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VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
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PALMERSTON.
STATESMEN SERIES.
I
LIFE OF
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
BY
LLOYD C. SANDERS
»>
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VOLS. ALEE AD Y ISSUED.
The Rt. Hon. W. E. GLADSTONE.
By Mr. H. W. Lucy. Ready.
PRINCE BISMARCK.
By Charles Lowe, M.A. Ready.
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By Col. G. B. Malleson, C.S.I. Ready.
:-• :"' 76
oS
• ••
PREFATORY NOTE.
The chief authority for Lord Palmerston's life is the
biography of which the first three volumes were written
by Lord Dalling — better known, perhaps, as Sir Henry
Bulwer — and the fourth and fifth by Mr. Evelyn Ashley
(1870-76). A condensed, and in many respects im-
proved, edition of the whole was published by Mr.
Ashley in 1879. It is a mine of information to the
student of political history, and we may hope that
the value of the concluding chapters may one day be
increased by the publication of that fuller documentary
evidence which has hitherto been apparently withheld
from the necessity of keeping secrets of State. A small
biography of Lord Palmerston was published by An-
thony Trollope in 1881, but it contains little that is
not to be found in Mr. Ashley's volumes.
Apart from this main source of knowledge, there is a
very large quantity of matter illustrative of Lord Pal-
merston's private and public life. Lady Enfield tells
us something about his youth in her Life and Letters of
the First Earl of Minto ; and much that is of interest,
vi PREFATORY NOTE.
about his personal character especially, is to be found in
Sir Henry Holland's Recollections, Abraham Hayward's
Letters, and his article in Eraser's Magazine, vol. xviii.,
and the Life of Lord Shaftesbury by Mr. Hodder.
For an account of his career as a Tory statesman we have
his own short autobiography, published as an appendix
to the first volume of Lord Dalling's Life, which has
been proved to be inaccurate on various points by Mr.
E. Hemes, in his Memoir of the Right Hon. J. C.
Herries; and incidental notices in Plumer Ward's
Memoirs, Lord Colchester's Diary, also in the Croker
Papers, which continue to illustrate his official life
down to 1855. j With the formation of the Grey
ministry commences the severe criticism of Greville,
and with the beginning of the present reign the hardly
less hostile comments of Sir Theodore Martin ; still
the evidence of both of these writers cannot be neg-
lected by anyone who wishes to form a fair judgment of
Lord Palmerston's merits. Scattered notices of his
foreign policy during the Grey, Melbourne, and Russell
ministries are to be found in the third volume of Lord
Brougham's Life and Times, Earl Russell's Reminis-
cences and Suggestions, the Life of Lord Melbourne
by Mr. McCullagh Torrens, and Raikes's Journal',
while towards the close of this period, Lord Malmes-
bury's Memoirs of an Ex-Minister and Mr. Morley's
Life of Cobden begin to be valuable sources of fact.
The continental view of his policy is to be found parti-
cularly in the Memoirs of Prince Metternich and Baron
Stockmar, the Life of Count Saldanha, and in Guizot's
PREFATORY NOTE. vii
Memoires and L'Histoire de Dix Ans, besides works
like Theodore Juste's Memoirs of Leopold I., the his-
tories of the Revolution of 1848 by Lamartine
and Gamier Pages, and Mr. Spencer Walpole's admir-
able History of England, which includes also the
Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. On the crisis of
1845 much valuable information is to be found in an
article by A in the Historical Review ; and the Spanish
marriage intrigue is to be traced at length in the corre-
spondence between Louis Philippe and Guizot, pub-
lished by Taschereau in the Revue Retrospective in
1848. Mr. Kinglake's views on Lord Palmerston's
conduct as a member of the Aberdeen Cabinet may be
compared with advantage with those set forth in the
Quarterly Review of April 1877. During Lord Pal-
merston's first premiership and onwards, Lord Malmes-
bury and Mr. Morley continue to be instructive critics,
and they are reinforced by Bishop Wilberforce, and Mr.
Walter Bagehot in his sketch of The English Constitu-
tion. An excellent precis of English foreign policy
from 1859 to 1865 is given by Lord Russell in the
preface to the second part of his Selected Speeches and
Despatches. On Lord Palmerston's later Italian policy
abundant information may be found in Bianchi's Storia
Document ata delta Diplomazia Europea in Italia, in
Mazade's Vie de Cavour, Cavour's Letters and
Despatches, notably the private letters to Azeglio pub-
lished by Bianchi under the title of La Politique du
Comte Camille de Cavour. Not much original informa-
tion, as far as Lord Palmerston is concerned, is to be
viii PREFATORY NOTE.
found in Blanchard Jerrold's Life of Napoleon III.,
but his attitude towards German politics generally, and
the Schleswig-Holstein question in particular, are abun-
dantly illustrated in Count Beust's Memoirs, Count
Vitzthum's St. Petersburg and London, which contains
many personal reminiscences of Lord Palmerston, and
Busch's Our Chancellor (Eng. trans., 1884).
L. C. S.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
LORD PALMERSTON AND TORYISM.
1807-1830.
The Temples — Lord Palmerston' s father and mother — At Harrow.
Edinburgh, and Cambridge — Attempts to get into Parliament — A
Lord of the Admiralty — Maiden Speech — Secretary at War — The
Nexc Whig Guide — Palmerston in Society — His habits, tastes,
and disposition — Development of his political views — Attempt to
eject him from Cambridge — In the Canning, Goderich, and Wel-
lington Cabinets — He resigns office — The Portuguese speech — Its
faults and merits — Final breach with the Tory party . . p. 1
CHAPTER II.
BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE.
1830-1833.
Palmerston and home politics — At the Foreign Office — Activity of
his policy — Its general features — Objections to it — The Belgian
Revolution — Meeting of the London Conference — The Eighteen
Articles — Possibility of a war with France — Leopold of Saxe-
Coburg becomes King of the Belgians — Modification of the
Eighteen Articles — The Dutch declare war and the French enter
Belgium — Firmness of Lord Palmerston — The Twenty-four
Articles — Anglo-French expedition — Feeling in England — Sta-
bility of Belgium . . . . . . . p. 32
CHAPTER ILL
THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.
1830-1838.
Affairs in Greece, Italy, Germany, and Poland — Tyranny of Dom
Miguel in Portugal — Satisfaction obtained by England and France
— Dom Pedro's descent on Portugal — He is aided by English Vo-
lunteers — Death of Ferdinand of Spain — Combination of the two
Pretenders — The Quadruple Treaty — Its immediate success —
Coolness between England and France — Its effect on Spanish
politics — The Spanish Legion — End of the Carlist war . p. 52
b
x CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IV.
THE QUADRILATERAL ALLIANCE.
1831-1841.
Lord Palmerston and the Porte — Ibrahim Pasha's adrance on Cbn-<
stantinople — Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi — Anti-Russian policy of
Lord Palmerston — The first Afghan war — Burnea's despatches —
Collapse of the Turkish Empire — Divergence of views between
England and France — The Quadrilateral Alliance — Lord Palmer-
ston's difficulties — His bold course of action — His estimate of the
situation — Louis Philippe gives way — The fall of Acre — Lord
Palmerston's treatment of Guizot — Settlement of the Syrian
question — Lord Palmerston's marriage . . . . p. 68
CHAPTER V.
ABERDEEN AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.
1841-1846.
Lord Palmerston and the Smaller Powers — Lord Aberdeen — The
Chinese War — Policy of the Government — Treaty of. 1842— Dis-
putes with the United States — The Boundary Question — The
Greely and McLeod affairs — Right of Search — The Ashburtom
Mission — Lord Aberdeen and Prance — Palmerston and Home
Affairs — The crisis of 1845 — His visit to Paris . . p. 82
CHAPTER VI.
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES.
1846.
Earlier stages of the negotiations — Louis Phillippe's first condition —
The agreement of Eu — The Coburg candidate — Guizot's change
of attitude — Lord Palmerston's despatch— Its results— Announce-
ment of the marriages — Palmerston's efforts to postpone them
p. 96
CHAPTER VII.
/ YEARS OF REVOLUTION.
V 1846-1849.
Results of the Spanish marriages — The annexation of Cracow — Civil
war in Portugal — Lord Palmerston's policy — Termination of the
struggle — The Swiss Sonderbund — Lord Palmerston's despatch
— Settlement of the dispute — Constitutionalism in Italy — The
Minto Mission — The fall of Louis Philippe — The Spanish de-
spatch — Lord Palmerston and the Provisional Government at
Paris — Change in his Italian policy — His attitude towards the
Sardinian Government — Suppression of the Revolution — Palmer-
ston and Naples — His advice to Austria — The Hungarian
refugees . . • p. 107
CONTENTS. xi
CHAPTER VIII.
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT.
1849-1852.
Independence of Lord Palmerston — Differences of opinion with the
Conrt — The Danish succession question — The Pacifico affair —
Breadown of negotiations — Indignation of France — Chris Roma-
nus num. — Effect of the speech — The Queen's Memorandum — The
Haynau and Kossuth incidents — The coup d'etat — Dismissal
of Palmerston — Constitutional side of the question — The Militia
Bill— The first Derby Ministry p. 129
CHAPTER IX.
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY.
1852-1855.
Lord Palmerston at the Home Office — Legislation and Deputations —
The Reform Bill — Temporary Resignation of Palmerston — Be-
ginnings of the Eastern Question — The Menschikoff mission —
Lord Palmerston's policy — His popularity with the nation — The
Vienna note — The Concert of the Powers — Palmerston's descrip-
tion of the objects at issue — Declaration of war by Turkey — The
Sinope disaster — Beginning of the war — The Napier banquet
and its consequences — Proposal to make Palmerston Secretary at
War — The Crimean expedition — Fall of the Ministry . p. 146
CHAPTER X.
THE CONCLUSION OP THE RUSSIAN WAR.
1855-1856.
Attempts to form a Ministry — Lord Palmerston accepts the task —
His difficulties — Darkness of the prospect — Harmony of the Cabi-
net — Lord Palmerston's tactics — The second Vienna Conference —
The Austrian compromise — Conclusion of the war — The Congress
of Paris — The Treaty — Lord Palmerston receives the Garter
p. 161
CHAPTER XI.
WARS AND RUMOURS OP WARS.
1856-1839.
Monotony of Home Affairs — Dispute with the United States — Russian
chicanery — The Danubian Principalities — Egypt and the Suez
Canal — Palmerston and Persigny — The Persian War — The
"Arrow" Affair — The Dissolution and General Election — The
Indian Mutiny— The Conspiracy to Murder Bill — Defeat of the
Government ........ p. 175
ar
un detour.* But Guizot denied emphatically that there
* Gnizot's expression to M. Bresson, the French Minister at
Madrid.
98 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
was any hidden end in view ; and on the occasion of the
Queen's visit to Louis Philippe at Eu in September of
that year, he voluntarily promised Aberdeen that " the
Montpensier match should not be proceeded with until
it was no longer a political question, which would be
when the Queen was married and had children/'
How far Louis Philippe and his Minister would
have kept faith with Aberdeen if the eligible Bour-
bon had been forthcoming for Isabella, it is unneces-
sary to enquire. At the same time, it is only just
to say that they gave some indication to the English
minister of their contemplated volte-face. On the
27th of February, 1846, a memorandum was written
by Guizot to be shown to Aberdeen, in which it
was declared that if the marriage either of the Queen
or of the Infanta to a prince who was not a de-
scendant of Philip V. became " probable and immi-
nent," France would consider herself free from her en-
gagements, and at liberty to demand the hand of the
Queen or of the Infanta for the Due de Montpensier.
Upon this memorandum Guizot laid considerable stress
when afterwards accused of underhand conduct. But
it should be observed that the language was studiously
vague, France being left sole judge of the " probability
and imminence," and that the memorandum was only
read to Aberdeen. No copy of the document was left
with him, and so little importance did he attach to it,
that he said nothing about it to Mr. Bulwer, our mini-
ster at Madrid, or to his own successor, Lord Palmer-
ston. ('Now, the candidate other than a Bourbon
alluded to in the memorandum was Prince Leopold of
Saxe-Coburg. Louis Philippe affected to be greatly
afraid of him on account of his family connections ;
his brother was King of Portugal, aud his cousin Prince
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 99
Consort of England. Aberdeen, however, did his very
utmost to calm his susceptibilities on the point. He
actually acquainted Guizot with the fact that Christina,
not for the first time, was trying to secure Prince Leo-
pold for her daughter, and had even made a formal offer
to Leopold's father through Mr. Bulwer ; and he sent the
most ample assurance to Guizot that the English Court
would give no support to the candidature.
It appears incredible that Louis Philippe can ever
have considered the Coburg marriage as really "immi-
nent," and it is difficult to see that any real excuse can
be made for the complete change of attitude adopted by
the King and Minister almost simultaneously with the
formation of Lord John Russell's Ministry. The con-
dition that the Montpensier marriage should not take
place until Isabella had had children was allowed to
drop out of sight altogether, and it was determined that
the luckless Queen should marry the cretin Don Fran-
cisco. It is true that the turpitude of the two conspi-
rators was not as black as it has sometimes been
represented. Francisco was practically the only
Bourbon left, as far as they were concerned, his brother
being intimately connected with the anti-French party ;
and the fact that for many months they had actively
supported another candidature, Count Trapani, is incon-
sistent with the charge commonly brought against them,
that their idea was to force the Queen to marry an in-
competent husband so as to place Montpensier on the
throne par un detour. Towards the English Govern-
ment, however, they acted with the grossest treachery.
When Bresson, the French Minister at Madrid, acting
on his own responsibility, obtained on the 12th of July
Christina's consent to the Cadiz alliance on condition
that the Infanta should simultaneously marry the Due
7 *
LofG.
100 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
de Montpensier, he was rebuked, and apparently dis-
avowed, but only on the ground of simultatieite* f^As
Guizot subsequently pointed out to his master, Chris-
tina would only accept Cadiz with Moutpensier for a
pendant ; and to ensure success, it must be understood
that as soon as one marriage was completed, the second
must be discussed and arranged.
It is clear, then, that Louis Philippe and Guizot had
resolved to depart from the agreement of Eu before they
were acquainted with the " astonishing and detestable
despatch " of Lord Palmerston, which they afterwards
alleged as the cause of their change of plan and the
simultaneous celebration of the Cadiz and Montpensier
marriages, with terrible consequences to the unhappy
Isabella and still more unhappy Spain. That despatch
was dated July 18th, 1846, and explained to Mr. Bulwer
the views of the new Government on the double ques-
tion of the marriage of the Queen and the political
condition of Spain.
In regard to the first [he wrote], I have not at present any instruc-
tions to give you in addition to those which you have received from
my predecessor in office. /'The choice of a husband for the Queen of
an independent country is obviously a matter in which the Govern-
ments of other countries are not entitled to interfere unless there
should be a probability that the choice would fall upon some prince
. . . directly belonging to the reigning family of some foreign state.
But there is no person^ of this description among those who are
named as candidates for/ the Queen of Spain ; those candidates being
reduced to three, namely, the Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, and
the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula. ... As between the three
candidates above mentioned, Her Majesty's Government have only to
express their sincere wish that the choice may fall upon the one who
* This point appears to be overlooked by Mr. Spencer Walpole
in his otherwise well-considered defence of Louis Philippe and
Guizot, but it comes out very clearly in the letters between the
two published after 1848 in the Reviie Retrospective.
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 101
may be most likely to secure the happiness of the Queen and to pro-
mote the welfare of the nation.
The second part of the despatch was a vigorous
onslaught on the Spanish Government in true Palmer-
stonian style ; it was one of absolutism, force, and
tyranny, a mockery of constitutionalism, and so forth.
Bulwer, however, was told in conclusion that
Her Majesty's Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of
interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of indepen-
dent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions to
make any representations whatever to the Spanish Minister on these
matters ; but though you will, of course, take care to express on no
occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I
have thus explained to you, and although you will be careful not to
express these sentiments in any manner, or upon any other occasion,
so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet
you need not conceal from any of those persons who may have the
power of remedying the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are
entertained by the British Government.
Of this despatch, Palmerston, who seems to have
gathered from Lord Aberdeen no idea that the marriage
question was at all serious, rather imprudently gave a
copy to Jarnac, the French Ambassador, and at once set
the French and Spanish Courts ablaze. Christina saw
in it a design to effect a revolution in Spain which
would overthrow the Moderado Ministry, and sur-
round her with the leaders of the Progressist party,
Espartero, Olozaga, and the rest, who had already
driven her from Madrid, and would probably try
to expel her again. There can be no doubt also that
Louis Philippe and Guizot were seriously alarmed for
the moment ; the language of the latter to Greville on
the occasion of his visit to Paris proves that real
alarm was mingled with his hypocrisy. From the day
of Palmerston's arrival at the Foreign Office they
102 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON'.
had been shaking in their shoes, and it was in vain
that the Minister attempted to keep up the King's
spirits by assurances that " les prospects du cabinet
Whig sont bien gloomy" Themselves conspirators
against the agreement of Eu, they were, inclined to sus-
pect a countermine at every turn. /It was certainly
rather rash of Palmerston to mention the Coburg prince
as if his chances were equal to those of the sons of Don
Francisco de Paula, and it gave Gruizot a certain handle
for his contention that Palmerston intended to depart
from the engagement with Aberdeen. Pourquoi nom-
mer le Coburg ?" asked Madame de Lieven of Greville
after all was over ; and to confirm Guizot's suspicions,
/Jarnac's letter arrived at Paris about the same time as a
mission from Christina, the object of which was to effect
a retreat from the Cadiz arrangement, and obtain for
Spain the French King's permission to choose a king
for herself. At the same time the mere mention of the
Coburg marriage could not be said, even by the most
extreme alarmist, to render it " imminent," and a
categorical demand for an explanation would have
immediately dissolved his fears. As Queen Victoria
pointed out in the crushing rebuke — a "twister,"
her Foreign Secretary admiringly called it — which she
afterwards addressed to the French Court through the
Queen of the Belgians, Lord Palmerston mentioned
Leopold among the candidates merely as a fact known
to Europe ; and he referred Bulwer to the last instruc-
tions which he had received from Lord Aberdeen : —
In which, in terms most explicit and most positive, he asserts the in-
controvertible right of the Queen of Spain to marry what prince she
pleases, even although he should not be a descendant of Philip V.,
adding, at the same time, what I give in his own words : " that we
ventured, although without any English candidate or English pre-
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 103
ference, to point out Don Enrique as the prince who appeared to us
the most eligible, because the most likely to prove acceptable to the
people of Spain."
Greville's conclusion was that the mischief had arisen
from Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot
suspicious and alarmed. The Foreign Secretary was cer-
tainly rather careless, and perhaps not sufficiently awake
to the importance of the Spanish marriage question, but
he was also overwhelmed with business on entering into
office. But the month's delay which occurred between
the general demand on the part of Guizot for an ex-
position of the English policy and Palmerston's reply
was undoubtedly most unfortunate, and tended to give
further colour to his suspicions. There can be no
doubt that they were quite baseless as far as the
Coburg marriage was concerned. Palmerston's only
reason for advocating that alliance was, as he cha-
racteristically wrote to Bulwer, that " the English
Government would see with pleasure a good cross in-
troduced into the family of Spain ;" on the whole he
thought, considering the average tif intellect in his
father, brother, and sister, that the chances were against
Leopold being anything remarkable. The prince whom
he really wished to see on the throne of Spain was En-
rique, of whose abilities he seems to have formed a very
exaggerated opinion, and who was very acceptable on
account of his Progressist leanings.
Upon the best of consideration we can give to the matter [he wrote
to Bulwer] and according to the information which we hitherto
possess, we think it best for all parties concerned that Enrique should
marry the Queen, and that Coburg should marry the Infanta ; and
that is the arrangement we wish you to try for. )
Upon the question of the Montpensier marriage,
however, even when safeguarded by the conditions
104 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
into which Guizot had voluntarily entered at Eu, it
appeared that Palmerston, instead of being neutral like
Aberdeen, was most emphatically hostile.^
The language I hold to Jarnac [he tells Bulwer] is purposely
general and applicable to Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta as
well as with the Queen. I tell him that it is a great and paramount
object with us that Spain should be independent, and that her policy
should be founded upon Spanish and not upon French considerations :
so that if ever we should have the misfortune of finding ourselves
engaged in war with France, we should not merely on that account,
and without any separate quarrel with Spain, find ourselves involved
in war with Spain also. That this independence of Spain would be
endangered, if not destroyed, by the marriage of a French prince into
the royal family of Spain ; and that as, on the one hand, France
would be entitled to object to such a marriage being contracted by an
English prince, so England is entitled to object to such a marriage
being contracted by a French one. That such an objection on our
part may seem uncourteous, and may be displeasing ; but that the
friendships of States and Governments must be founded upon natural
interest, and not upon personal likings.
After this decided harangue, it was absurd for Guizot
to complain, as he subsequently did, that he had been
kept in ignorance of the strong objections ©f the Eng-
lish Government to the Montpensier marriage.] His
game, as time went on, evidently was to use the Coburg
scare as an excuse for hastening on the simultaneous
marriages of Cadiz to the Queen, and Montpensier to
the Infanta coute que coute. Indeed, his own panic does
not seem to have lasted more than three or four days ;
for as early as July 31st he had come to the conclusion
that neither the English Cabinet nor Palmerston
himself had any serious projects for a Coburg, and in
the following month the unconditional refusal of the
Coburg family to accept Christina's proposal was
actually sent to Madrid. While Palmerston was playing
for the Enrique and Coburg combination with his cards
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES. 105
on the table, Guizot, while artfully pretending to follow
his lead, as far as Enrique was concerned, a choice
which he mendaciously declared " would be perfectly
satisfactory to France," was urging Bresson at Madrid
to bring matters to an issue. Christina's remaining
scruples were removed by her fears of " the English and
the Revolution," and on the 2nd of September, Jarnac
announced to Palmerston that the two marriages of the
Queen to Cadiz and her sister to Montpensier, had
been arranged on the 28th of August.
The indignation entertained by the English Court
and the English Ministry against the pair of tricksters
who had deliberately broken their word, and that to
further projects which, under the most favourable con-
struction, were those of sordid fortune-hunters, was
expressed without much circumlocution : The most striking exception was in the case of
Spain, whither Palmerston thought it advisable to send
a lecture on constitutional government, which, though
sound in argument, and justified to a certain extent by
the semi-domestic relations established between England
and Isabella by the Quadruple alliance, was decidedly
too peremptory in tone. The Queen of Spain was
informed that she "would act wisely in the present
critical state of affairs if she was to strengthen her exe-
cutive government by widening the bases on which the
administration reposes, and in calling to her counsels
some of the men in whom the Liberal party reposed
confidence." The Queen of Spain retaliated by return-
ing the despatch, and, after a heated controversy, by
ordering our minister, Sir Henry Bulwer, to quit the
120 LIFE OF VISCOUNT FALMEBSTON.
kingdom within forty-eight hours, and Palmerston was
powerless to avenge the insult which his inconsiderate
zeal had brought on England. ) It seems that the
despatch was sent in direct defiance of Lord John Rus-
sell's directions, and the Ministry was naturally not
sorry to retaliate on their headstrong colleague by
refusing to support his proposals for the coercion of the
Spanish Government.
Otherwise, his conduct of affairs was thoroughly
pacific and sane. ( It was not in human nature for the
Foreign Secretary to refrain from expressing satisfaction
at the overthrow of Louis Philippe ; but no trace of
malignancy is to be found in his satisfaction, and his
hospitable doors were thrown open to the fallen Guizot. 1
To Lamartine, whose splendid efforts as head of the
Provisional Government at Paris against socialism and
anarchy were attracting the admiration of Europe,
he held out the right hand of fellowship.") Lord Nor-
manby was directed to remain at his post; and was told
that whatever rule possessed prospect of permanency,
would be acknowledged by the British Government. In
the same spirit our ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna
were directed to use their influence to prevent the Ger-
man Powers from attacking France. " For the present/'
Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby, " the only chance
for tranquillity and order in France, and for peace in
Europe, is to give support to Lamartine. I am con-
vinced the French Government will not be aggressive if
left alone ; and it is to be hoped that Apponyi (the
Austrian ambassador) and others will be allowed to re-
main in Paris till things take a decided turn. If a
republic is decidedly established, the other Powers
of Europe must, of course, give credentials addressed
to that Government, or they will have to give billets to
YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 121
its troops." Not even Lamartine's circular, declaring
that the treaties of 1815 had ceased to exist, could
frighten Palmerston out of his confidence in the high-
minded orator ; he saw in it a mere paper concession to
the French war party, and Lamartine's cold recep-
tion of Smith O'Brien's deputation confirmed his good
opinion of the intentions of the French Provisional
Government.
Palmerston's Italian policy naturally changed with
the times. With the Austrian provinces of Italy in full
revolt, it was impossible to keep to the programme of
the Minto mission. Even the sovereigns whose laggard
steps the Foreign Secretary had attempted to quicken,
had severed themselves from the Austrian connec-
tion ; and whether from dynastic ambition as in the
case of Carlo Alberto, or from prudential motives as
that of Tuscany and Naples, were sending troops to the
aid of Lombardy and Venetia. Palmerston thought, under
the circumstances, that the Austrian rule, south of the
Alps, must come to an end, and the Sardinian dynasty
take its place. " Northern Italy," he wrote to Lord
Minto, "will henceforward be Italian, and the Austrian
frontier will be at the Tyrol. ... Of course, Parma
and Modena will follow the example, and in this way
the King, no longer of Sardinia, but of Northern Italy,
will become a sovereign of some importance in Europe.
This will make a league between him and the other
Italian rulers still more desirable, and much more
feasible. (Italy ought to unite in a confederacy similar
to that of Germany, commercial and political, and now
is the time to strike while the iron is hot." j No very
ambitious scheme this, and certainly falling far short of
the dreams of Mazzini and Young Italy, since it left
Florence to the Medici, Naples to the Bourbons, the
122 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
Papal States to ecclesiastical misgovernment. f Per-
haps Palmerston felt that the important point for the
moment was to secure the freedom of North Italy, that
with the Hapsburgs gone, the Bourbons and their kind
must follow. Anyhow, when the old Austrian com-
mander Eadetsky was compelled to retire from Milan,
and take refuge in the Quadrilateral fortresses behind the
Mincio, with Venice triumphant in his rear, it seemed as
if Italy, to use the phrase afterwards made by Napoleon
III., would be free from the Alps to the Adriatic.
The temptation to throw the military strength of
England into the scale was possibly considerable with
the Foreign Secretary ; but the Austrian sympathies of
the Court, the Conservative party, and a not incon-
siderable section of the Whigs, were far too vehement to
warrant such an undertaking, and Palmerston had to be
content with that position of "judicious bottle-holder '*
which he afterwards described himself as having taken
up with regard to the Hungarian insurgents. Carlo*
Alberto was told that " he was engaged in a struggle of
doubtful result, and that the principle upon which it
was commenced was full of danger ;" but Austria was
informed again and again that " things had gone much
too far to admit of any future connection " between the
Italians and herself. In the actual result his anticipa-
tions proved far too sanguine. The recuperative power
of Austria was greater than Europe imagined ; and the
want of cohesion among the Italians, on account of the
treachery of the King of Naples, the insincerity of the
Pope, the deep-rooted antipathy of the republican party
to the Sardinian dynasty, the inability of Carlo Al-
berto to control the forces he had brought into activity,
rendered them impotent to work out their own salvation.
French intervention alone could have saved Italy after
YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 123
Eadetzky had stamped out the insurrection in Venetia,
and by that time the turbulence of Paris had compelled
the substitution at the head of affairs of the unimagina-
tive Cavaignac for the cosmopolitan Lamartine.
Perhaps Lord Palmerston ought to have foreseen the
fatal consequences of Italian disunion, but he only erred
with the rest of Europe in believing, after the fall of
Peschiera, that Carlo Alberto could hold the whole of
North Italy, and it is improbable that he could have
persuaded the Sardinian Government to accept less
terms than the surrender of the whole of Venetia and
Lombardy, even if he had wished to do so. There was,
too, an insincerity about the Austrian overtures which
disgusted both Palmerston and the advisers of Carlo
Alberto. It was found that the proposals for an
armistice, of which Palmerston consented to be the
mouth-piece, were only made to gain time for the ad-
vance of Austrian reinforcements, and for attempts to
sow dissension between Lombardy and Sardinia. And
the maximum of Austrian surrender, the cession of
Lombardy minus Venetia, seemed ludicrously inadequate
at a moment when everyone expected to hear that
Badetzky was in full retreat to the Alps. Things had
gone too far, was Palmerston's opinion, and the British
Government were unwilling to enter upon a negotiation
which, in their opinion, offered no prospects of success ;
and to make a proposal, which they felt confident be-
forehand that one of the parties, Sardinia, would posi-
tively refuse to accept. He pointed out besides, what
subsequent events amply proved to be true, that Austria
could only hold Venetia by military occupation pure
and simple, and that any possessions south of the Alps
must, therefore, be a source of weakness to her rather
than of strength. The retort of the Austrians, that
124 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
the loss of prestige would be far more serious than the
expense of maintaining troops in Italy, was perhaps
natural ; and in the impregnable defences of the
Quadrilateral, and the Fabian skill of Eadetzky, they
had ample means for closing the discussion for the
time being. Lord Palmerston's attempts to mitigate
the punishment of the Italians, when the recapture of
Milan proved how completely the tide had turned, and
during the cessation of hostilities which preceded the
final overthrow of their hopes at No vara, were vigorous,
but of course unsuccessful ; and it was left for Napoleon
III. and the present Emperor of Germany to accomplish
by blood and iron what Palmerston had so nearly
•effected by diplomacy. The rapture with which the
news of the Austrian victory was received at Court and
in London society, proved that in his faith in the cause
of Italy, Palmerston was in advance of his time by at
least a decade. At all events, he had the courage of
his opinions.
Yesterday [writes Greville in March 1849] there was a Drawing-
room, at which everybody, the Queen included, complimented and
wished joy to Oolloredo (the Austrian ambassador), except Palmer-
ston, who, though he spoke to him about other things, never alluded
to the news that had just arrived from Italy. . . . Nothing could be
more striking than this marked difference between the Foreign Secre-
tary and his Sovereign, and all his countrymen, and we may be pretty
sure Oolloredo will not fail to make a pretty story of it to his Court.
The Foreign Secretary about this period was doomed
to witness the temporary overthrow of all his Italian
projects. His protege, Pio Nono, proved unsatisfactory ;
reforming zeal was evanescent at the Vatican, and the
Holy Father was eventually forced by the outbreak of
the revolution at Rome to summon French bayo-
nets to support him against his own subjects, whose
YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 125
sympathies were for a republican form of govern-
ment. Equally disappointing were Lord Minto's efforts
to mediate between the King of Naples and the insur-
gent Sicilians ; the revolt was drowned in blood, and the
hideous ferocity of the bombardment of Messina and
Palermo gained for Ferdinando the nickname of
" Bomba/' by which he is chiefly remembered. Un-
fortunately for himself, Palmerston did not confine his
efforts to mediation, but overstepped the limits of
friendly neutrality by allowing arms to be supplied to
the Sicilian insurgents from the Ordnance — as usual,
without informing his colleagues. The matter was
taken up by the Times, and in the House of Commons,
but Palmerston escaped unscathed. He had, it is true, to
apologise to Bomba, but apologies never cost him a very
violent pang of regret ; while Greville was constrained
to record the complete success of his answer to Mr.
Barker. " a slashing, impudent speech, of sarcasms,
jokes, and clap-traps," scarcely deigning to notice
the question. A more dignified course of conduct
was bis remonstrance to the % Neapolitan ambassador
on the infamous misgovernment disclosed by Mr.
Gladstone's famous letters to Lord Aberdeen on the
state prisons and state trials of King Bomba's Govern-
ment. Prince Castelcicala was informed that Mr. Glad-
stone's letters presented a picture of illegality, injustice,
and cruelty, such as might have been hoped would
not have existed in any European country. The re-
monstrance was, however, burked by the Neapolitan
ministers until the outcry had passed away, and pro-
duced no effect, though Palmerston supplemented it by
a fine speech in the House, in which he eulogised Mr.
Gladstone's sympathy for the oppressed.
The fulness of time has so amply demonstrated the
126 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
justice of Palmerston's contention that the Austrian
rule in Italy was an anachronism, and that freedom
would certainly he accomplished, if not hy the unaided
efforts of the Italians, yet certainly through foreign
intervention, that to defend it would be a mere waste of
words. Italy, as he says in one of his letters to Lord
Ponsonby, was to Austria the heel of Achilles, not the
shield of Ajax. The Alps were her natural barrier, and
her best defence. Palmerston was no enemy to Austria ;
on the contrary, he wished to see her empire north of
the Alps in a condition of strength and prosperity to
act as a counterpoise to France. She was "the pivot
of the balance of power in Europe." His advice during
the crisis was thoroughly sound, and was actually adopted
in part. The abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand, " an
implumis bipes, a Guy Faux, a perfect nullity, next thing
to an idiot," as Palmerston rather imprudently styled him
in his private letters, was in conformity with his recom-
mendation ; and he may be forgiven for not being ac-
quainted with the good qualities of the " lad of sixteen
or twenty,''' Francis Joseph, who mounted the tottering
throne in the place of his uncle; And with regard to
the revolution in Hungary, his conduct was equally dis-
interested. The idea of armed intervention was never
entertained for a moment, though the sympathies of this
country were as active in favour of the Magyars — thanks
to the picturesqueness of Kossuth — as they were tepid
with regard to the Lombards. He even declined to
recognize the insurgents by giving an audience to their
representative. At the same time he interceded on
their behalf at Vienna; but to his admirable advice
Schwarzenberg, the successor of Metternich, turned a
deaf ear. In the hour of victory the Austrian Govern-
ment was urged to make a generous use of the successes
YEARS OF REVOLUTION. 127
which it had obtained, by restoring to Hungary its due
constitutional rights ; and Palmerston did not fail to
point out that, by calling in .Russian aid to crush the
rebellion, Austria had set open a door which it might
not be easy to shut.* When the full details of the
brutal suppression of the rebellion, the flogging of
women and other atrocities, reached England, he allowed
his righteous indignation full play ; and directed Lord
Ponsonby to maintain the dignity and honour of Eng-
land by expressing openly and decidedly the disgust
which such proceedings excited in the public mind.
Though Palmerston's good offices on behalf of Italy
and Hungary were of no avail for the time being, the
diplomatic campaign against Prince Schwarzenberg
closed with a brilliant triumph. After the end of the
war, numerous fugitives, among whom were Kossuth
and Bern, a Pole who had commanded the Hungarian
insurgents with conspicuous success, took refuge in
Turkey. The Kussian and Austrian ambassadors at
Constantinople took upon themselves to demand their
surrender, with a threat that if their demands did not
receive a categorical answer within a limited time they
would suspend diplomatic relations ; and their high-
handed conduct received the full sanction of their
respective Governments, who appealed to loosely-worded
treaties extorted from the Porte in former days of
humiliation. An immediate surrender would have fol-
lowed, had not Stratford Canning been at hand to
- * Cobden blamed bim for not baving sent a vigorous protest against
tbe Russian expedition, and tbougbt tbat it would bave so strength-
ened tbe hands of tbe Russian ministers tbat tbe Czar -would bave
countermanded bis troops (Morley's Cobden, vol. ii. p. 67). Tbe idea
tbat a Czar, especially Nicbolas, would allow himself to be swayed by
ministerial advice, is one of exquisite simplicity.
128 LIFE OF VISCOUUT PALMEBSTON.
inspire the Sultan with a week's resolution ; and Palmer-
ston availed himself of the opportunity with his accus-
tomed skill. Baron Briinnow, the Russian minister in
London, was informed before the determination of his
Government was known, that the British fleet was to be
sent to the Dardanelles — "just as one holds a bottle of
salts to the nose of a lady who has been frightened " —
remarked the flippant Foreign Secretary ; and the alter-
natives of the withdrawal of the obnoxious demands,
or war, were placed plainly before him and his Aus-
trian colleague. In vain Schwarzenberg attempted to
effect a retreat through a back-door, by moderating his
demands to a request that the fugitives should be
detained by the Porte in the interior of Turkey ; it was
incompatible with the dignity of the Sultan, said Pal-
merston, that he should act as the gaoler of the
Emperor of Austria. When, two years later, the
Sultan summoned up courage to set Kossuth and his
companions free, Palmerston could claim to have won
all along the line.
129
CHAPTER VIII.
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT.
1849—1852.
Independence of Lord Palmerston — Differences of opinion with the
Court — The Danish succession question — The Pacifico affair —
Breakdown of negotiations — Indignation of France — Civis Roma-
nus sum — Effect of the speech— The Queen's Memorandum — The
Haynau and Kossuth incidents — The coup d'tftat — Dismissal of
Palmerston — Constitutional side of the question — The Militia
Bill— The first Derby Ministry.
Though Lord Palmerston's policy since the return of
the Whigs to power had been on the whole remarkably
sober and sagacious, the Bulwer fiasco at Madrid and
the Sicilian incident proved that the old Adam of in-
subordination was not wholly dead within him. Nor
were these the only occasions on which, forgetful of
the flight of time, he attempted a repetition of the
tactics which had been so successful in the good old
days of Lord Melbourne, and sent off important
despatches without submitting them to Lord John
Russell and the Sovereign, or without inserting the
alterations which he had been directed to make. And
the necessity of coming to a previous understanding
9
130 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
upon important steps was all the greater because the
opinions of the Court and the Foreign becretary
were distinctly at issue on many questions of Eu-
ropean importance. The sympathies of the Court
were with Austria, those of Palmerston with Italy
and Hungary, and his views were the wiser of the
two ; but about North German politics he was rather
prejudiced and rather ignorant, yet he paid small
attention to the opinions of Prince Albert, who was
unquestionably better informed. Among the many wise
memoranda which are to be found in Sir Theodore
Martin's Life of Prince Consort, perhaps the most re-
markable are those in which he urged the necessity of
German unity under Prussian leadership. Palmerston,
though, as can be seen in an interesting letter written by
him during a visit to Berlin in 1844, he was not without
some insight into the great part that Prussia would some
day be called upon to play, cared little for German
unity ; and while Prince Albert saw in the Zollverein,
or customs union, a feeble beginning of a one and un-
divided Fatherland, Palmerston resented its existence
as an arrangement for placing prohibitive duties on
British exports.
Indeed, if the Danish succession question may be
taken as a test, Palmerston's want of information
on the inner workings of Teutonic politics was very
considerable. Count Vitzthum, in his memoirs, goes
so far as to state that the Foreign Secretary was
actuated by personal motives in the matter, his aim
being to purchase the non-interference of Baron
Briinnow in the Don Pacifico affair by giving Russia
a free hand at Copenhagen, and supporting, or at
all events acquiescing, in the claims put forward by
the Kussian dynasty to a portion of the Danish terri-
PALMEBSTON AND THE COURT. 131
tory, which included the important harbour of Kiel.
Even if this account of the history of the Protocol of
July 4th 1850, upon which was based the Treaty of
1852, guaranteeing the crown of Denmark to Prince
Christian of Glucksburg, be not accepted as gospel,
there can be no doubt that the continued exclusion of
Germany from the Baltic by the maintenance of the con-
nection between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein was
far more a matter of interest to Russia than to England.
And though there may be some question as to the
motives which dictated the arrangement, there can be
none as to the carelessness with which it was executed.
The choice of the negotiators fell upon a prince who,
whatever claims he might have to the throne of Den-
mark, was regarded by German jurists to have a right
to the Duchies inferior to no less than nineteen other
members of the house of Schleswig-Holstein. The
renunciations of these " agnates " were never obtained,
nor was the consent of the Estates of the Duchies.
Lastly, though the Duchies were indisputably members
of the German Federation, no attempt was made to
obtain for the arrangement the sanction of the Federa-
tion in its collective form, for Austria and Prussia
signed the Protocol not as mandatories of the Ger-
man Diet, but individually, as great Powers.
It seemed quite on the cards that a trial of strength
between the Court and the Foreign Secretary might be
averted by the retirement of Lord Palmerston from
office, in consequence of a hostile opinion in the House
of Commons as to the merits of Ms treatment of what is
generally known as the Don Pacifico affair. LordPalmer-
ston's defence of the Porte against the menaces of Russia
and Austria had been generally approved, but there was
naturally some revulsion of public feeling when it was
9 *
132 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
discovered that the fleet which had been so honourably
employed at the Dardanelles was immediately after-
wards despatched to coerce the weak little kingdom of
Greece for the non-compliance with the demands of the
British Government for compensation for various acts
of violence committed towards British subjects. There
was even a feeling of dismay when the intelligence
leaked out that the French Government had actually
recalled its Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, from London,
because it believed that his attempts to patch up the
dispute between England and Greece had been treated
with scanty respect, and that the Kussian Government
had demanded an explanation of Palmerstons's proceed-
ings in rather a serious tone.
Perhaps the points at issue were hardly understood.
The seizure of the Greek gunboats and Greek mer-
chantmen by Admiral Parker was regarded as a piece
of bullying, by people who argued as if the feebleness of a
State was a reason for allowing it to commit crimes with
impunity. There was also a disposition to minimise
the amount and duration of the wrongs committed, and
to overlook the utter impossibility of obtaining redress
through the Greek courts of law or by any means short
of the employment of force. Because one of the com-
plainants, Don Pacifico, was a Jew adventurer who seized
the opportunity to put forward some utterly extortionate
claims for compensation, there was no reason why satis-
faction should not be exacted for the destruction of his
house by an Athenian mob. At any rate, Mr. Finlay,
the historian, whose 'land had been seized by King
Otho without a drachma in return, was a perfectly
reputable person; and, of the other offences of the
Hellenic authorities, the torture of an Ionian who was a
British subject, and the arrest of the coxswain and boat's
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 133
crew of H.M.S. Fantdme, were unquestionably outrages
of a very serious nature.
The British case against the disreputable little Greek
Government was really perfectly clear, but to apportion
the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations was
a nicer question. The offer of French mediation was
certainly made in good faith, though Palmerston
strongly suspected that the intrigues of the French
minister at the Greek Court were at the bottom of King
Otho's obstinacy. But when Baron Gros, the French
Commissioner, arrived at Athens, his proceedings
resembled those of an advocate rather than those of an
arbitrator ; the terms of his settlement were rejected by
our ambassador, Mr. Wyse, as inadequate, and he
thereupon gave notice that his mission was at an end.
Meanwhile, a parallel series of negotiations had been
going on in London between Drouyn de Lhuys and
Palmerston, which had issue in a convention signed on
the 18th which disposed of the whole question under dis-
pute. Intimation of the terms of the proposed arrange-
ment, of which the essential was that if the negotia-
tors at Athens could not agree, they should refer their
differences to London, reached Baron Gros on the 24th,
and was communicated by him to Mr. Wyse ; but the
latter, who had received no fresh instructions from
London corresponding to those that his French col-
league had received from Paris, did not venture to
depart from his previous instructions and postpone the
employment of force. The embargo was renewed on
the 25th, and on the following day the Greek Govern-
ment submitted unconditionally.
It was but natural that the French Government
should feel that they had been treated with disrespect,
and resent that treatment accordingly. Drouyn de
134 LIFE OF VI800UNT PALMEBSTON.
Lhuys was recalled from London, and General Lahittei-
the French Foreign Minister, openly charged the British
Government with duplicity. A dispassionate examina-
tion of the whole affair would probably have acquitted
Palmerston of a more serious offence than neglect to
keep Mr. Wyse constantly and accurately informed
on the progress of negotiations in London. But
he did not improve matters by trying, in answer to
Mr. Milner Gibson, to explain away the recall of
Drouyn de Lhuys, who, said he, had^ gone to Paris " in
order personally to be a medium of communication
between the two Governments." The excitement was
great, though the danger of war was in reality quite
remote ; many of Palmersfcon's colleagues were anxious
to be rid of him, and the Opposition in the House of
Lords seized the opportunity to win a bloodless victory
by carrying a hostile resolution on the motion of Lord
Stanley by a majority of 27. The Cabinet, after delibe-
ration, decided to stand or fall together, and resolved
to cancel the bad effects of the vote in the Upper House,
by availing themselves of a resolution of which Mr.
Koebuck had given notice — that the principles on which
the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government had
been regulated had been such as were calculated to
maintain the honour and dignity of this country, and
in times of unexampled difficulty to preserve peace
between England and the various nations of the
world.
The debate of four nights which followed was made
memorable by the last speech that Sir Eobert Peel ever
made, by Mr. Oockburn's brilliant "Crown and An-
chor" harangue, as Mr. Disraeli termed it, by one of
the greatest of Mr. Gladstone's oratorical displays, and
by Palmerston's magnificent defence of his policy in a
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 135
speech lasting " from the dusk of one day till the dawn
of another."** Of that magnificent specimen of sus-
tained and elaborate argument it is impossible here to
give more than a very meagre account. Part of it was
a well-considered apologia pro vita sua, in which he
passed the whole of recent European history before him
in skilful review, by a series of graceful transitions
from the " sunny plains of Castille and gay vineyards
of France " to the " rugged Alps and smiling plains
of Lombardy." Incidentally he managed to make a
remarkably neat cut at his enemies in Paris, and to
those who listened to them in England, by laughing
to scorn the idea that the French had driven out M.
Guizot at the instigation of a knot of foreign con-
spirators who were " caballing " against him, " for no
other reason than that he upheld, as he conceived, the
dignity and interests of his country." On the Greek
question his argument was temperate and lucid, except
when it concerned the breakdown of the mission of
Baron Gros, and there leakages are to be discovered in
abundance. But little exception can be taken to his
contention that if British subjects could get no redress
from foreign courts of law, they were not to be con-
fined to that remedy only, but were entitled to receive
the protection of their own Government; or to his
arguments that Mr. Finlay had no redress because the
Greek revolution of 1843 had thrown a veil over the
unconstitutional acts of the Monarchy, and that with
respect to Don Pacifico it was impossible to take pro-
ceedings against a mob of five hundred persons. The
orator brushed aside the flimsy objection that, because
* The speech I had to make [he wrote to his brother] could not
be comprised within a shorter time than from a quarter before ten to t
twenty minutes past two.
136 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
M. Pacifico was a person of doubtful antecedents, he
could be maltreated with impunity.
The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case ;
and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redresa
to a man because in some former transactions he may have done
something which is questionable. Punish turn, if you will — punish him
if he is guilty, but don't pursue him as a Pariah through life. ..." Oh,
but," it is said, " what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large
a force against so small a power ! " Does the smallness of a country
justify the magnitude of its evil acts ? Is it to be held that if your
subjects suffer violence, outrage, and plunder, in a country which is
small and weak, you are to tell them, when they apply for compensa-
tion, that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it
for compensation? Their answer would be that the weakness and
smallness of the country makes it the more easy to obtain redress
At the dose of the speech came the well-known
peroration in which the Foreign Secretary extolled the
dignity of English citizenship. He did not, he said,
blame the Opposition for attacking Ministers ; for the
government of England was an object of fair and
legitimate ambition for men of all shades of opinion.
For while we have seen .... the political earthquake rocking
Europe from side to side, while we have seen thrones shaken,
shattered, levelled, institutions overthrown and destroyed, while in
almost every country of Europe the conflict of civil war has deluged
the land with blood, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the
Baltic to the Mediterranean, this country has presented a spectacle
honourable to the people of England and worthy of the admiration
of mankind. We have shown that liberty is compatible with order,
that individual freedom is not irreconcilable with obedience to the
law. We have shown the example of a nation, in which very
class of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence
has assigned to it, while at the same time every individual of each
class is constantly striving to raise himself in the social scale — not by
injustice and wrong, not by violence and illegality — but by persever-
ing good conduct, and by the steady and energetic exertion of the
moral and intellectual faculties with which his Creator has endowed
him. To govern such a people as this is indeed an object worthy
of the ambition of the noblest man who lives in the land ; and there-
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 137
fore I find no fault with those who may think any opportunity a fair
one for endeavouring to place themselves in so distinguished and
honourable a position. . . . But, making allowances for those diffe-
rences of opinion, which may fairly and honourably arise among
those who concur in general views, I maintain that the principles
which can be traced through all our foreign transactions, as the
guiding rule and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as
deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly challenge the verdict
which this House, as representing a political, a commercial, a con-
stitutional country, is to give on the question before it ; whether the
principles on which the foreign policy of this country has been con-
ducted, and the sense of duty which has led us to think ourselves bound
to afford protection to our fellow subjects abroad, are proper and
fitting guides for those who are charged with the government of
England, and whether, as the Roman in the days of old held himself
free from indignity when he could say Civis Romanus sum, so also a
British subject, in whatever land he be, shall feel confident that the
watchful eye and the strong arm of England shall protect him against
injustice and wrong.
This speech not only gave the Government a hand-
some majority of forty-six, but it raised the reputation
of Palmerston to a height to which none of his con-
temporaries, not even Lord John Russell himself, could
hope to aspire. " We are proud of the man who delivered
that most able and temperate speech " was Sir Robert
Peel's generous acknowledgment ; and Palmerston wrote
to his brother, that he was for the present the most
popular Minister that for a very long course of time had
held his office. The Don Pacjlico debate was un-
questionably an important landmark in the life of Lord
Palmerston. Hitherto his merits had been known only
to a select few ; for the British public does not read
Blue Books, and as a rule troubles itself very little about
foreign politics at all. His greatest achievements had
passed almost unnoticed by the electorate, though they
had certainly looked upon him as a strong and capable
man. But the Pacifico speech caught the ear 'of the
138 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
nation, and was received with a universal verdict of
approval. From that hour Lord Palmerston became the
man of the people, and his rise to the premiership only a
question of time. As Mr. Morley has pointed out in his
Life of Cobden, Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli were un-
able to keep in power if they got there ; the Whigs were
steadily losing ground in popular opinion ; the Man-
chester School was out of the question. Lord Pal-
merston's only possible rival was Sir Robert Peel, and
he met his death the very day after he had taken part in
the Pacifico debate.
At the same time there were breakers ahead. The
distrust of the Court continued without abatement, and
attempt was made, with the concurrence of Lord John
Russell, the Duke of Bedford, Lord Lansdowne, and
Lord Clarendon, to induce the Foreign Secretary to
accept some other office, which, however, he declined to
do. Fresh negligence brought down upon him fresh
rebukes from the Queen, culminating in the famous
Memorandum of August the 12th, in which she required
that, under penalty of dismissal, (1) he would distinctly
state what he proposed in a given case, in order that
the Queen might know as distinctly to what she had
given her Royal sanction ; (2) that, having once given
her sanction to a measure, it should not be arbitrarily
altered or modified by the Minister^ Palmerston, with
tears in his eyes, protested to Prince Albert that he had
been accused of being wanting in respect to the Queen,
which was an imputation on his honour as a gentleman :
pleaded stress of business, and the loss of time incurred
by sending despatches to the Queen through the Premier r
and promised amendment. He did not resign, he after-
wards explained, for several reasons, because he had no
reason to believe that the memorandum would ever be
PALMERSTON AND TEE COURT. 139
made public ; because he had recently gained a signal
victory in the Commons, and to have resigned then
would have been to have delivered the fruits of victory
to the adversaries whom he had defeated ; and thirdly,
because he would have been bringing to the bar of
public opinion, a quarrel between himself and his
Sovereign, the result of which course must have been
fatal to himself or injurious to his country.
Within a month he had submitted a letter of regret for
the maltreatment of the " Austrian butcher " General
Haynau, by Messrs. Barclay's draymen, to Baron Koller
the Austrian Charge d'Affaires, without consulting the
Premier or the Queen, which contained a paragraph to
which they both objected, and which they forced him to
withdraw. This was early in September. Early in
November, Kossuth arrived in England, and Palmerston,
dissuaded by the united representations of the Cabinet
from receiving him at Broadlands, relieved his feelings by
receiving a deputation of Islington and Finsbury Radicals,
to whom, in return for their denunciations of the Em-
perors of Russia and Austria as "odious and detestable
assassins " and " merciless tyrants and despots," he de-
livered the "judicious bottle-holder" oration, and thanked
them for their flattering and gratifying expressions of
opinion. \
The impropriety of such language was so obvious,
that the virulence of the Kossuth mania in England was
probably the only reason which prevented Lord John
Russell from effecting his long meditated manifestation
of authority. " I think," was Greville's comment, " this
is on the whole the worst thing he (Palmerston) has
ever done." Certainly Lord John Russell, who had
swallowed the camel, seems to have strained at a gnat,
when he ejected Palmerston from office on the 19th of
140 LIFE OF VISQOUNT PALMERSTON.
December, for having^ expressed his approval of Louis
Napoleon's coup d'etat, in a conversation with the
French Minister,] Count Walewski ; and Greville's sur-
mise, that the occasion was made a casus belli because
Palmerston had taken the unpopular side, was probably
right. No doubt it was extremely inconvenient, when
Lord Normanby informed the French Foreign Minister
that he was directed to observe a policy of strict
neutrality, that he should receive intimation that, two
days before, Count Walewski had conveyed Palmerston's
entire approbation of the act of Louis Napoleon. Our
Minister and Government were placed in an extremely
false position. Still Lord John Eussell never at-
tempted to deny that he, Lord Lansdowne, and Sir
Charles Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had
also expressed their approval of the coup aV'etat to
Count Walewski in conversation ; and there is, as diplo-
matists know, considerable force in^Palmerston's argu-
ment that his communication was " unofficial." * \Lord
John probably thought that the sum total of Palmerston's
offences was so great that any harshness towards him
was justifiable, even the crowning indignity of the offer
of the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. When the usual
explanations took place in the [House of Commons, he
was even more relentless, and produced with crushing
effect the Queen's memorandum of August 1850. , Pal-
merston, who had refused to believe that so complete an
* Lord Malmesbury clearly acknowledges the distinction between
an " officious" and " official" conversation (Memoirs of an Ex- Mini-
ster, i. 303, note). On the other hand the Duke of Wellington pro-
nounced most decidedly against any attempt to establish a distinction
between private and official opinions. " Oh, but that won't do," he
said to Prince Albert, " That would be dishonest. It would be
appearing in two characters. No ! No ! We are very particular on
that point." (Life of the Prince Consort, vol. ii., p. 427.)
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 141
execution was imminent, was exceedingly inefficient in
his defence ; and most people would probably have agreed
with the comment in Macaulay's diary, " Palmerston is
out. It was high time; but I cannot help feeling
sorry."
The constitutional questions raised by the struggle
between the Foreign Secretary and the Court were of a
very complicated nature. Let us say at once that
Lord Palmerston cannot be held to have been actuated
by any deliberate disrespect for the Crown./ His
contention was this — that his experience in foreign
affairs was more extended than that of Prince Albert,
and that he might therefore claim an immunity from
supervision in matters of detail, though he acknow-
ledged that both the Crown and the Premier had a right
to consider the draft of despatches upon matters of im-
portance, j He was also of opinion that the transmission
of despatches involved great waste of time in cases of
urgency, that their alteration was frequently the cause of
grave ambiguity of language, in short, that too many
cooks spoil the broth. Such contentions are evidently
of considerable force. But there can hardly be any
doubt that(Lord Palmerston really aimed at a far greater
measure of independence than he professed X that if he
had been able to get his own way, he would have
secured the imperium in ■imperio of Lord Melbourne's
time ; and that, failing to get it by direct means, he had
resort to subterfuges and neglects of duty, the ultimate
object of which was to steal a march upon his Sovereign
and colleagues when they happened to disagree with
him.
On the other hand, it is impossible not to see that the
Court, through want of judgment, by no means adopted
the most straightforward means of reconciling their
142 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
views with those of the Foreign Secretary, /instead of
encouraging him to lay his opinions freely before them
in frequent interviews and direct intercourse, they treated
him with distrust and appeared to shun his society).
The interposition of Lord John Eussell was invoked, the"
arrangement being that " the despatches submitted for
(the Queen's) approval must pass through the hands of
Lord John Russell, who, if he should think that they
required any material change, should accompany them
with a statement of his reasons." To the transmission
through the Prime Minister Lord Palmerston agreed ;
and the fact says volumes for his generous and loyal
disposition. For if the arrangement had been carried
out to the letter, the result would have been, that while
the Foreign Secretary prepared the drafts, they would
have been discussed and settled between the Prime
Minister and the Sovereign.* He would thus have
been reduced from a confidential servant of the Crown,
to the position of a mere clerk, indeed his position
would have become almost intolerable for a man of any
self-respect. Even with the most delicate treatment, the
system could hardly fail to create and perpetuate a feel-
ing of antagonism between the Prime Minister and the
head of the Foreign Department, and it should certainly
never have been proposed to Lord Palmerston as a law
of conduct. Though approved by Lord John, it seems
to have been almost entirely the work of Stockmar, and
expressive of the feelings of the Court. Fresh suspicion
and confusion was the inevitable result ; and Lord
Palmerston's admirers might fairly have advanced as an
excuse for some of his escapades, that he was proscribed
and subordinated to another, in a place where he had
every right to play the part of a familiar friend.
* Mr. Gladstone's Gleanings of Past Years, vol. i. p. 87.
PALMERSTON AND THE COURT. 143
" There was a Palmerston," said Mr. Disraeli ; and
Guizot, himself in exile, raised a Nunc dimittis when he
heard of his enemy's overthrow. The member for
Tiverton bore his temporary adversity with that entire
absence of rancour which is perhaps the most delightful
trait in his fine nature. " Ah, how are you, Granville ? "
he said to his successor; " Well, you have got a very in-
teresting office, but you will find it very laborious," and
proceeded to give him every assistance in his power.
There was no ill-feeling in his mind against the Court,
though he imagined that they had been influenced by
foreign, especially Orleanist, influences in his dismissal.
This view he communicated to his brother without
circumlocution, together with a curious story about
a contemplated descent upon the French coast by
the Orleauist princes, the Due d'Aumale and the
Prince de Joinville, which he believed to have preci-
pitated Napoleon's coup d'etat, and which induced
him to express his warm approval of that measure.
Nor did he bear any unworthy resentment against
Lord John Russell. According to Lord Shaftesbury,
he never alluded to him but with a laugh, and
" Oh, he's a foolish fellow, but we shall go on very well
now."
It is onlv fair then to consider that Palmerston was
not influenced by personal motives in his attack upon
Lord John's Militia Bill, by which, within a very short
space of time, he so signally avenged his own dismissal
from office. " I have had my tit-for-tat with John
Russell," he wrote to his brother, " and I turned him
out on Friday last "; but he hastened to add that his only
object was to persuade the House to reject the feeble
plan of the Government. Indeed, few statesmen of the
day had taken more honourable interest in the state of
144 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMFBSTON.
our defences, or had spoken more frequently on the
subject. A memorandum which he addressed to Lord
Melbourne, set forth the liability of England to invasion
•with a fulness of knowledge that a military authority
might envy. During Peel's ministry he had examined the
Government on harbours and fortifications with a per-
sistency which aroused the wrath of Oobden, and which
calls forth the mirth of Oobden's biographer, Mr. John
Morley. Nor can it be questioned that Palmerston's
amendment, which made the militia generally instead of
" locally " available, was a vast improvement to the
measure. It might have been accepted by the ministry
without loss of honour, and he suspected them of incur-
ring the defeat because they were anxious to escape from
the responsibility of carrying on the Government any
longer. A passage in Lord John Kussell's He?ninis-
cences proves that the guess was correct.
The tit-for-tat naturally drew attention once more to
Palmerston's political isolation. In spite of his long
service in the Whig ranks, he was still a political free
lance ; and Lord Derby, to whom fell the formation of a
ministry, thrice made overtures for his services ; in
February 1852, again in July, and for a third time in
December. All proposals were, however, declined,
chiefly because of the Protectionist colour of the ad-
ministration, though Palmerston gave valuable support
to their Militia Bill, and even prolonged their existence
at the opening of the new Parliament by bringing forward
an amendment to Mr. Charles Villiers' free trade reso-
lution which they were able to accept without loss of
dignity. Conscious of his own strength, he was but
little troubled by the gloomy looks of his former col-
leagues, whom from time to time he treated rather un-
kindly. When at the Tiverton hustings, the local orator
PALMERSTON AND THE COVET. 145
the butcher, Kowcliffe, attempted to rally him on his
position, Palmerston blandly replied that whatever Go-
vernment he meant to join, he would never join a
Government called a Kowcliffe Administration. His
letters show that he was equally determined not to serve
again under " Johnny "; and the admission which he went
on to make, that Johnny was not likely to serve under
him, proves that he felt that his" own hour was not yet
come. There happened at this time to be a movement
on foot among the Whigs for uniting the Liberal party
under the eminently prudent leadership of Lord Lans-
downe ; and though it was not initiated in any way by
Palmerston, he gave it his cordial support. Age and
ill-health, however, compelled Lord Lansdowne to deter-
mine upon a nolo episcopari ; and on the retirement of
the Derby Ministry, Lord Aberdeen constructed a cabi-
net of Peelites and Whigs, with Sir William Molesworth
as the representative of Philosophic Kadicalism.
10
146 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
CHAPTER IX.
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY.
1852-1855.
Lord Palmerston at the Home Office — Legislation and Deputations —
The Reform Bill — Temporary Resignation of Palmerston — Be-
ginnings of the Eastern Question — The Menschikoff mission —
Lord Palmerston's policy — His popularity with the nation — The
Vienna note — The Concert of the Powers — Palmerston's descrip-
tion of the objects at issue — Declaration of war by Turkey — The
Sinope disaster — Beginning of the war — The Napier banquet
and its consequences — Proposal to make Palmerston Secretary at
War — The Crimean expedition — Fall of the Ministry.
In the Coalition Ministry Lord Palmerston, rather to
the general surprise, was persuaded to take the Home
Office. He did not yield until after considerable pres-
sure had been put upon him, conscious, perhaps, that
he was open to a charge of inconsistency if he served
under a premier whose continental policy he had
criticized so mercilessly. But the co-operation which
he refused to Aberdeen was conceded to the solicita-
tions of Lord Lansdowne, especially when he found
that foreign affairs were to be in sound Whig hands.
Palmerston chose the Home Office because it would
bring him in contact with his fellow-countrymen, and
would give him influence with regard to the militia and the
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 147
national defences ; and as Home Secretary he was a most
unqualified success. " I never knew any Home Secre-
tary," wrote Lord Shaftesbury, "equal to Palmerston
for readiness to undertake every good work of kindness,
humanity, and social good, especially to the child and
the working class. No fear of wealth, capital, or elec-
tion terrors ; prepared at all times to run a tilt if he
could do good by it. Has already done more good than
ten of his predecessors." The Shaftesbury hall-mark
was indeed to be seen in most of his measures, with the
exception of the timely extinction of the Board of
Health, which vexed the righteous soul of his relative.
The Youthful Offenders' Bill gave Government aid to
reformatory schools, and greatly increased their num-
ber and efficiency ; the Factory Acts were amended for
the benefit of children ; the institution of tickets-of-leave
effected an admirable reform in the criminal system ;
while attention was paid to the health of the people of
London by measures for the abatement of the smoke
nuisance, and for shutting up the graveyards within the
metropolitan area.
If Lord Palmerston's legislation was influenced by
others, his manner of receiving deputations and answer-
ing memorials was entirely his own. Mr. Evelyn Ash-
ley records that when the people of Rugely wanted a
new name for their town, which had acquired notoriety
through having been the residence of the poisoner,
Palmer, the Home Secretary asked them how his own
name, " Palmerstown," would suit them. His answer
to the Presbytery of Edinburgh, who requested that a
national fast might be appointed on account of the visi-
tation of the cholera, was even more Palmerstonian, and
resulted, wrote Lord Shaftesbury, in his being regarded
by the religious world as little better than an infidel.
10 *
148 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
The Maker of the Universe [he replied] has established certain laws-
of nature for the planet in which we lire, and the weal or woe of man-
kind depends upon the observance or the neglect of these laws. One
of these laws connects health with the absence of those gaseous exha-
lations which proceed from overcrowded human dwellings, or from
decomposing substances, whether animal or vegetable ; and those
same laws render sickness the almost inevitable consequence of expo-
sure to these noxious influences. But it has, at the same time, pleased
Providence to place it within the power of man to make such arrange-
ments, as will prevent or disperse such exhalations so as to render
them harmless, and it is the duty of man to attend to those laws of
nature and to exert the faculties which Providence has thus given to
man for his own welfare. . . . When man has done the utmost for
his own safety , then is the time to invoke the blessing of Heaven to
give effect to his exertions.
During the existence of the unlucky Aberdeen Govern-
ment, Lord Palmerston not unfrequently acted as chief
of the ministerial party in the House of Commons,
while Lord John Eussell remained at Eichmond, dis-
gusted with the abnormal position of leader without
office, which the rearrangement of the Cabinet had com-
pelled him to accept. The Home Secretary's direction
of the business of the House was thoroughly good-
humoured and judicious; even Greville is constrained
to chronicle his great popularity with all sections of the
political world. But within the Cabinet there was but
little unanimity on any subject. The views of Lord
John Eussell and several of the Peelites, especially
Lord Aberdeen and Sir John Graham, were far more
advanced on the question of Eeform than were those of
Lord Palmerston and Lord Lansdowne, who disliked
the thing itself, and more particularly Lord John's per-
sistency in introducing a Eeform Bill at a moment when
the aspect of foreign affairs was menacing in the ex-
treme. The Home Secretary swallowed his objections
so far as to consent to serve on the committee of the
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 149
Cabinet for the preparation of the proposed Bill. But
when Lord John stated his scheme, Palmerston, in a
letter to Lord Lansdowne, raised a number of objec-
tions, which, in the opinion of Lord Aberdeen, as ex-
pressed in a letter dated the 14th of December, were
" so serious as to strike at the most essential principles
of the measure/' and which were accordingly rejected
by the Committee. Palmerston thereupon sent in his
resignation, and was out of the Cabinet for ten days.
The world naturally jumped to the conclusion that
Reform was only a pretext, and that Palmerston had
really resigned because of the want of vigour in the
Eastern policy of the Cabinet. Mr. Ashley appears to
countenance that idea, and Mr. Kinglake, going a step
further, actually asserts that Lord Palmerston was
" driven from office." But a passage in one of Palmer-
ston's letters to his brother-in-law, Mr. Sulivan,
directly contradicts that view ; and no one who reads
the correspondence between Lord Aberdeen and his dis-
sentient colleague, published in the Quarterly Review
of April 1877, can possibly doubt that the Reform
Bill was the sole reason for Palmerston' s resignation,
though the reviewer's suggestion that he hoped that
Lansdowne would also withdraw, and so break up the
Cabinet, appears to be rather uncharitable.
From the Malmesbury and Greville memoirs it may be
gathered that both parties in the Cabinet, that of the
Premier and the Home Secretary, were conscious of
having made a mistake in failing to come to terms, and
that a reconciliation was accordingly not difficult to
arrange. Lord Palmerston's withdrawal of his resignation
was accepted by the embarrassed Premier ; and the Home
Secretary, though he was compelled for the moment to
.accept the obnoxious Bill, was eventually compensated
150 LIFE OF VISCOUNT FALMFBSTON.
by its abandonment in the face of the complete indif-
ference of public opinion.
All this while Lord Palmerston, though most con-
scientious in his discharge of the duties of his multi-
farious office, and most assiduous in his attendance at the
House of Commons, was seldom absent in spirit from
the shores of the Golden Horn and the banks of the-
Danube. Even Mr. Cobden himself could hardly
have denied that the ex-Foreign Secretary, though he-
might be supposed to approach the Eastern Question
with prejudice, brought to bear upon it at any rate
a considerable amount of knowledge. Ever since
1830 he had made an intricate study of Eussian diplo-
macy, and had watched the twists and turns of Eussian
statesmanship in crises as serious as that of 1840. He
was yet at the Foreign Office when, in 1850, the dis-
pute concerning the guardianship of the Holy Places
was revived by Louis Napoleon, as a distinct bid against
Eussia for paramount influence in the East ; and he had
been duly warned by our Minister at Constantinople,
Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, that the question at issue,
though apparently trivial, might easily develop into one
of most serious moment. At the outset he attempted to
avert war by directing Lord Normanby to persuade the
French Government to moderate its unreasonable de-
mands in favour of the Latin Church. The Catholics
in Turkey, he pointed out, were few in number, there
were millions of Greeks ; Eussia, the protectress of the
latter, was a colossal power close on the Sultan's back;,
France, the advocate of the Catholics, was a long way
off.
As soon, however, as Prince MenschikofFs mission to
Constantinople disclosed an entirely new programme of
Eussian aggression, namely, a claim to a protectorate:
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 151
over all the Greeks within the Turkish Empire, which
was presented in the form of an ultimatum and sup-
ported by military demonstrations on the Turkish fron-
tier, Lord Palmerston's tone changed, and he advocated
the answering of threat by threat. He was aware, as
were the rest of the Ministry, that the Czar had long
ago told Sir Hamilton Seymour that the " sick man "
was at the point of death, and that in the division of
the inheritance, although he would not establish him-
self at Constantinople as proprietor, " as trustee — that
he would not say." And though he was not privileged like
Count Vitzthum to listen to the wild outbursts of the
Czar against ces chiens de Turcs, Palmerston must have
been aware that the existence of the fata] agreement
to recognise the Russian protectorship of the Greek reli-
gion in Syria, between the autocrat on the one hand,
and Peel, the Duke, and Aberdeen on the other,* would
drive Nicholas to new acts of menace directly Lord
Aberdeen returned to power.
Palmerston's description of the methods of Russian
encroachment is as true to day as it was when it was
written : —
The Russian Government [he wrote to Lord Clarendon] has always
had two strings to its bow — moderate language and disinterested pro-
fessions at St. Petersburg and at London ; active aggression by its
agents on the scene of operations. If the aggression succeed locally,
the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which
it did not intend but cannot in honour recede from. If the local
agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language pre-
viously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped
their instructions.
When this system of mingled threats and caresses was
followed by the occupation of the Principalities by a
Russian army, Palmerston urged that the French and
* Lord Malmesbury's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 402.
152 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
English fleets should at once he sent up to the Bos-
phorus to encourage the Porte and give check to the
Czar ; hut the Aherdeen party in the Cabinet was too
strong for him. Not that he was under the illusion that
such a course of action would prevent war; on the
contrary, he was of opinion that the Czar " was bent on
a stand-up fight," and felt that to meet the enemy half-
way was more consonant with the traditions of English
statesmanship, and would be more popular with the
country, than bated breath and whispered humbleness.
" If he [the Emperor] is determined to break a lance
with us," he wrote to Mr. Sidney Herbert, " why then,
have at him, say I, and perhaps he may have enough
of it before we have done with him." At the same time,
he had taken the right measure of the man when he
asserted that Nicholas was far more likely to yield to
action than to argument. If the Czar had known the
crossing of the Pruth would be made a casus belli, it
was probably that he would have thought twice about
crossing it ; when once he had crossed the river, it was
difficult to retreat without loss of honour at the bidding
of any Power or any collection of Powers.
Lord Palmerston had certainly interpreted the feeling
of the country aright. Young England was actually
eager for a war with Russia ; and nearly everyone was of
opinion that the extreme moderation of the English
Government was not likely to gain its end, and that a
bolder policy would more probably be crowned with
success. Lord Palmerston was known to favour a vigo-
rous conduct. Conscious, as he must have been of the
immense power that he wielded as the people's man in an
inharmonious administration, it is greatly to his credit
that he did not attempt to force the hand of our Foreign
Secretary, Lord Clarendon, during the anxious period
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 153
while it seemed as if peace might yet be achieved by
diplomacy. He even went so far as to conceal his
approbation on an occasion when Lord Clarendon sent
particularly bold directions to Sir Hamilton Seymour,
from fear lest words of praise from him whom men
called " Lord Firebrand," might make the Aberdeens
and Grahams of the Cabinet think that they were com-
mitted to some desperate adventure. In fact his relations
with Clarendon were most harmonious, and there is no
warrant for Greville's insinuation that he attempted to
undermine his colleagues by keeping up a correspon-
dence with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. To the views
of Prince Albert he paid far less deference, and wrote,
doubtless with considerable gusto, a slashing commen-
tary on the Prince's very sensible memorandum on
Eastern Affairs, which was far more critical than candid,
and which the Prime Minister subjected to a very un-
favourable examination.
Possibly the Home Secretary felt that when every
concession on the part of England and France was
followed by a fresh menace on the part of Russia, war,
sooner or later, was inevitable ; and that it was unneces-
sary to do more than record the fulfilment of his various
prophecies. Even Lord Aberdeen's belief in the pacific
intentions of the Emperor was shaken when, in return
for our advice to the Porte not to make the occupation
of the Principalities a casus belli, but to give diplomacy
another chance, a circular was issued by Count Nessel-
rode, in which that very occupation was declared to be
in answer to the presence of the British and French
squadrons outside the Dardanelles, where they had every
right to be stationed. " It is," wrote Palmerston, " the
robber who declares that he will not leave the house
until the policeman shall have first retired from the
154 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON,
back yard "; still he acquiesced in Lord Aberdeen's deci-
sion that an expostulation would for the moment be
enough. His opinion of the Vienna Note is not on
record. But, if we may judge by his advice on subse-
quent diplomatic attempts to create a modus vivendi
between Kussia and the Porte, he disapproved of the
vague language of the document which was so signally
turned to good account by Count Nesselrode, and
agreed with Lord Stratford in countenancing the right
of the Sultan to amend the note in his favour. It
was unjust, he contended, later on, to attempt to impose
a form of words on Turkey which we were not equally
prepared to impose on Eussia.
The chief blot on the system of action advocated by
Lord Palmerston, was that it was adapted rather to a
question in which England was acting single-handed,
than to one in which it was necessary to pay con-
siderable deference to the wishes of the other Powers.
He seems to have put his trust entirely in that Anglo-
French Alliance, of which by his approbation of the
coup d'etat he had been the creator, and to have paid small
regard to the moral support of Austria and Prussia. It
is true that in his public utterances, Lord Palmerston,
wishing, no doubt, to put a stop to the stories of
ministerial differences that were flying about, laid con-
siderable stress upon the value of the European concert.
" I believe," he said on Feb. 20th, 1854, "I shall not
overstate the truth when I say that the conduct of Eng-
land and France in that respect has been thoroughly
appreciated by Austria and by Prussia ; whereas if
matters had been hurried on in the course of last
summer, when we might have had no reason or right ta
expect their co-operation, I cannot persuade myself that
the conduct of Austria and Prussia would have been the
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 155
same as it is at the present time." But though the
voice was the voice of Palmerston, tho arguments were
the arguments of Aberdeen ; and the Home Secretary-
was more in his element when he proceeded to describe
the objects at issue.
All the Powers [he said] have acknowledged in the most solemn and
distinct manner that the independence and integrity of the Turkish
Empire is an essential condition for the maintenance of the peace of
Europe, that it is an essential element in the balance of power, and
that it would be a calamity to Europe if any attempt was made to
destroy that integrity and independence. Why, even Russia, while
she is pursuing the course which is acknowledged by all, except her-
self, to be fatal to that independence — even Russia does not venture to
deny that principle that the integrity and independence of the Turkish
Empire is an essential element and condition of the welfare of Europe.
Now, Sir, it is manifest that if Russia were to appropriate these terri-
tories now under the sway and sovereignty of the Sultan, she would
become a power too gigantic for the safety of the other states of
Europe. Bestriding the continent from north to south, possessing the
command of two seas, the Baltic and the Mediterranean, enveloping
the whole of Germany, embracing regions full of every natural re-
source, and with a population of enormous extent, she would become
dangerous to the liberties of Europe, and her power would be fatal to
the independence of other states. I say, therefore, it is the duty of the
other countries of Europe to prevent such enormous aggrandizement
of one Power as that which would result from such a change.
The declaration of war by Turkey, after the failure of
the Vienna Note had shown that the hour for the con-
flict of pens had gone by, was considered by Palmerston
to be not unnatural and not unwise. He was equally-
pleased with the successive decisions of the Cabinet to
give material support to Turkey : that of September by
which Lord Stratford was authorized to summon the
fleet to the Bosphorus, that of October by which he was
permitted to direct defensive operations in the Black
Sea. We had now crossed the Kubicon, Lord Palmer-
ston considered, and had taken Turkey by the hand; he
pooh-poohed, as has been mentioned above, the Priuce
156 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMFRSTON.
Consort's memorandum, in which a fear was expressed
lest the Turks were seeking " to obtain for themselves
the power of imposing a most oppressive rule of two
millions of fanatic Mussulmans over twelve millions of
Christians," and argued that —
No peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless
the Emperor consents to evacuate the Principalities, to abandon his
demands, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipulations of
former treaties upon which he has founded the pretensions which have
been the cause of existing difficulties.
This was a well-defined position with a vengeance ;
hut it had the merit of making the war something better
than a mere querelle d'Allemand, and answers the objec-
tions of historians like Mr. Spencer Walpole, who urge
that the Crimean campaign was unnecessary after the re-
tirement of the Russian troops from the Principalities.
On the following day came the news of the destruc-
tion of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, that untoward
event which more than any other precipitated the war ;
and it is to be noted that the British Cabinet, by way of
reprisal, agreed to the proposal of the French Emperor
that the combined squadrons should not merely enter the
Black Sea but " invite " every Eussian vessel they met
to return to Sebastopol, during the period of Palmer-
ston's absence from office. So that the blame, if blame
there be, for the actual commencement of hostilities
rests, not on the man who believed them from the first
to be inevitable, but upon his colleagues, including those
who had been most inclined to throw cold water on his
bold counsels in the past.
The war was unavoidable ; it was, to use a happy ex-
pression of the Prince Consort's, a " vindication of the
public law of Europe " ; but it was a serious matter, and
should not have been regarded by any responsible states-
man with a light heart. Probably Lord Palmerston did
THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY. 15?
appreciate its gravity ; but the outside world was not
allowed to suspect the fact, and his public utterances on
the eve of its declaration were couched in a tone of
flippancy and jocularity which, though possibly intended,,
as Mr. Ashley suggests, to keep up the heart and spirit
of the nation, can hardly be read now without a feeling
of irritation and regret. On March 7th, Lord Palmerston
presided over a banquet given at the Reform Club to Sir
Charles Napier, previous to his departure to take com-
mand of the Baltic fleet. Of his essentially after-dinner
remarks, and the rather small jokes with which they
were interspersed, it is unnecessary to reproduce any
specimens here ; but it is fair to mention that they were
discretion itself when compared with the utterances of
Sir James Graham, who was also present in the capacity
of First Lord of the Admiralty. When taken to task a.
few days later by Mr. Bright, in the House of Commons,,
Lord Palmerston made a still sorrier exhibition of him-
self, and for once in his life gave vent to some ill-
natured remarks. Mr. Bright, according to Lord
Shaftesbury, was one of the few men whom he really
regarded as an enemy ; and a desire to pay off old scores-
was probably his motive for beginning his answer with
u The honourable and reverend gentleman," and con-
tinuing, on pouvait bien donner le berceau, was well
content to have gained Central Italy at the price of the
cession of the French-speaking districts of Nice and
Savoy, showed no disposition to draw back from the
bargain. Still, though it was impossible any longer to^
co-operate with France, in the cause of Italian unity,
Lord Palmerston did not cease to help the peninsula as
best he could single-handed. When Garibaldi, havings
freed Sicily, was about to cross over to Naples, the
Emperor of the French wished to prevent him ; but his
request for the co-operation of the English fleet was
met with a curt refusal. And when Garibaldi's romantic
campaign was over, and he had handed over the two
Sicilies to Victor Emmanuel, the English Government,,
alone in Europe, hastened to recognise the new king-
dom of Italy.
The Italian revolution [wrote Lord John Russell to Sir James Hud-
son on October 27th, 1860] has been conducted with singular temper
and forbearance. The subversion of existing power has not been fol-
lowed, as is too often the case, by an outburst of popular vengeance.
The venerated forms of constitutional monarchy have been associated
with the name of a prince who represents an ancient and glorious
dynasty. . . . Her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient ground
for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and
Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia [by withdrawing
their ministers from Turin]. Her Majesty's Government will turn
their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up-
the edifices of their liberties amid the sympathies and good wishes of
Europe.
The Emperor of the French also was warned that the
Savoy coup must not be repeated ; and that the British
fleet would at once be sent to the scene of action,,
if the Emperor attempted to compensate France for the
creation of a powerful kingdom on her borders by the
annexation of Genoa or Sardinia. The expediency of
withdrawing the army of occupation from Rome was.
LORD PALMERSTON AND ITALY. 199
urged by him upon the Emperor again and again ; but
without effect, since Napoleon did not dare to affront
French clericalism. Lord Palmerston even entertained
the idea, and urged it more than once on the Italian
Cabinet, that Venetia should be acquired by purchase
from Austria. But the proposal was rejected as imprac-
ticable, and another war with Austria had to be under-
gone before Italy could recover Venetia.
The death of Count Cavour gave Lord Palmerston
an opportunity of paying a fine tribute to his memory,
and of placing thereby on record his own generous
sympathies with the cause of Italian unity. In a speech
in the House of Commons on June 6th, 1861, he said
that of Count Cavour " it might truly be said that he
had left a name * to point a moral and adorn a tale/ "
The moral is this — that a man of transcendant talents, of indomi-
table energy, and of inextinguishable patriotism, may, by the impulses
which his own mind may give his countrymen, aiding a righteous
cause and seizing favourable opportunities, notwithstanding difficulties
that appear at first sight insurmountable, confer on his country great
and most inestimable benefits. . . . The tale with which Count
Cavour's memory will be associated is one of the most extraordinary
— I may say one of the most romantic in the history of the world.
Under his influence, we have seen a people who were supposed to
have become torpid in the enjoyment of luxury, to have been enervated
by the pursuit of pleasure, and to have had no knowledge or feeling in
politics except what may have been derived from the traditions of their
history and the jealousies of rival states — we have seen that people,
under his guidance and at his call, rising from the slumber of ages,
breaking that spell with which they had so long been bound, and dis-
playing on just occasions the courage of heroes, the sagacity of states-
men, the wisdom of philosophers, and obtaining for themselves that
unity of political existence which for centuries has been denied them.
I say, these are great events in history, and that the man whose name
will go down in connection with them to posterity, whatever may
have been the period of his death, however premature it may have
been for the hopes of his countrymen, cannot be said to have died too
soon for his glory and fame.
200 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
CHAPTER XIII.
HOME AFFAIRS.
1859-1865.
Lord Palmerston's Second Cabinet — His relations with the Radicals
and the Opposition — The Reform Bill — Lord Palmerston and Mr.
Gladstone — The Paper Duties Bill — His views on the National
Defences — The Fortifications Bill — Legislation and Appointments
— The Charges commonly brought against Lord Palmerston's
Government — His Irish Policy.
The administration formed by Lord Palmerston in
June 1859 was, in point of ability, perhaps the
strongest that had been entrusted with the affairs of the
nation since the famous ministry " of All the Talents "
collected under the leadership of (rrenville and Fox in
1806.* Lord John Kussell's fixed determination to
* Lord Palmerston's second Cabinet was composed as follows : —
First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Palmerston.
Lord Chancellor, Lord Campbell.
President of the Council, Earl Granville.
Lord Privy Seal, The Duke of Argyll.
Home Secretary, Sir G. Cornewall Lewis.
Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell.
Colonial Secretary, The Duke of Newcastle.
Secretary for War, Mr. Sidney Herbert.
Secretary for India, Sir Charles Wood.
HOME AFFAIRS. 201
have the Foreign Office and nothing else, was the cause
of the exclusion of Lord Clarendon, a loss, perhaps,
less to be regretted than it would otherwise have been,
because of the Italian complication. Sir James Gra-
ham, during the brief remainder of his life, played the
congenial part of the candid friend of Liberalism. Mr.
•Cobden refused to listen to the voice of the siren, and
declined the presidency of the Board of Trade. Other-
wise, the Ministry was composed of the flower of
the Peelites, Whigs, and Eadicals, as a glance at the
list below will show. But though an extremely able
administration, it was composed of the most discor-
dant elements, and was in fact, far more of a coali-
tion than Lord Aberdeen's government. Its three most
important members, the Prime Minister, Lord John
Bussell, and Mr. Gladstone, were, as we have said in
the previous chapter, in thorough accord on the Italian
question, and it is pleasant to see the cordiality with
which the two veterans, after years of " tit-for-tat *' and
" paying one another out," worked together in the
shaping of our relations with the continental powers in
the autumn of their days. But Lord John and Lord
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone.
First Lord of the Admiralty, The Duke of Somerset.
President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Milner Gibson.
Postmaster- General, Lord Elgin.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Sir George Grey.
Chief Commissioner of the Poor Law Board, The Hon. Charles
Villiers.
Chief Secretary for Ireland, Mr. Cardwell.
Lord Carlisle was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; Mr. James Wilson
Vice-President of the Board of Trade and Paymaster of the Forces ; Mr.
Lowe, Vice-President of the Council ; Sir Richard Bethell (Lord
Westbury), Attorney-General, and, on the death of Lord Campbell in
1861, Lord Chancellor.
202 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMFBSTON.
Palmerston were, of course, of entirely different minds?
on the question of Reform ; the Prime Minister and Mr.
Gladstone fell out about the national defences. There
was a large section of the Cabinet who regarded the
Premier as little better than a Tory in disguise, and
another which utterly distrusted his foreign policy.
That Lord Palmerston should have held such a body of
men together until his death, with considerably less
than the average number of resignations, is perhaps the
greatest of his feats as a parliamentary manager. And
critics who accuse him of degrading political life by
shelving important questions and so forth, should
remember that daring tactics are impossible when a
general is surrounded by a divided staff.
The difficulties with which Lord Palmerston had to
contend were increased by the confusion that prevailed
among the rank and file of both parties. As has occurred
very frequently in our political history, the real divisions-
did not coincide with the sections into which parties
nominally fell ; the gulf between Lord Palmerston and
the Conservatives was far narrower than that between
Lord Palmerston and the Cobdenites, and as the minis-
terial majority was not very large, the defection of the
latter was a most dangerous eventuality. Lord Palmer-
ston's real strength lay accordingly in the strange fact
that while the Radicals were, as several of Mr. Cobden's
letters prove, speculating eagerly on his approaching
downfall, the Conservatives on the other hand, having
had more than enough of office in a minority, were
anxious that he should remain in power until they had
a chance of coming in on a full tide. If, under the
circumstances, Lord Palmerston had actually made
overtures for the support of the Opposition against
his nominal friends, the step should be blameworthy
HOME AFFAIRS. 20S
only in the eyes of the mere political hack, who affects
to think that his party has the monopoly of the
cardinal virtues. But Mr. Ashley distinctly denies that
there was any secret understanding — of a permanent
nature as we understand him — and that the most that
happened was that when Lord Malmeshury gratuitously
offered to Lady Palmerston, in the name of Lord
Derby, the support of the Conservative party, in the
event of the resignations of Lord John Russell on
Reform and of Mr. Gladstone on the Paper Duties Bill,
for the remainder of the session of 1860, the offer was
gratefully accepted. A transaction which, if carried
into effect, would have thwarted the wrecking of a Go-
vernment to further the desires of individuals, appears^
to be distinctly creditable to both parties concerned.
Lord John Russell's advocacy of Reform was less
determined than Mr. Gladstone's opposition to the ex-
penditure on the defences, and was disposed of by Lord
Palmerston by the simple device of letting him have his-
way. On the 1st of March 1860, the anniversary of
the great measure which he had introduced twenty-nine
years before, the Foreign Secretary brought in a Bill of
which the effect was to lower the franchise from £10 to
£6, and to redistribute twenty-five seats. But he soon
found that the country cared little about the Bill, the
House still less, and it perished in Committee. Lord
Palmerston's speech was, as Mr. Disraeli said, very hap-
pily, " not so much in support of, as about " the Reform
Bill ; and in his reports to the Queen he made little or
no attempt to conceal his satisfaction at its approaching^
demise. In fact, his whole course of action was one of
most judicious expediency. Even Lord John Russell
was compelled to acknowledge that " the apathy of the
country was undeniable, nor was it a transient humour."
204 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
This the Radicals too discovered when they stumped
the North of England on the question. If it had been
set aside for the moment, the Prime Minister said, in
1862, in answer to Mr. Cobden, it was owing in a
great degree to the feeling of the House of Commons ;
it was owing in a still greater degree to the general
feeling of the constituencies in the country ; and it was
most eminently owing to the course pursued in regard
to the question by Mr. Cobden himself and Mr. Bright,
for there was no denying that the tone which was taken
•on the subject by many of those who advocated the ques-
tion had the effect of weaning from it those who were
formerly most anxious for it. " Why do we not bring
in a Reform Bill ?" said Lord Palmerston to Rowcliffe at
Tiverton ; " because we are not geese." The truth of the
inference is undeniable, and it does not necessarily imply
that Lord Palmerston imagined that he had thrust aside
Parliamentary Reform for an indefinite period. All
that he meant was that the question was not ripe for
solution at the moment.
The questions at issue between Lord Palmerston and
the Chancellor of the Exchequer were less easy of
solution. There seems to have been a certain want of
personal cordiality between the two men. Lord Shaftes-
bury has placed on record the old Premier's saying
concerning his ambitious lieutenant, " He has never
behaved to me as a colleague." But affairs of State
were almost certainly the causa causans of their diffe-
rences. Lord Palmerston distrusted the approximation
of his colleague to Radicalism. " Gladstone will soon
have it all his own way/' he told Lord Shaftesbury,
tl and, whenever he gets my place, we shall have strange
doings." The Chancellor, on the other hand, natu-
rally felt bitterly annoyed at the temporary annihilation
HOME AFFAIRS. 205
of most of the good effects of the commercial treaty
negotiated by Mr. Cobden and the Emperor, a treaty in
which he took the utmost interest, by the deep distrust
entertained by the Prime Minister towards the " Sphinx
of the Seine " in 1860 and onwards. He had to submit
to the temporary abandonment of one of his most
popular measures for lightening the burdens upon the
people at the bidding of the House of Lords, and for
purposes of constructing coast-defences and ironclads.
He seems also to have agreed with the Kadicals in
stigmatising what Palmerston called a policy of defence
as one of defiance. So completely were his views at
variance with those of the Prime Minister that Mr.
Cobden was of opinion that he ought to have left the
Cabinet.
The rejection of the Paper Duties Bill by the House
of Lords was undoubtedly prompted by patriotic motives,
and not, as was systematically stated at the time, bv a
bigoted desire to hinder the spread of knowledge among
the people. The chief reason for the temporary un-
popularity of the Cobden commercial treaty was that it
cheapened the necessities of war, coal and iron, for our
possible antagonists; and for similar reasons, the
opinion prevailed that when war was in sight, the volun-
tary abandonment of a source of revenue which brought
in over a million and a quarter a year was most inexpe-
dient. In fact, their action was dictated entirely by
prudential considerations ; and if an important consti-
tutional question, whether the Upper House had the
right to reject a money-tax, was raised, it was raised only
incidentally. Public opinion approved of the conduct
of the Upper House, because it held that they had con-
sulted wisely for the interests of the moment ; and Lord
Palmerston was in thorough concord with the nation, as
206 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
Oreville suspected and Lord Malmesbury knew, though
he was compelled [by the necessities of his position to
veil his satisfaction under an air of assumed displeasure.
His management of the dispute in its later stages was
masterly in the extreme. By appointing a committee
of the House of Commons to consider the validity of
Lord Lyndhurst's contention that the House of Lords
had a right to reject, though not to originate or alter
money Bills, he gave the angry passions of the Radical
party time to cool ; while the purely historical character
of the report of the committee served as a useful basis
for the judicious resolutions which, while asserting that
the House of Lords had acted within their right, upheld
the privileges of the Commons in a manner which even
Mr. Gladstone acknowledged was " mild and temperate
but firm."
The more general question of the necessity of spend-
ing millions on the fortifications of the coast caused
still greater friction in the Cabinet. In 1860, Lord
Palmerston wrote to the Queen that " however great the
loss to the Government by the retirement of Mr. Glad-
stone, it would be better to lose Mr. Gladstone
than to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or
Plymouth " ; and when the Fortifications Bill was intro-
duced, the Chancellor of the Exchequer reserved for
bimself the right to take what course he pleased in the
following year, a course which the Prime Minister de-
scribed to Her Majesty as likely to be one of "ineffec-
tual opposition and ultimate acquiescence." And in
1861, Mr. Gladstone, in his Budget speech, commented
on the nation's " increased susceptibility to excitement,
in our proneness to constant and apparently boundless
augmentations of expenditure." He was thus tho-
roughly in agreement with Cobden, who, on July 10th,
HOME AFFAIRS. 207
1860, wrote an able letter to Lord Palmerston urging
the postponement of the fortification scheme, and in
1862 forwarded to the Premier a memorandum in which
he suggested that the Governments of England and
France should come to an understanding about the
•number of ships of war which each of the two countries
should maintain.
The Prime Minister's counter arguments are to be
found in Mr. Ashley's biography, and may be
summarised here as far as they deal with the general
principles of coast defence. In a letter dated Decem-
ber 1859, he pointed out to Mr. Gladstone how liable
to invasion England was. One night, he wrote,
is enough for the passage to our coast, and twenty
thousand men might be landed simultaneously at Ports-
mouth, Plymouth, and in Ireland, with the result that
our dockyards would be destroyed before twenty thou-
sand men could be got together to defend either of
them. Or the manoeuvre of the first Napoleon might
T^e repeated and a large French fleet with troops on board
despatched to the West Indies. Were we then to leave
our colonies to their fate, or were we to go in pursuit,
leaving our coast bare in case the French doubled back ?
In April 1862, in a letter to the same, he denied that
England was acting under the influence of panic.
Panic there has been none on the part of anybody. There was for
a long time an apathetic blindness on the part of the governed and
the governors as to the defensive means of the country compared
with the offensive means acquired and acquiring by other Powers.
The country at last woke up from its lethargy, not, indeed, to rush
into extravagance and uncalled-for exertions, but to make up gradu-
ally for former omissions, and so far, no doubt, to throw upon a
• shorter period of time expenses which earlier foresight might have
spread over a greater length of time. The Government, the Parlia-
ment, and the nation acted in harmonious concert ; and if any proof
were wanting that the nation has been inspired by a deliberate
208 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
and sagacious appreciation of its position "with respect to other
Powers, that proof has been afforded by the long-continued and well-
sustained sacrifices of time and money which have been made by the
160,000 volunteers, and by those who have contributed to supply them;
with requisite funds.
To Mr. Oobden's proposal for a mutual limitation of
armaments the Prime Minister only sent the most
general reply.
It would be very delightful [he wrote] if your Utopia could be-
realised, and if the nations of the earth would think of nothing but
peace and commerce, and would give up quarrelling and fighting alto-
gether. But, unfortunately, man is a fighting and quarrelling animal j
and that this is human nature is proved by the fact that republics,
where the masses govern, are far more quarrelsome and more ad-
dicted to fighting than monarchies, which are governed by compara-
tively few persons. But so long as other nations are animated by
these human passions, a country like England, wealthy, and exposed
to attack, must by necessity be provided with the means of defence,
and however dear these means may be, they are infinitely cheaper
than the war which they tend to keep off.
The speech,"* in which Palmerston proposed the
raising of nine millions to he spent in fortifying the
dockyards, contained a remarkable account of the dangers-
to which the country was exposed, which is not without
interest at the present moment. Invasion, he said,
might be made for three purposes, first, with the hope
of conquest, which he thought no foreign country would
imagine to be possible ; secondly, to get possession of
London, and there levy contributions or dictate an
ignominious peace. This kind of attack could only be
resisted by an army in the field. London was too vast
a space to be surrounded by fortifications, and there
were strong natural positions between it and the coast
which could be successfully held by a large force. The
size of some of the great harbours, Liverpool and New-
* July 23rd, 1860.
HOME AFFAIRS. 209
castle for instance, made it also extremely difficult to
fortify them, but they could be defended by batteries
from the only kind of attack to which they were liable
^the attack of small squadrons for purposes of mis-
chief and for levying contributions. But the operation
which he apprehended was most likely to be attempted,
was that of landing a considerable force for the purpose
of destroying our dockyards.
If your dockyards are destroyed, your navy is cut up by the roots.
If any naval action were then to take place, your enemy, whatever the
success of it might be, would have his dockyards, arsenals, and stores
to refit and replenish and reconstruct his navy; while, with your
dockyards burned and your stores destroyed, you would have no
means of refitting your navy and sending it out to battle. If ever we
lose the command of the sea, what becomes of this country ? Only
let hon. gentlemen compare how dependent we are for everything that
constitutes national wealth — aye, and a large portion of national food,
on free communication by sea. We import about ten million quarters
of corn annually, besides enormous quantities of coffee, sugar, and
tea and cotton, which is next to corn for the support of the people by
enabling them to earn their food. Our wealth depends on the expor-
tation of the products of our industry, which we exchange for those
things which are necessary for our social position. Our exports
amount to considerably more than one hundred millions in value
annually. Picture to yourselves for a moment such places as Liver-
pool, Bristol, Glasgow, and London, that is to say the Thames,
blockaded by a hostile force.
The resistance offered by the Prime Minister to thd
cry of economy in military and naval expenditure, even
when raised by the most important member of hid
Cabinet, is assuredly much to his credit. And it should
be remembered also that, if he played no active part in the
great financial triumphs of his second administration,
the Cobden treaty and Mr. Gladstone's budgets, he at
any rate sympathised thoroughly with their objects as
far as they were purely commercial and did not interfere
14
210 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
with the naval and military strength of England. The
budgets alone are enough to absolve the second Paliner-
ston Cabinet from the charge of useless inactivity ; but
a perusal of the Queen's Speeches at the close of each
Session conveys also the impression that the two
Houses, without attempting heroic legislation, succeeded
in getting through a vast amount of unpretentious but
exceedingly useful work — Prisons Bills, Partnership
Liability Bills, Crime Chargeability Bills, and so forth.
Lord Westbury, one of the greatest of modern Lord
Chancellors, made vigorous efforts at law reform, and
though the result fell far short of his plans, he at any
rate induced the public to take an interest in the techni-
calities of land transfer and the registration of title.
To the Prime Minister, and also, though in a less
degree, to the leader of the Opposition, must be assigned
much of the credit for the business-like character of the
debates. Though the average of oratorical ability was
possibly not very high, the speeches were generally to
the point, the discussions were never unduly protracted,
and the Sessions, instead of dragging on into Septem-
ber, were generally over by the middle of August; and
once, in 1865, Parliament rose on the 6th of July.
Halcyon were the nights for the most part, and their
peacefulness was due to the unfailing tact with which
the aged Premier, though not a frequent speaker,
restored by his timely interventions a querulous House
to a sense of dignity, and an angry House to good
humour. If there was comparatively little wool in
those days there was also little cry.
Another feature that the apologist of Lord Palmers-
ton's second Ministry will dwell upon with pleasure is
its freedom from jobbery. This we say, notwithstand-
ing the scandal that was created by certain peccadilloes
HOME AFFAIRS. 211
of Lord Westbury during the last months of its active
existence. The various cases of abuse of patronage
were certainly proved to the hilt, though no attempt
was made to establish a charge of personal corruption
against the Lord Chancellor; but the incident did not
damage the Government as a whole, and the nation
proved by its verdict at the polls, that it fully accepted
Lord Palmerston's explanation, that Lord Westbury had
been advised to remain at his post in order that the
question might be sifted by parliamentary inquiry. As
to the propriety of Lord Palmerston's own distribution
of patronage, both lay and ecclesiastical, the evidence
contained in the numerous official letters reproduced by
Mr. Ashley is most conclusive ; he was no nepotist. His
recommendations to ecclesiastical appointments were,
no doubt, a rock of offence to the High Church party
in general and to Bishop Wilberforce in particular ; but
the outcry amounted to no more than this — that the
" Shaftesbury bishops " were chosen almost entirely
from the Evangelical party. Even an undue partiality
for one section of the Establishment would have been
preferable to choices dictated by political or family
interests; but Lord Shaftesbury, in his diary, disposes
of the accusation. Altogether the charge was true, he
said, of the first bishops; they were decidedly of an
Evangelical character, but after Lord Palmerston's
junction with the Peelites, that is after 1859, the best
men were chosen, no matter to which wing of the
Church they professed to belong."*
And now for the most serious accusation that has
been brought against Lord Palmerston by political
* Hodder's Life of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, vol. iii. pp.
196-200.
14 *
212 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
thinkers — that he degraded public opinion. Now this,
and similar charges, practically resolve themselves into
two : — That Lord Palmerston approached matters of
grave importance with levity, and that he deliberately left
undone much that he ought to have done. To the
former of them candour compels a reluctant assent ; but
even that assent need not necessarily be unqualified.
For, in the first place, instances of misplaced flippancy,
like the remarks at the Napier banquet, are unfortu-
nately remembered far more easily, and lend themselves
far more readily to quotation by the severe critic than
passages of dignified earnestness. It is only just to
recollect that outbreaks like the " honourable and re-
verend gentleman. " speech were far rarer with Lord
Palmerston during his last years, and never so accen-
tuated. And if Lord Palmerston failed sometimes
to strike a deeply reverberating note, the reason is,
perhaps, to be found in the fact that he was always,
in his latter days, compelled by the weakness of his
eyesight to speak without preparation. But there were
occasions on which he rose to a height worthy of his
subject. The death of Cavour was one ; and there is
a good deal of distinction in some of his speeches at
the time of the American war.
When we come to the charge that Lord Palmerston
was associated with no great distinct policy, it might be
sufficient to reply that during his first Ministry he had to
deal with the Crimean war and the Mutiny ; during the
second he directed vast fiscal reforms, and it was cer-
tainly not entirely from motives of self-preservation
that, when the Government was attacked by Mr. Disraeli
for the mismanagement of the Schleswig-Holstein ques-
tion, the old Premier pointed with pride to the finan-
cial triumphs of the time as a reason why Parliament
HOME AFFAIRS. 213
and the nation might reasonably continue to support
him. Besides he was over four-score years of age when
he died ; the ideals of his manhood had for the most
part been translated into fact, and when a statesman is
over seventy he does not readily adopt new programmes.
Mr. Cobden reproached Lord Palmerston for not advoca-
ting the ballot ; he replied that he did not believe in the
ballot, and that he, not Mr. Cobden, had been placed by
the nation at the head of affairs.
It would [he said] no doubt be not at all right for followers to follow
a leader from whom they differed, but it is too much to insist that the
leader should follow them wherever they pleased. The hon. member
says I have opposed the ballot. I have done so ; and I did it because
I unfortunately differ from him in opinion upon that measure. He
believes the ballot to be a moral good. I believe it would have an
immoral effect. If he can convince me I am wrong, I would be most
ready to adopt his views, but until that time comes, sitting here, sent
by those whom I represent, to act according to the best of my judg-
ment, I must take leave to act upon my own judgment and to oppose
a measure which I think would be injurious to the public interests.
It is, of course, undeniable that since Lord Palmerston
passed away many extensive changes of unquestionable
benefit have been effected, and many useful measures
added to the statute book. But, without going into
questions of the expediency of State interference and
considerations of how far it is possible to make a
people virtuous by acts of Parliament, it is surely only
fair to urge that sufficient unto the day is the legis-
lation thereof, and that the English, whose Constitution
has been the growth of centuries, are the last nation
in the world whom it would profit to be perpetually
engaged in paroxysms of law-making. The constituen-
cies of 1859 felt that enough had been done for the
present in the cause of liberty, that they could linger
awhile on the ebb tide of economic improvements. u It is
214 LIFE OF VISCO TJNT PALMERSTON.
plain/* the Premier said in 1864, " that there does not
exist the same desire for organic charge which was ob-
servable some time ago. The fact is that organic
changes were introduced more as a means than as an
end, the end being great improvement in the whole of
our economical legislation. All such changes as have
been desirable have long since been effected, as the re-
sult of our organic reforms, and therefore there is no
such desire now for further innovations." He was per-
fectly right ; for the Reform Bills passed since his day-
have been " dishing " measures passed by politicians for
the discomfiture of their adversaries rather than to
satisfy any real popular demand. At the General Elec-
tion of 1865 came the first symptoms of the desire
for a new advance, and then Lord Palmerston died,
happy, perhaps, in the opportunity of his death. The
old constituencies were, besides, keenly interested in
foreign politics, and sufficiently enlightened to see
that what was going on in the East or in the
United States was of supreme moment to themselves.
In that respect their successors have changed for the
worse. And they were right in regarding Palmerston
as a safe guardian of the national honour. For, unless
the preceding pages have been written wholly in vain,
it is almost superflous to say here that he never ceased
for a single moment to keep before the nation the great
lesson that Empires are kept as they are gained, by
courage, self-reliance, and the rejection of morbid self-
consciousness.
His policy with regard to Ireland was one of simple
common sense ; he had no belief that legislation could
fight against nature, but he did believe that a firm
administration of the law would produce security and
so attract capital to the country. In the last great
HOME AFFAIRS. 215
speech he ever made, his views were expounded with
remarkable clearness. It contained an eloquent tribute
to the talents and industry of the Irish peasantry, and
it assigned the paramount reason for the continued emi-
gration of the Irish to the peculiarities of their climate.
You cannot expect [he continued] that any artificial remedies
which legislators can invent can reconstruct the laws of nature, and
keep in one country a population which finds it to its advantage to
emigrate to another. Things will find their level, and until by some
means or other there shall be provided in Ireland the same remunera-
tion for labour, and the same inducement to remain which are afforded
by other countries, you cannot by any laws which you can devise pre-
vent the people from seeking elsewhere a better condition of things
than exists in their own country. We are told that tenant-right and
a great many other things will do it. None of these things will have
the slightest effect. As to tenant-right, I may be allowed to say that
I think it is equivalent to landlord's wrong. Tenant-right, as I un-
derstand it to be proposed, would be little short of confiscation ; and
though it might cause the landlords to emigrate, it certainly would not
keep the tenants at home. The real question is how can you create
in Ireland that demand and reward for labour which would render the
people of Ireland willing to remain at home, instead of emigrating to
England or Scotland on the one hand, or to the North American States
on the other. Nothing can do that except the influence of capital.
He was as firmly opposed to the creation of fixity of
tenure by statute as was Mr. Gladstone when he intro-
duced the Land Act of 1870. With regard to compen-
sation for improvements, however, Lord Palmerston's
Government in 1860 passed an important Act, by which,
in cases where landlord and tenant agreed, compensation
could be fixed by a Government valuer, and secured in
the form of an annuity on the estate. Thus he believed
that legislation could accomplish something for Ireland,
though he shrank from banishing political economy to
Jupiter and Saturn.
His views on the terribly vexed topic of Irish Univer-
sity education were equally moderate. Undenomina-
216 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
tional education was the only solution, and he thought
that the conferment of degrees might safely be entrusted
to the aggregate university body of the Queen's Col-
leges. The experience of Maynooth, " a place where young
men were brought up to be bigoted in religion, to feel
for Protestants theological hatred, and to feel political
hatred against England," made him adverse to granting
degrees to the Catholic College, even if, as Mr. Glad-
stone attempted to contrive in his Irish Education Bill,
it formed one of a number of affiliated institutions-
But he died before the questions advanced into the
political foreground.
217
CHAPTER XIY.
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES.
1860-1863.
Lord Palnierston's distrust of Napoleon — Permanent and Special
Reasons — Speech on the Fortifications Bill and Conversation with
Count Flahault — The Anglo-French Expedition to China — The
American Civil War — England's declaration of neutrality — The
Trent and Alabama affairs — The Mexican expedition.
Distrust of France and of the Emperor of the French
was the distinguishing feature of Lord Palmerston's
foreign policy during the last five years of his life. And,
though it may seem inconsistent that the Statesman who
had heen the pivot of the Anglo-French alliance during
the Crimean war, should abruptly part company with his
former friend and become his undisguised opponent, the
Prime Minister was in reality no more inconsistent than
when, at an earlier period of his career, he had thrown
over the entente cordiale with Louis Philippe. For
with Palmerston the interests of his country were all in
all, and he would never have consented to surrender
an infinitesimal part of them to further the designs of
Louis Napoleon or anyone else. He had trusted the
Emperor to the last ; perhaps, during the Italian cam-
218 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
paign beyond the limits of prudence. But his eyes were-
opened by the annexation of Nice and Savoy, still more
by the " natural frontiers " theory, which was then put
forward as the reason for that act of Vandalism, and the
additional violation of the arrangements of 1815 com-
mitted by Napoleon when he refused to hand over to<
Switzerland, Ohablais and Faucigny, the northern dis-
tricts of Savoy, which had been declared by the Con-
gress of Vienna to share in the neutrality of the Hel-
vetic Federation. The " natural frontiers " theory was
evidently capable of being put into practice in several
directions, practically towards the Rhine, where the re-
sistance, thanks to the want of cohesion among the
German states, would possibly be feeble in the extreme.
The Cabinet was constrained to declare through the
mouth of Lord John Russell that upon such an unsettle-
ment of the peace of Europe, England would not pur-
sue a policy of isolation.
Lord Palmerston was no milk-and-water enemy, and
his distrust of the Emperor was undoubtedly to some
degree exaggerated. Napoleon might have had " a mind
like a rabbit-warren," but it did not necessarily follow,
from his recent proceedings, that he had intended all along
to " avenge Waterloo," and that his design was to beat
■ •' with our aid or with our concurrence or with our neu-
trality, first Russia and then Austria, and by dealing
with them generously to make them his friends in any
subsequent quarrel with us." That was a somewhat
unsubstantial specimen of a deductive argument, and
Lord Palmerston was in all probability equally under a
delusion when he ascribed to the French Emperor the
design of instigating Spain to seize Tangiers, and so, by
occupying fortified points on each side of the gut of
Gibraltar, of \irtually shutting England out of the Medi-
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 21$
terranean. His suspicions were also based upon a slight
substratum of fact when he accused Napoleon, who, as
mandatory of the Powers, had sent an expedition to
put down a bloody and barbarous war of religion be-
tween the Druses and Maronites in Syria, of being
actuated by the desire of permanently occupying that
country. Lord Palmerston seems, in fact, to have
hardly appreciated the position of the man of Decem-
ber. Napoleon was not ungrateful ; he was fully con-
scious, as his letters to the Queen and the Prince Con-
sort clearly prove, that he owed nearly everything to
England. She had been the first power to give him a
status; and without her make- weight, he would never
have been able to pose, even for a moment, as the
holder of the European balance. If the French alliance
was useful to Lord Palmerston, the English alliance was
to the Emperor as the breath of his nostrils.
At the same time there were both permanent and
special reasons for regarding the Emperor of the French
as an untrustworthy ally. The permanent reasons were
compressed in the contradictions of his position. The
elected of a plebiscite, the crowned ex-Carbonaro, was
logically bound to assist subjects against the sovereigns,
on the other hand, a ruler who claimed to govern by
Divine right, was equally bound to uphold the royal y
and particularly the Papal, power. He had thus no-
firm basis of action ; and, as the author of the coup d'etat r
the patentee of a veiled autocracy, he was irresistibly
driven to risky adventures abroad, so as to distract
the French nation from the spectacle of ministerial cor-
ruption and financial mismanagement, in which the
Second Empire was rapidly being engulfed. The man
of December was, in short, developing into the man of
Mexico and Sedan.
220 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
The special reasons were to be found iu the vast naval
preparations which were being hurried on in the French
ports, and which evidently menaced a maritime power.
It was in vain that the Emperor protested that his navy
was not sufficient for his wants, and that Mr. Cobden,
of course in perfect good faith, attempted to persuade
the Cabinet that the alarm was entirely baseless.
We know [said Lord Palmerston, on the Fortifications Bill] that
the utmost exertions are made and still are making, to create a navy
very nearly equal to our own — a navy which cannot be required for
purposes of defence for France, and which, therefore, we are justified
in looking upon as a possible antagonist we may have to encounter — a
navy which, under present arrangements, would provide to our neigh-
bours the means of transporting within a very few hours a large and
formidable number of troops to our coast.
And he made no disguise of the fact that the increased
expenditure on our defences was necessitated by the
attitude of France.
It is impossible for any man to cast his eyes over the face of
Europe, and to see and hear what is passing, without being convinced
that the future is not free from danger. It is difficult to say where
the storm may burst ; but the horizon is charged with clouds which
Ijetoken the possibility of a tempest. The Committee, of course, knows
that in the main I am speaking of our immediate neighbours across
the channel, and there is no use in disguising it. No one has any
right to take offence at considerations and reflections which are
purely founded upon the principles of self-defence.
A few months previously, Lord Palmerston had stated
his meaning with even more definiteness in the well-
known conversation with old Count Flahault, then French
Ambassador in London, as they drove together to the
House of Commons. He bluntly told him that it was
impossible to trust the Emperor any longer; and that if
war was forced upon England, England would fearlessly
accept it.
" This was very spirited and becoming/' was the ver-
dict of Greville in one of the last entries in his journal
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 221
upon an imperfect report of the conversation being
transmitted to him by Lord Clarendon. And though it
is proverbially difficult to prove a negative, the terms of
the Emperor's letter of self-exculpation to Count Per-
signy of the 23rd of July 1860 fairly warrant the con-
clusion that in this case post hoc and propter hoc were
identical, and that war was averted by Lord Palmerston's
firm language, backed up by preparations for war. At
all events, the relations between the two countries grew
considerably less fraught with danger, and the inter-
national friendship was almost reconnected before the
close of the year by the success of the joint Anglo-French
expedition to China, under Sir Hope Grant aud General
Montauban, better known as Count Palikao. Pekin was
taken, and the ratification of the important Treaty of
Tien-tsin, which had been signed by Lord Elgin two
years previously, was at length wrung from the Celestial
Government.
The breach was, however, never completely healed,
and it was well that the British Government continued
to be on its guard against the dreamer of the Tuileries ;
otherwise, we should have been almost inevitably em-
broiled in the American Civil war. More than once in
the course of that struggle, the Emperor of the French
urged our Ministers to recognise the Southern States,
but he was always met with a firm but courteous refusal.
That refusal was greatly to their credit. There could
be no doubt that there was in England a strong cur-
rent of feeling in favour of the South, especially among
the upper classes. Material interests may be consi-
dered to have influenced the commercial stratum of
society more than the fact that the Virginians could
trace descent from the Cavaliers. The closure of the
Southern harbours would cut off the cotton trade, and
222 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
inflict vast losses upon manufacturers, if not, as actually
occurred, famine upon their workmen. Mr. Gladstone
gave expression to a very prevalent feeling, when, in his
famous speech at Manchester, he declared that Mr.
Jefferson Davis had made an army, had made a navy,
and, more than that, had made a nation.
How far Lord Palmerston shared the views of
his Chancellor of the Exchequer it is difficult to say
with any appoach to certainty. Mr. Ashley tells
us that though he admired the American people, the
politicians of the United States appeared to him to
fail on the score of character ; and he certainly would
not have committed himself to remarks ahout the " un-
fortunate rapid movements" of the Federal troops at
the hattle of Bull's Eun, unless he had anticipated a
speedy triumph for the Confederate cause. All the more
credit is due to him for having observed a complete
neutrality" at the outset of the struggle. A letter to Mr.
Ellice establishes beyond all doubt the prudence of his
motives. He was all for non-intervention until the
" wire edge of the craving appetite for conflict had
worn off "; and he pointed out that it was impossible to
intervene upon any sound basis, except that of separa-
tion, the discussion of which would evidently be prema-
ture, or without committing ourselves to an acknow-
ledgment of the principle of slavery, and the right to
pursue fugitive slaves from State to State. But, it may
be said, did not Her Majesty's Government, by the
act of proclaiming neutrality, acknowledge the South
as a belligerent power, and so virtually play into its
hands ? The answer is conclusive and complete. Un-
less the South was acknowledged as a belligerent power,
there was obviously no war going on. If there was no
war, the English Government could not be expected
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 223
to recognise the blockade of the Southern ports.
The recognition of the South as a belligerent power
was indeed to the advantage of the North, as its advo-
cates discovered when, in the crisis .of the English
ootton-famine, numerous appeals were made to Mini-
sters in the House of Commons to break the blockade,
which was paralyzing the energies and stopping the
supplies of the Confederate Government. Fortunately,
Lord Palmerston and his colleagues stood firm; and
sought relief for the deficiency, not in embroiling
themselves in their neighbours' quarrel, but in drawing
supplies of cotton from other parts of the world.
The labyrinths of international law had also to be
threaded in the two chief causes of dispute between the
English and United States Governments, the Trent
and the Alabama affairs. In the first, Earl KusselJ,
and, by implication, Lord Palmerston, behaved with the
utmost promptitude and spirit. There could be no doubt
whatever that Captain Wilkes was entirely in the wrong
when he compelled the Trent to lay to, and carried off
Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, the Confederate envoys, as
prisoners on board the San Jacinto. It was a gross vio-
lation of the law of nations, an arbitrary assertion of
that right of search which had been abandoned by the
United States, and against which, when exercised by
Lord Palmerston, for the benefit of kidnapped negroes,
they had never ceased to protest. There was, besides,
an impression abroad, which the Prime Minister at first
shared, that the deed was not the spontaneous act of a
hot-headed captain, but that it had been deliberately
planned and executed by the United States Government.
Under the circumstances Earl Kusseli was amply justi-
fied in sending out a demand for an apology and the
liberation of the envoys, and in limiting the answer to
224 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
a period of seven days. Nor can any objection be-
taken to the tone of his despatch to Lord Lyons, after it
had been toned down by the advice of the dying Princa
Consort ; even the American Secretary, Mr. Seward,
acknowledged it to be " courteous and friendly — not
dictatorial or menacing," and his apology was ample*
But why send 8,000 or 10,000 troops to Canada, asked
Mr. Cobden, after the United States Minister, Mr.
Adams, had told the British Government that the act
of Captain Wilkes was not sanctioned by the Washing-
ton Cabinet. Lord Palmerston's answer was, as usual,
the sound one, that peace is best preserved by showing
that you are not afraid of war.
The American Minister did not tell us that the act of Captain
Wilkes was disapproved ; he did not tell us that it would be dis-
avowed ; he did not tell us that the insult to the British flag would be
atoned for by the surrender of the persons who were taken from the
British ship Trent. Therefore, the communication which Mr. Adams
made and made with the very best intentions, was not a communica-
tion upon which we would have been justified in acting, so far as to
forego any measure of precaution which in our opinion was necessary.
But everybody recollects the ferment which prevailed in the United
States, the language held at public meetings, the honours paid to.
Captain Wilkes at the Theatre, the language held in Congress, and
also the letter of the Secretary to the Naval Department, approving
the conduct of that officer. Then, I say, we were justified in assuming
that that difficulty might not terminate in a satisfactory and amicable
manner. That being the case, I hold that we should have been ex-
tremely blamable if we had not taken the precautions which we
adopted. . . . We should only have been misleading the American
Government into the supposition that after all we might not really be
in earnest. And I do believe that the measures we took were most
materially conducive to opening their eyes to the consequences of a
refusal, thereby enabling their calm judgment to determine upon the
course which it was most for their interest that they should adopt.
Lord Lyons, who was not an alarmist, and who had
in addition the advantage of being on the spot, was of
precisely the same opinion.
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 225
Of course the Trent affair left bitter memories behind
it, and their workings are to be seen conspicuously in the
controversy about the Alabama and the other privateers
which were built for the South in English dockyards,
and sometimes manned by British crews. If England
had the law on her side in the matter of the Trent,
America had no less the principle of equity with her in
the case of the Alabama. But this Lord Palmerston
and Earl Russell hardly appreciated enough ; and when
the frigate started on her destroying career from Bir-
kenhead, without the smallest attempt at concealment
as to her real character, and in spite of the vigorous
protests of Mr. Adams, the Prime Minister based his
defence on a textual exposition of the Foreign Enlist-
ment Act. You could not, he said, seize a vessel under
the act unless you have evidence on oath confirming a
just suspicion.
That evidence was wanting in this case. The American Minister
came to my noble friend the Foreign Secretary, and said, " I tell you
this, and I tell you that, I 'm sure of this, and I 'm sure of that " ; but
when he was asked to produce evidence on oath, which was the only
thing on which we could ground any proceedings, he said that the in-
formation was furnished him confidentially, that he could not give
testimony on oath, but that we ought nevertheless to act on his asser-
tions and suspicions, which he was confident were well founded.
What would happen if we were to act in that way ? When a vessel
is seized unjustly and without just grounds, there is a process of
law to come afterwards, and the Government may be condemned in
heavy costs and damages. Why are we to undertake an illegal mea-
sure which may have had those consequences, simply to please the
agent of a foreign Government ?
The position was full of difficulties ; but it was obvious
that breaches of neutrality were being committed, and
that it was the duty of the English Government to put a
stop to them. The Americans retorted that self-preser-
vation was the first law of nature ; and, though Mr.
15
226 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
Adams could not effect the detention of the Alabama,
he enforced that of two ironclad rams under threat of
war. Even if the dispute ended there, the British
Government would have come out of it second best ;
but, as everyone knows, it dragged on until it was
finally settled against England on most points by the
Geneva tribunal. Lord Palmerston did not live to see
that day ; and as the discussion of " might-have-beens "
is invariably sterile, it is not very profitable to speculate
at length on which of the alternatives, war or arbitra-
tion, he would have elected to adopt. One thing is
quite certain, that he would not have submitted for a
moment to the monstrous Indirect Claims. The manage-
ment of the Alabama affair by the Palmerston Govern-
ment was a blunder, but the recognition of the South,
to which several of its members were apparently by
no means adverse, would have been a worse one, and, on
the whole, they may be considered to have come out of
an exceedingly trying crisis with a fair amount of credit.
It was but natural, as the Prime Minister said, that
when we endeavoured to maintain a perfect neutrality
between two parties who had quarrelled, we should
satisfy neither. At least we had shown by a prompt
despatch of troops to Canada, and by the vote for the
fortification of Quebec, which was one of the last acts
of Lord Palmerston's administration, that we were not
to be cowed by any manifestations of spread-eagleism
on the part of the American press and people.
Though the Ministry were not to be lured into a recog-
nition of the Southern States of America to oblige the
Emperor of the French, they committed themselves to
a participation in the Mexican expedition, the argu-
ments for which really, though not ostensibly, rested
on the supposition that the South would triumph, and
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 227
in the hour of victory would he glad to strengthen
herself by an alliance with the gimcrack Empire which
he proposed to erect on the ruins of the Mexican Re-
public. In so doing, they undoubtedly embittered their
relations with the North, and became entangled in an en-
terprise from which they were speedily obliged to beat a
retreat. Not that the grievances of England, France,
and Spain, the signatories of the Convention of 1861,
against the Mexican Republic, were not perfectly genuine.
During the anarchy which for years had desolated that
unhappy State, English subjects had been exposed to all
kinds of outrage, and redress had never been obtained.
Agreements which had been made by various presidents
to set aside a certain portion of the customs receipts for
the satisfaction of foreign bondholders, had never been
fully carried out; the house of the British Legation had
been robbed of part of the money that was actually
paid, and another portion had been carried off while on
its way to the coast. At the same time, Lord Palmer-
ston's Government were hardly well-advised in pushing
matters to an extremity at that particular moment.
The prospect of French and Spanish co-operation was
perhaps tempting ; but, on the other hand, a war with
the North appeared to be imminent over the Trent
affair, and the circumstances of Mexico herself ap-
peared to counsel delay. For, bad as the government
of the Red Indian Juarez was, it was the government of
a strong man, and should have been allowed time to
make head against its clerical antagonists, instead of
being coerced to satisfy wrongs which had been com-
mitted for the most part by its predecessors. Besides,
there lurked in the minds of two of the signatory
Powers a shrewd suspicion that the third was not
strictly to be relied upon, and it was found advisable to
15 *
228 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
inBert an article in the Convention by which the three
Powers bound themselves not to interfere with the form
of government established in Mexico. When it appeared
that these suspicions were only too well based, that
Napoleon had not only determined to overthrow the
Mexican Republic, but actually had his nominee, the
unfortunate Archduke Maximilian, in waiting, there
was nothing left for the English Government but to
withdraw themselves from the Convention, and their small
force of 700 marines from the expedition. At least
there was no hesitation on the part of the Cabinet, and
they extricated themselves from a dangerous enterprise
without loss of dignity.
229
CHAPTER XV.
POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
1863-1865.
The Polish Rebellion — Policy of the Cabinet — The proposed European
Congress — The Schleswig-Holstein Question — Motives of the
Powers — English advice to Denmark — The Cabinet determines on
eutrality — The Conference of London — Lord Palmerston on the
state of Europe — The Danish debate — Palmerston's last victory —
The General Election of 1865 — Lord Palmerston's last illness and
death — Conclusion.
From the hour of the withdrawal of the English con-
tingent from the Mexican expedition to the last day of
his life, Lord Palmerston never laid aside his distrust of
the Emperor Napoleon. It became a fixed idea with
him, and when opportunities presented themselves for
reconstituting the alliance of the Western Powers he
deliberately rejected them. Such an opportunity was
the Polish rebellion of 1863. The cause of the insur-
gents, gallantly maintained against overwhelming num-
bers, was extremely popular in England ; it was favoured
by statesmen of all shades of opinion, and was the
theme of enthusiastic resolutions passed at swollen
mass meetings. Food for eloquent periods was espe-
cially to be found in the proceedings of the new
230 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
Prussian Minister, Herr von Bismarck, who had turned
the occasion to his own ends, and at the same time pre-
vented the spread of the rebellion, by proposing to the
Russian Chancellor — and the proposal was gladly
accepted — that the two Governments should sign a con-
vention authorising the troops of each nation to cross
their respective frontiers in pursuit of fugitive rebels.
This grim method of exterminating the revolt aroused a
perfect storm of indignation throughout the country ;
and a war for the liberation of Poland would un-
doubtedly have been very popular. Nor should we have
gone to the battle without allies. France would have
plunged enthusiastically into the struggle, for affection
for the Poles had been for centuries a national pro-
clivity, and her ruler was drawn in the same direction
by the double consideration that the reconstruction of
Poland was a Napoleonic tradition, and that success on
the Vistula would detract attention from the failure
imminent in Mexico. As there was no fear of the move-
ment extending into Galicia, the Austrian Government
would certainly not have departed from a friendly
neutrality.
Lord Palmerston made no secret of his sympathies
with the insurgents. He wrote a letter to Baron
Briinnow in which he bluntly told him that he regarded
the Polish rebellion as the just punishment inflicted by
Heaven on Russia for her numerous attempts to stir up
revolution in the Christian Provinces of the Porte.
In the House of Commons he was equally outspoken
against Prussia. He hoped that the February con-
vention would not be carried into execution, " because
such an interference of Prussia with what was then
passing in Poland would excite, as it had already
excited, great condemnation everywhere, and if that
POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 231
conventional interference were followed by acts it would
cast discredit on the Government of Prussia." But
the Prime Minister and his colleagues were determined
not to commit themselves to any threat of intervention.
They thoroughly distrusted the Emperor of the French,
and declined his invitation to address, in concert with
Austria, a violent note of remonstrance to the Prussian
Government. The Premier, in a letter to the King of
the Belgians, described the invitation as a trap. They
felt, also, that it was useless to engage in a war of which
the object would have been the establishment of Poland
as an independent State, when the dissensions among
the insurgents proved that the basis for such a State
was altogether wanting. Under the circumstances,
the diplomatic action of the three Powers was barren of
result. Lord Palmerston helped to frame some able
despatches the aim of which was to convince Prince
Gortschakoff that the promises of a constitution made
to the Poles at the Congress of Vienna had never been
carried out; Austria took the lead in declaring that
Poland was a source of never-ending disquietude to
Europe ; and the three Powers agreed upon six sugges-
tions of reform which they urged in concert upon the
Russian Government. But, unaccompanied by a
menace of war, their remonstrances at Berlin and St.
Petersburg were not treated with much respect, and
signally failed to ameliorate the lot of Poland.
Lord Palmerston was quite as adverse to the next
adventure of the Emperor of the French, his proposal
that the treaties of 1815 should be submitted to a
European Congress. It was known that Napoleon had
been brooding over the idea for many years, and when
it was at last put into shape it certainly contained a
certain amount of plausibility. There was justice in
232 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
his contention that most of the arrangements of the
treaties of Vienna were destroyed, modified, mis-
understood, or menaced. But directly Lord Palmer-
ston's keen intellect played round the proposal he saw
its absurdity. He pointed out in the House of Com-
mons that unanimity was extremely unlikely, and that
a single dissentient voice would upset every suggestion
before the Congress. In a letter to the King of the
Belgians he described the assembling of a Congress as a
measure inapplicable to the present state of Europe.
With regard to past modifications of the treaties, some,,
such as the independence of Belgium, and the creation
of the kingdom of Italy, required no sanction ; others,
such as the annexation of Cracow by Austria, we should
not care to sanction. With regard to the future, an
infinite number of squabbles and animosities would
arise, especially if possible changes of territory were
taken into consideration — for instance, if France were
to ask for the Rhine provinces, Austria for Bosnia or
Moldo-Wallachia, Spain for Gibraltar. The Congress
was, therefore, curtly declined by Earl Russell in the
name of our Government, and the Emperor had to
digest his mortification as best he could.
Thus, while the Northern Powers were united, those
of Western Europe were hostile and divided. Bismarck
had everything in his favour when he proceeded to tear
up the Treaty of London and to force on the solution
of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Viewed by the
light of later experience, it is impossible to pronounce
that treaty to have been other than a mistake. It was
drawn up without sufficient knowledge and precautions ;
it attempted to perpetuate a wholly obsolete state of
affairs. In the end, the separation of the Duchies from
Denmark was a benefit to Europe. But it would be
POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 23a
unjust to blame Lord Palmerston for not having fore-
seen the great things that Bismarck was to accomplish
for Germany. There was nothing in the past of the
new director of Prussian statesmanship which desig-
nated him as a man likely to emancipate his country
from the unworthy policy which she had pursued since
the Crimean war. Lord Palmerston may be forgiven
for not having seen in Bismarck's treatment of the
Schleswig-Holstein question any more elevated feeling
than a desire to get Kiel as a German harbour, and for
being, therefore, determined to maintain the integrity of
Denmark at the cost of Prussia. Nor does the fact that
he was wrong put the rest of Europe in the right. The
treaty had been mainly the work of a Russian diplo-
matist, Baron Briinnow; though it had not been signed
by the German Federation as a body, several of the
States had afterwards acceded to it, and Prussia and
Austria had signed as great Powers. He could hardly
have foreseen that when the treaty was put to the test,
Russia would shrink from her engagements, bought off
by the co-operation of Bismarck in the suppression of
the Polish rebellion ; that Austria and the German Diet
would blindly play into the hands of Prussia, and thereby
bring upon themselves ultimate disaster and extinc-
tion. If English statesmanship was at a discount during
this period, that of Austria and Saxony was so in a
double measure ; and it is difficult on any grounds to
justify the support given by the German Diet to the
Augustenburg candidate for the Duchies, the son of the
one agnate who had expressly resigned his rights of
succession. Bismarck alone knew what he was about.
If the Treaty of London was a mistake^ the English
Cabinet at all events tried to carry it out with the
utmost good faith. It fully acknowledged the position
234 LIFE OF VISGOVNT PALMERSTON.
of Schleswig and Holstein as members of the German
Federation; the King of Denmark undertook not to
incorporate Schleswig with the rest of his monarchy,
and guaranteed to the Duchies the continuance of their
autonomy. And the efforts of Earl Russell to prevent
the Danes from violating the treaty were unceasing.
He protested again and again against the schemes of
Frederick VII. for the u Danification " of the Duchies ;
he sent a special mission to dissuade him from the
famous patent of 1863 by which he incorporated Schles-
wig in the kingdom of Denmark. When the German
Diet decreed in consequence " federal execution " in
Holstein, the British Cabinet made no attempt to pre-
vent it, and their offer of mediation was made in a
purely friendly spirit. Earl Russell also warned Chris-
tian IX. against the consequences of following the evil
example of his predecessor ; but his counsellors refused
to listen to good advice, and reaped the consequences
of their obstinacy. If they had shown moderation,
they would have put the German Powers entirely in the
wrong, and Denmark would have kept the Duchies, at
all events, for the time being.
The conduct of the Danes was undoubtedly actuated
by a belief that England would draw the sword on their
behalf. And at the close of the previous Session they
had received a certain amount of countenance from
Lord Palmerston, though not enough to justify their
foolhardiness.
It is impossible [he said, in the House of Commons] for any man
who looks at the map of Europe, and who knows the great interest
which the Powers of Europe feel in the independence of the Danish
monarchy, to shut his eyes to the fact that war begun about a petty
quarrel concerning the institutions of Holstein would, in all proba-
bility, not end where it began, but might draw after it consequences
which all parties who began it would be exceedingly sorry to have
POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTMN. 235
caused. . . . We are convinced — I am convinced at least — that if any
violent attempt were made to overthrow these rights and interfere
[with the independence of Denmark], those who made that attempt
would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with
which they would have to contend.
Lord Palmerston, as is well known, afterwards ex-
plained that what he had intended to convey was not a
threat of intervention, but a prophecy that some Power
or other would intervene. The explanation was, of
course, plausible; but whatever the meaning of the
utterance, it was certainly rather injudicious. Still Count
Beust has recently shown that Lord Palmerston was
less the cause of their stubborn resistance than Bis-
marck, who, to further his own ends, had mendaciously
assured the Danes that England had actually threatened
Germany with intervention, if hostilities should be
opened.* When Lord Palmerston spoke, he reckoned
upon Russia and France ; but when the war broke out,
he found that Sweden was the only ally upon whom
England and Denmark could depend. Russia had been
bought off; and Napoleon, piqued by the refusal of
England to attend his Congress, declined to stir in the
quarrel, though definite overtures were twice made to
him. Those overtures would have confined the war to
the assistance of Denmark, for Lord Palmerston, even
to save the Danes, would not sanction the conquest of
the Rhenish Prussia by France, to the peril of Holland
and Belgium. After the refusal of Napoleon, Lord Pal-
merston came reluctantly to the conclusion that the
Danes must be left to their fate.
The truth is ("he wrote to Earl Russell on February 13th, 1864]
that to enter into a military conflict with all Germany on continental
ground would be a serious undertaking. If Sweden and Denmark
* Count Beusfs Memoirs, vol. i., pp. 241-42.
236 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
were actively co-operating with us, our twenty thousand men oughV
to do a good deal ; but Austria and Prussia would bring two hundred
thousand or three hundred thousand into the field, and would be joined
by the smaller German States.
The position was somewhat humiliating, but as there
had been no pledge that we should come to the assist-
ance of the Danes alone, there had been no breach of
faith. And what diplomatic influence England could exer-
cise in favour of the Danes, she exercised without stint.
By his persona] authority with the Austrian ambassador,.
Lord Palmerston prevented the Austrian fleet from
entering the Baltic and bombarding Copenhagen. At
the Conference of London, Lord Clarendon nearly saved
the situation by his proposal that Denmark should cede
Holstein and the German part of Schleswig. The terms
were better than the Danes ultimately obtained, and
they were accepted by the German plenipotentiaries. But
statesmanship at Copenhagen was unable to recog-
nise accomplished facts, and from first to last the
efforts of English diplomacy on behalf of the Danes
were doomed to futility.
It was least with no petulant quos ego that Lord
Palmerston accepted the defeat of his policy. Writing
to Earl Russell the following year he dealt with the fate
which was to be hoped for the Duchies, and at the same
time indulged in one of the most remarkable political
forecasts that has ever been penned. It was better, he
considered, that Schleswig-Holstein should be absorbed
into Prussia, than be formed into a petty German State*
Prussia is too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent
in her action, and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Ger-
many, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those
two ambitious and aggressive Powers, France and Russia, that press
upon her west and east. As to France, we know how restless and
aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium, for the-
POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 237
Hhine, for anything which she would be likely to get without too
great an exertion. As to Russia, she will, in due time, become a
Power almost as great as the old Roman empire. She can become
mistress of all Asia, except British India, whenever she chooses to
take it ; and when enlightened arrangements have made her revenue
proportioned to her territory, and railways have abridged distances,
her command of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means
gigantic, and her power of transporting armies over great distances
most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian
aggression, and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength.
This letter has not inaptly been called Lord Palmer-
ston's legacy to the nation.
The failure of the ministerial policy as a whole had
been undeniable. It abounded in miscalculations and
misapprehensions. Herr von Bismarck had been under-
valued, the possibility of foreign co-operation had been
too confidently anticipated, and the interests at stake
had been misunderstood. Lord Palmerston did not dis-
cover that it would, on the whole, have been to the
advantage of Denmark to be quit of a population which
had long been discontented and difficult to govern, until
after the failure of the Conference. The Opposition
naturally seized the opportunity to challenge the pro-
ceedings of the Government. As at the time of the
Don Pacifico affair, they were successful in the House
of Lords, but suffered defeat in the House of Commons,
through the skill and resource of Lord Palmerston. The
victory was won by sheer generalship. Mr. Disraeli's
attack was extremely telling, and ministers found it
advisable to escape his condemnatory resolution by ac-
cepting a colourless amendment moved by Mr. King-
lake. The manoeuvre was transparent, but is was
entirely successful. In support of the amendment the
old Prime Minister made a remarkable speech, wind-
ing up the debate in the early morning of the 9th of
238 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMEBSTON.
July. As usual, he spoke without the aid of a single
note, and with the evident aim to be clear and convin-
cing rather than brilliant and antithetical. It is not
altogether correct to say that he dropped the questions
immediately connected with the vote of censure almost
immediately, that would have been an affront to the
intelligence of the House, which so accomplished a
master of Parliaments would be the last man to
commit. As a matter of fact, more than half his
speech dealt with the Danish question, and he made out
a case which, if not altogether convincing, was dis-
tinctly reasonable. And then he proceeded to the main
point of his speech. Why had not the Opposition
proposed a direct vote of want of confidence ? In that
case he would have been able to show that during the
five years during which his Government had been
honoured with the confidence of the House and had
carried on the Government, the country had continued
in an unexampled state of prosperity. In a telling sum-
mary he proceeded to take the Kadicals captive by show-
ing that on general, and especially on financial grounds,
he and his colleagues had deserved well of their country.
The Opposition cried " Question," but, as Mr. Ashley
points out, the arguments had a good deal of bearing
on the main question — the division. It is pathetic
to notice that Lord Palmerston in conclusion made
use once more of the argument which he had in-
troduced with such telling effect in the Don Pacifico
speech : —
I quite admit that hon. gentlemen opposite are perfectly entitled to
make a great struggle for power. It is an honourable struggle, and I
make it no matter of reproach. They are a great party, comprising
a great number of men of ability and influence in the country, and
they are perfectly entitled when they think the prize is within thoir
POLAND AND SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 239
reach, to make an attack on those who hold it. But, on the other
hand, I say that we have not done anything to deserve that the priz»
shall be taken from us.
The Government escaped defeat by a majority of
eighteen, and Lord Palmerston was secure for the brief
remainder of his life. After the following session,
which was for the most part uneventful, Parliament,
having peacefully lived out its time, was dissolved on
July 6th, 1865. At the General Election which followed,
Lord Palmerston, whose popularity with the nation had
become almost an article of faith, was once more re-
turned for Tiverton, and secured a further lease of power
for the Liberal party, though with a considerable
increase of the Radical wing. But the veteran states-
man was not destined to lead the party in another
Parliament. He had nearly completed his eighty-first
year, and had been a member of every administration,
except those of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Derby, since
1807. Already his iron frame had begun to show signs
of giving way. He had been very ill at the time of
the death of the Prince Consort, and his illness
was certainly increased by his overpowering anxiety and
grief. But he spent the whole of his eightieth birth-
day on horseback ; and earlier in the year he rode
from Cambridge House to Harrow, trotting the dis-
tance, nearly twelve miles, within the hour. During
the Session of 1865, however, he showed signs of
feebleness, keeping to his post with great difficulty,
and, after the General Election, he retired to Brocket,
in Hertfordshire, a place which Lady Palmerston had
inherited from Lord Melbourne. There the gout be-
came very serious, and he made it worse by going out
for a ride before he had fairly recovered from an attack.
Finally, a chill brought on inflammation ; and, though
240 LIFE OF VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.
on October the 17th he rallied wonderfully, in the night
his case became hopeless, and shortly before eleven in
the morning of the 18th he died. An interesting
account of his last moments is to be found in the life
of Lord Shaftesbury, and the description of the great
philanthropist praying over the great statesman is one
that, once read, is not easily forgotten.
Lord Palmerston was buried in Westminster Abbey,
and four years later Lady Palmerston was laid by his
side. His funeral took place on October 27th, amidst
a manifestation of popular sympathy, which showed
how strong were the ties which bound the nation to its
aged counsellor. As the coffin sank into the grave, a
dark storm broke over the Abbey, until, as the service
drew to its close, the sun appeared once more. His tomb
is in the North Transept, that quarter which pious cus-
tom has reserved for England's statesmen, near the last
resting-places of the great men who before him upheld
the honour of England in days of doubt and despair —
the noble Chatham, and his nobler son, and Canning,
and the much-misunderstood Castlereagh. Near it
stands his fine statue by Jackson, confronted by that of
Canning ; like a pair of sentinels, ever at their post, and
ever on the watch.
INDEX.
A.
Abd-el-Medjid, 70. 164.
Aberdeen, Lord, 24, 42; foreign
Minister, 83-95 ; and the
Spanish marriages, 96-98 ;
Premier, 145-160.
Afghan War, the, 67, 68.
Alabama affair, the, 225-226.
Albert, Prince, differences of
opinion with Palmerston, 130 ;
memorandum of, 156 ; death of,
239.
Althorp, Lord, 4, 32.
Arrow affair, 184.
Ashbnrton, Lord, 91.
Austria, relations with, 38, 58,
73 ; and Cracow, 66, 108 ; and
Switzerland, 113-116 ; and
Italy, 117-119, 121-124; and
Hungary, 126 ; and the Eastern
question, 154, 164, 169-170,
173 ; and Italy. 180-198 ; and
Poland, 230-231; and Den-
mark, 233 ; Palmerston on, 237.
B.
Ballot, the, 213.
Belgium, Independence of, 41-51 ;
in 1848, 119 ; offer of assistance
by, 187.
Bentinck, Lord G., on Portugal,
113.
Beust, Count, 36, 236.
Bismarck, 230, 233, 235.
Bolgrad, 177, 178.
" Bomba," see Naples.
Brazil, 41.
Bright, Mr., attacked by Pal-
merston, 157, 166; defeated,
186.
Brougham, Lord, on Lord Pal-
merston, 165 ; and Lady Pal-
merston, 188.
Briinnow, Baron, 71, 130, 172,
176.
Bulwer, SirH. (LordDalling), 63,
72, 74, 76; at Madrid, 100-
106 ; dismissed from Spain,
119 ; at the Porte, 180.
Buol, Count, 169, 170.
Burnes, Sir A., 67.
c.
Cambridge University contested
by Palmerston, 6, 7, 20, 33.
Canning, George, 8, 22, 23 ; Pal-
merston on, 32.
Carlo Alberto of Sardinia, 117,
121-123; defeated at Novara,
123.
Carlos, Don, 56-62.
16
242
INDEX.
Cavour, Count, and Palmerston,
190-193 ; and Lord Clarendon,
192 ; at Plombieres, 193 ; di-
plomacy of, 195-199 ; death of,
199.
China, war with, 83-87 ; second
war with, 184-186; Anglo-
French expedition to, 221.
Christina, Queen Regent of Spain,
56, 58, and the Spanish mar-
riages, 96-106.
Clarendon, Lord, 33, 73 ; becomes
Foreign Secretary, 152-153 ;
again Foreign Secretary, 165-
166 ; at the Congress of Paris,
172-174 ; and the United
States, 176 ; and the Treaty of
Paris, 177-179 ; and Walewski's
despatch, 188 ; and Italy, 192-
193 ; out of office, 201 ; and
Denmark, 236.
Cobden. Mr. , and the Militia Bill,
142 ; Palmerston on, 166 ; and
China, 185 ; defeat of, 186; re-
fuses office, 201 ; on Palmer-
ston, 202 ; and Reform, 204 ; on
Mr. Gladstone, 205 ; and the
defences, 207 ; treaty of, 209.
Conspiracy to Murder Bill, 187-
188.
Cowley, Lord, 172, 180, 197.
Cracow occupied by Austria, 66 ;
annexation of, 108, 232.
Crimean Expedition, the, 159,
164.
Croker, J. W., and the New Whig
Guide, 13 ; on Palmerston, 26 ;
interview with Palmerston, 31.
D.
Danubian Principalities, 151, 156,
173, 178-179.
Denmark, the succession ques-
tion, 130-131 ; and Schleswig-
Holstein, 232-237.
Derby, Lord (Lord Stanley),
motion on Portugal, 113 ; on
Greece, 135 ; great ministry of,
143-44 ; attempts to form a
ministry, 162 ; on the treaty of
Paris, 172 ; second ministry of,
188, 189.
Disraeli, Mr., 175, 190.
Drouyn de Lhuys, recall of, 132-
34 ; at Vienna, 170.
Dudley, Lord, 24, 25.
E.
Egypt and the Powers, 64-79;:
Palmerston on, 176.
Ellice, Mr., 73, 222.
F.
Ferdinand, the Emperor, abdica-
tion of, 126.
France, relations with, 37, 40;
and Belgium, 43-49 ; and Por-
tugal, 55, 57 ; coolness towards
England, 59-62 ; and the Syrian
question, 70-79 ; and Tahiti,
93 ; and the Spanish marriages,
96-106 ; subsequent results,
107; Revolution of 1848, 119;
Second Empire, 140 ; and the
Eastern Question, 150, 154 ;
and Italy, 193-198; relations
with England, 217-221, 226,
229-236.
Flahault, Count, 220.
Fortifications Bill, 208-209.
INDEX.
243
G.
Garibaldi, 198.
Gerard, Marshal, 47, 49.
Gibson, Mr. Milner, 186, 190.
Gladstone, Mr., letter of Palmer-
ston to, 40 ; refuses to join the
Conservatives, 162 ; resigns
office. 163 ; in favour of peace,
167 ; and Italy, 125, 190, 201 ;
and the defences, 204-209.
Gortschakoff, Prince, at Vienna,
169, 170, 173; chicanery of,
177-178 ; and Naples, 183 ; and
Poland, 230-231; and Den-
mark, 233.
Graham, Sir James, on China, 84 ;
and Reform, 148 ; at the Napier
banquet, 157 ; death of, 201.
Granville, Lord, 34, 45. 59, 73,
78.
Granville, Lord (son of above),
Foreign Secretary, 143 ; at-
tempts to form a ministry, 194.
Greece, Palmerston on, 24, 27 ;
Otho becomes king of, 53;
coercion of, 131-137.
Greville, Mr., 34, 75. 81, 82, 92,
102, 106, 124, 140, 161, 172,
188, 189.
Grey, Earl, 30 ; Premier, 32.
Guizot, 77, 78 ; and Aberdeen,
92-93 ; and the Spanish mar-
riages, 96-106; fall of. 119-
120.
H.
Haynau affair, the, 139.
Herat attacked by Persia, 66, 184.
Herbert, Mr. S., 152, 162, 163,
190.
Herries, Mr., 22, 23.
Holland, Lord, 33, 73, 74 ; death
of, 75.
Horsham, Palmerston elected at,
7.
Hume, Joseph, 12, 113.
Hungary, revolution in (1848),
126 ; refugee question, 127 ;
and Italy, 193.
Huskisson, Mr., 23, 25, 31.
I.
Ireland, Palmerston and, 214-
216.
Italy, Austrian rule in, 117 ; at-
tempted reforms in, 118-119
revolution of 1848, 121-124
Sardinian contingent, 172, 191
Palmerston and, 190-199.
Isabella, Queen of Spain, 56 ; her
marriage, 106 : dismisses Sir
H. Bulwer, 119.
K.
Kars, 164, 172, 173, 177.
Kinglake, Mr., 149, 237.
Kossuth, 126 ; his visit to Eng-
land, 139 ; his mission, 193.
L.
Lamartine, 120-121, 123.
Lansdowne, Lord, 6, 30 ; pro-
244
INDEX.
posed as Leader of the Libe-
rals, 145 ; attempts to form a
Ministry, 162 ; in the Cabinet,
165.
Leopold I. of Belgium, 46, 48, 51,
231.
Lewis', Sir G. C, 165, 188.
Lieven, Madame de, 14, 102.
Liverpool, Lord, Premiership of,
9, 19, 21.
Lombardy, see Italy.
London, Convention of (1841), 79;
treaty of (1852), 131, 233.
Louis Philippe, 43, 44, 47, 59-62,
75, 78 ; and the Spanish mar-
riages, 96-106 ; fall of, 119.
Militia Bill, the, 143-144.
Minto mission, the, 118.
Mutiny, the, 186.
M.
McLeod affair, the, 88-90.
Mahmoud, 64, 65, 70.
Malmesbury, Lord, 7, 9, 11.
Malmesbury, Lord (grandson of
above) on the coup oVe'tat, 140 ;
on the Czar, 141 ; and Italy,
190 ; interview with Lady Pal-
merston, 203.
Maria, Donna, 27-28, 29, 56 ; her
marriage, 110.
Mehemet Ali, 64, 70, 76-77, 79.
Melbourne, Lord, 24, 25, 30, 33,
35, 59, 67 ; and Palmerston, 74-
75; resigns office, 79.
Menschikoff mission, the, 150.
Metternich, Prince, 37, 38-39 ; on
Spain, 58 ; on the Quadruple
Treaty, 73 ; on the Spanish
marriages, 105 ; and Cracow,
109; and Switzerland, 113-
116 ; and Italy, 117-119 ; fall
of, 119.
Mexican expedition, the, 227.
Miguel, Dom, 27-28, 54-58, 111,
112.
N.
Napier, Sir C, 55, 77 ; banquet
to, 157.
Naples, coercion of, 82 ; and the
Sicilian rebellion, 118, 125;
coercion of, 183 ; conquest of,
198.
Napoleon III. , coup oVetat of, 140 ;
and the Holy Places, 150 ; and
the Eastern question, 164, 171,
172; visit to England, 179;
and Egypt, 179 ; relations with
England, 182-183; attempt to
murder, 187; and Italy, 193-
199; and Savoy, 197, 218;
schemes of, 218-221 ; and Po-
land, 231 ; proposed Congress
of, 231 ; and Denmark, 235.
Nesselrode, Count, 53, 153.
New Whig Guide, 13.
Newtown, Palmerston elected at,
7.
Nicholas, Czar of Russia, 65, 66,
71 ; visit to England, 151, 152.
Normanby, Lord, 107, 109, 120.
Pacifico affair, 132-137.
Palmerston, second Viscount,
2-4 ; death of, 6.
INDEX.
245
Palmerston, Lady (Mary ,Mee), 2,
4 ; death of, 6.
Palmerston, Henry John, third
Viscount, birth, 2; education,
4-6; enters Parliament, 7;
Lord of the Admiralty, 7;
maiden speech, 8 ; Secretary at
War, 9-12, 21-25; character,
12-19 ; visits to France, 21 ;
attempt on, 21 ; in opposition,
25-31 ; Foreign Secretary, 32-
79 ; his marriage, 80 ; ^"oppo-
sition, 82-95; visit to Paris,
95; again Foreign Secretary,
96-139; dismissed from office,
1 40 ; Home Secretary, 146-160 ;
temporary resignation, 149-
150; first Ministry, 162-188;
receives the Garter, 174 ; visit
to Compiegne, 193 ; second
Ministry, 200-239 ; last illness
and death, 239-240; funeral,
240.
Palmerston, Ladv(Ladv Cowper),
79-81, 188, 203; "death of,
240.
Paper Duties Bill, 203, 205.
Paris, Congress of, 172-174;
treaty of, 176-179 ; Cavour at,
191-193.
Pedro, Dom, 27-28, 54-58.
Peel. Sir R., 4, 51; Premier,
83-95; on Portugal, 113;
death of, 138.
Persian war, 183-184.
Persigny, Count, 182, 194.
Pio Nono, 117, 122, 124.
Poland, rebellion of (1830), 53-
54; rebellion of (1863), 229-
231.
Portugal, Palmerston on, 26-30 ;
English intervention in, 54-58 ;
further intervention, 110-113.
Presbytery of Edinburgh, Pal-
merston's answer to, 147-148.
Prussia, Palmerston's views on,
130 ; and the Eastern question,
154, 164; and Poland, 229-
231; and Denmark. 232-236;
Palmerston on, 237.
Q.
Quadrilateral Ti-eaty, the, 72,
Quadruple Treaty, the, 57.
R.
Radetzky, Marshal, 122, 123.
Raglan, Lord, 158, 167.
Roebuck, Mr., resolution on the
Pacifico affair, 134; motion of
inquiry, 159, 164.
Russell, Lord John (Earl), 74;
attempts to form a ministry,
94 ; Premier, 95 ; quarrel with
Palmerston, 140-142; Reform
Bill of, 148-150; proposed
Palmerston for Secretary at
War, 158 ; attempts to form a
ministry, 162 ; resigns office,
159 ; at Vienna, 163, 168-170 ;
resigns office, 170 ; reconcilia-
tion with Palmerston, 190; and
Italy, 190, 194-198 ; on Reform ;
203-204 ; Foreign Secretary,
217-238.
Russia, relations with, 40, 53;
and Turkey, 65 ; and England,
66, 70-79; and the Holy
Places, 150 ; diplomacy of,
150-156, 168-174 ; and Poland,
229-231; and Denmark, 133,
233 ; Palmerston on, 237.
246
INDEX.
S.
Saldanha, Count, 110-112.
Sardinia and Savoy. See Italy.
Schleswig-Holstein. See Den-
mark.
Schwarzenburg, Prince, 126-
128.
Sebastiani, Count, 45-47.
Serpents Island, 177, 178.
Shaftesbury, Lord (Lord Ashley),
18, 19, 80, 94, 143, 147, 240 ;
his bishops, 211.
Sicily, revolution in, 118, 125 ;
freed by Garibaldi, 198.
Sinope, Turkish fleet destroyed
at, 156.
Slave-trade, the, 39, 41, 90-91,
93, 184.
Soult, Marshal, 71, 72, 77.
Spain, English intervention in,
56-62 ; Spanish Legion, 60-
62 ; Spanish marriages, 96-
106 ; rupture with, 119.
Stockmar. Baron, 87, 110, 142.
Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 127,
150, 154.
Suez Canal, 180-182.
Switzerland, revolution in, 113-
116 ; and Prussia, 182.
Syrian question, the, 64-79 ; reli-
gious war in, 219.
T.
Talleyrand, Prince, 43, 44, 45,
47, 49, 59.
Temple, Sir William, 2, 57, 58.
Temples, the, 1, 2.
Thiers, 72, 76, 77.
Tiverton, Palmerston elected at
33 ; speeches at, 144, 204
election at (1865), 239.
Trent affair, the 223-224. .
Turkey, Palmerston on, 27, 63 ;
. and Syria, 64-79 ; Menschikoffs
mission to, 151 ; declaration of
war by, 155 ; conditions of
peace with, 170, 176-178.
u.
United States, disputes with, 87"-r
92, 95, 175-176 ; civil war in,
221-227.
Unkiar Skelessi, treaty of, 65..
Urquhart, Mr., 37, 75.
V.
Venetia. See Italy.
Victor Emanuel, visits England,
191.
Victoria, Queen, and Palmerston,
94: on the Spanish marriages,
102 ; her Memorandum, 138 ;
letters of Palmerston to, 170,
171 : gives Palmerston the Gar-
ter, 174; and Italy, 196;
letters of Palmerston to, 206.
INDEX.
247
Vienna Conference, the first, 154 ;
the second, 168-170.
Villafranca, treaty of, 195-196.
w.
Walewski, Count, and the coup
d'etat, 140; and Kussia, 177,
182 : and the Orsini affair, 187.
Webster, Daniel, 89-91.
Wellington, Duke of, premiership
of, 23-31 ; on Portugal, 56 ; on
the Chinese War, 86 ; on the
Spanish marriages, 106.
Westbury, Lord, 210, 211.
Willis's Rooms meeting, 190.
Wylde, Colonel, mission of, 112-
113.
z.
Zurich, treaty of, 196.
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