Class EJj&ZSL Book._L Copyright N° COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. i\K ELEMENTS OF ETHICS NOAH K. DAVIS, A.M., Ph.D., LL.D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia Tpiipovrai Trdvres oi avdpdjireioi v6p.oi i/irb ivbs rod 6elov • KparieL yap toctovtov 6k6t\f} } ocra evrjfxxi } el tls aperrj kolI et rts tiraivov 6vtwv • i} fikv yap eTrio~T7)HT) tQ)v fier dirodei^eo^s 6vtwv icrlv al 5' dpxat dvairb- 8eiKT0L. — Magna Moralia, i, 35. Kant, the highest modern authority in this matter, defines thus : ' ' Pure reason (Vernunft) is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori." — Critique of Pure Reason, Int. , § vii. PHILOSOPHICAL 17 of the view adopted in the present treatise is practicable in this connection. We hold that mind is constituted with power to know both itself and things other than itself, the conditions of their existence, and their relations to each other. This cog- nitive constitution is fitted, not only for the empirical, but also for the pure intuition of objective reality. Conscious- ness, in the presence of some adventitious, empirical matter perceived by sense, external or internal, has, beside and along with sense, an intellectual power to discern in the total fact an essential element, equally adventitious, but not at all sensuous. This is the power of pure reason. That element of the total which is not the object of sense, is the object of reason ; both elements are objective and real in the total thing known. A conscious experience, for example, of a succession of mental states given in self-perception, the internal sense, in- volves time, which is not an object of sense, but is discerned by pure intellect or reason, as a necessary and objectively existing condition of the succession. Upon the occasion of an experience of body, the empirical intuition implies and is conditioned on a pure intuition of space, a non-sensuous object occupied by and containing the body. An experience of a change, especially of one that is constrained by conscious effort, noting that the subsequent is not detached but grows immediately from its antecedent, is an empirical occasion for the purely intellectual discernment of causation as the necessary condition of change, of a reality, a force, existing in the relation of things that change. Now from the law of relativity, that every mode of consciousness subsists by virtue of an opposition, that every affirmation is also a negation, 1 it follows, that the idea of causation as constrained action, is necessarily supplemented by the negative correlative idea of i See Elements of Psychology, § 58. 18 PROLEGOMENA freedom as unconstrained action. A conscious act, judged to be free, is, in the human mind, an occasion for an intuition of the pure idea of right or duty. Such action, not coming under the law of causation, is cognized as under a different law, the law of obligation. Thus time is a condition of event, space a condition of body, substance a condition of quality, non-contradiction a condition of thought, cause a condition of change, right a condition of obligation. Upon the metaphysical question whether these pure ideas correspond to objective realities, we observe simply, that they stand prior to things in the relation of condition to conditioned. They must be in order that things may be ; the former necessary, the latter contingent. If a thing be real, its condition must be real. We have already identified the intuition of duty in its mandatory form, that is, the moral law or law of obligation, with conscience. Even should the intuitive character of this discernment be rejected, still it would remain true that conscience, the discerning of moral law, is, like freedom, a necessary condition, and hence a postulate of Ethics. § 12. It is here in place to inquire what is meant by a person. 1 We can readily conceive of beings intelligent and sentient, and having free-will, but not having conscience. In fact we thus judge of brutes. But beings destitute of 1 A word borrowed from the theater where it still plays its part in dramatis persons, impersonation, etc. Its etymology is more curious than helpful. "Lat. persona, personare, to sound through; per, through, and sonare, to sound, from sonus, sound. The persona was first a mask used by an actor, then a personage, character, part played by an actor, a person. The large-mouthed masks worn by the actors were so called from the resonance of the voice sounding through them. ' ' — Ske at. Persona has come to mean the inner spiritual subsistence that sounds through the mask of ex- ternal individuality. It is not the collected fagot of those peculiar visible traits, which may distinguish but do not compose the man ; it is the unified sum of those common mental and moral characteristics which make him an answerable soul. PHILOSOPHICAL 19 moral insight, and therefore not morally accountable, are not persons ; for moral insight or conscience is the differentiating essence of personality. Accordingly we define a person to be an intelligent and sentient being, having free-will, and moral insight. But, since consciousness is generic of the modes knowing and feeling, desiring and willing,' it will be sufficient to define a person as a being conscious of moral insight. In the knowledge of our shortcomings we recognize our- selves as imperfect persons, and as such subject to the law with its penalties, of which law we have moral insight. Hence the imperfect person, the human person, is a being conscious of obligation. The notion of an imperfect person is necessarily supple- mented by the correlative notion of a perfect person. This ideal person fulfills the requirements of the law by virtue of his nature, and therefore is superior to obligation, not under the law, which is for imperfect persons only. Now perfection is complete, consummate wholeness. Hence a perfect person is a being conscious of holiness. In the knowledge of the narrow limitation of our powers we recognize ourselves as finite beings. The notion of finite being is necessarily supplemented by the correlative notion of infinite being. This notion, combined with that of a per- fect person, constitutes the notion of Deity, a perfect and in- finite person, or a perfectly harmonious personality infinitated. The moral law demands of imperfect persons perfection. This then must be possible, else the law would be brutum fulmen. Now the real object of a will determinable by moral law, is its perfect accord with the law. This angelic per- fection is an ideal not attainable, says Kant, by human beings in this life. But, since it is required as practically necessary, it can be looked for only as the result of progress thereafter in infinitum. Hence, not only the present existence of per- sons, of imperfect persons, but also their immortality, as 20 PROLEGOMENA inseparably connected with moral law, is a postulate of Ethics. 1 § 13. Whether there be an objectively real being corre- sponding to the notion of Deity, is yet another metaphysical thesis, to which attention is now directed ; for the reality of a superhuman person, the supreme maker, ruler and judge of the universe, is a doctrine essential in complete ethical theory. Hence, after a very brief consideration, we shall assume it as an additional postulate of Ethics. Logical proof of the existence of God has, in all ages, been earnestly sought by philosophic thinkers, but even yet it is hardly established as an unquestionable philosophical doctrine. /Various forms of the ontological, the teleological, and the ^ cosmological arguments have been proposed, criticised, and replaced by other forms, without settled result. We cannot here examine this august theme adequately, but will venture to offer a suggestion. 2 Let the cosmological argument be formulated, not a priori as is usual, but a posteriori, adhering strictly to the logical 1 So Kant in Critique of Practical Reason ; the Dialectic, ch. iv. 2 " How can one be calm when he is called on to prove the existence of God ? But let us reason gently, smothering our indignation." — Plato in the Laws, 888 a, Ste. The several forms of argument named are effectively- criticised by Kant, 'the all-destroyer,' in the Critique of Pure Reason; the Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. 3, § 3 sq., concluding in § 6 : "A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal, though a faultless one, a conception which perfects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure speculative reason." Elsewhere he says : " Providence has not willed that those convictions . which are most necessary for our happiness should be at the mercy of subtile and finely-spun reasonings, but has delivered them directly to the natural, vulgar understanding. ... It is altogether necessary that we should be convinced of God's existence, but not so necessary that we should be able to demonstrate it." — In the Essay : Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763. It is well worth noting that the Scriptures nowhere offer logical proof of the existence of God ; but, from the very outset (Genesis 1:1) throughout, it is assumed. PHILOSOPHICAL 21 method for solving the problem : Given intermixed effects to find their cause. The method is one highly approved and very familiar in physical science. 1 A scientific explanation of phenomena is found in their causes. Looking abroad on the world of nature, we behold a bewildering multitude, a vast complexus of objects and events. To explain these severally, science investigates their proximate or second causes. In explanation of the great total, the universe, let us posit hypothetically an adequate personal first cause. That this is a possible conception is evinced by the fact that it is the faith of millions of men. The personal cause in the hypothesis is a vera causa, that is, an agency known to be effective in other connections. Every person knows himself and his fellows to be efficient causes, originating causes, creators or builders of new things from material at hand. We shall claim only this for the posited first cause. The supposed adequacy of the personal first cause is an indefinite extension of such powers as are known to belong to ordinary persons. It becomes thereby a complete and suf- ficient explanation of the totality of the phenomena under consideration. So the geologist, in positing early cataclysmic causes, supposes these to be such forces as are now under ob- servation, and that they acted with vastly greater intensity. Thus the two prime conditions of a soundly scientific hypothesis are fulfilled in that we posit a vera causa, and one that explains all the facts. It is therein superior to Dalton's atomic hypothesis which does not posit a vera causa, to Darwin's development hypothesis which does not explain all the facts, 2 and to Huygen's luminiferous ether hypothesis 1 See this method of investigation explicated and exemplified in Elements of Inductive Logic, § 82 sq.; see also § 97. 2 See Professor Cown's admissions in his Evolution of To-day, p. 117 sq. ; and Mi ll 's System of Logic, 8th ed. p. 355 note. See infra, § 20. 22 PROLEGOMENA which does neither; yet these are generally approved by scientists, and claimed as invaluable parts of the sum of positive knowledge. But our hypothesis, notwithstanding its excellence, remains an hypothesis, an unproved proposition, unless we can show also that no other hypothesis will explain the facts. Now a first cause is the only possible explanation ; for its sole alternative is an infinite regressus of causes, and this can make no pretense to be an explanation, for evidently it merely pushes explanation back, away, out of reach, in fact denies any explanation to be attainable, which is essentially the agnostic position. Therefore an explanation of the uni- verse must posit a first cause. By like process of proof, that no other hypothesis would explain the facts, Newton estab- lished the theory of gravitation. Furthermore, the first cause must be either personal or impersonal. The latter alternative is proposed to us in the unintelligent deity of the pantheist, its manifestations being unconsciously worked out by the inward necessities of its nature. This banishes freedom in willing from the universe. Moreover, how an unconscious, unintelligent being, which is not a person but merely a thing, could originate personal beings, beings consciously intelligent, is inexplicable ; which is to say, the impersonal hypothesis does not explain the facts. Therefore the tenable hypothesis of a personal first cause, no other hypothesis being tenable, having thus fulfilled the prime and the final conditions of strict logical proof, should be accepted as an established scientific theory. 1 1 By the same logical process the existence of Neptune was proved, "before its revelation by the telescope. Lord Bacon says : "It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, hut depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion ; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further •. but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." — Essay xvi. PHILOSOPHICAL 23 An additional word may be said in reference to the moral element in personality. The moral law, the most important factor in a world of intelligences, is necessarily referred to the personal first cause as an expression of his will, which, further, is an expression of his nature. This law demands holiness. Therefore his nature must be holy. 1 Now it is to be admitted that the foregoing argument, like the teleological argument, does not establish the infinity of the divine attributes. The power and wisdom are seen to be indefinitely great, but this falls short of infinite. Moreover, the bringing into being what was not, is unproved. The personal first cause herein concluded is, therefore, no more than the demiurge of the early Greek philosophers, an archi- tect, building with material at hand. But let it be observed that, while the passing from the indefinitely great to the infinite may have insufficient logical ground, still it is an easy step for faith. 2 Also be it observed that creation, in an absolute sense, is for philosophy an impossible concep- tion, since it is an attempt to think a relation of one term, which is absurd. 3 We have touched briefly upon the great theses of philoso- phy, freedom, immortality, 4 and God. For while Psychology is merely a system of natural order, and Ethics a system of 1 The unity of this First Cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing between parts of the world, as portions of an integral edifice ; an inference which all our observation favors, and all prin- ciples of analogy support. 2 See supra, § 12, fourth paragraph. 8 Absolute creation means : Nothing becomes something. Herein is no subject, for nothing is — well, no thing, a pure and total negation. For like reason annihilation is an impossible conception. Physicists hold it im- possible that any particle of matter, or any pulse of energy, can cease to be. The Hegelian, however, setting aside the law of contradiction, also holding that nothing is a thing, and that becoming mediates nothing and something, presumes otherwise. 4 Kant, Critique of Pure Eeason, Introduction, § 3, et al. 24 PROLEGOMENA natural jurisprudence, Philosophy is properly a system of natural theology. Science, in its full comprehension, is knowledge of myself, of the world, and of God. This is its beginning, its mean, and its end. The problem of the ages is : Given self, to find God. § 14. In preparation for an ethical doctrine founded on personal relations, it is needful to examine the philosophy of relations taken in a more general sense. Nature, under which term we here include all objective realities, presents only individual things, or individual groups of things, in certain relations. The things are real, and their relations are real. This statement assumes the doctrine of Natural Realism, as opposed to Idealism. An individual, as the form of the word indicates, is a thing or a group of things, indivisible in itself, while divisible from every other thing. This means that its parts are not kinds of the whole taken generically, but are new individuals, and that it is distinguishable, at least numerically, from every other thing. Moreover, an individual is, as to its mere exist- ence, independent of other things. 1 The general, which is the logical opposite of the individual, has no objective existence. It is wholly subjective, a state of mind, a conception, a product of thought, or simply a thought. All common nouns, as stone, tree, man, are merely signs or expressions of thoughts. They have no general object corresponding to them hi nature, and their generality consists solely in being predicable of any one of a plurality of individual things. 1 The Scholastics, following Porphyry, define an individual to be ens in- divisum in se, et divisum ab omni alio ; id cujus proprietates alteri simul con- venire non possunt. Also as ens per se subsistens. " Whatever occupies a distinct portion of space is an individual object of external intuition ; and whatever occupies a distinct moment of time, without extension in space, is an individual object of internal intuition* . . . The general notion as such is emancipated from all special relation to space or time." — Mansel, Meta- tics, pp. 37, 39. PHILOSOPHICAL 25 While generalities have no objective reality, the particular relations of individual things are evidently not less real than the things themselves, though indeed they are not objects of sensuous but only of intellectual cognition. 1 These relations are reciprocal, and when thoroughly traced, each is seen to be illimitable. All things in the universe are mutually related. Plurality and unity interpenetrate and condition each other. Each is in all, and all in each. For let us consider that every particle of matter occupies and is contained in space. Each particle is related to every other as to its position, a geometrical relation, and as to its motion, a mechanical relation. Any change of position places it in a different and distinguishable relation. Relative rest and relative motion are the only kinds of rest and mo- tion known. These reciprocal spatial relations combine the plurality of things into the unity of a corporeal whole. 2 Consider also temporal relations. Space is extension, hav- ing three dimensions ; time is protension, having but one dimension. Yet every event is related temporally to every other as precedent, simultaneous or subsequent. These rela- tions also are reciprocal, comparative and measurable. They combine the plurality of events into the unity of an histori- cal whole. Together with spatial and temporal relations are relations of causative interaction. Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other. 3 All are in motion, and mutu- 1 Some philosophers, in opposing the doctrine of the Absolute or Being without relation, emphasize the reality of relations, regarding them indeed as the very essence of all reality. So Lotze : " Sein heist in Beziehungen stehen, und das Wahrgenommenwerden ist selbst nur eine solche Beziehung neben andern." — Grundzilge der Metaphysik, § 10. 2 World and universe are proper synonyms, the latter from Lat. ad unum versus, turned into one, equivalent to e pluribus unum. Aristotle defines Nature as the complex of objects having a material constitution and involved in necessary motion or change. — Physica, ii, 1 ; cf. Be Coelo, i, 1. 3 Hence each material particle is the center of a sphere of force filling 26 PROLEGOMENA ally determine each other's motion. A stone falls to the ground; the earth rises to meet it. The earth and moon enforce each other to revolve about their common center of gravity. Also, because of their motion and mutual attraction, the planets and the sun revolve about their common center of gravity, and thereby constitute the solar system a unitary system. This system as a whole revolves about some higher center of the stellar system, a larger whole. Thus again the corporeal universe is a unit, more closely bound into one by virtue of efficient causes. 1 Moreover, these causative inter- actions are continuous throughout time, bringing past, pres- ent and future into a more compact historical whole, binding them into a closer unity by interlinked chains of causes and effects. Thus throughout the universe of space and time, every individual body is causally related to every other. All act upon each, and each upon all. § 15. The foregoing are primary conditions of yet another specific relation of the highest import, the relation of means and end. Its philosophic treatment is teleology, which views nature as a kingdom of ends. 2 We shall here consider space. Gravity, unlike energy, is not transmitted, nor transferred, nor transformed, and is not obstructed. It coexists with its substantial center. 1 To the molar motions indicated are to be added molecular motions, including all vibratory and chemical action. 2 The expression is borrowed from Kant, who says : " Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends. Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case, the kingdom of ends is a theoret- ical idea, adopted to explain what actually is. In the latter, it is a practical idea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be realized by our conduct, provided it conforms to this idea." — Metaphysic of Morals, inR. and S. ed. of Kant's works, vol. viii, p. 66 note. "Leibnitz termed the world when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, ' the kingdom of Grace, ' and distinguished it from the 'kingdom of Nature,' in which these rational beings live, under moral laws indeed, but expect no other consequences PHILOSOPHICAL 27 the teleologic relation merely as an existing fact, the end as an effect, not as a design or final cause. 1 In many individual groups of things the relation of means and end may be discerned, binding the components into an organic whole. Accordingly an organism is defined as a group in which all parts are mutually means and end. Each part is for every other ; also each is for the whole, and the whole for each ; all serving all. 2 An organ is a member of an organ- ized group, serving all other members as ends. Every con- stitutive part is an organ, an instrument, a means. It has certain special functions relating to the rest severally and as a whole ; and when it entirely ceases to perform its office, it ceases to be a member of the organism. It is not a fancy, nor a mere speculation, but a fact, recog- nized by philosophy and lying at the base of all science, that the universe is a kingdom of ends, an organism constituted of minor organisms. Space is for bodies, and bodies are for space. Time is for events, and events are for time. Space without body, or time without event, is unthinkable. Gravi- tation draws all bodies toward one center, and radiation disperses to all bodies the store of energy collected in that center. Every star, and every planet, and every satellite, has its peculiar office relative to the rest. The extinction of any one would necessitate a readjustment of the whole. Nature, from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happi- ness, is a practically necessary idea of pure reason. "— Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's trans., Bonn's ed. p. 492. i Final cause, the excitant and object of purpose, implying antecedent efficient cause, and inferring First Cause. On the Aristotelic division of causes into four several kinds, see Elements of Inductive Logic, § 14 note. 2 The word all is ambiguous, meaning either all as an undistributed unity, or all as a distributed plurality ; as in Drink ye all of it. In the above formula, and elsewhere in this connection, both meanings are applicable. 28 PROLEGOMENA the great world of all things, is an organized individual, a cosmos. The earth is a cosmic unity. In its series of periodically recurring changes, reproductive life is linked with the seasons, and active life with day and night. It is itself made up of relatively independent organisms. For example, every animal is an organism. Each of its members, even the least, is an organ serving the sustenance of all others, and receiving sus- tenance from all. The head is for its hair, and the hair for the head, and both for the trunk. Should any organ cease its functions, it suffers atrophy, or is cast off as excrementitious ; and when the chief organs cease their ministry, life ceases, and the integral whole disintegrates. A plant is an organic whole. The root is for the leaf, and the leaf for the root; and the other parts serve the leaf and root, else these could not perform their functions. All are reciprocally related as means and end. 1 As physiology thus resolves living bodies into organized organs, so chemistry teaches that all bodies consist of systems of molecules, and these ultimately of systems of atoms. 2 Every subordinate is a microcosm repeat- ing the macrocosm. 1 Says von Baer, as quoted by Paulsen: "The animal kingdom cannot exist without the vegetable kingdom ; this again cannot arise before the stony crust of the earth has been disintegrated into loose soil by physical and chemical influences. We must further presuppose that this soil is watered by rains from time to time. The rain can fall only on condition that the water has previously been absorbed by the air, that it has been car- ried to a higher stratum and then condensed by a change of temperature. The water, again, cannot rise unless the earth is heated by the sun's rays. Hence the smallest blade of grass really calls into play the entire planetary system with all its arrangements and movements, and all the laws of nature." — Int. to Phil, p. 232. 2 "Das Staiibchen, selbst der unfruchtbare Stein, Indem er sein Gesetz hat, muss er wirken Und thatig fiir das grosse Ganze sein." — Goethe. The relations seen in simple cohesion "indicate more than mere resem- blance, an inherent kindred. They indicate on the part of two globules of the same elementary body a predisposition perfectly reciprocal to cleave to PHILOSOPHICAL 29 § 16. In the kingdom of ends is included the spiritual realm. We conceive that it contains no isolated elements, that throughout its sphere there is organized interaction. Within the range of observation is the human mind, con- stituted by a complement of faculties whose activities are mutually conditioned, and cooperate to a common end. As in the corporeal so in the spiritual sphere, very many of the most important ends are attained only by means of a com- bination of energies. 1 The universe as a total we conceive to be composed of the spiritual and the corporeal united in an interchange of functional activities. Many minor wholes are thus organically constituted. Each individual man is a double organism con- sisting of body and mind. He is also a member of wider combinations ; for none of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself. The family is an organic individual, its members being normally related for mutual service. Every individual community or organized society has a constitution, written or unwritten, whose essence is a definition of the offices of its members in their service of the common interest. The city, the state, the nation, has organic laws constituting it an individual, wherein its citizens are each for all and all for each. The human race is an organized individual, its members being bound into one by natural affinities, and related by teleological interaction. Moreover, the content of an individ- one another, to hold real relations. They indicate that no particle exists for itself, but that its nature points to relation with other particles. They indi- cate that though each particle thus exists for others, as well as for itself, it does not exist indifferently for all others of any sort, but for others of its own kind in the first degree, and then for others of different kinds in a second degree." — Wm. Arthur, in the Fernly lecture On the Difference between Physical and Moral Law, p. 49 ; London, 1883. 1 Says Leibnitz : " Les iimes agissent selon les loix des causes finales par appe'titions, fins et moyens. Les corps agissent selon les causes efncientes ou des mouvements. Et les deux regnes, celui des causes efficientes et celui des causes finales, sont harmoniques entre eux." — Monadology, § 79. 30 PBOLEGOMENA ual life cannot be described except relatively to the historical whole. The entire history of the age and of the entire past is contained in it, and its influence extends throughout the entire future. The kingdom of ends is the universe. Every- where there is reciprocity, a relation of mutual interdepen- dence and altruistic subservience, a universal ministry. All- serving all is the fundamental, thorough-going, uniform plan of the world. § 17. Yet another philosopheme to be considered is the conception of law. It is probable that the notion originated historically in the expressed will of a superior in authority and power. But this meaning has become specific, the notion having been extended to include generically various uni- formities, though still retaining, perhaps in all of its appli- cations, a covert suggestion of authoritative imposition. We must look away from this origin for its essence. The ultimate ground of the notion is in the shock of simi- larity. 1 When two facts, either things or events, make a striking impression of similarity, one is regarded as a repeti- tion of the other ; that is, a phenomenon is said to be repeated when the mind of the observer receives impressions so very similar as to be indistinguishable except as to place or time. When several such impressions recur, the notion of repetition is expanded into the notion of order. This implies a corre- spondence, more or less constant, among the facts, which is referred either to their inherent nature or to their conformity with some rule, perhaps a mandate, an order, of a ruler. When the order of the facts, either existing or required, is undeviatingly constant, the notion of order is expanded into the notion of strict uniformity. It has already been pointed out that objective reality pre- sents only related individuals. Now among real things or 1 See Elements of Psychology, § 59. PHIL OS OPHICAL 31 events, we observe many cases of naturally existing repeti- tion, order, strict uniformity ; and, by interposing our force, we are able to induce uniformities that otherwise would not exist. These uniformities may be severally reduced to the form of a general conception, and the expression of this con- ception is a law. Thus a law is an expression of a strict uniformity, either of one observed to exist in nature, or of one required to be produced by will. These considerations enable us to make a formal statement of the essential mean- ing of this comprehensive and important term in its most general definition, thus : A law is a designation of a con- stant order of facts determined by the constitution of the things. Let it be remarked that the things are those from whose constant order the law arises, and to which it applies ; also that the constitution of a thing is an assemblage of inherent properties which, being constant causes, determine both the facts and their constant order or uniformity ; also that, since a plurality of individual things have similar constitutions, the uniformity is intellectively viewed as general, and is expressed in a general formula or law. Hence, furthermore, since a law is a form of intellective apprehension, a generality in itself and in its expression, it is entirely subjective, existing only in mind as a thought. Law has no real existence in the external world. Uniformities there are, but these are indi- vidual though similar facts. Their mental reduction, by virtue of their observed similarity, to a generality is a law, which being expressed in language attains thereby only a quasi-objectivity. The very common notion that law pre- vails objectively and reigns throughout the universe, is a rhetorical fiction. Laws are only mental representations, conceptions, intelligent interpretations of recognizable uni- formities. Hence a law, formulated and expressed, is merely and properly a designation, or that which marks out and 32 PROLEGOMENA makes known in general terms a real uniformity, either ob- served or required. 1 § 18. Laws are primarily of two kinds, formal and mate- rial. Formal laws designate or express merely the forms of mental conception, and thus are intellectual abstractions dis- charged of all content. Such are the principles of mathe- matics and of logic. Material law has content ; it designates order in phenomena. Material law is likewise of two kinds, natural and moral. Natural law is a generalization of facts of coexistence, or of events of orderly succession, in inanimate things, and also in animate beings apart from their free will. It designates an established uniformity which has been found to exist in na- ture. Moral law is a mandate addressed to persons. It implies a possible alternative ; and the required order, deter- mined by the constitution of its subjects, is sanctioned and enforced by penalty. Natural law is simply indicative ; moral law imperative. 1 See in Elements of Inductive Logic the chapter on "Natural Law," §§ 90-100. Montesquieu defines thus: "Laws in their most extended sig- nification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things." — L'Esprit des Lois, bk. i, ch. 1, opening sentence. It has been strikingly said : " A law is a human translation of the divine procedure." Perhaps it would be more permissible to say : A law is an interpretation of cosmic order. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, defines law in its universal meaning. Also we have : "A law is a rule or method according to which phenomena or actions follow each other." — Black, Dictionary of Law, ad verb. But: "Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action . . . prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey." — Blackstone, Commentaries, Int., §2. Thus jurists usually limit the meaning to what we term moral law; as, "A law, properly so called, is a command which obliges a person or persons." — Austin, as quoted by Black. Again: "A law, in the literal and proper sense of the word, may be defined as a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him." — Austin, Jurispru- dence, § 2. Again: "Law in its most comprehensive sense is a rule of action for intelligent beings, and in its practical and more limited sense for men,"— Minor, Institutes, Int. § 2, p. 22. Under this limited mean- PHILOSOPHICAL 38 The one is a uniformity established, having no alternative ; the other is a uniformity enjoined, having an alternative. The basis of natural law is causation ; the basis of moral law is obligation. In the one the facts come before the law ; in the other the facts come after the law. The one general- izes real facts that actually are ; the other designates ideal facts that ought to be ; the former inductively, the latter deductively. We conceive accordingly of the kingdom of ends, the macrocosm, as divided into two realms, the corporeal and the spiritual. Body, which is the substantive content of the former, is ever strictly subject to causation, and hence its sphere is characterized by necessity, and is the realm of nat- ural law. Mind, which is the substantive content of the latter, exercises self-determination ; and hence its sphere is characterized by freedom, and is the realm of moral law. These two spheres, the realm of physical facts and the realm of moral worths, intersect in the microcosm man, who, be- longing at once to both spheres, is thus the connecting link, the bond of the universe. 1 Moral law, with which alone we are concerned in this treatise, is based upon a single essential principle, which ing some moralists and jurists distinguish Divine Law, or the revealed will of the Deity, and Natural Law, or the constitutional order of human na- ture, and Civil Law, or the enactments of the State. See infra, § 47, note. We include all these under the generic term Moral Law, to which is opposed Natural or Physical Law, in accord with more general usage. 1 We venture, for the sake of greater clearness, a diagrammatic repre- sentation of the Kingdom of Ends distinguishing its two Realms : Corporeal Sphere "x^"^ Spiritual Sphere , Body / \ Mind Causality / \ Volition XT .. [Man] _. , Necessity I / Freedom Natural Law \ / Moral Law Realm of Physical Pacts JX^ Realm of Moral Worths 34 PROLEGOMENA takes an imperative form, and in this form is recognized as an all-comprehending mandate, as the moral law. It has many subordinate branches or specific applications which apply to every phase of human conduct. Without offering a complete or strictly logical distribution, it will be sufficient just now to point out its most important subordinates. The Decalogue is so widely comprehensive that it is often spoken of as itself the moral law. ' All municipal laws, both com- mon and statute, of organized states, derive their authority solely from the supreme authority of the moral law. Mili- tary law in all of its details, has no other ground. The laws of all kinds of formally organized societies, such as churches, colleges, clubs, bands, etc., are likewise specializations of the moral law. All the tacit conventions and unwritten laws of social intercourse, including the internal regulations of the family, and even the petty forms of politeness and simple kindness, owe whatever claim they have on us to the one law, the moral law, whence they are derived. This catho- licity of the law throughout human affairs, applying to all human voluntary activity, to all conduct public and private of single persons or of communities, renders the inquiry, on which we are now about to enter, one of supreme impor- tance, and therefore of profoundest interest. ETHICS FIEST PAET- OBLIGATION INTRODUCTION § 19. In looking on the world around and above us, we discover, amid an infinite variety of ceaseless changes, a cer- tain uniformity established, which, reduced to comprehensive expression, is termed the law of gravity. In looking on the world within us, we discover, amid its incessant changes, a certain uniformity enjoined, which, reduced to comprehen- sive expression, is termed the law of morality. The law of gravity represents something real, a fixed corporeal order, with which we have to do in every waking moment of active life, and to which we must constantly adjust the movements of our bodies. The law of morality also represents some- thing equally real, a required spiritual order, with which we constantly have to do, a universal mandate overruling all relations between man and man, to which must be adjusted every voluntary action and proposed line of conduct. The reality of moral law as an inflexible factor in human life, in- volved in the essential constitution of human nature, is a scientific truth, as undeniable as the law of gravitation, and one whose importance surpasses comparison. Science has been well defined to be a complement of cogni- tions, having, in point of form, the character of logical per- fection; in point of matter, the character of real truth. 1 1 Hamilton, Logic, § 80. 35 36 OBLIGA TION More briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are a number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences of human nature, Ethics being the chief. Pre-supposing and involving more or less knowledge of the others, it as- sumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles and rules for the conduct of men individually and collec- tively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights ; in view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation. 1 i "Ethic, relating to custom. (Lat. from Gk.) Commonly used as ethics, sb. pi. ' I will never set politics against ethics ' ; Bacon (in Todd's Johnson). From Lat. ethicus, moral, ethic. From Gk. ydiKos, ethic, moral. From Gk. fjdos, custom, moral nature; cf. e0os, manner, custom. Cognate with Goth, sidus, custom, manner; with Ger. sitte, custom; with Skt. svadhd, self-will, strength. And cf. Lat. suetus, accustomed. The Skt. form is easily resolved into sva, one's own self (Lat. se = Gk. £'), and dhd, to set, place (= Gk. 0e);-so that Skt. svadhd (= Gk. '4-dos) is ' a placing of one's self,' hence self-assertion, self-will, habit." — Skeat. "Moral virtue results from habit, ijdos, whence also it has got its name, iiduc-q, which is only in a small degree altered from e'0os." — Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 1. Perhaps this was suggested by Plato : Kvpiwrarov ydp ow kixfyierai iracn t6tc irav fjdos did idos. — Laws, vii, 792 e. See also infra, § 21, note. Right, erect, correct, straight, upright, according with truth and duty. From A. S. riht, from Teut. base rehta, right ; from the base rak, root rag, to rule, direct; whence Lat. rectus (for regtus), right, pp. of regere, to rule. — Skeat. Used also substantively with a modified meaning. See infra, § 34, note. For etymology of wrong, see infra, § 55, note. Obligation, from vb. to oblige = to bind to, to constrain ; from Fr. obliger, from Lat. obligare, to bind together, from ob, to, and ligare to bind. — Skeat. We shall use the word exclusively in its most usual sense of moral constraint, or bounden duty, as distinguished from causal constraint. Deontology;" the science of obligation ; from rb 8£ov, what is binding, p. of dec, impers. from dico (the Gr. correlate of Lat. obligo), to bind, and X670S, discourse. Bentham chose this word as the title of his system and treatise, using it, as he says, ' ' to represent, in the field of morals, the prin- ciple of utilitarianism, or that which is useful." Whewell objects, and says : "The term deontology expresses moral science, and expresses it well, pre- cisely because it signifies the science of duty and contains no reference to utility." Stewart tells us that "the ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "E£is tov dtovros, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding, the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable." The term is, however, insolens verbum, having been superseded by the word ethics. INTRODUCTION 37 § 20. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the explanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine, is concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a beginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the primal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue. Only a small section of the series is accessible to observation, yet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon this hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present phenomena. The speculation is captivating but hazardous. It inquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in some heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence of environment. But we are rather concerned to know what morality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest in mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis and prehistoric development may well be postponed until at least we have a firm hold upon the thing itself. 1 There are many moralists who educe their ethical systems from the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has enabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the conceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has given him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may not borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of its doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science and revelation. These are distinct though concordant means of knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own 1 See supra, § 6, note ; and Elements of Inductive Logic, §§ 75, 85. Professor Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture, affirms that: "The practice of what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self- restraint ; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual should not merely respect, but shall help his fellows ; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladia- torial theory of existence." See infra, p. 41, note. 38 OBLIGATION effort, the other condescending to impart from its abundant store. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical sciences, it must have a basis of its own, and build thereon its system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed in- vestigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or as proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will be encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doc- trines in accord, and mutually corroborative. § 21. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted in the present treatise is now in order. The basis assumed is human nature. Man has an original, native constitution, which, however much it may be distorted, disordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is nevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fun- damental and essential features of humanity, which no pro- cess of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface. There are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in their mutual relations, and relatively to their environment, are clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or de- formed by abuse. The recognition of these features and powers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is an ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition, and to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabil- itated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find in him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and suffi- cient ground for determining his universal though intricately varied obligation. 1 1 Professor Birks of Cambridge Univ., Eng., in his Lectures on Moral Science, defines happily thus : "Ethics is the Science of Ideal Humanity.' 1 — Lecture ii. The phrase "the natural man" is used scripturally and theologically to mean the man in his present actually disordered state. To avoid confu- sion it should be understood that by the natural man we mean on the con- INTRODUCTION 39 Referring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe that a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in some other person. A right and an obligation exist only as they coexist ; neither can be alone. But rights are logically prior ; they condition and originate their corresponding obli- gations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its possessor, determines that there be a corresponding obliga- tion ; whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine a right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our trary, here and throughout, not man as he is, but man as he should be, the normal man. So Butler, Sermon II, on Romans, 2 : 14. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons, Whewell's Ed. p. xlii, in the passage beginning, " There are two ways," etc., presents an approved statement of the matter, substantially reproduced in the following : "The question concerning the basis of morals may be put in two different ways, subjectively or objectively. We may ask, What is there in man that constitutes him moral ? what do we mean by morality as an attribute of human nature ? Or, on the other hand, What ground is there for morality in the nature of things, in the order and frame of the universe around and above us ? The answer to the first question constitutes what is called psychological ethics ; the second belongs to metaphysical ethics. The former method, that commonly pursued by British philosophers, addresses itself to our daily usage and self -acquaintance ; the latter leads up to the first principles of knowledge, to those primary concepts and fundamental necessities of thought that lie behind our ordinary thinking and govern our mental operations unawares, and which form the subject matter of the highest and ultimate philosophy. We set out on the former line of inquiry, asking ourselves what are the facts concerning our ethical constitution, and how we are to interpret them. But we shall find that those facts point us beyond ourselves. The human consciousness is not self-sufficient nor self- explaining. The psychological question pushed far enough in any direction passes, beyond arrest, into the metaphysical. The soul cannot conceive of itself without some corresponding conception of the world and of God." Professor Findlay, of Headingly College, Leeds. See also infra, § 25, where the psychological inquiry begins. "The problem of Ethics is to set forth in general outlines the form of life for which human nature is predisposed. . . . This science is related to life as grammar is to language, aesthetics to art, dietetics to bodily life. It sketches the form of the possible and of the allowable, and these forms may be filled with different contents." — Paulsen, Int. to Phil., Appendix. 40 OBLIGATION point of departure for a search into the philosophy of morals. 1 As already indicated, the matter that constitutes the con- tent of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science, its matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection is attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent treatment. To approximate this ideal a methodical proce- dure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of facts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished by testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in social relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in these phenomena the universally determinative notion of inherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a formative principle, imperative in character, and constituting the common bond of obligation among men. This strictly universal and necessary principle is not inductively general- ized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are then made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a logical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human activity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation. Ethics thus constituted is a deductive science. 2 1 Moral, virtuous, excellent in conduct. From Fr. moral; from Lat. moralis, relating to conduct, from mor — , stem of mos, a manner, custom. Root uncertain. Derivatives, moral, sb., morals, sb. pi., moralize, "But what said Jaques ? Did he not moralize this spectacle ? " — As You Like It, ii, 1, 44; moralist; morality, "I had as lief have the foppery of free- dom as the morality of imprisonment." — Meas. for Meas., i, 2, 125 ; from Fr. moraliU. — Skeat. Moral science or the philosophy of morals is synonymous with ethics. Cicero says: "... quia pertinet ad mores, quod Ijdos illi vocant, nos earn partem philosophise, De moribus, appellare solemus ; sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem." — Defato, ch. i, 1. 2 Theories of morals are primarily the authoritative or heteronomous and the autonomous. Heteronomy finds the origin and sanction of moral conduct in constraining precepts whose validity is derived from supreme authority, demanding submission and obedience without condition or ques- tion. It recognizes the Deity, the Church, or the State as lawgiver. The INTRODUCTION 41 In this essay the First Part treats of the source and character of Obligation. Its view is confined to the moral bond subsisting in the simple relation of man to man in entire parity and reciprocity. The Second Part treats of the va- rieties of obligation arising from the varieties of relation due to the Organization of men into complex associations. theological and ecclesiastical view traces obligation to the revealed will of God as ultimate, maintaining that a course is good and right simply because he wills it, and that if he willed otherwise its morality would be otherwise (Crusius, Grotius, Descartes). The political view discerns ultimate authority in the enactments of the State (Hobbes, Kirchmann). Autonomy finds the origin and sanction of morality in spontaneous, original, independent cognitions and impulses. It subdivides into aprio- rism or nativism or intuitionism, and empiricism whose specialized form is evolutionism. The apriorist founds morality on an original, innate, intui- tive activity ; the empiricist refers it to experience, or to a gradual develop- ment. Among apriorists we reckon Cudworth, Clarke, Kant, Fichte, Lotze ; among empiricists, Spencer, Wundt. Empiricism in the special form of evolution, to which allusion has already been made in § 20., is widely approved in the philosophic ethics of to-day. Evidently it is an hypothesis of psychogenesis, of historical psy- chology. But we question " whether ethics really has any necessary interest in an historical and psychological inquiry into the origin of ethical judg- ments. A normative discipline, an art of volition and action, can gain nothing either for the validity or for the systematization of its norms and precepts from the proof of their gradual development under a variety of conditions and influences. . . . Evolutionism is an hypothesis, not a norm ; it gives an explanation of particular facts, but no precepts or laws by which to regulate our conduct ; and hence the antithesis of intuitionism and em- piricism is not of essential significance for Ethics." — Kulpe, Int. to Phil., § 27, 9. Cf. F. Bretano, Torn Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss, 1889 ; and C. M. Williams, Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution, 1893. The view of the present treatise is heteronomous in that it finds the basis of morality in the order of nature taken in its widest sense ; autono- mous or nativist in that it attributes to man the ability to interpret con- stituent nature, and discern his obligation to conform to its order. But the basis and genesis of morality, unless merely a historical, is a philosophical and not an ethical thesis. The problem before us is : Given the simple idea or notion of a right ; to find all forms of obligation. 42 OBLIGATION CHAPTER I EIGHTS § 22. Every man conceives himself as having certain per- sonal rights which he esteems of great worth, and guards with jealous care. Throughout life he is chiefly occupied with enlarging, confirming and defending them. They are a sacred possession which he zealously maintains, and whose loss or diminution he regards as degrading his manhood. This is one of the most striking and significant facts in the historical and current activities of mankind. Thence arises much of the strife that continually agitates the world. Among barbaric peoples personal violence is commonly used to maintain or to recover what one claims to be his personal rights. Among civilized peoples courts of justice are established to determine the relative rights of contending parties, and an executive is empowered to enforce their decrees. Nearly all the litigation abounding in every nation throughout history is a contention for real or imagi- nary rights. While each individual man has his own private rights, there are many of which he is possessed in common with other persons. The maintenance and development of com- mon or public rights is committed to organized society, the tribe, the state, the nation. When the claims of one on another of these conflict or are questioned, diplomacy assumes to adjust the rights involved. This failing, recourse is had to war. Hence the innumerable battles that mark the tragic history of mankind. RIGHTS 43 § 23. Evidently the notion of a right, since it is the source of such intense particular and social activity, has deep root in human nature. Also it is evident that, through- out the contentions to which it gives rise, there is an appeal to some common principle or law of widest generality, appli- cable to an infinity of cases, and of the highest practical importance in the progressive life of humanity. But inas- much .as this universal and overbearing law is for the most part obscurely discerned and imperfectly formulated, it is inevitable that men should differ often and widely in its ap- plication to particular cases. It is the province of Ethics to search out and formulate the law, and to unfold its general bearing on the several classes of its subjects. To this end let us fix discriminatmg attention on the no- tion of a right. It is an abstract from personal relations, and catholic in them. Whenever and wherever two persons come into any mutually affective relation whatever, then and there come into being reciprocal rights, and consequent obli- gations. The abstracted notion of a right, being pure and simple, is as to itself incapable of analysis, and hence of formal definition. But we may examine its conditions, its correlatives, antitheses, and other implications, and thus clear the conception, and distinguish it by its invariable environ- ment and limitations. This analytical process will disclose fundamental and determining elements, fixing clearly the scope and bearing of the notion, and evolving the formative principle and the law involved in its essence. § 24. Life is obviously a primary condition of any right. Only living beings have rights. The notion is incongruous to a stock or a stone. Among riving beings, those alone can be conceived as having rights that are endowed with a con- sciousness involving at least volition, its primary element, conjoined with some degree of sensibility. 1 A right, then, is 1 The new Psychology considers will as the primary and constitutive 44 OBLIGATION a logical property, a mark that belongs to this, and to no other class of beings. 1 But conscious life is not merely a condition of rights, not merely what must be in order that rights may be. There is in its very nature that which determines that rights shall be. They are of its essence. Thus every conscious being neces- sarily has rights by virtue of its ultimate constitution. It is not necessary that every one so constituted should be aware of the fact, either in detail or in general, not even in the most obscure way. But the higher orders of conscious be- ings recognize relatively to themselves the existence of rights function of mind ; intelligence, as a secondary development. The leader of this view is Schopenhauer (Willen in der Natur, et al.) ; followed by Schneider (Der Theirische Wille, 1880), Wundt (System der Philosophic, 1889, and Vorlesungen liber die Menschen und Thierseele, 2d ed., 1892), Paulsen (Einleitung in die Philosophic, 1893), and many others. It sees the will arising, without perception or intelligence, as a blind craving or in- stinctive impulse, and thereon and thereby a gradual development of intelli- gence as a means to gratification. Thus a jelly-fish, a polyp, an infusory, knows nothing of itself, or of external things ; a mere craving determines its vital activities. Gradually, in the progressive series of animal life, we see intelligence grafted on the will. To instinctive movements are added others guided by perception, and then by intelligent purpose involving deliberation and choice. Also every human being enters the world as a blind will with- out intellect. The nursling is all will ; its voluntary movements are blindly instinctive. When a craving is satisfied, a feeling of satisfaction arises, otherwise a feeling of discomfort. In pleasurable and painful feelings, the will becomes aware of itself, and of its relation to an environment. Out of feeling, knowledge is gradually evolved, and in the more mature child the will appears saturated with intelligence. In this survey, the will is seen to be the original and constant factor of the life of the soul. At the close of the series, we find it directed towards the same great ends as at the begin- ning, the preservation and evolution of individual life and of the species. Intelligence is the secondary and variable factor, which is gradually imparted to the will as an instrument. So the voluntaristic as distinguished from the intellectualistic Psychology. 1 The rights of man extend, however, beyond his natural life. Our an- cestors still have rights, and posterity has rights, which the living are bound to respect. Yet life, past, present or to come, is a condition of this property. See infra, § 119. EIGHTS 45 in the lower orders, though these be quite destitute of the notion. 1 § 25. Every man has, elemental in his conscious life, cer- tain powers of mind, and thence of body. These powers, faculties and capacities, belong to his nature, to his original constitution, and are essential in his make-up as a man, as a human being. They are, more specifically, conditions psycho- logically antecedent to the existence and apprehension of rights, and rights are the natural and necessary consequence of their existence. That is to say, powers and rights are natural, constitutional, original correlatives. These native powers are distributed as modes of knowing and feeling, desiring and willing. The members of the latter couple constitute more particularly the practical side of human nature, and are intimately concerned with the exist- ence and exercise of rights. Therefore on them especially we fix our present attention. A desire implies an impulse, excited by the want, urging the will to an activity, relative to other powers, such as seems likely to result in gratification. 2 Every one is actuated by desires which thus motive his conduct. These sources of activity are the determinants of his welfare, and his rights have in them their ultimate ground. Hence it is only as his desires, either actual or potential, are infringed that his rights are affected ; and to that for which he has not and cannot possibly have a desire, e. g., a villa in the moon, he has not 1 The wide class of beings having conscious life includes the brute forms of animal life. That brutes have rights is beyond question, though they themselves have no knowledge of the fact. This is recognized by a merciful man ; he does not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn. Also it is recognized in many States by protective laws. See infra, § 68, note. Our proposed inquiry shall be limited, however, to beings of the highest order, and among these, more especially, to human beings. 2 See supra, § 5. 46 OBLIGA TION and can never possibly have a right. Normal desires, or such as have an instinctive rise, and are in accord with the gene- ral order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appro- priate functions of the man in a world of persons and things. This consideration of its terms brings into clear view the truth of the principle : A man has a right to gratify his normal desires. 1 Every volition or act of the will is immediately conditioned on desire ; that is to say, no exercise of the will can occur except by virtue of an antecedent desire which as a motive impels it to action. But notwithstanding this dependence, the will is to be regarded as central in the personality, since it has the function to control, modify, suppress or arouse the 1 Principle, a beginning, a fundamental truth or law, a tenet, a settled rule of action. From Fr. principe, from Lat. principium, from princeps, chief. — Skeat. Cicero says: " Principio autem nulla est origo, nam ex principio oriuntur omnia ; ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest ; nee enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde." — Tusc. I)isp. bk. i, ch. 23, § 54. Aristotle distinguishes seven different senses of the word apxv, a beginning or first principle, then adds : " Common to all first principles is the being the original from whence a thing either is, or is produced, or is known." — Metaphysics, bk. iv, ch. 1. The term dpx'n was introduced into philosophy by Anaximander. — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., § 13. A principle is also a designation of order ; a principle of nature is a designation of natural order, physical or psychical ; a moral principle is a principle of nature which, in view of possible alternatives, takes imperative form, enjoining one, forbidding the other. Normal, according to rule. A late word. From Lat. normalis, from norma, a carpenter's square, rule, pattern ; Gk. yvupi/xos, fem. yvoptprj, well-known ; cf . yv&p.wv, an index ; all from the root gna, to know. — Skeat. A thing is normal when strictly conformed to those principles of its con- stitution which make it what it is. See infra, § 35, second paragraph. Let it be here observed in anticipation of subsequent matter that a man's malevolent desires, as anger, envy, jealousy, misanthropy, are in general abnormal in kind, since they do not conform to the normal principles of the human constitution ; and that his benevolent desires or affections, which are normal in kind, may in general become abnormal in degree, either by in- anity or by excess, temporary or permanent, and need to be invigorated or restrained. BIGHTS 47 activity of all other powers, including even its conditioning desires. Freedom consists in the possibility of this voluntary exercise of one's powers, and it is evident that without freedom their normal functions cannot be f ufilled, or that free- dom is necessary to the natural working and development of the entire personality in its existing relations. These con- siderations bring to light the truth of the principle : A man has a right to a free use of his native powers. 1 The two statements are not to be taken as distinct princi- ples. Together they constitute the mutually dependent and complementary parts of the consistent whole : A man has a right to a free use of his native powers in the gratification of his normal desires. This principle is the basis of Ethics. It is axiomatic, self- evidently true, not needing or admitting any logical proof ; for the intuitive, synthetic d priori judgment involved in the pure notion of a right finds its immediate application to the desires and volitions. At first view it may appear thoroughly egoistic or selfish in character, but the outcome of a pa- tient and thorough scrutiny of its bearings will reverse this primary impression. Likewise its formal universality may seem to sanction unbounded license, but the close in- spection to which we shall submit it will discover very strin- gent limitations, not arbitrarily imposed, but arising from the matter of its constituent terms, and leading to a disclosure of our varied obligations. Thus there is no need to look be- yond the natural and original constitution of man, despite its I "Not only will all these [principles] be found in the enacted laws (vSfiois), but nature herself has marked them out in her unwritten laws (voftlfwis), and in the moral constitutions of men." — Demosthenes, De Cor- ona, § 275, Teubner. II Selbstverstandlich ist das urspriingliche Recht der Freiheit, d. h. des freien Gebrauchs seiner Krafte und der freien Wahl der Ziele, worauf sie gerichtet werden. In der Gesellschaft unterliegt dies Recht, wie jedes, Beschrankungen." — Lotze, Grundzuge der praktischen Philosophie, § 42. 48 OBLIGATION weakness, perversion and distortion, to discern the prolific principle of morality. 1 i See supra, § 21. "In Plato's Republic, as in Butler's Sermons, the human soul is represented as a system, a constitution, an organized whole in which the different elements have not merely their places side by side, but their places above and below each other, with their appointed offices • and virtue or moral Tightness consists in the due operation of this constitution the actual realization of the organized subordination. We may notice, too, that Plato, like Butler, is remarkable among moralists for the lucid and forcible manner in which he has singled out from men's springs of action the irascible element (his Gvfweid^s ; Butler's Resentment ;) and taught its true place and office in a moral scheme." — Whewell, Preface to Butler's Sermons, p. xxxiv. "The foundation of Aristotle's system of ethics is deeply laid in his psychological system. Upon the nature of the human soul the whole fabric is built up, and depends for its support. According to Aristotle, we are endowed with a moral sense, aXr), is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfill- ment by each part of its peculiar function. Even piety, 6o-i6rijs, is justice in JUSTICE 125 general sense. When a right consists in a specific claim on the action or inaction of some one, the concession of a just man implies his action or inaction in satisfaction of the claim. An important distinction is sometimes laid down between justitia interna, disposition to do right, and justitia externa, rectitude of conduct. 1 The opposite of justice is injustice, which is to refuse or to neglect the concession, and of course its actualization. Whoever is treated unjustly, be the injury great or small, is thereby restrained, more or less, in his right- ful liberty to gratify some normal desire, which restraint is essentially a trespass. Indeed it is quite obvious that injustice is trespass, and trespass injustice ; and that the law forbidding trespass is a law forbidding injustice. For, according to the moral princi- ple, every one has a right, if not trespassing, to gratify his normal desires ; but it is impossible to have this gratification in a multitude of cases except by concession of one's fel- lows ; hence, if they withhold the concession, they disap- point his desires, and nullify his claims. For example, I have a right to the fulfillment of all formal contracts and of all informal promises made to me, whether for money or ser- reference to the gods. See Republic, bks. i and ii. According to Aristotle, justice, in its general sense, is the practice of all virtue towards others, rrjs 8\ris apeTrjs xPV. is a relic of barbarism, is cruel and wrong. Unwarranted vivisec- tion is a crime. See supra, § 24, note ; also, for the views of the present writer, an article on "The Moral Aspects of Vivisection," in The North American Review, for March, 1885. 138 OBLIGATION owes to be done. When an action is clearly conceived to be right, that action and that alone is duty. 1 It is a corollary that duty is but another name for obliga- tion, whose measure is found in the full application of the whole law to the whole life. Also it follows that duties never conflict. Often we are confused and in doubt as to the particular obligation, but of two possible acts, one being right, the other is wrong. There is no " divided duty." Moreover, it is wrong, ex vi termini, to do less than one ought to do ; also it is wrong to do more, this being an expenditure that is due elsewhere ; for example, to overpay a 1 u Le devoir et le droit sont freres. Leur mere commune est la liberty. lis naissent le meme jour, ils se developpent et ils perissent ensemble. On pourrait meme dire que le droit et le devoir ne font qu'un, et sont le meme §tre envisage" de deux cotes diff erents. Qu'est-ce, en effet, que mon droit a votre respect, sinon le devoir que vous avez de me respecter, parce que je suis un etre libre ? Mais vous-m§me vous etes un etre libre, et le f ondement de mon droit et de votre devoir devient pour vous le f ondement d'un droit egal, et en moi d'un egal devoir." — Cousin, Du Vrai du Beau et du Bien, Douzieme Lecon, § 4. In Lieber's biography we find that his life "was a continual exposition of his favorite motto : ' No right without its duties ; no duty without its rights. ' Whence came it ? A letter to Judge Thayer, in 1869, gives the Genesis of this Deuteronomy. Lieber, bound for Greece, with his freedom-loving comrades, in 1822, saw at the end of the schooner's yard-arm a little flame. 4 That's bad indeed,' said the captain, who explained that the flames (elec- tric lights) were called Castor and Pollux, or St. Elmo's fire. If both appeared, it foretold fine sailing; if only one, foul weather. 'I thought,' says Lieber, ' this is like right and duty ; both together, and all is well ; right alone, despotism ; duty alone, slavery.' " — President Gilman, in The Century for Sept. '83, p. 793. Patrick Henry, in his famous argument in the British Debt Cause, deliv- ered in Richmond, Va., Nov., 1791, says : " Rights and obligations are corre- spondent, coextensive, and inseparable ; they must exist together or not at all. ... If then the obligation be gone, what is become of the correspon- dent right ? They are mutually gone." — Wm. Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry, vol. iii, p. 621. Some writers condition rights on duties, reversing the view taken in this treatise. Thus Trendelenburg; also Lotze, Tract. Phil, §32. See also Hyslop, Ethics, ch. x. DUTY AND VIRTUE 139 bill. Sometimes one ought to do all he can; he is never bound to do more, but frequently less. The essential identity of justice and right, and of injustice and trespass, has already been indicated. 1 Hence it suffi- ciently appears that, right and duty being equivalent, justice and duty are likewise equivalent terms. In a didactic treat- ment of ethics, it is far less important to mark the shades of distinction among these synonymous terms, a right, right, justice, equity, mercy, obligation, duty, than it is to show distinctly that, as to their essence, they are one and the same, and that a violation of any one is a wrong, an injustice, a trespass. § 70. An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous action. This qualification implies a contrary inclination overcome by will. It is the doing of justice, the perform- ance of duty, in a particular case, wherein the agent was tempted to disregard obligation by an opposed desire, against which there was a voluntary struggle ending in its subjec- tion. A virtuous person is one with whom the voluntary suppression of wrong desire is habitual, he subjecting him- self uniformly to the law of duty, and thus molding his character anew. Under the law of habit, that our faculties acquire facility and strength by exercise, the righteous desires of the virtuous person prevail more and more uniformly, while their opposites, denied the nourishment of gratifica- tion, become weaker and suffer atrophy ; until, finally, when and although all conflict, all struggle, has ceased, the victor, because of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person. The abstract name of this mark is virtue. 2 In general, 1 See supra, § 63. For Kant's doctrine of duty, see infra, § 86. 2 From Lat. virtus, strength, vigor, valor ; cognate with vir, man, man- hood ; equivalent to aper^, prowess, the Homeric notion of worth, cognate with "Aprjs, Mars, the god of war. Thus virtue implies opposition to be overcome, exertion of strength, vigor in overcoming, a struggle going on. 140 OBLIGATION virtue is the conformity of will to the law discerned by prac- tical reason or conscience. This definition implies that all subjective activities are regulated, duly coordinated and sub- ordinated, so that each fulfills its normal function ; thus enabling objective activities to attain their highest efficiency. Primarily it indicates the subjection of the craving to the giving desires ; secondarily, the bringing of the members of each class into harmonious cooperation. Otherwise there is a continual strife, the lust of the flesh against the spirit and disorderly preferences of each, that is incompatible with per- fected virtue. Such entire harmony is perhaps an unattainable ideal, but in human nature there is a native impulse toward it, and an ability to approximate it. Virtue, then, is a pro- ficiency in willing what is conformed to practical reason, developed from the state of natural potentiality by practical action. 1 In a certain narrowed sense virtue is synonymous with chastity. More properly and widely the factitive forms to chasten, to chastise, from Lat. castus, pure, mean to purify, to correct, by reproof or penalty. " Whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth." Of. to castigate. As chastity implies purity, so virtue implies victory. Too often " on vante la vertu, mais on la laisse se morf ondre. ' ' — Gaboriau. Too often its majestic severity chills us ; "probitas laudatur et alget." — Juvenal. Yet, as said by Plato, "virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, while vice is its disease, weakness and deformity." — Republic, bk. iv, 444, Step. The Lady, in Milton's Comus, 1. 210 sq., beset by " a thousand fantasies," says : " These thoughts may startle well, hut not astound The virtuous mind, that ever walks attended By a strong siding champion, Conscience. welcome, pure-eyed Faith ; white-handed Hope, Thou hovering angel girt with golden wings ; And thou unblemished form of Chastity ! 1 see ye visibly, and now believe That He, the Supreme Good, to whom all things ill Are but as slavish officers of vengeance, Would send a glistering guardian, if need were, To keep my life and honour unassail'd . . . Was 1 deceived, or did a sable cloud Turn forth her silver lining on the night? " 1 This last definition is according to Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 6, with whom aperf is a 2£is, a habitus. Virtue has been characterized as DUTY AND VIRTUE 141 § 71. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are forti- tude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution originated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in modern literature. They are called cardinal, because the specific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be conditions rather than kinds of virtue. 1 Each may be con- sidered a fountain from which "virtues flow. The Pythag- oreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance together as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of all duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and of human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect virtue, yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In this wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as the sum of all virtues, which are but variations upon its essence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete com- mandment, Be thou just. § 72. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the desire to do right is weak, passes, by frequently yielding to adopted when prompted by inclination or native bent of mind ; as genuine and ethical when prompted by principle. 1 Socrates (according to Xenophon), Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, each pre- sents a varied list. Turning to the O. T. Apocrypha, in the book of Wis- dom, written in Greek, and ascribed by Jerome to Philo of Alexandria, we find, 8:7: "If a man love righteousness, her labors are virtues; for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude ; which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in their life." Cf. the list of Christian virtues in Galatians 5 : 22, 23. In Nic. Mh., bk. ii, chs. 6-9, Aristotle elaborates his doctrine that 11 every ethical virtue is a mean state between two vices, one on the side of excess, and the other on the side of defect." Thus courage is the mean between temerity and cowardice ; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid indifference ; liberality, the mean between prodigality and parsimony. Hence the familiar phrase " a golden mean." With reference to prudence, let it be remarked that, taken in its best sense, it is much the same as the wisdom that is from above ; see James 3 : 17. Whenever it is not strictly identical with duty, it is parallel to it, having the same direction, and the two become one there where parallel lines meet. 142 OBLIGA TION temptation, under the dominion of other desires. Especially the appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire abnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into gross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order, may take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the avaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar absorbed in the pursuit of " knowledge for its own sake," or the unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power. The will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional powers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural, which is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office, and becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by his passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor, his actions are determined by their impelling energy, his independent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to a choice among contending masters and forms of obedience. To prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplora- ble condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of conscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law. This regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural relations and proportions, which is the essence of right action, and will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral order, the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous rectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral excellence. 1 The virtue that brings our activities into due conformity with moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition of soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per- 1 Virtue is simply natural, vice unnatural \ man is made for virtue as a clock is to keep time. ^ But he finds himself disordered. Self-mastery, har- monizing one's faculties, directing them to the right end, may seem to be within our power, but uniform human experience shows that when we would do good evil is present with us and in us. This state of human nature is fully set forth in the Scriptures, and that, as we cannot unaided accom- plish rectification, we need regeneration. DUTY AND VIRTUE 143 fected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations, one becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage, said the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indul- gent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to the complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free. 1 This is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day, and we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of the worth of liberty. 2 The liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous, discordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed from the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy lusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admira- tion and emulation. 3 But this liberty is merely relative, not absolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we pass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one bondage for another. All language supports this view. We are bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just, forbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in 1 So Epictetus the freedman, whose favorite maxim was, Bear and for- bear, avixov Kal air^x ov i is reported by Arrianus, in the 'TZyxdpldiov, 8, 9, as saying: "Freedom and slavery are but names respectively of virtue and vice, and both depend on the will. ... No one is a slave (SoOAos) whose will is free. ... Fortune is an evil bond of the body, vice of the soul ; for he is a slave whose body is free, but whose soul is bound ; and, on the con- trary, he is free whose body is bound, but whose soul is free." 2 ' ' The only perfect conception of liberty is perfect obedience to perfect law." — President Seelte. " Intellectual freedom consists in the subjugation of the understanding to the truth, which delivers from errors, prejudices, and the babble of human opinions. Moral freedom consists in the submission of the will to duty, which is the practical outcome of truth. , To do as we ought is liberty ; to do as we like is slavery. Spiritual freedom consists in the bowing down of the whole man to God, who is revealed by the truth, and to serve whom is to be master of self and things." — Alexander McLaren. 8 St. Paul says : "He that was called in the Lord, being a bond-servant (SoOXos), is the Lord's freedman (aireXe^depos) ; likewise he that was called, being free (iXetidepos), is Christ's bond-servant (SoOXos)." — 1 Corinthians , 7 : 22. For further discussion of the matter, see infra, § 92. 144 OBLIGATION fulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigi- lance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but rigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that ex- pands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all-pervading and overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man with himself and with universal order. Still it is bond- age. Strict morality is strict subjection. Absolute liberty is incompatible with law. SELFISHNESS 145 CHAPTER IX SELFISHNESS § 73. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound in speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, self- condemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhor- rence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably have their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The human mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as conscious and the ego as represented. The former, the con- sciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential to the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a feeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal and habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself as an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this subjective object as though it were really another self, an alter ego. 1 The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a conflict of desires; the opposed impulses, being a pair, are personified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the objectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly 1 Spirit is capable of becoming its own object. I am I ; at once subject and object. " We find, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends, or is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which it otherwise so entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-con- sciousness, or power of separating one's self as subject from one's self as object, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process, and relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call immaterial." — Illingworth, Divine Immanence. See Elements of Psy- chology, § 108 sq., and § 226. 146 OBLIGA TION subjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which finds expression in such familiar phrases as one's self, control yourself, I hold myself responsible, and the like. The two are identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we our- selves, they themselves. This distinction between the conscious ego and the repre- sented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential unity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in speech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal mode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to commit the fallacy of figure of speech. § 74. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that longing for gratification which marks the craving desires when their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to benefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of self. It necessarily implies a relation between two ; in self there is really and literally but one. The compound word self-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally, and can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fan- ciful idea of an alter ego. But self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the thing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is self- interest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite of love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire to profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one's own enjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another's*/ Psychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires, the appetites and appetencies, over the affections ; either dis- regarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a more intense and refined egoism, making the affections sub- serve self. 1 Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filch- ing the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary, i See supra, §§ 5, 6. SELFISHNESS 147 interest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is to be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel. 1 Closely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty to self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe myself a dollar ? How is it to be paid ? By passing it from one pocket to another ? Can I in any manner or measure be indebted to myself ? Is anything due me from me ? Duty is essentially the name of a relation between two ; I myself am but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some other one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms, self-contradictory and absurd. 2 It, too, originates in the fancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as to another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions from the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty commit the subtle fallacia figurce dictionis. As in the phrase love of self, so in the phrase duty to self, wede^tect^selfish- ness again masq ueradmg^nowTn^j^ the § 75. But aside from terms the important question arises : Does not moral law command motives and actions that are selfish, that is, such as find in self an end ? Moralists very generally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and weighty class of obligations terminating in self, having re- spect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually entitled duties to self. 3 For example, they teach that every 1 It must be acknowledged that many eminent authorities hold a contrary- view ; e.g., Aristotle, in Nic. Eth., bk. ix, ch. 8, "Of Self-love" ; Butler, Sermons, Preface, and i, xi ; et al. In "the royal law," Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, the phrase, as thyself, evidently does not command self-love, nor does it approve it, but merely sets up what is in fact, as men are, a high mark for attainment, one beyond the reach of most of us. There is no Scripture that commands or approves self-love. Cf. supra, § 48, note. 2 Let it be remarked that the term obligation is from the verb to oblige, meaning to bind to, to bind together. Obligation binds, and the binding is of at least two together. Cf. supra, § 19, note. 8 With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties. See 148 OBLIGATION one owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as opposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one's self, for the sake of one's own personality, and in order to self-culture. Popular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is dis- posed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them para- mount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to my- self, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like. Postponing for the present a direct argument of the ques- tion, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound in any case whatever to make himself an end, or in other words, if there be any real thing answering to the lame phrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formu- lated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass necessarily implies at least two parties, and the given inter- pretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes always a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view of moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not include the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self as an end. And truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase is not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding to it in any admissible sense. Self is never, can never be a moral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is violation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate to others, and selfishness is sin. § 76. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usu- ally classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic interpretation. Grundlegung, etc., S. 56 sq.; Abbott's trans., p. 65 sq. Elsewhere he says : " Supposing that there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no duties of any kind ; for I can only think myself under obligation to others as far as I am under obligation to myself." Per contra, Martineau says : "Duties to self can be saved from contradiction only by an impossibility, namely, the splitting one's self in two, susceptible of reciprocal obligation." SELFISHNESS 149 Temperance or the control of appetites and passions, bringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them to moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most compre- hensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be temperate ? Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty I owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character? Is it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake of my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the moralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end. To be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation; but it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others. I owe to God, my maker and highest benefactor, to modulate into harmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the mission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work he has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate, husbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my neighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and completely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay these dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this golden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice. Temperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top round in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still it is due, not to self, but to those around. 1 1 For the graces, see Galatians, 5 : 22, 23. Closely allied to temperance is economy. Do I owe it to myself to be economical ? No ; yet it is a duty, a real duty. I am but a steward, and am bound to economize my time, my energy, my property, because of my relations. Man is instinctively an econ- omist. He naturally takes the short cut, the straight line. Also he takes what lies near as requiring less reach, and is, when calm, sparing even of unnecessary words. The habit is fostered, perhaps, by mere laziness or other selfish consideration ; but one ought always to prefer frugality of means in attaining his proper ends, because this also is due. Economy generally takes part as one rational determinant in choosing, and often, in cases of light moment, is the sole determinant. Carelessness or thought- lessness, excessive animal spirits, excited nerves, may neglect economy of effort ; but this is waste, and all waste is wrong. To be economical, frugal, 150 OBLIGATION The pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a refined and noble avocation. " Knowledge for its own sake " is a high sounding phrase; but it is merely a euphemism concealing the reality, which is knowledge for one's own sake, a refined selfishness. But the worth of knowledge is in its power for good, and he who possesses it in large meas- ure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to increase his stores, solely that he may thereby more effi- ciently promote the welfare of the present and the coming generations. Much the same may be said of the duty of preserving life and health and strength. These belong not to me save in trust. They belong to my relatives and friends, to mankind. I am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical, mental and moral culture. I am bound to account with usury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness, sparing of energy, is prudence, wisdom, duty, both private and public, per- sonal and political, a saving for expenditure elsewhere. "Je loue Veconome; c'est la richesse des pauvres, et la sagesse des riches." — Dumas. The earlier political economists based their science on the aphorism that men are governed by interest, that in affairs selfishness determines conduct. Hence Carlyle dubbed it " the dismal science." But viewing economy as a duty, this reproach disappears, and Economics, so far as it depends on will, becomes a branch of Practical or Applied Ethics. This, however, would not greatly modify its other principles. For it is remarkable that industry, though so largely directed by interest, works out for society about what would follow from a strict observance of duty. The farmer, the manufac- turer, the merchant, whether laboring for his own or for the common weal, accomplishes in the long run the same general result. ' ' To men is not given that God-like unselfishness that thinks only of others' good ; but in working for themselves they are working for us all. We are so bound together that no man can labor for himself alone. Each blow he strikes in his own behalf helps to mold the universe. Stephenson, to win a fortune, invented the steam engine. Shakespeare wrote his plays to keep up a comfortable home. The ambitious man, building a pedestal for himself, leaves a monument to posterity. Alexander and Caesar fought for their own ends, but, in doing so, they put a belt of civilization half round the earth." Such is the benefi- cent world-ordering of human affairs. J SELFISHNESS 151 decency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public. So of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect, of my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indul- gence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recrea- tion, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my dues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed by the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others' sake. 1 § 77. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. 2 It trans- fers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its fellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish. The moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is equivalent to, Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure. We say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous ; a 1 See 1 Corinthians, 10: 31. Kobert Browning, in Balaustiori 1 s Adven- ture, 1. 1212 sq., and 1723 sq., speaking of Herakles banqueting between his labors, expands the aphorism, Neque semper arcum iend.it Apollo, thus : He was — "glad to give Poor flesh and blood their respite and relief In the interval 'twixt tight and fight again — All for the world's sake ; frank and free, Out from the labor into the repose, Ere out again and over head and ears I' the heart of labor, all for love of men ; Making the most o' the minute, that the soul And body, strained to height a minute since, Might lie relaxed in joy, tbis breathing-space, For man's sake more than ever ; till the bow, Restrung o' the sudden, at first cry for help, Should send some unimaginable shaft True to the aim and shatteringly through The plate-mail of a monster, save man so." 2 Altruistic, from Lat. alter, other, regardful of others. See infra, § 83, note. Ascetic, from Grk. Ao-icrjo-is, exercise, training. Asceticism, a dis- torted out-growth from early Stoicism, is the exercise of the soul in suppress- ing and stifling many of the normal impulses, apparently holding that whatever is natural is wrong. The early Stoics taught, on the contrary, that whatever is natural is right (see supra, § 25, notej, which is also the doctrine of the present treatise. Bentham, rather cynically, says : " Asceti- 152 OBLIGATION lavish or a disproportionate distribution of means or of ser- vice is wrong, being an expenditure that is due elsewhere. The virtuous exercise of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, when clearly understood, is not the giving up of what one has a right to retain and enjoy, but the yielding to another his due, discharging his rightful claim, according to him a right of which he is perhaps quite ignorant. Truly it is a parting with what I might keep, but what I have no right to keep. It is free, unconstrained justice. While the chief, indeed the only end of life is usefulness, the promotion of the welfare of those to whom some one is related in accord with the relations, one is not thereby ex- cluded from participating in his benefaction. The law, by this doctrine, forbids his making himself alone the end, and requires his regard and intent to be constantly beyond him- self ; but it does not prohibit his sharing, as a member of a community of two or more, the welfare he promotes. It does not require self-abnegation, nor entire self-forgetfulness, but that the inclination, the impulse, the motive and the intention be altogether benevolent. It is a fact that in the judgment of mankind, for some rea- son or other, the practice of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, the exercise of affection, is held in high esteem, is accounted generous, noble, even heroic, and receives the warmest praise ; while, on the other hand, selfishness, exclusive or excessive regard for one's own, is accounted ignoble, ungenerous, mean, and is heartily condemned. Disinterested motives and con- duct are always praised ; interested motives and conduct are cism approves of actions in as far as they tend to diminish the agent's hap- piness, and disapproves of them in as far as they tend to augment it." — Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 2, § 3. Says Gibbon: "The ascetics renounced the business and the pleasures of the age, abjured the use of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified [put to death] their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal happiness." — Decline and Fall, ch. 37. SELFISHNESS 153 always blamed. Why is this? Is it a delusion? Is it merely because when my neighbor works in his own interest, I have less of his help in mine ? If so, then it is merely my selfishness that prompts me to condemn his. Is there not some less degrading, some better reason for the universal condemnation of interested action, and the universal appro- bation of disinterested service ? Surely there must be, for I judge after this manner of the conduct of the ancients, whose conduct cannot possibly affect me. Yet there is a school of moralists holding that disinterestedness is a delusion, that human nature is incapable of a purely disinterested action, that all conduct resolves, in the last analysis, into self-seek- ing. 1 It is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and is dominant. But let us distinguish between the actual and the potential, and heartily deny the impossibility of disinter- estedness. Nay more, let us hold that purely disinterested conduct has sometimes been actually experienced, and also observed, and that it is truly the culminating perfection, the realization of ideal humanity. § 78. The thesis is presented in the following questions : Why is it that the affections, the giving desires, have a right- ful supremacy over the appetites and appetencies, the craving desires ? Why is it that the moral law enjoins the practice of affections, impulses to benefit others, and forbids the in- 1 So Spencer in The Data of Ethics ; and others, In the egoistic school of Ethics it is maintained that human nature is incapable of a strictly disin- terested action, that the expectation of one's own profit or reward enters into all cases of personal sacrifice as the fundamental, informing motive. But this cannot be said of extreme cases involving, under the impulse of duty, the sacrifice of life itself. There is often a total giving away of self, as in defensive warfare, with no thought of reward beyond death, in order that those who remain may have their rights. "We claim, in opposition to Hobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucauld, Spencer, and the rest, that purely dis- interested actions are not only possible, but often actual. 154 OBLIGATION dulgence of impulses craving a gain for self as an end ? The reason lies deep in human nature. Let it be granted that all constitutional desires have natu- ral and therefore rightful aims, and should harmonize, thus sustaining each other in their normal functions. Also, that craving and giving are contraries, whence a conflict between appetency and affection, which two therefore do not accord but are in constant and inevitable discord, unless one become subservient to the other. That our desires should be brought into functional harmony, will hardly be denied. That this harmony can be attained only by the subservience of one to the other class, is evident. Which is entitled to supremacy ? Now suppose affection be made to subserve interest. What is the consequence ? The impulse to benefit another is ob- scured under the impulse to benefit self. I treat my friend with apparent and professed affection, using the manner and language of friendship, my real intent being to obtain for myself a gain. Perhaps I indulge my generous impulses in order to cultivate my generosity, a virtue I desire to possess in myself. Evidently this is egoism or selfishness doubly re- fined, and therefore doubly odious. I degrade my friend into a mere means for my own profit, and so dishonor and wrong him. I do it under the form, and name, and profession of love, when in reality it is the contrary, base, self-seeking hypocrisy. If there be one character the most despicable of all, it is the hypocrite, he whom our Lord denounces in his most scathing terms. But such procedure is something more than hypocrisy. It is the extinction of half of one's nature, of his affections. For, if I confer a benefit on my neighbor solely in order to benefit myself, this does not merely subject love to interest, since love is then no longer love, but simply interest. Love has ceased to be, and I am wholly, exclusively selfish. This is not the subordination and subservience of affection to SELFISHNESS 155 appetency, but the complete suppression and extinction of affection. A -large part of the normal nature of the man dis- appears, and he stands in opposition to all his fellows. It is universal war ; every man's hand against every other. Surely this is not the way to personal excellence, to perfection of character. Surely this violates the law. It is amazing that many moralists should hold it obligatory to cultivate our affections to the end that we may thereby perfect our own personality, thus advocating a principle which would result in the extinction of affection, and produce a character abso- lutely selfish. 1 § 79. Suppose, on the contrary, the craving desires be made subject to the affections. What follows? Are they likewise extinguished ? Not at all. It is easy to understand how my appetency may, without loss, be made to subserve the ends of affection, craving various objects, not for my own sake as the end, but for the sake of those on whom I would bestow my energies and gains. Thus I may seek pleasure as a recreation, as a means of refreshing my powers for more efficient service. I may strive, with great earnestness and activity, to acquire property and increase my wealth, not from the miser's desire to possess, nor the voluptuary's desire to enjoy, but in order that I may bestow on others the bene- fits wealth commands, reserving for myself only such portion as is needful for further beneficence. I may cultivate my intellect, not for the sake of proficiency, but of efficiency. Further illustration is superfluous. But let us add, I may desire power in order to greater usefulness ; and I may desire reputation, the esteem of my neighbors, or even fame, simply because my influence in favor of the welfare of others is therein extended. Evidently the craving desires may crave in order to give, that is, they may become entirely subject to 1 So Janet in The Theory of Morals ; and others. 156 OBLIGATION the affections, and so far from being extinguished, they are thereby refined and ennobled, and their activity enlarged. 1 We conclude that, since the subjection of the affections would quench them, but the subjection of the appetencies would advance them, the affections have rightful supremacy. Furthermore it follows that the right growth of character consists largely in this subjection of selfish propensities to the unselfish, and in so directing the former that they be no longer interested, but disinterested. If it be objected that there are occasions for the exercise ■ of affection, and other occasions for self-indulgence, the answer is easy. The claims of near relatives, of friends, of neighbors, of country, of mankind, of God, upon my means and energies, are paramount and exhaustive. Paramount, because these are dues, debts, duties, to be paid before self- gratification ; exhaustive, since the totality of a devoted life fails to requite their righteous demands. Hence no hour, no dollar is my own to spend upon myself alone, regardless of my overwhelming indebtedness, of my unremitting and end-. less obligations. It must be allowed that the scheme of character and con- l duct here proposed, is ideal, a high ideal, unattained and unattainable by any man. It calls for a declaration of truce- ^ less and internecine war upon selfishness. But selfishness so interpenetrates, in its many subtle forms and sacred guises, the human soul, interweaving its delicate fibers and gilded threads throughout our better nature, that to unravel and 1 The acquisitions of my appetencies are my resources. Affection giving out from these does not impoverish, but only imparts so much as can and should be spared, economically reserving what is needed for continued effi- ciency. Sacrifice should rarely be total. In some cases the giving, as in the case of knowledge, does not diminish the store, nor does it weaken ability, but recuperates, refreshes, strengthens. Moreover, affection stimulates ac- quisition, so as to enlarge its available resources, which is the legitimate function of the appetencies. SELFISHNESS 157 wholly displace it seems impossible. The best of men, those morally most refined, are still more or less influenced by selfish propensities, and occupied with self-seeking. But to approximate, as nearly as may be, the moral ideal, is the true struggle of a noble life. 1 1 Even Saint Paul confessed to falling grievously short, but still kept up the struggle. See Philippians, 3 : 12-16. Says Carlyle : " David's life and history, as written for us in those psalms of his, I consider to be the truest emblem ever given of a man's moral progress and warfare here below. All earnest souls will ever discern in it the faithful struggle of an earnest human soul toward what is good and best. Struggle, often baffled sore, baffled down into entire wreck, yet a struggle never ended ; ever with tears, repen- tance, true, unconquerable purpose begun anew. Poor human nature ! Is not a man's walking in truth always that — a succession of falls ? Man can do no other. In this wild element of a life he has to struggle upward ; now fallen, now abased ; and ever with tears, repentance, and bleeding heart he has to rise again, struggle again, still onward. That his struggle be a faith- ful, unconquerable one, that is the question of questions. ' ' — Heroes and Hero Worship. In connection with duties to self Martineau says: "Without objective conditions, the idea of Duty involves a contradiction, and its phraseology passes into an unmeaning figure of speech. Nothing can be binding to us that is not higher than we ; and to speak of one part of self imposing obliga- tion on another part, — of one impulse or affection playing, as it were, the God to another, — is to trifle with the real significance of the sentiments that speak within us. Conscience does not frame the law, it simply reveals the law, that holds us ; and to make everything of the disclosure and nothing of the thing disclosed, is to affirm and to deny the revelation in the same breath." — Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii, p. 4. Again he says : "It takes two persons to make a duty ; for it is what I owe to another, and is not constituted by the interior egoistic relations of a single subject. No doubt, it makes a great difference to myself whether I do this or that ; but a difference which lies within the scope of Prudence, and in- volves no consequences but those of error. If I am a sot instead of a phi- losopher, you may call me a fool ; but the moment you say I am responsible and must answer for it, you assume the presence (society aside) of an authoritative Law ; that is, of a higher personality that has rights over me ; and such assumption lurks in every recognition by the conscience of a higher and a lower object of the will. Whatever, therefore, in action purely egoistic, may put on the aspect of something more than prudence, is duty, not towards ourselves, but towards God, the inspirer of conscience. " — Op. cit., vol.i, p. 231. 158 OBLIGATION CHAPTER X SERVICE § 80. The three expressions of the law already considered, Trespass not, Be just, Do duty, upon a liberal yet fair inter- pretation, taking each in both its positive and its negative sense, are evidently coextensive and have the same content. This will be allowed. But their common extension may per- haps be understood to be limited to the obligation to do no harmful injury to another, either positively by direct aggres- sion, or negatively by reserve of what he may justly demand. Practically most persons take this view, holding that, if one commit no hurtful trespass, pay promptly his manifest dues, be just in thought and deed, by this simple innocence his obligations are completely fulfilled. Many a man holds him- self acquitted before the tribunal of his own moral judgment, before that of his fellow men, and of his final judge, pro- vided he can truly say he has committed no wrong, meaning thereby that he has done no violence to patent rights, and awarded to every one his established claims. This seems to have been substantially the doctrine of the Stoics. It is a high estimate of duty, and one rarely accomplished. Never- theless, if the notion be thus limited, it is safe to affirm there are obligations higher than duty. But the indicated limita- tion is by no means clear, the line cannot be sharply drawn, and hence it is better to extend the notion of duty to include these higher and wider obligations. Recurring to the moral principle, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires, we observe that not merely the SERVICE 159 acquiescence, but the assistance, of his fellows, is essential to this gratification. No man can live for himself alone. Apart from his natural longing for social intercourse, there are necessities that can be supplied only by the concurrence of those around, and in addition to necessities, there are many native and normal wants that require the cooperation of others. Here, then, is a just claim upon their assistance, upon their service. It is his right, and if withheld, he suf- fers trespass. The service cannot be compulsory, from lack of power, except in rare cases, and therefore must be free, willing service. Now rights are reciprocal. If some one have a rightful claim upon some other for free service, then this other has a like claim upon him ; not, however, by way of repayment, of compensation, but because such claim is original with either. Hence no man may live for himself alone. Every one is morally bound to render, within certain limits, willing service to his fellow men. It is due them; free, willing service is duty. § 81. The obligation to render mutual service is univer- sally recognized among men. In all the relations of life, this duty, though so imperfectly fulfilled and often grossly vio- lated, is nevertheless judged by all to be binding on all, and its observance to be an essential part of righteous living. The prompting of instinct, antecedent to moral inference, is decisive in the matter. Imagine an extreme case. 1 Suppose yourself standing on the brink of deep water in which a stranger is drowning, and it needs only that you reach out your hand to save him. Ought not you to do it? If you withhold the hand, and disregarding his cries for help and his manifest need, allow him to drown, would not your in- 1 Extreme cases bring an informing principle more clearly to light, and hence are preferable for illustration. A principle, if true, will be thoroughly applicable to either extreme. 160 OBLIGATION action be instinctively self-condemned and condemned by all as inhuman ? Suppose him to be your friend, or your only brother ; and, further, suppose that by letting him drown you shall obtain the whole instead of half the inheritance ; would not even hesitation be intensely vile ? Ought not a man to help his brother, his father, his mother, his child, his neigh- bor, his fellow man ? There is but one answer in any candid mind, but one among all cultured peoples. Again, let us suppose the drowning man to be known as a worthless vagabond, or even as a dangerous criminal whose death would be a blessed relief to his family, and to society — let him drown? No. Is it to give him time to repent and reform ? Hardly. Suppose him, on the contrary, to be a godly man, afflicted with painful incurable disease, a dis- tressing burden to himself, and to everybody else — let him drown ? No. Stretch forth thy hand. Help, in the name of common humanity. The obligation of helpfulness has no other condition. It is binding in every personal relation. Setting aside the differences in concrete cases, there remains the common, imperative principle : Thou shalt serve. 1 1 An historical case occurring in the north of Holland, early in the year 1569, is narrated by Motley, in The Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part iii, ch. 5, thus : "A poor Anabaptist, guilty of no crime but his fellowship with a per- secuted sect, had been condemned to death. He had made his escape, closely pursued by an officer of justice, across a frozen lake. It was late in the winter, and the ice had become unsound. It trembled and cracked beneath his footsteps, but he reached the shore in safety. The officer was not so fortunate. The ice gave way beneath him, and he sank into the lake, uttering a cry for succor. There were none to hear him, except the fugitive whom he had been hunting. Dirk Willemzoon, for so was the Anabaptist called, instinctively obeyed the dictates of a generous nature, returned, crossed the quaking and dangerous ice, at the peril of his life, extended his hand to his enemy, and saved him from certain death. Unfortunately for human nature, it cannot be added that the generosity of the action was met by a corresponding heroism. The officer was desirous, it is true, of avoiding the responsibility of sacrificing the preserver of his life, but the burgomaster of Asperen sternly reminded him to remember his oath. He accordingly SERVICE 161 We have here another form of the law, but let it be ob- served, not another law. The law is one. The several forms may be viewed as progressing in comprehension, the second including the first, but wider, and so on, until this last ex- pands to embrace the larger duty of man. That it includes the others is evident, for he who rightly serves will not trespass, and will pay his just dues. But it is preferable to interpret each as coextensive with the others, only presenting a different phase. Thus it may fairly be regarded as a tres- pass, as injustice, as undutiful to withhold helpful service, the moral law being comprised and expressed in the formula : Serve thy fellows. 1 § 82. To serve is to promote the welfare of another. He who does this is a servant. The term as applied to menials has acquired rather a bad sense, especially when the service is compulsory, and the cognate word servile is distinctly opprobrious. But no bad sense, indeed only the contrary, colors the notion of voluntary service, and of this we are speaking. To serve is to confer a benefit, and he who does this is a benefactor. A teacher is a servant, though we call him a master. He is a servant directly of his pupils, indi- rectly of his employers, of the public, of posterity. Poli- arrested the fugitive, who, on the 16th of May following, was burned to death under the most lingering tortures." 1 It is worth noting that Geometry, the science of Space, arises from the three axioms of Non-inclosure, Straitness, and Possible parallelism ; that Logic, the science of Thought, arises from the three axioms of Non-contra- diction, Identity, and Excluded middle; and that Ethics, the science of Rights, arises from the three axioms of Non-trespass, Justice, and Loving service. If in any of these several groups we try to deduce one of the axioms from the other two, we find that the axiom to be inferred is neces- sarily presupposed in the other two. Like the sides of a triangle, each gives, in its own existence, the existence of the other two. They are co- ordinate and complementary, distinct, yet inseparable. Accordingly we view the ethical axioms as different phases and expressions of an essence that is one and the same. 162 OBLIGATION ticians proclaim themselves servants of the people, which truly is their office, though the profession be insincere. Husband and wife, parent and child, mutually subserve each other's interests. A servant is a minister, and this is a title of honor. 1 Min- isters of religion are servants of the Church, and as such are justly honored and reverenced. To become a Minister of State is to attain the highest official rank. The Prime Min- ister of Great Britain holds a place of exalted dignity. The motto of the Prince of Wales, descending to him from the Black Prince, is 3£dj trim, I serve, and perhaps no heraldic cognizance is more widely known, or more frequently quoted. A king on his throne is lightly the servant of his subjects ; and the very King of kings pronounced himself a lowly ser- vant, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, and because of his humble service to humanity, he has the highest throne. All service implies sacrifice. In reaching forth my hand to save a drowning brother, there is some expenditure of mental and neural energy, perhaps not measurable, but real. No service can be rendered without sacrifice, without giving, imparting what is in one's keeping. Hence the law of ser- vice is a law of sacrifice. Culture, in general, is preparation for yielding a return ; specifically, as the cultured field is capa- ble of yielding fruits, so the cultivated man is one prepared, by what he has acquired, to render services. When a sacri- fice is complete and directed to a noble end, we call it heroic. The very essence of heroism is the entire sacrifice of self for 1 Minister, a servant, from Lat. minus, less ; cf. to administer, and ad- ministration. Master, from Lat. magister, from majus, more ; cf. magistrate. In the Virginia Bill of Eights, § 2, it was perhaps first (June, 1776) authori- tatively declared : ' ' That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people ; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them." This great democratic principle is the gift of Christianity. See infra, § 146, note. SERVICE 163 the sake of others. It is the object of unbounded admiration and praise. In ancient days it became distinctly a cult. But heroes and hero worship are not peculiar to antiquity, for always and everywhere the heart of humanity responds to the call. The heroic sacrifice of the great servant of all is commanding, not merely the admiration, but the adoration of mankind. 1 i " Gladness be with thee, Helper of our world ! I think this is the authentic sign and seal Of Godship, that it ever waxes glad, And more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts, Into a rage to suffer for mankind, And recommence at sorrow : drops like seed After the blossom, ultimate of all. Say, does the seed scorn the earth and seek the sun? Surely it has no other end and aim Than to drop, once more die into the ground, Taste cold and darkness and oblivion there : And thence rise, tree-like grow through pain to joy, More joy and most joy, — do man good again." —Browning, in Balaustion's Adventure, 1.1917 sq.; spoken of Herakles. It is fitting here to observe that standard literature, especially of history, biography, and prose and poetic fiction, owes its position largely, perhaps chiefly, to its ethical elements, thereby appealing to the profound interest which men universally take in questions of right and wrong. Narratives of mere adventure, sentiments, mysteries, intricate plots, novelties, extrava- gancies, though of highest rhetorical finish, command but a passing atten- tion, or have but an ephemeral popularity ; while such as rightly apply ethical principles to life, hold permanently a high place in the esteem of the world. A skillful account of difficult duties well done, of brave endurance by an innocent sufferer, of resistance to sore temptation or the fall and rising again of the tempted, of stern repulsion of aggression, of struggles for liberty, of the heroic self-sacrifice of patriots, never fails to stir the heart of our common humanity, and to inspire a noble emulation. Very familiar to us all are the sturdy manhood and piety of Crusoe, the heroism of Leonidas and his Spartan band, the lofty steadfastness of Luther, the warning cry of d'Assas, the simple truthfulness of Jeanie Deans, it being divinely impossi- ble for her to lie, the vacillation of Prince Hamlet, the torture of Othello, the unscrupulous ambition of Lady Macbeth, the wifely faithfulness of Imogene, the immaculate chastity of Isabella, and the filial piety of Cordelia. Minor incidents and characters are mere accessories. Shakespeare's most famous works, resolving questions of casuistry or developing the inevitable consequences of injustice, oppression and crime, are ethical treatises. They 164 OBLIGATION § 83. The constant service demanded by moral law is not to be indiscriminate. One is not to serve all others equally. Our obligations to our fellows vary very greatly in extent. To near relatives we are bound for more service than to those further removed ; first, because the possibilities are greater ; secondly, because service creates debt, and where intercourse is intimate the exchange of benefactions is more frequent; and thirdly, because in certain cases, as of husband and wife, the minute interdependence calls for minute reciprocation. The extent of obligation is to be judged by the law of tres- pass. My service is due to one in so far as I do not thereby trespass on the rightful claims of some other. I may, for example, distribute my fortune in alms so widely as to violate the rights of my children. Likewise I am bound to promote the general welfare of the state only in so far as I do not thereby trespass on the rights of individual citizens, or of neighboring states, either by encroachment, or by transferring to either the service due to the other. Moreover, it should be particularly observed that the alien service required does not preclude the agent from participat- ing in the benefit conferred. When a man labors for the welfare of his family without thinking of or caring for his own individual profit, still, as a member of the family, he shares in the beneficence. When one serves the community or his country, either by promoting or by defending the com- mon interests, it is evident that, since the interests are common, he thereby enlarges his own liberty, and guards his own well being. If he does these things selfishly, himself his end, then he meanly degrades his family, his country, so far as in his power lies, to merely useful means ; which treat- ment is unworthy, is a trespass, whatever be the result. But if, with no thought of his own interest or gain, he does those discuss matter of deepest and of universal interest, and constitute a hand- book of morals for mankind. See infra, § 133, note. SERVICE 165 things unselfishly, making perhaps many painful personal sacrifices, still he shares in the beneficial results, is repaid and rewarded ; and even should his efforts fail, he neverthe- less enjoys the satisfaction of disinterested intent. Moral law does not prohibit any one from acting in a way that shall benefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he may benefit himself. These modifying considerations forestall the criticism usu- ally and justly applied to strict altruism, that if every one should be constantly sacrificing his own welfare for that of others, there would be no permanent recipient of benefaction, and the perfection of morality on this basis would be not only a universal disregard of welfare, but also its annihila- tion. But according to the modified altruism of the present treatise, moral law does not call for such absolute self-sacri- fice, for the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for one's own welfare. 1 It forbids this only as a personal end ; and the gratification of the desire is provided for, in the economy of human nature, by the community of interests, so that whatever promotes the welfare of another redounds to the benefactor; for, although, in the existing disorder of society, the objective return fail entirely, still the subjective sanction is abundant reward. § 84. In view of the right to service arises the question, in what manner and to what extent may one use another person. According to Kant, never as a means, but only as an end. He says : " The foundation of this principle is : Rational nature exists as an end in itself. . . . Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows : So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, 1 Nor does Christianity make this call, though it is often charged with doing. See supra, § 79, note. 166 OBLIGATION in every case as an end withal, and never as a means only." l He argues that to make use of another person as a means whereby to accomplish one's end, degrades him from a person into a mere thing, thus violating his dignity, his worth as a man. Since this is to wrong him grievously, he should be treated only as an end in himself. The doctrine is striking, and with qualification it is true. We should never use another as a means, unless with his own full knowledge and free consent. If, without this, I myself be used as a mere tool, then, on discovering it, I am indignant, feeling I have been treated unworthily, degraded and wronged, according to the measure of the abuse. But with the consensus of all parties, the using each other as means to rightful ends is justifiable. Indeed, the greater part of the amenities of life, the enjoyment and benefit of social intercourse, kindness, politeness, could not otherwise exist. Such reciprocal use does not degrade, it ennobles; and by consenting to become an instrumental means, one becomes a participant in beneficence. This privilege of using others is limited also to rightful ends. One may never seek to use another even with consent in a way or to an end that is wrong ; for this would be inducing him to become a partner in wrong doing, which would be doing him a wrong. The point in Kant's doctrine that I should make myself in mine own person an end, we have previously rejected as the essence of egoism. On the contrary, I ought ever and actively to constitute myself an intelligent and willing means to the welfare of others, which is altruism. § 85. A very important corollary from the general doc- trine of obligatory service is stewardship. Since unintermit- ting service is due from each one to others, according to his * From Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten, Auflage der R. and S., Seite 57 ; Abbott's translation, p. 67. SERVICE 167 relations, it follows that his time, his energy, his ability, his capital, his estate, whatever he may have in possession or acquire, is in reality not his own, but the property of those others, and he himself is their steward. The transient in- fluence one may have on his surroundings, his daily walk and conversation, his health of mind and body, his life itself as the basis of all, these are held in trust, and are to be devoted to the well being of his fellow men! 1 They are the owners; he, their agent. All is due, all is debt, ever paying, never paid. Not less is comprehended in the law of service. 2 1 Hence the deep criminality of suicide. Stoicism came short of the doctrine of service, and taught that the sage is lord of his life. From this teaching and the example of Zeno, together with the pessimism of the death- counseling Hegesias, resulted the horrible prevalence of suicide among the ancient Greeks and Eomans. On the battle field of Philippi (b.c. 42), when their cause was lost, Cassius, Titinius, and hundreds of the nobles of Rome, together with .Brutus, the noblest Roman of them all, in despair of the Republic, took refuge in self-slaughter. These did not see that suicide is the vile and wicked deed of a coward and thief. " La voix de l'honneur de l'homme lui cria-t-elle que se soustraire par la mort a la responsabilite' de ses acts est une insigne lachete\ Si irreparable que paraisse le mal qu'on a fait, il y a toujours areparer." — Gaboriau. "Le suicide est un vol fait au genre humain." — Rousseau. It is more, it is the fraud of a trustee, a total violation of a most sacred trust, it is robbery of both man and God ; a strange mixture of cowardice and rashness. With open-eyed timidity he flees from the passing ills of life, and with blind temerity rushes unbidden into the eternal presence, hurling himself against the thick bosses of Jeho- vah's buckler. 2 In Measure for Measure, Act i, sc. 1, 1. 30 sq. , the Duke, a personifica- tion of watchful and retributive providence, says : " Thyself and thy belongings Are not thine own so proper as to waste Thyself upon thy virtues, they on thee. Heaven doth with us as we with torches do, Not light them for themselves ; for if our virtues Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike As if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touch'd But to fine issues, nor Nature never lends The smallest scruple of her excellence, But, like a thrifty goddess, she determines Herself the glory of a creditor, Both thanks and use." 168 OBLIGATION We are bound, as trustees, not merely for the keeping, but also for the increase, the accumulation of our holdings. One's talents, whether of gold, silver or iron, of brain, brawn, bone, of intellect, sensibility, will, are all, whether great or small, to be put to usury, and a strict account rendered. 1 The servant who kept his Lord's pound laid up in a napkin was condemned as a wicked servant. Possessions are to be used, and used rightly, imbursed and disbursed, as dictated by the law of service, which demands a continuous distribu- tion of our gifts. 2 A further corollary is the obligation to guard and to de- fend possessions. Obviously one is bound to secure what is intrusted to his keeping against all comers, otherwise he can- not fulfill the obligation to use it in alien service. Guardian- ship is itself a service, since it preserves for others their property, which preservation is, indeed, a very necessary part of the general service due. Hence my rights are to be watchfully and zealously guarded. The property in my hands must be carefully protected, to prevent any trespass. My personal liberty must be maintained free from unwar- ranted interference. 3 My bodily welfare, and especially my life must be courageously defended against hurtful and deadly violence. The powerful instinct of self-preservation indicates the sacred duty of self-defense, and the original 1 " Talent, a weight or sum of money, natural gift or ability, inclination. Fr. from Lat. from Grk. See Trench, Study of Words. We derive the sense of ability from the parable in Matthew xxv [cf. Luke 19 : 11-27], our talents being gifts of God." — Skeat. 2 The pernicious vice of betting or gambling in any of its many forms is sufficiently condemned by the fact that it is a misuse of trust funds. Money is transferred without equivalent, and while the winner takes something for nothing, which is clearly akin to theft, the loser abandons his charge, whereby somebody other than himself, somebody to whom his service is due, suffers a loss, a wrong, a trespass. See supra, § 39. 8 " Le premier des biens est la liberty Le plus saint des devoirs de l'homme est de la conserver." — Dumas. SERVICE 169 impulse of natural affection shows the no less sacred duty of defending the lives intrusted to our care. Violence must be repelled, if need be, by counter violence. But defense should not be allowed to pass over, as it strongly tends to do, into mere vengeance. The impulse to revenge is a male- volent desire, and hence abnormal, and hence unjustifiable. Yet retaliation is sometimes the best and indeed the only means of effective defense, in which case it is duty. 1 § 86. We can imagine a life conducted throughout accord- ing to the principles thus far expounded. One might con- ceivably be governed, in general and in particular, by a sense of duty, duty being here taken in the limited meaning of outward obedience to the law of trespass, justice and ser- vice, inspired by respect for the law, recognized as demand- ing that much but no more. The whole life being one of innocence and beneficence, duty is said to be perfectly ful- filled by this external conformity to the law simply out of respect for the law, a profound reverence for all pervading moral obligation, and this alone is what should determine all human conduct. 2 1 See supra, § 40 ; and infra, § 136 sq., where an application of this doc- trine of defense shows more fully its great importance. But let it be observed here that defense is the sole warrant for interference in another's liberty. In a profound and wide sense I am my brother's keeper, and must defend him from the trespass of others, which is a warrant for my interfer- ence in their liberty. Conversely, I am bound to defend them from him in case he attempts doing a wrong, and thus have a warrant for my interfer- ence in his liberty. See supra, § 32. 2 Such is, the doctrine of Kant. He says : "Duty is the necessity of act- ing from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it. . . . Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim to follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations." — Grundlegung, u. s. w. ; Auflage der R. and S., Seite 20; Abbott's trans., pp. 22, 23. The implication is that 170 OBLIGATION The rigorism of this stoical doctrine is impressive and imposing. It is a severe and noble conception of duty, a high ideal. But observe, it does not merely disregard the affections ; it requires their suppression. If we judge a man to be governed in all his conduct by a sense of duty, fulfill- ing carefully, anxiously, assiduously his many obligations, living a life of sacrificial service, purely because of respect for the law of duty, we are filled with admiration for so lofty a character ; but if we judge him at the same time destitute of love, we admire him as we admire an iceberg. There is an instinctive repugnance to a person human, yet not hu- mane. And if we find he has laboriously extinguished the yearnings of natural affection in favor of an overruling and exclusive conception of absolute duty, we turn from him as from a monstrous and repulsive prodigy. The sense of duty, rising high but stopping with good works, fails to fulfill the law's demands. In the moral ideal of humanity, there is something higher than this rigid stoi- cism. 1 Were I sick and suffering, and did my friend serve love is not a duty ; for this conception of obligation excludes all personal inclination, teaching that an action determined by love alone is not a moral action, and that one wherein love mingles with duty is morally impure, being contaminated by inclination. 1 The poets sometimes rise above the philosophers. Lowell, in The Vision of Sir Launfal, tells of the knight going to search for the Holy Grail, who, as he rode out of his castle's gate, saw a leper awaiting alms. Not moved with compassion (Mark, 1: 41), but with loathing, he tossed him a piece of gold, and without a word, rode on. " The leper raised not the gold from the dust ; • Better to me the poor man's crust, Better the blessing of the poor, Though I turn me empty from his door.' That is no true alms which the hand can hold ; He gives nothing hut worthless gold Who gives from a sense of duty. The Holy Supper is kept indeed In whatso we share with another's need ; Not what we give, hut what we share, For the gift without the giver is hare." SERVICE 171 me merely from a sense of duty, I should be displeased, I would tell him to begone, I will hire a nurse. Is it suffi- cient for a father to guard and promote the welfare of his child simply out of respect for his rational obligation? Shall a mother tend her babe with all the wonderful, beautiful solicitude and ready self-sacrifice that win our adoration, merely because she knows she ought so to do ? No, there is a higher, nobler impulse, maternal love. Should a hus- band and wife serve each other merely from a sense of duty, it would be a just cause of dissatisfaction, and perhaps of disunion. The conception of duty, enlarged beyond inno- cence to include beneficence, comes short of obligation. If it be thus limited, then it is legality, not morality, and again there is something higher than duty, something nobler than service. We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying that a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his country, but should purify his character by eliminating all such inclinations ; a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts : Thou shalt not love thy neighbor. 172 OBLIGATION CHAPTER XI CHAKITY § 87. An argument already offered, having its basis in the general principle that the natural or constitutional powers of man ought to fulfill their normal functions, or, more spe- cifically, that every one has a right to gratify his normal desires, a right being a duty, concludes the appetites and appetencies to be auxiliary to the affections, which are thus normally supreme. 1 From this it was directly inferred that self cannot rightly be an end. With equal cogency it is implied that the object of affection is the normal and right- ful end of all endeavor. In other words, the affections, included under the general name love, are obligatory ; they ought, in due manner and measure, to be gratified. The moral law, found in the original and innermost nature of man, enjoins that he love his fellow man. Consider the meaning of affection, love, charity, benevo- lence, these terms being taken synonymously. Love is a desire, an impulse or inclination toward others, disposing one to give out from his own resources what may benefit them. Let it be kept clearly in mind that love is strictly a desire. It should not be confused with volition, though the synonym, benevolence, partakes, etymologically, of the voli- tion; for love is simply the causative antecedent of the volitional endeavor. 2 It is not a feeling, though attended i See supra, §§ 78, 79. 2 Benevolence, from Lat. bene, well, and volens, wishing, willing. Bene- ficence, from bene, and faciens, doing. Endeavor, from Fr. en, in, and CHARITY 173 by peculiar feelings ; being neither an emotion, though the name is commonly applied to its attendant emotions ; nor a sentiment, though the sentiments that normally accompany it act and react powerfully to stimulate the desire. Love is properly and definitely a desire, relative to a sentient object, whose welfare it would promote. 1 § 88. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of high authority, Love cannot be commanded, for it is an affection, and not a volition which alone is subject to com- mand. 2 But love, benevolence, charity, pathological love, devoir, duty, Charity, love; from Lat. caritatem, ace. of caritas, dearness, from cams, dear; c/., cherish, caress. We use the beautiful word charity, ay airy, in this wide sense which is imbedded in our early literature, not ap- proving the reduction to almsgiving and like external acts, which it has suf- fered in common speech. The Revisers of The English New Testament unfortunately make the concession, and in 1 Corinthians, xiii, replace it by love, which term, besides marring the rhythm, is quite as ambiguous in usage, and as liable to be misunderstood. The words chastity and virtue have suffered alike reduction to a certain narrow and less delicate sense; see supra, § 70, note. 1 The so-called love of complacency especially should be distinguished from the love of benevolence. Complacency is the quiet, pleasurable feeling that arises on contemplating with approbation the character or conduct of another. It hardly differs from the feeling of approbation, and as one may have self-approbation, so also he may be self-complacent. Complacency is strictly a feeling, a sentiment, and not a desire, and it is a misnomer to call it love. The love of benevolence alone is love. Hence it is quite possible to love one whose character and conduct are abhorrent. Jesus loved both Judas and John, but his love of John was mingled with and strengthened by complacency. 2 " Love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake ; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination, nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practi- cal love [i.e. service], and not pathological [i.e. affection], a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense, in principles Of action, and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be com- manded. It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy." — Kant, Grundlegung, S. 19 ; Abbott's trans., p. 21. See 174 OBLIGATION as distinguished from practical love which is not properly love but willing service, can be commanded ; though truly it is an affection, becoming active only as the subject is affected by an amiable object, that is, an object susceptible of wel- fare. For, although every command is primarily addressed to the will, yet the will, having, by means of voluntary atten- tion, indirect control of all the mental faculties, carries out the command, if not thwarted by passion, in impressing its subordinates into the required order. Otherwise the sub- jective springs of conduct could have no moral quality. Even belief, a feeling of assurance, of conviction, is com- manded in the presence of truth ; and the command is obeyed, and the feeling is induced, by giving attention, sincere heed, to the presented truth. 1 Love, charity, a desire for another's welfare, may likewise be commanded in the presence of amiability, and the command obeyed, the affection induced, by giving like heed to the amiable capacity of the object. Hence the love of benevolence can be commanded, since it can be voluntarily induced, nourished and invigorated. Not only can this love be commanded, but i^iscpmr- manded. The moral law is embedded in and arises from the very constitution of human nature. Desires awakened by objects and guided by intelligence are the motives of volun- tary conduct. We have seen that among these the affections are normally supreme, rightly subjecting all other motive impulses to their ends. Therefore we find that, in order to in Luke, 6: 27-38, where this " practical love" specifically is commanded. Elsewhere Kant says: " Love to God, considered as an inclination (patholo- gical love), is impossible, for he is not an object of the senses. The same affection toward men is possible no doubt, but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at command; therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that pith of all laws, Love God above everything, and thy neighbor as thyself." — Kritik der praktischen Yernunft, Auflage der R. und S., Seite 210; Abbott's trans., p. 250. i See Supra, § 60. CHABITY 175 fulfill their natural functions, the affections must have not merely free but preeminent exercise, and that this is essen- tially the supreme law of humanity demanding reverent obedience. § 89. The affections having different objects, have re- ceived various names ; as, conjugal, parental, filial and fraternal love, friendship, kindness, patriotism, philanthropy. In each of these the affection varies both in kind and degree. The differences in kind are due to differences in the rela- tions. The differences in degree are regulated by the pos- sibilities. We are not bound to love all others equally, this being unnatural. Many ties, many obligations. Those most nearly related are bound to love each other with a special ardor ; as, parents and children. The sentiment of gratitude excites love for a benefactor or neighbor. It enters largely along with friendship and kindness into the forms and substance of true politeness, which is love in littles, and in all its grades is essential to high moral culture, and is ennobling. 1 We are bound to love those whose character and conduct 1 Friendship is discussed by Aristotle at length in Nic. Eth. bks. viii and ix. On gratitude, see Elements of Psychology, § 254. The royal law, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, suggested the reasonable question, Who is my neighbor ? Luke, 10 : 25 sq. The answer, in the parable, is, The Samaritan was neighbor to the wounded man, because he showed mercy on him. Hence the wounded man was bound to love the Samaritan as himself. This is the obligation of gratitude to a benefactor. The parable does not, as commonly supposed, teach philanthropy, but gratitude, and the love that would requite benefaction. My benefactor is my neighbor, come he from the far east or west, from a despised race or a hostile camp, and I am told to love him as myself. The added injunction, Go and do thou likewise, is philanthropic in tone, but it is no part of the parable, no part of the an- swer. There is no Scripture commanding us to love everybody as in fact we love ourselves. The new commandment, John, 13 : 34, is to a special class, and sets up a higher and purer standard. See supra, § 74, note, and § 48, note. 176 OBLIGATION we abhor, cherishing the desire to remedy the evil in them, and otherwise to better them. We should love even a wicked and active enemy ; righteous defensive resentment being quite consistent with the impulse to promote, not his evil way, but his well-being whenever opportunity offers or can be found, and in so far as we do not thereby trespass on some other. In civilized warfare after a victory the wounded abandoned by the defeated are cared for humanely. This is love to enemies ; we feel the obligation, and call it humanity. We are bound to love all men of all races, those in the remotest regions of the globe, our very antipodes, yes, and even the generation yet unborn, in a due manner and meas- ure. This is the obligation of philanthropy. 1 § 90. Service fulfilling the law must be, not merely willing service, but loving service. We have seen that a life of sacrificial service, of active beneficence, determined only by respect for the law, fails of completeness. 2 Though I be- stow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. It is essential to duty that love be its spring. The service due is loving service. Let the duplex form of this phrase be noted. Loving is desiring, a subjec- tive motive ; it is benevolence, well-wishing. Service is acting, an objective motion ; it is beneficence, well-doing. Serving is the normal outcome, the natural consequent, of loving ; they are psychological correlatives. Neither is com- plete without the other. For, how is it possible that one should sincerely, willingly, intentionally endeavor to promote another's welfare, unless 1 "Friends, parents, neighbors, first it will embrace, Our country next, and next all human race. Wide and more wide, th' o'erflowing of the mind Takes every creature in of every kind. Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed, And heaven reflects its image in her breast." — Pope. 2 See supra, § 86. CHARITY 177 he desire the other's welfare ? All voluntary effort is con- ditioned on an antecedent desire, so that the command of intelligent, willing service is a command of intelligent, loving service. One cannot sincerely strive for another's welfare unless he desire it, and this is love. If it be said, the desire is simply to obey, we reply, a desire to obey a command to serve, is a desire to serve as commanded. On the other hand, how can there be love not followed by service ? As faith without works is dead, so also is love without service. If it have any life, it is at least ready and watchful of opportunity to serve. For generous love impels to service. He who loves will serve, will render willing, active, self-sacrificing service. Also he who loves will be just, will pay all dues, will not trespass. Bear ye one another's burdens,' and so fulfill the law. Owe no man any- thing, save to love one another, this being the only debt that cannot be finally discharged ; for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. Love is the fulfillment of the law. 1 All the various presentations of the moral law heretofore considered, we now find to be summed in the law of loving service, Thou shalt love and serve. And indeed we see that even herein is superfluity, for the whole moral law, the total of human obligation, is completely and comprehensively 1 See Galatians, 6:2; Romans, 13:8, 10. Love is natural, normal; hate, unnatural, abnormal. "It is to the credit of human nature, that, except where its selfishness is brought into play, it loves more readily than it hates. Hatred, by a gradual and quiet process, will even be transformed into love, unless the change be impeded by a continually new irritation of the original feeling of hostility." — Hawthorne, Scarlet Letter, ch. 13. " Das Gesetz der Liebe soil walten, und was das Naturgesetz in den Dingen, das ist das Sittengesetz und das Recht im Menschen." — Auer- bach, Auf der Hbhe. " First of all was Chaos ; next in order, Earth with her spacious bosom ; then Love, who is preeminent among the Immortals." — Hesiod, as quoted by Aristotle in Metaphysics, bk.i, ch. 4. 178 OBLIGATION summed in the single categorical imperative of one syllable, love. Thou shalt love, is the perfect law, the law of love. 1 § 91. Progress in moral culture consists in transforming fear into respect, and respect into love. With primitive char- acters, and even with many highly cultured otherwise, the fear of penalty is the chief, often the only, motive of obedience. To this may be added as one step higher, the hope of reward. In this is an appeal to the selfish propensities usually pre- dominant in crude humanity. They are not thereby ap- proved, but used to bring the man to at least outward obedience, a step toward inward culture. Thus the law is a pedagogue, leading men upward. 2 A thoughtful consideration of one's relations, a clear recog- nition of the law in us, inspires respect for its mandate, and an impulse to observance. Herein is a passing away from the influence of threats and promises. These are lost to * " General benevolence is the great law of the whole moral creation." — Butler, Sermon viii. " O high imperative, how dost thou impend Over our guilty consciences, that know And yet ignore, fear yet transgress, admire As best, and yet pursue the way that's worse ! What statesman, or what scholar, or what man J Is there who knows not that this law, if kept, Would work man's perfect weal ; who doth not know That man was made to keep the law of love, And keeps it not ; that love sums all his duty, All his need ; and, did it once prevail, Love would ensure all right, include all virtue, Compel obedience to each lower law, Perfect man's being and fulfill his end ? " — Henry W. Bankin, The Law of Love. "The law ordained, Thou shalt love, and love ordained that law. Man could not keep it. Then love ordained the gospel, God so loved. Thus, Thou shalt love, is the whole of The Law; and, God so loved, is the whole of The Gospel. This is so clear, that it is at once Law and Gospel for chil- dren and for savages ; and yet it is so deep in its limpid clearness that no philosopher can fathom it." — Duncan, Colloquia Peripatetica. 2 See Galatians, 3 :24, 25 ; 2 Corinthians, 5 : 11 ; and cf. supra, § 52, last paragraph. CHARITY 179 sight, and obedience is determined simply by respect for the law. 1 The vast all-pervading sense of moral obligation, a wide comprehensive view of dnty, an obedience to the law for its own sake superior to its sanctions, produce nobility and excellence in moral character. Yet this ideal is cold, hard, stern, repressing as weakness the natural play of tender sympathy, of generous sentiment, of warm inclination toward others, maintaining a stoical indifference to their weal or woe, and giving help exclusively out of respect for the law of service. As a scheme of morals, this cannot be purged of egoism, of selfishness ; for necessarily it holds that the so- called duties to self are equally or even more imperative than duties to another, those being the basis from which all other duties arise. 2 In the still higher ideal, cold respect for law is gradually, as culture progresses, replaced by charity, which is the bond of perfectness. As in the second grade the sanctions of the law are lost to sight, so in this highest grade the law itself disappears from view, and its requirements are fulfilled with- out reference to its mandate. It is the fruit of moral growth that both subjective and objective activities accord with the law, not because of its pressure, but because the order and harmony of the natural powers have been restored, and the man does what is right because his dominant im- pulses lead thereto, and his free preference finds therein his highest gratification. He renders loving service in due meas- 1 " It argues a low degree of insight into the nature and dignity of man," says Froebel, "if the incentive of reward in a future world is supposed to be needed in order to insure a conduct worthy of his nature and destiny. If the human being is enabled at an early period to live in accordance with genuine humanity, he can and should at all times appreciate the dignity of his being ; and at all times the consciousness of having lived worthily and in accordance with the requirements of his being, should be his highest reward, needing no addition of external recompense.' ' — Education of Man, § 88. 2 See supra, § 75, note ; and § 86. 180 OBLIGATION ure to his fellow men, this having become the habit, the second nature of his being. He does by nature the things of the law, and having no law, is a law unto himself, showing the work of the law written in his heart. For love knows no law other than its own impulse. 1 Obviously, in the economy of human nature, this progres- sion does not take place uniformly. A criminal at war with society at large may be dutiful to his family in other matters because of strong domestic affection, and in so far fulfill the law of love. The average good citizen knows little and cares less about the criminal code. Its enactments are not for him. He has not the slightest disposition to do what it forbids, and orders his actions without reference to it. The penitentiary, the jail, the gallows, have no terrors for him. The police, the courts, the judiciary, he recognizes as social machinery devised and maintained for the protection of his rights. They have no other meaning for him. He has risen above the great body of civil law, and is not, properly speak- ing, an obedient, but a law-abiding citizen who, without 1 See Colossians, 3:14; 1 John, 4:18. See the progress as stated in 2 Peter, 1: 5-7. " He who does good with inclination, and with love to his neighbor, stands on a higher plane than he who is doing it with a constant victory over himself." — Stahl, Eechts- und Staats-Lehre, i, 158. " Sympa- thy, fellowship in the needs of others, philanthropy, is the source from which flows everything that Ethics prescribes under the name of duties of virtue and love. It is the source of all actions which have moral value, the sole genuine moral motive, and the firmest and surest pledge of moral de- portment." — Schopenhauer, Grund-Probleme, 133. It is curious to note that the words of St Paul, in Romans, 2 : 14, odroi pSfiov fir] exovT€$ eavrois ds ?£«, olov v6/jlos &v eavrip, the refined and free-spirited will behave, as being a law unto himself. Again in Galatians, 5 : 23, we find : Kard, rCav toiovtwv oi>K tariv vdfios, against such there is no law ; and in Aristotle's Politico,, bk. iii, ch. 13, we have : Kara 8k twv tolo6twv oi K can v6/j.os - avrol ydp den ?6/aoj, against such there is no law ; for they themselves are a law. CHARITY 181 thought of the law, governs his conduct by his own cultured preferences. In his intercourse with friends and acquaint- ances, he may still have duties that are irksome and repug- nant which he fulfills from a sense of duty, and therein feels the tense bonds of obligation. His further moral growth requires the enlarging and deepening of charitable sympa- thies, so that his conduct may be determined more and more by love, less and less by law ; doing always the right thing, not because he ought so to do, but because he wants to do just that thing rather than any other. § 92. We have seen that so long as one acts merely from respect for the law, he is in bondage to the law. 1 He has passed perhaps with many a fierce struggle out from a de- grading slavery to appetites and passions and unbridled lusts, for of what a man is overcome of the same is he also brought into bondage, into a voluntary and honorable bondage. His conduct becomes uniform, reduced to the order of facts that ought to be, regulated by principles conforming to moral law. This is a dignified attitude, a high and rare attain- ment. But the man is in bonds, rigid, inexorable, though honorable, bound under a law that knows no concession or relaxation. By many moralists this is called liberty. Surely it is not liberty, but strict, the strictest, bondage. It is moral necessity. Regulus said: I must return. Luther cried : I can do no otherwise. Where, then, is liberty, the perfect liberty for which man so ardently longs ? 2 Evidently when one does more and more as the law requires, not by virtue of the obligation, but by virtue of his own native or cultured disposition, he is passing from 1 In § 72, supra; cf. §86. 2 See 2 Peter, 2 :19. For the several kinds of necessity, see supra, § 44, note. Christians are servants, bond-servants, slaves, doOXoi. They are no longer their own ; they are bought with a price. See Romans, 6 : 16-22 ; 1 Corinthians, 7: 21-23 ; Luke, 2 : 29. 182 OBLIGATION under bondage into the realm of liberty. When love takes the place of constraining duty, the law ceases to be law. Then he is no longer under law, but under grace ; then, but not till then, is he perfectly free. The law commands, Thou shalt love ; and when through obedience love has become the dominating impulse, confirmed and established, the law as law has disappeared. Thus perfect love is perfect liberty. 1 Then all doing is righteous yet free, since it is done in free preference to any other. Here and here only is the longed for liberty to be found. In our imperfection and struggles with self, which never cease, this highest ideal is never fully realized in human life. The imperfect person is one conscious of obligation. The perfect person is one conscious of holiness. Perfect persons are not under law; so that we may truly say the holy angels and the Deity are under no obligation to do what they do, but being perfect in love, are perfect in work, and perfect in liberty. Heaven knows no law. 1 Love and liberty grow out of the same root in the reality of their meaning, as in the origin of the words which express it ; both arising from the Teutonic base Lub. The view presented is in accord with the true doctrine of antinomianism, or Christian liberty. See John, 8 : 32 ; 15 : 12-15 j Galatians, 5 : 1, 13, 14 ; James, 1:25. WELFARE 183 CHAPTER XII WELFARE § 93. The term welfare has been used in the foregoing discussion. The corresponding notion is of so great impor- tance in ethical theory as to require special examination. Many philosophers, both ancient and modern, hold that the total essence of well-being or welfare or happiness is pleasure. All activity, they say, resolves ultimately into seeking for pleasure and shrinking from pain, this being a necessary consequence of the original constitution of the animal man, fully explaining all his conduct, and determin- ing his character in its highest development. The maxi- mum of pleasure attained throughout life is the maximum of welfare. Pleasures are admitted to vary in quantity, and even in quality, the coarse enjoyment of brutal sensuality differing widely from the refined enjoyment of delicate sen- timent. Originally, according to the hypothesis of evolu- tion, all impulsion is brutally selfish ; gradually it becomes polished by its environment, but with no change of sub- stance. The doctrine is essentially egoistic. Benevolence, in its most generous forms, is explained by the pleasure it gives the benefactor, and a purely disinterested action is pro- nounced a psychological impossibility. 1 1 Bentham begins his treatise on "The Principles of Morals and Legis- lation" as follows : "Nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 184 OBLIGATION Without renewing the objections to egoism, let it be here observed that pleasure and pain are qualities belonging to feeling only. They are not elements of desire or of its grat- ification, though indeed they accompany both. We often seek to gratify a desire utterly regardless of the attendant pleasure or pain, and hence these are not universal ends. 1 Moreover, pleasure and pain have in themselves no moral quality, they are neither right nor wrong. But if pleasure were the ultimate end of human endeavor, then it were ethical in the highest degree, and the maximum of pleasure attained would be the maximum of virtue; which is absurd. 2 It is freely admitted that there is a natural and hence uni- versal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, the reverse being psychologically impossible. But pleasure as an object of desire is only one among a large number of appetences, and it is not the chiefest or strongest or most prevailing, for there are others that often override it. Now it is evident that the gratification of one normal desire among many that are coordinate cannot constitute entire well-being ; for to this end there must be a measured, harmonized gratification of all native inclinations. Nor can desire for pleasure be, even obscurely, the constantly informing element of the other desires ; for very often we desire and ardently pursue, not pain itself, but what we know to be painful ; we take pains to reach a painful end, bitterly demanding satisfaction, all we think ; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The principle of utility recog- nizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law." Cf. J. S. Mill's treatise on Utilitarianism. 1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 228, 256; and supra, § 5. 2 "The principle of private felicity," says Kant, " which some make the supreme principle of morality, would be expressed thus : Love thyself above everything, and God and thy neighbor for thine own sake." — Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, S. 210, note. WELFARE 185 and heartily accepting the poignant consequences. Hence pleasure, even should it be at a. continuous maximum through- out life, cannot of itself be accounted welfare, though indeed in complete welfare it is an ever-present and important factor. 1 Of course one may define welfare as a maximum of pleas- ure and discuss it accordingly ; but it is very certain that this is not the notion of welfare that prevails among men. No doubt the notion includes pleasure, but it includes much more ; for men condemn, as lacking dignity, a life whose sole aim is pleasure however refined. Who enjoys more delightful pleasure, according to De Quincey, than the opium-eater? Despite his delicious dreaming, he is judged a most pitiful wretch. Even he who devotes himself to giving pleasure to others, as the professional musician, is held in slight esteem. So also the comedian. Men enjoy laughing, but the perpetually funny man is classed with the circus clown, a lineal descendant of the court jester, whose rank was low, and whose quips were regulated with whips. Still the pleasure giver has a calling, for pleasant recreation 1 " The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but self-conservation. Such was the doctrine of Chrysippus, the Stoic. Pleasure, said he, is the natural result, eiri'yivvqixa' 1 of successful effort to secure what is in harmony with our nature. It follows upon activity, but should never be made the end of human endeavor." — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., §55. " If hap- piness means the absence of care and the inexperience of painful emotion," says Froude, " then the best securities for it are a hard heart and a good digestion." Carlyle dubbed this view of happiness "the pig philosophy," and also says : " Man's unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness ; it is because there is an Infinite iu him, which with all his cunning, he cannot quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers and Uphol- sterers and Confectioners undertake, in joint stock company, to make one Shoeblack Happy ? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two ; for the Shoeblack also has a soul quite other than his stomach ; and would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more, and no less : GooVs infinite universe altogether to himself, therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as fast as it rose." — Sartor Resartus, bk. ii, ch. 9. 186 OBLIGATION is needful to our welfare. But the mere pleasure seeker, studying his own enjoyment, not occasionally as a recreation but as the end of living, the devotee of social amenities, the professional sportsman, the dissipated spendthrift, the disso- lute libertine, each of these is even more justly reprobated, hardly for lack of wisdom in his way, rather for total lack of wisdom's way. A life of pleasure, whether generous or self- ish, even one of simple playful gayety apart from vice, is accounted a wasted life, and wise men take infinite pains to secure, through much self-denial, a regulated and sober welfare. § 94. We are, then, in great need to know, clearly and distinctly, the meaning of welfare. In accord with the fun- damental doctrine of this treatise, the following definition is proposed: Welfare is the gratification of normal desire. From this it follows that continuous welfare is the constant gratification of normal desires throughout a complete life. Its attainment calls for self-control, for a measured adjust- ment of incompatible gratifications, in order to harmony, and to the maximum gratification of those desires that are natu- ral, normal and in accord with moral law. The primary principle is, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires, if he do not trespass. Hence he has a right to welfare ; but whether he will attain it or not depends on the intelligent regulation of his desires, together with the possibility of their gratification within the given limits. It has been pointed out that, taken concretely, virtuous conduct is conduct conformed to practical reason or con- science, and, taken abstractly, virtue is action in conformity with moral law. Also it was observed that virtue implies a struggle against obstacles. 1 Now, besides the subjective dif- ficulties of virtuous endeavor, the judging, choosing and i See supra, § 70. WELFARE 187 striving for right life, there are practically numerous and great objective difficulties, external obstacles in circum- stances, that oppose one at every turn, preventing the com- plete gratification of virtuous longings. If the subjective intention and effort be accomplished, then, even though the objective result fail, the chief condition of welfare is ful- filled, and its principal element provided. But to complete welfare, there must be an external realization of the subjec- tive virtuous intent. So it is that, in the actual warfare of life, though it chastens and strengthens, there is rarely, if ever, a complete realization of thorough-going welfare. 1 Since we have defined welfare as the gratification of nor- mal desires, and have characterized virtue as being the effort to realize this gratification in loving service, it appears that one's welfare comes from seeking disinterestedly to promote the welfare of others, and that an earnest constant striving to reach this end comprises the sum total of obligation. It is attained on two parallels. First, as a prime condition, one should seek, directly and indirectly, by precept, by exam- ple, and by whatever influence he may rightly use, to culti- vate in his fellows a virtuous disposition, inducing generous impulses, and impressing the mandate, Go, and do thou likewise. Such education is due especially from parents to children, from teachers to pupils, from the enlightened civ- ilizer to the benighted barbarian. Secondly, he should strive to remove, in so far as practicable, the external obsta- cles to their welfare lying in the way of his fellows, espe- cially of those more nearly related to him ; and also to fur- nish out of his own resources all reasonable facilities for these others to do likewise, thus helping them to modify and arrange their circumstances favorably to their own righteous 1 Semita certe Tranquillse per virtutem patet unica vitae." — Juvenal, lib. iv, sat. 10. 188 OBLIGATION ends. So doing, he shall himself, without thought of him- self, experience the working of that great natural law of human activity, It is more blessed to give than to receive. 1 § 95. It is now needful to inquire concerning happiness, of which nothing has heretofore been said. The term is very indefinite, and though in common use, there is difficulty in fixing its meaning. 2 Sometimes we hear that happiness is continuous pleasure. If this be allowed, then happiness cannot be identified with welfare ; for, as we have seen, wel- fare is something more than pleasure. But, while pleasure is a large, and perhaps an essential ingredient in happiness, this also seems to have other elements. 3 Then shall not happiness and welfare be identified? Not strictly; for, though surely there is an intimate connection between them, a distinction remains. It is the distinction of antecedent and consequent in causal relation. Welfare consists in the constant gratification of right desires. Now, like as pleas- ure is the reflex or correlate of spontaneous and unimpeded 1 "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said: MaKa.pi.bv £ adpuv, he who looks upward) ; certain it is that what makes man to be man, is that he alone can turn his face to heaven ; certain it is that he alone yearns for something that neither sense nor reason can supply." — Max Muller, Science of Religion, Lee. 1. " Pronaque cum spectent animalia coetera terram, Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere valtus." — Ovid, Metamorphoseon, i, 2. DEITY 201 erly makes no mention of the Deity. But in metaphysics the chief problem is the existence of God. Ethics, which also is not a science of material nature, but of human nature, of man on his spiritual side, in like manner transcends physics. It treats exclusively of mental states and acts, of phenomena of the soul or spirit. The facts on which its theory is based are subjective facts of direct observation by introspection, which are combined with inferences from them and from observed external activities. Here we are wholly within the spiritual sphere. 1 A clear distinction may be made, by a difference in degree, between the human and the superhuman, but who shall draw the line between the natu- ral and the supernatural ? 2 To posit in the spiritual sphere a supreme personal spirit, so far from being unscientific, is simply to complete the content of the sphere with a substance and its attributes, with the conscious personality of a rational being, in kind like to that which gives rise to the theory ; and therefore this complementing of the scheme is strictly scientific. 3 1 See supra, § 18, note. 2 Professor F. Godet, in his Defence of the Christian Faith, Lee. 4, p. 148, Lyltleton's translation, seeks to do so. He defines the supernatural as "any modification of being in nature which is not the effect of the forces with which it is endowed, or of the laws under whose command those forces act." Of such modifications he finds two cases, "the one existing in nature itself, man; the other, above nature, God," both characterized as super- natural beings by freedom. Passing by the errors of viewing laws as causes, and natural laws as mandatory, we remark that to say the freedom of man, a being within nature, "is not the effect of the forces with which it [nature] is endowed," is inept, unless "nature" be restricted by definition to a meaning more narrow than that commonly understood in scientific discus- sion. Freedom is not something superadded to man's nature ; it is the very law of his being, and essential also in the nature of a personal Deity. See Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, ch. 2. 3 Should anyone flippantly say that the introduction of the Deity into ethical theory renews the Deus ex machina of the ancient drama, a god let down at last, from the machinery overhead, to disentangle the imbroglio on the stage, the answer is easy. Theism posits God as the only explanation 202 OBLIGATION § 100. The ground from which the doctrine of this treatise has thus far been developed, is the natural constitution of man. His several powers of intellect and will, his emotional capacity, and the impulse to activity in his motive desires, have each a normal and cooperative function. Herein is dis- cerned the principle that it is right to gratify normal desire, together with the supreme law of humanity commanding the constant order of facts that ought to be, the single impera- tive of trespass, duty, justice or loving service. Now, it may reasonably be asked whether the common constitution . of human beings is to be regarded as an ultimate ground, an original source of obligation, beyond which there is no determinant. Positivism answers affirmatively, which consists with its rigid empiricism. But we have tried to show that there is for us something more than experience. Evolutionism finds an antecedent determinant in the environment, a combina- tion of second causes, under whose influence the human con- stitution has been developed. But when we consider the great variety of environment to which the several races of mankind have been subjected, we should expect, on this view, to find a corresponding variety of constitution, and consequent varieties of moral law ; whereas, however great the variations in degree especially of intelligence, and the variety of constructions built upon the law, still, throughout history and everywhere, mankind is one, and the law is one. 1 of cosmic order, as both establishing and maintaining. If from the drama of human life his part be left out, then indeed it were a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel. But on recognizing him as its author director, and principal personage, present throughout, combining, regulating, overruling the great lines of action amid a free play of characters, the whole becomes intelligible, the obscure clear, and the ultimate solution foreseen. 1 The pessimism of Pascal led him to say, in Pensees, that justice on one side of the Pyrenees is a different thing from justice on the other side. But even Hobbes found place to say : " The laws of Nature [meaning of Human DEITY 203 This essentially permanent uniformity points distinctly to an origin for the human constitution in a cause beyond itself and its environment, and, on the principle of like effect like cause, to a common cause, to a unity in the originating cause. 1 The existence of an omnipotent and consistent maker and ruler, is the only satisfactory explanation of these significant facts that has been or can be offered, and this explanation alone fulfills the demand of ethical theory. § 101. Many theistic moralists hold that the will of God is the original and ultimate ground of obligation. He has made us as it hath pleased him, revealing his will in us, and in our relations to each other and to himself. A reverent interpretation of nature and of history enables us to under- stand his will more clearly, and to these he has added a distinct revelation of it in the holy scriptures. Had it pleased him to make us and our surroundings otherwise, or merely to issue different, even contrary, commandments, our obligations would have been different from what they are, since his express will is their sole, sufficient and final ground. That the will of God, however revealed, defines our obliga- tions is unquestionable. But we cannot regard his authority as decisive, if it be merely arbitrary ; for this view implies the possibility of contradictions that are revolting. Should he capriciously command lying, murder, theft, all heaven and earth would rebel. The doctrine unwittingly represents him as a tyrant ruling by fear, liable to transient whims inverting right and wrong, disordering order, compounding felony, falsifying truth, thereby divesting his intelligent Nature ; see supra, § 18, note] are immutable and eternal. What they forbid can never be lawful ; what they command can never be unlawful." — Be Cive, vol. ii, p. 46. 1 See Elements of Inductive Logic, § 21 ; and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 384 of Meiklejohn's translation. 204 OBLIGATION subjects of all reliable knowledge of himself and of his crea- tions. Such notion is psychologically, philosophically and logically absurd. 1 We must look beyond the will of God for the ultimate determinant of obligation, into that which determines his will, into his original, eternal, essential nature. Necessarily and rightly we conceive of him as a spirit, having harmoni- ous attributes constituting his nature, in which is no vari- ableness nor shadow of turning. Being in himself the embodiment of truth, it is impossible for him to lie ; being essentially just, he can never justify crime ; such self-contra- diction would dethrone him, would be the suicide of God. His omnipotence is not absolute, but limited to what accords with his nature, and his every action is confined to the strait and narrow way of righteousness. The macrocosm, the world, " answering his fair idea," conforms in the fixed material laws to his unchanging essence, and the uniformity of nature is the faithfulness of God. The microcosm, man, the express image of his person, is formed to conform in the fixed moral law to the same unchanging essence, and the oneness of justice is the righteousness of God. It is not the will, but the nature of the Deity that is the original and ultimate ground of obligation, 2 1 "Amongst the rational principles of morality," says Kant, "the onto- logical conception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better than the theological conception which derives morality from an absolutely perfect divine will." If we avoid a gross circle tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain, " the only conception of the divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of the attributes of desire for glory and dominion, combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance ; and any system of morals erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality." — Grundlegung, etc., Abbott's trans., p. 89. 2 " Here is the Ground of Right ; the nature and character of God, the great designer and creator of all things ; and my nature and character so far as I am the expression of this creator and his design. I am right when energizing and controlling myself in accordance with these ; my rights are DEITY 205 § 102. The final problem in our obligation to each other is now readily solved. The prior examination of human nature found it constituted for a free and harmonious play of its powers in the exercise of loving service, and this was recognized as the sum of obligation. Further examination has disclosed that human nature is derived from and akin to the divine nature, so that in promoting the welfare of each other, men are conforming to the divine will arising from the divine nature. ^'The maker and ruler has given to every man more or less ability to promote the common welfare, and holds him accountable for its exercise. Whoever unwar- rantably interferes with this service trespasses both on the servant and on the served, and thereby violates the divine will and nature. Much has been said about the divine right of kings. Every man's right is a divine right ; both because of its origin, and because it involves the right of the Deity himself. Hence the sacredness of human rights, and the paramount obligation to respect them. Arising from the very nature of God, they are invariable, inalienable, irrevo- cable, grounded in eternal justice and truth, and he who would violate them is at war with the inflexible Almighty. Along with our obligation to each other is our obligation whatever may be necessary to my so doing. By knowing and doing the right, I attain to excellence ; excellence brings enjoyment ; and in the two combined I find blessedness." — A. T. Bledsoe in Southern Beview for Oct., 1875, p. 436. The theistic moralist may learn much from heathen philosophy. " This then, as it appears to me," says Cicero, "has been the decision of the wisest men, that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor estab- lished by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding and forbidding. Therefore they called that primal and supreme law the mind of God enjoining or for- bidding each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account it is that this law, which the gods have given to the human race, is so justly praised. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally able to urge us to good, and to deter us from evil." — Laws, i, 4. 206 OBLIGA TION to God. To him is due, in the most comprehensive sense, loving service. We are bound to love God for his own sake, and all others for God's sake. 1 The recognition of him as our personal creator and ruler, and of our obligation to him as his creatures and subjects, leading to adoration, is religion, the binding of man to God. 2 Thus ethics expands over reli- gion by comprehending the author of our being, the father of our spirit, the eternal One from whom all our obligations arise, and in whom all our obligations end. He desires all that is disorderly to become orderly, and calls upon his rational free creatures to gratify, so far as in them lies, this desire ; hence it is hardly too much to say that our conduct affects the welfare and happiness of Our Father. 3 To serve rightly our fellows for his sake, is to serve him ; and a tres- pass upon a fellow man is a trespass upon him. Moreover, he has a supreme right to our reverential worship, and omit- ting or neglecting it is using our freedom, which having given he will not revoke, to restrict his liberty in gathering up his due. Contemplating, inversely, the relation of God to man, we observe that the obligation is not properly reciprocal. We 1 Which brings the peace of God that passeth understanding. " D'un coeur qui t'aime, Mon Dieu, qui peut troubler la paix ? H cherche en tout ta volonte' supreme, Et ne se cherche jamais. Sur la terre, dans le ciel meme, Est-il d' autre bonheur que la tranquille paix D'un cceur qui t'aime?" — Kacine, Athalie, close of Act iii. 2 Religion, from Lat. religio ; etymology doubtful. " Allied to religens, fearing the gods, pious ; and therefore not derived from religare, to bind, as often supposed." — Skeat. Lactantius of the third century, followed by Augustine of the fifth, and many others, held that it is from re-ligare, to bind back or anew. This, however, seems to refer to the Tall, which is hardly allowable to an ante-classical word. 8 " To do good and to communicate forget not ; for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." — Hebrews, 13 : 16. DEITY 207 cannot think of the Deity as under any obligation, under aoy law, under anything ; for this contradicts his essentially absolute supremacy and sovereignty. But while it cannot correctly be said that he is bound to be steadfast in purpose, and faithful in promise, it is very certain that he will be thus, and all that is righteous, because of his ultimate nature. 1 Now, as the universality of physical, psychical and ethical law indicates his unity, so does the total content of ethical law, loving service, indicate his benevolence. He seeks the welfare and consequent happiness of his sentient creatures in his own constant loving service of them, both by direct providence, and by the obligation laid upon them to serve each other. Hence are we confident of his inexor- able and perfected justice, essential to entire welfare, in which justice every life shall eventually be complete ; also of his tender mercy to the erring, he having opened a way, through infinite self-sacrifice, whereby to be just and yet justify the penitent, and secure to him eternal welfare and blessedness. Our God is no egoist, but an altruist. He did not make us, nor does he rule us, for his own glory, but for our own beatitude. God is love. 1 We speak of his justice and holiness, but never of his duty or virtue. "No imperatives hold for the divine will, or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law." — Kant, Grundlegung, u. s. w. § 43. Bacon, in his treatise Of the Advancement of Learning, bk. vii, quotes Aristotle as saying: "As beasts cannot be said to have vice or virtue, so neither can the gods ; for as the condition of the latter is something more elevated than virtue, so that of the former is something different from vice." Ilav to crai/xa crvvapfioXoyovfxevov /cat o-v/A/?i/?a£o/x€vov Sta Traces a^5 tt/s c7ri^op>;ytas, /car' cvepyetav ev /act/ow evo? eKaorov [tcpovs, r-qv av£r)cnv tov crw/xaros 7roieiTai ets oiKoBofxrjv kavrov ev ayd7rr]. ETHICS SECOND PAKT-OKGANIZATION TRANSITION § 103. A glance over the course thus far pursued will prepare for further advance. The purpose of Ethics is to bring our ordinary moral judgments, so far as they tally with enlightened conscience, into a coherent system, discovering in them a principle which shall give it philosophic unity, and also furnish, if we would not have a mere castle in the air, a foundation on which to build. Beginning with the common notion of a right, its condition is at once seen to be a reciprocal relation between persons, each having orderly claims upon the other, which claims compose his rights. These rights are grounded in the very constitution of human nature, which, moved by its normal desires, seeks their grati- fication. The fundamental right is a right to liberty in this pursuit. This is the primary principle of Ethics. An inten- tional violation of a right, an interference in one's proper liberty, is a wrong, a trespass, which being a subversion of constituted order, is forbidden. This is the moral law, dis- cerned by conscience, and supported by subjective and objec- tive sanctions. Obligation takes several forms whose essence is one. Pri- marily its law forbids aggressive trespass, then equally it forbids retentive and neglective trespass. From these emerge 209 210 ORGANIZATION the comprehensive forms of justice, duty, virtue, service and love, the last pair being the choice expression simply because it brings more clearly forward the common essence. For, in examining the springs of action, the affections are seen to be naturally paramount, all other desires ancillary and disinter- ested. They are inconsistent with interested motives whose ends, lying within the agent himself, are selfishly opposed to loving service. The ideal man expends his energies in serving the interests of his fellows without thought of his own as separate and independent, but only as involved in the common welfare. It should be observed that there are three principal notions pervading the discussion, which grow out from the funda- mental notion of rights. These are: 1st. Trespass, in its direct and indirect sense, which as forbidden expresses the whole of obligation. 2d. Trust, in the active sense of mutual confidence that the law of trespass will be observed; and in the passive sense of stewardship, of being a trustee of all possessions, including life itself. 3d. Defense, meaning the right and duty to guard trusts by resisting encroachment on them ; which is the only prem- ise that can warrant an interference in another's liberty. A strict and generous conformity to law results in common welfare. Welfare consists of liberty and continuous success in the exercise of benevolence and beneficence. The correl- ative criterion and natural consequence of welfare is happi- ness, which involves the special pleasure arising from a consciousness of disinterested conduct, and in general that arising from the satisfaction of enlarged and harmoniously regulated desires. But it is the essential dignity of benevo- lence rather than the resultant happiness that makes common welfare the proper aim and end of endeavor. Finally, the general constitution or nature of mankind is TRANSITION 211 not the ultimate ground of obligation. A practical ethics may be built upon it, but complete theory needs to look beyond, into the nature of the Maker, which is the ultimate determinant of all nature, and more especially of the native obligation which binds his rational creatures to each other and to himself. 1 § 104. We are to pass now from the consideration of obli- gation, a binding together, to that of organization, a working together. Heretofore the simple reciprocal relation of man to man, with occasional anticipations of other relations, has been the basis of our explanation. This view has proved sufficient for the development of certain ethical principles, and their application to the case supposed. But human relations are mostly complex, consisting largely of relations of the individual man to societies, and of societies to their individual members, and also of societies to each other. In considering hereafter these complex relations, it will be found that the same principles without addition are applica- ble to solve the obligations involved. The right aim of society, in its various organic forms, is likewise the common welfare, to be sought under the impulse of love. Every moral agent is a member of some system in whose welfare his own is bound up, and thus sharing his own beneficence, he finds his welfare, not in opposition to or deprivation of others or in any self-seeking, but in union with his kind. 1 The doctrine that the moral law is discoverable in the constitution of human nature brings to light the profound ethical significance of the motto inscribed over the portal of the temple at Delphi : Know thyself. See in Elements of Psychology, opposite p. 1, Plato's comment as found in Charmides, 164d, Step. Perhaps the first who declared the unity and divinity of the law was Herakleitos of Ephesus (circa 500 b.c.) who, in Fragment 91, says: "All human laws are nourished by (or fed by, and so get their strength from) One, the divine (or of God) ; for it has power (strength, force) so much as he wills, and it has enough for all, and more than enough." See his words on the title-page of this volume, and cf. his koiv6$ (£w6s) \6yos in Fr. 92. 212 KJJX KxjO.HJ.L,^ II UJS The advantage of organized effort is familiar in the notion of help, the combination of several energies to accomplish a single purpose, one will directing many forces to the same end. ' The will may be that of one man, as a Caesar, a Loy- ola, a Richelieu, a Napoleon, a Bismarck, overmastering and bringing to unity the wills of a multitude ; or, turning from autocracy to democracy, the unity of many wills may be the result of a free consensus, as in a republic, and in voluntary associations of all kinds. In this oneness of will the divided becomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively plural is objectively single. The individuality is complete in its solidarity, and the combination is to be judged as an undivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a society, an army, or a nation. Likewise let it be observed that conscience is catholic, and the law it reveals universal. Now a combination of men for a common purpose or purposes must be duly regulated by the common conscience. An organized association is respon- sible for its official actions. Even a nation may do right or wrong, and accordingly is honored or censured and perhaps punished. As a common will makes it an individual, so a common conscience makes it a person ; for as a body it is conscious of obligation, and thus is a person. This organic personality, though not wholly independent of, yet is to be distinguished from, the private and persistent personality of the members taken severally, for it implies a mass of super- added obligations dominating the whole. Thus an organism, or that wherein all parts and the whole are mutually means and end, is recognized, when it consists of men, as an indi- vidual person ah ty, subject in all functional activity, both internal and external, to the moral law. 1 1 Eelative to this general topic, see especially supra, §§ 14-16. THE 213 CHAPTER I THE MAN § 105. It will be well, as introductory to the subsequent matter and for the sake of its clear treatment, to examine here the organic character of the human constitution. Each individual man is a completely organized being. Primarily he consists of a body and a mind or spirit. He is essentially a duality. A human body without a mind is not a man ; it is merely a corpse. A mind without a body is — science knows not what. The disembodied human spirit may furnish matter for revelation, but since it presents no phenomena for our observation, it is beyond the reach of science. The man we study is a body and mind. These are coordinate. Both being essential, we cannot say which has priority in efficiency, any more than we can say which blade of a pair of shears does the more work. They cooper- ate, and neither can perform its functions apart from the other. Thus the body is for the mind, and the mind is for the body. Each is a means serving the other as an end, so that together they constitute a duplex organic whole. 1 1 For definition of organism, see supra, § 15. Ever since Plato declared the end of philosophy to be unity, science has constantly been seeking the reduction of the many to one ; and in the history of philosophy we find a doctrine of the absolute. But does not the ultimate constitution of the uni- verse of things seem rather to be essentially duplex ; essential, since each thing depends for its actuality upon some other ; ultimate, since analysis of what is essentially a pair is annihilation ? God and the world ; creator and creature ; the spiritual and the corporeal spheres ; mind and matter ; subject and object ; means and end ; time and space ; attraction and repulsion ; love and hate ; heaven and hell ; good and evil ; and so on indefinitely. 214 ORGANIZATION Evidently the body is itself an organism. The limbs are for the sustenance of the trunk, and the trunk is for the sustenance of the limbs. If the body suffer mutilation, the loss may in a measure be compensated by an increased or a specialized activity of other organs, yet it is a defect. The heart supplies the brain with blood, the brain supplies the heart with energy. Moreover, each subsidiary organ is itself an organism. The visual organ, the eye, serving as a guide to the movements of the whole, is composed of various organs, as the cornea, the lens, the retinal screen, each of which is a means to every other as an end. Thus the whole body is an organism composed of many organisms, to each of which every other and the whole brings its contribution. 1 § 106. The mind is a complement of faculties, an assem- blage of functions. 2 Its several generic powers, knowing and That contraries are first principles of entities is a Pythagorean doctrine (see Aristotle's Metaphysics, bk. i, ch. 5). Necessarily we conceive things by virtue of their oppositions (see Elements of Psychology, § 56 sq.), and if the realities correspond with our conceptions, the universe is a system of coun- terparts in couples polarized. See supra, § 14 sq. Philosophic materialism on the one hand, and idealism on the other, teach monism, the unity of the human being, of self ; but the prevailing doctrine in philosophy is dualism, and such is the common notion of man- kind. This dualism of mind and body is usually thought of as limited to mankind, or at most extended to animals ; but, in the very dawn of philoso- phy, two centuries before Plato, the Ionians taught hylozoism, d\r}, matter, and fay, life, that all matter is endowed with life, or, as Thales expressed it, all things to be full of gods, iravra irXriprj deQv ehai. — Aristotle, DeAnima, i, 5. This doctrine, with some modification, has in our day been revived under the title panpsychism or the universal subconsciousness of matter. See Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, bk. i, ch. 1, § 5. 1 " In the physical constitution of an organized being," says Kant, "we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose." — Grundlegung, etc., Abbott's trans, p. 13. What follows on pp. 14-16 will repay thoughtful reading. 2 See supra, § 1, and note ; also § 16. THE MAN 215 feeling, desiring and willing, are reciprocally related. Each class is a means to the others as ends, enabling them to fulfill their normal functions. Were there no intelligence, there could be no emotion or sentiment ; were there no intelligence and feeling, there could be no desire ; were there no desire, there could be no volition ; and were there no motived voli- tion, there could be no intelligence higher than mere brutal receptivity. Each serves the other and the whole. We must be on our guard lest we transfer to this spiritual sphere our notions of corporeal organs. These organs are distinct entities standing apart in space ; whereas the mental faculties and capacities are simply properties or functions of one and the same entity whose substance has no relation to space, except through the incorporating body. 1 It is never- theless evident that these generic properties are mutually related as means and end. Hence they are organized as to their functions, and the mind, by virtue of this constitution, is a spiritual organism. Furthermore, the specific powers are organically related, each special faculty being supported in the exercise of its functions by each and all the rest of its class. It will be best to exemplify this by the desires, with which, as motives of the will, we are here particularly concerned. The desires are primarily divided into the craving desires, or appetites and appetencies, whose function impels to acquire, and the giving desires, or affections, whose func- tion impels to impart. 2 This opposition is merely logical, for actually, in their naturally constituted order, they coop- erate, the former seeking to acquire in order that the latter may be prepared to impart. The suppression or hinderance of either would be a mutilation, worse than the amputation of a leg or arm. As already pointed out, the exercise of the 1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 77, 78, 149, 154. 2 See supra, §§ 5, 6. 216 ORGANIZATION craving desires in disregard of the affections, is abnormal, leading to a distraction of the affections from their proper objects, and to a subversion of their functions; also the exercise of the affections in disregard of the appetites and appetencies, is abnormal, leading to inefficiency from lack of resources supplying what affection would bestow; but, if both classes be exercised according to their constitutional relations, each with regard to the other, then the offices they are naturally fitted to fulfill are performed, their several and combined efficiency is attained, and their exercise is normal. 1 Each is for the other. The same principle is applicable to all the various mental powers both in particular and in general, thus showing the mind as a whole to be an organism consisting of minor or subsidiary organisms so delicately adjusted that an excess or deficiency or distortion in the action of any one disorders every other and the whole. § 107. Let us try for a moment to imagine what a man might be and become if he were somehow so separated from all objects of affection that it could have no play. We need not suppose him incapable of affection, but only that it be wholly dormant from lack of call. Allow that this solita^ can provide the necessaries of life, and even many of its luxuries, and that he can successfully engage in self-culture. Pru- dently caring for his body, he is temperate, and enjoys phys- ical health and strength. Under the impulse of craving propensities, he acquires a wealth of means to further enjoy- ment, and his cultured intellect gathers and delights in treas- ures of knowledge. 1 See supra, §§ 78, 79. It should be observed that the term affection is used here and heretofore in its popular sense of benevolence. In its wider generic and scientific sense affection is of two kinds, benevolent and malevo- lent. See Elements of Psychology, §§ 262, 263. In general the benevolent affections are normal, the malevolent abnormal. THE MAN 217 Now we point out that, in this imaginary case, there is strictly nothing moral or immoral; for, it is the relation to rational beings, including Deity, or at least to sentient beings, and not merely the possession of a rational nature, that determines the existence of rights and obligation. No trespass is possible, in case of an absolute solitary, for there are no rights or counter rights. No duty is done, for there is no one to whom a debt is due. There is no virtue or vice, for there is no law demanding conformity. There is no justice or injustice, for there is no claimant. Nor can there be loving service. Indeed, this isolated man is desti- tute of actual conscience, for no occasion would bring the potential to an actual discernment of moral law. He has no responsibility, is not a moral being, not human, not a man, unus homo, nullus homo, not a person, since he has no con- sciousness of obligation. With him nothing is either right or wrong ; even suicide would not be a crime. 1 Truly it is not good that the man should be alone. Pleasures we allow he may have, even the intellectual; otherwise they are less than brutal, for the brute enjoys at least instinctive affec- tion. But the solitary can never be happy, certainly not with that happiness which ripens into blessedness. 2 It appears, then, that man is essentially a moral being, and therefore essentially a social being. So let us change our supposition from one solitary to one in society, whose affections, however, are wholly dormant because of his entire selfishness. Guided by the counsels of prudence, 3 negatively in avoiding harm, positively in securing personal benefit, he may accomplish the correct functioning of his physical or- gans, and maintain his body in wholesome condition. Also he may wisely discipline his intellectual powers, and regulate his passions and emotions, and so attain a high grade of effi- ciency. Moreover, by observing certain rules of art, using 1 See supra, § 85, note. 2 See supra, § 97. 3 See supra, § 44. 218 OB GANIZA TION his fellows as means to secure his own ends, 1 he may accu- mulate wealth, power, and fame. Such seem to have been the character and aims of the more refined peoples of antiquity, especially of the Greeks. Their self-culture, looking solely to the beautiful development of the individual man, was very sensitive to the aesthetic elements essential to excel- lence, while the ethical elements were more lightly esteemed and often disregarded. The tendency was strongly egoistic, seeking the enjoyment of a fair personality, and its secure tenure against infringement. And in modern times such self -culture is widely and highly approved, many moralists making it the basis of their systems. The supposition of a cultured man in society without nat- ural affection is monstrous. Unlike the solitary, he is a morally responsible person, for conscience in him is actual, the law is upon him, and in his disregard of all save his own interests, he is a law-breaker, thoroughly immoral. Yet, strange to say, he may be a good neighbor and citizen ; for, if one selfishly serve his own interest with far-sighted pru- dence and wide-reaching wisdom, this works out for society very much the same result as if his energies were wholly devoted to thoroughly unselfish, disinterested, loving ser- vice. Such is the economical ordering of human affairs. 2 But it does not so work for the man himself. Though far from criminal or even disorderly, though he do not sin with his lips, and though he practice, for his own ends, a large beneficence, yet, without benevolence, he is a whited sepul- cher, a hypocrite, a moral monster. More likely, however, the inward corruption breaks forth, poisoning the air and multiplying ills. This has usually been the historical result. 3 These considerations illustrate the fact that men are social 1 See supra, § 84. 2 See supra, § 76, note. 3 See the catalogues in Bomans, 1 : 28-32, and 2 Timothy, 3 : 1-5. Cf. Colossians, 3 : 5-8. TBE MAN 219 beings in the sense of interdependence, not merely for the common needs of pleasurable living, but also for moral devel- opment by the exercise of mutual affection, through which alone the dignity of complete manhood is attainable. § 108. But in real human life there is not and cannot be thorough seclusion. A solitary is a mere negation, a meta- physical abstraction, a logical ghost. We find ourselves in a world of fellow beings from whom it is impossible to be completely absolved. Even a Selkirk on his desert isle not only remembers his former associations, but contemplates the possibility of a return to the world, and hence is bound to comport himself with reference to it, to care for and culti- vate his powers as far as may be in view of that possibility. But should he reasonably despair of a return among men, still he may not neglect his personal dignity, or ever, even under the greatest suffering, take his own life ; for he can- not know his future here, and one relation, the chiefest of all, persists. He is bound by indissoluble obligations to his maker, law-giver and judge, whose claims are never released, and whose honor is involved. Also let it be remarked that the individual owes his exis- tence, as well as the possibility of its continuance and of all moral culture, so much to the human society in which he is ordinarily included, that it is rare to find one so totally de- praved as to be entirely destitute of all natural affection. A mother gives birth to her child; therein and thereafter the moral tie binds. No distance of place or time can atten- uate it to nothingness, no violence can sever it, even death spares a bond in dutiful memories rendered more precious and sacred by loss. Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb ? Hardly is it possible. Can a son forget the mother who bore him, that he should not have compassion for her 220 OR GANIZA TION pains, her nurture, her watchings, her tender caresses? Hardly, yet perhaps less rare. Shall he not, even in mature years, honor his father and mother with kindly watch-care and grateful memories ? Surely, even amid a godless civili- zation, or even amid a barbarous heathenism, Nature will enforce in some measure her claims for loving service. 1 * § 109. If we view each man, then, as an organism of orga- nized organs, these standing to each other and to the whole in a relation of interdependence, and if we observe that he has the power of self-direction and control, it is clear that it is within him to conserve and cultivate his natural powers by regulating their organic relations, and that the bringing of all the corporeal and spiritual powers with which he is endowed by nature into full activity and harmonious coop- eration, is the discharge of obligation and the perfection of manhood. But also it is clear that the constitution of the man, apart from his affections, furnishes no ethical element, no basis for an ethical system. His subsidiary powers of body and mind are not persons, and there is no moral ele- ment that does not involve a personal relation. 2 1 ' ' We could not live in society unless we had some of the qualities of the moral character. We should be what Hobbes supposed us to be, mere brutes with intelligence enough to see that it is best to give up something in order to attain a greater good. Honesty then were honesty only because it is the best policy." 2 "The trifling of comparing society with a living organism, that is to say, that of a man or an animal, and of making the functions of the latter the pattern for its regulation, is altogether fruitless. The essential differ- ence is overlooked, that every such living organism serves a single individual soul with very many wholly impersonal parts ; while in society many indi- vidual persons unite themselves into a community which does not exist apart from them as a distinct being.' 1 — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 49. Plato committed this " trifling " in taking the organization of the individual man as the pattern for the constitution of his ideal republic. Also Freder- ick II : "As men are born and live for a certain period, and at last die of age or infirmity, so also States are constituted ; they flourish for some cen- turies and then at last cease to exist." — Antimacchiavelli, ch. 9. So also THE MAN 221 Such relation is necessarily implied in the existence and exercise of affection. There must be a sentient object, one capable of benefit, to whom there is conscious obligation. Herein, and herein only, personality appears ; herein, and herein only, moral character has its root and growth. The affections being psychologically and ethically essential to integral manhood, it follows that a man cannot be truly and rightly a man apart from his fellows, and in his relations to them his conscience discerns the moral law de- manding the exercise of righteous affections, and claiming recognition as the supreme law of humanity. There is no need to consider further the individual man. We have noted him as a typical organism, pointing out that, apart from his relations to others, that is, in him alone, there is no ethical element. In the prior part of this treatise the reciprocal relations of man to man, in their ethical aspect, have been discussed at length.* True the mere coexistence of two persons may correctly be construed as an organism, each being for the other and both for the pair; especially exemplified by partners in business, they being formally uni- fied. But to view the simple relation of man to man as an organism would lead to no conclusions other than those already attained, and hence we may now dismiss this simple case also, and proceed to consider more intricate relations. Herbert Spencer : " We find not only that the analogy between society and a living creature is borne out, but that the same definition of life applies to both." — Social Statics, p. 490. Elisha Mulford says : "The logical fallacy of defining an ethical by a physical organism, and limiting the one to the conception of the other, appears in Draper's Civil Polity. . . . But nations do not exist in history in this limitation in a physical sequence ; they ap- pear under the conditions of a moral life, and their growth or decay is traced, not in necessary, but in moral causes." — The Nation, p. 18, note. And von Mohl says : ' ' These conceptions of the State and its correspon- dences based on physical science appear from time to time, partly through an altogether sickly tendency of thought, and partly through a mystical and fanciful conceit.' 1 — Encyklopadie der Staatswissenschaften, p. 84. 222 ORGANIZATION CHAPTER II THE FAMILY § 110. A study of the simple relation of man to man has enabled us to discover the principles of obligation, with their application in equivalent intercourse. This exposition, how- ever, though fundamental and widely comprehensive, is not exhaustive, and not adequate to the demands of right living. For, in actual life, the relations subsisting among men exhibit many varieties in kind, and those of the same kind many differences in degree ; also these relations are subject to many and extreme changes, often amounting to reversal, due to growth, activity, and the ceaseless mutations of inter- course. Now, since all obligations originate in and corre- spond to present relations, it follows that the special duty of a man to some one on his right hand is rarely quite similar to what is due to some one on his left ; also that his duty to either is often quite unlike the duty of that other to him ; and further, that his duty to any one to-day frequently differs greatly from what is due to the same one to-morrow. It is needful, therefore, to consider the kinds of relations in which men stand to each other, and their variations, in order to determine the corresponding obligations. The relations that obtain among men exhibit many varie- ties chiefly because of differences in social organization ; under which general title, therefore, human relations and consequent obligations may be distributed and discussed. The procedure involves the principle that the perfection of natural order, its harmony and stability, require that each member fulfill its office in the several organisms to which it THE FAMILY 223 belongs. This is a natural principle, physical and psychical and ethical, being applicable to the universe considered as an organic whole, as well as to each of its organized mem- bers, and specially, as we have just seen, to the microcosm, man. In society at large each one is morally bound to fulfill his functions as a member of the whole, and also as a mem- ber of each of those subordinate and constitutive organisms in which he is integrant. A study, then, of the chief con- stituents of society will bring into view the various kinds and degrees of duty corresponding to these functional rela- tions, whose variations determine the variations of personal obligation under the sole but universal law of loving service. To this study we now proceed. § 111. Nature presents in both animals and plants a fun- damental fact in sex. This is a primary, inerasable distinc- tion that cuts all higher forms of animated beings, and especially the total of humanity together with every subordi- nate class of mankind, into two portions, delicately marked by anatomical and physiological variations which extend throughout the body, being discoverable even in the brain. The physical differences are normally attended by mental and moral differences which though less definite are not less deep, permanent and universal. In these differences originate an appetite and an affection which often become passionate, tending on the one hand toward the deepest degradation, and on the other to the highest exaltation. Hence it comes that the relation of the sexes is perhaps the most powerful social factor in every community, both savage and civilized. Herein the pointing of nature is distinctly to marriage and offspring. It sets apart a pair, a male and female, for each other, their exclusive union being spontaneously guarded by hygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, fierce and fatal. Offspring brings into play strong parental instincts, prompt- 224 OR GANIZA TION ing protection, provision and nurture until maturity. Thus the family is preeminently a natural institution, which in some important respects takes precedence of all others, and is fundamental in the constitution of society. 1 § 112. The ideal family in modern society consists of a mature man and woman, not differing greatly in age, who of their own free will, have entered with civil and ecclesiastical forms, into the marriage bond, are living together as husband and wife, and providing for their yet unemancipated chil- dren. Their children are first a son, then a daughter, again a son, then another daughter. The parents, beside each other, have both a son and a daughter, and each child has both a brother and a sister. These exhaust the family rela- tions. To complete this ideal, add a home, giving common shelter, furnishing conveniences, and serving as a local habi- tation and center of union. What support this ideal receives from ethical principles will be more clearly seen after a detailed consideration of the several relations involved. But we make at once the obvious remark that it is not often fully realized, because of failure or irregularity in births, intervention of death, or ex- treme poverty. Still, even in such incomplete families, the relations are generally sufficient for the unfolding of the domestic virtues, the building of character, and the enjoy- ment of home life. 2 1 It is noteworthy that the zoologist and the anthropologist, in their logi- cal distribution of the animal kingdom into genera, species and sub-species, never recognize, even in the most insignificant varieties, sex as marking a class. This indicates that scientifically a male and female together consti- tute one individual of a kind. So in the story of Eden this essential oneness is singularly emphasized ; see Genesis, 1 : 27 ; and 5:1, 2. 2 "Home, its perfect trust and truth, its simple holiness, its ex- quisite happiness, is to the world what conscience is to the human mind." — BULWER. THE FAMILY 225 § 113. It is evident that a family is an organic union of several persons, as indicated in their common surname, and in the correlative terms husband and wife, parent and child, father or mother and son or daughter, brother and sister; each of these implying the existence of the other. Ethically each member is related to every other, and to the whole, as at once means and end. The existence of relations among these persons determines that there be corresponding obliga- tions, and the variety of relations determines a variety in the obligations. The particular kind and degree of the obli- gation of each member, is determined by the special function belonging to that member in maintaining the orderly unity of the organism. Just this much is the duty of each, and no more. If, however, there be, as there often is, disorder, distrac- tion or failure on the part of some one member, requiring addi- tional and special efforts on the part of the others to restore and maintain order and efficiency, then their duty is enlarged to meet the requisition. An excellent analogy is seen in the physical organism of the individual man. Each of the organs of his body contributes to the healthful action of every other, and all the others contribute to sustain each one. Moreover, when any one is disordered, there is a disturbance more or less general, a sympathetic suffering of all allied organs, and a feverish effort of nature to restore the normal condition. § H4. In the actual case of a man and a woman obeying the beck of nature, and entering into the marriage relation, let the distinct personality of each, and their entire moral equivalence, be granted ; then several important truths are logically consequent. First. In consenting to this union, both parties are to exercise their unbiased free will. Any unwarranted inter- ference, objective or subjective, in the liberty of either is a 226 ORGANIZATION trespass the more grievous because of its far reaching conse- quences. It is true that circumstances often warrant or even require a hindering interference, extending perhaps to pro- hibition, on the part of parents especially, or of friends, or of the State ; but it is obvious that, in a matter so extremely delicate, and of such vast importance to those immediately concerned, the warrant should be very clear. Compulsory marriage, on the other hand, is never warrantable, and is one of the grossest forms of trespass. Secondly. Actual marriage, or the yielding of each to the other of what is peculiar to the distinct personality, works no detriment to the honor of either party, provided it be accom- panied by an entirely voluntary, mutual and unreserved sur- render of all the interests of life into the common keeping of both. 1 Thereby the pair, without losing the distinct personality, become a single individual personality. In this fusion, their honor, social standing, property and prospects are rightly held in common by each for the other, by each for both, by both for each. The two are one. Their joint welfare and happiness is an inseparable compound. Thirdly. In the pair thus unified there should be but one will. A constant endeavor to harmonize opinions, senti- ments and desires, wherein a firm adherence to principle is combined with a yielding even in matters of importance, results in a singleness of will that is essential to the perfec- tion of the union. A tie so sacred should never be loosened by willful discord. Custom has established on firm and suf- ficient grounds that, generally speaking, the control in detail of interests outside the home shall be in the hand of the hus- band, and those within the home shall be subject to the man- agement of the wife. But, while the decisions of each should be as far as possible in accord with the views and wishes of the other, yet, in case of a permanent differ- 1 See Lotze, Practical Philosophy, § 35. THE FAMILY 227 ence, the final decision should be left to the one in whose province the matter in question belongs. 1 Fourthly. The union may not be enlarged by the addi- tion of another partner. Polyandry or polygamy, common among brutes, is inadmissible among persons, it being incon- sistent with the moral equivalence of the sexes. If more than one of either sex be bound to one of the other, the plu- rality is severally deprived of the rank of equal fellowship, and degraded to a thing useful merely as a means. Fifthly. While it may be doubted whether there be physi- ological reasons why the marriage of persons of near consan- guinity should not be permitted, the ethical reasons are I We quote from Victor Hugo's " Quatrevingt-Treize,'''' p. 492, part of a dialogue : " Gauvain reprit : — Et la femme ? qu'en faites-vous ? Cirnourdain repondit : — Ce qu'elle est. La servante de Phomme. — Oui. A une condition. — Laquelle ? — C'est que Phomme sera le serviteur de la femme. — Y penses-tu ? s'e'cria Cirnourdain, Phomme serviteur! jamais. L'homme est maitre. Je n'admets qu'une royaute\ celle du foyer. L'homme chez lui est roi. — Oui. A une condition. — Laquelle ? — C'est que la femme y sera reine. — C'est-a-dire que tu veux pour Phomme et pour la femme. . . . — L'egalite. — L'egalite" ! y songes-tu ? les deux etres sont divers. — J'ai dit Pegalite\ Je n'ai pas dit P identity. II y eut encore une pose, comme une sorte de tr§ve entre ces deux esprits ^changeant des Eclairs. Cirnourdain la rompit. — Et Penfant ! a qui le donnes-tu? — D'abord au pere qui Pengendre, puis a la mere qui Penfante, puis au maitre qui P 61 eve, puis & la cite qui le virilise, puis a la patrie qui est la mere supreme, puis a P humanity qui est la grande aieule. — Tu ne paries pas de Dieu. — Chacun de ces degree, pere, mere, maitre, cite", patrie, humanity, est un des Echelons de Pechelle qui monte a Dieu." 228 ORGANIZATION clearly good and sufficient. The marriage of members of the same family would bring about such an admixture of moral relations as to confuse the functions of its members, rendering them perplexing and distracting, and so disorder- ing the harmony of its system. Hence the State, in the interest of the family, and of general society whose moral health is involved with that of the family, prohibits such marriage as incestuous, tending to disturb the normal opera- tion of the family organism, and to check the unfolding of its peculiar beauty and worth. 1 § 115. Marriage is indissoluble, except by death or crime. If death sever the bonds, a new marriage of the survivor cannot be prohibited by the State, for civil law is properly concerned with temporal relations only, and so the question of second marriage must be left to the religious convictions of the parties. A formal dissolution of marriage is justified specially by the crime of conjugal infidelity, this being a vio- lation of its peculiar significance and manifest purpose, and itself an actual breaking of the vow. Legal questions concerning divorce, with permit of new marriage, present many difficulties, especially on plea of cruelty or desertion. But it is clear that a wished-for disso- lution cannot rightly be decreed merely because of disease, poverty, misfortune, disappointed expectation, "incompati- bility," whatever this may mean, or the dissatisfaction of one or both parties, or even because of wickedness and crime that does not victimize home. None of these can be allowed as sufficient ground for entire divorce, if society would pre- serve its moral health, so largely dependent on the sanctity 1 For like reason it forbids the marriage of certain collateral relatives. English statute forbids even the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister, for which certainly no physiological, and perhaps no sufficient reason can be given, other than the liability of intermixing moral relations. THE FAMILY 229 of marriage. Relief may be had in extreme cases by a legal recognition of actual separation, without a severance of the moral bond that forbids a new relation. 1 1 Among heathen peoples, ancient and modern, the marriage tie has always been loose, and divorce facile. In Christendom the reverse is gen- erally true, influenced by the law of marriage gathered from Genesis, 2 : 24 ; Matthew, 19 : 9 ; Mark, 10 : 2-12 ; Luke, 16 : 18 ; and 20 : 27-36 ; Romans, 7 : 2, 3 ; 1 Corinthians, 7 : 10-14. The principle informing these precepts was incorporated in the Canons of the Church at an early date, and in 1562, the Council of Trent decreed marriage indissoluble from any cause. Soon, however, under the influence of the Reformation, the distinction was made between separation a vinculo matrimonii, or complete divorce, and separa- tion a mensa et toro, which latter, in extreme cases, the Canons allowed. Constantine prohibited, circa 315, by special edict, divorce on simple consent of the parties ; and the States of Europe have ever since recognized marriage as a civil contract, and, with fluctuating severity and laxity, have restricted divorce, on grounds of civil polity. In England, until of late, marriage was, by the Canon Law, indissoluble ; but, after the Reformation, separation a mensa et toro was allowed, by de- cree of Ecclesiastical Court, neither party being permitted to marry again ; while complete divorce with this privilege could be granted only by special act of Parliament. Late statutes, 20, 21 Vic. c. 85, et al., have made great changes. Jurisdiction in divorce casSs is transferred to a special Civil Court, in which either spouse may obtain a decree of complete divorce on ground of adultery ; and judicial separation from board and couch may be secured on ground of cruelty or desertion, in which case the woman thereby becomes femme sole in regard of property. In America the practice varies in different States. " In several of them no divorce is granted but by special act of the legislature, and in others the legislature itself is restricted from granting them, but it may confer the power on courts of justice. So strict and scrupulous has been the policy of South Carolina, that there is no instance in that State since the Revolution of a divorce of any kind, either by sentence of a court of justice or by act of the legislature. In all other States divorce a vinculo may be granted by courts of justice for adultery. In New York the jurisdiction of the courts as to absolute divorce for causes subsequent to marriage is confined to the single case of adultery ; but in most of the other States, in addition to adultery, intolerable ill-usage, or willful desertion, or unheard-of absence, or habitual drunkenness, or some of them, will authorize a decree for divorce a vinculo under different modifications and restrictions." — Kent, Commen- taries, iv, 105. The laws relating to divorce have undergone many changes since the publication of these Commentaries in 1830. 230 ORGANIZATION § 116. Persons of full age, and emancipated from parental authority, often do not marry for some years, or perhaps never marry. The social status of such persons is more or less abnormal according as they are more or less absolved from family connection. For the family is the basis of social organization, and since these are now but external appen- dages to some one, they cannot be accounted more than fractional members of society at large. 1 Such persons are unhappily at great disadvantage in respect of moral culture. For the conditions of complete develop- ment are lacking to those destitute of the familiar objects around which the strongest and best affections of the human soul gather and grow, and whose lack it is not possible fully to compensate by other lines of moral activity. In these other lines, however, exceptional attainments are often made, commanding high respect, and rounding out a useful life. § 117. When the family circle is completed by the birth of children, a new and wide field is opened for the cultiva- tion of ethical graces. Moral possibilities, which otherwise are forever latent, become patent. The potential becomes actual, and nature has not planted in vain. No man is ever wholly a man until he is a husband and a father ; and, more emphatically, no woman is wholly a woman until she is a wife and mother. A babe is a pledge of love, an additional and powerful tie, a sacred trust, calling out and taxing the moral energies, and making an unlimited demand on loving service. All that is beautiful in human nature blooms under the influence of this fertilizing relation. It is easy to adore the Madonna. 2 1 It is at least curious to note that a prerequisite to membership in the ancient Jewish Sanhedrin was that one should be a husband and a father ; perhaps because this would qualify him to be a wiser and more compassion- ate judge. See Bunsen, Hippolytus, ii, 344. 2 It is a famous saying of Froebel : " Kommt, lasst uns unsern Kindern THE FAMILY 231 The familiar care and provident rearing of children con- stantly exercises the domestic virtues, tending directly to the perfection of manhood and womanhood. The responsibility and difficulty are of the gravest. The culture should be dominated by the view that, in the order of nature, the child is destined to moral independence, and to membership in society. In being prepared for this, it has many and very sacred rights. Its parents are bound, as their function in the family organism, to provide for its healthful maintenance suitable to their rank in society, for its education, intellec- tual, moral and religious, and, in general, for its present and prospective welfare. Great laxity of restraint is likely to be ruinous; but, on the other hand, severe restrictions, a rigid molding of character, opinions, and religious creed, is hardly less to be deprecated as an injurious trespass on the right of the child to generous culture, and the free growth of its individuality. 1 The office of brothers and sisters in this organic relation is affectionate sympathy, and mutual helpfulness, which should extend throughout life. As sons and daughters they are bound to honor father and mother by a willing and pleased obedience to their rightful authority, and by a prompt readiness to promote their welfare. Also they are bound to guard sedulously the honor of the family name, and to seek actively the advancement of the common interest. leben. Come, let us live for, with and in our children. Then will the life of our children bring us peace and joy, then shall we begin to grow wise, to be wise." — Education of Man, § 42. 1 "The feeling of community, first uniting a child with its mother, father, brothers and sisters, and resting on a higher spiritual unity, to which later is added the unmistakable discovery that father, mother, brothers, sisters, human beings in general, feel and know themselves to be in community and unity with a higher principle, with humanity, with God — this feeling of community is the very first germ, the very first beginning of all true reli- gious spirit, of all genuine yearning for unhindered unification with the Eternal, with God."— Idem, 8 21. 232 OR GANIZA TION § 118. This human institution, the family, is preeminently natural, being physically determined. Those born into it are involuntarily and inseparably its members. By its pri- macy it stands as the unit of society and of the State, with- out derogation from the distinct personality, moral status and obligation of its individual members. Yet it is a whole. Even when some part or parts are lacking, it is still a unit. It is not a logical whole, a genus, for its parts are not species or kinds of family. It is an integral whole ; not col- lective, as a cluster of grapes, but organic, as a flower whose central organs, stamen and pistil, yield germ and seed, within a corolla. It is an individual, indivisible in itself, and sepa- rate from every other. Less clear perhaps, but not less true, is it that a family is a single personality. The definition of a person is a being conscious of obligation. Now there is a consciousness com- mon to all members of a family, an intelligent apprehension of moral law which is the same in each, a judgment which, under the influence of common interest, is assimilated into one, a pervading sentiment, a united impulse to effectuate a single will. The obligation of some one family as an organic whole to some one man as its benefactor, or to some other family, or to general society, is matter of familiar speech and acknowledgment, and the common consciousness of such obligation constitutes its unique personality, quite distin- guishable from the peculiar personality of its several mem- bers. To this conception of its distinct personality may be added the possession of family traits in features, manners, customs, habits, and in general, of character, often sharply marked. Moreover, what wounds one member, wounds all ; the honor, dignity and welfare of the whole, is in common keeping. 1 1 This moral solidarity is not a product of refined civilization. In rude, primitive ages it found abundant recognition ; for example, in the infliction TEE FAMILY 233 § 119. The individual personality of a family as an organ- ized unit, distinct from the personality of its members, is manifest in the significant fact that it claims a life beyond the present generation. Its ancestry extending back for ages is its pride, and its posterity in an indefinite future is its hope. What it has been confers titles of honor, and what it may become excites anxious solicitude. The death of a member breaks in upon its present entirety, but does not interrupt its continuity. Only by sterility and death com-, bined is it extinguished, and this is accounted a special loss to society, a public and private misfortune. 1 A family of the present generation, inheriting the honor and wealth of the same family in preceding generations, rec- ognizes its moral obligation to maintain and rightly use the trust, thus discharging a sacred debt due the dead. Also it recognizes its moral obligation to the coming generation in provision for its welfare, thus discharging a sacred debt due descendants, including those yet unborn. That one is thus bound to pay debts due the deceased and the unborn, is not fanciful sentiment, nor figurative speech, but real, literal ethics. Current expressions and approved literature recog- nize in many ways the obligation as especially incumbent on of punishment due to the offense of a single member upon the whole of his family ; the guilt of one, it was held, making all alike guilty. This lingers with us in the social ostracism of an innocent member of a dishonored or disreputable family. Put merit for guilt, gratitude and love for vengeance, and we have a law of the moral order holding good for all time, for the high- est civilization, for the most refined moral consciousness. 1 Witness the deification and worship of ancestry, so common among heathen peoples, ancient and modern. The law of primogeniture in Eng- land, and in most of the States of Europe, by which, the father dying intes- tate, his eldest son inherits the real estate, i.e. lands and buildings, in pref- erence to and in exclusion of all other members of the family, clearly intends to confirm its continuity. So also the practice of entail. The preference in inheritance of males to females, found in ancient Jewish, Athenian (but not in Koman) law, and in the laws of some modern States, e.g. the Salic law, likewise was apparently intended to perpetuate more distinctly the family. 234 OB GANIZA TION the family, whose individuality and personality extend through generations that come and go, yet perpetuate its organic unity. § 120. The foregoing considerations enable us to under- stand more clearly the ethical principles that regulate the holding and disposing of property. 1 Property owned by either party at time of marriage, and that acquired afterward, is, by virtue of the marriage, the common property of the family. That either husband or wife should have property at disposal apart from and inde- pendently of the other, though often it is so arranged, con- tradicts the unity of the relation, drawing a line of separation and making a distinction that ought never to exist. Such an arrangement is inconsistent with that entire surrender of all the interests of life into the common keeping which the marriage bond requires; and in so far the marriage is but partial. The reserve implies a distrust that is chilling, and likely to produce a discord that is fatal. It is a withholding trespass. Evidently, then, the family property should not be largely ventured in trade, or otherwise disposed of, without the free consent of all members, including the children, in whom also property rights are vested by birth, when they become suffi- ciently mature to appreciate and rightly judge the interests involved. Yet, be it remembered, that each and all should seek, by a reasonable yielding, to assimilate their views and wishes, thereby attaining a unity of will which thus becomes the will of the family. Also it is evident that the management of the family prop- erty in detail must be left to some one member. This seems naturally to devolve upon the husband and father who, according to the usual and approved order, takes charge of 1 See supra, § 38. THE FAMILY 235 the family interests outside of home, and hence is best acquainted with public affairs. Because property is held and ordinary business transacted in his name, he is apt to regard himself as exclusive and irresponsible owner. This error, pervading society, stands greatly in need of correction. 1 § 121. Distribution by testament of the property of a family is, for like reasons, by the hand and in the name of its ostensible head ; also for the reason that, preparatory to his decease, when the house band is loosed, and the family disintegrated, there is need of a special and provisory adjust- ment of property rights by the one to whom their care has been chiefly committed. In any such adjustment the united consensus of all members should be had, so that together with the avoidance of any actual trespass, complaint of wrong may also be forestalled. Testamentary distribution gives rise to many difficult questions which largely occupy the courts. The funda- mental principles involved are, however, sufficiently clear. A producer has a right to use and dispose of his products at will, and this will must be effective beyond his decease, else a great incentive to industry and accumulation would be lost, projects for the benefit of the coming generation would not be devised and driven, and social progress would be hindered, inasmuch as each generation would have to make a new be- ginning. But let it be observed that the home management and industry, its provision for rest and refreshment, its cheer- ing influence, its trifling comforts even, are very important elements in the efficiency of the producer, and thereby enter 1 In the United States, when the head of a family dies intestate, distri- bution to the survivors, is made of the property according to civil statute, and guardians of minors are appointed. There are differences, but the ex- istence in any form of such statutes is a distinct recognition by the State that property rights in what was an undivided possession inhere in each member of a disrupted family. 236 ORGANIZATION into his product ; so that all members of the home circle, but especially the husband and wife, are partners in business, and since they share in the producing, are entitled to share in the production, both in consuming and in disbursing. Beside this, it should be distinctly recognized that all posses- sions are held and managed as trusts, and their agreed testa- mentary distribution should be regulated accordingly. The testator is bound to provide suitably for the family, thus dis- charging his primary obligation as its trustee. A surplus may rightly become matter of bequest to collaterals, to friends, or to the general public, in the founding or endowing hospi- tals, schools, libraries, and such like benefactions, according to the best judgment of the trustee representing the family in this discharge of its alien obligations. THE COMMUNITY 237 CHAPTER III THE COMMUNITY § 122. Human beings manifest a strong disposition to gather into groups more or less permanent. In some of these population is massed, as in cities ; in others it is more sparse, as in villages, hamlets, neighborhoods. Hence in any inhab- ited region, it is easy to point out centers of population, though the circumference be quite indefinite. Besides the gregarious instinct of the human animal, there are many rational determinants of this tendency, both economical and ethical. Every one owes his existence to progenitors and also is indebted for its continuance, for all physical means, conveniences and comforts of living, for all intellectual and moral culture, so entirely to association, more or less intimate, with his fellows, that all the interests of life, his whole wel- fare, is bound up with them. Strict independence is a prac- tical impossibility. 1 1 "La nature de l'homme le porte a vivre en soci£te\ Quelle qu'en soit la cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout ou Ton a rencontre* des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut- 6tre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur surety commune ; peut-gtre afin de pourvoir plus aisement a leur besoins ; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans la nature de Phomme de se reunir en soci&6, comme font les abeilles et plusieurs especes d'animaux ; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces reunions d'hommes, en quelque parti du mondequ'ils habitent." — Say, Cours d'Econ. Polit. " The impulse which leads to combination lies in the necessity of supple- menting the force of the individual by that of others, without which the aims of life are not completely attainable. Here belong not merely the con- ceivable advantages which one receives from another, but above all the social intercourse itself, without which a really human development is incon- ceivable." — Lotze, Trad. Phil, § 56. 238 ORGANIZATION A group of people thus specially related by living in prox- imity is a community. 1 This is not merely a collection but a body of people ; for the necessities of its members which draw them together determine at once an organic constitution. 2 Each member contributes more or less directly to the welfare of every other, and to the welfare of the whole, in which welfare he participates. The variations of function are deter- mined by the pressure of various needs, and by the fitness of various abilities to meet them. There is a tacit consensus in the distribution of these functions ; but since there is no formal and definite enactment of a constitution, the com- munity is often spoken of as unorganized society ; whereas, though not formally, yet it is essentially an organism, neces- sitated by the interdependence of its members. 3 1 " Common = public, general, usual, vulgar; Fr. from Lat. com-, for cum, with, and munis, complaisant, obliging, binding by obligation." — Skeat. Community, from Lat. communitas, fellowship, from cum, together with, mutually, and munis, ready to serve. 2 " Quam fluctus diversi, quam mare conjuncti." 3 " A quoi bon la sociele" ? Restez dans la nature. Soyez les sauvages. Otai'ti est un paradis. Seulement, dans ce paradis on ne pense pas. Mieux vaudrait encore un enfer intelligent qu'un paradis bete. Mais non, point d'enfer. Soyons la sociCte" humaine. Plus grande que nature ? Oui. Si vous n'ajoutez rien a la nature, pourquoi sortir de la nature ? Alors, con- tentez-vous du travail comme la fourmi, et du miel comme l'abeille. Restez la bete ouvriere au lieu d'etre rintelligence reine. Si vous ajoutez quelque chose a la nature, vous serez nCcessairement plus grand qu'elle ; aj outer, c'est augmenter, c'est grandir. La sociCte', c'est la nature sublimed. Je veux tout ce qui manque aux ruches, tout ce qui manque aux f ourmilieres, les monuments, les arts, la poe'sie, les he'ros, les genies. Porter des fardeaux kernels, ce n'est pas la loi de Thomme. Non, non, non, plus de parias, plus d'esclaves plus de formats, plus de damned ! je veux que chacun des attri- buts de l'homme soit un symbole de civilisation et un patron de progres ; je veux la liberte devant 1' esprit, l'egalite" devant le cceur, la fraternite" devant Tame. Non ! plus de joug ! l'homme est fait, non pour trainer des chaines, mais pour ouvrir des ailes. Plus d'homme reptile. Je veux la transfiguration de la larve en lepidoptere, je veux que le ver de terre se vivante, change en fleur et s'envole." — Victor Hugo, Quatrevingt-Treize, p. 495. THE COMMUNITY 239 § 123. Recur to the primary ethical principle that every one has a right to gratify his normal desires, and to this, be- side, that it is his obligation not merely passively to allow their impulse, but actively to seek their gratification, and it is manifest that the fulfillment of obligation is impracticable apart from society. 1 For, no class of normal desires can properly be gratified without reference to associates ; but especially the affections, which are conditioned on the presen- tation of sentient objects, can have no exercise in solitary life. In such life the chiefest, indeed the sole function of humanity is perverted and comes to naught. Mankind is a brother- hood, and it is only by close fraternization, only by being a man among men, that it is possible to be wholly a man. Whoever lives his life in its natural and rightful fullness is a constant recipient from his fellows of the necessary means, for which he is dependent on them, and therefore is constantly incurring an indebtedness which requires a constant reciprocal activity to repay. These considerations forbid an ascetic life, which, under the guise of righteous self-denial, renounces invigorating en- joyment, and thus leads to such an impoverishment of spirit- ual power that its dues go unpaid. 2 Nor can the life of a recluse be approved, which seeks self-sufficiency in solitude and retired contemplation, or an escape from thronging ills by a timid retreat into privacy, idle ease, and indifference to the common welfare. Likewise we must condemn the life of a reserved student who, enamored of truth, withdraws from familiar intercourse, and in the scholarly seclusion of his library seeks to accumulate knowledge with no intent or thought of sharing it, and thereby promoting the well-being even of his compeers. 3 These several forms of social seques- 1 See supra, §§ 25, 35. 2 See supra, § 77. 3 " We are right in being enthusiastic for science only on account of the fact, partly that we discern the usefulness of its impulse for the sum-total of 240 ORGANIZATION tration can be approved only when they are temporary, and for the purpose of recuperation and preparation for better service in subsequent life. Thus only can they be acquitted of selfishness, and accepted as transient phases of that active life of practical benevolence which alone develops the moral dignity of true manhood. 1 § 124. The reciprocal obligations of the members of a com- munity are recognized in a code of social intercourse, an unwritten common law, which prevails throughout and regu- lates communication. This law, like the unwritten Common Law of the courts, is a detail of rights and duties. Both sys- tems originated in the exigencies of popular intercourse, and human life so well as to renounce all claim to see a special application for every individual (einzelne) truth, and partly that the general character of truth, its consistency, and the manifoldness of the consequences that follow with certainty from a few principles, places before our eyes an actualization ( Verwirklichung) of what we ought to attain in the moral world by our own conduct." — Lotze, Pract. Phil, § 30. 1 Moral isolation is not in being retired, but in being selfish. One may be "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife," yet in a communion that braces and strengthens ; and amid the turmoil of the throng, he may be apart, alone. " To sit on rocks, to muse o'er flood and fell, To slowly trace the forest's shady scene, Where things that own not man's dominion dwell, And mortal foot hath ne'er, or rarely heen ; To climb the trackless mountain all unseen, With the wild flock that never needs a fold ; Alone o'er steeps and foaming falls to lean ; This is not solitude ; 'tis but to hold Converse with nature's charms, and view her stores unrolled. But 'midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men, To hear, to see, to feel, and to possess, And roam along, the world's tired denizen, With none who bless us, none whom we can bless J Minions of splendour shrinking from distress ! None that, with kindred consciousness endued, If we were not, would seem to smile the less Of all that flatter'd, follow'd, sought and sued ; This is to be alone ; this, this is solitude." — Bybon, Childe Harold, Canto ii, 25, 26. THE COMMUNITY 241 by degrees have been fully developed : and both are but va- riations, explications and applications of the law of trespass. The conventions of society are known as the rules of good breeding and good manners. They require comity, a proper consideration and respect for the minor rights of each other, a delicate regard for one another's wishes, feelings and pe- culiarities, a prompt attention to wants, their serviceable anticipation, a complaisant readiness in assistance ; this is politeness. In the denser portions of a community there is constant call for its exercise, so that people, even those of otherwise indifferent culture, become by attrition polished, that is, polite ; they are civil, and the higher ranks are cour- teous or courtly in address. To this must be added the spe- cial code of social etiquette observed in refined circles, which descends to minutiaa, and is so rigid in its required decorum that an infraction of it is sometimes less readily condoned than vice. All such conventionalities arise from the union or consolidation of interests and responsibilities, and betoken the solidarity of the community. 1 § 125. A prime condition of the wholesomeness of a com- munity is the truthfulness of its members. The obligation to be truthful in both word and deed is clear. Every one has a right to certain services from his fellow-man, and a usually just and sometimes very important claim is for an opinion, judgment, information, direction, advice, sympathy. If these be reserved when due, it is a trespass, a restriction of a rightful liberty to use and profit by them. Still greater 1 " Nicht die Sittlichkeit regiert die Welt, sondern erne verhartete Form derselben : die Sitte. Wie die Welt nun einmal geworden ist, verzeiht sie eher eine Verletzung der Sittlichkeit als eine Verletzung der Sitte. Wohl den Zeiten und den Volkern, in denen Sitte und Sittlichkeit noch Eins ist. Aller Kampf dreht sich darum, den Widerspruch dieser Beiden aufzuheben und die erstarrte Form der Sitte wiederum fur die innere Sittlichkeit flussig zu machen." — Auerbach. 242 OB GANIZA TION is the trespass, if they be misstated, thereby misinforming and misleading the recipient, for then his trust is violated, his confidence outraged. If the claim be allowed, the expres- sion by word or deed must be true to the thought. 1 But the claim is not always just, not always to be allowed. We are not always bound to speak; often it is right and wise to" be silent. Nor, if we speak, are we always bound to tell the whole truth ; in which case the extent of the reserve is matter for conscientious judgment, having care not to mis- lead by the partial statement. This right of private reserve is superseded by the courts in the interest of society at large, and the witness required to tell the whole truth without reserve. Whether deceit in any form is ever justifiable is a ques- tion that has been discussed for centuries, and is still unset- tled. On the one hand it is affirmed that deceit is in its very nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of right and justice ; and on the other hand it is asserted that certain emergencies may justify a departure from ordinary rules of conduct, and render deceit not only justifiable but obligatory. This question of the ages is not to be answered in a few words. We must be content here with saying : first, that a lie is never justifiable ; secondly, that not every deception is to be accounted a lie, e.g., the myth of Santa Claus ; and thirdly, if the definition of a deception be allowed wider scope than the definition of a lie, yet is a deception so rarely right and duty that every one should practice habitual truth- fulness, deviating from it with great hesitation, and only when the justification is beyond all question. 2 1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 218, 251. In north China, a request for information is usually introduced by the polite phrase : ' ' May 1 borrow your light ? " 2 See Trumbull's^. Lie Never Justifiable; especially ch. vi, which cites many authorities ancient and modern, heathen and Christian, pro and contra. To these add Kant, who, in a tractate tiber ein vermeintes Becht aus Men- THE COMMUNITY 243 § 126. The general obligation to be truthful takes a num- ber of specific forms. Beside this duty in the commonplace talking of familiar intercourse, we place the formal tie of a promise, written, oral, or indirectly implied in mere behavior. The obligation in such case is strengthened by the fact that the promisee, in reliance on the faithfulness of the promiser, may in his life-conduct order important matters with refer- ence to the promise, and suffer injury or even disaster should it fail. A promise given under an essential misunderstand- ing, or, since we cannot accurately forecast the future, in case the duty of its observance is superseded by some higher unforeseen duty with which it is radically inconsistent, is null. This does not endorse the loose aphorism that a bad promise is better broken than kept ; for, if its badness work merely the private personal injury of the promiser, unless ruinous in an intolerable extreme, he is not thereby dis- charged of the obligation. We commend him that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not. A promise made under compulsion cannot be claimed by the promisee, yet it meas- urably binds the promiser because of respect for his word. In no case, however, is a promise obligatory if the fulfillment be criminal, for it can never be duty to commit crime. A contract or covenant differs from a simple promise in that it implies an exchange of services, and reciprocal obliga- tion. 1 It is usually under the protection of special statute, an outcome of the moral element, of that mutual trust which is the basis of social order. Contracts are of endless variety, schenliebe zu liigen (Auflage R. und S. vii, S. 295) pronounces strongly for the negative. A translation of this tractate is appended to Abbott's KanVs Theory of Ethics, p. 431 sq. Cf. Lotze, Grundziige, § 45. 1 "A contract is an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing." — Blackstone, Commentaries, etc., bk. ii, p. 442. The Constitution of the United States, Article i, Section 10, forbids any State to enact a " law impairing the obligation of contracts," which clause has given rise to a vast deal of litigation. 244 ORGANIZATION and affect nearly every detail of private and public life ; and if their binding character were not fully recognized there would be no security in affairs. A deception practiced by either party in making a contract invalidates it; but both parties must abide the consequences of carelessness, thought- lessness, or stupidity. Common honesty in trade, and in business dealings gener- ally, is another form of truthfulness. Exchange of services, of goods, and of other forms of property, has the advantage of being estimated numerically in the medium of exchange, money, which gives exactness to the mutual obligation, ana sharply expresses its violation. The interests involved in such transactions are so widely interlaced that fraud excites general indignation and reprobation. There is hardly any form of trespass that incurs such deep and lasting disgrace as dishonesty. 1 § 127. The membership of an organized community does not consist in merely so many men, women and children, standing singly as discrete elements coalescing into a con- crete body. A strong tendency to such individualism has marked the nineteenth century, in France, in England, and even more positively in the United States. It cries out for 1 It is worth noting that honor and honesty are, etymologically, the same word. Cf. Cicero's usage of honeslas. "The advantage to mankind," says Mill, " of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life ; the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable." — Polit. Econ., bk. i, ch. 7, § 5. Says Professor James : "A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the cooperation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is ever attempted. ' ' — The WUl to Believe, p. 2^ TEE COMMUNITY 245 liberty, equality, fraternity, and demands that creed, race, and even sex shall be ignored on the forum, at the polls, and in the schools. Now, while each individual man and woman is a distinguishable member of society, it should be observed, in opposition to individualism, that each is primarily a mem- ber of a family whereby he or she is socialized, that the family is properly the organized and organizing unit of so- ciety, and that a community consists fundamentally of asso- ciated families. This incidentally appears in the fact that the social standing of the individual is in general determined by that of his family, above which it is difficult to rise, and below which one rarely falls. The question, What is he? asks after his vocation ; but, Who is he ? asks after his family. A variety of minor organizations are usually formed by voluntary association, which also are integrant members ; as, social or literary clubs, and benevolent societies. Beside these are business firms of two or more members, stock com- panies, cooperative associations, and guilds or trade-unions. Such combinations for more effective achievement are often legally incorporated, and usually have a contract or articles of agreement, or a written organic law or constitution, stating the ends they seek and the means, and defining the functions of members and officers as duties ; the variations in duty arising from a specializing of functions so as to constitute an efficient cooperative whole. A special class of subordi- nate organisms is seen in the schools, which also usually have a formal constitution and laws defining the duties of members, official and unofficial. They are instituted specially to meet the debt due the next generation, are essential to the perpetuity rather than to the maintenance of society, and form a bond, a historical enchainment, between its present and its future. Each of the foregoing minor organizations is itself a mem- 246 ORGANIZATION ber of the community, having, as already said of the family, an individual personality distinguishable from the individual personality of its components. 1 Moreover, although the bounds of any single community be ill denned, still commu- nities are recognized as more or less distinct from one another. Now each of these as an organic whole has not only obligations to its various members, but also to neighbor- ing communities with which it is in communication. Thus the community as a whole is an individual, a personality, with a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of its members, which passes upon its own character and con- duct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of affiliated communities. § 128. The organic nature of a community distributing various functions or offices and consequent duties among its members, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The neces- sities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor alone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce the many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man has many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to be classed as necessaries. 2 For the full gratification of these he is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows. Hence the pressure of such wants molds the community into an organism, in which each works for every other, and they for him ; also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and the end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple community will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter, a blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a schoolmaster, and a curate. These exchange services or 1 See supra, § 118. 2 Said Voltaire: "Le superflu, c'est le vrai ndcessaire. " This paradox was revived by Charles Boyle, saying : " Only give me the luxuries of life, and I will dispense with the necessaries." THE COMMUNITY 247 products, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the organization. A discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise on Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics. 1 It is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its economical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving rise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect for order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the re- sponsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the commu- nity at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a vocation, a calling, and establishes each worker in a position, changed from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no longer just like all others, but assumes a place and mark specially his own. 2 Extreme division of labor, however, de- presses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his spiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an automatic mechanism. The distribution of functions brings about social classifica- tion. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and mechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again from artists and the professional class whose work is mostly intellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and less to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome effect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a higher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civil- ization. But here also an abatement must be made. Classes strongly marked tend to become castes, in which form their 1 See supra, § 76, note. 2 The familiar word vocation implies Providential superintendence and appointment to special service. The reality of this is perhaps not commonly recognized. Still " die sittliche Weihe des Berufs, 1 ' or the moral consecra- tion of a calling, has great influence in the regulation of society. It acts like " the expulsive power of a new affection," ejecting all that is inconsistent and unworthy, and assimilating all that is concordant and befitting in a new consecration. 248 ORGANIZATION wholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed, improvement discouraged, and civilization restrained. § 129. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in general is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to repro- ductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of those more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special class is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from the wage-earners whom they employ in their large and enlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advan- tages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic industry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uni- formity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability of the sma]l free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces the larger portion of the community to the position of wage- earners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom their livelihood depends. The evils of this division of soci- ety, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in what are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness of moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of injustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of the amenities of life, induce violent revolt. Certain remedial schemes, under the generic name of socialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They propose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite and compact solidarity. In general, they would abolish com- petition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership of property, especially of land ; substituting work under the stimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products, and a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property by closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of reorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also the family, substituting for domestic relations and the gov- ernment of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com- THE COMMUNITY 249 ruunistic care for the nurture and education of offspring. Attempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation have hitherto failed. A discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and even as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the gen- eral remark that the evils of society as actually constituted arise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral equipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture seeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon the rights of even the humblest member ; and in the absence of just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station determined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until this Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the inseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to greater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recogni- tion of reciprocal rights. 1 Meantime, remedy against oppres- sion by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and disorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardian- ship of rights, to the strong arm of the State. 1 " Voici une sage et belle devise : Prendre pour point de depart et pour point d'appui de tout progres le devoir du rich plutCt que le droit des pauvres ; de sort que 1' accord dut pu se faire entre les deux adversaires, a l'aide de quelque concessions, en somme assez peu douloureuses. ' ' — Revue des deux Mondes, 1883, p. 725. 250 ORGANIZATION CHAPTER IV THE STATE § 130. It is essential to any widely associated life of men that there should be definite and effective provision for the protection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or at least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and strong, that its several members are not competent, without combination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties. Moreover, certain important interests of the total community are best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot otherwise be served. To attain these two general ends, the safeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal, the one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of the State. 1 1 "The society of many families, instituted for mutual and lasting advan- tage, is called a village, Kiijmj. . . . When many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a State, 7r6\ts, and con- tains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence. It is first founded that men may live, and continued that they may live happily [i.e., in the perfect practice of virtuous energies. — bk. vii, ch. 8]. For which reason every State is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such ; for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by its tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house. Besides, its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing ; but a government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident, that a State is one of the works of nature, and that man is naturally a political animal, -rroXiTiicbp&ov, and that whosoever is natu- rally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, &tto\is, must be either inferior or superior to man ; just as the person reviled in Homer : * No tribe, nor State, nor home hath he.' For he whose nature is such as this, must needs be a lover of strife, and as solitary as a bird of prey. ' ' — Aristotle, Politico,, bk. i, ch. 2. THE STATE 251 The established State occupies a definite territory. It em- braces several, perhaps many distinguishable communities usually of one race and language, having common manners, customs and traditions. It consists primarily of the whole body of people, the body politic, including all officers of gov- ernment; but the term is often, secondarily, limited to the official class, the sovereign body having supreme power held in trust for the common weal, which class, however, is more properly termed the government. 1 It is not within the scope of this treatise to discuss the relative merits of different forms of state government, nor to trace the historical evolution of the State through the abuses, turmoils, and civil wars which, because of the imperfect or erroneous views and the selfish ambition of statesmen and rulers, have embarrassed its development. We shall attempt no more than to sketch the essential features of its constitu- tion, and to indicate its exclusively ethical basis, its thor- ough-going ethical character, and the varieties of moral obligation imposed on its members by its specific and peculiar organization. § 131. Governments are distinguished as monarchic, aris- tocratic or republican, and democratic. Some combine ele- ments of each of these principal forms ; as, Great Britain. No exclusive preference can be given to any one form. That is best which best accords with the historical traditions and habits of its subjects, is suitable to their grade of intellectual and ethical culture, and is administered in the interest of the public rather than of the rulers. 2 1 When a number of States, whose people as a body come of a common stock, natus, are confederated under a general government, this is properly a Nation ; as, the German Nation, especially prior to the unification in 1870, and the nameless Nation formed by the United States. When a number of States of distinct nationality are united under a common government, this is properly an Empire ; as, the Roman Empire, and the British Empire. 2 The very best form of government, according to Aristotle, is the aris- 252 ORGANIZATION Every well-ordered State, whatever be its form of govern- ment, has essentially a Constitution, unwritten or written, positively decreed, and loyally observed by its officials and citizens. 1 The Constitution is the fundamental organic law, organizing the body politic. It has three essential features tocracy of intellectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities be found, in their highest development, in a few persons, or only in one. The Virginia Bill of Eights, § 3, says : "Of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the great- est degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of mal-administration." "A government is to be judged," says Mill, "by its action upon men, and by its action upon things ; by what it makes the citizens, and what it does for them ; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of them." — Representative Government, p. 43. 1 England has no formally enacted and written Constitution. The gov- ernment, originally an absolute monarchy, has been reduced to a limited monarchy by Magna Charta and numerous subsequent Acts of Parliament, which stand in lieu of a formal Constitution, and insure to the people re- publican liberty. The Constitution of the United States is a written and formally enacted document. Its preamble is : " We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran- quillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Thus is declared the multiple end, essentially a duplicate, to protect and to pro- mote welfare. The articles which follow enact the specific means for attain- ing the end, reciting the functions or duties, with limitations, of the various officers of the government. In a republican government, whose legitimate procedures are determined ultimately by the will of the majority, the Constitution is an aegis for the minority, shielding it from the caprice of popular whims. In general, it is protective of citizens from the tyranny of magistrates. " The powers must be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger than the social feelings. And hence, the powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. That by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant by constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to govern- ment." — Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, p. 7. THE STATE 253 arising from the very nature of the State, the legislative, the judicial, the executive. The functions of the three are some- times embodied in one person ; as, an absolute monarch. In many cases they are irregularly distributed to a number of persons ; but the historical trend is clearly to separate them as distinct departments intrusted to a distinct personnel ; as, in each of the States of our Union, and in the Federal whole. The function of the Legislature is to enact statutory laws within the limits and in pursuance of the organic law, the Constitution. As a necessary corollary it has authority to affix penalties to these laws to insure their observance, and power to lay and collect taxes for the support of the govern- ment, and for the execution of its measures. 1 The function of the Judiciary is to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of the legislated statutes, to interpret their application, to sanction and decree the penalty for violation. When not otherwise directed by statute, the inferior courts proceed in accord either with the Roman or Civil Law, as in the States of continental Europe, or with the English Com- mon Law, which has been adopted as the basis of jural rights in the United States. 2 1 Legislation for the general welfare is to be distinguished from legisla- tion for the welfare of individuals, which is favoritism, or to benefit some distinct social group, which is class legislation. These are illegitimate. 2 Except in Louisiana, where the Napoleonic Code, a modification of the Justinian, is recognized. For Koman or Civil Law, see supra, § 47, note. The English or Common Law, lex non scripta, derives its authority from long usage or established custom, and has been immemorially received and recognized by the English tribunals. The historical source of this system cannot be traced. The origin of the Common Law, says Lord Hale, is as undiscoverable as the head of the Nile ; which is true historically, but phil- osophically its origin in human rights is easily discerned. Its settled rules and principles have not been authoritatively codified ; they are found only in the records of courts, and reports of juridical decisions. Statute Law, lex scripta, is a body of laws or rules of action prescribed or enacted by the legislative power, providing for specific and exceptive cases, and promul- gated and recorded in writing. 254 ORGANIZATION The function of the Executive is to enforce the laws and carry out the measures enacted by the Legislature. The execution of laws respecting crime, and of those respecting property rights, is intrusted to the inferior courts with their police and prison auxiliaries, backed by the superior courts, and by the chief executive, be he governor, or president, or king. Measures for the public weal, as the coinage of money, the care and disbursement of the public funds, the system of public education, the postal system, the improvement of har- bors and waterways, the making of treaties, and many others, are carried into effect by this branch of the government. Also the chief executive is commander in chief of the army and navy, wherewith to insure domestic tranquillity, and the common defense against foreign aggression, invasion, or other form of trespass. 1 § 132. Now be it observed that the State is a complete, authoritative and powerful organization. Its foundation is on human rights, its superstructure is a fortress against tres- pass, a lodgment of justice, an abode of public duty and patriotic service. The structure is not new ; for the human race, so long as it has existed, has been busied in building, remodeling, repairing, improving, and maintaining in differ- ent forms, through all the vicissitudes of history, this emi- nently ethical institution. 1 " What constitutes a State? Not high-raised battlement or labored mound, Thick wall or moated gate ; Not cities proud with spires and turrets crowned ; Not bays and broad-armed ports, Where, laughing at the storm, rich navies ride ; Nor starred and spangled courts, Where low-browed baseness wafts perfume to pride. No ; men, high-minded men, With powers as far above dull brutes endued In forest, brake, or den, As brutes excel cold rocks and brambles rude ; Men, who their duties know, And know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain." — Sib William Jones. THE STATE 255 Recalling the definition of an organism, that each member is at once means and end for every other, and the whole for each and each for the whole, we observe : first, that each citizen in his action as such, as in voting, or paying a tax, or serving on a jury or in the army, and likewise each officer of any department in exercising his special function, is thereby expending energy as a means for the profit, directly or re- motely, of every other individual member of the State ; sec- ondly, that in so far as each member is profited thereby, he is an end ; thirdly, that the whole as a systematized means finds its end in guarding and promoting the liberty, privileges, rights and property of each individual member separately taken; and fourthly, that it is the function of each officer and citizen to become a means whereby to maintain the integ- rity and efficiency of the State in all its departments as an end. In ancient times this last relation was emphasized, the people are for the State ; as in the Roman Constitution, and in the Spartan Constitution so greatly admired by Aristotle. In modern times the reverse relation is emphasized, the State is for the people ; as in the Virginia Bill of Rights, which has been generally accepted as their Magna Charta by the United States. 1 The right relation, however, between the governing and the governed is one of constant reciprocity. The mutual obligations are dissimilar, but in delicate and admirable equipoise. 2 Moreover, in observing that the ends in every view are the preventing of trespass and the promoting of welfare, it is evident that the raison d'etre of the organization and its informing elements are strictly ethical. It would be easy to 1 See supra, § 82, note ; and infra, § 146, note. 2 A mere allusion may be permitted to the famous old Roman fable of "The Belly and the Members," as told by Menenius Agrippa in the early days of the city. Livy, ii, 32. The analogy illustrates a profound truth. See 1 Corinthians, 12 : 14-26. Also supra, § 109, note. 256 ORGANIZATION . treat in detail of the duties of citizens to the State, and of the duties of the State, to citizens, showing them to be strictly and exclusively moral obligations of high order, all coming under the law of trespass as prohibitions or as requisitions ; and it is well worth repeating that all laws of civil government are amplifications and specifications of the law of trespass. 1 The Legislature originates no law abso- lutely. Having discovered certain rights unguarded or in abeyance, it is obligated to enact specific laws to meet the specific cases; and these laws derive their authority ulti- mately, not from the enacting body, nor from the whole people whom it represents, but from the fundamental impera- tive principle of right and justice, the moral law. 2 § 133. Mention has already been made of the strong tendency in recent days to individualism, of the disposition to lay stress upon the individual personality of each man and woman, slighting the unity of society in favor of its disparate plurality. 3 It is evidently a reaction against the centralizing tendency of former times, which regarded the State as comprised in one man, 4 or in one set of men, and all others as fused to a mass whose sole relation to the state was subservience. Both views are exaggerations, between 1 See supra, § 65. 2 " For even Tarquin had the light of reason deduced from the nature of things, which incites to good actions and dissuades from evil ones ; and which does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in writing, but from the first moment that it exists ; and its existence is coeval with the divine mind. Therefore the true and supreme law, whose com- mands and prohibitions are equally authoritative, is the right reason of the sovereign Deity." — Cicero, Laws, bk. ii, ch. 4. "Law in general," says Montesquieu, "is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth ; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be the particular cases in which human reason is applied." — I? Esprit des Lois, Tome ii, ch. 3. 8 See supra, § 127. * Said Louis XIV : " L'&at ! C'est moi." THE STATE 257 which lies the truth. Both violate the organic character of the State, the latter excessively integrating, the former dis- integrating. Against individualism we point out that the State is not an aggregate of men and women, nor are individual men and women its originating units. The unit of the State is the family. 1 As a city is composed of houses, so is a State of homes. The representative head of a family judges and acts for it in uniting with others to organize, or in the far more usual case, to conduct the affairs of the already organ- ized State. To him alone is properly committed the right of suffrage, as the one best capable of guarding and promoting all interests outside the domestic sphere. 2 It has been wisely said that the two pillars upon which the whole structure of the State reposes, are the sanctity of the marriage relation and that of the judicial oath. 3 Should a blind Samson bow 1 " It is clear," says Aristotle, " that a State is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a State cannot exist ; but all of them together do not constitute a State, which is a community of well-being in families and in aggregations of families called villages or com- munes, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. ' ' — Politico,, bk. hi, ch. 9. He distributes society as follows : oTkos, a house, home, or family ; Kd)/A7) , a village, neighborhood, or community ; ir6\ts, a city, municipality, or State. — Idem, bk. i, ch. 2. 2 That bachelors of twenty-one or more years of age, notwithstanding their incomplete social status, are admitted to citizenship, is a concession to the prospect of their becoming heads of families, and to their usefulness in public affairs ; e.g., in the army. A sharp line of franchise is necessary ; it is best furnished primarily by sex and age. See supra, §§ 114 (3), 116. Wisdom from experience dictates there should be also educational and prop- erty qualifications for franchise. Its extension to ignorant paupers, espe- cially to those of other races and nationalities, has always proved disastrous. The presence in the State of a proletariat incapable of a voice in its affairs, should be recognized as unavoidable ; so that it is not the total people, but only a selected portion that rules, the portion which most contributes to the consistence of society, and therefore is privileged to represent it. 3 For 'oath' we would substitute the more general 'truth,' inspiring trust ; see supra, § 125. Aristotle, in Politica, teaches that human society 258 ORGANIZATION himself on these, the whole edifice would fall with disaster to ruins. 1 The State is thus constituted primarily of a congeries of families organized into the larger whole. But beside these are many other organizations holding membership in the State, to whom protection is due ; as, business firms, stock companies, and corporations generally, including incorporated towns and cities. These are endowed by the State with large powers, and thus become subordinate municipalities, each imperium in imperio? Also each department of the State, and each of its subdivisions, as a court, an army, is itself a subsidiary organism. can be resolved into the two ultimate elements, sexual relation and private property. Upon these the State is founded. The first is necessary for its continuance, and both for its welfare. His recognition of private property as a twin pillar, rather than merely a buttress, of civic organization, is more likely to be apprehended and approved in modern times. i "In Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare has indicated the deep moral relation of the family and the nation, and its significance in the story of Troy. The war had its origin in the violation of the purity of marriage life, and it was this which involved the city in destruction. The doom which overtakes Troilus and Cressida is the reflex borne on through the years, and on to the close of the city, of the moral judgment upon Paris and Helen. There is an expression not only in the catastrophe, but through the whole drama, of the organic and moral relation of the family and the State." Muxford, The Nation, p. 282. See supra, §82, note. Thus it teaches that the natural and moral consequence of the disrupted family is the disrupted State. What the wise Ulysses therein says of the State, may be applied to the drama itself : " The providence that's in a watchful State Knows almost every grain of Plutus' gold, Finds bottom in th' nncomprehensive deeps, Keeps pace with thought, and almost, like the gods, Does thoughts unveil in their dumb cradles. There is a mystery — with whom relation Durst never meddle — in the soul of State, Which hath an operation more divine Than breath, or pen, can give expressure to." — Act iii, sc. 3, 1. 196 sq. 2 On' the social and moral effects of the affranchisement of the cities, see Guizot, History of Civilization, vol. i, Lee. 7. THE STATE 259 § 134. The State as an organized whole, while distin- guished by special characteristics, has features resembling those of its elementary and subsidiary members. It is logi- cally indivisible in itself, an individual. Its subdivisions are not kinds, but departments, into which it is logically severed. As a self-subsisting individual, it has a life whose beginning is sometimes out of sight in remote antiquity, as that of Greece ; and whose continuity does not depend on that of its several members. We are born into it, we live within it, we die out from it ; we are but its transient accidents. A man looks forward to his end, and makes provision for it by testament ; a State, looking forward with expectation of in- definite continuity, makes no provision for cessation, which, indeed, as with Poland, rarely occurs. 1 Moreover, a State is a personality. It has an intelligence and a culture of its own, and it has a will of its own. Also it has a conscience of its own. 2 Often it incurs debt, and with unconstrained honesty meets its obligation. If it fail, it is dishonored and disgraced before the world, and causes 1 ' ' Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut seterna sit. ' ' — Cicero, Be Republica, bk. iii, ch. 23, § 34. " It is not composed of its present occu- pants alone, but it embraces those who are, and have been, and shall be. There is in it the continuity of the generations, it reaches backward to the fathers and onward to the children, and its relation is manifest in its rever- ence for the one and its hope for the other. . . . The work of the individ- ual is brief, and in its isolation would be almost vain, but in the continuity of the nation it is inwrought in the longer social development. Thus, also, a single generation, in its furthest advance, achieves but little in comparison with the long line of the generations in the nation, and if there is laid on any the necessity of battle, still the holiest triumph is that in which the life of the nation in its continuity is maintained. ' ' — Mulford, The Nation, pp. 6, 9. 2 " The conception of the magistracy is significant to a certain extent of the common conscience of the people, which is made thereby to confront the changeable will of the individuals, precisely as within the spirit of the individual the consciousness of moral laws that are universally binding confronts the momentary frames of mind. 1 ' — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, §63. 260 ORGANIZATION guilty shame in every citizen, though he himself be blame- less. 1 Sometimes States commit crime as States, and are punished by other States, or by ordinary providence. Usu- ally they are very jealous of national honor, and an offense arouses national indignation. 2 i One generation in a State incurs debts to be paid by subsequent gener- ations, and these accept the burden without question ; as, war debts, bonds issued for improvements, and the like. The historical enchainment is also seen in the provision by law for general public instruction, which recognizes a debt due the coming generation. This obligation of the State is felt to be so weighty that not only in many modern but in some ancient States, as in early Greece, compulsory education has been adopted ; see Plato, Crito, 50d, and 51c, e, Step. ; cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. x, ch. 9, §§ 7, 13, 14, who in this last place says : " It would be best that the State should pay attention to education, and on right principles, and that it should have power to enforce it ; but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to be the duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose." "The State," says Burke, " ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper, and coffee, calico or tobacco, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all per- fection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many « generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appropriate place." — Reflexions on the Revo- lution in France, Select Works edited by Payne, Clarendon Press, vol. ii, pp. 113, 114. 2 "The State is bound," says the Bishop of Peterborough, Eng., "by precisely the same morality that binds the individual ; for morality is not a duty of positive, but of natural obligation, and is binding therefore on all men under all possible circumstances. The State may not, any more than the individual may, act immorally in the discharge of its trust. As he may not lie or steal for his wards, so neither may the State. It may not, for instance, in the interests of its citizens, plunder the property of other States, ? THE STATE 261 Also this distinct individual personality is manifest in the familiar recognition of national calamities, national pros- perity, national blessing, and national thanksgiving ; all these being clearly distinguished from what befalls this and that man, or this and that family. Withal there is a national character, as seen by contrast of the English, French, and Spanish peoples, more or less common to the individual citizens, but attributed to the nationality rather than to the man. It is only in a clear recognition of the distinct and unique personality of the State that a full and correct con- ception can be had of civic interest, of common welfare, and of public obligation. 1 § 135. Let us here give a passing glance at the great vari- ety of duties devolving upon a man because of his member- ship in a variety of organizations, each involving a special class or series of obligations. First as a member of a family, whose name he bears, he has peculiar obligations to each of or lie to them, or take unfair advantage of them in any way. Similarly in all its dealings with its own subjects it must be scrupulously and equally just. But this is a natural and not a distinctively Christian obligation. Morality and justice were not created, nor even revealed, by Christ ; they existed, and were known to exist, before the giving of the Sermon on the Mount, and would have continued to exist had that discourse never been spoken, or had He who spoke it never appeared among men." — Govern- ment and the Sermon on the Mount. 1 Much that is here said of the State may be, indeed has been already, said of the family ; supra, §§ 118, 119 ; cf. § 127. It was perhaps the inti- mate relation of the family and the State that gave rise to the paternal theory : As is a father to his children, so is a ruler to his subject. In his- tory, since the patriarchs, we find paternalism affected by kings and magis- trates generally. But this is not the doctrine of modern civics. The State is an organization sui generis, not patterned after the family, or any other organized body. See supra, § 109, note. Furthermore, the theory, promulgated by Bousseau in his famous Du Contrat social, ou Principes du Droit politique, which attributes the origin of the State to a social contract binding in perpetuity, has not survived the French Bevolution. 262 OBGANIZATION the other members and to the whole. Then as a member of polite society, as a business man in the market, on change or in professional relations, as one of a club, or company, or as- sociation, or church, he enters into many varied relations ; and, since obligation is founded on relation, these many varied relations determine, not only a multiplication but also a diver- sity, in kind and degree, of obligations. No man compre- hends life until he is made to see by how many organic fila- ments he is bound to his fellows ; how utterly impossible it is for him to separate his interests and his fortunes from theirs; in how many ways the welfare of those who are round about him depends upon the working, in due manner and measure, of that part of the organism which he occupies. With membership in the State, whether as a citizen sim- ply or as an official also, arises another distinct series of obli- gations, often of a very exacting and absorbing character. 1 Upon the sincere discharge of these by rulers and subjects depend the health and strength, the wholesome welfare, of the body politic. No merely perfunctory conduct, no dis- play of avowed patriotism, can replace genuine civic virtue. 2 1 The relations and consequent obligations in the family and in the State are alike in this, that they are both involuntary and indissoluble. A man becomes a member by birth, and finds himself already under bonds. Con- sent is not asked. There is an important sense in which it is true that States " derive their just powers from the consent of the governed " (Decla- ration of Independence, postulate), and that " all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the people " (Virginia Bill of Bights, § 2) ; but this does not apply to the individual man. If dissatisfied, he may transfer his allegiance, removing himself and his effects, but this is merely an ex- change, and not a dissolution of bonds. 2 It was Doctor Johnson, I believe, who said : ' ' Patriotism ! the last refuge of a scoundrel." Oliver Cromwell said to the men of England : "You glory in the ditch which guards your shores, but I tell you that your ditch will not save you, if you do not reform yourselves. ' ' Says the Virginia Bill of Bights, § 15: "No free government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence THE STATE 263 It is sorrowful to observe that public duties are ordinarily performed from dread of penalty or hope of reward, or per- haps from the higher motive of respect for the law. But in extraordinary junctures, in crises, in war, the service ren- dered, even when enforced, is often loving service, the com- pulsory is lost in the voluntary, and the dormant good-will of the people arouses to free and devoted exercise. This loving service of the State is the noble affection of true patriotism. § 136. What is the justification of legal punishment? What is the ground on which rests the acknowledged right of society organized as a State to deprive a member offend- ing against its laws of his property, his liberty, his life? What is the warrant? This grave question has been vari- ously answered. It is the right of the stronger, the com- bined force of many against one, the right of might, say some. It is the right of vengeance, of revenge for injury, transferred from the sufferer to the more capable and effect- ive State, say others. Yet others say, in lofty words, the dignity and authority of the law must be vindicated; the broken law must have its integrity restored, must be made whole again, rendered holy, sanctified, reconsecrated in the eyes of all before whom it has been violated, and this is the end of penalty. Let us seek firmer ground, some more rational justification. 1 to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." 1 That might gives right, that whatever a man can he may rightly do, take, hold, enforce, is the "brutal maxim of barbarians. There is a sense, however, in which might confers right. What one cannot do is not duty ; but, the condition of ability supplied, many things, within the limit of tres- pass, thereby become duties with their correlative rights. Noblesse oblige. In unorganized society, says Lotze, each man avenges his wrongs with all his might ; but this is inadequate, either as insufficient or excessive. Hence organized society takes from him the right of private vengeance, undertaking 264 ORGANIZATION At the beginning of this treatise it was pointed out as a familiar fact in history that men are exceedingly tenacious of their rights, defending their claims with great pertinacity. This is obviously the ultimate explanation of most quarrels between individual men, of suits and prosecutions before the courts, of contests between states or nations leading to inter- necine wars. Evidently by the common judgment of men every one has a right to defend a right. This judgment is clearly correct For, if we once more fix discriminating attention on the primary, necessary, and universal notion of a right, we discern, implied in its exclu- sive ownership, this addendum to the original conception, a right to defend a right. Whatever possession is truly my own, I may retain and use, I may protect it from all damage, especially from trespass, I have a right, indeed am bound, to defend it against all comers. Evidently the right and obli- gation to defend my right is an essential implication in the demand for maintenance of moral order. Again, of my pos- sessions I am steward and guardian, they are trusts. A neglect to conserve and defend, within limits, a trust, is an indirect trespass upon all who have a claim upon me for its keeping and using. An attempted or threatened trespass upon my life, liberty or property, is to be resisted, else I my- self become a trespasser. Thus defense is not a mere con- tingent privilege, but a necessary obligation. 1 Further, the obligation to defend a right implies a recipro- cal loss of right in the aggressor. By becoming a trespasser he forfeits in some corresponding degree his right to liberty, in extreme cases even to life. One attempting assassination, to avenge him in due measure. This is legal punishment. See Tract. Phil, § 52; cf. § 13 (3). Also cf. Butler, Sermons viii and ix. But revenge is essentially wrong. Can such wrong become right by transference ? Civil law nowhere recognizes that its penalties are retributive. Whatever is righteous in vengeance is reserved to a higher tribunal. 1 See supra, § 85. THE STATE 265 or arson, or burglary, is killed, if this be the only preventive means, by his intended victim, with regret, with sorrow in- deed, but without compunction. In the right of defense lies the warrant for interference in the liberty of a trespasser, which interference is not, therefore, itself a trespass. § 137. In an unrestrained intercourse of men, with their various abilities physical and mental, and with the varied opportunities afforded by wealth and station, the stronger trespass upon the weaker. An oppressor may perhaps con- sole himself with the brute maxim that might makes right, but the oppressed is not thereby relieved and quieted. Be- sides, impelled by selfish interests, men combine in couples, or squads, or large bands, and thus accumulate force to over- come the weaker. To inhibit such predicament society is organized into a State, constituted by a combining majority ; which organization is not oppressive but rather protective of the minority, the organic law becoming its shield, a defensive weapon, against popular caprice. The body politic employs agents, empowered by general consensus, to frame, apply and enforce particular laws in accord with the general purpose. 1 To accomplish the chief end of its existence, the protec- tion of its subjects in their rightful liberty, the government must, as far as practicable, defend, both at large and in de- tail, the original and acquired rights of individual men, of trade firms, of legalized corporations, of all subordinate com- 1 The historical origin of States has rarely perhaps been just thus. Yet many a clan, or tribe, or people has organized, on a patriarchal or on a military basis, for defense of common and private rights from aggression of similar bodies, as well as for conquest. More often, it may be, States have arisen from the skillful and selfish handling of the strong, seeking to enlarge and perpetuate their power. While the progress of civilization has failed to enlighten many, others have been gradually modified to approximate at least the form and intent indicated. Our discussion, however, is not con- cerning historical origin, but of the ground on which the ideal State, the State as it ought to be, is justified in exercising punitive powers. 266 ORGANIZATION binations of its citizens for legitimate purposes ; the right of private defense being transferred, except in emergency, to the more potent and equable agency. In order to fulfill this great trust, the government must defend itself. Its officers must be protected in the discharge of their legitimate func- tions against violence or intimidation. It must prevent the high crimes of regicide and treason, must resist the insurrec- tion of a disaffected minority, or the aggression of a foreign power. As an individual personality it is bound to preserve its integrity and efficiency by vigorous self-defense. It is clear that a State, as a faithful trustee, is bound, first, to preserve its own existence, and secondly, to restrain, to resist, and, if need be, to destroy whatsoever and whosoever assails its authority or attacks the interests committed to its charge. Self-preservation, and the preservation of all that is intrusted to it, are moral obligations of every State. § 138. Therein is the ultimate ground that justifies legal punishment. It is discovered in the obligation to exert pro- tective defense of rights. All legal penalties are set for the defense of rights. They inflict pain on the law-breaker, are a painful interference in his liberty, warranted by the prin- ciple of defense. They deter him from repetition of the offense, and they deter observers from like misconduct, thus defending the rights involved. Practically imperfect as it is, no other means is known by which to effect defense against offense, except this of inflicting pain on offenders in propor- tion to the gravity of their misdeeds. The punishment, as to kind and degree, is determined by what is past and cannot be reinstated ; its purpose is to determine what is future, and is deterrent, preventive of further or like trespass. Thus the sufficient, rational, and only righteous ground of legal penalty is the protective defense of rights. The principle applies to the divine government of the THE STATE 267 world. The natural sanctions of universal moral law are the typical antecedents of the artificial sanctions of civil law, and go far in an explanation of the righteousness of pain. 1 The sovereign Deity has rights on which men trespass as well as on the rights of his subjects. He defends these and his authority by the appointed natural pains attending dis- order, and by special penalties affixed to special offenses. Sin is essentially trespass on Deity, and the punishment of sin is self-defense, and the defense of all under his protec- tion. To have any other gods before him is high treason. 2 Deterrent defense is disciplinary. This gives title to houses of correction or reformatories set especially for re- claiming youthful offenders, and to penitentiaries where felons do penance, rendering them penitent, leading to reformation. So imprisonment generally, and also fines are disciplinary, not only of the offender, but of the observer, and even capi- tal punishment has this salutary effect on society. Thus the law is a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, leading to higher life. But this, with the State, is not its original, nor its avowed, nor indeed its ultimate purpose, but is an accessory. The State is not an educational, but a protective institution, and reformation is not the end, but a means of preventing tres- pass. Its enacted sanctions, among which are no rewards, are not incentive, but deterrent. Indeed, in the last analysis, any and every warranted interference in liberty is a defense against trespass, or, no interference in a person's liberty has 1 See supra, § 54. 2 That the purpose of civil punishment is deterrent, is the common doc- trine of jurists. It is here carried one step further back to the ultimate ground of a right and duty in defense of trust. The Church has always very generally held that the only legitimate end of civil punishment is the prevention of crime. The doctrine merges justice into benevolence. It is because God has a view to the welfare of his rational creatures, that he visits sin and moral disorder with punishment. Leibnitz defines justice to be benevolence guided by wisdom ; and Tertullian says : " Omne hoc justi- tise opus procuratio bonitatis est." 268 ORGANIZATION ever a warrant save in defense against trespass. In the domestic sphere parents punish to chasten. Chastisement is punishment intended to benefit the sufferer. It is often and rightly inflicted with no wider or further view ; but this whip of love means more, and the chastening has its only complete justification in forestalling the trespasses of perhaps a remote future. Our Father, in the abundance of his love, chastens his children, not only that the erring may turn and live, but more largely that all who might suffer from the persisting error may be spared the harm, and loss, and sorrow. § 139. The right of a government to suppress mob turbu- lence or riots of any kind, is obviously the right and duty to defend domestic tranquillity; and to quell an insurrection against magisterial authority, is clearly to exercise the right and duty of self-defense. The inverse right of revolution has the same basis. The ends of the State being the defense of rights and the promotion of the common welfare, " when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu- bitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." 1 Evidently, if a government be con- tinuously oppressive to the body of the people, their original and sacred right of self-defense justifies them in subverting it, and substituting one that promises better things. 2 1 Virginia Bill of Rights, § 3. Cf. American Declaration of Indepen- dence. Unjust laws, such as are not intolerably oppressive, of which exam- ples continually abound, ought, until repealed, to be obeyed by all concerned, from respect for the dignity and integrity of the State. In such case it is duty patiently to suffer injustice. 2 In usage of the terms, the distinction between revolution and rebellion is not always clear. Generally, if a revolt succeed, it is called respectfully a revolution ; if it fail, it is stigmatized as a rebellion ; the justice of the cause being disregarded in favor of the historical result. Treason or rebel- lion against righteous civil authority, is rankest offense. " Whoever lays THE STATE 269 War has no other justification. A war of conquest is plainly the crimes of murder, arson, robbery, and the rest of the foul catalogue, many times multiplied. On the other hand, a defensive war, provided all other honorable means of rectification have failed, is thoroughly righteous. That a State repel vi et armis the encroachment, the aggression, the trespass of another, is a moral obligation of highest order. A brave and conscientious people, possessing civic rights inherited to be fostered and transmitted, maintains them, even against overwhelming numbers and resources, and does not surrender, but dies in defending its trusts, warring until resistance becomes madness. Defense may fire the first gun, may invade the enemy's territory, may sweep his commerce from the sea, thus to conquer immunity and peace ; but, to be justified, all proceedings must originally and continuously be intentional and essential defense. This is so clearly recog- nized by civilized States in modern times that, whenever war between them occurs, each party loudly claims to be acting on the defensive, thus seeking to justify its action in its own eyes, and in the eyes of the rest of mankind. § 140. Geographic, climatic, and other conditions deter- mine that there shall be many States. Differences of race, language, religion, tradition, the genius and general culture of the people, further determine different forms of govern- ment, as monarchies, republics, democracies. These, the world over, have both common and conflicting interests, and are otherwise more or less intimately related. Their relations are adjusted by resident ambassadors and consuls, and by occasional diplomatic correspondence, forming and perform- ing treaties of commerce, and of alliance, fixing boundaries, violent hands upon the State, assails the conditions of all moral life, and therefore the crime is regarded as the greatest." — Trendelenburg, quoted by Mulf ord, The Nation, p. 16. 270 OR GANIZA TION and regulating minor matters. The trend of civilization has long been towards a brotherhood of peoples, and the enter- prise of the nineteenth century has so vastly increased the facilities of intercommunication, by multiplying roads of rapid transit, by tunneling Alpine barriers, by devising a swift and safe crossing of seas, by weaving over the globe a network of electric wires and submarine cables, that civic isolation has now almost entirely disappeared, and the na- tions are fusing and welding together. This intimate inter- course and manifold relation is subject to the one universal moral law of trespass not. There is no other obligation in all the comity of nations. 1 1 In the foregoing- discussion it sufficiently appears that {.he sole purpose of the State is the welfare of its constituents. It is in no sense a philan- thropic institution. The United States, for example, and the several States, in their manifold functions, are for the benefit of their own people, and not for the good of France, or Spain, or Mexico, or Canada, or any country or people not within their territorial limits. No government has a right to do charity outside its own jurisdiction, or to legislate for or to govern an alien people. A man may charitably give away money which is his own, but governments, federal, state, municipal, have no money except that ob- tained by taxation. Its possession and disbursement is a trust of the people whose agents they are, to be exercised only within sharply defined constitu- tional limitations which make no provision for philanthropy. To use it for other purposes than the welfare of the taxpayers, to use it to relieve oppressions or sufferings of remote or adjacent peoples, is illegitimate, a departure from right and duty, and liable to the grossest abuses. It is sometimes alleged that it is the right and duty of our government so to intervene in foreign affairs as to extend the area of civil liberty, to save others from misgovernment, to prevent persecution, and to establish the true religion. But what is liberty, right government, true religion ? We may determine these questions for ourselves, but we are not required nor authorized to determine them for others. No State is bound to incur cost or danger in the interest of others, this being detrimental to its own interest and that of its subjects, but rather therefore is it bound to abstain rigorously from all unnecessary interference in foreign affairs. The exercise of wide philanthropy, and the propagation of our high civilization, of our free insti- tutions, of our cherished religion, belong exclusively to voluntary associa- tions organized for the purpose, and more especially to the Christian Church. THE STATE 271 The increasing intimacy of these civic relations brings clearly into view the organic unity of mankind, and suggests the conception of a universal State, whose mighty function shall be to secure international justice without war. This ideal is becoming in a measure realized. " Its realization," says Dr. Seelye, "does not require, indeed, in the actual condition of men, would not permit that all particular States should lose their individuality of government or institutions, and be merged in what might be deemed the visible embodi- ment of the one universal State. The universal State has no visible embodiment. Yet it is not thereby without reality or power. In our modern world nothing has shown itself more real or potent. What we call international law, or the law of nations, unknown except in the vaguest, faintest way in ancient times, is recognized in our day as a sovereignty in human affairs, equally majestic and mighty. It has no visible throne ; it does not utter itself through the voice of a mon- arch, or the votes of a legislature or people ; it has no courts to expound, nor any fleets or armies to enforce its dictates ; but it guides kings, and legislatures, and peoples, and courts, and fleets, and armies in our times, with an authority whose manifestation of power is steadily increasing. There is nothing so characteristic of modern politics as the sway which international law, a development of the one moral law, is continually gaining among existing nations. There is no other point in which the politics of the present day are so clearly distinct from those of the ancient world. But international law is nothing other than the voice of the one universal State. It is the State in the highest exhibition of it yet given in history." The State thus organizing is a whole, is one and indivisible, uniting through itself more and more manifestly its constituent organizations, without effa- cing their distinct individuality, and presenting to the vision of political philosophy a world of united States. 272 ORGANIZATION CHAPTER V THE CHURCH § 141. Religion, in its widest sense, viewed subjectively, is belief in presiding, superhuman, spiritual power, earnest enough to influence moral character and conduct; viewed objectively it is a body of doctrine relative to such power, instructing and regulating its votaries. Religion is of two kinds, natural and revealed ; the former relying for its be- lief and doctrine on reason alone ; the latter claiming to have in addition information communicated by the higher power. The negative member of this dichotomy is natural reli- gion. Under scientific treatment it is entitled natural theol- ogy. It proceeds independently of historical, racial and local influences, discarding the dogmas of tradition, author- ity and custom, and upon rational grounds investigates the evidence furnished by nature of the reality and character of a higher power. More particularly, it seeks proof of the existence of God, his unity and personality, the kind and degree of his attributes, his will concerning us, the distinc- tion between right and wrong, good and evil, our relation and obligation to him, and our destiny both here and here- after. Revealed religions, which Diderot calls the heresies of natural religion, seek in general to impose their systems far less by reason than by persuasion with appeal to emotion and passion. Historically they have been largely character- ized by superstition or extreme reverence and fear of what is unknown or mysterious, and by fanaticism or ignorant, irra- THE CEUECE 273 tional worship of deities, with excessive rigor in opinions and practice. Witness the prevailing Asiatic and African cults. Christianity, however, is a revealed religion claiming to be in entire accord with natural religion, to be at its basis strictly rational, and to demand no more of its adherents than conformable faith in its transcendent doctrine. 1 1 It is an old saying that man is a religious animal. This differentiates, distinguishes him. His very nature determines that he shall look upward and worship. Among Aryan races, even the name which is above every name, in which every knee shall bow, is one, and tells of filial adoration. "In exploring the ancient archives of language," says Max Muller, "we find that the highest god received the same name in the ancient mythology of India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, and retained that name whether wor- shipped on the Himalayan mountains, or among the oaks of Dodona, on the Capitol, or in the forests of Germany. His name was Dyaus in Sanskrit, Zeus in Greek, Jovis in Latin, Tiu in German. These names are not mere words. They bring before us the ancestors of the whole Aryan race, thou- sands of years it may be before Homer and the Veda, worshipping an unseen Being, under the selfsame name, the best, the most exalted name they could find in their vocabulary, under the name of Light and Sky. . . . We have in the Veda the invocation Dyaus pitar, the Greek Zed 7rdrep, the Latin Jupiter; and that means in all the three languages what it meant before these three languages were torn asunder ; it means Heaven-Father. . . . Thousands of years have passed since the Aryan nations separated to travel to the North and the South, the West and the East ; they have each formed their languages, they have each founded empires and philosophies, they have each built temples and razed them to the ground ; they have all grown older, and it may be wiser and better ; but when they search for a name for what is most exalted and yet most dear to every one of us, when they wish to express both awe and love, the infinite and the finite, they can but do what their old fathers did when gazing up to the eternal sky, and feeling the presence of a Being as far as far, and as near as near can be ; they can but combine the selfsame words, and utter once more the primeval Aryan prayer, Heaven-Father, in that form which will endure forever, Our Father which art in heaven. ' ' — The Science of Beligion, Lee. iii. " Im Innern ist ein TTniversurn auch, Daber der Volker loblicber Gebrauch, Dass jeglicber das Beste was er kennt, Er Gott, ja seinen Gott bqnennt, Ihm Himmel und Erden ubergiebt, Thn fiircbtet und womoglicb liebt." — Goethe. 274 ORGANIZATION § 142. It has already been pointed out that a theory of Ethics to be complete as to its system must include the rec- ognition of a personal God, and of man's relation to him, and consequent obligation to render him loving service. This does not mean that there may not be practical morality even of very high grade in the various relations among men, with- out religion, without any acknowledgment of God; but it means that a scheme of morality without God is necessarily incomplete, has no ultimate support, no philosophic unity, and cannot be expanded into a scientifically systematized theory. Herein it appears that natural religion is the cap- stone, or rather the key-stone, of Ethics. Oriental scholars testify that Confucianism is simply and solely a body of inconsistent, ill assorted and often erroneous ethical doctrines, that Buddhism, the confession of one-third of the human race, is little else, and that both are distinctly atheistic. 1 Hinduism is pantheism, and pantheism, whether taught by the Brahman or by the god-intoxicated Spinoza, or by the haughty Hegelian, is merely a refined and enlarged, a generalized feticism. It denies the intelligence and freedom, the personality of its god. Now, since ethics with its com- plement religion is grounded in and arises from relations among persons, an impersonal being can have no part therein. Man cannot trespass on the world of nature, on the moun- tains, the continents, the ocean, or the stars, but only on him who intelligently and freely produced them, and to whom therefore they belong. The impersonal, so-called god of the pantheist is not at all the God of the ethical and reli- gious philosopher. Pantheism is essentially atheism. 2 The mythical polytheistic cult of the ancient Greeks, in 1 "Buddhism is no religion at all, and certainly no theology, but rather a system of duty, morality and benevolence, without any real deity, prayer or priest." — Monier Williams, Hinduism, p. 74. 2 See supra, § 99, note. THE CHTJBCH 275 form adopted by the skeptical Romans, and by them diffused over the Empire, was doubtless originally a deified personifi- cation of natural objects and forces, and an apotheosis of heroes. It was replaced in the philosophic thought of An- axagoras and of his successors by a strict monotheism, shin- ing forth clearly in the famous hymn of Cieanthes. 1 Thus unaided philosophy early reached and taught esoterically a remarkably pure natural religion, which, though it seems not to have taken practical form, nevertheless gave to the ethics of the Stoics a coherence, a consistency, an ultimatum and completeness that secured its permanence and general accep- tance even to this day. 2 All religions, and even atheistic cults, come within the scope of Ethics. We have already seen that a man is re- sponsible for his beliefs. 3 Every belief relating to conduct, be its matter true or false, carries with it obligations, duties ; for every one is bound, whatever be its error, to conform his conduct to the result of his moral judgment, or, as it is com- monly expressed, is bound to obey his conscience. In reli- 1 The text of the Hymn may be seen in Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, § 54 ; and a translation in Mayor's Ancient Philosophy, p. 177. A metrical rendering of the opening lines is as follows : — " Thou, who amid the Immortals art throned the highest in glory, Giver and Lord of life, who by law disposest of all things, Known by many a name, yet One Almighty forever, Hail, O Zeus ! for to Thee should each mortal voice be uplifted ; Offspring are we too of thine, we and all that is mortal around us." 2 See supra, § 100. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel says: "The idea of God constitutes the general foundation of a people. Whatever is the form of a religion, the same is the form of a State and its constitution ; it springs from religion, so much so that the Athenian and the Roman States were possible only with the peculiar heathendom of those peoples, and even now a Roman Catholic State has a different genius and a different constitu- tion from a Protestant State. The genius of a people is a definite individual genius, which becomes conscious of its individuality in different spheres ; in the character of its moral life, its political constitution, its art, religion and science." 8 See supra, § 60, note. 276 ORGANIZATION gion it is not otherwise. Ethical principles prevail within the shrine. They are immutable and all pervading. They are the ground not only from which natural religion arises, but on which revealed religion descending must take its stand to find a firm support. Shall an exception be made in favor of Christianity ? Not at all. Christianity is preeminently ethical. Indeed in a philosophic view its great strength lies in the exact conform- ity of its teaching to the universal and eternal ethical princi- ples which it enlightens, widens, exalts and refines. It came not to destroy but to fulfill the law more enduring than heaven and earth. The Sermon on the Mount speaks of the Kingdom of heaven and of the fatherhood of God, but it con- tains no distinctively Christian doctrine, and is occupied otherwise with applications of purely ethical principles. It might fairly be entitled a Lecture on Practical Ethics. These principles determine what is due in domestic, in social, and in civic order, and are likewise fundamental in religious order. Hence it is that so much is discovered to be common to all those religions, both natural and revealed, that have attained to the dignity of a system. 1 1 Bishop Bigandet of Ava, in his Life and Legend of Gaudama, p. 494, says: "The Christian system and the Buddhistic, though differing from each other in their respective objects and ends as much as truth from error, have, it must be confessed, many striking features of an astonishing resem- blance. There are many moral precepts equally commanded and enforced in common by both creeds. It will not be rash to assert that most of the moral truths prescribed by the gospel are to be met with in the Buddhistic scriptures. " Mozoomdar, one of the leaders in a new religious movement in India, belonging to the high caste of his people, and reputed as learned in almost all the wisdom of certain kinds in England and America as well as in India, says : " Every great religion of which I have any knowledge has worshipped God either through the forces of nature, or in the form of heroes and great men, or through their own spiritual instincts. No religion, however idola- trous, has been able to shake off this threefold medium. The Vedas wor- shipped God through the forces of nature. David and Elias also saw the THE CHURCH 277 § 143. In general it is true that wherever cults develop, even those full of superstition, there arises a priesthood pro- fessing the function of mediator to propitiate the super- human power. The priesthood becomes organized, and unites with the State, seeking its protection, using its au- thority, and lending in turn its potent influence to strengthen the secular government. So it has been with the Christian Church, an organization that prevails to-day throughout Europe and America. To it we will now give special attention. In the Christian Church we find a purified and exalted ethical doctrine, including natural religion supplemented and complemented by revelation. Christianity is differentiated from other religions by the teaching that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the incarnate Son of God, making atonement- by the cross, and ever living as Savior and King. 1 It is this differentia only that Christian polemics has to defend against infidelity. Its expansion constitutes Christology. With this a treatise on Ethics has nothing to do ; it is concerned only with the generic features which are common. manifestations of God's power and wisdom in natural objects so glorious that no argument, no logic, no sophistry, could overcome the simplicity of their natural religion. Behold, also, God's attributes in the different deities wor- shipped in the Hindu Pantheon ! We cannot escape the conclusion that the processes of religious development have been universal. . . . Every nation has had its different surrounding circumstances. Its climate is different ; its geography, its bodily constitution, its mental temperament, its history, all different. That these differences should have deeply affected religious development is not at all wonderful. But the sense of trust, love, and holi- ness in all religions is the same or similar, only the forms disagree. . . . Yet I declare that even in the midst of all this variety there is so much in common that the student is wonder-struck at the fact of unity. In the midst of all the controversies and conflicts that afflict the religious world, we come across fundamental truths which are so similar that we are struck by the thought that they must have a common soul, a common impulse, a common origin, and a common aim." 1 For the best possible definition of Christianity, see John 3 : 16. 278 ORGANIZATION For, all the great virtues that stand out as cardinal have had existence among all peoples from the beginning. The decalogue, excepting perhaps the sabbath-day law, contains nothing new. All moral obligations binding men to God and to each other originate, not in legislation, but in the nature which God gave to man, and are determined in detail by the variations in his complex relations. The virtues have been developing through all the ages among all peoples, and are developing to-day under a better understanding, a fuller comprehension, a more subservient recognition of personal relations and their consequent obligations. No doubt Chris- tianity has been and still is powerfully influential in their higher development, giving brighter light over a widening horizon; but Christianity did not originate them, it merely found them, enlarged them, enlightened them. Manifestly, the all-informing, all-embracing, fundamental law of Chris- tian activity, is the ethical, altruistic law of loving service. 1 § 144. Historically the Christian Church emerged from Judaism very weak in numbers, and in social influence. Its organization, comparable to a shepherd with his flock, was 1 "It is sufficiently evident," says Guizot, " that morality may exist in- dependently of religious ideas ; that the distinction between moral good and evil, and the obligation to avoid evil and to cleave to that which is good, are laws as much acknowledged by man, in his proper nature, as the laws of Logic, springing likewise from a principle within him, and finding likewise their application in his life. Granting all this, and yielding up to morality its independence, the question naturally arises : Whence cometh morality, and whither doth it lead ? This obligation to do good, is it a fact standing by itself, without author, without aim ? Doth it not conceal, or rather doth it not reveal an origin, a destiny reaching beyond the world ? By this ques- tion, which arises spontaneously and inevitably, morality leads man to the porch of religion, and opens to him a sphere whence it was not borrowed." — History of Civilization, Lecture V. " The real novelty of Christian Ethics," says Dr. Broadus, " lies in the fact that Christianity offers not only instruc- tion in moral duty, but spiritual help in acting accordingly." — Commentary on Matthew, p. 161. THE CHURCH 279 extremely simple and apparently feeble. But its native strength was soon manifested. The original hundred and twenty speedily became as many thousands. Local churches were multiplied. The ' heresy ' was propagated with an activity, energy and devoted zeal that knew no bounds. It spread into Asia Minor, it invaded Europe, and entered Rome. The vast power of the State, then mistress of the civilized world, was put forth to suppress the rising ' super- stition,' and in the course of three centuries ten fierce and bloody persecutions, extending throughout the Empire, and waged with all the implacable might of the Roman power, sought to crush it, and failed. Gathering new and greater strength from adversity, it successfully resisted the oppressor, conquered the conqueror, and shared the throne of the Caesars. 1 1 " We can be at no loss to discover the cause of this triumph. No other religion, under such circumstances, had ever combined so many distinct ele- ments of power and attraction. Unlike the Jewish religion, it was bound by no local ties, and was equally adapted for every nation and for every class. Unlike Stoicism, it appealed in the strongest manner to the affections, and offered all the charms of a sympathetic worship. Unlike the Egyptian religions, it united with its distinctive teaching a pure and noble system of ethics, and proved itself capable of realizing it in action. It proclaimed, amid a vast movement of social and national amalgamation, the universal brotherhood of mankind. Amid the softening influence of philosophy and civilization, it taught the supreme sanctity of love. To the slave, it was the religion of the suffering and the oppressed. To the philosopher it was at once an echo of the highest ethics of the later Stoics, and the expansion of the best teaching of the school of Plato. ... To a world, grown very weary of gazing on the cold and passionless grandeur which Cato realized and Lucan sung, it presented an ideal of compassion and of love, an ideal destined for centuries to draw around it all that was greatest, as well as all that was noblest on earth, a Teacher who could weep by the sepulchre of his friend, who was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. ... It was because Christianity was true of the moral sentiments of the age, because it represented faithfully the supreme type of excellence to which men were then tending, because it corresponded with their religious wants, aims, and emotions, because the whole spiritual being could then expand and expatiate under its influence, that it planted its roots so deeply in the hearts of men." — Lecky, History of European Morals, ch. iii, p. 387 sq. 280 ORGANIZATION This affiliation of the Church with the State, in the middle of the fourth century, together with an increasing complexity and solidarity of organization, gave even greater efficiency to its propagandism. Apparently weakened by the schism into East and West, into Greek and Latin, it nevertheless with- stood the floods of barbarians that overwhelmed and over- threw the Empire, converted and subdued them, saved Christianity for Europe, and ruled the continent throughout the mediseval centuries. 1 In modern times, beginning with the sixteenth century, a further division of the Western Church into Catholic and Protestant, with many subdivi- sions, has occurred, which seems to have stimulated rather than impaired its zealous activity. Thus during two millen- niums, amid the rise and fall of States and Empires, the Church has maintained its growing power, and to-day Chris- tendom embraces Europe and America, and is pressing its jurisdiction into Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea. 2 1 Strikingly similar is the historical spread of Buddhism, propagated from India over eastern Asia and Japan, by its lofty ethics, and the promise of Karma and Nirvana ; and of Mohammedanism, propagated from Arabia over western Asia and northern Africa, by the sword and the Koran, with its promise to the faithful of a paradise of houris. Mohammedanism swept Christianity out of Asia and Africa, excepting the feeble remnants in Arme- nia and Abyssinia ; and Christianity in southern Europe was threatened with a like fate from the invasions of the northern barbarians overthrowing the Roman Empire. " Humanly speaking, it is not too much to aver," says Guizot, "that in the fourth and fifth centuries, it was the organized Christian Church that saved Christianity ; the Church with its institutions, its magistrates, its authority, which struggled so vigorously to prevent the internal dissolution of the Empire, which struggled against the barbarian, and in fact overcame the barbarian, it was this Church that became the great connecting link, the principle of civilization, between the Roman and the barbarian worlds. ' ' — Hist. Civ. , Lee. ii. Cf. Lectures V, and VI, on The Christian Church. 2 " Christianity enjoyed no privileges and claimed no immunities when it boldly confronted and confounded the most ancient and most powerful reli- gions of the world. Even at the present day it craves no mercy, and it receives no mercy. Unless our religion has ceased to be what it was, its THE CHURCH 281 § 145. What therein determines this unique persistence and expanding potency is not far to seek. First, there is an exalted, purified and extended morality, approving itself to the heart and conscience of humanity as in accord with its ideal constitution and the natural order of life among men, which morality is taught in precept and urged in practice. Secondly, there is an enlarged and enlightened view of our relation and obligation to God as Our Father, giving to natural religion a clearness and cogency never attained in the schools of philosophy. Thirdly, there is a well settled claim of a divine origin, of a divine founder in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, of a divine revelation promising redemp- tion to the faithful and eternal blessedness to the righteous. We would not ignore but heartily approve the further claim of the Church that it is multiplied, upheld and impelled by the immanent Spirit of God ; but, from a historic and philo- sophic point of view the aforementioned principles go far toward explaining the phenomenal strength and growth of this the most durable and comprehensive of all human organizations. Moreover, consider the ends for which the Church pro- poses itself as the means. It claims to have solved the problem of life, to interpret its meaning, and to offer sure guidance to the faithful. Maintaining that our terrestrial life is teleologically justified only by the fact that it is related to a higher life, to a life beyond, and therefore has import, not as an end in itself, but as a period of preparation and probation for eternal life, it proclaims to restless humanity : defenders should not shrink from any trial of strength." — Max Mullek, Science of Religion, Lee. i. Let me, the writer of this treatise, reverently add, that a religion which cannot abide the most searching investigation of philosophy and of physical science, a Bible which cannot pass unscathed the fire of adverse criticism, of skeptical, hostile criticism, that religion, that Bible are not for me. Let research go freely on, free from all check save fact and logic ; the result, we need not fear. 282 ORGANIZATION Come unto me, and find your promised rest. " We may con- cede that the teleology of history has never reached a system formally more complete than the philosophy of the Church. Heaven and eternal happiness the goal of historical life, the earth its temporal scene of action, its central point the incar- nation of God and the foundation of the Kingdom of heaven on earth, all past ages leading up to this culmination which shall determine the entire future, the whole course of history bounded by the day of creation on the one hand and the day of judgment on the other, these indeed constitute such a grand philosophy of history that Hegel's or Comte's barren abstractions are mere nothing when compared with the fruit- ful, concrete conception." 1 Under the shield of this massive doctrine, and by right of its divine ordination, the Church is claiming ownership and actively seeking possession of the whole world in the name of its living King. § 146. In the fourth century the Church was incorporated with the State. It is generally admitted by ecclesiastical his- torians that, from and after the time of Constantine, the ori- ginal constitution of the Church was overlaid by a vast body of human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, assimilating the magistracy by a long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities or powers, rising upward from the primitive pastor or curate to the bishop, to the pope or patriarch ; and that by these and other results of the alliance of the Church with the Empire, its simplicity was lost, its purity corrupted, and the prior relations of the clergy and laity injuriously affected. 2 1 Translated, with some verbal adaptation, from Paulsen's Einleitung in die Philosophie, Berlin, 2d ed., 1893 ; bk. I, ch. ii, § 3 (p. 178). 2 "If it be assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to the development of the mediaeval hierarchy, its influence must be conceived as mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Neo- Platonists, and the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted and influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the ultra-phenomenal world. But THE CHURCH 283 Yet " it was of immense advantage to European civilization that a moral influence, a moral power, a power resting entirely upon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments, should have established itself in society, just at the period when it seemed on the point of being crushed by an over- whelming physical force. Had not the thoroughly organized Church at this time existed, the whole world must have fallen a prey to mere brute power. It alone possessed a moral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of a precept, of a law superior to all human authority ; it pro- claimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of our hope for humanity, namely, that there exists a law above all human law, which, by whatever name it be called, whether reason, or the law of God, or what not, is, at all times and in all places, eternally one and the same." 2 In the course of the centuries, however, the alliance of the Church with the State proved unwholesome. An arrogant and ambitious clergy endeavored to render its rule entirely independent of the people, to bring them under authority, to take possession of their mind and life without the conviction of their reason or the consent of their will. Claiming to be in possession of the keys, it exercised a spiritual lordship of almost unbounded power. It endeavored with all its might to establish a theocracy, to usurp the temporal authority of the State, to establish universal dominion. The struggle for supremacy between the Church and the State, always at the expense of the liberties of the people, often resulted in the subjugation and subservience of the latter ; and the former, asserting its catholicity, was for centuries the dominant power whatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence, and setting aside many specific differences, the general character of the Pla- tonic State and that of the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages are essentially the same." — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., § 43, note, 1 Guizot, Hist. Civ., Lee. ii. 2 84 OR GANIZA TION over Europe. Ecclesiastical dissension and division, in some States, broke this dominion, but the ill-starred communion of the two organizations has persisted, an unholy alliance, con- fusing the sacred with the secular to the prejudice of both. 1 The end, the ultimate purpose for which the State exists, and that for winch the Church exists, are quite distinct, and their rightful means of attaining their ends have little in common. The proper function of the State is concerned with the material prosperity, the external wealth of its citizens ; the proper function of the Church is concerned with the spiritual prosperity, the internal weal of its clergy and laity. The one seeks to protect and promote the health and wealth of the body politic ; the other to edify and multiply its adhe- rents. Membership in the one is quite involuntary ; in the other it is essentially voluntary. The one upholds its au- thority by physical force ; the other by moral force alone, having no penalties beyond censure and excommunication. The State has sharply marked geographical limits which it may not transgress ; the Church, expanding its realm, freely invades all other realms. The former is in no sense a propa- gandist ; the latter is essentially a missionary. In their union the lines of demarcation become obscured, and each under- takes more or less the office of the other, leading to a strug- gle for mastery and a consequent hinderance of efficiency. Christendom has greatly suffered, and is still suffering from 1 Still, Mr. Gladstone, an eminent Statesman, in one of his later Essays, strongly advocates the maintenance of the union ; but, on the other hand, the Bishop of Peterborough, a high Ecclesiastic of the established Church of England, in a recent Essay, says : "The Church is not and cannot become the State. These words stand for two wholly distinct and different societies, having different aims, different laws, and different methods of Government. The State exists for the preservation of men's bodies ; the Church for the salvation of their souls. The aim of the State, even put at its highest, is the welfare of its citizens in this world ; the aim of the Church is their holi- ness here in order to their welfare hereafter. The duty of the Church is to eradicate sin; the duty of the State is to punish and prevent crime." THE CHURCH 285 this error. And not without warning. For, at the very origin of the Church, their prospective divorce, their separate functions, their distinct work and harmonious adjustment, were declared in the profoundly wise prescription of its founder : Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's. 1 1 According to Plato, the chief end of the State is the training of its citi- zens to virtue. " Our object," says he, " in founding the State is that, not a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." — Republic, iv, 420 b. Elsewhere he teaches that happiness depends on culture and justice, or the possession of moral beauty and goodness. — Gorgias, 470 e. Accord- ing to Aristotle, the State originated for the protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally upright living, its principal function being the development of moral capacity in all its citizens, but especially in the young by education. The end is of higher order than the causes which brought it into being ; 17 tt6\ls -yivo^vt] yJkv odv rod ^rjv %v€kcl, od