Joint ÇJt (J
THE UNIVEESmr GUILD
and the
R E P O R T.
KAFia TRIBES.
Ordered, by Tlie House of Commons, to he Printed,
2 Ati^ust 1 851.
[Frice 3 «. 4 </.J
Under 2 lbs. 10
REPORT
FROM THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
OV THE
KAFIR TRIBES;
TOGETHER WITH THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,
APPENDIX, AND INDEX.
Ordered, hy The House of Commons, to he Printed,
2 August 1851.
635-
Mariis, 15° die Aprilis, 1851.
Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the
Keiaiions between this Country and the Kafir and other Tribes on our
^ South African Frontier.
J OVIS, 8° die Mail, 1851.
Committee nominated, of—•
Mr. Secretary at War.
Marquis of Granby.
Sir Edward Buxton.
Mr. E. H. Stanley.
Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Card well.
Viscount Mandeville.
Mr. Evans.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Mr. Booker.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Hawes.
Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for Persons,
Papers, and Records.
X)rdered, That Five be the Quorum of the Committee.
Veneris, g° die Mail, 1851.
Ordered, That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members.
Lunœ, 12° die Mail, 1851.
Ordered, That Colonel Dunne, Mr. Fiizpatrick, and Mr. Monsell be
added to the Committee.
Veneris, 23° die M ait, 1851.
Orrfererf, That Mr. Evans be discharged from further attendance on
the Committee, and that Mr. Hindley be added thereto.
Lunœ, 2° die Junii, 1851.
Ordered, That Mr. Secretary at War be discharged from further
attendance on the Committee, and that Mr. Labouchere be added
thereto.
Sabbati, 2° die Augusti, 1851.
Ordered, That the (Committee have power to report the Minutes of
Evidence taken before ihem to The House.
THE REPORT p. iii
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE - - p. iv
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE p. 1
APPENDIX P- 485
INDEX p. 509
[ iii }
REPORT.
THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into
the Relations between this Country and the Kafir and
other Tribes on our South African Frontier, and who
were empowered to Report the Minutes of Evidence
taken before them to The House;
Have examined various witnesses who have been able
to give them valuable information, bearing upon the
questions which were referred to their consideration, and beg
to report to The House the Minutes of Evidence which they
have received.
These examinations were protracted to so late a period of
the Session, that Your Committee have not been able to
devote that degree of time and attention to the consideration
of a Report which the magnitude and difficulty of the
subject entrusted to them would require.
It will be for The House to determine in the next Session
of Parliament whether it will be expedient to renew the
Committee for that purpose.
2 August 1851.
635-
a 2
« ^ I te A.j' AJ
iv
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SELECT
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.
Lunœ, 26° die Mali, 1851.
members present:
The Secretary at War.
Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Edward Stanley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
The Secretary at War called to the Chair.
Colonel I'hompson.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Booker.
Mr. Hindiey.
LuruBy 2" die Junii, 1851.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Esicourt.
M arquis of Granby.
Mr. Mackinnon called to the
[Adjourned ti
present:
Mr. Booker.
Mr. Hindiey.
Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Hawes.
Chair.
1 Friday next, at Twelve o'clock.
Veneris, 6° die Junii, 1851.
members present:
Mr. Labouchere.
Mr. Hawes.
Colonel Estcourt.
Lord Mandeville.
Colonel Thompson.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Labouchere called to the Chair.
The Rev. Joseph Freeman, examined.
[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Booker.
Mr. Hindiey.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
V
J OVIS, \2'^ die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Hawes.
Colonel Estcourt.
Lord Mandeville.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Marquis of Granby.
Dr. Andrew Smith and Mr. John Fairbairn, examined
Colonel Dunne.
Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Card well.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
[Adjourned till Monday, at One o'clock.
Luna, xG* die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS PRESENT :
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Hindley.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Col, Dunne.
Mr. Bonliam Carter,
Mr. Mackinnon.
Lord Mandeville.
Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Hawes.
Marquis of Granby.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Booker.
Mr. Stanley.
Dr. Adamson and Major John J. Bissett, examined.
[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.
JOVIS, die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Mr. Booker,
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. B. Carter.
Colonel Estcourt.
Colonel Ovans and Sir Andries Stockenstrom, examined.
Sir E. Buxton.
Marquis of Granby.
Colonel Dunne.
Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Hindley.
Sir J. Walmsley.
[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SELECT
Lunce, 23° die Junii, 1851.
MEMDERS present:
Mr. La BOUCHERE in the Chair.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Hindley.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. ßooker.
Mr. Stanley.
Colonel Dunne.
Lord Mandeville.
Sir George Napier, examined.
[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'cloek.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. B. Caller.
Sir J. Walrasley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Moiisell.
Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Cardwell.
Jovis, 26 die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS present:
Mr. Labouchere in tlie Chair,
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. B. Carter.
Mr. Booker.
Lord Mandeville.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Card well.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Colonel Dunne.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Stanley.
Colonel Thompson.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom, further examined.
[Adjourned till Monday, at One o'clock.
Lunœ, die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Mr. 11 awes.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Lord Mandeville.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Monsell.
Colonel Thompson.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Dr. Smith, further examined.
Lieutenant-colonel Smith, examined.
Mr. B. Carter.
Colonel Dunne.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Hindlev.
M'. Booker.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
[Adjourned till Thursday next, at Twelve o'clock.
COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
vii
Jûvis, 3° die Julii, 1851.
members present:
Mr. Hawes in the Chair.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Mackinnoii.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Dunne.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Hiiidley.
Captain Owen, r. e., examined.
Sir James Alexander, examined.
[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.
Mr. B. Carter.
Mr. Monsell.
Sir E. Buxton.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Cardwell.
Lunce, 7» die Julii, 1851,
members present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Mackiniion.
Lord Mandeville.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. B. Carier.
Marquis of Granby.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Dunne.
General Sir Peregrine Maitland, examined.
[Adjourned.]
Mercurii, 23° die Julii, 1851.
members present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Cardwell.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Hawes.
Sir E. Buxton.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
The Rev. Henry Rentan, examined.
[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.
vin
PROCEEDINGS OP THE SELECT
Jovis, 24° die Julii, 1851.
members present:
Mr. Ha wes in the Chair.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Esicourt.
Mr. B. Carier.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Cardwell.
The Rev. Henry Rcnion, further examined.
[Adjourned till Monday next, at One o'clock.
o
Luna, 28 die Julii, 1851.
members present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. B. Carter.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Hawes, m.p., a Member of the Committee, examined.
[Adjourned till Wednesday, at Tivelve o'clock.
Mercurii, 30° die Julii, 1851,
members present:
Mr. Labouchere in the Chair.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Hindley.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. B. Carter.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Colonel Dunne.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom and the Rev. Henry Renton, further ex¬
amined.
[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.
COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
ix
Jovis, 31° die Julii, 1851.
members present :
Mr. Hawes in the Chair.
Sir J. Walmsley. Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Estcourt. Mr. Mackinnon.
Colonel Dunne. Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. B. Carter.
The Rev. H. Renton, further examined.
The Rev. P. Latrobe, examined.
The Committee agreed to their Report.
Ordered, To report, together with the Minutes of Evidence.
EXPENSES OF WITNESSES.
NAME
of
WITNE88.
By what
Member of
Committee
Motion
made for
Attendance
of the
Witness.
Date
of
Arrival.
Date
of
Dischai^e.
Total
Number
of
Days
in
London.
Number
of
Days under
Exa¬
mination
by
Com¬
mittee,
or acting
specially
under their
Orders.
Expenses
of
Journey
to
London
and back.
Expenses
in
London.
TOTAL
Expenses
allowed
to
Witness.
£. $. d.
£. s. d.
dL
Kev. Henry Renton
Chairman
30 July
31 July
2
2
9 10 -
2 2-
11 18 -
635.
b
[ X ]
LIST OF WITNESSES.
page.
Veneris, 6' die Junii, 1851.
Rev. Joseph John Freeman - - i
Jovis, 12" die Junii, 1851.
Andrew Smith, m.d. - - - - 45
Mr. John Fairbairn - - - - 68
Luna, 16° die Junii, 1851.
Rev. James Adamso'n, d.d. - 102. 135
Major John Jarvis Bissett • - - 114
Jovis, 19° die Junii, 1851.
Colonel C. Ovans - - - - 148
Sir Andries Stockenstrom - • ' - 164
Luna, 23a die Junii, 1851.
Sir George T. Napier, k.c.b. - - 19G
Jovis, 26° die Junii, 1851.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom - - - 226
Lunœ, 30° die Junii, 1851.
Andrew Smith, Esq., m. d. - - 274
Lieutenant Colonel T. C. Smith - - 298
page.
Jovis, 3° die Julii, 1851.
Captain Henry Charles CunlifFe Owen - 312
Major Sir Jas. Edw. Alexander, a.d.c., 33S
Lunœ, 7° die Julii, 1851.
General Sir Peregrine Maitland, k.c.b., 355
Mercurii, 23° die Julii, 1851.
Rev. Heniy Renton, a.m. - - - 376
Jovis, 24° die Julii, 1851.
Rev. Henry Renton, a. m. - - - 399
Lunœ, 28® die Julii, 1851.
Benjamin Hawes, Esq., m.p. - - 440
Mercurii, 30° die Julii, 1851.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom - - - 442
Rev. Henry Renton, a.m. - - - 445
Jovis, 31° die Julii, 1851.
Rev. Henry Renton, a. m. ... 451
Rev. Peter La Trohe . - . 4^6
t ' ]
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.
Veneris, 6° die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS PRESENT.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Sir Josltua Walmsley.
Mr. Hawes.
Viscount Mandeville.
Mr. Booker.
Colonel Dunne.
Marquis of Granby.
Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Stanley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
The Right Hon. HENRY LABOUCHERE,
IN THE Chair.
Rev. Joseph John Freeman, called in ; and Examined.
1. Chairman^ IN what way have you been connected with Rev././,
the colony of the Cape of Good Hope ?—As a Visitor from the reman.
London Missionary Society of this country ; not as a resident G .Tune 185».
2. What time have you passed in the colony?—I spent
about a year there in 1830, about half a year in 1836, and a
year and a half about a year ago ; I have lately returned.
3. What are the duties of a visitor of the society ?—I will
instance the last visit, if the Committee please. I went out
as a visitor from the Missionary Society which I have just
named, that is to say, the London Missionary Society ; de¬
puted by them to visit and inspect all their missionary stations
in South Africa, whether within the colony or beyond the
boundaries of the colony, and to report upon them.
4. You had no other business or occupation connected
with the colony, except that of a visitor from the Missionary
Society?—None at all.
5. Are you a clergyman ?—A Protestant dissenting clergy¬
man.
there.
0.63.
A
6. What
2 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
^v. J./. 5 What are the number and situation of the stations of
remm. fission in South Africa?—We have within the colony,
6 June 1851. that is to say, between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, about
10 stations ; in towns lying to the north of this line, and
including Kat River, Graham's Town, Cradock, GraafF Reinet,
and Colesberg, 10 more; beyond the colony, that is to say,
within British Kafraria, three or four ; in the Griqua country,
three; and in the Bechuana country, six. We have alto¬
gether about 34 stations in and beyond the colony.
7. Will you state the number of the native population
which you believe to be in connexion with your society ?—
That will require a little estimate. We have about 4,000
natives who are communicants ; they would form, I should say,
perhaps, one-fourth or fifth of the whole number of the con¬
gregations without the schools. I should say we have from
25,000 to 30,000 in direct connexion with our missionary
labours.
8. Are they chiefly Kafirs or Hottentots?—The Hottentots
within the colony may form about one-fourth of the number ;
they are mixed with the late apprentices. The latter have no
distinct name but that ; they are commonly called " late
apprentices," meaning, as the Committee are aware, those
who were till lately in slavery: I should say they constitute
another fourth. The other two-fourths, or one-half of the
whole number, I suppose, would be Kafirs, Griquas, Bechu-
auas, and Fingoes.
9. Has the number of natives in connexion with your
society been increasing of late years ?—Not largely ; it has
increased however since the emancipation ; I should say
since 1834, 1835, and 1836 it has increased considerably.
1 do not know the proportion ; I presume to the amount of
one-third at any rate.
10. Have you been led to form any opinion of the policy
pursued by the British Government towards the natives, and
have you any observations upon that subject which you are
desirous of making to the Committee ?—To some extent I
think I have been led to make some observations upon that
policy ; that is a large and comprehensive question ; I think
by allowing a little time to it, and taking up the matters dis¬
tinctly and separately, I may be able to throw out a few
suggestions. I should like to be allowed to say generally, that
having read Lord John Russell's speech on moving his
amendment in the House of Commons for the appointment
of this Committee, which was an amendment I believe upon
Mr. Adderley's motion, and having read his remarks touch-
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3
ing Sir Harry Smith, and that this was not a Committee Rev. J. J.
designed to impugn the character of Sir Harry Smith or of Freeman.
his government, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I g \
do not come with that view at all, and any remarks which "
I may now offer respecting his measures and government I
trust will be understood as not intended to impugn the cha¬
racter of the Governor or of his government. If my observa¬
tions imply or involve dissent from his measures, I trust
I shall not be thought to be making it my object to impugn his
character or his policy. But I have looked at the effect of
certain Government measures upon the Hottentot population of
the Kat River Settlement especially, and I have thought some
of those measures to be decidedly unfavourable to the people.
Certain measures also affecting the Griquas and Bassutos, I
have equally thought unfavourable and undesirable, not to
say in some degree unjust, as I endeavoured to state in a
communication of mine to Lord Grey, which is iii the Blue
Book lately published. In speaking of the Kat River Settle¬
ment, and implying some dissatisfaction with the Government
measures there, I refer rather to individual acts of the local
magistrate, who is of course, however, appointed by the
Government, than to any general and comprehensive mea¬
sures of the Government itself. My strong impression has
been that the constituting the Kat River Settlement a home
for the Hottentots has been a wise and salutary measure for
them and for the colony generally, as a part of our border
policy. By the Kat River Settlement, I mean the northern
part of the district of Victoria, towards Beaufort, and adjoin¬
ing British Kafraria on the north. It would scarcely be
important now, perhaps, to discuss the policy of locating a
large body of Hottentots there, instead of allowing them tobe
scattered more extensively over the colony as landowners.
That policy has been adopted now for so many years that it
may not be needful to go into that question ; it seems that
that previous question is already settled. But I refer to acts
on the part of the late magistrate, which for the last three
or four years have been, I think, of an extremely injurious
and irritating character, and going far, as I think, to account
for, though not to justify, the disaffection under which the
Hottentots have now for some time been labouring, and which
very unhappily has broken out during this present Kafir war
in the shape of disloyalty. If the Committee wish it, I can go
into a detail of several of those acts of the magistrate, Mr. J.
H. Bowker. He has been removed from the office, and so far
the evil is checked ; but the previous evil, which was very
0.63. A 2 serious
4 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J. serious, was doue, and so much evil was being done, that
'teeman. June a letter was written to me by a friend on the spot,
6 June 1851. intimating a fear that if the Kafirs should again attack the
colony, it was questionable if the Hottentots would be induced
to come forward in defence of the colony, inasmuch as they
felt so aggrieved and irritated and goaded by this constant
series of what they term acts of oppression.
11. What was the nature of those acts ?—Two or three of
those acts, which will enable the Committee to judge of
others, I should say were these : one of them was the case
of fining very heavily a number of people residing at the
settlement called Buxton. A quantity of cattle belonging to
the people had trespassed upon some corn lands, and done
some damage.
12. Mr. Hawes.'] Corn lands belonging to the settlers?—
Corn lands belonging to the settlers in Buxton ; corn lands,
however, wholly unenclosed. I mention that because usually
in awarding damages some consideration is given to that
circumstance, that the lands are unenclosed. There is then
a temptation of course to cattle to trespass, and it is a reason
why the proprietor of the ground should have his lands
enclosed. However, in this case about 100 head of cattle
had trespassed, and the field cornet, that is, a sort of high
constable there, authorised for the purpose, assessed the
damages at 50s. ; 6i/. a head. The people being poor, and not
having the money, paid it in value ; that is to say, they paid
two young oxen, fit for yoking into a waggon, and a cow in
calf, which was supposed to be, and all parties thought to be,
a fair and just consideration for the damages which had been
done. The people were then allowed to drive their oxen
away, but through some bungling or other, which 1 cannot
fully understand, the parties to whom the land belonged said
they had not received a sufficient amount for damages, and
the case was then wholly referred to Mr. Bowker, the resi¬
dent magistrate. He set aside the decision of the field cor¬
net, and assessed the people in damages eight head of cattle ;
but as the allegation was set up by the constables, who, how¬
ever, were not cross-examined, that in bringing the cattle, the
owners, five in number, had attempted to rescue them, he
fined them 10Í. a head, which was the extreme penalty of
the law, being 50/. for an attempt at rescue. The cattle,
however, belonged to only three of the parties ; the other two
had neither cattle nor money. Thirty head of cattle were
then taken as an equivalent for the 30/., or 10/. each, the
fine imposed for the offence of attempted rescue. The other
two
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 5
two men were accused of interrupting the constables and Rev. J. J.
being insolent, and they were put in irons and set to work Freema».
upon the high road, a punishment which a local magistrate g jung 1851
has not by law the power of inflicting. The Supreme
Court alone can put a man in irons, and order working on
the road. I saw the people themselves bitterly aggrieved
amidst all this, and they begged me to communicate it to
the Governor. I wrote to Sir Harry Smith, and he very
promptly and suitably instituted an inquiry. In the mean¬
time, the people themselves had applied to the circuit
judge. Sir John Wilde, and got the magistrate's decision
reviewed at the circuit held at Beaufort. Sir Harry Sinitli
appointed a commission, the result of which was that bis
Excellency severely blamed the magistrate: for that I
have his Excellency's own letter in reply to my commu¬
nication. He reprimands him strongly for his severity. He
ordered the fines to be returned to the people, and recom¬
mends the magistrate to compromise the matter with the
men who had been imprisoned and put in irons. It was a
long time before those fines were repaid ; I had to write a
second time to his Excellency, and ultimately the 30/. has
been repaid. The men who were put in irons have never
received any kind of compensation. The Governor did most
promptly what could be done in the matter, but the mischief
was done, and the whole of the people there sympathizing
one with another, felt exceedingly aggrieved and indignant
at this treatment. I may also refer to the case of turning out
what are called the Gonah Hottentots, residing near to Bux¬
ton, and whose friends do reside there. Among those ex¬
pelled as being squatting Kafirs, but who were in fact resident
Gonah Hottentots, having lived there for 20 years, and been
recognised as having a full right to reside among them, were
some of the parties who had complained of the magistrate ;
and it seemed to them to be a kind of revenge on the part of
the magistrate concerned. An appeal had been made by the
people to the Governor, to have certain squatting Kafirs in
their neighbourhood turned away. They were chargeable,
I believe, with thefts ; and to say the least, they were inter¬
lopers. They were residing about Blinkwater, and all that
neighbourhood. Sir Harry Smith had again very properly
desired inquiry to be made as to the number of those squat¬
ting Kafirs of whom the people complained, and had sent an
order that they should be removed, and proper arrangements
to that effect were made ; but in carrying them into execu¬
tion by that same magistrate, Mr. Bowker, not the squatting
> q.6j. a 3. Kafirs
6 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rév. J. J. Kafirs alone were turned out, but about 60 families of other
reeman. people, who had the same right in law to reside there as any
6 June 1851. of us have to our own residences here. They were people who
had resided there since the formation of the settlement, and
had been recognised by the Government as having a right
to be there. They had served in the war from time to time,
and had received the commendations of the Government.
When I called on Sir Harry Smith, at the Cape, I mentioned
to him this case of the expulsion of the Hottentots, and espe¬
cially the burning of their huts as soon as they had been
driven out, which is to them the most painful insult you can
offer ; his Excellency assured me at once that it was never
his intention to have had them turned out, he felt that they
had rendered essential service to the colony, and he would have
preferred to do them a service, rather than to see any injury
inflicted upon them. I think Sir Harry Smith was led into
a mistake by the act of the magistrate and the report of the
police, who, instead of saying. We have expelled so many Go-
nah Hottentots, simply said. We have turned out all those
squatting Kafirs. As soon as his Excellency found out the
real faets of the case, he appointed a commission of inquiry.
He has allowed to return to their settlements all those who have
a right to be there ; but in tlie meantime their minds have
been greatly aggrieved ; their property was taken from them,
in fact they were driven out. Their wives and children were
turned out in the coldest season known there for a long time.
I have passed over the same country before, and I can speak
to its being most intensely cold ; we have nothing in England
or Scotland more intense. It was on a Sunday, in the coldest
Weather, when this order was carried into execution ; a thing
I am sure 'which the Governor never intended, but it has
given rise to a state of disaffection in the minds of the people.
That has been followed also by numerous other circumstances.
13. What was the date of the transactions to which you have
referred ?—The events I have last referred to took place about
the middle of June 1860 ; the previous event, with respect to
the fines inflicted upon the people, took place about the middle
of 1849.
14. Colonel Dunned] That is the coldest season there?
—I should say that our Midsummer is their Christmas. I
am desirous of adverting for a moment to the case respecting
the forests, which perhaps the people had simply from usage
supposed to belong to the respective allotments or settlements.
The Committee will understand that the whole district is
palled the Kat River Settlement, but that it embraces some
12 or
8BLECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. ^
12 or 13 divisions, which are also called settlements ; Buxton Rev. J. 3.
Settlement; Wilberforce Settlement ; and so on. The people Fieeman.
had supposed the forests to be attached to their several loca- g juae 1851.
lities, villages, or settlements, and the cutting timber and
selling it has been a great source of profit to them. But
within the last four years, since the war of 1847, the Govern¬
ment has seen it right to impose a tax of 6s. per load on the
timber cut, claiming of course for the Crown a right over that
forest land, which may be very proper; I only name it
as having tended to discourage the people. The people had
lost their all during two or three successive wars ; first in
the war of 1834-35, and again in the war of 1846-47 ; they
were reduced then to extremity, and by cutting timber, and
selling it in the neighbouring countries for 50 or 60 or 100
miles round, many of them obtained a comfortable livelihood.
I saw when I was there about 80 or 90 saw pits at work
among those people. The imposition of a tax of 6s. a load
came very heavily upon them after having suffered the loss
of all during the wars. It is just one of the matters relating
to the policy of the Government towards them, wliich is im¬
portant in the consideration of the question proposed.
15. Chairman.'] What is the principal occupation of the
people ; is it agriculture, or pasturage, or both ?—Agricul¬
ture, pasturage, and the conveyance of goods. Many of the
people have waggons and oxen of their own, and they are
carriers. The same remark would apply very extensively to
the Hottentots throughout the whole colony ; they are car¬
riers of goods from the ports into the towns in the interior ;
large mercantile houses employ them. For example, Messrs.
Barry, a respectable house at Zwellendam, paid two years
ago 600/. sterling during one year to the Hottentots of
Zuurbrak, for the conveyance of goods.
16. What is the number of the native inhabitants within
the settlements?—About 5,000, it may be rather more;
they have said from year to year from 5,000 to 7,000 ;
I should say 5,000 is the minimum.
17. Are they well-conducted people, generally?—Ex¬
tremely so. There is but one of those small settlements
where there is any disposition to intoxication, and that is
marked, it has a stigma upon it as such ; there are but few
families there. I visited the whole of those 10 or 12 settle¬
ments, and I found the people extremely well conducted.
18. Is the whole populattion in connexion v\ith your
society ?—No ; there is a congregation in connexion with
the Dutch Reformed Church at Balfour, of which the Rev.
0.63. A4 W. Thompson.
8 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
^ev. J. J, M'. Thompson is the minister ; he is sustained by the Go vern-
Freeman. ment, as the other Dutch clergymen are.
6 Junfi 1851. ^9* greater number of the people are in connexion
v»'ith your society?—Yes, 1 think I may say nine-tenths of
them are in connexion with our society.
20. Do the children attend your schools?—Yes, we have
had as many as 1,000 children on the books, and 700 or 800
in attendance. Since the war we have not had more than
perhaps 500 ; the people have been too impoverished to spare
their children from attention to their gardens and their flocks
and herds.
21. Are they generally able to read and write ?—Yes, many
of them, and they are familiar, to a large extent, with the Eng¬
lish as well as with the Dutch language. I have given them
publicly addresses in English, and was distinctly understood
by them speaking simple English. I should add that Mr. Bow-
ker has resigned his oflice as magistrate, in consequence of
those measures to which I have referred, after being severely
reprimanded. But still the facts which I state, I have stated
merely to show that a disaffection and restlessness and vexa¬
tion have been created in the minds of the Hottentots by this
series of measures. I lament that he was ever appointed,
because his known feelings were not so much with the
coloured race as against them.
22. Are these settlements of the coloured race mixed up
with settlements of the European race ?—There are very few
Europeans there. In the Kat River Settlement I should not
think there are 25 Europeans resident. The settlement was
granted, as the Committee is aware, under Sir Lowrie Cole's
administration, sanctioned by the Home Government, as an
experimental settlement for the Hottentot race. I believe
by Sir Andreis Stockenstrom, at that time an officer of high
standing in the colony, a selection of Hottentots had been
made from the different missionary institutions, the Mora¬
vian and ours ; well-disposed men, men of some little property,
were taken from those other settlements in the colony, and
located in the Kat River Settlement.
23. What is about the extent of country which they oc¬
cupy ?—It extends about 25 miles north and south, by 20
miles east and west.
24. You have stated certain circumstances which, in your
opinion, have constituted particular grievances with respect
to this population, and which have produced an irritating
effect upon their minds; are you prepared to state to the
Committee an opinion as to any general change in the exist¬
ing
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 9
îng relations between the British Government and those
people which it would be expedient to adopt?—No; the
main thing, I think, would be to secure for them a magis- q june 185».
tracy in which they would have confidence. I feel sure that,
upon the whole, they are a thoroughly loyal and devoted
people. Their present state of disaffection and disloyalty is
entirely a new thing ; I believe the disaflfection to have been
general, but the disloyalty to have been very partial.
25. You think that nothing more is required than the
residence of a discreet and judicious magistrate among them
to meet all their wants and wishes r —That is the main thing ;
it would lead to others. I think an important end would be
gained by encouraging them to become bonáßde landholders
thei'e. Give them a personal interest in the land ; the greater
the interest they have at stake, I think, the more anxious
they will be to preserve peace, and to stand by the Govern¬
ment.
26. What is the tenure by which they now hold their
land?—In the Kat River Settlement the Hottentots were
allowed, through their headmen, to make a selection of
certain spots for villages, depending of course upon the
supply of water ; the fountains and streams. Then so many
feet, I do not remember now exactly the amount in width
and in depth, were allotted to each one, but they have
not received diagrams. They simply dwell there as part of
the Hottentot nation, but not as the holders of those erven,
as they are called ; allotments for building, we should call
them here. The people have not got diagrams ; they have
been promised those diagrams, which would make a certain
amount of land theirs, which might be conveyed to others
under given circumstances. Those I think should be given
them, but I think there should be a provision at the same
time that that land should not be alienated, say, to Europeans
and colonists, but that it should be kept for the Hottentot
nation, which was the design originally of the settlement.
That I think could be done without improperly infringing
upon the liberties of such landholders.
27. Mr. Mackinnon.'\ Will you be kind enough to state
somewhat more distinctly the nature of their present tenure ?
—^They have simply permission to occupy.
28. Can they be turned out at any time ?—I do not know
what the right in the colony is ; I believe that occupation for
a certain number of years gives them a right against being
expelled, but it would not be sufficient to enable a man to
sell the property ; they do not feel it to be secure. I have
sometimes
10 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J. sometimes said to them, " Why do not you build better
reemm. Jjouggg gjjjj cultivate your laud more ?" They say, and I
6 June 1851. think reasonably say, " But we have no security upon the
property ; we can be excluded, if the Government chooses to
interfere."
29. Chairman.^ In point of fact, has any one of them ever
been disturbed in his occupation ?—That which I have men¬
tioned was a very strong measure, the turning out of those
Gonah Hottentots.
30. But there the error was set right as soon as it was dis¬
covered ?—The people obtained permission to return after
losing a large amount of property, and suffering a great
deal.
31. Colonel Dunne.] Was not that case the result of an
accident ?—Sir Harry Smith certainly did not intend it ; he
did not intend, he assured me, to turn out those Gonah Hot¬
tentots ; it was entrusted to parties whose feelings were not
kindly towards the people.
32. Colonel Estcourt.] Those people you say are living in
villages, but they have no actual division of property amongst
themselves ?—^There is common land attached to each settle¬
ment. Suppose it to be a village having 100 or 200 inha¬
bitants, they have all their respective houses and allotments,
with so many feet of frontage, and a general right to com¬
monage at the back of the settlement. That which is common
in the colony is, that each real landowner shall have a recog¬
nised diagram, provided by a sworn Government surveyor,
which is to be the basis of any measure he may adopt in the
disposal of his land. The Hottentots at present feel that they
are resident there by a kind of permission only ; no man feels
himself secure in point of law for the continued occupation of
his land.
33. Chairman.] What is the extent of one of those dia¬
grams ?—I think it is about an acre ; but I cannot speak with
certainty.
34. Colonel Dunne.] What is the tenure by which occu¬
pants generally hold land ?—They have in all cases a diagram
recognised by the Government, and entered in the Transfer
Court.
35. Colonel Estcmrt.] In fact the Hottentots are treated
with as a united village ; the individuals are not treated with ?
—They are not.
36. Viscount Mandeville.] Was any ground given for the
expulsion of those Hottentots in the case you have mentioned ?
—Yes ; the people themselves had requested the Government
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 11
to expel certain squatting Kafirs, which was the term used. J-
Certain Kafirs had come in and settled in the neighbourhood
without permission. The people had requested to have those 6 June 1851.
removed ; and it was under the general idea of the removal
of those squatters that these burghers themselves were
expelled.
37. Colonel Dunne-I Who made the application for their
expulsion ?—The residents of Blinkwater.
38. Were they Hottentots?—Yes.
39. Mr. MackinnonJ] If the Government at home or the
Government in the colony gave a positive title to those Hot¬
tentots to hold their land for ever, would it not tend to retard
the civilization of the colony by preventing Europeans, or
persons who would efl&ciently cultivate the land, from having
the opportunity of doing so ?—Many of the Hottentots have
greatly improved their lands ; they have built good houses,
and have furnished their houses very decently. They have
acquired horses, oxen, waggons, and various other moveable
property ; and I think, as a whole body, they would do much
more for the improvement of a given locality than Europeans;
not as individuals perhaps, but as a body. That is to say,
the Kat River Settlement will now sustain 5,000 or 6,000
Hottentots, but it would not sustain one-tenth of that number
of Europeans, who would require farms so much larger, and
whose means of support must be upon a greater scale. It
may be well to say here, that there were evidently two views
on the part of the Government in granting the Kat River
Settlement to the Hottentots. The one was, to reward the
Hottentots for the faithful services of many past years, espe¬
cially in the war ; and secondly, to have a body of men who
might serve as a defence to the colony in the event of a Kafir
attack. Now, having 5,000 or 7,000 men just upon that
spot, if you secure their fidelity and loyalty, you have that
defence ; but you would not have it in the small number to
which a body of European farmers would be limited. Not
only would there be fewer men to defend the colony, but you
would present much greater temptations to the Kafirs to
come in and steal the property of the Europeans than the
more trifling property of the native Hottentots.
40. Chairman.'] Is there a feeling of dislike existing
between the Kafirs and the Hottentots?—There is a great
deal of jealousy, and on this ground : The whole of that
settlement belonged some few years ago to the Kafirs.
Maquomo, the chief, of whom the Committee has probably
heard, was expelled from a part of the Kat River Settlement
to
12
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J, to make way for the Hottentots, and the jealousy between
Freeman, them, I may say, has continued from that moment to the
6Ju¡r785i. ,
41. Mr. Hawes^ Is the Kat River Settlement in the ceded
territory, as it is called?—Yes, it is; that was where Ma-
quomo resided.
42. That territory was ceded, was it not, by treaty with
the British Government ?—It was said to be ceded, but it
never was.
43. Are you acquainted with the circumstances which occur¬
red at that time ?—1 have read them over and over again,
and conversed about them with different parties there. 1 have
been most strongly assured by those who know all the facts,
that the Gaikas never said nor implied that they ceded it.
Lord Charles Somerset was then the Governor, and it was his
wish and plan to get it, and to get it without the force of the
sword ; but there is no document I believe existing, which
would go to show that it had ever been really ceded.
44. Though there is no document, is not it a fact, stated
upon the highest authority in the colony, that the chiefs who
were consulted at that time did cede the territory, and that
with a view of being separated from the settlers ?—I have heard
it affirmed, of course, and it so appeared in some of the Blue
Books, that there was a cession ; but I never could ascertain
in what way any cession was made ; I could find no document,
nor any distinct declaration on the subject. And a further
question arises, which implies that there was not a cession ;
namely, that the people there, and I may say the people through¬
out all South Africa, do not recognise any right on the part
of their chiefs to part with the territory occupied by them.
The people regard themselves as the rightful owners of the soil
which they cultivate and occupy ; they recognise a general
authority over their conduct in alí matters of theft, or anything
else of that kind, on the part of their chiefs, but they do not
recognise that they have the power to cede any part of their
territory.
45. Was not Lord Charles Somerset in direct communica¬
tion with Gaika at that time ?—I have understood that he was.
And an attempt was made to put up Gaika as the paramount
chief, much to the annoyance of all the other chiefs, and that
led to those successive misunderstandings which terminated
in the expulsion of the Gaika tribes from what we have since
called the ceded territory. The agreement, first of all, was
to make it a neutral territory, that neither part}' should occupy
it.
46. Was
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
13
46. Was that policy generally sanctioned by the leading Rev. J. J.
colonial authorities at the time?—1 think it was ; I think Freeman.
the liberal press of the colony, as it may be called, which g jjj.,
defended the interests of the native tribes, scarcely concurred
in the propriety of the measure, and for the same reasons they
have not, to the present day, changed their v^ws upon the
matter. We have had nothing but a series of misunder¬
standings and expensive wars with the Kafirs since that time.
47. Do you think that that has arisen from a neglect of
the stipulations which for the moment I will call the treaty
or understanding with Gaika, or from an infraction of those
stipulations ?—I think Gaika, so far as I could understand the
case, sincerely believed that the country was not to be granted
to others, or to be occupied by them. When he yielded it, it
was agreed that the Kafirs should cease to be the masters and
occupiers of it, but he had no expectation that the colonists
were to be made the occupants of it. Neither he nor the
other chiefs ever sincerely yielded that point, and up to this
day Maquomo keeps on asking the question, " Why was I
expelled from my country ?" The Committee are aware that
he put that question last year to his Excellency.
48. Was not it at that time as clear an understanding as
could be come to with barbarians, that that tract of country
should be considered as neutral, and neither occupied by the
Kafirs nor by the settlers ?—I think it was so.
49. Will you favour the Committee with your opinion
upon that arrangement as a means of preserving the tran¬
quillity of the border ?—I am incompetent to give any opinion
touching what would be properly a military view of the
matter. I have always thought, from what information I
could gather, that upon the whole it was a wise thing to
occupy that neutral territory, and to give to the Hottentots
the occupation of it. It seems to have been a wise policy;
but I think something more should have been done at the
time to meet the wishes and requests and feelings of the
Kafirs whowere excluded, and especially of Maquomo; I think
you ought to have provided for him more distinctly. Though
he has turned out, I will admit, an unworthy man, still at
that time he was not so ; and I think a distinct provision
being made for the necessities of the Kafir chiefs would have
secured more fidelity and more affection on their part.
Whether the boundary line which we have adopted, namely,
the Keiskamma, be the best for the colony in a military point
of view, 1 do not know ; whether it is better than the Kei
I cannot say.
50. Are
14 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
]^v. J. J. ^o. Are the Committee to understand you to say that in
reeman. your opinion the policy which was then followed, namely, the
6 June 1851, establishment of a neutral territory between the Kafirs, on the
one hand, and the settlers upon the other, was or was not a
policy which was wise and judicious ?—I think it would have
been wise andjudicious, if it had been well followed up by
all those other measures which might have been brought to
bear upon the Kafirs, whom we were then shutting out of
that part of their country.
51. Are the Committee to understand that in your opinion
it would have been judicious, subsequently to the carrying
out of that arrangement, to have located the Hottentots in the
neutral territory?—Yes, I cannot blame it; I should have
thought it would have been better also to have put some
Hottentots in other portions of the colony, simply as land¬
holders, so as to give them a deep interest in the soil.
52. Supposing the Hottentots had been located in the
neutral territory, what would have been their pursuit; would
it have been agricultural ?—On the exclusion of the Kafirs
the Hottentots were brought in. It did not remain a neutral
territory.
53. Their pursuits are chiefly agricultural, are not they ?
—Agricultural and pastoral together, with the carriage of
goods ; many of them are artisans, masons, carpenters, and
so on.
54. Would not the effect of that have been, and was not
the effect of that location of the Hottentots to bring them
more immediately into contact with their fiercer and more
warlike neighbours, the Kafirs?—Yes, and so far it would
seem to endanger them ; but here was the difference : the
Kafir was still left to his own wild and undisciplined habits
of warfare, and the Hottentots were our soldiers. Our Cape
corps and mounted rifles were all Hottentots ; and I need not
say that 100 well-disciplined Hottentots would be a match
for 1,000 undisciplined Kafirs.
55. Such was the fact, was not it, that the location brought
these new settlers immediately into contact with the Kafirs ?
—Yes.
56. Is not it also true that the Kafirs committed a series
of depredations upon the settlers, both Hottentots and emi¬
grants, in that territory?—Yes. There have always been
thefts committed by the Kafirs; I believe, however, that
from about the year 1835 to 1845, the number of those
thefts, on the part of the Kafirs, was very much upon the
decline.
57' The
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
15
57. The Committee understand you to say that there were Rev. J. J.
depredations constantly occurring on the part of the Kafirs Freeman.
upon the settlers, both Hottentot and emigrant?—Yes. I 5junei85i.
presume that to have been the case from the charges which
were brought before the magistrates ; but I do not believe
that all the charges, nor anything like all, were well-founded
charges ; because if the farmers lost their cattle, their tempta¬
tion was at once to say, " The Kafirs have stolen them."
And instances have certainly occurred in which cattle said
to have been stolen by the Kafirs, have been found to have
been stolen by other parties ; stolen it may have been, in the
colony, or killed and destroyed by the farmers' own servants.
Many cases could be mentioned in which the charge of cattle
stealing has not been established ; but beyond all doubt
there were thefts on the part of the Kafirs.
58. Were there any more serious crimes than those thefts
committed, which you have heard of?—There is the parti¬
cular case which led to the late war in 1846-7, which Sir
Peregrine Maitland took up, the murder of a Hottentot con¬
stable. I do not think, generally, there were very serious
cases.
59. Viscount Mandeville.] Was there no one but a Hot¬
tentot murdered then ?—In that particular case two persons
were killed ; one of them was a Kafir, and the Kafirs
killed the Hottentot, to whom a Kafir prisoner was hand¬
cuffed.
60. Was not there a farmer killed also?—I think not at
that particular time ; it may have been so.
61. Mr. H awes.1 Passing from the conduct of the Kafirs
in reference to the occupation of this neutral territory in the
Kat River Settlement, to the conduct of the settler and the
Government generally, is it clear, in your opinion, that the
Government was altogether free from the imputation of
having made encroachments upon or having committed any
act of injustice towards the Kafirs, notwithstanding their
depredations; take the period you have mentioned, from
1835 to 1845 ?—I should say that during that period, from
1835 to 1845, there was a gradual diminution of crime, so
far as appears in the magistrates' courts and books, and that
things were working, upon the whole, tolerably well for the
preservation of peace between the Kafirs and the colony, and
promoting the improvement of the Hottentots in this neutral
territory, then called the Kat River Settlement.
62. May the Committee presume it to be your opinion
that Sir Peregrine Maitland, wh^ he issued his proclamation
in
l6 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J, in 184G, declaring war ag-ainst the Kafirs, was perfectly
Freeman, correct in stating this ; " So far as a feeling of hostility
6 June 1851. amongst the Kafirs might be provoked or palliated by even
one solitary act of violence, outrage, or injustice committed
by any colonist in Kafir land, the Kafirs are withoat excuse ;
no Kafir can charge the commission of any such act during,
at all events, the last seven years. It is with pride and
pleasure that I make this statement, which I believe to be
accurate even to the letter"?—Yes, I presume that state¬
ment was well founded.
63. Would your experience and knowledge of the colony
lead you generally to concur in that expression of opinion ?—
Yes, I should concur in it, taken as a whole. In the procla¬
mation of war I do not coincide with Sir Peregrine Maitland ;
I do not. see that a casus belli was made out.
64. You were understood to say that 3'ou thought the
formation of the Kat River Settlement was a wise and
judicious step on the part of the Government ?—Yes.
65. Will 3'ou state the grounds of your belief to the Com¬
mittee?—So far as the Hottentots who were located there
are concerned, I think it was due to them to secure at least
a fraction of the colonj- to them in perpetuity. None of us
can doubt that the whole of South Africa had been originally
occupied by the Hottentot race.
66. Upon whom the Kafir was an intruder?—As far as
history goes back, I think they have about met ; the Hot¬
tentots have come down on the western side, the Kafirs have
come down on the eastern side, and they have met, say 100
years back, somewhere about the Gamtoos River, which is now
within the colony.
67. Viscount Mandeville."] Are you acquainted with the
Hottentot language ?—I am not.
68. Can you say whether the names of the rivers resemble
the Hottentot language ?—Many of them I have heard stated
to me as being Hottentot names. The monosyllabic names
are Hottentot words, certainlv.
69. Mr. Hawes.'[ Will you eontinue the statement you
were about to make as to the grounds upon which you thought
the settlement of the Kat River a wise and judicious one?—■
My first reason for thinking it a wise and good and useful
measure would be that we owed it to the Hottentots to pre¬
serve for them some portion of the whole colony, which ori¬
ginally belonged to their ancestors.
70. What do you mean when you speak of the settlement
of the Hotteatots j do you mean to say that the settlement as
founded
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
17
founded and as conducted was wise and judicious ; or do you Rev. J. 3.
merely mean to express a general opinion that the location of Freeman.
the Hottentots in the territory was due to the Hottentots who g
owned the territory originally ?—In the first instance I meant
to say that the obtaining a piece of land for them was desi¬
rable, leaving out of the question how we got that piece of
land, whether from Kafirs or Dutchmen. I think it was wise
that a piece of land in the colony should be reserved in per¬
petuity to the Hottentot race. It was a fair consideration for
our having obtained all the rest of the land. With respect to
the particular mode of settlement, I should say that it was a
wise thing to arrange that the best of the Hottentots which
could be found in the colony should be selected and brought
there. It was a reward to them, and an encouragement to
them ; a reward for services during the past, and an encou¬
ragement, I think, for time to come. It was putting them
upon their trial ; it was a new position to put them in. For
the most part they had either been residents upon the lands
granted by Government for missionary institutions, where of
course they had no individual right in the soil, or they were
simply residents in the colony, settling down wherever they
could.
71. With reference to this settlement, are the Committee
to understand you to say that the system upon which it was
founded and conducted was a wise and judicious one ?—
I think so.
72. Have you acquainted yourself with the reports which
Sir Henry Pottinger has made respecting that settlement ?—!
Yes; I have read Mr. Biddulph's report particularly ; that
was drawn up, I think, at the request of Sir Henry Pottinger,
and published by Sir Henry Pottinger ; in which report I
am aware that Mr. ßiddulph, in commop with many other
gentlemen in the colony, is of opinion that the locating of
large numbers of labouring people together in that manner is
not favourable to the colonial interests ; it is locating in one
spot labourers whom they think might be advantageously
distributed over the colony.
73. Is your notion of a settlement this, that the persons so
located should have lands granted to them with a good title ;
that they should cultivate them and maintain themselves,
and be ready, if necessary, to take their share in the defence
of the frontier ?—That is iny opinion.
74. Does that description correspond with the Kat River
Settlement, from your knowledge of it ?—Only that the par¬
ties have no right in the soil as individuals, or even as vil-
0.63. B lagers.
l8 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Dev. J. J. lagers, but merely as a whole body ; it is this, that 5,000
Freeman, people may go and live at a place called the Kat River Set-
g , ^ tlement ; it conveys no right of property.
one 51« Were not those Hottentots, to a great extent, supported
by the Government ?—I do not see in what particular direc¬
tion they were so.
76. Did they earn their own subsistence by their own
labour ?—Entirely ; even during the war they never received
wages, nothing but rations.
77. Rations means food, does not it?—Yes; while they
were in service.
78. Was not clothing also given them ?—I should think
possibly it may have been ; but I do not know.
79. Are you quite sure that rations and clothing were given
only to those who were actually in the service of the Govern¬
ment ?—To the best of my belief only those who were serving,
or who had been in the service, and were allowed to return
home for the sake of their families, received rations. I am
certain of this, that they could have employed their time far
more profitably for themselves as labourers and carriers and
sawyers, and so on, than they could in the service of the
Government. What they have done has been of service to
the Government, but not to themselves, in a pecuniary point
of view.
80. Would you describe the Kat River Settlement as an
industrious and thriving settlement ?—I should, looking at
all the circumstances. It did not fully meet all my wishes
and expectations, I candidly confess ; but when I saw that
the people had been utterly ruined by the war of 1834-5,
and as soon as they recovered from that, were again ruined
by the war of 1846-7, I being there in the middle of 1849,
I was not surprised to find a considerable degree of poverty,
and a deficiency of the signs of industry which I had hoped
for. But will the Committee allow me to say this : Mr.
Biddulph's report goes to represent the Hottentots as want^
ing in industry, and therefore in the signs of industry on the
spot. When Sir Harry Smith went there immediately after-s
wards, and saw their orchards and enclosed lands, with
many good houses and decent huts, he said most properly,
in relation to Mr. Biddulph's report, " If that is a failure,
the whole world is a failure." That was Sir Harry Smith's
own declaration.
81. According to your opinion the Kat River Settlement
is a thriving, industrious, and successful settlement ?—Yes,
all the disadvantages being considered.
82. Did
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
19
82. Did the Hottentots ever complain of any want of pro- Rev. J. /.
tection on the part of the Government ?—The principal com- Freeman.
plaints which I heard while I was there recently, were of a g june iSgi.
series of oppressive acts on the part of the magistrate, very
heavy fines being imposed in many more cases than I have
just described.
83. I am now speaking of the period from 1835 to 1845,
the Kat River Settlement having been established many
years before 1835. Taking that period, have any instances
come to your own knowledge, or have you from the mission¬
aries heard any complaints of the want of efficient protection
on the part of the Government, or the want of efficient magis¬
trates, excepting for a moment the cases to which just now
you referred ?—No ; I should say there have been no com¬
plaints ; I am not familiar with any complaints during that
earlier period. I think Mr. Biddulph was the first magis¬
trate appointed at the Kat River Settlement.
84. Considering your description of this settlement as a
thriving, industrious, well-protected settlement, upon fertile
land, how do you account for the general disloyalty which
has recently prevailed there ?—That is a most mysterious
thing, a thing which strikes me with great surprise. I am
as much surprised at it as Sir Harry Smith himself, who, in
his communication to Lord Grey, says it is the most wonder¬
ful thing in history, in his opinion, that a religious body of
men, such as this professes to be, should at once have gone
over and joined the heathen. There is a little mistake in
that ; a large body has not gone over, as 1 am prepared to
affirm. General Somerset is under a mistake in his commu¬
nications, as can be proved. In the next place, they have
not gone to join the heathen, if any reference to religion be
there meant. It is a political movement, and not at all a
religious one. I am not going to say it was religious to rebel,
of course ; I do not mean anything of that kind ; but I mean
to affirm that the Hottentots never were idolaters, and con¬
sequently have not gone back to idolatry, as charged on
them by some writers. They have made a creditable profes¬
sion of Christianity ; and now, in some fitful moment, in sad
dissatisfaction, some of them have joined the Kafirs as a
political movement, but it has nothing at all to do with
heathenism.
85. You are connected with the London Missionary
Society, are you not}—Yes.
86. Who is your oldest and principal missionary in South
Africa ?—Mr. Read, senior, who has been there 50 years.
0.63. B 2 87. Has
20
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Hey. J. J. 87. Has not he married a native woman ?—He married,
Freeman. 40 years ago, a Hottentot ; she is lately deceased ; she
6 June 1851, 'Jï'ought up her family very creditably. Young Mr. James
Read, who was examined by a Committee of the House of
Commons in 1845, was a son of Mrs. Read.
88. Mr. Read is one of your missionaries ?—Yes.
8g. Has he made any communications to his brother mis¬
sionaries, or has he written home to give any explanations of
this extraordinary change of feeling on the part of these
people towa,rds the Government, which seems to have done
all it could for them during many years past?—Yes, he has
written home. 1 have here a letter of General Somerset,
which is contained in the '* Graham's Town Journal " of the
15th of March of the present year, being addressed to Sir
Harry Smith. Upon that I have Mr. Read's remarks, which
he has addressed to our agent in Cape Town, and which by
him have been transmitted to us.
90. Does he assign any reasons for this singular disalfec-
tion ?—No ; in this particular document he does not.
gi. What is the date of that letter?—March 26, 1851.
gi.* Have you any objection to give that letter from Mr.
Read to the Committee ?—I will readily furnish the Com¬
mittee with a copy of it. (Vide Appendix.)
92. Is Mr. Bowker, the magistrate to whom you have re¬
ferred, a settler of long standing and of some property there?
—He was an Albany farmer ; I do not know for how many
years, but he has been several years in the colony as an Albany
farmer.
93. Has the general administration of his duties been satis¬
factory to the inhabitants ?—Not to the inhabitants of Kat
River.
94. Not at any time?—No; from the first they looked
upon him with suspicion and were prejudiced against him, and
that chiefly from some letter which he had published, before
he was magistrate, in some journal of the colony; that gave
them a dislike to him.
95. Do you recollect about what was the date of his appoint¬
ment?—I am not sure whether it was 1848 ; I think it was. ,<
96. Do you know whether he was recommended to the
Cioverncr by the residents?—I do not know that.
97. With reference to these transactions to which you have
referred, in June 1850, had the inhabitants of the Kat River
Settlement made complaints to the Governor of depreda¬
tions and incursions committed upon them by the Kafirs?—
Yes; it was at their request that tiiis interference was made.
The
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
2t
The inhabitants of Blinkwater had made a representation to Rev. J. J.
the Governor. Freeman.
98. That led to an inquiry, did not it, by a local commis- g june 1851.
sion ?—I think his Excellency desired Colonel Mackinnon to
institute an inquiry as to the parties who had located them¬
selves, that is, in provincial language, squatted in the vicinity
of Blinkwater, with a view to making some arrangements for
removing those who ought to be removed and retaining those
who might be retained.
99. Had not the settlers there long complained of the
number of Kafirs and squatters among them, and of the great
losses which they sustained in consequence ?—Yes.
100. Complaints had been made long before June 1850,
and they continued to be made after the severity of which you
have spoken, down to November; is not that so?—Yes.
101. Some gentlemen, it appears, wrote to the local magis¬
trates there, calling for some inquiry. Will you have the
goodness to look at this document, and at the names signed
to it, and tell me whether they are men of whom you have
any personal knowledge as men of standing and respecta¬
bility in that district ?—There are but two names that I know
at all, and only one that I know personally. Mr. Blakeway
I have heard of, but further than that I do not know him.
Mr. Painter is a gentleman whom I have seen at Fort Beau¬
fort ; he is a merchant tliere, in a moderate way of business,
and 1 presume a respectable man.
102. Notwithstanding the severities which you have com¬
plained of, it appears that the colonists were still suffering
from the depredations of theKafirs?—I should presume so from
this document. Upon a requisition like this, I should think it
would have been important at once to have looked into the
matter.
103. The Committee understand you to say that the main
thing wanted in the government of the Cape, especially on
the frontier, is the appointment of magistrates in whom the
people would have confidence ?—Yes, provided they possess
the other magisterial qualifications of sound sense and a know¬
ledge of law. In the case of Mr. Bowker, the Governor
himself says he had found out that he had not sufficient
knowledge of the law.
104. Do you know anything of the steps which are taken
previously to the appointment of a magistrate ; is there any
inquiry made into his qualifications?—I know his Excellency
possesses the power of making the appointment ; but in those
0.63. B 3 cysc's,
21
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Kcv. J. J. cases, as far as I know, it has been exercised when the person
Freeman, has been recommended to him.
6 June 1851. Colonel Dünne.] From what class do you think that
tlie magistrates should be taken ; are there any men among
the natives of sufficient standing and intelligence to act as
magistrates ?—There may not be precisely in the same
locality ; but still I cannot but believe there are respectable
men in the colony, many perhaps in Graham's Town, but
certainly in Cape Town, which is the seat of Government,
who are very well qualified to act as magistrates,
106. Chairman.] What is the salary generally given to a
magistrate ?—About 400/. a year.
107. Colonel Dunne.] In that particular locality you think
there are not any ?—In Fort Beaufort there would not be,
probably ; it is a small military town, which has sprung up
in the last few years.
108. Are there European settlers ?—Yes.
109. What would be the reasons which would make the
Hottentots have more confidence in one stranger to them
rather than another ?—When men have committed themselves
by the expression of a strong opinion as against the coloured
races generally, and the Hottentots particularly, there would
almost certainly exist a suspicion and jealousy in their minds.
Mr. Bowker had done that previously to his appointment.
11 o. That is only an individual case. There are not many
men who do that, are there ?—There are two classes of per¬
sons in the colony. There are those who take what I should
be disposed to regard as a just and benevolent and liberal
view of the question, and who would endeavour to raise and
improve the coloured races ; and there are others who deem
them utterly incapable of improvement, and would sweep
them from their land entirely.
111. Chairman.] Is it a fact that the coloured race within
the limits of the British colony are increasing in number ?
—I presume they are increasing ; but there are no statistics
on which you can depend upon that subject.
112. There is no manifest diminution in their numbers ?
—No, I think not.
113. Mr. Booker.] Did you ever hold any official appoint¬
ment at the Cape ?—No, not at the Cape, nor have I done
so at any time, except while residing some years ago in
Madagascar, and that was a mere nothing; I received simply
a request from the Governor of the Mauritius that I would
coarrespond with him a little while on the state of Madagascar.
114. Does religious or sectarian feeling or rivalry reign
high
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
23
high in that part of South Africa ?—I think not ; there is a -f-
little of it.
115. You were in connexion, as you state, with the Lon- 6 June 1851.
don Missionary Society ?—Yes.
116. Mr. Mackinnon.] In reply to a question with regard
to the neutral territory, which was put to you by Mr. Hawes,
you stated your impression to be that it was better to locate
the Hottentots on the neutral territory than to leave it open ?
—I think so.
117. In another part of your evidence you stated that the
chief cause of difference between the persons under the con¬
trol of the British Government and the Kafirs was the dis¬
putes which took place about cattle, and the difficulty of
ascertaining by whom the cattle were taken. Would not
that cause of difference cease if there were a certain space of
territory left between the two races ?—Perhaps if you could
really secure an absolutely neutral, unoccupied ground, it
might have that result ; but where there was a beautiful piece
of pasturage, and beautiful springs and streams, I think it
would be impossible upon the one side and the other. You
could not keep the Kafirs who were in sight of it from tres¬
passing upon it, and you could hardly keep some of our
own colonists either from doing so.
118. If there were a tract of neutral country between
them, would not that render it much more difficult for any
differences of this sort to take place ?—But that becomes an
impracticability. My objection would be that the thing is
impracticable, and could not be done without keeping a
great body of troops there to keep ofi' the men on both
sides.
11 g. Chairman.] Is there any system of local self govern¬
ment among the Hottentots, through the medium of their
chiefs ?—No ; there are head men of the villages ; the people
have the appointment themselves of a head man ; but the
field cornets, who are a superior kind of constables, are
appointed by the officers of the Government.
120. Among themselves is there any self government at
all?—There are headmen.
121. What are the functions of the headmen ?—In the event
of any dispute occurring between' them involving a petty
question, which the parties might settle amongst themselves
without going to a magistrate, the headman would be re¬
ferred to.
122. Are the magistrates always Europeans?—Yes.
123. Do you think any change of the existing system in
0.63. B 4 that
04 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOKE THE
Rev. J. J. that respect would be desirable?—I think that some men
reeman. could be found who have been brought up in the colony, or
6 June 2851. ^^ve been brought up in Europe, capable of acting as
magistrates ; respectable members 01 colonial families could
be found, of enlarged mind and knowledge, who would be
acceptable to the people.
124. You do not think that there are any persons of the na¬
tive race who would be fit to fill the situation of magistrate ?—
I do not know a native at present who I think would be quite
competent to fill the magistrate's ofl&ce, though he might
occupy all the subordinate offices up to that of a magistrate.
When I speak of Europeans I do not refer to those born in
Europe ; there are some who have been brought up in the
colony who have occupied stations of importance there ; such
as Sir Andreis Stockenstrom.
125. Do you believe, if it were possible to find a person of
the native race possessing the requisite qualifications, the
appointment of such a person would very much conciliate the
feelings of the settlers ?—No ; I think at present they would
pay more respect to a European ; I do not mean by that, one
born in Europe.
126. One of European extraction?—Yes; as I believe
Mr. Wienand is, who I think has succeeded Mr. Bowker.
127. You think that there.is a confidence on the part of the
native population in the general superiority and qualifications
of the white man which would, at present at least, induce
them to put more confidence in him than in one of their own
race ?—I think so.
128. Colonel ThompsonJ] Are there no half castes in the
colony ?—Y es.
129. Would they be respected, in your opinion?—Yes,
if they were known to be men of character and intelligence.
130. Might they not form a kind of bond of amity between
the two races }—I think they would ; but I think they are
few in number.
131. Chairman.~\ Are the half castes increasing as the result
of marriages between respectable white men and colonial
females?—Yes. The Hottentot race will become extinct-
before many years, I think, from that circumstance. In the
Kat River Settlement, Mr. Read mentioned to me as a fact,
that 17 young Englishmen had married Hottentot young
women within the last few years.
132. Colonel Z>2m;?e.] How are the headmen chosen?—
I think by election among the people themselves. The people
of the village would meet, and if the senior man among them
were
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 2$
were a respectable man having their confidence, he would be Rev,./. J.
chosen by a kind of acclamation. Freeman, ^ ^
133. Colonel Estcourt-I You say it would be desirable to 6 juneiSsil
have Hottentot settlements in certain situations ; how are
those settlements to be encouraged ?—The only other settle¬
ments of the Hottentots beside this of the Kat River, are the
missionary institutions.
] 34. Where the people have congregated round the mis¬
sionaries?—Yes; a portion of land, say 5,000 acres, is per¬
haps allotted by the Government as the location of the
Hottentots, where a missionary resides, and a schoolhouse is
built, and a church or a chapel, as the case may be.
135. The act of the Government is simply to allot a certain
portion of ground, which they say shall be for the Hottentots ?
-Yes. .
136. And that is occupied as chance may direct?—Yes.
] 37. The missionaries go into the country, and take up
their positions in certain localities?—Yes, appointed from the
societies at home.
138. When the Hottentots come into the country and
assemble in sufficient numbers, they choose their headmen
after their own fashion ?—Yes ; those headmen are not recog¬
nised by the Government as possessing any official station ;
it is a simple arrangement among the people themselves,
13g. They are acknowledged and obeyed by the people,
are they not ?—Yes ; they have a moral influence rather than,
any other.
140. The only official is the magistrate?—Yes, the nearest
magistrate.
141. Colonel Thompson^ Has any institution like that of
juries made any progress in the settlement?—No, I think not
among the natives themselves. Lately the Hottentots in the
Kat River Settlement have become competent to serve on
juries, and have been summoned accordingly.
142. To serve where?—At Fort Beaufort: Fort Beaufort
is the town most contiguous. Whether they have served I
do not know, but they have been summoned.
143. There has been no attempt to settle disputes among
the Hottentots themselves by any tribunal resembling that of
a jury?—No, I think not.
144. You stated your opinion to be, that the occupying
what you called the neutral ground was, in the sense in which
you used the terms, w ise and judicious.^—Yes.
145. Was it just and according to treaty as regarded the
Kafirs ?—Assuming that they had ceded that territory to us,
then
26 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J. then we had a right, I presume, to occupy it. My own im
Freeman, pression, however, is, upon the whole, that that is a previous
6 June 1851. 9*^^stion, and it is one which remains to this day a bone of
contention with the Kafirs ; but it was ceded by them as
neutral ground first of all, certainly. It has been subse¬
quently affirmed that Gaika ceded it altogether to us, and
we, assuming our right to the occupation of it, planted the
Hottentots there.
146. It is not at this moment acknowledged by the Kafirs
that it was ceded to us entirely, you say?—No, I think you
would not find a single Kafir who would say that Gaika ever
did really cede that territory to us.
147. Do you conceive that that has been one cause of the
feeling which has led to the wars and the expenditure which
have since occurred ?—I think, judging from the answers
given by the chiefs to Sir Harry Smith, as published in the
BluejBooks from time to time, it is so ; that their loss of land
has been throughout to them a source of dissatisfaction.
148. Do you think that the knowledge that that is the
case ought to constitute a set-off against its being considered
upon the whole as wise and judicious to have so occupied the
land ?—I think it should clearly have gone so far as this ;
to constrain us while taking and occupying the land, to
adopt the kindest and wisest measures that we could towards
those whom we excluded from it.
149. Do you think it is just and politic to exclude a man
from his land in opposition to a treaty, on condition that yon
shall be kind to him afterwards ?—No, I do not, certainly.
150. Marquis of What is the number of magis¬
trates in the Kat River settlement?—I think there is only
one for the Kat River settlement ; Mr. Wienand is at present
the magistrate.
151. Mr. Bowker was alone there, was he?—Yes; he suc¬
ceeded Mr. Biddulph.
152. Is there a strong desire] for independence among the
Hottentots?—Not to be independent of our Government,
certainly.
153. Sir J. Walmsley.] You speak of there being but one
magistrate in the Kat River settlement ; over what extent of
country does his district extend ?—It is the whole of the Kat
River settlement ; say 25 miles by about 20 ; that is the
extent of it.
154. Are all questions brought to him, or does he remove
from place to place ?—They are all brought to him.
155. Does
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 27
155. Does great inconvenience arise from that?—No; Rev. j. j.
I tliink the people there do not mind going a few miles. Freeman.
156. When you speak of the Hottentots being well satisfied g
with the European magistrates, or those which havehitherto
been appointed, with one exception, do you think that that
arises in any degree from the want of capacity among them¬
selves for such appointments?—At the Kat River they have
had but two magistrates hitherto in the settlement, Mr. Bid-
dulph and Mr. Bowker. In those two cases I think the ap-
pointments have been rather unfortunate, and it has given
the people a bad impr( ssion, but I believe with their present
magistrate, who is the third who has been appointed, they
are satisfied ; I have heard nothing to the contrary.
157. Do you suppose that the natives themselves are
capable of taking those offices, if they were encouraged to do
so ?—I think I have met with some three or four men whose
intelligence and energy of mind was such that I should have
as full confidence in referring any case of my own to them,
as I should between white man and white man.
158. There is no general want of capacity among the
natives ?—Far from it.
159. They are a quick, intelligent race, are they ?—Yes.
They have not advanced very far ; I have met with a few
who have advanced to a respectable degree of general know¬
ledge, though not in any one specific branch of attainments ;
but for all the ordinary purposes of life and of society they are
perfectly competent.
160. Would the existing evils arise, in your opinion, if
they had the appointment of their own magistrates ?—No; I
think if they had in some large degree, I would not say the
final appointment, but if they had the power of making a
strong recommendation, perhaps of a veto to a certain extent,
still leaving the appointment finally with the Government, it
would give them great satisfaction.
161. Colonel Estcourt.'] Is the Kafir boundary very accu¬
rately defined ?—I think so ; as far as the course of the river
is concerned it is.
162. That is the present boundary?—Yes.
163. What was the former boundary ?—There was the
Keiskamma, and before that the Fish River. There have been
boundaries by rivers generally.
164. Were they sufficiently understood, so that a Kafir
chief, in making a treaty, might certainly know that what he
proposed to give actually belonged to him ?—Yes, they have
a ready capacity for making boundary lines ; trees, nooks,
juttings.
2ö MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J. J. j Uttings, and sprouts, or whatever can constitute a boundary
leeman. They have most distinct boundaries.
6 June 1851. ^^5- Boundaries which are acknowledged by other people
as well as by themselves ?—The boundary has been distinctly
marked out from time to time by the Government and the
chiefs together.
166. How do the Kafirs occupy the country ?—They are
a very scattered population. You could not call it sparse,
because there is sufiiciehl po^lation for a large district ; but
they do not dwell together in and that mainly
because the springs are not sufficiently large to affsard a
supply of water permanently for their families arid theii
cattle.
167. They do not remain in the immediate neighbourhood
of the rivers ?—No, they cannot do that, they must go farther
inland; 12 or 20 huts would form a kraal or village ; 100
people living together, including men, women, and children,
would be a respectable village as to its extent, among the
Kafirs.
168. And they occupy the ground in that way ?—They do.
169. The chief whom they acknowledge living somewhere
else ?—Yes, living perhaps in one of those kraals.
170. Mr. Hawes.~\ With respect to the grants of land
made to the Hottentots in this settlement, were they Govern¬
ment grants giving a title to the land ?—The people of the
Kat River Settlement have not had those. That is what
I meant in speaking of the diagrams, which is the technical
term they use ; I believe a few of the people have received
them, but very few.
171. Is that so with respect to the Hottentots ?—It is the
Hottentots of whom I speak.
172. Viscount Mandeville.^ Would it be sufficient to give
diagrams to the headmen of the villages ?—That would bé'
a step in advance of the present indefinite mode in which it
is performed, but it would hardly give to an individual the
confidence which he wants to acquire in order to lead to the'
improvement of his property.
'173. Mv. Harves.] Some of the Hottentots, you are under¬
stood to say, have grants?—I have understood so; I have
been told that they have.
174. Was not it the fact that they sold or exchanged them
immediately they had them ?—That is the difficulty. It was
that objection which led me to remark, in answer to a ques¬
tion from the Chairman, that I thought there should be some
provision made which would not infringe upon the liberty of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 29
the individual himself, but which should secure the occupa- J' J-
tion of the land to his race. If the Hottentot will sell his freeman.
land, let him, but it should be to a Hottentot, as long as the 5 june 1851.
settlement is reserved for the Hottentots by the Govern¬
ment.
175. The sale, or parting with the grants, did interpose a
difficulty, did not it, in continuing to make grants to the
Hottentots clear?—So I have understood ; I think Mr.
Montague once referred to it in conversation with me.
176. The old boundary of the colony was the Fish River,
was not it ?—^Yes.
177. That was the boundary in Lord Charles Somerset's
time ?—It was.
178. The Kafirs at that time occupied what is now called
the neutral or ceded territory ?—Yes; it is now called Vic¬
toria.
179. At that time there were constant depredations and
constant disturbances upon the boundary, were not there ?—
I should say there were frequently, and that on both sides.
I question if their own servants, I mean the servants of the
colonists, were not sometimes guilty of trespassing upon the
lands of the Kafirs.
180. Were not those depredations at that time repressed
by the commando system which had prevailed under the
Dutch Government ?—Yes.
181. Did that lead to very great abuses, in your opinion?
—I think it led to very great abuses and involved constant
wrongs ; I have seen it in operation, and the impression left
lipon my mind was, that whether it were the custom of the
Kafirs or not, as I am told it was, still it was sure to involve
the punishment of the innocent together with the guilty.
182. Was not the establishment of a neutral territory
made with a view to put an end to that commando system,
and to prevent an immediate contact between the barbarian
on the one side, and the settlers on the other ?—Yes, so I
have understood.
183. You have said that it is a disputed point whether or
not this territory was ceded. It is admitted that there is no
written treaty?—Yes.
184. Was not there an interview between the authorities
at the Cape and the chiefs?—Yes; Lord Charles Somerset
had an interview with Gaika.
185. As far as the local authorities are concerned, they
have always maintained that the result of that interview was
the cession of that territory to be held as neutral ground, with
a view
30 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
^re man' ^ disturbances, and as the means
reeman. i.0pj.0ggjjjg tliose disturbances to which I have referred ?—
6 June 1851. it would be painful to say that Lord Lharles Somerset
had at all misrepresented the interview ; one could not do
that in the case of an English nobleman. But while Lord
Charles Somerset would say it was ceded, I am sure Gaika
and his party would say it never was.
186. After that period did not the Kafirs occupy the terri-
tory again ?—Maquomo came in there.
187. Previously to that period did not they do so ?—This
would be prior to 1834.
188. Did not they occupy the territory and graze cattle in
the district?—Yes; it was permitted more especially to
Maquomo to come in, inasmuch as it had been his patrimony
and ancestral land.
189. Were not the depredations and disturbances again
revived, and did not that lead to the driving of Maquomo from
the territory?—So it was affirmed ; it is difficult to ascertain
the exact truth between some unprincipled Kafirs who would
take every advantage they could, and perhaps some white
men not really having much principle, but wishing to get
possession of the land and its advantages.
190. In point of fact, depredations and disturbances did
arise subsequently to the re occupation of the neutral ter¬
ritory?—Yes, there were complaints.
191. And those led to violence, whether on the part of the
settlers on the one hand to defend their property, or on the
part of the Kafirs on the other to steal cattle ?—Yes. One
great evil was the adoption of the spoor, that is, the footmark
of the animal, and making that the means of detecting the
theft. That is always an evil. And another was accepting
simply complaints on the part of European or colonial
farmers, who having lost their cattle were able to trace the
spoors or footmarks perhaps to the next adjoining kraal, and
by the commando system making them refund whatever the
farmer alleged he had lost.
192. Colonel Dunne^ How are they to find the cattle
without following the track?—That may be the case, but
still the system involves great injustice.
7 93. Is there any other means of finding out whei'e the
cattle go to except by following the spoor ?—I do not know
whether there are other modes than those which we should
adopt here ; but the evil of it has been that you do not simply
trace the cattle up to the village where you have evidence
they must be, but up to a certain point near that village:
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3I
for example, in travelling one day along the road, I saw Rev. J. J.
some 20 or 30 people stooping down and examining most Freeman.
carefully the road; 1 inquired, "What is the matter?" g June 1851.
They said, " There are cattle lost here." The spoor was
traced up to that spot, and then it was lost ; because cattle
from the neighbouring village had come down to that spot
also to be driven on upon that road to watering, and the
spoor of the lost cattle mingling with the spoor of the village
cattle, was lost. Yet that village was condemned to pay for
the cattle that had been lost, though where they were driven
to no one could ascertain.
194. Colonel Thompson.] Did the Kafirs ever make com¬
mandos upon the British territory r—No.
195. Mr. Hawes.] But they made irruptions into it, did
not they, for the purpose of stealing cattle ?—The Kafirs have
made war upon us occasionally, but the thefts have usually
been by one or two men stealing, just the same as in our
own country, by individuals, not by a defined and organized
plan.
196. Marquis of Granhy.] Were you in the country when
the commando system was in operation?—No, I never was
in Kafirland at that time.
197. Can you say whether there has been any greater loss
of life and property since the commando system was put an
end to than there was before ?—No, my source of information
upon that subject would be only the magistrates' reports
appearing in the public press of the colony. My judgment,
formed from all 1 could read and from personal observation,
has been, that the commando system was far less effective
and just than the system subsequently adopted.
198. Chairman^ You are aware of the objects for which
this Committee is constituted ?—To inquire into the relations
subsisting between the border tribes and the colony of the
Cape of Good Hope.
199. Are there any other observations with regard to those
objects which you desire to make to the Committee?—
I think I should like to be allowed to offer a few observations,
when I have stated certain facts touching the case of the
Griquas and the Bassutoes. They are people with whom
we have relations.
200. Have the goodness to make any statement that occurs
to you upon those subjects ?—I should say, first, with regard
to the Griquas : they complain of being deprived by Sir Harry
Smith of a portion of their territory seemingly under treuty.
201. The Griquas are a tribe of Kafirs, are not they?—
They
32 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
They are commonly called Bastards ; they are chiefly de-
teeman. scendants of Hottentot women by Dutch farmers ; they are
6 June 1851. ^0^ black, but light coloured ; the Hottentot is very light, and
of course their progeny by Dutchmen would be light. The
point complained of at present is, that although Sir Peregrine
Maitland made a treaty with them, recognising a division of
their territory into alienable and inalienable land. Sir Harry
Smith has deprived them, by his last treaty with them of the
date of February 1848, of the whole of that portion which is
called alienable land. I would say that.I attach some little
importance to the interpretation given to the word used ; their
Dutch word would be liuurbaar ; that is, hireable or leaseable
land ; and onhuurhaar, which would mean inalienable or
unleaseable. Those we have in our English translation of
the treaties, and in all proclamations, called alienable and
inalienable, being a step in advance evidently of leaseable
and unleaseable ; Sir Peregrine Maitland's idea being that of
the people being allowed to let their land upon leases, but
not involving the idea of final alienation. The people
complain that by Sir Harry Smith's measure they are de¬
prived of a personal interest in a very large number of
their farms in the alienable territory. I took the liberty
of writing to my Lord Grey upon that subject, and my
two letters are in this Blue Book recently published, to
which Sir Harry Smith has given a reply, which is also
here ; but which is, speaking respectfully of the Governor, to
my mind most unsatisfactory and delusive, and such as I think
he should not have written as Governor, nor would Lord
Grey very readily receive, I think, if he went into the detail
of the case. Will the Committee allow me to suppose that
this is the Griqua territory, consisting of two divisionSj alien¬
able and inalienable. A number of Dutch Boers, in giving up
their allegiance to the British Government, crossed the
Orange River, then the boundary of the colony, and obtained
permission from the Griquas to settle down in that country,
and take leases of them. They were then beyond the
British jurisdiction, and yet were unwilling to come under
the native jurisdiction. That led Sir Peregrine Maitlatíd
very properly to propose the leasing for 40 years of a part of
the land on which those Boers were allowed to settle, which
should be brought under British jurisdiction, while, to secure
the intei'ests of the natives finally, a portion of the land
should be called inalienable, and no leases recognised as valid
which the Boers might take upon that land. That was the
treaty made by Sir Peregrine Maitland, and confirmed at
home
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 33
home by Her Majesty. That treaty was made, I think, in Rev. J, J.
1^46. After the disturbances with the Dutch Hoers in 1847, 2-ieeman.
Sir Harry Smith compelled those Griquas to relinquish to the g june 1851.
British Government the whole of that portion of the land
which was called alienable. Upon that land there were
about 300 farms held distinctly by individual Griqua natives.
Out of that number about 150 were let on lease to Dutch
farmers, say for 40 years, and of the other 150 farms some
were not let at all; others were let for short periods, 7, 14,
and 20 years, and so on. Sir Harry Smith takes the whole
of this land from them, and gives them a consideration for
it, calling the whole of it a 40 years' leased property. Tiie
people then say, " We who have our lands for less than 40 years
are entitled to the difference between the short lease and the
40 years' lease, and we who have not let our lands at all are
entitled to the benefit of letting those lands for 40 years ; we
do not say we object to give up the whole of this section of
our country ultimately, only let us have a fair consideration
for it ; let us let those farms which we have not let at all,
and let us relet those which were let only for short periods,
for the balance of the period up to 40 years." Sir Harry
Smith said, " No, I call the whole of that land 40 years'
leased land." His treaty had not so called it. Only a por¬
tion of it was let for that time, and when they appealed again
to his Excellency to allow them not to take back this land
from the British Government, but to have the benefit of the
lands not let at all, or let for a short period, his Excellency
says the point is finally settled. The Griquas then requested
me to place the matter before the Britisli Government, whicli
led me to communicate with Lord Grey. In reply to that
communication his Excellency, not wilfully of course, deludes
Lord Grej'. He makes a complete blunder in the matter, for
want of entering patiently into the matter, as I presume to
think, and he begins to talk about the inalienable property.
There is no reply in Sir Harry Smith's letter to Lord Grey,
touching the alienable land, but only touching the inalien¬
able. He says, properly enough, that the Cineftain, Adam
Kok, consented to the payment of the Dutch Boers, for their
improvement upon that land, at the expiration of their leases.
The Committee will understand there are Dutch farmers
upon both divisions of that property. Upon the one, the
alienable division, the Dutch are to remain in perpetuity,
paying a quit-rent to the Government; but upon the inalien¬
able portion, all those colonial settlers are to go away at tlie
expiration of their leases, upon the Griquas paying tlie valu-
0.63. C atiou
34 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J. ation of the property, as improved by the farmers. In reply
Freeman, to that which I put before Lord Grey, at the request of the
6 JuneT85i ^"quas, Sir Harry Smith's statement affects only the inalien-
' able land, and not at all the question of those short leases, nor
the unleased lands. Sir Harry Smith is pleased to say that
the Griquas are mere squatters. Now I must be allowed to
remark upon that, that it is not fair to say so, when Sir
Peregrine Maitland had, in the treaty of 1846, most distinctly
r.ecognized the indefeasible right of the Griquas to the whole
of that territory. That was the basis of the treaty. It is
printed and proclaimed that the Griquas are indefeasibly
entitled to that portion of the land, and that treaty of Sir
Peregrine Maitland is confirmed by Her Majesty at home.
Then in the face of that it is hardly fair, I think, of a subse¬
quent Governor to come in and say they are mere squatters,
inasmuch as we have recognized their right and made a treaty
with them. It may be said that the Griquas have not been
there, perhaps, above 40 years, and that they are interlopers
and have driven out other tribes. But we have come in upon
other portions of the colony later even than that, and I do
not know that we have a higher right to come in upon our
land than the Griquas have to come in upon theirs.
202. Mr. Hawes.'] ^Vho was the chief with whom the treaty
was made?—Adam Kok.
203. The treaty which Sir Harry Smith made, was made
with him, was not it ?—Yes.
204. With his full and free consent, as far as you know?
—No. .
205. Will you explain that answer to the Committee.^—
That is one of the points on which I feel it needful to allude
again to my previous request that nothing I say should be
taken as impugning directly Sir Harry Smith, the Governor.
The late treaty was obtained from theGriquas by intimidation,
most certainly. The Griqua chief and his councillors,called his
Raad, had met at Bloem Fontein by Sir Harry Smith's desire.
Sir Harry Smith, perhaps for sufficient reasons to his own mind,
thought it requisite to obtain the final settlement of the land
I now speak of, and to obtain for the British Government, as
part and parcel of the colony, the alienable division of the
Griqua territory. Adam Kok and his people objected to
that ; that is, they objected to the final alienation of the land
which they were letting for periods of 40 years under Sir
Peregrine Maitland's treaty. After a good deal of dispu¬
tation in the matter, the Governor, certainly in a passion, told
them that unless they signed that treaty by five o'clock in
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 35
the afternoon, he would " hang them at that beam." I have Rev. J. J.
reason to believe that he said so, but he said it in a moment Freeman.
ofpassion. I asked the men if they sincerely believed that '
Sir Harry Smith intended to do it ; I thought that they could ^
not as honest and reasonable men suppose it ; and their reply
was very simple and just : " We took Sir Harry Smith for a
sort of madman, and we believed he would do it, though we
knew he had no right to do it." I said, " Did you sign that
treaty under that intimidation ? " " We certainly did," said
they ; " we did not know what he might do, and we felt com¬
pelled to do it."
206. The treaty was made you say, with Adam Kok,
under compulsion ?—Yes.
207. Were not there great disputes existing in the district
at the time between the Griquas and the Boers ?—No, not
as to that particular point ; because those Dutch farmers
who had obtained their land of the Griquas were satisfied
with the title given them to their farms, as coming under the
signature of Adam Kok, and countersigned by his secretary
Hendrik Hendriks. The validity of such title is shown to this
day, since that property has been treated as British property.
The court records are kept at Bloem Fontein. Those docu¬
ments received by the farmers from Adam Kok form the
basis of all the claims to the farms recognized by the British
authorities at Bloem Fontein. The farmers had no doubt but
that the Griquas were the real proprietors and had a right
to dispose of the lands, and they made individually their
agreements with the Griquas as the proprietors of all those
lands accordingly.
208. The Griquas had granted land upon those 40 years'
leases to the Boers?—Yes, and for shorter periods.
209. What was the arrangement made for converting the
40 years' lease into a holding in perpetuity ?—Sir Harry
Smith promises 300 /. a year on the part of the British
Government in lieu of the Ghiquas receiving quit-rents from
the Boers, or in lieu of a division of the quit-rent. The quit-
rent was to be paid, and half the amount was to be paid over
to the Government as a means of sustaining the expenses of
that district, and the half to go among the landholders.
210. Do you know from your own knowledge what passed
between Sir Harry Smith and Adam Kok upon that occa¬
sion ?—1 had it from Adam Kok himself, and from his coun¬
cillors. I have not of course asked Sir Harry Smith to re¬
late the details to me ; I could not presume to do that.
211. As you have referred to your own letter in the Blue
0.65. c 2 Book,
36 MINUTES or EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J. Book, have you also referred to the dispatch of Sir Harry
Irt^an. Smith of the 20th of January 1851 ?—Yes, I have read that
6 J une 1851. carefully , • r i
212. Does the account the Governor there gives ot what
passed between himself and Adam Kok correspond at all
with your own account ; and if it does not, can you throw
any light upon the discrepancy?—I think the Governor is
under some mistake regarding the terms "alienable" and
" inalienable." I think the explanation he gives refers to
the inalienable portion, as to which he says Adam Kok him¬
self proposed a payment for the buildings which should be
found upon it.
213. I wish to refer you to a passage in the middle of
paragraph 5 ; " The chief himself suggested that after the
expiration of the 40 years' leases in his ' inalienable ' ter¬
ritory, the Boers might purchase from his people a future
right, upon the conditions set forth in my additional treaty
transmitted to your Lordship. This was Adam Kok's own
proposal, and it met the wishes of the Boers" ?—Precisely
so; but the honourable Member will observe that that is in¬
alienable property ; my reference is to the alienable property
upon which leases have been let.
214. Did not the system of leasing under that treaty apply
to the whole territory ?—No, not the same system ; upon the
land which is called alienable, the Dutch Boers were allowed,
to take leases, though only for 40 years ; but the inalienable,
although they had buildings upon it, they were to be com¬
pelled to leave, on certain repayments, at the expiration of
whatever leases they had got. The inalienable territory was
to be secured for ever to the Griquas : the Griquas might
grant no more leases on it.
215. There was a conversion of those leases into a per¬
petuity ?—Not by the treaty of Sir Peregrine Maitland ; the
object of Sir Peregrine Maitland was to throw a difficulty in
the way of this land becoming part of the British territory.
216. What is the precise nature of the injustice of those
treaties as regards the Griquas?—I will suppose I am a
Gricpia, and that I possess in this alienable territory a farm,'
or two farms. One farm I have not let at all, it is mineij
another farm I have let for 10 years, as by Sir Peregrine
Maitland's treaty I may do. By Sir Harry Smith's treaty I am
deprived of that farm which I have not let at all ; and I
am deprived of 30 years' interest in the other, which I have
let for 10 years onl}'-, because Sir Harry Smith calls it all
40 years.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
37
40 years' leased territory, and then demands the quit-rent Rev. J. J.
for the Government in perpetuity. Freeman.
217. Does that apply to the whole of the 40 years' lease- g ju^^TTssi
hold property, or are you describing only an exceptional
case?—I am describing the whole. Upon this alienable
territory there, were 300 farms belonging to individual
Griquas ; they have in the course of time let half that number
of the farms to Dutch Boers upon 40 3'ears' leases ; but the
other half, namely 150 farms, were either not let at all or
were let only for short periods. Sir Harry Smith say.s,
" I take the whole, and call it 40 years' lease property." The
expression which was first used led the Griquas who had not
let their farms for 40 years to believe that they were still
secured in their right over the remainder of the term,
between 7 or 10 3'ears and 40 years, and entirely so over the
farms which were not let at ail. But upon applying to Sir
Harry Smith he says, " No, I sweep ofi the whole of that
piece, let or not let, or let for long periods or short periods ;
I call it all a 40 years' lease territory, and give you 300
annually as a consideration in lieu of it all." The chief was
to have 200/. and the people 100/. among them.
218. At that time, and for some time afterwards, was
there any dissatisfaction e.xpressed with that arrangement?—
I have reason to believe that there was from the beginning,
because I have seen letters written by Adam Kok, the
chieftain, to Sir Harry Smith, complaining of this imme¬
diately after it occurred.
219. Chairmayi.^ Do you mean that 300/. a year was to
be given to them?—Yes ; that would be in lieu of the 300
farms.
220. Mr. Havjes.'\ What was the obiect which Sir Harry
Smith had in view in making that arrangement ?—conceive
it was partly to carry out the principle with which he set out
on the frontier, that where he found black men, there they
should be ; and where he found white men, there they should
be. He states that he assumed that as a general principle of
policy with the people as a whole. I am not here to com¬
plain of it, provided you will do individuals justice where
there are individual rights concerned. I am not now com¬
plaining of his taking the whole of this territory in which so
many Dutch farmers were settled. I think it is better that
they should be under our Government rather than under that
of the Griquas, but I would do justice to the individual native
proprietors. They do not at this moment object to the land
being taken from them for ever, but they ask you to pav
0.63. c 3 ^ them
38 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
^Tree' farms they have not let, and to give them the
reeman. balance of the term for the farms which are let for short
6 June 1851. periods.
221. Are there many individual cases of the kind?—Yes;
I have conversed with several of the men ; I did not go over
the whole 150 farms, but they assured me that half the whole
number of the farms were in that predicament.
222. He did not interfere with their actual holding at the
time, but it involved the loss of the land to them when the
lease expired ?—And tlie whole of that land upon which they
had let no leases at all.
223. That land was in the hands of the chief, was not it ?
—No.
224. Was it in the hands of individual Griquas?—Yes;
and their right was recognised by the farmers in their pur¬
chases.
225. Are the Committee to understand that any Griquas
were deprived of land which they held, and which they had
not let?—Entirely so, in the alienable territory.
226. Were they removed r—No ; they might not be living
upon the spot, but it had been distinctly recognized as theirs,
as much as in the case of any English gentleman here having
three or four estates, and not living upon the whole of them.
The land was marked out; each Griqua was recognized as
having a right to his particular farm. There he may take his
cattle in the dry season if there is a fountain there, or he may
reside there himself.
227. What was the immediate effect of Sir Harry Smith's
measure?—To prevent a Griqua from ever letting his farm.
228. Was he removed and deprived of the use of the land
or the water?—Of both. The Griqua may have been living
20 miles from it, but the fountain has been recognised as his.
He goes there occasionally; in the rainy season he may send
his cattle there to obtain fresh grass, and so on.
229. He was deprived of the right of using the water, and
of the right of occupying the land ?—Yes, and of the right of
letting it.
230. To whom did the land go then?—The British Go¬
vernment has taken it, and now lets it and receives a quit-
rent over the whole of those 300 farms.
231. Could those Griquas, under that arrangement, again
take possession of that land, subject to a quit-rent?—Not
under the present treaty, without becoming British subjects
by so doing.
232. Could the British Government give them occupation
of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 39
of the land and the use of the water under new conditions. Rev. J. J.
namely, upon the payment of a quit-rent?—I think they Freeman.
would not take it. They would prefer, I think, to be away g ju^TTs'ïi
from the Boers, and to allow the territory which is alienable
to be alienated, but they would desire to receive a fair com¬
pensation or valuation for the farms, which, if Sir Harry
Smith had not interfered, they would have let under Sir
Peregrine Maitland's treaty.
233. Is not it the fact that there were great disputes
between the Boers and the Griquas, and was not it the
object of Sir Harry Smith to settle the Boers on the land to
which they had a perfectly clear right, and to remove the
Griquas from close contact with the Dutch farmers ?—Yes,
I think that was the purpose ; but then it need not have been
carried out at the expence of the Griqua, in depriving him of
his farm without compensation.
234. I understand your point to be this ; you think the
arrangement ought to have comprehended some compensa¬
tion to the Griqua occupiers who were removed?—Yes, I
think so ; to those who lost their interest in their lands,
which had been distinctly recognized as theirs as much as
those who had let the land for 40 years.
235. Are you prepared to give the Committee any infor¬
mation upon the subject of the compensation, as to what
would be the nature or the result of it in any way : could
it be accomplished by giving land in any other district,
or do you contemplate a money payment, and if so, how
would you estimate the money payment ?—I think a money
payment would be most acceptable, and that the fair mode
of estimating it would be by taking the value of the other
farms that they have let. If a farm of the same extent
remains to be let, for example, which has a volume of
water on an average equal to a spring on another farm
adjoining, which other farm has let for so much, say 100
rixdollars, or 500 rixdollars, or whatever the amount
might be, that would be a fair consideration to the owner
for the interest which he has in it. I do not know what
the total would be, but certainly nothing very large, quite
within the means of the British Government, and enough
to secure the good will and confidence of the people ; for
they do not quarrel over the broad question of our having
their land, for the Dutch farmers came in with their own
consent to occupy the land ; but they ask, as individual
proprietors, compensation for the lands they give up.
236. Is that question still agitated on the part of the
0.63. C3 Griquas?—
40 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKËN BEFORE THE
Hev. J.Griquas?—I think it is; it ivas a sore point when I left.
Freeman, jt ^y.^g thing which they spoke to me about.
June 1851, ^37" know whether-they have made any recent
representations on the subject?—No; what has occurred
since I left last June I do not know.
238. Did you know the secretary of Adam Kok?—Yes,
I have met him several times.
23g. Is he a clever intelligent man ?—A shrewd man, but
weak in principle ; he is given to intoxication, that is his
great vice. He is a well-meaning man, a long-headed man,
something like Stoffles, who was over here and examined by
the Committee respecting the Aborigines, some 12 years
ago. I think Hendriks would put himself in the power
of a Dutch farmer who would give him a bottle of brandy,
and keep him for a daj' or two.
240. Are you not aware that he was represented to be
favourable to the agreement in the first instance?—Yes, and
I think he was. J think he was the the means of letting many
of those farms for the Griquas to the Boers ; and he has
been deprived of the office, not for being favourable, l)ut
for being so habitually intoxicated as to be unfit for
business.
241. Should you describe him as a shrewd far-seeing
man ?—Yes, quite so.
242. And you state from your own knowledge that he was
in the first instance favourable to this arrangement which Sir
Harry Smith entered into?—Yes ; and I think that the lead¬
ing Griquas are now favourable to the occupation of this
alienable territory by the Dutch Boers.
243. Colonel Dunne.'] You think it is a mere question of
compensation ?—Yes, founded upon just claims ; 1 think they
were just claims.
244. In what state of civilization are the Griquas ?—They
are not quite so far advanced as those living within the colony;
I mean those of the coloured races living within the colony.
But some of them individally are far advanced ; there are
men who have got good houses, and dress in European cloth¬
ing very comfortably ; a few of them unite to pay for a
sclioolmaster at their own farms for the education of their
children ; they possess immense flocks of cattle, and their
houses are furnished in capital style.
245. Are they Christians ?—A great many of them deci¬
dedly are Christians; some were brought up from infancy
with Dutch families, and many of them are good men.
246. Mr. Hawes.] In your letter to Lord Grey, your re-=
commendation
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 41
commendation is that there should be some inquiry on the J-
spot ?—I think there should, to ascertain from those men the reeman.
whole statement of the case ; what farms they claim and why, q june 1851.
and how their claims are to be established, and what would
be the value of them. I think, in order to secure satisfaction
to the people themselves, to hear them state their own case
would be the safest and best course.
247. Are you aware that Commissioners are proceeding to
the Cape with a view to assist Sir Harry Smith in the settle¬
ment of questions of that, kind ?—I thought they were going
on the Kafiijfaffair chiefly.
248. Chairman.'] Are there any other points which you
wish to represent to the Committee ?—There is one other
point regarding the inalienable territory. On the inalienable
territory the Dutch have been permitted by the Griquas to
come in, but they are not to remain. Sir Harry Smith con¬
firms that part of Sir Peregrine Maitland's arrangement, but
the Griquas must pay for the property as improved. Now I
feel tbat although their chieftain admitted the propriety of it
and almost projjosed it, yet in the working of it it will be
found extremely difficult; and one would just suggest that
there should be the kindest consideration of them in the
matter, even though at the expense in some measure of
the colonial or Bi-itish Government. Because the Dutch
coming in have gone upon this plan : " We will improve
and build so much that these Griquas will not be able to out-
buy us in the end, and so we shall have final possession of
the laud." There was to have been a valuation of the property-
taken at the time the treaty was made ; it is so distinctly
stated; but that valuation was not made, and the parties have
gone on improving the property so as to place it beyond the
reach of the Griquas ever to pay for it. Therefore they will
be allowed to remain and occupy the land, and of course the
Griquas feel that the thing has gone from them. I think if
the Griqua nation be at all worth preserving as a coloured
I'ace upon our boundary, the case of these occupied lands,
which they will not be able to recover through not being able
to pay for the improvements, should meet with some consi-
dei ation on the part of the Governor.
249. Sir J. Wabnsley.] You said that 300/. was agreed to
be given by Sir Harry Smith as compensation ; with whom
was that agreement made ?—It was made with the chieftain
Adam Kok.
250. You have said that 200/. went to the chieftain?—
Yes.
251. Öne
42 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. 7.7. 251. One hundred pounds went as a compensation to the
Freeman, farmers?—Yes, but they do not accept it; they deem it so
6 JuncTssi. below the value of their property that they scorn to
touch it.
252. They have not taken it?—They have not.
253. Colonel Esicourt.] Do you think the Government
ought to make compensation with regard to the inalienable
property ?—I think it ought.
254. And you also think that they ought to make com¬
pensation in respect of the farms included in the alienable
l)roperty ?—Yes.
255. So that the Government ought to make compensa¬
tion in both cases ?—I think the Griqua is entitled to com¬
pensation for the alienable land above all. I could not press
that as to the inalienable land so much, but still for the sake
of securing their affection, and confidence, and allegiance, I
think their case is worth looking into.
256. Chairman.] What is the number of the Griqua popu¬
lation ?—I think from 10,000 to 15,000.
257. Have you any observations to make with respect to
the Bassuto tribe?—Yes ; their territory is across the Orange
River, just above Caledon, to the north-east. Moshesh is
the chieftain there, with whom we have been in treaty for a
long time past. His complaint would be this, that a large
piece of the territory has been taken from him without his
consent, and without compensation being made to him. A
boundary line was drawn out for him some years ago by the
Coloniiil Government, which he recognised. Sir Peregrine
Maitlaud wished him to give up a small piece of his terri¬
tory, which the British Government recognised as his. We
therefore had passed by the previous question of how he got
it, and so on. The British Government did recognise his
right to that territory. Sir Peregrine Maitland, for very
proper reasons, no doubt, wishing a small piece of his terri¬
tory to be added to the colony, Moshesh gave it up ; but
since then another boundary line has been drawn by Sir
Harry Smith, very likely for the purposes of convenience to
the colony, and Moshesh has been required to sign a treaty
which gives over a very large section of his land and makes
it now a part of the colony. Sir Harry Smith says, " I have
not taken that land from him ; I have not driven him out."
That is true to some extent, but tlie fact is this : There were
80 villages ; there were 4,000 or 5,000 natives settled there,
and there w ere also some farmers allowed by Moshesh to come
into
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 43
into that territory, with the distinct understanding that they Rev. J. J.
had no right in the soil ; that they were there only by per- Freeman.
mission. Moshesh had a notice printed of that in the Dutch g ,
language, which I have seen. It was given to these Dutch
farmers that they might be aware that if they built upon that
proj)erty it was still the property of Moshesh, and that he
claimed the whole. Sir Harry Smith, with the same view I
mentioned just now, that of placing the coloured man where
he found him, and the black man where he found him, has
now taken that portion into the colony in which are those 80
villages and 4,000 or 5,000 people of the Bassutos. They
must either leave that territory and go back to Moshesh,
or become bonci fide British subjects, especially after the
letter which Lord Grey has sent out, stating, that where¬
ver sovereignty has been proclaimed, the people become
British subjects. That will be a new bone of contention
by-and-bye.
258. Was the treaty signed by which Moshesh ceded this
territory to the British Government?—Yes, but by the same
kind of intimidation as in the case of the Griquas ; that is to
say, there was a dispute between Sikonyella and Moshesh.
The Corrannas were called in by Sikonyella's part}^ and
there was a probability of a fierce war ensuing between those
petty tribes. Sir Harry Smith, in a very kind and judicious
manner, had insisted upon the native chiefs not settling their
own disputes by the sword, but appealing to him as a com¬
mon father, and telling them that he would settle the whole
matter for them. Moshesh, who was one of the principal
men among them all, said, " I yield to that, and I will not
fight this battle myself;" but he sends to Major Warden,
who was acting immediately under Sir Harry Smith, at his
residence at Bloem Fontein, and points out to him that
attacks are being made upon his territory, and he appeals to
Major Warden to carry out the provisions of the treaty, and
to defend him against Sikonyella. Major Warden writes
down, " Then sign that treaty which makes over this portion
of the land to the colon}^ and I will settle the matter about
the attack upon your country." Moshesh said to me, " To
preserve my people from being destroyed, to save blood, and
to save my property, I signed it, but with great reluctance;"
and he used this figure, "Just as you drag a dog by a cord out
of a room, and then say he goes out willingly. 1 signed the
treaty," he said, "just with that feeling, to save my people."
And it was so ; I was on the spot and saw the burnt villages
and the destruction there. He did sign the treaty, but he did it
44 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. J. J. with reluctance and under a kind of protest, and he has been
Freeman, greatly aggrieved about it ; so much aggrieved, that I Jiave
6 JuneTs-i moment that if the Kafirs are succeeding at
^ ' present in their war, the Bassutos may join them, which will
augment our difficulties very much. There is no fear but vre
can put them all down by-and-bye, but we may augment our
difficulties unnecessarily and unjustly.
25g. Colonel Is not there a distinction between
the last transaction that you have mentioned and the pre¬
vious one, where mention was made of hanging at the beam :
does not it appear to you that this native chieftain received
something like a quid pro quo in the case you have last
referred to ?—No, I think he did not.
260. Was not it to sav^e his people that he signed the
treaty ?—He could have defended himself; but he had signed
a previous treaty, in which he said, " In the event of disputes
with my neighbours, I yield to Sir Harry Smith's arrange¬
ment, and I will not fight my own battle. Sir Harry Smith
says I must not do it, and for that reason I will apply to the
British Government for protection." That was evidently not
for his own sake; he had men enough to fight; it was with
difficulty he could restrain his men from fighting. He has
the greatest amount of intelligence of all the natives that
I have met with there, and I believe him to be a man of
peace.
261. Mr. Hawes.'] He is not a Christian, is he ?—He
is not.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 45
Jovisy 12" die Junii, 1851.
members present.
Colonel Estcouri.
Sir Joshua Wahnsley.
Viicouni Maucieville.
Colonel Thompson.
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Fiizpa'riclt.
Mr. FTawe-.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Colonel Dunne.
Marquis of Graiiby.
Mr. Card well.
The Right Hon. HENRY L.^BOUCHERE,
in the Chair.
Andrew Smith, m.d., called in ; and Examined.
262. Chairman.] WHAT has been the nature of your A. Smith,
connexion with the colony of the Cape ofCîoodHope?—I m-
was stationed at the Cape of Good Hope for 16 years on the i Timle
medical staff of the army, and during part of that time I was Í851.
em[>loyed confidentially by different Governors, in reference
to the frontier tribes, the Kafirs and Bushmen.
263. What was the nature of your communications with
those frontier tribes?—To obtain information in reference to
their views, and in reference to what was going on among them
with regard to the Businnen; to ascertain whetlier the colonial
policy was correctly understood by them, in ordt r to suggest
any alterations in the policy, if I discovered from my own
observation that the Bushmen did not take a correct view of
the intentions of the Government.
264. Are you acquainted with any of the native languages?
.—Not suffieiently so to speak them ; I knew enough of Kafir
to be able to understand when my interpreter attempted to
mislead me.
265. You are aware of the purpose for which this Com¬
mittee has been appointed ?—Yes, I understand it to be with
reference to the tribes beyond the boundary of the colony.
266. Are there any o{)inions which you are desirous of
stating to the Committee with reference to these questions?—
I cannot say that 1 have any special opinions to otfer ; I merely
appear here as being summoned to give my evidence; I have
po
4^ MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Smith, no special interest in the subject ; I do not come forward in
M.I). any particular capacity to state any opinion.
12 June -^7' Mr. Hawes.} Von state that you were employed with
I »5». the object of explaining to the natives the policy pursued by the
local Government?—Yes.
268. And to ascertain whether they were contented or dis¬
contented with that policy ?—Yes, at least as far as the Bush¬
men were concerned.
269. In what part of the colony?—To the north of it.
270. Do you mean towards Kat River settlement?—No;
towards the Orange River.
271. Will you state to the Committee what passed between
you and the natives?—On that occasion the principal remarks
which passed had reference to the law in the colony, that
when commandos went out they were prohibited from firing
upon the Bushmen, hut were required to take them prisoners.
A good deal of doubt had arisen whether that was practicable,
or uhether, if the law were continued, it would not lead to
such constant robberies as eventually to remove the whole of
the colonists from the northern frontier; I was sent to see how
the Bushmen règarded that law.
272. Was the law which you refer to, the law which for a
short time was in force reviving the old commando system ?
—It was previous to that ; it was when tiiat was suspended.
273. (if what year are you speaking?—I think it must have
been the year 1828.
274. How long is it since you left the Cape?— I left the
Cape in 1837.
275. And you have not been there since ?—No.
276. You explained to them, as I understand you, that
this commando system was about tobe abandoned ?—The old
commando system had been abandoned, and the belief was,
both on the part of the authorities of Cape Town and also
throughout the colony, that by abandoning this system the
robberies had greatly increased ; my object was to ascer¬
tain the cause of the increase of those robberies. I was
desired to go among them and talk to them in regard to the
then existing policy, and to see whether they appreciated
the policy or not. When I went I found that they did ap¬
preciate it ; they knew that they could not be fired on ; they
were aware that the farmers might retake their cattle, and
take them prisoners, but they said they would take good care
tli.it they should not be taken prisoners, because, as the
farmers could not fire, they had the superiority ; before the
farmers
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 47
farmers could come and lay their hands upon them, they would A. Smith,
take care to shoot the farmers.
277. Did you make any report to the Government of the
result or your inquiries i—íes. 1851.
278. Will you state the nature of it as far as you can re¬
collect it ?—The report was to the eifect that the Bushmen did
not correctly appreciate the policy, and I thought that if it
were continued it must produce the effect I have stated,
namely, that it would increase the number of robberies very
materially, by rendering it impossible to take any of the Bush¬
men.
279. Did you suggest any alteration of the policy?— I sug¬
gested that every endeavour should be made to take them
prisoners, but in the event of that being impossible, and that
they still persisted in keeping the cattle on the tops of the hills
as they did, that they should be fired on. I recommended
that after certaiu efforts had been made to induce them to
give up the cattle, if they still persisted in not doing so, the
farmers then, if a single arrow were shot at them, should be
allowed to fire. To a certain extent that plan was adopted,
and was followed immediately with some advantage, though
not perhaps with the amount of advantage one would have
expected.
280. Were you for investing the frontier emigrants with a
kind of summary power of redress in the event of depreda¬
tions upon their eattle ?—I was ; there was no mode of getting
redress but by investing the farmers with that power.
281. Was there any locally organized force when you were
there ?—No.
282. Was there any disposition to form one, or the contrary ?
—I do not think the subject had been considered on the
northern boundary. There never had been any proposition of
the kind made either by the colonists or by the Government
to form a force there ; both bad hitherto depended, and even
then depended, upon the field cornets collecting their people.
283. Did they answer to the summons of the field cornets
with alacrity ?—Sometimes they did, and sometimes they did
not.
284. Was there a general inclination or not to form a local
military force, to protect the frontier and their own property ?
—Decidedly not.
285. From what did that arise ?—In the first place, they
have a great horror of being soldiers ; they think it is the next
thing to being slaves. In the next place, they do not like to
leave their families for any length of time.
28 6. Are
48 minutes of evidence taken before the
A. Smith, 286. Are the Committee to understand that the general
M-n- prevailing- opinion was, that reliance should be placed upon
j^Juíie British force, and the British force alone, in the protection
1851. 'he frontier?—Not exactly upon the British force, because
they were prepared to protect themselves in the way they had
hitherto done, but they had no idea of organizing a regular
Burgher force, to be kept up continuously.
287. They were willing, inriividually, to defend their pro¬
perties, but they were not willing to enter into any general
j)lan for defending any general part of the frontier in which
they were not particularly interested ?—That was pretty nearly
the case ; the frontier districts consisted of a certain number
of field cornetcies ; each field cornet had a certain petty govern¬
ment over a certain portion of country, and when anything
happened within that district, he summoned the farmers of
his own field cornetcy, and aiso applied to the field cornet of
the adjoining district to summon his, if necessary.
288. When they were summoned into the field did they
come with willingness and alacrity to defend the frontier from
the attack of the natives ?—Yes, I should say so, generally ;
it was their interest to do so, and, generally speaking, they
did. There miirht be some occasions on which some would
O
find an excuse or invent an excuse, but that was not common.
289. Then they were not unwilling to join together to
defend their properties on the frontier ?—No, they were not.
290. They were not unwilling to take the field and resist
the inroads of the Kafirs ?—Not at all. I did not quite under¬
stand the former question. I thought the object was to ascer¬
tain whether the farmers were prepared to form a permanent
militia. That certainly they were not prepared to do, and
would have resisted to the last; and, no doubt, the fear
of having to do that was in some measure the cause of the
late emigration of the farmers in 1835 and JS36. That fear
caused many farmers to emigrate wlio had no idea of emi¬
grating. When I came back from the interior in 1836 1 found
the farmers all violent, from having the idea that a regular
trained militia was about to be established.
291. 1^0 you think the frontier can be maintained in peace
by the present system of field cornetcies as contradistinguished
from some regular militia force?—I do not think the frontier
can be maintained in peace by any force, as long as we have
peo|)lc in an uncivilized state who believe it is their right to
steal when they can steal. I think it is impossible to main¬
tain the frontier in peace with a military force, or any other,
under such circumstances.
292. You
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 49
292. You think that no local organization would be suffi- A. Smith,
cieiU?—None; it might diminish the amount of the depre-
dations, but there would still be a certain class of men who j^^unc
would continue to commit depredations, because the chiefs have 185t.
little power over them.
293. Did you ever come into contact with any of the chiefs?
■—I had seen every chief in iny time in Kafirland. I do not
believe there was a chief of any note with whom I had not
had personal intercourse.
294. Did they make any special complaints to you ? —
Many.
295. State what they were ?—They were principally in
reference to the transactions between themselves and the
Government ; that is to say, they were always complaining of
the Government holding them responsible for the thieving
which went on among their tribes, notwithstanding that they
had not the power of restraining it. They have no organized
government. The Kafir has a sort of sacred respect for the
chief, but nothing beyond that. If he exacts anything from his
subjects which is not agreeable to the whole body, he has no
certain means of enforcing it.
296. Was there any other complaint which they made ?—
No ; I think what I have stated was the constant and lasting
complaint. It was the great complaint of Gaika when he was
appointed chief of all Kafirland, and was held the medium of
communication between the Kafirs and the colony, and bound
to restore all stolen cattle, and so on. Gaika engaged to do
so ; yet at the same time that he engaged to do so he was
perfectly sensible he could not do it, and he was not backward
in saying he could not, still he was afraid of offending the
white king, as he called him, by refusing.
297. That was the Governor?—Yes ; he agreed to the plan,
and as soon as cattle were stolen from any part of the frontier
he was required to restore them, though they had been stolen
by the Kafirs of some other chief. Gaika, in that case, sent
to the chief and informed him that his people had stolen the
cattle, and that he must send them to him that he might restore
them to the Government ; the chief frequently refused. Per¬
haps a second message was sent to him without success ;
Gaika frightened, thought it necessary to comply with the
request of the colonial Government. The consequence was, he
was very often forced to take from his own people, who had
not plundered in any way, cattle to the amount which had been
lost, and send them to the Government.
0-63* ^ 298. C/tainnan.'^
50 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. SmitK 298. Chairman.'] Have you known that to be frequently
!>• done ?—Yes.
i2~June ^99* Of your own knowledge?—So far of my own know-
1851. ledge, that I have been told it by the Kafirs, and I know that was
the general impression. I know every Kafir in Kafirland
complained ; that Gaika, and also other chiefs, were compelled
to take cattle away from their own people to repay the colony,
because they could not find out the robbers.
300. You are as well acquainted with the Kafir tribes on
the eastern boundary of the colony as on the northern boundary ?
—I know every tribe in South Africa as far as the tropic.
301. Mr. Hawes.] May the Committee infer it to be your
opinion that it is useless to attempt to enter into treaties with
the chiefs ?—I do not know that it is useless ; but you must
form a treaty which would organize a government for them.
302. Who must form such a treaty ?—The contracting par¬
ties ; if we form a treaty it must be such as will require such
an organization among the native chiefs as would establish for
them a government.
303. Without that you think it is useless ?—Ves.
304. Chairman.] Are you able to state to the Committee
what you think would be the proper policy to pursue in regard
to those frontier tribes ?—One of two courses must be pursued.
In the first place, the question must be taken into consider¬
ation in suggesting any course of policy, whether we are
merely to look to the tribes that are on the immediate frontier,
or whether v/e are to look to the whole body of Kafirs. If
we look at the map we will find the Amakosa Kafirs ; they
extend as far as the boundary ; then when we get up on the
Kei you come to the Amatembus; that is another race of
Kafirs, who are now also at war with us ; and then we come
to the Amapondas ; so that if we were to extend the policy
to the whole of the Kafirs, it would be different in some respects
from the policy which would be re(|uired to be extended merely
to those on the immediate frontier.
305. Taking all those questions together, are you prepared
to state to the Committee any opinion of what you think,
from your observation, would be the most expedient and prac¬
ticable policy for the British Government to pursue in refer¬
ence to those frontier tribes?—There rai^bt be one of two
courses adopted ; cither to let them entirely alone, and allow
them to manage their own affairs, as was the case when I first
went to the colony, or take them under the British jurisdiction
altogether. If the latter plan were to be adopted, every great
chief must immediately be removed from the country. We
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 51
will never manage the Kafirs, keeping their own chiefs. The A. Smith,
chiefs would naturally feel in an irksome and degraded position,
and would never be friendly to the colony as long as they feel
themselves to be so. I had not a doubt that when the treaty jgjj.
was made, by which we constituted the chiefs magistrates,
that it would only last as long as it was necessary for them to
submit to it.
306. Suppose the policy were adopted of not interfering
with their internal concerns, in what way do you think the
frontier could be protected against the incursions and rob¬
beries committed by those people ?—In that case it would
require a line of military posts along the immediate frontier.
My opinion has always been, and is still, that it would be
necessary to have a special Commissioner in Kafirland, who
would be, to a certain extent, the adviser of every tribe
•of Kafirs, and who would appear to the Kafirs to have an
interest in them, and thern only. They do not consider the
Governor to have an interest in them ; they fancy that as the
Go vernor is white and the colonists are white, that therefore
the Governor must have a special affection for white people,
and must feel disposed to make the interest of the Kafirs
subordinate to theirs. The Commissioner ought not to be
connected with the colony, nor to receive orders from the
Government. The Governor should have no power to con¬
trol him ; he ought to be separate and independent, and
communicate with the Colonial Office at home. The only
power he would have would be in case of an outbreak, which
might happen among them even under any circumstances,
to call upon the Governor for assistance ; but in no way
should he interfere otherwise. The object should be to make
the Kafir feel that the white man residing with him was
his friend, which they do not feel now with respect to any
white man. They themselves would not befriend the white
man in preference to the black man ; they would make the
white man's interest always subordinate to the black man's ;
and the black man supposes that the white man would do the
same.
307. When you talk of a chain of posts along the line of
the frontier, have you considered the immense length of the
frontier of the colony?—Yes ; there was originally a chain of
posts when I first went to the colony, and the posts were at no
very great distance from each other ; I do not think very
much protection would arise from military posts ; the great pro¬
tection would arise to the colony from the presence of the Com¬
missioner, or whatever he may be called, who would be resi-
0.63. D 2 dent
52
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEPORE THE
A- Smith, dent in Kafirland ; all communications as to stolen cattle would
D. require to be made to him, and he would have to take steps
'Jjune die chiefs M'ith a view to recover them.
'iSji. 308. Do you think such a system would work satisfactorily,
this Commissioner having no communications with the British
authorities, his sole communication being wiih the Colonial
Oihce in London?—I think it would work better than the
present system. 1 must explain ; I never intended it to be un¬
derstood that he should not have communication with the Colo¬
nial Government, in reference to matters aftecling the colonists
and the Kafirs; I simply intended he should hold his appoint¬
ment from the Home Government, receive his instructions
from the Home Government, and correspond directly with the
Home Government on all points he might think necessary.
309. Supposing a question arose as to the restitution of
cattle which had been stolen, would not it be rather a circui-»
tous mode of correspondence on such a question that it should
go round by London ?—It would be i'or the Commissioner
himself to take care and arrange that; he should have
sufficient power, I think, to do it.
310. From whence would his power arise if he were a single
Commissioner in that country, without the power of calling in
any force or assistance from the British colony ?—It would
be merely a moral power, which would, generally speaking,
be enough ; moral power, if employed with tact, is better
than physical power against the Kafirs.
311. Do you think it likely that a single white man, resid¬
ing among the Kafir tribes, who was known to possess no
means of enforcing any opinions he might form, would obtain
such a moral power as you describe among all the Kafir
chiefs?—Yes, I think so, provided there was an understand¬
ing in the first instance as to what was to be his position. He
would not go there as a private individual, but accredited ;
he would go there with a certain understanding, which of
course would be explained to the whole of the chiefs.
312. Colonel Estcourt.] You said not long ago that the
Kafirs would not obey their chiefs in some cases?—Neither
do they.
313. Do you think that this Commissioner appointed by
the British Government and sent into that country will have
more influence and more power to enforce obedience than the
individual chiefs they now have, who are elected by them¬
selves r—I contemplate that this Commissioner will be a man
who will succeed in organizing a government for each sepa¬
rate tribe, and will enable the chief to have an executivej
which
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 53
which he has not now. If a chief wants now to punish a A. Smith,
kraal of Kafirs, he perhaps orders the next kraal to himself to
go and do it ; that kraal perhaps objects ; then if another kraal June
will not do it the chief has no power to enforce his orders. But ,851.
if you organize a government for them, and create an execu¬
tive, the chief would have the command over the whole of that
executive, and he would make that executive the instrument of
carrying out his orders, and not make his subjects indiscrimi¬
nately the instrument.
314. The object of such a government as that would be in
some measure to control the Kafirs?—Yes; that is what is
wanted.
315. If the Kafirs are now so reluctant to yield any obedi¬
ence under some circumstances to their present chiefs, would
they be willing to submit to the control of a government so
'organized as you have mentioned?—I do not know that they
would be willing instantly to do it; it must be brought about
by a gradual process among them.
316. Mr. Mackimion.l How would you form the executive ;
if the kraals of Kafirs to whom he appealed would not obey
the chief, how could he get an executive to obey hicn ?—It
must he effected principally by the exertions of the Commis¬
sioner; certain advantages must be granted to those who were
employed as an executive. The chief can get no executive now,
because there is no payment to the executive,—the execu¬
tive must be made to feel the benefit of being agents in the
Government.
317. How could the Commissioner enable the chief to pay
his executive ; or supposing it were possible, would not the
chief, for his own sake, do it now without the Commissioner?
—It appears to me that their minds have not attained to that
extent of operation as to suggest that. In the case of the
Griquas in 1836 when I went into the interior the Griqua
chief, Adam Kok, was constantly speaking to me about how
the white people managed their affairs and their govern¬
ment ; he said 1 have no means of managing my people ; any
expense which must be incurred in redressing injuries, or
compelling the law to be observed, must fall upon me, and I
have no means of paying it ; I said there was a very easy way
of doing it, and I told him in a few words how a civilized
government managed; then he asked me if I would have any
objection to be present at one of his councils, and to suggest
those things ; I said not the slightest ; I was present accord¬
ingly and I suggested a kind of tax, namely, that each inhabi¬
tant of the Griqua country should pay yearly to the chief a
0.63 D 3 sheep.
54 minutes op evidence taken before the
A.Smith, sheep, which was to be sold and the money appropriated to
such purposes. They immediately took up the idea and passed
12 June ^ resolution to that effect at the council. Though they were
1851. much farther advanced in civilization than the Kafirs they had
never thought about that before, but the instant it was proposed
they saw it, I think the Kafirs might be got to do the same thing.
318. It was formerly proposed in South Australia that there
should be a protector of aborigines, who was to be a man
speaking the language of the natives and to take their part, but
it was never thought that that protector of aborigines could
by any means obtain any powerful influence over the natives,
except by taking their part and knowing their language ?—My
experience in South Africa is rather different from that ; I
know, in 1824 and 1825, I had such an influence over the
frontier Kafirs that I could have almost raised them against
the w hole of their chiefs.
319. Chairman.'] Over what extent of country would you
propose that the jurisdiction of this Commissioner should
extend ?—It would not do to extend it over the whole of Kafir-
land, but over the immediate frontier it might be extended ;
over the Kafirs who are more directly in communication
with the colony ; the Gaika Kafirs.
320. From your observation, are you of opinion that the
influence of the missionaries is very great among the Kafir
tribes?—Among a certain portion of them it is great; it is not
great among the chiefs, the chiefs rather dislike them : they
find that those persons who attach themselves to the missionary
station get an idea of liberty, and various other notions
which are not exactly in conformity with their wishes, and on
very many occasions the chiefs, in the first instance, have
endeavoured to get rid of the missionaries, finding the people
were not so manageable by their tyrannical government as
they were previously to the missionaries arriving there. With
respect to the poor of the country, the missionaries' influence is
great, because they look to them in some degree as their pro¬
tectors.
321. Mr. Hawes.'] As against their chiefs?—As against
their chiefs ; at least, not protectors exactly, but men who
will always remonstrate with the chiefs, and point out to
them that those people are ill-used, and that they ought, for
their own sakes, to adopt a better sys>tem towards them.
322. The Committee understand you to say, that you are of
opinion that there are only two modes of maintaining peace in
the colony of the Cape. One is to allow the Kafirs to
manage their own affairs, and the other is to assert the British
authority
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 5^
authority over the various barbarous tribes beyond the frontier? Smithf
—Yes ; and removing their chiefs. P'
323. With regard to the first plan, was it not in force when ju„ç
you were there, and had not there been frequent wars, and "1851.
many disturbances ?—Yes ; but I do not think that those were
wars which arose from any inclination to go to war on the part
of the nation; they were wars which I do not think any effort
will prevent occasionally breaking out. The Government regu¬
lations were stringent and good in reference to the treatment
of the natives ; but there were individuals who would break
through those regulations ; they broke through them, and the
Kafir being an excitable person, and not reñecting much, he
fancied it was the act of the Government, and not of an indi¬
vidual. In that way gradually, those things happening from
time to time, brought about a state of feeling that they were
ready for anything.
324. When Sir Benjamin D'Urban was Governor, which I
presume was about the time you were in the colony, there was
a serious war, was not there ?—I was in the interior, beyond
the Kafirs, during the whole of that time ; I do not know
personally anything about that war ; we heard rumours that
there was something going on between the colonists and the
frontier Kafirs, but nothing so distinct as to know what it was
till I returned.
325. When you returned, you became aware of the general
policy which Sir Benjamin D'Urban recommended?—'Yes.
326. As to the extension of the British authority at the
Kei ?—Yes.
327. What was your opinion of that system ?—I did not
think it would answer.
328. Colonel Thompson.'] With respect to those two alter¬
natives which you propose, did you mean them to apply to the
tribes which have acknowledged the supremacy of the British
Government, or to the tribes which have not acknowledged it,
or to both ?—I do not see, myself, that their having acknow¬
ledged the supremacy of the British Government means any¬
thing as far as regards them individually ; they did it because
it answered their purpose at the time ; no doubt they calculated
to have an opportunity at some future period of throwing it off.
329. There are some who have professed to acknowledge
the supremacy of the British Government, and others who have
not professed to do so ?—Yes, the latter are behind.
330. Then possibly you do not mean those alternatives
to apply to those you state to be behind?—There is a diffi¬
culty as regards that ; there does not appear to me to be
O.tij, D 4 any
$6 Minutes oe evidence taken before the
À. .WA, R'ly íulvantage in taking the tribes of Kafirs which adjoin the
M. D. frontier; if joii take them you simply advance the frontier
~ in order to come in contact with people who are exactly like
*1851"^ the Gaikas, and so have the battle to fight over again ; then, if
you take a second step you come in contact with another belt,
and so you will have to conquer from time to time a succession
pf belts; you must either do the thing entirely, or there is no
use in doing it at all.
331. Have you, in your own mind, any opinion as to the
possibility of doing it with respect to those tribes who have
never acknowledged anything like the supremacy of the British
Government ? Could you go to those different tribes and say.
Now, give us up your chiefs, because we desire it ?—No ; none
of the tribes will give up their chiefs ; you must capture them.
332. You meant, then, to confine it to those on whom there is
some kind of hold on the part of the British Government?—
Yes; it may be done in that way, or in a general way.
333. Do you think an officer, in the nature of what in
India is called a Resident, appointed by the British Govern¬
ment at home, but with directions to communicate with the
Government at the Cape, would act favourably for the purpose
for which you propose a Commissioner to be appointed?—
Yes ; my only object in proposing a Commissioner was, it
should be understooil among the Kafirs, that the Resident or
Commissioner, or whatever he might be termed, was a man
specially there to protect the interests of the natives, not to
have any jurisdiction or authority in the colony, and that he
was separate and apart from it altogether. I do not care as to
his having friendly communications with the Governor; what
I would like to see is, tliat an effect be produced U|)on the
minds of the Kafirs which would lead them to know that a
man was with them whose sole duty it was to protect them,
and not do anything beyond them, among the wliite people.
334. The difficulty appears to be in having two commands;
do you think that such a plan as here suggested would get
over the difficulty?—I think It might.
335. Mr. Hazces.] Should you propose to support such a
Resident by any military force?—Yes; we must maintain
his importance ; we must make them respect him. Indepen¬
dently of there being a mere moral respect, there must be a
certain station in Kafirland where he should have a party of
troops under his command. Wliat appeared to me to have
done great mischief was, that persons residing among them
were always writing letters backwards and forwards to the
colony, hence the Kafirs came to the conclusion that those
communications
SELECT COMMITTEE 0>î THE KAFIR TRIBES. 57
communications were against them. There should be no con- A. Smith,
stant references to the colony, things should be managed and
done in Kafirland, and Kafirland only. i2~jüñe
336. You would make that Commissioner a sort of military 1851.
man, supported by an adequate force ?—Yes.
337. Where would you place him in Kafirland ; in King
William's Town, for instance?—I should not like to say much
about that ; I have not considered that point.
338. Chairman.'] Do you think it would be possible to pre¬
clude a Commissioner so circumstanced from having some
relation with the Government of the neighbouring colony ?—
I cannot see what relations would be required ; he would, of
course, have to receive reports of aggressions chargeable on the
Kafirs.
33g. He would be somewhat in the situation of the head of
the exeeutive of Kafirland, would not he ?—No, I should not
propose him to be the head of the executive of Kafirland ; I
would only propose that he should have a moral influence.
Suppose anything, for instance, broke out in the Sandilli
tribes, he should send for Sandilli. In reference to chiefs,
however, they have, in their own country, a great idea of
their own importance, and they do not like to be sent for by
the Government agents ; they will come, but they will feel it
to be degrading.
340. T'en propose to give the Commissioner a certain
amount of European force with him—Yes ; that is to be at
his own residence.
341. That surely would be for the purpose of giving him,
besides a moral influence, the influence of an executive Go¬
vernment?—It would be for his own defence, not to use that
force against the natives.
342. If your plan succeeds the eflTect will be, will not it, to
place this Commissioner in the situation of Chief Governor of
Kafirland in many respects ?—As far as regards appearance ;
but if he does not exercise the power, I do not see how you
would make him Chief Governor ; ray intention is that he should
not interfere with the natives, except through the chiefs;
there should be a constant communication between him and
the chiefs ; he should be merely protected in the way I have
stated.
343. You mean those European soldiers to be there as his
own personal guard, and not with a view of carrying into effect
any policy or view which he may have in regard to the chiefs ?
—Decidedly so ; I do not think he ought to have any power in
his
58 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smàh, i^jg hands to carry out any operation among the chiefs except
moral influence.
18 June 34^- Go\one\ Thompson.] You mean that the troops should
1851. be merely an escort?—I can hardly say that I mean that ; they
should be an evidence of his importance. The Kafir chiefs
themselves have a great number of persons of the tribe con¬
stantly about them, which indicates their position and standing
in the tribe. If you sent a man into Kaflrland as a mere indi¬
vidual, without any show or appearance of support, he would
not be regarded with the same respect as if he had a certain
number of soldiers attached to him.
345. Chairman.'] Suppose he had a very few troops with
him, which were to be altogether unsupported by the military
force within the colony, in the case of a hostile feeling arising
against him, would not he be more exposed to danger than if you
left him altogether dependent upon the protection of the Kafirs
themselves?—No. Any man who knows much of the Kafirs
would scarcely be taken unawares in that way ; he must see
when a combination is taking place ; he must see it by the
movements of the Kafirs ; there are certain things which always
indicated the intentions of the Kafirs in all their outbreaks;
there were plenty of people in the case of the last outbreak,
who saw long before it took place that it was going to happen.
346. Supposing the Commissioner .saw those appearances of
a movement against him, would you allow him to resort to the
neighbouring colony for assistance ?—Yes ; I stated that he
should have nothing to do with the colony, except that in case
of necessity he should be able to call upon the Governor for
assistance.
347. Colonel Thompson.] You mean that he should be de¬
pendent upon the Governor for assistance if he required it ?—
Yes.
348. Colonel Estcourt.] Suppose there are some cattle
stolen from our frontier, we call upon the resident to give us
restitution, and the resident calls upon the native chiefs to
give up the cattle ; the native chiefs are not obeyed, and they
tell the resident they can do nothing ; what is the resident
then to do ?—He must still persist ; they will at length be
persuaded to do something; they are not a very unmanageable
people.
349. You said, at the beginning of your evidence, that fre¬
quently the Kafirs will not obey their native chiefs now, and
that in cases where cattle are stolen the chiefs themselves are
not able to make restitution through not being obeyed by their
own people ; suppose they told the resident that, what is he
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 59
to do?—I am afraid I have been misunderstood; I was A.Smith,
speaking then about Gaika ; 1 said it frequently happened d.
that under the system by which we make one large tribe
responsible for all the small tribes, the large tribe sent to a 1851.
small tribe to say, cattle had been stolen by their people, and
they were required to give up the cattle that they may be sent
in ; the small tribe, in such a case, sometimes resists ; but in
the case of subjects being ordered by their chief himself, they
would yield to him. He may have to enforce his command
sometimes, and if it is to be enforced, and it is an unpopular
thing, under the present organization in Kafirland, he some¬
times will not get persons to enforce it.
350. What organization would you recommend in order to
vest that power in the chiefs which they have not now ?—I am
not quite prepared to suggest what would be required ; I
think every tribe might be divided into a certain number of
districts, perhaps each district having 100 or 150 families;
there should be a minor chief appointed in charge of those ;
he should receive a salary in some way or other, so as to make
him wish to continue in the position, and he should have a
fixed police of four, or five, or six of his own people, and
should make use of that police, that police being paid.
351. Colonel Dunne.] You said you recommended the
Gaikas to levy a tax, which recommendation they adopted ;
can you tell the Committee how long they continued that
practice, or whether they continue it to this day ?—I said the
Griquas.
352. Did they continue it for any time ?—They adopted it
at once ; I mean the Griquas.
353. Did they carry it out ? —Yes, for a time ; whether
they continue it now I do not know, but I think it is very pro¬
bable they do, because they saw the advantage of it.
354. Colouel Dsfcouri.] You think they continue to pay a
sheep each?—Yes; one sheep was given by each house¬
holder, and the persons thrown into gaol were maintained out
of this fund, whereas previously they were only maintained out
of the funds of the chief, and, as he could not afford to do it,
the consequence was that crimes often passed unpunished.
355- Colonel Dunne.] Your recommendation would be,
that some officer should be appointed to try and organize a
species of government in each tribe ?—Yes.
356. What is the number of the Gaika tribe ?—Since
Gaika died his tribe has been broken up into numerous smaller
tribes. Sandili is recognised as the great chief of the tribe ;
but that is merely nominal ; he has other brothers, Maquomo^
&c..
60 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A, Smith, &€., who have each a subordinate tribe under him ; that was
not the case in the time of Gaika ; he commanded the whole
, a June those tribes which are now minor tribes,
lös». 357- Have you any idea of the number of them at that
time?—I should think they could have brought into the field
from 6,000 to 8,000 fighting men ; the population might be
about 44,000.
358. Mr. Stanlei/.] What do you reckon to be the pro¬
portion between the fighting men of a tribe and the whole
population ?—Perhaps the fighting men are one-sixth of the
whole.
359. Chairman.l Is the love of marauding and cattle steal"
ing a strong passion among the young men of the Kafirs, or
do you think, if they easily found subsistence by other means,
they would be diverted from such pursuits ?—If you could
once get them to think that it was as honourable to find sub¬
sistence by other means as by the means their forefathers
adopted, there would be a great change wrought. There
are, however, certain practices which must be changed before
that ; one of them is the purchasing of their wives by cattle :
when a man has not cattle enough himself, and feels disposed
to get a wife, he must go and steal in order to purchase the
wife. As long as that practice exists, it will be an induce¬
ment to stealing. Then there is another thing in Kafirland ;
a good thief, especially if he can avoid being detected, is held
up by the Kafirs as a person to be imitated; when they have
large meetings and dances, their poets relate the deeds of their
forefathers, and they always hold out for imitation a person
who has been celebrated for carrying otF many black cows or
many red cows.
360. It is one chief means of acquiring personal distinction ?
•—Yes ; that and war and hunting are the only means.
361. Is the passion for war strong among the young men?
—No ; I think the passion for plunder is stronger, and war
generally arises from that.
362. Mr. Stanley.'] Do they attack other native tribes in
the same way that they attack the colonists?—In the same
way.
363. Then their attacks upon us have arisen not so much
from any jealousy of race as from their general love of plun¬
der?—There is a great deal of jealousy too; they are per¬
fectly aware of the whole history of the Cape colony ; they
are aware that the Cape colony was but a few miles round
Cape Town at one time, and that gradually the white people
' have
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 61
have extended themselves, taking the land of the natives; A. Smith,
knowing that, they say it will be our fate next.
364. There is a greater feeling of hostility against the white June
men than against any of the neighbouring tribes?—There is a 1851.
feeling of fear ; I do not know about hostility ; they fear that
eventually they will be sacrificed by the white men. The first
intercourse we had with the Kafirs was an intercourse of that
kind, and it showed even at that time how well they were aware
of the system which had been adopted. In 1702 the colonists
first became acquainted with Kafirs; a predatory party left the
vicinity of Cape Town, and having gone 600 or 700 miles to
see the Kafirs, the Hottentots fled before the colonists as
they advanced, and informed the Kafirs what had been going
on; the Kafirs advanced three days in front, because they felt,
it is better to do that than allow them to come into their
country. An attack took place, in which the Kafirs were
worsted. That was the first knowledge which the Kafirs
obtained of the white men.
365. Mr. Mackinnon.] The British had not possession of
the colony in 1702 ?—No, the Dutch had it ; since then there
has been a constant succession of attacks : they have hap¬
pened from time to time to the present day.
366. Mr. Stanlei/.] Have the Kafirs shown a disposition at
any time to unite with other native tribes and make a combined
attack upon the w hite men ?—On several occasions there has
been a combination between them and the Hottentots. In.
1797 there was a combination between them, and there is
always more or less of a disposition to that ; the Hottentot
feels that he has been deprived of his land, and that the white
man is occupying it; under those circumstances some are
ready to take advantage of any events which may arise.
367. There has been no union between the Kafirs and the
Zoolas?—No, there is no opportunity for that, they are not
likely to unite ; they are hostile to each other.
368. Colonel Dunne.] What is the extent of frontier which
we have to defend now ?—I am scarcely able to answer that
question; it may be 120 miles.
36g. Mr. Machlnnon.] The British power does not extend to
the tropic, does it?—The British power, to a limited extent,
extends, according to the Act of Parliament, as far as 25
degrees south latitude.
370. Has not it advanced since that?—Not that I am
aware of.
37' • Mr. Hawtsi] You do not mean to say that the British
power, in the ordinary sense of the word, extends to the 25th
degree
62 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smith, degree soutii latitude, do you ?—If I understand the Act of
" Parliament, and the proclamation, the Government at the
la June Cape has the right to interfere with any British subject who
1851« ntay commit a crime to the south of that latitude.
372. They have the power of |)unishii)g any British subject
who may be guilty of any crime ?—Yes.
373. Colonel Dunne.] You were in the colony while the
commando system was practised, were not you ?—hen it
was practised on a modified scale.
374. You have been there since, also?—Yes.
375. Could you form any estimate as to whether the loss
of life and property was greater since or before that system
was totally abolished ?—I should think before ; the farmers
are much more effective, if their object is to destroy life, than
the white troops ; the white troops may go out a thousand times
and hardly destroy a Kafir, but the Commando of boers rarely
go without doing so. The white troops fight the Kafirs as if
the Kafirs were civilized people ; the boers do not do so, they
fight them in their own way.
376. Is the defence of the frontier more effectual under the
commando system than under the system of protection by
regular troops ?—I should question if there is much difference.
377. But you think the defence by the boers is a more
effective system than the operation of regular troops?—Much
more ; in the case of a boer pursuing stolen cattle, lie will
pursue completely out of sight; he will pursue principally
during the night, w hen the Kafir does not know that he is io
pursuit. The English troops pursue during the day, when
they are seen ; and in that way the boer is a much more effi¬
cient agent in retaking cattle than any English troops ever
have been or can be.
378. The boer does not carry a pack of 64 lbs. upon his
back ?—No ; he carries a much larger gun than a soldier
carries.
379. Colonel Estcourt.] Are the boers able to protect their
own property ; are not their numbers few as compared to the
Kafirs?—If the colony were left to them without any British
Government at all, the boers would maintain it, and could
very soon exterminate the w hole of the Kafirs.
380. They are settled along the frontier; are they able to
take care of their property without any assistance ?—They
would revert back to the old commando system, and under the
old commando system they could do it; I should be very sorry,
however, to see that system re-established, it was so tatal to
the natives.
381. Colonel
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 63
381. Colonel Zii/nwe.] But it was effective as far as defence A. Smith,
goes ?—Yes.
382. Chairman.^ But it would lead to a system of massacre, jo june
you think?—Quite a system of massacre. 1851.
383. Colonel Dunne.'] Would there be any diflSculty in re¬
viving it under a modified system, establishing, at the same
time, a militia of the colonists ?—I do not think you would
get a militia of colonists ; the boers would not serve ; I do
not think you would get 200 men to serve throughout the
whole colony ; they look upon a soldier as a very degraded
being ; they would not serve as soldiers.
384. They¿ would serve when called out in commandoes,
you think?—Yes j that is, temporarily, in the immediate defence
of their property ; but they will not serve continuously.
385. Mr. Hawes.] When they turned out under the old
commando system, they acquired considerable property in
cattle, did not they, without much scruple?—They took all they
could get ; they made a regular foray, and took whatever they
could lay their hands on ; they took any cattle which came
in their way ; they argued. The Kafir had stolen from them,
and they must take from the Kafirs. They did not take the
cattle only of the guilty. So the Kafirs reason if the white
troops injure the Kafirs ; they do not say. We will only injure
the troops in return, but we will injure any white men we meet.
386. Your opinion is, that the only government which would
be successful would be the establishment of a Resident or
Commissioner, with an ample military force, in the heart of
Kafirland ?—Yes, if you did not choose to adopt the other
course, of depriving them of every chief who is at all recog¬
nized as a chief, and appoint new magistrates or new managers
among them, taking the whole expense of doing so upon the
British Government.
387. Mr. CardwelL] By the tirst plan you propose, you
would sever all connexion between the British colonial Go¬
vernment and the Kafrarian country ?—Yes, if the Kafirs are
to be independent.
388. You would have a resident in the nature of an ambas¬
sador residing at the head quarters of the native Kafrarian
Government ?—Yes.
38g. With wliom you would station a small military force ?
—Yes.
390. Which would be rather in the nature of a body¬
guard than of a force to carry into effect any system of policy
in Kafraria ?—Yes; disclaiming all idea of establishing a
powçr in the Commissioner to carry out anything by force, the
soldiers
64 MIXUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smit/i, soldiers should be only as a body-guard to give importance
lo the man.
i2"^ne 391- In the case of any outrage being committed, or alleged
1851. to be committed, by the Kafírs u[)on the British colony, that
would form a subject of negotiation between tlie colonial
government and the resident ?*—Yes.
392- The resident being the agent of the British Govern¬
ment to negotiate with the Kafrarian Government?—Yes.
393* II restitution were refused, that would be a casus belli
in every instance r—^Yes.
394. Mr. Hazoes.] An additional military force in that case
being afforded from the colony?—Yes, if it became necessary.
395. Chairmazi.'] In the event of a war between Kafraria
and the colony, the Commissioner would withdraw, would not
he ?—Y es ; it would not do to leave him there, unless he had
a very strong force, if a war broke out.
396. Do you believe that the Kafirs themselves would be
disposed to receive a Commissioner such as you have described?
—1 think so, from all I have seen of them. I think they are
generally a manageable people. I have always found them
manageable and tractable.
397. Mr. MackinnonY\ Would not the chiefs be jealous of
their power or influence?—No; my notion is that no direct
power ought to be exercised over any of the tribes by the
Commissioner ; the Commissioner, if he chose to give a man
a present, he might do so, but he would.have no political power
or influence with the tribes except through the chiefs.
398. Chairv\anY\ You would not propose that he should
exercise any judicial functions?—No; whatever was done
should be done openly by the chief, before all the Kafirs.
For example, in case of a resident, or a commissioner, or what¬
ever he might be, being placed there, there should be a certain
meeting place in each subordinate tribe, and when any crime
was committed by the subjects of one of those subordinate
tribes, or cattle had been stolen from the colony by them,
he should communicate directly with the chief of the tribe
who should investigate the matter openly. There should be a
building for the purpose, where the Commissioner himself and
the chief would preside. They would hear what the accu¬
sation was, and go on to investigate it. If suflScient evidence
could not be procured at the time, they must meet again.
Let the people see everything done openly and in a systematic
way, and it would suggest the idea among the Kafirs of new
modes of doing things which at present do not enter their
beads ; continue the inquiry in the same way, and other infor¬
mation
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 6^
niation would be obtained which would enable the chief and SmiiA.
the Commissioner to come to a decision as to who was guilty
and what redress was to be offered. läTüne
399. Colonel Estcowt.'l Supposing they came to that de- 1851.
cisión, what power would there be, according to your notion,
to enforce it?—Along with the appointment of this resident
you must take other steps, and incur a certain amount of
expenditure to pay those chiefs as subordinate magistrates,
and to pay police among their own people to cax*ry out the
system, and thus gradually organize a civil force in the coun¬
try which does not now exist.
400. Chairman.'] You believe that a certain amount of
expense ought to be incurred by this country for a certain
time in order to introduce this system ?—Yes ; you would not
otherwise attach those subordinate chiefs to the system ; the
money, though very trifling in amount, would be a great object
to them.
401. Will you describe more particularly the tract of coun¬
try which you propose to orgar.ize in this manner?—British
Kafraria and Victoria ; it should only extend over that coun¬
try at present.
402. Where would you commence to the west ?—At the
Keiskamma.
403. And extend how far ?—To the Kei River ; there you
would come into contact with tribes who do not in any way
acknowledge our influence.
404. Taking the Keiskamma as the western, boundary,
would not that include some settlements of Europeans ?—
Yes ; the settlements of Europeans extend as far as Buffalo
River ; some of the best parts of Kafirland are now settled by
Europeans.
405. How would you propose to deal with those settle¬
ments ?—I do not know.
406. Viscount Mandeville.] You are giving to the Com¬
mittee your experience of the colony 12 or 15 years ago?—
Yes.
407. The circumstances of Kafirland may have changed a
good deal since that ?—I have no reason to fancy that they
have changed ; the Kafir customs do not change very rapidly.
408. Chairman.] King William's Town would be within
the district you speak of —Yes.
409. Marquis of Granby.] You said that the Commissioner
was to have no judicial power whatever?—No.
410. Supposing that a robbery takes place, and the nego¬
tiation between him and the chief were to fail, what would be
0.63. E the
66 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smith, the next step towards obtaining redress ?—That might hap-
pen, but I do not think it is very likely to happen ; I am not
laJune prepared to say what would be the next step. If the person
1851. appointed were competent to deal with the chiefs, I do not
think it would happen that he would fail.
411. You do not suppose that upon all occasions they
would agree to his suggestions, do you ?—If the robbery had
been committed by tl^eir own immediate people it would not
fail; the only tiling is, you must always take into considera¬
tion that the Kafír community consists of two classes ; viz.
of a settled or wealthy class and a pauper class. That pauper
class lives on the outskirts of the tribe, and depends entirely
upon plunder ; if a crime were committed by them, it would
have been committed either for the purpose of slaughtering
oxen and eating them, or for the purpose of purchasing a wife.
If redress w ere demanded from them, they would have nothing
wherewith to pay ; the chief would say directly, "Those men
are not under me ; I cannot control them." If the next day
there was an adjoining tribe going on a warlike expedition,
these paupers would immediately join the other chief, and
say they belonged to him ; then afterwards when they came
back they would return and say, "We are now again under
our own chief." When Gaika was the great chief of Kafir-
land, and supposed to be very friendly to the colony, and the
colony to him, if you met the greatest rogue in the world, and
asked him to whom he belonged, he said he belonged to
Gaika. It is the Kafirs located round the settled tribes who
chiefly commit the robberies ; that is why I think it is so
absolutely necessary to organize governments for them. Till
you have governments organized you cannot have any re¬
straint over those persons.
412. Colonel Dunne.'\ How were the Kafirs armed at the
time you were there ; were they armed with muskets ?—A few
of them.
413. Do you understand that they are armed in a much
more eflPeclive way now?—Yes, I should say that the differ¬
ence between the Kafirs in 1821, when I first saw them, and
the last time I saw them, in 1836, was very great; and I have
reason to believe they have made great advances in knowledge
and everything else since the latter date.
414. They are become a much more formidable enemy?—
Undoubtedly they are.
415. Chairman.'] Would you propose to found this new
system, which you recommend should be introduced into the
government of Kafirland, upon some convention to be entered
into
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 67
into betw'een the British Government and the Kafirs ?—Yes. j. Smith,
It would only be eíTectual in that way. If the convention he m. d.
not properly understood before the Commissioner takes up his
position in Kafirland, little good comparativelv will be acconi-
plished. ' " ^ ■
416. In that convention you would probably define the
rights and duties of the Commissioner?—Yes, and on what
terms the Kafirs and the colonists were to continue.
417. Would you propose to consider the Kafirs as British
subjects or not ?—No.
418. Colonël Dunne.'] With whom would you make the
convention?—With each chief, or with the chiefs assembled.
419. I understood you to say that you could not rely upon
any convention with the chiefs?—I was speaking with refer¬
ence to Kafirland, without an improved organization. At pre¬
sent you cannot rely upon it, but if you had this organization,
and had got the chiefs all together to consent to a certain un¬
derstanding, and that were to be carried out by means of a
resident in the country, you might rely upon it, I think.
420. Colonel Estcourt.] Supposing they were not willing
to receive a resident, what are you then to do ?—I think, from
what I know of the Kafirs, they would not object. They have
been so long accustomed to fancy that they will be compelled
to comply, that they think it is better to assent than to
object.
421. Chairman?^ Have you no apprehension that such an
arrangement as you propose would wound the national feelings
or the pride of the chiefs; very much?—None; I think they
would rather like it. The chiefs very often, in conversation
with me, expressed a wish that the Government would assist
them more in suppressing plunderers ; however, it is very
questionable whether they were always sincere; they have a
great deal of duplicity about them. There was an arrange¬
ment made in 1807 to shoot Kafirs who were discovered
carrying off booty. On that occasion Slamby, who is since
dead, expressed his high approval of it, and his reply, when
informed of it, was, "Now I am glad the White King has
approved of a Kafir being shot when he is discovered carrying
otf booty, because you have been accusing me and my people
so often of having committed these crimes when 1 know we
have not committed them : now that men are to be shot, we
will have the opportunity of ascertaining to what tribe they
belong."
0.63. E 2 Mr.
68 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. John Fairbairn, called in ; and Examined.
. 422. Chairman'] IN what way have you been connected
jjjg colony of the Cape of Good Hope ?—I have resided
12 June tliere for the last 26 or 27 years.
1851. 423. At Cape Town?—Yes.
424. In what capacity ?—I was proprietor and editor of a
newspaper there.
425. Had you any other trade or profession ?—No other.
426. You are not engaged in commerce in any way?—
No.
427. Have you been concerned in editing this newspaper
tlie whole of that time?— I have.
428. Have you been chiefly or altogether resident at Cape
Town during that period, or have you been much in the inte¬
rior ?—I have been resident in Cape Town the whole of that
time, and have only come here in consequence of the summons
I received ; I have no personal knowledge of the tribes beyond
the frontier; I only know them through the despatches of
Government, and the other papers which have been pub¬
lished.
42g. Have you been at all among the Kafir tribes ?—I have
been in Kanrland 20 years ago, but on a visit only.
430. Have you, since that time, been in any distant part
of the colony ?—I have been in the Zwellendam district, and
other districts of the colony.
431. Have you been at Graham's Town ?—I have not been
at Graham's Town since then ; I was at Graham's Town then,
but not since.
432. Have you been led to form an opinion upon the
policy which has been pursued by this country in regard to
the frontier tribes :—I have considered the question for the
last quarter of a century, and have fonned opinions upon it>
but recent events have so altered the circumstances of both
parties, both the Kafirs and the colony generally, that I can¬
not say what ought to be done.
433. Should you say that events have very much disap¬
pointed the expectations of the most judicious and experienced
persons in the colony with regard to the policy to be pursued
in this respect ?—^They disappointed me, but they did not dis¬
appoint many of the old inhabitants on the frontier ; I did
think that the present Governor was going to be successful^
tor two or three years, the accounts from Kafirland were
highly satisfactory, but the sudden outbreak has shown that
there was some deception or mistake somewhere.
434. In
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
69
434. In what way do you apprehend that the policy of the Mr-
present Governor differed from that of his predecessors in
dealing with those frontier tribes ?—He took possession of iTjmi«
the country, and he established military forts within the country 1851.
itself.
435. Mr. Hawes.\ Within British Kafraria ?—Military
forts were established along the Buffalo River, which is in
British Kafraria, and in the mountains towards Amatóla on
that side, and at the mouth of the Buffalo River, where there
is the means of landing goods and stores, so that he had
military possession of the country, and governed it by a Chief
Commissioner, he himself being High Commissioner ; he
appointed Colonel Mackinnon to take charge of that country,
independently of the Cape Government.
436. Chamnan.] Have not the natives been recently more
employed in the British service as police, with a view to
check the inroads and outrages on the part of the Kafirs, than
they were in former periods ?—Much more.
437. And for some time, that policy seemed to be very
successful, did not it ?—It seemed to be verv successful for
two years.
438. Has it been the case, that recent events have shown
that those native allies were not so trustworthy as had been
supposed ?—The native Kafir police were perfectly trust¬
worthy when pursuing thieves, the common enemies of all
men ; but when Sir Harry Smith employed them against
their own chiefs, he mistook the Kafir character I think ;
those men had been born and educated, and brought up
under their present chiefs; they were a new regiment, with¬
out the spirit of organization which men have in this country ;
they were just brouglit there as it were to act in the nature
of a police against thieves and such persons, and they were
active and would even go into the kraals of their own chiefs
to seize the cattle; but when they were employed to seize the
persons of their own chiefs, they failed.
439. You think they were trustworthy so long as their
duties were confined to the ordinary functions of policemen,
but when they were brought forward as parties in what might
be considered a national quarrel, their feelings led them to
join their old chiefs against tl.c British Government ?—It has
so turned out.
440. Mr. Hawes.] Not universally so, has it?—I believe
the Kafir police which were employed in Colonel Mackinnon's
force all deserted, or nearly all, and the rest he could not
0.63. E 3 trust.
^0 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. trust. I do not think they will again venture to employ them
J.Fairbaira^ in the same kind of service, that is, in political service.
14 Jun* 44'* Chairman.^ Do there exist the same reasons for ac-
185t. counting for the conduct of the Kat River settlers, for instance,
in leaving the British Government, and siding in considerable
numbers with the Ka6rs ?—No ; the Kat River settlers are a
mixed race on one side. There was a Kafir chief down in the
Kat River of the name of Hermanus, who was a Kaûr and
not a Hottentot ; he and a number of other Kafirs were
located there in return for certain services performed by Her-
manus against the Kafirs in the last Kafir war ; that man
continued pretty steady up to the last war, when he fairly
broke out in rebellion, unexpectedly by everybody ; but he
and other settlers in the Kat River settlement complained of a
number of things done to them by the Government ; how far
thev were true or otherwise 1 have no personal knowledge.
I heard much of it, and the Government appointed a Com¬
mission to inquire into it, but the report of that Commission
has not been published.
442. Does the Cape Mounted Police consist principally of
Kafirs or Hottentots ?—They are nearly all Kafirs.
443. With regard to the Cape Mounted Rifles, do they
consist of Hottentots or Kafirs ?—Nearly entirely of Hot¬
tentots.
444. How have they behaved ?—They always behaved well
op to the present war ; now a number of them have deserted,
and suspicion has fallen upon the whole body.
445. Are you able to account for their conduct?—Not io
the slightest degree. It was since 1 left the colony. I had
heard nothing of it, nor was there the least suspicion thrown
upon them in the public papers or elsewhere till the thing
broke out.
446. Is not it a fact which is undeniable, that the disafièc-'
tion among the native troops is much greater than was anti¬
cipated, even by those who best knew them ?—There are
several people on the frontier w ho have been for years declaring
that the tribes were hostile to us ; and that the Govern¬
ment and a great portion of the people in the colony were
deceiving themselves in supposing that they were in a state of
security. Those persons, both publicly in writing through the
newspapers, and in addresses to the Government, expressed'
their fears that something mischievous was about to take
place.
447. Taking the general feeling at Cape Town, do you
believe there was that distrust of the native population which
events
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 71
events have shown, to a great extent at least, to have been
justifiable?—Not in Cape Town ; we had not that suspicion *
there. 12 June
448. You have no means at Cape Town, except by rumour, 1851.
of obtaining much information as to the frontier tribes, have
you ?—My opinion was formed almost entirely upon the
Governor's despatches, printed every month ; upon the de¬
spatches from Colonel Mackinnon, the returns of cattle stolen,
and the general state of the country expressed monthly or
oftener in the Government Gazette ; upon those accounts we
relied up to the very last.
449. Do you think there is some inconvenience in the dis¬
tance of the seat of Government at Cape Town from those
frontier tribes?—It would depend upon what is meant by
Government ; if it means legislation there would be no incon¬
venience, but if it means executive I think there should be an
officer of high rank constantly on the frontier.
450. Mr. Hawes.J Do you mean Graham's Town, in speak¬
ing of the frontier?—No ; the frontier is much beyond Gra¬
ham's Town.
451. What do you contemplate that the rank of that officer
should be?—In my opinion, which is not of much value how¬
ever, he should not be of lower rank than major-general, and
he should have a strong force constantly in hand on the
immediate frontier.
452. Chairman.] In your opinion, would it be desirable to
separate the present Cape colony into two distinct colonies,
and to fix the seat of Government of one of them on some
spot more to the westward, such as Graham's Town ?—I think
it would weaken both very much to separate them at present ;
it would make the frontier Government very weak to separate
it from the western division. The safety of the frontier, I
think, is better provided for by one strong Government,
wherever its seat may be, if" the colony is to pay its own
expenses, and have the management of the frontier policy.
453. What would be the effect of transferring the seat of
Government from Cape Town to Graham's Town ?—I do not
think that it would succeed ; I do not think the great body of
the colony would have confidence in any Legislature which
could be assembled at Graham's Town. The great mass of
the population and the property and commerce of the country
is in the western division and along the sea coast there ; they
have the greatest amount of education and general knowledge,
and connexion with the world.
454. "With reference to the frontier tribes, are not the inte-
0.63. E 4 rests
72
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. rests of Cape Town and the district about it affected only in
J.Fairbairn. a very indirect manner by what goes on on the frontier ?—-We
líTiñe much interested in it. A large proportion of the
1851. money in Cape Town is derived from mortgages on frontier
farms and frontier estates ; a large portion of the trade of
Table Bay is connected with the frontier, and a great many
people in Cape Town have an interest in estates in the eastern
province. I do not think there is any separation desirable
between the two portions of the colony.
455. In the event of the colony not being divided, and the
ve[)resentative .system being brought into operation throughout
that colony, the Legislature meeting at Cape Town, do you
think there would be any indisposition on the part of that
Legislature to take adequate measures for the protection of
the frontier ?—None M'hatever.
456. You do not think that the distance of Cape Town
from the eastern frontier would cause the Legislature to be
indifferent to what went on there ?—No.
457. You do not think that on that account only it would
be desirable either to separate the colony into two parts, or to
remove the seat of Government nearer to the frontier?—No, r.
458. Are you of opinion that there would, be any inconveni¬
ence from the chief British officer residing at Cape Town,
rather than residing at some point nearer the frontier ?—I
think there must be an officer of high rank always on the
immediate frontier as the Executive, and that officer should
have very great powers.
459. But still be subordinate to the Government of the
colony residing at Cape Town ?—The Governor of the colonyi
need not always reside at Cape Town.
460. Still, if the Legislature is at Cape Town, probably it
would be necessary for the Governor to be a good deal there ?
—^The communication between the different parts of the
colony is constant by steam and by excellent roads ; we have
capital roads now from one end of the colony to the other ;
the steam communication is constant; in 48 or 52 hours, you-
go from Cape Town to Algoa Bay.
461. You have stated that if a representative system were
brought into operation in this colony, in your opinion the
Legislature at Cape Town would be disposed adequately to
provide for the defence of the frontier ?—I think so.
462. Have you any idea as to what would be the necessarytj
expense of doing so?—Not till I know what the policy is
to be.
463. Are you able to state to the Committee any opinion!
of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 73
of your own as to what that policy ought to be, looking for- Mf.
ward to the future?—None. If I had been asked that ques- J. Fairbatm.
tion some years ago, I should have been very positive, like iTJûne
other people. 1851.
464. What is the answer which you would have given, if
you had been asked that question a year ago ?—The plan
I proposed many years ago, which was in part adopted, w as
that the Kafirs should be considered foreigners, and indepen¬
dent people ; that we should deal in a friendly manner with
the chiefs, treating them with respect, and receiving them into
the houses of the chief officers, just as you would treat any
man of respectability and standing ; that those chiefs shouhl,
in consideration of certain services to be performed to the
colony, receive small salaries; those services should be the
discovery of cattle stolen, and of bad characters who have
committed offences within the colony, just as you would apply
to the French Government to assist you in taking up persons
who had done mischief to this country. I would propose that
those salaries should be paid quarterly, and always be left till
matters were settled between us and those chiefs. That was
a portion of the plan proposed at that time, which it was sup¬
posed would be successful. The colony and the Government
were discussing it in 1834, when the war broke out. That war
upset many of our notions about the Kafirs, and led to the
trial of two or three new systems from time to time, which
were popular for a while, and then, not succeeding in protect¬
ing the frontier as was expected, they became unpopular again.
New wars broke out, and new systems were introduced, till
this last system was adopted, which we all hoped would be a
permanent one, because it seemed based on power and on
popularity, as we were led to suppose, believing that the Go¬
vernor, Sir Harry Smith, was not only popular in the colony,
as he was to a great extent, but that the Kafii-s both respected
and liked him. We had hoped that this would continue, and
we were under the impression, that if peace could be preserved
for 20 years, or for a generation, we should have gained our
point. The Kafirs by that time would have become an agri¬
cultural people, and have been a fixed people, and we should
have had a hold upon them, but we have been all disap¬
pointed.
465. Mr. Cardtoell.'] When you spoke of the Legislature
undertaking to pay for the defence of the frontier, did you
mean that they would be willing to undertake it out of the
colonial funds to be raised by colonial taxes ?—think, if a
Legislative Assetrrbly,- representing the whole colony, were
established
74 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J Faù^irn the Cape, the British Government and that
"**' Assembly could then talk over the matter, and come to a
laJune reasonable compromise. At present the Cape, as a cominu-
1851, nity, does not exist; we are merely a numlier of individuals ;
one man thinks one thing, and another another; no man can
pledge the colony to anything.
466. You said that you thought a Legislature fairly chosen
from among the people of the colony would undertake for
the defence of the frontier r—As far as was reasonable. The
British Government have taken in new territories unconnected
with the colony, and beyond the colony. For the defence of
this part of her territories Great Britain must be responsible.
For the immediate defence of the frontier the colony would
be ready, I have no doubt, to pay its due proportion ; but we
always believe that our frontier is a British frontier, and that
the enemy who attacks you, by coming across a river, is as
much an enemy of the empire as if he came by sea ; so that
the British Government should defend us against the men
who come by land as well as against those who come by sea.
467. Then the major-general, who is to reside upon the
frontier with a large force, is to be paid in some part, at
least, from Imperial resources ?—I should think so.
468. Are you prepared at all to state your own view of
what proportion the empire should pay and what proportion
the colony should pay?—I am not prepared to answer that
question till I know something of the policy which is to be
adopted, and to what extent the colony is to have a voice in
that policy. It would be possible for an injudicious system
to be formed there under the British authority which would
lead to continual wars.
469. Under the supposition that the Colonial Legislature
had the entire control of the policy, would they be prepared
to defray the entire expense ?—I suspect that if a Colonial
Parliament were asked the question they would say, " Uo you
mean us to separate from Great Britain?" If the entire de¬
fence of the frontier, which is the whole of our foreign rela¬
tionship is to come upon us, and the whole control of the
policy is to come upon us, that is equivalent to a separation"
from Great Britain, which we deprecate.
470. You advocate independent institutions, but you depre¬
cate that degree of separation which would throw the whole
of the expenditure upon yourselves?—Not the whole of the
exfjenditure, as if we were dealing as an independent people;
but if our policy is still to be interfered with by another
power.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 75
power, that other power must be responsible in some degree ^ f^J¿airn,
for the consequences. *
471. Colonel Dunne.] Would the Cape of Good Hope from June
its own resources be able to support a war carried on at the 1851.
expense of the last war, which cost 2,000,000/.?—It would
never have cost that under their own management.
472. If the Colonial Government had the management of
the war, would not they manage it by the commando system
more than by sending large bodies of regular troops along the
ifrontier ?—They would establish a regular force on the fron^
tier, and then when any mischief occurred the people would
turn out, as they have done formerly.
473. Could not that system be carried on in such a manner
as would not be revolting to humanity, and yet would be per¬
fectly effectual for the defence of the frontier ?--War is ex¬
termination ; war is killing; you kill on till the people submit.
474. Chairman.^ Supposing the settlers in the frontier
were allowed, without much interference on the part of the
Government, to carry on a war against the natives, what do you
think would be the result; would not it have a strong tendency
to lead to a system of extermination and constant bloodshed on
the frontier, which would finally end in the extermination of the
natives?—The present situation of things there has been pro¬
duced by a policy in which the colonists have had no concern;
it is a very formidable situation ; the Kafirs have been repeat¬
edly at war with the British power; they have ceased to respect
and dread the British power as they formerly did ; they^ have
measured their strength and stood for 12 months against all the
force of the British Government upon the frontier and against
the colonists too, so that now they are a very formidable
people ; they have horses, and guns, and gunpowder. I think
it would not be fair to turn them over on any consideration
suddenly upon the colony, and to say, in the present situation
into which we have brought you, you must fight it out in the
best way you can ; but after peace is secured and a better sys¬
tem adopted, I have no doubt the colony would take the
greater part of the expense of management upon itself, and to
a certain extent co-operate with the British Government in a
reasonable and humane policy towards the natives.
475. Mr. Hawes.] Suppose the Legislature to have an entire
control over the frontier policy, and to be sitting in Cape
Town, you contemplate of course the inhabitants of the eastern
districts being fully represented ?—Yes.
476. Would not they wish for the most speedy and the
most economical mode of terminating the war in the event of
its
76 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
its breaking out ?—Undoubtedly they would; but the question
vv'ould be, which was the tnost speedy and economical,
n June 477* of opinion that the old commando system
1851. would be the cheapest and most speedy?—I am not sure that
I understand what is meant by the old commando system as
distinguished from the system of calling out the Boers with
guns to shoot the Kafirs.
478. Supposing it to consist in the field-cornets or the
authorities within certain districts meeting to consider the
depredations of the Kafirs, and then agreeing to arm them¬
selves as well as they could to retaliate upon the Kafirs, taking
cattle, and destroying life to the extent they thought necessary
to prevent future depredations ?—I do not think that was the
system.
479. Will you describe what you think it was ?—There were
divisions of the colony into certain districts called field-corr
netcies, the field-cornet being some respectable farmer, who
had authority to call out a certain number of the neighbouring
farmers within the district, with guns and horses, to receive
orders. Then above those field-cornets there was a man called
a field-commandant, who, with three or four field-cornet^
turned out and took the command. They received from the
Government orders what to do, and were exactly like an
army. Suppose a certain number of cattle had been stolen, or
a certain inroad had been made upon the colony from .any part
of Kafirland, those men were ordered by the Government to
proceed there and retake the cattle, and those cattle were dis¬
tributed among the losers by the public authorities.
480. Supposing that to be the system, do not you thiuk it
the most effective which could be adopted?—It is as good as
any which could be adopted ; it is the system now, as far as I
understand it.
481. There is no commando system now existing?—It is
not called so, but a patrol or body of mounted burghers are,
in fact, a commando.
482. Are there bodies of that kind who are now ordered by
the Government to pursue cattle and destroy the Kafirs?—
Whenever it is necessary, the Boers are ordered out to go any¬
where and to retake cattle which have been stolen.
483. Will you give the Committee an instance within your
recollection of such orders proceeding from the Government
since the period when the commando system was abolished, in
fact, since 1835?—I consider that the calling out all the
burghers in the years 1834 and 1846, and in the present war,
is just the same as the old commando system.
484, You
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 77
484. You think the commando sy.stem consisted chiefly in .
this, that particular districts assembled their whole force for '
the special purpose of retaliating injuries which those particular la June
districts had received ?—No ; I do not understand that it was 1850
for retaliating injuries, hut for recapturing cattle that was the
chief object, and also seizing evil doers.
485. And shooting the Kafirs ?—If they resisted and at¬
tempted to shoot them.
486. Was not that system interfered with in consequence
of the great abuse to which it led, and the loss of life, and ti)e
constant irritation it kept up on the frontier between the
Kafirs and the settlers?—I heard a good deal of Dr. Smith's
evidence, but not the whole of it, upon that point, and I do
not quite understand the diflerence ; there may be a different
name for it. The body of men now sent out are not allowed
to go out without military officers, and some degree of autho¬
rity, but that is all tlie diflerence I can see betvvecn calling
out a number of men to follow up the spoor of cattle and
retake them, and the system of the field-cornet calling them
out ; they are now called out under the field-cornets.
487. They are now called out because a general war exists.
Is not that quite distinct from the case of special injuries
received by individual farmers, to which the old commando
system applied ?—In the one case you call them out to act as
a general body to put down the Kafirs. In the other you call
out a certain number of farmers to go into Katirland to retake
the cattle by force ; the one is a small body, the other a
large one.
488. Colonel Dunne.] Is not it done in the one case by the
executive government, and in the other by the parties them¬
selves on the spot r—It was never done by the will of the
parties, but always by officers duly authorised for the purpose.
489. Colonel Estcourt.] The people never went out of
their own accord ?—If they did so it was an abuse, or on an
emergency. The Boers were bound to obey the field-cornet
whenever duly summoned, and if they did not they were liable
to fines and punishment.
490. Colonel Dunne.] Does not it appear to you that that
system would aflbrd the cheapest means of defending the
frontier?—" Frontier "' is an extensive word. One part of the
frontier is very different from another ; the Kafir frontier is
the boundary between us and a highly organized and for¬
midable people.
491. What is the extent of that frontier?—They generally
say that there is about 120 or 130 miles of the Kafir frontier
from
78 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. from the mouth of the Keiskamma up to the upper part of
J.Fairbairn. tJjg Amatóla Mountains. It bends out and in a good deal,
ja June ^^at there is a large frontier to defend.
1851. 492. Mr. Hawes.^ Do you remember the proclamation of
Lord Macartney in reference to commandos?—I do not re¬
member it.
493. You know nothing of that proclamation? — I have
read it long ago, but I forget the terms of it. I have always
understood that a commando is a number of men called out to
recover cattle by the constituted authorities.
494. The constituted authorities being the local authorities
on the spot?—Yes.
495. And subsequently they obtained the sanction of the
Government to what they had done?—They were ordered to
do whatever was necessary in certain circumstances, and when
those arose they acted.
496. By the local authorities ?—The local authorities were
bound, under certain circumstances, to perform certain acts.
That was their duty; if they failed, they would come under
the animadversion of the Government.
497. Thai proclamation authorised the inhabitants to arm
whenever they thought fit to attack the native tribes?—Yes.
498. Did not that lead to great bloodohed ?—They would
be responsible the same as any other public officer with arras
in his hands would be responsible for the peace around him.
If they acted against the natives without provocation, they
would be liable to animadversion.
499. Was not the system liable to very great abuses, in
your opinion?—I have no personal knowledge on the subject.
500. Have you no acquaintance with the past history ot the
colony in reference to the commando system ?—I have read a
great deal about it. I have no doubt a great deal of bloodr
shed arose under that system, but not so much as under the
new system ; so that, without blaming the people of those
barbarous times very much, I would say there was not much
difference between them.
501. From your knowledge of the history of the Cape
affairs, are not you prepared to say decidedly whether or not
that system was attended with so much bloodshed and injustice
as to be put an end to both by the public feeling in the colony
and public opinion at home?—The public feeling ii) the colony
has undergone a great change on that subject ; but that may
have arisen from the altered circumstances of the colony. The
people are not now so much exposed to the injuries or the
attacks of the native tribes, and they have ceased over a large
portion
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 79
portion of the colony to have that angry resentment towards jftr.
them which they formerly, of necessity, had from their J, Fairbairn.
position. laJuiie
502. Do you think it would be acceptable to the general
body of the colonists to revive the old commando system ?—
No ; they do not like to be called suddenly out ; they would
much prefer to have a regular fixed paid force always main¬
tained for the protection of the colony.
503. A regular military body, not of the nature of a volun¬
teer force ?—Yes.
504. Do you think that that force should be considerable,
and maintained constantly on the frontier? —There must be a
considerable force maintained constantly on the Kafir trontier.
505. Have you formed any notion of the cost of such a
force to the colony, supposing it took upon itself the defence
of the frontier?—Sir Harry Smith had 1,500 men in Kafir-
land, and they turned out to be altogether insufficient when
the Kafirs rose. We must therefore suppose that it must be
a much larger force than that, probably not less than 3,000
men. They must be constantly employed. I do not know
what the expense of that would be, but it must be con¬
siderable.
506. Chairman.] They must be regular soldiers ?—Either
regular soldiers or persons in the nature of mounted police,
always ready for service.
507. Mr. Hawes.^ What is the revenue of the Cape at
present?—It is about 200,000/.
508. What is the present expenditure of the Government?
—It was rather more than 200,000 /. last year.
509. Mr. Cardwdl.'l Are the Committee to understand
that you would call upon those persons whose property lies
near the frontier, and who therefore are specially interested in
its preservation, for no special exertions in the time of danger;
but that you would protect the frontier entirely by a regular
force constantly maintained ?—I would have a regular force
constantly maintained, but I would have the old system con¬
tinued of making it necessary for the inhabitants when called
on by the proper authorities to turn out with theii* arms and
assist in repelling their enemies, the same as if this country
were invaded by a foreign force you would call upon every one
to resist it.
510. 'ë)\x J. JValmsley.] You have spoken of the frontier;
will you have the goodness to describe what you mean by the
frontier?—The present frontier of the colony is the Keis-
kamma River and the Buffalo River. There is a chain of forts
upon
Só MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORÉ THE
Mr. upon those two rivers all the way up to the mountains from the
J. Fairhairn, gea ; that is the Kafir frontier.
i2jüñé You would maintain that force and those forts upon
1851. that frontier ?—Yes, wherever military men thought it would
be most eificient that they should be placed upon the frontier.
512. Have you any knowledge of the tribes to the east of
that frontier?—I know a great deal of them from documents
which have been published and by conversation, but I have no
personal knowledge of them.
513. Have you any idea of their numbers?—When the
census was taken, at the end of last year, the Gaika Kafirs were
estimated at 46,000 ; it was supposed, however, that a great
number were absent. The tribes who are upon this frontier
which we are speaking of, consist of two, the Gaikas and the
T'Slambie tribes. The T'Slambies are on the sea side, and
the Gaikas up towards the mountain? ; I understood that the
Gaikas were about 45,000 or 46,000 ; I gather that from
the papers published in the Blue Books. The parties said
that they believed a great number were absent. The number
of the T'Slambie tribe was about the same, but rather less. All
together there must be, Í should suppose, about 80,000 or
90,000 of Amakosa Kafirs, with whom we are now in imme¬
diate hostility.
514. Will you go on to describe the various tribes in that
part of the country, till you come to the Zoolas?—Immediately
behind these Amakosa Kafirs, across the Kei River, you have a
powerful chief called Kreli, who is the paramount chief of all
the tribes on both sides of that river ; he is the son of Hintza.
He has been alwa}'? considered, and I know it to be the fact,
that he is regarded as the great chief of Kafirland ; I believe
his people are about the same number as the Gaikas.
515. Mr. Hawes.^ There never has been a census of those
people taken, has there ?—Never. Then of the tribes behind
them I know very little. There is a chief of the name of Faku,
who has a powerful tribe there. Whether it is more or less
powerful than any of those which have been mentioned, I do
not know ; I should think it was not so powerful. Then,
immediately behind those are the Zoolas, who are an exceedingly
powerful tribe, and highly organized.
516. The colony of Natal is interposed between the two
tribes you have last spoken of, is not it ?—They are around
the colony of Natal ; the Zoolas begin on the west ; their main
body is on the north of that colony ; the organization of that
tribe was very complete, and the executive exceedingly power¬
ful, so much so, that when a regiment was called out on any
perilous
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 8l
perilous service, if they returned unsuccessful, the chief put p^laim
every man of them to death ; he was able to put whole "
villages to death ; this man was killed, and succeeded by a 12 June
person named Panda ; his power is evidently very great. The 1851.
grounds on which 1 have mentioned the numbers are these ;
I had no idea of the course the present examination would
take ; I thought I should be immediately dismissed on my
saying that I had no personal knowledge of the Kafirs; I am
only speaking from memory and what I have read in the Blue
Books.
517. Sir J. ïValmsley¡I You have now mentioned all the
tribes from the seat of war to the eastern country of the
Zoolas, and to the best of your knowledge, the number of
those tribes ?—Yes.
518. And you make them about 208,000?—As I have
been accustomed to believe from my reading and hearing the
subject talked of, I consider the Amakosa Kafirs between the
Kei and the Keiskamma Rivers, to amount to about 80,000 or
90,000 J I believe the number of Kreli's people which are
immediately behind the Kei River, to be about 30,000 or
40,000 ; then there are Faku's people, which I believe to be
fewer than any of those tribes ; and then the Zoolas, much
more powerful than either of them.
519. Mr, Hawes.] I understand you to say, that you esti¬
mate the Kafir population between the Kei and the Keis¬
kamma, including what is generally called British Kafraria, to
amount to 80,000 or 90,000 ?—That is my impression.
520. With regard to the other tribes, you are not able to
state the population of either of them ?—No ; only from the
reports of traders and the general estimate which may be made.
521. Are you aware that a census was taken, in the year
1849, of the Gaika and T'Slambie tribes ?—No; I have not
seen that census.
522. Colonel Dunne.^ You say the frontier is the Keis¬
kamma ; all the forts which seem to be the base of Sir Harry
Smith's operations are beyond the Keiskamma, some of them
20 miles distant ; there are a great many places with English
names beyond those forts, and therefore, of course, beyond the
frontier?—We consider the whole of Kafraria now as British ;
the frontier of the British possessions is the great Kei.
523. That is 100 miles beyond the Keiskamma?—I think
about 90 or 100 miles.
524. The Keiskamma, therefore, is not really the frontier?
—It is the frontier of the colony.
0.63. F 525. There
82 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. 525« There is a distinction between the colony and the
J. Fairbairn. British possessions ?—Quite so.
12 jm,e 526- In speaking of the defence which you would wish for
1851. frontier, you speak of the Keiskamma, not the British fron¬
tier ?—Yes.
527. The colonial frontier, as contradistinguished from the
British frontier?—Yes.
528. Chairman.'] With regard to the frontier, more to the
north-east towards Orange River, is it not necessary to defend
the colony from inroads upon that side also?—That comes
upon the Tambookie frontier ; that has hitherto been a very
peaceful frontier, but it is now disturbed, and I see that the
Tamhookies are at open war with the Colonial Government.
A greater force will he required hereafter on that frontier.
52g. Therefore the extent of frontier of the colony which
will require to he defended is very much larger than the 120
miles which you speak of?—Yes.
530. What do you apprehend to he the state of things upon
the frontier more to the north-west, in the direction of the
Orange River?—On the Tambookie frontier there is war;
further to the west there is a powerful chief called Moshesb,
w ho has hitherto been very friendly, hut it is now very doubtful
if he has not declared against British authority.
531. Colonel Estcmrt.] In what part does he reside ?—In
the Bassuto country, next to the Tamhookies, before you come
to Bloem Fontein.
532. Chairman.] Emigrant hoers have established them¬
selves in this country, have they not?—A number of hoers
have established themselves in the country of the Griquas,
who border on the Orange River ; the present Governor has
established the sovereignty there, taking in all the hoers on
this side of the Vaal River, and has formed them into a com¬
munity with a regular government. They have a Legislative
Assembly or Council, and make laws and have courts of justice;
they fine and imprison, and, I believe, hang people ; and they
have a British resident there. Those hoers now are considered
a community under the British authority, the supreme power
being vested in the Governor of the colony, who appoints a
resident there to administer the government. They have their
titles to land from the British Governor as High Commissioner
for the settlement of affairs beyond the boundaries of the
colony ; behind them you have a body of hoers who have cast
off their allegiance altogether, and established themselves in a
republic or independent government.
533. Are the hoers you have last mentioned numerous ?—
It
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. . 83
It is difficult to say what the numbers are ; they cannot be Mr.
under 10,000 or 12,000. J- Fairbairn.
534. What do you conceive ought to be the policy of the i7"june
Government with regard to those boers who are desirous of
pushing themselves beyond the limits of the colony ?—Some
things would be very desirable which are impossible; it is
absolutely impossible to follow them. To recover their affec¬
tions, so as to control their actions to a great extent, I think
is possible, and that can only be done by establishing a good
government within the colony, where we are supreme, and
where we can establish a good government, and by obtaining
the opinions and views and knowledge of all the colonists.
Through a representative assembly constantly in action you
would be able to discover the truth respecting South Africa,
and come by degrees to a sound system of policy, but till that
is done you can have no accurate knowledge of what is passing
in South Africa. No one man knows it ; it is too wide a
field for any one man to obtain all the information which is
requisite. Perhaps those who have the knowledjie conceal
it, and there may be many people interested in withholding
facts and inventing stories, so that altogether at present no
man living knows the real state of Southern Africa, and I
think that there is no mode of getting at it except partially by
a Commission of Inquiry from this country ; but there is no
method of getting at it completely without an open government
at the Cape, where all parties can be heard always, as in this
country, and where every statement would be published and
met on the spot by persons competent to give evidence upon
it. Till that is done I think the whole will be a scene of dark¬
ness and confusion ; so that I consider the Kafir question as
involving the establishment of a Legislative Assembly, or an
open government of some sort at the Cape of Good Hope ;
you would then liave the means of acquiring information as to
the course to be taken, and you would have the colonists
reconciled, self-government creating self-respect, and com¬
bining the different classes together.
535- What are the reasons alleged by the boers for emi¬
grating beyond the limits of the colony 1—In the first place
they supposed that justice was not done to them at the end of
the Kafir war—that a sufficient system of protection was not
established by Sir Benjamin D'Urban at the conclusion of
the war.
536. Do you mean protection against the inroads of the
Kafirs ?—Yes ; they said the peace was patched up, and they
had no security whatever. They said also tliey had not got
0.63. F 2 any
84 , MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. any redress for the great losses which ihey had sustained, and
J. Fairbaim. they gave it as their opinion that the British Government was
i^Juñe qualified to deal with the Kafirs.
1851. 537' They were very much dissatisfied with the enfran¬
chisement of their slaves, were not they?—I do not think
there were many slaves in that part of the country ; and I do
not believe that that w as the real cause of their moving away.
538. Viscount Mandeville.'] They took slaves when they
went beyond the frontier, did not they ?—It was often said,
and we suppose it to be true, but I never saw any clear
evidence of it.
539' Was not that the reason of the Act of the 6th and 7th
of William the 4th being passed ?—No, it was to protect the
aborigines more than the slaves, I think.
540. They took the aborigines as slaves, did not they?—
They might take them into their service, and buy and sell
between themselves.
541. Chairman.} Are you aware upon what terms the
emigrant boers, who have gone beyond the frontier, live with
the natives ?—We have heard of several attacks being made
by the boers upon the natives lately. When they first went
there they had several fierce wars, in which both parties
suffered severely, but lately we have not heard much of any
war between those on the Vaal River and the natives around.
The natives fear the Dutch people more than they do the Eng¬
lish, and they understand them better. The natives, who are
at all civilized, speak the Dutch language, and that is a great
means of communication between them and the stranger.
They know the boer ; they know his power ; and they know he
is always awake, and not like the English, who only go to war
now and then, and come with great form and state to accom¬
plish a war.
542. Is that fear of the boer merely founded upon the
readiness of the boer to take the punishment into his own
hands of any native who attacks his property ?—I think they
understand one another.
543. Is not it the case that the boer adopts a very summary
way in dealing with a native who attacks his property?—Yes,
if he can get hold of him; but an Englishman would do
exactly the same.
544. Colonel Dunne.} It is an individual contest ?—If any
native, or any person whatever, attacks a man's property he
will shoot him, and that would be so anywhere.
545. Chairman.} Within the limits of the colony would a
settler, either Dutch or English, feel justified in shooting a
native
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 85
native for rommitting, it may be a petty theft, upon his Mr.
property ?--If the man would not stand, he would do the J.Fairbairn.
same as you would do in this country ; he would attempt to
seize him, and if he would not yield, he would use force to the 185I.
utmost.
546. Mr. Cardu^elL] Do you mean that that greater fear
of the Dutch arises from the impression that they are more
cruel?—No. I think the natives consider the Dutch as na¬
tives like themselves, and they consider the English as intru¬
ders, who have come to take their own country from them.
547. Chairman^ You think they believe the English to be
a more encroaching race ?—Yes ; I have been told from good
authority that the boars have spread this among the native
tribes, that the English have taken the land from the boers,
and will finally take it from the natives. I have been told by
parties who have been in the countrv that those stories have
been spread abroad, and a feeling of hatred and fear of the
English was created in consequence.
548. Is there a feeling of alienation and estrangement be¬
tween the Dutch and English races in the Cape colony ?—
Not that I am aware of ; I think it is quite gone.
549. Do they intermarry ?—Yes.
550. Very commonly ?—Yes ; they are partners in business
of all kinds ; about Cape Town I do not know the difference.
551. In the event of a Representative Assembly sitting at
Cape Town, would the Dutch or English element predominate,
in your opinion ?—The great majority of the colonists are of
Dutch extraction, as we say ; we call them Dutch, but in
reality they are made up of all nations. The Dutch East India
Company disliked the Dutch burghers because they had rights,
and if they were oppressed, they went back to Holland and
preferred complaints against the Government. Others would
be Prussians, Italians, Danes, and so on, and those are the
real fathers of the (Jape colony ; there are a great many of
German descent and of Danish descent throughout the colony;
the Dutch language however is general, and those persons
who are called Dutch are the majority throughout the colony,
but they generally prefer electing Englishmen to situations
where activity and business habits and the power of speaking
may be required ; so that in the municipalities we find the
English generally selected for holding public offices of trust by
the Dutch people. Latterly, when there was a general election
in the colony, several Dutchmen who would have been elected
unquestionably, if they had been so disposed, came forward,
and declared that they would not accept seats in the Council,
0.63. F 3 on
86 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Mr. on the ground that they could not speak, with comfort to
.Fatrbatrn. themselves, in the English language.
12 June 552- Mr. CaldzielL] You spoke of the establishment of
1851. representative institutions at Cape Town as a means of draw¬
ing back those boers who have penetrated beyond the frontier
into Kafraria ; do you think that the Dutch, or the foreigners
who live at a distance, would go to reside at Cape Town in
order to take part in a representative council ; would not
they be more likely to elect as their representative some agent
who happened to be living at Cape Town?—Tiiose on the
Vaal River could have no connexion with any representative
government at the Cape.
553. How do you expect then that the establishment of
representative institutions at Cape Town would re-establish a
hold upon the affections of those people, and bring them back
within the cfilony ?—It would not bring them back within
the colony ; a reference to the map will show that. They are,
however, the sons, and brothers, and relatives of the colonists,
and if the colonists were thoroughly reconciled to the British
Government that feeling would extend itself to them. At pre¬
sent there is a feeling against the British Government, or at
least there is not a strong feeling in favour of it, on account of
certain petitions for political rights being so long disregarded,
and from the fear also that they are about to be deprived of
them altogether. Those feelings may be unreasonable, but
they exist.
554. Those boers you think would still continue an inde¬
pendent and separate government, but they would become
less unfriendly to the British Government?—I am not sure
that they would not insist upon being entirely separate. If
the sovereignty continues I think they might coalesce with
the British sovereignty again. They were all united at one
time. Those are parties who left the colony, and w ho lelt
Natal when the British sovereignty was firmly established
there. If they obtained political rights and a share in the
management of their own affairs, I think it is likely that the
common feeling of relationship would be revived, and the
European race would act more like itself throughout the
whole of Africa than it does at present.
555. Do you mean that though remaining beyond the
limits of the colony altogether they would become amenable
to the jurisdiction of the Government at Cape Town ?—In
the sovereignty which we have e.stablished the government
there would not be amenable to the government of Cape
Town; the Governor of the colony is the High Com¬
missioner, ,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 87
tnissioner, through his representative, the local Governor. Mr.
Something of the same kind would be clone probably with the
boers beyond that river, unless they joined with the boers in la June
the sovereignty formed under the government. 1851.
556. The government being established at Cape Town,
there would be a sort of independent government in some
way or other attached to it, but lying entirely beyond the
British frontier, within the limits of what would be Kafra-
ria ?—The whole country up to Vaal River is called British
now.
.557- Were you not speaking of a number of boers, who,
after the Kafir war, from a sense of injustice, had left the
British limits altogether, and penetrated within the Kafrarian
limits ;—Not the Kafrarian limits ; it is away from Kafir-
land.
558. Within the limits of the native tribes, where no race
of British possession at present extends ?—It exists now ; it
is all British now.
559. Colonel Dunne.l Is not there a large number of boers
beyond the Vaal who repudiate the Government of Great
Britain, and have a government under Petrorius, who signs
himself commandant?—That is beyond the Vaal River.
560. Mr. Cardwell.'] You said a reference to the map would
show that those people are too far removed to be brought
within the limits of the colony ?—They would not come back
within the colony ; between the Orange River and the Vaal
River you have a large tract of country which has been made
British territory by a recent proclamation ; beyond them,
again, is the independent boer.
561. How do you explain your proposition that a repre¬
sentative government at Cape Town would re-establish the
connexion between those di.stant boers and the British Govern¬
ment ?—A representative government for Cape Town means
a representative government for the whole colony up to the
Orange River. The colonists there would he able to tell their
friends beyond the river that they were as free as they were ;
that they could now take care of themselves, and manage their
own affairs according to their own judgment. In that way a
reconciliation might take place between them and those who
are living under the British Government. At present they
reproach the colonists with being slaves, and being under thé
control of men who have no responsibility to the public, while
they themselves have established independent republics of their
own.
562. You look to their remaining independent republics,
. 0.63. F 4 but
88 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
y®" think the fact of a representative governnient being
air airn. 0sta]3ijgj^g(j Cape Town would give them a friendly disposi-
13 June tion towards the British ?—I think it is just possible that when
1851. the colonists have a representative government established,
and are made a peo|)le, a free community, they may reconcile
those men so far as to lead them to join together, the boers in
the sovereignty and the boers beyond forming a government
under the British Government, the same as Natal is.
563. Those independent boers beyond the frontier would
then become British subjects ?—Yes.
564. And take their share in those representative institu¬
tions?—Not at the Cape ; they would l)e separate colonies
altogether, as much as New South Wales and Van Diemen's
Land are. But those are widely distant things ; there is
something to be done immediately if possible, and then when
you get light at one point you will be able to enter more satis¬
factorily into those distant questions.
565. Colonel Dunne.'] Is not there a formidable question
respecting these republican boers ; have not thev assumed an
independent authority, and taken British subjects, and tried
them by their own tribunals?—Yes, they have done all that.
566. Are not they said to be preparing to go more to the
north, to some lake which has been discovered ?—It appears
that they wish to prevent any Englishman from penetrating
to the lake, and forming anything like an establishment beyond
them so as to check them. Wlien the last Blue Book but one
goes out there, they will see that it has been recommended by
the Governor, and agreed to by Lord Grey here, that some
British influence should be established at the lake for the pur¬
pose of forming a confederation of chiefs to resist the boers.
I know how they will take it ; they iviil take it as an attempt
to raise the savages to cut their throats. The consequence
will lje that they will seize every Englishman ; and if they
catch the agent, whoever he may be, they will kill him. That
influence may come in the course of time, but it is too great
a step at present.
567. Mr. Mackinnon.] From what you know of the cha¬
racter of the Kafirs, do you suppose that any form of govern¬
ment whatever will be sufficient to prevent occasional colli¬
sions taking place between the settlers and the Kafirs ?—I
think it is possible ; at all events, we are front to front, and
must do the best we can.
568. What occasioned the war in 1834?—^That war broke
out upon the expulsion of the Kafir chief, Maquomo, from a
portion of the territory between the Keiskamma and the Fish
River ;
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 8(J
River ; he was suddenly ordered off in a very dry season. The ^
people were driven into a part of the country which was dry, '
w ithout a bit of grass upon it, so that many people were in the 12 June
utmost distress. He considered this as equivalent to a de- 1851.
claration of war on the part of the Colonial Government, he
having been dispossessed of a large portion of territory on the
Kat River about six or seven years before thai. That was the
exciting cause of that outbreak apparently, but the discontent
had been growing for several years.
569. What was the cause of the break-out in 1846?—In
1846 the Kafirs had got an opinion that we were going to
encroach upon their country. The Government had given
orders for the survey of a piece of ground on which to build
a fort. Unfortunately the surveyors went beyond the river
into Kafirland, and began to survey a piece of ground for
a fort there. The Kafirs then interfered, Sandilli among the
rest, and stopped it by violence. There was then a consulta¬
tion, and Colonel Hare, who was the Lieutenant-governor at
the time, saw the chiefs, and they used very strong and bad
language to him, and incensed him, and showed that they had
ceased to respect the British Government. Much collision
took place by little petty depredations on the side of the
Kafirs for a good while, and last of all a theft was committed
by a Kafir in a town called Fort Beaufort, on the immediate
frontier. He stole an axe of trifling value, and was detected.
He was carried before a magistrate, the magistrate put him
in gaol, but determined to send him to Graham's Town to be
tried. The chief to whom he belonged said that was contrary
to the treaty ; that all such offences were to be tried at Fort
Beaufort, in the immediate vicinity of the frontier, where both
the parties could have their witnesses, and the thing might be
properly investigated, but if he was carried into the interior
it was a breach of the treaty. The magistrate resisted, and
with the slight escort of two or three policemen he sent this man
from Fort Beaufort across the Kafir frontier, unluckily within
sight of this very man's kraal, his brother being the head of the
kraal. As they were passing by, a number of young men
rushed from the kraal, defeated the escort, and rescued the
prisoner, killing one or two persons. The Government then
demanded immediately that the offenders should be given up.
The Kafir chiefs said they would do so, and they would
inquire, but they required time, and they requested the
Government not to be in a hurry. The people throughout the
w hole colony were very much incensed at their open defiance of
the British power, and very strong language was used throughout
90 MIXUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
T r-^1' • whole colony as to the method of treating the Kafirs ; that
•J* .f*/yy/y^"y*w. * • ^
' It was too lenient, and tliat the Government ought to strike
12 June ^ blow to intimidate them as they were become so bold as to
1851. interfere with the course of justice and rescue a prisoner.
Colonel Hare raised a force and entered Kafirland. They
marched three days before they met the Kafirs, the Kafirs
declaring at the time that they were not prepared for war, and
did not wish it. But in the neighbourhood of the mountains
they met the Kafirs and the war broke out.
570. Connecting those two instances which you have men¬
tioned with the last outbreak, do you consider that any change
which might be made in the legislation of the colony would
prevent similar outbreaks from taking; place in future ?—One
would hope that experience will lead to more caution in deal¬
ing with the Kafirs. 1 think the war of 1846 need not have
broken out at that time if the Governor had waited a little to
give the Kafirs time to deliver up the men, for they declared
they were ready to do it.
571. Is not it likely that collisions must take place when
the progress of the colonists is gradually encroaching upon
the Kafirs, who perhaps have no means of retreating, except
upon a hostile tribe behind them?—It is an indispensable con¬
dition of any future policy that there shall be no further
encroachment upon the Kafirs upon our side. It is a great
question whether we ought not to give up certain lands which
we have taken from them. That is a question which can
scarcely be discussed at present, because so much local
information is required on the subject.
572. Assuming a sort of neutral ground were established by
the consent of both parties, between the advancing colonists
on the one side, and the retreating Kafirs upon the other,
would not such an arrangement prevent the possibility of
future outbreaks?—It has not prevented it; the neutral
ground became the resort of bad characters from all quarters,
who were constantly committing depredations. The Kafir
chiefs said it was worse than if we were on the immediate
frontier, because w e made them responsible for the actions of
men whom they knew nothing about.
573. Your idea of the means of preventing the possibility
of future outbreaks would be, that the British power should
not make any further advances, but should rather recede ?—
If it were possible to do it.
574. Would not that retreat give an idea to the Kafirs that
they were getting the best of it ?—That has often been said,
but I think it is rather fanciful ; I think if it were clearly
thought
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. pi
thought to be just, and that the Kafirs had a rightful claim to v^rbaim
the country between the Keiskamina and the Fish River, we ' '
ought to give it to them ; I think we have looked too much to 12 June
expediency and overlooked justice, as the foundation of our 1851.
policy.
57f). If that were done at the conclusion of a war, would
not it bear the appearance, in the eyes of those tribes, of a
defeat on our part?—At the conclusion of the war of 1836 we
gave them back the territory between the Keiskamraa and the
Fish River, upon the express understanding that it was a mis¬
take to have taken it, but that now we were fjuits for every¬
thing, and if they again attacked us, they must stand by any
consequences which might be the result of their being de¬
feated, That system, it was believed by many people, liad it
been well worked, would have been successful, but it was
worked by parties supposed to be under the influence of men
entirely hostile to it, although it continued for, I think, nearly
eight years, with various changes.
576. Marquis of Granby.] Have you any knowledge of the
number of fighting men which the Kafirs can bring into the
field?—I have not; except from merely calculating what
number of male adults there may be in proportion to the whole
population.
577. There are many Kafirs fighting on our side, are not
there?—There is a tribe which continues friendly, between
King William's Town and the mouth of the Buffalo River,
but it is a very small tribe.
578. You have spoken of the disaffection of the Cape
Mounted Rifles ; at what time did that disaflfection show
itself?—I think it was in February last.
57g. It was before the war broke out, was not it?—No;
the war broke out in December.
580. Whenever they had been engaged before, had not
they fought very bravely ?—Much reliance was placed upon
them. Their commander. Colonel Somerset, always had much
confidence in them, and he has acted with them for the last
30 years.
581. Mr. Cardwell.'\ Will you name the newspaper of
which you are the editor ?—The " South African Commercial
Advertiser."
582. Colonel Estcourt.'] The system you propose with re¬
gard to the maintenance of the frontier is a mixed system,
partly depending upon the settlers, and partly upon a fixed
corps ; you said that the colony would be disposed to pay part
of the expense of such a system, provided the imperial go¬
vernment
92 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J ^Irbairn colony agreed upon the policy to be pur-
■ sued. Supposing the imperial government wished to adopt
12 June a system whicli did not correspond with the views of the
1851. colonial government, in what way would such a difference be
arranged ?—I think the difficulty would be met by the colony
being responsible for a certain amount of force at all times,
and the payment of a fixed sum ; that they should pay either
the whole or a due proportion of the expense of the persons
who might be called out from their farms to act with the regu¬
lar forces.
.583. ChairmanJ] If the general Government were respon¬
sible for a portion of the expense of maintaining the frontier,
do not you think it reasonable that the general government
should have a voice in the policy to be pursued towards the
frontier tribes, with a view to prevent the recurrence of wars
for which this country would become chargeable to a certain
extent?—We propose that its voice shall be supreme ; that
the Governor's assent shall be required for every measure
which passes through the local parliament, just the same as
here, the consent of all three parties, King, Lords and Com¬
mons, is required to sanction any Bill.
584. Mr. llawes.] Then practically the frontier policy
would be in the same hands as it now rests in ?—No, I do
not think so.
585. Have you formed any idea of the amount of contri¬
bution which the Cape would be required to pay?—-They
would be ready to pay all that the case required ; there would
be no specific limit to it; they would pay whatever might be
necessary.
586. Would they be prepared to pay 80,000/. or 100,000/.
a year?—Whatever was required they would be ready to
give.
587. That you speak confidently, from your knowledge of
the colony, do you ? The Committee understand you to say
that the colony would be prepared either to pay a certain sum,
or to maintain a certain fixed military force ?—Till I knew
what the policy was, it would be impossible for me to say
what amount would be required.
588. Supposing the policy to be that which you represent
it would be upon a colonial legislature being established, and
that the colony had a considerable share in directing it, have
you formed any opinion what would he the force which the
colony would be willing to maintain, or the sum they would
be willing to pay ?—I can only speak for myself, and not in
the slightest degree as leading the Committee to believe that
I speak
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 93
I speak the opinions of the colonists, or that they would stand W*".
by what I say to the slightest extent ; I should say one-third
or one-fourth of the whole amount. iJjutie
589. Chairman.'] Are not there large classes of persons in 1851.
the colony interested in promoting, or in the continuance of
these frontier wars, and in the great expenditure which is
occasioned by them ?—A very small number indeed ; a small
number of British merchants and their agents may be so,
but there is not a single resident colonist who is so.
590. Do not you believe that their influence would be
appreciable in its effect upon the legislature of the colony?—
No.
591. Mr. Cardwell.] What did you mean when you said
that the great expenditure of two millions would never have
been incurred if the colony had had the control of the war ?
—The boers and Hottentots, to the amount of about 1,500,
went to the Amatóla Mountains at once and expelled the
Kafirs, and compelled them to come to a conference and
adopt terms of peace. This was all done in a very few
months. The regular forces had been lying down there for a
great many months in Lower Kafir land, and had notattempted
to enter the Amatóla Mountains ; I believe, therefore, if the
colonial force had acted at once upon the Kafirs, they would
have put an end to the war in perhaps one-fourth of the time ;
1 give that as an opinion which 1 have heard from a great
many people who served in the war, both military and
burghers.
592. In a former part of your examination, did not you
state that you proposed to defend the frontier entirely by a
regular force, and not by a voluntary force ?—The regular
force, I think, should always be the base of an irregular force.
593. Mr. Hawes.] You would have a voluntary force
besides, then ?—I would have the force which we have now ;
every man may be called out by the Government to turn out
with arras for the defence of the colony when attacked ; that
is what I understand to be the present system.
594. You would vest that power in the supreme authority
of the colony, would you ?—Yes, at all times.
595. Colonel Dunne.] Was not that expense of 2,000,000/,
chiefly caused by marching the regular troops into a country
in which they were neither armed nor equipped to carry on
the war ?—A large portion of it was spent in waggon hire ;
the country was burnt up, and they had to derive their supplies
from a great distance ; therefore every supply of provisions
cost them an enormous sum for waggon hire, and by the time
94 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
r additional supply their former supply was ex-
ai^irn. hausted. so that the troops could not move at all. It is not
12 June known, I believe, where all the money went.
1851. 59^- Mr, I/awes.] That great expenditure bein<» occasioned,
as you say, by drought, might occur again under the same cir¬
cumstances, of course ?—If the troops had to derive their
resources from the sea, and through a regular commissariat;
but I believe the burghers found a sufficient supply ; they
were able to supply the troops frequently from their stores,
which they themselves had collected.
597. Mr. Cardwell.'] In one of your answers, you stated
that there are no residents in the colony who were interested
in a warlike expenditure ; in another, you have said that
nobody knows where a great part of the money went ; do you
consider those two answers perfectly consistent with each
other?—I think so; it must have gone through the con¬
tractors, and those contractors were English merchants and
persons of that description, and not the regular Dutch or
agricultural inhabitants of the colony.
598. Would those contractors be entitled to vote under the
representative system which you propose to establish ? —
Undoubtedly, if they were proprietors of lands.
599. Then there would be in the representative government
you propose to establish, interested parties, whose personal
advantage would be promoted by wars on the frontier ?—So
small in number, as to be altogether inappreciable in the general
legislation of the country; their number may not be above
20 or 50, or 100 at the very outside. If you established an
extensive franchise their interest would be neutralized.
tioo. Chairman.] Is not the general expenditure of the
colony promoted by troops coming from England, and by the
whole stir which is made in consequence of a war upon the
frontier ?—I have no doubt the whole of the mercantile part
of the colony gains by it, directly or indirectly, but the general
body of the people suffers enormously. In the first place, all
the people on the frontier suffer ; their farms are over-run, their
cattle are destroyed, their horses stolen, and many of their
friends killed, and their houses burnt. The people in the
middle districts suffer from being called away, either themselves
personally or their servants, in time of harvest.
601. Their sufferings must depend upon the amount of com¬
pensation they receive, must not it?—They get nothing at
all ; their servants are paid j but when the beers have been out
themselves they have received almost nothing. The men may
be called away from their farms when there is the greatest
necessity
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 95
necessity for labourers to be employed. A farmer requires Mr.
perhaps 30 or 40 labourers to be employed upon his crop, and
if they are taken away at ploughing time he suffers loss for the
whole of the next year. Then, in the western district, when 1851.
they are called away, either themselves or their servants, they
suffer in their vintage ; the whole of their vintage might have
been destroyed, and a great portion of it was lost for want of
labour ; so that the great body of the colonists are clearly and
indisputably injured by every war. The parties who gain are
the military, who get promotion and field-pay, and the con¬
tractors, who also make abundance of money. Sir Harry
Smith has distinctly stated in one of his despatches, and he is
a much better authority than I am, that no doubt there are
some persons who make large sums of money.
602. Take the case of Cape Town generally, do not the
shopkeepers and traders of that town make a good deal of
money by warlike operations being active upon the border ?—
Not Cape Town ; Graham's Town may do so ; it makes very
little difference in Cape Town ; the places where the prices
are so much raised are in the immediate neighbourhood of the
frontier, Graham's Town, and Port Elizabeth, and Fort
Beaufort, and some of those frontier towns.
603. Mr. Hawes.^ All those persons would have a voice in
the election of representatives, would not they ?—'Yes.
604. Viscount Mandeville.'] But they are the minority, you
say?—A very small minority, not one in 100 ; and even those
parties would be far from inducing a war because they profited
by it. I suppose many parties in this country gained by the
French war, but they would not have caused a French war on
account of that gain.
605. Colonel Dunne.] Were not there an immense number
of cattle taken by our troops ?—Yes.
606. Were they kept for the support of the troops ?—
During the last war I think they were sold ; an attempt was
made to remunerate certain losers out of the price, but they
complained very much of that.
607. Was not there a complaint among the Hottentots that
while the men were serving on the frontier, during the war,
their families were left almost to starve ?—There were some
complaints of that kind during the last war, and they were
true, but they were remedied afterwards.
608. That caused an indisposition to serve in the present
war, did not it ?—The Hottentots have turned out from the
western province during the present war upon a public promise
being
96 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
. being made by the Government that their families should re-
ceive food during their absence.
12 June That promise has now been given ?—Yes, and it has
1851. been kept.
610. Viscount Mandevillt.'] The Kat River Hottentots
made a good deal of money in the first wai by carriage and
waggon hire, did not they?—Some of them might do so, but
the general body of the Kat River settlers lost enormously ;
they were ordered to leave their houses and to assemble under
the command of the military. The consequence was that
their gardens and fields were wasted, their cattle lost, and they
themselves reduced to great poverty and distress. That was
the state of the Kat River during the last war. The consequence
was that in this war they at first said they would not leave
their places, but defend them ; but I believe a great number of
them, instead of defending them, have joined the Kafirs.
611. Mr. Hawes.'] Is it not the fact that the frontier on the
eastern part of the colony has far more interest than the
western in preventing a war; it is there the first sufierings
caused by a war begin?—But we must have a frontier, and that
is our frontier as well as theirs, so that we are as much con¬
cerned in defending the Fish River frontier as any other.
612. It is the fact, is not it, that property in that district
suffers first in the event of an irruption of the Kafirs ?—Yes,
they are upon the immediate frontier.
613. Do you think the western district would be quite ready
at all times to come forward with its full quota, especially hav¬
ing to pay a larger quota, in consequence of its possessing
larger property, to defend property in which the eastern district
was so much more interested than the western?—Yes, I have
never heard a single whisper of any distinction being likely to
be made.
614. That you state generally as being the opinion of the
people?—Yes, and I think I know what their opinions are
upon the subject.
615. But the eastern district have put forward a claim to
have a separate government, have not they ?—A considerable
part of them are very an.xious on the subject, I think, from
confounding the future government with the past. We hope
that the future government will be a better one than the past
has been. They always speak of the Table Mountain govern¬
ment being ignorant of the frontier. That may be very true,
because the Table Mountain government was merely the
Governor; but we propose that the legislature shall be filled
up
SÉLECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 97
up by representatives from the eastern province, and shall no ^Ir.
1 1 1 I .. J, Fairbairit,
longer be a local government.
616. Chainnan.\ Have you any apprehension of the colony j2jui,e
being inconveniently large in point of" extent for the purpose 1851.
of legislation?—Í think not; now that we have good roads,
and steam along the coast, there will be no inconvenience, I
think, in people coming to the Legislative Assembly.
617. Viscount MandevilleJ] There is a mail coach from
Graham's Town, is not there ?—There is a mail twice a week
regularly.
618. Colonel Dunne.] What is the distance?—It is about
600 miles.
619. Chairman^ How long does it take to travel that dis¬
tance ?— I think 3 è days.
620. Travelling night and day?—Yes.
621. Colonel Dunne.] How far is Graham's Town from
the frontier ?—About 30 or 40 miles from the immediate
frontier.
622. Mr. Howes.] Do you think that the inhabitants of the
eastern district are likely to agree in opinion with the inhabi¬
tants of the western, as to the policy to be pursued on the
frontier?—I think they would ; 1 think that people in the west
would pay great deference to the opinions of the people on
the immediate frontier.
623. Do not the people round the immediate frontier now
complain of the want of information and knowledge on the
part of the Cape Town government ?—On the part of the
Governor, who is the government ; the people have nothing
to do with it.
624. They do complain, do not they ?—We complain ; at
least, if we may judge from the newspapers and public meet¬
ings, the people of Cape Town have been loudest in their
complaints of being deceived as to the state of Kafirland, and
it is clear that the Governor was completely in the dark up to
the last moment. Colonel Mackinnon was in Kafirland, Sir
Harry Smith was also there frequently, yet up to the last
moment they declared that all was tranquil. The colonists
were very much alarmed, and the Governor w rote several pro¬
clamations, accusing them of doing mischief by their alarm,
so that the people were informed, but the Governor was not.
625. Were not there, previously to the outbreak of former
wars, similar reports of tranquillity?—No, not in 1846, I
think. There was a considerable outcry for more than a year
that there was a war impending, arising from several circum¬
stances ; one was the immense supply of gunpowder and fire-
0.63. G arms
98 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE TBE
^ Mr. arms which was known to have gone into Kafirland, and by
Fairbavn. autlacious tone of the chiefs, especially Sandiiii, towards
12 June the Lieutenant-governor.
1851. 626. You now speak of the war which broke out in 1846?
—Yes.
627. Do you at all remember the accounts which preceded
the outbreak of 1835 ; were not there statements then made
as to the tranquillity of the frontier ; in point of fact, have not
the Kafir chiefs been remarkably secret in their preparations
for war ?—This last time they have been very secret, but in the
two former wars there was a good deal of discontent manifested
by them previously to the war.
628. You are not aware of its being officially stated that
the apprehensions of a war were not great at the time the war
broke out in 1835 ?—Some parties then were pretty confident
that the Government measures would prevent war, baton the
frontier a great many persons maintained that nothing could
prevent a war. It was supposed that if the Governor had
gone up when he first arrived he would have prevented the
war.
629. That was a matter of opinion ?—Yes ; the Kafirs ex¬
pected him ; and said they would remain peaceable and quiet
till he came; they had heard that he was a man who would
do them justice.
630. You would admit that there would always be great
difï'erences of opinion upon matters of that kind ?—Where
there is no means of coming at the truth positively there will
always be differences of opinion ; but I think if there were
a representative government, including representatives from
all parts of the country, they could meet and communicate
accurate information as to what was taking place in their
respective districts.
631. You do not think the Governor at present has full
means of getting correct information?—I do not think he
has.
632. And you think he has not got correct information ?—
I am certain he had not got correct information with reference
to the last war.
633. How can you account for that at all ?—Colonel Mac-
kinnon seems not to have got correct information from those
under him, for he also, though not so confident as the Governor,
did not expect an outbreak.
634. Colonel Mackinnon is an officer of some experience at
the Cape, is not he ?—One or two people on the frontier seem
to have obtained better information, for they addressed the
G ovei nor
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 99
Governor on the subject, and said that war was coniing ; they Mr.
observed the Kafir servants leaving, and they judged also J- Fairbairn.
from a certain instinct which a man acquires who has been all xójüñe
his life upon the frontier. 1851.
635. Colonel Mackinnon is an officer of experience in that
district, is not he?—He has been there since 1848.
636. Do you know any of the civil commission who are
under him by name ?—I know them by name.
637. Are they able and energetic men?—They all bear
a very high character.
638. And they are constantly moving among the Kafir
population ?—They are constantly moving among the Kafir
population.
63g. Do you not think they were likely to get as good
information as could be obtained ?—I am not certain that they
were not well informed, or that they did not represent the
matter to the Governor.
640. Am I to understand you to doubt whether they repre¬
sented accurately what they knew to the Governor ?—I do not
doubt it, but probably not in the despatches which have been
published.
641. Do you think that there are despatches communicating
information of the kind which have not been published ?—I
do not know the fact ; I think there aré two sets of correspon¬
dence, one private, and the other public ; that I have no
doubt of whatever.
642. Upon what does that opinion rest ?—I. know it to be
the fact.
643. Mr. Cardwell.^ Is that hypothesis consistent with
what you said just now, that you thought the Governor him¬
self was misinformed on the subject?—Yes, I think it is quite
so ; he did not know all.
644. You now say that you believe that certain official
despatches were written which were intended to be published,
but that these intelligent men on the frontier wrote private
letters to the Governor, acquainting him with the truth. In
your former answer you said that you believed neither the
Governor nor Colonel Maekinnon had any accurate informa¬
tion of what was going on?—I did not say that they had no
accurate information ; I said that the Governor was not fully
informed ; we must believe that, because he distinctly states
that there was no danger, when he was in the very jaws of
danger.
645. Do you mean to suggest that when he was distinctly
stating that there was no danger, he was writing confidential
. . 0.63. G 2 letters
100 MINÜTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J Fairbaim effect that there was danger ?—I think I can
* answer that question by referring to the Blue Book. There
12 June are despatches there published in the colony, and there is
. 1851. other correspondence which was not exactly confidential, and
which contains a good deal more than appears in the published
despatches.
646. Do you mean to say, or do you not, that Colonel
Mackinnon and the Governor were accurately informed ?—
No, I do not think they were accurately informed of the whole
of what took place, but they did not draw proper inferences
from certain facts.
647. Do you mean to state to the (Committee that drawing
themselves accurate inferences they published to the colony
inferences which were inaccurate, or do you mean to state
that their own inference was an inaccurate one ?—I would not
charge the Governor with ánything so strong as actual mis¬
representation, but his despatches and his letters did not
convey to the colony the real state of Kafirland, with which, I
think, he was better acquainted than one would have inferred
from the published despatches.
648. Do you withdraw your former answer, in which you
said that the Governor and Colonel Mackinnon were not
accurately informed?—No; I think "fully informed" was
the expression which I used. My meaning, I think, is
pretty clear, that they were not sufficiently informed to be
convinced that to attempt to seize Sandilli would certainly
produce a war, otherwise they would not probably have
done it.
649. You have made two statements, which I cannot recon¬
cile with each other ; one, that the Governor and Colonel
Mackinnon were not themselves informed ; the other, that they
had private information, but had published to the colony
official information of a different tenor?—Not of a different
tenor. There is an understanding among men who are
carrying on business in a country like Kafirland ; they are
daily informed about different events, and then despatches
are generally written about them. I know that there is
private correspondence going on between men in such cir¬
cumstances, and that every little event which they consider
trifling is not immediately published ; I speak chiefly from
the Blue Book, which is open to the Committee, from
which a correct inference may be drawn if I have drawn a
wrong one.
650. Mr. Hawes.] Will you refer to the part of the Blue
Book to which you refer, to support your statement ?—I refer
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 101
to the whole correspondence respecting the witlidrawal of the Mr.
servants, and the letters to the Graham's Town people about J.Fairbaim.
the slate of Kafirland. It appears to me that those would
have induced the colonists to believe that there was no danger,
whereas Colonel Mackinnon was very much alarmed, and the
Governor was also very much alarmed.
651. Does that appear ?—I believe so.
652. Are the Committee to understand you to say this, that
tliere are two sets of communications made to the Governor,
and two sets of communications made by the Governor to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies ?—No ; I did not say
that.
653. And that one is published, while the other, containing
different information, is suppressed ?—I made no reference
whatever to the Secretary of State ; I was speaking of dif¬
ferent commissioners and persons conducting the government
at the frontier.
654. Do you think they obtain accurate information, which
they communicate privately, and at the same time vvrite letters
of a diffeient tenor, which they mean to be published?—I
have formed opinions upon the subject, but I would rather not
at this moment put them into words till I have looked again
into the Blue Books. I think I have seen something like it in
them, and I have also had occasion to hear it said, and to
believe it, that frequently the despatches have not contained all
that was known respecting the general administration of the
government in Kafirland.
655. Colonel Dunne.] May not there be circumstances in
which it is not judicious to publish all the information which
has been received ?—Quite so.
656. To do so would be the means of exciting unnecessary
alarm ?—Yes. If I have said anything which would bear the
meaning that I charge the authorities with misrepresentation,
I did not intend it at all.
657. Mr. CardiveU.] You think that they themselves were
not fully informed ?—That no one of them was fully informed
as to the real state of the colony, but that they knew sufficient
to make them very uneasy.
658. And that uneasiness, for some reason or other, they
kept to themselves?—They kept it to themselves; that is my
impression ; but it is an inference.
659. Colonel Dunne.] That might have been done judi¬
ciously, you think ?—If everything bad been let out the colo¬
nists would have been ready to spring to arms when the danger
0.63. G 3 came,
loí MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J F^riairn ^6^6 scolded for saying they were in dan ger ;
* ^nd then were suddenly called out. I think it would have
iiz June been better if the whole truth had been laid before them, and
1851. openly discussed.
Luna, Aß" die Junii, 1851.
members present.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Ilawes.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Mackinnon,
Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Booker.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Colonel Thonapson.
Sir Edward Buxton.
Mr. Monsell.
Viscount Maiideville.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Colonel Estcourt.
The Right Hon. HENRY LABOUCHERE,
in the Chair.
The Rev. James Adamson, d. d., called in ; and Examined.
56o. Chairman^] HOW long have you resided in the co-
J. Adamson, Cape ?—About 23 years, with a short interval.
' 661. In what capacity have you resided there?—I have
16 June bad charge of religious concerns chiefly, and latterly almost
the sole direction of the college for about 12 years.
662. You are a clergyman ?—I am.
663. Do you know anything of the missionary stations in
the colony ?—I have not visited thern extensively, as I have
been chiefly confined to Cape Town ; I have corresponded
with missionaries, and have had access to people who have been
engaged in travelling in the country.
664. Do you know what the number and localities of the
.stations are ?—I am not quite sure that I can state the number
accurately,
665. Have you been able to form any opinion of the general
eonduct of the missionaries in the colony ?—It has been upon
the whole highly advantageous; and our colony, I think, is
peculiarly distinguished by the fact, which is very honourable
to British institutions, that representatives of almost every great
missionary
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 103
missionary institution in the world are now found in the colony, Rev;
or in the territories adjoining it, both Germans and French, J-Adamson,
and latterly also from the Established Church in Norway. ^^
666. Mx. MackinnonA Of different denominations?—Yes. 16 June
667. ChairmanA What, in your opinion, may be said to be
the general result of tnissionary labours in the colony ?—As
far as I myself have been connected with them, it has been in
the highest degree beneficial ; I allude, in particular, to the
late apprentices, who have come more cs[)ecially under my
own charge. As to the effect upon the natives, it has saved a
great number of those who otherwise would, I suspect, have
been expelled from their territory, and it has advanced them
considerably in moral qualifications and in civilization.
668. Do you believe the influence the missionaries have
acquired to have been considerable, and to have produced im¬
portant results upon the conduct and feelings of the people ?—
I have no doubt, as to most of the stations which have been
occupied, that that has been the case.
669. Have the missionaries and traders interfered with one
another much ?—There is somewhat of an opposition of in¬
terests between the two parties, which has generally led to
something approaching to a hostile feeling. The traders very
often deal in articles which the missionaries do not wish to see
distributed over the regions in which they are placed ; and
upon the whole the missionaries are rather disinclined that the
traders should visit their stations, from the effects which they
apprehend from the visits of those persons.
670. Are the articles to which you allude brandy and gun¬
powder?— Yes; it is reported that those are two articles
which the traders sometimes carry to those stations.
671. In what you have said, are you referring to the mis¬
sionary stations among the Kafirs ? — Beyond the colony
generally.
672. Viscount MandevilleA Is not gunpowder prohibited
from being exported ?—I believe it is, but it is so much an
article in demand, that it may be considered as a kind of cir¬
culating medium in the interior; at least, it is the most accept¬
able of all gifts which can be given to the natives.
673. ChairmanA Have you had any opportunity of forming
an opinion of the cause of the late outbreak among the Kafirs ?
—I cannot say decisively. I visited Scotland lately for the
purpose of making inquiries among those who were concerned
in the missions in Kafirland, but I was not able to procure
any decisive information as to the cause pf the outbreak.
D.63. 04 " 674. When
104 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J Ad^' When did you leave the colony ?—1 left on the 28th of
D October. I have with me a printed document which refers to
that subject. The Committee are perhaps aware that there are
16 June two Scottish bodies engaged in missionary operations there,
^^5'. the Free Church of Scotland and the United Presbyterian
Church, or the Old Seceders. The document I have in my hand
contains a letter from one of the missionaries of the United
Presbyterian Church, who was stationed in the very middle of
the country where tiie disturbance appears to have commenced ;
lie had formed a station in advance of the others, called Union
Dale, ill the centre of the Amatóla Mountains ; he makes
allusions to the commencement of the outbreak.
675. Have you formed anv opinion of the political system
which is now pursued by the British Government towards the
native tribes?—1 think it is defective in two points, inasmuch
as theie has been a great tendency to take the lands of the
natives, which has the effect of driving them before our advance,
and cooping them up in places not quite suitable to afford them
the means of support, and of course keeping them in a some¬
what dissatisfied and discontented state.
676. Do you mean there has been a tendency in the settlers
to establish themselves in the country which had been thereto¬
fore occupied by those savage tribes, and that that has produced
a feeling of irritation among them ?—Not exactly so ; it had
been the practice at an early date, that the farmers of the
colony should cross the great rivers for the purpose of pro¬
curing pasturage for their cattle when the season was dry in
the colony ; but they seem to have done that generally on
amicable terms with the natives, either getting leave or making
some sort of bargain with them, by which they were to pay
some compensation for the advantage they gained. What I
alluded to «as the fact of taking possession of countries occu¬
pied by savage men. In consequence of its being the right of
the Ciown to become the absolute pro|>rietor of the lands, in
that case they became grantable, and tliey a|)pear to have been
granted away in great quantities, so as to injure the interests of
the natives, and unavoidably to give rise to a considerable
degree of irritation among them.
(>77. Are not the circumstances of the colony such as to
induce the settlers to spread themselves over a large extent of
country, rather lium occupy very densely any particular portion
of the territory ?—Yes ; that has been the case, undoubtedly,
inasmuch as the frontier population all round the colony are
pastoral people, who require a great extent of ground for the
support of their flocks and herds ; but that extension is mainly
owing
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 10^
owing to the incidental circumstance I mentioned, of seasons of Jt®*"-
great drought occurring, obliging them to look out for water. *
678. Probably that renders it more difficult for the European '
population to defend themselves against the sudden inroads of 16 June
their more barbarous neighbours?—Undoubtedly it does.
679. You are probably aware of the objects for which this
Committee has been appointed ?—Yes, I am.
680. Are there any observations, with regard to those
objects, which you would desire to address to the Committee?
—Yes ; if the Committee will allow me, I should like to present
some details to them, which may require a few sentences. If
you look round the boundary of our colony, you will find, upon
the north, it appears to be bounded by the Orange River, but
the real frontier, in fact, is the desert tract which borders the
Orange River on the south, in which civilization and the
means of support can scarcely be found ; that is the proper
region of the Bushmen ; that district, appearing to be occupied
by them, is in fact almost uninhabitable, from the want of per¬
manent streams, and from the character of the climate being
such as that rains very seldom fall there. These Bushmen
appear to have been e.vteuding their frontier, at the expense of
the Hottentot races, to the south ; that race of men is now
almost extinct; they were the enemies of all the other tribes, and
were looked upon by the others as being their enemies ; they
were in a state of constant warfare with every one around them.
The colonists may be considered as inheriting that warfare at
their hands, because their neighbourhood is extremely dan¬
gerous to life and to property; that accounts for the hostility
ascribed to the colonists in respect to those people. On the
north side we come to the proper Hottentot races ; the country
is upon the whole barren and desert, but in various spots
affords a good deal of pasturage, so that they can support
herds of cattle, and missionary stations are now established
among them. There is one circumstance to be remarked, of
great importance there, that though the frontier appears upon
tiie whole to be perfectly safe, yet there are causes of danger
in the advances the natives are making in the attainment of
European power, such as thei.- getting possession of fire¬
arms ; the immediate effect is, that they have a preponderating
power in respect of the natives beyond them, and when not
under the authority of moral principle, they perpetrate acts of
depredation which tend to harass greatly the native tribes in
their neighbourhood. That advance which I have S()oken of
will almost necessarily result from their intercouise with
European people. A more important circumstance is their
getting
106 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. getting possession of the horse ; and though it happens that,
country, upon the whole, is not very favourable to the
' nurture of that animal, yet if it be treated in a domestic man-
16 June ner, as in Arabia, the animal might be reared, and the popu-
1851, lation might then resolve itself into hordes of mounted
depredators. I do not know that any remedy can be found
for those dangers, except in the extension of missionary
influence among them, and the preponderating power which it
is probable the colonial autliority will ultimately assume. As.
you proceed onwards, you get out of the Hottentot tribes of
people, and among those who may be called the Chuana
races, the Bechuanas, and others who are advanced further in
civilization than either of the two I have mentioned ; and
then you get to a part of the country called the Northern
Sovereignty. There are small detachments of Bushmen
still ranging about the frontier divisions of it. They appear
to occupy a great valley north of the Quathlamba Moun¬
tains, where it appears no European has hitherto gone, and
where the only traces of habitation appear to be the smokes
which are seen, and which it is presumed arise from small
tribes of Bushmen. They are an annoyance to all the
tribes around them, and of course there is something ap¬
proaching to a state of warfare constantly existing between
them and the other people. Missionary stations are pretty
numerous in the Northern Sovereignty, being partly \\^esleyan,
and partly belonging to the London Missionary Society. The
London Missionary Society lias extended itself further to the
north, and occupies the extreme stations which are marked
upon the map. As the country slopes up towards the moun¬
tains we get to the out-crop[)ing of a great coal field, which
may ultimately become of great economic value. I have had
specimens sent to me from a small branch of the Caledon
River, which indicate the existence of coal fields, but these
have not any great economic value, because the beds are
very thin ; but in consequence of being the out-cropping of
great horizontal beds, that country is greatly broken, and
abounds with precipitous summits, which are occupied by the
natives as fortresses, of a character so strong that it would be
very difficult for any European power to drive the natives from
one of them if they chose to resist. That I think is a very
important circumstance in regard to the after experience of
the countries which are connected with this Northern Sove¬
reignty ; one of them is held by Moshesh, who is perhaps the
most imfiortant and the most intelligent of the native chiefs
w hp are settled there ; he wants greatly to extend the civiliza¬
tion
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 107
tion of his people, and favours the missionary stations in his Rev.
neighbourhood, and about four or five years ago he sent down
four of his relations, two sons and others, to Cape Town, to
be instructed in the English language, that he might the better 16 jmie
keep up his communications with the British authorities. This 1851.
is considered as under the jurisdiction and superintendence of
the resident in the sovereignty, whose office it is particularly
to see that they do not fall into a state of hostility ; he has had'
occasion to interfere lately between the tribes occupying such
stations, for the purpose of putting an end to or preventing
their hostilities ; as long, therefore, as the Northern Sove-'
reignty retains its present character, the frontier of the colony
proper may be considered as absolutely secure. If dissension,
however, occurs among those tribes, the frontier will be liable
to invasion ; and if it should appear, which I should very
much regret, that Moshesh has actually consented to take a
share in the hostilities, it is not very easy to say what may be
the extent of the difficulty which may arise. It should be re¬
collected that this country was invaded, and the invaders were
driven out of it only by the Governor calling out the British
troops and engaging in skirmishes there ; that the safety of the
natives depended upon that interference of the British Go¬
vernment, and all they have is due to that interference. Then
we come immediately to the Kafir country, which, by looking
at the map, it will be seen is almost bounded by our colonial
territories ; therefore, if any mere frontier system were erected
for the purpose of restraining the Kafirs, it would necessarily
require to extend round the whole of the three sides, which
constitute the supposed boundary of that small territory. In
regard to the general policy, one of the principles which ought
to be adopted in all the transactions with the natives would
be to give them absolute security that in no cases should the
possession of their land be interfered with. Even in cases of
warfare, I think the effects of the warfare should be considered
as having an influence on the station of the chiefs alone, and
not of the chiefs' families, or the people who have been under
their direction. It would be very much preferable that the
lands should be preserved absolutely for the support of the
natives ; and it appears to me also, that it would be almost
necessary for the advance of civilization, that the native autho¬
rities should be got rid of, or reduced as quickly as possible.
681. Do you mean the chiefs?—Yes.
682. Mr. MonselL'] What do you mean by the native au¬
thorities being got rid of?—That some other authorities of
00
better character should be substituted in their place.
683. Chairtnan.j
108 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. 683. Chairman."] What description of authority do you
mean ?—It must be the authority of a government ; at present
' there is really no government which you can trust to in carry-
16 June iog on any operation in that country.
'851. 684. Do you mean a native Government ? —No ; I think it
must be the British Government.
685. Mr. Mackinnon.'] By the appointment of magistrates,
or something of that sort ?—Yes, these being operations which
can only be carried on gradually ; and it should always be
kept in view, that it is just, and must be found expedient, to
compensate the chiefs in all cases where tliey are left residents
in the country. I think that the Governor has seen that
though it was too late, when he says that he had thought of
compensating the chiefs for the diminution of their authority,
which brings with it also the destruction of their means of
support, because what they receive for their present support
is almost entirely dependent upon the exercise of their au¬
thority.
686. Chairman.^ If you deprive the chiefs of their autho¬
rity, would you think it just to hold thern responsible for the
conduct of their people ?—No ; I do not think they can be
held responsible for the conduct of their people. It has been
established that there is a considerable proportion of the
people of Kafirland who are not under the influence of the
chiefs ; any influence to be exerted upon them must be from a
foreign source.
687. If you relieved the chiefs from all responsibility, and
said that even in case of war the native tribes should be secure
of not having their property disturbed, what hold would you
have upon them to induce them to keep their treaties with
this country, and prevent their constantly taking up arms and
resorting to plunder?—I think that the error has been the for¬
mation of treaties at all ; I do not think treaties are at all advi¬
sable in respect to a people situated as the Kafirs are, from
the circumstance that the chiefs cannot be responsible to any
very great extent.
688. What means would you substitute for treaties, and for
an attempt to get an influence over the chiefs, in order to keep
the frontier safe against the incursions of the natives ?—I see
no mode in which it can be effectually accomplished, but that
of rendering them all, as rapidly as possible, British subjects,
by including the whole of that rectangle in our dominion, or
controlling its authorities.
689. How far would that push the British frontier?—As I
said before, this territory is bounded in a peculiar manner ; on
three
select committee on the kafir tribes. io9
three sides of it there are already the British territories ; and Rev.
it appears to me very undesirable to draw any frontier round J. Adamson,
those three sides, which in that case you would allow to
remain in a state of irritation, provided you exercise no con- lé^üñe
trol over the people who are included within those boundaries. 1851.
690. Colonel Estcourti] How would you proceed to get
rid of the chiefs ?—I should not think of interfering with them
while they remained at peace ; as long as the chiefs remain at
peace 1 would allow them to retain their authority over their
tribes, and encourage them to act right, and to extend their
authority as much as possible, converting them as much as
possible into magistrates : in those cases in which they have
compelled you to engage in war, I should hold that the right
of the chief to his authority was forfeited ; you might say that
the right to his property is forfeited also, but I would not go
so far as that; as soon as possible I would ascertain and put
on record the rights of all parties, in order to bring them as
much as possible under the jurisdiction of our courts, so that
there should be real property rights.
691. Do you speak of the rights of the chiefs ?—The rights
of the chiefs and the rights of the people.
692. In respect of what ?—In respect to land, or the produce
of the land particularly.
693. If the land belongs to them, we know the boundaries
of it, do not we ?—That can be ascertained.
694. Suppose, instead of chiefs, there were so many magis¬
trates appointed by the Colonial Government in the colony,
how would they be able, in that remote part of the country,
to influence or control the people?—I think they might be
established in villages or small communities, each under the
direction of a magistrate, and that by his influence he might
prevent any dangerous crimes occurring ; it might happen, of
course, in that transition state, that you would be compelled
to overlook a good many occurrences which otherwise you
would take notice of.
695. Sir J. JValmsley.\ You are now speaking of tribes
within the limit of the colony, are not you ?—In Kafraria par¬
ticularly ; it is a.country which is so bounded by our territory,
that it appears to me you cannot possibly let it go ; it might
become a nest of savage life if you lose it, and it would be a
very dangerous one ; it would become a source of great an¬
noyance to the colonial population, and would lead eventually
to a war of extermination.
690. Colonel Dunne.^ Could you transfer the authority
from the chiefs to the magistrates without the presence of a
strong
110 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. strong military force ?—It could only occur as the result of
conquest ; if a chief is living in peace, and managing his
people well, I should not interfere with him.
16 June 697. It would amount to a complete conquest ?—Yes ; I do
not see how you are to avoid it.
698. Mr. Booker.} What is the state of feeling of the
chiefs in relation to each other, as to their own territories and
tribes ; do they live in concord, or are they jealous of each
other ?—I presume that if there were no authority near them,
of which they had as much fear as they have of the white men,
they would be living constantly in a state of internal dissen¬
sion ; that is the condition of all the tribes to the north-east
which we are acquainted with.
699. Sir J. Walmsley.} Can you inform the Committee
what are the numbers of the missionaries?—I remember
making a rough sum of them lately ; I think they amount
altogether to 63.
700. Distributed over the various boundaries ?—This was
within the colony ; it was in reference to something relating
to the master and servants ordinance. I had occasion to con¬
sult the blue book upon the subject.
701. What are their denominations?—The oldest are the
Moravians, who have several influential stations in the colony ;
they have preserved, to a great extent, the original Hottentot
population, so that we are entitled to say that, as compared
with other tracts of the world, the native population in that
colony has been preserved and improved to a greater extent
than has occurred anywhere else. A considerable portion of
the peasantry population is of the Hottentot race, among
whom you can see distinct traces of Hottentot origin. Next
to the Moravians there is the London Missionary Society, who
have several stations within the colony, and also considerable
stations beyond its present boundary, or in the Northern So¬
vereignty. Then there is the Wesleyan body, who have sta¬
tions in almost every village ; they do not distinguish between
their churches and their missionary stations as the others do,
though they have various stations, particularly in the Northern
Sovereignty also, which are occupied entirely by natives ;
there is more intermixture of the white class with the coloured
people in their establishments than anywhere else, excluding
those entirely within the colony with which I am connected,
which are for the benefit of all parties. Then there is the
French mission in Moshesh's country j they have some very
successful institutions indeed.
702. Sir £. ßuxion.\ is that a French Protestant mis¬
sion?
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. Ill
sion ?—Yes. Then there is the American Board of Com- Rev.
missioners of Foreign Missions, occupying the Natal country. Adomson,
They are the leading missionary interest in the country of
Natal. Along with them there are a few Wesleyan stations 16 June
also in the same country ; and there is one established, I pre- 185t.
sume, now, though it \vas a long time in doubt, by the repre¬
sentatives of the Established Church of Norway. Then there
are colonial missions of all classes ; those are entirely in the
interior of the colony.
703. Sir J, Wahnsley.] Are the missionaries looked on
favourably by the natives, and received with kindness ?—By
the coloured natives they are, and their influence extends
very far beyond the stations which they occupy. The natives
have been known to come down from a distance equal to per¬
haps from 400 to 500 miles to visit a station, residing there
for a time, getting a little instruction, and then going away to
their own people.
704. Viscount Mand&oilk.\ Are they disliked by the
chiefs ?—I am not aware of that being suspected, except in
Kafirland proper. In other cases the chiefs have been the
parties who have a()plied for missionaries, and have sent long
distances and made great efforts for the purpose of getting
missionaries to reside at their stations.
705. Sir J. Walmsley.\ Have you reason to be satisfied
with the progress of missionary labour in South Africa ?—
Yes, completely so.
706. Have you any knowledge of the number in com¬
munion with the various missionary societies ?—I cannot
speak to that point at present. There is one source of in¬
formation which can be got at very readily, which is the Cape
Almanack, where there may be details of that kind. In the
blue book there are details satisfactory enough as to the
number of the missions in the interior of the colony; the
Committee will find there the name of every individual at¬
tached to the missionary stations, the particulars of his em¬
ployment, and the amount he gains annually.
707. And the number of schools?—Yes.
708. How many years have the missionaries been em¬
ployed in South Africa?—All those things are on record in
former inquiries of the House of Commons. I think the
Moravians made an attempt some time after the middle of
last century, about 1772 or 1776, and others have followed
them at various intervals, chiefly however, in more modern
times, since 1815.
709. Wlien you were speaking a short time ago of govern¬
ing
112 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. ing the tribes by means of magistrates and others, had you
missionaries taking any part or interest in
' the matter ?—Not the slightest ; I think missionary influence
16 June must be kept perfectly distinct from Government and magis-
1851. trate influence.
710. Do not you think that that would be a better course
to pursue than the plan of going to war with the tribes and
almost exterminating them before you attempt to put civil
oificers over them ?—I presume that you should never go to
war with a tribe unless they commence a war with you first.
711. Under present circumstances, did not you say you
saw no alternative ?—As to Kafirland proper. With regard
to the Northern Sovereignty, I think the rights of the chiefs
should be ascertained as soon as possible, and as soon as pos¬
sible put on record.
712. Are you not of opinion that the missionaries might
themselves be made more useful in that way than any other
parties?—Ido not think so; I think it would interfere very
greatly with their proceedings.
713. You think it would probably interfere with their use¬
fulness in other ways ?—I think it would.
714. You stated, in the early part of your evidence, that
the traders and the missionaries had diííerent interests ; you
said that the traders introduced gunpowder ; perhaps there are
other things which they trade in, which you will be good
enough to explain ?—I only stated that from report.
715. Have you no knowledge of that yourself ?—None; I
only know they have been accused of it.
716. I understood you to say that gunpowder had become
almost an article of currency among the natives ?—Yes, to a
certain extent it has taken the place of beads and such tilings.
717. That you think is introduced by the traders 1—I pre¬
sume it is.
718. Against the wishes of the missionaries ?—Yes, I have
always understood so. It does happen in the colony fre¬
quently, and in some stations in Kafirland, that to prevent
the intrusion of the traders the missionary has a trading esta¬
blishment in his own station; he has procured some establish¬
ment there in connexion with some respectable house whom he
can trust.
719. Then the missionary became the distributor of the
powder in that case, did not he ?—No, he has no direct in¬
terest in the trading establishment ; he places it there for the
purpose of preventing the introduction of such articles ; he
gets established in his station a commercial establishment for
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES, II3
the purpose of furnishin«^ the natives with goods, articles of
clothing and tools, and such things, and I presume with the
intention of excluding the interference of the traders,
720. Viscount Mandeville.] The object being to exclude the 16 June
travelling trader?—Yes. ^^5»-
721. Sir Buxton.^ The missionary would take care that
no gunpowder was soltl at the store ?—That, I understand,
is his object; there are instances in which some missionaries
appear to have been accused of selling gunpowder.
722. Sir J. Walmslei/.] Has anything reached your ears
of that kind ?—I have seen it stated in the colonial papers; I
presume that establishes the fact that there was such an esta¬
blishment in the station, and I believe that the purpose was to
exclude those articles which might be dangerous.
723. Do you know whether the missionaries have in any
instances dealt in powder and fire-arms ?—I do not know the
fact with respect to those stations; I know that in the colony
they deal in no such things.
724. Have you visited any of those stations yourself ?—No,
I have not.
725. Colonel Dunne.] Do you think that any exertion of
the missionaries would now prevent the natives getting the
gunpowder, which seems to be so necessary to them ?—I do not
think any exertion of the missionaries would have the slightest
effect,
726. Has not it become almost necessary to their existence;
they having adopted fire-arms to such an extent, will they not
buy it in some way or other, and will they not always find
people to bring it to them ?—I presume that that is the case ;
and perhaps if arms of that character were universally distri¬
buted over the interior of Africa, the detrimental effect of their
possession by particular tribes might be counteracted,
727. They live by hunting a good deal, as well as by the
keeping of flocks, do not they ?—Yes.
728. And those fire-arms are used in hunting?—Yes; they
hunt for ivory a good deal.
729. Mr.MonselL] You spoke of the success of missions,
and particularly of the success of the Moravians, among the
Hottentots ; do you consider that the missions in Kafirland
have been successful ?—They have had attached to them a
great number of Kafir people, who have generally accompanied
the missions in case of warfare.
730. Do you think that the missionaries have made much
progress among the Kafirs in Kafirland ?—They have only
made progress among the people who have been attached to
0.63, H them ;
1 14 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. them ; I do not think the pro}iress anion» the Kafirs, as a
i T""' has been great.
731. Sir/. Walmslet/.'] Can you give the Committee any
16 June information as to the localities and numbers of the various
»851. tribes?—I am not very particularly acquainted with them.
I remember obtaining a return from a very intelligent man, as
to the number and distribution of the tribes, which was printed
in one of our journals, but it is so long ago that I do not
remember much of the particulars ; perhaps circumstances
may have changed so greatly, that that return would not be
worth much now.
Major Joh?i Jarvis Bissett, called in ; and Examined.
Major 732. Chairman.'\ HOW long have you resided at the Cape ?
J.J. Bisselt. —All my life ; when I say all my life, I was a year old when
I went there.
733. In what capacity have you lived there?—For the last
15 years as an officer in the service; previously to that, my
father was a half-pay officer of the navy, and went out there
with the British settlers in 1820.
734. Have you been there without intermission, during the
whole of that time ?—Yes.
735. To what regiment do you belong ?—The Cape Mounted
Rifles.
736. Will you have the goodness to state to the Committee
what service you have seen during your residence there?—
I have served there during three wars ; the war of 1834-5, that
of 1845-6, and the commencement of the present war.
737. AV'hen did you leave the colony?—I left on the ist of
April last, having received a wound at the beginning of this
affair.
738. Are you aware of the purpose for which this Committee
is constituted ?—I imagine it is to enquire into the Cape affair,
but I am not aware of it very perfectly.
739. The principal object of the appointment of this Com¬
mittee is to inquire into our relations with the frontier tribes,
and the policy which it would be expedient for this country to
pursue in reference to those trihes, and for the defence of the
settlers against the incursions which have taken place ; are
there any observations which you are desirous of addressing
to the Committee on those subjects?—It is such a complicated
question, that I cannot bring my ideas all at once to a matter
so important as that ; any question which the Committee
would like to put I will answer to the best of my ability.
740. Have
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. II5
740. Have you any iiifoimation as to the inimediate cause Major
of the recent outbreak —The last three years I have been
brigade-major in British Kafraria, under Colonel Mackinnon,
therefore I have had a good insight into the vvoiking of the 1851.
late system. 1 conceive the chiefs made this outbreak with a
view of regaining their power, which they were gradually
losing ; and of course, not having troops enough there, they
commenced the war with impunity, knowing that we were not
able to cope with them.
741. Do you think it unfortunate that the military power
had been reduced to the degree it had been ?—Very much so ;
had the system worked another three years, had there been
troops sufficient to coerce them for that time, 1 believe their
power would have been annihilated.
742. For three years the system has appeared to be work¬
ing extremely well ?—Perfectly.
743. You are of opinion, that the reason why the successful
operation of that system was disturbed by the recent outbreak
was, because there was not sufficient military power to keep
the Kafirs in awe?—Just so.
744. Mr. Booker.'] Was that power exerted humanely as
well as vigorously ?—Entirely so.
745. There was no undue stretch of authority ?—None at
all ; no even-handed justice could have been administered with
greater propriety in any way.
74G. Chairman.] The conduct of the Kat River settlers
mainly contributed to the recent outbreak, did not it?—I am
confident that the Gaika Kafirs would not have entered upon
this war, had not they been sure of the co-operation of the
Kat River Hottentots. Tliere has been so much confidence
placed in them by the British in former wars, that they have
imagined that without their assistance the white men would
have gone to the wall.
747. What in your opinion was the cause of the defection
of the Kat River settlers?—Their proximity to the Kafirs;
their intermarriages with them, and the settlement being such
a loose establishment ; it is a collection of all the bad coloured
people in the whole of the provinces ; they are easily led, and
being an excitable people, they have been induced to join the
Kafirs ; the Hottentots are very easily led ; they are most
excitable.
748. You think the policy recently introduced has failed to
preserve tranquillity, not so much from any defect in the prin¬
ciples upon which that policy rested, as from the want of a
0.63. H 2 sufficient
1 l6 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major sufficient force to keep the Kafirs in awe while it was esta-
J, J. Bissett. blished ?—I do, entirely.
16 June 74g. Colonel jKy/cowri.] You said that it was the loss of the
1851» authority of the chiefs, which had begun to dwindle under the
system recently pursued, to which you attribute their hostility?
—Certainly ; the chiefs finding their authority gradually
leaving them, they have made an etfort to regain that au¬
thority.
750. Chairman.'] We are now engaged in a very arduous
contest with these Kafirs?—Very much so.
7,51. Supposing that contest is brought, as it is to be hoped
it will be at no distant period, to a successful termination, and
the whole of that country, up to the Amatóla Mountains, is
reduced to submission, what do you think ought to be the
future policy of this country with regard to those tribes ?—
I think there never will be peace for the colony as long as the
Kafirs are allowed to occupy the Amatólas ; it is such a strong
hold, that they can any day, with impunity, overrun the
whole country, it is so near the immediate border.
752. When you say they ought not to be allowed to occupy
the Amatólas, do you mean they ought not to occupy it exclu¬
sively, or ought they to bo expelled from it?—I think they
ought to be expelled altogether.
753. Mr. AIonselL] There is not much grazing ground in
the Amatólas, is there ?—It is a splendid water country, and
more suited to agricultural than pastoral purposes.
754. Chairman.] Do you think there would be any difficulty
in expelling the Kafirs from the Amatóla district, yet allowing
them to occupy the country in the plains which they now
possess?—Yes, I do, so far as the Gaika tribe is concerned;
and as long as they do that, there will be constant intercourse,
and they can always stir up disaffection.
755. Mr. Booker.] To whom does that Amatóla country of
right belong ?—To the Gaikas, Sandili's people,
756. Chairman.] You think the Kafirs should be totally
expelled from the country which they now occupy ?—I do ;
that is, those at war with the Government.
757. How far back would you push them ?—I would push
them over the Kei.
758. Do you mean that you would allow no native at all
to reside there ?—None, except those who had been faithful
to the Government.
759. Which is a comparatively small portion, is not it?—
No, it is half.
760. Is it, in point of numbers, half?—There was a census
taken
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. II7
taken at the beginning of 1848; the Tslambies, which are Majpr
faithful to the Government, were then 35,000, and the Gaikas
127,000 ; therefore the greater proportion is on the side of the igj^e
friendly tribes. 1851.
761. Have not many of those, who at that time were
friendly, since gone over against us?—Yes, Seyolo has gone
over against us.
762. Sir J, IValmsley.] The Committee understand you to
say, that you would expel the Gaikas from their own country ?
—Yes.
763. How long have they been in possession of that
country ?—I cannot say exactly ; it is beyond my memory.
764. They have had undisputed possession of that territory
for a very long series of years, have not they ?—Yes, they have ;
or rather they were placed under Government rule and martial
law during Sir B. JJ'Urban's policy; it was taken from them
in 1835, and restored to them.
765. You think it right that they should be expelled from
that country ?—I do.
7(16. Do you think the reason of the Gaika tribes rising has
been the fear of expulsion from their territory ?—No.
767. "What has been the cause of their rising?—To regain
the power they (the chiefs) were losing generally.
768. And to prevent the loss of their country ?—They were
not losing their country ; a white man is not allowed to locate
in it, except at military posts, and missionaries on their stations.
76g. You say 5'ou would drive them entirely from it.'—Now
I would.
770. Has not it been the fear of your driving them from its
which has caused them to rise?—No, not at all.
771. Mr. Mackinnon.'] You speak of the chiefs.'—Yes.
772. Cfiah^man.'} Do you rate the influence of the chiefs
as very high among them ?-—For bad purposes very much so ;
tiiey are a superstitious people, and are easily led by their
chiefs for any bad purpose. But their referring cases to the
commissioners during the last three years shows that they do
not dread their chiefs so much as was contemplated, other¬
wise they would have gone to their chiefs instead of to the
commissioners.
773. The influence of superstition is very great among
them?—Yes.
774. Which is used for political purposes ?—Yes.
775* Supposing this territory cleared from the native inha¬
bitants who now occupy it, what means would you then pro¬
pose to adopt with regard to it ?—There is the difficulty ; you
0.63. H 3 want
Il8 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major want population upon the borders ; it is now a scattered po-
pulalion ; the farms are of large extent, and they have not
i6Juñe sufficient numbers to cope with an enemy ; if you could intro-
1851. duce a population of any class there, which you could rely on,
it would be a great thing.
776. Are not the circumstances of the colony very unfa¬
vourable to the concentration of population in any particular
place?—Some parts are sterile, and only fit for grazing stock,
but the most part would support a large population.
777. Is not that in consequence of the nature of the soil
and the climate?—It has been so in part of the colony, but
as you advance to Kafirland the country becomes a garden ;
when I left it, it was a perfect garden ; people for agricultural
purposes might be located there to any extent.
778. You think it would be of advantage to bring about a
more dense settlement of people there?-—Yes.
779. Is the Amatóla ridge easily susceptible of military de¬
fence ?—You may put a post upon it ; 1 should say it is not
capable of military defence except by having an open country
to the east of it.
780. Sir J. Walmsley.'] You speak of driving the Gaika
tribes out of their present territory ; where would you drive
them ?—Over the Kei.
781. Upon another tribe ?—They are of the same nation;
ihey are all Kafirs ; Kreli is the head of the Kafirs.
782. What would be the result of driving the present tribes
into the territory of another tribe ?—They would then occupy
the open country, where they could not form themselves in
strongholds, as they do now, and you could keep them in
better subjection.
783. Would not that force them to take a part of the terri¬
tory of another tribe, and thus produce war between those tw o
tribes ?—No ; those two tribes are now in open hostility
against us ; they are one tribe, in fact. It is only the country
to the Kei which has been taken possession of by our Govern¬
ment ; beyond that they have an unlimited country.
784. Sir JE. Buxton.'] Those beyond the Kei are what?—•
Krelis, or Umagalikas.
785. Chairman.] Is the country there free from bush?—
Yes.
786. Sir E. Buxton.] Has not the effect been, when one
tribe has been driven back upon another tribe, or another part
of a tribe, that those upon whom they have been driven have
resisted, and attempted to drive them out again?—Never; it
has never occurred at the Cape.
787. Has
SELECT COMMITTEE 0\ THE KAFIR TRIBES. HQ
787. Has not it been the case that our colony has gradually
extended?—Not in my day; it has not extended much in my J-J'oissetL
788. Mr. Mackinnon.'\ Assuming they were driven over the 1851.
river, would there be sufficient means of support for them
selves and for the tribe which is there now?—Yes; there is
150 miles of unoccupied country immediately in the rear of
Kreli.
789. S\v E. Buxton.] Is not it occupied by flocks Not
by any tribe.
790. Nor by their flocks?—No; it is a most beautiful
country, but abandoned.
791. Chairman.] Have you been there yourself?—I have.
792. Sir J. Walnisley.] Is that adjoining to the Gaika ter¬
ritory ?—It is adjoining Kreli's country ; Kreli occupies from
the Kei to the Bashee, which is an extent of 80 miles east¬
ward, bounded by the coast upon one side, and I suppose 150
miles north from the coast. From the Bashee to the IJmgazi
River is unoccupied; the Umgazi is close to St. John's River.
793. Sir E. Buxton.] Was not there a famine during last
year on the eastern frontier?—Not a famine ; they were suf¬
fering a good deal from drought.
794. Was not the eflPect of that drought that the Kafirs
were unable to drive their cattle to the pastures now occupied
by the British settlers, which they had formerly been in the
habit of occupying in the time of drought?—No, decidedlv
not.
795. Sir J. Walmsley.] If you were to succeed in driving
the Gaika tribes, as you propose, over the Kei, what advantage
would you have by so driving them upon another tribe, and
what security would you have against the tribes beyond them
combining and coming down upon you ?—There is an unoc¬
cupied space between Kreli's country and that of any other
tribe, and they would be in a country where, in case of war,
cavalry could act against them.
796. There is a large space of ground between the Gaika
tribe and the next, is there?—Not the Gaikas ; they join
Kreli's ; but they are in fact the same people—they are the
Amakosa nation ; but the Gaikas have been under the British
rule for the last three years ; Kreli's people have not ; between
Kreli's people and the Arnapondas there is a large space of
country unoccupied.
797. Are Kreli's people now opposed to us?—Yes, they
are.
798. What security would you have against Kreli's people
0.63. H 4 and
120 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major and the Gaika tribe uniting against the British r—You have
» * Yy • O O
" none, except that they would be in a more open country, where
i6 June y®" more easily cope with them.
1851. 799. C/iah^man.] The great difficulty in Kafir warfare is
the bush and the mountains?—Yes; and that is the space
now occupied by the Gaikas, called the Amatóla Mountains.
800. Marquis of Granby.\ Do you think, if yon drove them
beyond the Kei, the present amount of force would be sufficiently
large to hold them in check ?—No.
801. Chairman¡] You think that a considerable force must
be kept there ?—Yes ; or in another war the Kafirs will become
so formidable an enemy that they will quite equal our troops.
802. Mr. ^ooA-er.] How do the chiefs acquire their position
as chiefs ; is it an hereditary office ?—With most of them it is;
in the case of Pato it is not so ; and in the case of Umhala it
is not so.
803. Chairman¡\ You have had experience in several wars,
you say?—Yes.
804. Did you find the Kafirs much more formidable enemies
in the last war than before ?—Decidedly ; they were nothing
in former wars compared with the last.
805. They have now become formidable enemies, even
against British troops?—Yes; so much so that the native
levies have not been able to stand their ground against them.
806. Adopt what policy you will as to the frontier, do you
think it will be possible, for some years to come at least, to do
without the presence of a considerable regular force upon the
frontier ?—I do not think it will.
807. You think it would be impossible to trust altogether, or
mainly, to the settlers for the defence of the frontier?—Yes.
808. Do you believe that if there is a respectable regular
force maintained upon the frontier, there will be any indisposi¬
tion on the part of the settlers to co-operate with that regular
foice in defending their own countrv ?—No.
O „
809. Have you formed any opinion as to what would be the
best and most efficient manner in which the colonists could co¬
operate with the military in defending the frontier?—It is a
most difficult thing to say ; the Dutch people there have a
dread of being made soldiers in any way ; there is a difficulty
in raising a militia from them ; títere would be no difficulty
with the English community, but the Dutchman thoroughly
dreads being a soldier, and he looks upon a militia-man, who
has to attend muster and parade, as a soldier.
810. Have not they, on several occasions, evinced no in¬
disposition to turn out and fight in defence of their own pro¬
perty ?
SKLECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 121
pert}'?—Not ill time of war; they have always been most Major
willing to do so. more so in former wars than the present. J- J- Bissett.
811. They have evinced a great indisposition to enrol them- jß Juue
selves in any corps or militia ?—Yes, there was a great outcry ,35,.
against it when it was proposed a short time ago in the Cape.
812. Has not there been an attempt lately to employ the
Kafirs themselves as police?—Yes.
813. Do you think that that has succeeded?—They did
admirably during ijeace, but they went over to the enemy on
the very first attack.
814. In the character of policemen the experiment answered
very well?—Yes.
815. But it failed when this country was engaged in a war
against that nation ?—Yes.
816. Mr. Hindley.] In what re.spect are the Kafirs more
formidable now than they used to be?—In point of bravery.
You may say in point of numbers also, but particularly in bra¬
very, and their possession of fire-arms.
817. Colonel Are they mounted ?—Great numbers
of them are.
818. Have you ever been at the Kat River Settlement?—
Yes.
819. You have stated that you consider that a collection of
bad characters ; do not you think that Colonel Somerset, in
breaking up that settlement, would do a politic and wise thing?
—Yes.
820. Do you know a missionary of the name of Read who
was thei*e ?—Yes, a missionary of that name was there for a
long time.
821. Was not that a Hottentot community?—Yes.
822. Are you aware, that in the case of the desertion of
some of the Cape Corps under Colonel Napier lately, the men,
M hen they were taken, said they deserted from the preaching
of one of the missionaries ?—Yes, a local preacher, not the
missionary ; he used to preach to our men every night.
823. Was he connected with the Kat River Settlement?—
lie was.
824. Is there any reason to suppose that the desertion of
those men from the Cape Corps was connected with this set¬
tlement ?—I think so. I had a letter from some of my brother
officers in the corps, which stated thai his name was Lavilot ;
he 1 las been stationed at King William's Town for some time ;
he led those fellows off.
825. He was connected with the Kat River Settlement ?—
Yes,
826. Sir
122 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
T -ßW'i'iow.] Did he go with them ?—He did.
J ■ 827. Colonel DunneJ] Several of them were killed in a
16 June subsequent action, were not they?—That is since I left; I see
>851. it reported.
828. Do you think that the Hottentots now can be as much
depended on, as troops in our service, as they were formerly ?
—No, I do not.
829. Do not you think it would be more advisable to send
out troops from this country ?—I do, decidedly.
830. Mr. Booker.] Do you know anything of the civil ap¬
pointments in the colony or on the frontier, whether they have
been proper or improper ?—I think proper men have been
appointed ; I do not know of any instance where it has not
been so.
831. Do you think any irritation has been occasioned by the
conduct of any of the magistrates ?—None.
832. Have you had occasion to assist the civil power in your
military capacity ?—No ; we have never had a single case in
Kafraria in which it has been necessary to call the military to
the assistance of the civil power.
833. Colonel Dunne^ You are decidedly of opinion that
instead of recruiting the Cape Corps with recruits from the
Hottentots, it would be advisable to get young men from this
country who would serve in the colony, and become colonists ?
-Yes.
834. Would not it be possible to place military colonies
along the frontier, if you allowed the men to take their wives
and to settle along that frontier ?—Not unless they were under
a regular code of discipline, because there has been a perfect
failure in the military villages established on the border.
835. Is not that failure attributable to the manner in which
the colonies were formed, and not to the system itself?—Yes;
it was because there was no restraint upon them ; the men had
their free discharge, and were allowed to roam and to go where
they could better themselves.
836. Were not those men, in general, unmarried men ?—
Yes, and many of them bad characters.
837. Do not you think men would be more likely to stay in
those colonies if they were encouraged to settle there with their
families?—Yes, if they were pensioners, or people whom you
had a control over.
838. Woidd not pensioners be too old, generally speaking?
—It would depend upon circumstances ; they are always avail¬
able for defending garrisons.
839. Do
SELECT COMMTTTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 123
83g. Do you think that we can have any security, in case Major
of any future outbreak, without clearing the Amatólas?—No. Bissett.
840. Do you think, if they were cleared, the frontier would
be more easily defended?—Yes, with a certain number of ig^,.
troops.
841. ^\x E. Buxt07i.'\ What number would you think suffi¬
cient?—You should have 3,000 troops on the border, inde¬
pendently of the colonial corps.
842. Colonel Dunner\ Would it be possible to have a chain
of posts along the Amatólas, supported by regular troops ?—
It is difficult to answer that question ; the ridge of the Ama-
tolas forms a half-moon ; it is an oblong j it is the shape of a
half-moon.
843. Running in what direction?—Running east and west;
to the north of it is open country ; therefore a chain of posts
could be placed east of it to communicate with the north
country, which is open and defensible; and from there to the
sea it is entirely an open and defensible country.
844. Are the Amatólas to be passed at every point, or are
there certain passes only ?—There are three great passes by
which they can be entered.
845. By taking possession, and putting a force upon those
passes, would not you be able to defend the chain of the
Amatólas ? — No, a Kafir can pass anywhere.
846. Chairman.^ What is the height of the Amatólas ?—I
cannot exactly say.
847. Colonel Dunne!] They are not any great height, are
they?—They are not so high as the Great Winterberg. I
cannot exactly remember the height ; I should say they were
about 3,000 feet above the level of the sea.
848. You say that the Kafirs are now supplied with arms
and ammunition, and are much more formidable than they
were in preceding wars ?—Yes, very much so.
84g. Are you aware how those arms and ammunition have
been supplied to them?^—No; I could make a guess; the
only mode I can see in which they might procure them would
be from their proximity to a number of Kafirs living itj the
Kat River Settlement ; there would be an opening there which
we have not hitherto been able to guard. The line from the
Kat River downwards has been always defended, so that nothing
could pass in and out, and no trader comes into Kafirland with¬
out taking out a license, and then only allowed to trade at a
military post or missionary station.
850. Are the traders forbidden to carry arms and powder
for sale?—Yes.
851. Would
124 minutes of evidence taken before the
J JBimtt there be any means, by taking possession of the
] ' Kat River, of preventing the introduction of arms and ammuni-
16 June tion ?—I doubt it ; they would procure them in other ways.
1851. 8^2. Are they supplied by the traders, do you think?—No,
except in the ease of smuggling.
853. Have you ever heard that the missionaries have intro¬
duced gunpowder?—No, not into Kafirland.
854. Therefore it is done in some way which as yet we are
not aware of?—Yes.
855. But it must be introduced in considerable quantities ?
—Yes, it is so ; there has been no end to it.
856. Chairman7\ What has been the effect of the influence
of the missionaries upon the people ; has it had a tendency to
civilize them ?—I do not think it has in a single instance ; Mr.
Bonats left Shiloh the other day without a single person ad¬
hering to him.
857. Was not Hermanoz brought up at a missionary sta¬
tion?—I do not think he was.
858. Mr. Hazves.'] Mr. Bonats was a very old missionary,
was not he?—Yes, he had been 19 years at Shiloh.
859. Mr. B. Carter.'\ You stated that the Boers have
been less willing to turn out in the last war than at previous
periods ; to what do you attribute that ?-—There has been an
anti-government feeling on the part of the Boers.
860. Arising from what ?—From the late convict question
in a great degree.
861. Chairman.] With reference to the present state of the
frontier, do you think it would be expedient to provide for the
seat of government being nearer to it than Cape Town is,
either by dividing the colony into two, or by transferring the
seat of government to some place more to the east?—I think
it would be advisable to transfer the seat of government.
862. Do you think much practical inconvenience arises
from the distance at which Cape Town is from the eastern
frontier?—Yes, I do.
863. In what way does that inconvenience show itself?—
In the length of time you are in getting up your forces to the
east, and the delay caused in waiting for orders before you
can act.
864. Is not that inconvenience much diminished by a com¬
munication by sea being established ?—Yes ; had it not been
for the circumstance of those two steamers being there, we
should have had to abandon the [)rovince of Kafraria.
865. Colonel Dunne.] Notwithstanding the convenience, is
not it a long march from Cape Town to the frontier, too long
for
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 125
for any emergency ?—You could not march it, you must go Major
by sea J* ^isscttm
866. Would not it be sufficient that there should be an läTüne
officer, with very extensive powers, upon the frontier, who 1851.
should make reports to the central Government ?—Yes ; but if
he is to wait for the authority of the central Government before
he can act, it must tend to weaken his power greatly.
867. If he had the power of acting for himself, and in faet
the whole line of frontier was under his command, would not
that answer all the purposes which could be desired ?—Yes, if
he bad unrestricted power, it would do.
868. Do you think the same system of government can be
carried on at the frontier as that which is maintained about
Cape Town?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the Go¬
vernment measures to answer the question.
869. Chairman.'] Is there an identity of feeling and of
interest between the inhabitants of the eastern portion of the
colony and those who reside at Cape Town and its vicinity?—
There is a great extent of Dutch feeling at Cape Town.
870. There are a considerable number of Dutch settlers in
the eastern provinces, are not there ?—No ; they are becoming
more English there ; a great many of the Dutch settlers have
migrated.
871. Colonel Dunne.] Is not there a large colony of Dutch
who have crossed the Vaal?—Yes ; that is a long way to the
north.
872. They are totally independent of our sovereignty? —
Yes.
873. They are moving northward from the British power,
are not they ?—Yes.
874. Do you think there would be any possibility of stop¬
ping them, and making them defend the frontier?—None
whatever.
875. Marquis of Granby.] Those Kafirs who are not armed
with guns, use a kind of spear, do not they?^—They use the
assagais.
876. Which is a very formidable weapon ?—Yes, they carry
seven.
877. Do they manufacture that weapon themselves ?—Yes,
they do.
878. Colonel Dunne-] Is there any possibility of the Kafirs
manufacturing powder, if we could stop its exportation to
them ?—None.
87g. Then we should put a stop to further war, if we could
put a'stop to the introduction of powder ?—Yes.
880. Colonel
126 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major 880. Colonel Estcourt.~\ Could we stop the introduction of
J. Bissen, powder into that country ?—Not unless you extended the ope-
16 June i'ations to Natal.
851. 881. Would not that be too great an extent of country to
undertake operations over?—There would always be smug¬
gling; there are so many little bays, and means of landing
anything on the coast of Kafirland.
882. The temptation of course is very great?—It is.
883. Mr. B. Carter.'] You apprehend a good deal of powder
comes from Natal ?—I do not say it is so in the present in¬
stance.
884. Mr. Hawes.] Did you ever hear of its being imported
into the Portuguese settlements?—No.
885. With regard to the late outbreak, you having long re¬
sided in the colony, and served a good deal on the frontier,
have any acts of injustice come under your knowledge on the
part of the settlers towards the Kafirs?—Not in a single in¬
stance.
886. Can you state to the Committee whether you believe
the Kafir population generally has been contented with the
policy pursued towards them?—Perfectly so.
887. May the Committee infer that the discontent is chiefly
on the part of the chiefs of tribes, who feel their power de¬
clining ?—Yes.
888. Declining, in a great degree, from the advance of
civilization and the restraints of law ?—Yes.
889. When you say that you would remove those chiefs
especially from the Amatóla district, the Gaika tribe more
particularly, and drive them over the Kei, do you contemplate
making any arrangements with regard to their location beyond
the Kei, or would you leave that to chance, or the charity^ of
the chiefs into whose tribes they may be driven?—There is an
immense extent of country beyond the Kei ; there would be no
difficulty in respect to that ; it is a thinly populated country.
890. Would they find ample land for pastoral purposes?—
Ample land ; they existed there for three years during the
last war ; they were then all over the Kei, the Gaikas and the
Tslambies, and there was no want of territory then.
891. Would it be necessary to do more than to remove the
principal chiefs, who have been the cause of the present dis¬
content?—I think it would be advisable to place commissioners
to see them located.
892. Do you think, if the chiefs were removed, and the
people remained, friendly relations could be established be¬
tween them and the-British authorities in British Kafraria? —
They
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 127
They would always be open to revolt ; there would be always Major
bad characters springing up as adherents of those chiefs. «^.7. Bissett.
893. Is that consistent with the opinion you have expressed
that the people generally are satisfied with the exercise of 1851.
British authority ?—Yes ; because I believe that one bad man
could influence 10 good men ; they are more easily led for bad
than they are for good purposes. They are a very superstitious
people ; the belief in this prophet has a great tendency to
draw aside those who found themselves bettered by the present
system, and induce them to join the chiefs.
894. I believe, speaking generally, the Kafirs are altogether
a people without any religion ?—They have none whatever.
895. They are not believers in a future state ?—^They are not.
896. They are susceptible of being influenced through a
class of people called prophets, as well as by means of their
attachment to their chiefs ?—Yes ; this is a rare instance of a
prophet arising among them ; they say that we have our pro¬
phets ; we speak of our prophets, and the missionaries tell
them of our prophets, and now they have their prophet.
There have been only two instances of such prophets. There
was a man of the name of Linx, who led the Kafirs in former
times to attack Graham's Town, telling them that the English¬
man's bullets would turn to rain. This is the second one who
has arisen.
897. Do you think the present prophet has with him the
cordial sympathy of the people, or that he is the mere tool of
the chiefs ?—The mere tool of the chiefs.
898. And that he is not acting in conformity with the feelings
and wishes of the people ?—I cannot altogether account for
their superstitious feeling, but they have been led to believe
him, and to put great faith in him.
899. Do the Kafirs cultivate land to any great extent ?—
Yes, the women do ; the men never work.
900. What are the chief products they raise ?—Kafir corn
and millet ; but chiefly millet.
90Í. They simply cultivate the land for their own support,
but not for any purposes of trade ?—That is all ; they are an
improvident peo[)le ; they will sell a great deal in a time of
abundance to traders, and thereby cause a sort of famine before
the next crop comes in.
902. Do they supply traders with wool and hides?—They
have no sheep in Kafirland ; they supply them with hides.
903. Colonel Dunne.^ What is given in return ?—Spades
and hoes, and blankets ; particularly blankets ; handkerchiefs
and beads.
904. And
128 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major 9®4> And gunpowder ?—-We have never been able to trace
J.Bissett. the sale of gunpowder to any of them.
905. Sir E. Buxton.'] "No smuggling of gunpowder has ever
10 •IUII6 1 I* 1 » ■V T
1851. discovered ?—No.
906. Sir J. Walmsley.] Have you lived among the Kafir
tribes, so as to know their habits ?—I know them to a great
extent; I have been stationed during Sir Benjamin D'Uiban's
time in Kafraria, and I have been there now.
907. You have had frequent opportunities of ascertaining
the feelings and wishes of the people?—Yes.
908. You speak from your own knowledge when you say
they are a perfectly contented people ?—Yes.
909. Chairman.] Do you understand the Kafir language at
all ?—Yes, I do, partially.
910. Colonel Estcourt.] You have been in personal com¬
munication with persons of importance among the Kafirs?—
Yes, I may say I have.
911. Viscount Mandev'ille.] The Kafirs, although they may
be perfectly contented with our rule, would be always ready to
be excited by the hope of plunder, would not they?—Yes.
912. That would be sufficient to excite them to go to vvai j
would not it ?—Unless they had a wholesome dread of us, in
consequence of there being sufficient troops to keep them in
subjection.
913. Mr. Hindley.] You said Mr. Bonats left Shiloh without
a single Kafir following him?—'Yes; it was not altogether a
Kafir missionary station ; it was a Hottentot station.
914. Without any followers he left?—Yes; some Fingoes
followed him, but no Hottentots.
915. Before the destruction of Shiloh, did he take the sub¬
mission of the people to the commander. Captain Tilden, who
said it was too late ?—I cannot answer that question exactly,
916. Do you know that the chapel was actually offered to be
used as a fort by the military ?—No, I do not ; Shiloh is not in
Kafraria.
917. ^\v J. Walmsley.'] You have stated, in reply to an
honourable Member, that the people are perfectly contented ;
you have also stated, that you would not only remove the
chiefs, but that you would drive the whole people out of that
country ?—The whole of the people who have now made war
against our Government.
918. Do not you think it would be much more desirable to
drive out those who are instigating the people to war, rather
than drive the whole of the people out of that country ?—You
cannot
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 120
cannot discriminate where the people have been all in arms Major
• , J. J. Bissett,
against you.
919. Then they are not perfectly contented?—I am speak- 16 June
ing of the Kafir tribes themselves ; previously to the war the i»5i.
lower orders were contented.
920. They were contented previously to the war, but they
are not contented now ?—-The lower orders were, but the chiefs,
and those who were influenced by the chiefs, were of course
against the Government.
921. Colonel I understand you to say that you
would only drive out those who had taken up arms ; but that
would leave a considerable number who are well affected,
would not it ?—None of the Gaikas are well affected.
922. But there are other tribes who are well affected whom
you do not propose to remove?—Yes, the Tslambies; you
could not remove them.
923. Viscount Mandeville.'\ The Tslambies are well affected,
are not they?—Except one tribe of them.
924. Colonel Dtówwe.] The difficulty you apprehend would
be in supplying that country with a sufficient population for
defence ?—Yes.
925. Do you think it would be possible to meet that diffi¬
culty by encouraging emigration, or is the nature of the
country such as to encourage emigrants to remove there ?—
From this country I think emigration would be advantageous,
but I do not think there is population enough in the colony to
fill it up.
926. Sir E. Buxtoni] You propose to people that country
with English colonists ?—Yes.
927. Is it your opinion that if the English colonists were
located in the country, up to the River Kei, they would be con¬
tented with that country ; as their flocks increased would not
they be likely to pass over to the other side of the Kei ?—No ;
I would make it an agricultural country, and fill it up with that
class of persons ; I would not place there extensive farmers
who might keep large flocks of sheep, which will always induce
the Kafirs to plunder.
928. Colonel Dunnc.'\ Do you think if the convicts, who
were sent to the Cape, had been sent to the frontier, there
would have been any ill feeling there?—Yes, just the same,
but not the same radical measures resorted to.
929. Sir E. Buxton.] Does the land in Kafirland belong to
the chiefs, or is it tiie property of private individuals ? — It lie-
longs to the chiefs and their people generally ; there is no
defining each man's land.
0.63. I 930. Mr.
130 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major g3ö. Mr. B. Carter.'] Is there any actual property recog-
. J. Bissett. at all ? —They do not care anything about property ;
16 June niove from one place to another, as it suits their conve-
1851. nience.
931. Sir JE. Buxton.] Would those Gaika tribes be willing
that their land should be taken away from them ?—Decidedly
not.
932. Would not it reduce them to abject poverty?—No,
not at all.
933. Mr. Machinnon.] You state that if they were driven
on the other side of the river there would be plenty of support
for them, notwithstanding the country is already occupied by
other parts of the same tribe ?—Yes.
934. Mr. B. Carter.] You say that one-half of the natives
who now occupy British Kafraria are friendly to us ?—Yes.
935. y ou would leave them where they are?—Yes; it
would be a breach of faith to remove them.
936. In fact, then, they would have the sole occupation of
the territory at first ?—Yes.
937. Chairman.] The territory they occupy is chiefly to¬
wards the Kei, is not it ?—Yes.
938. Sir E. Buxton.] Of that part of the tribe which you
call friendly, large sections have gone over to the enemy, have
not they ?—Not large sections ; there are two chiefs from
those tribes who have gone over to the enemy.
939. With how many men ?—One has 2,000 men ; the
other is a petty chief, and I do not think he is classed as a
chief.
940. Were you present at the Kat River when the outbreak
took place there ?—No.
941. Have you been there since ?—No.
942. Your knowledge, then, of the causes which led to that
outbreak is not derived from personal acquaintance with the
facts ?—Yes, I have been stationed in the Kat River for years,
but it is a long time ago; I know the settlement has been in¬
creasing in the collection of those people ever since ; it is some
years since I was stationed there.
043. Should you have given to the Kat River settlers the
character you have given them now, some years ago?—Yes,
with respect to their collecting idle people about them, I
should.
944. Colonel Dunne.] Many people came from the colony
who are unwilling to work there?—Men from all parts of the
colony are collected there.
945. But,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. I3I
16 June
945. But, generally, they are people of idle and bad cha- Major
racter ?—Y es. J. J. Bissett.
946. Sir E. Buxton.] Were the Kat River settlers them¬
selves, the Hottentots, people of bad character?—They are
chiefly Hottentots ; there are a great many Gonahs, a race of
people between the Hottentots and the Kafirs,
947. Is it your opinion that the Kat River settlers generally
were worthless characters ?—Yes, decidedly; I think there are
some good men among them, but they are overpowered by the
other idle people.
948. Have the Kat River settlers any reason to complain
of the conduct of the Government or of particular magistrates ?
—Not that I am aware of. There has been a talk recently of
their complaining about some idle squatters having been
removed from there, I think, about July last.
949. Colonel Dunne.] Were you there at the time of the
removal of those squatters ?—I was at King William's Town.
950. At what time of the war were you wounded ?—At the
very first outbreak.
951. Sir E. Buxton.] Are you of opinion that the political
excitement which has been going on among the white people
in the colony has tended to disturb the minds of the natives ? —
Yes, I think so.
952. Has it affected them to any great extent?—I think it
has. I do not think it has extended so much to the Kafirs,
but with respect to the others, I think it has.
953. Colonel Estcourt.] You say that the military occupa¬
tion of the country has been insufficient up to this time ?—
Yes.
954. Will you tell the Committee what was the eharacter
of that occupation ?—We occupied a number of forts in British
Kafraria.
955. Detached forts ?—Yes ; King William's Town was the
head-quarters ; and there were seven other posts.
956. Isthat a good system, in your opinion?—Had they
been occupied in sufficient numbers to act in case of any hos¬
tility, it is shown that they would have been of great service ;
but there were only enough there to defend themselves.
957. In regard to the future, would you rely upon the
settlers as a means of defence, or would you depend entirely
upon the regulars?—You must depend upon the regulars,
I think.
958. The settlers are too far apart to be depended on ?—
It is a great inconvenience for them to meet for the purpose of
drill, or anything of that kind.
0.63. I 2 959. Could
132 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major 95^. Could you depend upon them as irregulars?—Yes,
I think you could depend upon the white population,
16 June decidedly.
1851. 960. Mr. B. Carter.'] Do you find that the settlers gather
round the forts more freely than in other quarters?—No; the
forts have only been in Kafirland, and tiierc were no white
people there, except in King William's Town.
961. Chairman.] With respect to Kafirland, you must
depend entirely upon the regulars, you think ?—Yes.
962. Mr. Mackinnon.] Your opinion is, that a force of
3,000 British troops, and also the driving of those persons the
other side of the river, would be necessary to secure the
British power?—Yes, I am of opinion that they must be sub¬
jugated first ; you must conquer them ; they have never been
conquered in fact.
963. Colonel Dunne.] You believe, in fact, that the last
war was never completely finished; tiie people were never
completely put down ?—They w ere not.
964. Had they been conquered during the last war, pro¬
bably the present war would not have occurred?—Decidedly
not.
965. And you propose that the [iresent war sliould be com¬
pletely finished, and that then a proper system of defence
should be put up ?—Yes.
966. Would you propose to encourage the white population
to go into Kafirland, when the natives were driven out?—
If you do so, you must throw in a large po[)ulation, so that
they might rally, and form a defence for themselves.
967. Are you aware that the commando system was a more
effective system of defence, whatever other faults it might
have had, than any whicli we have adopted since?—In those
days the Kafirs were not armed ; they could not cope with
any great force which might be brought against them.
968. Do you think they could cope with the Boers at the
present time ?—Yes.
969. When those Boers have formed a settlement of their
own, will they be able, without support, to defend that settle¬
ment against the Kafirs ?—No.
970. Are we likely to give them any support?—Yes, by
means of forts.
971. I speak of those who have left the colony ?—It is all
open country to the north.
972. They could defend themselves, you think ?—Yes.
973. Viscount MandeviUe.] Did you hear the Kafirs make
any
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
I33
any remarks when the battalion of the Rifle ih igade left ?— Major
Yes, I liave heard them express surprise at their shooting. J- J- Bissen.
974. Have you ever heard them make any remarks as to
what the effect would be upon them ?—No. ,8^,^
975. You said the missionaries have not been useful in a
single instance ; did you confine that remark to their exertions
upon the frontier, or do you speak of South Africa generally ?
—I do not speak of South Africa generallv ; 1 speak more of
Kafirland.
976. Chaifman.] Even in the case of regular troops, it re¬
quires some practice in the mode of warfare 10 be efficient
against the Kafirs, does not it?—Yes, you are some time before
you get into it.
977. Colonel Duntie.^ Can regular troops, equipped as they
are for ordinary warfare, become efficient; must not they alter
their equipments?—Yes; at present the troops are dressed as
burghers.
978. The ordinary dress of soldiers is quite unfit for Kafir
warfare?—Yes, you cannot stoop and get through the bush.
979. Chairman.'] The great difficulty you say consists in the
nature of the country ?—Yes.
980. The same difficulty would not exist in the open country ?
—No.
981. Mr. Stanley.] You consider that if the Amatóla country
were once clear there would be no great danger of future wars?
—Not if you keep a sufficient number of troops there ; but you
must always have a large number of troops there.
982. Chairman.] When you speak of 3,000 men, have you
contemplated the possibility of difficulty arising to the north¬
west, in the Orange River territory ?—When J. speak of 3,000
men, I mean them exclusively for the defence of Kafraria.
983. Do you think it would be necessary to provide, by the
presence of regular troops, against inroads on the north-western
side?—You are not likely to have inroads into the colony from
that direction.
984. Colonel Diinne.] What is the extent of frontier which
you contemplate to defend ?—It is about 100 miles.
985. Those regular troops, with the colonial corps, must be
moved in columns ?—Yes, you nmst have a force available,
which you may move in three columns upon any given point,
and it is not safe to move a less number of troops than 1,000
men.
986. Chairman.] What number of troops were maintained
previously to this war upon the frontier ?—In Kafraria we
had 1,100.
0.63. I 3 9S7. Mr.
134
MINUTES OI" EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major 987* Mr. Hawes.'\ Were you serving under Sir Harry
j.J.Bissett. Smith at the conclusion of the last war?—-Yes.
ic'june fo 1-^® policy he has since adopted, of ex-
1851. tending British military authority to the degree he has doue in
British Kafraria, do you think that that has been the means of
saving the colony from much loss and devastation ?—Decidedly ;
there have been comparatively very few devastations com¬
mitted upon the colony since that system has been established.
Very rarely cattle have been carried into Kafirland lyithout
being traced and restored.
98g. Looking at the state of the colony under the former
system, and comparing it "ith its present state, are you of
opinion that the policy now adopted has been very beneficia),
and has aíTorded great protection to the farmer and settler
within the old boundary ?—Decidedly, up to the time of this
outbreak.
990. Marquis of Granhy.l There have been some dreadful
murders committed by the Kafirs since the breaking out of the
war, have not there?—Yes, they never show mercy if you fall
into their hands ; they never take a prisoner. The men in the
rear, on a late occasion, having discharged their arms, were
taken behind the rocks and their throats cut before they could
reload. It was in an intricate pass.
991. Colonel Estcourt.'] You are for clearing Kafraria of
the Kafirs ?—That part of it occupied by the Gaikas.
992. You would require no more troops in Kafraria, would
you ?—Yes, on the border you would.
993. Thß border would then be on the Kei, would not it?
—I would not extend the border quite to the Kei ; I would
have an unoccupied territory between Amatóla and the Kei.
994. Could you maintain that unoccupied territory?—I
would have a chain of posts there.
995. On the unoccupied territory ?—Yes.
996. Viscount Mandeville.'] The Kei is a much more de¬
fensible frontier than any we have yet occupied, is it not f—
Yes, much more so.
997. Colonel Dunne.] Is the Kei navigable for any distance
up ?—There was an instance the other day of a small vessel
being brought in there, but that is the only instance.
998. Is it fordable at all points?—No, the fords are at
some distance apart, but still in dry seasons you would cross
at many more places than at other times.
999. Are those places too numerous for us to hope to block
them up ?—Yes, and besides that, the Kafirs can always swim
any river.
1000, The
select committee on the kafir tribes. i35
1000. The most defensible boundary, you think, is an open Major
space in wblch you can act with cavalry ?—Yes. J.J. BUsett.
1001. The chief use of horses now is for the purpose of
conveying mounted infantry from one spot to another?—Yes. •
1002. Mr. Stanley.'\ Are any large number of the Kafirs
mounted ?—Yes, I dare say they have a couple of thousand
cavalry.
1003. You spoke of many of them having fire-arms ; have
vou any idea of the proportion, as far as you could judge from
what you saw of them ?—Probably one-fourth or one-fifth of
the whole may possess fire-arms.
1004. And those arms are serviceable?—Yes.
1005. Colonel Estcourt.'] How do the Kafirs cross a river
in any numbers?—They swim; they get a block of wood and
drive a stake in it, and tie a handerchief containing their powder
to it, and then paddle themselves over.
1006. Colonel Dunne^ Do you think if the war continues,
they will be able to keep up the supply of powder which is
necessary r—No, I do not think they have any means of ob¬
taining powder, except what they capture, or the rebels take
to them.
1007. That would not be sufficient to carry on the war for
any length of time ?—I think nothing but hunger and famine
would tend to bring the war to a close.
1008. Mr. Booker.'\ Are the arms which they have of Euro¬
pean manufacture?—All of them, I think.
loog. M.V. Mackinnon.'] English?-^Yes, I think so; they
are common muskets chiefly.
1010. Mr. B. Carier.'] How was it that the late outbreak
was so unexpected, occurring as it did immediately after the
intimations that everything appeared to be quiet ? — Sir Harry
Smith made a demonstration ; there were certain demands
made upon the Gaika chiefs, as restitution for depredations,
which not being complied with, he marched his troops for the
purpose of a demonstration into Amatóla, and they (the Kafirs)
iired upon them ; that led to the war ; meeting a reverse at
first, numbers went into it who would not otherwise perhaps
have joined it.
The Reverend James Adamson, u. d., called in ;
and further Examined.
1011. Mr. Hawes.] WHAT is the nature of the duties ira- Rev.
posed upon a missionary at any particular station ?—Tiiat de- J- Adamson,
pends a good deal upon the character of the station itself,
0.63. I 4 whether
136 MINÛTÊS OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Ilev. whftlier it be a new one or one whicli has been some time
J. Adamson, established ; in case of its being a station established ibr some
his duties are very much like those of an ordinary
16 June clergyman in a village ; he superintends the whole religious in-
1851. struction of the people, officiates as their minister on the Lord's
day, and conducts every religious operation necessary in regard
to those who are converted, and takes charge of the means of
education ; he may teach himself, or have a body of teachers
under him.
1012. Are specific instructions issued, by the bodies sending
out missionaries, to their missionaries ?—I am not aware of any
specific instructions, further than that I think all the regula¬
tions contain a stipulation that the missionaries shall not in¬
terfere with political movements in any respect. As to a station
newly formed, of course the missionary has a great many
other afiairs to transact ; for instance, having fixed upon a
station, he must erect buildings, in which he very often has to
labour with his own hands ; he must prepare cultivated
grounds ; ail which require a great deal of personal trouble,
and stand in the way of his proceeding to his proper business
for a considerable time.
1013. Is he or not insti ucted to instruct the people in agri¬
culture, or in any useful arts, as well as to discharge spiritual
duties 1—Undoubtedly ; that is made a more prominent object
of attention by certain classes of missionaries than others; it
has been more especially the object of the Moravians to instruct
them in agriculture and in other arts, than of other denomina¬
tions of missionaries ; but all of them necessarily engage in cul¬
tivation to a considerable extent, and endeavour to set an
example to the natives of the way in which produce can be
derived from the soil, such as introducing the use of ploughs
or spades, or digging canals for irrigation.
1014. It is part of the practice of the Moravian missions, is
not it, to instruct the people in agriculture ?—It is.
1015. Are there any other missions in which it is made
especially a part of the duty of the missionary to do that, besides
the Moravians ?—I have understood always that it was the
case with all of them ; the greatest operation of that kind
which has been conducted in the colony was the digging a
tunnel through the spur of a mountain to supply water to a
missionary station, which was conducted by the missionary and
the people under his charge.
1016. Of what denomination was he?—Of the London
Missionary Society ; he was the son of Dr. Phillip.
1017. Is
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIÉES. 137
101". Is there any difference in the respect shovvn to Rev.
particular iriissionarics as compared with others ; are the J- Adamson,
Moravians more liked by the people than the missionaries of .
the London Missionary Society, or the Scottish Missionary jß J^„g
Societies 1 —T do not know that there is any difference as to 1851.
the natives; sectarian differences are of very slight account in
our country ; the members of the different missions appear to
hold very cordial intercourse, and sometimes the members of
one mission may be transferred very readily to another. As
to the opinions of the colonists generally, I think they have
been rather in favour of the Moravians, in preference to the
others ; next, perhaps, are the Wesleyans. Then I may remark,
as a very interesting circumstance, that when the French
mission, in consequence of the late revolution in France, was
apparently likely to be suspended or abolished altogether, the
colony felt the value of operations of that kind in general, and
of that one in particular, so greatly, that they came forward
almost universally to offer their support, and collected a sum
of money amounting to i ,200 /., for the purpose of preserving
that missionary .station from being abolished.. Nearly the same
thing happened in respect to the American mission at Natal,
in a season of great commercial depression in America, when
orders had been given to withdraw their missionaries from that
country by the Board of Missions of the United States; the
people then professed their readiness to help, and the Govern¬
ment also came forward in that case and proposed to give
pecuniary aid for the purpose of sustaining that mission ; how¬
ever, it turned out that it was not required. The missionaries
of the London Missionary Society are, perhaps, upon the whole,
less generally esteemed than the others.
1018. Has cultivation extended around those missionary
stations, and has the example thus .set induced any large body
of the natives to follow agricultural, instead of their own
pastoral and wild pursuits ?—That is a question which of
course can refer only to regions beyond the colony itself.
I think the circumstances of the natives generally are of such
a character, that in some districts that could scarcely be ex¬
pected ; there would scarcely be any means of agricultural
operations afforded, from the barrenness of the soil and the
want of water. In some regions, particularly along the whole
north of the Orange River, and in a great part of the Northern
Sovereignty, agriculture cannot be very greatly extended. I am
not aware that the natives there have very generally emulated
the example set by the missionaries, with the exception of the
Griqua stations and the Kuruman station j there, I understand,
a great
'38 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
- 3, great deal has been done, and much more has been attempted,
D defeated by the physical character of the country.
1 '0'9* Speaking of the missions within the colony, are there
i6 June any natives who are farmers to any extent ; take the Hot-
1B51. tentots or the Gonahs, are any of them farmers to any extent?
—'They raise a great deal of produce in some of the stations ;
for instance, at Camisberg, under the Wesleyan body, there
is a great deal of cultivation in the neighbourhood of that
station,
1020. Do they raise it for food, or for the purposes of trade ?
—^They trade with it.
1021. Are there any native farms of any extent ?—There are
farms held by coloured men, but not the property of the Hot¬
tentot race, but of intermingled races ; I think they occur
everywhere throughout the colony.
1022. The Committee rather gather from what you say,
that the missionaries have not induced the people to resort to
industrial occupations generally ?—They have in the stations
inside the colony ; but Í do not think that the character of the
country beyond has permitted that, generally speaking, hitherto.
1023. Speaking of the stations within the colony, to which
would you point as a proof that the Hottentots have been
induced to become farmers or traders to any extent ?—There
is a great Moravian station at Genadendal, where a good deal
of manufacture has been carried out, such as sewing muslins;
at Riet Fontein, I think, a great deal of agricultural produce is
raised. The stations within the colony are very generally
attached to villages where the members of the mission churches
are commonly working people, daily labourers ; in some cases
grounds have been purchased and divided into small proper¬
ties, w hich have been put in possession of the natives, and
those are cultivated as gardens ; so that during certain seasons,
such as the ploughing season or the reaping season, the native
members of those stations can proceed to a distance where
agriculture is carried on, for the purpose of giving their help
at those peculiar seasons, or during the season of vintage, and
then they return to their own small properties at other times,
when they labour in their gardens to contribute to their sup¬
port ; that is the common mode of operating inside the
colony.
1024. Do you think that the missionary influence has been
generally extensively successful in the colony in inducing the
native population to resort to agriculture or industrial pursuits?
-—I think it has.
1025. Speaking of the stations without the colony, take those,
for
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES, 1^9
for instance, in the Orange River Sovereignty, or in the Ofiika Rev.
country, have they been equally successfnl there ?—The cir- J- Adarnsor,
cumstances of the country do not admit of anything like the
same success there, j6 june
1026. The country is not equally fertile?—By no means ; 1851.
the climate is very uncertain. We have two climates in our
colony, bounded by the ridge which stretches diagonally across
the country from the north-west to the south-east, and which
divides it into two districts ; in them the character of the climate
is very different. One is an oceanic climate, where we receive
all the rains from the ocean ; the other is a climate where the
rains occur only in the summer season, attended by thunder¬
storms generally.
1027. As regardjs the climate, the great difficulty you have
to contend with is drought, is not it ?—Particularly in the in¬
terior ; there is not much fear of drought in the other region.
)028. Are there efforts made to form tanks to collect and
preserve the water of the streams which dry up in seasons of
drought?—There are few streams in the colony which are not
led out by small canals for irrigation. The practice of forming
tanks upon the farms has now become very common.
1029. Do the missionaries take an active part in promoting
such works 1—They do ; in Kafirland the missionary stations
have cultivated land, which contributes to their support. I
think in the Kat River Settlement there is a great extent of
canal digging for irrigation ; I have heard it estimated as
amounting in length to five miles.
1030. Have you ever visited the Kat River Settlement?
—No.
1031. Have you ever read any reports which have been pub-
blished in the colony respecting it; Mr. Biddulph's report, for
instance?—I did not read that report; I have read the mis¬
sionary reports, which alluded occasionally to its condition and
its progress.
1032. Did you ever hear reports which were very unfavour¬
able as to the industry and character of the people there ?—
Yes, I have heard that there were such reports.
1033. It was largely supported, was not it, by Government
aid?—It occurred in this way: the Government intended to
establish the Hottentot race in that country as a sort of refuge
for them. They appointed a resident clergyman, with the
understanding that the whole establishment was likely to be
under his charge ; but in consequence of the more respectable
members of other missionary stations in the colony resorting
there when lands were offered to them, a movement occurred
among
140 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. among themselves to request the missionary under whom they
J. Adamson, l)een to accompanv them to that station.
' 1034. Colonel Who was he ?—Mr. Read.
16 June 1035. Was that the father or the son ?—The father.
1^6'- 1036. Is lie a man highly spoken of by the missionaries ? —
I think he is ; he seems a very zealous and devoted man.
1037. Mr. Hawes.'\ It is the fact, is not it, that there was
considerable Government aid given to that settlement in the
shape of rations and clothes ? —Mr. Thompson was supported
upon the Government establishment ; I think privileges were
conferred upon the residents there in the way of a preference
being given to them in the purchase of forage.
1038. Arc you of opinion that the system of giving direct
Government aid in any shape to those stations is a desirable
one to be pursued '?—I think, at present, it can scarcely be
dispensed with. Our Government has acted upon the prin¬
ciple of giving aid to all parties who would receive it, provided
they could show that they were engaged in the public service.
In respect to the missions to the late apprentices, we have had
no scruple in requesting aid from the Government, and have
received it ; I do not think at present we can very well do
without it.
1039. How is that applied?—What they give to us is a
salary for my colleague in Cape Town, who officiates as the
regular minister of a large coloured church there ; and grants
for the school.
1040. Tiie question referred more particularly to the aid
given to the Kat River Settlement in the shape of rations?—I
should doubt very much the propriety of that system ; I think
that establishment led to a good deal of jealousy among the
cultivators of that region.
1041. You do not happen to have read Mr. Biddulph's
report upon the Kat River Settlement?—No, I have not
read it.
1042. Did the missionary reports which you have read give
a favourable account of the Kat River Settlement ?—They have
alnays done so.
1043. Iii what respect?—In respect chiefly to the spiritual
condition of the people, with occasional notices of the opera¬
tions they were carrying on with respect to agriculture.
1044. How is that progress in religious instruction con*
sistent with the part which a portion of them have recently
taken.?—I do not know; the circumstances at present are ex¬
ceedingly obscure; I cannot make out any consistent account
of what has happened.
1045. You
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
141
1045. You have no knowledge of the circuuistances yourself? Rev.
—T have not. J- Adamson,
1046. With respect to the general climale and soil of Kaf-
raria, are they good, and is the land fertile ?—It has always jç
been represented as exceedingly fertile. It i.s a beautiful 1851.
picturesque country ; the streams from tiie mountains are the
chief source of the fertility there.
1047. Is that country more fertile than any portion of the
Cape colony proper?—Much more so, I believe, than the
western division. The eastern division approaches the same
character, but it has always been reckoned inferior. The
country improves as you go eastward.
1048. May that explain the gradual tendency of the settlers
to advance cultivation, and to encroach upon that distiict?—
It explains its direction, inasmucii as towards the north you
can scarcely make any progress at all, the climate is so irregular,
and the country so bad.
1049. The Kafirs are not cultivators to any extent, are they,
beyond the amount which is necessary to raise the food they
want ?—That is all ; they cultivate rather by w hat may be
termed garden culture ; they raise millet, which is the grain of
Africa, and pumpkins, the abundance of which is a peculiar
characteristic of the climate also ; lately they have introduced
maize to a considerable extent.
1050. The Committee has been told that the Kafirs are
generally without any belief in a future state ; is that your
opinion of them ?—Yes, I think that is the case ; the only w ord
which occurs in the Kafir language indicating a Divinity is a
Hottentot word.
1051. As regards the Kafirs, have the missionaries been at
all successful in inducing them to embrace Christianity ?—Not
in point of numbers ; I think the number is small ; I ana not
aware myself what it may be.
1052. They have been more successful among the Hottentot
race than among the Kafirs?—Yes; the Hottentot race, and
the related race of the Griquas; and also with the Northern
Sovereignty people they have been successful, I think.
Î053. Colonel Dunne.] Into what districts is the colony
divided?—There are about 22 or 23 different districts.
1054. What is the number of inhabitants in those districts?
—The whole population of the country is estimated at about
200.000.
1055. Have you any idea of the population in the more
distant districts?—No.
1056. When you speak of the population of the colony,
what
142 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
what tract of country do you include ; is it the part which is
coloured red on the map before you ?—I should say the whole
' which is coloured red upon this map ; the whole of the colonial
16 June territory.
1057. With the recent additions?—Not including British
Kafraria.
1058. Excluding British Kafraria, it would be about
200,000 ?—Yes.
1059. Are they generally scattered over the surface, or are
they congregated more in the neighbourhood of Cape Town ?—
The population is much more dense in the neighbourhood of
Cape Town and in Albany than anywhere else.
1060. Can you state the proportions of those who are in the
immediate neighbourhood of Cape Town, and in the more
distant part of the province ?—In Cape Town there are 23,000.
In the Cape Town Almanack, which is published every year,
the exact numbers are given for every district of the colony :
the proportion of coloured people to the whites appears to me
to be about as 78 to 72, the coloured people being somewhat
more numerous. Out of the 200,000, there are perhaps
15,000 or 20,000 who are looked upon as a kind of wanderers ;
what are called native foreigners.
1061. Mr. ßawes.] In the former part of your evidence
you stated that there was a considerable portion of the popu¬
lation in Kafirland who are not under any chief?—Yes.
1062. Are they Kafirs, strictly speaking?—Yes; I do not
mean exactly that they are not under a chief, but I mean that
the chief can exercise no authority over them.
1063. Is it known what proportion they bear to the whole
population in Kafirland ?—I do not know.
1064. Would they be accessible to the direct influence of
British authority much more readily than those who are under
chiefs acknowledge the authority of those chiefs ?—I do not
know, unless you had possession of the territory, how you
could exercise any authority at all ; any authority exercised
hitherto in Kafirland has been through the chiefs, till the
country was taken possession of and made British territory.
1065. The proportion that this unappropriated population
bears to the whole you cannot inform the Committee?—No ;
it can scarcely be called an unappropriated population, for
sometimes the people will attach themselves to one chief and
sometimes to another; very often, I suspect, according to the
reputation he has of being an active, energetic man ; if he acts
in accordance with their general sentiments, which go so much
to encourage depredation, his authority will extend over them.
1066. With
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. I43
1066. With a view to maintain a friendly understanding Rev.
with the Kafir population in British Kafraria, are you of «f*
opinion that any large proportion of the population should be
actually removed beyond the Kei ?—I do not think any should jyng
be removed. 1851.
1067. Would you remove any of the chiefs who have taken
an active part in the hostilities?—Undoubtedly; I think it
would he advisable that they should he removed entirely.
1068. What authority would you substitute for the authority
of the chiefs ; that of the British authority, directly ?—Yes ; I
think you can trust to nothing else.
io6g. Colonel Dunne.~\ If the chiefs were removed, do not
you think the people would follow them ?—If they were sent
to any other native tern rtory.
1070. Did you hear Major Bissett's evidence, which was
given in a military sense, and have you any reason to rioubt
that it is a prudent way of defending our frontier, to remove
those tribes which have been actually at war with us?—It
appears to me you would have the same kind of frontier diffi¬
culties occurring ; and moreover, if the Amatóla range were
freed from the Kafir population at present, they would he very
likely to concentrate in the Quathlamha range, which is imme¬
diately beyond it. That separates the streams of the Orange
River from Natal, and, I am told, is as difficult a ground for
military operations as the Amatólas.
1071. What is the distance of this other mountain range
from the Amatólas?—There can be said to be no distance
between them ; they are connected by a very narrow ridge or
neck of mountain.
T072. Sir J. ÏValmsley.'] Is not there a dread on the part of
the Kafirs generally, that the white men will dispossess them
of their territories ?—I have understood that that dread is
general over the whole region.
1073. Should you trace the war in any respect to that feel¬
ing ?—I presume it is never absent from the remembrance of
the K afir, thut the white man has intrudedupon the native
population. That, unquestionably, is the active motive with
them for watchfulness and caution, and for what we may call
preparation for war, because they are constantly in the habit of
preparing for war ; all their conversation is about it, and all
their common employments are sharpening their assagais or
looking to their arms; and though there should be nothing in
the shape of treachery, nor a preconcerted scheme to engage
in war at any time, the whole character of their lives is in
fact a preparation for war.
1074. Chairman^
144 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. 1074. Chairman.'] They are a warlike population Yes,
Walmsley.] Dispossessing the Gaika tribes of
_J their territory would tend greatly to increase this dread of the
16 June whites, would not it?—I think it would.
1076. I understand you to sa}', if these Gaika tribes were
driven backwards, they would only be driven upon other tribes,
who would in their turn endeavour to dispossess theiu ?—They
would certainly be driven upon other tribes, at least upon the
territory occupied by other tribes ; what may be the extent of
that territory whieii those people do not really use I cannot
say ; when one tribe is driven in to another, they always sink
into a subordinate position, and become a kind of slaves to
those among whom they have been driven ; that was the case
with the Fingoes.
1077. Colonel Dunne.] The Gaikas woud be driven back
upon another part of their own tribe?—Yes, it would be a
tribe closely related to them.
1078. Major Bissett stated that there is a space of 150
miles of unoccupied country between them ; how then could
they suffer ?—They could not suffer if there were room enough,
except by the loss of their cattle.
1079. Would it be necessary to (ake their cattle when you
drove them back?—It appears to me that in conducting a
warfare among Kafirs, the victory must be gained by the
extent of your military means, and the sacrifice of the cattle is
a necessary part of the operation.
1080. Suppose you drive them over the Kei, they may take
their cattle with them, may not they ?—The cattle would be
either captured or killed in all probability.
1081. Mr. Mackinnon.^ Supposing you drove them quietly,
and let them take their cattle with them ?—'Then thev might
V O
establish themselves in the country.
1082. Sir J. JValmslty.] Are the Committee to understand
you to say, that if the Gaika tribe was driven hack upon the
tribe next to them, they would be made the slaves of that tribe?
—If they were of a different race ; not perhaps in this case ;
they would become not exactly slaves, but as they have no
property of their own, they are always held as inferiors. In
the case of the natives beyond the Orange River towards the
desert, they are stationed in the outskirts of the native popu¬
lation as a kind of defence against intrusion and attack, and
they rank as herdsmen.
1083. Chairman.] Are you able to say how far that ordi¬
nary state of things might be modified by the close connexion
subsisting between the Gaika tribes and those which they
would
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. I45
would find on the other side of the Kei River ?—I do not Rev.
know. You might perhaps make arrangements by which they J- Adamsou,
might be favourably received.
1084. S\\' J.Walmsley.] The Committee understand you to 16 June
deprecate any system which would drive the Gaikas back upon 1S51.
other tribes?—Yes. I think, unless you adopted effectual mea¬
sures for restraining the whole of the country which is bounded
by our territories, anything you do of that kind would only
remove the evil for a short time.
1085. Chairman.'] Suppose the war to have been brought
to a successful termination, and those persons to be altogether
in our power, and it became a question what measures should
be taken with a view to promote the defence of the colony,
and what policy should be pursued towards that tribe, what
course are you prepared to recommend?—I think, as I have
said already, jurisdiction must be assumed over the whole ter¬
ritory, and civilization introduced as rapidly as possible.
1086. You think the whole of that country must be sub¬
jected to British rule, and to the immediate operation of the
British Government?—I think so; and the sooner that is ef¬
fected the better, because if it remains in any state approaching
to what it now is, it will be a source of conflict at all times,
not only with our colony alone, but with all the regions round.
1087. Mr. B. Carter.] You would effect that, would not
you, rather by good treatment, and by sending British officers
among them, than by driving them out of their own country ?
—Yes ; I think to drive them out of their country would not
tend to bring about the desired result.
1088. Mr. Booker.] Did not you say that there were ex¬
tensive coal-fields in one of the border districts?—Yes ; I had
some specimens sent to me by the late Governor, Sir Peregrine
Maitland, from a small stream which falls into the Caledon
River, now in the Northern Sovereignty.
1089. Has there been any attempt made by the missionaries
to introduce arts and manufactures among the tribes?—Not
, ^ O
m those regions, except agricultural improvements. There has
been a kind of art carried on in the countrv, in smelting metals
and making brass ornaments, in the mountain region which
borders upon the coal-fields. The natives fell into confusion and
conflict some years ago, and the establishment has been given
up.
1090. Do they weave their own clothing?—They do not
weave; they make their own clothing of skin.
1091. Sir./. Walmsley.] Could you now, or within a few
days, give the Committee anv information as to the number
0,63, K and
14,6. MINUTES OB' EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOUE THE
Bev, and localities of the various tribes on the eastern frontier ?—
I think that that could be procured through Dr. Smith, who
was examined by the Committee before ; he has spent a long
16 June time in studying everything relating to the native tribes of our
1851, colony, and has prepared an abstract of everything in the
Colonial Registers in respect to the interference of the Euro¬
peans with the coloured population.
1092. Colonel Estcourt.] Are the Gaikas included among
the Kafirs?—Yes.
1093. Their cattle are already taken, are not they?—They
have been captured to a considerable extent, but there may be
a considerable number hidden in the Amatóla range.
1094. There is a report that their cattle have been taken
across the Kei ; do you know anytifing upon that subject?—
No ; it has been asserted at all times that they have been in
the habit of driving them across the Kei when they are
threatened with danger.
1095. Therefore they are in a measure prepared themselves
to go?—Yes, I should presume so.
1096. There would not be much difficulty in removing
them from the country, would there ?—There would be no
difficulty, if you are determined to do it.
1097. Would there be any difficulty with respect to the
other portion of the people ?—That would depend upon the
disposition of the others to receive them.
1098. Sir X Walmslei/.] Do you mean to say that they
would not resist being expelled ?—They would resist, no
doubt.
1099. And there might be great loss of life in consequence ?
—Yes.
1100. Colonel Estcoui'i.] What do they now do for food?
—They have their cattle with them, and it is presumed that
they make small de[)osits of grain in places which they are
acquainted with ; I doubt if that can be carried on to any
great extent.
noi. Mr. Hawes.] They do not use their cattle for food,
generally, do they ; the Kafir prides himself upon having a
large herd as a proof of his wealth, rather than keeps it for the
purpose of food ?—They are very fond of animal food, but
they live chiefly upon the milk of their herds.
1102. Colonel £íícom/'í.] For what purpose do they keep
those cattle ?—They kill them occasionally in times of feastings,
and they are reckoned to be their wealth.
1103. Mr. B. Carter^ Do the members of a tribe pay any,
tribute to the chief, which enables him to be in possession of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 147
greater riches than others?—Y^es; I understand there are
certain dues which he receives from many of them ; one man
may supply him with milk, another may give him a calf now
and then ; 1 think their emolument arises a great deal from 16 June
their legal proceedings.
1104. Mr. HawesJ] They do not rear cattle as we do in
England, for the ordinary food of their population, do they?
—Not the ordinary food; it is used as a species of luxury;
their common food is milk and grain Kafir millet, or pumpkins.
1105. Colonel Estcourt.'\ Is the chief generally the richest
man in the tribe?—Among some tribes that is the case; it is
the case with Moshesh ; he claims the whole cattle of his dis¬
trict as his own ; he does not, as far as I know, assert any title
to the land as his own property. In consequence of an incur¬
sion driving the population of the country all away, and he
alone being enabled to take refuge with his cattle on the top of
the mountains, he claims, as his right, the whole of the cattle
of his tribe, as being descended from his.
1106. They rather claim the right of ranging with their
cattle over the country, than any actual property in the country
itself?—Yes, they cultivate where they choose. The person
who finds an unoccupied plot of ground cultivates it as long as
he pleases.
1107. The idea of actual property in the land does not
generally exist among them ?—Not as the property of the in¬
dividual ; the property is in the tribe.
1108. Colonel Estcourt¡] They choose certain localities for
pasturage ?—Yes.
1109. As the grass grows from year to year, do they go back
to the same neighbourhood ?—They keep a few permanent
stations either for habitation or defence : if a severe drought
O
falls upon the land they must move to some other.
IIID. Mr. Mackinnon.'\ They migrate like pastoral tribes,
do not they ?—They do not migrate ; I do not think migration
occurs except in consequence of war within their own country ;
they move from one place to another, but it generally happens
that the tribe is distributed in smaller settlements round the
main one.
nil. You say they have no individual property in the
land. The tribe itself has a certain amount of land as the
property of the tribe, has not it?—Yes.
1112. Then the hardship would not appear to be great in
their being directed to cross the river, where there appears to
be plenty of land for them?—They would lose tiie garden pos-
0.63. K 2 sessions
148
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. sessions which they have, and there may be a doubt whether
' the other tribe would be disposed to receive them.
. 1113. Mr, JBooker.] Would they willingly change cultivated
16 June for uncultivated land ?—They are strongly attached to the
places of their birth.
Jovis, 19® die J unit, 1851.
members present.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Booker.
Sir Edward Buxton.
Mr. Hind ley.
Viscount Mandeviile.
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Bonharn Carter.
Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Colonel Dunne.
Marquis of Granby.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
The Right Hon. HENRY LABOUCHERE in the Chair.
Colonel C. Ovans, called in ; and Examined.
Colonel 1114. Mr. Ha'wes.'] ARE you in the East India Coin-
C. Ovans. pany's service ?—I am ; I am a Colonel in the Bombay
i~June
1115. Will you state the length of your service in India?
-—I have served in India thirty-two years. I was first em¬
ployed in the revenue survey department, after which I was
sent as Bheel agent to Khandesh. During the last ten years
of rny service in India, I was quarter-master-general of the
Bombay army and resident at Sattara.
1116'. Had not the wild tribes in that district been
troublesome, both to the people and to the government?—
They had.
1117. Will you describe generally the state of the Khan¬
desh territory, when it first fell into our hands ?—In 1817 and
1818, when the British Government first took possession of
Khandesh, it was in a complete state of anarchy, overrun by
mercenary bands of Arabs, Pindarees, and Bheels, so that
the roads were nearly impassable, and neither life nor property
was secure.
1118. What
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 14g
1118. What means generally were adopted by the Indian Colonel
government to restore order in that district ?—The Arab mer- C- Ovms.
cenaries and the Piiidarees were very speedily put down, but 19 June
the great difficulty which was experienced was in dealing with »851.
the Bheels. In 1819 I think it was, the then political agent
reported to the government that the distress and terror of the
inhabitants in consequence of the depredations of the Bheels
was extreme, and that no improvement could be expected to
take place in the state of the country till settlements were
made with those wild tribes.
1119. Was the local government instructed to bring about
that settlement, and if so, what was the nature of the instruc¬
tions ? —In consequence of that report coercive measures
were undertaken, and strong detachments of troops were em¬
ployed in different parts of the province against the Bheels,
but they proved only temporarily successful, inasmuch as, as
soon as the troops were withdrawn, they reassembled for the
purpose of plunder, and carried devastation through the whole
country.
1120. In the first instance military measures were resorted
to to restore peace and order ?—Yes.
1121. Will you state what was the result of those military
operations; were the people subdued?—No; I mentioned
that as soon as the detachments were withdrawn, which were
employed against the Bheels, those bands again assembled and
carried on their depredations, and devastated the country just
as before.
1122. So that the military and coercive means to which
you have alluded failed ?—They permanently failed ; they had
only a temporary effect.
1123. Will you state to the Committee the civil means
which were employed?—In 1824 and 1825, in consequence
of orders from England to endeavour to introduce a different
and conciliatory system, European officers were then appointed
as Bheel agents ; the province was divided into districts,
and a Bheel agent appointed to each district, with full
powers and instructions to settle all the Bheels within his own
limits.
1124. Were those agents armed with magisterial powers?
—They had very ample powers in every way ; they had full
magisterial powers.
1125. Chairman.] What was the extent of the districts
over which they presided ?—The district of which I had
charge was about lOO miles in length, by 30 or 40 in
breadth.
0,63. K 3 1126. What
1.50
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Colonel 1J 26. What was the amount of the population within that
district ? — It was not large ; they were the very wildest
19 Juno Bheels in Khandesh ; it bordered on the Nizam's territory;
1851. both above and below the hills, I should say, there was a
population of go,000 or 100,000 souls, of whom 10,000 or
12,000 were Bheels.
1127. Within the district of which you had charge ?—Yes;
in the whole of Khandesh I think the population might have
been at that time 374,000, of which about one-eighth was
estimated to be composed of the predatory tribes.
1128. Mr. Hazves.'] Will yon proceed to describe the nature
of the conciliatory policy adopted by those several magis¬
trates?—I stated that the Bheel agents were empowered to
act as magistrates ; they had powers to offer an amnesty to all
who would submit, except to a few of the most notorious
offenders, who were named, and to give a free pardon to all
who would submit ; they were empowered to grant protection
also to all who came in.
1129. That is, personal protection?—Yes, they were em¬
powered to grant lands, and make advances of money to those
who would cultivate ; to inquire into all their rights of which
they had been deprived, and to restore those to which they were
found to be entitled ; to re-establish and reorganize the police
of the country ; and to raise a regiment composed of Bheels.
1130. In accomplishing this policy, did the agents come
into personal communication with these chiefs ?—They did ;
I think I may say I communicated personally with almost
every Bheel in my district.
1131. Speaking his own language, of course?—Yes.
1132. Was the result of those arrangements and policy
successful ?•—I may s^ perfectly successful ; for in a report
which I made to Sir John Malcolm in 1830,1 stated that
although all means liad formerly failed to produce order, a
conciliatory policy had been successful, inasmuch as Khan¬
desh, which had formerly been in such a state of anarchy, was
now as quiet as any district under the Bombav presidency.
1133. You stated that part of the measures adopted con¬
sisted in the grant of land, and also advances of money ; was
land granted and money advanced on any conditions such as
the cultivating of ground or paying any revenue?—On con¬
dition of cultivating the ground and of holding it for a certain
term of years, and repaying those advances within that term
of years.
1134. Did they pay any taxes in any shape?—In the first
instance, it was given them free for three years ; they were
then
SELKCT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. I5I
tlicii bound to commence paying according to their ability, till Colonel
the whole was discharged ; and then I proposed that a small C. O^s.
tax upon each plough, which was considered to be the fairest ,g
mode of assessment there, should be levied; indeed, before I 1851.
left, they had begun to pay in small sums the money advanced.
1135. And generally those arrangements and this policy
were successful both in restoring order and in bringing those
wild tribes under the government of the company ?—Certainly.
I mentioned having made a report to Sir John Malcolm. I
of course, entered into considerable detail in that report, and
it shews the success of the arrangements made, and of the
policy pursued.
1136. Could you consistently with your duty furnish the
Committee with a copy of that report ?—I have brought a
copy with me, which I respectfully submit to the Committee,
if it will be of any service to them.
1137. Did those magistrates reside constantly within their
districts, and constantly superintend the arrangements, and see
that the conditions were fulfilled ?—They constantly resided
within the district, and moved about from village to village
hearing the complaints of the Bheels, and redressing their
grievances, and personally superintending the whole of the
operations.
1138. M'as the magistrate in doing that supported b}' a
military force ?—There were small detachments of military
which were placed in small parties in commanding positions.
Their orders were to prevent any assemblage of Bheels for
hostile purposes, and generally to maintain the peace of the
country.
113g. Can you at all state the amount of the Indian force
that is, European and native, employed by the Company? —
We had no Europeans employed ; they were all Sepoy troops.
In that part of Khandesh of which I had charge, I think there
might have been 200 or 250 regulars of Bombay Native In¬
fantry, and about 600 irregular horse and malseebundees
(district police).
1140. That was in your own particular district ?—Yes.
1141. The force generally within the province was no doubt
larger ?—Y'es ; there was a large military station at Malleigarn,
consisting of two native regiments and a large body of irregular
cavalry at Dhoolia.
1142. Was that intended for the protection of that pro¬
vince, or was it part of the general military arrangements of
India?—It formed one of the chain of posts; still it was for
the protection of that province particularly, yet forming one of
0.63. K 4 the
15^ MINütES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Colonel the chain of posts connecting the Bombay territory with that
C.O^s. of Bengal.
19 June You state that a corps consisting of those native
1851, tribes was formed ; has that been successful from that time to
this ?—Perfectful successful.
1144. Has their fidelity been found uninterrupted?—So
successful has it been, that it has taken, for some years, the
whole of the escort duties of that province, guarding treasure
and prisoners.
1145. Is it commanded by European officers ?—Lieutenant
Outram, now Colonel Outram, was the Bheel agent who had
the raising of that regiment. He was then adjutant of the
23d Regiment of Native Infantry, and very much beloved by
the men. He took certain nom cointnissioned officers and
privates with him, and by that means, it may be easily sup¬
posed, he more readily succeeded in inducing the Bheels to
submit to discipline. Those men speaking their language
and understanding their customs, they submitted to discipline
more readily, and became in this manner completely reformed.
1146. And they formed a corps which was to be relied on ?
—They are as good now as any irregular corps in the service.
1147. Having stated that you made a report to Sir John
Malcolm, which you have put in ; did Sir John Malcolm make
any reply to that, expressing any concurrence of opinion with
it r—He stated that it was just the thing that would do good.
The report was ordered to be lithographed, and circulated
throughout the presidency.
1148. Thereby giving his authority to it, and circulating it
for general instruction ?—As a sort of guide to others who
might be employed in the same manner. He, also, in his
work on the Government of India, speaks in terms of com¬
mendation of this settlement, and the good effects which have
been brought about by it.
1149. Did the Home Government also concur in it?—Yes.
In a despatch dated the ist April 1835,11 is stated, ''This
signal instance of (what we have so often impressed upon you)
the superior efficacy of conciliatory means in reducing uncivi-
lÍ2ed and predatory tribes to order and obedience, is one of
the most gratifying events in the recent history of British
India ; and w e trust the success of your measures w ill impress
upon our Indian government the policy, as well as humanity,
01 pursuing the same course in all similar cases."
1150. You have probably acquainted yourself with a good
deal of the contents of the Parliamentary Papers which have
beert
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 153
been published in regard to the state and condition of Southern Colonel
Africa?—I have read the Parliamentary Papers. Ovans.
1151. Speaking from your experience iii India, and from ig~june
your knowledge of the contents of those papers, do you think 1851.
the policy which was pursued in Khandesh is at all applicable
to the wild tribes in Southern Africa, the Kafirs especially ?—
I must premise by stating that I have never been in South
Africa ; but it appears to me that the habits and feelings of all
those wild tribes are so similar in many points, that it is pro¬
bable the same principles might be applied, and with equal
success, in settling those tribes also.
1152. Have you any other and more especial reasons for
applying a similar policy to the tribes in South Africa ?—Yes.
I observe in the Parliamentary Papers to which I have alluded,
particularly those laid before Parliament in August 1850, re¬
specting the Settlement of Natal, that a similar policy has
been followed by Mr. Shepstone, who is stated to be the diplo¬
matic agent among the Zoolas there ; and from his own account
of it, contained in his Reports to the Natal government, pages
42 to 47, the principle of that system appears to me to resemble
so much the system followed in Khandesh, that I think the
presumption is, that if it has succeeded in Natal so well, it
might also succeed elsewhere.
1153. Have you any opinions to offer to the Committee as
to the measures which you think should be taken in Southern
Africa to apply the Indian policy to the settlement of the
differences which exist between the local government and those
tribes ?—I think that, as Sir John Malcolm observes, and
reiterates in many of his reports, the great object is to have
men fitted for the work ; men speaking the language of the
people, acquainted with their habits and customs, and disposed
to make allowances for their prejudices and feelings ; and,
above all, I think that it is necessary to use the authority of
the chiefs, to govern the people, in short, as much as possible
through the medium of their own chiefs, and to avoid all
sudden and premature innovations. The subsidiary measures
must of course depend upon the state of the country; but still,
as I before observed, as these principles have been applied in
one part of South Africa, that is at Natal, by the diplomatic
agent there, and as they are reported to have succeeded there
in the same manner as they have done in India, it appears to
me that they might be generally applied to other wild tribes
with the same good effect.
1154. Chairmayi.'] What is the amount of the salary given
to
1.54
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
lo a Bheel agent ?—I received 400 rupees a month, that was
independent of my military pav and allowances.
19 June '155- Were they chiefly officers in the army who were
jSfii. employed in that capacity?—They were all officers in the
army.
1156. Do you think there was an advantage in employing
military men in that capacity ?—I think there was ; by em¬
ploying civil servants the salary would have been larger j and
from the former being accustomed to deal with troops, and
the military and civil power being united in the same person,
a considerable advantage was gained.
1157. Do you think there was a disposition on the part of
the natives to look up with greater respect to military men?—
No, I do not know that I can say that.
1158. Mr. HawesJl Had these Bheels any religion; were
they Hindoos or Mahometans ?—A portion of them call them¬
selves Hindoos, and a portion call themselves Mahometans,
but still they held very loosely to either faith.
1159. Were they a very superstitious race?—Very like all
wild tribes, apt to take alarm at the slightest evil omen : they
would change their encampments on the death of any^person,
or on the death of any cow or other animal ; indeed the great
difficulty was to induce them to come in and submit.
1160. Were they addicted to witchcraft?—They had what
were called jadooqurs (sorcerers), who, I believe, a good deal
resemble the prophets in Africa.
1161. Had they considerable influence over the people?—
Very great.
11Ö2. Do the chiefs make use of their influence for the
purpose of acquiring power over the people ?—Over their own
immediate followers, certainly ; among many tribes in India
they were supposed to possess the power of taking away life
by their incantations.
1163. Did the resident magistrates attempt to deal with
those local superstitions in any way?—Only when they were
brought before them in the shape of positive crimes ; but not
from any mere presumption of those persons being possessed
of the power of witchcraft.
1164. Did the magistrates venture to arrest and punish
those sorcerers?—Not unless they were accused of any positive
crime; in that case they were dealt with just in the same
manner as any other persons.
1165. Was that readily submitted to by the native popu¬
lation ?—I found no difficulty in it, though I do not recollect
any
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 155
any particular case at this moment; I presume there would Colonel
have been no difficulty in dealing with those men. C. Ovans.
1166. Were their peculiar laws and customs, and local super-
stitions, respected by those resident magistrates, or did they 1851.
attempt to interfere with them in any way ?—They did not
interfere at all ; they were entirely respected, provided there
was no criminality.
1167. They were brought alone within the British jurisdic¬
tion by the commission of crime r—Crime was always dealt
with without reference to person or superstition ; in other re¬
spects we never interfered with any mere superstition because
it was a superstition.
1168. Did the magistrates exercise any civil jurisdiction ;
did they settle disputes regarding land or the payment of
debts?—Not except with regard to the Bheels ; they had full
power over the Bheels, civil and criminal ; they had only
criminal powers over the rest of the inhabitants. The civil
disputes of the rest of the inhabitants were carried to the
Adawluts.
ii6"g. Did the Bheels readily submit to the civil jurisdiction?
—They did ; because we made use of the chiefs in settling
disputed points, and they generally followed the customs of
the country in employing punchyats, which are juries.
1170. A kind of jury system exists there?—This punchyat
is a jury system, composed of five, and the word meaning
"five," This was the ancient system of India formerly; the
civil government was chiefly carried on by that means.
1171. The chiefs lent their authority to the resident magis¬
trates, and co-operated cordially with them ?—Yes.
1172. Did the chiefs receive any pay or pension from the
Company ?—They had certain rights over certain districts, in
consequence of being the hereditary guardians of those dis¬
tricts. They had also certain payments and lauds from every
village in their own districts. The lands were continued to
them, but the payments in kind were commuted into a money
payment, which we made monthly.
1173. Can you state to the Committee the average amount
of payment to each chief in British money ?—They varied so
very much that I could not exactly state.
1174. Can you state the two extremes, the smallest and the
largest payment ?—I think the largest payment in my agency
was about 150 I. a year, 1,500 rupees; the lowest might have
been about 25 rupees.
1175. Did the revenue of the province compensate the
Company for the expense of their establishment upon the
restoration
156 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Colonel restoration of order and tranquillity ?—When I took charge
t. Ovaru. of my agency, which is situated both above and below a
19*^6 of hills, called the Satmalla Hills, ihe villages in the im-
1851. mediate vicinity of the hills were almost all depopulated, and
in a de[)lorable state. As those settlements obtained confi¬
dence among the people, the people returned to their villages,
and I think I reported that 113 deserted villages had been
re-established in the course of a few years, and the people had
returned to the others also, so that the increase of revenue
must be supposed to have been very considerable.
1176. You did not resort, with a view to the settlement of
that district, to the formation of treaties with the chiefs ?—
Not at all. Cowls, or papers of protection, were given to
them ; these were drawn up in a particular manner, stating,
that as long as they behaved well and protected the country,
and were present with the sirkar, their rights would be re¬
spected ; but then those papers were given by the Govern¬
ment. They were not in the shape of a treaty ; they were
papers given to them as a sort of deed to give them confi¬
dence, and which they could always keep in their possession
to show that their rights had been restored to them.
1177. It was in the nature of a personal protection, ackow-
ledging the position or rank of the chief?—Yes, and guaran¬
teeing those rights to him as long as he remained peaceable and
performed the duties laid down in the paper.
1178. You ascertained in the first instance the rights of
those chiefs, and then guaranteed them in this instrument of
w hich you have spoken ?—I myself personally examined into
the rigtits, not only of the chiefs, but of all the Bheels within
my agency. I ascertained what those rights were, confirmed
those to which they were entitled, and settled them either at
the plough or as jagleeas (village watchmen).
1179. committed no crime which brought
them within the British jurisdiction, you left them to govern
themselves and manage their own affairs?—Yes.
1180. Colonel Estcourt.~\ You assumed first of all that you
had possession of the country ?—Yes.
1181. Was that disputed by those people?—No, they did
not claim the country ; they were driven into the hills, as I
state in my report ; the country had become depopulated in
consequence of those marauding parties, and in consequence
of the famine ; they themselves took to the hills and plundered,
but they simply claimed those rights which they had on the
villages.
1182. In giving them letters of protection you did not say
that
BELEGT COMxMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 157
that the country was theirs ?—No, there was no claim what- Colonel
ever to the country in that part of Khandesh, of which I had C.O^s.
charge, jg june
1183, In fact you took possession of the country as a con- 1851.
quered country ?—It was taken from the Peishwa in the war
of 1817 and 1818, When the war broke out between the
Peisiiwa and the British Government it was conquered from
him, that being then a portion of the Peishwa's dominions.
11 84. Inhabited by the Bheels ?—Inliabited by the same
race which I speak of, and also by other castes ; the Bheels
do not form a very large portion of the population; the Bheels
are a predatory tribe.
1185. Were they anxious to obtain these letters of protec¬
tion?—They were extremely anxious at that time to he
settled.
1186. Supposing quarrels had occurred between those tribes,
in what way would the Government have enforced their autho-
■ n - •
nty ?—By military means.
1187. Would the force in the country at the disposal of the
officers who had the charge of those districts, have been suffi¬
cient to maintain the authority of the government in such
cases?—If the detachment which I had under my orders had
not been sufficient, I should have made a requisition to Mal-
leigam, and a reinforcement would have been sent; but I had
no occasion to do so, because as the settlement proceeded I
dispensed with the assistance of the military altogether, except
a very small body.
1188. There was a regiment raised in the country, was
there not?—Yes, a Bheel regiment; a regiment raised from
these predatory tribes.
1189. By whom was that regiment officered?—Colonel
Outram raised the regiment, and there was another officer
under him ; there were but two European officers ; native
officers were brought from one of the native regiments.
1190. Those people had the advantage of beingable to
speak the language of the country ?—Yes, they spoke the lan¬
guage of the Bheels themselves ; they were acquainted with
our discipline, and those Bheels looked up to them as being
men of a higher caste ; therefore that made them more dis¬
posed to submit to disci[)line. It was supposed they would
not submit to discipline, but they did so, and it vvas found
that this discipline brought about a more complete change in
their habits than anything else. It was by enforcing discipline
that they turned out so well.
1191. With regard to the disputes among themselves, who
settled
158 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
C^O^ans them ; had you anything to do with the disputes of the
people?—I had a complete control over those Bheels, both
19 June civil and magisterial.
1851. 1192. When there were disputes in the country among the
people themselves, did they bring their disputes to you for
settlement ?—Yes.
1193. In ail cases ?—Yes, they were bound to do so.
1194. Did they refer them first of all to their own chiefs?
—The chief, for instance, generally settled disputes among his
own Bheels, but provided he could not succeed in so doing
they were referred to the agent.
1195. What is the character of the country ?—That part of
the country of which I had charge was in fact a range of hills,
extending about 100 miles east and west, and perhaps about
30 in breadth.
1196. It is a hilly country?—^Yes, and broken into very
deep rugged ravines ; it was a very difficult country.
1197. Covered with jungle ?—Yes.
1198. You had cavalry, you say?—Irregular cavalry.
1199. Were they to be used principally as messengers in
keeping up the communications?—No, as troops.
1200. Was the country fitted for cavalry ?—They were em¬
ployed in the plains ; those hills were bounded towards the
Decçan by tableland, and also below.
1201. There was a mixture of land; sometimes a portion
being mountainous, and sometimes a portion being level ?—
Yes, the hills rise very perpendicular from the plain.
1202. Viscount Mandeville.'] With respect to the annual
payment to the chiefs, was that regulated by the amount of
their former income ?—Their rights were inquired into, and
commuted into a money payment, the amount of which of
course depended on the amount of their former rights.
1203. The Kafir chiefs seem to have no regular income;
in what manner would you deal with them or regulate the
payment to be made to them ?—Not having been in Africa,
I could not presume to say. My opinion is chiefly formed
from reading the account of the settlements which have been
made in Natal by Mr. Shepstone; he seems to have made use
of the authority of the chiefs, and to govern those people
through their means, very much in the same manner as we
have done in Khandesh. They seem there also to be settled in
localities ; he even states that they have paid a tax, amount¬
ing to between 3,000/. and 4,000/.; he said he had visited
41 of those chiefs, and he had received between 3,000 /. and
4,000 /. as a tax, and he supposed the whole amount would
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. I59
be 10,500/. per annum. I give this from the Parliamentary Colonel
Papers of the 14th of August, 1850, regarding the "Settle- C.^Omns,
ment of Natal," pages 65 and 165. 19 June
1204. Mr. Booker.] Was all the military force withdrawn i85i'
from Khandesh before these conciliatory measures were taken,
or were the Company's officers backed by a large military
force in carrying them out ?—In the agency of which I had
charge I think there were about 300 regular troops when I
took charge of it, and perhaps there might have been 400 or
500 irregular cavalry, and malseebundees (district police).
1205. Were the employments of the Bheels in that district
pastoral, or what were their ordinary pursuits ?—They had no
fixed habitations when in the hills, and no cattle ; in fact, no
property ; that was the great difficulty we found in dealing
with men who had no property and no local habitation.
1206. You stated that you had paid attention to the Par¬
liamentary Reports, as to the system of policy which of late
has been pursued towards the South African tribes ?—I have
read them.
1207. 1^0 yo" think there have been any, mistakes made
either by this Government or by the local Government ?—Not
having been in the colony, I could not presume to speak upon
that point.
1208. Mr. Hindley.] By what means did those Bheels
subsist if they had no property ?—As regards their local
habitations, perhaps, I ought to explain, that, although when
those chiefs and Bheels were in the hills they had none, yet
still they did belong originally to villages in the plains ; they
were hereditary watchmen of the villages of the plains. In
those disturbed times they gathered in the hills, and instead of
protecting the country, they plundered it. This being the
case, of course it gave us a great advantage in reorganizing
the police of the country, because, as they came in and sub¬
mitted, we settled the hereditary watchmen in their own
hereditary villages, and thus re-established the ancient police
of the country, so that the jagleea became responsible for the
police of his village, and the chief became responsible for the
police of his district.
1209. Do not you think that that constitutes a great dif¬
ference between the situation of the country you have been
speaking of, and that of Kafraria ?—No doubt, that is a
difference.
1210. Mr. Booker.] What was the nature of the frontier
between the East India Company's possessions and the country
you have spoken of; was it mountainous ? —It was bounded
by
l60 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TA,KEN BEFORE THE
Colonel by those high mountains which are of a very difficult nature,
C. Ovan», rising almost perpendicularly from the plain of Khandesh,
i9~Juiñe tableland of the Deccan above; that tableland form-
»851. iog the dominions of his Highness the Nizam ; consequently
that rendered the settlement more difficult, the Nizam's being
a different country.
1211. Mr. Stanley.'] What was the mode of life of the Biieels
when resident in the hills ; did they live entirely by plunder ?
—Entirely by plunder.
1212. The Committee understand you to say that the
government have acted on the plan of governing through
chiefs; was their authority over their subjects despotic.^—I
think that all cases of importance were submitted to the agent,
but all smaller cases were generally settled by arbitration
among themselves, which is the custom of the country, and
by those punchyats or juries.
1213. Did you find it necessary to diminish the authority
of the chiefs, in order to protect the peo[)le from ihem ?—
No, I do not recollect any instances of oj)pression on their
part, inasmuch as in the case of any heinous offences they were
brouüht before the maffistrates.
O w
1214. You say that you did not interfere in any manner with
the customs or habits or laws prevailing among themselves ;
in that case, what law did you administer as a magistrate?—
The police regulations of the Company's government, in all
magisterial cases.
1215. In point of fact, they had no civilized system of law
among themselves ?—No, except the law of custom. In all
cases coming under the head of magisterial cases the magis¬
trate interfered, but they were left to themselves in everything
regarding their local prejudices and feelings and customs.
1216. You did not meet with any jealousy on the part of
the chiefs, from the fear of their authority being diminished?
—I did not ; I found no impediment from that cause at all.
1217. You were understood to say that waste lands were
allotted to these tribes, and that colonies and villages were
formed.^—äste lands were granted for a certain term of
years; advances of money were made to enable them to pur¬
chase implements of industry and cattle ; and the chiefs were
placed in the colonies with their followers. There were also
other Bheels placed in different villages of the agency sepa¬
rately. I think in my agency there were 25 of those colonies
established when I was there.
1218. About what length of time did it take to transform
those wandering tribes into peaceful colonists ?—I took charge
of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. l6l
of the agency in 1825, and I was tliere about six years. The Colonel
system was gradually progressing the whole of that time; but
there has been no relapse, so that we may now consider the jg
reform to be permanent. 1851.
1219. Was there any serious outbreak during the time you
were there ?—I think there was only one of any consequence ;
some of the colonists took to the hills, but they were almost
immediately brought in again by their own chiefs, and pu¬
nished. I think that was the only case of any consequence.
1220. From first to last you had the chiefs entirely with
you ?—Yes.
1221. Willing to co-operate in the work?—Yes.
1222. Was anything done in the way of opening the country
by road communication ?—The roads were improved ; money
was given to make wells in those colonies which I speak of,
and their villages were improved as much as circumstances
permitted.
1223. You stated that you considered the Bheels to be
very susceptible of being worked on by kind treatment?—■
Exactly so.
1224. You have alsfl stated that there is a very general
resemblance, in your opinion, in the habits of all wild tribes ;
should you say that that is a characteristic of all savage tribes ?
—As far as my experience goes.
1225. ChairmanS\ In the report which you have given in,
yon describe these people as a wild race in the midst of civili¬
zation; what do you mean by that expression ?—It ought to
be understood comparatively, of course, because the cultivating
classes and the other castes of the country, the Brahmins, the
Rajputs, the Coombees, and the Mahometans, may be considered
as civilized races compared to the Bheels.
1226. Those races lived intermingled, did they?—They
were in the country ; but the Bheels did not intermarry, or
communicate with the others.
1227. Did they live in a completely different district, or
were they all mixed up together ?—They were all mixed up
together.
1228. Did your functions as magistrate extend over all the
inhabitants, or merely over the Bheels?—Over all. The Bheels
were subject to me in every way; I had full power, boihcivil
and police, over them; but over the rest of the inhabitants I
had only magisterial power.
1229. How were they governed?—The rest of the inhabi¬
tants were under the collector of the district,
1230. Mr. Hawes.] Was there any attempt made to intro-
0.63. L duce
102
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Colonel duce schools for the instruction of the children of those tribes ?
C. Ovans. —Not during my time ; but the officer who succeeded me,
19 June succeeded in establishing a few schools.
1851. 1231. Chairman.] Were the religious opinions of the
Bheels at all interfered with by missionaries or others?—In
no manner whatever; there were no missionaries in the
country ; there were no Europeans, except oureelves.
1232. Mr. Stanley.] Was it a part of your policy to employ
as police or as troops for the preservation of order, those who
would otherwise have taken to a life of plunder?—Precisely
SO; those very Bheels, who were in point of fact the watchmen
of the village?, had taken to plunder, because they were in
the hills with their chiefs ; when brought down again and
placed in their villages, they became the police of the country,
and, in fact, guarded that country which they had plundered
before.
1233. The villages you speak of were formed of the more
peaceful part of the population ?—The villages were entirely
composed of cultivators.
1234. The Marquis of Granby.] The feelings and disposi¬
tions of the Hindoos and ]\I ussuliuans are quite different, are
they not?—Yes.
1235. W as the effect of the conciliatory measures equally
beneficial towards both classes ? —Yes, the system was applied
to both without the slightest difference ; in India we make no
difference as to religion oreaste; the effect was precisely the
same in both cases.
1236. Mr. B. Carter.] You stated that these people were
a savage tribe, living in the midst of civilization?—I spoke
comparatively, inasmuch as the other castes, the Brahmins,
and Coombees, and Rajputs, may be considered as a civilized
race compared to the Bheels.
1237. They formed about one-eighth of the population, and
were mixed up with other inhabitants, who were more civilized
than themselves ?—If there were a certain number of Bheels
in a village, they would live in a distinct part of that village ;
they would not live mixed up with the Brahmins and the
cultivating classes.
1238. In the district in which they lived would it have been
possible for them to retire before the Europeans into any
country which was not under the authority of Europeans?—
They might have retired into the Nizam's country.
1239. There was a frontier bordering on the Nizam's
country?—Yes; our country there is bordered by the Nizam's
country.
1240. They
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 163
1240. They would in that case have had to contend with Colonel
the subjects of another government probably hostile to them? C- Ovans.
—They might have retired into the Nizam's territory, but still jg June
they would have been met by the Nizam's troops, commanded 1851.
by British officers,
1241. They v/ere not in the position of having any supposed
rights of their own which were interfered with by the en¬
croachments of Europeans ?—^No, they were not in that posi¬
tion ; their rights consisted, as I say, of these dues from the
villages, and they had been interfered with during those trou¬
blesome times by the native governments. That was partly
the cause of their having been driven into these acts of
rebellion and plunder.
1242. It was, in fact, a quarrel with other native tribes
which led to the acts of rebellion?—There were no other
native tribes there similarly situated to them ; they had been
deprived of their rights by the native governments.
1 243. The Kafirs range over a large district of country, and
possess cattle ; is there any analogy between the condition of
the Bheels in that respect and the Kafirs ?—^The Bheels had
no cattle ; in fact, the difficulty with the Bheels was, that there
was nothing tangible ; they had no property ; our great object
was to give them property.
1244. Your experience, in fact, is confined to an effective
mode of dealing with native tribes in combat with Europeans ;
you do not speak of the position of the Bheels as being similar
to that which the Kafirs now hold ? —I cannot speak of the
Kafirs from any personal acquaintance with them ; my opinion
as to the conciliatory system being applicable to other wild
tribes is chiefly formed from the success it has met with at
Natal.
1245. Mr. Halves.] Are you of opinion that the possession
of cattle on the part of the Kafirs, and their pastoral habits,
render it more difficult to adopt the Indian policy than if they
had no property and no cattle, and were merely a predatory
tribe living upon plunder ?—I should certainly think that if a
tribe possesses property of any description it gives you a hold
upon them, and gives you so far an advantage in settling them.
That is our opinion in India with regard to those tribes. We
have not any of those pastoral tribes there, and of course the
country which I speak of is of a much more limited extent.
1246. Marquis of Granby.] One of the great difficulties you
had to deal with was the lawlessness of the Bheels, and their
savage mode of life, was not it?—Yes.
0.63. L 2 Sir
164
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir Andries Stockenstrom, called in ; and Examined.
1247. Chairman.] ARE you a native of the colony of the
ocken$trom. ^ c i tt i t
uape 01 Good Hope r—1 am.
19 June 1248. You have passed almost your whole life there?—I
* have lived there all my life, except that this is my third trip to
Europe.
1249. I" ^vhat part of the colony have you resided during
that period ?—In my earlier life I resided in Cape Town, but
I have been principally in public employment in the eastern
parts, except since the year 1839, when 1 have been upon a
pension. I was for a short time upon a pension previously to
that, when I lived in the north of Europe, in Stockholm.
1250. In what part of the colony do you now reside?—I
now reside withiti 25 miles of Kafirland, at a place called
Maestroom, in the district of Somerset.
1251. Have you landed property there?—Considerable.
1252. You yourself exercise the pursuits of agriculture
there, do you not ?—I am a farmer there.
1253. You have been connected with the government of
the country ?—Very much.
1254. Will you have the goodness to state for what period,
and in what capacities?—I began public life in 1808, as a
clerk ; I was then a boy. In 1811 I entered the military ser¬
vice. In 1812 I was appointed a magistrate of Cradock
district. In 1815 I became llandrost of the district of Graaf
Reinet. On the ist of January 1828 I became commissioner-
general of the frontier of the eastern division, an office substi¬
tuted for the lieutenant-governor at that time. In 1833 I
came to this country and resigned my office, and retired to
Stockholm, the land of my forefathers. At the end of 1835 I
was called away from Stockholm by Lord Glenelg ; and in the
beginning of 1836 I was sent as lieutenant-governor to the
Eastern Province. About the close of 1838, I think it was, I
returned to this country. In 1839 1 was removed from the
office of lieutenant-governor. I then returned to the colony,
and have been living in retirement ever since, except when,
occasionally, the public service has called me forward.
1255. You have had abundant opportunities of forming an
opinion upon the subject of the policy pursued by this country
with respect to the border tribes upon the frontier of the
colony ?—In order to be very particular, I have put in writing
my answer to that question. Having given that answer, it
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 165
will be for the Committee to decide whether they think it Sir A.
worth while to ask me any further questions. Having yester- Stockenstrom.
day received a summons to appear before this Committee, I
have deemed it my duty, with the utmost deference, to comply 1851.
therewith. At the same time I consider it right respectfully
to inform the Committee that I gave my views with reference
to the affairs of the Cape frontier most fully before the Abo¬
rigines Committee of the House of Commons, in the years
1835 and 1836, and have, within the last five or six years, had
occasion to make some communications on the same affairs to
the Colonial Department, in Downing-street. I humbly sub¬
mit, that it may save much of the valuable time of the Com¬
mittee, if I be allowed to refer to my said evidence and com¬
munications, and to add, that I fully adhere to the opinions, as
well as the facts, therein stated by me, and that subsequent
events have unfortunately too much confirmed my views in
general. For the tacts stated by me I am of course respon¬
sible ; but I take the liberty to submit to the consideration of
the Committee how utterly hopeless it is to get at the truth on
any disputed point without the most full investigation on the
spot, where the witnesses on all sides may be heard and con¬
fronted ; and 1 cannot better prove this assumption than by the
following circumstance, which is within the immediate reach
of the Committee. In the Parliamentary Blue Book, on the
"State of the Kafir Tribes," dated 20th March 1851? there
appears at page 10 a letter, which 1 addressed to the Cape
government on the ist July 1850 ; and in page 108 of the
Parliamentary Blue Book, on " a Representative Assembly at
the Cape," dated 191h May 1851, there appears another letter
of mine to the same government, dated ii July 1850.
In a despatch, dated February i8th, 1851, published in the
last-named Blue Book, at page 202, Lord Grey writes to
the Governor of the Cape, " I am glad that the civil commis¬
sioner of Victoria has been able to furnish you with satisfac¬
tory answers to the statements made by Sir A. Stockenstrom
and Mr. Hart, relative to the treatment of the natives in that
quarter." Now I have carefully examined every report or
statement which has been published in any of the Parlia¬
mentary Blue Books, as received from the said civil commis¬
sioner of Victoria, and I cannot find that they contain one
syllable referring to either of my said letters ; and so far from
any " satisfactory answer" to, the said civil commissioner in
a great measure confirms the main point of my said letter of
the 1st July 1850, without referring to it, where he says, in
his letter of the 4th October 1850, to be found in page 35 of
0.63. L 3 the
l66 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir^i. the said Blue Book, of the 20th March 1851: "TheTam-
Stochnstrom. bookies say, and with truth, that a large piece of fine country
loJuiie taken from them, and given to the farmers along the
1851. Stormbergen. They agreed to this, in the full confidence that
Kralee would be ordered out of the Ballotta," &c. My state¬
ment is, that the field cornet, Z. Pretorios, " resorted to me
for advice and assistance in obtaining from the Governor the
execution of his own promise, whereby he had given the said
Tambookie territory to the farmers," 1 leave to the Com¬
mittee to judge in how far the former passage is a " satisfac¬
tory answer " to the latter. The same field cornet had also,
as I stated in my said letter, " produced a copy of a memorial
which the said farmers had presented to the Governor, the
details of which Í cannot now give, but which in substance
prayed for the annexation of the said territory to the colony ;
and the reply to which, written and signed by the Governor's
own hand, which Pretorius likewise produced, granted the
prayer, subject only to this exception, viz., that the Kafir
chief, Rama, and his followers were not to be expelled,
because the former was a Christian, and the latter would
make good servants for the farmers." I have just seen a Par¬
liamentary Blue Book, containing a letter, in which the
Governor writes that the document above stated to have been
written and signed by bis own hand, if it exist, must be a
forgery. The Committee will judge whether a forgery con¬
nected with so vital a question ought not to have at once
become matter of investigation on the part of the Attorney-
general, in July 1850, when the Governor received notice of its
existence. In the meantime, the field cornet has been dis¬
missed for trying to enforce that "forged" document, without
the slightest inquiry as to this document itself ; and the Tarn-
bookies, from whom, as the civil commissioner says, " a large
piece of fine country has been taken," have joined in the war
against us. It strik.es me that the merits of this question
cannot be decided without the most minute examination and
confronting of the field cornet and several other witnesses.
To my other letter also, as above named, the civil commis¬
sioner, so far from affording " satisfactory answer," does not
make the slightest allusion, that I can trace. The fact is, that
the complaints of the Kat River Hottentots, as therein con¬
tained, were fully substantiated, as the Committee and the
public would have found, if the Blue Book had contained the
proceedings of a court of inquiry, in consequence of which the
magistrate complained of received a hint that he ought to
resign, without, however, any satisfaction or compensation
being
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
167
being made to the aggrieved parties, some of whom are or have Sir A.
been, I believe, in open rebellion. There, are, consequently, Stockenstrom.
in the Blue Book, no "satisfactory answers" to the state- i^^üñe
ments made by me ; and I am bound, with every possible 1B51.
deference, but firmly, to maintain that without a commission
deputed to the Cape, composed of men of the highest character
and independence, totally unconnected vvtth the colony or any
party therein, to examine the numbers of witnesses of opposite
opinions and interests, whom it is almost impossible to bring
over to this country, the British Government and Legislature
will never be able to ascertain the true causes of the disaffec-
tions, disturbances, and wars, which are at present raging at
the Cape ; and to do justice, unless a free constitutional
government be granted to that colony, whose local knowledge
and public scrutiny would render all mystifications very difficult
at least. After this preamble, I shall feel great satisfaction in
affording the Committee every information in my power.
1*256. Without entering into particular cases, such as that
to w liich you have alluded, will you have the goodness to state
to the Committee generally what you believe to have been the
cause of the late outbreak?—I think our vacillation in systems,
in making treaties and breaking them, and the nature of the
people we have to deal with. One party will tell you they are
all harmless inoffensive people ; another, that they are irre¬
claimable savages. They are both equally remote from the
fact ; they are just barbarians who will plunder, and require to
be kept tight. At the same time strict justice and humanity
are the only means by which you can rule that or any other
nation, I believe.
1257. Supposing this war to be brought to a successful
termination, what is the course which you would suggest as
desirable to be pursued upon the frontier of the Cape co¬
lony?—Allow me, with every deference, to say that I believe
there is not a man in this country, or at the Cape, who can
tell you what must be done at the close of the war; every¬
thing depends upon its termination. I ought to know a great
deal of our colonial natives, but I cannot tell you what ought
to be done. What we are to do now is, not to rest till we
have those people down. They believe themselves our masters
now, and unless they are put clown they will drive us out of
the colony. But then, on the other hand, when the question
is put to me, what ought to be done? I can only say that
justice and truth are the only means which we have to rule
the colony.
1258. Are you able to suggest to the Committee any prac-
0.63. L 4 tical
l68 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Slr^i. tical measures, which, in your opinion, and from your expe-
Stuckenstrom, i.Í0n0e, you think the Government of this country ought to
19 June adopt in reference to these tribes, in the event of the British
1851. authority being completely re-established over them ?—Î could
have done that 20 years ago, and I did so ; it is a very diffi¬
cult questjon now ; we have now called in the Zoolas and the
Amapondas, to attack those people in the rear. That involves
the question in a new difficulty; it is the greatest misfortune
which could ever happen to lead the blacks into the idea that
we want their assistance ; if we could not do it ourselves, it
would be better to give it up ; I believe we were perfectly
competent to do it ourselves.
1259. Do you mean that, supposing Kafraria to be subdued,
you antieipate further difficulties with the Zoolas ?—With all
the tribes which we call into our assistance now ; I believe it
is an ascertained fact that the moment the request came to
Port Natal for the Zoolas, they at once assumed an arrogant
tone towards the whites. They said they never could have
expected the white men would have required the assistance of
the blacks.
1260. Do you think that there would be any advantage in
])ushing the frontier as far as the great Kei River?—T thought
so in 1846, provided you had adopted a certain humane policy,
and would acknowledge Kreli, the son of Hintza, as the para¬
mount chief, and entered into negotiations with him ; it would
hâve been a complicated matter even then ; I do not see now
" how it is to be done.
1261. Do you still think that in connexion with new
measures of another description, it would be advantageous
that the Kei River should be the future boundary of the British
colony ?—You might enter into a certain system, but I think
it has become very difficult to rule those natives ; I believe
there is not a more able officer anywhere than the officer we
have had there for two or three years carrying on this system,
the officer who acts immediately under Sir Harry Smith.
1 262. Whom do you mean ?—Colonel JMackinnon. I do
not know him personally, but I have heard from all quarters
that he is a man of the strictest integrity, and wishing to do
justice, but under the present system he cannot do it.
1263. Under what system?—The system he has carried
out ; the patrol system. And if you look to the Government
Gazettes, you will find that if a man has committed a crime
in the colony which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the
colonial courts, in which he may be tried according to the
laws of the colony, convicted and punished, he is brought
over,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 169
over, and if it is supposed that there is not sufficient proof Sir A.
before those courts, he is tied up and flogged. No nation Stockenstrom.
on earth can submit to that. I quote the Government
Gazette. 1851.
1264. Do not you thjnk that it would be possible to devise
some improved system of managing the internal affairs of
Kafraria, being of opinion, as you are, that the existing system
is liable to so much objection ?—It entirely depends upon the
termination of the war ; I should revert to my original opinion,
which is on record. I should leave those people independent,
and rule them through the chiefs. I would gain an influence
over the chiefs.
1265. You would not attempt to rule them through the
means of Englishmen ?—I do not think you can gain any¬
thing by doing that; but it comes back, to the same
question. We have got ourselves into such a labyrinth that
it is impossible to say what you will have to do at the close
of the war.
1266. You are not prepared to suggest any very distinct
policy which, in your opinion, ought to be pursued in reference
to these tribes at the close of the war?—I should refer to what
I stated before the Committee in 1835-6, which it is impos¬
sible for me to recollect. I should be disposed to refer with
confidence to that ; modifications may suggest themselves at
the close of the war, and we may see how matters may then
stand. I dare not commit myself now by suggesting any¬
thing.
1267. Do you think that the outbreak which has recently
taken place is attributable to the absence of a military force
of sufficient amount upon the frontier?—Decidedly; under
the present system they could not do with the present force.
I do not think 5,000 men would carry out that system perma¬
nently.
1268. You consider the system itself radically impolitic and
unjust?—Radically bad and impolitic ; I have stated so repeat¬
edly. The Kafirs have been in a state of agitation ever since
that system was adopted. They have been constantly plotting
against the colony ever since that system has been in force.
Since the last war there has never been one moment's perma¬
nent peace upon the frontier.
1269. What is the radical vice of that system which has
produced those effects?—Those men do not like to be de¬
prived of their land and to be domineered over by us. It is
not natural that they should.
1270. Do you think that no system of interference is neces¬
sary
170 minutes of evidence taken before the
Stockemtrom protection of the British colonists against the
' inroads of these barbarous tribes?—For a long time Kafirland
19 June was ruled by a species of prestige ; the black man had a fearful
i85>- idea of the superior moral and physical power of the white;
he has lost that ; the prestige has gone.
1271. Has not that been the result in a great measure of
his having become acquainted with the use of fire-arms, and
very much better able to cope with the white man than he was
in former times ?—That contributes at present to his showing
that strength ; they never thought of meeting us in the open
field till 1846, when they deTeated us, and burnt all our
waggons.
1272. They have now become a most formidable foe?—A
very formidable foe, I assure you ; they are now united ; here¬
tofore we have had to do with Kafirs only, and only with
tribes of Kafirs occasionally ; so that sometimes you could
keep all the others quiet while you were dealing with one tribe.
We had the Tambookies in our favour; they are now against us.
1273. Do you think that under any policy which can be
suggested or pursued, it will be possible to live on the frontier,
for some time at least, without the defence of a considerable
military force ?—For some years to come it will be impossible;
affairs have got into that state that you must expect to keep
up a considerable force.
1274. Do you think that the colonists would be either able
or willing to defend the frontier against the inroads of those
savage tribes, without the assistance of the Queen's troops?—
Not without the assistance of the Queen's troops, but they
have invariably borne the brunt of the business ; whenever
there was a waríhey turned out by hundreds. In 1846 I was
called on by the Governor, in consequence of the burgher
forces requesting that I should lead them. The burghers
came from every part of the ,colony. I dare say the Governor
had 6,000 or 8,000 colonial troops upon the frontier in a very
short time, as soon as they could reach it.
1275. Is not it the fact, that the manner in which the Kafirs
have improved in the means of carrying on wars successfully
against the whites has made it much more necessary that there
should be regular troops to oppose them than in former times?
—For some time to come, decidedly.
1276. At present the colonists would naturally and properly
shrink from coping, unassisted by the regular troops, with
these barbarians?—They cannot be permanently upon the
frontier, therefore they expect to have troops there ; they are
perfectly
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 17*
oerfectlv strong enough, as long as they are in the field, to Sir A.
cope Whh the Kafirs. , Sloch^om.
1277. would be a great inconvenience to the colonists to jm,g
be on constant service?—It is impossible. 1851.
1278. Do you think the colony would be disposed, in the
event of their having representative institutions which were
satisfactory to ihem, to bear the whole or a considerable por¬
tion of the pecuniary burden of maintaining a military force
upon the colony ?—That brings me back to my former answer.
It all depends upon the manner in which the war is ultimately
settled and the state in which the frontier is delivered over to
them. • It is quite impossible to decide what the colonists
would do, or what they ought to do, before you know how the
war terminates ,and in what state the frontier will be delivered
over to them. It is impossible for any man to say, or to
pledge the future Parliament as to what they would do, or
what the colony would do generally. The colony is entitled
to a constitutional government; accepts it, of course, with all
its legitimate responsibilities: beyond that I would not take
upon myself to go. That is what they have themselves said.
In various petitions which they have sent home they have
repeatedly stated that that is what they wish.
1279. In reference to the defence of the colony, do you
think it would be important either that the seat of government
should be transferred from Cape Town to some point further
in the east, or that the colony should be divided ?—I do not
think either step to be necessary ; I think an executive officer
with full powers would be necessary upon the frontier.
1280. You think there can be such an executive officer who
is not the governor of the colony ?—A lieptenant-governor,
decidedly ; I do not see any objection to that.
1281. Are the interests and feelings of the eastern part of
the colony, and that of the western part of the colony, abso-
lutely the same in respect to those subjects ?—No ; a very
small fraction in the eastern part of the colony are for separa¬
tion. It may be necessary here to observe that the people of
the west have no objection to separation ; but the majority
object to separation, except through the Parliament ; the ma¬
jority would have no separation, except as the act of their own
parliament.
1282. Colonel Estcourt.] Great objections are entertained
by you to the present system ?—Yes.
1283. What are the precise objections which you entertain
to the present system?—I object to our having, for instance,
the right of sending patrols among those people as one of the
greatest
172 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Siodlíú'rom misfortunes, and which has brought on several succes-
■ sive wars. I object to the flogging system, which is, that when
19 June ^ man's case cannot he sufficiently proved, he shall by the mere
1851. ipse dixit of an individual be tied up and flogged, when the
proofs are not supposed to be sufficient to bring him before a
competent court. In the long run no people on earth can
submit to that ; it has been carried on by one of the ablest
and most upright officers, tiiough I have not the honour of
knowing that gentleman ; he has done his best, but it has
failed under him, and the Kafirs have had the cunning to
make him and others believe that they were satisfied ; and
while they were kissing hands and receiving presents, they
were brooding over their misfortunes, and they have been
caballing and plotting for war ever since the moment that
system was set on foot for the second time ; it is not a new
system ; it is the second time it has been tried.
1284. Under what authority was tiie patrol system esta¬
blished?—The patrol system had its origin in 1817, under
Lord Charles Somerset ; it has been going on from that time
to this.
1285. Is the patrol system different from the commando
system ?—Yes, the patrol system is distinguished from the
commando system.
1286. The commando system is an old system ?—Yes; but
it has been mistaken. I have met «Ith some men ignorant
enough to suppose the commando system meant a parcel of
people going and shooting anybody whom they eame across.
In cases of emergency, a field cornet had a right to call out
people on the frontier; in some cases the magistrate might
do so ; but, generally speaking, and in cases of general war,
the Governor onlv had the ri^lit to call out a commando. That
was the old system, from time immemorial; but the patrol
system was established in 1817, by which, if you lose your
cow, and can show the spoor, you rollow it with the patrol,
and the first kraal you come to you demand satisfaction; if
the kraal do not pay you, you seize their cattle.
1287. What does that patrol consist of?—It often con¬
sisted of a field cornet and some burghers, who were collected
together ; lately, generally, it has consisted of military men,
a military officer being at its head.
1288. Under the old commando system, did not they follow
the spoor of the cattle under the field cornet ?—A commando
very seldom collected, except where it had been ascertained
that there were a gang of robbers to be dealt with ; on ordi¬
nary occasions the field cornets and the landrosts bad a right
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
Ï73
to order out the commando in case of emergency ; then, of Sir A.
course, they went upon the spoor. Stockenstrom,
1289. Did they deal with the natives in the same way as ig june
the patrols did ?—They brought their own property back ; it 1851.
was not then permitted them to demand compensation, except
when the Government went to war. If they found their own
property they brought it back, but they could take nothing from
the natives.
1290. The patrol system has been adopted ever since 1817 ?
'—Ever since 1817, with a short intermission ; I believe from
1836 up to 1844; during that time there was no patrol
system.
1291. Then the principal difficulties have arisen since that?
—I know that under my administration, as lieutenant-
governor, and as long as Sir George Napier was governor of
the colony, and up to 1844, there was no patrol system.
1292. What makes the question so complicated since the
last war with the Kafirs ; if the patrol system has been going
on since 1S17, what new state of things has now arisen?—It
was most pernicious while it lasted ; it brought all the mis¬
fortunes upon the colony. All those things will a|)pear stated
before the Committee on Aborigines, in 1835 and 1836.
1293. Mr. Hindley.^ What was the effect of the suspension
of the system between 1836 and 1844?—Tiie effect is very
difficult to state; it will be necessary to refer to Downing-street ;
I can only speak respecting it up to the end of 1838. I left
the government of the Eastern Province at the end of 1838.
Governor Sir George Napier's despatches may be found, and
it will be better to refer to them. The Committee will see
from them in what state the colony was then. Lord Nor-
manby put into my hands a despatch from Sir George Napier,
containing a report from Colonel Somerset ; that despatch is
dated ist of February 1839; " show the state in which
the country was then, and the feelinsi of the Governor as to the
system which was then going on ; but having been out of
office since that time, I know very little on the subject that
can be considered authority.
1294. Sir E. BuxlotiA Did that despatch give a satisfactory
account generally, or an unsatisfactory account?—A very satis¬
factory account, particularly the enclosure from Colonel So¬
merset. Generally, I beg to refer the Committee to Sir
George Napier's statement up to the end of 1838 and the
beginning of 1839 ; this despatch is dated the 1st of February
1839; there were others to the same effect.
1295. Mr. Hindley.'^ In fact, from 1836 to 1844 were there
any
174 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. any robberies of any consequence committed by the Kafirs ?—
Stockenstrom. There were robberies ; on the frontier there have been rob-
19 June beries as long as I have known it, more or less; but I know
1851. of no instance of a breach of treaty.
1296. Mr, Booker.] Being a native of the colony, and resi¬
dent within 25 miles of Kafirland, have you been in personal
communication with the tribes and the chiefs ?—Constantly.
1297. Up to the year 1836?—Up to the present time; that
is to say, I live near the frontier, and those men had a kind
of notion that I could be of assistance to them, and they have
annoyed me so much that I have been obliged to be rude, and
to keep them off.
1298. In what way was that prestige, which you spoke of,
kept up ; had they a high opinion of our military strength, or
of our justice and humanity ?—Both of our moral and physical
superiority.
1299. What circumstances have led to the alteration of that
opinion?—Various circumstances, which are stated in my evi¬
dence before the Committee on Aborigines, to repeat which
would require me to enter into particulars which I should
rather abstain from ; we have come into contact with these
people ; we have done wrong, and they have done wrong.
1300. To maintain that opinion, was it necessary to use our
physical force vigorously?—If we had strictly used our moral
superiority over them, we might have avoided bringing into
play that physical force, and teaching them their strength.
1301. Do you think it is possible to regain that opinion by
any other means than by conquest?—You must conquer now;
they must be put down ; they have an idea now that we are
the weaker party, and they would not let us rest ; we must
put an end to the war, and that cannot be done by fine words.
1302. Do you think it would be a very difficult matter to
accomplish that, or that it would require a very great expen¬
diture of blood or treasure?—I do not think so, if we could
bring the colony to be as unanimous as they were in 1846. I
believe there are gentlemen in the room who can say what
force we had on the frontier in 1846 ; it was immense, and if
those men could be brought to come forward as they did then,
with the resources which have gone from this country, the war
would be soon put a stop to. But allow me to say, that we
have now got additional enemies to deal with ; we have the
Tambookies. The Galekas have also Joined against us, that
being a very powerful tribe.
1303. Do you, as an owner of property in the colony,
think it would be safe to grant a representative government in
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 175
the present state of things ?—Decidedly ; I think it would be S""
quite safe to grant it, and absolutely necessary, in order to ocj^om.
make the colony unanimous ; I do not think yon could accom- jg jung
plisli the object without, unless an overwhelming force goes 1851.
from this country, and we keep the Cape of Good Hope as the
French keep Algiers.
1304. Marquis of Granby¡] You have said that you are of
opinion that the Kafirs must be put down by force, and you
have also said that in 1836 you thought it would be very de¬
sirable, in order to put them down, to make the Kei the boun¬
dary of the colony?—To make the Kei the boundary of the
colony, and look upon Kreli as the paramount chief, entering
into treaty with him as we did in reference to the territory
upon this side. My correspondence with Sir P. Maitland
contains my views on this point.
1305. You were of opinion, then, that you would make the
River Kei the boundary of the colony ?—^Under certain modifi¬
cations.
1306. Would you treat them as British subjects, supposing
you were to make the Kei the boundary ?—I doubt it ; it
would depend in a great measure upon the terms which you
might come to in reference to them and their chiefs; I do not
think you can do anything with those people except through
their chiefs ; I never found the possibility of doing anything
with them except through the chiefs, keeping a sort of moral
control over the chiefs. It is difficult now ; at the same time
you must keep up the idea that your power is very great ; but
1 think by the chiefs alone you can control the Kafirs, unless
you crush them altogether.
1307. Supposing it is necessary to carry the war to a suc¬
cessful termination, why is it not equally expedient now to push
the boundary as far as it was taken in the year 1846?—I
think the Kafirs are more exasperated against us ; they are
less disposed to enter into understandings and treaties with us.
It will be a very difficult question, which can only be solved
at the time when the war is put an end to ; it depends upon
how you end this war. Our frontier affairs are in a perfect
state of chaos,
1308. You think that no measures of conciliation can have
any good effect at the present moment?—I think they may,
provided you get the upper hand of them completely ; they
will not give in ; their feeling as to their own strength and our
weakness is so great that they will not give in unless you do
put them down. Whatever may have been ihe origin of the
war,
176
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir^, war, it is clear that we must conquer them or give up the
stocienitrom. country.
ig juue ^309- Mr. B. Carter.'] In reply to a former question, as to
1851. what were you objections to tlie present system, you men¬
tioned two points ; if you have other points of objection, will
you continue them ; the first you stated was the right to send
a patrol ; the second was the practice of flogging ?—I refer
to the Government Gazette with respect to both points.
1310. Do you consider that those are the chief objections,
or are there any ot,hers which you wish to add ?—There are
details which led to our earlier disputes with the Kafirs, which
are stated in my evidence in 1835-36.
1311. Sir E. Buxton.] ^Yas the flogging system frequently
adopted ?—That I cannot answer for. The Government
Gazette was shown me as proof of the system.
1312. Are you aware whether there have been many cases
of persons being flogged ?—I cannot answer; I saw the cases
I have referred to published in the Government Gazette.
1313. The commando system, though it was legal, was open
frequently, was it not, to very great abuses?—Very great.
1314. Did not it practically consist of a band of men who
murdered whomsoever they pleased?—No; such instances
were invariably punished if they could be traced.
1315. It did not go to that extent ?—No. If a farmer lived
upon the frontier and was attacked by the natives, he would
gather together his neighbours, and they would defend them¬
selves ; but the commando system never authorised anything
of that kind.
1316. Mr. ffini/kj/.] Do any British subjects occupy land
in British Kafraria ?—I believe not, except on sufferance by
the Kafirs ; I am not aware how that may be ; what has taken
place since 1838 I merely know from what I learn occasion¬
ally; I have not been in Kafirland since 1846.
1317. As'far as your impression goes, you do not think
that British subjects do occupy land in British Kafraria?—It
may be that they do with the permission of the chiefs.
Colonel Mackinnon may have authority for allowing it, but
that 1 cannot answer.
1318. It appears from the map that the country is divided
into districts, which are named; what kind of jurisdiction do
we exercise in those different districts ?—I know nothing of
them.
131g. What kind of influence and jurisdiction have the
British settlers there. The land of that country, von say, is
not occupied at all by British settlers, but it is left'entirely to
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 177
the Kafirs. Vou say they do not like to be domineered over sir J.,
and deprived of their land ; have they been deprived of their Stockenstrom.
land in British Kafraria ?—I cannot say. The bone of con- —
tenlion now is the land between the Kat River and the Keis-
kamma.
1320. Sir E. Buxton.'\ Supposing a boer were attacked and
robbed, what did he do to recover his property under the
commando sj'stem ?—He rode after it as fastas he could to
recover it, and if it was necessary in recovering his property,
he would fire upon the thief. If he could not succeed indivi¬
dually he would collect his neighbours, which was always
considered justifiable.
1321. The field cornets had authority to summon them?—
In cases of emergency, when there would be danger arising
from the delay of referring to a magistrate, who might be 300
or 400 miles distant.
1322. Supposing a legal assemblage of peo[)le were col¬
lected, and entered Kafraria to recover cattle; if the cattle of
the Kafirs were taken away, would not the Kafirs also follow
them, and thus a disturbance ensue ?—The commando would
go to the chief, and require satisfactory compensation from
the chief. Under the patrol system, the party woidd go into
Kafirland, upon the spoor, and if the man did not find his
own property, he would seize the cattle of the first kraal the
spoor should lead him to.
1323. Mr. Hawes!} I understood you to say that there
were two great evils of which you complain, the patrol system,
and what you describe as the flogging system ?—Yes.
1324. I understood you to say that the patrol system origi¬
nated about 1817?—Yes.
1325. Is the flogging system under the colonial law of long
standing ?—No, we never had anything to do with the Kafirs
as to their domestic affairs.
1326. Is it confined to the Kafirs?—I am only speaking of
what I have found in the Government Gazette.
1327. Will you state what you read in the Government
Gazette ?—I can refer you to the Gazette if 1 have time
given me. It merely states that a man had been taken steal¬
ing in the colony, and it being considered that there was not
sufläcient proof to send him to the colonial court, he was
flogged.
1328. Are the Committee to understand that it is a punish¬
ment exercised summarily by magistrates there for the offence
of theft?—I do not know whether it is done by the magis-
0.63. M trates ;
178 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A, trates ; it is done in King William's Town under martial law.
toe enstrom. j jg jj^g Government Gazette, which you have, of course.
19 June 1329. Is what you speak of quite recent?—I suppose it is
1851. about a year or eight months ago.
1330. You have described it as the flogging system?—The
Government published this as an act which had taken place
under their auspices. It must therefore be a system.
1331. Are the Committee to understand you to mean that
it is a system adopted to punish the Kafirs for theft ; and that
being adopted as a mode of punishment, as such you object
to it ?—I object to any punishment which has not the sanction
of the Kafir chiefs, and of the nation generally. I object to
the system, to punishment upon insufficient proof.
1332. Do you think that in the event of a Kafir being
caught in the act of stealing he should be remitted to punish¬
ment to the chiefs of his tribe, and should not be punished by
the British authorities ?—That depends upon the system which
you adopt.
1333. Will you further explain that answer, and tell the
Committee what you mean by the expression, " the system
you adopt" ?—I object to a system which gives any man a
power in Kafirland of flogging a Kafir except with the con¬
sent of the chief of his tribe. I decidedly object to any man
being punished in Kafirland at all who commits a crime in the
colony.
1334. First of all, confining yourself to Kafirland, are the
Committee to understand that you think all petty crimes com¬
mitted by Kafirs should be punished alone by or with the con¬
sent of their chiefs ?—Yes.-
1335. Suppose those chiefs are in hostility to us?—Then
there is a state of war.
1336. Assuming war to be the state of the colony?—I sup¬
pose that there will be martial law there, and you would deal
with them just as you would do if you were carrying on war
in France.
1337. Are the Committee to understand your objection to
be to that mode of punishment as a punishment?—I am
speaking of a time of peace exclusively.
1338. Assuming a time of peace, are the Committee to
understand you to object to flogging as a punishment?—I
object to the punishment altogether, except there be some sort
of court in which the Kafir chiefs have a voice.
1339. think that if a Kafir is caught committing some
crime, he should not be punished, especially by flogging, unless
his chief has some voice in the sentence passed upon him?—1
would
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
1.79
would not interfere with their domestic affairs, except through -Sir A.
their chiefs. I mean the Kafir courts. Siochendrom.
1340. Supposing a Kafir commits a crime upon a British
subject, and is caught in the act of doing so, do you think the 1851.
consent of the chief should be obtained before he is punished ?
—Yes.
1341. That is your opinion ?—Yes.
1342. ChairmanP\ Do you consider that the authority of the
chiefs in Kafirland is so complete over the Kafirs generally,
that they can be justly held responsible to the English Govern¬
ment for the conduct, both public and private, of the Kafirs
connected with them ?—It was so, as much as in most coun¬
tries. I do not know how it may be now, but it was so ; the
Kafir chiefs had considerable powerover their people.
1343. Do you believe the authority of the chiefs over the
natives in connexion with them to be very complete and abso¬
lute?—No, I do not think so ; every chief has his council ;
they are not despotic at all ; they have no despotic power ;
they have power as the executive officers of their council.
1344. Do you believe that the executive authority thus
constituted is really such that it would be safe for the British
Government to trust to that authority for maintaining police
within Kafirland, even against British subjects ; and also that
it would be just to make the chiefs, assisted in this manner by
their council, responsible for all acts of aggression committed
by persons of their tribes against British subjects ?—^What they
may be now I am not competent to say ; I am perfectly confi¬
dent that it was the case that you could hold the chief respon¬
sible about 15 or 20 years ago.
1345. Have you any reason to believe that the authority of
the chiefs has diminished since that period ?—There has been
a great deal of disorganization in Kafirland in consequence of
the wars.
1346. In case the chief should set himself to discourage the
predatory habits of the Kafirs connected with him, do you think
there would be no reason to fear that he would become unpo¬
pular, and that his authority would be greatly diminished and
altogether subverted ?—I do not think it would be more so
among them than among any other people.
1347. Do you mean that it would not be more so with a
Kafir chief than with the lord-lieutenant of an English county ?
—You are speaking of a country in a high state of civilization.
I say, making allowance for the Kafir as a barbarian, the
chiei I think has sufficient control over his own people to
maintain order.
Ü.63. M 2 1348. Do
l8o MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. 1348. Do you think he has sufficient control over his
Stockenstrom, people to maintain order in those cases in which he might be
,g running counter to the feelings and supposed interests of his
1851, people ?—I do not liiink any chief upon earth can do that ;
he cannot run counter to the interests of his people, and retain
his authority.
1349. Are not the general feelings of the young men,
especially among the Kafir tribes, very much in favour of
their present predatory habits, and their expeditions for the
purpose of cattle stealing ?—Yes, I think they are ; not more
so than might be controlled in time of peace, when a regular
state of order is established ; when a system of justice sliall
prevail.
1350. It has been stated to the Committee by witnesses well
acquainted with the Kafir tribes, that among the young men
personal distinction is often acquired by successfully making
inroads upon their neighbours, and carrying away their cattle;
suppose the chief were to set himself to work effectually to
repress those habits, do you think there would be no fear that
he would become un[)Opular, and that his authority would
be subverted ?—To a certain extent it might be so. To act
against the feelings of the tribe is impossible; he is not
despotic. If you have a good understanding with those men
I do not doubt but they will see it their interest to maintain
order.
1351. Do you mean to maintain order so far as effectually
to check those predatory habits ?—Effectually to check robbery
and stealing is almost impossible in any community ; thefts will
be committed anywhere.
1352. Is there not a wide distinction betw een those habitual
inroads upon the cattle of their neighbours, and the ordinary
cases of offences against property which take place in all
countries ?—I can only say that these Kafirs are barbarians,
and nothing more nor less; but if the European Government
w ill maintain a proper moral influence over the minds of the
Kafir chiefs, the chief has sufficient power over the majority of
his people to n)aintain order.
1353- Sir J. D'almsley.'] What power has the chief, in con¬
currence w ith his council, over his tribe ?—I think it is very
great.
1354. Will you state in what that power consists ; does he
possess the power of life and death ?—Yes.
13.55. Does he possess power over the property of any
individual in his tribe ?—No.
1356. Neither he nor his executive council ?—I could not
exactly
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THÉ KAFIR TRIBES. l8l
exactly say that; they can intiict punishment upon individuals, Sir A.
but they cannot seize their property, except for crimes, and Stockemtrom.
sometimes the crimes are imaginary ; such, for instance, as
witchcraft. Their property is occasionally seized under the 1851.
pretext of punishment for witchcraft.
1357. What would be the conduct of a chief in such a case,
finding that any portion of his people had committed acts of
robbery?—He would punish them by seizing their cattle;
they never punished by corporal punishments till they came
into contact with us, and I do not think that they have even
yet adopted that plan.
1358. That, is your reason for objecting to the flogging
system, is it?—I object to it as an unjust principle that any
man should be withdrawn from a competent court and flogged
because there is not sufficient proof to bring him before that
competent court.
135g. The chiefs, you say, have not hitherto inflicted cor¬
poral punishment ?—It is not a Kafir punishment.
1300. The chief does possess the power of life and death,
you say ?—Death is often inflicted.
1361. Does he possess the power of banishment?—They
never adopt it. It would be difficult to intiict it in a barbarous
country.
1362. You say he would take the cattle of the individual ?
—Yes, he would fine him.
1363. Mr. B. Carter.] Your objection has been put in these
words : that you disapprove of the " flogging system" ?—Such
as I have described it ; such as the Government Gazette
describes it.
1364. You instance one particular casein which a man has
been flogged during a time of peace, and your objection in
that particular case was, that he was flogged for want of there
being sufficient evidence to convict him ?—That is what the
paper stated.
1365. Do you think that that individual case which you
have mentioned is sufficient to establish what you call a system ?
—I suppose it to be a system, because otherwise it could not
be carried out. This was published under the sanction of the
Government.
1366. Have you any other grounds, beyond that particular
case, to suppose that any system of punishing by flogging men
not convicted was established?—This was brought to my par¬
ticular notice ; I do not know how many more cases there
might be.
1367. Have you any knowledge of your own of other cases
0.63. M 3 which
i82 minutes of evidence taken before the
Sir which could justify you in coming to the conclusion that this
btockenstrom. isolated case ?—I could not be positive j I cannot
19 June remember, at the present moment, any other case.
1851. 1368. You have accepted from a newspaper an assertion
that there was a system of flogging in existence, of which you
instance that one case ?—This is one case which I have seen in
the Government Gazette.
136g. The impression upon your mind is that that is a part
of a system ?•—I believe it is. If it were not it could not thus
figure under the sanction of Government.
1370. You cannot say from your own knowledge that any
such system exists ?—No. I only know this case ; I have
heard of others ; but I know only this case.
1371. Mr. Hawes.] Is flogging sanctioned by the colonial
law within the colony for any offences ?—Yes, I believe so. •
1372. Mr. B. Carter.] You say in this case the man was
not legally convicted, but that he was flogged upon suspicion ?
—The words were used, "There not being sufficient proof to
send him to the colonial court, he was therefore flogged.''
1373. How long do you calculate that this system has
existed which you so define ?—I suppose it is part of the pre¬
sent system.
1374. Do you refer that to the same date as the other
objection you have referred to, namely, the patrol system ?
—No.
1375- It is of later introduction than that ?—Yes, I suppose
so, as part of the present system.
1376. Are the Committee to understand that information,
as to this which you have denominated the flogging system,
has reached you through articles in the paper, buc that it has
not come to your knowledge from your own personal inquiry ?
—I saw this in the Government Gazette, which was exhibited
to me as a specimen of the system, many more cases having
taken place ; but I cannot answer for that being the case.
1377- Co\one\ Dunne.] In the district where this flogging
was stated to liave taken place was there martial law pro¬
claimed at that time?—I believe there is martial law ihere at
the present time.
1378. Therefore it was done under martial law ?—I believe
so, but I believe the whole system is based upon martial law;
martial law is there, and no other.
137g. Do you object to the proclamation of martial law, or
to tlie exercise of martial law in a district which is in a state
of warfare ?—No ; it was not in a state of warfare at the time
I speak
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 183
I speak of ; the governor represented the country as in a per- Sir A."
feet state of peace. Stockenstrom.
1380. By the colonial law, does the civil law e.Ktend to any jJ"j7ne
defined boundary ?—Tiic colonial law extends to the banks of 1851.
the Orange River and to its mouth, and from the Orange
River up to the Stormbergen, and down again to the Keis-
kamma, but not to Kafirland.
1381. Was this punishment inflicted in Kafirland ?—Yes,
decidedly.
1382. Therefore the punishment was inflicted as a punish¬
ment of military necessity, for which the officer who ordered it
was responsible ?—It was under the authority of the Govern¬
ment ; so the Gazette states.
1383. Then it could hardly be considered as part of a
system, could it ; if that country is only governed by martial
law, the man could not be sent legally before a colonial tri¬
bunal ?—The crime was committed in the colony; it is so
stated, and the man was amenable to the colonial courts.
Punishing him in Kafirland was both unlawful and impolitic.
1384. You are not aware of any other instance of the kind?
—No ; I was asked whether I objected to martial law : the
present system cannot exist without martial law, and that is
one of my objections to it.
1385. In a letter published recently in the Blue Book, they
speak of a system of governing " by the bayonet and the cat."
In a country where martial law is prevalent the cat may be
used, and the military commandant is responsible for its use;
have you any objection to that when war is carried on ?—I
am not speaking of a state of war.
1386. This occurred before the war, did it?—Yes.
1387. Can you point out the difference between the patrol
and the commando system ?—Yes ; the commando system
was adopted under the authority of the Government in cases of
inroads. In cases of emergency the field cornet had a right
to act, and in a case of less emergency the magistrate had to
be appealed to ; but in a case of general war no one but the
Governor could order out a commando.
1388. Comparing your former evidence with your evidence
to-day, you appear to consider that under the commando
system the actual perpetrators of a theft were taken up, and
the cattle restored ; but under the patrol system there is a
general sweep of the cattle through the country, which may
include the property of the innocent among that of the guilty ?
—The patrol system was this, as it was established in 1817.
A man losing his cattle, followed the spoor, and the first kraal
0.63. M 4 he
184 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir^. he came to he demanded satisfaction. If he did not get it, he
Stockenstrom, took it ; that led to constant collisions.
~~ ^380. Under the commando system they only took what
'®85r Ihey had lost i-Yes.
1390. The result of your opinion is, that the commando
system was less unjust and less injurious than the patrol sys¬
tem ?—Decidedly; a patrol coming to a kraal and demanding
compensation, and not getting it, but taking it, would neces¬
sarily lead to a collision, particularly when the kraal knew
itself innocent; and those collisions, constantly occurring,
would bring on such a state of irritation that a war ensued.
1391. Is there not a greater objection among the Kafirs
to the patrol system than to the commando system, because
the commando system suited their ideas of justice better than
the patrol system?—Undoubtedly the patrol system has been
one of the main causes of our misfortunes, which may be
proved by the evidence of several witnesses in 1835 and 1836.
1392. Have you not stated that the Kafirs have also said,
" You may shoot any thief who is stealing your cattle, but we
object to your interfering with the cattle of persons who have
never done you any injury"?—They have repeatedly said,
" We will thank you if you kill our wolves for us. The more
you kill on the other side of the boundary the better, because
it takes the trouble off our hands."
1393. Are you of opinion that the commando system, under
proper regulations, would be better than the patrol system ?—
You cannot do without the commando system on a barbarous
y
frontier.
1394. Do you think there would be any difficulty in restoring
the commando system under proper regulations?—It depends
in a great measure, as I before said, upon how the war ter¬
minates.
1395. If the war terminates successfully, will not the fron¬
tier be very much denuded of inhabitants?—I do not see why
it should.
1396. Will not it be denuded of inhabitants of European
descent?—I do not see that it will, unless the measures of the
Government be such as to drive the people to emigration ;
there is a great deal of soreness.
1397. Are you acquainted with the localities in the neigh-
bourhood of the Amatóla mountains?—Yes.
1398. Do you consider that the Amatóla mountains would
afford a sufficient boundary ?—They run into the colony ;
they do not form a boundary; they run at right angles through
the old boundary and through the new boundary.
1399- You
SËLECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 185
1399. You consider the Keiskamma as the boundary at Sir.á.
present ?—Y es. Stockmstrom,
1400. Do you think, if we cleared the Amálola mountains ~j^e
of the Kafir inhabitants, we should put an end to the means
which they have of renewing the war?—Where are we to drive
them to? They must have a place to go to; and wherever
they go to, if they have not got food, they must come down
upon you ; whether from the Amatólas or from beyond the
Kei, it signifies nothing.
1401. If you drive the inhabitants over the Kei, are you
aware of any district of country which would be sufficient for
their support in the rear of another tribe?—Decidedly not;
there is an open country and high snow mountains, where the
cattle in winter could not exist; and even where there is open
ground, there are other tribes who use it for hunting, and
you would drive them upon the assagais of those people at
once, and create wars which must re-act upon yourselves.
1402. Are not they people of the same tribe ?—Originally
they were, some five centuries ago or more ; but they are now
a different people, though they speak the same language.
1403. It is your opinion that there is no place to which we
could drive that tribe, which would enable them to support
themselves ?—I am afraid not, without forcing them back upon
you.
1404. In Kreli's country, is there any space of that kind
which they might occupy ?—I have not been much through
Kreli's country. There is a vacant space towards the White
Mountains, but those are some miserable mountains upon
which no tribe could exist. Those are a pastoral people.
Independently of a great deal of agriculture, they have great
flocks ; and those pasture lands they require to go to in par¬
ticular seasons of drought, and for their hunting grounds. You
cannot drive other people upon that land without bringing
them into collision, and forcing them back upon you.
1405. Would not the result be to make them attend to
agricultural more than to pastoral pursuits ?—No, decidedly
not : a nation becomes agricultural from the natural course of
events, by the increase of population and the increase of com¬
merce and civilization. You do not force them to it by com¬
pressing them together in a barbarous state ; you only starve
them, and render them desperate, until extermination is your
only resource.
1406. You have not been much yourself through Kreli's
country ?—No. I have gone through Kreli's country during
the
l86 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOEE THE
StMkeÙro some 30 or 40 years ago I went to the
PC ens rom, ß^shee. I know there is no more ground than they require
19 June for themselves.
1851. 1407. You would not recommend the policy of driving the
natives from the Amatólas ?—No.
1408. You stated that you considered the natives should be
put down before the war terminates ?—Yes.
1409. What do you mean by being put down? —If you
were at war with France, you would certainly wish to gain
the upper hand^ and to be the stronger party, and to dictate
terms ; that is what I mean ; that we must conquer the Kafirs.
1410. At the end of the last war, you have stated, in a
letter to the Governor, that instead of having put them down,
they laughed to scorn what we considered to be our conquest
over them ; that they set us at defiance ; and that though the
war was represented to have been finished successfully, really
the Kafirs thought they got the best of it. How are we to
know that they are really put down unless we drive them from
their present country ?—The same as you do with any other
nation ; they sue for peace, and you dictate terms.
1411. With whom could you make peace?—With the
chiefs.
1412. Have the chiefs authority to make peace?—They
had in 1835.
1413. Can that peace be relied on ?—Yes.
1414. In the instance of the Gaikas, who gave up to us a
certain territory, it has been represented that the Kafirs said
that Gaika had not power to cede it ?—They said so.
1415. Therefore how can we make treaties with men when
their own people say afterwards that they had not the power
of ceding the country ?—I do not allow that the chiefs have
any power without their councils.
1416. Chairman.'] How is the council composed?—Of
Ammapahati, as the Kafirs call them.
1417. Are they elected?—Yes, they are selected from the
men of the greatest ability in peace, and prowess in war.
1418. Colonel Dunne.] You understand that we can make
no treaties with the chiefs, except with the concurrence of
their councils?—Yes.
1419. When we make peace at the end of a war, what
assurance have we that they will keep that peace ?—I have not
found European and civilized nations more true to their treaties
than the Kafirs. Up to this present moment we have never yet
reduced the Kafirs.
1420. What would you consider to be a reduction of the
Kafirs,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
187
Kafirs, such as we could depend on for a permanent peace Sir A.
succeeding it?—Following them up through Kafirland till they Stockenstrom.
sue for peace, and you dictate terms to them ; show them you ^
are the stronger party ; make treaties, and honestly keep them. ^^851".^
1421. Have not they repeatedly sued for peace, and then
broken out again ?—Not that I know of. In 1846 they asked
for peace ; but there was no peace made with them. We re¬
fused to make peace, and the present policy was adopted.
' 1422. In 1835 did not we make peace with them ?—We
did.
1423. They made a cession of territory to us in 1835, did
not they ?—Yes, the thing is upon record ; you have the treaty
of peace there, and you can see the terms ôf the treaty. We
said we had conquered the Adelaide district, and we then
established the present system in the district.
1424. You say that we have pursued a system of injustice
and oppression, and violation of treaties ; and that we have
half ruined ourselves, and completely ruined the nation. Will
you explain what you mean by those terms ?—I mean this :
in 1844, for instance, we drew the pen through the treaties of
Sir George Napier with the Gaikas without any sort of discus¬
sion with the opposite party, and from that moment the irri¬
tation has been such as led to the war of 1846. We sent
engineers to mark out fortifications in Kafirland. This is one
case.
1425. Upon land belonging to them ?—Yes ; that irritated
them, and brought us into collision with them.
1426. You say that we have half ruined ourselves?—Yes;
I am an instance of it.
1427. You have stated the instance of an opulent farmer,
who once sat in the council, to whom you had been obliged
almost to extend charity ?—Yes, a Kafir ; he was my menial
servant at that time.
1428. He was in the Kafir council ; not in your own coun¬
cil?—Yes, in the Kafir council.
1429. You state that you consider the farmers along the
frontier to have been ruined by that policy ?—Yes.
1430. What was the policy which caused their ruin?—^
Breaking the treaty without reference to the chiefs themselves,
and dictating a new treaty to them.
1431. Of which the result was the war?—Yes. Not im¬
mediately ; the Napier treaty lasted till 1844. The Gaika
tribes were then told that that treaty was abolished, and that
another treaty would be shortly laid before them for signature.
1432. Did not the Gaika tribes themselves repudiate the
treaty ?
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE TIÍE
Sil treaty?—They oliiected to it decidedly : I speak of the treaty
Stocke^. J
19 June M33- Did that relate to a cession of territory?—No; it
1851. was only a new system that was introduced.
1434. Are you aware whether the Kafirs are better armed
now than they were?—Yes.
^435- How did they obtain those arms ?—From the colony;
the Custom-house returns will show what import of ammuni¬
tion and fire-arms there is.
1436. Is it forbidden ?—The importation into the colony is
quite legal ; it is unlawful to send them into Kafirland.
1437. If we were to put a stop to the importation of fire¬
arms and gunpowder, would it not put an end to the war?—
They would be smuggled into Kafirland in that case.
1438. Do you think in such quantities as would enable
them to carry on the war?—Smugglers will find a market for
their produce wherever they can, and I am afraid you cannot
stop it.
^439- You do not think it could be stopped ?—I am afraid
not ; I wish it could, but I am afraid it cannot.
1440. If there were a possibility of doing it, it would be an
advantage, you think?—Yes, in the present state of things.
1441. You think that the trade in arms and in ammunition
comes through our own colony?—The greatest part of it;
some may come from Natal, and some from the petty ports on
the coast ; the import of fire-arms and ammunition in the Cape
colony is fearful.
1.^42. If it were checked it would put some diflSculty in the
«ay of their obtaining arms, would not it?—I am afraid they
would find an entrance in other places.
1443. What are the articles of exchange which they give
for fire-arms?—Cattle and skins, and ivory ; but they have no
other articles of importance but cattle.
1444. Those are the only articles which they are able to
give?—Yes.
1445. Natal is a colony totally under our influence ?—Yes,
it is a British colony.
1446. Could not we prevent arms and ammunition obtain¬
ing an entrance through that colony ?—I think that would be
very difficult.
1447. You have no hope of putting a stop to the war in that
way ?—Certainly not.
1448. You live in Somerset county'—In that district.
1449. Can you state the population of Somerset district ?—
No ; there are returns of it.
1450. Are
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 189
1450. Are thçre returns of the extent and population of Sir A.
each part of the colony?—Yes, I believe so. I am a private Slockenstrom.
individual, living in retirement, and those official documents
never reach my eye, so that I should not like to commit myself 1851.
by saying anything on the subject ; there are returns which
will show it.
1451. Sir E. Buxton.] What, in your opinion, is the influ¬
ence of the missionaries upon the native tribes ?—Very good ;
I think the missionaries do a great deal of good ; I think there
have been a great many follies committed also ; missionaries,
like other men, are not perfect, and there has been a great deal
of nonsense; but the cause of missions no man, I hope, will
depreciate.
1452. Chairman.] Is there any jealousy on the part of the
chiefs, or the people, of their interference ?—No ; of late there
has been on the part of the Gaikas an idea that some of the
missionaries have leaned to the Government side, and sacrificed
their cause.
1453. Do the operations of the missionaries run counter to
any religious feelings of the natives?—Not with the heathen ;
they are very fond of the missionaries, exce[)t where they sus¬
pect them, as I have just stated.
1454. Sir E. Buxton.] Are there many European settlers in
British Kafraria ?—I cannot say.
1455. Is it your opinion that the land being taken from the
natives has caused irritation among them ?—Unquestionably ;
as much so as it would here.
1456. Has the land been taken from them in British
Kafraria?—From the Kat River to the Keiskamma, decidedly.
We have lately sold part of Kafirland by public auction.
1457. What part of Kafirland ?—It is to be found in the
Government Gazette ; it is a regular speculation.
1458. Chairman.] Do you think it advisable to put a check
to the further extension of European settlements in that direc¬
tion ?—Decidedly ; you must leave them the land ; no tribe can
do without land, barbarians less than civilized nations. The
Kafirs are not manufacturers nor sailors ; if they have no corn
and pasture land, they must rob or starve.
1459. Mr. Hindley.] Beyond the province of Victoria has
any land been sold by the Government ?—The province of
Victoria borders upon the Keiskamma ; in that province we
have sold land which is part of the land whicii the Kafirs are
now fighting about ; that land has been sold by public sale.
1460. That is not called British Kafraria?—No, I believe
not; it is a district which was Kafirland before the war of 1846.
1461. Then
190 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. 1461. Then the limits of the colon\- have increased ?—Since
SlöoiMrm. the war of 1846 they have.
19 June 1462. Visconnt Mandeville.'] Had not they that district
1851. merely on condition of good behaviour?—Not that part; it
was Kafirland.
1463. Chairman.l Is it the case that the land you are
speaking of formed part of the ceded territory ?—No, never;
not this part which I say was sold by public auction by the
Government lately.
1464. Mr. HawesJ] What w^re the boundaries of the ceded
territory, east and west ?—The Keiskamma on the east, and
the Fish River on the west.
1465. Where is Victoria situated ?—Victoria embraces part
of it, but'Victoria runs into what was Kahrland in 1846.
1466. Do you mean that it runs beyond the Keiskamma?—
It runs to the north, beyond the ceded territory.
1467. What was the limit of the ceded territory to the
north ?—It took a line below Block Drift ; from Block Drift
it took a line connecting it with the Kat Berg ; Block Drift
was Kafirland when the war of 1846 broke out; Block Drift
is the place where we had engineers measuring out fortifica¬
tions in Kafirland, where the very unpleasant affair took place
between our troops and the Kafirs.
1468. Mr. Hindley.'] That part of Victoria in w hich Auck¬
land appears to be situated was Kafirland?—Yes.
1469. That has been added to the province of Victoria?—
Yes.
1470. When was that done?—Certainly since 1846; in
1846 it was Kafirland.
1471. By whose authority was it done?—I should not like
to be positive. There were three successive governors in a
very short time ; Sir Peregrine Maitland, Sir Henry Poltinger,
and Sir Harry Smith.
1472. Chairman.'] What is the extent of the district of
which you are now speaking, which in your opinion was im¬
properly added to the ceded territory?—About 10 miles by
six ; the whole of the country beyond the mountains to the
Kei has been added to the colony since.
1473. Sir E. Buxton.] Has there been an accession of Eu¬
ropean colonists on the eastern frontier of the colony during
the last four or five years ?—Individuals have come in, but not
many; I could not say hundreds, much less thousands ; indi¬
viduals have come in in succession, but no masses.
1474. Was not there a severe drought on the eastern fron¬
tier of Kafraria in the course of the last year ?—About a year
ago,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. IQI
ago, but these things are very common ; every four or five I''
years we calculate upon a very severe drought ; for instance, "
the year of the war was a very dry year, and we had another ig June
very dry year the year before last. 1851.
1475. Is not the efiect of drought upon all persons who
have cattle, whether they be natives or British colonists, to
induce them to spread their cattle over the countiy in search
of pasture ?—^Tiiey must do so, or they perish.
147Ô. The natural consequence therefore is, that in times
of drought the European settlers and the natives come in colli¬
sion by their spreading their cattle over the country in search
of grass ?—Yes.
1477. Are you aware whether the drought of last year
caused excitement among the Kafirs?—I could not tell; it
always creates a great deal of suffering, but I cannot tell whe¬
ther it caused any peculiar excitement.
1478. SirX WalmsleyJ] Are you of opinion that one of the
chief causes of offensive operations on the part of the Kafirs
arises out of their dread of incursions upon their territory ?—
Yes.
1479. general disposition on the part of the
British to seize upon their territory?—It is not only there ;
wherever white men come in contact with barbarians, that
is the result ; it is the same in the back settlements of
America.
1480. If they were well assured of the contrary, do you
think the tribes would be much more contented ?—If they had
proof positive of it they would be.
1481. What means, in your opinion, would be the most
likely to produce peace and contentment among the various
tribes?—As a general rule, nothing will answer but strict
justice. Where there is aggression, follow it up and insist
upon redress ; when you make a treaty, keep it most scrupu¬
lously, and insist upon its being kept most scrupulously ; deal
with them as a Christian nation, and honestly keep your own
word with them ; thereby prevent physical collision, and the
exposure of your weakness.
1482. The Committee may gather from what you have now
said, that it has been the absence of that conduct on the part
of the British which has caused these incursions and fightings ?
— I have already stated that I disapprove of the measures of
the Government, and to that I adhere.
1483. Chairma7i.'\ You are aware of the policy which has
been pursued by the Government with regard to what you call
the
192 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. the emigrant boars ; are there any observations you are desi-
Stockenstrom. rous of offering to the Committee upon that subject?—They
ig^uiie present very quiet, but they are in a very discontented
1851. and excited state; they feel themselves very much aggrieved,
and they are very anxious to have the causes of their late
collisions with the Government most minutely investigated.
Emigration from the colony is just the same as emigration to
the back settlements of America ; it is a natural result of the
nature of the country, and consequently the people go where
they can find land. At very early periods individuals have
gone; but in the years 1835 and 1836, in consequence of
various causes, which they considered causes of dissatisfaction,
and particularly the state of insecurity they were in when the
Kafir war of 1835 took place, a number of people emigrated.
The Governor of the colony obtained the opinion of the
Attorney-general in reference to those men, and he gave it as
his opinion that nothing could prevent their emigration ; that
they had as much right to emigrate as a British subject had to
emigrate and become an American subject in the United States.
They went in great masses ; they came in collision with the
natives, and afterwards Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was the
Governor, had something to do with making a treaty between
them and the native chiefs there. This state of things lasted
till the present Governor arrived, and he went over and made
modifications in those treaties between the emigrant beers
and the native tribes. He informed them, that unless four out
of five were willing to submit to British rule, he would have
nothing to say to them ; otherwise, he would legislate for
them. Upon this, unfortunately, they acted ; and the general
voice of course was, that instead of four out of five being for
us, 99 out of 100 were against us. This led to the unfortunate
collision at Boom Plaats. After this conflict between the
British troops and the boers, a boer was taken and tried by
court-martial and shot. The boers are all extremely anxious
to come to some understanding. They wish to have peace
and quietness; but they wish to have matters properly under¬
stood. They are extremely anxious to have investigated the
question as to the legality of the death of this man, who, they
maintain, was either not a British subject and then a prisoner
of war, or, if he was a British subject, that he ought to have
been tried by a court which could have properly judged the
case. All these matters these men are anxious to have inves¬
tigated, and I believe that all those rebels, as we call them,
may be brought to their senses, and something done with them,
by a thorough investigation and an explanation of the matters
which
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 193
which have occurred, justice being done where wrong has Sir A.
been done. Stodenttrom.
1484. Irrespective of emigration, caused, as you seem to
suppose it has been in this instance, by acts of impolicy or 1851.
injustice, Avould not there be generally a tendency, under any
system, for tbe colonists to go over the border, and establish
themselves there?—It is proved to be so in this country and
in every other country which is either uninhabited or thinly
inhabited.
1485. What is the policy which in your opinion ought to
be pursued with regard to the colonists going beyond the limits
of the territory in that manner; to what degree should any
control be exercised over them ; or should they be left alto¬
gether to themselves or, in short, what is the policy which you
would recommend as the right one to pursue in regard to a
class of cases which are likely, under all circumstances, to
occur?—I do not exactly know ; they form themselves into a
community, they must be allowed to have their oWn laws,
and to unite under certain conditions, as has been done in
America.
1486. Would you leave them entirely to themselves ; would
you not meddle in their affairs at all, but leave them to form
such relations or pursue such a course in reference to the savage
tribes around them as they may think fit?—We have tried
another plan, and it invariably brought on the most fearful con¬
sequences ; we have attained to nothing but collision and
aggravated evil.
1487. Your recommendation is that we should not meddle
with them at all, but that as long as they commit no injury or
outrage upon the colony, we shoiild not take any notice of
what they did in other respects ?—I am aft'aid that that is the
wisest plan. Anything else has only aggravated the evil when
we have tried it.
1488. Do you believe that jrractically there would be a
prospect of very dreadful scenes taking place upon the colli¬
sions which would ensue between those colonists thus sepa¬
rated from all control on the part of the Government, and the
native tribes with whom they might come into contact ?—Not
so bad as when we do interfere : the irritation then increases,
and sympathy with those men is produced in the colony. The
Boom Plaats affair has been a most unfortunate affair. It has
created feelings in the colony which have been very per¬
nicious. Persons have tried to trace the present feeling to a
later date, but it has chiefiy sprung from that.
1489. Suppose a colonist, beyond the limits of the colony,
0.63. N exercises
194 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAfeEN BEFORE THE
Sir exercises some act of barbarity, would you not provide in any
Stockms&om. jjjanner for his trial and punishment for such an act?—If you
19 June could do so, it would be desirable ; but I do not see that we
1851. have done any good by it; our interference has aggravated
the evil.
1490. Upon the whole, your opinion is that it would he
best to take no cognizance of what takes place beyond our
own boundaries?—I would try to influence those people. In
the Blue Book there is a letter of mine which I wrote from
Stockholm in 1834, in which I laid down a certain theory of
my own, which I thought would prevent a good many evils ;
but the country is in such a state now, that I do not know
whether it would answer at all. We have done no good by
interference hitherto.
1491. Sir J. Walmsley.] Have you read a despatch from
Lord Grey to Sir Harry Smith, dated Downing-street, the
12th November 18.50?—I have not read the despatch. I
know the law to which it refers.
1492. " The proposal of the Executive Council to extend
the provisions of the Statute 6 & 7 Will. 4, to the equator, in
order that the Boers emigrating to the newly discovered
country may not be entirely beyond the reach of British law,
had been already recommended on other grounds by the Com¬
mittee of Privy Council, and I hope to be able in the next
Session of Parliament to introduce a Bill for that purpose."
What would be the effect of that despatch upon the Boers;
how would they view it?—It would be calamitous. It would
bring on collision worse than ever. If we interfere at all that
will be the effect. Our plan is to try and conciliate those Boers.
They are not unreasonable beings.
1493. Colonel Dunne.'\ Do you think there is any means of
conciliating them, and what would you suggest as the mean
of doing so ?—They are averse to our system of government;
let them have their own.
1494. Do you think we should be able to govern them by
the people who are now ejected as their own chiefs ?—Yes;
you cannot do it in any other w ay, unless you bring an over-
whelming force and put them down ; to organise the blacks
against them by means of Brl'"^h non-commissioned officers
would be a decree for mutual extermination.
1495. Would they be valuable assistants in defending the
colony if the Government dealt with them fairly and justlyi
according to their own ideas?—First inquire into what they
consider their grievances. They consider themselves to have
suffered great injustice, and particularly in consequence of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES* Í ^5
M'hat has lately taken place ; let that be inquired into, and if Sir
they are wrong, let the matter be explained ; if they are right, Stockenstrom.
let them get redress, and establish some kind of social order j^Tuiie
among them, so that they may be a benefit to the colony and 1851.
to the natives, instead of the contrary.
1496. Chairman^ Your plan would be to treat them as an
independent nation ?—I do not see how to avoid it. I should
be glad to see them reincorporated with the colony, which
perhaps a system of justice may bring about.
1497. Viscount MandevilleJ] What does Pretorius call him¬
self?—He now calls himself the president; he is the com¬
mandant in a military point of view, but he is the president of
their council. The man has gone wrong; but he is not an
unreasonable man.
1498. Colonel Dwwne.] What are the injuries w hich they
complain of?—Particularly the last conflict which we had with
them.
1499. Were not they in a state of hostility before the con¬
flict, and was not the conflict the result of that hostility ?—Yes ;
they possessed themselves of Natal, and thought it was wrong
that the British should take possession of Natal.
1500. Is not the dispute between us and them this, that
they are for moving further into the country and taking
possession of the native lands, which we have attempted to
prevent ; is not that the original cause of the hostilities ?—
We iiave not prevented their doing so, but taken the land
ourselves.
1501. Have not they fought against the Queen's troops;
was not the man who was executed taken in arms, and exe¬
cuted for fighting against the Queen's troops?—I do not
know the particulars.
1502. Is it not perfectly notorious that that was the case?—
I do not know whether he was taken in arms ; he is supposed
to have been one of the band who fought against the Queen'.s
troops. I am only stating their grievance. I am not giving
my own opinion upon it; but I do say that they demand inves¬
tigation, and that it is unjust to deny it.
1503. Do you deny the statement that he was in arms
against the Queen's troops ?—I have heard it denied ; I can¬
not say that it is generally denied.
1504. The point to be inquired into is, whether he was
guilty or not of the crime he suffered for ?—No, the question
is this ; if he was a British subject, he ought to have been
tried by a competent court ; that is my opinion.
1505. Was not there a state of warfare then existing, and
0.63. N 2 weie
196 MINUTES OF EVIDENCÈ TAKÈN BEFORE TtÍE
Sir A. were not tliey in arms against our äüthörity ?—They were in
Stockenstrom, arms against our authority, certainly.
iqJune ^506- You have stated that you think in a state of war
1851. military law shoüld obtaili ; war was at that time going on,
and this man was taken prisoner and executed ?—All they
desire is that the thing shall be inqliired into ; if the man
suffered justly, and that were explaitied to them, there would
be an end of the case. The whole transaction demands the
most thorough investigation.
1507. The inquiry would be whether he was guilty or not?
—Whether he was tried before a competent court.
1508. Was he tried before a court martial ?— I believe so.
1509. Which court martial found him guilty ?—Yes.
1510. Chairman^ Was not he punished as a British sub¬
ject emigrating to France or America, and afterwards engaging
in hostility against the Queen's troops, would be punished ?—
I am not sufficient lawyer to know what the law would bé
in the case of the emigrant you speak of.
Luna, 23° die Junii, 1851.
MEMBERS PRESENT.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Bonliam Carter.
Mr. Hindley.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Booker.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Stanley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Viscount Mandeville.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Cardwell.
The Right Hon. H. LABOUCHERE in the Chair-
Sir George T. Napier, k. c. b., called in ; and Examined.
Sir 1511. Chairman.'] YOU have held the office of Govefnor
Cape of Good Hope?—Yes, I was Governor there for
' between six and seven years.
¡23 June 1512. What were the dates of your assuming the goVefù-
ment, and of your relinquishing it ?—I assumed it at the
beginning
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. I97
beginning of January 1838, and I came away in April sir
1844. G.T.Napier,
1513. It is rather the object of this Committee to consider
what ought to be future course of the British Government 23 June
with regard to the Cape frontier than to go very minutely 1851.
into past transactions. You have doubtless paid attention to
what has happened at the Cape since you left it?—I have in
general ; but, to tell the Committee the truth, I have not
paid so much attention as I should otherwise have done,
because I have lived abroad continually. I have kept myself
free from everything of the kind as much as possible. I have
had correspondence with friends, and I have a son who com¬
mands the Cape corps, but I have always prohibited him
from giving me political information ; as being a military
man, I considered his duty was entirely military. When the
war under Sir Peregrine Maitland commenced I was in
Scotland. I happened to come home, and the Duke of
Wellington sent for me, and I had some hours conversation
with his Grace. Sir Peregrine Maitland had applied for
troops, and for a general officer to help him in the war.
Hearing that, I thought it was my duty to write to the
Horse Guards, to say I should waive all etiquette as to
haying heen relieved by Sir Peregrine Maitland, and that if
ipy services could be of any use I was quite willing to serve
as major-general under Sir Peregrine Maitland, and give
him the benefit of whatever experience I might have of the
colony. The Duke of Wellington, however, said there wos
no general officer going out, and there the matter dropped.
Not living in England, I seldom saw any of the papers laid
before the House of Commons.
1514. Still you are^ no doubt, generally aware of the cir¬
cumstances under which the war which is now raging at the
Cape has broken out ?—Yes, I have heard a good deal of it,
of course.
1515. Will you have the goodness to favour the Com¬
mittee with any opinions which you may have formed with
regard to the future policy which this country should pursue
towards the Kafir tribes ?—In the first place I am perfectly
convinced of this, and I was exceedingly glad to hear Sir
Andries Stockenstrom give the same answer as I shall give,
that the Kafirs must be put down, and so completely put
dowq as to call out for peace before anything can be done ;
that I am perfectly convinced of. If you let them oflT now, I
am perfectly convinced that they would consider that they
had got the better, aiid that we were afraid of them ; there-
p.63. N 3 fore
198 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
. fore I am sure that it must be done, and it can only be done,
by a strong military force being put at the
complete disposal of Sir Harry Smith.
23 June 1516. You think the first step must be to put the Kafirs
1851. absolutely down and completely conquer them ?—Completely,
so as to force them to cry out for peace.
1517. Supposing that to be done, what is the general policy
which you would then propose to adopt ?—That is a very
difficult question. I think, if you mean to keep the whole of
Kafraria, you can only do it by means of a military occupa¬
tion of the country : that is my opinion, clearly and dis¬
tinctly. I do not see how it is to be done in any other way.
The Kafirs certainly are not completely savages, but they are
very much more of savages than of barbarians, I think.
1518. Which is the frontier which you think it would be
most advantageous to maintain?—My opinion is, the Keis-
kamma ; I may be wrong in that ; but that was the frontier
which Lord Charles Somerset took, and along which there
were very excellent forts built. Then the Fish River was
behind that again, and my opinion is, that Graham's Town,
and Fort Beaufort, and all along there, might be kept as a
place d'armes for stores and for some troops ; but that the
Keiskamma, and that line, should be maintained as it was
under Lord Charles Somerset. I think he understood the
Kafirs, and the management of that frontier, better than any
Governor who was ever there, before or since.
1519. You would not propose to push the frontier to the
Great Kei ?—Not unless you mean to keep Kafraria ; if you
mean to keep Kafraria, it can only be kept by a military
force, in my opinion.
1520. Do you think it would be the better policy for this
country to keep Kafraria under British rule, or to endeavour
to establish satisfactory relations with the Kafirs as indepen¬
dent tribes?—The ground they are now in is narrow and
confined. In consequence of the drought, and of the diffe¬
rent kinds of grass which grow, they must, with their herds,
at certain times of the year quit the district they are on and
occupy a further extent of territory to the right and the left;
because, when the grass gets sour in one spot on that frontier,
it is not so in another, and they must have that range. If
you force them all into one spot they will starve.
1521. That is, supposing they retain their present habits?
—Yes. As to civilizing them, my own opinion is that they
never will be much better than they are ; I may be wrong; I
went off to the frontier immediately I arrived in the colony;
I visited
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
m
I visited the missionary stations. The missionaries are most Sir
excellent people; they go out with a thorough idea and G.T.Napier,
belief that they are doing good, but as to whether they are k.c.b.
really doing so, that is a matter of great doubt, in my 23~júñe
opinion. The Moravians have done good, but even at Shiloh 1851.
the Hottentots have turned against their ministers, and
against the Government. I do not mean to say that missions
are all nonsense, or anything of that kind, but I do not
conceive that the missionaries at the different stations there
have done a great deal of good, or will do a great deal of
good.
1522. You say you would adopt the Keiskamma frontier,
and place a strong military force upon it ; do you think it
would be expedient in any way to interfere with the internal
government of the Kafirs beyond that frontier, with the view
of preventing their incursions into the British territory?—
No, I should say not ; I would have a few small isolated forts
in different parts, but 1 think you should not interfere with
their government, except just to prevent such practices as
witchcraft, and the system of torturing which they employ.
I think those should be interfered with, but otherwise I
would leave them totally to themselves, telling them that if
they committed any depredation in the colony we would
punish them by military force.
1523. When you say you would punish them by military
force, do you mean that you would punish individuals, or
that you would make the chiefs responsible ?—I would make
the chiefs responsible ; my opinion is that everything ought
to be done through the chiefs.
1524. Do you believe the authority of the chiefs over the
tribes to be of that nature that they can justly be held
responsible for the acts of persons under them?—I do,
certainly.
1525. You think they have the power, if they choose, of
preventing depredations?—I think they have. I went twice
to see them. I went on one occasion to alter a treaty, not to
make new treaties, as was erroneously said the other day ;
but I altered certain treaties, because many of the articles
of those treaties were most unjust towards the colonists : such
as forcing them in different ways to track the spoor, which
sometimes, after rain particularly, was impossible ; I went to
alter those treaties by permission of the Kafirs, as much as
1 could. I met them in three different places; 6,000 at one
place, at another 3,000, and at another 5,000. I went
with a small force of troops, and I then travelled into the
0.63. N 4 country
200 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir country vith Lady Napier, two servants, and two orderlies ;
O.T.Napier, J went through the Gaikas country, and said to them,
" I will send my troops round another way, and will try
33 June whether you are honest in what you say." I went through
1851. in three days and two nights, and never met with anything
but the greatest kindness from them. That was in Eno's
time ; Eno was with me. Blockdrift was the place where I
saw those men. That was in Kafirland, about 15 miles from
Fort Beaufort.
1526. What was the date of those transactions?—The first
visit was after some depredations had been committed. The
next occasion was in 1841. I only went twice, and I am
speaking of the second time ; I met them in a friendly way.
My instructions told me that I was not to attempt to do any¬
thing, or to break any of those treaties upon my own respon¬
sibility, without the perfect acquiescence of the native tribes
and their chiefs ; therefore when I saw them they were in
a very good humour, and I did alter a good many of the de¬
tails of the treaties.
1527. Do you believe that the undefended state of the
frontier has been a great inducement to the Kafirs to make
those incursions which have taken place?—It has been a
very great inducement to the Kafirs to make those incur¬
sions. The inducement to the Kafir is, that it is his nature;
every Kafir is told that the best thing he can do is to steal-
1528. Mr. Halves.] What are the treaties to which you
refer ?—The treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom
under Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in 1835 or 1836.
1529. Do you refer to treaties made, not by Sir Benjamin
D'Urban, but during the time he was governor of the
colony?—Yes, while he was governor of the colony; not
by his direction. They were Sir Andries Stockenstrom's
treaties.
1530. Chairman.'] Can you give the Committee any idea
of what, in your opinion, would be the amount of force
which it will be necessary for some time to come to station
upon this frontier, in order adequately to protect the colony
against the incursions of the Kafirs?—Certainly not less
than between 3,000 and 4,000 men. I should say 4,000
eflPective men.
1531. Regular troops?—Yes; I am sorry to see that my
son's corps have proved disaffected. I cannot help thinking
that there is some misunderstanding there, or something
which the men have got hold of that they cannot understand.
I found that corps with only three troops ; I got it augmented
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 201
to six troops. It has since been augmented again ; and my .
son, I know, would have gone anywhere with those troops. *
He now seems to have lost a great deal of his confidence, J '
except that he says Sir Harry Smith had re-armed 90 of 23 June
them; and he (Lieut.-colonel Napier) had gone out with
them, and given them an opportunity of retrieving their
character, and they had behaved very well.
1532. Even with the amount of force you have mentioned,
considering the constant disposition of the Kafirs, especially
the young men among them, to engage in these predatory
expeditions, would not it be very difficult to prevent depre¬
dations from constantly happening upon such a frontier ?—
I believe it would be very difficult, but you would prevent
them to a certain extent. Depredations, in my opinion, will
constantly take place. When I first went up there, Sir
Andries Stockenstrom was with me, as Lieutenant-governor,
and he spoke to the chiefs through an interpreter. I do
believe that there was no man in the colony who had so
much political and moral power over the Kafirs as Sir
Andries Stockenstrom, and also over the Kat River Hotten¬
tots ; he has more power than any other man among the
Kafirs.
1533. Do you think it would be practicable or expedient
to attempt to obtain in Kafirland some such influence as the
British Government possess in certain parts of India over
districts which are not immediately and absolutely under
British authority?—I never was in India; I know a good
deal from reading ; but my own opinion is that you must do
all things through the chiefs ; I am convinced of it. 1 may
be wrong in it, but my experience there leads me to believe
that that is the case. I never did anything but through tht
chiefs: and I never fired a shot against the Kafirs, nor the
Kafirs against me the whole time. I ordered monthly
returns of the number of head of cattle or horses or any other
property which was stolen by the Kafirs, and what means
were taken, according to Sir Andries Stockenstrom's treaties,
to recover those cattle. I was urged over and over again to
go to war with them, but I resisted it. It struck me that it
was great folly for a nation like England, who has conquered
most nations in the world, to be provoked into such a war.
During the first six weeks of the war I would defy any man
to prevent the Kafirs darting into the colony, and committing
enormous ravages, leading to great loss of life and property.
Taking the greatest amount of property lost by their depre¬
dations to be 4,000/. per annum, 1 thought to myself. Is it
worth
202 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir worth while for such an amount of loss to encounter all the
O.T.Napier, damage that will be done by going to war? I said, "If it
' were the French or a European nation, you would not let
33 June them injure you in this way ; " but looking at the amount
1851. stolen, and at the nature of the people, I thought it was
much better to try to get the colonists to submit to this loss
rather than incur the bloodshed and the expense which
would be caused by a war. With respect to the treaties, I
will venture to say, that those treaties made by Sir Andries
Stockenstrom were never once infringed by the colonists, by
the Government, by Dutchmen, or by Englishmen, the whole
time I was there ; but they were infringed by the Kafirs over
and over again. The moment it occurs to a savage that it is
his interest to do so and so, treaties may go to the wind.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom told them that we had not in¬
fringed the treaties, and threatened them that he would give
me advice, if they did not stop their depredations, to drive
them to the Bashee.
1534. What may be called the open frontier of the colony
of the Cape of Good Hope, is not of very great extent, is it ?
—^You run up the Fish River, which is very open ; every mile
or two in summer you can ford it ; the Fish River runs up to
the mountains a good way, and then again the Orange River
is all pretty open ; there was never sufficient force there to
guard all the places which ought to have been guarded ; I
had an enormous number of detachments at the different
forts, and at one time I had only 1,500 effective troops there.
1535. The course you have recommended supposes a great
expense to this country for a great many years r—I should
think so ; I think it will be a very great expense to this
country.
1536. Do you believe that the colony would be disposed,
under any circumstances, to contribute any considerable part
of that expense ?—I think it would to a certain extent, but
that would depend a great deal upon circumstances too. The
Committee must be aware that there are a great many people
in the colony who make a great deal of money by wars, and
by the troops, whose constant cry was, " Have troops over;"
that was the great réason why they wished to go to war.
Contractors and such people make a great deal of money by a
war, but I do not think that the country itself could pay any
very large amount ; I have heard people speak of giving them
a constitution, but a constitution and keeping the Kafirs off
are two very distinct questions ; I do not think you could
raise money in the colony to do it. It is with great difficulty
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 203
that they have raised sufficient to pay the expenses of the Sir
colony. During the first two or three years 1 was there, we G.T.Napier,
had always a deficit.
1537. Do you think the distance of Cape Town, as the 23 june
seat of government, from the Kafir frontier, is a source of in- 1851.
convenience in the event of a Kafir war r—Not now so much ;
when I was there it would have been very much so, and
when Sir Benjamin D'Urban was there it was very much so ;
but now the roads are pretty good, and they have steamers
which communicate with Algoa Bay. I understand that now
you can send to Graham's Town and get an answer the same
week. Formerly, when I was there, it took 14 days before
you could get an answer to a letter. Sir Benjamin D'Urban
I understand, though he did not tell me so, proposed to
move to Uitenhage, thinking that a more central place. I
think the expense, however, would be so great that I cannot
say I am of the same opinion. I believe it is Sir Andries
Stockenstrom's opinion that the seat of government should
be moved more into the centre of the colony, and more
towards Uitenhage ; but I am not prepared to say that he
told me so. I think it better that the seat of government
should be at Cape Town.
1538. Mr. Mackinnon.^ How far has the British boundary
been extended from your time to the present ?—Sir Benja¬
min D'Urban took in Kafraria, that is the same ground they
have now ; but when I went out there it had all been given
up by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, and all the forts on the
Keiskamma had been destroyed, and the Kafirs were in
possession ; he had given up that territory, and then the
boundary was the Fish River.
1539. Then, in fact, we do not hold a greater extent of
territory than we held some years back before Sir Andries
Stockenstrom gave it up?—We hold now the same boundary
as Sir Benjamin D'Urban had after the war which took place.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom gave it away again.
1540. It has been since retaken?—It has been retaken;
that is the boundary which Sir Harry Smith has now.
1541. Chairman.l Do you think there would be any ad¬
vantage in making on the part of the British Government
small allowances to the chiefs as long as they maintained
good order among their people, and prevented depredations ?
—^Very great. I have always been of that opinion, that as
in former times black mail was raised in Scotland, something
of that sort might be given now, under proper regulations.
1542. The system of black mail is supposed to have had
a tendency
304 MINUTAS OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir a tendency to keep up the predatory habits of the Scotch,
G.T-Napier, though in a somewhat regulated form?—I cannot help
thinking that if the chiefs were told, " There is a certain
23 June quantity of money, or a certain number of heads of cattle
1851. which you shall have for yourselves ; but, on the other
hand, when anything is stolen from the colonists, that shall
be taken out of your allowance, and you must pay also the
value of what is taken over and above the allowance,"
that would have a good effect. But I may be perfectly
wrong in that opinion ; it is six or seven years since I was
in the colony, and of course the state of things alters.
1543. Suppose the chiefs were seriously to set about re¬
pressing those marauding dispositions, after what you have
said of the attractions they possess among the more active
portion of the community, especially the young men, do not
you think there is great reason to apprehend that those chiefs
would lose their popularity and influence among their tribes,
and would be in reality unable to accomplish those objects ?
—I cannot say whether they would or not. 1 cannot attempt
to give a distinct opinion upon that siibject. The Committee
must be aware that, as the governor, I did not live among
the Kafirs. I went up twice. The man who, I think, can
answer that question better than any other man is Sir Andries
Stockenstrom. Sir Andries Stockenstrom and I are not
friends, therefore I am not saying it out of any compliment
to him ; but I do say that I look upon him as a man who
knows more about the Kafir nation than any other man at
the Cape of Good Hope.
Ï544. Mr. Macldnnon.] A former witness appeared to
think that the chiefs have not much influence over their
tribes. You appear to be of a different opinion?—I have a
very different opinion ; of course, however, the Comnjittee
will take into their consideration that 1 speak as the governor
of the colony, having lived a long way from them, and only
visited them twice, and from such matters as have copie
under my cognizance. A witness may have been before the
Committee who haß lived among them ; such a witness, of
course, would know the feelings of the Kafirs better than I do.
Sir Harry Smith ought to know a good deal about them, but
lately it appears to me fie was mistaken in the influence lie
thought he had with them. I myself thought that he had
very great influence with them ; he lived for a long while
himself in the same situation in which Colonel Mackinnon
is now.
1545. Chairman.^ Those Kafir chiefs have managed to
deceive
SRtECt COMMITTEE OÍÍ THÉ KAEIR TklBES.
205
deceive the British goverhor and the British authoritiés Sir
repeatedly, have not they?—Yes, they have; they are very T.Napier,
cunning and very clever people, and they look, as most other
people do, I suppose, to their own interest more than any-
thing else. 1851.
1546. Viscount Mahd'evilk.'\ You stated that you thought
Sir Andries Stockenstrom had very great influeilCe over the
Kafirs ?—Yes.
1547. Do you think he has exercised it at all to maintain
peace ?—That I cannot say with respect to the Kafirs ; I am
asked the question; and I shall certainly answer it, I do
think that if Sir Andries Stöckenstrom had gone down or
written to the Governor, and said, " Things are going wrong
at the Kat River, I will go there and answer for the loyalty of
that settletnent;" he could have made that settlement do what¬
ever he liked; I am sUre he woüld have kept them in loyalty
if he had gone there ; that settlement was made by himself,
and was always à favourite settlement of his ; Und when I was
Up there 1 saw the influence which he had, arid he ruled the
«hole of that part of it with great justice. I have no com¬
plaint to make of him when he was Lieutenänt-governor
there ; he tried in every way to do his duty, but he was
thwarted by everybody in evety possible way that they could
thwart him. He was then very unpopular for the evidence he
had given in a Committee of this House, atid everybody's
hand was against him except my own ; he, however, had
great influence in that settlement, so much so; that I believe
if he had gone to them and said, " You shall be loyal, and
you shall do exactly as I tell you," everybody in the settle¬
ment would have done as he told them.
1548. When you travelled through Kafirland yOU said you
were escorted by Eno ?—Yes.
1549. Do not you think he was much more worthy of con¬
fidence than any other Kafir chief ?—I think he was. There
was a man of the name of Stock, named after Sir Andries
Stockenstrom, in whom I should have had great confidence ;
and so I had in Pato and those people. In the last war Pato
turned most violently against us. I never found Eno behave
ill ; but he had no influence. It was supposed Maquomo had
great influence.
1550. Do you think that the fact of Eno having bUt little
influence was owing to his discouraging the predatory incur¬
sions of the Kafirs?—No ; he had grown an old man, and he
was not of the first rank among them ; they looked to other
and younger men. I perceive, in looking back to events
which
2o6 minutes of evidence taken before the
Sir which have happened in the colony, that about every 10
G.T.Napier, years, when the young men of 12 or 14 liave grown up into
manhood, a war has broken out.
23 June 1551- Mr. CardwelL'] You spoke of giving a subsidy to
1851. the Kafir chiefs ; do you intend the subsidy to be so large as
to be divisible among all the members of a tribe, or only an
honorarium to the chief himself ?—To the chief himself.
1552. You think a very small sum would be sufficient?—
Not a very large sum ; just enough to buy him some cattle.
1553. you give the Committee an idea of the amount
of charge upon the public revenues, which would be occa¬
sioned by subsidizing all the Kafir chiefs ?—At the time I
was there, I thought about 7,000/. a year would have
done it.
1554. Sir./". Walmsleyi] You would not desire to subsi¬
dize all the Kafir chiefs, would you, but only those who are
upon our immediate frontier ?—Merely the Gika chiefs and
the T'Slanibies ; there is a great line of them. Many chiefs
have said to me, " You blame us when cattle are taken,
because we live upon the frontier. It is very hard upon us
when Kreli sends his people in, and they come through our
property, and upon our lands, and go back to him, that you
should come upon us for the cattle." My answer was, " I
cannot help that ; I cannot go beyond you ; you are here,
and you must pay. If you choose to live upon the frontier
you must pay, in the same way that those Boers and settlere
wiio live upon the frontier must expect to have their cattle
stolen." I think, though I am not certain, that under Sir
Lowry Cole, in the case of every settler who came up to the
frontier, though he did not wish to give them lands along
there, near the Kat River, yet he was persuaded to do so at
last, and then on conditiofi that they should have a certain
number of armed herdsmen upon their estates, and that
they should never be without them, in order to defend them¬
selves. That went on pretty well at first, but by degrees they
got tired and neglectful, and then the Kafirs took their cattle.
1555. Mr. Booker.^ Are the combinations among the
chiefs themselves very complete ?—Yes. I am surprised at
present at Pato. I see from some of these despatches, and
from a letter I have received from Sir Harry Smith himself,
that he says Pato is faithful to him. If he were not, it would
be difficult to get supplies from the coast at all ; he was very
faithful when I was there, but in the war under Sir Peregrine
Maitland and Sir Henry Pottinger, he was most violent
against us. It puzzles me very much when I see him now
again
SELECt COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 207
again in alliance with us ; I feel sure it is his interest, or he Sir
would not be so a single day. G.T.Napier,
1556. M.V. Hindley.^ Do you think it was just to avenge
the depredations of Krell upon the frontier tribes ?—The 23 June
stolen cattle went through their territory ; it was according 1851.
to the different treaties that it was done.
1557- If the French were to go through Wurtemburg and
Bavaria to Vienna, would it be right for the Austrians to
avenge themselves upon Munich ?—That analogy will not
do; I am speaking of savages, and you are speaking of civi¬
lized people.
1558. Are not the principles of justice the same every
where ?—No doubt they are ; but there is a word called ex¬
pediency, which comes against justice very often,
1559. Viscount Mandeville.'\ Might not the Kafirs on the
frontier have prevented the stolen cattle going through their
country ?—Of course they might, if they had chosen.
1560. Colonel jG5ícom?'¿.] For that reason you think it
quite just that you should expect from those living on the
frontier that Kreli should not pass through their territory to
commit incursions upon the colony ?—Yes ; unless they had
said, "We will show you the spoor into Kreli's country ; " in
some instances they have done that. I recollect one or two
instances in which they traced the spoor, and the cattle were
found in Kreli's country, and they then gave them up.
1561. Sir J. Walmsley.~\ Will you tell the Committee
whether in your opinion it would be more advisable to send
out European troops, or to raise native levies ?—I have not
the slightest doubt about the advantage of sending European
troops.
1562. Colonel Dimne.] Do you think it would be better
to send out troops, and form a cbrps of our people, instead of
having Hottentots in the Cape Corps ?—If it is clear that they
are disaffected, and determined not to fight for the Govern¬
ment, then I have no hesitation in saying that it would be
so ; but if not, they are a description of troops which are of
the greatest consequence there ; they know the habits of the
people, and how to trace the Kafirs, which the European can¬
not tell how to do, through thebusli. These men are in that
way very effective, but if you could meet the Kafirs in the
field, which they take very good care that you shall not, I
have no hesitation in saying it would be belter to have Euro¬
peans. My son, in one of his letters, says, " I have told the
Governor that it would be much better to allow volunteers
from regiments out there, and recruit from England."
1563. Viscount
2Ö8 MINUTES of ÈVIDÈNCË TAkÊN SEfORB THE
Sir 1563. Viscount Mandevilié.] Have ^ou any hopë öf the
Hottentots returning to their duty?—Yes; my son's letter
' was tvritten >îvhen they Were disarmed; He was theii Very
23 June müch out of spirits about it ; he has since wtitteH to mfe to
1851- say that Sir Harry Sttiith has re-armed 90 or 100 of thèse
men, and that tfiey have behaved uncommonly well. He
saidj in one of his first letters, that his own opinion was that
those 48 men deserted, in consequence of some malicious per¬
sons out there instilling into the minds of the Cape Corps
that General Somerset was going to the Kat River in order
to set fire to the place, and hang and shoot their relativêfe.
Almost all those deserters came from that settlement; and my
own opinion is that they have gone there^ and not to the
Kafirs, except in one or two instances. They are goncj he
thinks, to the Kat River, to see what has becoihe of their
friends.
1564. Colonel Dunne.'] Could not a corps be formed partly
of Europeans and partly of Hottentots, who might be used in
the warfete for which they are peculiarly fitted ?—I think so.
I do not know whether that would do or not ; but I think yOu
might have a certain number of Hottentots attached to each
regiment. I should be inclined to try that, but I do not
know whether Sir Harry Smith's opinion is to the saine
efièct. Any military opinion I may suggest must be of far
less value than that of the man who is commanding the troops
out therej who is the proper person, and much more capable
of forming an opinion than I can be in England. I agree
with the Honourable Member^ in thinking that that would
be a very good thing if it could be done. If, however, the
Hottentots are disaffected, they are of no use, of course; I
shall be very sorry for it. I put my son into the corps, and
did everything I could do to get them on. During the last
war they behaved uncommonly well throughout.
1565. Do you approve of the Kat River settlement being
so near the frontier ?—If I had had to make that settlement I
should never have placed it there ; but it was made by a
man who knew the place well, and who knew both the Kafirs
and the Hottentots, and the country, namely, Sir Andries
Stockenstrom. It was agreed to at the time by Sir Lowry
Cole. At first, I believe. Sir Lowry Cole, and General Bell,
who was then secretary, were against it. When I visited the
settlement, in 1838, they certainly were in a very good state
of civilization. The houses were generally built of unburnt
bricks.
1566. Looking at the position of that colony, and at the
disaffection
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 20^
disaíFectioii it has shown, and the danger to our military ope- Sir
rations caused by that disafl'ection, should you approve of G.T.Napier,
breaking up tiiat settlement and placing those Hottentots
more within the frontier of the colony?— I think it would be 33 june
a very proper thing ; I think they might be better placed. 1851.
Another reason is, that everybody has got the idea that it is
a nest of iniquity ; they will never recover their character.
It is seldom that a regiment recovers a good name if it gets a
bad one ; therefore they will always be suspected, and they
will always think that people are suspecting them, and they
will go wrong. But Sir Harry Smith, I think, on that sub¬
ject also, is a better judge than I am.
1567. Would you propose to supply their place with
English settlers, who would be subject to be called out as
militia or commandos along the frontier?—I am one of
those who think that if you had a body of Englishmen
in Kafraria, along the whole line of that country, it would
be a very good thing.
1568. Could not that be accomplished by degrees, by
encouraging soldiers to settle there, and allowing them
to settle with their families?—That was my opinion, and
I have heard no reason to alter that opinion. In the case of
every regiment, when it was relieved from the Cape of Good
Hope, while I was there, I invariably gave every man per¬
mission to receive his discharge according to the regulations,
paying for it; and I discharged as many men, and left them
at the Cape, as I could get to remain as settlers.
1569. Did they settle on the frontier ?—Yes, almost all of
them.
1570. Had they their families with them?—Some had and
some had not; I think the greater part had not. Young and
able men got work very easily there. A great number of the
75th settled there.
1571. Was not it a disadvantage to those settlements that
the men left the frontier, and went into the colony, where they
were able to get work. If their families were settled with
them, would they not be likely to remain upon the frontier?
—I think they would stay upon the frontier.
1572. You would recommend that system to be tried ?—■
Yes, I do not know what those military villages have done;
but I do not understand how they came to be so suddenly
broken in on, and treated as they have recently been.
'573- Could not they be so placed as to be able to defend
themselves till relief came?—Yes, I think so; the men hav¬
ing been subjected to military discipline, they would believe
0.6,3. O what
210 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOEE THE
• what the officers and people in authority told them. I tried
kcb!"^'' Dutch farmers and English settlers. I proposed
to numbers of them to build a wall with loop-holes in it, in
23 June order that they might defend themselves till the military
iSöi« came to their support. One or two did it ; but it was found
to be a trouble, and it was neglected.
1574, Could not they be placed at such distances that by
a system of signals they might support one another ?—I think
they might. Colonel Selwyn was the engineer out there
when I came away : two or three posts were established, and
I had an idea of establishing signals all along the colony, so
that the moment there was a depredation committed the
whole of the force, both military and civil, should know it
in the course of a short time ; but it fell to the ground,
I believe.
575- With such a defence as that, would not a much
smaller military force be required than if we undertook the
whole defence of the frontier by a purely military force ?—
Certainly.
1,576. If you had a line of regular troops to support those
settlers, you think they would form an efficient defence?—
After you once got them well settled ; but it would take some
years before they were well settled and established there.
1577. Do you think the system would be worth trying
even now ?—I think it would, if you give them plenty of
men. You must not leave them too isolated.
1578. Do you think it would be necessary to place the
whole of the frontier under a military chief, with summary
powers to act for himself in his treaties with the Kafirs?—If
he is merely a military chief, to be ready in case of invasion,
I agree with that suggestion, if there is to be a lieutenant-
governor, then, I think, and I myself found it so, that, look¬
ing to the constant correspondence and the delay experienced
in getting an answer, the circumstance of the lieutenant-
governor being obliged to send to me for the approval of every¬
thing caused a great deal of delay. It was proposed by Sir
Andries Stückenstrom that he should be independent of the
governor, and correspond directly with the Colonial Secretary
at home. 1 objected to that. I said I would much rather
let him be the lieutenant-governor completely distinct from
me, but I could not consent that he should correspond with
the Secretary of State at home without the correspondence
passing through me ; but if you had a military man to act as
General Somerset once did, as commandant of that line, I
think that would do very well.
1579. You
SELECT COMAHTTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 211
1579. would fix some boundary over which his powers Sir
should extend?—Yes. I believe Colonel Mackinnon is now G.T.Napier,
in that position. icc^.
1580. Should the law which should prevail be purely 33 June
military law, or would you be able in such a state of things 1851,
to put the ordinary laws of the colony in force ?—Military
law should prevail, I think.
1581. Mr. Hawes.] What was the date of your arrival in
the colony ?—I arrived there about the middle of January
1838.
1582. How long did you remain governor?—I remained
till 1844, just six years and three months.
1583. What were the principal treaties then in force which
regulated the relations between the British authorities and
the Kafir chiefs?—Those denominated Sir Andries Stocken-
strom's treaties. They were treaties signed by Sir Benjamin
D'Urban ; but he disagreed with them, though he signed
them as the governor. They were in full force when I went
up to the colony. Sir Andries Stockenstrom met me as soon
as I entered his districts. He managed the treaties, and had
done so.
1584. Was one of them a treaty dated the 1st of June
1837 ?—No, 1 think the treaties were dated immediately after
the Kafir war which Sir Benjamin D'Urban put an end to ;
I think that was in 1836. They were the treaties made by
Sir Andries Stockenstrom.
1585. When you say the treaties, do you refer to one prin¬
cipal treaty, or were there others which were then in force ?
—There were treaties with the Gaika tribes and the TSlam-
bies. They were all in force, and were all made together.
1586. It was the same treaty made with various chiefs,
was it not ?—Yes.
1587. The Committee'^understoodi you to say that that
treaty had not been violated, either by the colonists or by
any British authorities ?.—1 cannot recollect an instance of it.
When Colonel Hare was Lieutenant-governor a war had
nearly broken out, but not from any violation of the treaties,
that I know of.
1588. During your governorship no violation of a treaty
was brought under your notice, either on the part of any
British authority or of the colonists ?—None.
158g. Were many complaints made to you that the treaties
had been violated by the Kafir chiefs?—Yes, many.
1590. You have stated in the course of your evidence that
the cliiefs have the power to enforce the observance of treaties
0.63. O 2 upon
212 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir upon their followers, if they are so disposed?—Yes, in my
G.T.Napier, opinion clearly so.
1.591 • How then do you account for the violations of those
23 June treaties by the Kafir chiefs or their followers, if they have
1851. power to enforce the obligations of a treaty upon their people ?
—I think the Kafir chiefs connived at it.
1592. You think that they have the power to enforce those
treaties, but that they are disposed to connive at the violation of
them when it suits their interests '/— Exactly so.
1593. Do you attach much value to entering into those
treaties with the chiefs?—No.
1594. You would not be disposed to recommend it as any
part of the British policy to make such treaties in future with
the Kafir chiefs ?—No, I should not ; the more I thought of
it and the more experience I had, the more I was convinced
that any treaties you might make with savages or barbarians,
would only be observed by them as long as it suited their in¬
terests, therefore I think it is as well not to make them.
1595* Was not the boundary of the colony, when you were
governor, strictly speaking the Fish River?—Yes.
1596. Beyond that again, there was what was first called
the ceded territory, subsequently called the neutral territory,
which was bounded by the Keiskamma?—Yes.
1597. Keeping in mind those violations of treaties which
have been entered into, how should you propose, supposing
the boundary of the colony to be that which you prefer,
namely, the Keiskamma, to maintain peace on that frontier?
—I should have all the forts which were there before; I
should maintain it by a military force, having military posts
the whole way ; I do not see any other way of maintaining
it. I have heard people say, though I am not inclined to
think so myself, that if you take away the military and let
the settlers and Boers protect themselves they will do it ; J
do not think they can.
1598. You are of opinion, from your experience, that even
that boundary which is a better boundary, as I understand,
than the Fish River, could only be maintained by a large
military force?—That is my opinion.
1599. Are you at all prepared to state to the Committee
what you think would be the numerical amount of force
which wmuld be required ?—I should say 4,000 effective
troops. I do not mean 4,000 troops upon paper, I mean
4,000 troops able to take the field.
1600. Are you or not disposed to think, that taking a cer¬
tain military possession of Kafirland beyond the boundary of
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES, 21^
the Keiskamma ; that is to say, establishing military posts íjir
there, as has been done by Sir Harry Smith, with the con- G.T.Napier,
currence both of Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir Peregrine
Maitland,. has been so far successful that it has prevented an 23 June
irruption of the Kafirs into the colony proper ?—I think cer- 1851.
tainly it has. I went out, if I had any prejudice at all, with
a prejudice against the colonists, and against that former
occupation of the ground by Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Sir
Harry Smith, and thinking that it was better not to have it.
My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes
there, convinced me that I was wrong, and that Sir Benja¬
min D'Urban was perfectly right ; that if he meant to keep
Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing so was
by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them.
No doubt it must be so, and if all those forts were well
garrisoned and provisioned, it would answer very well. I
think the system has prevented a very sudden irruption into
the colony ; but owing to the nature of the bush, in spite of
anything which can be done, the first irruption of the Kafirs
must be a source of great detriment to the colony.
1601. May the Committee infer it to be your opinion that,
simply as regards the protection of the colony, the establish¬
ment of military posts in British Kafraria, is the best means
of securing the peace and tranquillity of the colony itself
against the depredations of the Kafirs ? —Certainly.
1602. Supposing such a policy to be pursued, and military
posts to be established in Kafraria, Kafraria being therefore
under a kind of military possession, what would you be
disposed to recommend as the policy to be pursued towards
the chiefs within that territory?—I should certainly uphold
their authority in every possible way I could, and then let
them govern their people according to their laws with their
councils, and pursue their own course ; putting down
witchcraft and torture, and such things, but otherwise
interfering with them as little as possible. Tliere was a very
clever young man, who was interpreter to Sir Andries
Stockenstrom, of whom he gave me a very high character, 1
mean Mr. Shepstone; he has been placed by Sir Harry
Smith over theZoolas at Natal, which was first taken posses¬
sion of by me ; he has managed the people exceedingly well.
I saw a letter giving an account of his management there,
and giving a most excellent account of it ; I think it was as
good as anything I ever saw.
1603. The Committee understand you to say, that suppose
ing this military possession of British Kafraria to be
0.63. O 3 conceded
314 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
G T Na ier policy, you would leave the chiefs in
K.C.B. * possession of their authority over their followers, and retain
_—, them in their respective districts, that is to say, you would
23 June leave them possessed of the lands they now have ?—Cer-
^851. tainly.
1604. Would you govern them directly by military
authorities, or by means of diplomatic or resident agents, or
magistrates ?—It may be supposed to be prejudice, but I say it
should be by military authorities; therewere diplomatic agents
before, and I found that many of them did not act as I thought
right. There was a man at Block Drift who did not do so ;
I believe afterwards Sir Peregrine Maitland or Sir Henry
Pottinger dismissed him. My opinion is, that it would be
better they should be governed by military authorities.
1605. Sir Benjamin D'Urban extended, the boundary of
the colony to the River Kei, did not he?—Yes.
1606. Public opinion in the colony was very much in
favour of that extension, was not it ?—^Yes ; some people were
not so, but the majority were clearly in favour of it.
1607. They thought it the best policy as regards the
interests of the Cape of Good Hope?—All those persons
whom I ever conversed with did. When I arrived there,
certainly a very great majority wished for it.
1608. Were not some of the most enlightened among the
missionaries also very much in favour of it ?—Yes, the Wes-
leyans particularly ; but I do not believe that the missionaries
of the London Missionary Society were in favour of it.
1609. Do you know Dr. Philip ?—Yes.
1610. Is not he connected with the London Missionary
Society?—Yes. With respect to Dr. Philip, I may say that
he and I had not a great deal of political conversation. I met
him in London before I went out, and he said a great deal
to me as to his being forced into politics by what was taking
place in the colony. 1 told him this : " When you go out
to the colony, as you are going out at the same time I am, if
you will keep to your avocation, which is preaching the
Gospel, and not interfere with mine, we may go on very
well ; but if you attempt politically to interfere with me,
I will see who goes to the wall." I must in justice to Dr.
Philip say, that from the moment he arrived in the colony,
while 1 was there, till I went away, he never gave me the
slightest difficulty or embarrassment of any kind or sort.
1611. Did you know Mr. Shaw ? —Yes, he was a Wesleyan
missionary ; he was a very respectable, excellent man.
1612. Did
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 2l5
1612. Did his plan for the government of British Kafraria Sir
ever come under your notice?—Never. G.T.Napier,
1613. Did the missionaries generally aid the Government
in their attempts to preserve peace with the Kafirs?—I think a3~7üñe
they wished it, certainly ; but 1 tell the Committee very 1851.
fairly that I did not much trouble them with questions upon
the subject.
1614. Colonel Dunne.] Do not you think it a very unad-
visable thing to have any political communication with the
missionaries ?—That is clearly and distinctly m}^ opinion.
1615. Chairman.] You stated that you were struck with
the success of the policy pursued by the Government towards
the Zoolas, will you have the goodness to inform the Com¬
mittee what that policy consisted of?—-I saw it alluded to
the other day in a letter to the " Times " from an officer in
India, recommending that the same policy should be pursued
towards the Gaika tribes which had been pursued by Mr.
Shepstone with the Zoolas in Natal.
1616. You have not yourself any special sources of infor¬
mation upon that subject?—No; but I know Mr. Shepstone
to be a very clever young man in every way.
1617. Viscount Mandeville.] Do you find that the traders
are troublesome among the Kafirs?—Yes, they introduce
gunpowder and arms and brandy, and everything which is
bad, in my opinion ; they smuggle very much.
1618. Do you think that ought to be put a stop to ?—Yes; I
think it was better under the system established by LordCharles
Somerset ; there were fairs held, and the Kafirs met them at
those fairs and bought what they wanted. That seemed to
work very well, from w hat I have read. They now take gun¬
powder and arms into Kafirland ; the merchants at Cape
Town and Graham's Town purchase large quantities of arms
from England. The muskets cost, I believe, about 7 s. or
8 s. a piece at Birmingham, but they get 21, or 3/. for thern
in selling them to the Kafirs. I tried to stop the gunpowder
from going in, but I found it impossible ; tlie settlers and the
Boers said, " If you take the gunpowder from us what is to
become of us in winter, or in the dry season, when the ante¬
lopes in millions, and the beasts of prey, come down upon
us? We must have gunpowder and arms."
16 ig. You think that the only means of preventing the
introduction of firearms and gunpowder is to put some check
upon'the traders ?—Do not let them go into Kafirland, except
as they did formerly.
0.63. O 4 1620. You
2i6 minutes op evidence taken before the
Sir 1620. You would put a stop to these itinerant traders?—
Certainly.
1621. Chairman.] Do you believe it would be possible^ by
S3 June any means, to prevent gunpowder being introduced into
1851, Kafirland as long as the Kafirs desire to obtain it, and it is
the interest of parties to introduce it ?—I think they will always
obtain it. I tried, in every way, but I could not see how it
was to be avoided ; they will get it somehow or other.
1622. Colonel Thompson.] Could not they obtain it by
sea ?—I have no doubt tliey could ; they get it from the Mo¬
zambique coast, and from the settlements of the Portuguese ;
they would get it, 1 think, in spite of every precaution.
1623. Colonel Z)MWMe.j Are those arms exported from Liver¬
pool ?—I believe so.
1624. All along the slave coast, are there great quantities
of arms ?—Yes, great quantities.
1625. W^icomxt Mandeville.] Do you think that Kafir ser¬
vants coming into the colony are the means of stealing cattle
in anyway ?—I think some of them may be honest, but very
few ; they all look very much to the interests of their tribe,
and they are afraid of the chief. They must give information,
and they do give it.
1626. Would you prohibit Kafirs going as servants to the
farmers ?—The only thing against that is that when they
want to cut their harvest they must have hands ; but there
are a great many Fingoes now who are the best servants,
and a very excellent race.
1627. Do you think if the Kafirs who went as servants
were obliged to bring their families and cattle with them to
the farms, that would be beneficial ?—I think that would be
a very good thing ; but then against that is to be placed this,
that the farmer would not have the means of feeding those
cattle upon his grounds.
1628. Mr. Stanley.] I understand you to propose to give
up all interference with the internal affairs of Kafraria,
provided the Kafirs do not interfere with us?—Yes, having a
military force there ; I would have a military force, but I
would not interfere with them. Let them be governed by
their own laws ; but if you withdraw the troops from the
frontier, and take the troops out of Kafraria, of course they
will be the same as they were before.
1629. What rule would you enforce as to individual Kafirs
entering the colony ?—In his treaties. Sir Andries Stocken¬
strom had an article, that a Kafir coming into the colony
to be a servant must have permission from his chief and
from
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 217
from the political agent, upon which he was allowed a pass ; Sir
therefore they were all known to the Lieutenant-governor. G.T.Napier,
That plan seemed to act very well.
1630. With respect to the British colonists, would you en- ^3
force the same rule ; would you allow no British subject to 1851.
enter Kafraria without a pass?—Yes, I would ; I do not see
that they would do any harm.
1631. You would allow the colonists to enter Kafraria
freely, hut you would not allow the Kafirs to enter the
colony?—Just so.
1632. Chav-man.] In a military point of view, do you
attach great importance to the possession of the Amatóla
district r—It ought to be in our possession if we wish to keep
the country ; on the same ground that I think you should
keep Kafraria by military possession, you should have the
Amatólas.
1633. Do you think it would be important to clear the
Amatólas of the Kafir tribes ?—It must be done now; the
war will not be finished till the Amatólas have been cleared.
1634. Having been cleared, could they be kept clear ?—
It would require a larger force than I spoke of before, if you
are to take possession of the Amatólas, and keep up the forts
there and maintain roads for bringing up provisions and
water.
1635. You do not contemplate onr permanently cleaidng
the Amatólas of the natives, and retaining the country in our
hands ?—No.
1630. You think that would be too expensive an under¬
taking ?—I should say so.
1637. Colonel Esicourt-I You think the Keiskamma the
better boundary?—Yes, I think so.
1638. Supposing the Keiskamma to be the better boun¬
dary, having cleared Kafraria, do you think that without the
appearance of being defeated, and without losing your prestige,
you could retire upon the Keiskamma ?—I do not think the
prestige of the Britisli army is ever lost.
1639. think you could take up the Keiskamma as the
boundary ?—Yes, I think so ; I should not be afraid of
doing so.
1640. Mr. Stanley.'] You have stated that during your
tenure of office, you were very reluctant to go to war in con¬
sequence of any trifling depredations ?—Very reluctant.
1641. Was not the effect of that pacific policy to cause an
increase in the number of those depredations ?— I do not think
it was. The number of depredations, I thought, decreased.
Returns
2i8 minutes of evidence taken before the
G "J^Na i were kept, and when I looked over them on coming
k.c.T'^' numbers had decreased rather than increased. At
the time when I altered the treaties so as to give the colonists
23 June more facility in tracing their cattle and their stolen property,
1851. for six months after there were hardly any cattle stolen.
1642. What means did you take of obtaining restitution
from the chiefs if the colonists were unable to trace their own
property ?—I threatened them. 1 here and there got the
property ; but they evaded it in every way they could. They
employed every kind of subterfuge in their power. 1 had no
resource but to have gone in and taken the cattle of the first
kraal I came across, and then a war would have taken place
immediately.
1643. You say that there are in the colony many parties
who profit by a war ?—Yes, there are.
1644. Are not there also a great many who lose by a war?
—The colonists on the frontier on whose estates the Kafirs
make depredations, and whose houses are burnt, lose an im¬
mense deal. When I went out there I found in the office at
Graham's Town claims by the colonists to the amount of
between 200,000/. and 300,000/. during that war. It ap¬
pears to me just that they should have been paid, but they
were not.
164.5. Setting those two interests one against the other, is
not there a stronger interest in the colony against a war than
in favour of one ?—I believe so. I think it is only a few
persons who make money by a war, and who wish for a war.
The whole interior of the colony from Cape Town up to the
frontier does not wish for a war. Graham's Town has pro¬
fited by the contracts and the money which is spent by the
troops.
1646. You said that public opinion was in favour of the
last extension of the frontier ; was there a strong feeling on
that subject in Cape Town, and in the western parts of the
colony?—That was in the time of Sir Benjamin D'Urban.
There was then a very strong feeling in favour of Sir Ben¬
jamin D'Urban's policy in every part of the colony ; stronger
in Cape Town than anywhere else almost ; but there was
a very strong feeling from Cape Town up to the frontier.
1647. It was not merely approved of by those colonists
who personally gained by the frontier being removed further
from themselves, but there was a general feeling throughout
the colony that the measures then taken conduced to the
general safety?—Decidedly. I was rather prejudiced against
that
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 2I9
that feeling, but common sense showed rne that I was Sir
wrong. G.T.Napier,
1648. ï'ou spoke of establishing military villages along
the frontier ; by whom would you have those villages occu- 33 june
pied; by retired soldiers, or by soldiers actually in servicer 1851.
—Soldiers who had received tiieir discharge. There was a
tery able statement put into my hands by Colonel Lewis, in
which he referred to the Russian villages ; but there was no
way of carrying it out then. 1 sent the plan home, and since
then there have been military villages established; but I
hear that the other day they were all destroyed, and the
people all murdered.
1649. You propose also the establishment of a line of sig¬
nals along the frontier?—I did when I was there. I should
think a line of signals would be very advantageous, so that
the whole line of frontier, from one end to the other, might
receive intimation of an incursion of the Kafirs, particularly
now that science has brought the means of doing it so easily
within our reach. Sir Harry Smith was my adjutant-general
at the time. I forget whether he agreed with me about it
or not.
1650. Mr. B. Carter.] You said you thought the system
of giving a pass to every Kafir on entering the colony was ä
proper system ?—1 think so.
1651. That was as a guarantee for his good behaviour?—
Yes, certainly; the chief guaranteed that he was a well-
behaved man.
1652. Do not you think it important also that you should
have some sort of guarantee that a colonist when he goes
into Kafirland should not involve you in disputes?—It might
be so : perhaps I may correct myself, and say that I would
have a pass for the colonists. It would do good, and it would
look more like justice to do the same to our own people as
we do to the Kafirs. No trader can go in without a pass.
1653. Disputes do arise from colonists going in an un¬
authorized manner into Kafirland, do not they?—Yes, several
disputes have arisen in consequence of it.
1654. It would be desirable, in your opinion, to have
some surveillance over the dealings of our colonists with the
Kafirs?—Yes.
1655. Marquis of Granby.] You have said that the colony
must be governed by military occupation ; in fixing any
boundary for the future, one of the most important con¬
siderations would be the nature of the country around the
boundary
220 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir boundary which you would fix, in a military point of view ?
G.T.Napier, ^Ycs.
From your knowledge of the countr\% do you think
23 June the boundary you propose would be the most advantageous,
1851. in a military point of view?—I do, but then it must be
observed I never went beyond that boundary. It was not
the boundary when I was in the colony.
1657. You know nothing of the country beyond ?—No.
1658. You think that we should govern the Kafirs through
their chiefs.'—Yes, I think so.
1659. yo" aware that one of the great causes of dis¬
content among the chiefs has been, that we held them re¬
sponsible for the cattle which were taken ?—I know that
they said so very often, and that they do say so ; but I know
that the chiefs will say whatever suits them best. I have
every wish to do the black man good as well as the white, in
every way ; but still I must say that I saw and had many
instances of deceit among the chiefs. I repeat, that during
the time I was there I do not recollect an instance of any
treaties being infringed by the colonists against the Kafirs.
I have told the Kafirs so.
1660. Mr. Hawes.] Do you recollect the date of the esta¬
blishment of the Kat River settlement ?—It was at the time
of Sir Lowry Cole, about the year 1830 or 1831.
1661. When did you visit it?—In 1838, immediately
after I went out; I visited it also in 1841 or 1842. Mr. Read
was the missionary there.
1662. I understand you to say that you doubt the policy
of placing that settlement so near the frontier?—I do.
1663. When you visited the settlement was it in a pros¬
perous state ?—It was; when I went into it I was astonished
to find myself met at the end of the village by four or five
distinct columns of children and adults, with schoolmasters.
Every one of those children could read and write, to a certain
degree. The houses were built of unburnt brick, and some
of brick, and they had gardens before them, with all kinds
of tillage, and they had beasts in the different kraals. Dr.
Philip showed me in the schools, boys and adults who were
reading and writing, and they came up as regular as any
school in any town of England would do, under their different
teachers.
1664. You saw the gardens cultivated, and the land
generally cultivated ?—Yes, there was a large tract of land
cultivated.
1665. Were the Hottentots themselves the labourers; did
they
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
they cultivate the gardens and the land themselves?—Yes; ^
they make the women work a great deal more than the ' '
men.
i6t)6. Were not the Fingoes the chief labourers?—No; 23 Jme
the Fingoes were not in that settlement. ^^5»-
1667. Were there no Gonahs ?—After the war a few
Kafirs had gone in among them, but generally they were
Hottentots, and a great many of them old discharged soldiers
from the Cape Corps.
1668. ^\ ere you led to believe that the Hottentots them¬
selves were the actual cultivators of the gardens and fields,
or did you ascertain the fact from your own personal know¬
ledge?—I saw them myself cultivating the fields. I do not
say I saw them at the plough, because they use the hoe.
i66g. Have you heard or read any reports of the state of
that settlement since ?—I heard reports that they were not
going on so well as they had done ; but I cannot give those
reports from any authority.
1670. Were not there considerable advances made on the
part of the Government for the support of the people ?—At
times a good deal.
1671. They received food and clothing?—Yes; I do not
think they ever required food while I was there.
1672. If those advances were made they were made
subsequently to your time ?— I think so ; I do not remem¬
ber advances being made while I was there.
1673. You are not at all acquainted with the reports made
upon the state of that settlement by Mr. Biddulph, who was
sent there by Sir Henry Pottinger?—I read a Blue Book of
Sir Henry Pottinger two years back ; Mr. Biddulph came
out when I was there ; I think he reported unfavourably. I
remember reading a report, and saying at the time, " Mr.
Biddulph does not report very favourably of this settlement."
It was sent home to me by the secretary.
1674. Mr. Biddulph, in that report, makes the following
statement :—" Whatever might be the avowed motives of the
founders of the settlement, it is quite clear, by this statement,
that it was never designed to be a self-supporting commu¬
nity, although there is no reason why it should not have
been ; for it might, after the lapse of a few years, just as well
have produced 1,000/. as 50/. per annum, and the people
would have been more prosperous and respectable. But the
truth is, the whole affair, from beginning to end, has been no¬
thing but the most transparent piece of humbug ever practised
222 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
r public, to serve the purposes of unscrupulous, in-
kcT'^'' people " ?—I cannot agree in that.
J 1G75. This report is dated in October 1847 ; that is nearly
33 June 10 years after you visited the settlement ?—Yes ; when I saw
1851. the settlement on that occasion they were going on very well
and very prosperously. It appeared to me they would have
gone on very well, as 1 told Dr. Read, if he would have
abstained from politics.
1676. They held their land upon very easy terms, did
they not ?—Yes.
1677. You do not recollect contributions being made to
them from the Government?—No, I do not recollect it; it
was not the case in my time.
1678. Would you think it a wise step to grant such allow¬
ances to a settlement of that kind ?—When the settlement
was first made, 1 think it might have been so; when I saw
them there was no necessity for it. The settlement was very
close upon the Kafirs, and at the time that I was there the
Kafirs and these Hottentots disliked one another very much.
I was very much surprised at it, but they did so.
1679. Did the Hottentots in that settlement show a readi¬
ness to take their share in the defence of the colony during
your government ?—I felt convinced at that time that I had
nothing to do but to call them out, and they would have
behaved well.
1680. Did you put that disposition to the test?—No, I had
no occasion to do so.
1681. With respect to occasional depredations, did they
show courage in resisting them ?—The field cornet was
always very ready to come to me if I wanted him. I always
employed the troops if there was any occasion to threaten the
Kafirs, or anything of that kind.
1682. What was the name of the cornet when you were
there ?—He was an old serjeant-major in the Cape Corps ;
Boeter was one field cornet, and there was another man who
had been in the Cape Corps. The fact is, however, that Mr.
Read, the clergyman, did exactly as he chose.
1683. Colonel Z)M«we.] Did he enter into politics ?•—Yes;
he attempted it with me, but 1 would not allow it.
1684. Is not t he situation of the Kat River settlement very
important in a military point of view ?—No, 1 do not think
so. There was another settlement nearer to Fort Beaufort, the
settlement of Hermanns ; I see that he was killed in his
attack on Fort Beaufort ; he collected around him every
depredator and every rogue he could collect together.
1685. Mr.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 223
1685. M If such settlements are to be encouraged, Sir
YOU would be of opinion that tbey should be entirely self- G.T.Napier,
!• " iCCB
supporting?—I think so. _U_'
1686. And beyond what might be necessary first to esta- 23 June
blisb them, you would contribute nothing from the Govern-
ment funds?—No, certainly not.
1687. During your Government, that is from 1838 to
1844, no such contributions were made r—Not that I know
of, to the Kat River settlement.
1688. Mr. Cardwell.^ Your general view is that you would
make the Keiskamina the frontier of the colony r—Yes.
1689. Do you think that that would be a good frontier, in
a military point of view ?—I think so.
i6go. You would leave the whole of Kafraria to the govern¬
ment of the native chiefs ?—Yes.
1691. You would keep on good terms with them by pay¬
ing to them a small subsidy, the whole amount of which you
think would not exceed 7,000 I. a year; you would maintain
a military force upon the line of the Keiskamma, aided by a
system of signals ; and you would keep up a native popula¬
tion, who should act when occasion required in aid of the
troops?—Yes ; and I would have a few forts in Kafraria.
1692. You would maintain a military force within Kafraria,
though you would limit yourself to preserve the frontier of
the Keiskamma ?—Yes.
1693. You would maintain a military force of about 4,000
men you say?—Yes, from 4,000 to 5,000, but not less than
4,000 certainly.
1694. Have you at all considered whether the expense of
a permanent military protection of the nature which you
have described, could fairly be thrown upon the colonial
revenues if the colony had a representative government, and
if to that government were entrusted the direction of the
policy to be observed towards the Kafir tribes ?—I do not
think they could possibly defray it ; I do not think it would
be in their power to sustain so large an expense, but it must be
borne by the mother country ; that is my clear and distinct
opinion.
1695. Mr. Hindky.] What do you consider the present
boundary of the colony ?—The Kei is the boundary.
1696. In what respect does the present policy differ from
that which you suggest ?—I do not believe from what I have
heard that it differs at all.
1697. What was the boundary according to the treaty
with
224 MIMUTES OP EVIDÈNCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir with Krell t—Kreli has Iiis own boundary, which is beyond
G.T.Napier, the Gaika and the T'Slambie tribes.
1698. What is the boundary of the colony by the treaty
»3 June with Kreli}—After Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy was given
1851. up, the Fish River was the boundary of the colony for the
whole of those tribes.
1699. According to the treaty with Kreli, you consider
the Fish River to have been the boundary ?—There was a
treaty made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom with those tribes,
and then came the Fish River boundary ; before that it was
the Kei, under Sir Benjamin D'Urban ; but when his whole
system, and with it the province of Adelaide, was thrown
over by the treaties of Sir Andries Stockenstrom, the Fish
River became the boundary for the whole of the Kafir
tribes.
1700. In the time of Sir Benjamin D'Urban a treaty was
made with Kreli which gave us possession of the land up to
the Kei, and also a small portion of land to the east of the
Kei, containing the settlement of Butterworth ?—Yes.
1701. By whose authority was the land given up ?—It was
under the government of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, but with
a protest, I believe, upon his part; it was done by treaties made
by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, who was appointed from home
Lieutenant-governor, and had to mark out the line of boun¬
dary he thought proper.
1702. It was under the specific direction of the home
Government that the land was given up?—Whether it was
by the specific direction of the home Government that the land
was given up, I cannot say. I went to take leave of Lord
Gleneig, and he said to me, " I have just received a despatch
from Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in which it appears that Captain
Stockenstrom, as he was then, has delivered up the whole of
the forts of the Keiskamma, and dismantled them, and has
given up the whole of that territory, taking the Fish River
as the boundary of the colony." I said, " Then there is a
great deal of trouble taken off my hands."
1703. Up to the year 1844, the boundary of the colony
was the Fish River ?—Yes, up to the w^ar which took place
under Sir Peregrine Maitland. I objected to that boundar}^
and wrote home to that effect. Lord Gleneig asked me,
before I went out, to give my opinion as to the boundary.
I told him I could not give my military opinion of a country
I had never seen ; but that when I got out there I would do
so, and I wrote him word that it was a very bad one. The
most had been made of it by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and
the
Select cOmmittèe on the kaeir tribes. ¿25
the engineers, which could be made ; but I was of opinion Sir
that it was a very bad boundary. The Keiskamma ought G.T.Napier,
to be the boundary.
1704. During the period of the reversal of the policy of 23 June
Sir Benjamin D'Urban, you had no war with the Kafirs?— ^^5^-
No, none.
1705. Mr. Hawes.'] Though you had no war with the
Kafirs immediately upon, or for some time after the reversal
of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy, the frontier was in a con- •
stant state of disturbance in consequence of the depredations
of the Kafirs, was it not?—A great deal of depredation took
place. I cannot deny that there was an immense deal of
commotion, and many people may think that I ought to have
gone to war two or three times, but I did not do it for the
reasons I have stated.
1706. Does it fall within your knowledge that Sir Ben-
jam in D'Urban, in his despatches, distinctly predicted that
the frontier would continue to be disturbed, and that a future
war would be the consequence of a reversal of his policy ?—
I will not say that I recollect that, but my impression is that
he did think so, clearly and distinctly.
1707. Mr. Hindley.] After the reversal of his policy,
for six years there was no war with the Kafirs ?—There was
not.
1708. The depredations committed by the Kafirs on an
average, were not above 5,000 I. a year in value?—From
recollection it is hard to say, but I should not think the
value would amount to more than that.
0.63.
P
226 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Jovis, 26° die Junii, 1851.
members present.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Booker.
Mr. Bonhani Carter.
Mr. E. H. Stanley.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Estcourt.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Mr. Labouchere.
Mr. Monsell.
Sir Edward Buxton.
Viscount Mandeville.
The Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Card well.
Mr, Fitzpatrick.
The Right Hon. H. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom, called in ; and Examined.
^iT A. 1709. Mr. Hawes.'] I observe in the Evidence which you
Stockenstrom, before the Committee in 1835, you stated that the
26 June Government could at tha itime " have laid down a system of
1851. preventive measures which would have effectually protected
the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard their
cattle, and could make stricter rules for said territory, than
perhaps it would have been able to do on the western side of
the old frontier." Will you have the goodness to state to the
Committee what were the preventive measures which you con¬
templated in the answer you gave to the Committee at that
time, and which I have read ?—The measures were carried
out subsequently by order of Lord Glenelg. If the Com¬
mittee will allow me, I will quote an authority which may
perhaps have some weight here ; it is that of Sir Harry Smith.
1710. Do so, if you please?—It is confirmatory of that
view. I thought it best to refer to old documents ; I have
done so, and I have found a paper of Sir Harry Smith's.
This was sent to me by Sir B. D'Urban : " Extract copy
from Colonel Smith's plan of the frontier police, and relations
with the Kafir Tribes, upon giving up the new province of
Adelaide." It is dated 12th July 1836. I take this from
the supplement to the Cape Frontier Times of the i8th of
July 1848.
1711. Mr. Booker.] Is that a despatch ?—It is a memoran¬
dum
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 227
dum sent to me by Sir Benjamin D'Urban when he had sir A-
re[)ealed martial law, and ordered the territory to be given up ; Stockenstrom.
he sent me this as a suggestion from Sir Harry Smith, for me 26"jûîie
to adopt. As far as it was consistent with Lord Glenelg's
instructions I adopted it ; other parts which were inconsistent
I did not adopt ; but this passage bears upon it so strongly,
that I should like to read it to the Committee. In the fourth
paragraph it is said, " upon the farmer discovering he has
been robbed, he is to follow up the spoor, to proceed to the
nearest agent of j)olice, make añidavit that he has lost
; if during the day, that he was satisfied with the dili¬
gence of his herd ; if at night, that his cattle were in the kraal ;
half the depredations are occasioned by tlie farmers themselves
from allowing their cattle to «ander about, without even
counting them, for days ; the next thing to be considered is,
suppose the farmer is robbed to a serious extent, yet his cattle,
or any traces of them, are not discovered, has he any claim on
the Government ? I say no, for if he attends to his herds it is
totally impossible they can fly ; the spoor must be discovered,
and so must the cattle ; " that is the passage I allude to, and
this was so consistent with my vie«-, and, in fact, with Lord
Glenelg's views, that it was carried out.
1712. Mr. Hawes.'] Then am I to understand that the
measures you have spoken to of the general policy you
thought desirable for the protection of the frontier was carried
out in the treaty you made, and signed at King William's
Town on the 5th of December 1836?—Yes.
1713. I understand that that treaty carried out generally
those preventive measures which you have referred to in the
answers you gave when giving evidence before the Committee
in 1835?—Generally speaking, those views of mine, com¬
bined with the instructions which I received from Downing-
street.
1714. Now did the treaty of 1836, which I have just re¬
ferred to, work well and successfully for this object ?—1 hardly
think that I am an unbiassed witness upon that point ; I should
rather like to refer you to others. Sir George Napier was as
humane and upright a man as we have had there, and I should
like to refer to his letters to Lord Gienelg up to the end of
1838 or the beginning of 1839, when I left the frontier;
subsequent to that I can say very little, except from hearsay ;
but as long as I was there I considered it to work well, and
Sir George Napier expressed his unqualified approbation to
ine, but that is in private letters ; but they will be officially
found in Downing-street. In one particular letter I find this
0.63. p 2 — (" I"
!Í28 MINÜTES OÍ EV1ÖENCE TAKEN ¿EFORE THE
Sir A. —In a report made to Sir George Napier, and transmitted
Stockenstrom, officer under cover of his despatcii of the ist o.
26 June February 183g to Lord Normanby, who placed it in my
1851. hands) Colonel Somerset felt himself bound to declare lha
he ' never observed such apparent quiet throughout the country,
adding, ' that toar can only have been contemplated by those
who wish to keep up a feeling of excitement in the minds of the
tribes, either against each other or against the colony, and thus
disfgure and distort every subject, btU in the minds oj the Kafirs
nothing of the hind was ever contemplated ; but this is not
the only one, there are several other documents that "ill be
found, both private and official, addressed to Lord Glenelg,
and the private ones were also in the office at that time ; I
refer particularly to that of the 1st of February 1839, and my
report thereon.
1715. Has it or not come within your own knowledge, that
complaints were very frequently, not to say universally, made
in the colony against those treaties, to the effect that the pro¬
visions were not such as to protect the frontier farmers?—Not
generally or universally ; but certainly on the frontier there
was a very strong party determined to upset those treaties ;
there is no doubt about that ; l)ut they were as ¡lostile to the
D'Urban system ; I hold in my hand documents to show
that.
1716. Did not Sir George Napier feel it necessary to amend
those treaties?—That was in 1840, I think, two years after Í
left the Government; I allude to Sir George Napier's view of
the Glenelg treaties, and how they worked for t\vo years and
upwards.
1717. Allow me to call your attention to a statement made
by Sir George Na[)ier, with reference to those treaties; he
says in a despatch dated the 2ist of September 1840, " 1 bave
determined to proceed about the beginning of next month to
Graham's Town, in order to investigate afresh the grievances
so deservedly complained of by the colonists, with reference
to the plunder of their property, herds and flocks ; and also
in reference to a new feature in Kafir depredations, namely,
the frequent murders of the armed herdsmen belonging to the
colonists, whom tbey are forced by the articles of the treaties
to have so armed, in oi'der to entitle them to demand com¬
pensation for their plundered cattle." Now is not that a
rather strong opinion, that the provisions of those treaties
were not sufficient?—I am speaking of the despatches in the
beginning of 183g and the end of 1838, when I had for two
years conducted the system.
1718, But
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 229
»
1718. But this, as you will observe, is dated in 1840, after Sir A.
another year's experience'/—I had then left the frontier two Stockenstrom.
years, and had been in this country two years, consequently ^6 June
I do not know anything about Sir George Napier; I have had 1851.
no intercourse with him since I left the frontier.
1719. 1 vvill ask you this general question then, whether
you are or are not aware from your long residence and expe¬
rience in that colony, that Sir George Napier from time to
time spoke of the inadequacy of those treaties to maintain
peace, and found it necessary to enter into fresh agreements
with the Kafirs ?--I know he made a fresh agreement with the
Kafirs ; that is a notorious fact. What he spoke I know not.
1720. I will just call your attention to one more despatch
of Sir George Napier's, and ask your opinion upon the points,
if you Jilease ; he says in the despatch of the 26th of August
1841, "After a full and impartial trial during four years of
the treaties entered into in 1837," which should be 1836
I believe now, " between Lieutenant-governor Stockenstrom
and the various tribes of frontier Kafirs, I find that these trea¬
ties were defective in some particulars, bearing hard and
unjustly upon the colonists, and tending rather to encourage
than to discourage stealing on the part of the Kafirs did any¬
thing justifying or bearing that opinion come within your
personal knowledge?—lie would not give that opinion with¬
out he was perfectly convinced it was so ; but Í disagree with
him altogether. I refer to his opinion when he had been
about a year in the colony, and the system had been in opera¬
tion for upw ards of two years.
1721. Now I gathered fron) your former evidence, and you
vvill correct me if I am wrong, that you were of opinion that
there had been a constant tendency to encroachment upon
the land justly belonging to the Kafirs, and that that had led
to collisions, ill feelings, íínd ultimately war between the
Kafirs and the colonists ?—I spoke of the encroachments of
tiie white man from the Cape of Good Hope for the last 200
years, and the natural state of colonies by white men coming
in contact with aboriginal tribes, and I believe that that is an
established fact ; it has always been my opinion, and is so
now. We have before our eyes the Cape of Good Hope,
when the Dutch took possession of it ; they first built a little
fort, and we have now got to the Orange river, upon that prin¬
ciple of gradual encroachment.
1722. And your opinion is, that that gradual encroach¬
ment has in fact led to bad feeling on the part of the Kafirs
towards the colonists, as between the Kafirs and the settlers ?
0.63. p 3 —Yes,
230 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. —Yes, as a natural process in the new world as well as in the
Stocienttrom.
«6 June ^ 723. And has brought our relations to their present un-
1S51.. satisfactory condition ; that is your opinion ?—Yes.
1724. Will you let me call your attention to the arrange¬
ments that you entered into with the chief Kreli in 1846,
and I ask you simply vMth a view to explanation. In 1846,
I find in the papers laid before Parliament in 1847, that you
made a treaty with Kreli, and I will read you the last article
of that treaty, with a view to ask you for some explanation :
"Fourthly," Kreli is "to acknowledge the right of the
British government to all the land vvest of the Great or White
Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he, Kreli, or any other
Kafir, chief or subject, may have possessed to any part of the
said territory." Before you answer the question, in order to
put you in full possession of the points I wish to direct your
attention to, I will read the comment which you make in your
letter dated 14th August 1846, addressed to Lieutenant-
colonel Cloete. In that letter I find this passage: "His
Excellency declines all negotiation with any other Kafir chief.
He declares the territory west of the Kei, forfeited to the
British Crown : he will dispose thereof as he shall see fit,
and he will not allow any Kafir to reside therein except upon
terms dictated by himself. It now rests with Kreli whether
his territory, east of the Kei, shall share the fate of that on
the west of that stream." Now will you allow me to ask you
generally for an explanation of the arrangement which you
entered into with Krell, seeing that you generally object to
encroachments upon the lands held by native tribes?—I have a
memorandum as to that, which with permission I will read :
" The Committee having pressed the question as to the best
policy to be adopted when the present Kafir war shall be
brought to an issue, I have given -the subject my most anxious
consideration. Besides considering myself in duty bound to
afford the Committee every assistance in my power, I have
every farthing that I possess at stake on the Kafir frontier;
but I am bound to declare that I cannot see my way through
the labyrinth in which we are entangled. As late as 1846, I
still hoped, that by treating with Kreli as the paramount chief,
and obtaining from him the cession of the land west of the
Kei, we might thus obtain a title to the principal strongholds,
and restore the remainder, holding him responsible as any
other independent chief. But we broke the convention which
was made with Kreli, by marching an army against him,
which only exposed our weakness, shook more than ever the
faith
ÖELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
faith of the barbarian in our justice, and the result is, that Sir A.
Krell has joined the war against us ; this plan, therefore, I can Stockenstrom.
no longer recommend." I drew up that because it struck me 26jüñe
the Committee expected something from me. I have given it ig^i.
my most serious attention, and I have come to that conclusion.
It is impossible for me to say what is to be done. I more¬
over wish to say this, the orders I received to carry that out
generally coincided with my view.
1725. Now, will you further explain to the Committee if
this treaty, or this result of the conference as it is called, with
Krell, generally coincided with your view, wherein materially
you differ from the view taken by Sir Benjamin D'Urban for
the preservation of the peace of the frontier, by advancing
into Kafírland, and holding a kind of military possession of it
in connexion with the chiefs?—After that war of 1846, I
should have had no objection to hold certain strongholds in
Kafirland, provided it were the result of a treaty with Kreli,
whom I expected the Governor would treat with as paramount
chief. I knew that after seizing the land in the manner in
which we did it, we could not hold it without an overwhelm¬
ing force. All confidence was lost between us and the western
chiefs, and I thought it best for the Governor to hold himself
to Kreli. It would have been for Sir Peregrine Maitland and
Kreli to enter into such further arrangements as fhey thought
proper. I was merely commanding the burgher force at the
time, and carried out the Governor's views in that convention,
I only cleared the w ay to give the Governor carte blanche for
entering into treaties w ith Kreli, which might have placed our
frontier affairs upon a good footing.
1726. Which coincided with your own ?—Yes.
1727. This treaty, or this result of the conference, never
took effect?—It was broken immediately we marched a force
against Kreli.
1728. Did not the Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, actu¬
ally revoke it ?—I believe he did.
1729. In point of fact it was never fulfilled ?—Kreli I'ested
upon the faith of that convention, and so did 1.
1730. But the Governor refused to confirm the arrange¬
ment you had entered into?—Yes, but that arrangement was
his own.
1731. Was not your object in making that treaty, and was
not the policy you now slate you generally adopted, that which
you considered best for the defence of the frontier of the
Cape, and the preservation of the peace in Kafirland ?—Yes ;
I should at that time have thought .so, and it was my object
0.63. p 4 -i— to
232 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Governor full play over the whole of that territory
StiKk^^om. in ajjy negotiations he might see fit to enter into with Kreli.
a6June They were his own views, not mine; but I perfectly agreed
1851. with him.
1732' Then, with a view to defend the frontier of the
Cape, you consider this military possession of Kafirland
essential, and beneficial to the interests of the Cape colony
proper ?—I should have thought so at that time decidedly,
leaving at the same time the Governor the discretion of making
any arrangement with Kreli he thought proper on the subject.
>733- Are you disposed in any degree to modify that opi¬
nion now ?^No, not the least. On that occasion, when I was
sent there, in fact, even before that, I gave the Governor my
opinion that it would be the plan to hold Kreli responsible, and
to deal with him to get his cession of the land, and make any
arrangement afterwards which might be thought politic.
1734. Then may I infer from your evidence this, that sup¬
pose the war ends in the retention of Kafirland by these mili¬
tary posts, you would think that to be the best mode of
maintaining a peaceful frontier ?—I must again decline saying
anything that is to be done when this war ends. At that time
I suggested a plan which was adopted and afterwards repudi¬
ated. When 1 spoke to Sir Peregrine IMaitland, I thought
that was the best plan to get the cession of the land, and have
a carie blanche to do what he pleased in any negotiations he
might enter into with Kreli. The object was merely provi¬
sional, to give him complete power to deal with Kreli as he
thought proper.
1735. Must 1 conclude that you are unwilling to state to
the Committee whether or not a similar course of policy now
pursued, assuming the war to be brought to a conclusion,
would be as successful now as you thought it would be then ?
—I cannot say ; the country is in too diificult a position to
say what may be necessary hereafter.
1736. In what does the diflference consist between the two
periods, then and now, which prevents your forming an opinion
whether the policy you then recommended is unsuited to the
present state of afiairs ?—I should not like to give any opinion
w ith reference to what ought to be done at the close of the
w ar ; I did then, and I found I had gone too far ; I had acted
bonâfide, and I found that it would have been better if I had
not done so ; I think that we are in a very great difficulty with
reference to that frontier, and I should not like to recommend
the same policy just now ; w e may be obliged to adopt that, or
even
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 233
even perhaps a severer one ; I am not, however, prepared to Sir A.
say how that may be. StockensUom.
1737. You stated one of the evils of the present system was igTüne
the existenee of what you call the patrole system ?—Yes. 1851,
1738. Did that actually cease upon your treaties being
entered into ?—Yes; that could not be ; it was not allowed.
1739. Ï stated by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, on the 12th
of August 1837, "That the practice of military patroles along
our whole frontier line as it existed before the late war, and
which, if I mistake not, your Lordship has strongly con¬
demned, has been revived since the conclusion of the treaties
(probably rendered indispensable by the incessant depreda¬
tions which have taken place, and as a necessary aid to the
maintenance of the j)resent system), and now prevails so
unremittingly, that I have observed in some recent duty states
of the posts along the new border line as many as nine daily
patroles sent out from the same post in 14 days;" were you
aware of that ?—Those are military patroles scouring the
country, but not patroles going after stolen cattle in Kafirland.
1740. They are totally different, I understand?—Quite dif¬
ferent.
1741. What was the duty of the patroles spoken of by Sir
Benjamin D'Urban ?—If you look at some ot the articles of
the treaties, you will see that no patrole was allowed to cross
the frontier after stolen cattle ; that whenever cattle were
traced to the frontier, notice was given to the authorities.; but
those were military patroles ; every ofiScer sent out his patrole
whenever he thought it necessary, to see if there were traces
of cattle gone into the Kafirland. Patroles within the colony
to see whether bodies of Kafirs had entered the colony, and
other similar objects, are quite a différent thing.
1742. Then I understand the patrole system was effectually
put down by you?—Yes. See the treaties.
1743. But did you succeed in stopping depredations by
Kafirs ?—The depredations were never stopped completely ;
that was never expected.
1744. Did they not continue extensively?—No, I believe
not ; but the official returns wili show ; but they must be
obtained up to the end of 1838, through the agent-general,
who kept Iiis returns on purpose. To those returns I refer,
and it will be found not to be the case. Mr. Hudson was
agent-general. No other return can be correct.
1745. Are you able to give the Committee any information
upon this point as to the extent to which the Cape is willing
to contribute towards the defence of the frontier, in the event
of
234 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. of their obtaining the constitution they desire?—The constitu-
Stochenstrom. jjQj^ jg ^ distinct point from the Kafir war. The colonists had
2(5 nothing to do \i'ith the Kafir war, which is entirely the result of
1851. Government measures. Her Majesty has sanctioned and
granted a constitution to the colony of the Cape of Good
Hope. The colony is entitled to it, and expects it, and I do
not think you can connect the two points. But I give my own
opinion that they accept that constitution, and accept it with
all its legitimate responsibility ; but it will not be in the power
of that colony, for a considerable time, to pay the expenses of
this war, because it will take a vast number of troops yet
before this war is at an end, and the consequences of the war
it would be cruel to load upon the colonists. I think the
questions are two distinct ones, and I am not authorized to
pledge myself for the colony ; and I do not believe the colony
can, for a considerable time, pay the expenses ; that will be
the result of the present war, which they had nothing to do
with. But if they take the constitution, they accept it with
all its legitimate responsibilities.
1746. Do I understand you to say the policy pursued is
generally unacceptable to the people of the Cape ; I mean in
entering upon this war to punish the Kafirs for their depreda¬
tions ?—The war has been not unpopular. The people see it
must be done. If the war be not carried on, it will be a most
awful affair- The Kafirs fancy themselves our masters.
1747. In what respect do I understand you to say that this
war is a war of Her Majesty's Government as distinguished
from the interests of the colony?—It is the result of the mea¬
sures of the Government, in which the colonists generally have
no concern ; they have no control over the acts of the Govern¬
ment.
1748. They have an interest though they have not a control ?
—Much more interest than the Government have.
1749. And they have a deep interest in the settlement of
the frontier question, by a policy, somewhat similar to that
recommended by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and of which you
have stated generally to the Committee you approved in 1 846?
—I never approved of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system at all ;
I disapproved of it from first to last.
1750. What is the difference between Sir Benjamin
D'Urban's system in the main, and that arrangement you
entered into with Kreli in 1846?—That was a provisional
agreement ; a convention to enable Sir Peregrine Maitland to
do what he thought proper with Kreli afterwards ; but Sir
Benjamin
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 23.5
Benjamin D^Urban's system was, taking Kafirland under his Sir J.
own control, and ruling by martial law. Stockenstrom.
1751. How is that consistent with the maintenance of
the treaties ; that the right of the British Government should 1851,
be acknowledged " to all the land west of the Great or White
Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he Kreli, or any other
Kafir chief or subject, may have possessed to any part of the
said territory"?—That was made in order to enable the
Governor to have a carte blanche., to put the frontier in such a
state as he thought politic. I was acting in a military capacity
rather than a diplomatic capacity. I wish to say, there has been
a great mistake on the D'Urban system. It was stated, and I
think generally believed, that the D'Urban system was super¬
seded by Lord Glenelg, which is not the case. The D'Urban
system cannot exist without martial law. Sir Harry Smith has
proved that. He has carried it on for four years, now for the
second time, and has failed, and I was expected to do it
Mithout martial law, as if that were possible, for before I
reached that frontier with my instructions Sir Benjamin
D'Urban repealed martial law. His system therefore was at
an end, and the Kafirland he had attaclied to the colony was
thrown upon my hands without martial law. The jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and civil law was extended over it. To
carry this out was declared impossible hy Sir H. Smith him¬
self and his friends. I have here a document to show that
the D'Uiban system was not superseded by order of Lord
Glenelg. I had my positive orders to carry on Sir Benjamin
D'Urban's system till I should receive further instructions from
this country, which were never received, because Sir Benjamin
D'Urban upset his own system. I can refer to the official
document to prove that, if necessary.
1752. Will you have the goodness to explain a little more
fully what you mean by Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system as
contra-distinguished from Lord Glenelg's system ?—I refer you,
rather than trust to my memory, to Lord Glenelg's despatch
of December 1835, in which he enters fully into that, and
explains his system in contra-distinction to the measures Sir
Benjamin D'Urban had adopted.
1753* Am I right in describing Sir Benjamin D'Urban's
system to be this, that of taking military possession of the
territory west of the Kei, maintaining the colonial frontier,
within which colonial law prevailed, and holding it by a kind
of military possession ; and Lord Glenelg's system to be this,
that of withdrawing all authority and all military force from
British Kafraria, and leaving the Kafir Chiefs to govern
-t— themselves.
236 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sw^. themselves, and maintaining the frontier of the Keiskamma;
tocj^om. jg —Yeg^ J believe Sir Benjamin D'Urban's system
a6 June to have been exactly what Sir Harry Smith's system is now,
1851. and Lord Glenelg's system can be found in his own despatch,
and the treaties made in consequence of that.
1754* Lord Glenelg's system consisted practically in with¬
drawing all authority whatsoever from what is called British
Kafraria ?—Yes.
1755. Leaving the chiefs as they were before, perfectly
independent ; was not that so ?—Yes.
1756. Now I understand you to say that Sir Benjamin
D'Urban himself upset his own system ?—Yes.
1757' In what respect, and what proof have you of that ?—
1 have the proof here, the whole of it; I think I had better
read Lord Glenelg's instructions to me : " Although I have
thus adverted to the main object of your future care, as if it
were immediately within you reach, you will yet understand,
that until you shall have received further instructions, you are
not to proceed to treat with the Kafir chiefs, or to frame the
laws to which I have adverted; those instructions will be
conveyed to you so soon as I shall have received from Sir
Benjamin D'Urban the final report, for which I have applied
to him in my despatch of the 26th December; yuur duty in
the meantime will be to administer the law as it actually
stands;" this is the passage I allude to in that despatch, and
there are my orders. When I arrived at the Cape, Sir Ben¬
jamin D'Urban seemed rather disposed to at once abandon his
system, and referred the question to me, which I answered
thus : " Cape Town, August 5th, 1836. To his Excellency the
Governor. Sir, Having attentively perused the several docu¬
ments which your Excellency did me the honour to transmit
under cover of your letter of the ist instant. No. 1, I take the
liberty, for our mutual satisfaction, hereby to record officially
the sentiments which I expressed at the interview with which
you favoured me this morning, and to repeat that I shall feel
great pleasure in cordially carrying into effect the system
established by your Excellency on the frontier, as now in
operation, in strict accordance with the instructions of His
Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, contained in his
despatch addressed to me on the 5th February 1836, No. 2,
and more particularly in the passage running thus," which
I have just read. " In thus expressing myself, I am not losing
sight of the passages from Lord Glenelg's despatches to your
Excellency, of the 171h February and 28th March last, as
inserted in your Excellency's said letter of the ist instant, but
as
Select committee on the kafir tribes. 237
as on the 19th of April, «hen T had the honour of an audience sir A.
of leave with his Lordship, I was pointedly referred to the Stnckenstrom.
instructions which I had received, without any allusion to any 26'j^e
communication to your Excellency, it docs appear to me, that
though the supercession of vour Excellency's plan was evi¬
dently contemplated as the ultimate result of the instructions
which I had received, and of my arrival here, it would never¬
theless be premature in me to proceed to such supercession
without those further instructions for which I was so positively
instructed to wait, and which were to be framed after the
receipt by ids Lordship of your Excellency's reply to his
des|)atch of the 261h December last, unless indeed it were your
Excellency's desire that I should do so at once. But as your
Excellency, after a test of nine months practical experience of
the working of said plan, is enabled to anticipate such desirable
and important results, from a perseverance in the same, we
must admit the possibility that those further instructions
which must follow within a moderate period, may contain the
sanction of your Excellency's views ; in which case the re-
estaldishment of the present state of adairs w ould be attended
with much greater ditficuhies than its reversal, as soon as you
shall have received the final instructions alluded to. At any
rate, as I nowhere find the door entirely closed against such
possibility, I should humbly propose that I proceed to the
eastern frontier (which, with your Excellency's permission,
I shall do immediately, having, in order to avoid delay,
made up my mind to leave my family to follow at leisure),
and after a personal inspection and examination of the
affairs of the borders, communicate to your Excellency the
conclusions which I may have come to, by which time the
Minister's decision may, perhaps, have left no further doubt
on our minds, nor will by such a proceeding any material
time be lost, as the undoing of what has been done will
require a degree of caution, towards which an exact know¬
ledge of various circumstances will be indispensable on my
part.'' That is signed by myself in consequence of the
Governor showing a disposition, and in fact, there is a letter
which I have not got, in which he proposed to give up the
system.
1758, Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy was not confirmed
by Lord Glenelg 'I—No ; those are the words I have read ;
stating that further instructions would come from Lord
Glenelg after he should receive from Sir B. D'Urban the
final report above referred to.
1759. Whilst Sir Benjamin D'Urban remained Governor of
the
238 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
« colony he gave you assistance, and acquiesced so far in
toe enstrom. policy that had been prescribed by the Secretary of
26 June State ?—My answer is above.
1851. 1760. My question referred to Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—
I wish to make my answer clear ; I proceeded to the frontier
expecting in consequence Lord Glenelg's orders to carry out
strictly the D'Urban system.
1761. Your orders were, upon your proceeding to the Cape,
to carry out the system introduced by Sir Benjamin D'Urban
until further instructions proceeded from the Secretary of
State ?—Yes ; I have just read it.
1762. Were you not aware, and was not Sir Benjamin
D'Urban aware, that tliose instructions would in all proba¬
bility put an end to that system, and altogether reverse it ?—
Lord Glenelg did not lead him to expect that, because he said
in his despatch, if you give me sufficient explanation, I may
change my mind.
1763. In fact, was not the whole policy reversed?—Ulti¬
mately; but who reversed it? The whole policy rested upon
martial law. I left the Cape w ith the determination, of course,
to follow up Lord Glenelg's orders, and to carry out the
system exactly as Colonel Smith had carried it out ; but I was
not away a day from Cape Town, when a proclamation
issued without my knowledge, whereby martial law was re¬
pealed. The jurisdiction of the judges was at once extended
into Kafirland, and there was at once an end to the D'Urban
system. That Lord Glenelg had nothing to do with what¬
ever ; his order was, Administer the law as it actually
stands."
1764. You entirely concurred in the reversal of that system
yourself?—Yes, decidedly. Sir Harry Smith himself and his
own friends had declared the thing impossible after the repeal
of martial law.
1765. And Sir Benjamin D'Urban, I believe, protested
strongly against the policy which he was instructed to adopt ?
—This correspondence with Lord Glenelg is on record, and is
of a very voluminous nature ; I would rather leave it to the
Committee to read.
1766. But the effect of it was a strong protest, was not it,
against the policy which was then introduced ?—Which I was
to introduce upon receiving final instructions from Lord
Glenelg, which I never received.
1767. But it came within your knowledge that Sir Ben¬
jamin D'Urban altogether protested against the reversal of his
policy ?—I have read that.
1768. Did
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 239
1768. Did he ever oredict that it would not put an end to Sir/Í.
the depredations on the frontier, or the chances of war?—He Stockenstrom.
predicted much more awful consequences than that even, but
it is many years ago ; I have read it, and the Committee will ^^185""^
find it upon record, which will be better than taking it from me.
1769. You are not aware of the observations which were
made by Sir Benjamin D'Urban himself upon your treaties?
—I believe he had a very great objection to them ; he ratified
them in Council, and there was a great deal of correspondence
between him and me on the subject before they were ratified ;
they were ultimately ratified, and approved by the Secretary
of State and his Majesty the King.
1770. Is not it notorious in the Cape that depredations
continued, and that there were as constant collisions between
the colonists and the Kafirs subsequent to those treaties as
before?—As I said before, I should like to refer the Com¬
mittee to the returns of the agent-general, Mr. Hudson,
1771. Living, as you do, near the frontier,-does it not come
within your knowledge ?—Of late years, certainly.
1772. Since the conclusion of those treaties of 1836?—Yes,
but not immediately; mark me, I speak only of the two years
I conducted that treaty, and I refer to Sir George Napier for
his opinion in confirmation of my own view ; beyond that I
can only state what rumour and the newspapers state.
1773. Can you refer to the opinion of Sir George Napier?
—I speak of his opinion when I left the government of the
eastern province, about the close of 1838, and the very strongly
favourable character of Sir George Napier's testimony when I
left.
1774. Did not Sir George Napier, very shortly after the
conclusion of those treaties, repeatedly bring to the notice of
the Secretary of State depredations that must have come
within your knowledge, living near the frontier, beginning in
the year 1838, and going on steadily during the whole course
of his government ?—I am not aware of that ; I have not seen
Sir G. Napier's despatches since 1839.
1775. I will read you a passage from the despatch of Sir
George Napier, dated the 25th of May 1838, in which he
states, " I cannot conclude this despatch without informing
your Lordship that I am taking every means within my power,
in strict accordance with the treaties, to prevent the constant
and now much-extended depredations of the Kafirs Sir
George Napier, also, in September 1838, states that he in¬
formed the chiefs of the Tambookie nation, that he "must
insist on all the articles of the treaties being fulfilled on their
parts,
240 Minutes of evidence taken before tiIe
Sir^#, parts, as they have been on ours, and to impress upon them,
Stockenstrom, as I have constantly done upon the Gaika nation, that the
aë^ïin® consequences of their non-compliance with every article of
1851. these treaties will he war"?—There is no statement in that
passage that he did it in consequence of depredations ; he
would naturally, as a new Governor in the colony, make these
statements, and tell the chiefs his determination.
1776. Is not it an evidence to show, on the part of Sir
George Napier, that those treaties did not prevent extended
depredations?—I can only speak of Sir George Napier's com¬
munications to me, and those to Lord Gleneig, and I would
refer particularly to one; but I have not got the letter; I
have only got an extract from Colonel Somerset's Enclosure;
I refer to the one of the ist of February 1839, containing
Colonel Somerset's views on the then state of the frontier.
1777. I have it here; will you read the extract?—It is a
most important letter, hut I do not see it here. The enclosure
is by Colonel Somerset ; it begins something about disputes
between diplomatic agents. Then he says, that he " never
observed such apparent quiet throughout the country;" adding,
" that war can only have been contemplated by those who
wish to keep up a feeling of excitement in the minds of the
tribes, either against each other or against the colony, and thus
disfigure and distort every subject ; but in the minds of the
Kafirs nothing of the kind was ever contemplated." That was
the letter enclosed, and was referred to me by Lord Nor-
manby. Sir G. Napier's letter, as well as my report thereon,
is of the utmost importance to this Committee.
1778. What was the date of that?—Sir George Napier's
letter was dated the ist February 1839. Here I accidentally
see a letter from Sir George Napier to Lord Gleneig, dated
Government-house, Cape Town, 20th of November 1838: "I
am happy to say that Captain Stockenstrom's successor.
Colonel Hare, is zealously and actively carrying into effect all
the measures necessary for the tranquillity of those provinces,
and firmly establishing that peace and amity with the Kafirs so
vital to the Avelfare of this colony. The chiefs confess they
have no cause of distrust or complaint of the Government;
and that in any little unpleasant occurrence which may at
times happen (and which often must be the case), Colonel
Hare, following the footsteps of his predecessor, Captain
Stockenstrom, instantly redresses it in person, according to
my'directions, which were given in consequence of the advice
of Captain Stockenstrom to myself, and as he will tell you, I
invariably treated all the chiefs as my equals, as I am con¬
vinced
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 24I
vînced the more we hold them up in a respectable lii^ht, and sir A.
as great men, which they are in their own nations, the greater Stockenstrom.
will be their confidence in us, and the more power they will
have of keeping their people quiet. I am aware that this is
not the way in which they were ibrmerly treated, and that
every thing was done to lower them in the eyes of their tribes,
and thereby undermine, as it was called, their power. In
this policy I never can concur ; I am convinced it is based on
wrong principles, and certainly failed when pursued. I do
most earnestly and respectfully entreat of you to confirm
Colonel Hare as Lieutenant-governor and Commandant of
the troops (in which I feel confident Captain Stockenstrom
will join me), for he is calming the irritation of party, and
doing justice to all, at the same time firmly supporting the
enlightened policy of your Lordship, and in a conciliatory
manner, which towards a community composed as that of
Graham's Town, is of the greatest importance ; he is, in my
opinion, decidedly the best lieutenant-governor your Lordship
can have, provided he is also made commandant of the troops
on the frontier, uncontrolled by any one except the Com¬
mander-in-chief of the colony, in the same way as he is under
the governor in his civil capacity; and as your Lordship is
aware, that in our profession rank carries with it much weight,
I trust you Avill press upon the General Commanding-in-chief
the necessity of giving Colonel Hare the local rank of either
major-general or brigadier, with an aide-de-camp, as the
military duties on the frontier require the commanding officer
of the troops to have an aide-de-camp. Should all this meet
your approbation, and that Colonel Hare is nominated by
your Lordship, I feel confident that ere long everything will go
according to your wishes, as already property of all kinds, and
particularly land, is rising steadily and at the same time rapidly,
and even the most furious of our opponents, and the greatest
alarmists, are forced to admit that public confidence is fast
returning, and that the Kafirs are not going to eat up the
colonists, but that everything indicates a continuance of our
present peace and tranquillity ; I have no fears myself as long
as justice is fairly administered to the native tribes, but that
they will be quiet, and not give any cause to expect an irrup¬
tion into the colony ; still I am bound to state to your Lord¬
ship, that I earnestly request that another British regiment
should be sent out to reinforce this army, as I consider three
regiments absolutely necessary for the duties and defence of
the frontier ; of course, if it cannot be clone, and that your
Lordship is of a dift'erent opinion, I shall exert myselt and
0.63. Q use
242 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. "se every means in my power to do without a reinforcement."
Stockenstrom. Then he says, " I cannot close this letter without expressing
aêjun your Lordship, privately, the very great advantage I have
'1851".^ derived from my friend and medical adviser, Mr. Clarke, the
surgeon of the 72d Highlanders ; this gentleman has known
this colony, and particularly the eastern frontier, for upwards
of 20 years in his capacity of an officer, and being a man of
great observation and sound, unprejudiced judgment, and well
acquainted both with the Dutch boers and English settlers
of 1819 (the worst importation that ever was imported into
this colony), as well as with the Kafirs, his experience and
knowledge was, and is of infinite service to me, particularly
as he, 20 years back, always publicly said the system then
pursued of commandoes, &c. &;c. was bad, and until a more
just and humane one, as regarded the native tribes, was
adopted, it was useless to expect peace with or confidence
in them ; he served in most of the commandos of former
times, and therefore speaks from personal knowledge, and he
tells me he feels full confidence in the working of your Lord¬
ship's system. I mention this for two reasons ; first, I am sure
it w ill give you pleasure to hear the opinion of a clever, sen¬
sible, scientific, well-educated professional man, whose liberal
ideas and sentiments, as well as his position, have given him
the power of impartially judging, from the experience he has
had of the various systems pursued by the different govern¬
ments towards the native tribes ; secondly, it would be most
uncandid in me not to acquaint you with one of the principal
sources from whence I have derived the information which
has enabled me to get on so well as I hope I have done in
the arrangement of the affairs of the frontier ; and I refer your
Lordship to my friend Captain Stockenstrom for a full corro¬
boration of the very high opinion I entertain for Mr. Clarke,
and also to confirm, as I know he will, Mr. Clarke's useful¬
ness to me in every way, as Captain Stockenstrom and
Mr. Clarke have known each other for upwards of 20 years."
This is as strong as I can w ish it, confirmatory of what I said
when I left the frontier; those were Sir George Napier's sen¬
timents, and they are very strong, particularly when he says
property is rising and confidence is re-establishing ; stronger
than that I do not wish to pre?s anything.
1779. Is there anything in that letter to show depredations
to a great extent were not continuing on the frontier }—They
were diminished, but still I would not be positive; I must
refer you not to newspaper reports, but to the official state¬
ment of the agent-general, Mr, Hudson, appointed by Sir
Benjamin
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
243
Benjamin D'Urban, and a very great friend and supporter of sir A.
Sir Benjamin D'Urban's. Stockenstrom.
1780. Let me call your attention to the despatch from Sir
George Napier of the 7th of May 1839?—^ do not know 1851.
that; I appeal to this which I have read, and I could point
to several others, but I refer particularly to this one, and the
terms there expressed as to the working of the system, and as
confirmatory of my views of the way in which the chiefs ought
to be dealt witli.
1781. In the early part of the year 1839, I think you were
in the colony and on the frontier?—No, I was in this country
in November 1838, and did not leave it until the middle of
1840, I believe.
1782. Sir JS. Buxton.'] When did you leave ; in what month
of 1838?—August or September 1838 I left the Cape; I beg
to say I have letters from Sir George Napier, of course private
letters, speaking in the same tone exactly.
1783. Mr. Hawes.] Were you in that colony in September
1840 ?—Yes.
1784. Let me call your attention to the statement made on
the 2ist of September 1840 by Sir George Napier, in which
he says, " I have determined to proceed about the beginning
of next month to Graham's Town, in order to investigate
afresh the grievances so deservedly complained of by the
colonists with reference to the plunder of their property, herds
and flocks, and also in reference to a new feature in Kafir
depredations, namely, the frequent murders of the armed
herdsmen." Were you not at all acquainted with the reports
that were then existing on the frontier ?—The frontier is full
of clamour, and if Sir George Napier states that, it is perfectly
correct.
1785. I understand you to admit, then, that this description
by Sir George Napier in September 1 840, as far as you know
from your residence, is correct ? —I could not contradict it ; I
know nothing of that of my own knowledge.
1786. Did not the frequency of the depredations, and the
notoriety of those murders come to your knowledge ?—But
we are always having clamour about depredations and mur¬
ders ; it is possible that the thing may have come to my
knowledge; I could not possibly say it had or had not; I
know Sir George Napier does not write that without good
authority ; at the same time, of my own knowledge, I could
not speak to it.
1787. Are you disposed to think now that those treaties of
your own, or treaties upon such a basis, will or will not be
Q.63. Q 2 successful
244 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. successful in maintaining the peace of the frontier ?—They
loc enstiom. jjjjgg . j wish they were ; they were Lord Glenelg s ;
26 June I only an instrument in carrying them out.
1851. 1788. They are treaties you signed ?—Yes.
1789. You think they lay down the best rules of frontier
policy ?—I would not say that now ; I say again, that I wish
to give the Committee my full sentiments; but lam afiaid
to say what ought to be done when this war ends ; and I
further say, that I am perfectly certain, if the treaties had
been strictly and honestly adhered to, we should have had no
more «ar.
1790. Is it your opinion, that the treaties have not been
adhered to on the part of the local Government or the colo¬
nists?— I think there has been vacillation; I think Sir George
Napier's amendments were injurious.
1791. Do you think the violations of the treaties referred
to were on the part of the colonists.or the Kafirs ?—Not the
colonists.
1792. Then on the |)art of the local Government ?—'-Yes ;
the Government, decidedly.
1793. What was the year the violations were committed
by the local Governmeot, in respect of those treaties? —I
speak of the year 1844, when the Gaika people were told
that the treaties were at an end, without any discussion,
and new treaties would be put before them. And if it
can serve any purpose, I will state exactly my reasons for
stating so.
1794. What was done by the local Government to which
you object, then, in 1844?—I object to the breaking of the
treaties, without any reference to the opposite part}'.
1795. Did not the original treaty you made, contemplate
its being- put an end to, in the event of the Kafirs ceasing to
observe it ; is not that one of the articles of the treaty ?—
I never knew of treaties being altered except by both parties
discussing the matter, and corning to an understanding. War
breaks treaties, but no party has the right to break a
ti'eaty.
1796. I will refer you to article 5 of the very treaty which
you made, and in wb.ich you secure to the Kafirs their
country, or Kaffraria we call it, " never to be reclaimed by
or on behalf of his said Majesty, except in case of hostility
committed, or a war provoked by the said chiefs or tribe, or
in case of a breach of this treaty or any part thereof, and for
which breach satisfaction or redress shall not be otherwise
given
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
245
given or obtained"?—I am not aware that there was any injury Sir A.
done for which satisfaction was refused. Stockenstrom.
1797. You are not aware, then, whether tlie depredations June
on the part of the Kafirs were so extensive that the mere 1851.
demands of the local Government were, from time to time,
altogether ineifectnal to obtain the restitution of stolen pro¬
perly or not?—1 believe not ; but I cannot say, being out of
office at the time. Cattle stealing by individuals and breach
of treaty by a nation are two different things.
1798. Colonel Dunne.] Do you recollect the date of your
treaty?—December 1836.
1799. Do you recollect whether there was any complaint
of that treaty having been violated on the 2d of June, sub¬
sequently?— I am not aware, but I will refer to it parti¬
cularly,
1800. In the despatch to Lord Glenelg, in August 1837,
do you know whether he accuses them of having wantonly and
flagrantly violated the treaty of the 5th of December?—I am
not aware.
1801. That there was an attack made on "the Fingo set¬
tlements around Fort Peddie, on the Clusie, plundered them
of all their cattle, and murdered 10 or ii of the Fingo race,
together with an English corporal then in the execution of his
protecting duty;" are you anare of that fact?—I believe
what is stated there to be correct, but you must take the text
with the context.
1802. I am only asking you if you recollect that; arc you
aware of that fact?—Yes, but I should prefer to refer to the
correspondence and record ; it would l)c preferable to refer to
the record rather than to trust to my memory.
1803. I refer to the statement published in the book in
your hand ; yon will find it in page 15 r—Yes ; I see it.
1804. 1 think you proceeded to make inquiry, as Lieu¬
tenant-governor of the frontier, as to the circumstances of this
attack on the Fingoes?—Yes, I think I did ; it strikes me so ;
I can only say, whenever anything of importance took place
I-was on the spot immediately afterwards.
1805. page 20, you will find a letter of yours, in which
you make observations on this outbreak of the Kafirs; it is
dated Graham's Town, 9th of iVugust 1837 ?—Yes.
1806. Is it in that despatch you condemn the policy of
allowing the Fingoes, who are the .slaves of the Kafirs, to
have property and being in close proximity to the Kafirs, and
proposed taking them under your protection ?—I do not know
whether I said that, but I know that was the feeling ; it was
0.63. Q 3 wrong
'^4^^ MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. wrong to bring those people out of Kafirland, and put them
Stückenstrom, jjj juxta-position with those Kafirs ; it was most injudicious,
26 June have paid dearly for it.
1851. 1807. If they remained in Kafirland, must they not have
remained as slaves ?—What we call slaves ; it is a different
sort of slavery.
1808. Was there not a strong difference of opinion between
you and Sir Benjamin D'Urban on the very fact of your
treatment of those Fingoes? — There was a difiference of
opinion upon almost every subject, and particularly on that.
Recurring to the question of martial law, when I was to
proceed to the frontier to carry out his system, based upon
martial law, it was repealed before I was out of Cape Town
50 miles.
1809. Did not Sir Benjamin D'Urban think, and express
the opinion he felt in the despatch of the 9th of October
1837, that, in consequence of the policy you adopted with
respect to the Fingoes, order could not be maintained, because
of a want of good faith, in " the abandonment and .sacrifice of
the Fingo race to the tender mercies of their inveterate enemies
the Kafirs." In the despatch you find he expresses that in
condemnation of the policy pursued towards that race?—I do
not think that was so ; the Fingoes got the territory at Fort
Peddie.
1810. Was there not a difference of opinion upon that sub¬
ject on the part of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, however erroneous
he may have been, he believing that you had abandoned the
Fingoes to the " tender mercies " of the Kafirs?—It could not
be ; there were treaties made with the Fingoes as well as the
Kafirs.
1811. Did not he say that the conduct you pursued towards
them was a breach of good faith ?—I dare say he did say so ;
he approved of nothing that I did.
1812. With regard to the Amakosa Kafirs, did not Sir
Benjamin D'Urban accuse them of violating the stipulations
made in favour of the Fingoes ?—In what respect ?
1813. By attacking them, and plundering and murdering
them ?—There was a collision between those people con¬
stantly; but I would rather refer to the documents.
1814. In this particular instance, at page 33 (I refer now
to the particular document), in the last page Sir Benjamin
D'Urban states, that "The Fingoes were amply provided for
w ithout expense to the colony, industrious, thriving, and pros¬
perous; now they are, some of them, dispersed and about to
become destitute, the others expecting the same fate; that
portion
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
247
portion of them whom I had located on the western bank of Sir À.
the Chumie have since been forcibly expelled from that country, Stockenstrom.
which they had converted into a garden of cultivation, to give ^6 June
it to the Gaika Kafirs, who had ravaged the colony two years 1851.
ago ; and these Fingoes will, in all probability, the greater
part of them starve;" I am reading that from the despatch ?
—I beg you to refer to my despatch, and Lord Glenelg's
decision. I differ with Sir Benjamin D'Urban altogether.
1815. I will afterwards. Were not those the points in dis¬
pute between Sir Benjamin D'Urban and yourself as to the
frontier policy adopted by you and condemned by him ?—He
says, the Fingoes have been driven out of the Chumie, and
the Chumieland belonging to the Kafirs of the Gaika tribes
had been given by Sir Benjamin D'Urban to the Fingoes.
1816. But in the first treaty here, I find that the frontier,
that you laid down in your proclamation, and which is after¬
wards confirmed, is from the source of the Chumie ?—Yes.
1817. Was not that the treaty by which those Fingoes were
established there ?—And which was ordered to be restored to
the Kafirs by Lord Glenelg.
1818. Was not it subsequently to the violation of the treaty
on the occasion that I allude to, namely, on the ist of June
1837, that it was restored?—It was restored by the treaty of
December 1836. I know of no violation,
181 g. That was an engagement to drive out those Fingoes
we had placed there by that treaty ?—If you will refer to the
treaty, you will find a special article in which the arrange¬
ments are made, that the Fingoes were to remain until they
had collected all their crops.
1820. Was not this arrangement made a long time before
they had collected their crops, and before they were driven
out.?—I believe not. Here are the documents before us, and
we should appeal to them. I believe they contain what is
correct, or at least, the different views of the different parties.
1821. Sir Benjamin D'Urban in this despatch took a dif¬
ferent view to what you did of the provisions of those treaties ?
—He disapproved of them altogether.
1822. Does not he point out that this treaty of the Lieu¬
tenant-governor was violated, and that the Amakosa Kafirs
were murdered and plundered with impunity, as he calls it,
" an earnest, as it seems, of their ultimate and very speedy
destruction." You are aware of that despatch ?—Not to Lord
Glenelg ; I never saw his despatches to Lord Glenelg ; I was
directed to communicate with the Governor of the colony, and
not directly with the Secretary of State ; my despatches went
0.63. Q 4 to
248 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. to Sir Benjamin D'Urban ; but his despatches to Lord Glenelg
Siockendrom. J never saw, unless they were specially referred to me.
•jG^üñe ^ '*• accusation on the part of Sir Benjamin
1851. D'Urban, that the policy pursued by you ; in fact, that this
treaty was one of the causes of the retirement of the beers from
the frontier?—I believe that was said, but I can prove the con¬
trary. I have the documents in my hands.
]"824. Was there not a certain rieid-commandant, Relief,
on the frontier?—Yes.
1825. Had you strong differences of opinion with him ?—
Not on that point.
1826. Was not he the man who led the emigration first of
all ?—My difference of opinion with him was, because he
threatened to go away into Kafirland in defiance of Sir
Benjamin D'Urban's treaties, and take from the Kafirs the
cattle and other property which had been taken by the Kafirs.
Sir Benjamin D'Urban had made peace with the Kafirs with¬
out taking back one iota of those things ; the ultimate result
was, that he was dismissed by me in consequence of his
violence.
1827. Subsequent to his dismissal, did not he retire into
Kafirland from the colony ?—Yes ; and he was prepared to do
so long before I reached the colony. The boers were not
without organization. The farmers had emigrated, and were
prepared to emigrate long before they heard of Lord Glenelg.
1828. Do you mean in a body or individually?—Indivi¬
dually ; for the last 30 years they have been emigrating in
that direction. The emancipation of the slaves, or rather the
amount and mode of compensation, gave great dissatisfaction, as
also the state of insecurity consequent on the war of 1835,
and the peace then made. Great numbers then went. Tliey
were gone and going before the Glenelg treaties.
1829. But I understand you, those were individual cases of
emigration r—When I reached that colony they w ere going
en masse.
1830. But more immediately so on Mr. Relief going?—
Yes; while the Governor was still at war in Kafirland, a man
went to Natal and returned and said, there was such a beautiful
country, he would get all his relations to sell their farms ;
that was before there was anything heard of the Glenelg sys¬
tem at all.
1831. Do you consider the causes of that emigration were
originally from the measure which took the slaves from under
the colonists' power?—Not so much the emancipation as the
manner in which compensation was given,
1832. Was
SELECT COMMITTEE ON TIÎE KAFIR TRIBES. 249
1832. Was that compensation paid fairly and promptly to j''
the owners of the slaves ?—I think not. btockemtrom.
1833. Was the cause that the money was not fairly paid ?— 26 June
Not the cause of emigration, but of discontent. 1851.
1834. There w ere causes of discontent antecedent to the
emigration that Mr. Retief conducted ?—Yes.
1835. And organization?—^Yes.
1836. What were the causes do you consider, of that dis¬
content which induced the emigration ?—They were various;
one was the manner in which the emancipation affected many ;
the manner in which the compensation was given caused a
great deal of dissatisfaction. I was in Sweden when all that
took place.
1837. Was not the slave population chiefly about the Cape
and not on the frontier?—Chiefly in the western districts and
not on the frontier.
1838. The frontier being in the eastern district?—Yes.
1839. How did the discontent act so much on the eastern
frontier as to induce those people to go aw ay ?—Every man
feels that when dissatisfaction gets hold of a country it spreads
throughout the whole country ; added to that, the insecurity
after the war of 1835 aggravated the cause.
1840. Do you think the circumstance of the insecurity of
cattle and property on the frontier also was a cause of emi¬
gration ?—It added to it.
1841. Was not it caused by the treaties which were made ?
—The Glenelg treaties ?
1842. The treaties generally ?—The depredations ?
1843. Yes.—No; the depredations have been continued
from time immemorial almost.
1844. I understand you that when the boers repelled those
depredations themselves, they did it more effectually than we
subsequently did?—Yes ; the old commando system I speak of.
1845. Therefore putting a stop to the old commando system
was one cause?—No; I say the dissatisfaction sprung partly
from the manner of compensation for the slaves ; that produced
a great deal of irritation ; but there were many other causes,
and one great one, which I have mentioned, is, the nature of
the country, and the nature of the people who are always
wishing lor land, and emigrate where it is to be found, as it is
all over the world. This took place after the Kafir war of
^^35 ; great quantities of people going in masses, which took
place before there was even the name of Glenelg heard among
them, which I have the documents to show, so that tho.se
treaties could not have contributed to it.
1846, Then
250 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. 1846. Then you do not actually regard the infraction to
Stockenstrom, which I before alluded, of the treaty in June, subsequently to
26JWe treaty being formed, was the cause ?—I should rather refer
1851. you to my despatch to Sir Benjamin D'Urban; he must have
had that information from me, and I refer you to my despatch.
1847. Was the Kat settlement at that time formed ?—Yes.
1848. Was the Kat settlement self-supporting?—Yes; it
never had one farthing of support, and has done more for the
Government than any other part of the country.
1849. Were not supplies of clothing and other support
given in 1836?—During the war, and never otherwise that I
know or heard of.
1850. Were not there complaints from the Kat river on the
14th of December 1836 of depredations that had happened by
the Kafirs f—It must be there before you.
1851. Do you recollect it?—I should not specifically recol¬
lect it ; if it did take place, it is there ; my despatch will
show it.
1852. Are you not aware in consequence of that, that there
were applications to the amount of 578 applicants for relief,
and application sent on behalf of 2,679 individuals for clothing
and different support at that time at the Kat river?—In con¬
sequence of the war ; yes, decidedly, they were ruined by the
war.
1853. there not a loss stated of 988 head of cattle?—
During the war.
1854. Those were applications made in consequence of
losses during the war ?—Yes, during the war.
1855. But you have no immediate recollection, and can
only refer me to the returns on the subject of the violation of
the treaty?—Yes, whatever I know of it, is all in my des¬
patches, and you have them.
1856. Mr. MonselL^ Lord Glenelg's system was introduced
in 1836?—December 1836.
1857. How long do you conceive it was faithfully carried
out?—I can only speak as long as I was in the country, the
two first years.
1858. You returned in 1840 to the colony ?—Yes; it was
in some measure put a stop to by amendments made by Sir
George Napier.
1859. How long do you consider the system had a fair
trial ?—I can only answer for two years.
1860. During those two years, did it work in a manner
satisfactory to you ?—I have just read a letter from Sir George
Napier, and there are many more of the kind ; I should refer
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 251
to him rather ; he is more unbiassed ; there has been so much Sir^.
feeling on that subject, I was naturally biassed in my view. Stockenstrom.
1861. Was the system you found in operation when you aô^une
returned to the frontier in 1840, substantially the same system 1851.
as existed when you left ?—When I returned to the frontier,
Sir George Napier made his amendments.
1862. Did you consider at that time that those amendments
were fatal to the system ?—Yes, I did.
1863. Mr. Hindleyl] You do not consider there was an
absolute reversion of the policy of the Government?—There
were one or two points that certainly were in direct opposition
to it, I thought.
1864. Were you in the colony in the year 1845?—Yes.
1865. At that time petitions were presented to the Governor
of Cape Town with respect to the incursions of the Kafirs on
the frontier, and of depredations committed by them?—Yes.
1866. Do you remember meeting the Governor in Council
on the 7th of October 1845 ?—I do not recollect the date ; I
was not in Council.
1867. Do you recollect the speeches made on the occasion
of the presentation of petitions by the Secretary to the Go¬
vernment, by the Attorney-general and by Mr. Cloete ?—They
were in the newspaper, and I believe 1 read them ; I recollect
them.
1868. You would consider that speeches made on that
occasion would be very likely to contain a very good account
of the state of the colony on the frontier, and the effects of
the system pursued?—I should suppose that such men as Mr.
Montagu, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Cloete must have very good
information.
1869. Then I come to the speech of the Secretary to the
Government ; he says, " There seems too much disposition too
hastily to circulate reports of Kafir depredations, without
taking sufficient pains to ascertain their truth ; they are thus
sent about among the colonists, who do not see the contradic¬
tions, or what may be urged on the part of the Kafirs, and,
unfortunately, the contradiction of an unfounded report is not
always to be found in the medium which circulated the error;"
do you believe that many of the reports were unfounded ?—I
believe what you read there is perfectly correct.
1870. Do you remember that he makes a comparative state¬
ment with respect to the security of the colony then and the
previous time, and that then he states that it has been reviv¬
ing, and that the depredations are diminishing?—I believe he
said so.
1871. With
252 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir 1871. With respect to the incorrectness of those reports,
t-toc en^om. (Jq jQy recollect the case of Mr. Hewson, who stated he had
26 June some cattle stolen from him, and which were eventually
1851. found to be upon his own farm ?—I do not recollect that case ;
but it is of constant occurrence. If you refer to my evidence
in 1835 and 1836, you will find it is one of our great misfor¬
tunes that a man will pursue cattle into Kafirland, and jiets
compensation from an unfortunate kraal, and afterwards finds
his cattle in an opposite direction. That was one of the state¬
ments which gave so much offence in regard to my testimony
in 1835 and 1836; but truth is truth, whether it gives offence
or not.
1872. You think this was the cause of frequent complaints ?
—Frequent, perhaps I should not say, but those things do
occur constantly.
1873. Viscount Mandcxille.] ^^'ere the majority of instances
of that description ?—No, I should not say so. It has often
occurred that we have had unfortunate cases in earlier times,
where a man has thought himself right in tracing the spoor,
and gone to a kraal and insisted upon compensation, and
brought cattle back, when his own have been in quite a dif¬
ferent direction, or in the pound.
1874. Mr. Ilindley.'] Now, I go on to the speech of the
Attorney-general, in which he declares, "Although my career
in this colony has not yet been a long one, it has yet ap¬
proached a period of sevt n years, and during that time I have
not been entirely neglectful of the opportunities w hich occurred
of informing myself respecting the past history and present
state of our trontier relations ; and I set out by declaring my
conviction—a conviction formed after an attentive reading of
documents laid before Parliament, and such other authentic
sources of information as have come in my way—that at no
former period in the history of this colony, from the day of
Van Riebeck's landing to this present moment, were our fron¬
tier relations, comparatively speaking, so comfortable as at
present ; that never did our colonists suffer so little from na¬
tive tribes beyond their boundary as they do at this very time."
Now, is that your belief?—No,
1875. As the result of the policy of Lord Glenelg?—I be¬
lieve that at that time, in 1845, fh® Kafirs were preparing to
attack the colony in consequence of Lord Glenelg's treaties
having been put a stop to.
1876. Do you think that fact would not have been known
tQ the Attorney-general ?—The Attorney-general must have
taken
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
253
taken a sweep of a few years; but at that time we were in Sir^.
great danger, when he made that speech. Stockenstrom.
1877. He adverts to one point, that the value of property 26 June
had risen, and was rising higher than it was ever known ; was 1851.
that the fact ?—I believe so.
1878. Then do you not believe that the circumstance of the
greater value of property proves confidence and great security ?
—I have read what Sir George Napier states ; that was Sir
George Napier's feeling.
1879. IVlr.//awes.] That letter was dated 20lh November
1838; was not it?—Yes.
1880. Mr. Hindley.] I will refer now to the speech of
Mr. Cloete, in which he says, " With an experience of 30
years in this colony, I may add that I entirely concur with the
observation made by my honourable friend opposite (the
Attorney-general), that the great ditficulty of this govern¬
ment has been, and must be for a long time to come, the
Kafir and frontier question ; yet I am quite ready to admit,
that at no period during those 30 years were affairs in that
quarter managed in a more systematic and just manner than
at this present moment ; I say this quite independently of
any feeling connected with the office to which I am likely soon
to be appointed;" that confirms the statement of the Attorney-
general ?—Yes, it does.
i88t. But yet you cannot take the same view as those gen¬
tlemen ?—At that time w e were in a very precarious position.
1882. And you think that that was not owing to the system
of policy laid down by Lord Glenelg, but rather to its having
been varied and altered by Sir George Napier?—I would
rather give a detailed answer to that. The first that I heard
of a feeling in Kafirland with reference to the abolition of
the treaties by the Governor in 1844, was the Kafir chief
Maquomo sending to me to ask whether he could visit me ;
I, being in retirement, said he must not come near me ; I
wished to have nothing to say to him ; but he came notwith¬
standing, and said, " I have taken an oath at King William's
Town for your word, and I have kept the peace in Kafirland
hitherto ; now the Governor is come, and he has had some
communication with our dogs, as he calls the Gonaquabe
tribe ; an inferior race ; we are very jealous ; he has sent
letters ; he has broken the word, and says that we must now
subscribe to new treaties ; those have been put before me,
and I have taken my pen and put my name down ; and when
I put my name down I said to the diplomatic agent, ' I put it
down again, not for those treaties, but the old treaties.' " I
told
254 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir^. told Maquomo,You have signed these new treaties, and
Stockenstrom. yQ^ gj.g bound by them ; and if you have anything to say, you
a6 June g® to Colonel Hare ; I have nothing to do with these
1851. matters." He said, " Then war must come, if you cannot
help me; let the Governor know we will have nothing to do
with those new treaties ; when I put my name down, I told
the diplomatic agent I was signing for the old treaties."
1883. When did that conversation with Maquomo occur ?—
Shortly after they had signed those new treaties.
1884. CAairnuin.] Do you mean that Maquomo stated that
he signed the new treaties under the impression that he was
signing the old treaty?—No; he knew they were new, but
being pressed to sign, he put down his name, and said, '• I
sign for the old treaties."
1885. Yet he knew, in fact, the document he was signing
was the new treaty, and not the old one ?—I told him so, and
he said be did not care a straw what they contained, he signed
for the old treaties.
1886. Mr. Mackinnon.\ Did you not tell him he was guilty
of deception ?—I told him he was bound by the treaty he
signed.
1887. Mr. Hindley.] Would you give the date of the treaty
to which Maquomo alludes ?—It is in 1844.
1888. That was a treaty made by Sir Peregrine Maitland ?
—Yes.
1889. The treaty at variance with the policy of Lord
Glenelg?—Yes.
1890. And from that treaty you date the origin of the dis¬
turbance ?—It was subsequently.
1891. Can you give me the date of that speech ?—This
was about the end of 1844, or the beginning of 1845.
1892. Those facts might not have come to the knowledge
of the Attorney-general then ?—No, I believe not,
1893. Had Maquomo then signed the treaty under Jhe im¬
pression that he was compelled to do so ?—I told him he was
bound by the new treaties, and referred him to the Lieutenant-
governor.
1894. He did not go to the Lieutenant-governor ?—I do
not know that; there is a communication of mine to Lieu¬
tenant-governor Young upon the subject in print somewhere,
in «hich I stated that; Sir Henry Young had it printed.
1895. Did Maquomo suppose he was under the influence
of constraint when he signed that?—Yes.
1896. What would have been the result if he had refused
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 255
to sign it?—I do not know; it would be better to refer those Sir A.
questions to the diplomatic agent himself. Stockenstrom.
1897. Do you recollect the name of that diplomatic agent?
—Mr. Stretch. 1851.
1898. Mr. Hawes.'] You have been referred to the debate
which took place in the Legislative Council on the 7th of
October 1845?—Yes.
1899. The officers of the Government in that debate stated
that the Kafir frontier was then quiet, and that the Govern¬
ment had done all in its power to maintain tranquillity ?—
Yes.
1900. Was not it the fact, at the time there were great
complaints against the Government for not taking more
efficient measures to preserve tranquillity?—I believe those
speeches were made in consequence of those complaints.
1901. And you state that at that moment the colony was
in considerable peril from the Kafirs?—I think it was in peril
for years.
1902. You have been referred to the statement made in the
debate of the 7th October 1845, to this effect: "Will any
man deny that farms on the immediate frontier, which 15 or
20 years ago were purchased for a trifle, too small almost to
be reckoned as a valuable consideration, can now be sold for a
consideration large enough to justify in the fullest sense the
use of the term valuable now, at that time was not it the
fact that the price of land was high ?—The land had been
gradually rising in value for many years back, and this was
immediately after the upsetting of the Glenelg system, and
the introduction of Sir Peregrine Maitland's system.
1903. And that system was not consistent with the treaties
which had been sanctioned, I think, at the time of Lord
Glenelg ?—Not consistent ? Why ?
1904. Mr. Hindley.'] That treaty of Sir Peregrine Maitland
could not have operated upon the value of land in a few
months?—Unless there had been some sort of miracle.
1905. Sir Joshua Walmsley.^ I understand you to say, that
up to 1844 the value of land in the colony had been im¬
proving, and the state of the colony up to that period was
satisfactory ; but that the breaking of the treaties with the
Gaika tribes at that period, attempting to substitute new
treaties instead of the old one, was the means of laying the
foundation of the present war, and the great dissatisfaction on
the part of the Kafirs generally ?—From that time there has
never been peace upon that frontier.
1906. You
256 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir 1906. You attribute, then, the cause of the present disturb-
Stockenstrom. anees to the breaking of those treaties in 1844?—I do.
26 June 1907. Mr. BooJcer.] And you attribute the blame to the
Government, and no [»ortion of it to the chiefs ?—INo, I do not.
1908. Do you impute it to our Governor?—Not to the
Kafirs nor the colonists, but to the Government exclusively.
1909. Sir E. Bua:t07i.] Generally speaking, was there a state
of peace in Kafirland after 1 836 ?—Peace is comparative with
barbarous tribes ; there are always disagreements between
them, but no war.
1910. Were the people quiet or irritated against the Go¬
vernor at that time ?—As long as I had to do with them ; you
see what Sir George Napier says.
1911. Could any system be devised which would altogether
prevent the depredations of the Kafirs ?—As long as the
frontier is in that state, it is impossible altogether; you may
just as well try to put a stop to pocket-picking in London.
1912. Can you point to any period during which the depre¬
dations of the Kafirs have been entirely put a stop to?—I
have been 42 years connected with that frontier, and I do not
know a period when there was not some little depredation,
more or less.
1913. What were the main difterences between Lord
Glenelg's treaties and those made in 1844?—I should not like
to say, for being unconnected with public matters I have not
compared them.
1914. You have stated that the value of land increased
from 1836 to 184,5?—Yes.
1915. Has it decreased since that time?—Just before this
last war it was very high ; it gradually increased, I think.
1916. Has land been saleable since the war began?—I have
not been there since.
1917. Do you conceive that there has been much political
excitement produced at Cape Town, which has had an effect
upon the Kafirs during the last two years ?—Not in the
remotest degree ; it could not have been by any possibility,
unless people were sent into Kafirland for the purpose of
agitating.
1918. Would a constitutional Government in the Cape
colony produce, in your opinion, a more kind and just policy
towards the natives than that which has been in force during
the last four years ?—Decidedly I think so.
1919. Mr. Hindley.] Sir George Napier stated, that the
policy of Sir Benjamin D'ürban was more popular among
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ONT THE KAFIR TRÍBES.
257
the colonists than the policy of Lord Glenelg ?—Yes, im- Sir aí.
doubtediy. ' Slockemtrom.
1920. To what do yon attribute that?—I do not know;
there was a dislike to the policy decidedly, and there was 1851.
great clamour against Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy before
Lord Glenelg's policy was introduced.
1921. Do the colonists like to have an unlimited entrance
into the occupation of land upon the frontier?—It is the
natural state of things in such localities as that ; you see it in
America.
1922. And then to ask that their property should be secured
to them by the military force of the Government?—It must be
observed that the British settlers in 1819 were sent there
against their will, and they expected the British Government
to protect them.
1923. Still you think that is the natural desire of the colo¬
nists?— Everywhere in the world wliere colonists come in
contact with barbarians, civilized man goes on ; there is no
preventing it. I have done all in my power in the various
situations which I have been in to struggle against them.
• 1 • n
1924. Do you think this feeling on the part of the colonists
led to the adoption of rather a different policy by Sir Peregrine
Maitland ?— No, I do not think it had anything to do with it.
1925. You consider he was not urged to the adoption of
his policy by representations fiom the colonists?—The colo¬
nists were very much opposed to the system which was intro¬
duced ; even when Sir George Napier had amended it, they
wore very much opposed, and were constantly complaining of
it, although his amendments were at first very popular.
192Ô. Were they opposed to, or did they approve of the
alteration made by Sir Peregrine Maitland in the treaties?—
They were delighted ; they illuminated the town and burnt me
in elligy; it was quite delightful.
1927. And why?—It is difficult to say what their motives
may have been ; I know the fact, they burnt me in every
direction. They were very much pleased indeed, but the de¬
monstrations were unfortunately too soon followed up by con¬
flagrations from one end of the frontier to the other ; the whole
country was in a blaze ; every farmhouse was on fire ; so much
so they were obliged to resort to me, though in retirement, to
take the lead and repel the enemy.
1928. What part of the treaty was it that particularly de¬
lighted them ?—There never was any particular part stated ;
it was just a dislike to the old treaties.
1929. Did they conceive it an alteration from a humane to
0.63. ' 11 a military
258 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. a military policy, the treaty that Maquomo signed in 1844?—
toe euitrom. j cannot distinguish ; you will observe that I do not know
26June when the treaties were signed; but the Napier treaty was
1851. broken, or at least annulled in 1844.
1930. 1 want to ask a question respecting the speech of the
Attorney-general, made on the occasion referred to. He says,
" I therefore consider that placed as this colony is, it is by
christianizing and civilizing the Kafirs,—by religiously respect¬
ing our own engagements, by a judicious admixture of firm¬
ness and forbearance, reward and punishment, by encouraging
the well-disposed, and strengthening their hands against the
mischievous, and by gradually cultivating amongst them the
notion of moral obligation : that it is by such things, more
than by commandos ; more than by seizing land, more than
by military force, that the ultimate safety of the frontier
farmers is to be secured " ?—There never was a more sound
truth pronounced.
1931. And that you conceive to be the best policy to be
adopted f—Yes.
1932. Colonel JEstcourt.] Is it not consistent with that
policy, that in the meantime before those moral influences can
have effect, that military government must be maintained ?—
You cannot now, for a considerable time, do without a very
strong military force.
1933* Colonel Thompson.] What are the forms of break¬
ing a treaty at the Cape ?—This was one, which was merely
telling the people that the treaties were at an end, and that
new treaties would be laid before them sometime thereafter for
them to sign.
1934. Then the Government at the Cape assumes the right
of breaking a treaty wh.enever it pleases?—It did on this
occasion. Sir George Napier, on making his amendments,
did not do that. I disapproved of Sir George Napier's amend¬
ments. At the same time he had a discussion with the Kafirs,
and the Kafirs have to thank themselves if they cut their own
throats ; he made a treaty regularly with them.
1935. Do the Kafirs break treaties in return; do they exer¬
cise the same right of breaking treaties ?—They have not
hitherto ; we have not allowed that those Kafirs should send
to us to say. We are tired of these old treaties, and we will
put new treaties before you next month.
1936. By what form are treaties annulled at the Cape ?—
I am not aware of treaties having been annulled before this
instance.
1937. What was the form in which it was done in that
instance ;
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAEIR TRIBES. 23g
instance ; was there any form in fact at all ?—I atn not Sir A.
aware, except that the Governor just announced that he had
done so, but it will appear from the documents ; I only had it J^n^J
from thence. 1851.
1938. Chairman.] I think you stated that thé feeling of
the colonists was in favour of a very summary and stringent
policy to be exercised towards the frontier tribes, for the
defence of the colony?—Yes, I believe that was the feeling
with many.
193g. Am I right in supposing you think that the opinion
of the colonists in that direction is stronger than from motives
of justice and humanity, you, yourself, would be disposed to
go along with them ?—Much of it is ; many of the popular
views, it is well known, I do not adopt. I know that injustice
invariably recoils on ourselves.
1940. Speaking generally of the prevalent feeling of the
colony, do you think that the prevalent feeling of the colony
runs in that direction rather more strongly than you think is
consistent with the dictates of humanity and of justice, espe¬
cially among those colonists that reside upon the frontiers ?—
There are many of them there ; I should not like to class
the whole of the colony in that way ; there are excellent
people there.
1941. You have stated circumstances to the Committee
with respect to illuminations and bonfires, where a policy
was adopted towards the natives that you thought was not
altogether consistent with justice, and you, yourself, were
burnt in effigy?—They thought it right to mark their
approbation of the new treaties in that way, and it gave
them satisfaction ; and they had bonfires and burnings in
effigy.
1942. It is plain, therefore, that among a considerable
part of the public there was an opinion that a more stringent
and decisive policy towards the natives was necessary than
you yourself thought right?—Yes, decidedly; I agree fully
with Mr. Porter's speech just read, and many people think
otherwise.
1943. Mr. Stanley.] Looking back to past times, what
period would you indicate as that during which the frontier
was most free from depredations on the part of the Kafirs ?—
It has been varying ; I should not like to take upon myself
to fix any time ; we have always had depredations so long as
1 have known the frontier; 1 came up as a boy in 1808,
and up to the present time they have never been without
0.63. R 2 depredations ;
26o MINUTES Of EVibENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. depredations ; to fix any time when they were more or less is
Slockenstrom. impossible.
26~.íúñe ^P44- Then yon think, in that respect, there has been no
1851. great difference between one year and another?—^There has
been, but the returns will show it better; I could not fix upon
any particular time ; I should not like to do so.
1945. I ask because I find it slated in a Parliamentary
Paper tliat the annual averajre loss of colonists in cattle was
computed, between 1810 and 1834, at about 1,200 head;
that in 1835 and 1836 there were hardly any; that in 1837
and 1838 there were above 2,000; in the four following years
about 1,200, and in 1843 there were about 1,900 ; do you at
all acquiesce in that statement?—Notât all; it is all erro¬
neous, and no return is woilli anything but that of the agent-
general.
1946. Sir George Napier, in 1841, expresses an opinion
that the character of the Kafiis was improving, and that they
were bona ßde anxious to cultivate good feeling witii the
British Government; do you believe that is correct?—I be¬
lieve so, if they are justly dealt with ; it must be always
understood, with this qualification, those people have all the
vices of barbarians, but when honestly and justly dealt with,
as Mr. Porter has stated, they are, I believe, disposed to be
friendly.
1947. In 1842 there was great suffering among the Kafirs,
arising from the pasturage ?—Yes.
1948. Did not the Lieutenant-governor supply them with
food to a considerable extent?—Those droughts are periodical;
they operate upon us every four or five years ; I should not
like to speak to any particular period.
1949. Did not the Lieutenant-governor upon that occasion
supply them with food to a considerable extent ?—I believe
something was done, and money was subscribed, but what year
it was I cannot fix.
1950. Did you remark whether it produced any effect upon
their conduct towards the colonists?—Their conduct I should
not like to speak of; but the diplomatic agent told me they
were very thankful and very grateful, and be thought it a very
wise measure.
1951. How long did the effect of that last; was there any
difference found in their conduct towards the frontier colonists ?
—Not so much that I believe it was ever mentioned ; I will not
say there was none, but I do not think it had any permanent
effect.
1952. I find that Lieutenant-governor Hare writes, in August
1843»
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
261
1843, in these terms ; " Murders are read of in every county ; Sir A.
but, comparatively speaking, I am persuaded that fewer would ^^ockstisirom.
be found to be perpetrated on that frontier than in any county aGJime
of England;" do you consider that true?—I believe it per- 1851.
fectly true.
1953. I find it again stated, by Sir George Napier, that
many of the depredations of which the frontier colonists
complain were really committed by natives whom they had
encouraged to squat on their farms, with a view to secure
their services as herdsmen and labourers ?—Often it hap¬
pens so.
1954. Mr. Booker.] I find in a letter among the papers
which came to our hands yesterday, in page 232, " Enclo¬
sure 1, in No. 50. Amended Treaty." The first article of
that amended treaty is this : " It is agreed between the said
Governor and the said contracting chiefs, that all former trea¬
ties between the colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the
said chiefs shall be annulled, and the same are hereby an¬
nulled accordingly, and this present treaty shall stand hence¬
forth in room and stead thereof." Now would the British
Government, or the representatives of the British Government
in that colony, undertake to enforce an article of that kind,
without the free consent of the other contracting parties, the
chiefs, thereto ?—They say they did not.
1955. What is your opinion?—I have only this instance
before me ; I know it led to the war ; that is all I can say.
1956. Did that amended treaty lead to the war?—That
amended treaty led to the war; the abolition of the treaties
before it and the substitution of this led totlicwar; there
have been other causes, but this was the chief.
1957. Is it your opinion that the consent of the chiefs to that
amended treaty was not a voluntary one, but was an enforced
one?—I can only say what the chief said to me when he
signed the treaty; he put down the pen, and said. I sign for
the old treaties.
1958. Was his attention directed to the last article ?—I was
not there ; I never had them in my hand till now ; I do not
know what took place there on the spot.
1959. Is it part of our policy, or is it our policy, to make
treaties and break them when we please, holding the other
contracting parties to those treaties as long as we please?—
I know that was undoubtedly done in this instance, but I was
not present at the time, nor have I ever seen them.
1960. Lord Mandeville.] Was not it in consequence of the
0.63. R 3 treaties
262 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. treaties being constantly broken by the Kafirs, that they were
Stockenstrom, annulled by Government ?—Depreciations were taking place
a6 June constantly j I am not aware of any breaches of the treaty.
1851. 1961. It was an infringement of the treaty?—An infringe¬
ment it could not be, unless the Government had demanded
satisfaction in consequence of the articles of the treaty', and
the Kafirs had refused to give it.
.1962. Chairman.'] Was not it alleged, at least on the part
of the Government, that the provisions of the existing treaty
had been found inadequate to secure that peace of the frontier
which they were designed to obtain, and that, therefore, a new
treaty with new provisions became necessary ?—Those state¬
ments will be found in the official documents; I should not like
to answer that question.
1963. Mr. Booker.] At page 229, I find this statement in
a despatch from Sir Peregrine Maitland to Lord Stanley: " My
next step was to invite the chiefs of the T'Slambie, Congo, and
ringoe tribes, the best disposed of our Kafir borderers, to an
interview at Fort Peddie, where, after giving them credit for
their conduct as neighbours, I proposed to them a new treaty,
calculated to unite them in closer relations of amity with the
British Government, and to promote the welfare of the inha¬
bitants on both sides of this part of thefrontier. At this meeting,
my proposal was received by them with gratitude and lively
satisfaction"?—That is not the Gaika tribe; it is not the
Kafirs I allude to at nil.
1964. Colonel Dunne.] 1 wish to ask you a question with
regard to your own treaty ; the 4th article of that treaty, by
which the Kafirs were to return part of the ceded territory,
says this : " As a special mark of his said majesty's grace and
favour, any part of the territory between the Keiskamma and
the Kat River, as a loan, to be by them or their tribe, or any
part thereof, held upon such terms and to such extent as shall
be laid down by or on the part of his said majesty, which
terms shall be incorporated in this treaty; they, the said chiefs,
promising at no period ever to lay claim to the possession or
occupation of any other part of the territory known by the
name of the ceded territory, except such part as shall be
allotted to them in the manner hereinabove stated" : was not
that the case ?—That is there I believe.
1965. That is your fourth article of your own treaty?—
Yes.
1966. Then, under the guns of Fort Peddie, on the 2d of
August, that is, about six months after the treaty was made,
was not there an attack made upon the Fingoes who were in¬
cluded
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
263
eluded in that treaty ? —I know there was a collision of that Sir .«i.
kind, but I beg of you to refer to my reports. Stockenstrom.
1967. But did not that amount to an infraction of the 26~j^,e
treaty?—I could only refer to those documents ; 1 could not
now state what has taken place without referring to those
documents.
1968. I have before me the report?—If you will refer to
my letter to Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and Lord Glenelg's letter
on the subject, the whole case was decided you find.
1969. Mr. MonselL'] 1 understood you to say in 1845, at
all events, the colonists were in favour rather of a military
system than of the milder system you had been the medium
of introducing into the colony?—I do not know that we
should call it a military system, but a system of more strict¬
ness.
1970. You were in favour, yourself, of the milder system?
—^The system that was introduced in 1836.
1971. Then why do you conceive that representative insti¬
tutions, if introduced into the colony, would most probably
lead to a better mode of dealing with the Kafirs than the
system that now prevails, if you believe that the colonists are
not in favour of that milder system ?—The very circumstances
of the frontier first of all, and then the advantage to be derived
from the diffusion of opinion by public discussions, and that
greater knowledge and truth which certainly are not attained
now.
1972. Sir You wrote a letter, I believe, during
the summer of 1850, relating to the complaints made by the
settlers on the Kat River?—Yes.
1973. Can you state to the Committee wiiat grounds of
complaint the Kat River settlers had at that time ?—All that
they stated to me I stated in that letter, about burning them
out of their houses ; I cannot recollect exactly every word ;
I received it from one of the chiefs, and it is there in my
despatch.
1974. That letter was written some months before the war
began ?—Yes ; I believe it was written in July ; the war broke
out towards the new year, about Christmas.
1975» Was there much irritation in the minds of the Kat
River settlers in consequence ?—Yes.
1976. From that injustice, as they supposed?—Yes, very
great ; it was connected with such grievances as they thought
they had; I ought to state, on that subject, that up to 1847
there was never a more loyal set of people in the world.
During the year 1846, I was asked to take the lead of those
0.63. R 4 men.
264
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
• Sir A. men, burghers, white and black, and I had the force under
Stockenshon. nie against the Kafirs, and no men could behave better.
soTui-e ^'"ce I retired from the war they served under Sir George
1851. Berkeley, whose report may be seen, where it is pointed out
that upwards of 90 p r cent, were in the field, and those men
sei ving the Government after they had been robbed by the
Kafirs of all their property. They were naked and hungry,
and charitable contributions were made to keep the women
and children alive, and never did I hear one disloyal word.
But it is since then that this change has taken jilace among
them, which greatly surprises every one. Moreover, I should
like to refer, with regard to the Kat River, to Justice Menzies'
report and Sir John Wilde's men, who have no bias, as I may
be supposed to have, and to Sir George Napier and Sir
Benjamin D'tJrban and Sir Peregrine Maitland and Sir Harry
Smith, as to the conduct of those men on all occasions, and
their loyalty and readiness to serve the colony up to 1847.
1977. Has the change produced in their minds since 1847
been produced by the measures of the Pritish Government ?
—This is one thing that they complained of, and they also,
on the same occasion, complained of magistrates being put
over them known to be hostile to them ; but those were only
subordinate matters I think, and if the Kafir war had not
broke out, they would have emigrated beyond the Orange
River to get rid of the connexion with the colony, but
rebellion never was dreamt of by them before the war
broke out.
1978. Chairman.'] Do you think any circumstances of
offence on the part of the settlers of the Kat River can be
adduced at all adequate to account fur the conduct they have
pursued ?—Not adequate to account for their conduct ; it is
impossible ; I know more of them than most people, and it is
a perfect riddle to me.
1979. Mr. E. H. Stanley.] Were not some of the differences
and complaints merely accidental ; did they not arise from
the individual misconduct or misunderstanding between ihrm
and those magistrates on the spot? — I do not know ; I do not
think that this Committee will ever get to the bottom of this
rebellion, (I cannot give it another name,) without a most
minute investigation on the spot of ail the parlies, and par¬
ticularly the missionaries, who risked their lives and stayed
among them, and made every sacrifice to keep them within
bounds. I do not believe, without the most minute investiga¬
tion on the spot by the most impartial men of the highest cha¬
racter, totally unconnected with any party in the colony, and
hearing
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 265
heaving all sides of the question, that this mystery will be ever sir A.
solved ; where this has con)e from I do not understand ; the Kafir Stockenstrom.
war gave it an impulse ; but in 1840 those men fought under aG^ne
me against the Kafirs with greater desperation than the boers. 1851.
1980. You mean the Kafir war was the occasion rather
than the cause ?—It was a great impulse.
1981. Mr. Booker.] Were you present at any conference be¬
tween the present Governor and any of the chiefs?—Yes; when
he delivered over the Kafirs to me in 1836, I relieved him,
1982. I am speaking of the present Governor?—I relieved
him in 1836.
1983. Mr. Hindley.] You have stated that the returns
quoted by Mr. Stanley were inaccurate ?—Yes.
1984. You are not yourself prepared to state in what year
or in what series of years the least number of robberies had
taken place ?—No. Without reference to the official return of
the agent-general you cannot get it.
1985. Sir E. Buxlon.] Sir George Napier was asked these
questions: ''You state that you thought Sir Andries Stocken¬
strom had verv great influence over the Kafirs?" The answer
«/ Ö
is " Yes." " Do you think he has exercised it at all to maintain
peace?" "That I cannot say. With respect to the Kafirs, I
am asked a question, and 1 shall certainly answer it. I do
think that if Sir Andries Stockenstrom had gone down or
written to the Governor, and said, things are going wrong at
the Kat River, I will go there and answer for the loyalty of
that settlement, he would have made that settlement do what¬
ever he liked. I am sure he would have kept them in loyalty
if lie had gone there ; that settleiuent was made by him, and
was always a favourite settlement of his; and when I was up
there I saw the influence which he had ; he ruled the whole of
that part with great justice." Have you any statement to
make upon that, that you might have kept that colony loyal
if you had chosen to go there ?—I was in Cape Town imme¬
diately after the war broke out in 1850. The Kat River
people, including their missionaries, sent me an address, re¬
questing me to take the command of the burgher forces against
the Kafirs as I had done in 1846. The people of Port Eliza¬
beth sent me a similar address. From other parts of the
country I received applications to the same effect. I was then
pledged to the colony to come to this country on a different
errand ; but my answer was, that if the colony released me
from that pledge, I was ready to lead the burgher forces
against the Kafirs, although my medical friends thought that in
my state of health my doing so would have been suicide.
My
266
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. My answers to the Kat River and Port Elizabeth addresses
Stockenstrom. were published. If the Governor had called upon rne, I
26 June should have gone, but when he appointed another officer, I
1851. bad no right to interfere. Sir George Napier thinks rather too
much of my influence. I might have done good perhaps, but
I could take upon myself no authority which the Governor
conferred on another.
1986. You could not properly go to the Kat River settle¬
ment, unless you were appointed to command the burgher
forces by the Governor?—It would have been interfering with
Colonel Somerset.
1987. Mr. Hawes.^ What was the date of your last visit to
the Kat River settlement ?—After I resigned my office, I never
went back again ; I had no business there.
1988. About what time was that?—The papers will show
that. I believe I resigned in October 1846. The war was
not over. Sir Henry Pottinger then came ; that was imme¬
diately after my convention with Kreli. I differed with Sir
Peregrine Maitland, and I thought it better to withdraw, and
1 did withdraw, and have never been there since.
1989. Did you ever meet, within the colony, a report made
by Mr. Biddulph, of the state and condition of the Kat River
settlement in May 1847?—Yes, and I addressed Sir Henry
Pottinger upon it.
1990. Did you differ from him, or agree with him?—I
strongly differed.
1991. You thought that description of the settlement
erroneous?-—Libellous; I thought it was exceedingly impro¬
per to publish it, and that was one of the causes of this dis¬
content. The Hottentots said that Mr. Biddulph was put
over them because he was known to be hostile to them.
1992. Then this description given by Mr. Biddulph, and
addresses to the Secretary of the Governor, you think would
be altogether unfounded : " It is quite impossible to describe
the scene presented at these posts from the thousands of
people and cattle which have been all huddled together.
' Where the carcass is, there the eagles flock,' and accordingly
Fort Armstrong and Eland's Post can be compared to nothing
else but immense dunghills. At the former, in particular, near
3,000 people, fed at the public expense, and with nothing to
do, have actually been too lazy to remove the dirt from before
their huts, and it has been suffered to accumulate for 13
months close under the walls of the fort. I merely mention
this, as showing to what an evil extent this indiscriminate and
profligate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 267
profligate expenditure of food to indolent people has been Sir
allowed to go on." Stockenstrotn.
1993. Do you doubt that statement?—I know it to be in- 26 June
correct. It is very well to talk of those people in that style 1851.
immediately after a war, when the Government, first of all,
has brought thousands together in one batch for its own con¬
venience, to make use of them against the Kafirs. They were
brought into one camp, where all their cattle perished from
hunger ; the Kafirs took away some, but the greater proportion
died on the spot from want of grass. The women and children
were kept together, and tlie men were employed in the Go¬
vernment service ; they lost all by the war ; they were
naked ; they were hungry ; they were exhausted by the war,
and that poverty, therefore, should be conspicuous in every
corner is not to be wondered at ; it could not be otherwise.
It is very little known what the colony and the Government
are indebted to those people. Sir Harry Smith I appeal to ;
Sir George Napier I appeal to; Sir Benjamin D'Urban, even
Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was going to follow out my plan
in the Kat River. In one of his despatches, he said he was
going to follow it up. I appeal to that document.
1994. Were not there large contributions made for the
people r—When they were starving, after being exhausted in
the service of Government.
1995. From the Government funds, constantly and liberally?
—Not, except in war, when they were actually exhausting
every breath they had in the Government service, and the
women and children were starving, then the Government had
to come to their assistance, and even the charitable part of the
community of Cape Town had to contribute to keep those
people alive. The secret of this rebellion is unaccountable to
me. Sir George Napier is quite right, and Justice Menzies,
and Sir Harry Smith, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban were aware
of the services that these men had rendered the Government;
you can never repay them, the colony in particular, and the
missionaries who have been slandered, but who have sacrificed
everything, and risked their lives in order to preserve those
men in loyalty and utility to the Government ; they can never
be repaid.
1996. Are you aware that Sir Henry Pottinger adopted the
views of Mr. Biddulph?—I know it; I think you will find in
Downing-street, in the Colonial Office, my letter to Sir Henry
Pottinger upon the subject, or at least the Secretary of State,
through Sir Henry Pottinger ; I complained to the Secretary
268 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. of State of those statements, and of Sir Henry Pottintrer pub-
Stocke^rom. pbellous slander.
q6 June 1997- If Í do not misunderstand your testimony, the rations
1851. and clothing, and the assistance that were given to those set¬
tlers, were confined entirely to iliose in the field ?—No ; dur¬
ing the war, when they had lost everything by acting with the
Government in the field, when the charitable contrihutions ran
short, the women and children had to be kept also; but I
believe in war actually only.
1998. Am I to understand, from the account you now give,
that the aid afforded to the settlers was entirely afforded to
them on the ground that they discharged military duties iu
the field ?■—Yes, and they even refused to take pay for those
duties when offered.
1999. That no other support or assistance was given to the
settlers except that?—Except from charity; the Government
gave for the military services, and in consequence of those
military services taking the men away from their wives and
children, there was nothing but starvation for them, and there
was no sending them to the rear, because the services of their
husbands were wanted in the front, and they would have
starved unless the Government had assisted them.
2000. What remark have you to make upon this passage in
Sir Henry Pottinger's despatch of the 2d of November 1847:
referring to certain documents he says, " From them it will be
learned that the Lieutenant-general and myself then quite con¬
curred as to the amount of rations that I had originally sanc¬
tioned, as w ell as the terms ; but it is to be borne in mind that
half the burghers had intermediately deserted their duty in
the field, and had returned home to wallow in filth and idle¬
ness at the expense of Government"?—I never heard it; I
never knew it; those people had served throughout the war
under Sir Peregrine Maitland, under my direct orders, and
they were exhausted ; then came Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir
George Berkeley. At first it was thought they could do with¬
out any burgher force, but it was found that that w as required,
and those people were again appealed to, and they volunteered
in great numbers, and tliey were again for a considerable time
in the field. But Sir George Berkeley's report stated the pro¬
portion of Hottentots to be more than 90 per cent., whereas the
proportion of the burgher population was very small indeed,
but upwards of 90 per cent, of those men were serving under
him during Sir Henry Pottinger's government ; Sir Henry Pot¬
tinger was altogether misled therefore ; but such men as the
Rev. Mr. Thompson, not a party man, and the other mis¬
sionaries,
SELECÏ COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 26g
sionaries, were amongst those people at the time they were sir A.
accused of fillii and misery and starvation ; but the state they Stockenstrom.
were in was in consequence of the war and the measures of the gëj""
Government. I repeat, let there be inquiry on the spot by ^1851"^
honourable impartial men.
2001. Mr. Stanley.^ Do you think that such a plan as is
proposed for compensation by the Government for losses
incurred by colonists upon the frontier, is advisable or not?—
Certainly, I should think not, because if tlie Kafirs thought
the Government would |)ay, they would not pay ; if they could
avoid the payment, they would. They are barbarians. But
I should vvisli before answering that question to be referred to
the document to whicli yon refer. I am 12 years out of office
now. If the Kafirs were not bound to comply with the trea¬
ties, then the treaties would not be worth the paper they are
written upon : they must be kept to their treaties. I must be
understood to speak of losses by depredations, not by war.
2002. Sir George Napier appears to have considered one
of tlie principal causes of the predatory habits of the Kafirs,
that they attach no sort of idea of disgrace to theft ; he there¬
fore proposed to punish them for such offences with a view to
degrade them in the eyes of their tribes ; was that policy wise ;
would it answer the purpose ?—Any punishment would do,
provided it went through the regular channel ; I would like
to show Sir Harry Smith's view of obtaining redress through
the agency of the Kafirs themselves. It is the same document
that I quoted from before : " Now for the law which may be
"ridiculed, but which is as applicable to the society we have to
deal with as Blackstone. A robber being delivered up to the
superintendent of police, with the evidence, the chief of the
tribe to assemble a jury of 12 of his people, who in the pre¬
sence of the superintendent of police, will try the offender ; if
they pronounce him guilty, the superintendent of police will, as
a judge, pronounce sentence, having previously recorded the
evidence adduced, the wdiolc to be instantly dispatched to
the Lieutenant-governor, the parties to be detained in the
meanwhile, and if the sentence be approved by the Lieu¬
tenant-governor, be it what it may, capital or otherwise,
to be immediately put into execution. Those ignorant of Kafir
manners and customs will exclaim ' Oh, the Kafirs would
never find their people guilty such I say is not the case. I
never saw more honest or unprejudiced people when assem¬
bled for such purposes, or evidences who more plaiidy speak
out without lying ; I have never on such occasions fined but
one man for a lie ; on trivial occasions they will lie fast
enough, but not in council or in jury, * so it is.* This would
270 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. be my law if it were possible to establish it." These are Sir
Stoc enstrom. Smith's suggestions, and I adopted some of them. The
26 June "^"'y *^3^' Benjamin D'Urban's letter
1851. enclosing them to me is the 9th of November 1836.
2003. Do you agree in thinking that such a jury would do?
—No, Sir Harry Smith goes too far ; I spoke of the chief and
his councils, but Sir Harry Smith may be right ; I doubt it.
2C04. You apprehend such a jury would be altogether too
much under the control of the chief?—I think there is some
pride in a native councillor ; I have not that faith that Sir
Harry Smith seems to have in their veracity ; I do not go to
that extent.
2005. Chairman.] Therefore would there not be more diffi¬
culty than Sir Harry Smith conceived at that time, in obtain¬
ing a verdict of guilty for cattle-stealing from a Kafir jury?—
I think so ; I have not the faith in a Kafir jury which Sir Harry
Smith has.
2006. Mr. E. H. Stanley.] Of what nature are the criminal
trials among Kafirs, for offences con)mitted among themselves ?
—Both the civil and criminal trials are very solemn and very
particular.
2007. You are inclined to think that among themselves
they would probably do justice, but they would not do justice
between white men and black men ?—I cannot say that ; they
have no juries ; I was speaking of juries ; I have no faith in
their juries. With the chief and the councillors, I think we
have a very good chance according to treaty ; that is when
there is good understanding ; I have not that faith in a jury of
J 2 common Kafirs that Sir Harry Smith has.
2008. If that system were adopted, would you have the
punishment inflicted by the Colonial Government, or by the
chief himself ?—By the chief himself.
2009. Viscount Mand&oille.] You have stated you thought
strictness was necessary ; in what respect ?—Necessary to keep
the Kafirs to their treaties.
2010. Colonel Estcourt.] I am going to refer to the Minutes
of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Aborigines,
and to your own evidence given on the 19th of August 1835,
and 1 shall be glad to know whether you still agree in the
opinions you then expressed. This is the question put to you :
"One of your opinions was with reference to the treatment
of the Kafirs, that some greater degree of indulgence should
be extended towards them ; did that opinion give dissatisfac¬
tion at head quarters r " The answer is, " I am not aware
that it did give dissatisfaction, but I know that that was not
acted on ; my orders and complaints were disregarded." The
next
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 271
next question was, "Did I understand you correctly, that your sir A.
system was one of very great severity towards the Kahrs if Stockenstrom.
actually detected in the oftence?" The answer is, " Yes; very
conscientious men have often criticised my system as too
bloody ; but I felt that I had also to protect the colonists
against murderers and plunderers, and could not sacrifice
those to conciliate my accusers "?—Those are my sentiments
at the present moment.
2011. Therefore you depend upon the military force in the
colony to redress complaints against the Kafirs ?—That is not
implied there.
2012. 1 think you say you would depend upon your own
force to resist the Kafirs ?—I am decidedly of opinion that
you require force not only «Ith barbarians, but with civilized
people to keep them to treaties ; 1 should not rely upon the
integrity of any party ; I should always be sure to have a
strong force to back me under any circumstances, in cases of
treaties with any party.
2013. Viscount Mandeville.] You stated that a considerable
force is necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties?—I said
I believe that it would require a considerable force for a long
time upon that frontier ; I should think power necessary to
keep any party to a treaty, that the opposite party shall be
always aware you have the power to enforce your rights,
2014. You believe you could not depend upon the chiefs
to keep the treaties unless they knew you had the power to
enforce them ?—To that question I must give the same answer,
that I tliink that in all treaties, and we see it every day in all
people, European or African, it is absolutely necessary that
the opposite party should be thoroughly aware that you have
the power to enforce your riglit.
2015. Mr. Hawes.~\ 1 think in a former part of your exa¬
mination you stated, that from what you had heard, the Kafir
chiefs, when they entered into the treaties they did with Sir
Peregrine Maitland, did it unwillingly, and in some degree
compulsorily ?—Unwillingly decidedly ; I would not say com-
pulsorily ; they objected to the upsetting of the former treaties.
2016. Let me call your attention to a passage in Sir Pere¬
grine Maitland's despatch, and ask you to make any observa¬
tion upon it that occurs to you : " My next step was to invite
the chiefs of the T'Slambie, Congo and Fingo tribes, the best
disposed of our Kafir borderers, to an interview at Fort Peddie,
where, after giving them credit for their conduct as neigh¬
bours, I proposed to them a new treaty calculated to unite
them in closer relations of amity with the British Government,
and
2/2 MINUTES Of" EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Sir A. and toproinotn the welfare of the inhabitants on both sides of
Siockensfrom. tlifg part of the frontier. Ai ibis meeting my proposal was
26~jime leccived by them with gratitude and lively satisfaction. One
1851. chief, Eno, of the Gaika tribe, who had hitherto treated only in
concert with the rest of that nation, was present, and expressed
a desire to enter into the same treaty, and renounce his con¬
nexion with those habitual marauders. To this I gladly
acceded, and |)roniised to conclude with him a treaty similar to
that about to be contracted with the T Slambic and Congo
Kafirs"?—I have nothing to remark upon that; 1 know nothing
about it.
2017. You do not know any of the circumstances .-—I know
nothing with regard to the details you read.
2018. You observe irere a new treaty was entered into,
which has had the effect of cancelling the old ones with feel¬
ings of gratitude, according to Sir Peregrine Maitland ?—I
spoke of the Gaika tribe.
201 p. Now what treaties do you refer to that were unwil¬
lingly entered into ?—The same with regard to the Gaika tribes.
2020. When Sir Peregrine Maitland entered into treaty
with the Gaika chiefs, are you aware, whether or not, Mr.
Stretch communicated to them the contents of the treaty ?—I
am not aware ; I suppose he did; I would rather not venture
upon that. Let Mr. Stretcli be heard as well as the Kafirs.
2021. You are not acquainted with the circumstances?—
No ; except that w hich was stated to me by the chief, that in
signing, he said, I sign for the old treaties, or I adhere to the
old treaties. Mr. Stretch reported the fact.
2022. Being aware that what he signed was, in fact, anew
treaty, cancelling the old ?—I told him he was bound by what
he signed.
2023. Chairman.] Is there anything in addition to what
vou have slated to the Committee, yon wish to add to your
evidence?—No; except in regard to the question of the
emigration of the boers, I said it had been somewhere stated,
that the emigration of the boers was in consequence of the
breaking of the ü'eaties ; I have the documents to show that
was impossible, and that Retiff made a strong remonstrance
to the Government against the proceedings of the Governor
before Lord Glenelg's name was heard of.
2024. Viscount Mandeville], It was in consequence of their
considering they were not sufficiently protected against the
Kafirs ; that was one of the principal causes for leaving?—
They complained of the result of the war of treaties having
been made with those Kafirs, without the Kafirs being com¬
pelled
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ÜAFIR TRIBES. 273
pellcd to restore the property taken throughout the war, and Sir A.
an order had been issued by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, strictly Stockensiro»;,
prohibiting Colonel Smith ratifying his treaty with the Kafirs, ^6 June
before they should have delivered up all the fire-arms in their 1851.
possession ; we demanded the horses, we demanded the cattle,
and we demanded the guns, and they set us at defiance, and
laughed at us, and never delivered up one ; and that is what
actuated the boers, and particularly that man RetiflF; I was
obliged to threaten him, because he said, unless he got satis¬
faction for everything that was lost, and for all for which they
had had no compensation whatever, he would go into Kafir-
land in defiance of me and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and go and
take them ; I warned him, and he continued, and I was obliged
to put him out of the place.
2025. Colonel Dunne.'l Do you think those feelings were,
to a certain degree, well grounded, that we had not given the
boers that defence they were entitled to?—They were cer¬
tainly dissatisfied with the result of the vvar ; they got no com¬
pensation,
2026. They were not indemnified for what they lost?—
Very partially ; even these men that were exhausted after
serving under the commanders, when allowed to go home, at
last their horses were seized from under them, and they com¬
plained of not getting compensation for that, or very partially
at least.
2027. Viscount Mandeville.] Then again, there was a con¬
siderable emigration when they heard that the ceded territory
Avas to be returned to the Kafirs r—Not the slightest ; they
were all preparing when I reached the colony.
2028. They had heard it was to be returned ?—No, they
could not have heard it.
2029. Colonel DuiiJie.] That was the ultimate conclusion
of the war ; we never completed the war ?—^The Kafirs have
never been subdued. I here most positively repeat my posi¬
tive denial that Lord Glenelg's measures had the slightest
influence on the emigration of the boers ; I can prove by Sir
B. D'Urban's own documents that excitement was at its height
before those measures were heard of ; I also repeat that this
inquiry is incomplete without its being followed up on the
spot. All parties have a right to be heard.
0.63.
S
374 minutes of evidence taken before the
Lunce, 30° die Junii, 1851.
members present,
Mr. Labouchere.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Mackinnoii.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Hindley.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Viscount Mandeville.
Mr. Monsell.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
The Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Booker.
Colonel Dunne.
A. Smith,
Esq., M. D.
30 June
iB5i'
Mr. Fitzpatiick.
The Right Hon. H. LABOUCHERE in the Chair.
Andrew Smith, Esq. m.d., called in ; and further
Examined.
2030. Mr. Hawes.] I believe you are able to give the
Committee some information as to the number of tribes, as
well as the population of each tribe, in British Kafraria?—
I think I can state pretty nearly what they were in 1830. I
should say there were 12 principal tribes : Gaika tribe, Eno's
tribe, Botman's tribe, T'Slambie tribe, Congo's tribe, Hintza
tribe, the Tambookie tribe, Unyeki's tribe, Qanda's tribe,
Depa's tribe, Faku tribe, and Kapai's tribe; those were all the
tribes.
2031. Viscount Mandeville.] Can you distinguish what are
properly the Gaika tribe ?—The tribe of which Sandilli isithe
principal chief.
2032. They were at any rate the same nation ; the Gaikas
are part of the Amakosa nation ?-—The Gaikas are part of the
Amakosa nation ; the whole that I have enumerated are of
the same nation ; they are merely branches of one nation ;
they are all sprung from one tribe, the Zwide tribe, the first
recognised by the Kafirs.
2033. Mr. Hawes.] Do the tribes which you have named
occupy the space be^iween the Keiskamrna and Natal?—No;
there are nearly 200 miles umjccupied territory before you
reach Natal. They occupy the space between the Keiskamrna
and Umzimvoobo Rivers; one of those tribes, Kapai's tribe.
when
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 275
when I passed that country to go to Natal, in 1830, was A.Smith,
living to the eastward of the Umzimvoobö River; but that Esq., m.d.
was not pro[)erly his place; he happened to be living then to
the eastward ; all the rest were to the westward. The
Umzimvoobo River was regarded by the Kafirs as their eastern
boundary,
2034. Rut with regard to that tract of territory called the
Orange River Sovereignty, and the territory between it and
the Keiskamma, are there any tribes in that district which
you have not mentioned ?—There are Bechuana tribes.
2035. Have you described all the tribes immediately ad¬
joining the British boundary ?—Yes, to the eastward ; but
there are some to the north-east I have not described, the
Bechuanas. There are four or five different collections of
them ; there are the Basutos and Mantatees. Then there is
the collection of Bechuanas not called by any particular
name, consisting of a congregation of the remains of tribes
living at Thaba Unchu, under an elected chief. There is
another collection living neat the mouth of the Caledon
River, under a chief of the name of Lapui ; they are in the
same condition, being remnants of a variety of tribes which
are collected together at a missionary station.
2036. So far as you know, are all those the tribes that
occupy that tract of country, bounded on the west by the
Keiskamma, on the east by the colony of Natal, on the
north by the Orange River, and on the south by the sea ?—
Yes.
2037. What are the tribes nearest that Vaal River?—They
are Bechuana tribes.
2038. Colonel Dunne7\ The Vaal and Yellow River are
identical?—Yes. There are besides those settled tribes a
number of minor tribes inhabiting the mountain region lying
between the Basutos and the Amakosa Kafirs, consisting of
persons of different tribes under particular chiefs ; those are
•generally very actively engaged in depredations ; they do not
hold any settled habitation, and are constantly moving from
place to place.
203g. Mr. Hawes^ Can you now inform the Committee
what was the population of those tribes, so far as you have
information upon the subject?—From questions put to the
natives in various ways, and from my own observations, I
came to the conclusion, about the year 1830, when I passed
through Kafirland, that the Gaika population was about
45,000 ; the T'Slambie about 35,000 ; Eno, Botman, and
Congo, together, about 20,000.
0.63. s 2 2040. Colonel
276 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smith, 2040. Colonel Dunne.] You include in that men, women,
Esq^. D. cl)il(iren?—Yes. Hintza about 40,000 ; the Tambookies
3oJune about 40,000; Umyeki, 1,5,000; Qanda, Üepa-, and minor
1851. tribes connected with them, 15,000; Faku, 45,000 ; Kapai,
i5>ooo ; and tiie scattered tribes about 10,000.
2041. Sir J. Walmslei/.] Are those the tribes to the north?
—No, those in the mountainous parts. The Basutos about
15,000 ; the Mantatees about 10,000 ; the Thaba Unchu
tribe about io,ooo; and the Lepui tribe about 6,000 or
7,000. I may mention that the editor of the Graham's Town
Journal, who liad a <?reat deal of facility of ascertaining the
population of Kafirlaud in 1836, after the termination of Sir
Benjamin D Urban's war, gives the population, not exactly in
the detail I have given it. as 395,000.
2042. Mr. Hawes.] Your total estimate amounts to about
311,000?—Yes, about that. The editor estimated it from
documents which he had obtained, and he made it, as I have
said, 395,000.
2043. Mr. Mackinnon.] That is more than your estimate
considerably ?—But it was made six years later. There might
have been an increase of population in that time.
2044. Sir J. Walmsley.] In that calculation you do not
estimate the Zoolu tribe ?—No ; there are no Zoolu tribes
near. After you leave the Kafirs, you pass over 200 miles of
unoccupied territory ; but since Natal has become a British
colony, a number of Kafirs, broken-up tribes, have come into
that country, feeling that they can live there in security. You
travel So or 90 miles beyond Natal, before you come to the
Zoolu country.
2045. Then have you no knowledge of the scattered tribes
between the Zoolus and Kafraria Proper ?—No farther than
that they were principally hunters ; I saw occasionally six, or
eight, or 10 men, but I should not suppose, in the whole 200
miles from east to west, and the 100 miles from north to
south, there were more than 300, or 400, or 500 Kafirs.
2046. Have you any knowledge of the number of the
Zoolus ?—The number is very great; I should say the Zoolus
have about 25 regular regiments; their system is very much
like our system in regard to militias of counties. In the
centre of each of their districts they have a large barrack
established, where they yearly assemble all the warriors and
keep them at drill a month ; each of those barracks is calcu¬
lated to hold from 1,500 to 2,000 men, so that I should say
they certainly had, of regular warriors, 60,000 or 70,000 up
every year to drill.
2047. Under
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 277
2047. Under one king?—Yes. Smithy
2048. They inhabit the territory to the east of Natal?— Esq.,m.d.
To the north-east of Natal.
2049. Chairman.'] To the north-east the Zoolus have a
more regular military organization, have they not?—They
have a regular drill, according to their own view; and a regular
movement in the field, according to their own view.
2050. Has this system been recently adopted, in imitation
of our own, or has it subsisted for a long time under their own
institution ?—I believe it originated with a chief of the name
of Chaka, the first great Zoolu chief, and it was followed up
by his brother Dingan'.
2051. Do you apprehend the Zoolus to be more formidable,
or less formidable than the Kafirs, as warriors ?—^They were
more formidable in 1830, but I cannot say now, because the
Kafirs have got guns and horses, the others have not; they
could easily have overrun the Kafirs when I was witli Dingan ;
they do not throw the spear, they rush on.
2052. They use the assagai?—Yes, in close combat.
2053. Mr. Mackinnon.] Which do you consider the original
aborigines of the country in which you have described those
tribes ; do you consider that the Kafirs, the Hottentots, or the
Fingoes are the aborigines?—I should say for a certain dis¬
tance from the Keiskamma, perhaps for 40 miles to the east¬
ward, the Hottentots were the possessors of the country in
1752. The Kafirs had not advanced then much to the west¬
ward of the Kei ; there were a few villages to the westward of
the Kei, but not many. Within the next 30 years the Kafirs
reached as far as the Fish River, having taken possession of the
Hottentot country.
2054. Should you consider the Hottentots were the aborigines
of that part of the country you have described ?—Certainly.
2055. And that they were driven out of it by the Kafirs ?
•—I would not say exactly driven out of it, because the Kafirs
and Hottentots more or less amalgamated together. The Kafir,
being the more considerate person, and having property and
taking better care of it, seemed to live while the Hottentot
perished ; the Kafirs also took their women for wives, and so
gradually the Hottentots disappeared ; still you see, in many
Kafirs of the present day, evident indications of Hottentot
blood. I do not think they drove them away altogether.
20,56. Tiiey overpowered them ? —They amalgamated w ith
them.
2057. Were they Fingoes or Zoolus?—The Fingoes were
a people who cauie from near Natal, and belonged to the
0.63. s 3 Zoolu
278 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smith, Zoolu race ; they came into Kafirland, thinking they would be
sq^.D. treated, but found out their mistake.
30 June 205B. Sir J. Walmsley.l You have given us the names and
1851. number of the tribes to the east of the Keiskamma and north¬
east; can you now define the boundaries, or give anything
like a definition of the boundaries of each tribe?—It is very
difficult.
2059. The nearest approximation you can give, for the
information of the Committee, would be desirable ?—The
Gaika tribe live towards the Amatóla mountains, upon the
Keiskamma and streams falling into it ; the T'Slambie Kafirs
live between the Gaika Kafirs and the sea, to the eastward of
the Keiskamma, between it and the Kei.
2060. Could you say in miles anything like what the dis¬
tance would be, as that would still further facilitate the infor¬
mation you are giving us ?—I should find a difficulty in doing
that, because the boundaries are so irregular ; they go by the
rivers ; thus perhaps the boundary will extend a considerable
distance to the north one way, and then it will turn back
again. There is no well-defined boundary. Probably the
T'Slambies might extend 40 miles from the sea, but that is a
guess ; I cannot say for certain. Eno, Botman, and Congo's
tribes also lived in the same territory, but more to the west¬
ward, towards the Keiskamma, and therefore immediately
upon the frontier of the colony ; they extended also down to
the sea. The Gaikas had possession of the whole country
towards the Amatóla mountains and sources of the river ; they
are the most powerful tribe, and situations of the kind they
occupied are the best ; they held the best territory.
2061. Marquis of Granby.'\ Have the numbers of the Hot¬
tentots diminished much of late years?—Very much ; they
have been gradually diminishing ever since the commence¬
ment of the colony. The next tribe in succession to the east¬
ward is the Tambookies. The country of the Tambookies is
towards the sources of the Kei, Bashe, and Umlala riveis ;
they also extended a short way down towards the sea ; they
principally lived on the higher grounds ; they were one of the
most powerful tribes.
2062. Colonel Dunne.'] Is Hintza a Gaika?—No, he be¬
longed to another branch, a more direct branch of what we
may call the Royal family ; a nearer branch to tiie original
stock. Between the Tambookies and the sea Hintza lived.
The tribes of Unyeki, Qanda, and Depa lived between the
Bashe and a small river situated about twelve miles to the
eastward of the Umlala river. The Amapondas occupied the
district
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 279
district between the small river referred to and the Urnzitn- A.Smith,
voobu, and they reached from the sea to the mountain belt Esq., m.».
which divides the present sovereignty from Kafirland. The
tribe of Kapai lived on the eastern side of the Umzimvoobu,
near its sources. Between Kapai's tribe and Natal, a distance
of about 200 miles, the country in 1830 was almost without
inhabitants ; I do not think I saw during a journey through
it more than 50 Kafirs.
2063. And you think at present there are not more than
500 ?—I believe there is towards Natal a collection of broken
up tribes that has come since the white people were esta¬
blished there to seek protection direct from them against the
native chiefs, who are apt to put them to death if they continue
to live in their neighbourhood.
2064. Those are the Zoolu tribes that live to the westward
of Natal. You were speaking of the district between the
Umzimvoobu River and Natal?—Yes.
2065. You say that it is very thinly populated there, but
that a portion of the Zoolus have come down and occupied the
territory between Natal and this river?—I did not mean you
to understand that. I meant to say a very considerable number
of Zoolus have congregated about our settlement at Natal,
seeking protection against the chiefs.
2066. Chairman.^ Within the limits of the colony ?—Yes.
2067. Sir J. Walmsley.'\ But extending to the westward of
Natal, towards Kafraria Proper?—When I passed tlirough the
country, between the Umzimvoobu and Natal, I did not see 25
Kafirs ; and I do not believe there were more than 500 scat¬
tered over the whole of that district then, as far as I could
ascertain from the number I saw; they were merely out there
hunting for elephants. They were scattered over the country,
and the total would not amount to more than 500.
2068. You have given the population of the various tribes,
from the sea to the Vaal River, and the Keiskamma to the
eastward, as far as Kafraria Proper, at 300,000, or thereabouts ?
—Yes.
2069. What number of fighting men may be estimated in
that country, in proportion to the population ?—It is exceed¬
ingly difficult to say, because with the Kafirs the boys, that is,
boys of 15, 16, or 17, are considered the very best troops;
those that are most to be trusted. I should say, taking the
population with that understanding, one in six. Does the
question mean the number they could bring into war?
2070. You have given the population as 300,000 men in this
district ; I want to know what proportion of those you would
0.63. s 4 consider
28o MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J. Smith, consider fighting men, able to be broiii>ht into the field in their
Esq., M. D. own mode of warfare, not as a body ?—I must explain why I
go June ^ Riean that in consequence of the great
1851. quantity of cattle the Kafirs always have, there is a very con¬
siderable number of able-bodied men required to be away with
them to protect them. Those could not serve as fighting
men ; but if we include those, and say men that they could
bring, provided they had no charge of that kind, I should say
one in five.
2071. Taking them at one in six, that would give an amount
of 50,000 fighting men in that district ?—Yes.
2072. Are those men well supplied with fire-arms and am¬
munition ?—In my time they were not well supplied ; they
dreaded fire-arms then ; and could scarcely be induced to
touch a gun.
2073. Do you anticipate, from your knowledge of those
tribes, that they would unite generally against the British ?—I
think so.
2074. You think the whole of ihose tribes would unite
against the British?—Yes, they consider that the Government
has taken the country of the Hottentots, and further, that
it has taken more or less territory that they consider Kafir
territory ; hence they anticipate that the day will come, and
that it is not very distant, when we shall endeavour to take
all their territory, therefore they think their only chance is in
union among themselves.
2075. And that country generally is very favourable for
their mode of fighting ?—Yes.
2076. Being a great deal of bush fighting?—Yes.
2077. In which they might contend against European troops
with advantage?—Yes, they would have considerable advan¬
tage.
2078. You say there are 50,000 troops in that district;
you said also the Zoolus were a very powerful nation ?—Yes.
2079. And that they were under one head or king, who
had troops to the amount of 60,000, well organized • and
drilled ?—Yes.
2080. Have they any fire-arms ?—No ; there was not I
believe a serviceable musket in the whole Zoolu country.
2081. You are aware they approach closely to the colony of
Delagoa Bay ?—No.
2082. The Portuguese country ?—That country is far be¬
yond the Zoolus.
2083. Would they not be likely to be supplied with fire¬
arms through that source in case of war ?—They might be
supplied
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 281
supplied from Delagoa Bay. The frontier Kafirs have such A. Smith,
ample opportunities of getting supplies, that you cannot pre- Esq., m.u.
vent their getting what they are determined to have. QoTTne
2084. They are a very formidable force; a very powerful 1851.
nation to the north-east of Natal, close upon the colony of
Natal?—In my time they were powerful; but I may mention
that subsequently to that Dingan's tribe (the true Zooliis) was
broken up by an attack of the emigrant boers, and entirely
scattered. Now, the natives, that are in the vicinity of Natal,
are a congregation of broken-up tribes under a chief who
during Dingan's time was tributary to him ; they are a newly
organized tribe since my time ; a heterogeneous tribe, not
connected together, as the Zoolus were when under Dingan.
2085. The boers were driven again to the north-west ?—
Yes ; but notwithstanding that, they made a very serious
attack upon Dingan, and drove him away.
2086. Chairman.'] Are you speaking of the Zoolus within
the limits of the British colony, or the Zoolus without ?—I
am speaking of the Zoolus without the limits of the British
colony.
2087. ^'\T J. IValmsley.] Those within the British colony
are, then, runaway Zoolus ?—Yes.
2088. The Zoolus within Natal are those that ran away
from their own country, through crimes and other things r—
Exactly so.
2089. They are the servants of the colony, and do a great
portion of the work; of the labour of the colony?—I be¬
lieve so.
2090. They are rather an athletic people?—The real Zoolus
are a smaller people than the Kafirs.
2091. And not capable of doing a great deal of work?—
They are never tried in that way, because they never do work ;
their only occupation is hunting and war.
2092. Do you know what the European population is at
Port Natal?—No; I have not been there since it became a
colony.
2093. Do you know the number of troops there?—One
regiment, consisting of about 650 men.
2094. Then with so powerful a nation close upon them,
with so small a force, do you think Natal a safe colony
as a British possession?— Not if the natives became our
enemies.
2095. Then you consider that the safety of that country
depends entirely upon the will of the Zoolus?—In a great
measure ; they could destroy the whole colony if inclined ;
Dingan
282 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smith, Dingan could have done it easily ; the present man may not
Es^^d. have the tact and management of Dingan; the latter could
30 June overrun it without difficulty.
1851. 2096. Since then the Europeans at Port Natal have greatly
increased in number?—Yes, they have; but the European
force of that country is still small.
2097. Mr. Hawes.'] Do you know anything of the number
of the natives in the colony of Natal at this moment?—I have
not the least idea.
2098. You know nothing of the relations that have been
recently established between the colony of Natal and those
natives, as to the mode of governing them, or managing
them ?—No ; as far as I have understood from conversation
I have had upon the subject, we have no particular under¬
standing with Panda, who is now the native chief.
2099. Have you any knowledge of the system now pursued
in Natal, as to the government of the natives ?—Not from my
own observation.
2100. Nor from reading?—No.
2101. My question goes simply to this, whether have you
any knowledge of the system that has been recently adopted
in that colony, with a view to the management and govern¬
ment of the natives who now resort to that colony ?—No,
none.
2102. ^\x J. IValmsley.'] Is there any further remark you
wish to make as to the numbers or localities of the tribes or
the country?—No, I think not.
2103. Mr. Monsell.^ Are the customs of those tribes
similar to one another ?—Very nearly; there are some slight
modifications, but generally they are the same ; so much so,
that Hintza, who was considered to know best the established
customs of the Kafirs, was always resorted to in cases of
doubt.
2104. You have made yourself intimately acquainted with
the customs and habits of the different tribes?—I think I
know all their customs.
2105. What are the relations between the different tribes ;
how do they arrange disputes that arise between themselves ?
—If it is a dispute that involves the chief or the whole of the
tribe, it is either settled by friendly negotiations between the
respective chiefs and their counsellors, or by recourse to arms.
The disputes which occur are principally about the stealing
of cattle and things of that kind, not at all considered as
nationly disputes ; they are only considered as border disputes ;
if
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 283
if the people of one tribe take cattle from another tribe, the Smití»,
losers retaliate and take cattle, perhaps not always from the same Esq., m.p.
persons who took theirs, but from others. Such border war- jq
fare never involves the chief, even though he knows what has 1851.
been done, and has, perhaps, partaken of the cattle that have
heen taken.
2106. Are there any sorts of contracts or other treaties
between the tribes ?—None beyond an understanding that no
tribe must trespass on or interfere with the hunting or grazing
grounds of another tribe.
2107. Are they generally faithful to those engagements?—
Yes, I should say so ; at least a weak tribe will be faithful
towards a strong tribe, but not always the converse ; a strong
tribe will occasionally take liberties with a weak tribe, knowing
it cannot avenge the injury.
2108. Have they a different feeling as to engagements
made amongst themselves, that is, made by one tribe with
another tribe, to that which they have as to engagements made
between the British Government and the Kafirs generally ?—
I should say they have ; they consider that the Government
has treated them ill, by taking their lands ; therefore there is
a special feeling, creating an aversion to the Government,
which does not exist in regard to their own tribes, who have
not taken land from them.
2109. From your observation, do you think generally the
agents of the British Government have fairly respected their
prejudices and feelings ?—Decidedly so; but unfortunately in
respecting them they have not benefited the Kafirs or the
colonists. In regard to respecting their prejudices and feel¬
ings, the Kafirs do not view any consideration of that sort as a
proof of kindness, but of fear.
2110. Have you ever known an instance of a Kafir chief
being required to execute upon a criminal a sentence of the
colonial court ?—Yes ; I was present as the medical officer to
see a Kafir executed.
21)1. Is not such a course as that very abhorrent to the
feelings of the Kafirs?—Yes, it was a most unfortunate
case ; it occurred when Gaika was living. A murder had been
committed in the colony, and Gaika was required to send in
the murderer to be tried by the colonial court at Graham's
Tpwn. After reporting from time to time that he could not
discover the murderer, at last a man arrived at Graham's
Town ; he was tried by the colonial court, was found guilty
of the murder upon the evidence of a Hottentot boy, and was
sentenced to be executed. The colonial government directed
284 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. SmiiJt, that the commandant of the frontier should cany the man
Esq., M. D. into Kafirland and require Gaika, in the presence of his
3ojüñe pí^ople, to put him to death. The commandant proceeded
1B51. with about 500 troops, carrying along with hirn the criminal,
and arrived at the Chumie missionary station late in the
evening. A messenger was sent to Gaika the next morning,
to say his presence was required at the institution ; the mes¬
senger returned, saying Gaika could not attend. A second
message was sent, with some threats if he did not attend that
it would be necessary to take some steps against him. He
then came, but halted about a mile from the institution, upon
the top of a ridge, when it was discovered that he was ac¬
companied by 1,000 or 1,500 Kafirs. On the ridge he
remained till a third messenger was sent to invite him to the
institution. I must mention that previously to this the troops
had been concealed in a bush that was close to the institution,
so that there appeared very few about the station. On the
third invitation being sent, he came on, accompanied by his
men, and approached to within 100 yards of tlie missionary's
house, where he halted, standing in a semicircle, in which
he had formed his people. The commandant of the frontier,
myself, and another staff" officer, then went to see him, and
after a few ordinary observations, he was informed what was
the object of his being sent for, namely, that he was to put a
criminal to death. He immediately objected, and put the
question to the commandant, " How would you feel, provided
you were required to execute a person of whose guilt you
were perfectly ignorant ? " " My people," he said, " look to
me for protection, and what will they think of me, if I go and
execute this man without having tried him, or having proved
that he had been guilty of any crime ? I have no doubt the
crime has been proved against him by your court, and that
being the case, I think you and not me ought to execute him."
The argument went on for some time ; at last the commandant
said to me, " Cannot you help me out of this difficulty ? " My
reply was, " It is of no use, for Gaika has the best of it, and
you can never drive him from the position he has taken."
The commandant then said, " 1 cannot help it, it must be
done and holding up his hand 500 or 600 troops imme¬
diately sprung out of the bush, and marched forward and
formed in rank directly opposite to Gaika's people ; Gaika
then commenced to tremble, and turning round said to his
son Maquomo something or other, which our interpreter did
not catch. Maquomo looked round, and on seeing a leathern
thong in the hands of one of the men, immediately seized it,
and
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 285
and rushed up to the criminal, who was standing present A.Smith,
guarded by two British soldiers, and aided by two Kafirs imme- Esq., m. d.
diatelv seized him by the ankles before he was aware of their oTTT.,»
• 111!* /* r ii» i« • 3® jullg
intentions, pulled his feet from under hira, and cast him on bis 1851.
face. Maquomo then placed his foot on the man's neck, and
gave orders to the person who possessed the thong to pass it
under the neck, and to pull it with the assistance of the
other till the man should be strangled, Gaika departed much
disgusted, carrying with him all his people; he left the corpse
at the missionary station to be buried.'
2112. In what year did this take place ?—1821 or 1 822.
2113. Have any similar cases occurred, do you know? —
Not during my time ; I never heard of any other.
2114. That is merely an exceptional case; it is not the
system that was carried out?—No.
2115. Colonel Dunne.^ Who was the commandant?—
Colonel Scott.
2116. Mr. MonsellP\ Were you in the country when Sir
Andries Stockenstrom was Lieutenant-governor?—Yes, for
six or eight months only.
2117. Did you approve of the system called Lord Glenelg's
system ; the system he was appointed to carry out ?—I ap¬
proved of it to a certain extent ; but I thought something
more was wanted : namely, that there should be a commis¬
sioner appointed to reside among the Kafirs, who should
endeavour to organize a government for each chief, and so
enable them to prevent their subjects committing depredations
in the colony, and thereby ensure peace. The system, so far
as it went, of giving back the land to Kafirs, I could not help
approving, because I think it has been taken from them un¬
justly ; they had been given to understand since 1778, when,
the Dutch government established the boundary, that the whole
of the country to the east of the Great Fish River was to be
considered Kafir country, and I do not think they had done
sufficient in the interim to justify their being driven beyond
the Keiskamma.
2118. Are you of opinion that the system of which you
have just been speaking, namely, that which was introduced
by Lord Glenelg, would on the whole have worked more suc¬
cessfully than the system substituted for it?—Yes, provided
steps had been taken to create an executive for the Kafirs ; if
on the contrary no such steps had been adopted, I do not
know that matters would have been better than before the
occurrence of Sir Benjanfiin D'Urban's war. I consider it was
essentially necessary to the success ®f the system of Lord
Glenelg,
286 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEEORË THE
A. Smith, Glenelg, that there should have been some British authority
Esq., M. D. amongst the Kafirs, because, as mentioned before, they have
30 June no confidence in the Governor of the colony ; they consider he
1851. is interested in the white people, and in the white people only,
and that he would sacrifice the black people's interest at any
moment to promote the interest of the white people, whether
right or wrong ; that is their idea. Had a commissioner been
appointed, one of his principal objects should have been to get
the chiefs to subdivide Kafirland into small districts and create
an executive for each, and look to it rather than to the volun¬
tary services of any number of subjects. Had that been effected
the system proposed by Lord Glenelg would, in my opinion,
have answered better than the system that was substituted
for it.
2119. Would you describe, in a few words, what you mean
by Lord Glenelg's system?—It was to give up the country to
the Kafirs and allow them to live independent, as they had
done previously ; that is, to give up the country which the
Kafirs maintained was their country, and which the colonial
government had recognised to be their country so far back as
1778, namely, the country east of the Fish River.
2120. Mr. Ha'wes.'] The effect of that was to return to the
old boundary of the colony, the Fish River?—Yes.
2121. How far did or did not that system comprehend the
maintaining the territory between the Fish River and the
Keiskamma as a neutral territory, as was previously arranged
under the administration of Lord Charles Somerset?—I
believe it required that the neutral territory should be given
up. The Kafirs will very frequently enter into an agreement
when they have 600 or 700 soldiers before them ; and will
sign anything from fear, but the moment they go away they
say they were compelled to do it, and they do not hold such
as an agreement amongst themselves ; they are always ready
to throw off any agreement of that kind the moment an oppor¬
tunity offers.
2122. Mr. Monsell.'] Returning to the consideration of
Lord Glenelg's system with the addition you propose ; suppose
such a system had been consistently carried out, do you con¬
ceive, from your knowledge of the Kafirs, that there would
have been reasonable grounds for believing they would have
observed the treaties that were made with them ?—To a very
great extent ; there would be always depredations, because as
long as they are so desirous of getting cattle, there will be occa¬
sionally thieving.
2123. Mr. B. Carter.] You stated that you wished they
should
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 287
should have a commissioner to lead them to establish some A. Smith,
sort of executive ?—Yes. Esq^. d.
2124. Would you have that under one head, or could you 30 June
have separate executives for separate tribes?—I would have 1851.
separate executives for separate tribes.
2125. Mr. MonseU.'\ Do you consider the Kafirs to be very
deficient in the appreciation of the truth ; did you find them
not very careful in keeping their word ?—In some respects they
are very careful in keeping their word ; they consider it an
honour to prove themselves efficient thieves, therefore they are
not very particular in that respect. I never lost anything
which they promised me they would take care of for me. I
used to put my cattle under the charge of the chief, or perhaps
simply of a subject, and I never lost any ; they would have
considered it a dishonour to have made away with cattle
under such circumstances. Had I gone into Kafirland and
not taken that precaution, they would have thought it justifi¬
able to have stolen one, two, or more of them.
2126. Did their proneness to break their treaties with the
British Government arise in any degree from a feeling that
the British Government did not respect the agreements made
with them?—1 think it arose more from a desire to obtain
cattle ; at the same time they considered they had been ill
used by the Government, and that they might fairly take
advantage of the colonists, when an opportunity offered.
2127. Colonel Dunne.\ You said the system of Lord
Glenelg, which you have described, was more an alteration of
boundary than an alteration of policy ; do 1 understand you
to say the alteration of the system was merely an alteration of
boundary?—That was not all, as far as I understood the sys¬
tem. It was just coming into operation when I left.
2128. What is the system ; very often you have spoken of
the system before that of Lord Glenelg and the system subse¬
quently, and the reversal of this and of that system ; I want to
know what those systems were, and the differences between
them ; after we took the colony are you aware of the bounda¬
ries we received from the Dutch?—Yes, 1 knew them ; at the
time we took the colony, in 1795, the acknowledged boun¬
dary was the Fish River,
212g. The Fish River was one boundary when we received
it from the Dutch ?—Yes, that was established as the boundary
in 1778 by the Dutch, and we took over the colony, consider¬
ing that to be the boundary.
2130. In what year was the treaty with the Dutch ?—1795«
2131. Did
288 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
J. Smith, 2131, Did we finally get possession then ?—AV'e gave it up
Esq., M. D. again in 1802.
•io Junf 2132. When did it come finally into our possession ?—In
1Ö51. 1806.
2133. Then what was the next change of boundary made ?
—The neutral territory in 1819, by Lord Charles Somerset.
2134. What was that ?—That the country lying between
the Fish River and tiie Keiskamma should be neutral ; that is,
it was not to be occupied either by whites or blacks.
2135. There seems to be a distinction between the colonial
boundary and the British territorial boundary. Was the colo¬
nial boundary pushed to the Keiskamma?—No colonist was
sanctioned to live xipon the neutral territory.
2136. Then in fact it was a mere neutral territory?—
Yes.
2137. And the Keiskamma was no more the boundary to
them than the Fish River was to us ?—No more.
2138. Was the neutral territory to be totally uninhabited by
either party ?—Yes; but we did not keep the treaty.
213g. The treaty was understood so ?—Yes, but we broke
the treaty. We built Fort Wiltshire upon the banks of the
Keiskamma.
2140. Did you consider that we violated that treaty ?—■
Yes.
2141. Mr. Hawes.] Was not it an understanding at the
time that a fort should be built on a certain portion of the
neutral territory, for the protection of the neutral boundary?
—I never understood that.
2142. Colonel Dunne.'] Was the treaty ever reduced to
writing?—No, I think not ; it was a mere verbal treaty with
Gaika, who, within a few hours, denied that he ever consented
to such an arrangement ; he said the white people say I con¬
sented, and 1 suppose I must consent.
2143. Was it, in fact, a mere compulsory affair ?—I was
given to understand so. There was a second proposition
made in 1820, by Sir Rufane Donkin ; he got Gaika to con¬
sent to allow a certain portion of the neutral territory to be
inhabited by British settlers ; he consented to it, because he
could not help himself.
2144. In fact, whether compelled by force or inclination,
such a consent was understood ?—Yes, it was said to have
been obtained.
2145. Now, what was the difference of the system of policy
pursued j was there any difference in the means of holding
those
SELECT CÖMMITTteE ÓN ÏHE KAFIR TRIBES. 289
those separating boundaries. After the Dutch handed it A. Smith,
over to us, we defended the boundary by the commando
system ?—Y es.
2146. Who was the next Governor that changed that 1851.
system ; it continued to what date ?—It is difficult to say; the
system was altered frequently, from the necessities of the case;
in general terms, the system of protecting the colonial frontier
was continued, either by means of Burgher commandos or
military troops, up to 1837.
2147. What do you understand by military troops?—I
mean the military.
2148. When did we first send the regular soldiery on
the frontier?—In 1806, when we took possession of the
colony.
214g. Then that was a combined defence of the local force
and the regular military force?—Yes.
2150. And ever has been ?—Our principle was, that "any¬
thing done against the Kafirs should be done b y the
military, if possible ; but at times it became necessary to
have additional assistance, and that was sought for from the
Burghers,
2151. Some time after we received the colony from the
Dutch, did we not allow the Burghers to defend themselves
without any military interference ?—Yes, frequently.
2152. "When did we adopt the plan of stopping the
commando system ?—I think in General Burke's time ;
in 1827.
21 ,t3. That was previously to the adoption of Lord Glenelg's
system ?—Yes.
2154. What was Lord Glenelg's system ; I do not speak
now as to boundary ?—To protect the colony by means of the
military, and then to carry on a communication with the Kafir
tribes, when any crime had been committed, by means of the
civil authorities.
2155. Do I understand that in the former case the Burghers
who lost cattle were allowed to pursue them and avenge their
own injury, and in the latter, that we made the whole tribes
responsible?—In the latter we did not make the whole tribes
responsible, because when the spoor of the cattle was traced
to a certain part of the boundary, the Kafirs living in the dis¬
trict opposite to where we traced it were held responsible to
produce them.
2156. We held the tribe into whose territory the spoor was
traced responsible?—Yes.
2157. Was it in pursuance of that responsibility that the
0.63. T execution
290 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A.Smith, execution you have spoken of took place?—No; that was a
Esq., M. p. gjjgg jjj some Kafirs had entered the colony, and had
30 June murdered one of the herdsmen of a colonist.
1851. 2158. It was not in consequence of that system ?—No, it
was long previous to that system.
2159. Can you point out the difference between the patrol
system and the commando system, or is there any dif¬
ference ?—A patrol consisted of a body of troops going out
for observation ; not going out in pursuit of depredators, but
to see if they could discover depredators : a commando was
a body again that was in pursuit of depredators : the one
was trying to discover wandering Kafirs, the other was
in pursuit of depredators, a depredation having been com¬
mitted.
2160. I do not quite see the difference?—There were a
series of posts along the boundary line, and troops were
placed at each of them, and once or twice a week the
regulation was that an officer and six or eight, or lo or 20
men should patrol the frontier between them half-way to
the next post, where they were to be met by the patrol from
the next post.
2161. Then one was for the prevention of crime, and the
other for the detection and punishment of it ?—Yes.
2162. Do you think the best defence of the frontier would
be by those patrols along the boundary ? —No, I do not think
they were of much use.
2163. Then would you suppose that the commando system
was the more effective system ?—The commando system is not
of much use; you must raise the condition of the people, get
the Kafirs to think difi'erently, and get the chiefs to be the
eflScient persons to restrain depredations; you will never effect
n)uch by commandos or patrols.
2164. Would you look to the defence of the frontier totally
to the Jiioral elevation of the Kafirs, and not to force ?—I
would ; that ought to be the main efibrt, the moral elevation
of the people; but you cannot change them all at once;
in the meantime you must be prepared to resort to force, if
necessary.
2165. Therefore, for the moment, we must look to the
ordinary human means of force?—Yes; but you will not
want so much of that if you raise the m.oral character of the
Kafirs.
2166. From your knowledge of the Kafirs, is there any
reasonable chance of raising their moral character, so that
cattle stealing, instead of being an honourable employment,
should
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES, 291
should be a dishonourable employment?—It will take a long A.Smith,
time to do it. Esq., m.d.
2167. In the meantime, would you not say it is quite
necessary to keep up some frontier system that would enforce 3° June
the protection of our colonists ?—No doubt of it.
2168. Mr. Hindley.'] You said Sir Benjamin D'Urhan, in
1819, permitted the colonists to occupy some portions of the
neutral territory ?—I said Sir Rufane Donkin j he established
a military village, called the Beka, in 1820.
2169. How far did the occupation of that part of the terri¬
tory by the colonists extend ?—It was merely on the banks of
the Beka River ; it did not extend any great distance, perhaps
four or five miles on each side.
2170. Then when might the colonists have been considered
to have occupied the neutral territory ?—Generally after Sir
Benjamin D'Urbans war, I think; but I ought to mention
that the colonists were always occupying parts of that country,
hut never before 1825 with the consent or concurrence of the
Government. Such occupations were frequent sources of war
between the Kafirs and the colonists ; the colonists were
always desirous to obtain additional territory. The pasture on
some of the places in the colony not being very good, or not
so good as was wished, they were always applying to the
Government to allow them to take additional places beyond
the colony.
2171. Then afterwards seeking the protection of the Go¬
vernment?—Yes, having deprived the natives of portions of
their land. I hold in my hand an extract from a memorial
that was addressed to the first English Governor immediately
after we took possession of the colony in 1795 ; it embraced a
number of points, and was signed by 30 farmers. One para- ,
graph ran to this effect : " And we beg further leave most
humbly to request your Excellency will be pleased to allow
us to occupy another tract of land, situated on the other side
of the Great Fish River, unto the Konap (or if it would be
unto the Kat River), in order that not only those who dwell
too near each other may thereby be enabled to enlarge their
business of breeding cattle, but also those who have not yet
got any place, and who are still obliged to dwell with others,
may likewise thereby be enabled to obtain one, and thus to
forward their business." Their object was to get the Governor
to consent to this.
2172. Mr. Ha'wes.'\ What was the reply of the Governor?
—A refusal.
0.63. T 2 2173, You
292 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A.Smith, 2173. You attribute a great deal of the dissatisfaction that
Esq^ D, feij tQ encroachments of the colonists?—Yes.
30 June 2174. Do you mean encroachments or advances into Kañr-
iSöi- land beyond the Fish River?—Yes, to a certain extent. At
one time the Kafirs occupied the country to the west of the
Fish River, especially towards the sea, and maintained that
they had purchased it from the Hottentots, who were the
original possessors of it, and that they were there encroached
on by the colonists.
2175. Is there any doubt upon this point that the Fish
River had been for a very long period of time, before the
acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope by the British Govern¬
ment, the boundary of the colony?—In the GraafFReynet
district it was the boundary, but not in the Utenhague district
till after the Kafirs were driven out of the Zuurveldt in 1812.
2176. And it still continued the boundary of the colony?—
Yes.
2177. Now, speaking with reference to the encroachments
of the colonists, do you know any instance of a settlement by
the colonists, irrespective of the consent of the Government
being sought for it, beyond the Fish River?—Yes.
2178. Will you state any case of that sort?—The moment
there occurred a drought in the colony, or anything like a
scarcity of grass, the hoers immediately used to move over to
Kafiriand and take certain places, and establish themselves
there. There was a man I can speak particularly to, of the
name of Prinslo.
2179. I asked with reference to there being anything like a
regular settlement by the colonists beyond the established
colonial boundary?—Yes, there were temporary settlements ;
the colonists migrated occasionally, and took possession of the
country.
2180. I asked whether, in point of fact, you could state any
particular place or tract of country that was occupied by the
colonists beyond the old boundary?—Yes, between the Fish
River and the Konap River.
218]. Then I understand you to say there were settlements
formed in that part of the country which was beyond the
boundary?—Yes, many of the persons who signed the memo¬
rial already referred to were at the time living beyond the
boundary.
2182. Was that ever brought under the notice of the local
Government?—I dare say it was; it was constantly being
brought under the notice of the Dutch Government, but it
had not the means of restraining them.
2183. I am
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 293
2183. I am speaking of the British Government, and I ivish a. Smith,
to know whether those encroachments upon the Kafirs, beyond Esq., m.d,
the colonial boundary, liad ever been brought under the notice
of the local Government?—I think they were, from time to
time.
2184. Do you happen to know the course the Government
took ?—The Government desired that the settlers should be
ordered back, and they generally came back, but they soon
returned again ; the distance, was so great that the magistrate
knew little of what went on.
2185. Did not those disputes originate the arrangement made
by Lord Charles Somerset in 1849?—No, I do not think that
they had much to do with it ; the constant depredations which
were going on, and the opinion in the colony that the Fish
River Bush, being so extensive, afforded great facilities to
thieves, led him to think it desirable that this bush should
not be occupied by either party.
2186. Was not all his policy directed to this, to establisli
not only more clearly the old boundary, but to keep a certain
tract of country beyond that free from all settlers, with a view
to secure peace and quietness on the frontier ?—Certainly.
2187. Before that was done, there were communications
between the Governor and the Kafir chiefs ?—Y es.
2188. From that time to the present have there been en¬
croachments on the part of the colonists beyond the boundary ?
—Frequent encroachments since that time.
2189. To what extent, and will you state the dates when ?
—Ï am hardly prepared to say, but I think a number of
farmers located themselves in the country between the Fish
and Konap Rivers between 1822 and 1825.
2190. Has the boundary of the colony ever been acknow¬
ledged to an extent so as to comprehend those encroach¬
ments?—Yes, after they were made.
2191. Can you give the Committee any notion of the
extent to which that has been carried?—Perhaps 40 or 50
farmers occupied 40 or 50 farms ; some badly disposed farmers,
who used to take ten)porary possession of farms, in that manner
used to excite the natives to plunder from the colonists, in
order that there might appear some reasons for dispossessing
the Kafirs, so that the colonists might get permanent posses¬
sion.
2192. You are speaking of your own knowledge?—No;
but 1 have been told so by farmers, good and just men, of
which there are many ; they mentioned to me, amongst others,
a man of the name of Buis, who was well known as a person
0.63. T 3 who
294 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
A. Smith, who used to excite tlie Kafirs to commit depredations upon
Esq., M.D. colonists merely to bring on a war, that he might have a
3^~e pretence for seizing cattle.
1851. 2193. About what date was this?—That date was previous
to the one mentioned, about 1793 or 1794.
2194. I am speaking of the encroachments to which I
thought you referred subsequently to the boundary being fixed
by Lord Charles Somerset?—I mentioned that there had
been encroachments between the Fish River and the Konap.
But I do not ascribe so much of the hostility that exists be¬
tween the Kafirs and the colonists to those late acts, as to
the general system that has long prevailed. The moment a
Kafir sees a white man come and take his position near his
tribe, he fancies he is following up the old system.
2195. Did you approve of the treaties entered into with the
Kafir chiefs and signed by Sir -Andries Stockenstrom ?—I
cannot say that I ever saw the treaties.
2196. Colonel Dutine.'l Were you in the country at the
time they were signed ?—I believe I was ; but I was about
coming home.
2197. Were you on the frontier?—No; I was in Cape
Town.
2198. Mr. Hawes.'] You are aware that treaties were en¬
tered into at that time, and the whole boundary of the colony
was restored ?—Y es.
2199. Was that policy successful, and was peace better
secured by that arrangement than by any former arrange¬
ment ?—I am not prepared to say as to that, because I left
shortly afterwards. I have been told there was a modification
of those treaties followed very soon after, and to that modifica¬
tion was ascribed the outbreak of the Kafirs ; but I was not in
the country.
2200. From the knowledge you have of the colony, have
you any reason to say that the frontier became peaceful and
quiet after the signing of those treaties ?—I was in the colony
only a short time after those treaties were signed ; six or eight
months ; and I had no communication with the Kafirs. Still
I heard they were very much satisfied, and considered that
an act of justice had been done.
2201. That was just at the conclusion of the war?—It
might have .been about the end of the year 1836.
2202. When did Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war terminate?—
In 1835.
2203. That was shortly after the termination of the war?
—Yes.
2204. When
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 295
2204. When they were likely to feel the consequences of A. Smith,
the war in which they had embarked ?—Yes ; but they were Esq., m.d.
very much dissatisfied before the treaties were signed. I saw
some of the Kafirs after the war was ended (the D'Urban ^185""^
war), and they were exceedingly dissatisfied touching the pro¬
vince of Adelaide and the war. They said they never of their
own accord asked for peace, and they complained of their
having been brought into subjection, not in a fair way. They
considered advantages were held out to them by persons who
were sent to them to advise them to sue for peace, and that,
when peace was established, they did not get those advan¬
tages and privileges they were led to expect.
2205. Are you at all aware of the means that were taken
to inform the Kafirs of the meaning of the treaties they entered
into ?—No.
2206. Do you place any great reliance upon treaties with
Kafir chiefs ?—No ; unless there be a commissioner or resident
to aid and assist them to carry them out, and that they are so
detailed that the Kafirs cannot misunderstand them.
2207. Even with that precaution, do you think, without
sufiScient force to maintain them, it would be safe to rely upon
such arrangements ?—I think so; I would rather rely upon
them than simply upon physical force ; I would prefer moral
to physical force. The Kafirs are an independent and daring
people, but I rarely found them difficult to manage when I
endeavoured to persuade them by just arguments. They are
very quick, and soon see when they have the advantage of
you ; still I seldom found them unreasonable.
2208. You think that civil commissioners or residents,
without the aid of force to support them, would be sufficient
to maintain peace between the colony and the Kafirs ?—I
think more likely than by means of troops.
2209. Mr. Hindley.] Were you on the frontier when the
treaty was made by Sir Benjamin D'Urban ?—No, I was in
the interior at the time.
2210. When the treaty was afterwards established, and
the English Government threw up the country to the east of
the Great Fish River, was it satisfactory to the colonists ?—
I think not, as far as I recollect.
2211. Because that put an end to the system of which you
have spoken of, people going and occupying portions of the
country, and then claiming the protection of the Government.^
—Yes.
2212. To that they decidedly objected?—Yes; some at
least did, but I cannot say that the dissatisfaction arose on
0.63. T 4 that
296 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
SmiUi, that account ; I think the reversal of the general policy of Sir
Esq., M.D. ß, D'Urban, which the colonists generally considered the
ScTjuiie one, tended greatly to create it. When I spoke of the
i8ji. colonists as having been always anxious to obtain extension
of land, I alluded to the old Dutch colonists, who, being
merely graziers, considered each man required 6,000 or 8,000
acres to enable him to keep the quantity of cattle necessary to
ensure his respectab'ility ; men of that way of thinking imme¬
diately made application to Government, when their sons
reached the age of manhood, for additional farms ; and if
refused, they or their sons sought for them beyond the
colonial boundaries. From the time the colony was established,
in 1652, up till at least 1837, that practice was more or
less observed.
2213. Then supposing the Government were to communi¬
cate to the Kafir chiefs, that any colonist settling to the east¬
ward of the boundary must not be considered entitled to the
protection of the British Government, and that whatever the
Kafirs did to him would not be noticed by the Govern¬
ment, do you think that that would be effective ?—The Kafirs
would not believe him ; they would want proof of it. It would
require 10 or 12 years to satisfy them that Government meant
that.
2214. You said the chiefs respected each other —Yes.
2215. And you think they do not respect the English Go¬
vernment ?— I think they have not much respect for the Go¬
vernment ; they believe, whether from misapprehension or
otherwise, that the agreements they have made with it have
not been kept. I think the belief generally arose out of a
misapprehension, because no Government could have dealt
more nobly and generously than the colonial Government
usually dealt with the Kafirs : the lenity of the Government
brouijht much bloodshed and ruin on the Kafirs, The succès-
sive governors always endeavoured to prevent the Kafirs being
much interfered with, and always urged on the frontier autho¬
rities to keep in mind how far the Kafirs were in arrear as
regarded civilization and moral feelings, and therefore that they
should be treated leniently. Those kindly feelings were not
rightly appreciated by the Kafirs ; they imagined we were
lenient to them because we feared them, and were unable to
subdue them.
2216. You said the Kafirs had an opinion that we were con¬
stantly stealing their land, and that there was foundation for
that feeling ?—Yes.
2217. At the same time, we have not impressed upon the
Kafir
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 297
Kafir a sense of our power to enable us to maintain our con- A. Smith,
quests?—No. Esq., m. n.
2218. Mr. iî. Carter.l The Kafirs, believing the Govern-
ment treated them with lenity, thought those encroachments
were in defiance of the Government ?—No, I do not think
they thought that the Government treated them with lenity
from a kindly feeling ; they thought the very kind treatment
they had was in consequence of fear ; they ascribed it to fear.
2219. Chairman.] You believe that the Kafirs entertain an
opinion of harsh conduct on the part of the British Govern¬
ment towards them, though you maintain that was not justified
by the reality ? —Certainly.
2220. Mr. Hindley.] Were you acquainted with the cha¬
racter of their missions, and their general effect upon the cha¬
racters and relations of the Government?—I have seen a good
number of the missionary stations.
2221. Do you believe that the missionary establishments
have had a tendency to promote a good understanding with
the Kafirs 1—Generally speaking, the chiefs do not like the
missionary stations, because from the preaching of the mis¬
sionaries the Kafirs get a certain degree of light, which makes
them not so completely subservient to their chiefs, and it has
happened frequently that as soon as a chief has found out
that, he has required the missionary to leave. The people liked
the missionaries, because they found protection from them.
2222. Marquis oüGranby.] With respect to the treaty you
spoke of, establishing a neutral territory between the Great
Fish River and the Keiskamma, in what year was that treaty
made ?—In 1819.
2223. Was that the treaty of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ?—No,
of Lord Charles Somerset.
2224. Was that the treaty which they violated immediately
after it was made ?—The Government built a fort, called Fort
Wiltshire, on the very eastern part of the neutral territory ;
that was a violation of the treaty.
2225. Then, in fact, there has never been a neutral territory
kept inviolate by the colonists on the one hand, and the Kafirs
on the other?—^I'he Government never sanctioned the colo¬
nists living on that ground ; they put troops there, but never
sanctioned colonists taking up ground on the neutral territory.
Frequently, when there happened to be a drought in Kafirland,
and the grass, partly by the cattle and partly by drought, had
almost entirely disappeared, the Kafirs used to apply to the
frontier authorities for permission to come over into the neutral
territory to feed their cattle there, as there was plenty of grass.
298 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
They frequently were allowed to come over, and perhaps
remain three or four months, until the grass had grown in their
own country.
2226. Is not it your opinion that the best method of prevent¬
ing those incursions and disputes would be to establish a bonâ
fide neutral territory, which neither colonists nor Kafirs should
be permitted to enter?—I do not think that would effect much
good ; they would cross that neutral territory ; a Kafir in the
night will go 60 miles.
2227. You do not think it will do any good, because it is
impossible to establish a really neutral territory ?—Even if it
were established they would steal nevertheless ; they would
cross that territory, and go to the farmers to the westward of
it ; I do not think it would do much good.
Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. Smithy called in j and Examined.
Lieut.-Col. 2228. Chairman.'] WHEN were you in the colony of the
T. C. Smith. Cape of Good Hope ?—I left it in January 1847.
~— 2229. How long had you been there ?—I arrived at the
Cape in May 1840, and early in 1841 was sent towards Natal,
and remained there till 1845; I went as far as half-way
between the eastern frontier of the Cape colony and Natal in
1841, and remained there till 1842.
2230. What do you mean by half-way ?—Near the Umzim-
voobo River. I had perhaps better explain the circumstances
under which I went.
2231. Do, if you please?—Shortly after my arrival in the
Cape colony the Dutch boers at Natal attacked one of the
native chiefs at that place, and carried off* a considerable por¬
tion of the cattle of his tribe; this determined the then
Governor, Sir George Napier, to send a force in the direction
of Natal for the protection of the native tribes ; this force he
placed under my command.
2232. What was the amount of force you commanded.^—
About 200 men ; of Europeans not more than 150.
2233. you go by land 1—Yes, by land.
2234. Had your experience in the colony been chiefly with
Natal, on the Kaflr frontier ?—I had some experience on the
Kafir frontier afterwards, having held a situation there when
the last Kafir war broke out ; I was appointed frontier com¬
missioner. That was long subsequent to the period I have
mentioned. On the appointment of a Lieutenant-governor to
Natal 1 went to the Cape of Good Hope ; that was in the latter
part of 1845.
2235. Were
A. Smith,
Esq., M. D.
30 June
1851.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 299
2235. Were you present on the Kafir frontier at the time Lieut.-Col.
the war in 1846 broke out?—I was. r.C.Smith.
2236. Had you any means of forming any opinion of what 30 juae
the causes of that war were?—It immediately originated in 1851.
the seizure of a prisoner by the Kafirs when under escort j he
was being sent under escort to Graham's Town.
2237. Speaking generally, do you believe the breaking out
of that war to have been caused by the conduct of the Kafirs,
or our own people?—By the conduct of the Kafirs.
2238. When you were at Natal you had, doubtless, an
opportunity of becoming acquainted with the number and
nature of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of that colony?
— I had.
2239. The largest portion are the Zoolus ?—The Zoolus.
2240. Do you consider them a formidable enemy in case of
war?—Not so formidable as the Kafirs ; at least, I speak of
the period when I was there ; they had not then attained the
use of the musket, which is so common among the Kafirs bor¬
dering upon the Cape colony.
2241. But do you not think it likely they will soon obtain
a supply of fire-arms, and become acquainted with their use ?
—Undoubtedly they will, through the various traders that will
sell them, in spite of any regulations to the contrary.
2242. In that event, you think them likely to become a
formidable enemy in the time of war ?—They are peculiarly
situated at Natal. A vast body of natives are located in the
colony. I think the number was calculated, when I was there,
as being close upon 100,000.
2243. Do you think the attachment of the natives within
the limits of the colony to the British connexion can be cal¬
culated upon in the event of a struggle between the colony
and the Zoolu tribes without the limits of the colony ?—I think
those that are within the colony would resist the Zoolus, because
nearly the whole of tiiem have fled from the tyranny of the
Zoolu king.
2244. It has been represented to the Committee that there
is a considerable degree of military organization among the
Zoolus ; is that the case, in your opinion ?—^There is; but I did
not conceive it to be dangerous during the time I was there,
as opposed to Europeans.
2245. Are they formed in regiments, something like Euro¬
pean regiments ?—I never perceived it. It was stated to be so
in Chaka's time, but it was not kept up, I believe, by his suc¬
cessors.
2246. You
300 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Lieut.-Cùl. 2246, You do not think there is any essential distinction
T. C. Smith, between them ami other savage tribes ?—No.
-íoTüñe -247. Are they superior, or physically inferior, to the Kafirs ?
1851. —I should say they are inferior.
2248. Rather smaller men ?—Rather smaller men.
2249. Within the limits of the colony, they do the hard work
of the colony ?—They do a great deal in that way, but it is
difficult to get them to engage as permanent labourers;
they will hire themselves as servants, and remain a certain
time, but not long. The Kafir must leave his employment
and go and " sit," to use his own expression, because among
themselves the women do all the work ; the men do nothing.
2250. Can you slate to the Committee what, in your
opinion, you think would be the best policy for that colony
to pursue towards the independent Zoolus in the neighbour¬
hood of the colony of Natal—the independent tribes ?—I
think it requires, on the part of the Government, a great
degree of firmness, with regard to the Zoolus, in the event of
their committing thefts of cattle, so that they should be com¬
pelled to restore them.
2251. Is the influence of the chiefs great among the inde¬
pendent Zoolus?—I think the influence of the Zoolu king is
greater than that of any other chief among the native tribes in
South Africa.
2252. Do you know if he has it in his power to restrain his
people from committing those depredations?—I think so, to a
certain extent.
2 253. What are their own habits ; are they owners of cattle
to a great extent?—Yes, to a large extent.
2254. Do they engage in agriculture much ?—Very little;
they are essentially a pastoral people.
2255. Are they hunting tribes?—Yes; they make large
hunting parties, going out 500 or 600 men at a time, or even
more than that ; but these hunting parties only occur occa¬
sionally ; they do not make it their business.
22.56. Is cattle stealing an honourable employment among
their young men ?—It is among all the tribes ; and will be so
until you can alter their habits. No Kafir can obtain a wife
unless he purchases her by so many head of cattle ; and as
polygamy is allowed, they may have as many wives as they can
purchase; this makes it so difficult to repress their thefts
from the colonists.
2257. Mv. Hawes.~\ Is theft common among themselves?—
Yes; one tribe plundering cattle from another, but not among
the people belonging to the same tribe.
2258. Chairman.']
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3OI
2258. Chairman.'\ That would be reckoned dishonourable ? Lieut.-Col.
—That would be reckoned dishonourable. T. C. Smith.
2259. Sir/. Walmsley.'] Do you know the extent of the 30June
colony of Natal Proper?—The boundaries have been fixed 1851.
since I left Natal.
2260. Do you know what number of miles it is?—I believe
somewhat between 13,000 and 14,000 square miles.
2261. Chairman.'] Is it a country formed for agriculture,
as distinguished from pasturage?—It is admirably formed for
both.
2262. Speaking generally, do you think it is possible to
anticipate a large population there of European origin engaged
in the pursuits of agriculture 1—I think so.
2263. There is nothing in the soil or climate to prevent that
being the case ?—I consider the surface particularly available ;
in some parts of the Cape colony seven-tenths are calculated
as desert, but at Natal you have nothing of that sort.
2264. It is almost all good soil ?—Yes.
2265. It is much troubled with drought.?—It is so occa¬
sionally, but it has the advantage of being well watered by
streams and rivers.
2266. Sir J. Walmsley!] Under what tenure is the land
generally held ; is it held from the Government by the people ?
—When the Boers originally went there they formed a govern¬
ment of their own, and granted land to the different persons
forming the community.
2267. Now as to the Zoolu tribes that are within the colony ;
how do they hold their land, and from whom?—An arrange¬
ment has been made since 1 left ; but I believe certain loca¬
tions have been set apart for them.
2268. How do they pay their rent; is it in kind or money ?
—^They paid none until lately ; they now pay, I understand, a
sort of head-tax.
2269. What are the means taken to levy the rent ?—It is
collected by the gentleman placed over the Kafirs in that
colony as a superintendent.
2270. Is it levied by the troops ?—Not by the troops, I
believe.
2271. You speak with certainty upon that subject?—No;
this has all taken place subsequent to my being there.
2272. Chairman^ Comparing the colony of Natal with
British Kafraria, in point of soil and climate, which do
you think is the most attractive to the settler ?—I should say
Natal.
2273. Mr.
302 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOKE THE
2273. M.V. Hindley.^ By whom were the boundaries of this
T.C^mith. colony fixed ?—By the Government.
30 June 2274. Were any arrangements made with the native tribes?
1851. ~There was a boundary fixed.
2275. Who were the parties to the arrangement for deter¬
mining the boundary ?—A commission appointed by the
Lieutenant-governor of Natal. The Zoolu king was commu¬
nicated with on the subject, and the river Tugela was chosen
on the part of the Zoolus as their boundary.
2276. So that you think no future disputes can arise respect¬
ing the boundary?—I do not think a dispute can arise in
that respect. The chief disputes that are likely to arise
between the natives without the colony and the Government
will arise from their people leaving them, and taking refuge
in the colony ; this I found a source of exceeding trouble
when I commanded there.
2277. Mr. B. Carier.] What is the character of the coast
between Umzimvoobo and Natal?—It is a pastoral country
chiefly.
2278. Viscount Mand&cille.] Is it thickly inhabited f—
Not thickly, except certain portions near the Umzimvoobo,
occupied by Faku, the king of the Amapondas, and a large
number of his people ; but this may be accounted for by the
natives occasionally migrating in search of better pasture
ground.
2279. looker.'] You say this tribe are becoming more
and more formidable, by reason of being better armed and
disciplined ?—Yes.
2280. Have they facilities for obtaining arms and ammu¬
nition ?— Yes, very great; they are imported into the colony
by merchants, and the traders contrive to smuggle them along
the frontier.
2281. Would there be any great difficulty in preventing that
trade?—Possibly not; but more stringent regulations should
be adopted.
2282. Do you think it would be expedient to check it ?—I
think very expedient.
2283. Mr. Mackmnon.] The only object of allowing pow¬
der is to enable the colonists to defend themselves ?—It is, of
course, for that purpose.
2284. Could not the power of purchasing arms and powder
be only obtained under some sort of regulations, so that no
more powder and arms should be imported into the colony
than was obtained by settlers?—It might be limited in that
way.
2285. Mr.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIE TRIBES. 303
2285. Mr. Hawes.'] Do you think you could prevent the Lieut.-Col.
smuggling in of arms and gunpowder ?—Not entirely. T. C.Smith.
2286. Chairman.] Would not the Zoolus be supplied by ß^^ne
the Portuguese Government from Delagoa Bay?—No; it is 1851.
too far to the north.
2287. Mr. Hawes.'\ Have you not heard that there are con¬
siderable importations of arms and gunpowder into Delagoa
Bay by tiie Portuguese?—There was not the slightest commu¬
nication between the two settlements when I was at Port Natal.
2288. Sir J. Walmsley.] Would it be possible to prevent
arms and ammunition being smuggled in ?—To a certain
extent ; not entirely.
2289. How would you set about such a restriction ?—There
might be a registry of arms ; the merchants, for example,
could tell the exact number of arms they imported into the
colony ; and keep a record of the persons to whom they were
sold, for the information of the Government.
2290. Taking into consideration the extent of coast you
would have to guard, how would it be possible to prevent
smuggling of arms there ?—The coast is very extensive, but
there are not many places of communication.
2291. Mr. Mackinnon.] There is a difficulty of access ?—
Yes.
2292. Sir J. Walmsley.] You would be obliged to have a
depot at the various rivers and creeks along the whole of that
coast?—Yes; at such of them as are accessible,
2293. Should not you think that would be very expensive ?
—It would be expensive, of course.
2294. And it would be almost impossible to prevent the
smuggling ?—And almost impossible.
2295. Mr. Mackinnon.] You say it would be impossible to
guard that coast?—I think it would.
2296. From Algoa Bay to Port Natal there is scarcely any
creek or place where it is easy for a vessel to have communi¬
cation constantly with the shore; are you acquainted with
that particular locality so as to answer the question ?—There
are places where vessels could have communication, but not
very many.
2297. But with considerable difficulty ?— But with con¬
siderable difficulty.
2298. That being the case, would there be likely to be
much smuggling going on ; would a vessel go and smuggle
powder and arms without having any previous communica¬
tion with the shore, and knowing to whom they were to sell ?
—I do not think the arms that find their way into the colony
are
304 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Lieut.-Col.' are smuggled that way ; they are imported by the merchants
^ large extent.
30 June 22^9. I mean to say, that supposing by any prohibitory Act
'^5^' the landiug'of powder and arms was entirely prohibited, so as
to make it smuggling to land them, would there be any facility
for that between Delagoa Bay and Port Natal ; that is the
question?—There would be facilities for landing at certain
places, but I do not think the smuggling would be practised
to any great extent.
2300. Then if some prohibitory Act was passed, and only
those who had licences were allowed to have powder and arms,
the Kafirs and Zoolus might be prevented from obtaining them
so easily as they do at present ?—I think they might, but the
facility for obtaining them in the Kafir country would be much
greater than at Natal.
2301. Mr. Haxves.l Would not this prohibitory law simply
interfere with the colonists importing arms?—Of course.
2302. The colonists exclusively?—I think so; but it would
check the supply to the Kafirs, as it is through arms being
imported by the merchants that the natives obtain them.
2303. It would not interfere with the Zoolus obtaining
supplies of arms and ammunition from the Portuguese
settlers at Delagoa Bay ?—There is not the slightest pro¬
bability, in my opinion, of their obtaining them from Delagoa
Bay.
2304. Colonel Thompson.^ Would there be anything to
hinder the Americans from trading with them in arms and
gunpowder?—The Americans do send traders to Natal, but
during the period I was there, they came but once every year,
and nothing of that kind was ever brought.
2305. Mr. Hawes.^ When you were in the colony you esti¬
mated the number of natives at about 100,000?—Approach¬
ing nearly to that ; that is, in round numbers.
2306. The numbers had been considerably increased in
consequence of war on the northern frontier between the tribes,
had not it?—Which war do you mean ; the last?
2307. I mean the war of the Zoolu tribes themselves ?—
Very largely increased.
2308. What steps did the local Government take to
manage this increase of native population ?—They were
placed in ten separate locations, in different portions of the
colony, under the control of magistrates ; but the very
great difficulty was in preventing the influx of these people
into the colony. I believe that to be an insurmountable
difficulty.
2309. Did
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 30,
2309. Did you find the magistrates acquire any influence Ueut.-Col.
over them ?—Very considerable. r. C. Smith
2310. Did you know one of the name of Shepston?—No, 30 June
for his appointment was subsequent to my departure from 1851.
Natal ; but I am aware that he obtained great influence, and
that they had great confidence in him.
2311. Were they allowed to follow their own laws and
customs ?—Yes, with some few exceptions.
2312. What was the duty of the magistrate?—A general
superintendence over their laws. They were not permitted to
practise witchcraft, or anything where the loss of life would
have occurred.
2313. When you left were they generally contented?—-
They were generally very contented when I left.
2314. And from those natives the chief supply of labour
was obtained for the settlers ?—Yes, it was.
2315. Did they cultivate the land at all themselves ?—Very
considerably during the time I was at Natal.
2316. Did they cultivate it on their own account?—They
did cultivate it on their own account.
2317. Then they entered into trade in fact —There was
an increasing want of articles of European manufacture among
them, for instance blankets instead of their carosses or skin
coverings.
2318. Did they readily submit to the decisions of the civil
magistrate ?—Yes.
2319. Did they ever resort to the courts of justice ?—There
was hardly any government established when I was there, but
they often brought their complaints to me for decision.
2320. What was the amount of force you bad to control this
body of natives?—About 600 men ; but at the time I origi¬
nally went to Natal the force was much smaller.
2321. Chairman.^ Is there any considerable diiference be¬
tween the Zoolus and Kafirs with respect to their disposition
to adopt the habits of civilized persons ?—I prefer the character
of the Zoolu to that of the Kafir.
2322. In what respect?—I do not think they are quite so
dishonest. I will mention an instance. Previous to my ar¬
riving at Natal I took up my position near the Umzimvooboo
River ; I was there fourteen months ; and during that time
the Amapondas were perpetually in the camp, and had the
most unrestrained intercourse with every person in it, and not
a single theft was committed during the whole time. The
few cattle we had with the troops were sometimes missing for
0.63. U two
3o6 minutes of evidence taken before the
Lieut.-Col. two or three days, but they were always found again ; they
T. C. Smith, had merely strayed ; they were not stolen.
30 June 2323. Sir J. Walmslcy.'l There were 600 troops at Natal,
1851. you say, when you were there ?—Yes.
2324. Was there at that period any native levies?—No
native levies.
2325. Are you aware there have been any since ?—I think
not.
2326. You are not able to say what sort of troops the na¬
tives make under British instruction?—No. I should rather
consider it a hazardous experiment making troops of them.
2327. Mr. hawes.] Were the boers at that time settled in
any great numbers in Natal?—There were a considerable
number of the boers when I went, but the long delay of the
Government in arranging about the settlement of their lands,
led them to go beyond the boundary of the colony.
2328. Did they acquire any influence.^—They were very
much disliked by the natives.
2329. The natives preferred the British authority and set¬
tlers to the Dutch farmers ?—Infinitely more so.
2330. Do tiie natives, in case of disputes among themselves,
voluntarily bring those disputes before the civil magistrates
for settlement ?—In many cases ; and there has been, subse¬
quently, no unwillingness on the part of the natives to resort
to the British couits to arbitrate their disputes.
2331. Chairttian.] .Are there any chiefs among the Zoolus,
w ithin the limits of the British colony, that retain any authority
over their people ?—The petty chiefs have some influence over
them.
2332. Has it been the policy of the British Government to
maintain the authority of those chiefs at all ?—It has. Daring
the time I was there I endeavoured to maintain their authority.
I think it would be advantageous to do so. I do not know
what course has been pursued subsequently.
2333. You have stated what was the immediate cause of
the w ar of 1846 at the Cape ; what do you believe to have
been the real reasons that induced the natives to have resort
to hostilities at that time ?—I imagine they saw that there was
a determination on the part of the Government to put a stop
to their perpetual thefts against the colony.
2334. Do you think the gradual diminution of the autho¬
rity of their chiefs had anything to do with the war, by pro¬
ducing a hostile feeling in their minds towards the British
Goveniinent, to whom they might have attributed tliat dimi¬
nution r—I think not; at that period there had been no very
great
SÉLECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 30^
great steps taken to reduce the authority of their chiefs ; it has Lieut.-CoJ.
been subsequently to that year, I believe, that arrangements T. C. Smith.
have been made to that effect. (Tjlliie
2335. You are aware generally of what has since occurred
at the Cape, and the circumstances under which the colony
now is with a war raging between the Kafirs and the British
Government ?—Yes.
2336. Have you formed any opinion, suppose the war to
be terminated, and the opposition on the part of those savage
-tribes to the British Government to be put down, what ought
to be the policy to be pursued with regard to the frontier in
future ?—I think the policy that ought to be pursued by the
Government should be one of great decision and firmness in
putting down and restraining their thefts from the colonists;
our policy hitherto, without being so intended, has been a one¬
sided policy ; we entered into treaties with the natives, which
we compelled our own subjects to observe, but it was out of
our power to compel the Kafirs to observe them in the same
degree.
2337. What, in your opinion, would be the best means of
enforcing in future the observance of engagements on the part
of the Kafirs, and especially of preventing this system of
plundering, which leads to collisions ?—I should be much dis¬
posed to make the chiefs responsible for the cattle stolen.
2338. Do you think their authority over their people is
such that they can be justly held responsible?—No thefts of
cattle, I think, take place by the members of any tribe without
the chief becoming aware of it,
233g. There is always a part of the Kafir population,
especially the more active part, the young men, w ho are very
much inclined to embark in those marauding expeditious ; do
you think if they were checked it would be very difficult for
the chief long to maintain his authority?—I do not know in
that case ; but they have a very expressive phrase for doina'
justice on their own people, which is what they call " eating
them up;" in fact the chief seizes the cattle of any of his
refractory people.
2340. Do you think those active young men, who are dis¬
posed to take the cattle of other people, would acquiesce in
such a process being applied to them ?—I think they would
be compelled to acquiesce by the chiefs ; they would have
sufficient power for that.
2341. What may be called public feeling among the Kafirs
is very much in favour of this cattle stealing ?—It is unques¬
tionably a matter of distinction.
0.63. u 2 2342. The
3o8 minutes of evidence taken befoke the
I.ieut.-Col. 2342. The young men engage in it in order to get wives ?
T. C^mth. —They do so ; until the whole habit of the Kafir is altered,
30 June ^ think you could ever put it down ; you may re-
1851. strain it.
2343- With really the best intentions, would not it be
very difficult for the head chief of a Kafir tribe to eíFectually
restrain it so long as this disposition remains unaltered
among his people ?—Only to a certain extent can it be re¬
strained.
2344. What practical means would you take to restrain it,
.so far as you think it could be done ?—1 should be inclined to
hold the chiefs responsible for the thefts committed by their
tribes; 1 do not mean to say that would put a stop to it
entirely.
2345. How would you enforce it against the chiefs them¬
selves?—By seizing their own cattle.
2346. Suppose the case of cattle being stolen in the colony,
how would you proceed?—If the cattle were traced into the
territory of any particular chief I should make him respon¬
sible, because I feel perfectly certain that no cattle can be
stolen by men of a particular tribe, and brought in, without
the chief being aware of it, or having the means of acquiring
that knou ledge.
2347. You would not pursue the cattle beyond the fron¬
tier ; you Avouid stop there, and then you would go to war
with the chief if he did not give back the cattle ?—I should
follow the cattle up into the territory.
2348. You would send the patrol into the territory?—Yes,
patrols for the purpose of following up stolen cattle.
2349. That would be hardly making the chief responsible.
You would follow the cattle to the actual robber?—Into his
tribe I should ; and so far assist the chief in finding the cattle
stolen.
2350. Mr. Halves.] Do I understand you, you would send
a patrol into the country, and that the patrol should have
power to seize any cattle he found?—I should send the
patrol to the kraal of the chief himself ; I should make the
patrol, if they could, seize the cattle actually stolen. If the
cattle were traced to the kraal of the chief I should follow it
up to the kraal of the chief himself.
2351. How would you proceed, then, to make the chief
responsible, the cattle not being found ?—I should make him
give an equivalent.
2352. Do not you think other chiefs might be likely to join
him
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 309
him in resisting the attack ?—It is possible they might do so ; Lieut.-Col.
but my own belief is, that the great cause of cattle stealing T. C. Smith.
has arisen from the want of sufficient firmness in not insisting
on immediate reparation being made. ^18.51"^
2353. You were frontier commissioner?—A very brief
time.
2354. When was that ?—In 1846.
-355' Were you frontier commissioner when the boundary
was extended to the Keiskamma ?—No, I was not ; I left it
before that war had been completed.
2356. Looking to the old boundary of the Fish River, and
the boundary subsequently of the Keiskamma, which do you
think the best for the preservation of peace on the frontier ?—
The Keiskamma ; the great difficulty of the Fish River is,
there is a dense bush that the Europeans cannot penetrate
through.
2357." Chairman.] Comparing the Keiskamma with the
great Kei, as a boundary, which would be the best P.—I
should say the Keiskamma; the other is too extended a
boundary.
2358. Mr. Hawes.'] Do you think it would tend to the
peace of the frontier to have military posts on the boundary of
the Keiskamma, or not?—It is likelv to do so, I think. The
• • *' 1 •
great object in choosing posts is to choose them in a grass
country, clear of the bush, so that any movement of the Kafirs
may be discovered, and more easily detected.
2359. As frontier commissioner, have you at all considered
the case arising out of the treaty of 1836 in reference to the
frontier ?~In regard to the treaties, I considered they were
one-sided treaties, so far as this: you compelled your own
subjects to observe them, and you could not compel the Kafirs
to observe them.
2360. You are not generally for entering into treaties with
Kafir chiefs ? — No. I think the great mistake has been
dealing with the savage as if he perfectly understood the
usages of civilized society.
2361. Could you rely simply, do you think, upon the ap¬
pointment of civil commissioners to advise the different chiefs
to endeavour to maintain something like order without any
military force to support them ?—I do not think you could do
without a military force. The Kafirs are the most sagacious
savages I ever came into contact with. They immediately
perceive your weakness if you have not sufficient power to
enforce any regulations you make connected with them.
0.63. u 3 2362. Sir
310 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
r 236-* Sir/. Walmsley.'] You think they would be disposed
■ _! ' to take advantage of that weakness?—I do think so.
30 .Tune 2363. Colonel Dunne.] The Forts Peddie, Wiltshire, and
i8ji. Cox ate in advance of the frontier of the Keiskamina?—They
are.
2364. Would it be possible to preserve that frontier without
the occupation of those forts?—Fort Peddie is a very essential
one. Fort Wiltshire was not occupied when I was there ; it
had been abandoned.
•2365. But they must keep certain posts. Fort Wiltshire
and Fort Cox are in advance of the Keiskamma?—Fort Cox
is on a height just above the Keiskamma.
2366. Is*Fort Cox supplied with water?—Only from the
river.
2367. Is not that an inconvenience to those forts ?—Un¬
questionably.
2368. Is there any local reason why that should not be
remedied?—Tanks might be erected there. The difficulty of
getting water at Fort Cox would not be very great : the river
flows not far from it ; but there is another of the forts, Fort
While, where the supply is bad.
236g. They would be untenable by a British force without
a supply of water?—Fort Cox would not be so; you might
command an access to water there.
2370. Do you know the Amatóla Mountains ?—Yes.
2371. Would you approve, as a military measure, of
clearing those mountains, in order to preserve the frontier?
—I do not think it is practicable; it has been several times
attempted ; but if you drive the Kafirs out they immediately
return.
2372. If it could be done it would be a great benefit?—
Yes.
2373. Would it be possible to occupy posts that would give
you the total military command there?—I tliink it would be a
matter of great difficulty. Fort Cox has been considered by
some as the key to the Amatóla.
2374. What force should each of those forts be garrisoned
with ?—Forts of that description require not only a sufficient
number of men for tlieir own protection, but enough for
patrols or escort duties, or for communicating with other
forts.
2375. There is no necessity for any strong fortification ; a
stockade would be quite sufficient?—Yes.
2376. What is the extent of the range of the Amatóla
Mountains
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 31I
Mountains across the frontier at right angles ; what is the Lieut.-Col.
length from the frontier to the termination on the eastern side? T. C. Smith.
—I could not at this moment answer the question. (T^e
2377. Could you give any guess; a hundred miles, or any-
thing of that sort ?—It is considerably less in extent, neither
have they any great elevation.
2378. What would you think would be the total number of
troops which would be requisite for the defence of the frontier?
—It is a matter of extreme difficulty to pass an opinion upon
that. I am not aware besides what number of posts are likely
to be taken up.
2379. Mr. B. Carier.] What is generally understood by the
term patrol system ; is it limited to the ordinary military term
patrolling?—Not entirely so; you send out patrols at the
Cape, for instance, to recapture stolen cattle and on various
duties ; and you patrol through the country for the purpose of
seeing that there is no enemy in it.
2380. What do you believe to be generally understood by
the patrol system, as applied to the frontier arrangements of
the Cape ?—Patrols sent out from post to post, to see the
country is kept clear of the natives, and as a general matter of
security. Patrols were sometimes sent out during the time I
was there after cattle j they are sent out generally for the
security of the frontier.
0.63.
312 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Jovis, 3° die Julii, 1851.
members present,
Mr. Hawes.
Colonel Estcourt.
Colonel Thompson.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Lord Mandeville.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Mr. Hindley.
Marquis of Granby.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Cardwell.
Sir Edward Buxton.
BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq., in the Chair.
Captain Henry Charles Cunliffe Owen, called in ; and
Examined.
Capt. 2381. Chairman.'^ WHEN were you in the colony of the
ÍÍ. C. C. Cape of Good Hope?—From January 1845 to March 1848.
2382. In what capacity were you effiploj'ed ?—I was a
3 July 1851. Lieutenant of the Royal Engineers.
2383. You were there just before the war broke out, and
served, I presume, under Sir Peregrine Maitland ?—I did,
beyond the Orange River.
2384. You were not then on the immediate boundary of
the Cape ?—I went up to the north-east frontier when the war
broke out.
2385. Will you state what took place in that district when
you were there ?—The exact pretext for the war I do not
exactly recollect.
2386. What was the object of the operations you were
engaged in at that time ?—It was to support the Griquas
against an attack that had been made upon them by the Dutch
Boers who were settled in their country.
2387. Can you at all state to the Committee the nature of
the aggression made by the Boers upon the Griquas ?—The
exact circumstances of it I do not recollect, but in a general
way it arose from our having supported the government of a
native chief, under the direction of a missionary, in the govern¬
ment of a tract of country the most powerful part of the
population of which was formed of Dutch farmers.
2388, Can
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 313
2388. Can you inform the Committee what it was the Capt.
Dutch farmers did ; did they endeavour to deprive them of
their lands ?—It was beyond the Orange River, in the neigh-
bourhood of Philippolis; I do not recollect the precise circum- 3 July 1851.
stances of the aggression,
2389. How was the dispute settled ?—It was settled after
the defeat of the Dutch farmers by our troops, by establishing
British authority in the country, to which the Dutch farmers
were amenable.
2390. Then was that with the consent of the chiefs of the
tribes in that district?—Entirely so.
2391. Was it at their request the British force interfered
for their protection?—It was; they would have been extermi¬
nated if it had not been for the presence of our troops.
2392. Was there any force left there to maintain tran¬
quillity, or was there any civil magistrate appointed upon the
troops withdrawing ?—There was a civil magistrate appointed,
and there was some force left to support him.
2393. Then you returned to Cape Town?—Yes, and sub¬
sequently I went up to the frontier on the breaking out of the
Kafir war in 1846.
2394. Did you at all gather from either the military men
with whom you associated, or from missionaries, or from any
source whatever, the causes which led to that war ?—I think
there is no doubt the Kafirs had been preparing for it for a
great number of years, nearly ever since the end of the war
under Sir Benjamin D'Urban ; they considered that their defeat
had been caused by the wants of fire-arms, and they made
use of the peace time to accumulate a quantity of arms and
ammunition.
2395. The arms and ammunition they obtained was by
selling their own raw products, hides, ivory and gums, or
whatever produce for which they could obtain in exchange fire¬
arms and gunpowder?—Yes, exactly, but ivory is not an article
of trade with them.
2396. And they obtained their supplies generally through
travelling traders?—Generally through the traders.
2397. Can you state to the Committee the force which the
Kafirs assemble to attack the colony ?—X cannot speak to that,
it is very difficult to estimate it.
2398. Reverting then to the causes of the war, did you at
all learn what was the operating cause with the Kafirs ?—^They
waited that we should give them a pretext for the war, and
that
3>4 minutes of evidence taken before the
Capt. that pretext was found in our sending a small party to survey
Owen ^ of ground uitliin their territory.
2399. Will you state exactly where that survey was made?
3 July 1851. —It was in the bend of the Chumie River on which now Fort
Hare stands.
2400. Beyond the Fish River or the Keiskamma ?—That
was beyond Chumie. The Chumie runs into the Keiskamma.
2401. I may assume, therefore, it was beyond the boundary
last fixed, namely, tke Keiskamma?—Yes, the Chumie and
the Keiskamma formed the boundary of what was called the
neutral territory.
2402. It formed the eastern boundary ?—Yes, it formed the
eastern boundary.
2403. Upon this alleged encroachment upon the territory
of the Kafirs, did they make any representation, so far as you
know, to the Government or to the general in command ?—Of
that 1 am not aware.
2404. Mr. Monsell.'] For what purpose was the survey
made?—With the view of obtaining their consent to place a
military post on that spot.
2405. Had their consent been asked ?—It had not, but it
was intended to have done so after the survey had been made,
if the ground had been found suitable for a post.
2406. Chairman.] The fort was not established, but there
was simply a preliminary survey made, with a view to esta¬
blish a fort there ?—That was all ; an officer and three sappers
pitched their tents on the ground, and commenced their sur¬
veying operations.
2407. Can you state why a fort was thought necessary
there?—Because the engineer officers on the frontier had found
it very'diificult to meet with a spot in the neutral territory
suitable for a large post, and where there was a proper supply
of water.
2408. Had it reference to the checking of depredations on
the part of the Kafirs or not?—Not in the choice of that par¬
ticular spot ; it was thought, necessary to have a large post in
the neutral territory, and after surveying several places and
finding that they did not do, it was determined to survey this
place.
2409. Were you one of the surveying party ? — I was
not.
2410. Colonel Dunne.] The ground surveyed was on the
neutral territory?—The ground which was surveyed was be¬
yond the Chumie, and was not in the neutral territory.
2411. Mr.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 315
¡¿411. ^r. Mackinnon.'\ It was in the Kafir territory?—
Yes, in the Kafir territory. ^Oue^'
2412. ChairmanJ] Then I understand you to state this, that
the survey was only preliminary to the establishment of a fort 3 July 1851.
there; that the fort had simjHy reference to a good situation
for the supply of water for the military that might be stationed
there ?—Yes.
2413. And that the value of the position, after the survey,
would have become the subject of a report to the general
officer before any post was established?—Yes.
2414. Mr. Monsell^ I understand you to say, no commu¬
nication had been made on the subject with the Kafirs?—None
that I know of.
2415. Chairman.] Then are you aware whether the Kafirs
resorted to representations, or demanded explanations, before
they resorted to arms ?—I am not aware of that ; I know
that the making of that survey, and the pitching of our tent
on that ground, was used by them as a pretext for invading
the colony.
2416. And I gather from your evidence that, in your
opinion, they had been long preparing for war, and seeking
for such a pretext?—Certainly.
2417. Can you state to the Committee the grounds on
which you form that opinion?—It is rather difficult to do that,
but it was the general opinion of those in the colony best ac¬
quainted with the circumstances.
2418. Are you at all acquainted with the papers that
have been printed and laid before Parliament on this sub¬
ject?—I have looked over some of them; not the whole of
them.
2419. When you were at Cape Town, did you hear the
Government complained of for want of energy in not taking
more active steps to avert a war which was expected?—Yes,
I did. I think that it was generally the impression among
the colonists on the frontier that a war sooner or later must
take place; that a Kafir irruption would take place. I think
that it was with a view of putting those apprehensions at
rest that Sir Peregrine Maitland wi.shed to establish a large
and strong post in the neutral territory, where a force
might be always ready to move upon the Kafirs in case of
invasion.
2420. Mr. Hindley.] Is Fort Hare in the neutral territory?
—It is not in the neutral territory.
, 2421. Chairman.] Fort Hare, I think, was estabiished after
the conclusion of the war; was not it?—It was established
during
3'6 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. during the war. I commenced the erection of Fort Hare
H. C. C. myself in 1847.
2422. There was no fort, was there, beyond the boundary
3July 1851. Keiskamma before the commencement of the war?—
None.
2423. The forts that had been established there, then,
simply had reference to the military defence of that boundary?
Yes, the forts erected there had that object.
2424. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the boundary
of the colony, that is, the Keiskamma, to state whether you
think it a good boundary, and more easily defended than
the old boundary of the Fish River, or not?-—I do not think
there is much to choose between them. The boundary
must be always very undefined ; it is very difficult to fix
it. All the rivers are fordable at a great many points ; I
suppose at every half mile or mile of their length they are
fordable.
2425. You are of opinion, then, that there is no good
boundary as a mere defensive boundary in itself?—None
whatever.
2426. In point of fact, the defence of the frontier of the
colony must rather turn upon military considerations than
upon any natural boundary?—-I should say so.
2427. Have you yourself ever been in contact with the
Kafirs?—On a few very unimportant occasions.
2428. Can you state to the Cortimittee whether you consider
them good soldiers?—I think, as long as they adhere to their
own particular mode of fighting, they are very difficult to deal
with.
2429. Will you describe what that mode is, to the Com¬
mittee, minutely ?—They do not show themselves, but keep
in the bush and take advantage of our men being in the
open to fire at them ; when we return the fire we do so
with scarcely any effect, having nothing but the bush to
fire at.
2430. Is it not therefore important, that wherever there are
military posts they should command the open country ?—It is
very desirable that they should have a large tract of open
country in their neiglibourhood, not for the reason stated in
the question, but for the security of the cattle, which must
necessarily be pastured near the posts.
2431. Is it possible'to find such open country between the
Keiskamma and the Old Fish River ; is not that a country
very much covered with jungle and rock?—There is no ex¬
tent of open country, except towards the coast, where Port
Peddie
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 317
Peddie stands. There is there a considerable quantity of open Capt.
country. H. C. C.
2432. Would not it follow, therefore, that the Keiskamma Ov>en.
would be a better boundary, supposing it to be defended by 3 July 1851.
military posts to the eastward of it, where the country is more
open ?—Then you must go across the Buffalo to the country
between the Buffalo and the Kei ; that is the only really very
open country that I know of.
2433. Is not King William's Town a post that fulfils that
condition of being in an open country and upon the Buffalo ?
—Yes.
2434. And having the advantage of a direct communication
with the sea ?—It has a very good natural road to the sea.
2435. Is it your opinion, from what experience you have
had in the colony, that maintaining a force at King William's
Town would be one of the best means of defending the frontier
of the colony from an inroad on the part of the Kafirs at any
time?—I think King William's Town is about one of the best
military stations in the colony.
2436. Did you ever come into contact with any of the
chiefs?—IS ever; I am not acquainted with the Kafir lan¬
guage.
2437. Can you at all give the Committee any opinion as
to whether, if treaties were made with the chiefs, they would
be likely to adhere to them, or have they the means of
enforcing the obligation of treaties upon their people?—None
whatever.
2438. You would place no reliance upon treaties made
with the chiefs ?—Not the slightest.
2439. You think it expedient to trust alone to the military
defence of the frontier, rather than to any treaties ?—Cer¬
tainly.
2440. Can you give the Committee any information as to
the force the Kafirs could, at any time, bring into the field ?—
Not with any degree of accuracy. I should think that, during
the last war, they must have had from 20,000 to 30,000 fight¬
ing men at difierent times.
2441. How do they support their force when in the field ?—
Principally by the cattle they capture ; they carry, perhaps,
a very little grain with them, tied to their belts. They prin¬
cipally depend upon the cattle they capture, and it is only in
war they eat meat ; in peace time they feed on corn and milk
altogether.
2442. Have you or not heard that the larger use of animal
food.
318 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
food, on those occasions, has occasioned mortality and illness
Owen i'lDong the Kafirs ?—I never heard so.
2443. Have you ever heard that any of tlie tribes amongst
3 July 1851. the Kafirs have anything like a disciplined force ?—No.
2444. Have you ever been up to Natal ?—I was never at
Natal.
2445. Have they any opportunity, do you think, beyond
the depredations they commit, of finding the means of main¬
taining any large force in the field for any length of time?—
No; they have no commissariat arrangement.
2446. Could they maintain a war for any great length of
time, do you think ?—No, I do not think they could, if their
own country is the seat of it, because that would prevent their
women from tilling their fields, and that would thus soon
leave them in a state of famine.
2447. Then the military occupation of Kafraria is one of
the best means of keeping the Kafirs in check, inasmuch as,
at once, it gives a command over their sources of supply for
food ?—The military occupation of it, certainly. An offensive
attitude is the only one that is of any avail in Kafirland, in peace
or war.
2448. And that would consist rather in diminishing and
destroying their supply of food, than in beating them in open
fight?—It is the only way in which you can have any effect
upon them, by constantly harassing them in such a way that
they cannot sow their fields, particularly at harvest time, and
by capturing their cattle. Their cattle they drive away far to
the rear, or else send them to friendly tribes who are at peace
with us, to take care of during the war.
2449. Are they very generally supplied with muskets ?—
They are now very generally supplied with them.
2450. They have given up, in a great degree, the use of
the assagai, and resort to the musket''—Most of them have
assagais besides the musket.
2451. Are they good marksmen?—No, they are bad marks¬
men ; they never practise with fire-arms at all ; they never
use them for the pui-pose of sport or shooting game, therefore
their only practice is when they come to war, and from what
I have heard, they generally fire from the hip ; they do not
bring the musket to the shoulder ; how ever, that is a thing
which after a time would wear off; no doubt, in the course of
another 10 years they tvould become very good marksmen.
2452. What sort of muskets are they supplied with ?—They
are common muskets with flint locks, inferior to those which
our soldiers used to be supplied with.
2453- Colonei
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 31^
2453. Colonel Dwnne.] Are they all flint muskets they have
now ?—All flint muskets ; I never heard of their having per- '
cussion arms. ——
2454. Do you think there would be any way of interrupting 3 July 185»«
the importation of arms into that part?—I think it is practi¬
cally impossible.
2455. How is the introduction of arms now, as you under¬
stand, carried on into Kafiiland, and by whom?—By our
traders.
2456. But have we no power of preventing the traders car¬
rying them into Kafraria?—I think if we prevented our traders
from taking them in, they would be landed on the coast at the
Umzimvooboo.
2457. What would they give in return for the muskets? —
Hides, horns and gum.
2458. Would those be received by foreign traders as well
as colonial traders ; would they be articles they would take in
exchange ?—No doubt ; they are marketable articles every¬
where.
2459. fhe forts along the frontier ?—
In most of them.
2460. What is the construction of them ; are they regular
fortifications, or merely field works stockaded ?—They are of
very different characters ; those that have been completed,
and are called permanent, are mostly situated on the Fish
River; they are built of stone, with stone loopholed inclosures.
2461. Is not a common stockade quite sufficient against any
attack of the Kafirs?—It is, certainly.
2462. Are those forts supplied with water ?—Very few of
them, if any.
2463. In case of attack, would not it be necessary they
should be always supplied with water?—I do not think they
are very likely to be subjected to a blockade from the Kafirs ;
but in case of a blockade it would be fatal.
2464. Fort Cox for instance ; is not it with considerable
difficulty, and from a great distance, that they obtain water?—
It is badly situated in that respect.
2465. Have they not to send 80 to 100 men whenever they
Avant to get water for the garrison ?—I have heard that that
lias been the case.
2466. Would not it be one of the best things to provide
those forts with tanks, and some means of having water?—It
is certainly very desirable when small inclosed forts are used
that they should be provided with water.
2467. You
320 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. 2467. You say King William's Town is the best military
H.^C. C. post we have?—Yes.
2468. That is far in advance of the Keiskamma, is not it ?
3 July 1851. —It is on the Buffalo.
2469. Would you propose the Buffalo as the better frontier,
taken in a military sense, than the Keiskamma?—It is a better
military position ; the country immediately in advance of the
Buffalo is open.
2470. It is more desirable in that country to have an open
space in immediate advance of the frontier?—Certainly.
2471. Does that open space extend nearly to the Amatóla
Mountains from the sea ?—The Amatóla Mountains are on the
flank as it were of that tract.
2472. They run at right angles to our boundary?—They do
run so.
2473. What do you consider to be the present frontier?—
The present frontier nominally is the Kei.
2474. It is said that the Amatóla Mountains are covered
with bush, and furnish a kind of fastness for the Kafir tribes
from which they may issue against the colony?—Yes.
2475. Do you think it would be a prudent military measure
to clear those mountains of the Kafirs, and drive them back
beyond the Kei?—Certainly.
2476. Have you any idea of the practicability of that ?—
I think it is practicable if you make up your mind to keep
military possession of them for a certain time, to prevent the
Kafirs either pasturing their cattle there or cultivating the
ground.
2477. Suppose the Kafir tribes who occupy them are driven
back, is there sufiicient ground in the rear for them to occupy
and live on; are you aware of that?—I should think there was
abundance.
2478. Do you think that the system of posts with a move¬
able column between would be a proper defence for that
frontier; posts that could communicate from one to another,
and, in case of attack, at any signal could assemble and defend
any part of the frontier?—No, I do not think that would be
very eifective.
2479. Then what is the defence you would propose?—
As far as the military force is concerned, if you have a mili¬
tary force, it is better to have it massed in as large numbers
as possible.
2480. Is it possible, consistent with the warfare which the
Kafirs carry on, which is perfectly desultory, you can have
large columns and masses, or is it requisite.^—You might dis¬
perse
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIll TRIBES. 321
perse them wlieii it is necessary, but, as a matter of postinj; Capt.
them, I think the larger the posts arc the better.
2481. But if you have large posts, will not the Kafirs get in
between the posts and ravage the country?—That they will ßjuiyis^i.
do if they are ever so close ; if they were i o miles or one mile
apart.
2482. Would not the system of patrols, if established there,
prevent it to a certain extent?—I am not aware what system
of patrols you allude to.
2483. What is the distance to the frontier from the mouth
of the Keiskamma, inland, that we require to defend ; the
distance to the Amatóla Mountains ?—I feel great awkwardness
in answering that question, or any other involving the term
frontier ; because I do not consider that the defence of a7ir/
frontier, in the way understood by military men in Europe, is
possible in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. I think it
is possible to occupy certain districts, and keep the Kafirs in
such order as that they would find great difficulty in organizing
a descent on the colony.
2484. Then you do not think that adopting any line of
country, and defending it by posts, or by usual military de¬
fences, is practicable ?—Quite impossible.
2485. The only way is keeping the Kafirs so much in sub¬
jection that they would be afraid to do anything we did not
like, and disregarding any particular line of defence ?—Tiiat
would answer for a time.
2486. Would anything else answer ?—I do not think any¬
thing like peace will last with the Kafirs.
2487. There must be continual readiness for war, if not
actual war ?—Precisely.
2488. Do you think the system of military colonies would
be of any use ?—To a certain extent.
248g. 1 mean planting farmers with their families round
the fort or stockade, which they could enter and drive their
cattle into ?—I think it would to a certain extent.
2489*. It would be a desirable policy ?—Yes ; I submitted
a report to Sir Harry Smith, when I was in the colony, upon
this very subject, which has been published with his des¬
patches, and laid before Parliament.
2490. You are an advocate for that system ?—I think so.
2491. Will you state to the Committee what your plan of
defence by these military colonies is ?—It was to locate a
certain number of farmers in the country, who would have a
certain amount of stock and capital, and who would be likely
to employ a number of military settlers for a certain time,
0.63. X until
322 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. until tho-e settlers became sufficiently acquainted with the
H.C.C. ways of the colony to become farmers themselves; and 1
should propose, that those farmers and all their tenants, that
3 July 1851. workmen and labourers of all kinds, should
hold their land by a sort of a military tenure ; that they should
be obliged to serve the Government for a certain number of
days every year, when called upon.
2492. Then, in fact, that is forming a system like the old
border system on the frontier between Scotland and England ?
—Perfectly.
2493. Then would you support that by bodies of military
of regular troops, in case of danger they would be unable
themselves to meet ?—Yes.
2494. Do you consider that would be the cheapest means of
defence for this country, or do you conceive holding large
bodies, that is a regular military force there, would be as
cheap as the system I have asked you about?—The more you
make the inhabitants of the colony depend upon themselves
the less will you require a large military force.
2495. Is there a population in that neighbourhood of the
country that would enable you to make those colonies, or
should you introduce colonists from other parts of the Cape
of Good Hope, or from England?—I would rather select for
those farmers who are in the country already.
2496. Can you get them to go there?—Yes, I think so.
2497. Is there not an indisposition among the Boers to
adopt that system, or rather, are they not inclined to with¬
draw themselves from our Government?—I think if you
granted them the land or sold them the land under those
conditions, or granted it to them giving them the right to de¬
fend their own land, and for a certain time supporting them by
our troops, I believe they would undertake to go there.
2498. Chairman.'] Are you not now describing what was
very much the old Dutch system when we took pos.session of
the colony at first ?—Yes.
2499. Colonel Dunne.] Do you think any colonists, whether
Dutch or English, will remain on the frontier where they had
not the permission to defend themselves ?—They would only
remain on account of the large profits arising from our military
expenditure.
2500. If you afforded them sufficient defence ?—No de¬
fence could be so effective or so economical as that which they
could give to themselves.
2501. I mean to say this, if you deny them the right to
defend themselves on the spot, and they have to appeal to
civil
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3J3
civil authorities for power to assist in their defence, do you Cupt.
ti)ink any colonist would reside on the frontier ?—No, certainly H. C.C.
not, except with the views alluded to in my reply to the last
question hut one, sJuIy.iSji.
2502. It must tend to drive men from the frontier ?—It
did actually drive the Boers from the frontier.
2503. Do you not think that those commandos by which
they defended themselves may be so regulated as to be an
effective defence without violating the ordinary rules of huma¬
nity?—I believe that the rules of humanity, as generally
understood, would be violated, and cruelty would be com¬
mitted, and great suffering would be caused to the Kafirs, but
I do not believe that there would be more caused than by the
present system of a very tremendous war, where very large
bodies are engaged on both sides, every nine or ten years or at
less intervals.
2504. Therefore, am I to understand you, that your opinion
is, that with all its abuses, the old system is a more humane
one in the aggregate than the present system which ends in
those bloody wars ?—It is quite as humane, if not more so.
2505. Mr. Mackinnon.'] Is not that at variance with what
you stated in the earlier part of your evidence, wherein you
stated that the Boers, if left to themselves, would have exter¬
minated the Kafirs ?—They would have exterminated the
Griquas in that particular instance, beyond the north-eastern
frontier to which I allude, and I believe also that, in the long-
run, the same will be the fate of the Kafirs.
250G. Then, consequently, if the Boers, left to themselves,
would have exterminated the Kafirs, that system which they
carried on must have been more cruel, and more determined
than that which now the British Government is carrying on.'
—I do not quite see that ; I think, sooner or later, whether
we do it ourselves, or leave the colonists to do it, the Kafirs
cannot remain long- in our neighbourhood.
O O
2507. Truly ; but then do you not consider it would be
more humane to let them gradually recede before us than to
leave them to be exterminated at once, as it were, in the
mass?—1 think that they are gradually receding ; it would
be only a part that would recede; a great many would be
exterminated.
2508. Still the extermination would be more gradual in one
case than in the other?—1 think not; spreading it over a
great number of years, it would be the same in one case as in
the other.
2509. What was tb.e cause of the difference beta ecu ti:c
0.63. X 2 Dutch
3.Í4 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. Dutch Boers and the Cliquas to which you alluded? —At
il. C. C. what period ?
2510. At the period you first mentioned, when that misun-
3 July 1851. derstanding took place.—It was theGriquas; they were not
a tribe of Kafirs at all ; they are supposed to be a bastard
tribe, formed originally from the runaway slaves from the
colony, who established themselves beyond the Orange River,
and they were afterwards supported by our Government
as an independent community ; but, as I said before, the
immediate cause of the quarrel between them at the time
I went up there, has escaped my memory, but I dare say it
could be found by reference to Sir Peregrine Maitland's
despatches.
2511. In all probability it was the encroachments of the
Dutch farmers on the land they occupied ?—Possibly some¬
thing of the kind.
2512. It appears to me that the sum total of your evidence
comes to this, that the commando system of defence adopted
by the Dutch, when they had power in the colony, would go
to exterminate the Kafirs with much greater quickness than
the system which the British Government has adopted?—Not
more quickly, but as quickly.
2513. Colonel Thompston^ Do the Kafirs ever send com¬
mandos into the colonial territory?—They do not now; but
there is no doubt they send what is equivalent, marauding
parties.
2514. Then a commando is a marauding party?—The Dutch
commandos generally went out to avenge.
2515. Do .the Kafir commandos avenge?—No; generally
they come to plunder.
2516. What is the consequence of those Kafir commandos ;
wiiat is the kind of feeling it creates and keeps up among the
colonists ? —Great irritation amongst those colonists who lose
their cattle.
2517. And do not the English commandos keep up the
same spirit amongst the Kafirs ?—Yes, they do, of course.
2518. Is not it, in fact, a sure way to have a continuance of
ill-feeling on both sides, that there should be commandos on
both sides?—I do not think, in the long-run, there is more
ill-feeling created than by the terrible wars we have had within
the last 20 years.
2519. Colonel Dunne.] Is not the difference between a
Kafir commando and an English commando, that one is an
aggression and the other a reprisal ?—It is ; I never heard
the term Kafir commando before. I perfectly understand the
word,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIE TRIBES. 325
word, but they are totally different things ; the Kafirs will Capt.
come in parties of five or six, and carry off the cattle during
the night. J)v>en.
2520. Colonel Thompson.] Have the Kafirs, in your 3 July 1851
opinion, no cause or pretext for making reprisals ?—That is
a matter which I have no knowledge of ; I was not in the
colony at all during the time that the commando system was
in vogue.
2521. Sir E. Buxton.] You have spoken of Kafir com¬
mandos ; do you mean that the Kafirs collect in considerable
numbers, and enter the colony to plunder ?—No ; that is the
reason why I think the term Kafir commando is likely to mis¬
lead the Committee.
2522. If they come in to plunder, they come in small com¬
panies of two or three?—Exactly so.
2523. Mr. Hindley.] You said that, in your opinion, and
in the opinion of the colonists, the Kafirs had been preparing
for war ever since the termination of the war of Sir ßenjamin
D'Urban in 1836, that is, preparing for the war that broke out
in 1846 ?—I did.
2524. Then I wish to know why you suppose they desired
war ; what was their object in desiring such war, and having
it in contemplation seven or eight years ?—I think they were
anxious to drive us out of the colony.
2525. Because they imagined the colony belonged to
them; was that it?—No, I do not think that; because
they are not the aborigines of the country any more than
we are.
2526. You say they waited for a pretext, and you think
they found one in our having sent a surveying party to survey
a piece of ground in their territory in 1846?—Yes.
2527. That survey was undertaken by Major Walpoie,
fnen Captain Walpole?—Yes ; at the desire of Sir Peregrine
Maitland.
2528. Had Sir Peregrine Maitland given orders for a survey
to be taken ?—I never saw the correspondence.
2529. Have you heard of it?—I have heard of it, but not
with sufficient minuteness to answer the question.
2530. Are you aware whether or not Sir Peregrine Mait¬
land, in his official despatch, denies that he gave his authority
for the survey î—I am not.
253'* Í will read you the words: "I accordingly gave
verbal instructions to Major Wortham, then the commanding
royal engineer at Cape Town, to desire Captain Walpoie,
the commanding engineer then on the frontier, to go over to
0.63. X 3 Blockdrif't,
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
and inspect the ground, and observe generally the
Owen. advantages which it possessed for the position of a post of the
same magnitude as the Victoria post. A regular survey was
3 July 1851. not in my contemplation, but merely a personal inspection by
Captain Walpole, that I might know enough about the ground
to guide me whether or not to enter on a final arrangement
with Sandilli for it." You are not aware of that?—I have
not read it.
2532. " On the arrival of these instructions on the frontier.
Captain Walpole laid them before Colonel Hare, and asked
for a surveying party to go over to Blockdrift, and survey the
ground, after he had himself fixed on the precise spot. Colo¬
nel Hare, it appears, did not read the instructions, but sup¬
posing they ordered ' a survey,' immediately issued an order
for an engineer ofiicer, Lieutenant Stokes, with four sappers,
to proceed to Blockdi ift. The party, in consequence went to
the spot, pitched their tent, and for several days carried on the
survey, when some events occurred to interrupt it, and threw
the frontier, on both sides, into a state of the greatest excite¬
ment." Did you ever hear of that circumstance r—1 never
remember having read that despatch.
2.533. You never heard that Captain Walpole was acting
without instructions for a positive survey from Sir Peregrine
Maitland ?—No, 1 never did.
2534. Was not it likely that Sandilli would feel that the
British had committed an act of gross injustice when they
came upon his ground, .and, without saying a word to him,
commenced instituting a positive survey?—I do not think he
would have felt the injustice of the act, because it was doing
him no harm.
2535. Are you not aware that it led to a very great dis¬
turbance in the country ?—I believe that they did make use
of it as a pretext for a disturbance.
2536. Then I will read to you the opinion of Sir Peregrine
Mailland himself upon the occurrence, and then I will ask you
your own opinion upon it : " The sending of the surveying
party to Blockdrift, prior to the conclusion of a formal agree¬
ment with Sandilli for the ground, was a great error; it was a
trespass on the chief's territory, and had in his eyes the
natural appearance of a treacherous attempt to occupy a post
in it without his permission. The chief, therefore, was justified
in demanding the instant abandonment of the survey, and
would have had an unquestionable right to drive us out by
force of arms, if he could, should we have hesitated to do a
simple act of justice by immediately withdrawing." Now, do
you
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
you think that injustice was done to Sandilli in sending a sur- Capt.
veying party, because no doubt it was a surveying party, C. C-
without a previous understanding with him upon the subject? Ome^.
—I consider that it was a pretext for war, and, perhaps, a just g jggx,
pretext for complaint, but not for war.
2537. Just, on the part of Sandilli?—On the part of
Sandilli ; but still I hold that the Kafirs were preparing for
war, and glad of that pretext.
2538. You have said that the chiefs do not respect treaties ;
would you mention some of the treaties they have broken
with our Government ?—I have only a general knowledge of
the treaties ; but I believe that the general object of the
treaties entered into with the Kafirs was, that they were to use
their best endeavours to repress cattle stealing among their
subjects, and that I do not believe they ever kept to.
2539' Is that an easy matter for them to do ?—I do not
think it is an easy matter, and for that reason it is that I think
that treaties are so useless.
2540. Are you aware that, on the evidence of Sir George
Napier to this Committee, it has been proved that those
depredations were diminishing from the time of Sir Andrew
Stockenstrom's treaty in 1836 ?—I am not aware of any of the
evidence that has been given to this Committee before.
2541. Then you do not know any other instance in which
you consider they have broken a treaty, except that they have
not fulfilled it up to the extent of preventing depredations
which, you admit, it was extremely difficult on their part to
do ?—I think it was the main object of those treaties to put a
stop to those depredations. I do not say whether from unwil¬
lingness or want of power ; but that the spirit of them was not
kept, nor the letter of them, is very clear.
2542. Have our Government respected treaties?—Yes, I
believe they have respected them.
2543. You said you would recommend the system of selling
land to farmers, and defending them, for a certain time, by
military force, until they had sufficient strength to defend them¬
selves ?—Yes, I did.
2544. What land is it you would dispose of in that way,
and where?—The whole of the neutral territory, and a great
part of the land occupied by the tribes who have made this
last attack upon us.
2545. Would you go up to the Buffalo, and sell any land
there ?—Yes, T would.
2546. So that, in fact, you would take possession of that
0.63. X4 part
328 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. part of the country completely, and dispose of it for Brllish
purposes r—I would.
' 2547' Sir E. BuxtonJ] You would drive the Kafirs over the
3 July 1851. Kei ?—I would not allow them to occupy, with any degree of
independence, those lands that they occupied previous to this
last outbreak.
2548. Supposing the land now belonging to the Kafirs on
the West Kei were taken possession of by our Government,
what means of subsistence could be provided for the Kafir
tribe?—I do not think that that is a question for our Govern¬
ment to enter into.
2549. Is opinion that it is necessary to exterminate
the Kafirs now living on the west side of the Kei ?—No ;
merely to prevent them occupying those districts.
2550. Have you any idea what resources would be open to
the Kafirs, provided that course was adopted ?—I am not
aware ; but my impression is, that there are parts of Kafirland
not nearly so thickly populated as our immediate frontier.
2551. Can you say where they are situated?—Between the
colony and Natal.
2552. On the east side of the Kei ?—On the east side of
the Kei.
2553. Practically, therefore, the efiect of that policy would
be to drive the Kafirs over the River Kei?—It would, in a
great measure.
2554. Mr. Hindley.\ Do you think it would be likely we
should secure the respect of the Kafirs by such a proceeding?
—I think so, because they have most respect for that which
tiiey fear most.
2555. Then it would be respect for our power, not for our
justice ?—Tliat is a question which I think it is difficult to
answer. It would be a respect springing from fear, Tvhich is
the only moral check you can have on them.
2556. Colonel Esicüurt.\ \ ou said you preferred having
our troops in large bodies concentrated in one place ?—Yes.
2557. And you would make King Y illiain's Town that
place?—King William's Town is about one of the best
points.
2558. Supposing King William's Town were that point,
could you maintain a communication with the sea without
much difficulty ?—I think so.
2559. And what point would be the point upon the sea ?—
The Buffalo mouth.
2.51)0. Is that a seaport ?— It is a very fair landing place, but
not a harbour.
2561. Sufficiently
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 329
2561. Sufficiently good to depend upon for supplies?— Capt.^
Quite so. ^(^en
2562. Supposing King William's Town a military point V
—Yes. 3 July 1851.
2563. Suppose King William's Town occupied in the man¬
ner you propose, would the effect of having that force at King
William's Town be sufficient to keep all the country in order
and subjection ?—I think it would be the best means of keep¬
ing the country in subjection ; and I also think that, from the
troops being in one large body, they would be kept in a higher
state of discipline than being scattered over a number of small
posts.
2654. They would be more efficient ?—Yes, they would be
more efficient.
2565. Then you would have no posts along the frontier of
the Keiskamma r—I think not.
2566. And you think that, supposing depredations to be
committed upon the frontier by Kafirs, with the post of King
William's Town occupied, any force in the manner you pro¬
pose would be sufficient for us to gain redress from the Kafir
chiefs?—I think so, on this account ; that from having a large
force at King William's Town, you would have a force always
concentrated to move upon any part of the country that was
distracted ; instead of that, when the force is distributed in a
number of small posts, it takes a much longer time in con¬
centrating the force ; and when the troops are in the field,
there are more points left to defend. You cannot abandon
your buildings and stores ; you are obliged to leave a number
of men in tliose posts, who are practically lost for most pur¬
poses of war.
2567. Then for the ordinary depredations committed along
the frontier, you would depend upon the individual settlers ?—
As much as possible.
2568. You would give the independent settlers permission
to defend themselves?—I would.
2569. Would you require them to give notice that depre¬
dations had been committed to those central posts, or should
they be entirely independent of the control of the central
post?—That is a question I should hardly like to give an
opinion upon. I cannot give an opinion upon that point
without considering, very minutely, the organization which
would be necessary on the frontier in commencing such a
system. I think, generally, that the best defence for the
frontier .nust spring from the settlers themselves ; and 1 think
also, that from the present very unnatural state of things on
the
330 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. the frontier, that they most have some military support for a
H. C. C, considerable period of time.
2570. Would you draw this sort of distinction ; supposing
a Julv 18/ii ^ settler to be attacked, you would allow him, of course, to
defend himself?—Certainly.
2571. But suppose his cattle were driven away to a distance
into Kafirland, would you require him then to give notice to
this central military post, and expect redress through the
post?—I would certainly allow him, if he considered himself
strong enough, to follow his cattle, and capture them wherever
he could.
2572. Into Kafirland?—Into Kafirland.
2573- To follow the spoor?—^To follow the spoor, and
execute summary Justice on the robbers, if he could.
2574. And supposing the spoor were to be lost, you would
not permit him then, perhaps, to seek redress from any neigh¬
bouring tribe, the nearest tribe ?—At first I would not cer¬
tainly ; but I give that answer in a very general way ; that
is really going into those very details which I do not at present
feel myself competent to answer.
2575. Then, in fact, you would depend, in regard to this
military post, upon the moral effect of its being there supported
by its own physical strength, to keep the country occupied by
the Kafirs in subjection?—^es, I would.
2576. That being the case, the Kafirs, I suppose, might be
allowed to occupy where they pleased, and you would not
locate them, or drive them away across the Kei to any other
country, but let them occupy as they pleased ?—I would not
allow them to have the same advantages after the present war
as they had before.
2,577. As to location?—No; I think they ought to be
made to feel, and feel severely, the consequences of this out¬
break.
2578. Then, supposing the Kafirs were entirely subdued,
and to sue for peace, would you then think it necessary to
drive them away from the land now occupied by them in
Kafirland ?—From a portion of it ; not from any wish to gain
territory, but to make them feel the disadvantages of going
to war.
2579. In fact you think this force, situated as you describe
it, might be depended upon as sufficient to maintain our in¬
fluence in Kafirland f—One or two such forces ; I do not limit
myself to one.
2580. Then would you give up the frontier of the Keis-
kamma. You said something about any frontier not being
capable
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 33I
capable of being maintained in the manner that frontiers are Capt.
in Europe, for instance ?—No ; I do not consider that any H. C. C.
frontier could be kept up. Owen.
2581. Would you think it necessary, then, to name a 3 July 1851.
frontier; after the war was over, and the country was in sub¬
jection, would it be necessary to name a frontier at all?—I
think it would, for legal purposes. I doubt whether it would
be possible at first to extend the laws of the colony, as they
at present stand, to the country that is partly occupied by
Kafirs; therefore it would be necessary to say the laws of
the country only operate up to a certain line.
2582. Still, would not you say that though the laws of the
colony were only to extend up to the Keiskamnia, as it were,
still, if Kafirland is kept in subjection, and we hold Kafirland
in subjection by military posts, we might permit the Kafirs, if
they pleased, to live quietly in the country, merely keeping
those military posts as security for their good behaviour ?—
My own idea is, that if after this outbreak the Kafirs were left
in possession of the same lands that they were in possession of
before it, they would break out again sooner than they would
otherwise.
2583. Then, in fact, you are for driving them away from
the land they now occupy to a certain extent?—To a certain
extent ; and I would make them feel the loss of some of their
most valuable pasturage.
2584. By way of punishment?—By way of punishment.
2585. And in a general way can you state to what extent?
—I think more particularly the Amatóla Mountains.
2586. To drive them out of the Amatóla Mountains ?—
Yes.
2587. Supposing they were driven out of the Amatóla
Mountains then, and you were to occupy King William's Town,
would not they at once come back again into the Amatóla
Mountains, without your being able to prevent them ?—No,
they could not. They might come there occasionally ; but I
think, if it was determined upon, they could not be allowed to
herd their cattle in the^ Amatóla Mountains, nor to till the
ground.
2588. Then if they were to come, you would immediately
march upon them a force, and drive them out again?—
Quite so.
258g. Colonel Dunne.'\ Have there been surveys made
over Kafirland frequently, without being a cause of irritation ?
—In no instance to my knowledge.
2590. Are
332 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. 2590. Are you aware that the Blockdrift was the place
^'rf' the survey took place ?—Yes.
2591, Were you aware that Sandilli had absolutely asked
3 July 1851. the English Government to place a post there, and withdrew
the permission ?—I am not aware of that.
2592, The frontier law would be military law ; I understand
you to say that you would not convey the colonial law to the
frontier; what law would you have, military law?—That is a
question I should hardly like to answer,
2593, It would be a military occupation, would not it?—
It would, to a certain extent,
2594, Would it be possible to have the ordinary colonial
tribunals in a colony so occupied ?—No ; I think the opera¬
tion of the ordinary tribunals of the country would be too
slow,
2595, Of course, the policy of those who had property
there, would be to keep the war as much as possible at a
distance from the frontier r—Certainly,
2596, Mr, B. Carter.'\ You said that one means of holding
the Kafir in check lies in their tillage land ?—It is possible
to prevent them tilling the ground.
2597, They live in ordinary times of peace principally upon
the produce of agriculture ?—Entirely upon the Kafir corn and
milk,
2598, Is there any permanent occupation, as far as you have
seen, of any large plots or districts of land ?—There are large
tracts of it under cultivation,
2599, Should you say that, putting aside the cattle, which
we are aware they possess, they are in any degree an agricul¬
tural people?—They are an agricultural people in the fullest
sense of the term, because they subsist principally, as 1 said
before, on the fmits of the ground.
2600, Then do you think that their present agricultural
habits could be in any degree encouraged so as to enable you
to have a greater hold over them as a nation, than you would
naturally have over a wandering nation merely subsisting in
that way ?—You cannot make them grow more produce than
they consume ; they already grow what they want for
consumption ; I do not think you could make them grow for
export.
2601, I understood you that they would be naturally disin¬
clined to commence a war upon any slight misunderstanding,
because they would, probably, lose the results of the care
they had bestowed upon the tillage of certain districts of land?
—That is their weakest point; that is where they have most
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 333
to fear froni us, because they can drive their cattle away, and Capt.
they must leave their crops in the ground. ^Owetf'
2602. Do you think that upon that ground any reliance
could, ill future, be placed by any extension of agriculture to 3 J"'y
secure a better understanding between us, and make that the
ground of good behaviour on their part ?—I do not think that
any such extension of their agriculture is possible by any means
that we can adopt.
2603. You said you thought treaties with their chiefs were
not to be relied upon ?—No, they are not.
2604. Supposing they were to be subsidized, and you made
a grant of a certain amount to a chief, do you think his in¬
fluence over the people is sufficient to lead him to keep down
depredations for the purpose of receiving the subsidy ?—No,
I do not think so,
2605. Mr, Mackin)î07i.~\ In reference to what you stated
just now, you seem to think they depend more for their
support upon agriculture, than they do upon their herds and
cattle ? —They seldom or never kill an animal to eat.
2606, They live chiefly upon milk, and whatever little corn
they get by scratching the land ?—Upon milk and corn,
2607, Is their state of cultivation such as to make it
necessary for them to dwell upon the samé spot continuously,
or could they not cultivate sufficient land to supply them¬
selves in that fine climate, and probably virgin soil, if they
went from one spot to another ?—Quite so ; I do not think
that with them a field at all improves by being repeatedly
cultivated,
2608, There is a great distinction, then, between their mode
of cultivation of the land and that which there is in a civilized
nation, because with respect to the people here who cultivate
the land, the longer they cultivate it, the more valuable it
becomes, in some measure; but with those people, I under¬
stand you, your opinion is, that whether they cultivate a piece
of land in one locality or another, it makes no difference ?—
No ; the only thing is, of course, being dug once, it is the easier
to diji again.
2609, Mr, Monsell.'] They grow nothing but corn ?—I am
not sure whether they do not grow a little tobacco of some
sort, or a substitute for it,
2610. Mr, Mackinnon.] Is not that facility of cultivation
exemplified by the 13oers, who make no difficulty of migrating
from one locality to another?—It is,
2611, Consequently, in the event of circumstances rendering
it
334 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. it necessary to drive the Kafirs out of the Amatóla, or any
H. C. C. particular locality, you do not, consider that the suffering to
them, or injury done to them, would be so great, because they
3 July 1851 ä locality elsewhere where they might exist in the
same manner as they do now ?—Quite so.
2612. Provided they do not encroach upon the neighbouring
tribe ?—I do not think there are any of the tribes so thickly
settled but what they might receive many additional families.
2613. .What extent of acres have you seen in any par¬
ticular tribe in cultivation in one spot?—I cannot speak to
that.
2614. Viscount Mandeville.'\ Four or five acres ?—I do not
know; I never made any measurement, or heard of any.
2615. Chamnan.] Is their cultivation a kind of garden
cultivation, rather than that of farming ?—You sometimes see
a large tract of country under cultivation, the side of a hill
covered ; they are called in the country Kafir gardens ; " but
they might be called fields.
2616. Mr. Mackinnon.] Where there is a great amount of
population ?—Where there is a large population.
2617. I wish to call your attention to a former part of your
evidence, in which you mention that it was supposed that
which gave rise to the war was the surveying party going out
of your bounds, or out of the neutral territory, and fixing their
tent for surveying in Sandilli's country ?—That was the mere
pretext for a war.
2618. I wish to call your attention to a despatch of Sir
Peregrine Maitland's, dated 2ist of March 1846, in which he
states that it was merely a pretence they made for the war ;
that it was not in fact the cause of the war. I will just read
you the passage : " That the survey was unfortunate, I have
said ; as it might, to a suspicious Kafir, have the appearance
of an encroachment ; but I cannot agree with Colonel Hare,
that it was the real cause of the hostile aspect which Sandilli,
his Ainapakati, and warriors assumed. The sketch which I
have given of the increasing influence of the war party, and
the evidences of an unfavourable change in Sandilli's senti¬
ments before the surveying tent appeared on his ground, con¬
vince me that the survey was not the cause, but only the
occasion, of the outburst of had feeling which then took place."
Is that your opinion ; have you heard anything to confirm that
statement of Sir Peregrine Maitland ?—^That is in substance
what I have already given.
2619. Marquis of Granby.] You think the Buffalo River, as
the boundary, would include the whole range of the Amatóla
Mountains ;
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 335
Äiountains ; the whole country that you wish to occupy of the Capt.
Kafirs ?—Do you mean after the present war ?
2620. Yes ; after the present war.—I have not stated that,
I think ; because, if I am right in my view of the case, a 3 July 1851.
portion of the land between the Buffalo and the Keiskarnma
would be forfeited to the colony by the present misconduct of
the Kafirs, and a portion of it would be left to the tribes which
had not been implicated in it, or not been so much implicated
in it as the others.
2621. But would not it be very difficult to form a boundary
that should not have some great river, or great mark, to de¬
note where it was ?—I think a boundary, except for legal
purposes, is not wanted at all. As a military question, I think
it leads to difficulties of all kinds.
2622. Chairman.~\ I gather your opinion to be this; that
you would generally organize a system of frontier defence by
means of the settlers themselves ?—Quite so.
2623. And that you would support them for a time by a
military force?—Yes, just so.
2624. Would you, from what knowledge you have of the
colony and the native tribes, attempt or not to bring the chiefs
into alliance with the Government ; that is, would you respect
their rights and the boundaries of their tribes, and leave them
quite independent ?—As long as they were peaceable neigh¬
bours I would recognise their authority, but not the complete
independence which we recognise in a civilized power.
2625. Do you think it possible to make any attempt to
civilize them?—No, 1 do not believe any attempts will prove
successful.
2626. Do you think it would be of any avail attempting to
raise a native force in combination with British troops, or
should you be disposed to rely entirely upon a British force ?
—I should depend, as much as possible, upon the force of the
British, white men or mulattoes.
2627. You would not rely at all upon either the Hottentots
or the Kafirs, for the defence of the colony ?—On Hottentots
you may, to a certain extent; principally those Hottentots
that have lived a long time in the colony, and been mixed up
with the whites and with other races of people, and are no
longer the original race of Hottentots ; some reliance might be
placed upon them.
2628. Probably you have heard that recently a portion of
the Hottentot force has deserted, and turned against us ?—Yes,
I have.
2629. Had you that fact in your mind when you stated you
would
336 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Capt. would rely on a Iloltentct force in aid of a British force?—
n.C.C. Yes, I had.
2630. You are still disposed to tliiuk that they might be
3 July 1851. Kiade useful allies?—To a certain extent I think they might,
but that too much reliance should not be placed on them.
2631. When you say to a certain extent, will you explain
that limitation to the Committee ?—That they might be mixed
advantageously with a white force; but that a large force com¬
posed entirely of Hottentots is mischievous,
2632. Have you any general observations which you wish
to make to the Committee ?—There is one remark which I
wish to make, which is this, that in consequence of the ques¬
tions put to me by an Honourable Member, that I only knew
of one instance of the treaties being broken, that is rather
putting a wrong construction upon my words, because I con¬
sidered tiiat the general object of those treaties was to stop
cattle stealing, and that as this cattle stealing was not stopped,
the treaties were broken in every point, whatever might be the
separate provisions of those treaties.
2633. Colonel Dunne.} By the Kafirs ?—By the Kafirs.
2634. Colonel JEstcourt.} That is, there were frequent rob¬
beries of cattle ?—There were.
2635. And, therefore, you were speaking to that one point,
that the treaties were broken in that one point, as regards the
general question of stealing cattle, that frequent robberies were
committed ?—There were.
2636. It was not a single robbery ?—No, it was constantly
done.
2637. Mr. B. Carter.] I understood you to say that your
plan was to allocate districts to farmers who knew the country,
and to allow them to take into their service certain military
dependents who, after they had become acquainted with the
character of the country, might ultimately become settlers
also ?—Yes.
2638. Do I understand by that, that you would allocate a
frontier to those farmers in the first place ?—I would divide
the country which becomes available from the expulsion of
the Kafirs into convenient portions, and either grant it or sell
it upon certain conditions.
2639. Should those portions be connected with each other ?
—They should touch each other. There can be no object in
having any waste between.
2640. Would not the consequence of that, being in a Kafir
country, be, to form naturally at once some sort of frontier.
If vou live in a country where you would occupy a series of
connected
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRiËES. 3;57
connected districts, those districts must have some boundary, Capt.
and one boundary would be in the direction of the Kafirs r—
A frontier is an obstacle to people going through it ; for in- *
stance, as the Rhine is a frontier, the frontier you allude 3 julv 1851.
to would not be one.
2641. This district would necessarily have some boundary
towards the Kafirs. If you take any district, whatever it may
be, and separate that district into farms or allotments, that, at
all events, and we may say in this case the eastern side of
those districts, would naturally be bounded by Kafir land of
some sort?—Yes.
2642. And then, in fact, it would be a boundary in the
direction of the Kafirs, the crossing of « hich by the Kafirs
the setders themselves would have to defend themselves
against ?—Quite so.
2643. Then, in fact, as far as regards colonial purposes,
whether it be a military frontier or defended in other ways,
there would be a boundary against the Kafirs ?—Between the
Kafirs and the whites there would be a boundary ; that is to
say, there would be a boundary on one side of which the rights
of the land were recognised to belong to the whites, and on
the other side of which the rights of the Kafirs would be con¬
sidered.
2644. Which rights you propose to be maintained by the
settlers themselves, with the assistance of a military post ?—
Quite so.
2645. Marquis of Granhy'\ Are you aware whether, pre¬
viously to the survey for Blockdrift, Sandilli had changed his
sentiments towards the British Government ?—I have no par¬
ticular knowledge of the circumstance.
2646. You said, I think, that the Kafirs had for a long time
wished for a pretext to quarrel with the British Government ?
—Yes, I did.
2647. Are you at all aware what the causes of discontent
were, that made them so desirous for a pretext ?—I think it
was eagerness to possess themselves of our lands and our
herds.
2648. Sir J. Walmsley.] Have you any knowledge of the
country to the east of the Kei?—I was never on the Kei.
2649. You were talking of dispossessing the Kafirs of their
land, which is now called the ceded territory or British Kafra-
ria, and driving them over the Kei ; that was the general tenor
of your observations?—I do not think I said that. I would
only drive enough of the Kafirs out of that territory to make
0.63. Y them
33^ minutes of evidence taken before the
Capt. them feel the evil of having made war upon us in this last
a. C. C. instance,
2650. I understand, then, you do not desire to drive the
3 July 1851. whole of the Kafirs out of what is termed British Kafraria, over
the Kei, but to drive some portion of them over ?—Only some
portion of them.
2651. Those chiefs mostly implicated in the war ?—Yes.
2652. With their tribes?—Yes.
2653. My question then is to ascertain whether you know
sufficient of the land, to the eastward of the Kei, whether it is
sufficiently fertile to sustain the tribes you would drive over,
besides those who now occupy that district, that is, Kafraria
proper?—I have already stated that I have every reason to
think there would be quite sufficient facilities.
2654. You think the land is of sufficient fertility to sustain
the people ?—I think so, from all that I have heard ; person¬
ally I have no knowledge of it.
2655. You said, in an earlier part of your evidence, that
the Kafirs had been preparing for war for six or eight years ;
w hat do you mean by preparing for war for six or eight years ?
—Accumulating arms and ammunition.
2656. Generally savage tribes do not require so longa pre¬
paration as that for war ?—No, they do not.
2657. Their actions are more impulsive than is generally
consistent w ith a long-settled disposition for war for six or eight
years ?—Yes.
2658. You speak of them as preparing for war; were
those preparations made in consequence of the irritation which
they received from the British Government, by any acts of our
Government or of the colonists ?—No ; T do not think so.
2659. You think there were no causes of irritation arising
from any acts of the white people. You have spoken of one
only ; were there other causes besides that of the survey }—
No ; I am not aware of any other causes than that of the
survey.
Major ^\x James Edward Alexander, a.d.c., called in; and
Examined.
Major Sir 2660. Chairman.'] WHEN were you last at the Cape of
J. E. Alex- Good Hope?—From 1835 to 1838; three years.
ander, a.d.c. 2661. What object had you in going there, or what was the
nature of your duties there ?—I was asked to go to Africa in
the first instance, by the Royal Geographical Society, under
the auspices of the Colonial Office, to survey and explore.
2662. You
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIIl TRIBES. 339
2662. You were on the staff of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in Major Sir
the year 1835 ?—Yes. -f-
2663. Can you state to the Committee generally, from a.d.c.
such information as you possess, the causes which led to the g jyjy
outbreak in 1835?—They were believed to be the natural
propensity of the Kafirs for plunder, and the defenceless state
of the frontier ; the military force at that time only consisted
of 400 bayonets of the 75th regiment, and 200 of the Cape
Mounted Rifles, and they guarded a frontier of 100 miles.
There was another cause, that Macomo had been driven out
of the Mankazana, near the Chumie, and some friends of his
in the colony had told him that that was unjust, and that he
had been unfairly dealt with, and they would endeavour to get
back the Mankazana for him. There was another cause,
which was, when Sir Benjamin D'Urban assumed the govern¬
ment the commando system was done away with by orders
from home. I understand as Sir Lowry Cole had established
it when he was the governor previously, Sir Benjamin D'Urban
was ordered to do away with it ; for this reason the Kafirs
thought we were afraid of them ; it was perhaps too lenient a
system to do away with it.
2664. Then generally in your opinion, the causes which led
to the war were these : the smallness of our military force, the
depredations of the Kafirs, and the abolition of the old system
of defence called the commando system?—Yes.
2665. Those causes combined led to that state of irritation
which ultimately ended in war?—Yes. I beg also to state,
that in 1834, the districts of Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage,
were exceedingly flourishing ; the farmers had plenty of cattle,
and that excited the cupidity of the Kafirs to an extent they
did not seem to be able to resist.
2666. Whilst on the spot, did you hear whether the colonists
had unjustly encroached upon the Kafirs, or committed depre¬
dations upon them ?—No, 1 did not hear that they had com¬
mitted any encroachment to occasion the Kafir irruption of
1834 and 1835.
2667. Did you hear, on the other hand, that the Kafirs had
committed constant depredations upon the colonists ?—Yes,
the amount ofd epredations I remember in 1834, immediately
previous to the outbreak, amounted to 3,000 head of cattle,
besides sheep and horses.
2668. Were any lives lost on the part of the colonists ?—
The Kafirs began the war by murdering some of the traders
who were in Kafirland, and destroying some of the missionary
stations ; that was the first we heard of the war.
0.63. Y 2 2669. Now
340 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THÉ
Major Sir 2669. Now what course did the Government take with a
J. A". Alex- view so obtain redress before war was proclaimed ?—The first
an er, a.p.c. (pjfjg j lemembcr was Colonel Smith, now Sir Harry Smith,
SJulyiS^i. being-sent to the frontier, to inquire into the nature of this
irruption, and to organize a force to repel it ; he was followed
by Sir Benjamin D'Urban himself.
2670. Was there any attempt to call the chiefs to account
for the depredations they had committed r—I do not remember
hearing of that; I arrived at the beginning of 1835, but Sir
Benjamin D'Urban intended to have gone to the frontier,
previously to the outbreak ; he had been only a year holding
the government, and be intended to make a progress through
the eastern part of the colony, and also to visit the frontier
and Kafirland, probably with a view to inquire into those
depredations.
2671. Who was the principal chief at that time, who was
supposed to be the most active in committing depredations ?—
Macomo, I believe, and Tyali his brother, were the most active
leaders of the Kafirs.
2672. How was the war conducted ; were the districts which
they resided in invaded, or vvere they called upon to make
restitution ?—A force was organized by Sir Benjamin D'Urban,
the base of departure was between Fort Wilshire and Fort
Beaufort, and his invadingarmy was composed of four divisions;
he was with the head quarter division. Colonel Somerset
commanded the right division, and Van Wyk, a Dutchman,
commanded the left ; the left centre was commanded by Major
Cox, now Colonel Cox, and they advanced into Kafirland.
2673. What was stated to be the object that Sir Benjamin
D'Urban had in advancing into Kafirland?—To punish the
Kafirs, and recapture the cattle which had been driven from
the colony ; they had taken away upwards of 100,000 head of
cattle, and some thousands of horses, sheep, &c.
2674. Within w hat period had that number of cattle been
stolen ?—Deceml)er and January, 1834 and 1835.
2675. Have you any document to prove that so great an
extent of depredation was committed?—I have the returns
here of the number of cattle, horses, and sheep which were
made out during the war, and after the war, to show the
losses of the farmers in December and January, 1834 and
1835-
2676. Who made out the account?—I believe it was Mr.
Hudson, who was the agent for collecting that information.
2677. What office did he hold ?—I think he was called the
Agent-general
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 34I
Agent-general for inquiring into the losses sustained by the Major Sir
farmers. a^d^c
2678. Are you able to place that account before the Com- J [
mittee ?—I have got it here; there were 111,418 head of 3 July 1851.
cattle, 5,438 horses, 156,878 sheep, and there were 455
houses burnt, not merely wigwams, but stone houses of the
farmers ; there were 7,000 subjects of His Majesty all ruined
at that time, and they subsisted on rations during 1835.
2679. Are you reading an extract from the official account
given in by the Agent-general?—These are notes I made re¬
specting the losses, and I believe they were collected and
made out by Mr. Hudson.
2680. Was the account made out before the outbreak, or
afterwards with a view to obtain compensation for the losses ?
—After the outbreak, when the information was collected re¬
garding it. Besides that, there were 40 people murdered
without any declaration of war.
2681. By the Kafirs?—Yes.
2682. And previous to the declaration of war on the part
of the Government ?—Previous to the declaration of war on
the part of the British Government.
2683. ^ix J. JValmsleyI] Were they numerous bodies that
crossed the frontier when those depredations were committed,
or were they incursions from small bodies of men?—Large
bodies came over and surrounded the military posts, and some
of the smaller posts were immediately abandoned ; they were
occupied by the Cape Mounted Rifles ; there were only 200
of these along the frontier ; the 75th were in Graham's Town
principally.
2684. This was a sudden incursion in December 1834, and
in the beginning of 1835?—Yes, without any declaration of
war on the part of the Kafirs.
2685. Had that system of depredations, to any extent,
been carried on previously on a small scale ?—Ttiey used to
come in, in small numbers, to make their forays ; but this was
a grand irruption ; the whole frontier was attacked simul¬
taneously.
2686. Which continued fora few months?—Until the troops
moved into Kafirland; because after they had carried off this
immense spoil of cattle and horses, they drove them beyond
the Kei into Hintza's country.
2687. How many chiefs were concerned in that marauding
excursion?—They were principally the Gaika people, also the
T'Slambies.
2688. They were united in this foray ?—Yes, they were
0.6;^. Y 3 united.
342 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major Sir united. The people of Pato, Cobus, and Kamer remained
J. E. Alex- friendly.
2689. Colonel Dunne.] You have been travelling in the
3 July 1851. interior a great deal, as well as on that part of Africa border¬
ing on the colony?—Yes.
2690. On the western boundary, I believe?—Yes, to the
north of the Orange River, and near its mouth, the tribes are
scattered in no great numbers; the Namaquas and Hill
Damaras. I travelled among them beyond the Tropic of
Capricorn.
2691. You do not think there is any necessity for entering
into the consideration of the defence of that frontier at the
present moment ?—No.
2692. Have you been on the frontier that is at present
attacked ?—Yes, I have.
2693. What was the frontier when you was in Kafirland
with Sir Benjamin D'Urban?—It was the Keiskamma ; the
neutral territory was between that and the Great Fish River.
2694. Do you think the neutral territory was in the rear of
the Keiskamma?—Between that and the Fish River.
2695. Have you been into Kafraria, between the Keis¬
kamma and the Kei ?—I went across from the Keiskamma to
the Kei, which is 95 miles.
2696. Are you aware of the Buffalo River, and the situation
of King William's Town ?—^Yes ; I was there when Fort Hill
was constructed.
2697. Is the country about King William's Town open, and
adapted for the movement of troops better than that on the
frontier of the Keiskamma ?—Much better ; it is an open
country.
2698. Therefore, for a military purpose you would prefer
pushing your posts as far as King William's Town ?—I would
like ftrst to have a strong post at the mouth of the Buffalo.
2699. That would include pushing your post as far as the
Buffalo ?—Yes, decidedly.
2700. Have you been in the Amatóla mountains ?—Yes.
2701. Do you know whether they are a kind of fastness
from which the Kafirs issue and attack our settlements ?—It is
a very difficult country ; indeed, it resembles the Highlands of
Scotland ; there are ravines, rocks, precipices, and forests.
2702. Would it be an advantage to the defence of our
colony if we cleared those Amatóla mountains?—The best way
would be. to make roads in them.
2703. Would you clear the people out of them ?—It would
be exceedingly difficult to clear them out, or keep them out.
2704. Is
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 343
2704. Is there any ground on the other side of the Keis- Major Sir
kamma where they could find a sufficient support?—It would
not be altogether safe to drive them across the Kei as long as '
we have Natal ; because, if we drive them in that direction, 3 July 1851.
they might attack the flourishing settlement of Natal.
2705. Where are the Zoolus?—To the north-west of Natal.
2706. Is there any gap between the Kei River and the set¬
tlement of Natal?—There is the people of Kreli, the son of
Hintza.
2707. What tribe is that?—A large tribe called the Ama-
galekas, in contradistinction to the Amakosas,
2708. What tribes inhabit the Amatela mountains ?—The
Amakosas, the Gaikas, the people of Macomo and Sandilli.
2709. They would not be received by the tribes between
Natal and the Kei ?—I think not ; at least there would be
difficulties and trouble.
2710. What would you propose, as a defence of that fron¬
tier ; would you defend it by posts and military colonies ?—
First of all, I would survey the mouths of all the rivers as far
as Natal. The mouth of the Umtata is supposed to have a
good harbour, but I am not aware of any good survey having
been made of it ; I went to survey the mouth of the Buffalo
with Colonel Smith, and made a sketch of it, and of late ad¬
vantage has been taken of the mouth of the Buffalo ; stores
have been landed there, and the Kafirs have been taken in
the rear and prevented from coming into the colony, since the
beginning of this present war.
2711. Would it not be difficult at times at the mouth of the
Buffalo ?—It is better than the mouth of the Fish River.
2712. Have you surveyed any part of the Amatólas?—I
have been through them.
2713. But you did not survey them ?—It was during the
war time ; we could not well, without being assagaied.
2714. Would you think it was necessary to have posts in
Kafraria if we adopt the Keiskamma on forts Hare and Cox
and those posts ?—I would have posts decidedly along the
Keiskamma, and I would have a post, if I could, in the Ama-
tolas ; I would have some very strong posts to overlook and
overawe the Kafirs ; and that, with the roads, would be a
great advantage.
2715. How would you make those roads?—With our own
people.
2716. Have we any people that we can apply to that pur¬
pose?—I would employ Hottentots, perhaps for hire, and
Fingoes.
0.63. ^ Y 4 2717. Are
344 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major Sir 2717. Are you acquainted with the habits of the tribes on
andfr frontier ?—I saw a great deal of them in 1835.
J ■ ' 2718. Do you believe that any treaty with the Kafirs would
3 July 1851. prevent their committing depredations and robberies?—I
think not ; it is only the strong hand that would prevent that.
2719. Do you believe the cause of every war that has oc¬
curred there, which you have experience of, has not been the
incorrigible habits of robbery which the Kafirs have ?—They
are brought up to robbery and plunder ; but from the way in
which some of the wild natives of India have been civilized,
(I should remark that I was in India for some years), I think
it is possible that even the Kafirs might be civilized.
2720. Do you think within any reasonable time the habits
of the Kafirs would be. so altered that we could make treaties
with them?—I should say within 10 years a change might
take place for the better.
2721. How would you operate that change on them ?—First
of all, by military posts, and then inducing them to attend fairs
for the purpose of exchanging their cattle for British goods.
2722. Then you prefer establishing fairs to permitting the
traders to go through the country ?—Decidedly ; though they
may be men of good character who supply the goods, they are
obliged to employ men sometimes of very inferior character—
British deserters sometimes—to sell them.
2723. Sir E. Buxton.^ Can you prevent traders of this sort
going into Kafraria ?—I think they might be checked to a
certain extent—men of bad character, because if they go with
waggons, they can only go along particular roads, and over
particular fords.
2724. Colonel Dunne-I I believe every trader is obliged to
have a pass ?—He used to be.
2725. Do you not think by checking the traders going into
the country, and making the inhabitants resort to those fairs,
you might prevent the introduction of ammunition and mus¬
kets ?—It might be considerably checked, but not altogether
prevented.
2726. Do you think that check would operate to make them
less ready to go to war ?—I think so.
2727. Do you know the Kat River settlement ?—I have
been there.
2728. Is it near the frontier?—It is near the frontier.
272g. Are you aware that they latterly have joined with
the Kafirs in this war against us, or is it so ?-^I have heard so.
2730. Do you not think that it is a post where it is danger¬
ous to have people of doubtful fidelity r—It is dangerous.
2731. Would
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 345
2731. Would you think it a prudent measure to withdraw
that settlement, and supply it with more faithful subjects ?—I
think the measure that was at first proposed, if it had been J 1 '
carried out, to people the Kat River with 500 Scotch high- 3 July 1851.
landers, would have been the best thing that could have been
adopted ; that was not done,
2732. You think that colonists from this country should
have been placed there instead of Hottentots ?—Yes.
2733. You have served with the Cape corps ?—I have
been in the field with it.
2734. Did they behave well on the occasion you served
with them iu the field ?—I think they had been too much
" cried up," and too much reliance had been placed upon
them.
2735. Do you think for the future it would be much better
to substitute for those Hottentots a corps, the whole or a very
large proportion of which should be recruited from this coun¬
try?—The best thing would be to do something similar to
what happened in America during the last war ; namely, to
have a few Hottentots who should accompany the Europeans to
act as guides, from their knowledge of the spooT' and the habits
of the Kafirs, and in that way they would be useful ; but
having large bodies of Hottentots together would be very
dangerous, as it appears on the present occasion they have
turned against us in the most ungrateful manner.
2736. Therefore, you think at least the larger proportion
of the regiment should be European ?—Yes, Europeans; men
who are able and willing at all times to go into " the bush."
n o
2737. Were you there at the time of the existence of the
old commando system ?—No.
2738. When you went to the frontier, I understand you, it
was thriving and flourishing?—Yes.
2739. immense destruction occurred from the incursion
of the Kafirs ?—Yes.
2740. It was thriving and flourishing under the old com¬
mando system ; am I to understand that V—It was very
flourishing in 1834.
2741. When did the commando system cease ?—In the be¬
ginning of 1833, I think.
2742. In 1835 it was destroyed?—It was abrogated alto¬
gether, by orders, I think, from home.
2743. ■^"d the result vvas a war ?—It was understood at
the time on the frontier that it was too lenient a system doing
away with it, and the Kafirs imagined we were afraid of them,
and they could venture to act with impunity.
2744. Are
340 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major Sir 2744* -Are we able now, after the destruction that has gone
J. E. Alex- along the frontier, to establish a system of militia ?—I think so.
ander, a.d.c. tit- , , . , o -r
2745. Would It be an eihcient system of defence ?—In con-
3 July 1851. junction with the regular troops.
2746. Would it be possible to have a system of colonies
along the frontier holding by military tenure, such as was the
former feudal system on the borders of England and Scotland,
for the defence of that country ?—I think it would be a very
good system, and well worth a trial.
2747. Do you think it possible to carry it out ?—It is pos¬
sible, if you could get people to live there. If there is no
protection, of course they could not settle there.
2748. Do you think that any people would go on the
frontier if they were not allowed the privilege of defending
themselves, or their property when attacked ?—It would be a
dangerous thing to allow settlers to go on their own account
into Kaiirland, they might commit injustice,
2749. Under the regulation of the magistrates, would it be
difficult ?—Under strict regulation it might be very well; it
would be a dangerous thing to allow people unrestrictedly to
do it.
2750. Were they ever allowed to do it ?—I believe often in
the old time, when there were cattle depredations, the Field
Cornet of the district would assemble the Boers, and go on
commando.
2751. Was the Field Cornet a magistrate ?—Yes, a magis¬
trate under the Dutch, and under the English also.
2752. What is the length of frontier from the boundary of
the Keiskamma to the Amatóla mountains, we should have to
defend ?—It i.s, in a straight line, about 70 miles ; it is usually
considered that the length of the frontier in that quarter is
100 miles.
2753. What number of troops would you consider neces¬
sary to defend that frontier?—I would have a regiment of
European light dragoons, and three regiments of British in¬
fantry, besides the native levies.
2754. What will the native levies consist of?—1 would en¬
deavour to have Griquas, or Bastards, as they are generally
called, to assist.
2755. Would they be more faithful than the Hottentots ?—
I think so.
2756. Is the Keiskamma fordable in every place?—No ;
but in various places.
2757. In so many places that you could not defend it by
parties
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 347
parties placed at the fords ?—No ; it is fordable in some sea- Major Sir
sons of the year in a great many places. J- -E. AUx-
2758. And the banks of the river?—They are precipitous, ander^^.c,
with bush. 3 July 1851.
27.59. Adverse to our defence, and favourable to the Kafirs?
—Favourable to the Kafirs, but not nearly so as the bush of
the Great Fish River.
2760. Therefore the Keiskamma is a better boundary for
our military posts ?—Yes.
2761. Is the Buffalo fordable?—It is; the banks of it are
tolerably flat ; they are not precipitous.
2762. Therefore it is a better boundary than either ?—It is
a river of minor importance altogether ; the best is the Kei.
There are few fords across the Kei; the banks are open so far
as I saw, free of bush and wood.
2763. Chairman.'] I think you stated you travelled in Africa
under the auspices of the Geographical Society?—Yes.
2764. Can you give the Committee any information as to
the agricultural capacity of the Cape, whether it is not at
present a good field for colonization ?—It would present a
very good field if attention were paid to irrigation ; there is
too little attention paid to that ; there ought to be tanks
everywhere; the valleys ought to be crossed by dams or bunds,
as they call them in India.
2765. It is subject occasionally to long droughts?—Yes;
but this might be obviated.
2766. Is it generally a good soil ?—There are large tracts
of fine soil, and very fertile valleys also.
2767. Is the finer land generally to the eastward round
about Graham's Town, and eastward of that in Kafraria ?—
About Graham's Town the land is indifferent, but the course
of the Kowie, the river that takes its rise nearer Graham's
Town, presents favourable spots for agricultural purposes.
2768. Is Kafraria generally more fertile than the land
within the boundary to the westward of the Keiskamma?—
I think it is, as far as I saw ; the land increases in fertility as
you leave the Keiskamma and proceed to the north-east,
until you get to Natal, which is exceedingly fertile.
2769. What is the average temperature at Cape Town ?—
About 70 degrees I should say was the average.
2770. At Cape Town ?—In the summer time, which is our
winter, I have seen the thermometer at 90 in Cape Town, and
a few miles from Cape Town I have seen a difference of 10
degrees, about 80 ; that was at the hottest season of the year;
at other times I have seen it at 55 and 65.
2771, Is
34® MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major Sir 2771. Is the range between 55 and 90 throughout the
J-E. A ex- yg^j. p—J should think that must be considered the ranece of
thermometer.
3 July 1851. 2772. Would that apply to the other portions of the colony
about Graham's Town, and again to the eastward of Graham's
Town in Kafraria ?—Not much difference ; I have seen it
as much as 110 in Namagualand, a little beyond the Orange
River.
2773. All tropical products might be grown with success
—Yes.
2774. Have you made any inquiry as to the possibility of
cultivating cotton ?—At Natal it has been tried, and coffee also.
2775. In the Orange River district?—^They have a sort of
tobacco grown in considerable quantities.
2776. Is any portion of the Cape colony capable of being
applied to the growth of cotton ?—I never heard of its being
attempted within the Cape colony proper, only at Natal.
2777. Are you of opinion it would at all succeed in any
part of Kafraria ?—I think it might.
2778. Do you think natives could be induced at all to
plant and cultivate cotton ?—I think it is worth the trial.
2779. You stated you thought the Indian system of manag¬
ing the chiefs might be resorted to?—Yes.
2780. Is it possible to induce them, and through them their
people, to cultivate cotton for sale?—I think it is possible.
There has been a very successful experiment in Rajapootana,
in a country very similar to Kafraria. The people there, the
Mairs, have been altogether reformed. There was a war there
in the first instance ; but now they are exceedingly prosperous,
and they cultivate the soil. It is in the country between
Goozerat and Delhi.
2781. You are speaking of the district under the command
of Lieutenant-colonel Dixon ?—Yes.
2782. What do you think should be the preliminary mea¬
sures, as between the Government and the chiefs, to induce
them to resort to cultivation and the growth of cotton, for
instance, for the purposes of trade ?—I think that conferences
ought to be held with them, and the advantages of a change in
their habits ought to be shown.
2783. You would begin probably by respecting their rights
and local customs ?—Y es.
2784. Do you think it expedient to attempt to confer small
pensions upon chiefs, to induce them to resort to industrial
occupations?—I think it would be worth a trial. 1 remember
Waterboer, the chief of the Griquas ; all he got which made
hirn
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 349
him friendly to the English was 50 Z. a year, and 200 muskets Major Sir
to arm his people with. He seemed well satisfied. It would
not require a large outlay to satisfy the chiefs. er, a.d.c.
2785. Do you then think it possible tobring the native 3 July 1851.
chiefs and their people to follow industrial occupations, and to
act in harmony with the British Government?—I think it is
very well worth a trial, and might possibly succeed with the
assistance of intelligent missionaries and schoolmasters.
2786. In your opinion, have the missionaries been successful
in introducing civilization ?—There are some very valuable men
among the missionaries who have appeared in Africa. Mr.
Moffat was particularly successful. The Rev. Mr. Shaw and
Mr. Schmeling were also very successful.
2787. Have they been successful in introducing pursuits of
industry?—They induced the people to cultivate the land to a
considerable extent, and I think they reformed their habits.
27S8. Where has the most successful experiment of that
sort been tried ?—Mr. Mofiat has been the most successful.
2789. Where ?—Amongst the Bechuanas.
2790. That is to the north of the Orange River?—Yes, to
the north of the Orange River.
2791. He has had no force to support him?—No j but the
people there are not so warlike as the Gaikas. They are a
milder people ; not so wild and savage as the people on our
borders seem to be.
2792. Supposing for a moment the leading chiefs who have
taken an active part in this war were removed, whilst the rights
of the people were respected, do you think that that would
facilitate the means of producing industrial pursuits ?—Perhaps
it would ; if it could be possible to get those men to surrender
themselves ; Macomo, for instance ; he is the head and front
of almost ail this war.
2793. Macomo is now a man advanced in years somewhat?
.—Yes, and he was very debauched in his habits ; I wonder he
has lived so long ; they say now he is reformed. Formerly
he was always drunk when he had an opportunity.
2794. But supposing the Kafir chiefs were assured of pro¬
tection, that the rights they now possess were assured to them,
and that their boundaries and their lives would be respected,
do you think that would facilitate the missionary operations,
and also facilitate the efforts of the Government to induce
them to follow useful pursuits?—Yes.
2795. May I consider it to be your opinion that it would be
inexpedient to attempt to drive the Kafirs out of Kafraria, or
to remove the chiefs ; but that it would be desirable, by means
of
35í> MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major Sir of small pensions, to induce them to take to industrial pursuits ?
J. E. Alex- —I think it would be the best plan.
ander, a.d.c. 2796. Do you think it could be done without the main-
3 July 1851 tenance of a considerable force for some time?—There must
be a considerable force to overawe those people, of course, but
at the same time, on no account to oppress them or treat
them with undue harshness.
2797. Are the Kafirs so different from the Bechuanas you
have spoken of, that missionaries and civil magistrates could
not induce them to follow peaceful pursuits without the sup¬
port of the military ?—I think not. They have got so many
muskets among them, and so many bad characters mixed up
with them, which make them worse than they naturally are.
2798. When were you at the Kat River settlement ?—In
July 1835.
2799. In what state was the settlement then ?—The settle¬
ment then was divided into two congregations ; one was the
congregation of the Rev. Mr. Thompson, composed, of what
they call Bastards ; that is a mixed people between the Hot¬
tentots and the Dutch ; they were very good men indeed ;
they were the chief cultivators of the Kat River settlement,
and converted it into fertile fields. The others were the con¬
gregation of the Rev. Mr. Read ; they were Hottentots, and
they were not so good as those under Mr. Thompson; at
least I thought so, from what I saw.
2800. Did the natives actually cultivate the land, and de¬
pend upon the produce of the land for their support and sub¬
sistence ?—Chiefly; the congregation of Mr. Thompson did;
the others were more idle ; the Hottentots are idle people.
2801. Did they raise any produce for sale?—I did not hear
that they raised any for sale, or beyond merely what was wanted
for the supply of their own wants.
2802. Was it in the flourishing state that you have described
it at that time ?—It looked very flourishing at that time.
2803. As far as you know, at that time was there any direct
Government aid given to them?—It was during the war time,
when the Kat River people, as well as others, were obliged to
be supported by rations from the Government ; the Kafirs had
plundered them also.
2804. The aid then given was only to the families of those
persons who were in the field engaged in the war ?—Yes, for
a temporary purpose.
2805. Are there any general observations you would wish to
make ?—Merely, I would say, I consider that the best way to
maintain friendly relations with the people beyond our borders
is
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 351
is by an annual mission to them, and by small pensions to the Major Sir
chiefs, and inducing them also to visit Cape. Town, and to re-
ceive the missionaries and schoolmasters, and also to engage
in trade as much as possible, and to give them a taste of 3 July 1851.
European habits.
2806. Mr. Hindley.] Do you think that is practicable?—I
think it is quite possible ; it has never been fairly tried.
2807. Colonel Dunne.Do you think that any treaty would
bind them, to prevent them from stealing cattle?—^Not without
a strong force to overawe them.
2808. Then, in fact, all moral improvements must be pre¬
ceded by a very strong force to keep them in subjection ?—
Decidedly; they would laugh at any treaty without a sufficient
force.
2809. Are you aware of any rules that the herdsmen are
obliged to comply with on losing their cattle, which make it
very difficult to obtain the cattle, and whether the farmers on
the frontiers have repeatedly made complaints to the Govern^
ment on the impossibility of obtaining justice?—There was at
one time a rule, that when a Kafir was found plundering, he
could not be fired at, but merely pursued with a hue and cry,
and followed to the border,
2810. Are they not obliged to comply with four or five
requisitions before they can obtain any justice; was not the
farmer obliged to take his oath " that he traced his cattle
across a particular spot on the boundary line ; that the cattle,
when stolen, were properly guarded by an armed herdsman ;
that the pursuit was commenced immediately after the cattle
were stolen ; that, if stolen during the night, the cattle had
been properly secured in a kraal ; that the pursuit in that case
was at latest commenced early next morning ;" before he could
obtain anything from the magistrates, was not he obliged to
make oath to those five points, ?—I am aware that was the
custom.
2811. How far was the magistrate from him, to whom he
would make oath on this subject ?—Sometiines 20 or 30
miles oflF.
2812. Was not the consequence this : when it could not be
sworn before a magistrate, and no magistrate could be found,
that the plunder became a legal prize to the Kafir who stole
it ?—It would be exceedingly difficult to recover it then,, of
course.
2813. But did not it, in fact, legalize the robbery, if the
person could not swear to those things, though he had lost
the cattle ?—If they could not go through those forms.
2814. Literally,
352 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
^ Major Sir 2014. Literally, robbery was legalized by our own arrange-
J?. Alex- ments on the frontier; was it not so?—It seemed to be a mis-
a er, A.p.ç. 3ystern altogether.
3 July 1851. 2815. You condemn that system?—It was not stringent
enough.
2816. Are you aware that several petitions were presented
to our governors on the frontier, complaining, in fact, that
they could get no justice and no defence for their property,
from the system that was adopted ?—I have heard ofthat.
2817. Sir E. Buxton!] Were you in the colony when these
rules were in force?—It was before I went to the colony.
2818. In what year?—I went to the colony in the begin¬
ning of 1835, and I was there until the beginning of 1838;
three years.
2819. Colonel Dunne!] Were they not continued while
you were in the colony, and afterwards; was there any abro^
gation of those rules that you know of?—The Kafir war had
changed altogether the system, and then, when Sir Benjamin
D'Urban was removed from his governorship, a new system
took place altogether.
2820. Are you or not acquainted with the facts, that those
rules remained as the rules for the recovery of stolen cattle
to a later period than the one you speak of, when you were
engaged with Sir Benjamin D'Urban ?—I have heard they
continued in force in 1838, and after 1838.
2821. Sir £. Buxton!] Were they in force when you were
in the colony ?—The system was upset altogether in conse¬
quence of the Kafir war of 1835.
2822. Have you any practical experience of the incon¬
venience of those rules which have been mentioned ?—I
remember one cause of complaint of a Dutch settler was this,
in relation to the protection of the natives. There was a
Dutchman said, if he inflicted a blow on his own coloured
servant, he had to go a long distance to a magistrate to answer
for it, and was perhaps fined 5?., and so on. He had to
go long distances to answer complaints, which was a great
grievance.
2823. Did you feel that to be a grievance when you were
in the colony ?—It seemed to be a new thing for them alto¬
gether ; it harassed the minds of those people, because they
did not conceive they were very cruel, or cruel at all, to their
coloured people, who were exceedingly idle and careless as
servants, and that was the great cause of irritation to the
Dutch on the frontier.
2824. Was it a reasonable cause of irritation ?—I think it
was.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 353
was, to be taken away from tlieir employment to answer frivo- Major Sir
lous complaints often on the part of their coloured servants. J. È. Alex-
2825. Colonel Diinne.^ You speak of those com|)laints that a.p.c.
were frivolous ?—Of those that were really frivolous. 3 juiy 1851.
282Ó. Then if it were a complaint well grounded, of a man
having ill treated his servants, you would not disapprove of
his being brought up ?—No ; merely of the frivolous com¬
plaints.
2827. Colonel Estcourt.'] Do yon approve of the [rermission
to strike a hired servant on the part of the Boers ?—No, cer¬
tainly not.
2828. You do not mean that?—Certainly not.
2829. Colonel Dunne.] In fact, in any society where a
magistrate is at such a distance from the people, there must
be a balance of inconvenience ?—Y'es.
2830. Sir J. JValmsleyHave you any knowledge of the
land beyond the Kei, as to the quality of it?—-I know it by
report only ; I saw it from the heights in the upper part of the
Kei, as far as the Bashee ; it seemed to be a very fine ' country ;
it had a very promising appearance, as far as I could see.
2831. Have you reason to believe it is as fertile as British
Kafraria, or the Ceded Territory ?—Yes.
. 2832. Do you know whether it is densely populated?—The
population of Hintza's country beyond the Kei was reckoned
about 80,000, but I doubt that ; some say it was then only
^0,000. Sir Benjamin D'Urban removed from Hintza's
country 17,000 Fingoes, vvho were slaves to the Kafirs of
Hintza ; I do not include those in the population of Hintza's
country; they w-ere a distinct people altogether.
2833. My desire in asking tliat question was to ascertain
your opinion as to the propriety of driving such tribes, or
portions of such tribes, from the westward to the eastward of
the Kei?—I think it would be rather a dangerous experiment,
seeing that we appear to wish to promote the prosperity of
Natal, because that might induce those people to attack our
people at Natal instead of the people on the west, or of Cape
Colony Proper.
2834. Are you then of opinion that driving a large portion
of the Kafirs from British Kafraria over the Kei into Kafraria
Proper would again drive the other tribes on the eastward to¬
wards Natal?—The expatriated Kafirs might attack Natal.
2835. And the result would be dangerous to that colony?—
Yes; if Natal was not there it might be tried ; but that being
occupied as a British settlement, it would be dangerous.
0.63. Z 2836. Otherwise
354 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Major Sir 2836. Otherwise do you beleve there is a sufficiency of land
anJu drive a number of the tribes from British Kafraria over the
an er, a p.c. them to occupy; is there any sufficient space?—There
3 July 1851, are 200 miles usually reckoned to the south-west of Natal,
without a single inhabitant hardly.
2837. Then, believing that the land of Kafraria Proper is
as fertile as that of British Kafraria, and seeing also there is
a large quantity of that land unoccupied, you do not think it
would be a very great hardship upon the people to drive
certain tribes over the Kei ?—But the difficulty is how to do
it, and how to keep them there.
2838. Would you think it a great hardship upon those
people ?—No ; I should not think it a great hardship, because
the country is fertile, and capable of cultivation in their simple
way of cultivating the ground. It is also susceptible of sup¬
porting large flocks and herds.
2839. I ask the question, because evidence has been given
of the desirability of driving some portion of those predatory
tribes of Kafirs across the Kei ?—Perhaps so.
2840. Mr. Mackinnon.^ You state that if we drive them
across the particular boundary, it would drive the other tribes
to the north-east towards Natal ?—It might.
2841. Upon what do you found that opinion; because, as
■ you stated, there is a sufficiency of land, namely, 200 miles of
land, unoccupied. Why, if that be so, and they were driven
there, should those tribes in their turn be driven farther on to
the eastward ?—I did not say so ; that it would drive other
tribes on Natal, but the Gaika Kafirs themselves on Natal ;
they would plunder our settlements there, instead of plunder¬
ing the Cape colony as they have done hitherto ; that is what
I mean to say.
2842. The tribe driven out by us, would be itself driven
on farther towards Natal ?—Yes.
2843. You did not quite say that ; you said other tribes
would be driven, as I understood you ?—I mean to say the
people who had been driven out of Gaika's country would
take to plundering Natal, because they have got so many
muskets and ammunition ; whereas the Zoolus have no mus¬
kets or ammunition yet, but they may have soon.
2844. Then it is your decided opinion, that if we drove
them out of the district they now possess, they would not
locate amongst the other tribes, but become a sort of roving
tribe ? —I think it would be likely to be the case ; unless their
present habits and feelings were changed they would be de¬
sirous
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. $55
sirous of revenge, and revenging themselves particularly on Major Sir
the British wherever they found them. J. E. Alex-
2845. Mr. Hindley^ You have given an account of the ander, a.d.c.
depredations of the Kafirs in 1834 and 1838 ?—Yes. aJuly^iSsi.
2846. Do you think their character and conduct are im¬
proved since ?—It appears not; I do not hear of any improve¬
ment in them at all.
LuncËy 7° dde Julii, 1851.
members present.
Mr. Labcuchere.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Sir Joshua Walmsley.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Mr. Hindley.
Sir Edward Buxton.
Viscount Mandeville.
Mr. Monsell.
Marquis of Granby.
Colonel Estcouri.
Colonel Dunne.
Colonel Thompson.
The Right Hon. H. LABOUCHERE, in the Chair.
General Sir Peregrine Maitland, k.c.b., called in ; and
Examined.
2847. Chairman.'] WHEN did you fill the situation of Go- General
vernor of the Cape of Good Hope?—On the 14th of March Su fei egrine
1844 I was sworn in. Maitlund,
2848. How long did you continue there?—About three k.c.b.
years, till the beginning of 1847. 7Ju"l7^85i.
2849. You are aware of the objects for which this Com¬
mittee was appointed?—To examine into the state of our
Kafir relations.
2850. I think at the period you were so employed you had
occasion to consider very minutely the state of the colony with
reference to the Kafir tribes?—I had.
2851. What was the general condition of the Kafir frontier
when you were there ?—The Kafir frontier at that time was a
great deal unsettled on account of the number of robberies that
had been committed, and there had been one or two boers
killed. The petitions from the frontier were very numerous,
and there had been others previous to my arrival, in Sir
0.63. z 2 George
35Ö
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Genoiil George Napier's time, which had been transmitted to Lord
Stanley, and Lord Stanley desired me to investigate the state
K.C.B. ' things, and to modify, if necessary, the existing treaties.
Í2852. This state of things lasted until the year 1846, when
7 Ju'y 1851. there was an actual outbreak of hostilities between the colonists
and the Kafirs ?—No, not so ; there was an interval of six or
eight months, when there was no plundering at all.
2853. When was that interval?—It was after I had vi.sited
the frontier, and entered into new treaties with the Griquas ;
after placing troops in the ceded territory, and forming a post
there, there was a cessation of plunder altogether, I think, for
more than six months, which was unprecedented.
2854. What do you apprehend to have been the principal
cause of the outbreak of hostilities in 1846?—I ought pre¬
viously, I think, to explain what was the occasion oí the re¬
commencement of the Kafir [)lunder. The expatriated boers
beyond the frontier had attacked the Griquas, who were our
allies, and to prevent them from destroying that tribe, I had
to move the troops from the Kafir frontier. At the same time,
there was great excitement in the minds of the boers in the
colony, and a very strong threat to join their brethren to repel
the troops which were sent to aid the Griquas. That, I think,
was the occasion of the Kafirs renewing their depredations.
It stems, from a speech of Mr. Nell'.^, who was the great
orator of the boers, that the Kafirs sent messengers to the
boers, to ask them why they let us subdue their brethren ?
why they did not join them to drive ns away from the
country? I think tliat that excitement had an influence upon
the Kafirs.
2855. I find this sentence in an address which you published
on the 31st of March 1836 : " So far as a feeling of hostility
amongst the Kafirs might be provoked or palliated, by even
one solitary act of violence, outrage, or injustice, committed by
any colonist in Kafirland, the Kafirs are without excuse. No
Kafir can charge the commission of any such act during, at all
events, the last seven years. It is with pride and pleasure that
I make this statement, which I believe to be accurate, even to
the letter "r—I believe so.
2856. This was your deliberate opinion at that time?—That
was my deliberate opinion at that lime, and I think so still ;
I have no reason to think otherwise.
2857. To what, therefore, generally speaking, do you attri¬
bute the hostilities of 1846?—I attribute it to our attempting
to control their thieving in the colony.
28.58. The war was a very troublesome and expensive war?
—Very!
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
357
—Very troublesome and expensive ; it was rendered very much General
more so by the pre-ssure of the drought that prevailed. Sir Peregrine
2859. At that time the communications were much less perfect
than they are now?—They were, and when the war began, all
the communications were at times interrupted by the Kafirs, 7 jujy X851.
2860. The communication between the colony and the
eastern frontier was very slow, and the transport of every thing
very expensive?—Yes, the things were landed at Port Eliza¬
beth, and after a time, our supply from that quarter entirely
ceased ; had not we landed the things in Pato's country, after
driving him back, we should have been starved.
2861. You did not continue in the colony, I think, until the
termination of those hostilities?—No, I was with the troops in
Kreli's territory, beyond the Kei, expecting to finish the war
there, when I was recalled.
2862. You have, I dare say, a general knowledge of what
has taken place in the colony since you left it, and the circum-
siances under which it is now placed by the present Kafir
war?—Yes, to a certain extent I have.
2863. Will you favour the Committee with any opinion that
you may have formed, as to the general policy which you think
it is advisable for this country to pursue with regard to the
frontier of Cape Colony?—I think well of the line of frontier
I had intended to take, and the manner in which I had in¬
tended to defend it, might be still applicable, only that it
would be now difficult not to take the Amatólas in.
2864. What is that line of frontier?—The course of the
Keiskamma and Chumie, taking in Blockdiift.
2865. Would you make the Great Kei the boundary?—I
would make the Great Kei the boundary for British Kafirland ;
that is, I would admit Kafirs there, the Kafirs that would
become British subjects, and that would give up their arms
and register themselves and their cattle.
2866. Would you carry the limits of the British colony itself
as far as the Great Kei?—No; I would not locate British
subjects, I mean white men, beyond the Fish River. 1 should
take in the ceded territory, and occupy it with the troops
and coloured settlers, as I have explained in my despatches.
2867. You would occupy in a military manner the country
as far as the Great Kei River, including the Amatóla ridge ?—
What I had intended was this: I had driven the Kafirs out
of the ceded territority ; that I intended to maintain ; to have
no Kafirs in it at all, but to have occupied it with troops ; to
have had four or five strong posts, and not to have dispersed
the troops in small posts in Kafirland ; so that I could send
0.63. z 3 out
358
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
í^neral out a respectable force whenever I pleased, to act immediately
^Maitland"^ upon Kafirland, I would have had no Kafirs there; I would
K.C.B. ' ^ot have had them intermingled with my posts. I would have
placed Hottentots and Fingoes there under a defensive organi-
7 July 1851. zation, superintended by British officers, and have given them
up all the old fortified barracks for their wives and families ;
they would have had also the protection of the line of troops
in the ceded territory.
2868. Do you think those people could he depended upon,
as a barrier against the Kafirs on the frontier ?—I certainly
thought so then, and I have still great faith in them. I believe
that the Hottentots have been misled, probably in part by
the state of things in the colony. They are restless, but they
are easily brought to reason.
2869. Is it essential, do you think, supposing the present
war to be terminated favourably, and the country to be com¬
pletely subdued, to keep on the frontier a considerable military
force of regular troops for some time ?—Certainly ; a large
force for some time.
2870. Can you tell at all what number would he required?
—I should,think 6,000 men.
2871. Sir JValmsley.'] With your present views do you
desire to allow the Kafirs to come within the ceded territory or
entirely over the Great Kei?—Not to come within the ceded
territory, nor entirely over the Great Kei.
2872. You would drive them out of British Kaffiaria ?—Out
of the ceded territory. They were driven out before I came
away ; and I settled that they should leave the ceded territory
altogether ; they were coming in and registering themselves,
and giving up their arms, this being understood.
2873. Then what would he the limits at the outside of
w hich you would keep the Kafirs ?—I would keep the Kafirs
without the Keiskamma and the Chumie, which would con¬
nect our line unbroken with the Kat River settlement.
2874. Would you have forts to the eastward of the Keis¬
kamma ?—No, and only one to the eastward of the Chumie,
which is Block Drift, where the position is particularly favour¬
able. I would have had my other posts in the ceded territory,
I should have had no Kafirs, hut other coloured people, on my
line of communication.
2875. Chairman.] Have you formed any opinion of the
policy that it would he desirable for this country to pursue to¬
wards the Kafir tribes, with a view to prevent their constant
depredations ?—The most effective policy would he the locating
of the Fish River Bush with Hottentots and other coloured
people.
SELEér COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
359
people. When the Kafirs occupied that boundary it was im- General
possible to prevent them from getting off with their plunder.
A friendly coloured people, grazing their goats and cattle in k.c.b. '
the bush, would be the best guardians we could have.
2876. In the event of those depredations still taking place, 7 July »851.
what system should be adapted in order to prevent their recur¬
rence and to punish them ?—I should have sent immediately
the police, and insisted upon the chief, who was the bead
of the district, giving up the plundered property, and if he
would not, I should have immediately marched a body of
700 or 800 troops in, and compelled restitution and a just
fine.
2877. 1^0 you approve of what has been called the patrol
system in the pursuit of Kafir robbers?—That has been the
only alternative hitherto ; we have never followed them with
a military force in time of peace ; but now we should have
them under a different organization ; all those would be con¬
sidered British subjects who remained on our side of the Kei,
and those who did not choose to register themselves as such,
and give up their arms, would be driven across the Kei, where
there is plenty of room for them, and there we would have
entered into treaties with them.
2878- You think it would be our policy to uphold the au¬
thority of the chiefs, and deal with the Kafirs through the me¬
dium of the chiefs?—I intended not to have done quite that;
the chiefs should not be hereditary, but I would appoint the
chiefs to be heads of districts, and they should hold their
authority from the Governor.
2879. You would have given them magisterial authority?—
Yes.
2880. And have held them responsible?—Yes, under a
civil commissioner.
2881. Do you think the Kafirs would acquiesce in that?—
The chiefs gave in their submissions to me upon those terms,
clearly explained to them.
2882. And you think the Kafirs themselves would ac¬
quiesce in such a system ? - I think they would, under strict
but kind managemeni, and if they saw that you had force
enough to support it.
2883. Did you find in the Kafir war you were engaged in,
great inconvenience in consequence of the distance of the seat
of Government from the scene of that war ?—It was lessened
by the zeal of my council. But Cape Town was the seat also
of mercantile business, and of my commissariat resources.
0.63. z 4 My
36o
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General My conmiissary-general was necessarily there, at a distance of
miles ; a great inconvenience.
K c.b" ' 2884. Do you think the residence of the principal officer
of the British Government ought to be nearer the Kafir frori-
7 July 1851. tier than Cape Town ?—I think decidedly there ought to be an
officer, with paramount authority on the frontier ; it is always
a questionable thing to move a capital, particularly one as
Cape Town is situated. I should be very loath to move the
Government from Cape Town ; but there should be a com¬
petent authority on the frontier.
2885. Would any authority be competent, except the au-
ihority of the principal governor in the country ?—I suppose
you might constitute one.
2886. Do you think a Lieutenant-governor would be suffi-
fieient?—Whether you call him Lieutenant-governor or Go¬
vernor, he ought to be left to act entirely independently.
2887. You think there should be somebody on the fron¬
tier who could act independently, and upon his own responsi¬
bility, as occasion required? —I think so, certainly.
2888. Mr. Hindley.^ That was not your opinion with regard
to the relation in which you stood to Colonel Hare ?—In what
I did I abided by the tenor of my commission. Í had also to
revise the treaties Lord Stanley's desire ; this I should have
done, whatever opinion I held.
2889. Chairman.^ Do you think, speaking generally, that
it would be true to say, that the conduct of the British Govern¬
ment towards the Kafirs has been marked by a want of that
proper degree of forbearance which is due from a civilized
country to tribes less civilized ? —I should say not: my most
ardent wish was to have benefited them in every way.
2890. Do you think any advance has been made in civili¬
zation among the Kafir tribes, by the etForts of missionaries, or
others ?—I think not a great deal ; but I think the few that
came over to us with the missionaries were most exemplary
people: there were few, but their conduct was very exemplary.
2891. You arc acquainted with India.^ — Yes, a little.
2892. Mad you had occasion to see some of the wild tribes
in India, some of the mountain tribes ?—Not much of the
mountain tribes.
2893. Have you any means of comparing the Kafirs with
those Indian tribes, with respect to their disposition to receive
civilization, and the stopping of those marauding habits
among them?—The best way, I think, is to employ mis¬
sionaries, to establish schools, and encourage agricultural
pursuits.
2894. Have
select committee Olí tlle kafir tribes. 361
2894. Have they a disposition to enter into the pursuits of General
cominerce ?—No; only as far as selling their hides and the
gum of the mimosa. Here I may remark, that one plain k^cb" '
proof that the Kafirs were preparing themselves for hostilities
is, that they are so well furnished with arms and ammunition, 7 July 1851.
because the Kafirs have not a head of game in their country.
They are not like the tribes of North America, hunters ; the
women cultivate the soil, and the sole occupation of the men
is the acquisition and care of cattle.
289.5. As a matter of humanity and policy, is it indispen¬
sable that there should he such a force for some time upon the
frontier as shall not expose those wild tribes to the temptation
of supposing they can resume hostilities with advantage ?—1
think so, clearly. It is the most humane thing we can do.
2896. They are formidable opponents in war, are they not ?
—In the bush they are.
2897. And they have improved in that respect since you
were there, I apprehend?—I should think in some degree
they no doubt profit by the Hottentots that have joined them.
2898. When you were there you think they could not make
much stand against regular troops ?—Not for a lengthened
period, nor in the open country at all.
2899. bush, and among the rocks, they could ?—Yes;
but they never did make any long stand ; they generally
evaded us.
2900. Mr. Mackinnon.'} Do you consider that the Kafirs
are a more agricultural or a pastoral nation ?—I should say
pastoral ; they have not sheep, but cattle.
2901. Do you consider that they would incur great hard-
.ship and privation if they were driven out of the Amatóla, as
you have been stating, on the other side of the river ?—There
would be plenty of room, and plenty of open space for them,
on the other side of the Kei. On this point I inquired par¬
ticularly of a missionary, who knows that country very well ;
from him I understood, I need be under no apprehension on
that account.
2902. Then they would not be received hostilely by the
tribes, or the parlies on the other side of the river, into whose
land they would be driven ?—No ; it is land that is in fact
unoccupied.
2903. As a matter of fact, then, there would be no cruelty
or hardship ?—No ; there would be no cruelty or hardship
as regards space ; but I should be sorry to dispossess the sub¬
missive ones of the land further than the Keiskamma, because
we should have there a much better opportunity of civilizing
them ;
362
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General them ; the refractory ones would, for their own sakes, not less
^^MaUland^^ ours, be better beyond the Kel.
K c. B ' 2904. The outline of your recommendation is that a settle-
ment should be made with the Fingoes and Hottentots in the
7 July 1851. rear, and then in front we should have a line of posts?—Yes,
a line of strong posts, but not surrounded by the Kafirs ; to
small and dispersed posts I particularly object. Considering
the limited number of troops that I could count upon, I should
have taken up the line of the ceded territory, as I have stated,
relying upon Waterloo Bay for my landing place. We had not
more accidents when I so employed it, than I see have occurred
at the mouth of the Buffalo. I should have got Madras surf
boats.
2905. If the Fingoes and Hottentots were settled as you
mention would they cultivate the land ?—They would cultivate
the land to a certain extent, and their cattle browse the bush.
2906. And locate themselves there ?—Yes, and locate
themselves there.
2907. I think you said that occasionally the Hottentots
were rather changeable ?—They do nut like being away from
home long.
2908. Therefore they would be satisfied and contented with
cultivating the land in the rear of the posts you have men¬
tioned ?—Yes.
2909. Marquis of Grmiby.] Do you think that, in a mili¬
tary point of view, the Buffalo River is a better boundary than
the Kei r—It will require more troops than I was likely to
have had to protect it; and I think it would not be complete
without the Amatólas in our possession.
2910. As regards the coloured settlements you have spoken
of, I see in your despatch of the 18th of September 1846, you
say, you would have a defensible village, or the villages de¬
fensible ; do you adhere to that as between the Fish River and
the Buffalo River? I will read the passage to you in your
despatch ; it is this : " To occupy this country by a series of
coloured settlements, each consisting of a defensible village, in
which the population of the settlement shall reside, and sur¬
rounded by ample lands for pasture and tillage."—That was
not actually the last opinion I formed. I changed my view
once or twice as I got more acquainted with the country. I
would have placed the Hottentots and coloured settlers in our
old military posts on the Fish River line. These places of
security for their families would have induced them to locate
immediately.
2911. You think it would be better to have a settlement of
coloured
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
.363
coloured men, Hottentots and Fingoes, than have Europeans General
in that ceded territory ?—Certainly, Sir Peregnwc
2912. You think it is better to have them, than leave the '
country to be altogether depopulated, and have a space without —l.
any inhabitants whatever ?—I would place the Hottentots and 7 July 1851.
Fingoes first of all in the rear of the troops, that is, in the rear
of our posts, and along the Fish River ; we should see what the
effect of that would be, whether it would protect the colony;
then I would go on locating the ceded territory with the
coloured people, if I found it answered.
2913. And, with regard to Kafirland, the district of country
beyond the Keiskamma, I see you state in this despatch, " Over
the country between the boundary line I have suggested and
the Kei river, probably some sort of control ought to be
maintained." What sort of control do you allude to there?—
I thought it would be necessary to establish over them a system
of control and superintendence, whereby their submission might
be completed and fostered into a habit. Therefore, when they
sued for peace, the terms proposed by me were, their loss of
the territory west of the Chuniie and Keiskamma, the sur¬
render of their arms and booty, a stipulated payment of cattle
for the injuries they had inflicted, and submission to the British
rule if they remained west of the Kei river. To this the Gaika
chiefs, one by one, agreed, and came to be registered, profess¬
ing to place themselves at my disposal, under the distinct under¬
standing, that in so doing they abdicated their chieftainship,
and that any power they might possess thereafter, would be
only by delegation from the British Government.
2914. Mr. Monsell.]^ Do you think sending the surveying
party by Colonel Hare had anything to do with the breaking
out of the war in 1 846 ?—No, after I had seen the Kafirs in
1844, and entered into new treaties with them, Sandilli's
councillor got up, and on behalf of Sandilli, who was present,
he congratulated the Gaika chiefs upon the British Govern¬
ment having taken it into their hands to check the marauders,
and place a post in the country ; he said, " Now we shall be
able to master the thieves and he made a long speecii to that
effect. Sandilli himself, by the diplomatic agent, proposed to
me to place a post at Blockdrift. I should not have had an
idea of a post there but for his proposing it.
2915. There was some difference of opinion between you
and Colonel Hare upon the subject?—Yes ; but Colonel Hare
thought his explanation to Sandilli had removed any unfriendly
feeling the chief might have had ; and he was quite satisfied
afterwards that the war party were influenced by other motives.
2916. Do
364 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General 2916. Do you know anything of the character of the native
tribes in the neighbourhood of Natal ?—Very little,
jjpg ' 2917. Do you know whether they were likely to become
troublesome to the British settlers there ?—I suppose they will
7 July 1851. some of thevn be troublesome.
2918. Are they of much the same character as the Katir
tribes ?—The Zoolus are not ; they now occupy Natal, as our
subjects, about 120,000 at present, have been driven in by the
tyranny of their chiefs.
2919. Marquis of Granby.] With reference to the sur¬
veying party at Blockdrift, your opinion was quoted the other
day, and I think it was somewhat mistaken ; I should like,
therefore, to set it right. At question 2536, you were asked
this : "Then I will read to you the opinion of Sir Peregrine
Maitland himself upon the occurrence, and then I will ask
you your own opinion upon it ; " and the opinion the honour¬
able Member read was this : "The sending of the surveying
party to Blockdrift, prior to the conclusion of the former
agreement with Sandilli for the ground, was a great error."
That is put in as your opinion, and I think, in referring to the
despatch, you will find that it was not your opinion, but the
opinion of Colonel Hare that you quoted ?—I quoted Colonel
Hare's opinion, but there is no doubt about it ; it was unfor¬
tunate ; but every explanation was given, and Colonel Hare was
satisfied of the contentment of the chief. I would not cer¬
tainly have sent a party to survey ; w hat 1 meant was that
Colonel Walpole should ride over, and look at the ground
that Sandilli had proposed that we should occupy.
2920. Colonel DunneJ] When you say it was proposed,
you mean that Sandilli had proposed it?—Two years before he
had proposed it.
2921. Colonel Eslcourt.'] Unless the Kafirs had been al¬
ready inclined to go to war, they would not have taken up
such a slight error as that ?—Certainly not ; the Resident was
on the spot when .Colonel Walpole arrived, and he would
have said. Do not bring the surveying party here, had he been
made aware that Sandilli would object to it.
2922. Colonel Dunne.'] It was a mere pretence for war ?—
It was not made a pretence for war afterwards ; it was our
taking into custody within the colony a man who had stolen
in the colony from a shop at Fort Beaufort ; they sent in a
party to rescue him, they fired upon our party and did rescue
him, and the Hottentot he was bound to they murdered, and
cut his arm off. We demanded the people who had inflicted
the injury, and they would not give them up to us ; and it was
only
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 365
only a little before I accepted the chiefs' submission, in General
November 1846, that they gave ihem up on my repeating the SwPeregrine
demand. They could not make the survey a pretence for this Maitland,
K C S
outrage. • '
2923. Sir E. Buxton.'] Did you, in the main, adhere to the y jyjy 1851,
policy which was established by Lord Glenelg, with reference
to the Kafirs ?—I think, in the main, except the putting of
posts in the ceded territory, and which had the effect, as I have
said, for six months, of keeping all matters quiet ; that was
such a cessation of robberies as had not been previously known.
The ceded territory brings the Kafirs close to our border ;
they cannot resist the temptation to steal the cattle. Their
lav\s and usages are unfortunate : a young man has to buy his
w ife, he has to give so many cattle for her ; what can he do ?
he asks his friend to assist him to get them in the colony, and
says, I will do the same for you. They have no other active
occupation.
2924. Chairman.] You stated, that the limits of the colony
are now the Great Fish River?—The Keiskamma and the
Chumie I took as limits; the limits of European farms I
meant to be the old Fish River.
2925. Are you aware whether there are many European
settlers now beyond the Great Fish River?—No, there are
none of the colonists there, unless they have been placed there
lately since I came away. I do not know whether there has
not been a military settlement placed there.
2926. Arn I to understand you, you would revert to the
policy of keeping what is now called Victoria as a neutral
ground, which should be neither inhabited by the Kafirs nor
by the British settlers ?—No ; I should place the troops
there; if Victoria means the ceded territory, I would not have
any Kafirs there,
2927. Nor European settlers ?—I would have no European
settlers there, unless in towns. I would not let them have
any cattle farms there.
2928. Do you imagine it would be possible for us to drive
the Kafirs out of the Amatóla Mountains ?—I conceive it
quite possible to do so.
2929. And to maintain that as a frontier freed from the
presence of Kafirs?—I think so; I think you may do it.
2930. To effect that where would you station the troops ?—
I should station the troops just upon the same principle; as I
have stated, I would take up the line of the Buffalo ; but
then I would let no Kafirs settle between the Buffalo and the
colony, nor in the Amatólas. I would let no Kafir be in the
rear
366 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General rear of my posts; and I would adopt the same principle of
^"Maitland'^ four or five large posts, instead of scattering small posts
K.C.B. ' through the country.
'r jÛÏTÏBîi ^93^* Mr. B. Cí/ríer.J I understand that the opinions you
have given with regard to the frontier policy were what you
would have done?—What I should have done.
2932. And now you think it is desirable, as Sir Harry Smith
has expressed an opinion in favour of making the Buffalo the
frontier, to carry the same policy out, taking the Buffalo instead
of the Keiskamma?—Yes ; but then I must put in the proviso
that he is allowed troops to do it. I was always pressed
to send back the troops as soon as I could, spare them, and I
took the line most compatible with the amount of force likely
to be permanently spared.
2933. I understand that you have stated the general prin¬
ciple upon which you would have dealt with the frontier, in
your own time, and that those principles may yet be carried
out, subject to such alterations as may have become necessary
from the state of circumstances at present occurring, which
may render it necessary to advance the frontier ?—Yes, just so.
2934. Do you consider more troops would be required at
the Buffalo frontier than the Keiskamma?—Yes ; I think any
extension of frontier would require that; the frontier would not
be extended in length, but it would be further from the colony,
and the course of the frontier would be rather altered by
taking up the Buffalo line.
2935. Colonel Dunned] Is not there an advantage gained
by the Buffalo, that you can get your supplies by sea more
easily?—Yes; but from what I have seen in the papers I
judge the loss of shipping to be as great at the Buffalo as it
was near the mouth of the Great Fish River.
2936. There is no advantage gained, you thiuk, as a better
landing place ?—I fear little ; the report of the naval officer I
sent was not very encouraging in that respect ; there is smooth
water within the bar ; but the bar is dangerous.
2937. Must not the base of all our operations now be from
some port, and not from the colony ?—Certainly, from some
port or landing place in Kafirland.
2938. Sir E. BuxtonJ] Would you drive the Kafirs alto¬
gether out of the territory between the Keiskamma and the
Buffalo ?—If the latter river is decided to be our line, certainly
I would.
2939. You would not allow Kafirs, even though they were
subject to British rule, to remain in that territory ?—I would
not.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
367
not, between the troops and the colony. I think that our
cattle farms offer a temptation that they cannot resist. ^Maiufnd^
2940. Mr. Hindley.\ You would not have Kafirs between k.c.b. '
the Keiskamma and the Buíí'alo ?—Not if you take up the new
line; you see I should have taken little away from the Kafirs 7* «y 1851.
but what was formerly neutral ground, and had been restored
to them, and this for the sake of getting a better line, and in¬
terposing coloured settlements as a barrier between them and
our cattle farms.
2941. Sir E. Buxton.] Can you give the Committee any
opinion as to the effect upon those Kafirs who may be driven
to the eastward of the Buffalo ?—They would not like it, of
course. I had given up the idea of taking up the line of the
Buffalo ; it is a tempting line, but it requires a larger force,
and is not, I think, complete without the Amatólas.
2942. Mr. Hindley.] In what respect is the Buffalo line
tempting ?—It is a shorter line, and the prospect of a landing
place at the mouth of a river in smooth water is a tempting
consideration, though a dangerous bar is to be first crossed.
2943. In the event of the Buftalo being made the frontier
line, what use would be made of the land between the Keis¬
kamma and the Buffalo ?—I should keep it free from settlers
entirely ; I would not let European settlers into it.
2944. Nor Kafiis ?—Nor Kafirs ; I should not object to
Kama's Kafirs ; they are friendly and attached to us.
2945. Sir. E. Buxton.] Their chief is Kama?—Yes; he is
a Christian ; but his tribe are not Christians, or but few of
them are.
2946. Would not such a measure as you have described,
namely, the driving of the Kafirs to the east of the Buffalo,
reduce them to poverty ?—No, I do not think it would reduce
them to poverty; because, as I have said, beyond the Kei they
have plenty of land, and there is nothing to make them poorer,
if they take their cattle with them.
2947. Mr. Hindley.] In all this arrangement of the frontier,
do you discard all considerations except those of expediency ?
—No, I do not discard all considerations except those of ex¬
pediency. I think that nothing can be more demoralizing than
to have a state of frontier in which you are perpetually dis¬
turbed by inroads, and in the course of the year two or three
people fall ; it is a perpetual state of warfare.
2948. Is not it demoralizing if the Governor and the
British do not recognise the principles of justice?—Certainly.
2949* -And can it be consistent with those principles to be
dealing with the Kafir land precisely as we please, and appoint¬
ing
308 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General ing the Kafir chiefs as you propose, without any regard to the
hereditary rights those chiefs possess?—It comes to this; you
k!c b" ' either drive the Kafirs out, or they will drive you out,
one or the other. Your questions to me have all been those ol
7 July 1851. expediency.
2950. Viscount Mandevitle.] It is just a question whether
you are unjust to the colonists or protect them. You see no
injustice in punishing the Kafirs for their robberies?—I do
not hesitate to say the Kafirs had no cause of complaint what¬
ever against the colony ; that their plunder has been altogether
for the love of plunder, and that they had no cause of com¬
plaint against the. colony ; there were no reprisals made.
Macomo came and said he had lost two horses. I desired
the garrison to be paraded, and he could not find out the
people he had lent them to ; but I found out that two of the 7th
Dragoons had deserted and taken the two ponies he had lent
them. I paid him for those horses far more than they were
worth.
2951. Colonel Dunne.'] Was not it the fact that those
Kafirs who inhabit this country did become possessed of it in
the way we have?—Yes, just so.
2952. Sir E. Buxton.] How long since ? —They removed the
Hottentots, and the Hottentots removed the Bushmen.
2953. How long ago was it they became possessed of it ?—
I forget at this moment.
2954. Colonel Estcourt.] They having begun the war, it
would be quite fair to adopt a line of policy upon the frontier
that would suit our defence for the future?—Yes, and I think
humanity requires it.
2955. Whether you take land from the Kafirs or not, it
would not be dealing unjustly with them, they having begun
the war?—No, certainly; tliey began tiie last war. You can¬
not allow the Kafirs to take a prisoner out of your hands, and
to murder your escort, with impunity.
2956. Mr. Hindley.] Do you think the complaints of the colo¬
nists respecting depredations committed by the Kafirs were al¬
ways just and well founded?—I think in some instances they
were ; in a few they w ere not, but they were generally well founded.
2957. Are you aware of a circumstance that took place,
I think in the year 1842 ; you may perhaps have heard of it ;
on the 19th of June 1841, it was reported that "a man of the
name of Redman, a superintendent of cattle belonging to Mr.
Howse, went to the door and looked out ; the moment he did
so a Kafir shot him through the head, and he fell back into the
hut,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
369
hut, and never spoke afterwards; the Kafirs immediately left General
the place ; they only fired the one shot, and those that we SïrPeregrine
heard were fired by two Hottentots belongina to the deceased." Maitland,
• • 0^ O ^ K C B
That is signed " J. F. Lonsdale, Captain 27th Regiment." '
That wason the 19th of June 1841. On the igth of June, the 7 July 1851.
very same day, there was a requisition for a public meeting at
Graham's Town; that meeting was held on the 21st, and a
number of very strong resolutions were passed, accusing the
Kafirs of plunder and depredations, and outrage and murder, the
murders chiefly being, I believe, confined to this fact. Lieut.-
Governor Colonel Hare had immediately informed the Kafir
chiefs, and he says that they were exceedingly diligent in
sending out persons to discover the Kafir who had shot this
Redman. Now, on the 25th of June, that is four days after
the meeting, I find the following letter from Mr. West, the
resident magistrate, to Mr. Hudson, the acting secretary to the
Lieutenant-Governor :—" In reply to your letter of yesterday's
date, received this morning, I beg to acquaint you that I
have no doubt Redman came to his death by accident, and by
his own hand. The examinations with respect to this matter
are not yet finally concluded, it being the intention of the
public prosecutor to proceed against one of the two Hottentots
sent up ill custody from Fort Brown, for perjury, in having
falsely accused the other; but under any view of the case, there
is not the slightest pretence for charging Redman's death,
either directly or indirectly, upon the Kafirs." Now, dues not
this manifestly state a great exaggeration on the part of the
colonists?—They certainly do not understate their grievances.
2958. Do you not think they exceedingly exaggerate them ?
—I think that is the case ; but in England you would hear
very much the same language under the same circumstances.
I hope I shall not be misunderstood. When I am asked all
those questions about the best frontier, I am answering as to
the point of expediency as things are in existence, not enter¬
ing into the question of the justice at all. You are now
asking me what I think is best to be done to put an end to
the war. I am in no apprehension as to the issue of the war,
nor from the first have I feared that there will be anything
like a victory gained by the Kafirs ; but still it is a very dilatory,
and harassing, and expensive kind of war; and I believe you
will find it .so. They may not have a drought to contend with,
as I had, and whicli augmented our expense twenty-fold, and
reduced me to the necessity of taking a longer process. I was
obliged to open a new line of country through Pato's country,
and instead of moving against the Amatólas at once, I had
0.63. A A first
370 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General first to drive the T'Slambies back to the Kei ; we should have
heen starved but for this precaution.
k!c!b! ' 2959* 1^0 you not think that the Kafir chiefs have a sense
of the principles of justice ?—I think some have, to a certain
7 July 1851. extent. I think a great many bf their subjects have not.
•2960. We have it in evidence that the chiefs respect each
other, but I am sorry to say we have it in evidence the chiefs
never respect our Governors at the Cape ; can you account for
that?—That is a very a strong assertion ; I doubt its accuracy.
I was six or eight weeks with the Gaika Kafirs when they
were coming in and registering, and they must have been
very great adepts in hypocrisy if they had no respect for me.
I was on good terms with Macomo and others.
2961. Sir J. Walmsley.~\ Looking at the position of things
as they now stand, seeing the Kafirs are in hostility to the
British, do you see any other course than that of prosecuting
the war now?—No, I do not ; that I am decided upon ; you must
not appear to draw back or give in in any thing; if you do,
they w ill attribute it to fear and weakness.
2962. Chairman.^ You think that it is absolutely necessary,
to keep us out of war with them, tliat the Kafirs should be
convinced we are the stronger party ?—Yes, the Kafirs should
be thoroughly convinced that we are the stronger party.
2963. Colonel Estcourt.'] And having concluded the war,
we must maintain the frontier by a military force for some
time?—Yes. If we had gone on making the Kafirs give up
their arms and plunder, and register themselves as British
subjects, or go beyond the Kei, they would have felt that we
were the victors. Sir Harry Smith attempted it in a différent
manner. He thought, perhaps, the submission they gave to
him in kissing his feet would have the same effect, but I doubt
whether the Kafirs felt it in the same way.
2964. Mr. Hindley.'\ Should you think 0,000 men would
be required to keep our frontier ?—Yes, I think humanity
would require as many. One reason why I have such an
objection to small [)osts is, that they present a teuiptation to
the Kafirs to attack. I consider that humanity requires vou
to maintain a large force.
2965. Sir E. Buxton.]^ What number of men had you dur¬
ing the time you were governor of the Cape, before the war
broke out?—At tiie beginning I had very few; I expected two
regiments, which would have arrived very verv opportune, if
they had not been detained. The Kafirs verv likely seeing
those regiments, would not have gone to war ; they would
have thought more of it, and would have postponed it. The
Kafirs
SELECT COMMITTEE OM THE KAFIR TRIBES. 371
Kafirs have a strong idea that the English people will not General
suffer them to be beaten or deprived of their territory to any
extent. They have an idea that it will be restored to them as k c b. '
it was before. We found a book in Tatzo's hut, " the Wrongs
of the Kafirs," which taught them, that if they had continued 7 July
the war of '36 a little longer, the British nation would have
risen in their favour.
2966. Chairman.'] Who was that book [mblished by ?—
I do not know.
2967. Sir E. Buxlon.] Who was it written by ?—I forget
who it was said to be written by. The author's name was not
pfrefixed.
2968. Chairman.] It is an English book ?—It is an English
book.
296g. Sir J. JValmsley.] You have given an opinion that
5,000 or 6,000 troops will be required ; you only mean that
they will be required for a limited period ?—I mean for a
limited period.
2970. You would in the meantime endeavour so to en¬
courage the coloured people, the Fingoes and Hottentots, and
others, to locate themselves upon the territory nearest to the
Kafirs, so as finally, in a few years, to be able to defend
that frontier themselves with a small number of troops ?—
Yes.
2971. Mr. Hindley.] You thought, you said, that there was
not much improvement among the Kafirs?—There was not any
grëat improvement among them. I think the missionaries
have laboured very faithfully ; but I do not think they have
been very sticcessful.
2972. Will you allow me to read to yo'u a report of Sir
Harry Smith's statement to the Kafirs at King William's
Town, in the course of this year ; it is taken from a work
entitled " Periodical Accounts relating to the Missions of the
Church of the United Brethren established among the
Heathen it is as follows: "He then expresses his satisfaction
with the progress in civilization ; he observed that they had
adopted the use of riioney, and had learned to sow and plough,
&c. He declared that the missionaries had laboured with
more success during the last three years than ever before " ?—
That is since I came away ; I dare say they have.
^973- That is part of a letter from Mr. Kelvin ; the letter
contained information from Shiloh of the account of the war,
and this is a conversation which took place at King William's
Town ?— All I can say is, that the missionaries had, humanly
speaking, a better chance of labouring with success among the
0.63. A A 2 Kafirs
372 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
General Kafirs after the last war than they had before. In addressinij
Wesleyaus, I expressed my earnest wish that " Yon will
K.C.B. ' withhold your hands or relax your efforts, but that rather,
with increased opportunities you will augment your endeavours
7 July 1851. tQ fulfil your chosen task." I do not mean to say the colonists
have not exaggerated their sufferings in some degree; it is
natural they should ; people that are suffering, and are living
in a state of insecurity, generally do.
2974. The Marquis of Granbyi] With regard to the pre¬
text of the war being the survey at Blockdrift, you were of
opinion at the time that it was an advantage to Sandilli, and
that he merely seized that as a pretext for war?—Certainly
The war did not take place on that account ; I distinctly state
that the war did not take place upon that. The matter was
explained to the satisfaction of Sandilli. The war took place
upon quite a different ground. As I have said, it arose out
of one of the Kafirs stealing an axe from a shop at Fort
Beaufort within the colony. The man belonged to Tola ;
Tola went off to his tribe, got a number of his men under
arms, waylaid the constables who were carrying the man to
prison, and murdered a Hottentot, and wounded one of the
party conducting him. They took the Hottentot, to whom the
man was chained, across the boundary, and cut his hand off,
and they would not give up the perpetrators of the outrage.
2975. The opinion you formed at the time of the survey at
Blockdrift, that the Kafirs were anxious to obtain a pretext for
war, was confirmed afterwards, that is, after the war had broken
out, by the position of the Griquas, by their organization, and
by the quantity of muskets and gunpowder they had collected
together ?—Yes ; and by the report of the missionaries among
them, and other strong evidence. It was impossible, as the
war continued, to doubt that an immense deal of ammunition
had been got together for the purpose of hostilities.
2976. They must have been years in collecting those arras
and ammunition, you think?—Yes.
2977. Viscount Mandeville.] It has been stated in evidence
that Macomo referred to some treaties having: been siirned
00
with you, that is, as having been forced to do it, and against
his will ; will you explain that circumstance ? —I do not know
how you can make a man sign a treaty against his will. I can
only say this, that so far from its being true, there were two
articles which the Gaikas were taught to think injurious to
them, which I struck out, though they had agreed to them.
I had them first explained to them. They were to the eti'ect
that, instead of the Lieutenant-Governor, to whom it was
difficult
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 373
difficult to attend the appeals quarterly at Fort Beaufort, they General
should have a commissioner and a permanent court of appeal. Sir Peregrine
I explained that to them, that it would be beneficial to all '
parlies ; however, they objected, and I withdrew the articles. '
2978. Did you ever hear that statement made when you were 7 >^"'7 ^^5'«
in the colony ?—That he was forced to sign the treaties? No,
I never heard it.
2979. You stated just now that the Kafirs had gone to Mr.
Nel to ask him to rise in favour of the boers beyond the fron¬
tier?—Here is what Mr. Nel stated : '■ I know the Kafir does
not fear the Government, and I believe that I have the power,
if I chose to exercise it, but from which God protect me, to
bring the whole of Kafirland upon the colony. The Kafirs
have repeatedly sent messages to the Dutch boers, to ask them
why they do not stand aside, so that they may drive the English
into the sea. Even lately, when the troops were sent against
the emigrants, Kafirs have come from Kafirland and have asked
several Dutch boers whether they did not see that the Govern¬
ment was determined to annihilate the boers, and why they did
not assist their countrymen and leave the Englishmen to them.
This can be proved."
2980-81. Then you consider that the Kafirs may be at least
in some degree influenced by the state of politics in the colony ?
—No doubt. I suppose both the Hottentots and the Kafirs to
be influenced to a certain degree by what is going on in the
colony.
2982. Colonel Dwnne.J There is a despatch of yours that
goes very fully into the policy of the colony, and the military
defence of the colony, in 1844, to Lord Stanley ?—Yes.
2983. Do you recollect that despatch ?—Longer experience
in Kafirland may perhaps have altered in some things my
views since 1844.
2984. I wish to refer you to that despatch, if you please ; it
is a statement as to the nature of the frontier between the Fish
River and the Keiskamma ?—I see it. I am just of the same
opinion now.
2985. The question I want to ask you is this ; considering
that frontier to be a military frontier, would not there be an
advantage in pushing it further, where the country would be
open ?—That is just what T proposed doing ; and the line, I
mention here, is just where I wanted to place the Hottentots
and other coloured settlers under a defensive organization, so
that they might at any time reinforce our military posts which
were pushed forward.
0.63. A A3 2986. I believe
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAiÇEN BEFORE THE
General SqSG. I lieücve |he policy you rccommetHl, in iiict, i$ to keep
aw Peregrina the »v&r in jroiit of our line ot colony?—Yes.
'kTc'^b.^' 2987. And at a greater distance from our line of colony ?—
' Yes, certainly.
7 July i?5i. 2988. As to the employment of Kafirs as police or soldiers,
is your opinion favourable to that?—I commenced forming
that Kafir police corps that has since gone over. I thought then
well of it.
2989. What is your opinion of the Cape Rifle Çorps?—I
would have trusted myself with the Cape corps anywhere.
There must have been some delusion practised to mislead the
Hottentots.
2990. At that period, also, I thinjc yon mentioned in that
despatch that the tribe of Sandilli had, in fact, become, ac¬
cording to his own account, much more wicked ?—Yes.
2991. And that the missionaries having remonstrated, he
told them so?—Yes, he told them so.
2992. And, in fact, he had re-established several of the
abominable customs of the tribe?—Yes, giving that as his
reason.
2993. Therefore the missionaries would have had no pos¬
sible influence over that tiibe?—The missionaries went in a
body to him, and remonstrated with him in vain on that
occasion.
2994. Colonel Eslcourt.l It has been suggested in evidence
here, that if representative institutions were given to the
colony, the colony itself would, either in part or in the whole,
be able to take care of its own frontier ; do you think that
possible ; do you think the colony has the means of defending
itself?—They would be very sorry to try it. It must be recol¬
lected that they have not even the same means that they had
formerly of doing it ; because since the former Kafir war of
1836, a vast number of the principal boers have left the
country ; they have expatriated themselves.
2995. Mr. Hindley.'] Do you not think, as far as your ob¬
servation and experience goes, it is desirable that the Kafirs
shall, as much as possible, have the same persons to deal with
on the frontier ; not to have many changes ?—I think so, cer¬
tainly.
2996. Because then they get accustomed to the temper of
the people ? — Quite so ; I agree in that.
2997. In speaking of the frontier, I suppose it is understood,
whatever may be the opinion of different Governors, the boun¬
dary is determined entirely by the Home Government?—Cer¬
tainly.
2998. So
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 375
2998. So tl»al no Cîovernor can take any steps independently General
of the Colonial Office?—Certainly they cannot take any steps Sir Peregrine
tinally ; they are dependent upon Her Majesty's approval. Maitland,
2999. Sir E. Buxton.'] Is it your opinion that the establish-
mont of a constitutional government at the Cape would have - July 1851.
a beneficial effect upon our relations with the Kafir tribes,
and with the frontier tribes particularly r—I do not see how it
would affect it at all.
3000. Is it your opinion that the relations with the Kafir
tribes should be arranged by the Government of the Cape, or
by the Colonial Office, as it is at present?—I think they must
depend upon the Government in England ; I do not think it
would do at all, if they had a constitution, to give them the
power of deciding in questions of boundary or treaty ; I should
not give the colony the power to decide anything on these
points ; I think that should rest entirely with the Queen.
3001. Mr. jB. Carter.] In the address dated January the
20th, 1847, after the close of the war of 1846, there is the
following passage: " The tract of country adjoining the present
colonial boundary, commonly called the Ceded Territory,
together with that part which formed a deep indenture in
the colonial line (giving the Kafirs the advantage of completely
overlooking Fort Beaufort), and also the western side of the
Cliurnie Hock, I have taken away entirely from the Kafir
tribes as forfeited territory." That was part of the penalty
which you thought fit to enforce upon them at the conclusion
of the war ?—Yes ; it formed a vast indenture in the colony ;
it scqiarated us from the Kat River settlements, and enabled
Macomo's Kafirs to see everything that was going on in Fort
Beaufort.
3002. Does it apply also to the western side of the Chiimie
Hock ?—The tract is on the western side of the Chumie Hock.
I was very sorry to deprive Macomo and his son of any part
of his territory.
3003. Was Macomo aware of the grounds on which it
was forfeited ?—I think he was quite.
3004. It has been stated in the evidence of Sir Andries
Stockenstrom as to this district ; he called this district the
bone of contention. Do you conceive that the object of re¬
covering this small district can have been the grounds of the
Kafirs' present invasion ?—No ; have they declared it to be so ?
3005. Did they sufficiently understand the settlement of the
question, then, to have no real grounds of complaint on which
they could found any future attack upon us?—I think, cer¬
tainly. Mr. Calderwood explained it to them fully.
0.63. A A 4 3006. You
376
minutes of evidence taken before the
General 3006. Yoli say tliey have at times been encouraged with
Peregrine the hope that they would recover their territory ; was that by
k'.c 'b ' within their own bouiularies ?—I think they were
encouraged hy the fact that it was given back to them after
7 July 1851. Sir Benjamin D'Urban's war.
3007. Then, in point of fact, you think it very undesirable
after we have occupied any territory that we should re-cede it
to them, upon the ground that they would not appreciate any
retrocession on our part ?—I am afraid they would take it as
weakness.
Mercurii, 23° die Julii, 1851.
members present.
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Hiiidley.
Mr. Cardkvell.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Havves.
Sir E. Buxton.
Sir J. Waluisley.
Mr. Mack innen.
Mr. Bonliam Carter.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Filzpatrick.
The Right Hon. HENRY LABOUCHERE,
in the Chair.
The Rev. Henry Renton, a.m., called in; and Examined.
Rev. 3008. Chairman.^ WHAT was the occasion of your visit to
H. Renton, colony of the Cape of Good Hope ?—I went as Coinmis-
sioner from the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland to
23 July visit a few missionary stations that body has on the frontier,
1851. among the Kafirs.
3009. What was the date of your arrival in the colony ?—
The 3rd of November 1850.
3010. Did you go immediately into the Kafir country?—-
I went with all celerity.
3011. How long did you remain there?—I remained from
the middle of November among the Kafirs, till the 21st of
January, when I had to go into the Kat River Settlement.
3012. What was the state of things in the Kafir country
when
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
377
wlien you arrived there ?—I found rumours of war all the way Rev.
up on my journey; I found them very prevalent on the
frontier, hut I discredited them for various reasons. [
3013. Do you mean rumours among the white settlers ?— 23 July
Yes, rumours among the white settlers ; I had been reading 1851.
with care reports for two years antecedent to my arrival from
the missionaries of the body with whom I am connected, and
from the civil commissioners to the Governor of the colony,
as published among other official papers at the Cape ; those
accounts, to my mind, quite harmonised in representing the
increasingly quiet and settled state of matters among the
Kafirs ; in fact, on the assumption that matters were being
consolidated, one or two new stations had been proceeded
with, at a considerable outlay of money, from the belief that
there was a fair prospect of security, if not of tranquillity ;
this state of information in my mind before going made
me extremely incredulous of the mere rumours. Then I found
a proclamation from the Governor, dated King William's Town ;
he bad gone up in October, had met the Kafir chiefs, had
made inquiries of his commissioners, and seemed to have
arrived at the conclusion that there was no just reason for the
rumour and panic which prevailed in the colony. Thirdly,
when I got to the frontier, my first business was to ask anxiously
of the missionaries what their views on the state of matters
were ; the missionaries to whom 1 applied had been in com¬
munication with the Kafirs, and I believe enjoyed their con¬
fidence in as great a measure as any missionaries have ever
done ; their testimony was confirmatory of my previous im¬
pression ; they said " We know of various causes of discontent,
but we can see no indication on the part of the common
people of a desire to engage in war."
3014. Are you speaking of the missionaries who were
living among the Kafirs ?—I am.
3015. And they were of a contrary opinion from the set¬
tlers in tlie neighbourhood, and did not anticipate any Kafir
outbreak ?—They did not see grounds to apprehend it at that
time.
3016. Where did they reside ; in what part of Kafraria ?
—The station to which I went was the Chumie station j
the first and tlie oldest, therefore, and also the largest mis¬
sionary station among the Gaika Kafirs. I had occasion,
from an investigation which I was to prosecute, to summon
there two or three missionaries, who continued for a period of
days, indeed of weeks, with interruptions. There was the
missionary of that station, the oldest and most numerous mis¬
sionary
378 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. sionary station among the Kafirs, the Chuniie. Mr. J. F.
H, Rentoii, Cummlng was missionary there—(the Witness described the
J !. 'position of the Missionary Stations on the Map). Another
23 July missionary there was the Rev. Robert Niven, who had gone to
1851. Uniondale, a new station toward the head of the Keiskamma,
the very centre of the Amatólas.
3017. Had you any communication with the Kafirs them¬
selves ?—I had.
3018. Were vou led to believe, from their representations,
that there would, be no outbreak ?—Yes, 1 was.
301g. What was the nature of these assurances?—I con¬
versed, first of all, with some of those men on the Chumie
station, pointed out to me as the most intelligent Christian
Kafir men, who had been very faithful and exemplary under
former wars and trials, and who were very acute men, as most
of the Kafirs are. They said to me, that they did not think
that any of the Kafirs wanted war, and they did not them¬
selves see any preparations for v\ar. Then I had a visit from
the head of iheTyalie tribe, the Inkosikazi, widow of the late
chief, acknowledged by our Government as the head during
the minority of the young chief. She came over attended by
counsellors, and asked me why the English wished to go to
war ; I stated the English did not want to go to war. " Why
should the Kafirs w ant war ? " she said ; " the Kafirs did
not want war ; they dreaded war." I referred to some
individuals in her tribe who had not paid fines that were im-
poseil on them by the civil commissioners as evidences of a
refractory spirit. She said, " If those black people," as she
designated the common people, "if those black people behave
ill, let them be punished ; but why punish all the rest of the
Kafiis because a few black people were disaftected ?" I said,
" You ought to punish them ; you ought to enforce their obe¬
dience." She said, " Vou have taken away all my power ;
you take away the power of the chiefs; and then you
find fault with us for not keeping the people in order." But
so far as I could judge from the manner of the woman,
and the look of depression and anxiety she had, the im¬
pression was deepened in my mind that they dreaded war.
I paid a visit to her some days after, perhaps the succeeding
week, as a sort of act of courtesy, and put a variet}' of ques¬
tions to her and to her counsellors, the " Pakati " they call
them, but I elicited nothing to alter this opinion that they
were fearful of an outbreak and dreaded it, and were averse
to it, and that had an influence on my mind. I had repeated
opportunities of being and conversing with the Gaika Com¬
missioner,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES,
379
iiiitj.-ionei-, Mr. Brownlce, an able and upright magistrate, Rev.
and I a^ke(l him what his views were of the state of matters. Rentan,
He said, "We know very well that Sandilli has been plotting *'•
long ; we know very well his designs ; but 1 cannot find among ^3 July
the people, from all my sources of information, through the 1851.
police and under my own eye, evidences of any general sym¬
pathy with Sandilli or any design to break out into revolt."
Well, this was additionally confirmatory. I made inquiry of
Mr. Brownlee in relation to the civil causes that came before
him ; I believe he occupied what was considered the most in¬
vidious position of any European there ; he was represented as
having been put in the room of the deposed Sandilli, which is
a great mistake, and I see it is so represented in this country,
though such is not the case. He administered without the
intervention of Sandilli, as the local chief of a small section
or tribe of the Gaikas, after Sandilli's deposition, the affairs of
that portion, and that directly, without those affairs coming
up through the intervention of a local chief, but he was not
any otherwise over Sandilli, or substituted in his place, than
he had been since the last peace, when, as civil commissioner,
he was put over the whole of the Gaika chiefs, and when
matters were not settled by those chiefs, they were a[)pealed
to him. I asked him, as a material point, whether there were
many of those causes which he decided as appeals between
tlic ciiiefs and tlie people which were appealed against to
Colonel Mackinnon, his superior officer, and I think he said,
" Only one for 12 months," while the causes were nunnn'ous
in u Inch the chiefs and people, instead of appealing, came to
him directly to settle the matter, through the confidence they
had in his justice. That v/as very material ; and then, finally,
when 1 spoke to missionaries about the state of things as
compared with what they had been before 1835, they all con¬
curred that the common people of the Kafirs had a security for
their lives and for their property^, and an amount of personal
liberty such as they never had enjoyed at any former period ;
so that it was not the interest of the common people to rebel ;
they were much better off socially than they had been under
the single control of their chiefs, who could find occasion
against a rich man at any time to mulct him of Iiis property.
3020. Mr. Monsell.^ Do you attribute the diminution in
the power of the chiefs to the confidence that the people had
in this gentleman's system of administration ?—Decidedly ; I
believe that the righteous and impartial administration of
justice under the Gaika commissioner for those tribes, and under
the T'Slainbie commissioner for the other tribes, efficiently
superintended,
380 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. superintended, as both were, by Colonel Mackinnon, was
H. Renton, rapidly undermining the power of the chiefs.
3021. Chairman.'] The end of it was there was a formi-
23 July dable outbreak ?—There was a formidable outbreak.
1851. 3022. You were there at the time ?—Yes,
3023. To what do you principally attribute this outbreak,
which as you say, although it had been to a certain extent by
the settlers, was not expected by the missionaries who were
so conversant with the habits and feelings of the Kafirs ?—
While the missionaries did not see any evidences as they
thought of a desire to revolt, they did apprise me that there
were latent causes of disatfection in the minds of the people.
3024. But still those causes were not in their opinion suffi¬
ciently active to be likely to produce an outbreak?—Unless
some occasion arose to excite those latent influences.
3025. What were the causes that, in your opinion, led to
the outbreak ?—I think had those latent causes not existed,
and to a certain extent predisposed the minds of the Kafirs,
that the occasion which arose would have been insufficient.
3026. What were, generally speaking, those latent causes?
—There was among all the Gaikas a soreness under the
thought of having lost so much territory ; there was a soreness
at the deposition of Sandilli, an act which no Kafir really
acknowledged ; they believed him to be chief by a kind of
Divine right ; he succeeded Gaika, and was the head of the
Gaikas ; they are a very strongly feudal people ; it seems in¬
bred in them, the spirit of feudalism. Then there was a com¬
plaint and local grievance that a portion of land had been
taken after the last war, which the English had no right by
the war to take. They admitted that there was a right since
they went to war that the English should take possession of
what had been originally neutral, and latterly the ceded ter¬
ritory ; but they said this piece of land had never belonged
to the neutral territory, never belonged to the ceded territory ;
a piece of land running from Fort Hare to the head of the
Chumie River. They said this had been seized, that it was a
piece of robbery by the English, and it was taken from the
Tyalie tribe.
3027. Do you consider the loss of power among the chiefs,
which you have described, as one of the latent causes of dis¬
content ?—A powerful one to the chiefs, not to the people ;
but sufficient motive to niake every chief desirous of an occa¬
sion which might give him a chance of recovering his power.
3028. Will you go on to state any other reasons you have
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 381
to mention ?—Within this spoliated tract, as they considered Kev.
it, this piece of land taken by spoliation from them, there were
planted a line of military villages ; those had been designed
as a defence of the frontier; I am satisfied it was a most un- 23 July
fortunate step. The men placed in those villages were gene- 1851.
rally men of bad character ; they were placed on the one side
of the Chumie River, which is there the boundary between the
Kafirs Proper and the extended colony.
3029. Were those British settlers ?—They were British ;
they were discharged soldiers. They had a right of pounding
cattle at each of the villages ; and that, though a small matter
to our view, is a very serious matter to a population situated
as that population is, where there are no fences dividing the land.
The right of seizure and pounding was felt as a grievance by
the Kafirs on the colonial side, the Christian Kafirs. It was felt
as a great grievance by the Kafirs on the Kafir side, when the
cattle came through the river where it was shallow, as it often
is,* indeed, except at floods it is always passable at certain
fords. When the cattle came through there, and were seized
and pounded, it gave a great deal of irritation ; those men had
been in the habit of acting violently, I mean in their deport¬
ment, speaking offensively, and showing contempt and in¬
sult to the Great Place of the Kafirs ; and at one of them,
Woburn, their village nearest the Chumie station, a very sad
matter had occurred two or three years ago : Tyalie, the chief
of that district, and the most respected of all the Gaika chiefs
for character, had died at Iiis great place ; he had been l)uried
where he died ; the funeral was one of unusual circumstance
and pomp among the Kafirs, from the universal reverence in
which this chief was held, the brother of Sandilli and Macomo
and others, but more respected than any of them. Into his
grave had been put, with his remains, his clothes, which he
had had from the governor, his saddle and bridle, his assagai,
his muskets, and various utensils and articles considered per¬
sonal to the chief. The grave was watched day and night for
a considerable period by one of the clansmen, and this very
Woburn was unfortunately located by the side of this grave.
After its location the men of that village, aware of what was
buried with the chief, dug u[) the grave, to get possession of
the saddle and bridle, and guns, and what not, that might be of
use to them. On the other side of the river, by a spot that could
command a view, was the great place of his widow, and his
heir, and the great men of his tribe; and this act of outrage,
I was assured by the missionaries, had excited the Kafirs in
that district to an extent that could not be supposed.
3030. How
382
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
H.Renton 3030- How long ago did this event take place?—Some
•A.M. * two or three years ago.
3031« ^ 00 have stated all these latent causes of discontent ;
23 July but it there were so many causes of irritation operating upon
^ the mintis of the Kafirs, in your opinion, at that tinie, liow
came it that you, and the missionaries with wlioin you were
communicating, were so much astonished at the notion of the
Kafirs taking some opportunity of making an outbreak in the
colony r—I did not say we were astonished, but that, under
the benefits they were enjoying, and under the belief of the
impotency of resistance, and under the credit given to the
British power, we did not think that they would venture, unless
powerfully excited by some circumstance, to rebel ; though
we believed that if a rebellion broke out there were a great
many men who were tolerable subjects, who would immedi¬
ately sympathize with the revolters.
3032. Are you of opinion that at this time, although thçre
were causes of discontent, yet upon the whole that the great
body of the Kafirs were well bfif, and that the great body of
the Kafirs wtre sensible that they were better off under the
syktem that had been recently introduced than they were
before ?•—I have no doubt of the fact of the great body of
them being better off than they had ever been before.
3033. Did you reckon among the latent cáuses of discon¬
tent the check which had been put upon the plundering of
cattle by the young men among the Kafirs ?—I should think
thàt the chiefs and certain portions of the Kafirs would, of
course, feel that ; but the body of the common people had
not benefited by those forays.
3034. Would not those who felt that restriction most be the
most active and enterprising portion of the nation, and would
not they be able to influence the minds of others ?--They
might influence them ; but I did not see, and I have not yet
reason to think, that unless they had been powerfully acted
Upon, there was a sufficient inducement in those causes, some
of which you see were rather grumblings in regard to the
past than present felt grievances ; they were connected rather
<vith their traditional associations and their pride, and above
all, idehtified with a feudal attachment.
3035. Still do you think it extraordinary that a semi-
civilized race, such as the Kafirs are, with all those topics of
irritation, more or less welt founded, existing among them, a
very slight and accidental cause should suffice to produce
a general outbreak r—I should say that the prevalence of
rumours along the frontier and within the colony, of war,
had
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRÎBES. 383
had a very bad effect in turning the minds of all to the ex- Rev.
pectation of it, in inducing a sort of restlessness of feeling, tJ- Renton,
and along with that, apprehensions that something was medi-
taling, and thereby calling into activity those latent elements 23 July
to which I have referred as being upon their minds. 1851.
3036. Do you believe that the unprotected state with re¬
gard to the want of sufficient military force there, had any¬
thing to do with the aggression of the Kafirs, i)y inducing
them to think the moment was come when they could strike
a blow with advantage against British power?—I am not suf¬
ficiently acquainted with military aflairs to be warranted in
giving an opinion ; it did not strike myself. I had heard of
the vigilance of the Kafir police, and their remarkable success
in executing all police matters up to that time; and though
there were but few troops on the frontier, I couíd not judge
of their sufficiency or insufficiency against an outbreak.
3037. You have stated, I think, that the chiefs among the
Kafirs were very much dissatisfied with the existing state of
things in consequence of their diminished influence; but the
great bulk of tlie people were sensible of their improved con¬
dition from British influence ?—I have no doubt of it.
3038. Reverting to what you said about the violation of
Tyalie's grave, did you yourself see the grave in this state
after it had been rifled r—went to visit it, not being aware
of the outrage that had been committed ; and was struck, on
coming to the spot, to see its dilapidated confused condition,
rather like the ruins of some house foundation than what 1
expected, save that there were verdure and plants growing up
sown by the wind, I suppose ; and I inquired how it was the
chief's grave was in such a state of ruin, apparently, and
confusion ; and I was then told the fact which I have men¬
tioned.
3039. Do you know whether any investigation at the time
was instituted with a view to discover who had been guilty of
this outrage, and to punish them for it ?—I was told that a
representation had been forwarded to the Government ; that
the Governor had replied by expressing his strong disappro¬
bation, and had intimated that an inquiry would be made ; but
nothing had been done which the Kafirs knew of, or which
the missionary at the adjacent station knew of, which the
missionary deeply lamented, for he thought that if punish-
ment had been inflicted, it would have allayed the feelings of
indignation which were cherished by the Kafirs about that
matter.
3040. Did
384
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. 3040. Did anything take place more than you have stated
A about it, to your knowledge ?—Not that I am aware of.
__1 3041. Where were you when the outbreak actually took
23 July place ?—At the Chuinie station.
1851. 304'J- To what do you attribute generally the outbreak that
actually took place?—I understood that Sandilli had been
plotting long with Anta, his brother, and some others, to
foment revolt ; that a person called Umlangeni, who went by
the name of " the prophet," had been exercising a su|)ersti-
tious influence over the Kafirs who carne to him in further¬
ance of Sandilli's project ; that he had obtained perhaps more
influence than was suspected by the officials up to the time
that the outbreak occurred.
3043. Do you consider the outbreak to have been princi¬
pally the work of the chiefs acting upon the people, or of the
people themselves?—Of the chiefs acting upon the people.
3044. Will you state any other reasons that you think were
the immediate occasion of the outbreak ?—I think that the
course followed by the Governor, unintentionallv, but unfortu¬
nately, precipitated it.
3045. In what respects ?—He came up to Fort Cox; held
a meeting with the Gaika chiefs and their retainers ; I was
present ; the numbers computed who met of the Gaikas that
day, were about 2,500. His Excellency made what seemed
to me an excellent declaration of his purpose to punish the
guilty, whom he considered to be only a few individuals in
some kraals, and to protect all the innocent. He stated his
disbelief of any design on the part of the Kafirs to revolt, and
his determination to maintain peace. He renewed his denun¬
ciation of Sandilli, offering a reward for his apprehension ; and
he assured them that he would not allow a red coat to go out
to hunt Sandilli. All this, with the views I had, and the impres¬
sions under which I came, seemed to me to be excellent.
Unfortunately he indulged, besides this declaration, in an
extemporaneous harangue, and so expressed himself as to
excite, I fear, distrust and suspicion in the minds of the Kafirs
as to the declaration he had made to them. To a question
which was put by one of the Pakati to the Governor, " if he
believed that they did not desire war, and if he did not desire
war, and if he was not going to hunt Sandilli, whatdid he mean by
those camps," referring to the men that were immediately behind
them, some infantry, and the Cape Mounted Rifles; that ques¬
tion, which struck me as a pertinent and natural one, under the
circumstances, the Governor answered rather quickly and
angrily, by merely saying that he had said he was not going to
send
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 385
send out any red coats to hunt Sandilli, and that was enough.
Then several of the chiefs, along with the protestation to
maintain peace, intimated that he had not produced proofs '
of Sandilli's defection to justify his deposition or his being cast 23 July
off, and that they should like the proofs. This was met by
affirming that he had information from Tois, another chief, and
some other party that he could credit. The appeals for mercy
for Sandilli were met by very strong expressions of indignation
at such a request, stating that he would lose his head if he
showed mercy to Sandilli ; that the Queen would chop off his
head, and could he be such a fool as to lose his head for San¬
dilli, upon whom he poured out all manner of vituperative
epithets; and he spoke of Macomo, who was present, in terms of
a very irritating nature, stating that he did not care whether he
touched the stick of peace to-day or not ; that he might have
been a great man, but he was now a drunken beast and had
to be turned out of the colony, and a number of things, which
I lamented, as they seemed to be uncalled for ; and knowing
the feudal attachment of the Kafirs, I thought very likely
needlessly to ruffle their feelings ; but I left greatly satisfied
with the purpose and the views of the Governor, after the
information and impressions that I had. I thought he was
taking a very wise course, and only lamented that he marred
the good effect of his purpose and intentions by so much
indiscreet language and behaviour. On going home that
evening I was surprised to find that some of the Kafirs whom
I knew to be tolerably well affected to the British Government
did not concur with me in the views now of peace. They said
they saw there was to he war. I asked what put that into their
heads. They said, Oh the Governor is going to hunt Sandilli.
I said. The Governor is going to do the very reverse ; he said.
You Kafirs must hunt Sandilli, so that unless some of you catch
him he is a free man ; the Governor had said not a red coat
shall hunt him, and you have quite misunderstood him. I said.
Did you not hear him say it ? and they admitted that ; but then
they said he would not answer that question about what he
was going to do with the red coats and the mounted rifies ;
and you saw how he spoke when any reference was made to
Sandilli. And what did you infer from that? That the Governor
means something else than what he said ; that he is going to
hunt him, and that this is a pretence; and I was both sorry and
angry at their unjust interpretation of the Governor's views, and
told them I had seen the Governor privately before the public
meeting, and I was as confident as 1 was of my own sentiments
that the Governor meant nothing of the kind ; that he was
0.63. B B perfectly
minutes op evidence taken èefore the
„ perfectly sincere and they might rely upon his integrity
A.M.""' matter; this was on the Thursday night. On the
Saturday morning following, we heard with great distress
03 July at the Chumie, that some of the refractory kraals were obsti-
1851. nate and sullen, and not disposed to submit ; the missionary
at the Chumie, and the missionary from the Kat River, Mr.
Read, junior, who had come over to pay a visit that morning,
went directly to those kraals to use their influence in urging
tiie people to instant and unconditional submission, unless they
wished to provoke war, and to bring down upon themselves
and all the Kafirs the vengeance of the British power ; they
went and dealt with them, but came back greatly dissatisfied
with the state of the people's sentiments ; uneasy symptoms
continued to increase from that day, which was Saturday ; On
the Sunday, on the Monday, and on the Tuesday, Colonel
Mackinnon marched up, by his Excellency's orders, as I have
understood, from Fort Cox, through the gorge of the Keis-
kamma ; you are aware that the rear of the large body he
had with him was attacked by a handful of Kafirs; that several,
including some oflBcers, were killed, and several were wounded ;
and that when attacked the men were not loaded, and were
quite unprepared for such an occurrence.
3046. Mr. Monsell.'] Was the march in the direction of
Sandilli's house ?—It was through what was considered Sandilli's
stronghold ; it was an act in the estimation of the missionaries
and of all who knew the Kafirs, of the utmost imprudence,
unless it was meant as a declaration of war.
3047. Chairman.'] I think the next day after this the mili¬
tary villages were destroyed ?—They were ; after that occur¬
rence in the Keiskamma some of the men who had spoken to
me about their interpretation of the Governor's meaning at
Fort Cox on the preceding Thursday, said. We told you the
Governor was going to hunt Sandilli ; he would not give an
answer, and this mtist have been his intention, or he would
have given one. Now there were, I believe, thousands of
Kafirs who were not disposed to embark in revolt, but would
sooner have died than have surrendered Sandilli.
3048. Sir J. Walmsley.] You spoke of the stick of peace
atid of the Governor's referring to it ; will you tell us what yOU
mean by that?—All I can say is, I saw what might have
passed for a long broomstick, seven or eight feet in iieight per¬
haps, w ith a brass round handle of a door stuck at the top of
it, which the Governor held during his interview with the
Kafirs, and which he called tlic stick of peace, and flourished,
and he required all those of the chiefs that were pacific to
touch
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3^7
touch the stick, and those who would not do so he regarded Rev,
were not in favour of peace ; I thought,""perhaps, it might be in Retdon,
accordance with some emblem that had been used among these
barbarians, but I heard it was a device of his Excellency, and
23 July
the exhibition he made of the stick was not calculated to make 1851.
any impressions favourable to the dignity or authority of the
representative of the British power, in my humble opinion.
3049. Was that at the same period that a distant wagon
was attempted to be blown up r—It was at a former time the
exhibition of the wagon took place.
3050. You speak of Macomo ; who is Macomo ?—
Macomo is a son of Gaika ; the son of the greatest intel¬
lect, and the greatest military tact, but he was not the son
of the great wife, and consequently is not the chief of the
Gaikas.
3051. Is he a man held in great estimation?—The highest
estimation among the Gaikas in all military matters, aiid for
intellect.
3052. You spoke of some opprobrious terms which the
Governor used towards him ; do you know of any other act
towards Macomo of that character?—What the Governor
had done to Macomo formerly I know was felt by all the
Kafirs; they referred to what was done with feelings of in¬
dignation. On his arrival at Algoa Bay, I vvas informed, after
he came out as Governor, he called in Macomo, who
was then living in that neighbourhood, and ordered him to
put his head under his foot, and he put his foot upon Macomo
in the room of the hotel, in the presence of a number of
people.
3053. What was Macomo's observation?—Macomo rose
up and said, " I always thought you a great man till this
day."
3054. Mr. Carter.'\ How would the question of the re¬
fractory kraals bear upon this general proceeding of the
Kafirs ?—Incidentally along with the panic that prevailed
among the colonists on the frontier, and along with the
facts of Sandilli's and Umlanjani's plotting. There occurred
two or three cases of resistance to the police in the Tyalie
tribe, which act of resistance the commissioner regarded as
of some moment in the then circumstances. Under the
desire, I was informed, of avoiding a forcible collision, he
did not send down the force that he might have done to over¬
whelm the refractory individuals, but referred the case to the
Governor, forbidding the police to use violence. The cases
themselves, I understand, were some ordinary police cases,
0.63. B B 2 but
388 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. but fines had been imposed, and when the police went the
' fi-iies were refused to be paid, as well as some muskets known
1 to be in the possession of those people refused to be sur-
23 July rendered. The commissioner instead of employing forre to
1851, execute his decision under the circumstances, referred to the
Governor. He thought this resistance was indicative of some
dangerous design in connexion with what they knew Sandilli
and Umlanjani had been doing.
3055. Were any means taken directly by the Governor
with respect to this refractory kraal?—Yes; he came up to
Fort Cox ; he intimated that the police should be sent down
to levy the fines, and that if that did not do he should enforce
them ; and I suppose it was for such a purpose he took up
the military.
3056. Do you believe the military were actually employed?
—No ; it had not come to that.
3057. The collision took place irrespective of those refrac¬
tory kraals, without their being employed upon that service ?—
A collision took place without the employment of force, so
far as 1 am aware, to exact the fines imposed upon those
kraals.
3058. Mr. HawesJ] You have spoken of two interviews
that took place between the Governor and the chiefs ; will you
give me the dates of the two interviews you have spoken of?
—The interview to which I referred at an early part of my
examination, when the Governor issued a proclamation, after
the interview with the Gaikas, was in October 1850.
3059. When was the other ?—The second interview which
he had, the last meeting with the Gaika chiefs, was in Decem¬
ber 1850 ; on the 19th.
3060. Was that the occasion to which you refer, when the
stick of authority was exhibited, and the language of which
you have spoken was used?—On the latter occasion.
3061. Had not this stick of authority been long in use in
Kafraria?—I understood it had not been employed till the
present Governor instituted it ; that he first employed it.
3062. You are aware, are you not, that the present Gover¬
nor was there in the year 1848?—I have understood that he
had used this since he assumed the government of the colony.
3063. Had not perfect peace been maintained, and the civil
authority been thoroughly respected from 1848 down to the
end of 1850 ?—I understand so.
3064. During the whole of this time, this mode of commu¬
nicating the orders of the Governor, by a messenger carrying
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3^9
the stick, had been in use ?—I am not aware how long it had ^ ^n'ton
been resorted to ; probably for a considerable period. A.-a. '
3065. Are yon or are you not aware that the civil officer
had carried on the business of the government with perfect 23 July
peace and security under that system ?—I am. ^
3066. Why then have you been led to suppose that this
mode of symbolizing the authority of the Government among
the Kafirs tended to bring the authority of the Government
into disrespect?—I merely stated my own sentiment and feel¬
ing in relation to the manner in which this symbol was flou¬
rished by the Governor, and I think that such exhibitions do
harm and not good before a grave, subtle, and discriminating
race like the Gaika Kafirs.
3067. Had not for two years previously this emblem of
authority been used ?—I believe so.
3068. And perfect peace and perfect obedience to the law
had been maintained ?—I believe so.
3060. Then why do you suppose that at the end of 1850
this peculiar exhibition of the stick was so fatal to the authority
of the Governor ?—I did not say so ; I have no idea that it was
the exhibition of the stick.
3070. Are you aware whether that has any foundation in
local customs or usages ?—I understand not.
O
3071. From whom have you understood that?—I asked of
some of the missionaries, and probably some others, becaiise
njy impression was that it must have been so ; but I was told
it was not so.
3072. Are you aware or not that amongst an adjacent body,
the natives of Natal, for instance, a somewhat similar means
have been used to give authority to the Government messen¬
gers and weight to the Governor's orders ?—I have not heard
of that.
3073. Mr. Qardwell.l You have spoken of the causes of
distrust between the Gaika Kafirs and the Governor, and you
first said that one of the latent causes was the question in their
minds as to the lawfulness of the assumption of a certain piece
of land. Then you have said that one of the immediate causes
of the outbreak was the suspicion they entertained that the
Governor did not intend to keep faith with them with regard
to hunting Sandilli. Is it your opinion that the Gaika tribe
are a people over whom you could exercise a moral influence
if you preserved in their minds the belief that you were acting
towards them with justice and good faith ?—Yes.
3074. You believe that they are sufficiently civilized and
sufficiently docile for the moral power of the British Govetn-
Ü.63. B B 3 ment
300 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
llev. iTient to be exercised over tlieni, if that essential condition
" were maintained ?—I have an impression that it is much more
' difficult to deal with them now than it would have been at any
23 July preceding period ; they are a very deceitful, very deep race of
1851. people ; but I have heard numerous testimonies regarding in¬
dividuals, regarding chiefs, that if they had once pleilged their
word you might rely upon it. Several persons have told me
that SandiUi never broke his word ; that they never knew hirn
to do so ; they have told me so, and of others also, and what I
saw inclines me to the conclusion that if you could impress them
with the belief of our perfect sincerity and determination to
abide by a compact to which they were intelligent consenting
parties, not constrained, but intelligent voluntary parlies, you
might rely upon them ; that is th^e conclusion I decidedly
come to.
3075. Then is it your opinion that if this war were once
put down, and the British power vindicated, you could con¬
tinue to govern those tribes by civil commissioners, without
maintaining there the perpetual presence of an overbearing
military force?—That is a very difficult question, especially as I
am ignorant of military matters; it involves other previous ques¬
tions. You say, "if this war was put down;" now very much
depends upon the way in which that shall be accomplished.
3076. Suppose it were put down by military force in the
first instance ?— 1 doubt the practicability of that ; I have no
idea that the Gaikas will stand to be defeated, so as to
acknowledge that you have conquered them. I apprehend
that so soon as they find that you are in earnest, moving in a
strong force upon the Amatólas, they will retreat and leave
you in possession of the territory, and say. We have never been
conquered ; and there arises a great difficulty, for after the
impunity with which they have committed outrages now, it
would be a great calamity that that race, or any other native
race, should imagine that the power of the British is to be
trifled with. Existing circumstances seem to me to render
extremely difficult the formation of a compact consequent
upon such a vindication of the indomitableness of the British
power, as should exert a wholesome influence for the time to
come ; that seems to me to be desirable over all the native
tribes.
3077. Have you formed in your own mind any prospect
with regard to the future operations between us and the Gaika
tribes ?—I have thought much on that subject, but the result
is only to augment the sense of its difficulty.
3078. However, you would be disposed to desire that in tlie
first
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIE TRIBES. 391
first instance full manifestation should be made of the in- jjgy
domilable superiority of the British power?—Certainly. H. Renton,
3079. That being done, what would be the next step you a. m.
would propose to take for the pacifiation of these regions?— aTTuIy
That is a very grave question, and a very difficult question ; I 1851.
lament that our territory was ever extended so far as it has
been ; we have nothing to gain by that extent of territory ;
we can only retain it at an enormous expense ; we have lost
much treasure, much blood, and much moral influence by its
extension, and if it were possible after the unmistakeable vin¬
dication of the indomitable power of Britain to act a mag¬
nanimous part, and say. We care nothing about your land ;
what we want is your benefit, and if you will be faithful
allies and preserve that territory from invasion, to give back a
large part of it ; that would, I think, be a saving of much
money, and would be the means of restoring goodwill and
confidence in the minds of the Kafirs towards us.
3080. How far do you propose to retire, in carrying out the
course of policy you are now suggesting?—My ignorance of
militaiy tactics and matters renders my opinion of no value.
I am told that the Fish River does not afford a good line of
defence, otherwise I should have thought it desirable to have
gone back to what was our territory in 1819.
3081. Suppose we had retired considerably, either to the
Fish River or to some good military frontier, what would be
the personal situation of the missionaries established in what
would be indisputably Kafir territory ?—Personally their situa¬
tion would be just what it was before. The colonial connexion
has been hurtful and not beneficial to the progress of Christian
missions. At this time I am informed by the French mission¬
aries, than whom there has not been a more successful class of
men in any part of Africa, that they find their usefulness is
impeded by the approximation of the British colony to that
territory in which they have been labouring among Bassutos;
and for Christian missionaries I think nothing ought ever to
be needed in the way of political protection ; they ought to
go asking nothing political, and seeking no political influence,
and trusting entirely to other means. The Kafirs gave them
perfect protection ; but I think their disposition towards mis¬
sionaries is less favourable now than it ever was ; nevertheless,
they pledged protection to the missionaries of the Chumie
station, who were cut off from all communication with the
colony at the time that their revolting fury was most violent.
3082. Then do I understand you to think that if we had
vindicated our power by some exemplary manifestation of
0.63. B B 4 force,
392 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. force, and then retired considerably within the limits we at
//. Renton, present occupy, to whatever might, in a military point of view,
be tlie most tenable frontier, we should place both the Kafir
23 July tribes, and the missionaries residing among them, in a better
1851. state than we have any prospect of placing them in by a con¬
tinued extension of our power to the north ?—I atn disposed
to answer your question in the affirmative, because I cannot
see how our power is to be extended colonially to the north,
without fomenting a mass of discontent and rebellion among
the tribes now beyond, and without needing to multiply our
defences, and therefore our forces, correspondingly without
accomplishing any compensating benefit.
3083. In short, the question of the possession of land and
of the powers exercised by the chiefs are at the bottom of all
controversy between us ?—Certainly.
3084. Then remove those two questions and you prepare
the ground for the exercise of moral force on the part of the
missionaries?—You do.
3085. By that moral force you do not doubt that the British
influence might be exerted over those tribes very beneficial
to us in regard to political consequences, and very beneficial
to them in regard to moral and religious consequences. When
I use the word British, I mean the influence of our race over
the Kafir race. But I am assuming that the missionaries are
to be the instrumentality through which that influence is to be
accomplished ; do you agree in that ?—I agree with you con¬
cerning that ; there was in the minds of the Kafirs a prestige
possessed by the British over other races, a prestige that would
have been increased had they known the British only through
the mollifying influences of Christianity and civilization, which
grow concurrently w here they have missionary stations.
3086. What has been the conduct of the Kafir chiefs
towards the missionaries?—Faithful and friendly.
3087. Then in short, to sum up in very few words the course
of policy you would recommend, would be, first, the vindication
of the British name by our exemplary display of force ;
secondly, the withdrawing of the exercise of British power
within the narrowest possible limits; and thirdly, the extension
of moral power to those half civilized tribes through the
instrumentality of the missionaries ?—That is the course I
should prefer.
3088. \i\'. Maclctnnon.] In the course of your examination
you have stated that you consider the indomitable power of
the British name to be of vast consequences as a moral in¬
fluence over the Kafir tribes ; you also have stated afterwards
that
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 393
that you considered it would be desirable, after we had con- Rev.
(juered them and reduced them to submission, to give them Renton,
back a great part of the territory we now occupy, which has
been within some years past taken by the British ; does it not 23 July
strike you tliat those two statements are rather at variance ; 1851.
would the mass of the Kafir population imagine that we had
really got the ascendancy, if after the war we gave them up
a great part of the territory which we have already occupied
for a considerable time ?—The apparent discrepancy is guarded
against by specifying that all would depend upon the way in
which the war was finished ; the difficulty about this restora¬
tion lies in the vindication of our power sufficiently to pre¬
clude the idea that this cession of territory is made from weak¬
ness ; it is the necessity of that that led me to speak of the
desirableness of the vindication of our power, and to say that
unless we do vindicate it, to give them back land would be
liable to a misconstruction, and therefore to great danger.
3089. But does not it strike you that whatever vindication
of our power we might make, yet that ceding the land we
had occupied so considerable a time past would to all the
tribes, I may say, in South Africa, appear like a weakness on
our pari, and weaken our power?—Not necessarily, if proper
means are taken ; if the vindication of our power is unmis-
takeable, and if our views are communicated clearly and de¬
liberately through channels that would preclude all dubiety and
distrust, I do not dread that consequence.
3090. With the character that we have of those different
barbarous tribes, do you not suppose any private communica¬
tion with any one particular tribe, and then our ceding a very
great portion of territory, would have a very bad moral effect
upon the mass of the Kafir tribes as to our power and sove¬
reignty ?—It has been a great misfortune hitherto, that at the
conclusion of successive hostilities there have been compro¬
mises or equivocal positions which diminished, in the estima¬
tion of the Kafirs, the authority and the power of Britain ; that
has been a great evil.
3091. And you think that that authority would not be
diminished by the cession of a great part of the territory we
now occupy ?—I should think it would, unless you had pre¬
viously to that made a most unmistakeable vindication of your
power.
3092. Mr. Hawes.^ You have stated it to be your opinion,
that it is now necessary that British power and authority
should be thoroughly vindicated ?—That is my conviction of
the painful necessity.
3093. And
394 minutes of evidence taken before the
ti 3093- And that the Kafir tribes should be humiliated and
to ihe belief that their defeat is inevitable in any con-
flict uith the British power?—That is my view.
33 July 3094* What then do you mean by that more specifically ;
iSji- to what extent is this war to be carried on according to your
views ; are the Kafir tribes to be beyond the Kei, for in¬
stance, or what is your notion of the thorough vindication of
British power which you think to be so essential?—It is easy,
of course, after results have taken place, to say what would
seem to have been desirable. My impression was that in the
case of a violation of an acknowledged law, prevailing under
the system of government that had obtained for three years,
on the violation of that law there should be a most rigorous
uncompromising vindication of it, although there should have
been brought 9,000 or 10,000 men to enforce the law. It
would have been a great point for us to have been able to say
to every Gaika, " You broke that known law, and if you had
been punished for resisting that law, you would have been
righteously dealt with." I think that any exercise of power
in a clear case of that sort, is invaluable in convincing the
barbarian, as the civilized man, that the authority of the law
is supreme. Now that we lost that by getting into collision,
I do not know what can be done unless by doing w hat the
Governor said he would do, driving them out of the Amatela
mountains, which I do not think would be a matter of great
difficulty ; that has been done before by Sir A. Stockenstrom ;
therefore a moderate force knowing that country, with skilful
leaders, could do it again. I do not see how that is to be avoided
now, and if it bad been possible without the dreadful resort to
war to have vindicated our authority, nothing is so desirable,
but I do not see how that is possible myself at present, I
lament to say.
3095. You are aware, of course, that the territory now occu¬
pied by British military authority was the territory which was
once included within the colony and was subsequently surren¬
dered to the Kafirs?—I am not aware that the Kafirs at any
time were not the occupants, since British power was in South
Africa, of the land that they at present occupy.
3096. Are you aware of the proclamation of Sir Benjamin
D'Urban that included the w hole of British Kafraria up to the
Great Kei within the colony of the Cape?—Yes.
3097. Are you aware that that territory was subsequently
surrendered and left entirely in the hands of the Kafirs and
their chiefs?—Yes, I am.
3098. You are aware perhaps, also, that subsequently, when
Sir
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 395
Sir Peregrine Aiaitland was Governor, he was forced into a Rev,
war with the Kafirs?—I am avrare that a war did take place H. Renton,
at that time.
3oqQ. Aie yon aware whether or not Sir Peregrine Mait- 23 July
land thought it necessary again to occupy a part of that terri- 1851.
tory to preserve the peace of the colony ?—I have understood
so.
3100. In what way do you conceive it would he beneficial
or likely to promote peace and security if we should once again
conquer in Kafirland, and once again surrender the land to the
chiefs and retire into our own boundary ?—If you do not mean
to acquire Kafirland, there is no necessity for doing it, but
Kafirland is not yet subjected to British power ; I mean to say
that persons who occupy it are in a state of revolt; I would
put down that insurrection, although I lament that it cannot
be put down, I conceive, but by fighting; I was not disputing
the position of the land the Gaikas occupy being in the Bri¬
tish possession.
3101. Then you would carry on the war simply for the
pur[)Ose of subduing the Kafirs, without any intention of occu¬
pying any of the additional territory ?— Yes.
3102. Do you think the defeating them in the field, and sub¬
duing them by military p.ower, would be sufficient to maintain
our authority, if, afterwards, we surrendered all the territory
we had occupied in so subduing them?—I think that towards
such a step a variety of conditions would be indispensable with
the chiefs and with the people, conditions that should he
very distinct, and conditions about which no party in Kafirland
should have it in his power to affect ignorance or misa[)pre-
hension.
3103. Mr. J/o«seZ/.] I think at the period you left off your
narrative of the events you had witnessed, you were about to
speak with regard to those military settlements. Will you
state to the Committee what your opinion is of the effect pro¬
duced by the existence of those military settlements as between
the colonists and the Kafirs?—I think that the location of military
villages was a very unfortunate step, first on account of the
bad moral character of a great number of the men who came
to settle there. In the vdlage of Woburn, for example, that
was nearest the Chumie Station, there was not a married man,
but every man had his concubine ; those men were a moral
nuisance on the frontier, and were a continual source of irrita¬
tion ; and therefore instead of being a defence, were the cause
of danger in provoking collision along that part of the
territory.
3104. Will
39^ MINUTES OP EVIDÈNCË TAKEN BEFORE THE
! Rcnton 3'04. Will you mention what occurred just after those
A. M. ' occasions you have been describing in your narrative, in answer
to the Right honourable Chairman, in regard to those military
23 Jqly villages?—On the day after the collision in the Keiskamma,
1851. ^j,g whole of these military villages were destroyed j it was on
them that the outburst of the fury of the Kafirs was expended.
I was a painful witness of the conflagration of Woburn, and
the spectacle of the fugitive women and children from the
other villages. There was not a man spared at Woburn, or at
Auckland, which is further up. One or two escaped from
one of the others, but the woinen and the children, whether
from Woburn or Auckland, where there were some more
respectable men, were all spared by the Kafirs ; they were
sent to the mission station ; they were told to fly there, and
the poor creatures came with nothing but what was barely
sufficient to cover their nakedness.
3105. Mr. Hawes.l Might not the attack upon the military
villages, especially upon the men, arise from an impression
upon the minds of the Kafirs thai they were beginning to be
an organized military defence to the colony ?—The Kafirs
were aware of that being the design ; those villages were not
numerically so strong as they had been previously ; some of
their number had gone off; and it was doubtless a political
object with the Kafirs to cut off" one source of retaliation and
punishment certainly.
3106. Sir E. Buxton.'] What happened to the missionaries
at Cliumie and the neighbourhood of Chumie, at the breaking
out of the war?—There were three European missionaries
there ; one of them came in consequence of it, Mr. Niven
from Uniondale. He fled there wiih his wife and family, and
they were spoliated on their way of all their horses and
some of their clothes by the insurgent Kafirs who did not
know him, but after he got there he remained from that day,
Christmas day, until the 20th of January, and the mission¬
aries and their families were unmolested. The head of the
Tyalie tribe, Macomo and Sandilli, successively sent mes¬
sages to myself, under the apprehension that 1 had some super¬
intendence of the missionaries, to sit still, meaning by that
that there was no occasion for our going away, and they
guaranteed protection to our persons and our property, which
guarantee they redeemed.
3107. Were the buildings belonging to the mission at
Uniondale preserved by the Kafirs?—They were burnt, and
also at every station which was deserted by the missionaries in
Kafirland; the buildings were burnt and the property confis¬
cated
SEI^ECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 397
cated at every station from which the missionaries fled. There Rev.
was no station where missionaries remained among the insur- Ronton,
gent Kafirs except that one station at Cluiraie. Tiiere was
another station, at which an old missionary, Mr. Keyser, re- 23 juiy
inained for some time after the war, and while there his house 1851.
and garden were unmolested ; the son of Macomo conducted
him out when he would not remain longer. But I believe the
mission property throughout the whole extent of Kafirland has
been destroyed, save at the Ciiumie, which was on the colonial
side, but in the midst of the insurgent district.
3108. Are you correct in saying that the Kafirs who robbed
Mr. Niven were not aware that he was a teacher?—That he
was a missionary.
3109. What they call a teacher?—They were strangers to
him and he to them ; they had taken the five horses on which
he and his family were riding ; they seized his coat, which they
tore OÍF and demanded his money, and he gave them the little
money he had in his pocket ; fortunately the rest of his money
was in the hands of one of the females ; the man who hati
taken his coat went to the Great Place ot'the Tyalie tribe the
following day ; they heard what he had done, and the coat was
taken from him and sent to the missionary station, with an
apology from the Inkosikazi, who expressed her regret that the
teacher had been touched, and that she would endeavour to
recover the horses, but they were taken over to Sandiili, who
also said lie would deliver them, but they were never obtained.
3110. Is it your impression that if Mr. Niven had remained
at Uniondale the buildings belonging to the society would
have been saved?—That was my impression.
3111. Are you aware whether acts of great cruelty were
committed by the Kafirs on the outbreak of the war?—Very
great on the male population.
311'2. But have any of the missionaries been injured in per¬
son ?—Not one, save that case of Mr. Niven coming over to
the Chumie station, and passing through the district when the
blood of the insurgents was boiling and the destruction of the
military villages going on ; he was not aware of any mischief
in our direction : he imagined if he sfot to us he would find all
, ^ O O
quietness; he left, intending to go back the next day, but the
excitement produced in his family by the affair in the Keis-
kama induced him to leave for their safety.
3113. Is it your opinion that the effect of missionaries of
various denominations, on the Kafir tribes, has been exten¬
sively useful ?—I was disappointed in finding the amount of
that influence to be considerably short of my anticipation. I
found
39^ MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. found individuals on whom the success seemed to me, as we
should say, complete and indubitable ; perhaps at every sta-
! ! tion there was to be found some ; in some instances very few,
July and in others considerable numbers, but yon might find all
1851. over Kafirland individuals who had abandoned their super¬
stitions and habits, and incurred the obloquy of their friends
and adopted European manners and dress, and who were
yielding the most consistant obedience to the precepts of the
Gospel, and foilowinw our arts of tillage. You might also
find what certainly is of some account, that although the
number who had been Christianized seemed to be few, taking
it in the strict sense of the term, as men yielding obedience
to the precepts of the Gospel, yet through the presence and
influence of the missionaries there was a very great diflfusion
among the Kafirs of the knowledge of the first principles of
the Christian religion. You do not find a Kafir who disputes
the existence of a God, his unity, and the infinitude of his
perfections, nor who disputes the authority of the Word of
God. They all understand it is a revelation from God. They
do not like appeals to conscience ; they do not like appeals to
a future reckoning. They are more disconcerted by that tlian
all the arguments you can use ; when I came to talk with
them I found that not only with the common people, but with
the chiefs, and Sandilli among others.
3114. Colonel Estcourt.'] Are the missionaries in the liabit
of giving advice to the chiefs upon temporal matters ?—I un¬
derstand that the missionaries avoid, on principle, giving
advice on political matters. In relation to sucii temporal
matters as are connected with husbandry and ordinary affair.^,
they give them advice readily.
SEtECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 3gg
Jovis, 24° die Julii, 1851.
MEMBERS PRESENT.
Colonel Estcourt.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. H awes,
Mr. Monsell.
Mr. Hindley.
Mr. Card well.
BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq., in the Chair.
Reverend Renton, k.'tu., called in ; and further Examined.
3115. Sir J. Walmsley.'] WII.L you state what was the
time of your going to the Kat River Settlement, and what were
your reasons ihr going there ?—I went on the 20th January
1851, from the Churriie station, accompanying the missionaries
Messieurs Niven and Cumming on their resolution to quit,
and finding thete was no other route by which there was a
prospect then bf getting into the colony, which I desired to
do, by Fort Beaufort or Somerset.
3116. What was the state of the settlement at that period ?—
Disaffection extensively prevailed ; the followers of Hermanus,
who had rallied after his defeat, and had received accessions
frorn numerous discontented Hottentots from the colony,
had drawn into their vortex sbme of the Hottentots in the
lower part bf the Kat River, and were exercising a most
pernicious influence. There seemed to be no civil or military
authority in the settlement competent to the exigency; there
seemed to be no power to repress the Kafirs without, or to
control the turbulence within.
3117. Are you speaking of the period at which you were
there ?—On going there.
3118. Can you give us any information as to the treatment
of the population in ahd after the war of 1835-36, and
i846-217> when the sacrifices and services were the greatest,
and no compensation was made ?—1 understood on inquiring
of the missionaries, and again on inquiring of intelligent Hot¬
tentots and bastards, into the causes of the extraordinary
Rev.
H. Rentan,
A.M.
24 July
1851.
disaffection.
400 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
H Relioie that there were a long series of matters which
' A.M. ' soured the spirit of the inhabitants, and all spoke prima-
rily of the war of 1835-36 and 1846-47. It appeared that
on the first of those occasions the whole settlement were
brought from their homes to Fort Armstrong as the place of
rendezvous. Thev had to abandon with their houses their fields,
and property they could not take with them. The whole of
the males of the settlement capable of bearing arms were
required to do duty either in the field or in the garrison; that, 1
had understood, amounted to 90 per cent, of the whole popu¬
lation ; the women and children and old men were huddled
together at this miserable camp ; the cattle grazed around, and
a great quantity perished ; the ordinary means of subsistence
and of industry were suspended for upwards of an entire year,
and of the losses sustained you may form some idea from the
statement founded upon ofiicial returns which I have. Before
that war of 1835, the people of the settlement had 624 horses,
during the war they lost of those 557 ; they had of black cattle
before the war 5,406, and they lost of those during the war
3,992. They had before the war of sheep and goats 8,925,
and they lost of those during the war 5,460 ; they had sown
before the war 310 muids of wheat, barley and oats; 70
muids of Indian corn, beans and peas ; 045 ridges of pump¬
kins, and the greater part of them were destroyed ; 44 of their
dwellings were burnt to the ground; 2,673 of the inhabitants
had to receive support from the Board of Relief, of whom
1,470 were also partially clothed.
3119. Chairman^ What document are you reading from ?
—I am reading from a valuable memorandum furnished to me
by Dr. Innes, the superintendent-general of education in the
colony, founded upon ofiicial returns which he was kind
enough to go over, for this object, and containing an accurate
and full statistical account of the Kat River settlement, which
I should be happy to submit to the Committee entire.
3120. Sir J. Walmsley^ Has that paper reference to
1835-36?—That which I have read is a pait of the facts
relating to that period.
3121. Chairman.'] Is it compiled from ofiicial documents
and documents which have already been printed ?—I am not
aware how far they have been printed, but it is founded
upon official returns in some degree, particularly, I may add,
that part which I have now quoted, and other parts are
founded upon Dr. Innes s own investigation when visiting the
settlement on official duties at different periods, during the
course of the last twenty years.
3122. TheiJ
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 40I
3122. Then I presume when he was there on official duties R®*-
he reported the results of his inquiry to the secretary to the
Governor, or to the Governor ?—I presume so ; but in this '
document I find some quotations from his journal in regard to 24 July
his impressions of matters at diflferent periods of the settle-
ment's history.
[The same was delivered in, and is as follows :]
Mémorandum on the Kat River Settlement.
1. At the close of the Kafir war of I8I9 a Parole Treaty was
entered into by Lord Charles Somerset and the paramount chief of
tlie Amakosa tribe, Gaika, the father and predecessor of Sandilli.
2. By tills treaty, which left the eastern boundary of the colony
the same as that proclaimed by Lord Macartney in 1798, it was pro¬
vided that the Kafirs should forthwith give up and retire from the
11 act of country lying between the Great Fish River and the Kies-
kama. It was then occupied by remnanis of the Gonaqua Hottentots
or Gonas, the Gaika, Tslainbi and Amagonaquabie or Kongo Kafirs.
3. This tract was denominated the Neutral Territory, and by the
stipulations of the treaty was in future to be occupied neither by
colonist nor Kafir, or in the language of the Amakosa chief, its waters
were to flow undisturbed into the si a. The basin of the Kat River
forms the upper, and from its abundance of water the most fertile
part of this tract of country. Its area is about 200 square miles.
4. On the arrival of the British settlers in 1820, and previous to
their being located in the Zumveld (near Albany), the then acting
Governor, Sir Rufane Donkin, obtained the consent of Gaika to
occupy this tract of country, which from that time was designated
the Ceded Territory. His Excellency's plan then was to locate in
the basin of the Kat River the body of emigrant Highlanders under
a Captain Grant, whom he daily expected. This was to form the left
flank of a line of defence which he intended to form by a chain of
military posts along the Ceded Territory, to terminate in another
settlement on the IBaka (called Frederk'sberg), which was to form
the right flank of the line.
5. Captain Grant and his body of Highlanders never arrived ; the
occupation of this part of the line of frontier by a body of hardy and
warlike mountaineers was abandoned, and soon after (1822) parties
of Kafirs were permitted to re-occupy portions of the Ceded Territory
undisturbed, so long as they continued to live peaceably among
themselves and desisted from plundering the Ironlier inhabitants.
It was then that Macomo and his followers were allowed to return to
and settle down in the Kat River basin, whilst Tyali took possession
of the valley of the Mancasana, a tributary of the Kat River.
6. In 1829 Macomo and his followers were removed from the Kat
River in consequence of his having attacked a kraal of peaceable
Tambookies, plundered them of their cattle, and pursued with great
slaughter the fugitives into the Tarka, a frontier district of the colony.
On this occasion the Commissioner-general of the Eastern Province,
0.63. C c Sir
402 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 1'AKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. Andries Stockenstrom, was dispatched from Cape Town, the seat
H. Renton, Government, to carry into effect the expulsion of Macomo from
A.M. the sources of the Kat River.
—— 7' I" April 1829 the Commissioner-general arrived at Algoa Bay,
24 July on his way to the frontier to expel Macomo, but with no instructioris
^851- as to the future occupancy of the Kat River. From Uitenhage he fiist
addressed the Government on the subject, and in due course received
its sanction to occupy the Kat River, by a large body of Hottentot
settlers, upon the same principle as Sir Rufane Donkin had contem¬
plated in 1820, the location there of a body of emigrant Highlanders
under Captain Grant.
8. The location of the Kat River settlers was conducted under the
personal superintendence and direction of the Commissioner-general.
They consisted chiefly of Hottentots from the missionary institutions
of Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, bastards from the districts of Bavian's
River and Zwagerishoek, and some Gonahs who had been suffered to
remain after the expulsion of Macomo. At first it was in contem¬
plation to mix up a certain amount of English and Dutch with the
coloured classes in this settlement, but this was abandoned on the
ground that an English or Dutch settler would not consent to take
a grant with which a Hottentot would be satisfied, and that if they
accepted of a grant at all, it would be in the hope, by persevering
industry and superior energy, of adding others to it, thereby defeating
the main object of the settlement, and leaving the Kat River as open
to inroads as any other part of the eastern frontier.
9. With the exception of some seed distributed among the settlers
on their arrival at their locations by the Commissioner-general, no
aid was given them in the shape of rations, implements of husbandry,
or in any other form, whilst undergoing the trials and privations of
a first settlement. Of this tliey were made fully aware before
leaving their homes, nor did they express any dissatisfaction with the
decision of the Government on this head. Those who brought the
means of subsistence with them until the first crop was reaped, ex¬
perienced no inconvenience ; those who did not lived on bulbs, roots,
berries, and wild beans indigenous to the country, until their crops
yielded them more substantial food.
10. For some time the best friends of the coloured people had
their fears and apprehensions as to the ultimate success of this
experiment of forming on a lat^e scale native settlements on our
immediate borders, more especially in the immediate vicinity of those
tribes which had been but very recently expelled from the very lands
which the Hottentots were called to cultivate and defend ; these,
however, were soon removed by the most favourable and glowing
report of the late Mr. Justice Menzies, in 1832, and the no less
encouraging statements of the acting Governor, Colonel Wade, when
we visited the frontier in 1834, after the arrival of Sir Benjamin
D'Urban to assume the administration of the government.
11. In 1830, the first year of the settlement, the population con¬
sisted of 900 souls, of whom from 250 to 300 were available for the
purposes of defence. At that time, however, they had barely pro¬
duced sufficient grain for food and seed. In 1833 the whole settle¬
ment had been subdivided into 640 allotments capable of irrigation,
with
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 403
with grazing commons attached ; the average size of the allotments Rev.
was three morgen, or six acres, which, in tlie aggregate amounted to Renton,
3,840 acres ; in that year the population amounted to 2,114, of all a.m.
ages and sexes ; their stock consisted of 250 horses, 2,444 head of j^j
cattle, and 4,996 sheep; they had reaped 2,300 muids of wheat and J85J.
barley (6,900 imperial bushels) ; besides temporary cottages of
wattle and daub; they had built 12 subsiantiul stone houses, planted
13 orchards, and completed 55 canals for irrigating iheir allotments,
of which 44 measured 41,750 feet in length, or, in round numbers,
24 miles.
12. In the following year, and in 1835, they had to bear the brunt
of the most formidable Kafir war which had yet been experienced on
our frontiers ; they had now to defend 26 miles of frontier, exposed,
from the circumstances already explained, to the most determined
attacks of the followers of Macomo and Tyali.
13. The returns from the settlements previous to this outbreak in
December 1834 were as follows: horses 624, black cattle 5,406,
sheep and goats 8,925; quantity of seed sown, 310 muids of wheat,
bai ley, and oats ; 70 muids of Indian corn, beans, and peas ; 645
ridges of pumpkins; the quantity reaped amounted to 1,500 muids
of wheat, barley, and oats, 60 muids of Indian corn, &c., and 33 loads
of pumpkins.
14. With regard to their live stock, 557 horses, 3,992 black cattle,
and 5,460 sheep and goats, were swept away, and the greater part of
their produce destroyed ; 44 of their dwellings were burnt to the ground.
On that occasion 2,673 of the Kat River inhabitants had to receive
support from the Board of Relief, of whom 1,470 were also partially
clothed. From 1835 to 1839 it is not in my power to furnish any¬
thing like a connected narrative of the progress of the settlement,
based on official statements, which for obvious reasons I prefer.
15. In 1839 I visited the settlement for the first time; the impres¬
sions then formed as I passed from the Chumie Station to Balfour,
the residence of my esteemed and much respected friend Mr. Thom¬
son, are thus expressed in my private journal : August 5th, 1839,
" I arrived at Balfour from the Chumie about three o'clock in the
afternoon, passing through several of the Hottentot locations on my
way. I was much struck with the simple but neat appearance of
many of their cottages, surrounded with their gardens and cultivated
fields. In no part of the colony have I seen cultivation carried on
to the same extent ; every patch of ground capable of irrigation has
been encircled by their watercourses. At present their crops, which
are more extensive this year than at any former period, afford a most
luxuriant prospect. I am sorry to say, however, that the rust has
attacked their crops in many places, and that in consequence the
grain crop will be to a considerable extent a failure. This is greatly
to be lamented, as the poor people have suffered much from drought
during the last two years, and the prospect they now have of sur¬
mounting their difficulties is in a great measure cut off. They are,
however, by no means disheartened, as their crops of barley, oats,
and Indian corn, are rich beyond all former years. Really at present
the Kat River is one of the most interesting sights in South Africa.
Not an inch of ground is left unturned that can be brought within
0.63. C C 2 the
404 MIÍ^UTES OF EVIDENCE TAltEN BEFORE THE
Rev. the reach of irrigation, whilst on the slopes of many of the hills, fields
H. Benton, have been |irepared by the Fingoes, which are planted with Kafir
A. M. corn."
—~ 16. During my visit in 1839, I had an opportunity of forming an
«4 July opinion of the state of education in the settlement. In connexion
1 with Mr. Thomson's congregation, there were two elementary schools
partly supported by a small stipend from the Government, and partly
by fees paid by the parents. In connexion with the church at
Philipton, tiiere w ere schools established at 12 of the locations, partly
supported by fixed allowances from the London Missionary Society,
and private individuals in England (after whom some of the locations
were named), and partly by fees paid by the parents. These elemen¬
tary schools were in charge of young Hottentot men, who were at the
same time receiving instruction liurn Mr. Read, jun., whom they met
twice a week at Philipton. Of these I wrote at the time as follows :
" I speak ill perfect sincerity, when I say that I have seldom met with
a more interesting body of young men. It is neither from their
attainments nor experience that 1 thus speak of them, fur high ex¬
pectations cannot be reasonably formed of either, but it is for this ;
that they possess in an eminent degree the spirit and the zeal of the
teacher. Their unwearied activity, directed by the younger Mr. Read,
is the soul of the system ; and I cannot but admire the efforts they
have made for personal improvement under considerable difiiculties.
At this lime Mr. Thomson had three day srdiools, and 12 Sabbath
schools, very efficiently conducted in those parts of the settlement
occupied by the people of his congregation. The chief drawback
to attendance throughout the settlement proved to be the exaction of
fees."
17. It was on the same occasion that I sat down with my friend,
Mr. Tliomson, to calculate, on a rough estimate, the value of the
labour which the settlers had expended in constructing drains and
cutting watercourses, for the purpose of irrigating their allotments.
The result of this was, that up to that period labour had been expended
to the amount, on a moderate estimate, of 3,500/. for that object.
This includes many cuttings tvhich were abandoned when it was
found tiiat the water could be made to embrace a larger area.
18. From 1841 to 1844, both inclusive, I visited the settlement
four times. I found it steadily progressing, but not in the rapid
manner that characterised the first to years after its I'ormation ; it
had perhaps become somewhat over-stocked and over-peopled. Its
progress, however, will be best shown by the following statistical
returns :—
In 1844 the road-rate was first imposed on the fixed property of
the colony; this was exactly 10 years after the commencement of the
Kafir war alluded to in paragraph 12. The fixed property of the
Hottentot settlers of the Kat River was then assessed at the agore-
gate value of 36,000/., which in reality represents fixed property to
the amount at least of 40,000/. Of their live stock at this time or
rather in tiie year following (1845), which consisted of 550 horses,
9,100 black cattle, and 9,500 sheep and goats, the aggregate valu^
amounted to 20,180/. The produce of their cultivated lands con-
sisted of 7,560 muids (22,680 bushels) of grain, 50,000 lbs. of oat
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 405
hay, with a proportionate quantity of pulse, pumpkins, potatoes, Rev.
fruit and vegetables. These, together with the value of transport Rtnton,
service, wood cut down and sawn up into planks, beams,8ic.,amounted
in the aggregate to 5,575 /. The value of the settlement therefore at
this period amounted in fixed property, live stock and annual produce, iS^i
to upwards of 65,850 being on an average of 3301, to every square
mile of area.
19. This area, as already stated, was divided into 640 allotments,
and, at the time I refer to, sustained a population of 5,000 souls.
Had it been granted to stock farmers it would, on the average area of
such farms on the eastern frontier, have been subdivided into 25
farms, on which there would have been a population of not more than
350, of all classes and colours. The whole of these lands realized to
the Crown, in the shape of quit-rent on the several allotments, a sum
not short of 1,200/., exclusive of the forest of the settlement, which
in 1848 could not have produced less than 50/. for licences to cut
wood. During the years 1844 and 1845, the erfholdersor occupiers
(not more than 600 in number) paid in road-rate nearly 300 /. From
1840 to 1846, both inclusive, that section of the settlement in con¬
nexion with the London Missionary Society contributed in money,
exclusive of the repairs of buildings, i,ioo/. towards the support of
their religious and educational institutions. Within the same period
Mr. Thomson's congregation erected a new and spacious church at
Tambookie Valley, which must have cost them at least 1,000/.,
giving a fair value to their labour.
20. At this time the infant, juvenile, evening and Sabbath schools
throughout the settlement were affording instruction to upwards of
1,200 persons, diffusing extensively a knowledge both of the Dutch
and English languages.
21. I did not again visit the Kat River until 1848; it was then
severely suffering (though rallying) from the effects of the war in 1846 ;
their losses in that war have been estimated at 30,000/., and to
complete their misery, the floods of 1848 carried away dams, water¬
courses, and all the apparatus they had constructed for the purposes of
irrigation. In the words of my friend Mr. Thomson, "The Hottentots
had now to encounter the severest trial that had fallen on them since
the formation of the settlement," When allowed to return to their
locations from the military encampments of the settlement their
houses had to be rebuilt, their families fed, and their lands culti¬
vated. For the purposes of cultivation, seed had been issued to
them by the Government, which, with hired oxen (chiefly) was put
in tiie ground J for subsistence and the purchase of stock, they went
to the forest; and at the time I visited the settlement there were
upwards of 90 saw-pits in active operation, whilst boys of nine years
of age and upwards were withdi awn from school to aid their parents
in the work. At the time I visited the settlement a large quantity of
draught oxen and other stock had been exchanged with the farmers
for planks, beans, and other produce of the forist; but their efforts
had glutted the market, and so low had the prices become, that one
of the inhabitants of an interior di:^trict town dt dared to me, while
several Hottentot buyers were standing in the market laden with
wood, that after deducting the expense of transport and the licence
0.63. C C 3 of
4o6 minutes of evidence taken before the
Rev.
H. Rentan,
A. M.
24 July
1851.
3123. Are you at all acquainted with the proceedings that
took place at the time at the Cape, with reference to these
things?—Not beyond the fact of the people being supplied
with rations that were utterly destitute ; I am not aware of
any other proceedings in the Cape beyond those eleemosynary
supplies.
3124, Does the paper you have just put in contain any
account of what steps the Government did take, or whether
they took any, to inquire into those complaints ?—I think there
is no reference to it in the memorandum.
2125. Upon that subject you yourself personally are igno¬
rant?—My information irrespective of this document, to w hich
I have referred incidentally, is taken down pretty fully from
the lips of the missionaries and of the natives ; and I find
their statements to be on all the points where they come
together, in harmony with what I found subsequently in that
document, which is more exact as to statistics.
3126. The statements you took down were statements made
to you in the year 1851 ?—Entirely ; all that I propose to give
is the account of the people in the place of their grievances;
I do not profess to do more.
3127. That is to say, an account given in 1851 of the com¬
plaints and grievances that had occurred in 1835-36?—In
answer to my inquiries about the causes of disaffection they
referred to this fact, that in the year 1835-36 they returned
to the dilapidated buildings, to fields run wild, to places in
which the ditches and watercourses had been obstructed,
deprived of their cattle, without anything, and having suffered
to an extent in the defence of the colony to which no other
district had been subjected.
3128. In what you have stated you have referred to the
years 1835-36; I want now to draw your attention to the
period of 1846-47 ; have you any information to give the
Committee as to that?—They had been diligent during the in¬
terval in recovering their position by industry from 1835-36
to 1846-47; in that latter period they state that again the
whole male population of the settlement were called out
for the defence of the colony ; they were collected again,
not
of 6 s. payable on each load, there remained little or nothing for the
■ labour of cutting, hewing, and sawing in the forest.
22. My opinion is, ihat the Kat River Settlement had not entirely
recovered from the war of 1846-7 when that of 1850 commenced.
(signed) J. Rose Innes.
Cape Town, 30 May 1851.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 4O7
not in one as before, but into three camps, at Fort Armstrong, R,ev.
at Eilands Port, and the Blinkwater ; about those camps, with-
in which they were without the means of comfort and almost
of decency, their cattle depastured, but under the drought 24 July
a very large proportion of them perished ; there was disease, 1851.
and there was considerable mortality ; at both periods the
means of instruction were suspended, and they felt that not
only were they brought down by poverty, but that the morals
of their youth were corrupted, and the benefits of education
and of Christian instruction during the past period had been
fearfully counteracted.
3129. Was any compensation made to those people for the
losses they had sustained ?—^They complained in connexion
with that last war that while they were doing duty as burgh¬
ers they did not receive the same treatment as others who
were serving in defence of the colony ; that certain rations
were withheld from them, such as coffee and soap, which dimi¬
nished their comfort and their cleanliness, and made them feel
they were treated as a degraded race ; they complained that
they got no compensation ; they complained that solemn pro¬
mises made to them by successive governors were broken.
According to their statement Sir Peregrine Maitland, who was
Governor at the war of 1846 and 1847, promised assistance
after the war ; Sir Henry Pottinger, who succeeded him, pro¬
mised all the cattle captured in their incursions upon the
Gaikas and the T'Slambies ; there was a quantity of seed corn
and of oxen and clothes, which had been set apart for their use
by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, in compliance with the promise
of Sir Peregrine Maitland, which were refused them, and the
cattle they had taken were withdrawn from them ; those were
the acts of the first magistrate appointed over that settlement,
namely, Mr. ßiddulph. To the representations of the people
that they were reduced to poverty and destitution, he replied
that they were a set of lazy paupers who had been living on
Government rations, and that if they had nothing to subsist
upon, they might hire themselves as servants to the English
and Boers in the colony, or go to hell ; his reply to their state¬
ments that pledges had been made by the Governor, was, that
it was under martial law, but he now came to administer civil
law, and therefore that the arrangements under martial law
were good for nothing ; this statement was made to me by the
missionaries.
3130. Mr. £. Carier.] There were certainly strong ex¬
pressions used there ; was that complaint made to you by
more than one individual, or was it the expression of one
0.63. c c 4 person
4o8 minutes of evidence taken before the
Rev. person who complained of it?—I got the same account from
H. Renion, several.
3I31- J. Walmsley.'] Including the missionaries?—Yes,
24 July including the missionaries.
1851. 3132. Who corroborated the statements ?—Yes.
3133. Have you reason to believe those statements are
correct?—I am sure they were fully believed by the people;
and from what I saw of the men that I took them down from,
and who were all loyalists and in no way mixed up with the
rebellion, men who never wavered in their allegiance, I con¬
sider them entitled to credit.
3134. Chairman.] Have you any means of checking this
statement yourself?—I have not ; I only took the precaution
of asking various parties ; they complained also in regard to that
magistrate, that a tax was imposed upon wood cutting, which
was the means of industry to which they betook themselves
after the war of 1846 more than they had done before, as the
readiest to procure money, and that this tax, which was ex¬
acted at first upon the purchasers, was afterwards exacted
upon the wood cutters, and between the people's zeal to get
some means by this employment and the operation of this tax
they felt themselves greatly aggrieved. Doctor Innes states,
I think, in that memorandum, that a respectable inhabitant on
the frontier told him, that the remuneration to the people for
their labour would be almost nothing at one time, that is, at
the period to which I refer, fi'om the operation of the tax, and
from their resorting to wood cutting as a means of meeting
their present necessities.
3135. Sir J. Walmsley.] Was this a tax recently levied?—
It was levied since the last war ; since 1846-47.
3136. What was the amount exacted for the tax?—Seven
and a half per cent. I think they say ; it amounted to so many
shillings per waggon load.
3137. Chairman.] What objection on principle do you take
to that tax ?—I do not speak to the principle, I merely men¬
tion the fact as a part of the narrative of their complaints.
3138. Sir J. Walmsley.] The peo|)le had not previously
been taxed in that way ?—^They considered the wood as their
own ; as a part of the property that was given to them on
their location in that district.
3139. Chairman.] Do you mean they were not allowed to
cut down wood standing within the grant of land made to
them?—That is their statement, that they were not allow^
to cut down and sell wood out of the bush or forest, without
paying a tax of 7 | per cent.
3140. My
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 409
3140. My object is to elicit an explanation upon this point ; Rev.
was it a tax upon wood felled in the forest, or do I understand H-Renton,
you to say that they could not fell timber within the grant of
land which was made to them ?—I understood that they ^4 July
could not fell timber and take it away for sale, without paying 1851,
a tax of 7 è per cent.
3141. That is, the wild timber growing in the forest?—
Growing in the forest.
3142. Sir J. Walmsley^ Not included in their particular
grant of land ; that is, they had not the grant of the forest, I
presume ?—^The dispute, 1 suppose, hangs upon the property
of the forest ; they consider they have a certain district called
the Kat River for pasture and for forest, and up to that period
they had at discretion entered the forest and cut when they
pleased, and what quantity they pleased, and disposed of it as
they pleased, and subsequently the tax was levied.
3143. Do you know the date at which that tax was levied ?
—Subsequently to the war of 1846 ; they complained of it as
coming upon them after their second impoverishment by
war, as a fresh obstruction in the way of their prosperity, and
as a bitter grievance to those who had suft'ered greater sacri¬
fices in the defence of the colony than any other portion of the
colonial population, I think I have seen it stated in the
official report of Sir George Berkeley or Colonel Somerset,
that the contingent of the male population furnished by the
other districts of the colony for that war was three per cent.,
whereas the proportion furnished by the Kat River was ninety
per cent.
3144. Chairman.'] Have you seen Mr. Biddulph's report
upon the Kat River settlement ?—I have seen it, and I may
mention, since that is adverted to, that his report in which he
represented the inhabitants of the settlement as a worth¬
less and immoral class of people, excited universal indignation
throughout the settlement, and was succeeded by remon¬
strances which led to his removal from the settlement. I have
understood that persons out of the settlement, and that in par¬
ticular Sir Andries Stockenstrom, who knows it more inti¬
mately than any person out of it, instantly on the reading of
that report, which was published as a despatch by Sii Henry
Pottinger, sent in a very strong paper to the Government in
reprobation of the statements contained in it. The Kat River
people complained that although that officer was removed from
them, who was known to cherish hostile prejudices to the
coloured people
3145. Known
4Î0 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. 3M5- Known by whom?—Before he came to the settle-
H. Renton, ment.
3146« Are you making this statement upon anything like
&4 July authority, or mere hearsay ?—I am merely stating their alle-
1851. gation that he was known to be hostile in his feelings towards
the coloured people.
3147. Colonel Als/cowri.] That Mr. Biddulph was hostile?
—Yes, before he was appointed ; and I made the remark on
hearing the same complaint from different quarters, that the Go¬
vernor had done what he could ; he removed the obnoxious man
when he behaved in this offensive manner, and what more could
he do ?—They replied, that would have been well, but he ap¬
pointed the man who had behaved so ill to a more lucrative
magisterial office in another part of the colony, and they con¬
sidered that, therefore, as an evidence that the Governor was
not dissatisfied, though as a matter of policy he had taken him
out of the way.
3148. Chairman.^ Have you any means of controverting
the statements made by Mr. Biddulph ?—I think so.
3149. Will you proceed to state them ?—In the document
which I have submitted as furnished by Doctor Innes to me,
founded upon official returns, there are facts showing the
extent of irrigation, showing the extent of cultivation, showing
the extent of building by the natives, showing the rapid accu¬
mulation of property in that settlement, showing at what
amount they were rated for the public burthens, and contain¬
ing what I apprehend will be accounted demonstration that
whatever the people of that settlement lacked, they did not
lack industry.
3150. To what period does that refer to, in Doctor Innes'
report ?—The state of them up to 1835, and the state of them
up to 1846 again.
3151. Do I understand Doctor Innes' statement as in¬
tended to controvert Mr. Biddulph's report ?—Doctor Innes'
statements do not advert, so far as I remember, at all to Mr.
Biddulph's or any other report ; I am quoting Doctor Innes'
report merely as an unbiassed calm statement founded upon
statistical data.
3152. And made upon personal inspection of the settle¬
ment ?—Along with personal inspection of the settlement.
3153. Do you happen to recollect at this moment the data
of Mr. Biddulph's report ; was not it later than that of Doctor
Innes ?—His report was immediately posterior to the war ;
I think in 1848.
3154. You are aware also that Mr, Biddulph's report was
drawn
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 411
drawn up in the shape of an official report to the Governor Rev.
from a personal inspection of the state of the settlement ?—
I do not call that in question ; he was resident in the settle-
ment. 24 July
3155. You have stated that Mr. Biddulph called the popu- 1851.
lation of the Kat River settlement worthless and immoral ; are
you accurate in that; does not he rather describe them as
being very idle, and living in filth, and neglecting industry
altogether, rather than ascribing to.them anything in the shape
of immorality ?—I do not profess to quote any terms of his
report, which I have not, and but once saw. I was merely
giving my impression of the general character which he by
that report conveyed of the settlement. Then, again, I should
refer to the progress of education in that settlement as suc¬
cessful up to the time when it was vvholiy interrupted by the
carrying off all the people into military posts ; and on this
matter, antecedent to the war, I apprehend that the testimony
of the superintendent general of education is very decisive,
tie says, " During my visit in 1839, I had an opportunity of
forming an opinion of the state of education in the settlement.
In connexion with Mr. Thomson's congregation, there were
two elementary schools, partly supported by a small stipend
from the Governor, and partly by fees paid by the parents.
In connexion with the church at Phiiipton, there were schools
established at 12 of the locations, partly supported by fixed
allowances from the London Missionary Society and private
individuals in England (after whom some of the locations
were named)"—such as Wilberforce, Buxton, and so on—
" and partly by fees paid by the parents. These elementary
schools were in charge of young Hottentot men, who were at
the same time receiving instruction from Mr. Read, jun.,
whou) they met twice a week at Philipton. Of these I wrote
at this time as follows : * I speak in perfect sincerity when
I say that I have seldom met with a more interesting body of
young men. It is neither from their attainments nor expe¬
rience that I thus speak of them, for high expectations cannot
be reasonably formed of either ; but it is for this, that they
possess in an eminent degree the spirit and the zeal of the
teacher. Their unwearied activity, directed by the younger
Mr. Read, is the soul of the system ; and I cannot but admire
the efforts they have made for personal improvement under
considerable difficulties.' At this time Mr. Thomson had
three day schools and 12 Sabbath schools, very efficiently
conducted, in those parts of the settlement occupied by the
people of his congregation."
3156. That
4<2 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
„ 3'5Ö- That description of tlie settlement was written in the
A '839?—Yes, as to education.
A. M. • '
3157. Will you read any description that may refer to the
34 July state of the settlement at a later period ?—Dr. Innes furnishes
^ from official returns some important facts, which I deem
valuable because so shortly previous to the last war. " In the
year 1844 the road rate was first imposed on the fixed
property of the colony ; this was exactly ten years after the
commencement of the Kafir war, alluded to in paragraph 12.
The fixed property of the Hottentot settlors of the Kat River
was then assessed at the aggregate value of 36,000 which
in reality represents fixed property to the amount, at least, of
40,000 I. Of their live stock at this time, or rather in the
year following (1845)," that was just the year before the last
war, "which consisted of 550 horses, 9,100 black cattle;"
now you will remember that the horses were reduced to 70,
and that their black cattle had been reduced to a little more
than 1,000, "and 9,500 sheep and goats, the aggregate
value amounted to 20,180/.; the produce of their cultivated
lands consisted of 7,560 muids," a muid is equivalent to three
bushels, therefore it would be 22,680 bushels; "of grain,
50,000 lbs. of oat hay, a proportionate quantity of pulse,
pumpkins, potatoes, fruit, and vegetables ; these, together
with the value of transport service, wood cut down and sawn
up into planks, beams, &c., amounted in the aggregate to 5,575/.
The value of the settlement, therefore, at this period amounted
in fixed property, live stock, and annual produce, to upwards of
65,850/., being on an average 330/. to every square mile of
area."
3158. Was that to be considered as the property of the
Hottentots exclusively ?—I understood so.
3159. Are you clear upon that point, whether or not, for
instance, there were not other settlers who had also property
to a considerable extent in that settlement?—There were
the Bastards and Gonahs ; this includes, I presume, the
whole of the coloured settlers ; they are mixed up indis¬
criminately.
3160. But not, I think, all together in Mr. Biddulph's
report ; he speaks rather more particularly of the idleness of
the Hottentots as contradistinguished from the industry of
some other settlers ?—The Hottentots constitute an over¬
whelming majority.
3161. But they are the most industrious class of settlers ?—
I do not say so.
3162. Vfas
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 413
3162. Was not it a settlement intended to benefit them, „
and to promote their welfare?—It was.
3163. And do you think that that has really been the _!—
result, from your own experience and inquiry ?—I think that, 24 July
if we look at the progress up to 1835, if we look again at 1851,
what it was from 1836 up to the outbreak of the war in
1846, if we look again at their condition before this present
war, when I saw with my own eyes cultivation surpassing
what I had seen anywhere between the sea coast and Port
Elizabeth until I came into that settlement ; if we look at this
and take into account the trials to which the people had been
subjected, the successive losses of all the fruits of their
industry once and again, with the occurrences of the most
formidable discouragements,it would seem tome unwarrantable
to say it was a failure ; and I question if any body of Irish¬
men, or Scotchmen, or Englishmen would have submitted to
be taken away from all their employments, and to lose all
their property, and to get no compensation, and yet go on
again with more spirit than the people of that settlement have
done.
3164. Were they not paid when they were called out to
serve in the field, and were not rations also given to their
families at the same time, as well as clothing?—I understand
they got nothing but rations ; no payment.
3165. Did not the men receive pay during the time they
were in the field ?—I understand not.
3166. Are you speaking now from statements made to you,
or irom information which you have carefully acquired by an
examination of the documents themselves?—I speak from the
impression on my own mind left by the information given to
me ; I am not of course positive, but I speak distinctly from
that impression.
3167. When you speak of the great losses sustained by
those settlers in the Kat River district, you are of course
aware that other settlers in other parts of the Cape suffered
great losses from the Kafir war, both in 1835-36 and in
1846-47 ?—I am aware that many cases occurred of great
individual losses ; but in other districts it was optional to men
to abandon or to remain at their homes ; it was in a great
degree optional with tliern to come out and to retire. The
Kat River men were the first called out, and the last relieved ;
they were ordered all to quit their homes in defence of the
colony, which was done with no other district.
3168. Was it no condition of that settlement that they
should serve in the event of being called out upon the occasion
of
414 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
of the Kafir war ?—I suppose the design of the settlement was
A to make them a sort of bulwark to the colony, which they have
proved, for they have borne the brunt of every war.
«4 July 3169. In your opinion they always turned out readily, espe-
^ cially on the last occasion, to act in defence of the colony ?—
I have understood that on every occasion the Hottentots were
ready to obey orders, and were zealous in their loyalty.
3170. And that the present disaffection, to which you have
referred, is traceable alone to the neglect of those complaints,
and the absence of redress for those losses to which you have
referred ?—I do not say alone ; there had been a succession
of causes inducing a spirit of disaffection ; those two were
there specified as main causes ; then there was the conduct of
this magistrate, Biddulph; then there was the conduct of the
magistrate who succeeded him, Bowker, who had published a
letter in a Graham's Town paper, vindicating the statements
of Mr. Biddulph; and the man who had done that was put
over this settlement, who were rankling under what they con¬
sidered the insult and injuries of the man who had been
removed.
3171. Was not Mr. Bowker a very old resident in that
district?—I believe he resided in the neighbourhood.
3172. And possessing considei-able property there?—That
might be ; I do not know.
3173. Have you any reason to doubt he was a respectable
man, and that his statement is as much entitled to belief as
those of the Hottentots, from whom you received yours ?—
I speak of the fact that he had publicly vindicated the state¬
ments which had given offence to the entire settlement ; state¬
ments which had been impeached not only by the settlement,
but by responsible parties out of it as unwarrantable.
3174. 'The statements you refer to affected the character
of the settlement, and were calculated to create great discon¬
tent in the minds of those who were more immediately the
object of them, were they not ?—They were calculated to
do so.
3175. But the question is really whether they were true or
not, and you have no means of throwing any light upon that
question yourself, from the inquiries you made ; you are
aware Mr. Biddulph was officially employed to report upon
the state of that settlement ; he did report, and reported most
unfavourably ; and I understand you now to say that Mr.
Bowker, a gentleman resident in that district, whose personal
responsibility you are not prepared to impeach, confirmed that
statement ?—Yes.
3176. Against
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 415
3176. Against that I understand you to place the state- Rev.
ments of certain parties in the settlement which are in oppo-
sition to those of Mr. Biddulph and Mr. Bowker; have you '
any reason to doubt under those circumstances that the state- 24 July
ments made by a person officially employed, confirmed by a
resident in the district, were not as well entitled to belief as
the statements of parties affected unfavourably by the state¬
ment made by the person officially employed to investigate
the condition of that settlement?—When I found that the
whole coloured population of the settlement were indignant
at the statement made by the magistrate ; when I found that
missionaries in the settlement and that missionaries out of the
settlement who knew it, spoke to me of that statement as
a grievous injury to the people of that settlement ; when I
found that men of the character and standing of Sir Andries
Stockenstrom remonstrated on reading that statement against
the injustice which it did to the people, and when I found
that the magistrate who had made himself obnoxious by that
statement was removed from his office over the settlement,
I have no hesitation from personal knowledge of various of
the parties, in giving credit to their testimony before the
testimony of those two magistrates, Mr. Biddulph and Mr.
Bowker, who furnished, I conceive, evidence that they were
actuated by hostile prejudices towards the coloured classes.
3177. Where do you find that evidence?—I shall speak
immediately to what Mr. Bowker did, according to the state¬
ments furnished to me.
3178. Do you mean statements to show that Mr. Bowker
was hostile to the Hottentot population, or the coloured popu¬
lation generally ?—Actuated by prejudices.
3179. Does the statement you are going to refer to con¬
tain evidence of that fact?—I conceive so; the people of the
Kat River complained of certain proceedings of Mr. Bowker
in burning the huts of proprietors in Lower and Upper Blink-
water.
3180. At what date was that?—Shortly after his coming
into the settlement, and in the winter season, I think of 1849,
but I have not the date.
3181. Was not it subsequently to the report of Mr. Bid¬
dulph ?—Subsequently to the report of Mr. Biddulph, and
subsequent to Mr. Bowker being magistrate.
3182. How does that show he was animated by prejudices
against the coloured inhabitants at the time he supported the
statement made by Mr. Biddulph?—In regard to his pre¬
judices
4i6 minutes of evidence taken before the
Rev. judices at the time, I can only say that his letter in the news-
^ A'm considered as a repetition of the offence.
——^ 31 S3. Of what oflfence ?—Given by Mr. Biddulph, and that
24 July Jjc reported in the district to be a man who was known to
' entertain those prejudices.
3184. Known to entertain those prejudices by whom; what
evidence is there of the fact ?—I cannot furnish you with any
evidence beyond the popular impression.
3185. I am sure you will perceive that you are in some
degree impeaching the character both of Mr. Biddulph and
Mr. Bowker, and I wish to know, as far as you can possibly fur¬
nish the Committee with information, the grounds upon which
you impeach the fidelity of that report, and the perfect pro¬
priety of Mr. Bowker supporting that othcial report, supposing
he deemed it to be true and correct ?—I do not appear to
impeach either gentleman ; I only offer the statements given
to me on the spot.
3186. Given by parties who were aflected injuriously, as
they thought, by the report of Mr. Biddulph .?—And also
by their teachers, and by respectable parties out of the
settlement.
3187. Who were all parties, were they not, more or less
interested in the settlement ?—I do not know what interest
they could have beyond that of intelligent and benevolent
men, who had watched its progress.
3188. Without implying in the slightest degree any pre¬
judice against any particular parties, I believe that the Kat
Hiver Settlement was supported by particular parties in the
colony, and equally opposed by others?—I believe so; the
missionaries out of the settlement who spoke to me, were
not connected with the London Society who had missionaries
in the settlement, and who expressed to me their conviction
that the statements were most unwarranted, that they gave a
representation of the state of the Hottentots such as no candid
man would have given or could have given.
3189. Are you aware that the Governor adopted Mr.
Biddulph's report?—I am aware that he published it as a
despatch, and was understood to sanction it.
3190. Have you any personal acquaintance with Sir Henry
Pottinger?—None; but the fact of Mr. Biddulph's removal
after remonstrances and complaints, was considered as an ac¬
knowledgment by the Governor that that magistrate had done
what could not be vindicated.
3191. Might not an officer who had done his duty thoroughly
in
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 417
in reporting the abuses of any settlement become unpopular ? Rev*
H, Rentoiii
3192. And upon that ground, though without the slightest
blame or reproach, it might be expedient to appoint a fresh 24 July
officer to that district ? —I also see that clearly, and the mere
fact of his removal does not prove that he had done anything
wrong.
3193. I might perhaps illustrate it in this way: a Poor-law
Commissioner in Scotland or in Ireland, who had conceived
the poor had been neglected and ill-treated, might become
very unpopular in the parish upon which he reported?—Yes,
decidedly.
3194. Sir Walmsley^ Your previous observations have
had reference to Mr. Biddulph and Mr. Bowker; were there
other magistrates in any way identified with those circum¬
stances ?—I am not aware that there were, identified with
either of those points to which reference has been made. In
the case of Mr. Bowker, there were two acts much complained
of ; the one about the burning of the huts of certain parties
that I have mentioned.
3195. Chairman.l Subsequently to the date of the report?
—Yes, subsequently to his succeeding Mr. Biddulph.
3196. Mr. Estcourt.'l This is an after complaint?—Yes.
And again, about driving the Gonahs out of the district into
Kafirland, where, having fought against the Kafirs, they were
likely to incur special hostility. In relation to these two
matters there were commissioners appointed by the present
Governor, who reported against Mr. Bowker, and he it is
understood escaped dismissal by being allowed to retire. On
Mr. Bowker's withdrawal from the office under the finding of
the commission against him, the English residents in the set¬
tlement showed their sympathy with Mr. Bowker by inviting
him, with one exception, unanimously to a public entertain¬
ment, and that act was regarded by all the coloured people as
the approbation and identification of the English residents
with a man whom they considered had injured and oppressed
them.
3197. J. Walmsley.l Were there any other magistrates
in that district against whom the settlers complained ?—There
were.
3198. Will you state the circumstances?—The late magis¬
trate of Fort Beaufort, Mr. Borcberds, hired out the grazing
lands of the people on the Mankasana, a tributary of the Kat
River, without their consent obtained or asked, to Fingoes ;
an application and remonstrance was sent to the Governor ;
0.63. D D the
—Decidedly
418 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. the people were directed to impound the cattle illegally de-
H. Rentotit pasturing on their own land, but they complained that the sums
which Mr. Borcherd had derived in rent were not paid to the
24 July parties injured, and that no compensation was made to them
Ï851. for the loss of the pasture for seven months, which sustained the
cattle of 100 Fingoes. There was a subordinate magistrate
in that district, suj)erintendent Cobb, who by impounding the
cattle on the people's own grazing lands, and by different
assaults upon individuals, for one of which he was fined in
the Criminal Court, and some other cases of which were
pending for adjudication, increased the excitement and dis¬
content in the spirit of the people. These are supplementary
cases that were given to me connected with the conduct of
magistrates. There was another matter about which great
soreness had been excited. Towards the close of last year
complaints had been made by the farmers and boers about
Fort Beaufort of losses of sheep and cattle, which they attri¬
buted to people residing at the Blinkwater; a commission was
appointed to investigate the matter, consisting of Messrs.
Blakeway, Godlonton, and Gilbert, all of them personally
interested, as sheep and cattle farmers, in the district. It is
complained that instead of hearing and disposing of the com¬
plaints, those gentlemen went personally into the houses of
the district, and without any magistrate's warrant searched
them, inquiring, where any flesh was found, how it had been
obtained, and descending, in some cases, to wipe the insides
of the cooking pots with their fingers to find if any grease
could be discovered in them; occasioning by this scrutiny
and procedure great offence, not only to the parties subjected
to it, but to the population of the settlement generally, who
concluded that a vagrant act must have been passed, which
had been an object of great dread and aversion for a good
while previously. These, I think, together form the various
causes to which I could refer, on the showing of the people
and of their missionaries, as creating great discontent and
irritation, though they by no means justified a resort to arms
or revolt.
3199. Have you any observations to make on the location
of Hermanus on the settlement?—I have understood that
that was an infringement of the original design of the settle¬
ment, and all accounts lead me to the conclusion tliat it was
singularly unfortunate ; Hermanns was a red Kafir ; he had
a body of followers who greatly increased ; his place became
the rallying point, 1 am assured, for discontented and dis¬
orderly persons, and the presence of such a body was neces¬
sarily
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 4I9
sarily injurious to the morals, if not also dangerous to the Rev.
allegiance of the people of the Kat River. H. Rento»,
3200. Have you any knowledge of the precautions that were '
taken for the defence of that place at the time of the outbreak ? 34 July
—There were some means attempted ; on the 26th of Decern-
her last Mr. Van Rooyen, a native missionary at Tidmanton,
that is close by Blinkwater, gave information to the authorities
at Fort Beaufort of his suspicions that Hermanus, who had
been to Umlangerie, and was obeying the prophet's orders,
was preparing to take part in the revolt, yet after that infor¬
mation ammunition was known to have been supplied from
the Queen's stores at Fort Beaufort to that individual, to
Hermanus, who shortly after fell in the attack that he led on
on that place.
3201. Chairman."] How was that known?—This is the
statement of Mr. Van Rooyen himself,
3202. Do you mean the local authorities there supplied
Hermanus with arms and ammunition ?—On his application ;
previous to the outbreak he had been considered loyal. Mr.
Van Rooyen gave this statement to myself, which I now make
to the Committee. On December the 28th, Mr. Van Rooyen
sent a letter to the field commandant Groepe, at Fort Arm¬
strong, and the field cornet at Tidmanton sent one to Colonel
Sutton, at Fort Beaufort, with intelligence that Hermanus had
a force of about goo men, and that if they had had possession
of guns and ammunition they could have withstood him.
Colonel Sutton replied that he had not a supply of arms and
ammunition to furnish ; and Commandant Groepe, to whom a
messenger had again gone on the 28th, and to whom Mr. Van
Rooyen sent a second letter on that day, and to whom once
more he went personally on the 30th, stating the extreme
danger in which the people were placed, and the fact that
Hermanus had taken some of the young men, yet afforded
no assistance, although it is alleged that 50 men could have
been sent from Fort Armstrong, whose presence at that junc¬
ture would have saved extensive defection, if it had not
turned the course of events. In this state of things not only
could no resistance be offered to Hermanns by the people at
Tidmanton, but many of them were compelled against their
will to join him; and the example of want of power on the
part of the authorities to afford protection to the loyal, or
to resist the rebellious, was most detrimental throughout the
settlement.
3203. Sir y. Have the missionaries great in-
0.63. D D 2 fluence
420 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. fluence with the Kafir chiefs, or with the tribes generally ?
Retúon, —I should say they have.
"• 3204. Have they generally exerted that influence for the
24 July purpose of keeping the peace of the country ?—In the district
1851. of the Kat River, the influence of the missionaries, as well as
of the minister of the Dutch Church, was exerted incessantly
to repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist the violence of
the rebels.
3205. Did they take any direct means from time to time
of apprising the authorities in the colony of the best means
of defence, and the best mode of pacifying tlie tribes?—This
outbreak in the Kat River came suddenly upon all parties.
3206. Chairman^] Is not Mr. Read the chief missionary ?
—There is old Mr. Read and young Mr. Read ; old Mr.
Read was invited to become their minister by the coloured
population who assembled in Kat River, on the formation of
the settlement.
3207. Is it true that he has married a native woman ? —
He was married many years before he came there to a Hot¬
tentot, and has by her a numerous coloured family. I wish
to state that I hold in my hand a copy of the meinoranilum
of a conference with the insurgents at Blinkwater, on the 9th
of January, which document was sent to Major-general
Somerset by Cobus Forie, then the field cornet, and subse¬
quently field commandant of the district ; of a conference
which was held with the rebels when making known to them
the offer of pardon from his Excellency. In this memoran¬
dum there is an account of «hat passed between Mr. Read,
jun., and the rebels, as well as what passed on the part of the
other individuals who accompanied the field cornet, and the
sentiments by which at that time the rebels were actuated.
This is a copy of the official document ; the date, I think, is
the 9th of January.
[ The same was delivered in, and is as follows :]
Memorandum.
Pursuant to General Somerset's instructions, and in the absence of
my colleagne, Adam Waymers, I proceeded on my mission to make
known to the insurgents liie gracious offer of pardon from His Excel¬
lency the Governor.
The Rev. Messrs. Read, junior, and Van Rooyen, field cornet
Bottha, my son-in-law Andreas Hatha, and my two sons, accoiopanied
lue. On approaching the Blinkwater we saw hundreds of men, be¬
tween 000 or 700 on foot and mounted, coming over the ridges to the
station of Wilberforce, where the mam body of the Hottentots are
encamped. Being rather taken aback by coming on them so suddenly,
and
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 42 I
and being unarmed, we stopped for a little, and sent forward field Rev.
cornet Botliia and my eldest son, to know if we might approach, and "• Äenio«,
signs being made affirmatively, we rode up to the men, who were
marching in regular order to the spot tiiey had appointed as a place oTjuJy
of meeting. Tiie Hottentots marched in rank and file' as they were iSii
ordered by their officers, while the commander rode about from point
to point screaming at the men, and imitating the bearing of a general
officer on parade, putting his men through their various evolutions.
The Kafirs were led on after our way, humming their war songs,
whistling, groaning, beating and clattering their assigais as ihey made
for the place of rendezvous. Mr. Read having assumed a central pggi-
tion, and the vast concourse of people, including women and children,
who stood behind the ranks, having surrounded him, he beckoned to
us to come and take our station by his side. He then said, " Those who
consider themselves as the heads and responsible parties had better
come forward." John Hermanus then came forward, and on Mr. Read
asking him whether he was his father's successor, his men replied,
"Yes, he is Hermanus himself." Kupido Klas approached as the head
of the " Kafir servants." Addressing him, Mr. Read said to him, "Well,
Kupido, how is this ? Why, your appoiniment as Kafir interpreter
of the Hertzog Court is lying in the magistrate's desk, and you are now
one of the leaders of the revolt. You have brought me into a sad
predicament, as I recommended you to the magistrate. Where did
you get so many Kafir servants? I thought you told the commis¬
sioner that there were comparatively few among Hermanus's Kafirs."
He merely smiled, and said, " Yes, so it is and intimated that he was
able to justify his conduct. The Hottentots said that they would not
say 'who were their leaders, as it might expose such to danger should
the chances of war throw them into the hands of the Governor; but
each man who had taken up arms was personally responsible for what
he did, and all were prepared to suffer the consequences of their present
course. Mr. Read then asked Kupido whether he would be so good as
interpret for me, which he at first refused to do,but afterwards consented.
Having lequestedMr. Read toexplainthe proclamation,he proceeded
to do so. He commenced by asking them whether they were all British
subjects. They replied, "Yes, and we have always been the faithful
subjects of the Queen, and have for many years fought side by side
with white soldiers and burghers against tlie Kafirs." Mr. Read then
begged that they would first allow him to address a few words to
them, and that they may afterwards make any statement they pleased
to me. He again told them, as he did some days before, what the
British Government and the religious public of England had done
for the Hottentots, apprentices, and other natives of this country
within the last 50 years, and the ungrateful and unenviable position
they now appeared in, in taking up arms against a Government and
a people that had done so much for them. That their state within
the time named had been of gradual improvement and amelioration,
and that the top stone of their liberties was about being put on, by
their being entitled to vote for members of the South African Parlia¬
ment, and thereby getting a share in the government of the country
through their representatives. That although he could not defend
individual acts of the Government, or the conduct of some function¬
aries of Government, he thought, notwithstanding, on the whole since
0.63. p D 3 their
422 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. iheir civil emancipation, the Colonial Government had shown a dispo-
II. Renton, sition to protect the Hottentots, apprentices, and other natives of
A. M. colour in the colony ; that their present proceedings would shock the
feelings of the civilized world, ant! grieve all their religious friends in
24 July England and in this eountry. He asked the interpreter whether there
was a word for traitor and treachery in the Kafir language, and on
being told there was, he charged that on Hermanns and all those
who participated in his guilt, as they were guilty of treachery to the
Queen and country. On this sentiment being uttered, there was a
good deal of feeling manifested. One Kafir in a menacing attitude
exclaimed, as he forced his way past Mr. Read, "The time of speak¬
ing is past, and the time of fighting is come " ; others said they felt
the treacherous nature of the case, and that was its bad point; while
others said the Fingoes were traitors to their king Hintza ; others
again asked what Pato and the T'Slambe chiefs were, who were now
in arms against their Sovereign. Maian Ranabana then stood forward
and said, "This land is our land, but what portion of it was in the
possession of the Hottentots ? Strangers inhabited it, while the real
owners had only this ostrich nest, the Kat River, and th:s was called
giving a nation land." Then addressing the Kafirs, he said, " Don't
think thai because we are with you against the settlers, we will sub¬
mit to you ; we are ready to fight you at any day, if we see that you
wish to domineer over us as you did before."
Agie Michaels, a Gona, spoke of the hatred which existed against
the Hottentots and the Kafirs, as also that the tronks were full of
Hottentots, but that white men escaped punishment, though guilty.
Mr. Read said, " But you Gonas must remember that by your own
admission you have shown that you have greater confidence in the
justice of the Colonial Government than in that of the Kafirs."
" How so?" said he : the speaker replied, "When Sir Andreas Stocken¬
strom was forming the settlement the Gonas who were there among
the Kafirs, came to him and made some doleful complaint as to their
ill usage by the Kafirs, and then requested Sir Andreas to receive
them back into the colony by giving them lands in the settlement."
Hendreck Noeca said, that " for 20 years they had been faithful
subjects of the Queen, and within that period had been engaged in
several wars and commandoes against the Kafirs on the behalf of
Government, but that they had b«n most shamefully treated by the
Governor, Sir H. Pottinger, who preceded Sir H. Smith, as also by
the two functionaries Biddulph and Bowker. That they had received
no thanks from Government after the last war, although they had
served for more than two years, and only receiving raiions for them¬
selves and families without any pay; that they were sent away from
military jiosts where they have been stationed, like dogs, by Mr.
Biddulph, who said, ' You may now go to serve the settlers and the
Boers, or go to the .' "
That the proclamation by which cattle taken in war had been given
them was said in time of peace to have been superseded by the civil
law, and that by virtue of this Mr. Bowker had taken away cattle
which they had acquired in war and given them to those who after¬
wards claimed thein, and that in the same way the civil law would
supersede martial law, and their lives now guaranteed would be for¬
feited. Again, that the people of the settlement were disarmed by
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 423
Mr. Biddulph without any cause being assigned, and that two magis- l!ev.
trates, Bowker and Cobb, had been doing nothing but annoy and H. Renton,
oppress the people ; that Mr. Blakway had unjustly taken a portion A- *'•
of ihe grazing lands of Blinkwater and built a house on it, and ——
although they had repeatedly complained of it, no redress had been ^4 J"'y
given by Government; that a part of the grazing lands had likewise 185'•
been advertised for sale by Government.
That a commission consisting of men whom they looked upon as
their eneipiies had been appointed as a Board to inquire into certain
charges which they themselves had preferred against the people of
Blinkwater, and that they had proceeded in a most unwarrantable
maimer to search their houses and inquired into the mode of support¬
ing themselves, and entered their houses without a search-warrant
from the magistrate, and that they (the rebels) consequently firmly
believed that a vagrant law had been passed, or these men could not
have acted as they did.
Mr. Read again tried to defend the general character of the
Colonial Government, and added that they must remember that
when Sir H. Smith came to the colony and heard how they had been
treated by his predecessor and one of the functionaries already men¬
tioned, he warmly sympathised with them, and dismissed the magis¬
trate ; and that being oppressed by another magistrate, Mr. Bowker,
he had, after due inquiry, dismissed him also, and appointed Mr.
Weinand, who had so impartially administered the laws ; that the
Government had shown a great readiness to hear their grievances,
and they should also remember the impartiality with which Com¬
missioners Brownlee and Calderwood had acted in the cases they had
sat on. At this point of the business of the meeting a messenger
came up to John Hermanus, and said that the English had murdered
certain Hottentots near Waterkloof, who were on their way to the
Kat River ; in consequence of this, the assembly broke up in the
greatest confusion ; horsemen catching their horses, and setting off
in the most furious way in the direction whence the affair was
reported to have happened ; some of our party thought it was a mere
trick to escape the unpleasant charge which Mr. Read reiterated
against them of having acted the part of traitors against the
Government, and which seemed to affect them more than anything
besides; he said, moreover, that judges and magistrates of the land
may try their conduct legally, but that the civilised world would
judge the moral delinquency of persons and communities, and that
if they persisted in their course, the truthfulness of the Hottentots,
which was proverbial, would be greatly damaged by their treacherous
proceedings. They all said that they confessed that this was the
weak side of their case. Mr. Read further said, in consideration of
certain circumstances and features in their case, the Government
had made so many concessions, that he could not, in conscience,
lake on himself to ask for anything more. That longer time for
repentance had been given, and the exceptions against Klaas
Stuurman and Kupido Klaas, had been left out in his Excellency's
proclamation.
During all this time the rain was falling in torrents, and the wind
blowing briskly. After the great bulk of the men had left Water¬
kloof, a second meeting was held, and the proclamation read word
0.63. D D 4 for
424 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
word. The conversation was desult )ry, and some of the speakers
Ji. KentoH, began to put queries about the powder which was in the tower at
Fort Armstrong, and the English who were living there, and a kind
24. July jokinL"^, half threatening intention, held out that they would
1851. attack the fort if the English were not seni away.
Thereupon Andreas Hatha said, "This is really too bad, friends,
you speak as if we were prisoners of war in your camp, or that you
have already conquered us," and added, " It is not for you to ask the
secrets of our camp, and we told you we did not want the secrets of
your camp ; though now you are rebels, you must still stick to
honourable conduct and general rules, which obtain among mankind
even in war. Kemember we are on the side of Government, which is
the side of order and law, and we have come in order to beg of you
and to adyise you to return to your duty and allegiance. Let us
again he one ; we have heard your complaints ; we regret there should
be occasion for these ; we agree with you as to the treatment you
have received, but differ with you as to the means of their redress.
You have recourse to arms ; we say we must get our rights by the
pen and argument. You should also remember that the Government
has in several instances shown a willingness to hear complaints and
give redress, and we have now a magistrate who acts justly between
man and man. The Government cannot help it, if some of the
magistrates are not good. What will our friends Sir Andreas and
Fairbairn say, when they hear of this defection in England ? V\ hat
will our venerable father and friend Dr. Philip say, who obtained our
liberties for us 1 You have ruined our ministers by your conduct, and
you will grieve the hearts of the directors of the London Missionary
Society, Mr. Freeman and the British public, when they hear of what
has transpired. I must tell you plainly, that though I heard that you
have grievances to complain of, I see no cause for rebellion. I at
least will take no part in proceedings which have treachery for their
foundation, and must therefore needs end badly. Remember further
that Government cannot remove the prejudices against colour and
class on which you lay so much stress. Now we must understand
each other well ; I wish then to say, that we who are still loyal to the
Queen, had undertaken to defend the posts, the tower, the powder
magazine, the magistrate, his establishment, and all our white fellow
colonists who have taken shelter under our ruins ; and if you friends
touch any of these, we shall at once come into collision and fight you."
One of them rejoined, " I am not afraid of another Hottentot ; and if
we who came from one mother come into contact, we shall hang on
each other's necks like Turkey cocks, and fight till we die together ;
and where we meet in a hostile manner there the grass will never
again grow." Then old Cornet Botha, who had listened very quietly,
stood forward, and slowly lifting his shainbock, said with a low deli¬
berate tone of voice, " Boys, you have done this thing without the old
people, the commandant, or the field cornets ; you won't hear what
the ministers say, and you seem not inclined to accept the Governor's
gracious pardon, which the magistrate and ministers have asked of
him for you. If you come near any Government posts we defend, or
you injure a single poor Englishman who has sought shelter among us,
or do anything to the magistrate, his clerk or the constables, we shall
take it as a declaration of war. I tell you," he proceeded to say, with
emphasis,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 425
emphasis, and as he gave a piercing glance lo one of the leaders, Rev.
" take care my child, and don't burn your fingers, you know me." H. Renton,
I merely said, "Take care children, I warn you, and if you want to a.m.
fight you may have it ; we pity you ; don't provoke us. Had an ob- j ,
noxious law been passed, there would be some excuse for your con- 1851.
duct; but I say there is neither cause nor excuse for your conduct" ;
" Come home" says the Governor, " and go to your work, and get your
bread honestly."
(signed) Cnbus Forie.
3208. Did you see Mr. Read yourself, when you were
there?—Daily.
3209. Did he speak of a meeting that he had with Major-
general Somerset, when he came to the Kat River Settlement?
—It was at the close of the operations in February.
2210. Did he speak to you about that interview ?—He did ;
I was on the spot at the time.
3211. Will you state yourself what passed?—The general
came in to Philiplon, on Tuesday, I think, the 25th of Fe¬
bruary ; I had a long private conversation with him that
evening about the general state of matters as they came under
my own observation during the preceding four weeks in the
settlement, and gave him all the information I possessed about
the facts, and about my views of matters ; about the number
of loyal parties about which he made particular inquiries then
at Philipton, and other circumstances. He seemed in a very
friendly mood indeed ; Mr. Read, I understand, had a long
conversation with him afterwards, and this same individual
Forie, who had been appointed then field commandant of the
Kat River Settlement, had also an interview with him. They
had, I know, a list carefully scrutinized, and regularly authen¬
ticated, of the individuals on whom implicit reliance could be
placed. Several of those individuals I knew, having .seen
them frequently during the preceding four weeks ; some of
them I have seen in circumstances of peculiar trial, when their
patriotism and their valour were demonstrated in a way that
could not be surpassed, namely, on the Friday preceding when
there was a double visit of Sandilli with a large Kafir force,
and Uithalder with a large Hottentot force. The rebels came
into the place professedly to seize the Fingoes' cattle, but
that was so very trivial an object that universal suspicion was
entertained they meditated the seizure of the cattle belonging
to the Hottentots at Philipton, and of the property known to
be collected at Philipton. There was then no force capable
of withstanding this fearful body of Kafirs and Hottentot
rebels, but a number of the men who had been loyal through¬
out
426 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. out determined secretly that though they could not withstand
force, they should not suffer a head of the Hottentot
! herds to be seized nor the person of a Fingoe, nor injury done
34 July to any parties in Philipton, without avenging it by the imnie-
1851. diate slaughter of the leaders of the rebellion. One man
marked out Sandilli as his victim, whom he should shoot on
the first signal, and another Uithalder and other leading chiefs
of the rebels ; and there they kept within a few paces of their
victims, if a contingency arose, ready to fire off'their muskets,
although they knew it would be succeeded by the penalty oí
their own lives.
3212. Was this towards the end of February í—On the
Friday preceding the siege of Fort Armstrong, the 21st of
■ I'ebruary. I then mentioned that among other things to the
general ; on the day succeeding that of the interview with him,
Mr. Read, sen., can)e to me on the morning as I was coming
out from breakfast very dejected, and said they had had a most
dreadful address from the general, who had called a meeting
and denounced all the people at Philipton as a band of rebels,
and spoke of it as the focus of rebellion, and talked of all the
waggons as those of rebels and being filled w ith stolen property.
I asked who were present ; he said loyal men of the place
were there, and a number of the burghers were there, and he
and Mr. Thomson were there.
3213. You were not present at that interview?—No; it
was early in the day, before nine o'clock, I should think. I asked
him whether he and Mr. Thomson had allowed that to pass
without protest ; he said the general was so very excited and
violent, and they were so thunderstruck, that they could say
nothing ; but he immediately went aside to the general, and
told him he had committed a very great error ; that those were
all loyal men belonging to the place he had spoken to, and
merited very different treatment. I asked Mr. Read if it
was so, that any of those waggons (there might be about 60 of
them) did belong to the rebels ; he said, None he knew of, and
he understood there had been great care about their admission^
for he assisted Forie in deciding about what waggons should
come into the place ; the general had ordered that all the
waggons containing the stolen property should be marched
to the centre of a sort of square by 12 o'clock. About
that hour I came back, having witnessed in the interval a
very painful spectacle ; a considerable patrol of burghers hacj
gone out from Philipton in the direction of Readsdale, itr
which district there was not a tainted man, in which district^
the cultivation was at the highest pitch to be found in tha
whol^
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 427
whole K at River Settlement ; following the course of that patrol, ^
I observed rising from time to time a smoke, indicating the
conflagration which they made of the houses that were left
there, and it was sad to think that all the effect was to burn 24 July
down the dwellings of the loyalist inhabitants who had never
been in any way involved with the rebels; they had come in
in obedience to published orders to rendezvous to Philipton.
After 12 o'clock 1 went to the square to see what waggons
had been sent in in obedience to the major-general's orders ;
there was not one ; 1 saw old Mr. Read sulssequently, and
said, Well, your rebels are very obstinate, or you are pretty
free. He laughed, and said he apprehended the general
would have great difficulty in discovering the rebels' waggons
there. In the afternoon I heard of some waggons being
searched ; I heard a complaint that an honest widow had
had her waggon searched by some parties who had said she
was a rebel. I found two or three waggons in that state on
going up ; I made inquiry what was going on, and was told
the people suspected some of them were rebels ; I asked if
that was ascertained, and was told, " O, yes, there was no doubt
of it," so that seemed to be authorised ; but the intimation was
given to me that every waggon was to be searched, to which I
demurred immediately, saying, I should take care no hand
should touch my waggon under such an imputation without
a regular warrant, and that it should be then under protest
if siich a step was taken ; and I conceived that what was due
to me as a British citizen, accidentally shut up there, was due
to the meanest Hottentot, against whom no distinct ground of
charge had been brought forwai'd. The searching of the
waggons, about which the burghers and levy were standing,
was done in the most loose way, " Show me that," one cried,
'• that cannot belong to a Hottentot ; it is too good for a
Hottentot ; does it belong to you ?" There was the most
loose manner of going to work in the disposal of property in
these waggons that they were searching. But the general,
I understand, had countermanded that. We did not know
then that he meditated the evacuation of the settlement. His
language to myself induced the belief that he meant to select
some proper post of defence, at which they might be con¬
gregated as in former times. Information was sent that
evening that all were to leave for Eilands Post next day ; the
next morning all had to go out, those who could find the
means ot carrying their property with them doing so ; those
who could not had to go without it. From Eilands Post the
whole body was subsequently moved on to Lushington and
to
428 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE TtíE
Rev. to Burgher's Post, and then to Fort Hare ; and on reaching
Hare, which we did on the evening of the succeeding
1 Sunday, all the cattle that the loyal Hottentots had brought
24 J"l.y out with them from Philiplon where their cattle were col¬
lected, amounting, I think, to some 3,000 head, were sud¬
denly seized and distributed by the Fingoes and Burghers
within the guns' range of the fort that evening.
3214. Was all this done by the military ?—Done by those
who were in the force General Somerset brought into the Kat
River with him.
3215. Colonel Estcourt^ Was that done under the autho¬
rity of Major-general Somerset ?—I do not suppose he gave
a distinct sanction to it, but it was the force he had under his
command,—the same force he brought into the Kat River.
3216. Chairman.'] All of what I now understand you to
describe was done by the military acting under the imme¬
diate eye of the major-general commanding?—Yes; under¬
standing by that, not our regular troops, but the burgher and
levy force, and Fingoes that he had as his force in the Kat
River.
3217. Not the Queen's troops, but the native force?—
Yes.
3218. Under the command of the general?—Yes; but
there were no British soldiers proper ; there were Cape
Mounted Rifles with him, who had nothing to do with this
affair of pillage.
3219. The fact is that the insurrection broke out in that
Kat River Settlement?—The insurrection had broke out
first at the Keiskamma among the Kafirs on the 24th of
December.
3220. One of the principal insurrectionary movements
was at the Kat River Settlement?—Immediately following
the outbreak of the Kafirs.
3221. It was also the fact that great numbers of persons
belonging to that settlement, Hottentots especially, joined
the rebels ?—Yes, a great many.
3222. Sir J. Walmsky.] And you are of opinion that the
Hottentots as a people are a very loyal people ?—Very loyal.
From the time of the British occupation of South Africa,
they have been to the British power most loyal, and at this
present time they are as a race most loyal ; a great outcry
has naturally been made and great astonishment and indig¬
nation have naturally arisen at the defection of the Hot¬
tentots at the Kat River, but at the time of ray quitting the
colony there were not fewer than 3,000 Hottentots under
arms.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 429
arms at King William's Town and Fort Hare, while I sup- Rev.
pose, the whole number in actual rebellion did not exceed H.Renton,
one-sixth part of that number in the main ; then it was a '
curious circumstance in the Kat River, that when speaking to 24 July
the Hottentots and charging them with rebellion, those of
them that were involved, they always repudiated it, and
even the leader Uithalder repudiated it, affirming that they
were not against the Queen, not against England ; that they
were only against the settlers ; drawing a distinction be¬
tween hostility to a certain party on the frontier, whom they
considered as their enemies, and what they regarded as Eng¬
land and the Queen.
3223. Chairman.\ However subsequently they joined the
Kafirs?—They were involved.
3224. Mr. Monsell¡\ You only stated a sixth of them?—
More than 3,000 men are actually fighting for us at this
moment, and not above one-sixth of that number, I do not
mean one-sixth of those 3,000, but a number equal to one-sixth,
are engaged in actual rebellion. I should say that the in¬
stances of proof of the Hottentot loyalty are numerous. Now,
for example, 1 heard in the Kat River that at the time there
had been a great excitement in the colony about the convict
question, while the inhabitants of the Kat River entirely joined
with the colonists in opposition to the admission of convicts, they
were indignant at the threats which the colonists were making
about the Cape, and had a meeting, and passed a resolution
condemning that, and declaratoiy of their readiness to come
and fight for the Government in maintaining order. Then again,
there was the conduct of those few men that I spoke of at
Philipton, in circumstances of far greater trial than meeting
an enemy. Such was the habitual feeling of the people,
and I believe that up to this time there is in the minds of the
Hottentots, a strong conviction that England would do them
justice, and a strong attachment to England, although a por¬
tion of them have been carried away in the time of excitement
into their present position.
3225. Chairman.'] That is, a portion of them have been
carried away ?—A portion, and only a portion.
3226. Was the portion which took a more active part in the
insurrection that portion which had been most instructed, and
which previously was to be relied upon, in the opinion of Mr.
Read, for instance ?—I understood that the greater number of
those who took part in the insurrection were residents in the
lower distriets of the Kat River, nearer to Hermanns, and those
places where the grievances had occurred, and that they com¬
prised
430 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. prised individuals who were understood to have been instructed,
H.Renton, and who were in membership with the church. There are
some 640 allotments in the Kat River; of those holding allot-
24 July ments, which comprise some six acres or so, the greater num-
1851. ber have been in no way involved.
3227. Sir J. JV%hnsley.~\ Have you formed any opinion as to
the desirableness or otherwise of locating coloured people in
a settlement by themselves ?—I think that a very difficult and
a very momentous question, especially in the existing state of
sentiment throughout the colony; a question worthy of a most
careful consideration by all parties, both the statesman and
the Christian, and especially by the missionary societies ; if
one were to judge alone of the Kat River settlement, I incline
to think that nothing unfavourable could be deduced from it,
because I ask what any portion of my own countrymen
would have done, passing through such an ordeal, taken from
the lowest class of the people, imperfectly educated, and with
a character and position to gain in society ? I ask myself
what they would have done, and what they would have been
had 5,000 of them been collected in any district and left to
themselves, and had they been required to act as they have
been, and treated as they been ? I am inclined to a conclusion
favourable to the inhabitants of the Kat River in that light.
3228. Chairman^] But speaking generally in reference to
the question just put, are you or not favourable to the estab¬
lishment of exclusively coloured settlements ?—I hesitate very
greatly about the expediency of that course.
3229. You think it would be better to mix the coloured
races with the white ; with the English race or Dutch Boers?
—It seems to me desirable if society is to be amalgamated,
that there should be a general diffusion of all the classes who
are to unite in that amalgamation, and that there should be as
general a similarity of treatment as possible, all understanding
and enjoying the rights that are common to all.
3230. Sir J. Walmsley.'\ Do not great prejudices exist
against the coloured races on the part of the whites in the
colony ?—In a part of the colony, unhappily, very strong
prejudices, which I fear form an element of difficulty, if not
of danger, equal to any that exists out of the colony on the
frontier in the way of preserving tranquillity, and an element
that it seems to me it is more difficult for Government to
grapple with.
3231. Chairman.^ It is a difficulty which prevails as far
as you know, does not it, in all places and in all countries
where there is a white and a black race ?—It no doubt prevails
in
SBLECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 43I
in all ; but it is remarkable in some portions of the colony that ^ n^ton
it scarcely exists in comparison of what it does in others, a.m. '
even though the presence of the black population is very
considerable. 24 July
3232. Speaking now of the eastern district of the colony, ^
taking Graham's Town as the centre, do you think that
that prejudice against the coloured race exists in any peculiar
force ?—In a very formidable degree among the English popu¬
lation generally ; there are of course a portion of the English
population there who are as free and as enlightened men as
any in this country. If you go to Cape Town, again, you
meet with a vast body of coloured people, Malays and Hot¬
tentots, and people of a mixed race, and you find a very
excellent feeling prevailing, and an amount of voluntary means
fur the elevation of the coloured races, for their instruction,
which I suppose is not to be met with in any other spot in
the British colonial empire.
3233. Do you think that prejudice exists in such force as
to present an element of great difficulty in the preservation
of peaceful relations between the settlers and the Kafirs 1—
On the frontier, among the Englisli settlers, I have under¬
stood, greatly more than among those to the westward of the
old Dutch settlers.
3234. Sir J. fValmsley.'] Does a prejudice to the same ex¬
tent exist among the Kafirs against the British colonists ?—
There is a jealousy of the white men and a feeling of injury
from the aggression of the white men, and that is concen¬
trated more towards the Englishman than towards others.
3235. When you speak of aggression, you mean the aggres¬
sive policy as regards their land ?—Yes.
3236. And they are fearful, consequently, of our taking
their land and dispossessing them ?—Yes, and a feeling which
is not unnatural still rankles, though it may not, in times of
peace, be at all alarming.
3237. You have spoken particularly of the conduct of some
of the magistrates and as to a commission ; have you any
observations to offer generally upon the fitness of the magis¬
trates who have been appointed to the colony, and their use¬
fulness on the border districts?—Without giving any opinion
about the system which has been tried for several years with
the Kafirs, the government of whom is quite distinct from the
colonial government proper, I am bound to say, from many
inquiries, that the magistrates there, the civil commissioners
over them, seem to me to have most admirably discharged
their duties in at once maintaining what is due to British
authority
432 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
îlev. authority and doing justice to the natives. The same remark
H. Renton, seems applicable to the magistrate in Victoria, who has been
over that district, which was a ceded territory formerly ; but
24. July from the statements which I have submitted to-day, and from
1851. information given me by reliable individuals of facts, I have
no doubt that in several cases men without sufficient capacity,
of hot temper, and of adverse prejudices towards the natives,
have been appointed to the office of magistrate, and that their
influence has therefore been injurious. It is of course a matter
of great difficulty in a colony such as that to get thoroughly
qualified men.
3238. To what portion of that colony do you particularly
refer in speaking of magistrates ?—I refer to different parts of
the colony, and also to the extended boundary beyond Kafraria.
There are so many jurisdictions in our South African posses¬
sions, and from the nature of them and the circumstances of
them they are so varied and peculiar, that it must be a matter
of great anxiety to Government to get the men that they should
exactly like ; but I humbly conceive if suitable men could be
found, though at a large increase of expenditure, from the
mother country, the additional outlay would be well expended.
3239. Chairman.^ You are aware the magistrates are not
paid by the mother country at all?—I think that the inade¬
quate payment may account in some measure for the difficulty
of getting the right sort of men ; that seems to me more valu¬
able than money.
3240. Did you come into contact with the gentlemen who
acted as commissioners under Colonel Mackinnon ?—With one
of them.
3241. Are those the gentlemen whom you refer to as having
discharged their duties so well ?—They are ; both from what
I saw and from what I ascertained from various quarters.
3242. Have you information enough to tell the Committee
whether they had acquired any influence over the Kafirs, and
had acquired their confidence ?—I believe they had ; probably
as much as any men could have done in their circumstances.
3243. Do they speak the Kafir language ?—Most fluently.
3244. Is not it rather an essential qualification that those
who exercise authority over the native races should be tho¬
roughly able to speak their language?—If the choice lay
between an able, thoroughly just, and intelligent man, who
did not speak their language, but could, by an interpreter,
communicate with them, and one who was inferior but could
talk fluently, I should of course prefer the former ; but if an
intimate knowledge of the Kafir tongue can be got in con¬
junction
SELECT CÓMMitTÉE ON T&E KAFÏR TRIRES- 433
junction with those mural and intellectual qualities, it is of Rev.
the utmost value.
3245. Sir J. Walmsley.'] Do you think it difficult to find
among the colonists, that is, the w hite people in the colony, 24 July
such magistrates as you have described?—The colony, over 1851.
a vast extent of territory, comprises, after all, so small a popu¬
lation, and parly spirit and all the littleness that comes along
with it, meet you so provokingly at every step, that I fear, out
of such a district as Cape Town, there would be great diffi¬
culty in getting enlightened and liberal-minded men.
3246. Then I gather from what you have said that you
would prefer magistrates being sent from this country who
even did not know the Kafir language at present, rather than
select them from those persons you consider prejudiced against
the coloured races now in the colony ?—Decidedly,
3247. Have you in your mind formed any definite idea as
to the preliminary course necessary for the foundation of
tranquillity in the colony and of peace among the Kafir tribes ?
—It appears to me that an Imperial or Parliamentary commis¬
sion from this country, composed of men of capacity and high
character, entirely removed from all colonial local influence,
and with ample power to call parties and documents before
them, who should thoroughly and impartially, on the spot, in¬
vestigate facts, is most desirable if not most necessary to the
ends of truth and justice ; and that the idea of permanent
tranquillity cannot be entertained unless you have the founda¬
tions laid clearly and solidly in justice.
3248. Mr. Monsell.'] You mean, I presume, a separate
commission ; not one in which the present governor should
be included ?—No.
3249. Colonel Estcourt.'] Suppose you sent out a commis¬
sion of that sort, would not it take away from the authority of
the governor in the colony in the minds of the inhabitants ?
— I do not see that it should impair his executive authority
at all, if this commission had no power of action beyond
investigation and report.
3250." Sir J. Walmsky!] Would, in your estimation, such
a commission be calculated to give satisfaction to the Kafirs,
and put down that excitement that at present exists among
them ; would they have confidence, in other words, in such
a commission?—I think that it would command their respect
if they knew of it; but I look not only at the probable rela¬
tion of such a commission to the Kafirs, and to other tribes
on the frontier who are tnibulent, and with whom we are apt
to get into collision, but also to what is needed within the
0.63. E E precincts
434 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. precincts of the colony proper. And I conceive that in tl)e
H. Renton, present excited state of party in the colony, and amid the
unhappy jealousy and antipathy which prevail there, such a
24 July commission would command the universal respect and confi-
1851. dence, and be a guarantee to all, which it might be, I fear,
impossible to secure by any local commission, however excel¬
lent the individual members of it, which could be furnished in
the colony, that an adequate remedy was really to be applied.
3251. Chairman.^ Do I understand you to recommend
that the commission to which you have referred should be
appointed rather to inquire into the state and condition of the
Cape colony, and into the feelings, and wants, and wishes of
the people there, than into the relations between the colony
and the Kafir tribes, or their better government hereafter?—
I referred to the latter case ; to the dealing with all that has
been involved in the question about Kafirs and Hottentots,
and what not, on the frontier ; to find out all the facts in
relation to the alleged grievances, whether real, or only sup¬
posed to exist.
3252. As between the colony and Kafirs, or the grievances
and complaints of the Cape colony proper ?—Both ; I would
take in the whole question in relation to the coloured tribes.
3253. Mr. Monsell.'] You have described the excited
feelings of the Hottentots as directed chiefly against the
settlers, and not against the British Government, not against
England ; do you conceive that observation would apply
also to the case of the Kafirs ?—To the Kafirs also.
3254. Do you conceive the Kafirs draw a clear distinc¬
tion in their minds between the colonists and the mother
country?—I think they do, though not so broadly as the
Hottentots ; that is, at present ; I gather from the mode in
which the missionaries of all denominations have acted to
them ; they look upon them, for example, as friendly and
as trustworthy. They conceive that they are the repre¬
sentatives of a class of people in this country who have no
unkindl}^ feelings towards them, and who «ish to do them
good ; they conceive that there is something behind what
they can see in the colony. They have a more favourable
impression of England than they have of the people that
they come in contact with on the frontier ; they prefer, I
think, the military ; they have a higher opinion of our sol¬
diers and ofiBcers than tiiey have of the settlers, and the
people resident on the frontier.
3255. Still have you not described the Kafirs as feeling
considerable distrust even of the Governor and of those con¬
cerned
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 435
cerned in the government of the military department ?—Yes, Rev.
they have in that respect, certainly.
3256. Chairman.'] You stated the existence of strong pre- ^
judices as regards the coloured and white populations; does 24July
not that imply that the charge of partisanship would be gene- 1851.
rally made against all individuals in important positions
under existing circumstances}— Not necessarily ; I con¬
ceive, for examplej that the Commissioners over the Kafirs
were looked upon personally without jealousy or any un¬
kindly feeling by the Kafirs, and with confidence by the
colonists.
3257. But there is not an uncommon tendency either to
charge with partisanship or actually to partisanship ?—^There
is a strong disposition to it.
3258. Mr. Monsell.] You would look with considerable
distrust at any measure which should increase the power of
the colonists, as regards the government of Kafraria, in deal¬
ing with the Kafir tribes ?->-I should.
325g. Chairman.] With reference to the feelings expressed
to you as regarded Messrs. Biddulph and Bowker, was that
feeling, in your opinion, in consequence of their having
brought charges which were held to be utterly unfoundetl, or
that they were indiscriminating in their condemnation ?—The
conclusion at which I arrived from the representations made
to me was, that the charges had not only been indiscriminat¬
ing, but several of them unfounded.
3260. That they had in fact considerably misrepresented
the circumstances?—That was the conclusion at which I
arrived.
3261. I gather from your evidence that it is your opinion
that in the pursuance of the general policy adopted towards
the Kafirs, that course has been considerably complicated
and interfered with by acts of indiscretion on the part of
individuals which our relations with the savage tribes have
given some importance to ?—I should say that I hold, espe¬
cially with regard to the Kat River Hottentots, with that
exception of what they deemed a violation of the pledges
made about helpj at the close of the war in 1847, the
retention of the cattle which they had captured from the
enemy, they have been not acts by the Government, but
local acts of indiscretion, sometimes to mere individuals, on
the part of magistrates ; but being occurrences coming after
the sufferings of the inhabitants of the settlement, they have
operated as if they were public universal injuries. It is to be
noted that the Hottentots are a very sensitive and very sym-
U.63. E E 2 pathetic
436 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Uev. patlietic race, and that when they become excited they are
II. Rentan, very jealous, and so it holds that where one man suffers all
- sufier ; and 1 apprehend that that sympathy has iiad no small
34 July influence on the Cape Corps in their recent defection.
1851« 3262. Sir J. iValmsley.'\ Following up that question, I
think 1 gather from your previous evidence that a great deal
of the irritation arose from the supplemental harangue of the
Governor at Fort Cox, and that you were of opinion that that
was the great cause of the outbreak ?—My opinion of that
was, that the indiscretion of the Governor in the manner of that
harangue, and that the still greater imprudence of the march
up the Keiskamma, precipitated the outbreak, and furnished
the occasion for which Sandilli and others were anxious,
though it might be sooner than they themselves had antici¬
pated ; but 1 have no doubt, from what transpired, that
although the Governor had not made that address in that
manner, and although that had not taken place, an outbreak
would have occurred, though it would not have been in the same
circumstances. It is an important fact that the Kafirs in the
present war were the first to shed blood ; that is a fact against
them, and I only lament that an occasion for their hostilities
was furnished by apparently the imprudence of this act I have
spoken of.
3263. Do numerous missionaries still remain in the dis-
aftected and disturbed distriets ?—There is not in the whole
district over which the insurrection has spread a single mis¬
sionary or mission family remaining, save at the Chumie
Station, where the widow and the family of a deceased
missionary, w ho was very much respected among the Gaikas,
continue unmolested, and I am sure will on the part of the
Kafirs, though I should not have equal confidence if the
liurgher commandoes were going to that district.
3264. Were the missionaries ordered to withdraw by the
colonists ?—Not by the colonists ; about the beginning of De¬
cember, when some symptoms of alarm prevailed, a notice was
sent to the missionaries among the Kafirs, to be ready to pro¬
vide for their immediate safety ; that was followed by a counter
notice, previous to the meeting at Fort Cox, that it was un¬
necessary to leave, and they were assured they should be
apprised if danger arose ; but they got no further information,
because the outbreak came so unexpectedly upon the autho¬
rities.
3265. Do you think it desirable that the missionaries should
withdraw from the seat of war, or that they should remain?—
That is a question about which good men and wise men differ,
and
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 437
and much is to be said on both sides ; but it is obvious to me,
that if the missionaries can remain with personal safety, there
, .111- • A.M.
are various important ends to be gamed by their continuance,
in exerting their influence to prevent the well affected from 24 July
being involved in the rebellion, which would otherwise be in-
evitable. Again, in supplying the means of communication
with the British authorities, that would often be most im¬
portant, as well as in preserving the property of the missionaries,
which is an important object in its own department.
3266. As respects the Kafirs, they were quite willing that
you should remain in their country ; that you might sit where
you were in peace?—Sit still was the expression.
3267. Had you any interviews with the Kafir chiefs, at
which you received their protection or their assurance of pro¬
tection?— I had from Sandilli himself, who came to the
station three weeks after the outbreak, v/ith a large body of
armed men, and when we were absolutely in the power of the
insurgents, without arms and without ammunition.
3268. What was Sandilli's language on that occasion ?—•
That of assurance to the teachers as they were called, and to
myself, that we might sit still ; he proposed also, on our inti¬
mating an intention of leaving, that we were not to remove to
any military post, or go anywhere without apprising him, in
which case he would engage to give an escort. I told him of
rny purpose to leave, and he fulfilled his pledge ; he left a
confidential man of his tribe as a sort of guard, not from the
Kafirs of the district, but from strangers, Kafirs who were
insurgents, passing to and fro, from doing any harm to the
teachers' families, as the missionaries were called ; and when I
did go out his escort went with us to the borders of the Kat
River.
3269. What was the nature of his remarks as to the war
itself, so far as you could gather his own views and opinions?
—I might have supplied you with ail that passed ; it was all
taken down ; but I have not the document here ; he was very
much excited ; there was nothing very material. He com¬
plained that he did not send any of his people across the sea-
water to England to invade our country, and why did the English
come across the sea-water to this country to invade him ; he said
that the Queen did not make him a chief; she could make great
men, she could make governors, but God made him a chief ;
he was the chief of all the Gaikas, and God had given the
white man England, and He had given the coloured men
South Africa, Kafirland, and why did we English wish to
undo what God had done? He said tliey had stripped him
0.63. E É 3 of
438 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
^ Key. of his land ; he complained that the teachers or missionaries
wherever they went alienated his children from him; that
! whenever they became Christians they ceased to be his sub-
24 July jects ; and he complained that the young men that were
1851- educated left Kafirland and went into the colony, instead of
remaining among their own people and doing them good, if
that was the object. I expressed my entire concurrence with
him in the last view, and lamented that, any Kafirs should
leave Kafirland that were themselves educated or christianized,
and I said I hoped the time was coming when they would
need no white teachers at all ; that we wished as much as
possible to have only Kafirs teaching Kafirs. He stated that
his object in coming was to claim all his own children, by
whicii he meant all the residents on the station. I asked him
to exempt them from fighting, stating that as Christians it was
against the Gospel to fight ; that it would be wrong in any of
them to fight against their own countrymen, but I must equally
object to any of them fighting against the English ; and he
asked me if Somerset would exempt them from fighting against
him. I told him I could give no pledge for Somerset, as I
had not communicated with him, but that I should prefer the
same request to him as to himself, and I had great hope he
would allow them to continue free ; but he would not consent
without this pledge to promise exemption, and the determina¬
tion with which he adhered to refuse consent unless he could
have the pledge that the people on the station should not be
made to fight against him, impressed me with the respect
which he had for pledges, and with the confidence which might
be reposed in him if his pledge were actually given.
3270. When was the first intimation you received of your
conduct being questioned as regards the war ?—After I got to
Fort Hare, I cannot say how long.
3271. Was it questioned whilst you remained in the settle¬
ment of which you have first spoken, where you saw Sandilli
and others ?—Not to my knowledge.
3272. The first time you heard your conduct questioned,
as having taken part with the rebels, was at Fort Hare?—Yes.
3273. And no offensive interference did you find till you got
to Graham's Town ?—No.
3274. Do you believe that the missionaries, as far as your
judgment and information go in that district, took any part,
directly or indirectly, in promoting the rising of the Kafirs ?
None whatever.
3275. That you are quite clear about?—Quite clear; all
their influence was distinct and unmistakeable in reprobation
of
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 43^
of the outbreak, because before it had happened I never Rev.
missed an opportunity, and I know my brethren there did not,
of impressing upon the minds of the Christian Kafirs who
were on the station, who were the only parties, with the exeep- 24 July
tion of those I before referred to, with whom I came into
contact, and with the view of their carrying it to others, the
inevitable ruin that conflict with the British power would .
entail upon them.
3276. Colonel Bunne.'] At the time that they deprecated
war, did not the missionaries in many instances hold out to
the Kafirs that they were very much illused by the English ?
—What they may have done, I cannot say ; I witnessed no
such representations, and I was privy to none.
3277. Was not Shiloh a missionary station?—Yes.
3278. Was not some of the plunder that was taken from
Fort Armstrong found in Shiloh afterwards, that being a mis¬
sionary station ?—I think I have heard so ; but I am not
positive that I have.
3279. I want to know whether, when the troops went to
Shiloh, they did not find a part of the plunder that was taken
from the settlement at Armstrong in the missionary station at
Shiloh?—When you mention that, I think I have heard so;
but I cannot speak positively, I beg to add the painful
fact, that as regards the pillage of Fort Armstrong, not only
rebels but people in the neighbourhood indiscriminately came
in and seized what they could carry, so as to leave nothing ;
the rights of property were all in abeyance ; and that was done
by many who were not regarded as taking part in the rebellion.
3280. What were they; Kafirs or Hottentots, or whom?—
Hottentots and Bastards.
3281. From the settlement at Shiloh?—I am not aware
that any were from Shiloh.
3282. Was any of that plunder found in Shiloh ?—I think
I have heard what you mention, but I am not aware of the fact.
3283. Was not Shiloh defended against the troops by Hot¬
tentots belonging to the missionary station there ?—-Yes.
3284. Did they not defend the church with great force ?—
I understand so.
3285. Do you understand 140 alone were defending the
church ; one of the detachments at Shiloh ?—I cannot speak
as to the number ; but I may state, that while at Philipton
there were two or three very disastrous occurrences, which
aggravated the state of affairs very greatly, and one of those
was this affair of Shiloh.
0.63.
E E 4
440 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Lunœ, 28° die Juin, 1851.
MEMBERS PRESENT.
Colonel Estcoui t.
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Labouchere.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Mackinnon.
B. Haloes,
Esq., M.F.
28 July
1851.
The Right Hon. HENRY LABOUCHERE, in the
Benjamin Hawes, Esq., a Member of the Committee ;
Examined.
3286. Chairman.l ARE there any observations you are
desirous to make to the Committee, with reference to a letter
which has been addressed to the Chairman of this Committee
by Sir Andries Stockenstrom ?—In Sir Andries Stockenstrom's
letter, 1 find the third paragraph to be to this effect : " The
Under Secretary for the Colonies, after handing to me during
my examination on the 26th ultimo, the Blue Book of the 23d
ultimo, referred me to others of Sir G. Napier's despatches ;
but I searched in vain for that of the ist of February 1839,
although in doing so my eye accidentally fell on one of the 20th
November 1838, w hich I read to the Committee, and which was
strongly indicative of the opinion which Sir G. Napier then en¬
tertained of the Glenelg system, of my proceeding under it, and
of those by whom 1 was so furiously and factiously resisted in
that important task. Í have, however, this morning purchased
another copy of the said Blue Book of the 23d ultimo ; but 1
do not find in the copy so purchased the said letter of Sir G.
Napier of the 20th November 1838, such as it was handed to
me by the Under Secretary, such as I then read it to this
Committee, and such as it must appear in my evidence, inas¬
much as in the latter copy there appeared in said letter, in
page 40* of the said Blue Book, in the second line from the
bottom, the following sentence parenthetically between the
figure 1819 and the word "as;" viz., " the worst importa-
Chair.
tion
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 441
tion that ever came to this colony." I feel it an imperative Haxaes,
duty to notice this omission, because I audibly read this pas- sq^.p,
sage before the Committee in the hearing of a number of 38 July
bystanders; and as the letter, suchas I received it from the 1851.
Under Secretary, with the said passage, is gone to the Cape
and may there be published, I cannot allow the cause of the
discrepancy to.be left doubtful." In the passage which I have
read from Sir Andries Stockenstrom's letter, the Committee
will observe that he points out that certain words within a
parenthesis were in the copy of the papers delivered to the
Committee, and that they are not to be found in the copy
delivered for general circulation. I wish to explain to the
Committee bow that arose : The papers, as the Committee is
aware, were prepared with considerable haste, with a view to
being placed in the hands of the Committee ; and the moment
that the papers were collected and printed, I desired that 15
copies of them should be at once delivered to the Committee.
The copies that I ordered to be delivered passed under my
view, and also came under the notice of Lord Grey ; and it
was decided they should be laid, as they were laid, before the
Committee. The copies for general circulation were not deli¬
vered for about a week afterwards, and during that interval the
gentleman who is at the head of the department of all matters
relating to the Cape, perceived these words in the parenthesis;
he thought they cast a very unnecessary imputation upon a
body of settlers, and he took upon himself, without communi¬
cation with Lord Grey or with myself, to strike them out. I
was not aware that they were omitted until Sir Andries
Stockenstrom pointed out the omission in his letter. I desire
also to state that in laying such papers as these before Parlia¬
ment, whenever a paper is not given in extenso, it is at once
marked " copy " or " extract." In this case, it will be per¬
ceived that it is stated to be an extract. I would further re¬
mark also, that it is the practice in the office, and I apprehend
a wise and proper one, that where in the papers or despatches
personal reflections are cast upon individuals, as far as is con¬
sistent with the duty of laying beiore Parliament or the
Committee the fullest information upon the subject to which
the papers relate, they are omitted, provided the omission
does not in any way affect the main information to be con¬
veyed to the House or to a Committee, as the case may be.
Under those circumstances, though I think those words w^ere
irregularly and improperly struck out, inasmuch as this was
done without the authority of the Secretary of State, contrary
to a standing regulation of the Colonial Office ; but otherwise
there
442 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
B. Hawes, there is not much blame to be attached to the gentleman who,
Esq. M.p, from motives which may be readily appreciated and under-
28~Jui stood, took upon himself to omit them.
32^7- Colonel Estcourt.] Was not this a copy of that which
was shown to Sir Andries Stockenstrom in his examination?—
The copy which Sir Andries Stockenstrom read from was the
early copy I presented to the Committee, coiitaining those
words; and in the course of his examination he quoted the
passage in question.
3288. And those copies were the copies given to the Com¬
mittee alone ?—And those copies were intended for the
Committee alone. It is, however, but right to Sir Andries
Stockenstrom to state, that a copy was given to him at the
time.
Mercurii, 30° die Julii, 1851.
MEMBERS PRESENT.
Mr. Labouchere.
Sir J. Walmsiey,
Mr. Bonham Carter.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Colonel Dunne.
Sir E. Buxton.
Mr. Hindley.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Hawes.
The Right Hon. HENRY LABOUCHERE, in the
Chair.
Sir Andries Stockenstrom, called in ; and further Examined.
Sir A. SiocA- 328g. Siv. J. kFalmskt/.] HAVE you any knowledge of the
emtrom. Neuaber localities, relations of the various Kafir and other
■~TT tribes ?—No ; I do not think that anybody can give you that
1851. accurately; I have formed some sort of idea, having been a
great deal among them, but I think any statement I can make
upon the subject must be very vague.
3290. Are you prepared to give the Committee any infor¬
mation as to the number of the tribes to the east and north-east
of the Keiskamma ?—As far as I could, I have paid a great
deal of attention to the subject, but any information I could
give upon it must be very vague ; I believe them to be about
200,000
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 443
200,000 strong, that is including the Galaikas and the Rarabes, Sir A. Stock-
and including the Amagonaquabies, which is a Pato tribe. ensirom.
3291. In those tribes do you include the Tambookies ?— 30 July
No, they are independent of them ; when I speak of the Kafirs, 1851.
I speak of what we call now the Kreli Kafirs, and the
T'Slambie, and the Pato Kafirs.
3292. What.do you designate the Tambookie :•—The Araa-
tembu are never called Kafirs; they may have been some cen¬
turies ago the same stock.
3293. Then when you speak of the Kafir tribes as being
200,000 strong, you do not include the Tambookies ?—No.
3294. What other tribes do you not include upon that fron¬
tier ?—There are the Basutus, and if you go on into the interior,
you come to the Pondus and the Zoolus, and various other
tribes, which have been coming upon the colony like waves,
from the destructions committed by the Chartre in 1823; but
Kafirs we only call the Galaikas and the Rarabes, the Ama¬
gonaquabies, the Tambookies, and the Amatembus, so called.
3295. You have no specific knowledge of the Tambookie
tribe?—No, only generally.
3296. Were the Tambookies in friendly relation with the
colony during the previous war ?—^That leads to a lengthy
subject ; I must begin in 1829 ; those people were at war, and
up to that period there was no union among them against the
colony ; then the Kafirs attacked the Tambookies and pursued
them into the colony, and carried on the war, to the great terror
of the farmers ; such was then the enmity between those two
races. Sir Lowry Cole in consequence of this punished the
Kafirs that were living by sufferance in the Ceded Territory,
and drove them out and established a Hottentot settlement
upon that same ground, which had originally been measured for
Scotch islanders.
3297. Mr. Hawes.] Did you take any part in the expulsion
of Maquomo at that time ?—I was the principal instrument.
3298. Did you approve of the policy pursued ?—Fully.
Maquomo had taken possession of a part of the Ceded Territory;
they were allowed by sufferance to remain there ; and when
they committed this outrage upon the Tambookies, they pur¬
sued them into the colony, and the Government very properly
made an example of them ; and that, I must say, has been
very much disapproved of in this country ; but still I think
that it was necessary. This hostility continued, and the Tam¬
bookies were extremely grateful to the British Government for
the assistance they had received on this occasion. In the war
of 1835 the Tambookies did not only remain neutral, but
whatever
444 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THÉ
Sir il. SíocA- whatever they did was in favour of the British Goverimient;
ensirom. consequently they had no share in the war against the Govern-
30 July ment ; but as soon as the war was over, we rewarded them by
1851. annexing their country to the colony, and placing them under
the D'Urban system. This they never forgave. Up to that
period there had always been jealousies between the Tara-
bookies and Kafirs. When the D'Urban system was put a
stop to, this country fell back, of course, to the Tambookies.
When the v\ar of 1846 broke out, the consequence of this
treatment which they had received was, that one part of the
nation, the Mapassa, joined the Kafir tribe against us, for the
first time that they had shown any hostility towards the colony.
That part joined the Kafirs against us in 1846 ; but the great
proportion remained neutral, owing to the influence of the
missionaries. During the war of 1846 we attacked those
people, the Mapassa, and, of course, what we called punished
them ; and at the same time we also sent a detachment by
mistake—a very improper measure—into a peaceable kraal,
who were living under the protection of the diplomatic agent,
in the middle of the night, and men, women, and children
were destroyed.
3299. Mr. Bonham Carter.] Wlrat is that attack known by ;
is there any reference to" it anywhere ?—It is in the Colonial
Office in Uowning-street ; it was the kraal of Guadda. Per¬
haps it is as well to explain what I mean by the improper
measure. When I was sent by Sir Peregrine Maitland to
bring Kreli to terms, I requested the assistance of 200 Hot¬
tentots to bring up any supplies ; these were Zweilendain
Hottentots, then serving under Captain Hagart, 7th Dragoon
Guards ; I was told that they could not be spared, because
Colonel Hare, who had to defend the Amatóla Mountains,
would be too weak during my absence at the Kei ; but as soon
as I was absent they spared 1,000 men out of the same force,
and deranged all my plans ; one detachment was sent from
Shiloh, of boers who were serving under my orders, and were
beaten in consequence of mismanagement, and a detachment
of British soldiers was sent into this kraal of Guadda ; ihey
of course knowing no better than that they had to deal with
enemies. The kraal was destroyed in the manner I have just
stated. Those men complained to me, and I reported it ;
they never got any redress, which very much exasperated
them. After the war, the present Governor, upon the me¬
morial of some of the farmers, attached the land as far as the
Kei to the colony, and had a number of farms measured out
for those farmers. I saw the reply to this memorial in the
Governor's
select committee on the kafir tribes. 445
Governor's own hand, in which they were told that their ^\vA.StocJc-
request was complied with, provided they would not disturb enstrom.
the Kafirs under the chief Kama. The boers took it for ^
granted that the land was theirs, and part of it was actually '
measured out for them. As soon as the present war broke out,
the whole of the Tambookie tribes west of the Kei joined the
Kafirs against us.
3300. Sir J. Walmsle^.'] It has been given in evidence that
the aggiessions in the colony have all been on the part of the
Kafirs, and not by the colonists; is this, in your opinion, cor¬
rect ?—When I speak of the wars of i 846, and of everything
that has taken place since then, I draw a broad distinction
between the colonists and the Government ; I think them the
results of the acts of the Government, and not of the colonists.
3301. Do you think the aggressions have been on the part
gf the Government, or on the part of the Kafirs, or both ?~ I
think that the war of 1846 was brought about by the violation
of our treaties with the Kafirs in 1844, and everything that
has followed since was just the consequence of that.
3302. Chairman.'\ Is there any other point you are desirous
of otfering observations to the Committee upon ?—I must
observe, if the Committee will allow me to say, the same ques¬
tion was put to me the first time I was heard here, and as I
then did not know whether the Government would pursue this
inquiry at the Cape, I thought that it was my duty to wait
until that point was decided ; because I do not think it right
that I should say all that I have to say with reference to indi¬
viduals, and with reference to classes, in their absence, if there
is a chance of my having the opportunity of saying so to their
faces : if, therefore, there should be an inquiry at the Cape,
where those people can be confronted with those who charge
them, and where all the blacks as well as the whites can be
heard, and every one whose name shall be put forward shall
be put in a position to defend himself ; if that can be done, I
think it would not be well for me to add here what I have to
say. But if there is no inquiry to follow, and all the things
are to rest here, I say the whole inquiry is incomplete.
The Reverend Henry Renton, a.m., called in ; and further
Examined.
3303. Mr. Hindley.] YOU have stated, in your answer to Rev.
a question put by a Member of this Committee, that you had H. Renton,
heard that a part of the plunder that was taken from the
settlement at Armstrong was found in the missionary station
at
440 MINUTES Ol' EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
H Äewio» Shiloh ; have you any reason to believe that that was cor-
^ merely a flying rumour you heard in the colony ?
—I heard a great many idle rumours in the colony, many of
30 July them I am aware quite unfounded ; on the question being put
^^5». to me the other day, I thought I had heard that among
others, but I have not the slightest evidence of the fact,
nor the slightest reason for thinking that the rumour is well
founded.
3304. You were not at Shiloh ?—No.
3305« From what you heard at Shiloh, would you believe
that the general disposition of the people there was loyal to
the Government ?—Decidedly ; they had been a community
not only of undisputed, but of eminent loyalty, from their
foundation up to the present unhappy occurrence.
3306. Did you hear of the circumstances which attended
the destruction of Shiloh, and the previous occurrences?—J
was at Philipton when the tidings of the destruction of Shiloh
arrived. I was with the missionaries and the minister of the
Dutch church there at the time, and we took down from two
men, who came to consult us what they should do, a statement
of what had taken place; that statement 1 hold in my hand.
It was forwarded to General Somerset, along with a minute of
our view of the matter, and we took the view we did from the
unanimous and strong conviction up to that moment that i
Shiloh w as a most unlikely spot from which an emanation of
hostility to the Government might have been anticipated. I
have also here a subsequent statement which I took down from
an individual who had acted as the secretary of the com¬
mandant for some weeks at Shiloh; a man who came to
Philipton subsequently, and who gave a very distinct account
from a journal he had kept, and continued at Philipton, re¬
maining steadfast and loyal, and who was enrolled in the levies,
and whose testimony seems to me important in connexion with
that of the other witnesses.
3307, Can you give the purport of that statement?—These
men, David Taai and Hendrick Vischer, after a reference to
some skirmishes between the Fingoes and the Tambookies, in
the neighbourhood of Shiloh, stated that four men, w ho had
gone down to the Kat River to bring up their families,
returned to Shiloh on the 29th of January. On the return of '
those men. Captain Tylden wrote a letter to Mr. Bonatz, the
presiding missionary at the station, stating that he must imme¬
diately appear with those four men at Whittlesea. Two of
those, who belonged to Shiloh, went with Mr. Bonatz, and, on
their arrival, were put in prison by Captain Tylden, at Whit
tlesea.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 447
tlesea. The captain required the other two to be brought. ^^iton
The commandant told them he could not take those two men 'a.'m. '
prisoners, as they belonged to the Kat River, and were ready
to leave for that destination. Captain Tylden then said the 30 July
Shiloh people were not on the side of Government, because ^^5^*
they would not give up those two men. On Thursday, January
the 30th, a letter was drawn up to Captain Tylden, which
two of the missionaries and three of the people carried and
delivered to him ; he refused to have anything to do with it,
and stated that, instead of sending it, the Hottentots ought to
have come and fallen down on their knees before him. He
demanded that by 12 o'clock that day, 10 men from Shiloh
should be sent, with their guns and ammunition, to be delivered
up to him, and at one o'clock 10 more to do the same, and, after
giving up their guns and ammunition, they were to be sent to
Cradock to prison. By their submission, he said he would see
that they were still on the side of Government. On the mis¬
sionaries reporting to the men of Shiloh the captain's demand,
and urging them to compliance, they refused, assigning as the
reasons of their refusal, that they recollected how Mr. Shepston
had acted to the people of the Bushman station, taking their
guns, and breaking them to pieces, and then putting them in
prison, and half-starving them ; and that they had heard how
the people at Bavaians River had been treated by the
Pringles ; their guns taken from them, and broken, and
the people afterwards fired upon, and some of them killed.
Captain Tylden replied, that if they did not submit, and bring
in the guns within two hours, the missionaries must leave
immediately. Upon that, the missionaries left the same after¬
noon ; six missionaries, four of whom had families, with four
v/aggons. On January the 3tst, Captain Tylden came with a
body of Fingoes, Kama's Kafirs, and English to attack the
station. The Shiloh people, numbering about 70, went out to
meet the force, but were driven back into the station. The
Whittlesea people took possession of their houses, and fired
upon them. On the following morning, February the ist, the
English and Fingoes who had retired on Friday returned before
sunrise, and renewed the attack. They fought from that time
till about one o'clock in the afternoon, the Shiloh people occu-
pying a position within the square. The assailants went into
their houses, and into one of the,mission houses, and made
holes in them, through which they fired. They also took away
and destroyed the property of the Berlin missionaries which
Was in the infant school. They burnt the mission-house, con¬
sisting of nine rooms, besides store and pantries, which was full
of
44S MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. of valuable mission property ; they also burnt the kitchen and
H. Henton, cabinetmaker's shop, supplied with complete sets of smith's,
Carpenters' and wheelwrights' tools ; also the shop of mer-
24 July chandise belonging to the mission. The premises were set on
1851. fire by an Englishman named John Webster, who got up by a
ladder to a window in the gable, and with lucifers, which he
had taken from the infant school, began his work of incen¬
diarism. About 15 Fingoes and Kafirs were shot in Shiloh,
but the inhabitants drove back the assailants into the plain,
and saw them afterwards carrying some dead bodies ; they
interred subsequently in one large grave the body of the
Englishman, who had been shot from the ladder, with those of
the Fingoes and Kafirs. One of the Shiloh men was killed,
and two were wounded. The assailants took away all their
cattle and sheep. That is the substance of their statement
in relation to the attack on Shiloh, by which the station was
destroyed. The other individual, who had been acting as
secretary to the commandant at Shiloh, related to me that on
the 27th of January four men came to Commandant Paarl,
and asked his permission to go to Kat River to buy soap and
tobacco, as they could not get anything to buy at Whittlesea ;
the ministers also had nothing of the kind. On the 2gth those
four men came back to Shiloh. When Commandant Tylden
heard they were come, he wrote to Mr, Bonatz a letter that
Commandant Paarl should bring them to Whittlesea. Com¬
mandant Paarl went to the four men, and told them of Captain
Tylden's demand, ordering them to submit to the requisition;
the two belonging to Shiloh went with them, the others would
not. When Mr. Bonatz, with the two men, came. Captain
Tylden said, " There were four men ; where are the other
two ?'' On Mr. Bonatz stating the circumstances. Captain
Tylden wrote to the Commandant Paarl, saying, that before
six o'clock he must deliver up the two men at Whittlesea.
Paarl ordered some of his men, but he could get no one to
transport them as prisoners to Whittlesea ; he then went to
Captain Tylden in person, and told him he could find no men to
carry out his orders ; that the two men did not belong to Shiloh,
and were ready to go to Kat River. The same evening two
of the missionaries returned to Captain Tylden to tell the same
fact. On the 30th two of the ministers went to Whittlesea
about the matter. They reported that Captain Tylden accused
some of the Shiloh people of having been seen among the
Kafirs the day the Kafirs and Fingoes fought. Mr. Bonatz
said if that was true he would give his head, for he was sure
that it was untrue, and pointed to a Fingoe who was in the
field
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
449
field of battle to bear testimony ; the Fingoe assured Captain Rev.
Tylden that no Hottentot was among the Kafirs. A letter was H. Rentan,
then vvritten to Ca[)tain Tylden from the people of Shiloh, that •*'
they had solemnly resolved to give their lives as a sacrifice for jyjy
the ministers and Fingoes, as faithful subjects of the Govern- 1851.
ment, and that the reason why they had not fired upon
Mapassa, was not only because they had not enough powder,
but because they expected an order from Commandant Tylden ;
that as they did not receive the order, they had stood ready for
an attack ; that they were reminded when in the last war
Mapassa attacked them, and they were obliged to defend them¬
selves, they were charged with having attacked the Kafirs with¬
out reason, and now they had no orders from anybody to fire,
and that Avas the reason why they had not fired upon Mapassa.
Captain Tylden wrote that no way was now open but to
deliver up the men within two hours ; that they were to come
down to Whittlesea 10 by 10 to lay down their guns and
powder, and go to Cradock and answer for their conduct, and
if they did not do so he would hold them as rebels. When the
ministers saw that they would not lay down their guns and
powder, and their reasons for refusing to do so, the ministers
left the same day. Such was the statement of Balie, the
secretary.
3308. You made a representation of those circumstances to
General Somerset?—We did. I might have added, that, on
taking down the statements of those men, we sent an imme¬
diate representation to the Major-General, with an authenti¬
cated copy of the same, submitting most respectfully and ear¬
nestly the suggestion to him, that until the rigorous inquiries
which the case demanded could be prosecuted, a suspension of
the w ork of destruction between the people of Whittlesea and
the people of Shiloh was an object of urgent moment, not
only for the sake of those communities, but to prevent the ex¬
tension of the disaffection among the coloured classes, which
was already, unhappily, so widely spread, and which this trans¬
action was greatly fitted to aggravate. We suggested that
this might be effected by an order from the Major-General to
Captain Tylden to suspend all operations against Shiloh, on
the condition that the people of Shiloh should engage that no
offensive operations should be resumed on their part. That
suggestion was submitted not only on account of the very
extraordinary manner in which Captain Tylden Avas repre¬
sented to have acted, but because we Avell knew that previous
to that occurrence the Shiloh people Avere a community of
undisputed loyalty, and of most peaceable and exemplary
0.63. F F deportment,
450
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. deportment, and because, from the statement of the men,
H. Renton, those people considered themselves as forced in self-defence
to do what they had done by the hazard t» their property,
30 July their liberty, and their life, to which the demand of Captain
1851, Tylden, and the subsequent attacks of the Whittlesea people,
exposed them.
3309. Are you aware what steps General Somerset took
after that statement had been received ?—He sent a despatch
through Philipton to Captain Tylden, arresting any further
operations until that office had reported fully his conduct ;
and the arrival of that despatch prevented further hostilities,
which were fixed to be recommenced on the morning that it
came,
3310. Colonel Dunne.^ Do you think that any conduct on
the part of an officer of the Queen's troops would justify the
people of Shiloh resisting the authority of the Queen, or the
missionaries encouraging them ?—I conceive there may be
conduct on the part of an officer that would justly raise the
question of the duty of submission.
3311. I mean to say, do you think the missionaries would
be justified in countenancing any armed resistance from a
colony of that kind against the Queen's troops, on a suspicion
that the military officer commanding was not doing what they
conceived to be his duty ?—The missionaries at Shiloh, in¬
stead of offering any resistance, did all they could to induce
the people to submit to the order ; and because the people
would not do so the missionaries left.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
45»
JoviSy 31° die Julii, 1851.
members present.
Colonel Dunne.
Mr. Bonhatn Carter.
Colonel Estcourt.
Mr. Mackinnon.
Sir J. Walmsley.
Mr. Hawes.
Mr. Hindley.
Sir E. Buxton,
BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq., in the Chair.
HenryRenton, a.m., called iu ; and further Examined..
3312. %'ví: J. Walmsley.^ YOU were proceeding at your Rev.
last examination to assign some reasons for the conclusion at-
which you had arrived that the Kat River settlement was not
a failure ; have you any other reasons to state besides those 31 July
already adduced ?—On looking to the services and sacrifices
and subsequent treatment undergone by the population, I
should not have regarded the experiment as having had a fair
trial had the case been one of Irishmen or Highlanders instead
of Hottentots and coloured people. The progress that was
made up to 1835, »h® extent to which they had recovered)
themselves after that deplorable war before 1846, and again
the extent to which they had recovered before this present
outbreak, preclude, I humbly conceive, any conclusion, on
just grounds, that the settlement was a failure. I had referred
to the progress of education and of industry. I should havo
gone on to have noticed the fact that there was no canteen in
that settlement ; nearly all the inhabitants are total abstainers,
from any intoxicating liquors ; they are proverbially honest ;
the number of criminal cases that have come before the magis-;
trates in that settlement I understand to be fewer than the
number in any corresponding part of the colony. There is a
handsome church which was built for Mr. Thompson's con-,
gregation by the voluntary labours and contributions of thq
people, with the exception of 100contributed by the Go¬
vernment. I have heard the building estimated at 1,000 I.,
value. There was before the last war a large church in the
0.63. F F 2 course
452
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
course of erection by the voluntary efforts of Mr. Read's con-
S''®gû*'on ; a place of worship between 80 and go feet in
1 length and above half that in breadth nearly completed as to
31 July the walls ; and considerable contributions, for their circum-
»851. stances, have been raised towards missionary objects. Look¬
ing at these things I think no one would be surprised at the
succession of strong testimonies that have been borne, not
only by visitors but by official men, from the late Judge
Menzies down to the present Governor, in favour of that
settlement.
33^3* You said in your Answer 3204, that the missionaries
had exerted themselves incessantly to repress the spirit of
rebellion, and to resist violence ; have you any particular in¬
stances to bring forward in support of that statement ?—
1 produced a minute the other day of a conference with the
rebels at Blink water, an oflScial document, in which the con¬
duct of one of the missionaries was at some length exhibited,
and in which also there is considerable light thrown upon the
state and views of parties, both loyal and insurgent, at that
period. I have here a copy of a letter of Major-general
Somerset to the Rev. Messrs. Read and Van Rooyen, dated
Fort Hare, 17th January 1851, in which he says, "Reverend
Sirs,—I have been made aware by tire resident magistrate of
the Kat River settlement, Mr. Wienand, of your exertions in
explaining to the mi.sguided Hottentots of the Blinkwater his
Excellency the Governor's most gracious proclamation in re¬
ference to their revolt, and their illegal proceedings in the
colony. I most fully appreciate the loyalty and zeal you have
evinced, and the truly Christian feeling that has guided you in
endeavouring to induce these misguided men to return to their
allegiance, which has had the effect of inducing 11 of these
men, hitherto loyal and valued subjects of Her Majesty, to
return to their allegiance ; and which, as some days will yet
elapse before his Excellency's most gracious pardon held out
to these misguided men will cease to operate, I trust may still
be the means of inducing others to see the enormity of their
rebellion, and of bringing them to a sense of their duty.
I remain. Gentlemen, your obedient servant, Somei^set,
Major-General." That I produce as evidence of the views
he had of their conduct. You will notice that the Rev. Messrs.
Read and Van Roogen alone are addressed there. I had a
private letter while at Chumie from the Rev. Mr. Thompson,
the minister of the Dutch reformed church in the .settlement,
dated the 10th of January 1851, from which I beg leave to
read the following extract, as showing his views at that
period :
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ÎHÉ KAEIR TRIBES. 453
period ; " Very important events, in connexion with our pre^ Rev.
sent troubles, have taken place since I wrote to you last. H- Renton,
The defeat at Fort Beaufort, and the death of Herraanus, •*'
have already, i doubt not, prevented an aggravation of our gj jujy
circumstances. Had the reverse of these events taken place, 1851.
and success attended the attempt on I^ort Beaufort, it would
have greatly emboldened the Kafirs, and probably induced
more of the Hottentots to join in the rebellion, I hope the
result will be the opposite of this ; and I cannot help looking
upon what has taken place as most providential, and it may
be the means of shortening the war, and of preventing a much
greater shedding of blood. Thinking it a favourable time to
work upon the minds of those who had been led away, the
Messrs. Read and a few of their influential people rode to
Blinkwater yesterday, and had an opportunity of speaking
with a good number. The result we can scarcely yet speak
of. None have yet appeared to give in their submission ;
some we expected to do so ; but it is not a good token of
regret for their conduct, that they endeavour to magnify their
complaints, so as diereby to insinuate that they had just cause
for their conduct. I do not mean to say that their complaints
are groundless. I understand that they are desirous the
magistrate should meet them, in order to hear these com¬
plaints. This would almost seem as if they meant to take
the position of treating for concessions to their demands. If
so, it is doubtful how they may be met, or the benefits of the
amnesty extended to them. What shall be the end of these
things is a question which forcibly presents itself to the
mind. The elements of discord and strife between oppo¬
site elements and classes of society have been awakened,
wbich, if not controlled and subdued by the hand of God,
may lead to the most lamentable consequences. I am glad
you have been allowed to remain so long undisturbed at
Gwali, and wish the same comparative quietness may con¬
tinue ; but I must say that if the war is prolonged, and when
the Governor enters upon offensive measures, it is very doubt¬
ful to me that your position will be tenable. Without doubting
the present favourable disposition of Sand illi towards the mission,
or Soga's sincerity, circumstances may arise such as will rouse
the passions of barbarous men, so that the immunity you now
enjoy may be disregarded. I quite feel, with you, the weight
of the reasons for remaining at the station, if possible. Hu¬
manly speaking, there is great risk, but God may cover with
His hand the many children whom he has gathered in that
place : for their sates I pray that the enemy may not be per-
0.63. F F 3 mitted
454 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOEE THE
H mitted to break in upon you. At all events, it is, I think,
A. M.""' prudent and desirable that the ladies and children should be
removed, as appears to be now the design of the brethren."
31 July I should say that, subsequently, the whole conduct of those
185Ï. gentlemen was in accordance with what the facts brought
before you would lead you to anticipate. Their influence was
very great, and it was energetically and successfully exerted to
abate the evils that were accumulating. On the 22d of Jan¬
uary, the rebels came in great numbers to Fort Armstrong, to
demand the surrender of the English, and of the property there,
threatening also the slaughter of the farmers, and offering exemp¬
tion only to the ministers and their families, and the magis¬
trates and officials. The very fact of the ministers and their
families being there was a proof of their devotedness; they
had no occasion to have left their own homes; there was no party
going to disturb them, and their families were considered sacred;
but they took away their wives and children into the wretched
accommodation that was to be found there, of a temporary
kind, partly as an example to others, at the request of the
magistrate, and partly because others, especially the English,
did not feel themselves safe unless they were there. A question
was started on that day that a vast force was collected of the
rebels, whether it was not the duty of the ministers to give up
the English, that is, to consent to the demand, and not to
expose their own families to a siege, and their own persons,
and a great number of others, who would be all safe if the
obnoxious persons were delivered up. There was but one
sentiment in the minds of every minister and missionary,
that although unprepared to act on the offensive, it was their
duty to incur the last hazards to their families and themselves,
sooner than surrender one Englishman under these circum¬
stances.
3314. Colonel Dunne.'] Was this at Fort Armstrong?—
Yes, on the 27th of January.
3315. Chairman.] Will you explain to the Committee what
you mean by its being the duty of the missionaries to give up
the English ?—It happened that on that morning the greater
number, if not all, of the missionaries were at Philipton,
whither Messrs. Read and Thompson had come to see my
brethren and myself, who had arrived there. When the mes¬
sage was brought of the assemblage of a vast force about Fort
Armstrong with this design of demanding the English, a lady
present, who was excited, started the question to which I have
referred—Were the families of the missionaries, and them¬
selves and hundreds of other people, to be exposed to de¬
struction,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES.
struction, when the surrender of a few individuals would save Rev.
them all ? That was the circumstance under which the ques- Renton,
tion arose; and it was put to myself with the addition, " You
are a peace man ; what would you say to that?" I gave the jyjy
answer first, that whatever might be my hostility to war, in 1851.
such circumstances, I considered they were under the most
solemn obligation to incur the last hazards, if all their families
and themselves should perish, sooner than give up an English¬
man ; and every one of the missionaries present emphatically
added his determination so to do. Mr. Thompson rode off,
and Mr. Read followed him, and they encountered a party of
rebels on their approach to Fort Armstrong at the ordinary
entrance to Fort Armstrong ; they that day prevented a col¬
lision which would inevitably have produced vast bloodshed.
The fort was miserably without defences ; there was no forti¬
fication, and no defence except a small tower ; but there were
some, I have said, who were anxious to fight. Confidence was
not entire in the minds of some of the ministers about the
fidelity of ail that were within the fort; though they had not,
nor the magistrate either, evidence against any sufficient to act
upon. Having found that besides prayer to God, parley with
the rebels was the only means left them, they engaged the leaders
of the rebels in a parley; they reasoned, and expostulated, and
remonstrated ; they got them to forbear, then to consent to
delay ; then to allow the English three days to retire ; and I
consider that on that occasion all the evil that was prevented
and ail the good that was secured was due to the interposition
of those gentlemen.
3316. Have you any reason to suppose that the missionaries
had any knowledge beforehand of the intended outbreak ?—I
understood, about the time of the meeting at Fort Cox, that
there were some manifestations or expressions of reluctance,
on the part of the Hottentots, in the event of an outbreak,
which was then universally talked of, to go out beyond the Kat
River settlement ; but I have no knowledge of any expecta¬
tion on the part of any of those gentlemen, including Mr.
Thompson, of an outbreak in the settlement, or by those
belonging to it.
3317. But at that time there was an impression, if I under¬
stand you rightly, that an outbreak was impending ?—Over all
the frontier.
3318. Did any of the missionaries, from the superior in¬
formation which they necessarily possessed, communicate with
the Governor ?—I understand there were different communi¬
cations between them and Mr. Wienand, the magistrate, on
0.63. F F 4 the
456
MíNÜTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. the one hand, and the Governor and the authorities under him,
other, anticipatory of circumstances if they should
' emerge ; but I am not privy to the nature of those communi¬
ai July cations J I only know the general fact of their taking place.
1851. 3319' -As far as you know, was there any hesitation what¬
soever on the part of the missionaries to communicate the
earliest and most accurate information to the Governor?—I
believe none.
3320. Sir J. JValmsley.] You have spoken of obnoxious
persons demanded to be given up ; were there many of them ?
—There were some 30 or three dozen of Englishmen at Fort
Armstrong.
3321. Why were they obnoxious ?—Several of them had
been residents in the settlement ; some of them carrying on
business at Fort Armstrong, and others, I believe, farming,
and I heard that they manifested strongly the prejudices which
many English on the frontier showed to the coloured people ;
but at the period spoken of, the ill-will of all the insurgent
classes to Englishmen had become very strong ; that is on the
22d of January. I should add that on the day following those
occurrences all the Englishmen in Fort Armstrong escaped
and were conducted from Philiptom to Whittlesea; they have
themselves acknowledged that mainly to Mr. Read, junior,
were they indebted for their life, he having accompanied them
through some defiles, and led them by those passes in which
he conceived they would be most secure from the attacks of
those parties of rebels that were out. On the day succeeding
the 24th, all the English females connected w ith those indivi¬
duals were brought to Phillipton with a considerable portion of
the property, in safety, through the protection of the ministers.
Then on the 25th there was an excitement surpassing what
had obtained before, from neu s of the deplorable occurrence
in the Mankasana. The details were subsequently furnished
in formal depositions before the magistrate of the settlement
on that and the succeeding days. According to these a laager
or camp, which had been formed immediately after the Kafir
outbreak, of Hottentots, Bastards, and some English on Mr.
Rennet's place, having broken up on the 22d in consequence
of a party in it showing themselves in collusion with some
rebels, had been overtaken on their way to Fort Armstrong,
which they understood to be still the rendezvous of the
Royalists, by a party of Burghers who had demanded
their arms. They had somewhat reluctantly, by the order of
their commandant, surrendered, and had gone back to the
camp, after losing their arms and having their property
and
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 457
and cattle taken away ; they were attacked under night^ Rev.
and several of them were killed ; several were wounded,
and they attributed this to Fingoes under the guidance of '
some of the Burghers, to whom they had on the previous day 31 jaly
surrendered their arms. The men who had voluntarily sur- »851.
rendered were all loyal, and were on their way to the loyal
rendezvous, as they supposed. Those men were excited to
the last degree, and not only those, but all the loyalists in the
settlement were intensely excited ; it seemed to strengthen
the power of the rebels, who mustered immediately in great
force, and proposed to set off as a commando to punish the
Burghers, who had made this assault. Through the inter¬
position of the missionaries, the injured men, who had been
steadfast loyalists, were prevented from seeking in any
manner private vengeance. Through the influence of the
ministers, also, the rebels were kept under restraint from
executing their purpose. The injured party were urged to
the course of giving their depositions, and trusting to the
justice they were sure to obtain ; and by the wisdom of that
course, I conceive that a torrent of resistless destruction was
stayed at a time when, but for the presence and exertions of
those ministers, the whole Kat River Settlement .would have
been carried away by the desire of retaliation, and when the
mischief they would have done on the frontier would have
very greatly exceeded anything which has yet taken place.
I have in my hand copies of the depositions which were made
on that occasion, specially of the commandant and of the sub-
commandant. I find from the statement of the former that
the cattle and sheep belonging to himself and three others
amounted to 2,400 sheep, 130 cows and oxen, 33 horses, be¬
sides 300 muids of grain. He stated, on giving his depo¬
sition, that the house which was set on fire contained, among
others, his wife, who had been confined only two days before,
and that when she was compelled to leave it she had nothing
but the clothes she had on, and not a handkerchief to put
her baby in. Another loyal man who was with them, and
continued a stedfast loyalist till the end, after all this occur¬
rence, stated that he had at that camp 112 head of cattle,
56 ewes, all having lambs ; that he had 50 goats, two
stallions, and two mares, and a new waggon ; and that the
whole of his property had been swept away by the parties
who attacked the camp, in the manner he had deposed,
along with 2 J muids of corn. I think that under the impulse
of feeling and the conviction that they would be massacred,
there was nothing but the moral influence of the ministers
to
45^ MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. to prevent the revolt of the whole settlement at that time.
^ A Then, unhappily, on the succeeding week, Wednesday the 29th,
__1_1 the magistrate having resolved to quit and to take the deposi-
31 July lions with him, was escorted by four of the field cornets, by
1851. Mr. Read, junior, by the son of the Dutch clergyman, and by
some two dozen other loyal men of the settlement of fort
Beaufort. On reaching it, where they were welcomed by Colonel
Sutton, they found themselves suddenly exposed to insults, to
threats, and to personal injury ; they came back with com¬
plaints against the English settlers and Fingoes at Fort Beau¬
fort, one of them, the bravest man in the settlement, declaring
that he had escaped assassination ; and the feeling then pro¬
duced was as bad as ever throughout all parties towards what
they conceived a course on the part of the English that showed
they were bent upon destroying every coloured man. It was
the presence of the missionaries which prevented violent mea¬
sures, inducing as they did the parties offended to give dis¬
tinct depositions, all of which have been transmitted to the
authorities, with claims for redress. There were many instances
after that when the leaders of the rebels came to Philipton,
demanding the powder and property, and were only pre¬
vented from- accomplishing their objects by the firmness and
remonstrances of the missionaries. I referred formerly to
what had been done when Sandilli joined the Hottentot rebels,
and I should say generally that but for the presence and
influence of those gentlemen not a loyalist could have continued
to lift up his head ; that not an Englishman would have been
preserved ; that no property would have been protected ; and
that the whole Kat River Settlement would have been swept
away in the tide of rebellion.
3322. Colonel Dunne.^ What was your object in going to
Kaffraria?—I have stated in the beginning of my evidence
that it was to visit some missionary stations connected with the
body to which I belong.
3323. You went on missionary purposes solely Yes.
3324. How long were you there?—From about the middle
of November till going into the Kat River on the 20th of
January.
3325. That is about 67 days in KaiFraria; therefore all your
knowledge of that country is founded upon your experience of
that 67 days ?—And information collected.
3326. I find in your evidence that you have had conversa¬
tions and negotiations with several chiefs ?—After being there
some time.
3327. What were the subjects of those conversations, were
they
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 459
they religious or political ?—They were in reference chiefly to ^
the position of the missionaries atter the outbreak ; messages ^
to sit still, and so on. —
3328. Had you no communications with the chiefs before
the outbreak, immediately on going up?—I had with the head
of one of the tribes, the Unkosikazi,
3329. That was the widow?—Yes.
3330. Were the conversations with her chiefly relating to
politics ?—They related to rumours of an outbreak,
3331. Had you also conversations with Mr. Brounlee, ^
magistrate there ?—I had conversations with him.
3332. And with some of the Gaika chiefs?—Subsequently
to the outbreak.
3333. Not before?—No.
3334. Were those or not all on political subjects ?—Yes;
they related to political matters.
3335. Y'ere not a great deal of the missionary communi¬
cations with the chiefs more political than religious ?—I am
not aware.
3336. Those conversations you yourself admit were un¬
doubtedly political, as they entered into the grievances under
which they said they suffered ?—They referred to these, but
they more particularly related to the security of the mission¬
aries and the mission property.
3337. Have there not been abundant instances in which the
missionaries have entered into a kind of négociation with the
inhabitants, and a kind of intercession with the Government ;
Mr. Read, for instance, on account of what the Kafirs termed
their grievances ?—I do not know of any négociations with
the Kafirs on the part of the Messrs. Read ; but I am aware
that the Messrs. Read have often been employed as negociators
on the part of the Government.
3338. Have there been no instances of their doing that on
their own account, without any actual authority from the
Government?—I believe when the people of the settlement
have been desirous of communicating their views and griev¬
ances, they have been the medium frequently of transmitting
them.
3339- Can you estimate the number of Kafirs that are
under the spiritual guidance of the missionaries ?—I am not
prepared to answer that question at present, though I have
seen very exact returns, authenticated by Colonel Mackinnon.
They are published ; they were returned to Colonel Mackinnon
in answer to statistical questions, giving periodically an exact
account
4^0 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. account of the number of stations and people under Christian
H. Renton, instruction.
^ _3340. Did the missionaries usually report to Colonel Muc-
3t July kinnon as to the number of converts they were presiding
1851. over ?—The missionaries had to report regularly to their
respective churches or societies ; but independently of these,
there were returns asked for by Colonel Mackinnon for the
Government, which were readily supplied.
3341. Would you be able to put in in evidence the num¬
bers who were attached to the missionaries you were sent to
superintend?—I could give that to the Committee.
3342. The missionaries you say were employed occasionally
by Government as the media of political communication ?—
I should say, at all events, communications about matters in
which politics were involved,
3343» Do not you think it is undesirable, if not prejudicial
to the cause of religion, to mix up in the cases of persons so
situated as missionaries, the two purposes of religion and
politics ?—I think it is very desirable to keep the two quite
distinct, but I apprehend that in many cases there are no
other suitable parties through whom communications can be
made.
3344. Do you not think that that unfortunate necessity has
caused a considerable degree of ill feeling in the colony between
the missionaries and the settlers?—I cannot speak as to that.
I speak of communications ijetwcen the missionaries and the
natives, or between the missionaries and the Government.
3345. Was there in Graham's Town a meeting held in
March, which rondenined very much the conduct of the mis¬
sionaries in respect of the Kafirs?—There was a meeting at
that time in which strong disapprobation, at all events, was
expressed at the conduct of the missionaries.
3346. And was not the tendency of that condemnation to
the effect that the missionaries had given a kind of indirect
encouragement to the insurrection in several instances ?—I
only once at Fort Hare glanced over the report, and I have
but a very vague recollection of it.
3347. You are aware there was such a meeting ?—Yes.
3348. You say that the missionaries have a very great in¬
fluence over the Kafirs. Does that extend merely to those
who are under their spiritual care, or to the Kafir tribes in
general?—I should say it was great over those under their
spiritual care, and that on the part of the neighbouring Kafirs
connected with these there was an impression that the mis¬
sionaries
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 461
sionaries were friendly and kind to them, and their influence Rev.
therefore was considerable.
3349. Was there a feeling held out by the missionaries that
they were the mediators between the native tribes and the jjj j„|y
English Government ?—î am nqt aware. 1851.
3350. What was the cause of the influence ?—Before the
native tribes had any transactions at all with the Government,
and «here they have none, in those cases the influence of the
missionaries is paramount, for the parties at the stations look
upon them as their instructors, and as the medium through
which they get knowledge, religion, and other benefits.
3351. Does it extend to people who are not under their
spiritual superintendence ? In what do they instruct those
whom they do not instruct in spiritual matters?—They do not
give instruction proper except of a spiritual kind, but there is
a reflex influence accompanies it, and the influence of civiliza¬
tion is also felt in some measure, though it may be a small one,
by the heathen Kafirs.
3352. Would not that reflex influence be felt and would
not that civilization be felt, and would not there be the same
influence from traders or any persons residing among them, if
there is nothing spiritual in that reflex influence ?—If you had
traders of truth and integrity who equally commanded the
confidence of the people, and who acted uprightly and candidly
with them, there would be a great deal ofthat.
3353* -Am I to understand that the traders generally
engaged with the tribes are not men of such character as you
describe ?—I fear several are not ; but there are respectable
men among them.
3354. Do you know of what business the traders are who
are called "Winklers"?—It is the Dutch name for a small
trader.
3355- They are not connected with the missionaries ?
-No.
3356» You spoke of the immorality of the military villages.
In your answer to Question 3103, you said that the people of
Wobum were a nuisance on the frontier, and a continual
source of irritation, and you also mentioned that the immo¬
rality was keeping concubines ; do you mean that was a nui¬
sance to the Kafir tribes or to the missionaries r—It was to
both. I do not mean that the mere act condescended upon
rendered them a nuisance to the Kafirs ; they were also in¬
temperate men as well as men that lived in that manner ;
and they were violent in their language and conduct, exciting
irritation.
3357- What
402 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
rj p®*' 3357« What; was their conduct, actually ; did they steal
cattle from the Kafirs ?—No, they did not steal them, but the
. eagerness with which they seized cattle that trespassed, and
31 July sought opportunity of petty annoyances in that way, had all the
1851. effect of more serious injuries, in keeping up irritation. I con¬
ceive that industrious, peaceably disposed men would have
acted a different part.
3358. Were those soldiers discharged for bad conduct, or
were the characters they got on leaving their regiments bad ?
—I cannot say as to that ; there were strong inducements to
men held out after the last war to accept discharges with a
view to going up there.
3359. Were not those men generally discharged with good
characters ?—I have no doubt some of them were so. I stated
so of the village of Auckland.
3360. You say they were a moral nuisance, therefore the
corruption of those villages warranting that very strong ex¬
pression must have been very great and demoralizing ?—I con¬
ceive that the location of communities that shall be marked
by immorality and intemperance, by violence of temper, and
by irritating conduct to the neighbours, must be a nuisance
anywhere.
3361. Then, on what authority do you accuse them of
those crimes ?—I stated what I learned on the spot ; about
the village of Woburn in particular; my other information I
gathered from many individuals who have spoken in the same
manner of those villages.
3362. Has there been any tangible crime committed, or
any outbreak committed on the Kafirs by the men inhabiting
those military villages ? —Not beyond the circumstances I have
adverted to.
3363. Will you state any circumstance of that sort ?—
I have spoken of their character, and their manner of speaking
to the Kafirs, and the vexatious nature of their pounding pro¬
ceedings, and their not making allowances for the accident of
cattle coming through the stream when the water is very shal¬
low, and the difficulty of herding them at all times.
3364. Then am I to understand you, that it was their inju¬
dicious severity in exercising their undoubted rights that made
them offensive to the Kafirs?—I have heard of instances of
their being in the wrong in an unwarrantable exercise of their
alleged rights with regard to the Kafirs on the colonial side.
3365. Are you aware of their ever going into Kafirland and
plundering their cattle ?—No.
3366. Did the Kafirs ever plunder their cattle ; are you
aware
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 463
aware of any instances of that kind ?—I have not heard of Rer.
that. H.Retdon,
3367. Do you suppose that the Kafirs are of that sensitive
morality that it would cause those military villages to be gi juiy
abhorred from their immorality ?—The Kafirs, though they 1851.
practice polygamy, are very jealous in regard to the rights of
purity ; they are not a liceniious people ; and they are very
acute in marking the inconsistencies and bad conduct of Eng¬
lishmen.
3368. I believe, though not licentious, it is the custom of
the chiefs of the tribes to go among the tribes, and take any of
their women over 12 years old ?—There was an abominable
usage of that sort prevailed before their being brought under
British control.
3369. Has not that been practised lately by Sandilli ?—He
attempted, I suppose, to practise it, but our Commissioners
do not tolerate anything of that sort ; I believe it is the fact
that the Kafirs allow certain rights, as they deem them, to be
exercised by the chief which they would reprobate in others.
3370. Is not almost all the employment of the Kafirs, and
is not it considered to be an honourable employment, that of
stealing cattle ?—In their heathen state I suppose a great
deal of that goes on.
3371. Are you aware of their roasting a boy they took at
Eland-point ?—No ; I never heard of it.
3372. You are aware generally of their barbarous treatment
of their prisoners ?—They have of late years, I understand,
been increasingly barbarous to their male prisoners ; but they
have always shown lenity to women and children.
3373. You were present at the attack on Woburn ?—I was
in the vicinity ; I saw the smoke of the burning village.
3374. And of Auckland ?—I was in that vicinity also.
3375. Not a man of the colony was spared in either of
those places?—No.
3376. Did the missionaries make any use of that large
influence you say they possessed to prevent those murders}—
They could not.
3377. Were they present at those murders, any of them ?—
There were some of them in the vicinity with myself, at
Chumie. We learnt of the attack at Woburn, after we saw
the smoke, but we were aware that the station was in the midst
of imminent danger.
3378. Were any of the missionaries or their families
molested at the point ?—None except Mr. Niven, in the
course of journeying through a part of the excited district.
3379- Was
4^4 minutes of evidence taken before the
3379- not this attack a treacherous one ; and were not
ReiUoii, several of those Kafirs or Hottentots who made the attack, at
^ that very moment partaking in the festivities of the village ?—
1 July It was so, deeidedly.
3380. That was not an open attack?—No.
3381. You say, as to the Kat River, that you have a favour¬
able view of that settlement ?—I have a view favourable to the
extent that justice seems to me to require, on a review of the
circumstances.
3382. I understand you to say that the Hottentots in
general are faithful to their engagements?—Yes, up to this
occasion they had been ; and the majority of the proprietors,
the people properly possessed of the allotments, are still.
3383. You also say that they have had discontent, from
being employed in the last war for a considerable timer—It
was not the mere employment that I specified as occasioning
the discontent, but the conditions of it, and the treatment after¬
wards, and the losses they suffered.
3384. When Sir Andries Stockenstrom placed that colony
there, were they not placed there expressly as a military post,
for the defence of the frontier, and was not that part of the
obligation of the settlement, that they were to give military
service?—I am not aware that the settlement was given them
on that tenure, though I am fully aware it was with the
design of their proving a bulwark to the colony that the settle¬
ment was formed.
3385. Does not that come to the same thing?—No; I
think a tenure by military service is distinct from such a
design. I am not aware that there was such a tenure.
3386. Was there any condition of tenure at all?—I cannot say.
3387. Did not Sir Andries Stockenstrom put them there,
with the understanding that they should be a military bulwark ?
—Yes.
3388. Therefore the withdrawing them, or using them, was
a legitimate use of them by the Cape authorities?—I say
nothing upon that subject.
3389. As to the losses estimated by them, was not a return
sent in to the Government, and were not those losses paid by
the Government ?—I have never understood so.
3390. Do not the Blue Books furnish a list of every man's
loss, and of the actual indemnification for those losses?—
I have not understood that they received indemnification.
3391. Were they not supported by rations ?—Yes.
3392. And also their families?—They were supported by
rations, and from nothing else could they have subsisted, for
all
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 4^5
all their own means were taken from them, I stated the Rev.
other day my distinct impression that they had received no
pay, and I find that impression was correct, on looking at '
official documents. 3' July
3393. Do you consider that the rest of the Hottentots 1851.
settled along the frontier were as loyal as you say those at the
Kat River were?—1 believe quite as loyal.
3394. Are you not aware that Colonel Somerset, and al¬
most all the frontier authorities, represented them as perfectly
disaffected in almost all those settlements at the breaking out
of the last war? — I was not aware of that.
3395. Are you aware of the proclamation of the Governor,
Sir Harry Smith, that at the Kat River there was a most ex¬
tensive, combined and wicked rebellion, at that very post of
the Kat River ?—That, was subsequently to the outbreak.
3396. Are you not aware that in the previous time it was
called the hot-bed of insurrection, previously to that prc-
clamalion r—I am aware that Major-general Somerset used
such an expression at Fhilipton.
3397. Then at Shiloh, were not the Hottentots there in
insurrection?—All that remained after the missionaries left
were involved in resistance to the authorities at Whittlesea,
but subsequently to the cessation of hostilities there was a
portion that were never engaged in any way in rebellion against
the Government. I refer to one man whom 1 personally
knew, who resided at Philipton constantly afterwards; the
man from whose statement I quoted yestçrday.
3398. Were there not Hottentots among those who mur¬
dered the military .settlers at Woburn and Auckland ?~I heard
that a Hottentot or Hottentots had been seen among the Kafirs
who attacked these .settlements, but I understood there were
only one or two.
3399. But at Shiloh, were not there several bodies of Hot¬
tentots found, after the church was stormed, in the church,
and were not several taken prisoners?—I am not aware of any
being found in the church.
3400. Were they not also found at Fort Armstrong ?—
Several were found about Fort Armstrong; that was after the
general engagement.
3401. You have not any doubt then that there was a very
large disaffection ; that if not a majority, certainly a very large
proportion of the Hottentots along the country were perfectly
disaffected ?—Before any outbreak had taken place in the Kat
River there were complaints of the conduct of bands of
Hottentots in some parts upon the frontier within the colony ;
0.63. G G those
4^6 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEPORE THE
Rev. those were not Kat River Hottentots. Subsequently to the
H. Renion^ outbreak there was a very large disaíFection in the Kat River
settlement, and that spread to other quarters ; but in large
31 July portions of the colony, and I should say over the whole of the
1851. western province, I have not heard of any disaffection. On
the contrary, there was no class in the colony from which
the Governor met with anything like the same readiness to
enroll themselves as among the Hottentots of the western
province.
3402. Did not a large body of the Cape Corps desert?—
A very large number.
3403. They were all Hottentots?—'Either Hottentots or
half Hottentots,
3404. Are you aware that a person who had been employed
in the Commissariat preached to them, and was the person
supposed to seduce them ?—I heard that he was understood
to be a person possessed of considerable influence.
3405. And have you any reason to doubt that fact ?—I
have no reason to doubt it.
3406. Those Hottentots who deserted were chiefly from
this Kat River settlement î—I do not know ; I am aware that
some of them were.
3407. They were found, some of then), killed in action with
our troops ?—So I have seen it stated.
3408. Would not that therefore lead you to suppose that
it was injudicious, the forming those colonies of Hottentots on
the frontier who were so easily seduced from their allegiance ?
—There have been several Kafir wars, and there have been
several insurrections of Dutch Boers, and duiing all those
the Hottentots have never shown the slightest sympathy
uith either party of insurgents, and the fact that a portion of
that race has now been involved in disaffection does not in¬
dicate a very great readiness to become enemies of the
Government.
3409. Do you think there are any causes acting upon those
Hottentots in the conduct of the Government that would
warrant that disaffection ?—The statements I have submitted
of their own views of their local grievances I think are suffi¬
cient to account foi-, and to occasion, disaffection in their
minds, though by no means to justify the course they have
adopted.
3410. Do you not think that the repetition by the mis¬
sionaries of their grievances to the Government is, to their
minds, a kind of encouragement to those people ?—We know
where parties have been excited how ready they are to go back
upon
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 467
upon all the causes that have given them at any time offence Re*-
or irritation, and liow they will be led, under this state of
excitement, to magnify some of them unduly, and to dwell
upon some of them unreasonably ; but if there are substan- 31 July
tial grounds of complaint not removed, I conceive that the 1851.
seed is left of certain murmuring and disaffection.
3411. You have stated a cause at the Kat River of the
discontent among the Hottentots to be, that they were not
remunerated for what they suffered by their losses ; but you
have not told us that that extended to all the Hottentots on
the frontier, or to the Cape Corps. I would be glad if you
would state to the Committee what are the actual and tangible
complaints that you think they have ground for ?—^Then they
have complained of the acts, as I formerly mentioned, oí
some of the magistrates preceding the present one.
3412. What were those acts which they have complained
of ?—They are detailed in the evidence already given.
3413. Do you mean the report of Mr. Biddulph, who re¬
ported unfavourably ?—That is one.
3414. Do you think that because a magistrate reports con¬
scientiously of a colony, and it may be not favourable to
the colony, that that is a just ground of complaint?—If he
reports conscientiously, and states the truth, however un¬
favourable to the colony, that is not a just ground of com¬
plaint ; hut if a magistrate is charged with misrepresenting
the colony, and not stating the truth, if the colony shall unite
in affirming that, and other parties shall say it is their solemn
conviction that that statement is a gross misrepresentation, or,
as I understand one gentleman to have designated it, a libel,
I do think that that is a just ground of complaint.
3415. Who is to be the judge, the colony, or the persons
sent to examine ?—It would be a very hard thing if in con¬
sequence of the accident of an incompetent or a deeply pre¬
judiced man being sent to report, his testimony should be
hyld infallible in defiance of the united testimony of all the
people he was sent to examine about, and of numerous other
witnesses.
3416. Was not there another magistrate sent to examine
who approved of that report, Mr. Bowker ?—That magistrate
approved of the report before he was appointed his successor.
3417. Was the Government responsible for Mr. Biddulph's
report ?—If the Government sanctioned that report, as the
publication, not merely of the report, but of his private letter,
by the then Governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, in an official
manner, seemed to do.
0.63. G G 2 3418. Did
468 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev 3418. Did the Government sanction it?—They published
H. Renton, it as a despatch.
3419- Was that a sanction ; was there any public act that
31 July followed in consequence, to the injury of that settlement ?—
1851.- The very publication of it officially was naturally regarded
as the Government sanction.
3420. That was another cause of discontent ; are there
any other further causes of discontent that the Hottentots had
a right to complain of, in your opinion ?—I understand my¬
self as relating to you their causes of complaint ; I do not
think the whole settlement had a right to find fault with the
Government because there were acts affecting individuals, or
particular localities. But aware, as I am, of the sympathetic
character of the Hottentots, I do not wonder at the feeling
that was occasioned by those acts.
3421. I want to know your opinion of what were the real
grievances that they complained of, which you consider sub¬
stantial grievances ; you seem to say that there were some
substantial grievances, and I want to know what those griev¬
ances were in your opinion ; in your opinion, and from any
information you have been able to collect, were the Hottentots
remunerated, or were they not remunerated ?—I am under
the impression that tl)ey were not.
3422. Do you consider that they had reason to complain of
the Government because Mr. Biddulph reported against
them ?—I do not say they had reason to complain of the
Government in respect of that.
3423. In respect of the publication of his despatch ?—I
think in respect of the publication of it.
3424. Would you state any other grievances, in your
opinion, as the cause for this very extensive outbreak and
defection of those people from their allegiance ? — I have no
other reason to adduce beyond those formerly stated ; but I
have never considered that all their r-easons put together jus¬
tified the revolt.
3425. I only find two reasons related in your previouê
evidence ; tire one not being sufficiently remunerated after the
war, and the other, Mr\ Biddulph's statement; I see no other
i-eason given for it ?—I think you will find there is a reference
in that evidence to certain acts of Mr. Bowker's, to the dutv
that was imposed upon timber, and to certain acts of some
other subordinate magistrates, as well as to certain conduct of
a commission that was appointed at the end of last year, as
all having concurred to increase the feelings of acerbity and
alienation on the part of numbers of the settler's.
3426. But
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 469
3426. But are those all the sole reasons that you think Rev.
caused the outbreak ?—I have not knowledge of them, but
I apprehend that there must have been communications ^ '
from the Kafirs with a part of the Hottentots, endeavouring 3, juiy
to obtain their neutrality, and probably their co-operation. 1851.
The occurrences at the lower part of the Kat River, where
Hermanus was the first to lead the revolt, himself a Kafir, who
had about him the discontented Hottentots, brought from the
other parts of the colony, with his Kafirs, and the contagion of
evil influence, no doubt operated in that way, and acted upon
the then state of feeling to bring about that deplorable dis¬
affection which afterwards spread so widely.
3427. But the Shiloh people combined with Mapassa, who
was a Kafir ; was not that stated in the proclamation of Sir
Harry Smith?—There seemed to have been at Shiloh commu¬
nications between those Kafirs and some of the Hottentots,
assuring the latter that no evil would be done to them, and
thereby seeking to procure their neutrality. That I have
gathered from documents, letter^, and other sources which I
have seen since I left the district.
3428. Have you any doubt that there was a communication
and combination between all the Hottentot settlements on the
frontier, and even the soldiers of the Cape Corps, on the subject
of the outbreak ?—I have no idea of a combination ; it was
the opinion of those in the settlement, of the ministers, and
it was my own opinion from what took place, that there was
just a concurrence of accidents and circumstances, but that
there was no regular plan.
3429. And the combination of the Cape Corps occurred
after the outbreak of the war ?—It was manifested after the
outbreak.
3430. You know nothing of the details of that outbreak, of
the cause of this person who seduced them, the person who
preached to them, bringing them off towards the Kat River?—
I heard that some reports bad been conveyed to them of what
had taken place in the Kat River, exaggerated reports, and
that the men had been excited ; and, from my knowledge of
the sympathetic character of the Hottentot, I conceive it very
likely. He is an impulsive being, and his attachments are
strong ; and I conceive that if a Hottentot thought his family
or friends were injured or outraged, he would be ready to fly
off like an explosion of gunpowder.
3431. You know nothing of that meeting at Graham's
Town?—Not beyond having seen the report.
3432. And you are perfectly convinced that the missionaries
0.63. G G 3 dkl
^10 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. did all they could to prevent the war?—My belief is that they
H. Rentan, did ; they exerted themselves, especially in the Kat River, to
an astonishing extent.
31 July 3433* I also understand you to say that you consider the
1851. political interference of the missionaries to be injudicious in
all instances ?—I have not so said ; I have stated that I con¬
ceive it desirable to have the political and religious functions
kept as distinct as possible ; I think it a great misfortune that
missionaries should be involved in political négociations.
3434. Mr. B. Carter.l¡ But being on the frontier, and being
there for the education and increase in knowledge of the
Kafirs, it aln)ost necessarily arises that they are the most avail¬
able persons, and that they are necessarily somewhat employed
in that way ?—There are cases in which I do not see how it
is possible to conduct négociations, especially of an amicable
nature, except through their instrumentality.
3435. Chairman.^ Does the missionary of your church at
all consider it a part of his duty to instruct the natives in the
arts of industry and agriculfure ?—Our direct object is teach¬
ing the truths of the Gospel and conveying what is called ele¬
mentary education ; but to our mission stations we have sent
out ploughs and articles of that sort ; and it is our instruction
to the missionaries to exert their influence to encourage and
promote the cultivation of the soil and other habits of industry,
and the useful arts.
3436. To what extent have you been successful in that
respect?—We have only three principal stations among the
Kafirs, and at each of those there were a good many acres under
cultivation by the plough, and there were small portions with
paddocks, as we should call them, with inclosures ; but the pro¬
gress in that respect has as yet been limited, although I am
aware it was going on generally at all the missionary stations.
3437. Do those missionary establishments more or less
attach to them anything like model farms for the instruction
of the natives ?—At the stations of the church that I belong
to, there are not ; there are other mission stations connected
with other bodies where there is a regular, and I should say
tolerably perfect system of instruction in those matters.
3438. To what mission do you allude particularly ?—I allude
to the Moravian mission especially.
3439. Have the Moravian missions been, do you think,
more attentive to the instruction of the natives in the arts of
agriculture and industry than other missions?—I think so.
3440. Is it desirable, in your opinion, that those missions
should, as much as possible, combine with spiritual instruction
the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 471
the teaching of the useful arts?—I think it desirable that they Rev.
should go concurrently, and I conceive that, to a certain
extent, they must ; but it is |(iestion worthy of grave consi- ^^
deration whether missionaries and their assistants should not 31 July
devote their labours entirely to the one object of instructing 1851.
the mind, leaving it to a separate department in conjunction
with them to take the subordinate part of the cultivation of
the land.
3441. Do you mean a separate department of the mission,
or individuals altogether disconnected from it ?—I should
think it desirable to have the provinces distinct; that while
they should be united there should be a separate department,
but that if by individuals disconnected, the other party should
make arrangements to concur with them.
3442. Should you be disposed to say generally, from your
knowledge of missionary labours in South Africa, that the mis¬
sionaries have succeeded in introducing any useful arts, either
improvements in agriculture or any manufacture, or any use¬
ful art generally ?—It is entirely owing to the missions that
the Kafirs have been taught at all to plough the land, and that
applies not only to converts but to some of the heathen
Kafirs.
3443. Speaking of any one mission of which you are best
acquainted, to what extent should you say the land is under
the plough ?—I am not prepared to answer the question ; but
I am aware of this fact, that at some of the Moravian stations
such was the extent of cultivation and industry that they were
not only self-supporting, bearing all the expenses of the mis¬
sion, but that they had a surplus to contribute to missionary
objects beyond.
3444. I understand you to place the Moravian mission in
the first rank as regards the teaching of the arts and industry ?
—Yes.
3445. What mission would you next mention as devoting
most attention to that subject ?—The London Society has
given considerable attention to it ; at various of their stations
there is a large portion of ground under cultivation, and at one
of them, Hankey, which is within the colony, a tunnel has
been executed recently to distribute water for the purposes of
irrigation over a space which we should account a consider¬
able farm.
3446. Is it or not your opinion that those missions which
have given most attention to the instruction of the natives in
the useful arts have the greatest influence over the natives ?—■
I should think the influence of missions was very much pro-
0.63. G G 4 portioned
4^2 MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKÈN BEPORE THE
Rev. poiiioned to the number of individuals they have got under
Renton, good instruction, whether with or without the arts. I believe
that all solid improvement is based on sound knowledge; and
that where that is the most distinctly and extensively conveyed,
i85n and where the foundation is laid of sound moral principle, there
you have the best and surest influence,
3447. Was there any other mission in South Africa where
there was so large a number of natives under immediate mis¬
sionary superintendence, and supposed to be well instructed,
as in the Kat River settlement ?—There is a very large Mora¬
vian station at Glenadendal, in the western province.
3448. Excepting that, was there any other where there was
so large a number of natives immediately under missionary
superintendence, and who for so many years had received both
moral and religious instruction from the missionaries ?—Pro¬
bably not.
3449. Are you able to throw any light, then, upon the
cause of the great disaffection that prevailed in that settle¬
ment, which had been so remarkably closely superintended for
so many years by the missionaries?—1 suppose, for the amount
of population the cultivation of that settlement exceeded
that of any other mission station in the whole of South Africa.
1 conceive that they were subjected to an expense which no
other was, through their position, and the demands made upon
them in those successive wars ; and I think that was a detri¬
ment to their educational progress, by the suspension of the
schools, the interruption of their religious improvement, and
the deplorable influences of having a number of idle people,
of young men and females, congregating together ; those
would unavoidably counteract what we should have expected
otherwise to have witnessed.
3450. You think no fair com[)arison could be made between
the state and condition of that settlement, from the circum¬
stances you have referred to, and that of others, the Moravian
settlement, for instance, that you have referred to r—1 do not
consider tliem analogous.
3451. And that therefore no fair comparison can be drawn?
—I think not ; there are many circumstances quite peculiar
to it, and differing from any other experiment.
3452. Sir J. Walmsley.'] You stated in evidence, a short
time ago, that you were in the vicinity of Woburn, and Auck¬
land, at the time of the aggression made by the Kafirs upon
those places?—Yes.
3453- When you say you were in the vicinity, what distance
were you from them f—About three miles from Woburn.
3454. Can
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 473
3454. Can you say, then, whether the missionanes with Rev*
whom you were at that time had any, and what means of
aiding the inhabitants of Woburn and Auckland ?—The '
spectacle of the conflagration, succeeded by the tidings that 31 July
there was a large body of Kafirs surrounding them, coming 1851.
after the intelligence of the disastrous war of the preceding
day at the Keiskamma, filled us with consternation. We had
neither arms nor ammunition at the station ; there were only
then there the Kafirs connected with the Chumie station ;
and if there had been the inclination or the purpose, there
was no force to have gone out to the insurgent body that
we were told had environed Woburn.
3455. Do you know of an instance; that is, was there
any case, to your knowledge, where the missionaries either
directly or indirectly had given sanction to the rising of the
Kafirs?—I never heard of such a case.
3456. Do you believe that such a thing ever existed ?—
I never heard of such a case.
3457. Chairman.'] I understand you to say distinctly that,
as far as you know anything of missionary influence and
labour in South Africa, they have been devoted to the pre¬
servation of peace and the maintenance of good and loyal
feeling towards the Government?—Most decidedly.
3458. Sir J. WalmsleyT] When and where did you first
hear of the defection of the Cape Corps?—I first heard of
the defection of the Cape Corps while at Chumie, within a
few days after the outbreak at the Keiskamma. The defec¬
tion reported to me then had taken place at Fort White.
3459. Sir E. Buxton.] Had you heard of it before it
took place ?—No ; I heard that there had taken place defec¬
tion on the part of some of the Cape Corps men stationed
there when the Kafirs attacked that post.
3460. Sir J. Walmsley.] Are you aware whether any notice
was taken of that fact in the despatches at the time ?—
There was not ; on the contrary, I had referred to that, among
other alarming occurrences, in a communication to a friend
at Block Drift, which I had an opportunity of sending by
the Kafir women, and in reply I was assured that 1 must
be under some great mistake, that nothing of the kind had
been reported there, and if it had happened the military
authorities must have known it.
3461. Chairman.] I do not quite understand your mean¬
ing H hen you say no notice was taken of that in the despatches ;
do you mean the despatches that were sent home, or in the
local accounts ?—The despatches that appeared in the colony.
346a. Sir
474
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. 3462. Sir J. JValmslej/.] In your opinion, were there any
^ could have been taken to repress the rebellion in
' the Kat River settlement after it had broken out?—Could a
31 July very small number of regular troops, could a company, or half
1851. a company, with a military officer, have been sent into the
Kat River, I have no doubt it would have been sufficient to
have rallied the loyal, and to have put down the insurrection,
there was so much vacillation visible ; but it was impossible
from the state of the fort at Fort Beaufort, the nearest post, and
I understood from Major-general Somerset that it was equally
impossible for him. There had been immediately on the
outbreak, I was told, a representation sent requesting that Sir
Andries Stockenstrom might be sent there, and I understood
that a similar representation went from other parts of the
colony ; and I have no doubt that had he come in with autho¬
rity, though he had not had a soldier at his back, if he had had
authority to come there, his influence is so very great from
the confidence reposed in his integrity, capacity, and courage,
and the general reverence felt for him, that he would have been
able to suppress it.
3463. There were numbers in that settlement that were
loyal, I suppose ?—A considerable number.
3464. Do you know whether arms were given to the loyal
inhabitants at the time ?—That suggests a point I might have
adverted to before ; it was one of the complaints which I
heard, that Mr. Bowker had recalled 300 or 400 stand of
arms, which had been furnished to the inhabitants at the pre¬
vious war. An application was made for arms by the regular
channels through the field cornets after this outbreak, and they
got only, I think, some three dozen stand of arms, which was
only half a dozen for each of the field cornets.
3465. Chairman.^ Was there any store on the spot from
which arms could have been issued ?—None.
3466. The outbreak at the Kat River settlement was con¬
ducted with great secrecy ?—It came upon all of us as a
thunder clap, so unexpected was it.
3467. So that there were no means of providing beforehand
against it ?—On the part of the Hottentots I mentioned that
indications of Herraanus's defection were observable imme¬
diately after the outbreak in Kafirland, on the second day after
or so, by the native missionary in the lower part of the Kat
River, who communicated his views to the authorities at Fort
Beaufort; but they had supposed, I conceive, that it must
have been a mistake.
3468. Am I to understand you to imply that there was any
unwillingness
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES, 475
unwillingness on the part of the authorities at Fort Beaufort Rev.
to trust the inhabitants of the Kat River settlement with H. Benton,
arms ?—I have not an idea that there was the slightest.
Colonel Sutton^ who is a popular man in the settlement, the gj jpiy
man the parties applied for, or proposed to apply for, to be 1851.
their commandant, stated that he had not arms or ammunition
to supply when the application was made.
3469. Sir J. IValmsley.] You have stated, in answer to a
question put to you by an Honourable Member, that the
Kafirs were increasingly barbarous; can you give any reasons
for that increasing barbarity on the part of those tribes ?—I
heard from individuals that the successive collisions with the
English seemed to have had a very deteriorating influence
upon the feelings of the men, and that they had heard that
there had been private gross outrages by parties of the British
force formerly, which they retaliated ; that it was Englishmen
whom they had first seen rip up the body of a foe, and that
a Kafir was never known to do that until it had been done by
them.
3470. Chairman^ Do you mean English soldiers ?—Yes.
3471. Mr, Bonham Carter.] Regulars?—I cannot say.
3472. Sir E. Buxton.] You heard that as the report?—It
was before the war.
3473. Chairman.'\ What war do you refer to ?—^To this
present one. It was in conversation with those who had
known the Kafirs for 20 years, and who stated the change they
had seen in them ; and the general impression was, that they
were worse men now than then.
3474. Do you attach any value to that report, that any
part of the force, whether local or regular, was guilty of such
an atrocity?—The instance was detailed to me; but I am
unable at present to specify what were the circumstances
which led me to regard it as a true account, that in one in¬
stance the aggravated occurrence had taken place by a party ;
but I am unable just now to state it,
3475. Was it whilst they were in the field, or was it an act
of atrocity by an individual?—It was an act, so far as 1 re¬
member, of a party who had been out skirmishing ; that they
had shot an individual, and had done this, and that the spec¬
tacle of it was seen, of course, by some of the Kafirs ; and
that some time afterwards they did a similar act, if I mistake
not, to the body of a British officer, who had been shot,
3476. Whether it was by any portion of the local native
force, or the British regular force, you are quite unable to
say ?—I am J I incline to think it was not the regular force.
3477. Sir
4,76 minutes of evidence taken before the
Rev- 3477- Sir Walmsley7\ You have been asked as to
A m'""' charges made against the missionaries at Graham's Town ; do
you know anything whatever of those charges ?—I saw the
31 July report which Colonel Dunne referred to, and I became myself
1^51- subsequently the victim of préjudices and hostility on the part
of a large body in the colony.
3478. Did you attend a meeting at Graham's Town subse-
quentlj;'?—Yes.
3479. Did you satisfy the people that you were not guilty
of any of the acts that had been rumoured or laid to your
charge ?—I do not know that I did ; their conduct was so very
extraordinary altogether.
3480. Did you attend a public meeting to defend yourself
against the charge.^—I attended a public meeting to meet the
charges, but the whole of that affair was to my mind, as I have
said, so very extraordinary, that I cannot say what measure of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction prevailed. I know T did not
regard myself as in a state of safety notwithstanding.
3481. Then you know of no instance in which any charge
of disaffection on the part of the missionaries has been proved r
—Not one.
The Rev. Peter La Trobe, called in ; and Examined.
Rev. 3482. Chairman.^ I think you are connected with the
P. La Trobe. Moravian Missions in South Africa ?■—I am Secretary to the
' Church of the United (or Moravian) Brethren in this country,
and have been in connexion with the missions of that church
for 30 years.
3483. I think you wish to put in some statement with
i-egard to your mission at Shiloh ?—Certainly,
3484. Will you put it in ?—1 will, with the permission of
the Committee.
[The Witness delivered in the same, which is as follows ;]
The undersigned, secretary to the Church and Missions of the
United (or Moravian) Brethren in England, begs leave respectfully to
submit to the Committee on the Kafir Tribes the following statement
relative to the recent occurrences in Kafraria, in as far as they have
reference to the Moravian settlement of Shiloh.
*•*■*#*
The missions of the Church of the United or Moravian Brethren
were commenced in the year 1732, and have, consequently, existed
for a period of 119 years. The field of labour which they occupy
contains 69 stations, situated in Greenland and Labrador ; in America,
Northern,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 477
Northern, Central, and Southern; in the West Indies, in South Rev.
Africa, and in the Australian continent. Wherever they exist, and P. La 7 robe*
under whatsoever circumstances carried on, whether for the benefit —
of the Arctic, the Indian, the Negro, or the Hottentot races, or urider 3» •'"'y
the sovereignty of Great Britain, Denmark, Holland, or the United ' 5'«
States, they have but one great object, and are established and main¬
tained upon one leading, and it is hoped, scriptural principle. They
are designed to bring the heathen, under the blessing of God, to the
knowledge of the gospel of Christ, and the enjoyment of the spi¬
ritual and temporal benefits attendant on its reception, and, at the
same time, to the gradual adoption of the usages and practice of
the arts of civilized life, whereby their minds may be enlarged, their
habits improved, and their usefulness, as members of the great
human family, extended. Among the principles inculcated by the
Moravian missionaries, at all times and in all places, those of loyalty,
subordination, industry, honesty and sobriety, hold a foremost place ;
while, in the conduct they have pursued, they have manifested an
anxious desire to devote themselves to the performance of their
proper work, and to abstain from all interference in matters of a
purely civil or political nature.
The Moravian Mission in South Africa—commenced in 173G and
renewed in 1792,—comprised at the time of the late insurrection eight
stations (besides the Leper-Hospital on Robben-Island) of which
three were situated in the western and two in the eastern district of
the Cape Colony, and three in British Kafraria. The consequences
of the present unhappy war have been felt by all, more or less severely;
the three settlements in Kafraria (two of them but recently estab¬
lished) having been laid utterly waste, and a fourth, Enon, on the Witte
river, partially abandoned, while from the older stations in the west
of the colony, no fewer than 900 men, young, able-bodied, and for
the most part fathers of families, have been called away from their
homes and ordinary occupations, to perform military service on the
frontier.
To the Christian character and beneficial results of the Moravian
Mission in South Africa, every successive Governor of the Cape colony,
from the period of its first capture by the Lnglish in 1795, to the
present time, has borne willing, and perhaps only too partial testi¬
mony. Among the number of those who have shown it the greatest
favour may be named Lord Charles Somerset, at whose request
the Leper-hospital was placed under the charge of a Moravian mis¬
sionary, and by whom the regulations of the principal settlement of
Genadendal, were officially approved and confirmed ; Sir Benjamin
D'Urban, whose written testimony the undersigned has in his pos¬
session ; Sir George Napier, at whose particular solicitation, the set¬
tlement of Clarkson was founded in 1838, with the benevolent object
of instructing and benefiting the Fingoo refugees ; Sir Richard
Bourke, Sir Henry Pottinger, and Sir Harry Smith, on whose respec¬
tive applications, stations were formed at Shiloh in 1828 ; Mamre, on
the Beka, in 1848, and Goshen, on the Windvogelsberg, in 1849. To
the value of the settlement of Shiloh, and the important services
rendered to the colony and its defenders, during the wars of 1835
and 1847, by the missionaries at that place, and the people under
their
478 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. their charge, both Tambookies and Hottentots, the strongest and
P. La Trcbe. most cordial testimony was borne by the present, governor. Sir Harry
Smith, in an interview with which his Excellency favoured the
31 July undei-signed, previous to his departure from England in 1847, and on
1851. occasion of his first visit to Shiloh in January 1848, when he ex¬
pressed his sentiments on the subject, to both missionaries and people
assembled in the church, in the kindest and warmest manner. Indeed
it is but simple justice to acknowledge, that both from his Excellency
himself and from Colonel M'Kinnon, the respected and benevolent
Chief Commissioner for the Kafir tribes, the Moravian missionaries
in Kafraria have experienced nothing but encouragement and
support.
Of the progress made by the mission at Shiloh, during the 22
years of its existence, it may be more difficult to speak with con¬
fidence. That it had been less rapid and permanent than could be
wished, must be freely admitted, a circumstance which may, how¬
ever, be in some measure accounted for, by the fact, that it has been
subjected from the very outset to heavy trials and serious calamities ;
first, from the inroads of predatory Fetkannas ; afterwards from suc¬
cessive Kafir wars. Though resolutely maintained by the mission¬
aries and the people under their care, during the war of 1847, it
suffered severely and in various ways from its effects, as that en¬
lightened and steadfast friend of the Hottentot and Kafir races, Sir
Andries Stockenstrom, is prepared to testify. In the course of the
past two years, its prosperity was, however, gradually increasing, as
the reports of its actual state, made by two independent and
altogether trustworthy witnesses. Archdeacon Merriman and the
Rev. Mr. Freeman, of the London Missionary Society, are suffi-
See App. cient to prove. At the close of the year 1850, the number of in¬
habitants of the place was about 750, of whom above one-third were
Hottentots and Fingoos, and nearly two-thirds 'J'ambookies. Of the
whole number, about 261, including children, were baptized, of whom
about 60 were Tambookies. Some of these people occupied well-
built houses," a yet larger number were possessors of good and pro¬
ductive gardens, and well cultivated fields, and not a few were indus¬
trious artisans. To the mission-premises were attached a corn-mill,
a smithy, and a carpenter's shop, and by the help of these, and the pro¬
duce of the soil, the station had been for several years self-supporting.
The spiritual and moral condition of the people had been of late
such as to cause the missionaries more or less anxiety. The small
flock of Tambookie converts gave them generally satisfaction by
their steadiness and apparent sincerity; the Hottentots, especially
the younger portion of them, manifested a spirit of indifference
and insubordination which pained them deeply. The contiguity
of the settlement to the village of Whittlesea evidently promoted
habits of sensual indulgence. That the missionaries, under these
circumstances, regarded with disquietude and apprehension the out¬
break and progress of the war with the Kafirs, will not be a matter
of surprise ; but that the people under their care should so far forget
their duty, as professing Christians and as loyal subjects, as to act as
they are alleged to have done, is an event for which they were not
prepared, and which causes them far deeper sorrow, than any amount
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 479
of suffering or of loss to which they have been themselves exposed. So Rev.
far as their information, experience, and ability extended, they spared P. La Trobe.
no exhortation and neglected no effort for the prevention, repression ~
and counteraction of the disloyalty, to whose influence, by some 31 July
strange infatuation, the poor people appeared suddenly to yield them- ^ 5^*
selves ; and as soon as it became evident, that their entreaties and
endeavours were unavailing, they hesitated not to abandon the scene
of their long and pleasant labours, their comfortable dwellings, and
the bulk of their property of every kind, and what cost them a j'et
greater struggle, the native congregation whose best interests
they had so faithfully and perseveringly sought, and to become house¬
less wanderers and exiles in a strange land. Into this exile they
were accompanied by one Kafir and three Hottentot families, and by
the whole of the Fingoo portion of their flock, amounting to upwards
of 100 individuals.
Of the occurrences at Shiloh, both previous and subsequent to the
departure of the missionaries, the accounts are hitherto imperfect, and
in part conflicting. From the statement of the missionaries themselves,
on which the undersigned can place the fullest reliance, it would appear
that the Tambookies withdrew from the settlement some time before it
was attacked, under the influence of superstitious fear (its destruction
having been announced by the prophet Umlangeni), and of an in¬
telligible, however, in this instance, culpable national feeling. For the
conduct of the Hottentots less excuse is to be made ; cause of com¬
plaint they had none, nor did they profess to have any ; and making,
therefore, every due allowance for the effects of sudden alarm, of
national sympathy and of exaggerated rumours upon minds not of
the strongest order, it is impossible not to mourn over and condemn
the facility with wiiich the well-disposed majority (for such it is be¬
lieved they were), allowed themselves to be influenced and seduced by
the disloyal and refractory minority, first into conduct insubordinate
and reprehensible ; afterwards, as is alleged, into acts of open rebellion.
On the other hand, it appears only proper and reasonable to remark,
in palliation of their offence, that up to the 30th of January, the day
on which the missionaries quitted Shiloh, the people do not seem to
have been chargeable, nor indeed to be actually charged, with the
commission of any overt act of rebellion. The refusal to deliver up
two Hottentots from the Kat River, who happened to be in the place,
however blameable under the peculiar circumstances of the time, can
be the less regarded as such, since the two Shiloh Hottentots,
whose surrender was likewise demanded by Captain Tylden, the
military commandant at Whittlesea, gave themselves up at once, at
the instance of the missionaries, though expecting the imprisonment
to which they were immediately subjected, and apprehending even a
worse fate. Such being the case, it appears therefore to the under¬
signed, as it did at the time to the missionaries themselves^ to have
been an unfortunate circumstance, that Captain Tylden, acting no
doubt on honest convictions of duty, possibly on information which
he officially possessed, but of which the missionaries knew nothing,
and not improbably on the suggestions of interested and even pre¬
judiced parties, of whom there was no lack at Whittlesea, refused to
accept the submission which the Hottentots at Shiloh were at
length
48o MINUTES OP EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE
Rev. length induced to tender, so far as regarded the delivery to him of
p. La Trohe, the two Kat River Hottentots, and the admission of a garrison into
—the settlement and church; and required that they should lay down
^'h their arms in successive companies of 20, and consent to be trans-
' 5'« ported to Cradock. That they should decline to submit on these
conditions, especially under the excitement and alarm caused by the
report which had reached them of the recent tragedy at Dods
Pringle's, will not perhaps excite much surprise, however deeply it
may be deplored. The withdrawal of the missionaries, and the
eventual destruction of the settlement, appear to have been the
melancholy result of this abortive negotiation.
As to the events which occurred on the 31st of January, the day
immediately following the departure of the missionaries, with the
Fingoos and the few Hottentots who remained faithful and deter¬
mined to share their lot, considerable uncertainty appears to prevail.
The published reports charge the Shiloh people with having com¬
mitted the first act of open hostility ; the manuscript depositions of
two respectable Hottentots of Shiloh, Nathaniel Baalie and David
Taai, go to prove, that the Whittlesea people were the aggressors.
A searching inquiry on the spot will perhaps alone ascertain all the
facts of the case. One fact, however, admits of no question ; the
utter desolation of the settlement dliring the progress of the attack
made upon it by the colonial forces on the 1st and 2d of February;
the destruction of the mission-premises, a severe but possibly a
necessary act, justifiable on military principles ; the burning or
plundering of the greater portion of the property belonging to the
mission and to the missionaries themselves ; the ruin of the habitations
and grounds of the people under their care, and the utter dispersion
of the Hottentots and Tambookies belonging to their flock. This
grievous catastrophe, with all its distressing concomitants,—a sad
requital, in the judgment of man, for their faithful and persevering
and disinterested labours of above 20 years,—the missionaries are
however disposed to receive as a chastisement from the hand of God
himself, rather than as an injury inflicted by the hand of their fellow-
men and fellow-subjects ; and in doing so, to endeavour to derive
instruction and profit from the visitation. That their principles and
practice, their motives and their general conduct, as loyal subjects and
right-minded instructors and guides of the native population, are
not unappreciated by those in authority, is evident from the invita¬
tion addressed to them by Captain Tylden himself, only a few weeks
after their withdrawal from Shiloh, to return and re-occupy the
desolated settlement, with such of their people as had adhered to
them, including the whole Fingoo portion of their flock, many of
whom had shown their loyalty and their bravery in the field of action,
and resume the cultivation of the fields and gardens, which had
but lately yielded so abundant an increase. In compliance with
this invitation, given with the cordial approbation of the Governor
himself, the missionaries had returned with their flock of faithful
refugees from Colesberg, and entered anew upon their manifold
labours at Shiloh, making themselves and their families as com¬
fortable as circumstances permitted among the ruins of the place.
According to the latest advices received from them, the majority
of
èELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 481
of the Hottentots belonging to their former congregation had re- Rev.
turned to their duty, and not a few of their number were already P. La Trohe.
engaged in assisting in the defence of the colony, and the posts in ——
Bntish Kafraria. 31 July
The conduct of the 900 volunteers, who on the first outbreak of the ' 5'«
war, and before any considerable number of burghers or colonists had
joined the forces under his Excellency the Governor or his subordinate
officers, cheerfully came forward and enrolled themselves in the ranks
of the defenders of the colony ; dismissing from their minds the re¬
collection of the privations to which the families of the levies from
Genadendal, Groenekloof and Elim, had been subjected for many
months, at the commencement of the war of 1847, appears to be the
theme of general commendation. They are reported to have thus far
distinguish^ed themselves by bravery in the field and good conduct in
the camp and on the march, and the numerous letters which they are
continually writing to their wives and families, who are meanwhile
liberally provided for, are creditable alike to their principles and
feelings. (signed) Peter La Trohe.
Extract of a .Tournai kept at the Cape, in 1849 (from the " Colonial
Church Chronicle, and Missionary Journal," for June and July
1850, No. XXXVI, p. 457, and XXXVII, p. 29.) By Arch¬
deacon Alerriman.
Moravian Settlement, at Shiloh.
* * * After service and breakfast, we walked on to Shiloh, where
we spent the rest of the day and following night, among a set of the
most simple, hard-working, and earnest missionaries, as it seems to
me, of any I have seen in this land.
Shiloh has been established 20 years : there are at present four
Moravian brethren, three of whom are married, and two have small
families. There are about 700 people round the station, a mixture of
Hottentots, Fingoes, and Kafirs ; about 300 are baptized, several are
possessors of considerable property, have comfortable houses, waggons,
horses, oxen, and sheep. Most of them have a piece of land, which
they cultivate for themselves, enjoying the privilege of water from the
watercouse, which was dug by the first missionaries, with the assist¬
ance of native labour ; and altogether there is an appearance of
industry far greater than what is witnessed at the missionary
stations of other bodies. The whole buildings were erected, and
the whole of the furniture made, and the mill constructed by
the hands of the missionaries themselves. This renders it less
astonishing, both that the institution itself should be self-supporting,
and even return a yearly surplus for the assistance of weaker stations,
and that the converts should adopt habits of industry more readily
than elsewhere. 11 was a goodly sight, to see so many Kafir men,
whose incorrigible disinclination to cultivate the ground is so much
spoken of, labouring voluntarily in their own fields. In the house of
one Kafir which I entered, and which was almost as comfortably fur¬
nished as the house of an English agricultural labourer, I saw several
0.63. H H sacks
4^2 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFOUE THE
ev. sacks of diiferent kinds of grain ; nor did he show any jealousy, but
Trobe, rather pleasure, when I remarked on his wealth as the product of his
~ own industry.
y Mr. Bonatz, who devoted his whole time to us for the day, which
'''* he said he was able to do, being "house-father" at present, took
great pleasure in showing us the new watercourse, which they had
led out from a distance of above three miles, for the purpose of hav¬
ing plenty of water to turn their mill, without taking away any of
that which was devoted to the irrigation of the native grounds ; and
thus cutting off all occasions for murmurings and jealousy in a dry
season. Be confessed to me that, in spite of all the good appear¬
ances, the ingratitude of the natives had tried him sorely.
Graham's Town, 22 October 1849.
Having just returned from a second visit to the Moravian mission¬
ary station of Shiloh, on the borders of Kaftrland, T wish to give
you a few of my thoughts on the subject ; but fírst I must refer you
to my journal of June last for a general account of the station and
its inmates, their numbers, their work, their expenditure, and other
matters.
On this second occasion I took with me, who is no less
delighted with the sisters of the establishment than I was with the
brethren. Their frankness, simplicity and kindliness win more and
more upon us the better we know them.
Besides giving the abstract of their year's accounts, which the
frank kindness of Mr. Bonatz enabled me to do, I have said in my
second visit that I was very minute in my inquiries about the ex¬
penses of their newly contemplated station at Windvogel, because I
thought we might learn more from them, than from any other body of
Christians who are engaged in missionary work in this land.
Now, when we consider that Shiloh is only of 20 years' standing;
that they have incurred the plunderings consequent upon the Kafir
wars, when all their cattle was swept away from them (though they
were never compelled to quit the station, nor was any one's life lost) ;
it is a subject worthy of much reflection, that for some years past they
have not only been a self-supporting society, but have actually re¬
turned a surplus in aid of poorer missions. £. 400 was all that their
Society received from the Government, at whose instigation two soli¬
tary men first came to settle on this trackless wild (as it then was),
surrounded by a fierce tribe of savages. They had a promise of
a grant of land, it is true ; but it is the industry which they have
bestowed on this land, and their simple, self-denying lives, which has
placed this and other Moravian missions on the present footing ; the
missionaries having taught the natives while they maintained them¬
selves by the sweat of their own brow.
I found that Mr. Bonatz considered it would be a very great outlay
if it cost their Society 1,000 I. from first to last before the new station
in Kafirland was able to maintain itself. He was himself engaged
in making the door-frames and window-frames for the mission-
house to be conveyed to Windvogel ; and a Christian Kafir car¬
penter (the only handicraftsman of that nation I ever saw) was
working with him.
3485. Sir
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 483
3485. Sir J. Walmsley.'] Is there any information which ^ ¿^^robe
you wish to give to the Committee which is not contained in '
that document to which you have referred?—I was anxious, 31 July
as reference had been made in the previous examination to 1851.
that which had taken place at Shiloh, affecting the character
both of the missionaries and the people under their care, to be
permitted to state what I know on that subject ; that the mis¬
sionaries there, as I believe was the case everywhere else, as
soon as they had the least suspicion that anything was going
wrong, did their very utmost to allay the prevailing irritation,
and to bring the people to reason, who appeared for the time
to be under a degree of infatuation for which they could them¬
selves scarcely account. This was especially the case with re¬
gard to the Hottentots, of whom I am bound to say, that, so
far as our knowledge extends, they had no cause of complaint
against the local authorities, or against the Government ; and
concerning whom, up to the time referred to (for they were to
a certain extent, but only to a certain extent, involved in
the prevailing disaffection), the missionaries had an opinion
that they would have stood by them to the very last
extremity.
3486. Sir E. Buxton.] Can you in any way account for the
outbreak at Shiloh ? —It is right to state, that there is very
great uncertainty connected with that event. There was, in
lact, no outbreak at Shiloh, up to the time when the mis¬
sionaries left on the 30th of January. It was in order to show
that at all events their loyalty was above suspicion, and that
they were willing to suffer any loss I'ather than be in the
slightest degree implicated in anything like disaffection, that
they quitted the place. Up to that time no overt act, amount-
.ng to rebellion, had been committed ; there was simply a
refusal of the Hottentots to deliver up two men from the Kat
River who were suspected, and over whom they had no control.
Up to that period there was no outbreak ; and there is consi¬
derable doubt, from what was stated by Mr. Renton, and the
depositions which the Committee have allowed to be put in,
whether the first aggression was on the part of the Whittlesea
people or the Shiloh people.
3487. Have the Moravian missionaries any station at
Whittlesea ?—No.
0.63.
H H 2
LIST
[ 484 ]
LIST OF APPENDIX.
Appendix, No. 1.
Copy of Letter from Rev. J ames Read, Sen., Missionary of the T.iondon
Missionary Society, Philipton, Kat River, dated Alice, 26 March
1851 p. 48.5
Appendix, No. 2.
Letter from Colonel C. Ovans to the Honourable Sir John Malcolm,
&c. &c. - .- -..-.-.p. 489
Appendix, No. 3.
Letter from Sir A. Stockenstrom to the Right Hon. H. Labouchere,
Chairman - .- -- -- ...p. 493
[ 485 ]
APPENDIX.
Appendix, No. 1.
Copy of LETTER from Rev. James Rea«/, Sen., Missionary of the App. No. 1,
London Missionary Society, Philipton, Kat River, dated Alice, ——
26 March 1851.
Sir,
Having addessed a letter to the Governor, and lodged my protest
against the representations and resolutions of Major-general Somerset
ill his despatch of 28th February, I deem it necessary, in order to
counteract and abate the erroneous impressions on the public mind,
which that despatch is fítted to produce, before the impartial and rigid
investigation which 1 have demanded can be made, and more espe¬
cially to prevent the conclusion, which I am given to understand my
silence will be held to sanction, that I am unable to gainsay the alle¬
gations in said documents, to offer through your columns some
animadversions upon those portions of it which relate to Philipton
and myself.
In the first paragraph of the despatch, there are six points which
I take leave to notice :
1st. " That Philijiton, so proverbially stated to be loyal, had in
fact been the focus of almost all the disaffected of the setilemeni."
This is a sweeping accusation, which it is easy to utter, and which,
coming from a person in authority, is fitted to blast the character of
a place: in the absence of any proof to support it, I am constrained
to repel the cliarge, and to challenge the Major-general to substan¬
tiate if.
2nd. " That the two field cornets, Andries Botha and Piet Bru-
inljis, were both with the rebels."
One would imagine there were no field cornets at Philipton on the
Major-general's arrival, whereas there were oilier two. That Piet
Bruintjis was not with the rebels, the General is, I suppose, ere this
satisfied, as after coming into Fori Hare he was set at liberty. That
Botha was with them has not been proved, and I understand evidence
can be produced that he was not.
0.63. H H 3 8fd
486
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. 1. 3rd. Says the Major-general, " I found upon undoubted evidence,
——— that from ihis body of people detachments had been furnished to
support the rebels in tiieir desultory attacks on the farms in the
colony; in fact, that the most disgraceful deception had been carried
to an incredible extent."
Here again are most sweeping and injurious, but, as will be noticed,
vague and unsupported charges : being ignorant of any foundation
for them, I am entitled to ask, what detachments went from Philip-
ton ? Who furnished them ? and by whom were they carried on ?
4lh. He proceeds to say, " On the morning of the 26lii I assem¬
bled the whole of the people, and in presence of their missionary,
Mr. Read, I explained to them my full perception of their conduct;
that under such circumstances, there was but one course for me to
pursue, viz., to break up such a nest of traitors and rebels, and bring
them all away, disarming every one."
There was on the morning referred to a considerable number of
people suddenly collected, partly mine, partly Mr. Thomson's;
whom, in Mr. Thomson's presence and my own, the Major-general
addressed in the excited and extraordinary manner he has described.
I told him privately, at the close of his address, that it was a pity he
had spoken as he did, as the men whom he had denounced as traitors
and rebels were faithful and peaceful subjects of the Queen, and
I told him so the evening before ; men who, instead of being treated
in such a manner, deserved to be commended for their loyalty and
stedfastness. Moreover it is not the case that he disarmed every one :
the greater number were allowed to retain their arms; some had no
arms, and others from whom arms were taken were neither disloyal
nor suspected, but only unknown to Commandant Forie, who, not
being cornet of the district, was a stranger to them, and could not be
responsible for them.
6th. The Major-general goes on to say, " I found 17 waggons be¬
longing to the rebels in the place; about 100 women and children,
and property to a great extent."
On the morning in question he spoke as if all the waggons in
Philipton, amounting to between 50 and 60, were those of rebels,
and so as they have been represented in some newspaper accounts.
But the fact is, that although, wiih a rashness and rudeness which to
Englishmen at home would seem incredible, many waggons were
seized and searched, not four altogether, I am not sure if more than
two, were found to be or to have been those of rebels : of all those in
question, and indeed of all at Philipton, accurate accounts can be
furnished whenever demanded by competent authority. I am afraid
the property to a great extent said to have been found belonging to
rebels at Philipton will have dwindled into very small amounts
when the returns of the proceeds are made into the Government's
treasury, and I also apprehend that few farmers will boast of having
found their stolen property at Philipton ; that property to a great
extent was found there is perfectly true, but it was the lawful pro¬
perty of loyal people, of which I am sorry to say that the greater
part, in cattle, corn, and meal, was rifled from them by the Major-
general's
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 487
general's forces, either at Philipton, on the journey to, or at Alice, ^pp
where the plunder of cattle and flocks was wiiolesaie. ___
6th. The Major-general adds, " On tlie 27th I carried this measure
into efi'ect, moving everybody off to Eiland's post ; conveying away
also the reverend missionaries resident at Philipton."
The strain of the document and the form of this remark now lead
one to fancy that the missionaries were a sort of captives. How
stands the case? A strong representation was sent from those of the
Kat River, and from the council of the Loyal Burghers Association,
two days before, to the Major-general, against leaving them or the
loyal inhabitants of the settlement, unless he left an adequate force
to protect them. Other missionaries and a Scotch minister, who are
at Philipton, supported this application, and some of them, I believe,
sent private letters requesting to be taken out.
In the fourth paragraph of the despatch the Major-general states
that Field-commandants Forie and Piffer rendered every assistance,
and their information was most valuable to him.
Why did he not act upon that information? Kobus Forie gave
him a list of upwards of 100 loyal men at Philipton whom he could
answer for; a list which on the day the Major-general entered
Philipton, I referred him to as quite correct ; yet it was those men
who chiefly composed the meeting he addressed next morning as
traitors and rebels.
The Major-general proceeds to say, "Your Excellency will per¬
ceive that I have decided upon and adopted, after very mature
reflection, a strong measure in breaking up this settlement ; but
I have felt it an imperative duty. It is impossible to conceive the
mischief that has occurred from the delusions that have been en¬
gendered in the minds of these people. The measure I have adopted
has, at one blow, dissolved the charm. I can already perceive a com¬
plete change in the minds of these people ; tlie honest and well-
intentioned are reassured; the vacillating and disloyal have been
struck with terror, and the arm of rebellion is broken, and all seem
anxious now in word and in deed to return to their allegiance. I am
now returning to Fort Hare, where I purpose trying the principal
ringleaders by a general court martial. I shall then decide as to the
disposal of the captured property, but as very many of the waggons
are the property of those worthy men who have been robbed and
plundered by the rebels, I shall restore the whole as far as possible."
On the most important announcement m the despatch, "The
strong measure he had decided on and adopted" of breaking up the
settlement, I forbear to say more at present, than that, while heartily
desiring the detection of the criminals, and approving of the confisca¬
tion of the property of such as shall be proved to be traitors and
rebels, I believe it is beyond the power of any military commander
to break up the settlement in this off-handed style ; and the Govern¬
ment and the public, both here and in England, will perhaps be sur¬
prised to find after all the dreadful accounts of the Kat River people,
that very few of thoie holding property had any participation in this
rebellion ; although, by the forces of the Burghers and the Fineocs
0.63. H H 4 which
4«8
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. t, \vhich came into the settlement with the Major-general, their houses
—— were burnt, and their property destroyed, as if they had been counted
rebels.
I wish I could entertain as strong a confidence as the Major-
general, that the rebellion is broken. Had the third or the fourth of
the large force which has lain idle at Fort Hare for about a month,
been employed in scouring the mountains and bushy defiles of the
Kat River, I doubt not that ere this every rebel would have dis¬
appeared from it. It was a mistake to fancy that the victorious siege
of Fort Armstrong, however important an event, followed up by the
evacuation of all the loyal, with all the women and children in the
settlement, was the suppression of the rebellion. I suppose there
were about 200 men in Fort Armstrong when besieged, and I fear
the |)rincipal ringleaders, who are to be tried by court martial, have
yet to be captured.
The exaggerations aie, unhappily, very great, both of the defection
of the Kat River Hottentots and the victory which has been achieved
over them. I deprecated and lamented, and did all I could, in con¬
junction with other brethren in the Kat Kiver, to stop that defec¬
tion. I deprecate and lammt not less all delay and inefficiency in
suppressing and punishing it ; and 1 mourn over the injury done to
hundreds of innocent persons, |)ariicularly of women and children,
by some ol' the measures which have been taken tor that object.
But I wait and pray for our impartial and searching investigation
into the conduct of all parties concerned.
I am, &c.
(signed) J. Read, Sen.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 489
Appendix, No. 2.
LETTER from Colonel C. Omns to the Honourable Sir John App. No. a.
Malcolm, &c. &c.
Honourable Sir, Poonah, 12 August 1830. (a)
According to your request, I have the honour to lay before you the
following account of the settlements made with the Naiks and Bheels
of the districts composing the Kunur agency. These settlements were
undertaken, when every other expedient for reducing to order the
wild and lawless tribes of that country had failed of success; and the
result has proved the efficacy of a conciliatory and liberal mode of
treatment in reforming a race of men, who may almost be said to have
considered plunder as their birthright, and who, from being the
scourges of the country, are now quietly engaged at the plough, or
employed in preserving the peace of these very districts, which they
formerly ravaged.
2. These districts, with the exception of a few villages of the Kunur
purgunnah, all lie below the Adjunta range of hills, which here form
the southern boundary of Khandeish. They are for the most part badly
cultivated, thinly peopled, and intersected in all directions by wild
wastes covered with low jungle, well calculated for the operations and
concealment of banditti.
3. 1 he range of hills alluded to throughout this report extends from
the Kusarbaree Ghat on the west, to a point about 20 miles from
Adjunta on the east, where Khandeish ends. The western portion of
this range, from Kusarbaree to Gaotala, belongs to the Company, and
immediately below it is the Chaleesgam talooka. (¿) The eastern part,
from Gaotala to Adjunta, belongs to the Nizam. A low, waste, jungly
strip of country, also belonging to the Nizam, intervenes between this
range and the Bhurgam talooka. (/») But to the eastward of Adjunta,
the Jhamneir talooka runs down and touches the hills. These three
talookas,(¿») viz. Chaleesgam, Bhurgam and Jhamneir, are part of
the Khandeish colleetorate, and are those which form the Kunur
agency.
4. These hills, in many places, rise almost perpendicularly from the
plains, and are, generally speaking, very difficult of access. They are
covered with dwarf teak, bamboo and other trees, and are broken into
deep.
(a) Sir J. Malcolm was then Governor of Bombay.
(b) A revenue division of the country under a mamlutdar, or native collector.
490
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. 2. deep, scraggy " koras," or ravines, inaccessible to all but Bheels.
There are, however, numerous passes through them for laden cattle
and foot passengers, but the Adjunta and Kusarbaree Ghats (c) are the
only ones at all practicable for wheeled carriages, and these are about
70 miles asunder.
5. These mountains are divided by the natives into different ranges,
each of which has its particular denomination. The principal of these
are the Arnuddee Hills (so called from a small mountain-stream run¬
ning through them) which extend from Kusarbaree to the hill fort of
Kunaira ; the Sathmala Hills (so called from a high bluflf peak) run¬
ning from Kunaira to Gaotola; and the Kaldurree Hills (so called
from a deep chasm, the Kaldurry Kora), in the midst of which is the
strong and celebrated fortress of tJntoor.
6. It was in these separate ranges, that the Bheel Naiks (rf) formed
their " huttees," or temporary encampments, and from them they
derived their names, as Rora Naik, of the Arrunddee ; Saiba Naik, of
the Sathmala; and Bhaeejee Naik, of the Kaldurree; though these
appellations may possibly have originated from the Naiks being the
guardians of the passes of their particular hills. For the Bheel Naiks
of this agency have never had, as far as I can learn, any acknowledged
rights or authority as independent chiefs ; they have no lands, no
tenures of any kind, save the hucks (e) and enams (/) they possess as
the hereditary superintendents of the police of the different purgunnahs
of which they are the wuttundars. {g)
7. According to the immemorial usage of this country, the Naik was
considered answerable for the general police of his purgunnah, the
jagleea(Ä) for that of his particularvillage, and the Naikjvvas also bound
to see that the jagleeas did their duty. Indeed, the Naik originally
seems to have had the right of appointing all the jagleeas of his pur¬
gunnah ordistrict, as is still the case in the Bhurgam purgunnah, where
the jagul right continues to be vested in the Kaldurry Naiks, who, to
this day, appoint their own jagleeas (A) to every village there. But in
the other districts of this agency, this power has now become so far
modiñed, that the present jagleeas, from long possession, are con¬
sidered as wuttundars, (g) though, when they become extinct in any
particular village, the jagul still reverts to the Naik. And to this, as
well as to his being their official head, we may, probably, trace the
influence exercised by the Naiks over the jagleea Bheels of this range.
8. For the performance of his duties, the Naik was paid by hucks,
chiefly in kind, on every village of which he was wuttundar, and the
jagleea received his karee-peendee(i) like the rest of the baruh-bulota.(y)
But though this, as far as I can ascertain, seems to have been the
original
(c) Passes in the hills. (d) Chiefe so called,
(e) Payments in kind and money for semces performed.
1/) Lands held in perpetuity for services performed,
(ff) Hereditary owners. (A) Village watchman,
(t) Portion of grain. (y ) Village servants.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 49I
original situation of the Naiks in this quarter, they nevertheless ap- App. No. 2.
pear, at an earlier period, to have risen to considerable consequence
heie. Each Naik has still his purdhan,(A)his kharbaree, (/)or his jemi-
dar,(jw) who has a certain share of the hucks, and in the memonr of the
oldest inhabitants they are only known as living in or near the hills,
at the head of a body of their followers, who were more or less for¬
midable according to circumstances. They then, as now, held theni-
selves responsible for all robberies in their own districts, and their
hucks were usually collected and taken to their huttees by the jagleeas,
who, though looking up to the Naik as their head, were generally pre¬
sent in their villages, until the famine of Fuslee 1213, A. D. 1803.
9. At that time nearly all the villages in this part of the country
became depopulated, and the Bheels suffered in common with the rest
of the inhabitants. The lands fell waste, and their hucks, of course,
ceased. Many of them fled into Berar, and the remainder, as well as
others of different castes, driven by hunger, joined the Naiks in the
hills, who now began to plunder the country far and near for a sub¬
sistence.
10. The disturbances succeeding this unhappy period served to
increase the confidence of these bands, and to recruit their strengths
Many of the Naiks now assumed the state of petty rajahs, and kept
regular bodies of armed men in their pay for the purposes of plunder.
The evil, too, was only increased by the attempts of the native govern¬
ments to correct it. They did not hesitate to employ fraud as well as
open force to effect their object, and many cruel massacres of the
Bheels are said to have taken place. Seeing, therefore, that their
extermination was determined upon, they at last became utterly des¬
perate, and avenged themselves on the surrounding country by such
atrocities, as caused their very name to be equall}' dreaded and
abhorred by the inhabitants.
11. This was the state of things on our taking possession of the
country in 1817-18, when some settlements were made with the
Arrunddee and other Naiks, which, however, were found to be ineffec¬
tual in restoring the peace of the country. The jagleea Bheels still
kept to the hills, and continued their depredations. Detachments of
troops were employed at different times against them, but all to no
purpose. The gangs dispersed for a time, and then returned to their
old haunts and habits.
12. " The distress occasioned by these robberies" (says Captain
Briggs in a despatch to Mr. Elphinstone, dated in January 1819)^
" to the inhabitants, is not to be imagined and after describing the
terror felt by the people, on receiving the insolent and threatening
requisitions which the Bheels were then in the habit of sending to
the villages, and stating that one or two purgunnahs had actually
refused tuccavee (71) to extend their cultivation, until their persons and
property were secured ; he goes on to argue, that until some provision
was
(k) Minkter.
(m) Commander.
(Q Manager.
(») Advances of money;.
A92
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App- No. 2. was made for the Bheels, little or no improvement in tlie state of the
—— country could be expected to take place.
13. It was not, however, until 1824-25, that the conciliatory line of
policy and the'settlements which have been productive of so much
good, and which, as will be seen by the extract above quoted, had
been so long before pointed out as essential to the peace of the
country, were first fairly brought into operation, (o) Indeed, it may be
doubted whether, at an earlier period, these settlements would have
succeeded as they have now done. For when we consider the state
of Khandeish, overran as it formerly was by bands of freebooters,
rendered desperate and daring beyond example by the absence for
years of anything like regular government, it will be evident that
nothing but an opinion of our irresistible power could possibly have
paved the way for a more settled order of things, or have induced
the Bheels, habituated as they then were to all kinds of violence, to
have adopted a different course of life.
14. It must be admitted, therefore, that though the military opera¬
tions carried on at intervals from the period of our conquest failed in
restoring permanent quiet to the country, still such coercion was
unquestionably indispensable to break the power of the different
bands, and to prepare the means of effecting the good subsequently
done. Indeed, the course adopted at the time 1 have now arrived at,
viz. 1824-25, towards the Bheels, who had then assembled in the
Arrunddee and Sathmala ranges of hills, and who, under active and
daring leaders, were then ravaging the country both above and
below the Ghats, sufficiently proves the truth of what I have here
advanced.
15. It was first necessary to show these Bheels that all resistance
would be hopeless. Detachments of regular troops were employed
against them, which by penetrating into every part of the hills,
reduced them to extremities. An amnesty was then oflered to the
Naiks, and generally to all the Bheels of this range, with a few
exceptions, on condition of their returning to their villages, and
refraining from all future aggressions, and an attempt was to be made
to reform this wild and hitherto intractable race, and provide for their
future support, by giving tuccavee(p) and waste lands to cultivate to
all those who could be persuaded to take to the plough.
16. A very successful commencement of these settlements was made
by the late Mr. Graham, then second assistant collector of Khandeish,
who had charge of this agency until October 1825. By his judicious
and active measures, the most desperate and formidable of the outlaws
were secured, and several of the principal Naiks persuaded to take
advantage of the liberal and humane offers of Government. To these,
as well as to the rest of the leaders and their followers, as they con¬
tinued to come in, tuccavee was given, and waste lands were allotted
wherever they themselves chose to settle. Of course it required both
time and patience to put things on a regular and permanent footing in
these
(o) 1 took cliarg« of this agency in 1826.—C. Ovans. (p) Advances of money.
SELECT COMMITTEE ÖN THE KAFIR TRIBES. 49^
these infant villages, composed, too, as they were of such wild mate- PP] '
rials, but the fact of there now being 25 of these colonies established
in this agency will, 1 trust, prove the progress made in this part of
the undertaking.
17. At first, the plan of setting the Bheels to cultivate was con¬
sidered almost hopeless, such was their wild, intractable and savage
character in this quarter. And, certainly, the difficulties to be over¬
come in bringing about such a change in their habits were not much
exaggerated ; but the Bheel is wonderfully susceptible of being
worked upon by kind and liberal treatment. By attention to Iiis
little wants and petitions, by a jiresent to his women, and by showing
him that you take an interest in him and his affairs, anything may
be done with him. The true secret, however, of the power we now
possess over the minds of this wild people is, that they feel themselves
secure on the faith of our kowls.((y) This they never did before ; and
it is owing to this implicit reliance on the sanctity of our word, that
they submitted themselves so readily, and have re-established them¬
selves so generally, with their wives and children, in their wuttunny(r)
villages in the plains, where upwards of 600 lamilies are now settled
at the plough alone.
18. So entirely, too, have the prejudices of the Bheels, with regard
to engaging in cultivation, been got over, that it would not now be
difficult to increase the number of ploughs in this agency, were it
expedient to do so. But it ought, at present, I think, to be our object,
rather to watch over and secure the present settlements, than to
extend them unnecessarily. To all wuttundar(s) Bheels, however, of
these districts, who return to their homes, and who have no other
means of support, ploughs must be given, as also to the grown-up
children of those now settled, as soon as they are of an age fit to
cultivate.
19. After the settlement of the Naiks (t) and their followers, the next
object was that of the jagleeas, (m) and the reorganization of the police
of the country on its ancient footing. The Naiks, by the restoration
of their bucks, (x) in the shape of a money payment, again became
resjionsible for the general police of their respective districts, but the
jagleea bucks, in the present depopulated state of the country, were
found to he quite insufiicieut for their support. An agreement was,
therefore, entered into with the patels and jagleeas of every village
separately, by which one particular Bheel was, by common consent,
set apart to do the jagul duty and receive the bucks, and the others
agreed to receive tuccavee, and to cultivate for their livelihood.
■20. About 400 Bheels have in this manner been re-established in
their wuttunny villages throughout this agency, in their original
occupation of village watchmen, and as enam lands have been given,
wherever there was none before, to all these jagleeas, in addition to
their grain bucks, it is to be hoped they will not again be driven by
want into any excesses.
21. In
(q) Paper of protection. (r) Hereditary villages. (s) Hereditary.
{f) Chiefs. (m) Village watchmen. (x) Rights.
494
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. fl. 21. In those purgunnahs where wuttundar Naiks were not found to
exist, one or two Bheels, belonging to the same purgunnah, have been
appointed as rukwaldars, to superintend the jagleeas, and to preserve
the general peace of their division. These Bheels are entered as
nialseebundus, (w) and receive pay as such. But they reside in their
own villages, in tlie midst of the purgunnah, of which they have police
charge, where they are constantly on the alert to prevent robbery, as
well as to detect it if committed. And this system, being in con¬
formity with the ancient constitution of these purgunnahs, answers very
well.
22. Thus an efficient police has been created in these districts with¬
out expense, and simply by reverting to the old-established usages of
the country, which an experience of nearly five years has proved to
work better, perhaps, than any other that could have been devised,
and, in fact, the effects of these settlements altogether have been such,
that this country, formerly described as being in so distracted a state
that neither life nor property was secure, now enjoys perfect tran¬
quillity. The roads too, which were unsafe, even for armed men, are
now travelled at all hours by single passengers without fear, and
almost all the deserted villages have been re-established.
23. The Bheels themselves also, from being savage outcasts, wan¬
dering about the hills and jungles, with their hands against every
man, and every man's hand against them, are now reunited to
society, and living quietly in their villages, and gradually becoming
useful and obedient subjects.
24. It was to be expected that exceptions would occur ; the in¬
veterate habits of a race of men like the Bheels are not to be changed
in a day : but these exceptions only prove the efficacy of the present
system ; for instance, five or six families from Bholték, the most tur¬
bulent colony above the hills, took to the hills in November last, and
recommenced the old system of plunder ; but in a few days they were
all seized, except one man, and brought in by their own Naik, assisted,
in the first instance, by a small detachment of the Bheel corps, and
this is the only defection of any consequence since I concluded my
settlements with the Bheels.
25. It would be tedious to go into all the details of these settle¬
ments, but it may be necessary to mention, that a general register of
all the Bheels of this agency has been made ; that every Bheel has
had a kowl («) given to him with my own hands, which they generally
carry about with them, and on which they set great value ; that the
Naik and jagleea hucks have all been inquired into and adjusted,
and the patels bound down to see that the jagleeas receive their
proper dues, as well as to assist those Bheels who cultivate. The
Bheels, on their part, also are required never to leave their villages
even for a day, without permission from the Naik or the patel; if
they do, it is immediately reported, and the patels and jagleeas are
strictly
(y) District policemen.
(«) Paper of protection.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 495
strictly enjoined to bring in all stray Bheels to give an account of -App. No. a,
themselves, and to receive kowl.
26. A darogah kharkoon (a) is employed in each talooka, who
constantly moves about from village to village, to see that all these
orders are attended to, and that the Bheels are present, and busy at
their ploughs. A darogah malseebundy (6) is also stationed in each
colony to superintend and overlook them, and report their proceedings ;
during the dry weather, likewise, I move about from place to place, to
receive tbe urzees (c) of the Bheels, and to ascertain, by personal in¬
spection, that all is doing well.
27. In the letter from Captain Briggs to Mr. Elphinstone, dated
the 8th January 1819, and which has been before alluded to in the
12th paragraph of this Report, such appeared to be the urgency at
that time, for making some provision for the Bheels, and for re-esta¬
blishing the police of the country on its ancient footing, that the
political agent then proposed giving each Bheel jagleea an allowance
of two rupees per month for his support, and this was to be raised by
a house tax, which he calculated would amount to 1,38,034 rupees
annually ; but even this measure, so burdensome in its nature to an
already exhausted country, would not have answered the end in view ;
for it would have kept the Bheels in a state of idleness, and the
money, instead of being spent in grain, would most probably have
been thrown away on liquor, of which, like all savages, they are im¬
moderately fond.
28. The present outlay of tuccavee, on the other hand, by which
these settlements have been effected, only amounts to about 42,000
rupees, of which one-third at least is now forthcoming in the sbape
of bullocks and agricultural implements. A further advance, to the
extent of a few thousand rupees, may still be necessary, as until the
produce of the fields of the cultivating Bheels is adequate to their
support, they must, of course, be assisted with tuccavee. But this
money is not sunk, as the sums given in the shape of pay would have
been. Part of it, at least, will be recovered, and Government will be
amply remunerated for the remainder, by the re-establishment of the
waste villages, and by the improved condition generally of this
country, owing to the security of person and property now enjoyed
here by all classes. The large tracts of jungle already cleared by
the cultivating Bheels, now computed at about 8,000 beegas, must
likewise ultimately yield some return to the State. Besides, the Bheel,
instead of being a burden to Government, now looks to his own
honest labour for his support, and his mind being occupied in attending
to his fields, his habits are undergoing a slow but certain reform.
No system of money payments could, I think, have produced such
effects.
29. By the kowls (d) which have been given to the cultivating Bheels
for the waste lands allotted to them, they are bound to repay the
above
io) Native writer,
c) Petitions.
(5) Native policeman.
(<9 Agreements.
APPENDIX TO REPORT ERÖM THË
App. No. 2. above tuccavee in seven yeais: but these terms must not, of course,
be insisted upon, particularly as there is authority from Government,
under date the I'ith of January 1826, for not bringing these lauds
under the full assessment for a period of 20 years ; and, in fact, in
a late report, I have proposed at once to give fresh kowls for the
above period : but even when this extended term expires, great
allowances must be made. The realization of the tuccavee, or of
revenue from this class, is a very secondary consideration ; their
thorough reform is everything, and hereafter, instead of laying
a beegotee'vC") on their fields, the best plan would probably be, to levy
a small sum on each plough, which system seems to suit best with
the habits and feelings of all half-civilized communities.
30. On the recall of Major Deschamp's detachment in 1825, 200
regulars, with two European officers, were left in the Chalu.'gam
lalooka ; this number being then considered necessary for the pro¬
tection of that district alone. The services of the whole of this body,
except 25 men, have now been dispensed with, and parties of the
Bheel corps have been substituted in their stead. The 25 regulars
remaining are stationed in the Bhurgam and Jhamneir talookas,
chiefly with a view of protecting our eastern frontier from the incur¬
sions of freebooters from the Nizam's country, and the Bheel sepoys
occupy all the other posts.
31. And here in justice to the Bheel corps, which was composed
of the same wild materials as those now settled in the villages of this
agency, and which, in fact, is an indispensable part of the Bheel
system as now followed up in Khandeish, I trust I may be permitted
to say a few words regarding it. This corps absorbed those young
and fiery spirits who could scarcely have been expected to have re¬
mained long at rest in their villages. It drew Bheels of this stamp
from all quarters of the province, and by the ability displayed by
Lieutenant Outram in the management of it, it soon became an honour¬
able and popular employment. The Bheels of this corps are now
engaged on every kind of duty, in guarding prisoners, escorting trea¬
sure, in outposts in the most unhealthy parts of the country, and
I speak from personal experience when I say, that no body of men
could possibly be more zealous or efficient, and what is still higher
praise, more orderly in their conduct, particularly when we consider
what these Bheels were before they were embodied.
32. It only remains for me now to add a few observations on the
appearance and character of this singular race, which, in the midst
of civilization, has so long retained its own wild and peculiar habits.
The Bheels of the Adjunta range are divided into two classes,
Moosulmans and Hindoos. The former, however, are only found to
the eastward, in the Parchora, Loharra, Seendhoornee, Jhamneir and
Bornar purgunahs. The exact time of their conversion is not known.
They do not differ much in appearance or manners from the common
Moosulmen of the country, but they retain a good deal of the fero¬
city of their tribe, and are of a discontented quarrelsome disposition,
which renders them difficult to manage.
33. All
(e) Rate per beega.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 497
3.3. All the Bheels to the westward of Parchora are Hindoos ; they App. No. 2.
are generally of low stature, of slight but active make, plain features,
and dark complexions. They speak the common language of the
country, and are naturally quick and intelligent ; but they are of
indolent, dissipated and singularly improvident habits, so much so,
that even yet they can scarcely be trusted with the smallest sum of
money of their own, as they would, in all probability, at once make
away with it, without any thought of the wants of to-morrow. They
eat all sorts of flesh, cows' flesh not excepted, and have great know¬
ledge of roots and herbs, which they were occasionally driven to
subsist on when in the hills. They take as mauy women as they can
aflbrd to marry and feed ; but they cannot manage without one at
least to cook and perform other menial offices ; and so dependent are
they in this respect, that they have been known to come in and sur¬
render themselves on their women being seized. As may be supposed,
there is little religious feeling amongst the Bheels. They keep all
feast and festivals, both Hindoo and Moosulman, with equal zeal,
and they are staunch believers in all kinds of " jadoo," or witchcraft.
They have also their "bhuguts"(y) amongst them, who at times
pretend to be inspired, and in whose responses they place implicit
confidence.
34. With all his faults, however, tlie Hindoo Bheel is not without
some redeeming qualities. He is attached to his own patel and his
own Naik ; he is kind and affectionate to his own family and kindred,
and he is faithful to his word, of which I have had good proof, as of
all the Bheels to whom I have given kowl, very few, comparatively
speaking, have as yet broken their engagements.
35. Such is the people whose reformation is now in progress in this
agency, and which, if it prove permanent, will be productive of so
much good, both to the Bheels themselves and to the country at
large. The plan, too, for effecting this reformation, so ably sketched
out by Lieutenant-colonel Robertson, and so zealously followed up by
his successors in Kbandeish, of which I have here attempted to give
the details, has been proved by experience to have been equally wise,
politic and humane. Nor has Government left anything undone on
its part to ensure success; so that, if the experiment does ultimately
fail, the fault will not be ours. But I hope for better things. Partial
breaches of the peace there may and will be, because, as 1 have said
before, such inveterate habits are not to be changed in a day ; but
there never can, I think, be a general relapse as long as the above
system be persevered in ; and as the present race dies away, the
naipg ;ge|ieration, enured to labour from their youth up, will Ipse
sight of o}d timçs^ and gradually become useful, obedient and peace¬
ful subjeçts.
I have, &c.
(signed) C. Ovans,
Bheel Agent, Kbandeish.
(True copy.)
(signed) C. Ovans.
0.63.
(/) Priests.
1 1
498
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
Appendix, No. 3.
App. No. 3. letter from Sir A. Stockenstrom to the Right Hon. H. Labouchere,
Chairman.
Sir, London, 7 July 1851.
At the close of my last examination, on the 26th ultimo, by the
Committee over which you preside, I was not informed whether
I should again be required to appear or not ; and from my not having
received any subsequent summons, I conclude that the inquiry, which
must necessarily here be so utterly incomplete, will be continued at
the Cape. I ri the meantime, there are certain points which it becomes
my duty to bring to the immediate notice of the Committee.
In the first place, I must take the liberty to call to the recollection
of the Committee, that during my examination, I repeatedly referred
to a despatch addressed by Sir George Napier, as Governor of the
Cape of Good Hope, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated
1st February 1839. I was anxious to have the Committee in pos¬
session of that document, as well as of its enclosures, together with
my observations thereon. Lord Normanby having transmitted it to
me for my report as soon as it reached Downing-street. To the best
of my recollection. Sir G. Napier, in thatdespatch, dwells particularly
on the nature and working of the Gleneig system. He had then been
about a year in the colony; had visited the greatest part of the
frontier; had minutely examined into the character of my proceedings
under the said system for near two years, and their results, and was
fully competent to give an unbiassed opinion. My observations on
that despatch appear to me to be also essential in the inquiry here
pending, as showing, if I recollect right, in how far I agreed with,
and in how far I differed from, the Governor, particularly ray objec¬
tions to the slightest deviation from the principles of the said system
by means of military interference.
The Under-Secretary for the Colonies, after handing to me during
my examination on the 26th ultimo, the Blue Book of the 23d ultimo,
referred me to others of Sir G. Napier's despatches, but J searched
in vain for that of the 1st February 1839, although in doing so my
eye accidentally fell on one of the 20th November 1836, which I read
to the Committee, and which was strongly indicative of the opinion
which Sir G. Napier then entertained of the Gleneig system, of my
proceeding under it, and of those by whom I was so furiously and
factiously resisted in that important task. I have, however, this
moining purchased another copy of the said Blue Book of the
23d ultimo; but I do not find in the copy so purchased the said
letter
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 499
letter of Sir G. Napier of the 20ih November 1838, such as it was App. No. 3.
handed to iiie by tlie Under-Sf cretary, such as I then read it to this
Committee, and such as it must appear in my evidence, inasmuch as
in the latter copy there appeared in said letter, in page 40* of the
said B'ue Book, in the second line from the bottom, the following
sentence parenthetically between the figure " 181,0" and the woid
" as viz., " the worst importation that ever came 10 this colony."
I feel it an imperative duty to notice this omission, because I audibly
read this passage before tiie Committee in the hearing of a number
of bystanders ; and as the letter, such as I received it from the Under-
Secretary, with tiie said passage, is gone to the Cape, and may there
be published, I cannot allow the cause of the discrepancy to be left
doubtful.
Moreover, I beg leave to observe that upon further examination,
it will be found that Sir G. Napier's despatch of the 1st February
1839, to which I have so often referred, does appear in the said Blue
Book of the 23d ultimo, but escaped nry notice, because I could not
find the matter to which I attach importance. The three first para¬
graphs of said despatch are entered in page 41, but for that part which
I deem most essential to the proper understanding of the subject
under consideration, there are five asterisks substituted, and my
report on the whole transaction does not appear at all. 1 must leave
to the wisdom of the Committee whether the said deficiencies ought
to be supplied ; but as my object is to show what I have throughout
maintained, viz., that if the Glenelg system had bi en strictly adhered
to, it would ultimately have proved perfectly successful, I cannot but
deeply regret the omissions, whilst I may at least refer the Committee
to one of the enclosures of the said despatch, where in page 44, it
appears that on the 3d January 1839, Colonel Somerset reported (as
I have before stated) that he " never observed such apparent quiet
throughout the country;" adding, " that war can only have been
contemplated by those who wish to keep up a feeling of excitement
in the minds of the tribes, either against each other, or against the
colony, and thus disfigure and distort every subject; but in the minds
of the Kafirs nothing of the kind was ever contemplated."
I also find by page 35, that on the 1st September 1838, Sir G.
Napier wrote thus to Lord Glenelg: " and as the most perfect tran¬
quillity exists upon the frontier, and is acknowledged even by the
opponents of the treaties, there is no reason to expect any interrup¬
tion of our present peaceful relations."
Lieutenant-governor Hare's report of the 10th October 1838, to
be found in pages 37 and 38 of said Blue Book, is equally strong
and satisfactory. He says, amongst other matter, " I have no hesi¬
tation in declaring to your Excellency my opinion from what I have
myself observed, as well as from the reports of the officers at the out¬
posts, that this frontier, with reference to the Kafir tribes, was never
more tranquil than it is at present; contentment seems to prevail
throughout ; and I am happy to say there are marks of improving
industry visible in many parts of the Kafir country ; they are much
in want of instruments to turn up the earth; and if a few hoes and
spades were procured from England as presents, they would be more
acceptable, and certainly more useful, than beads and baubles."
0.63. 1 I 2 Now,
500
ÀPPfiNDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. 3. Now, if the said omitted parts of the said despatch of Sir G. Napier,
dated 1st February 1839, should be found to confirm the above views
and facts, as I expect from my own recollections, as well as from
Lord Normaiiby's reply of the lOlh May 1839, wliicli is likewise
only given in part, in page 261 of the said Blue Book, the Committee
will be able to judge of the actual working of the Glenelg system,
as well as of the Opinions of the highest officers of the Government,
of the character of ihat system at the time when I retired from the
administration of the eastern districts, and for some time afterwards.
What is above stated by Governor Sir G. Napier, Lieutenant-gover¬
nor Colonel Hare, and ihe military commandant Colonel Somerset,
can be proved beyond the possibility of doubt. The causes of the
subsequent failure of the same system could best be explained by the
diplomatic agents, Bowker, Stretch, and F)nn. The former is dead,
but the evidences of the latter two are indispensable. Mr. Fynn,
during the Kafir war of 1816, read to nie a memoir, which he bad
drawn up on this subject, and handed to the then Governor Sir P.
Maitland, in 1844. Messrs. Stretch and Fynn therefore, 1 humbly
submit, ought to be heard. A return of depredations and murders
committed by the Kafirs during the said two years of my administra¬
tion of the Glenelg system, should likewise be called for from the
Agent-general's office. No other return can be of the slightest
value. 1 have seen returns, pretending to be founded on authority,
which are utterly false. When all the documents and testimonies
above appealed to shall be united, I have no doubt as to the conclu¬
sion to which they will lead any candid mind.
In the second place, the Committee will recollect that I was on the
said 26th ultimo particularly pressed by an honourable Member on the
point of some collisions between certain Kafirs and Fingoes, as they
appear detailed in pp. 1$ to 25. As these transactions occurred about
14 years since, it was, of course, impossible for me at once to
call to mii>d the particulars thereof ; cut as I have since glanced
through the Blue Book, which was handed to me when I was thus
pressed, I think it due to the Committee and to myself to be as ex¬
plicit as the reperusal of the said pages enable me to be, especially
as the discussion of the subject at is-ue affords an opportunity of
entering upon the history and nature of the so-ralled D'Urban system,
upon which there has been as much wilful misrepresentatiou as there
has been affected misapprehension.
The Committee will observe that I shall state nothing of which the
proofs or disproofs are not within the immediate reach of the Colonial
Under-Secretary.
In the year 1835 the Govérnor, Sir B. D'Urban, deemed it expe¬
dient to carry war into tire territory the Galeka Kafirs beyond the
Key. He found there many thousands of Fingocs Irving under the
protection of the then paramount chief of Kafirland, Hintza, whose
miserable end in that war we need not here dwell on. These Fin«Toes
were refugees, or remnants of tribes, who had been driven out of tlieir
own country and almost annihilated by equally barbarous tribes.
They found shelter and home in Hintza's country, among Hintza^s
people. They become what we were pleased to call the ""slaves" of
the Kafirs, but what the Kafirs call their " dogs," as they call them¬
selves
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 5P1
selves our dogs, when they wish to express (heir sense of our supe- App. No. 3.
riority. They were not saleable ; hard labour for men there is not in —'
Kafirland ; agriculture, which is carried on by the women, is com¬
paratively limited ; as herdsqien, therefore, were they mainly em¬
ployed, and they were beginning to intermarry and to acquire pro¬
perty ; still they were bondsmen, and treated as inferiors; and under
such circumstances instances of severity or hard treatment may be
supposed. These Fingoes Sir B. ü'ürban liberated and brought to
the frontier of the colony, allowing them to hring with them the docks
of their masters ; and with these flocks they were placed in posses¬
sion of some of the finest tracts of the Kafir territory, iti close contact
with the dispossessed infuriated Kafirs on the one side, and the un¬
protected, at least badly protected, discontented colonists on the
other.
It is in my humble opinion self-evident that t<» keep the peace
between the Kafirs and their late slaves under such circumstances,
without an overwhelming force, was just as possible as it would be in
the north of this island if some hundreds of thousands of Russian
serfs were placed in possession of the lowlands of Scotland, and the
proprietors of the soil driven and squeezed up into the highlands.
All the said Kafirs and Fingoes, besides many thousands of Tam-
bookies, with whom we had never had a quarrel, were incorporated
with the colony, and made British subjects; but although it was
said that all was peace and contentment, these happy British subjects
were ruled by martial law under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel
(now Sir H.) Smith. This was the D'Urban system.
Now let the Committee, in the first place, call for the strictures
passed upon this system by Mr. Justice Menzies, long before it was
known what the Home Government would think of it.
However this system was in force when I reached the colony as
Lieutenant-governor, and my orders were to administer the law as it
then stood until I should receive further instructions, which were to
be conveyed to me as soon as Lord Glenelg should have received
from Sir B. B'Urban the final report, for which his Lordship had
applied to his Excellency by despatch of the 26th December 1835.
(Vide Blue Book of the 30th May 1836, page 118.)
In compliance with this order I left Cape Town on the 17th
August 1836, with the positive understanding between myself and
Sir B.D'Urban that I should carry on his system until the receipt of
the said final instructions (vide Blue Book of 12th July 1837, page
28); but I had not proceeded 50 miles on my journey »hen Sir
B. D'U rban, without reference either to Lord Glenelg or me, abolished
his system by repealing martial law, and extending the jurisdiction
of the civil courts over some 150,000 barbarians, the greatest propor¬
tion of whom he had proclaimed "irreclaimable savages." (Vide
Proclamation, 18th August 1836.)
The D'Urban system, without martial law, was, of course, like the
British Constitution without Parliament ; accordingly on my reach?
ing King William's Town, Colonel Smith asked me how I was to
"eat up" a Kafir according to Blackstone, Mr. Stretch, a great
friend and strong supporter of Sir B. D'Urban, said, " The sooner we
0.63. 113 pack
503
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. 3. pack up and walkout of the province the better." Ca|)tain Bain^
likewise a warm admirer of the Governor, officially wrote in much
stronger terms. His words, as sent to Sir IÎ. D'Urban under cover of
my despatch of the 3d November 1836, run thus : " The premature
adoption of the British laws among the Kafir tribes will certainly be
the cause of much bloodshed, turmoil, and never-ending dispute."
These were the very officials who had been the main instruments in
the administration of the D'Urban system; and there was not a man
of sense on either side of the frontier who did not ridicule the idea of
controlling the heterogeneous masses thus jumbled together, by the
intricate forms of the civil law, which could haidly maintain order in
a civilised colony of near two hundred years old.
Títere then is the D'Urban system abolished by its own author, in
defiance of Lord GleneU's order, and of Sir B D'Urbun's engagement
with me. That tlie judges compelled Sir B. D'Urban to abolish that
system shows the inherent vice of the system, but cannot be charged
either against Lord Glenelg or myself, nor does it palliate the
delusions so long fostered as to who really was guilty of the abolition.
Here we have martial law repealed and civil law impossible. Some
150,000 " irreclaimable savages" to be ruled by attorneys and briefs,
by Blackstone and Van der Linden, instead of gunpowder and
bayonet, when our whole army had been unable to prevent witch
burning under the noses of our magistrates, or to obtain the delivery
of a single musket according to agreement.
However, in the midst of this cliaos it was clamorously maintained
that the D'Urban system was working successfully, that the Kafirs
were completely subdued, praying for peace and mercy, that plun¬
dering had altogether ceased, and that on both sides of the frontier
all was peace and contentment; whereas this was so notoriously
contrary to the truth, that in my despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated
11 October 1836, the following passage will be found: "On the
8th instant, he (Colonel Somerset) brought to me, on the Gouappe,
the chief Cobus Congo, who had stated to him, and then repeated to
me, that it had been seriously intend« d to assassinate all the troops
and other white people at the late meeting with Colonel Smitii and
myself at King William's Town, and that the attempt was only pre¬
vented by' Umhala refusing to assist. Pato and Kama gave me the
same information at Fort Peddie on the 10th ; in receiving which,
however, it is necessary to bear in mind that these chiefs are very
jealous of the Gaika tribe." In the same despatch I transmitted a
letter of a missionary, Mr. Boyce, (a great friend of Sir B. D'Urban,
and very much opposed to me,) in which letter, dated 10th October
1836, he informs me that " a large proportion of the (Kafir) popula¬
tion are ready for war, and anxiously expecting orders for its com¬
mencement." What Lieutenant-governor Hare said on this subject,
upon the auihority of Mr. Stretch, the Committee may find in page
183 of ihe Blue Book of the 23d ultimo, and the Kafir chiefs have
repeatedly admitted that they were at the very period, under the
D'Urban system, making extensive preparations for recommencing
the war. As fi.r their being " completely subdued," they insisted
upon it that they had beaten us, and that we had sued for peace ;
and this was in so far proved that we never could compel them to
restore one single article of the booty which they had captured from
■ us.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 503
US. That "plundering had altogether ceased" under the favourite App. No. 3.
system, the Commitlee will likewise find illustrated by the said
laeutenant-governor in the same page 183 of the Blue Book of the
23d ultimo, by this passage : " I have never been amongst the advo¬
cates of that system, nor have I ever regarded it as one calculated to
improve matters on the frontier, or give more security to the farmers'
property than they at present enjoy ; and in this opinion I am fully
borne out by theofficiai returns of Kafir depredations during the eight
months that that favourite system continued inexistence and in full
operation. An authenticated extract by the agent-general from the
returns is herewith transmitted, showing depredations to the amountof
514 head of cattle and 129 horses, from February to September 1836 ;
an amount equal to any since, within the same period, if I except
the depredations of last year by Tola, and for wliich that chief has
been punished."
The following ofiScial documents afford the same species of proof:
1. Extract of my despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated 20 September
1836, running thus : " I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter
addressed by me to the Commandant of Kafraria, on the 17th instant,
and of that officer's reply ; particularly referring, among other matter,
to the numerous depredations which hav? of late taken place, prer
vious to his resuming the general command of the forces in this
division ; which depredations Captain Armstrong represents as ' un¬
precedented since the war.' "
2. Ditto, dated 7 October 1836, where, in transmitting a report
from the Civil Commissioner of Albany, dated 29 September 1836,
I wrote thus: " I take the liberty to call your Excellency's attention
to the following passage of the Civil Commissioner's letter as en¬
closed, viz., ' The losses which have been sustained by the people
since the conclusion of the peace have been felt with peculiar
severity.' This fully corresponds with the complaint of every farmer
who has spoken to me. They positively declare that up to the
present hour there has never been a week's successive tranquillity
since the peace was made; that the Fingoes and Kafirs, since they
have become British subjects, plunder worse than ever tliey did
before the war, and that this state of insecurity is the main cause of
the expatriation now in progress."
Such was the " successful working" of the D'Urban system, and
the " peace and contentment" prevailing under it, when 1 received
Sir B. D'Urban's order, dated 13 October 1836, to carry out Lord
Glenelg's system. 1 took this order to be the "final instructions"
of the King's Government which were to be sent me after the ex¬
planations which had been called for from Sir B. D'Urban. This,
the Committee will find, by Lord Glenelg's despatch to Sir B..
D'Urban, dated 1 May 1837, at page 278 of the Blue Book of
12 July of that year, not to have been the case, for the explanations,
called for were never sent, and consequently the final instructions
could not be framed. In ignorance of this fact, I had no alternative-
but to obey Sir B. D'Urban's orders, one of the necessary (at the
same time most salutary) consequences of which proceeding was the-
0.63. 1 I 4 restoration
5<Í4 APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. ^ restoration to the Ka'fira of ihat part of Kufírland beyond the Ceded
— Territory which had been given to the Fingoes.
If in the midst of the ocean of confusion, anarchy, and disorder
into which ihe frontier was then nlungedy the Gienelg system had
beert established, and something like order created witnout the least
Collision between the masses of combustibles there jumbled together
in active and incessant friction, it would indeed have been a miracle.
Such collisions accordingly did take place between the Kafirs and
Fingoeö. If these collisions were the result of the introdaciion of
the Glene'g systemj and if this introduction was premature, it is clear
that the responsibility lies on the Governor who thus prematurely
introduced it in defiance of the instructions of his superior, as he had
abolished his own system by the repeal of martial law, and not upon
that superior, nor upon his lieutenant, both of whom he misled.
However, my exertions prevented the said collisions from leading to
that renewal of the war which was so anxiously desired by those who
had so lately scrambled for half a million of British money, and hoped
to see another half million squandered; this I prevented. The Kafirs
were quite prepared for the wat, which we were not. Our most
efficient forces Were discontented and irritated, great number of them
emigrating beyond the Orange River. Of those remaining, not one
hundred would at that time have taker! the field. The regular troops
were not sufficient even for defertce, and the auxiliary forces having
beert detained in military service against their will after the white
burghers had been dismissed to their homes, were in ä state bordering
on open mutiny. The war for which the Kafirs had been long pre¬
paring would conseqiiently have annihilated the Fingoes, and com¬
pleted the ruin of the colony which had been partially accomplished,
whilst it would have enriched a few. My proceedings in this crisis
were fully approved of by the Supreme Government, as the Com¬
mittee will find in pages 256, 257, and 258 of the Blue Book of the
23d ultimo ; and 1 see by page 262 of the same book, that Lord
Normanby declares that I retired " from.the service in possession of
the cordial approbation and esteem of the Government under which
1 had acted." I may be allowed to add, that upon no official act of
my life do I look back with more satisfaction than upon having pre¬
vented the war which was imminent at the period referred to. Peace
at that moment gave time for the consolidation of the Glenelg system,
which worked successfully for two years at least, as has been shown
before this Committee, and which, if strictly adhered to, would, I
conscientiously believe, have saved this country a few millions of
money, and prevented all the bloodshed and crimes which have
befallen the Cape frontier for the last five years. The D'Urban
system has been in operation once more, and has, as an inevitable
consequence, produced a war which will require at least another
million from the British Exchequer, besides drawing into the same
vortex of slaughter and misery every tribe along our frontier. Nor
will the ruinous expense cease when the war is concluded. It will
take 5,000 troops at least, for a long period, to maintain anything
like even partial tranquillity; and unless some Just and equitable
system for the influencing of the native tribes by means of their chiefs
be resorted to (whethet our frontier be the Key, the Fish, or the
Sunday River), our only alternative will be exterminatluti, which
will
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 505
will be no less honourable than economical to this great nation. App. No.
1 repeat it, South Africa will be to England what Algiers is to —
France.
I now come to a third point, about which the Committee appeared
to roe to be peculiarly solicitous; viz., the cause of the emigration of
the boors subsequent to the war of 1836. After stating the true
causes in my evidence, I gave, as I now again give, the most direct
denial to tlie assertion that the Glenelg system did in the remotest
degree produce, increase, or accelerate that emigration. First, it was
pretended that rumours of the intended reversal of tlie D'Urban
system had produced emigration, and next, that the restoration of
the Adelaide province to the Kafirs was the cause; and some
addresses were scraped together from factious and ignorant men to
give some likelihood to these assertions. I proceed to prove both
assertions 10 be utterly unfounded, mainly by Sir B. D'Urban's own
documents.
It is quite notorious that long before anything was known in the
colony of Lord Glenelg or his views, whole clans and neighbourhoods
were beginning to sell off and move ; and it is equally notorious that
the boors were perfectly indifferent about the Adelaide province;
that they openly declared that they would not live in it; that they
went away expressly to get rid both of the English Government and
of the Kafirs, and that they would seek land towards the north,
beyond the Orange River.
As early as the 16th October 1835, within one month after the
D'Urban treaties, thus long before the Home Government as much
as knew of these treaties and the system founded thereon, such was
the state of excitement and discontent among the boors that an influ¬
ential military officer was sent to try to pacify them, as appears by
page 246 of the Blue Book of the I2th July 1837.
Before the 13th August 1836 (about four months before the intro'-
duction of the Glenelg system), the said excitement and discontent
had risen to such a pitch, atid emigration was going on at such a
rate, that the Attorney-general of the colony was appealed to by Sir
B. D'Urban, and gave it as his opinion that the emigrating boors
" evidently mean to seek their fortunes in another land, and to con¬
sider themselves no longer British subjects, so far as the colony of
the Cape of Good Hope is considered ; would it therefore be prudent
or just, even if it were possible, to prevent persons discontented with
their condition to try to better themselves in whatever part of the
world they please ? The same sort of removal takes place every day
from Great Britain to the United States." And farther on, " Is there
any efiectual means of arresting persons deiermiued to run away,
short of sho >ting them as they pass the boundary line ? I apprehend
not ; and if so, the remedy is worse than the disease ; the Government,
therefore, if I am correct in my conclusions, is and must ever remain
without the power of effectually preventing the evil, if evil it be."
The unfortunate Retief was named by one of the honourable Mem¬
bers of the Committee. With reference to him I need only quote
the following passage of my despatch to Sir B. D'Urban, dated 27tli
September 1836 s " Ptevious to my leaving Balfour, the Field-
commandant, Fret Relief, met me and informed me that a number of
inhabitants of his division had made up their minds to emigrate from
the
5o6
APPENDIX TO REPORT FROM THE
App. No. 3. ihe colony, but were w avering in hopes of a change in the present
state of affairs. Their grievances he represented to be, that the
country was swarming with armed blacks of all sorts, as Fingoes,
JVIantatees, Tambookies, Kafirs, &c. ; that by these they were every
day plundered of the little left them or acquired by them after the
war ; that the present frontier system afforded no prospect of protec¬
tion for the future, and that they lost all hopes of being compensated
for their losses." This same Relief told me on a subsequent occasion
when I rebuked him for keeping up agitation, that it was impossible
to submit to the actual state of things; that peace had been begged
of and made with the Kafirs, leaving them in full possession of the
property plundered from the colonists ; that even in violation of a
positive published pledge that the treaty should not be ratified before
the Kafirs had surrendered all the fire-arms in their possession, the
ratification had taken place without any, the least, such surrender,
and that therefore he was determined to collect a force and go and
take said property and fire-arms from the Kafirs, in defiance of the
peace and the tr aty. My warning to him nied not be repeated here,
but he soon after wrote to Captain Armstrong two lett« rs, dated 9th
and 12th October 1836, containing similar threats. These letters
were transmitted by Captain Armstrong to the Commandant of Kaf-
fraria, who handed them to me, complaining that Relief " was making
himself extremely troublesome." Vide my despatch to the Governor,
dated 20th March 1837.
Moreover, the following facts, taken from a Graham's Town paper,
I pledge myself to prove, viz.: "In the statement of grievances
laid before the local authorities by Mr. Relief, there is no allusion
whatever to any supposed, rumoured, or contemplated change of
frontier policy. The numerous body of farmers whose grievances he
enumerated had not heard of any. The grievances under which they
laboured were not theoretical, prospective, or speculative, but real,
direct, and positive evils."
There then, I suppose, is an end of the long encouraged and oft
repealed fraud that the Glenelg measures either produced or in the
least increased the boor emigration ; and I may close this point with
ol serving that the impartial part ol mankind will judge whether,
after the above opinion of the attorney-general, publicly proclaimed
by the Governor and Lieutenant-governor of that day, and after the
assurance given the emigrants by the present Governor, Sir H. Smith,
that unless a majority of at least four out of five should volunteer to
submit to British rule, they should not be interfered with,—the treat¬
ment which these men have since received as "rebels and as
traitors" be fair and honourable, and whether a refusal of the oft-
demanded investigation of their case be consistent with Englishmen's
ideas of justice.
On other matters I can afford to be brief ; it is only necessary to
refer to the dales of my letters in the Colonial Office in Downing-
street. By my communications of the l.^th November 1847, 12th
February 1848, 21st February 1848, 10th June 1848, 26th August
1848, (three of the same date,) 9th October 1848, 15th May 1849,
22nd May 1849, 1st August 1849, and 11th August 1849, I was, by
the force of circumstances, compelled to make representations to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, relative to certain transactions
connected
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE KAFIR TRIBES. 507
connected with the political state of South Africa and the frontier App. No. 3.
tribes. I was reluctantly drawn from my retirement in private life
into these disagrerable controversies; but I have duiies towards my
Sovereign and the land of my birth, where I have every farthing of
my property in jeopardy. 1 had consequently a right to complain
and appeal, and from a public duty I have never shrunk. I am
thoroughly convinced that if the said representations had been
inquired into, if redress had been given and justice had been done,
the calamities which have since befallen my unfortunate country
would have been prevented, and the Briti.sh exchequer might have
saved a million or two to facilitate the reduction of taxes. I was
informed that the Secretary of State was determined " not to assist
in the continuance of a controversy «hich can only be injurious to
the public intele^ts." A public invesngation which might have saved
South Africa was thus contemptuously refuseil, whereas I have
lately been informi d that secret and underhand evidence was collected
at the Cape, militating against my statements, and forwarded to
Downing-street without the slightest notice or reference to myself.
On such dealings my sentiments are known, and what the character
of the said secret and underhand evidence may be can be imagined
from the malicious calumny which appears in page 126 of the Blue
Book of the 20th March 1851, where the Cape secretary to Govern¬
ment accuses the " farmers, principally the Dutch," with " determined
and dogged inactivity whereas everything effectual that has been
as yet done against the enemy has been accomplished by these very
farmers, whose "inactivity," if it had existed, would have been easily
accounted for by the unredressed ill-treatment which they received
during the former war, and whose loyal zeal to assist in the struggle
was restrained by the very Government which now goads them bv
slander, and did not shrink from patroni.sing and encouraging the
most infamous and disgraceful libels against some of the most loyal
of Her Majesty's subjects, amongst w hich was not the least, ttiat I
had used my influence to prevent the boors from taking the field.
Similar calomnies indeed swarm in some of the late Hlue Books, of
which even the Prime Minister of England condescended to avail
him>elf in an attack which he made m the House of Commons upon
four men who believe they did their duty in resisting despotism and
jobbing. I hope, theiefore, and pray most fervently, that the present
Committee, on whose proceedings the fate of millions may depend,
will be the means of dragging to light the above documents, public
as w ell as secret and underhand, or at least of causing the investiga¬
tion here begun to be continued there, where so many witnesses
must be heard, if indeerl truth be tlie object; where not only the
Englisiiman and the Dutchman, hut the llotientoi and the Griqua,
the Kafir and the Tambookie, the Bassuto and the Coranna, the
emigrant and the resident, may be heard in his own defence.
I conclude with a brief reference to some questions pressed by the
C.>lonial Under-Secretary, as to my opinion of the failings of the Cape
colonists with reference to the aboriginal tribes ; and I deliberately
stale, with appeal to my evidence before the Committee of 1835 and
1836, that I believe the Cape comniunitVi like a'l others, to be com¬
posed of good and bad; that iheie are men there as bad as bad can
be, who would with heart and soul hail a mandate for extermination,
»and rejoice in war as long as it is profitaole to themselves; but these
numerically
5o8 appendix to report on kafir tribes.
App. No. 3. numerically constitute an insignificant fraction. The great body of
Majesty's Cape subjects are, as I have repeatedly said, under
wise rule, " the best disposed and easiest managed" people in Her
dominions, and would cordially support any humane, politic system
that would secure peace and civilization to themselves and their sable
ft'llow subjects and neighbours; in fact, they know it to be their
interest. Where 10 make their fortunes by war, 10,000 suflFer in
some shape or other; and I have long felt convinced that if the said
colonists had had the control over public affairs by means of free
institutions, the mere publicity of truth, and exposure of falsehood,
would have prevented the deplorable condition of South Africa, which
we are now so deeply lamenting,
I have, &e.
(signed) A. Stockenstrom.
ANALYSIS
C 509 3
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
A1.phabetical and Classified LIST of the Principal Headiugs in the following
Index, with the Pagii^ at which they will be respectively found.
ABORIGINES -
Auatola Moüntains:
1, Jmportance of the Ama-
tolas being cleared of
the Kafir tribes as a
means of finishing the
mar -
2. Impracticability of clear
in g the Amatóla moun¬
tains, and making them
iheboundarytfihefron
tier -
Buffalo river -
Bush fighting -
Roads -
B rharity
Bheels - - -
Khandeish province
Biddulph, Mr.
Kat river settlement,
Magistrates, 1
Timber tax
Blinkwater
Boers - - -
Commaiido system, 1
"Defence of the frontier
Disaffection
Emigration
PAGE.
ßom—continued.
PAGE.
517
Griçuas, 2 - - -
- 551
Military force, 2 -
- 566
Representative government
- 587
f*
Border tribes - - - -
- 526
Boundaries - - -
- 526
521
Frontier tribes
- 549
Boundaries - - . -
- 526
Amatóla mountains -
- 621
Buffalo river - - »
- 526
521
Colonial offce - - -
- 63«
526
Frontier boundary -
- 549
527
Kei river -
- 558
588
Keiskamrna . . •
- 559
622
Neutral territory
- 673
522
Buffalo river - - .
- 526
560
Bushmen - . . .
- 527
522
Cape Corps - - - -
- 527
556
Hottentots ...
- 553
562
Cattle stealing ...
- 528
603
Chiefs, 2 . - .
- 529
525
525
Commando system, 1
- 533
Servants ...
- 589
533
Ceded territory ...
- 528
536
Boundaries ...
- 526
537
Cattle stealing
- 528
538
Kat river settlement, 1
- 556
510
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
page.
Chiefs ;
1. Generally - - - 5^9
2. Complaints of the ch efs
as to their being held
responsible Jbr the
depredations of their
tribes - - - 5^9
3. How Jar the diminished
influence (J the chijs
has led to their inciting
the people to war - 530
4. Recommendation that the
chiefs shouldberemoved,
and other authorities
appointed in their stead 530
5. Extent to which the autho-
rity ijthe chiefs should
be upheld - - - 530
Cattle stealing ... 528
Ceded territory ... 528
Civil commissioners - - - 53^
Cotton cultivation - - - 535
Depredations - - - "536
Government grants - - - 550
Kajr wars, 1.4 - - - 554
Kei river - 558
Kreli, Chief - - - 560
Local government - - - 561
Missionaries, 2. 4 - - - s6g
Moshesh - _ , - ¿¡70
Policy of the government, 2 - 578
Rights of property - - - ¿88
Superstition - . - . 602
Treaties- - - - 604
Wandering tribes ... 606
Zoolus ----- 607
Civil Commissioners - - " 53t
Chiefs, 5 .... ¿30
Magistrates .... ¿(>2
Civilization :
1. How far the efforts of
the missionaries have
been succesfvl in civili¬
zing the Kafirs - - 531
Civilization—continued. page.
2. Opinions that their civili¬
zation is impracticable - 53'^
Chiefs, 4 - 530
Depredations - - - - 53G
Griquas - - - - -55^
Climate - - - - -532
Natal - 573
Colonists •V - - 532
Commando system, 1 - - 533
Compensation - - - - 535
Constitutional government - 535
Europeans - 539
Kafir Wars, 5 - - - 556
Kat iver settlement, 4 - - 558
Neutral territory ... ¿73
Treaties, 2 - - - - 605
Coloured races ... - 53.2
Europeans .... ¿39
Griquas ... - - 551
Kat river settlement, 4 - - 558
Magistrates, 2 ... ¿63
Commando System:
1. Opinions in favour of the
commando system ; hov3
far expedient to revive
it - • - - 533
2. Objections to the com¬
mando system - - 534
K'fir wars, 1 ... ¿¿4
Patrol system .... 577
Commission of inquiry - - - 534
Griquas, 3 - - - - 551
Constitutional government - - 535'
Commission of inquiry - - ¿34.
Legislative assembly - - - 561
Representative government - 587
Cultivation .... - ^36
Tenure of land ... qq2
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
511
PAGE.
Defence of the frontier - - - 536
Boers - - • - - 525
British troopi - - . - 526
Expenditure - - - - 540
Fish river . - - - 544
Forts ----- 544
Frontier boundary - - - 549
Kat river settlement - - 556
Kei river, 1 - - - - 558
Military colonies - - - 566
Military force - - - 566
Military posts - - - - 567
Patrol system - - - - 577
Representative government, 1. 2 587
Seai tyf government - - 589
Treaties, 2 - - - - 605
Western frontier - - - 606
Depredations ----- 536
Cerfcd territory - - - 538
Chiefs ----- 529
Commando system, 1.2 - - 533
Aii^r xcars, 1 - - - - 554
Military force, 2 - - - 566
Patrol system - - - - 577
Plunder ----- 577
Treaties, 1 - - - - 604
Zoolus ----- 607
Disaffection ----- 537
Ca/je Mounted Rifles - - 527
Commission of inquiry - - 534
Compensation - - - - 535
Hottentots - - - - 553
/Caí noer settlement, 2. 3 - 557
Magistrates, I - - - 562
Missionaries, 4 - - - 569
Division of the colony - - - 538
Seai o/" government - - 589
D' Urban, Sir Benjamin - - - 538
Fingoes ----- 543
A« river, l - - - . 558
PAGE.
Emigration - - - -
- 538
Bocri - - - -
- 5^5
Encroachments - - -
- 539
Griquas - - - -
- 551
Kreli, Chief - - -
- 560
Retro-cession of territory-
- 587
Surveys - - - -
- 60a
Europeans - - - -
- 539
Ca;7e Coraje - - -
- 527
Cattle stealing
- 528
Coloured races
- 532
Jealousy - - - -
- 554
Xai river settlement
- 556
Magistrates, 2 - -
- 563
Expenditure - - - -
- 540
legislative assembly
- 561
Military force, 2 -
- 566
Revenue and expenditure -
- 588
Fingoes - - - .
- 543
Europeans - - »
- 539
Missionaries, 1 - -
- 568
Fire-arms -
- 543
Assagais - - -
- 52a
Gunpowder - - -
- 552
Traders - - - .
- 603
i^iiÄ river - - - -
- 544
Boundaries - - -
- 526
Commando system, 2
- 534
Aei river, 1 - - .
- 558
Keiskamma - - •
- 559
jForii - - - - .
- 544
Keiskamma - - -
- 559
Military force, 2 -
- 566
Frontier boundary - - .
- 549
Amatóla mountains -
- 521
Boundaries - - -
- 526
Buffalo river - - .
- 526
Defence (f thefrontier
- 536
Division of the colony
- 538
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
Frontier boundary—continued.
PAGE.
Fish river . - - -
544
Kafir wars - . . .
554
Kei rixer ....
558
Keiskamma - - - -
559
Military colonies ...
566
Military force - - -
566
Military law - - - -
567
Military posts - - - -
567
Military villages - - -
568
Heutral territory -
673
Open frontier - - - -
574
Patrol system - - - -
577
Plunder - - - - -
577
Tambookiefrontier - - -
602
Western frontier - - .
606
Caila tribes - - - - -
550
Chiefs, 2 - . - .
529
Europeans - - - -
539
Çlenelg, Lord -
550
Defence of the frontier
536
Treaties, 1 - - - -
604
CBIQUAS :
I. Generally -
551
2. Complaints of the Griq.uas
of being dispossessed of
their territory -
551
3. Opinions that compensa¬
tion should be made to
thtrn „ - .
551
Missionaries, 1 ...
568
Treaties, 2 - - - -
605
Çhinpowder - - - - -
553
Fire-arms - . . _
543
Traders - - - - -
C03
Hottentots - - - - -
553
Aborigines - . . .
517
Cqpe Corps - - - .
527
Cape Mounted Rifles • •
527
Ceded territory - - -
528
Compensation -
535
Hottentots—continued.
PAGE.
Disaffection
- 537
Europeans
- 539
Gaika tribes - -
- 550
Grants of land
- 55»
Kafir wars, 3
- 655
Kat river settlement
- 556
Magistrates, I
- 562
Missionaries, 1
- 568
Rations -
- 580
Tenure qf land
- 6u2
Treachery
- 604
Incursions of territory
- 553
Military posts
- 567
Juries - - - -
- 554
KjfiJi Wars :
1. Explanation as tothe cause
of the war of ' 554.
2. Evidence as to the cause
of the outbreak in 1846 555
3. -Circumstances which may
be alleged to have led to
the present war - - 555
4. Opinions that no other
course can now be pur¬
sued than that of pro¬
secuting the war with
the sitmost rigour and
entirely subduing the
Kafirs - - - 555
5. How fur the feeling of the
colonists is against a
war - - - - 556
British power - - - - 526
Chiefs, 3 - 530
Coloured races ... 532
Commando system, I - - 533
Commission of inquiry « 534
Constitutiona government - 535
Defection - . . ^36
Depredations . . .
Disaffection . . .
Encroachments - . . ron
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
613
Kafir Wars—continued. page.
Expenditure - - - - 540
Hottentots - 5.5,3
Kat river settlement, 2 - - 557
Military force ... 566
Missionaries, 1. 4 - - - 5^)8
Neutral territory - - - 573
Police ..... 577
Regular troops - • - 580
Sandilli, Chief - - .588
Surveys ..... 602
Treaties, l . . - . 604
Kat River Settlement :
1. Particulars as to the for¬
mation, extent and po¬
pulation of the settle¬
ment ; character of the
settlers ... 556
2. Complaints of the settlers
(f their losses in the
different viars - - 557
3. Evidence as to the present
disaffection existing in
the settlement • - 558
4. Opinion that it would be
expedient to break up
this settlement - - 558
Biddulph, Mr, . . .522
Ceded territory ... 528
Disaffection .... 537
Europeans - . . . 53g
Gaika tribes .... 550
Hermanus, Chief ... 552
Hottentots .... 553
Juries ..... 554
Kafir wars, 3 - . . . 555
London Missionary Society - 561
Magistrates, 1. 2 . - . 562
Military force, \ - - - 566
Missionaries, 4 - . . 569
Morals ..... 570
Peculation .... 57g
0.63. K
Kat River Settlement—continued, page.
Schools ..... 588
Tenure of land ... 602
Timber tax .... 603
Kei River :
1. Recommendations that the
Kafirs should be driven
across the Kei, and this
river made thefrontier
boundary - 558
2. Objections to the Kei as
the frontier boundary • 559
Amatóla mountains -
- 531
Buffalo river ...
. 526
Civil Commissioners
- 531
D'Urban, Sir Benjamin -
- 538
Frontier boundary -
* 549
Keiskamma ...
- 559
Kreli, Chief ...
- 560
Soil ....
- 594
Wandering tribes
- 606
Keiskamma ....
- 559
Aborigines . . -
- 517
Fish river ...
- 544
Kei river, 1 -
- 558
Somerset, Lord Charles
- 5.94
Khandeish province
- 560
Bheels ....
- 522
Kreli, Chief ....
. 560
H Urban, Sir Benjamin -
- 538
Legislative assembly
- 561
Local government ...
- 561
London Missionary Society
- 561
Missionaries, !..
- 568
Schools - • .
- 588
Useful arts ...
. 606
Magistrates :
1. Complaints of the Kat
river settlers of the con¬
duct of former magis¬
trates ... ^62
K
6H
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
Magistrates—continued. fags.
2. Hoi» for expedient to
appoint native magis¬
trates ... 563
3. Observations relative to
the magistrates of Na¬
tal - - - - 563
Biddulph, Mr. - _ - 522
Chiefs, 4. 5 - - - - 530
Civil appointments - - - 531
Civil Commissioners - - 531
Military Force :
1. Insufficiency of the force
in the colony at the pe¬
riod of the recent out¬
break - 566
2. Necessity for the mainte¬
nance of a large mili¬
tary force on the fron¬
tier - 566
3. Hofw far the colony itsdf
mould he able to bear
the expense of such
force - 567
Buffalo river - - - - 526
Cape Corps - - - 527
Civil commissioners - -531
Commando system, 1 - - 533
Depredations - - - -536
Expenditure - - - - 540
Forts ----- 544
Kafir wars - - - - 554
Kat river settlement - - 556
Kei river, 1.2 - - - 558
Natal 573
Regular troops - - - 580
Rifie brigade - - - - 588
Tambookiefrontier - - - 602
Treaties, 2 - - - - 605
Zoolus ----- 607
Military posts - 5^7
Amatóla mountains, 1 - - 521
Forts ----- 544
King William's Town - 560
page.
Missionaries :
1. Generally - - - 568
2. Advantages and benefits
derivedfrom the labours
of the misssionaries - 569
3. Opinion that the progress
made by the missionaries
has not been great - 569
4. Exertions made by them
to repress the spirit of
rebellion - 569
6. Inexpediency <f any po¬
litical communication
between the Government
and the missionaries - 470
Barbarity - - - - 522
Chiefs, 4 - - - - 530
Christianity - - - - 531
Civilization, I • - - - 531
Commission of inquiiy - - 534
Gunpowder - 552
Hottentots - - - - 553
Late apprentices - - - 5^6
London Missionary Society - 561
Policy of the Government - - 578
Politics - - - - - 579
Shiloh - - - - - 589
Traders ----- 603
Natal 573
Boers ----- 525
Kei river, l - - - - 558
Policy of the Government, 3 - 579
Zoolus ----- 607
Neutral territory - - - - 573
Boundaries - - - - 526
Ceded territory - - - ¿28
Commando system, 2 - - 534
Frontier boundary - - -
Treaties, 2 - - - - 605
Patrol system ----- 577
Commando system - - - 333
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
515
Plunder - .
Cattle stealing ...
Chiefs, 2 - - - -
Commando system, 1 - -
Military posts ...
Shiloh . ... .
Policy of the Goveenment ;
1. Démotivé nature of the
past and present policy
pursued by the British
Government ; difficul.
ties of suggesting any
practical measures on
the subject
2. Suggestions as to the most
expedient and practica,
ble policy for the British
Government to pursue
in reference to the fron¬
tier tribes - - -
PAGE.
■ 577
• 528
■ 529
■ 533
• 567
■ 589
578
578
3. Opinions that a system of
conciliatory policy might
be pursued with success 5'jg
Bheels ..... ¿¿a
Border tribes .... 526
Ceded territory ... 528
Chiefs, 3 .... 530
Commission of inquiry - - 534
Constitutional government . 535
Division (fthe colony . - 538
D' Urban, Sir Benjamin - - 538
Glenelg, Lord - 550
Kafr wars, 4 - - - - 555
Magistrates - - - - 562
Patrol system ... 577
Special commissioner - - 595
Treaties ... - 604
Zoolus . ... . 607
Population - ... . 579
Printed papers - - - 580
PAGE.
Representative Government:
1. Opinions in favour of a
representative govern¬
ment for the colony
2. Objections thereto
Division of the colony
Legislative Assembly
Retro-cession if territory ...
D' Urban, Sir Benjamin -
Territory -
Rights of property . - . -
SandiUi, Chief ....
Surveys .....
Seat of government ...
Shiloh ......
Smith, Sir Harry - - - -
D fence f thefrontier^ -
Griquas, 2 - - - -
Juries .....
Policy of the government -
Special commissioner ...
Stockenstrom, Sir A. - - .
Frontier boundary ...
Printed papers ...
Treaties, \ ... .
587
587
538
561
587
538
603
588
588
602
589
589
593
536
55«
554
578
595
602
549
580
604
Surveys 602
Tenure (f land .... 602
R'ghts of property ... ¿88
Territory - 603
Boundaries - - - . ¿26
Ceded territory ... 528
Chiefs, 1 .... 229
Fish river ....
Frontier boundary ...
Neutral territory ... ¿173
Retro-cession of territory . . ¿87
5I6
ANALYSIS OF INDEX.
Timber tax
Traders
Cultivation
Fire-arms
Itinerant traders
Treaeheuj
PAGE.
- 603
- 603
- 536
- 543
- 554
- 604
Treaties :
1. Opinion that the Kafir
wars have been brought
about by our breaking
our treaties with the
chiefs - 604
2. Evidence showing that no
reliance can be placed
upon treaties with the
Kaßr chiefs - - 605
Treaties—continued. page.
3. Suggestions as to the only
mode in which a satis¬
factory treaty can be
entered into between the
British Government and
the chiefs - - - 605
Civilization, 1 ... 531
D fence of the frontier - - 53^
Emigration - - - - 538
Glenelg, Lo/d - - - - 550
Griguas, 2 - - - - 551
Kreli, Chief - - - - 560
Military chief - - - - 566
Useful aits ----- 606
Wandet ing tribes - - - - 606
Zoolus ------ 607
Natal 575
Population - - - - 57g
[ 517 1
INDEX.
—In this Index, the Figures following the Names of the Witnesses refer to the
Questions of the Evidence, and those following App. to the Page of the Appendix.]
A.
ABORIGINES. Witness would say tliat the Hottentots were the aborigines
of the country from the Keiskanima to about 40 miles to the eastward; but
they have since amalgamated with the Kafirs, A. Smith, 20.53, 2057.
Adamson,Rev. J fîmes, d. 0. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has resided in the colony
of the Cape about 23 years in charge of religious concerns chiefly, and for
the last 12 years has had almost the sole direction of the college, 600-662
Witness has not visited the missionary stations extensively, but has had much
correspondence with missionaries travelling the country, 663, 664 Opinion
that the labours of the missionaries at the Cape have been highly advantageous
atid beneficial to the colony, 665 et seq Beneficial effeci of the missionary
labours with regard to the late apprentices, 667 The general effect of the
missionary labours at the Cape has been considerably to advance the natives
in moral qualifications and in civilization, 667, 668 Nature of the opposi¬
tion between the missionaries and the traders; the traders supplying the
natives vvitii articles, such as biandy and gunpowder, which the missionaries
wish to prevent their being supplied with, 669-671. 714-728 Although
gunpowder is prohibited from being exported, large quantities find their way
into the interior, where it is an article in great demand, 672.
Witness is unable to give a decisive opinion as to the cause of the late out¬
break among the Kafirs ; reference to a letter from a missionary at Union
Dale station in the centre of the Amatóla mountains who makes allusions to
the commencement of the outbreak, 673, 674 Witness considers that the
political system now pursued by the British Government towards the native
tribes is defective, inasmuch as there has been a great tendency to take the
lands of the natives, which has had the effect of driving them before an
advance, and cooping them up in places not suitable to afford them the means
of support, and ol course keeping them in a somewhat dissatisfied and dis¬
contented state, 67.5-678 Details relative to the boundary and nature of
the frontier of the Cape colony, and the various tribes inhabiting the districts
across the frontier, 680.
Existence of extensive coal fields in tiie northern sovrreigniy ; imporiance of
this circumstance, which may ultimately become of great economic value 680
0.63. L L —
A D A M ö o N.
Report, 1851—continued.
Adamson, Rev. James, n.n. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
—In regard to the general policy, one of the principles which ought to be
adopted in all the transactions with the natives, would be to give them abso¬
lute security that in no cases should the possession of their land be interfered
with, 680 Even in cases of warfare, the eíFects of the warfare should be
considered as having an influence on the station of the chiefs alone, and not
of the people who have been under their direction, 680 It would be very
preferable that the lands should be preserved absolutely for the support of
the natives, 680 It appears to witness, that it would be almost necessary
for the advancement of civilization, that the native chiefs should be got rid
of or reduced as quickly as possible, and that some other authorities of better
character should be substituted in their piase, 680-682.
Evidence relative to the mode in which witness would recommend that
this plan should be carried out; great advantages which would result there¬
from, 683-697 Opinion that the formation of treaties with the Kafir chiefs
has been a great error; treaties are not advisable in respect to a people
situated as the Kafirs are, from the circumstance thai the chiefs cannot be
responsible to any very great extent, 686, 687 The native chiefs should
not be interfered with while they remain at peace, but in the event of war
they should be removed from their authority, 690.696, 697 It is advisable
as soon as possible to ascertain and put on record the rights of the chiefs and
people, in order to bring them as much as possible under the jurisdiction of
our courts, so that there should be real property rights, 690-693.
State of feeling of the chiefs in relation to each other, as to their territories
and tribes; constant state of internal dissention existing, 698 Statement as to
the number and denominations of mi^sionaries distributed over the Cape colony
and its boundaries, 699-702 The missionaries are looked on favourably by
the natives, and received with kindness ; and their influence extends very
far beyond the stations which they occupy, 703, 704 -There is every reason
to be satisfied with the progress of missionary labour in South Africa, 705-
708.
The witness's plan for removing the native chiefs, and appointing magis¬
trates to their authority, he had no idea as to the missionaries taking any part
or interest in the matter, 709 Opinion that missionary influence must be
kept perfectly distinct from government and magistrate influence, 709-713
Witness does not believe that the missionaries at their stations deal in
fire-arms and powder ; they have^stores for supplying the natives with goods,
articles of clothing, &c., their object being to exclude the travelling trade, 718-
723 Witness does not think that any exertions of the missionaries would
have the effect of preventing the natives getting gunpowder, as it has become
almost necessary to their existence, 725-728 Remarks relative to the pro¬
gress made by the missionaries among the Kafirs in Kafirland ; witness does
not think that the progress among the Kafirs, as a whole, has been great, 729,
730-
[Second Examination.] Evidence relative to the nature of the duties
imposed upon missionaries at the various stations, 1011 The missionary in¬
fluence has been generally extensively used in inducing the native population to
lesorttoagricultuial or industrial pursuits, 1011-1029——Circumstances which
led
ADA
ALE
519
Report, 1851—continued.
Adamsoti, Rev. James, d.d. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
led to the fornaation of the Kat River settlement ; Government aid granted to
the settlers ; unfavourable reports as to the industry and character of the
people there, 1030-1045 Opinion that at present it is scarcely possible
to dispense with the aid given by Government to the missionary stations,
1038 Remarks relative to the aid granted by Government to the missions
to the late apprentices ; manner in which it is applied, 1038,1039 Evidence
I as to the general good climate and fertility of the soil ofKafii land ; the country
is more fertile than any portion of the Cape colony proper, 1046-1049.
The Kafirs are generally without any belief in a future state; the mission¬
aries have not been very successful in point of numbers in inducing Kafirs to
embrace Christianity, 1050-1052 Extent of the population of the Cape
colony; districts into which the colony is divided, 1053-1060 Considerable
poriion of the population of Kafirhmd who are not under the authority of any
particular chief; they are a wandering tribe, now attached to one chief, and
now another, 1061-1065 Objections to the removal of the Kafir tribes
beyond the Kei, as proposed by Major Bissett, 1066-1071 Great dread
on the part of the Kafirs that the whites will dispossess them of their terri¬
tories ; how far the present war is to be traced to this feeling, 1072-1074
Dispossessing the Gaika tribes of their territory would tend greatly to increase
this dread of the whites, 1075.
It is witness's opinion that driving the Kafirs out of their own country
across the Kei would only remove the. evil for a short lime, and would not
tend to bring about the desired result, 1076-1087 Further remarks
relative to the extensive coal fields in one of the border districts, 1088
Attempts which have been made by the missionaries to introduce arts and
manufactures among the tribes ; they have only succeeded as to agricul¬
ture, 1089, 1090 The Gaikas are included among the Kafirs; their cattle
has been captured to a considerable extent, 1092-1094 There would be
no difficulty in driving the Kafirs from their country across the Kei, provided
the Government was determined to do it, 1094-noo Remarks relative to
the great pride taken by the Kafir chiefs in their possession of large herds of
cattle, 1101-1105 The Kafirs do not place any value upon the rights of
property in the land ; they rove from place to place in search of pasturage,
1106-1112 The Kafirs have a great objection to being dispossessed of
their land; they are strongly attached to the places of their birth, 1112,
1113.
Agents, See Military Officers.
Agriculture. See Climate. Natal. Useful Arts.
Alexander, Major Sir James Edward, a.d.c. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was
on the staff of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, at the Cape of Good Hope, in 1835 ;
was in the colony from 1835 to 1838 ; 2660-2662 Opinion that the causes
which led to the outbreak of the Kafir war, in 1835, were the smallness of our
military force, the depredations of the Kafirs, and the abolition of the old
system of defence called the commando system, 2663-2668 Course taken
by the Government with a view to obtain redress from the Kafir chiefs before
war was proclaimed in 1835; 2669-2682—^—Enormous extent to which the
0-Ö3' n L 2 depredations
o20
ALEXANDËR.
Report, 1851 —continued.
Alexander, Mqjor Sir J. Edward, a.d.c. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued,
depredations of the chiefs were carried on, and great number of murders com¬
mitted by them, previous to the proclamation of war against the Kafirs in
^835; 2073-2688 V/itness does not consider that there is any necessity
for entering into the consideration of the defence of the western frontier at
the present moment, 2689-2691 The country about King William's Town
is more open and better adapted for the movement of troops than that on
the frontier of the Keiskamma, therefore for a military purpose witness would
prefer pushing the poits as far as King William's Town, 2692-2699.
Remarks relative to the tribes inhabiting the Amatóla mountains ; it would
be exceedingly difficult to clear tliem out, and keep ihem out of those moun¬
tains, 2700-2703. 2708 Opinion that it would be very unsafe to drive the
Kafirs across the Kei as long as we have Natal, because, if driven in that
direction, they might attack the flourishing settlement of Natal, 2704-2709.
2830-2844 Necessity for the frontier beingidefended by means of posts and
military colonies, 2710-2714 Importance of the formation of roads in the
Amatóla mountains, and the establishment of a military post, 2714-2716
Opinion that treaties with the Kafirs would not prevent their committing
depredations; it is only the strong hand of military power that could prevent
that, 2717-2719. 2807, 2808 It is possible that the Kafirs might be
civilized, so that treaties might be made with them, but it would require ten
years to effect the change in ther habits, 2719, 2720.
Great advantage would result from checking the itinerant traders visiting
Kafirland, and the establishment of fairs for the purpose of trading with the
natives, 2722-2726 Remarks as to the Kat River settlement; it is a very
dangerous post to have people of doubtful fidelity ; opinion that colonists from
this country should have been placed there instead of the Hottentots, 2727-
2732 Too much reliance has been placed upon the Hottentot Cape corps;
the greater proportion of the regiments should be European, a few Hottentots
being attached thereto as guides, 2733-2736 Thriving and flourishing
condition of the froniier under the old commando system ; the result of that
system being done away with was a war, 2737-2743 Suggested establish¬
ment of a system of military colonies along the frontier ; the setilers being pro¬
tected by a military force, 2744-2751 ^Opinion that the best boundary for
our military posts is the Kei; it is preferable to the Great Fish River or the
Keiskamma, 2752-2762.
Evidence relative to the climate, soil, and general agricultural capacity of
the Cape colony and British Kafraria ; it would present a good field for colo¬
nization if attention were paid to irrigation, 2763-2775 Recommendation
that the Indian system of managing the chiefs should be resorted to; it is
worth the trial to induce the natives to plant and cultivate cotton; small pen¬
sions should be conferred upon the chiefs to induce them to resort to industrial
occupations, 2776-2785. 2795. 2805 Success which has generally attended
the etfbits of the missionaries in South Africa; and with the assistance of intelli¬
gent missionaries and schoolmasters it might be possible to civilize the Kafirs,
2785-2791. 2805 The seizure and removal of the leading chiefs who have
been active in the war, whilst the rights of the people were respected, would
facilitate the means of producing industrial pursuits, 2792-2797.
State
ALE AMA
Report, 1851 —continued.
521
Alexander, Major Sir J. Edward, a.d.c. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
State of the Kat River settlement on witness's visit in July 1835 ; idleness
of the Hottentots generally, 2798-2804 The best way to maintain friendly
relations with the people beyond our borders is by an annual mission to them,
and by small presents to the chiefs, and inducing them to visit Cape Town,
and to receive the missionaries and schoolmasters, and also to engage in trade
as much as possible, and to give them a taste fur European habits, 2805
Such a pi m is quite possible, but it has never been fairly tried, 2806
Great inconvenience to the farmers and herdsmen on the frontier, of the rules
in force up to 1838, for the recovery of stolen cattle ; necessity of the farmers
making oath before a magistrate before any proceedings could be taken to re¬
cover the cattle, 2809-2829 The land on the other side of the Kei is of a
very fine and fertile quality; there would be no hardship to the Kafirs in
driving them across that river, 2830-2839 It does nut appear that the
character or conduct of the Kafirs has improved since 1838; they are still
as depredatory and uncivilized, 2844-2846.
Amatóla Mountains :
1. Importance of the Amatólas being cleared of the Kafir Tribes as
a Means of finishing the War.
2. Impracticability of clearing the Amatóla Mountains, and making
them the Boundary of the Frontier.
1. Importance of the Amatólas being cleared of the Kafir Tribes as a
Means of finishing the War :
Opinion that tliere will never be peace for the colony as long as the Kafirs
are allowed to occupy the Amatólas ; they ought to be expelled altogether,
and pushed over the Kei, Bissett 750-769. 780-798. 839. 917-923; Sir G.
T. Napier 1632-1639 The Amatóla ridge might liave a military port upo»
it ; but it is not capable of military defence except by having an open countr_
to the east of it, Bissett 779 How far it would be possible to defend the
chain of the Amatólas by a chain of military posts along the mountains, ib.
839-847 In the event of the Kafirs being driven from the Amatóla district
across the Kei, they would find ample land for pastoral purposes, ib. 889, 890.
933 Opinion that the Kafirs should be driven out of the Amatóla moun¬
tains, and never again be allowed to heid their cattle there, or till the ground,
Owen 2585-2588 Witness conceives it to be quite possible to drive the
Kafirs out of the Amalóla mountains, and maintain that as a froniier freed
from the presence of the Kafirs, Sir P. Maitland 2928-2930.
2. Impracticability of clearing the Amatóla Mountains, and makintr
them the Boundary of the Frontier :
The Amatóla mountains would not form a boundary ; they run at rio-ht
angles through the old and through the new boundary, Sir A. Stockenstrom
^397-1399 If the Amatóla mountains were cleared of the Kafir inhabi¬
tants they would fall back upon us again, as there is no place to drive them to,
where they could exist, ib. 1400-1407 Witness would not recommend the
permanent occupation of the Amatólas ; the Keiskamma would be the better
boundary, Sir G. T. Napier 1632-1639 Witness does not consider it
9-63« L1. ^ practicable
522
AMA
BID
Report, 1851—oantinued.
Amatóla Mountains—continued.
practicable to clear the Amatóla mountains, and preserve the range of moun¬
tains as the frontier, T. C. Smith 2370-2378 Remarks relative to the
tribes inhabiting the Amatol a mountains ; it would be exceedingly diflScult to
clear the Kafirs out and keep them out of those mountains, Sir J. É. Alexander
2700-2703. 2708.
See also Buffalo Rivei\ Bush Fighting, Roads.
Ammunition. See Fire-Arms. Gunpowder.
Apprentices. See Late Apprentices,
Assagais. Those Kafirs who are not armed with guns use the assagais, a kind
of spear, which is a very formidable weapon, Bissett 875-877.
Auckland Village. See Treachery.
B.
Barbarians. See Border Tribes.
Barbarity. The Kafirs never take a prisoner or give quarter ; they slay all that
fall into their hands, Bissett 990 Acts of very great cruelty were exercised
by the Kafirs on the male population at the outbreak of the war ; but the
missionaries were unmolested except in one instance, that of Mr. Niven,
Renton 3106-3112 Evidence as to their barbarous treatment of their pri¬
soners ; they liave of late years been increasingly barbarous to their male
prisoners, but they show lenity to women and children, ib. 3371, 3372. 3469-
3476-
Bassuto Tribe. Observations with respect to the Bassuto tribe, Freeman
257-261.
Bheels. Detail relative to the military operations carried out against the Bheels
by the Indian government in 1819, in order to lestoie ihe tranquillity of
the Khandeish district ; failure of those coercive measures to restore peace
and order, Ovans 1118-1122 On the failure of the military operations
oiders were received from England in 1824 and 1825 to endeavour to in¬
troduce a different, a conciliatory, system, ib. 1123 Appointment of
European ofiBcers as Blieel agents, with full magisterial powers to settle
all the Bheel's disputes ; division of the Khandeish province into districts
for this purpose, ib. 1123-1127 Letter from Colonel C. Ovans to the
Hon. Sir John Malcolm, dated 12 August 1830, giving an account of the
settlements made with the Naiks and Bheels of the districts composing the
Kunur agency of the Khandeish province, App. 489-497.
See also Khandeish Province.
Biddulph, Mr. Observations upon Mr. Biddulph's Report upon the Kat River
settlement, Renton 3144-3155—This report, in which he represented the
inhabitants of the settlement as a worthless and immoral class of people,
excited
íTrifieOt]
BID
BIS
523
Report, 1851—continued.
Biddulph, Mr.—continued.
excited universal indignation throughout the settlement, and was succeeded
by remonstrances, which led to his removal from the settlement, Renton
3144-3147—•—Means witness has of controverting these statements of Mr,
Biddulph, ib. 3148-3155.
See also Kat River Settlement, 1. Magistrates, 1. Timber Tax.
Bissett, Major John Jarvis. (Analysis of his Evidence.) Has resided at the
Cape all his life; belongs to the Cape Mounted Rifles; left the colony on
1 April 1851, having received a wound at the beginning of the Kafir affair,
732-737 Witness conceives that the chiefs made the late outbreak with
a view of regaining their power, which they were gradually losing, 740.
749. 767. Witness attributes the recent outbreak to the want of suffi¬
cient military power to keep the Kafirs in awe ; it was very unfortunate
that the military force had been reduced, 740-745. 748 Witness is con¬
fident that the Gaika Kafirs would not have entered upon the war had not
they been sure of the co-operation of the Kat River Hottentots ; cause of
the defection of the Kat River settlers, 746, 747 Opinion that there will
never be peace for the colony as long as the Kafirs are allowed to occupy
the Amatólas ; they ought to be expelled altogether, and pushed over the
Kei, 750-769. 780-798. 839. 917-923 Witness does not think the reason
of the Gaika tribes rising has been the fear of expulsion from their terri
tory, 766. 770, 771.
The influence of superstition is very great among the Kafirs ; this is very
much made use of by the chiefs for political and any bad purposes, 772-
774- 893-898 It would be very desirable after the expulsion of the
hostile tribes from Kafirland to bring about a more dense settlement of the
people there; people, for agricultural purposes, might be located there to
any extent, 775-778 The Amatóla ridge might have a military post upon
it, but it is not capable of military defence except by having an open
country to the east of it, 779 The great difficulties in Kafir warfare are
the bush and the mountains ; expelling the tribes from the Amatóla would
give the British troops a great advantage, 798, 799. 976-980 Necessity
for a large military force for the protection of the frontier should the Kafirs
be driven beyond the Kei, 800, 801. 957-962. 981-986.
Manner in which the chiefs of the various tribes acquire their position
as chiefs ; with most tribes it is an hereditary office, 802 The Kafirs
have lately become much more formidable enemies compared with what
they were by the possession of fire-arms and horses, 803-805. 816, 817.
848.1001-1009 Impossibility for some years to come of doing without
the presence of a considerable regular militery force upon the frontier ; it
would be impossible to trust altogether or mainly to the settlers for the
defence of the frontier, 806-811. 967-962 Employment of the Kafirs as
a police force in the colony ; in the character of policeman the experiment
answered very well, but it failed when this country was engaged in a war
against their nation ; they went over to the enemy on the very first attack,
812-815 Witness considers the Kat River settlement as a collection of
ail tiie bad coloured people in the whole of the provinces ; opinion that
0.63. L n 4 Colonel
524
B I S S E T T.
[»afit*
Report, 1851—continued.
£issett, Major John Jarvis. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
Colonel Somerset in breaking up that settlement would do a very politic
and wise thing, 818-827. 940-947.
Opinion that instead of recruiting the Cape corps with recruits from the
Hottentots, it would be advisable to get young men from this country who
would serve in tlie colony and become military colonists, 827. 833-838. 924"
227 The Hottentots cannot now be as much depended on as troops
in our service as they were formerly, 828, 829 Satisfactory manner
in wliich the civil appointments in the colony and on the frontier are filled;
no irritation has been occasioned by the conduct of any of the magistrates,
830-832 How far it would be possible to defend the chain of the
Amatólas by a chain of military posts along the mountains, 839-847
Remarks as to the way in which the Kafirs are supplitd with fire-arms
and ammunition ; impossibility of preventing their introduction into Kafirland,
848-855.
Witness does not think that the effect of the influence of the missionaries
upon the natives of Kafirland has any tendency to civilize them, 856-858.
975 Existence of an anti-government feeling on the part of the boers at
the colony, arising in a great deuree from the late convict question, 859, 860
Much practical inconvenience arises from the distance at which Cape
Town is from the eastern frontier ; it would be very advisable to tranfer the
seat of government, 861-868 Observations relative to the emigration of
the Dutch settlers ; large number that have crossed the Vaal and gone to the
north, where they are totally independent of our sovereignty; witness does
not consider there is any possibility of stopping them and making them defend
the frontier, 870-874 Those Kafirs who are not armed with guns use the
assagais, a kind of spear which is a very formidable weapon, 875-877.1
Impossibility of the Kafirs manufacturing powder; if it were possible to
prevent the exportation of powder and fire-arms to them it would put a stop
to further war, 878-884. 1006-1009 There is no doubt that the Kafir
population generally were satisfied with the policy pursued towards them;
the discontent is on the part of tlie chiefs, who feel their power declining
from the advance of civilization and the restraints of law, 885-888. 906-920
On the event of the Kafiis being driven Irom the Amatóla district, across
the Kei, they would find ample land lor pastoral purposes, 889, 890. 933
In the event of the removal of the piincipal chiefs ot tiie Kafirs who have
been the cause of the present discontent, and the people driven over the Kei,
it would be advisable to |)lace commissioners to see tbem located, 891
Cultivation of the land by the Kafirs ; nature of the traffic carried on with
the traders ; the sale of gunpowder has never been traced to tlie traders,
899-905-
There is no actual recognition of property rights among the Kafir chiefs ;
they move from one place to another as suits their convenience, 929-933
The tribes which are friendly to this country should not be removed from
Kafirland, as that would be a breach of faith, 934-939 Witness is not
aware thai the Kai River settlers have had any reason to complain of the
conduct of the government or of particular magistrates, 948-950 Opinion
that the political excitement which has been going on among the white
people
BIS
BO E
525
Report, 1851—continued.
Bissett, Major John Jarvis. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
people in the colony has tended to disturb the minds of the natives, 951, 952
Explanation as to the present cliaractei" of the military occupation of the
country of British Kafraria; insufficiency of such occupation up to this time,
953-956.
Necessity for the Kafirs being conquered before any proper system of
defence could be put up ; tlie last war was never completely finished or the
present war would not have occurred, 962-965 Provided Kafirland be
peopled by a wiiite population when the natives are driven out, they would
require to be protected by means of forts, 966-972 Surprise expressed by
by the Kafirs at the shooting of the rifle brigade, 973, 974 Impossibility
of the regular troops carrying on the war with efficiency with their present
equipments, 976-978 Opinion that the policy adopted by Sir Harry
Smith in the government of the colony has been very beneficial, and has
afforded great protection to the farmer and settler within the whole boundary,
and has been the means of saving the colony much loss and devastation,
967-989.
The Kafirs never take a prisoner or give quarter ; they slay all that fall
into their hands, 990 In witness's opinion the Kei is a much more
defensible frontier than any we have yet occupied ; the most defensible
boundary is an open space in which cavalry can act, 991-1005 Circum¬
stances which led to the late unexpected outbreak; the British troops
meeting a reverse at first, numbers went into the war who would not perhaps
otherwise have joined it, 1010.
Blacks. See Coloured Races.
Blinkwater. Copy of memorandum of a conference with the insurgents at
Blinkwater on 9 January, this document being sent to Major-general
Somerset by Cobus Forie, then field cornet, and subsequently field com¬
mandant of the district ; this conference v\ as held with the rebels when mak¬
ing known to them the offer of pardon from his Excellency, Renton 3206-
3218 Account in this memorandum of what passed between Mr. Read,
jun. and the rebels, as well as what passed on the part of the other individuals
who accompanied the field cornet, and the sentiments by which at that time
the rebels were actuated, ib. 3207-3218.
Blockdrift. See Surveys.
Boers. Evidence showing that the defence of the frontier by the boers is a much
more effective system than the operation of regular troops ; but witness would
be sorry to see the system re-established, A. Smith 376-385 Existence of
an anti-government feeling on the part of the boers at the colony, arising in a
great degree from the laie convict question, Bissett 859, 860 The emigrant
boers are at present very quiet, but they are in a veiy discontented and
excited state ; they feel themselves very much aggrieved, and they are very
anxious to have the causes of their late collisions with the Government most
minutely investigated. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1483 et seq. As things have
turned out, witness considers the wisest plan would be not to meddle with them
at all, but that as long as they commit no injury or outrage upon the colony,
we
526
BO E
BUT
[»Afir
Report, 'Continued.
Boers—continued.
we should not take any notice of what they do in other respects, Sir A.
Stockenstrom 1485-1510 Great dislike of the natives round Natal to the
Dutch boers ; they prefer the British authority and settlers infinitely before
tlie Dutch farmers, T. C. Smith 2327-2329.
See also Commando System, 1. Defence of the Frontier. Disaffection.
Emigration. Griquas, 2. Military Force, 2. Representative Government.
Border Tribes. Witness has had abundant opportunities of forming an opinion
on the subject of the policy pursued by this country with respect to the border
tribes upon the frontier of the colony, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1255 There is
no doubt the border tribes are just barbarians, who will plunder, and require
to be kept tight, ib. 1256 The customs of tbe various tribes are very nearly
similar to one another; there are some slight modifications, A. Smith 2103,
2104 Way in which they arrange disputes that arise between themselves,
ib. 2105 See also Boundaries. Frontier Tribes.
Boundaries. The Kafir boundary is very accurately defined as far as the course
of the river is concerned ; the Kafirs have a ready capacity for making boun¬
dary lines ; the boundary has been distinctly marked out from time to time by
the Government and the chiefs together. Freeman 161-165 ^The old boun¬
dary of the colony was the Fish River, ib. 176, 177 The Kafirs at that time
occupied what is now called the neutral or ceded territory, ib. 178 At that
time there were constant depredations and disturbances upon the boundary,
ib. 179 Difficulty of defining the boundary of each tribe; statement of
the nearest approximation witness can give, A. Smith 2058-2067 Opinion
that a boundary, except (or legal purposes, is not wanted at all ; as a military
question it leads to difficulties of all kinds, Owen 2619-2621.
See also Amatóla Mountains. Buffalo River. Colonial Office. Frontier
Boundary. Kei River. Keiskamma. Neutral Territory.
BoieÄer, Mr. Magistrates, \.
British Influence. See Chiefs, 3.
British Power. The grand point in the present state of affairs will be to prove
the indomitable superiority of the British power; but the question as to what
is to be done after this is a very grave and difficult question ; much must
depend upon the way in which the war is put down, Renton 3075-3079.
(See also Kafir War, 4. Military Force, 1. Policy of the Government.
British Troops. In the defence of the frontier it is desirable to rely as much as
possible on British troops, Owen 2626. See also Military Force.
Buffalo River. There is a tribe of Kafirs which continues friendly, between
King William's Town and the mouth of the Buffalo River, but it is a very small
tribe, Fairbairn 577 The Buffalo River, as a boundary, would require
more troops for its defence than the Kei, and it would not be complete with¬
out the Amatólas in our possession. Sir P. Maitland 2909. 2941 If it is
considered desirable that Sir Harry Smith should establish the Buffalo River
as the frontier boundary he should be allotved sufficient troops for the pur¬
pose ;
Criiiee.]
BÜF
CAT
527
Report, 1851—c»ntinued.
Buffalo River—continued.
pose ; there can be no objection to our taking possession of the country to the
Buffalo River on the ground of justice to the Kafirs, tbey having been the
aggressors should be punished by the loss of territory, Sir P. Maitland 2931-
2955.
Bmh Fighting. The great diflâculties in Kafir warfare are the bush and the moun¬
tains; expelling the tribes from the Amatólas would give the British troops a
great advantage, Bissett 798, 799, 976-980——The country generally is very
favourable to their mode of fighting ; there is a great deal of bush fighting,
A. Smith 2075-2077.
Bushmen. Witness was stationed at the Cape of Good Hope for sixteen years,
on the medical staff of the army, and during part of the time was employed
confidentially by different governors in reference to the frontier tribes, the
Kafirs and bushmen, A. Smith 262 Witness was employed with the object
of explaining to the natives the policy pursued by the local government, and
to ascertain whether, at least as far as regards the bushmen, they were con¬
tented or discontented with that policy ; this was in the north part of the
colony, towards the Orange River, ib. 263-270.
C.
Cape Corps. Opinion that, instead of recruiting the Cape corps with recruits
from the Hottentots, it would be advisable to get young men from this country,
who would serve in the colony and become military colonists, Bissett
833-838. 924-927 Disaffection among the Hottentots in the Cape corps;
great advantage of sending European troops to the Cape ; it might be advan¬
tageous to form a regiment partly of Europeans and partly of Hottentots, Sir
G. T. Napier 1561-1564 Too much reliance has been placed upon the Hot¬
tentot Cape corps; the greater proportion of the regiments should be Euro¬
pean, a few Hottentots being attached thereto as guides. Sir J. E. Alexander
2733-2736 Witness always had a good opinion of the Cape Rifle corps ;
there must have been some delusion practised to mislead the Hottentots, Sir
P. Maitland 2988, 2989. See also Hottentots.
Cape Mounted Rifles. The Cape Mounted Rifles consist nearly entirely of Hot¬
tentots ; they have always behaved well up to the present war ; now a number
of them have deserted, and supsicion has fallen upon the whole body; witness
is unable to account for their conduct, Fairbairn 443-445 The disaffection
among the Cape Mounted Rifles did not show itself till after the breaking out
of the war ; previously much reliance was placed upon them, ib. 578-580.
Cape Mounted Police. See Police
Cape Town. See Seat of Government.
Cattle. Remarks relative to the great pride taken by the Kafir chiefs in their
possession of large herds of cattle, Adamson 1101-1105.
See also Droughts.
Cattle
saß CAT CED [»«fit
Report, 1851—continued.
Cattle Stealing. The love of marauding and cattle stealing is a strong passion
among the Kafirs, A. Smith 359 But if they could once be got to think that
it was as honourable to find subsistence by other means than their forefathers
adopted there would be a great change wrought, ib. 359, 360 Sir G. Napier
considered that one of the principal causes of the predatory habits of the Kafirs
was, that they attach no sort of idea of disgrace to theft, Sir A. Stock¬
enstrom 2002 He therefore proposed to punish them for such offences,
with a view to degrade them in the eyes of their tribe, ib. In witness's
opinion any punishment would do provided it went through the regular
channel, ih.
The great cause of cattle stealing has arisen from the want of sufficient
firmness in the Government in not insisting on immediate reparation being
made by the chiefs, T. C. Smith 2352 Inconvenience of the ceded tem-
tory being occupied by Kafirs, as it brings them close to our border, and they
cannot resist the temptation to steal the cattle. Sir F, Maitland 2923 Wit¬
ness's objections to Europeans being allowed to establish cattle farms on the
frontier are the great temptation which they offer to the Kafirs, ib. 2939-2950
Almost all the employment of the Kafirs, in their heathen state, is stealing
cattle ; it is considered an honourable employment. Menton 3370.
See also Chiefs, 2. Commando System, 1. Servants.
Ceded Territory. The Kat River settlement is in what is called the ceded
territory; but witness has gieat doubts whether it ever was ceded by treaty
with the British Government; grounds on which witness considers it neutral
territory, JFVeema« 41-48.183-185 From such information as witness could
gather, he has always thought that upon the whole it was a wise policy to
occupy this neutral territory, and to give the Hottentots the occupation
of it, ib. 49-53. 64-71. 144-149 But still witness thinks something more
should have done to meet the wishes and requests and feelings of the Kafirs
who were excluded, and especially of the chief Maquomo ; he ought to have been
provided for more distinctly, i6. 49,50. 141-149 A distinct provision being
made for the necessities of the Kafir chiefs would have secured more fidelity
and more affection on their part, ib.
The effect of this location was, no doubt, to bring the Hottentots more
immediately into contact with their fiercer and moie warlike neighbours, tlie
Kafirs, and many depredations were committed on the settlers. Freeman
54-57. 61 But there was no serious crime committed till that particular
case which led to the late war in 1846-47, which Sir Peregiine Maitland look
up ; viz., the murder of a Hottentot constable ; a Kafir was also killed, ib,
58-60. 62, 63 Extent of the district which witness considers has been
improperly added to the ceded territory. Sir A. Stockenstrom, 1459-1472.
See also Boundaries. Cattle Stealing. Kat River Settlement, 1.
Chiefs :
Âriôi«.]
CHIEFS.
529
Report, 1851—continued.
Chiefs :
1. Generally.
2. Complaints of the Chiefs as to their being held responsible for
the Depredations of their Tribes.
3. How far the diminished Influence of the Chiefs has led to their
inciting the People to War.
4. Recommendation that the Chiefs should be removed, and other
Authorities appointed in their stead.
5. Extent to which the Authority of the Chiefs should be upheld.
1. Generally :
State of feeling of the chiefs in relation to each other, as to their territories
and tribes; constant state of internal dissension existing, Adamson 6g8
Manner in «hich the chiefs of the various tribes acquire their position as
ciiiefs ; with most tribes it is an lierediiary office, Bissett 802 Witness
would not interfere with the domestic affairs of the Kafirs except through
their chiefs. Sir A. Stockenstrom '.264-1266. 1331-1341 Great advantage
would result from the British Government making small allowances to the
chiefs as long as ihey maintained good order among their people and prevented
depredation^, Sir G. T. Napier 1542. 1551-1554. 1691 Witness
believes that the Kafirs when honestly and justly dealt with are inclined
to be friendly. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1946-1953.
2. Complaints of the Chiefs as to their being held responsible for the
Depredations of their Tribes ;
Witness, in his time, has had personal intercourse with every chief in Kafir-
land, A. Smith 293 They made many special complaints to witness ;
nature of these complaints, ib. 294 et seq. They were always complaining
of the Government holding them responsible for the thieving which went on
among their tribes, notwithstanding that they had not the power of restraining
it, ib. 295, 296 This was the great complaint of Gaika when he was
appointed chief of all Kafirland, and was held the medium of communication
between the Kafirs and the colony, and bound to restore all stolen cattle and
so on, ib' 295-300.
The Kafir has a sort of sacred respect for the chief, but nothing beyond
that; if he exacts anything from his subjects which is not agreeable to the
whole body, he has no certain means of enforcing it, A. Smith 295
Opinion that everything ought to be done through the chiefs ; there is no
doubt that the chiefs have sufficient authority over the tribes to prevent their com¬
mitting depredations, and they should be held responsible for the acts of iheir
tribes, Sir G. T. Napier 1523-1525. 1533. 1658, 1G59 It is witness's
opinion that the policy to be pursued with the Kafirs should be one of great
decision and fiimness in putting down and restraining their thefts from the
colonists; the chiefs should be held lesponsible for the cattle stolen, T. C.
Smith 2336-2352 In the event of depredations continuing the chiefs should
be compelled to make restitution and pay a just fine. Sir P- Maitland 2876.
3. How
530
CHIEFS.
iUíífiv
Report, 1851—continued.
Chie FS—continued.
3. How far the diminished Influence of the Chiefs has led to their incii"
ing the People to War :
Witness conceives that the chiefs made the late outbreak with a view of
regaining their power, which they were gradually losing, Bissett 740. 749. 767
There is no doubt that the Kafir population generally were satisfied with
the policy pursued towards them ; the discontent is on the part of the chiefs
who feel their power declining, from the advance of civilization and the
restraints of law, ib. 885-888. 906-920 Formerly the authority of the
chiefs in Kafirland was so complete over the Kafirs generally that they
might be lield justly responsible to the English Government for the con¬
duct, both public and private, of the Kafirs connected with them ; witness
does not know how this may be now ; the power which the chief has in
concurrence with his council is very great. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1342-1356.
1360-1362.
It is witness's firm opinion that the chiefs do possess great influence
over their tribes, Sir G. T. Napier 1543-1545. 1548-1550. 1590-1592
Opinion that the diminution of the authority of the chiefs iiad
nothing to do with the outbreak of the Kafir war in 1846, T. C. Smith
2333, 2334 Witness considers the outbreak to have been principally the
work of the chiefs acting upon the people, Benton 3041-3043 Witness
has no doubt that the chiefs among the Kafirs were dissatisfied with the
existing state of things in consequence of their diminished influence; but
the great bulk of the people were sensible of their improved condition arising
from British influence, ib. 3037.
4. Recommendation that the Chiefs should be removed, and other
Authorities appointed in their ste ad
It appears to witness that it would be almost necessary, for the advancement
of civilization, that the native chiefs should be got rid of or reduced as quickly
as possible, and that some other authorities of better character should be sub¬
stituted in their places, Adamson 680-682 Even in cases of warfare the
effects of the warfare should be considered as having an influence on the
stations of the chiefs alone, and not of the people who have been under their
direction, ib. 680 Evidence relative to the mode in which witness would
recommend that this plan should be carried out ; great advantages which would
result therefrom, ib. 683-697 In witness's plan for removing the native
chiefs and appointing magistrates to their authority he had no idea as to the
missionaries taking any part or interest in the matter, ib. 709 ^The seizure
and removal of the leading chiefs who have been active in the war, whilst the
rights of the people were respected, would facilitate the means of producing
industrial pursuits. Sir J. E. Alexander 2792-2797.
6. Extent to which the Authority Chiefs should be upheld :
The native chiefs should not be interfered with while they remain at peace,
but in the event of war they should be removed from their authority, Adamson
690. 696, 697 The authority of the chiefs should be upheld, they being
allowed to govern the people by their owri laws, Sir G. T. Napier 1602-1604.
1628, 1629 As long as the Kafir chiefs are peaceful neighbours witness
would recognise their authority, but not the complete independence which is
recognized
Cfiíie».]
C Ii I
C I V
531
Report, 1851—continued.
Chiefs—continued.
5. Extent to which the Authority of the Chiefs, S^c.—continued,
recognized in a civilized power, Owen 12624 Opinion that the chiefs should
not be hereditary, but should be appointed by, and hold their authority from,
tlie Governor ; they sliould be invested with magisterial authority under a civil
commissioner. Sir P. Maitland 2878-2882.
See also Cattle Stealing. Ceded Territory. Civil Commissioners.
Cotton Cultivation. Depredations. Government Grants. Kafir
Wars, 1. 4. Kei River. Kreli, Chief. Local Government,
Missionaries, 2. 4. Moshesh. Policy of the Government, 2. Rights
of Property. Superstition. Treaties. Wandering Tribes.
Zoolus.
Christianity. The Kafirs are generally without any belief in a future state ; the
missionaries have not been very successful, in point of numbers, in inducing
Kafirs to embrace Christianity, Adainson 1050-1052 The colonial con¬
nexion has been hurtful and not beneficial to the progress of Cliristian mis¬
sions, Renton 3081-8085.
Civil Appointments. Satisfactory manner in which the civil appointments in the
colony and on the frontier are filled ; no irritation has been occasioned by the
conduct of any of the magistrates, Bissett 830-832.
Civil Commissioners. In the event of the removal of the principal chiefs of
the Kafirs, who have been the cause of the present discontent, and the
people driven over the Kei, it would be advisable to place commissioners
to see them located, Bissett 891 Impossibility of protecting the frontier
without a large military force; the appointment of civil commissioners
would be useless, T. C. Smith 2361, 2362 Opinion that the magistrates
or rather the civil commissioners who have been appointed over the Kafirs
have most admirably discharged their duties in at once maintaining what
is due to the British authority and doing justice to the natives, Renton 3237-
3244. See also Chiefs, 5. Magistrates.
Civilization:
1. How far the Efforts of the Missionaries have been successful in
civilizing the Kafirs.
2. Opinions that their Civilization is impracticable.
1. How far the Efforts of the Missionaries have been successful in
civilizing the Kafirs :
The general eflfect of the missionary labours at the Cape has been con¬
siderably to advance the natives in moral qualifications and in civilization,
Adamson 667, 668 Witness does not think that the effect of the influence
of the missionaries upon the natives of Kafirland has any tendency to civilize
them, Bissett 856-858. 975 It is possible that the Kafirs might be civilized
so that treaties might be made with them, but it would require ten years to
effect the change in their habits. Sir J. E. Alexander 2719, 2720 Success
which has generally attended the efforts of the missionaries in South Africa,
and with the assistance of intelligent missionaries and schoolmasteis it might
be possible to civilize the Kafirs, ib. 2785-2791. 2805 It does not appear
that the character or conduct of the Kafirs has improved since 1838 ; they are
still
532
CIV
COL
[ÍK:afir
Report, 1851—continued.
Civiliza tion—continued.
1. Sow Jar the Efforts of the Missionaries, ^c.—continued.
still as depredatory and uncivilized, Sir J. E. Alexander <2844-2846—
missionaries have not been successful in their labours to improve and civilize
the Kafirs, Sir P. Maitland 2990-2993.
2. Opinions that their Civilization is impracticable :
Impossibility of civilizing the Kafirs ; it is witness's opinion that they will
never be much better than they are, Sir G. T. 'Napier 1521 ^Witness does
not believe any attempt to civilize the Kafirs would be successful, Owen 2625
Very little advance has been made towards civilization among the Kafirs;
they have very little disposition to enter into the pursuits of commerce. Sir
P. Maitland 2890-2894. 2971-2973.
See also Chiefs, 4. Depredations. Griquas.
Climate. Evidence as to the general good climate and fertility of the soil of
Kafirland ; the country is more fertile than any portion of the Cape colony
proper, Adamson 1046-1049 Evidence relative to the climate, soil, and
general agricultural capacity of the Cape colony and British Kafraria ; it
would present a good field for colonization if attention were paid to irrigation.
Sir J. E. Alexander 2763-2775. See also Natal.
Coal Fields. Existence of extensive coal fields in the northern sovereignty; im¬
portance of this circumstance, which may ultimately become of great economic
value, Adamson 680. 1088.
Collisions. From what witness knows of the character of the Kafirs he thinks
it possible that the establishment of a form of government will be sufficient to
prevent collisions taking place between the settlers and the Kafirs, Fairbairn
567. (See also Boers.
Colonial Office. Whatever may be the opinion of the different governors of the
Cape as to the frontier, the boundary is determined entirely by the Hume
Government ; no steps can be taken independently of the Colonial Office, Sir
P. Maitland 2997, 2998.
Colonists. It is desirable to have some surveillance over the dealings of the
colonists with the Kafirs as a means of preserving peace. Sir G. T. Napier
1650-1654 Speaking of the wars of 1846-47, and of everything that has
occurred since, witness draws a broad distinction between the colonists and
the Government; witness considers them the acts of the Government and not
of the colonists. Sir A Stockenstrom 3300.
See also Commando System, 1. Compensation. Constitutional Govern-
ment. Europeans. Kafir 'Wars, 5. Rat River Settlement, 4.
Neutral Territory. Treaties, 2.
Colonization. See Climate.
Coloured Races. There are two classes of persons in the colony ; those who
take what witness would call a just and benevolent and liberal view ot the
question, and who would endeavour to raise and improve the coloured races.
Freeman
Ctifieô»!
COL
COM
533
Report, —continued.
Coloured Races—continued.
Freeman iio And there are others who deem them utterly incapable of
improvement, and would sweep them from their land entirely, ib.
Witness presumes that the coloured race within the limits of tiie British
colony are increasing in number, but there are no statistics on the subject
which can be depended upon, ib. in, 112 It is one of the greatest mis¬
fortunes that could have happened, to have called in the blacks to our assist¬
ance, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1258, 1259.
The desirableness or otherwise of locating coloured people in a settlement
by themselves is a very difficult and a very momentous question, especially in
the existing state of sentiment throughout the colony, but witne^s hesitates
very greatly about the expediency of this course. Rentan 3227, 3228—^It
seems to witness to be desirable if society is to be amalgamated, that there
should be a general diffusion of all the classes who are to unite in such amal¬
gamation, and that there should be as general a similarity of treatment as
possible, all understanding and enjoying the rights that are common to all
ib. 3229 There is no doubt that in parts of the colony great prejudices
exist against the coloured races on the part of the whites in the colony,
ib. 3230-3233.
See also Europeans. Griquas. Kat River Settlement, 4, Magis¬
trates, 2.
Commando System:
1. Opinions in favour of the Commando System; how far expedient
to revive it.
2, Objections to the Commando System.
1. Opinions in favour of the Commando System; how far expedient to
revive it.
After the old commando system had been abandoned, the belief was both
on the past of the authorities of Cape town and also throughout the colony,
ihat the robberies bad greatly increased, A. Smith 276-279 Witness was
for investing the frontier emigrants with a kind of summary power of redress
in the event of depredations on their cattle ; there was no locally organized
force, nor was there any disposition to form one, ib. 280-288. 28g, 290
They depended on the field-cornets collecting their people; sometimes they
answered to the summons of the field-cornets with alacrity, and sometimes
they did not, ib. 282, 283. 288-290 Witness would say that the loss of
life and property was greater before the commando system was totally abolished
than it has been since, ib. 373-385.
Evidence generally with respect to the commando system formerly adopted
in the colony ; witness cannot see any material difference between that and
the existing system, Fairbairn 472-501 Witness has no doubt that a
great deal of blood arose under the « oramando system, but not so much as
under the new system of frontier protection, ib. 500, 501-——It would not be
acceptable to the general body of the colonists to revive the old commando
system ; tbey would not like to be called suddenly out, ib. 502- The
colonists would prefer a regular paid military furee always mamtaincd for the
0.03. M M protection
.534
COM
COM
[Safit
Report, 1851—continued.
Commando Sfstem—continued.
1. Opinions in favour of the Commando System, êfc.—continued.
protection of the colony, not of the nature of a volunteer force, Fairbairn 502-
509. 592 Independent of the maintenance of a regular force, witness would
have the old system continued of making it necessary for the inhabitants
when called upon by the proper authorities to turn out with their arms and
assist in repelling their enemies, ih. 509. 592-594.
Upon receiving the colony from the Dutch, the burghers were allowed to
defend themselves without any military interference, A. Smith 2151 The
commando system was stopped in General Burke's time in 1827; opinion that
the commando system is not of much use as a means of protection for the
frontier, ib. 2152-2163 Evidence generally relative to the commando
system formerly adopted ; opinion ihat that system is more humane in the
aggregate than the present system, which ends in these bloody wars, Owen
2497-2522 In ordinary depredations committed along the frontier, witness
would depend upon the individual settlers, who should have permission to
defend themselves, and execute summary justice on the robbers; they being
supported for a time by a military force, ib. 2567-2575. 2622, 2623. 2644
Thriving and flourishing condition of the frontier under the old commando
system; the result of that system being done away with was a war, Sir. J.
JE. Alexander 2737-2743 Great inconvenience to the farmers and herds¬
men on the i'rontier of the rules in force up to 1838 for the recovery of stolen
cattle ; necessity of the farmers making oath before a magistrate before any
proceedings could be taken to recover the cattle, ib. 2809-2829.
2. Objections to the Commando System :
At the time the old boundary of the colony was the Fish River, there were
constant depredations upon the frontier. Freeman 179 These depredations
were repressed by the commando system which iiad prevailed under the
Dutch government; this led to very great abuses and involved constant
wrongs, ib. 180, 181 The establishment of a neutral territory was made
with a view to put an end to this system, ib. 182. 196, 197 After the
establishment of this neutral territory Maquomo was again allowed to come in
and the depredations and disturbances were revived; this led to the driving
of Maquomo from territory, ib. 183-195.
See also Kaßr Wars, 1. Patrol System.
Commercial Pursuits. See Civilization, 2.
Commissioners. See Civil Commissioners. Commission of Inquiry. Special
Commissioner.
Commission of Inquiry. Grounds on which witness maintains firmly, that
without a commission deputed to the Cape, totally unconnected with the
colony, or any party therein, to examine the numbers ol witnesses of opposite
opinions and interests, whom it is almost impossible to bring over to this
country, the British Government and Legislature will never be able to ascer¬
tain the true causes of the disaffection, disturbances, and wars at present
raging at the Cape, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1255 And that they will never be
able to do justice unless a free constitutional government be granted to that
colony
ÎTriiiiô»] COM CRI 535
Report, 1851—continued.
Commission of Inquiry—continued,
colony, whose localkm wledge and publicscrutlny would render all mystifications
at least very difficult, Sir A. Stockensirom 1255 Witness does not believe that
this Committee will ever get 10 ihe bottom of this rebellion without a most
minute investigation on the spot of all the parties, and particularly the mission¬
aries, who risked their lives, and stayed among them, and made every sacrifice
to keep them within bounds, ib. 1979, 1980 It appears to witness that an
Imperial or Parliamentary Commission from this country, composed of men
of capacity and high character, entirely removed from all colonial local
influence, and with ample power to call parties and documents before them,
who should thoroughly and impartially, on the spot, investigate facts, is most
desirable, if not most necessary to the end of truth and justice, Renton 3247-
3258 Witness considers such a commission would give satisfaction to the
Kafirs, and would command their respect, ib. 3249, 3250. 3253-3258.
See also Griquas, 3.
Compensation. Such a plan as is proposed for compensation by the Govern¬
ment for losses incurred by the colonists upon the frontier is not advisable,
Sir A. Stockénstrom 2001 Explanation as to the treatment of the popula¬
tion in and after the war of 1835-36, and 1846-47, when the sacrifices and
services were the greatest, and no compensation was made, Renton 3118
et seq.—The present disaffection of the Hottentots is mainly attributable to
the neglect of their complaints and the absence of redress for their losses, ib.
3170 See also Griquas,'A. Moshesh.
Cunciliation. See Kandeisk. Policy of the Government, 3.
Constitutional Government. The colony of the Cape of Good Hope accepts the
constitution which has been granted, and accept it with all its legitimate
responsibility, but it would not be in the power of the colony for a consi¬
derable time to pay the expenses of the war. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1745
The constitution is a distinct point from the Kafir war; the colonists had
nothing to do with it; it is entirely the result of Government measures, ib.
^745~t748 A constitutional government in the Cape colony would
decidedly produce a more kind and just policy towards the natives than that
which has been in force during the last four years, ib. 1918.
See also Commission of Inquiry. Legislative Assembly. Representative
Government.
Convicts. See Boers.
Cotton Cultivation. Recommendation that the Indian System of managing the
chiefs should be resorted to ; it is worth the trial to induce the natives to plant
and cultivate cotton; small pensions should be conferred upon the chiefs to
induce them to resort to industrial occupations, Sir J. E. Alexander 2776-
2785- 2995. 2805.
Crime. See Ceded Territory.
M M 2
Criminal
536 CRI D E P [«a«r
'
Report, 1851 —continued.
Criminal Trials. The criminal trials among Kafirs for offences committed
among themselves are very solemn and very particular, Sir A. Stockenstrom
2006.
Cruelty. See Barbarity.
Cultivation. Cultivation of the land by the Kafirs; nature of the traffic carried
on with the traders ; the sale of gunpowder has never been traced to the
tiaders, Bissett 899-905——The Kafirs are a pastoral nation; there would
be no hardship in driving them across the Kei, the country beyond tiiat river
being unoccupied, Sir P. Maitland 2900-2903.
See also Tenure of Land.
Customs of the Natives. See Border Tribes.
D.
Defoction. Circumstances wiiich led to the late unexpected outbreak; the
British troops meeting a reverse at first, numbers went into the war who would
not perhaps otherwise have joined it, Bissett loio. See also Police.
Defence of the Frontier. Reference to the evidence given by witness before ihe
committee of 1835, in which he stated that the Government could at any time
have laid down a system of preventive measures, which would have effectually
protected the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard the cattle,
and could make stricter rules for said territory than perhaps it would have
been able to do on the western side of the old frontier; nature of the preventive
measures contemplated in this answer, Är A. 5/ocÄewsiroOT 17096^565'.
These measures were subsequently carried out by order of Lord Glenelg in
the treaty witness made and signed at King William's Town on 5 December
1836, ib. 1709-1713 Evidence showing that the view of Sir Harry Smith
was confirmatory of these measures, ib. 1709, 1710 Up to the heginning
of 1839, when witne-s left the frontier, he considered his plan to have worked
well, and Sir George Napier expressed his unqualified approval of it, tô. 1714
Ho vv far Sir George Napier has since felt it necessary to amend this treaty,
ib. 1715-1720.
See also Boers. British Troops. Expenditure. Fish River. Forts.
Frontier Boundary. Kat River Settlement. Kei River, 1. Military
Colonies. Military Force. Military Posts. Patrol System.
Representative Government, 1. 2. Seat of Government. Treaties, 2.
Western Frontier.
Depredations. Opinion that the frontier cannot be maintained in peace by any
force so long as we have people in an uncivilized state who believe it is their rio'ht
to steal whenever they can steal, A. Smith 291, 292 Witness considers it
perfectly just that the frontier tribes should be held responsible for depredations
committed on the settlers, G. T. Napier 1554-1 ¿60 During witness's
tenure of governorship, he was very reluctant to go to war with the Kafirs in
consequence of trifling depredations; the number of depredations did not in¬
crease from that line of policy ib. 1640-1642 Witness was in the colony in
Eviter.]
DEP
D I S
537
Report, 1851—continued.
Depredations—continued,
the year 1845, at the time petitions were presented to the governor of Cape
town with respect to the incursions of the Kafirs on the frontier, and of de¬
predations committed by them. Sir J. Stockenstrom 1864, 1865 Refer¬
ence to the speeches made on the occasion of the presentation of these petitions
hy Mr. Montagu, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Cioete, stating that the rumours of
these depredations were unfounded, and that the colony was never in greater
security and tranquillity,and more free from depredations,¿6. 1867-1874. 1876-
i88t. 1898-1905. So long as the frontier is in its present state it is im¬
possible altogether to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs, ib. 1911, 1912.
Enormous extent to which the depredations of the chiefs were carried on
and great number of murders committed by them previous to the proclama¬
tion of war against the Kafirs in 1835, Sir J. E. Alexander 2673—2688
Opinion that treaties with the Kafirs would not prevent their committing
depredations; it is only the strong hand of military power tiiat could prevent
it, ih. 2717-2719. 2807-2838 The complaints of the colonists respecting
the depredations committed by the Kaffirs were generally speaking just and
well founded, though they may i:ave been somewhat exaggerated, Sir
P. Maitland 2956-2958. 2973.
See also Ceded Territory. Chiefs. Commando System, 1, 2. Kafir
Wars, 1. Military Force, 2. Patrol System. Plunder. Treaties, 1.
Zoolus,
disaffection. Witness cannot account for the general disloyalty which has
recently prevailed among the Hottentots in the Kat River settlement; ii is a
most mysterious thing, a thing which strikes witness with great surprise; opi¬
nion that it is a political movement, and not at all a religious one. Freeman
24. 84-91* On witness's visit to the Kat River settlement in January 1851,
he understood that there were latent causes of disaffection in the minds of the
people, but they « ere not sufficient to produce an outbi'eak unless some occa¬
sion arose to excite these latent influences ; statement generally of these latent
causes, Reriton 3023-3035. 3038-3040.
On making inquiries of the missionaries as to the causes of the extraordinary
disaflfection, witness learnt that there was a long series of matters which had
soured the spirit of the inhabitants, and all spoke primarily of the vyars of 1835-
36 and 1846-47, lientoii 3118 Witness does not consider that the small
portion of the race that has shown disaffection, and has been engaged in tlie
late outrages, is'any proof of their readiness to become enemies of the Govern¬
ment, ib. 3394-3410 There have been several Kafir wars, and there have
been several insurrections of Dutch boers, and during all these the Hottentots
have never shown the slightest sympathy with either party of insurgents, ib.
3408.
See also Cape Mounted Rifles. Commission of Inquiry. Compensa¬
tion. Hottentots. Kat River Settlement, 2. 3. Magistrates, 1.
Missionaries, 4.
disloyally. See Disaffection.
disputes. See Border Tribes.
0,63.
M M 3
Division
538
T> I V
E M T
imafiv
Report, 1851 —continued.
Division of the Colony. Objections to separating the present Cape colony into
two distinct colonies, with two governments; such a separation would weaken
both, Fairhairn 452. 454 Opinion that the safety of the frontier is better
provided for by one strong government, wherever it seat may be, if the colony
is to pay its own expenses, and have the management of the frontier policy,
ih. 452 Witness does not consider that the colony is inconveniently large,
in point of extent, for legislation by representatives; there is no doubt that
the inhabitants of the eastern district would agree with the inhabitants of tlie
western district, as to the policy to be pursued on the frontier, ib. 611-622.
See also Seat of Government.
Droughts. Droughts are very common on the eastern frontier of Kafraria ; they
occur every (bur or five years ; this has the effect of inducing the colonists to
spread their cattle over the country in search of pasture, and at times the
people come into collision. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1474-1477 Troublesome
and expensive nature of the war in 1846 ; it was rendered more so from the
pressure of the drought that prevailed, and the imperfect communication
between the colony and the eastern frontier. Sir P. Maitland 2858-2861.
D'Urhan, Sir Benjamin. Circumstances attending the reversal of the policy of
Sir Benjamin D'LIrban, and the giving up of the territory between the present
boundary and the river Kei; prediction of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in his
despatches, thai a future war would be the consequence of a reversal of his
policy. Sir G. T. Napier 1695-1708 Witness never approved of Sir Ben¬
jamin D'lJrban's system, he disapproved of it from first to last; difference
between his system and the arrangement entered into by witness, with Krell,
in 1846 ; evidence showing that Sir B. D'Urban himself upset his own system.
Sir A. Stockenstrom 1749-1769 The statement of Sir George Napier that
the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was more popular among the colonists
than the policy of Lord Gleneig is correct, ib. 1919 There was great
clamour against Sir Benjamin's policy before Lord Glenelg's policy was intro¬
duced, ib. 1920. See also Fingoes. Kei River, 1.
Dutch Boers. See Boers. Commando System, 1. 2.
Dutch Race. The feeling of alienation and estrangement between the Dutch
and English races in the Cape colony is quite gone, Fairbairn 548-550.
E.
Education. Evidence showing that the progress of education in the settlement
was successful up to the time when it was wholly uninterrupted by the carry¬
ing off of all the people into military posts, Renton 3155, 3156.
See also Schools.
Emancipation of Slaves. See Emigration.
Emigration. Observations relative to the migration of the Dutch settlers;
large numbers that have crossed the Vaal and gone to the north, where
they are totally independent of our sovereignty ; witness does not consider
there
EMI
EUR
539
Report, continued.
Emigration—continued.
there is any possibility of stopping them and making them defend the fron¬
tier, Bissett 870-874 Witness does not see why, if the war terminates suc¬
cessfully, the frontier should be much denuded of inhabitants, unless the
measures of the Government be such as to drive the people to emigration.
Sir A. Stockenstrom 1395, 1396 It was an accusation on the part of Sir
Benjamin D'Urban that the policy pursued by witness, in fact that his
treaty of 5 December 1836 was one of the causes of the emigration of boers
from the frontier; statement made by witness that he can prove the con¬
trary, ib. 1823-1830. 1845. 2023-2029 In witness's opinion the causes
of the discontent which induced the emigration were various, ib. 1831-1846
One was the manner in which the emancipation of the slaves affected
many, and the manner in which compensation was given also caused a great
deal of dissatisfaction, ¿6. 1836-1839 The circumstance of the insecurity
of cattle and property on the frontier was also a cause of emigration, ib, 1840-
1846. See also Boers.
Encroachments. In regard to the general policy, one of the principles which
ought to he adopted in all transactions with the natives would be to give
them absolute security that in no cases should the possession of their land
be interfered with, Adamson 680 It would be very preferable that the
lands should be preserved absolutely for the support of the natives, ib.
Opinion that there has been a constant tendency and encroachment upon
the land justly belonging to the Kafirs, and that this has led to bad feeling
on the part of the Kafirs towards the colonists, as between the Kafirs and
the settlers, .4, Stockenstrom 1721, 1722 This has brought our rela¬
tions to their present unsatisfactory condition, ib. 1723 Evidence relative -
to the encroachments made by settlers on the territories of the Kafirs; wi:-
ness attributes a great deal of the dissatisfaction of the Kafirs to the encroach¬
ments of the colonists, A. Smith 2168-2194.
See also Griquas. Kreli, Chief. Retrocession of Territory. Sur¬
veys.
English Settlers. Witness thinks it would be a very good thing if there was a
body of Englishmen in Kafaria along the whole line of that country; such a
system might be accomplished by degrees by encouraging soldiers to settle
there, and allowing them to settle with their families. Sir G. T. Napier 1567-
>577 ^There is a feeling of jealousy of the white men among the Kafirs,
and also a feeling of injury from the aggression of the white men; this is
concentrated more towards the Englishmen than towards others, Renton 3034-
3236. See also Dutch Race.
Europeans. There are very few Europeans resident in the Kat River settlement,
F, eeinan 22 On several occasions the Kafirs and the Hottentots have
combined to attack the white man, A. Smith 366, 367 Opinion that the
political excitement which has been going on among the white people in the
colony has tended to disturb the minds of the natives, Bissett 951, 952
Great dread on the pait of the Kafirs that the whites will dispossess them of
their territory; how far the present war is to be traced to this feeling, Adam-
son 1072-1074 Dispossessing the Gaika tribes of their territory would
greatly tend to increase this dread of the whites, ib. 1075. 1112, 1113.
0.63. M M 4 The
54Q
EUR
FAI
[mstfít
Report, 1851—continued.
Europeans—continued.
The land which has been taken from the natives for the European settlers
in British Kat'raria has caused great irritation among them; it would deci¬
dedly be advisable to pur. a stop to further extension of European settlements
in that direction. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1454-1458 There has been no great
accession of European colonists on the eastern frontier of the colony during
the last four or five years, ih. 1473 Witness considers it would be better
to have a settlement of coloured men, Hottentots and Fingoes, on the ceded
territory than to have Europeans, Sir P. Maitland 2911. 2921-2927.
See also Cape Corps. Cattle Stealing. Coloured Races. Jealousy.
Kat River Settlement. Magistrates, 2.
Expenditure. Opinion that the colony would be willing to bear a proportion
of the expense of protecting the frontier, say one-third or one-fourth the
whole amount, Fairbairn 582-588 Opinion that the great expenditure
of 2,000,000/. would not have occurred 101846 if the colony bad had the
control of the war, ib. 594 Reason of the war in 1846 costing the enor¬
mous amount of two millions of money ; if the troops had to derive their
resources from the sea, and through a regular commissariat, the same ex¬
penditure might again be occasioned, ib. 595, 596 Impossibility of the
Cape colony defraying the expense of the military force necessary for the
protection of the frontier; the expense must be borne by the mother
country. Sir G. T. Napier 1694.
See also Legislative Assembly. Military Force, 2. Revenue and
Expenditure.
Extermination. How far allowing the settlers on the frontier without the in¬
terference of the Government to carry on war against the natives would
result in a system of extermination, Fairbairn 472-474.
See also Coloured Races.
P.
Fairbairn, John. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Proprietor and editor of the
" South African Commercial Adveriiser" newspaper at Cape Town ; has been
residing at the Cape for the last twenty-six or twenty-seven years, 422-428.
.581 Witness has no personal knowledge of the tribes beyond the fron¬
tier; all he knows of them is through the despatches of Government and
other papers which have been published, 428 Witness has been in the
Zwellendam district of Kafirland, but it is twenty years ago; has also been
at Graliam's Town, 429-431 Witness has considered the policy of this
country in regard to the frontier tribes, and has formed opinions upon it,
but recent events have so altered the circumstances of both parties, the
Kafirs and the colony generally, that witness cannot say what orn^ht to be
done, 432 Recent evenis have very much disappointed witnesses expec¬
tations ; the accounts from Kafirland were highly satisfactory for two or
three years, but the sudden outbreak has shown that there was some
deception or mistake somewhere, 433.
The
FAIRBAIRN
541
Report, 1851—continued.
Fairbaim, John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
The policy of the present governor differed from that of his predeces¬
sors in dealing wiih the frontier tribes, as he took possession of the country
and established military fens within British Kafraria, 434, 435 The
natives have been recently more employed in the British service as police,
with a view to check the inroads and outrages on the part of the Kafirs,
436 The native Katir police were perfectly trustworthy when pursuing
thieves, but wiien Sir Harry Smith employed them against iheir own chiefs
he greatly mistook the Kafir character ; their feelings led them to join
their old chiefs against the Government, 438-440 Remarks relative to
the outbreak of tlie Kat River settlers against the Government; complaints
made by those tribes of certain acts of the Government, 441.
The Cape mounted police consist principally of Kafirs, 442 The Cape
mounted rifles consist nearly entirely of Hottentots ; they iiave always be¬
haved well up to the present war, now a number of them iiave deserted,
and suspicion has fallen upon the whole body ; witness is unable to account
for their conduct, 443-445 Geneia! feeling of mistrust of the tribes by
people on the frontier, who have been for years declaring that the tribes
were hostile, and that the Government and a great portion of the people
in the colony were deceiving themselves in supposing that tliey were in a
state of security, 446,447 Opinion in favour of the seat of the Legis¬
lative Government being at Cape Town, 449 Necessity for an officer of
high rank with a strong force being constantly stationed on the frontier,
449-451- 458-460.
Objections to separating the presetit Cape colony into two distinct colonies
with two governments ; such a separation would weaken both, 452-454
Opinion that the safety of the frontier is better provided for by one strong
government, wherever its seat may be, if the colony is to pay its own expenses,
and have the management of the fiontier policy, 452 Objection to trans¬
ferring the seat of government from Cape Town to Graham's Town, 453-457
If a representative system were brought into operation in the colony, tfie
legislature at Cape Town would be disposed adequately to provide for the
defence of the frontier, 455-457. 461 Nature of the policy which witness
considered would be the most advantageous to be adopted previous to the
present war breaking out ; now witness is unable to suggest any line of policy,
looking forward to the future, 463, 464.
In the event of the establishment of a legislative assembly in the colony
they would undertake to pay a largè portion of the expenses of the colony;
not the whole, as that would be equivalent to a separation from Great Britain'
465-471 How far allowing the settlers on the frontier, without the inter¬
ference of the Government, to carry on a war against tiie natives, would result
in a system of extermination, 472-474 Evidence generally with reference
to the commando system formerly adopted in the colony ; witness cannot see
any material difference between that and the existing system, 472-501
Remarks relative to the nature and extent of the Kafir frontier, 490, 491, 510
Witness has no doubt that a great deal of bloodshed .arose under the
commando system, but not so much as under the new system of frontier pro¬
tection, 500, 501.
It
F A 1 R B A I R N
[iËAfïv'
Report, 1851—continued.
Fairhairn, John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
It would not be acceplable to the general body of the colonists to revive
the oil! commando system ; they would not like to be called suddenly our,
502 The colonists would prefer a regular paid military force always main¬
tained for the protection of the colony, not of the nature of a volunteer force,
502-509. 592 Extent of the military force necessary to be maintained for
the protection of the colony ; witness 'does not know what the expense would
be, but it must be considerable, 505, 506 Amount of the revenue of the
colony, and amount of the present expenditure of the Government, 507, 508
—Independent of the maintenance of a regular force, witness would have the
old system continued of making it necessary for the inhabitants when called
on by the proper authorities to turn out with their arms and assist in repelling
their enemies, 509. 592-594 Nectssity for the maintenance of the military
forts and forces on the Kafir frontier, wherever the military men thought they
would be most efficient, 511.
Evidence relative to the various tribes inhabiting the country on the other
side of the Kafir frontier; the Kafir population may be estimated at about
80,000 or 90,000, but it is impossible to form an idea as to the numbers of
the other tribes, 512-521 Further explanation as to the natuie and extent
of the Kafir frontier ; the whole of Kafraria is British, and the frontier of the
British possessions is the great Kei, 522-527 Remarks relative to the
Tambookie frontier ; this has hitherto been a very peaceful frontier, but now
the Tambookies are at open war with the colonial government; a greater force
will be required hereafter on that frontier, 528-531.
Evidence relative to a number of emigrant boers having established them-
selves in the country of the Griquas, who border on the Oimige River ; cir¬
cumstances which led to their emigrating beyond the limits of the colony;
line of policy best adapted to recover their affections so as to contiol their
actions, 532-547 Necessity for the establishment of an open government
or legislative assembly at the Cape of Good Hope ; until such is carried out,
it will be impossible to obtain correct information as to the real state of
southern Africa, 534 The feeling of alienation and estrangement between
the Dutch and English races in the Cape colony is quite gone, 548-550.
In the event of a representative as.sembly sitting at Cape Town, opinion as
to whether the Dutch or English element would predominate, 551 Grounds
on which witness founds the opinion that the establishment of a representative
government at Cape Town would tend to re-establish a hold upon the affections
of those botrs who have penetrated beyond the frontier into Kafraria, and
ttiere established independent authority, 552-566 From what witness
knows of the character of the Kafirs, he thinks it possible liiat the establish¬
ment of a form of government will be sufficient to prevent collisions taking
place between the settlers and the Kafirs, 567 Explanation as to the
cause of the Kafir war breaking out in 1834; 568 -Evidence relative to the
cause,of the out-break in 1846 ; 569, 570 It is an indispensable condition
of any future policy that there shall be no further encroachment upon the
Kafirs upon our side ; it is a great question whether we ought not to give up
certain lands which we have taken from them, 571-575.
There
Cl*ÍÍ»í0.J
FAI
FIR
543
Report, continued.
Fairhairn, John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
There is a tribe of Kafirs which continues friendly, between King William's
Town and the mouth of the Buffalo River, but it is a very small tribe, 577
The disaffection among the Cape mounted rifles did not show itself till after
the breaking out of the war; previously much relianee was placed upon them,
578-580 Opinion that the colony would he willing to bear a proportion of
the expense of protecting the frontier, say one-third or one-fourth the whole
amount, 582-588 In tiie event of a local government being granted to the
Cape, the Governor's voice should be supieme, and his assent be required for
every measure which passes the assembly, 583 There are but a very small
number of persons in the colony ititerested in promoting, or in the continu¬
ance of the frontier wars; their influence would not be appreciable in its
effect upon the legislature of the colony, 589. 590. 597-604.
Opinion that the great expenditure of 2,000.000Z. would not have occurred
ill 1846, if the colony had had the conirol of the war, 591 Reason of the
war in 1846 costing the enormous amount of two millions of money; if the
troops had to derive their resources fiom the sea, and thiough a regular
commissariat, the same expenditure might again be occasioned, 595, 596
Complaints of the Hotteniots in 1846, that while the men were serving on the
frontier their families were left almost to starve ; this has been remedied ;
the Government in the present war promising to supply food to the families
of all parties serving on the frontier, 605- 609 Great losses to which the
Kat River settlers were subject in tiie last war; a great number of them have
now joined the Kafirs, 610.
Witness docs not consider that the colony is inconveniently large in point of
extent for legislation by representatives ; there is no doubt that the inhabitants
of the eastern district would agree with the inhabitants of the western district
as to the policy to be pursued on the frontier, 611-622 Evidence relative
to the complaints of the colonists of their being deceived as to the dan¬
gerous state of Kafirland by the despatches of the Governor ; witness does
not consider that the Governor at present has full means of getting correct
information, 623-659 Opinion that it would have been better if the whole
truth had been laid before the colonists by the Governor, and openly dis¬
cussed, 659.
Fanners. See Boers.
Field Cornels. See Commando System.
Fingoes. Particulars in detail relative to the strong difference of opinion beween
witness and Sir Benjamin D'Urban as to the treatment of the Fingoes; opinion
expressed by Sir Benjatnin, that witness had abandoned and sacrificed the
Fingoe race to the tendermercies of their inveterate enemies, the Kafirs, Sir A.
Stockenstrom 1798-1822. 1964-1968.
See also Furopeans. Alissionaries, 1.
Fire-Arms. The Kafirs have lately become much more formidable enemies
compnied with what they were, by the possession of fire-arms and horses,
A. Smith 412; Bisselt 803-805. 816, 817. 848. 1001-1009 The Kafirs
are better armed llian they were ; difficulties in the way of preventing fire¬
arms
544
FÏR
FOR
[Uíífit
Report, 1851—continued.
Fire-Arms—continued.
aims and gunpowder being smugsiled into tiie colony, Bissett 848-855;
Sir A. Stockenstrom 1434-1447 In witness's time they were not well sup¬
plied with fire-arms and ammunition; they could hardly be induced to touch a
gun, A. Smith 2072.
There is no doubt that the savage tribes will soon f)btain a supply of arms,
and become acquainted vvitli iheir use through the various traders that will sell
them, in spite of any regulations to the contrary, T. C. Smith 2241 Expe¬
diency of establishing some check on the supply of fire-arms and powder to
the natives around Natal; impossibility of altogether preventing the smug¬
gling of arms, though it might be prevented to a certain extent, ib. 2279-
2304 Supply of fire-arms and ammunition obtained by the Kafirs from the
travellino- traders, Owen 2395, 2396 Witness looks upon it as praetically
impossible to prevent the importation of arms into Kafitland ; provided the
traders were prevented from supplying them, they would be supplied by
foreign traders, and landed on the coast, ih. 2449-2458.
See a\so Assagais. Gunpowder. Traders.
Fish River. Considering the frontier between the Fish River and the Keiskamma
as a military frontier, there would bean advantage in pushing it further where
the country would be open, Sir P. Maitland 2982-2987 The Fish River
does not afford a good line of defence, otherwise witness would have thought
it desirable to have gone back to what was our territory in 1819, Reiiton 3080
Supposing we had retired considerably either to the Fish River orto some
good military frontier, the personal situation of the missionaries established in
what would be indisputably Kafir territory would be just what it was before.
ib. 3081.
See also Boundaries. Commando Sj/stem, 2. Kei River, 1.
Keiskamma.
Flogging. Objection to the system by which if a man has committed a crime
which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the colonial courts, and it is supposed
there is not sufficient proof before these courts, he is tied up and flogged,
Sir A. Stockenstrom 1263-1283.1323.1325-1341. 1357-1359. 1363-1385.
Forests. See Timber Tax.
Forts. The policy of the present Governor dififered from that ofhis predecessors
in dealing with the frontier tribes, as he took possession of the country and
established military forts within British Kafraria, Fairbairn 434, 435
Provided Kafirland be peopled by a white population when the natives are
driven out, they would require to be protected by means of forts, Bissett 966-
972 Opinion that the frontier can only be protected by a line of forts and
military posts ; amount of military force that would be required for this purpose.
Sir G. T. Napier 1595-1601 Remarks relative to the forts on the fron¬
tier ; great difficulty of obtaining a supply of water ; it is very desirable that
tanks should be provided for the forts, Owen 2459-2466.
See also Keishßmma. Military Force, 2.
Freeman,
FREEMAN
545
Report, 1851—continued.
Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence.) A Frotestant dissenting
clergyman. Has been connected with the colony of the Cape of Good Hope
as a visitor from the London Missionary Society of this country, but not as a
resident there ; spent about a year there in 1830, about half a year in 1836,
and a year and a half about a year ago; has lately returned, 1, a, 4, 5
On witness's last visit he went out as a visitor from the Missionary Society,
deputed by them to visit and inspect all their missionary stations in South
America, whether within the colony, or beyond the boundaries of the colony,
and to report upon them, 3 Number and situation of tlie stations of the
mi.ssion in South Africa; there are altogether about 34 stations in and beyond
tlie colony, 6 As an approximate estimate of the number of the native
population in connexion with the Missionary Society, u ilness would say there
are from 25,000 to 30,000 in direct connexion with their missionary labours, 7
The Hottentots within the colony may form about one-fourth of the
number; they are mixed with the late apprentices, 8 The latter have no
distinct home, but that of "late apprentices," meaning those that were till
lately in slavery ; these constitute another fourth, 8 The other two fourths,
or one-half of the whole number, would be Kafirs, Griquas, Bechuanas, and
Fingoes, 8 The number of natives in connexion with the London Missionaiy
Society has not been increasing very largely of late years ; but since the
emancipation it has increased considerably, 9.
General statement made by witness, that in his evidence he has no inten¬
tion or design to impugn the character of Harry Smith or his government, 10
Witness has looked at the effect of certain Government measures upon
the Hottentot population of the Kat River settlement, and has thought some
of these measures 10 be decidedly unfavourable to the people, 10 Witness
refers rather to individual acts of the local magistrate, \\ ho is however ap¬
pointed by the Government, than 10 any general and comprehensive measure,
of the Government itself, 10 Detail of several of the acts of the late ma¬
gistrate, Mr. J. H. Bowker, ofan extremely injurious and irritating character,
going far, as witness tliinks, to account for, though not to justify the disaffec¬
tion of the Hottentots, which has unhappily broken out during the present
Kafir war in the shape of disloyalty, 10-14. 9"2-i02.
Allusion to tlie case of the forests which the people had simplv, from
usage, supposed to belong to the respective allotments or settlements,"14
The whole distiict is called tlie Kai River settlement, but it embraces twelve
or thirteen divisions, which are called settlements, 14 The cutting of tim¬
ber and selling it has has been a great source of profit to them, 14-^^—Since
the war of 1847 Government has seen it right to impose a tax of 6 s. per
load on the timber cut; way in which this has tended to discourage ilie
people, 14 Agriculture, pasturage, and the conveyance of goods are the
principal occupations of the people, 15 The number of native inhabi¬
tants within the settlements is rather more than 5,000; 16 Generally
speaking, the people are an extremely well-conducted people ; there is but
one settlement where there is any disposition to intoxication, 17 The whole
population is not in connexion with the London Missionary Society, i8
There is a congregation in ConnexiOtl with the Dutch Reformed Church at
Balfour, 18 But nine-tenths of the people are in connexion with the
London Missionary Society, xg The children attend the schools in large
numbers
546
FREEMAN.
[Siaâr
Report, 1851 —continued.
Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
numbers, and the people generally are able to read and write ; they are
familiar, to some extent, with the English as well as the Dutch languages,
20,21.
There are very few Europeans resident in the settlement, 22- The Kat
River settlement extends about twenty-five miles nortb and south, by twenty
miles east and west, 23 Opinion that no general change in the existing
relations between the British Government and these people is required, 24
The main thing would be to secure to them a magistracy in which they
would have confidence, 24, 25. 103-110 Witness feels sure that upon the
whole they are a thoroughly loyal and devoted people; their present slate
of disafiection and disloyalty is entirely a new thing ; the disaffection may
have been general, but the disloyalty has been very partial, 24 An im¬
portant end would be gained by giving them a personal interest in the land,
and encouraging them to become bona fide landholders; at present they have
simply permission to occupy, 25-38.
With respect to the question whether giving title to these Hottentots to
hold (heir lands for ever would lend to retard the civilization of the colony
by preventing Europeans from efficiently cultivating the land, witness can
only say there wt re two views on the part of the Government in granting
the Kat River settlement to the Hottentots, 39 One was to reward them
for faithful services for many years past, especially in the war, 39 And
the other, to have a body of men who might serve as a defence to the
colony in the event of a Kafir attack, 39 Having 5,000 or 7,000 men
just on that spot, if we secure their fidelity and loyalty, we have that de¬
fence ; but we should not have it in the small number to which a body of
European farmers would be limited, 39 There is a great deal of jealousy
existing between the Kafirs and the Hottentots; grounds for this feeling, 40.
The Kat River settlement is in what is called the ceded territory ; but
witness has great doubts whether it ever was ceded by treaty with the Bri¬
tish Goveinment; grounds on which witness considers it neutral territory,
41-48. 183-185 From such information as witness could gather he has
always thought that, upon the whole, it was a wise policy to occupy this
neutral territory, and to give the Hottentots the occupation of it, 49-53.
64-71. 144-149 But still witness thinks something more should have
been done to meet the wishes and requests and feelings of the Kafirs, who
were excluded, and especially of the chief Maquomo; he ought to have been
provided for more distinctly, 49, 50. 141-149 A distinct provision being
made for tlie necessities of the Kafir chiefs would have secured more fidelity
and more affection on their part, 49, 50. 141-149 The eflíéct of this loca¬
tion was, no doubt, to bring the Hottentots more immediately into contact
with their fiercer and more warlike neighbours, the Kafirs; and many depre¬
dations were committed on the settlers, 54-57. 61 But there was no serious
crime committed till that particular case which led to the late war in 1846-47,
which Sir Peregrine Maitland took up, viz., the murder of a Hottentot con¬
stable ; a Kafir was also killed, 58-60. 62, 63.
Witness is aware of the opinion expressed in the report of Air. Biddelph on
the settlement drawn up at the request of Sir Henry Pottinger, that the
locating
O
Ctriftíít.]
FREEMAN.
547
Report, 1851—continued.
Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—cowi/nweif,
locating of large numbers of labouring people together in this manner is not
favourable to the colonial interests ; it is locating in one spot labourers who
might be advantageously distributed over the colony, 72 Witness's notion
of a settlement is, that the persons so located should have lands granted to
them with a good title ; that they should cultivate them and maintain them¬
selves, and be ready, if necessary, to take their share in the defence of the
frontier, 73 This description coriesponds with the Kat River settlement,
only that the parlies have no right in the soil, 73-79 Looking at all the
circumstances, and all the disadvantages being considered, witness would
describe the Kat River settlement as an industrious and thriving settlement,
80, 81 Witness is not aware that they have any cause to complain of
want of protection on the part of the Government, except in the instances of
the acts of Mr. Bowker, the magistrate mentioned above, 82, 83. 92-102.
Witness cannot account for the general disloyalty which has recently pre¬
vailed in the settlement; it is a most mysterious thing, a thing which strikes
witness with great surprise ; opinion that it is a political movement and not
at all a religious one, 84-91* With regard to appointing natives magis¬
trates, witness would say that there are many respectable men, perhaps in
Graham's Town, but certainly in Cape Town, which is the seat of government,
who are well qualified to act as magistrates, 103-110. 122-127, '57-159
There are two classes of persons in the colony; those who take what witness
would call a just, and benevolent, and liberal view of the question, and who
would endeavour to raise and improve the coloured races, 110 And there
are others who deem them utterly incapable of improvement, and would sweep
them from their land entirely, 110.
Witness presumes that the coloured races within the limits of the British
colony are increasing in number, but there are no statistics on the subject
which can be depended upon, 111, 112 Religious or sectarian feeling and
rivalry does not run so high in this part of South Africa, but there is a little
of it, 114, 115 Impracticability of maintaining a certain space of neutral
ground between the two races, the Hottentots and the Kn.firs, 116-118
There is no system of local self government among the Hottentots through
the medium of their chiefs ; there are headmen of the villages appointed by
the people; functions of the headmen, 119-121. 132. 138-140 The
magistrates are always Europeans : reasons why witness thinks that at
present this is better than that they should be appointed fiom their own race,
122-127.
There are half castes in the colony who would be respected if they were known
tobe men of character and intelligence; but they are few in number, 128-
130 The half castes are increasing, as the result of marriages between
respectable white men and Hotteniot women; opinion that from this circum¬
stance the Hottentot race will become extinct, 131 The only other settle¬
ments of the Hottentots besides that of the Kat River are the missionary
institutions, where the people have congregated round the missionaries, 133,
'34 A portion of land, say 5,000 acres, is perhaps allotted by the
Government as the location of the Hottentots, where a ttiissionary resides and
a schoolhouse is built, and a church or a chapel, as the case may be ; the
missionaries are appointed from the societies at home 134-137.
54^
F Ë E E M A N.
Report, 1851—continued.
Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
Any institution liké ihat of juries has not made any progress in the Kat
River settlement, 141-143——There is only one magistrate for the Kat River
settlement ; he is stationary ; all questions are brought to him ; no inconveni¬
ence arises from this, 150,151, 153,154 There is no desire among the Hot¬
tentots to be independent of our Government, 152 Witness believes the
'natives are satisfied with their present magistrate, Mr. Wien, and wlio is the
third who has been appointed ; the two former appointments were rather unfor¬
tunate, 156 As regards the appointment of magistrates, if the natives
themselves had the power of making a strong recommendation, perhaps of a
veto to a certain extent, still leaving the appointment finally with the Govern¬
ment, it would give them great satisfaction, 157-160.
The Kafir boundary is very accurately defined, so far as the course of the
river is concerned; the Kafiis have a ready capacity for making boundary
lines; the boundary has been distiucily marked out from time to time by the
Gavernment and tlie chiefs together, 161-165 Evidence showing that the
Kafirs are a very scattered population; reason of tiiis, 166-169 Some of
the Hottentots have had grants of land made to them ; but they sold or parted
with their grants, which interposed a difficulty in the way of continuing these
grants ; there would be no iiarm in tliis if they were tied down to sell it only to
a Hottentot, 170-175 The old boundary of the colony was the Fish River,
176, 177 The Kafirs at that time occupied what is now called the neutral
or ceded territory, 178——At that time there were constant depredations and
disturbances upon the boundary, 179 These depredations were repressed
by the commando system, which had prevailed under the Dutch government;
this led to very great abuses and involved constant wrongs, 180, 181
The establishment of a neutral territory was made with a view to put an end
to this system, 182. 196, 197 After the establishment of this neutral terri¬
tory Maquomo was again allowed to come in, and the depredations and dis¬
turbances were revived; this led to the driving of Maquomo from the territory,
183-195.
Evidence on the subject of the complaint of the Griquas, of having been
deprived by Sir Harry Smith of a portion of their territory, seemingly under
treaty, 198 et seq. The Griquas are commonly called bastards; they are
chiefly descendants of Hottentot women and Dutch farmers, 201 The
point at present complained of is, that although Sir Peregrine Maitland made
a treaty with them recognizing a division of their territory into alienable and
inalienable land. Sir Harry Smith has deprived them, by his last treaty with
them, of the date of February 1848, of the whole of that portion which is
called alienable land; detailtd narrative on this point, 201-219 Sir Harry
Smith treated the Griquas as mere squatters, and witness conceives his object
was to carry out the principle with which he set out on the frontier, that where
he found black men, there they should be; and where he found white men,
there they should be ; he assumed this as a general principle of policy with the
people as a whole, 220.
The Griquas do not at this moment object to the land being taken from
them for ever, but they ask us to pay them compensation, 220-229. 233, 234.
236-243 The British Government has taken the land, and now lets it, and
receives
iCtriiieô.]
FR E
FRO
549
Report, 1851—continued.
Freeman, Rev. Joseph John. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
receives a quit-rent over the whole ; under the present treaty the Griquas could
not lake possession of the land paying a quit-rent, without being British subjects
by so doing, 230-332 There were great disputes between the boers and
the Griquas, and it was the object of Sir Harry Smith to settle the boers on
the land to which tbey had a perfecily clear right, and to remove the Griquas
from close contact with the Dutcii fanners, 233 Kecomniendations as tp
the mode in wliich compensation should be made to the Griquas ; opinion that
a money payment would be more acceptable to them than by giving them
land in any other district, 23,5 The Griquas, generally, are not so far
advanced in civilization as the coloured races living within the colony, but some
of them are very far advanced ; a great many or them are decidedly Christians,
and many of them are good men, 244, 245.
Reference to witness's recommendation to Lord Grey, that there should be
some inquiry into the case of the Griquas on the spot, 246, 247 Witness
is of opinion that Government ought to make compensation with respect to
the inalienable property also, 248-255 The number of the Griqua popu¬
lation is from 10,000 to 15,000; 256 Observations with respect to the
Bassuto tribe, 257-261 Detail of the mode in vvhicii the territory belong¬
ing to Moshish, the chieftain of the tribe, was taken from him without com¬
pensation being made to him ; witness would say it was taken away from
him by intimidation, 257-261.
Frontier Boundary. Witness would say that the extent of frontier which we
have to defend now is about 120 miles, A. Smith 368-372 Remarks rela¬
tive to the nature and extent of the Kafir frontier; the whole of Kafraria is
British, and the frontier of the British possessions is the great Kei, Fairbaini
490, 491. 510. 522-527 Details relative to the boundary and nature of the
frontier of the Cape colony, and the various tribes inhabiting the districts
across the frontier, Adamson 680 The extent of territory has not been
increased; we hold now the same boundary as Sir Benjamin D'Urban had
after the war; Sir Andries Slockenstiom gave it away again, Sir G. T. Napier
1538-1540 Opinion that the boundary must be always undefined; there
is no good boundary as a mere defensive boundary in itself; the defence of
the frontier must rather turn upon military considerations than upon any
neutral boundary, Owen 2422-2426. 2580.
See also Amatóla Mountains. Boundaries. Buffalo River. De¬
fence of the Frontier. Division of the Colony. Fish River. Kaßr
ÍVars. Kei River. Keiskarnma. Military Force. Military
Lo.w. Military Posts. Military Villages. Neutral Territory.
Open Frontier. Patrol System. Plunder. Tambookie Frontier.
Western Frontier.
Frontier Tribes. General feeling of mistrust of the tribes by people on the
froniier, who have been for years declaring that the tribes were hostile, and
that the government and a great portion of the peojile in the colony were
deceiving tliemselvts in supposing that they were in a state of security,
Fairbairn 446, 447.
See also Amatóla Mountains. Bassuto Tribes. Border Tribes.
Bushmen. Depredations. Gaika Tribes. Griquas, Population.
0.63. N N
5)0
GAI G II A
Report, 1851—continued.
G.
Gaîka Tribes. Witness is confident that the Gaika Kafirs would not havö
entered upon the war liad not they been sure of the co-operation of the Kat
River Hottentots; cause of the defection of the Kat River settlers, Bisseii
^ 746, 747 Witness does not think the reason of the Gaika tribes rising has
been the fear of expulsion from their territory, 766. 770-77^'
Gaikas are included among the Kafirs ; their cattle has been captured to a
considerable extent, Adamson 1092-1094 Opinion that the Gaika tribe
are a people over whom a moral influence might be exercised if we preserved
in their minds the belief that we were acting towards them with justice and
good faith. Rentan 3073, 3074. See also Chiefs, 2. Europeans.
GleneJg, Lord. Lord Glenelg's system was introduced in December 1836;
witness can only speak as to its being faithfully carried out the first two years.
Sir A. Stockenstrom 1856, 1857. 1859, i860 It was in some measure put
a Slop to by amendments made by Sir George Napier; when witness returned
to the colony in 1840 he considered that these amendments were fatal to tlie
system, ib. 1858. 1861-18C3 Grounds on which witness forms the opinion,
that in 1845 the Kafirs were preparing to attack the colony in consequence of
Lord Glenelg's treaties having been puta stop to, ib. 1874, 1875. 1882-1897.
1901-1905 Remarks relative to the system adopted by Lord U le neig for
the protection of the colony, A. Smith 2153-2158 During witness's
governorship he adhered in the main to the policy which was established by
Lord Glenelg with reference to the Kafirs, Sir P. Maitland 2923.
See also Defence of the Frontier. Treaties, 1.
Government, The. See Colonists. Policy of the Government.
Government of the Colony. See Constitutional Government. Legislative
Assembly. Local Government. Policy of the Government. Repre¬
sentative Government.
Government Despatches. Evidence relative to the complaints of the colonists
of their being deceived as to the dangerous state of Kafirland by the de¬
spatches of the Governor; witness does not consider that the Governor at
present has full means of getting correct information, Fairbairn 623-659
Opinion that it would have been better if the whole truth had been laid before
the colonists by the Governor, and openly discussed, ib. 659.
Covernrnent Grants. In the event of Government grants being made to the
chiefs, witness does not think they possess sufficient influence over their tribes
to lead them to keep down depredations for the purpose of receiving the sub¬
sidy, Owen 2604. See also Missionaries, 3.
Corcrnor of the Colony, See Chiefs, 5. Colonial Office.
Giaham's Town. See Seat of Government,
Grants
Crific«.]
G R A
G RI
55»
Report, 1851—continued.
Grants of Land. Some of the Hottentots have had grants of land made to
them ; but they sold or parted with these grants, which interposed a difficulty
in the way of continuing these gi ants ; there would be no harm in this if they
were tied down to selling it only to a Hottentot, 170-175.
See also Tenure of Land.
GRIQUAS:
1. Generally,
2. Complaints of the Griquas of being dispossessed of their
Territory.
3. Opinions that Compensation should he made to them.
1. Generally :
The Griquas are commonly called Bastards; they are chiefly descendants of
Hottentot women and Dutch farmers, Freeman 201 The Griquas generally
are not so far advanced in civilization as the coloured races living within
the colony, but some of them are very far advanced ; a great many of them
are decidedly Christians, and many of them are good men, ib. 244, 245
The number of the Griqua population is from 10,000 to 15,000, ib. 256,
2. Complaints of the Griquas of being dispossessed of their Territory :
Evidence on the subject of the complaint of the Griquas of having been
deprived by Sir Harry Smith of a portion of their territory seemingly under
treaty, Freeman 198 et seq. The point at present complained of is, that
although Sir Peregrine Maitland made a treaty with them, recognizing a
division of their territory into alienable and inalienable land, Sir Harry Smith
has deprived them, by his last treaty with them, of the date of February
1848, of the whole of that portion which is called alienable land ; detailed
narrative on this point, ib. 201-219 Sir Harry Smith treated the Griquas as
mere squatters, and witness conceives his object was to carry out the principle
with which he set out on the frontier, that where he found black men, there
they should be; and where he found white men, there they should be ; he
assumed this as a general principle of policy with the people as a whole, ib.
220.
There were great disimles between the boers and the Griquas, and it was the
object of Sir Harry Smith to settle the boers on the land to whicli they had a
perfectly clear right, and to remove the Griquas from close contact with the
Dutch farmers. Freeman 233 Evidence relative to a number of emigrant
boers having established themselves in the country of the Griquas, who border
on the Orange River ; ciicumstances which led to their emigrating beyond
the limits of the colony ; line of policy best adajited to 1 eco ver their aflections,
so as to control their actions, Fairbairn 532-547 Explanation relative to
the operations in which witness was employed beyond the Orange River in
the neighbourhood of Philippolis, in supporting the Griquas against an
attack of the Dutch boers, defeat of the boers and establi=bment of a civil
magistrate in the country, Owen 2386-2392.
3. Opinions that Compensation should be made to them :
The Griquas do not at this moment object to the land being taken from them
for ever, but they ask us to pay them compensation, Freeman 220-229. 233,
0.63. N N 2 234
552 GR! HER [UAfiv
Report, 1851—continued.
Griquas—continued.
3. Opinions that Compensation should he made to them—continued.
234- 236-243 The British Government has taken the land, and now lets
it, and receives a quit-rent over the whole; under the present treaty tlie Gri¬
quas could not take possession of the land, paying a quit-rent, without becom¬
ing British subjects by so doing, F/eewiara 230-232 Recommendation as
to the mode in which compensation should be made to the Giiquas; opinion
that a money payment would be more acceptable to them than by giving them
land in any other district, ib. 235 Reference to witness's recommendation
to Lord Grey, that theie should be some inquiry into the case of the Griquas
on the spot, ib, 246, 247 Witness is of opinion that Government ought to
make compensation with respect to the inalienable property also, ih. 248-255.
See Missionaries, 1. Treaties, 2.
Gunpowder. Although gunpowder is prohibited from being exported from the
colony, large quantities find their way into the interior, where it is an article
in great demand, Adamson 672 Witness does not think that any exertions
of the missionaries would have ihe eflPect of preventing the natives getting
gunpowder, as it has become almost necessary to their existence, ih. 725-728
Impossibility of the Kafirs manufacturing powder; if it were possible to
prevent the exportation of powder and fire-arms to them, it would put a slop
to further war, Bissett 878-884. 1006-1009.
See also Fire-Arms. Traders.
H.
Habits of the Natives. See Civilization, 1.
Half-Castes. The half-castes are increasing, as the result of marriages between
respectable white men and Hottentot women ; opinion that from this circum¬
stance the Hottentot race will become extinct, Freeman 131.
See also Magistrates, 2.
Hawes, Benjamin, M. P. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Observations and ex¬
planations with respect to a letter which has been addressed to the Chairman
of the Committee by Sir Andries Stockenstrom, stating that certain words
contained in a letter of Sir G. Napier's of 20 November 1838, and which
were inserted in the copy of the papers which were delivered to the Com¬
mittee, weie omitted in the copy delivered for general circulation, 3286-3288
This sentence was, " ihe worst importation that ever came to this
colony reasons for their being omitted in the copy delivered for general
circulation, 3286-3288.
Headmen. See Chiefs. Local Government.
iiermanus (Chief). Observations relative to the location of Hermanus on the
settlement, shoviing that his presence was dangerous to the allegiance of the
pe ople of the Kat River Settlement, Renton 3199-3202. 3206.
See also Kat River Settlement, 3.
Hereditary
íTrifiw.J
HER
r R R
553
Report, 1851—continued.
Hereditary Chiefs. See Chiefs, 5.
Hottentots. Tlicre is no desire among the Hottentots to be independent of our
Government, Freeman 152 The Hottentots cannot now be as much
depended on as troops in our service as they were formerly, Bissett 828,829
Tlie number of Hottentots has been very much diminishing ever since the
commencement of the colony, A. Smith 2061 From witness's knowledge
of these tribes, he is of opinion that they would unite generally against the
British, ¿6. 2073, 2074 Opinion that the Hottentots might be made useful
allies by combination with the British forces, Owen 2627-2631.
Witness has understood that on every occasion the Hottentots were ready
to obey orders, and were zealous in their loyalty, iíeníon 3169 Reasons
why witness would still say that the Hottentots are a very loyal people, ib.
3222-3226 When witness stated that the Hottentots had had discontent
from being employed in the last war for a considerable time, it was not the
mere employment he specified as the cause, but the conditions of it, and the
treatment afterwards, and the losses they suffered, ib. 3383-3392 Witness
considers the re.-t of the Hottentots settled along the frontier were as loyal as
those at the Kat River, ib. 3393 Witness has no idea that there was any
combination between all the Hottentot settlements on the frontier, including
the soldieis of the Cape Corps, on the subject of the outbreak, ib. 3426-3430
But witness apprehends there must have been communications from the
Kafirs with a part of the Hottentots, endeavouring to obtain their neutrality,
and probably their co-operation, ib—~-As far as witness's knowledge ex¬
tends, the Hotteirtots had no cause of complaint against the local auth nities
or the Government, and the missionaries had an opinion that they would have
stood by them to the very last extremity. La Trohe 3485.
See also Aborigines. Cape Corps. Cape Mounted Rifles. Ceded
Territory. Compensation. Disaffection. Europeans. Gaiha
Tribes. Grants of Land. Kafir Wars, 3. Kat River Settlement.
Magistrates, I. Missionaries,!. Rations. Tenure of Land.
Treachery.
I.
Incursions of Territory. One of the chief causes of offensive operations on the
part of the Kafirs arises out of their dread of incursions upon their territory.
Sir A. Stockenstrom 1478-1482 It would not be expedient in any way to
interfere with the internal government of the Kafirs beyond the frontier, with
the view of preventing incursions into the British territory. Sir G. T. Napier
1522. 1690. See also Military Posts.
Indian Government. See BheeU. Khandeish Province.
Industrial Occupations. See Cotton Cultivation. Kat River Settlement, 1.
Vseful Arts.
Influence. See Chiefs, 2. 3.
Insurrection. See Disaffection. Kafir Wars.
Irrigation. See Climate.
«.63. N N 3 Itinerant
554
ITI
KA F
lUnfit
Report, 1851—continued.
Itinerant Traders. Great advantage would result from checking the itinerant
traders visiting Kafirland, and the establishment of fairs for the purpose of
trading with the natives, Sir J. E. Alexander 3722-3726.
See also Fire-Arms. Traders.
J.
Jealousy. There is a great deal of jealousy existing between the Kafirs and the
Hottentots ; grounds for this feeling, Freeman 40 The feeling of the Kafirs
against the white man is more that of jealousy and fear than that of hostility ;
thev fear eventually that they will be sacrificed by the white men, A. Smith
363-365-
Jones, Dr. See Kat River Settlement, 1.
Juries. Any institution like that of juries has not made any progress in the
Kat River settlement, Freeman 141-143 Objections to Sir Harry Smith's
view of obtaining redress through the agency of the Kañrs themselves, that
is, by a chief assembling a jury of twelve of his people to try the offender, in
presence of the superintendent of police. Sir A. Stockenstrom 2002-2005.
3007, 2QO8,
K.
Kafir Chiefs. See Chiefs.
Kafir Force. Estimated force of the Kafiis; manner in which they are sup¬
ported; impossibility of their maintaining a war for any length of time from
the want of provisions, Owen 2440-2448. 2605. See also Population.
Kafir Wars:
1. Explanation as to the Cause of the War of 1835-36.
2. Evidence as to the Cause of the Outbreak in 1846.
3. Circumstances which may be alleged to have led to the present
War.
4. Opinions that no other Course can now be pursued than that of
prosecuting the War with the utmost Rigour, and entirely
subduing the Kafirs.
5. How far the Feeling of the Colonists is against a War.
1. Explanation as to the Cause of the War of 1636-36 :
Explanation as to the cause of the Kafir war breaking out in 1835, Fair-
bairn 568 Opinion that the causes which led to the outbreak of the Kafir
war in 1835, were the smallness of our military force, the depredations of the
Kafirs, and the abolition of the old system of defence called the Commando
system, Sir J. E. Alexander 2663-2668 Course taken by the Government
with a view to obtain redress from the Kafir chiefs before war was proclaimed
in 1835, ib. 2669-2682.
2. Evidence
CríííW.]
KAFIR WARS.
555
Report, 1851—continued.
Kafir Wars—continued.
a. Evidence as to the Cause of the Outbreak in 1846 :
Evidence relative to the cause of the outbreak in 1846, Fairbairn 569, 570
The immediate origin of the Kafir war in 1846 was the seizure of a pri¬
soner by the Kafirs when under escort ; the breaking out of that war was
caused by the conduct of the Kafirs, T. C. Smith 2235-2237 The causes
of the discontent in 1846, which made the Kafirs so desirous for a pretext for
war, was their eagerness to possess themselves of our lands and herds, Owen
2645-2647.
3. Circumstances which may be alleged to have led to the present War :
Witness is unable to give a decisive opinion as to the cause of the late out¬
break among the Kafirs ; reference to a letter from a missionary at Union
Dale station, in the centre of the Amatóla mountains, who makes allusions
to the commencement of the outbreak, Adamson 673, 674 Opinion that
the Kafirs had been preparing for war for some years pa^t, nearly since the
end of the war under Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and only wanted a pretext for
breaking out, Owen 2394-2416, 2417. 2523-2537. 2655-2657 Witness
remained with the Kafirs from the middle of November 1850 till the 21st
January, when he had to go into the Kat River settlement, lienton 3011
When witness went into the Kafir country he found rumours of war all the
way Upon his journey ; witness found these rumours very prevalent on the fron¬
tier, but he discredited them for various reasons, ib. 3012 From what
witness could learn from the missionaries, he could not find that there were
any grounds for anticipating an outbreak, ib. 3013-3016. 3021-2025.
Witness had communication with the Kafirs themselves, and from their
representations and assurances was led to believe there would be no outbreak;
evidence in detail relative to the nature of these assurances, and showing that
the Kafirs at this time even dreaded war. Rentan 3017-3019-^—The pre¬
valence of rumours along the frontier, and wiihin the colony, of war, had a
very bad effect in turning the minds of all to the expectation of it, and
thereby calling into activity these latent elements, ib. 3035 The insurrec¬
tion broke out first at the Keiskamma among the Kafirs on the 241h Decem¬
ber, i6. 3219- And one of the principal insurrectional y movemenis was at
the Kat River settlement, immediately following the outbreak of the Kafirs,
ib. 3220 It is also the fact that great number of persons belonging iq
that settlement, Hottentots especially, joined the rebels, ib. 3221.
4. Opinions that no other Course can now be pursued than that of pro¬
secuting the War with the utmost Rigour, and entirely subduing
the Kafirs.
Necessity for the Kafirs being conquered before any proper system of
defence could be put up; the last war was never completely finished, or the
present war would not have occurred, Bissett 962-965 There is not a man
in this country, nor at the Cape, who can tell what must be done at the close
of the war; everything depends on its termination, ¿sir A. Stockenstrom
1257. 1264—1266 What we are now to do is not to re>t till we have put
these people dovvn ; unless they aie put down they will drive us out ot the
colony, 1257—"—The Kafirs must be conquered now aiu' iiut down by
0,63. N N 4 force.
5.56
K A F
K AT
Report, 1851—continued.
Kafir Wars—continued.
4. Opinions that ¡10 other Course can now be pursued, Sçc.—continued,
force, and the only way of controlling them hereafter will be through their
chiefs, unless we crush ihem altogeiher, and a sort of moral control must be kept
over their chiefs. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1301-1307. 1408-1423 Up to the
present moment we have never yet reduced tlie Kafirs, i¿. 1408-1423
Opinion that the first step must be to put the Kafirs down, and tliat so com¬
pletely as to force them to cry out for peace. Sir G. T, Napier 1515-1517
This can only be done by a strong military force being placed at the complete
disposal of Sir Harry Smith, ib. 1515 Looking at the position of things as
they now stand, seeing the Kafirs are in hostility to the British, there is no
other course open than that of prosecuting the war, and convincing the
Kafirs that we are the stionger party. Sir T. Maitland 2958-2962.
5. How far the Feeling of the Colonists is against a War :
There are but a very small number of persons in the colony interested in
promoting or in the continuance of the frontier wars; their influence would
not be appreciable in its eflect upon the legislature of the colony, Fairbaim
589, 590. 597-604 Opinion that taking the united interests of the
colonists, there is a stronger interest in the colony against a war than in
favour of one, Sir G. T. Napier 1643-1645.
See also British Power. Chiefs, 3. Coloured Races. Commando
System, 1. Commission of Inquiry. Constitutional Government.
Defection. Depredations. Disaffection. Encroachments. Ex¬
penditure. Hottentots. Kat River Settlement, 2. Military Force.
Missionaries, 1. 4. Neutral Territory. Police. Regular Troops.
Saridilli. Surveys. Treaties, 1.
Kat River Settlemest :
1. Particulars as to the Formation, Extent, and Population of the Set¬
tlement ; Character of the Settlers.
2. Complaints of the Settlers of their Losses in the different
Wars.
3. Evidence as to the present Disaffection existing in the Settle¬
ment.
4. Opinion that it would be expedient to break up this Settlement.
1. Particulars as to the Formation, Extent, and Population of the
Settlement-, Character of the Settlers.
The Kat River settlement extends about twenty-five miles north and south,
and twenty miles east and west ; the whole district is called the Kat River
settlement, but it embraces twelve or thirteen divisions, which are also called
settlements. Freeman 14. 23. Agriculture, pasturage, and the conveyance
of goods are the principal occupations <.f the people, tb. 15 Having 5,000
or 7,000 men just on iliat spot, ii we secure their fidelity and loyalty we
have that defence, but we should not have it in tiie small number to which a
body of European farmers would be limited, ib. 39 Looking at all the
circumstances, and all the disadvantages being considered, witness would
describe the Kat River settlement as an industrious and thriving settlement,
Fre&nan
«TriftW.] K A T R I V E R. 557
R( port, 18.51—continued.
Kát River Settlement—continued.
1. Particulars as to the Formation, Fkctent, Sçc.—continued.
Freeman Bo, 8i Circumstances which led to the formation of the Kat River
settlement ; Government aid granted to the settlers ; unfavourable reports as
to the industry and character of the people there, ib. 1030-1045.
Evidence relative to the establishment of the Kat River settlement, and
the stale of that colony. Sir G. T. Napier 1(360-1687 Witness has met
with a repoit made by Mr. Biddulph of the state and condition of the Kat
River settlement in May 1847 ; witness strongly differs from him ; he con¬
siders the description of the settlement to be libellous; reference to certain
statements made in this report which witness knows to be incorrect. Sir A.
Stockenstrom 1989-2000 State of the Kat River settlement on witness's
visit in July 1835 ; idleness of the Hottentots generally. Sir J. E. Alexander
2798-2804 Memorandum of the Kat River settlement drawn up by
Dr. Jones, the Superintendent-general of education in the colony, founded
upon oiHcial returns and documents, delivered in and read, Renton^li^-
3125 Witness supposes the design of the settlement was to make them a
sort of bulwark to the colony, which ihey have proved, for they have borne
the brunt of every war, ib. 3168.
Reasons for Sir Lowry Cole punishing the Kafirs that were living by suffer¬
ance in the ceded territory, and driving them out and establishing a Hottentot
settlement on the same ground. Sir A. Stockenstrom 3296 Witness fully
approved of the policy pursued at that lime, and was the principal instrument
in the expulsion of Maquomo, ib. 3297-3299 Reasons for arriving at the
conclusion that tlie Kat River settlement has not been a failure. Menton 33t 2
On looking at the services and sacrifices and subsequent treatment under¬
gone by the population, witness does not regard the experiment as having had
a fair trial, ib.
2. Complaints of the Settlers of their Losses in the different Wars :
Remarks relative to the outbreak of the Kat River settlers against the
Government; complaints made by those tribes of certain acts of the Govern¬
ment, Fairbairn 44t Great losses to which the Kat River settlers were
subject in the last war ; a great number of them have now joined the Kafirs,
ib, 610 In 1836 the Kat River settlement was self-supporting; it never
had one farthing of support, and had done more for Government than any
other part of the country; it was ruined by the tvar, Sir A. Stockenstrom
1847-1855 Witness wrote a letter duiing the summer of 1850 relating to
the complaints made by the settlers on the Kat River; their principal com¬
plaint was about burning them out of their houses; there was much irritation
in the minds of the settlers ; tliis was before the war, ib. 1972-1976.
Detail of the grievances of the people as related to witness on his visit to the
colony in 1851, Renton 3126 et seq. Complaints wei-e made by them that
both in 1835-36 and 1846-47 they were treated as a degraded race, and that
they had received no compensation from the losses they had sustained by the
wars ; they also complained that solemn promises made to them by successive
Governments had been broken, ib. 3129 et seq. 3157-3167 Witness is
aware that many cases occurred of great individual losses to other settlers in
other
538
K AT
K E I
Report, 1851—continued.
Kat River Settlement—conúamcá.
2. Complaints of the Settlers of their Losses, S^c,—continued.
other parts of the Cape from the Kafir war, but it was optional with them to
come out or to retire, lienton 3167 The Kat River men, on the contrary,
were the first called out and the last relieved, ib.
3. evidence as to the present Disaffection existing in the Settlement ;
Up to 1847 there was never a more loyal sel of people in the world. Sir A.
Stochenslrom 1976, 1977——Since then the change which has taken place
among them greatly surprises every one, ib. 1976-1978 Witness went to
the Kat River settlement on the 20 January 1851 ; reasons for his going
there, Renton 3115 Disafi'ection prevailed there extensively at that period,
ib. 3116, 3117 Tlie followers of Hermanus who had rallied after his defeat
had received accessions from numerous discontented Hottentots, and were
exercising a most pernicious influence, ib. 3116 ^Theie seemed to be no
civil or military autiiority in the colony competent to ihe exigency ; there
seemed to be no power to repress the Kafirs without or to control the turbu¬
lence within, ib.
Copy of letter from the Rev. James Read, sen., missionary of the London
Missionary Society, dated 26 March 1851, in refutation of the statement con¬
tained in Major-general Somerset's despatch, that Philipton, Kat River, had
become the focus of almost all the disaffected, App. 485-488.
4. Opinions that it would be expedient to break up this Settlement :
Witness considers the Kat River settlement as a collection of all the bad
coloured people in the whole of the provinces ; opinion tiiat Colonel Somerset,
in breaking up that settlement, would do a very politic and wise thing, Bissett
812-827. 940-947 Witness would approve of breaking up the Kat River
settlement; if witness had had to make that settlement, he would never have
placed it there. Sir G. T. Napier 1565,1566 Remarks as to the Kat River
settlement ; it is a very dangerous post to have people of doubtful fiilelity ;
opinion that colonists from tliis country should have been placed there instead
of the Hottentots, Sir J. E. Alexander 2727-2732.
See also Biddulph, Mr. Ceded Territory. Disaffection. Europeans.
Gaika Tribes. Hermanus. Hottentots. Junes. Kafir Wars, 3.
London Missionary Society. Magistrates, 1. 2. Military Force, 1.
Missionaries, 4. Morals. Population. Schools. Tenure of
Land. Timber Tax.
Kei River:
1. Recommendations that the Kafirs should be driven across the
Kei, and this River made the Frontier Boundary.
2. Objections to the Kei as the Frontier Boundary.
1. Recommendations that the. Kafirs should be driven across the Kei,
and this River made the Frontier Boundary :
In witness's opinion the Kei is a much more defensible frontier than any
we have yet occupied ; the most defensible boundary is an open space in
which cavalry can act; necessity for a large military force for its defence,
fiijtsptt
K E I
KEI
559
Report, 1851—continued.
Kej JÎ/F£â—continued.
1. Recommendations that the Kaßrs, ^c.—continued.
Bissett 800, 801. 957-962. 981-986. 991-1005 Extension of the boundary
of the Cape colony to the River Kei, by Sir Benjamin D'LTrban ; the majority
of the colonists were in favour of this extension, Sir G. T. Napier 1605-1608.
1646, 1647 Advantage of driving the Kafirs over the great Kei; by sucli
a proceeding the Government would secure the respect of the Kafirs, as they
have most respect for that which they most fear, Owen 2544-2555. 2576-2584
In recommending that the Kafirs should be driven over the great Kei,
witness only refers to those chiefs and tribes most implicated in the war, ih.
2648-2654 Opinion that it would be very unsafe to drive the Kafirs across
the Kei, as long as we have Natal ; because if driven in that direction they
might attack the flourishing settlement of Natal, Sir J. E. Alexander 2704-
2709. 2830-2844 Opinion that the best boundary for our military posts is
the Kei ; it is preferable to the Great Fish River or the Keiskamma, ib. 2752-
2762 Recommendation that all the Kafirs should be driven across the
Great Kei, and that river adopted as the frontier boundary ; no Kafirs should
be located in British Kafiaria unless they registered themselves and gave up
their arms, Sir P- Maitland 2862-2875.
2. Objections to the Kei as the Frontier Boundary.
Objections to the removal of the Kafir tribes beyond the Kei, as proposed
by Major Bissett, Adamson 1066-1071 It is witness's opinion that driving
the Kafirs out of their own country across the Kei would only remove the
evil for a short time, and would not tend to bring about the desired result, ib.
1076-1087 There would be no difficulty in driving the Kafirs from their
country across the Kei, provided the Government was determined to do it, ib.
1094-1100 A few years ago there might have been an advantage in push¬
ing the frontier as far as the great Kei River, but witness does not see how it
is to be done now. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1260-1263 With respect to making
the Kei River the boundary of the colony, it must depend in a great measure
on the terms which may become to with the Kafirs and their chiefs, ib. 1304-
1307 Witness would not propose to push the frontier to the Great Kei,
unless it is proposed to keep Kafraria ; opinion that Kafraria can only be
kept by a military force. Sir G. T. Napier 1519 Necessity for the Kafirs
being allowed the free range of their country ; provided they were all forced
into one spot they would starve, ib. 1520, 1521.
See also Amatóla Mountains. Buffalo River. Civil Commissioners.
E'Urban, Benjamin. Frontier Boundary, Keiskamma. Kreli,
Chief. Soil. Wandering Tribes.
Keiskamma. Opinion that the Keiskamma is the most advantageous frontier to
maintain, along which there were very excellent forts built, Sir G. T. Napier
1518. 1655-1657. 1688, 1689. 1692-—Opinion in favour of the Keiskamma
as the frontier of the Cape colony ; great difficulty of protecting the Fish River
boundary ; the Great Kei would be far too extended a boundary, T. C. Smith
2353-2358 Observations relative to the military forts on the Keiskamma
frontier, there would be no difficulty in occupying these forts with a British
force, ib, 2363-2369 Information as to the number of the varions Kafir
tribes
56o
K E I
K RE
[£tafiv
Report, 1851—continued.
Keiskamma—continued.
tribes to the east and north-east of the Keiskamma, Sir A. Stockenstrom
3290-3296,
See also Aborigines. Fish River. Kei River, 1. Somerset, Lord
Charles.
Khandeish Province. Troubled slate of the Khandei>h territory at the time it
fell into our hands in 1817; it was completely overrun by mercenaiy bands of
Arabs, Pindarte-, and Bheels, so that the roads were nearly impassible, and
neither life nor property was secure, Ovans 1116, 1117 Nature of the con¬
ciliatory policy adopted by the agents, and complete success which attended
that policy, by which Khandeish has become as quiet as any district under
the Bombay presidency, ib. 1128-1138. 1158-1246 Amount of the Indian
force employed in the Khandeish province ; formation of two native regiments
wiiose fidelity has been found uninterrupted, ib. 1139-1146 Report made
by witness to Sir John Malcolm in 1830, stating the success which had at¬
tended the conciliatory policy in the Khandeish province; this report was
approved of by Sir John and also tlie home Government, and was printed and
distributed for future guidance of officers, ib. 1132-1136. 1147-1 HQ-
See also Bheels.
King William's Town. From the mode <;f warfare of the Kafirs, it is very
desirable that the boundary should have the command of an open country ;
opinion that King William's Town is about one of the best military stations
in the colony, Owen 2427-2435. 2557-2566 The country about King
William's Town is more open and better adapted for the movement of troops
than that on the frontier of the Keiskamma ; therefore for a military purpose
witness would prefer pushing the posts as far as King William's Town, Sir J.
E. Alexander 2692-2699.
Kreli, Chief. Explanation relative to the arrangement entereil into by witness
with the chief Kreli in 1846; the fourth article of which treaty was that
Kreli is "to acknowledge the right of the British Government to all land
west of the Great or White Kei, and to relinquish all claim which he, Kreli,
or any other Kafir, chief or subject, may have possessed, to uny part of the
said territory," Sir A. Stochenstrom 1724-172Ó Although witness generally
objects to encroachments upon the lands held by native tribes, he hoped that
by treating with Kreli as the paramount chief and obtaining from him the
land west of the Kei, we might thus obtain a title to the principal strongholds
and restore the remainder, holding him responsible as any other independent
chief, ib. 1724 But we broke the convention which was made with Kreli,
by marching an army against him, which only exposed our weakness, shook
more than ever the faith of the barbarian in our justice, and the result is that
he has joined the war against us; witness can therefore no longer recommend
this plan, ib. 1724-1736. See also D'Urban, Sir Benjamin.
LAB
L O N
561
Report, 1851—continued
L.
Labourers. Witness is aware of the opinion expressed in the Report of Mr.
Riddulph on the Kat River settlement, drawn up at the request of Sir Henry
Poltinger, that the locating of large numbers of labouring people together in
this manner is not favourable to the colonial intouTsts ; it is locating in one
spot labourers who might be advantageously distributed over the colony,
Fieeman 72.
" Late Apprentices." Beneficial effect of the missionary labours with regard to
the "late apprentices," Adamsou 667 Remarks relative to the aid granted
by Government to the missions to the "late apprenticesj" manner in which
it is applied, it. 1038, 1039. See also Missionaries, 1.
La Trohe, Rev. Peter. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Secretary to the Church of
ihe United (a Moravian) Brethren in this country; has been in connexion
with the mission of that Church for thirty years, 3482 Statement relative
to the recent occurrences in Kafraria, in as far as they have reference to the
Moravian settlement of Shiloh, 3483-3486 Every exertion was made by
tiie missionaries to allay the prevailing irritation among the Kafirs, 3485
As far as witness's knowledge e.stends, the Hottentots had no cause of com¬
plaint against the lo( al authorities or the Government, and the missionaries
had an opinion tba tthey would have stood by them to the very last extremity,
3485 There is considerable doubt whether the first aggression was on the
part of the Whittlesca people or the Shiloh people, 3486 The Moravian
missionaries have not a station at Whiltlesea, 3487.
Laws of the Colony. See Military Law.
Legislative Assembly. In the event of the establishment of a Legislative
Assembly in the colony, they would undertake to pay a large portion of the
expenses of the colony ; not the whole, as that would be equivalent to a sepa¬
ration fiom Great Britain, Fairbairn 465-471 Necessity for the esta¬
blishment of an open Government or Legislaiive Assembly at the Cape of
Good Hope; until such a plan is carried out, it will be impossible to obtain
collect information as to the real state of Southern Africa, ib. 534 Opinion
as to whether the Dutch or English element would predominate, in the event
of a Representative Assembly sitting at Cape Town, ib. 551.
Local Government. There is no system of local self-government among the
Hottentots through the medium of their chiefs ; there are headmen of the
villages appointed by the people ; functions of the headmen. Freeman 1 ig¬
te 1. 132. 138-140 in the event of a local Government being granted to
the Cape, the Governor's voice should be supreme, and his assent be required
for every measure which passes the Assembly, ib. 583.
Location of Settlers. See Ceded Territory. Coloured Races.
London Alissionary Society. The number of natives in connexion with the
London Missionary Society has not been increasing very Iar2ely of late years ;
but since the emancipation it has increased considerably, Freeman 9——The
whole
5Ö2
LO N
MAG
[»afir
Report, 1851—continued.
London Missionary Society—continued.
whole population of the Kat River settlement is not in connexion with the
Loricion Missionary Society, Freeman 18 There is a congregation in con¬
nexion with tlie Dutch Reformed Churcli at Balfour, ib. But nine-tentlis
of the people are in connexion with the London Missionary Society, ib. 19.
See also Missionaries, 1. Schools. Useful Arts.
Losses. See Compensation. Kat River Settlement, 1. 2.
Loyalty. The tribes which are friendly (0 this country siiould not be removed
from Kafirland, as that would be a breach of faith, Bissett 934-939.
See also Hottentots. Kat River Settlement, 3.
M.
Mackinnon, Colonel. See Patrol System.
Magistrates :
1. Complaints of the Kat River Settlers of the Conduct of former
Magistrates.
2. How far expedient to appoint Native Magistrates.
3. Observations relative to the Magistrates of Natal.
1. Complaints of the Kat River Settlers of the Conduct of former
Magistrates :
Witness has looked at the effect of certain Government measures upon the
Hottentot population of tiie Kat River setdemsnt, and has thought some of
these measures to be decidedly unfavourable to the people, Freeman 10
Witness refers rather to individual acts of the local magistrale, who is,
however, appointed by the Government, than to any general and compre¬
hensive measure of the Government iiself, ib. Detail of several of the acts
of the late magistrate, IMr. J. II. Bowker, of an extremely injurious and
irritating character, going far, as witness thinks, to account for, though not to
justify, the disaffection of the Hottentots, which has unhappily broken out
during the present Kafir war in the shape of disloyalty, ib. 10-14. 21. 92-102.
Witness is not aware that the settlers have any cause to complain of want of
protection on the part of the Government, except in the instances of the acts
of Mr. Bowker, Freeman 24, 25. 82, 83, 92-110 Witness believes the
natives are satisfied with their present magistrate, Mr. Wienand, who is the
third who has been appointed ; tiie two former appointments were rather un¬
fortunate, ib. 150. 156 Witness is not aware that the Kat River settlers
have had any reason to complain of the conduct of the Government or of
particular magistrates, Bissett 948-950.
Reference to the complaints made by the Kat River settlers of the conduct
of the first magistrate who was appointed over the settlement, namely, Mr, Bid-
dulph, Äenion 3129-3134 And also of the magistrate who succeded him, Mr.
Bowker; respects in which this magistrate gave them offence,i6.3i 70-3176
Evidence upon which witness bases the opinion that Mr. Bowker was actuated
by
íTtifií».]
MAG
M A I
5Ö3
Report, 1851—continued.
Ma gistra tes—continued.
1. Complaints of the Kat River Settlers, continued.
by prejudices against the Hottentot population and the coloured population
generally, iîcnion 3176-3196 There were also other magistrates in the dis¬
trict against whom the settlers complained j circumstances under which these
complaints arose, ib. 3197, 3198 Grounds for witness's arriving at the
conclusion that the course of the general policy adopted towards the Kafirs
has been considerably complicated and interfered with by acts of indiscretion
on the part of individual magistrates, ib. 3259-3262. 3411-3425.
2. Mow far expedient to appoint Native Magistrates ;
With regard to appointing native magistrates witness would say that there
are many respectable men perhaps in Graham's Town, but certainly in Cape
Town, which is the seat of government, who are well qualified to act as
magistrates. Freeman 103-110. 122-127. 157-159 The magistrates are
always Europeans; reasons why witness thinks that at present this is better
than that they should be appointed from their own race, ib. 122-127 There
are half-castes in the colony who would be respected if they were known to be
men of character and intelligence ; but they are few in number, ib. 128-130
As regards the appointment of magistrates, if the natives themselves had the
power of making a strong recommendation, perhaps of a veto to a certain
extent, still leaving the appointment finally with the Government, it would
give them great satisfaction, ib. 157-160 Witness would decidedly prefer
magistrates being sent from this country who even did not know the Kafir
language, rather than select them from those persons now in the colony
whom he considers prejudiced against the coloured races, Renton 3239-3246.
3. Observations relative to the Magistrates of Natal:
Nature of the duties of the magistrates in the colony of Natal ; satisfaction
of the natives with the magisterial controul, T. C. Smith 2309-2313
There is no unwillingness of the natives in the colony of Natal to bring their
disputes before the civil magistrates ; it has always been the policy of the
Government to maintain the authority of the chiefs, ib. 2330-2332.
See also Biddulph, Mr. Chiefs, 4. 5. Civil Appointments. Civil
Commissioners.
Maitland, General Sir Peregrine, k. c. b. Was governor of the' Cape of
Good Hope from March 1844 to the beginning of 1847; 2847, 2848
Unsettled state of the frontier at the commencement of witness's governor¬
ship on account of the number of robberies by the Kafirs; numerous peti¬
tions received from tiie frontier, 2851 Visit paid by witness to the frontier
and new treaties entered into with the Griquas ; after placing troops in the
ceded territory; cessation from plunder consequent upon these proceedings,
2852-2854 Opinion as to the principal cause of the outbreak of hostilities
in 1846; it is attributable to the Government attempting to control the
thieving in the colony, 2854-2857 Troublesome and expensive nature of
the war in 1846; it was rendered more so from the pressure of the drought
that prevailed and the imperfect communication bet ween the colony and the
eastern frontier, 2858-2861.
Recommendation
564
MAITL AND.
[Wtíítit
Report, 1851—continued.
Maitland, Gen. Sir Peregrine, g. c. b. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
Recommendation that all the Kafirs should be driven across the Great Kei,
and that river adopted as the frontier boundary; no Kafirs should be located
in British Kafraria unless they legistered themselves and gave up their arms,
Í2862-2875 In the event of depredations conlinuing the chiefs should
be compelled to make restitution and pay a just fine, 2876 The patrol
system has been the only al'ernative hitherto in the pursuit of Kafir robbers,
2877 Opinion that the chiefs should not be hereditary, but should be
appointed by and hold their authority from the Governor ; they should be
invested with magisterial authority under a civil commissioner, 2878-2882
Great inconvenience from the seat of government, Cape Town, being so
great a distance from the frontier ; there oui^ht to be an officer with paramount
authority on the frontier, 2883-2888 AVitness does not consider it would
be true to say that the conduct of the British Government towards the Kafirs
has been marked by a want of that proper degree of forbearance which is due
from a civilized country to tribes less civilized, 288g.
Very little advance lias been made toward civilization among the Kafirs;
they have very little disposition to enter into the pursuits of commerce, 2890-
2894. 2971-2973 As a mutter of humanity and policy, it is indispensable
that there should be such a force for some time upon the frontier as shall not
expose the Kafirs to the temptation of supposing they can resume hostilities
with advantage, 2895-2899. 2964 The Kafirs are a pastoral nation; there
would be no hardship in driving them across the Kci, the country beyond that
river being unoccupied, 2900-2903 Recommendation that a settlement
should be made with the Fingoes and Hottentots in the rear, and then in
front there sliould be a line of military posts, 2909-2913. 2970. The
Buffalo Kiver, as a boundary, would require more troops for its defence than
the Kei, and it would not be complete without the Amatólas in our possession,
2909-2941 \A itness considers it would be belter to have a settlement of
coloured men, Hottentots and Fingoes, on the ceded territory than to have
Europeans, 2911-2924. 2927.
Witness docs not think that sending the surveying party by Colonel Hare
had anything to do with the breaking out of the war in 1846; witness had
no idea of placing a post at Blockdrift until it was proposed by Sandilli
himself, 2914, 2915. 2919-2922. Remarks relative to the Zoolus who
occupy Natal, as our subjects; they were driven in by the tyranny of their
chiefs, 2916-2918 During witness's governorship he adhered in the main
to the policy which was established by Lord Glenelg with reference to the
Kafirs, 2923 Inconvenience of the ceded territory being occcupied by Kafirs,
as it brings them close to our border, and they cannot resist the temptation
to steal the cattle, 2923 Witness conceives it to be quite possible to drive
the Kafirs out of the Amatóla mountains, and maintain that as a frontier freed
from the presence of Kafirs, 2928-2930.
If it is considered desirable that Sir Harry Smith should establish the
Buffalo River as the frontier boundary, he should be allowed sufficient troops
for the purpose ; there can be no objections to our taking possession of the
country to the Buffalo River on the grounds of justice to the Kafirs; they
having been the aggressors, should be punished by the loss of territory,
2931-2955 Witness's objections to Europeans being allowed to establish
cattle
M A I
HAQ
.565
Report, iSQlr—çuntinued.
Muilland, Gen. Sir Peregrine, o, p. b. (Anaiyei^ of Iiis Evidence)—coBí/rawerf,
cattle farms on the frontier are the great temptation which they offer to the
Kafírs, -2939-2950 The complaints of the colonists respecting the depre¬
dations committed by the Kafirs were, generally speaking, just and well
founded, though they may have been somewhat exaggerated, 2956-2958.
2973 Looking at the position of things as they now stand, seeing the
Kafirs are in hostility to the British, there is no other course operi than th^t
of prosecuting the war, and convincing the Kafirs that we are the stronger
party, 2958-2962.
Opinion that it W'll be necessary to inaiptain a mthtgry force of some
5,000 or 6,000 troops pn the frontier for some time, 2963-2970 ^The
Kafirs had been for yéars previous to 1846 preparing for war by the collection
of arras and ammunition, and the occasion of the survey of Blockdrift was
seized on by them as a pretext for commencing the war, 2974-2976 Remarks
relative to the treaties entered into by witness with the Qriquas; denial that
Maquomo was forced to sign the treaties, 2977, 2978 There is no doubt
that the Kafirs and the Hottentots may be in some degree influenced in their
proceedings by the state of politics in the colony, 2979-2981 Considering
the frontier between the Fish River and the Keiskamma as a military frontier,
there would be an advantage in pushing it further where the country would
be open, 2982-2987 Witness always had a good opinion of the Cape
Rifle Corps; there must have been some delusion practised to mislead the
Hottentots, 2988, 2989.
The missionaries have not been successful in their labours to improve and
civilize the Kafirs, 2990-2993 Witness has heard that if representative
institutions were given to the colony, the colony in itself would be able to take
care of its frontier ; witness very much dopbts the power of the colony to
defend the frontier ; they would be very sorry to try it, 2994 Whatever
may be the opinion of the different governors of the Cape as to the frontier,
the boundary is determined entirely by the home Government ; no steps can
be taken independently of the Colonial-otiice, 2997, 2998 Witness does
not see how the establishment of a constitutional government at the Cape
would have any beneficial effect upon our relations witli the Kafir tribes,
2999, 3000 It is very undesirable that after we have occupied any territory
we should re-cede it to the Kafirs; they would not appreciate any retro¬
cession on our part; they would take it as weakness, 3001-3007.
Maitland, Sir P. The colonists were delighted with the alteration made by Sir
Peregrine Maitland in the treaties, the feeling of many of the colonists was in
favour of a very summary and stringent policy to be exercised towards the
frontier tribes, and therefore the change from'a humane to a military policy
delighted them. Sir A. Stokensirom 1921-1932. 1938-1942. 1969-1971.
See also Treaties, 1.
Manufactures. See Useful Arts.
Ifaquoma (Chief). See Ceded Territory. Commando System, 2. Kat River
Settlement, 1. Treaties, 2.
0.63. O 0
566
MIL
MIL
[Uíifite
Report, \%^\'-~continued.
Military Chief. How far it would be necessary to place the whole of the
frontier under a military chief, with summary powers to act for himself in his
treaties with the Kañrs, Sir G. T. Napier 1578, 1579 In tiie event of
Kafraria hein» placed under military possession, the authority of the chiefs
should be u|>held, they being allowed to govern their people according to their
own laws, 1602-1604. 1628. 1690.
Military Colonies. Opinion in favour of the system of military colonies ; manner
in which they could be established; plan of defence, Owen 2488-2497.
2543. 2637-2644 Suggested establishment of a system of military colonies
along the frontier; the settlers being protected by a military force, Sir J. A.
Alexander 2744-2751. See also Military Villages.
Military Force:
1. Insufficiency of the Force in the Colony at the Period of the recent
Outbreak.
2. Necessity for the Maintenance of a large Military Force on the
Frontier.
8. How far the Colony itself would he able to bear the Expense of
such Force.
1. Insufficiency of the Force in the Colony at the Period of the recent
Outbreak :
Witness attributes the recent outbreak to the want of sufficient military
power to keep the Kafirs in awe ; it was very unfortunate that the military
force had been reduced, Bissett 740-745. 748 Explanation as to the
present character of the military occupation of the country of British Kafraria;
insufficiency of such occupation up to this time, ih. 953-956 The outbreak
which has recently taken place is decidedly attributable to the absence of a
military force of sufficient number on the frontier. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1267-
1272 There has never been a sufficient military force at the Cape to guard
the frontier as it ought to be guarded. Sir G. T. Napier 1534.
Witness is not sufficiently acquainted with military affairs to say whether
the want of sufficient military force had anything to do with the aggression of
the Kafirs by inducing them to think that the moment was come'when they
could strike a blow with advantage against British power, Renton 3036 At
the time of the outbreak if a very small number of tegular troops with a
military officer could have been sent into the Kat River settlement, there is
no doubt it would have been sufficient to have rallied the loyal, and to have
put down the insurrection, ib. 3462-3468 When application was made
for arms and ammunition there were none to supply, ib. 3463-3468 ^The
outbreak was conducted with great secresy and was most unexpected; there
were no means of providing against it beforehand, ib. 3465-3467.
2. Necessity for the Maintenance of a large Military Force on the
Frontier :
Necessiiy for an officer of high rank with a strong force being constantly
Stationtd on the frontier, Fairbairn 449-451. 458-460 Extent of the
military force necessary to be maintained, for the protection of the colony ;
witness does not know what the expense would be, but it must be. consider¬
able.
Cri6í0.j MIL
M I L
507
Report, 1851 —continued.
Military Force—continued.
2. Necessity for the Maintenance, ¿fc.—continued.
Me, Fair bairn 505,506 Necessity for the maintenance of the military forts
and forces on the Kafir frontier wherever the military men thought they would
be most eflïcient, ib, 511 Impossibility for some years to come of doing
without the presence of a considerable regular military (orce upon ihe fron¬
tier; it would he impossible to trust altogether or mainly to tlie settlers for
the defence of the frontier, Bissett 806-811, 957-962; Sir A, Stockenstrurn
1273-1277; Owen 2483-2487. 2556-2566; Sir F, Mailland 2895-2899.
29Ö4 if it is intended to keep the whole of Kafraria, it can be done only
by a military occupation of the country. Sir G. T. Napier 1517 ; Owen 2447-
2448; 2592-2602.
Opinion that an army of about 4,000 effective men would be necessary to be
stationed on the frontier for its protection; such a force would tend materially
to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs, Sir G. T. Napier 1530-1532, 1693 ;
Sir P. Maitland 2963-2970 To provide the necessary force for the proper
protection of the frontier will be a very great expense to this country, Sir G.
T. Napier 1535 Witness has heard it said that provided the military were
withdrawn the settlers and boers would protect themselves; witness does not
think they could, ib, 1597.
3. How far the Colony itself would be able to bear the Expense of such
Force,
With respect to the question whether the colony would be disposed in the
event, of their having representative institutions to bear the expense ot a mili¬
tary force, witness can only say this must depend on the manner in which the
war is settled, and the frontier delivered over to them ; the colony is entitled
to a representative government and accepts it of course with all its legitimate
responsibilities, .Sir .4. Stockenstrom 1278 Witness considers that the
colony would be disposed to contribute a pait of the expense ot maintaining
a military force on the frontier, Sir G, T, Napier 1536.
See also Buffalo River. Cape Corps. Civil Commissioners. Com¬
mando System, 1. Depredations. Expenditure. Forts. Kafir
Wars. Kat River Settlement. Kei River, 1. 2, Natal.
Regular Troops. Rifle Brigade. Tambookie Frontier, Trea¬
ties, 2. Zoulus,
Military Law, Opinion that military law should prevail on the frontier and not
the ordinary laws of the country, Sir G. 2\ Napier 1580.
Military Officers. Advantage of employing military officers as agents betweèn
the Government and the natives ; amount of salary given to the Bheel agems,
Ovans 1154-1157.
Military Posts, It would require a line of military posts along the immediate
frontier to protec t it fiora tiie incursions and robberies commitied by ihe
Kafirs, A. Smiih 306, 307 Opinion that adopting any line of country in
Kafirland as a frontier, and defending it by posts or by usual miliiary defences,
is quite impossible, Owen 2467-2485. 2563, 2580 Nece.ssity for the frontier
0,63. O O 2 being
568
M IL
MIS
Report, 1851—continued.
Military Posts—continued.
being defended by means of posts and military colonies, Sir J. E, Alexander
2710-2714 Recommendation tliat. a settlement should be m^'de with the
Fingí es and Hottentots in the rear, and then in front there should be a line of
military posts, Sir P. Maitlartd 2909-2913, 2970.
See also Amatóla Mountains, 1. Forts. King William's Town.
Military Villages. The establishment of military villages and a line of signals
along the frontier would be very advantageous, Sir u. T. Napier 1648, 1649
Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that the location of imliiary
villages was a very unfortunate step, Renton 3103-3105.
See also Military Colonies.
Missionaries :
1. Generally.
2. Advantages and Benefits derived from the Lalieur§ of the Mis'
sionaries.
3. Opinion that the Progress made by the Missionaries has not been
great.
4. Exertions made by them to repress the Spirit of Rebellion.
6. Inexpediency of any Political Communication between the
Government and the Missionaries.
1. Generally:
Number and situation of the stations of the London Missionary Society in
South Africa ; there are altogether about thirty-four stations in and beyond
the colony, Freeman 6 As an approximate estimate of the number of the
native population in connexion with the Missionary Society, witness would
say there are from 25,000 to 30,000 in direct connexion with their missionary
labours, ib. 7 The Hottentots within the colony may form about one-fourth
of the number; they are mixed with the "late apprentices," ¿6. 8 The
latter have no distinct name but that of " late apprentices," meaning those that
were till lately in slaveiy ; these constitute .inoiher fourth, i6. The other
two-fourths, or one-half of the whole number, would be Kafirs, Cliquas,
Bechuanas and Pingues, ib. The only other settlements of the Hottentots
besides that of the Kai River are the missionary institutions, where the people
have congregated round the missionaries, ib. 133, 134 A portion of land,
say 5,000 acres, is perhaps allotted by the Government as the location of the
Hottentots, where a missionary resides and a schoolliouse is built, and a
church or a chapel, as the case may be ; the missionaries are appointed from
tile societies at home, ib. 134-137.
Statement as to the number and denominations of missionaries distributed
over the Cape colony and its boundaries, Adamson 699-702 In the whole
district over which the insurrection has spread there is not a single missionary
or mission family remaining except at the Chumie station, Renton 3263, 3264
Whether it is desirable that ihe missionaries should withdraw from the
seat of war or tiiat thry should remain is a question about which good men
and wise men difi'er, ib. 3265 There is much to be said on both sides, but
it is obvious to witness that if they can remain with personal safety there are
various
etittü,]
MISSIONARIES.
569
Report, 1851—continued.
Missionaries—conwnueà.
1. Generally—continued.
various important ends to be gained by their continuance, in exerting their
influence to prevent the well affecled from being involved in the rebellion ;
the Kaflrs were willing that they should remain in their country. Rentan 3265-
3273 Witness is aware that a meeting was held in Graham's Town in
March, in which strong disapprobation was expressed at the conduct of the
missionaries, ib. 3345-3347- 343'• 3477-3481-
2. Advantages and Benefits derivedfrom the Labours of the Missionaries :
Opinion that the labours of the missionaries at tlie Cape have been highly
advantageous and beneficial to the colony, Adamson 665 et seq. The mis¬
sionaries are looked on favourably by tiie natives and received with kindness,
and their influence extends very far beyond the stations whicii they occupy,
ib. 703, 704 There is every reason to be satisfied wiih the progress of mis¬
sionary labour in South Africa, ib. 705-708 Opinion tliat missionary
influence must be kept perfectly distinct from Government and magistrate
influence, ib. 709-713 Generally speaking, the influence of the mission¬
aries over the native tribes is very beneficial. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1451-1453.
Remarks relative to the missionaries at the Cape; they generally aided the
Government in their attempts to preserve peace with the Kafirs, Sir G. T.
Napier 160S-1614 Generally speaking the chiefs do not like the mis¬
sionary stations, because from the preaching of the missionaries the Kafirs
get a ceriain degree of light which makes them not so completely subservient
to their chiefs ; the people like the missionaries, A. Smith 2220, 2221 The
conduct of the Kafir chiefs towards the missionaries has been faithful and
friendly, üíeníon 3086 The influence of the missionaries over the Kafirs
who are under their spiritual influence is very great, and from this circum¬
stance there is a reflex influence over the Kafir tribes in general, ib. 3348-
3355-
3. Opinion that the Progress made by the Missionaries has not been
great :
Remarks relative to the progress made by the missionaries among the Kafirs
in Kafiiland ; witness dees not think that tiie progress among the Kafirs, as a
whole, has been great, Adamson 729, 730 Evidence relative to the nature
of the duties imposed upon missionaries at the various stations, ib. 1011
Opinion that at present it is scarcely possible to dispense with the aid given
by Government to the missionary stations, ib. 1038 Great doubts as to
whether the missionaries are doing any good among the Kafirs and tribes of
Southern Africa, Sir G. T. Napier 1521 Witness was disappointed in
finding the amount of influence of the missionaries of various denominations
to be considerably short of his anticipations ; still great good has been done
by them. Rentan 3113.
4. Exertions used by them to repress the Spirit of Rebellion :
The missionaries have great influence with the Kafir chiefs and with the
tribes generally in the district of the Kat River ; the influence of the mission¬
aries, as well as of the minister of the Dutch Church, was exerçiseid incessantly
0.63. O O 3 to
M I S
NAP
Report, iSßi—continued.
Ml SS I ON A RIES—continued.
4. Exertions used by them to repress the Spirit, Sfc.—continued.
to repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist the violence of the rebels,
JíewíoH 3203-3205. 3313-3331. 3432 As far as witness's judgment and
infoimaiion go, the missionaries in Sanclilli's district took no part whatever,
either directly or indirectly, in promoting the rising of the Kafirs, ib. 3274-
3276 Witness has never heard of any instance where the missionaries
either directly or indirectly had given sanction to the rising of the Kafirs, ib,
3452-3457 Every exertion was made by the missionaries to allay the
prevailing irritation among the Kafirs, La Trobe 3485.
5. Inexpediency of any Political Communication between the Govern..
ment and the Missionaries :
Witness thinks it a very unadvisable thing to have any political communi¬
cation between the Government and the missionaries. Sir G. T. Napier 1614
Witness is not aware whether many of the communications between the
missionaries and the chiefs have been more political than religious; some of
the missionaries have been employed as negociators on the part of the Govern¬
ment, /Íenío;/3322-3338. 3342 With respect to the question whetlier it is
prejudicial to the cause of religion to mix up in the "cases of persons the two
purposes of religion and politics, ib. 3343 Witness would say that it is
desirable to keep the two quite distinct, but he apprehends tiiat in many cases
there are no other suitable parties through whom communications can be
made, ib. 3343, 3344. 3433, 3434.
See also Barbarity. Chiefs, 4. Christianity. Civilization, 1.
Commission of Inquiry. Gunpowder. Hottentots. Late Apprentices.
London Missionary Society, Policy of the Government, Politics,
Shiloh. Traders.
Murals. Generally speaking the people of the Kat River settlement are a well
conducted people ; there is but one settlement where there is any disposition
to intoxication. Freeman 17 Witness would look for the defence of the
frontier totally to themoral elevation of the Kafirs, and not to force; it will
no doubt take some time to raise their moral character to the required stan¬
dard, A. Smith .
Moravian Mission. See Shiloh. Useful Arts.
Moshesh, Chief. Detail of the mode in v/hich the territory belonging to
Moshesli, the chieftain of the tribe, was taken (rom him without compensation
being made to him ; witness wouki say it was taken away from him by intimi¬
dation, Freeman 257-261.
Murders. See Depredations.
N.
Napier, Sir George T., k.c.b. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has held the
office of Governor of the Cape of Good Hope; was Governor there between
six and seven years, 1511-151,3 Opinion that the first step to be taken
must be to put the Kafirs down, and that so completely as to force them to
cry
ITriíiííi»]
NAPIER.
57»
Report, 1851—continued.
Napier, Sir George T., k. c.b. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
cry out for peace, 1515-1517 This can only be done by a strong military
force being placed at the complete disposal of Sir Harry Smith, 1515 If
it is intended to keep tlie whole of Kafraiia, it can be done only by a military
occupation of the country, 1517 Opinion that the Keiskamma is the most
advantageous frontier to maintain, along which there were very excellent forts
built, 1518.1655-1657,1688, 1689. 1692 Suggestion that Graham's Town
and Fort Beaufort, and along there might be kept as a depot for stores and
for some troops, 1518 The Keiskamma should be maintained as it was
under Lord Charles Somerset ; opinion that he understood the Kafirs and
the management of that frontier better than any governor who was ever there
before or since, 1518.
Witness would not propose to push the frontier to the Great Kei, unless it
is proposed to keep Kafraria ; opinion that Kafraria can only be kept by a
military force, 151g Necessity for the Kafirs being allowed the free
range of their country ; provided they were all forced into one spot they would
starve, 1520, 1521 Impossibility of civilizing the Kafirs; it is witness's
opinion that tiiey will never be much better than they are, 1521 Great
doubts as to whether the missionaries are doing any good among the Kafirs
and tribes of Southern Africa, 1521 It would not be expedient in any
way to interfere with the internal government of the Kafirs beyond the frontier
with a view of preventing incursions into the British territory, 1522. 1690.
Opinion that everything ought to be done through the chiefs; there is no
doubt that the chiefs have sufficient authority over the tribes to prevent them
committing depredations, and they should be held responsible for the acis of
their tribes, 1523-1525. 1533. 1658, 1659 Observations as to the altera¬
tions made by witness in the treaties of Sir Andries Stockenstrom with the
Kafir chiefs, 1525-1529 Opinion that an army of about 4,000 effective
men would be necessary to be stationed on the frontier for its protection ;
such a force would tend materially to prevent the depredations of the Kafirs,
1530-1532. 1693 Witness will venture to say that the treaties made by
Sir Andries Stockenstrom were never once infringed by the colonists, but they
were frequently infringed by the Kafirs ; the moment it occurs to a savage
that it is his interest to do so and so, treaties may go to the wind, 1533.
1581-1592.
Nature and extent of what may be called the open frontier of the colony of
the Cape of Good Hope, 1534 There has never been a sufficient military
force at the Cape to guard the frontier as it ought to be guarded, 1534
To provide the necessary force for the proper protection of the frontier, will
be a very great expense to this country, 1535 Witness considers that the
colony would be disposed to contribute a part of the expense of maintaining
a military force on the frontier, 1536 Witness thinks it better that the seat
of government should be at Cape Town, 1537 The extent of territory
has not been increased ; we hold now the same boundary as Sir Benjamin
B'Urban had after the war which took place ; Sir Andries Stockenstrora
gave it away again, 1538-1540 Great advantage would result from the
British Government making small allowances to the chiefs as long as they
maintained good order among their people, and pevented depredations,
0.63. OO4 154'»
572
N A P t E R.
Report, 1851—continued.
Napier, Sir George T., k. c. b. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
*541» 1542. 1551-1554. i6gi It is witness's firm opinion that the chiefs
do possess great influence over their tribes, 1543-1545. 154®~^550'
»690-1592.
Great influence possessed by Sir Andries Stockenstrom over the Kafirs,
which he exercised to maintain peace and loyally, 1546, 1547 Witness
consideis it perfectly just that the frontier tribes should be held responsible for
depredations committed on the settlers, 1554-1560. Disaffection among the
Hottentots in the Cape Corps ; great advantage of sending European troops
to the Cape ; it might be advantageous to form a regiment partly of Europeans
and partly of Hottentots, 1561-1564 Witness would approve of breaking
up the Kat River settlement; if witness had had to make that settlement, he
would never have placed it there, 1565, 1566 Witness thinks it would be
a very good thing if there was a body of Englishmen in Kafraria, along the
whole line of that country ; such a system might be accomplished by degrees,
by encouraging soldiers to settle ihere, and allowing them to settle with their
families, 1567-1577 How far it would be necessary to place the whole of
the frontier under a military chief, with summary powers to act for himself in
his treaties with the Kafirs, 1578, 1579 Opinion that military law should
prevail on the frontier, and not the ordinary laws of the colony, 1580.
Witness attaches no value to treaties enterëd into with the Kafir chiefs ;
such treaties would only be observed as long as it suited their interests, 1593,
1594 Opinion that the frontier can oidy be protected by a line of forts and
military posts ; amount of military force that would be required for this pur¬
pose, 1595-1601 Witness has heard it said that provided the military
were withdrawn, the settlers and boers would protect themselves; witness
does not think they could, 1597 the event of Kafraria being placed
under military possession, the authoiiiy of the chiefs should be upheld, they
being allowed to govern their people according to their own laws, 1602-1604.
1628. 1690 Observations as to the great success which has attended the
policy of the Government, as pursued with the Zoolus in Natal, 1602. 1615,
1616.
Extension of ihe boundary of the Cape colony to the River Kei by Sir
Benjamin D'Urban ; the majority of the colonists were in favour of this
extension, 1605-1608. 1646, 1647 Remarks relative to the missionaries at
the Cape; they generally aided the Government in their aitempts to preserve
peace with the Kafirs, 1608-1614 Witness thinks it a very unadvisable
thing to have any political communication between the Government and the
missionaries, 1614 The itinerant traders introduce arms, ammunition, and
brandy in Kafirland ; great deal of smuggling carried on by them; they should
not be allowed to go into Kafirland, except as they did under the system esta¬
blished by Lord Charles Somerset, 1617-1624 Opinion that the Kafir
servants coming into the colony are the means of stealing cattle from the
farmers, 1625-1627.
It is advisable that Kafirs should not be allowed to enter the colony with¬
out a pass from their chief and from the political agent, 1628-1631 Im¬
portance of the Amatólas being cleared of the Kafir tribes as a means of
finishing the war; witness would not recommend the permanent occupation of
the
Ättftes.J NAP
NEU
573
Report, 1851—continued.
Napier, Sir George T., k. c.b. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
the Amatólas, the Keiskainma would be the better boundary, 1632-1639
During witness's tenure of governorship he was very reluctant to go to war
witli the Kafirs in consequence of trifling depredations ; the number of depre¬
dations did not increase liom that line of policy, 1640-1642- Opinion that
taking the united interests of the colonists, there is a stronger interest in the
colony against a war than in favour of one, 1643-1645.
The establishment of military villages and a line of signals alohg thé
frontier would be very advantageous, 1648, 1649 It is desirable to have
some surveillance over the dealings of the colonists with the Kafirs as a
means of preserving peace, 1650-1654 Evidence relative to the establish¬
ment of the Kat River settlement and the state of that colony, 1660-1687
Impossibility of the Cape colony defraying the expense of the military
force necessary for the protection of the frontier ; the expense must be borne
by the mother country, 1694 Circumstances attending tiie reveisal of the
policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the giving up of the territory between
the present boundary and the River Kei ; prediction of Sir Benjamin D'Urban
in his despatches, that a future war would be the consequence of a reversal of
his policy, 1695-1708.
See also Defence of the Frontier. Glenelg, Lord. Printed Papers.
Natal. Evidence showing that Natal is not a safe colony as a British posses¬
sion if the Zoolus b( came our enemies; there is only one regiment there,
consisting of about 650 men, A. Smith 2078-2096 Statement as to the
extent of the colony of Natal proper, T. C. Smith 2259-2260 Favourable
nature of the country and climate of Natal ; it is preferable 10 Briiish Kafraria ;
it is possible to anticipate a large population ttrere of European origin
engaged in the pursuits of agriculiure, ib. 2261-2272 Manner in which
the boundaries of Natal were fixed; nature of the arrangements made between
the Government and the native tribes, ib. 2273-2276 Estimated number
of native tribes in the colony of Natal ; great influx of natives since the last
war; amount of military force employed to control the native population,
ib. 2305-2320.
■See also Boers. Kei River, 1. Policy of the Government, 3. Zoolus,
Native Chiefs. See Chiefs.
Native Magistrates. See Magistrates, 2,
Neutral Territory. Impracticability of maintaining a certain space of neutral
ground between the two races, the Hottentots and the Kafirs, Freeman 116-
118 All the policy of Lord Charles Somerset was directed to establish
more clearly the old boundary, and to keep a certain tract of country beyond
free from all settlers, with a view to secure peace and quietness on the
frontier, A. 2186- Opinion that the establishment of a bona fide
neutral territory which neither colonists nor Kafirs should be permitted to
enter, would not effect much good ; the Kafirs would cross that territory and
steal, ib. 2226,2227 There has always been an impression among the colon¬
ists on the frontier that a Kafir war would take place, and it was with a view
of putting these apprehensions at rest that Sir Peregrine Maiiland wished to
establish.
574
NEU
OVA
[iKafiít
Report, 1851—continued.
Neutral Territory—continued.
establish a large and strong post in the neutral territory, where a force might
be always ready to move upon the Kafirs; establishment of Fort Hare, Owen
2419-2421.
See also Boundaries, Ceded Territory. Commando System, 2. Fron¬
tier Boundary. Treaties, 2.
Niven, Mr. See Barbarity,
O.
Open Frontier. Nature and extent of what may be called the open frontier of
the Cape of Good Hope, Sir G. T. Napier X534.
Orange River. See Griquas, 2.
Ovans, Colonel C. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Colonel in the Bombay Army;
has served in India thirty-two years, 1114, 1115 Witness was sent a
Bheel agent to Khandeish, 1115 Troubled state of tiie Kiiandeish territory
at the lime it fell into our hands in 1817; it was completely overrun by
merctnary bands of Arabs, Pindarees, and Bheels, so that the roads were
nearly impassable, and neither life nor property was secure, 1116, 1117
Detiiil relative to the military operations carried out against the Bheels by
the Indian Government in 1819, in order to restore the tranquillity of the dis¬
trict; failure of those coercive measures to restore peace and order, 1118-
1122 On the failure of the military operations, orders were received from
England in 1824 and 1825 to endeavour to introduce a different and concilia¬
tory system, 1123.
Appointment of European oflncers as Bheel agents, with full magisterial
powers to settle all the Bheel disputes; division of the Khandeish province
into districts for this purpose, 1123-1127 Nature of the conciliatory
policy adopted by the agents, and complete success which attended that
policy, by which Khandeish has become as quiet as any district under the
Bombay Presidency, 1128-1131, 1158-1246 Amount of the Indian force
employed in the province; formation of two native regiments, whose fidelity
has been found uninterrupted, 1139-1146 Report made by witness to Sir
John Malcolm in 1830, stating the success which had attended the conciliatory
policy in the province; this report was approved of by Sir John and also the
home Government, and was printed and distributed for future guidance of
officers, 1132-1136. 1147-1149 Opinion that the same conciliatory policy
as that pursued at Khandeish might be pursued with equal success with the
Kafirs and wild tribes of South Africa, 1150-1152.
Remarks relative to the conciliatory policy followed by Mr. Shepstone
respecting the settlement of Natal, and success thereof; the same system
would succeed with the Kafirs, 1152. 1244 Recommendations as to the
measures which should be taken in Southern Africa to apply the Indian con¬
ciliatory policy to the settlement of the difi'erences which exist between the
local government and those tribes, 1153 et seq. Advantage of employing
military officers as agents between the Government and the natives ; amount
of salary given to the Bheel agents, 1154-1157.
Owen,
Ctrifie».]
OWEN.
575
Report, 1851—continued.
Owen, Captain Henry Charles Cunliffe, (Analj'sis of his Evidence.)—Was in
the colony of the Cape of Good Hope from January 1845 to March 1848;
was a lieutenant of the Royal Engineers, and served under Sir Peregrine
Maitland, 2381-2384 Explanation relative to the operations in which
witness was employed beyond the Orange River, in the neighbourhood of
Philiipolis, in supporting the Griquas against an attack of the Dutch boers ;
defeat of the boers and establishment of a civil magistrate in the country,
2386-2392 Opinion that the Kafiis have been preparing for war for some
years past, nearly since the end of the war under Sir Benjamin D'Hrban, and
only waited a pretext for breaking out, 2394. 2416, 2417. 2523-2537, 2655-
2657 Supply of fire-arms and ammunition obtained by ihe Kafirs from
the travelling traders, 2395, 2396 The Kafirs found a pretext for com¬
mencing tlie war in 1849 on our sending a small party to survey a piece of
ground within their territory, beyond the Chunie River; nature and objects
of this survey, 2398-2415.
Tiiere has always been an impression among the colonists on the frontier
that a Kafir war would take place, and it was with a view of putting these
apprehensions at rest that Sir Peregrine Maitland wished to establish a large
and strong post in the neutral territory, where a force might be always ready
to move u(ion the Kafirs; erection and establishment of Fort Hare, 2419-
2421 Opinion that the boundary must be always undefined; there is no
good bouneary as a mere defensive boundary in itself; the defence of the
irontier must rather turn upon military consideration than upon any neutral
boundary, 2422-2426. 2580 From the mode of warfare of the Kafirs, it is
very desirable that the boundary should have the command of an open
country; opinion that King William's Town is about one of the best military
stations in the colony, 2427-2435. 2557-2566 Witness does not consider
the slightest reliance can be placed upon treaties entered into with the Kafir
chiefs; it is expedient to trust alone to the military defence of the frontier,
2436-2439. 2538-2542. 2603. 2632-2636.
Estimated force of the Kafirs; manner in which they are supported;
impossibility of their maintaining a war for any length of time, from the want
of piovisions, 2440-2448. 2605 Witness considers the military occupation
of Kafiaria as the only means of keeping the Kafirs in check, 2447, 2448.
2592-2602 Witness looks upon it as practically impossible to prevent the
importation of arms into Kafirland ; provided the traders were prevented from
supplying them, they would be supplied by foreign traders and landed on the
coast, 2í;49-2458 Remarks relative to the forts on the frontier; great
difficulty of obtaining a supply of water ; it is very desirable that tanks should
be provided for those forts, 2459-2466 Opinion that adopting any line of
country in Kafirland as a frontier, and defending it by posts, or by usual
military defences, is quite impossible, 2467-2485. 2563. 2580 The only
means of preventing Kafir incursions into the colony, is by maintaining a large
military force on certain spots of the boundary in continual readiness for war;
witness does not think that anything like peace will ever last with the Kafirs,
2483-2487. 2556-2566.
Opinion in favour of the system of military colonies; manner in which
they could be established ; plan of defence, 2488-2497. 2543. 2637-2644
Evidence generally relative to the commando system formerly adopted;
opinion
OWE
PAS
[«Ä«t
Report, 1851—continued.
Owen, Captain H. C. C. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
opinion that that system is more humane in the aggregate than the present
system, which ends in these bloody wars, 2497-2522 Remarks relative to
the survey made on part of the territory of Sandilli, the Blockdrift, at the
desire of Sir Peregrine Maitland, which the Kafirs made a pretext of war in
1846; sitch an encroachment might have been a just pretext for complaint,
but not for wat', 2523-2537. 2590, 2591. 2617, 2618 Advantage of driving
the Kafirs over the great Kei ; by such a proceeding the Governtnent would
secute the respect of the Kafirs, as they have most respect for tliat which they
fear most, 2544-2555. 2576-2584 For ordinary depredations committed
along the liontier, witness would depend upon the individual settlers, who
should have permission to defend themselves and execute summary justice on
the robbers, they being supported for a time by military force, 2567-2575.
2622, 2623. 2644.
Opinion that the Kafirs should be driven out of the Amatóla mountains,
and never again be allowed to herd their cattle there or till the ground, 2585-
2588 In the event of Government grants being made to tiie chiefs, witness
does not think they possess sufficient influence over their tribes to lead them
to keep down depredations for the purpose of receiving the subsidy, 2604
From the nature of the cultivation adopted by the Kafirs, it would be no hard¬
ship to push them across tiie Great Kei, they being migratory tribes, seldom
inhabiting the same spot for long together, 2605-2616 Opinion that a
boundary, except for legal purposes, is not wanted at all; as a military
question it leads to difficulties of all kinds, 2619-2621 ^As long as the
Kafir chiefs are peaceful neighbours, witness would recognise their authority,
but not the complete independence which is recognised in a civilized power,
2624 Witness does not believe any attempts to civilize the Kafirs would
be successful, 2625 In the defence of the frontier, it is desirable to rely as
much as possible on British troops, 2626.
Opinion that the Hottentots migitt be made useful allies by combination
with the British forces, 2627-2631 The causes of the discontent in 1846,
which made the Kafirs so desirous for a pretext for war, was their eagerness
to possess themselves of our lands and herds, 2645-2647 In recommend¬
ing that the Kafirs should be driven over the Great Kei, witness only refers to
those chiefs and tribes most implicated in the war, 2648-2654 Witness
knows of no other cause of irritation arising from any acts of the white people,
which could have led to the war in 1846, than that of the survey of the
Blockdrift on the Cliumie River, 2658, 2659.
P.
Parliamentary Commission. See Commission of Inquiry.
Pastoral Employment. See Amatóla Mountains, 1. Cultivation.
Passports. It is advisable that Kafirs should not be allowed to enter the colony
without a pass from their chief and from the political agent. Sir G. T. Napitr
1628-1631.
Patrol
PAT
POL
577
Report, i85i-reo«¿iii«erf.
Patrol System. It has become very diíEcuIt to rule the Kafir tribes under the
Çrpsefît sysIofT), tjiat is, the patl'o} systeip. Sir 4. StQchenslrom 1261 -1263
here is not a more able officer anywhere than the officer who has been for
two or three years carrying on this sysieiPj Colonel Mackinnon, ib. 1261-1263
He isa man of the strictest integrity and wishing to do justice, but under
tlie present system he cannot do it, ib. 1262, 1263 Strong objections
witness entertains towards the present patrol system; difference between this
system and the commando system ; way in which the coinmaiido system has
been mistaken ; opinion that the patrol system, which Itas with the exception
q! the interval from 1836 to 1844, been going on since 1817, has brought all
the misfortunes on the colony, ib. 1282-1295. 1309-1315. 1320 et seq. 1387.
In witness's opinion the commando system was decidedly less unjust and
Ifss injurious than the patrol system; the commando system is necessary on a
barbarous frontier, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1387-1394——The patrol system was
put down by witness ; but the depredations by the Kafirs were never com¬
pletely stopped ; thjs was never expected, ib. 1737-1744 Explanation as to
the difference between the patrol system and the commando system; neither
system is effective for the protecti;)n of the frontier boundary, A. Smith 2159-
2163 Explanation as to the meaning of the term patrol system; nature of
the patrol system as applied to the frontier arrangeme its, T. C. Smith 2379,
2380 The patrol system has been the only alternative hitherto in the pur¬
suit of Kafir robbers, Sir P. Maitland 1877,
See also Commando System.
Peace. Peace is comparative with barbarous tribes ; there are always disagree¬
ments between them without war, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1909,1910 Opinion
as to the preliminary course necessary lor the foundation of tranquillity in the
colony, and of peace among the Kafir tribes, Renton 3247 et seq.
See also Chiefs, 5.
Pensions. See Chiefs, 1.
Plunder. The passion for plunder is stronger w ith the Kafirs than the passion
for war, but war generally arises from this, A. Smith 361 They attack
other native tribes in tiie same way as they attack the colonists, ib. 362
Unsettled state of the frontier at the commencement of witness's governorship
on account of the number of robberies by the Kafirs; numerous petitions re¬
ceived from the frontier. Sir P. Maitland 2851 Visit paid by witness to
the frontier, and new tieaties entered into with the Griquas, after placing
troops in the ceded territory; cessation from plunder consequent on those
proceedings, ib. 2852-2854 Opinion as to the principal cause of the out¬
break of hostilities in 1846; it is attributable to the Government attempting
to control thieving in the colony, ib. 2854-2857.
See also Cattle Stealing. Chiefs, 2. Commando System, 1. Military
Posts. Shiloh.
Police. The natives have been recently more employed in the British service as
police, with a view to check the inroads and outrages on the part of the Kafirs,
Fairboirn 436——Employment of the Kafirs as a police force in the colony ;
in the character of policemen the experiment auswei'cd very well, hut it failed
when
578
POL
POL
[mär
Report, 1861—continued.
Police—continu ed.
when this country was engaged in a war against their nation ; they went over
to the enemy on the very first attack, Fairbairn 438-440; Bissett 812-815
The Cape mounted police consist principally ol" Kafirs, Fairbairn 442.
Policy of the Government :
1. Defective Nature of the past and present Policy pursued by the
British Government ; Difficulties of suggesting any practical
Measures on the Subject.
2. Suggestions as to the most expedient and practicable Policy for
the British Government to pursue in reference to the Frontier
Tribes.
3. Opinions that a System of conciliatory Policy might be pursued
with Success.
1. Defective Nature of the past and present Policy pursued by the British
Government ; Difficulties of suggesting any practical Measures on
the Subject.
Witness considers that the political system now pursued by the British
Government towards the native tribes is defective, inasmuch as there has
been a great tendency to take the lands of the natives, which has had the
effect of driving them before our advance, and cooping them up in places not
suitable to afford them the means of support, and of course keeping them in
a somewhat dissatisfied and discontented state, A damson Witness
has considered the policy of this countiy in regard to the frontier tribes, and
had formed opinions upon it, but recent events have so altered the circum¬
stances of both parties, the Kafirs and the colony generally, that witness
cannot say what ought lo be done, Fairbairn 432, 433. 463, 464 Ditticulty
of suggesting any practical measures which the Government of this country
ought 10 adopt in reference to these tribes in the event of the British authority
bi ing completely re-established over them, A. Stockenstrom 12¿8
Witness did suggest measures 20 years ago, but it is a very difficult qiiestioa
now, ib.
2. Suggestions as to the tnost expedient and practicable Policy for the
British Government to pursue in reference to the Frontier Tribes ;
There might be one of two courses adopted ; either to let them entirely
alone and allow them to manage their own affairs, as was the case when
witness first went to the colony, or take them under the British jurisdiction
altogether, A. Smith 304 et seq. ; 322-332 If the latter plan were to be
adopted every great chief must be immediately removed from the country,
^5, ^05 We shall never manage the Kafirs keeping their own chiefs,
ib. Opinion that the policy adopted by Sir Harry Smith in the go¬
vernment of the colony has been very beneficial, and has afforded great
piotection to the farmer and settler within the old boundary, and has been
the means of saving ihe colony much loss and devastation, Bissett 987-989.
The best way to maintain friendly relations with ihe people beyond our
borders is by an annual mission to them, and by small pensions to the chiefs,
and inducing them to visit Cape Town and to receive the missionaries and
schoolmasters.
POL
POP
579
Report, 1851—continued.
Policy of the Gorjent—continued.
2. Suggestions as to the most expedient, —continued.
schoolmasters, and also to engage in trade as much as possible, and to give
them a taste for European habits. Sir J. E. Alexander 2805 Such apian is
quite possible, but it has never been fairly tried, ib. 280Ô The course of
policy witness would recommend would be, first, the vindication of the British
name by an exemplary display of force, Renton 3087 Secondly, the with¬
drawing of the exercise of British power within the narrowest possible limits,
ib. And, thirdly, the extension of moral power to those half civilized tribes
through the instrumentality of the missionaries, ib.
3. Opinions that a System of conciliatory Policy might be pursued
with Succsss:
Opinion that the same conciliatory policy as that pursued at Khandeish
might be pursued with equal success with the Kafirs and wild tribes of South
Africa, Ovans 1150 et seq. Remarks relative to the conciliatory policy^
followed by Mr. Shepstone respecting the settlement of Natal, and success
thereof; the same system would succeed with the Kafirs, ib. 1152. 1244
Measures of conciliation might have a good effect at the present moment
provided we get the upper hand of them completely. Sir A. Stockenstrom
1256, 1257. 1302. 1308 At the same time strict justice and humanity are
the only means by which this or any other nation can be ruled, ib. 1256, 1257
Witness does not consider it would be true to say that the conduct of the
British Government towards the Kafirs has been marked by a want of that
proper degree of forbearance which is due from a civilized country to tribes
less civilized. Sir P. Maitland 2889.
See also Bheels. Border Tribes. Ceded Territory. Chiefs, 3. Com"
mission of Inquiry. Constitutional Government, Division of the Colony.
D'Urba7i, Sir Benjamin. Glenelg, Lord. Ha/ir Wars, 4. Magistrates.
Patrol System. Special Commissioner. Treaties. Zoolus.
Politics. There has- not been the remotest political excitement produced at
Cape Town which has had any effect upon the Kafirs during the last two
Ïears, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1917 There is no doubt that the Kafirs and the
lottentois may be in some degree influenced in their proceedings by the state
of politics in the colony. Sir P. Maitland 2979-2981 The missionaries
avoid on principle giving advice to the chiefs on political matters ; but in
relation to such temporal matters as are connected with husbandry and
ordinary affairs, they give their advice readily, Renton 3114.
(See also Missionaries, 5,
Population. The number of native inhabitants within the Kat River settlements
is rather more than 5,000, Freeman 16 Evidence relative to the various
tribes inhabiting the country on the other side of the Kafir frontier; the Kafir
population may be estimated at about 80,000 or 90,000, but it is impossible
to form an idea as to the numbers of the other trioes, Fairbairn 512-521
Extent of the population of the Cape Colony; districts into which the colony
is divided, Adamson 1053-1060 Information as to the number of tribes
and the population of each tribe in British Kafraria in 1830; witness estimated
thçm at about 311,000, A. SwifA 2030-2043 In this calculation witness
58o
POP
REN
[ittaftií
Report, i^si-^0Qntinued.
Population—continued.
does not estimate the Zoolu tribes : the Zoolu country lits about 80 or 90
miles beyond Natal ; the number of tne Zoolus is very great ; they have about
25 regular regiments; their system is very much like our system in regard
to mihtias of counties, A.Smith 2044-2052 Out of the population esti¬
mated by witness at about 311,000, witness would say there would be about
50,000 fighting men, ib. 2068-2071.
Prestige, For a long time KafirlantI was ruled by a species of prestige; the
black had a fearful idea of the superior moral and physical power of the white ;
he has . now lost this, the prestige is gone, Sir A. Stockenstrom 1298—^—
Various circumstances have led to the alteration of this opinion, ib. 1299
If we had strictly used our moral superiority over them we might have avoided
bringing into play that physical force and teaching them their strength, ib,
1300.
Printed Papers. Observations and explanations with respect to a letter which
has been addressed to the Chairman of the Committee by Sir Andries Stock-
enstrom, dated 7 July 1851, stating that certain words coiitained in a letter
of Sir G. Napier's of 20 November 1838, and which were inserted in the copy
of ihe papers which were delivered to the Committee, were omitted in the
copy delivered for general circulation, Hawes 3286-3288 This sentence
was, " the worst importation that ever came to this colony "; reasons for this
being omitted in the copy delivered for general circulation, ib. -Letter
from Sir A. Stockenstrora to the Right Hon. U. Labouchere, dated 7 July
1851, in correctioii and explanatipn of certain portions of his evidence before
the Committee, App. 498-508.
Prisoners. See Parbarity,
Punishments. See Cattle Stealing.
R.
Potions. Complaints of the Hottentots in 1846, that while the men were serv¬
ing on the frontier their families were left almost to starve ; this has been
remedied, the Government in the present war promising to supply food to the
families of all parties serving on the frontier, Fairbairn 605-609.
Recruits. See Cape Corps,
Regular Troops, Impossibility of the regular troops carryiiig on the war with
eflficiency with their present equipments, Bissett 976-978. See also Boers.
Renton, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Witness arrived in the
colony of the Cape of Good Hope on 3d November 1850 ; went as commis¬
sioner for the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland to visit a few missionary
stations that body has on the frontier, among the Kafirs ; witness went imme¬
diately into tlie Kafir country, 3008-3010 Witness remained with the
Kafirs from the middle of November till the 21st January, when he had to go
inio the Kat River setilement, 3011 When witness went into the Kafir
country he found rumours of war all the way up on his journey ; witness
found
Ctrttrfii.l
RENT () N.
581
Report, 1851—continued.
Rentan, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued,
found these rumours very prevalent 0]i the frontier, but he discredited them
for various reasons, 3012 From v\hat witness could learn from the mission¬
aries he could not find that there were any grounds for anticipating an out¬
break, 3013-3016. 3021-3025 In fact, one or two new stations had been
proceeded with at a considerable outlay of money, from the belief that there
was a fair prospect of security if not of tranquillity, 3013.
Witness also had communication vviih the Kafirs themselves, and from
their representations and assurances was led to believe there would be no
outbreak; evidence in detail relative to the nature of these assurances, and
showing that the Kafirs at this time even dreaded war, 3017-3019 Witness
had frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing with the Gaika Commis¬
sioner, Mr. Brownlee, an able and upright magistrate, and his statement was,
that it had been long known that Sandilli had been plotting, but that he
could not find any evidences of any general sympathy with him, or any design
to break out in revolt, 3019 Witness atliibutes this diminution in the
power of the chiefs to the confidence that the people had in the adminis-
traiion of Mr. Brownlee, 3020 The end of it was that there was a for¬
midable outbreak, 3021, 3022 Witness at the time understood that there
were latent causes of disaíFeclion in the minds of the people, but they were
not sufficient to produce an outbreak unless some occasion arose to excite
these latent influencfs; statement generally of these latent causes, 3023-3035.
3038-3040.
The prevalence of rumours along the frontier and within the colony, of war,
had a very bad effect in turning the minds of all to the expectation of it, and
thereby calling into aciivity these latent elements, 3035 Witness is not
sufficiently acquainted with military affairs to say whether the want of suffi¬
cient military force had anything to do with the aggression of the Kafirs, by
inducing them to think that the moment was come when tliey could strike a
blow with advitntage against British power, 3036 Witness has no doubt
that the chiefs among the Kafirs were dissatisfied with the existing state of
things in consequence of their diminishtd influence; but the great bulk of the
people were sensilile of their improved condition arising f om British influence,
3037—;—Witness considers the outbreak to have been principally ihe work of
the chiefs acting upon tiie people, 3041-3043 Respects in which witn> ss
considers that the course followed by the Goveinor, uninitntionully, but
unlortunately, precipitated ii ; evidence in detail as to the course pursued
by the Governor with regai'd to Sandilli, and also with respect to his conduct
towards Macomo, which further tended to irritate the people, 3044-3073.
Opinion that the Gaika tribe are a people over whom a moral influence
might be exercised, if we preserved in tlieir minds the belief that we were
acting towards them with justice and good faith, 3073, 3074 The grand
point in the piesent state of affairs will be to piove the indomitable supeiiority
of the Briiish power ; but ihe question as to what i^ to be done afier ihis is a
very grave and difficult question; much must depend upon the way in which
the war is put down, 3075-3079 Witness laments that our territory was
ever extended so far as it has been ; we have nothing to gain from this
large extent of territory, and can only retain it at an enormous expense,
3079 Witness's own opinion is that the best tiling would be, if it were
0.63. P p possible,
582
R E N T O N.
Report, 1851—continued.
Rentan, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
possible, after the unmistakeable vindication of the indomitable power of
Britain, to act a magnanimous part, and say. We care nothing about your
land; what we want is your benefit, and if you will be faithful allies, and
preserve the territory from invasion, we give back a large part of it, 3079——
This would be a saving of much money, and would be the means of restoring
goodwill and confidence in the minds of the Kafirs towards us, 3079.
The Fish River does not afford a good line of defence, otherwise witness
would have thought it desirable to have gone back to what was our territory
in 1819; 3080 Supposing we had retired considerably, either to the Fish
River or to some good military frontier, the personal situation of the missionaries,
established in what would be indisputably Kafir territory, would be just what
it was before, 3081 The colonial connexion has been hurtful and not
beneficial to the progress of Christian missions, 3081-3085 The conduct
of the Kafir chiefs towards the missionaries has been faithful and friendly,
3086.
The course of policy witness would recommend would be, first, the vindica¬
tion of the British name by an exemplary display of force, 3087 Secondly,
the withdrawing of the exercise of British power within the narrowest possible
limits, 3087 And thirdly, the extension of moral power to these half-
civilised tribes, through the instrumentality of the missionaries, 3087-
The difficulty in the way of restoring to these tribes a portion of the territory
we now occupy, which has been some years past taken by the British, lies
in the vindication of our power sufficiently to preclude the idea that this
cession of territory is made from weakness, 3088-3102 Towards such
a step a variety of conditions would be indispensable with the chiefs and with
the people, conditions that should be very distinct, and-about which no party
in Kafirlaud should have it in his power to affect ignorance or misappre¬
hension, 3102.
Grounds on which witness forms the opinion that the location of military
villages was a very unfortunate step, 3103-3105 Acts of very great cruelty
were exercised on the male population at the outbreak of the war ; but the
missionaries were unmolested except in one instance, that of Mr. Niveo,
3106-3112 Witness was disappointed in finding the amount of influence
of the missionaries of various denominations in tiie Kafir tribes to be con¬
siderably short of his anticipations; still, great ^ood has been done by them,
3113 The missionaries avoid, on principle, giving advice to the chiefs on
political matters ; but in relation to such temporal matters as are connected
with husbandry and ordinary affairs, they give their advice readily, 3^ï4*
[Second Examination.]—Witness went to the Kat River Settlement on the
20th January 1851; reasons for his going there, 3115 Disaffection pre¬
vailed there extensively at this period, 3116,3117 The followers of Hermanus
had i-allied after his defeat and had received accessions from numerous dis¬
contented Hottentots, and were exercising a most pernicious influence, 3116
There seemed to be no civil or military authority in the colony competent
to the exigency; there seemed to be no power to repress the Kafirs without or
to control t'.ie turbulence within, 3116 Information as to the treatment of
the population in and after the war of 1835-36 and 1846-47, when the
sacrifices
Ärifiii».]
R E N T O N.
583
Report, 1851—continued.
Renton, Rev. Henry, a. m*. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
sacrifices and services were the greatest, and no compensation was made,
3118 et seq. On making inquiries of the missionaries as to the causes of
the extraordinary disaffection, witness learned that there was a long series of
matters which had soured the spirit of the inhabitants, and all spoke primarily
of the wars of 1835-36 and 1846-47; 3118.
Memorandum on the Kat River Settlement, drawn up by Dr. Innes, the
superintendent general of education in the colonv, founded upon official
returns and documents, delivered in and read, 3118-3125 Detail of the
grievances of the people as related to witness on his visit to the colony in
1851 ; 3126 et seq. Complaints were made by them that both in 1835-36
and 1846-47 they were treated as a degraded race, and that they had received
no compensation for the losses they had sustained by the wars ; they al-o
complained that solemn promises made to them by successive governors
were broken, 3129 et seq.
Reference to the complaints made by them of the conduct of the fii st magis»
trate who was appointed over the settlement, namely, Mr. Biddulph, 3129-
3134 In regard to this magistrate they complained ihat a tax was imposed
upon wood cutting ; this tax was levied since the war of 1846-47 ; they were
not allowed to cut down and sell wood out of the bush or foiest, without pay¬
ing a tax of seven and a half per cent., 3134-3143 The people had not been
previously taxed in this way ; they considered the wood as their own ; as a part
of the property that was given to them on their location in that district, 3137-
3142 They complained of it as coming upon them after their second im¬
poverishment by war, as a fresh obstruction in the way of their prosperity,
3143.
Observations upon Mr. BiddulplTs report upon the Kat River Settlement,
3144-3155 This report, in which he represented the inhabitants of the
settlement as a worthless and immoral class of people, e.xcited universal in¬
dignation throughout the settlement, and was succeeded by remonstrances
which led to his removal from the settlement, 3144-3147 Means witness
has of controverting these statements of Mr. Biddulpb's, 3148-3155
Evidence showing that the progress of education in the settlement was
successful up to the time when it was wholly interrupted by the carrying off
of all the people into military posts, 3155,3156.
Further evidence in detail as to the losses sustained by the settlers of the
Kat River Settlement, consequent on the wars of 1835-36 and 1846-47 ; 3157-
3167 Witness is aware that many cases occurred of great individual
losses to other settlers in other parts of the Cape from the Kafir war, but it
was optional with theiu to come out or to retire, 3167 The Kat River men
on the contrary were the first called out and the last relieved, 3167
Witness supposes the design of the settlement was to make them a sort of
bulwark to the colony, which they have proved, for they have borne the brunt
of every war, 3168 Witness has understood that on every occasion the
Hottentots were ready to obey orders and were zealous in their loyalty, 316g
The present disaffection is mainly, atttibut.ible to the neglect of their
complaints, and the absence of redress for their losses, 317® there
are also other causes ; there was the conduct of this magistrate, Biddulph, and
0.63. p p 2 also
584
R E N T o N.
[Uafiv
Report, 1851—continued.
Rentan, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
also of the magistrate who succeeded him, Bowker; respects in which this
niiigistrate gave them offence, 3170-3176.
Evidence upon which witne>s bases the opinion that Mr. Bowker was
actuated by prejudices against the Hottentot population, and the coloured
population generally, 3176-3196 Tiiere were also other magistrates in the
district against whom the settleis complained; circumstances under which
these complaints arose, 3197, 3198 Observations relative to the location
of Hermanus on the settlement, showing tirai his presence was dangerous to
the allegiance of the people of the Kat River, 3199-3202. 3206 The
missiotiaries have great influence with the Kafir chiefs, and with the tribes
generally; in the disti'ict ol the Kat River the influence of" the missionaries,
as well as of the minister of the Dutch church, was exerted incessantly to
repress the spirit of rebellion, and to resist the violence of the rebels, 3203-
3205.
Copy of memorandum of a conference with the insurgents at Bliukwater on
9th January, this document being sent to Major-general Somerset by Colonel
Folic, then fii Id cornet, and subsequently field commandant of the district;
this conference was held widi tlie rebeE when making known to them the
offer of pardon from his Excellency, 3206-3218 Account in this memo¬
randum of what passed beiwet n Mr. Read, jun. and the rebels, as well as what
passed on tl e pait of the other individuals who accompanied ihe field cornet, .
and the sentiments by which at that time the rebels were actuated, 3207-
3218 The insurrection hioke out first at theKeiskamma among the Kafirs
on the 24th December, 3219 And one of the principal insunectionary
movements was at the Kat River Settlement, immediately following the
outbreak of the Kafiis, 3220 It is also the fact that great numbei's of
persons belonging to that settlement, Hottentots especially, joined the rebels,
3221 Reasons why witness would still say, were all these circuuistanccs
considered, that the Hottentots are a very loyal people, 3222-3226.
The desirableness or otherwise of locating coloured people in a s. tilement
by themselves is a very difficult and a very momentous question, especially
in the existing slate of sentiment throughout the colonv ; but witness hesi¬
tates very greaily about the expediency of this course, 3227, 3228 It
seems 10 witness to be desirable, if society is to be amalgamated, that ihere
should be a general diffusion of all the classes who are to unite in such amal¬
gamation, and that there should be as general'a similarity of treatment as
possible, all understanding and enj:iying the rights that are common to all,
3229 There is no doubt that in parts of the colony great prejudices eyist
against the colouied r.ices on the part of the whites in the colonv, 3230-3233
^There is a feelmg of jealousy of the white men among thé Kafirs, and
also a feeling < f injury from the aggression of the white men; this is concen¬
trated more towards the Englishman than towards others, 3234-3236.
Opinion that the magistrates, or rather the civil commissiuiieis who have
been appointed over the Kafirs, have most admirably discharged their duties
in at once maintaining what is due to Biitish authority and doing justice to
the natives, 3237-3244 Witness would decidedly piefer magistrates being
gent from this countiy, who even did not know the Kafir language, rather than
select
R E N T O N.
.585
Report, 1851—continued.
Rentan, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
select tiiem from those persons whom he considers prejudiced against the
coloured races now in the colony, 3239-3246.
Opinion as to the preliminary course necessary for the foundation of tran¬
quillity in ihe colony and of peace among the Kafir tribes, 3247 et seq. It
appears to witness that an Imperial or Parliamentary Comniission from this
country, composed of men of capacity and high character, entiiely removed
from all colonial local influence, and with ample power to call patties and
documents before them, nho should thoroughly atid impartially,on the spot,
investigate facts, is most desirable if not most necessary to the ends of truth
and justice, 3247-3258 Witness considers such a commission would give
satisfaction to the Kafirs and would command their respect, 3249, 3250.
3253-3258.
Further grounds for witness's arriving at the conclusion that the course of
the general policy adopted towards the Kafirs has been considerably com¬
plicated and interfered with by acts of indiscretioti o 1 the part of individual
magistrates, 3259-3262 In the whole district over which the insurrection
has spread, there is not a single missionary or rais-ion family retnaining
exceptât the Ciiumie Station, 3263, 3264 Whether it is desirable that the
missionaries siiould withdraw from the seat of war, or that they should remain,
is a question about which good men and wise men differ, 3265 There is
much to be said on both sides ; but it is obvious to witness that if they can
remain with personal safety, there are various important ends to be gained by
their continuance in exerting iheir influence to prevent the wcll-affected from
being involved in the rebellion; ihe Kafirs were willing that they should
remain in their country, 3265-3273 As far as witness's judgment and
information go, the mirsionaries in Sandilh's district took no part whatever,
either tlirectly or indirectly, in promoting the ridng of the Kafirs, 3274-3276
Witness has heard that some of the plunder that was taken from Fort
Armstrong was found afterwards in Shiloh, this being a missionary station ;
but witness is not positive of ihe fact, 3277-3285.
[Third Examination.]—Witness has not the slightest reason for thinking
that the rumour that some of the plunder taken from Fort Armstrong was found
at Shiloh is well founded, 3303 Detail of the circumstances attending the
destruction of Shiloh and of the previous occurrences ; parties from whom
witness has gathered these details, 3304-3311.
[Fouith Examination.]—Further reasons for .arriving at the conclusion that
the Kat River Settlement has not been a failure, 3312 On looking to the
services and sacrifices and subsequent treatment undergone by the population,
witness does not regard the experiment as having had a fair trial, 3312
Instances in support of the statement, made by witness in "his former evidence,
that the missionaries had exerted theniselvcs incessantly to repress the spirit
of rebellion and to resist violence, 3313-3331. 3432 Witness is not aware
wheiher m:my of the communications between the missionaries and the chiefs
have been more political than religious ; some of the missionaries have been
employed as negotiators on the part of the Government, 3322-3338. 3342.
With respect to the que.stion whether*itis prejudicial to the cause of religion
22.63. JP P 3
586
R E N T O N.
Report, continued.
Renton, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis oí' his Evidence)—pontpmed.
to mix up in the cases of persons the two purposes of religion and politics,
3343 Witness would say that it is desirable to keep the two ^uite distinct,
but he apprehends that in many cases there are no other suitable parties
through whom communications can be made, 3343,3344. 3433, 3434
Witness is aware that a meeting was held in Graham's Town in March, in
which strong disapprobation was expressed at the conduct of the missionaries,
3345-3347. 3431. 3477-3481 The influence of the missionaries over the
Katirs who are under their spiritual influence is very great, and from this cir¬
cumstance there is a reflex influence over the Kafir tribes in general, 3348-
3355-
Further evidence as to the evils which resulted from the establishment of
military villages, 3356-3369 Almost all the employment of the Kafirs in
their heathen state is stealing cattle ; it is considered an honourable employ¬
ment, 3370 Evidence as to their barbarous treatment of their prisoners ;
they have of late years been increasingly barbarous to their male prisoners ;
but they show lenity to women and cliildren, 3371, 3372. 3469-3476 The
attack on Woburn and on Auckland villages was a treacherous one; many
of the Kafirs and Hottentots who made the attack were at the time partaking
of the festivities of the villages, 3373-3380 Up to this period the Hottentots
had been faithful to their engagements, and the majority of the proprietors,
the people properly possessed of the allotments, are so still, 3381-3383.
When witness stated that the Hottentots had had discontent, from being
employed in the last war for a considerable time, it was not the mere employ¬
ment he specified as the cause, but the conditions of it, and the treatment after¬
wards, and the losses they suffered, 3383-3392 Witness considers the
rest of the Hoitentots settled along the frontier were as loyal as those at the
Kat River, 3393- Witness does not consider that the small portion of this race
that has shown disaffection and has been engaged in the late outrages is any
proof of their readiness to become enemies of the Government, 3394-3410
There have been several Kafir wars, and there have been several insurrections
of Dutch Boers, and during all these, the Hottentots have never shown the
slightest sympathy with either party of insurgents, 3408 Further evidence
as to the indiscretion of some of the former magistrates having been one
cause their of disaffection, 3411-3425.
Witness has no idea that there was any combination between all the
Hottentot settlements on the frontier, including the soldiers of the Cape
corps, ou the subject of the outbreak, 3426-3430—•—But witness apprehends
there must have been communications from the Kafirs with a part of the
Hottentots, endeavouring to obtain their neutrality, and probably their co¬
operation, 3426-3430 It is very desirable that the missionaries should as
much as possible combine with spiritual instruction the teaching of the arts
of industry and agriculture, 3435-3451 -Extent to which this has been
carried out; the Moravian iVIission ranks fiist as regards the teaching of the
useful arts; the London Society has also given considerable attention to it,
3435-3451-
Witness has never heard of anjr instance where the missionaries, either
directly or indirectly, had given sanction to the rising of the Kafirs, 3452-3457
At
REN
RET
587
Report, 18 ¡i—continued.
Renton, Rev. Henry, a. m. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
——At the time of the outbreak, if a very S'mall number of regular troops,
with a military officer, could have been sent into the Kat River Settle¬
ment, there is no doubt it would have been sufficient to have rallied the
loy;il and to have put down the insurrection, 3462-3468 When appli¬
cation was made for arms and ammunition there were none to supply,
3463-3468 Tiie outbreak was conducted with great secrecy, and was
most unexpected J there were no means of providing against it beforehand,
3465-3467.
Representative Government :
1. Opinions in favour of a Representative Government for the
Colony.
2. Objections thereto,
1. Opinions in favour of a Representative Government for the Colony :
If a representative system were brought into operation in the colony, the
Legislature would be disposed adequately to provide for the defence of the
frontier, Fairbairn 455-457. 461 Grounds on which witness founds
the opinion that the establishment of a representative government at Cape
Town would tend to re-establish a hold upon the affections of those boers who
have penetrated beyond the frontier into Kaffraria, and there established inde¬
pendent authority, ib. 552-566 As an owner of property in the colony,
witness would say it is absolutely necessary, and would be quite safe to grant
a representative government in the present state of things. Sir A. Stocken"
Strom 1303.
2. Objections thereto :
Witness has heard that if representative institutions were given to the
colony, the colony itself would be able to take care of its frontier ; wifjiess
very much doubts the power of the colony to defend the frontier; they would
be very sorry to try it. Sir P. Maitland 2994 Witness does not see how
the establishment of a constitutional government at the Cape would have any
beneficial effect upon our relations with the Kafir tribes, ib. 2999, 3000.
See also Division of the Colony. Legislative Assembly.
Retro-Cession of Territory. It is an indispensable condition of any future
policy that there shall be no further encroachment upon the Kafirs upon our
side ; it is a great question whether we ought not to give up certain lands
which we have taken from them, Fairbairn 57t~575 R undesirable
that after we have occupied any territory that we should re-cede it to the Kafirs ;
they would not appreciate any retro-cession on our part; ihey would take it
OS weakness. Sir P. Maitland 3001-3007 Witness's own opinion is,
that ihe best thing would be, if it were possible, after the unmistakeable
vindication of the indomitable power of Britain, to act a magnanimous part
and say. We care nothing about your land ; what we want is your benefit, and
if vou will be faithful allies, and preserve the territory from invasion, we will
givx- back a large part of it. Rentan 30^9 This would be a saving of much
0.63. p p 4 money,
588
RET
S C H
[ISaftr
Report, 1851—continued.
Metro-Cession of Territory—continued.
money, and wonid be the means of restoring good will and confidence in the
minds of tlie Kafirs towards us. Menton 307g.
See also D'Urban, Sir Benjamin. Territory.
Revenue and Expenditure. Amount of the revenue of the colony, and amount of
the present expenditure of tlie Government, Fairbairn 507, 508.
See also Expenditure.
Rifle Brigade. Surprise expressed hy the Kafirs at the shooting of the rifle
brigade, Bissett 973, 974.
Rifle Corps. See Cape Corps. Cape Mounted Rifles.
Rights of Property. It is advisable as soon as possible to ascertain and put
on record the rights of the chiefs and people, in order to bring them as much
as possible under the jurisdiction of our courts, so that there should be real
property rights, Adamson 690-693 There is no actual recognition of
property rights among the Kafir chiefs ; they move from one place to another
as suits their convenience, Bissett 929-933 The Kafirs do not place any
value upon the rights of property in the land ; they rove from place to place
in search of pasturage, Adamson 1106-1112.
Roads. Impoi tance of the formation of roads in the Amatóla mountains, and
the estabiishnftnt of a military post. Sir J. E. Alexander
Robberies. See Cattle Stealing. Depredations. Plunder.
S.
Sandilli, C\\\eï. Witness had frequent opportunities of seeing and conversing
with the Gaika commissioner, Mr. Browniee, an able and upright magistrate,
and his statement was, that it had been long known that Sandiili had been
plotting, but that he could not find any evidences of any general sympathy
with him, or any desiie to break out in revolt, Renton 3019 Witness
attributes the diminution in the power of the chiefs to the confidence that
the people had in the administration of Mr. Brownloe, ib. 3020 The end
of it was that there was a funnidable outbreak, ib. 3021, 3022 Respects
in which witness considers that the course followed by the Governor, uninten-
tioiially, but unfortunately, precipitated it; evidence in detail as to the course
pursued by the Governor with regard to Sandiili, and also with respect to his
conduct towards Maquomo, which further tended to irritate the peojile, ib.
3044-3073.- See also Surveys.
Schools (Kat River Settlement). The children attend the schools of the Lon¬
don Missionary b'ocieiy in large numbers, and the people generally are able to
read and write; they are familiar, to some extent, with the English as well as
the Dutch languages. Freeman 20, 21.
5ee also Civilization, 1. Edu9ation.
Seat
Crifie«.]
SEA
S M I
589
Report, 1851 —cenlinued.
Seat of Government. Objection to transferring the seat of government from
Cape Town to Graham's Town, Fairbairn 449. 453-457 Much practical
inconvenience arises from the distance at which Cape Town is from the eastern
frontier; it would be very advisable to transfer the seat of government, Bissett
861-868 In reference to the defence of the colony, it is not necessary either
that the seat of government should be tiansferred from Cape Town to some
point further in the oast, or that the colony should be divided, Sir A. Stock¬
enstrom 1279 An executive officer with full powers would be all that would
be necessary on the frontier; there could be no objection to a lieutenant-
governor, ib. 1279-1281 Witness thinks it better that the seat of govern¬
ment should be at Cape Town, Sir G, T. Napier 1537 Great inconvenience
from the seat of government, Cape Town, being so great a distance from the
frontier ; there ought to be an officer with paramount authority on the frontier.
Sir P. Maitland 2883-2888.
Sectarian Feeling. Religious or sectarian feeling and rivalry does not run iiigh
in the Kat River Settlement, but there is a little of it. Freeman 114, 115.
Servants. Opinion that the Kafir servants coming into the colony are the means
of stealing cattle from the farmers, Sir G. P. Napier 1625-1627.
Settlements. It would be very desirable after the expulsion of the hostile tribes
from Kafirland, to bring about a more dense settlement of the people there;
people for agricultural purposes might be located there to any extent, Bissett
775-778. See also Kat River Settlement.
Settlers. See Depredations. Encroachments. English Settlers. Kat River
Settlements. Military Force, 2.
Shiloh. Witness has heard that some of tlie plunder that was taken from Fort
Armstrong was found afterwards in Shiloh, a missionary station. Ronton
-3285 Witness has not the sligiitest reason for thinking that this rumour
is well grounded, ib. 3303 Detail of the circumstances attending the
destruction of Shiloh, and of the previous occurrences; parties from whom
witness has gathered these details, ib. 3304-3311 Statement relative to
the recent occurrences in Kafraria, in as far as they have reference to the
Moravian settlement of Shiloh, La TroJe 3483-3486 Theie is considerable
doubt whether the first aggression was on the part of the Whittlesea people
or the Shiloh people, ib. 3486 The Moravian missionaries have no station
at Whittlesea, ib. 3487.
Smith, Andrew, m.d. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was stationed at the Cape
of Good Hope for 16 years on the medical staff of the army, and during part
of the time was employed confidentially by different governors in reference to
the frontier tribes, ihe Kafirs and bushmen, 262 Witness was employed
with the object of explaining to the natives the policy pursued by the local
government, and to ascertain whether, at least as far as regards the bushmen,
. they were contented or discontented with that policy ; this was in the north
part of the colony, towards the Orange river, 263-270 The old commando
system had been abandoned, and the belief was, both on the part of the autho¬
rities of Cape Town, and also throughout the colony, that by abandoning this
system the robberies had greatly increased, 276-279 Witness was for
investing
590
SMITH.
Report, 1851—continued.
Smith, Andrew, m.d. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
investing the frontier emigrants with a kind of summary power of redress in
the event of depredations on their cattle ; there was no locally organized force,
nor was there any disposition to form one, 280-288. 289, 290 ^Tliey
depended on the field cornets collecting their people; sometimes they
answered to tlie summons of the field cornets with alacrity, and sometimes
they did not, 282, 283. 288-290.
Opinion that the frontier cannot be maintained in peace by any force so long
as we have people in an uncivilized state, who believe it is their right to steal
wherever they can steal, 291, 292. Witness has had personal intercourse
with every chief in his time in Kafirland, 293 ^They made many special
complaints to witness; nature of these complaints, 294 et seq. ^They were
always complaining of the Government liolding them responsible for the
thieving which went on among their tribes, notwithstanding that they had not
the power of restraining it, 295, 296 This was the great complaint of
Gaika when he was appointed chief of all Kafirland, and was held the medium
of communication between the Kafirs and the colony, and bound to restore all
stolen cattle, and so on, 295-300 The Kafir has a sort of sacred respect
for tiie chief, but nothing beyond that ; if lie exacts anything from his subjects
which is not asireeable to the whole body, he lias no certain means of enforc¬
ing it, 295.
Witness does not know that it would be useless to attempt to enter into
treaties with the chiefs, 301 But if v.e form a treaty it must be mie that
will require sufth an organization among the native chiefs as would establish a
government for them, 301-303 Suggestions as to the most expedient and
practicable policy for the British Government to pursue in reference to these
frontier tribes, 304 et seq. There might be one of two courses adopted,
either to let them entirely alone, and allow them to manage their own affairs,
as was tiie case when witness first went to the colony, or take them under the
British jurisdiction altogether, 304, 305. 322-332 If the latter plan were
to be adopted every great chief must be immediately removed from the country,
305 We shall never manage the Kafirs, keeping their own chiefs, 305.
If the policy were adopted of not interfering with their internal concerns it
would require a line of military posts along the immediate frontier to protect
it from the incursions and robberies committed by these people, 306, 307
Witness's opinion always has been, and is still, that it would be necessary to
have a special commissioner in Kafirland, who would be, to a certain extent,
the adviser of every tribe of Kafiis, and who would appear to the Kafirs to
have an interest in them and them only ; they do not consider the Governor to
have an interest in tliem, 306-318.333-337.386-395 ^Tlie commissioner
ought not to be connected with the colony, nor to receive orders from the
Government; the Governor should have no power to control him ; he ought to
be separate and independent, and communicate with the Colonial Office at
home, 306-318. 333-337- 386-395-
The only power he would have would be, in the case of an outbreak, to call
upon the Governor for assistance ; but in no way should he interfere otherwise,
306. 346-350. 386-395 The object should be to make the Kafir feel that
the while man residing with him was his friend, which he does not feel now
with
ITríj&í»,] SMITH.
• .'.JAI flMBBI
Report, X 851 —continued.
.59»
Smith, Andrew, m.d. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
with respect to any white man, 306 -Grounds on which witness forms the
opinion that such a commissioner would obtain great moral power and influ¬
ence over the Kafirs ; moral power, if employed with tact, is better than phy¬
sical power against the Kafirs, 306-3x8 It would not do to extend the
jurisdiction of this commissioner over the v/hole of Kafirland, but over the
immediate frontier it might be extended ; over the Kafirs who are more
directly in communication vvitli the colony, the Gaika Kafirs, 3x9.
It would no doubt be necessary to support such a commissioner by a mili¬
tary force J bis importance must be maintained ; the Kafirs must be made to
respect him, 335-337. 340-345. 386-395 Witness does not propose that
this commissioner should be in the situation of head of the executive of Kafir-
land, he only proposes that he should have a moial influence, 338, 339. 355-
358 The love of marauding and cattle stealing is a strong passion among
the Kafirs, 359 But if they could once be got to think that it was as
honourable to find subsistence by other means than their forefathers adopted,
there would be a great change wrought, 359, 360 The passion for plunder
is stronger with them than the passi m for war, but war generally arises from
this, 36t Tliey attack other native tribes in the same way as they attack
the Colonists, 362 Their feeling against the white man is more that of jea¬
lousy and fear than that of hostility ; they fear eventually that they will be
sacrificed by the white men, 363-365 On several occasions the Kafirs and
the Hottentots have combined to attack the white man, 366, 367.
Witness would say that the extent of frontier which we ha«ve to defend now
is about 120 miles, 368-372 Witness would say that the loss of life and
properly was greater before the commando system was totally abolished than
it has been since, 373-385 Evidence showing that the defence of the fron¬
tier by the boers is a much more effective system than the operation of regular
troops; but witness would be sorry to see the system re-established, 376-
385-
From what witness has seen of the Kafirs he believes they would be dis¬
posed to receive a commissioner, such as he has described ; they are generally
a manageable and tractable people, 396, 397. 420,421 Way in which, in
the course of time, under such a commissioner a civil force might be organized
in the country, which does not exist now, 398-400.409-4x1 A certain
amount of expense ought to be incurred by this country for a certain time, in
order to introduce this system, 399, 400 Tract of country witness pro¬
poses to organize in this manner, 40X-408 The Kafirs are now well armed ;
they are a much more formidable enemy than they were in 1821; 412-4x4
This new system recommended by witness could only be introduced into
Kafirland upon some convention to be entered into between the British
Government and the Kafirs; it would only be effectual in that way,415-419.
[Second Examination.]—Information as to the number of tribes and the
population of each tribe in British Kafraria in 1830; witness estimated them
at about 311,000; 2030-2043 In this calculation witness does not esti¬
mate the Zoolu tribes ; the Zoolu country lies about 80 or 90 miles beyond
Natal ; the number of the Zoolus is very great; they have about 25 regular
regiments; their system is very much like our system in regard to militias of
counties,
592
S Vi I T H.
[iKafir
Report, 1851—continued.
Smith, Andrew, m.d. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
counties, 2044-2052 Witness would say that the Hottentots were the
aborigines of the country from the Keiskamma to about 40 miles to the east¬
ward ; but they have since amalgamated with the Kafirs, 2053-2057
Difficulty of defining the boundary of each tribe ; statement of the nearest
approximation witness can give, 2058-2067.
The number of Hottentots has been very much diminishing ever since the
commencement of the colony, 2061 Out of the population estimated by
witness at about 311,000, witness would say there would be about 50,000
fighting men, 2068-2071 ——witness's time they were not well supplied
with fire-arms and ammunition; they could hardly be induced to touch a
gun, 2072 From witness's knowledge of these tribes he is of opinion that
they would unite generally against the British, 2073, 2074 The country
generally is very lavourable to their mode of fighting; there is a great deal
of bush fighting, 2075-2077 Evidence sliowing that Natal is not a sale
colony as a British possession if the Zoolus became our enemies; there is
only one regiment there, con'<isting of about 650 men, 2078-2096.
The customs of the various tribes are verv nearly similar to one another ;
there are some slight modifications, 2103, 2104 Way in which they arrange
disputes that arise between themselves, 2t05 No contracts or other
treaties are entered into between tiie tribes beyond an understanding that no
tribe must trespass on or interfere with the hunting or grazing grounds of
another tribe; they are generally faithful to these engagements; this is not
the case in their treaties with the British Government, 2106-2115 Witness
approved of Lord Glenelg's system to a certain e.xtent, but thought something
more was wanted; namely, thai there should be a commissioner appointed to
reside among the Kafirs to organize a government for their chiefs; explana¬
tion as to what witness means by Lord Glenelg's system, 2116-2124. 2127-
2150.
Upon receiving the colony from the Dutch, the burghers were allowed to
defend themselves without any military interference, 215t The commando
system was stopped in General Burke's time, in 1827; opinion that the com¬
mando system is not of much use as a means of protection for the frontier,
2152.2163 Remarks relative to the system adopted by Lord Glenelg for
the protection of the colony, 2153-2158 Explanation as to the difference
between the patrol system and the commando system ; neither system is
effective for the protection of the frontier boundary, 2159-2163 Wiiness
would look for the defence of the frontier totally to the moral elevation of the
Kafirs, and not to force ; it will no doubt take some lime to raise their moral
chai-acter to the required standard, 2163-2167.
Evidence relative to the encroachments made by settlers on the territories
of the Kafirs; witness attributes a great deal of the dissatisfaction of the
Kafirs to the encroachments of the co onists, 2168-2194 All the policy of
Lord Charles Somerset was directed to establish more clearly the old boundary,
and to keep a certain tract of couiitiy beyond free from all settlers, with a
view to secure peace and quietne-s on the fiontier, 2186 Observations
relative to the treaties entered into with the Kafirs by Sir Andries Stocken¬
strom ; this very much satisfied the Kafirs, who considered that an act of
Justice
€ri6í0.]
S M I
S M I
593
Report, 1851—continued.
Smith, Andrew, m.d. (.Analysis of his Evidence)—continued,
justice liad been done them, 2195-2205 Witness has heard that there was
a modification of those treaties very soon afier, and to that modification was
ascribed the outbreak of the Kafirs, 2199.
Witness does not place mucii reliance upon treaties with the Kafir cliiefs,
unless there be a commissioner or resident to aid and assist them to carry
them out; but even then it would not be safe to rely upon such arrangements
without sufficient force to maintain them, 2206-2208 'I'lie Kafirs have not
much respect for the British Government ; they believe that the agreements
they have made have not been kept; this belief must have arisen out of a
misapprehension, because no government could have dealt more nobly and
generously than the colonial government usually dealt with the Kafirs, 2209-
2219 Generally speaking the chiefs do not like the missionary stations,
because from the preaching of the missionaries ihe Kafirs get a certain degree
of light which makes them not so completely subservient to their chiefs; the
people like the missionaries, 2220, 2221.
Remarks relative to the violation of the treaty made by Lord Charles
Somerset in 1819, establishing a neutral territory between the Great Fish
River and the Keiskamma, by the erection of a fort called Fort Wilshire; the
govemment never sanctioned the colonists living on that neutral terriior3',
2222-2225 Opinion that the establishment of a bona fide neutral territory,
which neither colonists nor Kafirs should be permitted to enter, would not
effect much good ; the Kafirs would cross that territory and steal, 2226,
2227.
Smith, Sir Harry. General statement made by witness that in his evidence he
has no intention or design to impugn the character of Sir Harry Smith or his
government. Freeman to.
See Defence of the Frontier. Griqiias,2. Juries. Policy of the
Government, 2.
Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explanation
relative to witness's experience at the Cape; services performed by him at
Matal ; was appointed frontier commissiimer at the last Kafir war, 2228-2234
'i'he immediate origin of the Kafir war in 1846 was the seizure of a pri¬
soner by the Kafirs when under escort ; the breaking out of that war was caused
by the conduct of the Kafirs, 2235-2237 Evidence generally with respect
to the number and nature of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of the
colony of Natal ; more particularly as to the Zoolus tribe, 2238-2258
There is no doubt the savage tribes v/ill scon obtain a supply of arms and
become acquainted with their use through the various traders that will sell
them, in spite of any regulations to the contrary, 2241 Great influence
possessed by the Zoolu king over the native tribes in South Africa ; his power is
suihcient to lestrain his people from coininittiug depredations to a certain
extent, 2251, 2252 Statement as to the extent of the colony of Natal
Proper, 2259, 2260.
Favourable nature of the country and climate of Natal ; it is preferable to
British Kafraria ; it is possible lo auticipaie a large population there of
European origin engaged m the pursuits of agriculture, 2261-2272 Man¬
ner
594
SMI
S O M
[ISaûr
Report, 1851—continued.
Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel T. C. (Analysis of his Evidence)—contmued.
ner in which the boundaries of Natal were fixed ; nature of the arrangement
niade between the Government and the native tribes, 2273-2276—•—Expe¬
diency of establishing some check on the supply of fire-arms and powder to
the natives around Natal; impossibility of altogether preventing the smug¬
gling of arms, though it might be prevented to a certain extent, 2279-2304
- Estimated number of native tribes in the colony of Natal ; great influx of
natives since the last war ; amount of military force employed to control the
native population, 2305-2320 Nature of the duties of the magistrates in
the colony of Natal ; satisfaction of the natives with the magisterial control,
2309-2313.
Preference to be given to the character of the Zoolu natives over the Kafirs;
they are not quite so dishonest, 2321, 2322 Witness would considerita
very dangerous experiment to make troops of the Zoolus under British in¬
struction, 2323-2326 Great dislike of the natives round Natal to the Dutch
boers ; they prefer the British authority and settlers infinitely before the
Dutch farmers, 2327-2329 There is no unwillingness of the natives in the
colony of Natal to bring their disputes before the civil magistrates; it has
always been the policy of the Government to maintain the authority of the
chiefs, 2330-2332 Opinion that the diminution of the authority of the chiefs
had nothing to do with the outbreak of the Kafir war in 1846 ; 2333, 2334.
Opinion that the policy to be pursued with the Kafirs should be one of
great decision and firmness in putting down and restraining their thefis from
the colonists ; ihe chiefs should be held responsible for the cattle stolen,
2336-2352 The great cause of cattle stealing has arisen from the want of
sufficient firmness of the Government in not insisting on immediate reparation
being made by the chiefs, 2352 Opinion in favour of the Keiskamma as
the frontier of the Cape colony ; great difficulty of protecting the Fish River
boundary ; the great Kei would be far too extended a boundary, 2353-2358
Objections to treaiies being entered into with the Kafir chiefs; it has
been a great mistake to deal with the savages as if they perfectly understood
the usages of civilized society, 2359, 2360.
Impossibility of protecting the frontier without a large military force; the
appointment of civil commissioners would be useless, 2361, 2362 Obser¬
vations relative to the military forts on the Keiskamma frontier ; there would
be no difficulty in occupying these forts with a British force, 2363-2369
Witness does not consider it practicable to clear the Amatóla mountains, and
preserve the range of mountains as the frontier, 2370-2378 Explanation
relative to the meaning of the term patrol system ; nature of the patrol
system as applied to the frontier arrangements, 237g, 2380.
Soil. The land on the other side of the Kei is of a very fine and fertile quality ;
there would be no hardship to the Kafirs in driving them across that river,
Sir J. E. Alexander 2830-2839. See also Climate.
Somerset, Lord Charles. The Keiskamma should be maintained as it was under
Lord Charles Somerset ; opinion that he understood the Kafirs and the man¬
agement ofthat frontier belter than any governor who was ever there, before
or since. Sir G. T. Napier 1518.
See also Neutral Territory. Treaties, 2.
Special
CtitiW*]
S P E
STO
595
Report, 1851—continued.
Special Commissioner. Witoess's opinion always has been and is still, that it
would be necessary to have a special commissioner in Kafirland, who would
be to a certain extent the adviser of every tribe of Kafirs, and who would
appear to the Kafirs to have an interest in them and them only ; they do not
consider the Governor to have an interest in them ; powers with which he
should be vested, A. Smith 306-318. 333-337- 3^6-395 The object should
be to make the Kafir feel that the white man residing with him was his friend,
which he does not feel now with respect to any white man, ib. 306
Giountis on which witness forms the opinion that such a commissioner would
obtain great moral power and influence over the Kafirs ; moral power, if em-
ploved with tact, is better than physical power against the Kafirs, ib. 306-
318. 396, 397. 420, 421.
It would not do to extend the jurisdiction of this commissioner over the
whole of Kafirland, but over the immediate frontier it might be extended ; over
the Kafirs who are more directly in communication with the colony, the
Gaika Kafirs, .4. «SmííA 319 It would no doubt be necessary to support
such a commissioner by a military force ; his importance must be maintained ;
the Kafirs must be made to respect iiim, ib. 335-337. 340-345. 386-395——
Witness does not propose that this commissioner should be in the situation
of head of the executive of Kafirland ; he only proposes that he should have a
moral influence, ib. 338, 339. 355-358. Way in which, in the course of
lime, under such a commissioner a civil force might be organized in the country
which does not exist now, ib. 398-400. 409-411.
A certain amount of expense ought to be incurred by this country for a
certain time, in order to introduce this system, A. Smith, 399, 400 Tract of
countiy witness proposes to organize in this manner, ib. 401-408 This new
system recommended by witness could only be introduced into Kafirland
upon some convention being entered into between the British Government
and the Kafirs; it would only be effectual in that way, ib. 415-419
Witness approved of Lord Gienelg's system to a certain extent, but thought
something more was wanted ; namely, that there should be a commissioner
appointed to reside amongthe Kafirs to organize a Government for their chiefs;
explanation as to what witness means by Lord Gienelg's system, ib. 2116-
2124.2127-2150.
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Nature of the colony
of the Cape of Good Hope; has lived there all his life, except that this is his
third trip to Europe, 1247, 1248 In witness's earlier life he resided in Cape
Town, but has been principally in public employment in the eastern parts,
1249 Resides now at Maestrom, in the district of Somerset, within 25
miles of Kafirland; has considerable landed property, and is a farmer there,
1250-1252 Periods for which, and capacities in which witness has been
connected with the government of the country, 1253, 1254 Has had abun¬
dant opportunities of forming an opinion on the subject of the policy pursued
by this country, with respect to the border tribes upon the frontier of the
colony, 1255.
Witness gave his views with reference to the affairs of the Cape frontier
most fully before the Aborigines Committee of The House of Commons in
1835 and 1836, and still adheres to the opinion therein expressed, 1255
Grounds
596
STOCKENSTROiVJ.
{Unfix
Report, 1851—continued.
Stockensirom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
Grounds on which witness inaint;iins firmly, that without a commission
deputed to the Cape totally iincounected with the colony, or any party therein,
to examine the numbers of witnesses of opposite opinions and interests, whom
it is almost impossible to bring over to this country, the British Government
and Legislature will never be able to ascertain the true causes of the disaffec¬
tion, disturbances, and wars at present taxiing at the Cape, 1255 And that
they will never be able to do justice, unless a free constitutional government
be granted to that colony, whose local knowledge and public scrutiny would
render all mystifications at least very difficult, 1255.
Witness considers the cause of the late outbieak to have been our vacilla¬
tion in systems, in making treaties and breaking them, and the nature of the
people we have to deal with,1256 1here is no doubt they are just barba¬
rians who will plunder, and require to be kept tight, 1256 At the same
lime strict justice and humanity are the only means by which this or any other
nation can be ruled, 125G, 1257 There is not a man in this country, nor at
the Cape, who can tell what must be done at the close of the war; every¬
thing depends on its termination, 1257. 1264-1206 What we are now to
do is, not to rest till we have put those people down ; unless they are put down
they will drive us out of the colony, 1257 Difficulty of suggesting any
practical measures which the Government of this country ought to adopt in
reference to these tribes in the event of the British authority being completely
re-established over them, 1258 Wiiness did suggest measures 20 years
ago, but it is a very difficult question now, 1258.
It is one of the greatest misfortunes that could have happened, to have
called in the blacks to our assistance, 1258, 1259 A few years ago, there
might have been an advantage in pushing the frontier as far as the great
Kei River; but witness does not see how it is to be done now, 1260-1263
It has become very difficult to rule these natives, under the present system,
tb.at is, the patrol system, 1261-1263 Objection to the system by
which if a man has committed a crime which subjects him to the jurisdiction
of the Colonial couit, and it is suppostd there is not sufficient proof before
these courts, he is tied up and flogged, 1263 There is not a more able
officer anywhere, than the officer who has been for two or three years carrying
on this system. Colonel Mackinnon, 1-261-1263 He is a man of the
strictest integrity, and wishing todo justice, but under the pre-rent system
he cannot do it, 1262,1263.
Witness would have these people independent, and rule them through their
chiefs; he would gain an influence over the chiefs, 1264-1266. 1331 et seq.
The outbreak which has recently taken plate is decidedly attributable to the
absence of a military force of suffit ient number on the frontier, 1267-1272
Under any policy which can now be suggtsteil or pursued, it will be
impossible for some years to cometo live on the frontier without the defence
of a considerable military force, 1273-1277 With respect to the question,
whether the colony would be disposed, in the event of their having representa¬
tive institutions, to bear the expense of a military force, witness can only say
this must depend on the manner in which the war is settled, and the
frontier delivered over to them; the colony is entitled to a*representative
Government
CrifiífiO
STOCKENSTROM.
597
Report, 1851—continued.
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
Government, and accepts it of course with ail its legitimate responsibilities,
1278.
In reference to the defence of the colony it is not necessary either that
the seat of government should be transferred from Cape Town to some poin
further in the east, or that the colony should be divided, 1279 An executive
officer with full powers would be all that would be necessary on the frontier;
there could be no objection 10 a lieutenant-governor, 1279-1281 Strong
objections witness entertains towards the present patrol system; difference
between this system and the commando system ; way in which the commando
system has been mistaken ; opinion that the patrol system, which has, with
the exception of the interval from 1836 to 1844, been going on since 1817, lias
brought all the misfortunes on the colony, 1282-1295. 1309-1315 Objec¬
tions witness has to what he calls the flogging system, 1283. 1323. 1325-1341.
1357-1359- 1363-13«5.
For a long time Kafirland was ruled by a species of prestige ; the black had
a fearful idea of the superior moral and physical power of the white ; lie has
now lost this, the prestige is gone, 1298 Various circumstances have led
to the alteration of this opinion, 1299 If we had strictly used our moral
superiority over them we might have avoided bringing into play that physical
force and teaching them their strength, 1300 They must be conquered
now and put down by force, and the only way of conti oiling them hereafter
will be through their chic fs, unless they crush them altogether ; and a sort of
moral control must be kept over their chiefs, 1301-1307 With respect to
making the Kei River the boundary of the colony, it must depend in a great
measure on the terms which may be come to with the Kafirs, and their chigfs,
1304-1307-
Measures of conciliation might have a good effect at the present moment, pro¬
vided we get the upper hand of them cotnpletely, 1302. 1308 Asan owner
ol property in the colony, witness would say it is absolutely necessary, and would
be quite safe to grant a representative government in the present slate of
things, 1303 Witness would not interfere with the domestic affairs of tlu-
Kafirs, except through their chiefs, 1331-1341 Formerly the authority of
the chiefs in Kafirland was so complete over the Kafirs generally, that they
might be held justly lesponsible to the English Government for the conduct,
both public and private, of the Kafirs connecied with them ; witness does not
know how this may be now ; I he power which the chief has, in concurrence
with his council, is very great, 1342-1356. 1360-1362.
Evidence showing the difference between the patrol system and the com¬
mando system, 1387 In witness's opinion the commando system was de¬
cidedly less unjust and less injurious than the patiol system ; the commando
system is necessary on a barbarous frontier, 1387-1394 Witness does not
see why, if the war terminates successfully, the frontier should be much de¬
nuded of inhabitants, unless the measures of the Government be such as to
drive the people to emigrate, 1395, 1396 Tne Amatóla mountains would
not form a boundary ; they run at right angles through the old and through
the new boundary, 1397-1399 If the Amatóla mountains were cleared of
the Kafir inhabitants, they would fall back upon us again, as there is no place
to drive them to where they could exist, 1400-1407.
0.63. Q Q Further
598
STOCKENSTROM.
[muv
Report, 1851—continued.
tockenstrom, Sir Andries, (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
Further expression of the opinion that the natives must be put down before
the war terminates; that is, they must be conquered ; up to the present mo¬
ment we have never yet valued the Kafirs, 1408-1423 ^The only plan will
be to make them sue for peace, and then dictate terms to them ; treaties must
then be made with the chiefs, with the concurrence of their councils, and these
treaties must be honestly kept, 1408-1423 Witness has not found Euro¬
pean and civilized nations more true to their treaties than the Kafirs, 1410-
1423.
Grounds on which witness bases the assertion that we have pursued a sys¬
tem of injustice and oppression, and violation of treaties, and that we have
half ruined ourselves, and completely ruined the nation, 1424-1433—The
Kafirs are better armed than tney were; difficulties in the way of preventing
fire-arms and gunpowder being smuggled into tlie colony, 1434-1447
Generally speaking, the influence of the missionaries over the native tribes is
very beneficial; 1451-1453 The land which has been taken from the
natives for the European settlers in British Kafraria has caused great irrita¬
tion among them ; it would decidedly be advisable to put a stop to further
extension of European settlements in that direction, 1454-1458 Extent of
the district which witness considers has been improperly added to the ceded
territory, 1459-1472.
There has been no great accession of European colonists on the eastern
frontier of the colony during the last four or five years, 1473 Droughts are
very common on the eastern frontier of Kafraria ; they occur every four or five
years ; this has the effect of inducing the colonists to spread their cattle over
•the country in search of pasture, and at times the people came into collision,
1474-1477——One of the chief causes of offensive operations on the part of
the Kafirs arises out of their dread of incursions upon their territory, 1478-
1482 The emigrant boers are at present very quiet, but they are in a very
di>contented and excited state ; they feel themselves very much aggrieved, and
they are very anxious to have the causes of their late collisions with the Go¬
vernment most minutely investigated, 1483 et seq. As things have turned
out, witness considers the wisest plan would be not to meddle with them at all,
but that as long as they commit no injury or outrage upon the colony, we
should not take any notice of what they do in oiher respects, 1485-1510.
[Second Examination.] Reference to the evidence given by witness before
the Committee of 1835, in which he stated that the Government could at that
time " have laid down a system of preventive measures which would have effec¬
tually protected the frontier, provided the farmers were forced to guard their cat¬
tle and could make stricter rules for said territory than perhaps it would have
been able to do on the western side of the old frontier ;" nature of the preven¬
tive measures witness contemplated in this answer, 1709 et seq.' These
measures were subsequently carried out by order of Lord Glenelg in the treaty
witness made and signed at King William's Town on the 5th December
1836; 1709-1713 Evidence showing that the view of Sir Harry Smith
was confirmatory of these measures, 1709, 1710 Up to the beginning of
1839, when witness left the frontier, he considered this plan to have worked
well, and Sir George Napier expressed his unqualified approbation of it, 1714
How
STOCKENSTROM.
599
Report, 1851—continued.
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
How far Sir George Napier has since Celt it necessary to amend this
treaty, 1715-1720.
Further expression of the opinion that there has been a constant tendency
to encroachment upon the land justly belonging to the Kañrs ; and that this
has led to bad feeling on the part of the Kafirs towards the colonists, as be¬
tween the Kafirs and the settlers, 1721,1722 ^This has brought our relations
to their present unsatisfactory condition, 1723 Explanation relative to the
arrangement entered into by witness with the chief Kreli in 1846, the 4th
Article of which treaty was that Kreli is " to acknowledge the right of the
British Government to all land west of the Great or White Kei, and to re¬
linquish all claim which be, Kreli, or any other Kafir chief or subject, may
have possessed to any part of the said territory," 1724-1736.
Although witness generally objects to encroachments upon the lands held
by native tribes, he hoped that by treaty with Kreli as the paramount chief,
and obtaining from him the land west of the Kei, we might thus obtain a title
to the principal strongholds, and restore the remainder, holding him respon¬
sible as any other independent chief, 1724 But we broke the convention
which was made with Kreli, by raising an army against him, which only ex¬
posed our weakness, shook more than ever the faith of the barbarian in our
justice, and the result is that he has joined the war against us; witness can
therefore no longer recommend this plan, 1724-1736 The patrol system
was put down by witness ; but the depredations by the Kafirs were never com¬
pletely stopped ; this was never expected, 1737-1744.
The colony of the Cape of Good Hope accepts the constitution which has
been granted, and accepts it with all its legitimate responsibility ; but it will not
be in the power of the colony for a considerable time to pay the expenses of the
war, 1745 The constitution is a distinct point from the Kafir war ; the colo¬
nists had nothing to do with it; it is entirely the result of Government mea¬
sures, 1745-1748 Witness never approved of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's
system ; he disapproved of it from first to last ; difference between his system
and the arrangement entered into by witness with Kreli in 1846; evidence
showing that Sir B. D'Urban himself upset his own system, 1749-1769
Extracts from various letters and despatches, showing the data upon which
witness arrives at the conclusion that subsequently to his treaties of 1836
depredations were much less frequent, and the general peace and tranquillity
of the country much greater than it had previously been, 1769-1787 The
treaties were not witness's, they were Lord Glenelg's; witness was only an
instrument in carrying them out, and signed them, 1787, 1788.
Witness is perfectly certain that if the treaties had been strictly and honestly
adhered to, we should have had no more war, 1787-1789 The violations
of the treaties iiave been on the part of the Government, 1790-1792 Par¬
ticulars in detail relative to the strong difference of opinion between witness
and Sir Benjamin D'Urban as to the treatment of the Fingoes; opinion
expressed by Sir Benjamin that witness had abandoned and sacrificed the
Fingo race to the tender mercies of their inveterate enemies, the Kafirs, 1798-
1822. 1964-1968 It was an accusation on the part of Sir Benjamin
D'Urban, tha't the policy pursued by witness, in fact, that this treaty of 5 De¬
cember
6oo
STOCKENSTROM.
[»afir
Report, —continued.
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
ceniber 1836, was one of the causes of the emigration of the boers from the
frontier; statement made by witness that he can prove the contrary, 1823-
1830. 1845.2023-2929 in witness's opinion the causes of the discontent
which induced the emigration were various, 1831-1846 One was the man¬
ner in which the emancipation of tiie slaves affected many ; and the manner
in which compensation was given also caused a great deal of dissatisfaction,
1836-1839 The circumstance of the insecurity of cattle and property on
the frontier was also a cause of emigration, 1840-1846.
101836 the Kat River settlement was self-supporting ; it never had one
farthing of support, and had done more for Government than any other part
of the country; it was ruined by the war, 1847-1855 Lotd Glenelg's
system was introduced in December 1836 ; witness can only speak as to its
being faithfully carried out the first two years, 1856, 1857. 1859, i860 It
was in some measure put a stop to by amendments made by Sir George
Napier when witness returned to the colony in 1840; he considered that these
amendments were fatal to the system, 1858. 1861-1863 Witness was in
the colony in the year 1845, at the time petitions were presented to the
Governor of Cape Town with respect to the incursions of the Kafirs on the
frontier, and of depredations committed by them, 1864, 1865 Refeience
to the speeches made on the occasion of the piesentation of tliese petitions by
Mr. Montague, Mr. Porter, and Mr. Cloete, stating that the rumours of these
depredations were unfounded, and that the colony was never in greater
security and tranquillity, and more free from depredations, 1867-1874. 1876-
1881.1898-1095.
Grounds on which witn( ss forms the opinion tiiat at that lime, in 1845, the
Kafirs were preparing to attack the colony in consequence of Lord Glenelg's
treaties having been puta siop to, 1874, 1875. 1882-1897. 1901-1905
Witness attributes the cause of the present disturbances to tiie breaking of
these treaties in 1844; witness attributes the blame r xclusiveiy to the Govern¬
ment, and no portion of it to the chiefs, 1906-1908 Peace is comparative
with barbarous tribes ; there are always disagreements between them without
war, 1909, 1910 ¡¿o long as the frontier is in its present state it is impos¬
sible altogether to prevent ihe depredations of the Kafirs, 1911, 1912
There has not been ihe remotest political excitement produced at Cape Town,
which has had any effect upon the Kafirs during the last iwo years, 1917
A constiiiitional government in the Cape colony uould decidedly produce
a more kind and just policy towards the natives than that which has been in
force during the last four years, 1918.
The statement of Sir George Napier, that the policy of Sir Benjamin
D'Uiban was more popular among the colonists than the policy of Lord
Glenelg, is correct, igiy—^There was great clamour against Sir Benjamin's
policy before Lord Glenelg's policy was introduced, 1920 The colonists
were delighted with the alteration made by Sir Peregrine Maitiand in the
treaties ; the feeling of many of the colonists was in favour of a very summary
and stringent policy,to be exercised towards the frontier tribes, and therefore
the change from a humane to a military policy delighted them, 1921-193-2.
1938-1942. 1969-1971 Witness believes that the Kafirs, when honestly
and
CtrífiWf]
STOCKENSTROM.
601
Report, 1851—continued.
Stockenstrom, Sir Andries. (Analysis of his Evidence)—continued.
and justly dealt with, are inclined to be friendly, 1946-19.53 Further
grounds on which witness considers that the amended treaty led to the war,
1954-1963. ^ „
Witness wrote a letter during the summer of 1850, relating to the com¬
plaints made by the settlers on the Kat River; their principal complaint
was about burning them out of their houses ; there was much irritation
on the minds of the settlers; this was before the war, 1972-1976
Up to 1847 there was never a more loyal set of people in the world, 1976,
Since then the change which has taken place among them yearly
suiprises every one, 1976-1978 Witness does not believe that this Com¬
mittee will ever get to the bottom of this rebellion without a most minute
investigation on the spot of all the parlies, and particularly the raissionaiies
who risked their lives, and stayed among them, and made every sacrifice to
keep them within bounds, 1979, 1980.
VVitness has met with a report, made by Mr. Biddulph, of the state and
condition of the Kat River settlement, in May 1847 ; witness strongly difiers
from him; he consiiiers the description of the settlement to be libellous;
reference to certain statements made in this report which wiiness knows to
be incorrect, 1989-2000 Such a plan as is proposed for compensati.m by
the Government for losses incurred by the colonists upon the frontier is not
advisable, 2001 Sir G. Napier considered that one of the principal causes
of the predatory habits of the Kafirs was, that they attach no sort of idea of
disgrace to the theft, 2002 He therefore proposed to punish them for such
offences, with a view to degrade them in the eyes of their tribe, 2002
In witness's opinion any punishment would do provided it went tlirough the
regular channel, 2002.
Objections to Sir Harry Smith's view of obtaining redress through the
agency of the Kafirs themselves, that is, by a chief assenting to a jury of 12
of his people to try the offenders in presence of the superintendent of police,
2002-2005. 2007, 2008 The criminal trials among Kafirs for offences com¬
mitted among themselves aie very solemn and very particular, 2006 Great
strictness is necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties ; it will require a
strong military force for a long time upon the frontier for this purpose, 2009-
2014 From what witness has heard, he would say that the Kafir chiefs,
when they entered into the treaties they did with Sir Peregrine Maiilaud, did
it unwillingly, and in some degree compulsorily, 2015-2022.
[Third Examination.]—Information as to the number of the various Kafir
tribes to the east and north-east of the Keiskamma, 3290-3296 Reasons
for Sir Lowry Cole punishing the Kafirs thai weie living by sufferance in the
ceded territory, and driving them out, and establishing a Hottentot settlement
on the same ground, 3296 Witness fully approved of the policy pursued
at that time, and was the principal instiument in the expulsion of Maquomo,
3297-3299 Speaking of the wars of 1846-47, and of everything that has
occurred since, witness draws a broad distinction between the colonists and
the Government ; witness considers them the acts of the Government, and not
of the colonists, 3300 The war of 1846 was brought about by the viola¬
tion of our treaties with the Kafirs in 1844, and everything that has followed
since was just the consequence of that, 3301.
0.63. R R Stockemtrom,
6o2
s T o
TEN
[IKafir
Report, 1851—continued.
Stockensfrom, Sir A. Great influence possessed by Sir Andrew Stockenslrorn
o\er the Kafirs, which he exercised to maintain peace and loyalty. Sir G. 1.
Napier 1546, 1547,
5eealso Frontier Boundary. Printed Papers. Treaties, I.
Store Depots. Sujigestion that Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort, and along
tliere, might be kept as a depot for stores, and for some troops. Sir G. T.
Napier 1518.
Superstition. The influence of superstition is very great among the Kafirs ; this
is very much made use of by the chiefs for political and any bad purposes,
Bissett 772-774. 893-898.
Surveys. The Kafirs found a pretext for commencing the war in 1849, on our
sending a small party to survey a piece of ground within their territory beyond
Chumie River; nature and object of their survey, 2398-2415
Remarks lelative to the survey made on part of the territory of Sandilli, the
Blockdrift, at the desire of Sir Peiegrine Maitland, which the Kafirs made a
pretext of war in 1846; such an encroachment migiit have been a just pretext
for complaint, but not for war, ib. 2523-2537. 2590, 2591. 2617, 2618
Witness knows of no other cause of irritation, arising fiom any acts of the
white people, which could have led to the war in 1846, than that of the survey
of the Blockdrift on the Chumie River, ib. 2658, 2659 Witness does not
think that sending the surveying party by Colonel Hare had anything to do
with the bieaking out of the war in 1846; witness had no idea of placing a
post at Blockdrift until it was proposed by Sandilli himself, Sir P. Maitland
2914, 2915. 2919-2922——The Kafirs had been for years, previous to 1846,
preparing for war, by the collection of arms and ammunition, and the occa¬
sion of the survey of the Blockdrift was seized on by them as a pretext for
commencing the war, ib. 2974-2976.
T.
Tambookie Frontier. Remarks relative to the Tambookie frontier ; this has
hitherto been a very peaceful frontier, but now the Tambookies are at open
war with the colonial government; a greater force will be required hereafter on
that frontier, FarVôntr« 528-531.
Taxation. See Timber Tax.
Tenure of Land. An important end would be gained by giving the Kat River
settlers a personal interest in the land, and encouraging them to become bona
fide landholders ; at present they have simply permission to occupy, Freeman
25-38 With respect to the question, whether giving title to these Hot¬
tentots to hold their lands for ever would tend to retard the civilization of the
colony, and prevent Europeans from efficiently cultivating the land, witness
can only say there were two views on the part of the Government in granting
the Kat River settlement to the Hottentots, ib. 39 One was to reward them
for faithful services for many years past, especially in the war, ib. And the
oilier to have a body of men who might serve as a defence to the colony in the
event of a Kafir attack, ib. Witness's notion of a settlement is, that the
persons
TEN
TR A
603
Report, 1851 —conti nued.
Tenure of Land—continued,
persons so located should have lands granted to them with a good title, that
they should cultivate them, and maintain themselves, and be ready, if neces¬
sary, to take their share in the defence of the frontier. Freeman 73 This de¬
scription corresponds with the Kat River settlement, only that the parties have
no right in the soil, ib. 73-79. See also Rights of Property.
Territory. Witness laments that our territory was ever extended so far as it
has been ; we have nothing to gain from this large extent of territory, and
can only retain it at an enormous expense, Renton 3079 The difficulty
in the way of restoring to these tribes a portion of the territory we now
occupy, which has been some years past taken by the British, lies in the vin¬
dication of our power sufHcieiitly to preclude the idea that this cession of
territory is made from weakness, ib. 3088-3102 Towards such a step a
vaiiety of conditions wotild be indispensable with the chiefs, and with the
people; conditions that should be very distinct, ai.d about which no party in
Kafirland should have it in his power to affect ignorance or misapprehension,
ib. 3102.
See also Boundaries. Ceded Territory. Chiefs, 1. Fish River.
Frontier Boundary. Neutral Territory. Retrocession of Territory.
Theft. See Cattle Stealing. Depredations. Plunder.
Timber Tax. Allusion to the case of the forests, which the people of the Kat
River settlement had simply, from usage, supposed to belong to the respec¬
tive allotments or settlements. Freeman 14 The cutting of timber and
selling it has been a great source of profit to them, ib. Since the war of
1847, Government has seen it right to enforce a tax of 6 s. per load on the
timber cut ; way in which this has tended to discourage the people, ib.
in regard to Mr. Biddulph, they complained that a tax was imposed upon
wood cutting; this tax was levied since the war of 1846-47 ; they were not
allowed to cut down and sell wood out of the bush or forest without paying a
tax of seven and a half per cent. Renton 3134-3143 The people had not
been previously taxed in this way; they considered the wood as their own, as
a part of the property that had been given them on their location in that
district, ib. 3137-3142 They eomp'ained of it as coming upon them after
their second impoverishment by war, as a fresh obstruction in the way of their
prosperity, ib. 3143.
Traders. Nature of the opposition between the missionaries and the traders, the
traders supplying- the natives with articles such as brandy and gunpowder,
which the missionaries wish to prevent their being supplied with, Adunison
669-671. 714-728 Witness does not believe that the missionaries at
their stations deal iti fire-arms and powder ; they have stores for supplying
the natives with good-^, articles of clothing, 8cc., their object being to
exclude the travelling trader, ib. 718-723 Tite itinerant tradeis intro¬
duce arms, ammunition, and brandy into Kafirland ; great extent of smug¬
gling catried on by them; they should not be allowed to go into Kafirland,
except as they did under the system established by Lord Charles Somerset,
Sir G. T. Napier 1617-1624.
«See also Cultivation. Fire-Arms. Itinerant Traders.
0.63. R R 2 Treachery.
6O4
T RE
TR E
[«afir
Report, 1851—continued.
Treachery. The attac;k on Woburnatid on Auckland villages was a treacberous
one; many of the Kafirs and Hottentots who made the attack were at the
time were partaking or the festiviiks of the villages. Rentan 3373-33^0
Hp to tliis period the Hottentots had been faithful to their engagements, and
the majority of the proprietors, the [leople properly possessed of the allotments,
ate so still, ib. 3381-3383.
Treaties:
1. Opinions that the Kafir Wars have been brought about by our
breaking oar Treaties with the Chiefs.
2. Evidence showing that no Reliance can be placed upon Treaties
with the Kafir Chiefs.
3. Suggestions as to the only Mode in which a satisfactory Treaty
can be entered into between the British Governmerit and the
Chiefs.
1.. Opinions that the Kafir Wars have been brought about by our breaking
our Treaties with the Chiefs:
Grounds on which witness bases the assertion that we have pursued a system
of injustice, tuid oppression, and violation of treaties, and that we have half
ruined ourselves and completely mined the nation. Sir A. Slrochenstrom 1256.
1424-1433 Witness Considers the cause of the late outbreak to have been
our vacillation in systems, in making treaties and breaking them ; and the
nature of the peofde we have to deal with, ib. 1256 Observations as to the
alterations made by witness in ihe treaties of Sir Andries Stockenstrom wiih
the Kafir chiefs. Sir G. T.Napier 1525-1529.
Extracts from various letters and despatches, showing the data upon winch
witness arrives at the conclusion that subsequently to his treaties of 1836
déprédations were much less frequent, and the general pi ace and tran¬
quillity of the country much greater than it had previously been. Sir A.
Stockenstrom 17G9-1787 The treaties weie not witness's, they were Lord
Glenelg's ; witness was only an instrument in carrying them out, and signed
tiiem, ib. 1787, 1788 Witness is perfectly certain that if ihe treaties had
been strictly and honestly adhered to we should have had no more war,
ib. 1787-1789 The violations of the treaties have been on the part of
the Government, ib. 1790-1792,
Witness attributes the cause of the present disturbances to the breaking
of the treaties in 1844; vvitness attributes the blame exclusively to the
Government, and no portion of it to the chiefs. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1906-
190S. 1954-1963 Fiom what w itness has heard, he would say that the
Kafir chiefs, when they enteied into the treaties they did with Sir Peie-
grine Maitland, did it unwillingly and in some degree compulsorily, ib.
2015-2022 Observations lelative to the treaties entered into witli the
Kafirs by Sir Andries Stockenstrom; this very much satisfied the Kafirs,
who considered that an act of justice had been done them, A. Smith 2195-
2205 Witness has heard that there was a modification of those treaties
very soon after, and to tiiat modification was ascribed the outbreak of the
Kafirs, ib. 2igg The war of 1846 was brought about by the violaiion of
cur treaties with the Kafiis in 1844, and everything that has followed
since was just the consequence of that. Sir A. Stockenstrom 3301.
2. Evidence
®rí6í«.]
TREATIES.
605
Report, 1851—continued.
TreA TI es—continued.
2. Evidence showing that no Reliance can be placed upon Treaties with
the Kaßr Chiefs :
Opinion that the formation of treaties with the Kafir chiefs has been a
great error; .treaties are not advisable in respect to a peo|)Ie situated as
the Kafirs are, from the circumstance that the chief cannot be responsible
to any great extent, Adamson 686, 687 Witness will venture to say that
the treaties made by Sir Andries Stockenstrom were never once infringed by
the colonists, but they were frequently infringed by the Kafirs ; the moment
it occurs to a savage that it is his interest to do so and so, treaties may
go to the wind, Sir G. T. Napier 1533. 1581-^592 Witness attaches no
value to treaties entered into with the Kafir chiefs ; such treaties would only
be observed as long as it suited their interests, ib. 1593, 1594.
Great strictness is necessary to keep the Kafirs to their treaties ; it will
require a strong military force for a long time upon the frontier for this
purpose. Sir A. Stockenstrom 2009-2014 No contracts or other treaties
are entered into between the tribes beyond an understanding that no tribe
must trespass on or interfere with the hunting or grazing grounds of
another tribe; ihey are generally faithful to these engagements; this is not
the case in their treaties with the Britisii Government, A. Smith 2106-2115
Witness does not place much reliance upon treaties with the Kafir
chiefs unless there be a commissioner or re.sident to aid and assist them
to carry them out, but even then it would not be safe to rely upon such
arrangements without sufficient force to maintain them, ib. 2206-2208
The Kafirs have not much respect for the British Government, they believe
that the agreements ihey have made have not been kept ; this belief must
have arisen out of a misapprehension, because no government could have
dealt more nobly and generously than the colonial government usually dealt
with the Kafirs, ib. 2209-2219.
Remarks relative to the violation of the treaty made by Lord Charles
Somerset in 1819, establishing a neuiral territory between the Great Fish
River and the Keiskamma, by the erection of a fort called Fort Wilshire; the
Government never sanctioned the colonists living on that neutral territory,
A. Smith 2222-2225 Objeciions to treaties being entered into with the
Kafir r hiefs ; it has been a great mistake to deal with the savages as if they
perfectly understood the usages of civilized society, T, C. Smith 2359, 2360
Witness does not consider that the slightest reliance can be placed upon
treaties entered into witti the Kafir chit fs; it is expedient to trust alone to
the military defence of the frontier, Owen 2436-2439. 2538-2542, 2603.
2632-2636 Remarks relative 10 the treaties entered into by witness with
the Griquas; denial that Maquomo was forced to sign the treaties, Sir P.
Maitlaiid 2977, 2978.
3. Suggestions as to the only mode in which a satisfactory Treaty can he
entered into between the British Government and the Chiefs.
Witness does not know that it would be useless to attempt to enter into
treaties with the chiefs, A. Smith 301 But if we form a treaty it must be
one that will require such an organization among the native chiefs as would
establish
6oö
T R E
W E S
[l^aör
Report, 18,51—continued.
TreATI es—continued.
3. Suggestions as to the only Mode, kc.—continued.
estciblish agdvernmeut for them, A. Smith 301-303 The only plan will be to
make them sue for peace, and then dictate terms to them ; treaties must then be
made with ihe chiefs, with the concurrence of their council, and these treaties
must be honestly kept. Sir A. Stockenstrom 1408-1423 Witness has not
found European and civilized nations more true to tlieir treaties than the Kafirs,
ib. 1410-1423.
See also Civilization, 1. Defence of the Frontier. Emigration.
Glenelg, Lord. Griquas, 2. Kreli, Chief. Military Chief.
Trial by Jury. See Juries.
U.
Useful Arts. The missionary influence has been generally extensively used in
inducing the native population to resort to agricultural or industiial pursuits,
Adamson 1011-1029 Attempts which have been made by the missionaries
to introduce arts and manufactures among the tribes; they have only suc¬
ceeded as to agriculture, ib. 1089, 1090 Extent to which tills has been
carried out; the Moravian mission ranks first as regards the leaching of the
useful arts ; the London Society has also given considerable attention to it,
lie/iton 3435-3451 It is very desirable that the missionaries should, as
much as possilrle, combine with spiritual instruction the teaching of the arts
of industry and agriculture, ib. See aLo Chiefs, 4.
Violation of Treaties. See Treaties.
Volunteer Force. See Commando System, 1,
W.
Wandering Tribes. Considerable portion of the population of Kafirland who
are not under the authority of any particular chief; they are a wandering
tribe, now attached to one tribe, and now to another, Adamson 1061-1065
From the nature of the cultivation adopted by the K .firs, it would be no
hardship to push them across the great Kei, they being migratory tribes,
seldom inhabiting the same spot for long together, Öwen 2005-2616.
Wars. See Kafir Wars.
Western Frontier. Witness does not consider that there is any necessity for
entering into the consideration of the defence of the western frontier at the
present moment, Sir J. E. Alexander 2689-2691.
White
Evite^J]
W H I
ZOO
Report, 1851—continued.
White Men. See Coloured Races. Europeans.
Wienand, Mr. See Magistrates, 1.
Woburn Village. See Treachery.
Women and Children. See Barbarity.
Wood Cutting. See Timber Tax.
Z.
Zoolus. Observations as to the great success which has attended the policy of
the Government as pursued with the Zoolus in Natal, Sir G. T. Napier 1602.
1615. 1616 Evidence generally with respect to the number and nature of
the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of the colony of Natal, more particu¬
larly as to the Zoolu tribes, T. C. Smith 2238-2258 Great influence pos¬
sessed by tile Zoolu king over the native tribes in South Africa; his power is
sufficient to restrain his people from committing depredations to a certain
extent, ib. 2251, 2252 Preference to be given to the character of the Zoolu
natives over the Kafirs ; they are not quite so dishonest, ib. 2321, 2322
Witness would consider it a very dangerous experiment to make troops of the
Zoolus under British instruction, ib. 2323-2326 Remarks relative to the
Zoolus who occupy Natal as our subjects ; they were driven in by the tyranny
of their chiefs, Sir P. Maitland 2916-2918.
See also Natal. Population.
Ii E P o R T.
KAFIR TRIBES.
Ordcitd, bij Tlie House of Coiumons, lo he Printed,
2 August 1851.
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