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H, ALLEN & CO., Ltd., 13, Waterloo Place, STATESMEN SERIES. \ ■ VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. (All Rights reserved.) PALMERSTON. STATESMEN SERIES. I LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. BY LLOYD C. SANDERS »> LONDON : W. H. ALLEN & CO., LIMITED, 13, WATEELOO PLACE, S.W. Ti a s 5 c ■ 1 - &- STATESMEN SERIES. Popular Price of ONE SHILLING. 250 pp., crown 8vo, strongly bound in cloth. WITH PORTRAITS. VOLS. ALEE AD Y ISSUED. The Rt. Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE. By Mr. H. W. Lucy. Ready. PRINCE BISMARCK. By Charles Lowe, M.A. Ready. WELLESLEY. By Col. G. B. Malleson, C.S.I. Ready. :-• :"' 76 oS • •• PREFATORY NOTE. The chief authority for Lord Palmerston's life is the biography of which the first three volumes were written by Lord Dalling — better known, perhaps, as Sir Henry Bulwer — and the fourth and fifth by Mr. Evelyn Ashley (1870-76). A condensed, and in many respects im- proved, edition of the whole was published by Mr. Ashley in 1879. It is a mine of information to the student of political history, and we may hope that the value of the concluding chapters may one day be increased by the publication of that fuller documentary evidence which has hitherto been apparently withheld from the necessity of keeping secrets of State. A small biography of Lord Palmerston was published by An- thony Trollope in 1881, but it contains little that is not to be found in Mr. Ashley's volumes. Apart from this main source of knowledge, there is a very large quantity of matter illustrative of Lord Pal- merston's private and public life. Lady Enfield tells us something about his youth in her Life and Letters of the First Earl of Minto ; and much that is of interest, vi PREFATORY NOTE. about his personal character especially, is to be found in Sir Henry Holland's Recollections, Abraham Hayward's Letters, and his article in Eraser's Magazine, vol. xviii., and the Life of Lord Shaftesbury by Mr. Hodder. For an account of his career as a Tory statesman we have his own short autobiography, published as an appendix to the first volume of Lord Dalling's Life, which has been proved to be inaccurate on various points by Mr. E. Hemes, in his Memoir of the Right Hon. J. C. Herries; and incidental notices in Plumer Ward's Memoirs, Lord Colchester's Diary, also in the Croker Papers, which continue to illustrate his official life down to 1855. j With the formation of the Grey ministry commences the severe criticism of Greville, and with the beginning of the present reign the hardly less hostile comments of Sir Theodore Martin ; still the evidence of both of these writers cannot be neg- lected by anyone who wishes to form a fair judgment of Lord Palmerston's merits. Scattered notices of his foreign policy during the Grey, Melbourne, and Russell ministries are to be found in the third volume of Lord Brougham's Life and Times, Earl Russell's Reminis- cences and Suggestions, the Life of Lord Melbourne by Mr. McCullagh Torrens, and Raikes's Journal', while towards the close of this period, Lord Malmes- bury's Memoirs of an Ex-Minister and Mr. Morley's Life of Cobden begin to be valuable sources of fact. The continental view of his policy is to be found parti- cularly in the Memoirs of Prince Metternich and Baron Stockmar, the Life of Count Saldanha, and in Guizot's PREFATORY NOTE. vii Memoires and L'Histoire de Dix Ans, besides works like Theodore Juste's Memoirs of Leopold I., the his- tories of the Revolution of 1848 by Lamartine and Gamier Pages, and Mr. Spencer Walpole's admir- able History of England, which includes also the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. On the crisis of 1845 much valuable information is to be found in an article by A in the Historical Review ; and the Spanish marriage intrigue is to be traced at length in the corre- spondence between Louis Philippe and Guizot, pub- lished by Taschereau in the Revue Retrospective in 1848. Mr. Kinglake's views on Lord Palmerston's conduct as a member of the Aberdeen Cabinet may be compared with advantage with those set forth in the Quarterly Review of April 1877. During Lord Pal- merston's first premiership and onwards, Lord Malmes- bury and Mr. Morley continue to be instructive critics, and they are reinforced by Bishop Wilberforce, and Mr. Walter Bagehot in his sketch of The English Constitu- tion. An excellent precis of English foreign policy from 1859 to 1865 is given by Lord Russell in the preface to the second part of his Selected Speeches and Despatches. On Lord Palmerston's later Italian policy abundant information may be found in Bianchi's Storia Document ata delta Diplomazia Europea in Italia, in Mazade's Vie de Cavour, Cavour's Letters and Despatches, notably the private letters to Azeglio pub- lished by Bianchi under the title of La Politique du Comte Camille de Cavour. Not much original informa- tion, as far as Lord Palmerston is concerned, is to be viii PREFATORY NOTE. found in Blanchard Jerrold's Life of Napoleon III., but his attitude towards German politics generally, and the Schleswig-Holstein question in particular, are abun- dantly illustrated in Count Beust's Memoirs, Count Vitzthum's St. Petersburg and London, which contains many personal reminiscences of Lord Palmerston, and Busch's Our Chancellor (Eng. trans., 1884). L. C. S. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. LORD PALMERSTON AND TORYISM. 1807-1830. The Temples — Lord Palmerston' s father and mother — At Harrow. Edinburgh, and Cambridge — Attempts to get into Parliament — A Lord of the Admiralty — Maiden Speech — Secretary at War — The Nexc Whig Guide — Palmerston in Society — His habits, tastes, and disposition — Development of his political views — Attempt to eject him from Cambridge — In the Canning, Goderich, and Wel- lington Cabinets — He resigns office — The Portuguese speech — Its faults and merits — Final breach with the Tory party . . p. 1 CHAPTER II. BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE. 1830-1833. Palmerston and home politics — At the Foreign Office — Activity of his policy — Its general features — Objections to it — The Belgian Revolution — Meeting of the London Conference — The Eighteen Articles — Possibility of a war with France — Leopold of Saxe- Coburg becomes King of the Belgians — Modification of the Eighteen Articles — The Dutch declare war and the French enter Belgium — Firmness of Lord Palmerston — The Twenty-four Articles — Anglo-French expedition — Feeling in England — Sta- bility of Belgium . . . . . . . p. 32 CHAPTER ILL THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE. 1830-1838. Affairs in Greece, Italy, Germany, and Poland — Tyranny of Dom Miguel in Portugal — Satisfaction obtained by England and France — Dom Pedro's descent on Portugal — He is aided by English Vo- lunteers — Death of Ferdinand of Spain — Combination of the two Pretenders — The Quadruple Treaty — Its immediate success — Coolness between England and France — Its effect on Spanish politics — The Spanish Legion — End of the Carlist war . p. 52 b x CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. THE QUADRILATERAL ALLIANCE. 1831-1841. Lord Palmerston and the Porte — Ibrahim Pasha's adrance on Cbn-< stantinople — Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi — Anti-Russian policy of Lord Palmerston — The first Afghan war — Burnea's despatches — Collapse of the Turkish Empire — Divergence of views between England and France — The Quadrilateral Alliance — Lord Palmer- ston's difficulties — His bold course of action — His estimate of the situation — Louis Philippe gives way — The fall of Acre — Lord Palmerston's treatment of Guizot — Settlement of the Syrian question — Lord Palmerston's marriage . . . . p. 68 CHAPTER V. ABERDEEN AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE. 1841-1846. Lord Palmerston and the Smaller Powers — Lord Aberdeen — The Chinese War — Policy of the Government — Treaty of. 1842— Dis- putes with the United States — The Boundary Question — The Greely and McLeod affairs — Right of Search — The Ashburtom Mission — Lord Aberdeen and Prance — Palmerston and Home Affairs — The crisis of 1845 — His visit to Paris . . p. 82 CHAPTER VI. THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 1846. Earlier stages of the negotiations — Louis Phillippe's first condition — The agreement of Eu — The Coburg candidate — Guizot's change of attitude — Lord Palmerston's despatch— Its results— Announce- ment of the marriages — Palmerston's efforts to postpone them p. 96 CHAPTER VII. / YEARS OF REVOLUTION. V 1846-1849. Results of the Spanish marriages — The annexation of Cracow — Civil war in Portugal — Lord Palmerston's policy — Termination of the struggle — The Swiss Sonderbund — Lord Palmerston's despatch — Settlement of the dispute — Constitutionalism in Italy — The Minto Mission — The fall of Louis Philippe — The Spanish de- spatch — Lord Palmerston and the Provisional Government at Paris — Change in his Italian policy — His attitude towards the Sardinian Government — Suppression of the Revolution — Palmer- ston and Naples — His advice to Austria — The Hungarian refugees . . • p. 107 CONTENTS. xi CHAPTER VIII. PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 1849-1852. Independence of Lord Palmerston — Differences of opinion with the Conrt — The Danish succession question — The Pacifico affair — Breadown of negotiations — Indignation of France — Chris Roma- nus num. — Effect of the speech — The Queen's Memorandum — The Haynau and Kossuth incidents — The coup d'etat — Dismissal of Palmerston — Constitutional side of the question — The Militia Bill— The first Derby Ministry p. 129 CHAPTER IX. THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 1852-1855. Lord Palmerston at the Home Office — Legislation and Deputations — The Reform Bill — Temporary Resignation of Palmerston — Be- ginnings of the Eastern Question — The Menschikoff mission — Lord Palmerston's policy — His popularity with the nation — The Vienna note — The Concert of the Powers — Palmerston's descrip- tion of the objects at issue — Declaration of war by Turkey — The Sinope disaster — Beginning of the war — The Napier banquet and its consequences — Proposal to make Palmerston Secretary at War — The Crimean expedition — Fall of the Ministry . p. 146 CHAPTER X. THE CONCLUSION OP THE RUSSIAN WAR. 1855-1856. Attempts to form a Ministry — Lord Palmerston accepts the task — His difficulties — Darkness of the prospect — Harmony of the Cabi- net — Lord Palmerston's tactics — The second Vienna Conference — The Austrian compromise — Conclusion of the war — The Congress of Paris — The Treaty — Lord Palmerston receives the Garter p. 161 CHAPTER XI. WARS AND RUMOURS OP WARS. 1856-1839. Monotony of Home Affairs — Dispute with the United States — Russian chicanery — The Danubian Principalities — Egypt and the Suez Canal — Palmerston and Persigny — The Persian War — The "Arrow" Affair — The Dissolution and General Election — The Indian Mutiny— The Conspiracy to Murder Bill — Defeat of the Government ........ p. 175 ar un detour.* But Guizot denied emphatically that there * Gnizot's expression to M. Bresson, the French Minister at Madrid. 98 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. was any hidden end in view ; and on the occasion of the Queen's visit to Louis Philippe at Eu in September of that year, he voluntarily promised Aberdeen that " the Montpensier match should not be proceeded with until it was no longer a political question, which would be when the Queen was married and had children/' How far Louis Philippe and his Minister would have kept faith with Aberdeen if the eligible Bour- bon had been forthcoming for Isabella, it is unneces- sary to enquire. At the same time, it is only just to say that they gave some indication to the English minister of their contemplated volte-face. On the 27th of February, 1846, a memorandum was written by Guizot to be shown to Aberdeen, in which it was declared that if the marriage either of the Queen or of the Infanta to a prince who was not a de- scendant of Philip V. became " probable and immi- nent," France would consider herself free from her en- gagements, and at liberty to demand the hand of the Queen or of the Infanta for the Due de Montpensier. Upon this memorandum Guizot laid considerable stress when afterwards accused of underhand conduct. But it should be observed that the language was studiously vague, France being left sole judge of the " probability and imminence," and that the memorandum was only read to Aberdeen. No copy of the document was left with him, and so little importance did he attach to it, that he said nothing about it to Mr. Bulwer, our mini- ster at Madrid, or to his own successor, Lord Palmer- ston. ('Now, the candidate other than a Bourbon alluded to in the memorandum was Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. Louis Philippe affected to be greatly afraid of him on account of his family connections ; his brother was King of Portugal, aud his cousin Prince THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 99 Consort of England. Aberdeen, however, did his very utmost to calm his susceptibilities on the point. He actually acquainted Guizot with the fact that Christina, not for the first time, was trying to secure Prince Leo- pold for her daughter, and had even made a formal offer to Leopold's father through Mr. Bulwer ; and he sent the most ample assurance to Guizot that the English Court would give no support to the candidature. It appears incredible that Louis Philippe can ever have considered the Coburg marriage as really "immi- nent," and it is difficult to see that any real excuse can be made for the complete change of attitude adopted by the King and Minister almost simultaneously with the formation of Lord John Russell's Ministry. The con- dition that the Montpensier marriage should not take place until Isabella had had children was allowed to drop out of sight altogether, and it was determined that the luckless Queen should marry the cretin Don Fran- cisco. It is true that the turpitude of the two conspi- rators was not as black as it has sometimes been represented. Francisco was practically the only Bourbon left, as far as they were concerned, his brother being intimately connected with the anti-French party ; and the fact that for many months they had actively supported another candidature, Count Trapani, is incon- sistent with the charge commonly brought against them, that their idea was to force the Queen to marry an in- competent husband so as to place Montpensier on the throne par un detour. Towards the English Govern- ment, however, they acted with the grossest treachery. When Bresson, the French Minister at Madrid, acting on his own responsibility, obtained on the 12th of July Christina's consent to the Cadiz alliance on condition that the Infanta should simultaneously marry the Due 7 * LofG. 100 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. de Montpensier, he was rebuked, and apparently dis- avowed, but only on the ground of simultatieite* f^As Guizot subsequently pointed out to his master, Chris- tina would only accept Cadiz with Moutpensier for a pendant ; and to ensure success, it must be understood that as soon as one marriage was completed, the second must be discussed and arranged. It is clear, then, that Louis Philippe and Guizot had resolved to depart from the agreement of Eu before they were acquainted with the " astonishing and detestable despatch " of Lord Palmerston, which they afterwards alleged as the cause of their change of plan and the simultaneous celebration of the Cadiz and Montpensier marriages, with terrible consequences to the unhappy Isabella and still more unhappy Spain. That despatch was dated July 18th, 1846, and explained to Mr. Bulwer the views of the new Government on the double ques- tion of the marriage of the Queen and the political condition of Spain. In regard to the first [he wrote], I have not at present any instruc- tions to give you in addition to those which you have received from my predecessor in office. /'The choice of a husband for the Queen of an independent country is obviously a matter in which the Govern- ments of other countries are not entitled to interfere unless there should be a probability that the choice would fall upon some prince . . . directly belonging to the reigning family of some foreign state. But there is no person^ of this description among those who are named as candidates for/ the Queen of Spain ; those candidates being reduced to three, namely, the Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, and the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula. ... As between the three candidates above mentioned, Her Majesty's Government have only to express their sincere wish that the choice may fall upon the one who * This point appears to be overlooked by Mr. Spencer Walpole in his otherwise well-considered defence of Louis Philippe and Guizot, but it comes out very clearly in the letters between the two published after 1848 in the Reviie Retrospective. THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 101 may be most likely to secure the happiness of the Queen and to pro- mote the welfare of the nation. The second part of the despatch was a vigorous onslaught on the Spanish Government in true Palmer- stonian style ; it was one of absolutism, force, and tyranny, a mockery of constitutionalism, and so forth. Bulwer, however, was told in conclusion that Her Majesty's Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of indepen- dent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Minister on these matters ; but though you will, of course, take care to express on no occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I have thus explained to you, and although you will be careful not to express these sentiments in any manner, or upon any other occasion, so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not conceal from any of those persons who may have the power of remedying the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the British Government. Of this despatch, Palmerston, who seems to have gathered from Lord Aberdeen no idea that the marriage question was at all serious, rather imprudently gave a copy to Jarnac, the French Ambassador, and at once set the French and Spanish Courts ablaze. Christina saw in it a design to effect a revolution in Spain which would overthrow the Moderado Ministry, and sur- round her with the leaders of the Progressist party, Espartero, Olozaga, and the rest, who had already driven her from Madrid, and would probably try to expel her again. There can be no doubt also that Louis Philippe and Guizot were seriously alarmed for the moment ; the language of the latter to Greville on the occasion of his visit to Paris proves that real alarm was mingled with his hypocrisy. From the day of Palmerston's arrival at the Foreign Office they 102 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON'. had been shaking in their shoes, and it was in vain that the Minister attempted to keep up the King's spirits by assurances that " les prospects du cabinet Whig sont bien gloomy" Themselves conspirators against the agreement of Eu, they were, inclined to sus- pect a countermine at every turn. /It was certainly rather rash of Palmerston to mention the Coburg prince as if his chances were equal to those of the sons of Don Francisco de Paula, and it gave Gruizot a certain handle for his contention that Palmerston intended to depart from the engagement with Aberdeen. Pourquoi nom- mer le Coburg ?" asked Madame de Lieven of Greville after all was over ; and to confirm Guizot's suspicions, /Jarnac's letter arrived at Paris about the same time as a mission from Christina, the object of which was to effect a retreat from the Cadiz arrangement, and obtain for Spain the French King's permission to choose a king for herself. At the same time the mere mention of the Coburg marriage could not be said, even by the most extreme alarmist, to render it " imminent," and a categorical demand for an explanation would have immediately dissolved his fears. As Queen Victoria pointed out in the crushing rebuke — a "twister," her Foreign Secretary admiringly called it — which she afterwards addressed to the French Court through the Queen of the Belgians, Lord Palmerston mentioned Leopold among the candidates merely as a fact known to Europe ; and he referred Bulwer to the last instruc- tions which he had received from Lord Aberdeen : — In which, in terms most explicit and most positive, he asserts the in- controvertible right of the Queen of Spain to marry what prince she pleases, even although he should not be a descendant of Philip V., adding, at the same time, what I give in his own words : " that we ventured, although without any English candidate or English pre- THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 103 ference, to point out Don Enrique as the prince who appeared to us the most eligible, because the most likely to prove acceptable to the people of Spain." Greville's conclusion was that the mischief had arisen from Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot suspicious and alarmed. The Foreign Secretary was cer- tainly rather careless, and perhaps not sufficiently awake to the importance of the Spanish marriage question, but he was also overwhelmed with business on entering into office. But the month's delay which occurred between the general demand on the part of Guizot for an ex- position of the English policy and Palmerston's reply was undoubtedly most unfortunate, and tended to give further colour to his suspicions. There can be no doubt that they were quite baseless as far as the Coburg marriage was concerned. Palmerston's only reason for advocating that alliance was, as he cha- racteristically wrote to Bulwer, that " the English Government would see with pleasure a good cross in- troduced into the family of Spain ;" on the whole he thought, considering the average tif intellect in his father, brother, and sister, that the chances were against Leopold being anything remarkable. The prince whom he really wished to see on the throne of Spain was En- rique, of whose abilities he seems to have formed a very exaggerated opinion, and who was very acceptable on account of his Progressist leanings. Upon the best of consideration we can give to the matter [he wrote to Bulwer] and according to the information which we hitherto possess, we think it best for all parties concerned that Enrique should marry the Queen, and that Coburg should marry the Infanta ; and that is the arrangement we wish you to try for. ) Upon the question of the Montpensier marriage, however, even when safeguarded by the conditions 104 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. into which Guizot had voluntarily entered at Eu, it appeared that Palmerston, instead of being neutral like Aberdeen, was most emphatically hostile.^ The language I hold to Jarnac [he tells Bulwer] is purposely general and applicable to Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta as well as with the Queen. I tell him that it is a great and paramount object with us that Spain should be independent, and that her policy should be founded upon Spanish and not upon French considerations : so that if ever we should have the misfortune of finding ourselves engaged in war with France, we should not merely on that account, and without any separate quarrel with Spain, find ourselves involved in war with Spain also. That this independence of Spain would be endangered, if not destroyed, by the marriage of a French prince into the royal family of Spain ; and that as, on the one hand, France would be entitled to object to such a marriage being contracted by an English prince, so England is entitled to object to such a marriage being contracted by a French one. That such an objection on our part may seem uncourteous, and may be displeasing ; but that the friendships of States and Governments must be founded upon natural interest, and not upon personal likings. After this decided harangue, it was absurd for Guizot to complain, as he subsequently did, that he had been kept in ignorance of the strong objections ©f the Eng- lish Government to the Montpensier marriage.] His game, as time went on, evidently was to use the Coburg scare as an excuse for hastening on the simultaneous marriages of Cadiz to the Queen, and Montpensier to the Infanta coute que coute. Indeed, his own panic does not seem to have lasted more than three or four days ; for as early as July 31st he had come to the conclusion that neither the English Cabinet nor Palmerston himself had any serious projects for a Coburg, and in the following month the unconditional refusal of the Coburg family to accept Christina's proposal was actually sent to Madrid. While Palmerston was playing for the Enrique and Coburg combination with his cards THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 105 on the table, Guizot, while artfully pretending to follow his lead, as far as Enrique was concerned, a choice which he mendaciously declared " would be perfectly satisfactory to France," was urging Bresson at Madrid to bring matters to an issue. Christina's remaining scruples were removed by her fears of " the English and the Revolution," and on the 2nd of September, Jarnac announced to Palmerston that the two marriages of the Queen to Cadiz and her sister to Montpensier, had been arranged on the 28th of August. The indignation entertained by the English Court and the English Ministry against the pair of tricksters who had deliberately broken their word, and that to further projects which, under the most favourable con- struction, were those of sordid fortune-hunters, was expressed without much circumlocution : The most striking exception was in the case of Spain, whither Palmerston thought it advisable to send a lecture on constitutional government, which, though sound in argument, and justified to a certain extent by the semi-domestic relations established between England and Isabella by the Quadruple alliance, was decidedly too peremptory in tone. The Queen of Spain was informed that she "would act wisely in the present critical state of affairs if she was to strengthen her exe- cutive government by widening the bases on which the administration reposes, and in calling to her counsels some of the men in whom the Liberal party reposed confidence." The Queen of Spain retaliated by return- ing the despatch, and, after a heated controversy, by ordering our minister, Sir Henry Bulwer, to quit the 120 LIFE OF VISCOUNT FALMEBSTON. kingdom within forty-eight hours, and Palmerston was powerless to avenge the insult which his inconsiderate zeal had brought on England. ) It seems that the despatch was sent in direct defiance of Lord John Rus- sell's directions, and the Ministry was naturally not sorry to retaliate on their headstrong colleague by refusing to support his proposals for the coercion of the Spanish Government. Otherwise, his conduct of affairs was thoroughly pacific and sane. ( It was not in human nature for the Foreign Secretary to refrain from expressing satisfaction at the overthrow of Louis Philippe ; but no trace of malignancy is to be found in his satisfaction, and his hospitable doors were thrown open to the fallen Guizot. 1 To Lamartine, whose splendid efforts as head of the Provisional Government at Paris against socialism and anarchy were attracting the admiration of Europe, he held out the right hand of fellowship.") Lord Nor- manby was directed to remain at his post; and was told that whatever rule possessed prospect of permanency, would be acknowledged by the British Government. In the same spirit our ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna were directed to use their influence to prevent the Ger- man Powers from attacking France. " For the present/' Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby, " the only chance for tranquillity and order in France, and for peace in Europe, is to give support to Lamartine. I am con- vinced the French Government will not be aggressive if left alone ; and it is to be hoped that Apponyi (the Austrian ambassador) and others will be allowed to re- main in Paris till things take a decided turn. If a republic is decidedly established, the other Powers of Europe must, of course, give credentials addressed to that Government, or they will have to give billets to YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 121 its troops." Not even Lamartine's circular, declaring that the treaties of 1815 had ceased to exist, could frighten Palmerston out of his confidence in the high- minded orator ; he saw in it a mere paper concession to the French war party, and Lamartine's cold recep- tion of Smith O'Brien's deputation confirmed his good opinion of the intentions of the French Provisional Government. Palmerston's Italian policy naturally changed with the times. With the Austrian provinces of Italy in full revolt, it was impossible to keep to the programme of the Minto mission. Even the sovereigns whose laggard steps the Foreign Secretary had attempted to quicken, had severed themselves from the Austrian connec- tion ; and whether from dynastic ambition as in the case of Carlo Alberto, or from prudential motives as that of Tuscany and Naples, were sending troops to the aid of Lombardy and Venetia. Palmerston thought, under the circumstances, that the Austrian rule, south of the Alps, must come to an end, and the Sardinian dynasty take its place. " Northern Italy," he wrote to Lord Minto, "will henceforward be Italian, and the Austrian frontier will be at the Tyrol. ... Of course, Parma and Modena will follow the example, and in this way the King, no longer of Sardinia, but of Northern Italy, will become a sovereign of some importance in Europe. This will make a league between him and the other Italian rulers still more desirable, and much more feasible. (Italy ought to unite in a confederacy similar to that of Germany, commercial and political, and now is the time to strike while the iron is hot." j No very ambitious scheme this, and certainly falling far short of the dreams of Mazzini and Young Italy, since it left Florence to the Medici, Naples to the Bourbons, the 122 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. Papal States to ecclesiastical misgovernment. f Per- haps Palmerston felt that the important point for the moment was to secure the freedom of North Italy, that with the Hapsburgs gone, the Bourbons and their kind must follow. Anyhow, when the old Austrian com- mander Eadetsky was compelled to retire from Milan, and take refuge in the Quadrilateral fortresses behind the Mincio, with Venice triumphant in his rear, it seemed as if Italy, to use the phrase afterwards made by Napoleon III., would be free from the Alps to the Adriatic. The temptation to throw the military strength of England into the scale was possibly considerable with the Foreign Secretary ; but the Austrian sympathies of the Court, the Conservative party, and a not incon- siderable section of the Whigs, were far too vehement to warrant such an undertaking, and Palmerston had to be content with that position of "judicious bottle-holder '* which he afterwards described himself as having taken up with regard to the Hungarian insurgents. Carlo* Alberto was told that " he was engaged in a struggle of doubtful result, and that the principle upon which it was commenced was full of danger ;" but Austria was informed again and again that " things had gone much too far to admit of any future connection " between the Italians and herself. In the actual result his anticipa- tions proved far too sanguine. The recuperative power of Austria was greater than Europe imagined ; and the want of cohesion among the Italians, on account of the treachery of the King of Naples, the insincerity of the Pope, the deep-rooted antipathy of the republican party to the Sardinian dynasty, the inability of Carlo Al- berto to control the forces he had brought into activity, rendered them impotent to work out their own salvation. French intervention alone could have saved Italy after YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 123 Eadetzky had stamped out the insurrection in Venetia, and by that time the turbulence of Paris had compelled the substitution at the head of affairs of the unimagina- tive Cavaignac for the cosmopolitan Lamartine. Perhaps Lord Palmerston ought to have foreseen the fatal consequences of Italian disunion, but he only erred with the rest of Europe in believing, after the fall of Peschiera, that Carlo Alberto could hold the whole of North Italy, and it is improbable that he could have persuaded the Sardinian Government to accept less terms than the surrender of the whole of Venetia and Lombardy, even if he had wished to do so. There was, too, an insincerity about the Austrian overtures which disgusted both Palmerston and the advisers of Carlo Alberto. It was found that the proposals for an armistice, of which Palmerston consented to be the mouth-piece, were only made to gain time for the ad- vance of Austrian reinforcements, and for attempts to sow dissension between Lombardy and Sardinia. And the maximum of Austrian surrender, the cession of Lombardy minus Venetia, seemed ludicrously inadequate at a moment when everyone expected to hear that Badetzky was in full retreat to the Alps. Things had gone too far, was Palmerston's opinion, and the British Government were unwilling to enter upon a negotiation which, in their opinion, offered no prospects of success ; and to make a proposal, which they felt confident be- forehand that one of the parties, Sardinia, would posi- tively refuse to accept. He pointed out besides, what subsequent events amply proved to be true, that Austria could only hold Venetia by military occupation pure and simple, and that any possessions south of the Alps must, therefore, be a source of weakness to her rather than of strength. The retort of the Austrians, that 124 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. the loss of prestige would be far more serious than the expense of maintaining troops in Italy, was perhaps natural ; and in the impregnable defences of the Quadrilateral, and the Fabian skill of Eadetzky, they had ample means for closing the discussion for the time being. Lord Palmerston's attempts to mitigate the punishment of the Italians, when the recapture of Milan proved how completely the tide had turned, and during the cessation of hostilities which preceded the final overthrow of their hopes at No vara, were vigorous, but of course unsuccessful ; and it was left for Napoleon III. and the present Emperor of Germany to accomplish by blood and iron what Palmerston had so nearly •effected by diplomacy. The rapture with which the news of the Austrian victory was received at Court and in London society, proved that in his faith in the cause of Italy, Palmerston was in advance of his time by at least a decade. At all events, he had the courage of his opinions. Yesterday [writes Greville in March 1849] there was a Drawing- room, at which everybody, the Queen included, complimented and wished joy to Oolloredo (the Austrian ambassador), except Palmer- ston, who, though he spoke to him about other things, never alluded to the news that had just arrived from Italy. . . . Nothing could be more striking than this marked difference between the Foreign Secre- tary and his Sovereign, and all his countrymen, and we may be pretty sure Oolloredo will not fail to make a pretty story of it to his Court. The Foreign Secretary about this period was doomed to witness the temporary overthrow of all his Italian projects. His protege, Pio Nono, proved unsatisfactory ; reforming zeal was evanescent at the Vatican, and the Holy Father was eventually forced by the outbreak of the revolution at Rome to summon French bayo- nets to support him against his own subjects, whose YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 125 sympathies were for a republican form of govern- ment. Equally disappointing were Lord Minto's efforts to mediate between the King of Naples and the insur- gent Sicilians ; the revolt was drowned in blood, and the hideous ferocity of the bombardment of Messina and Palermo gained for Ferdinando the nickname of " Bomba/' by which he is chiefly remembered. Un- fortunately for himself, Palmerston did not confine his efforts to mediation, but overstepped the limits of friendly neutrality by allowing arms to be supplied to the Sicilian insurgents from the Ordnance — as usual, without informing his colleagues. The matter was taken up by the Times, and in the House of Commons, but Palmerston escaped unscathed. He had, it is true, to apologise to Bomba, but apologies never cost him a very violent pang of regret ; while Greville was constrained to record the complete success of his answer to Mr. Barker. " a slashing, impudent speech, of sarcasms, jokes, and clap-traps," scarcely deigning to notice the question. A more dignified course of conduct was bis remonstrance to the % Neapolitan ambassador on the infamous misgovernment disclosed by Mr. Gladstone's famous letters to Lord Aberdeen on the state prisons and state trials of King Bomba's Govern- ment. Prince Castelcicala was informed that Mr. Glad- stone's letters presented a picture of illegality, injustice, and cruelty, such as might have been hoped would not have existed in any European country. The re- monstrance was, however, burked by the Neapolitan ministers until the outcry had passed away, and pro- duced no effect, though Palmerston supplemented it by a fine speech in the House, in which he eulogised Mr. Gladstone's sympathy for the oppressed. The fulness of time has so amply demonstrated the 126 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. justice of Palmerston's contention that the Austrian rule in Italy was an anachronism, and that freedom would certainly he accomplished, if not hy the unaided efforts of the Italians, yet certainly through foreign intervention, that to defend it would be a mere waste of words. Italy, as he says in one of his letters to Lord Ponsonby, was to Austria the heel of Achilles, not the shield of Ajax. The Alps were her natural barrier, and her best defence. Palmerston was no enemy to Austria ; on the contrary, he wished to see her empire north of the Alps in a condition of strength and prosperity to act as a counterpoise to France. She was "the pivot of the balance of power in Europe." His advice during the crisis was thoroughly sound, and was actually adopted in part. The abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand, " an implumis bipes, a Guy Faux, a perfect nullity, next thing to an idiot," as Palmerston rather imprudently styled him in his private letters, was in conformity with his recom- mendation ; and he may be forgiven for not being ac- quainted with the good qualities of the " lad of sixteen or twenty,''' Francis Joseph, who mounted the tottering throne in the place of his uncle; And with regard to the revolution in Hungary, his conduct was equally dis- interested. The idea of armed intervention was never entertained for a moment, though the sympathies of this country were as active in favour of the Magyars — thanks to the picturesqueness of Kossuth — as they were tepid with regard to the Lombards. He even declined to recognize the insurgents by giving an audience to their representative. At the same time he interceded on their behalf at Vienna; but to his admirable advice Schwarzenberg, the successor of Metternich, turned a deaf ear. In the hour of victory the Austrian Govern- ment was urged to make a generous use of the successes YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 127 which it had obtained, by restoring to Hungary its due constitutional rights ; and Palmerston did not fail to point out that, by calling in .Russian aid to crush the rebellion, Austria had set open a door which it might not be easy to shut.* When the full details of the brutal suppression of the rebellion, the flogging of women and other atrocities, reached England, he allowed his righteous indignation full play ; and directed Lord Ponsonby to maintain the dignity and honour of Eng- land by expressing openly and decidedly the disgust which such proceedings excited in the public mind. Though Palmerston's good offices on behalf of Italy and Hungary were of no avail for the time being, the diplomatic campaign against Prince Schwarzenberg closed with a brilliant triumph. After the end of the war, numerous fugitives, among whom were Kossuth and Bern, a Pole who had commanded the Hungarian insurgents with conspicuous success, took refuge in Turkey. The Kussian and Austrian ambassadors at Constantinople took upon themselves to demand their surrender, with a threat that if their demands did not receive a categorical answer within a limited time they would suspend diplomatic relations ; and their high- handed conduct received the full sanction of their respective Governments, who appealed to loosely-worded treaties extorted from the Porte in former days of humiliation. An immediate surrender would have fol- lowed, had not Stratford Canning been at hand to - * Cobden blamed bim for not baving sent a vigorous protest against tbe Russian expedition, and tbougbt tbat it would bave so strength- ened tbe hands of tbe Russian ministers tbat tbe Czar -would bave countermanded bis troops (Morley's Cobden, vol. ii. p. 67). Tbe idea tbat a Czar, especially Nicbolas, would allow himself to be swayed by ministerial advice, is one of exquisite simplicity. 128 LIFE OF VISCOUUT PALMEBSTON. inspire the Sultan with a week's resolution ; and Palmer- ston availed himself of the opportunity with his accus- tomed skill. Baron Briinnow, the Russian minister in London, was informed before the determination of his Government was known, that the British fleet was to be sent to the Dardanelles — "just as one holds a bottle of salts to the nose of a lady who has been frightened " — remarked the flippant Foreign Secretary ; and the alter- natives of the withdrawal of the obnoxious demands, or war, were placed plainly before him and his Aus- trian colleague. In vain Schwarzenberg attempted to effect a retreat through a back-door, by moderating his demands to a request that the fugitives should be detained by the Porte in the interior of Turkey ; it was incompatible with the dignity of the Sultan, said Pal- merston, that he should act as the gaoler of the Emperor of Austria. When, two years later, the Sultan summoned up courage to set Kossuth and his companions free, Palmerston could claim to have won all along the line. 129 CHAPTER VIII. PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 1849—1852. Independence of Lord Palmerston — Differences of opinion with the Court — The Danish succession question — The Pacifico affair — Breakdown of negotiations — Indignation of France — Civis Roma- nus sum — Effect of the speech— The Queen's Memorandum — The Haynau and Kossuth incidents — The coup d'tftat — Dismissal of Palmerston — Constitutional side of the question — The Militia Bill— The first Derby Ministry. Though Lord Palmerston's policy since the return of the Whigs to power had been on the whole remarkably sober and sagacious, the Bulwer fiasco at Madrid and the Sicilian incident proved that the old Adam of in- subordination was not wholly dead within him. Nor were these the only occasions on which, forgetful of the flight of time, he attempted a repetition of the tactics which had been so successful in the good old days of Lord Melbourne, and sent off important despatches without submitting them to Lord John Russell and the Sovereign, or without inserting the alterations which he had been directed to make. And the necessity of coming to a previous understanding 9 130 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. upon important steps was all the greater because the opinions of the Court and the Foreign becretary were distinctly at issue on many questions of Eu- ropean importance. The sympathies of the Court were with Austria, those of Palmerston with Italy and Hungary, and his views were the wiser of the two ; but about North German politics he was rather prejudiced and rather ignorant, yet he paid small attention to the opinions of Prince Albert, who was unquestionably better informed. Among the many wise memoranda which are to be found in Sir Theodore Martin's Life of Prince Consort, perhaps the most re- markable are those in which he urged the necessity of German unity under Prussian leadership. Palmerston, though, as can be seen in an interesting letter written by him during a visit to Berlin in 1844, he was not without some insight into the great part that Prussia would some day be called upon to play, cared little for German unity ; and while Prince Albert saw in the Zollverein, or customs union, a feeble beginning of a one and un- divided Fatherland, Palmerston resented its existence as an arrangement for placing prohibitive duties on British exports. Indeed, if the Danish succession question may be taken as a test, Palmerston's want of information on the inner workings of Teutonic politics was very considerable. Count Vitzthum, in his memoirs, goes so far as to state that the Foreign Secretary was actuated by personal motives in the matter, his aim being to purchase the non-interference of Baron Briinnow in the Don Pacifico affair by giving Russia a free hand at Copenhagen, and supporting, or at all events acquiescing, in the claims put forward by the Kussian dynasty to a portion of the Danish terri- PALMEBSTON AND THE COURT. 131 tory, which included the important harbour of Kiel. Even if this account of the history of the Protocol of July 4th 1850, upon which was based the Treaty of 1852, guaranteeing the crown of Denmark to Prince Christian of Glucksburg, be not accepted as gospel, there can be no doubt that the continued exclusion of Germany from the Baltic by the maintenance of the con- nection between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein was far more a matter of interest to Russia than to England. And though there may be some question as to the motives which dictated the arrangement, there can be none as to the carelessness with which it was executed. The choice of the negotiators fell upon a prince who, whatever claims he might have to the throne of Den- mark, was regarded by German jurists to have a right to the Duchies inferior to no less than nineteen other members of the house of Schleswig-Holstein. The renunciations of these " agnates " were never obtained, nor was the consent of the Estates of the Duchies. Lastly, though the Duchies were indisputably members of the German Federation, no attempt was made to obtain for the arrangement the sanction of the Federa- tion in its collective form, for Austria and Prussia signed the Protocol not as mandatories of the Ger- man Diet, but individually, as great Powers. It seemed quite on the cards that a trial of strength between the Court and the Foreign Secretary might be averted by the retirement of Lord Palmerston from office, in consequence of a hostile opinion in the House of Commons as to the merits of Ms treatment of what is generally known as the Don Pacifico affair. LordPalmer- ston's defence of the Porte against the menaces of Russia and Austria had been generally approved, but there was naturally some revulsion of public feeling when it was 9 * 132 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. discovered that the fleet which had been so honourably employed at the Dardanelles was immediately after- wards despatched to coerce the weak little kingdom of Greece for the non-compliance with the demands of the British Government for compensation for various acts of violence committed towards British subjects. There was even a feeling of dismay when the intelligence leaked out that the French Government had actually recalled its Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, from London, because it believed that his attempts to patch up the dispute between England and Greece had been treated with scanty respect, and that the Kussian Government had demanded an explanation of Palmerstons's proceed- ings in rather a serious tone. Perhaps the points at issue were hardly understood. The seizure of the Greek gunboats and Greek mer- chantmen by Admiral Parker was regarded as a piece of bullying, by people who argued as if the feebleness of a State was a reason for allowing it to commit crimes with impunity. There was also a disposition to minimise the amount and duration of the wrongs committed, and to overlook the utter impossibility of obtaining redress through the Greek courts of law or by any means short of the employment of force. Because one of the com- plainants, Don Pacifico, was a Jew adventurer who seized the opportunity to put forward some utterly extortionate claims for compensation, there was no reason why satis- faction should not be exacted for the destruction of his house by an Athenian mob. At any rate, Mr. Finlay, the historian, whose 'land had been seized by King Otho without a drachma in return, was a perfectly reputable person; and, of the other offences of the Hellenic authorities, the torture of an Ionian who was a British subject, and the arrest of the coxswain and boat's PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 133 crew of H.M.S. Fantdme, were unquestionably outrages of a very serious nature. The British case against the disreputable little Greek Government was really perfectly clear, but to apportion the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations was a nicer question. The offer of French mediation was certainly made in good faith, though Palmerston strongly suspected that the intrigues of the French minister at the Greek Court were at the bottom of King Otho's obstinacy. But when Baron Gros, the French Commissioner, arrived at Athens, his proceedings resembled those of an advocate rather than those of an arbitrator ; the terms of his settlement were rejected by our ambassador, Mr. Wyse, as inadequate, and he thereupon gave notice that his mission was at an end. Meanwhile, a parallel series of negotiations had been going on in London between Drouyn de Lhuys and Palmerston, which had issue in a convention signed on the 18th which disposed of the whole question under dis- pute. Intimation of the terms of the proposed arrange- ment, of which the essential was that if the negotia- tors at Athens could not agree, they should refer their differences to London, reached Baron Gros on the 24th, and was communicated by him to Mr. Wyse ; but the latter, who had received no fresh instructions from London corresponding to those that his French col- league had received from Paris, did not venture to depart from his previous instructions and postpone the employment of force. The embargo was renewed on the 25th, and on the following day the Greek Govern- ment submitted unconditionally. It was but natural that the French Government should feel that they had been treated with disrespect, and resent that treatment accordingly. Drouyn de 134 LIFE OF VI800UNT PALMEBSTON. Lhuys was recalled from London, and General Lahittei- the French Foreign Minister, openly charged the British Government with duplicity. A dispassionate examina- tion of the whole affair would probably have acquitted Palmerston of a more serious offence than neglect to keep Mr. Wyse constantly and accurately informed on the progress of negotiations in London. But he did not improve matters by trying, in answer to Mr. Milner Gibson, to explain away the recall of Drouyn de Lhuys, who, said he, had^ gone to Paris " in order personally to be a medium of communication between the two Governments." The excitement was great, though the danger of war was in reality quite remote ; many of Palmersfcon's colleagues were anxious to be rid of him, and the Opposition in the House of Lords seized the opportunity to win a bloodless victory by carrying a hostile resolution on the motion of Lord Stanley by a majority of 27. The Cabinet, after delibe- ration, decided to stand or fall together, and resolved to cancel the bad effects of the vote in the Upper House, by availing themselves of a resolution of which Mr. Koebuck had given notice — that the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government had been regulated had been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country, and in times of unexampled difficulty to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world. The debate of four nights which followed was made memorable by the last speech that Sir Eobert Peel ever made, by Mr. Oockburn's brilliant "Crown and An- chor" harangue, as Mr. Disraeli termed it, by one of the greatest of Mr. Gladstone's oratorical displays, and by Palmerston's magnificent defence of his policy in a PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 135 speech lasting " from the dusk of one day till the dawn of another."** Of that magnificent specimen of sus- tained and elaborate argument it is impossible here to give more than a very meagre account. Part of it was a well-considered apologia pro vita sua, in which he passed the whole of recent European history before him in skilful review, by a series of graceful transitions from the " sunny plains of Castille and gay vineyards of France " to the " rugged Alps and smiling plains of Lombardy." Incidentally he managed to make a remarkably neat cut at his enemies in Paris, and to those who listened to them in England, by laughing to scorn the idea that the French had driven out M. Guizot at the instigation of a knot of foreign con- spirators who were " caballing " against him, " for no other reason than that he upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his country." On the Greek question his argument was temperate and lucid, except when it concerned the breakdown of the mission of Baron Gros, and there leakages are to be discovered in abundance. But little exception can be taken to his contention that if British subjects could get no redress from foreign courts of law, they were not to be con- fined to that remedy only, but were entitled to receive the protection of their own Government; or to his arguments that Mr. Finlay had no redress because the Greek revolution of 1843 had thrown a veil over the unconstitutional acts of the Monarchy, and that with respect to Don Pacifico it was impossible to take pro- ceedings against a mob of five hundred persons. The orator brushed aside the flimsy objection that, because * The speech I had to make [he wrote to his brother] could not be comprised within a shorter time than from a quarter before ten to t twenty minutes past two. 136 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. M. Pacifico was a person of doubtful antecedents, he could be maltreated with impunity. The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case ; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redresa to a man because in some former transactions he may have done something which is questionable. Punish turn, if you will — punish him if he is guilty, but don't pursue him as a Pariah through life. ..." Oh, but," it is said, " what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a power ! " Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts ? Is it to be held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, and plunder, in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them, when they apply for compensa- tion, that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be that the weakness and smallness of the country makes it the more easy to obtain redress At the dose of the speech came the well-known peroration in which the Foreign Secretary extolled the dignity of English citizenship. He did not, he said, blame the Opposition for attacking Ministers ; for the government of England was an object of fair and legitimate ambition for men of all shades of opinion. For while we have seen .... the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side, while we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled, institutions overthrown and destroyed, while in almost every country of Europe the conflict of civil war has deluged the land with blood, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, this country has presented a spectacle honourable to the people of England and worthy of the admiration of mankind. We have shown that liberty is compatible with order, that individual freedom is not irreconcilable with obedience to the law. We have shown the example of a nation, in which very class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it, while at the same time every individual of each class is constantly striving to raise himself in the social scale — not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality — but by persever- ing good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual faculties with which his Creator has endowed him. To govern such a people as this is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the noblest man who lives in the land ; and there- PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 137 fore I find no fault with those who may think any opportunity a fair one for endeavouring to place themselves in so distinguished and honourable a position. . . . But, making allowances for those diffe- rences of opinion, which may fairly and honourably arise among those who concur in general views, I maintain that the principles which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict which this House, as representing a political, a commercial, a con- stitutional country, is to give on the question before it ; whether the principles on which the foreign policy of this country has been con- ducted, and the sense of duty which has led us to think ourselves bound to afford protection to our fellow subjects abroad, are proper and fitting guides for those who are charged with the government of England, and whether, as the Roman in the days of old held himself free from indignity when he could say Civis Romanus sum, so also a British subject, in whatever land he be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England shall protect him against injustice and wrong. This speech not only gave the Government a hand- some majority of forty-six, but it raised the reputation of Palmerston to a height to which none of his con- temporaries, not even Lord John Russell himself, could hope to aspire. " We are proud of the man who delivered that most able and temperate speech " was Sir Robert Peel's generous acknowledgment ; and Palmerston wrote to his brother, that he was for the present the most popular Minister that for a very long course of time had held his office. The Don Pacjlico debate was un- questionably an important landmark in the life of Lord Palmerston. Hitherto his merits had been known only to a select few ; for the British public does not read Blue Books, and as a rule troubles itself very little about foreign politics at all. His greatest achievements had passed almost unnoticed by the electorate, though they had certainly looked upon him as a strong and capable man. But the Pacifico speech caught the ear 'of the 138 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. nation, and was received with a universal verdict of approval. From that hour Lord Palmerston became the man of the people, and his rise to the premiership only a question of time. As Mr. Morley has pointed out in his Life of Cobden, Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli were un- able to keep in power if they got there ; the Whigs were steadily losing ground in popular opinion ; the Man- chester School was out of the question. Lord Pal- merston's only possible rival was Sir Robert Peel, and he met his death the very day after he had taken part in the Pacifico debate. At the same time there were breakers ahead. The distrust of the Court continued without abatement, and attempt was made, with the concurrence of Lord John Russell, the Duke of Bedford, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Clarendon, to induce the Foreign Secretary to accept some other office, which, however, he declined to do. Fresh negligence brought down upon him fresh rebukes from the Queen, culminating in the famous Memorandum of August the 12th, in which she required that, under penalty of dismissal, (1) he would distinctly state what he proposed in a given case, in order that the Queen might know as distinctly to what she had given her Royal sanction ; (2) that, having once given her sanction to a measure, it should not be arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister^ Palmerston, with tears in his eyes, protested to Prince Albert that he had been accused of being wanting in respect to the Queen, which was an imputation on his honour as a gentleman : pleaded stress of business, and the loss of time incurred by sending despatches to the Queen through the Premier r and promised amendment. He did not resign, he after- wards explained, for several reasons, because he had no reason to believe that the memorandum would ever be PALMERSTON AND TEE COURT. 139 made public ; because he had recently gained a signal victory in the Commons, and to have resigned then would have been to have delivered the fruits of victory to the adversaries whom he had defeated ; and thirdly, because he would have been bringing to the bar of public opinion, a quarrel between himself and his Sovereign, the result of which course must have been fatal to himself or injurious to his country. Within a month he had submitted a letter of regret for the maltreatment of the " Austrian butcher " General Haynau, by Messrs. Barclay's draymen, to Baron Koller the Austrian Charge d'Affaires, without consulting the Premier or the Queen, which contained a paragraph to which they both objected, and which they forced him to withdraw. This was early in September. Early in November, Kossuth arrived in England, and Palmerston, dissuaded by the united representations of the Cabinet from receiving him at Broadlands, relieved his feelings by receiving a deputation of Islington and Finsbury Radicals, to whom, in return for their denunciations of the Em- perors of Russia and Austria as "odious and detestable assassins " and " merciless tyrants and despots," he de- livered the "judicious bottle-holder" oration, and thanked them for their flattering and gratifying expressions of opinion. \ The impropriety of such language was so obvious, that the virulence of the Kossuth mania in England was probably the only reason which prevented Lord John Russell from effecting his long meditated manifestation of authority. " I think," was Greville's comment, " this is on the whole the worst thing he (Palmerston) has ever done." Certainly Lord John Russell, who had swallowed the camel, seems to have strained at a gnat, when he ejected Palmerston from office on the 19th of 140 LIFE OF VISQOUNT PALMERSTON. December, for having^ expressed his approval of Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat, in a conversation with the French Minister,] Count Walewski ; and Greville's sur- mise, that the occasion was made a casus belli because Palmerston had taken the unpopular side, was probably right. No doubt it was extremely inconvenient, when Lord Normanby informed the French Foreign Minister that he was directed to observe a policy of strict neutrality, that he should receive intimation that, two days before, Count Walewski had conveyed Palmerston's entire approbation of the act of Louis Napoleon. Our Minister and Government were placed in an extremely false position. Still Lord John Eussell never at- tempted to deny that he, Lord Lansdowne, and Sir Charles Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had also expressed their approval of the coup aV'etat to Count Walewski in conversation ; and there is, as diplo- matists know, considerable force in^Palmerston's argu- ment that his communication was " unofficial." * \Lord John probably thought that the sum total of Palmerston's offences was so great that any harshness towards him was justifiable, even the crowning indignity of the offer of the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. When the usual explanations took place in the [House of Commons, he was even more relentless, and produced with crushing effect the Queen's memorandum of August 1850. , Pal- merston, who had refused to believe that so complete an * Lord Malmesbury clearly acknowledges the distinction between an " officious" and " official" conversation (Memoirs of an Ex- Mini- ster, i. 303, note). On the other hand the Duke of Wellington pro- nounced most decidedly against any attempt to establish a distinction between private and official opinions. " Oh, but that won't do," he said to Prince Albert, " That would be dishonest. It would be appearing in two characters. No ! No ! We are very particular on that point." (Life of the Prince Consort, vol. ii., p. 427.) PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 141 execution was imminent, was exceedingly inefficient in his defence ; and most people would probably have agreed with the comment in Macaulay's diary, " Palmerston is out. It was high time; but I cannot help feeling sorry." The constitutional questions raised by the struggle between the Foreign Secretary and the Court were of a very complicated nature. Let us say at once that Lord Palmerston cannot be held to have been actuated by any deliberate disrespect for the Crown./ His contention was this — that his experience in foreign affairs was more extended than that of Prince Albert, and that he might therefore claim an immunity from supervision in matters of detail, though he acknow- ledged that both the Crown and the Premier had a right to consider the draft of despatches upon matters of im- portance, j He was also of opinion that the transmission of despatches involved great waste of time in cases of urgency, that their alteration was frequently the cause of grave ambiguity of language, in short, that too many cooks spoil the broth. Such contentions are evidently of considerable force. But there can hardly be any doubt that(Lord Palmerston really aimed at a far greater measure of independence than he professed X that if he had been able to get his own way, he would have secured the imperium in ■imperio of Lord Melbourne's time ; and that, failing to get it by direct means, he had resort to subterfuges and neglects of duty, the ultimate object of which was to steal a march upon his Sovereign and colleagues when they happened to disagree with him. On the other hand, it is impossible not to see that the Court, through want of judgment, by no means adopted the most straightforward means of reconciling their 142 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. views with those of the Foreign Secretary, /instead of encouraging him to lay his opinions freely before them in frequent interviews and direct intercourse, they treated him with distrust and appeared to shun his society). The interposition of Lord John Eussell was invoked, the" arrangement being that " the despatches submitted for (the Queen's) approval must pass through the hands of Lord John Russell, who, if he should think that they required any material change, should accompany them with a statement of his reasons." To the transmission through the Prime Minister Lord Palmerston agreed ; and the fact says volumes for his generous and loyal disposition. For if the arrangement had been carried out to the letter, the result would have been, that while the Foreign Secretary prepared the drafts, they would have been discussed and settled between the Prime Minister and the Sovereign.* He would thus have been reduced from a confidential servant of the Crown, to the position of a mere clerk, indeed his position would have become almost intolerable for a man of any self-respect. Even with the most delicate treatment, the system could hardly fail to create and perpetuate a feel- ing of antagonism between the Prime Minister and the head of the Foreign Department, and it should certainly never have been proposed to Lord Palmerston as a law of conduct. Though approved by Lord John, it seems to have been almost entirely the work of Stockmar, and expressive of the feelings of the Court. Fresh suspicion and confusion was the inevitable result ; and Lord Palmerston's admirers might fairly have advanced as an excuse for some of his escapades, that he was proscribed and subordinated to another, in a place where he had every right to play the part of a familiar friend. * Mr. Gladstone's Gleanings of Past Years, vol. i. p. 87. PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 143 " There was a Palmerston," said Mr. Disraeli ; and Guizot, himself in exile, raised a Nunc dimittis when he heard of his enemy's overthrow. The member for Tiverton bore his temporary adversity with that entire absence of rancour which is perhaps the most delightful trait in his fine nature. " Ah, how are you, Granville ? " he said to his successor; " Well, you have got a very in- teresting office, but you will find it very laborious," and proceeded to give him every assistance in his power. There was no ill-feeling in his mind against the Court, though he imagined that they had been influenced by foreign, especially Orleanist, influences in his dismissal. This view he communicated to his brother without circumlocution, together with a curious story about a contemplated descent upon the French coast by the Orleauist princes, the Due d'Aumale and the Prince de Joinville, which he believed to have preci- pitated Napoleon's coup d'etat, and which induced him to express his warm approval of that measure. Nor did he bear any unworthy resentment against Lord John Russell. According to Lord Shaftesbury, he never alluded to him but with a laugh, and " Oh, he's a foolish fellow, but we shall go on very well now." It is onlv fair then to consider that Palmerston was not influenced by personal motives in his attack upon Lord John's Militia Bill, by which, within a very short space of time, he so signally avenged his own dismissal from office. " I have had my tit-for-tat with John Russell," he wrote to his brother, " and I turned him out on Friday last "; but he hastened to add that his only object was to persuade the House to reject the feeble plan of the Government. Indeed, few statesmen of the day had taken more honourable interest in the state of 144 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMFBSTON. our defences, or had spoken more frequently on the subject. A memorandum which he addressed to Lord Melbourne, set forth the liability of England to invasion •with a fulness of knowledge that a military authority might envy. During Peel's ministry he had examined the Government on harbours and fortifications with a per- sistency which aroused the wrath of Oobden, and which calls forth the mirth of Oobden's biographer, Mr. John Morley. Nor can it be questioned that Palmerston's amendment, which made the militia generally instead of " locally " available, was a vast improvement to the measure. It might have been accepted by the ministry without loss of honour, and he suspected them of incur- ring the defeat because they were anxious to escape from the responsibility of carrying on the Government any longer. A passage in Lord John Kussell's He?ninis- cences proves that the guess was correct. The tit-for-tat naturally drew attention once more to Palmerston's political isolation. In spite of his long service in the Whig ranks, he was still a political free lance ; and Lord Derby, to whom fell the formation of a ministry, thrice made overtures for his services ; in February 1852, again in July, and for a third time in December. All proposals were, however, declined, chiefly because of the Protectionist colour of the ad- ministration, though Palmerston gave valuable support to their Militia Bill, and even prolonged their existence at the opening of the new Parliament by bringing forward an amendment to Mr. Charles Villiers' free trade reso- lution which they were able to accept without loss of dignity. Conscious of his own strength, he was but little troubled by the gloomy looks of his former col- leagues, whom from time to time he treated rather un- kindly. When at the Tiverton hustings, the local orator PALMERSTON AND THE COVET. 145 the butcher, Kowcliffe, attempted to rally him on his position, Palmerston blandly replied that whatever Go- vernment he meant to join, he would never join a Government called a Kowcliffe Administration. His letters show that he was equally determined not to serve again under " Johnny "; and the admission which he went on to make, that Johnny was not likely to serve under him, proves that he felt that his" own hour was not yet come. There happened at this time to be a movement on foot among the Whigs for uniting the Liberal party under the eminently prudent leadership of Lord Lans- downe ; and though it was not initiated in any way by Palmerston, he gave it his cordial support. Age and ill-health, however, compelled Lord Lansdowne to deter- mine upon a nolo episcopari ; and on the retirement of the Derby Ministry, Lord Aberdeen constructed a cabi- net of Peelites and Whigs, with Sir William Molesworth as the representative of Philosophic Kadicalism. 10 146 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. CHAPTER IX. THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 1852-1855. Lord Palmerston at the Home Office — Legislation and Deputations — The Reform Bill — Temporary Resignation of Palmerston — Be- ginnings of the Eastern Question — The Menschikoff mission — Lord Palmerston's policy — His popularity with the nation — The Vienna note — The Concert of the Powers — Palmerston's descrip- tion of the objects at issue — Declaration of war by Turkey — The Sinope disaster — Beginning of the war — The Napier banquet and its consequences — Proposal to make Palmerston Secretary at War — The Crimean expedition — Fall of the Ministry. In the Coalition Ministry Lord Palmerston, rather to the general surprise, was persuaded to take the Home Office. He did not yield until after considerable pres- sure had been put upon him, conscious, perhaps, that he was open to a charge of inconsistency if he served under a premier whose continental policy he had criticized so mercilessly. But the co-operation which he refused to Aberdeen was conceded to the solicita- tions of Lord Lansdowne, especially when he found that foreign affairs were to be in sound Whig hands. Palmerston chose the Home Office because it would bring him in contact with his fellow-countrymen, and would give him influence with regard to the militia and the THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 147 national defences ; and as Home Secretary he was a most unqualified success. " I never knew any Home Secre- tary," wrote Lord Shaftesbury, "equal to Palmerston for readiness to undertake every good work of kindness, humanity, and social good, especially to the child and the working class. No fear of wealth, capital, or elec- tion terrors ; prepared at all times to run a tilt if he could do good by it. Has already done more good than ten of his predecessors." The Shaftesbury hall-mark was indeed to be seen in most of his measures, with the exception of the timely extinction of the Board of Health, which vexed the righteous soul of his relative. The Youthful Offenders' Bill gave Government aid to reformatory schools, and greatly increased their num- ber and efficiency ; the Factory Acts were amended for the benefit of children ; the institution of tickets-of-leave effected an admirable reform in the criminal system ; while attention was paid to the health of the people of London by measures for the abatement of the smoke nuisance, and for shutting up the graveyards within the metropolitan area. If Lord Palmerston's legislation was influenced by others, his manner of receiving deputations and answer- ing memorials was entirely his own. Mr. Evelyn Ash- ley records that when the people of Rugely wanted a new name for their town, which had acquired notoriety through having been the residence of the poisoner, Palmer, the Home Secretary asked them how his own name, " Palmerstown," would suit them. His answer to the Presbytery of Edinburgh, who requested that a national fast might be appointed on account of the visi- tation of the cholera, was even more Palmerstonian, and resulted, wrote Lord Shaftesbury, in his being regarded by the religious world as little better than an infidel. 10 * 148 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. The Maker of the Universe [he replied] has established certain laws- of nature for the planet in which we lire, and the weal or woe of man- kind depends upon the observance or the neglect of these laws. One of these laws connects health with the absence of those gaseous exha- lations which proceed from overcrowded human dwellings, or from decomposing substances, whether animal or vegetable ; and those same laws render sickness the almost inevitable consequence of expo- sure to these noxious influences. But it has, at the same time, pleased Providence to place it within the power of man to make such arrange- ments, as will prevent or disperse such exhalations so as to render them harmless, and it is the duty of man to attend to those laws of nature and to exert the faculties which Providence has thus given to man for his own welfare. . . . When man has done the utmost for his own safety , then is the time to invoke the blessing of Heaven to give effect to his exertions. During the existence of the unlucky Aberdeen Govern- ment, Lord Palmerston not unfrequently acted as chief of the ministerial party in the House of Commons, while Lord John Eussell remained at Eichmond, dis- gusted with the abnormal position of leader without office, which the rearrangement of the Cabinet had com- pelled him to accept. The Home Secretary's direction of the business of the House was thoroughly good- humoured and judicious; even Greville is constrained to chronicle his great popularity with all sections of the political world. But within the Cabinet there was but little unanimity on any subject. The views of Lord John Eussell and several of the Peelites, especially Lord Aberdeen and Sir John Graham, were far more advanced on the question of Eeform than were those of Lord Palmerston and Lord Lansdowne, who disliked the thing itself, and more particularly Lord John's per- sistency in introducing a Eeform Bill at a moment when the aspect of foreign affairs was menacing in the ex- treme. The Home Secretary swallowed his objections so far as to consent to serve on the committee of the THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 149 Cabinet for the preparation of the proposed Bill. But when Lord John stated his scheme, Palmerston, in a letter to Lord Lansdowne, raised a number of objec- tions, which, in the opinion of Lord Aberdeen, as ex- pressed in a letter dated the 14th of December, were " so serious as to strike at the most essential principles of the measure/' and which were accordingly rejected by the Committee. Palmerston thereupon sent in his resignation, and was out of the Cabinet for ten days. The world naturally jumped to the conclusion that Reform was only a pretext, and that Palmerston had really resigned because of the want of vigour in the Eastern policy of the Cabinet. Mr. Ashley appears to countenance that idea, and Mr. Kinglake, going a step further, actually asserts that Lord Palmerston was " driven from office." But a passage in one of Palmer- ston's letters to his brother-in-law, Mr. Sulivan, directly contradicts that view ; and no one who reads the correspondence between Lord Aberdeen and his dis- sentient colleague, published in the Quarterly Review of April 1877, can possibly doubt that the Reform Bill was the sole reason for Palmerston' s resignation, though the reviewer's suggestion that he hoped that Lansdowne would also withdraw, and so break up the Cabinet, appears to be rather uncharitable. From the Malmesbury and Greville memoirs it may be gathered that both parties in the Cabinet, that of the Premier and the Home Secretary, were conscious of having made a mistake in failing to come to terms, and that a reconciliation was accordingly not difficult to arrange. Lord Palmerston's withdrawal of his resignation was accepted by the embarrassed Premier ; and the Home Secretary, though he was compelled for the moment to .accept the obnoxious Bill, was eventually compensated 150 LIFE OF VISCOUNT FALMFBSTON. by its abandonment in the face of the complete indif- ference of public opinion. All this while Lord Palmerston, though most con- scientious in his discharge of the duties of his multi- farious office, and most assiduous in his attendance at the House of Commons, was seldom absent in spirit from the shores of the Golden Horn and the banks of the- Danube. Even Mr. Cobden himself could hardly have denied that the ex-Foreign Secretary, though he- might be supposed to approach the Eastern Question with prejudice, brought to bear upon it at any rate a considerable amount of knowledge. Ever since 1830 he had made an intricate study of Eussian diplo- macy, and had watched the twists and turns of Eussian statesmanship in crises as serious as that of 1840. He was yet at the Foreign Office when, in 1850, the dis- pute concerning the guardianship of the Holy Places was revived by Louis Napoleon, as a distinct bid against Eussia for paramount influence in the East ; and he had been duly warned by our Minister at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, that the question at issue, though apparently trivial, might easily develop into one of most serious moment. At the outset he attempted to avert war by directing Lord Normanby to persuade the French Government to moderate its unreasonable de- mands in favour of the Latin Church. The Catholics in Turkey, he pointed out, were few in number, there were millions of Greeks ; Eussia, the protectress of the latter, was a colossal power close on the Sultan's back;, France, the advocate of the Catholics, was a long way off. As soon, however, as Prince MenschikofFs mission to Constantinople disclosed an entirely new programme of Eussian aggression, namely, a claim to a protectorate: THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 151 over all the Greeks within the Turkish Empire, which was presented in the form of an ultimatum and sup- ported by military demonstrations on the Turkish fron- tier, Lord Palmerston's tone changed, and he advocated the answering of threat by threat. He was aware, as were the rest of the Ministry, that the Czar had long ago told Sir Hamilton Seymour that the " sick man " was at the point of death, and that in the division of the inheritance, although he would not establish him- self at Constantinople as proprietor, " as trustee — that he would not say." And though he was not privileged like Count Vitzthum to listen to the wild outbursts of the Czar against ces chiens de Turcs, Palmerston must have been aware that the existence of the fata] agreement to recognise the Russian protectorship of the Greek reli- gion in Syria, between the autocrat on the one hand, and Peel, the Duke, and Aberdeen on the other,* would drive Nicholas to new acts of menace directly Lord Aberdeen returned to power. Palmerston's description of the methods of Russian encroachment is as true to day as it was when it was written : — The Russian Government [he wrote to Lord Clarendon] has always had two strings to its bow — moderate language and disinterested pro- fessions at St. Petersburg and at London ; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggression succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend but cannot in honour recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language pre- viously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. When this system of mingled threats and caresses was followed by the occupation of the Principalities by a Russian army, Palmerston urged that the French and * Lord Malmesbury's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 402. 152 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. English fleets should at once he sent up to the Bos- phorus to encourage the Porte and give check to the Czar ; hut the Aherdeen party in the Cabinet was too strong for him. Not that he was under the illusion that such a course of action would prevent war; on the contrary, he was of opinion that the Czar " was bent on a stand-up fight," and felt that to meet the enemy half- way was more consonant with the traditions of English statesmanship, and would be more popular with the country, than bated breath and whispered humbleness. " If he [the Emperor] is determined to break a lance with us," he wrote to Mr. Sidney Herbert, " why then, have at him, say I, and perhaps he may have enough of it before we have done with him." At the same time, he had taken the right measure of the man when he asserted that Nicholas was far more likely to yield to action than to argument. If the Czar had known the crossing of the Pruth would be made a casus belli, it was probably that he would have thought twice about crossing it ; when once he had crossed the river, it was difficult to retreat without loss of honour at the bidding of any Power or any collection of Powers. Lord Palmerston had certainly interpreted the feeling of the country aright. Young England was actually eager for a war with Russia ; and nearly everyone was of opinion that the extreme moderation of the English Government was not likely to gain its end, and that a bolder policy would more probably be crowned with success. Lord Palmerston was known to favour a vigo- rous conduct. Conscious, as he must have been of the immense power that he wielded as the people's man in an inharmonious administration, it is greatly to his credit that he did not attempt to force the hand of our Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, during the anxious period THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 153 while it seemed as if peace might yet be achieved by diplomacy. He even went so far as to conceal his approbation on an occasion when Lord Clarendon sent particularly bold directions to Sir Hamilton Seymour, from fear lest words of praise from him whom men called " Lord Firebrand," might make the Aberdeens and Grahams of the Cabinet think that they were com- mitted to some desperate adventure. In fact his relations with Clarendon were most harmonious, and there is no warrant for Greville's insinuation that he attempted to undermine his colleagues by keeping up a correspon- dence with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. To the views of Prince Albert he paid far less deference, and wrote, doubtless with considerable gusto, a slashing commen- tary on the Prince's very sensible memorandum on Eastern Affairs, which was far more critical than candid, and which the Prime Minister subjected to a very un- favourable examination. Possibly the Home Secretary felt that when every concession on the part of England and France was followed by a fresh menace on the part of Russia, war, sooner or later, was inevitable ; and that it was unneces- sary to do more than record the fulfilment of his various prophecies. Even Lord Aberdeen's belief in the pacific intentions of the Emperor was shaken when, in return for our advice to the Porte not to make the occupation of the Principalities a casus belli, but to give diplomacy another chance, a circular was issued by Count Nessel- rode, in which that very occupation was declared to be in answer to the presence of the British and French squadrons outside the Dardanelles, where they had every right to be stationed. " It is," wrote Palmerston, " the robber who declares that he will not leave the house until the policeman shall have first retired from the 154 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, back yard "; still he acquiesced in Lord Aberdeen's deci- sion that an expostulation would for the moment be enough. His opinion of the Vienna Note is not on record. But, if we may judge by his advice on subse- quent diplomatic attempts to create a modus vivendi between Kussia and the Porte, he disapproved of the vague language of the document which was so signally turned to good account by Count Nesselrode, and agreed with Lord Stratford in countenancing the right of the Sultan to amend the note in his favour. It was unjust, he contended, later on, to attempt to impose a form of words on Turkey which we were not equally prepared to impose on Eussia. The chief blot on the system of action advocated by Lord Palmerston, was that it was adapted rather to a question in which England was acting single-handed, than to one in which it was necessary to pay con- siderable deference to the wishes of the other Powers. He seems to have put his trust entirely in that Anglo- French Alliance, of which by his approbation of the coup d'etat he had been the creator, and to have paid small regard to the moral support of Austria and Prussia. It is true that in his public utterances, Lord Palmerston, wishing, no doubt, to put a stop to the stories of ministerial differences that were flying about, laid con- siderable stress upon the value of the European concert. " I believe," he said on Feb. 20th, 1854, "I shall not overstate the truth when I say that the conduct of Eng- land and France in that respect has been thoroughly appreciated by Austria and by Prussia ; whereas if matters had been hurried on in the course of last summer, when we might have had no reason or right ta expect their co-operation, I cannot persuade myself that the conduct of Austria and Prussia would have been the THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 155 same as it is at the present time." But though the voice was the voice of Palmerston, tho arguments were the arguments of Aberdeen ; and the Home Secretary- was more in his element when he proceeded to describe the objects at issue. All the Powers [he said] have acknowledged in the most solemn and distinct manner that the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire is an essential condition for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, that it is an essential element in the balance of power, and that it would be a calamity to Europe if any attempt was made to destroy that integrity and independence. Why, even Russia, while she is pursuing the course which is acknowledged by all, except her- self, to be fatal to that independence — even Russia does not venture to deny that principle that the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire is an essential element and condition of the welfare of Europe. Now, Sir, it is manifest that if Russia were to appropriate these terri- tories now under the sway and sovereignty of the Sultan, she would become a power too gigantic for the safety of the other states of Europe. Bestriding the continent from north to south, possessing the command of two seas, the Baltic and the Mediterranean, enveloping the whole of Germany, embracing regions full of every natural re- source, and with a population of enormous extent, she would become dangerous to the liberties of Europe, and her power would be fatal to the independence of other states. I say, therefore, it is the duty of the other countries of Europe to prevent such enormous aggrandizement of one Power as that which would result from such a change. The declaration of war by Turkey, after the failure of the Vienna Note had shown that the hour for the con- flict of pens had gone by, was considered by Palmerston to be not unnatural and not unwise. He was equally- pleased with the successive decisions of the Cabinet to give material support to Turkey : that of September by which Lord Stratford was authorized to summon the fleet to the Bosphorus, that of October by which he was permitted to direct defensive operations in the Black Sea. We had now crossed the Kubicon, Lord Palmer- ston considered, and had taken Turkey by the hand; he pooh-poohed, as has been mentioned above, the Priuce 156 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMFRSTON. Consort's memorandum, in which a fear was expressed lest the Turks were seeking " to obtain for themselves the power of imposing a most oppressive rule of two millions of fanatic Mussulmans over twelve millions of Christians," and argued that — No peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless the Emperor consents to evacuate the Principalities, to abandon his demands, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipulations of former treaties upon which he has founded the pretensions which have been the cause of existing difficulties. This was a well-defined position with a vengeance ; hut it had the merit of making the war something better than a mere querelle d'Allemand, and answers the objec- tions of historians like Mr. Spencer Walpole, who urge that the Crimean campaign was unnecessary after the re- tirement of the Russian troops from the Principalities. On the following day came the news of the destruc- tion of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, that untoward event which more than any other precipitated the war ; and it is to be noted that the British Cabinet, by way of reprisal, agreed to the proposal of the French Emperor that the combined squadrons should not merely enter the Black Sea but " invite " every Eussian vessel they met to return to Sebastopol, during the period of Palmer- ston's absence from office. So that the blame, if blame there be, for the actual commencement of hostilities rests, not on the man who believed them from the first to be inevitable, but upon his colleagues, including those who had been most inclined to throw cold water on his bold counsels in the past. The war was unavoidable ; it was, to use a happy ex- pression of the Prince Consort's, a " vindication of the public law of Europe " ; but it was a serious matter, and should not have been regarded by any responsible states- man with a light heart. Probably Lord Palmerston did THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 15? appreciate its gravity ; but the outside world was not allowed to suspect the fact, and his public utterances on the eve of its declaration were couched in a tone of flippancy and jocularity which, though possibly intended,, as Mr. Ashley suggests, to keep up the heart and spirit of the nation, can hardly be read now without a feeling of irritation and regret. On March 7th, Lord Palmerston presided over a banquet given at the Reform Club to Sir Charles Napier, previous to his departure to take com- mand of the Baltic fleet. Of his essentially after-dinner remarks, and the rather small jokes with which they were interspersed, it is unnecessary to reproduce any specimens here ; but it is fair to mention that they were discretion itself when compared with the utterances of Sir James Graham, who was also present in the capacity of First Lord of the Admiralty. When taken to task a. few days later by Mr. Bright, in the House of Commons,, Lord Palmerston made a still sorrier exhibition of him- self, and for once in his life gave vent to some ill- natured remarks. Mr. Bright, according to Lord Shaftesbury, was one of the few men whom he really regarded as an enemy ; and a desire to pay off old scores- was probably his motive for beginning his answer with u The honourable and reverend gentleman," and con- tinuing, on pouvait bien donner le berceau, was well content to have gained Central Italy at the price of the cession of the French-speaking districts of Nice and Savoy, showed no disposition to draw back from the bargain. Still, though it was impossible any longer to^ co-operate with France, in the cause of Italian unity, Lord Palmerston did not cease to help the peninsula as best he could single-handed. When Garibaldi, havings freed Sicily, was about to cross over to Naples, the Emperor of the French wished to prevent him ; but his request for the co-operation of the English fleet was met with a curt refusal. And when Garibaldi's romantic campaign was over, and he had handed over the two Sicilies to Victor Emmanuel, the English Government,, alone in Europe, hastened to recognise the new king- dom of Italy. The Italian revolution [wrote Lord John Russell to Sir James Hud- son on October 27th, 1860] has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance. The subversion of existing power has not been fol- lowed, as is too often the case, by an outburst of popular vengeance. The venerated forms of constitutional monarchy have been associated with the name of a prince who represents an ancient and glorious dynasty. . . . Her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient ground for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia [by withdrawing their ministers from Turin]. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up- the edifices of their liberties amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe. The Emperor of the French also was warned that the Savoy coup must not be repeated ; and that the British fleet would at once be sent to the scene of action,, if the Emperor attempted to compensate France for the creation of a powerful kingdom on her borders by the annexation of Genoa or Sardinia. The expediency of withdrawing the army of occupation from Rome was. LORD PALMERSTON AND ITALY. 199 urged by him upon the Emperor again and again ; but without effect, since Napoleon did not dare to affront French clericalism. Lord Palmerston even entertained the idea, and urged it more than once on the Italian Cabinet, that Venetia should be acquired by purchase from Austria. But the proposal was rejected as imprac- ticable, and another war with Austria had to be under- gone before Italy could recover Venetia. The death of Count Cavour gave Lord Palmerston an opportunity of paying a fine tribute to his memory, and of placing thereby on record his own generous sympathies with the cause of Italian unity. In a speech in the House of Commons on June 6th, 1861, he said that of Count Cavour " it might truly be said that he had left a name * to point a moral and adorn a tale/ " The moral is this — that a man of transcendant talents, of indomi- table energy, and of inextinguishable patriotism, may, by the impulses which his own mind may give his countrymen, aiding a righteous cause and seizing favourable opportunities, notwithstanding difficulties that appear at first sight insurmountable, confer on his country great and most inestimable benefits. . . . The tale with which Count Cavour's memory will be associated is one of the most extraordinary — I may say one of the most romantic in the history of the world. Under his influence, we have seen a people who were supposed to have become torpid in the enjoyment of luxury, to have been enervated by the pursuit of pleasure, and to have had no knowledge or feeling in politics except what may have been derived from the traditions of their history and the jealousies of rival states — we have seen that people, under his guidance and at his call, rising from the slumber of ages, breaking that spell with which they had so long been bound, and dis- playing on just occasions the courage of heroes, the sagacity of states- men, the wisdom of philosophers, and obtaining for themselves that unity of political existence which for centuries has been denied them. I say, these are great events in history, and that the man whose name will go down in connection with them to posterity, whatever may have been the period of his death, however premature it may have been for the hopes of his countrymen, cannot be said to have died too soon for his glory and fame. 200 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. CHAPTER XIII. HOME AFFAIRS. 1859-1865. Lord Palmerston's Second Cabinet — His relations with the Radicals and the Opposition — The Reform Bill — Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone — The Paper Duties Bill — His views on the National Defences — The Fortifications Bill — Legislation and Appointments — The Charges commonly brought against Lord Palmerston's Government — His Irish Policy. The administration formed by Lord Palmerston in June 1859 was, in point of ability, perhaps the strongest that had been entrusted with the affairs of the nation since the famous ministry " of All the Talents " collected under the leadership of (rrenville and Fox in 1806.* Lord John Kussell's fixed determination to * Lord Palmerston's second Cabinet was composed as follows : — First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Palmerston. Lord Chancellor, Lord Campbell. President of the Council, Earl Granville. Lord Privy Seal, The Duke of Argyll. Home Secretary, Sir G. Cornewall Lewis. Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell. Colonial Secretary, The Duke of Newcastle. Secretary for War, Mr. Sidney Herbert. Secretary for India, Sir Charles Wood. HOME AFFAIRS. 201 have the Foreign Office and nothing else, was the cause of the exclusion of Lord Clarendon, a loss, perhaps, less to be regretted than it would otherwise have been, because of the Italian complication. Sir James Gra- ham, during the brief remainder of his life, played the congenial part of the candid friend of Liberalism. Mr. •Cobden refused to listen to the voice of the siren, and declined the presidency of the Board of Trade. Other- wise, the Ministry was composed of the flower of the Peelites, Whigs, and Eadicals, as a glance at the list below will show. But though an extremely able administration, it was composed of the most discor- dant elements, and was in fact, far more of a coali- tion than Lord Aberdeen's government. Its three most important members, the Prime Minister, Lord John Bussell, and Mr. Gladstone, were, as we have said in the previous chapter, in thorough accord on the Italian question, and it is pleasant to see the cordiality with which the two veterans, after years of " tit-for-tat *' and " paying one another out," worked together in the shaping of our relations with the continental powers in the autumn of their days. But Lord John and Lord Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone. First Lord of the Admiralty, The Duke of Somerset. President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Milner Gibson. Postmaster- General, Lord Elgin. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Sir George Grey. Chief Commissioner of the Poor Law Board, The Hon. Charles Villiers. Chief Secretary for Ireland, Mr. Cardwell. Lord Carlisle was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; Mr. James Wilson Vice-President of the Board of Trade and Paymaster of the Forces ; Mr. Lowe, Vice-President of the Council ; Sir Richard Bethell (Lord Westbury), Attorney-General, and, on the death of Lord Campbell in 1861, Lord Chancellor. 202 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMFBSTON. Palmerston were, of course, of entirely different minds? on the question of Reform ; the Prime Minister and Mr. Gladstone fell out about the national defences. There was a large section of the Cabinet who regarded the Premier as little better than a Tory in disguise, and another which utterly distrusted his foreign policy. That Lord Palmerston should have held such a body of men together until his death, with considerably less than the average number of resignations, is perhaps the greatest of his feats as a parliamentary manager. And critics who accuse him of degrading political life by shelving important questions and so forth, should remember that daring tactics are impossible when a general is surrounded by a divided staff. The difficulties with which Lord Palmerston had to contend were increased by the confusion that prevailed among the rank and file of both parties. As has occurred very frequently in our political history, the real divisions- did not coincide with the sections into which parties nominally fell ; the gulf between Lord Palmerston and the Conservatives was far narrower than that between Lord Palmerston and the Cobdenites, and as the minis- terial majority was not very large, the defection of the latter was a most dangerous eventuality. Lord Palmer- ston's real strength lay accordingly in the strange fact that while the Radicals were, as several of Mr. Cobden's letters prove, speculating eagerly on his approaching downfall, the Conservatives on the other hand, having had more than enough of office in a minority, were anxious that he should remain in power until they had a chance of coming in on a full tide. If, under the circumstances, Lord Palmerston had actually made overtures for the support of the Opposition against his nominal friends, the step should be blameworthy HOME AFFAIRS. 20S only in the eyes of the mere political hack, who affects to think that his party has the monopoly of the cardinal virtues. But Mr. Ashley distinctly denies that there was any secret understanding — of a permanent nature as we understand him — and that the most that happened was that when Lord Malmeshury gratuitously offered to Lady Palmerston, in the name of Lord Derby, the support of the Conservative party, in the event of the resignations of Lord John Russell on Reform and of Mr. Gladstone on the Paper Duties Bill, for the remainder of the session of 1860, the offer was gratefully accepted. A transaction which, if carried into effect, would have thwarted the wrecking of a Go- vernment to further the desires of individuals, appears^ to be distinctly creditable to both parties concerned. Lord John Russell's advocacy of Reform was less determined than Mr. Gladstone's opposition to the ex- penditure on the defences, and was disposed of by Lord Palmerston by the simple device of letting him have his- way. On the 1st of March 1860, the anniversary of the great measure which he had introduced twenty-nine years before, the Foreign Secretary brought in a Bill of which the effect was to lower the franchise from £10 to £6, and to redistribute twenty-five seats. But he soon found that the country cared little about the Bill, the House still less, and it perished in Committee. Lord Palmerston's speech was, as Mr. Disraeli said, very hap- pily, " not so much in support of, as about " the Reform Bill ; and in his reports to the Queen he made little or no attempt to conceal his satisfaction at its approaching^ demise. In fact, his whole course of action was one of most judicious expediency. Even Lord John Russell was compelled to acknowledge that " the apathy of the country was undeniable, nor was it a transient humour." 204 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. This the Radicals too discovered when they stumped the North of England on the question. If it had been set aside for the moment, the Prime Minister said, in 1862, in answer to Mr. Cobden, it was owing in a great degree to the feeling of the House of Commons ; it was owing in a still greater degree to the general feeling of the constituencies in the country ; and it was most eminently owing to the course pursued in regard to the question by Mr. Cobden himself and Mr. Bright, for there was no denying that the tone which was taken •on the subject by many of those who advocated the ques- tion had the effect of weaning from it those who were formerly most anxious for it. " Why do we not bring in a Reform Bill ?" said Lord Palmerston to Rowcliffe at Tiverton ; " because we are not geese." The truth of the inference is undeniable, and it does not necessarily imply that Lord Palmerston imagined that he had thrust aside Parliamentary Reform for an indefinite period. All that he meant was that the question was not ripe for solution at the moment. The questions at issue between Lord Palmerston and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were less easy of solution. There seems to have been a certain want of personal cordiality between the two men. Lord Shaftes- bury has placed on record the old Premier's saying concerning his ambitious lieutenant, " He has never behaved to me as a colleague." But affairs of State were almost certainly the causa causans of their diffe- rences. Lord Palmerston distrusted the approximation of his colleague to Radicalism. " Gladstone will soon have it all his own way/' he told Lord Shaftesbury, tl and, whenever he gets my place, we shall have strange doings." The Chancellor, on the other hand, natu- rally felt bitterly annoyed at the temporary annihilation HOME AFFAIRS. 205 of most of the good effects of the commercial treaty negotiated by Mr. Cobden and the Emperor, a treaty in which he took the utmost interest, by the deep distrust entertained by the Prime Minister towards the " Sphinx of the Seine " in 1860 and onwards. He had to submit to the temporary abandonment of one of his most popular measures for lightening the burdens upon the people at the bidding of the House of Lords, and for purposes of constructing coast-defences and ironclads. He seems also to have agreed with the Kadicals in stigmatising what Palmerston called a policy of defence as one of defiance. So completely were his views at variance with those of the Prime Minister that Mr. Cobden was of opinion that he ought to have left the Cabinet. The rejection of the Paper Duties Bill by the House of Lords was undoubtedly prompted by patriotic motives, and not, as was systematically stated at the time, bv a bigoted desire to hinder the spread of knowledge among the people. The chief reason for the temporary un- popularity of the Cobden commercial treaty was that it cheapened the necessities of war, coal and iron, for our possible antagonists; and for similar reasons, the opinion prevailed that when war was in sight, the volun- tary abandonment of a source of revenue which brought in over a million and a quarter a year was most inexpe- dient. In fact, their action was dictated entirely by prudential considerations ; and if an important consti- tutional question, whether the Upper House had the right to reject a money-tax, was raised, it was raised only incidentally. Public opinion approved of the conduct of the Upper House, because it held that they had con- sulted wisely for the interests of the moment ; and Lord Palmerston was in thorough concord with the nation, as 206 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. Oreville suspected and Lord Malmesbury knew, though he was compelled [by the necessities of his position to veil his satisfaction under an air of assumed displeasure. His management of the dispute in its later stages was masterly in the extreme. By appointing a committee of the House of Commons to consider the validity of Lord Lyndhurst's contention that the House of Lords had a right to reject, though not to originate or alter money Bills, he gave the angry passions of the Radical party time to cool ; while the purely historical character of the report of the committee served as a useful basis for the judicious resolutions which, while asserting that the House of Lords had acted within their right, upheld the privileges of the Commons in a manner which even Mr. Gladstone acknowledged was " mild and temperate but firm." The more general question of the necessity of spend- ing millions on the fortifications of the coast caused still greater friction in the Cabinet. In 1860, Lord Palmerston wrote to the Queen that " however great the loss to the Government by the retirement of Mr. Glad- stone, it would be better to lose Mr. Gladstone than to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or Plymouth " ; and when the Fortifications Bill was intro- duced, the Chancellor of the Exchequer reserved for bimself the right to take what course he pleased in the following year, a course which the Prime Minister de- scribed to Her Majesty as likely to be one of "ineffec- tual opposition and ultimate acquiescence." And in 1861, Mr. Gladstone, in his Budget speech, commented on the nation's " increased susceptibility to excitement, in our proneness to constant and apparently boundless augmentations of expenditure." He was thus tho- roughly in agreement with Cobden, who, on July 10th, HOME AFFAIRS. 207 1860, wrote an able letter to Lord Palmerston urging the postponement of the fortification scheme, and in 1862 forwarded to the Premier a memorandum in which he suggested that the Governments of England and France should come to an understanding about the •number of ships of war which each of the two countries should maintain. The Prime Minister's counter arguments are to be found in Mr. Ashley's biography, and may be summarised here as far as they deal with the general principles of coast defence. In a letter dated Decem- ber 1859, he pointed out to Mr. Gladstone how liable to invasion England was. One night, he wrote, is enough for the passage to our coast, and twenty thousand men might be landed simultaneously at Ports- mouth, Plymouth, and in Ireland, with the result that our dockyards would be destroyed before twenty thou- sand men could be got together to defend either of them. Or the manoeuvre of the first Napoleon might T^e repeated and a large French fleet with troops on board despatched to the West Indies. Were we then to leave our colonies to their fate, or were we to go in pursuit, leaving our coast bare in case the French doubled back ? In April 1862, in a letter to the same, he denied that England was acting under the influence of panic. Panic there has been none on the part of anybody. There was for a long time an apathetic blindness on the part of the governed and the governors as to the defensive means of the country compared with the offensive means acquired and acquiring by other Powers. The country at last woke up from its lethargy, not, indeed, to rush into extravagance and uncalled-for exertions, but to make up gradu- ally for former omissions, and so far, no doubt, to throw upon a • shorter period of time expenses which earlier foresight might have spread over a greater length of time. The Government, the Parlia- ment, and the nation acted in harmonious concert ; and if any proof were wanting that the nation has been inspired by a deliberate 208 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. and sagacious appreciation of its position "with respect to other Powers, that proof has been afforded by the long-continued and well- sustained sacrifices of time and money which have been made by the 160,000 volunteers, and by those who have contributed to supply them; with requisite funds. To Mr. Oobden's proposal for a mutual limitation of armaments the Prime Minister only sent the most general reply. It would be very delightful [he wrote] if your Utopia could be- realised, and if the nations of the earth would think of nothing but peace and commerce, and would give up quarrelling and fighting alto- gether. But, unfortunately, man is a fighting and quarrelling animal j and that this is human nature is proved by the fact that republics, where the masses govern, are far more quarrelsome and more ad- dicted to fighting than monarchies, which are governed by compara- tively few persons. But so long as other nations are animated by these human passions, a country like England, wealthy, and exposed to attack, must by necessity be provided with the means of defence, and however dear these means may be, they are infinitely cheaper than the war which they tend to keep off. The speech,"* in which Palmerston proposed the raising of nine millions to he spent in fortifying the dockyards, contained a remarkable account of the dangers- to which the country was exposed, which is not without interest at the present moment. Invasion, he said, might be made for three purposes, first, with the hope of conquest, which he thought no foreign country would imagine to be possible ; secondly, to get possession of London, and there levy contributions or dictate an ignominious peace. This kind of attack could only be resisted by an army in the field. London was too vast a space to be surrounded by fortifications, and there were strong natural positions between it and the coast which could be successfully held by a large force. The size of some of the great harbours, Liverpool and New- * July 23rd, 1860. HOME AFFAIRS. 209 castle for instance, made it also extremely difficult to fortify them, but they could be defended by batteries from the only kind of attack to which they were liable ^the attack of small squadrons for purposes of mis- chief and for levying contributions. But the operation which he apprehended was most likely to be attempted, was that of landing a considerable force for the purpose of destroying our dockyards. If your dockyards are destroyed, your navy is cut up by the roots. If any naval action were then to take place, your enemy, whatever the success of it might be, would have his dockyards, arsenals, and stores to refit and replenish and reconstruct his navy; while, with your dockyards burned and your stores destroyed, you would have no means of refitting your navy and sending it out to battle. If ever we lose the command of the sea, what becomes of this country ? Only let hon. gentlemen compare how dependent we are for everything that constitutes national wealth — aye, and a large portion of national food, on free communication by sea. We import about ten million quarters of corn annually, besides enormous quantities of coffee, sugar, and tea and cotton, which is next to corn for the support of the people by enabling them to earn their food. Our wealth depends on the expor- tation of the products of our industry, which we exchange for those things which are necessary for our social position. Our exports amount to considerably more than one hundred millions in value annually. Picture to yourselves for a moment such places as Liver- pool, Bristol, Glasgow, and London, that is to say the Thames, blockaded by a hostile force. The resistance offered by the Prime Minister to thd cry of economy in military and naval expenditure, even when raised by the most important member of hid Cabinet, is assuredly much to his credit. And it should be remembered also that, if he played no active part in the great financial triumphs of his second administration, the Cobden treaty and Mr. Gladstone's budgets, he at any rate sympathised thoroughly with their objects as far as they were purely commercial and did not interfere 14 210 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. with the naval and military strength of England. The budgets alone are enough to absolve the second Paliner- ston Cabinet from the charge of useless inactivity ; but a perusal of the Queen's Speeches at the close of each Session conveys also the impression that the two Houses, without attempting heroic legislation, succeeded in getting through a vast amount of unpretentious but exceedingly useful work — Prisons Bills, Partnership Liability Bills, Crime Chargeability Bills, and so forth. Lord Westbury, one of the greatest of modern Lord Chancellors, made vigorous efforts at law reform, and though the result fell far short of his plans, he at any rate induced the public to take an interest in the techni- calities of land transfer and the registration of title. To the Prime Minister, and also, though in a less degree, to the leader of the Opposition, must be assigned much of the credit for the business-like character of the debates. Though the average of oratorical ability was possibly not very high, the speeches were generally to the point, the discussions were never unduly protracted, and the Sessions, instead of dragging on into Septem- ber, were generally over by the middle of August; and once, in 1865, Parliament rose on the 6th of July. Halcyon were the nights for the most part, and their peacefulness was due to the unfailing tact with which the aged Premier, though not a frequent speaker, restored by his timely interventions a querulous House to a sense of dignity, and an angry House to good humour. If there was comparatively little wool in those days there was also little cry. Another feature that the apologist of Lord Palmers- ton's second Ministry will dwell upon with pleasure is its freedom from jobbery. This we say, notwithstand- ing the scandal that was created by certain peccadilloes HOME AFFAIRS. 211 of Lord Westbury during the last months of its active existence. The various cases of abuse of patronage were certainly proved to the hilt, though no attempt was made to establish a charge of personal corruption against the Lord Chancellor; but the incident did not damage the Government as a whole, and the nation proved by its verdict at the polls, that it fully accepted Lord Palmerston's explanation, that Lord Westbury had been advised to remain at his post in order that the question might be sifted by parliamentary inquiry. As to the propriety of Lord Palmerston's own distribution of patronage, both lay and ecclesiastical, the evidence contained in the numerous official letters reproduced by Mr. Ashley is most conclusive ; he was no nepotist. His recommendations to ecclesiastical appointments were, no doubt, a rock of offence to the High Church party in general and to Bishop Wilberforce in particular ; but the outcry amounted to no more than this — that the " Shaftesbury bishops " were chosen almost entirely from the Evangelical party. Even an undue partiality for one section of the Establishment would have been preferable to choices dictated by political or family interests; but Lord Shaftesbury, in his diary, disposes of the accusation. Altogether the charge was true, he said, of the first bishops; they were decidedly of an Evangelical character, but after Lord Palmerston's junction with the Peelites, that is after 1859, the best men were chosen, no matter to which wing of the Church they professed to belong."* And now for the most serious accusation that has been brought against Lord Palmerston by political * Hodder's Life of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, vol. iii. pp. 196-200. 14 * 212 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. thinkers — that he degraded public opinion. Now this, and similar charges, practically resolve themselves into two : — That Lord Palmerston approached matters of grave importance with levity, and that he deliberately left undone much that he ought to have done. To the former of them candour compels a reluctant assent ; but even that assent need not necessarily be unqualified. For, in the first place, instances of misplaced flippancy, like the remarks at the Napier banquet, are unfortu- nately remembered far more easily, and lend themselves far more readily to quotation by the severe critic than passages of dignified earnestness. It is only just to recollect that outbreaks like the " honourable and re- verend gentleman. " speech were far rarer with Lord Palmerston during his last years, and never so accen- tuated. And if Lord Palmerston failed sometimes to strike a deeply reverberating note, the reason is, perhaps, to be found in the fact that he was always, in his latter days, compelled by the weakness of his eyesight to speak without preparation. But there were occasions on which he rose to a height worthy of his subject. The death of Cavour was one ; and there is a good deal of distinction in some of his speeches at the time of the American war. When we come to the charge that Lord Palmerston was associated with no great distinct policy, it might be sufficient to reply that during his first Ministry he had to deal with the Crimean war and the Mutiny ; during the second he directed vast fiscal reforms, and it was cer- tainly not entirely from motives of self-preservation that, when the Government was attacked by Mr. Disraeli for the mismanagement of the Schleswig-Holstein ques- tion, the old Premier pointed with pride to the finan- cial triumphs of the time as a reason why Parliament HOME AFFAIRS. 213 and the nation might reasonably continue to support him. Besides he was over four-score years of age when he died ; the ideals of his manhood had for the most part been translated into fact, and when a statesman is over seventy he does not readily adopt new programmes. Mr. Cobden reproached Lord Palmerston for not advoca- ting the ballot ; he replied that he did not believe in the ballot, and that he, not Mr. Cobden, had been placed by the nation at the head of affairs. It would [he said] no doubt be not at all right for followers to follow a leader from whom they differed, but it is too much to insist that the leader should follow them wherever they pleased. The hon. member says I have opposed the ballot. I have done so ; and I did it because I unfortunately differ from him in opinion upon that measure. He believes the ballot to be a moral good. I believe it would have an immoral effect. If he can convince me I am wrong, I would be most ready to adopt his views, but until that time comes, sitting here, sent by those whom I represent, to act according to the best of my judg- ment, I must take leave to act upon my own judgment and to oppose a measure which I think would be injurious to the public interests. It is, of course, undeniable that since Lord Palmerston passed away many extensive changes of unquestionable benefit have been effected, and many useful measures added to the statute book. But, without going into questions of the expediency of State interference and considerations of how far it is possible to make a people virtuous by acts of Parliament, it is surely only fair to urge that sufficient unto the day is the legis- lation thereof, and that the English, whose Constitution has been the growth of centuries, are the last nation in the world whom it would profit to be perpetually engaged in paroxysms of law-making. The constituen- cies of 1859 felt that enough had been done for the present in the cause of liberty, that they could linger awhile on the ebb tide of economic improvements. u It is 214 LIFE OF VISCO TJNT PALMERSTON. plain/* the Premier said in 1864, " that there does not exist the same desire for organic charge which was ob- servable some time ago. The fact is that organic changes were introduced more as a means than as an end, the end being great improvement in the whole of our economical legislation. All such changes as have been desirable have long since been effected, as the re- sult of our organic reforms, and therefore there is no such desire now for further innovations." He was per- fectly right ; for the Reform Bills passed since his day- have been " dishing " measures passed by politicians for the discomfiture of their adversaries rather than to satisfy any real popular demand. At the General Elec- tion of 1865 came the first symptoms of the desire for a new advance, and then Lord Palmerston died, happy, perhaps, in the opportunity of his death. The old constituencies were, besides, keenly interested in foreign politics, and sufficiently enlightened to see that what was going on in the East or in the United States was of supreme moment to themselves. In that respect their successors have changed for the worse. And they were right in regarding Palmerston as a safe guardian of the national honour. For, unless the preceding pages have been written wholly in vain, it is almost superflous to say here that he never ceased for a single moment to keep before the nation the great lesson that Empires are kept as they are gained, by courage, self-reliance, and the rejection of morbid self- consciousness. His policy with regard to Ireland was one of simple common sense ; he had no belief that legislation could fight against nature, but he did believe that a firm administration of the law would produce security and so attract capital to the country. In the last great HOME AFFAIRS. 215 speech he ever made, his views were expounded with remarkable clearness. It contained an eloquent tribute to the talents and industry of the Irish peasantry, and it assigned the paramount reason for the continued emi- gration of the Irish to the peculiarities of their climate. You cannot expect [he continued] that any artificial remedies which legislators can invent can reconstruct the laws of nature, and keep in one country a population which finds it to its advantage to emigrate to another. Things will find their level, and until by some means or other there shall be provided in Ireland the same remunera- tion for labour, and the same inducement to remain which are afforded by other countries, you cannot by any laws which you can devise pre- vent the people from seeking elsewhere a better condition of things than exists in their own country. We are told that tenant-right and a great many other things will do it. None of these things will have the slightest effect. As to tenant-right, I may be allowed to say that I think it is equivalent to landlord's wrong. Tenant-right, as I un- derstand it to be proposed, would be little short of confiscation ; and though it might cause the landlords to emigrate, it certainly would not keep the tenants at home. The real question is how can you create in Ireland that demand and reward for labour which would render the people of Ireland willing to remain at home, instead of emigrating to England or Scotland on the one hand, or to the North American States on the other. Nothing can do that except the influence of capital. He was as firmly opposed to the creation of fixity of tenure by statute as was Mr. Gladstone when he intro- duced the Land Act of 1870. With regard to compen- sation for improvements, however, Lord Palmerston's Government in 1860 passed an important Act, by which, in cases where landlord and tenant agreed, compensation could be fixed by a Government valuer, and secured in the form of an annuity on the estate. Thus he believed that legislation could accomplish something for Ireland, though he shrank from banishing political economy to Jupiter and Saturn. His views on the terribly vexed topic of Irish Univer- sity education were equally moderate. Undenomina- 216 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. tional education was the only solution, and he thought that the conferment of degrees might safely be entrusted to the aggregate university body of the Queen's Col- leges. The experience of Maynooth, " a place where young men were brought up to be bigoted in religion, to feel for Protestants theological hatred, and to feel political hatred against England," made him adverse to granting degrees to the Catholic College, even if, as Mr. Glad- stone attempted to contrive in his Irish Education Bill, it formed one of a number of affiliated institutions- But he died before the questions advanced into the political foreground. 217 CHAPTER XIY. FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 1860-1863. Lord Palnierston's distrust of Napoleon — Permanent and Special Reasons — Speech on the Fortifications Bill and Conversation with Count Flahault — The Anglo-French Expedition to China — The American Civil War — England's declaration of neutrality — The Trent and Alabama affairs — The Mexican expedition. Distrust of France and of the Emperor of the French was the distinguishing feature of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy during the last five years of his life. And, though it may seem inconsistent that the Statesman who had heen the pivot of the Anglo-French alliance during the Crimean war, should abruptly part company with his former friend and become his undisguised opponent, the Prime Minister was in reality no more inconsistent than when, at an earlier period of his career, he had thrown over the entente cordiale with Louis Philippe. For with Palmerston the interests of his country were all in all, and he would never have consented to surrender an infinitesimal part of them to further the designs of Louis Napoleon or anyone else. He had trusted the Emperor to the last ; perhaps, during the Italian cam- 218 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. paign beyond the limits of prudence. But his eyes were- opened by the annexation of Nice and Savoy, still more by the " natural frontiers " theory, which was then put forward as the reason for that act of Vandalism, and the additional violation of the arrangements of 1815 com- mitted by Napoleon when he refused to hand over to< Switzerland, Ohablais and Faucigny, the northern dis- tricts of Savoy, which had been declared by the Con- gress of Vienna to share in the neutrality of the Hel- vetic Federation. The " natural frontiers " theory was evidently capable of being put into practice in several directions, practically towards the Rhine, where the re- sistance, thanks to the want of cohesion among the German states, would possibly be feeble in the extreme. The Cabinet was constrained to declare through the mouth of Lord John Russell that upon such an unsettle- ment of the peace of Europe, England would not pur- sue a policy of isolation. Lord Palmerston was no milk-and-water enemy, and his distrust of the Emperor was undoubtedly to some degree exaggerated. Napoleon might have had " a mind like a rabbit-warren," but it did not necessarily follow, from his recent proceedings, that he had intended all along to " avenge Waterloo," and that his design was to beat ■ •' with our aid or with our concurrence or with our neu- trality, first Russia and then Austria, and by dealing with them generously to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us." That was a somewhat unsubstantial specimen of a deductive argument, and Lord Palmerston was in all probability equally under a delusion when he ascribed to the French Emperor the design of instigating Spain to seize Tangiers, and so, by occupying fortified points on each side of the gut of Gibraltar, of \irtually shutting England out of the Medi- FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 21$ terranean. His suspicions were also based upon a slight substratum of fact when he accused Napoleon, who, as mandatory of the Powers, had sent an expedition to put down a bloody and barbarous war of religion be- tween the Druses and Maronites in Syria, of being actuated by the desire of permanently occupying that country. Lord Palmerston seems, in fact, to have hardly appreciated the position of the man of Decem- ber. Napoleon was not ungrateful ; he was fully con- scious, as his letters to the Queen and the Prince Con- sort clearly prove, that he owed nearly everything to England. She had been the first power to give him a status; and without her make- weight, he would never have been able to pose, even for a moment, as the holder of the European balance. If the French alliance was useful to Lord Palmerston, the English alliance was to the Emperor as the breath of his nostrils. At the same time there were both permanent and special reasons for regarding the Emperor of the French as an untrustworthy ally. The permanent reasons were compressed in the contradictions of his position. The elected of a plebiscite, the crowned ex-Carbonaro, was logically bound to assist subjects against the sovereigns, on the other hand, a ruler who claimed to govern by Divine right, was equally bound to uphold the royal y and particularly the Papal, power. He had thus no- firm basis of action ; and, as the author of the coup d'etat r the patentee of a veiled autocracy, he was irresistibly driven to risky adventures abroad, so as to distract the French nation from the spectacle of ministerial cor- ruption and financial mismanagement, in which the Second Empire was rapidly being engulfed. The man of December was, in short, developing into the man of Mexico and Sedan. 220 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. The special reasons were to be found iu the vast naval preparations which were being hurried on in the French ports, and which evidently menaced a maritime power. It was in vain that the Emperor protested that his navy was not sufficient for his wants, and that Mr. Cobden, of course in perfect good faith, attempted to persuade the Cabinet that the alarm was entirely baseless. We know [said Lord Palmerston, on the Fortifications Bill] that the utmost exertions are made and still are making, to create a navy very nearly equal to our own — a navy which cannot be required for purposes of defence for France, and which, therefore, we are justified in looking upon as a possible antagonist we may have to encounter — a navy which, under present arrangements, would provide to our neigh- bours the means of transporting within a very few hours a large and formidable number of troops to our coast. And he made no disguise of the fact that the increased expenditure on our defences was necessitated by the attitude of France. It is impossible for any man to cast his eyes over the face of Europe, and to see and hear what is passing, without being convinced that the future is not free from danger. It is difficult to say where the storm may burst ; but the horizon is charged with clouds which Ijetoken the possibility of a tempest. The Committee, of course, knows that in the main I am speaking of our immediate neighbours across the channel, and there is no use in disguising it. No one has any right to take offence at considerations and reflections which are purely founded upon the principles of self-defence. A few months previously, Lord Palmerston had stated his meaning with even more definiteness in the well- known conversation with old Count Flahault, then French Ambassador in London, as they drove together to the House of Commons. He bluntly told him that it was impossible to trust the Emperor any longer; and that if war was forced upon England, England would fearlessly accept it. " This was very spirited and becoming/' was the ver- dict of Greville in one of the last entries in his journal FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 221 upon an imperfect report of the conversation being transmitted to him by Lord Clarendon. And though it is proverbially difficult to prove a negative, the terms of the Emperor's letter of self-exculpation to Count Per- signy of the 23rd of July 1860 fairly warrant the con- clusion that in this case post hoc and propter hoc were identical, and that war was averted by Lord Palmerston's firm language, backed up by preparations for war. At all events, the relations between the two countries grew considerably less fraught with danger, and the inter- national friendship was almost reconnected before the close of the year by the success of the joint Anglo-French expedition to China, under Sir Hope Grant aud General Montauban, better known as Count Palikao. Pekin was taken, and the ratification of the important Treaty of Tien-tsin, which had been signed by Lord Elgin two years previously, was at length wrung from the Celestial Government. The breach was, however, never completely healed, and it was well that the British Government continued to be on its guard against the dreamer of the Tuileries ; otherwise, we should have been almost inevitably em- broiled in the American Civil war. More than once in the course of that struggle, the Emperor of the French urged our Ministers to recognise the Southern States, but he was always met with a firm but courteous refusal. That refusal was greatly to their credit. There could be no doubt that there was in England a strong cur- rent of feeling in favour of the South, especially among the upper classes. Material interests may be consi- dered to have influenced the commercial stratum of society more than the fact that the Virginians could trace descent from the Cavaliers. The closure of the Southern harbours would cut off the cotton trade, and 222 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. inflict vast losses upon manufacturers, if not, as actually occurred, famine upon their workmen. Mr. Gladstone gave expression to a very prevalent feeling, when, in his famous speech at Manchester, he declared that Mr. Jefferson Davis had made an army, had made a navy, and, more than that, had made a nation. How far Lord Palmerston shared the views of his Chancellor of the Exchequer it is difficult to say with any appoach to certainty. Mr. Ashley tells us that though he admired the American people, the politicians of the United States appeared to him to fail on the score of character ; and he certainly would not have committed himself to remarks ahout the " un- fortunate rapid movements" of the Federal troops at the hattle of Bull's Eun, unless he had anticipated a speedy triumph for the Confederate cause. All the more credit is due to him for having observed a complete neutrality" at the outset of the struggle. A letter to Mr. Ellice establishes beyond all doubt the prudence of his motives. He was all for non-intervention until the " wire edge of the craving appetite for conflict had worn off "; and he pointed out that it was impossible to intervene upon any sound basis, except that of separa- tion, the discussion of which would evidently be prema- ture, or without committing ourselves to an acknow- ledgment of the principle of slavery, and the right to pursue fugitive slaves from State to State. But, it may be said, did not Her Majesty's Government, by the act of proclaiming neutrality, acknowledge the South as a belligerent power, and so virtually play into its hands ? The answer is conclusive and complete. Un- less the South was acknowledged as a belligerent power, there was obviously no war going on. If there was no war, the English Government could not be expected FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 223 to recognise the blockade of the Southern ports. The recognition of the South as a belligerent power was indeed to the advantage of the North, as its advo- cates discovered when, in the crisis .of the English ootton-famine, numerous appeals were made to Mini- sters in the House of Commons to break the blockade, which was paralyzing the energies and stopping the supplies of the Confederate Government. Fortunately, Lord Palmerston and his colleagues stood firm; and sought relief for the deficiency, not in embroiling themselves in their neighbours' quarrel, but in drawing supplies of cotton from other parts of the world. The labyrinths of international law had also to be threaded in the two chief causes of dispute between the English and United States Governments, the Trent and the Alabama affairs. In the first, Earl KusselJ, and, by implication, Lord Palmerston, behaved with the utmost promptitude and spirit. There could be no doubt whatever that Captain Wilkes was entirely in the wrong when he compelled the Trent to lay to, and carried off Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, the Confederate envoys, as prisoners on board the San Jacinto. It was a gross vio- lation of the law of nations, an arbitrary assertion of that right of search which had been abandoned by the United States, and against which, when exercised by Lord Palmerston, for the benefit of kidnapped negroes, they had never ceased to protest. There was, besides, an impression abroad, which the Prime Minister at first shared, that the deed was not the spontaneous act of a hot-headed captain, but that it had been deliberately planned and executed by the United States Government. Under the circumstances Earl Kusseli was amply justi- fied in sending out a demand for an apology and the liberation of the envoys, and in limiting the answer to 224 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. a period of seven days. Nor can any objection be- taken to the tone of his despatch to Lord Lyons, after it had been toned down by the advice of the dying Princa Consort ; even the American Secretary, Mr. Seward, acknowledged it to be " courteous and friendly — not dictatorial or menacing," and his apology was ample* But why send 8,000 or 10,000 troops to Canada, asked Mr. Cobden, after the United States Minister, Mr. Adams, had told the British Government that the act of Captain Wilkes was not sanctioned by the Washing- ton Cabinet. Lord Palmerston's answer was, as usual, the sound one, that peace is best preserved by showing that you are not afraid of war. The American Minister did not tell us that the act of Captain Wilkes was disapproved ; he did not tell us that it would be dis- avowed ; he did not tell us that the insult to the British flag would be atoned for by the surrender of the persons who were taken from the British ship Trent. Therefore, the communication which Mr. Adams made and made with the very best intentions, was not a communica- tion upon which we would have been justified in acting, so far as to forego any measure of precaution which in our opinion was necessary. But everybody recollects the ferment which prevailed in the United States, the language held at public meetings, the honours paid to. Captain Wilkes at the Theatre, the language held in Congress, and also the letter of the Secretary to the Naval Department, approving the conduct of that officer. Then, I say, we were justified in assuming that that difficulty might not terminate in a satisfactory and amicable manner. That being the case, I hold that we should have been ex- tremely blamable if we had not taken the precautions which we adopted. . . . We should only have been misleading the American Government into the supposition that after all we might not really be in earnest. And I do believe that the measures we took were most materially conducive to opening their eyes to the consequences of a refusal, thereby enabling their calm judgment to determine upon the course which it was most for their interest that they should adopt. Lord Lyons, who was not an alarmist, and who had in addition the advantage of being on the spot, was of precisely the same opinion. FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 225 Of course the Trent affair left bitter memories behind it, and their workings are to be seen conspicuously in the controversy about the Alabama and the other privateers which were built for the South in English dockyards, and sometimes manned by British crews. If England had the law on her side in the matter of the Trent, America had no less the principle of equity with her in the case of the Alabama. But this Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell hardly appreciated enough ; and when the frigate started on her destroying career from Bir- kenhead, without the smallest attempt at concealment as to her real character, and in spite of the vigorous protests of Mr. Adams, the Prime Minister based his defence on a textual exposition of the Foreign Enlist- ment Act. You could not, he said, seize a vessel under the act unless you have evidence on oath confirming a just suspicion. That evidence was wanting in this case. The American Minister came to my noble friend the Foreign Secretary, and said, " I tell you this, and I tell you that, I 'm sure of this, and I 'm sure of that " ; but when he was asked to produce evidence on oath, which was the only thing on which we could ground any proceedings, he said that the in- formation was furnished him confidentially, that he could not give testimony on oath, but that we ought nevertheless to act on his asser- tions and suspicions, which he was confident were well founded. What would happen if we were to act in that way ? When a vessel is seized unjustly and without just grounds, there is a process of law to come afterwards, and the Government may be condemned in heavy costs and damages. Why are we to undertake an illegal mea- sure which may have had those consequences, simply to please the agent of a foreign Government ? The position was full of difficulties ; but it was obvious that breaches of neutrality were being committed, and that it was the duty of the English Government to put a stop to them. The Americans retorted that self-preser- vation was the first law of nature ; and, though Mr. 15 226 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. Adams could not effect the detention of the Alabama, he enforced that of two ironclad rams under threat of war. Even if the dispute ended there, the British Government would have come out of it second best ; but, as everyone knows, it dragged on until it was finally settled against England on most points by the Geneva tribunal. Lord Palmerston did not live to see that day ; and as the discussion of " might-have-beens " is invariably sterile, it is not very profitable to speculate at length on which of the alternatives, war or arbitra- tion, he would have elected to adopt. One thing is quite certain, that he would not have submitted for a moment to the monstrous Indirect Claims. The manage- ment of the Alabama affair by the Palmerston Govern- ment was a blunder, but the recognition of the South, to which several of its members were apparently by no means adverse, would have been a worse one, and, on the whole, they may be considered to have come out of an exceedingly trying crisis with a fair amount of credit. It was but natural, as the Prime Minister said, that when we endeavoured to maintain a perfect neutrality between two parties who had quarrelled, we should satisfy neither. At least we had shown by a prompt despatch of troops to Canada, and by the vote for the fortification of Quebec, which was one of the last acts of Lord Palmerston's administration, that we were not to be cowed by any manifestations of spread-eagleism on the part of the American press and people. Though the Ministry were not to be lured into a recog- nition of the Southern States of America to oblige the Emperor of the French, they committed themselves to a participation in the Mexican expedition, the argu- ments for which really, though not ostensibly, rested on the supposition that the South would triumph, and FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 227 in the hour of victory would he glad to strengthen herself by an alliance with the gimcrack Empire which he proposed to erect on the ruins of the Mexican Re- public. In so doing, they undoubtedly embittered their relations with the North, and became entangled in an en- terprise from which they were speedily obliged to beat a retreat. Not that the grievances of England, France, and Spain, the signatories of the Convention of 1861, against the Mexican Republic, were not perfectly genuine. During the anarchy which for years had desolated that unhappy State, English subjects had been exposed to all kinds of outrage, and redress had never been obtained. Agreements which had been made by various presidents to set aside a certain portion of the customs receipts for the satisfaction of foreign bondholders, had never been fully carried out; the house of the British Legation had been robbed of part of the money that was actually paid, and another portion had been carried off while on its way to the coast. At the same time, Lord Palmer- ston's Government were hardly well-advised in pushing matters to an extremity at that particular moment. The prospect of French and Spanish co-operation was perhaps tempting ; but, on the other hand, a war with the North appeared to be imminent over the Trent affair, and the circumstances of Mexico herself ap- peared to counsel delay. For, bad as the government of the Red Indian Juarez was, it was the government of a strong man, and should have been allowed time to make head against its clerical antagonists, instead of being coerced to satisfy wrongs which had been com- mitted for the most part by its predecessors. Besides, there lurked in the minds of two of the signatory Powers a shrewd suspicion that the third was not strictly to be relied upon, and it was found advisable to 15 * 228 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. inBert an article in the Convention by which the three Powers bound themselves not to interfere with the form of government established in Mexico. When it appeared that these suspicions were only too well based, that Napoleon had not only determined to overthrow the Mexican Republic, but actually had his nominee, the unfortunate Archduke Maximilian, in waiting, there was nothing left for the English Government but to withdraw themselves from the Convention, and their small force of 700 marines from the expedition. At least there was no hesitation on the part of the Cabinet, and they extricated themselves from a dangerous enterprise without loss of dignity. 229 CHAPTER XV. POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 1863-1865. The Polish Rebellion — Policy of the Cabinet — The proposed European Congress — The Schleswig-Holstein Question — Motives of the Powers — English advice to Denmark — The Cabinet determines on eutrality — The Conference of London — Lord Palmerston on the state of Europe — The Danish debate — Palmerston's last victory — The General Election of 1865 — Lord Palmerston's last illness and death — Conclusion. From the hour of the withdrawal of the English con- tingent from the Mexican expedition to the last day of his life, Lord Palmerston never laid aside his distrust of the Emperor Napoleon. It became a fixed idea with him, and when opportunities presented themselves for reconstituting the alliance of the Western Powers he deliberately rejected them. Such an opportunity was the Polish rebellion of 1863. The cause of the insur- gents, gallantly maintained against overwhelming num- bers, was extremely popular in England ; it was favoured by statesmen of all shades of opinion, and was the theme of enthusiastic resolutions passed at swollen mass meetings. Food for eloquent periods was espe- cially to be found in the proceedings of the new 230 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. Prussian Minister, Herr von Bismarck, who had turned the occasion to his own ends, and at the same time pre- vented the spread of the rebellion, by proposing to the Russian Chancellor — and the proposal was gladly accepted — that the two Governments should sign a con- vention authorising the troops of each nation to cross their respective frontiers in pursuit of fugitive rebels. This grim method of exterminating the revolt aroused a perfect storm of indignation throughout the country ; and a war for the liberation of Poland would un- doubtedly have been very popular. Nor should we have gone to the battle without allies. France would have plunged enthusiastically into the struggle, for affection for the Poles had been for centuries a national pro- clivity, and her ruler was drawn in the same direction by the double consideration that the reconstruction of Poland was a Napoleonic tradition, and that success on the Vistula would detract attention from the failure imminent in Mexico. As there was no fear of the move- ment extending into Galicia, the Austrian Government would certainly not have departed from a friendly neutrality. Lord Palmerston made no secret of his sympathies with the insurgents. He wrote a letter to Baron Briinnow in which he bluntly told him that he regarded the Polish rebellion as the just punishment inflicted by Heaven on Russia for her numerous attempts to stir up revolution in the Christian Provinces of the Porte. In the House of Commons he was equally outspoken against Prussia. He hoped that the February con- vention would not be carried into execution, " because such an interference of Prussia with what was then passing in Poland would excite, as it had already excited, great condemnation everywhere, and if that POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 231 conventional interference were followed by acts it would cast discredit on the Government of Prussia." But the Prime Minister and his colleagues were determined not to commit themselves to any threat of intervention. They thoroughly distrusted the Emperor of the French, and declined his invitation to address, in concert with Austria, a violent note of remonstrance to the Prussian Government. The Premier, in a letter to the King of the Belgians, described the invitation as a trap. They felt, also, that it was useless to engage in a war of which the object would have been the establishment of Poland as an independent State, when the dissensions among the insurgents proved that the basis for such a State was altogether wanting. Under the circumstances, the diplomatic action of the three Powers was barren of result. Lord Palmerston helped to frame some able despatches the aim of which was to convince Prince Gortschakoff that the promises of a constitution made to the Poles at the Congress of Vienna had never been carried out; Austria took the lead in declaring that Poland was a source of never-ending disquietude to Europe ; and the three Powers agreed upon six sugges- tions of reform which they urged in concert upon the Russian Government. But, unaccompanied by a menace of war, their remonstrances at Berlin and St. Petersburg were not treated with much respect, and signally failed to ameliorate the lot of Poland. Lord Palmerston was quite as adverse to the next adventure of the Emperor of the French, his proposal that the treaties of 1815 should be submitted to a European Congress. It was known that Napoleon had been brooding over the idea for many years, and when it was at last put into shape it certainly contained a certain amount of plausibility. There was justice in 232 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. his contention that most of the arrangements of the treaties of Vienna were destroyed, modified, mis- understood, or menaced. But directly Lord Palmer- ston's keen intellect played round the proposal he saw its absurdity. He pointed out in the House of Com- mons that unanimity was extremely unlikely, and that a single dissentient voice would upset every suggestion before the Congress. In a letter to the King of the Belgians he described the assembling of a Congress as a measure inapplicable to the present state of Europe. With regard to past modifications of the treaties, some,, such as the independence of Belgium, and the creation of the kingdom of Italy, required no sanction ; others, such as the annexation of Cracow by Austria, we should not care to sanction. With regard to the future, an infinite number of squabbles and animosities would arise, especially if possible changes of territory were taken into consideration — for instance, if France were to ask for the Rhine provinces, Austria for Bosnia or Moldo-Wallachia, Spain for Gibraltar. The Congress was, therefore, curtly declined by Earl Russell in the name of our Government, and the Emperor had to digest his mortification as best he could. Thus, while the Northern Powers were united, those of Western Europe were hostile and divided. Bismarck had everything in his favour when he proceeded to tear up the Treaty of London and to force on the solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Viewed by the light of later experience, it is impossible to pronounce that treaty to have been other than a mistake. It was drawn up without sufficient knowledge and precautions ; it attempted to perpetuate a wholly obsolete state of affairs. In the end, the separation of the Duchies from Denmark was a benefit to Europe. But it would be POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 23a unjust to blame Lord Palmerston for not having fore- seen the great things that Bismarck was to accomplish for Germany. There was nothing in the past of the new director of Prussian statesmanship which desig- nated him as a man likely to emancipate his country from the unworthy policy which she had pursued since the Crimean war. Lord Palmerston may be forgiven for not having seen in Bismarck's treatment of the Schleswig-Holstein question any more elevated feeling than a desire to get Kiel as a German harbour, and for being, therefore, determined to maintain the integrity of Denmark at the cost of Prussia. Nor does the fact that he was wrong put the rest of Europe in the right. The treaty had been mainly the work of a Russian diplo- matist, Baron Briinnow; though it had not been signed by the German Federation as a body, several of the States had afterwards acceded to it, and Prussia and Austria had signed as great Powers. He could hardly have foreseen that when the treaty was put to the test, Russia would shrink from her engagements, bought off by the co-operation of Bismarck in the suppression of the Polish rebellion ; that Austria and the German Diet would blindly play into the hands of Prussia, and thereby bring upon themselves ultimate disaster and extinc- tion. If English statesmanship was at a discount during this period, that of Austria and Saxony was so in a double measure ; and it is difficult on any grounds to justify the support given by the German Diet to the Augustenburg candidate for the Duchies, the son of the one agnate who had expressly resigned his rights of succession. Bismarck alone knew what he was about. If the Treaty of London was a mistake^ the English Cabinet at all events tried to carry it out with the utmost good faith. It fully acknowledged the position 234 LIFE OF VISGOVNT PALMERSTON. of Schleswig and Holstein as members of the German Federation; the King of Denmark undertook not to incorporate Schleswig with the rest of his monarchy, and guaranteed to the Duchies the continuance of their autonomy. And the efforts of Earl Russell to prevent the Danes from violating the treaty were unceasing. He protested again and again against the schemes of Frederick VII. for the u Danification " of the Duchies ; he sent a special mission to dissuade him from the famous patent of 1863 by which he incorporated Schles- wig in the kingdom of Denmark. When the German Diet decreed in consequence " federal execution " in Holstein, the British Cabinet made no attempt to pre- vent it, and their offer of mediation was made in a purely friendly spirit. Earl Russell also warned Chris- tian IX. against the consequences of following the evil example of his predecessor ; but his counsellors refused to listen to good advice, and reaped the consequences of their obstinacy. If they had shown moderation, they would have put the German Powers entirely in the wrong, and Denmark would have kept the Duchies, at all events, for the time being. The conduct of the Danes was undoubtedly actuated by a belief that England would draw the sword on their behalf. And at the close of the previous Session they had received a certain amount of countenance from Lord Palmerston, though not enough to justify their foolhardiness. It is impossible [he said, in the House of Commons] for any man who looks at the map of Europe, and who knows the great interest which the Powers of Europe feel in the independence of the Danish monarchy, to shut his eyes to the fact that war begun about a petty quarrel concerning the institutions of Holstein would, in all proba- bility, not end where it began, but might draw after it consequences which all parties who began it would be exceedingly sorry to have POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTMN. 235 caused. . . . We are convinced — I am convinced at least — that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow these rights and interfere [with the independence of Denmark], those who made that attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend. Lord Palmerston, as is well known, afterwards ex- plained that what he had intended to convey was not a threat of intervention, but a prophecy that some Power or other would intervene. The explanation was, of course, plausible; but whatever the meaning of the utterance, it was certainly rather injudicious. Still Count Beust has recently shown that Lord Palmerston was less the cause of their stubborn resistance than Bis- marck, who, to further his own ends, had mendaciously assured the Danes that England had actually threatened Germany with intervention, if hostilities should be opened.* When Lord Palmerston spoke, he reckoned upon Russia and France ; but when the war broke out, he found that Sweden was the only ally upon whom England and Denmark could depend. Russia had been bought off; and Napoleon, piqued by the refusal of England to attend his Congress, declined to stir in the quarrel, though definite overtures were twice made to him. Those overtures would have confined the war to the assistance of Denmark, for Lord Palmerston, even to save the Danes, would not sanction the conquest of the Rhenish Prussia by France, to the peril of Holland and Belgium. After the refusal of Napoleon, Lord Pal- merston came reluctantly to the conclusion that the Danes must be left to their fate. The truth is ("he wrote to Earl Russell on February 13th, 1864] that to enter into a military conflict with all Germany on continental ground would be a serious undertaking. If Sweden and Denmark * Count Beusfs Memoirs, vol. i., pp. 241-42. 236 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. were actively co-operating with us, our twenty thousand men oughV to do a good deal ; but Austria and Prussia would bring two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand into the field, and would be joined by the smaller German States. The position was somewhat humiliating, but as there had been no pledge that we should come to the assist- ance of the Danes alone, there had been no breach of faith. And what diplomatic influence England could exer- cise in favour of the Danes, she exercised without stint. By his persona] authority with the Austrian ambassador,. Lord Palmerston prevented the Austrian fleet from entering the Baltic and bombarding Copenhagen. At the Conference of London, Lord Clarendon nearly saved the situation by his proposal that Denmark should cede Holstein and the German part of Schleswig. The terms were better than the Danes ultimately obtained, and they were accepted by the German plenipotentiaries. But statesmanship at Copenhagen was unable to recog- nise accomplished facts, and from first to last the efforts of English diplomacy on behalf of the Danes were doomed to futility. It was least with no petulant quos ego that Lord Palmerston accepted the defeat of his policy. Writing to Earl Russell the following year he dealt with the fate which was to be hoped for the Duchies, and at the same time indulged in one of the most remarkable political forecasts that has ever been penned. It was better, he considered, that Schleswig-Holstein should be absorbed into Prussia, than be formed into a petty German State* Prussia is too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent in her action, and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Ger- many, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and aggressive Powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and east. As to France, we know how restless and aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium, for the- POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 237 Hhine, for anything which she would be likely to get without too great an exertion. As to Russia, she will, in due time, become a Power almost as great as the old Roman empire. She can become mistress of all Asia, except British India, whenever she chooses to take it ; and when enlightened arrangements have made her revenue proportioned to her territory, and railways have abridged distances, her command of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means gigantic, and her power of transporting armies over great distances most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian aggression, and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength. This letter has not inaptly been called Lord Palmer- ston's legacy to the nation. The failure of the ministerial policy as a whole had been undeniable. It abounded in miscalculations and misapprehensions. Herr von Bismarck had been under- valued, the possibility of foreign co-operation had been too confidently anticipated, and the interests at stake had been misunderstood. Lord Palmerston did not dis- cover that it would, on the whole, have been to the advantage of Denmark to be quit of a population which had long been discontented and difficult to govern, until after the failure of the Conference. The Opposition naturally seized the opportunity to challenge the pro- ceedings of the Government. As at the time of the Don Pacifico affair, they were successful in the House of Lords, but suffered defeat in the House of Commons, through the skill and resource of Lord Palmerston. The victory was won by sheer generalship. Mr. Disraeli's attack was extremely telling, and ministers found it advisable to escape his condemnatory resolution by ac- cepting a colourless amendment moved by Mr. King- lake. The manoeuvre was transparent, but is was entirely successful. In support of the amendment the old Prime Minister made a remarkable speech, wind- ing up the debate in the early morning of the 9th of 238 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON. July. As usual, he spoke without the aid of a single note, and with the evident aim to be clear and convin- cing rather than brilliant and antithetical. It is not altogether correct to say that he dropped the questions immediately connected with the vote of censure almost immediately, that would have been an affront to the intelligence of the House, which so accomplished a master of Parliaments would be the last man to commit. As a matter of fact, more than half his speech dealt with the Danish question, and he made out a case which, if not altogether convincing, was dis- tinctly reasonable. And then he proceeded to the main point of his speech. Why had not the Opposition proposed a direct vote of want of confidence ? In that case he would have been able to show that during the five years during which his Government had been honoured with the confidence of the House and had carried on the Government, the country had continued in an unexampled state of prosperity. In a telling sum- mary he proceeded to take the Kadicals captive by show- ing that on general, and especially on financial grounds, he and his colleagues had deserved well of their country. The Opposition cried " Question," but, as Mr. Ashley points out, the arguments had a good deal of bearing on the main question — the division. It is pathetic to notice that Lord Palmerston in conclusion made use once more of the argument which he had in- troduced with such telling effect in the Don Pacifico speech : — I quite admit that hon. gentlemen opposite are perfectly entitled to make a great struggle for power. It is an honourable struggle, and I make it no matter of reproach. They are a great party, comprising a great number of men of ability and influence in the country, and they are perfectly entitled when they think the prize is within thoir POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 239 reach, to make an attack on those who hold it. But, on the other hand, I say that we have not done anything to deserve that the priz» shall be taken from us. The Government escaped defeat by a majority of eighteen, and Lord Palmerston was secure for the brief remainder of his life. After the following session, which was for the most part uneventful, Parliament, having peacefully lived out its time, was dissolved on July 6th, 1865. At the General Election which followed, Lord Palmerston, whose popularity with the nation had become almost an article of faith, was once more re- turned for Tiverton, and secured a further lease of power for the Liberal party, though with a considerable increase of the Radical wing. But the veteran states- man was not destined to lead the party in another Parliament. He had nearly completed his eighty-first year, and had been a member of every administration, except those of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Derby, since 1807. Already his iron frame had begun to show signs of giving way. He had been very ill at the time of the death of the Prince Consort, and his illness was certainly increased by his overpowering anxiety and grief. But he spent the whole of his eightieth birth- day on horseback ; and earlier in the year he rode from Cambridge House to Harrow, trotting the dis- tance, nearly twelve miles, within the hour. During the Session of 1865, however, he showed signs of feebleness, keeping to his post with great difficulty, and, after the General Election, he retired to Brocket, in Hertfordshire, a place which Lady Palmerston had inherited from Lord Melbourne. There the gout be- came very serious, and he made it worse by going out for a ride before he had fairly recovered from an attack. Finally, a chill brought on inflammation ; and, though 240 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. on October the 17th he rallied wonderfully, in the night his case became hopeless, and shortly before eleven in the morning of the 18th he died. An interesting account of his last moments is to be found in the life of Lord Shaftesbury, and the description of the great philanthropist praying over the great statesman is one that, once read, is not easily forgotten. Lord Palmerston was buried in Westminster Abbey, and four years later Lady Palmerston was laid by his side. His funeral took place on October 27th, amidst a manifestation of popular sympathy, which showed how strong were the ties which bound the nation to its aged counsellor. As the coffin sank into the grave, a dark storm broke over the Abbey, until, as the service drew to its close, the sun appeared once more. His tomb is in the North Transept, that quarter which pious cus- tom has reserved for England's statesmen, near the last resting-places of the great men who before him upheld the honour of England in days of doubt and despair — the noble Chatham, and his nobler son, and Canning, and the much-misunderstood Castlereagh. Near it stands his fine statue by Jackson, confronted by that of Canning ; like a pair of sentinels, ever at their post, and ever on the watch. INDEX. A. Abd-el-Medjid, 70. 164. Aberdeen, Lord, 24, 42; foreign Minister, 83-95 ; and the Spanish marriages, 96-98 ; Premier, 145-160. Afghan War, the, 67, 68. Alabama affair, the, 225-226. Albert, Prince, differences of opinion with Palmerston, 130 ; memorandum of, 156 ; death of, 239. Althorp, Lord, 4, 32. Arrow affair, 184. Ashbnrton, Lord, 91. Austria, relations with, 38, 58, 73 ; and Cracow, 66, 108 ; and Switzerland, 113-116 ; and Italy, 117-119, 121-124; and Hungary, 126 ; and the Eastern question, 154, 164, 169-170, 173 ; and Italy. 180-198 ; and Poland, 230-231; and Den- mark, 233 ; Palmerston on, 237. B. Ballot, the, 213. Belgium, Independence of, 41-51 ; in 1848, 119 ; offer of assistance by, 187. Bentinck, Lord G., on Portugal, 113. Beust, Count, 36, 236. Bismarck, 230, 233, 235. Bolgrad, 177, 178. " Bomba," see Naples. Brazil, 41. Bright, Mr., attacked by Pal- merston, 157, 166; defeated, 186. Brougham, Lord, on Lord Pal- merston, 165 ; and Lady Pal- merston, 188. Briinnow, Baron, 71, 130, 172, 176. Bulwer, SirH. (LordDalling), 63, 72, 74, 76; at Madrid, 100- 106 ; dismissed from Spain, 119 ; at the Porte, 180. Buol, Count, 169, 170. Burnes, Sir A., 67. c. Cambridge University contested by Palmerston, 6, 7, 20, 33. Canning, George, 8, 22, 23 ; Pal- merston on, 32. Carlo Alberto of Sardinia, 117, 121-123; defeated at Novara, 123. Carlos, Don, 56-62. 16 242 INDEX. Cavour, Count, and Palmerston, 190-193 ; and Lord Clarendon, 192 ; at Plombieres, 193 ; di- plomacy of, 195-199 ; death of, 199. China, war with, 83-87 ; second war with, 184-186; Anglo- French expedition to, 221. Christina, Queen Regent of Spain, 56, 58, and the Spanish mar- riages, 96-106. Clarendon, Lord, 33, 73 ; becomes Foreign Secretary, 152-153 ; again Foreign Secretary, 165- 166 ; at the Congress of Paris, 172-174 ; and the United States, 176 ; and the Treaty of Paris, 177-179 ; and Walewski's despatch, 188 ; and Italy, 192- 193 ; out of office, 201 ; and Denmark, 236. Cobden. Mr. , and the Militia Bill, 142 ; Palmerston on, 166 ; and China, 185 ; defeat of, 186; re- fuses office, 201 ; on Palmer- ston, 202 ; and Reform, 204 ; on Mr. Gladstone, 205 ; and the defences, 207 ; treaty of, 209. Conspiracy to Murder Bill, 187- 188. Cowley, Lord, 172, 180, 197. Cracow occupied by Austria, 66 ; annexation of, 108, 232. Crimean Expedition, the, 159, 164. Croker, J. W., and the New Whig Guide, 13 ; on Palmerston, 26 ; interview with Palmerston, 31. D. Danubian Principalities, 151, 156, 173, 178-179. Denmark, the succession ques- tion, 130-131 ; and Schleswig- Holstein, 232-237. Derby, Lord (Lord Stanley), motion on Portugal, 113 ; on Greece, 135 ; great ministry of, 143-44 ; attempts to form a ministry, 162 ; on the treaty of Paris, 172 ; second ministry of, 188, 189. Disraeli, Mr., 175, 190. Drouyn de Lhuys, recall of, 132- 34 ; at Vienna, 170. Dudley, Lord, 24, 25. E. Egypt and the Powers, 64-79;: Palmerston on, 176. Ellice, Mr., 73, 222. F. Ferdinand, the Emperor, abdica- tion of, 126. France, relations with, 37, 40; and Belgium, 43-49 ; and Por- tugal, 55, 57 ; coolness towards England, 59-62 ; and the Syrian question, 70-79 ; and Tahiti, 93 ; and the Spanish marriages, 96-106 ; subsequent results, 107; Revolution of 1848, 119; Second Empire, 140 ; and the Eastern Question, 150, 154 ; and Italy, 193-198; relations with England, 217-221, 226, 229-236. Flahault, Count, 220. Fortifications Bill, 208-209. INDEX. 243 G. Garibaldi, 198. Gerard, Marshal, 47, 49. Gibson, Mr. Milner, 186, 190. Gladstone, Mr., letter of Palmer- ston to, 40 ; refuses to join the Conservatives, 162 ; resigns office. 163 ; in favour of peace, 167 ; and Italy, 125, 190, 201 ; and the defences, 204-209. Gortschakoff, Prince, at Vienna, 169, 170, 173; chicanery of, 177-178 ; and Naples, 183 ; and Poland, 230-231; and Den- mark, 233. Graham, Sir James, on China, 84 ; and Reform, 148 ; at the Napier banquet, 157 ; death of, 201. Granville, Lord, 34, 45. 59, 73, 78. Granville, Lord (son of above), Foreign Secretary, 143 ; at- tempts to form a ministry, 194. Greece, Palmerston on, 24, 27 ; Otho becomes king of, 53; coercion of, 131-137. Greville, Mr., 34, 75. 81, 82, 92, 102, 106, 124, 140, 161, 172, 188, 189. Grey, Earl, 30 ; Premier, 32. Guizot, 77, 78 ; and Aberdeen, 92-93 ; and the Spanish mar- riages, 96-106; fall of. 119- 120. H. Haynau affair, the, 139. Herat attacked by Persia, 66, 184. Herbert, Mr. S., 152, 162, 163, 190. Herries, Mr., 22, 23. Holland, Lord, 33, 73, 74 ; death of, 75. Horsham, Palmerston elected at, 7. Hume, Joseph, 12, 113. Hungary, revolution in (1848), 126 ; refugee question, 127 ; and Italy, 193. Huskisson, Mr., 23, 25, 31. I. Ireland, Palmerston and, 214- 216. Italy, Austrian rule in, 117 ; at- tempted reforms in, 118-119 revolution of 1848, 121-124 Sardinian contingent, 172, 191 Palmerston and, 190-199. Isabella, Queen of Spain, 56 ; her marriage, 106 : dismisses Sir H. Bulwer, 119. K. Kars, 164, 172, 173, 177. Kinglake, Mr., 149, 237. Kossuth, 126 ; his visit to Eng- land, 139 ; his mission, 193. L. Lamartine, 120-121, 123. Lansdowne, Lord, 6, 30 ; pro- 244 INDEX. posed as Leader of the Libe- rals, 145 ; attempts to form a Ministry, 162 ; in the Cabinet, 165. Leopold I. of Belgium, 46, 48, 51, 231. Lewis', Sir G. C, 165, 188. Lieven, Madame de, 14, 102. Liverpool, Lord, Premiership of, 9, 19, 21. Lombardy, see Italy. London, Convention of (1841), 79; treaty of (1852), 131, 233. Louis Philippe, 43, 44, 47, 59-62, 75, 78 ; and the Spanish mar- riages, 96-106 ; fall of, 119. Militia Bill, the, 143-144. Minto mission, the, 118. Mutiny, the, 186. M. McLeod affair, the, 88-90. Mahmoud, 64, 65, 70. Malmesbury, Lord, 7, 9, 11. Malmesbury, Lord (grandson of above) on the coup oVe'tat, 140 ; on the Czar, 141 ; and Italy, 190 ; interview with Lady Pal- merston, 203. Maria, Donna, 27-28, 29, 56 ; her marriage, 110. Mehemet Ali, 64, 70, 76-77, 79. Melbourne, Lord, 24, 25, 30, 33, 35, 59, 67 ; and Palmerston, 74- 75; resigns office, 79. Menschikoff mission, the, 150. Metternich, Prince, 37, 38-39 ; on Spain, 58 ; on the Quadruple Treaty, 73 ; on the Spanish marriages, 105 ; and Cracow, 109; and Switzerland, 113- 116 ; and Italy, 117-119 ; fall of, 119. Mexican expedition, the, 227. Miguel, Dom, 27-28, 54-58, 111, 112. N. Napier, Sir C, 55, 77 ; banquet to, 157. Naples, coercion of, 82 ; and the Sicilian rebellion, 118, 125; coercion of, 183 ; conquest of, 198. Napoleon III. , coup oVetat of, 140 ; and the Holy Places, 150 ; and the Eastern question, 164, 171, 172; visit to England, 179; and Egypt, 179 ; relations with England, 182-183; attempt to murder, 187; and Italy, 193- 199; and Savoy, 197, 218; schemes of, 218-221 ; and Po- land, 231 ; proposed Congress of, 231 ; and Denmark, 235. Nesselrode, Count, 53, 153. New Whig Guide, 13. Newtown, Palmerston elected at, 7. Nicholas, Czar of Russia, 65, 66, 71 ; visit to England, 151, 152. Normanby, Lord, 107, 109, 120. Pacifico affair, 132-137. Palmerston, second Viscount, 2-4 ; death of, 6. INDEX. 245 Palmerston, Lady (Mary ,Mee), 2, 4 ; death of, 6. Palmerston, Henry John, third Viscount, birth, 2; education, 4-6; enters Parliament, 7; Lord of the Admiralty, 7; maiden speech, 8 ; Secretary at War, 9-12, 21-25; character, 12-19 ; visits to France, 21 ; attempt on, 21 ; in opposition, 25-31 ; Foreign Secretary, 32- 79 ; his marriage, 80 ; ^"oppo- sition, 82-95; visit to Paris, 95; again Foreign Secretary, 96-139; dismissed from office, 1 40 ; Home Secretary, 146-160 ; temporary resignation, 149- 150; first Ministry, 162-188; receives the Garter, 174 ; visit to Compiegne, 193 ; second Ministry, 200-239 ; last illness and death, 239-240; funeral, 240. Palmerston, Ladv(Ladv Cowper), 79-81, 188, 203; "death of, 240. Paper Duties Bill, 203, 205. Paris, Congress of, 172-174; treaty of, 176-179 ; Cavour at, 191-193. Pedro, Dom, 27-28, 54-58. Peel. Sir R., 4, 51; Premier, 83-95; on Portugal, 113; death of, 138. Persian war, 183-184. Persigny, Count, 182, 194. Pio Nono, 117, 122, 124. Poland, rebellion of (1830), 53- 54; rebellion of (1863), 229- 231. Portugal, Palmerston on, 26-30 ; English intervention in, 54-58 ; further intervention, 110-113. Presbytery of Edinburgh, Pal- merston's answer to, 147-148. Prussia, Palmerston's views on, 130 ; and the Eastern question, 154, 164; and Poland, 229- 231; and Denmark. 232-236; Palmerston on, 237. Q. Quadrilateral Ti-eaty, the, 72, Quadruple Treaty, the, 57. R. Radetzky, Marshal, 122, 123. Raglan, Lord, 158, 167. Roebuck, Mr., resolution on the Pacifico affair, 134; motion of inquiry, 159, 164. Russell, Lord John (Earl), 74; attempts to form a ministry, 94 ; Premier, 95 ; quarrel with Palmerston, 140-142; Reform Bill of, 148-150; proposed Palmerston for Secretary at War, 158 ; attempts to form a ministry, 162 ; resigns office, 159 ; at Vienna, 163, 168-170 ; resigns office, 170 ; reconcilia- tion with Palmerston, 190; and Italy, 190, 194-198 ; on Reform ; 203-204 ; Foreign Secretary, 217-238. Russia, relations with, 40, 53; and Turkey, 65 ; and England, 66, 70-79; and the Holy Places, 150 ; diplomacy of, 150-156, 168-174 ; and Poland, 229-231; and Denmark, 133, 233 ; Palmerston on, 237. 246 INDEX. S. Saldanha, Count, 110-112. Sardinia and Savoy. See Italy. Schleswig-Holstein. See Den- mark. Schwarzenburg, Prince, 126- 128. Sebastiani, Count, 45-47. Serpents Island, 177, 178. Shaftesbury, Lord (Lord Ashley), 18, 19, 80, 94, 143, 147, 240 ; his bishops, 211. Sicily, revolution in, 118, 125 ; freed by Garibaldi, 198. Sinope, Turkish fleet destroyed at, 156. Slave-trade, the, 39, 41, 90-91, 93, 184. Soult, Marshal, 71, 72, 77. Spain, English intervention in, 56-62 ; Spanish Legion, 60- 62 ; Spanish marriages, 96- 106 ; rupture with, 119. Stockmar. Baron, 87, 110, 142. Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 127, 150, 154. Suez Canal, 180-182. Switzerland, revolution in, 113- 116 ; and Prussia, 182. Syrian question, the, 64-79 ; reli- gious war in, 219. T. Talleyrand, Prince, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 59. Temple, Sir William, 2, 57, 58. Temples, the, 1, 2. Thiers, 72, 76, 77. Tiverton, Palmerston elected at 33 ; speeches at, 144, 204 election at (1865), 239. Trent affair, the 223-224. . Turkey, Palmerston on, 27, 63 ; . and Syria, 64-79 ; Menschikoffs mission to, 151 ; declaration of war by, 155 ; conditions of peace with, 170, 176-178. u. United States, disputes with, 87"-r 92, 95, 175-176 ; civil war in, 221-227. Unkiar Skelessi, treaty of, 65.. Urquhart, Mr., 37, 75. V. Venetia. See Italy. Victor Emanuel, visits England, 191. Victoria, Queen, and Palmerston, 94: on the Spanish marriages, 102 ; her Memorandum, 138 ; letters of Palmerston to, 170, 171 : gives Palmerston the Gar- ter, 174; and Italy, 196; letters of Palmerston to, 206. INDEX. 247 Vienna Conference, the first, 154 ; the second, 168-170. Villafranca, treaty of, 195-196. w. Walewski, Count, and the coup d'etat, 140; and Kussia, 177, 182 : and the Orsini affair, 187. Webster, Daniel, 89-91. Wellington, Duke of, premiership of, 23-31 ; on Portugal, 56 ; on the Chinese War, 86 ; on the Spanish marriages, 106. Westbury, Lord, 210, 211. Willis's Rooms meeting, 190. Wylde, Colonel, mission of, 112- 113. z. Zurich, treaty of, 196. LOKDON : PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE. Cfttftirtn'0 ani