D-16 .*' 'wmt .:r: --^SST" 3. /If Srom f^e &t6rarg of (profcBBor nriffiam (glider (J)a;rton, ©.©., fefe.®. ^reecnfe^ 6g (Wire, ^arton to f ^e feifirare of (Princeton C^eofogicdf ^eminat]^ I ^' J±£&XL J ^ MAR 14 19: i'-pfnr. CAREFUL and STRICT c called a Cal'viniji, for DilHnftion's Sake : tho' I utterl)' dif- claim a Dependance on Calvin, or believing the Dodtrines which I hold, becaufe he believed and taught them ; and cannot juftly be charged with believing in every Thing juft as lie taught. But left I Ihould really be an Occafion of Injury to fomc Perfons, 1 would here give Notice, that tho' I generally fpeak of that Doftrine, concerning Free-will and moral Agency, which I oppole, as an Arminian Dodtrine ; yet I would net be underftood, that CA^ery Divine or Author whom I have Occa- Hon to mention as maintaining that Doftrine, was properly an Arminiaiz, or one of that Sort which is commonly called by that Name,, Some of them went far beyond the Arminians : And I would by no Means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt Doftrine, v/hich thefe maintained. Thus, for In- flance, it would be very injurious, if I (hould rank Arminian Divines in general, with fuch Authors as Mr. Chuhh. I doubt not, many of them have fome of his Dodlrincs in Abhorrence ; tho' he agrees, for the moft Fart, with Arminians, in his No- tion of the Freedom of the Will. And on the other Hand, tho' I fuppofe this Notion to be a leading Arficle in the Armi- nian Scheme, that v/hich, if purfued in its Confequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the reft ; yet I don't charge all that have this Doctrine, v;ith beiiig Arminians. For what- ever may be the Confequences of the Doftrine really, yet fume that hold this Dcftrine, may not own nor fee thcfe Confe- quences ; and it would be unjaft, in many Inftances, to charge every Author with believing and maintaining all the real Con- fequences of his avowed Doftrines. And I defirc it may l^ particularly .noted, that tho' I have Occafion in the following Difcourfe, often to mention the Author of the Book entitled. An EJfay on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature , as holding that Notion of Freedom of the Will, which I oppofe ; yet I don't mean to call him an Arminian : however iin that Dodrine he agrees with Ar?ninians, and departs from the current and general Opinion of Caluinifis. It the Author of that Effay be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to, he doubtlefs was not one that ought to bear that Name. But how- ever good a Divine he was in many Refpefts, yet that particu- lar Arminian Doftrine which he maintained, is never the better for being held by fuch an One : nor is there lefs Need of oppof- ing it on that Account ; but rather is there the more Need of it; as it will be likely to have the more pernicious Influence, for being taught by a Divine of his Name and Charader j fuppof- jng The P R E F A C E. vii ing the Doflrine to be wrong, and in itfelf to be of an ill Tendency. I have Nothing further to fay by Way of Preface ; but only to bcfpcak the Reader's Candour, and calm Attention to what I have written. The Subjedl is of fuch Importance, as to de~ ma}id Attention, and the moft thorough Confideration. Of all Kinds of Knowledge that we can ever obtain, the Knowledge of God, and the Knowledge of ourfelves are the moft important. As Religion is the great Bufin?fs, for which we are created, and on which our Happinefs depends;, and as Religion confifta in an Intcreourfe between ourfelves and our Maker ; and fo has its Foundation in God's Nature and our's, and in the Relation that God and we ftand in to each other; therefore a true Knowledge of both muft be needful in Order to true Relif^ion. But the Knowledge of ourfelves confifts chiefly in right Appre- henlions concerning thofe two chief Faculties of our Nature, the Underjiandwg and W ill. Both are very important : yet the Science of the latter muft be confefled to be of greateft Moment; in as much as all Virtue and Religion have their Seat more im- mediately in the Will, confiiHng more cfpecially in right Afts and Habits of this Faculty. And the grand Queftion about the Freedom of the Will, is the main Point that belcno-s to the Science of the Will. Therefore, I fay, the L-nportance of this Subjeft greatly demands the Attention of Chrifrians, and efpecially of Divines. But as to my Manner of handlino- the Subjeft, I will be far from prefuming to fay, that it is fuch as demands the Attention of the Reader to what I have written^ I am ready to own, that in this Matter I depend on the Rea- der's Courtefj. But only thus far I may have fome Colour for putting in a Claim; that if the Reader be difpofed to pafs hia Cenfure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently- heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. How- ever, this is \That I would humbly afi of my Readers ; toge- ther with the Prayers of all fincere Lovers of Truth, that I may- have much of that Spirit which Chrift promifed his Difciples„ which guides into all Truth ; and that the bleffed and powerful Influences of this Spirit would make Truth viftorious in the World. AGc [ viii ] ^W^W^w^v K ^^ ^ '^ ''M ^ )^ U ^K^^J^^^ ^ ^ n ^ n u n y^^ X n M u M n n M K ^ M A General TABLE OF THE C O ■ N T E N T S. PART L Wherein are explained various Terms and Things belonging to the Subje6l of the enfuing Dif-> courfe. SECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the ?r/7/. Pag. i, l^c. SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. Pag. J. SECT. III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms 'NecfJJltj, ImpoJJihility , Inability, Sec. and o{ Conti»£/rncf. P^g. 13. SECT. IV. Of the Diftinftion of natural and moral Necef- fity and Inabilit}'. Pag. 20, SECT. V. Concerning the Notion of i/^fr/)', and of -wor/?/ Age7icy. Pag. 27. PART IL • ^Vherein it is coniidered. Whether there is, or can be any fuch Sort of Freedom of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the Eflenceofthe Liberty of all moral Agents; and whether any fuch Thing ever was^ or can he conceived of. SECT. I. Shewing the manifcft Inconfiftence of the /£CT« 2-^>^ C O N T E N T S. ix SECT. II. Se\eral fuppofed Ways of evading the foregoing !R-eafoning confuleied. Pag- 35- SECT. III. Whi-ther any Event whatfoever, and Volition in particular, tan come to pafs 'voithout a Caufe of its Exiftence. Pag. 41. - SECT. IV. Whether Volition can arife without a Caufc, thro' the Aaivity of the Nature of the Soul. Pag. 47. SECT. V, Shev.ing that if the Things afierted in thefe Evafions (hould' be fuppofed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the Caufe of Armi7iiafi Liberty ; and how, this being the State of the Cafe, Arminiati Writers are obliged to talk ?>tc///5/?^»i'/)'' ^^S'* S^' SECT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Ihings -.vhich are ^rit&\y^it2differe?!t, in the View of the JSIind. Pag. 5^. SECT. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty ot Will confuting in IndiJ, r^jice. Pag. 63. SECT. VIII. Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will, as oppofite to all Ntctj/ity. Pag. 73. SECT. IX. Of the Connexion of the Ads of the ??V// with the Diftates of the fyWc-r/^aW/V/^. Pag. 76. SECT. X, Volition neceflJArily connefled witli the Influence o( Mofi-t'es : With particular Obfervations on the great Inccn^ fiftence of Mr. Chubh's Affertions and Reafonings, about the Freedom of the Will. Pag. 84. SECT. XI. The E-videtice of God's certain Forchnoivlcdge of the Volitions of moral Agents. P'^g- 9^'» ■ SECT. Xil. God's ceri(7ir2 Forebia-jjlcdge ef the future Vo- litions of moral Agents, inconfifienl with futh a CojUingence of thofe Volitions, as is without all Neceffity. Pag. 117. And infers a Neceflity of Volition, as much as an abfclute Decree. Pag. 12 2. SECT. XIII. Whether we fuppofe the Volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they nnift be neceiJary^ in fuch a Senfe, as to overthrow Arminian Liberty. Pag. 131, PART III. Wherein is inquired. Whether any fuch Liberty of Will, as Arminians hold, be neceffary to moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praife and Dif- praife, &c, SECT. I. God's moral Excellency necejfary, yet B« Section II. Concemmg the Determination cf the IVill. By detcrynzning the Will, if the Phrafe be ufed with any Mean- ^ing, muft be intended, cdufittg that the Ad of the l^ ill or Choice Jbonld be thus, and not othernuije : And the Will is faid to be determined, when, in Confequence of fome A«ftion, or Influence, its Choice is direfted to, and fixed upon a particular Objeft. As when we fpeak of the Determination ot Motion, we mean caufmg the Motion of the Body to be fuch a Way, or in fuch a Direction, rather than another. To talk of the Determination of the Will, fuppofes an EfFeft, which muft have a Caufe. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This muft be fuppofed to be intend- ed even by them that fay, the Will determines itfelf. If it be fo, the Will is both Determiner and determined ; it is a Caufe that afts and produces EfFefts upon itfelf, and is the Objecl oi its own Influence and Aftion. With refpedl to that grand Inquiry, PFhat determines the Will, it would be very tedious and unneceffary at prcfcnt to enumerate and examine all the various Opinions, which have been advanced concerning this Matter ; nor is it needful that I fliould enter into a particular Difquifuion of all Points deba- ted in Difputes on that Queftion, Whether the Hill alnjoays fol- lotvs the lajl diiiate of the Underflanding. It is fufficient to my prefent Purpofe to fay, — // is that Moti-ve, nx'hich, as it (lands in the Vieiv of the Mind, isthejlrongejl, that determines the Will. — But it may be neceffary that I (hould a little explain my Meaning in this. By Motive, I mean the Whole of that which moves, excites or invites the Mind to Volition, whether that be one Thing ilngly, or many Things conjunftly. Many particular Things- may concur and unite their Strength to induce the Mind ; and when it is fo, all together are as it were one complex Motive. And when I fpeak of the ftrongeji Moti-ve, I h^ve Refpeft to the Strength of the Whole that operates to induce to a particular Aft of Volition, whether that be the Strength of one Thing alone, or of many together^ What- 6 ll'ljat determines the Will. Part I. Whatever is-a, Motive, in this Senfe, muft be fomething that is extant in the Fienxj or Apprehenjion of tht Underjlatiditig, or per* ceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to will or aft any Thing, any further than it is perceived,^ or is fome Way or other in the Mind's View ; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfedly out of the Mind's View, can't affeft the Mind at all. 'Tis moft evident, that nothing is in the Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwife than as it is perceived or thought of. And I think it muft alfo he allowed by all, that every Thing that is properly called a Motive, Excitement or Inducement to a perceiving willing Agent, has feme Sort and Degrse of Tendency, or /Idnjafiiage to move or excite the 'Will, previous to the Effeft, or to the Aft of the Will excited. This previous Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Mo- tme. That Motive which has a lefs Degree of previous Ad- vantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears lefs inviting, as it ftands in the View of the Mind, is what I call a nfieaker Moti've. On the contrary, that which appears moft inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the Un- derftanding or Apprehenfion, the greateft Degree of previous Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the Jirongeji Moti've. And in this Senfe, I fappofe the Will is al- ways determined by the ftrongeft Motive. Things that exift in the View of the Mind, have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Cir- cumftances of the Thing vie-ai'd, the Nature and Circumftances of the Mind that ■uienvs, and the Degree and Manner of its ^/>t!;,' v/hich it would perhaps be hard to make a perfeft Enumeration of. But fo much I think may be determined in general, with- out Room for Controverfy, that whatever is perceived or ap- prehended by an intelligent and voluntary Agent, which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive to Volition or Choice, is confidered or view'd as good; nor has it any Tendency to in- vite or engage the Eleftion of. the Soul in any further Degree than it appears fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to eleft them, fome other V/ay than by their appearing eligible to it ; which is ab- furd. And therefore it muft be true, in fome Senfe, that the ' Will aliunys is as the greateji apparent Good is. But only, for the right underftanding of tRjs, two Things muft be well and dHlinftly obferved, c 1. U ^3:. H. PFbaf determines the U-'ill. 7 1 . It muft be obfeived in what Senfe I ufe the Term Good;^ r.amely, as of the fame Import v;ith Agreeable. To appear good to the Mind, as I ufc the Phrrfe, is the fame as to appear agrscablcy or feem phr^fi?ig\.o the Mind. Certainlv, aothing ap- pears inviting and eligible to t^e Mind, or tending to engage its Inclination and Choice, cc-nfidered as evil or difagreeable; Mor indeed, 2is indifferent, and neither agreeable nor difagreea- ble. But if it tends to draw the Inclination, and move the Will, it muft be under the Notion of that which fuits the Mind. And therefore that mud have the greateft Tendency to attraft and engage it, which, as it ftands in the Mind's View, fuits it belt, and pleafes it moft ; and in that Senfe, ia the greateft apparent Good : to fay otherwife, is little, if any Thing, fiiort of a direft and plain Contradiftion. The Word Good, in this Senfe, includes in its Signification, the Removal or Avoiding of Evil, or of that which is difa- greeable and uraafy. 'Tis agreeable and pleafmg, to avoid what is difagreeabJe and difpleafing, and to have Uneafinefs remo- ved. So that here is included what Mr. Locke fuppofes deter- mines the Will. For when he fpeaks of uneafinefs as de- termining the Will, he muit be underftood as fuppofing that the End or Aim which governs the Volition or Aft of Prefe- rence, is the Avoiding or Removal of that Uneafinefs ; and that is the fame Thing as chufing and feeking what is more cafy and agreeable. 2. Wheti I fsy, the Will is as the greateft apparent Good i'Sj or (af. I have explained it) that Volition has always for it3 Objefl the Thing which appears moft agreeable ; it muft be carefully obferved, to avoid Confufion and needlefs Objection, that I fpeak of the dire/il and immediate Objeft of the Aft of Volition ; and not fome Objeft that the Aft of Will has not an immediate, but only an indireft and remote Refpeft to. .Many Afts of Volition have fome remote Relation to an Ob- jeft, that is different from the Thing moft immediately will'd and chofen. Thus, when a Drunkard has his Liquor before him, and he has to chufe whether to drink it, or no ; the proper ;and immediate Objefts, about which his prefent Volition is converfant, and between which his Choice now decides, are his own Afts, in drinking the Liquor, or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the prefent View of his Mind, taken in* the Whole of it, is moft agreeable to him. If he chufes or v/ills to drink it, and not to let it alone ; then this Aftion, as it ftands in the View of his Mind, with all that belongs to its Appearance there, is more agreeable and pleafmg than letting it alone. But ^ Wfjat determines the Will. Part Ic But the Objc<5ls to which this Aft of Volition may rel-ate more remotely, and between v/hich his Choice may determine more indireftly, are the prefcnt Pleafure the Man expefts by drinking, and the future Mifery which he judges will be the Confequence of it: He may judge that this future Mifery, when it comes, will be moie difagrecable and unnleafant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But thefe two Things are not the proper Objefts that the Aft of Volition fpo- ken of is nextly converfant about. For the Aft of Will fpo- ken of is concerning prefent Drinking or Forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then Drinking is the proper Objeft of the Aft of his Wi-11 ; acd drinking, on fome Account or other, now appears moft agreeable to him, andfuits him beft. If he chufes X.O refrain, then Refraining is the immediate Objeft of his V/ill,' and is moft plcafing to him. If in tlie Choice he makes in the Cafe, he prefers z. prefent Pleafure to a future Advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes ; then a lelfer prefent Pkafure appears more agreeable to him tlian a greater Advantage at a Diftance. If on the contrary a future Advantage is prefer'd, then that appears molt agreeable, and fuits him beft. And fo ftiil the prefent Volition is as the greateft apparent Good at preftnt is. I have rather chofen to exprefs myfelf thus, that the Wdl airways is as the greateft apparent Good, or as 'what appears mop a- greeable, is, than to fay that the Will is determined by the greateft apparent Good, or by what feems moft agreeable ; becaufe an appearing- moft agreeable or pieafing t© the Mind, and the Mind's preferring and chuung, feem hardly to be properly and perfeftly diftinft. If ilrift Propriety in Speech be infifted on, it may more pr«perly be faid, that the voluntary Atlion which is the immediate Confequence and Fruit of the Mind's Volition or Ciioice, is determined by that which appears moft agreeable, than the Preference or Choice itfelf ; but that the Aft of Volition itfelf is always determined by that in or abbut the Mind's View of the Objeft, which ca'ijes it to appear moft agreeable. I fay, /» or about the Mind's Vienjj of the Objeft, becaufe what has Influence to render an Objeft in View agreeabie, is not only what r.pptars in the Objeft viewed, but alfo the Manner of the View, and the State and Circu7nftanccs of the Mind that viev/s. — Particularly to enume- jate all Things pertaining to the Mind's View of the Objefts of Volition, which have Influence m their appearing agreeable to the Mind, would be a Matter of no fmall Difficulty, and might require a Treatife by itfelf, and is not necelTary to my prefent Purpofe, I ihall therefore only mention fpme Things in general, C 2 J> Oae Sed. n. What determines ihe Will. 9 I. One Thing that makes an Objeft prcpofed to Choice agreeable, is the apparetit Nature and Circumjiances cf the Objci'i. And there are various Things of this Sort, that have an liand in rendering the Object more of iefs agreeable ; as, 1. That which appears in the Objeft, which renders it 'beautiful and pkafant, or deformed and irkfcme to the Mind ; viewing it as it is in itjeif. 2. "^Ihe apparent Degree of Pleafure or Trouble ntiendivg the Objeft, or the Confequence of it. Such Concomitants and Confequents being viewed as Circumftances of the Ohjcd, are to be confidered as belonging to it, and as it were Parts of it ; as it Hands in the Mind's View, as a propoied Objed of Choice. 3. T'he apparent State of the Pleafure or Trouble that ap- pears, with Refpeft to Difance of Tir.u ; being either nearer or farther off. 'Tis a Thing in itfeif agreeable to the Mind, to have Pleafure fpeedily j and difagreeable, to have it delayed : ' So that if there be two equal Degrees of Pleafure fet in the Mind's View, and all other Things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off ; the nearer will ap- pear mcft agreCfible, and fo will be chofen. Becaufe, tho' the Agreeablenefs of the Objetfts be exaftly equal, as view'd iii Tiiemfelves, yet riot as view'd in their Circumfiances ; one of them having the additional Agreeablenefs of the Circum- ftance of Nearnefs. II. Another Thing that contributes to the Agreeablenefs of an Objed of Choice, as it ftands jn the Mind's View, is the Man?!er cf the View. If the Objeft be fomething which ap- pears connefted with future Pleafure, not only will the Degree o,f apparent Pleafure have Influence, but aiib the Manner of the View, efpecially in two Refpefts. 1. With refpeifl to the Degree o^ Judgment, or Firmnefs of AJfent, with which the Mind judges th? Pleafure to be fu- ture. Becaufe it is more agreeable to have a certain Happinefs, than an uncertain one ; and a Pleafure viewed as more proba- ble, all other Thiiigs being equal, is more agreeable to the Mind, than that which is view'd as Iefs probable. 2. With refpeft to the Degree of the Idea of the future Pleafure. With Regard to Things which are the Subjeft of our Thoughts, either part, prefent or future, we have much more of an Idea or Apprehenfion of fome Things than others ; that is, our Idea is much more clear, lively and ftrong. Thus, the Ideas we have of fenfible Things by immediate Senfation, are ufuaily much more lively than thofe we have by mere Imagination, or by Contemplation of them when ab- fent. lo fVhat determines the Will. Part I. fent. My -Idea of the Sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid, than when I ojnly think of it. Our Idea of the fweet KeJifli of a delicious Fruit is ufually ftronger when we talte it, than when we only imagine it. And foraetimes, the Ideas we have of Things by Contemplation, are much ftronger and clear- er, than at other Times„ Thus, a Man at one Time has a much ftronger Idea, of the Pleafure which is to be enjoyed ia eating forae Sort of Food that he loves, than at another. Now the Degree, or Strength of the Idea or Senfe that Men have of future Good or Evil, is one Thing that has great Influ- ence on their Minds to excite Choice or Volition. When of two Kinds of future Pleafure, which the Mind confiders of, and are prefented for Choice, both are fuppofed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other Things are equal, but only one of them is what the Mind has a far more lively Senfe of, than of the other ; this has the- greateft Advantage by far to afFed; and attra'ft the Mind, and move the Will. 'Tis now more agreeable to the Mind, to take the Pleafure it has a ftrong and lively Senfe of, than that which it has only a faint Idea of. The View of the former is attended v/ith the ftrongeft Appetite, and the greateft Unea- linefs attends the Want of it ; and 'tis agreeable to the Mind, to have Uncafinefs removed, and its Appetite gratified. And if feveral future Enjoyments are prefented together, as Com- petitors for the Choice of the Mind, fome of them judged to be greater, and otiiers lefs ; the Mind alfo having a greater Senfe and more lively Idea of the Good of fomc of them, and of others a lefs ; and fome are viewed as of greater Certainty or Probability than others ; and thofe Enjoj-ments that appear moft agreeable in one of thefe Refpeds, appears leaft fo in others: In this Cafe, all* other Things being equal, the A- greeablenefs of a propofed Objeft of Choice will be in a De- gree fome Way compounded cf the Degree of Good fuppofed by the Judgment, the Degree of apparent Probability or Cer- tainty of that Good, and the Degree of the View or Senfe, or Livelinefs of the Idea the Mind has, of that Good ; becaufe all together concur to conftitute the Degree in which the Ob- jeft appears at prefent agreeable; and accordingly Volition will be determined. I might further obferve, the State of the Mind that views a propofed Objeft cf Choice, is another Thing that contributes to the Agreeablenefs or Difagreeablenefs of that Objed ; the particular Temper which the Mind has by Na- ture, or that has been introduced and eftabhihed by Educa- tion, Example J Cuftom, or fome other Means ; or the Fr^me or Scd. II. What determines 7/&f Will. i\ or State that the Mind is in on a particular Occafion. That Objeft which appears agreeable to Otie, does not fo to another. And the fame Objeft don't always appear alike agree- able to the fame Perfon, at different Times. It is molt a- greeable to fome Men, to follow their Reafon ; and to others^ to follow their Appetites : To fome Men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious Inclination, than to gratify it ; Others it fuits bell to gratify the vileft Appetites. 'Tis more difagreea- ble to fome Men than others, to counter-aft a former Refo- lution. In thefe Refpefts, and many others which might be mentioned, different Things will be molt agreeable to ditferent Perfons ; and not only fo, but to the fame Perfons at different Times. But poffibly 'tis needlcfs and improper, to mention the Frame and State of the Mind, as a diltinft Ground of the Agrceablenefs of Objefts from the other two mentioned be- fore ; njtz. The apparent Nature and Circumftances of the Objefts viewed, and the Manner of the View : Perhaps if we ftriftly confider the Matter, the different Temper an€ State of the Mind makes no Alteration as to the Agrceable- nefs of Objefts, any other Way, than as it makes the Ob- jefts themfelves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent PLeafure or Pain attending them : And as it occafions the Manner of the View to be different, caufes the Idea of Beauty or Deformity, Pleafure or Uneafinefs, to be rrjore or lefs lively. However, I think fo much is certain, that Volition, in no one Inftance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the gneateft apparent Good is, in the Manner which has been explained. The Choice of the Mind never departs from that which, at that Time, and with Refpeft to the direft and immediate Objefts of that Decilion of the Mind, appears moft agreeable and pleafing, all Things confidered. If the im- mediate Objefts of the Will are a Man's ov/n Aftions, then thofe Aftions which appear moft agreeable to him he wills. If it be now molt agreeable to him, all Things confidered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the Whole of what at prefent appears to him, moft agreeable to fpeak, then he choofes to fpeak : If it fuits him beft to keep Silence, then he choofes to keep Silence. There is fcarcely a plainer ' and more univerfal DIftate of theSenfe and Experience of Mankind, than that, when Men aft voluntarily, and do what they plcafe, then they do what fuits them beft, or what is jnoft mgreeahU to them. To fay, that they do what they pleafe, or i'i IVfjat determines the Will. Part I. or what pleafes them, but yet don't do what is agreeable to them, is the fame Thing as to {^y, they do what they pleafc> l>at don't aft their Pleafure ; and that is to fay, that they do what they pleafe, and yet don't do what they pleafe. It appears from thefe Things, that in fome Scnfe, the Will alnuaysfolloivs the loft Dilate of the Underjianding. But then the Vnderjianding muft be taken in a large Senfe, as including the whole Faculty of Perception or Apprehenfiort, and not merely what is called Reafon or Judgment. If by the Didatc of the Underftanding is meant what Reafon declares to be befl or mofl: for the Perfon's Happinefs, taking in the Whole of his Duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the laft Didate of the Underftanding. Such a Diftate of Reafon is quite a different Matter from Things appearing now moft agreeable ; all Things being put together which pertain to the Mind's prefent Perceptions, Apprehenfions or Ideas, in any Refpeft. Altho' that Didate of Reafon, when it takes Place, is one Thing that is put into the Scales, and is to be eoafidered as a Thing that has Concern in the compound In- fluence which moves and induces the Will j and is one Thing that is to be confidered in eftimating the Degree of that Ap- pearance of Good which the Will always follows ; either as having its Influence added to other Things, or fubdufted fiom them. When it concurs with other Things, tlien its Weight is added to them, as put into the fame Scale ; but when it is againft them, it is as a Weight in the oppofitc Scale, where it refifts the Influence of other Things : yet its Refiftance is often overcome by their greater Weight, and fo the Adl ot the Will is determined in Oppofitioa to it. The Things which I have faid may, I hope, ferve, in fomc Meafure, to illuftrate and confirm the Pofition I laid down in the Beginning of this Sedion, 'viz. That the Will is airways determined by the ftrtngeji Moti've, or \>^ that View of the Mind which has the greateft Degree oi pre'vious Tendency to ex- cite Volition. But whether! have been fo happy as rightly to explain the Thing wherein confifts the Strength of Motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the Pofition itfelf; which carries much of its own Evidence with it, and is the Thing of chief Importance to the Purpofe of the cn- fuing Dilcourfe : And the Truth of it, I hope, will appear with greater Clean^fs, before I have finilhed what I have to fay on the Subje(Jt of human Liberty^ SECT, Sed.Ul. The Nature of NecefTity. rj ij&G«eoaeceeoco«ooe8oeo900eoocGsoocaooooooo«M>ioooeoooMdDosooooooa0eeapeeooaoaseB9oee<]ooeaescaoseoo9ease<e«osooooMeoweo<& Section V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency. TH E plain and obvious Meaning of the Words Freedom and Liberty, in common Speech, is Ponver, Oppor- tunity, or Ad'vantage , that any one has, to do as he pleafes. Or in pther Words, his being free from Hindrance or Impediment jn the Way of doing, or conducing in any Refpeft, as h^ iwills. * And the contrary to Liberty, whatever Name wc call that by, is a Perfon's being hinder'd or unable to con- duct as he will, or being neceffitated to do othcrwife. If this which I liave mentioned be the Meaning of the Word Liberty, in the ordinary Ufe of Language ; as I truft that none that has ever learn 'd to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny ; then it will follow, that in propriety of Speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be afcribed to ^ny Being or Thing, but that which has fuch a Faculty, Power or Property, ^s is called Will. For that which is poffefTed of no fuch Thing as Will, can't have any Poiver or Opportunity of doing according to its Will, nor be neceffitated to aft contrary to its Will, nor be reftrained irom afting agreca- jbly to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the 'very Will it/elf, is not to fpeak good Senfe ; Jf we judge of Senfe, and Nonfenfe, by the original and proper Signification of Words. For the Will it/elf is not an Agent that has a Will : The Power of chufing, itklf, has not a Powef * I fay not only doing, but conduEling ; becaufe a voluntary forbearing to do, fitting ftill, keeping Silence, &c. are Inftances of Perfons ConduSl, a« \>out which Liberty is cxercjfed j tho' they are not fo properly called ^w>»|^. Sedl. V. '7he Notion o/'Liberty ^«c/ moral Agency. 2 8 Power of chufing. That which has the Power of Volition or Choice is the Man or Soul, and not the Power of Volijjon itfelf. And he that has the Li- berty of doing according to his Will, is the Agent or Doer who is poffeffed of the Will ; and not the Will which he is polTefled of. We fay with propriety, that a Bird let loofe has Power and Liberty to fly ; but not that the Bird's Power of flying has a Power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the Property of an Agent, who is poffefled of Powers and Facul- ties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zea- lous. But thefe Qualities are tlie Properties pf Men or Per- fons ; and not the Properties of Properties. There are two Things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in common Speech. One is Conjiraint; the fame is otherwife called i^arf^-, Comfuljion, and Coafiian; which is a Perfon's being neceffitated to do a Thing contrary to his Will. The other is Rejiraint; which is his being hindred, and aot having Power to do according to his Will. But that which has no Will, can't be the Subjeft of thefe Things.- 1 need fay the lefs on this Head, Mr. Locke having fet the fame Thing forth, with fo great Clearnefs, in his Ejjay on the human Unde rjiatidifig. But one Thing more I would obferve concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely, that Power and Opportunity for one to do and condud as he will, or according to his Choice, is all that is meant by it ; without taking into the Meaning of the Word, any Thing pf the Caufe or Original of that Choice ; or at all confidering how the Perfon came to have fuch a Volition ; whether it was caufed by fome ex- ternal Motive^ or internal habitual Bias ; whether it was de- termin'd by fome internal antecedent Volition, or whether it happen'd without a Caufe ; whether it was necefiarily con- neded with Something foregoing, or uot connected. Let the Perfon come by his Volition or Choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is Nothing in the Way to hinder his pur- fuing and executing his Will, the Man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common Notion of Free- dom. What has been faid may be fufKcient to fhew what is meant by Liberty, according to the common Notions of Man- kind, and in the ufual and primary Acceptation of the Word : But the Word, as ufed hy Arminians , Pelagians and others, who o\>^o{e ths. Cal'vinijtsy has an entirely different Signification. — • Thefe fevcral Tiii»gs belong to their Notion of Liberty. u That 2^9 ^be Not ion of Liberty and moral Agency . Part L I'. That it confifts in a Self-determining Poiuer in the Willi or a certain Sovereignty the Will has over itfelf, and its own Ads, whereby it determines its own Volitions ; fo as not to be dependent in its Determinations, on any Caufe v/ithout itfelf, nor determined by any Thing prior to its own Afts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their Notion of it, or that the Mind, previoas to the Art of Volition be, in ejui2ibric'^ a. Contingence is another Thing that belongs and is effential to it ; not in the common Acceptation of the Word, as that has been already explain'd, but as oppofed to all Neceffity, dr any fixed and certain Connexion with fome previous Ground or Reafon of its Exiftence. They fuppofe the Effence of Li- berty fo much to confift in thefe Things, that unlefs the Will of Man be free in this Senfe, he has no real Free- dom, how much foever he may be at Liberty to Aft ac- cording to his Will. A moral Agent is a Being that is capable of thofe Aftions that have a moral Quality, and which can properly be de- nominated good or evil in a moral Senfe, virtuous or vici- ous, commendable or faulty. To morai Agency belongs a moral Faculty, or Senfe of moral Good and Evil, or of fuch a Thing as Defert or V/orthinefs of Praife or Elame, Re- ward or Punlftiment ; and a Capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his Aftions by moral Inducements or Motives, exhibited to the View of Underftanding and Rea- fon, to engage to a Conduft agreeable to the moral Faculty. The Son ij very excellent and beneficial in its Artioh and Influehce on the Earth, in warming it, and caufing it toi bring forth its Fruits; but it is not a moral Agent: Its Aftion, tho' good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a City, and confumcs great Part of it, is very mifchievous in its Operation ; but is not a moral A- gent ; what it does is not faulty or fmful, or deferving of any Punifhment. The brute Creatures are not moral Agents : the Aftions of fome of them are very profitable and pleafant ; others are very hurtful : yet, feeing they have no moral Fa- culty, or Senfe of Defert, and don't Aft from Choice guided by Underftanding, or with a Capacity of reafoning and re- flefting, but only from Inftinft, and are not capable of being influenced by moral Inducements, their Aftions arc not proper- ly finful or virtuous; nor are they properly the Sub- jefts of any fuch moral Treatment for what they do, as mo- ral Agents are for their Faults or good Deeds, Here Sedt. V. 0;^ moral Agency. 30 Here it maybe noted, that there is a circumftantial diffe- rence between the moral Agency of a Ruler and a SubjeS.. I call it drcumflantial, becaufe it lies only in the Difference of moral Inducements they are capable of being influen- ced by, arifing from the Diiierence of Circuwjtanccs. A R-'4er ading in that Capacity only, is not capable of being inihienced by a moral Law, and its bansftions of Threat- nings and Proniifes, Rewards, and Punilhtments, as the SubjeB is ; tho' both may be influenced by a Knowledge of moral Good and Evil :' A.nd therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who afls only in the Capacity of a Ruler to- wards his Creatures, and never as a SubjeB, differs in that Refpeft from the moral Agency of created intelligent Be- ings. God's Aifiions, and particularly thofe which he ex- erts as a moral Goverhour, have moral Qualifications, are morally good in the higheft Degree, They are moft per- fedUy holy and righteous ; and we mufl conceive of Him as influenced in the higheft Degree, by that which, above all ethers, is properly a moral Inducement ; 'nix,. the moral Good which He fees in fuch and fuch Things : And therefore He is, in the moft proper- Senfe, a m.oral Agent, the Source of all ihoral Ability and Agency, the Fountain and Rule of all Vir- tue and moral Good ; tho' by Reafon of his being Supreme over all, 'tis not pofTible He fhould be under the Influence of Law or Command, Promifes, or Threatnings, P.ewards, orPu- liifhments, Counfels or Warnings. The eflential Qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greateft poffible Perfedtion ; fuch as Undcrftanding, to perceive the Difference between mo- ral Good and Evil ; a Capacity of difcernihg that moral Wor- thinefs and Demerit, by which fome Things are Praife-wor- thv, others deferving of Blame and Punifhment ; and alfo a Capacity of Choice, and Choice guided by Underftanding, and a Power of ading according to his Choice or Pleafure, and being capable of doing thofe Things which are in the higheft Senfe Praifc-worthy. And herein does very much confift that Image of God wherein he made Man, (which we read of Cen. i. 26, 27. and Chap. ix. 6.) by which God diftinguiflied Man from the Eeafts, wz. in thofe Faculties and Principles of Na- ture, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein ver)/- much confifts the natural Image of God ; as his fpiritual and moral Image, wherein Man was made at firft, conflfted in that moral Excellency, that he was endowed with. ( 3t ) e^> ^--^ <> ^-^ ^ >,ir-^ O r "^ O ^"^ ^ i >^'^ PART II. Wherein it is confidered whether there is or can be any fuch Sort of Freedom of Will, as that wherein Ar7ninia7is place the Effence of the Liberty of all moral Agents; and whether any fuch Thing ever was or can be conceived of. Section I. ^Shewing the riravifeft Incovfiftence of the Arminian l>Jotmn of Liberty of Will, mi/ljling in the IVill'^^ felf-determinino; Power. # ^%.%%%%% * A V I N G taken Notice of thefe Things which S ^-^ * "^'^■^ ^^ neceflary to be obferved, concerning # ^ M % ^^ Meaning of the principal Terms and 3i^ uV ^ v^ Phrafes made ufe of in Controverfiesconcern- %: "^^ % ^"S human Liberty, and particularly obferved # ,. ,. # what Liberty is, according to the common # ##*%*¥•...• * Language, and general Apprehenfion of Man- kind, and what it is as underftood and maintained by Arminians ; I proceed to confider the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the fuppofed Neceflity of it in Order to moral Agen- cy, or in Order to any One's being capable of Virtue or Vice, and Sedl. I. The Inconfijiencey &c. 32 and properly the Subjeft of Command or Counfel, Praife or Blame, Promifes or Threatnings, Rewards or Pnnifhmer.ts j or whether that which has been defcribed, as the Thing meant by Liberty in common Speech, be not fufficient, and the on!y Liberty, which makes, or can make any one a moral Agent, and fo properly the Subjeft of thefe Things- In this Fart, I (hall coniider whether any fuch Thing be pofilbic or conceiva- ble, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians infift on \ and Ihall inquire whether any fuch Sort of Liberty be necefl'ary to moral Agency, ^c. in the next Part. And Firll of all, I fhall confider the Notion of a Self- dftermining Fonver in the Will : wherein, according to the Arminians, does moft eflentially confift the Will's Freedom ; and {hall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly ab- furd, and a manifelt Inconfiftence, to fuppofe that the H' ill it- f elf determines all the free Ads of the Will. Here I fhall not infift on the great Impropriety of fuch Phrafes, and Ways of fpeaking, as the Will's determining it- felfi becaufe Aftions are to be afcribcd to Agents, and not properly to the Powers of Agents ; which improper Way o^ fpeaking leads to many Miftakes, and much Confufion, a^ Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that the Arminianj^ when they fpeak of the Will's determining itfelf, do by the Will mfinx\\t Soul ^illifig, I {hall take it for granted, that when they fpeak of the Will, as the Determiner, they mean the Soul in the Exercife of a Poujer of Willing, cr aftijig volun- tarily. I fhall fuppofe this to be their meaning, becaufe No- thing elfe can be meant, without the groffefl and plainefl: Ab- furdity. In all Cafes, when we fpeak of the Powers or Prin- ciples of Ading, as doing fuch Things, we mean that the A- gents which have thefe Powers of afting, do them, in the Exercife of thofe Powers. So when we fay. Valour fights courageoufly, we mean, the Man who is under the Influ- ence of Valour fights ccurageouOy. When we fay. Love feeks the Objeft loved, we mean, the Perfon loving feeks that Objeft. When we fay, 'the Underflanding difcerns, we mean the Soul in the Exercife of that Faculty. So when it is faid, the Will decides or determines, the Meaning mufl be, that the Perfon in the Exercife of a Power of Willing and Chufmgj i)r the Soul afting voluntarily, determines. F 3 Therefor© 53 "^^^^ Inconjijfence of Part IL Therefore, if the Will determines all its o-.vn free Ads, the Soul determines all the free Afh of the "V^'ill in the Ex- ercife of a Power of Willing and Chufing ; or, which is the fame Thing, it determines them of Choice; it determines its own Atts by chufing its own Afls. If the Will deter- liiines the WiD, then Choice orders and determines the Choice : and AQls, of Choice are fubjeft to the Decificn, and follow the ConduCl of other Ads of Choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free Ads, then every free Ad of Choice is determined by a preceding Ad of Choice, chufing that Ad. And if that preceding Ad of the Will or Choice be a!fo a free Ad, then by thefe' Princi- ples, in this Ad too, the Will is Self-determined ; that is, this, in like Manner, is an Ad that the Soul voluntarily chu- fes ; or which is \h& fame Thing, it is an Ad determined ftill by a preceding Ad of the Will, chufing that. And the like may again be obferved of the laft mentioned Ad. Which' brings us diredly to a Contradiction : for it fuppofes an Act of the Will preceding the firft Act in the wl:o!e Train, directing and determining the reft ; or a free Act of the Will, before tbe firft free Act of the Will. Or elfe we muit come at laft to an Act of the V7ill, determining the confequent Acts, wherein the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free Act, in' this Notion of Freedom : But if the firft Act in the Train, de- termining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all can be free ; as is manifeft at firft View, but fhall be demon- Urated prefently. If the Will, which we find governs the Members of the Body, and determines and commands their Motions and Adions, docs alfo govern itfelf, and determine its own Mo- tions and Acts, it doubtlefs determines them the fame Way, even by antecedent Volitions. The Will determines which Way the Hands and Feet fhall move, by an Act of Volition or Choice : and there is no other Way of the Will's deter- mining, directing or commanding any Thing at all. Whatfo- ever the Will commands, it commands by an Act of the Will. And if it has itfelf under its command, and determines it- felf in its own Actions, it doubtlefs does it the fame Way that 3t determines other Things which are under its Command. So that if the Freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it has itfelf and its Own Actions under its Command and I)irectiori, and its own Volitions are determined by itfelf, 3t will follow, that every free Volition arifes from another an- tecedent Volition, directing and commanding that : And if that Sect. I. Self'deterfnining Power. 34 that dire^li'g Volition be alfo free, in that alfo the Will Is de- termined ; that is to fay, that directing Volition is deter- mined by another going before that ; and fo on, 'till we come to the firft Volition in the whole Series : And if that ifirft Volition be free, and the Will felf-determined in it, then that is determined by another VoHtion preceding that ; which is a Contradiction : becaufe by the Suppofition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the firft in the Train. But if that firlt Volition is not determined by any preceding Act of the Vv'ill, then that Act is not determined by the Will, and fo is not free in the Arminian Notion of Freedom, which confifts in the Will's Self-determination. And if that firft Act of the Will, which determines and fixes the fubfequent Acts, be not free, none of the following Acts, which are determined by itj can be free. If wd fuppofe there are five Acts in the Train, the fifth and laft de- termined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the fecond, and the fecond by the firft ; If the firft is not determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will : that is, that each of them are as they are, and not othcrwife, is not firft owing to the Will, but to the Determination of the firft in the Series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no Kand in the Determination of. And this being that which decides what the reft fhall be, and determines their Exift- ence ; therefore the firft Determinrttion of their Exiftencc is not from the Will. The Cafe is juft the fame, if, inftead of a Chain of five A(fts of the Will, we ftiould fuppofe a ^ucceffion of Ten, or an Hundred, or ten Thoufard. If the firft Act be not free, being determined by fomethlnp- out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itfelf, and that the next, and fo on; They are none of them free, but all originally depend on, and are determind by fome Caafe out of tlie Will : and fo all Freedom in the Cafe is excluded, and no Aft of the Vv'ill can be free, accordinp- to this Notion of Freedom. If we ftiould fuppofe a long' Chain, often Thoufand Links, fo conneJxed, that if the firlt Link moves, it will move the next, and that the next ; and fo the whole Chain muft be determined te Motion, and in the Direction of its Motion, by the Motion of the firft Link ; and that is moved by fomething dfc : In this Cafe, tho' all the Links, but one, are moved by other Parts ot the fame Chain ; yet it appears that the Motion of no One, nor the DiVedion of its Motion, is from any Self-moving or Self- determining Power in the Chain, any more than if every Link 35 -^^^^^ Evafions confidered. Part IL Link were immediately moved by fomething that did not be- long to the Chain. If the Will be not free in the firft Aft, which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caufed by that firft Aft : for tho' indeed the Will caufed it, yet it did not caufe it freely ; becaufe the preceding Aft, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the fecond Aft, fo neither can it be in the third, which is caufed by that; becaufe, in like Manner, that third was determined by an Aft of the Will that was not free. And fo we may go on to the next Aft, and from that to the next : And how long foever the Succeffion of Afts is, it is all one ; if the firft on which the whole Chain depends, and which determines all the reft, be not a free Aft, the Will is not free in caufing or determining any one of thofe Afts ; becaufe the Aft by which it determines them all, is not a free Aft ; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, tlian if it did not caufe them at all. Thus, this Ar- minian Notion of Liberty of the Will, confifiing in the Will's Self-deter minatioti, is repugnant to itfelf, and (huts itfelf whol- ly out of the World. Section II. Several Jup-pojed Ways of evading the foregoing Reafoning^ confidered. I F to evade the Force of what has been obferved, it fhould be faid, that when the Arminiaits fpeak of the Will's deter- mining its own Afts, they don't mean that the Will de- termines its Acts by any preceding Act, or that one Act of the Will determines another ; but only that the Faculty or Power of Will, or the Soul in the Ufe of that Power, de- termines its own Volitions ; and that it does it without any Act going before the Act determined ; fuch an Evafion would be full of the moft grofs Abfurdity. 1 confefs, it is an Eva- iion of my own inventing ; and I don't know but I fhould wrong the Arminians, in fuppofing that any of them would make ufe of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would obferve upon it a fev/ Things. Seel. IL Suppofed Evafions confidered. 36 Firji, If the Faculty or Power of the Will determines an Act of Volition, or the Soul in the Ufe or Exerci/e of that Power, determines it, that is the fame Thing as for the Soul to determine Volition by an AB of Will. For an Exercife of the Power of Will, and an Aa of that Power, are the fame Thing. Therefore to fav, that the Power of Will, or the Soul in the Ufe or Exercfe of that Power, determines Voli- tion, without an ^(^ of Will preceding the Volition deter- mined, is a Contradiction. Secondly, If a Power of Will determines the Act of the Will, then a Power of Chufing determines it. For, as was before obfcrved, in every Act of Will, there is Choice, and a Power of Willing is a Power ofChufmg. But if a Power of Chufing. determines the Act of Volition, it determines it by Chufing lU For 'tis raoft abfurd to fay, that a Power of Chufing deter- mines one Thing rather than another, without chufing any Thing. But if a Power of Chufing determines Volition by chufing it, then here is the Act of Volition determined by an antecedent Choice, chufing that Volition. Thirdly, To fay, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines its- own Volition, but not by any Act, is a Contradiction. Be- caufe for the Soul to direH, decide, or determijie any Things is to act ; and this is fuppofed ; for the Soul is here fpoken of as being a Caufe in this Afi"air, bringing fomething to pafs, or doing fomething ; or, which is the fame Thing, ex- erting itfelf in order to an Eifect. which Effect is the Deter- mination of Volition, or the particular Kind and Manner of an Act of Will. But certainly, this Exertion or Action is not the fame with the Effect, in order to the Production of which it is exerted ; but mull be fomething prior to it. Again, The Advocates for this Notion of the Freedom of the Will, fpeak cf a certain Sovereignty in the W'ill, whereby it has Power to determine its own Volitions. And there- fore the Determination of Volition muft itfelf be an Act of the Will ; for otherwife it can be no Exercife of that fuppofed Power and Sovereignty. Again, If the Will determines itfelf, then either the Wil! \% a£iLve in determining its Volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the Determination is an A£l of the Will ; and fo there is one Act of the Will determining another. But if the Will is not aQ'we in the Determination, then liow doea 37 Suppofed Evafioiis confidered. Part II; does it exercife any Liberty in it ? Thefe Gentlemen fiippofe that the Thing wherein tlic Will exerci/es Liberty, is in its determining its own Afts. But how can this be, if it be not atiinje in determining ? Certainly the Will, or the Soul, can't exercife any Liberty in that wherein it don't ailf or wherein it don't exercijt itfelf. So that if either Fart of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, confiR- ing in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be an Ail cf the Will in determining all its own free Ads, then one free Aft of the Will is determined by another ; and fo we have the Abfurdity of every free Aft, even the very firft, determined by a foregoing free Aft. But if there be no Aft or Exercife of the Will in determining its own Afts, then no Liberty is exercifed in determining them. From •whence it follows, that no Liberty confifts in the W^ill's Pov.er to determine its own Afti : Or, which is the fame Thing, that there is no fach Thing as Liberty confiding in a Sdf-de- tcrmihing Power of the Will. If it (hould be faid. That altho" it be t-rue, if the Soul de- termines its own Volitions, it mult be attive in fo doing, and the Determination itfelf muft be an Aft ; yet there is no Need of fuppofing this Aft to be prior to the Volition de- termined ; But the Will or Soul determines the Aft of the "V^Wl in W illing ; It determines its own Volition, in the very Aft of Volition ; It direfts and limits the Aft. of the Will, caufing it to be fo and not otherwife, in exerting the Aft, without any preceding Aft to exert that. If any Ihould fay after this Manner, they muil mean one of thefe three Things : Either, (i.) That the determining Aft, tho' it be before the Aft determined in the Order of Nature, yet is not before it in the Order of Time. Or (2.) That the determining Aft is not before the Aft determined, either in the Order of Time or Nature, nor is truly diftinft from it ; But that the Soul's determining the Aft of Volition is the fame Thing with its exerting the Aft of Volition : The Mind's exerting fuch a particular Aft, is its caufing and determining the Aft. Or, (3.) That Volition has no Caufe, and is no EfFeft ; but comes into Exiftence, with fuch a particular Determination, without any Ground or Reafon of its Exiftence and Determi- nation. 1 fliall confidcr thefe diilinftly. ( I.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining Aft is not before the Aft determined in Order of Time, it will not help the Cafe at all, tho' it ftiould be aliovvcd. If it be be- fore Sect. IL Suppofed Evafions con/Idered. 38 fore the determin'd Aft in. the Order of Nature, being tha Caufe or Ground of ivs Exiftence, this as much proves it to lie dillin>ft from it, and independent on it, as if it were be- fore in the Order of Time. As the Caufe of the particular Motion of a natural Body ia a certain Diredlion, may have no Dillance as to Time, yet can't be the fame with the Mo- tion effefted by it, but muft be as diftin pafs or no. And becaufe it is a Queftion, in mfiny Refpects, very im- portant in this Controverfy about the Freedom of Will^ Whether the free AJIs of the Will are E'vents ^which come to pafs nxiithout a Caife? I ftall be parti,:;uiar v^ exaroining this Paint in the two following Sectiona, .4„|..f4....f.4..H-4--f-H"4-i--f-i-4-4-f-r4-fT'^ $8TT101l 4l ^0 Event without a Cauje. Part II. ^»oo#a9Si#3S8o||aooe#oooo^o3oe^o»op^MOo||^-oooo^l^oo||,:3iooo^o»(»s;4o3o,-^jooo^i Section III. Whether any Eveitt wbatfjcvery and VolitioA in, ■ particular^ can come to paj's without a Caufe of- its Exifience: ■ BEFORE,! enter on an Argument on tins Subject, I would explain how I would be underftood, when I life the Word Caufe in this Difcourfe : fince, for want of a. better Word, I fflall have Occafion to ufe it In a Senfe which' is more extenfive, than that in y/hich it is Sometimes ufed. The Word is often ufed in fo reflrained a Senfe as to fignify' only that which has a pojiti'v? Efficienry'ox Influence to produce a Thing, or bring it to pafs. But there are many Things which have no fuch pofitive productive Inanence; which yet are Caufes in that Refpect, that they have truly the Nature of a pround or Reafoh why fome Things are, rather than others ; or why they are as they are, rather than othervvife. Thus the Abfence of the Sun in the Night, is not the Caufe of the failing of the Dew at that Time, in the fame Manner as its Beams are the Caufe of the Afcending of the Vapours in the Day-time ; and its Withdrawment in the Winter, ia 3iot in the fame Manner the Caufe of the Freezing of the' Waters, as its Approach in the Spring is the Caufe of their' Thawing : But yet the Withdrawment or Abfence of the Sun is an Antecedent, with which thefe Effects in the Night and Winter are connected, and on which they depend ; and is one Thing that belongs to the Ground and Reafon why they come to pafs at that Time, rather than at other Times ; tho' the Abfence of the Sun is Nothing pofitive, nor has any pofitive Influence. tt may be further obferved, that when I fpeak of CnitneHion of Carfes and Effe^s, I have Refpect to moral Caufes, as well ar, thofe that arc called natural in DiHinction ficni them. Moral Caufes may be Caufes in as proper a Senfe, as any Caufes whatfocver ; may have as real an Influence, and may as truly be the Ground and Reafon of an Event's coming tp pafs. Therefore I fometimes ufc the Word Caufe, in this Inquiry, to fignify any Antecedent, either natural or moral, pofitive or negative. §e'5:. III. No Event without a Caufe. 42 negntive, on v.-hich an Event, either a Thing, or the Mariner and Circumftance of a Thing, fo depends, that it is the Ground and Reafon, either in Whole, or in Part, why it is, rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwife : Or, in other Words, any Antecedent ^vith which a confequent Ei^ent is fo connefted, that it truly belongs to the Reafon why the Propofition which affirms that Event, is true ; whe- ther it has any pofitive Influence, or not. And In an Agreca- blenefs to this, I fometimes ufe the Word Effeil, for the Confequence of another Thing, which is perhaps rather an Occafion than a Caufe, moft properly fpcaking. I am the more careful thus to explain my Meaning, that I ^ay cut off Occafion, from any that might feek Occafion to cavfl and objed againft fome Things which I may fay con- cerning the Dependance of all Things which come to pafs, on fome Caufe, and their Connedlicn M'ith their Caufe. Having thus exphin'd what I mean by Caufe, I affert, that Nothing ever comes to pafs without a Caufe. What is Self- exif!ent mufl be from Eternity, and mufl be unchangeable : But as to all Things that begin to be, they are not bclf-ex- ritent, and therefore mufl have fome Foundation of their Ex- i■ft;^!nce without themfelves. — That v/hatfoever begins to be, ivhich before was not, mufl have a Caufe why it then begins to' exift, feems to be the firft Didlate'of the common and natural vSenfe which God hath implanted in the Minds of all Mankind, and the main Foundation of all our Reafonino-s about the Exiflence of Things, pafl, prefent, or to come. And this Dictate of common Senfe equally refpccts Sub- ftances and Modes, or Things and the Manner and Circum- liances of Things. Thus, if we fee a Body which has hither- to been at Refl, ftart out of a State of Refl, and begin to move, v/e do as naturally and neceffarily fuppofe there is fome Caufe or Reafon of this new Mode of Exiflence, as of the Exiflence of a Body itfelf which had hitherto not exifled. And fo if a Body, which had hitherto moved in a certain Direction, fhould fuddenly change the Direction of its Motion; or if it fliculd put off its old Figure, and take a new one ; or change its Colour ; the Beginning of thefe new Modes is a new Event, and the Mind of Mankind seceflTarily fuppofes that there is fome Caufe or Reafon of them. • 43 ^'^0 Event without a Cauje. Part IL If this grand Principle of common Senfe be taken away, aU Arguing from Effects to Caufes ceafethj and fo all Knowledge of any Exiltence, bef.des what we have by the moft direct and immediate Intuition. Particularly all our Proof of the Being of God ceafes : We argue his Being from our own Being, and the Being of other Things, which we are fenfible once were not, but have begun to be ; and from the Being of the World, with all its conftituent Parts, and the Manner of their Exiftence ; all which we fee plainly are not necefTary ia their own Nature, and fo not Self-exiltent, and therefore muft have a Caufe. But if Things, not in themfeh^es ne- cefl'ary, may begin to be without a Caufe, all this arguing is vain.. Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the Nature of *rhings no Foundation for the Knowledge of the Being of God without any Evidence of it from his Works. I do fup- pofe there is a great Abfurdity, in the Nature of Things {im- ply confidered, in fuppofing that there thould be no God, or in denying Being in general, and fuppofing an eternal^ abfolute, univerfal Nothing : And therefore that here would be Foundation of intuitive Evidence that it cannot be, and that eternal infinite moft perfect Being muft be ; if wc had Strength and Comprehenfion of Mind fufficient, to have » clear Idea of general and univerfal Being, or, which ie the fame Thing, of the infinite, eternal, moft perfect di- vine Nature and EfTence. But then we (hould not properly come to the Knowledge of the Being of God by arguing ; but our Evidence would be intuitive : W^e fhould f(*e it, as ■we fee other Things that are necefTary in themfeives, the Contraries of which are in their own Nature abfurd and con- tradictory ; as we fee that twice two is four ; and as wc fee that a Circle has no Angles. If we had as clear an Idea of aniverfal infinite Entity, as we have of thefe other Things, I fuppofe we fhould moft intuitively fee the Abfurdity of fuppof- ing fuch Being not to be ; fhould immediately fee there is no Room for tlie , Queftion, whether it is poifible -that Eeing, in the moft general abftrafted Notion of it, fhould not be. But we have not that Strength and Extent of Mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent Man- ner : But the Way that Mankind come to tbe Knowledge of the Being of God, is that which the Apoftle fpeaks of, Rom, i. 2Q- The in'vijible Things of Him, from the Creation of the Worlds are clearly ft en; being underfiood by the Things that are made; even, itii eternal Power atfd Godhead, We firji afcend, and prove a Po^erisri^ Sedt. III. Mb Even! witBout a Caufe. ^^ Pojieriori, or from EfFeds, that there muft be an eternal- Caufe J and t\ie.n /tcondly, prove by Argumentation, not In- tuition, that this Being muft be neceflarily exiftent ; and then thirdly y from the proved Neceflity of his Exiftence^ wG may dejcend, and prove many of his Perfeftions a Priori. But if once this grand Principle of common Senfe be given up, \S\2X mokat is not neceffary 171 itfelf, Tnuji ha'ue a Caufe ; and we begin to maintain, that Things may come into Exiitence, and begin to be,' which heretofore have not been, of them- fclves, without any Caiife ; all our Means of afcending in our arguing from the Creature to the Creator, and all our- Evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one Blow. In this Cafe, we can't prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the World, and the Creatures in it, or from the Manner of their Being, their Order, Beauty and Ufe. For if Things may come into Exiftence without any Caufe at all^ then they doubtlefs may without any Caufe anfwerable to the Effect. Our Minds do alike naturall}- fuppofe and determine both thefe Things ; namely, that what begins to be has a Caufe, and aifo that it has a Caufe proportionable and agreeable to the Effedt. The fame Principle which leads us to dietermine, that there cannot be an.y Thing coming to par<» without a Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the Effeft than in the Caufe. Yea, if once it fhould be allowed, that Things may come to pafs without a Caufe, we ihould not only have no Proof of the Being of God, but we fhould be without Evidence of the Exiftence of any Thing whatfoever, but our own imme- diately prefent Ideas and Confcioufnefs^ For we have no Way to prove any Thing elfe, but by arguing, from Effefts to Caufes : from the Ideas now immediately in View, we ar- gue other Things not immediately in View : from SenfationS now excited in us, we infer the Exiftence of Things without: lis, as the Caufes of thcfe Senfations : And from the Ex- iftence of thefe Things, we argue other Things, which they depend on, as Effefis on Caufes. We infer the pafl: Exift- ence of our Selves, or any Thing elfe, by Memory ; only as we argue, that the Ideas, which are now in our Minds,. are the Confequcnces of paft Ideas and Senfations, We im- mediately perceive nothing elfe but the Ideas which are this Moment extant in our Minds. We perceive or knov/ other Things only by Means of tlwfe,, as xieceffarily conne(5led with' others. 45 ■A'o Event without a Cauje, Part 1.1, others, and dependent on them. But if Things may be without Caufes, all this, necefiary Connexion and Depen- dence is diflblved, and fo all Means of our Knowledge is gone. If there be no Abfurdity or Difficulty in fuppofing one Thing to ft'art out of Non-Exiftence, into Being, of it- feH" without a Caufe ; then there is no Abfurdity or Difficulty ' in fuppofing the fame of Millions of Millions. For Nothing, oi" no Difficulty Multiplied, ftill is Nothing, or no Difficulty : Nothing multiplied by Nothing don't increafe ths Sum. And indeed, according to the Hypothecs I am oppoling, of the Acts of the Will coming to pafs without a Caufe, it is the Cafe in Fact, that Millions of Millions of Events are continually coming into Exiftence Cojitingently, without any Caufe or Reafon why they do fo, all over the World, every Day and Hoiir, thro' all Ages. So it is in a coattant Suc- cefSon, in every niorai Agent.' This .Contingency, this efficient Nothing, this efFedual No-Caufe, is always ready at Hand, to produce this Sort of Effeds, as long as the Agent exifts, and as often as \\t has Cccafion. If it were fo, that Things only of one Kind, f/z. Ads of the Will, feem'd to come to pafs of Themfelves ; but thofe of this Sort in general came into Being thus ; and it were an Event that was continual, and that happen'd in a Cburfe, wherever were capable Subjefiis of fuch Events ; this very Thing would demonitrate that there was fome Caufe of them, which made fuch a Difference between this Event and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For Con- tingence is blind, and does not pick and choofe for a particu- lar Sort of Events. Nothing has no Choice. This No-Caufe, which caufes no Exiftence, can't caufe the Exiftence which comes to pafs, to be of one particular Sort only, dlftinguifh'd from all others. Thus, that only one Sort of Matter drops out of the Heavens, even Water, and that this comes fo often, fo conftantly and plentifully, all over the World, in all Ages, fhows that there is fome Caufe or R-eafon of the falling of Water out of the Heavens ; and that fomething befides mere Contingence has a Hand in the Matter. ■ If wc Ihould fuppofe Non-entity to be about to bring forth; and Things were coming into Exiftence, without any Caufe or Antecedent, on which the Exiftence, or Kind or Manner of Exifter;cc depends ; or which could at all determine whe- ther the Things fnould be. Stones, or Stars, or Beafts, or Angels, Scci. III. Voiicicii arifes not without a Capfe. 46 Ancrels, or human Bodies, or Souls, or only feme ne;v/ Mo- tion or Figure iii natural Bodies, or feme nev/ Senfations iri Animals, or new Ideas in the human Underftaning, or new Voiitioos in the Will ; or any Thing elfe of all the infinite Number of Poffibies ; then certainly it would not be expect- ed, altho' many Millions of Millions of Things are coming into. Exiitence in this Manner^ all ov^r the Face of the Earth, that they fhould all be only of one particular Kind, and that it fhould be thus in all Ages, .and that this Sort of Exiftences Ibould never fail to come 10 pafs where there is Room for them, or a Subjeft capable of them, and that conftantly, whenever there is Occafion for them. if any (hould imagine, there is fomething in the Sort of Event that renders it poffible for it to come into Exiftence without a Caufe ; and fhould fay, that the free Afls of the Will are Exiiiences of an exceeding different Nature from other Thing;; ; by Reafcn of which they may come into Ex- iftence without any previous Ground or Reafon of it, tho* other Things cannot ; If they make this Objedxion in good Earneft, it would be an Evidence of their itrangeiy forget- ting themfelves : For they would be giving an Account of fome Ground of the Exifter.ce of a Thing, when at the fame Time they ■yvould maintain there is no Ground of its Exift- ence. Therefore I would obferve, that the particular Nature pf Exiftence, be it never fo diverfe from others, tan lay no Foundation for that Thing's coming into Exiftence without a Caufe; becaafe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppofe the particular Nature oi Exigence to be a Thing prior to the Exiftence ; and fo a Thing ^yhich makfes V^ay for Exift- ence, with fuch a Circumftance, namely va:hout a Caufe or Reafori of Exiftence. But that which in any RefpecTt makes Way for a Thing's coming into Being, or for any Manner pr Circumftance of its tirft Exiftence, muft be prior to the Exiftence. The diftinguifh'd Nature of the ElFeft, which is fomething belonging to the Effed, can't have Influence backward, to aft before it is. The peculiar Nature of thac Thing called Volition, can do Nothmg, can have no Influ- ence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its Influence : for then the Thing has made furc of Exiftence already, without its Help. So that it is indeed as repugnant to Reafon, to fuppofe that an Aft of the Will fnould come into Exiftence withoi^t a Caufe, ?.s to fuppofe the human Soul, or an Angel, qr H tlie 4^' ^'olition-arifes not without a Cauje. "j^art M- rtie Globe of the Earth, or the whole Univerfe, fhould come into Exiftence without a Caufe; And if once we allow, that fuch a Sort of Effect as a Volition rhay come to pafs without a Caufe,' how do we know but that many other Sorts of Effefts may do fo too ? 'Tis not the particular Kind of Effect that makes the Abfurdify of fuppofmg it has Being without a Caufe, bui: fomething which is common to all Things that ever begin to be, n^iz. that they are not Self-exiftent, or neceffary in tha Nature of ThingSo -.^osoo(»occioce(»eoocooaocoo<50Poooeoooi!oooo«S«Pecasoto9oeoooeoeecoo«ro3a«o9oco3ocaeoe«& Section IV. Whether Volition can arife without a Caufcy through the Adlivity of the Nature of the Soul. 'HE Author of the Effay on the Freedom cf the Will in God mid the Creatures, in Anfwer to that Objeftion againll his DoClHne of a Self-determining Power in thcr will, (P. 68, 69.) ^hai Nothing is, or comes to pnfs, njjithoiit afiiffici' eni Rep/on nxhy it is, and tvhy it is in this Manner rather tha-.i another, allows that it is thus in corporeal Things, nvhich are ffoperly and fhilofofhically fpeaJang pajf,n)e Beings ; but denies That it is thus in iS^/rJ/j, nxihich are Beings of an nSi've Nature, njoho ha-ve the Sprin';^ of AH ion 'Vjiihin themjel'ves, end can deter- mine themj'el-ucs. By which it is plainly fiippoftd, that fuch an Event as an Afl of the Will, may come to pafs in a Spirit, with- out a fufficient Reafon why it comes to pafs, or why it is after this Manner, rather than another ; by Reafon of the Adtivitr of the Nature of a Spirit. But certainly this Author, in this' Matter, mufl: be ■very unwary and inadvertent. For, ■'' i.'Tfie Objeiftion or DifEctilty propofed by this Author, leems to be forgotten in his Anfwer or Solution. The very 5)ifficulty, as he himfelf propofes it, is this ; How an Eveni Can come to pafs ^without afjifficient Reafon n.vhy it is, or nvhy it is in this Manner rather than another? Inftead of folving this pifficulty, or anfwering this Queftion with Regard to Voli- tion, as he propofes, he forgets himfelf, and anfwers ano- ther Qucflion quite diverfc, and wholly inconfiftent witii ^hisr, 'v/s;. What is a fufficient Rep-fon why it is, and why it h in- Se6t. IV. Volition not "jcithout a Caiifcy Scc 4-8 in this Manner rather than another? And he afligns the Aflive Being's own Determination as the Caufe, and a Caufe fufficient for the Eftefi:; and leaves all the Difficulty ynrefolved, and the Quefticn unanrwered, which yet returns, even. How the Soul's own Determination, which he fpeaks of, cara2 to exift, and to be what it was without a Caufe ? The Activity of the Soul may enable it to be the Caufe of EfFefts; but it don't at all enable or help it to be the Sub- jeft of EfFefts which have no Caufe ; which is the Thiijg this Author fuppofes concerning Ads of the Will. Aftiviiy of Nature will no more enable a Being to produce Efiefts, and determine the Manner of their Exigence, n.':itki?i itfelf, without a Caufe, than mt of itfelf, in fome other Being. But if an adtive Being Ihould, through its Aftivity, produce and determine an EfFeft in fome external Objeft, how abfurd would it be to fay, that the EfFed was.produced withgut a Caufe \ 2. The Queftion is not fo much. How a Spirit endowed -vith Aiftivity comes to aft:, as why it exerts fuch an Aft, and not another ; or why it afls with fuch a particular De- termination ? If Adlivity of Nature be the Caufe why a Spirit (the Soul of Man for Infcance) afts, and don't lie ftill ; yet that alone is not the Caufe why its Aftion is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Aftii^e Nalure is a _^^»("ra/ Thing; 'tis an Ability or Tendency of Nature to AfHon, , generally taken; which may be a Caufe why the Soul ads as Occafion or Reafon is given ; but this alone can't be a fufficient Caufe why the Scul exerts fu.ch a partkvlar Aft, at fuch a Time, r-ather than others. In order to this, there muft be fomething befides a genrral Tendency to Aftion ; there muft alfo be a particular Tendency to that individual Aftion. If it fliould be afked, why the Soul of Man ufes its Aftivity in fuch a Manner as it does ; and it fhould be an- fwered, that the Soul ufes its Aftivity thus, rather than other- wife, becaufe it has Aftivity ; would fuch an Anfwer fatisfy a rational Man ? Would it not rather be Icoigsid upon as a ve- ry impertinent one I 3. An aftive Being can bring no Eirefts to pafs by his Aflivity, but what are confequent upon his afting: He pro- duces Nothing by his Aftivity, any other Way than by the Exercife of his Aftivity, and {o Nothing but tlie Fruits of JLs Exercife : He brings Nothing to pafs by a dormant Aftivity. But the Exercife of his Aftivity is Aftion ; and fo 'Jtiie Aftion, or Exercife of his Aftivity, muft be prior to the H 3 ESefts 49 Volition a^/ without a Cauje, Part II. SfFeiSs of his Activity, if an aftive Eein? prodaces an Efeft in another Being, about which his Adivity is conver- faint, the Effeft being the Fruit of his Activity, his Adi- vity rnuft be firft exercifed or exerted, and the Efteft of it mufi: follow. So it maft be, with equal Reafon, if the active Being is his own Object, and his' Activity is confver- fant about Himfelf, to produce and determine feme Effect :n himfelf; ftill the Exercife of his Activity mult go before the Effect, which he brirrgs to pais and determines by it. And therefore his Activity can't be the Caufe of the Deter- inination of the firft A.cticn, ox' Exercife of" Activity itfelf^ whence the Effects of Activity arife ; for that would imply a Contradiction ; It would be to fay, the firft Exercife of Activi- ty is before the firft Exercife of Activity, and is the Caufe of it. 4. That the Soul, tho' an active Subftance, can't divtrffy its own Acts, but by firft actmg ; or be a determining' Caufe of different Acts, or any different Effects, fometimes of one Kind, and fometimes of anothe'', any other Way than in Confequence of its own diverfe Acts, is manifeft by this ; That if fo; then the fame Caufe, the Jam/' oaufal Power, Force or Influence,' 'without VdriatioTi 172 any Rejped, would produce different Effects at different Times. For the fame Subftance of the Soul before it acts", and the fame active Nature of the Soul before it is exerted (i- e. before in" the Order of Nature) would be the Caufe of different Effects, n;iz. different Volitions at different Times. But the Subftance of the Soul before it acts, and its active Nature- before it is exerted, are the fame without Variation. For 'tis- feme Act that makes the firft Variation in the Caufe, as to any caufal Exertion, Force or Influence. But if it b^ fo, that the Soul has no different Caufality, or diverfe caufal Force or Influence, in producing thefe diverfe Effects ; then 'tis evident, that the Scul has no Influence, no Hand in the diverfity of the Effect; and that the Difference of the Effect can't be owing to any Thing in the Soul ; or which is the fame Thing, the Soul don't determine the Diverfity of the Effect; which is contrary to the Suppofition. 'Tis true, the Subftance of the Soul' before it acts, and before there is anv Difference in that Refpect, may be in a different State and Circumftances : But thofe whom I oppofe, will not allow the different Circumftances of the Soul to be the de- termining Caufes of the Acts of the Will ; as being con- trary to their Notion.of Self-determination and Self-ipoticn. ? , : ■ ' . 5. Let Seel. IV. thro' the Soul's Adivity, ^q c. Let us fuppofe, as thefe Divines do, that there are no, A(5ts of the Soal, ftriftly fpeaking, but free Volitions'; Then it will follow, that the Soul is an aftive Being in Nothing further than rt is a voluntary or eleftive Being | and whenever it produces Effefts aftively, it produces Effects voluntarily and eleiiively. But to produce EfFefts thus, is the fame Thing as to produce Eifefts in Ccnfequence of, and according to its own Choice. And if fo, 'then furely the Soul don't by its Activity produce all its own Afts of Will or Choice themfelves : For this, by the Suppofition, is to produce all its free Adls of Choice voluntarily and eledive-' iy, or in Confequence of Its own free A<$\s of Choice, which brings the Matter ^ireftly to the fore-mentioned Contra- didipn, of a free Aft of Choice before the firft free Aft o^ Choice.- According to thefe Gentlemen's own Notion of Aftion, if there arifes in the Mind a Volition without a free Act of the Will or Choice to determine and produce it, the Mind is not tiie aftive voluntary Caufe of that Voli- tion ; becaufe it don't arife from, nor is regulated by Choice or Defign : And therefore it can't be^ that the Mind (hould be the aftive, voluntary, determining Caufi; of the firft and hading Volition that relates to the Affair. The Mind's being a dejigniiig Caufe, only enables it to produce Eifefts in Confequer.ee of its Def,gn; it will not enable it to be the deligning Caufe of all its own Defigns. The Mind's being an eleilive Caufe, will only enable it to produce EfFefts in Confequence of its Ele8io?2, and according to them ; but can't enable it to be the eleftive Caufe of all its own Elec- tions ; becaufe that fuppofes an Eleftion before the firft E- leftion. So the Mind's being an aBi-ve Caufe enables it to produce Effefts in Confequence of its own Ails, but can't enable it to be the determining Caufe of all its own Afts ; for that is ftili in the fame Manner a Contradiftion ; as it fuppofes a determining Act converfant about the firft Act, and prior to it, having a caufal Influence cu its Exiftence, an4 Manner of Exiftence. ' , I can conceive of Nothing elfe thr.t can be meant by the Soul's having Power to caufe and determine its own Voli- tions, as a Being to whom God has given a Power of Action, but this; that God has given Power to the Soul, fometim^s at leaft, to excite Volitions at its Fleafure, or according as it chufes. And this certainly fuppofes, in all fuch Ca/e?,, a Clipice preceding all Volitions vvhich are ' ■ ' :- ■ .. thus -^€ Tbe/"^ Ez'o/Iom impertincm. Part:!!., tlius caufed, even the very firft of them : Which runs into <'he fore- mentioned great Abfurdity. Therefore the Aftivity of the Nature of the Soul affords r.o Jlelief from tiae Difficulties which the Notion of a Seif- idetermining Power in the Will is attended v/ith, nor will it help, in the leaft, its Abfurdities and Inconfiftences. Section V. lihewingy thai if the Things ajferted in thefe E'va^ fions fhould he Jnppojed to be true, they are al- together impertinent^ and cant help the Caufe of ArminiaB Liberty,- And how (this being the State of the Cafe) Arminian, IFriters are obliged to talk inconfifientJy, WHAT was laft Obferved in the preceding Seftion may fhew, not only that the aftive Nature of the Soul can't be a Reafon why any Act of the Will is, or why it is in this Manner, rather than another ; but alfo •that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that Volitions are contingent Events, in that Senfe, that their Being and Manner of Being is not fix'd or determined by any Caufe, or any Thing antecedent; it would not at all ferve the Pur- pofe of Arminians, to ellablifh the Freedom of the Will, ac- cording to their Notion of its Freedom, as ccnfifting in the Will's Determination of its Self; which fuppofes- every free Act of the Will to be determined by fome Act of the Will going before to determine it ; in as much as for t\\c Will to determine a Thing, is the fame as for the Soul to determine a Thing by Witling ; and there is no Way, that the Will can .determine an Act of the Will, tTian by ^willing that Act of she Will, or, which is the fame Thing, chufng it. So that jhere muft be two Acts of the Will in the Cafe, one going ?:^efore another, one converfant about the other, and the lat- •yf;r the Object of the former, and chofen by the former. If Sed:. V. Thefe Evafwns impertinent. ^i' If the Will don't caufe and' determine the Act by Choice, it don't caufe or determine it at all ; for that which is noe determined by Choice, is not determined voluntarily or <-jcilUngly : And to fay, that the Will determines fomething which the Soul don't determine willingly, is as much as to^- fay, that fomething is done by the Will, which the Soul^ don't do with its Will. So that if Arminian Liberty of Will, ccnlifting in the: Will's determining its own Acts, be maintained, the old Abfurdity and contradiction muft be maintained, that every ftee Act of Will is caufed and determined by a forej^oing free A.ct of W^ill : Which don't conlift with the free Act's arifmg without any Caule, and being fo contingent, as not to be fix'd by any Thing foregoing. So that this Evafion muft be given up, as not at all relieving, and as that which, inftead of fup- porting this Sort of Liberty, directly dettroys it. And if it Ihould be fuppofed, that the Soul determines its own Acts of Will fome other Way, than by a foregoing-. Act of Will ; ftill it will not help the Caufe of their Liberty of Will. If it determines them by an Act of the Undcr- ftanding, or fome other Pov/er, then the V/ill don't deter-- • mine itfelf ; and fo the Self-determining Power of the Will is giverv up. And what Lib'^rty is there exercifed,- according tc- their own Opinion of Liberty, by the Soul's being deter- mined by fomething bef:des its oivn - Choice ? The Acts o£" the Will, it is true, may be directed, and effecruaiiy deter- mined and fix'd ; but it is not done by the Soul's own Will and Pleafure : There is no Exercife at all of Choice or Will- in producing, the Effect : And if fp^ill and Choice are nor exercifed in it, ho'A^ is the Ldbertj of the WiU exercifed in it I So that let Armiraans tarn which Way they pleafe -with their Notion of Liberty, confiding in the Will's determining its own Ads, their Notion deftroys itfelf. If they hold every free Act of Will to be determined by the Soul's own free- Choice,- or foregoing free Act of Will; foregoing,' either in- the Order of Time, or Nature ; it implies that grofs Contra- diction, that the firft free Act belonging to the Affair, is de- termined by a free Act which is before it. Or if they fay- that the free Acts of the Will are determined by fome other Act of the Soul, and not an Act of Will or Choice, Thia alfo deftroys their Notion of Libert)^, confifting in the Acts of th« Will being determined by the Will itfelf: Or if 53 Arminians talk inconiiiiently. Part IL if ihe^ hold that the Afts of the Will are determined by Nothing at all that is pricr to them, but that they are contin- gent in that Senfe, .that they are determined and fixed by no Caufe at all ; this alfc deftroys their Notion of Lit^erty, con- fifting in the Will's determining its cwn Acts. This being the true ftate of the Arrzinia-t Notion of Li- berty, it hence comes to pafs, that the Writers that defend it are forced into grofs Inconfifter.ces, in what they fay upon this Subjeft. To inftance in Dr. Whitby ; he in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of. the V7ill, * oppcfes the Opicicn of the Calvinifts, who place Man's Liberty cnh in a Poiver cf dditig ivhat He nuilly as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet'he himfelf mentions the very fame Notion of Liberty, as the Dictate of the Serfe a-^id cormnon R'eafon of Mankind, and a Rule laid doivn by the Light of Nature ; viz. That Liberty is a Po'vjerof Atlingfrom our Sel'ves , or DOING WHAT" WE WILL.i This is indeed, as he fays, a Thing agreeable toiheSenfe and co.mmon Reajon of Mankind; and therefore 'tis not fo much to be wondered at, that he unawares acicnow- ledges it againR himfelf: For if Liberty don't confifl in this, what elfe can be devifed that it fhould confift in ? If it be faid, as Dr. Whitby elfewere infifts. That it don't only con- fift in Liberty of dnng ivhat lue ivill, but alfo a Liberty of willing without Neceifity ; ftill the Queftion returns, What does that Liberty bf willing without Neceffity confift in, but in a Power of willing as nxje plea/e, without being impeded by a contrary Neceffity ? or in other Words, A Liberty for the Soul in its willing to adl: according to its otvn Choice ? _ Yea, this A'ery Thing the fame Author feems to allow, and fap- pofe again and again, in the Ufe he makes of Sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his Vouchers. Thus he cites thefe Words of Origen, which he produces as a Teftimony on his Side ; |t The Soul aas By HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to 'whate'uer Part S HE W I L L, And thofe Words of Juftin; \ The DoSirine of the Chrijiians is this. That Nothing is done or fuffered according to Fate, but thai every Man doth Good or Ei?iifi.s have ; which he at llie fame Time conuemns, as agreeing with the Opinion of Ivir. Hobhes, namely, the Soul's Ailing iy its o'Uin Chnice, Men's doing Good or Eiiil according to their oivn free Choice, '■I heir being in that Exercije nx'hich proceeds from their o'wn free Choice, Halving it in their Choice to turn to Good or E'vil, and doing ivhat they ov///. So that if Men exercife this Liberty in the Ads of the Will themfelves, it miift be in exerting Aits ot" Will as they will, o.r accordit/g to their on.vn free Choice; or exerting Afts of Will that proceed fro7n their Choice. And if it be fo, then iet every one judge whether this don't fuppofe a free Choice going be- fore the free Act of Will, or whether an Ad of Choice don't go before that Ad of the Will -wYiich. proceeds from it. And if it be thus v>ith ail free Ads of the Will, then let every- one judge, v/hether it won't follow that there is a free Choice or Will going before the firft free Ad of the Will exerted in the Cafe. And then let every one judge, whether this be not a Contradidion. And finally, let every one judge v/hether in the Scheme of thefe Winters there be any PoJibility of avoiding thefe Abfurdities. If Liberty Confiftg, as Dr. Whitby himfelf fays, in a Man's ^oing nvhat He njoill ; and a Man exercifes this Liberty, not only in external Adions, but in the Ads of the Will them- felves ; then fo far as Liberty is 'e::ercifed in the latter, it Qoniilts in 'voilling aoocQ09caf the Idea, or View of the Thing chofen. And indeed it is impoffible to offer this Argument without overthrowing it ; the Thing fuppofed in it being inconfiftent with itfelf, and that which denies itfelf. To fuppofe the Will to aft at all in a State of perfeft Indifference, either to determine itfelf, or to do any Thing elfe, is to affert that the Mind chufes without chufing. To fay that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleafes, is to fay that it can follow its Plea- fure, when it has no Pleafure to follow. And therefore if there be any Difficulty in the Inftances of two Cakes, or twp Eggs, &c. which are exaftly alike, one as good asanofher; concerning which this Author fuj^pofes the Mind in Faft has a Choice, and fo in Effeft fuppofes that it has a Preftret/ce; it as much concern'd himfeif to folve the Difficulty, as it does^ thofe whom he oppofes : For if thefe Inllances prove any 55 Of the Will's deierminitfg Part II. any Thing to his Purpofe, they pro\-e that a I'vlan chufes without Choice. And yet this is not to his Purpofe ; be- caufe if this is what he afferts, his own Words are as muck againft him, and do as rrjuch contradidt him, as the Words .ot thofe he difputes againft can do. 2. Thsre is no great Difficulty in {hewing, in fuch Inftan- ces as are alledged, not only thai it miiji needs he fo, that the Mind muft be influenced in its Choice by fomething that has a preponderating Influence upon it, but alfo honx) it is fo, A little Attention to our own Experience, and a diftinft Confidcration cf the Ads of our Minds in fuch Cafes, •^\\\ be fuiHcieni: to clear up the Matter. Thus, fuppofing I ha^'c a Chefs-board before me ; and becaufe I am required by a Superiour, or defired by a Friend^ or to make forae Experiment concerning my own Ability and Liberty, or on fome other Confideration, I am detezmined to touch fome one cf the Spots or Squares on the Board with my Finger _; not being limited or direfted in the firft Propo- fal, or my own firll Purpofe, which is general, to any one in particular ; and there being nothing in the Squares in themfeives confldered, that recommends any one of all the- lixty-four, more than another : In this Cafe, my mind de- termines to give itfelf up to what is vulgarly called Accidtnt, \ by determining to touch that Square which happens to be moil in View, which my Ej-e is efpeciaUy upon at that Mo- ment, or which happens to be then moil in my Mind, or which I fhall be dircdtcd to by feme other fuch-like Accident, Here are feveral Steps of the Mind's proceeding (tho' all may be done as it were in a Moment) the firji Step is its general Determination that it will touch one of the Squares. The next Step is another general Determination to give itfelf up to Accident, in fome certain Way ; as to touch that which fhall be moH in the Eye or Mind at that Time, or to fome other fuch-like Accident. The third and laft Step is a f articular Determination to tojjch a certain individual Spot, €ven that Square, wliich, by that Sqrt of Accident the Mind has f I have elfewhere obferved what that is w4iich is vulgarly called Accident; That it is Nothing akin to \!i\t Armir.ian metaphyfical Notion of Contingence, fomething not connedled with any Thir,g foregoing; But that it is lomething that comes to pais in the Courfe of Things, in fome Affair that IVIen arc concerned JDj unforefeen, and net owiag to their Defigs. Sect. VI, in Things indifferent. 6a' has pitcl\ed upon, has aftually offered itfelf beyond others^ Now 'tis apparent that in none of thefs feveral Steps does the Mind proceed in abfolute Indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating Inducement. So it is in xhcjirji Step ; The Mind's general Determination to touch one of the fixty-four Spots : I'he Mind is not abfolutely in- different whether it does fo or no : It is induced to it, for the Sake of making fome Experiment, or by the Defire of a Friend, or fome other Motive that prevails. So it is in the fecnnd Step, The Mind's determining to give itfelf up to Accident, by touching that which fhall be moft in the Eye, or the Idea of which fhall be moft prevalent in the Mind, &c. The Mind is riot abfolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this Rule or no ; but chufes it, becaufe it appears at that Time a convenient and requifite Expedient in order to fulfil the general Purpofe aforefaid. And fo it is in the third and laft Step, Its determining to touch that indivi- dual Spot which actually does prevail in the Mlind's View« The Mind is not indifferent concerning this ; but is influ- enced by a prevailing Inducement and Reafon ; v/hich is, that this is a Profecution of the preceding Determination, which appeared requifite, and was fix'd before in the fecond Step. Accident will ever ferve a Man, without hinderin? him a Moment, in fuch a Cafe. It will always be fo amono- :i Number of Objedb in View, one will prevail in the Eye, or in Idea beyond others. When we have our Eyes open in the clear Sun-fhine, many Obje(fts ftrike the Eye at once, and mnumerable Images may be at once painted in it by the Rays of Light ; but the Attention of the Mind is not equal to feveral of them at once ; or if it be. It don't conti- nue fb for any Time. And fot it is v/ith Refpeft to the Ideas of the Mind in general : Several Ideas are not in equal Strength in the Mind's View and Notice at once ; or at leafl, don't remain io for any fenf;ble Continuance. There is nothing in the World more eonflantly varying, than the Ideas of the Mind : They don't remain preclfely in the fame State for the leail perceivable Space of Time; as is evident by this. That all perceivable Time is judged and perceived by the Mind only by the Succeflion or the fiic- cefuve Changes of its own Ideas. Therefore v/hile ths Views or Perceptions of the Mind remain prccifely in the fome State, there is no perceivable; Sp^ce OC Length of Time, becaufe no fenfiblc SuccefTion at alU 6 1 Of the- Will's determinw£, &c. Part IL As the Adls of the Will, in each Step of the fore-men^ tioned Procedure, don't come to pafs without a particular Gaufe, every Aft is owing to a prevailing Inducement ; fo the Accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unfearchable Courfe of Things, to which the Mind yields itfelf, and by which it is guided, is not any Thing that comes to pafs without a Caufe ; and the Mind in de- termining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething that has no Caufe ; any more than if it determmed to be guided by a Lot, or the calling of a Die. For tho' the Die's falling in fuch a Manner be accidental to him that caits it, yet none will luppofe that there is no Caufe why it falls as it does. The involuntary Changes in the Succeflion of our Ideas, tho' the Caufe may not be obferved, have as much a Caufe, as the changeable Motions of the Motes that float in the Air, or the continual, infinitely various, fuccefiive Changes of the Unevenneffes on the Surface of the Water. __ There are two Things efpecially, which are probably the Occalions of Confufion in the Minds of them who infill up- on it, that the Will afts in a proper Indifference, and without being moved by any Inducement, in its Determinations in fuch Cafes as have been mentioned. I. They feem to miftake the Point in Queftlon, or at leaft not to keep it diftinftly in View. The Queilion they difpute about, is. Whether the Mind be indifferent about the ObjeSis prefented, one of which is to be taken, touch'd, pointed to, &c. as two Eggs, two Cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the Queftion to be confidered, is. Whether the Perfon be indifferent with Refr-^Tt to his own Anions ; whe- ther he don't, on feme ~'onf leration or other, prefer one Aft with Refpeft to l.. " Objefts before another. The Mind in its Determination and Choice, in thefe Cafes, is not moft immediately and direftly converfant about the ObjeSs prefented; but the Ads to be done concerning thefe Ob- jefts. The Objefts may appear equal, and the Mind may never properly make any Choice between them : But the next Aft of the Will being about the external Aftions to he performed. Taking, Touching, &:c. thefe may iiot ap- pear equal, and one Aftion may properly be chofen before another. In each Step of the Mind's Progrefs, the Deter- mination is not about the Objefts, unlefs indireftly and im- properly, but about the Aftions, which it chufes for other Reafons than any Preference of the Objects, and for Reafons not taken at all from the Objefts,' There Sedl. VI. Ofchufing in Things indifferent. 62 There is no Neceffity of fuppofing, that the Mind does ever at all properly chufe one of the Objefls before ano- ther; either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the Man chufes to iake or touch one rather than another ; but not becaufe he chufes xht Thing taken, or touch'd; but trom foreign Confiderations, The Cafe may be fo, that of two Things offered, a Man may, for certain Reafons, chufe and prefer the taking of that which he underijalues, and chufe to neglect to take that which his Mind prefers. In fuch a Cafe, chufing the Thing taken, and chufing to take, are diverfe : and fo they are in a Cafe where the Things prefented are equal in the Mind's Efteem, and neither of them preferred. All that Fact and Experience makes evi- dent, is, that the Mind chufes one Action rather than ano- ther : And thersfore the Arguments which they btirig, in order to be to their Purpofe, ought to be to prove that the Mind chufes the Action in perfect Indifference, with Refpect to that Adion ; and not to prove that tlie Mind chufes the Action in perfect Indifference with Refpect to the Qhjed ; which is very poffible, and yet the Will not act at all with- out prevalent Inducement;, and proper Preponderation. 2. Another Reaion of Confufion and Difficulty in this Matter, feems to be, not diilinguiiliing between a general Indifference, or an Indifference with Refpect to what is to be done in a more diflant and general View of it, and a -par- ticular Indifference, or an Indifference with Refpect to the next immediate Act, view'd with its particular and prefent Circumftances. A Man may be perfectly indifferent with Refpect to his own Actions, in the former Refpect ; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing Inflance of touch- ing one of the Squares of a Chefs-board ; when 'tis firft propofed that I fliould touch one of them, I may be per- fectly indifferent v/hich I touch ; becaufe as yet I view the Matter remotely and generally, being but in the firft Step of the Mind's Progrefs in the Affair : But yet, when I am actually come to the laft Step, and the very next Thing to be determined is, which is to be touch'd, having already- determined that I will touch that which happens to be moft in my Eye or Mind, and my Mind being now fix'd on a particular one, the Act of touching that, confidered thus immediately, and in thefe particular prefent Circumftances, is not what my Mind is abfolutely indifferent about. . ^;^ 339CMeoa9<303e;e39COgpClge9eg09C>99gogeso.S2'939cgg;o99oog9SP3MC0990ao9C3aosoa«ea9ao.i^ K S E C T X O K 63 Of Ltherty of Indifference; I'art If .- Section VII. Concerhlng the Notion of Liberty of Will corfifting in Indifference. 'TX7HAT has been faid in the foregoing Seftrori, has: V V a Tendency in fome Meafure to evince the Abfur- dity of the Opinion of fuch as place Liberty in Indifte- rence, or in that Equilibrium whereby the Will is without ail antecedent Determination or Bias, and left hitherto free from any prepoiTeffmg Inclination to one Side or the other ; that the Determination of the Will to either Side .Tiay be entirely from itfclf, and that it may be owing only to its- own Power, and that Sovereignty which it has over itfelf,- that it goes this Way rather than that. || But in as much as this has been cf fuch long Handing, and has been fo generally received, and fo much infifted on by Pelagians, Semi-Felagians, "Jefuits, Sociytian^, Arminians , and' Others, it may deferve a more full Confideration. And therefore I (hall now proceed to a more particular and tho- rough Inquiry into this Notion. Now \ Dr. Whitby, and fonie other Armiriinns, make a Dlllin39a9cao6oi33aco90ooooo^^ Section IX. Of the Connexion of the A^s of the Will with the Dilates of the Underftandmor. IT is manifeft, that the A6Is of the Will are none of them contingent in- fuch a Senle as to be without all Neceflity, or fo as not to be neceflary with a Neceflity of Confequence and Connexion ; becaufe every Adl of the Will is fome Way conneded with the Underftanding, and is as the greateft apparent Good is, in the Manner which has already been explained; namely, that the Soul always wills or chufes that which, in the prefent View of the Mind, confidered in the Whole of that View, and all that belongs to it, appears moft agreeable. Becaufe, as was obferved be- fore, Nothing is more evident than that, when Men ad vo- luntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they do what ap- pears moft agreeable to them j and to % otherwife, would. be 77 Of the Connexion of the Will Part IL- be as much as to affirm, that Men don't chufe what ap- pears to fuit them beft, or what feeras moft pleafing to them; or that they don't chufe what they prefer: Which brings the Matter to a Contradidion. As 'tis very evident in itfelf, that the Atls of the Will have feme ConiieiSion with the Diftates or Views of the Underftanding, fo this is allowed by feme of the chief of the Arminian Writprs, particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, tlio' a great Enemy to the Doftrine of Neceffity, allows the fame Thing. In his Chrijiian Philofophy, (P. 196,) He with much Approbation cites another Philofopher, as of the fame Mind, in thefe Words : " No Man, (fays an excellent Philofopher) fets *' himfelf about any Thing, but upon fome View or other, " which ferves him* for a Reafon for what he does; and ** whatfoever Faculties he employs, the Underftanding, with " fuch Light as it has, well or ill informed, conftantly ** leads ; and by that Light, true or falfe, all her operative " Powers are direfted. The Will itfelf, how abfolute and *' incontrolable foever it may be thought, never fails iri '* its Obedience to the Dictates of the Underftanding. '* Temples have their facred Images; and we fee what In- " fluence they have always had over a great Part of Mar^- " kind ; But in Truth, the Ideas and Images in Men's ** Minds arc the invifible Powers that conftantly govern " them ; and to thefe they all pay univerfally a ready Sub- " miiTion." But v.'hether this be in a juft Confiftence with Themfelves, and their own Notions of Liberty, I defire may now be im- partially confidered. Dr. Whitby plainly fuppofes, that the Afts and Determina- tions of the Will always follow the Undcrftanding's Appre- henfion or View of the greateft Good to be obtain'd, or Evil to be avoided ; or in other Words, that the Determinations of the Will conftantly and infallibly follow thefe two Things in the Underftanding : i. The Degree of Good to be obtained, and Evil to be avoided, propofed to the Underftanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken Notice of by it. ■2. The Degree of the Underftanding s Vienjj, Notice or Appre- henfion of that Good or Evil ; which is increafed by Atten- tion and Confideration. That this is an Opinion he is ex-> ceeding peremptory in, (as he is in every Opinion which he maintains in his Controverfy with the Cahnnijls) with Dif- dain Sect. IX. ziLV'/i' /i'i' Underftanding. ^g dain of the contrary Opinion, as abfurd and Self-contra-. dictory, will - appear by tha Ibiiowing Words of his, in his Difcourfe on the rive Points. * •< Now, 'tis certain, that what naturally makes the Un- *•' derllaiidxng to perceive, is Evidence propofed, and appre- " hendcd, confidered or adverted to: for Nothing elfe caa *' be requilite to maice us come to the Knowledge of the *' Truth. -Again, what makes the Will chufe, is fome- " thing approved by the Underftanding ; and confequently " appearing to the Soul as Good. And whatfoever it re- ** fufeth, is fomething. reprefented by the Underftanding, " and fo appearing to the Will, as Evil. Whence all that " God requires of us is, and can be only this ; to refufe the " Evil, and chufe the Good. Wherefore, to fay that Evi- " dence propofed, apprehended and confidered, is not fufR- " cient to make the Underltanding approve; or that the «' greateft Good propofed, the greateit'£vil threatned, whea *' equally belie v'd and refleded on, is not fuficient to ,cn- *' gage the Will to chufe the Good and refufe the Evil, is ** in EfTeft to fay, that 'which alone doth mo-ve the H ill to chufe. *« or to refufe, is net fufficient to engage it fo to do ; v/hich " being contradictory to itfelf, muft of Necedity be falfe- " Be it then fo, that we naturally have an Averfation to ** the Truths propofed to us in the Gofpel ; that only caa ** make us indifpofed to attend to them, but cannot hinder <* our Conviftion, when we do apprehend them, and attend " to them.— Be it, that there is in us alfo a Renitency to *' the Good we are to chufe ; that only can indifpofe us to " believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefeft Good. Be '*« it, that we are prone to the Evil that we Ihould decline; " that only can render it the more difficult for us to be- " lieve it is the worft of Evils. But yet, nuhat ave do really ' ' helie'oe to be our chiepji Good, luillfiill be chef en ; and luhat tvs " apprehend to be the ivorji of E'vils, n^vill, ixihilfi nue do continue '* under that Convitiion, be rcfufed by us. It therefore can be " only requifite, in order to thefe Er.Js, that the Good Spi- ** rit (hould fo illuminate our Underftandings, that we at- ** tending to, and confidering what lies before us, fhould *' apprehend, and be convinced cf our Duty ; and that the *' Bleffmgs of the Gofpel flrould be fo propounded to us, as *' that we may difcern them to be our chiefeft Good ; and ** the Miferies it thrcateneth, fo as we may be convinced «' they are the worft of Evils ; that vve may chufe the one, «« and refufe the other." M Her« • Edit. 2d. P. an, 213, 2J3, 79* Of the Connedlion of the Will Part lE Here let it be obferved, how plainly and peremptorily it is afierted, that the great efi Good propofed, and the greatcji Evil threatened, nvhen equally belUn:ed and refleded ott, is Jufficicnt to" mgage the Will to chafe the Good, avd refnfe the E'vil, and is that alone nvhich dyih mo^e the Will to chuj'e or to rcfufe ; and that it is contradiSlory to it/elf, to ffppij'e othertvijt; and therefore mufi of Necef^ty be falfe ; and then njuhat vJe do really belienje to be our chief- efi Good nvill fill be chofen, and nvhat nue apprehend to be the nvorji cf Evils, 'willy'whilji nve continue under that Con'viBion, be refufed by us. Nothing could have been faid more to the Purpofe, fully to fignify and declare, that the Determinations of the Will mufI: evermore follow the' Illumination, Conviftion and' Notice of the Underilanding, with Regard to the greatelt Good and Evi! propofed, reckoning both the Degree of Good and Evil underftood, and the Degree of Underftand- ^^vi^. Notice and Conviftion of tliat propofed Good and Evil ; and that it is thus neceflarilv, arid can be otherwife in no In- flance : becaufe it is afllerted, that it implies a Contradidion, to fuppofe it ever to be otherwiffe. I am. fenfibie, the Doftor's Aim in thefe Aflertions is againll' the Cal^lnifs; to fhew, in Oppofition to them, that there is no Need of any phyfical Operation of the Spirit of God on die Will, to change and determine that to a good Choice, but that God's Operation and Affiftance is only morali fuggefting Ideas to the Undcrftanding ; which he fuppofes to he enough, if thofe Ideas are attended to, infallibly to ob- tain the End. Bat whatever his Defign was. Nothing can more direcHy and fully prove, that every Determination of the Will, in chufing and refufing, isneceffary; direftly con- trary to his own Notion of the Liberty of the Will. For if th6 Determination of the Will, evermore, in this Manner, follows the Light, Conviftion and View of the Underftand- ing, concerning the greateft good and Evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a Contradi«5tion to' fuppofe otherwife ; then it is nereffarily fo, the Will neceffarily follows this Light or View of the Underftanding, not only- in fome of its Afts, but in every Afl of chufing and refu- lino-. So that the Will don't determine itfelf in any one of its own Afts; but all its Ads, every Aft of Choice and Re-' fufal, depends on, and is neceflarily conneded with fome an- tecedent Caufe ; which Caufe is not the Will itfelf, nor any A^ of its own, nor any Thing pertaining to that Faculty, but fomething belonging to another Faculty, whofe Afts go before the Will, in all its Ad?, and govern and determine; lierii- everj? one, Here, Sedi:. IX. . with, the Undcrftanding. g© Here, if it fhould be replied, that altho' it be true, thtt according to the Doftor, the final Determination of the "Wiii always depends upon, and is infallibly connected v/ith the Underftanding s Conviftion, and Notice of the greateil Good ; yet the Afts of the Will are not neceflary ; becauie that Convidion -and Notice of the Underftanding is firft de- pendent on a pi;ecediu^ Aft of the Vv'ill, in determining to 'attend to, and take Notice of the Evidence exhibited ; by which Means the Mind obtains that Degree of Convidioa which is fufficient and effeftual to determine the confcquent .and ultimate Choice of the "Will ; and that the Will with Regard to that preceding hOt, whereby it determines whe- ther to attend or no, is not neceflary ; and that in this, the Xiberty of the Will connfts, that when God holds forth Sufficient objeftive Light, the Will is at Liberty whether to command the attention of the Mind to it. Nothing can be more weak and inconfiderate than fuch a "Reply as this. For that preceding Aft; of the Will, in de>- ' terrr.ining to attend and conlider, ftill is as an .4d of the Will, (it is fo to be lure, if the Liberty of the Will conlifts in it, as is fuppofed) and if it be an Aft of the Will, it is an Act of Choice or Refiifal : And therefore, if what the Doctor afferts be true, it is determined by fome antecedent Light in the Underftanding concerning the greateft apparent Good or Evil. For he alTerts, it is that Light nvhich alone doth move the Will to chufe or rcfufe : And therefore the Will muft be moved by that in chuiing to attend to the objective Light offered, in primer to another confequent Act cf Choice ; fo that this Act is no lefs neceflary than the other. And if we fuppofe ano- ther Act of the Will, ftill preceding both thefe mention'd, to determine both, ftill that alfo muft be an Act of the Will, and an Act of Choice : and fo muft, by the fame Principles, be infallibly determin'd by fome certain Degree of Ligbtin the Underftanding concerning the greateft Good. And let us fup.pQfe as many Acts of the Will, one preceding another, as we pleafe, yet they are every one of them neceffarily determined by a cer- tain Degree of Light in the Underftanding, concerning the greateft and moft eligible Good in that Cafe ; and fo, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby ^ Notion of Free- dom. And if it be faid, the Reafon why Men don't attend to Light held forth, is becaufe of ill Habits contracted by ^vil Acts committed before, v/hereby their Minds are in- difpofed to attend to, and conlider of the Truth held forth M 3 tok Si Of the Conneaion of the Will Part IL, to them by God, the Dffieulty is not at all avoided : ftiU the Queftion returns, What determined the Will in thofe preceding evil Afts ? It muft, by Dr. Whithj'i Principles, Itill be the View of the Underftanding concerning the greateft Good and Evil. If this View of the Underftanding be that alone nvhich doth mo^oe the Will to chuj'e or rcfufe, as the Doftor afferts, then every Acl: of Choke or Rrfiijat, from a Man's firft Exiftence, is moved and determined by this View i and this View of the Underlianding exciting and governing the Aft, muft be before the Ae Underftanding. 82 jion has Opportunity to determine any Thing. It 13 itfelf the very Rife and Exiilence of Volition. But a Thino-, af- ter it exifts, has no Opportunity to determine as to its own Exiilence ; it is too late for that. If Liberty confifts in that winch JrTniniaus fuppofe, fviz, in the Will's determining its own Afts, having free Oppor- tunity, and being without all Necsirity ; This is the fame as to fay, that Liberty confilb in the Soul's having Power jmd Opportunity to have what Determinations of the Will it pleafcs or chufes. And if the Determinations of the Will, and the laft Dictates of the Underftanding be the fame Thing, then Liberty conf.fts in the Mind's having Power to have what Dictates of the Underftanding it pieafes, having/ Opportunity to chufe its own Dictates of Underftanding. But this is abfurd ; for it is to make the Determination of Choice prior to the Didate of Underftanding, and the Ground of it; which can't confift with the Dictate of Un« derftanding's being the Determination of Choice itfelf. Here is no Way to do in this Cafe, but only to recur to the old Abfurdity, of one Determination before another, and the Caufe of it ; and another before that, determining that ; and {o on i/i ififinitum. If the laft Dictate of the Un- derftanding be the Determination of the Will itfelf, and the Soul be free with Regard to that Dictate, in the Jrminian Notion of Freedom ; then the Soul, before that Dictate of its Underftanding exifts, voluntarily and accordino- to its own Choice determines, in every Cafe, v.hat that Dictate of the Underftanding (hall be ; otherwife that Dictate, as to the Will, is i:aceflary ; and the Acts determined by it, muft alfo be neceffary. So that here is a Determination of the Mind prior to that Dictate of the Underftanding, an Act of Choice going before it, chufing and determining what that Dictate of the Underftanding ihall be : and this precediiig Act of Choice, being a free Act of V/ill, muft alio be the fame with another laft Dictate of the Undcrftandino- : And if the mind alfo be free in that Dictate of Underftanding, that muft be determined ftill by another ; and fo on forever, BefidcE, if the Dictate of the Underftanding, and' Dcr termination of the WiH be the fame, this confounds the Un- derftanding and Will, and makes them' the fame. Whether they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute; but only ^veuld obferve, that if it be fo, and the Arminia?: Notion of Liberty ,«3 0/"//^^ Connedlion of the Will, Szc. - Part li. Liberty confifts in a Self-determining Power in the Under- ./landing, free of all Necefiity; being independent, unde- termined by any Thing prior to its own Adts and Determi- nations ; and the more the Underftanding is thus indepen- dent, and fovereign over its own Determinations, the more free. By this therefore the Freedom of the Soiil, as a moral Agent, muft confift in the Independence of the Underftand- ing on any Evidence or Appearance of Things, or any Thing whatfcever that ftands forth to the View of the Mind^ prior to the Underftandiag's Determination. And what a Sort of Liberty is this ! confifling in an Ability, Freedom and Eafinefs ot judging, either according to Evidence, or a- gainft it ; having a fovereign Command over itfelf at all Times, to judge, either agreeably or difagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own View. Certainly, 'tis no Li- berty that renders Perfons the proper Subjedts of perfwafive Keafoning, Arguments, Expoftulations, and fuch-like moral Means and Inducements. The Ufe of which with Manicind, is a main Argument of the Armhnans, to defend their Notion. of Liberty without all Neceflity. For according to this, the more free Men are, the lefs they are under the Govern- ment of fuch Means, lefs fubjeft to the Power of Evidence and Reafon, and more independent on their Influence, in theif Determinations, And wliether the Underftanding and Will are the fame or no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe, yet, in order to maintain the Arminian Notion of Liberty without Neceflity, the free Will is not determined by the Underftanding, nor necefliirily connefted with the Underftanding; and the further from fuch Cormeftion, the greater the Freedom. And when the Liberty is full and complete, the Determinations of the Will have no Connexion at all with the Dictates of the Underftanding. And if fo, in vain are all Applications to the Underftanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous Act ; and fo in vain are all Inftructions, Counfels, Invitati- ons, Expoftulations, and all Arguments and Perfwafives what- foever : For thefe are but Applications to the Underftanding, and a clear and lively Exhibition of the Objects ot Choice to the Mind's View. But if, after all, the Will muft be felf-de- termined, and independent on the Underftanding, to what Pur- pofe are Things thus reprefented to the Underftanding, in orde? tp determine the Choice ? «^ooco9oeo<)0(»oc«o«coosocogccogceoscoMoc(><^e*occoooopcoce«cK«o«««o«ooeauooo<)cooooo^ Section. Sed.X. A^s of the Will connecJred with Motives. %'' Section X. Vdiiion necejfarily conneEfed with the Injj-uence of ■ Motives ; with partiailar Ohjervations on ths great Incof7ji(ience of Mr. Chubb' j Affert ions and ReafoningSy about the Freedom of the IVill. THAT every Ad of the Will has fome Caufe, and confequently (by what has been already provedj has-" a neceflary Connexion with its Caufe, and fo is ne- ceffary by a Neceffity of Connexion and Gonfequence, is evident by this, That every Aft of the Will whatfoever, is excited by fome Motive : Which is mamfeft, becaafe, if rhe Will or Mind, in willing and chufing after the Manner that it does, is excited fo to do by no Motive or Inducement, then it has no End which it propofes to itfelf, or purfiies in fo doing; it aims at Nothing, and feeks Nothing. And if it feeks Nothing, then it don't go after any Thing, or ex- ert any Inclination or Prsference towards any Thing ; which ■ brings the Matter toa Contradiftion : Becaufe for the Mind to' will Something, and for it to go after Something by an Ad of Preference and Inclination, are the fame Thing. But if every Aft of the Will is excited by a Motive, th'ea-. that Motive is the Caufe of the Aft of the Will. If the A^^s of the Will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the Caufes of their being excited ; or, which is the fame Things the Caufe of their being put forth into Aft andExiftence. And if fo, the Exiftence of tlie Afts of the Will is properly the Ef- feft of their Motives. Motives do Nothing as Motives or In- ducements, but by their Influence ; and fo much as is done by their Influence, is the EfFeft of them. For that is the Notion of an EfFeft, fomething that is brought to pafs by the InSuenee of another Thing. And if Volitions are properly the EfFefts of their Motives, - then they are neceffarily connefted with their Motives. Every EfFeft and Event being, as was proved before, neceffarily connefted with that which is the proper Ground and Reaforj- of its Exillence, Thus it is manifdt, that Volition. is ne- ceflary,. S^ uiasDfiheV^illconne^lediijithMoiivts. Parr. IL ceflary, and is not from any Self-determining Power In the Will : The Volition \vhich is cauied by previous Motive and Inducement, is not cauied by the Will exercifing a fovereigit Power over itfelf, to determine, caufe and excite Volitions in itfelf. This is not coniiflent with the Will's acting in a State of Indifference and Equilibrium, to determine itfelf to a Preference; for the Way in which Motives operate, is by biaffing the Will, and giving it a (^rtain Inclination or Pre- V onderaticn one Way. Here it may be proper to obferve, that Mr. Chubb, in his Collection of Tracts on various Subjefts, has advanced a Scheme of Liberty, which is greatly divided againft itfelf^ ^nd thoroughly fubverfive of itfelf j and that many Ways. I. He is abundant in averting, that the Will, in all its Adls, is iniiuenced by I'vlotive and Excitement ; and that this is the pre'vious Ground and Reafon of all its Ai^s, and that it is never otherwife in any Inftance. He fays, (P; 262.) iV(3 A^iojz can take place tvithout fame Moti've to excite it. And inT. 263. Volition cannot take place miithoiufome PREVIOUS Rea- Jcn or Moti've to induce it. And in P. 3 1 Oi /jBion nuould ?iot take Place 'without fome Ren/on or Moti've to induce it ; it being abjurd to /uppo/cy that the adi've Faculty 4» '^'iS> '^^^' ^^^' ^^3> ^64. And yet at the fame Time, by his. Scheme, the Influence of Motives upon lis to excite to Action, and to be actually a Ground of Volition, is confequerit en the Volition or Choice of the Mind. For he very greatly infiils upon it, that in all free Actions, before the Mind is the Subject of thofe Volitions which Motives' excite, it cl^ufes to be fo. It chufes whether it will comply with the Motive, which prefents itfelt in View, or not ; and when various Motives are prefented, it chufes which it will . yield to, and which it will reject. So P. 256. Emery Man has Poivcr to aS, or to refrain from aBing agreeably 'vnth, or contrary to, any Moti-zie that prefents. P. 2^7. E-very Matt is at Liberty to aJi, or refrain from ailing agreeably 'withy or contrary to, ivhat each of thefe Moti-jes, confederedfingly, pre^vioujly in'vite, induce, excite and dijpofe the Mind io ABion. This implies, that they have fomething in them- felves that is in-viting, fome Tendency to induce and difpofe to Volition, previous to Volition itfelf. And if they have in themfelves this Nature and Tendency, doubtlefs they have it in certain limited Degrees, which are capable of Diver- fity ; and fome have it in greater Degrees, others in lefs ; and they that have moft of this Tendency, confidered with all their Nature and Circumftances, previous to Volition, they are the ftrongeft Motives ; and thofe that have leaft, are the weakeft Motives. Now if Volition fometimes don't follow the Motive v;hich IS ftrongeft, or has moft previous Tendency or Advantage, all Things confidered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakeft, or that which as it ftands previoufly in the Mind's View, has leaft Tendency to induce it ; herein the Will ap- parently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous P-cafon to difpofe the Mind to it, contrary to what the lame Author Sed. X. Scheme of Liberty, &c, ^o Author fuppofes. The Aft wherein the Will mud proceed without previous Motive to induce it, is the Ad of prefer- ring the weakeft Motive. For how abfurd is it to fay. The Mind fees previous Reafon in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other ; and at the fame Time to fuppofe, that there is Nothing in the Motive, in its Nature, State, or any Circumftances of it vvhatfoever, as it ftands in the pre- vious View of the Mind, that gives it any Preference ; but on the contrary, the other Motive that ftands in Competition with it, in all thefe Pvcfpefts, has nicft belonging to it, that is inviting and moving, and has moft of a Tendency to Choice and Preference ? This is certainly as much as to fay, there is previous Ground and P..eafon in the Motive for the Aft of Preference, and yet no previous Reafon for it. By the Suppofition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives which tends to Preference, previous to the Aft of Preference, it is not in that which is prefer'd, but wholly in the other : becaufe appearing fuperiour Strength, and all appearing Pre- fcrablenefs is in that ; and yet Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Aft of Preference is from pre'v'wns Grou7td and Reafon in the Motive which is preferred. But are thefe Things confiftent ? Can there be previous Ground in a Thing for an Event that takes Place, and yet no previous Tendency in it to that Event ? If one Thing follows another, without any previ- ous Tendency to its following, then I (hould think it very plain, that it follows it without any Manner of previous Rea- fon why it fhould follow. Yea, in this Cafe, Mr. Chubb fuppofes, that the Event follows an Antecedent or a previous Thing, as the Ground of its Exiftence, not only that has no Tettdency to it, but a contrary Tendency. The Event is the Preference which the Mind gives to that Motive which is weaker, as it ftands in the previous View of the Mind ; the immediate Antecedent is the View the Mind has of the two rival Motives ccn- ■^unftly ; in which previous View of the Mind, all the P/e- ferablenefs, or previous Tendency to Preference, is fuppofed . to be on the other Side, or in the contrary Motive ; and all the Unworthinefs of Preference, and fo previous Tendency to Comparitive Negleft, Rejeftion or Undervaluing, is oa that Side which is prefer'd : And yet in this View of the Mind is fuppofed to he, t\\t previous Ground or Reafon of this Aft of Preference, exciting it, and d/fpojing the Mind to it : Which, I leave the Reader to judge, whether it be abfurd' 9r not, If it be not, then it is not abfurd to fay, that th^ previous ^i Inconfifience of Mr. Chuhh's Part II. previous Tendency of an Antecedent to a Confequent, is the Ground and Reafon why that Confequent does not follow ; and the Want of a previous Tendency to an Event, yea, a Tendency to the Contrary, is the true Ground and Reafon why that Event does follow. An Aft of Choice or Preference is a comparative Aft, ■wherein the JVIind afts with Reference to two or more Things that are compared, and ftand in Competition in the Mind's View. If the Mind, In this comparative Aft, prefers that which appears inferiour in the Comparifon^ then the Mind herein afts abfolutely without Motive, or Inducement, or any Temptatiou whatfoevcr. Then, if a hungry Man has the Offer of two Sorts of Food, both which he finds an Ap- petite to, but has a ftronger Appetite to one than the other ; and there be no Circumftances or Excitements whatfoever in the Cafe to induce him to take either one or the other, but merely his Appetite : If in the Choice he makes between them, he chufes that which he has leaft Appetite to, and xefufes that to which he has the ftrongeft Appetite, this is a Choice made abfolutely without previous Motive, Excite- ment, Reafon or Temptation, as much as if he were perfeftly without all Appetite to either : Becaufe his Volition in this Cafe is a comparative Aft, attending and following a comparative View of the Food which he chufes, viewing it as related to, and compared with the other Sort of Food, in which View his Preference has abfolutely no previous Ground, yea, is againft all previous Ground and Motive. And if there be any Principle in Man from whence an Aft of Choice may arife after this Manner, from the fame -principle Volition may arife wholly without Motive on ei- ther Side. If the Mind in its Volition can go beyond Mo- tive, then it can go without Motive : for when it is be- yond the Motive, it is out of the Reach of the Motive, out of the Limits of its Influence, and fo without Motive. Jf Volition goes beyond the Strengtli and Tendency of Mo- tive, and efpecially if it goes againft its Tendency, this demonft rates the Independence of Volition or Motive. And if fo, no Reafon can be given for what Mr. Chubb fo often af- ferts, even that in the Nature of Things Folition cannot take Flace -without a Moti-ve to induce it. If the moft High fhould endow a Balance with Agency or Aftivity of Nature, In fuch a Manner, that when une- qual Weights are put into the Scales, its Agency could enable Se(5t. X. Schejne of Liberty, &c. 92 it tc caufe that Scale to defcend which has the leaft Weight, snd fo to raife the greater Weight ; this would clearly de- monftrate, that the Motion of the Balance does not depend on Weights in the Scales, at leaft as much, as if the Ba- lance fhould move itfelf, when there is no Weight in ei- ther Scale, And the Aftivity of the Balance which is fufficient to move itfelf againft the greater Weight, muft cer- tainly be more than fufficient to move it when there is na Weight at all. Mr. Chubb fuppofes, tjiat the Will can't ftir at all without" fbme Motive ; and alfo fuppofes, that if there be a Motive to one Thing, and none to the contrary. Volition will in- fallibly follow that Motive. This is virtually to fuppofe an entire Dependence of the Will on Motives : If it were not wholly dependent on them, it could furely help itfelf a little without them, or help itfelf a little againft a Motive, with- out help from the Strength and Weight of a contrary Mo- tive. And yet his fuppofing that the Will, when it has be- fore it various cppofitc Motives, can ufe them as it pleafes,, and chule its own Influence from them, and negleft the ftrongeft, and follow the weakeft, fuppofes it to be wholly in- dependent on Motives. It further appears, on Mr. Chubb'i Suppofition, that Vo- lition muft be without any previous Ground in any Motive, thus : If it be as he fuppofes, that the Will is not deter- mined by any previous fuperiour Strength of the Motive^ but determines and chufes its own Motive, then, when the rival Motive are exadly equal in Strength and Tendency to induce, in all Refpefts, it may follow either ; and may in fuch a Cafe, fometimes follow one, fometimes the other. And if fo, this Diverfity which appears between the Adis of the Will, is plainly without previous Ground in either of the Motives ; for all that is previouily in the Motives, is fuppofed precifely and perfedly the fame, without any Di- verfity whatfoever. Now perfeft Identity, as to all that is previous in the Antecedent, can't be the Ground and Rea- fon of Diverfity in the Confequent. Perfeft Identity in the Ground can't be a Reafon why it is not followed with the fame Confequence : And therefore the Source of this Diverfity of Confequence muft be fought for elfewhere. And laftly, it may be obferved, that however Mr, Chub& does much infift that no Volition can take Place without feme 93 Jnconjifience of Mr. ChubbV Part IL Ibme Motive to induce it, which previoufly difpofes the- Mind to it ; yet, as he alfo infilts that the Mind without Reference to any previous fuperiour Strength of Motives, picks and chufes for its Motive to follow ; He himfelf here- in plainly fuppofes, that with Regard to the Mind's Prefe- rence of one Motive before another, it is not the Motive that difpofes the Will, but the Vv'ill difpofes itfelf to follow the Motive. IV. Mr. Chubb fuppofes Necftffity to be utterly inconlifl- e-nt with Agency ; and that to fuppofe a Being to at an Agent in that which is neceifary, is a plain Contradiftion. P. 311, and throughout his Difcourf<;s on the Subject of Liberty, he fuppofes, that Neceffity cannot confift with Agency or Freedom; and that to fuppofe otherwife, is to make Liberty and Ne- ceffity, Aftion and Paffion, the fame Thing. And fo he feems to fuppofe, that there is no Action flriftly fpeaking, but Volition ; and that as to the Effefts of Volition in Body or Mind, in themfelves confidered, being neceifary, they are faid to be free, only as they are the Effeds of an Aft that is noj_ neceifary. And yet, according to him. Volition itfelf is the EfeS of Volition ; yea, every A(ft of free Volition : and therefore every Aft of free Volition muft, by what has now been ob- ferved from Him, be neceffary. That every Aft of free Volition is itfelf the EfFeft of Volition, is abundantly fup- pofed by Him. In P. 341, he fays, " If a Man is fuch a *' Creature as I have above proved him to be, that is, if he " has in him a Power or Liberty of doing either Good or " Evil, and either of thefe is the Subjeft of his own free " Choice, fo that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, " have CHOSEN and done the contrary." Here He fup- pofes, all that is Good or Evil in Man is the Effeft of his Choice ; and fo that his good or evil Choice itfelf is the FfFeft of his Pleafure or Choice, in thefe Words, He might if he had PLEASED, ha^ue CHOSEN the contrary. So in P. 3 ^6, " Tho' it be highly reafonable, that a Man fhould always •' chufe the greater Good, yet he may, if he PLEASES, ♦' CHUSE otherwife." Which is the fame Thing as if he had faid. He may, if he chufes, chufe others-wife. And then he goes on, " — that is, he may, if he pleafes, chufe what is good for himfelf," &c. And again, in the fame Page, " The •' Will is not confined by the Underftanding to any parti- *' cular Sort of Goodj whether greater or lefs i but is at « Liberty Se(5l. X. Scheme 'of Liberty ^ &c. 04 "" Liberty to chufe what Kind of Good it pleafes." If there be any Meaning in thefe lall Words, the Meaning mull b* t:his, that the Will is at Liberty to chife end thy Servants, IKNOfVthatyenfjill ■not fear the Lord. See alfo Chap. xi. 9. The moral Con- duft of foftahy by Name, in his zealoufly exerting himfelf in Oppoiicion to Idolatry, in pi^ticular Ads of his, was foretold abov^ Sed. XI. the Volit tons of moral Agents, lOo above three Hundred Years before he was bom, and th« Prophecy feal'd by a Miracle, and renewed and confirm- ed by th* Words of a fecond Prophet, as what furely would. not fail, I Kings xiii. i, — 6, 52. This Prophecy was alfo in EfFed a Prediftion of the moral Conduft of the People, in upholding their Schifmatical and Idolatrous Worftiip 'till that Time, and the Idolatry of thofe Priefts of the high Places, which it is foretold Jojiah Ihould offer upon that Altar of Bethel. — Micaiah foretold the foolifh and fiiiful Con- dudl of Ahab, in refufing to hearken to the Word of the; Lord by him, and chufing rather to hearken to the falfc Prophets, in going to Ramoth-Gilead to his Ruin, i Kings xxi. 20, — 22. — The moral Condudt of Hazael was foretold, in that Cruelty he fhould be guilty of; on which Hazael fays. What, is thy Ser'vant a Dog, that he Jhould do this Thing ! ^ he Prophet fpeaks of the Event as what he knew, and not what he conjeftured. 2 Kings viji. 12. I knonv the Evil thou auilt do tin to the Children of KxztX: Thou of the Kingdom of the Mejfiah, were predifted and pro- mifed while God was in Ignorance whether any of thefe Things would come to pafs or no, and did but guefs af them. For that Kingdom is not of this World^, ic don't conlift in Things external, but is within Men, and confifts in the Dominion ot Virtue in their Hearts, in Righteouf- 'nefs, and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghoft ; and in thefe Things made manifeft in Practice, to the Praife and Glory of God. The Meffiah came to /woe Men from their Sim, and deliver them from their fpititual Enemies ; that they might ferve Him iii Righteorfnefs and Holinefs before Him : He ga've Himfelf for us , that he might redeem us from all Iniquity, and pu- rify unto Himfelf a peculiar Feople, zealous of good If orks . An4 therefore his Succefs confifts in gaining Men's Hearts to Virtue, in their being made God's njoilling People in the Day of his Pofjer. His Conqueft of his Enemies confifts in his Vidory over Men's Corruptions and Vices. And fuch Succefs, fuch Viftory, and fuch a Reign and Dominion is often exprelly foretold : That his KingdomJ&allf II the Earth ; that all People, Nations and Languages Jhould fernje and obey Him ; and fo, that all Nations Jhould go up to the Moun~ tain of the Houfe of tie Lord, that He might teach them his Ways, and that they might nvalk in his Paths : And that all Men Jhould be dra-ivn to Chriji, and the Earth be full of the Knoiu- ' ledge of the Lord (by which, jn the Style of Scripture, is meant true Virtue and Religion) as the Waters co'ver the Seas j that God's Laix) Jhould be put into Mens iimvard Parts, and lurit- ten in their Hearts ; and that God's People Jhould be all Righ- teous, &c. &c. A very great Part of the Prophecies of the Old Tefta-' nient is taken up in fuch Prediftions as thefe. And here I would obferve, that the Prophecies of the Univerfal PrevaT lence of the Kingdom of the Meffiah, and true Religion of Jefus Chrift, are delivered in the moft peremptory Manner, and confirmed by the Oath of God. Ijai. xlv, 22, to the End, Look to me, and beyejaved, all the Ends of the Earth ; for I am God, and there is none elfe. I hanje SWORN by my Self the Word is gone out of my Mouth in Rightcoujnejs, and Jhall ?tot re- turn, that unto Me every Knee Jhall boiv ; and e'very Tongue Jhall f'wear. SURELT, JJmll one Jay, in the Lord hwve I Righte- oujnejs and Strength : e-ven to Him Jhall Men come, l£c. But here this peremptory Declaration, and great Oath of the moft High, are delivered with fuch mighty Solemnity, to Things which God did not know, if He did not certainly forefee the ^olitions of moral Agents, An4 I07 GOD certainly foreknows Part 11. And all the Prediftions of Chrift and his Apoftles, to the like Purpofe, muft be without Knowledge : As thofe of our Saviour comparing the Kingdom of God to a Grain of Muftard-Seed, growing exceeding great, from a fmall Begin- ning ; and to Leaven, hid in three Meafures of Meal, 'till the whole was leaven'd, &c. And the Prophecies in the E- piftles concerning the Reftoration of the Nation of the J^^ws to the true Church ef God, and the bringing in the Fulnefs of the Gentiles ; and the Prophecies in all the Revelation con- cerning the glorious Change in the moral State of the World of Mankind, attending the DeftruSion of Antichrift, the Kingdoms of the World becoming the Kingdoms of our Lord and vf iis Chrif ; and its being granted to the Church to be arrayed in that fine Linen, 'white and clean ^ 'which is the Righteoufnefs of Saints, &c. Corol. I. Hence that great Promife and Oath of God to Abraham, Ifaac and Jacob, fo much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old Teftament and New, namely, That in their Seed all the Nations and Families of the Earth Jhould be bleffed, jnuft be made on Uncertainties, if God don't certainly fore- know the Volitions of moral Agents. For the Fulfilment in this Promife confifts in that Succefs of Chrift in the Work of Redemption, and that Setting up of his fpiritual Kingdom over the Nations of the World, which has been fpoken of. Men are bleffed in Chrift no otherwife than as they are bro't to acknowledge Him, truft in Him, love and ferve Him, as is reprefented and predifted in Pfal. Ixxii. ri. All Kings fhall fall dowjn before Him ; all Nations Jhall ferve Him. With ver. 17. Men Jhall be blejfed in him ; all Nations Jhall call hint Blejed. This Oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in fub- duing Men's Iniquities ; as is implied in that of the Prophet Micah, Chap. vii. 19, to. Carol. 2. Hence alfo it appears. That firft Gofpel- promife that ever was made to Mankind, that great Predidion of the Salvation of the Mefliah, and his Vidlory over Satan, made to our firft Parents, Gen. iii. i j. if there be no certain Prefcience of the Volitions of moral Agents, muft have no better Foundation than Conjedlure. For Chrift's Viftory over Satan confifts in Men's being faved from Sin, and in the Vidlory of Virtue and Holinefs, over that Vice and Wickednefs, which Satan by his Temptation has introduced, and wherein his Kinedom confifts. ^ 6. If Scdl. XL the Volitions of moral Agents. loZ 6. If it be fo, that God has not a Prefcience of the future Aftions of moral Agents, it will follow, that the Prophecies of Scripture in general are without Foreknowledge. For Scripture-Prophecies, almoft all of them, if not univerfally without any Exception, are either Predidions of the Aftings and Behaviours of moral Agents, or of Events depending on them, or fome Way conneded with them ; judicial Dif- penfations. Judgments on Men for their Wickednefs, or Re- wards of Virtue and Righteoufhefs, remarkable Manifefta- tions of Favour to the Righteous, or Manifeftations of fo- vereign Mercy to Sinners, forgiving their Iniquities, and magnifying the Riches of divine Grace -y or Difpenfations of Providence, in fome RefpeS or other, relating to the Conduft of the Subjefts of God's moral Government, wifely adapt- ed thereto ; either providing for what Ihould be in a future State of Things, through the Volitions and voluntary Ani- ons of moral Agents, or confequent upon them, and regu- lated and ordered according to them. So that all Events that are foretold, are either moral Events, or other Events which are connefted with, and accommodated to moral Events^ That the Predid^ions of Scripture in general muft be with- out Knowledge, if God don't forefee the Volitions of Men, will further appear, if it be confidered, that almoft all E- vents belonging to the future. State of the World of Man- kind, the Changes and Revolutions which come to pafs in. Empires, Kingdoms, and Nations, and all Societies, depend innumerable Ways on the Ads of Men's Wills ; yea, on an innumerable Multitude of Millions of Millions of Volitions, of Mankind. Such is the State and Courfe of Things in: the World of Mankind,, that one lingle Event, which ap- pears in itfelf exceeding inconfiderable, may in the Progrefs and Series of Things, occalion a Succeffion of the greateft and moft important and extenfive Events ; caufmg the State of Mankind to be vaftly different from what it would, otherwife have been» for all fucceeding Generations. For Inftance, the coming into Exiftenee of thofe particu- lar Men, who have been the great Conquerors of the World, which under God have had the main Hand in all the con- fequent State of the World, in all after-Ages ; fuch as Bebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Cefar, &c. undoubtedly depended on many Millions of Afts of the Will, which followed, and were occafion'd one by ano- ther. j'09 GOD certainly foreknows Part IL ther, in their Parents. And perhaps moft of thefe Volition* depended on Millions of Volitions of Hundreds and Thou- fands of others, their Contemporaries of the fame Genera- tion ; and moft of thefe on Millions of Millions of Voliti- ons of others in preceding Generations. As we go back, ftill the Number of Volitions, which were fome Way the Occafion of the Event, multiply as the Branches of a River, "till they come at laft, as it were, to an infinite Number. "iThis will not feem ftrange, to any one who well confiders the Matter ; if we recolleft what Philofophers tell as of thfe in- numerable Multitudes of thofe Things which are as it were the Principia, or Stamina Vit<£^ concerned in Generation ; the Animalcula in Semine majculo, and the O'va in the Womb of the Female ; the Impregnation, or animating of one of thefe in Diftinftion from all the reft," muft depend on Things infinitely minute, relating to the Time and Circumftances of the Adt of the Parents, the State of their Bodies, ^c. which muft depend on innumerable foregoing Circum- ftances and Occurrences ; which mtift depend, infi- nite Ways, on foregoing Afts of their Wills ; which are occafioned by innumerable Things that happen in the Coiirfe of their Lives, in which their own, and their Neigh- bour's Behaviour, muft have a Hand, an infinite Number of Wa\'s. And as the Volitions of others muft be fo many Ways concerned in the Conception and Birth of fuch Men ; fo, no lefs, in their Prefer vatiori, and Circumftances of Lire, their particular Determinations and Aftions, on which the great Revolutions they were the Occafions of, depended. Ai for Inftance. When the Confpirators in Perjia, againft. the Magi, were confulting about a Succeffion to the Empire, it came into the Mind of one of them, to propofe, that he whofe Horfe neighed firft, when they came together the ilext Morning, fhould be King. Now fuch a Thing's com- ing into his Mind, might depend on innumerable Incidents, wherein the Volitions of Mankind had been concerned. But in Confequence of this Accident, Darius, the Son of Hijia/pes, was King. And if this had not been, probably his Succeflbr would not have been the fame, and all the Circumftance:; of the PerfMti Empire might have been far otherwife. And then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered that Empire. And then probably the Circum- ftances of the World in all fucceeding Ages, might have been vaftly otherwife. I might further inftance in many other Occurrences ; fuch as thofe on which depended Alex- anders Scdl. XI. "the Volitions of moral Agents. no mnders Prefervation, in the many critical Junftures of his Life, wherein a fmall Trifle would have turned the Scale againft him ; and the Prefervation and Succefs of the Ra- man People, in the Infancy of their Kingdom and Common- Wealth, and afterwards; which all the fucceeding Changes, in their State, and the mighty Revolutions that afterwards came to pafs in the habitable World, depended upon. But thefe Hints may be fufficient for every difcerning confide- -rate Perfon, to convince him, that the whole State of the World of Mankind, in all Ages, and the very Being of every ■Perfon who has ever lived in it, in every Age, fince the Times of the ancient Prophets, has depended on more .Volitions,, or Ads of the Wills of Men^ than there are Sands on the Sea-ihorco , And tlierefore, unlefs God does moft exad^ly and perfefl- vly forefee the future A(f^s of Men's Wills, all the Pre- didions which he ever uttered concerning Da ged. XI. the Volitions of moral Agents. n^ Arc. IV. It will alfo follow from this Notion, that a? God is liable to be continually repentir.g what He has done; fo he muit be expofsd to be conftantly changing his Mind and Intentions, as to his future Conduft ; altering his Meafures, re- iinquilhing his old Defigns, and forming new Schemes and Pro- jedions. For his Purpofes, even as to the main Parts of his iScheme, namely, fuch as belong to the State of his moral Kingdom, mult be always liable to be broken, thro' want qi Forefight ; and He muft be continually putting his Syftem to rights, as it gets out of Order, through the Contin- gence'of the Aftions of moral Agents : He muft be a Being, who, mftead of being abfolutely immutable, muft neccfla- riiy be the Subjeft of infinitely the moft numerous Ads of Repentance, and Changes of Intention, of any Being what- ioe^'er; for this plain Pvcafon, that his vaftly extenfive Charge comprehends an infinitely greater Number of thofe Thing's which are to Him contingent and uncertain. In fach a Situation, He muft have little elle to do, but to mend bVoken Links as well as he can, and be rectifying his dif- jointed Frame and difordered Movements, in the heft Man- ner the Cafe will allow. The fupreme Lord of all Things muft needs be under great and miferable Difadvantages, in governing the World which He has made, and has the Care 6f, through his being utterly unable to find out Things of chief Importance, which hereafter fhall befal his Syftem ; which if He did but know, He might make feafonable Pro- vifion for. In many Cafes, there may be very great Neceffity that He ftiould m.ake Provifion, in the Manner of his order- ing and difpoftng Things, for fome great Events which are to happen, of vaft and extenfive Influence, and endlefs Confequence to the Univerfe ; which He may fee after- wards, when it is too late, and may wilh in vain that He had known beforeh-and, that He might have ordered his Affairs accordingly. And it is in the Power of Man, on thefe Principles, by his Devices, Purpofes and Aftions, thus to difappoint God, break his Meafures, make him con- tinuaUy to change his Mind, fubjeft Him to Vexation, and bring Him into Confufion. But how do thefe Things confift with Reafon, or with the Word of God ? Which reprefents, that all God's Works, all that He. has ever to do, the whole Scheme and Series' t»f his Operations, are from the Beginning perfedly in his View ; and declares, that •whate'ver Dc^jices and Defigns are in the Hearts of Men, the Counfel of the Lord is that dthout forefeeing Men's Volitions, know whether ever Chriftendom would return from this Apoftacy ? And which way could He tell before -hand how foon it would begin ? The Apoftle fays, it began to work in his Time ; and how could it be known how far it would proceed in that Age ? Yea, how could it be known that the Gofpel, which was not effeftual for the Reformation of the Jenvs, would ever be efFedual for the turning of the Heathen Nations from their Heathen Apo- ftacy, which they had been confirmed in for fo many Ages ? *Tis reprefented often m Scripture, that God who made the World for Himfelf, and created it for his PleafurC;, would infallibly obtain his End in the Creation, and in all his Works ; tliat as all Things are of Him, fo they would all be to Him ; and that in the final Iffue of Things, it would appear that He is tJje firjl, and the laji. Rev. xxi. 6. And i 1 7 Certain Foreknowledge Part II, And he /aid unto me. It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the Beginning atid the End, the firfl and the laji. But thefe Things are not confxftent with God's being fo liable to be difappointed in all his Works, nor indeed with his faihng of his End in any Thing that he has undertaken, or done. ^oMoaoo9ac particularly when it is poffcfiTed and enjoyed in its Pcrfedion, Std. Xllt. Arminiah Liberty inconfifient. 134 ^j'lz.. a full ?.nd perfeft Freedom and Liablenefs to aft altogether at Random, without the leaft Connexion with, or Reftraint or Government by, any Diftate of Reafon, or any Thing whatfoever apprehended, confidered or viewed by the Underftanding ; as being inconfiftent with the full and perfed Sovereignty of the Will over its own Determina- tions. The ^Motion Mankind have conceived of Liberty, is fome Dignity or Privilege, fomething worth claiming. But what Dignity or Priviledge is there, in being given up to fuch a wild Contingence as this, to be perfef^Iy and conftantly liable to aft unintelligently and nnreafonabiy, and as much without the Guidance ot Underftanding, as if we had none, or were as dellitute of Perception as the Smoke that is driven by the Wind ! (^^^^^)^^^^)^)^'^)^)^M^}^^)^)^)^)^) {)6()6()eC)@()6C)8()8()§()9C)@C)§( )§C)^)^)^)2()909C)9C)8C)90§C) PART ( 135 ) PART III. Wherem is inquired^ whether any fuch Liberty of Will ^ as Arminians yi^/^/, be necejjary to Moral Aqency, Virtue ^;^^ Vice, Praise, and Dispraise, ^c. •&ao{3caooo30ooooooao«ooocoo90e33()B099<»!|h Section I. G O D's moral Excellency necefjaryy yet virtuous and Praife-'worthy. F*^^"^ AVING confidcred xht Jirji Thing that was pro- ^ R ^ pofed to be inquired into, relating to that Fieedom uV ^j of Will which ^^/-OT/W^/zr maintain ; namely, Whe- k ^*2" 9^ ^^^^ ^"^ ^^'^^^ Thing does, ever did, or ever can exift, or be conceived of; I come now to iMcfecoud Thing propofed to be the Subjeft of Inquiry, 'viz. Vv'^hether any fuch Kind of Liberty be requifite to moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praife and Blame, Reward and Puni^-*ment, ^c. I fliall begin with fome Confideration of the Vir tue and Agency of the Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain, of all Agency and Virtue. Dr, Whiiby, in his Difcourfe on the five Poii^'s, P. 14. fays, "' If all human Aftions are neceffary. Virtue and Vice muft « be empty Names j we being capable of Nothing that is T 2 J^ blames 136 God'jjmordl'ExctWtncY necejfary, Part III. ** blanie-wortiiy, or deferyeth Praife ; For who c?n. blan;? *' a Perfon far doing only what he could not help, or judge ** that he deferveth Praife only for what he could not avoid ?" To the like Purpofe he fpeaks in Places innumerable ; efpe- cially in his Difcourf? on the Freedom of the Will ; conftantly maintaining, uiat a i^r^'fi/jOT not only from Coadion, hut NeceJJity, is abfolutely requifite, in order tp Aftions beijig either wor- thy of Blame, or deferving of Praife. And to this agrees, as is well known, the current Dodlrine of Armiman Writers ; '^ji'ho in generial hold, that there is no Virtue or Vice^ Reward or Punifhmenit, nothing to be commended or blamed, with- out tliis Freedom. And yet Dr. V/hitby, P. 300, allows, that God is without this Freedom ; And Arminians, fo far as I liave had Opportunity to obferve, generally acknowledge, that God is Ineceffarily holy, and his Will neceffarily deter- mined to that which is Good. So that, plutting thefe Things together, the infinitely holy God, who always ufed to be elleemed by God's People, not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all poffible Virtue, and every Virtue in the moft abfolute Purity and Perfedion, and in infinitely gieater Brightnefs and Amiablenefs than in any Creature ; the ^oft perfect Pattern of Virtue, and the Fountain from whom all others Virtue is but as Beams from the Sun; and who has been fuppofed to be, on the Ac- count of his Virtue and Holinefs, infinitely more worthy to be efteemed, loved, honoured, admired, commended, extoird and prajfed, than any Creature ; and He who is thus every where repreiented in Scripture ; I fay, this Being, according to this Notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no virtue at all ; Virtue, when afcribed to Him, is but an empty Name ; and he is deferving of no Commendation or Praife ; becaufe he is under Neceflity, He can't avoid being holy aad good as he is ; therefore no Thanks to him for it. It feems, the Holinefs, Juftice, Faithfulnefs, &c. of the moft High, muft not be accounted to be of the Nature of that which is virtuous and Praife-worthy. They will not deny, that thefe Things in God are good ; But then we muft un- derftand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the Nature of anyT^hing commendable, than the Good that is in any other Being that is not a moral Agent ; as the Bright- nefs of the Sun, and the Fertility of the Earth are good, but not virtuous, bccauie thefe Properties are neceffary to thef^ Bodies, and not the Fx^it of Self-determining Power, • ■ ' Ther^ Sect. I. yet Virtuous and Praife-worthy. 137 There needs no other Confutation of this Notion of God's not being virtuous or Praife-worthy, to Chrittians acquainted with the Bible, but only ftating and particularly reprefentino- of it. To bring Texts of Scripture, wherein God is repre-. fented as in every R?fpect, in the higheft Manner virtuous, and fupremely Praile-worchy, would be endlefs, and is altoge- ther needlefs to fuch as have been brought up under the Light of the Gofpelj, It were to be wifhed, that Dr. Whitby, ai)d other Divines of the fame Sort, had explain'd themfelves, when they have aflerted that That which is necefi'ary, is not defernjing of V'raije ; at the fame Time that they have own'd God's Per- feftion to be necelTary, and lb in Effeft reprefented God as i)Ot deferving Praife. Certainly, if their Words have any Meaning at all, by Praife, they muft mean the Exercife or Tedirnony of fome Sort of Efteem, Refpeft, or honourable Regard. And will they then fay, that Men are worthy of that Efteem, Refpeft, and Honour for their Virtue, fmall and imperfeft as it is, which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite Righteoufnefs, Holinefs, and Goodnefs ? If fo, it muft be b'ecaufe of fome Sort of peculiar Excellency in the virtuous Man, which is his Prerogative, wherein he really has the Preference ; fome Dignity, that is entirely dillin- guifli'd from any Excellency, Araiablenefs or Honourablenefs in God ; not in Imperfedion and Dependance, but in Pre-eminence ; which therefore he don't receive from God, nor is God the Fountain or Pattern of it ; nor can God, in that Refpeft, ftand in Competition with him, as the Objeft of Honour and Regard ; but Man may claim a peculiar Eileem, Commendation and Glory, that God can have no Pretenllon to. Yea, God has no Rights by virture of his neceffary Ho- linefs, to intermeddle with that grateful Refped and Praife» due to the virtuous Man, who chufes Virtue, in the Exercife of a Freedom ad utrumque ; any more than a precious Stone. which can't avoid being hard and beautiful. And if it be fo, let it be explained what that peculiar Refpeft is, that is due to the virtuous Man, which dilFers in Nature and Kind, in fome Way of Pre-eminence, from all that is due to God. What is the Nature or Defcription of that peculiar AfFeftion ? Is it Efteem, Love, Admiration, Honour, Praife, or Gratitude ? The Scripture every where reprefents God as the higheft Objeft of all thefe : there we jrcad of the SqkI's magnifying the Lird, of laving Him with all the Heart, 13 § CoHcemug G O D's Virtue. Part III, Heart, njuith all the Soul, nuith all the Mittd, ajtd njoith all the Strength; admiring him, and his righteous AHs, or greatly re- garding thsm, as mar-vellous and ivonderful ; honouring, glorify-,, ing, exalting, extolling, hlejjing, thanking, and praijlng Him j giving unto Him all the Glory of the Good which is done or re- ceived, rather than unto Men; that no Flejh Jhould glory in his PreJ'ence ; but that He {hould be regarded as the Being to whom all Glory is due. What then is that Refpeft ? What Paflion, AfFeftion, or Exereife is it, that Arminians call Praife, diverfe from all thefe Things, which Men are worthy of for their Vir- tue, and which God is not worthy of, in any Degree ? If that Neceffity which attends God's moral Perfedlions and Aftions, be as inconfiftent with a Being worthy of Praife, as a Neceffity of Coaftion ; as is plainly implied \i\ or inferred from Dr. Whitby's Difcourfe ; then why fhoul4 we thank God for his Goodnefs, any more than if He were forced to be good, or any more than we fhould thsnk one of our Fellow-Creatures who did us Good, not freely, and of good Will, or from any Kindnefs of Heart, but from mere Compulsion, or extrinfical Neceffity ? Arminians fuppofe, that God is neceffarily a good and gracious Being : for this they make the Ground of fome of their main Argument^ againft many Dodrines maintain'd by Cal-vinijis : They fay, thefe are certainly falfe, and it is impojihle they Ihould be true^ becaufe they are not confident with the Goodnefs of God, This fuppofes, that it is impojjihle but that God fhould be good : for if it be poffible that He fhould be otherwife, then -that ImpofTibility of the Truth of thefe Dpftrines ceafes, accordr» ing to their own Argument. That Virtue in God is not, in the mofl proper Senfe, reivardable, is not for Want of Merit in his moral Perfec- tions and Atlions, fufficient to deferve Rewards from hia Creatures ; but becaufe He is infinitely above all Capacity of receiving any Reward or Benefit from the Creature : He is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we can't be profitable unto Him. But flill he is. worthy of our fupreme Benevolence for his Virtue 5 and would be worthy of our Beneficence, which is the Fruit and Expreffion of Benevo- lence, if our Goodnefs could extend to Him. If God de- lerves to be thanked and praifed for his Goodnefs, He would for the fame Reafon, deferve that we fhould alfo requite his Kindnefs, if that were poffible. What /hall I retider to the Lord for all his Benefits ? is the natural Language of Thank- fulnefs i Sect. II. Chrift's Obedience /zd'c.^ry. 13^ fulnefs : and {o far as in us lies, it is our Duty to recompenfe God's Goodnefs, and render again according to Benefits receinjcd* And that we might have Opportunity for fo natural an Ex- preflion of our Gratitude to God, as Beneficence, notwith- ftanding his being infinitely above our Reach ; He has ap- pointed others to be his Receivers, and to Hand in his Stead, as the Objects of our Beneficence; fuch are efpecially our indigent Brethren. S E C T I O N II. 'The A^s of the Will of the human Soul o/" J e s u s Christ ncCelTarily holy, yet truly virtuouSf praife-worthyy rewardable, &c. I Have already confidered how Dr. Whitby infifts upon it, that a Freedom, not only from Coaction, but Necefiity, is requifite to either Virtue or Vice, Praife or Difpraife, Re'vjari or Fufiijhmentt He alfo infifts on the fams Freedom as abfo- lutely requifite to a Perfon's being the Subject of a Lanjo, of Precepts OT Prohibitiojis ; in the Book before mentioned ; P. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410. And of Promifes zndiThreatnings ; P. 298, 301,305, 311, 339, 340, 363. And as requifite to a State of Trial ; P, 297, &c. Now therefore, with an Eye to thefe Things, I would in- quire into the moral Conduct and Practice of our Lord Jefun Chrift, which he exhibited in his human Nature here, in his State of Humiliation. And Firjl, I would ftiew, that his holy Behaviour was ?iecejfary ; or that it was impnjjible it Ihould be othcrwife, than that He fhould behave himfelf holily, and that he Ihould be perfectly holy in each indivi- dual Act of his Life. And Secondly, that his holy Behaviour was properly of the Nature of Virtue, and was 'vjorthy of Praife ; and that He was the Subject of Zaw, Precepts or Commands, Fromifei and Rewards i and that he was in a State of TriaU I, It I40 The Aas of the Will of Chrifl, Part IIL- J. It was impojftble, that the Afts of the Will of the human Soul of Chrift Ihould, in any Inftance, Degree or Circum- ftance, be othervvife than holy, and agreeable to God's Na- ture and Will. The following Things make this evident. I . God had promifed fo efFedually to preferve and uphold Him by his Spirit, under all his Temptations, that he rfiould not fail of reaching the End for which He came into the World ; which he would have fail'd of, had he fallen into Sin. We have fuch a Promife, Ifai. xlii. 1,2,3,4. Behold my Servant, njohom I uphold ; mine Elc£i, in ivhom my Soul ielighteth : I ha^jeput my Spirit upon Him : Hejhall bring forth Judgmtit to the Gentiles : Hejhall jiot crj , nor lift up, nor cauje his Voice to be heard iti the Street. — Hejhall bring forth Judgment iinto Truth. Hejhall not fail, nor he di/couraged, till he ha'vefet Judgment in the Earth ; and the IJles Jhall njuait for his Lam:. This Promife of Chrift 's having God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up his Voice, &c. relates to the Time of Chrift's Ap- pearance on Earth ; as is manifeft from the Nature of the Promife, and alfo the Application of it in the New Tefta- ment, Matth. xii. 18. And the Words imply a Promife of his being fo upheld by God's Spirit, that he (hould be pre- ferved from Sin ; particularly from Pride and Vain-glory, and from being overcome by any of the Temptations he Ihould be under to affeft the Glory of this World ; the Pomp of an earthly Prince, or the Applaufe and Praife of Men : and that he fhould be fo upheld, that he fhould by no Means fail of obtaining the End of his coming into the World, of bringing forth Judgment unto Vidory, and eftablifhing his Kingdom of Grace in the Earth.— And in the following Verfes, this Promife is confirmed, with the greateft imagina- ble Solemnity. Thus Jaith the LORD, HE that created the Hea'vens, and Jiretched them oiU ; He that fpread forth the Earth, and that a manifeft Allufion to the Cove- pant which the willing Servant, who loved his Mafter's Ser- vice, made with his Mafter, to be his Servant for ever, on the * See Dr. Whitby on the five Points, P. 48, 49, 50. 146 The A&s of the Will of Chrift, Part HI, the Day wherein he had his Ear bored ; which Covenant v/as probably inferred in the publick K.ecoids, called the Volume of the Book, by the Judges, who were called to take Cognizance of the Tranfadion ; Exod. xxi. If tiie Logos, who was with the Father, before the World, and who made the World, thus engaged in Covenant to do the Will of the Father in the human Nature, and the Promife, was as it were recorded, that it might be made fure, doubtlefs it was im- pojjible that it ihould fail ; and fo it was impoJftbU that Chrift •fhould fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human Nature. I o. If it was poffibie for Chrift to have failed of doing the Will of his Father, and fo to have failed of efFeftually •working out Redemption for Sinners, then the Salvation of all the Saints, who were faved ftom the Beginning of the World, to the Death of Chrift, was not built on a firm Foundation. The Mefliah, and the Redemption which He was to work out by his Obedience unto Death, was the Foundation of the Salvation of all the Ppfterity of fallen Man, that ever were faved. Therefore, if, when the Old- Teftament Saints had the Pardon of their Sins, and the Fa- vour of God promifed them, and Salvation beftowed upon them, ftill it was poffibie that the Meffiah, when he came, might commit Sin, then all this was on a Foundation that was not firm and ftable, but liable to fail ; fomething which it was poffibie might never be. God did as it were truft to what his Son had engaged and promifed to do in future Time ; and depended fo much upon it, that He proceeded aftually to fave Men on the Account of it, as tho' it had been jilready done. But this Truft and Dependance of God, orj the Suppofition of Chrift's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a Staff" that was weak, and might poffibly break. The Saints of old trufted on the Promifes of a future Redemption to be wrought out and compleated by the Meffiah, and built their Comfort upon it : Abraham faw Chrift's Day and rejoyced ; and "he and the other Pa- triarchs died in the Faith of the Promife of it. [Heh. xi. 13.) But on this Suppofition, their Faith and their Comfort, and their Salvation, was built on a moveable fallible Foundation ; Chrift was not to them a tried Stone, a fure Foundation; as in Ifa'u xxviii. 16. Danj'id entirely refted on the Covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious Dominion and Salvation of the Meffiah, of his Seed; fays, it was all his Sal'va/iof/, and all his Dejire ; and comforts himfelf that this Covenant was SedwiL • necefTatily hdy. 147* an e-~jerlaj}ing Co'venant, ordered in all Things and /tire, 2 Sam, xxiii. 5. But if Chrift's Virtue might fail, he was miftaken : his great Comfort was not built To fure, as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the Determinations of the Free-Will of Chrilt's human Soul ; which was fubjeft to r.o Neceffity, and might be determined either one Way or the other. Alfo the Dependance of thofe who looked for Re- demption in Jerufale?n, and waited for the Confolation o£ J/rael, [Luken. z^, & 38.) and the Confidence of the Difci- ples of Jefus, v/ho forfook all and followed Him, that they might enjoy the Benefits of his future Kingdom, was built on- a fandy Foundation. II. The Man Chrift Jefus, before he had finifhed his Courfe of Obedience, and while in the midft of Tempta-' tions and Trials, was abundant in politively predifting his own future Glory in his Kingdom, and the Enlargement of- his Church, the Salvation of the Gentiles through Him, &c,- and in Promifes of Bleffings he would beitow on his true Difciples in his fiiturc Kingdom ; on which Promifes he re- quired the full Dependance of his Difciples. {Joh. xiv.), Biit the Difciples would have had no Ground for fuch De- pendance, if Chrift had been liable to fail in his Work : And Chrift himfelf would have been guilty of Prefumption, in fo abounding in peremptory Promifes of great Things,, which depended on a mere Contingence ; -viz. the Determi- nations of his free Will, confifting in a Freedom ad ntrumque^ to either Sin or Holinefs, ftanding in Indifference, and incident,, iii Thoufands of future Inftances, to go either one^Way or the other. Thus it is CAtidcnt, that it was impojjihle that the Ads of the Will of the human Soul of Chrift fhould be otherwife than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father ; or, in other Words, they were ncceffarily fo conformed. I have been the longer in the Proof of this Matter, it being a Thing denied \>y fome of the greateft Arminians, by Epifcophcs in particular ; and becaufe I look upon it as a Point clearly and abfolutely determining the Controverfy between Caluinijis and Arminians, concerning the Neceffity of fuch a Freedom of Will as is infifted on by the latter, in order to moral Agency, Vir- tue, Command or Prohibition, Promife or Threatning, Re- ward or Puniftiment, Praife or Difpraifs, Merit or Demerit. 1 now therefore proceed, U, Ta 148 ' Chris t's Righteoufnefs Part 111, II. To confider whether Christ, in his holy Behaviour on Earth, was not thus a moral Agent, fubjeft to Commands ^ Pro' mifesy &c. * Dn Whithy very oftert fpeaks of what he calls a Freedom ad utrumlibet, without Ntceffity, as requiilte to Lanv and Com- mands ; and fpeaks of Neceflity as entirely inconfiftent with hijunBions and Prohibitions. But yet we read of Chrift's being the Subjeft of the Commands of hi>s Father^ Joh. x. 18. and XV. 10. And Chrift telL us, that every Thing that He Jaid, or did, was in Compliance with Commandments he had recei-ved of the Father; Joh. xii. 49, 50. & xiv. 31. And we often read of Chrift's Obedience to his Father's Commands, Rom. Vi 19. Phil. ii. i8» Heb. V. 8. The forementioned Writer reprefents Promifes offered as Motives to Perfons to do their Duty, or a being tnoi-ed and i?i- duced by Promifes, as utterly inconfiftent with a State wherein Perfons have not a Liberty ad utrumlibet, but are neceffarily determined to one. (See particularly, P. 298, & 311.) But the Thing which this Writer afferts, is demonftrably falfey if the Chriftian Religion be true. If there be any "Truth in Chriftianity or the holy Scriptures, the Man Chrift Jefas had his Will infallibly, unalterably and unfniftrably deter- mined to Good, and that alone; but yet he had Promifes of glorious Rewards made to Him, on Condition of his per- fevering in, and perfedting the Work which God had ap- pointed Him; Ifaii liii. 10, 11, 12. Pfal. ii. & ex. Ifaii xlix. 7j 8, 9. In Luke xxii. 28, 29, Chrift fays to his Dif- ciples. Ye are They tvhich hanje continued njuith me in my Tempta- tions; and I appoint unto you a Kingdom, as my Father hath ap^ pointed unto ?nei The Word moft properly fignifies to ap- point by Covenant, or Promife. The plain Meaning of Chrift's Words is this : "As you have partook of my Temptations *' and Trials, and have been ftedfaft, and have overcome ; I *' promife to make you Partakers of my Reward, and to give " you a Kingdom ; as the Father has promifed me a Kingdom *' for continuing ftedfaft, and overcoming in thofe Trials." And the Words are well explained by thofe in Rev. iii. 2i« To him that overCometh, njuill I grant to Jit . x.v. 10. Rom. viii. 17.. 2 Tm. ii. 1 1, 12. I Pei. ii. 19, 20. and iv. 13. But if there was Nothing of any Virtue or Merit, or VVorthinefs of any Reward, Glory, Praife or Commendation at all, in all that He did, becaufe it was all neceflary, and He could not help it ; then how is here any Thing fo proper to animate and incite us, free Creatures, by patient Continuance in Well-doing, to feek for Honour,. Glory, and Virtue? God fpeaks of Himfelf as peculiarly well-pleafed with tfhe Righteoufnefs of this Servant of his. Ifai. xlii. 21. The Lord is •well plcajcd for his Righteoufnefs Sake. The Sacrifices of Old are fpoken of as a fweet Savour to God, but the Obe- dience of Chrift as far more acceptable than they. Pfal. xl. 6, 7. Sacrifce and Offering Thou didji ?!0t dcf re : Mine Ear haji Thou opened [as thy Servant performing willing Obedience ;] Burnt-Offering and Sin-Offering haft thou not re- quired: Then faid I , Lo, I come [as a Servant that chearfully anfwers the Calls of his Matter :] / delight to do thy Will, O my God, and thy Laiv is nvilhin ?nine Heart. Matth, xvii. J. This is my belo'ved Son, in 'whom I am nvell-pleafed. And Chrift tells us exprefly, that the Father loves Him for that wonderful Inftance of his Obedience, his voluntarily yielding himfelf to Death, in Compliance with the Father's Command, Joh. k. 17, 18. Therefore doth my Father lonje me, becaufe I lay donvn my Life : No Man taketh it from me ; but I lay it don.vn of 7nyfelf- This Ca?nmandment recei'ved I of ■my Father. And if there was no Merit in Chrift's Obedience antcr Peath, if it was not worthy of Praife, and of the moft? glorious Sedl. II. Praife-worthy^ rewardaMe, &c. 151 glorious Rewards, the heavenly Hofts were exceedingly miftaken, by the Account that is given of them, in Rev. v. S, 12. 'Thf four Beajis and the fonr-and-t'voenty Elders fell danxiu before the Lamb, ha-uing e'very one of them HarpSy and golden trials full of Odours ; And they fung a nenxj fang, fay- ing. Thou art WORTHY to take the Book, and to open the Seals thereof; for thou nxjafi flain, And I beheld, and I heard the V oice of many Angels round about the Throne, and the Beajis, and the Elders, and the Number of them njuas ten Thoifand Times ten Thoufand, and Thoufands of Thoufands, faying luith a loud Voice, WORTHY is the Lamb that 'uias flain, to recei've Po'wer, and Riches, and Wifdom, and Strength, and Honour^ and Glory, and Bleffing, Chrift fpeaks of the eternal Life which He was to re- ceive, as the Reward of his Obedience to the Father's Com- mandments. Joh. xii. 49, 50. I haije not fpoken of myjelf ; but the Father ^which fent me. He ga've me a Commandment tvhat I Jhould fay, and ', or Proclivity to Sin, thro' a being given up to Hardnefs of Heart, or indeed by any other Means whatfoever, is an Inconfiftence, according to Dr. Wluioy's Notions of Li- berty, Virtue and Vice, Blame and Praife. The avoiding Sin and Blame, and the doing what is virtuous and Praife-v/orthy, ^ull be always equally eafy. Sea. III. ^fallen Man. 157 Dr. IVhiloy'h Notions of Liberty, Obligation, Virtue, Sin, &c. lead Him into another great Inconfiftence, He abundantly inlifts, that Necelfuy is inconiillent with the Nature cf Sin or Fault. He fays in the foremention'd Treatife, P. 14. Who can. i;la:Ki; a PcrJ^n f:r d-Aug n.\jhcit.he could not help ? and P. i 5. It hiinv jinfibly unjrijl, to punijh any Ma?i for doing that But a being fincere, hearty and in good Earnell, is no Virtue, un- iefs it be in a Thing that is virtuous. A Man may be fin- cere and hearty in joining a Crew of Pirates, or a Gang of Robbers. When the Devils cried out, and befought Chrilt mot to torment them, it was no mere Pretence ; they were very hearty in their Defires not to be tormented : but thii did liot make their Will or Defires virtuous. And if Men have finccie Defires, which are in their Kind and Nature no better, it can be no Excufe for the Want of any required Virtue. And as a Man's being fincere in fuch an indirect Defire oc Willingnefs to do his Duty, as has been mentioned, can't ex- cufe for the want of Performance ; fo it is with Endea^jours arifing from fnch a Willinijnefs. The Endeavours can have no more Goodnefs in them, than the Will which they are the Effect and Expreffion of. And therefore, however fincere and real, and however great a Perfon's Endeavours are ; yea, tho* they fhould be to the utmoft of his Ability ; unlefs the Will which they proceed from be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no Avail, Influence or Weight to any Purpofe what- foever, in a moral Senfe or Refpect. That which is not truly virtuous in God's Sight, is looked upon by Him as good for Kothing : and fo can be of no Value, Weight or Influence Z iij 174 lVl:)at Sincerity of Endeavours Part IlL in his Account, to recommend, fatisfy, excufe or make up foe aay moral Defect. For Nothing can counter-balance Evil, but Good. If Evil be in one Scale, and we put a great deal into the other, fincere and earneft Defires, and many and great En- deavours ; yet if there be no real Goodnefs in all, there is no Weight in it ; and fo it does nothing towards balancing the real Weight which is in the oppofite Scale. 'Tis only like the fubltracting a Thoufand Noughts trora before a real Number, which leaves the Sum juil as it was. Indeed fuch Endeavours may have a vegat'i'vely good Influ- ence.- Thofe Things which have no pofitive Virtue, have no pofltive moral Influence ; yet they may be an Occafion of Perfons avoiding fome pofitive Evils. As if a Man were in the Wattr with a Neighbour that he had ill-will to, who could not fwim, holding him by his Hand ; which Neigh* hour was much in Debt to Him ; and ihould be tempted to let him link and drown ; but fhould refufe to comply with the Temptation ; not from Love to his Neighbour, but from the Love of Mon?y, and becaufe by his drowning He flioiild lofe his Debt ; that which he does in preferving his Neighbour from drowning, is nothing good in the Sight of God: Yet hereby he avoids the greater Guilt that would have been contrafted, if he had defignedly let his Neighbour fink and perifti. But when Arminians in their Difputes v\ith Cal'vlnijis infill fo much on fincere Defires and Endeavours, as what muft excufe Men, rauft be accepted of God, &c. 'tis manifett they liavc Refpesfl to fome pofitive moral Weight or Influence of thofe Defires and Endeavours. Accepting, juftifying, or excufing on the Account of fincere honell Endeavours (as they are called) and Men's doing what they can, &c. has Re- lation to fome moral Value, fomething that is accepted as Good, and as fuch, countervailing fome Defeft* Eat there is a great and unknown Deceit, arifing from the Ambioruity of the Phrafe, Jineere Etjdea^oours. Indeed there i^ a vaft Indiftinftnefs and LTnfixednefs in moll:, or at leafl: very ma- ny of the Terras ufed to exprefs Things pertaining to moral and fpiritual Matters. Whence arife innumerable Miftakes, ftrong Prejudices, inextricable Confufion, and endlefs Controverfy. The W'ord fincere is moft: commonly ufed to fignify fome- thing that is good: Men are habituated to underfl:and by'it the fame as hojicft zxi\ upright ; which Terms excite an Idea of fomething good in the itrideft and higheft Senfe j good in the Sc6t. V. is no Excufe. 27^ the Sight of Him who fees not only the outward Appearance, but the Heart. And therefore Men think that if a Perfon be Jincere, he will' certainly be accepted. If it be faid that any one is finceye in his Endeavours, this fuggefts to Men's Minds as much, as that his Heart and Will is good, that there is no Defect of Duty, as to virtuous Inclination ; he horicjily and uprightly defires and endeavours to do as he is required ; and this lead's them to fuppofe that it.would be very hard and unrea- fonable to punifh him, only becaufe he is unfuccefsful in his Endeavours, the Thing endeavoured being beyond his Power. Whereas it ought to be obferved, that the Word f.ncere has thefe diiferent Significations. I. Shcei-ity, as the Word is foraetimes ufcd, lignifies no. vc\ox& \.\\?^Ti Reality of Will arid Endeavour, with refpett to any Thing tb.at is profeiTed or pretended j without any Coniidera- tion of the Nature of the Principle or Aim, whence this real Will and true Endeavour arifes. If a Man has feme real De- foe to obtain a Thing either direft or indirect, or does really endeavour after a Thing, he is faid lincerely to dpfire or endea-' vour it ; without any Conlideraticn of the Goodnefs or Virtu- oufnefs of the Principle he ads from, or any Excellency or Worthinefs of the End he ads for. Thus a Man that is kind to his Neighbour's Wife, who is fick and l?nguifhing, and very Iielpful in her Cafe, makes a Shew of defiring and endea- vx)uring her Reiloration to Health and Vigour; and not only makes fuch a Shew, but there is a Reality in his Pretence, he does heartily and earneftly defire to have her Health retlored, c^nd ufes his true and utmoit Endeavours for it; He is faid lin- cerely to delire and endeavour it, becaufe he does fo truly or really ; tho' perhaps the Principle he ads from, is no other than a vile and fcandalous Paffion ; having lived in Adultery •with her, he earneftly defires to have her Health and Vigour reftored, that he may return to his criminal Pleafures with her. Or, ±. By Sincerity is meant, not merely a Reality of Will and Endeavour of fome Sort or other, and from fome Confiderati- on or other, but a njirtuous Sincerity. That is, that in the Per- formance of thofe particular Ads that are the Matter of Vir- tue or Duty, there be not only the Matter, but the Form and EfTence of Virtue, confuting in the Aim that governs the Ad, and the Principle exercifed in it. There is not only the Reali- ty of the Ad, that is as it were the Body of the Duty ; but al- fo the Soiili which Ihould properly belong to fuch a Body. In Z 3 thi& 176 O/Promifes. Part IIL this Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, vvhenhe a(fis with & fure Intention ; not from finifter Views, or bye-Ends : He . not only in Reality defires and fceks the Thing to be done, or Qualification to be obtain'd, for feme End or other ; But he wills the Thing diredly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed ; the Virtue of the Thing is properly the Obje»ft of the Will. In the former Senfe, a Man is faid to be fmcere, in Oppofi- tion to a mere Pretence, and Shenu of the particular Thing to be done or exhibited, without any real Deiire or Endeavour at all. In the latter Senfe, a Man is faid to be fmcere in Oppofition to that She-iV of Virtue there is in merely doing the Matter of Duty, without the Reality of the Virtue itfelf in the boul, and the Effence of it, wriich there is a Shew of. A Man may be fin- cere in the former Senfe, and yet in the latter be in the Sight of God, who fearches the Heart, a vile Hypocrite. In the latter Kind of Sincerity, only, is. there any Thing truly valuable or acceptable in the Sight of God. And this is the Thing which in Scripture is called Sincerity, Uprightnefs, Integrity, Truth in the intvard Parts , and a being of a perfe^ Heart, And if there be fuch a Sincerity, and fuch a Degree of it as there ought to be, and there be any Thing further that the Man is not able to perform, or which don't prove to be con- nected with his fincere Defires and Endeavours, the Man is wholly excufed and aquitted. in the Sight of God ; His Will ihall iurely be accepted for his Deed : And fuch a fincere Will and Endeavour is all that in Striftnefs is required of him, by any Command of God. But as to the other Kind of Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, it having no Virtue in it, (as was obferved before) can be of no Avail before God, in any Cafe, to recommend, fatisfy, or excufe, and has no po- iitive moral Weight or Influence whatfoevei;. CoroL I. Hence it may be infer'd, that Nothing in the Rea- fon and Nature of Things appears, from the Confideration of any moral Weight of that former Kind of Sincerity, which has been fpoken of, ■ at all obliging us to believe, or leading us to fuppofe, that God has made any pofitive Promifes of Salvation, or Grace, or any faving Afliftance, or any fpiritual- Benefit whatfoever, to any Defires, Prayers, Endeavours, Striving, or Obedience of thofe, who hitherto have no true. Virtue or Holinefs in their Hearts ; the' \ye ihould fuppofe I Sect.V. to graceiefs Eiideavour-s. fy/^ all the Sincerity, and the utmoft Degree of Endeavour, that ig poiuble to be in a Perfon without Holinefs. Some objedl againil God's requiring, as the Condition of Salvation, thofe holy Exercifes, which are the Refult of a fu- pernatural Renovation ; fuch as a fupreme Refped to Chrift, Love to God, loving Holinefs for its own Sake, Hzc. that thefe inv/ard Difpolitions and Exercifes are above iVIen's Power, as they are by Nature ; and therefore that we ipay conclude, that when Men arc brought to be fincere in their Endeavours, and do as well as they can, they are accepted ; and that this mud be all that God requires in order to Men's being received as the Objects of his Favour, and mull be what God has ap- pointed as the Condition of Salvation. — Concerning which I would obferve, that in fuch a Manner of Speaking of Men's oeing accepted, becaufe they are Jirtcere , and do as luell as they can, there is evidently a Suppofition of fome Virtue, fome Degree ct that which is truly Good; tho' it don't go fo far as were to be wifti'd. For if Men do ^uuhat ihey can, unlefs their fo doing be from fome good Principle, Difpofition, or Exercife of Heart, fome virtuous Inclination or Aft of the Will ; their fo doing what thev can, is in fomg Refpefts not a Whit bettei* than if they did Nothing at all. In fuch a Cafe, there is nq more pofitive moral Goodnefs in a Man's doing what he can, than in a Wind-mill's doing what it can j becaufe the Aftion does no more proceed from Virtue ; and there is Nothing in fuch Sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that Ihould render it any more a proper or fit Recommendation to pofitive Favour and Acceptance, or the Condition of any Reward or a.ftual Benefit, th-n doing Nothing ; for both the one and the other are alike Nothing, as to any true rnoral Weight or Value. Carol. 2. Hence alfo it follows, there is Nothing that appears in the Reafon and Nature of Things, which can juftly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the neceffary Means of Salvation, or fome Way or other beftow true Holinefs and eternal Life on thofe Heathen, who are fincere (in the Senfe above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the W^ill of the Deity, and to pleafe Him, according to their Light, that they may efcape his future Difpleafure and Wrath, and obtain j-Iappinefs in their future State, through his Favour. 4SS'(>Oce>4OQO3OWcxioeaopoaO9(oeeoq«sc0MaMO(^MOogoocQ9Osqo!)po99cqac!Cc^oaoqeoa^ Section 17^ Indifference inconfifient Part III. 4bjJ*oOflfiaOMa#6ei56.eality of it. But if there be any Afts which are done in a State of Equilibrium, or fpring immediately from perfeft Indifference and Coldnefs of Heart, they cannot arife from any good Principle or Dif- pofition in the Lleart ; and confequently, according to common Senfe, have no uncere Goodnefs in them, having no Virtue of Heart in them. To have a virtuous Heart, is to have a Heart that favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfeft- ly cold and indifferent about it. And befides the Aftions that are done in a State of Indiffer- ence, or that arife immediately out of fuch a State, can't be virtuous, becaufe, by the Suppofition, they are not determined by any preceding Choice. For if there be preceding Choice, then Choice intervenes between the Aft and the State of In- diiFerence ; which is contrary to the Suppofition of the Aft's arifing immediately out of Indifference. But thofe Afts which are not determined by preceding Choice, can't be virtuous or vicious by y!?r/«/«/ Virtue. Part llf ; difference, nor does immediately arife from fuch a State ; and fo is not done in a State of Liberty. If the Aftion be not de- teymined by a precedmg Aft of Choice, then it can't be vir- tuous ; becaufe then the Will is not Self-determin'd in it. So /that 'tis made certain, that neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find any Place in the Univerfe. Moreover, that it is neceflary to a virtuous Aftioa that it be performed in a State of Indifference, under a Notion of that's being a State of Liberty, is contrary to common Senfe ; as 'tis a Didate of Common Senfe, that Indifierence itfelf, in many CafeSj is vicious, and fo to a high Degree. As if when I fee my Neighbour or near Friend, and one who has in the highefl Degree merited of me, in extreme Diftrefs, and ready io perifh, I find an Indifference in my Heart with Refpeft to ariy Thing propofed to be done, which I can eafily do, for his Relief : So if it fhould be propofed to me, toblafpheme God, or kill my Father, of to do numberlefs other Things which might be mentioned ; the being indifferent, for a Momentj would be highly vicious and vile. And it may be further obferved, that to fuppofe this Liberty of Indifference is effential to Virtue and Vice, deitroys the great Difference of Degrees of the Guilt of different Crimes, and takes avvay the Heinoufnefs of the mofl flagitious horrid Iniquities ; fuch as Adultery Befliality, Murder, Perjury, Blaf- phemy, &c. For according to thefe Principles, there is no Harm at all in having the Mind in a State of perfeft Indiffer- ence with Rcfpedl to thefe Crimes; nay, 'tis abfolutely neceffary in order to any Virtue in avoiding them, or Vice in doing them. But for the Mind to be in a State of Indifference with Refpeft to them> is to be next Door to doing them : It is then infinitely near to chufing, and fo committing the Faft : For Equilibrium is the next Step to a Degree of Prepondera- tion ; and one, even the leafl Degree of Preponderation (all Things conlidered) is Choice. And not only {o, but for the Will to be in a State of perfeft Equilibrium with Refpeft to fuch Crimes, is for the Mind to be in fuch a State, as to be full as likely to chufe them as to refufe them, to do them as td omit them. And if our Minds mufl be in fuch a State wherein it is as near to chufing as refufing, aind wherein it muft of Ncceffity, according to the Nature of Things, be as likely to commit them, as to refrain from them ; where is the exceeding Heinoufnefs of chufing and committing them ? If there be no Harm in often being in fuch a State, wherein the Probability Seel. Vi. O/* vir/uous and vicious Habits. 1 8i Probability cf doing and forbearing are exadly equal, there being an Equillbriun-,, and r,o more Tendency to one trian the other ; then according to the Nnture and Laws of fuch a Con- tingcnce, it may be expeded, as an inen:itable Confequence of jfuch a Difpoiition of Things, that we fhould chufe them as often ss rejedt them : That it fhould generally fo fall out is ne- ceflary, as Equality in the Effefl is the natural Confequence of the equal Tendency of the Caufe, or of the antecedent State of Things from which the EfFeft arifes : Why then fnould we be fo exceedingly to blame, if it does fo fall out ? 'Tis many V\"ays apparent, that the Arminiait Scheme of Li- berty is utterly inconhflent v.-ith the being of any fuch Things as either virtuous or vicious Habits or Difpofitions. If Liberty of Indifference be eflential to moral Agency, then there can be no Virtue in any habitual Inclinations of the Heart ; which are contrary to Indifference, and implj^ in their Nature the very Deilruclion and Exclufion cf it. They fuppofc nothing tan be virtuous, in which no Liberty is exercifed ; but how abfurd is it to talk of exercifmg Indifference under Bias end Prepondcration ! And \'i fclf-dctermini7ig Povjer in the Will be necefTar)'' to nioral Agency, Praife, Blame, &c. then nothing done by the Will can he any further Praife or Blame-worthy, than fo far as the Will is moved, fwayed and determined by itfelf, and the ijcales turned by the fovereign Power the Wili has over itfeif. And therefore the Will mull not be put out of its Balance alrea- dy, the Preponderation muff not be determined and efTecled be- fore-hand ; and fo the felf-determining Aft anticipated. Thus it appears another Way, that habitual Bias is inconfiilent with that Libert)^ which Arminians fuppofe to be necefTary to Virtue or Vice ; and fo it follows, that habitual Bias itfelf cannot be cither virtuous or vicious. The fame Thing follows from their Doflrine concerning thclnconfirtence of iV^-tYj^/y with Liberty, Praife, Difpraife, &c. Kone will deny, that Bias and Inclination riiay be fo ftrong as to be invincible, and leave no FoiTibility of the Will's determin- ing contrary to it ; and fo be attended with Neceffity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God, Angels and glorified Saints, with Refpeft to Good ; and the Will of Devils with Refpcd to Evil. Therefore if NecefTity be incon- fiftent with Liberty ; then when fix'd Inclination is to fuch a Degree of Strength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, Psaife, A a oc. 1 82 Of virtuous P^rt IlL ©r Blame. And if fo, then the nearer Habits are to this Strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and fo diminifh Praife and Blame. . If very ftrong Habits deftroy Liberty, the lefier Ones proportionably hinder it, according to their Degree of Strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the Aft moil virtuous or vicious, when performed without any Inclination or habitual Bias at all ; becaufe it Is then perform- ed with moft Liberty. Every pre-pofleffing fix'd Bias on the Mind brings a Degree of moral Inability for the contrary ; becaufe fo far as the Mind rs biafled and pre-pofleffed, fo much Hindrattce is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be inconfiftent with moral Agency, or the Nature of Virtue and Vice, then fo far as there is any fuch Thing as evil Difpcfition of Heart, ot ha; bitual Depravity of Inclination j whether Covetoufnefs, Pride, Malice, Cruelt)^ or whatever elfe ; fo much the more excuf- able Perfons are ; fo much the lefs have their evil Afts of thi^ Kind, the Nature of Vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent Difpofitions and Inclinations they have, fo much are they the lefs virtuous. 'Tis evident, that no habitual IMfpofition of Heart, whether it be to a greater or leffer Degree, can be in a7iy Degree \\r>- tuous or vicious ^ or the Adions which proceed from them ai all Praife or Blame-worthy. Becaufe, tho' we fhould fup- pofe the Habit not to be of fuch Strength as wholly to take away all moral Ability and "felf-determining Power ; or hin- der but that, altho' the Aft be partly from Bias, yet it may be in Part from Self-determination ; yet in this Cafe, all that is from antecedent Bias muft be fct afiJe, as of no Confidera^ tion ; and in eftimating the Degree of Virtue or Vice, no more muft be confidered than what arifes from felf- determin- ing Pov.'er, without any Influence of that Bias, becaufe Liberty is exercifed in no more : So that all that is the Exercife of lia:bitual Inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the Morality of the Aftion. By which it appears, that no Exer- cife of thefe Habits, let them be ftronger or weaker, can ever have any Thing of the Nature of either Virtue or Vice. Here if any one (hould fay, that notwithftanding all thefe Things, there may be the Nature of Virtue and Vice in Habits of the Mind ; becaufe thefe Habits may be the EfFefts of thofe Afts wherein the Mind exercifed iLiberty ; that how- ever the forementioii'd Reafons will prove that no Habits Sc(5i. VI. iind vicious "Hiihits. iSj v/hich are natural, or that any are born or created with us, can be either virtuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of Habits, which have been acquired and eftablifti'd by repeated free Ads. To fuch an Objeftor I would fay, that this Evafion will not at all help the Matter. For if Freedom of Will be eflential to the very Nature of Virtue and Vice, then t lie re is no Virtue or Vice but only in that very Thing, wherein this Liberty is exercifed. If a Man in one or more Things that he does, ex- ercifes Liberty, and then by thofe Afts is brought into fuch Circumltances, that his Liberty ceafes, and there follows a long Series of A&s or Events that come to pafs neceffarily ; thofe confequeni: AQs are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punil-hable ; but only the free Ads that eftablifh'd this Ne- eeffity ; for in them alone was the Man free. The following EtFeds that are neceffary, have no more of the Naiure of Vir- tue or Vice, than Health or Sicknefs of Body have properly the Nature of Virtue or Vice, being the EfFeds of a Courfe of free Ads of Temperance or Intemperance ; or than the good Qualities of a Clock are of the Nature of Virtue, which are the Effeds of free Ads of the Artificer ; or the Goodnefs and Sweetnefs of the Fruits of a Garden are moral Virtues, being the Efieds of the free and faithful Ads of the Gardener. If Liberty be abfolutely requifite to the Morality of Adions, and Neceifity wholly inconfiitent with it, as Arminiatn greatly in- fift ; then no 7iecej[fary Effeds whatfoever, let the Caule be never fo good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious ; but the Virtue or Vice muft be only in the free Cartfe. Agreeably to this. Dr.' Whitby fuppofes, the Neceffity that attends the good and evil Habits of the Saints in Heaven, and Damned in Hell, which are the Confequence oi their free Ads in their State of Probation, are not rewardable or punifhabie. On the Whole, it appears, that if the Notions of Armintnns eoneerning Liberty and moral Agency be true, it will follow that there is no Virtue in any fuch Habits or Qualities as Humility, Meeknefs, Patience, Mercy, Gratitude, Generofity, Heavenly-mindednefs : Nothing at all Praife-worthy in loving Chrift above Father and Mother, Vv^ife and Children, or our own Lives ; or in Delight in Holinefs, hungering and thirfting after Righteoufnefs, Love to Enemies, univerfal Benevolence to Mankind. And on the other Hand, there is Nothing at all vicious, or worthy of Difpraife, in the moft fordid, beaftly, ftialignant, devilifh Difpofuions ; in being ungrateful, profane, A a 3 habitually 1 84 Arminianifm inconfiftcnt Part IIL^ habitually hating God, and Things facred and holy ; or in. being mofl treacherous, envious and cruel towards Men. For all thefe Things are Difpojitions and Inclhmtions of the Heart. And in fnort, there is no fuch Thing as any virtuous or vici^ pus 'Surdity of Mind ; no fuch Thing as inherent Virtue and Holinefs, or Vice and Sin : And the ftronger thofe Habits or Difpoiitions are, which ufed to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being fo indeed ; the more violent Men's Lufts are, the more fix'd their Pride, Envy, Ingratitude and-Malicioufnefs, ftill the further are they from being blame- worthy. If there be a Man that by his own repeated Acls, or by any other Means, is come to be of the raoft hellifti i)ifpo(ition, defperately inclined to treat his Neighbours with Injurioufncfs, Contempt and Malignity ; the further they ihould be from any Difpofition to be angrv with Him, or in the leaft to blame Him. So on the other iland, if there be a. Perfon, who is of a moft excellent Spirit, ftrcngly inclining him to the moft amiable Adtions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. fo much is he further from any Thing rewardable or com- mendable. On which Principles, the Man Jefus Chrift was very far from being Praife-worthy for thofe Ads of Holinefs and Kindnefs which He performed, thefe Propenfities being fo ftrong in his Heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God, is infinitely remote from any Thing commend- able, his good Incbnations being infinitely ftrong, and He therefore at the utmoft poiTible Diftance from being at Liberty. And in all Cafes, the ftronger the Inclinations of any are to Virtue, and the more they love it, the lefs virtuous they are ; and the more they love Wickednefs, the lefs vicious.' • Whether thefe Things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Chriftian, and every Man who has read the Bible, judge : and whether they are agreeable to common Senfe, let every one judge, that have human Undcrftanding in Exercife. And if we purfue thefe Principles, we fhall find that Vir- tue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the World ; and that there never was, nor ever can be any fuch Thing as one or tjie other ; either in God, Angels or Men. No Propenfity, Difpofition or Habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been Hiewn ; becaufe they, fo far as they take Place, deftroy the Freedom of the Will, the Foundation of all moral Agency, and exclude all Capacity of either Virtue or Vice. And if Habits and Difpofitions themfelves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the Exercife of thefe Difpofitions be fo : For the Exercife of Bias is not the Exercife oi free /elf- determining Seel. VII. with moral Habits and Motives. 1 85 ietcrminwg Will, and fo there is no Exercife of Liberty in it. Confequently no Man is virtuous or vicious, eitherjn being well or ill difpofed, nor in aifting from a good or bad Difpofuion. And wliether this Bias or Difpofitidn be habitual or not, if it cxifts but a Moment before the MX of Will, which is the Effed of it, it alters not the Cafe, as to the Neceffity of the Efieft. Or if there be no previous Difpoiition at all, either habitual or occafional, that determines the Aft, then it is not Choice that determines it : It is therefore a Contingence, that happens to the Man, arifing from Nothing in him ; and is necelTary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his; and there- fore can't make Him either the better or worfe, any more than a Tree is better than other Trees, becaufe it oftener happens to be lit upon by a Swan or Nightingale ; or a Rock more vicious than other Rocks, becaufe Rattle-Snakes have happen'd ofrener to crawl over it. So that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad Difpofitions, either fix'd or tranfient ; nor any Virtue or Vice in afting from any good or bad previous In- clination ; nor yet any Virtue or Vice in afting wholly with- out any previous Inclination. Where then fball wc find Room for Virtue or Vice ? j>0«k2>oO''0>0'0<0'0'^'0'>'>0'><5>>'0'»cale, and take the Work of felf-determining Power out of its Hands. And the clearer the Inftruftions are that are given, the more powerful the Arguments that are ufed, and the more moving the Perfwafions or Examples, the more likely they are to fruftrate their own Defign ; becaufe they have fo much the greater Tendency to put the Will out of its Balance, to hinder its Freedom of felf-detcrmination ; and fo to exclude the very Form of Virtue, and the Effence of wbatfoever is Praife- n'orthy. So it clearly follows from thefc Principles, that God has no Hand in any Man's Virtue, nor does at all promote it, eichec by a phyfical or moral Influence ; that none of the moral Methods He ufes with Men to promote Virtue in the Worlds have Tendency to the Attainment of that End ; that all the Inftruftions which He has given to Men, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, by Prophets, or Apoftles, or by his Son Jefus Chrift ; that all his Coanfels, Invitations, Promifes, Threatnings, Warnings and Expoftulations ; that all Means He has ufed with Men, in Ordinances, or Providences j yea, all Influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no Tendency at all to excite any one virtuous A Arminianifm excludes all Virtue^ Part- lit- diis be all, then ail thofe Means do no more to promote Vir- tue, than Vice : For they do Nothing but give the Will- Opportunity to determine itfelf either Way, either to Good dr Bad, without laying it under any Bias to either : And fo there is really as much of an Opuortunity given to determine sn Favour of Evil, as of Good. Thus that horrid blafphemous Confequence will certainly follow from the Arminian Doftrine, which they charge on others ; namely, that God afls an inconfiftent Part in ufmg fo many Counfels, Warnings, Invitations, Intreaties, &c, with Sinners, to induce them to forfake Sin, and turn to the Ways of Virtue ; and that all are infincere and fallacious. It will fol- low from their Doftrine, that God does thefe Things when.' He knows at the fame Time, that they have no Manner of Tendency to promote the EfFeft He feems to aim at ; yea, knows that if they have any Influence, this very Influence will be inconfiftent with fuch an EfFeft, and will prevent it. But what an Imputation of Infincerity would this fix on Him who is infinitely holy and true ! — So that their's is the Doftrine which if purfued in its Confequences, does horribly reflefl: on the moft High, and fix on Him the Charge of Hypocrify ; and HOt the Dottrine of the CaWinifi ; according to their frequent, and vehement Exclamations and Invedives. Corol. 2. From what has been obferved in this Seftlon, it again appears, that Arminmn Principles and Notions, when- fairly examined, and purfued in their demonftrable Confe- quences, do evidently fliut all Virtue out of the World, and make it impoflible that there fliould ever be any fuch Thing,, in any Caie ; or that any fuch Thing Ihould ever be conceiv'd of. For by thefe Principles, the very Notion of Virtue or Vice implies Abfurdity and Contradiction : For it is abfurd in kfelf, and contrary to common Senfe, to fuppofe a virtuous A& of Mind without any good Intention or Aim. And by their Principles, it i.s abfurd to fuppofe a virtuous Aft with a good Intention or Aim ; for to aft for an End, is to aft from a Motive. So that if we rely on thefe Principles, there can be no virtuous Aft with a good Defign and End ; and 'tis lelf-evident, there can be none without : confequently there can be no virtuous Aft at all. Carol. 3. 'Tis manifeft, that Arminian Notions of moral Agency, and the Being of a Faculty of Will, cannot confift to>- gether J and that if there be an/ fuch Thing as, either a vi?- tUOUSj Sedt.VIL andYiot.miofffjeJVorld. 191 tuous, or vicious Aft, it can't be an Aft of Will; no Will can be at all concerned in it. For that Aft which is performed without Inclination, without Motive, without End, niuft be performed without any concern of the Will. To fiippofe an Aft of the Will without thefe, implies a Contradiftion. If the Soul in its Aft h?s no Motive or End ; then in that Aft (as was obferved before) it feeks Nothing, goes after Nothing, exerts no Inclination to any Thing ; and this implies, that in that Aft it defires Nothing, and^bufes Nothing ; fothat there is no Aft of Choice in the Cafe : And that is as much as to fay, there is no Aft of Will jniheCafe. Which very efFeftually ihuts out all vicious and virtuous Afts out of the Univerfe^ in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous Aft wherein the Will is concerned ; and according to the plaineft Diftates of Reafon, and the Light of Nature, and alfo the Principles of Arminians themfelves, there c^n be no virtuous or vicious Aft wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore there is no Room for any virtuous or vicious Afts at all. Carol. 4. If none of the moral Aftions of intelligent Beings are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, ano- ther ftrange Thing will follow ; and this is, that God not - only can't foreknow any of the future moral Aftions of his Creatures, but He can make no Conjefture, can give no pro- bable Guefs concerning them. For, all Conjefture in Thi«gs of this Nature, muft depend on fome Difcerning or Appre- henfion of thefe two Things, prc'vio.us Di/pojitio?!, and Moti've ; which, as has been obferved, Arminian Notions of moraj Agency, in -thpir real Confequence, altogether exclude. g b I PART ( 19^ ) PART IV. Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafonings oi Arminians^ in Sup- port and Defence of the foremen- tion'd Notions of Liberty^ 7noral Agency^ &^c. and againft the op^ pofite Dodtrine, are confidered. Section I. ^je ElTence of the Virtue and Vice of Dijpofitions of the Hearty and A5ls of the Willy lies not in their Caufe, but in their Nature. ^•O*©*^ N E main Foundation of the Reafons, which are A brought to eftablifh the foremention'd Notions of O A Liberty, Virtue, Vice, &c. is a Suppofition, that ^ the Virtuoufncfs of the Difpofitions or Ads of the ^s£>«o<<^ Will confifts not in the Nature of thefe Difpofi- tions or Adls, but wholly in the Origin or Caufe of them: ti% that if the Difpofition of the Mind or Aft of the Will be never fo good, yet if the Caufe of the Difpofition or Aft be not our Virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praife-worthy in it ; and cn the contrary, if the Will iiv its Inclination or Afts be ne- ver SediA. Of the "E^tnct of Virtue and Vice. 193 yer fo bad, yet unlefs it arifes from fomething that is our Vice or Fault, there is Nothing vicious or blame-worthy in it. Hence their grand Objedlion and pretended Demonftration, or Self-evidence, againft any Virtue and Commendablenefs, or Vice and Blame-worthinefs, of thofe Habits or Ads of the Will, which are not from fome virtuous or vicious Determina- tion of the Will itfelf. Now, if this Matter be well confidered, it will appear to be altogether a Miftake, yea, a grofs Abfurdity ; and that it is moft certain, that if there be any fuch Things, as a virtuous, or vicious Difpofition, or Volition of Mind, the Virtuoufnefa or Vicioufnefs of them confif^s not in the Origin or Caufe of thefe Things, but in the Nature of them. If the Kflence of Virtuonfrefs or Commendablenefs, and of Vicioufnefs or Fault, don't lie in the Nature of the Difpo- fitions or Afts of Mind, which are faid to be our Virtue or our Fault, but in their Caufe, then it is certain it lies no ■where at all. Thus, for Inftance, if the Vice of a 'vkwus A&. of Will, lies not in the Nature of the Aft, but the Caufe; fo that its being of a bad Nature will not make it at all our Fault, unlefs it arifes from fome faulty determination of our's as its Caufe, or fomething in us that is our Fault ; then for the fame Reafon, neither can the Vicioufnefs of that Caufe lie in the Nature of the Thing it- felf, but in its Caufe : That evil Determination of our's is not our Fault, merely becaufe it is of a bad Nature, unlefs it arifes from fome Caufe in us that is our Fault. And when xvt are come to this higher Caufe, fiill the Reafon of the Thing holds good ; tho' this Caufe be of a bad Nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that Account, unlefs it arifes from fomething faulty in us. Nor yet can Blame-worthinefs lie in the Nature of /^/> Caufe, but in the Caufe oi that. And thus we muft drive Faultinefs back from Step to Step, from a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitHm ; and that is thoroughly to banifh it from the World, and to allow it no poffibility of Exiftence any where in the Univerfality of Things. On thefe Principles, Vice or moral Evil can't confift in any Thing that is znEfe^; becaufe Fault don't confift in the Nature of Things, but in their Caufe ; as well as becaufe Effeds are neceffary, being unavoidably connected with their Caufe : Therefore the Caufe only is to blame. And fo it follows, that Faultinefs can lie only in that Caufe, which is a Cmjfe o?ily, and no Effeft of any Thing. Nor yet can it lie in this ; for then ^t muft lie in the Nature of th$ Thing itfelf] not in its be- ing" 194 ^^^^ Eflence of Virtue and Pice, Part IV, ing from any Determination of our's, nor any Thing faulty in us which is the Caufe, nor indeed from any Caufe at all, for by the Suppofition, it is no Effe^Tl, and has 710 Caufe. And thus. He that will maintain, it is not the Nature of Habits or Ads of Will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the Caufe, muft immediately run Himfelf out of his own AfTertion ; and in maintaining it, will infenfibly .contradict and deny it. This is certain, that if EiFej5ts are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them, but becaufe they are from a bad Caufe, it muft be on Ac- count of the Badnefs of the Caufe ; and fo on Account of the l>!ature of the Caufe. A bad Effefl in the Will muft be bad, becaufe the Caufe is bad, or oj an e'vil Nature, or has Badnefs as a Quality inherent in it : And a good Efteft in the Will muft be good, by Reafon of the Goodnef of the Caufe, or its h^va^ of a good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the very Suppofition of Fault and Praife lying not in the Nature of the Thing, but the Caufe, con- tradifts itfelf, and does at leaft refolve the Eflence of Virtue and Vice into the Nature of Things, and fuppofes it originally to confift; in that. And if a Caviller has a Mind to rua from the Abfurdity, by faying, ?' No, the Fault of the •* Thing which is the Caufe, lies not in this, that the Caufe. •• itfelf is of an emil Nature, but that the Caufe is evil in " that Senfe, that it is from another bad Caufe:" Still the Abfurdity will follow him ; lor if fo, then the Caufe before charged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame muft be laid to the higher Caufe, and muft confift in that's being Emil, or of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay the Blame of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolifh as to go higher ftill, and afcend from Step to Step, till he is come to that •yvhich is the firft Caufe concerned in the whole Affair, and will fay, all the Blame lies in that ; then at laft he muft be forced to own, that the Faultinefs of the Thing, which he fuppofes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the Thing, and not in the Original or Caufe of ii; for the Suppofition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no Aft of our's, is caufed by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely nuithout any. Cauje. And fo the Race is at an End, but the Evader is taken, in his Flight. 'Tis agreeable to the natural Notions of Mankind, that moral Evil, with its Defert of Diflike and Abhorrence, and all its other lU-defervings, conlifts 'iv\ a certain Deformitji in the Se6l. I. inthe^2it\xttofVolition^ Hot intheCdtw^t. 195 the Nature of certain Difpofitions of the Heart, and Ads of the Wni ; and not in the Deformity o'i fomethivg elfe, diverla from the very Thing itfelf, which deferves Abhorrence, fuppofed to be the Caufe of it : Which would be abfurd, becaufe that would be to fuppofe, a Thing that is in- nocent and not Evil, is truly evil and faulty, becaufe another Thing is Evil. It implies a Contradiction ; for it would be to fuppofe, the very Thing which is morally evil and blame- worthy, is innocent and not blame-worihy ; but that fomething elfe, which is its Caufe, is only to blame. To fay, that Vice don't confift in the Thing which is vicious, but in its Caufe, is the fame as to fay, that Vice don't confift in Vice, but in that which produces it* 'Tis true, a, Caufe may be to blame, for being the Caufe of Vice : It may be Wickednefs in the Caufe, that it pro- duces Wickednefs : But it would imply a Contradiftion, ta fuppofe that thefe two are the fame individual Wickednefs. The wicked Aft of the Caufe in producing Vvickednefs, is one Wickednefs ; and the Wickednefs produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore the Wickednefs of the latter don't lie in the former, but is diftind from it ; and the Wickednefs of both lies in the e-vil Nature of the Things tvhich are wicked. The Thing which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it deferves Punifhment ; which is but the Expreflion of Hatred. And that which renders Virtue lovely, is the fame with that, on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praife and Re- ward ; which are but the Expreflions of Efteem and Love. But that which makes Vice hateful, is its hateful Nature ; and that which renders Virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. 'Tis a certain Beauty or Deformity that are inherent in that good or evil Will, which is the Soul of Virtue and Vice, (and not in the Occajion of it) which is their Worthinefs of Efteem or Difeftecm, Praife or Difpraife, according to the common Senfc of Mankind. If the Caufe or Occafion of the Rife of an hateful Difpofition or Aft of Will, be alfo hateful ; fuppofe another antecedent evil Will ; that is entirely another Sirr, and deferves Punill\ment by itfelf, under a diftinft Confide- ration. There is Worthinefs of Difpraife in the Nature of an evil Volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing Aft which is its Caufe ; otherwife the evil Volition which is the Efteft, 39 no moral Evil, any more than Sicknefs, or fome other na- tural Calamity, which arifes from a Caufe morallj^ evii. Thus i 96 ^hi? Erfence of Virtue and Vicey Part IV^ Thus, for Inflance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of Difpraife, according to common Senfe ; not becaufe foraething as bad, or vvorfe than ingratitude, was the Caufe that produced it; but becaufe it ia hateful in itfeifj by its own inherent Deformity. So the Love of Virtue is amiable, and worthy of Praife, not merely becaufe fomething elfe went before this Love of Virtue in our Minds, which caufed it to take Place there ; for Inftance, our own Choice ; we chofe to love Virtue, and by fome Method or other wrought ourfclves into the Love of it ; but becaufe of the Amiabknefs and Condecency of fuch a Difpofition and Inclination of Heart. If that 'was the Cafe, that we did chufe to love Virtue, and fo produce*! that Love in ourfelves, this Choice it/elf could be no other- wife amiable or praife-worthy, than as Love to Virtue, or fome other amiable inclination, was ex.ercifed and implied in it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it mult be fo on Ac- count of fome amiable Quality in the Nature of the Choice; If we chofc to love Virtue, not in love to Virtue, or any Thing that was goad, and exercifed no Sort of good Difpofi- tion in the Clioice, the Choice itfelf was not virtuous, nor worthy of any Praife, according to common Senfe, becaufe the Choice was not of a gaod Nature, It may not be improper here to take Notice of fomething faid by an Author, that has lately made a mighty Noife in Ame- rica. " A neceiTary Holinefs (fays He*) is r>o Holinefs. *' Adam could not be originally created in Righteoufnefs and " true Holinefs, becaufe He muft chufe to be righteous, before •' He could be righteous. And therefore He muft exift. He •' muft be created, yea He he muft exercife Thought and Re- " flection, bei'bre he was righteous." There is much more to the fame Effeft in that Place, and alfo in P. 437, 438, 439,^ 440. If thefe Things are fo, it will certainly follow, that the firft chufmg X.0 be righteous is no righteous Choice ; there is no Righteoufnefs or Holinefs in it ; becaufe no chufing to be righteous goes before it. For He plainly fpeaks of chufing to he righteous f as what mufi go before Righteoufnefs : And that which follows the Choice, being the Effeft of the Choice, can't be Righteoufnefs or Holinefs : For an Effecl is a Thing neceffary, and can't prevent the Influence or Efficacy of its Caufe ; and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the Caufe : And He fays, A neceffary Holinefs is no Holinefs, So that neither can a Choice of Righteoufnefs be Righteoufnefs or Holine{s> * Scrip. D»c, of Original Sin, P, 180. jd Edit* Sec. I. in the Nature of Volition, not in the Caufe. 197 Kolinefs, not can any Thing that is confequent on that Choice> and the Effecft of it, be Righteoufncfs or Holinefs ; nor caa any Thing thnt is without Choice, be Righteoufncfs or Holi- nefs. So that by his Scheme, all Righteoufncfs and Kolinefs is at once fhut out of the World, and no Door left open, by which it can ever pofFibly enter into the World. I foppofe, the V7ay that Men came to entertain this abfurd inconfment Notion, with Refped to ijitemal Inclinations and Volitiotis themfelves, (or Notions that imply it) njiz. that the Eflence of their moral Good or Evil lies not in their Nature, "bat their Caufe, was, that it is indeed a very plain Didlate of common Senfe, that it is fo with Refpeft to all outnuari Anions, and fenfible Motions of the Body ; that the moral Good or Evil of them don't lie at all in the Motions them- felves ; which taken by themfelves, are nothing of a moral Nature ; ard the EiTcnce of all the moral Good or Evil that concerns them, lies in thofe internal Difpofitions and Volitions which are the Caufe of them. Now being always ufed to de- termine this, without Hefitation or Difpute, concerning external Aaions ; which are the Things that in the common Ufe of Language are fignified by fuch Phrafes, as Men's Anions, or their Doings : Hence when they came to fpeak of Volitions, and internal Exercifes of their Inclinations, under the fame De- nomination of their Anions, or 'vjkat they do, they unwarily de- termined the Cafe muft alfo be the fame with thefe, as with external Anions ; not confidering the vaft Difference in the Na- ture of the Cafe. If any fliall ftill obje^ an(3 fay, "Why is it not neceffary that the Caufe fhould be confidered, in order to determine whether any Thing be worthy of Blame or Praife ? Is it agreeable to Reafon and common Senfe, that a Man is to be praifed or blamed for that which he is not the Caufe ox Author of, and has no Hand in ? I anfwer, fuch Phrafes as being the Cavfe, being the Author , harving a Hand, and the like are ambiguous. They are moft vulgarly underftood for being the defigning voluntary Caufe, or Caufe by antecedent Choice : And it is molt certain that Men are not in this Senfe the Caufes or Authors of the firft Aft of their Wills, in any Cafe ; as certain as any Thing is, or ever can be ; for nothing can be more certain, than that a Thing is not before it is, nor a Thing of the fame Kind be- fore the firft Thing of that Kind ; and fo no Choice before C c the v^t The Armrniart Notion of A6lion, Part Vfo x\t firft Choice. As the Phrafe, being the Author, may be un- derftood, not of being the Producer by an antecedent Aft of Will ; but as a Perfon may be faid to be the Author of the Aft of Will itfelf, by his being the immediate Agent, or the- Being that is ading, or in Exercife in- that Aft : If the Phrafe of being the Author , is ufed to lignify this, then doubtlefs com- mon Senfe requires Men's being the Authors of their own Afts of Will-, in order to their being efteemed worthy of Praife or I)ifpraife on Account of them. And common Senfe teaches,, that they muft be the Authors q{ external Adions, in theformer Senfe, namely, their being the Caufes of them by an Aft of Will or Choice, in order to their being juftly blamed or praifed: But it teaches no fuch Thing with Rcfpeft to the Afts of the Will themfelves. But this may appear more manifeft by the- Things which will be obferved in the following Seftion. •&ooo6oaoro3oeooasooocio09Sooooooo«c»ooam the original Meaning of the Word. The more ufual Signification of it in vulgar Speech, feeras to be fome Motion or Exeriio?i of Poiver, that is voluntary, or that is the Effe^ of the Will ; and is ufed in the fame Senfe as doing : And moft commonly 'tis ufed to fignify oiiiti.vard Anions. So Thinking is often diilinguillied from Ailing ; and Defying and Willingy from Doing, Befides 202 The Arminian Notion of Adion, Part IV. Befides this more ufual and proper Signification of the Word Adion, there are other Ways in which the Word is ufed that are lefs proper, which yet have Place in common Speech, Oftentimes 'tis ufed to fignify fome Motion or Alteration in inanimate Things, with Relation to fome Objeft and Effeft. So the Spring of a Watch is faid to a£l upon the Chain and Wheels ; the Sun-beams, to aft upon Plants and Trees ; and the Fire, to aft upon Wood. Sometimes the 'V^'^ord is ufed to fignify Motions, Alterations, and Exertions of Power, which are feen in corporeal Things, conjidered abfolutely ; efpecially when thefe Motions feem to arife from fome internal Caufe which is hidden ; fo that they have a greater Refemblance of thofe Motions of our Bodies, which are the Effeds of internal Volition, or invifible Exertions of Will. So the Fermentation of Liquor, tiie Operations of the Loadftone, and of eleftrical Bodies, are called the ASiion of thefe Things. And fometimes the Word Anion is ufed to fignify the Exercife of Thought, or of Will and Inclination ; fo meditating, loving, hating, in- clining, difinclining, chafing and refufing, may be fometimes called afting; tho' more rarely (unlefs it be by Philofophers and Metaphyficians) than in any of the other Senfes, But the Word is never ufed in vulgar Speech in that Sen{e which Arminian Divines ufe it in, namely, for the felf-deter- minate Exercife of the Will, or an Exertion of the Soul that arifes without any neceffary Connexion with any Thing fore- going. If a Man does fomething voluntarily, or as the EfFeft of his Choice, then in the moft proper Senfe, and as the Word is moft originally and commonly ufed, he is faid to act : But whether that Choice or Volition be felf-determined, or no, whether it be connefted with foregoing habitual Bias, whether it be the certain Effect of the ftrongeft Motive, or fome extrin- fick Caufe, never comes into Confidcration in the Meaning of the Word. ^ And if the Word Action Is arbitrarily ufed by fome Men otherwife, to fuit fome Scheme of Metaphyficks or Morality, no Argument can reafonably be founded on fuch a Ufe of this Term, to prove any Thing but their own Pleafure. For Di- vines and Philofophers ftrenuoufly to urge fuch Arguments, as tho' they were fufficient to fupport and demonftrate a whole Scheme of moral Philofophy and Divinity, is certainly to ereft a mighty Edifice on the Sand, or rather on a Shadow. And tho' it may now perhaps, through Cuftom, have become natural for them to ufe the Word in this Senfe, (if that may be called a Senfe Se6l:. It. falfe and inconfjfent. 10% Senfe or Meaning, which is fo inconfiftent with itfelf) yeC this don't prove that it is agreeable to the natural Notions Men have of Things, or that there can be any Thing in the Creation that fhould anfwer fuch a Meaning. And tho' they appeal ta Experience, ytt the Truth is, that Men are fo far from expe- riencing any fuch Thing, that it is impoffible for them to have any Conception of it. If it (hould be objefted, that Aaion and Pa_ffion are doubtlefs Words of a contrary Signification ; but to fuppofe that th& Agent, in its Adion, is under the Power and Influence of fomething extrinfick, is to confound Adion and Paffion, aad make them the fame Thing. I anfwer. That Adion and Paifion are doubtlefs, as they arc fometimes ufcd. Words of oppofite Signification j but not as fignifying oppofite Ex:Jietices, but only oppofite Relations. The Words Caiife and Effeii are Terms of oppofite Signification ; but neverthelefs, if I affert that the fame Thing may at the fame Time, in different Refpefts and Relations, be both Cavfe and Effeif, this will not prove that I confound the Terms. ^ Tfe Soul may be both a^l-ve and paffi--ve in the fame Thing in dif- ferent Refpefts, aiiit'e with Relation to one Thing, and pajjl've with Relation to another. The Word PaJJion when fet in Op- pofition toAdion or rather JSimenefs, is merely a relative Term : It fignifies no Effeft or Caufe, nor any proper Exiftence ; but is the fame with Paffi'venefs, or a being pafiive, or a being afted up - on by fomething : Which is a mere Relation of a Thing to fome Power or Force exerted by fome Caufe, producing fome Effect in it, or upon it. And ABion, when fet properly in Oppofitiom to Pajfwn, or Pajfinjenefs, is nO real Exiftence ; it is not the fame with A'N ABion, but is a mere Relation : 'Tis the ASii'venefs of fomething on another Thing, being the oppofite Relation to the other, 'viz. a Relation of Power, or Force exerted by fome Caufe, towards another Thing, which is the Subjeft of the Effeft of that Power. Indeed the Word A^ioa is frequently ufed to fignify fomething not merely relati've, but more abfolute, and a real Exiftence ; as when we fay ^n ABion ; when the Word is not ufed ttanfitively,. but abfolutely, for fome Motioii or Exercife of Body or Mind, without any Relation to any Objeft or Effeft : And as ufed thus, it is not properly the op- pofite of Pajp^on ; which ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, but merely the Relation of being aBed upon. And therefore i€ the Word ABion be ufed in the like relative Senfe, then Adioa and Paffion are only two contrary P.elations, And 'tis no Ab- furditjr 264. i'iozv this Arminian Notion Part IV, furdity to fuppofe, that conti-ary Relations may belong to the fame Thing, at the fame Time, with Refpeft to difFerent Things. So to fuppofe, that there are Ads of the Soul by which a Man voluntarily moves, and Ai^ts upon Obje«fts, and produces Effefts^ which yet themfelves are Efeds of fomething elfe, and wherein the Soul itfelf is the Object of fomething acfting upon, and influencing that, don't at all confound Aftion and Paffion, The Words may neverthelefs be properly of oppcfite Signifi- cation : There may be as true and real a Difference between aclhig and being cauj'ed to ad, tho' we ihould fuppofe the Soul to be both in the fame Volition, as tliere is between li'ving, and hebig quicken d, or made to li've. 'Tis no more a Contradidion, to fuppofe that Aftion may be the Effeft of fome other Caufe, befides the Agent, or Being that ads, than to fuppofe that Life may be \\\t EiFed of fome other Caufe, befides the Liver, or the Being that lives, in whom Life is caufed to be. The Thing which has led Men into this inccnfiftent No- tion of Adion, when applied to Volition, as tho' it were effchtial to this internal Adion, that the Agent fliould be felf- determined in it, and that the Will fliould be the Caufe of xx, was probably this ; that according to the Senfe ot Mankind, and the common ufe of Language it is fo, with refped to Men's external Adions ;. which are what originally, and ac- cording to the vulgar ufe and moft proper Senfe of the Word, are called 4^ions. Men in thefe are felf-direded, felf-deter- mined, and their W^ill's are the Caufe of the Motions of their Bodies, and the external Things that are done ; fo that unlefs Men do them voluntarily, and of Choice, and the Action be de- termined by their antecedent Volition, it is no Action or Doing of theirs. Hence fome Metaphyficians have been led unwarily, but exceeding ahfurdly, tofuppofe the fame concerning Volition itfell, that That alfo muft be determined by the Will ; which is to be determin'd by antecedent Volition, as the Motion of the Body is ; not confidering the Contradiction it implies. But 'tis very evident, that in the metaphyfical Diftinction be- tween Action and Paffion, (tho' long fince become common and the general Vogue) due Care has not been taken to conform Language to the Nature of Things, or to any diftinct clear Ideas. As it is in innumerable other Philofophical, Metaphy- fical Terms, ufed in thefe Difputes ; which has occafion'd in- expreiSble Difficulty, Contention, Error and Confufion. And Sfed. II. prohably arofe, 205 And thus probably it came to be thought, \\\iX Neceliity was jnconliftent with Action, as thefe Terms are applied to Vo- lition. Firfl, thefe Terms ABion and Necejfity are changed from their original Meaning, as l:gnif;^ing external voluntary Action, and Conltraint, (in which Meaning they are evidently incon- liftent) to fignify quite other Things, 'viz. Vc)lition itfelf, and Certainty of Exiftence. And when the Chang"aeeeoewoeeedeeBoeeei;Sfi Dd SsCTIOlt CLO& , Why Calvinifm is fappofed Part IT., Section III. The Reafons why fome think it contrary to com- mon Senfc, to fnppofe thofe Things which are neceflary, to be- worthy of either Praife or Blame. V I ' I S abundantly aiErmed and urged by ^://--^/«/«« Writers, X that it is contrary to commofi Seiife, and tlie natural No- tions and Apprehenfions of Mankind, to fuppofe other wife than that Neceility (making no Diftinftion between natural and mo- ral Neceflity). ii inconliitent with Virtue and Vice, Praife and Blame, Reward and Punifhment, And their Arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in ; and have been not a little perplexing to many who have been' friendly to the Truths as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures : It has feem'd to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Cal-viniftic Doftrines with the Notions Men commonly have of Juftice and Equity. And the- true Reafons of k feem to be thefe that follow : I. 'Tis indeedia very plain Didate of common Senfe, that natural Neceffity is wholly inconfiftent with juil Praife or Blame. If Men, do Things which in themfelves are very good, fit to be brought to pafs, and very happy EfFeds, pro- perly againft their Wills, and can't help it ; or do them from a Neceffity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no Concern or Connexion ; then 'tis a plain Diclate of common Senfe, that its none of their Virtue, nor any moral Good in them ; and that they are liot worthy to be rewarded or praifed ;. or at ail efteemed, honoured or loved on that "Account. And on the other Pland, that if from like Neceffity they do thofe Things which in Themfelves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them becaufe they can't help it ; the Neceffity is fuch, that it is all one whether they will them, or no ; and the Reafon why they are done, is from Neceffity only, and not from their Wills ; 'Tis a very plain Didlate of common Senfe that they are not at all to blame ; there is no Vice, Fault, or moral Evii at alli iu the EiFeft dong.;. por are they vvho are thus ncceflitated. Scdt. III. {-onirary to common ScnCe. 207 -necelFitated, in any wife worthy to be piinifhed, hated, or in the leaft difrefpefted, on that Account. In like Manner, if Things in themfclves I good and defira- b]e are abfolutely impoffible, vvith a natiiral Impoffibility, the univerfal Reafcn of Mankind teaches, tliat this 'vjholly and ferf.-cilj excufes Perfons in their not doing them. And 't's alfo a plain Dictate cf common Senfe, that if the rloing Tilings in ihemfelves Good, or avoiding Things ia themfelves Lvil, is not abfolutely impoffible. With fiich a natural Impoffibility, but very difficult, with a natural Difficulty; that is, a Difficulty prior to, and not at all conGding in Will and inclination itfelf, and which would remain' the fame, let the Inclination be what it will ; tlien ii Perfcn's Negleft or O- miffion is excufed inform Meafire, tho' not Wholly ; his Sin is kfs aggravated, than if the Thing to be donel v/ere eafy. And if inltead of Difficulty and Hindrance, there be a contrary na- tural Propenfity in the State of Things, to the filing to be done, or Effed to be brought to pafs, abftra(fted from any Coniidera- tion of the Inclination of the Heart ; tho' the Propenfity be not fo great as to amoant to a natural Necqffity; yet being fome Approach to it, fo that the doing the good Thing be very much from this natural Tendency in the State of Things, and but little from a good Inclination ; then it is a Diftate of common Scnfe, that there is fo much the lefs Virtue in what is done ; xmd fo it is lefs Praifc-worthj' and rewarda^ ble. The Reafon is eafy, hjIz. becaufe fach a r.atural Propen- fity or Tendency is an Approach to natural Neceffity ; and the greater the Propenfity, ftill fo much the nearer is the Approach to Neceffity. And therefore as natural Neceffity takes away or fhuts out all Virtue, fo this Propenfity ap- proaches to an Abolition of Virtue ; that is, it dimirsiffies it. And on the other Hand, natural Difficulty, iri the State of Things is an Approach to natural Impoffibility. And as the Jatter, when it is complete and abfoiute, 'wholly takes away £lame ; fo fach Difficulty takes away fome Blaipe,, or dimi- nifhes Blame; and makes the Thing done to bei lefs vvorthj^ of Punifhment. IL Men in their firft Ufc of fuch Phrafes 'as Ihefe, Muffi, can't, catit help it, can't avoid it, neceffiary, nnabk, impoffible, unavyidahie, irrefijiihle, &c. ufe them to fignify a Neceffity of Confiiaint or Reiftraint, a natural Neceffity or Impopibility ; or fome Neceffity that ' the Will has nothing to do in ; which D d 3 may 20Z ffHoy Calvinifm is fuppofed Part IV, xnay be, whether Men will or no ; and which may be fup- pofed to be juft the fame, let Men's Inclinations and Defires be what they will. Such Kind of Terms in their original Ufe, I fuppofe aimong all Nations, are relative ; carrying in their Signification (as was before obferved) a Reference or Ke- fpeft to fome contrary Will, Defire or Endeavour, which, it is fuppofed, is, or may be in the Cafe. All Men find, and be- gin to find in early Childhood, that there are innumerable Things that can'c be done, which they defire to do ; and in- numerable 'Ihings. which they are averfe to, that muft be, they can't avoid t.'liem, they will be, whether they chufe them or no. 'Tis to exprefs this Neceffity, which Men fo foon and fo often find, and which fo greatly and fo early affects them in innumer^ible Cafes, that fuch Terms and Phrafes are firit formed ; and 'tis to fignify fuch a Neceffity, that they are firft ufec'l, and that they are moll conftantly ufed, in the common AfF?iirs of Lifej and not to fignify any fuch me^ taphylical, fpecii lative and abftraft Notion, as that Connedion in the Nature or Courfe of Things, v/hich is between the Subjed and Predicate of a Propofition, and which is the Foun- dation of the certain Truth of that Propofition ; to fignify which, they who employ themfelves in Philofophical Inqui- ries into the Eril Origin and Metaphyfical Relations and Dependences o f Things, have borrowed thefe Terms, for want of others.. But we grow up from our Cradles in a Ufe of fuch Terms and Phrafes, entirely different from this, and carrying a Senf e exceeding diverfe from that in which they are commonly uftd in the Controverfy between Arminians and Caluinijis, A nd it being, as was faid before, a Diftate of the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, evident to us as foon as we begin to think., that the Neceffity fignified by thefe Terms, in the Senfe in ^vhich we firft learn them, does excule Perfons, and free them from all Fault or Blame : Hence our Idea's of Hxcufablenef J or Faultlefnefs is tied to thefe Terms and Phrafes by a. ftrong Habit, which is begun in Childhood as foon as we !begin to fpeak, and grows up with us, and is flrengthned by conftant Ufe and Cuftom, the Conneftio^ growing ftronger and ftronger. The habitual Connexion which is in Men's Minds be- tween Blanaelefnefs and thofe loremention'd Terms, Muji, cannot, unable, necejfary, impojjtble, una'uoidahle , &c. becomes very ftrong ; becaufe as foon as ever Men begin to ufe Reafon and Speech, they have Occafion to excufe themfelves, from |jie natural Neceffity figniiied by thefe Terms, in numerous Infiances ; Sc(-l. III. contrary to common Senfe. 209 Inftances :■■ / can't do it 1 could not help it, And all Mankind have conilant and daily Occafion to ufe fuch Phrafes in this Senfe, to excufe thenjfelves and others in almoft all the Concerns of Life, with Refpedl to Difappointments, and Things that happen which concern and affeft us and others, that are hurtful, or difagreeable to us or them, or Things de- iirable that we or others fail of. That a being accuftomed to an Union of different Ideas, from early Childhood, makes the habitual Connexion ex- ceeding ftrong, as tho' fuch Connection were owing to Nature, is manifcft in innumerable Inftances, It is altogether by fuch an habitual Connection of Ideas, that Men judge of the Big- nefs or Diftance of the Objeds of Sight from their Appearance, Thus 'tis owing to fuch a Connexion early ^ftablilhed, and growing up with a Perfon, that he judges a Mountain, which he fees at ten Miles diftance, to be bigger than his Nofe, or further off than the End of it. Having been ufed fo long to join a confiderable Diftance and Magnitude with fuch an Ap- pearance, Men imagine it is by a Dictate of natural Senfe : Whereas it would be quite otherwife with one that had his Eyes newly opened, who had been born blind : He would have the fame viiible Appearance, but natural Senfe would didate no fuch Thing concerning the Magnitude or Diftanpe of what appeared. III. When Men, after they had been fo habituated to connedl Ideas of Innocency or Blaraelefnefs with fuch Terms, that the Union feems to be the Effeft of mere Nature, come to hear the fame Terras ufed, and learn to ufe them themfelves in the fore- mention'd new and metaphyfical Senfe, to fignify quite another Sort of Neceflity, which has no fuch Kind of Relation to a contrary fuppofable Will and Endeavour ; the Notion of plain and manifeft Blamelefnefs , by this Means, is by a ftrong Pre- judice, infenfibly and unwarily transfer'd to a Cafe to which it by no Means belongs : The Change of the Ufe of the Terms, to a Signification which is very diverfe, not being taken No- tice of, or adverted to. And there are feveral Reafons why it is not. I. The Terms, as ufed by Philofophers, are not very diftind and clear in their Meaning ; few ufe them in a fix'd deter- mined Senfe. On the contrary, their Meaning is very vague »nd confwfed. Which is what commonly happens to the Word* 0.10 ff^hy Czlvlmitn is fiippdfcd Part IV, Words ufed to fignify Things intelleftual iind moral, and to cxprefs what Mr. Locke calls fnlxt Modes. If Men had a clear and iliftind Undef ftanding of what is intended by thefe meta- •phyfical Terms, they would be able more eafily to compare ,them with their original and common Senfe ; and fo would not be fo eafily cheated by them. The Minds of Men are fo eafily Jed into Deluficn by no Sort of Terms in the World, as by Words of this Sort. 2. The Change of the Signification of the Terms is the more infenfible, becaufe the 1 hings fignified, tho' indeed very different, yet do in fome generals agree. In NecpJJity, that which is vulgarly fo called, there is a ftrong Connection be- tween the Thing faid to be Neceflary, and fomething antece- dent to it, in the Order of Nature ; fo there is alfo in philo- fophkal NeceJ/ity. And tho' in both Kinds of Neceffity, the Connexion can't be called by that Name, with Relation to an oppofite Will or Endeavour, to which it h /tiperiair ; which is the Cafe in vulgar Neceffity ; yet in both; the Con- reftion is prior to Will and Endeavour, and fo in fome Re- i^tdifuperiour. In both Kinds of Neceffity there is a Foun- dation for fome Certainty of the Propofition that affirms the Event. The Terms ufed being the fame, and the Things fignified agreeing in thefe and fome other general Circumflances, and the Exprefilons as ufed by Philofophers being not well dcr figned, and fo of obfcure and loofe Signification ; hence Per- fons are not aware of the great Difference ; and the Notions of Innocence or Faultlefnefs, which were fo ftrongly afl'ociated with them, and were flridly united in their Minds, ever fince they can remember, remain united with them flill, as if the Union were altogether natural and neceffary ; and they that go about to make a Separation, feem to them to do great Violence, even to Nature itfelf. IV. Another Reafon why it appears difficult to reconcile it with Reafon, that Men fhould be blamed for that which is neceffary with a moral Neceffity (which as was obferved before is a Species of Philofophical Neceffity) is, that for want of due Confideration, Men inwardly entertain that Apprehenfion, that this Neceffity may be againfl Men's Wills and fincere En- deavours. They go away with that Notion, that Men may truly will and wifh and flrive that it may be otherwife ; but that invincible Neceffity flands in the Way. And many think thus concerning themfelves : Some that are wicked Men tliink they svifti that they were good, that they loved God and Holinefs ; but Seta. III. contrary to common Senfc. ^tt but yet don't find that their Wifhes produce the Effeft The Reafons why Men think thus, are as foUovv's. (i.) They find what may be called an indirect Willingnefs to have a better Will in the Manner before cbferved : For it is impollible, and a Contradiction to fuppofe the Will to be- direttly and properly againft itfelf. And they don't confider, that this in- direct Willingnefs is entirely a different Thing from properly willing the "1 hing that is the Duty and Virtue required ; and that there is no Virtue in that Sort of Willingnefs which they have. They don't confider, that the Volitions which a wicked Man may have that lie loved God, are no Acts of the Will at all agamlt the moral Evil of not loving God ; but only fome difagreeable Confequences : But the making the requifite Diltinction requires more Care of Reflection and Thought than molt Men are ufed to. And Men through a Prejudice ia their own Favour, are difpofed to think v»ell of their own Defires and Difpofitions, and to account them good and vir- tuous, tho' their Refpect to Virtue be only indirect and remote^ and 'tis nothing at all that is virtuous that truly excites or ter- minates their Inclinations. (2.) Another Thing that infenfibly leads and beguiles Men into a Suppofition that this moral NecefTity or ImpoiTibility is, or may be againft Men's Willi*, and true Endeavours, is the Derivation and Formation of the Terms themfelves, that are often ufed to exprefs it, which is fuch as feems directly to point to, and hold this forth. Such Words, for Inltance, as iinahle, unanjoidable , i7npoJJible, irre~ fjiibie- which carry a plain Reference to a fuppofable Power exerted. Endeavours ufed, RefiHance made, in Oppofition to the Neceffity : And the Perfons that hear them, not confiderins? nor fufpecting but that they are ufed in their proper Senfe : That Senfe being therefore underftood, there does naturally, and as it were necelfarily arife in their Minds a Suppofition that it may be fo indeed, that true Defires and Endeavours may take Place, but that invincible Neceffity flands in the Way, and renders them vain and to no Effect. V. Another Thing which makes Perfons more ready to fuppofe it to be contrary to Reafon, that Men fhould be ex- pofed to the Punifhments threaten'd to Sin, for doing thofe Things which are morally neceffary, or not doing thofe Things morally impoffible, is, that Imagination ffrengthens the Argument, and adds greatly to the Power and Influence of the feeming Reafons againit it, from the greatnefs of that Punifhment. To allow that they may be juftly expofed to a fmall Punifhment, would not be fo diffigult. Whereas, if thett were il% Necejfary VirtuCy &c. Part IV. were any good Reafon in the Cafe, if it were truly a Dictate of Reafon that fuch NeceiTity was inconfiftent with Faultinefs, or juft Puniftiment, the Demonftration would be equally certain with refpect to a fmall Punifhment, or any Punifhment at all, as a very great one : But it is not equally eafy to the Imagi- nation. They that argue againft the Juftice of fetting afide all Delufion arifing from the Impropriety and Ambiguity of Terms, this is not at all inconfiftent with the natural Apprehenfions of Mankind, and that Senfe of Things which is found every where in the common People, who are furtheft from having their Thoughts preverted from their natu- ral Channel, by metaphyfical and philofophical Subtilties ; but on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very Voice and Dictate o/this natural and vulgar Senfe. I. This will appear if we confider what the vulgar Notion of Blame-'worthinefi is. The Idea which the common People through Seft. IV-. agreeable to common Senfe. 213 through all Ages and Nations have of Faultinefs, I fuppofe to be plainly this ; A Perfcns being or doitig lurottg, 'with his onvn T/ ill and Plfafum ; containing thefe two Things ; i. His doing ivrjng, 'whcn he docs as he pleafes, 2. His Pleofure's being 'wrong. Or in other Words, periiaps more intelligibly exprefiing their Notion J A Per/oh's han:ing his Heart avrong, a?!d doing ivrotig from his Heart. And this is the Sum total of the Matter. The common People don't afcend up in their Reflexions and Abftractions, to the metaphyficaj Sources, Relations and De- pendences of Things, in order to form their Notion of Faul- tinefs or Blaiiie-worthinefs. They don't wait till they have decided by their Refinings, what firft determines the Will ; \vhether it he determined by fomething extrinfic, or intrinfic ; whether Volition determines Volicion, or whether the Under- Handing determines the Will ; v/hether there be any fuch Thing as Metaphyficians mean by Contingence, (if they have any Meaning ;) whether there be a Sort of a ftrange unac- countable Sovereignty in the Will, in the Exercife of which* by its own fovereign Acts, it brings to pafs ail its own fove- reign Acts. They don't take any Part of their Notion of Fault or Blame from the P.efolution of any fuch Queftions. If this were the Cafe, there are Multitudes, yea the tar greater Part of Mankind, nine Hundred and ninety-nine out of a Thoufand would live and die v/ithout having any fuch Notion as that of Fault ever entring into their Heads, or with- out fo much as once having any Conception that any Body was to be either blamed or commended for any Thing. To be fure, it would be a long Time before Men came to have fuch Notions. Whereas 'tis manifeft, they are fome of the firft Notions that appear in Children ; who difcover as foon as they can think, or fpeak, or act at all as rational Creatures, a Senfe of Defert. And certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they make no ufe of Metaphyiicks. All the Ground they go upon coniiils in thefe two Things ; Experience, and a natu- ral Scn/ation of a certain Fitnefs or Agreeablenefs which there is iri uniting fuch moral Evil as is above defcribed, 'viz. a being or doing 'wrong tvith the Will, and Refentment in others, and f'ain inflicted on the Perfon in whom this moral Evil is. Which natural Senfe is what we call by the Name of Confcience. 'Tis true, the common People and Children, in their Notion of a faulty Act or Deed of any Perfon, do fuppofe that it is the Perfon's o'wn Act and Deed. But this is all that belongs to what they underlland by a Thing's being a Perfon's o'wn Deed or E e Action ; " •21-4 Neceffary Virtue, &c. Pait X^\, ABion ; even that it is fomething done by him of Choice- That fome Exercife or Motion fhould begin of itfelf, don't belong to their Notion of <7« ^^/5», or Doincr. If fo, it would belong to their Notion of it, that it is fomething which is the Gaufe of its own Beginning : And that is as much as to fay,, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of an ASlion fome Motion or Exercife that begins accidentally, with- out any Caufe or Reafon ; for that is contrary to one of the prime Diftates of common Senfe, namely, that every Thing, that begins to be, has fome Caufe or Reafon why it is. The common People, in their Notion of a faulty or praife-worthy Deed or Work done by any one, do fup- pofe that the Man does it in the Exercife of Liberty. But then their Notion of Liberty is only a Perfon's having Oppor- tunity of doing as he pleafeS. They have no Notion of Liber- ty confining in the Will's firft afting, and io caufing its own- Afts; and determining, and fo caufing its own Determina- tions ; or chufing, aaid fo caufing its own Choice. Such a. Notion of Libeny is what none have, but thofe that have darken'd t'aeir own Minds with confufed metaphyfical Specu- lation, and abftrufe and ambiguous Terms. If a Man is not reftrain'd from adting as his Will determines, or conftrain'd to adl otherwife ; then he has Liberty, according to common No- tions of Liberty, without taking into the Idea that grand Con- tradiftion of all the Determinations of a Man's free Will being the Eitedts of the Determinations of ■ >.» free Will. Nor have Men commonly any Notion of freedom confifting in In- difference. For if fo, then it would be agreeable to their No- tion, that the greater Indifference Men aft with, the more Freedom they aft with ; whereas the Reverfe is true. He that in afting, proceeds with the fuUeft Inclination, does what He does with the greatcft Freedom, according to common Senfe. And fo far is it from being agreeable to common ^'enfe, that fuch Liberty as confifts in Indifference is requifite to Fraife or Blame, that on the contrary, the Diftate of every Man's natu- ral Senfe thro' the World is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his afting Good or Evil, and the more he does cipher with full and ftrong Inclination, the more is he efteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned. II. If it were inconfifcent with the common Senfe of Man- kind, that Men fnould be either to be blamed or commend- ed in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Cafe of moral Neceffity or Impoffibility ; then it would furely alfo be agreea- Wz to the fame Senfe and Reafon of Mankind,, that the near- er Secfl. IV. agreeable to common Senfe. i\^ •er the Cafe approaches to fuch a moral Neceffity or Impofli- bility, either through a ftrong antecedent moral Propenfity on the one Hand, * or a great antecedent Oppofition and Difficulty on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blameable nor commendable ; fo that Atts exerted with fuch preceding Propcniity would be worthy of propor- tionably lefs Praife 4 and when omitted, the Ad being attend- ed with fuch Difficulty, the Omiffion would be worthy of the lefs Blame. It is fo, as was obferved before, with natural Neceffity and Impoffibility, Propenfity and Difficulty : As 'ti,s a plain Diftate of the Senfe of all Mankind, that natural Ne- ceffity and Impoffibility takes away all Blame and Praife ; and therefore, that the nearer the Approach is to thefe through previous Propenfity or Difficulty, fo Praife and Blame are ■proportionably diminiJhecL And if it were as much a Diftate of common Senfe, that moral Neceffity of doing, or Impoffi- bility of avoiding, takes away all Praife and Blame, as that natural Neceffity or Impoffibility does this; then, by a perfe^i Parity of Reafon, it would be as much the Diflate of commoii Senfe, that an Approach to moral Neceffity of doing, or Im- poffibility of avoiding, dhninijhes Praife and Blame, as that an Approach to natural Neceffity and Impoffibility does fo. 'Tis equally the Voice of common Senfe, that Perfons are exatfable in Part, in neglecting Things difficult againft their Wills, as that they are excujable 'wholly in neglefting Things impoffible againft their Wills. And if it made no Dilference, whether the Impoffibility were natural and againft the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, witli regard to Excufablenefs ; fo neither would it make any Difference, whether the Difficulty, or Approach to Neceffity be natural againft the 'Will, or moral, lying in the Propenfity of the Will. But 'tis apparent, that the Reverfe of thefe Things is true. If there be an Approach to a moral Neceffity in a Man's Ex- ertion of good Ads of Will, they being the Exercife of a ftrong Propenfity to Good, and a very powerful Love to Vir- tue ; 'tis fo far from being the Dictate of common Senfe, that He is lefs virtuous, and the lefs to be eiteem'd, loved and praifed ; that 'tis agreeable to the natural Notions of all Man- kind that he is fo much the better Man, worthy of greater Refped, and higher Commendation. And the ftronger the Inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to Neceffity iri that E e 3 Refped, * 'Tis here argued, on Suppofition that not all Propenfity implies mor^^l Neceffity, but only fomc rcry high Degrees ; which none will deny- 21 6 Necejfary Virtue^ &c. Part IV. Refpefl, or to Impoffibility of negleding the virtuous Aft, or of doing a vicious one ; ftill the more virtuous, and worthy of higher Commendation. And on the other Hand, if a Man exerts evil Adts of Mind ; as for Inftance, Afts of Pride or Malice, from a rooted and ftrong Habit or Principle of Haugh- tinefs and Malicioufnefs, and a violent Propenfity of Heart to fuch Acts; according to the natural Senfe of all Men, he is fo far from being the lefs hateful and blameable on that Ac- count, that he is To much the more worthy to be detefted and condemned by all that obferve Him. Moreover, 'tis manifeft that it is no Part of the Notion which Mankind commonly have of a blaraeable or Praife- •worthy Adf of the Will, that it is an Aft which is not deter- mined by an antecedent Bias or Motive, but by the fovereign Power of the Will itfelf ; becaufe if fo, the greater Hand fiich Caufes have in determining any Aft of the Will, fo much the lefs virtuous or vicious would they be accounted ; and the lefs Hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas the TReverfe it true : Men don't think a good Aft to be the lefs praife-worthy, for the Agent's being much determined in it by a good Inclination or a good Metive, but the more. And if good Inclination or Motive has but little Influence in deter- mining the Agent, they don't think his Aft fo much the more virtuous, but the lefs. And fo concerning evil Afts, which are determined by evil Motives or Inclinations. Yea, if it be fuppofed that good or evil Difpofitions are im- planted in the Hearts of Men by Nature itfelf, (which, it is certain, is vulgarly fuppofed in innumerable Cafes) yet it is, not commonly fuppofed that Men are worthy of no Praife or Difpraife for fuch Difpofitions ; altho' what is natural is un- doubtedly neceffary. Nature being prior to all Afts of the Will •whatfoever. Thus for Inftance, if a Man appears to be of a A'ery haughty or malicious Difpofition, and is fuppofed to be fo by his natural Temper, 'tis no vulgar Notion, no Diftate of the common Senfe and Apprehenfion of Men, that fuch Dif:. pofitions are no Vices or moral Evils, cr that fuch Perfons are not worthy of Difeftcem, Odium and Difhonour ; or that the proud or malicious Afts which flow from fuch natural Difpo- fitions, are v^orthy of no Refentment. Yea, fuch vile na- tural Difpofitions, and the Strength of them, will commonly be mention'd rather as an Aggravation of the wicked Afts that come from fuch a Fountain, than an Extenuation of them. Its being natural for Men to aft thus, is often obferved by • Men Sefl. IV. agreeable to Gommon Senfe. 217 Men in the Height of their Indignation : They will fay, " 'Tis " his very Nature: He is of a vile natural Temper ; 'tis as " natural to Him to aft fo, as it is to breathe ; He can't help " ferving the Devil, &:c." But it is not thus with Regard to hurtful mifchievous Things that any ,nre the Subjefts cr Occa- fions of by natural Necc^/ity, againft tlieir Inclinations. In fuch a Cafe, the Necclfity, by the common Voice of Mankind, will be fpoken of as a full Excufe. Thus 'tis very plain, that common Senfe makes a vaft Difference betv/een thefe two Kinds of NecefTity, as to the Judgment it makes of their Influence on the moral Quality and Defert of Men's Anions. And thefe Dictates of Men's Minds are fo natural and necef- fary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Ar-Tr.ijiians themfelves have ever got rid of them ; yea, their greateft Dodtors, that have gone furthell in Defence of their metaphyfical No- tions of Liberty, and have brought their Arguments to their greateil Strength, and as they fuppofe to a Demonftration, againft the Confiftence of Virtue and Vice with any Neceflity : 'Tis to be queif ion'd, whether there is fo much as one of them, but that if He fuffered very nmch from the injurious Afts of a Man under the Power of an invincible Haughtinefs and Malig- nancy of Temper, would not, from the foremention'd natural Senfe of Mind, refent it farotherwife, than if as great Sufferings came upon Him from the Wind that blows, and Fire that burns by natural NeceiTity ; and otherwife than he would, if he fuffered as much from the Conduct of a Man perfectly de- lirious ; yea, tho' he firft brought his Diftraflion upon Him fome Way by his own Fault, Some feem to difdain the Diftinftion that we make between natural nnA moral NeceJ/liy, as tho' it were altogether impertinent in this Controverfy : " That which is neceffarv (fay they) is " neceffary ; it is that which muft be, and can't be prevented. " And that which is impoffible, is impoffible, and can't be done ; " and therefore none can be to blame for not doing it." And fuch Comparifons are made ufe of, as the commanding of a Man to walk who has loft his Legs, and condemning and pu- niihing Him for not obeying ; inviting and calling upon a Man, who is fhut up in a ftrong Prifon, to come forth, &c. But in thefe Things Arminiatis are very unreafonable. Let common Senfe determine whether there be not a great Differ- ence between thofe two Cafes ; the one, that of a Man who has offended his Prince, and is call into Prifon ; and after he ^as lain there a wiiile, the King comes to him, calls him to comQ. 21$ Calvinifm confijlent Part IV. come forth to him ; and tells him that if he will do fo, and will fall down before Him, and humbly beg his Pardon, he fhall be forgiven, and fet at Liberty, and alfo be greatly enrich'd, and advanced to Honour : The Prifoner heartily repents of the Folly and Wickednefs of his Offence againft his Prince, is thoroughly difpofed to abafe Himfelf, and accept of the King's Ofter; but is confined by ftrong Walls, vi^ith Gates of Brafs, and Barrs of Iron. Tlie other Cafe is, that of a Man who is of a very unreafonable Spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful Difpofition ; and moreover, has been brought up in traiterious Principles ; and has his Heart pofTeffed with an extream and inveterate Enmity to hJs lawful Soveriegn ; and for his Rebellion is caft into Prifon, and lies long there, loaden with heavy Chains, and in miferable Circumftances. At length the compailionate Prince comes to the Prifon, orders his Chains to be knocked off, and his Prifon-doors to be fet v/ide open; calls to him, and tells Him, if He will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and aJk his Forgivenefs ; He fliall be forgiven, fet at Liberty, and fet in a Place of great Dignity and Profit in his Court. But He is fo ttout and ftomachful, and full of haughty Malignity, that He can't be willing to accept the Offer : His rooted ftrong Pride and Malice have perfed Power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his Heart : The Oppofition of his Heart has the Maftery over Him, hav- ing an Influence on his Mind far fuperiour to the King's Grace and Condefconfion, and to all his kind Offers and Promifes. Now, is it agreeable to common Senfe, to affert and ftand to it, that there is no Difference between thefe two Cafes, as to any Worthinefs of Blame in the Prifoners; becaufe, forfooth» there is a Neceffity in both, and the required Aft in each Cafe is impoffible ? "T is true, a Man's evil Difpofitions may be as ftrong and immovable as the Barrs of a Caftle. But who can't fee, that when a Man, in the latter Cafe, is faid to be unable to obey the Command, the Expreffion is ufed improperly, and not in the Senfe it has originally ahd in common Speech ? And that it may properly be faid to be in the Rebel's Power to come out of Prifon, feeing he can eafily do it if he pleafes ; tho' hy Reafon of his vile Temper of Heart which is fix'd and rooted, 'tis impoffible that it fhould pleafe Him ? Upon the Whole, I prefume there is no Perfon of good Un- derftanding, who impartially confiders the Things which have been obfcrvcd, but will allow that 'tis not evident from the Pictates of the common Senfe, or natural Notions of Man- kindj Se(5l. xV. "^//jb common Senfc. at^ kind, that moral Neceffity is inconfiftent with Praife and Elame- And therefore, if the Armimans would prove any fuch Ineon- fiftency, it muft be by fome philofophical and metaphyfical Arguments, and not common Senfe. There is a grand lUufion in the pretended Demonftratioa of Artninians from common Senfe. 1 he main Strength of all thefe Demonftrations, lies in that Prejudice that arifes thro' the infenfible Change of the Ufe and Meaning of fuch Terms as Liberty, able, zcr.able, Jieccffary, impojjlble , unwyoidable , iti'vificibk^ ABion, Sec. from their original and vulgur Senfe, to a meta- phyfical Senfe entirely diverfe ; and the ftrong Conneftion of the Ideas of Blamelefnefs, Sec. with fome of thefe Terms, by an Habit contracfted and eftablifli'd, while thefe Terms were ufed in their firft Meaning. This Prejudice and Delufion is the Foundation of all thofe Pofitions they lay down as Maxims, by which moft of the Scriptures, which they alledge in this Controverfy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous Demonftrations from Scripture and Reafon depend. From this fecret Delufion and Prejudice they have almoft all their Ad- vantages : 'Tis the Strength of their Bulwarks, and the Edge of their Weapons. And this is the main Ground cf all the Right they have to treat their Neighbours in fo afluming a Manner, and to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as themfelves, as iveni Bigots, Men that d-juell in the dark Ca<-ces of Superjiition, periierjly fct , objiiTiately Jhutting their Eyes agaitift the Noo?i-day Light, Enemies to common Senfe, Tnaintainii: g the frf- horn of Abfurdities, fire. &c. But perhaps an impartial Confide- ratioh of the Things which have been obferved in the precedmg Parts of this Inquiry, may enable the lovers of Truth better to judge, whofe DoClrine is indeed abfurd, abftnfc, f If contra- dihory, and inconfiftent with common Senfe, and many Ways repugnant to the univerfal Didates of the Reafon of Mankind. Carol. From Things which have been obferved, it \vill fol- low, that it is agreeable to common Senfe to fuppofe, that the glorified Saints have not their Freedom at all diminifh'd, in any Refpeft ; and that God Himfelf has the higheft poffible Freedom, according to the true and proper Meaning of the Term ; and that He is in the liigheft polfible refpeft an Agent, and aftive in the Exercife of his infinite Holinefs ; tho' He afls therein in the higheft Degree necefiarily : and his Adions of this Kind are in the higheft, moft abfolutely perfed Man- ner virtuous and Praife-worthy ; and are fo, for that very Jleafon, becaufe they are moft perfedly necelTary. Section 2ii6 Endeavours not rendered vain. Part IV. ^>ex'0>e>«o<><'<>K2>=^><2><»oe>«<2>'>©»0'0^ Section V. Concerning thoje Objections, that this Scheme of Necejf/iy renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and Holinefsy vain, and to no Purpofe; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religioni jJRMINI ANS fay, if it be fo, that Sin and Virtue come to pafs by a Neceflity confifting in a fure Conneftion of Caufes and EiFecls, Antecedents and Confequents, it can never be worth the while to ufe any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one, and a\'oid the otlier ; feeing no Endeavours can alter tlie Futurit}'- of the Event, which is become necefiary by a Connexion already eftablifhed. But I defire, that this Matter may be fully confidered ; and that it may be examined with a thorough StricTinefs, whether it will foUov/ that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future Thing, muft be more in vain, on the Sup- pofition of fuch a Connection of Antecedents and Confequents, than if the contrary be fuppofed. For Endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be fuccefs- ful ; that is to fay, for them not eventually to be the Means of the Thing aimed at, which can't be, but in one of thefe two Ways ; either, Bhjl, That ailtho' the Means are ufed, yet the Event aimed at don't follow : Or, Secondly, If the Event does .follow, it is not becaufe of the Means, or from any Conneftion or Dependence of the Event on the Means ; the Event would have come to pafs, as well without the Means, as v/ith them. Jf either of thefe two Things are the Cafe, then the Means are not properly fuccefsful, and are truly in vain. The Suc- cefsfulnefs or Unfuccefsfulnefs of Means, in order to an EfFeft, or their being in vain or not in vain, confifts in thofe Means being connefted, or not connected, with the EfFeft in' fuch Se5l. V. ^^ Calviniflic Principles. i2t fuch a Manner as this, 'viz. That the EfFed is nx>ith the Means, and not ^without them ; or, that the Being of the EfFeft is, on the one Hand, connefted with the Means, and the Want of "the EfFe<5t, on the other Hand, is conneded with the Want of the Means. If there be fuch a Connection as this between Means and End, the Means are not in vain : The more there ]3 of fuch a Connexion, the further they are from being in vain; and the lefs of fuch a Conile<5^ion, the more are they in vain. Now, therefore, the Qiieftion to be anfwered, (in order to deteraiine, whether it follows from this Dodrine of the ne- ceffary Connection between foregoing Things and confequent Ones, that Means ufed in order to any Effeft, are more in Vain than they would be otherwife) is. Whether it follows from it, that there is lefs of the forementioned Conneftion between Means and EfFefi: ; that is. Whether on the Suppofi- tion of their being a real and true Connexion between 'antecedent Things and confequent Ones, there muft be lefs of a Conneftion between Means and EfFedt, than on the Suppo- lition of their being no fix'd Connection between antecedent Things and confequent Ones : And the very ftating of this Queftion is fufficient to anfwer it. It muft appear to every one that will open his Eyes, that this QuelHon can't be affirmed, without the grofseft Abfurdity and Inconfiftence, 'Means are foregoing Things, and Effects are following Things : And if there were no Connection between foregoing Things, and following Ones, there could be no Connection "between Means and End ; and fo all Means would be wholly vain and fruitlefs. For 'tis by Virtue of fome Connection only, that they become fucceisful : 'Tis fome Connection "obferved, or revealed, or otherwife known, between ante- cedent Things and following Ones, that is what directs in the Choice of Means. And if there were no fuch Thing as an cftablifh'd Connection, there could be no Choice, as to Means; 'one Thing would have no more Tendency to an Effect, than another ; there would be no fuch Thing as Tendency in the Cafe. All thofe Things which are fuccefsful Means of other Things, do therein prove connected Antecedents of them : And therefore to affert, that a fix'd Connection between Ante- cedents and Confequents makes Means vain and ufelefs, of Hands in the Way to hinder the Connection between Means and End, is juft fo ridiculous, as to fay, that a Connection between Antecedents and Confequents ftands in the Way to hinder a Connection between Antecedents and Confequents. F f Nor 322 Means and Endeavours made vain. Part IV.- Nor can any fuppofed Connexion of the Succeffion or Train of Antecedents and Confequents from the very Beginning of all Things, the Connection being naade already fiire and neceffary, either by eftablifh'd Laws of Nature, or by thefe together with a Decree of fovereign immediate Inter- pofitions of divine Power, on fuch and fuch Occafions, or any other Way,: (if any other there be ;) I fay, no fuch neceffary Conneflion of a Series of Antecedents and Confequents can in the leaft tend to hinder, but that the Means we ufe may belong to the Series ; and fo' may be fome of thofe Antecedents which are connefted with the Confequents we aim at, in the eftablifh'd Courfe of Things. Endeavours which we ufe, are Things that exift ; and therefore they belong to the general Chain of Events; all the Parts of which Chain are fuppofed to be conneded : And fo Endeavours are fuppofed to be con- nedted with fome EfFefts, or fome confequent Things, or other. And certainly this don't hinder but that the Events' they arc connefted with, may be thofe which we aim at, and which we chufe, becaufe we judge them moft likely to have a Con- neftion with thofe Events, from the eftablifh'd Order and (l^ourfe of Things which we obferve, or from fomething in divine Revelation. Let us fuppofe a real and fu re Connexion between a Man's having his Eyes open in the clear Day-light, with good Organs oi Sight, and Seeing ; fo that feeing is connefted with his opening his Eyes, and not feeing with his not opening his Eyes ; and alfo the like Connexion between fuch a Man's attempting to open his Eyes, and his aftually doing it : The fuppofed eftablifhed Connection between thefe Antecedents and- Confequents,. let the Connection be never fo fure and neceflTary,. certainly don't prove that it is in vain, for a Man in fuch Cir- eumftances to attempt to open his Eyes, in order to feeing; His aiming at that Event, and the Ufe of the Means, being the Effect of his Will, don't break the Connection, or hinder die Succefs. So that the Objection we are upon, don't lie agatnft the Doctrine of the Necelfity of Events by a Certainty of Connec- tion and Confequence : On the contrary, it is truly forcible againft the Armitiian Doctrine of Contingence and Self-deter- mination ; which is inconfiftent with fuch a Connection. If there be no Connection between thofe Events wherein Virtue and Vice confift, and any Thing antecedent ; then there is no Connection between thefe Events and any Means or Endeavours ufed \ Secfl.V. hy the Arminian Scheme. 223 ufed in order to them : And if fo, then thofe Means muft be in vain. The lefs there is of Connexion betv/een foregoing Things and following Ones, fo much the lefs there is between Means and End, Endeavours and Succefs ; and in the fame Proportion are Means and Endeavours inefFeftual and in vain. It will follow from Arminian Principles, that there is no Degree of Connexion between Virtue or Vice, and any foregoing Event or Thing : Or, in other Words, That the Determination of the Exiftence of Virtue or Vice don't in the lead depend on the Influence of any Thing that comes to pafs antecedently, from which the Determination of its Ex- jftence is, as its Caufe, Means, or Ground ; becaufe, fo far as it is fo, it is not from Self-determination : And therefore, fo far there is nothing of the Nature of Virtue or Vice. And fo it follows, that Virtue and Vice are not at all, in any Degree, dependent upon, or connefted with any foregoing Event or Exiftence, as its Caufe, Ground, or Means. And if fo, then all foregoing Means muft be totally in vain. Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any Confiftence with the Arminian Scheme, be any reafonable Ground of fo much as a Conjefture concerning the Confequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to efcaping Vice or obtaining Virtue, or any Choice or Preference of Means, as having a greater Probability of Succefs by fome than others ; either from any natural Connection or Dependence of the End on the Means, or through any divine Conftitution, or revealed Way of God's beftowing or bringing to pafs thefe Things, in Confequence of any Means, Endeavours, Prayers or Deeds. Conjefture in "this latter Cafe depends on a Suppofition that God himfelf is the Giver, or determining Caufe of the Events fought : But if they depend on Self determination, then Ged is not the determining or difpofing Author of them : And if thefe Things are not of his Difpofal, then no Conjefture can be made from any Revelation he has given concerning any Way or Method of his Difpofal of them. Yea, on thefe Principles, it will not only follow that Men can't have any reafonable Ground of Judgment or Conjecture, that their Means and Endeavours to obtain Virtue or avoid Vice, will be fuccefsful, but they may be fure they will not; they may be certain, that they will be in vain ; and that if ever the Thing which they feek comes to pafs, it will not be ?t all owing to the Means they ufe, For Means and En- s' f 3 deavours 224 Calvinifm dont encourage Sloth. Part IV. 4eavours can have no Effeft at all, in Order to obtain the End, but in one of thefe two Ways ; either (i.) Through a natural Tendency and Influence, to prepare and difpofe the Mind more to virtuous Ads, either by caufing the Difpofition of the Heart to be more in Favour of fuch Afts, or by ^ringing the Mind more in'co the View of powerful Motives and Inducements : Or, (2.) By putting Perfons more in the Way of God's Beftowment of the Benefit. But neither of thefe can be the Cafe. Not the latter; for as has been juft now obferved, it don't confift with the ^■^r/Tz/Wa/? Notion of Self-determination, which they fuppofe eflential to Virtue, that God (hould be the Beftower, or, (which is the fame Thing) the determining, difpofing Author of Virtue. Not the former; for natural Influence and Tendency fuppofes Caufality and Connection ; and that fuppofes Neceffity of Event, which is inconfiftent with Arminian Liberty- A Ten- dency of Means, by biafling the Heart in Favour of Virtue, or by bringing the Will under the Influence and Power of Motives in its Determinations, are both inconfiftent with Arminian Liberty of Will, confifting in Indifference, and fovereign Sejf-determinatipn, as has been largely demonftrated. But for the more full Removal of this Prejudice againft that Doftrine of Neceffity which has been maintain'd, as though it tended to encourage a total Negleft of all Endeavours as vain ; the following Things may be ccnfldered. The Queft;ion is not. Whether Men may not thus improve this Doftrine ; We know that many true and wholefome Doftrines are abufed : But, Whether the Doftrine gives any juft Occafion for fuch an Improvement ; or whether, on the Suppofition of the Truth of the Doftrine, fuch a Ufe of it would not be unreafonable ? If any ftiall affirm, that it would not, but that the very Nature of the Doftrine is fuch as gives juft Occafion for it, it muft be on this Suppofition ; namely. That fuch an invariable Neceffity of all Things already- fettled, muft render the Interpofition of all Means, Endea- vours, Conclufions or Aftions. of ours, in order to the obtaining any future End whatfoever, perfeftly infignjficant ; bccaufe they can't in the leaft. alter or vary the Courfe and Series of Things, in any Event or Circqmftance j all being already fixed nnalteral^ly by Neceffity : And that therefore 'tis Folly, for Men to ufe any Means /or any End ; but their Wifdom, to fave tljemfelves the Trouble of Endeavours, and take their Eafe. No Perfon can draw fuch an Inference froqpi this Doftrine, and Sed.V. Calvinifm doiit encourage Sloth. 225 and come to fuch a Conclufion, without contradiding himfelf, and going counter to the very Principles he pretends to aft upon : For he comes to a Conclufion, and takes z Courfe, in order to an End, even his Eafe, or the faving himfelf from Trouble ; he feeks fomething future, and ufes Means in Order to a future Thing, even in his drawing up that Conclufion^, that he will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to any Thing future ; he feeks his future Eafe, and the Benefit and Comfort of Indolence. If prior Neceffity that determines all 'rhino-s, makes vain all Aftions or Conclufions of ours, iti order to any Thing future ; then it makes vain all Conclufions and Conduft of ours, in order to our future Eafe. The Mea- fure of our Eafe, with the Time, Manner and every Circum- ftance of it, is already fix'd, by all determining Neceffity, as much as any Thing elfe. If he fays within himfelf, " What " future Happinefs or*Mifery I Ihall have, is already in EfFeft ** determined by the neceffaty Courfe and Conneftion of " Things ; therefore I will fave myfelf the Trouble of Labour " and Diligence, which can't add to my determin'd Degree *• of Kappinefs, or diminifh my Mifery ; but will take my *' Eafe, and will enjoy the Comfort of SlotH and Negligence." Such a Man contradifts himfelf: He fays, the Meafure of his future Happinefs and Mifery is already fix'd, and he won't try to diminifh the one, nor add to the other : But yet in his very Conclufion, he contradids this ; for he takes up this Conclufion, to odd to his future Happinefs, by the Eafe and Comfort of his Negligence ; and to diminifh his future Trou- ble and Mifery, by faving himfelf the Trouble of ufing Means and taking Pains. Therefore Perfons can't reafonably make this Improvement of the Dotlrine of Neceffity, that they will go into a voluntary Negligence of Means for their own Happinefs. For the Principles they muft go upon, in order to this, are inconfiftent with their making any Improvement at all of the Doftrine : For to make fome Improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to fome voluntary Conclufion, in Regard to their own Conduft, with fome View or Aim : But this, as has been (hown, is inconfiftent with the Principles they pretend to aft upon. In (hort, the Principles are fuch as cannot be afted upon at all, or in any Refpedt, confiftently : And there- fore in every Pretence of afting upon them, or making any Improvement at all of themj there is a Self-contradi(^ion, As §26 Calv'mitm don' i make Men Mzchines. PairtIV, As to that Objeftiop againft the Doftrine which I have jCndeavoured to prove, that it makes Men no more than mere Machines ; I would fay, that notwithftanding this Doc- trine, Man is entirely, perfeftly and unfpeakably different from ^ mere Machine, in that he has Reafon and Underftanding, ^nd has a Faculty of Will, and fo is capable of Volition and Choice ; and in that, his Will is guided by the Dictates or Views of his Underftanding ; and in that his external Adlion? and Behaviour, and in many Refpefts alfo his Thoughts, and the Exercifes of his Mind, are fubjed to his Will ; fo that he has Liberty to aft according to his Choice, and do what he fleafes ; and by Means of thefe Things, is capable of moral labits and moral Adls, fuch Inclinations and Adlions as according to the common Senfe of Mankind, are worthy of Praife^ Efteem, Love and Reward ; or on the contrary, ofDifefteem, Peteftation, Indignation and Punilhment. In thefe Things is all the Difference from mere Machines, as to Liberty and Agency, that would be any Perfeftion, Dig- nity or Privilege, in any Refpeft : All the Difference that can be defired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the Pretenfions of the j^rminians themklyes come to, as they are forced often to explain themfelves. (Tho' their Expli- cations overthrow and abolilh the Things afferted, and pre- tended to be explained:) For they are forced to explain a felf- determining Power of Will, by a Power in the Soul, to deter- mine as it chufes or wills ; which comes to no more than this, that a Man has a Power of chufmg, and in many Inftances, can do as he chufes. Which is quite a different Thing from that Contradidlion, his having Power of chufmg his firft Aft of Choice in the Cafe. ^ Or if their Scheme makes any other Difference than this, between Men and Machines, it is for the worfe : It is fo far from fuppofing Men to ' have a Dignity and Privilege above Machines, that it makes the Manner of their being determined llill more unhappy. Whereas Machines are guided by an un- derftanding Caufe, by the fkilful Hand of the Workman or Owner ; the Will of Man is left to the Guidance of nothing, but abfolute blind Contingence. ^occogoooseppsotogcoosooogooeeocescooaccoi&jccooeccMoogooesoooeoooooooooooooccooco.^ Section Sedl. VI. Of the Stoical Fate. 22f > on the five Points, Edit: 3. P. 345, 3z6, 3*7. Se(fl.Vi. 0/Hobbiftical Necejfity. 229 makes it l&k worth the while for Men to defire, and feek after any 'I'hing wherein their Virtue and Happinefs coniiits ; I hold no Dodtrine that is clog'd with any fiich Inconvenience, anymore than aily other Scheme whaifoever; and by no Means {o much as the Arminian Scheme of Contingence ; as has been (hewn. If they held any fnch Dodtrine of univerfal Fatality, as is inconfiftent with any Kind of Liberty, that is or can be any Perfedion, Dignity, Privilege or Benefit, or any Thing defirablej in any Refpeft, for any intelligent Crea- ture, or indeed with any Liberty that is poffible or conceivable ; I embrace no fuch Dodrine. If they held any fuch Dodrine of Fate as Is inconfiftent with the World's being in all Things fubjeft to the Difpofal of an intelligent wife Agent, that pre- sides, not as the^'Wof the World, but as the fovereign Zurd? of the Univerfe, governing all Things by proper Will, Choicb and Defign, in the Exercife of the mofl: perfeft Liberty con- ceivable, without Subjection to any Conftraint, or being pro- perly under the Power or Influence of any Thing before, above or without himfelf ; I wholly renounce any fuch Doftrine. As to Mr. Hobbes'i maintaining the fame Doftrine concern- ing Neceffity ; 1 confefs, it happens I never read Mr Hobbes, Let his Opinion be what it will, we need not rejedt all Truth which is demonftrated by clear Evidence, merely be- caufe it was once held by fome bad Man. This great Truth, that Je/us is the Son of God, was not fpoil'd becaufe it was once and again proclaimed with a loud Voice by the Devil. If Truth is fo defiled becaufe it is fpoken by the Mouth, or written by the Pen of fome ill-minded mifchievous Man, that it muft never be received, we fhall never know when we hold any of the moft precious and evident Truths by a fure Tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad Ufe of this Truth, that is to be lamented : But the Truth is not to be thought worthy of P.ejeiflion on that Account. 'Tis common for the Corruptions of the Hearts of evil Men, to abufe the belt Things to vile Purpofes. I might alfo take Notice of its having been obferved, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes + in many more Things than the Cal'vimjis. As, in what he is faid to hold concerning Original Sin, in denying the Neceffity of fupernatural Illumi- nation, in denying infufed Grace, in denying the Doftrine of Juftification by Fgith alone ; and other Things. + Dr. GUI, in his Anfwer to Dr. fVhithy. Vol. 3. P. 1^3. &c, G2' ' Sectiom I^o Concerning the Neceffity Part IV. Section VII. Concerning the Neceffity of the Divine V/ill. O O M S may poffibly objeft againft what has been fuppofed »^ oF the Abi'urdity and Inconliftence of a feif-determining Power in the Will, and the Impoffibility of its being otherwife, than that the Will fhould be determined in every Cafe by forne Motive, and by a Motive which (as it ftands in the View of the Underitanding) is of fuperiour Strength to any appearing on the other Side : That if thefe Things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created'Minds, but the Will of God him/elf is necefiary in all' its Determina- tions. Concerning which fays the Author of the Ejpiy on the Freedom of Will in God and iu the Creature, (Page '6^, 86.) " What Itrange Doctrine is this, contrary to all our Ideas of ** the Dominion of God ? Does it not deftroy the Glory of " his Liberty of Choice, and take away from the Creator and *■' Governoi' and Benefaftor of the World, that moft free and *' fovereign Agent, all the Glory of this Sort of Freedom ? *' Does it not feem to make Him a Kind of mechanical Me- ^' dium of Fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's Dodrine of Fata- ** lity and Neceffity, into all Things that God hath to do *' with ? Does it not feem to reprefent the bleffed God, as a *' Being of vaft Underftanding, as well as Power and Effi- •■* ciency, but ftill to leave Him without a Will to chufe among " all the Obieifls within his View ? In (hort, it feems to make " the blefled God a Sort of almighty Minifter of Fate, under " its univerfal and fupreme Influence ; as it was the profefs'd *' Sentiment of fome of the Amients, that Fate was above the « Gods." This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an Applica- tion to Men's Imaginations and Prejudices, rather than to mere Reafon. — • — But I would calmly endeavour to confider whether there be any Reafon in this frightful Reprefentation. But before I enter upon a particular Confideration of the Matter, I would obferve this : That 'tis reafonable to fuppofe, it fhould" be much, more difficult to exprefs or conceive Things accord- ing to exaft metaphyseal Truth, relating to the Nature and Manner of the Exiftence of Things in the divine Underftand- ing and Will, and the Operation of thefe Faculties (if I may {o Scd. Vil. of iheT)W\n^ Volition, 231 fo call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human Mind ; which is infinitely more within our View, and nearer to ji Proportion to the Meafure of oui Comprehenfion, and more commenfuratc to the Ufe and Import of human Speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in Regard of Terms tQ exprefs precife Truth concerning our own Minds, and their Faculties and Operations. Words were firft formed to exprefs external Things ; and thofe that arc applied to exprefs Things internal and fpirirual, are almoft all borrowed, and ufed in a 5:-ort of figurative Senfe. Whence they are mofl of them attended with a great Deal of Ambiguity and Unfixednefs in their Signi- fication, occafioning innumerable Doubts, Difficulties and Con- fufions in Inquiries and Controverfies about Things of this Na- ture. But Language is much lefs adapted to exprefs Things in the Mind of the incomprehenfible Deity, precifely as they are« We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exactly of the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithftanding ^11 the Progrefs which has been made in paft and prefent Ages, in, this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaph3'ficks, as it relates to thefe Things, is brought to greater Perfection than once it was ; yet here is llill Work, enough left for future In- quiries and Refearches, and Room for Progrefs ftill to be made, for many Ages and Generations. But we had need to be infi- ilitely able Metaphyficians, to conceive with Clearnefs, accord- ing to ftrict, proper and perfect Truth, concerning the Nature of the Divine Eflence, and the Modes of the Action and Ope- ration of the Powers of the divine Mind. And it may be noted particularly, that tho' we are obliged to conceive of fome Things in God a& confequent and depen- dent on others, and of fome Things pertaining to the divine Nature and Will as the Foundation of .others, and fo before Others in the Order of Nature : As, we muft conceive of the Knowledge and Holinefs of God as prior in the Order of Na- ture to his Happinefs; the Perfedion of his Underftanding, as the Foundation of his wife Purpofes and Decrees ; the Holi- nefs of his Nature, as the Caufe and Reafon of his holy De- terminations. And yet when we fpeak of Caufe and Effeft, Antecedent and Confequent, fundamental and dependent, de- termining and determined, in the firfl Being, who is felf- exiltent, independent, of perfedf and abfolute Simplicity and Immutability, and the firft Caufe of all Things ; doubtlefs there muft be lefs Propriety in fuch Reprefentations, than when G g ^ WQ i^2 Necejfity of aBing ntcjl wifely. Part IV. we fpcak of derived dependent Beings, who are contpounded^ and liable to perpetual Mutation and bucceirion. . Having premifed this, I proceed to obferve concerning the foremention'd Author's Exclamation, about the ntajfary Deter- mination af God's Will, in all Things, by what l^e fees to be fitteji and beji. That all the feeming Force of fuch Objedlions and Excla- mations muft arife from an Imagination, that there is fome Sort of Priviledge or Dignity in being without fuch a moral Neceffity, as will make it impofTible to do any other, than always chufe what is wifeft and beft ; as tho' there were fome Difadvantage, Meannefs and Subjedion, in fuch a Neceflity ; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by fomething, which, as it were, maintained a ffrong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that hel^ him faft, and that he could by no Means deliver himfelf from. Whereas, this muft be all mere Imagination and Delufion. 'Tis no Difadvjntage or Difhonour to a Being, necefTarily to aft in the moic excellent and happy Manner, from the neceffary Perfeftion of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfeftion, Inferiority or Dependance, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Afcendency. * 'Tis not incopfiftent with the * " It might have been objedled with much inore Plaufiblenefs, that *• the fupreme Caufe cannot be free, becaule he muft needs do *' always what is beft in the Whole. But this would not at all *' ferve Spinoza's Purpofe : For this is a Neceflity, not of Nature *' and Fate, but of Fitnefs and Wifdom ; a Neceflity confiftent " with the greateft Freedom, and moft perfeft Choice. For the •* only Foundation of this Neceflity is fuch an unalterable Redti- *' tude of Will, and Perfeftion of Wifdom, as makes it impoflible *' for a wife Being to a£l; foolifhly." Clark's Dem. of the Being " ^d Attributes of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. " Tho' God is a moft perfeAIy free Agent, yet he cannot but do *' always what is beft and wifeft in the Whole. The Reafon is *' evident; becaufe perfe being a Reftraint or Diminution of Freedom, •' that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it : 'Tis liot an Abridg- ♦' ment, 'tis the End and Ufe of our Liberty ; and the further we are " removed from fuch a Determination, the nearer we are to Mifery and '* Slavery. A perfeft Indifference in the Mind, not determinable by *' its laft Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its *' Choice, would be fo far from being an Advantage and Excellency of " any intelledtual Nature, that it would be as great an Imperfcdlion, as ♦* the Want of Indifferency to afl, or not to ad, till determined by the " Will, would be an Imperfedlion on the other Side. 'Tis as " much a Perfedlion, that Defire or the Power of preferring Ifiouid be " determined b'y Good, as that the Power of afting (hould be determined " by the Will : And the certainer fuch Determination is, the greater " the Perfeftion. Nay, were we determined by any Thing but the lafr " Refult of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Aftlon, ** we were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might " attain the Good we chufe ; and therefore every Man is brought under " a Neceffity by his Conftitution, as an intelligent Being, to be " determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what " is beft for him to do; elfe he would be under the Determination " of fome other than himfelf, which is Want of Liberfy. And to " deny that a Man's Will, in every Determrnation, follows his own •' Judgment, 234 Necejfity of aBing mofi wifely. Part IV, Dependance of his Power an any other Power, from whence it rfiould be derived, or which it Ihoula ftand in any Need of : So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is abfolutelv^ dependent on Him. (2.) '^I hat He has fu- preme Authority ; abfolute and moft perfeft Right to do what He wills, without Subjeftion to any fuperiour Authority, oc any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any diftinft independent Authority, either fuperiour, equal, or inieriour ; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountaiu of all Authority ; and alfo without Reftraint by any Obliga- tion, implying either Subjeftion, Derivation, or Dependance, or proper Limitation. (3.) That his Will is fupreme, unde- rived, and independent on any Thing without Himfclf j being in " Judgment, is to fay, that a Man wills and a£ls for an End that •' he would not have, at the fame Time that he wills and adts for it. " For if he prefers it in his prefent Thoughts, betore any other, " 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any " other; unlefs he can have, and nothaNC it; will, and not will it, " at the fajne Time : A Contradiftion too manifeft to be admitted. f If we look upon thofe fuperiour Beings above us, who enjoy per- " fe feft with Refpeft to the Apoftle ?aul, that God had wife Ends in chufing him to be a Chriftian and an Apoftle, who had been a Perfecutor, &c. The Apoftle himfelf mentions one End, I Tim. i, i^, 16. Chriji fefus came into the World to fa-ve Sinners y Dfnvhom I amchief. Hoiubeityfor this Caufe I obtained Mercy , that in me firji, fefus Chriji mightjhenv forth all Long-fuffering, for a Tattern to them avho Jhould hereafter believe on Him to Life e'ver- lafting. But yet the Apoftle never look'd on it as a Diminution of the Freedom and Riches of divine Grace in his Eleftioni which He fo often and fo greatly magnifies. This brings mc to obferve, 4. Our fuppofing fuch a moral Neceflity in the Afts of God'si Will as has been fpoken of, is fo far from neceffarily derogat- ing from the Riches of God's Grace to fuch as are the chofea Pbjefts of his Favour, that in many Inftances, this moral Ne- ceflity may arife from Goodnefs, and from the great Degree of it. God may chufe this Objedl rather than another, as having a fuperiour Fitnefs to anfwer the Ends, Defigns and Inclina- tions of his Goodnefs j being more finfulj and fo more mife- rable Std. VIII. Of Arminian Fatality. 25! rable and neceffitous than others ; the Inclinations of infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gra- cious Defign of God's fending his Son into the World may be more abundantly anfwtred, in the Exercifes of Mercy towards fuch an Objeci, rather than another. One Thing more I would obferve, before I finifti what I have to fay on the Head of the Neceffity of the Afts of God's Will ; and that is, that fomething much more like a fervilc Subjeftion of the divine Being to Fatal Neceffity, will follow from Arminian Principles, than from the Doctrines which they oppofe. For they (at leaft moft of them) fuppofe, with Re- fped to all Events that happen in the moral World depending on the Volitions of moial Agents, which are the moft important Events of the Univerfe, to which all others are fubordinatej 1 fay, they fuppofe with refpeft to thefe, that God has a cer- tain Foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any Purpofes or Decrees of his about them. And if fo, they have a fix'd cer- tain Futurity, prior to any Defigns or Volitions of his, and in- dependent cm them, and to which his Volitions muft be fubjeft, as He would wifely accommodate his Affairs to this fix'd Futurity of the State of Things in the moral World. So that here, inftead of a moral Neceffity of God's Will, arifing from or confifting in the infinite Perfeftion and Bleflednefs of the divine Being, we have a fix'd unalterable State of Things, properly diftinft from the pcrfeft Nature of the divine Mind, and the State of the divirve Will and Defign, and entirely in- dependent on thefe Things, arni which they have no Hand in, becaufe they are prior to them ; and which God's Will is truly fubjeft to, being obliged to conform or accommodate himfelf to it, in all his Purpofes and Decrees, and in every Thing He does in his Difpofals and Government of the World ; the moral World being the End of the natural ; fo that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that State of the moral World, which confifts in, or depends upon the Ads and State of the Wills of moral Agents, which had a fix'd Futurition from Eternity. Such a Subjection to Neceffity as this, would truly argue an Inferiority and Servitude, that would be unwor- thy of the fupreme Being ; and is much more agreeable to the Notion which many of the Heathen had of Fate, as above the Gods, than that moral Neceffity of Fitnefs and Wifdom which has been fpoken of; and is truly repugnant to the abfolute Sovereignty of God, and inconfiftent with the Supremacy of his Will ; and really fubjects the Will of the moft High to the Will of his Creatures, arid brings him into Dependence upon them. Se C TIOI* 25,^ Of the Objcdlion alcut Part IV; •fedo9b(ftbedb&oobooooooo»ocx)oeoooooooo»'a««»gooeoo98oooco«dcoo3e3S3e(»w .■ril (!0'' y]\\ ■arden^\\^X2.d\\s Heart, that he Jhall folloiu after them; and I n.vill be honoured np^n Pharaoh, ar:d upon all his Hoji, V. 8. And the Lord harden' d the Heart of Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he pnrfued after the Children o/'Ifrael. And it is certain that in fuch a Manner, God for wife and good Ends, ordered that Event, Jofeph's being fold into Egypt by his Bre- thren. Gen. xlv. 5. No^v therefore be not grie'Ved, tior angiy ivithyourfehoes , thatyefoldme hither ; forGod didj'endme before yon toprefer've Life. Ver. 7, 8. God did fend me before you to preferue a Pojierity in the Earth, and to Jd've yortr Li've s by a great Deliverance ; Jo that noiv it ivas not yon, thatfcnt me hither, but God. Pfal. c:'ii. l-y. He fen t a Man before them, e'ven Jofeph, ijoho ivas fold for a Servant. 'Tis certain, that thus God ordered the Sin and Folly of Sihon King of the Amoritcs, in refufing to let the People of Ifrael pafs by him peaceably. Dent. ii. 30. But Sihon King of Heihbon "cvould not let us pafs by him ; for the Lord thy God harden' d his Spirit, and made his Heart objiinate, that he might deliver H/;n into thine Hand. 'Tis certain, that God thus ordered the ''in and Folly of the Kings of Canaan, that tliey attempted not to make Peace with IJracl, but with a ftupid Boldnefs and Obfti- nacy, fet themfelves violently to oppofe them and their God. Jo(h. xi. 2o. For it -); ♦ ' perfcSi and good Gift, ivith lubom there is no Variablenef. nor Shadoiu ** of Turning, who tanpteth na M^n-,, but givcth to all Men liberally, 4ni Of GOD'S {tcrct Part IV, fo, then fuch a Choice is not an Evil, but a wife and holy Choice. And if fo, then that Providence which is agreeable to fuch a Choice, is a wife and holy Providence. Men do ivill Sin as Sin, and fo are the Authors and Adors of it : They love it as Sin, and for evil Ends and Purpofes. God don't will Sin as Sin, or for the Sake of any Thing evil ; tho' it be his Pleafure fo to order Things, that He permitting. Sin will come to pafs ; for the Sake of the great Good that by his Dif^ofal fhall be the Confequence. His willing to order Things fo that Evil ftiould come to pafs, for the Sake of the contrary Good, is no Argument that He don't hate Evil, as Evil : And if fo, then it is no Reafon why he mayn't reafona- bly forbid Evil as Evil, and punilh it as fuch. The Arminians themfelves muft be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a Diftinftion of God's Will, amounting to juft the fame Thing that Calvinifis intend by their Dillinc- lion of z/ecret and re-uealed Will. They muft allow a Diftinc- tion of thofe Things which God thinks beft Ihould be, eonfider- ing all Circumftances and Confequences, and fo are agreeable to his difpofmg Will, and thofe Things which he loves, and are agreeable to his Nature, in themfelves confidered. Who is there that will dare to fay, that the hellifh Pride, Malice and Cruelty of Devils, are agreeable to God, and what He likes and approves ? And yet, I truft, there is no Chriftian Divine but what will allow, that 'tis agreeable to God's Will fo to order and difpofe Things concerning them, fo to leave them to themfelves, and give them up to their own Wickednefs, that this perfeft Wickednefs {hould be a neceffary Confe- quence. Befure Dr. Whitby's Words do plainly fuppofe and allow it. j Thefe " and uphra'iSith not. And yet by the Prophet Jfa'ias He is introduced *' faying of Himfelf, I form Light, and create Darknefs ; I make Peace^ *♦ and create Evil : I the Lord do all thefe Things. What is ^he ** Meaning, the plain Language of all this, but that the Lord de- " lighteth in Goodnefs, and (as the Scripture fpeaks) Evil is hit *' firange Work ? He intends and parfues the univerfal Good of his ** Creation : and the Ewl which happens, is not permitted for its " own fake, or thro' any Pleafure in Evil, but becaufc it is rec[uiJ^t6 " to the greater Good purfued." X Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 3. P. 300, 305, 309. Sed. IX. and revealed IVill. 265 Thefe following Things may be laid down as Maxims of plain Truth, and indifputable Evidence. 1. That God is zperfeSllj happy Being, in the moft abfolute ?ind highsll Senfe polfibk. 2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every Thing that is co7itrarj to Happinefs ,• and fo, that in ftrift Propriety of Speech, there is no fugh Thing as any Pain, Grief or Trouble in God, 3. When any intelligent Being is really crofs'd and difap- pointed, and Things are contrary to what He truly defires. He is the lefs pleajed, or has le/s Flenjure ; his Pleafiire and Happi- nefs IS diminified, and he fuffers what is difagreeable to him, or is the Subjedt of fomething that is of a Nature contrary to Joy and Happinefs, even Pain and Grief. § From this laft Axiom it follows, that if no Diftinftion is to be admitted between God's Hatred of Sin, and his Will with Refpeft to the Event and the Exiftence of Sin, as the all-wife Determiner of all Events, under the View of all Con- fequences through the whole Compafs and Series of Things ; I fay, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pafs of every individual Aft of Sin is truly, all Things confidered, contrary to his Will, and that his W'ill is really crofs'd in it ; and this in Proportion as He hates it. And as God's Hatred of Sin is infinite, by Reafon of the infinite Contrariety of his holy Nature to Sin ; fo his Will is infinitely crofs'd, in every Aft of Sin that happens. Which is as much as to fay. He , endures that which is infinitely difagreeable to Him, by Means of every Aft of Sin that He fees committed : And therefore, as appears by the preceding Pofitions, He endures truly and really, infinite Grief or Pain from Every Sin. And fo He muft be infinitely crofs'd, and fuffer infinite Pain, every Day, in Millions of Millions of Inftances : He muft continually be the Subjeft of an immenfe Number of real, and truly infinitely great Croffes and Vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the moft miferable of all Beings. If ^ Certainly 'tis not lefs abfurd and unreafonabio^ to talk of God's Will and Defire's being truly and properly crofs'd, without his fuffering any Uneafinefs, or any Thing grievous or difagreeable, than it is t(j talk of fomething that may be called a revealed IViU, which m-ay in fome Refpedl be different from zfecnt Purpofej which Purpofe may be fulfilled, when the other is oppofei. -66 Of GO JD's fecret Part IV. If any Objcflor flvould fay ; All that thefe Things amount to, is, that God may do Ei'il that Good may come ; which is juftly efteem'd immoral and finful in Men ; and therefore may be juftly efteem'd inconfiftent with the moral Perfedions of God. I anfwer. That for God to difpofe and peripit Evil, in the Manner that has been fpoken of, is not to do Evil that Good may come ; for it is not to do Evil at all. In Order to a Thing's being morally Evil, there muft be one of thefe Things belonging to it : Either it muft be a Thing unfit and unfuitahle in its own Nature ; or it muft have a bad "^Fendency ; or it muft proceed from an e'vil Difpofition, and be done for au evil End. But neither of thefe I'hings can be attributed tq God's ordering and permitting fuch Events, as the immoral Afts of Creatures, for good Ends, (i.) It \s not ztnfit in its onun Nature, that He Ihould do fo. For it is in its own Nature fit, that infinite Wijdom, and not blind Chance, Inould difpofe moral Good and Evil in the World, And 'tis fit, that the Being who has infinite Wijdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and fupreme Governor of the Woxld, ft;ould take Care of that Matter. And therefore there is no Unfitnefs, or Unfuitablenefs in his doing it. It may be unfit, and fo immoral, for any other Beings to go about to order this Affair ; becaufe they are not pofTefs'd of a Wifdom, that in any Manner fits them for it ; and in other Refpefts they are not fit to be trufted with this Affair ; nor does it belong to them, they not being the Owners and Lords of the Univerfe, We need not be afraid to Affirm, that if a wife and good Man knew with gbfolute Certainty, it would be beft, 2\\ Things confidered, that there Ihould be fuch a Thing as mora^ Evil in the World, it would not be contrary to his Wifdom and Goodne/s, for him to chufe that it Ihould be fo. 'Tis no * evil Defire, to defire Good, and todefire that which, all Things confidered, is beft. And it is no unwife Choice, to chufe that That fhould be, which it is beft fhould be ; and to chufe the Exiftence of that Thing concerning which this is known, njiz, that it is beft it fhould be, and fo is known in the Whole to be moft worthy to be chofen. On the contrary, it would be a plain Defed in Wifdom and Goodnefs, for him not to chufe it. And the Reafon why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be becaufe he might not defire it, but only the ordering of that Matter don't belong to him. But it is no Harm for Him who is by Right, and m the greateft Pro- priety, the fupreme Orderer of all Things, to order every * Thine Sec^. 1%. And revealed PVill 26) Thing in fuch a Manner, as it would be a Point of Wifdom in Him to chufe that they fhould be ordered. If it would be a plain Defeft of Wifdom and Goodnefs in a Being, not to chufe that That fhould be, which He certainly knows it would, all Things confidered, be beft fhould be, (as was but now ob- ferved) then it mnft be impoffible for a Being who has no Defed of Wifdom and Goodnefs, to do otherwife than chufe it fhould be ; and that, for this very Reafon, becaufe He is perfeftly wife and good. And if it be agreeable to perfeft Wifdom and Goodnefs for him to chufe that it fhould be, and the ordering of all Things fupremely and perfedily belongs to him, it muft be agreeable to infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs, to order that it fliould be. If the Choice is good, the order- ing and difpofing Things according to that Choice muft alfo be good. It cdn be no Harm in one to whom it belongs /o /* his fVill in the Armies of Heaaieti, and among fi the Inhabitants of the Earth, to execute a good Volition. If his Will be good, and the Objeft of his Will be, all Things confidered, good and beft, then the chufing or willing it is not njuilling E'vil that Good may come. And if fo, then his ordering according to that Will is not doing Evil, that Good may come. 2. 'Tis not of a bad Tendency, for the fupreme Being thus to order and permit that moral Evil to be^ which it is beft fhould come to pafs. - For that it is of good Tendency, is the very Thing fuppofed in the Point now in Queftion.- Chrift's Crucifixion, tho' a moft horrid Faft in them that perpetrated it, was of moft- glorious Tendency as permitted and ordered of God. 3. Nor is there any Need of fuppofing, it proceeds from any evil Difpofttion or Aim : For by the Suppofition, what is aim'd at is Good, and Good is the aftual lilue, in the final Refult of Thines. ^0<0<»00«0<»0<>0'>09'>0'>0'^ Sec Tioi!f ^ht Q/::^^^s firfl Entrance Part IV; Sec t I ON X. Concerning Sin's firfl Entrance into the JVorld. THE Things which have alreaidy-- been •• offered; rtiay ferve to obviate or clear lijarty of" the Objeftions which might be raifed eoncerning Sin's firit coming into the World ; as tho' it would follow irom the Doftrine maintain'd, that God muft be the Author of the firft Sin, thro' his fo difpofing Things, that it fhould necefTarily follow from his Permiffi'on, that }the finful Adl ftioald be committed, &c, I need not therefore (tand to repeat what has been faid already, about fuch a Neceffity's not proving God to be the Author of Sin, in any ill Senfe, or in any i'uch Senfe as to infringe any Liberty of Man, concerned in his moral Agency, or Capacity of Blame, Guilt and Puniihment. But if it (hould nevertbelefs be faid, SuppofiAg the Cafe (o, that God, when he had made Man, might fo order his Cir- eumftancesj that from thefe Circumftances, together with his withholding further Affiftance and divine Influence, his Sin would infallibly follow. Why might not God as well have firft made Man with a fixed prevailing Principle of Sin in his Heart ? I anfwer, i. It was meet, if Sin did cortie irlto Exiftence, and appear in tlie World, it fhould arife from the Imperfeftion which properly belongs to a Creature, as fuch, and (hould ap- pear fo to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the Efficient or Fountain. But this could not have been, if Man had been made at firft with Sin in his Heart ; nor nnlefs the abiding Principle and Habit of Sin were firft introduced by art Evil Aft of the Creature. If Sin had not arofe from the Imperfeftion of the Creature, it would not have been fo vifible, that it did not arife from God, as the pofitive Caufe, and real Source of iv But it would require Room that can't be here ■ allowed, fully to confider all the Difficulties which have been flatted, concerning the firft Entrance of Sin into the World. Arid Sed. X. into the World, 269 And therefore, 2. I would obferve, that Objeftions againft the Doftrine t^at has been laid do\vn, in Oppofition to the Armin'tan Notion of Liberty, from thefe Dimcuities, are altogether impertinent ; becaufe no additional DiScu'lty is incurred^ by adhering to a Scheme in this Manner difterent from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that the Arminians fay, about the Contingence, or felf-determining Power of Man's Will, can ferve to explain with lefs Difficulty , how the firll finful Volition of Mankind could Jake Place, and Man be juftly charged with the Blame of it. To fay, the Will was felf-determined, or determined by free Choice, in that finful Volition ; which is to fay, that the firft: fmful Volition was determined by a foregoing finful Volition ; is no Solution of the Difficulty. It is an odd Way of folving Difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To fay. Two and Two makes Nine; or, that a Child begat his Father, folves no Difficulty : No more does it, to fay. The firft finful Ad of Choice was before the firft finful Act of Choice, and chofe and determined it, and brought it to pafs. Nor is it any- better Solution, to fay. The firlHinful Volition chofe, determined and produced itfelf; which is to fay. It was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the Diffi- culty, to fay. The firft finful Volition arofe accidentally, without any Caufe at all ; any more than it will folve that difficult Queftlon, Hon.v the World coiAd be made cut of Nothing ? to fay. It came into Being out of Nothing, without any Caufe ; as has been already obferved. And if we Ihould allow- that That could be, that the firft evil Voli|ion fhould arife by perfeft Accident, without any Caufe, it would relieve no Diffi- culty, about God's laying the Blame of it to Man. For how was Man to Blame for perfetl Accident, which had no Caufe, and which therefore, he (to be fure) was not the Caufe of, any more than if it came by fome external Caufe ? — Such Kind of Solutions are no better, than if fome Perfon, going about to folve fome of the ftrange matiiematical Paradoxes, about infi- nitely great and fmall Quantities ; as, that fome infinitely great Quantities are infinitely greater than fome other infinitely great Quautities; and alfo that fome infinitely fmall Quantities are infinitely lefs than others, which yet are infinitely little ; in order to a Solution, (hould fay. That Mankind have been under a Miftake, in fuppofing a greater Quantity to exceed a fmaller ; and that a Hundred multiplied by Ten, makes but a fingle Unit. M m Sectiok T]o Of the Objedlion Fart IV'.- •S>aoos300oa«of 0331 oMcoooroccc 3000 Gococosoaeoo.&»i90CQPOooeoo«oocowcooocMOo«ooecoceoooo«ai> Section XII. Of a fuppofed Tendency of thefe Principles i% Atheifm and Licentioufnefs. IF any objeft againft what has been maintain'd, that it tends to Atheijm ; I know not on what Grounds fuch an Objeftion can be raifed, unlefs it be that fome Atheifts have held a DoArine of Necefllty which they fuppofe to be like this. But if it be fo, I am perfuaded the Arminians would riot look upon it juft, that their Notion of Freedom ajid Contin- gence fhould be charged with a Tendency to all the Errors that ever any embraced, who have held fuch Opinions. The Stoick Sedl. XII. f ehd fo AtheiCm. ij^ Stoick Philofophers, whom the Calvmijis are charged with agree- ing with, were no Atheifts, but the greateft Theiits, and near- eft a-kin to Chriftians in their Opinions concerning the Unity and the Perfedions of the Godhead, of all the Heathen Philo- fophers. And Epicurus, that chief Father of Atheifm, maia- tain'd no fuch Dodrine of Neceffity, but was the greateft- Maintainer of Contingence. The Doftrine of Neceffity, which fuppofes a neceflary Con- nexion of all Events, on fame antecedent Ground and Reafon of their Exiftence, is the only Medium we have to prove the Being of God. And the contrary Doftrine of Contingence, even as maintain'd by Arminians, (which certainly implies or infers, that Events may come into Exiftence, or begin to be, without Dependence on any Thing foregoing, as their Caufe,- Ground or Reafon) takes away all Proof of the Being of God ; which Proof is fummarily exprefs'd by the Apoftle, \wRom. i. 20. And this is a Tendency to Atheifm with a Witnefs. So that in- deed it is the Dottrine of Arminians, and not of the Cal'vinfis, that is juftly charged with a Tendency io Atheifm ; it being, built on a Foundation that is the utter Subverfion of every de- monftrative Argument for the Proof of a Deity ; as has been fhovvn. Part II. Sed. 3d. And whereas it has often been faid, that the Cal-vitiifiic Doc trine of Neceffity, faps the Foundations of all Pvcligion and Virtue, and tends to the greateft Licentioufnefs of Praftice ; This Objection is built on the Pretence, that our Dodtrine ren- ders vain all Means and Endeavours, in order to be virtuous and religious. Which Pretence has been already particularly confidercd in the ;th 6'd' Volitions before I can fee the effedual Power of any Caufe to producs them, (for the Power and Efficacy of the Caufe is not feen but by the Effed) and this, for ought I know, may make fome imagine, that Volition has no Caufe, or tiiat it produces itfelf. But I have no more Reafon from hence to determine any fuch Thing, than I have to de- termine that I gave myfelf my own Being, or that I C3m^ into Being accidentally without a Caufe, bpcaufe I firft found myfelf pclTeffed of Being, before I had. Knowledge of a Caufe of my Being. ^t2 Of Metaphyfical Reqfonlng. Part IV, conceivable; that is, from his own Choice : How will that help the Matter, as to his being juftly blamed or praifed, un- iefs that Choice itfelf be Blame or Praife-worthy ? And how is the Choice itfelf (an ill Choice, for Inftance) Blame-worthy, according to thefe Principles, unlefs that be from himfelf too, in the fame Manner; that is, from his own Choice ? But the original and firft determining Choice in the Affair is not from his Choice : His Choice is not the Caufe of it. — And if it be from himfelf fome other Way, and not from his Choice, furely that will not help the Matter : If it be^ot from himfelf of Choice, then it is not from himfelf voluntarily ; and if fo, he is furely no more to Blame, than if it were not from him.- felf at all. It is a Vanity, tp jjretend it is a fufficient Arj- fwer to this, to fay, that it is nothing but metaphyfical Refine- ment and Subtilty, and fo attended with Obfcurity and Uncer- tainty. If it be the natural Senfe of our Mipds, that what is blame- worthy in a Man mull be from himfelf, then it doubtlefs is alfoj that it muft be trom fome^hing hadm himfelf, a bad Choice, or bad Difpofition, But then our natural Senfe is, that this bad Choice or Difpofition is evil in itfelf, and the Man blame- worthy for it., on its cwn Account, without taking into our No- tion of its Blame- worthinefs, another bad Choice, or Difpofi- tion going before this, from whence this arifes : For that is a ridiculous Abfurdity, running us into an immediate Contradic- tion, which our natural Senfe of Blame-worthinefs has nothing to do with, and never comes into the Mind, nor i$ fupppfed in the Judgment we naturally make of the Affair. As was de- monftrated before, natural Senfe don't place the moral Evil of Volitions and Difpofitions in the Caufe of them, but the Na- ture of them. An Evil Thing's being F R O M a Man, or from fomething antecedent in him, is not effential to tlie original Notion we have of Blame-worthinefs : But 'tis its being the Choice of the Heart ; as appears by this, that if a Thing htfrom us. and not from our Choice, it has not the Nature of Blame-worthinefs or lU-defert, according to our natural Senfe. When a Thing \%from a Man, in that Senfe, that it is from his Will or Choice, he is to Blame for it, be- caufe his Will is I N IT : So far as the Will is in it. Blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any further in oqr Notion of Blame, to inquire whether the bad Will be FRO M a bad Will : There is no Confideration of the Original of fhat bad Will ; becaufe according to our natural Apprehenfion, Blame Se6l. XIII. A Vault of Arminian Writers. 283 Blar.'i^ originally conjijis in it. Therefore a Thing's \it\Ti'gfrom a" Man, is a fecondary Confideration, in the Notion of iilame of lU-defert. Becaufe thofe Things in our external Actions, ars moft properly faid to htfi-om us, which 2^xtfrom our Choice ; and no other external Actions but thofe that are from us in this Senfe, have the Nature of Blame ; and they indeed, not fo properly becaufe they are from us, as becaufe we are /// thenif i. e. our Wills are in them ; not fo much becaufe they arc from fome Property of ours, as becaufe they are our Properties, However, all thefe external Actions being X.i\x\y from us, zs tlieir Caufe ; and we being fo ufed, in ordinary Speech, and in the common Affairs of Life, to fpeak of Men's Aiflions and Condutft that we fee, and that afreft human Society, as deferve- ing 111 or Well, as worthy of Blame or Praife ; hence it is come to pafs, that Philofophers have incautioufly taken all their Meafures of Good and Evil, Praife and Blame, from tlie Diftates of common Senfe, about thefe o'vert ABs of Men ; to the runnino; of every Thing into the moft lamentable and dread- ful Confuuon. And therefore I obferve, III. 'Tis {o far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the Proof of the Doi?frine which has been maintain'd, depends on certain abftrufe, unintelligible, metaphyfical Terms and Notions ; and that the Arminian bcheme, without needing fuch Clouds and Darknefs, for its Defence, is fupported by the plain Didates of common Senfe ; that the very Reverfe is moft certainly true, '^nd that to a great Degree. 'Tis faft that they, and not we, have confounded Things with metaphyfical, iinintelligible Notions and Phrafes, and have drawn them from the Light of plain Truth, into the grofs Darknefs of abftrafe metaphyfical Propofitions, and Words without a Meaning. Their pretended Demonftrations depend very much on fuch unintelligible, metaphyfical Phrafes, as Self-determination and Scnjereignfy of the fP'ill ; and the metaphyfical Senfe they put- on fuch Terms, as Neccfjity, Contingency , Anion, Agency, &c. quite' diverfe from their Meaning as ufed in common Speech ; and which, as they trfettiem, are without any confiftent Meanings or any Manner of diftind confiftent Ideas ; as far from it as any of the abftrufe Terms and perplexed Phrafes of the Peri- patetick Philofophers, or the moft unintelligible Jargon of the Schools, or the Cant of the wildeft Fanaticks. Yea, we may be bold to fay, thefe metaphyfical Terms, on which they build fo much, are what they ufe without knowing what they mean themfeiyes ; they are pure metaphyfical Sounds, without any Ideas 2^4 Arminiahs too metaphyfical. Part IVj Ideas whatfoever in their Minds to aiifwer them ; inafmuch as it has been demonltrated, that there cannot be any Notion iri the Mind cohfiftent with thefe Expreiiions, as they pretend to explain them ; becSufe their Explanations deftroy them- ■felves. No fuch Notions as imply oelt-contradiftion, and Self-abolition, and this a great many Ways, can fubfift in the ' Mind ; as there can be no Idea of a Whole which is lefs than any of its Parts, or of folid Extenfion without Dimenfions, or t'f an Eifeft which is bbfore its Caufe Arminia?is improve thefe Terras, as Terms of Art, and in their metaphylical Meaning, to advance and eftabiifh thofe Things which are ' contrary to common Senfe, in a high Degree. Thus, inftead "of the plain vulgar Notion of Liberty, which all Mankind, in every Part of the Face of the Earth, and in all Ages, have ; confining in Opportunity to do as one pleafes ; they have in- troduced a new ftrange Liberty, confifting in Indifference, Contingence, and Self-determination ; by which they involve themfelves and others in great Obfcurity, and manifold grofs Inconfiftence. So, inftead of placing Virtue and Vice, as common Senfe places them very much, in fix'd Bias and In- clination, and greater Virtue and Vice in ftronger and more eflablifh'd Inclination ; thefe, thro' their Refinings and abftrufe Notions, fuppofe a Liberty confifting in Indifference, to be eflential to all Virtue and Vice. So they have reafoned them- felves, not by metaphylical Diftinftions, but metaphylical Confufion, into many Principles about moral Agency, Blame, Praife, Rew'ard and Punifhment, which are, as has been fhewn, exceeding contrary to the common Senfe of Mankind ; and perhaps to their own Senfe, which governs them in common Life. 4^^oooo<|^^aoo6<|<,l|»o^9e<|^^aooo«oe<|^■>|>|^o«eo<|^ THE ( 285 ) *jita)oo.^oooo.;!j-iooo.-5^.-jooo^-oooo-:^"00oor^.jow-^'Oecio-^^ SS-aooo-^QOOo-n- T H E CONCLUSIO WK E T H E R the Things which have been alledged, are liable to any tolerable Anfwer in the Ways of calm, intelligible and Itrid Reafoning, I muft leave others to judge : But I am fenfihle they are liable to one Sort of Anfwer. 'Tis not unlikely, that fome who value themfelves on the fup- pofed rational and generous Principles of the modem ta« Ihionable Divinity, will have their Indignation and Difdainraif- ed at the Sight of this Difcourfe, and on perceiving what: Things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read^ or of fo much Notice as to fay much about it, they may probably renew the ufual Exclahiations, "with additional Vehemxnce and Contempt, about the Fate of 'the Heathen, WQ\h^?,' s NecrJJity, zndi making Me7i mere Machines; accumulating the terrible Epithets oi fatal, unfrufrable, iu" editable, irrefjftable. Sec. and it may be, with the Addition of horrid and blafphemous ; and perhaps much Skill may be ufed to fet forth Things, which have been faid, in Colours which fhall be Ihocking to the Imaginations, and moving to the Paffions of thofe who have either too little Capacity, or too much Con- fidence of the Opinions they have imbibed, and Contempt of the contrary, to try the Matter by any ferious and circumfpeft Examination. * Or Difficulties may be ftarted and infilled on O o which * A Writer, ef the prefent Age, whom I have feveral Times haci Occafion to mention, fpeaks once and again of thofe who hold the Doftriue of Necejfity, as fcarcely worthy of the Name of Philofo- phers. 1 don't know, whether he has refpedt to any particulac Notion of Necefuty, that fome may have maintain 'd ; knd if fo, what DoArine of Neceflity it is that He means. Whether I an» worthy of the Name of a Philofopher, or not, would be a Queftioa little to the prefent Purpofe. If any, and ever fo many, (hould deny it, I (hould not think it worth the while to enter into a Dif- f ute on that Queftjon j thg* at the fame Time I might expeft, (90n 236 r/j^ C O M C L u s r O K which don't belong to the Controverfy ; becaufe, let them be more or lefs real, and hard to be refolved, they are not what are owing to any Thing diitinguifriing of this Scheme from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor dimi- nilhed by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or fome particular Things may be pick'd out, which they may think will found horlhelt in the Ears of the Generality ; and thefe may be glofs'd and defcanted on, with tart and con- temptuous Words J and Irom thence, the V/hole treated with Triumph and Infuk. 'Tis eafy to fee how the Decifion of moft of the Points in Controverfy, between Cal-uhiijis and Arminians, depends on the Determination of this grand Article concerning the Freedom of the Will requtjiie to moral Agency ; and that by clearing and eftab- lifhing the Cfl'/^w//;?/f J'octrine in this Point, the chief Argu- ments are obviated, by which Arminian Dodtrines- in general are fupported, and the contrary Dodrines demonftratively confirmed; Hereby it becomes manifell, that God's moral- Government over Mankind, his treating them as moral Agents, making them the Objefts of his Commands,. Counfek Calls, Warnings, Expoftulations, Promifes, Threatenings, Rewards and Punidiments, is not inconfiitent with a determining Difpojal of ail Events, of every Kind, throughout the Univerfe, in his Proindence; either by pofitive Efficiency, or PermilTion. Indeed- fach an uni-cerjal, determijiing Pro'vidence, infers fome Kind of NeceiF.ty of all Events ; fuch a Neceflity as implies an infallible previous Fixednefb of the Futurity of the Event : But no other Neceflity of moral Events, or Volitions of intelligent Agents, is needful in order to this, than moral Nec(ffity ; which does as much afcertain the Futurity of the Event, as- any other Neceflity^ But, as has been demonftrated, futh a Neceffity is not at all repugnant to moral Agency, and the reafonable Ufa of Commands, Calls, Rewards, Punifiiments, &c. Yea, not only are Objeftions, of this Kind, againft the Dodrine of art' univerfal determining Providefice, removed by what has been faid ; but the Truth of fuch a Doftrine is demonftrated. As- it fome' better Anfwer fhould be eS^tn to the Arguments brought for the Truth of the Doftrine I maintain ; and I might further reafon- ably deflre, that it might be confidered, whether it don't become thofe who are truly ivorthy of the Name of Philofophers, to be fenfible, that there is a Difference between Argument and Contempt ; ■ yea, and a Difference between the Contemptiblenefs of the Perfo» jh^t argues, and the Inconeluiivenefs of the Aigutnents he offers. r/7^ C O N C L U S I O N. ^S7 '•^t has heen deraonftrated, that th^futurity of all future Events is eltablifhed by previous Necefuty, either natural or moral ; '{o 'tis manifeft, that the fovereign Creator and Difpofer of the World has ordered this Necefiity, by ordering his own Con- dud, either in defignedly afting, or forbearing to ad. For, as the Being of the World is from God, -fo the Circumftances in which it had its Being at flrft, both negative and pofitive, muft be ordered by him, in one of thefe Ways ; and all the necef- ffary Confequences of thefe Circumftances, muft be ordered by him. And God's adive and pofitive Interpofitions, after the World vi'as created, and the Confequences of thefe Inttrpoliti- -ons ; alfo every Inftance of his forbearing to interpofe, and the •iure Confequences of this Forbear3nce, muft all be determined according to his Pleafure. And therefore every Event which is the Confequence of any Thing whatfoever, or that is con- neded with any foregoing Thing or Circumftance, either po- fitive or negative, as the Ground or R.eafonof its Exiftence, imuft be ordered of God ; either by a defigned Efiiciency and -Interpofition, or a defigned forbearing to operate or interpofe. But, as has been proved, ail Events whatfoever are neceflarily conneded with fomething foregoing, either pofitive or negative, which is the Ground of its Exiftence. It follows therefore, that •the whole Series of Events is thus conneded with fomething in the State of Things, either pofitive or negative, which is ori^hial in the Series ; /. e. fomething whi<:h is conneded with •nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate Condud, either his ading or forbearing to ad. From whence it follows, 4:hat as God defignedly order's his own Condud, and its con- neded Confequences, it muft ^ecefi!arily be, that he defignedly -orders all Things. The Things which have been faid, obviate fome of the chief •Objedions of ^r;w/W<7/>// againft the Cc/tv^^/c Dodrine of the total Deprat'ify and Corruption of Man's Nature, wheieby his Heart is wholly under the Power of Sin, and he is utterly un- able, without the Interpofition of /overeign Grace, favingly to love God, believe in Chrift, or do any Thing that is truly ■good and acceptable in God's Sight. For the main Objedion againft this Dodrine is, that it is inconfiftent with the Freedom of Man's Will, confifting in Indifference and felf-determining Power ; becaufe it fuppofes Man to be under a Necefiity of Sinning, and that God requires Thin ^is of him, in order to ills avoiding eternal Damnation, which he is unable to do ; «nd tliat tiiis Dodrine is wholly inconfiltent with the Sincerity O o 3 of 288 r-^e- C O N C L U S I O R of Counfels, Invitations, &c. Now this Dodrine fuppofes no other NeceJ/tty of Sinning, tffiin a moral Neceflity ; which, as has been Ihewn, don't at all excufe Sin ; and fuppofes no other Inability to obey any Command, or perform any Duty, ev^n the jnoft fpiritual and exalted, but a moral Inability, which, as has, been proved, don't excufe Ferfons in the Non-perfoimance ot any good Thing, or make them not to be the proper Objefts of Commands, Counfels and Invitations. And moreover, it has been (hewn, that there is not, and never can be, either in Exiftence, or fo much as in Idea, any fuch Freedom of Will, confiding in Indifference and Self-determmation, for the Sake of which, this Dodrine of original Sin is caft out ; and that no fuch Freedom is neceffary, in order to the iSiature of Sin, and a juft Defert of Punilhment. The Things which have been obferved, do alfo take ofF- the main Objeftions of Arminians againft the Doctrine of effica- cious Grace; and at the fame Time, prove the Grace of God in a Sinner's Converfion (if there be any Grace or divine In- fluence in the Affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irrcjijiible too, if by irrefiftible is meant, that which is attended with a moral Neceffity, which it is impoffible fhould ever be violated by any Refiftence. The main Objeftion of Arminians againft this Dodlrine is, that it is inconfiftent with their felf-determining "Freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the Nature of Virtue, that it Ihould be wrought in the Heart by the deter- mining Efficacy and Power ot another, inftead of its being owing to a felf-moving Power ; that in that Cafe, the Good ■which is wrought, would not be our Virtue, but rather God's Virtue ; becaufe it is not the Perfon in w horn it is wrought, that is the determining Author of it, but God that wrought it in him. 'But the Things which are the Foundation ot thefe Objeftions, have been confidered ; and it has been demon- ftrated, that the Liberty of moral Agents docs not confill in felf-determining Power ; and that there is no Need of any fuch Liberty, in order to the Nature of Virtue ; nor does it at all hinder, but that the State or Ad of the Will may be the Virtue of the Subjeft, though it be not from Self-determina- tion, but the Determination of an extrinficCaufe ; even fo as to caufe the Event to be morally neceffary to the Subjeft of it. And as it has been proved, that nothing in the State or Afts of the Will of Man i:i contingent ; but that on the contrary, every Event of this Kind is neceffary, by a moral Neceffity ; and has alfo been noff demonftrated, that the Doftrine of an univerfal T/;^ C O N C L U S I O N. 28^ oniverfal deterntining Providence, follows from that Doftrine of Necelfity, which was proved before : And fo, that God does decifively, in his Providence, order all the Volitions of moral Agents, either by pofitive Influence or Permilfion : And it being allowed on all Hands, that what God does in the Affair of Man's virtuous Volitions, whether it be more or lefs, is by fome pofitive Influence, and not by mere Perniiffion, as in the Affair pf a fmful Volition : If we put thefe Things together, it will follow, that God's Aflifiance or Influence, mult be determin- ing and decifive, or mutt be attended , with a moral Neceliity of the Event ; and fo, that God gives Virtue, Holinefs and Converfion to Sinners, by an Influence which determines the Effeft, in fuch a Manner, that the EfFed will infallibly follow- by a moral Neceflity ; which is what Caivinifs mean by effica- cious and irrefillible Grace. The Things which have been faid, do likewife anfwer the chief Objedions againft the Doftrine of God's v.ni'verjal and ab/olute Decree, and aiFord infallible Proof of that Dodrine ; and of the Doftrlne ol abfolitte , eternal, perfov.al Ele8ioH in par- ticular. The main Objedions againfl: thefe Dodrines are, that they infer a Neceffiiy of the Volitions of moral Agents, and of the future moral State and A.ds of Men ; and fo are not con- fiftent with thofe eternal Rewards and Punifhments, which are conneded with Converfion and Impenitence; nor can be made to agree with the Reafonablenefs and Sincerity of the Precepts, Calls, Courfels, Warnings and Expoftulations of the Word of God ; or with the various Methods and Means of Grace, which God ufes with Sinners, to bring them to PvCpcntance ; and the Whole of that moral Government, which God exercifes towards Mankind : And that they infer an Inconfulence between tlie fecrct and reveaLd Will of God; and make God the Auv'nor of Sin. But all thefe Things have been obviated in the preced- " ing Difcourfe. And the certain Truth of ihefe Dodrines, concerning God's eternal Purpofes, will follow from what was juft now obferved, concerning God's univerfal Providence ; how it infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God orders all Events, and the Volitions of moral Agents amongft others, by fuch a decifive Difpofal, that the Events are infal- libly conneded with his Difpofal. For if God difpofes all Events, fo that the infallible Exiftence of the Events is decided by his Providence, then he doubtlefs thus orders and decides Things knoivinglj, znAon Def.gn, God don't do what he does, per order what he orders, accider.tally and unawares ; either 'wiihout iyo ri^^ C O N C L U S I O N. ^without, or hejtde his Intention. And if there be a foregoing De/ign of doing and ordering as he does, tliis is the fame with a Fiirpofe or Decree. And as it has been ftiewn, that nothing js new to God, in any Refped, but all Things are perfeftly and equally in his View from Eternity ; hence it will follow, that his Defigns or Purpofes are . not Things formed anew, founded on any new Views or Appearances, but are all eternal Purpofes. And as it has been now ftiewn, how the Doftrine of determining efficacious Grace certainly follows from Things proved in the foregoing Difcourfe ; hence will necef- farily follow the Doctrine of ]>arlicular, eternal, ahfolnte Elec- tion. For if Men are made true Saints, no otherwife than as God makes them ib, and dillinguilhes them from others, by an efficacious Power and Intiuence of his, that decides and lixes the Event ; and God thus makes fome faints, ana not others, on Defign or Purpofe, and las has been now obferved) no Defigns of God are new \ it follows, that God thus diftinguifhed from others, all that ever become true Saints, by his eternal Defign or Decree. — I might alfo fhew, how God's certain Foreknow- ledge mutt fuppcie an atl'olute Decree, and how fuch a Decree can be proved to a Demcnftration from it : But that this Dif- courfe may not be lengthen'd out too much, that mutt be omit- ted for the prefent. From thefe Things it will inevitably follow, that however Chrift in fome Senfe may be faid to die for all, and to redeem all vifible Chnftians, yea the whole World by his Death ; yet there mutt be fomething particular in the Defign of his Death, with Refpeft to fuch as He intended (hould adually be fave4 thereby. As appears by what has been now fhewn, God has the aftual Salvation or Redemption of a certain Number in his proper abfolute Defign, and of a certain Number only;, and therefore fuch a Defign only can be profecuted in any Thing God does, in order to the Salvation of Men. God purfues a proper Defign of the Salvation of the Eled in giving Chrift to die, and profecutes fuch a Defign with Refpeft to no other, moft ftriftly fpeaking ; for 'tis impoffible, that God {hould profecute any other Defign than only fuch as He has : He certainly don't, in the higheft Propriety and Striftnefs of Speech, purfue a Defign that He has not. — And indeed fuch a Particularity and Limitation of Redemption will as infallibly follow from the Doftrine of God's Foreknowledge, as from that of the Decree. For 'tis as impoffible, in Striftnefs of Speech, that God ftioiild profecute a Defign or Aim at « Things. N. ?1?^ C O N C L U S I O N. 2gi- "thing, which He at the fame Time molt perfeflly knows v/ili not be accompl:fhed, as that he ftiould ufe Endeavours for that which is befide bis Decree. By the Things which have been proved, are obviated fome of the main Obje(flions againft the Dodrine of the infallible and neceflary Fetfit'erance of Saints, and fome of the main Founda- tions of this Dodftrine arc eitabliflied. The main Prejudices oi Armi7}ia?is againft this Doftrine feem to be thefe ; they fup- pofe fuch a neceffary, infallible Perfeverance to be repugnant to the Freedom of rlie Will ; that it muft be owing to Man's own felf-determing Power, that he fiiji becomes virtuous and holy ; and fo in like Manner, it muft be left a Thing contin- gent, to be determin'd by the fame Freedom of Will, whether he will perjcvere in Virtue and Hohnefj ; and that otherwif© his continuing ftedlait in Faith and Obedience would not be his Virtue, or at all Praife- worthy and Rewardable ; nor could his Perfeverance be properly the Matter of divine Commands, Counfels and Promifes, nor his Apoltacy be properly threaten'd, and Men warned againft it. W'hereas we find all thefe Things in Scripture : There we find Stedfaftnefs and Perfeverance iii true Chriftianity, reprefented as the Virtue of the Saints, fpoken of as Praife-worthy in them, and glorious Rewards promifed to it ; and alfo find, that God makes it the Subjeft of his Commands, Counftls and Promifes ; and the contrary, of Threatenings and Warnings. But the Foundation of thefe Objections has been removed, in its being Ihewn that moral Neceffity and infallible Certainty of Events is not inconfiftent with thefe Things ; and that, as to Freedom of Will lying in the Power of the Will to determine itfelf, there neither is any fuch Thing, nor any Need of it, in order to Virtue, Reward, Commands, Counfels, &c. And as the Doftrines of efficacious Grace and abfolute Eleftion do certainly follow from Things which have been proved in the preceding Difcourfe ; fo fome of the main Foundations of the Dodrine of Perfeverance are thereby efta- bliftied. If the Beginning of true Faith and Hohnefs, and a Man's becoming a true Saint at firft, don't depend on the felf- determining Power of the Will, but on the deter- mining efficacious Grace of God ; it may well be argued, that it is fo alfo with Refpedt to Men's being continued Saints, or perfevering in Faith and Holinefs. The Converfion of a Sinner being not owing to a Man's Self-determination, but to God's Determination, and eternal Elediouj which is abfo- lute^ h^2 The CONCLUSION. lute, and depending on the fovereign V/ill of God, and riol on the free Will of Man; as is evident from what has beeni faid : And it being very evident from the ociptures, that the eternal Election which there is of faints to Faith and Holinefs, is alio an Eledion of them to eternal Salvation ; hence their Appointment to Salvation muft alfo be abfolute, and not de- pending on their contingent, felf-determining Will. From all which it follows, that it is abfolutely fix'd in God's Decree, that all true Saints fliall perfevere to adual eternal Salvation. But I mufl leave all thefe Things to the Confideration of the fair and impartial Reader ; and when he has maturely weigh'd them, I would propofe it to his Confideration, whe- ther many of the firil: Reformers, and others that fucceeded them, whom Gcd in their Day made the chief Pillars of his Church, and greateit Initrunients of their Deliverance front Error and Darlcncfs, and of the Support of the Caufe of Piety among thern, have not been injured, in the Contempt with which they ha\e been treated by many late Writers, for their teaching and maintaining fuch Dodtrines as are com- • monly called Cal-uinrjik. Indeed foir.e of thefe new Writers^ at the fame Time that they have reprefented the Doftrines of thefe antient and eminent Divines, as in the higheft Degree ridiculous, and contrary to common Senfe, in an Oftentation of a very generous Charity, have allowed that they were honell well-meaning Men : Yea, it may be fome of them, as tho' it were in great Condefccnlion and Compaflion to them, have allowed that they did pretty well for the Day which they lived in, and confidering the great Difadvantages they laboured un- der : When at the fame Time, their Manner of Speaking has naturally and plainly fuggeiled to the Minds of their Readers, that they were Perfons, who through the Lownefs of their Genius, and G.-eatnefs of the Bigotry, with which their Minds were Ihackled, and Thoughts confined, living ifl the gloomy Caves of Superllition, fondly embraced, and demurely andzea- Joufly taught the moft abfurd, filly and monftrous Opinions, worthy of the greateft Contempt of Gentlemen pofieffed of that noble and generous Freedom of Thought, which happily prevails in this Age of Light and Inquiry. When indeed fuch is the Cafe, that we might, if {o difpofed, fpeak as big Words as they, and on far better Grounds. And really all the Ar- minians on Earth might be challenged without Arrogance or Vanity, to make thefe Principles of theirs wherein they mainly differ from their Fathers, v/hom they fo much difpife, con- fiftenir '?y6^ C O N C L U S I O N. 293 fiftent vv ith common Senfe ; yea, and perhaps to produce any Doctrine ever embraced by the biindeft Bigot of the Church of Rome, or the moft ignorant Mnjj'ulman, or extravagant Enthu^ iiaft, that might be reduced to more, and more demonftrable Inconliftenciesj and Repugnancies to common Senfe, and to themfelves ; tho' their Inconfiftencies indeed may not lie fo deep, or be fo artfully vail'd by a deceitful Ambiguity of Words, and an indeterminate Signification of Phrafes. 1 will not deny, that thefe Gentlemen, many of them, are Men of great Abili- ties, and have been helped to higher Attainments, in Philofophy, than thofe antient Divines, and have done great Service to the Church of God in fome Refpefts : But I humbly conceive, that their differing from their Fathers with fuch magifterial AfTurance, in thefe Points in Divinity, mull be owing to fome other Caufe than fuperiour Wifdom. It may alfo be worthy of Consideration, whether the great Alteration which has been made in the State of Things in ouc Nation, and fome other Parts of the Proteftant World, in this and the paft Age, by the exploding fo generally Cal'vinijiic Dodlrines, that is fo often fpoken of as worthy to be greatly- rejoiced in by the Friends of Truth, Learning and Virtue, as an Inftance of the great Increafe of Light in the Chriftian Church ; I fay, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether this be indeed a happy Change, owing to any fuch Caufe as an Increafe of true Knowledge and Underftanfting in Things of Religion ; or whether there is not Reafon to Year, that it may be owing to fome worfe Caufe. And I defire it may be confidered, whether the Boldnefs of fome Writers may not be worthy to be reflefted on, who have not fcrupled to fay, that if thefe and thofe Things are true (which yet appear to be the demonftrable Diftates o£ Reafon, as well as the certain Diftates of the Mouth of the moft High) then God is unjuft and cruel, and guilty of m.ani- feft Deceit and double-dealing, and the like. Yea, fome have gone fo far, as confidently to aflert. That if any Book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches fuch Doftrines, that alone is fufficient Warrant for Mankind to rejeft it, as what cannot be the Word of God. Some who have not gone fo far, have faid. That if the Scripture feems to teach any fuch Doftrines, fo contrary to Reafon, we are obliged to find out fome other In- terpretation of thofe Texts, where fuch Dodlrines feem to be exhibited. Others exprefs themfelves yet more modeftly : They exprefs a Tendernefs and religious Fear, left they ftiould re- ceive and teach any Thing that (hould feem to refleft on God'» P p moral ^94' 77:^^ C O N C L U S I O 1^. moral Cliarafter, or be a Difparagement to his Methods of Adminiftration, in his moral Government j and therefore ex- prefs themfelves as not daring to embrace fome Dodrinesy though they feem to be delivered in Scripture, according to the more obvious and natural Conflrudtion of the Words. But indeed it would Ihew a truer Modefty and Humility, if they would more entirely rely on God's Wifdom and Dif- cerning, who knows infinitely better than we, what is agreeable to his own Perfeftions, and never intended to leave thefe Mat- ters to the Decifion of the Wifdom and Difcerning of Men ; but by his own unerring Inltruftion, to determine for us what the Truth is ; knowing how little our Judgment is to be de- pended on, and how extremely prone, vain and blind Men are, to err in fach Matters. The Truth of the Cafe is, that if the Scripture plainly taught the oppofite Dodrines, to thofe that are fo much ftum- bled at, 'z.v'z, the Jrminian Dodrine of Free-Will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greateft of all Difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its con- tainmg any, even the moll: myfterious of thofe Doftrines of the firft Reformers, which our late Free-thinkers have fo fuperci- lioufly exploded. Indeed it is a glorious Argument of the Divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach fuch Doctrines, which in one Age and another, thro' the Blindnefs of Men's Minds, and ftrong Prejudices of their Hearts, are reje(Sed, as moft abfurd and unreafonable, by the wife and great Men of the World ; which yet, when they are moft carefully and. flridly examined, appear to be exaftly agreeable to the moft demonftrable, certain, and natural dictates of Reafon. By fuch Things it appears, that the Foolijhttejs of God is 'wiftr than Meiii and God does as is faid in i Cor. i. 19, 20 ; For it is ivrittetiy J ijoill dejiroy the Wifdom of the Wife; I nvill bring to nothing the Underfanding of the Prudent. Where is the Wife ! Where is the Scribe ! Where is the Difpiiter of this World ! Hath not God made foolijh the Wifdom of this World? And as it ufed to be in Time paft, fo it is probable it will be in Time to come, as it is there written, in ver. 27, 28, 29: But God hath chofen the foolifh Things of the World, to confoimd the Wife : And God hath chofett the nueak Things of the World, to confound the Things that are mighty : And hafe Things of the World, and Things ivhich are defpifed, hath God chofen : Tea, and Things 'which are not, lo bring to nought Things that are ; that no Flefh fhoidd glorj in hti Prefence, Amen. FINIS, \ [ 295 ] r"»« i^*^ -iif "s£ 2ir^ xr*"^ ?jr"5ie sr"4s ^ "^ 5!^ »**« »it™ *\| *'li'* rrf^f^ **^3Mt if^ ;W;** 3t^ I N D E [N. B. Tlie Capital P. fignines the Prtr/; this Mark, §, the Se£iion ; Concl. \}as. Conclttjton ; and the fm all /. the Page ; where the Things here fpecified, are to be found.] ABfiraaed or Ahfirufe Rea- foning, whether juftly objected againft Cal-vinijis, P. 4- §• '3- P- 278. ABion, Inconfiftence of the Arminian'^Qtioxs. of it, P. 4. §. 2. p. J 99. and whence this arofe, p. 204. what it is in the com- mon Notion of it. Ibid. p. 201. — and how diiiinguifli'd from FaJJton, Ibid. p. 203. ABi'vitj cf the Nature of the Soul, whether thro' this. Voli- tion can arife without a Caufe, P. 2. §. 4. p.^47. Apparent Good, the greateft, in what Senfe it determines the Will, P. i.§. 2.p. 7. Arininians, obliged to talk jnconfiftently, P. 2. §. 5. p. '^1. Ibid. §. 7. p. 70. \. 9. p. 77. where the main Strength of their pretended Demonftrations lies, P. 4. §. 4. p. 219. Their Objeftion from God's moral Charader, confuler'd and re- torted. Ibid. ^. II. p. 271. 2. ^yminiaii Doilritie, its Ten- dency to fuperfede ail Ufe of Means, and make Endeavours vain, P. 4. §. 5, p. 222. and in Efteft, to exclude all Virtue and Vice out of the World, P, 3. §. 4. p. 161, 167. Ibid. §. 6. p. 184. and §. 7. p. 190. P. 4. §. I. p. 196,7. Ibid. §. 12. p. 276. Atheijm, the fuppofed Ten- dency of Calvmijiic Principles to it, P. 4. §. 12. p. 274. How Arminian Principles tend to it. Ibid. p. 275;. Attending t-) Moti-'ucs, of Li- l-ierty's being fuppofed to con- fill in an Ability for it, P. 2. § 9. p. 80. Atonement. See Christ. Author of Sin, whether it would follow from the Doc- trine here maintain'd, that God is fo, P. 4. § 9. p. 2)2. "pLame-nuorthtnefs, wherein it confifts, according to com- mon oenfe, P. 4. § 4. p. 2 1 2. Cal'vinifrn^ 2^6 INDEX. /^Alvlmfm, confiftent with common Senfe, P, 4. § 3. p. 206. Cau/ey how the Word is uf- ed ifl this Difcourfe, P. 2. § 3. p. 41. No Event njoithout one, P. 2. § 3. p. 42. and Iffed, a neceffary Comieilion between them, P. 2. § 8..p, 73. This refpeds moral, as well as natural Caufes, P. 2. § 3. p. 41 . Chriji, his Obedience necef- fary, yet virtuous and Praife- ivorthy, P. 3. § i. p. 139. His Atonement excluded in Con- fequence of Arminian Princi- ples, P. 3. § 3.p. 158. Chubb (Mr.) the Inconfift- ence of his Scheme of Liberty ^ &c. P. 2. § 9. p. 85, 98. Commands yCon^v^.Q.vA with mo- ral Neceflity and Inability, P. 3. §4. p. 159. P. 4. § II. p. 270. Inconfiftent with Arminian Principles, P. 3. § 4. p. 161. Commofz Senje, why the Prin- ciples maintain'd in this Dif- courfe, appear to fome contrary toit, P.4. § 3. p. 206. Necef- fary Virtue and Vice agreeable to it P. 4. § 4. p. 212. Ar- mnian Tenets oppofite to it, P. 3. § 6. p. 178. Ibid. § 7. p. 187. Contingenee, P. i. §3. p. 20. thelnconfiftenceof the Notion, P. 2. § 3. p. 45. Whether ne- ceffary in order to Liberty, P. 2. § 8. p. 73. '■ — implied in Arminian Liberty, and yet in- confiftent with it. P. 2. § 13. p. 132. Epicurus the greateft Maintainer of it, P. 4. ^ 6. p. 228. Ibid. § 12 p. 275. Corruption of Man's Nature^ CoNCL. p. 287. Creation of the World, at fuch a particulay '•7'/»7e' and Place, P. 4. § 8. p. 240. T\Ecree ahjolute, not inferring Neceflity, any more than certain Foreknowledge does, P. 2. § 12. p. 122. How it fol- lows from Things proved iii this Difcourfe. CoNCL.p. 289. Determination. See Will. Didates, See Underjlanding. pFfea. See Caufe. Efficacious Grace. Co. p. 2 8 8. Eicdion perjonal. See Decree, Endea'vours , what it is for them to be in vain, P. 4. § 5. p. 220. Render'd vain by Arminian Principles, Ibid. p. 222. But not fo by Cal'vinifm,, Ibid. p. 224. See Sincerity, Entrance of Sin into the World, P. 4. § 19. p. 268. Equilibrium. See Indifference. Exhortation. See Invitation, JpAllen Man. See Inability. Fatejioical, P. 4. v^ 6. p. 228. Fatality, the Principles of Arminians inferring that which ifi moft fhocking, P. 4. § 8. p. 251. Foreknoivledge of God, of Vo- litions of moral Agents, proved, P. 2. § II. p. 98.- — Inconfift- ent with Contingence, P. 2. § 12. p. 117. Proves Neceffity, as much as a Decree, Ibid. p. 1 22. The feeming Difficulty of reconciling it with the Since- rity of his Precepts, Counfels, &c. INDEX. Sec. not peculiar to the Cal'vin- ijiic Scheme, P. 4. ^ 1 1 . p. 27 1 . Y^OD, his Being how known, P. 2. ^3. p. 43 .P. 4.^ 12. p. 275. His moral Excellencies neceffary, yet virtuoqs and praife-worthy, P. 3.^ I. p. 135. P. 4. S 4. p, 219. The Ne- ceffity of his Volitions, P. 4. \ 7. p. 230. Whether the Prin- ciples maintain'd in this Dif- courfe are inconfiftent with his moral Charafter, P. 4. ^11. p. 270. How Arminianifm de- ftroys the Evidence of his mo- ral Perfedions. Ibid. p. 272. Grace of the Spirit y excluded by Arminian Principles, P. 3. § 3-P- 15?- Grace, its Freenefs confiftent •with the moral Neceffity of God's Will, P. 4. S 8. p. 249. TJAbits, virtuous and vicious, inconfiftent with Arminian Principles, P. 3. § 6. p. 181. Heathen, of their Salvation, P. 3. ^ 5. p._i77. Hobbes, his Doftrine of Ne- ceffity, P. 4. ^ 6, p. 229. TMpoJJibility , the fame as ne- gative Neceffity,P. i .^3.p. 1 9. Inability, how the Word is yfed in common Speech, and how by MctaphyficiLins and Ar- minians, P. i. ^ 4. p. 14, 17. P. 4. ^ 3. p. 207. Natural and moral, P. i . ^ 4. p. 20. Moral, the feveral Kinds of it, P. i. § 4. p. 29. P. 3. S 4. p. 165. of fallen Man to perform perfedl Obedience, P. 3, S 3« 297 p. 157. What does, and what does not excufe Men, P. 3. ^ 3. p. 155. Ibid. ^4. p. 167. P. 4. § 3. p. 206. Inclinations; fee Habits,- Indifference, whether Liberty confills in it, P. 2. S 1' p. ^'i* — Not neceffary to Virtue, but inconfiftent with it, P. 3. ^ 6, p. 178. Indifferent Things, thofe which appear fo, never the Ob- jects of Volition, P. 1.^2, p. 7. P. 2. ^ 6. p. 56. Whether the Will can determine itfelf in chufing among fuch Things, P. 2. s 6. p. 57. Inn)itations , confiftent with moral Neceffity and Inability. P. 3. S 4. p> 169. P. 4. ^ II. p. 270. But not confiftent with Arminian Principles, P. 2. \ 9. p. 81. P. 3. S 7. p. 188. P. 4. ^ II. p. 272. T Anus, the End whereof is to bind to one Side, render 'd ufelefs by Arminian Principles, P. 3. §4. p. 162. Z/^^r/j-jthe Natureof it, P. i. ^ 5. p. 27. The Arminian No- tion of it. Ibid. p. 28. This inconfiftent with other Armi- nian Notions, P. 2. ^ 9. p. 77, Licentioufne/s , whether the Cal»0»0'0<-'OoO<-0'^'<2xx2x»0<»0<'OxS>^>0»<£>'^ ^.0<>0<»0<00<0'x2>'^'0»0<0*0«S>«0<'0<»0'^ REMARKS ON THE ESSAYS on tlie Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, In a L E T T E R to a Minifter of the Church of Scotland : .- V By the Reverend Mr. JONATHAN ED- WARDS, Prefident of the College of New- Jersey, and Author of the late I n qjj i r y in- to the ModernNotions of the Freedom of Will, Re'v. SIR, ii^OCXXXw ^^ •''"'•''^^^^^"^ you have given me of the Ufe ^ y^l which has, by fome, been made of what I have X T' X written on the Freedom of the Will, &c. to vin- X X t^icate what is faid on the Subjed of Liberty and V^XX.XX Neceflity by the Author of the Ejfaji on the PrifZ'^ ciples of Morality atid Natural Religion, has occafioned my read-i ing this Author's Effay on that Subjefi:, with particular Care and Attention. And I think it muft be evident to every one, that has read both his E^ay and my Inquiry, that our Schemes are exceeding reverfe from each other. The wide Difference appears particularly in the following Things. This Author fuppofes, that fuch a Neceffity takes place with fefped to all Mens Adioris, as is inconfiftent with Liberty «, Q^q and a P. 1 60, 161, 164, 165, aiii map-/ oUier Places. ( = ) and plainly denies that Men have any Liberty in afting. ThuS' in p. 1 68. after he had been fpeaking of the Neceffity of our Determinations, as connefted with Motives, he concludes wiih faying, " In fhort, if Motives are not under our Power or Direction, which is confeffediy the Faft, we can at Bottom have . NO LIBERT Y." Whereas I have abundantly expreffed it as my Mind, that Man, in his moral Adions, has true Li- berty; and that the moral Neceffity which univerfally takes Place, is not in the leaft inconfiftent with any thing that is pro- perly called Liberty, and with the utnioft Liberty that can be defired, or that can poflibly exift or be conceived of a. I find that fome are apt to think, that in that Kind of mo- ral Neceffity of Mens Volitions, which I fuppofe to be univer- fal, at leaft fome Degree of Liberty is denied ; that though it be true I allow a Sort of Liberty, yet thofe who maintain a felf-determining Power in the Will, and a Liberty of Contin- gence and Indiuerence, hold an higher Sort of Freedom than 1 do ; but I think this is certainly a great Miftake. Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 38. and other Places, is the Po^ixer, Opportiiniiy , or Ad as he pleafes, or conducing, in any respect, according to his Pleafure; without conlidering how his Pleafure comes to be as it is. It is demonftrable, and I think has been demonftrat- ed, that no Neceffity of Mens Volitions that I maintain, is in- confiftent with this Liberty : And I think it is impoflible for a- ny one to rife higher in his Conceptions of Liberty than this : If any imagine they defire higher, and that they conceive of a. higher and greafer Liberty than this, they are deceived, and de- lude themfelves with coniufed ambiguous Words, inftead of I- deas. If any one ftiould here fay, " Yes, I conceive of a Freedom above and beyond the Liberty a Man has of conduc- ing in any Refpeft as he pleafes, 'vi%. a Liberty of chtijing as he pleafes." Such an one, if he reflefted, would either Lluih or laugh at his own Inftance. For, is not chufing as he pleafesj^ Gondurtinp-, in some respect, according to his Plea- fure, and ftill without determining how he came by that Plea- fure ? If he fays, " Yes, I came by that Pleafure by my own Choice." If he be a Man of common Senfe, by this Time he will fee his own Abfurdity : For he muft needs fee that his No- tion or Conception, even of this Liberty, don't contain any Judgment or Conception how he comes by that Choice, which iirft determines his Pleafure, or which originally fixed his own Will refpeding the Affair. Or if any fhall fay, " That a Man exercifea a Inquiry^ P. 37 30, 133, J34, I()8,-w— ao6, 214, %l^i %lt 339- ( 3 ) f xerclfes Liberty In this, even in determining his own Choice, but not as he pleafes, or not in Confequencc of any Choice, Preference, or IncHnation of his own, but by a determination arifi'ng contingently out of a State of abfolute Indifference ; " this is not rifing higher in his Conception of Liberty ; as fuch a Determination of the Will would not be a voluntary Determi- nation of it. Surely he that places Liberty in a Power of do- ing fomething not accor^ling to his own Choice, or from his Choice, has not a higher Notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleafes, or afting from his own Eledion. If there were a Power in the Mind to determine itfclf, but not by its Choice or according to its Pleal'ure, what Advantage would it give ? and what Liberty, worth contending for, would be exer- cifed in it ? Therefore no Arminian, Peiagian, or Epicurion, can rife higljer in his Conceptions of Liberty, than the Notion of it which 1 have explained: Which Notion is, apparently, perfeftly confiftent with the Whole of that NecefTity of Mens Adions, which I fuppofe talces Place. And I fcruple not to fay 'tis beyond all their Wits to invent a higher Notion, or form a higher Imagination of Liberty ; let them talk of So^jereig?i!j> of the Will, felf-determiniiig Fonver, Self-motio-n, Self-direiiion^ urbitrary Decijion, Liberty ad utrumvis, Ponver of chajtng diffe- re7itly in gh-ven Cafes, ^'c. &c. as long as they will. 'Tis ap- parent that thefe Men, in their ftrenuous Affirmation, and Difpute about thefe Things, aim at they know not what, fijdit- jng for fomething they have no Conception of. fubftitutino- a Number of confufed unmeaning Words, inftead of Things, and inftead of Thoughts, They may be challenged clearly '^to explain what they would have : They never can anfwer the Challenge. The Author of the EJfays, through his whole Eir;>y on Li- berty and Neceffity, goes on that Suppofition, that, in order to the Being of real Liberty, a Man rauft have a Freedom that is oppofed to moral Neceffity : And yet he fuppofes, P. lyr, that/wf^ a Liberty miift fignify a Poijoer in the M-hid of aSling 'without and againft Motives, a Poniuer of a^ing njoilhout any. Vieiu, Purpoje or Dcfiga, and even of aHiiig in ContradiSlion to our onjjn Dejires and A, as nice artificial Feelings, mere- ly that Confcience may have a commanding Power i : Meaning plainly, that thefe Feelings are a cunning Artifice of the Au- thor of Nature, to make Men believe they are free, when they are not k. He fuppofes that by thefe Feelings the moral World has a difguifed Appearance /. And other Things of this Kind he fays. He fuppofes that all Self-approbation, and all Re- morfe of Confcience, all Commendation or Condemnation of ourfelves or others, all Senfe of Defert, and all that is connect- ed with this Way of thinking, all tlie Ideas, which at prefent are fuggelled by the Words ought, Jhould, arife from this Delu- fion, and would entirely vanilh without it m. All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly infilled on and endeavoured to deraonftrate in my Liquirj ; v/here I have largely a P. 200. h P. 152. c P. J83. d P. 186. e P. 205. /P. 403, 204, 211. g P. 183. h P. 209. /■ P. 211. k P. 153 \ / P. 214. m¥. 160, 194,199,205, 206, 207, 209. ( 7 ) largely ftiewn, that it is agreeable to the natural Senfe of Mait- kind, that the moral Neceffity or Certainty that attends Mens Aftions, is confident with Praife and Blame, Reward and Pu- nifhment ; ?/ and that it is agreeable to our natural Notions, that moral Evil, with its Delert of Diflike and Abhorrence, and all its other Ill-defsrvings, confifts in a certain Deformity in the Nature of the Difpofitions and Afts of the Heart, and not in the Evil of fomething elfe, diverfe from thefe, fuppofed to be their Caufe or Occafion o. I might well afic here, whether any one is to be found in the World of Mankind, who is confcious to a Senfe or Feeling, na- turally and deeply rooted in his Mind, that, in order to a Man's performing any Adion that is Praife or Blame-worthy, he muft exercife a Liberty that implies and fignifies a Power of atfting without any Motive, View, Defign, Defire, or Principle of Aftion ? For fuch a Liberty this Author fuppofes That muft be which is oppofed to moral Neceffity, as I have already obferved once and again. Suppollng a Man ftiould adtually do Good, independent of Defire, Aim, Inducement, Principle or End, is it a Diftate of invincible natural Senfe, that his Aft is more meritorious or Praife-worthy than if he had performed it for fome good End, and had been governed in it by good Principles and Moti'ves ? And fo I might aik, on the contrary, with Re- fpedt to evil Aftions/. The Author of the Ejfays fuppofes that the Liberty without Neceffity which we have a natural Feeling of, ipiplies Cotitin- gence : And fpeaking of this Contingence, he fometimes calk it by the Name of Chance. And 'tis evident, that his Notion of it, or rather what he fays about it, implies Things happen- ing loofely, fortuitoiijly, by Accident ^ and ^without a Caufe q» Now I conceive the flighteft Refleftion may be fufficient to fa- tisfy any one, that fuch a Condngence of Mens Adions, ac- cording to our natural Senfe, is fo far from being eflential to the Morality or Merit of thofe Aftions, that it would deftroy it ; and that, on the contrary, the Dependence of our Aftions on fuch Caufes, as inward Inclinations, Incitements and Ends^ is eflential to the Being of it. Natural Senfe teaches Men, when they fee any thing done by others of a good or evil Ten- dency, to inquire what their Intention was ; what Principles and Views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be juftified or condemned ; and not to determine, that. n Inquiry Part IV. Sed. 4. throughout, Idem, Part IV. Seft. r , throughout, and P. 282 283. p See this Matter illuftrated in my /;ij«/ry,. Part IV. Seft. 4. efpeciilly, P. 215 317. q P, ij6, 157, J53> J59> 1771 ^781 iSi, 183, 184, 185. ( 8 ) ih order to their being approved or blamed at all, the Aftiort iTsuft be performed altogether fortuitoufly, proceeding from no- thing, arifing from no Caufe. Concerning this Matter, I have fully exprelTed my Mind in the Inquiry r. If the Liberty which we have a natural Senfe of as neceffary to Defert, conlifts in the Mind's Self-determination, without being determined by previous Inclination or Motive, then In^ difference is ellential to it, yea abfohite Indifference ; as is ob- ferved in my Inquiry s. Eut Men naturally have no Notion of any fuch Liberty as this, as effential to the Morality or Deme- rit of their Adions ; but, on the contrary, fuch a Liberty, if it were poffible, would be inconfiftent with our natural Notions of Defert, as is largely fnown in the Inquiry t. If it be agree- able to natural Senfe, that Men mufl be indifferent irt determine ing their own Adtions ; then, according to the fame, the more they are determined by Inclination, either good or bad, the lefs they have of Defert : The more good Aftions are performed from good Difpofitions, the lefs Praife-worthy ; and the more evil Deeds are from evil Difpofitions, the lefs culpable ; and in general, the more Mens Actions are from their Hearts, the lefs they are to be commended or condemned : Which all muft know is very contrary to natural Senfe. Moral Neceiiity is owing to the Power and Government of the Inclination of the Heart, either habitual or occafional, excited by Motive : But, according to natural and common Senfe, the more a Man does any Thing with full Inclination of Heart, the more is it to be charged to his Account for his Condemnation, if it be an ill Adion, and the more to be afcribed to him for his Praife, if it be good. If the Mind were determined to evil Adions by Contingence, from a State of Indifference, then either there v/ould be one Fault in them, or elfe the Fault would be in being fo perfectly indifferent, that the Mind was equally liable to a bad or good Determination. And if this Indifference be Liberty, then the very EfTence of the Blame or Fault would lie in the Liberty it- felf, or the Wickednefs would, primarily and fummarily, lie in being a free Agent. If there were no Fault in being indif- ferent, then there would be no Fault in the Determination's be- ing agreeable to fuch a State of Indifference : That is, there could no Fault be reafonably found with this, wz. that oppo- fite Determinations actually happen to take Place indifferently y fometimes good and fometimes bad, as Contingence governs and decides. And if it be a Fault to be indifferent to Good and r p 184 — 186, rgo, 215, 216, and other Places. •! 64—65, r EfpechllyinPartm. Seft. 6. and 7. ( 9 ) and Evil, then fucli IndifFerence is no Indifference to Good and Evil, but is a Determination to Evil, or to a Fault ; and fuch an indifferent Difpofition would be an evil, faulty Difpofition, Tendency or Determination of Mind. So inconfiftent are thefe Notions of Liberty, as effential to Praife or Blame. The Author of the Ejfays fuppofes Mens natural delulive Senfe of a Liberty of Contingencej to be, in Truth, the Foun- dation of all the Labour, Care and Induftry of Mankind u ; and that if Mens praflkal Ideas had bee?i formed on the Plafi ofti7ii~ n)erfal NeceJ/ity, the ignava Ratio, the inaSii've Doilrine of the Stoicks, - his Will, as he pleafes, or as he chufes ; which fuppofes that the Mind has a Choice, prior to its going about to conform any Adion or Determination to it. And if they mean that they determine even the original or prime Choice, by their own Pleafure or Choice, as the Thing that caufes and direfts it ; I fcruple not moft' boldly to affirm, that they fpcak they know not what, and that of which they have no Manner of Idea ; becaufe no fuch contradidfory Notion can come into, or have a Moment's Subfiflence in the Mmd of any Man living, as an original or firft Choice being caufed, or brought into Being, by Choice. After all they fay, they have no higher or other Conception of Liberty, than that vulgar Notion of it, which I contend for, 'viz.. a Mans having Power or Opportunity to do as he chufes : Or if they had a Notion that every Aft of Choice was determined by Choice, yet it would deftroy their Notion of the Contingence of Choice ; for then no one kdi of Choice would arife contingently, or from a State of Indifterence, but every individual Aft, in all the Series, would arife from fore- going Bias or Preference, and from a Caufe predetermining and fixing its Exiftence, which introduces at once fuch a Chain of Caufes and EfFefts, each preceding Link decifively fixing the following, as they would by all Means avoid. And fuch Kind of Delufion and Self-contradiftion as this. don't arife in Mens Minds by Nature : It is not owing to any natural Feeling which God has ftrongly fixed in the Mind and Nature of Man ; but to falfe Philofcphy, and ftrong Prejudice, from a deceitful Abufe of Words. It \^ artificial ; not in the Sfinfe of the Author of the Efays, fuppofing it to be a deceitful Artifice of God ; but artificial as oppofed to natural, and as owing To an artificial deceitful Management of Terms, to. darken and confound the Mind. Men have no fuch Thing when they firft begin to exercife Reafon ; but muft have a great deal of Time to blind therafelves with metaphyfical Confufion, before they can embrace, and reft in fuch Definitions of Liberty as are given, and imagine they underftand them. R r 3 On c p. 183, 184. See alfa P. 34, 39, 40, 52, 53, 56, 131, 134, aoo, zoi, 212, 214. ( " ) On the Whole, I humbly conceive, that whofoever will give himfelf the Trouble of weighing, what I have offered to Con- iideration in vc\y Inquiry, muft be fenfjbie, that fuch amoral Necelfity of Mens Adions as I maintain, is not at all inconfift- ent with any Liberty that any Creature has, or can have, as a free, accountable, moral Agent, and Subjeft of moral Govern- ment ; and that this moral Neceffity is fo far from being incon- fiilent with Praife and Blame, and the Benefit and Ufe of Mens own Care and Labour, that on the contrary it implies the very Ground and Reafon, why Mens Adlions are to be afcribed to them as their own, in that Manner as to infer Defert, Praife and Blame, Approbation and Remorfe of Confcience, Reward and Punifhment ; and that it eftablifhes the moral Syflem of the Univerfe, and God's moral Government, in every Refpeft, with the proper Ufe of Motives, Exhortations, Commands, Counfels, Promifes, and Threatenings ; and the Ufe and Be- nefit of Endeavours, Care and Induftry : And that therefore there is no Need that the flrift philofophic Truth fhould be at all concealed from Men ; no Danger in Contemplation and /ro- found Di/covery in thefe Things. So far from this, that the Truth in this Matter is of vaft Importance, and extremely needful to be known ; and that the more clearly and perfeftly the real Faft is known, and the more conftantly it is in View, the better ; and particularly, that the clear and full Knowledge of that which is the true Syflem of the Univerfe, in thefe Re- fpeds, would greatly eflablifh the Doftrines which teach the true Chriflian Scheme of divine Adminiflration in the City of God, and the Gofpel of Jefus Chrift, in its mofl important Articles ; and that thefe Things never can be well cftablifhed, and the oppofire Errors, fo fubverfive of the whole Gofpel, which at this Day fo greatly and generally prevail, be well confuted, or the Arguments by which they are maintained, anfwered, till thefe Points are fettled : While this is not done. It is, to me, beyond Doubt, that the Friends of thofe great: Gofpel Truths, will but poorly maintain their Controverfy with the Adverfaries of thofe Truths : They will be obliged often to dodge, fhufHe, hide, and turn their Backs ; and the latter will have a flrong Fort, from whence they never can be driven, and Weapons to ufe, which thofe whom they oppofe will 6nd no Shield to fcreen themfelves from ; and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the Friends of found Doftrine ; and glory, and vaunt themfelves in their Advantage over them ; and carry their Affairs with an high Hand, as they have done al- ready for a long Time paft. I conclude. Sir, with alking you: Pardon for troubling you with ( 13 ) with fo much faid in Vindication of myfelf from the Imputation of advancing a Scheme of Neceffity, of a like Nature with that of the Author of the ^JJhys on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. Confidering that what I have faid is not on- ly in Vindication of myfelf, but, as I think, of the moft im- portant Articles of moral Philofophy and Religion ; I truft, in what I know of your Candour, that you will excufe. Your obliged Friend and Brother ^ Stockbridgej J. EDWARD Sa ' J^b 25, 1757° !*',»0^'<'^— ><''''>^''<'*^— '^'"'''^^ v^'^^'^v^-v^^'^i^-v^'^iJ^v^. ^»0'$Ks.j5KS<:J>e>e>.:5'<5>e.j5'o:J:0'^ ^ ■^ri^siMikari