Class look. COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT PSYCHOLOGY. AN ABREVIATION v. H, BIDDISON, A. M. >'^ 0*^ Cnn^O/: v'^'^ ov a V? IVIAY 14 1895 '^ ^ AN INSTITUTE COURSE _ — IN PSYCHOLOGY. NINETEEN - LESSONS. Y)limDDISON, A, M, li Ex-Superintendent of Public Instruction, Marshall County, Kansas. Maiy.>ville, Kansas. 'koplk's advocate vkint 1895. 6//Z1L Z(n//Z1L ^^.^^ / ^'v \ fc,\ ^6'^ This book is dedicated to those who have found or may find it useful. The A^ithor, Copyriglited by Y. H. Biddison. 1805. PI^BFASB. In my Teachers' In>;t!tute last year, I pre- sented the subject of psycliolog-y by lectures, and while the examination papers on Theory and Practice (wliicli is largely psychology) at the following examination showed improve- ment, the work was unsatisfactory, because the class was without text books, and I knew of none so inexpensive as to be within the reach of all, nor so brief and concise in defi- nition as to be adapted to the brevity of time and the plane of the average student. So I have ^ftndertalven to prepare this course for my teacher-pupils in '92, and for such other demand as its merits may create. The work on psychology must be academic. It cannot be of the normal type; it is ah ini- tio. My method is deductive, dogmatic. In truth, the method of the teacher is deductoni: by that m3tho3, the fool's school of exper- ience is avoided and one generation begins where the last quit, and having learned the known, corrects errors and carries on further investigation by inducfcion. I have not space to discuss; I assume. This "course" is merely a jointe:! skeleton of the subject; to it the living teaclici' must add the muscle of appli- cation, and the student, the fat of illustra- tion. I present little tluit is new; my Iiope is to excel- in brevity and clearness of statement. I do not hope to be so clear as tc^ be unJer- stood without thought, but so clear as to pro- voke thought. I wish to be so explicit that no thoughtful reader will misunderstand, even if he disagree, and so plain that just criti- cism may not be evaded by ambiguity of words or sentences. If this plaiUy inexpensive treatment shall meet with the approval of Institute Instruct- ors and help to popularize the study among the teachers of the state, it will have ful- tillcd the purpose for which it was written. It has been prepared hurriedly in the office in the midst of other pressijig duties. My iiidebtecliicss to Prof. JJowne in writing on the Intellect, and to Dr. Munsell on the S.^nsibility, is too great to be exproised by (liiotation marks. I wish, also, to acknowl- edge the valuable assistance of Jas. P. East- erly in editing the MS. V. H. BiDDISON. SUPKIJINTENDENT'S OFFICE. Marysville, Kan.^ June i. 1892. PRBFASB TO SECOND EDITION. The demand justifies this second edition. One of our leading educators says, "It is al- together too elementary." That certainly justifies it, A college student tells me that when he wants to find what tlie two-volume work used by the class is trying to say he turns to this to find out. That justifies it. A teacher writes, "It aroused within me bet- ter purposes and ambitions." Surely that justifies it. "You have certainly given the teachers of Kansas a concise, complete and most valuable exposition of the principles of psychology applied to the teacher's work," writes an Institute Conductor. I have found it useful in my Institute work, so feeling that the first edition has filled its purpose, I issue this one believing that it is not only adapted to teacher's Institutes, but to High School courses of study. I have made some changes in the text mostly in the interest of clearness and sever- al quotations, so terse that I could not afford to omit them, have been added. One chap- ter has been divided and enlarged and a brief vocabulary added. The latter I have felt was necessary as a connecting link between this and more voluminous works. Y. H. B. ELEMENTS OF PSYCllOLOOY. LESSO]^ I. FUNDAMENTAL DEFINITIONS. "I think, therefore I am."— Descartes. Psychology is tliat department of science which treats of the mind, its acts, and tlie laws of its action and development. Mind is tiiat form of being whicli thinks, feels, and wills. The existence of mind is so basal a fact as to be almost beyond proof, its existence be- ing imxMed in every elfort to prove it. Proof is only an elfort to reach certainty, that is, knowledge, and is only applicable to those things of which we are not yet sure. Al- though the mind is unseen like oxygen, un- heard like the rose, and unfelt like light, it is known by that subtle sometliing called consciousness which is the essential element in the action of all the senses. What mind is we know only by its acts, as we know what any other thing is. We know of the existence and nature of iron only by its acts. It reflects light— we say we see it. It tends powerfully to fall to the earth — we say it is heavy. It resists blows— we say it is hard. If it did not act upon us we would not know of its existence and we have no idea of its nature or of the nature of any other form of being except tlie manner of its action. ' So of the mind, we Imow nothino^ but its existence and sucli ideas as we may form of its nature from its acts. What iron, is apart from its acts, we Imow not. Wliat mind is apart from its acts, we l^now not. Challc is something (I Icnow not what) tliat is white, light, soft, friable, brittle. Mind is something (I know not what) that is thought- ful, passionate, willful. The distinguishing acts of mind are thinking, feeling, and will- ing. The faculties, or powers by virtue of which it acts, are, INTELLECT, the power by which we obtain knowledge and think; Sensibility, the power by which we feel; Will, the power by which we choose and act. The mind is one, a unit. There are not three parts, but three powers of the mind. These powers are not independent; do not act or exist separately. The divisions are not in the mind or of the mind, but by the mind. In other words, the elements of men- tal action are abstractions and not, like chem- ical elements, capable of separate existence. Thinking (and by this term I mean to in- clude all forms of knowing) is scarcely defin- able, yet you know and I know what mental act is indicated by the word. Its elements are sensation and intuition. Sensation is the primary change in the state of the mind produced by an impression on an organ of sense. Intuition is the mind's power of origina- ting in the presence of proper stimuli, such as sensation, certain necessary ideas, and primi- Live judgments. From tlie union of these two elements and their mental digestion is evolved the whole thought process. LESSOR 11. SENSATION AND INTUITION* Sensation is the first change in the state of the mind which is produced by an impres- sion on an organ of sense; or it is the mind's reaction against the action of other things. The impression is the action of the outer world on one of the five organs of sense, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, or the skin, filled with the nerves of touch, by means of a ray of light, a sound wave, an odor, a solu- ble substance, or a resisting body. This im- pression is transferred by means of the nerve to the brain. I:»[either the eye, nor the optic nerve, nor the brain itself sees, or has the sensation of sight. ISTeither does the mind know of any change in the eye, nor is it conscious of any change in the optic nerve, nor in fact of its existence, but the change is a change of its own state. It is in action. It becomes a conscious soul, but conscious only of its own state. The second mental change (not in order of time, but logical order) is the act of intui- tion. Intuition is the mind's power of origina- ting in the presence of proper stimuli^ %ucli as sensation, certain necessary ideas and primi- tive truths, or judgments. The test^^ot hitiiition is necessity; that is, an idea to be classed as intuitive, and not derived from experience, must be necessary to all thought; an element without which sensation becomes meaning- less, and the mind a blank on which the outer world would make impressions (sensa- tions) that, like the letters of a school hoy^ are an alphabet, but spell nothing. But the intuition brings forth its products: first, the— Necessauy Ideas of (1) being, (2) cause, (3) time, (4) space, and (5) number. In the tirst sensation the mind, being acted upon and re- acting, becomes conscious; conscious of two things, "self" and "not self;"* and accounts for the sensation (change in my state) by as- signing "nofc self" as its cause. . And the idea of space arises when "not self" (the cause of sensation) is located as not only not part of me, but as apart from me. And the idea of time arises with the beginning and ending of the sensation. A sensation is now, was then in i3rogress. Three other ideas arise, (1) the true, (the real and unreal), (2) *The baby, new to earth and sky What tim^ his tender palm is pressed Against the circle of the breast, Has never thought that this is I. But as he grows, he gathers much, And learns the use ol: I nud me, Aud ttnds I ara not wliat I see. And other than the things I touch; So rounds he to a separatf^ mind, From whence clear mem )rv may begin. As tiiro' the frame that binds him in, His isolation grows (.iefineA.—Tetiiiytion. tlie heautifal, (the pleasing), and (3) the good^ (right or wrong); and se^ioni— The Primitive Judgments; these are— I. The Laws of Thought; they are — 1. The law of ideni3ity, Anythhig whatever is exactly equal to itself; or, in other vords, the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. 2. The law of contradiction. What is contradictory is unthinkable. S. The law of excluded middle. If one of two contradictory attributes is affirmed, the other is by imxolication denied. 4. The law of reason. Every change has a cause. II. The Axioms of Mathematics; they are — 1. Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. 2. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points; etc. III. The Demands of Conscience; they are — 1. I ought to do right, 2. I ought not to do wrong. You will see that these "primitive judg- ments" are derived from the "necessary ideas" originating in the intuition. Some of- them will seem meaningless to all save those who have studied logic or mathematics, be- cause both the "ideas" and "judgments" are abstract. These do not all arise in the first sensation, and perhaps never in this abstract form except in the highly cultured or remark- ably endowed mind. LESSOi;r HI. PERCEPTION. The combination of sensation and intuition is perception, or linowing. Sensation is so nearly a passive state tliat it can scarcely be distinguished from feeling,* and so far as it is an act of knowledge, it is a knowledge of our own selves, not of the outer world, in process of change of state. The knowledge offered in intuition is decidedly mental and interior — is not of things, but of their rela- tions. But in the combination of the two, the mind accounts for its sensation by pic- turing forth the outer world as the cause. It constructs the outer world in such form as to account for its various sensations. In this sense do we see that to account for the impressions made on our minds through the eye, we assume the existence of an object without, say a tree, if that best explains the individual character of the impression. We do not see the object with the eye, nor see the image of the object on the retina, which is reversed and inverted and double, but the mind sees by constructing in thought a rational cause for its sensations. As the magic lantern, by means of slides and a light, projects a picture which conforms to the na- ture of the scene upon the slide and ^is n * Sensation contains the primal elements f f e 1p- as well as of knowing, and is cause of both knowi ^ ni feeling interpretation of it; so the mind, by means of its sensations and the light of intuition, projects the outer world conforming to its sensations so as to account for them by assigning some object as their cause. This figure is as nearly a perfect illustration as a physical fact can be of a mental one. The process is the same with all the other senses. "But we are not concious of this process," says one. Neither are we of the heart-beat, nor of breathing, nor of the existence of the liver, nor of its secreting bile, but examina- tion reveals the facts. ISleither are we con- scious of the process of acquired perception, or perceiving, by using the knowledge given by one sense as the evidence of the linowledge which might be gained by another. "I go into a darkened room and perceive, by the sense of smell, the presence of a tuberose though I neither see nor touch it. I look at the white iron and say it is hot although heat is felt. A man strikes a barrel and says it is full or empty. A surgeon by the sense of hearing perceives the condition of his pa- tient's lungs." We judge distance by size in adult life, but the child reaches out for the moon just as for his ball. We judge of size also by assumed distance and thus perceive men at a distance as men although sight re- veals them as boys in stature. Likewise we judge of distance by intensity of color or dis- tinctness of outline. For illustration, dis- tances are very deceptive to persons going from a moist climate to one having a clearer atmosphere, because outline and color are more distinct than the person is accustomed to associate with similar distances. We have sensations formed by one half of- tlie surface of an orange, but we perceive an entire orange, the body, taste, and odor as well as the surface. But acquired percep- tions are not direct; they are based on pre- vious experiences and the exercise of the higher powers of memory and judgment. Their value to us is immeasurable. Unless sensations are clear^ that is^ the or- gans of sense are in perfect condition and the sensation has attention, the perception cannot be perfect, and if it is not^ no result- ing mental process can be clear, vivid, and reliable. Sensation and perception usually occur at the same instant, but not always- When absorbed in study one may only per- ceive, when some one speaks (the ear un- doubtedly being affected), that something has occurred, or that some one is present, or spoke, or who spoke, or what was said. These various perceptions may be in the same instant as the sensation, or the cause of the sensation may not be perceived till the attention is released from the subject under consideration. Perception Is the act of assigning a cause for sensation. LESSOI^ lY. MEMORY. "The great Keeper, or Master of the Rolls, of the soul. A power that am make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave hehind those things whlcli else he woLiU carry awaj as if they had not hten."— Bishop Hall, Memory is the mind's power of reprodu- cing its former intellectual states and recog- nizing them as having been part of former experience. Intellectual states are not things, but acts, and are not retained, but reproduced. They are not stored or kept, but recreated. "Except in a flgarative sense, the past is not in the mind at all. Our possession of a ImoT/Iedge of which we are not conscious, means only that we can reproduce that knowledge on occasion. Eeproduction in no way brings back the old fact. The particu- lar experience as a mental fact vanishes for- ever. What remains is the ability to perform anew the ancient function.''* That which is reproduced is purely an intellectual state. It is not a state of feeling or an act of will, but an intellectual state which preceded or fol- lowed that state of feeling or act of will which is reproduced. Not the emotion, but the knowledge of it returns though the re- turning knowledge of it may cause its return in a diminished degree. The renewed emotion is not an act of memory, but a result of the act of memory. * Bowne's "Psychological Theory." LESSON Y. MEMORY STI3IULI. What causes us to remember? What stimuli can cause the mind to repro- duce its former acts of perception and thouglit? I. The repetition of part of a previous mental act stimulates the mind to complete the entire act. This condition may be brought about by — 1. The presence of the cause of the orig- inal act. 2. A revival of similar or associated in- tellectual states; that is, states having some of the same elements, by means of objects similar to, or associated v^ith those v^hich caused the original mental act. One of the most potent causes of such revival is lan- guage. 3. A revival, from any cause, of acts of emotion or volition, which were associated with the original intellectual act. II. An act of the will may produce the same result, which is quite common and is most applicable when one desires to recall an object of a certain class or of a well ordered series. In these cases the will causes the in- tellect to complete its former thought scries. In many cases we cannot see that the will operates through this first law. The outer causes of these mental states, which stimulate the mind to" re-perCorm its former acts, are resemUances and contrasts X)e- tween objects now present, and the causes of former states, and contiguity in time or space, and the relation of cause and ejfect between the same objects. All of these operate through the first law. Even contrast means that the objects belong to the same class; i. e., have the same essential elements, but dif- fer in detail; so one object of the contrasted pair contains, most of the elements in the ■ other, and the mind having been caused to perform most of the former act, completes it. As to size, form, color, and weight, let a represent an object, A another; 6 time when seei^, B another time; c a cause, C its affect; d place where seen, D another place; e associated emotion, E same emotion from other cause; / associated volition, F same volition from other cause. Their combinations represent complex mental states or acts, as: 1. ahcd 4. ABC^ 2. A6c(Z 5. ABCD 3. aBcd 6. ABCD e/ 7. A B C D E F Number 1 is an original sensation or thought. Later, I have the experience Num- ber 3 and in it the elements, except time, are the same as in Number 1, and having thought the common elements a h c, the mind is stimulated to complete the series of Number 1, and thinks the full thought abed. So, in the future, Number 2 may remind me of Number 1, because the two objects were seen at the same time or had the same causative power c and were seen at tlie same place d. So, Number 5 may remind me of ISTumber 1 . tlioiigli not containing the same elements, by moans of an intermediate term; for instance. tliOLigli the colors of a and A are different, A's color sets the mind to rehearsing color-^ and when the color of a is reached, the mind not only recalls the color a, but with it h cd. So, ISTumber 4 causes the mind to recall Number 3, because in our experience C has been associated with c as its effect; but when C has caused the mind to think c again, c causes us to think all of Number 3, or 2, or 1. So flows the never ending stream of thought. And thought becomes more surely reproduci- ble by noting its elements and the surround- ings it has in common with other thoughts. The secret of memory is a sense, at the time of the original act, of the imioortance of the thought to he reproduced; that is, to see its import for our being, welfare, and destiny. This results in close attention; not only seeing a whole, but perceiving the parts that are common to other wholes; and systematic thought; seeing an object not as alone, but as part of a series or system. It is not enough to se^ things, but to see them in their natural or- der and relations. Memory of recent events, as a rule, fails in age, while early scenes re- main fresh, because the old man feels that life is nearly over and his surroundings are neither new, pleasurable, nor important and therefore do not command attention or thought. While those who think themselves dying, recall with wonderful vividness every word, thought, or deed of moral import be- e-ause they feel that eternity depends upon these things. Do not try to make the mind a library. Do not try to remember anything unimpor- tant. Do not try to msike the mind a "cliarnel house of dead thoughts." Talie time to reliearse and review tliosc things that should be remembered: review not by re-seeing or re-reading; but first tal^e so lit- tle that the mind can without difficulty re- produce it, and then review from memory; then add a little and review again, and so on. There is scarcely a limit to the development of the memory by this plan, if one is willing to go slowly and steadily, but one cannot af- ford to give a life time to the develop- ment of one power, nor to preserve the past, unless it is used. One of heaven's chief bless- ings is the power to forget the unimportant and trifling events of life. Do not burden the memory with any un- necessary thing; nor develop it as a show- power; but for things necessary, give it abso- lute confidence and trust in its testimony be- cause you conform to the laws of its action. LESSORS" VI. IMAGIITATION. "And as innglnatlon bodies forth The form ot things unknown; tne poet's pen Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing A local habitation an^l a name." Without guessing, science would be impossible,— 7;fM)(?."'. Imagination is the mind's power to re-ar- range the mental states or their elements when reproduced by memory. Iiniig-iLKition lias notliing' new in ifc but or- der. All of tlie material is farnislied by tlic real cxpciieaces of life. But tlie imagination varies the elements of shape, size, form, col- or, causative power, etc. Under its influence ail relations may change; that which in ex- perience was above, is placed below; the in- side becomes the outside; the old, new; the lirst, last. All the limitations of time, space, and cause; all the relations of truth, beauty, and goodness change, as the position of the colored glass changes in the kaleidoscope. And whether this wondrous power shall make of its possessor a philosopher, an inventor, a poet, a painter, a sculptor, a happy man or sad one, a good one or bad one, a dreamer or a fool, depends, first, on the thoughts fur- nished it; secondly, on the power controlling it. If directed by the will into systematic ac- tion, by the conscience unto a righteous end, by tlie reason into real and possible combina- tions, in the commonest life it may find col- ors to rival the rainbow and furnish the mind with flowers more beautiful than ever bloomed on earthly soil; it may find theories and hypotheses in the fall of an apple that shall account for the revolution and support of worlds; or it may, by changing the position of the almost powerless kettle's lid, lay the foundation for the utilization of powers that shall, unwearied, move the commerce of the world; it may picture to the mind of the or- ator, poet, painter, or sculptor, such ideals as have never been expressed in words, placed on canvas, or wrought in stone. To every occu- pation, it holds forth a higher possibility; to every life, a higher ideal. But, if uncontrolled, it makes the imprac- ticable dreamer the wild theorist and vision- juy. If it is the slave of the passions and appetites and is fed with obscenity, it will siak its possessor to the level of the beast; and if directed by selfish desires and uncon- trolled by conscience, its devices for gaining wealth, power, and place, will make the pos- sessor the scourge of the race, the accursed of God. LESSON YII. CONCEPTIOIT. **^ pluHhus unum.^^ Conception is the power of the mind to form general, or representative ideas or terms. General ideas are such as represent not single percepts, but groups of percepts. It is the algebra of the soul. It is the wholesale department of thought. It is the fountain of language. It is the grouping of similar percepts. Its best physical representation is the com- posite photograph. There are two processes of forming con- cepts, or general ideas; the primitive one is used on occasion of first experiences, especial- ly in childhood. The first experience is made to stand for all future experiences of the same or similar kind. The other process, more complex and accurate, is used by the experienced and trained mind. It consists in a recall of past experience by memory and— 1. Comparison; 2. Abstraction; ;:?. General izratioiT. Comparison is the act of giving attention! to two or more objects for the purpose of not- ing their relations; 1. e.^ likeness and unlikc- ness, etc. Abstraction is the act of withdrawing the- mind's activity from the elements consti Lu- ting the individuality (the distinguishing (lualities) of the percepts (objects) so the at- tention is centered upon the elements com- mon to the several percepts. Generalization is the act of using the ab- stract as a symbol of the concrete; or, using the common elements in a series of perccpfcs to represent the individual percepts. This process is called conception; its prod- uct, the "symbol" of the above definition, is a concept or notion. It is not a mental image, or picture, but represents a class of objects, as X in algebra represents a class of objects whose number and quantity are yet unknown ,^ or undetermined The object of the process- is to handle many percepts in one, and thus abbreviate the thought process; for instance ^ instead of saying "Friend Tom, friend John, friend Dick, friend Harry, and friend Will went with me," I say, "Five friends went with me." It not only accelerates thought, but makes it more exact and clear; for if the mind had to rehearse the individuals represented by ev- ery concept, the main thought would be lost before the mind completed the rehearsal of large classes. By this process we throw out all the elements irrelevant to the conclusion, retaining only those essential to the purpose in view. It may be truly said of the con- cepts, as it is said of the composite photo- graph, that it repra^oiits no one exactly, as its outlines are shadowy, but it shows wliat is essential, or common, to tlie group. It is a kind of average individual. While all concepts imply the process of ab- straction, they may be classed as abstract and concrete. A Concrete Concept is applied to a class of material objects; as, man. An Abstract Concept represents a thought object having no separate or independent ex- istence; as, manhood, whiteness, sensation, perception, etc. In applying the notion, or concept to the individual, the mind declares the individual to be described by, or not to be described by, the concept. This is classification: dividing the individual percepts or their causes by judging their agreement or disagreement with the concept. Classification is very crude among savages and children. The natives of one of the Pacific islands classed goats as hogs, calling them "horned hogs," and horses as "dogs." Most people still class whales as &shes. Let us illustrate the formation of concepts and classes: — I see our sorrel pony, Gyp; a dapple-gray draft horse, Carl; a bay track horse, Sunol; a white Arabian steed. Slick. The mind considers certain elements that be- long to all these animals and represents this concept by the term horse and uses the term horses to represent all of them, although the concept is not of a sorrel, gray, bay, or white horse, nor of a pony, or a draft horse, a track horse, or an Arabian horse. Besides the horses, I see, also, dogs, cats, cattle, etc., and form a new concept quadru- lied, reprcsontiiig' more individaals with less in common. I S3e, also, otlisr objects, such as fishes reptiles, etc., and form a greater concept rep- resented by the word veriebrates. With these objects, I place trees and plants, forming the higher concept living things, or animate objects. To the.ie add the inani- mate world and speak of the almost unlimit- ed concept being, which includes all existence and represents the only element common to Thus "out of many" the mind and in one word and one thought, can mentally handle the universe, having reduced the universe of though b to unity. This process is generalized thus: ab [iron) abc (lead) abed {cop])er] cb [tree) cbd [potato) cbn [moss) gb [bird) gba .[flsh) gbr [beast) fb [God) fbc [angel) J'bcd [man) Definitioi^ is the act of so describing any- thing that another may surely know it. To this end the description should give, first, the class to which the object belongs; i. e., th^ essential attributes, or the concept of which it is a part; second, the characteristics which distinguish its species from the other species composing the class; third, the peculiarities which mark its Individuality; i. e., distinguish it from others of its species. Percepts (Concept ab [minerals) S Concept cb [vegetables) (Concept gb [animals) I Concept fb { [spirits) CD-I; o O I. A clcriiiition must not contain the term defined. II. A dciinition must not contain obscure, llgimitive, or ambiguous terms. "III. A dciinition sliould not be negative. LESSON YIII. JUDGMENT. JuDQMEz^TT is tlie act of affirming or deny- ing the identity of two percepts or concepts, (tr the inclusion of a percept by a concept, after comparing the one with the other. A Proposition is a judgment expressed in \Yords. Whether a proposition affirms or denies iden- tity, it invariably declares that one percept or concept is equal to or part of the other, ;iQd is an act of classification. If I affirm that, *'A11 men are mortal," I declare "all men" to belong to and be part of the class "mor- tals." If I deny identity by saying that, "All men are not mortal," I affirm nothing less than that, "Some men belong to the class of not-morfcals, or immortals." If I say, "The man is guilty," I practically affirm that, "the uian" belongs to or is part of the class "guilty men." In a judgment there are always two and only two ideas (percepts or concepts) com- pared; one represented by the subject, the other by the predicate of the proposition. The names of the ideas are known as terms, and are classed as singular and general; the former being the names of single things; the latter, the names common to many things; that is, class names. The name of many things regarded as a unit is a collective term. The names of objects are called concrete terms; the names of qualities, abstract terms. Terms which express existence of qualities are 2^ositive. Terms which express absence of qualities are negative. These classes are not exclusive. There are three classes of propositions: I. Categorical, in which the judgment is positively affirmed or denied; as, He will speak. II. Hypothetic Aii, in which it is condi- tionally affirmed or denied; as. He will speak if—. And III. Disjunctive, in which the judgment suspends determination between two or more alternatives; as. He will speak or sing. Categorical propositions are classified as not only affirmative and negative, but also as uni- N^ersal and particular. If the proposition af- firms the predicate to belong to all of the subject, it is universal; as, "All metals are elements." But if we say, "Some metals are brittle," the quality is affirmed of only an indefinite portion of the metals. ISuch prop- ositions are particular. The signs of universality are all, every, each. any, the whole, etc. The signs of particular propositions are some, certain, most, many, a few, etc.; but these signs are not always pT^s- ent. JVb, not, and none are negative signs. When a proposition affirms or denies some- tiling of tlie whole of one of its terms, tliat term is said to Tbe distributed. Hence there are foar kinds of propositions: Affirmative A Universal Proposition xsegative E 1 Particular i Affirmative I \ ]N^egative O Subject Predicate J.— Distributed Undistribated. jB— Disuribated Distributed. J— Undistributed Undistributed. O — Undistributed Distributed. A. A' stulies are practical. E. Ko study is practical. I. borne studies are practical. O. Some studies are not practical. In the judgment A, it is implied that O is false, and vice versa; in IE, tliat I is false, and vice versa. If either A ov E is true, the other must be false; both may be false. I and may both be true; but if either one is false, the other must be true. If A or ^ is true, J or O must be true. If lor O is false, JL or jE/ is also false. This process of conclusion is called iraplied judgment. Good or true judgment is the foundation of sound reason. These classes are represented by the inclu- clusion or exclusion of the following figure -: A E All Msudid are Elements. No Me';i!8 are Compounds. Some Metals are Brittle Subst:inces.. Some Metals are not Brittle Subhtauces. LESSOI!^ IX. HEASON. Reasoning is the same process as perception, with tin's difference: perception Is inferential respecting objects present and reasoning is inferential respecting objects ab- sent.— Lewes. Keasoning is the act of inferring an un- known proposition by comparing two known propositions having a common term; — or, it is the process of forming a jiidjment of the re- lation of two percepts or concepts, or a per- cept and a concept by comparing eacli with a third; as, a=x', 5=3?; tlierefore a='b. The SYLI.OGISM is tlie ideal form of reason- ing. When not expressed, it is im]3lied. It consists of three propositions, or judgments, called the Major Premise, the Minor Premise, and the Conclusion. The Conclusion is the inferred proposi- tion. The Minor Term is the subject of the con- clusion. The Major Term is the predicate of the con- clusion. The Middle Term is the one common to both premises. With it each of tlie others is com- pared. Tii3 Matop. Premise contains tlie major term. The MijSTOR Premise contains tlie minor term. In tlie algebraic illustration above, a is the subject of the proposition a=6, which ex- presses the conclusion and is, therefore, the minor term: and b, the predicate, is the ma- jor term; x, with which each is compared, is the middle term; and a=x and 6=x are respecfcively the minor and major premise? beciiuse they contain respectively the minor term a and the major b. LcGic is the science which treats of the law^s of reason. It is of the same value to correct thinking that Physiology is to correct living. Both studies have their origin in de- praved action, mental or physical. Logic is valuable in proportion as mistakes in drawing conclusions are common. The syllogism is unnecessary in thinking in familiar lines, as a map is needless in traveling well known roads. So, one of the premises is offcen omit- ted. This form is called an Enthymeme. For example: "Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates must die." Often neither premise is stated and the conclusion stands alone. But when investigation begins and the fron- tiers and fundamentals of science are to be explored, the formal and definite statements of the syllogism make the detection of error much easier, and the resulting conclusion more accurate. lesso:n" X. EEASOIT, INDUCTIYE AND DEDUCTIVE. O God, I think thy great thoughts after th e.—Keplfr. But reason can only give us probability, not certainty,— James Freeman Clarice. The process of reasoning begins witli anal- ogy. Analogy is the judgment that what is true of some things is true of anofcher simi- lar thing. A child expects today what he had yester- day. If one person gives liim a penny, lie ex- pects the next one to do so, until he discov- ers that all persons are not alike or similar. He expects his sled to run down hill till he tinds that the surface of a bare hill is not like that of a snow covered hill. But with the passing years, he learns to presume from his experiences that like causes and omduions produce like results; or, in other words, that na- ture is uniform; for the seeming exceptions to the rule have mostly been explained, and he judges the others will be. With this great proposition he places others and reasons in this wise: For twenty years the sun has risen every twenty-four hours. jN'atare is uniform in her action. Therefore the sun will rise every twenty-four hours hereafter. This def- inite form of analogy is called induction. Induction is the act of deriving general laws from individual cases;— or, it is the act of judging, or concluding that what is true of the cases examined, is true of all similar cases. It is the method of discovery. While the prooess is the common property of the race, it was formulated by Lord Bacon. The cer- tainty of the conclusion is proportionate to the /number of particular cases examined. "One swallow does not make a summer." Its conclusions are absolutely sure only when ab- solutely useless; that is, when every case has been examined. Its value is in the power to determine the prohahilities in tlie unexamined cases. Deduction is the act of judging that what is true of the class, is true of the individ- uals composing it; — or, of inferring the par- ticular case from the general law. It is the method of instruction and applica- tion. While this process is also the common property of the race, it was formulated by Aristotle. The process is dependent for the accuracy of its conclusions, on tlie induction which furnishes its premises. It now ap- pears thab the act by which the mind passes in all reasoning from the known premises to the unknown conclusion, is not only an act of judgment, but essentially an act of faith.* "The distinguishing characteristic of science is its graduated method of verification, and not as some think the employment of induc- tion in lieu of deduction. All science is de- ductive and deductive in proportion to its separation from ordinary knowledge." *"Induction rests upon the assumption,— as it demands for Its ground,— that a personal or a thinking Deity ex- ists," and "that the rational methods of the Divine and human intellect must be the same."— Z?r. Porter, Philosophy proceeds upon a system of credit.— TAomp- son. To find new land we must quit sight of Und.— Lewes. Tii3 folio will J diagrani represents the relc& tions of the two processes of reasoning: A was a rntia B was a man € was a man X was a man He w.ll cUi ^9 ^ ^~~~~^ H^. wll die. LESSOR XI, REASOISry FALI^ACIES. H3 will dla Iteasonlrig is inferantial about objects f.a'm^rly given' in s'snsation but now absent. It is tli3 presjiitiitiou in cou- seiousnBss of objects, which, if actually present, would af- fect the consciousness in a similar way. * * * Bad reas^ii- liig will always be found to depend on some of the objects not beinij mentally present (realized.)— iewrf^s. Fallacies are violations of the laws of reason. The Laws of IncliioLbn are: "(1.) If, in all cases of an effect or phenomenon, one condi- tion is uniformly present, that is the cause or includes the cause of such phenomenon. (2,) If, 111 every instance in whicli an efiecl does occur, one single condition is present, wlilcli is uniformly absent whenever siicli ef- fect does not occur, this constantly^ present or absent condition is presumed to be its cause. (3.) If, whenever an effect or phenom- enon is marked vv^ith peculiar energy, any condition varies with proportional intensity^ this varying condition is the cause of such an effect." The basic idea of all these rules is that In- duction must be made not from few, but many instances. In taking a large number of cases one will probably meet all the con- ditions represented in the three laws and thus reach the truth. The fallacy of Induc- tion is concluding that "One swalloio makes a Slimmer.'^ The following illustrates: A quack is said to have had a patient who, against orders, ate a large quantity of raw cabbage and recovered. The quack wrote in ais notebook, "Cabbage cures tyj)hoid fever." He recommended cabbage to his next typhoid patient who was a Yankee and he died, so he wrote in his diary, "Cabbage cures French- men (his first patient was French) and kills Yankees." The Fallacies of Deduction are violations of the Laws of the Syllogism. The laws are: (I.) Every syllogism has three, and only three, terms. (II.) Every syllogism has three, and only three propositions. (111.) The middle term must be distributed once at least, and must not be ambiguous. (IV.) 'No term must be distributed in the con'jl'.ision, v/hich was not distributed in one of the piviiiisjs. (Y.) From two negative premises, no con- clusion can Ibe drawn. (VI.) From two particular premises, no con- clusion can be drawn. {VII. ) If one premise be negative or par- ticular, the conclusion must also be negative or particular. Violations of these laws are called Logical Fallacies. Another class is called Material Fallacies. They are seven in number: 1. The Fallacy of Accidental Attributes. 2. The Converse Fallacy of Accidental Attri- butes. 3. The Irrelevant Conclusion, k. The Petitio Principii. 5. The Fallacy of The Consequent. 6. The False Cause. 7. The Fallacy of Many Questions. They are illustrated by the following ex- iimples: 1. What you bought yesterday, you eat to- ■lay; you bought raw meat yesterday; there- fore, you eat raw meat today. 2. Wine used i n excess is a poison; what is once a poison, is always a poison; therefore, wine is always a poison. 3. The plaintiff's cause is just, but his at- torney is mean; therefore, the defendant should be acquitted. This is called the ar- gumentum ad hominem or populum, and is an appeal to prejudice, not reason. 4. A moving body must be moving in the place where it is or where it is not; it can- not be where it is not, and if it moves it cannot be where it is; therefore, motion is impossible. Here it is assumed that it can- not move from where it is to where a mo- iiient ago it was not. This is called begging (lie question. 5. Alfred the Great was a scholar, for he founded the University of Oxford. This is a conclusion that does not follow from the ])i-emises, and amounts to a simple assertion of the conclusion. 6. Night folloAYS day; an effect follows a cause; therefore, night is the effect of day. 7. Many questions will not all have the .same answer, and you cannot overthrow an argument by asking, "Have you left off beat- ing your mother?" The most common fallacy is the use of a term with two meanings in the same syllo- gism or with a different meaning in the minds of the speaker and hearer or writer and reader. It is not the term or word which is impor- tant, but the meaning or idea it represents. LEbtSOJ^ XIII. SENSIBILITY, — EMOTIONS . The words Sensibility and Feelings, in the broadest sense of the term, are equivalent. Prof. Bowne says, "No definition of Feel- ing can be given. We can only identify and name it. * * We might, then, deline feeling as that state of consciousness which consists in some form of pleasure or pain, like or dis- lilie, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Of course this is not a definition, but only an identifi- cation. What the terms mean can be known only in experience.'' Sensation contains not only the primal ele- ment of the higher intellectual activity, but also of the mental acts knov/n as acts of the sensibility. It is not only an act of knowledge, but also of feeling. Sensation, intuition, perception, memory, imagination, conception, judgment and rea- son — not only all intellectual activity, but acts of volition are causes of those changes of mental state known as Emotion; and emo- tions in turn are causes of Desire. These two divisions of the acts of the sensibility are distinguished from one another by their causes and their effects. Emotions are those acts of the sensibility which are caused directly by acts of intellect or will and do not act as motives to volition. but are the causes of desire. Desires are those acts of the sensibility which are caused by the emotions, and act directly on the will as motives to volition. The emotions, and consequently the de- sires wliicli are caused by them, are divided according to their causes into three classes, n:imely: Pliy.slcal, those caused by physical states; Physio-P.^ydLlcal, those caused by physical and intellectual states; and Psychical, those caused by purely mental states. The purpose of the Physical Emotions is the preservation and proper development of the body, by interesting the mind in its partner, making the comfort of one depend on the welfare of the other. They tend to regulate exertion and volition. They are subdivided into two classes, negative, (such as, weakness, weariness and discomfort), and positive, (such as, conscious strength or vital- ity and pain and pleasure). Pain is not a curse, but a blessing warning us of danger. The soul that can enjoy most, can suffer most. The Creator has made this class of emo- tions intense, "to prevent the tireless, ener- getic, ambitious soul from prematurely wear- ing out and destroying the body. All exper- ience proves that even cultivated minds can- not be safely trusted with the care of the body, unguarded by these faithful monitors." Then how carefully should the teacher note these signs of trouble, that divide and ought to divide the attention of his classes till giv- en recreation and rest. And no student should work on while the body protests. ]^o one has a moral right to trample underfoot the protest of his body, or the bodies of oth- ers. The Physio-Psychical emotions are caused by an intellectual apprehension of a physical state. They are not so intense, hut more persistent than the first class. Of these emo- tions there are three pairs, cheerfulness and melancholy, interest and ennui, anxiety and indifference. These emotions are generally of physical origin, but sometimes are caused by purely intellectual or volitional acts. They re-act on the mind unfitting it for business, society, or study, limiting power and in- fluence, or they make attractive, useful, and careful, those who were otherwise of indiffer- ent ability. The third group of emotions is called Psychical. Their cause is purely men- tal. These emotions are characterized by in- tensity, depth, and energy; also by brevity. As a rule intense feelings are short lived. Of this group, there are six divisions, namely: 1. Wonder, surprise, admiration; these are caused by the strange, the unexpected, the unusual, the contradictory, etc. 2. Ludicrous, disgust, contempt; the purpose of these is to restrain men from, first, "The undignified, the incon- gruous, and the little; and second, the low, the mean, the vile, and the contemptible." 3. iShame, sorrow, pity; the causes of these may be our own acts, or states, or those of others. Their purpose is to exert a regenera- ting moral influence and stimulate to a purer life. 4. Fear, horror, despair; these have causes in conscious weakness, guilt, and dan- ger. These emotions are much effected by physical states. They are intended to cause men to shun danger, wrong, and sin. 5. Beauty, sublimity, reverence; these emotions are caused by judgments of the relation of the causes of sensation, and the necessary ideas of the intuition. The end of these is Imman liapioiness and perfection. 6. Moral approval and disapproval; these emotions are caused by an act of reason in which^the mind comioares the act of the will with the standard of right given in the primitive judg- ments, and concludes their agreement or disa- greement. The moral emotions are moved only in view of our own voluntary acts or those of our fel- low men. No inanimate object and no act of even the most intelligent animal stirs them. LESSON XIY. SENSIBILITY,— DESIRES. A DESIRE is a demand for some gratifica- tion and is caused by the pleasure of emo- tion and is in turn a cause of or tendency toward volition. Desire is the basis of civili- zation and human advancement. Without it man would still be a savage, content to sit in his miserable abode and feed on carrion; yes, without it the race would cease to be. Out upon that silly affectation of effete social conditions which considers it "vulgar" to have an appetite. He only is strong whose body and will are underlaid with a volcano of controlled desires. And none of them, not even the acquired appetites or malevolent im- pulses,*" is without its place and part in our preservation and development; and none of them is wrong. They are God-implanted, as much as are arms or eyes. The wrong asso- ciated with them is not in the desire, but in the gratification by wrong objects, and condi- tions oat of harmony witli the judgment. What more terrible thing can befall man, more surely heralding disease, or death, than the state portrayed in the last chapter of Ec- clesiastes — that marvelous description of old age — where it is written that "desire shall fail." The desires, like the emotions, are of three kinds. Physical, Physio-Psych. cil, and Psychical, according to their causes. The Physical desires are known as appe- tites. They are hunger, thirst, sexual pas- sion, etc. Their essential characteristics are: 1. They are purely physical in origin. 2. They are occasional and not continuous. 3. They involve a sense of physical uneas- iness. 4. Their gratification causes a degree of pleasure proportionate to the intensity of the appetite. 5. Gratification temporarily destroys appe- tite. 6. Continued abstinence weakens appetite. Their purpose is the preservation and re- l)roduction of the race, rather than, though along with, human happiness. In infancy they are instinctive, but in later life should be controlled by the will in accord with rea- son. They are of two kinds, natural and mor- bid. The acquired morbid appetites seem to be a balance wheel thit prevents the jar of change of habits and tends to prevent the ir- regularity which seems more destructive than steady vice. The Physio-Psychical desires, or propensi- ties, are of two kinds, the selfish and the so- cial. The Selfish Propensities are self-love, self- preservation, self-assertion, and self-gratitica- tion,— and curiosity, (desire of knowledge), acquisitiveness, (desire of possession), and am- bition, (desire of power). Tlie Social Propensities are imitativeness, (desire to do like others), emulation, (desire to excel), approbativeness, (desire of esteem), and veracity, (love of truth). ;None of these should rule the soul, lll^one of these should be underrated. The two classes should be balanced. To fulfil the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy self," do not strive to love self less, but your neighbor more. The command does not ask emasculation of your own nature. Reli- gion does not ask destruction of our individ- uality, but development of it. There is not one of these desires whose absence will not wreck human life, and the rule of some of them is equally destructive. He who has no desire for knowledge, property, or power, will neyer be wise, rich, or influential, nor widely useful. He who does not care to excel will reach no high degree of excellence. He wiio does not desire the esteem of others has lost one of the strong stays of virtue, and power- ful motives of exertion. He who loves not the truth has little that is hopeful in his mental or moral future. The Psychical desires are known as affec- tions and moral impulses. The affections are malevolent and benevo- lent: The malevolent affections are indifference, resentment, hatred, and envy. Their possi- ble objects may be animals, men, or God. These affections are all disagreeable and wear- ing on health, nervous force, and intellectual and moral character. The purpose of these affections is self-protection, and to promote justice by the punishment of crime. The benevolent affections are such as wish well to others. They are divided by their ob- jects into three classes: 1. Love of animals; 2. Love of men, — in- dividuals, home, and country; 3. Love of God. These affections are stirred not so much by the objects as by our relations to them. We love animals because they are creatures of our Creator and are much like us. We love men because, "we be brethren," and have a common Father, God. We love God be- cause he is good and "first loved us." The Moral impulses are the stimuli of character. Woe to him in whom they are dead, in whom right and wrong are merely a judgment and an emotion, and in whom there is no wish to do the right, or shun the wrong; his character will scarcely outride life's storms of temptation. These impulses are characterized by persistence, but do not, like the lower desires, cease with gratification. God has so constituted us that, "The smiles of an approving conscience bring a peace and joy that are enduring." The judgments, emotions, and desires of the human soul are unerring, infallible as to the moral character of our motives and pur- poses, but often fail as to our acts, being no more accurate than our intellectual develop- ment is perfect. LESSOl!^ XY. THE WILL. The WILL is the mind's power of determin- ation and self-activity; or it is the self-caused activity of the mind. Much of human activity is involuntary like the breathing, the heart-beat,, etc. Much even of intellectual activity arises instinct- ively and necessarily, and while, in most in- tellectual and sensible activity, the mind is passive, only reacting against the external cause, there is a realm where the mind is the ground and cause of its own acts. It is the realm of the will. The act of the will is free —not determined by externality, but by it- self. We feel that it is free, and hold our- selves accountable for our determinations be- cause, and only when, we feel that we could have done otherwise. Here is the whole realm of morals. Our re- sponsibility for our thought is limited to our sincerity of purpose to find the truth. Our responsibility for emotions and desires, to our will to control them. No act, unless it be freely chosen, has any moral character, l^o approbation or disapprobation of the con- science of an intelligent mind can fall upon any but chosen, purposeful acts. And it is the great business of life to subordinate the whole being to the will of an intelligent, cul- tured mind by constantly narrowing the realm of the instinctive and involuntary, and broad- ening the realm of the voluntary, the con- trollable. The will is the mainspring of all power, intellectual and physical, and it i-s capable of almost unlimited development by rational exercise. Stubbornness is irrational determination. Pupils will yield and obey with others more readily than alone. If avoidable, do not mal^e demands of pupils under strong opposing emo- tions. LESSOI^ XVI. CONSCIOirSNESS AND ATTENTIOK. Consciousness is mind in action;— or it is the condition of mental action. There is notli- ing gained by saying that it is the mind's power to know its own states, or acts, for that would require another coii.scioii.sness to know that it knows its own states, and so on iiidetinitely, IS'either is consciousness limited to knowing. Consciousness varies in degree from the slight iictivity of the faint dream state through the semi-conscious condition ^vllen body or mind has been over-v/orked, to the point where intellect, sensibility and will hasten from sensation through instan- ianeous conclusion and deep feeling to im- mediate and all absorbing action. Attention (of unspeakable imi^ort to the teacher) is voluntary consciousness; — or intel- lectual activity under the direction of the will. To hold and develop this power is suc- cess for the teacher. The attention of a child is ever changing from one object to another. To give continuous attention wearies . it; therefore, develop instant, as the basis of attention. Attention begins with tlie pleasing, but must end wlien the most distasteful thing shall absorb us in needed consideration. Attention is much more in- tense in doing and investigating than in hear- ing. Physical comfort is essential to attention; therefore, light, heat, ventilation, seating and change of position must be regarded in the school-room. The teacher must he earnest, not shamming it. He may call the attention of a wanderei- by a pause, a movement of hand, or head, or a glance of the eye, or a question directed to him. Questions should be stated to the whole class, not indicating to any pupil by look, ges- ture, or any means that he is to answer, till the question is stated. Do not repeat a ques- tion, jior wait for an answer. Concerted men- tal exercises in arithmetic, or other branches requiring immediate answer, are powerful stimuli of attention. Calisthenics also ranks high for this purpose. But above all things else a good reason for it is the supreme motive for attention, and attention is the basis of Sensation, Memory and Thought. Give the child a reason why he studies each subject; let him see its import. Create a motive. LESSOI^ XYII. DEVELOPMENT. For now we know in part.— PawZ. Education is development, not creation. What can be done by development depends on the material on which you begin. Men are not made in one generation. The indi- vidual character on which the teacher begins is both basis and limit of results. Culture can not make an oak of an ash, but can vastly hasten its growth and improve its form. So you need not fear destroying indi- viduality. It should be remembered that the teacher cannot deal with the individuality of his pupils, but must deal with that which is common to all. His study must be of the concept mind, the subject of psychology, not the individual of which phrenology teaches(?). The teacher must not expect to see real- ized in the child, the exact and diagrammed thought processes of psychology, which is the science of ideal mental activity; but must look forward to such processes as the goal of education. Mental development is slow. While we cannot investigate directly, and memory does not bring back the earliest thought, we may reasonably infer that the manner of early development is like the later, from the indefinite to the definite. The infant has sensation after sensation in which it is almost passive, barely noting the differences in them; then it strives to account for the differences, and pictures forth causes differing just enough to account for the few and often trifling variations observed in sensation. But later sensations and experiences demand that we make causes to differ more," because our sensations are more varied and the varying elements are more noticed. For instance, a stove and a picture of a stove produce the same sensation to a child that does not touch them, but after the sense of touch has been exercised he accounts for the difference by perceiving two causes, one having colored surface, and one having weight, heat, body. Later the idea becomes more definite by see- ing different stoves and by discovering differ- ing internal constructions and purposes. The indefinite percex3t that would account for the sensations produced by a picture only, van- ishes and is replaced by one having definite form, color, size, purpose, construction, etc. Development is not partial, but integral. The common idea that in childhood the percep- tive faculties first develop, then the repro- ductive, then the reason, is simply nonsense. The Will HCts in the attention of every sen- sation; the Judgment, in every perception; the Sensibility, with every judgment. Mental powers never act separately, but always in combination. The mind is a unit. It is like a series of cog-wheels of which you can not move one without moving all. An illustration of the activity of reason in early childhood is found in the following con- versation of two girls, four and two years old. The older girl produced the following universal affirmation, "Everything is God's,*' and added, "I am God's girl." The younger replied, "I ain't God's girl. S'pose papa'd- give me away?" The elder one replied, "Yes, you are." And the younger, neglecting to ar- gue her case farther, proceeded to break the universal affirmative by an individual nega- tive. She had a pair of small scissors in her hand and said, ''These scissors ain't God's; Mrs. S. gave them to me." The development of perception and reason are synchronous. Many never reach a point of systematic thought and reason; neither do they, of accurate perception. We never see or thinlc more accurately or precisely than our purpose demands. The purpose— the object in view, is the primary element in determin- ing development. For instance, one sees a house well enough to know it again; another well enough to know its value; another well enough to build like it. The secondary element is the presence of the developed mind. He who thinks causes thought; he who feels produces feeling; he who wills, chooses, determines, moves others to volition by a process similar to electrical induction.* Psychology, so far as the school teacher is concerned, is not studied to be taught nor merely or principally to be used as the key of method, but for a guide in personal culture. Then, if you think correctly, your pupils learn the same thought processes and get a concrete psychology. Moral education must be by induction. The teacher must be an example of self-con- trol, love of truth, justice and righteousness. He must love others as himself and the pupil will carry his spirit into his own life. *ln!iucti m is the peculiar po^er of bodies charged with electii'. ty to reproduce their electrical state In bodies near to, but not in contact with them. LESSON XVIII. HABIT. Holy habits give the place \Mth the noblest, best, All most Godlike of thy race.— Dawes. "But it may be asked, does it depend merely on our will to correct and reform our bid habits? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the w.il of a patient, who has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that health which has been loht by profligacy. "V^hen we have thrown a stone we cannot control its flight." Habit is a tendency of mind an^ body to re- peat former acts. It might be called Inertia of the soul. There are habits of thinking, feeling, walking, sitting, digesting, etc. Habits of doing things in a particular way are created by doing them that way. Habits, good or bad, are formed before we know right from wrong and parents and teachers should see that when a child comes to years of accountability it shall be with a bias toward doing right instead of a con- firmed habit of wrong-doing to contend tigainst. First acts are seldom purposeful and are performed before we have knowledge of their moral character. We learn to do by doing not by being told or shown how nor by being scolded for not doing. Do things right; demand that your pupils do things right, for as we do so we will do. The advantages of habit are speed, accur- acy and ease. What is done slowly at first is done rapidly after much repetition. The pow- er of addition so inaccurate in the beginner bacomes certain in the practical book-keeper. TS^ot only so, but what at first requires great effort becomes automatic and can be done witti little attention, exertion or weariness. By our acts we are forming habits now that will determine character, power and destiny. But habit is not without its disadvantages. We cannot get along without the customary lines of travel called roads, but they tend to become ruts. He who never tries new ways never improves. Yariation is essential to im- provement. "Habit is not the pilot direct- ing the vessel; it is the vessel abandoned to the force of the current, the influence of the tides and the control of the winds." We need all these forces and the pilot, a rational will, choosing among these mighty powers those that will help us to our desired haven and. if need be stemming the current and facing the tide. LESSON XIX. YO0ABULARY. This vocabulary is added because numbers of philosophical terms are used in the text without deilnition and are used with mean- ings more limited than those in daily use. It has oeen the purpose of the author to use words in their most definite and consequent- ly narrow meaning in order to avoid ambigu- ity and consequent confusion of thought. Psychology has suffered and been almost lost in discussions over ambiguities by having no exact nomenclature like chemistry, but only a specialized use of common terms. It is believed the definitions of the text will be more clear for comparison with those be- low, some of which are varied statements of those in the body of the work, some repre- sent the use and views of other authors and some are the every day uses of the terms. Abstract— Abstraction.— (From abs and traho, to draw away from.) Lesson YII. To separate mentally. Tlie power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest. — Stewart. Much used as the opposite of concrete. -An abstract name is the name of an attri- bute. A concrete name belongs to an object. "Abstract ideas," Lesson II, are ideas of relations, qualities, etc. which have no inde- pendent existence, but result from a meiitui separation or analysis. All concepts are abstract. Act — Action. — To do; deed: to will; to cause. The exercise of a power or property. Act does not necessarily imply a result: action does. Our acts originate in our wills. Attributes and qualities are simply modes of action upon our senses. Analog Y.^;Gr. ana logia, proportionate.) Lesson X. Similarity of relations rather than of things. Analogy refers to causes; resemblance to (ippearances. Likeness is between two things; analogy be- tween two relations. Two similar relations can exist only between three or more things. Law of analogy. — The same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but similar things, provided, they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things and not the points of difference. Attention. — [attendo, to reach or stretcli toward.) Lesson XYI. "The voluntary directing of the energy of the mind towards an object or act." "Attention to external things is observation. Attention to the subjects of our own con- sciousness is reflecti07i. Attribute. — [attrihuo, to ascribe.) Quality: power. A power to act in a certain way or produce a certain result. Being. — Cause; substance; existence. That which acts. Believe— Belief. — ^Assent; conviction; cer- tainty; faith. Belief admits of degrees of certainty. As used in psycliology it lias no reference 10 wliat ^ believed. Cause. — A relation, wliicli see. That which produces change. The efficient cause is the principle oi:" cliange or motion. The final cause is- the purpose for whicli anything exists or acts. "The general idea of caus3 is that wibh xiit whicli another tiling called tli3 eiiejt caiinot be." CoGNiTioisi'. — Knowing; perceiving. Co:>irAiiiso]sr.— (to place together.) Lesson. VII. Knowledge of externals begins in com- parison of sensations, (see Lesson XVII); is increased by comparison of percepts resulting- in the concept. Comparison of lliesc forms the judgment and comparison of judgments is reasoning — the highest act of tli3 inteliec. — -the perfection of perception. Conceive. — {con and ccq^eri', to talvc togeth- er.) Commonly used as a synonym of imagine, think, supp ).;3 and believe, bat in psj^chology it means to form a concept. Co]srcp:pT— ConceptiojST. — Lesson VII. A group of attribaies common to two or more indiYiduals or percepts. Conclusion.— The result of reason or argu- ment. That which is inferred from the prem- CoNCRETE. — [con-cresco, to grow together). Undivided; real; as it exists in nature. See abstract. Conscience. — (con and scio, to know togeth- er). Our judgment of the harmony or discord between oar ideas of rig-lifc and wrong- and our motives, ^purposes and intentions, togetlier witli our consequent emotions of approval or disapproval. Conscious.— Awake-, knowing-; mentally active. Consciousness.— 'State of activity. Lesson XYI. Self-consciousness is a knowledge of our mental nature, acts and states. CoNSEQUENT.^That wliicli follows as a re- sult or effect. Deduction. — [deduco, to draw from; to bring out of). Lesson X. Drawing a parfcic- nlar conclusion from a general truth. Desire.— Wish; longing; craving; passion; love; etc. A stimulus to volition and action. Lesson XIY. Effect.— The result or consequent of a cause. The cause produces change; that upon which it operates determines its nature; viz: note the diiferent effects of the one cause^ heat, on ice, wabor and powder. Emotions.— Lesson XIII. A form of feel- ing; a class of acts of the sensibility, caused by knowledge, but not directly affecting the will. ENTiTY.^Being; that which acts; the cause and object of sensation and thought. FACULTY.^Power to do certain things, ^'acuities and powers are not divisions of the mind, but possibilities for the mind. Fallacy. — Lesson XL An argument hav- ing an unjustifiable conclusion. Feeling.— The sense of touch. Feelings.— Acts of the sensibility; emo- tions and desires. Sometimes used as the equivalent of sensation. Faith. — Lesson X. Believing on evidence hings not revealed to sense; tlie act of in- ferring; the power to accept the conclasion drawn from the premises. Distinguish from credulity and from what is believed. FoiiCE. — That which produces cliange. Generalization. — Lesson YII. Grouping similars; using the common results of ab- straction to represent the individuals form- ing the class. Habit.— Lesson XYIII. Thurot calls habit, '*the memory of the organs." Idea.— Image; percept; notion; concept; thought; belief; doctrine; opinion. A word used to represent almost every act or product of the intellect. Often defined as a mental picture. Bejt used as the representative of mental products without distinction between them. I3IAGINATI0N.— Lesson VI. The power to reproduce the elements of former experience in new relations. Induction. — (to lead to.) Le'sson X. To concUide from the individual cases the gener- al law. Instinct. — A propensity prior to exper- ience.— Pa???/. A low grade of reason. Intellect.— Lesson I. Understanding; power of knowledge and thought. Intuition.— (inliteor, to behold.) Lesson 11. Tlie power to know relations as distin- guished from things. Formerly used to represent perceptions a priori (previous to sensation) or what is some- times called innate ideas. Judgment.— Lesson A'JII. When expressed in words it is called a proposition. "Good judgment" is the power to draw correct concliisiyns after comparing facts and evidences. Know— Knoavledge.— To Ibe certain; to be satisfied beyond doubt. Firm belief on sufficient grounds. Knowledge supposes a mind, an object and ;i definite relation between tliem. Knowledge is a general term for the result of the various intellectual activities. Memory.— Lesson IV. It implies an intel- lectual act, the power to reproduce it, and a judgment of identity of the tv/o acts. The power to I'epL'odiice is the distinctive feature. Mind.— L3S3on I. That which moves. Mind is generic; soul, individual. Mind is opposed to matter; sonl, to body. Mind is tlie source of volition; sonl of life. Perceive — Perception. — To take knowl- edge of tiiroa;yli the senses; to obssrve. Les- son III. Apprehension; apperception. Premise. — The two propositions which af- ford the ground for the conclusion. Psychology. — (G-r. psucJie, the soul, logos, a discourse.) Lesson I. Reason. — [ratio, to think.) It is used to signify: 1. The intellectual powers. 2. The intellectual powers that distinguish men from brutes. 3. The power to reason. 4. The premises of an argumsnt. 5. A cause. Relation. — Tne possibility of one things a'^.ting upon another. Prepositions express relations. Cau^e is expressed by by, because, for, etc; Time by before and after; Sp:i:'e by here, there, above, beloio, etc; Ouli3r pirtsof speech also express relations, as, true, beautiful, good, etc. Sensation. — Lesson 11. An act of feeling and attention resulting from changes in an organ of sense. Distinguish from sensational. Seksibility. — Lesson I. Capacity for emo- tion and desire. Space. — Lesson II. Not an entity, but a relation, which see. An act or product of the the intuition. Psychologically considered it is an abstraction, but it does not originate primarily by abstraction. Syllogism. — Lesson IX. "The moulds of reason." The ideal form of argument. Think— Thought. — To use the higher in- tellectual powers; reason: reflection; medita- tion. Time. — Another class of relations. (See space and relation.) TiiUTH. — The sufficiency of our percepts to account for our sensations and the sufficiency of the limitations of our higher intellections to correspond as effects to our perceptions. Understanding. — Intellect; reason. ABOLITION. — Choice; power to act; the will. Will. — Lesson XV and determine. / ;i7 7f^? (^3f^-S Examination Questions CO CO Numbers 1 and 2. 'Ml'^ 1 CONTAINS all tlie ques- ^ ^* -*- tions and answers pub- lished in the Western School Jour- nal, from the examination of August 27, 1892, to that of August 26, 1893, in- clusive — seven examinations. 'VT^^. /^ CONTAINS all the ques- 1^ V7« ^J tions and answers pub- lished in the Western School Jour- nal, from the examination of October 28, 1893, to that of August 25, 1894, in- clusive — seven examinations. THERE are in both books 14 sets of questions, with answers to all, each set embracing the 12 branches in which Kansas teachers are required to be examined. Price of each book, postage prepaid, in paper covers, 35 cents: of both books, postage prepaid, 60 cents; either of the books, with one year's subscrip- tion to the Western School Jour- nal, $1.50; both books, with one year's subscription to the Journ.\l, $1.75. Address, WESTERN SCHOOL JOURNAL, Topeka, Kan. ^ With Answers.