap, Von Kluck, sweeping down on Paris from the north, properly turned south-eastward after the enemy. But he had not reckoned upon the formation of the sixth army sent out from Paris, in motor vehicles of every description to take its place on the battle front. Before, however, taking up the Battle of the Marne, we must very briefly de- scribe what had in the meantime been taking place in eastern France ; the pressure in this quarter, indeed, cul- minated in conflicts contemporaneous with and forming a part of the great battle of September 6. Before the sud- den swerve of Von Kluck from Paris on September 4, it seemed as if the predic- tion that the Germans would be in Paris six weeks from the outbreak of war was about to be fulfilled. General Gallieni had begun to prepare the city for a siege. The noise of the battle could be heard by the Parisians. Events before the Marne. — After the declaration of war the French invaded both Alsace and Lorraine. These in- vasions came to grief. The French twice occupied Mulhausen ; the first time artillery captain at 26; professor of tactics in the Ecole de Guerre for five years and later, as general of brigade, its director; in command of various divisions before European War; during war commander of northern armies in France, gaining victories of the Marne and Ypres; known internationally as a strategist and au- thor of Principles of War and Conduct of War, published in French, English, Italian and Ger- man; received British G.C.B. MILITARY OPERATIONS 49 they were driven out, the second they retired of their own accord. They had also reached Saarburg and Saarbruck- en. These invasions undoubtedly had a political end in view, conditioned of course by the possibility of military success. Incidentally, the Alsace op- erations were to contain troops that otherwise might have been used to re- sist the invasion of Lorraine. This in- vasion opened well enough: the French occupied Dieuze, Morhange, Chateau- Salins, across the frontier. But it came to naught at Morhange, in which the French, completely beaten, were driven back across the frontier, and were forced to settle down to the real busi- ness of protecting their eastern fron- tier. The Germans, early in August, occupied Cirey, Badonviller, and Bac- carat. Farther north the army of Metz got to within 15 miles of Verdun. Still, farther north the army of the Crown Prince, which had on August 22 crossed the frontier near Longwy (occupied the 27th), drove back the French, and finally took up a position between Bar- le-Duc and the Ardennes, facing east- ward, and opposed by General Sarrail's army. To the west of the Crown Prince the Duke of Wurttemberg, who had crossed the Meuse near Mezieres, formed up, facing south between the Crown Prince's army and Epernay. The first French army (Dubail) in front of Epinal faced the east; on its left General de Castelnau continued the line east and north of Nancy, along the Meuse, until it rested on the defenses of Verdun. The garrison of Verdun car- ried it on east, north, and west of the position until it joined with Sarrail's army. With the armies in these positions Nancy was attacked; its main natural defense in the chain of hills known as the Grand Couronne de Nancy. The Germans occupied various towns in the east, e.g., St. Die, but not without some heavy fighting in the Vosges. On the north they pushed the French back to the Grand Couronne, but never got be- yond it. The main army marched from Chateau-Salins and engaged the French in a series of stiff fights around the Forest of Champenoux. At the same time a part of the army of Metz, with its left resting on Pont-a-Mousson, joined in the attack. Six miles north- east of the city, on the plateau of Amance, de Castelnau had assembled his artillery. Before the troops from the north could cooperate with those from the east in attacking this position, Ste. Genevieve, 10 miles or so northwest of Amance, had to be occupied. Here Foch (August 22), with a modest force, defeated the Germans with fearful slaughter. The attack on Nancy from the east through Amance was equally unsuccessful. After much fighting along the entire position the bombard- ment of Amance began on August 30, 31 and lasted for more than a week. The contest over the entire line in- creased in intensity; indeed, from the German point of view, it could do no less, for now (September 7-8) their armies were being pushed back from the Marne, and it was vital to their success that they should break through. The Emperor himself was present at the great assaults, six in number, made on Amance, and all driven back with loss. Checked before Nancy, the Ger- mans on September 10 evacuated Pont- a-Mousson, and on the 12th, Luneville, St. Die, and some smaller places. They now concentrated their efforts between Toul and Verdun, with the purpose of surrounding the latter place. To this end they bombarded Fort de Troyon on the Meuse south of Verdun and several times attempted to take it by assault. 50 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR But the fort made an extremely gallant defense, and although almost reduced to extremities, managed to hold out. The final assault was delivered on the 13th of September. On the 20th a fresh advance was made on the for- tresses from the east to cross the Meuse south of Verdun. The garrisons of Verdun and Toul respectively pushed out attacks on the German flanks, while the Germans themselves advanced in the centre and captured the point of St. Mihiel on the Meuse (September 25). Grip on St. Mihiel. — The Germans crossed the river on the 26th and began to march northward towards the Aire valley. A situation was then developed that might have proved of the utmost consequence to the French. To meet it, Sarrail came down from the north, and the twentieth corps was hurried up from near Champenoux. At 5 p. m. of the 26th the advance guard of the corps, which had crossed at Lironville, got contact with the enemy. After some extremely heavy fighting the Ger- mans fell back to the Meuse and in- trenched at St. Mihiel, keeping their footing across the river at Camp des Romains. While these operations were taking place on the east and south, the other German armies had proceeded south- ward in pursuit of the retreating French and English (as related else- where). On September 6, the Crown Prince's army stretched from a point southwest of Verdun to the neighbor- hood of Bar-le-Duc. Verdun was thus almost completely surrounded. But the tide turned with the German defeat of the Marne; they retreated north- ward and divided right and left at the forest of Argonne. This rocky, hilly forested ridge, about 30 miles long north and south and 8 miles wide, then became the scene of incessant close fighting all through the autumn and winter. In the northern part of the Argonne Forest the Aire runs west to fall into the Aisne. This pass, called the Gap of Grand Pre, pierced as it was by a railway, would have been useful to the French, and so was one objective kept constantly in view by them in the operations of this region. These now took on the character that prevailed farther in the west, trench warfare, with the French pressing the Germans slowly back. Farther south there was much fighting on both sides of the St. Mihiel wedge, and in the Bois le Pretre to the eastward. In Alsace, after the second evacua- tion of Mulhausen, the French took up and held an intrenched position in front of Belfort from Thann to Moos until winter, when they fell back a little nearer to Belfort. Trench conditions developed here also, except that there were desperate struggles to take and hold Hartmannsweilerkopf, a mountain about 2900 feet high some miles to the north of Thann, which changed hands several times. Apart from various thrusts and points at German territory, the main purpose of the French was to cover the great position of Belfort. In this they succeeded. The Battle of the Marne. — Between the close of the retreat and the battle about to be described air reconnois- sances, etc., had revealed the fact that Von Kluck had changed direction to the southeast. The Battle of the Marne opened on Sunday, September 6. On the 3d the British had fallen back of that river and later had taken up a position behind the Seine. About this time (September 4) Joffre had resolved to take the offensive, wheeling up the left flank of the sixth army, pivoting it on the Marne, to move on the Ourcq. MILITARY OPERATIONS 51 The British were to fill the gap between the sixth and fifth French armies. Ger- man troops had been reported moving southeast along the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th and were now halted and facing that river. Heads of columns were also seen crossing at Changis, La Ferte, Nogent, Chateau- Thierry, and Mezy. The Allies' line on the 6th reached from Ermenonville, in front of the left flank of the sixth army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis, to Esternay and Charle- ville, the left of the ninth army under Foch, and so along the front of the ninth, fourth, and third French armies to a point north of Verdun. Recollecting, then, that the first and second French armies based on Belfort- Verdun were facing the German seventh and sixth, the French order of battle on September 6 was : the third army (Sarrail) Verdun-Bar-le-Duc, opposed by the German third (Crown Prince) ; the fourth (de Langle de Cary) across the plain of Champagne, south of Vitry- le-Francois, facing north, and opposed to the German fourth (Prince of Wiirt- temberg) ; the ninth (Foch) Mailly- Sezanne, opposed to the German second (Von Biilow); the fifth (d'Esperey) Esterney-Courtacon, with Conneau's cavalry on his left. The sixth army (Manoury) held a line north and south, with its right at Meaux and its left near Betz. The fifth and sixth armies were to engage Von Kluck. The gap between the fifth and sixth (French) armies was held by the British five divi- sions and five cavalry brigades, Ville- neuve-le-Comte to Jouy-le-Chateau. Von Kluck left two corps (II and IV) on the east bank of the Ourcq to hold the sixth army, while he proceeded with III, IV, and VII to Coulommiers, Rebais, and La Ferte Gaucher to at- tack the left and centre of the fifth (French) army. He had pushed for- ward two cavalry divisions towards Coulommiers and Crecy to give notice of any attack possibly coming from that quarter, and had occupied the villages on the west bank of the Ourcq. , :| The battle began at daylight Sep- tember 6 by the advance of the sixth army against the villages just men- tioned, and became general over the whole line from Paris to Verdun. In this struggle the British at once took a hand, and moving northeast, drove back Von Kluck's cavalry and advance guards. In the words of Sir John French, it must have been at about noon "that the enemy realized the pow- erful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving southeast." By night the British had reached the line Dagny-Coulommiers. This retreat of the Germans uncover- ing the west flank of the troops oper- ating against the fifth army forced these to withdraw and enabled the fifth to reach the Grand Morin between Es- ternay and La Ferte Gaucher. In the meantime the struggle further east had been most serious. Foch was heavily engaged with Von Biilow, and on his right with Von Hausen. On the whole, the centre had all it could do to hold its own, while the right even fell back a little. The day closed with the balance leaning a little in favor of the Germans, except on their left, when Von Kluck began to realize that he must look to his right as well as to his front. Sep- tember 7 was a day of desperate struggle, with the Allies progressing in the west, but not elsewhere. On the 8th the German right was definitely turned, and began to retreat. On this day, d'Esperey carried Montmirail, and thus made an opening on Von Bulow's right. Into this opening Foch 52 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR pushed his left, and he is reported to have discovered a gap between Von Biilow and Von Hausen, of which he also took advantage. The third and fourth armies on this same day held on only by the most devoted courage in face of the equally devoted attacks made upon them. September 9 saw the scale turn in favor of the Allies. The line of the Ourcq was taken ; French and d'Esperey joined hands at Cha- teau-Thierry in the evening. Foch drove a part of Von Bulow's right into the marshes of Saint-Gond and attacked his left with success, while the Saxons on Von Billow's left, after heavy losses, were pushed back towards Chalons. The third army still held. By the 10th there could be no doubt that the Allies had won a victory: the Germans re- treated, and in good order, to the Aisne, where they occupied a line said to have been prepared in advance. The Battle of the Marne must be re- garded as a significant defeat for the German army. Flushed with success, having the initiative, opposed to troops supposedly dispirited by defeat after defeat during a long and exhausting re- treat, the Germans found this check as unexpected as the French found it wel- come. On the French side moral forces were developed whose intensity con- tinued undiminished. The Germans, although not disabled, were neverthe- less compelled radically to change all their plans of operation. The German position on the Aisne extended from a point on the Heights of the Meuse north of Verdun, west across the Argonne country and the plain of Champagne to Rheims, north- west across the Aisne, west along the Heights of the Aisne to the Foret de PAigle, north of Compiegne. This po- sition was of great strength, carefully intrenched and thoroughly supplied. The Allied armies followed the Germans in their retreat. On the morning of the 13th the British advanced, and in spite of the resistance of the Germans passed the Aisne on pontoon bridges, a re- markable military achievement. The Allied lines, September 21, reached from the extreme south of Alsace through St. Die, Luneville, Pont-a- Mousson, Consenvoye, Grande Pre, Souain, Craonne, Noyon, to Le Catelet. Strong German forces held St. Quen- tin. In the east the Germans had pushed their way along the promontory of Hatton Chatel towards St. Mihiel and were shelling the forts of Camp des Romains and des Parodies. On the 26th they crossed the Meuse near St. Mihiel. Ypres was occupied on Octo- ber 14 by the British seventh division, which had assisted the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Antwerp. A period of deadlock now followed on the Aisne, during which each adversary made the most determined efforts to outflank the other on the west. From the Aisne to Flanders. — These efforts were logical for both sides. An attack on the German left, even if suc- cessful, would not interfere with their communications through northern France with Belgium and Germany. A frontal attack would have called for resources not then in the possession of the Allies. To turn their right, how- ever, might result in eutting some of the communications, might even save Antwerp. It would in any case assist the retreat of the Belgians and British from that city. Moreover, it was not impossible that the Germans might strike at Calais and Boulogne; it was not inconceivable that they might even push their way as far southwest as Abbeville. Accordingly about Septem- ber 20 an army was formed west of Compiegne, and its command given to MILITARY OPERATIONS 53 de Castelnau, who was to fill the gap between the Oise and the Somme, and to push his lines north of the Somme; as objectives he had St. Quentin and La Fere. On the 21st de Castelnau's right had moved as far as Noyon ; there was violent fighting around Lassigny. From Lassigny the French right moved towards Roye, while their left momen- tarily occupied Peronne. The Germans in the meantime concentrated a large force in the region, formed in part of troops drawn from the centre on the Aisne, and from Lorraine and the Vosges. On the 25th the French near Noyon were pushed back on that day and the next two, and the whole line as far as the Vosges was engaged. De Cas- telnau was driven from Lassigny, but during the next few days managed to hold his own. There was now some dan- ger that the Germans would themselves outflank the French; to meet this pos- sibility a new army (tenth, Maud'huy) was formed. De Castelnau was now merely to hold his position. Maud'huy's line ran from the Ancre through Arras and Lens to Lille, and his plan would be to move on Valenciennes. The Germans, who were in force in the region of Cam- brai and Douai, planned to take Lille, turn on and force back Maud'huy; at the same time other forces would ad- vance on Boulogne, Calais, and Dun- kirk. The battle opened October 1, and by the 4th the French had been pushed back west of Lens, and were beginning to retire to the hills behind Arras. On the 6th the Germans shelled Arras, and later attempted to take the town, in which they failed. They had succeeded, however, in repelling Maud'huy's of- fensive, and had prevented the turning of their flank. It was now decided to move the British force from their trenches on the Aisne to the left of Maud'huy, who now, like de Castelnau before him, would remain on the defen- sive. The situation of the Allies was critical. Antwerp was about to fall, the Lys had been crossed by the Ger- mans and Ypres occupied by them (Oc- tober 3). The channel ports as well as Lille were in danger. The presence of Germans in the region about Haze- brouck and Ypres implied an attempt either to intercept the British and Bel- gians retreating from Antwerp, or to turn Maud'huy's left in the region of Lens. Joffre therefore decided to con- centrate still another army between Lens and Dunkirk, which, with the Brit- ish, was to form the extreme left of the Allies. This army was to be com- manded by General d'Urbal, while Foch was to take general charge of the four armies — de Castelnau's, Maud'huy's, French's, and d'UrbaPs. The transfer of the British forces was successfully accomplished; they were to take posi- tion north of the line Bethune-Lille, at- tack the enemy opposing Maud'huy's left wing west of La Bassee, and at- tempt to defend or recover Lille, as the case might be. The country in which the operations of many months on the left of the Allies were to take place consists essentially of the plain of the Scheldt. This plain is broken by no natural obstacles but is intersected by many canals. The Scheldt bisects it roughly and receives the Lys at Ghent. On the western boun- dary of the plain rises the higher land running from Calais southeast to Peronne, at the base of which runs a series of waterways, mostly canals, forming as it were a wet ditch to the ta- bleland to the westward. The ditch was held by the French. The Germans oc- cupied Ghent, Bruges, and Ostend, and succeeded in capturing Lille, but were driven east of Ypres by the British. 54 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Further south, the Allies pushed the Germans back towards Lille between the Lys and the Bethune-Lille Canal. While these movements were going 1 on the other French armies still further to the south were in conflict with the Ger- mans from Bethune to Compiegne. This period is signalized by Joffre's third attempt to turn the German right. Lille, although held by the French, was in danger of being cut off by the ad- vance of the Germans west of the city south of the Lys, and the possibility was still strong that the Germans might make a rush for Calais and Dunkirk, or else try to crush the British and Bel- gians in retreat from Antwerp. Hence Lille was to be saved, if possible, and at any rate the other purposes of the Ger- mans were to be negatived at any cost. -The offensive was taken up by d'Ur- bal's army, the British Seventh Divi- sion, and the main forces of the British coming up from the Aisne. On Octo- ber 11 the Allies engaged the Ger- mans in a position extending from Mont-des-Cats southwest of Ypres through La Bassee to Vermelles. Part of this position was carried, but the main purpose, to drive the Germans out of La Bassee and to save Lille, failed. On the 10th this city had been bombarded; on the 13th it was sur- rendered. To the north the Allies had met with some success, driving the enemy from Ypres as their comrades were entering Lille. On the 17th the Allies lay approximately north and south from the Forest of Houthulst, holding the villages of Langemarck, Poelcapelle, Passchendaele, and east from Ypres to Zonnebeke and south to Wytschaete and Nieppe. Battle of the Yser.— On October 16 the Germans attacked Dixmude and opened the Battle of the Yser. The left wing of the Allies now stretched from Compiegne through Arras, Ypres, and Dixmude to Nieuport. With the com- mand of the sea in the hands of the Allies, the efforts of the Germans were necessarily confined to the fronts Nieu- port-Bethune and Bethune-Compiegne. The nature of the ground north of Be- thune greatly influenced the character of the operations, at first rolling, and then, as the sea is approached, flat and open, filled with dikes and ditches. From Nieuport to Dixmude the line was held by the Belgians and French colonial in- fantry. Then from Dixmude past Zon- nebeke came French Territorials and cavalry, then British, who continued on to Bethune. From Dixmude to Nieu- port the Yser is canalized, and 15-20 feet above the ground to the west, across which runs the embanked rail- road between the same points. As the country could be flooded, the bridge crossings were more than usually im- portant. Off the roads the ground was difficult to cross, by reason of ditches, dikes, etc., and, moreover, was marshy, so that artificial cover could not be made. For eight days, by night as well as by day, the Germans assaulted the Belgian position only to be repulsed and beaten back. The British monitor fleet, mounting 6-inch rifles, did great service shelling the German right and rear, during which Knocke was partial- ly destroyed. The conduct of the Bel- gians and the French colonial infantry during these eight days was beyond all praise: they had held their position against superior numbers backed by ar- tillery under the most terrible and dis- couraging circumstances, and had suc- cessfully prevented the desperate ef- forts of the Germans to break through across the position to Dunkirk and Calais. The plan of the Allies had been to fight a defensive battle on the Yser, and MILITARY OPERATIONS 55 to attack with their centre and right in front of Ypres and south of the Lys re- spectively. French's specific objective was the capture of Menin on the Lys, halfway between Roulers and Lille, as necessary to an offensive that should take Bruges and thus cut the German communications. To hold the road Menin-Roulers-Ostend was essential to German success, because from it ran out westward all the roads leading to the Allied line between Ypres and the sea. Heavily reenforced on the 19th, the Germans themselves took the offensive, captured Roulers, most of the Roulers- Dixmude road, and all of the Menin- Roulers-Dixmude-Ostend road and rail- road. The Menin operation failed. The plan assigned to Sir Douglas Haig,* to push through and if possible to cap- ture Bruges, became impossible of ac- complishment, for the Germans, in spite of the most determined resistance, in spite of frightful losses, were gaining, and it became evident that the best the Allies could hope for was to hold on until reinforcements could come up. By the night of the 22d the Germans had crossed the Yser Canal at Tervaete, and north of Ypres had pierced the Allied lines. South of that city there was only a thin line, and the right of the Allies was withdrawing from the Givenchy-Radinghem ridge. But on the 23d the Allied prospect brightened. * Sir Douglas Haig, born (1861) in Fife- shire; educated at Brasenose College, Oxford; served with distinction in the Sudan and in South Africa; later held important posts of India, being chief of staff (1909-1912); was general officer in command at Aldershot (1912- 14) ; general in command in the First Army from landing of expeditionary force in Euro- pean War (1914); distinguished himself in the retreat from Mons, at the Aisne, at Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle; succeeded Sir John French as commander in chief of British forces in France and Belgium (December, 1915); G.C.B. and Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor of France; author of Cavalry Studies (1907). The Forty-second French Division (Grossetti) with howitzers had reached Furnes and relieved the Belgians in Nieuport. On the night of October 23- 24, 14 assaults were made on Dixmude and all repulsed. North of Ypres, Brit- ish reinforcements had come up, moved on the enemy, captured their trenches, and beat back five attempts at recap- ture, and in the evening of this day a division of the French Ninth Corps was moved into the line. So far the Germans had failed to break through. On the 24th the French on the left stormed Lombartzyde and moved on Westende, thus menacing the German right. To prevent this the Germans opened a determined attack on Nieuport, and along the Yser Canal as far south as Dixmude. These at- tacks failed. The next day the battle was renewed ; guns were mounted on the dunes to beat off the fleet. So tremen- dous was the effort made that JofFre, October 25, resolved to flood the coun- try. But the water was slow to spread over the meadow's. In the meantime the Germans continued their attack, and on the 26th seemed to be in a fair way to reach Pervyse, halfway between Nieu- port and Dixmude. On the 28th they attacked all along the line. But in the meantime JofFre was hurrying up re- enforcements, and the water was rising. The next day attack after attack was made on Pervyse-Ramscapelle, and the latter place was captured that night. The 30th found the British fleet reen- forced by five destroyers, the Germans in Ramscapelle and along the railroad, but between it. and the canal embank- ment the water was mounting. All day the struggle continued for Ramscapelle, the embankment, and Pervyse. The 31st saw the Germans driven back across the railroad and the inundated region east of the canal. 56 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Battle around Ypres. — The Battle of Ypres is not a separate event from the Battle of the Yser. They really over- lapped, and are indeed only periods of increased intensity of combat distin- guished by the prominence of a special objective on the part of the Germans, and of a special effort by the Allies to prevent the realization of that objec- tive. Both of these battles are by the French denominated the battles in Flan- ders, a better name than Yser and YPRES BATTLE FRONT Ypres. However this may be, opera- tions on the Yser proper were checked by the inundation spoken of above and by the expulsion of the Germans from Ramscapelle. The scene now shifts to the southward, to the attempts made by the Germans to capture Ypres in the pursuit of the objective still held by them, to wit, to break through the Al- lied lines to the French channel ports. On October 24 the Allies lines ran in a great arc from Dixmude through Langemarck, Gheluvelt, through the woods southeast of Ypres, along the eastern ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, across the Lys, to La Bassee. This position was energetically attacked on this day by the Germans, who very nearly succeeded in taking possession of Gheluvelt. Attacks on Mont-des-- Cats were beaten off. At various other points likewise the Allies held. On the 23d a French division had entered Ypres, and for the first time East In- dian troops entered the trenches to do battle for the Empire — Gurkhas, Sikhs, etc. They were afterward withdrawn, for climatic reasons, it was said. Fight- ing continued through the 25th, and on the 26th many attempts were made against the Nieuport-Dixmude line. The advantage this day lay on the whole with the Germans, who had moved up the Menin- Ypres road, capturing Gheluvelt, and, south of the Lys, had got hold of part of Neuve Chapelle. On the 28th Gheluvelt was recaptured by the British, who also drove the enemy to the edge of Neuve Chapelle. Return- ing to the attack, the Germans recap- tured the entire village, only to be driv- en out again, this time by a force com- posed in part of East Indian troops. Passing over the fighting of the next day or two, on the 28th a wireless was intercepted, saying that the Germans would attack next morning. On that day (the 29th) the French south of Bethune took the offensive so as to keep as large a force as possible of the enemy from joining in the struggle around Ypres. On the 30th and 31st French reinforcements continued to arrive. The Allied position on the morning of the 31st ran from Zonnebeke on the north to Festubert on the southwest. The eastern ridges of Mont-des-Cats were still held by the Allies ; south of this the line extended to the Lys, cross- ing it and curving around Armentieres to Neuve Chapelle and thence to Festu- bert. The German plan was to hold on MILITARY OPERATIONS 57 the flanks and to make their main at- tack on the centre to Ypres : if the cen- tre could be broken, and the ridge of Mont-des-Cats captured, the Allied forces would be cut in two, and permit either an advance on Boulogne or an at- tack south of the Lys against the Al- lies intrenched there, or indeed both. At daybreak the Germans opened an in- tense fire on the lines southeast of Ypres and drove the British back into their re- serve trenches. An equally violent at- tack was made across the Ypres-Com- ines Canal, which also drove back the British. At one or two points the lines were momentarily broken. In general the Germans had advanced in the cen- tre and were within a few miles of Ypres. In the north the French had taken Bixschoote and reached Passchen- daele. On the Yser, at Ramscapelle, the Germans were hurled across the ca- nal, and farther south the French pushed their offensive in the direction of Roulers. But in the centre a tremen- dous effort was made to crumple up the British line and capture the ridge of Mont-des-Cats and Ypres. The defense made by the British, outnumbered and outgunned, against the successive at- tacks of the Germans will ever remain remarkable in their annals. These at- tacks came very near succeeding; the thin British lines, worn out by their efforts to hold, exposed to artillery fire, began to fall back, and the guns were even withdrawn to Ypres. The roads behind the Germans were filled with mo- tor vehicles ready to take the troops to any point of the field. But at this mo- ment the British stood their ground. The Germans coming up the Menin- Ypres road were stopped, and were driven out of the woods east and south- east of Ypres. To the south the de- fense was equally spirited, keeping the Germans from reaching the ridge of Mont-des-Cats. November 1 the Ger- mans took Wytschaete and Messines, villages at the foot of the ridge, but failed to make the ridge itself. The struggle continued during the whole of this day ; the Germans were driven out of Wytschaete, but the village was abandoned. On the 2d Neuve Chapelle was carried, but the attempt on Armen- tieres failed. North of the Lys re- newed efforts to gain possession of the ridge of Mont-des-Cats proved unsuc- cessful. On the 3d the French took the offensive from Dixmude-Nordschoote ; the effect of this was to hold back forces that otherwise would have moved against the lines farther south. And so it went day after day. The Germans made another great effort on November 10, when they shelled Dix- mude more heavily than ever before, blew up the French trenches and ad- vanced against the town. After a ter- rible hand-to-hand fight the French withdrew to the west of the Yser. On the remainder of the front artillery played and assaults were made. The 11th opened with tremendous artillery fire from both sides of the Menin-Ypres road, lasting three hours. Immediate- ly afterward 15 battalions of the Prus- sian Guard advanced from the east, while at the same time charges were un- dertaken by other troops. Everywhere north of the Lys the Allied front was attacked. Everything failed except the effort of the Prussian Guard, who got up to within a few yards of the trenches only to recoil and finally to retreat be- fore the blasting fire that greeted them. The Battle of Ypres was over, after having lasted one month, with stag- gering losses on both sides. It must be accounted a German defeat. The conclusion of the battles of Flan- ders, November 11, 1914, marks the be- ginning of what may be called the long 58 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR siege of the armies over the whole line from the sea to the Swiss frontier. It was a time of ceaseless watching, of hardship and trial, of continuous fight- ing with neither side able to advance at the expense of the other. Local advan- tages gained first by one and then by the other adversary in no way affected the issue, and indeed, as measured by the ground gained, could not be repre- sented on an ordinary map. A word is perhaps not out of place in respect of the nature of the contest that now be- came the rule over the entire western front. Trench warfare over this front took the place of what may now be called old-fashioned operations in the open. Mining and countermining be- came the rule: the lines in reality were areas of parallel trenches protected by networks of barbed wire so thickly in- terlaid and interwoven that only long- sustained artillery fire proved equal to breaking them down in clearing the way for assault. The troops lived in and under the ground, so that the shrapnel, the ideal man-killing projectile against troops in the open, proved nearly use- less, and was replaced by the high ex- plosive shell, able to pierce overhead shelter and overwhelm the occupants. Operations degenerated into a struggle of wear and tear. So close did the lines draw to each other that antiquated methods and weapons sprang into new life: hand grenades, knives, and even clubs for close work. Trench mortars came into existence. Asphyxiating gases, in violation of The Hague Con- vention, were used. Artillery took a po- sition of first importance, as was but natural, seeing that a state of siege warfare had developed. The reason of this state of affairs is to be found, in part at least, in the air service, making surprise well-nigh impossible, and allow- ing time for the threatened side to make ample preparations to resist any im- pending movement. It also greatly in- creased the efficiency of artillery by en- abling batteries to correct their fire, and by discovering and assigning tar- gets invisible from the batteries them- selves. In this tremendous struggle some few encounters deserve passing no- tice before going on to the serious at- tempts made by the Allies to break through the German lines. Thus the French took Vermelles on December 7 ; later in the month there was some ex- tremely heavy fighting in and near Givenchy, followed a few days after- ward by the capture of St. Georges by the Allies (French and Belgians). Jan. 3-4, 1915, was marked by a French vic- tory at Steinbach in Alsace. Soissons, too, became the scene of great activity. North of this city the French on Janu- ary 8 captured Hill 132, and pushed their way eastward. The German coun- ter attack, made in force, drove the French in from the east, and finally re- captured Hill 132. The French were compelled to cross the river. Under any other circumstances this action would have constituted a considerable affair; in reality it was only an inci- dent. The next action standing above the general level was that in the region of La Bassee. On January 25 a German demonstration was made along the whole front, from Festubert to Vermel- les and as far north as Ypres. Bethune was shelled. This contest lasted sev- eral days and ended in the repulse of the Germans. The French won some success in Champagne during this period, in the neighborhood of Perthes (February 16), and on the whole had rather the better of it until the month of March. Battle of Neuve Chapelle. — The event of this period is, however, the MILITARY OPERATIONS 59 Battle of Neuve Chapelle, an operation carried out by the British. The imme- diate purpose of the Allies was to carry this village, as the first step in an ef- fort to pass on and capture the ridge Aubers-Illies, held by the Germans, and curving westward between these two points. If this ridge could be taken, it was not impossible that the attack might even result in the capture of Lille, an event that would have been of the first importance to the Allies, as menacing the German position north- ward to the sea. Neuve Chapelle itself sits in the easterly angle of a lozenge formed by the roads breaking off* from the main road La Bassee-Estaires. The village itself, with the eastern side of the lozenge, was held by the Ger- mans ; the western side by the British. Strongly reenforced, the British at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th of March opened a bombardment said to surpass in inten- sity anything ever heard before. It was effective everywhere except at the ex- treme north point of the front of at- tack, where it failed to break down the wire entanglement. After 35 minutes the fire was shifted to Neuve Chapelle, and the British infantry advanced. In the village and south of it the attack succeeded, but to the northeast was held up by wire entanglement just men- tioned. It held off the advance until the artillery succeeded in breaking it up. By 11 a.m. the whole village and wood leading from it northeast and southwest had been taken. So well di- rected was the artillery fire that the at- tempt of the Germans to bring up troops was completely stopped. The British, however, made no further prog- ress. The German fire had cut all or nearly all the telephone wires and communica- tion with the rear became almost impos- sible. Furthermore the orchard north of the village had remained in German hands and so threatened the flank of the advance towards the Aubers-Illies ridge. There thus arose a delay of four and a half hours, which the Ger- mans took full advantage of to repair their lines, organize fresh defenses in rear, and bring up reinforcements. When the British advanced again, they were stopped both north and south by machine-gun fire. The next day found the British east of Neuve Chapelle, but the remainder of their plan had miscarried. On the 12th the arrival of German reinforcements put the British on the defensive. That night the British set to work to con- solidate the positions won, some 1200 yards on a front of 4000. The 13th was taken up in beating off a few Ger- man counter attacks. On the 14th the battle died down on both sides. The British casualties were extremely se- vere, over 12,000 killed and wounded; so also were the German. The net re- sult of the battle was undeniably a Brit- ish defeat, in that they had failed to carry through their plans. But it is also undeniable that they had managed to break the enemy lines ; whether the price paid was worth it, is doubtful. After Ypres and Neuve Chapelle. — In the next month, April, 1915, the Ger- mans made another great effort on a large scale to break through the Allied lines on the north and so gain the chan- nel ports. In anticipation of their ad- vance the British took the offensive themselves on April 17, with the result that, as before in the same region, the German plan was frustrated. The Al- lies were posted along an arc running from Steenstraate on the Yperlee Ca- nal east, southeast, southwest, through Langemarck, through Broodsende- Becelaere, from which last point the line curved round to Hill 50 and to 60 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the Ypres-Comines Canal. The chord of this arc was formed by the Yperlee Canal to a point about a mile southeast of Hill 60. From this position the Al- lies were driven back to a line close to Ypres, with especially heavy righting in and near St. Julien, where the Canadian contingent distinguished itself. The Germans even got across the canal at Steenstraate, and for a time the posi- tion of the Allies was precarious. In this particular battle of Ypres the Germans made use of deadly gases. By means of these the French troops de- fending the northern part of the arc were driven out ; these gases were later again and again discharged against the British. Until respirators were fur- nished later, there was no living in the fumes let loose on the trenches under at- tack. Day after day the contest went on, the Germans attacking and the Al- lies resisting, with the utmost despera- tion. On the 30th a vigorous attack by the French pushed back the enemy on the north of the line. On May 8 a concentrated effort — one of many — was made to reach Ypres. Allied (Brit- ish) attempts to push back the enemy coming up on both sides of the Ypres- Roulers road were unsuccessful. On the 9th, fresh but unsuccessful at- tempts were made on Ypres. On this day the French were successful at La Bassee (Carency), the English unsuc- cessful south of the Lys. On the 11th, Ypres was severely shelled. On the 13th, the British met with some suc- cess on the Ypres-Roulers railway, as well as towards the north. The French on May 15 recaptured Steenstraate and got up to the canal; by the 17th they were masters of the left bank. In its entirety this battle of a month's duration must be regarded as a defeat for the Germans. Setting out to take Ypres and break through, they had, in spite of many local successes, largely at least at the outset due to their use of poisonous gases, failed to carry out their plan. They had lost many thou- sands in killed, wounded, and prisoners. During the later part of the struggle around Ypres the British made a second attempt to carry the Aubers ridge with the capture of Lille as the principal ob- jective. The battle opened May 9 and lasted until May 20. The net result ARTOIS BATTLEGROUND was that the Allied lines were ad- vanced some 600 yards over a front of four miles. This battle comprised two actions known as Aubers Ridge and Festubert. Battle of Artois. — Before the contest before Ypres, just described, had closed, the French began the tremen- dous Battle of Artois, on the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette and south of it, or the line La Bassee-Arras. If this operation could be carried through German communications be- MILITARY OPERATIONS 61 hind it would be threatened and there might be a chance of taking Lille. The German positions on this front were of the strongest. They held the high ground around Loos, the ridges north of the Souchez stream, and most of the plateau run- ning south of Lens to the banks of the Scarpe. Upon this position had been expended every effort of modern mili- tary science to make it secure. Be- tween Souchez and Arras was a network of trenches known as the Labyrinth (underground), about 2 miles square. The ridge of Notre Dame breaks off abruptly to the south in spurs, the eastern one of which, the Souchez spur, commands Ablain St. Nazaire and a sugar refinery between Ablain and Souchez, held by the Germans. From one of these spurs trenches had been constructed across to the Arras-Be- thune road. South of Ablain are the heights of Carency, connected by trenches with Ablain and Souchez, and by another series, the "White Works" (white chalk), with La Targette on the Souchez-Arras road. East of La Targette is Neuville St. Vaast, like the Labyrinth, an underground fortress. In other words, not only was the surface of the ground admirably fortified by elaborate trenches and redoubts, sup- plied with ammunition, etc., but sub- terranean areas had been excavated to house troops and supplies, where, safe from aerial observation and overhead fire, they could be kept until needed, to rejiel the enemy already exhausted and reduced by his advance. General d'Urbal was in immediate command, assisted by Foch and Joffre, but to General Petain, later to distin- guish himself at Verdun, belongs the credit of the reduction of the Labyrinth. Seven corps were engaged, and over 1100 guns of all calibres had been con- centrated for the preparation. For months the French sappers had been occupied in mining the German defenses. The battle opened at 6 a.m. on Sunday, May 9, by the fire of the 1100 French guns. Three-quarters of an hour later the Carency mines were blown up, as were others on the Notre Dame ridge. The bombardment lasted three hours and at 10 the infantry moved out. All day the battle raged. Three of the five trenches on Notre Dame plateau were carried ; when night fell the French dug themselves in. South of Notre Dame, at the same time, the French at- tacked Carency, took the trenches, but failed to take a work on the east. They nevertheless pushed on to Souchez. La Targette was taken, as was part of the White Works. Passing on, a part of Neuville St. Vaast was then captured. On the 10th the fighting continued. On the 11th the attack on Neuville St. Vaast reduced the cemetery, but the Labyrinth still held out. The next day Notre Dame de Lorette fell, as did Carency. From Carency the French pushed on to Ablain St. Nazaire. But the Germans still held on to a spur of the Notre Dame ridge, the spur of the "White Way." On the 21st, however, the spur was carried, as was most of Ablain. A few Germans, however, still held the cemetery, only to be dislodged on the 28th. Three days later the French took the Souchez refinery and in June captured the Labyrinth. Indeed, fighting went on in this region until the autumn. Each side is estimated to have lost 60,000 men in this tremendous bat- tle. Having regard to the ultimate purpose of the French in taking the of- fensive, it must be admitted that they failed : they had not broken through the German lines. Lille was still in posses- sion of the enemy whose communications were still open. In all probability, 62 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR however, the Germans had been kept so busy as to have no troops to spare for the attempt on Ypres previously de- scribed. And it was further proved that with sufficient preparation by ar- tillery and mining German positions could be carried to a considerable depth. Simultaneously with the Battle of Artois, there was considerable activity further east in the Argonne region and on the St. Mihiel salient, on the western front of which the French succeeded in capturing Les Eparges. They also met with some success on the southern face, on the edge of the Forest of Apremont. Southeast of Luneville in the Vosges the Germans took the Ban de Sapt on June 22. In July it was recaptured by the French, who also made some small ad- vances in Alsace. Battle of Champagne. — The French check in the Artois country was fol- lowed by fighting chiefly in the Vosges, mostly of a local character. This con- tinued until September, when the French opened an offensive for which they had long been making prepara- tions. Apart from the advantage that would accrue if this offensive should succeed, there -were reasons of a politi- cal order that called for something more from the Allies than mere nibbling at the German lines. The German cam- paign in the east was meeting with suc- cess. To counterbalance this success, and at the same time to relieve the pres- sure on the Russians, it was regarded as necessary to deal the common enemy a mighty blow in the west. To keep him ignorant of the precise point at which the blow was to fall, for weeks previous substantially the entire German posi- tion was subjected to intense bombard- ment. Beginning in the middle of Au- gust, this bombardment was especially heavy on the Belgian front in the Souchez region, before Arras and Roye, along the Aisne, in Champagne, and fin- ally in the Argonne and Woevre dis- tricts, and in Lorraine. As the time drew near for the infantry work, the bombardment increased in intensity over the front selected for attack. That front was in Champagne, between Au- berive on the west and Ville-sur-Tourbe on the east, a distance of some 15 or 16 miles. The centre of the French line was defended by the 6th, 5th, and 4th armies. The front held by the 4th (Langle de Cary) was the one selected from which to deliver the offensive. Some 4 or 5 miles behind the corre- sponding German position and roughly parallel to it, runs the Bazancourt- Challerange railway. If the French of- fensive could reach this railway a mis- chief would be done to the enemy, for this road communicated with Metz on the east. But the natural strength of the German position had been increased by the arts of the engineer. From Au- berive this position followed the crest of the low ridge north of the Suippes Riv- er, rising, as it passed though Souain, then by Perthes, with Tahure behind (north of) it, and terminated at Mas- siges. To say that this whole position was intrenched is scarcely to do justice to the effort spent on its defensive or- ganization ; not only were there the usual trenches (lines) facing the enemy position, but cross trenches had been dug over the entire area, from which flanking fire could be delivered upon the enemy if he should succeed in passing the first and subsequent lines. There were really two positions, two miles or so apart, the first immediately in front of the French, the second on the re- verse of the ridge. The area between them was a network of trenches and en- tanglements. On September 22 the bombardment MILITARY OPERATIONS 63 increased in intensity and was kept up until the 25th, when the French infan- try broke out of its own trenches and gained practically the first line posi- tions of the enemy by 12 o'clock noon. At some points, however, the Germans held, and the work therefore became in some sort a series of isolated and de- tached actions. On the left the attack was exposed to the German artillery fire from the plateau of Moronvillers, in front it came up against the salients of the ridge. The first line was carried, however, and the right of this attack held all day, and later pushed on deep- er and deeper into the German network. To the right of the St. Hilaire-St. Souplet road, much the same thing happened, the French left being stopped while the right managed to advance and took all four lines of trenches. Fur- ther east the enemy trenches were pene- trated to a depth of about 500 yards, but machine guns stopped the advance. North of Souain the French met with pronounced success, carrying trench after trench almost to the Navarin Farm. Between Souain and Perthes the German position had been most sol- idly organized, but in its eastern por- tion the defenses were comparatively weak. Here the French delivered their main attack in this part of the front, the remainder (the left) playing a sec- ondary part. The attack carried the French advance as far as the Souain- Tahure road. In the Mesnil sector (east of Perthes) the greatest difficul- ties were encountered, but still further east, north of Beausejour, the French had better fortune, pushing north as far as Maison de Champagne. On the extreme right (Massiges) the colonial troops reached the top of the plateau in an incredibly short time, but could not advance, because of the effective machine-gun fire here developed. The first day's fighting therefore had pushed back the enemy lines in the centre : the flanks had not been driven in, but the French managed to secure the ground gained. In the west, on the 27th, the French got up to the Epine de Vede- grange, but no farther. On the next day the fighting died down in this sector of the battlefield. In the Souain sector the French on the 28th made contact with the second German position in these parts. Between Souain and Ta- hure, in front of Perthes, contact with this second position was also establish- ed, but here the French remained, dig- ging themselves in, until October 6. While all these events were occurring in the centre and left, the most desper- ate struggle of all was going on to the north of Massiges. From the plateau three long spurs ran down like fingers, whence the name given to them and to the plateau from which they spring, La Main de Massiges. These were strong- ly held by the Germans. The French accordingly attacked across the back of the hand, and got up on the pla- teau. The general result of this battle, the local and separate contests of which were not over before October 4, was that the French gained the Massiges plateau, the Tahure ridge, and various points in the German second position. The elaborate intrenchments and work of the first positions were taken. The total number of prisoners officially giv- en was over 23,000; many guns and much war material fell into the hands of the French. But as in all the other cases of real battles, as distinguished from the daily local strife, on the long front, the German lines were not brok- en ; they were merely pushed back. Al- though, therefore, the Germans had suf- fered a defeat in that they had been driven out of their positions, yet it must 64 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR be admitted, on the other hand, that the French had been disappointed of their purpose. This apart, there can be no question as to the thoroughness of the German defeat. The French staff estimated the German loss in killed, wounded, and missing at 1-10,000. Battle of Loos. — While this great battle was going on in Champagne, the Allies were renewing their offensive in Artois, the British in the Battle of Loos, the French in that of Vimy. As before in this region, the objective was to push into the plain of the Scheldt. Reinforcements both of men and of guns had given the British the necessary elements to undertake the offensive. Thanks to this increased strength, they had extended their trenches southward to Grenay, opposite to Loos and Lens. It is apparent, therefore, that in the month of September theAllies undertook a general offensive, for in addition to their two mighty efforts in Champagne and Artois, the Germans were kept busy in other regions of the front, by dem- onstrations on the extreme left, in which the navy took a part, in front of Ypres and also in the Vosges. In spite of the Battle of Artois, the Germans still held the eastern slopes of Notre Dame de Lorette ; from this point their lines stretched north in front of (west of) the Loos-Hulluch- Haisnes ridge to the canal near La Bas- see ; south, they curved through Angres and Lievin to Souchez, thench eastward of the high road from Bethune to Arras. Between Haisnes and Hulluch lay the powerful Hohenzollern redoubt, a work more or less like the Labyrinth. Their general position thus formed a sort of salient oriented southwestward on the axis Souchez-Lens. The plan contem- plated that the British should drive at the northern side of the salient (Loos- Hulluch-Haisnes), the French at the southern (Vimy Heights). The capture of either of these positions would force the evacuation of Lens. The terrain over which the British were to advance was covered with villages, pits, gal- leries, slag heaps, and mine works gen- erally, all connected by trenches. More- over, the industrial pits and galleries had been taken over and extended by the Germans for war purposes. The entire area had been defensively organ- ized, and equipped with machine guns, artillery, and small works and trenches generally. In front of the French po- sition, northeast of Neuville St. Vaast, lay the wooded heights of Vimy running northwest to Givenchy with hills 140 and 119 as conspicuous elevations. Preparations for the great offensive were completed by September 21. Specifically the British were to capture Auchy, Haisnes, Pit No. 8, and the LTohenzollern Redoubt; further south the ridge between Hulluch was to be the objective, involving the capture of Loos, and Hill 70 to the east of the town. The French, as stated, were to attack the Vimy Heights. Amply pro- vided with artillery, the British besides were to employ, for the first time, a gas that stupefied but did not kill. The action opened with artillery prepara- tion on the 21th. During this day the entire German position within range was taken under fire by both the French and the British artillery. On the 25th this fire was renewed very early in the morning, and suspended two hours later in order to allow the infantry to ad- vance. This they did at 6.30 a.m. The French, however, continued the artil- lery preparation until noon. On the extreme left, between the canal and Pit No. 8, the British met with a serious repulse. Part of the Hohenzollern Re- doubt was carried, so was Pit No. 8. Haisnes was taken as early as 8 a.m., MILITARY OPERATIONS 65 but had to be abandoned by 5 p.m. Loos, after a terrible struggle, fell to the English, as did Hill No. 70. A counter-attack by the Germans recov- ered most of Hill 70. As night fell, the British line ran around the south of Loos to the western part of Hill 70, past the west of Hulluch quarries to Pit No. 8, then east of Hohenzollern Re- doubt, and so back to the original posi- tion. The fighting was renewed the next day with no material results on either side. By night the line ran back from Hill 70 to the Loos-La Bassee road, then north along this road, then northeast of Hulluch. The remainder of the line was unchanged. On the 27th the Germans recaptured Pit. No. 8 and forced their enemies back to the eastern part of Hohenzollern Redoubt. The next few days were filled with desperate fighting, more or less localized. The net result, so far as the British were concerned, was the capture of Loos and a portion of Hill 70. The French, on their side, advancing a little after 12 o'clock noon, had made but slight progress. They took the Souchez cemetery, but lost it later, and reached the lower slopes of Hill 119. The German garrison of Souchez re- tired to Hill 119. On the 28th Vimy Heights were attacked; the western slopes and a large part of the wood of Givenchy were taken. This battle must be regarded as a failure on the part of the Allies. It would seem that the British had no re- serves available to clinch the results ob- tained in their advance. The Germans thus had time to rally and counterat- tack. It would seem too that the French perhaps made a mistake in de- laying their advance on the 25th by six hours. Had they moved out at the same time, the French left and the Brit- ish right might have joined hands. The Allies' losses were very heavy. The British alone lost 50,000 men in this battle. Disappointed, however, as were the Allies in respect of the main pur- pose they had in view, both in Cham- pagne and in Artois, they had, never- theless, made some real gains. In the latter regions they were gradually pushing the Germans to the rim of the plain of the Scheldt. The British gain had, as it were, pushed a salient in be- tween La Bassee on the north and Lens on the south, thus creating in some sort two German salients. After the battle the French relieved the British from the French left up to and including the village of Loos and a part of Hill 70. The position of the Allies in this new salient of Loos was none too secure. But apart from this, it was clearly incumbent on the Ger- mans to try to recover the terrain they had just lost. They accordingly, on September 29, attacked the northwest face of the British salient, but were beaten off. The French on their side advanced to Hill 140. The next day the German attempts on the northwest face were renewed. October 1 the French made more progress on Vimy Heights. October 3 was marked by a fresh attack on the northwestern face, and most of the Hohenzollern Redoubt was recaptured. On the 8th a counter- attack was made on the British posi- tion. It was repulsed with loss, as were the attempts made on the French near Neuville St. Vaast. Later, October 13, these attempts on the French were re- newed with very much the same results. On this day the British themselves took the offensive in an effort to extend the northern face of their salient. This ef- fort very nearly succeeded in gaining the Hohenzollern Redoubt for the Eng- lish, a part of which only was held, how- ever. October 19 the British line ran 66 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR from Auchez-Hohenzollern, St. Elie, and then, so as to encircle Loos on the east and south, back to the old trenches. The close of the year 1915 saw the adversaries confronting one another on this as on other portions of the front. But in respect of the northern region it must be remarked that unsuccessful as the Anglo-French efforts to break through had proved, yet they had suc- ceeded in pushing back the Germans to the last ridge of hills separating the area of conflict from the plain of the Scheldt. One more drive like the Sep- tember one, and the Germans might be pushed into the plain and so lose this part of France. Hence they reenforced their hold by reinforcements estimated at 600,000, and throughout the winter obtained a few minor successes. Verdun. — But these, as well as all the other events, gave way in February, 1916, to the most determined attempt yet made by any of the combatants on any front to win a decision. On the 21st of this month the Germans opened their assault on Verdun. But this place had changed its character since the opening days of the war. Warned by the fate of Liege, Namur, and Mau- beuge, it had passed from the condi- tion of fortress pure and simple to that of fortress related to an army in the field. Hence its reduction was no long- er a matter of sufficient pounding by 42-centimeter guns. General Petain * was summoned to conduct the of- fense. * Henri Philippe Petain, born in 1857; de- livered notable lectures at the Eeole de Guerre, for which he was decorated by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria; at beginning of European War was colonel of the Thirty-third Regiment of Infantry at Arras; distinguished himself in the retreat from Charleroi to the Marne; pro- moted general of division; in command of an army corps took Carency, breaking through the German front; in 1915 was in command of part of the "Iron Division" of Colonials in Artois and Champagne; given command of armies around Verdun. The first German drive was delivered against the point of the Verdun salient by heavy columns, over a 7-mile front, from Consenvoye to Azannes. After a prolonged bombardment of heavy artil- lery — it is estimated that during the first four days no fewer than 2,000,000 shells were fired — these columns struck the French advanced lines, and at the end of a week had advanced 4 miles towards Verdun. The right, advancing along the Meuse, had reached Champ- neuville ; the centre, after taking Beau- mont, faced the ridge known as the Cote de Poivre; while the left, after captur- ing Ornes, threw itself against Fort Douaumont, the most northerly of the permanent forts of Verdun. After sev- eral costly repulses this fort was storm- ed and held by the 21 francs per ton, Ger- many consenting to a rebate of 40 francs a ton for the 60,000 tons which represented domestic consumption. Each party was to be permitted to ex- port products of exchange in the pro- NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 267 portionate quantity. Switzerland ac- cepted a system of control, under the so-called Switzerland Fiduciary Office, which was to go into operation July 15, 1918, and which was to be responsible solely to the Federal Council. It was agreed in principle that Switzerland might freely make use of German coal in manufactures which might be ex- ported, but the merchandise manufac- tured from German coal could not be sent into countries at war with it unless it was shown that an equal amount of non-German coal had been employed in that enterprise. The Germans delayed the negotiations and increased their de- mands, but when France informed Switzerland that the Allies were ready to supply her with 85,000 tons of coal a month, Germany hastened to conclude the convention. On September 13, 1918, the French government abrogated the French-Swiss commercial convention of 1906. This was in accordance with the policy of the Entente Allies to put an end to all treaties containing the most favored nation clause. South American Countries. All of the South American countries were seriously affected by the outbreak of the European War. A large amount of the business in these countries was carried on by European credit and the dislocation of the European financial markets seriously crippled the business interests in South America. Moreover, a large part of the export trade of these countries was cut off and emergency measures had to be adopted to relieve the situation. In Chile a moratorium was declared, and the President was empowered to extend government aid to the nitrate industry, the most impor- tant in the country. Argentina floated two loans, one of $15,000,000 and the other of $25,000,000, in the United States. This was the first time a South American country had negotiated a loan directly in the United States. Chile became involved in a dispute with the belligerents when, on April 2, 1915, the German cruiser Dresden, which had entered Chilean waters and had been ordered interned, was sunk by a British squadron. Chile demanded an apology from Great Britain for this violation of her sovereignty and this de- mand was conceded. Germany sent a sharply worded note protesting against the acceptance of this apology, and Chile replied by demanding an apology from Germany for overstepping the bounds of international law in interven- ing in a question which involved Chile's relations with another Power. After some discussion the matter was ad- justed peaceably. Reception of the Barred Zone Note. — The issuance of the barred sea zone note on Jan. 31, 1917, created a pro- found impression in all the South Amer- ican republics. None of them, however, seemed ready to take the step adopted by the United States government and sever diplomatic relations. Brazil re- plied in part: "... The unexpected communication we have just received announcing a blockade of wide extent of countries with which Brazil is con- tinually in economic relations by foreign and Brazilian shipping has produced a justified and profound impression through the imminent menace which it contains of the unjust sacrifice of lives, the destruction of property, and the wholesale disturbance of commercial transactions. . . . For these reasons the Brazilian government, in spite of its sincere and keen desire to avoid any disagreement with the nations at war, with whom it is on friendly terms, be- lieves it to be its duty to protest against this blockade and consequently to leave 268 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR entirely with the Imperial German gov- ernment the responsibility for all acts which will involve Brazilian citizens, merchandise, or ships and which are proved to have been committed in dis- regard of the recognized principles of international law and the conventions signed by Brazil and Germany." Chile refused outright to recognize the legality of the German attempt to establish barred zones and "conse- quently reserves liberty of action to protect all her rights in the event of any hostile acts against her ships." Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Panama, and Cuba all took similar ac- tion. The keynote of their replies was that any act on the part of Germany against their rights as neutrals would be considered unfriendly. During 1918 the attitude of Chile toward the war was a subject of much comment, for it was not understood why she was so firm against taking any part in the war. This seemed to be the re- sult in the first place of a belief that German military power could never be conquered. Then there was no clear perception of the economic consequences of the war in case of a German victory. Nor did the fear of German imperial ambition count for much, for what was said on that subject by the Entente Allies was attributed to propaganda. Finally, there was no faith whatever in the military strength of the United States. Soon after the declaration of war be- tween the United States and Germany, Brazil issued a proclamation of neu- trality as between those two nations, although there was a strong party in the country which favored a declara- tion of war based on the grounds laid down by President Wilson of the United States. She kept this attitude of neu- trality until June 4, 1917, when the Brazilian Ambassador handed to the State Department at Washington a note which read in part, "Brazil ever was and now is free from warlike ambi- tions, and, while it always refrained from showing any impartiality in the European conflict, it could no longer stand unconcerned when the struggle involved the United States, actuated by no interest whatever but solely for the sake of international judicial order, and when Germany included us and the other neutral powers in the most violent acts of war." Brazil seized about 150,- 000 tons of German merchant vessels in her harbors and ordered her fleet to cooperate in the patrol work in the southern Atlantic. Brazil declared war on Germany on Oct. 26, 1917, and immediately took steps against her large German popu- lation. She annulled all contracts en- tered into for public works with Ger- mans, forbade land cessions to Ger- mans, took over the control of German banks, and interned all German sub- jects. Disorder immediately broke out in the large German settlements in southern Brazil, and an army had to be sent to restore order. Shortly after her declaration of war Secretary of State Lansing (United States) pub- lished two telegrams from Count Lux- burg, the German Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, to Berlin through the Swedish legation, stating that the situ- ation in Brazil was serious, but that a visit of a submarine squadron would materially relieve the situation. Brazil had knowledge of these before she de- clared war. By the end of 1917 the situation in Argentina was very acute. On Sept. 8, 1917, Secretary of State Lansing published telegrams that had been sent to Berlin in cipher through the inter- mediary of the Swedish foreign office. NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 269 The first one under the date of May 19, 1917, states that in the future Ger- many had better adopt one of two poli- cies with regard to Argentine ships. They must either let them alone or sink them without leaving a trace of their sinking (spurlos versenkt). In a tele- gram dated July 9, he reiterated the same sentiments. The publication of these created a profound impression on the country. Mobs gathered in the streets of the capital, German houses were wrecked and burned. Troops had to be called out to quell the riots. Count Luxburg was handed his pass- ports and the Argentine Senate passed a resolution asking for the breaking off of relations with Germany. President Irigoyen refused to sanction the reso- lution even after it had been passed by both houses. He announced that Ar- gentina would maintain her neutrality as long as Germany lived up to the pledge given in October, 1917, "to rec- ognize the Argentine flag and respect the nation and people." The country was almost in a state of civil war over the question of whether the country should go to war or not. A big strike on the railroads helped to mix up mat- ters further and to put the state in a serious plight. Costa Rica severed diplomatic rela- tions with Germany on Sept. 21, 1917. On October 6 the Peruvian government handed his passports to the German minister. On October 10, the govern- ment announced that the harbors of Peru were opened to the warships of the Allies. On October 8, Ecuador an- nounced that the minister from Peru who was also minister to Ecuador would not be received in that country. In December, 1917, she broke off diplo- matic relations with Germany entirely. Uruguay broke off relations with Ger- many on October 7. The President in his address to the Parliament stated that Uruguay had not received any harsh treatment at the hands of Ger- many but that the country should join hands with those fighting for justice and democracy. She seized almost 50,- 000 tons of German shipping in her harbors. Paraguay had also broken off relations with Germany soon after the publication of the "barred sea" note. In December, 1917, the State De- partment at Washington published sev- eral more telegrams sent to Berlin by way of the Swedish legation. The pur- port of most of them was to unify the German population of South America, which was very great, and organize them against the South American re- publics. They spoke very sneeringly of the people of South America, re- ferring to them one time as Indians with a slight veneer over them. Central American Countries. The addition of the United States to the belligerents profoundly influenced other neutral states, especially the South and Central American republics. Some had suffered from the German submarine campaign and were encouraged to fol- low the lead of the United States in breaking with Germany. Others who had not suffered material damage were influenced by the close ties which bound them to the United States. Of the lat- ter group were Cuba and Panama. On April 7, 1917, the day after the declaration of war by the United States, a war resolution passed both houses of the Cuban Congress and signed by the President. This declared that a state of war existed between Cuba and Ger- many from that date and the Presi- dent was authorized to use the military and naval forces in any manner he thought necessary. Four German and one Austrian vessel were seized in Cuban 270 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR waters. Toward the end of the month a mission was appointed to visit the United States and confer with the American government on Cuba's part in the war. The President authorized the issuance of $13,000,000 of bonds as a war loan beginning July 1 to bear in- terest at not more than six per cent. On May 26, 1917, several revenue meas- ures were announced, including taxes on sugar and the net income of mining and engineering companies. On August 3, 1918, the Congress passed a law au- thorizing obligatory military service applying to all male Cubans not espe- cially exempted. The age limit was twenty-one to twenty-eight years. The army was to be composed of 17,000 men and the necessary officers. A reserve force was also created, the number to be determined later. A custodian of enemy property was created on Sep- tember 18, 1918. Foreign enemies were defined as nations of an enemy coun- try ; nationals of a neutral power if they violate Cuban laws with intent of aiding country with which Cuba is at war; persons, societies, etc., domiciled in enemy territory and maintaining commercial relations with it ; persons, societies, etc., regardless of domicile whom the national safety or war neces- sities require to be included in the list of enemies. Panama also followed the lead of the United States and declared war against Germany April 7, 1917, the day after the American declaration. Toward the end of May, 1917, al- leged proof of conspiracies between German agents and former President Gonzales were made public in Costa Rica. Meanwhile on April 12 the Costa Rican government had placed its waters and ports at the disposal of the United States for war purposes. On April 26 it cancelled the letters patent of all Germans in its consular service. By this time a guard service had been or- ganized along the coasts and boundaries as a protection against German activi- ties. On May 23, 1918, it formally declared war against Germany. On April 28, 1917, martial law was declared in Guatemala because of dis- turbances along the frontier supposed to be of German origin. On April 18, 1917, diplomatic relations were broken off with Germany and on April 22, 1918, war was formally declared against her. Haiti declared war against Germany on July 20, 1918, because of the tor- pedoing of a French steamer causing the loss of eight Haitians. Nicaragua formally declared war against Germany on May 7, 1918. Honduras declared war against Germany on July 19, 1918. China and Siam. On resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare China issued a protest on February 9, 1917, saying that diplomatic relations would be broken off if the protest was not regarded. On the breaking of diplo- matic relations between the United States and Germany, China began dis- cussing similar action and on March 14 handed the German Ambassador his passports. China demanded of the En- tente Allies and the United States the suspension of the Boxer indemnities amounting to $30,000,000 a year and would last till 1940 ; consent of the Powers to raise her import duties ; their consent to the posting of troops at Tientsin and on the Tientsin railway and in the neighborhood of thelegations. The Allies, anxious to have China enter the war, not so much to take part in the fighting, but to provide a reserve of men, had already promised part of these concessions. China had already supplied 100,000 laborers and farm hands to the Entente man-power, for NEUTRAL NATIONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR 271 the most part in France, and the drown- ing of some of them on their way over on the Athos and other boats led to the first protest from China against Ger- man methods. Difficulties accompanied the breaking of relations with Germany. On March 4, 1917, when the cabinet decided to follow the example of the United States, the president refused approval and the prime minister and several of the other ministers resigned. Parliament and the vice-president supported the cabinet. The president later yielded and the prime minister returned to office. The German reply to the Chinese was con- sidered unsatisfactory and on the same day (March 10) the House voted to break off relations. The Senate took the same action on the following day. All merchant ships in Shanghai were seized and guards placed on them. Evidence of intent to destroy them was found. The question of declaring war was now debated and an extended discussion in Parliament went on. A special com- mission for international affairs was appointed to report on the subject. The commission decided in favor of en- try into the war. A secret session of Parliament was held on May 9, 1917, and a resolution declaring war was re- ferred to a standing committee. The Prime Minister urged its passage and a heated debate followed. After a stormy session the House of Representatives refused to pass the resolution on May 11 on the ground mainly that the war ought not be entered into until the cabi- net was reorganized. A mob gathered around the Parliament building and threatened violence and had to be dis- persed by troops. On May 19 the House decided not to consider any war measures until the resignation of the prime minister and the reorganiza- tion of the cabinet. A deadlock in the House and Senate on the war question followed. There was a strong demand in and out of Parliament for the resig- nation of the prime minister, who it was feared, in case of war, might vio- late the constitution and place the power in the hands of the Conservative Military Party. On the other hand the military governors objected to his dis- missal. On May 29 it was announced that the military governors of several provinces had declared their independence of the Central government. The president was forced to flee and the Manchu dynasty was declared reestablished. However, the government recovered strength and the emperor was forced to abdicate and the new imperial gov- ernment overthrown July 8-12. It was claimed that the Germans were respon- sible for the counter-revolution, but this was not established. What seems more certain is that the revolution was con- nected with international affairs, espe- cially with the relations between the United States and Japan and the Rus- sian revolution. The Chinese declara- tion of war checked by the constitu- tional crisis and by the attempt to restore the monarchy was unanimously decided upon by the cabinet and ap- proved by the president on August 5, 1917. China continued sending laborers to Europe, about two-thirds going to England and one-third to France. By the close of August, 1918, it was esti- mated that from 4,000 to 5,000 work- ingmen a month were transported to France by way of the Suez Canal and that 150,000 were at work on French territory, being employed in munition plants, in quartermaster's and engineer- ing branches of the army. A bureau of immigration was established to look after these workingmen. Two special 272 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR delegates were sent to England and France to watch over them and straighten difficulties that might pos- sibly arise between them and their em- ployers. China took little part in the war. It was thought that with the suspension of the Boxer indemnity and the increase in import duties China would develop industries and supply the Allies with raw materials. Instead the Allies com- plained the resources were squandered in civil war. The Chinese army was not properly organized and did not take part in the war. The appointment of a Chinese ambassador to the Papal See indicated a desire to embarrass the Allies. China did not deal effectively with German intrigue and did not prop- erly supervise enemy property. The Chinese enemy trading act though promulgated was not enforced. She was informed that a speedy and com- plete execution of the agreement was necessary to her enjoying equal privi- leges with the Allies at the peace con- ference. Siam declared war against Germany and Austria on July 27, 1917, interning the subjects of those countries and seiz- ing the enemy ships. For a long time past the Entente made demands on her. After the war broke out numbers of Germans in the Indo-Chinese posses- sions of France and the Indian terri- tories of England sought refuge in Siam. They recruited bands among the natives and organized movements against the Allies and the government looked on apparently indifferent. France demanded that she choose be- tween the Entente Allies and their ene- mies, and Great Britain, which before the war had great influence, presented an ultimatum to the Siamese govern- ment. The break with Germany fol- lowed. This restored order to the French and British possessions in the East. Liberia. The trade of this country was conducted almost wholly by Ger- man residents who controlled both im- ports and exports, but since the war began operations were at first restricted and later almost stopped by British war measures and Liberia was nearing starvation, according to official dis- patches received at Washington Febru- ary 4, 1917. Relations with Germany were broken off on May 8. This was important because many cables had their points of landing in Liberia and had been used by German} 7 as a base against the British. War was declared on August 4, 1917. Compulsory mili- tary service during the war was set up and some hundreds of laborers were sent to France for war work. Vigorous action was taken against German citizens. X. PEACE PROPOSALS AND STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS The most important move towards peace occurred in December, 1916. On the 12th of that month, Germany, Aus- tria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria submitted practically identical notes to the diplomatic representatives of the United States, Switzerland, and other neutral countries as well as to the Vati- can. No terms were mentioned but the Allies were asked "to enter forthwith into peace negotiations." The notes were forwarded to the Allies without comment. Russia immediately refused to open any negotiations whatever. Italy and France made similar declara- tions. Lloyd George, the new premier of England, declared that little could be expected of the peace move now and that "the very appeal for peace was de- livered ostentatiously from the triumph- al chariot of Prussian militarism." Rather unexpectedly the United States, on December 18, sent a note to the belligerent nations asking them "the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out." Germany replied on December 26 that the only thing she was willing to consider was a meeting of representatives of the bel- ligerent nations while the war was con- tinued. The Allied reply was received on January 12, 1917. It was a compila- tion of the views of all the Entente Powers and demanded (1) restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro with indemnities; (2) evacuation of in- vaded territories of France, Russia, and Rumania with reparation; (3) reor- ganization of Europe under guarantees to insure to all nations respect and lib- erty of development; (4) restitution of territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the people's will; (5) liberation of Slavs, Ruman- ians, Italians, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; (6) enfranchise- ment of population subject to Turkey; (7) expulsion from Europe of the Ot- toman Empire. This note effectively stopped for the time being all attempts to bring about peace, inasmuch as the world realized that the demands of the Allies could be gained only on the bat- tlefield and not in a conference. Pope Benedict's Peace Appeal. — In August, 1917, Pope Benedict * sent an identical note to all the belligerent pow- ers on the subject of peace. The note as translated by the State Department at Washington was published in the American newspapers on August 16. The first paragraphs stated that the Pontificate has made every effort to re- main absolutely impartial and thus espouse the cause of no one group of belligerents. It relates the unsuccessful attempts to mediate at the end of the first year of the war and then states the "base of a just and lasting peace." . . . First, the fundamental point must be * Benedict XV (Giacomo deixa Chiesa). 260th Pope, elected September 3, 1914. Born (1854) in Pagli, diocese of Genoa. Took de- gree in jurisprudence at University of Genoa. Ordained a priest in 18T8. In 1883 appointed secretary to the Nunciature at Madrid. On re- turn to Rome made permanent Under Secre- tary of the Secretariat of State. Made pre- late (1900), consultor of Holy Office (1901), Archbishop of Bologna (1907), and Cardinal (May, 1914). Known as man of diplomacy, cool and level-headed. Keen reverence for all traditions of the Vatican and foe of Modern- ism in Church. 273 274 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR that the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right, whence shall proceed a just agreement of all upon the simultaneous and recip- rocal decrease of armaments, accord- ing to rules and guarantees to be estab- lished, in the necessary and suffi- cient measure for the maintenance of public order in every State ; then tak- ing the place of arms, the institution of arbitration, with its high pacifying function, according to rule to be drawn in concert and under sanctions to be de- termined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." The Pope then takes up the question of the war, and suggests absolute free- dom of the seas. He also asks for mu- tual restitution of all territory that has changed hands during the war. "As re- gards territorial questions, as, for in- stance, those that are disputed by Italy and Austria, by Germany and France, there is reason to hope that, in con- sideration of the immense advantages of durable peace with disarmament, the contending parties will examine them in a conciliatory spirit, taking into ac- count, as far as is just and possible, as we have said formerly, the aspira- tions of the population, and, if occasion arises, adjusting private opinions to the general good of the great human so- ciety." He suggested that the ques- tions of the Balkan States, Poland, and Armenia might be settled on the same principles. The press in Entente countries se- verely criticized the Pope's appeal on the grounds that it made no condemna- tion of Germany's atrocities, the inva- sion of Belgium and the submarine war- fare. The Pope replied to this by stat- ing that he was acting as a peacemaker and not as a judge and that if he at- tempted to decide which set of bel- ligerents was right his peace attempt was certain to be a failure. On August n, 1917, President Wil- son replied to the Pope's note through Secretary of State Lansing. It stated that, "Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else." After reviewing the methods suggested in the Pope's note, the President's re- ply states : "It is manifest that no part of this programme can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the status quo ante furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peo- ples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military es- tablishment controlled by an irrespon- sible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceed- ed to carry out the plan without re- gard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of inter- national action and honor ; which choso its own time for the war ; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly ; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy ; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood — not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. . . . They (the American peo- ple) believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments — the rights of peoples great and small, weak or powerful — their equal right to freedom and secur- ity and self-government and to a par- ticipation upon fair terms in the eco- nomic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 275 they will accept equality and not seek domination. . . . We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people them- selves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. With- out such guarantees treaties of settle- ment, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German government, no man, no nation can now depend on." President Wilson's reply to Pope Benedict received the hearty approval of the press of the United States. Even the German papers printed in that country seemed to favor the note. The Allies of the United States, through their statesmen and press, endorsed the stand taken and the more enthusiastic of them hailed Mr. Wilson as the spokesman of the Entente. In Germany the government and pan-German or- gans bitterly attacked the President's note, claiming that it was nonsense to say that the German people were op- pressed by an irresponsible government. They cited the fact that the entire Ger- man people had time and time again re- peated that they stand firmly behind the government. The Socialist newspaper, Vorwarts, stated editorially, "The gov- ernment of a country at war with us has a perfect right to demand that for the conditions under which peace is to be concluded the people themselves shall be the guarantee." Semi-official organs in France, Great Britain, Italy, and Rus- sia announced to the world that the re- ply of President Wilson represented their own attitude toward the peace proposal. The official replies of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires were made public on September 22, 1917. The main theme of both notes was identical. It was that both empires agreed with the Pope's desire to have the right of might give way to moral force. Both stated that arbitration with efficient guarantees should follow an immediate disarmament by all the nations of the world. Freedom of the seas and the right of independent economic progress was inalienable to all nations. The press of the Entente countries passion- ately attacked the replies, not so much because of what was contained therein, but because of what was not said. Noth- ing was said of the evacuation, restitu- tion, and indemnification of Belgium, nothing of Alsace-Lorraine, nothing of Poland, Armenia, Trentino, etc. Sub- sequent statements by German diplo- mats refused absolutely to debate the question of Alsace-Lorraine. British Statement of War Aims. — At the beginning of 1918 a compre- hensive statement of British Labor war aims, passed by official representatives of the trade unions and the Labor par- ty, was made public. Its effect upon the governments of Great Britain and the other Allies was immediately per- ceptible and it continued to influence them in the formulation of war pur- poses throughout the year. It declared that "whatever may have been the ob- jects for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the British la- bor movement is that the world may (henceforth be made safe for democ- racy." It opposed any attempt to turn the war into a war of conquest and de- clared that it should not be prolonged for a single day after the conditions for permanent peace could be obtained, but it held that certain reparations and res- titutions were necessary. These should be based on the principle of self-deter- 276 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR mination of all the peoples concerned and should seek to remove the causes of future conflict. They included: Ger- man restoration of Belgium to complete independence, and reparation, under the direction of an international com- mission, of the wrong done; the right of the people of Alsace-Lorraine under the protection of a supernational au- thority, or League of Nations, to decide their own future political status ; the support of the claim of the people of Italian blood for union with their kins- folk, but the condemnation of Italian aims of conquest or imperialism; the settlement of other cases in dispute, such as those of Luxemburg, the Poles, and others, on the principle of self- determination by the peoples; the granting to the Jews of all lands the same rights of tolerance, freedom of residence, and equal citizenship that ought to be accorded to all the inhabi- tants of every nation. It recommended that Palestine be freed from Turkish domination and set up as an indepen- dent state, under international guaran- tee, to which Jews might return if they desired ; the neutralization of Constan- tinople and the placing of it along with a part or possibly all of Asia Minor under an impartial administration ; and the reorganization of the Balkans by a special commission or an international conference on the principles of: (1) Self-determination by the peoples with- out regard to Austria, Turkish, or oth- er alien control; (2) independent sov- ereignty of the predominant nationali- ties ; (3) universal adoption of reli- gious freedom, and equal citizenship of all races, and of local self-government ; (4) a customs union of all the Balkan states; (5) a federation of all national Balkan states for the joint voluntary arrangement of matters of common concern. It urged the abandonment by all the belligerents of all dreams of African Empire, and the transfer of the present colonies to a super- national authority or League of Na- tions. As to plans for an economic war after peace was secured, the Labor movement declared squarely against them. It favored government control of indispensable commodities for some time after the war in order to meet the needs of the whole community ; and it held that homes, factories, and farms destroyed by the war should be restored immediately upon the return of peace. It demanded a complete judicial inves- tigation of the charges that particular governments had ordered and particu- lar officers had committed acts of cruelty, violence, theft, and other of- fenses unjustified in the common usage of war ; and it recommended that a court of claims arid accusations should be set up in the interest of the non- combatant victims of such inhumanity and ruthlessness. The memorandum declared emphatically against imperi- alism in all countries ; and favored the complete democratization of all govern- ments, the universal abolition of com- pulsory military service, and the crea- tion of a supernational authority, or League of Nations, endowed with law- making authority and with power to en- force its decrees. In response to the continued demands that the Allies' war aims be distinctly declared, Mr. Lloyd George made a statement in regard to them in an ad- dress to the delegates of the trade unions on January 5. He said that the war aims of the Allies had been dis- cussed by him, the leaders of the La- bor party, with Mr. Asquith, Viscount Grey, and representatives of the Do- minions. He declared in the first place, that the Allies were not fighting against the German people, and were not seek- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 277 ing and had never sought to destroy or disrupt the German people or Ger- many, or to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to seize Constantinople, or to de- prive Turkey of those lands which are occupied by people mainly of Turkish race. He then outlined the purposes for which the Allies were fighting. They may be summarized as follows : 1. — Europe. Complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the de- vastation of its towns and provinces. Restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. Complete withdrawal of the alien armies and reparation for the injuries inflicted. Support of the French democracy in their demand for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, with- out regard to the wishes of the popu- lation, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorpo- rated in the German Empire. An independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, an urgent ne- cessity for the stability of western Europe. Genuine self-government on true democratic principles to those Austro- Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it. Satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. Justice to men of Rumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspira- tions. II. — Asia, and Africa. Constanti- nople to remain Turkish capital. Passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to be international- ized. Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine entitled to recog- nition of their separate national con- ditions. German colonies held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. III. — In General. Reparation for injuries done in violation of internation- al law, especially as regards British seamen. The establishment of some interna- tional organization of an alternative to war as a means of settling interna- tional disputes. Sanctity of treaties to be reestab- lished. A territorial settlement to be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed. The creation of some international organization to limit the burden of ar- maments and diminish the probability of war. President Wilson's" Fourteen Points" Message. — Soon after Lloyd George had made this brief and general state- ment of war aims, President Wilson sent to Congress (January 8) an im- portant message which set forth his peace programme in considerable de- tail, summing up the essentials of a final settlement in fourteen points, which be- came the subject of extensive discussion in the closing months of the year. The fourteen points he stated as follows : I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at; after which there shall be no private in- ternational understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. 278 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely im- partial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sover- eignty the interests of the populations con- cerned must have equal weight with the equi- table claims of the Government whose title is to be determined. VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co- operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and un- embarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of»her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sin- cere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself de- sire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their com- prehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she en- joys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their rela- tions with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of inter- national law is forever impaired. VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored; and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unset- tled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the inter- est of all. IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recog- nizable lines of nationality. X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe- guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. XI. Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories re- stored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and inter- national guarantees of the political and eco- nomic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute- ly unmolested opportunity of autonomous de- velopment, and the Dardanelles should be per- manently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under in- ternational guarantees. XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure ac- cess to the sea, and whose political and eco- nomic independence and territorial integrity shoidd be guaranteed by international cove- nant. XIV. A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of po- litical independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. The President's statement was sup- ported by Congress and the American press with surprising unanimity. Hard- ly any criticism of it appeared at the time. In Great Britain it was received with enthusiasm, as definitely stamping the Allied war aims with American ap- proval. It was declared to present es- sentially the same conditions as those laid down by Lloyd George. British labor organizations promptly en- dorsed and declared their unqualified support of a continuance of the war for these purposes. In the French press it was accepted by leading journals as an expression of French aims. Lloyd George answered in an Anglo-French declaration published a day or two later accepting its principles. Italy appar- ently supported it, though there were some suggestions that Italian aspira- tions in the Adriatic were not sufficient- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 279 ly emphasized. In Russia the official Bolshevik organ denounced the Presi- dent as the representative of capitalism and threw suspicion on his words of good-will toward Russia. The Central Powers on War Aims. — • On January 25, 1918, Count von Her- tling, imperial chancellor of Germany, and Count Czernin, Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, made their answers to the statements of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson. The principal points in Count von Hertling's reply were as follows : The Central Powers had been the first to favor extensive publicity of diplomatic agreements. The defensive alliance between Germany and Austria had been public ever since 1889, where- as the offensive agreements of the Al- lies were disclosed only through the present war and chiefly by Russia's publication of her secret documents. The Central Powers had again shown their adherence to the principle by the complete publicity which had been given to the peace negotiations of Brest- Litovsk. Mr. Wilson's principle of ab- solute freedom of navigation in peace and war was accepted by Germany, who, however, dissented from his quali- fication that this rule would not apply when the seas should be closed by in- ternational action. Germany also fully concurred in the demand that there should be no economic war. As to the reducing of armaments, the German government considered it entirely suit- able to discussion. In regard to the impartial adjustment of colonial claims in which the interests of the peoples con- cerned should have due weight, Ger- many believed there would be some dif- ficulty in applying this principle, but that for the present Great Britain should come to an understanding with her ally as to the nature of the pro- posal. Germany demanded uncondi- tionally the reconstruction of the co- lonial possessions of the world. To the demand that all the Russian territory be evacuated, and that Russia have full opportunity for self-development, he re- plied that since the Allies had not ac- cepted the proposal to take part in the Brest-Litovsk conference, the ques- tion concerned only Russia and the Cen- tral Powers. He declared in regard to Belgium that annexation was not part of the German plan but declined to dis- cuss the Belgian question so long as the Allies refused to admit that the only possible basis for peace negotiation was the integrity of the territory of the Central Powers. In regard to Alsace- Lorraine, he said that forcible annexa- tion was no part of the plan of Ger- many, but that Germany and France must settle the question between them- selves and that Germany would never consent to being robbed of the prov- inces. The invaded portions of France were a "valuable pawn" in the hands of Germany. The demand of President Wilson that the non-Turkish popula- tion in the Turkish Empire should be assured of self-government and that the Dardanelles should be permanently opened, he dismissed by saying that that point must be left to the Turkish statesmen. To the demand for an in- dependent Poland he replied that it was the Central Powers that had rescued Poland from Russia's despotism, that therefore it was the business of the Cen- tral Powers to settle the future of Po- land, and that this task had already well advanced. Finally, in regard to the League of Nations, he said that after all other questions had been set- tled the imperial government would be glad to investigate the principle of such an organization. Count Czernin's reply went further than von Hertling's toward meeting the 280 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR American demands and the inconsist- ency between the two gave rise to much comment in the press, especially as the German foreign minister had declared that he completely agreed with the views of his Austro-Hungarian col- league. The main points in Count Czernin's reply were as follows : He had no objection to make to the plan for open diplomacy, although he did not see how it could be executed. He was en- tirely in accord with the President on the principle of absolute freedom of navigation. He approved as just and reasonable the removal of economic bar- riers. He approved heartily the Presi- dent's words in regard to reduction of armaments. As to Russian territory, Austria did not desire for herself any of the Russian land and said that be- tween the diverging views of the Rus- sian and German delegates in regard to the western provinces and Poland a mid- dle solution must be found. He made no specific reference to Belgium fur- ther than to say that Austria would de- fend the possessions of her ally as she would her own. He declared that Italy had neglected her opportunity to ex- pand before the war without any sac- rifice of life and that she had gone into the war simply with a view to her own advantage. He refused to discuss the demand that the peoples of Austria- Hungary should have an opportunity for self-development, saying that he could not accept advice as to the con- duct of the internal administration of Austria-Hungary. In regard to read- justment in the Balkans on lines of nationality, he said that he refused to make a one-sided concession to the en- emy. He dismissed the question of Turkey's status with the same general remark that he had applied to Belgium, namely, that Austria would defend the possessions of her war ally. He agreed to the proposal for a Polish indepen- dent state, saying that Austria-Hun- gary also desired it, and wished Poland to have a free decision. Finally he said that the idea of a League of Na- tions would probably meet with no op- position in Austria. President Wilson's Reply to the Cen- tral Poxmers. — In an address to Con- gress, February 11, 1918, President Wilson after traversing the arguments of Count von Hertling and Count Czer- nin, set forth four principles upon the acceptance of which a discussion of the terms of peace would be possible. These were, in brief: (1) Each part of the final settlement to be based on the es- sential justice of that particular case. (2) Peoples and provinces not to be bartered from one sovereignty to an- other as if they were chattels. (3) Every territorial settlement to be made in the interest of the populations con- cerned. (4) National aspirations to be satisfied to the utmost without intro- duction or perpetuating elements of dis- cord. The Sixtus Letter. — As noted above, Count Czernin informed the city coun- cil of Vienna that he agreed to the four principles laid down by Mr. Wilson in his address of February 11, and that only Alsace-Lorraine stood in the way of peace with France and thereupon Premier Clemenceau replied that such discussion as had taken place had been only at Austria's instance. M. Cle- menceau published later the celebrated "Sixtus Letter," dated March 31, 1917. This had been sent and received on the condition that it should be regarded as confidential. It was addressed by the Emperor Charles to Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, whom it requested to commu- nicate to specified French officials the Austrian emperor's desire for peace and his readiness to use his influence to PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 281 bring it about, and to assure the grant- ing of the just claims of France in re- gard to Alsace-Lorraine and the resto- ration of Belgium and Serbia. It ap- pears to have been discussed by Presi- dent Poincare and Premier Clcmenceau together with a committee of French deputies and also by King George and the British premier, Lloyd George, but to have been dismissed as insincere. These points were brought out in the British parliament on May 16 in a re- ply of the British foreign minister, Mr. A. J. Balfour, to the questions raised by certain members of parliament who were identified with the policy of peace by negotiations. In the course of the discussion at that time, Mr. Balfour said that the government was ready to listen to peace proposals if they were brought forward by representatives of a country with which England was at war. German War Aims. — To the message of President Wilson on February 11 set- ting forth the four points upon which the negotiations might be based, the German chancellor, von Hertling, had replied that the four points were ac- ceptable but must be agreed to squarely by all the belligerents. The inde- pendence of Belgium was conceded, but under limitations to safeguard the in- terests of Germany. He said that the subject of Alsace-Lorraine was not de- batable and he declared that the only obstacle to peace was British imperial- ism. The attitude of the German gov- ernment was further illustrated by the address of the chancellor in the German parliament toward the end of June. He said that the proposal of the Society of Nations after the war would be in- jurious to Germany. He said that he had favored the four principles dis- cussed by President Wilson, but that from the views of the Allies as expressed since then, it was manifest that a peace based upon a league of nations would not be one that Germany could accept, for Germany's enemies would dominate it and isolate her. By their commer- cial rivalry and economic pressure they would stifle the economic life of Ger- many. On June 24 the Foreign Min- ister von Kiihlmann in the course of an address on Germany's war aims said in effect that the war could not be won by arms alone and that peace could only be had by negotiations. This aroused a storm of protest from the Pan-Ger- mans and Germans and was criticized from other points of view. By a part of the Allied press it was regarded as an attempt to make the enemies of Ger- many believe that favorable terms could be had at that time, whereas later Ger- many might not be willing to accord them. Von Kiihlmann afterwards ex- plained his words as meaning that while Germany intended to persevere until she was successful in a military sense, diplo- matic arrangements would have to fol- low, and he hoped the Entente Allies would offer terms appropriate to the situation and satisfactory to Ger- many's vital needs. The chancellor de- fended von Kiihlmann from the attacks that were made upon him, but neverthe- less it cost him his post and he resigned on July 9, being succeeded by Admiral von Hintzc. In spite of the distrust of von Kiihlmann's sincerity and in spite of the attacks made upon him in Ger- many, it appeared from subsequent events that the hopelessness of military victory was felt by a large and increas- ing number of Germans. Persons con- versant with German affairs reported later that they had observed distinctly as early as July the growing conviction that Germany was in a military sense beaten. In the debate that followed von Kiihlmann's speech, the leader of the 282 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR minority Socialists made a bitter attack upon the government, blaming it for its ruthlessness in the matter of Belgium, its aggressive course, its imperialism, its constant misrepresentations as to the war, its atrocious conduct in Ukraine, etc. He pointed to one instance after another in which the government had cheated the people by the hope of suc- cess as in the case of the repeated as- surance that the submarine campaign would lead to victory and the frequent assertion that the United States would not enter the war. Other Peace Discussions in July, 1918.— On July 16 the Austro-Hun- garian foreign minister, Baron Burian, who had succeeded Count Czernin, de- clared his approval in the main to the "four new points" which President Wil- son had stated in his Mount Vernon speech on July 4 and his readiness to discuss everything except what applied to the territory of the Dual Monarchy. He said the territorial claims of the Al- lies were inadmissible but that they alone stood in the way of a settlement. Austro-Hungarian internal affairs con- cerned Austria-Hungary alone, and their discussion by the Allies was "an offensive of irritation." On July 3, Lloyd George in a speech to the Na- tional Union of Manufacturers said the longer the war continued, the more se- vere would be the economic terms of the peace; that the fullest possible eco- nomic agreement between the Allies was necessary ; and that Great Britain must come to a complete understanding with her Allies and with her own Dominions in regard to the problem of raw ma- terials and transport. He declared for trade preference within the empire. On July 19, the French National Congress of Socialists passed a resolution calling upon the government to revise its war aims, denouncing imperialism, and de- claring for a Wilson peace. It also passed a resolution demanding immedi- ate negotiations for a League of Na- tions. At the same time Lord Lans- downe gave out his views, which attract- ed wide attention and caused sharp criticism as tending toward a policy of weakness. He said that the world was drained of men and money ; that the birth rate was falling off; that the de- sire for peace was widespread ; and that nevertheless the spokesmen of the bel- ligerent powers applied themselves merely to recrimination. He believed that now was the time for peace since the moment had come when the Allies were showing that they could hold their own in the conflict and he believed any reasonable proposal should be consid- ered. Alsace-Lorraine Question. — Early in June there was a demonstration in Switzerland on the part of the Alsace- Lorraine residents. Delegates from all of the Alsace-Lorraine organizations in Switzerland met in assembly in Berne. The committee on investigation pre- sented a report urging the final aban- donment of any idea of neutralization and declared for unconditional re-ab- sorption of Alsace-Lorraine in France. Among the Alsatians in Switzerland were many who had fought on the Ger- man side during the war and there were others who had lived in Switzerland a long time and become citizens. They unanimously expressed the wish to re- turn to France not only for reasons of sentiment but because they could not see any other guarantee for the peace- ful development of Europe in the fu- ture. Those who had formerly believed in neutralization seemed to have come over to this view. Swiss sentiment in general was on the same side. The question of a popular decision in Al- sace-Lorraine was much discussed dur- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 283 ing the year. The objections raised against the plebiscite were as follows: The proper field for the action of uni- versal suffrage was in the election to legislative bodies or the direct vote on measures submitted to the people by parliament as in the referendum. These decisions might be changed as popu- lar opinion varied, but when a popular vote decides the question of nationality that decision must be regarded as final. Yet such a vote could be very easily tampered with, and perhaps controlled in the interest of one side. The plebi- scite was generally opposed both by the French and the Alsace-Lorrainers. Since 1871 an inhabitant of Alsace- Lorraine had not been free to express his national preference and even now in voting he would be haunted by the mem- ory of all that he had suffered under the military dictatorship during the war, and he would think with dread of the revenge which Germany would take upon the minority if the decision were favorable to her. Secrecy of the bal- lot would do no good, for during many years the German authorities had spied upon and ascertained the views of all the natives. In these circumstances the weak and timid would all vote against their convictions and their real senti- ments. A good many of them would reason thus : If I displease the En- tente I can always get out of the diffi- culty without damage, but if I rouse the anger of Germany, woe betide me. In favor of the plebiscite it was said that it would bring Germany to terms and that she would renounce all fur- ther claims. Hence, it would consoli- date the peace. To this it was replied that Germany would never submit to a vote that was adverse to her. The lead- ers of Germany do not admit the right of peoples to dispose of themselves and they are opposed to a genuine plebi- scite. The reason why they consent to a consultation of the people is because they hope to bring pressure to bear upon the vote and more especially be- cause they expect as a result of that concession to obtain a peace which will leave them enough power to resume their schemes for dominating the world. In a debate in the German parlia- ment in the latter part of June the Ger- man view was indicated. One of the Socialist deputies said we must not be surprised if the population in Alsace- Lorraine is to-day full of hatred and the desire for revenge against Germany. Unless Alsace-Lorraine becomes a self- governing member of the state we shall lose the good-will of the people, even though retaining the country. If one were to organize to-day a plebiscite, four-fifths of the people would choose for France if only to get rid of our oppressive rule. A deputy on the op- posite side expressed the hope that these ideas were false, but he added that the pro-German tendency in Alsace- Lorraine had wholly disappeared, doubtless because the conviction ob- tained among the people that the En- tente would come out victorious in the war. In England at about the same time reference was made to the attempt of the Germans to give the impression that the war had been imposed upon them by France because France wished to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine and that the claim of France to those provinces was the only thing that stood in the way of a reasonable peace. This was characterized in England as elsewhere among the Allies as merely the attempt of Germany to cause discord among the members of the Entente. As soon as the armistice was signed (November 11), the French government began to take the necessary measures for the for- 284 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR mal recovery of the provinces, and three commissioners were appointed to act for the government in their three respective divisions, namely, Alsace, Upper Alsace, and Lorraine. Mean- while the armies of the Allies had al- ready occupied parts of the provinces in their advance toward Germany. See above under Military Operations. Dissensions Among the Central Pow- ers. — During 1918 there was much discussion in the press of the clash between the respective ambitions of the Turkish and Bulgarian govern- ments. It was evident that Ferdinand of Bulgaria aimed at leadership in the Balkans and that he had not consoled himself for the check of 1913, when he hoped to find the way open to Con- stantinople. But the ambitions of the Turks were awakened by the downfall of Russia. They wished to control Russian Armenia and to gain a foot- hold in the Caucasus and were believed to be coveting the Crimea, with the ap- parent aim of turning the Black Sea into a Turkish lake. These designs alarmed Bulgaria and the conflict in aims between the two governments was brought in the affair of the Maritza on one hand and the affair of the Do- bruja on the other. The treaty of Bucharest (see above) had given ab- solute possession to Bulgaria of only the northern part of the Dobruja and this was far from satisfying her. The least she expected was the annexation of the whole Dobruja. This, however, was opposed by the Turks ; and the German government, failing to bring the two rivals into harmony, adopted the policy of joint control for north- ern Dobruja. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, refused to yield to the Turks in the affair of the Maritza. On the right bank of this river the Central Powers, in order to win the Bulgarians to their side, had obliged the Turks to cede to Bulgaria the station of Adria- nople in 1915, and the main line to Constantinople was thus left at the mercy of the Bulgarians — a situation highly objectionable to the Turks, who therefore demanded the revision of that agreement. In this demand they were supported by the Germans. The Bul- garians sharply refused and in one of their papers, on June 19, a writer re- marked that Bulgaria was surprised at the attitude of the Turks, who seemed to assume that agreements between al- lies were merely scraps of paper. The German government apparently was having difficulty in keeping the peace with them. Her policy inclined toward Turkey and this was explained in the press of the Entente Allies on the ground that Germany wished to con- solidate her power all the way from Constantinople to Bagdad. Bulgaria's attitude, on the other hand, was dis- turbing and her czar showed little in- clination to work for the King of Prus- sia. The design of a greater Bulgaria threatened Germany's plan for the con- trol of the routes to the east. That is why she hesitated to surrender the whole of the Dobruja and encourage Turkey to claim Adrianople. The German government had given Bulgaria the right to annex eastern Serbia, but the Bulgarian government was apparently not satisfied with that so long as the status of the Dobruja was not determined in its favor. Tur- key had insisted that the question of the Dobruja should form part of the whole subject of the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier and the German government for the present consented to this. The Turks opposed the granting of the Dobruja to Bulgaria so long as the lat- ter did not offer any compensation. While the Turkish-Bulgarian dispute PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 285 continued the German government took the stand that it could not settle these questions and it would not make good its alleged promises to give Bulgaria the Greek towns of Calvalla, Drama, and Seres. At this time the Czar Ferdi- nand was reported in the press to have taken a long journey in foreign parts and this was supposed to mean that he had gone to Berlin to press his claim. At the same time the Bulgarian prime minister, M. Radoslavoff, who was friendly to Germany, resigned and was succeeded by an anti-German, M. Mali- noff. This was attributed to resent- ment at Germany's attitude and at her niggardliness in provisioning Bulgaria, where the food situation had become critical. Now that von Hintze had succeeded to von Kiihlmann, there seemed a better chance for Bulgaria be- cause von Hintze had from the begin- ning shown sympathy with the Pan- German element and the Pan-Germans heartily supported Bulgaria's claim both to the Dobruja and to the Greek cities. They favored the plan for the greater Bulgaria of the future which should include even Saloniki. As to the difficulty between Germany and Turkey, it was regarded at the beginning of August to be so acute as to threaten a rupture. This, however, seemed improbable, for the Young Turks who were in power were not like- ly to come to any agreement with the Entente Allies. The Allies could not recognize a government which was founded upon the crimes of Enver, Ta- laat and Djemal and which still held under its tyranny the Armenians and Syrians. The Allies would have to in- sist upon the liberation of those peo- ples and to this the Young Turk gov- ernment would never consent. Compro- mise seemed out of the question. Never- theless the relations between Germany and Turkey appeared to be far from harmonious. Germany had large de- signs in the East and hoped to realize them by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to which Turkey had agreed in return for certain concessions in the Caucasus. But now that Turkey virtually demand- ed the sole control of the Black Sea, which would eventually bar the way of Germany toward the East, there was much indignation in Germany, where the press bitterly denounced what they characterized as Ottoman chauvinism. The Turk retorted with the same ar- guments for their course in the Cau- casus as the Germans had employed on behalf of an independent Flanders, that is to say, Turkey argued that just as the Germans had undertaken to create an independent state in that part of Belgium which was akin to them in race, so the Turks wished to recognize the movement for independence on the part of their own kinsmen in the Caucasus. At other points the Turks were said to have ambitions inconsistent with the purposes of Germany: For example, Germany wished the Turks to drive the British from occupied territory, espe- cially in Mesopotamia, but the Turks realized that the task was too great and sought objects less difficult to attain in the Caucasus, Persia, and in the Black Sea. The German press reproached the Turks bitterly for this policy, say- ing that instead of trying to encroach in the direction of the Caspian and Baku, they should turn their efforts toward Bagdad. Turkey was accused even of coveting the Crimea and its ports in order that the Ukraine should not become a Black Sea power and of aiming to secure in the Caucasus a bar- rier against Russia in the East in or- der to protect Turkish communications with Persia. In short, a portion of the German press believed that Turkey was 286 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR aiming to turn the Black Sea into a Turkish lake and thereby choke off all trade from European Russia. The chief difficulty between Germany and Austria-Hungary arose from the question of Poland. The Germans had thought that von Burian would be less insistent in regard to Poland than his predecessor, Czernin, but to their sur- prise he had declared that the incor- poration of the Polish kingdom in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was a vital necessity. In the German press it was said squarely that German interests were superior to Austrian interests ; that the Germans would consider the Polish question from the German point of view, which required that there should be a strong strategic frontier. The safety of Germany was the first consideration. The Germans had not won their victories in order to be en- circled on the east by a Polish-Galician state. Some Pan-German organs de- manded that the Austro-Polish solu- tion be rejected at once. They said that after the arrangement following the meeting of the two emperors the German public had believed that this Austro-Polish plan had been abandoned. Seldom, they said, had a project been rejected more unanimously by public opinion, ■ and they complained of its revival. The Austrian emperor by go- ing to German military headquarters (May 12) for his famous interview with the kaiser had given the impression that he had abandoned his Polish claim. Shortly after he had returned to Vienna the whole project reappeared. It looked as if there was a real disagree- ment between the governments and as if Germany had been deceived. They demanded that the two governments promptly come to an agreement for the definite settlement of Poland's status so that the Entente Allies would be brought face to face with it as an ac- complished fact. As time went on it became apparent that the difficulties between Hungary and Austria were growing more and more serious. Hungary believed her- self to be supported by Berlin. A Hun- garian journal declared Hungary would have the right even to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria and added significantly that perhaps even now the time had come that Berlin and Buda- pest would have to interfere and insist that Austria should pursue a policy faithful to the Allies. In Germany there seemed from the newspapers to be strong sympathy with Hungary, though this was perhaps for the pur- pose of stirring up enmity between the two parts of the Dual Monarchy. For example, a German newspaper declared that it seemed extremely probable that Austria would fall to pieces. The Czechs, Poles, Southern Slavs, and other races with very divergent aims were all struggling for their complete independence, and feeling themselves too cramped within the Austrian state, they were sure to separate sooner or later. A German journal in Berlin declared that the only salvation for Austria was to transform herself into a Federal state. With only 10,000,000 Germans, it said, against 18,000,000 non-Ger- mans there would necessarily always be hostility on the part of the latter. The state could not exist unless it were transformed into a Federal organiza- tion. Thus, part of the German press sustained the same principle that Presi- dent Wilson had advocated, but this was interpreted by the press of the Allies as a step to the ultimate organization of the nations of Austria under the con- trol of Germany. With Hungary on her side, and with the Slav races pla- cated, there would be a chance for Ger- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 287 many to work out a system of control. Peace Discussions in August and September. — Mr. Balfour, the British foreign minister, reaffirmed British aims in an address in the House of Com- mons early in August. He announced that Great Britain would not consent to the return of the German colonies and that Germany was dominated by the moral doctrine of the mailed fist. Dr. Solf, the German colonial secre- tary, made an attack on the Allied at- titude on August 20. He asked where the blame lay. He said that the enemy had renounced the ideal of a League of Nations inasmuch as he had decided upon an economic war against Ger- many. He said that the German gov- ernment had already declared that Bel- gium would not be kept by Germany. This, he said, disposed of the preten- sion that Belgium was at present a cause of the war. As to the attack on Germany's eastern policy, he said that the Brest-Litovsk peace was made by agreement between the Russian and German governments and that it per- mitted the frontier peoples of Russia, after centuries of oppression, to live their own lives ; also, that the only dif- ference between Russians and Germans in regard to the peace had to do with the ways and means of conferring in- dependence upon these border peoples. The Germans insisted upon safeguards against anarchy. He declared that the Brest-Litovsk peace was the framework of a policy which in future would be car- ried out. He came to the conclusion that the enemy would not want peace by negotiation and he declared that he was waging a war for plunder and glory and was carried away by arro- gance. As to the extreme views of Ger- many, he spoke of the Pan-Germans as a small group without influence in poli- tics and without influence in the gov- ernment. Lord Robert Cecil on behalf of England issued a statement in an- swer to Dr. Solf. He denied that the Pan-German element was without power, pointing to the fact that only a few weeks before von Kuhlmann was dismissed for saying that Germans could not have everything their own way and Count von Hertling, the chan- cellor, had to make an explanation. As to Belgium, the chancellor had said he looked upon it as a pledge, adding that it would become closely related in com- mercial association with Germany. As to the Brest-Litovsk treaty, it was evi- dent that those border peoples had been so constituted as to have as little in- dependence as possible. As to the Ger- man colonies, he denied the moral right of Germany to be a protector of the colored colonies ; characterizing their rule as brutal and callous. During September there was a threefold peace movement on the part of the Central Powers, comprising three features: First, a note from the Austro-Hunga- rian government to all other govern- ments proposing a conference to discuss peace, but not in a binding manner ; sec- ond, a definite offer of peace to Belgium by Germany ; third, an offer to the Ger- man minister in Finland to refrain from attacking eastern Karelia on condition that the Allies withdraw their troops from that region and also from the whole' Murmansk coast. The most im- portant of these moves was the Austrian note. This declared that in spite of obstacles, the peace discussion had made progress and that almost all the bel- ligerents had again and again expressed themselves on the conditions of peace. The attitude had gradually changed and the differences between the two sides had diminished. It was manifest that in both camps there was a growth of the desire for peace. Remarks of 288 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Mr. Balfour were cited to indicate that the Entente Allies had abandoned their demand for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Cen- tral Powers had made it clear that they were waging a war of defense. Certain general principles were practically ac- cepted by both parties. In his messages of February 11 and July 4 President Wilson had asserted principles which were not contradicted by his allies and which were not likely to meet objection from the Central Powers. Discussion of the subject in public only embit- tered opinion and served no practical purpose. Statesmen who discussed it publicly were obliged to exaggerate lest they should endanger the interests of their country in the prosecution of the war. Therefore, it was suggested that a discussion should take place between the representatives of the governments and only between them. Such a dis- cussion was not to be binding and there was to be no interruption of hostilities. Such an exchange of views far from be- ing harmful could only be useful to the cause of peace. The reply of the United States government to this overture was as follows : "The government of the United States has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States could consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a mat- ter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain." The German proposal to Belgium suggest- ed that the political and economic inde- pendence of Belgium should be re- stored after the war on certain condi- tions, namely, those set forth in the memorandum as to Germany's pre-war commercial treaties with Belgium and the cooperation of Belgium in trying to secure from the Allied governments the restoration of the German colonies. The Austrian note contained nothing about restoration or reparation and it produced no effect in the Allied coun- tries. As to the German offer in re- gard to eastern Karelia, it was pointed out by the Allies that the Germans had few, if any, troops there and that the proposal really came to nothing. The net result of this peace offensive was practically negligible. The Approach of Peace: The Ger- man Crisis. — After the surrender of Bulgaria (see military section above) the demoralization of the Central Pow- ers was soon manifested. On Septem- ber 30 the German chancellor von Hertling, and the foreign secretary, von Hintze, resigned, and Prince Max of Baden, who had been a moderate in politics, was appointed chancellor two days later. Dr. W. S. Solf, the colo- nial secretary, was appointed foreign secretary and a coalition ministry was forced of which two Socialist deputies, Scheidemann and Bauer, and two Cen- trist deputies, Groeber and Erzberger, were members. The news was followed by details showing a radical change in the German political system. The ma- jority parties had gained control of the parliament and their programme was as follows : Adherence to the prin- ciples set down in the government's re- ply to the Pope's note of August 1, 1917; a declaration that Germany is ready to join the league of nations if it comprises all states and is based on the idea of equality, etc. ; a plain decla- ration as to the restoration of Bel- gium and an agreement in regard to in- demnity ; the peace treaties hitherto concluded not to stand in the way of a conclusion of general peace; Alsace- Lorraine to be an independent Federal state ; electoral reform to be carried out immediately in Prussia ; strict observ- ance of constitutional responsibility PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 289 and the summoning of government rep- resentatives from parliament ; the rules as to a state of siege to be amended in order to protect personal liberty, right of meeting and freedom of the press. In an address to the Reichstag, the new chancellor set forth this pro- gramme and declared that in conform- ity with the imperial decree of Septem- ber 30, the political leadership of the empire had completely changed. He addressed parliament in the belief that he was speaking in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. Henceforth the people must take an active part in deciding their destiny. In other words, the majority of the freely elected political leaders must be behind the action of the government. He said : "In the matter of international policies, I have taken a clear stand through the manner in which the formation of the government was brought about. Upon my motion, leaders of the majority parties were summoned for direct advice. It was my conviction, gentle- men, that unity of imperial leadership should be assured not only through mere schismatic party allegiance, but by the different members of the government. I considered almost still more important the unity of ideas. I proceeded from this viewpoint and have, in making my selections, laid greatest weight on the fact that the members of the new imperial government stand on a basis of a just peace of justice, regardless of the war situation, and that they have openly declared this to be their stand- point at the time when we stood at the height of our military successes. I am convinced that the manner in which imperial leadership is now constituted with cooperation of the Reichstag is not something ephemeral, and that when peace comes a government cannot again be formed which does not find support in the Reichstag and does not draw its leader there- from." At the same time he announced the sending of a message of peace to Presi- dent Wilson. He said he had appealed to the President because in the latter's message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and in his speech of September 27, he had proposals which Germany could accept as a basis of negotiation. German and American Peace Notes. — On receipt of the note, October 5, 1918, the people throughout the United States were greatly stirred by the re- port that Germany had accepted the terms of peace demanded by the Allies. It was soon found that the rejoicing was premature, but Germany had, nevertheless, taken the first step which led to the conclusion of hostilities. The note requested the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking measures to avoid further bloodshed. It declared that the German government accepted as a basis for peace negotiations the programme laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially in his address of September 27, 1918. It asked the President of the United States to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air. On October 8, the American secre- tary of state returned the following an- swer: "Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straight- forward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accept the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on January last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discus- sions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application? "The President feels bound to say with re- gard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessa- tion of arms to the governments with which 290 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the Government of the United States is asso- ciated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would mani- festly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory. The Pres- ident also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view." In reply to these questions by Presi- dent Wilson, Germany sent the follow- ing message on October 12, signed by Dr. Solf, state secretary of the foreign office: "In reply to the questions of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares: The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of Janu- ary 8 and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into dis- cussions would be only to agree upon practi- cal details of the application of these terms. The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Government of the United States also take the position taken by President Wilson in his ad- dress. The German Government, in accord- ance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armis- tice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. "The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrange- ments concerning the evacuation. The pres- ent German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and in agree- ment with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people." The United States secretary of state, under date of October 14, sent the fol- lowing reply : "The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of October 8 and 12, 1918. It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military ad- visers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide abso- lutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military su- premacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels con- fident that he can safely assume that this will also be the j udgment and decision of the Allied Governments. "The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Govern- ments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will con- sent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in. At the very time that the German Govern- ment approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace, its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present en- forced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been re- garded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and vil- lages, if not destroyed, are being stripped not only of all they contain, but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a ces- sation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoli- ation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts. "It is necessary also; in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German govern- ment has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4 last. It is as follows: " 'The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 291 its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency.' "The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. "The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indis- pensable that the governments associated against Germany should know beyond a perad- venture with whom they are dealing. "The President will make a separate reply to the royal and imperial government of Aus- tria-Hungary." Although there was some criticism of this course in the United States dur- ing the negotiations, the President's di- plomacy appeared to meet with general approval among the Allies and the above note was received by the press of the Allied countries with especial satisfac- tion. The German reply to the President's note of October 11 was as follows: "In accepting the proposal for an evacuation for occupied territories the German Govern- ment has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the con- ditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for ar- rangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government sug- gests to the President that an opportunity should be brought about for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the Ger- man people and with opening a way to a peace of justice. "The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat destructions will al- ways be necessary, and they are carried out in so far as is permitted by international law. The German troops are under the most strict instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished. The German Government fur- ther denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Govern- ment proposes with regard to all those charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral com- missions. "In order to avoid anything that might ham- per the work of peace, the German Govern- ment has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedo- ing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return. As a fundamental condition for peace the President prescribes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hither- to the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Govern- ment. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of representation of the peo- ple in decisions of peace and war. These con- ditions have just now undergone a funda- mental change. A new Government has been formed in complete accordance with the wishes (principle) of the representation of the peo- ple, based on equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. "The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. In the future no Government can take or con- tinue in office without possessing the confidence of a majority of the Reichstag. The responsi- bility of the Chancellor of the empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the Constitution of the empire so that the consent of the repre- sentation of the people is required for de- cisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic con- tinuance. "The question of the President — with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing — is therefore answered in a clear, unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which is free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence and is supported by the approval of an overwhelm- ing majority of the German people. 292 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Prince Max, the chancellor, in a speech to the Reichstag October 22 re- ferred to the necessity of a "peace of justice" and declared that it was Ger- many's duty not to submit to a peace of violence without a fight. At this stage of the negotiations the American public was alarmed lest peace should come about by bargaining, and there was a loud demand for "unconditional surrender." Many public men, espe- cially among the Republicans, expressed suspicion of the President's course and advocated a short, sharp reply saying that the question of armistice should be referred to the generals in the field. The American government's reply to the foregoing German note was as fol- lows : "Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and the prin- ciples of settlement enunciated in his subse- quent addresses, particularly the address of September 27, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanated, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and con- ducted the present war on German's behalf but from Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming major- ity of the German peoples; and having re- ceived also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the Pres- ident of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice. "He deems it his duty to say again, how- ever, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a posi- tion to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostil- ities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his cor- respondence with the present German author- ities to the Governments with which the Gov- ernment of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their mil- itary advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Gov- ernments associated against Germany the neces- sary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her un- equivocal acceptance of the terms and princi- ples of peace from which the whole action pro- ceeds. "The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German For- eign Secretary in his note of October 20, it does not appear that the principle of a Gov- ernment responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guar- antees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future war has been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been, and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the empire is unimpaired; that the determinat- ing initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. "Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straight- forward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften, what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the government of the United States can- not deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people, who have been assured a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical auto- crats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Em- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 293 pire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leav- ing this essential thing unsaid. On October 27 Germany requested proposals for an armistice in the fol- lowing note : "The German Government has taken cogni- zance of the answer of the President of the United States. The President is aware of the far-reaching changes which have been carried out and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure, and that peace nego- tiations are being conducted by a people's Gov- ernment in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. The military powers are also subject to it. The German Government now awaits proposals, for an armistice, which shall be the first step toward a just peace as the President has described it in his proclama- tion." To this the American government re- plied on November 4 : "In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his cor- respondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that if those Governments were disposed to accept peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments asso- ciated against Germany the necessary terms of tuch an armistice as would fully protect the Interests of the peoples involved and insure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deem such an armis- tice possible from the military point of view. The President is now in receipt of a memor- andum of observations by the Allied Govern- ments on this correspondence, which is as fol- lows: " 'The Allied Governments have given care- ful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Govern- ment. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the Pres- ident's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference. Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Con- gress of January 8, 1918, the President de- clared that invaded territories must be re- stored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this pro- vision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the ag- gression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.' "I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the mem- orandum above quoted. I am further in- structed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Govern- ments to receive properly accredited repre- sentatives of the German Government and to communicate to them terms of an armistice. Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my high- est consideration. Robert Lansing." Austrian Peace Move. — At the same time that Prince Max sent the German note of peace, the Swedish government was requested by the Austro-Hungar- ian goverment to submit to the Presi- dent the following message (October 7, 1918): "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war, and repeatedly given documentary evi- dence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to His Lordship the President of the United States of America, and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea and in the air, and to enter immediately upon nego- tiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12, 1918, should serve as a founda- tion and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account." 294 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR To this the United States govern- ment replied under date of October 18, as follows: "The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he can- not entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of ut- most importance which, occurring since the de- livery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and re- sponsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at the time occurred the following: "10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe- guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous develop- ment. "Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Gov- ernment of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro- Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho- slovak National Council is a de facto belliger- ent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the national- istic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom. "The President is therefore no longer at lib- erty to accept the mere 'autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they and not he shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hun- garian Government will satisfy their aspira- tions and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations. Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Robert Lansixg." At the same time the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto declaring that the reconstruction of the country must begin and that the wishes of the Austrian people must be made to har- monize. Austria, he said, would become a Federal state in which every race should form its own national state with- in its national dominion. He also ad- dressed a message to the army and fleet referring to the plan for a Federal state. In the Hungarian parliament there was a declaration on the part of the prime minister that peace must be concluded and that after Austria was organized on a Federal basis, the Hungarian state would organize its in- dependence, but would maintain a personal union with Austria. Count Mi- chael Karolyi attacked the prime min- ister, demanding that peace negotia- tions be opened at once. Soon after- wards Count Tisza declared that the country must admit that it had lost the war and that he approved of the government to make peace on President Wilson's terms. Count Karolyi at- tacked the government's foreign policy from the beginning of the war, blaming it for bringing on the war and speci- fying how it might have avoided the conflict. On October 28 the Austro-Hunga- rian foreign minister, Count Julius An- drassy, transmitted through the Swe- dish government the following reply : "In reply to the note of the President, Mr. Wilson, to the Austro-Hungarian Government, dated October 18 of this year, and about the decision of the President to take up, with Aus- tria-Hungary separately, the question of armis- tice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the Presi- dent and his opinion of the rights of the peo- ples of Austria-Hungary, notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President had put upon entering into negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning those ne- gotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into negotiations for a peace betv/een Austria- Hungary and the Entente States, and for an immediate armistice on all the fronts of Aus- tria-Hungary, and begs the President, Mr. Wil- son, to take the necessary measures to that ef- fect." The Beginning of the Collapse. — During the last ten days of October, when the notes were passing between the United States government and the for- PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 295 eign offices of the two Germanic powers, the following events rapidly succeeded one another: In Germany the general staff was divided on the question of the peace offer, Ludendorff opposing and Hindenburg favoring. Hindenburg pre- vailed and on October 22 an order from the German general headquarters which had been captured by the French was made public. In it Hindenburg de- clared his approval of the government's peace offer and called upon the army not to interfere with it. Ludendorff re- signed and on October 27 Gen. von Los- sing, who had been chief of staff in the battle of Arras in April, 1917, was an- nounced as his successor. In the Reichs- tag Dr. Solf, the foreign secretary, in response to inquiries, declared it was the government's intention to carry out honestly the principles set forth by President Wilson, including specifically the Polish and Alsace-Lorraine ques- tions. Meanwhile the power of the So- cialists was steadily mounting. The government released Herr Liebknecht on October 22. The Independent So- cialist leader, Haase, demanded in the Reichstag on October 24 that the mon- archy give way to a republic and there was evidence that the working class throughout the country was behind him. In the Prussian house of deputies there was sarcastic comment on the govern- ment's sudden conversion to democracy, which was characterized as a comedy that foreign governments ought to see through; militarism and imperialism were declared to be as superfluous as the dynasty. Mass meetings of the In- dependent Socialist Democrats were re- ported throughout all Germany. In Austria-Hungary the Hussarek ministry resigned, and on October 26 it was announced that Dr. Heinrich Lammasch, an advocate of peace, would form a cabinet. Meanwhile a movement for a new German- Austrian state within the empire had resulted in a so-called Constituent German Assembly which met at Vienna on October 21 and unani- mously passed a resolution declaring it to be the will of the German people in Austria to determine their own destiny and form an independent state. By the end of October a condition of anarchy was reported throughout the country. A provisional government was set up and a republic proclaimed. The em- peror abdicated November 3. In Hun- gary the movement to break away from Austria proceeded rapidly and on Octo- ber 17 the diet adopted a resolution de- claring Hungary independent except for the union in the person of the em- peror. Soon afterwards Count Michael Karolyi led a sharp attack upon the ministry and demanded the resignation of the prime minister, Dr. Wekherle. The latter resigned on October 25 and was succeeded by Count Apponyi. The announcement of the emperor's inten- tion to concede the independence of Hungary produced no effect, and early in November the diet, now styling itself the national assembly, proclaimed Hun- gary a republic with Count Michael Karolyi as prime minister of foreign affairs. Meanwhile the disintegration through the Slav movements for separa- tion was continuing. The Czecho-Slo- vak provisional government sitting in Paris issued a formal declaration of in- dependence, asserting that the Czecho- slovaks would no longer live under the direct or indirect rule of the violators of Belgium, that they repudiated the Vienna government's promises of inde- pendence, and that no one among them would care to have anything to do with those who had not wished to do justice to them or to the Polish and Jugo-Slav nations. There were violent scenes in the diet as the result of the assertion 296 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR of a Rumanian deputy that henceforth the Rumanians of Hungary were a na- tion. The resignation of Dr. Wekherle had followed the news that a Croatian regiment at Fiume had disarmed the Hungarian Honved (militia). This movement was a sequel to several south- ern Slav attempts at revolt in the army and navy, notably the mutinies among the sailors of the fleet in Italian wa- ters in the latter part of 1917 at Se- benico and Pola and in February, 1918, at Pola and Cattaro. The Croatian troops after the revolt at Fiume seized the buildings of the city. All Croatia meanwhile was in revolt. In the United States a great Slavic demonstration took place at Independence Hall, Phila- delphia, October 27, comprising repre- sentatives of eighteen Slav states of Middle Europe with a population of some fifty millions and representatives of other nationalities under alien rule. Among them were Poles, Czechoslo- vaks, Jugo-Slavs, Ukrainians, Ukro- Russians, Lithuanians, Rumanians, Italian Irredentists, Unredeemed Greeks, Zionists, and Albanians. Mean- while preparations were made for an Allied conference at Paris where Col. House, as the personal representative of the President, arrived on October 26 and was followed by the British prime minister, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, secretary for for- eign affairs. On November 11 the armistice with Germany was signed. See military section above. Although the above evidences of dis- ruption in Austria-Hungary and in Germany were reported in the press, prominent statesmen in the countries of the Allies continued to profess the be- lief that the peace move of the two Central Powers was of the same order as previous peace moves and could not be regarded in any other light than as an attempt to secure an advantage. The belief that it was merely part of Germany's and Austria's diplomatic strategy continued down to the moment of the conclusion of the armistice. The complete internal disorganization of the two Germanic powers during October and the first week in November seemed not to be in the least appreciated by many of the leading statesmen in spite of the numerous signs. Dr. Solf's Appeal. — Shortly after the signing of the armistice, an appeal was addressed by Dr. Solf to the Allied governments, comprising among others the following points : The conditions imposed by the armistice, he said, threatened the economic security of the left bank of the Rhine and its relations with German territory on the right bank. Unless those conditions were modified, Germany could not exist, and, moreover, the peaceful development which was beginning in Germany would be checked, with the result that a more or less Bolshevist movement would take shape. Hence it was urged that normal intercourse between the left bank of the Rhine and the rest of Germany and with foreign countries should not be dis- turbed even during military occupation. Then followed a long list of economic activities that Germany desired to re- sume in relation to the left bank of the Rhine, including permission to exploit as hitherto the coal, potash, and ore mines ; to transport the requisite coal, ore, and potash ; to use completely the Rhine for transports within the old boundary of the German Empire ; to have the right of free navigation via Rotterdam and the coast for provision- ing Germany ; to have free railway traf- fic and the right to electric power : to allow the civil and military organiza- tions on the left bank of the Rhine to continue to work, etc. PEACE PROPOSALS AND WAR AIMS 297 At the same time, a special appeal was made to the United States govern- ment that the distress was urgent and that the oppressive terms of the armis- tice were making the situation unbear- able ;. that anarchy could only be avoid- ed if aid were quickly given. The gov- ernment of the United States was im- plored to save the German people from starvation and anarchy by sending en- voys to the Hague or some other place to discuss with envoys from Germany details as to how American aid could be given. Still another appeal was made to the United States government requesting the President's intervention on behalf of the German civilians in Turkey who, by the 19th article of the Anglo-Turkish armistice, were required to leave the Turkish Empire — a re- quirement that would cause severe hard- ship especially to the poor people un- der German care, etc. France and Peace Terms. — On De- cember 30 Premier Clemenceau made an important address in the chamber of deputies, in the course of which he re- plied to various criticisms, especially in regard to his not having kept the chamber informed as to what was going on. He said if he had told the cham- ber all the details of the discussions in regard to the various claims of the pow- ers, he would have been the worst prime minister in Europe. He declared that while he was in accord with President Wilson on some points, he disagreed with him on others ; and he added this statement, which was regarded as high- ly significant since it indicated a di- vergence of view between the French government and the governments of the United States and England. He said France found itself in a particularly difficult situation. It was the nearest country to Germany. The United States was at a distance and it took its own time in entering the war. England entered immediately upon the appeal of Mr. Asquith. "We have suffered and fought ; our men have been mowed down, and our cities and villages destroyed. There exists an old system of alliance known as the balance of power. Every- body seems to condemn it now, and nevertheless if England, the United States, France, and Italy had agreed that whatever power would attack any one of them, it would be equivalent to a declaration of war upon the whole world, this war would never have taken place. This system, moreover, which I have not renounced, will be my all-guid- ing thought at the Peace Conference if your confidence sends me there." He demanded a vote of confidence saying that if there were any doubt as to the wisdom of leaving him in control, it should be settled now. The vote of confidence was accorded by an over- whelming majority, namely, 398 against 93. XI. RELIEF MEASURES The outbreak of the European War Ambassador at Berlin and the American very soon made it evident that millions of innocent victims in the fighting areas would be without independent means of support on account of wholesale de- struction of property, the confiscation of food supplies, and the paralysis of industry. This was first illustrated in Belgium, where it was estimated that by November, 1914, over 6,000,000 peo- ple had been rendered homeless and 1,500,000 destitute. The prosecution of the war, however, resulted in the creation of a similar situation in Rus- sian Poland, Galicia, and in Serbia. The situation in Poland was even worse than that in Belgium. Finally the un- precedented butchery of the Armen- ians by the Turks rendered relief for the remnant of the Armenian popula- tion an absolute necessity. As early as September, 1914, relief organizations began to be formed in the United States. After considerable duplication at first, relief committees gradually were systematized under cen- tral committees. All sorts of devices were resorted to, including appeals through newspapers, endless-chain , whist parties, fairs and bazaars, the- atrical and musical performances, "tag" days, balls and fetes of various kinds, and appeals through churches and other organizations. Commission for Relief in Belgium. — This was the most extensive relief or- ganization, embracing all neutral coun- tries. It was brought into existence through the activities of the American and Spanish ambassadors at London and ministers at Brussels, the American Minister at The Hague. There were national organizations in America, Spain, Italy, and England, besides a most extensive distributory organiza- tion in Belgium and northern France. It carried out the distribution of its aid in Belgium through the Comite Na- tional de Secours et d'Alimentation. Similarly on account of the devasta- tion in the occupied French territory the Comite d'Alimentation du Nord de France was organized. The commis- sion had assembling depots in every State in the United States, and repre- sentative executives in all but about 12 States. The committee secured pledges from England, Holland, and Germany, per- mitting the transportation of food products to the occupied territory and the pledge of Germany that such food would not be confiscated for war pur- poses. The general policy of the com- mission was to cooperate with organi- zations of every sort in Belgium and northern France ; local committees were brought into existence in almost every commune of the occupied territory, and over these were district and provincial committees, all under the Comite Na- tional. The work was carried out un- der three main divisions : the Provision- ing Department ; the Financial Relief and Exchange Department ; and the Benevolent Department. The Provi- sioning Department provided food for about 7,000,000 people in Belgium and 2,300,000 in northern France. Food- stuffs were sold to the population and the profits thus secured were used by 298 RELIEF MEASURES 299 the Benevolent Department for the care of the destitute. Food was given out through a system of canteens covering all Belgium, meals being supplied at a per capita cost of only eight cents a day. There were also baby canteens, cheap restaurants, meals for school children, and in some cases provision of shelter. Aid was also given to or through the following: a committee to aid doctors and pharmacists by sup- plying medicines, serums and other ne- cessities ; child institutions working for the better feeding of infants, the aid of private and public orphanages, and assistance to war orphans and other homeless children ; the treatment of in- digent consumptives ; an agricultural committee to control the supply of seeds and fodder; a committee for the aid and protection of artists, some 50,000 lace workers (mostly Belgian women), destitute foreigners, and refugees from other localities ; a committee for the re- habilitation of churches ; local work- rooms for the repair of clothing for the destitute; and miscellaneous grants for Cardinal Mercier for trade training for maimed soldiers, and for maternity hos- pitals. The total amount of money entrusted to the commission up to the close of the war was about $500,000,000, which, with the exception of overhead charges, were spent for food in Belgium and France. The British and French gov- ernments contributed more than $150,- 000,000 for relief in Belgium. After the diplomatic break between the United States and Germany the Dutch took over the work of the Commission. Belgian Relief Fund. This fund "for women, children and other non- combatants" had its headquarters in New York City. It embraced numerous local committees, including one in every State. Most of the cash received was spent for food, but small sums were sent to refugees in Holland and to war victims in the unoccupied parts of Bel- gium. Jewish Relief. On account of the great number of Jews in Poland and other parts of Europe who suffered ex- treme privation as a result of the war, the American Jewish Relief Committee for Sufferers from the War was organ- ized in New York City. Towards the close of the year 1915, a most active campaign for funds was undertaken. Local committees were formed in cities throughout the country. In 1916 a great bazaar was held in New York City which realized about $1,000,000. In Great Britain was formed the Rus- sian Jews' Relief Fund for the aid of Jews in Russia and Poland. It had branches in all the principal cities. By means of it over 120 relief centres were feeding every day more than 200,000 homeless and destitute Jews. In Russia a central relief committee at Petrograd sent out word that mili- tary authorities had forcibly removed 250,000 Jews from their homes in the occupied territory and that 200,000 more had left voluntarily. The com- mittee had opened employment agencies in 31 cities and equipped 10 workshops. Hospitals, asylums, infirmaries, and schools were opened. The Federal Council of Allied War Charities comprised some seventy-five organizations of varied interest and na- tional in scope. It was created as a part of the movement to coordinate ac- tivities, decrease duplication, and in- crease financial responsibility and ef- ficiency. It served also as a medium for effecting concerted action of its constituents with the Red Cross. The latter's Committee on Cooperation ex- tended an invitation to the war relief bodies to become auxiliaries of the Red 300 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Cross and this was accomplished to some extent. The individual organiza- tions, however, were loath to surrender their independence either in the collec- tion of funds or in the machinery, meth- ods, and area of the distribution of benefits. The aggregate membership of the bodies in the Federal Council was over 2,000,000. Its members had sent a total of more than $4,000,000 in cash and goods for relief work in Europe since the war began. Quakers in War Relief. Within a few months after the outbreak of the war Quakers of the United States and England began relief activities among peasants of devastated areas in France and Belgium. By the fall of 1917 they had erected nearly 500 wooden houses for peasants and assisted in securing supplies of agricultural implements and tools, seeds, poultry, rabbits, etc., as well as household furniture and uten- sils. They established work-rooms for farm women, convalescent homes, a small general hospital, and a mater- nity hospital. They organized indus- tries and recreation among the thou- sands of Belgians in refuge camps in Holland. Later they began similar work among Russians driven from home on the eastern battle line, this branch being in charge of the American Friends Service Committee, assisted by a group of English Friends. This committee began in July, 1917, also the training at Haverford College of 100 young men for reconstruction work in France, including agriculture, building, repair- ing, sanitation, medical and social work. The American Ambulance was one of the most important relief activities. It organized ambulance sections for work in different parts of France, and Italy, and at Saloniki. Ambulance drivers were secured primarily from American colleges, considerably more- than 1,000 such men having been re- cruited. The American Ambulance Field Service had in July, 1917, eight- een sections of ambulances serving the French army with staffs totalling 700 volunteers. In all it was maintaining more than 700 ambulances at the front, in reserve, or under construction. A branch of this service, ammunition transport, had nearly 80,000 auto- trucks at work. This latter branch was long handicapped for lack of capable drivers, but by mid-summer this was overcome, three reserve groups of forty men each being under train- ing. The American Ambulance Hos- pital at Paris was at first run entirely by voluntary workers ; it was after- wards turned over to the Red Cross. It then became the American Military Hospital, run by American money, with its staff drawn from various coun- tries, partly volunteer and partly paid professional physicians and surgeons. It had 600 beds, excellent surgical equipment, 250 motor ambulances, a hospital train fitted to accommodate 264 wounded and having operating room, sterilizing plant, diet kitchen and a staff of doctors, surgeons, and nurses. Another feature was the Mo- bile Field Hospital with 108 beds; and still another the Advance Hospital near the front at Juilly-sur-Marne. It organized the War Relief Clearing House for France and her Allies with its American headquarters in New York and its Paris headquarters in the house of the former ambassadors of the United States to France. This body was officially recognized by the French government as the agency for the distribution of American charity in France. It was given free transporta- tion by the French government for all of its supplies on French liners and over all French railways. RELIEF MEASURES 301 Perhaps the most important other relief activities were those directed toward Poland and Serbia. To a large extent Jewish relief funds were direct- ed toward the former country. There was in addition the Polish Victims' Re- lief Fund with headquarters at 33 West Forty-second Street, New York, Frank A. Vanderlip, treasurer, which had collected more than $1,150,000 at the beginning of 1919. There was also the Polish Children's Relief Fund, 37 East Thirty-sixth Street, New York, Mrs. Louisa Satterlee, treasurer, which had collected over $50,000. The Serbian Relief Committee had head- quarters at 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, Murray H. Coggeshall, treas- urer; it had secured $450,000. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, 1 Madison Avenue, New York, and Cleveland, Ohio, H. Dodge, treasurer, had spent many millions of dollars and was at the close of the year planning a drive for $30,000,000 more. The Serbian Aid Fund Cloth- ing Committee, 338 Madison Avenue, New York, was engaged in a campaign for 500 tons of warm clothing to be transmitted through the Serbian lega- tion at Washington ; while the Serbian Aid Fund, 1 Madison Avenue, New York, Otto T. Bannard, treasurer, had collected over $180,000. Some of the other principal relief funds with their headquarters, treas- urers, and collections to the close of 1918 were as follows: American Com- mittee for Devastated France, 16 East Thirty-ninth Street, New York, Dr. A. C. Humphreys, treasurer, $501,592 ; American Committee for Training Maimed Soldiers, Hotel Biltmore, New York, Mrs. Edmund L. Baylies, $428,- 763 ; American Fund for French Wounded, 73 Park Avenue, New York, Mrs. W. P. Bliss, $567,693; Amer- ican Students Committee, 107 East Thirty-seventh Street, New York, H. R. Sedgwick, $131,293; American Women's Hospitals, 637 Madison Ave- nue, New York, Dr. Sue Radcliffe, $310,029; British War Relief Associa- tion, 542 Fifth Avenue, New York, Henry Clews, $171,258; Christian Re- lief in France and Belgium, 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York, Al- fred R. Kimball, $155,419; Duryea War Relief, 9 East Thirtieth Street, New York, Charles E. Warren, $218,- 860 ; Fatherless Children of France, 140 Broadway, New York, Alexander J. Hemphill, $741,043; Food for France, 10 East Fifty-eighth Street, New York, Alexander J. Hemphill, $148,485; Free Milk for France, 675 Fifth Avenue, New York, Henry E. Cooper, $98,237; Italian War Relief Fund, 347 Madison Avenue, New York, S. R. Bertron, $43,730; Lafayette Fund, Hotel Vanderbilt, New York, Francis Roche, $301,000; Secours Na- tional Fund, 16 East Forty-seventh Street, New York, Mrs. Whitney War- ren, $581,148; Stage Women's War Relief, 366 Fifth Avenue, New York, Mrs. Shelley Hull, $178,321. Red Cross. This society was put to the severest test it ever had to under- go. In all the belligerent countries, the work of the relief committees was supplemented by the efficient service rendered by the Red Cross Society. The American National Red Cross So- ciety rendered greater continuous ser- vice than was ever given by any Red Cross of a neutral country during a foreign war. At the outbreak of the war this society had an enrollment of about 6,000 nurses and surgeons. It sent over a number of surgical and sanitary units (a unit is a working force of 3 surgeons and 12 nurses sent to a hospital, together with the neces- 302 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR sary supplies) for hospital work and the relief of noncombatants. An enor- mous quantity of purchased and do- nated medical, surgical, and hospital supplies, bed linen, garments, etc., were shipped from the United States to practically all the battle fronts by the American Red Cross. In Serbia and Montenegro the American Red Cross, in conjunction with the Rocke- feller Foundation, suppressed the epi- demic of typhus fever which destroyed 150,000 lives. United War Work Drive. One of the most comprehensive and unique campaigns for relief work with the military forces was that carried out in November, 1918, in combination by the National War Work Council of the Young Men's Christian Association, the War Work Council of the Na- tional Board of the Young Women's Christian Association, the National Catholic War Council (Knights of Co- lumbus), the Jewish Welfare Board, the American Library Association, the Salvation Army, and the War Camp Community Service. These organiza- tions were engaged in activities dis- tinctly different from those of the bodies treated in the foregoing para- graphs, inasmuch as their work was designed primarily to maintain the morale of soldiers in the fields. These seven agencies sought a total of $170,- 500,000 to be distributed as follows: Y. M. C. A., $100,000,000; K. of C, $30,000,000; Jewish Welfare Board, $3,500,000; American Library Asso- ciation, $3,500,000; Salvation Army, $3,500,000; War Camp Community Service, $15,000,000. This was the most remarkable campaign of money solicitation ever carried out in the United States. It was organized by experts in such activities. In every community an organization was per- fected and the campaign, which lasted for one week only, was carried out with vim and exceptional thoroughness. Total pledges in excess of the amount originally expected were secured. The Near East. Next to Belgium the most important relief problems at the close of war were those connected with the millions of destitute persons in Ar- menia, Syria, Russian Caucasus, Meso- potamia, Macedonia, Egypt, and Pal- estine. Throughout this immense area the Red Cross did not maintain any relief system. To meet these problems the American Committee for Relief in the Near East was organized and in- corporated by act of Congress. Among its principal organizers were Harry G. Hoak, William G. Willcox, John B. Breighton, Mrs. George W. Vander- bilt, Mrs. Nicholas Murray Butler, Mrs. W. Bourke Cochran, Mrs. Adrian Iselin, Mrs. Ogden Mills Reid, Mrs. Oren Root, Mrs. W. E. Guggenheim, Charles E. Hughes, Bishop Greer, and Rabbi Wise. It began at once to for- mulate plans for an extensive campaign to raise $30,000,000 for relief work. Fraudulent Charities. From time to time, from the very beginning of war charities in the fall of 1914, there were exposures of fraudulent promotions and solicitations. The most exten- sive exposure, however, was the result of a special investigation made by the District Attorney of New York and made public at the close of 1918. He found that millions of war charities had been stolen and announced that his investigation was the means of re- covering $250,000 for worthy projects. He recommended Federal investigation. His study led to the indictment of twenty-six alleged offenders, a number of whom were convicted by the end of the year. It was shown that the Na- tional Committee of Defence had esti- RELIEF MEASURES 303 mated that the American people had contributed between three and four billion dollars for war relief work, of which about 60 per cent was raised in New York. The investigation showed that many persons of high character and great prominence had carelessly lent their names to the charitable pro- motions of "ex-convicts," "confidence men," "adventurers," and "social para- sites." The "social climber" found in ostentatious philanthropy and patriot- ism means of acquiring social recogni- tion. Frequently names of well-known persons were used without their con- sent or knowledge. The investigation showed that many projects made con- tracts with solicitors whereby the lat- ter received from 40 per cent to 85 per cent of all their collections. The district attorney thought that worthy war relief societies had been robbed of $3,000,000 and that in a great many cases two-thirds of the money collected had been wasted by fraudu- lent or careless methods. After in- vestigating 534 organizations he clas- sified many of them as wasteful, profit- eering, or foolish charities, and mis- cellaneous frauds. He declared: "The field of war relief work in the United States presented a vast jungle of forms and fancies as various as the human imagination might suggest." Among those classified as wasteful he enumer- ated the Army and Navy Bazaar, the American Ambulance in Russia, Hol- land-American Home for Belgian Wid- ows and Orphans ; and the French Restoration Fund. XII. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS In ancient times wars involved the entire male population and frequently the women as well in the actual fighting and campaigning, but modem wars affect the vast majority of the popu- lation, even of belligerent nations, only through their economic relations. The development of the vast mechanism called into operation by war to-day has however required such immense financial transactions and such gigan- tic demands upon industrial resources that these indirect effects in the Euro- pean War were felt not merely by every family in the fighting areas but indeed by every family in the civilized world. The first immediate financial effect of the outbreak of war is a dis- turbance of the machinery of inter- national credit. Foreign investments frequently aid during peace in restor- ing the balance of trade, but in this war investment movements were exact- ly reversed. Thus normally the great excess of United States exports of merchandise over imports is offset in large part by foreign investments in American securities. But the war brought a sharp reversal of this proc- ess, the New York Stock Exchange being deluged with orders from abroad to sell at any price. The outbreak of hostilities creates a desire to delay payment of obligations owed but to insist on immediate payment of those due. Trade temporarily comes to a standstill and gold shipments become dangerous and. are impeded by great advances in insurance rates and by the reluctance of its holders to part with it. Moreover so paralyzing was the effect of the war at the moment it began that a temporary cessation of international exchange must have been inevitable. The greatest force of these conditions was naturally felt at Lon- don, the world centre. Consequently we find there the government taking most extraordinary measures to restore the movement of exchange. In war as in times of financial crisis each na- tion seeks to increase its gold holdings. This can be done only by increasing exports, decreasing imports, selling foreign investments, or contracting ob- ligations abroad. Now it is not pos- sible for belligerent nations to increase their exports because of the disturb- ance of their own production, the drafting of workers into the armies, the increased demand for goods due to the war, and, in the case of nations hostile to England, the control of the high seas by the British fleet. On the other hand all fighting nations experi- ence a greatly increased demand for goods, especially for food and all kinds of military supplies. This may be in part offset, and vigorous efforts were made in all countries and notably in England, France, and Germany to off- set this in part, by cutting down the consumption of articles classed as lux- uries. The great reduction of trade to and from the Central Powers made their foreign exchange problem rela- tively simple, though the rates of ex- change ran heavily against them. The Allies on the other hand began the war with rates of exchange in their favor, mainly owing to the enormous obliga- tions of the United States. This sit- 304 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 505 uation, however, was within a few months exactly reversed owing to the extensive purchases of the Allies and the great volume of American securi- ties sold by them. So unfavorable be- came the rate and so necessary were American goods that international loans of unprecedented size were ef- fected to enable the Allied Powers to continue their purchases in the Amer- ican market. Closely involved with the problem of international exchange are the bank- ing institutions and their rates of in- terest. In addition, however, the banks must meet great internal problems con- nected with currency, the flotation of government loans, and the special problems arising from the unique con- ditions in internal trade. Currency systems are deeply affected though less markedly than formerly when their basis was less firmly established. Nev- ertheless the shock of war was every- where so pronounced in its effect upon instruments of credit that every bellig- erent nation and the United States were compelled to issue additions to their outstanding currency. The in- terruption of foreign trade and the consequent dislocation of business are reflected in the movement of the stock markets. Almost upon the instant that hostilities began the world's stock exchanges were paralyzed. The Bourses at Toronto and Madrid closed July 28; those at Vienna, Budapest, Brussels, Antwerp, Berlin, and Rome on July 29 ; and those at Paris, St. Petersburg (Petrograd), Montreal, and all South American centres on July 30. This threw the burden of the world's stock market operations on the London and New York exchanges. The former of these closed on July 31 for the first time in its history. The governors of the New York Exchange thus faced a crucial situation. A panicky state of mind prevailed; brok- ers were deluged with orders, especially from abroad, to "sell at the market" ; it was evident that to remain open meant complete demoralization. Con- sequently this exchange also was closed on July 31, shortly after that at Lon- don. The gradual readjustment of indus- tries to the new war basis is another fundamental aspect of its effects. Nev- er before was concerted action in in- dustrial life so supremely important for the outcome of a trial at arms. The war brought about an actual mobiliza- tion of industries for war purposes in every belligerent country. Moreover the productive efforts of neutrals, not merely in munitions manufacture, but in many lines, were tremendously stim- ulated. The productive power of the entire world was raised almost to its highest pitch in the vast attempt at mutual destruction by the belliger- ents. Never were goods produced so abundantly and never was capital de- stroyed so rapidly or the world has- tened towards pauperization at such a pace. The nearly complete cessation of exports from the Central Powers in- volved a violent readjustment in many industries previously engaged in pro- ducing for foreign markets. Among the Allies such industries were less disturbed, while in the United States and other neutral countries there were numerous transformations due not merely to the development of munitions factories, but to the manufacture of all kinds of military supplies, and the development of industries for supply- ing articles previously imported from Germany and Austria as well as sup- plying the similar needs of other neu- trals. Finally the outbreak of the war was speedily followed in every nation 306 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR by the adoption of special financial measures for supplying the needed pub- lic funds and the longer the war con- tinued the more vital became the ex- tent, variety, and basis of the various war loans. The foregoing — exchange, banking, currency, stock market, war loans, and the readjustments of indus- try — constitute the principal features of the effects of war on finance and trade. International Exchange and Banking Problems. The financial problems con- fronting the bankers and traders of Great Britain were of the most mo- mentous importance for the trade and commerce of the world. The priority of England in the development of in- ternational trade had long since made London both the financial and commer- cial centre of the world. In conse- quence an important part of London financial institutions had been devoted to settling accounts between debtors and creditors in all parts of the world. Here are included the accepting houses, bill brokers and discounters, and the banks. The immense volume of this business is realized when it is known that at any one time there were before the war about $1,600,000,000 of trade and finance bills for which the accept- ing houses and banks were liable, many millions falling due daily. The entire system of handling international ex- changes collapsed early in August and it was not until about mid-September that regular quotations of rates of exchange again appeared in London. Accepting houses and joint-stock banks faced ruin because clients for whom acceptances had been made failed to remit; but these clients themselves were confronted with canceled orders, cessation of trade, stoppage of the supply of goods, impossibility of re- mitting and similar contingencies. The discounters and bill brokers found themselves with large quantities of dis- counted bills on hand for which they could not be reimbursed and at the same time their banks were calling for a return of loans. Even the banks themselves were directly involved through the possession of bills which they had discounted. Moreover their loans to bill brokers were counted as quick assets and the embarrassment of the brokers necessarily weakened the banks. To check demands upon its re- sources the Bank of England raised its rate to 10 per cent. Before this situation became unman- ageable, the government on August 2, two days before its own declaration of war, declared a moratorium on bills of exchange to last one month. This checked the tendency to panic by giv- ing a breathing spell during which methods and means of handling the problem were formulated. Nine days later a Treasury state- ment announced that the Bank of Eng- land would rediscount on certain terms any "approved bill" before it became due; and that acceptors of bills would be given time in which to make pay- ment but would be required to pay % per cent above bank rate for the priv- ilege of extension. The government suggested that the bank be prepared to approve all bills customarily dis- counted, "and also good trade bills, and the acceptances of such foreign and colonial firms and bank agencies as are established in Great Britain," with the understanding that the govern- ment would guarantee the bank against loss. On September 5 another Treas- ury statement announced that, owing to the choking of the exchange mechan- ism by premoratorium bills, acceptors would be lent funds for paying such bills as they came due, and that any FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 307 unpaid balance of such loans would not be pressed "for a period of one year after the close of the war." Thus both old and new acceptances seemed amply protected. A further difficulty was met in foreign indebtedness. On November 3 was promulgated a plan to investi- gate solvent traders and advance them funds up to 50 per cent of the foreign debts due them. Thus every obstacle to the resumption of exchange business was removed. On the Continent sim- ilar, but less stupendous, problems were to be met. Moratoria were declared in every belligerent country except Germany, and in some neutral coun- tries for reasons similar to the fore- going. Germany avoided a morator- ium mainly because of her isolation and partly by the stoppage of collections on bills owed abroad. In both France and Germany, as in England, the cen- tral banks were permitted to greatly enlarge their note circulations and thus expanded to unprecedented figures their rediscounts for other banks. The most serious aspect of the American financial situation and the fundamental cause of most difficulties was the stupendous debt owing to Europe upon the outbreak of war. Although this country had normally a trade balance of about one-half bil- lion dollars annually, nevertheless its indebtedness for interest and dividends, for tourists' expenditures, for freight, and* other items, changed the great trade surplus into a net debt. Sir George Paish, an international au- thority who was sent to the United States in October, 1914, by English bankers to expedite the payment of these obligations, estimated their total at $600,000,000. This included more than $100,000,000 of short-term loans which ordinarily could have been easily renewed or met by fall exports. Abroad refuge had been taken behind mora- toria; and the great central banks of Europe served to pool resources and control operations, while in the United States the new Federal Reserve System was not yet in working order. Al- though $45,000,000 in gold was sent to Europe during the last few days of July and the first week of August, sight exchange on London at New York, normally $4.86 per pound ster- ling, rose to $5, then to $6, and finally to $7, a height never before approach- ed, and regular exchange was not quoted until September 11. A special factor in aggravating the banking dif- ficulties at New York was the matur- ing early in the fall of about $82,- 000,000 of New York City warrants held in London and Paris. To meet these and to strengthen the city's cred- it there was provided a loan of $100,- 000,000 in gold to which every bank and trust company in the city but one contributed. At the same time bank- ers of the country created a "Gold Pool' , of over $100,000,000 to meet urgent mercantile obligations abroad, and to provide gold needed for export. It was composed of contributions from banks in reserve cities in proportion to their gold holdings. It served as a guarantee against the complete col- lapse of American credit abroad and removed from the banks the necessity of seeking refuge behind an unofficial moratorium. Portions of this fund were shipped to the branch of the Bank of England established at Ottawa, Can- ada, to serve as a basis for exchange on London. The sharp rebound of trade towards the close of the year, the entrance of the world into the American market for goods and loans made possible the dissolution of the "Gold Pool" in January, 1915. The exchange situation was made 308 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR particularly difficult by the great re- duction of the export trade, especially the exportation of cotton. Moreover the prosperity of the South was seri- ously threatened unless some means could be devised whereby cotton could serve as a basis for additional credit. Congress and Secretary McAdoo au- thorized banks to issue emergency cur- rency on the basis of cotton ware- house certificates. About the same time a plan for a Cotton Loan Pool was devised whereby pledges to supply funds to be loaned through Southern banks to cotton growers were deposit- ed with members of the Federal Re- serve Board as individuals. By the middle of November more than $100,- 000,000 was thus subscribed. How- ever the considerable revival of the ex- port trade in cotton towards the close of 1914 together with the great im- provement of internal trade, and the bracing effect of the establishment of the Federal Reserve System made the cotton pool well-nigh unnecessary. It became inoperative in January, 1915, only $28,000 having been applied for. The rates of international exchange reflect the conditions both of trade and of credit. At New York the rate on London was not regularly quoted until September 11, when the cable transfer rate stood at $4.95, par of exchange being $4.86. It became still more unfavorable, reaching $4,975 in the weeks of October 8 and 15. It thereafter fell steadily, reaching par on December 22. It continued to fall until early September, 1915, when it reached $4.63. It was partially re- stored by the Anglo-French loan, but only for a brief period. In December the British government began to bor- row or purchase American and Cana- dian securities owned by English citi- zens with a view to their use as secur- ity for loans to be advanced by Amer- ican bankers as a means of preventing further declines in the rate of ex- change. About the same time the im- portation of certain luxuries was pro- hibited for a like reason. At Paris the rate of exchange was slightly unfavorable to London during the first half of October, no rates be- ing quoted during August and Sep- tember; it gradually declined until November 26 and thereafter rose con- tinuously, reaching par again Febru- ary 19, 1915. It thereafter continued to become slightly more unfavorable to Paris with every passing week. In May, 1916, Finance Minister Ribot be- gan the collection of American, Swiss, Dutch, Scandinavian, and South Amer- ican securities to be used as a basis for credits for equalizing exchange with the United States.' At the same time the government announced a long list of articles the importation of which was prohibited partly to affect ex- change rates. Almost from the beginning of the war rates of exchange were unfavor- able to Berlin. The slight volume of foreign trade and the adjustment of outstanding accounts early brought the rates to considerable stability. Nevertheless the continued purchases in neighboring neutral countries and the steady inflation of German cur- rency brought about a decline of Ger- man credit in the later months of 1915. Thus the exchange rate at New York had been only 14 per cent unfavorable until November, 1915, when it dropped rapidly to 26 per cent unfavorable. Similar rapid declines brought about rates unfavorable by 38 per cent at Amsterdam, and by 28 per cent at Zurich. As stated above the New York Stock Exchange was forced to close very FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 309 quickly after the closing of the Lon- don Exchange. This naturally dis- turbed the banking situation since con- siderable loans were based on stock as collateral. Such collateral is general- ly most fluid of all, but with its mar- ket closed it became quite solidified. The banks, however, gradually read- justed affairs without forcing repay- ment of loans or otherwise unduly dis- turbing a delicate situation. The re- opening of the Exchange was delayed in part to prevent the resumption of the pressure of European sellers and the consequent increase of foreign ob- ligations. The Exchange declared the level of prices on July 30 the official minimum, and on this basis some transactions were carried through un- der the direction of a Committee of Five. In this manner more than $100,- 000,000 of bonds and 250,000 shares of stock were transferred by the end of November. In Philadelphia public auction sales of stocks and bonds were held at various times, prices ranging not far below those of July 30. Grad- ually at New York the scope of ex- change business was enlarged ; trans- actions in a restricted list of bonds were begun on November 28 ; and two weeks later trading in 181 specified stocks with definitely established mini- mum prices was begun. The total deal- ings, however, on the New York Ex- change aggregated only 47,899,000 shares for the year 1914, slightly more than one-third those of 1912. With the opening of 1915, however, pessimism gradually disappeared un- der the revival of business and was re- placed by waves of speculative fever in the stock market. This was notably true in April when 21,000,000 shares were transferred, and in August, Sep- tember, and October, 26,000,000 shares being transferred in the latter month. The shares of the munitions companies were popularly known as "war brides." Many of these stocks made most phe- nomenal advances in price during the year. Less speculative interest was shown in the stocks of numerous com- panies manufacturing supplies the de- mand for which had been greatly stim- ulated by the conditions of war. More- over the great increase in the volume of railway traffic, which towards the close of 1915 amounted to an unpre- cedented congestion of freight and the refusal of numerous roads with ter- minals on the Atlantic seaboard to re- ceive additional goods for export dur- ing certain periods, resulted in ad- vances in railway stocks. This revival of business did not occur soon enough to prevent a very large amount of rail- way mileage from going into the hands of receivers, but railway stocks in gen- eral showed advances of 10 to 20 points. The bond market likewise reflected the great abundance of capital seeking investment. While advances in bond prices were not remarkable, there was a general upward movement ranging from 1 to 6 per cent during 1915. Moreover the easy money market re- sulted in the ready flotation of an un- usual amount of public and corpora- tion bonds. In addition to the foregoing the American market absorbed an aston- ishing volume of securities previously held by foreign investors. At the open- ing of the war the par value of Amer- ican corporation securities owned abroad was variously estimated at from $4,000,000,000 to $6,000,000,- 000. The most authoritative estimate showed that $620,000,000 of these se- curities were repurchased during the first five months of 1915 ; the estimate for the entire year was that not less 310 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR than $1,000,000,000 of such stocks 1 and bonds were transferred to Amer- ican investors. See below. Currency. Every country in war time experiences an irresistible demand for increases in credit instruments. Not only do governments issue treasury notes but banks are certain, as in times of panic, to increase their note issues. In England there was much discussion of a proposed "suspension of the Bank Act," meaning a proposal to permit the Bank of England to expand its note circulation without increasing its reserves. The steps devised for rees- tablishing foreign exchange obviated this measure, though Bank of England circulation was expanded and a large volume of £1 and 5s treasury notes were issued. A law of August 7 made riot merely these treasury notes legal tender but also postal money orders. Provision was also made for the issue of certificates, like clearing-house cer- tificates, for the settlement of bank balances. Finally the currency and Bank Notes Act authorized the Bank of England to issue to depositary banks notes up to 20 per cent of their deposits and current balances. In May, 1916, the bank held $140,000,- 000 in gold against over $500,000,000 of paper. The bank, however, owing to its command of the entire gold pro- duction of South Africa amounting to about $200,000,000 per year, was en- abled to make extensive gold shipments to the United States and at the same time maintain its credit unimpaired. In France the government authorized practically unlimited issues by the Bank of France and various promises of the government were issued. (See below, Cost of the War.) It was esti- mated that whereas the actual inflation in England amounted to about 144 per cent by December, 1915, it was 157 per cent in France. In Germany, as explained below, the Darlehnskassen and the Kriegskreditbanken notes were based on property of various kinds. These tended to drive gold and silver out of circulation so that the govern- ment authorized the Reichsbank to is- sue its own notes in exchange for them. At the same time, however, the bank was instructed to refuse to pay out gold for its own notes, but a vigorous effort was made to increase the bank's gold reserves. This reserve was thus increased from about $300,000,000 in July, 1914, to $610,000,000 in Janu- ary, 1916. But the notes for which the bank was responsible had increased from $475,000,000 to $1,560,000,000. Austria and Hungary likewise went speedily to a paper basis. The breaking down of the mechanism of international credit seemed certain to produce a panic in American bank- ing circles. The American banking system was individualistic and proverb- ially weak under strained credit. It failed to supply additions to the cur- rency at times when most needed. The Federal Reserve System was particu- larly designed to remedy this weak- ness, but in August, 1914, this system had not been finally established. After a conference of bankers and the Sec- retary of the Treasury at New York on August 2 it was decided to issue emergency currency under the Aldrich- Vreeland Act as modified by the Fed- eral Reserve Act of 1913, and to issue in addition clearing-house certificates. Congress responded to the situation by hurriedly enacting a law reducing the tax on emergency notes for the first three months to 3 per cent and in- creasing their limit to 125 per cent of capital and surplus. Moreover State banks affiliated with the reserve sys- tem were authorized to take out notes ; FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 311 and cotton and tobacco warehouse re- ceipts were made a legal basis for note issues. In consequence more than $250,000,000 of emergency currency had been issued by September 1 ; a to- tal of $384,500,000 of such notes was issued by December 1. Very little pub- licity was given to the issue of clear- ing-house certificates in principal bank- ing centres of the country, but $250,- 000,000 of them were issued. Prac- tically all of the emergency currency and the clearing-house certificates were retired by the end of January, 1915. Meanwhile the banking and credit sit- uation had been materially strength- ened indirectly by the revival of trade and directly by the final establishment of the Federal Reserve System, which was in full working order by November 28, 1914. See below. Employment and Wages. In every nation the opening of hostilities brought on a temporary paralysis of trade, mak- ing the problem of unemployment acute in every belligerent country. Special committees, national and local, and special relief funds were created to meet the situation. The gradual read- justment of industry to a war basis and the recruiting of vast armies, how- ever, very soon solved the problem. In Great Britain the labor problem was greatly complicated by the re- quirements of international trade. There were not merely the demands of the army and navy for equipment and munitions, but the immense difficulty of paying for greatly increased im- ports from countries to which exports were reduced. This difficulty was greatly increased by the requirement that Great Britain aid in financing her allies and colonies. Consequently the raising of an army at home was di- rectly counter to her financial and com- mercial demands. The general effect of war on labor was stated by Glad- stone to be an immense stimulus dur- ing war with enlarged employment and rise in wages, but excessive labor com- petition, severe unemployment, and reductions in wages when war is over. The truth of the first part of this statement was made manifest in 1914. Very shortly in every country there was less unemployment than in times of peace, labor shortage actually be- came acute, wages advanced, and great numbers of women were drawn into unwonted industrial pursuits. At the outset Great Britain was more unfavorably situated with regard to the manufacture of munitions of war than France, Germany, or Austria, Except for a few scattered private firms, a few small governmental estab- lishments working for both army and navy, and the Woolwich Arsenal em- ploying about 10,000 men, she had no munitions factories operating in July, 1914. Nevertheless 18 months later the entire country was dotted with such factories, their creation being one of the striking phenomena of the war. The astounding demands early aroused the existing arm makers to the highest pitch of activity, but it early became evident that the output of existing plants would be inadequate. By Feb- ruary, 1915, it became manifest that heroic measures must be adopted to se- cure an adequate output. Out of the delays and confusion resulted a minis- terial crisis in May, 1915, which led to the formation of the Ministry of Munitions with Mr. Lloyd-George as its head. This sought to develop the latent capacities of manufactures in engineering and mechanical trades. The entire country was divided into eight munitions districts, besides two in Scotland and two in Ireland, with committees in principal towns. In 312 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR March the Defense of the Realm Act had authorized the government to com- mandeer any factory for war purposes. Under this Act many old plants had already been transformed and new ones built, equipped, and manned. The Ministry of Munitions was needed, however, to bring order out of existing chaos by centralizing responsibility and control. It systematically inves- tigated and listed every available fac- tory and private resource. By the close of 1915 there were in addition 33 national shell factories employing from 300 to 1,000 persons each, which had been created at government expense by adapting existing establishments. At the same time a number of national projectile factories were being com- pleted to manufacture ammunition for a new type of heavy gun. Gradually the staff of the munitions office, includ- ing over 3,000 persons divided among numerous departments, was brought to a high state of efficiency. From the first a source of great embarrassment was the inadequacy of skilled labor and its attitude towards the training and employment of unskilled workers. This problem was intensified by the enormous enlargement of the munitions industry, and was not alleviated by ex- tensive advertisement for machinists in the United States. It was estimated that early in 1916 this business alone employed not less than 1,000,000 workers. Among these were included about 300,000 women who were found in England, as in France and Ger- many, to be capable of performing practically every kind of labor re- quired in munitions making. The or- ganized skilled workers objected to the "dilution" of the shops by unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and resorted to strikes and other interruptions. Acts of Parliament very considerably re- duced the privileges of labor to leave work and to transfer at will, but spe- cial boards for adjusting demands were created and elaborate rules were estab- lished to protect the health of the workers, especially of Avomen and chil- dren. Statistical measures of the amount of unemployment were not wanting. The Labor Gazette gave the percent- age of trade-union members unemployed in June, 1914, as 2.4; it rose to 7.3 in August, and declined steadily there- after to 2.5 in December, 1914, and to 0.5 in February, 1916. Wages showed little advance before January, 1915, but in February moved sharply upward in engineering, shipbuilding, railway service, docking, and carting, and thereafter the advance spread to all lines. The dearth of skilled labor re- sulted in many labor tangles, but the government and trade-union officials succeeded in maintaining an unusual degree of industrial peace. The num- ber of trade disputes in 1914 was 999, involving 448,529 workers and a loss of 10,111,337 days of work; while in 1915 they numbered only 674, involv- ing 445,936 workers and a loss of only 2,929,700 days of work. The French Ministry of Labor re- ported that in August, 1914, only 48 per cent of establishments and 58 per cent of workers were employed. There was, however, a continuous improve- ment. By October, 1915, 81 per cent of establishments and 98 per cent of workers were employed. In metal manufactures and transportation new workers had been employed in num- bers nearly sufficient to offset those with the colors ; and this was partially true of food and chemical industries. But in printing, woodworking, build- ing, glass and pottery making, and precious metals the numbers employed FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 313 at the later date were less than half the peace normal. As in England women were drawn in great numbers, not only into munitions manufacture, but into many lines of industry, agri- culture, and transportation. In Germany the general course of events was very similar to that in Eng- land and France. The general dis- location of industry at the outbreak of the war brought into operation con- certed action not merely to relieve un- employment but to shift industry to a war basis. The amount of unemploy- ment among trade unions was 22.4 per cent at the end of August, 1914. It dropped to 15.7 per cent by the end of September, and continued steadily downward to 7.2 per cent at the end of December. This, however, was suf- ficiently above normal to require a special appropriation of $125,000 per month by the city of Berlin to relieve unemployment during the winter of 1914-1915. By May, 1915, trade- union members unemployed numbered only 2.9 per cent ; by September, only 2.5 per cent, at which percentage it remained until February, 1916. As in other countries all trades engaged di- rectly or indirectly in the production of military supplies were unusually prosperous, were employing unusual numbers of workers, and paying higher wages than before the war. But among hat makers, printers, lithographers, bookbinders, woodworkers, and porce- lain workers the percentage of unem- ployment was considerably higher than normal. The employment of women was very extensive ; their number in un- accustomed pursuits reached 500,000 by July, 1915; they were found in nearly every branch of industry. The effect of the war upon American industrial conditions was most remark- able. The impetus of the new demands set up by the war began to be felt be- fore the close of 1914. Early in 1915 feverish activity began in various branches of the iron and steel industry, in the production of copper, lead, spel- ter, and other metals, and in all branches of munitions manufacture. From these industries the impetus gradually spread to all allied indus- tries and to those engaged in manu- facturing such articles as automobiles, railway supplies, boots and shoes, blan- kets and woolen goods, and food prod- ucts. While in the fall of 1914 unem- ployment had been extensive, this prob- lem gradually disappeared, with the result that by the middle of 1915 there was an actual scarcity of labor in many lines, especially skilled labor, and wages had begun to advance. Conse- quently by the fall of 1915 the tremen- dous stimulus to American industry had reached all branches of the retail trade. Estimates of war orders placed in the United States during 1915 varied widely, ranging all the way from $1,000,000,000 to $2,000,000,- 000. During the early months of 1915 the Allies were victimized extensively by smooth, self-constituted, and often irresponsible agents of manufacturers, and by other speculating intermedia- ries seeking fortunes in commissions on war orders. Occasionally the Allies were defrauded by the manufacturers themselves. In all of this immense war business there was a feverish haste and a recklessness in expenditure that involved much waste. This was reduced, however, by the development by the Allies of regular channels for placing orders and by an elaborate and ex- tremely thorough system of inspection of products. (See below.) American Foreign Trade. Not only did the Allies resort to the United States for unprecedented quantities of 314 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR goods of numerous kinds, but Secre- tary of Commerce Redfield pointed out in his annual report for 1915 that the demands of Canada, Central and South America, India, the Near East, South Africa, and indeed every part of the world for American goods had in- creased. The impetus of this world- wide demand was scarcely felt during 1914. Consequently the exports in that year differed very little from those of the preceding years, being slightly less than in 1912 or 1913. For the calendar year 1915, however, the exports reached the remarkable figure of $3,547,480,372. This was an excess over imports of $1,768,883,677, an excess more than two and one-half times that of the previous maximum in 1913. Net importations of gold ag- gregated $530,000,000 in 1916, as compared with net importations of $420,000,000 in 1915. The fiscal year, 1916, showed imports valued at $2,- 197,883,510 and exports at $4,333,- 482,885; 1917, imports, $2,659,355,- 185, exports, $6,290,048,394; 1918, imports, $2,946,059,403; exports, $5,- 928,285,641. The immense volume of American export trade created an unprecedented situation in the shipping world. By the fall of 1915 the quantity of goods for export actually exceeded the car- rying capacity of merchant vessels available, in spite of great advances in freight rates and the utilization of every type of craft however old. Brit- ish experts pointed out that their gov- ernment had requisitioned for war pur- poses not less than 50 per cent of the tntire British merchant fleet. German submarine activities had destroyed about 6 per cent. Moreover the large German merchant marine was practic- ally nonexistent. Consequently freight rates first doubled, then trebled and quadrupled, and in special cases ad- vanced as much as 900 per cent by the spring of 1916. In some instances a vessel would earn its entire cost on a single round trip. Antiquated steam vessels were selling at prices from two to five times their value before the war ; consequently there developed unpre- cedented activity in American ship- building yards. By April 1, 1916, or- ders had been given for 360 vessels with a tonnage of more than 1,000,000, and 6,000,000 were expected in 1918. World Trade. The war seemed des- tined to have permanent and far-reach- ing effects upon the world's commerce. In America active measures were begun before the close of 1915 to strengthen the American hold upon new markets and to increase cooperation in foreign trade after the war. On December 1, 1915, e.g., was organized the American International Corporation, with $50,- 000,000 capital. Its purpose was to develop trade connections in foreign countries and promote the investment of American capital abroad. Its or- ganization was led by the National City Bank, which was then engaged in establishing branches in principal South American countries. This bank also had acquired control of the Inter- national Banking Corporation with 16 banks in China, Japan, India, the Philippines, and Panama. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission and numerous business organizations de- voted much attention to the further- ance of all efforts to secure a firm grasp of markets previously held by English and German traders. Similar- ly plans were formulated early in 1916 for systematic study of the demands of Europe during the period of recon- struction following the war. Among the Allies every effort was made to FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 315 stamp out every trace of German eco- nomic penetration, and plans were formulated for reducing German com- petition upon the restoration of peace. On April 23, 1916, there opened in Paris the International Parliamentary Economic Conference of the Entente Allies for the discussion of trade agree- ments and legislative measures designed to reduce German competition and facilitate trade among the Allies and their colonies. From Germany it was reported that systematic measures were being taken to prosecute most vigorously efforts to regain lost trade. See below. Foreign Credits. The commanding importance of the United States as the greatest neutral market of the world made it for the first time in its history a lender on a large scale. During 1915 loans aggregating $1,000,000,000 were contracted in America by foreign gov- ernments, more than four-fifths of the proceeds being expended there for war supplies. Loans to the Canadian Do- minion government, eight provinces, and ten cities, aggregated $147,000,- 000. Argentina borrowed $64,000,000 ; Switzerland, $15,000,000 ; Sweden, $5,- 000,000 ; Norway, $8,000,000 ; Greece, $7,000,000; notes of the German Treasury to the amount of $10,000,- 000 were sold to American investors. Russia secured loans for $92,000,000 ; Italy borrowed $25,000,000; but the great loans were those contracted by France and Great Britain. In addi- tion to the Anglo-French loan of $500,- 000,000, France secured $75,000,000 on notes, bonds, and collateral ; and London banks borrowed $50,000,000. The purpose of these loans was to equalize rates of exchange, but in spite of them and extensive gold shipments sterling exchange declined to $4.63 by September, 1915. It was therefore nec- essary for British financiers to restore a more normal rate. In that month a commission of British and French fi- nanciers came to the United States to establish a credit for $750,000,000 or even $1,000,000,000. The sum, however, was reduced to $500,000,000 after various conferences. A syndicate was formed led by J. P. Morgan & Company which took the loan at 96 or on a basis to yield an average of 5.75 per cent. Early in 1916 Argentina se- cured an additional $15,000,000; and Canada, $75,000,000. See below. Prices and Food Supplies. Inevitably the war had a far-reaching effect upon the movements of prices throughout the world. War not only destroys existing property, but it requires the creation and consumption of goods in amounts immesnsely greater than the demands of peace. All sorts of raw materials are required in unprecedented amounts and their prices together with those of products made from them rise corre- spondingly. The most striking ad- vances were those of copper, nickel, lead, zinc, and all kinds of steel prod- ucts, together with the various con- stituents used in the manufacture of explosives ; but even more important in their effect upon the general wel- fare of the inhabitants not only of bel- ligerent but of all other nations was the rise in the prices of food products. Thus, e.g., the price of copper rose from about 12 cents to nearly 30 cents per pound; cotton doubled in value; and food prices rose so extensively that administrative measures to regu- late them were undertaken by Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hol- land, Italy, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Tur- key. Most of these countries prohibited the exportation of foodstuffs. In most 316 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR of them municipal authorities either alone or in conjunction with national or military authorities fixed maximum prices. The actual extent olf the rise in prices is best indicated by index num- bers. For the United States Brad- street's Index rose from $8.7087 on August 1 to $9.8495 on August 15, 1914. It dropped during the next 10 weeks and thereafter rose steadily to $11.7598 on April 1, 1916. In Great Britain an astonishing rise in the price of coal resulted in the appointment of a commission of investigation in March, 1915. This body found that the increase of 100 per cent or more was a natural consequence of the recruit- ing of nearly 250,000 miners and in- creases in cost of transportation. Ac- cording to the Board of Trade Labour Gazette retail food prices advanced from July, 1914, to March, 1916, by 45 per cent in small towns and 51 per cent in large towns, an average of 48 per cent for the United Kingdom. The greatest interest attached to the question whether Germany could be starved into submission. Normally the annual excess of German food imports over exports is considerable. In 1912 and 1913 this excess amounted to 2,- 000,000 tons of wheat, 3,000,000 tons of barley, 1,000,000 tons of corn, and 500,000 tons of rice and potatoes. There are normally also large imports of meat and animal products, oil cake, and fodder. Imports amounted to about 40 per cent of the annual consumption of meat products, and 20 to 30 per cent of grains and vegetable products. The war cut off most of the imports ; the campaigns in East Prussia and Alsace destroyed crops ; agricultural labor was reduced; North Sea fisheries were closed ; and Chile fertilizer no longer available. Nevertheless considerable supplies were still derived from Hol- land, Scandinavia, and Switzerland, and through military and diplomatic oper- ations large supplies of grain and fod- der were procured from Bulgaria and Rumania. Moreover the entire eco- nomic resources of the Empire were mobilized by the early creation of an economic general staff, "The Division of Raw Materials of War," which re- organized industry, reduced consump- tion, reclaimed old materials, utilized b} 7 -products, created new materials and new chemical and industrial methods, erected factories, controlled goods seized by the armies and had great powers of appraisal and price fixing. By January, 1915, the extravagance of many consumers, the speculation in food prices, and the manipulation of food supplies and markets induced the government to extend its control. On January 25 it was decreed that all sup- plies of wheat and rye should come un- der control of the War Grain Associa- tion ; and local supplies were placed in charge of Communal Associations. The consumption of cereals was brought un- der the supervision of an Imperial Dis- tributing Bureau. In February a sys- tem of regulating the bread supply by bread cards, which limited the weekly consumption of each individual or fam- ily, was instituted. With the passage of time similar regulations were ex- tended to meat and vegetables, and finally in May, 1916, the control of all food supplies was placed in charge of a "food dictator" or government bu- reau. While the best statistical evi- dence seemed to indicate that food sup- plies were sufficient to meet minimum re- quirements there was some evidence that high prices led to serious food riots and much popular discontent late in 1915 and in 1916. According to the Prus- sian official Statistische Korrespondenz FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 317 the prices of 20 important food prod- ucts rose 88.5 per cent from July, 1914, to Feb. 1, 1916. In Vienna official reports showed an advance of 112.9 per cent in 17 im- portant foods from July, 1914, to De- cember, 1915. In Italy the general level of food prices was 31.2 per cent higher in December, 1915, than in July, 1914. The official index of retail food prices in Australia advanced 31 per cent from July, 1914, to July, 1915 ; 39 per cent to August, 1915 ; and then fell, being 31 per cent higher in No- vember, 1915, than in July, 1914. In New Zealand general prices rose 30 per cent from August, 1914, to December, 1915, inclusive. Official publications showed that in Copenhagen the cost of living rose 24.2 per cent from July, 1914, to February, 1916; for food prices alone the advance was 33.4 per cent. The Monthly Labor Review for October, 1918, gave comparative fig- ures of changes in retail prices from July, 1914, to various dates in 1918 for a considerable number of countries. If the retail price level of July, 1914, be considered in each case equal to 100, then the retail prices of 22 foodstuffs in the United States advanced to 125 by January, 1917; 157 by January, 1918 ; and 159 by June, 1918. In Aus- tralia 46 foods advanced to 125 by January, 1917; 129 by January, 1918, and 131 by March, 1918. The Austra- lian price level for foods did, in fact, change little after July, 1915, when it was 131. For Vienna, Austria, figures were not abundant, but showed that 18 foods rose to about 220 by January, 1916; 272, by January, 1917, and 315 foy August, 1917. Subsequent com- parative figures were lacking. In Can- ada 29 foodstuffs reached a level of 138 by January, 1917; 167 by Janu- ary, 1918, and 172 by June, 1918, thus exceeding the advance in the United States. In France, 13 foodstuffs, in cities over 10,000 population, except Paris, rose to 123 by July, 1915 ; 141, by July, 1916; 184 by July, 1917, and 232 by April, 1918. While a satisfac- tory index for Germany was wanting, it was found that 19 foodstuffs at Ber- lin had somewhat more than doubled in prices between July, 1914, and October, 1916. In Great Britain the index of 21 foodstuffs doubled between July, 1914, and June, 1917, but remained al- most stationary for the succeeding year. The index of 24 articles of food for Norway had doubled by March, 1917, when the index was 204; it rose steadily to 312 in May, 1918. For Sweden, the advance was less sharp than in Norway ; the index for 21 articles of food did not reach 200 until Novem- ber, 1917 ; for May, 1918, it was 258. From the Labour Gazette (October, 1918), it appears that the cost of liv- ing in Norway had advanced during the war up to April, 1918, by at least 140 per cent, while wages had advanced only 90 per cent. In Sweden, the cost of living, based on the average family bud- get, was estimated to have increased 119 per cent during the same period. Cost of the War. The real cost of war should be measured in terms of the sacrifices of the people engaged in it and of the rest of the world. Such sacrifices would include not merely the loss of lives of those killed in combat, the sufferings of the wounded, and the increased death rate both during and after the war consequent upon injuries and deprivations, but also the labors, hardships, and sufferings imposed upon the soldiers and the non-fighting popu- lation both during actual hostilities and during the long years of recupera- tion thereafter. It is evident that such 318 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR a cost cannot be computed. Even when measured in financial terms the cost should include not merely the huge pub- lic expenditures but also the dislocation, misdirection, and destruction of produc- tive power, both of labor and of capital, and the destruction of private and pub- lic property, works of art, and great historical landmarks. It is evident that these latter items can be only roughly approximated. Consequently the cost of war is usually stated in terms of gov- ernmental expenditures. The approximate per capita indebt- edness on March 1 was : Great Britain, $242; France, $330; Germany, $177; Austria-Hungary, $159; Italy, $87; and Russia (in Europe), $57. The daily cost of war gradually in- creased from less than $40,000,000 per day at the beginning to fully $122,- 500,000 per day to January, 1918. The following table estimates total and daily costs, exclusive of the United States. Country Cost to Jan. 1, 1918 Daily cost $27,236,500,000 18,405.000,000 14,340,000,000 7,650,000,000 2,165,000,000 $32,500,000 17,000,000 16,000,000 Italv 10,000,000 Other Allies 3 000,000 Total for Allies $69,796,500,000 24,455,000,000 10,475,000,000 1,755,000,000 $78,500,000 27,000,000 Turkey and Bulgaria. . . . 15.000,000 2,000,000 Central Powers $36,685,000,000 $44,000,000 $106,481,500,000 $122,500,000 The loans of the various belligerents from the beginning of the war to March 1, 1916, aggregated over $29,- 000,000,000. Of this enormous sum the Allied Powers had contracted 68 per cent and Great Britain alone 26 per cent or more than one-fourth. British loans included the first war loan of $1,750,000,000 of 3l/o per cent bonds on a basis of 3.97 per cent ; the second war loan of $2,925,000,000 of 4y 2 per cent bonds on a basis of 4.58 per cent ; and treasury bills of over $2,000,000,- 000. There were also included loans for Canada, India, and Australia ag- gregating over $260,000,000, one-half of the Anglo-French loan in the United States, and advances to Allies and col- onies exceeding $2,000,000,000. In ad- dition to the above the English Chancel- lor of the Exchequer had announced in February, 1916, that an additional war credit of $2,500,000,000 was immediate- ly needed, bringing the English total of loans to over $10,000,000,000. The principal item for France was the Loan of Victory of 5 per cents at 87 to yield 5.75 per cent aggregating $3,100,000,- 000. There were advances from the Bank of France to Feb. 17, 1916, of $1,120,000,000; bonds and notes in London of $506,000,000; and one-half of the Anglo-French loan, besides notes and banking credits in New York amounting to $80,000,000. France had also issued national-defense bonds to the amount of $1,392,584,000. Russia had issued four internal loans aggre- gating $1,545,000,000; 4 per cent bonds to the amount of $309,000,000 ; treasury bills at 5 per cent aggregat- ing $1,364,750,000; and had con- tracted loans in England, France, Japan, and the United States to com- plete her total. In Italy there had been three issues of 25-year bonds bearing 4l/o or 5 per cent in the aggregate amount of $1,190,000,000. In addition she had contracted obligations in Eng- land for $250,000,000 and in the United States for $25,000,000. France and England had advanced to Belgium $218,000,000. Japan issued a loan for $26,000,000 in 1914. Serbia had se- cured $33,000,000 from France. The German loans began with a 5 per cent issue at 97.5 in September, 1914, to the amount of $2,125,000,000. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 319 A second issue of 5 per cents at 98 in May, 1915, totaled $2,250,000,000. A third in September, 1915, at 99 aggre- gated $3,000,000,000. The fourth loan bearing 5 per cent interest, the books for which were closed in April, 1916, reached $2,500,000,000. Special banks (Darlehnska~ssen) were estab- lished by the government for the pur- pose of advancing money on securities of various kinds, such money to be in- vested in the loans. Similar advances of paper money (DarlehnsJcassen- sclieine) were made on goods for export but unable to leave Germany during the war. In some cases even pledged prop- erty, household goods, and instruments of trade could be mortgaged to these banks in order to secure funds for in- vestment in the war loans. In the sec- ond loan the bonds of the first loan were accepted in part payment; but the amount of such transactions was not published. In the third loan the gov- ernment exchanged its obligations for contracts of manufacturers and traders to deliver to the government goods of a specified value. It was believed by many that the slight resort to taxation, the great expansion of paper currency, and excessive use of credit were unsound methods of war finance. The Austro-Hungarian loans includ- ed a first, second, and third Austrian loan aggregating $1,782,000,000 and a first and second Hungarian loan aggregating $471,000,000 besides loans contracted in Germany to the amount of $298,500,000. The actual expend- itures, however, of the Dual Monarchy were somewhat shrouded in mystery. In floating their loans special banks and methods similar to those adopted in Germany were used. Turkey contracted two loans in Germany amounting to $214,000,000; and Bulgaria borrowed $30,000,000 from German bankers. In addition to the foregoing various neutral countries had been forced to contract loans by the added expend- itures made necessary by the war. These amounted to $143,000,000 in Holland; $40,000,000 for Rumania; $25,000,- 000 for Egypt; $51,000,000 for Swit- zerland; $28,000,000 for Denmark; $24,800,000 for Spain ; $16,000,000 for Norway ; $14,380,000 for Sweden ; and $8,000,000 for Greece. The Last Two Years of the War. The Wall Street Journal computed the total outlay of all nations for the first three full years of war, July, 1914, to August, 1917, at 90 billion dollars. The daily cost had reached $117,000,- 000. The daily cost to Great Britain rose to about $40,000,000 in the winter of 1916-17, but fell off nearly $5,000,- 000 by mid-summer. The total for all belligerents must have approximated at least 122 billions by the middle of 1918. American War Finance. The Fed- eral war finance programme was pro- digious. Little exact knowledge existed within the first months after the decla- ration of war of the total disbursements that would be required. Even as late as November 1 estimates were given to the papers that the requirements for the fiscal year 1917-18 would range from 14 billion dollars to 19 billion dollars. The actual appropriations for war purposes made by the 64th Con- gress, 2d session, were $1,977,210,000. The appropriations made by the 1st session of the 65th Congress were $16,- 901,967,000. There were in addition authorized contracts for $2,511,954,- 000. The total of these three items is $21,390,731,000. Of this seven billion dollars was to be lent to the Allies at the rate of $500,000,000 per month. It was not known even in December how much of these vast appropriations would be actually spent before June, 320 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR 1918. It did not seem possible in view of the productive capacity of the coun- try for the government to spend the entire appropriation. In December there was much agitation over the de- lays in production. It was reported that, although the government's pro- gramme called for expenditures of one billion dollars in October, only $450,- 000,000 of goods could be produced. To secure funds an extensive system of new taxes was. authorized and two lib- erty loans were put out besides short- term Treasury certificates of indebted- ness and the war savings stamps de- scribed below. Acts authorizing the issue of loans were passed on April 24 and September 24, 1917; the former called for seven billion dollars of bonds and the latter for $11,538,945,460 of bonds, certificates, and savings stamps. First Liberty Loan. — In the war revenue act of April 24, 1917, Congress had authorized the borrowing of $7,- 000,000,000, of which three billions were to be invested in war bonds of the Allies. On May 14, 1917, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo announced the offering of the first Liberty Loan to consist of $2,000,000,000 of 30-year 3I/0 per cent bonds. These bonds were absolutely exempted from all Federal and State taxes except the Federal in- heritance tax. They were made con- vertible into the bonds of any subse- quent issue at a higher rate of interest. In order to secure subscriptions an or- ganization was perfected with the twelve Federal reserve banks as the central agencies in their respective districts. In addition to the twelve district com- mittees great numbers of subcommit- tees, including one in every city and town, with still other subordinate com- mittees for special classes or groups in each community, were brought into operation. Numerous avenues of pub- licity were utilized. Subscriptions were closed on June 15 and the bonds dated from that day although not issued un- til late in the year. Total subscrip- tions from more than 4,000,000 persons were $3,035,000,000. Since only $2,- 000,000,000 had been offered, the larger applications were reduced. Each re- serve district, except those centering at Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Atlanta, collected subscriptions in excess of the allotment. The Second Liberty Loan. — Sub- scriptions to the second loan were opened October 1, 1917, and closed October 27. The minimum amount au- thorized was three billion dollars with the proviso that one-half of any ex- cess subscriptions would be accepted. The plan called for payment down of 2 per cent, 18 per cent on November 15, 40 per cent on December 15, and 40 per cent on January 15, 1918. The interest rate was 4 per cent, payable semi-annually on November 15 and May 15. The bonds will run for 25 years, but are redeemable at the option of the government after 10 years. They are convertible into any subse- quent war issue bearing a higher rate of interest within six months after such issue is announced. They are exempt from State and local taxation except State inheritance taxes and the "addi- tional" income taxes ; such "additional" tax, however, applies only to the inter- est on holdings of $5,000 or more. It was believed that this issue was by these taxes made more attractive to the small investors. The same thorough organi- zation for every State and locality was utilized as in the case of the First Lib- erty Loan. There were also numerous advertisements by billboards, street cars, newspapers, magazines, and circu- lars ; numerous corporations and bank- ing and other institutions generally FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 321 urged their employees or constituencies to subscribe. Much interest and enthu- siasm was also aroused by hundreds of volunteer canvassers and speakers. The total subscriptions from 9,500,- 000 persons were $4,617,532,300, so that the actual issue was $3,808,766,- 150. In every Federal Reserve Dis- trict the minimum allotment was over- subscribed, the percentage of over- subscription ranging from somewhat less than 4 per cent for Dallas to 62 per cent for Cleveland, 68 per cent for Richmond, and 72 per cent for New York ; the average over-subscription was 54 per cent. In determining the allotments it was decided to fill all sub- scriptions up to and including $50,000 at the full amount; but to allow only 90 per cent of subscriptions between $50,000 and $100,000, but no allow- ance in this group to be less than $50,- 000 ; 75 per cent of subscriptions be- tween $100,000 and $200,000, but no allotment less than $90,000; 60 per cent of subscriptions between $200,000 and $1,000,000, but none less than $150,000; 50 per cent of subscriptions between $1,000,000 and $8,000,000, but no allotment less than $600,000 ; 41.2 per cent of subscriptions between $8,000,000 and $30,000,000, but not less than $4,000,000; and 40.8152 per cent of a subscription for $50,000,000. Treasury certificates which were out- standing to the amount of $2,320,493,- 000, due at different dates in November and December, were applicable to pur- chase of these bonds. In the stock mar- ket the 31/2 per cent Liberty Bonds had fluctuated about par with a usually slight discount before the issue of the second series. Thereafter the 3^8 fluctuated about 98-99 and the 4s about 97-98. Third Liberty Loan. — On April 6 the campaign for the Third Liberty Loan was launched and continued until May 4. During this period 18,376,815 peo- ple subscribed to $4,176,516,850 in bonds, an over-subscription of nearly 40 per cent. These bonds are of shorter term than any of the other issues, be- coming due in 1928, but unlike the other issues are not collectible before ma- turity. They bear 4*4 per cent inter- est and are not convertible, thus differ- ing from the First and Second Loans, but similar in this respect to subse- quent issues. Inheritance taxes are payable with these bonds, for which purpose they are receivable at par, if they have been held for six months prior to death. These are exempt from all State and local taxation but are sub- ject to surtaxes, inheritance taxes, and excess and war profits taxes, on hold- ings in excess of $50,000. Fourth Liberty Loan. — The largest sum ever raised in a single national loan was raised in the drive for this loan, which extended from September 28 tq October 19. The vastness of the efforts may be gleaned from the fact that the Fifth Federal Reserve District alone mailed $9,000,000 of advertising matter to prospective buyers ; $6,989,047,000 was raised, and there were over 21,000,- 000 subscribers. But while the number who bought was unparalleled, the greater part of the loan was taken by the wealthy. For instance, in the New York Federal Reserve District, with 3,604,101 subscribers, 2,279,165 sub- scriptions were for $50 bonds, totaling but $113,958,250, whereas 967 of the larger subscribers alone invested in $768,167,950 of the total, of slightly over $2,000,000,000. The bonds ma- ture in 1938 but are collectible in 1933. Additional exemption is granted in that the interest on amounts of the bonds not in excess of $30,000 is not subject to surtaxes. 322 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Fifth Loan. — Before the close of 1918 plans were well under way for the floating of this loan — the Victory Loan, as it was to be called. The first and second issues of Treasury Certificates of indebtedness in anticipation of the Fifth Loan were oversubscribed, one of the subscribers of the latter issue being the Japanese government. These cer- tificates bore interest at 4l/o per cent and matured May 6, 1919. The Vic- tory Loan was over-subscribed. Stabilizing Market Values. — With a view to keeping the price of Liberty Bonds from dropping below par pur- chases of such bonds were made by the treasury's sinking fund. Until Novem- ber 1, $244,036,500 worth of bonds were purchased on the open market for $234,310,443, making an average price of 96 per cent. These purchases were made in accordance with the act of April 4, 1918, which authorized the Sec- retary of the Treasury to buy at such prices and upon such terms as he might prescribe. This did not prevent a con- siderable decline in market values of all except Liberty lsts. War Savings Stamps. — For the pur- pose of raising funds and cultivating thrift Congress authorized the sale of war savings stamps in two denomina- tions, 25 cents (thrift stamps) and five dollars (war savings stamps). A Thrift Card was furnished having space for 16 stamps ; when filled this could be exchanged for a $5 stamp by the pay- ment of 12 cents in December, 1917, or January, 1918 ; thereafter the cost for 16 stamps advanced one cent per month. These large stamps could be attached to a War Savings Certificate which had spaces for 20 stamps. If this was filled out between December 1, 1917, and January 31, 1918, at a cost of $82.40, the government would redeem the certificate on January 1, 1923, for $100; similarly for later dates. All stamps and certificates ma- ture in five years from date of issue. The difference between $4.12 and $5.00 is the interest on the former sum for five years at 4 per cent compounded quarterly. No one person could hold more than $1000 worth of these certifi- cates, nor purchase more than $100 worth at one time. The stamps were redeemable at the post office at any time at a lessened rate of interest. To carry out the plan there were appointed six Federal directors, giving their time to the work, each being in charge of two Federal reserve bank districts. There was a director for each State and fur- ther organization reaching to cities, counties, and towns. The national com- mittee was : Frank A. Vanderlip, who resigned the presidency of the National City Bank of New York to serve with- out pay as chairman of this committee ; Mrs. George Blass, Chicago ; Henry Ford, Detroit ; F. A. Delano, Washing- ton ; Eugene Meyer, Jr., New York, and Chas. L. Bayne, Boston. The sale of these stamps was begun on December 3, 1917, under the super- vision of the National War Savings Committee. This met with compara- tively little success at first, there being considerable passive and some active op- position, and in the opening month only $10,236,451 in stamps were sold. Great- er publicity, however, was given to the stamps, and they were put on sale at every post office and by letter carriers. In addition agents for the sale of the stamps were appointed by the Secre- tary of the Treasury, these numbering 233,287 at the end of October, 1918, while 151,361 war savings societies, numbering from 10 to 12,000 members each, had been formed by November 1, 1918. The sales gradually increased until FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 323 they reached their maximum in July, 1918, during which months $211,417,- 942.61 of stamps were disposed of. By November 1, 1918, the cash receipts from this source totaled $834,253,- 213.44, representing an average ma- turity value of a little over $1,000,000,- 000. Few persons availed themselves of the provision allowing for the re- demption of the stamps, the redemption constituting less than 1 per cent, of the cash receipts. The success of this experience has led the Secretary of the Treasury to suggest in his annual re- port that this be made a permanent part of the scheme of the nation's finan- cing. On September 24 an act was passed permitting the individual to hold as much as $1000 of War Savings Stamps of any one issue ; this super- seded the previous restriction of $1000 of stamps of all issues. This act also increased the total of stamps authorized from two to four billion dollars. About the same time Mr. Frank A. Vander- lip, who had for a year given up his duties as president of the National City Bank to supervise the thrift campaign, resigned this latter function. The work was incorporated in the activities of the Treasury Department. Treasury Certificates. — In order to raise immediate cash largely for the purpose of carrying out the proposed loans to the Allies, the Treasury issued at sixteen different times the varying amounts of temporary certificates of in- debtedness. Their total amount was $4,028,698,000 ; only $690,000,000 issued November 21, 1917, bearing 4 per cent interest and due June 25, 1918, were still outstanding at the close of the year. Two small issues on March 31 and October 29, 1917, bore 2 per cent interest ; 2 issues on April 25 and May 10, 1917, bore 3 per cent; 2 on May 25 and June 8, 1917, bore 3*4 per cent ; 3 issues on August 9, August 28, and September 17, 1917, bore 3y 2 per cent ; and 7 other issues, all after Sep- tember 26, 1917, bore 4 per cent. Near- ly $2,500,000,000 of these certificates were placed through the Federal reserve banks at New York. Advance to Allies. — The plan of the government included advances to the Allies of $500,000,000 per month. The first advance was of $200,000,000 to Great Britain on April 25, 1917. By the close of the year the total advances had reached the sum of $4,236,400,000, distributed as follows : Great Britain, $2,045,000,000; France, $1,285,000,- 000; Italy, $500,000,000; Russia, $325,000,000, of which $5,000,000 was for the Rumanian government ; Bel- gium, $77,400,000 ; and Serbia, $4,000,- 000. These advances were made on the basis of the obligations of foreign gov- ernments purchased by the Treasury. Loans were first made at the rate of 3 per cent per annum, but soon advanced to 3y± per cent in order to conform to the rates paid by the Treasury on its own certificates of indebtedness. Following the flotation of the first Lib- erty Loan the rate on foreign loans was advanced to 3^ per cent ; and finally following the issue of the second Liberty Loan the rate was raised to 4 1 / 4 per cent. Preceding our entrance into the war it had been the practice of foreign gov- ernments to issue loans in this coun- try; subsequently to our entrance, in order to avoid the competition of for- eign governments with our own, the policy of making loans to the Allies by the government itself, as indicated in the following paragraphs, was adopted. It was estimated that previous to the, American declaration of war about $2,500,000,000 of foreign war loans had been floated in this country. The 324 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR only variation from the new rule was the issue by the British Treasury through the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company of 90-day discount bills. It was planned to issue about $15,000,000 of bills weekly up to a total of not over $150,000,000. In fact, the total issued was only $100,000,000; this amount, bearing 6 per cent interest, was out- standing at the close of the year. In addition, the same firm acting for the British and French governments, sold some of the collateral upon which pre- vious loans had been based and repur- chased part of such loans themselves. Canada. War financing occupied much of public attention in Canada dur- ing 1917. On February 8, 1917, Pre- mier Borden in his budget speech stated that the cost of the war had exceeded all expectations. For the year 1917- 18 the estimated military and naval ex- penditures were put at $433,000,000, compared with $217,000,000 for the preceding year ; $166,000,000 for 1915- 16, and only $61,000,000 for 1914-15. The loans of the year included the third war loan of $150,000,000 in 5 per cent bonds at 96, issued in March, 1917. A loan of $100,000,000 was floated in the United States in July, 1917, through the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company. This was the only foreign loan floated in the United States after its entrance into the war, and special permission for it was given by Secretary of the Treas- ury McAdoo. Finally in November, 1917, the Victory Loan was put out, 807,361 subscribers asking for $417,- 000,000. The loan amounted to $400,- 000,000, in the form of 5% per cent gold bonds in three series, maturing in 1922, 1927, and 1937. The flotation of this immense loan in Canada was an evidence of sound financial conditions ; in 1916 two-thirds of the Canadian loans, Dominion and Provincial, had been floated in the United States, where- as in 1917 only slightly more than one- fifth were sold here. In connection with war financing, Canada began early in the year to issue savings stamps and certificates on a plan similar to that adopted previously in Great Britain and later in the United States. In trade and manufacturing new high points were reached. Exports for 11 months totaled $1,399,000,000, as compared with $961,666,000 and $521,953,000 for similar periods of 1916 and 1915. Im- ports for this period were $943,500,- 000, as compared with $698,709,000, and $405,973,000 for the like periods of 1916 and 1915. There was thus a favorable balance of trade of nearly twice that of 1916 and fully three times that of 1915. Crops were fairly abundant and prices high. Shipbuild- ing rapidly advanced on both coasts. Mineral production was hampered by labor shortage and unrest but the to- tal value of output was $200,000,000, as against $190,646,000 in 1914, and $39,000,000 in 1916, to $35,000,000 in 1917. Various new industries, notably potash, toy-making, and dye manufac- ture, developed rapidly. War orders aggregating about $1,812,000,000 were placed by the Imperial Munitions Board. Canada's Fifth War Loan was suc- cessful beyond all expectations. The subscriptions totaled $695,389,000, while the maximum asked for was $600,- 000,000 and the minimum $300,000,- 000 ; the government accepted the max- imum asked for. Maturing at five and fifteen years, the bonds become due on November 1, 1923 and 1933, and yield 5l/o per cent interest, payable semi- annually. The bonds may be convert- ed into any future domestic issues of like maturity or longer made during FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 325 the war. Unlike the later liberty issues in the United States, the bonds are ex- empt from taxes, including any income tax imposed in pursuance of legislation enacted by the parliament of Canada. The campaign extended from October 28 to November 16, 1918, and there were 1,104,107 subscriptions. The province of Ontario had 542,648 sub- scribers for $336,055,000. In the en- tire Dominion one person in every 7.08 subscribed and the average per capita subscription was $88.91. Great Britain. The great financial and commercial strength of Great Brit- ain showed to superior effect amidst the tremendous obstacles of the third year of war. Aggregate war expendi- tures reached £4,200,000,000 in Feb- ruary, 1917. In September, 1917, the war cost above the normal peace bud- gets was estimated at five billion pounds sterling ($25,000,000,000) and yet not the slightest feeling of uncertainty had been manifest as to the soundness of the financial structure. This estimate, made by the Select Committee on National Expenditure, showed that advances to Allies had amounted to £1,321,000,000 to September, 1917. The deadweight national debt had thus been increased by about £3,500,000,000 and the an- nual debt charge by over £200,000,000, or a billion dollars. It was estimated that each six months of war would add £750,000,000, exclusive of advances to Allies, to the debt and £45,000,000 to the annual debt charge (interest at 5 per cent and sinking fund 1 per cent). The total war credits for the fiscal year April, 1917, to March, 1918, inclusive, were £2,450,000,000. There were quan- tities of Treasury bills outstanding at all times, their volume in December being £1,059,000,000. As elsewhere, prices advanced sharply. The London Economist estimated the index level of general prices as follows : Average for 1901-5, 2200; September 30, 1916, 4423; September 30, 1917, 5634. As indicated above, British purchases in the United States necessitated large loans from the United States govern- ment to maintain trade balances. In addition for the same purpose, British owners of American securities were es- timated to have sold $1,750,000,000 of them back to American investors since the war started. The high rates of interest caused British Consols to drop in January to 51%, their lowest since 1803, while securities in general continued to shrink in market values. The London Bankers' Magazine report- ed that declines in the market values of 387 representative stocks amounted to nearly £158,000,000 for the year and to £771,000,000 since July, 1914. The high level of trade is indicated by total exports for the eleven months ending November 30, 1917, of £488,168,000, an increase of 4.6 per cent over the same period of 1916 and 26 per cent above those of 1915. Imports for eleven months were £980,500,000, or 12.2 per cent for the same period of 1916, and greatly exceeding any previous year. Re-exports, however, were only £66,- 372,000 for 11 months, a decline of 27.6 per cent and much less than any recent year. In October, 1917, Great Britain in- augurated its system of continuous sale of bonds known as National War Bonds and sold them throughout 1918. These consisted of 5 per cent bonds of 1922 at 102, of 1924 at 103, and of 1927 at 105, and of 4 per cent bonds of 1927. The coupon bonds were put forth in de- nominations ranging from £50 to £5000 and there were also registered bonds which are transferable either by deed or in the Bank Transfer Books. A legal tender privilege is attached, the 326 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR bonds being accepted at par and ac- crued interest by the commissioners of inland revenue in payment of death duties, provided bonds were held for six months before the date of decease. Both principal and interest are exempt from all British taxation, present or future, if shown to be in the beneficial ownership of persons neither domiciled nor ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. Interest on the 4 per cent bonds is exempt from British income taxation other than the super tax. The 5 per cent and the 4 per cent bonds both have a convertibility feature. The chancellor pointed out that in the year beginning October 1, 1917, over £1,120,000,000 had been invested in war bonds, much more than expected ; by January 18, 1919, the total had reached £1,500,000,000. The advan- tage claimed for the system of continu- ous borrowing is that it raises more money with the least disturbance of financial conditions, and it is argued that it is the best from a point of view of financial stability after the war is over. Through its representatives in the United States, J. P. Morgan & Com- pany, the British government offered its short term treasury bills through- out the year, these bonds selling on the market at 5*/? per cent at the beginning of 1918, the interest increasing to 6 per cent for the greater part of the year, and the bonds being again offered at 6 per cent during 1919. During the first four years of the war Great Brit- ain had borrowed over £5,900,000,000. The total indebtedness of Great Brit- ain on January 1,1919, was about $40,- 000,000,000, over 44 per cent of the national wealth. Germany. Financial conditions with- in the Central Powers were largely shrouded in mystery. There were, however, many indications of financial stress, food and clothing shortage, and industrial unrest. The war finances were a prodigious burden. The fifth war loan was reported in April, 1917, to have produced 12,770,000,000 marks ($3,192,000,000). In February, 1917, the Reichstag authorized a sixth credit of 15 billion marks and in July a sev- enth of like amount. The sixth loan was reported to have produced $3,089,- 000,000, and the seventh $3,156,000,- 000. This last called out 5,213,000 subscribers, of whom 3,233,000 made subscriptions of $50 or less, and 1,280,- 000 others subscribed less than $250 each. The total number of subscribers was less than for the fourth and fifth loans and greater reliance was placed on the large banks. The rapid growth of the public interest charge, the al- most complete absence of foreign trade, and the concentration of industrial ef- forts within the narrowest range of military necessities made increasingly difficult the preservation of a sound financial structure. In addition, in July, 1917, Germany assumed respon- sibility for war expenditures of Bul- garia and Turkey. Numerous reports indicated increasing food scarcity and the efforts of the authorities to supply fertilizers and seeds and stimulate pro- duction. Nevertheless, Mr. Hoover re- ported to President Wilson in May, 1917, that the Germans could not be starved into surrender. The scarcity of gold and silver gave great concern because of the unfavorable trade bal- ances with neighboring neutrals. The Reichsbank repeated its appeals for gold in any form and the government threatened to demonetize silver if it were not brought out of hiding. Loans were secured from Switzerland and Hol- land largely, according to report, by threats to cut off their coal supply. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 327 The scarcity of clothing necessitated government regulation and the issue of clothing cards. Plans for the rehabilitation of the merchant fleet and the recovery of for- eign trade made much progress. It was reported that a merchant fleet was under construction ; that the govern- ment would make generous allowances for vessels lost during the war and heavily subsidized shipping after the war; and that similar steps would be taken with reference to various branches of trade, especially toy-making and dye-manufacture. It was planned also to utilize monopolies of buying under government direction to secure raw ma- terials. During 1918 the German government floated two war loans, the eighth and the ninth. The eighth loan, offered to the public from March 18 until April 18, consisted of bonds bearing 5 per cent interest and treasury certificates bearing 4^/o per cent interest. These, as in the two preceding loans, were issued at 98 and the amount was un- limited. They were dated July 1, 1918, but the bonds were "unkundbar" (or unannounceable) until October 1, 1924, whereas the treasury certificates ma- ture on July 1, 1967, but subject to drawings, or, at the option of the gov- ernment, to entire redemption at par, on or after July 1, 1927. However, the holder of the certificates, if the gov- ernment exercises its right to redeem, may ask for 4 per cent treasury cer- tificates which are redeemable by draw- ing at 115. The bonds were issued, as in the United States, in coupon bonds, being in denominations ranging from 100 to 20,000 marks. The treasury certificates were in series in coupon form, in denominations of 1,000 to 20,- 000 marks. Both the bonds and certifi- cates of this and previous loans could be deposited by subscribers in the se- curities department of the Reichsbank, which would collect and forward in- terest without charge until October, 1919. In the campaign for the raising of the funds much was made of Wilson's assertion that the United States was to put all its force into the winning of the war. A total of 15,001,425,000 marks (about $3,520,000,000) was sub- scribed, which sum far exceeded the sub- scription to the sixth loan, which until then held the record of 13,120,000,000 marks. The number of subscribers, 6,510,278, exceeded the number for any previous loan except the sixth, to which over seven million subscribed. The ninth German loan met with much less success. In accordance with the bill introduced into the Reichstag for a war credit of fifteen billion marks, a campaign was conducted from Septem- ber 23 until October 23. The loan was issued as in the two preceding war loans in the form of 5 per cent bonds and of 41/0 per cent redeemable treasury cer- tificates, both being put forth at 98. In its other essential features this loan was similar to the preceding. Accord- ing to a statement attributed to the president of the Imperial Bank the to- tal subscription amounted to 10,433,- 957,700 marks, which was considerably less than called for. Japan. Japan was never so pros- perous as in 1917. Although nominally a belligerent, her trade and manufac- turing positions were those of a neu- tral. She nearly monopolized Oriental trans-Pacific trade and built up a thriv- ing commerce with much of the rest of the world. She sent trade commissions to all important countries, opened new steamship lines to China, Russia, Aus- tralia, Africa, North and South Amer- ica, Europe, India, and the South Sea Islands. Her shipyards were worked 328 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR at full capacity. Her combined im- ports and exports showed a value double that of 1914. As compared with 1916, there was an increase of over 50 per cent in exports and of about 20 per cent in imports. There were great ad- vances in commodity prices, resulting among other things in numerous indus- trial disturbances. Some indication of industrial development is given by Ja- pan's importation of cotton from the United States to the amount of 514,000 bales in the fiscal year 1917, as com- pared with 484,000 bales in 1916 and 337,000 in 1914. Her total exports for fiscal years were: 1917, $130,472,- 000; 1916, $74,470,000; 1915, $41,- 517,000. Japan, like the United States, has stood in the position of a lender, hav- ing furnished financial assistance to the extent of $742,298,000 to Great Brit- ain; $254,168,000 to Russia; and $155,569,000 to France; from the out- break of the war until the end of April, 1918. A national loan of $25,000,000 floated during 1918 drew forth sub- scriptions exceeding $67,500,000. Bonds to the amount of $400,000,000 were ex- pected to be issued in 1918-19. France. The Fourth French War Loan or "Liberty Loan" was opened for subscription October 20 and re- mained open until November 24, 1918. The bonds of nominal value of 100 francs were issued at 70.8 francs ; with interest set at 4 per cent on the nomi- nal value the yield is approximately 5% per cent. By December 31, with final results of the campagin not yet known, it was announced that the sub- scriptions reached a nominal total of 27,750,000,000 francs or a real value of 19,750,000,000 francs. The sum by far exceeds the amounts raised in any previous war loans. In addition France offered a new form of short term obli- gations beginning May 31, 1918. These were the National Defense Notes, which have a maturity of one month but which may be extended one or two months fur- ther. The interest set at 3.6 per cent the first month, increases to 3.9 per cent the second month, and to 4 per cent if held for four months. The French government's borrowings since the outbreak of the war to August 31, 1918, are classed as follows : Domestic, funded loans, 32,187,000,000 francs; national defense treasury bills, 26,453,- 000,000 francs ; short term bonds, 679,- 000,000 francs ; advances of the Bank of France and the Bank of Algeria, 19,- 415,000,000 francs ; total domestic, 78,- 734,000,000 francs. Foreign, loans contracted in: England, 12,533,000,000 francs; United States, 11,887,000,000 francs; Argentina, 471,000,000 francs; Spain, 326,000,000 francs; Japan, 197,000,000 francs; Switzerland, 97,- 000,000 francs ; Holland, Norway, and Sweden, 147,000,000 francs; total for- eign, 25,678,000,000 francs. Australia. During 1918 Australia floated two war loans, the sixth and the seventh. The sixth war loan cam- paign was carried on from February 18 to April 10 and £20,000,000 in bonds were issued. The bonds were offered so as to produce interest at 41/^ per cent free of Federal and State income taxes and of any levy of wealth hereafter to be made. There was, however, an al- ternative offer of 5 per cent interest subject to Federal but not to State in- come taxes — for those of smaller in- comes who would not be liable to the tax and to whom the tax free consid- eration would have no special attrac- tion. The bonds are accepted at par in payment of probate and succession duty due the Commonwealth. Further, trustees are allowed to invest in them notwithstanding the fact that the price FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 329 at the time of investment may be above or below par. Provision is made for the purchasing of the bonds on the mar- ket by the treasurer of the Common- wealth should they decline in price. The subscriptions which in aggregate were £43,500,000, more than doubled the amount asked for. Of this total only £6,500,000 was applied for at the 5 per cent rate. The Seventh Australian War Loan called for £40,000,000 and the cam- paign for this was inaugurated on Sep- tember 16. The bonds were issued at par in denominations ranging from £10 to £1000 and the rate of interest was fixed at 5 per cent. Unlike the pre- ceding loans, the whole issue is subject to Federal, though not to state, taxa- tion, and it is of short duration, the year of maturity being 1923. The number of applications was 223,863 (which was more than for any previ ous loan) and subscriptions amounted to £42,667,640. The seven war loans floated in Australia aggregated £186,- 994,940. In addition, up to June 30, 1918, Australia had borrowed from the British home government £38,000,000 for the prosecution of the war. New Zealand. In the early part of 1918 New Zealand raised another war loan of £20,000,000. This, like the preceding loan, had a compulsory fea- ture whereby if the set sum was not obtained persons with incomes of over £700 and who were thus able to sub- scribe but failed to do so were to be fined, and later compelled to put sur plus funds in war bonds receiving only 3 per cent interest. The compulsory provision in the war loan of New Zea- land in 1917 was probably the first in- stance of this form of conscription of wealth in the belligerent countries, though resort was not needed to this be- cause there were enough subscriptions. India. India continued its issue of its Post Office 5-Year Cash Certificates in 1918, these being offered continuously since April 1, 1917. The certificates are dated from the date of sale and become due in five years, thus being very similar to War Savings Certificates. These certificates may be cashed at any time within a year at cost price, ano} thereafter the cash value increases each quarter year until maturity. They are issued in denominations which vary from 10 to 100 rupees maturity value. The interest at 5.13 per cent per an- num is compounded quarterly from the date of purchase and paid at the end of the five years. While these are exempt from the income tax, the maximum amount that an individual can hold is 7500 rupees, irrespective of the amount of other kinds of bonds held. The issue of these certificates as well as of the 5 per cent War Loan bonds of 1929-47 and the 5% per cent war bonds of 1920-22, was authorized by the gov- ernment of India on March 1, 1917. Other British Colonies. Newfound- land, the Union of South Africa, the Malay States, and the Colony of Bar- bados, British West Indies, all raised loans for war purposes during 1918. Italy. The sum raised by Italy by its Fourth War Loan (its fifth loan since the outbreak of the European War) exceeded by far the amount ob- tained in any previous campaign. From January 15 to March 10 about $1,160,- 000,000 of bonds was subscribed for, as compared with the $500,000,000 of the preceding loan, which had before held the record. They were issued at 86.5, with the interest set at 5 per cent, but had no definite date of maturity. Coupon bonds in denominations from 100 to 20,000 lire were exchangeable for registered bonds. The bonds of this loan were exempt from all taxes and 330 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR enjoy all of the advantages which were Loans to Allies. The American gov- to go to future loans during the war. ernment, after its entrance into the Neutral Countries. The finances of war, made repeated loans to associated neutral countries required that loans be belligerents and also to certain neutrals, floated to meet the expenses of mobili- These advances were spent in this coni- zation and other expenditures occa- try for food and supplies; they were sioned by the war. For example, be- essential to the equalization of interna- fore Italy's entrance into the fray it tional exchange. They were based on had issued a mobilization loan and the obligations of foreign governments Switzerland put forth eight and Hoi- purchased by the United States treas- land four mobilization loans. ury ; these bore rates of interest con- Switzerland. Switzerland's eighth forming to the Liberty Loans and in- mobilization loan was opened to public terim certificates of the treasury. Pre- subscription from January 7 to Janu- vious to April, 1917, foreign loans to ary 16, 1918. The bonds were issued the amount of $2,500,000,000 had been at 100 in denominations ranging from placed here through banking houses by 100 to 5000 francs in coupon bonds, numerous foreign governments. After Coupon bonds which had an aggregate America's entrance into the war all ad- par value of over 1000 francs could be vances were made by the government, deposited at the Federal treasury in except certain short-term British treas- exchange for registered certificates, ury notes issued through J. P. Morgan The bonds are redeemable at par on or and Company and certain Canadian ob- after January 31, 1928, upon the giv- ligations. By January 15, 1919, the ing of six months' notice. Both prin- aggregate loans of our government to cipal and interest are exempt from all foreign governments were $8,598,773,- taxes, deduction or stamp duty of the 702, apportioned as follows: Great Federal government. There were 31,- Britain, $4,175,981,000; France, $2,- 601 subscriptions, totaling $28,950,- 436,427,000; Italy, $1,310,000,000; 000. Russia, $325,000,000 (all previous to The Netherlands. From January 2 1918) ; Belgium, $256,145,000; Greece, to January 4 Holland disposed of its $39,554,036; Cuba, $15,000,000; Ser- fourth mobilization loan. The bonds bia, $12,000,000; Rumania, $6,666,- were issued at 100 and the interest rate 666; Liberia, $5,000,000; and Czecho- was fixed at 4% per cent. They are Slovaks, $17,000,000. dated February 1, 1918, and mature Gross Debts of Belligerents. — As forty years from that time, with the published by the Commercial and Finan- right of redemption by the government cial Chronicle, the total debts of bellig- at any time after August 1, 1919. The erents on January 1, 1919, as compared coupon bonds were issued in denomina- with debts August 1, 1914, were as fol- tions of 100, 500, and 1000 florins, the lows (six figures [000,000] omitted): first coupon on definitive bonds matur- ing on February 1, 1919. In case the August January i • ■ i-i t 1,1914 1, 1919 voluntary subscriptions to this loan did united states $1,000 $21,000 not amount to 400,000,000 florins, the France.?.. ..".".'.".*.*.".".".'.'.'.".'.!".!".!!".! 6,500 30,000 , .j j - , , . Russia 4,600 27,000 law provided tor compulsory subscrip- itaiv 2,800 12,000 .- . a I 1 x 1AA J Germany 5,200 40,000 tlOnS tO a 6 per Cent loan at 100 tO Austria-Hungary 3,700 24,000 make up the deficiency. Totals $27,300 $194,000 XIII. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE TREATIES OF PEACE President Wilson's Visit to Europe. After the signing of the armistice all the eyes of the world were focused on the forthcoming gathering of the lead- ing diplomats of the world to settle the final terms of peace. On November 18, the President announced that he intend- ed to sail for Europe himself in order to take part in the peace discussion be- cause he felt that it would be impossible for him to handle the matter success- fully by cable. On November 29 the American delegates to the Peace Con- ference were announced as follows : The President, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, Colonel Edward M. House, Hen- ry White, former Ambassador to France, General Tasker H. Bliss, mili- tary representative of the United States at the Inter- Allied War Council. President Wilson, in his farewell address to Congress on December 2, stated that the Entente governments had accepted the principles laid down in his "fourteen peace points" address (see above), and that it was only reasonable for him to be present at the conference in order to interpret some of them as well as to offer suggestions as to their applications. The President and his party sailed for France on the steamer George Wash- ington, on December 4. They arrived at Brest on December 13 and went to Paris on the same day. They were re- ceived by the French President and other high dignitaries and the President took up his residence at the palace of Prince Murat. On Christmas Day, President Wilson visited General Persh- ing at general headquarters and ad- dressed American troops. On Decem- ber 26 the President visited England and stayed until the 31st, when he re- turned to France. Later he made a trip to Italy. His visits and speeches were everywhere received with an en- thusiasm and acclaim that was scarce- ly to be expected from a continent that had just passed through such a holo- caust. The Peace Conference. The Peace Conference held its first session on Jan- uary 18, 1919. This meeting was pre- ceded by a few sessions of the Inter- Allied War Council and two formal meetings between President Wilson and the ministers and ambassadors from Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. Before the meeting of the first full ses- sion it was announced that each day a formal communique would be issued to the press concerning the doings of the congress on that day. It was also stated that delegates had promised not to discuss with members of the press anything that had taken place at the sessions. This produced a formal pro- test from the correspondents present at Paris. They were finally permitted to attend the plenary sessions but were informed that deliberations would be held in secret. The Peace Conference held its sessions in the Salle de la Paix of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following joint plan was issued with reference to the organization of the Peace Conference. It was decided that the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan should be represented by five delegates apiece. The British Dominions and India, besides, shall be represented 331 332 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR as follows: Two delegates respectively for Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India, including the native States, and one delegate from New Zealand. Brazil will have three delegates. Bel- gium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Rumania, and Serbia will have two delegates apiece, Siam one delegate, and Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Panama one delegate apiece. Montenegro will have one delegate, but the rules concerning the designa- tion of this delegate shall not be fixed until the moment when the political situ- ation in that country shall have been cleared up. The meeting adopted the following two general principles : One — Each delegation being a unit, the number of delegates forming it shall have no influence upon its status at the conference. Two — In the selection of its delega- tion each nation may avail itself of the panel system. This will enable each State at discretion to intrust its in- terests to such persons as it may desig- nate. The adoption of the panel system will in particular enable the British Empire to admit among its five dele- gates representatives of the dominions, including Newfoundland, which has no separate representation, and of India. The following list of delegates was announced. France — Georges Clemenceau,* Prime * Clemenceau, Georges Benjamin Eugene, born (1841) in Mouilleron-en-Pareds in Ven- dee. Educated as physician, drifted into poli- tics. In 1876 elected to Chamber of Deputies. Independent from beginning. In 1880 founded daily paper, La Justice. Lost seat in 1893 be- cause suspected being in Panama scandal. Elected Senator in 1902. Founded L'Aurore to champion cause of Dreyfus. In 1906 became Minister of the Interior and shortly after pre- Minister ; Stephen Pichon, Foreign Min- ister; Louis Klotz, Finance Minister; Andre Tardieu, French High Commis- sioner to the United States, and Jules Cambon. Great Britain — David Lloyd George, Prime Minister; Arthur J. Balfour, Foreign Secretary; Andrew Bonar Law; George Nicoll Barnes, the labor leader, and another who was to act as alternate delegate. United States — Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States ; Robert Lansing, Secretary of State; Henry White ; Colonel Edward M. House ; and General Tasker H. Bliss. Italy — Vittorio Orlando, Prime Min- ister; Baron Sonnino, Foreign Secre- tary; Antonio Salandra, former Pre- mier; Marquis Salvago Raggi, and Signor Stringher, Minister of Finance. Japan — The Marquis Saionji, for- mer Prime Minister; Baron Makino, Baron Chinda, Baron Matsui, and Count Hayashi. Brazil — Senator Epitacio Pessoa, Dr. Pandia Caloreras, and Deputy Raoul Fernandez. Belgium — Paul Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Emile Vandervelde, and M. Vandenheuvel. Serbia — Nikola Pashitch, former Prime Minister, and M. Trumbitch, for- mer President of the Dalmatian Diet, who will alternate with Dr. M. R. Ves- nitch, Serbian Minister to France, and M. Reber. Greece — Eleutherios Venizelos, Pre- mier, and M. Politis, Foreign Min- ister. mier. Held office until 1909. Power con- tinued. Known as Destroyer of Ministries. Became editor of L'Homme Libre. Is stormy petrel of French politics. A consistent rad- ical. As prime minister bitter enemy of church. A brilliant writer and speaker. Wrote plays, novels, philosophic essays, and sociological studies. THE PEACE CONFERENCE 333 Rumania — M. Bratiano, Prime Min- ister, and M. Mishr. Czechoslovakia — Dr. Karl Kramarcz, Premier, and M. Benes, Foreign Min- ister. Poland — M. Dmowski, Polish repre- sentative to the allied Governments, and a second delegate representing General Pilsudski. China — Lu Cheng-Hsiang, Foreign Minister, and one other. Kingdom of the Hedjaz — Two dele- gates. Canada — Sir Robert Borden, Pre- mier; Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce, with others of the delegation alternating. Australia — William Morris Hughes, Premier, and one other. Union of South Africa — General Louis Botha and General Jan C. Smuts. India — The Maharajah of Bikaner and Sir S. P. Sinha. Siam — M. Charoon, Minister to France, and one other. New Zealand — William F. Massey, Premier. Portugal — Ejas Moniz. The opening session of the Peace Conference began on the afternoon of Saturday, January 18, 1919, at three o'clock. The opening address was made by President Poincare of France. He greeted those present and then paid a warm tribute to the United States of America and the other republics that had come into the war to defend the ideals of democracy and liberty. He said that the war was a rising of the oppressed nations of the earth against those of the Central Powers which had held them in submission for centuries. He called the present meeting a meet- ing of free peoples and stated that the Germanic idea of conquest had been de- feated forever. He finally appealed for a League of Nations which would make a recurrence of the past holocaust im- possible. His concluding paragraph was, "You are assembled in order to repair the evil that has been done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hands the future of the world. I leave you gentlemen to your grave deliberations and declare the Confer- ence of Paris open." Immediately af- ter the President of France had con- cluded his speech President Wilson nom- inated Clemenceau for the position of Permanent Chairman of the Conference. His nomination was seconded by Lloyd George and Baron Sonnino and the as- semblage ratified it unanimously. Af- ter Clemenceau's speech of acceptance, the first session of the conference came to a close with the announcement that a League of Nations would be the first order of business at the next plenary session. A Supreme Council, consisting of the two senior members of the five chief powers, was established. It held its first session on January 20, and adopted a resolution offered by President Wilson concerning the situation in Russia. All the warring factions in Russia were in- vited to take part in a discussion of the differences of opinion with the idea of attempting to settle them and thus restore peace and quietude over the vast area seething with unrest. The meet- ing was to be held on February 15 at the Princes' Island about 12 miles from Constantinople. The Bolsheviki, and the governments of Ukraine, Crimea, Esthonia, Lithuania, and the Lettish republic were invited to attend. Noth- ing however came of this suggestion on the part of the Associated Powers. The League of Nations. On January 25 the Peace Conference adopted a reso- lution to create a League of Nations. It will be remembered that this was one of President Wilson's famous four- 334 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR teen peace points. President Wilson was named chairman of the committee which was to draft the constitution of the proposed League. President Wil- son read his plan on February 14 and on the next day he sailed for the United States. During the meetings of the committee which drew up the constitu- tion of the League of Nations there arose sharp differences of opinion. All of these differences centred around the question as to how much power should be given to the League to enforce its decisions. The French held out for the use of strong military power to make them effective, while the British and American delegates declared the League should have only a modified form of authority, such as economic restraints and the like. The discussion arose to such a height that Premier Clemenceau practically appealed to the American public over the head of Pres- ident Wilson through the agency of the Associated Press. This action was wildly acclaimed by the French press and the latter modified its demands af- ter a threat was made to remove the seat of the conference to another city. A compromise was effected only after the British and American delegates agreed to a revision of the armistice terms which assured the impossibility of Germany renewing the war or re- jecting the peace terms. This satis- fied the French and Belgian representa- tives and the work of the committee was considerably lightened. President Wil- son read the text of the Constitution for the League of Nations which was pre- sented to the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference on February 14 as a unanimous report of the committee.The following day President Wilson sailed for America. When he arrived there and presented the document to the American public it was received rather coldly and this resulted in the making of several changes in the original text. When the President again went to Paris he presented several changes which were adopted by the Peace Congress. The following presents the text of the League of Nations as finally adopted. At the conclusion of the constitution there is a list of the differences added as a result of the hostility to the text in its original form. TEXT OF THE LEAGUE OF NA- TIONS COVENANT. In order to promote international coopera- tion AND TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as to actual rule of conduct among govern- ments and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the high con- tracting parties agree to this covenant of the League of Nations. ARTICLE ONE The original members of the League of Na- tions shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this covenant and also such of those other States named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant. Such accessions shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other members of the league. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or colony not named in the annex may become a member of the league if its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere in- tentions to observe its international obligations and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the league in regard to its mili- tary and naval forces and armaments. Any member of the league may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, with- draw from the league, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. THE PEACE CONFERENCE 335 ARTICLE TWO The action of the league under this covenant shall be effective through the instrumentality of an assembly and of a council, with a per- mament secretariat. ARTICLE THREE The assembly shall consist of representatives of the members of the league. The assembly shall meet at stated intervals, and from time to time as occasion may require, at the seat of the league or at such other place as may be decided upon. The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world. At meetings of the assembly each member of the league shall have one vote, and may have not more than three representatives. ARTICLE FOUR The council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy and of Japan, together with representatives of four other members of the league. These four members of the league shall be selected by the assem- bly from time to time in its discretion. Un- til the appointment of the representatives of the four members of the league first selected by the assembly, representatives of (blank) shall be members of the council. With the approval of the majority of the assembly the council may name additional mem- bers of the league, whose representatives shall always be members of the council. The coun- cil with like approval may increase the num- ber of members of the league to be selected by the assembly for representation on the council. The council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the league or at such other place as may be decided upon. The council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world. Any member of the league not represented on the council shall be invited to send a rep- resentative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the league. At meetings of the council each member of the league represented on the council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative. ARTICLE FIVE Except where otherwise expressly provided in this covenant, decisions at any meeting of the assembly or of the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the league represented at the meeting. All matters of procedure at meetings of the assembly or the council, the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by the council and may be decided by a majority of the members of the league represented at the meeting. The first meeting of the assembly and the first meeting of the council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. ARTICLE SIX The permanent secretariat shall be estab- lished at the seat of the league. The secretariat shall comprise a secretary-general and such secretaries and staff as may be required. The first secretary-general shall be the per- son named in the annex; thereafter the secre- tary-general shall be appointed by the council with the approval of the majority of the as- sembly. The secretaries and the staff of the secre- tariat shall be appointed by the secretary-gen- eral with the approval of the council. The secretary-general shall act in that ca- pacity at all meetings of the assembly and of the council. The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the members of the league in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the international bureau of the Universal Postal Union. ARTICLE SEVEN The seat of the league is established at Geneva. The council may at any time decide that the seat of the league shall be established else- where. All positions under or in connection with the league, including the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. Representatives of the members of the league and officials of the league when engaged on the business of the league shall enjoy diploma- tic privileges and immunities. The buildings and other property occupied by the league or its officials or by representa- tives attending its meetings shall be inviola- ble. ARTICLE EIGHT The members of the league recognize that the maintenance of a peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforce- ment by common action of international obliga- tions. The council, taking account of the geograph- ical situation and circumstances of each, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the 336 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR consideration and action of the several Govern- ments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsidera- tion and revision at least every ten years. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several governments, limits of arma- ments therein fixed shall not be exceeded with- out the concurrence of the council. The members of the league agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of muni- tions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those members of the league which are not able to manufacture the muni- tions and implements of war necessary for their safety. The members of the league undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes. ARTICLE NINE A permanent commission shall be consti- tuted to advise the council on the execution of the provisions of Articles One and Eight and on military and naval questions generally. ARTICLE TEN The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve, as against external ag- gression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggres- sion the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. ARTICLE ELEVEN Any war or threat of war, whether imme- diately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern of the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the secretary-general shall, on the request of any member of the league, forth- with summon a meeting of the council. It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each member of the league to bring to the attention of the assembly or of the council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to dis- turb either the peace or the good understand- ing between nations upon which peace depends. ARTICLE TWELVE The members of the league agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the council. In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. ARTICLE THIRTEEN The members of the league agree that when- ever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for sub- mission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitra- tion. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if es- tablished would constitute a breach of any international obligation or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed upon by the parties to the dispute or stipu- lated in any convention existing between them. The members of the league agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a member of the league which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award the council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. ARTICLE FOURTEEN The council shall formulate and submit to the members of the league for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. The court shall be com- petent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or ques- tion referred to it by the council or by the assembly. ARTICLE FIFTEEN If there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rup- ture which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the secretary-general, who THE PEACE CONFERENCE 337 will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the secretary-general, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, all the relevant facts and papers. The coun- cil may forthwith direct the publication thereof. The council shall endeavor to effect a set- tlement of any dispute, and if such efforts are successful a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute, terms of settlement thereof as the council may deem appropriate. If the dispute is not thus settled the coun- cil either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. Any member of the league represented on the council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclu- sions regarding the same. If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute the members of the league agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report. If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the league reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall con- sider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its set- tlement. The council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council. In any case referred to the assembly all the provisions of this article and of Article Twelve relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the rep- resentatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the par- ties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the repre- sentatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. ARTICLE SIXTEEN Should any member of the league resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article Twelve, Thirteen or Fifteen, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the league, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial rela- tions, the prohibition of all intercourse be- tween their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking member of the league and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking member of the league and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the league or not. It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military or naval forces the members of the league shall sever- ally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used to protect the covenants of the league. The members of the league agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to min- imize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mu- tually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking member of the state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the league which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the league. Any member of the league which has vio- lated any covenant of the league may be de- clared to be no longer a member of the league by a vote of the council concurred in by the representatives of all the members of the league represented thereon. ARTICLE SEVENTEEN In the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member of the league or between states not members of the league, the state or states not members of the league shall be invited to accept the obliga- tions of membership in the league for the pur- poses of such dispute, upon such conditions as the council may deem just. If such invita- tion is accepted the provisions of Articles Twelve to Sixteen inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the council. Upon such invitation being given the council 338 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effec- tual in the circumstances. If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the league, the provisions of Article Sixteen shall be ap- plicable as against the state taking such action. If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the league for the purposes of such dispute, the council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. ARTICLE EIGHTEEN Every convention or international engage- ment entered into henceforward by any mem- ber of the league shall be forthwith registered with the secretariat and shall as soon as pos- sible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered. ARTICLE NINETEEN The assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the league of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international condi- tions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. ARTICLE TWENTY The members of the league severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not here- after enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case members of the league shall, before becoming a member of the league, have under- taken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engage- ments such as treaties of arbitration or re- gional understandings like the Monroe Doc- trine for securing the maintenance of peace. ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for- merly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by them- selves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civili- zation, and that securities for the perform- ance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant. The best method of giving practicable effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples be intrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best under- take this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the league. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as indepen- dent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory. Other peoples, especially those of central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guar- antee freedom of conscience or religion sub- ject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the nations for other than police purposes and the defence of territory and will also secure equal oppor- tunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the league. There are territories, such as southwest Africa and certain of the south Pacific islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their popu- lation or their small size or their remoteness from the centres of civilization or their geo- graphical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the man- datory as integral portions of its territory subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In every case of mandate the mandatory shall render to the council an annual report in ref- erence to the territory committed to its charge. THE PEACE CONFERENCE 339 The degree of authority, control or admin- istration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the league, be explicitly defined in each case by the council. A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual report of the mandatories, and to advise the council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates. ARTICLE TWENTY-THREE Subject to and in accordance with the pro- visions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the league (A) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations ex- tend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organi- zations, (B) undertake to secure just treat- ment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control, (C) will entrust the league with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, (D) will entrust the league with the general supervi- sion of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest, (E) will make provision to secure and maintain free- dom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all » members of the league. In this connection the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be in mind, (F) will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease. ARTICLE TWENTY-FOUR There shall be placed under the direction of the league all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and all commissions for the regula- tion of matters of international interest here- after constituted shall be placed under the direction of the league. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of interna- tional bureaus or commissions the secretariat of the league shall, subject to the consent of the council and if desired by the parties, col- lect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable. The council may include as part of the expenses of the secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the league. ARTICLE TWENTY-FIVE The members of the league agree to encour- age and promote the establishment and co- operation of duly authorized voluntary na- tional Red Cross organizations having as pur- poses improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. ARTICLE TWENTY-SIX Amendments to this covenant will take ef- fect when ratified by the members of the league whose representatives compose tho council and by a majority of the members of the league whose representatives compose the assembly. No such amendment shall bind any member of the league which signifies its dissent there- from, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the league. ANNEX TO THE COVENANT One — Original members of the League of Nations. Signatories of the treaty of peace: United States Guatemala, of America, Hayti, Belgium, Hedjaz, Bolivia, Honduras, Brazil, Italy, British Empire, Japan, Canada, Liberia, Australia, Nicaragua, South Africa, Panama, New Zealand, Peru, India, Poland, China, Portugal, Cuba, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia, Ecuador, Siam, France* Uruguay. Greece, States invited to accede to the covenant: Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela. Two — First secretary-general of the League of Nations, . The first secretary of the League of Nations was Sir Eric Drummond. 340 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Important changes that were made in the new constitution of the League of Nations and which did not appear in the first draft may be summed up briefly as follows. ARTICLE I This article embodies parts of the old Arti- cle VII. It goes into detail regarding the method of admitting new members and pro- vides for withdrawal from the League, which was not mentioned in the original covenant. ARTICLE II Originally a part of Article I this gives the name of "assembly" to the representatives of member nations, formerly designated as the "body of delegates." ARTICLE III This includes parts of the old Articles I, II and III, with slight alterations and has refer- ence to "members of the League" instead of the "high contracting parties." This change is evident throughout the draft. ARTICLE IV That part of the old Article III outlining the structure of the Council is contained in this article. It also provides that the member- ship of the Council may be increased. ARTICLE V This is the same as the original Article IV except that the first paragraph requires unani- mous agreement in both Council and Assembly, except where otherwise provided. ARTICLE VI This is a substitute for the old Article V. In the replaced article the Council was to appoint the first Secretary-General and ap- proval of a majority of the Assembly was not required for appointment of his successors. ARTICLE VII Geneva is specifically named as the seat of the League, with the Council given the right to change it at any time. There is also a para- graph permitting women to hold positions in the League. This article embodies parts of the old Articles V and VI. ARTICLE VIII While this article was largely covered by the original Article VIII, it has been changed to make plain that reduction of armaments must be approved by the nations affected. ARTICLE IX This article is substantially the same as the original. ARTICLE X Virtually no change has been made from the old article. ARTICLE XI The phrase, "The League shall take any ac- tion," originally read, "The high contracting parties reserve the right to take any action." ARTICLE XII Practically no change has been made in this article. ARTICLE XIII The wording has been slightly changed. ARTICLE XIV Provision for the Court to give an advisory opinion on any dispute is new. ARTICLE XV Provision has been made for excluding do- mestic matters from the jurisdiction of the Council. ARTICLE XVI Provision is made for removing from the League any member which has violated the covenant. ARTICLE XVII Practically unchanged. ARTICLE XVIII This was formerly Article XXIII. ARTICLE XIX Practically the same as the old Article XXIV. ARTICLE XX Practically the same as the old Article XXV. ARTICLE XXI This article, recognizing the Monroe Doc- trine, is new. ARTICLE XXII This is only slightly changed from the old Article XIX., providing only that nations must be willing to accept the mandatories designated for them. ARTICLE XXIII. Reference to supervision of traffic in women and children and in drugs is entirely new, as THE PEACE CONFERENCE 341 is the preceding clause referring to treatment of natives. It contains portions of the old Articles XVIII and XXI and is a substitu- tion for the original Article XXI. ARTICLE XXIV Practically the same as the old Article XXII. ARTICLE XXV Recognition of the Red Cross is new. ARTICLE XXVI A change is made from the original in that amendments may be made by a "majority" vote instead of a three-fourths vote as before. ANNEX The Annex, containing a list of the charter members and the nations to be invited to join at once, is new. The German Peace Treaty. After the question of the League of Nations was disposed of for the time being the Peace Conference was able to take up the financial and economic problems that the war had brought in its wake. A Supreme Economic Council, an Eco- nomic Drafting Commission and a Fi- nancial Drafting Commission were es- tablished to enlighten the labors of the Peace Conference as a whole. The most prominent financiers and economists of the Allied nations were represented on these committees and they were a tre- mendous assistance in the ultimate so- lution of many knotty problems. The question of reparation was one concerning which there was a vast di- versity of opinion. The French and British averred that Germany should pay for all damages in full, while the American delegation held that the Ger- mans should only be responsible for the wanton destruction that they caused during the war. This would mean that Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, and parts of northern France would chiefly benefit from the reparation moneys, while Great Britain and the United States would only receive damages for mari- time losses and in the case of Great Britain for aerial losses. At the plenary session of the Con- ference of the Congress on March 1, financial and economic subjects were re- ported by the two committees that had them in charge. On the same day Mar- shal Foch presented the military terms which he suggested should be incorpor- ated in the treaty. On March 3, the Conference Committee on Reparation stated that it estimated that Germany and her allies should pay to the Entente Allies $120,000,000,000. During March and April the news that sifted through from behind the closed doors of the Peace Conference was very meagre. The Conference had now practically resolved itself into meetings between Lloyd George, Clemen- ceau, Orlando, and President Wilson. They were practically deciding the fate of the world. On May 7, 1919, the Treaty of Peace, consisting of more than 80,000 words, was presented to the German delegates in the dining hall of the Trianon Palace Hotel at Versailles. The chairman of the German delegation, which consisted of six main delegates and a number of specialists in various fields, was Count Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau. The Allied Peace Treaty naturally was received with a great deal of hostility in Ger- many. The press was particularly bit- ter towards it and everywhere was heard the complaint that Germany was betrayed inasmuch as she had consented to make peace on the terms laid down by President Wilson. She maintained that these "fourteen points" were almost to the last one cast aside and a peace, based on the principle "to the victor belongs the spoils" was drawn up. Her protests had very little effect, slight changes being made in the text of the 342 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR treaty which was originally handed to her. The official summary of the treaty is as follows. THE PREAMBLE The preamble names as parties of the one part the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, described as the Five Allied and Associated Powers, and Bel- gium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Hon- duras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, Siam, Czechoslovakia, and Uruguay, who with the five above are described as the allied and asso- ciated powers, and on the other part, Germany. It states that: bearing in mind that on the request of the then Imperial German Govern- ment an armistice was granted on Nov. 11, 1918, by the principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a treaty of peace might be concluded with her, and whereas the allied and associated powers, being equally desirous that the war in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly and which origi- nated in the declaration of war by Austria- Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on Aug. 1, 1914, and against France on Aug. 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm, just, and durable peace, the plenipotentiaries (having communi- cated their full powers found in good and due form) have agreed as follows: From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war will terminate. From the moment, and subject to the provisions of this treaty, official relations with Germany, and with each of the German States, will be re- sumed by the Allied and Associated Powers. SECTION I LEAGUE OF NATIONS The covenant of the League of Nations con- stitutes Section I of the peace treaty, which places upon the League many specific, in addi- tion to its general, duties. It may question Germany at any time for a violation of the neutralized zone east of the Rhine as a threat against the world's peace. It will appoint three of the five members of the Sarre Com- mission, oversee its regime, and carry out the plebiscite. It will appoint the High Commissioner of Danzig, guarantee the inde- pendence of the free city, and arrange for treaties between Danzig and Germany and Poland. It will work out the mandatory sys- tem to be applied to the former German colo- nies, and act as a final court in part of the plebiscites of the Belgian-German frontier, and in disputes as to the Kiel Canal, and decide certain of the economic and financial problems. An International Conference on Labor is to be held in October under its direc- tion, and another on the international control of ports, waterways, and railways is fore- shadowed. MEMBERSHIP The members of the League will be the sig- natories of the covenant and other States in- vited to accede who must lodge a declaration of accession without reservation within two months. A new State, dominion, or colony may be admitted, provided its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the assembly. A State may withdraw upon giving two years' notice, if it has fulfilled all its international obligations. SECRETARIAT A permanent secretariat will be established at the seat of the League, which will be at Geneva. The Assembly will consist of representatives of the members of the League, and will meet at stated intervals. Voting will be by States. Each member will have one vote and not more than three representatives. The Council will consist of representatives of the Five Great Allied Powers, together with representatives of four members selected by the Assembly from time to time; it may co-opt additional States and will meet at least once a year. Members not represented will be in- vited to send a representative when questions affecting their interests are discussed. Vot- ing will be by States. Each State will have one vote and not more than one representa- tive. A decision taken by the Assembly and Council must be unanimous except in regard to procedure, and in certain cases specified in the covenant and in the treaty, where decisions will be by a majority. ARMAMENTS The Council will formulate plans for a re- duction of armaments for consideration and adoption. These plans will be revised every ten years. Once they are adopted, no member must exceed the armaments fixed without the concurrence of the Council. All members will exchange full information as to armaments and programs, and a permanent commission will advise the Council on military and naval questions. By Permission of The Macmillan Company CENTRAL EUROPE BEFORE THE WORLD WAR By Permission of The Macmillan Company CENTRAL EUROPE ACCORDING TO THE PEACE TREATIES OF 1919 THE PEACE CONFERENCE 343 PREVENTING OF WAR Upon any war, or threat of war, the Coun- cil will meet to consider what common action shall be taken. Members are pledged to sub- mit matters of dispute to arbitration or in- quiry and not to resort to war until three months after the award. Members agree to carry out the arbitral award and not to go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with it. If a member fails to carry out the award, the Council will propose the necessary measures. The Council will formu- late plans for the establishment of a perma- nent court of international justice to deter- mine international disputes or to give advisory opinions. Members who do not submit their case to arbitration must accept the jurisdiction of the Assembly. If the Council, less the parties to the dispute, is unanimously agreed upon the rights of it, the members agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with its recommenda- tions. In this case, a recommendation, by the Assembly, concurred in by all its members represented on the Council and a simple ma- jority of the rest, less the parties to the dis- pute, will have the force of a unanimous recommendation by the Council. In either case, if the necessary agreement cannot be secured, the members reserve the right to take such action as may be necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. Members resorting to war in disregard of the covenant will immediately be debarred from all inter- course with other members. The Council will in such cases consider what military or naval action can be taken by the League collectively for the protection of the covenants and will afford facilities to members co-operating in this enterprise. VALIDITY OF TREATIES All treaties or international engagements concluded after the institution of the League will be registered with the secretariat and pub- lished. The Assembly may from time to time advise members to reconsider treaties which have become inapplicable or involve danger to peace. The covenant abrogates all obligations between members inconsistent with its terms, but nothing in it shall affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace. THE MANDATORY SYSTEM The tutelage of nations not yet able to stand by themselves will be intrusted to advanced nations who are best fitted to undertake it. The covenant recognizes three different stages of development requiring different kinds of mandatories: (a) Communities like those belonging to the Turkish Empire, which can be provisionally recognized as independent, subject to advice and assistance from mandatory in whose se- lection they would be allowed a voice. (b) Communities like those of Central Africa, to be administered by the mandatory under conditions generally approved by the members of the League, where equal oppor- tunities for trade will be allowed to all mem- bers; certain abuses, such as trade in slaves, arms, and liquor will be prohibited, and the construction of military and naval bases and the introduction of compulsory military train- ing will be disallowed. (c) Other communities, such as Southwest Africa and the South Pacific Islands, but ad- ministered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory. In every case the mandatory will render an anuual re- port, and the degree of its authority will be defined. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS Subject to and in accordance with the pro- visions of international convention, existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the League will in general endeavor, through the international organization established by the Labor Convention, to secure and maintain fair conditions of labor for men, women and children in their own countries and other coun- tries, and undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; they will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements for the suppression of traffic in women and children, etc.: and the control of the trade in arms and ammunition with countries in which control is necessary; they will make pro- vision for freedom of communication and tran- sit and equitable treatment for commerce of all members of the League, with special reference to the necessities of regions devastated during the war; and they will endeavor to take steps for international prevention and control of dis- ease. International bureaus and commissions already established will be placed under the League, as well as those to be established in the future. AMENDMENTS TO THE COVENANT Amendments to the covenant will take effect when ratified by the Council and by a majority of the Assembly. SECTION II BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY Germany cedes to France Alsace-Lorraine, 5,600 square miles to the southwest, and to Bel- gium two small districts between Luxemburg 344 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR and Holland, totaling 382 square miles. She also cedes to Poland the southeastern tip of Silesia beyond and including Oppela, most of Posen, and West Prussia, 27,686 square miles, East Prussia being isolated from the main body by a part of Poland. She loses sovereignty over the northeastern tip of East Prussia, 40 square miles north of the river Memel, and the internationalized areas about Danzig, 729 square miles, and the Basin of the Sarre, 738 square miles, between the western border of the Rhenish Palatinate of Bavaria and the south- east corner of Luxemburg. The Danzig area consists of the V between the Nogat and Vis- tula Rivers made a W by the addition of a similar V on the west, including the city of Danzig. The southeastern third of East Prus- sia and the area between East Prussia and the Vistula north of latitude 53 degrees 3 minutes is to have its nationality determined by popular vote, 5,785 square miles, as is to be the case in part of Schleswig, 2,787 square miles. SECTION III Germany is to consent to the abrogation of the treaties of 1839, by which Belgium was established as a neutral State, and to agree in advance to any convention with which the al- lied and associated Powers may determine to replace them. She is to recognize the full sovereignty of Belgium over the contested ter- ritory of Moresnet and over part of Prussian Moresnet, and to renounce in favor of Bel- gium all rights over the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, the inhabitants of which are to be entitled within six months to protest against this change of sovereignty either in whole or in part, the final decision to be reserved to the League of Nations. A commission is to settle the details of the frontier, and various regula- tions for change of nationality are laid down. LUXEMBOURG Germany renounces her various treaties and conventions with the Grand Duchy of Luxem- bourg, recognizes that it ceased to be a part of the German Zollverein from January first last, renounces all right of exploitation of the railroads, adheres to the abrogation of its neu- trality, and accepts in advance any interna- tional agreement as to it reached by the allied and associated Powers. LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE As provided in the military clauses, Germany will not maintain any fortifications or armed forces less than fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine, hold any manoeuvres, nor maintain any works to facilitate mobilization. In case of violation, "she shall be regarded as com- mitting a hostile act against the Powers who sign the present treaty and as intending to disturb the peace of the world." "By virtue of the present treaty, Germany shall be bound to respond to any request for an explanation which the Council of the League of Nations may think it necessary to address to her." ALSACE-LORRAINE After recognition of the moral obligation to repair the wrong done in 1871 by Germany to France and the people of Alsace-Lorraine, the territories ceded to Germany by the Treaty of Frankfort are restored to France with their frontiers as before 1871, to date from the sign- ing of the armistice, and to be free of all pub- lic debts. Citizenship is regulated by detailed provisions distinguishing those who are immediately re- stored to full French citizenship, those who have to make formal applications therefor, and those for whom naturalization is open after three years. The last named class includes German residents in Alsace-Lorraine, as distinguished from those who acquire the position of Alsace- Lorrainers as defined in the treaty. All public property and all private property of German ex-sovereigns passes to France without pay- ment or credit. France is substituted for Ger- many as regards ownership of the railroads and rights over concessions of tramways. The Rhine bridges pass to France with the obliga- tion for their upkeep. For five years manufactured products of Alsace-Lorraine will be admitted to Germany free of duty to a total amount not exceeding in any year the average of the three years pre- ceding the war and textile materials may be imported from Germany to Alsace-Lorraine and re-exported free of duty. Contracts for electric power from the right bank must be continued for ten years. For seven years, with possible extension to ten, the ports of Kehl and Strasbourg shall be administered as a sin- gle unit by a French administrator appointed and supervised by the Central Rhine Commis- sion. Property rights will be safeguarded in both ports and equality of treatment as re- spects traffic assured the nationals, vessels, and goods of every country. Contracts between Alsace-Lorraine and Ger- mans are maintained save for France's right to annul on grounds of public interest. Judg- ments of courts hold in certain classes of cases while in others a judicial exequatur is first re- quired. Political condemnations during the war are null and void and the obligation to repay war fines is established as in other parts of allied territory. Various clauses adjust the general provisions of the treaty to the special conditions of Al- sace-Lorraine, certain matters of execution be- THE PEACE CONFERENCE 345 ing left to conventions to be made between France and Germany. THE SABBE In compensation for the destruction of coal mines in Northern France and as payment on account of reparation, Germany cedes to France full ownership of the coal mines of the Sarre Basin with their subsidiaries, accessories and facilities. Their value will be estimated by the Reparation Commission and credited against that account. The French rights will be governed by German law in force at the armistice excepting war legislation, France re- placing the present owners, whom Germany undertakes to indemnify. France will continue to furnish the present proportion of coal for local needs and contribute in just proportion to local taxes. The basin extends from the frontier of Lorraine as reannexed to France north as far as Stwendell including on the west the valley of the Sarre as far as Sarre Holzbach and on the east the town of Homburg. In order to secure the rights and welfare of the population and guarantee to France entire freedom in working the mines the ter- ritory will be governed by a commission ap- pointed by the League of Nations and consist- ing of five members, one French, one a native inhabitant of the Sarre, and three represent- ing three different countries other than France and Germany. The League will appoint a member of the Commission as Chairman to act as executive of the commission. The commis- sion will have all powers of government for- merly belonging to the German Empire, Prussia and Bavaria, will administer the rail- roads and other public services and have full power to interpret the treaty clauses. The local courts will continue, but subject to the Com- mission. Existing German legislation will re- main the basis of the law, but the Commis- sion may make modification after consulting a local representative assembly which it will or- ganize. It will have the taxing power but for local purposes only. New taxes must be ap- proved by this assembly. Labor legislation will consider the wishes of the local labor organi- zations and the labor program of the League. French and other labor may be freely utilized, the former being free to belong to French unions. All rights acquired as to pensions and social insurance will be maintained by Ger- many and the Sarre Commission. There will be no military service but only a local gendarmerie to preserve order. The people will preserve their local assemblies, re- ligious liberties, schools, and language, but may vote only for local assemblies. They will keep their present nationality except so far as indi- viduals may change it. Those wishing to leave will have every facility with respect to their property. The territory will form part of the French customs system, with no export tax on coal and metallurgical products going to Ger- many nor on German products entering the ba- sin and for five years no import duties on products of the basin going to Germany or German products coming into the basin. For local consumption French money may circu- late without restriction. After fifteen years a plebiscite will be held by communes to ascertain the desires of the population as to continuance of the existing regime under the League of Nations, union with France or union with Germany. The right to vote will belong to all inhabitants over twenty resident therein at the signature. Tak- ing into account the opinions thus expressed the League will decide the ultimate sovereign- ty. In any portion restored to Germany the German Government must buy out the French mines at an appraised valuation. If the price is not paid within six months thereafter this portion passes finally to France. If Germany buys back the mines the League will deter- mine how much of the coal shall be annually sold to France. SECTION IV GERMAN AUSTRIA Germany recognizes the total independence of German Austria in the boundaries traced. CZECHOSLOVAKIA Germany recognizes the entire independence of the Czechoslovak State, including the au- tonomous territory of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, and accepts the frontiers of this State as to be determined, which in the case of the German frontier shall follow the frontier of Bohemia in 1914. The usual stipu- lations as to acquisition and change of nation- ality follow. POLAND Germany cedes to Poland the greater part of Upper Silesia, Posen and the province of West Prussia on the left bank of the Vistula. A Field Boundary Commission of seven, five rep- resenting the allied and associated powers and one each representing Poland and Germany, shall be constituted within fifteen days of the peace to delimit this boundary. Such special provisions as are necessary to protect racial, linguistic or religious minorities and to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce of other nations shall be laid down in a subsequent treaty between the principal allied and associated powers and Poland. EAST PRUSSIA The southern and the eastern frontier of East Prussia as touching Poland is to be fixed 346 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR by plebiscites, the first in the regency of Allen- stein between the southern frontier of East Prussia and the northern frontier, or Regie- rungsbezirk Allenstein from where it meets the boundary between East and "West Prussia to its junction with the boundary between the circles of Oletsko and Augersburg, thence the northern boundary of Oletsko to its junction with the present frontier, and the second in the area comprising the circles of Stuhm and Ro- senburg and the parts of the circles of Ma- rienburg and Marienwerder east of the Vis- tula. In each case German troops and authorities will move out within fifteen days of the peace, and the territories be placed under an interna- tional commission of five members appointed by the principal allied and associated powers, with the particular duty of arranging for a free, fair and secret vote. The commission will report the results of the plebiscites to the powers with a recommendation for the boun- dary, and will terminate its work as soon as the boundary has been laid down and the new authorities set up. The principal allied and associated powers will draw up regulations assuring East Prus- sia full and equitable access to and use of the Vistula. A subsequent convention, of which the terms will be fixed by the principal allied and associated powers, will be entered into be- tween Poland, Germany and Danzig, to assure suitable railroad communication across Ger- man territory on the right bank of the Vistula between Poland and Danzig, while Poland shall grant free passage from East Prussia to Germany. The northeastern corner of East Prussia about Memel is to be ceded by Germany to the associated powers, the former agreeing to ac- cept the settlement made, especially as regards the nationality of the inhabitants. Danzig and the district immediately about it is to be constituted into the "free city of Dan- zig" under the guarantee of the League of Na- tions. A high commissioner appointed by the League and President of Danzig shall draw up a constitution in agreement with the duly appointed representatives of the city, and shall deal in the first instance with all differences arising between the city and Poland. The actual boundaries of the city shall be delimited by a commission appointed within six months from the peace and to include three represen- tatives chosen by the allied and associated powers, and one each by Germany and Poland. A convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the principal allied and associated powers, shall be concluded between Poland and Danzig, which shall include Danzig within the Polish customs frontiers, though a free area in the port; insure to Poland the free use of all the city's waterways, docks and other port facili- ties, the control and administration of the Vis- tula and the whole through railway system within the city, and postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and Danzig; provide against discrimination against Poles within the city, and place its foreign re- lations and the diplomatic protection of its citizens abroad in charge of Poland. The frontier between Germany and Den- mark will be fixed by the self-determination of the population. Ten days from the peace German troops and authorities shall evacuate the region north of the line running from the mouth of the Schlei, south of Kappel, Schles- wig, and Friedrichstadt along the Eider to the North Sea south of Tonning; the "Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils shall be dissolved, and the territory administered by an international commission of five, of whom Norway and Swe- den shall be invited to name two. The commission shall insure a free and se- cret vote in three zones. That between the German-Danish frontier and a line running south of the Island of Alsen, north of Flens- burg, and south of Tondern to the North Sea north of the Island of Sylt, will vote as a unit * within three weeks after the evacuation. With- in five weeks after this vote the second zone, whose southern boundary runs, from the North Sea south of the Island of Fehr to the Baltic south of Sygum, will vote by communes. Two weeks after that vote the third zone running to the limit of evacuation will also vote by communes. The international commission will then draw a new frontier on the basis of these plebiscites and with due regard for geographi- cal and economic conditions. Germany will re- nounce all sovereignty over territories north of this line in favor of the Associated Gov- ernments, who will hand them over to Den- mark. HELIGOLAND The fortifications, military establishments, and harbors of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune are to be destroyed under the supervi- sion of the Allies by German labor and at Germany's expense. They may not be recon- structed, nor any similar fortifications built in the future. Germany agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independency of all territories which were part of the former Russian Em- pire, to accept the abrogation of the Brest- Litovsk and other treaties entered into with the Maximalist Government of Russia, to rec- ognize the full force of all treaties entered THE PEACE CONFERENCE 347 into by the allied and associated powers with States which were a part of the former Rus- sian Empire, and to recognize the frontiers as determined thereon. The allied and associ- ated powers formerly reserve the right of Rus- sia to obtain restitution and reparation on the principles of the present treaty. SECTION V GERMAN RIGHTS OUTSIDE EUROPE Outside Europe, Germany renounces all rights, titles, and privileges as to her own or her allies' territories to all the allied and as- sociated powers, and undertakes to accept whatever measures are taken by the five allied powers in relation thereto. COLONIES AXD OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS Germany renounces in favor of the allied and associated powers her overseas posses- sions with all rights and titles therein. All movable and immovable property belonging to the German Empire, or to any German State, shall pass to the Government exercising au- thority therein. These Governments may make whatever provisions seem suitable for the re- patriation of German nationals and as to the conditions on which German subjects of Euro- pean origin shall reside, hold property, or carry on business. Germany undertakes to pay reparation for damage suffered by French nationals in the Cameroons or its frontier zone through the acts of German civil and military authorities and of individual Germans from the 1st of January, 1900, to the 1st of August, 1914. Germany renounces all rights under the convention of the 4th of November, 1911, and the 29th of September, 1912, and undertakes to pay to France in accordance with an esti- mate presented and approved by the Repatria- tion Commission all deposits, credits, advances, &c, thereby secured. Germany undertakes to accept and observe any provisions by the al- lied and associated powers as to the trade in arms and spirits in Africa as well as to the General Act of Berlin of 1885 and the General Act of Brussels of 1890. Diplomatic protec- tion to inhabitants of former German colonies is to be given by the Governments exercising authority. Germany renounces in favor of China all privileges and indemnities resulting from the Boxer Protocol of 1901, and all buildings, wharves, barracks for munitions of warships, wireless plants, and other public property ex- cept diplomatic or consular establishments in the German concessions of Tientsin and Han- kow and in other Chinese territory except Kiao- Chau and agrees to return to China at her own expense all the astronomical instruments seized in 1900 and 1901. China will, however, take no measures for disposal of German prop- erty in the legation quarter of Peking without the consent of the powers signatory to the Boxer Protocol. Germany accepts the abrogation of the con- cessions at Hankow and Tientsin, China agree- ing to open them to international use. Ger- many renounces all claims against China or any allied and associated Government for the internment or repatriation of her citizens in China and for the seizure or liquidation of German interests there since Aug. 14, 1917. She renounces in favor of Great Britain her State property in the British concession at Canton and of France and China jointly of the property of the German school in the French concession at Shanghai. Germany recognizes that all agreements be- tween herself and Siam, including the right of extra-territoriality, ceased July 22, 1917. All German public property, except consular and diplomatic premises, passes without compensa- tion to Siam, German private property to be dealt with in accordance with the economic clauses. Germany waives all claims against Siam for the seizure and condemnation of her ships, liquidation of her property, or intern- ment of her nationals. Germany renounces all rights under the in- ternational arrangements of 1911 and 1912 re- garding Liberia, more particularly the right to nominate a receiver of the customs, and dis- interests herself in any further negotiations for the rehabilitation of Liberia. She regards as abrogated all commercial treaties and agree- ments between herself and Liberia and rec- ognizes Liberia's right to determine the status and condition of the re-establishment of Ger- mans in Liberia. Germany renounces all her rights, titles, and privileges under the Act of Algeciras and the Franco-German agreements of 1909 and 1911, and under all treaties and arrangements with the Sherifian Empire. She undertakes not to intervene in any negotiations as to Morocco between France and other powers, accepts all the consequences of the French protectorate and renounces the capitulations; the Sherifian Government shall have complete liberty of ac- tion in regard to German nationals, and all German protected persons shall be subject to the common law. All movable and immovable German property, including mining rights, may be sold at public auction, the proceeds to 348 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR be paid to the Sherifian Government and de- ducted from the reparation account. Ger- many is also required to relinquish her in- terests in the State Bank of Morocco. All Moroccan goods entering Germany shall have the same privilege as French goods. Germany recognizes the British Protectorate over Egypt declared on Dec. 18, 1914, and re- nounces as from August 4, 1914, the capitu- lation and all the treaties, agreements, etc., concluded by her with Egypt. She undertakes not to intervene in any negotiations about Egypt between Great Britain and other pow- ers. There are provisions for jurisdiction over German nationals and property and for Ger- man consent to any changes which may be made in relation to the Commission of Public Debt. Germany consents to the transfer to Great Britain of the powers given to the late Sultan of Turkey for securing the free naviga- tion of the Suez Canal. Arrangements for property belonging to German nationals in Egypt are made similar to those in the case of Morocco and other countries. Anglo-Egyp- tian goods entering Germany shall enjoy the same treatment as British goods. TXJEKEY AND BULGARIA Germany accepts all arrangements which the allied and associated powers make with Tur- key and Bulgaria with reference to any right, privileges or interests claimed in those coun- tries by Germany or her nationals and not dealt with elsewhere. SHANTUNG Germany cedes to Japan all rights, titles, and privileges, notably as to Kiao-Chau, and the railroads, mines, and cables acquired by her treaty with China of March 6, 1897, by and other agreements as to Shantung. All German rights to the railroad from Tsing-tao to Tsi- nan-fu, including all facilities and mining rights and rights of exploitation, pass equally to Japan, and the cables from Tsing-tao to Shanghai and Che-foo, the cables free of all charges. All German State property, movable and immovable, in Kiao-Chau is acquired by Japan free of all charges. SECTION VI Sub-Section IV MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes directly to ob- serve the military, naval, and air clauses which follow. MILITARY FORCES The demobilization of the German Army must take place within two months of the peace. Its strength may not exceed 100,000, including 4,000 officers, with not over seven divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, and to be devoted exclusively to maintenance of in- ternal order and control of frontiers. Divi- sions may not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs. The great German General Staff is abolished. The army administrative service, consisting of civilian personnel not included in the number of effec- tives, is reduced to one-tenth the total in the 1913 budget. Employes of the German States, such as customs officers, first guards, and coast guards, may not exceed the number in 1913. Gendarmes and local police may be increased only in accordance with the growth of popula- tion. None of these may be assembled for military training. ARMAMENTS All establishments for the manufacturing, preparation, storage, or design of arms and munitions of war, except those specifically ex- cepted, must be closed within three months of the peace, and their personnel dismissed. The exact amount of armament and munitions al- lowed Germany is laid down in detail tables, all in excess to be surrendered or rendered use- less. The manufacture or importation of as- phyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids is forbidden as well as the importation of arms, munitions, and war ma- terials. Germany may not manufacture such materials for foreign governments. CONSCRIPTION Conscription is abolished in Germany. The enlisted personnel must be maintained by vol- untary enlistments for terms of twelve consec- utive years, the number of discharges before the expiration of that term not in any year to exceed 5 per cent, of the total effectives. Offi- cers remaining in the service must agree to serve to the age of 45 years, and newly ap- pointed officers must agree to serve actively for twenty-five years. No military schools except those absolutely indispensable for the units allowed shall exist in Germany two months after the peace. No associations such as societies of discharged sol- diers, shooting or touring clubs, educational es- tablishments or universities may occupy them- selves with military matters. All measures of mobilization are forbidden. FORTRESSES All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in German territory within a THE PEACE CONFERENCE 349 zone of fifty kilometers east of the Rhine will be dismantled within three months. The con- struction of any new fortifications there is for- bidden. The fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers, however, may remain. Interallied commissions of control will see to the execution of the provisions for which a time limit is set, the maximum named being three months. They may establish headquar- ters at the German seat of Government and go to any part of Germany desired. Germany must give them complete facilities, pay their expenses, and also the expenses of execution of the treaty, including the labor and material necessary in demolition, destruction or surren- der of war equipment. The German navy must be demobilized with- in a period of two months after the peace. She will be allowed 6 small battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, and no submarines, either military or commercial, with a personnel of 15,000 men, including offi- cers, and no reserve force of any character. Conscription is abolished, only voluntary serv- ice being permitted, with a minimum period of 25 years service for officers and 12 for men. No member of the German mercantile marine will be permitted any naval training. All German vessels of war in foreign ports and the German high sea fleet interned at Scapa Flow will be surrendered, the final dis- position of these ships to be decided upon by the allied and associated powers. Germany must surrender 42 modern destroyers, 50 mod- ern torpedo boats, and all submarines, with their salvage vessels. All war vessels under construction, including submarines, must be broken up. War vessels not otherwise provid- ed for are to be placed in reserve, or used for commercial purposes. Replacement of ships except those lost can take place only at the end of 20 years for battleships and 15 years for destroyers. The largest armored ship Ger- many will be permitted will be 10,000 tons. Germany is required to sweep up the mines in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, as decid- ed upon by the Allies. All German fortifica- tions in the Baltic, defending the passages through the belts, must be demolished. Other coast defenses are permitted, but the number and calibre of the guns must not be increased. During a period of three months after the peace German high power wireless stations at Nauen, Hanover, and Berlin will not be per- mitted to send any messages except for com- mercial purposes, and under supervision of the allied and associated Governments, nor may any more be constructed. Germany renounces all title to specified cables, the value of such as were privately owned being credited to her against reparation in- debtedness. Germany will be allowed to repair German submarine cables which have been cut but are not being utilized by the allied powers, and also portions of cables which, after having been cut, have been removed, or are at any rate not being utilized by any one of the allied and associated powers. In such cases the ca- bles, or portions of cables, removed or utilized remain the property of the allied and associat- ed powers, and accordingly fourteen cables or parts of cables are specified which will not be restored to Germany. The armed forces of Germany must not in- clude any military or naval air forces except for not over 100 unarmed seaplanes to be re- tained till Oct. 1 to search for submarine mines. No dirigible shall be kept. The entire air per- sonnel is to be demobilized within two months, except for 1,000 officers and men retained till October. No aviation grounds or dirigible sheds are to be allowed within 150 kilometers of the Rhine, or the eastern or southern frontiers, ex- isting installations within these limits to be de- stroyed. The manufacture of aircraft and parts of aircraft is forbidden for six months. All military and naval aeronautical material under a most exhaustive definition must be sur- rendered within three months, except for the 100 seaplanes already specified. SUB-SECTION VI PRISONERS OF WAR The repatriation of German prisoners and in- terned civilians is to be carried out without de- lay and at Germany's expense by a commission composed of representatives of the Allies and Germany. Those under sentence for offenses against discipline are to be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentences. Until Germany has surrendered persons guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war, the Allies have the right to retain selected German officers. The Allies may deal at their own discretion with German nationals who do not desire to be repatriated, all repatriation be- ing conditional on the immediate release of any allied subjects still in Germany. Germany is to accord facilities to commissions of inquiry in collecting information in regard to missing prisoners of war and of imposing penalties on German officials who have concealed allied na- 350 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR tionals. Germany is to restore all property be- longing to allied prisoners. There is to be a reciprocal exchange of information as to dead prisoners and their graves. Both parties will respect and maintain the graves of soldiers and sailors buried on their territories, agree to recognize and assist any commission charged by any allied or associate Government with identifying, registering, main- taining or erecting suitable monuments over the graves, and to afford to each other all fa- cilities for the repatriation of the remains of their soldiers. SUB-SECTION VII RESPONSIBILITIES "The allied and associated powers publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, not for an offense against criminal law, but for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of trea- ties." The ex-Emperor's surrender is to be re- quested of Holland and a special tribunal set up, composed of one judge from each of the five great powers, with full guarantees of the right of defense. It is to be guided "by the highest motives of international policy with a view of vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality," and will fix the pun- ishment it feels should be imposed. Persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war are to be tried and punished by military tribunals un- der military law. If the charges affect nation- als of only one State, they will be tried before a tribunal of that State; if they affect nation- als of several States, they will be tried before joint tribunals of the States concerned. Ger- many shall hand over to the associated Gov- ernments, either jointly or severally, all per- sons so accused and all documents and infor- mation necessary to insure full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of the offenders, and the just appreciation of the re- sponsibility. SECTION VII REPARATION AND RESTITUTION "The allied and associated Governments af- firm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to which the allied and associated Governments and their nationals have been sub- jected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." The total obligation of Germany to pay, as denned in the category of damages, is to be determined and notified to her after a fair hearing and not later than May 1, 1921, by an inter-allied Reparation Commission. At the same time a schedule of payments to discharge the obligation within thirty years shall be pre- sented. These payments are subject to post- ponement in certain contingencies. Germany irrevocably recognizes the full authority of this commission, agrees to supply it with all the necessary information and to pass legislation to effectuate its findings. She further agrees to restore to the Allies cash and certain articles which can be identified. As an immediate step towards restoration, Germany shall pay within two years 20,000,- 000,000 marks in either gold, goods, ships, or other specific forms of payment, with the un- derstanding that certain expenses, such as those of the armies of occupation and payments for food and raw materials, may be deducted, at the discretion of the Allies. Germany further binds herself to repay all sums borrowed by Belgium from her allies as a result of Germany's violation of the treaty of 1839 up to Nov. 11, 1918, and for this purpose will issue at once and hand over to the Repa- ration Commission 5 per cent, gold bonds fall- ing due in 1926. While the allied and associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account perma- nent diminution of such resources which will result from other treaty claims, to make com- plete reparation for all such loss and damage, they require her to make compensation for all damages caused to civilians under seven main categories : a. Damages by personal injury to civilians caused by acts of war, directly or indirectly, in- cluding bombardments from the air. b. Damages caused to civilians, including ex- posure at sea, resulting from acts of cruelty ordered by the enemy, and to civilians in the occupied territories. c. Damages caused by maltreatment of pris- oners. d. Damages to the Allied peoples represented by pensions and separation allowances, capital- ized at the signature of this treaty. e. Damages to property other than naval or military materials. f. Damages to civilians by being forced to labor. g. Damages in the form of levies or fines im- posed by the enemy. "In periodically estimating Germany's capac- ity to pay, the Reparation Commission shall examine the German system of taxation, first to the end that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to that for THE PEACE CONFERENCE 351 the service or discharge of any domestic loan; and secondly, so as to satisfy itself that in general the German scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the powers represented on the commission." "The measures which the allied and asso- ciated powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial pro- hibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circum- stances." The commission shall consist of one repre- sentative each of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, and in certain cases of Japan and Serbia, with all other allied powers entitled, when their claims are under consideration, to the right of pre- sentation without voting power. It shall per- mit Germany to give evidence regarding her capacity to pay, and shall assure her a just opportunity to be heard. It shall make its headquarters at Paris, establish its own proce- dure and personnel; have general control of the whole reparation problem; and become the exclusive agency of the Allies for receiving, holding, selling and distributing reparation pay- ments. Majority vote shall prevail, except that unanimity is required on questions involving the sovereignty of any of the Allies, the can- cellation of all or part of Germany's obliga- tions, the time and manner of selling, distribu- ting, and negotiating bonds issued by Germany, and postponement between 1921 and 1926 of annual payments beyond 1930 and any post- ponement after 1926 for a period of more than three years, the application of a different meth- od of measuring damage than in a similar for- mer case, and the interpretation of provisions. Withdrawal from representation is permitted on twelve months' notice. The Commission may require Germany to give from time to time, by way of guaranty, issues of bonds or other obligations to cover such claims as are not otherwise satisfied. In this connection and on account of the total amount of claims, bond issues are presently to be required of Germany in acknowledgment of its debt as follows: 20,000,000,000 marks gold, payable not later than May 1, 1921, without in- terest; 40,000,000,000 marks gold bearing 2y 2 per cent, interest between 1921 and 1926, and thereafter 5 per cent., with a 1 per cent, sink- ing fund payment beginning 1926; and an un- dertaking to deliver 40,000,000,000 marks gold bonds bearing interest at 5 per cent., under terms to be fixed by the Commission. Interest on Germany's debt will be 5 per cent, unless otherwise determined by the Commis- sion in the future, and payments that are not made in gold may "be accepted by the Commis- sion in the form of properties, commodities, businesses, rights, concessions, &c." Certificates of beneficial interest, representing either bonds or goods delivered by Germany, may be issued by the Commission to the interest power, no power being entitled, however, to have its cer- tificates divided into more than five pieces. As bonds are distributed and pass from the con- trol of the Commission, an amount of Ger- many's debt equivalent to their par value is to be considered as liquidated. The German Government recognizes the right of the Allies to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war, and agrees to cede to the Allies all German merchant ships of 1,600 tons gross and upward; one-half of her ships between 1,600 and 1,000 tons gross, and one-quarter of her steam trawl- ers and other fishing boats. These ships are to be delivered within two months to the Repa- ration Committee, together with documents of title evidencing the transfer of the ships free from encumbrance. "As an additional part of reparation," the German Government further agrees to build merchant ships for the account of the Allies to the amount of not exceeding 200,000 tons gross annually during the next five years. All ships used for inland navigation taken by Germanj- from the Allies are to be restored within two months, the amount of loss not cov- ered by such restitution to be made up by the cession of the German river fleet up to 20 per cent, thereof. DYESTUFFS AND CHEMICAL DRUGS In order to effect payment by deliveries in kind, Germany is required, for a limited num- ber of years, varying in the case of each, to deliver coal, coal-tar products, dyestuffs and chemical drugs, in specific amounts to the Rep- arations Commission. The Commission may so modify the conditions of delivery as not to interfere unduly with Germany's industrial re- quirements. The deliveries of coal are based largely upon the principle of making good diminutions in the production of the allied countries resulting from the war. Germany accords option to the commission on dyestuffs and chemical drugs, including qui- nine, up to 50 per cent, of the total stock in Germany at the time the treaty comes into force, and similar option during each six months to the end of 1924 up to 25 per cent, of the previous six months' output. DEVASTATED AREAS Germany undertakes to devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of 352 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the invaded areas. The Reparations Commis- sion is authorized to require Germany to re- place the destroyed articles by the delivery of animals, machinery, &c, existing in Germany, and to manufacture materials required for re- construction purposes; all with due considera- tion for Germany's essential domestic require- ments. Germany is to deliver annually for ten years to France coal equivalent to the difference be- tween the annual pre-war output of Nord and Pas de Calais mines and the annual production during the above ten-year period. Germany further gives options over ten years for deliv- ery of 7,000,000 tons of coal per year to France in addition to the above of 8,000,000 tons to Bel- gium and of an amount rising from 4,500,000 tons in 1919 to 1920 to 8,500,000 in 1923 to 1924 to Italy at prices to be fixed as prescribed in the treaty. Coke may be taken in place of coal in the ratio of three tons to four. Provi- sion is also made for delivery to France over three years of benzol, coal tar, and of ammonia. The Commission has powers to postpone or an- nul the above deliveries should they interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany. Germany is to restore within six months the Koran of the Caliph Othman, formerly at Me- dina, to the King of the Hedjaz, and the skull of the Sultan Okwawa, formerly in German East Africa, to his Britannic Majesty's Gov- ernment. The German Government is also to restore to the French Government certain papers taken by the German authorities in 1870, belonging then to M. Reuher, and to restore the French flags taken during the war of 1870 and 1871. As reparation for the destruction of the Li- brary of Louvain Germany is to hand over manuscripts, early printed books, prints, &c, to the equivalent of those destroyed. In addition to the above Germany is to hand over to Belgium wings, now in Berlin, belong- ing to the altar piece of "The Adoration of the Lamb," by Hubert and Jan van Eyck, the centre of which is now in the Church of St. Bavon at Ghent, and the wings, now in Berlin and Munich, of the altar-piece of "The Last Supper," by Dirk Bouts, the centre of which belongs to the Church of St. Peter at Louvain. Powers to which German territory is ceded will assume a certain portion of the German pre-war debt, the amount to be fixed by the Reparations Commission on the basis of the ratio between the revenue and of the ceded territory and Germany's total revenues for the three years preceding the war. In view, how- ever, of the special circumstances under which Alsace-Lorraine was separated from France in 1871, when Germany refused to accept any part of the French public debt, France will not assume any part of Germany's pre-war debt there, nor will Poland share in certain German debts incurred for the oppression of Poland. If the value of the German public property in ceded territory exceeds the amount of debt assumed, the States to which property is ceded will give credit on reparation for the excess, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine. Mandatory powers will not assume any Ger- man debts or give any credit for German Gov- ernment property. Germany renounces all right of representation on, or control of, State banks, commissions, or other similar interna- tional financial and economic organizations. Germany is required to pay the total cost of the armies of occupation from the date of the armistice as long as they are maintained in German territory, this cost to be a first charge on her resources. The cost of reparation is the next charge, after making such provisions for payments for imports as the Allies may deem necessary. Germany is to deliver to the allied and as- sociated powers all sums deposited in Germany by Turkey and Austria-Hungary in connection with the financial support extended by her to them during the war, and to transfer to the Allies all claims against Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey in connection with agree- ments made during the war. Germany confirms the renunciation of the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk. On the request of the Reparations Commis- sion, Germany will expropriate any rights or interests of her nationals in public utilities in ceded territories or those administered by man- datories, and in Turkey, China, Russia, Aus- tria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, and transfer them to the Reparations Commission, which will credit her with their value. Germany guaran- tees to repay to Brazil the fund arising from the sale of Sao Paulo coffee which she refused to allow Brazil to withdraw from Germany. SECTION VIII Ten Economic Clauses customs For a period of six months Germany shall impose no tariff duties higher than the lowest in force in 1914, and for certain agricultural products, wines, vegetable oils, artificial silk, and washed or scoured wool this restriction ob- tains for two and a half years more. For five years, unless further extended by the League of Nations, Germany must give most favored nation treatment to the allied and associated powers. She shall impose no customs tariff for five years on goods originating in Alsace-Lor- raine, and for three years on goods originating in former German territory ceded to Poland THE PEACE CONFERENCE 353 with the right of observation of a similar ex- ception for Luxemburg. Ships of the allied and associated powers shall for five years and thereafter under con- dition of reciprocity, unless the League of Nations otherwise decides, enjoy the same rights in German ports as German vessels, and have most favored nation treatment in fishing, coasting trade, and towage even in territorial waters. Ships of a country having no sea- coast may be registered at some one place within its territory. UNFAIR COMPETITION Germany undertakes to give the trade of the allied and associated powers adequate safe- guards against unfair competition, and in par- ticular to suppress the use of false wrappings and markings, and on condition of reciprocity to respect the laws and judicial decisions of allied and associated States in respect of re- gional appellations of wines and spirits. TREATMENT OF NATIONALS Germany shall impose no exceptional taxes or restriction upon the nationals of allied and associated States for a period of five years and, unless the League of Nations acts, for an additional five years German nationality shall not continue to attach to a person who has become a national of an allied or associated State. MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS Some forty multilateral conventions are re- newed between Germany and the allied and as- sociated powers, but special conditions are at- tached to Germany's readmission to several. As to postal and telegraphic conventions Ger- many must not refuse to make reciprocal agreements with the new States. She must agree as respects the radio-telegraphic con- vention to provisional rules to be communicated to her, and adhere to the new convention when formulated. In the North Sea fisheries and North Sea liquor traffic convention, rights of inspection and police over associated fishing boats shall be exercised for at least five years only by vessels of these powers. As to the international railway union she shall adhere to the new convention when formulated. China, as to the Chinese customs tariff arrangement of 1905 regarding Whangpoo, and the Boxer indemnity of 1901; France, Portugal, and Ru- mania, as to The Hague Convention of 1903, relating to civil procedure, and Great Britain and the United States as to Article III. of the Samoan Treaty of 1899, are relieved of all obligations toward Germany. BILATERAL TREATIES Each allied and associated State may renew any treaty with Germany in so far as consistent with the peace treaty by giving notice within six months. Treaties entered into by Germany since Aug. 1, 1914, with other enemy States, and before or since that date with Rumania, Russia, and governments representing parts of Russia are abrogated, and concessions granted under pressure by Russia to German subjects are annulled. The allied and associated States are to enjoy most favored nation treatment under treaties entered into by Germany and other enemy States before Aug. 1, 1914, and under treaties entered into by Germany and neutral States during the war. PREWAR DEBTS A system of clearing houses is to be created within three months, one in Germany and one in each allied and associated State which adopts the plan for the payment of prewar debts, including those arising from contracts suspended by the war. For the adjustment of the proceeds of the liquidation of enemy prop- erty and the settlement of other obligations each participating State assumes responsibility for the payment of all debts owing by its na- tionals to nationals of the enemy States, except in cases of prewar insolvency of the debtor. The proceeds of the sale of private enemy property in each participating State may be used to pay the debts owed to the nationals of that State, direct payment from debtor to creditor and all communications relating thereto being prohibited. Disputes may be set- tled by arbitration by the courts of the debtor country, or by the mixed arbitral tribunal. Any ally or associated power may, however, decline to participate in this system by giving Germany six months' notice. ENEMY PROPERTY Germany shall restore or pay for all private enemy property seized or damaged by her, the amount of damages to be fixed by the mixed arbitral tribunal. The allied and associated States may liquidate German private property within their territories as compensation for property of their nationals not restored or paid for by Germany. For debts owed to their nationals by German nationals and for other claims against Germany, Germany is to com- pensate its nationals for such losses and to deliver within six months all documents relat- ing to property held by its nationals in allied and associated States. All war legislation as to enemy property rights and interests is con- firmed and all claims by Germany against the allied or associated Governments for acts under exceptional war measures abandoned. Prewar contracts between allied and asso- 354 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR dated nationals excepting the United States, Japan, and Brazil and German nationals are cancelled except for debts for accounts already performed. AGREEMENTS For the transfer of property where the prop- erty had already passed, leases of land and houses, contracts of mortgages, pledge or lien, mining concessions, contracts with governments and insurance contracts, mixed arbitral tribunals shall be established of three mem- bers, one chosen by Germany, one by the asso- ciated States and the third by agreement, or, failing which, by the President of Switzerland. They shall have jurisdiction over all disputes as to contracts concluded before the present peace treaty. Fire insurance contracts are not considered dissolved by the war, even if premiums have not been paid, but lapse at the date of the first annual premium falling due three months after the peace. Life insurance contracts may be restored by payments of accumulated pre- miums with interest, sums falling due on such contracts during the war to be recoverable with interest. Marine insurance contracts are dissolved by the outbreak of war except where the risk insured against had already been in- curred. Where the risk had not attached, pre- miums paid are recoverable, otherwise pre- miums due and sums due on losses are recover- able. Reinsurance treaties are abrogated un- less invasion has made it impossible for the reinsured to find another reinsurer. Any allied or associated power, however, may cancel all the contracts running between its nationals and a German life insurance company, the lat- ter being obligated to hand over the proportion of its assets attributable to such policies. tion into force by enacting within twelve months of the peace the necessary legislation. RELIGIOUS MISSIONS The allied and associated powers agree that the properties of religious missions in terri- tories belonging or ceded to them shall con- tinue in their work under the control of the powers, Germany renouncing all claims in their behalf. SECTION X GERMAN WATERWAYS Belgium is to be permitted to build a deep draft Rhine-Meuse canal if she so desires within twenty-five years, in which case Ger- many must construct the part within her terri- tory on plans drawn by Belgium, similarly the interested allied governments may construct a Rhine-Meuse canal, both, if constructed, to come under the competent international com- mission. Germany may not object if the Cen- tral Rhine Commission desires to extend its jurisdiction over the lower Moselle, the upper Rhine, or lateral canals. Germany must cede to the allied and asso- ciated governments certain tugs, vessels, and facilities for navigation on all these rivers, the specific details to be established by an arbiter named by the United States. Decision will be based on the legitimate needs of the parties concerned and on the shipping traffic during the five years before the war. The value will be included in the regular reparation account. In the case of the Rhine shares in the Ger- man navigation companies and property such as wharves and warehouses held by Germany in Rotterdam at the outbreak of the war must be handed over. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY Rights as to industrial, literary, and artistic property are re-established. The special war measures of the allied and associated powers are ratified and the right reserved to impose conditions on the use of German patents and copyrights when in the public interest. Ex- cept as between the United States and Ger- many, prewar licenses and rights to sue for infringements committed during the war are cancelled. SECTION IX OPIUM The contracting powers agree, whether or not they have signed and ratified the opium conven- tion of Jan. 23, 1912, or signed the special protocol opened at The Hague in accordance with resolutions adopted by the third opium conference in 1914, to bring the said conven- Germany, in addition to most favored na- tion treatment on her railways, agrees to co- operate in the establishment of through ticket services for passengers and baggage; to ensure communication by rail between the allied, as- sociated, and other States; to allow the con- struction or improvement within twenty-five years of such lines as necessary; and to con- form her rolling stock to enable its incorpora- tion in trains of the allied or associated powers. She also agrees to accept the denunciation of the St. Gothard convention if Switzerland and Italy so request, and temporarily to execute instructions as to the transport of troops and supplies and the establishment of postal and telegraphic service, as provided. CZECHOSLOVAKIA To assure Czechoslovakia access to the sea, special rights are given her both north and THE PEACE CONFERENCE 355 south. Toward the Adriatic she is per- mitted to run her own through trains to Fiume and Trieste. To the north, Germany is to lease her for ninety-nine years spaces in Ham- burg and Stettin, the details to be worked out by a commission of three representing Czecho- slovakia, Germany, and Great Britain. THE KIEL CANAL The Kiel Canal is to remain free and open to war and merchant ships of all nations at peace with Germany, subjects, goods and ships of all States are to be treated on terms of absolute equality, and no taxes to be imposed beyond those necessary for upkeep and im- provement for which Germany is to be respon- sible. In case of violation of or disagreement as to those provisions, any State may appeal to the League of Nations, and may demand the appointment of an international commis- sion. For preliminary hearing of complaints Germany shall establish a local authority at Kiel. SECTION XI AERIAL NAVIGATION Aircraft of the allied and associated powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in German territory, equal treatment with German planes as to use of German air- dromes, and with most favored nation planes as to internal commercial traffic in Germany. Germany agrees to accept allied certificates of nationality, airworthiness, or competency or li- censes and to apply the convention relative to aerial navigation concluded between the allied and associated powers to her own air- craft over her own territory. These rules ap- ply until 1923, unless Germany has since been admitted to the League of Nations or to the above convention. SECTION XII FREEDOM OF TRANSIT Germany must grant freedom of transit through her territories by mail or water to persons, goods, ships, carriages, and mails from or to any of the allied or associated powers, without customs or transit duties, undue de- lays, restrictions, or discriminations based on nationality, means of transport, or place of entry or departure. Goods in transit shall be assured all possible speed of journey, espe- cially perishable goods. Germany may not) divert traffic from its normal course in favor of her own transport routes or maintain "control stations" in connection with transmigration traffic. She may not establish any tax discrimi- nation against the ports of allied or associated powers; must grant the latter's seaports all factors and reduced tariffs granted her own or other nationals, and afford the allied and asso- ciated powers equal rights with those of her own nationals in her ports and waterways, save that she is free to open or close her maritime coasting trade. FREE ZONES IN PORTS Free zones existing in German ports on Aug. 1, 1914, must be maintained with due facilities as to warehouses, and packing, without discrimination, and without charges except for expenses of administration and use. Goods leaving the free zones for consumption in Germany and goods brought into the free zones from Germany shall be subject to the ordinary import and export taxes. The Elbe from the junction of the Ultava, the Ultava from Prague, the Oder from Oppa, the Niemen from Grodno, and the Danube from Ulm are declared international, together with their connections. The riparian states must ensure good conditions of navigation within their territories unless a special organization exists therefor. Otherwise appeal may be had to a special tribunal of the League of Nations, which also may arrange for a general inter- national waterways convention. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS The Elbe and the Oder are to be placed under international commissions to meet within three months, that for the Elbe composed of four representatives of Germany, two from Czechoslovakia, and one each from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium; and that for the Oder composed of one each from Poland, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, Denmark, and Sweden. If any ri- parian state on the Niemen should so request of the League of Nations, a similar commis- sion shall be established there. These commis- sions shall upon request of any riparian state meet wilhin three months to revise existing international agreement. THE DANUBE The European Danube Commission reassumes its pre-war powers, but for the time being with representatives of only Great Britain, France, Italy, and Rumania. The upper Danube is to be administered by a new international com- mission until a definitive statute be drawn up at a conference of the powers nominated by the allied and associated governments within one year after the peace. The enemy governments shall make full reparations for all war dam- ages caused to the European Commission; shall cede their river facilities in surrendered terri- tory, and give Czechoslovakia, Serbia, and Rumania any rights necessary on the shores for carrying on improvements in navigation. 356 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR THE RHINE AND THE MOSELLE The Rhine is placed under the Central Com- mission to meet at Strasbourg within six months after the peace, and to be composed of four representatives of France, which shall in addition select the President, four of Germany, and two each of Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Germany must give France on the course of the Rhine included between the two extreme points of her frontiers all rights to take water to feed canals, while herself agreeing not to make canals on the right bank opposite France. She must also hand over to France all her drafts and designs for this part of the river. SECTION XIII INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION Members of the League of Nations agree to establish a permanent organization to promote international adjustment of labor conditions, to consist of an annual international labor con- ference and an international labor office. The former is composed of four represen- tatives of each State, two from the Govern- ment, and one each from the employers and the employed, each of them may vote individ- ually. It will be a deliberative legislative body, its measures taking the form of draft conven- tions or recommendations for legislation, which, if passed by two-thirds vote, must be sub- mitted to the lawmaking authority in every State participating. Each Government may either enact the terms into law; approve the principle, but modify them to local needs; leave the actual legislation in case of a Fed- eral State to local legislatures; or reject the convention altogether without further obliga- tion. The international labor office is established at the seat of the League of Nations as part of its organization. It is to collect and dis- tribute information on labor throughout the world and prepare agenda for the conference. It will publish a periodical in French and English, and possibly other languages. Each State agrees to make to it for presentation to the conference an annual report of measures taken to execute accepted conventions. The governing body, in its Executive, consists of twenty-four members, twelve representing the Governments, six the employers, and six the employes, to serve for three years. On complaint that any Government has failed to carry out a convention to which it is a party, the governing body may make in- quiries directly to that Government, and in case the reply is unsatisfactory, may publish the complaint with comment. A complaint by one Government against another may be re- ferred by the governing body to a commission of inquiry nominated by the Secretary General of the League. If the commission report fails to bring satisfactory action the matter may be taken to a permanent court of international justice for final decision. The chief reliance for securing enforcement of the law will be publicity with a possibility of economic action in the background. The first meeting of the conference will take place in October, 1919, at Washington, to dis- cuss the eight-hour day or forty-eight-hour week; prevention of unemployment; extension and application of the international conven- tions adopted at Berne in 1906, prohibiting night work for women, and the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches; and employment of women and children at night or in unhealthy work, of women before and after childbirth, including maternity bene- fit, and of children as regards minimum age. LABOR CLAUSES Nine principles of labor conditions were rec- ognized on the ground that "the well-being, physical and moral, of the industrial wage earners is of supreme international impor- tance." With exceptions necessitated by dif- ferences of climate, habits and economic de- velopment. They include: the guiding principle that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; the right of association of employers and employes; a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life; the eight-hour day or forty-eight-hour week; a weekly rest of at least twenty- four hours; which should include Sunday wherever practicable; abolition of child labor and as- surance of the continuation of the education and proper physical development of children; equal pay for equal work as between men and women; equitable treatment of all workers law- fully resident therein, including foreigners; and a system of inspection in which women should take part. SECTION XIV Guarantees western europe As a guarantee for the execution of the treaty German territory to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by allied and associated troops for a fifteen years' period. If the conditions are faithfully carried out by Germany, certain dis- tricts, including the bridgehead of Cologne, will be evacuated at the expiration of five years; certain other districts including the bridgehead of Coblenz, and the territories near- est the Belgian frontier will be evacuated after ten years, and the remainder, including the THE PEACE CONFERENCE 357 bridgehead of Mainz, will be evacuated after fifteen years. In case the Interallied Repara- tion Commission finds that Germany has failed to observe the whole or part of her obligations, either during the occupation or after the fifteen years have expired, the whole or part of the areas specified will be reoccupied immediately. If before the expiration of the fifteen years Germany complies with all the treaty undertak- ings, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately. EASTERN EUROPE All German troops at present in territories to the east of the new frontier shall return as soon as the allied and associated governments deem wise. They are to abstain from all requi- sitions and are in no way to interfere with measures for national defense taken by the Government concerned. All questions regarding occupation not pro- vided for by the treaty will be regulated by a subsequent convention or conventions which will have similar force and effect. SECTION XV MISCELLANEOUS Germany agrees to recognize the full validity of the treaties o*f peace and additional con- ventions to be concluded by the allied and as- sociated powers with the powers allied with Germany, to agree to the decisions to be taken as to the territories of Austria-Hungary, Bul- garia, and Turkey, and to recognize the new States in the frontiers to be fixed for them. Germany agrees not to put forward any pecuniary claims against any allied or asso- ciated power signing the present treaty based on events previous to the coming into force of the treaty. Germany accepts all decrees as to German ships and goods made by any allied or asso- ciated prize court. The Allies reserve the right to examine all decisions of German prize courts. The present treaty, of which the French and British texts are both authentic, shall be ratified and the depositions of ratifi- cations made in Paris as soon as possible. The treaty is to become effective in all respects for each power on the date of deposition of its ratification. The German delegates and those of the Entente Allies officially signed the treaty of peace on June 28, 1919. Ratifications of the Treaty of Ver- sailles were exchanged, and peace be- tween Germany, France, Great Brit- ain and the other Allied and associated powers, with the exception of the United States, became effective at 4 :16 p.m. January 10, 1920. The ceremony took place in the Clock Hall at the French Foreign Ministry. Previously Baron Kurt von Lersner, head of the German mission, signed the protocol of November 1, providing for reparation for the sinking of the Ger- man warships at Scapa Flow, and to insure the carrying out of the armi- stice terms. The signing of this docu- ment took place in the office of the Min- ister of Foreign Affairs. Owing to the failure of the United States to ratify the treaty, the American Secretary of State served notice on Germany that the conditions of the armistice still governed the relations between the United States and Germany. The Shantung Dispute. One of the bitterest disputes that arose through- out the entire Peace Conference was the discussion concerning what should be done with Shantung, which was a sphere of influence under the control of Ger- many before the war. Japan insisted that it be turned over to her as com- pensation for what she had done toward winning the war. The chief opponent of this scheme was President Wilson. His argument was that China, who had been a faithful ally to the Entente cause, should not be made to suffer in order to satisfy another ally. Presi- dent Wilson was ultimately forced to concede the rich province to Japan, pre- sumably to get the support of Japan for the League of Nations idea. Japan's chief argument was that she had driven the Germans from this territory by military force and that inasmuch as it was Germany's before she was certainly entitled to it now. President Wilson was unwilling to accede to this point of view and finally accepted what amounted to a gentlemen's agreement, by the 358 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR terms of which Japan promised to re- turn the disputed territory to China upon the fulfillment of certain condi- tions, i. e., sign the treaty immediately, giving Shantung to Japan without for- mal reservation and make an agreement with Japan in regard to the disposition of Shantung. If China agreed to these conditions then Japan would withdraw her troops as soon as practicable and give up Shantung, only insisting upon certain economic advantages. The Fiume Controversy. The Fiume controversy, which was still unsettled as the year 1919 drew to a close, was the bitterest which presented itself at the Peace Conference. The dispute cen- tred around the possession of the port and harbor of Fiume and parts of Dal- matia. The claims of Italy were coun- tered by the claims of Jugoslavia. Italy claimed that inasmuch as the majority of the citizens of Fiume were Italian or of Italian origin, the city naturally be- longed to Italy under the principle of self-determination. President Wilson, who opposed the Italian claims, main- tained that inasmuch as the vast ma- jority of the people outside of the city proper were Jugoslovaks, the city it- self should belong to that newly formed country. Jugoslovakia claimed that her commerce would be ruined before it even gained a foothold if Fiume were given to the Italians, while the Ital- ians said that Fiume was a necessity to her as a protection against the Austrians and the desires of the Jugo- slovaks who had been unfriendly to Italy during the war and after it was over. The Peace Conference worked for weeks to bring about a peaceful settle- ment of the controversy. Great Brit- ain and France, tied up to Italy by the secret treaty of 1915, were in favor of a settlement of the dispute which would be favorable to Italy. President Wilson was adamant and stated on April 23 that he would not yield on the Adriatic question. As a result of this speech, Orlando and the other Italian delegates left the Peace Conference for Rome. They were everywhere received with pa- triotic fervor and their action seemed to receive the unanimous approval of the Italian press and populace. After an address to the Italian Parliament (April 29), Premier Orlando received a vote of confidence from the members. The vote was 382 to 40, only the So- cialists refusing to acquiesce in the Pre- mier's position. The Italian delegation returned to Paris on May 6 on their own initiative. The press stated that they had been invited to return by Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Presi- dent Wilson apparently had no part in the request for their return. The Fiume controversy, still un- settled by the Peace Conference, took another amazing turn during the month of September. Gabriele D'Annunzio, the poet-aviator, with a band of ap- proximately 9,000 followers seized the city and held it in defiance of the Italian government and against the wishes of the Entente Allies. The Italian gov- ernment on several occasions ordered D'Annunzio to return to Rome and sub- mit himself to the authorities there. This he continually refused to do. An economic blockade, declared against him by his own government, proved ineffec- tive because he was apparently able to get all the foodstuffs that he needed. The Italian government seemed exceed- ingly loath to use armed forces against him. He gradually extended his power up and down the Dalmatian coast and as the year 1919 drew to a close war clouds appeared on the horizon of bat- tle scarred Europe. Even as the great world war had its birth in the Balkans, THE PEACE CONFERENCE 359 so did this new threat of another strug- gle. Struggle Over the Ratification of the Treaty of Peace in the Senate of the United States. President Wilson pre- sented the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate of the United States on July 10, 1919. He stated that the treaty was a world settlement and that the United States had entered the war on a differ- ent footing from all European coun- tries. He summed up the glorious deeds of the American army on the battlefield and stated that at the Peace Confer- ence every effort was made to realize the hopes of freedom of the nations which had been succored by our army. The problem of the Peace Conference was not that of empires, they were all bankrupt, but of the smaller nations. From this theme he developed the idea of a League of Nations and the neces- sity for such an instrument in order to guarantee to these smaller nations a full measure of political and eco- nomic liberty. He closed his appeal for ratification by stating that the United States had now reached her majority as a world power and that she must "show the way." The treaty debate began on July 14 and continued until December, when Congress adjourned without ratifying it. The keynote speech of the admin- istration was delivered by Senator Swanson of Virginia. In a lengthy speech he asked the Senate to ratify the treaty as it stood. Three resolu- tions were reported on the same day, which opened the bitterest fight the Sen- ate has probably seen. Senator Lodge called upon the State Department for a copy of the alleged secret treaty be- tween Germany and Japan. Senator Borah asked for the report of some of the American Peace Commissioners op- posing the Shantung agreement. Sen- ator Johnson asked that a stenographic report of the Peace Conference be given to the Senate. This caused a wild out- burst from administration followers. On July 17, President Wilson began a series of conferences with Republi- can Senators with a view of changing their mind toward the League of Na- tions. Apparently the President was unable to change the point of view of any of the men he interviewed. After these meetings the Republicans threat- ened to hold up the ratification of the entire treaty if President Wilson did not accept certain amendments or at least reservations. Impetus was given to the reservation idea when prominent Republican leaders like Messrs. Taft, Hughes, Root, and Lodge proposed reservations to the League of Nations that they believed would be acceptable to most Repub- licans who favored a League of Na- tions. Mr. Hughes's reservations, which seemed to fit in with those of Senator Lodge, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, may be summa- rized as follows : 1. That on giving notice of its in- tention to withdraw from the League, a power shall cease to be a member or subject to obligations of the covenant at the time specified in the notice, but that such withdrawal shall not release that power from debt or liability there- tofore incurred. 2. That questions such as immigra- tion or import duties, which are solely within domestic jurisdiction, shall not be submitted for consideration or ac- tion by the League. 3. That the United States shall not relinquish its traditional attitude toward purely American questions, which shall not be subject to jurisdic- tion of the League, leaving this country free to oppose acquisition by any non- 360 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR American country of territory in the Western Hemisphere. 4. That under Article X. the United States shall assume no obligation to undertake any military expedition or employ its armed forces on land or sea unless such action is authorized by Congress. An important conference was held be- tween President Wilson and the Foreign Relations Committee on August 19, when practically all the important points of the League and the peace treaty came up for discussion. Presi- dent Wilson said that the article which was causing the most serious objection (X.) was drawn by himself and that American forces could never be sent abroad without the consent of Con- gress. He said that he would have pre- ferred another solution of the Shantung controversy, but that he was handi- capped by the secret treaties between Great Britain, France and Japan, the existence of which he was ignorant. After more than three hours of ques- tioning, the Republican members were still opposed to ratification without amendments or reservations. The Pres- ident suggested the use of "interpretive reservations" which would not be a spe- cific part of the peace treaty, but which would bind the United States to a def- inite action. He desired in this way to make no changes in the treaty as it then stood. This solution was entire- ly unsatisfactory to the opponents of the League. On September 10, the Senate Com- mittee reported the Peace Treaty to the Senate. The majority report pre- sented it with thirty-eight amendments and four reservations. On the follow- ing day the minority members pre- sented their report, which was opposed to reservations and amendments. The bitter attack made on the treaty in the Senate determined President Wilson to take the issue directly to the people. Consequently he started on a tour on September 3, 1919, in which he vigor- ously upheld the League of Nations Covenant and other provisions for the Peace Treaty. His itinerary was ab- ruptly halted at Wichita, Kansas, on September 26, when he was taken seri- ously ill. He immediately had to give up all public duties and was constantly attended by specialists. The first test between the opposing forces came on October 2, when the Sen- ate defeated the 35 amendments pro- posed by Senator Fall of New Mexico. The purpose of these amendments was to prevent the participation by the United States representatives on vari- ous commissions created by the Peace Conference. The average vote (when a vote was taken) was about 2 to 1. The vote showed fairly plainly that the chances of securing amendments were very slight but that the treaty could not be ratified without reservations. On October 16, the six Lodge amendments, giving to China instead of to Japan the economic privileges taken from Ger- many, were defeated as a unit by the vote of 55 to 35. On October 22, 23, and 24, the Sen- ate Foreign Relations Committee adopt- ed fourteen revised amendments. These were designed to take the place of those adopted on September 10. A preamble was also adopted by the com- mittee. The text of the preamble and the reservations follows. TEXT OF RESERVATIONS PREAMBLE.— The committee also reports the following reservations and understandings to be made a part and a condition of the reso- lution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said following reservations and understand- ings have been accepted as a part and a condi- tion of said instrument of ratification by at THE PEACE CONFERENCE 361 least three of the four principal allied and as- sociated powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan: Reservation No. 1. — The United States un- derstands and construes Article I. that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obliga- tions under the said covenant have been ful- filled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolu- tion of the Congress of the United States. Reservation No. 2. — The United States as- sumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations — whether members of the League or not — under the provisions of Article X., or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or to authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide. Reservation No. 3. — No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article XXII., Part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States. Reservation No. j. — The United States re- serves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic juris- diction, and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, and the suppression of the traffic in women and children, and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be sub- mitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations or any agency there- of, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power. Reservation No. 5. — The United States will not submit to arbitration by the assembly or the council of the League of Nations (pro- vided for in said treaty of peace) any ques- tions which in the judgment of the United States depend on or relate to its long-estab- lished policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany. Reservation No. 6. — The United States with- holds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan. Reservation No. 7. — The Congress of the United States by law will provide for the ap- pointment of the representatives of the United States in the assembly and the council of the League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council, of conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appoint- ment of members of said commission, com- mittee, court, council, or conference, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for, and the powers and duties of such representative so defined, no person shall represent the United States under either such said League of Nations or the treaty, or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citi- zen of the United States shall be elected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, courts, councils, or conferences ex- cept with the approval of the Senate of the United States. Reservation No. 8. — The United States un- derstands that the Reparations Commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by its Congress approves such regulation or interference. Reservation No. 9. — The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations or secretariat or any commission, committee, or conference or other agency, organized under the League of Nations, or under the treaty, or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States. Reservation No. 10. — If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limi- tation of armaments proposed by the council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article VIII., it reserves the right to increase such armament without the consent of the council whenever the United States is threat- ened with invasion or engaged in war. Reservation No. 11. — The United States con- strues subdivision "C" of Article XXIII. to mean that the League shall refuse to recognize agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children and that the League shall use every means possible to abolish and do away with such practice. Reservation No. 12. — The United States re- 362 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR serves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as denned in Article XVI. of the covenant of the League of Nations, to continue their commer- cial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States. Reservation No. 13. — The United States de- clines to accept any interest as trustee, or in her own right, or to accept any responsibility, for the government or disposition of the over- seas possessions of Germany to which Germany renounces her right and titles to the principal allied and associated powers under Articles 119 to 127, inclusive. Reservation No. l/ h — The United States re- serves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions affect its honor or its vital interests and declares that such questions are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the considera- tion of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power. Despite the efforts made by the Re- publicans and the Democrats to settle the question of the League of Nations and the entire treaty one way or the other, the year closed without ratifica- tion in any form. When the long ses- sion of the 66th Congress came to a close the matter remained deadlocked. Alliance Between France and Great Britain and the United States. On the same day that the Germans concluded their treaty of peace with the Allies, France concluded treaties with the United States and Great Britain which guaranteed to France the aid of both of these nations if there was any ag- gressive act on the part of Germany toward that republic. A provision was contained to the effect that the treaties would be submitted to the League of Nations and the Senate of the United States and the Parliaments of Great Britain and France for ratification. The text of the French-American treaty is as follows : Considering that the United States of Amer- ica and the Government of the French Repub- lic are equally animated by a desire to main- tain the peace of the world, so happily restored by the treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, which put an end to the war begun by the ag- gression of the German Empire and terminated by the defeat of that power, and Considering that the United States of Amer- ica and the Government of the French Repub- lic, fully convinced that an unprovoked aggres- sion directed by Germany against France would not only violate at the same time the letter and spirit of the Versailles Treaty, to which the United States and France are par- ties, thus exposing France anew to the intol- erable burden of unprovoked war, but that such aggression on the act reputed by the Treaty of Versailles as being against all the powers signatory to the treaty and calculated to trouble the peace of the world, involving inevitably and directly the States of Europe and indirectly the entire world, as experience has amply and unhappily demonstrated, and Considering that the United States of Amer- ica and the Government of the French Repub- lic apprehend that the stipulations concerning the left bank of the Rhine cannot assure im- mediately to France, on the one hand, and to the United States, on the other, as signatory powers to the Treaty of Versailles, appropriate security and protection; Consequently, the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic, having decided to conclude a treaty to realize these necessary ends, Woodrow Wilson, Presi- dent of the United States of America, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, specially authorized to that end by the President of the United States of America, and Georges Clem- enceau, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War, and Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, specially author- ized to that end by Raymond Poincare, Presi- dent of the French Republic, have agreed upon the following: ARTICLE I. — The following stipulations concerning the left bank of the Rhine are con- tained in the Peace Treaty signed with Ger- many at Versailles, June 28, 1919, by the United States of America, by the Government of the French Republic, and by the British Empire, among other pouiers: Article 42. — Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Article 43. — In the area denned above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or tem- porarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all perma- nent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. Article 44. — In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of THE PEACE CONFERENCE 363 Articles 42 and 43 she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world. In case these stipulations should not assure immediately to France appropriate security and protection, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her aid in case of any unprovoked act of aggression directed against her by Germany. ARTICLE 2.— The present treaty, couched in terms analogous to those of a treaty con- cluded on the same date and to the same end between Great Britain and the French Repub- lic, a copy of which is hereto annexed, will not enter into force until the moment when the latter is ratified. ARTICLE 3. — The present treaty must be submitted to the Council of the Society of Nations and must be recognized by the council, deciding if occasion arise by majority, as an engagement in conformity with the covenant of the society. It will remain in force until, upon demand of one of the parties to the treaty, the council deciding if occasion arise by a majority, finds that the society itself as- sures sufficient protection. ARTICLE 4.— The present treaty shall be- fore ratification be submitted to the Chambers of the French Parliament for approval and it shall be stibmitted to the Senate of the United States of America at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles shall be submitted for as- sent to ratification. Ratifications shall be ex- changed at the time of deposit in Paris of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles, or as soon afterward as possible. The agreement between England and France, the text of which was also given out, corresponds with that between the United States and France, with an ad- ditional provision that the treaty im- poses no obligation upon any of the dominions of the British Empire unless and until it be approved by the Parlia- ment of each dominion interested. The Polish Treaty. Another impor- tant treaty was signed on the same day that the German delegates signed the treaty ending the great world war. This was the treaty with Poland, the terms of which follow. The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, the prin- cipal allied and associated powers, on the one hand; and Poland, on the other hand: Whereas, The allied and associated powers have, by the success of their arms, restored to the Polish Nation the independence of which it had been unjustly deprived; and Whereas, By the proclamation of March 30, 1917, the Government of Russia assented to the re-establishment of an independent Polish State; and Whereas, The Polish State, which now, in fact, exercises sovereignty over those portions of the former Russian Empire which are in- habited by a majority of Poles, has already been recognized as a sovereign and important State by the principal allied and associated powers; and Whereas, Under the treaty of peace con- cluded with Germany by the allied and asso- ciated powers, a treaty of which Poland is a signatory, certain portions of the former Ger- man Empire will be incorporated in the terri- tory of Poland; and Whereas, Under the terms of the said treaty of peace, the boundaries of Poland not already laid down are to be subsequently determined by the principal allied and associated powers; The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, on the one hand, confirming their recognition of the Polish State, constituted within the said limits as a sovereign and independent member of the fam- ily of nations and being anxious to insure the execution of the provisions of Article 93 of the said treaty of peace with Germany; Poland, on the other hand, desiring to con- form her institutions to the principles of lib- erty and justice, and to give a sure guarantee to the inhabitants of the territory over which she assumed sovereignty; for this purpose the following representatives of the high contract- ing parties: The President of the United States of America; his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British dominions beyond the seas, Em- peror of India; the President of the French Republic; his Majesty the King of Italy; his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the Presi- dent of the Polish Republic, after having ex- changed their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows: CHAPTER I ARTICLE 1.— Poland undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 and 8 of this chapter shall be recognized as fundamental law, and that no law, regulation, or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. ARTICLE 2.— Poland undertakes to assure 364 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR full and complete protection to life and lib- erty to all inhabitants of Poland, without dis- tinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion. All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief whose prac- tices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals. ARTICLE 3. — Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals ipso facto Hungarian or Russian nationals habitually resident, at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, in territory which is or may be recog- nized as forming part of Poland under the treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Russia, respectively, but subject to any provi- sions in the said treaties relating to persons who became resident in such territory after a speci- fied date. Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over 12 years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age. Persons who have exercised the above right to option must, except where it is otherwise provided in the treaty of peace with Germany, transfer within the succeeding twelve months their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to re- tain their immovable property in Polish terri- tory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property. ARTICLE 4.— Poland admits and declares to be polish nationals, ipso facto and without the requirement of any formality, persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian, or Russian na- tionality who were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty they are not themselves habit- ually resident there. Nevertheless, within two years after the com- ing into force of the present treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Polish authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they aban- don Polish nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Polish nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age. ARTICLE 5. — Poland undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the treaties concluded or to be concluded by the allied and associated powers with Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Russia, to choose whether or not they will acquire Polish nationality. ARTICLE 6.— All persons born in Polish territory who are not born nationals of an- other State shall ipso facto become Polish nationals. ARTICLE 7.— All polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language, or religion. Differences of religion, creed, or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for admission to public em- ployments, functions, and honors, or the exer- cise of professions and industries. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of an official language, ade- quate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, be- fore the courts. ARTICLE 8.— Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the Polish nationals. In par- ticular they shall have an equal right to estab- lish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social 'institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein. ARTICLE 9.— Poland will provide, in the public educational system in towns and dis- tricts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents, adequate facilities for insuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their own language. This pro- vision shall not prevent the Polish Government from making the teaching of the Polish lan- guage obligatory in the said schools. In towns and districts where there is a con- siderable proportion of Polish nationals be- longing to racial, religious, or linguistic minor- ities, these minorities shall be assured an equi- table share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal, or other budgets, for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. The provisions of this article shall apply to Polish citizens of German speech only in that part of Poland which was German territory on Aug. 1, 1914. ARTICLE 10. — Educational committees ap- pointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland will, subject to the general control of THE PEACE CONFERENCE 365 the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and for the organization and management of these schools. The provision of Article 9 concerning the use of language in schools shall apply to these schools. ARTICLE 11.— Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a viola- tion of their Sabbath, nor shall be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provi- sion, however, shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Polish citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defense, or the preservation of public order. Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other pur- poses be compelled to be performed on a Sat- urday. ARTICLE 12.— Poland agrees that the stip- ulations in the foregoing articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Em- pire, France, Italy, and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. Poland agrees that any member of the Coun- cil of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to question of law or fact arising out of these articles, between the Polish Gov- ernment and any of the principal allied and associated powers, or any other power a mem- ber of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Govern- ment hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereof demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of Interna- tional Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the covenant. CHAPTER II ARTICLE 13.— Each of the principal allied and associated powers, on the one part, and Poland on the other shall be at liberty to appoint diplomatic representatives to reside in their respective capitals, as well as Consul Generals, Consuls, Vice Consuls, and Consular Agents, to reside in the towns and ports of their respective territories. Consul Generals, Consuls, Vice Consuls, and Consular Agents, however, shall not enter upon their duties until they have been admitted in the usual manner by the Government in the territory of which they are stationed. Consul Generals, Consuls, Vice Consuls, and Consular Agents shall enjoy all the facilities, privileges, exemptions, and immunities of every kind which are or shall be granted to Consular officers of the most favored nation. ARTICLE 14.— Pending the establishment of a permanent tariff by the Polish Govern- ment, goods originating in the allied and as- sociated States shall not be subject to any higher duties on importation into Poland than the most favorable rates of duty applicable to goods of the same kind under either the Ger- man, Austro-Hungarian, or Russian customs tariffs on July 1, 1914. ARTICLE 15.— Poland undertakes to make no treaty, convention, or arrangement, and to take no other action, which will prevent her from joining in any general agreement for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present treaty. Poland also undertakes to extend to all the allied and associated States any favors or privi- leges in customs matters which they may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which, since August, 1914, the Allies have been at war, or to any State which may have concluded with Austria special customs arrangements as provided for in the treaty of peace to be concluded with Austria. ARTICLE 16.— Pending the conclusion of the general agreement referred to above, Po- land undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels, or vessels of the most fa- vored nation, the vessels of all the allied and associated States which accord similar treat- ment to Polish vessels. By way of exception from this provision, the right of Poland or any other allied or associ- ated State to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved. ARTICLE 17. — Pending the conclusion, un- der the auspices of the League of Nations, of a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, Poland undertakes to accord freedom of tran- 366 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR sit of persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons, and mails in transit to or from any allied or associated State over Polish territory, includ- ing territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favorably as the persons, goods, vessels, car- riages, wagons, and mails respectively of Polish or of any other more favored nationality, origin, importation, or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters. All charges imposed in Poland on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in tran- sit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties. Tariffs for transit traffic across Poland and tariffs between Poland and any allied or associated power, involving through tickets or waybills, shall be established at the request of that allied or associated power. Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic, and telephonic services. It is agreed that no allied or associated power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded with re- spect to the same subject matter. If within a period of five years from the coming into force of the present treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, Poland shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months' notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate obligations of this article. ARTICLE 18. — Pending the conclusion of a general convention on the international re- gime of waterways, Poland undertakes to apply to the river system of the Vistula (including the Bug and the Narest) the regime applicable to international waterways set out in Articles 332 to 337 of the treaty of peace with Ger- many. ARTICLE 19.— Poland undertakes to ad- here, within twelve months of the coming into force of the present treaty, to the international conventions specified in Annex I. Poland undertakes to adhere to any new con- vention, concluded with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations within five years of the coming into force of the present treaty, to replace any of the international in- struments specified in Annex I. The Polish Government undertakes within twelve months to notify the Secretary Gen- eral of the League of Nations whether or not Poland desires to adhere to either or both of the international conventions specified in Annex II. Until Poland has adhered to the two con- ventions last specified in Annex I. she agrees, on condition of reciprocity, to protect by ef- fective measures the industrial, literary, and artistic property of nationals of the allied and associated States. In the case of any allied or associated State not adhering to the said con- ventions, Poland agrees to continue to afford such effective protection on the same conditions until the conclusion of a special bilateral treaty or agreement for that purpose with such allied or associated State. Pending her adhesion to the other conven- tions specified in Annex I., Poland will secure to the nationals of the allied and associated powers the advantages to which they would be entitled under the said conventions. Poland further agrees, on condition of reci- procity, to recognize and protect all rights in any industrial, literary, or artistic property belonging to the nationals of the allied and associated States now in force or which, but for the war, would have been in force in any part of her territories before their transfer to Poland. For such purposes they will accord the extensions of time agreed to in Articles 307 and 308 of the treaty with Germany. ANNEX I Telegraphic and Radio-Telegraphic Conventions International Telegraphic Convention signed at St. Petersburg July 10-22, 1875. Regulations and tariffs drawn up by the International Telegraph Conference signed at Lisbon June 11, 1908. International Radio-Telegraphic Convention, July 5, 1912. Railway Conventions Conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on Oct. 14, 1890, Sept. 20, 1893, July 16, 1895, and Sept. 19, 1906, and the current sup- plementary provisions made under those con- ventions. Agreement on May 15, 1886, regarding the sealing of railway trucks subject to custom inspections, and protocol of May 18, 1907. Agreement of May 15, 1886, regarding the technical standardization of railways, as modi- fied on May 18, 1907. Sanitary Convention Convention of Dec. 3, 1903. Other Conventions Convention of Sept. 26, 1906, for the sup- pression of night work for women. Convention of Sept. 26, 1906, for the sup- pression of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. Conventions of May 18, 1904, and May 4, 1910, regarding the suppression of the white slave traffic. Convention of May 4, 1910, regarding the suppression of obscene publications. THE PEACE CONFERENCE 367 International conventions of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised at Washington in 1911, for the protection of industrial property. International convention of Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, and com- pleted by the additional protocol signed at Berne on March 20, 1914, for the protection of literary and artistic works. ANNEX II Agreement of Madrid of April 14, 1891, for the prevention of false indications of origin on goods, revised at Washington in 1911, and agreement of Madrid of April 14, 1891, for the international registration of trade marks, revised at Washington in 1911. ARTICLE 20. — All rights and privileges ac- corded by the foregoing articles to the allied and associated States shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Na- tions. The present treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be rati- fied. It shall come into force at the same time as the treaty of peace with Germany. The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris. Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Repub- lic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given. In that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible. A proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifica- tions will be drawn up. The French Government will transmit to all the signatory powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications. ARTICLE 21. — Poland agrees to assume re- sponsibility for such proportion of the Rus- sian public debt and other Russian public lia- bilities of any kind as may be assigned to her under a special convention between the prin- cipal allied and associated powers on the one hand and Poland on the other, to be prepared by a commission appointed by the above States. In the event of the commission not arriving at an agreement, the point at issue shall be referred for immediate arbitration to the League of Nations. In faith whereof the above-named plenipo- tentiaries have signed the present treaty. Done at Versailles, [June 28, 1919,] in a sin- gle copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the signatory powers. Austrian Peace Treaty. The treaty of peace between Austria and the Allied Powers was signed at St. Germain-en- Laye, a suburb of Paris, on September 10, 1919. The chief signatory for Aus- tria was Dr. Karl Renner, the Austrian Chancellor, who had tried every means known to diplomacy to have the terms of the treaty modified. Despite his un- ceasing efforts to bring about funda- mental changes, the treaty practically stood as originally drafted. On Sep- tember 6, the Austrian Assembly by a vote of 97 to 28 decided to accept the terms of the treaty. The following digest of and quotations from the Aus- trian treaty were taken from the Cur- rent History magazine. The treaty consists of 381 articles, making 181 pages in The Congressional Record. In general terms it follows the scheme of the German treaty. Part I., consisting of the first twenty-six arti- cles, is the League of Nations covenant, already published as part of the treaty with Germany, which Austria likewise accepts, though she may not become a member of the League until admitted by vote of the other members. Part II. lays down in detail the new boundaries of Austria. The frontiers with Switzerland and Lichtenstein re- main unchanged. The treaty contains elaborate clauses covering the cession of territory to Italy, Poland, Czecho- slovakia, and Jugoslavia. The frontiers with Italy, the Klagenfurt area, and Hungary have undergone much modifi- cation ; that with Germany remains as before. Boundary commissions are to trace the various new lines, to fix points left undefined by the treaty, and to re- vise portions defined by administrative boundaries. The various States in- volved are pledged to furnish all pos- sible information to these commissions. One of the most vital parts of the treaty is that entitled "Political Clauses for Europe," referring to Austria's rela- 368 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR tions with neighbor nations. Article 88, which forbids annexation of Austria by Germany, save with the consent of the League of Nations Council, has a direct connection with Article 61 of the Ger- man Constitution, which foreshadowed political union between the two nations, and which the Peace Conference com- pelled Germany to modify. Following is the text of "Part III.: Political Clauses for Europe" : SECTION I.— ITALY Article 36. — Austria renounces, so far as she is concerned, in favor of Italy all rights and title over the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy situated beyond the frontier laid down in Article 27 (2) and lying be- tween that frontier, the former Austro- Hungarian frontier, the Adriatic Sea, and the eastern frontier of Italy as subsequently determined. Austria similarly renounces, so far as she is concerned, in favor of Italy all rights and title over other territory of the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy which may be recognized as form- ing part of Italy by any treaties which may be concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement. A commission composed of five mem- bers, one nominated by Italy, three by the other principal allied and associated powers, and one by Austria, shall be constituted within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line between Italy and Austria. The deci- sions of the commission will be taken by a majority and shall be binding on the parties concerned. Article 37. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 269 of Part X., (Economic Clauses,) persons having their usual residence in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy transferred to Italy who, during the war, have been outside the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy or have been imprisoned, in- terned or evacuated, shall enjoy the full benefit of the provisions of Articles 252 and 253 of Part X., (Economic Clauses). Article 38. — A special convention will determine the terms of repayment in Austrian currency of the special war expenditure advanced during the war by territory of the former Austro-Hun- garian monarchy transferred to Italy or by public associations in that terri- tory on account of the Austro-Hun- garian monarchy under its legislation, such as allowances to the families of persons mobilized, requisitions, billeting of troops, and relief to persons who have been evacuated. In fixing the amount of these sums Austria shall be credited with the amount which the territory would have contributed to Austria-Hungary to meet the expenses resulting from these payments, this contribution being cal- culated according to the proportion of the revenues of the former Austro-Hun- garian monarchy derived from the ter- ritory in 1913. Article 39. — The Italian Government will collect for its own account the taxes, dues, and charges of every kind leviable in the territories transferred to Italy and not collected on Nov. 3, 1918. Article 40. — No sum shall be due by Italy on the ground of her entry into possession of the Palazzo Venezia at Rome. Article 41. — Subject to the provi- sions of Article 204 of Part IX., (Fi- nancial Clauses,) relative to the acqui- sition of, and payment for, State prop- erty and possessions, the Italian Gov- ernment is substituted in all the rights which the Austrian State possessed over THE PEACE CONFERENCE 369 all the railways in the territories trans- ferred to Italy which were administered by the Railway Administration of the said State and which are actually work- ing or under construction. The same shall apply to the rights of the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy with regard to railway and tram- way concessions within the above-men- tioned territories. The frontier railway stations shall be determined by a subsequent agreement. Article 42. — Austria shall restore to Italy within a period of three months all the wagons belonging to the Italian railways which before the outbreak of war had passed into Austria and have not returned to Italy. Article 43. — Austria renounces as from Nov. 3, 1918, on behalf of herself and her nationals in regard to terri- tories transferred to Italy all rights to which she may be entitled with regard to the products of the aforesaid terri- tories under any agreements, stipula- tions, or laws establishing trusts, cartels or other similar organizations. Article 44. — For a period of ten years from the coming into force of the present treaty central electric power stations situated in Austrian ter- ritory and formerly furnishing electric power to the territories transferred to Italy or, to any other establishment the exploitation of which passes to Italy shall be required to continue furnishing this supply up to an amount corre- sponding to the undertakings and con- tracts in force on Nov. 3, 1918. Austria further admits the right of Italy to the free use of the waters of Lake Raibl and its derivative water- course and to divert the said waters to the basin of the Korinitza. Article 45. — (1) Judgments ren- dered since Aug. 4, 1914, by the courts in the territory transferred to Italy in civil and commercial cases between the inhabitants of such territory and other nationals of the former Austrian em- pire, or between such inhabitants and the subjects of the allies of the Austro- Hungarian monarchy, shall not be car- ried into effect until after indorsement by the corresponding new court in such territory. (2) All decisions rendered for po- litical crimes or offenses since Aug. 4, 1914, by the judicial authorities of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy against Italian nationals, including persons who obtain Italian nationality under the present treaty, shall be an- nulled. (3) In all matters relating to pro- ceedings initiated before the coming into force of the present treaty before the competent authorities of the terri- tory transferred to Italy, the Italian and Austrian judicial authorities re- spectively shall until the coming into force of a special convention on this subject be authorized to correspond with each other direct. Requests thus presented shall be given effect to so far as the laws of the public character allow in the country to the authorities of which the request is addressed. (4) All appeals to the higher Aus- trian judicial and administrative au- thorities beyond the limits of the ter- ritory transferred to Italy against de- cisions of the administrative or judicial authorities of this territory shall be suspended. The records shall be sub- mitted to the authorities against whose decision the appeal was entered. They must be transmitted to the competent Italian authorities without delay. (5) All other questions as to juris- diction, procedure, or the administra- tion of justice will be determined by a special convention between Italy and Austria. 370 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR SECTION II.— SERB-CROAT-SLO- VENE STATE Article 46. — Austria, in conformity with the action already taken by the al- lied and associated powers, recognizes the complete independence of the Serb- Croat-Slovene State. Article 47. — Austria renounces, so far as she is concerned, in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State all rights and title over the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy situated outside the frontiers of Austria as laid down in Article 27 of Part II., (Fron- tiers of Austria,) and recognized by the present treaty, or by any treaties con- cluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement, as forming part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Article 48. — A commission consisting of seven members, five nominated by the principal allied and associated powers, one by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and one by Austria, shall be constituted within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line described in Article 27 (4) of Part II., (Frontiers of Austria). The decisions of the commission will be taken by a majority and shall be binding on the parties concerned. Article 49. — The inhabitants of the Klagenfurt area will be called upon, to the extent stated below, to indicate by a vote the State to which they wish the territory to belong. [The definition of the Klagenfurt boundaries, and a boundary division of this area into two zones for the taking of the plebiscite, follow here.] Article 50. — The Klagenfurt area will be placed under the control of a commission intrusted with the duty of preparing the plebiscite in that area and assuring the impartial administra- tion thereof. This commission will be composed as follows : Four members nominated respectively by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, one by Austria, one by the Serb- Croat-Slovene State ; the Austrian member only taking part in the delib- erations of the commission in regard to the second zone, and the Serb-Croat- Slovene member only taking part there- in with regard to the first zone. The decisions of the commission will be taken by a majority. The second zone will be occupied by the Austrian troops and administered in accordance with the general regula- tions of the Austrian legislation. The first zone will be occupied by the troops of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and administered in accordance with the general regulations of the legisla- tion of that State. In both zones the troops, whether Austrian or Serb-Croat-Slovene, shall be reduced to the numbers which the commission may consider necessary for the preservation of order, and shall carry out their mission under the con- trol of the commission. These troops shall be replaced as speedily as pos- sible b}^ a police force recruited on the spot. The commission will be charged with the duty of arranging for the vote and of taking such measures as it may deem necessary to insure its freedom, fair- ness, and secrecy. In the first zone the plebiscite will be held within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty, at a date fixed by the commission. If the vote is in favor of the Serb- Croat-Slovene State, a plebiscite will be held in the second zone within three weeks from the proclamation of the result of the plebiscite in the first zone, at a date to be fixed by the commission. THE PEACE CONFERENCE 371 If on the other hand the vote in the first zone is in favor of Austria, no plebiscite will be held in the second zone, and the whole of the area will remain definitely under Austrian sovereignty. The right of voting will be granted to every person without distinction of sex who : (a) Has attained the age of twenty years on or before Jan. 1, 1919; (b) Has on Jan. 1, 1919, his or her habitual residence within the zone sub- jected to the plebiscite; and, (c) Was born within the said zone, or has had his or her habitual residence or rights of citizenship (pertinenza) there from a date previous to Jan. 1, 1912. The result of the vote will be deter- mined by the majority of votes in the whole of each zone. On the conclusion of each vote the result will be communicated by the com- mission to the principal allied and as- sociated powers, with a full report as to the taking of the vote, and will be proclaimed. If the vote is in favor of the incor- poration either of the first zone or of both zones in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Austria hereby renounces, so far as she is concerned and to the extent corresponding to the result of the vote, in favor of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State all rights and title over these ter- ritories. After agreement with the commission the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government may definitively establish its authority over the said territories. If the vote in the first or second zone is in favor of Austria, the Austrian Government, after agreement with the commission, will be entitled definitively to re-establish its authority over the whole of the Klagenfurt area, or in the second zone, as the case may be. When the administration of the coun- try, either by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State or by Austria, as the case may be, has been thus assured, the powers of the commission will terminate. Expenditure by the commission will be borne by Austria and the Serb-Croat- Slovene State in equal moieties. Article 51. — The Serb-Croat-Slovene State accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these pow- ers to protect the interests of inhabi- tants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion. The Serb-Croat-Slovene State fur- ther accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers such provisions as these powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equita- ble treatment of the commerce of other nations. Article 52. — The proportion and na- ture of the financial obligations of the former Austrian Empire which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will have to assume on account of the territory placed under its sovereignty will be de- termined in accordance with Article 203 of Part IX., (Financial Clauses,) of the present treaty. .»*• Subsequent agreements will decide all questions which are not decided by the present treaty and which may arise in consequence of the cession of the said territory. SECTION III.— CZECHOSLOVAK STATE Article 53. — Austria, in conformity with the action already taken by the allied and associated powers, recognizes the complete independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include 372 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR the autonomous territory of the Ru- thenians to the south of the Carpathi- ans. Article B4. — Austria renounces so far as she is concerned in favor of the Czechslovak State all rights and title over the territories of the former Aus- tro-Hungarian Monarchy situated out- side the frontiers of Austria as laid down in Article 27 of Part II., (Fron- tiers of Austria,) and recognized in accordance with the present treaty as forming part of the Czechoslovak State. Article 55. — A commission composed of seven members, five nominated by the principal allied and associated powers, one by the Czechoslovak State, and one by Austria, will be appointed fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line laid down in Article 27, (6,) of Part II., (Frontiers of Aus- tria,) of the present treaty. The decisions of this commission will be taken by a majority and shall be binding on the parties concerned. Article 56. — The Czechoslovak State undertakes not to erect any military works in that portion of its territory which lies on the right bank of the Danube to the south of Bratislava, (Pressburg. ) Article 57. — The Czechoslovak State accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and as- sociated powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the ma- jority of the population in race, lan- guage, or religion. The Czechoslovak State further ac- cepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers such provisions as these powers may deem necessary to protect free- dom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations. Article 58. — The proportion and na- ture of the financial obligations of the former Austrian Empire which the Czechoslovak State will have to assume on account of the territory placed under its sovereignty will be determined in accordance with Article 203 of Part IX., (Financial Clauses,) of the pres- ent treaty. Subsequent agreements will decide all questions which are not decided by the present treaty and which may arise in consequence of the cession of the said territory. SECTION IV.— RUMANIA Article 59. — Austria renounces, so far as she is concerned, in favor of Ru- mania all rights and title over such portion of the former Duchy of Buko- vina as lies within the frontiers of Rumania which may ultimately be fixed by the principal allied and associated powers. Article 60. — Rumania accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the principal allied and associated powers such provisions as may be deemed neces- sary by these powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or re- ligion. Rumania further accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the prin- cipal allied and associated powers such provisions as these powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the com- merce of other nations. Article 61. — The proportion and na- ture of the financial obligations of the former Austrian Empire which Ru- mania will have to assume on account of the territory placed under her sov- THE PEACE CONFERENCE 373 ereignty will be determined in accord- ance with Article 203 of Part IX., (Fi- nancial Clauses,) of the present treaty. Subsequent agreements will decide all questions which are not decided by the present treaty and which may arise in consequence of the cession of the said territory. SECTION V.— PROTECTION OF MINORITIES Article 62. — Austria undertakes that the stipulations contained in this sec- tion shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation, or official action shall conflict or inter- fere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. Article 63. — Austria undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Austria, without distinction of birth, nationalty, language, race, or religion. All inhabitants of Austria shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief, whose practices are not incon- sistent with public order or public morals. Article 64. — Austria admits and de- clares to be Austrian nationals ipso facto and without the requirement of any formality all persons possessing at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty rights of citizenship, (pertinenza,) within Austrian terri- tory who are not nationals of any other State. Article 65. — All persons born in Aus- trian territory who are not born na- tionals of another State shall ipso facto become Austrian nationals. Article 66. — All Austrian nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, lan- guage, or religion. Differences of religion, creed, or con- fession shall not prejudice any Aus- trian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions, and honors, or the exercise of professions and industries. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Austrian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Notwithstanding any establishment by the Austrian Government of an offi- cial language, adequate facilities shall be given to Austrian nationals of non- German speech for the use of their lan- guage, either orally or in writing, be- fore the courts. Article 67. — Austrian nationals who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treat- ment and security in law and in fact as the other Austrian nationals. In par- ticular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein. Article 68. — Austria will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals of other than German speech are resi- dents adequate facilities for insuring that in the primary schools the instruc- tion shall be given to the children of such Austrian nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Austrian 374 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Government from making the teaching of the German language obligatory in the said schools. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal, or other budgets for education, reli- gious, or charitable purposes. Article 69. — Austria agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing articles of this section, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute obli- gations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a ma- jority of the Council of the League of Nations. The allied and associated powers represented on the council sev- erally agree not to withhold their as- sent from any modification in these ar- ticles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. ! Austria agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circum- stances. Austria further agrees that any dif- ference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these articles between the Austrian Government and any one of the principal allied and as- sociated powers or any other power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dis- pute of an international character un- der Article 14 of the covenant of the League of Nations. The Austrian Gov- ernment hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the permanent court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the covenant. SECTION VI.— CAUSES RELAT- ING TO NATIONALITY Article 70. — Every person possess- ing rights of citizenship (pertinenza) in territory which formed part of the territories of the former Austro-Hun- garian monarch}' shall obtain ipso facto to the exclusion of Austrian nationality the nationality of the State exercising sovereignty over such territory. Article 71. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 70, Italian na- tionality shall not, in the case of terri- tory transferred to Italy, be acquired ipso facto; (1) by persons possessing rights of citizenship in such territory who were not born there : (2) by persons who acquired their rights of citizenship in such territory after May 24, 1915, or who acquired them only by reason of their official position. Article 72. — The persons referred to in Article 71, as well as those who (a) formerly possessed rights of citizenship in the territories transferred to Italy, or whose father, or mother if the father is unknown, possessed rights of citizen- ship in such territories, or (b) have served in the Italian Army during the present war, and their descendants, may claim Italian nationality subject to the THE PEACE CONFERENCE 375 conditions prescribed in Article 78 for the right of option. Article 73. — The claim to Italian na- tionality by the persons referred to in Article 72 may in individual cases be refused by the competent Italian au- thority. Article 74. — Where the claim to Ital- ian nationality under Article 72 is not made, or is refused, the persons con- cerned will obtain ipso facto the nation- ality of the State exercising sovereignty over the territory in which they pos- sessed rights of citizenship before ac- quiring such rights in the territory transferred to Italy. Article 75. — Juridical persons estab- lished in the territories transferred to Italy shall be considered Italian if they are recognized as such either by the Italian administrative authorities or by an Italian judicial decision. Article 76. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 70, persons who acquired rights of citizenship after Jan. 1, 1910, in territory transferred under the present treaty to the Serb-Croat- Slovene State, or to the Czechoslovak State, will not acquire Serb-Croat-Slo- vene or Czechoslovak nationality with- out a permit from the Serb-Croat-Slo- vene State or the Czechoslovak State respectively. Article 77. — If the permit referred to in Article 76 is not applied for, or is refused, the persons concerned will ob- tain ipso facto the nationality of the State exercising sovereignty over the territory in which they previously pos- sessed rights of citizenship. Article 78. — Persons over 18 years of age losing their Austrian nationality and obtaining ipso facto a new nation- ality under Article 70 shall be entitled within a period of one year from the coming into force of the present treaty to opt for the nationality of the State in which they possessed rights of citi- zenship before acquiring such rights in the territory transferred. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under 18 years of age. Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the succeeding twelve months transfer their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the other State where they had their place of residence before exercising their right to opt. They may carry with them their mov- able property of every description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the re- moval of such property. Article 79. — Persons entitled to vote in plebiscites provided for in the present treaty shall within a period of six months after the definitive attribution of the area in which the plebiscite has taken place be entitled to opt for the nationality of the State to which the area is not assigned. The provisions of Article 78 relating to the right of option shall apply equal- ly to the exercise of the right under this article. Article 80. — Persons possessing rights of citizenship in territory form- ing part of the former Austro-Hunga- rian monarchy, and differing in race and language from the majority of the population of such territory, shall with- in six months of the coming into force of the present treaty severally be en- titled to opt for Austria, Italy, Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, or the Czechoslovak State, if the major- ity of the population of the State se- lected is of the same race and language as the person exercising the right to 376 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR opt. The provisions of Article 78 as to the exercise of the right of option shall apply to the right of option given by this article. Article 81. — The high contracting parties undertake to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have under the present treaty, or under treaties concluded by the allied and associated powers with Germany, Hungary or Rus- sia, or between any of the allied and associated powers themselves, to choose any other nationality which may be open to them. Article 82. — For the purposes of the provisions of this section, the status of a married woman will be governed by that of her husband, and the status of children under 18 years of age by that of their parents-. SECTION VII.— CLAUSES RELAT- ING TO CERTAIN NATIONS [Section VII. binds Austria to accept all allied terms relating to Belgium, Luxemburg, Schleswig, Turkey, Bul- garia, and the Russian States.] SECTION VIII.— GENERAL PRO- VISIONS Article 88. — The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Aus- tria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particu- larly, and until her admission to mem- bership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power. Article 89. — Austria hereby recog- nizes and accepts the frontiers of Bul- garia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Ru- mania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Czechoslovak State as these frontiers may be determined by the prin- cipal allied and associated powers. Article 90. — Austria undertakes to recognize the full force of the treaties of peace and additional conventions which have been or may be concluded by the allied and associated powers with the powers who fought on the side of the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy, and to recognize whatever dis- positions have been or may be made concerning the territories of the former German Empire, of Hungary, of the Kingdom of Bulgaria and of the Otto- man Empire, and to recognize the new States within their frontiers as there laid down. Article 91. — Austria renounces so far as she is concerned in favor of the principal allied and associated powers all rights and title over the territories which previously belonged to the for- mer Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, being situated outside the new frontiers of Austria as described in Article 27 of Part II., (Frontiers of Austria,) have not at present been as- signed to any State. Austria undertakes to accept the set- tlement made by the principal allied and associated powers in regard to these territories, particularly in so far as concerns the nationality of the in- habitants. Article 92. — No inhabitant of the territories of the former Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy shall be disturbed or molested on account either of his polit- ical attitude between July 28, 1914, and the definite settlement of the sovereign- ty over these territories, or of the de- termination of his nationality effected by the present treaty. Article 93. — Austria will hand over without delay to the allied and associ- THE PEACE CONFERENCE 377 ated Governments concerned archives, registers, plans, title-deeds, and docu- ments of every kind belonging to the civil, military, financial, judicial or other forms of administration in the ceded territories. If any one of these documents, archives, registers, title- deeds or plans is missing, it shall be re- stored by Austria upon the demand of the allied or associated Government concerned. In case the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds or documents referred to in the preceding paragraph, exclusive of those of a military character, concern equally the administrations in Austria, and cannot therefore be handed over without inconvenience to such adminis- trations, Austria undertakes, subject to reciprocity, to give access thereto to the allied and associated Governments concerned. Article 94. — Separate conventions between Austria and each of the States to which territory of the former Aus- trian Empire is transferred, and each of the States arising from the dismember- ment of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, will provide for the interests of the inhabitants, especially in connec- tion with their civil rights, their com- merce, and the exercise of their profes- sions. PART IV.— AUSTRIAN INTER- ESTS OUTSIDE EUROPE Article 95. — In territory outside her frontiers as fixed by the present treaty Austria renounces so far as she is con- cerned all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory outside Europe which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or to its allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which it held as against the allied and associated powers. Austria undertakes immediately to recognize and to conform to the meas- ures which may be taken now or in the future by the principal allied and asso- ciated powers, in agreement where neces- sary with third powers, in order to car- ry the above stipulation into effect. SECTION I.— MOROCCO Article 96. — Austria renounces so far as she is concerned all rights, titles and privileges conferred on her by the General Act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906, and by the Franco-German agree- ments of Feb. 9, 1909, and Nov. 4, 1911. All treaties, agreements, ar- rangements and contracts concluded by the former Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy with the Sherifian Empire are re- garded as abrogated as from Aug. 12, 1914. In no case can Austria avail herself of these acts and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Morocco which may take place between France and the other powers. Article 97. — Austria hereby accepts all the consequences of the establish- ment of the French protectorate in Morocco, which had been recognized by the Government of the former Austro- Hungarian Monarchy, and she re- nounces so far as she is concerned the regime of the capitulations in Morocco. This renunciation shall take effect as from Aug. 12, 1914. Article 98. — The Sherifian Govern- ment shall have complete liberty of ac- tion in regulating the status of Austrian nationals in Morocco and the conditions in which they can establish themselves. Austrian protected persons, semsars, and "associes agricoles" shall be con- sidered to have ceased, as from Aug. 12, 1914, to enjoy the privileges attached to their status and shall be subject to the ordinary law. 378 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR Article 99. — All movable and immov- able property in the Sherifian Empire belonging to the former Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy passes ipso facto to the Maghzen without compensation. For this purpose, the property and possessions of the former Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy shall be deemed to in- clude all the property of the crown, and the private property of members of the former royal family of Austria- Hungary. All movable and immovable property in the Sherifian Empire belonging to Austrian nationals shall be dealt with in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of Part X. (Economic Clauses) of the present treaty. Mining rights which may be recog- nized as belonging to Austrian nation- als by the Court of Arbitration set up under the Moroccan Mining Regula- tions shall be treated in the same way as property in Morocco belonging to Austrian nationals. Article 100. — The Austrian Govern- ment shall insure the transfer to the person nominated by the French Gov- ernment of the shares representing Aus- tria's portion of the capital of the State Bank of Morocco. This person will repay to the persons entitled thereto the value of these shares, which shall be indicated by the State Bank. This transfer will take place without prejudice to the repayment of debts which Austrian nationals may have con- tracted toward the State Bank of Mo- rocco. Article 101. — Moroccan goods enter- ing Austria shall enjoy the treatment accorded to French goods. SECTION II.— EGYPT Article 102. — Austria declares that she recognizes the protectorate pro- claimed over Egypt by Great Britain on Dec. 18, 1914, and that she re- nounces so far as she is concerned the regime of the capitulations in Egypt. This renunciation shall take effect as from Aug. 12, 1914. Article 103. — All treaties, agree- ments, arrangements and contracts con- cluded by the Government of the for- mer Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with Egypt are regarded as abrogated as from Aug. 12, 1914. In no case can Austria avail herself of these instruments, and she undertakes not to intervene in any way in negotia- tions relating to Egypt which may take place between Great Britain and the other powers. Article 104. — Until an Egyptian law of judicial organization establishing courts with universal jurisdiction comes into force, provision shall be made, by means of decrees issued by his Highness the Sultan, for the exercise of jurisdic- tion over Austrian nationals and prop- erty by the British Consular tribunals. Article 105. — The Egyptian Govern- ment shall have complete liberty of ac- tion in regulating the status of Austrian nationals and the conditions under which they may establish themselves in Egypt. Article 106. — Austria consents so far as she is concerned to the abrogation of the decree issued by his Highness the Khedive on Nov. 28, 1904, relating to the Commission of the Egyptian Public Debt, or to such changes as the Egyp- tian Government may think it desirable to make therein. Article 107. — Austria consents, in so far as she is concerned, to the transfer to his Britannic Majesty's Government of the powers conferred on his Imperial Majesty the Sultan by the convention signed at Constantinople on Oct. 29, 1888, relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal. She renounces all participation in the THE PEACE CONFERENCE 379 Sanitary, Maritime, and Quarantine Board of Egypt, and consents, in so far as she is concerned, to the transfer to the Egyptian authorities of the powers of that board. Article 108. — All property and pos- sessions in Egypt of the former Austro- Hungarian monarchy pass to the Egyptian Government without payment. For this purpose, the property and possessions of the former Austro-Hun- garian monarchy shall be deemed to in- clude all the property of the crown, and the private property of members of the former royal family of Austria- Hungary. All movable and immovable property in Egypt belonging to Austrian nation- als shall be dealt with in accordance with Sections III. and IV. of Part X., (Economic Clauses,) of the present treaty. Article 109. — Egyptian goods enter- ing Austria shall enjoy the treatment accorded to British goods. SECTION III.— SIAM Article 110. — Austria recognizes, so far as she is concerned, that all treaties, conventions, and agreements between the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Siam, and all rights, titles, and privileges derived therefrom, including all rights of extraterritorial jurisdic- tion, terminated as from July 22, 1917. Article 111. — Austria, so far as she is concerned, cedes to Siam all her rights over the goods and property in Siam which belonged to the former Austro- Hungarian monarchy, with the excep- tion of premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices, as well as the effects and furniture which they con- tain. These goods and property pass ipso facto and without compensation to the Siamese Government. The goods, property, and private rights of Austrian nationals in Siam shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Part X., (Economic Clauses,) of the present treaty. Article 112. — Austria waives all claims against the Siamese Government on behalf of herself or her nationals arising out of the liquidation of Aus- trian property or the internment of Austrian nationals in Siam. This pro- vision shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be gov- erned by the provisions of Part X., (Economic Clauses,) of the present treaty. SECTION IV.— CHINA Article 113. — Austria renounces, so far as she is concerned, in favor of China all benefits and privileges result- ing from the provisions of the final protocol signed at Peking on Sept. 7, 1901, and from all annexes, notes, and documents supplementary thereto. She likewise renounces in favor of China any claim to indemnities accruing there- under subsequent to Aug. 14, 1917. Article 114. — From the coming into force of the present treaty the high contracting parties shall apply, in so far as concerns them respectively : ( 1 ) The arrangement of Aug. 29, 1902, regarding the new Chinese cus- toms tariff. (2) The arrangement of Sept. 27, 1905, regarding Whang-Poo, and the provisional supplementary arrange- ment of April 4, 1912. China, however, will not be bound to grant to Austria the advantages or privileges which she allowed to the for- mer Austro-Hungarian monarchy un- der these arrangements. Article 115. — Austria, so far as she is concerned, cedes to China all her rights over the buildings, wharves and 380 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian mon- archy, and which are situated or may be in the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin or elsewhere in Chinese ter- ritory. It is understood, however, that prem- ises used as diplomatic or consular resi- dences or offices, as well as the effects and furniture contained therein, are not included in the above cession, and, fur- thermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the public and private property be- longing to the former Austro-Hunga- rian monarchy situated within the so- called Legation Quarter at Peking without the consent of the diplomatic representatives of the powers which, on the coming into force of the present treaty, remain parties to the final pro- tocol of Sept. 7, 1901. Article 116. — Austria agrees, so far as she is concerned, to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Govern- ment under which the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin is now held. China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above area, declares her intention of opening it to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which the said conces- sion is now held shall not affect the property rights of nationals of allied and associated powers who are holders of lots in this concession. Article 117. — Austria waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any allied or associated Gov- ernment arising out of the internment of Austrian nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally re- nounces, so far as she is concerned, all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of Austro-Hungarian ships in China, or the liquidation, se- questration or control of Austrian properties, rights and interests in that country since Aug. 14, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X., (Economic Clauses,) of the present treaty. MILITARY AND NAVAL CLAUSES The disarmament of Austria is re- quired in as great detail as in the case of Germany. The Austrian Army is not to exceed 30,000 men. The number of guns and machine guns is strictly limited, mobilization is forbidden and compulsory military service is abolished. Surplus armament and munitions must be turned over to the Allies. The manu- facture of arms is restricted to one fac- tory controlled by the State, and the use of gases for warfare is prohibited. The Austrian Navy henceforth will consist of three patrol boats on the Danube. All warships and submarines are declared finally surrendered to the Allies and the treaty names thirty-two cruisers and fleet auxiliaries, including the President Wilson, (ex-Kaiser Franz Joseph,) which are to be disarmed and treated as merchant ships. All warships begun must be broken up. 'Austria will not be allowed to main- tain any military or naval air forces nor any- dirigibles, and all such equip- ment and material must be delivered to the Allies. The disarmament of Austria will be carried out under the supervision of an interallied commission, on which the United States will be represented. The repatriation of Austrian prison- ers of war and interned civilians is fully THE PEACE CONFERENCE 381 provided for under a joint commission. Austrians accused of violating the laws and customs of war are to be de- livered to the Allies for trial by military tribunals, together with all documentary evidence. REPARATIONS Details of reparations to be made by Austria are given in Part VII., notably in the following articles: Article 177. — The allied and associ- ated Governments affirm, and Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her allies for causing the loss and damage to which the allied and associ- ated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the ag- gression of Austria-Hungary and her allies. Article 178. — The allied and associ- ated Governments recognize that the re- sources of Austria are not adequate, after taking into account the permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the pres- ent treaty, to make complete reparation for such loss and damage. The allied and associated Govern- ments, however, require and Austria undertakes that she will make compensa- tion as hereinafter determined for dam- age on to the civilian population of the allied and associated powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an allied and associated power against Austria by the said aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and in general damage as defined in Annex 1 hereto. Article 179. — The amount of such damage for which compensation is to be made by Austria shall be determined by an interallied commission to be called the Reparation Commission and constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in an- nexed Nos. II.-V. inclusive hereto. The commission is the same as that provided for under Article 233 of the treaty with Germany, subject to any modifications resulting from the present treaty. The commission shall constitute a section to consider the special questions raised by the application of the present treaty. This section shall have consultative power only, except in cases in which the commission shall delegate to it such powers as may be deemed convenient. The Reparation Commission shall consider the claims and give to the Austrian Government a just opportu- nity to be heard. The commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments pre- scribing the time and manner for se- curing and discharging by Austria with- in thirty years dating from May 1, 1921, that part of the debt which shall have been assigned to her, after the commission has decided whether Ger- many is in a position to pay the balance of* the total amount of claims presented by Germany and her allies and ap- proved by the commission. If, however, within the period mentioned Austria fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may within the discretion of the commission be postponed for settlement in subsequent years, or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the allied and associ- ated governments acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in this part of the present treaty shall deter- mine. MODIFICATION POSSIBLE Article 180. — The Reparation Com- mission shall after May 1, 1921, from time to time consider the resources and capacity of Austria and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity 382 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR to be heard, shall have discretion to ex- tend the date and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in accordance with Article 179, but not to cancel any part except with the specific authority of the several Gov- ernments represented on the commis- sion. Article 181. — Austria shall pay in the course of the year 1919, 1920, and the first four months of 1921, in such in- stallments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Reparation Com- mission may lay down, a reasonable sum which shall be determined by the com- mission. Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the armistice of Nov. 3, 1918, shall first be met, and such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Governments of the principal allied and associated powers essential to enable Austria to meet her obligations for rep- aration may also, with the approval of said Government, be paid for out of the above sum. The balance shall be reck- oned toward the liquidation of the amount due for reparation. ANNEXES Annex No. 1 to the reparation arti- cles schedules in detail the damages which may be claimed of Austria for injuries to persons or property result- ing from acts of war, including naval and military pensions paid by the Al- lies, and also including repayment of levies or fines on civilian populations. Annex No. 2 sets forth the organiza- tion of the Reparation Commission, its procedure in assessing damage pay- ments by Austria and the financial ar- rangements Austria is required to make to secure to the Allies the discharge of its obligations. Annex No. 3 provides for the replace- ment by Austria "ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class of all mer- chant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war," and the Austrian Government cedes to the Allies the property in all merchant ships and fishing boats "belonging to nationals of the former Austrian Empire." Under Annex No. 4 Austria under- takes to devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of invaded allied territory. In partial reparation Austria is re- quired under Annex No. 5 to make an- nual deliveries of timber and manufac- tures of iron and magnesite. Annex No. 6 provides for the renun- ciation to Italy of all Austrian cables in Italian ports and of other specified cables to the allied powers. By special provisions laid down by Article 191-196 (including annex) Aus- tria is required to surrender all loot from invaded allied territory, particu- larly objects of art and historical rec- ords taken from Italy by the Haps- burgs, not only in this but in previous wars. Some of the loot from Italy which the Austrians are required to return are the Crown jewels of Tuscany and the private jewels of the Princess Elec- tress of Medici and other Medici heir- looms removed to Vienna in the eight- eenth century ; the furniture and silver plate belonging to the House of Medici and the "jewel of Aspasius" in pay- ment of debt owed by the House of Aus- tria to the Crown of Tuscany, and also the "ancient instruments of astronomy and physics belonging to the Academy of Cimento, removed by the House of Lorraine and sent as a present to the cousins of the imperial house of Vienna." This annex also specifies the return to Italy of "The Virgin" by Andrea THE PEACE CONFERENCE 383 del Sarto, and four drawings by Cor- reggio belonging to the Pinacothek of Modena and removed in 1859 by Duke Francis V. ; numerous manuscripts and rare books and bronzes stolen from Modena and "objects made in Palermo in the twelfth century for the Norman Kings and employed in the coronation of the Emperors." Austria also is required to restore to Belgium various works of art removed to Vienna in the eighteenth century. To Poland, Austria is required to re- store the gold cup of King Ladislas IV., No. 1,114 of the Court Museum at Vienna. Czechoslovakia will get back many historical documents removed by Maria Theresa and works of art taken from the Bohemian royal castles by various Austrian Emperors in the eighteenth century. The remainder of the treaty is taken up by financial, economic, legal, river and maritime, transport, labor and gen- eral miscellaneous clauses subsidiary to the main provisions of the treaty sum- marized or quoted above. These sec- tions are essentially similar to those in the German peace treaty. THE BULGARIAN TREATY On November 27, 1919, the treaty of peace between the Entente Allies and Bulgaria was signed in the May- or's office at Neuilly, near Paris. Al- though the United States had not de- clared war on Bulgaria, the treaty was signed by Frank L. Polk, Henry White, and General Bliss for that coun- try. The chief Bulgarian signature was that of M. Stambuliwsky, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria. A sum- mary of the terms handed Bulgaria in the middle of September follows. Bulgaria agrees to — Reduce her army to 20,000 men and gendarmerie to 10,000. Surrender her warships and subma- rines to the Allies. Recognize the independence of Jugo- slavia and return property taken from that state during the war. Cede Western Thrace to the Allies for future disposition. Modify her frontier at four places in favor of Serbia and compensate Serbia for stolen coal. Pay $450,000,000 in gold as repara- tion for damages. Renounce the treaties of Brest- Litovsk and Bucharest. The treaty which was handed to the Bulgarian delegation in Paris fol- lowed the same general plan as the Aus- trian treaty. Many clauses are iden- tical with the Austrian pact, except for the substitution of names, such as the League of Nations, labor, aerial navi- gation, penalties, prisoners of war and graves. Minority Races Protected. The Bul- garians are required to recognize the independence of the Serb, Croats and Slovene state, and provisions are made to change the nationality of the inhabit- ants of the territory formerly Bulga- rian and transferred to other states. Provisions are made for protection of the minorities of race, language, na- tionality and religion. Within three months the Bulgarians are required to demobilize the army and substitute vol- unteer enlistments. The Bulgarian army is reduced to 20,000 men, exclusively for the main- tenance of order and frontier control. The manufacture of war material is con- fined to one establishment, the other establishments to be closed or converted. Bulgaria agrees to return to Greece, Roumania and the Serb, Croat and Slo- vene state the records, archives and ar- 384 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR tides of historical and artistic value which were taken from these countries during the war, and livestock shall be returned within six months. As special compensation for the destruction of the Serbian coal mines Bulgaria shall for five years deliver 50,000 tons of coal annually to the Serb, Croat and Slo- vene state. The financial clauses are similar to those of the Austrian treaty and pro- vide priority over the charges against assets of Bulgaria for reparation shall be given to the cost of all armies of occupation of the Allies, and to serv- ices of the external pre-war Ottoman public debt. Bulgaria renounces the benefits of the Bucharest and Brest- Litovsk treaties and agrees to sur- render the moneys and securities re- ceived according to those treaties. Rumanian Frontier Unchanged. The frontier with Rumania remains the same as before the war, although it is under- stood the question of inducing Ru- mania to cede to Bulgaria that portion of Dobrudja which is wholly Bulga- rian in character will be taken up later. In the Timok Valley, at the north, Bulgaria cedes to Serbia a narrow ter- ritory sufficient to provide for proper policing of the important Serbian rail- way running through that valley. In the vicinity of Dragoman Pass Bul- garia cedes a small area, sufficient to protect Nish from Bulgarian attack. A little further south, in the vicinity of Varanye, where the Bulgarians in the war occupied the only railway that makes possible the defence of Northern Serbia, Bulgaria is required to cede a small area of mountainous territory sufficient to protect the Serbian fron- tier from similar [word missing] in the future. At the south of this frontier, where a projecting lobe of the Bulgarian territory came within six miles of the same vital railway, Bulgaria cedes the western projecting lobe to Serbia, so her frontiers are removed ten or twelve miles eastward. Changes in South Important. The most extensive territorial change is to the south. The frontier with Greece remains the same, except for slight rec- tification to afford proper protection to the Greek town Buk. It is stipulated that, whatever solu- tion is adopted with regard to West- ern Thrace, an economic outlet to the iEgean Sea will be guaranteed to Bul- garia, the powers having the right to return all or part of the territory to Bulgaria, transfer part to Greece, in- corporate the remainder with Eastern Thrace in an international state, or to make any other solution ultimately agreed upon. Greece agrees to embody in a treaty with the Allies such provisions to pro- tect the interest of the minorities of race, language or religion, and make provisions necessary to protect the freedom of transit and equitable treat- ment of the commerce of other na- tions. The number of Bulgarian gendarmes, customs officials and other armed guards shall not exceed 10,000 and there must exist only one military school. The importation or exportation of arms, munitions and war materials of all kinds is forbidden. All existing Bulgarian warships, in- cluding submarines, will be surrendered to the Allies and warships or subma- rines under construction will be broken up. Construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for commercial pur- poses, will be forbidden. All naval arms, munitions and other war material belonging to Bulgaria at the date of the armistice will be surrendered to the Al- lies. THE PEACE CONFERENCE 385 Bulgaria may have no military or naval air forces, including dirigibles, must demobilize all existing air forces within two months and must surrender to the principal Allied and associated powers such aviation material. Bulgaria recognizes that by joining the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and associated powers, she caused the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which she ought to make adequate reparation. As it is rec- ognized that Bulgaria's resources are not sufficient to make adequate repara- tion, the reparation agreed upon, two and a quarter billion francs in gold ($450,000,000) is agreed to be paid in thirty-seven years in half yearly payments, beginning January 1, 1920. Payments are to be permitted through the inter-Allied commission to the Reparation Commission created by the German treaty. The inter-Allied commission shall consider the resources from time to time of Bulgaria, and shall have power to recommend to the repara- tion commission the cancellation or postponement of any payments to be made by Bulgaria. The livestock to be surrendered, totalling 73,126 animals, goes to Greece, Rumania and the Serb, the Croat and Slovene states. The inter-Allied commission shall be established at Sofia as soon as possible after the coming into force of the pres- ent treaty. The commission shall con- sist of three members nominated by Great Britain, France and Italy, with a right to withdraw upon six months' notice. Bulgaria will be represented by a commissioner, who may be invited to take part in the sittings but will have no vote. Cost and expenses of the com- mission will be paid by Bulgaria and will be a first charge on the revenues pay- able to the commission. The economic clauses are of the same general import as those in the Austrian treaty, except that for one year customs duties on imports from the Allied and associated states will not be higher than the favorable duties when the war began. Danube is Internationalized. The general provisions of the ports, water- ways and railways clauses are similar to those of the Austrian treaty, provid- ing that Danube is to be international from Ulm. The European commission of the Danube shall reassume the powers it had before the war, but with only rep- resentatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania. All disputes which may arise through carrying out provisions of these clauses shall be settled as provided by the League of Nations and without preju- dice to the obligations of the present treaty. Bulgaria must agree to any general convention in regard to trans- portation concluded within five years by the Allied and associated powers with the approval of the League of Nations. See above. XIV. BIBLIOGRAPHY Historical Background: Carleton Hayes, History of Modern Europe (2 vols., New York, 1916); A. Bullard, Diplomacy of the Great War (ib., 1916); Charles Seymour, Diplomatic Background of the War (New Haven, 1916); B. E. Schmitt, England and Germany, 1140- 1914 (Princeton, 1916). Histories of the war: New York Times' Current History Magazine (New York, monthly); Nelson's History of the War (London, 1914 et seq.); F. H. Simonds, The Great War (2 vols., ib., 1915) ; Allen and Whitehead, The Great War (Philadelphia, 1915); London Times History of the War (London, weekly) ; Hilaire Belloc, General Sketch of the European War, First Phase (ib., 1915); Gabriel Hanotaux (ed.), Histoire illus- tree de la guerre de 1914 (Bordeaux, 1914-15); Chronik des deutschen Krieges, vol. i (Munich, 1915) ; H. F. Helmolt, Der Weltkrieg in Bild- ern und Dokumenten (Leipzig, 1915); F. A. Mumby, The Great War: A History, vols, i-iii (London, 1915-16). Documentary collections and criticisms: Collected Diplomatic Docu- ments Relating to the Outbreak of the Euro- pean War (London, 1915); American Journal of International Law, vol. ix (New York, 1915); E. C. Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, vol. i (Boston, 1915), containing an exhaustive analysis. Causes of the war — British point of view: E. P. Barker and others, "Why we are at War: Great Britain's Case," in Oxford Pamphlets (London, 1914); J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case (New York, 1915), a severe indictment of Germany; H. A. L. Fisher, The War: Its Causes and Issues (London, 1914); R. Muir, Britain's Case against Germany (Manchester, 1914) ; J. H. Rose, Origins of the War (London, 1914); J. H. Muirhead, German Philosophy in Rela- tion to the War (ib., 1915). German point of view: H. F. Helmolt, Die geheime Vorge- schichte des Weltkrieges (Leipzig, 1914); G. S. Fullerton, Why the German Nation has Gone to War (Munich, 1914); P. Rohrbach, Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik (Dresden, 1914); J. W. Burgess, The European War: Its Causes, Purposes, and Probable Resirfts (ib., 1915). French point of view: G. Arnoult, "Les origines historiques de la guerre," in Pages d'histoire, 1914-15 (Paris, 1915); Henri Char- riaut, Le droit contre la force (ib., 1915); E. Denis, La guerre, causes immediates et loin- taines (ib., 1915). Italian point of view: G. A. Borgese, Italia e Germania (Milan, 1915); G. Ferreno, La guerra Europea: studi e discorsi (ib., 1915) ; id., Le origini della guerra presente (ib., 1915). United States and the war: Theo- dore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York, 1915); Norman Angell, America and the New World State (ib., 1915) ; Hugo Miinsterberg, The War and America (ib., 1915); R. G. Usher, Pan-Americanism (ib., 1915); Lange and Berry, Books on the Great War (ib., 1915-16). Woodrow Wilson, Why We Are at War (New York, 1917), a reprint of the president's addresses to Congress, etc.; G. W. Prothero, German Policy Before the War (ib., 1917); K'ung Yuan Ku'suh, The Judgment of the Orient (ib. 1917); Gustave Le Bon, The Psychology of the Great War (ib. 1917), translated by E. Andrews; Count Ernst zu Reventlow, The Vampire of the Con- tinent (ib. 1917), translated by George Chat- terton-Hill; A. H. Granger, England's World Empire (Chicago, 1917) ; Jacques Bainville, Italy and the War (New York, 1917), trans- lated by Bernard Miall; David J. Hill, The Rebuilding of Europe (ib., 1917). Andre Cheradame, The Pan-German Plot Unmasked (New York, 1917); John W. Burgess, Amer- ica's Relations to the Great War (Chicago, 1917); David Starr Jordan, Alsace-Lorraine (Indianapolis, 1917) ; Ian Hay, Getting To- gether (Garden City, 1917); Edmund von Mach (editor), Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the War (New York, 1917). E. de Schelking, Recollections of a Russian Diplomat (New York, 1918); H. C. Woods, The Cradle of the War (New York, 1918); Dr. William Miihlon, The Vandal of Europe (translated by William L. McPherson, New York, 1918); M. Prince, The Creed of Deutschtum and Other War Essays (New York, 1918); H. J. Suter-Lerch, Germany Her Own Judge (New York, 1918); J. Adam, The Schemes of the Kaiser (New York, 1918); J. S. Bassett, The Lost Fruits of Waterloo (New York, 1918); Karl Lichnowsky, The Guilt of Germany (New York, 1918) ; J. W. Gerard, Face to Face with Kaiserism (New York, 1918); A. G. Keller, Through War to Peace (New York, 1918); M. Smith, Militarism and Statecraft (New York, 1918); T. Tittoni, Who Is Responsible for the War? The Verdict of History (Paris, 1918); O. A. Marti, Anglo- German Rivalry as a Cause of the Great War (Boston, 1918); O. Ferrara, Causes and Pre- texts of the World War (New York, 1918); 386 BIBLIOGRAPHY 387 F. W. Halsey, Balfour, Viviani, and Joffre (New York, 1918) ;. J. B. Scott, A Survey of International Relations Between the United States and Germany . . . (Oxford, 1918); Princess C. Radziwill, Rasputin and the Rus- sian Revolution (New York, 1918) ; G. Negu- lesco, Rumania's Sacrifice (New York, 1918); Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (New York, 1918). Military Operations. General: F. H. Si- monds, The Great War: The First Phase (2d ed., New York, 1914); id., The Great War: The Second Phase (ib., 1915) ; Edmund Dane, Trench Warfare: The Effects of Spade-Power in Modern Battles (London, 1915); Joachim Delbriick, Der deutsche Krieg in Feldpost- briefen, vols, i-vi (Munich, 1915); C. W. Bat- tine, Military History of the War, vol. i (Lon- don, 1916); Wilhelm Eisenberg, Zum Land- sturm nach Belgien und Nord-Frankreich (Brunswick, 1916). In the West: Sir John French, "Dispatches: Official Records of the Great Battles of Mons, the Marne, and the Aisne," in the Graphic, special no. 1 (London, 1914); Pierre Dauzet, Guerre de 1914: de Liege a la Marne, avec croquis et carte en couleur des positions successives des armies (Paris, 1915); Le martyre de Reims: I'occupation alle- mande, le bombardement (parts i-xxviii, ib., 1915); La campagne de I'armee beige (31 juil- let, 1914-ler Janvier, 1915) . . . d'apres les documents ofpZciels (ib., 1915). In the East: John Morse, An Englishman in the Russian Ranks: Ten Months' Fighting in Poland (Lon- don, 1915); G. R. Fortescue, Russia, the Bal- kans, and the Dardanelles (ib., 1915); E. Ser- man, Mit den Turken an der Front (Berlin, 1915) ; Hermann Blumenthal, Galizien, der Wall im Osten: Kriegserzdhlungen (2d ed., Munich, 1915); also Oxford Pamphlets (Lon- don, 1914 et seq.) ; Daily Telegraph War Books (ib., 1914 et seq.); Daily Chronicle War Li- brary (ib., 1914 et seq.). In the Far East: Jefferson Jones, The Fall of Tsingtau, with a Study of Japan's Ambitions in China (Boston, 1915); Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, A History of the Great War (London and New York, 1917); F. Coieman, With Cavalry in the Great War (Philadelphia, 1917); Jules Destrees, Britain in Arms (New York, 1917); S. Washburn, The Russian Advance (New York, 1917); Freder- ick Palmer, My Second Year of the War (New York, 1917); E. Y. Priestman, With a B. P. Scout in Gallipoli (New York, 1917) ; C. Snouck, The Revolt in Arabia (ib., 1917); Count C. de Souza, Germany in Defeat (ib., 1917); H. W. Allen, The Unbroken Line (Lon- don, 1917); H. E. Brittain, To Verdun from the Somme (New York, 1917); R. M. McRae, Offensive Fighting (Philadelphia, 1918); C. Le Goffic, General Foch at the Marne (translated by L. Menzies, New York, 1918) ; J. Rouvier, Present Day Warfare (New York, 1918) ; R. M. Johnston, General Foch (New York, 1918) ; S. Lauzanne, Fighting France (New York, 1918) ; Mario Alberti, etc., Italy's Great War and Her National Aspirations (Milan, 1918); W. T. Massey, The Desert Campaigns (New York, 1918); R. Radiguet, The Winking of a Modern Army (ib., 1918); I. F. Marcosson, The Busi- ness of War (ib., 1918); P. Azan, The War- fare of To-day (ib., 1918); F. Dodd, Generals of the British Army (ib., 1918); A. T. Clark, To Bagdad with the British (ib., 1918) ; F. H. Simonds, History of the World War (ib., 1918); G. Fortescue, France Bears the Burden (ib., 1918); The Story of the Anzacs (Mel- bourne, 1918) ; G. Blanchon, The New Warfare (New York, 1918). Naval Operations. The best account of the naval operations of the war is given in Gli avvenimenti navali nel conflitto europeo by R. Mazzinghi. This is a monthly supplement to the Rivista Marittima (Rome, monthly). The most complete accounts published in English will be found in the War Notes of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapo- lis, bimonthly). See also: The Battles of the South Seas, containing the Official Narratives of the Three Engagements, published by the Yachting Monthly (London, 1915) ; L. C. Corn- ford, With the Grand Fleet (ib., 1915); Sir Ian Hamilton, Despatches from the Darda- nelles (ib., 1915) ; H. Kirshhoff, Der Seekrieg, 1914-15 (Leipzig, 1915) ; O. Guiheneuc, Dread- naught ou submersible (Paris, 1916) ; T. D. Parker, Naval Handbook as Bearing on Na- tional Defense and the European War (San Francisco, 1916); S. Lake, The Submarine in War and Peace (New York, 1918) ; G. Fiennes, Sea Power and Freedom (ib., 1918) ; W. M. Dixon, The British Navy at War (ib., 1918)*f J. Leyland, The Achievement of the British Navy in the World War (ib., 1918) ; W. J. Ab- bot, Aircraft and Submarines (ib., 1918). Aerial Operations: "Aeroplanes et dirigea- bles de nos ennemis et de nos allies," in Cor- respondant, vol. cclxi (Paris, 1915); W. E. Dommett, Aeroplanes and Airships, Including Steering, Propelling, and Navigating Appara- tus . . . (London, 1915); Graham-White and Harper, "Zeppelin Airships: Their Record in the War," in Fortnightly Review, n. s., vol. xcviii (New York, 1915); id., Aircraft in the Great War: A Record and Study (Chicago, 1915); R. P. Hcarne, Zeppelins and Super- Zeppelins (New York, 1916); H. Bannerman- Phillips, "Progress in Aeronautics," a monthly summary in the United Service Magazine (Lon- don, monthly) ; for abstracts of technical and other articles, International Military Digest (ib., monthly, 1915 et seq.); Francis A. Col- lins, The Air Man (New York, 1917); C. D. Winslow. With the French Flying Corps (New 388 A REFERENCE HISTORY OF THE WAR York, 1917); J. R. McConnell, Flying for France (ib., 1917) ; E. Middleton, Aircraft of To-day and of the Future (ib., 1918). Political, Social and Economic Aspects: W. J. Ashley, "The War and its Economic As- pects," in Oxford Pamphlets (London, 1914) ; E. J. Schuster, Efect of War and Moratorium on Commercial Transactions (2d rev. ed., ib., 1914); E. L. M. Meignen, Les contrats et fa guerre (Paris, 1914) ; G. D. H. Cole, Labour in War Times (ib., 1915); containing a bib- liography; F. W. Hirst, Political Economy of War (ib., 1915); A. W. Kirkaldy (ed.), Credit Industry, and the War (ib., 1915); J. E. Barker, Modern Germany: Her Political and Economic Problems, her Foreign and Domestic Policy . . . (5th ed., ib., 1915) ; A. L. Bowley, Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United Kingdom (Cambridge, 1915) ; E. J. Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War: Neutral Rights, Belligerent Claims, and American Com- merce in the Years 191J/-1915 (New Haven, 1915) ; Paul Beauregard, "La vie economique en France pendant la guerre actuelle," in Pages d'histoire, 1914-1915, part lxii (Paris, 1915); F. Blanc, he danger national: notre sit- uation Sconomique genSrale, avant la guerre, pendant la guerre (2d ed., Saint-Etienne, 1915); Mario Alberti, "Adriatico e Mediter- raneo," in Problemi italiani, No. 5 (2d ed., Milan, 1915); Friedrich Lenz, 1st Deutschlands Krieg ein Wirtschaftkrieg? Ueber die okono- mischen Griindlagen des deutsch-britischen Konflicts (ib., 1915); Eduard Kuhn, Die Rechtsfolgen der Kriegswirren in der Schweiz (Zurich, 1915); J. F. Fraser, Russia of To-Day (New York, 1916) ; T. J. Hughes, State Social- ism after the War (Philadelphia, 1917) ; J. C. Brown, The Tarif and the Coming Trade War . . . (New York, 1917); I. F. Marcosson, The War after the War (New York, 1917); Phillipe Millet, Comrades in Arms (New York, 1917); Boyd Cable, Grapes of Wrath (ib., 1917) ; H. L. Reed, Serbia, A Sketch (Bos- ton, 1917); Bertrand Russell, Why Men Fight (New York, 1917); J. B. Pratt, Democracy and Peace (Boston, 1917); Emile Boutroux, Philosophy and War (New York, 1917), trans- lated by F. Rothwell; Roland Hugins, The Possible Peace (ib., 1917) ; E. A. Victor, editor, Canada's Future, etc., (ib., 1917) ; H. G. Wells, Italy, France, and Great Britain at War (ib., 1917); Donald Hankey, A Student in Arms (ib., 1917) ; A. N. Hyamson, Palestine (ib., 1917) ; S. Grumbach, Germany's Annexationist Aims (trans, by J. E. Barker, New York, 1918) ; G. D. Herron, Woodrow Wilson and the World Peace (ib., 1918); G. Stone (ed- itor), Women War Workers (ib., 1918); H. Fraser, Women and War Work (ib., 1918) ; D. Blumenthal, Alsace-Lorraine (ib., 1918); T. Marburg, League of Nations (ib., 1918) ; R. Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace (ib., 1918) ; E. H. Griggs, The Soul of Democracy (ib., 1918); A. Petrunkevitch, and others, The Russian Revolution (ib., 1918) ; I. C. Clarke, American Women and the World War (ib., 1918); A. G. Keller, Through War to Peace (ib., 1918) ; H. L. Gray, War-Time Control of Industry (ib., 1918); A. Henderson, The Aims of Labor (ib., 1918); C. W. Ackerman, Mex- ico's Dilemma (ib., 1918) ; M. Jastrow, Jr., The War and the Coming Peace (Philadelphia, 1918) ; J. Spargo, Americanism and Social Democracy (New York, 1918); Norman An- gell, The Political Conditions of Allied Suc- cess (ib., 1918); W. H. P. Faunce, Religion and War (ib., 1918); W. S. Howe, War and Progress (Boston, 1918); S. Herzog, The Fu- ture of German Industrial Exports (New York, 1918) ; G. F. Nicolai, The Biology of War (ib., 1918). Finance: W. R. Lawson, British War Fi- nance, 1914-15 (ib., 1915); W. W. Wall, The War and our Financial Fabric (ib., 1915); Daniel Bellet, Comment payer les frais de guerre: la fortune de I'Allemagne et celle des allies (2d ed., Paris, 1915) ; Gaston Jeze and others, ProbUmes de politiques et finances de guerre (ib., 1915) ; Ugo Ancona, "L'aspetto finanziario della guerra," in Quaderin delta guerra, No. 21 (Milan, 1915) ; Meisel und Spiethoff, Oesterreichs finanzen und der Krieg (2d ed., Munich, 1915); K. Helfferich, How Germany Raises Billions (Eng. trans., 2d ed., New York, 1915). INDEX Aerial Operations, 207 Africa, Campaigns in, 174 Agadir, 12 Aisne Offensive, 1917, 75 Aisne River, 2 Albert I., King of the Belgians, 26 Albrecht, Duke of Wurttemberg, 45 Algeciras Conference, 10 Allied Unity, 80 Alsace-Lorraine, 2; 5; 282 Amance, 49 American Ambulance, The, 300 American Expeditionary Force, 80 American Foreign Trade, 315 American War Finance, 319 Amiens, 2 Anglo-French-American Treaty, 362 Anti-Submarine Operations, 191 Antwerp, 45 Approach to Paris, 48 Archangel, 3 Argonne-Meuse Offensive, 100 Armed Merchantmen, Question of, 257 Armed Neutrality, (United States), 238 Armenia, Atrocities in, 222 Armistices With Austria-Hungary, 153 With Bulgaria, 159 With Germany, 106 With Turkey, 173 Arras, Battle of, 74 Art and Architecture, Destruction of, 225 Artillery, 43 Artois, Battle of, 60 Asia Minor, 4 Asquith, Henry Herbert, 32 Atrocities, Alleged, 219 Australia, Finance, 328 Austria-Hungary, 1 et seq. Austria-Hungary, Complete Collapse of, 153 Austrian Demands on Serbia, 19 Austrian Failure in Italy, 151 Austrian Peace Move, 293 Austro-Hungarian Peace Treaty, 367 Bagdad, 4 Bainsizza, 4 Balkan Wars, 12 Baltic Campaign, 119 Baltic, Naval Operations in, 192 Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 205 Beatty, Sir David, 183 Belgian Neutrality, Question of, 24 Belgium, 1 et seq. Belgium, German Retreat from, 104 Belgium Relief Fund, 299 Berchtold, Count von, 18 Bernhardi, Friedrich von, 8 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 26 Bibliography, 386 Bismarck, Prince von, 6 389 Bissing, Ferdinand Baron von, 222 Black Sea, Naval Operations in, 196 Blockade and Neutral Trade, 227 Bolsheviki, 130; 136 Bosnia, 11 Brazil, 268 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 131 Brusiloff, Alexei Alexeievitch, 112 Bucharest, Treaty of, 164 Bukowina, 3 Bulgaria, 1 et seq. Bulgarian Campaigns, 156 Bulgarian Peace Treaty, 383 Biilow, Prince von, 7 Cadorna, Count Luigi, 144 Calais, 54 Cambrai, Battle around, 79 Canada, Finance, 324 Carso Plateau, 4 Castelnau, General de, 45 Casualties, Estimated, 217 Caucasus, Campaigns in, 164 Cavell, Edith, 222 Central-American Countries, 269 Central Powers, 1 et seq. Champagne, Battle of, 62 Charleroi, 2 Charles I, King of Rumania, 31 Chemin des Dames, 2 Chile, 267 China, 270 Commission for Relief in Belgium, 298 Compiegne, 54 Concentration of Military Forces, 40 Concert of Powers, 9 Congress of Vienna, 5-9 Constantine I, King of Greece, 21 Constituent Assembly (Russia), 140 Coronel, 2 Costa Rica, 1 Cost of the War, 317 Coudouriotis, Admiral, 35 Council of National Defense, 244 Craddock, Sir Christopher, 200 Cramb, John Adam, 9 Crown Prince of Prussia, 45 Cuba, 1 Cyrenaica, 12 Czecho-Slovakia, 36 Czecho-Slovaks, 3 Dardanelles, 166 Dardanelles, Naval Operations in, 196 Debts of Belligerents, 330 Declarations of War, 37 Deimling, General von, 45 Deutschland, 233 Dixmude, 54 Dobrudja, 3 Dogger Bank, 2 390 INDEX Draft Acts, United States, 246 Drang nach Oesten, 11 Dubail, General, 45 Dubno, 3 Dunkirk, 54 d'Urbal, General, 54 Dwinsk, 3 Eastern Theatre, Military, 109 East Prussia, Invasion of, 110 Economic Aspects of the War, 304 Economic Causes of the War, 14 Egyptian Campaigns, 164 Embargo and Blockade of German Trade, 252 Emden, 201 Emmich, General von, 45 Employment and Wages, 311 Enemy Aliens, (United States), 245 Entente Allies, 1 et seq. Equipment of the Armies, 43 Erzerum, 4 Erzingan, 4 Events before the Marne, 48 Falkenhayn, General von, 41 Federal Council of Allied War Charities, 299 Ferdinand I, King of Bulgaria, 31 Financial Aspects of the War, 304 Finland, 135 Fiume Controversy, 358 Flanders, Battle of, 77 Foch, Ferdinand, 86 Forcing the Aisne and Marne, 90 Foreign Credits, 315 "Fourteen Peace Points," 277 France, 1 et seq. France, Atrocities in, 224 France, Finance, 328 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, 5; 18 Fraudulent Charities, 302 French, General Sir John, 55 French Three Year Law, 13 Galicia, Conquest of, 112 Galicia, Second Offensive in, 115 General Strategy and Resources, 41 German and American Peace Notes, 289 German Army Bill (1913), 13 German East Africa, 4 German Intrigues and Propaganda, (United States), 250 German Peace Treaty, 341 German Southwest Africa, 4 German Withdrawal, The (1917), 74 Germany, 1 et seq. Ghent, 53 Giolitti, Giovanni, 28 Giuliano, Marquis di San, 29 Gorizia, 145 Grand Duke Nicholas, 4 Grand Pre, 52 Great Britain, 1 et seq. Great Britain, Finance, 325 Greece, 33 Grey, Eir Edward, 1 et seq. Guatemala, 1 Haig, Sir Douglas, 55 Haiti, 1 Hamadan, 4 Hapsburg Empire, 1 et seq. Harden, Maximilian, 16 Hausen, General von, 45 Heeringen, General von, 45 Herzegovina, 11 Hindenburg Line, Breaking of, 102 Hindenburg, Paul von Beneckendorf, 111 Honduras, 7 Hoover, Herbert, 244 House, Edward Mandell, 262 Howitzer, 43 Industrial Revolution, 14 Intervention in Russia and Siberia, 141 Invasion of Belgium, 46 Invasion of France, 47 Italian Campaigns, 143 Italian Retreat, 1917, 149 Italian Spring and Summer Campaigns, 1917, 147 Italy, 1 et seq. Italy, Finance, 329 Japan, 1 et seq. Japan, Finance, 327 Jerusalem, 4 Jewish Relief, 299 Joffre, General, 48 Jutland, 2 Kamerun, 4 Kerensky, Alexander, 124 Kermanshah, 4 Kiachow, 30 Kluck, General von, 45 Knocke, 54 Krupps, 77 Kut-el-Amara, 4 La Bassee, 53 Ladies' Way, See Chemin des Dames Laibach, 4 Lambros, Spyridon, 35 Langemarck, 54 Langle de Cary, General, 51 Lassigny, 53 League of Nations, The, 333 Leman, General, 46 Lenine, Nikolai, 125 Lens, 2 Liberia, 272 Lichnowsky Memorandum, 27 Liebknecht, Karl, 17 Liege, 43 Lille, 53 Longwy, 47 Loos, Battle of, 64 Louvain, 46 Lusitania, Sinking of the, 254 Lutsk, 3 Luxemburg, 43 Lys River, Battle of the, 87 Lys Salient, Withdrawal from, 102 Machine Guns, 44 Mackensen, General von, 3 Mail, Interference with, 231 Manoury, General, 48 Marne, First Battle of, 43 INDEX 391 Marne, Second Battle of, 93 Masaryk, Thomas G., 37 Maubeuge, 45 Maud'lmy, General, 53 Mediterranean, Naval Operations in, 194 Mercier, Desire Joseph, Cardinal, 222 Mesopotamian Campaigns, 169 Metternich, Prince, 5 Metz, 48 Meuse River, 2 Mexican Note, 237 Military Alliances, 8 Military Operations, 39 Milyukov, Paval N., 124 Missions from Europe to the United States, 248 Mobilization, 39 Moltke, Helmuth von, 41 Monastir, 3 Monitors, 205 Mons, 47 Montenegro, 1 Moritz, Ritter von AufFenberg, 112 Moroccan Question, 10 Motor Trucks, 44 Murman, 3 Namur, 45 National Antagonisms, 5 Naval Lessons of the War, 205 Naval Operations, 177 Naval Strategy of the War, 204 Navies, Constitution of, 177 Netherlands, The, 264 Netherlands, The, Finance, 330 Neutral Flags, Use of, 231 Neutral Nations at Beginning of the War, 227 Neuve Chapelle, Battle of, 58 New Zealand, Finance, 329 Nicaragua, 1 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 110 Nieuport, 54 North Sea, Naval Operations in, 182 Official Papers, 21 et seq. Ostend, 53 Ourcq, 48 Pacific, German Possessions in, 176 Pacific, Naval Operations in, 199 Palestine, Campaigns in, 171 Panama, Republic of, 1 Pan-Germanism, 7 Pan-Serbianism, 18 Pan-Slavism, 18 Participants, Estimated, 217 Passchendaele, 54 Peace Conference, 331 Peace Proposals, 273 Peace Treaties Germany. 341 Anglo-French-American, 362 Poland, 363 Austria-Hungary, 367 Bulgaria, 383 Peronne, 53 Petain, Henry Philippe, 66 Piave River, 4 Picardy, Campaigns in, 2 Picardv, Second Battle of, 82 Plava,146 Poelcapelle, 54 Poineare, Raymond, 24 Poland, Atrocities in, 223 Polish Treaty, 363 Pope Benedict, 273 Portugal, 36 Prices and Food Supplies, 315 Pripet, 3 Przemysl, 115 Quakers in War Relief, 300 Ramscappelle, 56 Ratification of Treaty in United States Senate, 359 Red Cross, 301 Relief Measures, 298 Rennenkampf, Paul K., 110 Resources of Combatants, 41 Rheims, 2 Rifles, 44 Riga, 120 Riga, Fall of, 129 Riga, Gulf of, 2 Rodoslavnoff, Vaseil, 32 Root Mission to Russia, 125 Roye, 53 Ruffey, General, 45 Rumania, 39 Rumanian Campaigns, 160 Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, 45 Russia, 1 et seq. Russian Poland, 3 Russian Revolution, 123 Russo-Japanese War, 10 St. Mihiel, 99 St. Quentin, 2 Saloniki, 3 San Marino, 1 Sarrail, General, 49 Scandinavian Countries, 262 Scheldt River, 53 Serbia, 1 et seq. Serbia, Atrocities in, 223 Serbian Campaigns, 143 Serbian Reply to Austrian Demands, 20 Shantung Dispute, 357 Siam, 270 Siberia, 3 Sims, William S., Admiral, 189 Sixtus Letter, 280 Skouloudis, Stephanos, 34 Soissons, 2 Solf, Dr., 296 Somme, Battle of, 72 Sonnino, Sidney, Baron, 29 South American Countries, 267 Southeastern Theatre, Military, 164 Southern Theatre, Military, 143 Statements of War Aims,*273 Stiirmer, Baron von, 3 Submarine Campaign and Losses, 190 Suez Canal, 4 Switzerland, 266 Switzerland, Finance, 330 Tannenberg, 111 Togoland, 4 Tolmino, 145 392 INDEX Townshend, General, 4 Transylvania, 3 Trebizond, 4 Trentino, 4 Trieste, 29 Triple Alliance, 28 Triple Entente, 10 Tripoli, 12 Trotzky, Leon, 130 Turco-Italian War, 12 Turkey, 1 et seq. Turkish Campaigns, 164 Ukraine, The, 132 United States, 1 et seq. United War Work Drive, 302 Vardar River, 3 Venizelos, Eleutherios, 33 Verdun, 66; 76 Vilna, 3 War Message of President Wilson, 241 Warsaw, Battles around, 114 et seq. War Zone, 231 Western Theatre, Military Operations, William II., 8 William of Wied, 31 World Trade, 314 Wytsehaete, 54 Young Turk Revolution, 11 Ypres, Battle of, 56 Yser, Battle of the, 54 Zaimis, Alexander, 34 Zimmermann Note, 237 Zonnebeke, 54