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 LIBEAET 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Theological Seminary, 
 
 PRINCETON, N. J. 
 
 BR 45 .H84 1840 
 Smith, Theyre T. 1798-1852. 
 The Christian religion in 
 connexion with the 
 
 

HULSEAN LECTURES 
 
 FOR THE YEAR 1840. 
 
 EY THE 
 
 REV. THEYRE T. SMITH, M.A. 
 
LONDON i 
 RICHARD CLAY, PRINTER, BREAD STREET HILL. 
 
HULSEAN LECTURES 
 
 FOR THE YEAR 1840. 
 
 THE CHRISTIAN RELICxION 
 
 IN CONNEXION WITH 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. THEYRE T. SMITH, M.A. 
 
 OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
 AND ASSISTANT PREACHER AT THE TEMPLE CHURCH. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 B. FELLOWES, LUDGATE STREET; 
 J. & J. J. DEIGHTON, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 1841. 
 
TO 
 JOHN GRAHAM, D.D. 
 
 MASTER OF CHRIST^ COLLEGE, VICE-CHANCELLOR, 
 
 TO 
 
 CHRISTOPHER WORDSWORTH, D.D. 
 
 MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, 
 AND TO 
 
 RALPH TATHAM, D.D. 
 
 MASTER OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, 
 
 TRUSTEES OF THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY 
 
 THE REV. JOHN HULSE, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING DISCOURSES, 
 
 PREACHED BY THEIR APPOINTMENT, 
 
 ARE MOST RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED, 
 
 BY 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
SUBSTANCE OF CERTAIN CLAUSES RELATING TO THE 
 HULSEAN LECTURESHIP, 
 
 In the Will of the Rev. J. Hulse, M. A., the Founder of that and 
 other offices in the University of Cambridge. 
 
 [Dated July 21, 1777.] 
 
 He founds a Lectureship in the University of Cambridge. 
 
 The Lecturer is to be a " Clergyman in the University of 
 Cambridge, of the degree of Master of Arts, and under the 
 age of forty years." He is to be elected annually " on 
 Christmas-day, or within seven days after, by the Vice- 
 Chancellor for the time being, and by the Master of Trinity 
 College, and the Master of St. John's College, or any two 
 of them." In case the Master of Trinity, or the Master of 
 St. John's, be the Vice- Chancellor, the Greek Professor is to 
 be the third Trustee. 
 
 The duty of the said Lecturer, as stated in the Will, is "to 
 preach" so many as " twenty sermons in the whole year," as 
 well as to print them in the same period ; and it having been 
 found, in consequence, that few were willing to undertake the 
 office, application was made to the Court of Chancery, with a 
 view the better to carry into effect the intention of its 
 Founder. The result was, that by an order of that Court 
 (dated 21st December, 1830), the number of the Sermons 
 was reduced to eight, and the time allowed for printing them 
 extended to the term of one year from the delivery of the 
 last of them. 
 
 The subject of the Lectures is to be, " the Evidence for 
 Revealed Religion ; the Truth and Excellence of Christianity ; 
 Prophecies and Miracles ; direct or collateral Proofs of the 
 
Vlll CERTAIN CLAUSES. 
 
 Christian Religion, especially the collateral arguments ; the 
 more difficult texts or obscure parts of the Holy Scriptures ;" 
 or any one or more of these topics, at the discretion of the 
 Preacher. The subject of the Lectures is not to be " any 
 particular sects or controversies amongst Christians them- 
 selves ; except some new and dangerous error, either of 
 superstition or enthusiasm, as of Popery or Methodism, or 
 the like, either in opinion or practice, shall prevail." " And 
 in all the said twenty sermons," now eight, it is stated that 
 " such practical observations shall be made, and such useful 
 conclusions added, as may instruct and edify mankind." 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 It is the principal object of the following dis- 
 courses, as their title may indicate, to engage 
 the reflection of the reader on the exist- 
 ence of an essential connexion between the 
 fundamental principles of religion inculcated 
 in Christianity, and the principles of morality. 
 In the opinion of the Author, a chief cause of 
 indifference to religion, and, consequently, to the 
 particular evidences of Christianity, is either an 
 actual disbelief of such a connexion, or an in- 
 attention to its reality and importance. Of some 
 it is a settled conclusion, that the origin of our 
 notions of merit and demerit, and the feelings 
 consequent upon them, is of such a nature as to 
 make it evident that they have answered their 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 great and ultimate end, when they have served 
 the purposes of human society, and the business 
 
 of this life. Others, a far greater number, would 
 deny that particular origin to the moral senti- 
 ments, from which such a conclusion is drawn; 
 but their own account of those sentiments 
 appears to supply them with no powerful con- 
 firmation of the principles of the Christian reli- 
 gion. The Author, therefore, cannot but conclude 
 that in order to uphold and promote the belief 
 of Christianity — in his firm conviction the basis 
 of a people's virtues, as well as of their hopes 
 of happiness hereafter — that religion should be 
 exhibited in its relation to our moral principles, 
 as well as supported by the external evidences 
 of its divine authority. Indeed, could he judge 
 differently, he must hold in light esteem the 
 works of the most eminent theologians of the 
 Church of England : the names of Clarke and 
 Butler may remind the reader that British 
 divines, in defending Christianity against its 
 opponents, have been concerned, first of all, to 
 support it by the principles of natural religion ; 
 that is. by principles which are the rational 
 growth of our moral nature. 
 
PREFACE. Xi 
 
 Much of the diversity of opinion in works 
 upon ethics leaves the reality of a moral differ- 
 ence in actions — the point, more particularly, at 
 issue in reference to religion — untouched : con- 
 sisting, as it does, of a diversity of theories, each 
 reducing virtue to some single principle of action, 
 or merely clothing it in a peculiar phraseology. 
 Such theories are now, for the most part, but 
 little regarded ; anv farther than as thev seve- 
 rally occupy a place in the history of ethical 
 philosophy ; although the writings of their 
 authors may be held in the highest estimation, 
 as establishing a number of important facts, and 
 displaying an extensive knowledge of human 
 nature. One of these theories, however, that 
 which reduces virtue to a principle of general 
 benevolence, is considerably prevalent, and is 
 treated of in the following discourses ; though 
 in detached parts of the work ; for the design 
 of the Author, in the discussion of his subject, 
 interfered with the prosecution of a continue) 
 uninterrupted argument respecting it. 
 
 The ethical philosophy which directly oppos - 
 itself to the progress of religion in the mind, 
 and is consequently the subject of one of tin 
 
XII PREFACE. 
 
 following discourses, is that which explains our 
 notions of merit and demerit in the manner 
 adverted to, at the commencement of these pre- 
 fatory remarks. It destroys the connexion 
 between religion and morality, so far as it is 
 judged to be perceptible to human reason ; and 
 as it has lately been supported by a subtilty 
 of argument, and a show of system, calculated 
 to produce a more than ordinary impression in 
 its favour, it becomes a matter of great impor- 
 tance to subject it to a strict examination, with 
 a view to the exposure of its fallacy. 
 
 Impressed as the Author is with the essential 
 nature of the connexion between religion and 
 morality, it may be allowed him, as a member 
 of the University of Cambridge, to express his 
 sense of the service which has been rendered to 
 both by Professor Whewell, in calling attention 
 to the Foundation of Morals, in his powerful 
 Discourses on that subject ; followed up, as 
 it has been, by his own acceptance of the 
 Chair of Moral Philosophy. It must, doubtless, 
 be matter of regret, and regret akin to com- 
 punction, that Paley should have been the 
 author to fall under the disapprobation of the 
 
PREFACE. \iii 
 
 Professor, in his concern to effect an essential 
 improvement in the ethical instruction of the 
 university ; but a large debt will be due for the 
 works of Paley though we except his Introduc- 
 tory Chapters to his Moral Philosophy. To do 
 him justice, however, on this subject, he did not 
 abandon the reality of a moral difference in 
 actions, whatever may be judged of that criterion 
 of virtue which he so strongly advocated. But 
 that reality, it must be confessed, makes no con- 
 spicuous appearance on the face of his moral 
 philosophy. The truth appears to be, that, 
 having assumed the truth of Christianity, his 
 attention was, in no degree, drawn to the bearing 
 of ethical opinions upon the principles of reli- 
 gion. In this respect he was far from being 
 singular ; for it is very observable, that when 
 Christian authors, in the present day, apply their 
 attention to questions on ethics, it is, in some 
 if not most instances, with a view to enforce the 
 propriety, and duty, of conforming our opinions 
 upon such questions to the principles and teaching 
 of Christianity. And doubtless it is not without 
 reason that, in addressing believers of Chris- 
 tianity, they handle the subject of ethics for 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 this express purpose. But it deserves to be 
 considered, whether the principles of morals are 
 not strictly available to vindicate the truth, to 
 confirm the belief, of Christianity itself. 
 
 The Author will add only, that his design in 
 the following discourses brought him into a 
 subject so extensive and various, that he was 
 compelled either to limit his attention to a very 
 narrow portion of it, or, with a view to its 
 general magnitude and importance, to sacrifice 
 his own ideas of unity and completeness in its 
 discussion. He chose the latter course ; and 
 has effected such an approach to a continuous 
 line of argument as he was able. The dis- 
 courses are longer than is usual, portions of 
 them having been omitted in their delivery ; 
 and notes are added for a farther development 
 of the subject. On the whole, it is with much 
 diffidence that, in the fulfilment of the office 
 which he had the honour to hold, he commits 
 the work to the press, though not without hope 
 of a candid opinion on its imperfections. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Rom. ii. 14. — For when the Gentiles, which have not the 
 law, do by nature the things contained in the law, 
 these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves : 
 which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, 
 their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts 
 the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another . 1 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 THE REASONABLENESS OF GRATITUDE TO GOD. 
 
 1 John iv. 20. — He that loveth not his brother whom 
 he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not 
 seen ? "** 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE 
 
 SCRIPTURE. 
 
 Matt. xxii. 37, 38.— Thou shalt love the Lord thy God 
 with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all 
 thy mind. This is the first and great commandment . 73 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Deut. xxxii. 4. — A God of truth and without iniquity, 
 just and right is he 107 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 AN ADVERSE THEORY OF ETHICS EXAMINED. 
 
 1 Sam. ii. 3. — By him actions are weighed .... 138 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION OF OUR DUTIES. 
 
 Matt. vii. 12. — Therefore all things whatsoever ye would 
 that men should do to you, do ye even so to them . .183 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES. 
 
 2 Tim. hi. 16. — All Scripture is given by inspiration of 
 God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for cor- 
 rection, for instruction in righteousness 219 
 
 LECTURE VIIL 
 
 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSFEL OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 
 
 1 Tim. in. 16. — And without controversy great is the 
 mystery of godliness 249 
 
V r 
 
 PBIH. ok 
 
 THBGI ihl 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE MORAL 
 
 JUDGMENTS. 
 
 Rom. ii. 14, 15. 
 
 FOR WHEN THE GENTILES, WHICH HAVE NOT THE LAW, DO BY 
 NATURE THE THINGS CONTAINED IN THE LAW, THESE, HAVING 
 NOT THE LAW, ARE A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES : WHICH SHEW 
 THE WORK OF THE LAW WRITTEN IN THEIR HEARTS, THEIR 
 CONSCIENCE ALSO BEARING WITNESS, AND THEIR THOUGHTS 
 THE MEANWHILE ACCUSING OR ELSE EXCUSING ONE ANOTHER. 
 
 It will be generally agreed that there is not 
 a more important or distinguishing property of 
 our intelligent nature, — by whatever name we 
 may prefer to distinguish it, and however we 
 may trace its growth, or analyse its principles, — 
 than that by which we approve and disapprove 
 particular affections of our minds, or, which 
 is morally the same thing, such actions as are 
 perceived to flow from them ; judging them to 
 be right or wrong ; that is, attributing merit 
 or demerit to the doers of such actions, and 
 accounting ourselves and others to be under a 
 
 B 
 
2 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 moral obligation to perform or forbear them. It 
 is to our reason, in its cognizance of these moral 
 judgments, that the Christian religion, primarily 
 and to a great extent, appeals, in proposing 
 itself to our belief, or claiming to be received as 
 a revelation from the Author of our being ; 
 and it will be our endeavour to maintain the 
 propriety and force of that appeal, to such 
 an extent as the compass of a few discourses 
 may allow. We do not forget that, in judging 
 actions to be right and wrong, mankind are 
 subject to peculiar feelings of complacency and 
 aversion, of such a nature as to incline them 
 to the former, and to restrain them from the 
 latter; but we direct attention more particu- 
 larly to the moral judgments, in distinction from 
 the feelings with which they are associated, for 
 important reasons which we shall offer in the 
 sequel. 
 
 We have stated that Christianity, as proposed 
 to our belief, is, primarily and to a great extent, 
 an appeal to our reason in its cognizance of our 
 moral judgments, or our discernment of a moral 
 distinction in our dispositions and conduct : the 
 design of the present discourse is to establish and 
 explain this assertion, and, moreover, to premise 
 conditions which appear to be necessary to 
 entitle Christianity to a serious regard and 
 examination, under this particular description of 
 its claims, and which actually exist to command 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 3 
 
 attention to intrinsic indications of its truth and 
 authority. 
 
 That the Christian religion assumes to be 
 credible, first and principally, in virtue of its con- 
 gruity to our reason, in reference to our discern- 
 ment of moral distinctions, follows at once and 
 undeniably from the fact that it demands our 
 belief, — demands our impartial examination of 
 the evidences of its divine authority, — as the 
 fulfilment of a duty to God : thus implying the 
 most momentous of all realities, if it be one, that 
 we are subject to a moral obligation to the 
 Creator : that is, that we are properly objects of 
 a moral approbation and disapprobation, capable 
 of merit and demerit, in our affections and 
 conduct towards Himself. If this primary 
 assumption be consistent with a just account of 
 the moral judgments, the demand founded upon 
 it is so far consistent with the credibility of the 
 Christian religion. But how is this assumption 
 to be proved ? Not, it must be manifest, from 
 the Scripture itself, whose title to belief is, by 
 supposition, in dispute ; nor from any external 
 evidence adducible in support of the pretensions 
 of Scripture ; for the assumption in question is, 
 not that there are sufficient proofs of the 
 truth of Christianity, but that we stand in a 
 relation to the Deity which renders it our duty to 
 collect and examine them. It is unquestionable, 
 then, that the reality of our moral obligation to 
 
 b2 
 
4 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 the Deity is presumed in the Scripture to be 
 deducible by human reason, or capable of proof 
 on grounds independent of a divine revelation. 
 
 It is often imputed to the divines of the last 
 century, that they have laid an undue stress on 
 what are called the principles of natural religion; 
 attributing to human reason the knowledge of 
 truths which, in reality, were derived from 
 another source. Whether they have actually 
 exposed themselves to this animadversion, or 
 in what manner, it is here unnecessary to 
 inquire ; but we must take occasion to observe 
 that those who hold such principles to be entirely 
 superfluous, or human reason to be devoid of 
 authority, in the article of religious belief, have 
 erred into the opposite and, as we apprehend, a 
 far more dangerous extreme. In maintaining 
 the Scripture to be, exclusively, the source 
 of religious knowledge, they abandon the only 
 ground on which they are entitled to assert, for 
 the Scripture itself, a claim upon the attention of 
 mankind — to assert the duty of investigating the 
 evidence of an alleged communication from God 
 — to assert the existence of any duty to the 
 Creator whatsoever. 
 
 As our purpose is to deal with the principles of 
 religious duty as implied and inculcated in the 
 Scripture, we shall at once bring forward the 
 original and special ground, on which it is there 
 presumed to be agreeable to our reason to con- 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 5 
 
 elude that we are subject to a moral obligation to 
 the Creator, or capable of merit and demerit in our 
 affections and conduct towards himself. That 
 ground is, that he sustains towards our species the 
 relation of a donor or benefactor ; a relation the 
 same in nature as that which, under the same 
 title, one human being sustains towards another ; 
 and that as, in the latter instance, such a relation 
 imposes a moral obligation, to gratitude, on man 
 to man, so, in the former, it imposes a similar 
 moral obligation, to gratitude, on man to God. 
 The Scripture not only affirms, in full concurrence 
 with our reason, that our life and happiness are 
 the result of a designing intelligence, the work 
 and gift of God ; but it virtually affirms, as a 
 reasonable inference from that conclusion, that 
 God requires us to entertain and cultivate the 
 affection of gratitude to himself: — a principle 
 which, it is important to remark, is essentially 
 distinguishable from those feelings which attach 
 us to particular individuals, not to say inferior 
 creatures and even inanimate objects, merely as 
 the instruments or causes of our pleasure and 
 advantage. Feelings of this nature cannot but 
 associate themselves with the idea of God in the 
 belief of his benevolence ; and are alone sufficient 
 to engage mankind in the study and celebration 
 of his works. But gratitude, the moral quality 
 under that name, is essentially a principle of 
 action ; attesting its presence by a readiness to 
 
O THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 fulfil the will of its object ; to execute his com- 
 mand ; to forward his purpose. The proposition 
 relating to the Creator which the Scripture pre- 
 sumes to be agreeable to our reason, is, that he 
 requires, in virtue of his goodness towards us, a 
 corresponding disposition to obey his wilh We 
 consider this presumption of Christianity — (that 
 it is a presumption of other religions likewise 
 only aggravates its importance) — to demand our 
 attention first and principally, because the good- 
 ness of God, or his claim to our gratitude, is set 
 forth in the Scriptures as the fountain-head of all 
 moral obligation to the Creator ; and, moreover, 
 because our assent to that claim is strictly ante- 
 cedent to the inquiry, whether or how far his 
 will may be collected from the constitution of our 
 nature. For, let it be observed, in the absence 
 of a principle of religious duty, that inquiry is 
 one which we are wholly at liberty to prosecute 
 or forbear : in other words, the design of the 
 Almighty in endowing us with moral perceptions 
 and voluntary powers, is as purely matter of 
 curiosity and speculation, as his design in provid- 
 ing us with material organs of sense and motion ; 
 his design, for example, in the construction of the 
 eye or the hand ; that is, it is of no moral con- 
 cernment, relating to the Deity, at all. l 
 
 In premising the necessity of some principle of duty, or 
 moral obligation, to God, dictating a regard to the indications 
 of his will, we do not imply that a sense of duty to God is to 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 7 
 
 It may here, then, be proper to observe, that 
 this position, Gratitude is due to God, or, more 
 precisely, It is perfectly reasonable, in the belief 
 of his goodness, to entertain that affection 
 towards him, is presumed in the Scripture to be, 
 as we shall venture to call it, a first principle of 
 knowledge in our moral relation to the Creator. 
 It is there implied that in perceiving the duty, or 
 the rectitude, of gratitude to a human benefactor, 
 we are, at once, without any previous inquiry or 
 intermediate reasoning, prepared to perceive the 
 duty, or the rectitude, of gratitude to God ; and 
 thus that morality, so called, is properly intro- 
 ductory to religion ; that piety and virtue have a 
 common root ; the former being the proper growth, 
 as well as the highest exercise, of the latter. In 
 
 be expected to spring up in a mind unfurnished with mate- 
 rials for reflection or inquiry on the subject of religion. 
 Persons, it is very evident, may be acquainted with a number 
 of arguments alleged in support of natural, as well as revealed 
 religion ; but may not consider themselves morally bound to 
 observe and examine them, with a view to proceed to some con- 
 clusion, or actually to learn the will of God. Indeed this express 
 duty may have scarcely engaged their attention. It is dedu- 
 cible, as we argued at length in a former work, from the general 
 duty of obedience to God. This fundamental duty we are now 
 stating to consist in his claim upon our gratitude. It will be 
 perceived, then, that we address our argument to individuals 
 accustomed to regard religion as matter only of opinion or 
 speculation, and sceptical or indifferent as to our moral relation 
 to God ; not surely that we are looking for a sense of religious 
 duty in persons ignorant of facts, unacquainted with statements, 
 devoid of ideas, upon the subject. 
 
8 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 dealing, then, with this implied proposition in the 
 Scripture, namely, that we are morally bound to 
 exercise gratitude to God, we shall point atten- 
 tion to the fact that it answers the description 
 of a first principle of knowledge in one essential 
 particular, namely, its spontaneous suggestion or 
 instant admission to the human understanding. 
 It may however, notwithstanding, be supposed 
 to be founded in some erroneous apprehension ; 
 attempts may be made to disprove it. We 
 shall therefore proceed to maintain its reason- 
 ableness, as the result of subsequent inquiry, 
 and deliberate reflection. 1 
 
 1 It may be well to mention, expressly, our reason for 
 arguing this proposition in the manner proposed. We have 
 stated the general duty of obedience to God, (which is neces- 
 sary to infer the duty of inquiring into his will,) to be founded 
 in his goodness or claim upon our gratitude ; but we are now 
 supposing that claim itself to be brought into question ; that is, 
 we are proposing to inquire whether it be reasonable to con- 
 clude, that God demands that gratitude to himself which we 
 acknowledge to be morally due to a human benefactor. We 
 might, then, be asked to show a previous ground of obligation 
 to determine this particular question. If, however, as it is 
 intended to consider, the obligation to religious gratitude is 
 immediately assented to by mankind in general, and has been 
 assented to by the querist or objector himself, it must, in all 
 reason, be concluded to be actually in force, unless it be dis- 
 proved, or perceived to be founded in error. — Of course, we 
 assume a belief of the goodness of God as well as his existence. 
 
 It should here be intimated also, that if this primary duty be 
 allowed, our obligation to other religious affections, as venera- 
 tion, &c. may be presumed to be implied, inasmuch as these are 
 naturally connected with gratitude to a Being conceived to be 
 of infinite knowledge and power, as well as goodness. 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 9 
 
 But, farther, the Christian religion, assuming a 
 common ground of moral obligation for the exer- 
 cise of gratitude by man to man, and by man to 
 God, calls upon us to evince the reality of that 
 affection to God, by the fulfilment of our 
 duties towards our fellow-creatures. It refers us 
 to our moral judgments, or the dictates of the 
 conscience, for the indications of a law imposed 
 upon us by the Creator, prescribing our conduct 
 towards our fellow-creatures ; a law which it is in 
 our own will to obey or disregard, from gratitude 
 or indifference to himself. It virtually affirms, 
 as a reasonable inference from the general fact 
 that we judge our actions to be right or wrong, 
 that God also judges them to be right or wrong ; 
 approves or disapproves us in performing them ; 
 and in virtue of his own especial claim upon our 
 gratitude, estimates our conduct towards our 
 fellow-creatures as a test of our obedience to 
 himself. 1 
 
 We may here take occasion to mention that 
 the principal reason which led to the selection of 
 the present subject for discussion, was, that, 
 without compelling a recurrence to topics that 
 engaged our attention in a former series of dis- 
 courses, it would bring under consideration the 
 
 1 The duties towards ourselves, as they are called, appear to 
 be, strictly speaking, no separate class. Temperance and for- 
 titude, for example, are duties in a secondary sense ; or obli- 
 gatory upon us because essential to the fulfilment of our duties 
 towards God and towards man. 
 
10 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 two cardinal positions which have just been 
 stated ; namely, that we are subject to a moral 
 obligation to the Deity, and that a sense of that 
 obligation dictates the fulfilment of our duties 
 towards our fellow-creatures, or enjoins the prac- 
 tice of virtue as an offering of piety. In main- 
 taining the doctrine of a responsibility in reference 
 to our religious belief, we were entitled to assume 
 these positions ; and we could not have proceeded 
 a step in our argument without them. It is 
 manifestly in the conviction that there is a duty 
 of obedience to God, that the connexion subsist- 
 ing between the understanding and the affections, 
 supplies a ground for the inference, that we are 
 accountable to him in reference to the tenets we 
 embrace concerning him ; and unless we take for 
 granted that what is morally right is agreeable to 
 his will, it must be wholly premature to maintain 
 that the moral tendency of the Christian religion 
 furnishes a presumptive argument of its divine 
 original. But though, among persons avowing an 
 indifference to a particularity of religious belief, 
 there are many who, at the same time, profess 
 a conviction of these fundamental principles of 
 religion, there are, it is probable, almost as many 
 who either have actually discarded them, or are 
 very imperfectly convinced of their truth. Our 
 purpose, therefore, in the following discourses, is 
 chiefly to maintain the reasonableness of these 
 positions, as they are founded and illustrated 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 11 
 
 in the Scriptures ; inasmuch as, so founded and 
 illustrated, they may be gathered or confirmed 
 by reflecting on our own discernment of moral 
 distinctions, or the approving and condemning 
 judgments of the conscience. 
 
 But in maintaining the credibility of the Chris- 
 tian religion as an appeal to our moral principles, 
 we are unwilling to limit our argument to the sup- 
 port of these two propositions, though of primary 
 and most comprehensive import ; and we shall 
 proceed with a subject which, however, it were 
 idle to attempt to lay open, in any adequate 
 measure, in the ensuing discourses. It appears 
 incumbent to consider in what manner these gene- 
 ral principles are applied in that particular expo- 
 sition of our duties which is laid before us in the 
 Scriptures. We may readily suppose that the 
 teachers of this religion, in the execution of their 
 ostensible purpose of awakening the human race 
 to a sense of their duty to the Creator, might 
 have been satisfied to admonish them in general 
 terms of the reality of his moral government over 
 them, and the necessity of an essential amend- 
 ment of their character : encouraging and urging 
 them to the practice of all rectitude, by proclaim- 
 ing the forgiveness of the penitent, assuring them 
 of a divine aid, and announcing a future state of 
 reward and punishment ; but leaving them to ac- 
 quire a particular knowledge of the will of God, or 
 of what was morally right, by the exercise of 
 
12 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 their own reason. Especially may we make this 
 supposition when we reflect, that there is, in 
 every particular age and people, a considerable 
 unanimity of opinion, whether correct or other- 
 wise, as to the duties of individuals, or the moral 
 quality of particular actions ; and that what 
 is commonly judged to be most necessary is the 
 application of more powerful motives to the 
 practice of virtue. But Christianity opens a far 
 wider question for the deliberate exercise of our 
 reason on the validity of its pretensions. It as- 
 sumes to describe the sure path of duty, to par- 
 ticularize the precepts of the Creator ; and thus 
 places itself in a position the most critical and 
 dangerous that can be imagined to a religion 
 emanating from no higher intelligence than that 
 to which it appeals in the assertion of its truth ; 
 an intelligence which, however it may appreciate 
 the forms of moral excellence when presented 
 to its view, has, speaking generally, but ill suc- 
 ceeded in discovering them for itself. One 
 ascertained error in the morality of the Gospel — 
 one inequitable and pernicious precept attributed 
 to the Creator — must have been fatal to its pre- 
 tensions : a consideration of no little weight, whe- 
 ther we regard the practices taught or expressly 
 sanctioned by other religions, or the boldness 
 and peculiarity of some of its precepts. 
 
 Moreover our subject bears directly on the 
 probability of miracles. We are concerned to 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 13 
 
 insist that a present and commanding persuasion 
 of the reality and extent of our moral obligation 
 to the Deity, is essential to a rational estimate 
 of the credibility of the Scripture history, consi- 
 dered as a record of his special, miraculous inter- 
 position in the concerns of mankind. For if, in 
 reading that history, we grow forgetful of our 
 accountableness to the Creator, and consequently 
 lose sight of the purpose which it assigns to him 
 as the Author of a moral restoration to our 
 species, we have nothing before us but a series 
 of narrations at which to wonder ; nothing but 
 deviations from the laws of the physical universe. 
 It is, therefore, impossible that arguments alleged 
 in disproof of miracles in general, and, conse- 
 quently, of those related in the Scripture, should 
 be otherwise than specious and imposing ; and 
 not in the least degree surprising that they should 
 be considered sufficiently pertinent, and decisive 
 of the question. 
 
 There is one topic more which we shall en- 
 deavour to include in the discussion of our 
 subject. Though, as we have seen, the Christian 
 religion addresses itself, in the first instance, to 
 our reason, and assumes to be extensively con- 
 formable to its dictates, it should be expressly 
 considered that this appeal to the human under- 
 standing is accompanied with a special demand 
 upon the implicit belief of mankind. More pre- 
 cisely, the original teachers of Christianity, while 
 
14 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 thev looked to human reason, to bear out and 
 confirm their declarations regarding the attri- 
 butes and laws of the Creator in general, as the 
 Moral Governor of the world, professed, at the 
 same time, to publish doctrines which, however 
 we may speculate and determine concerning 
 them, they called upon mankind to receive in 
 deference to their special authority as the mes- 
 sengers of God. The connexion of the ensuing 
 argument with this particular demand of an 
 implicit belief, is so important and so often un- 
 considered in collecting the tenets of the Gospel, 
 that we shall make it the subject of the conclud- 
 ing discourse. 
 
 Having so far explained our assertion at the 
 outset, namely, that Christianity, in claiming to 
 be accredited as a divine revelation, appeals to 
 our reason as conversant with our moral senti- 
 ments, it is important we should now state the 
 reasons why, in weighing that appeal, we should 
 apply our attention more particularly to the 
 moral judgments in distinction from the feelings 
 with which they are naturally associated, or 
 which they are perceived to awaken in our 
 minds. 1 
 
 1 In actual experience, the judgment is the cause or occa- 
 sion of the feeling by which it is accompanied. Every one 
 explains the disgust which he feels at the conduct of another, 
 morally considered, and the self-reproach which he suffers 
 from his own, by alleging his judgment that such conduct is 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 15 
 
 Our discernment of a moral distinction in 
 actions is attended, as has been already noticed, 
 with certain feelings of complacency or aversion 
 in that complex state of the mind which is enti- 
 tled the sentiment of moral approbation or disap- 
 probation : especially, in reflecting upon our own 
 conduct as right or wrong, we are conscious of a 
 peculiar satisfaction in the former instance, and 
 of disquietude in the latter. Such feelings are 
 evidently required to invest our moral judgments 
 with a restraining and impelling power, or to 
 render them practically effective ; and they 
 appear to be included in the original constitution 
 of a moral agent. But it must be manifest that 
 our estimate of such feelings, in their bearing 
 
 wrong. Moreover, the judgment is so far distinguishable 
 from the corresponding or appropriate feeling that, in nume- 
 rous instances, the former is quite determinate in its character, 
 while the latter is scarcely experienced, or even entirely absent. 
 Without question, for example, a person may judge a particular 
 action to be wrong, and yet be sensible of little or no repug- 
 nance and dissatisfaction in committing it, or of feelings of an 
 opposite nature in avoiding it. Indeed a keen discrimination 
 of moral qualities in general, as well as a power of delineating 
 character, may distinguish an individual who betrays in his 
 whole conduct, and in various ways, a comparative obtuseness 
 of moral sensibility. These, it must be allowed, are facts in 
 the existing experience of the mind ; however opinions may 
 differ as to the origin of the judgments themselves, or the 
 composition in general of the moral sentiments. — For proof, 
 if necessary, that moral approbation implies judgment, we refer 
 the reader to Dr. Reid's defence of that position, (Essay v. 
 ehap. 7.) 
 
16 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 upon the reasonableness of the Christian religion, 
 will materially depend upon the manner in which 
 we account for the moral judgments with which 
 they are connected ; that is, upon the import 
 which we attach to our language when we pro- 
 nounce our actions to be right or wrong. If, for 
 example, Christianity, by the clearest implication, 
 ascribes these judgments of the understanding 
 to our discernment of an original independent 
 rule or standard of moral rectitude, and we, on 
 the contrary, explain their origin in a manner 
 which precludes a belief of that standard, it 
 follows that the feelings which accompany such 
 judgments can bring no argumentative support 
 to the assumptions of the Christian religion. It 
 is very possible, indeed, that these feelings may 
 appear, in their peculiar nature, inconsistent with 
 our explanation of the judgments which excite 
 them, and incline us to question its accuracy; 
 yet so long as we continue at issue with Chris- 
 tianity as to the reality of a distinction on which, 
 in its appeal to the conscience, we perceive it to 
 be strictly founded, it were idle to suppose that, 
 so far as its credibility may be deducible from 
 our moral constitution, we can entertain any 
 rational belief of its truth. Indeed, it is noto- 
 rious that accounts have been given of the for- 
 mation of our ideas of virtue, which exhibit the 
 moral character of our species under a totally 
 different aspect from that in which it is presented 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 17 
 
 in the Scriptures ; or which, rather, conduct us 
 to the conclusion that, in the judgment of the 
 Deity, mankind are suhject to no moral appro- 
 bation or disapprobation whatever ; that is, that in 
 His view, they possess no moral character at all. 
 But, further and more especially, it is specifi- 
 cally to the understanding, in its approval and 
 condemnation of our dispositions and conduct, 
 that Christianity addresses itself, in assuming to be 
 a most credible account of our moral relation to 
 the Creator, and a most reasonable exposition of 
 human duties. It is to our judgment as to what 
 we ought to feel, and how we ought to act, that 
 it takes upon itself to reason with us on the part 
 of the Deity, and not to our experience as to 
 what we do feel, or how we do act : and it must 
 be abundantly evident that until we have ascer- 
 tained our moral character as to what it ought 
 to be, or have decided upon our explanation of 
 such a phraseology, we cannot interpret correctly 
 our experience as to what our character is. This 
 distinction, so essential, has been remarkably 
 overlooked in theories relating to virtue, or the 
 principles of morals ; propounded, as they often 
 have been, in a spirit unfriendly to Christianity, 
 and indeed to all practical religion. For in- 
 stance — It is, say some, in obedience to the voice 
 of society, that individuals restrain themselves 
 from actions stigmatized as vicious, and practise 
 what is called virtue : it is that they may not 
 
 c 
 
18 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 incur the hostility of their fellow-creatures ; that 
 they may secure their countenance and win their 
 plaudits. In support of this assertion, they 
 allege a number of instances proving, beyond 
 question, that a regard to the estimation and 
 favour of society is an exceedingly powerful, and 
 often, apparently, the only effective inducement 
 to conduct accounted virtuous. The inference 
 pressed upon their readers is, that the princi- 
 ples of conduct inculcated in Scripture have no 
 rational foundation in the structure of the human 
 mind. They do not perceive that what they 
 have to establish against Christianity, is, not that 
 mankind are actually swayed by a regard to the 
 favour of their fellow-creatures, but that they 
 judge it to be right to yield to such a master- 
 principle of conduct. If they could make it 
 evident that they deliberately approve themselves 
 in the performance of virtuous actions, so called, 
 from no other and higher motive than a desire 
 to conciliate the feelings of their fellow-creatures, 
 then, unquestionably, the human conscience 
 would bear no witness to the moral data of 
 Christianity. The lamp of reason, as it shines 
 upon the pages of the Bible, would indeed grow 
 dim, and help us but little to discern in its in- 
 junctions the characters of truth, and the expres- 
 sion of the Creative Mind. But suppose, on the 
 contrary, we inwardly condemn, while we fully 
 admit, the extensive pre valency of such a prin- 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 19 
 
 ciple of conduct — nay, that we involuntarily 
 despise and loathe the character formed and de- 
 pendent upon it, the theory which resolves all 
 virtue into its influence and ascendency, so far 
 from exposing a fallacy in the principles of Chris- 
 tianity, lends a most powerful confirmation to its 
 history and portraiture of human nature ; con- 
 firming or, rather, exaggerating the account 
 which it has given us of the degeneracy and cor- 
 ruption of our moral principles. And thus it is 
 that those expositors of the Scripture who main- 
 tain the total depravity of our nature, could find 
 no better proofs and illustrations of their tenet, 
 than would be given them by the advocates of a 
 theory, the object of which is to show that the 
 rectitude, or holiness, assumed in the Scripture 
 to be proper to our species, is wholly imaginary, 
 and, consequently, that the depravity imputed 
 to them can have no existence. 1 
 
 1 To take an eminent example which has been followed by 
 many — Hobbes, the drift of whose philosophy, it is here enough 
 to say, is to prove that right is created by power, and to esta- 
 blish the reasonableness of a predominating and exclusive 
 regard to our own individual interest, sets out in his specula- 
 tions on the origin and bonds of society with what might well 
 appear to have been intended as a searching and pungent ex- 
 posure of the actual selfishness of mankind : — " Quo autem 
 consilio homines congregentur, ex iis cognoscitur quae faciunt 
 congregati. Si coeant enim commercii causa, unusquisque 
 non socium, sed rem suam colit. Si officii causa, nascitur 
 forensis qusedam amicitia, plus habens mutui metiis quani 
 amoris ; unde factio aliquando nascitur, sed bencvolentia 
 
 c2 
 
20 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 We have yet other matter to premise,, which, 
 however it may detain our attention, appears to 
 be strictly preliminary to the discussion of our 
 subject ; as well as essential to a just conception 
 of its momentous nature. In advocating Chris- 
 tianity on the ground of its congruity to our 
 reason as moral agents, we must premise that it 
 addresses itself to an intelligence common to 
 
 nunquam. Si animi et hilaritatis causa, solet maxime perplacere 
 sibi unusquisque iis rebus, quae risum excitant, unde possit, 
 (prout est natura ridiculi,) comparatione turpitudinis vel infir- 
 mitatis alienas, ipse sibimet commendatior evadere." . . . (Ele- 
 menta Philosophica de Cive, cap. i.) Now if this, and more 
 in the same strain, were a strictly correct and unexaggerated 
 account of the feelings and dispositions of mankind as mem- 
 bers of society, would it furnish any solid argument for the 
 opinions which it is intended to support ? Not, surely, unless 
 it were taken for granted that what men ought to be is ascer- 
 tained and explained by what they are. A disciple of Hobbes 
 would be forced to admit that, in point of fact, mankind are 
 subject to shame and self-reproach in consequence of an eager 
 and engrossing pursuit of their own advantage, and a com- 
 parative indifference to the interests and feelings of others ; — 
 but for what reason, if their conduct as it ought to be is to be 
 collected from what it is ? Doubtless he would say, that in 
 accusing themselves and others of an undue, inordinate desire 
 to promote their own ends, they betray an unacquaintance 
 with the principles of their own nature : — which is just, in 
 effect, to say that, let an author crowd his pages as he will 
 with examples of an exclusive regard to the indulgence and 
 aggrandizement of self, it is difficult and, in most instances, 
 impossible to make men believe that what they ought to be 
 may be learned from what they are ; or that their duties are 
 made known by their practices. 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 21 
 
 mankind in general, as well as to that more in- 
 timate knowledge of the human mind which 
 may be acquired by a particular study of its laws 
 and operations. It cannot be allowed, as a bare 
 hypothesis, with reference to a religion of divine 
 institution, asserting its title to the earnest and 
 impartial investigation of all to whom it may be 
 offered, on the ground of a conformity in its 
 practical principles with their own perceptions of 
 a moral good and evil in their affections and 
 conduct — it cannot be allowed, that, in order to 
 discern that conformity, it should be necessary 
 to trace back those perceptions of good and evil, 
 of virtue and vice, to their primitive elements or 
 earliest formation in the human mind — necessary 
 to account for the authority of the conscience, 
 as it is termed, by assigning those separate con- 
 ceptions and feelings, which, by a peculiar asso- 
 ciation and an increasing force, may be presumed 
 to have raised that approving and condemning 
 power within us, and invested it with its appa- 
 rently rightful supremacy as the dictator of our 
 conduct. If propositions forming the ground- 
 work of the Christian system be barely supposed 
 to be entitled to belief, in virtue of their con- 
 formity to our moral judgments, these judgments 
 must also be supposed to convey that import 
 which Christianity attaches to them, or to im- 
 press that conclusion on the understanding which 
 Christianity assumes to be derived from them, 
 
22 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 with a corresponding force and universality of 
 evidence ; — an evidence antecedent to specu- 
 lative or philosophical inquiry, and, in no ordi- 
 nary measure, independent of its results ; bearing 
 an important, though qualified, resemblance to 
 the evidence of the senses. We shall better ex- 
 plain this condition of the great question before 
 us, if we refer to that view of moral obligation 
 which is actually prevalent in the world. It is 
 natural to mankind so to understand their moral 
 judgments, as to infer the existence of a proper, 
 independent standard of moral rectitude. In 
 other words, they conclude that there is strictly 
 a reality in moral distinctions ; and that their 
 discernment of that difference in their actions, 
 which they signify by the terms " right " and 
 "wrong," is not accounted for by their tendency to 
 promote and impair the happiness of the commu- 
 nity ; still less by their consequent tendency to 
 provoke the resentment, and engage the favour 
 of the community, and thereby to affect, in 
 various ways, their own security and enjoyment. 
 It is this specific conclusion which has appeared 
 to support, and, as we apprehend, is absolutely 
 necessary to support, the assumption of all Scrip- 
 ture, that we are constituted to entertain and act 
 upon a sense of duty to the Creator, and, in our 
 conduct in general, to account ourselves subject 
 to his approving and condemning judgment. We 
 are concerned, then, to premise that it is precisely 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 23 
 
 because that conclusion — namely, that there is 
 a real, independent standard of moral rectitude — 
 impresses itself spontaneously upon the human 
 understanding, and even when disowned in spe- 
 culation, adheres to it with a remarkable tenacity, 
 that we can allow the presumption to be in any 
 degree probable, that the Deity has appealed to 
 the dictates of the conscience, in confirmation of 
 a particular declaration of his will, or exposition 
 of his moral government. If the case were other- 
 wise, if our moral judgments were of such a nature 
 as that whether they were significant of an original 
 and permanent standard of moral rectitude, was 
 purely a matter of inquiry, or determinable by 
 argument, — if we did not perceive them to be 
 so by an evidence naturally or, seemingly, by 
 intuition attaching to them, — we might at once 
 decide that the Deity had never required us to 
 apply such judgments in corroboration of a com- 
 munication from himself. In other words, there 
 would be the strongest presumption that we had 
 not been created for that moral subjection to 
 God, which the Scripture implies to be consonant 
 to our reasonable nature, and asserts to be actu- 
 ally required at our hands. 
 
 The argument from analogy may here be re- 
 sorted to with some advantage. The Almighty, 
 we know, has created us for the tenancy and 
 use of the world in which he has placed us, by 
 such a constitution of our faculties as that we 
 
24 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 naturally believe the reality of the objects 
 around us, or rely upon the report of the senses. 
 But we know also that objections have been 
 raised to the existence of the material world, or 
 arguments put forth to contravene the report 
 of the senses. Now, let it be supposed that the 
 Deity had left us to be sensibly affected by 
 reasoning of this nature, and to grow inert and 
 motionless under its influence, or that he had 
 not, by the same power which had brought us 
 into existence, secured and perpetuated such an 
 ever-present predominating impression of the 
 reality of the surrounding world, as to supply a 
 continual and effective stimulus to our active 
 powers, — would it be true, on that supposition, 
 that he had created our species for the possession 
 and enjoyment of the material world, or for the 
 knowledge and application of its laws ? We 
 may apply this supposition to our experience as 
 moral agents, when the question is mooted 
 whether it be consonant to reason to con- 
 clude, that the Deity has designed us for the 
 purposes of a moral creation as set forth in the 
 Scriptures, — that is, for a voluntary obedience to 
 himself, and a happiness consequent on a faithful 
 adherence to his will. We could not argue the 
 affirmative of this question, we could not propose 
 a discussion in its favour, unless it were plainly 
 answerable to some persuasion of mankind 
 which, like that of an essential reality in moral 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 25 
 
 distinctions, grew and prevailed amongst them 
 by the unbidden action of the human under- 
 standing, and opposed a certain powerful resist- 
 ance to other and contradictory conclusions : — 
 we say a certain powerful resistance, because it 
 is not to be forgotten that, in our capacity as 
 moral agents, the preservation of necessary 
 truth, as well as its practical efficacy, must 
 depend in some measure, and it may be difficult 
 to determine to what extent, on the voluntary 
 use of our faculties. Mankind are confessedly 
 betrayed into error, and often egregious error, 
 in applying the commonly acknowledged stan- 
 dard of rectitude to the estimation of particular 
 actions ; by the operation of various causes, but 
 most of all by the influence of self-love and the 
 bias of the passions. It were therefore no 
 matter for wonder, if they should be accessible 
 to doubt and scepticism as to the existence of 
 the standard itself, even presuming that they 
 were morally constituted to perceive it ; still less 
 if they were brought to dispute its existence in 
 compliance with reasoning which left them 
 subject, notwithstanding, to close and besetting 
 impressions of its reality ; and which displayed 
 its efficacy rather by creating an opinion of the 
 fallacy of the common persuasion, than in disci I 
 gaging them from the persuasion itself. 
 
 We are premising a condition of all reasonable 
 argument in support of Christianity, as an appeal 
 
26 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 to the dictates of the conscience, which merits 
 especial observation from inquirers into the 
 foundation of morals ; both from those who re- 
 ceive it as a divine revelation, and those who 
 have abandoned the belief of its principles. The 
 former as well as the latter have shown a dis- 
 position to theorize on the subject of ethics ; 
 adopting explanations of virtue, or the sense 
 of moral obligation, remote from prevailing 
 apprehensions, and with difficulty, if at all, per- 
 ceived to infer the existence of religious duties : 
 either overlooking the assumption of Scripture, 
 that there is a proper connexion between mo- 
 rality and religion perceptible to human reason ; 
 or not reflecting that if there be such a con- 
 nexion, it must present itself under that view 
 of moral obligation which is instant and pre- 
 dominant to the minds of men ; and that, con- 
 sequently, so far as the truth of Christianity is 
 involved in the principles of morals, it is, speci- 
 fically, that view, and no other, which demands 
 our close and most serious attention. The task 
 of the sceptical moralist is to adduce conclusive 
 proof, either that the persuasion to which we 
 have adverted is itself founded in error, or that 
 it lends no valid confirmation to the presump- 
 tions of Scripture. Inquiries into the principles 
 of morals, we are well aware, have given rise 
 to difficult questions, and may lead to inter- 
 minable speculation. The same may be said 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 27 
 
 of the origin of the universe, or the question 
 whether God exists. What we desire should be 
 considered is, that if we be constituted to re- 
 cognise a law of the Creator imposed upon us 
 as voluntary agents, or to realize his moral 
 government over us, it must be chiefly by the 
 efficacy of reasoning akin to that which com- 
 mands the belief of his existence, — reasoning 
 which it is not in the power of a few only to 
 comprehend and appreciate, but which is level, 
 as it is cogent, to the understanding of all. 1 
 
 1 It may be well to remark that, in discussions upon the 
 moral distinctions, questions are raised, and opinions adopted, 
 relating to processes of thought and feeling, which not only 
 require a particular study of the mind to be ascertained ; but 
 which, if ascertained, are confessedly productive of no practical 
 conclusions, and consequently immaterial to the subject of 
 religion. To take an example or two. We observed in the 
 preceding note, that mankind explain the feeling with which 
 they look upon an action, morally considered, by alleging 
 their judgment that it is right or wrong. Some, however, 
 refer the origin of the judgments entirely to the feelings : that 
 we judge actions right and wrong is, as they conceive, strictly 
 the effect of the emotions with which we are formed to con- 
 template them. This opinion is held by Dr. Brown, (Philo- 
 sophy of the Mind, Lect. 73.) " What we mean," he observes, 
 "by the moral difference of actions is their tendency to excite 
 one emotion rather than another." At the same time he 
 decidedly maintains the distinctions of morality to be real and 
 immutable ; dwelling upon the peculiar nature of the emo- 
 tions in question, and the fact that, notwithstanding apparent 
 exceptions which he expressly treats of, they are universally 
 awakened by the same difference in actions. We are not, then, 
 concerned to dispute his particular theory, as to the source of 
 
28 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 There is another condition of the question 
 before us which remains to be stated. It is 
 often sought to undermine our belief of pro- 
 positions relating to religion, and our reliance 
 on the arguments supporting them, by alleging 
 that such propositions have not been suggested 
 in the course of our own investigation ; but have 
 been impressed upon us by the authority of 
 writings believed to have been penned under 
 divine inspiration. Now, we should entirely 
 concur in the stress laid upon this consideration, 
 were it urged with the intention of rousing and 
 stimulating the readers of Scripture to an inde- 
 pendent use of their judgment on the principles 
 which it lays before them ; but it must be use- 
 less to offer an argument in support of such 
 principles, unless it be distinctly premised that, 
 
 our conceptions of " right" and " wrong ;" though we believe 
 it to be very insufficient, and open to objections which it would 
 be impossible to answer. As another example, we may 
 notice the opinion of Sir James Mackintosh, as to a peculiar 
 process of association among our thoughts and feelings, de- 
 scribed or adverted to in various parts of his work on the 
 Progress of Ethical Philosophy : a process which he conceives 
 to have been possible, or, rather, concludes to have actually 
 taken place, in the formation of the moral sentiments. He 
 considers such a process, however, matter of " purely philoso- 
 phical" inquiry ; and we here refer to it with no other view 
 than to suggest the importance, with reference to opinions on 
 the subject of ethics, of distinguishing between such as are 
 merely speculative in their nature, and such as may throw a 
 light upon questions of practical interest and moment. 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 29 
 
 however they have been introduced to our 
 thoughts, we are competent to form some cor- 
 rect determination as to their truth or fallacy ; 
 and if, on the contrary, it be actually taken for 
 granted that, seeing we have received them in 
 connexion with our earliest impressions of truth 
 and reality, we are unable to verify them by our 
 own reason, or can succeed only in confuting 
 them. These principles must be presumed to 
 lie open to discussion on their own merits, or it 
 must be idle to undertake either to support or 
 oppose them. To insist on so indispensable a pre- 
 liminary to all rational inquiry, may well appear 
 unnecessary ; but we are compelled to remark, 
 that the custom which obtains with some, of 
 depreciating the religious convictions of mankind 
 by referring them to the influence of authority, 
 or the growth of mere education, would, if 
 yielded to, prevent us from advancing a step in 
 the knowledge of the Deity, and even debar us 
 from inquiring into the proofs of his existence. 
 It would fix us to the vacuity and darkness of 
 atheism itself, so far as any apprehension of the 
 being of God depended, strictly, on the use of our 
 own faculties : for though we affirm his exist- 
 ence to be deducible by reason, yet we entirely 
 believed it antecedently to any exercise of our 
 own judgment upon it whatever. The being 
 of God can be no more matter of discovery, 
 strictly speaking, to the theologian, than the 
 
30 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 principle of gravitation to the astronomer, or the 
 circulation of the blood to the student of ana- 
 tomy, — than facts without number, of which, 
 notwithstanding, we are in no degree doubtful 
 because they were commended to our belief 
 by others, or, rather, were completely be- 
 lieved before we had looked into the proofs of 
 their reality. But we need dwell no longer on 
 an objection to religious opinions, which would 
 apply to by far the larger portion of human 
 knowledge, and not only unsettle our reliance 
 on probable truth, or moral evidence, but even 
 disturb the foundation of the sciences. 
 
 It deserves to be remarked, however, that the 
 defence of Christianity has, not ^infrequently, 
 been conducted in a manner calculated to restrain 
 the exercise of our own understanding on the 
 intrinsic credibility of the Scripture as an ac- 
 count of our moral relations to the Creator ; both 
 by those who have argued its conformity with 
 the deductions of reason, and those who have 
 maintained its truth by historical and other tes- 
 timony to the divine inspiration of its authors. 
 The former appear to have evinced an undue 
 solicitude in collecting, to the support of Christian 
 principles, the results of human inquiry on the 
 matter of religion, in ages preceding the publica- 
 tion of the Gospel ; while the latter have depre- 
 ciated the capabilities of reason in this department 
 of inquiry, and unduly narrowed its province, 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 31 
 
 in their concern to establish the necessity and 
 advantages of the Christian revelation. It has 
 not been sufficiently considered that the question 
 with ourselves who possess the Scriptures, is, 
 not what others have believed or conjectured, 
 or what we ourselves should have believed if this 
 volume had never come into our hands ; but 
 what we now discern to be true, with its pages 
 spread open before us. The reasonings of other 
 men in other circumstances, besides their intrin- 
 sic interest, may be greatly useful in prompting 
 our own investigation, and assisting us to form 
 our own conclusions ; but it is to ourselves, as 
 individuals, it is to the reason and conscience of 
 each one amongst us, that the Scripture makes 
 its appeal, in assuming to characterise our nature 
 in the judgment of God, and to describe the 
 path of rectitude, the way to his right hand. Do 
 we, then, as individuals, perceive in its pages the 
 indications of truth, and the mind of Him who 
 made us ? Or do we detect an error in its prin- 
 ciples, and wonder at the presumption of its 
 authors ? 
 
 We shall observe, however, consistently with 
 the scope of our argument, that they who hold a 
 measure of religious knowledge to be originally 
 attainable by the powers of reason, so far from 
 disparaging the value of the Scripture as a divine 
 revelation, espouse an opinion directly corrobo- 
 rative of its own declarations ; for it plainly affirms 
 
32 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 that the existence, and unity, and also the moral 
 government of the Divine Being might have 
 been collected from the structure of the external 
 world, and the frame of the human mind ; and it 
 holds up the superstition and idolatry prevalent 
 among the heathen as a melancholy but instruc- 
 tive proof of the proneness of mankind, when left 
 to the unresisted impulse of their passions, to 
 conceive the most fallacious and demoralizing 
 ideas of the Supreme Power, and thus to con- 
 firm and aggravate their own corruptions. 
 What the world stood in need of, with reference 
 to such truths, was some effective stimulus to 
 inquiry and reflection ; and in this respect Chris- 
 tianity has conferred a benefit on the human race 
 which it were impossible to calculate. The mass 
 of men had sunk, and had lain for ages, in gross 
 insensibility to their most essential duties ; and 
 whether in the absence of the Gospel they would 
 ever have been awakened to their reality and 
 extent, is, to say the most, only matter for con- 
 jecture. 1 
 
 i A similar observation may be made with reference to many 
 an individual reclaimed from habitual vice and irreligion. It 
 is highly probable that, but for the statements made to him, 
 and the counsel given him, by another, he would have con- 
 tinued insensible to his duties to the end of his life ; neverthe- 
 less, he was convinced of the truth of those statements, and 
 the wisdom of that counsel, in the exercise of his own reason ; 
 and the views which now regulate his conduct are strictly 
 independent of the character and fate of the person to whom 
 he so materially owes them. 
 
TO THE MORAL JUDGMENTS. 33 
 
 But we owe a debt to Christianity far exceed- 
 ing this ; and we cannot but add, that to attri- 
 bute, as is not uncommon, every just and worthy 
 conception of the Supreme Being, which may be 
 met with in the writings of the ancient heathen, 
 to some traditionary acquaintance with the Jewish 
 religion, — as though the whole of their intelli- 
 gence regarding him must, of necessity, have been 
 nothing more than a distant refraction of that 
 light which had illumined the region of Judea, — 
 is most unnecessary, with a view to establish the 
 worth and privileges of such a revelation as the 
 Gospel offers to our acceptance. For what is 
 the burden of that heavenly message, if we re- 
 ceive it as such ? That " God so loved the world 
 that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoso- 
 ever believeth in him should not perish, but have 
 everlasting life;" that " we have redemption 
 through the blood of Christ, even the forgive- 
 ness of sins ;" that " he gave himself for us, that 
 he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify 
 to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good 
 works ;" and that " in working out our own sal- 
 vation he worketh in us to will and to do of his 
 own good pleasure" — his own benevolence. 1 Was 
 it ever presumed that human reason could have 
 anticipated such communications as these from 
 the throne of the Almighty — could have conceived 
 or hoped such a method and fulness of divine 
 
 1 i»7rep rijc evCOKiac. Phil. ii. 13. 
 U 
 
34 THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY, ETC. 
 
 forgiveness as the Gospel makes known to us — 
 such a refuge for the stricken conscience, and 
 repose to the restless spirit — such encourage- 
 ment to our penitence — such an assurance of 
 everlasting happiness to beings oppressed with 
 the consciousness of guilt, and beset with the 
 fear of death ? Are communications such as 
 these disparaged in our estimation, when we 
 judge it to be the office of reason to recognise, 
 in our mental constitution, the principles of duty 
 which bind us to the service of the Creator, and 
 connect us with a future state ? Disparaged ! What 
 are such communications without this exercise of 
 our reason ? — for to whom are they made ? To 
 whom is the Gospel addressed but to beings 
 actually accountable to God for their doings, 
 and with greatly more to fear than to hope at 
 his hands ? — beings formed to appreciate the truth 
 and justice of that accusation which it brings 
 against them as transgressors ? — " Whosoever 
 among you feareth God, to you is the word of 
 this salvation sent." 1 
 
 1 Acts xiii. 26. 
 
LECTURE II. 
 
 THE REASONABLENESS OF GRATITUDE TO GOD. 
 
 1 John iv. 20. 
 
 HE THAT LOVETH NOT HIS BROTHER WHOM HE HATH SEEN, HOW 
 CAN HE LOVE GOD WHOM HE HATPI NOT SEEN? 
 
 In estimating the credibility of the Christian 
 religion as an appeal to our reason, with reference 
 to our moral judgments, the first proposition 
 that presents itself in those writings in which 
 its principles are unfolded, is, that the Deity 
 requires us to entertain and cultivate towards 
 him the affection of gratitude, as morally due to 
 him in virtue of his benevolence towards us. 
 It can admit of no doubt that this is the affec- 
 tion directly inculcated in that commandment, 
 which Christianity affirms to be the first and 
 great commandment of the Creator — " Thou 
 shaft love the Lord thy God ;" though, unques- 
 tionably, there are other religious affections 
 which grow up in connexion with the culture of 
 gratitude, and conspire to enlarge and animate 
 the love of God. In this implied proposition. 
 
 d 2 
 
36 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 then, Christianity, as we have expressly stated, 
 makes the assumption that the duty of gratitude 
 from man to man is rationally preparatory to the 
 duty of gratitude from man to God ; that is, 
 that the former is coincident in its nature 
 with the latter. The passage which has just 
 been cited from the Scriptures — " For he that 
 loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how 
 shall he love God whom he hath not seen?" — 
 appears to be especially worthy of attention, as 
 showing how completely this view of our subject 
 is taken up and implied by the original teachers 
 of Christianity. The writer of that passage 
 rejects, as a perfect delusion, the notion that we 
 can be actuated by a principle of duty towards 
 the Creator, while we are careless to fulfil our 
 duties towards our fellow-creatures ; and he 
 accordingly insists that if a man be wanting in 
 that love which is due to a fellow-creature, it 
 may at once be inferred that he is regardless of 
 that which is due to God : — " If a man say, I 
 love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar : 
 for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath 
 seen, how can he love God whom he hath not 
 seen ?" The reasoning of the writer, we are 
 aware, is specifically this : — If the relations in 
 which we stand to our fellow-creatures, with 
 whom we become acquainted, and with whom 
 we hold intercourse, through the medium of the 
 senses, fail to inspire us with appropriate afFec- 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 37 
 
 tions towards them, it is not to be expected that 
 we can realize such affections towards a Being 
 invisible to our bodily eyes, impalpable to our 
 senses ; whose presence and agency, to be rightly 
 apprehended by creatures so much the subjects 
 of sense as we are, must demand a special and 
 habitual application of our thoughts. But it is 
 not in this point of view, — in which, however, 
 it would furnish important matter for reflec- 
 tion, — that the passage has suggested itself in 
 connexion with our subject. We have selected 
 it for the purpose of remarking, how unquestion- 
 ably the Scripture assumes, that in judging a 
 certain affection, gratitude for example, to be 
 right towards a fellow-creature, we are ration- 
 ally prepared to infer that a similar affection is 
 morally due towards God. The distinction which 
 the Christian teacher more particularly points 
 out between morality, so called, and religion, — 
 or more properly, between the exercise of right 
 affections towards God and towards man, — 
 regards only a difference in the media through 
 which we commune with God and with our fellow- 
 creatures ; but, in remarking that distinction, he 
 manifestly proceeds on an assumption, which, if 
 well founded, cannot but raise the most exalted 
 conceptions of our moral nature, and render its 
 full development, its proper and effective culture, 
 an object of transcendent interest, and incom- 
 parable moment. It is, that whatever be the 
 
38 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 other various and great uses of virtue, or how- 
 ever essential the upright heart and conduct to 
 the happiness of mankind in the present life, one 
 and, manifestly, the principal end of our creation 
 as moral agents, is, that in sustaining particular 
 relations towards our fellow-creatures, and che- 
 rishing those affections towards them which we 
 consequently judge to be right and just, we may 
 perceive and appreciate certain analogous rela- 
 tions connecting us with our Creator, and be 
 prepared to yield Him also such affections as 
 are therefore due to him : that thus the rational 
 mind may be appealed to and attracted by the 
 Author of all good ; be led to all rectitude by his 
 claims and excellence ; and finally satisfied with 
 the eternal fruition of his presence. The Scrip- 
 ture instructs us that in allowing our affections, 
 in their moral character, to terminate on the 
 creature, we withhold them from that Being 
 who is supremely entitled to them, and leave 
 them to fail of their infinitely highest use and 
 destination : suffering those wings to decay and 
 perish, with which the soul is furnished to rise 
 above a merely present and terrestrial happiness, 
 and soar to immortality and perfection. 
 
 In maintaining the particular proposition be- 
 fore us, we may take for granted the reality of 
 that goodness which, in the judgment of Scrip- 
 ture, establishes a claim to our gratitude on the 
 part of the Creator. We may presume, more- 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 39 
 
 over, that this attribute of his nature must 
 engage the feelings of mankind in their mere 
 sensibility to pain and pleasure, and thereby 
 render him an attractive object of human con- 
 templation. Its influence, in this respect, may 
 indeed considerably vary with the speculative 
 views of individuals, and not a little with their 
 particular temperament, and the aspect of sur- 
 rounding circumstances. Our belief of the 
 divine beneficence may naturally kindle the hope 
 of a happier life than the present, and animate 
 the imagination with celestial visions ; or it may 
 serve to reconcile the mind to this mixed con- 
 dition of existence, and help us to tutor our 
 spirit to a stoical endurance of suffering, as the 
 result of a necessity to which God and man are 
 alike subject ; or it may leave us to brood, in 
 deep perplexity, over that large amount of misery, 
 that universal exposure to innumerable ills, which 
 we perceive to be compatible with the constitu- 
 tion of a world displaying, notwithstanding, un- 
 deniable proofs of the benevolence of its Author. 
 But however the goodness of the Deity may 
 operate on our hopes and fears, or whether it 
 add to the disgust or the love of life, it cannot 
 but prompt a natural affection towards him ; for 
 it cannot but awaken feelings of an agreeable 
 nature. A persuasion that the Creator of the 
 universe is a benevolent Being, must needs 
 afford us some comfort and satisfaction, when 
 
40 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 we contemplate his stupendous power, and con- 
 sider our absolute dependence upon him. We 
 must here advert to such feelings in order to 
 distinguish them from a sense of duty to the 
 Creator, with which, in the judgment of Scrip- 
 ture, they are properly united ; and admitted to 
 be so by the generality of mankind; however 
 this admission may need to be regarded as 
 to the extent of its import, or the conse- 
 quences which it involves. The one great ques- 
 tion of personal concernment that may present 
 itself, with reference to the goodness of the 
 Deity is, whether it be properly a reason for 
 that gratitude towards him which we judge to 
 be morally right, or approve ourselves in enter- 
 taining, towards a human benefactor ; and which 
 we realize in a readiness to act in pursuance of 
 his will and purpose, or to acknowledge prac- 
 tically the kindness which he has shown us. 1 
 
 1 It is most essential to distinguish these effects of kindness, 
 or beneficence, on its object, and we are led to remark this dis- 
 tinction more particularly, by the perusal of an " Analysis of 
 the Phenomena of the Mind," by J. Mill, Esq., Author of the 
 History of British India, &c. : a work which contains an ex- 
 planation of the moral sentiments that dissevers them entirely, 
 as we apprehend, from the principles of natural religion ; and 
 which, displaying, as it does, unusual acuteness and capacity 
 for mental analysis, may well be supposed to promote the opi- 
 nions which it advocates, or to raise a prepossession in their 
 favour. This author, in explaining the formation of our moral 
 sentiments, assigns a very prominent place to the pleasure 
 derived from the thought of whatever is regarded as a cause 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 41 
 
 Let it be considered, then, that the propo- 
 sition under discussion, that gratitude is due to 
 
 of pleasure to ourselves ; and, with reference to the disposi- 
 tions of our fellow-creatures, he makes this true and important 
 observation : — " From our earliest infancy we have had expe- 
 rience of nothing more constantly than this — that a great pro- 
 portion of our pleasures proceeded from a certain disposition 
 towards us, on the part of our fellow-creatures who were near 
 us ; and a great proportion of our pains from a certain other 
 disposition on their part. These dispositions, taken in the 
 most general sense, are kindness, and its opposite, unkindness. 
 We have, therefore, very intense associations of pleasure with 
 the idea of the disposition towards us called kindness in other 
 men ; and very intense associations of pain with that of the 
 disposition in them called unkindness towards us." (Vol. ii. 
 p. 189.) Now, it is manifestly consistent with this general 
 observation, that the kindness of the Creator towards us should 
 create associations of a pleasurable nature with the idea of his 
 disposition towards us. But we find that this author, in his 
 account of the effects of kindness upon us, takes no particular 
 notice of our perception or sense of a duty, dictating some 
 suitable practical acknowledgment of the kindness evinced 
 towards us by any individual, or operating as a motive in our 
 conduct towards him ; although this sense of duty is familiar 
 to every man's consciousness, and however it may be traced or 
 accounted for, is perfectly distinct from the pleasurable asso- 
 ciations which he has put so conspicuously forward. That 
 Mr. Mill would have explained this particular state of mind, 
 this effect of kindness, in a manner consistent with his analysis 
 of our moral sentiments in general, there can be no doubt. 
 Indeed, we may presume that he would have referred it to the 
 "favourable disposition" of our fellow-creatures, which we 
 procure by a reciprocation of benefits, as by all other acts of 
 virtue whatsoever : (a theory of morals which is the subject 
 of our fifth discourse.) But his omission to notice a sense 
 of duty among the effects of kindness is remarkable ; at least, 
 it leaves much of those effects entirely unexplained ; for as to 
 
42 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 the Divine Being, is one which, on its first sug- 
 gestion, commands the immediate assent of man- 
 
 the " intense associations of pleasure with the idea of a certain 
 disposition called kindness towards us," these, every one must 
 know, are often sorely broken in upon and put to flight by the 
 sense of duty in question, the fulfilment of which is generally 
 described as an act of gratitude. In some, indeed, those who, 
 in the common acceptation, " love the right," this sense of 
 duty supplies a most powerful and satisfying principle of action ; 
 but how often does it disturb and oppress the recipient of a 
 benefit, and even render the individual, who would otherwise 
 have been the source of" intense associations of pleasure," an 
 object, if not of dislike, yet certainly of avoidance. In truth, 
 this is the moral expression, so to speak, of the aspect of kind- 
 ness ; and its effect upon the feelings of its object is especially 
 decisive as to his regard for virtue. 
 
 Let it be added that the sense of duty becomes peculiarly 
 distinct and conspicuous among the effects of kindness, when 
 these are viewed in connexion with Mr. Mill's explanation of 
 the active power of virtue. Speaking of those acts " for which 
 we have the generical name of virtue," he observes, " the man 
 who has acquired, from habit, the facility of associating with 
 those acts the pleasures which result from them, is perfectly 
 virtuous," (p. 240.) Now, in addition to the pleasurable asso- 
 ciations already mentioned, connected with the idea of another's 
 kindness towards us, " we have," so this author elsewhere re- 
 marks, " associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feel- 
 ings of a fellow-creature, and therefore associations of pleasure 
 with those acts of ours which yield him pleasure," (p. 239.) 
 Yet, notwithstanding this two-fold chain of pleasurable associ- 
 ations, attracting us to a practical acknowledgment of the 
 kindness shown to us, a reluctant and grudging discharge of 
 this duty is matter of common observation ; so much so, that 
 of all debts, it is believed, none are more willingly forgotten 
 than those of gratitude. From the common aversion to the 
 remembrance of benefits received, Seneca derives a lesson of 
 prudence in the matter of bestowing them : — ■" Si arbitriumdandi 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 43 
 
 kind in general, however slow or partial may be 
 its operation on the springs of human action : 
 answering, in this respect, as was intimated in 
 our first discourse, the description of a first prin- 
 ciple of knowledge in our moral relation to the 
 Creator. Whatever question may be afterwards 
 raised upon this proposition, it never, we may be 
 sure, presents itself in a questionable shape on 
 its first appearance to any human being ; or, 
 rather, it so naturally enters and commends 
 itself to man's understanding, that however long 
 it may remain unobserved, yet, when brought 
 into view, it never appears to have been absent. 
 Disbelievers of Christianity, for the most part, 
 would hardly assert that, surrounded, as we are, 
 with manifestations of the goodness of God, and 
 regarding him as the Giver of all the good we 
 have received or anticipate, it is, notwithstanding, 
 unreasonable to infer the duty, the moral pro- 
 priety, of gratitude towards him. Their argument 
 against the Christian religion is, not that, in 
 demanding our gratitude to God, it enjoins a 
 duty in itself incongruous to our reason ; one 
 which he cannot be reasonably supposed to 
 
 penes nos est, praecipue mansura quaeremus, ut quam minime 
 mortale munus sit. Pauci enim sunt tarn grati, ut quod acce- 
 perint, etiam si non vident, cogitent. Ingratis quoque memoria 
 cum ipso munere incurrit : ubi ante oculos est, et oblivisci sui 
 non sinit, scd auctorem suum ingerit et inculcat." — Dc Benef, 
 lib. i. 
 
44 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 require ; but that it makes the demand on no valid 
 or sufficient ground ; that it offers no adequate 
 and touching appeal to that affection of the up- 
 right heart ; but, on the contrary, exhibits, as the 
 moral Governor and Judge of the world, a Being 
 whom they cannot identify with the Author of 
 the universe ; — one who, so far from affecting 
 them with sentiments of gratitude and devotion, 
 would fill them, in the belief of his existence, 
 with aversion and dismay. This objection to 
 the Scriptures it is proper should receive some 
 reply ; but, in alluding to it here, we have only 
 to remark, that it implies an acknowledgment 
 that the duty of gratitude to God is not the 
 point in dispute ; that this, itself, is perfectly 
 agreeable to reason. 
 
 In truth, we may detect a secret assent of the 
 understanding to the moral obligation of grati- 
 tude to the Creator in the most sceptical of 
 mankind, who have not abandoned the belief of 
 his existence. At least, it is observable that the 
 men who differ from the mass of their fellow- 
 creatures in regarding the judgments of the 
 conscience as significant of the divine govern- 
 ment over them, and premonitory of a future 
 retribution, appear to agree with the rest of the 
 world in concluding, that, were they apprised of 
 a law imposed upon them, as voluntary agents, 
 by the Creator, they should hold themselves 
 bound in rectitude to observe it. What they have 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 45 
 
 questioned and denied is, the sufficient proof of 
 the existence of such a law ; not that, could the 
 law itself be authenticated, and laid open in 
 legible characters, it would be right, or their 
 duty, to study and obey it. Now, how shall we 
 account for this universal though tacit impres- 
 sion, this implied understanding on all hands, 
 of an obligation to obey the Creator, were he to 
 lay any injunctions upon us ? Will it suffice to 
 remark, that men are willing enough to allow 
 a claim of duty upon them, so long as it lies 
 dormant in generalities and abstractions, or is 
 matter of merely verbal acknowledgment ; and 
 that it is not till it takes the shape of a specific 
 command or prohibition, and stands in the way 
 of their inclinations and purposes, that they are 
 provoked to question and confute it ? Or shall 
 we allege the idea of God's resistless power, and 
 say, that our capacity for happiness or misery at 
 his hands is the only argument that could satisfy 
 our reason for obedience to his will, were we 
 under subjection to his government ? Rather, 
 is there not here an inner irrepressible response 
 of the intellect, if not the heart, of man to that 
 appeal which is made to the sense of duty in 
 the manifestations of the divine benevolence ? — 
 an appeal made to us from the past, as well as 
 from the future ; and addressed to us, we may 
 add, from all nature, by unnumbered voices, the 
 countless ministers of the Almighty's goodness ; 
 
46 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 renewed again and again to our sluggish ear, and 
 iterated to the end of life ? l 
 
 1 Hobbes broadly maintains that God's right of dominion 
 (jus regnandi) is derived from his omnipotence ; and that man 
 is under an obligation to obey him on account of his weakness 
 (propter imbecillitatem) ; and this was at least consistent with 
 his general doctrine, that power was the sole foundation of 
 right. He was aware that such a view of religion would 
 somewhat shock the feelings of his readers ; but we need not 
 cite the quaint and singular arguments by which he endeavours 
 to defend it. (De Cive, cap. xv.) 
 
 Most readers of Paley, we believe, are dissatisfied with his 
 reply to the question, Why am I obliged to obey the will of 
 God ? and, indeed, to the general question, Why am I obliged 
 to do what is right ? And it must be confessed, that he has 
 here expressed his sentiments in a manner which might lead 
 us to infer, that he entertained very much the same notion of 
 moral obligation as that of Hobbes. "As we should not be 
 obliged," he says, " to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless 
 rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other 
 depended upon our obedience ; so neither should we without 
 the same reason be obliged to do what is right, to practise 
 virtue, or to obey the commands of God." But let us place, 
 by the side of this passage, the following, in which he describes 
 " the scope of Christianity as a revelation " : — " Its direct 
 object," he observes, " is to supply motives and not rules ; 
 sanctions and not precepts. And these were what mankind 
 stood most in need of. The members of civilized society can, 
 in all ordinary cases, judge tolerably well how they ought to 
 act : but without a future state, or which is the same thing, 
 without accredited evidence of that state, they want a motive 
 to their duty ; they want, at least, strength of motive sufficient 
 to bear up against the force of passion, and the temptation of 
 present advantage." (Evidences, part ii. chap. 2.) Here Paley 
 states, as clearly as possible, that the knowledge of virtue, 
 rectitude, duty, is acquired independently of the hope of 
 reward, or fear of punishment. He held, indeed, that the 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 47 
 
 However that be, it is essential to observe that 
 the assent immediately given to the reasonable- 
 ness of gratitude to God, and given, it may 
 be, for many years past, must be held to be 
 actually binding upon us, unless that assent be 
 
 rectitude of actions was to be collected from their expediency 
 on the whole ; and premising, as he did, the divine authority of 
 the Scriptures, he was not concerned to exhibit a common 
 basis for morality and religion ; but with such a passage before 
 us as that which has just been cited, we cannot doubt that he 
 fully believed the human mind to be formed for the perception 
 of moral distinctions irrespective of an expectation of rewards 
 and punishments. Indeed in the passage first cited, when 
 speaking of an obligation to do what is right, he recognises a 
 sense of rectitude to be prior to and distinct from that parti- 
 cular obligation which he troubled himself so unnecessarily to 
 explain. In truth, the cause of his penning this infelicitous 
 sentence, for so we must regard it, was his attempting to limit 
 the import of a word in a manner unauthorized by custom. 
 In the ordinary acceptation of language, the moral rectitude 
 of a man, and the fulfilment of his moral "obligations," signify 
 precisely the same thing. The pressure of necessity and com- 
 pulsion, the " violent motive urging us to do a thing" of which 
 Paley speaks, is something essentially different. (Moral Phi- 
 sophy, b. ii. ch. iii.) 
 
 With reference to rewards and punishments, let it be 
 remembered that both piety and virtue dictate the use of 
 whatever means may be afforded us for their own advancement 
 in the mind. Our fears and hopes from the power of God 
 cannot create the moral obligation to obey him ; but if they 
 arrest and fix the attention to this obligation, and thereby 
 impress it more deeply on the mind ; if they tend to su- 
 perinduce, as is proved by experience, a firmer and more 
 effective sense of duty to him ; are we not bound, by the 
 moral obligation itself, to cherish the expectation, if well 
 founded, of rewards and punishments hereafter? 
 
48 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 clearly perceived to have been given under a mis- 
 apprehension : unless we have made the discovery, 
 that the duty in question has stolen its rapid 
 way into our convictions under the disguise of a 
 false presumption ; and owes the influence which 
 it may still exert upon our thoughts and feelings, 
 strictly, to the power of habit. It is undoubtedly 
 proper to an intelligent being to retrace his own 
 conclusions, and, if necessary, to revise them, 
 be they ever so prompt and determinate : — 
 though it must be added, that, in question- 
 ing the conclusion before us, that gratitude 
 is due to the Creator, an individual should be 
 concerned to disengage his understanding, not 
 only from the influence which may belong to it 
 as an early and, it may be, a cherished prepos- 
 session, or merely as the effect of education, but 
 also from a bias of present inclinations and 
 wishes, which it is easy to perceive must be 
 adverse to the conviction of its truth. For we 
 can hardly presume that the duty of gratitude to 
 God can be reasonably suffered to terminate in 
 words, or be satisfied with nothing more than 
 ascriptions of praise, or a flow of the feelings, to 
 the Source of all happiness. It will assuredly be 
 found to dictate, together with the fulfilment of 
 our especial duties to its Supreme object, a 
 course of rectitude towards our fellow-creatures, 
 as an exemplification of obedience to himself. 
 And we need but be reminded that if it be 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 49 
 
 reasonable to entertain this affection towards the 
 Deity at all, it must be equally so to nourish it 
 to its utmost strength and energy ; to raise it 
 into a dominant principle of action ; preparing 
 us for whatever effort of self-restraint, or sacri- 
 fice of present inclination, may be required in 
 obedience to the divine will. 
 
 Now we are prepared to admit that, if it be 
 ascertained, on reflection, that we judge our 
 gratitude to be virtuous, or approve ourselves 
 and others in feeling and cherishing it, towards 
 a human being in virtue of some property be- 
 longing to it which cannot be affirmed of grati- 
 tude as a principle of conduct towards the 
 Creator, the Christian religion is incapable of 
 proof or corroboration from our reason in its 
 cognizance of our moral judgments ; for in pro- 
 fessing to announce the first and great command- 
 ment of the Deity, it undeniably implies, as we 
 have seen, that the duty of gratitude to a human 
 benefactor is rationally introductory to the duty 
 of gratitude to God, — that is, that the latter may 
 be gathered from the same fact in our moral 
 experience which constitutes and explains the 
 former. But if, on the contrary, we perceive on 
 reflection — what all mankind appear to presume 
 antecedently to reflection — that our gratitude to 
 a fellow-creature originates, strictly, in our per- 
 suasion of his benevolence towards us ; that we 
 approve it, specifically, as the growth of that 
 
 E 
 
50 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 persuasion ; and this whatever farther induce- 
 ment may be superadded to its exercise ; then 
 we have surely the testimony of our reason to 
 the primary assumption of Christianity, that the 
 Creator requires us to cultivate the affection of 
 gratitude towards himself. Indeed, if such be 
 a correct account of our moral approbation of 
 gratitude, how is it possible to evade the infe- 
 rence that it is due to the Donor of our life and 
 faculties, of all our capacities and means of hap- 
 piness ? — whether Christianity in other respects 
 be worthy of belief or not ; or whatever be the 
 evidence of any particular religion, that may 
 claim to deliver his laws, and to enforce them 
 on his own authority and sanctions. We need 
 not argue the inference. If beneficence towards 
 us on the part of a fellow-creature be, itself, the 
 proper and sufficient reason for gratitude towards 
 him, it were a preposterous notion that it ceases 
 to be such as an attribute of our Maker, though 
 the benefits which he confers upon us are per- 
 fectly gratuitous, as well as infinitely more 
 abundant, than our fellow-creatures — themselves 
 but instruments of his own beneficence — can 
 bestow. 
 
 We must here then direct attention to a doc- 
 trine relating to virtue, or moral rectitude, which 
 is not a little prevalent amongst us ; inasmuch 
 as it bears, in a remarkable manner, on the pro- 
 position under discussion. It is laid down and 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 51 
 
 confidently maintained by many, that that which 
 constitutes actions virtuous, or entitles them to 
 a moral approbation, — that for which they are 
 considered generally, and made the subject of 
 precepts enjoining the performance of them, — is 
 their tendency to promote the common happi- 
 ness, or their utility to mankind at large. This 
 position, we must at once observe, is capitally 
 defective, since it fails to specify the particular 
 disposition by which a person is presumed to be 
 actuated, in the performance of actions which 
 conduce to the welfare of society, and are 
 consequently denominated virtuous ; whereas 
 it is palpably the agent, and the agent only, who 
 is properly the object of moral approbation, 
 and this in virtue of the disposition which is 
 presumed to determine his conduct. Accord- 
 ingly amongst those who maintain the general 
 utility of actions to be the standard of their 
 moral rectitude, there is an important difference, 
 or rather perfect contrariety, of opinion on this 
 essential particular — the disposition of the agent. 
 According to some, an individual, in order to 
 entitle himself to a moral approbation, in per- 
 forming an action designated virtuous on account 
 of its general utility, must be actuated by a 
 desire of that general happiness which he is 
 instrumental to promote. These advocates of 
 utility, then, as the standard of rectitude, account 
 a man virtuous, or morally approvable, in the 
 
 e 2 
 
OZ THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 degree in which he is influenced in his conduct 
 by a benevolence which regards the welfare of 
 the whole community. 1 Others, however, who 
 contend for utility as the test of virtue, have 
 embraced a theory on the moral principles which 
 results in the conclusion, that individuals deno- 
 minated virtuous are prompted to actions con- 
 ducive to the common welfare, and therefore 
 termed right, by their tendency to promote, in a 
 variety of ways, their own gratification and ad- 
 vantage : — in other words, that the practice of 
 virtue consists in performing actions useful to the 
 community from a prevailing desire that those 
 actions may be useful to ourselves. 2 We shall 
 bring this theory under particular discussion in 
 a future discourse ; but it must be perceived 
 that the difference of opinion just stated, among 
 those who professedly espouse utility as the test 
 of virtue, is of fundamental importance in the 
 question of morals, and should be steadily kept 
 in view in the prosecution of our subject. 3 
 
 1 For example, Dr. D wight maintains that " virtue is 
 founded on utility," but he supposes benevolence on the part 
 of the agent. " Benevolence," he observes, " directs the whole 
 active power or energy of the mind in which it exists to the 
 production of the most extensive happiness. This is what I 
 intend by the utility of virtue ; and that in which, as it appears 
 to me, all its excellence is found." — System of Theology, 
 Ser. xcix. 
 
 2 Mills's Analysis, Chap, xxiii. 
 
 3 Most persons, we believe, who consider actions to be 
 right on the ground of their utility or expediency, take for 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 53 
 
 It will suffice, however, to our present pur- 
 pose to cite the position agreed upon by parties 
 
 granted the benevolence of the agent ; and it is natural 
 enough that they should do so ; but they are not entitled to 
 make this assumption in statements intended to be definitive 
 or explanatory upon the subject. Dr. Dwight, we remark, 
 considers the benevolence of the agent to be so obviously and 
 properly implied in his position, that "virtue is founded in 
 utility," that he speaks of any other supposition in terms of 
 impatience and even disgust. " It has been objected to this 
 doctrine," he observes, " that if virtue is founded in utility, 
 every thing which is useful must so far be virtuous. This 
 objection it is hardly necessary to answer. Voluntary usefulness 
 is the only virtue. A smatterer in moral philosophy knows that 
 understanding and will are necessary to the existence of virtue. 
 He who informs us, that if virtue is founded in utility, animals, 
 vegetables and minerals, the sun, the moon, and the stars, 
 must be virtuous, so far as they are useful, is either disposed 
 to trifle with mankind for his amusement, or supposes them 
 to be triflers." It is no part of ours to vindicate that par- 
 ticular objection which provoked the indignation of this 
 author ; though, be it observed, it was alleged by one who 
 was something above a smatterer in moral philosophy — Adam 
 Smith, in his well-known observation — " It seems impossible 
 we should have no other reason for praising a man than that 
 for which we commend a chest of drawers." We may allow it 
 to be taken for granted that understanding and will are ne- 
 cessary to the existence of virtue ; but surely this is no reason 
 for assuming that, in doing acts which are generally useful, 
 the understanding and will are directed to the promotion of 
 the general welfare ; and that this is clearly implied in the 
 position that virtue is founded in utility. There are ethical 
 writers, alluded to above, who are perfectly agreed with 
 Dwight that virtue is founded in utility, and also that under- 
 standing and will are essential to its existence ; but who are 
 directly at issue with him in the inference that therefore bene- 
 volence is the governing principle in the practice of virtue. 
 
54 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 who differ so widely on the most essential con- 
 ditions of a virtuous action — the position that 
 
 But even the system of Mandeville might have reminded 
 him, that understanding and will are readily conceivable in 
 the performance of actions useful to the community — that is, 
 in the production of utility, without the exercise of that bene- 
 volence which seeks the promotion of " the most extensive 
 happiness ;" and in which, as he states, all the excellence of 
 virtue is found. 
 
 That the motive of the agent determines the moral quality 
 of his action is generally acknowledged, but this essential 
 truth appears to be a little obscured by the use of a phrase 
 which we may properly here take occasion to notice. When 
 an act enjoined by a moral precept has been done, but not 
 from a virtuous motive, it is customary to say that the action 
 itself was abstractedly right. The phrase, we suspect, brings 
 with it a vague notion of a certain rectitude in the individual 
 who performed it ; though if the opinion be correct as 
 to the motive by which he was influenced, he has done an 
 act which was certainly not a right one, and it may have been 
 a foully wrong one. It should be considered then, as must 
 be readily evident, that in speaking of an action as abstractedly 
 right, we abstract the action only in its outward form or cir- 
 cumstances, and we term it right on the presumption that the 
 outward or physical circumstances of the action are attended 
 by a particular motive or disposition of the mind. If we say, 
 It is abstractedly right to relieve the distressed, we presume 
 the exercise of benevolence in doing: so. Should we call it 
 right on any other presumption ? The abstraction is, of course, 
 a purely intellectual operation ; the action without an agent 
 has no existence ; and the merit or demerit of the agent lies 
 in the motive by which he is influenced. Dr. Reid, indeed, 
 in answer to the question, What do we mean by goodness in an 
 action considered abstractedly ? — replies — " To me it appears 
 to lie in this, and this only, That it is an action which ought 
 to be done by those who have the power and opportunity, and 
 the capacity to perceive their obligation to do so." (Essay v. 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 55 
 
 actions are right or wrong, to be approved or 
 disapproved, inasmuch as they are useful or 
 pernicious to human society. This doctrine, we 
 have said, bears in a remarkable manner on the 
 principle of religion under discussion ; for, if 
 true, it follows that gratitude is a virtuous 
 affection, or the object of an intelligent moral 
 approbation, for this reason, and no other — that 
 by prompting us to reciprocate the kindness, to 
 return the benefits, which we receive, we en- 
 courage a spirit of mutual benevolence, or the 
 performance of useful actions one towards 
 another, and thereby augment the sum of human 
 happiness. But if this be a correct explanation 
 of the duty of gratitude from man to man, we 
 must confess we are unable to perceive on what 
 principle such a duty can be incumbent upon us 
 in relation to the Creator: for, palpably, there 
 is no possibility of returning, after this manner, 
 the gifts which he has bestowed upon us. If 
 we are bound to exercise gratitude to a fellow- 
 creature who has succoured us in urgent need, 
 or rescued us in imminent peril, or lavished his 
 bounty upon us, solely because the world is 
 
 Ch. 4.) But this reply regards the action both in its outward 
 circumstances and the motive from which it proceeds : an action 
 that ought to be done is an action to be done from a virtuous 
 motive. It gives no explanation of the phrase " abstractedly 
 right" when applied to an action not done from a virtuous 
 motive ; an instance in which, as we have intimated, it may 
 possibly affect the distinctness of our ideas of the nature of virtue. 
 
56 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 benefited by a reciprocity of kindness and gene- 
 rosity, and there is nothing in that affection 
 entitling it to a moral approbation apart from, 
 prior to, and independent of, this consideration, — 
 we cannot, from reflecting on the gratitude we 
 feel, the debt we acknowledge, to a human 
 benefactor, deduce an argument, or realize a 
 motive, of a moral, obligatory nature, for grati- 
 tude to the Being who created and sustains us, 
 and " whose tender mercies are over all his 
 works." We cannot advance from the love we 
 owe and cherish towards an earthly parent, to 
 any more profound and ruling sentiment, of a 
 kindred nature, towards our Heavenly Parent, 
 the Father of spirits. 
 
 Our subject is the particular duty of gratitude 
 to God ; but that ethical philosophy we speak 
 of, touching the reasons of our moral judgments, 
 discloses no rational basis, that we can discern, 
 for other affections to the Deity, which it might 
 have seemed the office of gratitude to call into 
 action, and to grow itself more ardent by en- 
 kindling. So far from bringing into view the 
 duty of gratitude, or any other duty, to the 
 Deity, it places us in such a position, that there 
 is apparently nothing, in the approving and con- 
 demning judgments of the conscience, to suggest 
 the existence of a moral relation to the Creator ; 
 and if suggested, nothing to confirm it ; and 
 that if we obtain any well-founded conviction of 
 
f- WP 
 
 GRATITUDE TO GOD. bj 
 
 his government over us, as voluntary agents, or 
 our responsibility to him for our doings, we must 
 obtain it by a direct revelation from himself. 
 And it manifestly follows, that if we believe any 
 particular documents, as the Scriptures, to com- 
 pose a revelation from himself, we must arrive 
 at this belief on evidence entirely exclusive of 
 any proof or intimation of the duties which they 
 inculcate, that may be gathered from our moral 
 principles, or the working of the conscience. 
 We know that the exercise and culture of 
 right affections, as we term them, are essential 
 to the welfare of human society ; but in deter- 
 mining such affections to be right, to be morally 
 approvable or obligatory in virtue of their utility 
 to human beings, we have singled out a property 
 in them for our moral esteem and admiration, 
 which discovers them to be wholly inapplicable 
 and nugatory as an offering to Almighty God ; 
 — a property, moreover, which affords no better 
 ground for concluding that he requires us to 
 cherish such affections towards our fellow-crea- 
 tures, than that he demands them immediately 
 for himself. It is true, the Creator manifestly 
 designs the happiness of his creatures, but 
 nothing is more evident from the general obser- 
 vation of his works, than that he accomplishes 
 that design in ways without number, and to 
 an unlimited extent, in a perfect independence 
 of our volition, or intentional concurrence, in 
 
58 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 promoting it. The simple fact, then, that certain 
 actions are, on the whole, necessary or con- 
 ducive to the happiness of mankind, can supply 
 no argument for believing that he requires us 
 to perform such actions, and to nourish the 
 affections from which they spring, as a voluntary 
 obedience to his will, and active subordination 
 to his purpose. 1 
 
 1 In rejecting this argument, we may appear to be directly 
 at issue with a writer so generally excellent, that we would 
 not be thought to differ from him in any degree more than we 
 strictly do. Paley observes : — " The method of coming at 
 the will of God concerning any action by the light of nature, 
 is to inquire into the tendency of the action to promote or 
 diminish the general happiness. This rule proceeds upon 
 the presumption, that God Almighty wills and wishes the 
 happiness of his creatures ; and, consequently, that those 
 actions which promote that will and wish, must be agreeable 
 to him; and the contrary." — Moral Philosophy, chap. iv. 
 But it should be remembered that this author, as before re- 
 marked, premises the divine authority of the Scriptures ; that 
 is, he assumes, by obvious implication, the position which we 
 are engaged to maintain — namely, that mankind stand in a 
 moral relation to God, that they are bound to obey him. In 
 the Scripture however, morality, as he states, is taught by 
 general rules, the application of which, though illustrated by 
 examples, is left, in a number of cases, for " moralists to 
 determine." Hence he has recourse to " the light of nature," 
 which instructs us, as he concludes, that the beneficial tendency 
 of an action is a proof of its conformity to the will of God. 
 He was, surely, too close an observer of nature, and too 
 cautious a reasoner, to maintain, a principio, that the beneficial 
 tendency of some actions, and the hurtful tendency of others, 
 constitute a proof that it is our duty to God to do the former 
 and to abstain from the latter. 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 59 
 
 We are far from imputing to any a willing- 
 ness to banish religion from the world, simply 
 because they consider the general utility of 
 right actions to be the essence and measure of 
 their moral rectitude, or the reason why they 
 are judged to be right. Persons have held, and 
 yet hold, opinions relating to morals at variance, 
 as we apprehend, with the assumptions of Scrip- 
 ture, who, notwithstanding, revere these writings 
 as an authoritative declaration of the will of 
 God ; and to such the want of a clear discern- 
 ment of the connexion between morality and re- 
 ligion is effectually compensated by that assent 
 which, as has been remarked, is instantly and 
 everywhere given to the reasonableness of gra- 
 titude to God ; or, generally, by the apparently 
 self-evident existence and propriety of religious 
 duties. But we are here supposing such duties 
 to be brought into question, to be disputed or 
 maintained, by individuals who have stepped aside 
 from a natural and customary mode of thinking 
 in reference to the Deity ; and, we repeat, this 
 inquiry is of primary importance in a deliberate 
 and reflective estimate of the claims of Christi- 
 anity ; for it is our conviction of an intrinsic rea- 
 sonableness in the practical principles which it 
 teaches, that dictates a conscientious examina- 
 tion of the historical and documentary evidence 
 of its truth ; that commands attention to its 
 distinguishing doctrines ; and must mainl\ 
 
GO THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 uphold them in the belief of mankind at 
 large. 1 
 
 We do not allow that our approval of gratitude, 
 with the actions that spring from it, is founded 
 on a perception of its favourable consequences 
 to the community. On the contrary, it will be 
 
 1 The consequence which we have alleged, and would urge 
 upon the attention, as issuing from the doctrine of utility in 
 morals, has not been unperceived by religious men, who have 
 intended by that doctrine to resolve all moral excellence into 
 benevolence ; though we can hardly suppose that it can have 
 received very much of their attention. Dr. Dwight, for 
 example, observes that " to glorify God, voluntarily, is exactly 
 the same conduct towards him, which, when directed towards 
 creatures, produces their happiness. It is, in truth, doing all 
 that which it is in our power to do towards the happiness of 
 the Creator." (Ser. xcix.) Maintaining, as this author did, 
 that all rectitude consisted in benevolence, he was compelled, 
 he was aware, to infer that if mankind were capable of recti- 
 tude to God, they must realize it in the exercise of that par- 
 ticular disposition towards him. This opinion as to the 
 governing principle of the devout mind appears so forced and 
 artificial, and such language as that which we read in the book 
 of Job — " Can a man be profitable unto God, as he that is 
 wise is profitable unto himself? Is it any pleasure to the 
 Almighty that thou art righteous ? or is it gain to him that 
 thou makest thy ways perfect ?" — such language as this appears 
 so congruous to our reason, and is so akin to men's actual 
 thoughts and feelings at the footstool of their Creator, that it 
 may well excite surprise that religious men, theologians as 
 well as others, should have selected, as the sole, all-compre- 
 hending principle of rectitude in the mind of man, one which, 
 if regarded in their relation to the Deity, must have compelled 
 them to accept such a description of piety as that which has just 
 been cited from Dr. Dwight. The fact, indeed, admits of explana- 
 tion ; but it were inconvenient here to pursue the subject. 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 61 
 
 found that the doctrine adverted to, namely, that 
 it is the general utility of actions which consti- 
 tutes their moral rectitude, when applied to the 
 elucidation of this particular virtue, is exceed- 
 ingly hypothetical and wholly unsupported by 
 the moral experience of mankind. Gratitude, 
 it deserves to be considered, grows out of our 
 persuasion of that goodness of which we have 
 been the recipients ; it is morally approved and 
 demanded as the fruit of that persuasion ; just 
 as pity is aw T akened, and the mind arrested to 
 the duty of active benevolence, by the aspect of 
 suffering, or the knowledge of its existence. 
 The happiness which so conspicuously flows to 
 the whole community of mankind from acts of 
 gratitude as well as of benevolence, we hold to 
 be strictly the result of such a constitution of our 
 nature, and illustrative of the mind of its Author. 
 But deferring this particular topic to the next 
 discourse, it may be necessary, before we con- 
 clude for the present, to offer some remarks in 
 vindication of that eminence and priority which 
 we have assigned to the duty of gratitude, in our 
 moral relation to the Deity. It may appear to 
 some that we have fallen into an error in regard- 
 ing our persuasion of the goodness of God as the 
 basis of religious obligations ; and that there is 
 a justice in the demand of the Creator upon our 
 obedience, which is strictly antecedent to and 
 distinct from his title to our gratitude. But if 
 
62 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 we consult that universal law of equity which 
 is everywhere appealed to as prescribing the 
 duties of mankind one to another, — and, be it 
 remembered, it is our perception of a rectitude 
 in our doings one to another which, in the 
 judgment of Scripture, supports the sense of 
 duty towards God, — we shall find that the claim 
 which beneficence raises to the gratitude of its 
 object, is strictly a claim of justice, and one of 
 the highest degree ; and that, in concluding 
 otherwise, we are very much occupied with that 
 partial and most limited idea of justice, which 
 may be perceived to grow out of the constitution 
 and arrangements of civil society ; enabling it to 
 exact from its members the fulfilment of a par- 
 ticular portion only of their duties, and these 
 merely in their outward character, for its own 
 preservation and advantage. In human govern- 
 ments, the power that compels obedience is the 
 predominating attribute of the ruling head or 
 body ; while the particular duty of gratitude is 
 almost, if not entirely, excluded. Hence a seem- 
 ing insufficiency in the benevolence of the Su- 
 preme Being, or in his title to our gratitude, 
 considered as the foundation of our duties to- 
 wards him, or his moral supremacy over us. 
 The universal law of equity, however, which 
 prescribes to ourselves the same conduct towards 
 others as it would prompt us to demand from 
 others towards ourselves, — a law so early recog- 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. Go 
 
 nised and understood in its primary dictates, 
 and so naturally presumed and appealed to 
 by all mankind in their transactions one with 
 another, that they have commonly spoken of it 
 as "originally inscribed" upon the hearts of 
 men, — that law dictates the exercise of bene- 
 volence on the one hand, and establishes a 
 right to gratitude on the other ; and deter- 
 mines that the more spontaneous and disinte- 
 rested the former, the more unjust and criminal 
 the man who withholds the latter. We need 
 but intimate that this is the weighed decision, as 
 well as the unbidden judgment, of mankind in 
 general ; and that in no single instance are they 
 more unanimous and determinate, than in com- 
 mending a cordial, active acknowledgment of 
 benefits, and branding the ungrateful with in- 
 famy. Moreover, it could readily be shown that 
 in no instance is the sense of duty more evidently 
 brought into conflict with the passions,- — virtue, 
 on numerous occasions, more severely tried, and 
 urged to nobler feats and a purer heroism. It 
 would consequently appear that the supreme and 
 absolute claim of the Creator upon our devotion 
 and obedience, in virtue of his goodness towards 
 us, is strictly a claim of right and justice. 1 
 
 1 This view of the duty of gratitude is fully adopted by Dugald 
 Stewart, in the following interesting observation on the feelings 
 which naturally prompt us to discharge it — feelings, the reality 
 and force of which, in the morally disciplined and habitually 
 
61 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 Indeed, we apprehend that, if it be reasonable 
 to entertain a sense of duty to God, the Chris- 
 tian religion has affirmed the specific ground on 
 which it properly rests. In other words, if it be 
 right and just in him to command, and conse- 
 quently in ourselves to obey, — or if there be any 
 significance in such terms as " right" and "just," 
 which render them applicable to the conduct of 
 God to his creatures, and the conduct of his 
 creatures to God, — the rectitude, the justice is 
 founded upon our assurance of his goodwill and 
 
 virtuous mind, cannot be doubted, notwithstanding the very 
 frequent and gross neglect of that duty, so commonly observed, 
 and adverted to in the former part of this discourse : — " In 
 one remarkable instance, too, Nature has made an additional 
 provision for keeping alive among men a sense of those obliga- 
 tions which justice imposes. That the good offices which 
 we have received from others constitute a debt, which it is 
 morally incumbent on us to discharge by all lawful means in 
 our power, is acknowledged in the common forms of expres- 
 sion employed on such occasions, both by philosophers and the 
 vulgar. As the obligations of gratitude, however, do not 
 admit (like the rules of honesty, strictly so called) of support 
 from the magistrate, Nature has judged it proper to enforce 
 their observance by one of the most irresistible and delightful 
 impulses of the human frame. According to this view of the 
 subject, gratitude, considered as a moral duty, is a branch of 
 justice, recommended to us, in a peculiar manner, by those 
 pleasing emotions which accompany all the modes of benevo- 
 lent affection." We cite the passage for its strong assertion 
 of the moral obligation to gratitude, the imperative nature of 
 which presses closely on the assumption of Christianity before us. 
 Indeed, the highest estimation of gratitude as a duty is frequent 
 among writers on morals. Cicero places it second to none : — 
 " Nullum officinal referenda gratia magis necessarium est." 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 65 
 
 benevolence of purpose in our creation. For 
 suppose that, instead of displaying himself as the 
 Author of happiness to ourselves and innume- 
 rable creatures, he had evinced a prevailing dis- 
 position to distress and torment us ; that we 
 had before us a scheme of the universe mani- 
 festly adapted to produce a preponderance of 
 misery in the world ; or that we had ascertained, 
 in whatever manner, his hostility or even in- 
 difference to our welfare ; and suppose, not- 
 withstanding, he had demanded our obedience 
 and promulgated a law for our scrupulous 
 observance ; — could we, on this supposition, 
 discern any principle of justice, any moral 
 propriety, in such a demand ? We apprehend, 
 not. Even if his law, so far as it defined our 
 duties towards our fellow-creatures, were per- 
 fectly equitable, could we hold it equitable in 
 him to require the discharge of such duties as a 
 course of obedience to himself? To fulfil our 
 duty, to do what is right, toward our fellow- 
 creatures, is one thing ; to fulfil our duty to 
 a fellow-creature in the discharge of our duty 
 to God, is another. The Scripture assumes 
 this distinction ; it challenges the assent of our 
 reason in enjoining the uniform practice of virtue 
 on the special ground of a moral obligation to 
 the Creator. 1 
 
 1 Here Cudworth's argument, against the notion that 
 " mere will" in God or man can found a moral obligation to 
 
66 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 We have put an hypothesis,, which, it need 
 hardly be observed, is purely imaginary, to 
 illustrate, as is often necessary, the condition in 
 which we actually exist. So far from being 
 enclosed in the awful grasp of an infinite and 
 arbitrary Power, and placed in a state of servile, 
 revolting subjection to Him " in whom we live, 
 and move, and have our being," there is an 
 unspeakable contrast in our real experience with 
 such an imagination of helplessness and terror : — 
 a contrast so palpable and convincing that few, 
 if any, of our sensitive and aspiring race have 
 uttered a suspicion, or whispered a doubt, of 
 the benevolence of God. The sufferings of our 
 species may have limited or perplexed the idea 
 of his power; but they have rarely, if ever, 
 impaired the conviction of his goodness. The 
 
 the obedience of commands, may be not inapplicable. " It 
 was never heard of, that any founded all his authority of com- 
 manding others and others' obligation or duty to obey his 
 commands, in a law of his own making, that men should be 
 
 required, obliged, or bound to obey him The right or 
 
 authority of the commander is founded in natural justice and 
 equity, and an antecedent obligation to obedience in the 
 subjects ; which things are not made by laws, but presupposed 
 
 before all laws to make them valid If this were not 
 
 morally good and just in its own nature, before any positive 
 command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, 
 the bare will of God himself could not beget an obligation 
 upon any to do what he willed and commanded, because 
 the natures of things do not depend upon will, being not 
 things that are arbitrarily made. — Eternal and Immutable 
 Morality, Ch. 1. 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 67 
 
 inquiring mind has sought a solution of the 
 numerous evils of our state in some quality of 
 matter untractable to his purpose ; or imputed 
 them to some malignant being intent upon 
 thwarting his beneficent designs,, and embittering 
 the springs of all human felicity. In our day, 
 at least, the sun in the firmament is not more 
 visible to the bodily eye, than the goodness of 
 the Creator is manifest to the human under- 
 standing in the constitution of the world. The 
 men who are searching into its structure and 
 laws are continually discovering his wisdom and 
 power in the works of beneficence ; continually 
 bringing to light some specific and heretofore 
 unknown " contrivance" for our good ; some- 
 thing made or adjusted to obviate a particular 
 danger, to supply some want, to superadd some 
 pleasure, to improve the well-being of his crea- 
 tures ; — a species of intelligence that, we may 
 be sure, will never come to an end ; a tale that 
 will never be told, while any portion of the uni- 
 verse shall remain unexplored, and till man has 
 run his career in knowledge. 
 
 Presuming, then, the truth of the prevailing 
 apprehension as to the ground or reason for 
 which gratitude itself is judged to be a duty, 
 God's right by creation over us, regarded as a 
 right founded in infinite beneficence, is perfectly 
 answerable to our moral constitution, and directly 
 adapted, we shall find, to bring its principles into 
 
 f 2 
 
68 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 vigorous action and full development. We are 
 so formed as to recognise in the affectionate 
 care and liberality of any individual towards us, 
 the preserver of our infancy, the guide of our 
 youth, the friend and benefactor of our riper 
 years, the man who has succoured us in need, 
 danger, or perplexity, remitted or mitigated the 
 debt we owed him,— who, in a word, has sought, 
 in whatever manner, to promote our happiness, 
 a claim upon our gratitude ; and experience 
 teaches us to estimate the depth and energy of 
 this principle by the promptitude which it 
 awakens, and the efforts which it calls forth, to 
 fulfil the will of its object, and to demonstrate 
 our sense of his benevolence in some appropriate 
 manner in our conduct. Hence the dictate of a 
 reasonable piety, of natural religion, to recognise 
 such a claim on the part of the Creator, and to 
 own it to be paramount and supreme. Such is 
 the conclusion, such the principle of religion, 
 which the Scripture everywhere implies and 
 appeals to, in impressing on the conscientious 
 observance of mankind those commands and 
 prohibitions which it affirms to have been laid 
 upon them by the Almighty : — declaring, as it 
 does, his continual and unsparing goodness 
 towards them, and urging it upon their habitual 
 reflection ; and recalling especial deliverances 
 which he has accomplished for them, or signal 
 and abundant blessings conferred and heaped 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 69 
 
 upon them ; whensoever it addresses their sense 
 of duty, expostulates with their waywardness, 
 exhorts them to repentance, or vindicates the 
 punishment which it denounces against the con- 
 tumacious and persisting transgressor. 1 
 
 1 The view here taken of God's right of creation over us 
 may possibly give rise to one or two objections, which we 
 would add a few words to anticipate. The Scripture, as we 
 have said, assumes, preeminently, the duty of gratitude to 
 God, and, though it were unlike the manner of its authors to 
 engage the attention of their readers on questions of an abstract 
 nature, or remote from ordinary modes of thinking, it would 
 be difficult, we apprehend, to make out any prior ground of 
 religious obligation. The " right of creation," however, is not 
 unfrequently alleged and treated of in such a manner as to 
 convey the idea of its existence, separately considered, or 
 irrespective of the communication of happiness to the creature. 
 If such an idea be really entertained, we would not seem to 
 be forward or concerned to dispute it. Indeed it is rather 
 corroborative of our preceding strain of observation than 
 otherwise. We must confess, indeed, that if such a right 
 exists, we are incorrect in saying that the duty of obedience 
 to God is founded in his goodness towards us ; but there is 
 another inference far more important ; — in connexion with 
 such a right, his claim to gratitude is rendered still more 
 prominent and conspicuous ; for if the act of creation itself 
 founds a claim upon the obedience of the creature, how must 
 such a claim be enhanced if that act be one of benevolence ! — 
 Farther, the claim of the Creator upon the gratitude of man- 
 kind may not appear readily applicable to those amongst them 
 whose experience seems to be, principally, one of suffering and 
 not of enjoyment. What are they to be grateful for, it is 
 possible some may be disposed to ask, who lament their exist- 
 ence and feel its continuance a burden ? We answer — we 
 have presumed the most unhappy of our species to believe that 
 the design of God in creating them was a benevolent one, 
 
70 THE REASONABLENESS OF 
 
 111 concluding, we would intimate the great 
 propriety of opposing this principle of duty to 
 the Creator to a notion, which any may be apt 
 to entertain, of a certain unreasonableness in 
 religion, on the ground that our conceptions of 
 his nature and attributes must be necessarily in- 
 adequate, and even mixed, we know not how far, 
 with such as are actually erroneous. What can 
 we properly know, some are wont to say, how 
 can we rightly conceive of the divine nature ? — 
 as though the alliance between reason and reli- 
 gion were one which, however it may arrest the 
 vulgar, or satisfy a superficial consideration, the 
 philosopher must disdain to acknowledge. Now, 
 it is readily admitted that when we speak of the 
 attributes of the Supreme Being, we do not and 
 cannot realize to our conceptions the import of 
 the words we utter. There is nothing in the 
 mind of man which can enable him fully to com- 
 prehend one of the perfections of God, — how 
 powerless, then, to conceive the effect of their 
 
 whatever be the mode or conditions of its accomplishment : — 
 a truth which they must find it hard to doubt, when, in seasons 
 of reflection, they raise their thoughts to the Author of their 
 being. What, however, is this but to acknowledge his claim 
 upon their gratitude ? But if there be an individual who 
 disbelieves the goodness of the Creator in bringing him into 
 existence, we must of necessity admit that we are pursuing 
 an argument which to such an one, in the present state of his 
 mind, is wholly inapplicable. We have premised a belief of 
 the divine benevolence. 
 
GRATITUDE TO GOD. 71 
 
 union and combination ! It is perceived, in a 
 moment, that there must be an inexpressible 
 disparity, and, consequently, scope for specula- 
 tive error, in our conceptions of the Deity : that 
 there must be " deep things of God " upon which 
 human reason can cast but a feeble light ; its 
 struggling torch rather making more palpable 
 an impenetrable darkness that covers them. 
 But when this sense of weakness and insufficiency 
 in the human understanding, so proper to the 
 spirit of piety, is applied to the disparagement of 
 piety itself, we would urge the sceptic to reflect 
 that religion, as taught in the Scriptures, consists 
 in such a present and habitual persuasion of the 
 goodness of God, as induces a supreme regard 
 to the expressions of his will concerning us ; that 
 it makes no pretensions to a strictly intelligent 
 apprehension of the infinite and perfect Spirit, 
 or to correct deductions from his nature and 
 attributes. Undoubtedly, it is an office of piety 
 to acquire, so far as we are able, such ideas of 
 God as may be most in harmony with his spiri- 
 tuality and perfections ; but the purely specula- 
 tive inaccuracy which an individual may admit 
 into his conceptions relating to the Deity, can 
 form no better objection to his religion, as a " rea- 
 sonable service" to him, than would his ignorance 
 of any one or all of the sciences. We might ask, 
 indeed, whether, supposing we had acquired a 
 greatly more enlarged, or even a perfectly true 
 
72 GRATITUDE TO GOD. 
 
 conception of the Deity in his natural or physical 
 attributes, in the infinity of his knowledge and 
 power, in his self- existence and eternity — we 
 might ask whether such a conception could affect 
 us, in the smallest degree, as the subjects of 
 moral ideas and affections ; and not rather leave 
 us utterly vacant of a sense of duty, or a notion 
 of rectitude, towards God ? But suffice it to say, 
 when a certain class of philosophers shall have 
 refuted the demonstrations of his goodness, and 
 enveloped in darkness this attribute of his cha- 
 racter ; — when they shall have shown the impro- 
 priety, the unreasonableness of gratitude to the 
 Supreme Being, and the inability of mankind to 
 better their nature under its influence ; — then we 
 may venture to deride devotion as the offspring 
 of ignorance, and contemn the principles incul- 
 cated in the Scriptures. Meanwhile, it appears 
 highly conformable to our conception of the 
 Deity, as the object of universal worship and 
 obedience, that he should found a religion pro- 
 motive of all the virtues, and the happiness which 
 flows from them, on a principle which appeals 
 alike and with equal efficacy to the understanding 
 and affections of all mankind : — " Thou shalt 
 love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and 
 with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY— THE APPEAL 
 TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURE. 
 
 Matt. xxii. 37, 38. 
 
 THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL THY HEART, 
 AND WITH ALL THY SOUL, AND WITH ALL THY MIND. THIS 
 IS THE FIRST AND GREAT COMMANDMENT. 
 
 In the last discourse we adverted to an opinion 
 not a little prevalent, that that which constitutes 
 the virtue or moral rectitude of actions, is, their 
 tendency to promote the happiness of the com- 
 munity, and insisted that it supplied no argu- 
 ment for the cultivation of a gratitude to the 
 Creator, similar to that which we approve our- 
 selves in entertaining towards a fellow-creature : 
 for, if that opinion be correct, it must follow 
 that gratitude is morally right inasmuch as, by 
 a reciprocation of kind and generous offices, it 
 materially improves the happiness of mankind : 
 an argument entirely unavailing to ground the 
 inference, or, rather, to verify the general and 
 
74 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 most spontaneous conviction of mankind, that 
 the beneficence of the Creator renders him a 
 proper object of gratitude to his rational crea- 
 tures. Moreover, it was observed, and may be 
 safely repeated, that you cannot, with any 
 propriety, conclude the human race to be under 
 a moral obligation to the Deity, whether in the 
 regulation of their affections towards himself or 
 their fellow-creatures, from the fact that a par- 
 ticular government of the mind, a particular class 
 of actions, is, on the whole, conducive to their 
 happiness. There are innumerable instances in 
 which the Creator has committed to our hands 
 the custody and advancement of our own happi- 
 ness, in which, however, we recognise no prin- 
 ciple of religious duty. In truth, it were a 
 strange conclusion that our species were guilty 
 before God because they had failed, either col- 
 lectively or individually, of that degree of happi- 
 ness which he had capacitated them to attain ; 
 and that they were liable to punishment in a 
 future state, by continuing to neglect the more 
 enduring sources of enjoyment, intellectual and 
 physical, in the present life. 
 
 But it will be found, we apprehend, that the 
 assent immediately and, in the first instance, 
 universally given to the duty of gratitude to 
 God, is strictly agreeable to our reason, or con- 
 firmed by subsequent reflection ; inasmuch as 
 our gratitude to a human benefactor originates 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 75 
 
 in a persuasion of his goodness towards us, and 
 is judged to be "right" as the effect, specifically, 
 of that persuasion, independently of advantages 
 unquestionably accruing to the community from 
 its general exercise and culture ; and that, con- 
 sequently, our approval of gratitude to a human 
 benefactor conveys a most intelligible indication 
 of a similar duty to the Supreme Being, the Author 
 of all good, and is directly confirmatory of that 
 commandment which the Scripture declares to 
 be the first and great commandment in his law. 
 
 Some, it is possible, may here be disposed to 
 ask, What is the meaning of the term "right" 
 as applied to gratitude, or any other virtuous 
 affection, if it do not signify its general utility ? 
 But it should be borne in mind that it is not in 
 the power of words, speaking strictly, to originate 
 ideas, but merely to suggest them ; and that we 
 endeavour to do this by employing the language 
 commonly used for that purpose. When, there- 
 fore, we say that gratitude is judged to be right, 
 in distinction from being generally useful, we 
 can add nothing essential in farther explanation 
 of the former term. We can only exchange it for 
 some synonymous term, or repeat that it does not 
 mean, that is, it is not used to express, the general 
 utility of actions ; and if it be affirmed on the 
 contrary, that this is its meaning, we answer the 
 affirmer, You do not explain the meaning of the 
 term u right,' 1 but you affirm, in effect, that the 
 
76 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 mass of mankind, in using it to signify something 
 in actions distinct from their general utility, 
 have ascribed to them a property which in 
 reality does not exist. And this is actually the 
 opinion of a section of those who maintain the 
 doctrine of "utility" in morals. It is evident 
 from their writings that, in their view, the term 
 "right," as applied to actions, signifies such as 
 are generally useful, and are, for this reason, 
 demanded or encouraged by society, and that 
 the generality of mankind, in using that term as 
 conveying a proper, distinctive meaning, or as 
 otherwise than synonymous with " generally use- 
 ful," believe the reality of a property in actions, 
 that is, in the individuals performing them, which 
 has no existence but in their own imagination : — 
 a moral rectitude which, in truth, is nothing 
 more than a conformity to rules of conduct 
 instituted and upheld through the common 
 sensibility to pain and pleasure, and the efforts 
 of all mankind, as members of society, to escape 
 the former, and to compass as much as may be 
 practicable of the latter. 1 
 
 1 As an example of the manner in which the prevailing 
 apprehension of virtue is often contested, we may quote a 
 passage from the writings of an eminent advocate of the 
 principle of utility in morals, Mr. Bentham. It may be 
 proper, however, in the first place, to extract his definition 
 of this principle. " A man," he observes, " may be said to 
 be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation 
 or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 77 
 
 It is not, however, with these advocates of 
 utility in morals that we propose at present to 
 
 is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he 
 conceives it to have to augment or diminish the happiness 
 of the community ; or, in other words, by its conformity or 
 unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility." He then 
 proceeds to observe — " Of an action that is conformable to 
 the principle of utility, one may always say either that it is 
 one that ought to be done, or, at least, that it is not one that 
 ought not to be done. One may say also that it is right it 
 should be done ; at least, that it is not wrong it should be 
 done ; that it is a right action ; at least, that it is not a wrong 
 action. When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right, 
 and wrong, and others of the same stamp, have a meaning ; 
 when otherwise, they have none." {Morals and Legislation, 
 vol. i. p. 6.) Now, what is this but to assert, as remarked 
 above, that that very large portion of mankind who use the 
 words " ought," and " right," and " wrong," and u others of that 
 stamp," to signify something else in actions than their general 
 utility, assign to actions a property, recognised, as they be- 
 lieve, in moral rules enjoining or forbidding them, which, in 
 the judgment of this author, and other " partizans of the prin- 
 ciple of utility," has no existence in the nature of things ? 
 Instead of saying that the " term ' right' has no meaning but 
 with reference to utility," (p. 12,) we apprehend, he would 
 more clearly have explained his view by such a statement as 
 this : — If human language, in relation to morals, had been 
 founded on a correct apprehension of the nature of things, 
 mankind would have used the term " right," if in that case they 
 had used it at all, as strictly synonymous with " generally 
 useful ;" and we should no more have heard persons say that 
 actions generally useful are right, than that actions generally 
 useful are generally useful. Of course, if the rectitude of 
 actions means, strictly and exclusively, their general utility, to 
 say that actions generally useful are right is to speak mere 
 tautology, to make no affirmation. In common usage, this is 
 not the specific meaning of the term in question ; and all 
 
/S GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 argue ; and we refer to them solely for the pur- 
 pose of separating them from the far larger 
 
 must submit to a limitation in the powers of language. " With 
 regard to the notion or conception of duty," remarks Dr. Reid, 
 "I take it to be too simple to admit of a logical definition. We 
 can define it only by synonymous words or phrases, or by its 
 properties and necessary concomitants, as when we say that it 
 is what we ought to do, what is fair and honest, what is ap- 
 provable, what every man professes to be the rule of his 
 conduct, what all men praise, and what is in itself laudable, 
 though no man should praise it." — Essays, vol. iii. ch. 8. 
 
 Having cited the conclusion of Mr. Bentham on the moral 
 judgments, we shall venture to remark, that he has not 
 treated this particular subject in a manner worthy of his own 
 reputation, and answerable to the claims of philosophy. That 
 mankind are naturally led to form the notion and belief of a 
 rectitude in actions themselves, apart from their utility, other 
 eminent Utilitarians have expressly admitted ; and they have 
 applied their knowledge of the mental operations to account for 
 the rise and establishment of such a notion in the mind. But 
 this author, though he endeavours to disprove the reality of 
 such a rectitude, by a series of arguments and interrogations 
 which he evidently intended should exhaust the question, has 
 taken no notice, that we observe, of a natural and adhesive 
 notion of its existence. He casts no light on this singular 
 spontaneous generation of error ; but deals with it as though 
 it were one of the most ordinary forms of popular ignorance 
 and misapprehension ; or, rather, as though he were remon- 
 strating with a capricious and dictatorial spirit in morals ; or 
 seeking to put down an obstinate prejudice in some, and a 
 stupid fanaticism in others. This remarkable omission in so 
 acute and studious a thinker is, indeed, partly explained, 
 though not excused, in the following observation of Sir J. 
 Mackintosh with reference to this author, and the ethical 
 opinions maintained in his writings : — " Injury on this, 
 as on other occasions, has been suffered by ethics from its 
 
 ose affinity to jurisprudence. The true and eminent merit 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 79 
 
 number who ostensibly subscribe to that prin- 
 ciple, but who, as was remarked in the last 
 
 of Mr- Bentham is that of a reformer of jurisprudence. He 
 is only a moralist with a view of being a jurist. . . . Both he 
 and his followers have treated ethics too juridically." (p. 306.) 
 Whether Mr. Bentham be entitled to this high praise as a 
 reformer of jurisprudence, is a question with which we have 
 here no concern ; but that his opinions on the principles of 
 morals were very much subservient to his views on that 
 subject, must be evident to most readers of his writings. We 
 must add however, it is no less evident that he was urged, in 
 his opposition to the notion of " rectitude" in question, by his 
 aversion to the religion, as well as the jurisprudence, with 
 which it was connected. But for this association, he could 
 hardly have made so much allusion to " monks" and " reli- 
 gionists," in disputing a notion which, if erroneous, had 
 misled most who had preceded him in the same path of in- 
 quiry, in ancient as well as in modern times ; escaping 
 detection from minds as acute and independent as his 
 own. The Ethics of Aristotle evince a considerable observa- 
 tion of the utility of virtuous actions ; but he was manifestly 
 far from the discovery that this was the quality, and this only, 
 that made them virtuous. It is true, the notion Mr. Bentham 
 opposed enters into a close alliance with the principles 
 of religion ; and is more efficacious in promoting the belief 
 of Christianity than even the details of its history, or the 
 genuineness of its documents ; but we need hardly say, it was 
 not the growth of Christian opinions. It filled the mind of 
 Plato, as well as of Cudworth and Hutcheson : and if it fos- 
 tered the asceticism of the middle ages, it had previously pro- 
 duced the enthusiasm of the Stoics. Moreover, this is the very 
 notion of moral rectitude which still continues to be current in 
 the world, and is no more rejected in the schools of philosophy 
 than it is doubted by the multitude of mankind. Whether, 
 then, it was the object of Mr. Bentham to apply his ethics to 
 the discredit of a particular religion or jurisprudence, it was a 
 poor method of refuting a notion such as this, to endeavour to 
 
80 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 discourse, in judging an action to be right because 
 conducive to the common welfare, presume the 
 agent to be actuated by a desire of that happi- 
 ness to the community which he is instrumental 
 to promote. These, in consistency, would not 
 allow the term " right" to convey no meaning but 
 with reference to the general utility of actions, 
 for they apply it to the disposition of bene- 
 volence, as it contemplates the welfare of the 
 
 demonstrate its folly and absurdity : his business was to resolve 
 it into its elements, and account for its existence. From the 
 men whose scope it is to correct or demolish notions of this 
 description, we look for a severe induction of facts, and an 
 unusual insight into the operations of our mind : we expect 
 them to adhere to the method of Bacon, as well as to emulate 
 the subtilty of Berkeley. They may deal with our errors as 
 they will, be as hard and sarcastic as they please ; only let 
 them give us to see that they are errors, by the light which 
 they pour upon the constitution of our nature. It is common 
 to place the name of Mill by the side of Bentham ; and 
 Sir J. Mackintosh appears to class them together. To our 
 judgment, in the treatment of this subject there is no equality, 
 if comparison, between them. Mr. Mill describes the notion 
 of " praiseworthiness " in actions themselves as a " remarkable 
 phenomenon of our nature" (which, upon the presumption 
 that no praiseworthiness exists, it unquestionably is), and he 
 assigns a particular process in the operations of the mind to 
 account for its formation ; and though we may consider his 
 explanation to be materially defective, he aids our inquiry, 
 and not a little, into the whole merits of the question. On 
 the other hand, as Mr. Bentham does not apprize us of this 
 " remarkable phenomenon of our nature," but leaves us, as 
 much as ever, subject to its delusive influence, he seems to be 
 taxing us with an error which it is not in our power to avoid — 
 which he offers us no means of escaping. 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 81 
 
 whole community ; whereas actions promotive 
 of the common good, and therefore generalized 
 as right or virtuous, may be performed in the 
 absence of that disposition, and under the influ- 
 ence of motives, which these advocates of the 
 principle of expediency would not confound with 
 the spirit of benevolence. 1 When, for example, 
 they contemplate an individual as a philanthro- 
 pist, and assign him a pre-eminence in virtue, 
 they are not only apprized of the fact, that he 
 expends his property, or his time and faculties, 
 in a manner calculated to promote the welfare 
 of his fellow-creatures, but they believe him to 
 be actuated by a predominating desire of allaying 
 their sufferings, and improving their condition ; 
 and, in the strength of this master-principle, to 
 hold in subjection those desires and propensities 
 of our nature which they distinguish as " selfish," 
 deriving a higher satisfaction from his own 
 approval of this principle of his conduct, than 
 the utmost gratification of such desires could 
 afford him. And when, again, these advocates 
 of expediency, as the test of virtue, adjudge a 
 high commendation to an individual who, with 
 the utmost difficulty, in severe toil and privation, 
 has fulfilled a contract which had been wholly 
 
 If, as Mr.Bentham says, " the term ' right' has no meaning 
 but with reference to utility," it cannot have a meaning with 
 reference to benevolence, unless when benevolence and utility 
 are predicated of a moral agent, they are only different words 
 for the same thing. 
 
 G 
 
82 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 forgotten by the only party who could have 
 claimed its fulfilment, or which might have been 
 easily evaded, without damage to his reputation, 
 they refer his conduct to a similar prevailing 
 regard to the common security and welfare, 
 which, they presume, he has considered, and is 
 well persuaded, must be essentially dependent 
 on a general unflinching adherence to the re- 
 ceived rules of morality. Now, it is to those 
 who support the principle of utility in morals 
 with this most important qualification, — to those 
 who demand, in a morally approvable or praise- 
 worthy action, the exercise of a comprehensive 
 benevolence, that we would offer a few obser- 
 vations on the virtue of gratitude, with a special 
 exclusive reference to the assumption of the 
 Scripture under consideration — that our approv- 
 ing judgment of gratitude to a fellow-creature is 
 so founded, or caused, as to evince the rea- 
 sonableness of acknowledging a moral obligation 
 to the Supreme Being ; and, of course, to furnish 
 proof of its existence. 
 
 We submit, then, that there is no proper 
 foundation in our moral constitution — by which 
 we mean, in the results of our own experience 
 and consciousness as moral agents — for resolving 
 the rectitude or duty of gratitude into that of 
 a general benevolence. For, assuredly, if there 
 be any ground for concluding a man to be vir- 
 tuous on account of his benevolence, — whether 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 83 
 
 its objects be few or many, — considered as an 
 affection of the mind, there is equal and pre- 
 cisely the same ground for concluding a man to 
 be virtuous on account of his gratitude, as an 
 affection of the mind. It is an arbitrary dealing 
 with our moral judgments, as they form and 
 establish themselves in the understanding, to 
 merge our approbation of gratitude into that of 
 benevolence. Gratitude springing, as it does, 
 from a sense of the goodness of a fellow-crea- 
 ture, and expressing itself in conduct judged to 
 be agreeable to his will, entitles the subject of 
 it to a moral approbation no less distinctly and 
 independently than benevolence, which itself is 
 enkindled by the want and suffering of another, 
 and displays its activity in exertions to relieve 
 them. It is certain that mankind approve them- 
 selves in the exercise of gratitude as early, at 
 least, as in acts of benevolence, and very much 
 earlier than in the exercise of that benevolence 
 which consults for the happiness of the whole 
 community. The duty of obedience to parents 
 is manifestly founded on their claim to the grati- 
 tude of their children, and it is as a parent, 
 especially, that the Almighty is represented in 
 the Scriptures as requiring oar observance of his 
 precepts ; and though he is there exhibited as a 
 ruler also, it is as one whose title to obedience 
 is equally founded on his beneficence ; who con- 
 templates the well-being of his subjects, and 
 
 g 2 
 
84 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 sways a sceptre of righteousness and mercy. It 
 is almost too obvious for remark, that it is strictly 
 under a lively persuasion of the kindness and 
 affection of his parent towards him, that a child 
 judges his conduct to be right, and is at peace 
 and harmony with himself, in a course of true 
 filial obedience. But also in riper years, and to 
 the end of life, it can admit of no question, if 
 we reflect on the experience of our own minds, 
 that we recognise a claim upon our gratitude in 
 the spirit of kindness and generosity displayed 
 towards ourselves, independently of any con- 
 sideration or inquiry, as to what would be the 
 condition of society if that affection were extir- 
 pated, or its impulses habitually suppressed. 
 
 It is true, we readily discover that this, as well 
 as every other virtue, is an important element of 
 the common happiness, and accordingly incum- 
 bent upon us in relation to the community of 
 which we are members. But is it reasonable, 
 we ask, that this superadded obligation to grati- 
 tude should be allowed to displace and set aside 
 an antecedent sense of duty ; with the question, 
 moreover, before us, whether our moral consti- 
 tution supplies any proof or confirmation of 
 religious duties ? It was in virtue of that con- 
 stitution, that we approved ourselves in the exer- 
 cise of gratitude at as early a period as we had 
 any consciousness of self-approbation whatso- 
 ever ; and it was in virtue of the same constitu- 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 85 
 
 tion, that we afterwards approved ourselves in 
 the exercise of benevolence. Can any cogent 
 reason be assigned why the former should cease 
 to be regarded as intrinsically virtuous, or a duty 
 in itself and independently, as before ? We are 
 not, it must be remembered, contending with 
 those who estimate benevolence merely as a 
 source of advantage to the community, and con- 
 sider it, under this description and no other, to be 
 fitly an object of universal regard and encourage- 
 ment ; but with those who approve and praise it 
 for itself ; who contemplate it as an attribute of 
 moral excellence in the mind which it purities 
 and adorns. Clearly, then, it was not their ob- 
 servation of human conduct as advantageous to 
 the community, which elicited their high appro- 
 bation of benevolence, but their reflection on the 
 nature of a particular disposition which bears this 
 name ; not their acquaintance with the general 
 tendency of actions, but their knowledge of the 
 operations of the human mind. To perceive 
 a certain disposition to be useful to society, by 
 inciting individuals to actions which are so, is 
 one thing; to perceive that disposition to be 
 right, or morally approvable, in an individual, 
 is another ; the moralists whom we are now 
 addressing perceive the disposition of benevo- 
 lence to be both. We repeat, therefore, that to 
 hold gratitude to be entitled to a moral appro- 
 bation purely as a modification of benevolence, 
 
86 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 is an arbitrary dealing with our moral judgments. 
 It is not to interpret them simply and strictly 
 by their own language, so to speak ; but it is to 
 place such a construction upon them as may 
 accord with our own pre- conception of their 
 meaning : in other words, it is not to explain 
 our constitution as moral agents by our own 
 experience of its principles ; but it is to assume 
 a theory upon ethics, and to explain our moral 
 experience accordingly ; — an error in our philo- 
 sophy of no little moment, when the question 
 we propose to determine is, What is the teaching 
 or purport of our moral constitution as the work 
 of God ? — is it adapted to corroborate or dis- 
 prove the duties of religion as inculcated in the 
 Scriptures ? 
 
 It may be asked, indeed, Does not the Deity 
 design the happiness of his creatures ? and do 
 we not directly promote their happiness by 
 teaching them to test their conduct by a prin- 
 ciple of general benevolence ? That the Creator 
 designs the happiness of his creatures we have 
 abundant proof; the world we have presumed 
 to be sufficiently convinced on that head. The 
 question on which it seems possible to doubt — 
 the question, at least, which suggests any matter 
 of practical concernment with reference to the 
 Deity, is this : What is the nature, or what 
 are the sources, of that happiness which he has 
 capacitated mankind to attain ? Does the happi- 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 87 
 
 ness which God designs for us, and is willing to 
 bestow, include in its nature the exercise of any 
 affections towards himself which we judge to be 
 right towards our fellow-creatures ? You answer 
 the question by resolving all rectitude of heart 
 and conduct, in man to man, into the exercise of 
 benevolence. But we cannot extend our bene- 
 volence to God ; our gratitude we can ; this 
 affection we can fix upon him to the utmost, 
 and for ever. By comprehending all rectitude 
 towards our fellow - creatures in benevolence, 
 you throw no light on our capacity for rectitude 
 towards God, or, rather, involve it in obscurity ; 
 as though in every instance that we own an 
 obligation to be laid upon us by acts of kind- 
 ness and liberality, yield our hearts to an emo- 
 tion of gratitude, or expect some expression of it 
 from another, we were not clearly instructed in 
 the elements of our duty to the Creator, and 
 were supplied with no proof of the reasonableness 
 of the first and great commandment attributed 
 to him in the Scripture. 
 
 We have insisted that no virtuous affection 
 obtains our moral approbation, in its simple, 
 elementary form, at an earlier period of life than 
 gratitude : it might be added, that there is no 
 upright affection of which we may affirm, with 
 greater certainty, that it commands the moral 
 approbation of all mankind. — But it would not 
 consist with our general object in these dis- 
 
88 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 courses to dwell longer on this particular topic ; 
 nor would we forget that, in maintaining a pri- 
 mary intrinsic obligation to gratitude, in opposi- 
 tion to the opinion that all human virtues are 
 but diversified forms of benevolence, we are dis- 
 puting a theory, relating to morals, adopted by 
 many Christians themselves, rather than vindi- 
 cating the assumptions of Christianity against 
 its opponents. Indeed, this theory is far from 
 necessarily inferring, on the part of its advocates, 
 an insensibility to the duties of religion : it has, 
 on the contrary, been maintained by certain theo- 
 logians, who supposed that, by fixing the moral 
 contemplation of Christians on the perfect bene- 
 volence of God, exclusively of any personal 
 interest in its manifestations, or of any benefits 
 which they had received or could expect at his 
 hands, they should purify and exalt the spirit 
 of religion ; and, in this belief, they have strained 
 their conceptions so far as even to assert, that 
 the faithful Christian would continue to love 
 God in a state of final exclusion from his favour, 
 and absolute hopelessness of his mercy. At 
 the same time, nothing, we may be sure, can be 
 gained to the cause of religion, to the spirit of 
 devotion or to practical piety, by a theory of 
 moral rectitude which fails to produce the link 
 of connexion between religion and morality, be- 
 tween our duty to God and our duty to man, 
 which is at once brought into view, and pressed 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 89 
 
 upon the conscience by our moral approbation 
 of gratitude, as that approbation is commonly 
 explained, or supposed to be founded : a theory, 
 therefore, which exhibits no proof that the exer- 
 cise of benevolence, or the practice of virtue in 
 general, is required by the Creator as " a reason- 
 able service" to himself. We shall now con- 
 sider a more general and strictly sceptical 
 objection to the reasonableness of Christianity, 
 regarded as an appeal from the Creator to the 
 gratitude of mankind. 
 
 It was intimated in the last discourse, with 
 reference to those who dispute the divine autho- 
 rity of the Scriptures, that they would hardly 
 deny, and appear for the most part to admit, 
 the claim of the Deity to the gratitude of his in- 
 telligent creatures ; but that they look upon the 
 Scriptures as supplying no valid or pertinent 
 ground on which such a claim could be esta- 
 blished ; and, on the contrary, as ascribing to 
 the Creator a character and procedure towards 
 our species, repugnant to those ideas of his good- 
 ness which flow into the mind from the study 
 and contemplation of his works. In denying 
 the goodness of God as he appears in the Scrip- 
 tures, it is evident, they virtually affirm, in some 
 form of statement or other, that they do not 
 recognise the benevolent Creator of the world 
 in the record and declarations concerning him 
 in those writings. 
 
90 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 It is impossible,, in these limits, to offer a 
 particular reply to this objection, or to attempt 
 a formal vindication of the credibility of the 
 Christian religion, as an appeal from the Creator 
 to the gratitude of mankind. But it is essential 
 to observe, that we are wholly unprepared for a 
 reasonable estimation of Christianity in this point 
 of view, until we have made the acknowledged 
 duty of gratitude to God, itself, the subject of 
 especial consideration ; until we have weighed 
 it in the fulness of its moral import, and traced 
 it to its proper consequences. It is observable, 
 however, that persons who reject Christianity, 
 or lean to scepticism on the question of its truth, 
 are but little disposed to this exercise of their 
 reason. They appear, for the most part, to be 
 actually unconcerned to comprehend the measure 
 of their duty to the Creator, and to ascertain, by 
 the light of nature, the path of rectitude before 
 him. In conceiving and entertaining objections 
 to Christianity, they appear to contract an 
 indifference to religion, as a practical principle, 
 altogether ; contenting themselves with merely 
 speculative views of the beneficence of the 
 Supreme Being, or verbal expressions of thank- 
 fulness towards him. Hence, as we have said, 
 they are proportionably disqualified for a just 
 appreciation of Christianity as an institution of 
 divine benevolence ; and, consequently, as a 
 credible exposition of the moral government 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 91 
 
 of God. To make this evident, let us anticipate, 
 in a measure, the second of the two cardinal 
 propositions which it was principally proposed 
 to establish ; one, it would seem, that requires 
 rather to be weighed than proved ; namely, that 
 the duty of gratitude to God binds us to the 
 practice of virtue generally, as an exemplification 
 of obedience to himself. Let us suppose this 
 proposition to be granted. It follows, — and the 
 inference is not only acknowledged in the reli- 
 gious confession of mankind in general, but must 
 be assented to by all who attach any meaning to 
 the proposition just stated, — that we have failed 
 of the obedience due to him ; that we have 
 committed innumerable offences, either wilfully 
 or through inadvertence, against him ; that 
 we stand convicted of ingratitude to the Author 
 of all the good which we have received or can 
 hope for ; — the essence and height of injustice, 
 as the accusing conscience has ever testified 
 to the awakened and fearful transgressor. We 
 ask, then, with what reason can the impugners of 
 Christianity appeal to the goodness displayed 
 in the structure of the universe, with a view 
 to expose the inconsistency of this religion with 
 the benevolence of the Creator? For if we are 
 bound to obey God in virtue of his goodness, 
 is it not certain that as we accumulate the proofs, 
 and enlarge our conceptions, of that attribute of 
 his nature, we do but collect the evidence of our 
 
92 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 guilt, — we do but aggravate the charge of ingra- 
 titude against ourselves, in revolting from his 
 benignant sceptre, departing from the command- 
 ment which, we perceive, he has laid upon us, 
 and allowing the heart to grow estranged from 
 the Author of all good, the rightful Proprietor of 
 our affections, and, therefore, of all our faculties 
 and powers ? There is, doubtless, a consistency 
 in this objection to the Scripture, when alleged 
 by persons who deny the fact of their responsibi- 
 lity to the Creator, and consequently disclaim 
 the imputation of ingratitude towards him, or of 
 any demerit whatsoever in his view ; resisting 
 the reproaches of their conscience, by referring 
 their conduct in general to the necessary, inevi- 
 table operation of principles inherent in their 
 nature. This, however, is a particular ground 
 of opposition to the Christian religion, or rather 
 to the reasonableness of religious duties alto- 
 gether, on which it was not our intention to 
 enter ; though, in alluding to it, we shall take 
 occasion to remark, that the man who disowns 
 the guilt of ingratitude against God, on the plea 
 of a necessity to which he is subject in his voli- 
 tions, must, to be consistent, deny the justice of 
 a similar imputation when brought by one hu- 
 man being against another. He must deny the 
 justice of that reproach and abhorrence which 
 stigmatize and punish the ingratitude of man to 
 man : he must deny the justice of all such feelings, 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 93 
 
 whatever be the acts that provoke them. That 
 class of persons who are labouring to disprove 
 the reality, and, if possible, to abolish the idea, of 
 accountableness to the Creator, are perfectly 
 consistent in affirming the unreasonableness of 
 blaming and punishing a fellow-creature, for the 
 perpetration of any crime, the commission of any 
 deed, whatsoever ; at least, under any other 
 impression than that with which you would 
 endeavour to secure yourself from the attack of 
 brute natures, or to subdue and train them 
 to your will and purpose. 1 
 
 1 It should be remembered, however, that many, indeed 
 most, who maintain the doctrine of a moral necessity, so called, 
 are not on this account the less convinced of their accountable- 
 ness to the Deity. Now these opinions are often judged to be 
 incongruous ; and that they have a considerable appearance of 
 being so is allowed by all. They who hold them both then, — 
 and multitudes do hold and have held them both, — make it 
 evident, at least, that their belief of a merit and demerit at- 
 taching to us as moral agents, and rendering us fit objects of 
 reward and punishment, is, in their minds, too deeply fixed to 
 be easily removed or unsettled. Indeed, unless those convic- 
 tions of personal guilt and innocence to which mankind are 
 subject, can be proved to be fallacious from the very mode in 
 which they enter and prevail upon the mind ; unless they can 
 be distinctly classed with illusions of the human understanding 
 known to be such ; it must be awfully unsafe to an individual 
 to disregard them in his relation to the Deity, on the pre- 
 sumption that he is ruled by a necessity in his doings, or has 
 no freedom in his volitions ; — a presumption, moreover, which, 
 most likely, is wholly powerless and without effect on his con- 
 duct in general ; — a presumption, too, grounded on reasoning 
 which he not only knows to be as unsatisfactory to some as it 
 appears to be pertinent and conclusive to others, but which 
 
94 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 But we are here presuming the opponent of 
 Christianity to disapprove and condemn ingrati- 
 tude in his conduct towards God, as he dis- 
 approves and condemns it in his conduct towards 
 his fellow-creatures ; and we ask again, with 
 what reason can he allege the goodness of the 
 Creator, the proofs and expressions of it in all 
 his works, as an objection to the credibility 
 of the Scriptures ? For what are these proofs 
 of the Creator's goodness, but so many grounds 
 of accusation against us as transgressors of his 
 laws ; so many reasons of compunction and 
 dread of retribution ; compelling us in truth and 
 sincerity to acknowledge that, were he to with- 
 hold his goodness for the future, and exclude 
 us from his favour and protection, we could not 
 accuse him of injustice ? This is not, we are 
 
 (and this is a far more important consideration) it is probable 
 he may not himself clearly perceive to be sufficient to establish 
 the presumption in question ; in which case he has manifestly 
 nothing to rely upon, as a reason and vindication for adopting 
 it, but his will to get rid of an obligation that is pressing upon 
 him ; and that obligation — to Whom ? And, be it yet added, 
 while he is pleading a law or laws of necessity, with a view to 
 justify his conduct, or rather to expose the unreasonableness 
 of calling upon him to justify it, and (o raise surprise that any 
 such notion as that of an excuse or justification for human 
 actions (at least before God) ever entered the human mind ; — 
 while, we say, he is thus pleading a law of necessity, the greater 
 number of those who have traced that law most closely, and 
 believe it most firmly, would be shocked to allege it in excuse 
 for a single act that affects them with compunction, and which 
 they jndge to be wrong. 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 95 
 
 aware, the conclusion to which the illustrations 
 of divine beneficence, that we are busied in 
 collecting, most commonly or readily conducts us : 
 it is not in general our mood to give a prompt 
 and close attention to any title which another, 
 be he God or man, may prefer to our regard and 
 service, still less to any reasons for rebuke 
 and accusation with which he may confront 
 us. It is a conclusion, notwithstanding, which 
 the Scripture most justly presses upon our 
 reflections ; preparing us, as it does, for a far 
 better judgment on its pretensions to reveal the 
 character and agency of the Deity, than can 
 be gathered by regarding the works of his power, 
 or the ordinations of his providence, as though 
 we were only the recipients of pleasure and pain 
 at his hands ; or as though our debt of gratitude 
 to him were entirely discharged by descanting 
 on the general and wondrous adaptation of all 
 things to the promotion of our happiness, and 
 by the experience of feelings, be they what they 
 may, which find no place among our principles 
 of action, and take no effect in the reformation 
 and improvement of our moral character. 
 
 We are far from maintaining that because the 
 whole creation, while it demonstrates the good- 
 ness of its Author, bears testimony to the 
 disobedience of mankind, we can discern no 
 reasonable ground for the hope of his forgive- 
 ness, and, consequently, no encouragement to the 
 
96 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 amendment of our conduct from the constitution 
 of our own nature, or irrespectively of a divine 
 revelation. But, however this be, the reflection 
 of a moment would convince us, that there can 
 be no example of his benevolence so signal and 
 decisive in its character, as a readiness to extend 
 his mercy towards us and cancel our offences. 
 Regarding ourselves as actually guilty before 
 him, and to such an extent as we are wont to 
 acknowledge — in other words, liable, as we are, 
 to remorse and the dread of punishment, in our 
 subjection to a Being whose claims upon us we 
 own to be absolute, and to whose power we can 
 conceive no limits, we must, of necessity, con- 
 clude that, of all the manifestations of his good- 
 ness, that which is at once the highest proof of it, 
 in itself considered, and most essential to our 
 well-being, inexpressibly and above all com- 
 parison, is, that he should, in whatever manner, 
 forego his accusation against us ; and instead of 
 leaving us to the apparently natural consequences 
 of our doings, so deal with our iniquities as that 
 the sense of our own unworthiness should only 
 tend to enhance our conceptions of his goodness ; 
 should kindle anew every devout affection, and 
 swell the song of adoration and joy. Whether 
 this consideration, that a disposition to forgive 
 the transgressor is paramount in our idea of 
 divine goodness, (as it must be if we sustain a 
 moral relation to the Deity,) be unfavourable to 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 97 
 
 the credibility of the Christian religion, we shall 
 leave the objector to determine. 
 
 Christianity, it is true, delivers an account of 
 the fallen, corrupt condition of human nature, 
 which it may try and exceed our faculties to re- 
 concile with the divine benevolence ; casting some 
 cloud upon the lustre of that goodness which it 
 attributes to the Almighty in the forgiveness of our 
 sins. But we are not warranted, on this account, 
 to rest in superficial objections to the Christian 
 religion : we are bound to consider its conformity 
 to admitted facts and unquestionable inferences ; 
 — a conformity which infers an imperative obli- 
 gation to inquire into its farther and special im- 
 port, and the evidences in general of its divine 
 original. 
 
 We are unwilling, however, to dismiss this 
 imputation on the Christian religion as an appeal 
 to the gratitude of mankind, without suggesting 
 the great propriety of applying to the agency of 
 God, as set forth in the Scriptures and relating 
 to our spiritual condition, the same method of 
 reasoning as is commonly assented to in refer- 
 ence to the constitution of our physical frame, 
 and the ordinary procedure of Divine Providence. 
 It merits observation that, notwithstanding all 
 who acknowledge a responsibility to the Deity 
 confess, at the same time, their actual demerit 
 before him, there is scarcely an argument 
 alleged to obviate apparent objections to his 
 
 ii 
 
98 , GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 goodness in the general constitution of our 
 nature, that would not apply to our spiritual 
 condition as described in the Scriptures ; that is, 
 so far as the physical and the moral world would 
 admit of such a parallel or comparison. There 
 is, indeed, one essential consideration relating to 
 the former, which would be wholly irrelevant to 
 the latter. Innumerable are the ills which beset 
 our natural life ; but we commonly admit and 
 maintain that the constitution of the world, as a 
 whole, bespeaks the benevolence of its Author ; 
 we insist on a clear preponderance of happiness 
 in the collective experience of mankind. This 
 is reasoning which we cannot apply to that 
 description which the Scripture has given us of 
 our condition as moral agents ; not because 
 it may be alleged that, if we estimate the human 
 character on Christian principles, piety and virtue 
 are not so prevalent among mankind as their 
 opposites, and, consequently, if Christianity be 
 true, there is less ground for hope than fear 
 in the issues of futurity ; not on this account — 
 though indeed the lofty and triumphant language 
 in which the Scripture predicts the future exten- 
 sion of the Messiah's kingdom, and the countless 
 myriads of his obedient subjects, might convey 
 a very different impression of the ultimate efficacy 
 of the Gospel ; but because in demanding an 
 actual prevalency of Christian character and well 
 founded hopes of immortality, as an evidence of 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 99 
 
 the divine benevolence, we should merge the 
 essential distinction between natural and moral 
 evil ; we should overlook the nature of a respon- 
 sible agent, and the conditions of a probationary 
 state, and instead of regarding the Deity as the 
 mercifully righteous Judge of the world, contem- 
 plate him as the absolute disposer of our destiny. 
 Passing, therefore, for an adequate reason, one 
 general topic of argument in maintaining the 
 goodness of God in the creation, we may find 
 others more applicable to the credibility of the 
 Scriptures, in the light of an appeal to our grati- 
 tude as his accountable creatures. For example, 
 our physical frame is subject to numerous painful 
 and debilitating maladies ; but, in arguing the 
 benevolence of the Creator, it is commonly 
 urged that all the contrivances in the human 
 frame are directed to a beneficent purpose ; that 
 " though evil exists, it is never the object of the 
 contrivance." Now, should we not apply this 
 equitable principle in deducing the character of 
 the Creator from the works of nature, to the 
 moral condition of mankind as described in the 
 Scriptures, with a view to judge rightly of the 
 Christian religion? This system, it is true, exhibits 
 our moral constitution as the seat of infirmity 
 and disease, and requiring peculiar remedies and 
 habitual care to preserve it in health and vigour — 
 in remarkable consistency, be it never forgotten, 
 with the results of human experience, — but, 
 
 ii 2 
 
100 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 at the same time, it declares that the end for 
 which God originally created mankind, and 
 which he still contemplates, is, that they may be 
 conducted by the path of rectitude to a complete 
 and enduring felicity. If, then, to reconcile the 
 existence of physical evil with the goodness 
 of God, we are satisfied with the reflection that 
 the diseases of the body are incidental to its 
 structure, and not the purpose for which it was 
 created, would it be just and consistent to 
 impute distemper and infirmity in our moral 
 functions to a defect in his benevolence ? — as 
 if moral evil and its consequences had been an 
 object in our creation — as if our passions had 
 been implanted in us for the purpose of causing 
 us to do wrong, and transgress the command- 
 ment given to us? Could we make this inference 
 from the tendency and manifest office of our 
 reason to restrain and control our passions; 
 from the dictates and remonstrances of con- 
 science; the compunction of guilt; the inward 
 peace and open confidence of virtue ? Is Chris- 
 tianity, then, to be judged unworthy of credence, 
 because it so represents the actual condition 
 of human nature — because it imputes corruption 
 and degeneracy to our moral nature ? As to the 
 particular history of our species, with which the 
 corruption of our moral nature stands connected 
 in the Scriptures, we are not in a condition to 
 form a right judgment of its credibility, till the 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 101 
 
 account of human redemption by Jesus Christ, 
 which is also delivered in the Scriptures, has been 
 made a subject of regard and contemplation, and 
 likewise the external evidence of the truth of 
 Christianity has been sifted and examined ; when 
 we may become convinced of the reality of facts 
 asserted in the Scriptures, which, however, we 
 may not be able to explain, in such a manner as 
 to harmonize with the separate and independent 
 deductions of our reason. What we are here sub- 
 mitting is, that inasmuch as a tendency to evil, 
 or a seed of disorder and suffering inherent in 
 our physical frame, is regarded as consistent with 
 the goodness of the Creator, notwithstanding the 
 presumption — in itself surely not unreasonable — 
 that the Power which produced the universe 
 could have shut out pain and anguish from the 
 experience of our natural life, it cannot be an 
 equitable conclusion, that an innate tendency to 
 evil in our constitution as moral agents, must be 
 incompatible with a benevolence of design on 
 the part of the Creator. In other words, there 
 is the same reason to qualify our idea of the 
 unlimited power of God, or to subordinate it to 
 the belief of his goodness, in reference to the 
 moral, as to the physical, constitution of his 
 creatures. 1 
 
 1 We have quoted an equitable position, that it is the main 
 purpose of a work which bespeaks the disposition of its author, 
 and we have regarded it in its usual application to the consti- 
 
102 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 Again, it is the effect of Christianity to beget 
 a concern and solicitude as to our condition in 
 a future state ; but — besides the reflection which 
 must here suggest itself, that a dread of retribu- 
 tion hereafter has at all times disquieted the 
 mind of man, and is the natural concomitant of 
 guilt and all iniquity — that concern is declaredly 
 intended for our enduring welfare, and manifestly 
 calculated to promote it. Let it be considered, 
 that as bodily pain is considerably palliated to 
 our experience, and even commended to our 
 judgment, as a means of self-preservation, so the 
 idea and apprehension of future suffering associ- 
 ated with the belief of Christianity should be 
 estimated on a similar principle. Surely, if it be 
 a correct philosophy to regard as good those 
 painful sensations of the body which are subser- 
 
 tution of our nature. For our part, however, if it be con- 
 cluded that mankind are subject to the authority of God, as 
 moral agents, then, considering that the goodness of God is 
 abundantly proved by the general tendency of his works to 
 the production of happiness, we hold it to be a deduction of 
 reason — with the human character before us, as known by ex- 
 perience irrespective of the declarations of Scripture — that a 
 mixture of suffering is actually a proof of the favourable pur- 
 pose of God towards us as accountable beings. But, unques- 
 tionably, it would be instrumental to the accomplishment of 
 such a design as the Christian religion repeatedly ascribes to 
 him ; namely, the correction of our disordered passions, our 
 advancement in moral excellence, and the ultimate perfection 
 of our enduring nature. — Sermons by the Author, (Serm.VIII. 
 Suffering, a Proof of Divine Goodness. 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 103 
 
 vient to its preservation,, — for instance, the smart 
 and agony of fire which causes us to recoil from 
 an element destructive of its organization and 
 vitality, — it cannot be reasonable to regard as evil 
 that feeling of insecurity and danger which the 
 Scripture aims to awaken, for the very purpose 
 of deterring us from vice and irreligion, and 
 fixing our resolution in the fulfilment of our 
 duties ; if the nature of sin be such as is described 
 in the Scripture, and is not a little evident to our 
 own reason ; if it be inimical to our wellbeing 
 here and hereafter, and destructive of our best 
 capacities and powers ; if it mar the structure, 
 and consume the happiness, of the immortal 
 mind. 1 
 
 And once more — with whatever clearness and 
 profusion we gather the proofs of divine goodness 
 from the works of nature, yet if our inquiries 
 stop at the visible universe, or are limited to the 
 experience of the present life, we may forego a 
 
 1 It can hardly be denied, however, that persons inclined to 
 scepticism often express themselves on this subject, as if the 
 announcement and representations of future punishment in the 
 Scripture were not denunciatory and preventive, not intended 
 to preserve us from suffering in a future state, and obviously 
 fitted to do so ; but strictly predictive descriptions of misery to 
 be personally and of necessity, realized. And they thus deal 
 with the subject without having previously argued, or apprized 
 us of their belief, that there is and can be no punishment in 
 another state of being ; none to be averted ; none which a 
 rational person need concern himself to escape. 
 
104 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 manifestation of the regard and beneficence of 
 the Creator, in comparison with which the 
 brightest and most extended demonstration of 
 his bounty from the frame of external nature, 
 and the manifold blessings of this life, may, after 
 all, be of small account, and actually insignificant; 
 be scarcely more than a dim reflection — a dimi- 
 nutive shadow — the mimic rainbow that glistens 
 in the spray of tumultuous waters, when compared 
 to the glorious arch that spans the sky. Philo- 
 sophers, and even divines, have often seemed to 
 regard the life "that now is" as the index and mea- 
 sure of God's munificence. But in what manner 
 is it spoken of in the Scripture, when assuming 
 to lay open the treasures of divine goodness ? 
 As " a vapour that appeareth for a little time, 
 and then vanisheth away." As such, indeed, we 
 ourselves describe it in seasons of reflection. 
 And why does it so often, if not in general, appear 
 to be otherwise, attracting and absorbing our 
 minds as though it were substantial and en- 
 during? Partly, it may be, from an illusion 
 of the imagination, in which we seem, in a man- 
 ner, to extend our being to the life of the human 
 race itself throughout its successive generations, 
 rather than to fix our attention upon our own 
 individual existence. The brevitv and worth- 
 lessness of our own life are merged in our con- 
 ception of the extent and duration of our species. 
 Reviewing the history and contemplating the 
 
THE APPEAL TO IT IN THE SCRIPTURES. 10-5 
 
 prospects of mankind, their progression in know- 
 ledge and the arts, their growing power and 
 dominion over nature, — expatiating over the past 
 and the future, we forget that tale which is told 
 so soon, those days which are so quickly num- 
 bered, — a boundless ocean of being fills and ex- 
 pands our thoughts, and who can realize that 
 his own existence is but a bubble that sparkles 
 for an instant on its surface ! But it may be, as 
 we have said, that this life is valuable and great 
 only as a preparation for a life to come ; that its 
 most vivid and attractive forms of happiness are 
 but types and images of things which " eye hath 
 not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into 
 the heart of man to conceive," but "which God" 
 may have "prepared for those that love him." 
 There is one only record that can assure us of 
 so sublime and animating a reality, — one only 
 which we allow to be worthy of any serious con- 
 sideration and inquiry, — that which declares that 
 Jesus Christ was " delivered for our offences and 
 raised again for our justification ;" exhibiting, in 
 his own person, the pledge and " first fruits " of 
 a general resurrection from the grave. But this 
 record, in claiming our belief, is not offered to 
 the indolent wishes, or the presumptuous hopes, 
 of man. It addresses itself to our moral convic- 
 tions and feelings. It looks to be understood, 
 and appreciated, and firmly believed under the 
 sense of our duty to God, and in a readiness to 
 
106 GRATITUDE AN ORIGINAL DUTY. 
 
 obey his will. These we must preserve and 
 actively cherish, if we would certainly do justice 
 to the evidence of the Gospel, and determine 
 rightly whether the prospect which it lays open 
 to us in futurity, the hopes which it enkindles, 
 be from God or not. 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 
 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION TO MORAL 
 RECTITUDE. 
 
 Deut. xxxii. 4. 
 
 A GOD OF TRUTH AND WITHOUT INIQUITY, JUST AND RIGHT IS HE. 
 
 We have maintained the reality of amoral obli- 
 gation to the Deity, as assumed and enforced in 
 the Christian religion, which exhibits his good- 
 ness, or his claim upon our gratitude, as the basis 
 of religious duties. Now, it seems very obvious 
 that every human being, assenting to this prin- 
 ciple of duty to the Creator, should either be 
 seeking to know the will of God, or, if known, 
 be concerned and occupied in obeying it. In 
 this state of mind, he would be prepared to do 
 justice to the credibility of the Scripture, under 
 the description of a special appeal to the grati- 
 tude of mankind. But it is observable, as was 
 remarked in the last discourse, that persons who 
 reject or disesteem the Scriptures as an impro- 
 
108 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 bable account of our moral relations to the Deity, 
 are frequently, if not commonly, betrayed into 
 habitual inattention to the nature of religion as 
 a practical principle, and appear, for whatever 
 reasons, to hold themselves exonerated from any 
 proper obligation to God in the regulation of 
 their affections and conduct ; omitting the cul- 
 ture of piety, as commonly distinguished from 
 morality, and observing the received rules of the 
 latter under the influence of motives arising out 
 of their condition as members of society, but in 
 comparative indifference to the question whether 
 an uniform rectitude of conduct be not incumbent 
 on them as a course of obedience to the Supreme 
 Being ; — as though the Creator had abdicated 
 his moral sovereignty over them, or there were 
 no obligation remaining to consult his will, and 
 to consider the particulars of their duty towards 
 him, because a document, professing to bear a 
 communication from himself, attributes to him 
 a method of dealing with mankind, or a scheme 
 of government over them, incompatible, as they 
 affirm, with the proofs of his benevolence in 
 the constitution of the world. As this is a state 
 of mind which must effectually indispose a person 
 for a full and impartial inquiry into the truth of 
 Christianity, we adverted to the general confes- 
 sion of a personal demerit before God ; and we 
 insisted, that if the creation bears testimony to 
 the goodness of its Author, it bears equal testi- 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 109 
 
 mony to our own ingratitude and disobedience 
 towards him, and is, consequently, to say the 
 least, most unreasonably urged in disparagement 
 of a religion which opens its message to the 
 world with a proclamation of forgiveness, and a 
 call to repentance. Dismissing, then, a prejudi- 
 cation against Christianity, taken up, as must be 
 owned, on superficial grounds, we proceed to 
 the second of the two cardinal propositions which 
 it was intended to maintain ; namely, that the 
 duty of gratitude to God dictates the practice of 
 all moral rectitude, or the fulfilment of our duties 
 to our fellow-creatures. This proposition is in a 
 manner acceded to in the common acknowledg- 
 ment of demerit before God, but that objection 
 to the Scriptures which has just been considered 
 sufficiently demonstrates that it is far from being 
 duly weighed. In estimating the claims of Chris- 
 tianity under the aspect contemplated in these 
 discourses, it is essential to appreciate it in a 
 measure corresponding to the evidence on which 
 it rests, as well as to the true extent of its 
 import. 
 
 It should be observed then, in the first place, 
 that, if we have assigned the true ground on 
 which it is reasonable to conclude that the 
 Creator demands our gratitude for the benefits 
 which he has conferred upon us, we must 
 hence infer that he demands, at the same time, 
 the practice of every virtue in our relations 
 
110 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 to our fellow-creatures. We have seen that that 
 which commends the exercise of gratitude to the 
 Creator is, specifically, the fact that our grati- 
 tude to a human benefactor springs up in our 
 persuasion of his kindness towards us, and is 
 morally approved as the growth of that per- 
 suasion ; — in other words, that we are so consti- 
 tuted as to discern a moral rectitude in gratitude 
 intrinsically — to approve ourselves in cherishing 
 this affection, independently of our knowledge of 
 the benefits derived to mankind at large from its 
 prevalency as a principle of conduct. But if it 
 be allowed that our moral approbation attaches, 
 directly and ultimately, to gratitude as an affec- 
 tion of the mind, it will not, we presume, be 
 disputed that it attaches, in the same manner, to 
 other and to all upright affections of the mind. 
 Indeed, we have had occasion to insist that by 
 far the larger number, if not the great body, of 
 those who professedly subscribe to the doctrine 
 of expediency in morals, must find, on reflection, 
 that they are resolving all virtue into a principle 
 of universal benevolence, or a disposition to pro- 
 mote the common happiness ; that is, that their 
 moral approbation attaches to benevolence, and 
 terminates on that affection. We repeat, then, 
 if it be allowed that gratitude is right in itself, 
 or independently considered, we may take for 
 granted that other affections bearing that name 
 are so likewise. It follows, that, if it be reason- 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. Ill 
 
 able to conclude that we are bound to exercise 
 gratitude towards God, bound therefore to obey 
 his will, it is equally reasonable to conclude that 
 we fitly exemplify our gratitude, and actually obey 
 his will, by the nurture and improvement of every 
 virtuous principle of conduct towards our fellow- 
 creatures. We are here maintaining the propo- 
 sition before us on a ground, we are aware, which 
 is not in general or readily suggested to the mind ; 
 for this reason, however, that the duty of gratitude 
 to God, itself, is not in general or readily called 
 into question, and, consequently, the particular 
 fact in our moral experience, which demonstrates 
 the reasonableness of that duty, is not brought 
 prominently into view. We have already laid 
 stress on the assent which is, at first, universally 
 given to the duty of gratitude to the Creator, and 
 have remarked, moreover, that even the most 
 sceptical amongst us appear to admit that they 
 should be bound to render obedience to God, 
 if obedience to him were in reality demanded ; 
 inasmuch as the point they contend for is, the 
 want of proof that he has actually imposed any 
 law upon us. It could not, therefore, be ex- 
 pected that mankind would revert to an original 
 moral obligation to obey the will of God, with 
 a view to determine what that will is ; and, in 
 point of fact, it is customary to deduce the will 
 of God itself, or his actual particular require- 
 ments, from our moral constitution in general. 
 
112 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 But, nevertheless, when the duty of gratitude to 
 the Creator, a spontaneous dictate of the human 
 understanding in the belief of his benevolence, 
 is perceived to be corroborated by subsequent 
 reflection, the inference which has just been 
 stated must also be perceived to be direct and 
 inevitable. We perceive a reasonableness in the 
 duty of gratitude to God, in the conviction that 
 we judge this affection to be right in its exercise 
 towards a fellow- creature for its own sake, as it 
 is commonly expressed, irrespective of its unde- 
 niable tendency to promote the general welfare. 
 Consequently, in acknowledging that primary 
 duty to the Creator, we virtually acknowledge 
 that all rectitude of heart and conduct is a 
 service which we reasonably owe him ; and that, 
 however we may distinguish between piety and 
 virtue, religion and morality, or whatever minor 
 and subordinate purposes may be answered by 
 this distinction, the latter is equally, in the nature 
 of things, incumbent upon us in our moral 
 relation to the Creator as the former. And 
 more than this — it is a clear deduction of our 
 reason, that if the Supreme Being should inter- 
 pose preternaturally, should suspend the laws of 
 the material universe, to break the slumbers of 
 the human conscience, and assert his claim upon 
 the gratitude of his creatures, such an interposi- 
 tion and assertion would be tantamount to a 
 special declaration of his approbation and love of 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 1 13 
 
 all rectitude, and his unchanging purpose to 
 promote it ; that if he should contemplate some 
 new and transcendent manifestation of his good- 
 ness towards them, his design would be to apply 
 a new and transcendent motive to the considera- 
 tion and fulfilment of all their duties ; and that 
 if he accompanied this signal display of his bene- 
 volence with a powerful application to their hopes 
 and fears, announcing an unlimited reward to 
 those who should bow to his gracious sceptre, and 
 threatening the " despisers " of his goodness with 
 a severer condemnation, he would still exhibit 
 the same determination, compatibly with the con- 
 ditions of a moral agency, to reclaim mankind 
 from the practice of all evil, and uphold the law 
 of rectitude in their reverent and studious ob- 
 servance. And this is surely a deduction of our 
 reason which must exalt the pretensions of 
 Christianity to the utmost in our view ; for that 
 such is the conduct attributed to the Deity in 
 the Scriptures — that the declared scope of the 
 Gospel is the recovery of mankind to the love 
 and pursuit of all rectitude, as preparatory to a 
 perfect and enduring happiness in a future state, 
 few, we believe, are known to dispute. 
 
 We shall now argue the proposition before us 
 on a more general and usual ground ; and we 
 proceed to observe, that the duty of gratitude to 
 the Creator dictates the practice of all virtue, 
 inasmuch as the conformity of virtue to his will 
 
 i 
 
114 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 is directly suggested, or powerfully confirmed, by 
 the moral judgments which we form of human 
 actions in general ; as those judgments are natu- 
 rally and at first understood, and their import 
 permanently acknowledged, by incomparably the 
 larger portion of mankind. 
 
 But here it may be necessary to revert to 
 some observations which were offered in our 
 first discourse, as preliminary to the discussion 
 of our subject. We have premised, it may be 
 remembered, that in order to sustain the credi- 
 bility of the Christian religion in its appeal to our 
 moral judgments, it is necessary, and must in all 
 reason be presumed, that those judgments convey 
 that import which Christianity attaches to them 
 with a corresponding force and universality of 
 evidence ; and we have also alleged the important 
 fact, that mankind, for the most part, have so 
 understood, and continue to understand, their 
 moral judgments as to conclude the existence of 
 an original, immutable standard of moral recti- 
 tude, or the reality of a merit and demerit in 
 human beings. This conclusion we shall find to 
 be expressly corroborative of the Christian 
 religion, when it calls upon us to believe that in 
 doing that which is morally right, we conform 
 to the will of God, and in doing that which is 
 morally wrong, we resist and disregard it. 
 
 There is, we do not forget, one school of 
 ethical philosophy which gives an explanation of 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 115 
 
 our moral judgments, or notions of merit and 
 demerit in ourselves and others, remarkably at 
 variance with the prevailing conviction respect- 
 ing them, and offering, we are compelled to 
 admit, no argument for concluding that God has 
 actually laid his commandment upon us, or 
 requires any obedience at our hands : that sec- 
 tion, we mean, of the advocates of expediency as 
 the standard of morality, who, it will here suffice 
 to observe, account for our notions of merit and 
 demerit in such a manner, as to preclude the 
 belief of a substantive reality in moral distinctions, 
 and to bring us to the conclusion, that the strictly 
 rational as well as actually prevailing induce- 
 ment to the performance of actions denominated 
 virtuous, is no other than a regard to that per- 
 sonal security, advantage, and enjoyment, which 
 are derived to individuals from the countenance 
 and favour of society. Such an explanation of 
 our moral judgments it is incumbent we should 
 discuss, and endeavour to appreciate, and we 
 reserve it for particular consideration in the next 
 discourse. Meanwhile, however, the fact itself, 
 that any considerable number — though, speaking 
 comparatively, few — should explain their moral 
 judgments, or interpret the voice of conscience, 
 so differently from the rest of the world, 
 may appear incompatible with the very hypo- 
 thesis that such judgments are appealed to in 
 verification of a religion instituted by God, and 
 
 i2 
 
116 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 offered to the belief and acceptance of mankind 
 in general. But we shall better estimate the 
 weight of this objection, when we shall have given 
 some attention to their ethical theory itself, and 
 considered the nature of the evidence by which 
 it is supposed to be established. It should be 
 remarked, however, that some of these expositors 
 of the human conscience have expressed an 
 opinion, that the question whether Christianity 
 be of God or not, is strictly independent of the 
 manner in which we explain the formation of 
 the moral judgments. These, we may infer, 
 have been carried by a love of speculation to 
 the adoption of a theory disowned in their feel- 
 ings and conduct ; and, on this supposition, we 
 can hardly doubt that a closer examination would 
 lead them to a detection of its fallacy. That 
 the especial claims of Christianity are not inde- 
 pendent of the question of our moral judgments, 
 but deeply implicated in the purport conveyed 
 by them, we endeavoured to make evident in our 
 first discourse. 
 
 The mass of mankind, however, as was just 
 remarked, have concurred in attaching a merit 
 and demerit to themselves and others, which, to 
 their apprehension, is essentially unexplained by 
 that school of ethics to which we have adverted. 
 They are well persuaded of the indispensable 
 necessity, and incalculable advantages, to the 
 whole community, of a general conformity to 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 1 1 7 
 
 moral rules, and they cannot but remark the 
 keen sensibility, the strong affections, the various 
 energetic principles of action, which are conse- 
 quently put into operation, to induce every indi- 
 vidual member of society to observe such rules 
 himself, as well as to assist in imposing them on 
 the observance of others. But however, in 
 point of fact, they may be deterred from vice, 
 or prompted to virtue, by a quick and perpetual 
 sense of their dependence on the conduct and 
 bearing of society towards them, they delibe- 
 rately conclude that it would be right, or their 
 duty, to abstain from the former and to practise 
 the latter, in every particular instance, even 
 were it possible they could be infallibly assured 
 that they should neither incur the displeasure 
 nor win the applause of their fellow-creatures. 
 In judging actions to be right or wrong, " in 
 judging, that they ought not to rob, or to kill, 
 or to slander their neighbour, they discern a 
 truth of which they are as well convinced as of 
 any proposition in Euclid." 1 And this, it is well 
 known, is not an explanation of the moral judg- 
 ments given only by persons who yield at once 
 to the spontaneous determinations of the under- 
 standing, but by those who search into the 
 principles on which they are founded. It will 
 be remembered on what philosophical authority, 
 and with what streLgth of argument, it was 
 
 1 Keid, Essay v. ch. 5. 
 
118 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 recently maintained from this place, that we 
 have as firm a basis for our convictions in this 
 branch of intelligence as in any other ; and that 
 the facts alleged in proof of the contrary might, 
 with equal reason, be held incompatible with the 
 certainty of those truths on which the sciences 
 are reared, as of those which constitute the 
 foundation of morals. 1 
 
 Moreover, as most persons, in judging that 
 they ought or ought not to perform particular 
 actions, discern a truth of which they are as 
 certain as of any truth whatsoever, so they dis- 
 cern a reality in that virtue in which the truth is 
 embodied. They perceive the moral attributes 
 of a human being as distinctly, and with as sure 
 a persuasion of their existence, as they perceive 
 his intellectual faculties to be real and not 
 imaginary existences. When observing in in- 
 
 1 Professor Whewell (Foundation of Morals, Sermon II.) 
 The passage cited from Dr. Reid expresses the certainty, or 
 full conviction of truth and reality, of which most persons are 
 conscious in their perception of that difference in actions on 
 which the rules of morality are founded : the diversity in the 
 moral judgments of mankind, which is so often alleged to 
 confute that certainty, and has filled so large a space in ethical 
 disputation, is, properly, a difference in applying the moral 
 rules to particular actions. It must not be forgotten that an 
 action is judged to be wrong as the effect of a certain principle 
 of conduct ; if it were not so — if we disapproved the external 
 act, properly speaking, there would never be a difference of 
 opinion as to whether a particular act were murder or not, 
 robbery or not, slander or not. Moral distinctions, therefore, 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 119 
 
 dividuals a defect of gratitude, or fidelity, or 
 benevolence, they perceive the mind to be as 
 palpably wanting in that particular virtue, as 
 they could perceive it to be deficient in memory, 
 or judgment ; nay, as they can perceive a person 
 to want the proper members or due proportions 
 of the human frame. But notwithstanding the 
 far larger portion of mankind would thus explain 
 their discernment of moral qualities ; notwith- 
 standing they thus approve, esteem, and vene- 
 rate an individual for his deeds of goodness, and 
 condemn as determinately the vicious person, 
 holding his character in detestation and scorn ; 
 many, it appears, have never deduced or weighed 
 this conclusion — one, however, which the esta- 
 blished religion of the most enlightened nations 
 conspicuously holds up to their attention — 
 that such a constitution of their nature is 
 
 are not proved to be merely conventional or factitious, by a 
 discrepancy of judgment among mankind as to whether an 
 action be referrible to a particular principle of conduct or not, 
 if there be no disagreement as to the principle itself. Thus, 
 to take an example given by Dr. Chalmers in his Bridgewater 
 Treatise, there may be a difference of opinion as to the justice 
 and humanity of retaining any portion of our species in a state 
 of slavery ; but this is no proof that the distinctions of morality 
 are uncertain and arbitrary, inasmuch as the disputants on 
 that question are entirely unanimous in their approbation of 
 justice and humanity. This distinction, so essential, has been 
 dwelt upon by several eminent writers on ethics : it is clearly 
 developed in the Treatise referred to, as well as illustrated in 
 the unrivalled manner of its author. (Vol. i. pp. 84, &c.) 
 
120 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 adapted, and was designed, to teach them, that 
 in their conduct in general, one towards another 
 and towards the whole community, they are 
 subject to the approving and condemning judg- 
 ment of God, as well as to their own. Nay, 
 authors who have discoursed and expatiated on 
 virtue, as itself a substantial and the chief good, 
 and have sought to fix the attachment of the 
 world on the virtuous affections, rejecting the 
 opinion that it is our experience of their general 
 utility which has led us to admire and extol 
 them, — even these have dealt covert blows 
 against the Christian religion, as though by 
 asserting the reality, the intrinsic worth and 
 excellence, the beauty, the sublimity of virtue, 
 they were not, in effect, bearing testimony to the 
 likelihood of its divine original; exhibiting its 
 peculiar and impressive congruity with the 
 moral sentiments ; and laying open its deep 
 foundations in the intellect and heart of man. 
 The severance of morality from religion is, doubt- 
 less, in most instances, practical rather than 
 strictly speculative ; but it is generally and incal- 
 culably important to a just appreciation of 
 Christianity, that our duties towards God and 
 towards man should be distinctly perceived to 
 be rooted in the same fact, or property, of our 
 mental constitution — the discernment of a truth 
 in our moral judgments, of a reality in the attri- 
 butes of moral rectitude. 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 121 
 
 We are speaking of the great body of man- 
 kind who believe and testify that they have that 
 discernment,, and we submit that, with such a 
 view of moral obligation, that philosophy is 
 " falsely so called/' which denies a proper con- 
 nexion between morality and religion, and fails to 
 recognise a religious obligation to the fulfilment 
 of every social and relative duty. For if, in 
 judging actions to be right or wrong, we believe 
 this distinction to be a real one, and not merely 
 verbal, or imaginary ; if we believe mankind to 
 be actually capable of the merit and demerit 
 attributed to them, and therefore fitly subject to 
 praise or blame, reward or punishment ; have we 
 not, to say the least, a presumption of cogent 
 probability, that all moral rectitude is an object 
 of approbation to the Deity, and that it is 
 agreeable to his will that we should practise it ? 
 Is it not consonant to reason to frame our con- 
 ception of the Being who created us, by ascribing 
 to him qualities of our own mind, consistently, so 
 far as permitted to our faculties, with the pure 
 spirituality and absolute perfection of his nature ? 
 Nay, is it not from reflecting on our own intelli- 
 gence and power, that we actually infer the 
 existence of One whose intelligence and power 
 infinitely transcend our own, as his works 
 transcend all that human beings can design 
 and accomplish ? And if, in thus deducing 
 the very existence of the Creator, we presume 
 
122 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 our nature to bear a resemblance or analogy to 
 his, shall we except from this analogy the most 
 distinguishing attributes of a rational being — 
 those of a moral agent? — notwithstanding, 
 moreover, we speak of his benevolence — notwith- 
 standing we assert this attribute of his character 
 to be demonstrable from his works, and own his 
 title to our gratitude and devotion ? Can we 
 deliberately doubt that our moral intelligence, 
 in particular, is an emanation from his own, and 
 witnesses that " He is a God of knowledge, by 
 whom actions are weighed V s And when we 
 consider the peculiar satisfaction which even 
 the partial, imperfect goodness of human beings 
 reflects into the minds of those who love and 
 practise the right, can we hesitate to conclude 
 that the consciousness of his own unblemished 
 rectitude is an element of the perfect, ineffable 
 happiness of God ? Assuredly, the frame of the 
 human mind bears testimony to the moral per- 
 fections and agency of God, as truly as it argues 
 his existence and attributes at all ; and responds 
 to the declaration — be it written where it may — 
 that " He is righteous in all his ways, and holy 
 in all his works ;" and, accordingly, that if we 
 would conform to his will concerning us, we 
 must seek " to be holy, even as he is holy." 1 
 
 1 " Is it possible," observes an excellent writer on the prin- 
 ciples of natural religion, " for any man who believes God to 
 be the Father, the designing Cause of spirits, of their intelli- 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 123 
 
 And yet more expressly, can we resist this 
 conclusion, as it is argued from specific evidences 
 
 gence, liberty, and all their other rational faculties and enjoy- 
 ments, to doubt whether he himself is possessed of intelligence, 
 liberty, and rational enjoyments ? — whether, since he has 
 endued them with a power of self-reflection, particularly of 
 reviewing their own affections and actions, and judging con- 
 cerning their rectitude, his own actions, and the principles 
 from which they spring, be not the object of his own under- 
 standing and attention ? — whether, having annexed the highest 
 enjoyment to their self-approbation upon this review, and 
 made their principal happiness to depend upon it, he possesses 
 the like, or a more exalted enjoyment of his own actions and 
 principles of actions ? And this being the sum of what we 
 mean by moral agency, can we doubt whether God be a moral 
 agent?" — Abernethy's Discourses, vol. ii. Serm. I. 
 
 We shall quote another observation from this author, in the 
 same discourse, on the rectitude of the Deity as distinguished 
 from that of man, with a view to remark its important 
 bearing on the doctrine that all moral rectitude is founded in 
 benevolence : a doctrine to which, in arguing the positions 
 maintained in these discourses, we are brought into con- 
 siderable opposition. "The virtues," he observes, "which 
 have a large share in a good human character, and indeed the 
 greatest part of the moral system, as accommodated to our 
 dependent and imperfect state, can have no place in the per- 
 fections of the Deity, or be any otherwise attributed to him, 
 than as by his authority he enjoins, and by his perfect recti- 
 tude, wisdom, and goodness, approves them. Of righteousness 
 as practised by him we must form an idea, abstracting from 
 all kinds of subjection or indigence as much as possible ; but 
 remembering, on the contrary, the absolute supremacy of his 
 dominion, the glorious immutable excellence of his nature, 
 and felicity of his condition." Now, in our apprehension, the 
 moralists and divines who have contended that all rectitude is 
 subordinated to and comprised in benevolence, have adopted 
 this opinion, principally, through inattention to the important 
 
124 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 of design in the constitution of our nature ? The 
 Author of our being has formed us to believe a 
 
 distinction here pointed out between moral excellence as 
 exemplified by God and as exemplified by man. In their 
 speculations on the character or moral agency of the Deity, 
 they have been led to the conclusion that benevolence is the 
 sole or the governing principle of his conduct. Hence they 
 have inferred that it is, or should be, the governing principle 
 of our own ; not reflecting, it would seem, that moral rectitude 
 must vary in its manifestations with the particular relations 
 which intelligent beings sustain towards each other. The 
 presiding principle of virtue in the parent towards the child is 
 benevolence ; but it is not so, surely, in the child towards the 
 parent. The analogous relation of the Creator to the creature 
 must suggest a far wider distinction of the same nature. Had 
 this been considered, it could hardly have been concluded that, 
 because the benevolence of the Deity is everywhere and 
 continually engaging our attention and inspiring our devotion, 
 the principle of benevolence should comprehend and absorb 
 every other attribute of goodness in the mind of man : still 
 less could it have been laid down, especially as no such doc- 
 trine is taught us in the Scripture, that the perfection of piety 
 consists in a strictly disinterested love of God ; as though we 
 had received or expected nothing at his hands for which to be 
 grateful ; for clearly there could be no place for gratitude if 
 all concern in our own happiness were extinguished. The 
 author himself, whom we have just cited, considers that the 
 moral agency of the Deity towards mankind may reasonably 
 be regarded as a scheme of benevolence ; but he keeps in view 
 an essential difference between the relation of the Creator to 
 ourselves, and of ourselves to him and to one another. 
 Regarding benevolence as one principle of moral rectitude, 
 there need be no fear of exalting it above its excellence and 
 value ; and it is expressly this attribute of the Deity which 
 the Scripture enjoins mankind to imitate in their conduct one 
 towards another ; — enjoins this, however, as an exercise of 
 gratitude to himself; thereby evincing, as we have elsewhere 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 125 
 
 difference in actions, and thereby to institute 
 rules for the regulation of our conduct one to 
 another: — rules so evidently founded in the nature 
 of things, and so imperative in their character, 
 that we signify and describe them by terms and 
 phrases expressive, to the utmost, of their funda- 
 mental truth and supreme authority. He has 
 formed us to perceive nothing so essentially 
 proper to human beings, so worthy, excellent, 
 and amiable, as the attributes of moral recti- 
 tude ; to hold, in comparison with these, the 
 adventitious distinctions of rank, and wealth, 
 and power, or great natural talents, to be utterly 
 base and contemptible ; and to reproach, and 
 scorn, and loathe ourselves, when reflecting that 
 we feel and act as if they were not so. Is it 
 possible to evade or overcome the conviction, 
 that, whatever be our actual character and doings, 
 the Almighty created and designed us for the 
 practice of virtue ; and that the structure of the 
 human mind bears its testimony to the credibility 
 
 observed, our benevolence to a fellow -creature to be " a rea- 
 sonable service" to God. 
 
 With reference to the position that the whole procedure 
 of the Deity is one of benevolence, it appears to require a 
 considerable degree of explanation. As was remarked, how- 
 ever, in the last discourse, his benevolence to accountable 
 beings must be chiefly displayed in his forgiveness of the 
 penitent ; and, if this be assented to, we are not solicitous to 
 reconcile with that position all the conditions and results of a 
 probationary state ; and may leave to those who make this 
 knot the task of untying it. 
 
126 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 of the Gospel, so far, at least, as this instructs us 
 to account ourselves " the workmanship of God, 
 created unto good works, which he hath before 
 ordained that we should walk in them ?" But 
 if so — is there any other conclusion relating to 
 virtue of equal practical interest and import- 
 ance ? Is it possible that a rational creature can 
 propose to himself a question of any comparable 
 moment with the following : — Do I habitually 
 neglect or regard the will of the Supreme Being ? 
 Do I voluntarily acquiesce in and promote the 
 purpose for which he brought me into existence, 
 or must I confess that I counteract and oppose 
 it ? Is my mind in an attitude of resistance to 
 the Deity, or are my affections allied to the 
 objects of his approbation, and the end of his 
 works ? Is there any question relating to the 
 obligations of morality of perceptible weight in 
 comparison with this ? In other words, are 
 there any motives to upright and virtuous con- 
 duct, derivable from our connexion with our 
 fellow-creatures, of the smallest significance when 
 weighed in the balance with those of religion ? 
 Is there any consideration so fitted to deter a 
 man from the wrong, or arrest him in a vicious 
 course, as that in yielding to a corrupt pro- 
 pensity, in committing an immoral act, he is 
 exposing a mind at issue with the counsel, at 
 enmity with the character, of that Being whose 
 perfections surpass our faculties, and suspend 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 127 
 
 them in astonishment, and the terribleness of 
 whose power is not only that it is irresistible, but 
 that those who sink under it must own the sen- 
 tence against them to be just ? That philosophy, 
 we repeat, must surely be "falsely so called," 
 which, admitting the essential distinctions of 
 moral character, stops at the conclusion, that in 
 our conduct, right and wrong, one to another, 
 we provoke the hostility, or attract the favour, 
 of our fellow-creatures ; or which carries us no 
 farther than the pursuit of that satisfaction which 
 unquestionably appertains to the consciousness 
 of having done the right to our fellow-creatures. 
 It were impossible, in the compass of a few 
 remarks, to do justice to those considerations 
 which have led inquiring and reflecting persons, 
 for the most part, as well as others, to regard 
 the dictates of the conscience as virtually decla- 
 ratory of the law and government of God, and 
 to expect some final retribution for good and 
 evil actions in a future state. We shall only add, 
 that this conclusion must obtain a tenacious 
 hold upon every individual who applies himself, 
 considerately, to this question : — Reflecting upon 
 the uncertainty and feebleness of human virtue 
 in general, which have at all times been observed 
 and acknowledged ; reflecting upon the nume- 
 rous temptations to do wrong, and their palpable 
 and extensive power upon mankind ; what would 
 be the consequences of a general persuasion, that, 
 
128 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 endowed though we were with perceptions of 
 moral rectitude,, as well as feelings of a corre- 
 sponding nature inclining us to exemplify it in 
 our conduct, the utmost we could hope to 
 accomplish by a steadfast course of virtue, was 
 to establish our integrity in the eyes of men, and 
 to realize the happiness which virtue might 
 bestow upon us in the present life ? What 
 would be the consequence, if all were assured 
 that, apart from the experience and prospects of 
 this world, their knowledge and sensibility as 
 moral agents might be safely slighted and over- 
 come, and sacrificed to the impulse of the 
 passions, and even to their habitual predomi- 
 nance ; if aW faith in our moral convictions were 
 done away, and none remained to sustain the 
 resolutions of the virtuous, or to awe and 
 trouble the wrong-doer ; — the faith, we mean, 
 that God will surely own and vindicate the 
 expressions of his will in the constitution of our 
 nature ; and that, however vice may prosper 
 and triumph, or escape detection for a season, 
 and the just and good be injured and defamed, 
 he will at length appear in the cause of the 
 upright, and put to confusion the doers of 
 iniquity ; making proof that, though " clouds and 
 darkness are round about him, righteousness and 
 judgment are the habitation of his throne ?" 
 
 But there is a remarkable inconsistency in our 
 actual views and feelings on this head, which 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 129 
 
 may carry a more powerful conviction to some 
 minds, if not to most, than any general reason- 
 ing, however cogent and difficult of refutation. 
 The inconsistency is, that there are some actions, 
 the more heinous crimes, which almost irre- 
 sistibly suggest the apprehension of God's 
 displeasure to the very persons who, in reference 
 to human conduct in general, whether their own 
 or that of others, entertain but fugitive impres- 
 sions of a religious obligation. For example, 
 what is that which renders the perpetration — 
 the thought of murder so revolting to our moral 
 principles ; — which gives to that crime an aspect 
 so grim and frightful, that all, but the most 
 vicious and depraved amongst us, would recoil 
 with horror from such an apparition of evil ; 
 well knowing that, should they be effectually 
 tempted to take the life of a fellow-creature, they 
 would burden the conscience with a peculiar 
 and most intolerable remorse ? Undoubtedly, the 
 law of self-preservation would incline us to 
 shrink from an act which we know to be 
 punishable by death ; but, till recently, other 
 crimes also were punishable by death, the com- 
 mission of which, notwithstanding, could never 
 have been contemplated with equal terror and 
 abhorrence. Does not the idea of murder at 
 once fill our thoughts with the offended majesty 
 and the avenging power of God ? Do we not 
 feel assured that, could we harbour an incentive- 
 
 K 
 
130 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 to that deed, the eye of the Omniscient would 
 penetrate our soul, and search it to its deepest 
 recesses ; and that the vision of his uplifted arm 
 would stagger and appal our resolution ? And 
 will any consent to account this a superstitious 
 imagination ? — as undeniably it is — for we must 
 look our opinions in the face — as undeniably 
 it is, if morality be no part of religion. In the 
 minds of most men, however, there is small room 
 for doubt that the blood of the innocent cries to 
 God for vengeance. But if we thus look upon 
 murder, and the most atrocious crimes, as acts of 
 rebellion against the authority of our Creator, 
 are we not chargeable with egregious inconsis- 
 tency in abandoning the belief, or cherishing 
 a doubt, of his supreme dominion over us in the 
 general conduct of our lives ? For if the dread 
 of God's displeasure in the destruction of human 
 life be not a vain imagination, can it be made 
 a question whether it ought to be continually 
 present to us, as a check to every injurious act 
 whatsoever ? If God be the protector of the life 
 of our fellow-man, can any one seriously doubt 
 that he is the protector of his property, and 
 reputation, and feelings — of all his rightful 
 happiness? Assuredly none. If it be fit that 
 we should bow and tremble before the Creator 
 as the observer of any one action of our lives, 
 undeniably it is fit that we should acknowledge 
 him in the discharge of every duty, in the 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 131 
 
 conduct of every transaction with our neigh- 
 bour : the light and influence of religion should 
 fill the whole circle of our relative duties. It 
 cannot for an instant be allowed that, as God has 
 formed us for a nice discrimination of moral 
 qualities, he takes cognizance only of the worst 
 crimes ; his judgment concerning us must extend 
 to every action we perform, to every volition in 
 our capacity as moral agents. But, in truth, such 
 exceptions, to a too prevailing inconsideration of 
 his presence and authority, might well engage 
 our attention as lamentable proofs of that natural 
 defection from our duty towards him, which the 
 Scripture has so expressly imputed to our 
 species. At least, if such a defection had taken 
 place, how could it have been more surely 
 betrayed, than by the fact that our sense of duty 
 towards God was arrested and shocked only by 
 ideas of the most flagitious offences against him ? 
 And, be this as it may, what can so unanswer- 
 ably demonstrate to our own conviction, that 
 the heart is actually hardened, and has " waxed 
 gross " in its moral sensibility towards God, 
 if nothing less than such deeds as do violence, 
 so to speak, to our moral feelings can affect us 
 with the turpitude of sinning against him ; force 
 from us the tears of contrition, or extort the 
 pangs of remorse ? — But we must dismiss the 
 particular subject of this discourse. 
 
 Before concluding, however, there is one infe- 
 
 k 2 
 
132 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 rence from the preceding argument, which we 
 are solicitous should not be overlooked or un- 
 considered. We have seen that our moral 
 judgments, as they are generally understood, 
 lend a powerful confirmation to a principal 
 assumption of the Christian religion — namely, 
 that God requires the fulfilment of our duties to 
 our fellow-creatures, as an exemplification of 
 obedience to himself; nay, that to reject this 
 conclusion, and, notwithstanding, to adhere to 
 the reality of moral distinctions, is apparently 
 incompatible with any philosophy but that which 
 disowns the belief of God's existence, and merits 
 no better description than that of practical 
 atheism — " knowing God, but not glorifying him 
 as God." It follows then, and is necessarily im- 
 plied, that that assumption of the Scriptures is 
 true — that is, that it is really authoritative on 
 our conduct, whether the Scriptures themselves 
 be a divine revelation or not. The implication 
 is inevitable, yet it appears to be far from 
 generally obvious. We have been led to remark, 
 in the discussion of our subject, a very frequent 
 connexion, to say the least, between a disbelief 
 of Christianity and an indifference to religion as 
 a practical principle, or as the presiding motive 
 of our conduct as moral agents. Persons appear 
 to imagine that if the divine institution of the 
 Gospel be disproved, they are exempted from 
 the duties of religion altogether, and, expressly, 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 133 
 
 from the obligation to a pure morality in 
 obedience to the will of God. The consequence 
 is, that they are little disposed for a close and 
 impartial examination of the evidence on which 
 it rests ; whereas it is precisely when we regard 
 religion in its practical nature, when we consider 
 the gratitude due to the Creator as a principle of 
 obedience to his will, that we clearly recognise 
 the religious duty of giving our attention to 
 Christianity, or any particular religion, at all ; of 
 ascertaining and considering its special purport ; 
 and of examining in general the evidence of its 
 divine authority. For the prevalence of such 
 a notion, various causes might be assigned ; but 
 it is certainly very much fostered by an opinion 
 that every principle of religion acknowledged 
 amongst us is founded on the testimony of the 
 Scripture, and that exclusively ; and, conse- 
 quently, must stand or fall with the proof of its 
 divine inspiration. We assert, on the contrary, 
 that the assumption of the Scripture which has 
 been brought under consideration, though un- 
 doubtedly confirmed and placed above question 
 in the belief of Christianity, is true, is practically 
 obligatory upon us, whether the Scripture be 
 a divine revelation or not. 
 
 An individual who professed to be divinely 
 commissioned and inspired, to be an apostle of 
 God, made the following assertion concerning the 
 Heathen : — " For when the Gentiles, which have 
 
134 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 not the law, do by nature the things contained 
 in the law, these having not the law, are a law 
 unto themselves ; which shew the work of the 
 Lord written in their hearts, their conscience also 
 bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean- 
 while accusing or else excusing one another." — 
 That is, he asserted that the substance of a 
 moral law, which had been formally announced 
 to the Jews as the law of God, was discernible 
 by the Heathen, was actually known amongst 
 them, in whatever degree, and in particular 
 instances obeyed, however defectively (so his 
 language appears to imply) — he asserted that 
 that law was perceptible to the understanding of 
 those who had never been privileged, as this 
 individual would have said, by a preternatural 
 communication from God ; that it lay among the 
 elements of human knowledge, and was actually 
 binding upon all mankind. Now, without 
 affirming or denying this individual to have been, 
 as he announced himself to be, a messenger 
 from God, he may have declared what was true 
 in the words which have been cited. Conclude 
 him to have been an impostor if you will, the 
 reasoning remains the same, and is all untouched, 
 which founds the conclusion — one which has 
 actually prevailed with more or less certainty 
 and comprehensiveness in all ages — that we are 
 subject, as voluntary agents, to the government 
 of God, and that the precepts of virtue are laws 
 
TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 135 
 
 which he has enjoined upon us. The same indi- 
 vidual, when alleging the immoral practices which 
 had prevailed among mankind, affirmed that 
 they "knew," or might have known, had the 
 evidence in their own conscience, " that they 
 which commit such things are worthy of 
 death." 1 Here again, he might have affirmed 
 the truth, even if it were proved that he had 
 deceived himself, or others, in announcing himself 
 as a messenger from God. Surely it is not our 
 belief of the Scriptures, only, which convinces 
 us that the vices and crimes of men are offences 
 against God, and urgent reasons for the dread of 
 punishment at his hands. 
 
 We would therefore admonish any one who, in 
 discarding his belief of the Scriptures, entertains 
 a notion, though probably vague and indeter- 
 minate, that he is absolved from religious obliga- 
 tions, and is now at liberty to observe the rules 
 of morality to whatever extent, and from what- 
 ever motives it may please him, — we admonish 
 him to beware lest he cherish a hollow and most 
 perilous delusion; if indeed he be not already 
 entangled in the known " deceitfulness of sin." 
 What, though he has refuted, as he believes, the 
 divine inspiration of the Scriptures, has he 
 thereby discovered a vindication, or excuse, or 
 the shadow of an excuse, for a single act or 
 disposition which he perceives to be a departure 
 
 1 Rom. i. 32. 
 
136 THE RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION 
 
 from rectitude, and to partake of the nature of 
 vice and irreligion ? Can his disbelief of Chris- 
 tianity obliterate the proofs of God's existence ; 
 or disprove the relations which his own reason 
 may suffice to convince him that he bears 
 to the Author of his nature ? Can it break 
 up the foundations of religion in the human 
 mind ? Can objections to the divine mission of 
 Christ and his Apostles ground a probability 
 that the judgments of the conscience, its moni- 
 tions and remonstrances, and bitter accusations, 
 bespeak no commandment from the Creator, 
 convey no sound of his voice, augur no verdict 
 of acquittal or condemnation at his tribunal ? 
 No : our disbelief of Christianity can only deprive 
 us of an infinite consolation and encouragement 
 in our sense of personal demerit, and exertions 
 to fulfil the law of our own mind. For this 
 is a religion which exhibits the unfailing mercy 
 of God as a commanding motive of obedience to 
 his will, and devotion to his service ; which 
 answers our efforts and aspirations after moral 
 excellence by special promises of assistance here, 
 and reward hereafter ; seconding and animating 
 our endeavours to embody in our conduct our 
 ideas of the right and the good, and to attain 
 that virtue, that "true holiness," which we 
 perceive to be necessary to realize the original 
 type of our nature, and to fulfil the end of our 
 creation — a religion which aims to detach our 
 
^ 
 
 TO MORAL RECTITUDE. 137 
 
 affections from things transient and precarious, 
 and to engage us in the nurture and promotion 
 of those principles in our nature, which yield 
 a satisfaction that promises to outlive the 
 pleasures of sense, and the enjoyments of this 
 world ; which argue our capacity for a happiness 
 unmixed and enduring ; — principles which be- 
 token a peculiar affinity to the Being who 
 created us, — to Him who is " the same yesterday, 
 to-day, and for ever." 
 
LECTURE V. 
 
 AN ADVERSE THEORY OF ETHICS EXAMINED. 
 
 1 Sam. ii. 3. 
 
 BY HIM ACTIONS ARE WEIGHED. 
 
 We have now arrived at the conclusion, that 
 that construction which the bulk of mankind 
 have placed, and continue to place, on the 
 moral judgments, is directly answerable to the 
 declaration of Scripture, that God requires our 
 gratitude, and, as an exercise and proof of that 
 affection, the practice of virtue in general, 
 or the fulfilment of our duties towards our 
 fellow-creatures. There is, however, one school 
 of ethical philosophy, maintaining utility to be 
 the foundation of morals, which explains the 
 formation of our moral judgments, or accounts 
 for our apprehension, or supposed discernment, 
 of merit and demerit in ourselves and others, in 
 a manner essentially differing from the rest 
 of mankind, and supplying, it must be admitted, 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED; 139 
 
 no proof or indication that the Deity requires us 
 to practise virtue, or that we are subject to his 
 law and government as moral agents, and 
 amenable to his tribunal. 
 
 This explanation of our moral judgments we 
 have heretofore endeavoured to keep distinct, 
 and we now proceed to bring it under some 
 examination ; with a view to estimate the weight 
 of that objection, which it may appear to offer 
 to the credibility of the Christian religion, in its 
 appeal to those judgments for proof and con- 
 firmation. In consistency, however, with the 
 more general design of these discourses, we 
 must comprise our observations on this par- 
 ticular theory within the limits of a single 
 discourse. 
 
 There is, then, a section of ethical writers 
 who account for the sense of moral obligation, 
 substantially, in the following manner : — Indi- 
 viduals, as all must know, are, naturally, and 
 apart from moral restraint and discipline, incited 
 to actions detrimental, in a greater or less 
 degree, to the welfare of society, and even 
 opposed to its existence ; and they are also 
 capable of actions more or less calculated to 
 strengthen its security, and bring accessions to 
 its happiness. It is equally certain that, inas- 
 much as individuals compose the society which 
 is thus affected by the conduct of its members, 
 there must be a general resistance to actions 
 
140 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 prejudicial to the community, or, in other words, 
 a general aversion and hostility to the doers 
 of them ; and that, on the contrary, there must 
 be a general desire for actions of an opposite 
 description, or attachment and favour towards 
 those who perform them. " What all men," it 
 has been said, " are exposed to suffer by, all 
 men are disposed to hate," 1 and it is equally 
 true that what all men expect to profit by, all 
 men are disposed to love. It must be farther 
 observed, that notwithstanding we are naturally 
 incited to actions pernicious to society, we are 
 formed to sympathise with the pains and plea- 
 sures of others, and, so far as this tendency of 
 our nature is unopposed by our personal inclina- 
 tions and schemes, we actually experience a 
 satisfaction in contemplating and promoting 
 their happiness. This, of course, must enhance 
 that disgust and animosity on the one hand, and 
 that complacency and favour on the other, with 
 which we look upon the conduct of individuals, 
 in its influence on the interests and welfare of 
 mankind at large. We need not trace more 
 particularly the operation of such feelings to 
 their consequences. Suffice it to say, that 
 society imposes on its members certain rules 
 of conduct, forbidding actions inimical to its 
 happiness, and enjoining others subservient to 
 
 1 Benlham on Morals and Legislation, vol. i, p. 32. 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 141 
 
 its objects and prosperity ; and that individuals 
 are deterred from violating such rules, by the 
 dread of penal law or the public odium, as well 
 as prompted and animated to obey them, by the 
 prospect of obtaining the general estimation and 
 applause. Now, it is the connexion existing 
 between our conformity to such rules and 
 our reception of the countenance and favour 
 of societv, which will be found to create the 
 sense of moral obligation, or the notions of merit 
 and demerit in ourselves and others. 
 
 To do justice, however, to this theory on the 
 basis of ethics, there are one or two particulars 
 which should be matter of specific observation. 
 It should be distinctly remarked, as indeed 
 already intimated, that, although its advocates 
 refer to society the creation of our moral senti- 
 ments, they are not compelled to limit its 
 agency to the institution of government, or the 
 enactment of civil laws. They may properly 
 comprehend, within the sphere of its controlling 
 influence, the aggregate of those powerful 
 motives which are brought to operate upon the 
 minds of individuals, by the universal solicitude 
 and endeavours to uphold the authority, and 
 commend the observance, of laws and precepts 
 essential to the defence of the whole community, 
 and indefinitely advantageous to its interests. 
 It should be observed, moreover, that they do 
 not, of necessity, imply that individuals must 
 
142 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 themseves be clearly apprized of the origin of 
 moral rules, or the inducements by which they 
 are actuated in conforming to them. Indeed, 
 the more able advocates of this theory are 
 observant of the fact, that mankind are naturally 
 inclined to suppose, as the bulk of them actually 
 believe, that their moral approbation of actions, 
 together with their promptitude and satisfaction 
 in performing them, are attributable to a moral 
 rectitude in the actions themselves ; and they 
 assign a particular process in the mind to 
 account for this supposition and belief; — 
 whether adequate to their purpose or not, will 
 be considered in the sequel. 
 
 What they insist upon is, that every individual 
 cannot but perceive himself to be surrounded 
 with relations of dependence on the proceedings 
 and disposition of society towards him, and, 
 accordingly, cannot but associate his own obe- 
 dience and uniform regard to moral rules with 
 his personal safety, and advantage, and gratifi- 
 cation ; and they maintain that it is this con- 
 nexion of ideas — undoubtedly a very intimate 
 and permanent one — which originates the sense 
 of duty or moral obligation. 1 
 
 1 In our consideration of this theory, which we have stated 
 as fully as our limits would allow, and with as much appear- 
 ance of probability as we could collect from the writings of its 
 advocates, we have given our attention, more particularly, to 
 the second volume of Mr. Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 143 
 
 Now a number of facts are alleged in support 
 of this theory, in themselves indisputably true, 
 as well as of very much interest and importance, 
 and this may be said of theories in general, which 
 have been elaborated to a semblance of truth by 
 a succession of ingenious advocates. The 
 question to be determined is, are these facts 
 strictly appropriate to the theory which they are 
 brought to establish — that is, are they to be 
 accounted for solely on its principles? It has 
 been repeatedly and, as we conceive, successfully 
 argued, that they are equally compatible with 
 that apprehension of moral distinctions which is 
 allowed to be natural to the human mind, and 
 
 of the Human Mind ; and also to a recent publication, en- 
 titled — " A Discourse on Ethics of the School of Paley, by 
 "William Smith, Esq." (Pickering.) The latter work, written 
 in a style better calculated to engage the attention of most 
 readers than the former, contains, in the compass of a few 
 pages, a very able exposition of this theory, which has never, 
 we believe, met with a more ingenious as well as eloquent 
 advocate. The author, however, considers the foundation of 
 religious belief to be strictly independent of the principles of 
 morals. " The Christian," he observes, " is not a religious 
 man because he is a moral being, but he practises morality 
 from motives which no system of ethics can supply." This 
 opinion is peculiar and, it may readily be perceived, has affected 
 the tone of his sentiments. He is manifestly solicitous that 
 the system he defends may appear to be entirely consistent 
 with an independent love of virtue, and may harmonize with 
 the feelings of those who practise it for its own sake ; occa- 
 sionally breathing a spirit far from kindred, we conceive, to 
 the school which he advocates ; — a school we must add, which, 
 it were easy to prove, is not that of Paley. 
 
144 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 is actually prevalent in the world ; while it leaves 
 that apprehension itself most imperfectly or 
 altogether unexplained. But it seems most 
 important, in the first place, to a correct appre- 
 ciation of this theory, as an explanation of our 
 moral judgments, to ascertain what that is for 
 which, it would lead us to conclude, a man is 
 judged to be upright and virtuous — that for 
 which he actually obtains the moral approbation 
 of mankind, whether they are cognizant of the 
 qualities for which they award it him or not ; 
 for, as it was expressly premised in our first 
 discourse, the prevailing conclusion of mankind, 
 that there exists an original independent 
 standard of moral rectitude, is derived, not from 
 their actual feelings and conduct, but from their 
 judgment as to what is " right" in their feelings 
 and conduct — derived from the understanding 
 in its discernment of what is morally approvable 
 in their dispositions and practices. — We shall 
 afterwards consider the process of mind, by 
 which the current apprehension of merit and 
 demerit in human beings is accounted for by the 
 advocates of this theory, and the nature of the 
 evidence by which, as they allege, it is explained 
 and disposed of. 
 
 But before we proceed to these topics, it 
 should be remembered that, in premising, in our 
 first discourse, the necessity of distinguishing, in 
 our inquiries into the principles of morals, 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 145 
 
 between that which is actually felt and done by 
 mankind, and that which is judged to be right in 
 their feelings and doings, we anticipated a mode 
 of reasoning which seems to have been, more 
 than any other, adopted in support of the theory 
 in question, and which consists in collecting a 
 number of instances tending to show that indi- 
 viduals are actually and powerfully and, we are 
 called to infer, exclusively influenced in their 
 conduct by a regard to the sanctions and favour 
 of society. 1 That important distinction it is not 
 our purpose to insist upon in the present dis- 
 course ; but we must remark that it deserves a 
 particular observation in estimating the sufficiency 
 of the ethical theory in question. We should 
 keep it in view, especially, when specific instances 
 are laid before us, in which the pleasurable or 
 painful feelings which men experience, in reflect- 
 ing on the moral quality of their own actions, 
 are alleged to be irreconcilable with the con- 
 clusion that actions are right or wrong intrin- 
 sically ; and which are brought forward to 
 prove, on the contrary, that our notions of merit 
 and demerit are traceable to nothing more than 
 the requirements and sanctions of society. In 
 reference to all such instances, it should be 
 inquired whether the pleasurable and painful 
 feelings are the whole of the moral phenomena : 
 
 1 P. 17. 
 
 L 
 
146 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 whether there is not a judgment approving or 
 disapproving the feelings themselves. 1 
 
 We may here, moreover, take some notice of 
 a fact alleged in support of this theory, which, 
 vague as it is in its character, and irrelevant, as 
 we conceive, to the question at issue, appears, 
 
 A strong instance of this nature is alleged in the following 
 statement : — " It is a fact which will not be disputed, that there 
 is a vast difference between the remorse felt when a crime 
 has been actually committed, and when its perpetration, 
 though fully resolved on, has been accidentally defeated. The 
 real murderer experiences a very different remorse from him 
 whose murderous intention has been balked by some unlooked- 
 for occurrence. In this last person, the sentiment of remorse 
 may be almost entirely overpowered by one of joy, at having 
 escaped the commission of so heinous and penal an offence. 
 Yet the guilt, all moralists tell us, lies in the intention, which 
 in both individuals might have been equally determined, 
 equally malignant. How is this to be explained ? On our 
 system the solution is at hand. The intention of an agent is, 
 indeed, that which the judgment of a rational society is chiefly 
 levelled against — the intention is the very cause of the injury, 
 and it betrays a mind within likely to be the source of similar 
 injuries ; but while society directs its displeasure to the inten- 
 tion of the criminal, with the criminal himself, it is not his 
 intention, but the judgment of society that is the source of that 
 moral awe by which he is impressed. While, therefore, 
 nothing but a murderous thought, hidden from all observers, 
 has passed through his mind, he is free ; if he is not a religious 
 man, he goes on his way quite at liberty." (Discourse on 
 Ethics, p. 34.) Now, taking this statement without question 
 or qualification, what does it amount to ? Simply this — that a 
 person who, intending to commit the crime of murder, is pre- 
 vented from carrying his intention into execution, is not 
 affected, pained, and shocked in his feelings in reflecting on 
 his intention to commit that crime ; and that, on the contrary, 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 147 
 
 notwithstanding, to produce some impression in 
 its favour. It is that our moral sentiments are 
 the growth of a state of society. Now a state 
 of society is so essential to inform and cultivate 
 the human mind, and so intimately involved in 
 the very conception of our rational nature, that 
 man, as a perfectly isolated being, is a creature 
 
 he may rejoice in his escape from the punishment which 
 he placed himself in danger of incurring. The writer does 
 not state — and could he state ? — that the individual in ques- 
 tion deliberately judges himself innocent notwithstanding his 
 intention to commit the crime ; or even that he does not 
 judge himself, in foro conscientice, equally guilty as if he 
 had effected his intention ; nay more, that he will not, at a 
 future period, if he do not even already, judge the present 
 state of his mind to be morally wrong, to be wanting in 
 the compunction due for guilt. But indeed, with reference 
 to the fact itself stated by the author, we might inquire, 
 whether the intention itself is not, of necessity, made more 
 manifest to the individual who formed it by its having been 
 embodied in action ; at least whether, since it has not pro- 
 ceeded into act, there be not some inlet to a presumption on 
 his part, that the intention itself was not completed. There 
 are other considerations to be taken into the account, but our 
 object is to point attention to the important distinction over- 
 looked in this example, as in numerous instances of a like 
 nature. — A stress is often laid upon the lax morality practised 
 by men collectively, or when united in bodies, especially in 
 nations — that is, when there is no dread of society to deter 
 them from injustice. Of such lax morality there can be no 
 doubt ; but if the dread of society be the source of our ideas 
 of what is wrong, what is " worthy" of punishment, whence is 
 it that we have come to perceive and remark, if not to despise 
 and abhor, this lax morality of bodies of men — of whole 
 societies — of nations ? 
 
 L 2 
 
148 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 of which we have strictly no knowledge, and 
 must strive to imagine. We can derive but 
 little help then, towards the elucidation of our 
 moral sentiments, from the fact that they are 
 the growth of a state of society. Unquestionably 
 they are so, together with immeasurably the 
 larger portion of human ideas and feelings, as 
 plants are the product of the soil ; but if it were 
 sought to ascertain the nature and properties 
 of one plant in particular, would any one state, 
 in explanation, that it sprung from the earth, or 
 was found in the bed of universal vegetation ? 
 But more particularly — in our intercourse and 
 transactions one with another we judge some 
 actions to be different in their nature from 
 others ; a difference which we signify by the 
 terms " right" and " wrong." A question is raised 
 as to the purport of these judgments, and the 
 design of the Creator in so constituting the 
 human mind as that we naturally and universally 
 form such judgments. To affirm, then, that they 
 are the growth of society is, in effect, to affirm 
 nothing more than that without society such a 
 question could never have occurred ; for the 
 actions themselves could never have been per- 
 formed which we judge to be different in their 
 nature, and pronounce to be right or wrong. 
 Such an affirmation can only divert attention 
 from the question itself; for surely, it would not 
 be maintained, a 'priori, that human beings could 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 149 
 
 not be so constituted as to acquire that real 
 personal rectitude, of which they are commonly 
 believed to be capable, in a state of society ; or 
 that a state of society could not be introductory 
 to a sense of duty to the Creator — could not be 
 a school of religion. 
 
 But, as we have said, in dealing with this 
 theory we are principally concerned to elicit the 
 conclusion, which it necessarily involves, as to 
 what that is which procures to an individual a 
 moral approbation, and is termed his moral recti- 
 tude. For, we apprehend, this theory is indebted 
 for a certain degree of plausibility, and the measure 
 of acceptance which it obtains, to nothing so 
 much as this, that its chief distinction and peculi- 
 arity, that in which it essentially differs from the 
 common persuasion on the subject, as well as 
 the primary assumptions of the Scripture, is, in a 
 great measure, concealed under the guise of the 
 ordinary phraseology relating to the subject of 
 morals : that phraseology calling up ideas in 
 connexion with the theory in question, which 
 appertain to an essentially different construction 
 of the moral judgments. What then is that 
 which, according to this account of our moral 
 judgments, would entitle an individual, or which 
 actually procures to him, a moral approbation 
 for actions denominated right and virtuous — 
 that which constitutes his merit or moral recti- 
 tude. This, in the prevailing apprehension of 
 
150 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 virtue, must be looked for in the dispositions by 
 which he is actuated in performing them. Now 
 the more able advocates of this theory, it has 
 been already intimated, have laid some stress on 
 the principle of sympathy, or the fact that we 
 naturally participate the pains and pleasures, the 
 suffering and enjoyment, of others ; that we have 
 kind affections, a spontaneous benevolence, inte- 
 resting us in the welfare of our fellow-creatures. 
 But it should be considered, and indeed it is 
 implied in this theory, that such affections, 
 however essential to the constitution of human 
 nature, in its moral as well as other capacities, 
 cannot be objects of a moral approbation, unless 
 subordinated to rules of conduct which con- 
 template the safety and well-being of the whole 
 community. A parent, for example, may be ex- 
 quisitely alive to the pains and pleasures of his 
 offspring; but his sensibility in their behalf is 
 the reverse of virtuous, if it impels him to defraud 
 the families of others in order to enrich his own. 
 Indeed our sympathy in general is, in itself, a 
 most uncertain index of the moral character. 
 It may be enlisted on the side of vice, as well as 
 in the cause of virtue ; it may be given to the 
 authors, as well as the sufferers, of injustice ; it 
 may kindle with and extend the worst passions 
 of our nature. Undeniably, the natural affections 
 and a spontaneous benevolence, as it is called, 
 are properly subject to a moral regulation, and 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 151 
 
 are virtuous only so far as they are really so 
 subject. What then, according to the theory 
 under discussion, is that disposition in the strength 
 and predominance of which an individual subor- 
 dinates to rules of conduct, instituted for the 
 benefit of the whole community, his inclinations 
 and propensities in general, including his natural 
 tendency to enter into and participate the feel- 
 ings of others ? — What is that disposition which 
 bears the name of virtue ? Now this, it must be 
 farther considered, is not a desire of that happi- 
 ness to society which his actions and course of 
 life are actually calculated to promote ; for we 
 are not here disputing that account of virtue 
 which resolves it into the exercise of a principle 
 of general benevolence. Nor is it a voluntary 
 and habitual subjection to a law of equity, dic- 
 tating to ourselves the same conduct towards 
 others, as it would lead us to demand from others 
 towards ourselves ; it is not a ready acquiescence 
 in that law — not a moral sympathy, as it may 
 be truly called in distinction from a natural sym- 
 pathy, which, according to this theory, com- 
 mands a moral approbation ; nor, as we have 
 remarked, is it a prevailing desire to augment 
 the general happiness. These are principles of 
 human conduct which its teachers hold to be 
 entirely imaginary, and to have no place in the 
 efforts and career of virtue. They maintain, as 
 we have seen, that the sense of moral obligation 
 
152 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 is created by the resistance which is made by 
 society to conduct prejudicial to its welfare, and 
 the encouragement which it offers to conduct of a 
 directly opposite tendency. It follows then that 
 the " moral rectitude" of a man consists in his 
 yielding to that resistance, and responding to 
 that encouragement. He is virtuous in shrink- 
 ing from the commission of a crime, because 
 he shrinks from the punishment which society 
 threatens to inflict, in one mode or other, on its 
 perpetrator ; and he is virtuous in aspiring to 
 deeds of justice and beneficence, because he 
 aspires to its applause and favour, and expects 
 that he shall, sooner or later, obtain them. We 
 repeat, in judging of this theory, it is, in the first 
 place and principally, essential that this import 
 which it would compel us to attach to the term 
 " rectitude/' this conclusion, as to what that is 
 for which we approve ourselves or others, should 
 be steadily and even pertinaciously detained 
 before the mind ; for, as we have said, it is con- 
 tinually escaping from our view, — while some- 
 thing, in the shape and mask of virtue, passes, in a 
 manner, for virtue itself, which could only move 
 contempt and loathing, but that it disguises and 
 arrays itself in the full and flowing robe of the 
 ancient and universal phraseology. 
 
 To take an example — a good name, a fair repu- 
 tation, is an element of our happiness second to 
 none in our relation to our fellow-creatures, or 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 15 
 
 o 
 
 on this side the grave. It is commonly regarded 
 and spoken of as a reward " due " to virtue ; and 
 one which, speaking generally, or in auspicious 
 times like the present, it may reasonably expect, 
 at some period, to obtain. Accordingly, in the 
 pursuit of this great object of human desire, the 
 counsel universally given to us, is, to act in such 
 a manner as to deserve it ; not merely to seem 
 virtuous, but to be so ; not merely to pretend to 
 the qualities of moral excellence, but really to 
 possess them. Now it merits observation, that 
 the advocates of the theory in question would 
 give us this counsel, and give it in precisely the 
 same language ; but are we, or they, immediately 
 aware that according to their account of moral 
 obligation, to " deserve the approbation of so- 
 ciety," and to " take the surest course to obtain 
 it," are but different expressions for precisely the 
 same thing. In common speech, when it is said 
 of an individual that he " deserves " universal 
 approbation, it is intended to signify his pos- 
 session of a quality distinct from the wish and 
 endeavour to obtain that approbation, and capa- 
 ble of existing, in the highest degree, though the 
 desire of esteem and commendation, with which 
 it is generally and intimately blended, may be felt 
 very feebly and, possibly, not at all. In the 
 theory in question, there is no recognition of 
 such a quality whatsoever. The moral obliga- 
 tion to perform a class of actions is created, as 
 
154 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 has just been said,, by society demanding and 
 rewarding them, and obviously the " desert " of 
 its approbation must consist in the fulfilment of 
 the moral obligation. It follows that to deserve 
 approval, to merit reward from society, is no- 
 thing more than to nourish a desire and to put 
 forth efforts to obtain it. To possess, and not 
 merely to pretend to, virtue, is to be in reality, 
 or practically, swayed by a desire of the general 
 approbation, and not merely to pretend to act 
 under its influence and ascendancy. Of course, 
 as the duty to abstain from vicious acts, from 
 acts pernicious to society, is brought into exist- 
 ence by society itself forbidding and punishing 
 them, to deserve the reproach and hostility of 
 society, by committing such acts, must signify 
 precisely this — to expose ourselves to an immi- 
 nent danger of incurring them. It is common 
 to speak of a self-approbation in the remem- 
 brance that we have done our duty, or the 
 consciousness of virtuous feelings and intentions. 
 It must be kept in view that the philosophy we 
 are now contemplating brings into light no other 
 matter for self-approbation, and the satisfaction 
 which attends it, than an ever-present predomi- 
 nating desire of retaining the countenance of 
 society, or augmenting our share of its favourable 
 regard. To urge this topic no farther, it must 
 be sufficiently manifest that, in dealing with this 
 theory of ethics, we do not readily distinguish 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 155 
 
 its specific and peculiar import ; and that 
 what is most necessary, in order to appreciate 
 its merits, is to determine the meaning which 
 it would compel us to place on the language 
 current among us on the subject : that language 
 being, evidently, the medium through which 
 we discover whether, and how far, the exposition 
 which it has given us of our moral judgments be 
 similar, or wholly foreign and opposite, to our 
 own. 1 
 
 1 That we have not unnecessarily pressed this point must 
 be evident, we conceive, if the endeavour be made to discrimi- 
 nate that import which would be actually conveyed by the 
 current language in morals, or which should be reasonably 
 affixed to it, if this theory were accepted as true. — " There 
 is," observes an author alluded to in a former note, " but one 
 sure way of obtaining the approbation of men, namely, by 
 deserving it, by really possessing, and not only pretending to 
 those qualities on which it is bestowed. And praise, when 
 gained in any other way, and divorced from the consciousness of 
 deserving it, is a momentary, precarious gratification, alloyed, 
 even while it lasts, with anticipations of a retributive contempt 
 and indignation." (Discourse on Ethics, p. 18.) Again, Mr. 
 Mill, in describing the conflict of feelings in the mind of a man 
 when tempted to commit a great crime, particularizes, as a mo- 
 tive calculated to deter him, his dread of ' ' the moral indignation 
 of mankind," and " the future reproaches of his own mind." 
 Elsewhere he speaks of " deeds which incur the execration of 
 mankind, and of the " agonizing state of remorse." Now it is 
 not, we imagine, till the reader of this language, in an exposition 
 of the theory before us, has reflected a little, that he becomes 
 distinctly apprised that, if this theory be correct, what is com- 
 monly signified by " desert " of retribution, by " guilt " incur- 
 ring a moral indignation, has no existence, and that the notion 
 of its existence is verily caused by that moral indignation and 
 
156 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 That the theory before us gives an interpreta- 
 tion of our moral judgments, which, in no degree, 
 supports the conclusion that God requires us to 
 practise virtue, that he has laid his commandment 
 upon us as voluntary agents, and that we are 
 subject to his approval and disapproval, we need 
 
 retribution, so called, which particular actions are said to 
 " deserve." Nothing, however, can be more explanatory of 
 such language, consistently with the principles of this theory, 
 than the construction placed upon it by Mr. Mill himself; and 
 the following passage might have spared us the endeavour to 
 bring into the light what that is which his ethical philosophy 
 decorates with the name of virtue, or brands with the name of 
 crime : — " The man who does acts of justice and beneficence," 
 — (that is, in the words of the same author, " acts which are 
 useful to others in the first instance") — anticipates the favour- 
 able dispositions of mankind as their natural effect ; and this 
 association is his belief, or conviction, or sense (he calls it by 
 all those names), of deserving the favourable sentiments of 
 mankind. The man, on the other hand, who performs acts 
 which are unjust and hurtful to others — (and, be it remem- 
 bered here that, according to the same author, unjust acts are 
 those which are hurtful to others in the first instance) — 
 " anticipates the unfavourable and hostile sentiments of man- 
 kind, as the natural consequents of his acts ; in other words, 
 has the belief, or conviction, or sense (for the association in 
 this case also has these various names), of deserving, not well, 
 but ill, at the hands of other men." The import then which 
 distinguishes this theory, is, that our conviction of deserving 
 well or ill by our conduct, of " deserving " commendation or 
 reproach, is significant of nothing really existing in our volun- 
 tary agency ; but is strictly the effect of the favourable or 
 unfavourable disposition excited by actions, by intentions, by 
 volitions, useful or hurtful to society. On what evidence this 
 is established, and the merit or demerit of mankind ascertained 
 to be nullities, is yet to be considered. 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 157 
 
 hardly stop to remark or allow. If the ruling 
 disposition for which we approve ourselves in a 
 course of virtue, so called, turns out, on reflection, 
 to be nothing more than the product of motives 
 brought into being by the care and exertions of 
 society to adapt the conduct of its members to its 
 own security and advancement, — if we have made 
 the discovery that that disposition is, strictly, a 
 predominating desire to conciliate the favourable 
 regard of the community, then is it far from being 
 a deduction of reason that we are the subjects of a 
 moral law, enjoined upon us by the Creator ; and 
 that we serve and obey him, as well as promote 
 our personal welfare, by a mastery of the passions, 
 and a pursuit of moral excellence. Society is 
 making large and incessant demands, not on the 
 virtues only, but also on the talents, of its members; 
 and divers are the rewards which it holds out to 
 stimulate their intellectual exertions ; but, much 
 as it may applaud the works of genius, and idolize 
 the men who produce them, it were something 
 new to conclude, that in yielding to such incen- 
 tives to the cultivation of their peculiar powers, 
 individuals were responding to the claim of the 
 Creator upon them as voluntary agents, and earn- 
 ing a title to the peculiar favour of Heaven. If 
 such be the source of our moral perceptions and 
 feelings, it must be evident that God has left the 
 practice of virtue, and the culture of the moral 
 powers, to the same stimulus and support as he 
 
158 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 has left the attainment of general knowledge,, and 
 the progress of science and the arts ; to the spur 
 of wants and the importunity of desires, which 
 give no intimations of an authority over us higher 
 than human, or of consequences beyond the pre- 
 sent life. The defect of practical goodness among 
 mankind is to be supplied, not by dwelling upon 
 the supremacy of God and our absolute depend- 
 ence on his power and beneficence, but by ren- 
 dering individuals more keenly and continually 
 alive to their dependence on their fellow-creatures, 
 or to the sentiments of society towards them. 
 
 Now regarding this account of the sense of 
 duty in its bearing on the credibility of Christ- 
 ianity, a fact has been adverted to of essential 
 importance, namely, that it is the reverse of im- 
 mediate and spontaneous ; that it stands opposed 
 to the ordinary apprehension ; and is propounded 
 as the result of a close inspection of the human 
 mind, or a special inquiry into its laws and 
 operations. This, we say, is a fact of essential 
 importance ; for otherwise there would have been 
 an objection to Christianity, and one apparently 
 insuperable, in the very existence of this theory. 
 It was premised, in our first discourse, that if 
 propositions, forming the ground-work of the 
 Christian religion, be seriously maintainable in 
 virtue of their conformity to our moral judgments, 
 these judgments must convey that signification 
 which Christianity annexes to them with a cor- 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 159 
 
 responding strength and universality of evidence : 
 they must be easily and universally intelligible in 
 that sense in which they are found to answer and 
 corroborate the appeal made to them in the 
 Scriptures. On the supposition that they were 
 otherwise, that they were of dubious import or 
 readily admitted of divers interpretations, it is in 
 no degree probable that God would have called 
 our attention to them as significant or confirma- 
 tory of his government over us ; or as supplying 
 ground for believing, with reference to any rule 
 of conduct, that it was enjoined upon us by his 
 authority, or with reference to any doctrines 
 calculated to promote the observance of such 
 precepts, that they were matter of divine com- 
 munication. That this theory, then, so adverse 
 to the principles of natural religion assumed in 
 the Scripture, should obtain a measure of accept- 
 ance, is in itself far from being conclusive against 
 their truth and reality ; propounded, as it is, with 
 a full admission that the notion of moral obliga- 
 tion to which it is opposed is naturally, and indeed 
 unavoidably, suggested to the understanding, as 
 well as commonly prevalent among mankind. 
 Our concern then is merely with the evidence on 
 which this theory is supposed to be established, 
 and we accordingly proceed to inquire in what 
 manner its advocates have explained, and endea- 
 voured to confute, that notion of moral obligation 
 which, as they must confess, is most powerfully 
 
160 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 pressed upon our attention by its force and pre- 
 valency in the human mind, and, as we conceive, 
 so impressively corroborative of the principles of 
 human duty inculcated in the Scripture. 
 
 But here we must first observe, that the notion 
 of moral obligation which by far the major por- 
 tion of mankind actually entertain, is greatly more 
 prevalent, and deeply-seated, and strictly contradic- 
 tory to the theory in question, than its advocates 
 appear to be aware. When, for example, we 
 insist that that satisfaction which is the fruit of 
 upright conduct, and that remorse which is the 
 consequence of crime, are felt in a degree and 
 under circumstances which would be unaccount- 
 able if this theory were true, — in what manner 
 do they answer the objection ? By alleging that 
 such feelings are the result of religion, not of 
 morality. The answer proves them to be im- 
 perfectly apprized of the extent and tenacity of 
 that specific conception of virtue which they are 
 labouring to supplant. It is true, such feelings are, 
 immediately, the effect of our religious appre- 
 hensions ; but if our religious apprehensions — if 
 our belief that God takes judicial cognizance of 
 our actions be, itself, originated or sustained by a 
 persuasion that we approve our conduct, or judge 
 it to be right in its own nature, irrespective of 
 the demands and sanctions of society, the satis- 
 faction and remorse alluded to bear testimony to 
 the depth and fixedness of this particular per- 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 161 
 
 suasion ; and it follows, not that such feelings 
 are the growth of religion in distinction from 
 morality, but that they result from a view of 
 morality essentially different from that which 
 this theory propounds and undertakes to esta- 
 blish. Our idea of the Deity as the Governor 
 and Judge of mankind is, precisely, that idea of 
 him which grows up under and is nourished by a 
 conviction that our moral judgments are caused 
 by a difference in actions themselves, and not by 
 the effects which they are known to produce 
 upon the feelings and conduct of the community 
 towards the agent ; and, speaking generally, we 
 may safely affirm, that inasmuch as persons are 
 actuated in their conduct towards their fellow- 
 creatures by a regard to the authority of God, 
 they are fully possessed with this conviction ; 
 nay more, that, to most reflective persons, this 
 conviction is held to be essential to support the 
 belief of a religious obligation to virtue. Why 
 otherwise, indeed, should writers on ethics who 
 assert the fallacy of this conviction be commonly 
 suspected, whether correctly or not, of attempts 
 to undermine the belief of our accountableness 
 to the Deity, and to dissipate the idea of a future 
 retribution ? 
 
 But it may be said, let the conviction that 
 actions are right and wrong, in themselves con- 
 sidered, be ever so general and tenacious, and 
 likewise apt to excite or coalesce with our belief 
 
 M 
 
] 62 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 of God's dominion over us as moral agents,, the 
 supposition is not inadmissible that such a con- 
 viction may rest upon no foundation in the 
 nature of things ; may be altogether an illusion ; 
 and one completely accounted for by the theory 
 in question. Undoubtedly the supposition, how- 
 ever foreign or apparently irreconcilable to the 
 views and feelings of mankind in general, may be 
 allowed. But we have not to deal with a sup- 
 position merely ; the supposition is presumed to 
 be verified by facts, to be established on evidence. 
 We proceed to inquire by what facts, by what 
 evidence ? We are looking, it will be observed, at 
 that persuasion which has taken hold upon man- 
 kind for the most part that, in their conduct, one 
 to another, they are under a moral obligation to 
 abstain from some actions, and to perform others, 
 which is incumbent upon them in virtue of the 
 constitution of their nature ; an obligation, there- 
 fore, which it is perfectly consistent society, man- 
 kind collectively, should recognise and enforce ; 
 but which it did not, properly speaking, create ; 
 and which it recognises and enforces in its instru- 
 mentality to the designs of that Being, who is as 
 certainly the Founder of human society as he is 
 the Creator of the world. In this persuasion it 
 is that they experience a peculiar satisfaction in 
 the practice of the right, which associated and 
 blended, as it is, with the pleasurable assurance 
 that they have obtained, or may expect to obtain ^ 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 163 
 
 the commendation and favour of society, is derived 
 from another source — derived from principles 
 in the human mind which it pertains to a state 
 of society to call forth, to nourish, and mature ; 
 but which society no more originates, than it 
 originates the natural inclinations and passions 
 of individuals, or their intellectual powers, — no 
 more than it creates those elements of our nature, 
 out of which it is itself formed, and by which it 
 subsists. It lies then upon the advocates of the 
 theory under discussion, to explain in what man- 
 ner this persuasion is generated in the human 
 mind, if, as they maintain, there is no foundation 
 for it in the nature of things. 
 
 Now, they are not here compelled to have re- 
 course to vague and general affirmations, touching 
 the association of ideas or the power of habit, nor 
 have they any reason or pretext, so far as we 
 can judge, to assign any particular process of the 
 mind which it would be difficult, even to reflect- 
 ing persons, and would require their own meta- 
 physical acumen, and power of mental analysis, 
 to trace and comprehend. That specific operation 
 of habit which they must suppose to have taken 
 place, and to have superinduced the conviction 
 of which we are speaking, is illustrated by nume- 
 rous and well-known examples. Few facts are 
 more familiar to observers of human nature than 
 this : — we are led to presume an intrinsic value in 
 things which, at first, were objects of desire only 
 
 ii 2 
 
164 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 because we perceived them to be instrumental 
 to the attainment of something farther ; and 
 also that, in a similar manner, we are brought to 
 experience a pleasure and satisfaction in the mere 
 performance of actions which, in the first instance, 
 were regarded as steps to ulterior advantage, and 
 were occasions of pleasure and satisfaction only 
 by exciting the hope and expectation of some 
 future good. To take an example no less appo- 
 site to the question before us than it is familiar 
 to general observation — men are urged to the 
 pursuit of gain as the means of subsistence or of 
 procuring accommodations and luxuries without 
 number ; but how much of the love of wealth 
 actually prevailing in the world may be perceived 
 to exist independently of those powerful induce- 
 ments to obtain it, and to extend no farther 
 than the act or occupation itself of acquiring and 
 amassing treasure. To the miser, the realized 
 value of riches is precisely of this nature. We 
 perceive the same operation of habit in the at- 
 tainment of languages. These are held to be 
 properly desirable as the medium of acquainting 
 ourselves with the minds of men of other nations 
 and ages, or of establishing an intercommunity 
 of ideas with some other portion of our species ; 
 but the ardent and successful study of a language 
 is universally found to create a gratification in 
 the act itself, of learning and remembering the 
 meaning of terms and phrases ; a gratification 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 165 
 
 which, in some instances, is even allowed to pre- 
 dominate over the original desire of knowledge, 
 as well as the disposition to impart information 
 to others. We perceive it also and remarkably 
 exemplified in the observance of the outward 
 forms of religion. These are properly instru- 
 mental to a spirit of devotion, and to practical 
 religion ; it is concluded, we presume, by the most 
 intelligent believers of Christianity that such 
 forms have been instituted expressly for this rea- 
 son, and that otherwise the spirit of piety would 
 have been left to its own spontaneous expressions. 
 Notwithstanding, we are confessedly prone to 
 rest in the forms of religion themselves ; to find 
 contentment in the appointed means of religious 
 improvement ; in a comparative indifference to 
 the effects which they actually produce on the 
 heart and conduct. Now, if the theory under 
 examination be correct, a similar process must 
 have taken place in the formation of the moral 
 judgments. The Known undeniable fact, that 
 mankind experience a pleasure in the perform- 
 ance itself of actions denominated virtuous, or 
 derive a peculiar satisfaction merely from the 
 consciousness of performing them, must be one 
 of a large number of instances, in which that 
 which was necessary or desirable as a means to 
 an end, is raised into an object of independent 
 importance, and ultimate regard. 
 
 The preference of virtue, for its own sake, as 
 
166 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 it is called, is superinduced upon the mind by 
 its being habitually regarded and practised as 
 the necessary and certain means of avoiding the 
 hatred and opposition of society, and of engaging 
 the regard and favour of our fellow-creatures ; 
 just as the love of wealth, for its own sake, is 
 superinduced by those natural wants and impor- 
 tunate wishes which wealth is essential to satisfy, 
 and the indulgence of which is allowed, in a 
 rational estimation, to constitute the real use 
 and worth of riches. That such is the cause of 
 an apparently original and independent obligation 
 to the practice of virtue, is a supposition which, 
 of course, may be allowably made, and, in some 
 points of view, may assume a certain appearance 
 of probability, What motives or desires, it may 
 be asked, are more actually coercive, on the one 
 hand, or more effectually alluring and persuasive, 
 on the other, as well as more incessant and 
 abiding, than those which are here presumed to 
 deter men from vice, and to attract them to 
 virtue ? Is the pressure of want itself more 
 urgent or prevailing than the dread of infamy ? 
 Or are there any pleasures more highly appre- 
 ciated than the mental luxury of praise and 
 adulation ? Can you wonder, it may be asked, 
 can you demur to allow, that desires so powerful 
 and so constant should invest those rules of 
 conduct, which they operate to enforce, with the 
 authority ascribed to the dictates of the con- 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 167 
 
 science,— an authority apparently underived and 
 self-existent, unchanging and supreme, — should 
 stamp a seemingly intrinsic and enduring worth 
 on those actions, by means of which such desires 
 obtain their repose and satisfaction ? l 
 
 1 It is satisfactory to know that this is the particular pro- 
 cess of habit and association to which our deceptive idea of 
 the merit or demerit of our own conduct, with the pleasurable 
 or painful feelings attending it, is attributed. " It is," Mr. 
 Mill observes, " a matter of common and constant experience, 
 that we have associations of painful consequences with the 
 idea of the unfavourable disposition of our fellow- creatures, — 
 associations which constitute some of the most painful feelings 
 of our nature. This it is which is commonly expressed by the 
 terms — loss of reputation, loss of character, disgrace, infamy. 
 In some instances the association rises to that remarkable case, 
 which we have had frequent occasions of observing, when the 
 means become a more important object than the end, the cause 
 than the effect." (P. 248.) 
 
 In reference to the alleged supremacy of the conscience, the 
 author of the Discourse on Ethics (p. 11) inquires — "What is 
 there in this claim put forth by the moral sentiment to supre- 
 macy and command, which does not inevitably follow from that 
 origin here assigned to it ? A sentiment imposed on us from 
 without, by the voice of parents, neighbours, society — re- 
 straining oftentimes our strongest propensities — how can it 
 fail to have an air of authority, and authority of a very different 
 kind from the desires it controls ? What else is it but a com- 
 mand ? What but domination ? We may reject its control ; 
 we may cavil at its sentence ; we may refuse to be governed ; 
 but we cannot make it other than a command, a governing 
 power— it is this or nothing." Specious and imposing— but a 
 bold arrogation this to society, of the supremacy claimed for 
 the conscience — considering how much in the moral life passes 
 under the review of conscience, of which, in the conviction of 
 the self-approving or self-condemning mind, society will never 
 
168 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 We shall answer such a question by proposing 
 another. Why do mankind in general admit 
 the reality of such a process of the mind in the 
 examples adverted to, and alleged to be ana- 
 logous to the present ? Why do they allow that 
 the worth supposed to inhere in riches, or the 
 pleasure experienced in simply acquiring and 
 accumulating them, is derived and secondary ? 
 Do they admit this in virtue of an antecedent 
 probability, or merely because there are certain 
 laws of association in the mind, the effect of 
 which is to lend to objects an apparently inhe- 
 rent character, which in reality does not belong 
 to them, and is entirely reflected upon them 
 from some other quarter ? No ; they admit it 
 because they retrace such a process in this par- 
 ticular instance ; and that they do retrace it is 
 made evident in the consequence which follows — 
 they discern an intrinsic worth in wealth no 
 longer. So, in other instances, they do not 
 merely hear, or read, or regard as possible or 
 very likely, that an object apt to be considered 
 intrinsically valuable is actually not so — they are 
 
 be cognizant ; and how much, besides, which, though society 
 may know, it is, if not careless to applaud and recompense, 
 yet powerless to punish or to censure, being itself tried and 
 found guilty at the very tribunal which this author maintains 
 to be its own. However, it must in all candour be allowed to 
 him, that he is determined mankind shall suffer no diminution 
 in their virtue, from their adoption of his theory on ethics, if 
 it be in his power to prevent it. 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 169 
 
 convinced it is not so by their own reflections. 
 They abstract the object from the benefits which 
 it serves to procure,, and with which it is closely 
 associated in their habitual apprehension, and 
 they perceive, with the eyes of their own under- 
 standing, that it is this association which gives 
 it an illusive appearance of intrinsic worth, and 
 independent existence. The consequence is, 
 that however the illusion may recur, and what- 
 ever hold it may occasionally take upon their 
 feelings, they are deliberately certain that it is 
 an illusion. Now, if they who assert that the 
 supposed approvableness of virtue, for its own 
 sake, is completely explained by those important 
 particular uses which are ascribed to it in the 
 theory under consideration, — if they have con- 
 templated virtue specifically, apart from those 
 uses, and perceived it, in consequence, to be 
 divested of every attribute commanding appro- 
 bation and esteem, and to become indifferent to 
 their moral perceptions and feelings, just as 
 wealth is perceived to be of no worth, or unde- 
 serving of its name, when regarded otherwise than 
 as the means of procuring the accommodations 
 and luxuries of life, — we have nothing to reply, 
 and must withdraw from the controversy, how- 
 ever it may surprise us, that the result of their 
 reflections upon virtue should be so essentially 
 different from that of our own. But we would 
 press them with the question, whether they have 
 
170 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 ascertained this result ? in other words, whether 
 they have actually tried and proved their theory 
 by its conformity with their own experience and 
 consciousness ? We protest against receiving a 
 theory in explanation of phenomena in the 
 moral world, anv more than in the natural world, 
 merely because it is proposed — and proposed 
 with whatever plausibility or likelihood — before 
 it has been made specifically evident to the un- 
 derstanding. When a substance, long regarded 
 as a simple one, is affirmed to be a compound 
 body, the affirmation is not believed, at least by 
 those who are engaged in resolving compound 
 bodies, till it has been proved, more or less 
 directly, to the senses ; and this, notwithstanding 
 it may be alleged that a number of substances 
 as apparently simple, and formerly judged to be 
 so, have been discovered to be otherwise. The 
 idea of moral rectitude has been long, and is 
 still generally, held to be one of an essentially 
 peculiar nature. It is affirmed, however, to be 
 the product of others, with no one of which it 
 appears to have affinity. We submit that the 
 assertion be verified, by the only test which 
 can be applied to such assertions — the reflection 
 of the mind itself on its own operations. The 
 truth, we suspect, is, that the application of such 
 a test to their own theory, is among the last 
 things which engage the attention of its sup- 
 porters. In disputing a proper reality in moral 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 171 
 
 distinctions,, they appear to be chiefly occupied 
 in considering, not what they perceive of moral 
 qualities in themselves and others, but how they 
 perceive them, or may be supposed to perceive 
 them; not in using the organ of moral vision, 
 so to speak, but in speculating on its form and 
 structure. At least, by their own admission, the 
 idea of an actual personal desert of praise or 
 blame, reward or punishment, retains a powerful 
 influence on the understanding, in spite of the 
 alleged detection of its fallacy ; and in contem- 
 plating the "virtues" and "vices" of mankind, 
 they are continually surprised with emotions of 
 admiration at the former, and disgust at the 
 latter, which seem inconsistent with their specu- 
 lative views of human agency in the department 
 of morals. What then we would insist upon is, 
 the necessity of a proper and decisive proof of 
 such a fallacy in the natural prevailing view of 
 moral obligation : — bearing in mind the consider- 
 ation which was urged in our first discourse, as 
 preliminary to the discussion of our subject, that 
 it is the very spontaneousness and tenacity of our 
 perceptions of a personal worthiness or delin- 
 quency in our conduct, which render them credible 
 and impressive tokens of the will of God, and of 
 his moral supremacy over us, and, consequently, 
 matter of solemn concernment with reference to 
 the especial claims of Christianity. 1 
 
 1 Pp. 'JO— 25. 
 
172 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 In conclusion, there is one admonition which 
 it is strictly our duty to offer to any who may 
 have embraced the theory of ethics in question, or, 
 rather, to any who may be engaged in the inves- 
 tigation of its principles ; since the adoption of it 
 leads in general, we do not say always, to a 
 rejection of our accountableness to the Supreme 
 Being, and a secret contempt of all practical reli- 
 gion. That admonition is, that in examining and 
 deciding upon the principles of morality, in their 
 presumed connexion with the duties of religion, 
 they regard themselves as personally and, it may 
 be, deeply concerned in the result of the exami- 
 nation ; inasmuch, we mean, as their discernment 
 of the truth may depend upon the actual use of 
 their own powers of intelligence — that is, upon 
 their own solicitude and endeavours to ascertain 
 the real constitution of their nature as moral 
 agents. The admonition, moreover, is imme- 
 diately needful, for the moral principles, as well 
 as other powers and susceptibilities of the human 
 mind, require, for their due development, a suffi- 
 cient exercise and their appropriate nurture ; and 
 there is no surer way of weakening their power, 
 than by undervaluing their character and impor- 
 tance ; no surer way of frustrating any efficacy 
 which may belong to them as monitions of reli- 
 gious duty, than by setting out in our career of life 
 with despising them. Let it be considered, them 
 that the man who questions his accountableness 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 173 
 
 to God, is either accountable to God or not at 
 the period of his questioning it. The conditions 
 of his moral agency are not suspended while 
 he is pondering that question, and will not be 
 in abeyance till he has determined it. We 
 are not assuming that he is accountable in the 
 consideration of that question for the use of 
 his faculties concerning it ; the sceptic, we are 
 aware, has here brought us into a position, in 
 which we cannot assert his duty to God in any 
 degree whatsoever, whether in the use of his 
 reason, or of any external possession. But, 
 on the other hand, it is premised that he may 
 be accountable ; and this while the question is 
 pending whether he be so or not. What then 
 is most of all needed on his part, is such a 
 measure of personal interest in the ascertainment 
 of the truth as may stimulate and enable him to 
 find it : for he must be aware, that the defence 
 of a theory, or the conduct of an argument, in 
 regard to this subject as well as others, is far from 
 implying, of necessity, a concern and effort to 
 discover truth. We have presumed, then, that he 
 believes the existence of God, and, consequently, 
 that he cannot but believe his utter dependence 
 upon him. What we would urge then is, that 
 he should entertain this consideration ; that he 
 should reflect, again and again, that his well- 
 being may be dependent, to an extent which he 
 cannot limit, on his conformity to the will and 
 
174 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 purpose of God in that constitution of his nature 
 which is here the subject of dispute and inquiry. 
 The consideration cannot be otherwise than 
 supremely proper, the question involving, ex- 
 pressly, the consequences which may be expected 
 to flow from our conduct in relation to the 
 Deity. We know that some are satisfied to 
 look upon man as little else than a very 
 credulous creature with regard to religion ; as 
 swayed almost entirely by his hopes and fears ; 
 the sport of imagination ; the prey of super- 
 stition. Hence they conclude that in forming 
 his conceptions of the Creator, he has been 
 guided by his first impressions, and accepted 
 such analogies as happened at once to present 
 themselves ; likening him, in consequence, to a 
 monarch among men; describing him as en- 
 throned in the heavens, as attended with a retinue 
 of superior beings, and as owning the world for 
 his empire. But whatever be attributed to the 
 credulity of man, or however we may choose 
 to account for his religious apprehensions, it 
 appears unquestionable that, so far as it is matter 
 of doubt or inquiry whether we be subject to the 
 moral government of God, it behoves us to con- 
 sider well that his favour towards us, and conse- 
 quently our personal and enduring welfare, may 
 be essentially dependent on our actual endeavour 
 to learn his will. The importance of some 
 powerful motive, operating as an adequate 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 175 
 
 stimulus to the faculties in the search and per- 
 ception of truth, is pressed upon our attention 
 by obvious undeniable facts, and the lessons of 
 daily experience ; and no reason, we are sure, 
 can be assigned why such a motive should be 
 superfluous, and not imperatively needful, for the 
 elicitation of truth in the inquiry before us — 
 needful for promoting a correct apprehension 
 of our experience as moral agents, and even for 
 disclosing the latent convictions of our own 
 minds. How powerfully our reflections on God 
 and futurity are actually calculated to bring out 
 to our view the characters of a law which he has 
 enjoined upon us, holy, just, and good ; and to 
 convince us of its reality, as well as to lay open 
 its extent — how far such reflections operate to 
 extinguish our doubts on this head, and to put 
 our scepticism to confusion, multitudes could 
 testify. Is this the effect of fear only — or 
 simply a dread of the power of God ? Can fear 
 convince a man that he is guilty and deserving 
 of punishment ? Is nothing else required to 
 constrain him to admit the reasonableness of the 
 precepts enjoined in the Scripture, or the justice 
 of its accusation against him ? Even if in some 
 instances this were credible, still a due considera- 
 tion of the consequences, which may flow from 
 the use of our own faculties on this momentous 
 question, cannot be otherwise than most con- 
 sistent and necessary. A spirit of levity or a 
 
176 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 state of indifference is here,, most evidently and 
 in the extreme, irrational, if there be any ground 
 for the question itself. — For let it be added for 
 the consideration of us all, that if to approve and 
 disapprove our own actions, to dictate the path 
 of duty and to pass judgment on our conduct, 
 instead of being a mode of thinking brought 
 about as this theory supposes, be a proper inde- 
 pendent function of the mind, it must assuredly 
 merit all that has ever been affirmed of its pre- 
 eminence and authority. The claims of the 
 conscience must be supreme ; and every one 
 may at once conclude that he is without excuse 
 in disregarding its dictates ; and that if he 
 thereby plunge himself into misery, here or here- 
 after, he cannot look for consolation in his own 
 mind. There can be no excuse for disobeying 
 rightful absolute authority : there can be no 
 solace in suffering the consequence of such 
 disobedience. It is a conclusion that admits 
 of no question, and allows of no qualification, 
 that " he that walketh uprightly walketh 
 surely." 1 
 
 The explanation given in the theory which we have dis- 
 cussed, of our idea of a personal merit or demerit, is a critical 
 point in an inquiry into the foundation of morals, and it may 
 not be useless to add a few remarks corroborative, as we appre- 
 hend, of its strictly hypothetical character, or of the deficiency of 
 actual proof in its favour. Let it again be considered that the 
 advocates of this theory, — Mr. Mill, for example, — in explain- 
 ing the notion of " praiseworthiness," does not allege an opera- 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 177 
 
 tion of the mind which, though we may not be conscious of 
 its taking place, is notwithstanding presumed to be inferrible 
 from known laws of the mind ; as, for instance, the operation 
 of memory in every act of perception by the senses. He 
 accounts for this notion of " praiseworthiness " or " blame- 
 worthiness " by a process of association, the reality of which 
 is, in numerous instances, made evident to our own reflections. 
 Every particular idea which Mr. Mill brings forward as the 
 result of this process, with a view to resolve and dissipate the 
 idea of praiseworthiness, is perceived to be the result of this 
 process by all who are accustomed to reflect upon the opera- 
 tions of their own mind. He adduces, for instance, as " a 
 remarkable exemplification of a high degree of association " 
 the love of posthumous fame ; and that the reader may fully 
 appreciate the cogency of his reasoning, we shall give in his 
 own words, first, the example itself, and, afterwards, his 
 application of it to the solution of the idea of praiseworthiness. 
 " Not only," he observes, " that praise of us which is diffused 
 in our lives, and from which agreeable consequences may arise 
 to us, is delightful, by the associated ideas of the pleasures 
 resulting from it ; but that praise which we are never to hear, 
 which will be diffused only when we are dead, and from which 
 no actual effects can ever accrue to us, is often an object of 
 intense affection, and acts as one of the most powerful motives 
 in our nature. The habit which we form, in the case of im- 
 mediate praise, of associating the idea of pleasurable conse- 
 quences to ourselves, is so strong, that the idea of pleasurable 
 consequences to ourselves becomes altogether inseparable 
 from the idea of our praise. It is one of those cases in which 
 the one idea never can exist without the other. The belief 
 thus engendered, is of course encountered immediately by 
 other belief that we shall be incapable of profiting by any 
 consequences which posthumous fame can produce : as the 
 fear, that is, the belief of ghosts, in a man passing through a 
 churchyard at midnight, may be immediately encountered by 
 his settled, habitual belief that ghosts have no existence ; and 
 yet his terror not only remains for a time, but is constantly 
 renewed, as often as he is placed in circumstances with which 
 
 N 
 
I 7^ AX ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 he has been accustomed to associate the existence of ghosts." 
 —P. 246. 
 
 Now, manifestly, the idea of those agreeable consequences 
 of praise which cannot accrue to us when dead — to which idea, 
 exclusively, Mr. Mill attributes " the intense affection " for 
 posthumous fame — is simply one of those numerous instances 
 in which we imagine ourselves to be subject, after death, to 
 pleasures or pains which must necessarily terminate with our 
 lives. It is essentially the same idea under the influence of 
 which most persons are interested in some degree, and not a 
 few very deeply, in the disposal of their remains — the lifeless 
 and perishing effigy which death will leave of them. It is the 
 same idea under the power and fascination of which we mourn 
 the decease of friends and relatives not only on our own 
 account, but on theirs, and are affected with a train of sym- 
 pathetic ideas described so truly by Adam Smith in his 
 Theory of Moral Sentiments. But instances are unnecessary 
 of this particular illusion — the difficulty of separating, in our 
 thoughts, the sentient, conscious being from the hitherto known 
 conditions of its existence. What we are solicitous should be 
 considered is, that the idea, or, as Mr. Mill terms it also, the 
 " belief" that we shall, after death, experience those pleasur- 
 able consequences of praise which must cease with our life, is 
 perceived to be an illusive idea or belief, and the feelings con- 
 sequent upon it are accordingly perceived to have no founda- 
 tion in reality. The result is, that in Mr. Mill's own words, 
 " the belief engendered " by the process of associations " is 
 encountered by a settled habitual belief of an opposite descrip- 
 tion." It is so in the other instances, to which we have alluded 
 as essentially similar in their nature. If then our idea of 
 praiseworthiness be a result of the same process, is it not 
 reasonable to conclude that this idea also will be perceived to 
 be illusive, and be, consequently, " encountered by a settled 
 habitual belief" of a contrary nature? We shall now, then, 
 give Mr. Mills's application of his example, and we submit 
 that it be ascertained whether his elucidation of our idea of 
 praiseworthiness admit of a similar confirmation, by inducing 
 a perception of the illusive character of that belief. " The 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 179 
 
 same considerations," he observes, " account for that remark- 
 able phenomenon of our nature, eloquently described, but not 
 explained, by Adam Smith, that, in minds happily trained, the 
 love of praiseworthiness, the dread of blameworthiness, is a 
 stronger feeling than the love of actual praise, the dread of 
 actual blame. It is one of those cases, in which, by the power 
 of the associations, the secondary feeling becomes more power- 
 ful than the primary. In all men, the idea of praise, as conse- 
 quent, is associated with the idea of certain acts of theirs, as 
 antecedent ; the idea of blame, as consequent, with the idea of 
 certain acts of theirs, as antecedent. This association consti- 
 tutes what we call the feeling, or notion, or sentiment, or idea 
 (for it goes by all those names) of praiseworthiness and 
 blameworthiness." (P. 249.) To some, and probably to many, 
 this account of the idea in question may be new and unthought 
 of, and accordingly require their close attention to appre- 
 ciate its nature and merits. But if, as we believe, by far the 
 larger number who read this statement of Mr. Mill's, will, afier 
 reflecting again and again on the pleasurable and painful 
 consequences of praise and dispraise, together with the effects 
 produced by these consequences upon the habitual current of 
 their thoughts and feelings, be equally as percipient as before 
 of a personal " desert " of praise and dispraise in themselves 
 and others, and as satisfied as before that that desert is 
 the cause of praise and dispraise, and not the praise and 
 dispraise the cause of the " idea " of that desert ; which, we 
 ask, is the more probable conclusion — that Mr. Mill's expla- 
 nation of the idea of praiseworthiness is correct, or that he 
 has been led to conclude that a known process of association 
 accounts for this particular idea, on no better ground than that 
 it accounts for many others. Mr. Mill, in allusion to Mr. 
 Alison, as the author of a " very pleasing, and, to a certain 
 degree, a philosophical book, on the Emotions of Taste," 
 remarks that " he has shown, by an abundance of well-chosen 
 illustrations, that it is not the immediate sensations, received 
 by us from the objects of taste, which constitute them a cause 
 of our pleasures ;" but he expresses surprise that Mr. Alison, 
 " exhibiting, as he did, a clear conviction of the wonderful 
 effects of association in one instance, seems to have had no 
 
 N 2 
 
180 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 idea of its affording an equally satisfactory solution of the other 
 complex phenomena of mind. — Now it is true and undisputed, 
 however opinions may differ as to the extent to which Mr. 
 Alison has carried his theory, that he has illustrated it as 
 Mr. Mill remarks, by an abundance of well-chosen illustra- 
 tions ; but these, be it observed, surprised and delighted the 
 readers of his work, not by their novelty only, but by their 
 truth : the " wonderful effects of association " were verified to 
 their own reflex intelligence— a pretty good proof that they had 
 been previously verified to the author's. We submit, then it 
 will be time to qualify our praise of Mr. Alison, as a great illus- 
 trator of the principle of association, when Mr. Mill's appli- 
 cation of this principle shall have called up a similar witness 
 to its truth in the mind of the reflecting community ; that is, 
 when it shall have been, not supposed and affirmed only, but 
 actually found, to " afford an equally satisfactory solution of the 
 other complex phenomena of mind." At present, Mr. Mill, 
 in the first place, exhibits as " a remarkable phenomenon of 
 our nature," an idea or belief, which, to the mass of mankind, 
 is quite the reverse ; for, let it not be forgotten, the belief of 
 praiseworthiness can be a remarkable phenomenon to none but 
 those who do not believe that praiseworthiness exists. It is 
 the advocates of the theory under discussion who propose this 
 " belief" as a thing requiring explanation; and if it be a 
 remarkable phenomenon, it is they who have discovered it to 
 be one. But, secondly, having exhibited this " belief" as a 
 remarkable phenomenon, he refers it to a cause which, we 
 may safely affirm, his readers, for the most part, consider 
 essentially inadequate to produce it. We are not opposing an 
 opinion because it is held by the few against the many ; our 
 argument against it is this : — nothing is more certainly known 
 of a particular process of association, than that the ideas which 
 it produces are, by the " many " among reflecting minds, per- 
 ceived to be its production ; that process, however, is alleged 
 to account for the idea of praiseworthiness, though, in this 
 instance, the well-known proof of its reality is absent — the 
 " many" among reflecting minds do not perceive the idea of 
 praiseworthiness to be its production. 
 
 Sir James Mackintosh, indeed, concludes that the process 
 
AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 181 
 
 of association in question has taken place among our ideas and 
 feelings at a period antecedent to " the age of attention and 
 recollection ;" for example, in the formation of the principle 
 of benevolence. But this, it need hardly be observed, is a far 
 " higher " degree of association than entered into the views 
 of Mr. Mill, in his solution of the belief of praise worthiness. 
 Moreover, as we have elsewhere observed, operations of the 
 mind which cannot be submitted to our attention afford us 
 no light, and are as darkness itself, in reference to the great 
 practical questions under discussion in these discourses. 
 Whether then the process described by Sir James Mackintosh 
 be capable of verification or not, it were apart from our pur- 
 pose to inquire ; but we cannot assent to its reality in the 
 example alluded to, that of benevolence ; and the instance is 
 so important that we shall state, very briefly, our objection to 
 his argument. Speaking of " avarice and other factitious 
 passions," he observes : — " Few will be found to suppose that 
 these are original principles of human nature, because the 
 process by which they are generated, being subsequent to the 
 age of attention and recollection, may be brought home to the 
 understanding of all men." He afterwards observes : — " As 
 soon as the mind becomes familiar with the frequent case of 
 the man who first pursued money to purchase pleasure, but at 
 last, when he becomes a miser, loves his hoard better than all 
 that it could purchase, and sacrifices all pleasures for its in- 
 crease, we are prepared to admit that, by a like process, the 
 affections, when they are fixed on the happiness of others as 
 their ultimate object, without any reflection on self, may not 
 only be perfectly detached from self-regard or private desires, 
 but may subdue these, and every other antagonist which can 
 stand in their way. As the miser loves money for its own sake, 
 so may the benevolent man delight in the well-being of his 
 fellows. His good- will becomes as disinterested as if it had been 
 implanted and underived." (P. 255.) Now, in our apprehension, 
 the premises here taken by Sir James should have conducted 
 him to a very different conclusion. If avarice has been dis- 
 covered to be a secondary passion, or the growth of associated 
 thoughts and feelings, by the exercise of attention and recol- 
 
182 AN ADVERSE THEORY EXAMINED. 
 
 lection, that discovery prepares us to admit benevolence to be 
 so by directing us to make this affection also a subject of 
 attention and recollection. But if, as Sir J. Mackintosh im- 
 plies, such a discovery with regard to benevolence " cannot 
 be brought home to the understanding by attention and recol- 
 lection," the example of avarice, we apprehend, prepares us 
 not to admit, but to reject, his opinion, that " as the miser 
 loves money for its own sake, so may the benevolent delight 
 in the well-being of his fellows." Our author expects us to 
 admit benevolence to be a derived and secondary principle 
 because avarice is such a principle, although he himself ap- 
 prizes us that the very proof of a secondary nature in the latter 
 is unavoidably wanting in the former. The ingenious manner 
 in which he traces the growth of benevolence from its infancy 
 upwards, need not be particularly noticed : our objection is, 
 that, in assigning a common parentage to the philanthropist 
 and the miser, he cites a precedent in our nature which fails 
 in an essential particular, and that, so far, his opinion is purely 
 conjectural. Bishop Butler maintained that benevolence was 
 an original principle of our nature, " whose object and end was 
 the good of another," and this conclusion he applied his own 
 great powers of reflection to bring home to the attention and 
 recollection of those who were disposed to doubt it, or if not 
 disposed to doubt it, yet not themselves well able to defend 
 it. We do not perceive that the argument of the celebrated 
 author of the " Dissertation on the Progress of Ethics" — that 
 is, that the case of avarice — supersedes or unsettles this con- 
 clusion. Indeed, we apprehend, his reasoning in general on 
 the principle of association is exceedingly hypothetical, and an 
 exceptionable feature in that admirable work ; and we will say 
 thus much — that his allusions to external nature are worded in 
 such a manner, and so pressed upon the consideration of his 
 readers, as to raise a suspicion, to say the least, that " chemical 
 combination," " transition states," and " tertiary formations," 
 &c, supplied him with more than figurative illustrations of his 
 opinion ; that they suggested the opinion itself; and furnished 
 material to support it. (Our quotations, it should have been 
 stated, are from his work, as edited by Professor Whewell.) 
 
LECTURE VI. 
 
 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION OF OUR DUTIES. 
 
 Matt. vii. 12. 
 
 THEREFORE ALL THINGS WHATSOEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN 
 SHOULD DO TO YOU, DO YE EVEN SO TO THEM. 
 
 Having brought under some examination, in 
 the last discourse, that particular view or theory 
 of morals, which, if true, would disprove the reality 
 of our accountableness to the Creator, so far as 
 it may be gathered from the constitution of our 
 nature, we now return to the point at which, 
 reserving that theory for a separate considera- 
 tion, we had previously arrived. We had, then, 
 endeavoured to establish the reasonableness of 
 Christianity in its assumption of these two posi- 
 tions ; — first, that we are subject to a moral 
 obligation to the Deity ; and, secondly, that our 
 duty to God dictates the fulfilment of our duties 
 towards our fellow-creatures, as an exemplifica- 
 tion of obedience to himself. Our design in 
 selecting the general subject under discussion, 
 
184 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 was, principally , to engage attention to the truth 
 of these fundamental principles of religion ; under 
 a persuasion, as was stated at the outset, that 
 of those who dispute the responsibility of man 
 in reference to his religious belief, there are not 
 a few who either reject these principles alto- 
 gether, or entertain but a superficial impression 
 of their truth. 
 
 Indeed these principles are of so imperative a 
 character, and lead, as we have seen, to conse- 
 quences so important, that, prior to experience, 
 it were scarcely credible that any who really 
 assented to them, with some adequate compre- 
 hension of their import, would be satisfied to 
 proceed no farther, and not be solicitous to 
 obtain a more particular knowledge of their rela- 
 tions towards the Creator ; a clear apprehension 
 of the duties which they owed him, and the true 
 foundation of hope and confidence towards him. 
 The Christian religion, however, not only en- 
 forces these fundamental principles of religion as 
 though they were perfectly conformable to 
 human reason, but professes, on the express 
 authority of God, to apply and illustrate them 
 in a number of particular commands and pro- 
 hibitions, which it enjoins for the particular 
 regulation of our conduct : thus submitting its 
 pretensions to as severe an examination as it is, 
 strictly, in the province of human reason to 
 institute. In a discussion, then, the object of 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 185 
 
 which is to maintain the credibility of the 
 Christian religion, in its appeal to our intelli- 
 gence as moral agents, it appears incumbent to 
 apply some attention to that particular exposi- 
 tion of our duties which it has laid before us ; 
 with a view to estimate the presumption offered 
 us that it is, as it purports to be, of divine 
 authority. The strength of this presumption 
 will be made to appear, if we consider the only 
 real and sufficient test, by which we are qualified 
 to judge of the internal evidence of a particular 
 religion, considered in its preceptive character 
 or as a rule of conduct to its professors ; and 
 bear in mind the manner in which Christianity, 
 both absolutely, and comparatively with other 
 religions, sustains that test. 
 
 This religion takes for granted, we have seen, 
 in concurrence with a prevailing apprehension 
 of mankind, that our duty towards the Supreme 
 Being is deducible from our duty towards our 
 fellow-creatures. It follows, that if this religion 
 be a divine institution, it can inculcate nothing 
 as a duty to the Creator incompatible with our 
 duties one towards another. Our duty to the 
 Divine Being is indisputably paramount ; but we 
 are regarding the Christian religion in its pre- 
 tensions to declare what that duty is ; to parti- 
 cularize what it implies and comprehends. 
 Agreeably to its own assumption, as we have 
 said, the sense of duty to a fellow-creature is 
 
186 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 properly initiatory to the sense of duty to the 
 Supreme Being. Accordingly, if Christianity be 
 a divine institution, it cannot publish, as a com- 
 mandment from God, one which would super- 
 sede or encroach upon the duty of man to man. 
 It cannot be subversive of itself. It cannot, 
 in the first place, appeal to a law of rectitude 
 in proof of our moral obligation to God, and, 
 notwithstanding, lay injunctions upon us which 
 would abrogate the authority of that law, or, in 
 any measure, obstruct its fulfilment. Moreover, 
 as we had occasion to remark in a former dis- 
 course, inasmuch as that which commends the 
 exercise of gratitude to the Creator, is, precisely, 
 the fact that he has formed us to discern a 
 moral rectitude in that affection intrinsically, as 
 it is entertained towards a human benefactor, it 
 is a deduction of our reason — one entirely recog- 
 nized in the general avowed design of Chris- 
 tianity — that if the Deity should interpose, in 
 some extraordinary manner, to assert his claim 
 to the gratitude of his creatures, such an inter- 
 position would be, virtually, a special declaration 
 of his love of all rectitude, and his determination 
 to promote it ; both in the regulation of their 
 affections towards himself, and towards their 
 fellow-men. We must immediately infer, then, 
 that a religion instituted by the Deity would 
 teach a morality of a perfectly pure and most 
 comprehensive character, as well as enforce it 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 187 
 
 by especial sanctions ; would be conspicuously 
 distinguished by its tendency to promote the 
 discharge of every social and relative obligation. 
 No conclusion of our reason is more peremptory 
 than this ; none so effective to lay open the 
 internal evidence of Christianity, and exhibit the 
 probability of its divine origin. That a parti- 
 cular religion demands our devotion, demands 
 our reverence, our adoration, nay, our humility 
 and resignation towards the Deity, is no distinc- 
 tion or peculiarity. Every religion demands the 
 exercise of such affections towards the Being 
 whom it professes to reveal, as the author of 
 creation, and, consequently, the supreme object 
 of worship and obedience. It is the manner in 
 which such affections are tried and exercised by 
 the precepts which it enjoins for the guidance 
 of our conduct, that we perceive its distinctive 
 character, and learn whether it bears an affinity 
 to that Being who, in the constitution of our 
 nature, has marked his approval and preference 
 of the right, and is adapted to prepare us for 
 that happiness in a future state which it befits 
 such a Being to bestow. It is in the law which 
 it promulges for the control and discipline of our 
 passions, that we contemplate, as in a mirror, 
 the character which it ascribes to the Deity, and 
 may, consequently, determine whether it would 
 attract our affections to the "living" and " true" 
 God, or fix them upon a god existing only in 
 
188 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 human imagination. And here an important 
 consideration suggests itself, which should not be 
 passed unnoticed, with respect to rites of worship, 
 or the special ordinances of religion. These are 
 justly regarded as means of expressing, and 
 thereby strengthening and confirming, our reli- 
 gious affections ; and consequently, if it be a 
 presumption of reason, as we have argued, that 
 the Deity, in demanding our affections to him- 
 self, demands, at the same time, the cultivation 
 of upright affections towards our fellow-crea- 
 tures, it must follow, with reference to particular 
 religious ordinances, that the intrinsic probability 
 of their appointment by God, and not by man, 
 is made apparent by nothing so much as their 
 ostensible tendency, their declared intention, to 
 pledge us more deeply to the fulfilment of our 
 duties one towards another, and to inspire a new 
 ardour in the pursuit of moral excellence. It 
 need but be intimated that the correspondence 
 of Christianity with this inference of reason is 
 perfect, and above all question ; the Scriptures 
 uniformly admonishing us that no rites of wor- 
 ship, no offerings at the altar of God, shall meet 
 with his acceptance, unless presented by a heart 
 pure from deceit and malice, and sustained by a 
 life of justice and benevolence. 
 
 The question here presents itself, How is this 
 test of the credibility of a religion, considered 
 in its preceptive character, to be applied with 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 189 
 
 particularity ? How shall it be brought into 
 contact, so to speak, with each separate com- 
 mand and prohibition of Christianity ? The 
 answer to this question, it will readily be 
 perceived, must depend upon the opinion enter- 
 tained as to the principle, or principles, which 
 constitute virtue, or moral rectitude. We have 
 disputed, in a former discourse, that theory of 
 moral rectitude which resolves it into a principle 
 of universal benevolence ; but we opposed it no 
 farther than as it implies an objection to the 
 assumption of Christianity, that the duty of 
 gratitude to God is a reasonable inference from 
 the duty of gratitude to man. In this point of 
 view, however, we were led to remark its very 
 arbitrary and purely hypothetical character. At 
 the present stage of our discussion, we shall take 
 occasion to observe that such is its character 
 generally, as an explanation of the moral judg- 
 ments. In the acceptance given to this theory 
 of virtue, we may readily detect the same error 
 of philosophy to which, as we have argued, there 
 is ground to attribute the adoption of that 
 ethical philosophy which was the subject of the 
 preceding discourse : — the error of omitting to 
 compare the hypothesis with the results of reflec- 
 tion on the actual experience of our own minds. 
 In one respect, indeed, the theory now in question 
 is the less supported, of the two, by its conformity 
 to the ideas and feelings of which mankind are 
 
190 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 actually conscious. That right actions so termed 
 procure for us the general commendation and 
 goodwill of those with whom we associate, and 
 that wrong actions expose us to their reproach 
 and aversion, is a difference which forces itself 
 upon our attention at the dawn of reason ; is at 
 once and powerfully influential upon our parti- 
 cular conduct, and continues to be so to the end 
 of life. On the contrary, that the former actions 
 tend to augment, and the latter to diminish, the 
 happiness of society, is a difference which can 
 scarcely be said to engage our consideration in 
 early life ; and, though matter of common 
 remark, is rarely found to affect the ethical 
 views and speculations of individuals, till their 
 virtues or their vices have become habitual, and 
 their character is substantially formed. That 
 this is not that difference in actions which 
 furnishes the mind with its perception of moral 
 distinctions, need only be stated ; and yet it is in 
 the face of this capital objection in the constitu- 
 tion of the mind itself, that the general tendency 
 of actions is proposed as a test of their moral 
 quality ; besides the objection, so repeatedly and 
 unanswerably alleged, that its application as a 
 guide of conduct would be attended with peculiar 
 difficulties, and rather endanger than improve 
 the common security and welfare. 1 
 
 1 Even, however, when these facts appear to be fully ad- 
 mitted — namely, that it is not the general beneficial tendency 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 191 
 
 There are forcible reasons, it is true, regarded 
 alone and exclusively, why the resolution of all 
 
 of actions which gives rise to the idea of virtue, or supplies the 
 actual motive to virtuous conduct, there is still a disposition to 
 retain it as a test of virtue. Sir James Mackintosh in particu- 
 lar, though keenly alive to the " unfitness " of beneficial 
 tendency as an immediate incentive and guide to right action, 
 contends for its " value as a test." Without here attempting 
 any adequate discussion of his opinion, we may allege some 
 valid ground for demurring to receive it. In his strictures on 
 the argument of Dr. Brown against " utility " as the criterion 
 of virtue, he remarks, that it follows from the concessions of 
 that author, " that beneficial tendency is at least one constant 
 property of virtue," and afterwards observes : — " Let us not 
 be assailed by arguments which leave untouched its value as a 
 test, and are in truth directed only against its fitness as an 
 immediate incentive and guide of right action. To those who 
 contend for its use in the latter character, it must be left to 
 defend so untenable a position. But all others must regard 
 as pure sophistry arguments which really show nothing more 
 than its acknowledged unfitness to be a motive," (p. 857.) Now, 
 we submit that Sir J. Mackintosh has here made an admission, 
 or rather laid down a position, as to the "unfitness " of " bene- 
 ficial tendency," without allowing its legitimate consequences — 
 an admission which is of more essential and comprehensive 
 purport than he actually assigns to it. In common accepta- 
 tion the virtue of an action is the virtue of the motive, the 
 disposition from which it springs ; and it is so, most expressly, 
 in the view of this author, (p. 198.) If, then, as he states, a 
 regard to the beneficial tendency of actions, that is, a disposi- 
 tion to promote the general happiness, be unfit as an immediate 
 incentive and guide to right action, does he not in effect admit 
 that this is not the test of virtue ? (It is observable that he says 
 a test, as if he were under the influence of " that sort of reluc- 
 tance and fluctuation," which he has just ascribed to Brown in 
 the use of the word " perhaps.") The virtue of an action is 
 in the mind of the agent ; it can certainly exist nowhere else, 
 
192 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 moral rectitude into a principle of general 
 benevolence, should be favourably received and 
 
 though we explore the universe in search of it ; and if a regard 
 to beneficial tendency be not essential to virtue, and even unfit 
 as a present motive and guide of right action, then " beneficial 
 tendency" may indeed be a constant property of virtuous 
 actions, but it cannot be that property which discovers and 
 proves them to be virtuous. The object of applying a test, let 
 it be observed, is to learn something relating to the thing to 
 be tested. With respect, for instance, to a portion of matter, 
 you wish to ascertain whether a particular substance has 
 entered into its composition ; you apply a test which will 
 detect its presence by some known invariable effect of that 
 substance, which it is its "property" to produce. But is it 
 not implied, in the passage cited from the author, that the 
 actions, to which he proposes to apply a test of the presence 
 of virtue, are already known to possess virtue ? The virtue 
 of actions is present in the idea or contemplation, as well as 
 realized in the conduct, of the agent without the perception 
 of their beneficial tendency ; it is ascertained by their property 
 of raising a moral approbation in regarding them. This is in 
 reality that criterion of virtue which Sir J. Mackintosh pre- 
 sumes to have been already applied, when he predicates 
 " beneficial tendency " of " virtuous " actions — actions already 
 known to be virtuous and bearing that name. — But, farther, 
 whatever be the sources of error in our judgment of the moral 
 quality of particular actions, they cannot be obviated by the 
 adoption of the test of virtue which he proposes, since, as he 
 expressly states, they who contend for " beneficial tendency " 
 as an immediate motive and guide to right action, maintain " an 
 untenable position." Yet if ever a test of virtue is wanted, it 
 is surely where men intent upon doing what is right are, not- 
 withstanding, in doubt as to what they ought to do. A man, 
 for example, is under a personal obligation to an individual 
 whose integrity, however, he has become convinced it would 
 be dangerous to rely upon. At one moment he may consider 
 it his duty to make no secret of this conviction, and, in a 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 193 
 
 reluctantly surrendered, by the virtuous mind. 
 For what is the antagonist principle, with which 
 
 manner, to warn the public respecting him ; and at another he 
 considers he ought to be grateful — that he ought to act in 
 such a way as to be beneficial to the individual who has done 
 him a service rather than to the public. He becomes however 
 apprized, or strongly suspicious, that a person is actually in 
 danger of suffering from the duplicity of the individual to 
 whom he is indebted — he weighs the question whether he shall 
 not disclose his own knowledge of his character. Now in such an 
 instance,— in all instances in which men are called to determine 
 between apparently, to themselves, conflicting claims of duty, 
 they cannot, according to Sir J. Mackintosh, be fitly actuated 
 or guided by a regard to the " beneficial tendency " of their 
 conduct. Yet he insists upon the " value " of " beneficial 
 tendency " as a test. We repeat that the admission which he 
 makes in the passage we have cited is of larger scope than he 
 appears aware ; and, we suspect, that in endeavouring to effect 
 a compromise between contending systems of ethics, he loses 
 sight of a primary distinction between them. 
 
 We are aware, indeed, that the general beneficial tendency 
 of actions must at all times form a prominent subject of ethical 
 inquiry and discussion. This cannot but be evident when we 
 consider the numerous instances in which our conduct is 
 morally dictated by the relations we sustain, the duties we 
 owe, not to one or more particular individuals, but to society 
 at large ; that is, to all the individuals who compose the com- 
 munity of which we are members ; and, especially, when we 
 consider the extent to which human agency is controlled by 
 laws and institutions, the object of which is specifically to 
 vindicate the rights of every member of the community, and 
 to promote the general welfare. In tracing the consequences 
 of actions as they extend, and insinuate, and ramify through 
 the whole society, there will doubtless be abundant occupation 
 for the human intellect ; as there must needs be a wide 
 sphere for the practice of public virtue ; more especially for 
 those who bear the responsibility of official power. And here 
 
 O 
 
194 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 we have chiefly to contend, in the practice of 
 virtue, but the spirit of selfishness, betraying 
 itself in an insensibility to the claims of others, 
 when their interests are brought into collision 
 with our own ? What is so essential to animate 
 the sense of duty towards our fellow-creatures, 
 and to incline us to acknowledge and vindicate 
 their rights, as a readiness to promote their 
 welfare ? And how can the rights of individuals 
 be correctly understood, unless we regard them 
 as they are modified by a condition of society 
 
 r 9 
 
 we are reminded of an observation of Dr. Brown, which 
 appears to throw no little light on the origin of the doctrine 
 of utility in morals. After remarking that " the independent 
 pre-established relation of virtue to utility has rendered less 
 apparent the error of the theory that would reduce moral 
 approbation itself to the perception of this mere usefulness," 
 he proceeds : — " And the illusion has certainly been aided, in a 
 great degree, by the reference to the public advantage, in the 
 enactment of laws, and the discussion of national measures of 
 external or internal policy. These measures, to be virtuous, 
 must indeed always have the public good in immediate view, 
 because the legislative and executive functions of the state are 
 either expressly or virtually trusts for this very purpose ; and 
 a neglect of the public good in those who exercise such func- 
 tions has, therefore, all the guilt of a breach of trust in addition 
 to any other partial delinquencies that may have been added 
 to the crime. It is not very wonderful, however, that we 
 should thus learn to extend to all particular actions, what is 
 true of those actions of general delegated power, which are 
 the great subjects of temporary debate ; and should erroneously 
 suppose all men in their little sphere to be swayed, when they 
 are virtuous, by the motives which alone we recognise as 
 giving virtue to the actions of legislators, judges or sovereigns, — 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 195 
 
 Moreover, what is the commanding aim of 
 virtue, in the consciousness of superior power 
 and resources, but to relieve the wants, and 
 better the condition of others ? And how can 
 this be surely and permanently effected but by 
 regarding them in their relation to the com- 
 munity of which they are members, and con- 
 sulting for all society ? Nevertheless, we may 
 be quite sure that this principle is inadequate 
 to explain morality, or to comprise all human 
 
 those actions about which all men speak, and which furnish so 
 much nice casuistry to the political discourse of every day." 
 Lect. Ixxviii. 
 
 It should be added, that the opinion of Sir J. Mackintosh 
 appears to have been, in a great measure, an inference from 
 the benevolence of the Deity. It could hardly have been 
 suggested by the constitution of our own nature ; observing, 
 as he does, that the constitution and circumstances of human 
 nature render it unfit or impossible to pursue the general 
 happiness directly as the object of life. But he adds : — " As 
 soon as we conceive the sublime idea of a Being who not only 
 foresees, but commands, all the consequences of the actions of 
 voluntary agents, this scheme of reasoning appears far more 
 clear. In such a case, if our moral sentiments remain the 
 same, they compel us to attribute his whole government of the 
 world to benevolence." Of this argument, as the basis or 
 support of an ethical theory, we have taken some notice in a 
 : previous note (p. 123); and we need but cite his own most 
 just and impressive conclusion : — " The laws prescribed by a 
 benevolent Being to his creatures, must necessarily be founded 
 on the principle of promoting their happiness. It would be 
 singular indeed, if the proofs of the goodness of God, legible 
 in every part of nature, should not, above all others, be most 
 discoverable and conspicuous in the beneficial tendency of his 
 moral laws. (P. 359.) 
 
 O 2 
 
196 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 virtue ; and if farther proof of this be wanting, 
 we need but look at that diversity in the external 
 circumstances of individuals, which every where 
 meets the eye ; that manifest inequality in 
 their comparative means of comfort and enjoy- 
 ment. Such a condition of society, w r e shall 
 presume, is not repugnant to the desire of 
 universal happiness ; not a malevolent, not 
 a selfish, not an immoral condition of society. 
 But what renders it otherwise ? What can 
 account for our moral approbation of such a con- 
 dition of society ? What but that it recognises 
 and embodies that principle, in the universal law 
 of equity, which prompts an individual to assert 
 a right of property, limited and qualified, but 
 not annulled, by society, a property in the fruit 
 of his personal industry and skill; and which 
 bids his fellow-men concede it to him? — a 
 claim of equity which it is possible you might 
 contrive to satisfy in some other manner than by 
 the present composition of society ; but which 
 you could never bring a human being, strictly 
 speaking, to renounce, or conceive that you had 
 renounced yourself, but under a mistaken appre- 
 hension of the principle on which you had acted. 
 You might destroy the distinction between the 
 rich and the poor; you might collect all the 
 materials of subsistence and comfort, which 
 human labour could furnish, into one common 
 fund, and distribute them in equal shares to every 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 197 
 
 member of the social body ; but what could have 
 induced, and what could induce, individuals to 
 consent to such a change and remodelling of 
 society ? What but the conclusion, whether 
 true or false, that, on the whole, weighing the 
 liability of individuals, in the pursuit of gain, to 
 adversity and misadventure, against the possi- 
 bility of acquiring riches by their personal ability, 
 or a favourable contingency of events, it were wise 
 to prefer a sure though a smaller share of the 
 produce of labour, to the capability and chance 
 of a very much larger, with the hazard of becom- 
 ing actually destitute and extremely miserable ? 
 And, farther, in trying the sufficiency of benevo- 
 lence to illustrate all human virtue, we might call 
 upon it to explain itself — to make out its own title 
 to a moral approbation in the absence of any 
 ownership in the good which it communicates, 
 — ownership which it is in justice entitled to 
 assert, and which others are morally bound to 
 respect. But we have already dwelt on this 
 topic at an undue length, and must proceed with 
 the subject more immediately before us. 
 
 Having disputed, for important reasons, the 
 opinion that virtue is reducible to a principle of 
 general benevolence, we should not, in judging 
 whether any particular precept of Chris- 
 tianity had been enjoined by divine authority, 
 immediately inquire whether it tended, on 
 the whole, to advance the happiness of the 
 
198 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 community. We conclude that the practice of 
 virtue consists in the fulfilment of a law, whose 
 direct and immediate object is to regulate the 
 conduct of individuals towards each other ; and 
 which dictates the exercise not of one disposition 
 only, but of several, according to the particular 
 relations existing between them. That law — 
 referred to in the precept, Do unto others as you 
 would they should do unto you — is not made 
 out and decyphered from a calculation of the 
 general consequences of actions, but, as we have 
 before remarked, discovers itself to the under- 
 standing at so early a period, and is so naturally 
 appealed to by all mankind in their transactions 
 one with another, that they have even described 
 it as innate, or originally engraven on the heart. 
 That law, however, in making known its exis- 
 tence and authority, binds an individual habitu- 
 ally to survey his position with reference to his 
 fellow-creatures, with a view to discriminate the 
 particular duties which arise out of his various 
 relations towards them ; forecasting the conse- 
 quences of his actions, remote as well as imme- 
 diate, in order to fulfil them. It is a law capable, 
 in the exercise of an adequate intelligence, of 
 an indefinitely diversified application to human 
 conduct, whether we regard individuals in the 
 relations which they sustain to each other, or to 
 the whole community ; and, accordingly, it is not 
 more clearly acknowledged in the intercourse and 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 199 
 
 transactions between individuals, than it is trace- 
 able in the foundation and arrangements of society. 
 But though we reject the opinion that virtue 
 is comprehended in a principle of general bene- 
 volence — from which it would follow that the 
 moral character of Christianity, and so far the 
 probability of its divine origin, should be deter- 
 mined to the conscientious inquirer strictly by 
 the tendency of its particular precepts to advance 
 the happiness of the community — we entirely 
 admit, and indeed maintain, that a religion of 
 divine institution would be distinguished by its 
 beneficial operation on the present condition of 
 mankind, and directly tend to augment to our 
 species at large that happiness which the world 
 is constituted to afford them. 
 
 That, speaking generally, that conduct which is 
 morally approved, or judged to be right and vir- 
 tuous, is extensively instrumental to the happiness 
 of the community, need not be formally argued ; 
 for this is not a point in dispute, and is never called 
 into question. Inquirers into the principles of 
 morals differ as to the ground on which actions 
 are judged to be right ; and they differ also as to 
 the motives by which individuals are actuated in 
 performing such actions ; but they are substan- 
 tially agreed that actions which mankind have 
 united to approve, and have distinguished by 
 the name of virtue, are of vital importance, and 
 inestimably beneficial, to the interests of society. 
 
200 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 If it were otherwise — if virtuous actions, so called, 
 were not useful to society, whence could have 
 sprung the opinion that it is their utility which 
 actually renders them virtuous ? With reference, 
 indeed, to the individual himself who practises 
 virtue, if he ascribes to the conscience an abso- 
 lute authority, it is necessarily implied that his 
 happiness is mainly dependent on a faithful 
 adherence to its dictates. He must be prepared, 
 and is often compelled, to forego other sources 
 of happiness for the consciousness of doing the 
 right, and thereby securing the approbation and 
 favour of God. But however he may himself 
 occasionally suffer in the trial of his virtue, he is 
 directly instrumental to the welfare of others, 
 and habitually contributes to the amount of 
 human happiness. For of how much misery is 
 injustice essentially the cause — his concern is to 
 commit none. Calculate, if possible, the increase 
 of happiness that would accrue to mankind if no 
 wrong were wilfully done, and every man received 
 his due : it is the business of virtue to give to 
 every one his due. Think for a moment of the 
 dangers besetting men in their property and 
 reputation, and of the wounds inflicted on their 
 feelings, through the recklessness and ungoverned 
 passions of their fellow-men. Think, especially, 
 of the sting of treachery, and the sharp tooth of 
 ingratitude. Think of the sufferings that might 
 be spared to multitudes, if all were benevolent 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 201 
 
 as well as just in the common acceptation ; in 
 obedience to the great law of equity, which not 
 more clearly bids us fulfil a contract with our 
 neighbour, than relieve his wants, with the 
 ability to do so ; and to promote his welfare, 
 consistently with an equal regard to our moral 
 obligations in general. Every virtuous person, 
 we say, is a minister of good to the commnnity ; 
 not, however, because he is bound to prefer the 
 advantage of others to his own ; but in conse- 
 quence of his obedience to the sense of duty, 
 which he has chosen as his guide to happiness 
 here and hereafter. Of course, with the ad- 
 vancement of individual virtue, there would be 
 a proportionate augmentation of the common 
 happiness, besides the comfort of a good 
 conscience, in the present life. 
 
 The presumption, then, that a religion ema- 
 nating from God would materially enhance the 
 wellbeing of society, follows from that conclusion 
 of our reason which has already been stated, 
 namely, that the precepts of such a religion 
 would exhibit a pure morality, as well as be 
 attended with additional and special motives 
 to obedience. And this presumption applies 
 particularly to those laws and institutions of a 
 public nature, the moral quality of which is col- 
 lected strictly from the consequences which they 
 produce to the whole community, including 
 essentially, as must be immediately evident, 
 
202 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 their effects upon the moral character of the indi- 
 viduals who compose it. So far as the Deity had 
 interposed to establish, or expressly sanction, 
 such institutions, these, it might well be presumed, 
 would evince a prescience of the influence which 
 they would be found to exert on the principles 
 and habits of virtue, as well as on the sources in 
 general of the common good. But, more than 
 this — the presumption in question applies to the 
 external ordinances of religion, which bind the 
 conscience in the belief of their positive insti- 
 tution by the Deity. The fact that actions 
 which the Author of our nature has formed us 
 to approve, and thereby signified his will that 
 we should perform, are characterised by a ten- 
 dency to promote our temporal welfare, renders 
 it exceedingly improbable that, in claiming the 
 worship due to himself, he would engage our 
 sense of duty in such a manner, or in such offices 
 of religion, as would impoverish our earthly 
 state, and inflict discomfort and privation on his 
 creatures. On the whole, then, if we make the 
 supposition that a people were instructed in a 
 particular religion, and that their conscientious 
 observance of its precepts and institutions, in- 
 stead of being attended with a proportionate 
 increase, was marked by a diminution, of that 
 happiness which the constitution of nature was 
 adapted to afford them, what would be the 
 reasonable conclusion ? Assuredly, that with 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 203 
 
 the disposition to obey the will of God they had 
 wanted a sufficient intelligence to guide them ; 
 and had either embraced a religion which was 
 purely a human invention, or, receiving a religion 
 of divine authority, had fallen into some gross 
 ?nisconceptiofi of its nature. The supposition, it 
 must be evident, were dishonourable to the wis- 
 dom and benevolence of the Creator, that he 
 would exact from his creatures a sacrifice of 
 present enjoyment unnecessary to their rectitude 
 of character, and enduring happiness. Undoubt- 
 edly our especial duty to God — the exercise of 
 the religious affections in habitual converse with 
 their Supreme Object, demands, no less than our 
 duty to our neighbour, a firm control and mode- 
 ration of the appetites in general, a " temperance 
 in all things ;" but need we stop to remark that 
 such moderation is actually conducive to our 
 present welfare, as though this had not been 
 taught by moralists and philosophers of Heathen 
 as well as Christian times ? ] 
 
 1 It will occur to the reader that, in this important respect, 
 Christianity, as taught in the Scriptures and understood by 
 Protestants, is in perfect conformity with reason. But it is 
 not enough to say that its institutions are not prejudicial to the 
 physical comfort and welfare of mankind : its great institution, 
 the Sabbath, appreciated and observed in a manner consistent 
 with the elder intelligence of the Christian dispensation, as 
 distinguished from the Jewish — (an intelligence which regards 
 expressly its spiritual uses, and to these attaches the highest 
 value) — is, in all respects and without question, a singularly 
 benignant institution. 
 
204 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 But we must proceed to offer a few observa- 
 tions on the manner in which Christianity sus- 
 tains the proper test of its credibility, as a 
 particular declaration of the will of God, and 
 corresponds to the anticipations of reason. A 
 religion, it was observed, which should inculcate 
 or allow a principle of conduct repugnant to the 
 law of equity appealed to in the precept, " Do 
 unto others as ye would they should do unto 
 you," would betray itself to be the offspring of 
 enthusiasm or imposture. In a former series of 
 discourses, we insisted on the opposition which 
 has grown up in the world between religion and 
 morality, in the prevalence of a spirit of perse- 
 cution, and the singular excellence of Christianity 
 in opposing itself to this peculiar form of iniquity : 
 the example is here too apposite to be passed 
 unnoticed. If the Christian religion allowed a 
 spirit of intolerance, or sanctioned the use of 
 force, in the propagation of its doctrines, there 
 would be an irreparable chasm in the evidence 
 of its divine authority ; for, independently of 
 other objections, the use of force for such a 
 purpose is as certainly a gross infraction of the 
 law of equity, as it is hostile to the peace and 
 welfare of society. If the conduct of Christians 
 in this respect, in past ages, had exhibited a true 
 portraiture of the religion they professed, the 
 unbeliever who, as the matter stands, alleges that 
 conduct to so little purpose, would have been 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 205 
 
 furnished with an argument, than which it were 
 impossible to supply a stronger against the 
 divinity of its origin. But no such noxious 
 principle lurks in the teaching of Christianity. 
 In this, as in all other instances, that religion 
 stands upon the foundations of moral truth, and 
 breathes the spirit of universal justice. And let 
 it be kept in view that the improvement of the 
 public opinion, in this respect as well as others, 
 is not attributable to any important modification 
 or refinement which Christianity itself, as taught 
 in the Scriptures, may be supposed to have 
 undergone in the advancement of general intelli- 
 gence ; — as though its principles had been sifted 
 by a discriminating philosophy, and, so far as 
 they were conducive to the morals and wellbeing 
 of society, had been preserved, and, so far as 
 they were prejudicial or indifferent, had been 
 thrown away ; — but attributable to the fact, that 
 a superior degree of intelligence has brought 
 with it a better capacity to comprehend the 
 purport of Christianity itself, and to appreciate 
 its attributes and value. The supposition, in- 
 deed, that the Christian religion had been 
 subjected to any such expurgation or refinement 
 through the progress of the human intellect, 
 would be wholly inconsistent with the belief of its 
 divine authority. In estimating the credibility 
 of a religion, morals are not to be identified with 
 physics. Whether the sun moved round the 
 
206 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 earth, or the earth round the sun ; whether living 
 creatures had subsisted on the globe which we 
 inhabit, previously to that creation of the world 
 which is recorded in the book of Genesis ; — these 
 are a sort of questions upon which, to say the 
 least, it was not important to mankind to be 
 furnished with particular information, in writings 
 penned for their instruction in piety and virtue ; 
 but that a religion taught by God himself, and 
 making its appeal, as Christianity so manifestly 
 does, to the dictates of the conscience in the 
 announcement of its precepts, should foster one 
 unjust depraving principle of conduct ; — nay, 
 that such a religion should not bear upon its 
 front the characters of moral excellence and 
 perfection, is not to be endured. But then, this 
 is a test of the credibility of a religion, as severe 
 as it is imperative ; and how unequal to sustain 
 it was the religion prevailing in the world at the 
 period when Christianity made its appearance, 
 has been abundantly proved, and can here only 
 be matter of allusion. When we consider, how- 
 ever, the vices which have been cloaked, and even 
 nurtured and honoured, by the religious faith of 
 mankind, the religion of the Gospel, we appre- 
 hend, stands alone in its moral character, and it 
 is hard to determine whether its negative or its 
 positive merits preponderate. 
 
 It is clearly a deduction of reason, that the 
 morality inculcated in a religion of divinr insti- 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 207 
 
 tution would not only contain no false and 
 corrupting precept, but would be distinguished 
 by the purity and comprehensiveness of its prin- 
 ciples. In what particular manner the Christian 
 morality realizes this internal evidence of a divine 
 original, it would be altogether impracticable in 
 these limits to discuss. The fact itself, however, 
 is so completely established to the conviction of 
 most readers of the Scriptures, that if they allege 
 an objection to the precepts of Christ and his 
 apostles, it is that they exhibit a standard of 
 morality above their power, or the power of 
 human nature, to attain ; not observing the 
 important distinction between the duties which 
 Christianity inculcates, and the conditions which 
 it annexes to the bestowment of future happiness ; 
 nor reflecting that a religion would be essentially 
 defective as a scheme of moral reformation, and 
 want the very mark of credibility in question, if 
 it in anywise sanctioned an imperfect discipline 
 of the passions ; and did not contemplate the 
 highest degree of personal rectitude, the nearest 
 approximation to perfect virtue, of which our 
 nature was capable. Judging, then, from the 
 impression which Christianity is found to make 
 upon the moral sentiments of mankind in 
 general, its incomparable and perfect morality — 
 the intrinsic probability that it is, as it purports 
 to be, a divinely authorized rule of duty, appears 
 to be placed above question : and the few excep- 
 
208 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 tions which have been formally made to it, by 
 particular individuals, have been repeatedly shown 
 to be founded on an inadequate application of its 
 principles, or a construction of language more 
 literal than is warranted by the custom of 
 speech. 1 
 
 1 It is alleged that patriotism is omitted in the Christian 
 virtues, but this objection is hardly worthy of notice ; as 
 though a man who fulfilled his duties as enjoined in the 
 Gospel, his duties as the member of a family, as a citizen, and 
 a subject, were not already imbued with the spirit of a patriot. 
 So far, indeed, as " patriotism " may be supposed to be other- 
 wise nourished, its omission is honourable to Christianity, and 
 comes under that distinction of the Christian morality stated 
 by Paley, in his admirable condensation of the argument of 
 Soame Jenyns, in which he explains the precepts relating to 
 forbearance and the forgiveness of injuries. {Evidences, partii. 
 ch. 11.) With reference, however, to this feature of the 
 Christian morality, it seems due to our argument to observe, 
 that the precepts enjoining forbearance under injury and pro- 
 vocation, are not commended to our obedience only, or chiefly, 
 because that disposition is an essential element of social happi- 
 ness. They appeal, in the first place, to a sense of justice one 
 towards another ; for who amongst us is not liable to offend, 
 and, morally, in need of forgiveness ? But, secondly, a spirit 
 of forbearance and concession is powerfully influential on the 
 better feelings of the offender, and conducive to his compunc- 
 tion and amendment ; and this is an instance which appears to 
 illustrate, in an eminent degree, the inseparable connexion 
 between religion and morality, or the necessity of both to 
 complete the idea of moral rectitude. For on what principle, 
 independently of a religious obligation, persons who are them- 
 selves careful to do no wrong to others, should account it their 
 duty to practise forbearance towards those who are not so, and 
 to carry it to the utmost limits which their duty in other 
 respects will allow, is far from being readily evident, notwith- 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 209 
 
 An objection, notwithstanding, may seem to 
 be conveyed against the morality of the Gospel, 
 by the fact that some of its opponents have 
 adopted, and are active in maintaining, a par- 
 ticular criterion of virtue — that of general utility 
 — other than that which is applied by mankind 
 in general to the habitual regulation of their 
 conduct, and w T hich, as we have seen, is assumed 
 and proceeded upon in the injunctions of Scrip- 
 ture. That a religion of divine institution would 
 be productive of greatly beneficial consequences 
 to the present condition of mankind, is deducible, 
 we have argued, from an unquestionable result 
 of human experience in general — namely, that 
 such conduct as man is formed to approve as 
 right and virtuous, is necessary, and abundantly 
 conducive, to the happiness of mankind at large. 
 So much stress, however, is laid upon general 
 
 standing a spirit of forbearance may be especially needful to 
 their moral improvement. But regarding virtue to be confor- 
 mable to the will of God, the highest pitch of self-denial mani- 
 festly becomes a duty, if instrumental to promote it. In the 
 Gospel this severe effort of virtue is enjoined upon us with a 
 most impressive consistency, and in a manner evidently intended 
 to affect and satisfy the sense of equity. It is required 
 from us not as though it were dictated by our duty to our 
 neighbour, as though this itself and alone could bind us to such 
 an effort of virtue ; not as though men who violate the acknow- 
 ledged law of equity retain intact their claim to its protection ; 
 but as an act of gratitude to the Deity for his transcendent 
 goodness towards us ; a concurrence in his purpose, and imita- 
 tion of his example, in the exercise of pure benevolence. 
 
 P 
 
210 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 expediency or utility as the criterion of virtue, 
 by individuals either manifestly hostile to Chris- 
 tianity or unconcerned in its diffusion, that it 
 appears to be believed, and, if we are not 
 mistaken, intended to be insinuated against this 
 religion, that it clashes with the desire of the 
 common weal and prosperity, and is the reverse 
 of useful and auspicious to society. Now if such 
 an objection can be proved against the Christian 
 morality, it must apply especially to its more 
 peculiar and distinctive attributes ; to those 
 precepts in which it differed most from the 
 received morality of mankind, and sought to 
 rectify and enlarge their apprehension of moral 
 rectitude, or the extent of human duties. 
 Undoubtedly, the morality of the Heathen 
 taught, or accounted virtuous, a course of life 
 which must be pronounced, in Christian estima- 
 tion, to have been materially defective. It did 
 not expressly teach that diffusive and inextin- 
 guishable benevolence which the Gospel enjoins 
 — that benevolence which extends itself beyond 
 the community to which we belong, and to every 
 individual of our species ; and which not only 
 places a check on the proneness to anger, and 
 the desire of retaliation, but even renders 
 the man who has suffered an injury capable of 
 seeking the welfare of the man who inflicted it. 
 Moreover, that morality differed from the Chris- 
 tian, inasmuch as it held in inferior esteem an 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 211 
 
 institution which binds the sexes in indissoluble 
 ties. Are the individuals,, then, to whom we 
 have adverted, prepared to maintain that the 
 morality of the Gospel is inimical to the interests 
 of society, because it has innovated, in these im- 
 portant particulars, on the morals of antiquity ? 
 Does their regard to the happiness of society in- 
 cline them to retain the spirit of revenge, or to 
 dread the prevalence of a disposition to mutual 
 forbearance and concession ? Or do they con- 
 ceive that a vagrant licentiousness would correct 
 the disorders of the social system, and elevate 
 the moral character of our species ? But where, 
 then, is this implied discrepancy between the 
 course of life enjoined by the Christian religion, 
 and that which would be dictated by a regard to 
 the general and progressive happiness of mankind? 
 Surely, if they who despise or undervalue the 
 Gospel, and revere utility as the basis of morals, 
 would but task themselves to particularize those 
 rules of morality, which are necessary to illustrate 
 and carry into effect their favourite principle, and 
 compare them with the precepts of Christianity, 
 they would find themselves effectually witnesses 
 to the worth and excellence of the latter. At 
 least, we are warranted in this opinion by the 
 testimony which has been undesignedly borne 
 to the general utility of the Christian precepts, 
 by authors who are either known to have disbe- 
 
 p2 
 
212 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 lieved Christianity, or who are never classed 
 among its advocates. 1 
 
 Apart from that imputation which appears to 
 be cast upon Christianity in the manner we have 
 stated, and inasmuch as the idea of a superior 
 happiness to our species in the present state is 
 inseparably associated, in most minds, with the 
 hope and prospect of their growing virtues, the 
 religion of the Gospel, in its preceptive character, 
 is fully commensurate to the deliberate presump- 
 tions of our reason, and substantiates our highest 
 
 1 Volney is an eminent instance. In his " Law of Nature," 
 he defines virtue to be the practice of actions which are useful 
 to the individual and society ; and sin, according to the law 
 of nature, to be " whatever tends to disturb the order esta- 
 blished by nature for the preservation and perfectibility of man 
 and society;" and the rules of virtue which he deduces from 
 his leading position are remarkably coincident with the pre- 
 cepts of the Gospel, (in the letter we mean,) relative to the 
 control of the appetites, and our conduct towards our neigh- 
 bour. The law of nature, as he explains it, dictates a high 
 degree of self-denial in general, and extends to the government 
 of the thoughts ; it dictates forgiveness of injuries so far 
 as consistent with self-preservation, which, in his view, the 
 precepts of Christianity preclude. He is not, it may be sup- 
 posed, unwilling to exhibit a difference between his inter- 
 pretation of the law of nature, and the moral rules of the 
 Gospel, but this willingness to differ is more apparent than the 
 difference itself; and, on the whole, it is a considerable testi- 
 mony undesignedly borne to the perfect harmony of the Chris- 
 tian precepts with a prudential regard to " the preservation 
 and perfectibility of man and society." 
 
 The work of Mr. Combe, " The Constitution of Man consi- 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 213 
 
 conceptions of a law of rectitude promulgated by 
 the Deity to mankind. Enjoining, as the main 
 purpose of our life, the faithful discharge of every 
 social and relative duty, and commending its 
 precepts to our observance by motives which 
 religion only can supply, it promises to enhance 
 the wellbeing of mankind in the present world 
 to an extent incalculable, and in ways without 
 number. It lays open to our moral speculations, 
 to our hopes of human happiness, a prospect that 
 cannot but enkindle and delight our best affec- 
 tions. We contemplate the Christian religion 
 
 dered in Relation to External Objects," is written in a very 
 different manner from that of a disbeliever of Christianity ; and 
 far be it from us to impute a sceptical purpose to an author 
 who is concerned to disclaim it. At the same time, any testi- 
 mony which he may bear to the worth of Christianity is apart 
 from the main object of his work, and must be allowed to be at 
 least independent and impartial. In his "introductory remarks," 
 he observes : — " To the best of my knowledge, there is not one 
 practical result of the natural laws expounded in the subsequent 
 pages, which does not harmonize precisely with the moral 
 precepts of the New Testament. ... It is my purpose to 
 show, that the rewards and punishments of human actions are 
 infinitely more complete, certain, and efficacious, in this life, 
 than is generally believed ; but by no means to interfere with 
 the sanctions to virtue afforded by the prospect of a future 
 retribution." 
 
 We have in nowise referred, on this topic, to those who have 
 made the discovery, as they allege, of a " new " moral world. 
 Of course we can argue only from the results of experience in 
 the world heretofore and now existing to the moral perceptions 
 of mankind ; a world which happily yields the promise of a 
 " new " creation, but one l< wherein dwelleth righteousness." 
 
214 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 as the agent of a great moral reformation in the 
 world ; as laying an effective restraint upon 
 every vicious passion, and opposing itself to 
 every form of crime ; imparting life and strength 
 to every virtuous principle in the human mind ; 
 ameliorating the character, and ensuring the 
 efficacy, of human laws and institutions for the 
 governance and peace of society ; diffusing a love 
 of equity, a spirit of mutual forbearance and 
 " brotherly kindness," among all orders of men, 
 and in every vicissitude of life ; and even placing 
 a curb on the aggressive spirit of a people, 
 abashing and subduing the spirit of war and con- 
 quest, and linking nations in the fraternal bonds 
 of justice. So manifest is the proper tendency 
 of Christianity to improve the peace, and 
 harmony, and general happiness of society, and 
 so attractive is the idea of its realization in the 
 practical efficacy and progress of its principles, 
 that Christians need be guarded lest they allow 
 the advantages which their religion promises 
 to confer upon mankind in the present world, to 
 obtain that ascendency in their views and expec- 
 tations, which properly appertains to the happi- 
 ness which it holds out to them in a future state 
 — a far higher and more efficient motive for 
 obedience to its precepts. Nothing can be more 
 decisive as to the favourable aspect of Chris- 
 tianity to the present world — but so it is — when 
 we look forward to the full success and preva- 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 215 
 
 lency of our religion, and behold all human 
 virtues springing up and expanding themselves 
 under its light and influence, producing their 
 healing and precious fruits in endless variety and 
 profusion, and the life of man, which must else 
 have been as " the wilderness, and the solitary 
 place," made " glad" for them, the " desert rejoic- 
 ing and blossoming as the rose," — gazing and ex- 
 patiating upon a prospect so rich and diversified, 
 we incline to be content and satisfied with the 
 terrestrial paradise which our fancy has created, 
 and grow in a manner forgetful of the scenes 
 which lie beyond it, and indifferent to a farther 
 sight into futurity ; making but little effort to 
 ascend that sublime and glorious height, to which 
 the hand of faith is pointing us, though that 
 height commands eternity — regions of unclouded 
 radiance, unfading verdure, stretching intermi- 
 nably before us. 
 
 In the conclusion of this argument in support 
 of the credibility of the Christian religion, we 
 may be met with a question of which it may be 
 proper to take some notice : — Suppose, it may 
 be asked, Christianity were deficient in the 
 internal moral evidence which you ascribe to it, 
 what would you reply to the evidence of miracles 
 alleged to have been wrought in its attestation ? 
 We answer, let such a case be first affirmed and 
 proved to exist, and it will then be fit we should 
 regard it. But we are not called to believe or 
 
216 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION 
 
 defend Christianity on a state of evidence which 
 is purely imaginary, and has no existence. The 
 case itself is one of the most arbitrary character 
 that can be conceived ; one which is scarcelv 
 credible ; namely, that Christianity should teach 
 a false morality, and yet have been attested by 
 miracles; or rather that evidence should be offered 
 that miracles had been wrought, in proof of its 
 divine institution, so close and convincing as that 
 which is alleged of the reality of the miracles of 
 Christ and his apostles. But, as we have said, 
 let the case be shown to exist ; our duty is with 
 things as they are. 1 
 
 One thing, however, is certain. If such were 
 actually the case, the rejection of Christianity 
 would be a determination and state of the mind 
 essentially different from what it is. A man would 
 not be subject to the misgiving and accusation 
 of his conscience, in demanding additional and 
 even irresistible evidence of the truth of the 
 Gospel. For probable evidence, as is often 
 
 1 But who would not admit the truth as well as the energy 
 of the following ? — " And surely it is not too much to say, that 
 those moral principles (though they may derive fresh sanction 
 from miracles), are such as no miraculous evidence can over- 
 throw. If a teacher were one hour to raise the dead, and the 
 next hour were to propose, on the strength of that wonder, a 
 scheme of faith and practice which should confound the land- 
 marks of good and evil, who can doubt that we should be fully 
 justified in disregarding his miracles, and in rejecting his doc- 
 trine ? The only proper reply to him would be — * Get thee 
 behind me, Satan !'" — Le Bas on Miraclei, p. 45. 
 
OF OUR DUTIES. 217 
 
 remarked and should be seriously considered, is 
 that on which we are formed and habituated to 
 act in relation to our fellow-creatures, and the 
 business of the present world. It supplies the 
 universal and sufficient stimulus to human con- 
 duct : it feeds the lamp of hope, and sustains 
 and nourishes our active powers ; and inasmuch 
 as we are, proverbially, prone to forestall and 
 exaggerate the evidence in support of such 
 statements and propositions as are agreeable to 
 our inclinations, or as we wish to be true, there 
 is, clearly, a sufficient reason why we should 
 suspect ourselves of disaffection to a law which 
 the conscience recognises to be holy, just, and 
 good — of aversion to the rule of life which 
 Christianity inculcates, if we demand still farther 
 and more decisive, if not overpowering, evidence 
 of the truth of the Gospel ; and can account even 
 the testimony which has been borne to the 
 resurrection of Christ from the grave, insufficient 
 to establish its divine authority, although it 
 would assure us that we ourselves shall outlive 
 the dissolution of these bodies, and obtain ever- 
 lasting happiness. It is, precisely, the intrinsic 
 moral truth in the Scripture which grounds the 
 argument for self-distrust and examination in 
 dealing with the evidence of its truth. It is 
 because the Gospel is corroborated by the testi- 
 mony of his conscience, that the Christian, in 
 receiving and availing himself of such evidence 
 
218 THE CHRISTIAN EXPOSITION OF OUR DUTIES. 
 
 of its truth as it is his wont and nature to act 
 upon in the general pursuits of life, may justly 
 conclude that he yields himself to the special 
 commandment of his Creator, and is actuated by 
 a disposition to obey his will. 
 
LECTURE VII. 
 
 CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES. 
 2 Tim. iii. 16. 
 
 ALL SCRIPTURE IS GIVEN BY INSPIRATION OF GOD, AND IS PRO- 
 FITABLE FOR DOCTRINE, FOR REPROOF, FOR CORRECTION, FOR 
 INSTRUCTION IN RIGHTEOUSNESS. 
 
 In the last discourse we considered the strong 
 presumption which there is, from its intrinsic 
 moral purity and excellence, that the particular 
 exposition of our duties laid before us in the 
 Christian religion is, as it purports to be, of 
 divine authority. A topic so extremely impor- 
 tant might well engage the whole of our attention 
 in the space remaining for the prosecution of 
 our subject ; but, in regarding the claims of 
 Christianity in its appeal to our reason as moral 
 agents, there are other topics almost equally 
 essential, as well as less repeated and familiar ; 
 and we proceed, as proposed at the commence- 
 ment of our discussion, to direct attention to the 
 
220 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 credibility of the Scripture as an account of 
 miraculous interpositions of the Deity ; inasmuch 
 as the end for which they are recorded stands 
 connected with those essential principles of 
 religion, which have been brought under consi- 
 deration as deducible from the constitution of 
 our nature. 
 
 Of those who have sought to illustrate the 
 operations of the human mind, and have applied 
 the result of their reflections to the defence of 
 the Christian religion, Dr. Hartley may be pre- 
 sumed to stand amongst the most distinguished. 
 On the other hand, no author appears to have 
 employed the sub til ty of the metaphysician so 
 effectually in the diffusion of a spirit of scepticism, 
 or to have equally succeeded in undermining the 
 belief of Christianity in curious and speculative 
 minds, as Hume. The conclusions which these 
 celebrated philosophers were led to form, in 
 reference to the internal evidences of truth in 
 the Scripture, were remarkably different ; or, 
 rather, in the utmost degree opposed to each 
 other. Dr. Hartley maintained, not only that 
 there were various internal indications of a 
 divine revelation in the Scriptures, as well as 
 marks of the veracity of their authors, but that 
 these were entirely adequate to command a 
 rational belief of the Christian religion. In 
 maintaining the specific proposition, that "the 
 excellence of the doctrine contained in the Scrip- 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 221 
 
 tures is an evidence of their divine authority," 
 he makes this striking observation : — " It seems 
 evident to me that, if there were no other book 
 in the world besides the Bible, a man could not 
 reasonably doubt of the truth of revealed reli- 
 gion." ! Hume, on the contrary, as is well 
 known, constructed an argument for the purpose 
 of proving that a miracle was in itself incredible ; 
 that no human testimony could entitle it to 
 belief. It were apart from our purpose to enter 
 upon a formal examination of that argument; 
 which, in our conviction, has met with ample as 
 well as repeated refutation. It may be proper, 
 however, to offer an observation on the conclud- 
 ing passage in his Essay on Miracles, which 
 may not a little qualify the impression which it 
 appears calculated to make on the mind of the 
 reader. In that passage, to which it is here 
 sufficient to advert, he proposes to confine our 
 attention to the miracles related in the Penta- 
 teuch, " lest," as he says, " we should lose our- 
 selves in too wide a field," and he remarks 
 expressly that these miracles " are corroborated 
 by no concurring testimony, and resemble those 
 fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its 
 origin." Now, what amount of truth, or the 
 contrary, there may be in this assertion, we are 
 not, on the present occasion, concerned to 
 
 1 u Observations on Man." Part ii. " Truth of the Christian 
 Religion," Prop. xxxv. 
 
222 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 inquire ; but why, we ask, should he have stated 
 this particular at all, if, as he argued, " no human 
 testimony could have such force as to prove a 
 miracle?" It would appear that, after all, he 
 was not without a secret apprehension that his 
 absolute negation of a miracle might, under 
 peculiar circumstances, be found to submit to a 
 qualification. But, more especially, the faith 
 which Christians place in the miracles recorded 
 in the Old Testament, is powerfully supported 
 by their belief of the miracles recorded in the 
 NewTestament. Now, in corroboration of these, 
 a concurring testimony is actually offered, what- 
 ever be its strength and sufficiency ; and if it was 
 needful or pertinent to remark that the former 
 were not avouched by a concurring testimony, 
 it was equally so to admit that the latter were. 
 Why, then, were these omitted in winding up 
 his argument, and collecting its weight on 
 the mind of his reader ? In other words, w T hy 
 did he have recourse to the arts of the mere 
 disputant, if the position which he had taken 
 was sufficiently secure and absolutely impreg- 
 nable without them ? That he had the miracles 
 related in the New Testament in his view, when 
 he was engaged in the construction of his argu- 
 ment, is evident; for, in a former part of his 
 Essay, he instances the restoration of a dead man 
 to life, as a miracle incapable of proof from any 
 amount of testimony whatever. 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 223 
 
 But to return to the singular difference, the 
 perfect contrariety, of opinion between two so 
 distinguished philosophers, as to the verisimi- 
 litude of the facts related in the Scriptures. Its 
 chief cause, we apprehend, may be readily disco- 
 vered — they entertained essentially opposite 
 views of the principles of morality, or the nature 
 of virtue. Hartley so understood the moral 
 judgments, or the distinction of right and wrong, 
 as to infer that piety and virtue had a common 
 root in our moral constitution. He regarded 
 the determinations of the moral sense — so he 
 entitles the moral faculty, or the human mind in 
 its function of approving and condemning its 
 own acts — as indicating the will of God, and 
 authoritative upon us in virtue of our obligation 
 to obey him. " The consideration," he observes, 
 " of the infinite power, knowledge, and goodness 
 of God, — of his holiness, justice, veracity, and 
 mercy, — and of his being our Creator, Governor, 
 Judge, and Father, — must inspire us with the 
 highest love and reverence for him, and beget 
 in us that tendency to comply with his will, 
 which, according to the proper use of language, 
 is called a sense of duty, obligation, of what we 
 ought to do." ** He must will that we should 
 apply to him as we do to earthly superiors 
 of the same character, purifying, however, and 
 exalting our affections to the utmost ; that we 
 should be merciful, holy, just, &c. in imitation of 
 
224 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 him, and because this is to concur with him in 
 his great design of making all his creatures 
 happy." J . . . " Natural religion/' he elsewhere 
 observes, " has independent evidences. We are 
 certainly able to infer the existence and attri- 
 butes of God, with our relation and duty to him, 
 from the consideration of natural phenomena, 
 and though our evidence here may not perhaps 
 be demonstrative, it is certainly probable in the 
 highest degree. Revealed religion," he pro- 
 ceeds, " has also independent evidences ; both, 
 however, receiving light and confirmation the 
 one from the other ; and this mutual confirma- 
 tion is a still farther evidence for both." 2 Such 
 is the strain of Hartley's reasoning, such the 
 complexion of his thoughts. 
 
 The moral speculations of Hume, on the other 
 hand, had conducted him to no such conclusions. 
 In his view, there was no distinct, independent 
 sense of duty, or judgment that actions were 
 right and wrong. " The rules of equity and 
 justice depend entirely on the particular state 
 and condition in which men are placed, and owe 
 their origin and existence to that utility which 
 results to the public from their strict and regular 
 observance." " The necessity of justice to the 
 support of society is the sole foundation of that 
 virtue. It is the sole source of the moral appro- 
 Part ii. ch. i. prop. xii. 3 Part ii. ch. iv. prop. xiii. 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 225 
 
 bation paid to fidelity, veracity, integrity, and 
 those other estimable and useful qualities and 
 principles." J Our concern for the public he 
 regards as not entirely resolvable into a concern 
 for our personal security and welfare, but partly 
 into a natural sympathy with the suffering and 
 enjoyment of others. Sympathy, however, 
 as we have before had occasion to observe, is 
 subject to a moral regulation no less properly 
 than inclinations distinguished as selfish, and 
 may be equally hostile to justice and benevolence. 
 Such an apprehension of virtue — which we need 
 not further distinguish or particularize — can 
 furnish no idea of moral obligation to the Creator, 
 and appears to render an investigation of the 
 Scriptures, which proceed on an opposite as- 
 sumption, actually superfluous. It cannot inspire 
 any sentiments towards the Creator responsive 
 to such an appeal as is alleged to be addressed 
 to us in those writings — sentiments rendering 
 a declared revelation from himself an object of 
 conscientious attention, of personal interest, of 
 solicitous inquiry. Its tendency is to extinguish 
 such sentiments altogether. 
 
 We can hardly want any farther solution of 
 the otherwise extraordinary difference of opinion 
 in question ; and, if so, it is not without reason 
 that, in connexion with our subject, we have 
 
 1 Essays, Principles of Morals, sec. iii. 
 Q 
 
226 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 brought that difference under notice. Hartley 
 was drawn to the study of the Christian religion 
 by his conception of " duty " or " moral obliga- 
 tion," as described in the passage just cited from 
 his works ; and he was consequently concerned to 
 investigate the various particular evidences of its 
 truth, in which, as is manifest from his writings, 
 he became profoundly versed. For he who con- 
 cludes from the nature of the moral principles, 
 that man is subject to the approving and con- 
 demning judgment of God, and is consequently 
 affected with convincing proofs of a moral im- 
 perfection, or rather a deep degeneracy and 
 exceeding guilt, before him, is essentially prepared 
 to appreciate such an interposition in behalf of 
 mankind as is ascribed to the Deity in the Scrip- 
 tures, and to seek and entertain the evidence of 
 its reality. Whatever questions may be other- 
 wise suggested, as to the causes which might 
 have operated to bring the human race into a 
 state of moral defection and necessity, he cannot 
 but observe, and be conscious of the fact, that a 
 corrupt tendency, a moral evil, has entered into 
 the human mind, and prevails more or less upon 
 the will and affections of every individual; 
 bringing man into strife and dissatisfaction with 
 himself, and intercepting his converse with the 
 Creator, whom he equally regards as the Governor 
 and Judge of the world. He is self-convinced of 
 a defect of that rectitude which is proper to his 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 227 
 
 nature ; or adequate to meet the demand of his 
 conscience, and to establish a valid ground of 
 confidence towards God. Accordingly, as we 
 have intimated, he is made acquainted with a 
 sufficient reason for such an interposition of the 
 Deity, in behalf of mankind, as is ascribed to him 
 in the Scriptures. To him, therefore, there can 
 be no difficulty in believing a miracle — the mere 
 instrumentality by which the benignant design 
 of the Almighty is alleged to have been made 
 known — a means, strictly, of attesting his pre- 
 sence and agency in the actual execution of his 
 purpose. He cannot surely doubt the possibility 
 of such a means of carrying into effect his own 
 design : he cannot conclude the Almighty to be 
 subject to the laws, hemmed in by the barriers, 
 of his own creation. 
 
 To one, on the contrary, who, like Hume, 
 recognises no principle of duty to the Creator, 
 and, consequently, no need or capacity of 
 amendment, and no want of solace and en- 
 couragement in his concern and endeavour to 
 obey him, the miracles recorded in the Scrip- 
 tures can present themselves in no other light 
 than as interruptions of an established order of 
 nature, for no adequate purpose, — for no purpose 
 whatever that a cultivated reason can acknow- 
 ledge. Accordingly, that author describes the 
 Pentateuch as u a book full of prodigies and 
 miracles," as though it contained nothing else : 
 
 q 2 
 
228 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 as though it made no mention of the delivery of 
 a moral law to the Israelites, but only of the 
 supernatural appearances with which it was 
 attended, and no mention of peculiar religious 
 rites and sanctions, intended to promote its 
 fulfilment. The Scripture is nothing but a 
 wonderful narration, or a series of wonderful 
 narrations, relating events connected with no 
 fundamental principles ; no permanent institu- 
 tions ; no progressive scheme of divine wisdom 
 and goodness for the religious instruction and 
 enduring benefit of mankind ; and, consequently, 
 offering no better claims, we do not say to 
 reception, but to examination, as a credible his- 
 tory, than the fictions of Heathen mythology, 
 with which it is his manner to compare them. 
 Accordingly, he encounters the Scripture with 
 reasoning that would have been, not only subtle 
 and ingenious, but pertinent and commanding, if 
 the drift of the Bible, in its relation of miracles, 
 had been to acquaint us that God had broken in 
 upon the laws which he had originally impressed 
 upon nature, or had deviated from the ordinary 
 mode of his agency as the Preserver no less than 
 the Creator of all things, for no other purpose 
 than to create a surprise and astonishment among 
 a portion of his creatures, — to amaze them with 
 a succession of miraculous operations on the 
 theatre of nature ; and that it was precisely 
 for the sake of conveying this information — of 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 229 
 
 acquainting succeeding generations with the mira- 
 culous exhibitions of divine power which had 
 been witnessed by the people of Israel, that 
 these had been collected into a continuous 
 account of the procedure of Almighty God ; to 
 be preserved as a precious deposit, an inestimable 
 treasure, of human knowledge. For aught we 
 perceive, the argument of Hume against miracles 
 proceeds upon no other and higher conception 
 of the purport of the Scripture in relating them ; 
 and such a conception is so egregiously inade- 
 quate, or rather erroneous, that we hold his 
 argument itself to be altogether inapplicable, 
 and actually powerless. In constructing it he 
 appears to have been so devoid of the principles 
 of natural religion, or so entirely to have laid 
 them aside, that he failed to apprehend the thing 
 virtually proposed to our belief in the Scripture, 
 and missed the question at issue between him- 
 self and the believer. He seems to have judged 
 that the chief, if not the sole, intent of the 
 Scripture, in relating a miracle, was to incline 
 us to believe the miracle itself: as though, for 
 example, we should receive its account of the 
 deluge, in pursuance of the end for which it was 
 recorded, if we believed that all mankind, with 
 the exception of a few persons, were drowned by 
 a preternatural outbreak of water : as though we 
 should adequately believe its account of the 
 destruction of the " cities of the plain," if we 
 
230 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 simply give credit to its statement that their 
 inhabitants were consumed by fire from heaven : 
 — as though the fact intended to be placed on 
 record in such instances was not the special agency 
 of God as the great Foe and Punisher of iniquity, 
 and the miracle was anything more than its 
 attendant circumstance, or the particular mode 
 of signalizing his retribution on the incorrigibly 
 vicious and wicked. From such a construction 
 of the import of the Scripture, in its relation 
 of miracles, it would follow that if we received 
 as true its assertion of the bare facts, and nothing 
 more, that a man named Jesus was put to death, 
 and restored to life again, we should satisfy the 
 demand which it makes on our belief, in an- 
 nouncing the resurrection of the Son of God 
 from the dead. Thus understood, it must be 
 admitted, and we presume it would be generally 
 agreed, that the miracles recorded in the Bible 
 are, antecedently, devoid of probability ; and we 
 could scarcely impugn the philosophy that pro- 
 nounces them to be incredible. If in setting out 
 in our discussions respecting miracles, we put a 
 negative on our moral relations to the Deity, and 
 thereby assume, in effect, that the design which 
 the Scripture attributes to the Deity, in endowing 
 individuals with miraculous powers, is, itself, 
 incongruous and incredible — a design to which 
 the established order of sensible phenomena 
 would be properly subordinate, and instead of 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 231 
 
 counteracting, would be directly instrumental to 
 display and accomplish — what reason is there 
 remaining, why we should examine any evidence 
 that may be offered us of the truth of the Scrip- 
 ture as a record of miracles, and even allow the 
 supposition of their reality ? What otherwise can 
 such miracles appear than interruptions of the 
 order established in the universe — departures 
 from the original plan of the creation — things 
 contrary to human experience ? Yet, after all, 
 to what experience are they contrary ? To the 
 experience of mankind inasmuch as they are 
 rationally constituted for a sense of duty to the 
 Creator, and susceptible of corresponding wants 
 and aspirations ? — to that experience to which 
 the Scripture directs our attention ? No : they 
 are contrary to our experience as inquirers into 
 the merely physical laws of the creation — ob- 
 servers only of the succession of material pheno- 
 mena ! 
 
 It was not our purpose, as was stated, to enter 
 upon a formal or particular examination of the 
 argument of Hume on the question of miracles, 
 still less to allege any other than an intrinsic 
 moral probability that the miracles related in 
 the Scriptures were actually wrought. But in 
 calling attention to a most defective appre- 
 hension, as it appears to our judgment, of the 
 true end and purport of the Scripture in its 
 account of miracles, on the part of an acute 
 
232 
 
 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 and subtle reasoner, and his want, in conse- 
 quence, of the requisite qualification for tracing 
 the characters of verisimilitude in its pages, we 
 must remark, in general, the necessity, in a 
 perusal of the Scripture, of keeping fully in our 
 view those fundamental principles of religion 
 which have been the subject of the preceding 
 discourses. There are many who, although they 
 would hardly reject such principles, nay, it is 
 probable, would recoil from an imputation of 
 utter scepticism in reference to the moral 
 government of the Deity, or his judicial regard 
 to our doings and character, yet, in perusing the 
 Scriptures — documents professing to record the 
 procedure of the Almighty towards mankind 
 precisely in the relation which he bears to them 
 as their moral Governor — allow such principles 
 to escape from their reflections, and to fall almost 
 into oblivion ; and are, consequently, in no better 
 preparation to appreciate the scope and credi- 
 bility of a particular record of divine acts and 
 dispensations, than the man who has actually 
 repudiated the notion of a moral obligation to 
 the Creator. In truth, we are generally more 
 or less chargeable with a grievous inattention to 
 acknowledged rudimental, but most pregnant, 
 principles of religion, in our estimation of the 
 Scriptures under that description in which we 
 are now regarding them. We do not sufficiently 
 recall such principles to our thoughts, and detain 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 233 
 
 them before the mind, in order that they may 
 work their proper effect, in raising and stimulating 
 the intellect to a correct and adequate compre- 
 hension of the claims which these writings prefer 
 to our reception, as a history of " the ways of 
 God to man." In our childhood and early 
 youth, it was natural that we should believe such 
 a history, if for no other reason, because we were 
 told that it was true. It was equally natural 
 that in the progress of experience we should 
 entertain the question whether it was entitled to 
 our belief; and, so far as it affected us merely 
 with surprise and wonder, that we should be 
 inclined to refer it to a fictitious origin. A per- 
 sonal inquiry, indeed, into the evidence of the 
 Christian religion, is commonly found to produce 
 an impression of its substantial truth ; but, not- 
 withstanding, we are apt to grow indifferent to 
 the preternatural events recorded in the Scrip- 
 ture, rather than to acquire a commanding con- 
 viction of their reality. Nay, is there not often 
 a considerable alloy of scepticism in our belief of 
 these writings ? May there not be some, even in 
 this assembly, who, if challenged by one of superior 
 intellectual pretensions to affirm their belief of the 
 miraculous narrations in the Scriptures, would, 
 instead of expressing a conviction of their truth, 
 in language such as that in which the great 
 philosopher referred to has recorded the result 
 of his meditations on the subject, rather evade 
 
234 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 the question than answer it ; would be conscious 
 of a secret diffidence and shame, and the dread 
 of something in the shape of ridicule ; would 
 shrink from the avowal of their faith, and dis- 
 honour their profession, as Christians ? 
 
 To what is this mixture of unbelief, this vacil- 
 lation of judgment on the truth of Scripture, to 
 be mainly attributed ? Is it not to the fact that 
 we look upon its accounts of miracles very much 
 in the light in which Hume regarded them ; that 
 is, as accounts of " prodigies and miracles," and 
 nothing more. As such we looked upon them 
 in our early years, and as such we are prone to 
 look upon them now, when inclined to doubt 
 them. It is true we may reject the position of 
 that author, that a miracle is incapable of proof 
 from testimony ; but that miracles are not, in 
 themselves and of necessity, incredible, is one 
 thing ; that those related in the Scriptures are 
 fully entitled to credence, is another. It is true, 
 moreover, we may find these miracles, in par- 
 ticular, avouched by adequate evidence from his- 
 torical testimony, and by most expressive marks 
 of sincerity in the individuals who relate them. 
 Still, an aspect of strangeness, and little else, 
 remains upon the miracles themselves : their 
 contrariety to experience continues to be their 
 prominent feature and characteristic. There is 
 no discovery, and succession of discoveries, of an 
 intrinsic probability in the miraculous agency 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 235 
 
 itself alleged to have been put forth by the 
 Deity ; no ideas of fitness and consistency flow- 
 ing into the mind as we contemplate the one 
 continuous procedure ascribed to him, towards 
 our species ; qualifying and abating the feelings 
 of wonder which it must otherwise awaken, and 
 familiarizing us, in a manner, with the mind of 
 that Being, whose agency and counsel it is which 
 the Scripture purports to record and declare ; — in 
 a word, no lustre of truth breaking out from the 
 several parts of its history, distinguishing and 
 surrounding them. The reason is, as we have 
 said, that we continue to regard the miracles 
 related in the Scripture as little more than 
 literal facts ; giving a disproportionate or ex- 
 clusive attention to the circumstantial detail of 
 the history, instead of attaching our thoughts to 
 that purpose of the Deity which the miracles 
 only served to testify and illustrate. In other 
 matters we may penetrate far beneath the outer 
 form, and the mere surface, of things, and culti- 
 vate a philosophical habit of mind. But in 
 reference to the miraculous narrations of Scrip- 
 ture, we have shaken off the credulity of our 
 early years, while our early apprehensions of the 
 narrations themselves may have undergone no 
 proportionate enlargement, and may be hardly 
 less superficial, and limited, and barren of matter 
 for argument and reflection, than when they 
 engaged out attention in our veriest youth ; 
 
236 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 stunted, moreover, by the influence of repetition 
 and the power of habit ; — as though it were not 
 an incumbent duty, and manifestly reasonable, 
 that we should contemplate anew such recorded 
 manifestations of the Deity ; with our matured 
 intelligence, and in a manner corresponding to 
 the present extent of our faculties. Meanwhile, 
 however, we may have long outgrown our early 
 and feeble conceptions of the works of human 
 genius ; and may be continually seeking to enter 
 more fully into their import, and to sympathize 
 more deeply with the minds of their authors. 
 
 To speak more particularly, when we take 
 the Scripture-history into our hands, we admit 
 the essential principles of religion — that it is our 
 primary duty to obey God, and that obedience 
 to him consists in the exercise of upright 
 affections towards himself and our fellow-crea- 
 tures ; and surely our progress in the perception 
 of religious as well as other truth, must mate- 
 rially depend upon a firm grasp of elementary 
 principles, and an habitual readiness in applying 
 them. Now, we cannot but know that the 
 great presiding purpose attributed to the Deity 
 in the Scriptures is to enthrone himself in the 
 affections of mankind, and to attach them to 
 his service in the habitual cultivation of piety 
 and virtue, preparatory to an enduring life and 
 happiness in a future state ; and we cannot but 
 perceive that such a purpose is infinitely worthy 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 237 
 
 of the Deity, and that to acquiesce and concur 
 in promoting such a purpose, in the government 
 of our own minds and the exertion of our in- 
 fluence on the minds of others, is an object 
 which reduces every other to insignificance, and 
 even annihilates it, in the comparison. We 
 submit, then, that it is an exercise of mind equally 
 reasonable and devout, in taking into our view 
 and consideration the historical Scriptures, to 
 attain and preserve a conception of that purpose 
 of Almighty God corresponding, if it be possible, 
 to its magnitude and importance. A continued 
 reference to this ostensible design of God, as set 
 forth in the Scripture, must have the effect of 
 bringing the whole and every part of its mira- 
 culous history to the true and proper test of its 
 intrinsic credibility ; namely, the express adapta- 
 tion of the procedure recorded of the Deity to 
 carry out and realize the design ascribed to him ; 
 that of effecting the reformation of his accountable 
 creatures, and restoring them to hope and con- 
 fidence towards him. Of course, it must at once 
 be perceived that, if it be unsound reasoning to 
 deny the credibility of one miracle for such a 
 purpose, there can be no reasonable objection to 
 more than one, or to one miracle more than 
 another, considered simply as a suspension of the 
 ordinary course of nature ; that incredulity on 
 this head, if once abandoned, should be aban- 
 doned for ever; and that the only criteria of 
 
238 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 internal probability in a miracle related in the 
 Scripture, are the conformity of the end which 
 it was designed to answer with the perfections 
 of God, and its fitness to carry that end into 
 effect. Such must be a necessary preparation 
 of the intellect for a correct apprehension of the 
 scope of Scripture in its relation of miracles ; 
 and, consequently, for a due appreciation of its 
 claims to the belief of mankind. For what are 
 the several portions of its history but, as we 
 have said, a particular continuous record of the 
 agency of the Creator towards our species ex- 
 hibiting his attributes as a moral Governor ; 
 towards one people, indeed, at the beginning 
 under peculiar circumstances, and for specific 
 temporary ends ; but thereby carrying forward 
 that plan of human redemption in general which 
 is ascribed to him in the Scriptures ? 
 
 We would therefore counsel the wavering and 
 unassured believer thus to extend his acquaint- 
 ance with the Scriptures, as a record of the 
 miraculous dealings of God with mankind. The 
 design itself attributed to the Divine Being is 
 not only so entirely agreeable to our conceptions 
 of his moral perfections, and brought out with 
 so bold an outline on the surface of the Scrip- 
 tures, as to render it a duty of natural religion 
 to inquire into the proofs of its reality ; but it is 
 exemplified in modes so various, in so many 
 particular instances, and with a consistency so 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 239 
 
 impressive and sustained, that to a mind ob- 
 servant of that design in its recorded progress 
 and development, the Scripture must be con- 
 tinually unfolding new evidences of truth, and 
 rivetting the conviction of its divine authority. 
 To a mind, indeed, like that of Hartley, holding, 
 in its close and powerful grasp, the links which 
 connect morality with religion, and furnished 
 with a knowledge of human nature singularly 
 varied and profound, it is far from difficult to 
 conceive that the Scriptures would, alone and 
 intrinsically, exhibit evidence of a divine original, 
 entirely adequate to satisfy a spirit of impartial 
 inquiry, and to outweigh the objections of scep- 
 ticism. And sure we are that, in proportion as 
 the Christian gives his thoughts to the precepts 
 and doctrines and narratives of the Scripture, in 
 the relation which they bear to his moral prin- 
 ciples, or his accountable nature, and as designed 
 and adapted to illustrate the attributes and 
 government of God, and to bind mankind to his 
 throne of righteousness, will he find his path 
 of research and meditation becoming illumined 
 with the emanations of an intelligence more than 
 human, and marked with the footsteps of the 
 Divinity ; and be increasingly prepared to 
 concur and sympathize with the deliberate judg- 
 ment of that philosopher, of whom we have 
 spoken, not as one standing alone, but as an 
 example and representative of a class of minds 
 
240 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 happily more numerous than many imagine — 
 namely, that if there were no other book in the 
 world besides the Bible, there would be a suffi- 
 cient evidence of the truth of the Gospel. 
 
 Before concluding, it is proper we should 
 select some particular instance, whereby to 
 illustrate the importance of such a mental pre- 
 paration for a due estimate of the miraculous 
 accounts in Scripture, as that upon which we 
 have insisted ; and we shall select that passage 
 which records the temptation of Christ by Satan 
 in the wilderness ; the conflict between one who 
 is described as the enemy of all goodness and 
 the implacable adversary of mankind, and One 
 who is represented as an example set before us 
 for our imitation, as well as our unfailing Friend 
 and Benefactor. And it should here be re- 
 marked, that, in a more extended view of the 
 moral attributes of the Christian religion, the 
 example of Christ would claim a distinct and 
 special consideration ; for, inasmuch as Chris- 
 tianity professes to be a divine institution for the 
 moral discipline and improvement of mankind, 
 who can fail to be impressed with the manifest 
 consistency, but surpassing greatness, of such a 
 design as that which it attributes to the Deity — 
 that of appointing in our own nature, and for 
 our special imitation, a model of perfect recti- 
 tude, of spotless innocence ; and moreover, by 
 the apparent marks of the actual realization 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 241 
 
 of such a design in the person of Jesus Christ ? 
 And with reference to Satan, it surely merits 
 observation, that his existence is declared and 
 his nature described, strictly and exclusively, in 
 pursuance of the moral purpose which pervades 
 the whole texture of Scripture — that is, in order 
 to excite a more watchful resistance to tempta- 
 tion, and a deeper abhorrence of all evil. The 
 existence of the idea of such a being is matter 
 of deep interest and curiosity ; and, if it ori- 
 ginated in human imagination, not a little 
 wonderful. It is wonderful if man, prone as he 
 is to transgress the divine commandment, and 
 engrossed with present gratification, has entered 
 into so much abstraction and spirituality of 
 thought — has taken so powerful an impression 
 of divine authority, and of the future conse- 
 quence of resisting it, as to personify the power 
 of temptation ; to represent it in a manner so 
 odious and formidable, as the nature and power 
 of Satan are exhibited in the Scriptures ; — won- 
 derful if man himself has fallen upon such a 
 method of stimulating his own vigilance and 
 determination in the conflict with his passions! 
 
 But returning to the account of the tempta- 
 tion of Christ by Satan, one cannot but perceive 
 the importance of regarding it under a due 
 impression of those truths, which lie at the basis 
 of natural as well as revealed religion ; for ex- 
 ample, that we are subject to the moral govern- 
 
 R 
 
242 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 ment of God, and are not merely the offspring 
 of his creative power, and that the great end of 
 our life is to give proof of our obedience to his 
 will. If unconvinced of such truths, or if we 
 do not bear them in our thoughts, and peruse 
 the pages of Scripture in the light which such 
 truths are fitted to cast upon them, what is 
 there in this narrative which it has given us of 
 the temptation of Christ by the Devil to fix our 
 attention — an attention approaching to reveren- 
 tial ? — what to solemnize our feelings ?— what 
 in itself to create a belief of its reality, nay, to 
 raise a presumption, or to stir a conjecture, that 
 it was recorded for the eternal well-being of 
 mankind by the pen of divine inspiration, the 
 finger of God ? We read of the Evil Spirit 
 appearing to Jesus Christ in a wilderness, in 
 what form we are left to imagine — an omission 
 however which, * we may express our belief in 
 passing, would not have been made if the account 
 had been fictitious — we read, we say, of the Evil 
 Spirit appearing to Jesus Christ in a wilderness, 
 and advising him to work a miracle to satisfy 
 his hunger ; and afterwards taking him — whether 
 by conveying him through the air, or conducting 
 him in a human manner, is not stated — into the 
 city of Jerusalem, and setting him on a pinnacle 
 of the temple, and challenging him to prove 
 himself to be the Son of God, by throwing 
 himself down from it and receiving no injury 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 243 
 
 from the fall. Again, we read of fyim taking 
 Christ, by whatever means, to the summit of an 
 " exceeding high mountain," and promising him 
 all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of 
 them, if he would fall down and worship him — 
 promising him regal possession of all the coun- 
 tries which could in any manner be descried 
 and pointed out from the elevation at which he 
 stood ; or, rather, promising him the empire of 
 the whole world, of which he might thus have 
 sought to convey a more lively impression. We 
 have before us little or nothing more than a 
 narrative of facts, not only of a most extraor- 
 dinary description, but marvellous in the highest 
 degree, running into the fabulous, and wearing 
 all the semblance of fiction. In other words, so 
 far as we are occupied, only or unduly, with the 
 bare literal narrative of the evangelist, we shall 
 be inclined to waver in our faith, and to suspect 
 that, in believing Jesus Christ to be the Son of 
 God, as he declared himself to be, we are resting 
 our faith on a human invention, and " following 
 cunningly-devised fables." That such, however, 
 should be the effect of our reading the Scrip- 
 tures, more especially such a portion of them as 
 that to which we are referring, in a forgetfulness 
 or virtual abandonment of the primitive truths 
 of religion, is as clearly implied and anticipated 
 in the Scriptures, as it is unquestionably certain 
 in the nature of things. Even in requiring our 
 
 r2 
 
244 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 belief of the divine authority of its particular 
 precepts, or the reality of facts entirely conform- 
 able to human experience, it assumes, as we 
 have seen, the evidence and authority of natural 
 religion ; how much more in calling upon us 
 to receive as true an account of events of a 
 strictly preternatural and miraculous character. 
 
 If, however, this part of Scripture be con- 
 sidered with the essential principles of religion 
 admitted into the understanding, and impressed 
 upon the heart, we are greatly mistaken if it do 
 not assume an aspect altogether different from 
 that which, in disregarding those principles, we 
 actually compel it to wear — if it do not exhibit 
 so striking a semblance of truth, and so many 
 of its characters, as effectually to counteract the 
 feeling of wonder and incredulity which it may 
 at first have awakened ; and accordingly to 
 reverse a prejudgment, which it may have led us 
 to form against the veracity of the Scripture in 
 general, or the competence and fidelity of its 
 authors. Reflecting upon this narration of the 
 evangelist in that appropriate state of mind, a 
 levity of spirit and a flippancy of comment are 
 impossible ; and the doubts and hesitations of 
 the believer, as to the reality of the Saviour's 
 encounter with the prince of darkness, will be 
 quickly scattered, and his faith sustained and 
 reassured. For, contemplating the recorded 
 conduct of Jesus Christ as an example of perfect 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 215 
 
 rectitude towards God, and with a willingness 
 to appreciate it under that character, and to 
 apply it to our own guidance and encourage- 
 ment under analogous circumstances, were it 
 possible to imagine conduct more answerable to 
 such a description ? — to imagine a severer trial of 
 obedience towards God than was put upon Jesus, 
 and of fidelity and resolution in his discharge of 
 that mediatorial office to which he was alleged 
 to have been divinely appointed, and prosecu- 
 tion of the work which he was declared to have 
 undertaken to accomplish for mankind ? Could 
 any mode of attack upon his integrity have 
 been adopted, more expressive of the craft and 
 treachery of such a being as Satan is described in 
 the Scriptures, or any manner of repelling him 
 more befitting the character of the predicted 
 Messiah? We allude particularly to the first 
 suggestion of the tempter, " If thou be the Son 
 of God, command that these stones be made 
 bread." 1 It will be remembered, w r hen this in- 
 sidious counsel was given to Jesus, he had fasted 
 a great length of time, forty days and forty 
 nights — whether it be meant that he was mira- 
 culously supported during that period, or that 
 he had taken no more nourishment than was 
 necessary to his bare subsistence — and had 
 become faint and exhausted from want of nou- 
 rishment. And what was that counsel of the 
 
 1 Matt. iv. 3. 
 
246 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 tempter? How did he urge him to satisfy his 
 hunger ? Not by an act of dishonesty so readily 
 excused in the extremity of want ; not by con- 
 duct which could trench in the smallest degree 
 upon the right or property of any human being ; 
 but by the exercise of a miraculous power, by 
 converting the stones of the desert into bread. 
 With that power, however, Christ had been 
 invested, not for his own advantage and wel- 
 fare, not to raise himself above the wants and 
 sufferings of humanity, but to enable him to 
 exemplify in a more illustrious manner the 
 patience, and resignation, and unshaken confi- 
 dence in God, with which, as his servants, we 
 are bound to endure them ; to set a conspicuous 
 example of that obedience to the will of the 
 Most High, which, as the elder brother of the 
 human family to which he had consented to ally 
 himself, it was preeminently his part to practise. 
 It was surely in a spirit corresponding to the 
 office and destination ascribed to him, of entire 
 self-renunciation and unreserved devotion to the 
 honour of God and the welfare of mankind, that he 
 foiled the artful adversary, and forbore to appease 
 the craving of his own hunger, by the exercise 
 of a power with which he afterwards, as related 
 in the same history, fed the famished multitude 
 in the desert ; thus setting a conspicuous and 
 encouraging example to the children of adversity 
 who should afterwards " believe in his name," and 
 
HARTLEY AND HUME. 247 
 
 whose integrity is so often tried by the urgency 
 of their wants, to hold fast their profession and, 
 on no account, to swerve from the path of duty. 
 Surely such conduct exhibits a perfect con- 
 sistency with the representation given of him in 
 the Scriptures, as at once the appointed medi- 
 ator between God and man, and as setting us 
 " an example that we should walk in his steps." 
 Surely it is a luminous comment upon the lan- 
 guage of Scripture : — " For we have not a High 
 Priest which cannot be touched with the feeling 
 of our infirmities ; but was in all points tempted 
 like as we are, yet without sin." It is unneces- 
 sary, for our purpose, to proceed any farther with 
 the particulars of this narration of the Evangelist. 
 Suffice it to say that if, with a view to appreciate 
 the strength of moral evidence, the amount of 
 internal probability, in this miraculous account 
 in the Scripture, we presume the assumption of 
 our nature by the Son of God to be a reality, it 
 was in utter solitude and extreme privation — so 
 far as any being can be alone and destitute who 
 " endures as seeing Him who is invisible " — that 
 the adversary of God and man was permitted to 
 assail the rectitude of his mind ; to ply him 
 with instigations to distrust in God, and the 
 indulgence of ambition and cupidity, and to 
 urge him to desert the cause of truth and 
 righteousness. It was in the pangs of hunger, 
 and the horrors of the wilderness, that he dis- 
 
248 
 
 ON MIRACLES. 
 
 dained the abundance of all nature, and exem- 
 plified the declaration made of him in the 
 Scripture, that it was " his meat to do the will 
 of Him that sent him." And we may well ask, 
 whether any example more impressive in its 
 character, better fitted to admonish us of our 
 inalienable duties towards God, and to animate 
 us to discharge them, to fortify our patience and 
 encourage our trust in God — in a word, to ac- 
 complish the end for which the Scripture is 
 declared to have been penned, and which our 
 reason concludes it must be the object of a 
 divine revelation to promote, could have been 
 given us, — namely, that of being " profitable for 
 doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruc- 
 tion in RIGHTEOUSNESS?" 
 
LECTURE VIII. 
 
 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL OF IMPLICIT 
 
 BELIEF. 
 
 1 Tim. iii. 16. 
 
 AND WITHOUT CONTROVERSY GREAT IS THE MYSTERY OF GODLINESS. 
 
 The argument in support of the reasonableness 
 and credibility of the Christian religion, from the 
 conformity which it exhibits with the conclu- 
 sions of human reason, or the principles of 
 natural religion, is often very inadequately re- 
 garded in its bearing upon that demand which 
 is made of an implicit assent to its peculiar and 
 distinguishing doctrines. Moreover, in collecting 
 and expounding the doctrines of Christianity, 
 the authority of human reason is sometimes 
 appealed to in a manner inconsistent, as we are 
 persuaded, with the dictates of a rational piety 
 in the belief of its divine origin. We propose, 
 then, in our concluding discourse, to consider 
 
250 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 that conduct of the understanding, in reference 
 to the special and distinguishing purport of the 
 Scriptures, which is incumbent upon those who 
 believe these writings to be a divine revelation, 
 or the men who penned them to have been 
 inspired by the Spirit of God. 
 
 Let it be presumed, then, that an inquirer 
 into the divine origin of Christianity has been 
 brought, by reflecting on the truth and reason- 
 ableness of the general principles of religion 
 which it assumes and inculcates, and the manner 
 in which it illustrates and applies them in its 
 particular exposition of our duties, — by reflecting 
 on its peculiar and incomparable tendency, in 
 general, to promote the practice of true piety 
 and virtue, and, we may add, by consulting 
 other sources of evidence concerning it, — let it 
 be presumed, we say, that he has been brought 
 by such means to a persuasion of its divine 
 authority. We conclude, then, that in that per- 
 suasion he is bound — he ought to feel that he 
 is infinitely privileged — he is bound, in the first 
 place, to apply his attention, at once and most 
 earnestly, to those facts, those doctrines, asserted 
 in the Scriptures, which human reason could 
 never have discovered, and is incompetent to 
 attest or verify, or which are, specifically and 
 preeminently, matter of divine revelation ; and, 
 secondly, that he is bound to place an implicit 
 reliance on the truth of such doctrines. 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 251 
 
 To proceed with the first particular — In 
 introducing the subject of these discourses, it was 
 remarked, that there was a radical deficiency in 
 that theology — that is, argumentatively and 
 speculatively considered — which aims to found 
 the belief of Christianity on the external 
 evidences of its truth, irrespectively of that 
 appeal which it makes to the independent conclu- 
 sions of our reason as moral agents, or as we are 
 subject to the dictates of the conscience. Not, 
 indeed, that the study of such evidence should 
 be in the smallest degree postponed, and the 
 mind of youth left vacant of such evidence, 
 instead of being preoccupied with it to the 
 utmost practicable extent ; for such is its force 
 and variety, that, in numerous instances, it effec- 
 tually precludes the inroad of scepticism from 
 whatever quarter, and often disturbs it in its 
 strongest positions ; raising a conflict in the 
 judgment which may terminate in its actual 
 overthrow. The position argued was, that, inas- 
 much as Christianity introduces its message to 
 the world with a commandment to believe its 
 declarations, it manifestly presumes a principle 
 of moral obligation to the Deity ; and that, con- 
 sequently, its foundations, so far as these are 
 subject to question, should be shown to have 
 been laid in the constitution of our rational 
 nature. It has, however, been alleged against 
 those advocates and teachers of Christianity 
 
252 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 who have maintained its credibility on the 
 ground of its congruity with the deductions of 
 reason, or the principles of natural religion, that 
 they have betrayed a proneness to limit their 
 exposition of Christianity itself to the inculcation 
 and enforcement of such principles ; and have 
 given but little attention, comparatively speaking, 
 to those doctrines which are strictly proper to 
 that religion, and exclusively matter of divine 
 revelation : — we say " comparatively speaking," 
 because we are not, in this branch of our dis- 
 course, referring especially to those professors 
 of Christianity who reject particular doctrines 
 alleged to be delivered in the Scriptures, on the 
 presumption that they are contrary to reason : 
 this is a mode of argument in deriving the sense 
 of the Scripture, to which we shall offer some 
 objection in the sequel. 
 
 Now we are far from believing that this allega- 
 tion could be sustained against the more eminent 
 of those advocates of our religion, who have 
 argued its consistency with the principles of reason 
 and natural religion ; and it were manifestly unjust 
 to affirm that a neglect of the distinguishing 
 doctrines of the Gospel is characteristic of 
 Christians of our time ; it were unjust to make 
 this affirmation of the members of the Church 
 of England. Nevertheless, it is generally and at 
 all times necessary to guard against the proneness 
 in question — a proneness to restrain and narrow 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIhF. 253 
 
 our religious views within such limits as may 
 only correspond with our preconceptions of the 
 genera] necessity and advantages of a divine 
 revelation, considered as bringing into light, and 
 placing more fully in our view, such truths as are 
 perceived to be agreeable to human reason, and 
 essential, in their practical operation, to the 
 rectitude and welfare of mankind ; and, conse- 
 quently, to estimate Christianity as little, if any 
 thing, more than a • declaration of the unity and 
 moral perfections of God, a definite and divinely 
 authorized rule of duty, with the promise of 
 forgiveness to the sincerely penitent, and an 
 announcement of a future state of rewards and 
 punishments ; — in brief, to content ourselves 
 with such sentiments of religion — more clearly 
 defined, and more firmly held, it is true — such 
 sentiments of religion, however, as a cultivated 
 and philosophic mind, emancipated from the yoke 
 of superstition, but unacquainted with the tidings 
 of the Gospel, might be competent to acquire, 
 and must be satisfied to embrace. It is at all 
 times necessary, we repeat, to guard against 
 a tendency of this nature, and to press onward 
 to a near and habitual contemplation of that 
 especial economy of salvation which is unfolded 
 to us in the sacred writings ; to bring the mind 
 under the immediate influence of those new and 
 powerful inducements, which it has brought us 
 to the fulfilment of all our duties, and to expe- 
 
254 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 rience their efficacy to enkindle every devout 
 affection, and to confirm every holy resolution. 
 This, it must be evident on reflection, is the 
 proper use of the understanding, as well as disci- 
 pline of the heart, in reference to the Scriptures, 
 under the conviction of their divine origin. 
 
 The case, indeed, is readily supposable, that it 
 might have been the sole design of Christianity 
 to recover mankind to that knowledge of their 
 relations to the Creator which they had been 
 originally capacitated to attain, and which, in 
 the due exercise of their faculties, would never 
 have been lost ; to repair the effects of their 
 forgetfulness and insensibility ; and, by express 
 denunciations and promises, to reclaim them to 
 the obedience of his laws. And, on this suppo- 
 sition, there would have been ample ground to 
 acknowledge the necessity and worth of the 
 Christian religion. But there is no colour what- 
 ever for so limited a conception of its actual 
 purport. The manner in which Christianity 
 was introduced into the world by its original 
 teachers, sufficiently betokened that they were 
 about to make some particular demand on the 
 faith of mankind, and to publish doctrines which 
 it would be incumbent to receive, in deference 
 to their special authority as the messengers of 
 God. Its Founder, it is true, declared that the 
 man who was desirous of obeying the will of 
 the Creator, was thereby qualified to perceive that 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 255 
 
 the doctrine which he delivered was from God ; 
 yet we can hardly suppose that the meaning of 
 his assertion was, that every such person would 
 be led to that conclusion by a consideration of 
 his doctrine alone ; for, if so, why should he have 
 professed to work miracles in attestation of his 
 divine commission, and have alleged their reality 
 and magnitude as proofs of a dereliction of piety 
 in those who rejected him ? The import of that 
 remarkable declaration was evidently this — that 
 there was such a conformity between the doc- 
 trine which he taught, in reference to our duties 
 to the Creator and our condition as subjects to 
 his government, as, in connexion with the tokens 
 of a preternatural agency in the person who 
 delivered it, to constitute an adequate evidence 
 that he was personally delegated by God to 
 instruct mankind, and, consequently, entitled to 
 belief in the whole extent of his communica- 
 tions. Moreover, the individuals who, after the 
 crucifixion of their Leader, represented them- 
 selves as divinely commissioned to teach more 
 fully, and to carry into all nations the religion 
 which he had taught them, appealed, in a similar 
 manner, to the miracles which they professed 
 to perform. With regard, indeed, to the attri- 
 butes and laws of the Creator as the Moral 
 Governor of the world, they positively asserted 
 that these, as they declared them, might have 
 been discovered in the right use of the human 
 
256 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 understanding ; clearly implying, that when pro- 
 posed to our reception, they would still more 
 readily admit of proof and confirmation. But that 
 they made declarations, or asserted doctrines, 
 the belief of which they demanded, peremp- 
 torily and absolutely, in virtue of the miracles 
 which they performed, is abundantly implied in 
 the following most important passage : — " How 
 shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, 
 which at the first began to be spoken by the 
 Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that 
 heard him ; God also bearing them witness, both 
 with signs and wonders, and with divers mira- 
 cles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to 
 his own will V 91 
 
 But farther, there are, upon the face of the 
 Scriptures, several facts stated, several doctrines 
 asserted and implied, which, manifestly, human 
 reason could never have anticipated, and is 
 unable to deal with in the way of proof or con- 
 firmation ; and which offer themselves to our 
 belief exclusively on the authority of a divine 
 revelation. Not only so ; there are express 
 declarations, on the part of the sacred writers, to 
 the effect that they were divinely commissioned 
 and qualified to teach such doctrines ; nay, that, 
 in the publication of the Gospel to mankind, 
 they were disclosing some fact of a most extra- 
 ordinary and wonderful nature, as well as of 
 
 1 Heb. ii. 3, 4. 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 257 
 
 inestimable value to mankind ; one calculated 
 to fill them with astonishment, as well as with 
 gratitude. " And, without controversy, great is 
 the mystery of godliness ;" — great is the secret 
 revealed, the fact made known, in the recovery 
 of mankind to true religion — " God was manifest 
 in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, 
 preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the 
 world, received up into glory." It were apart 
 from our purpose, on this occasion, to maintain, 
 on the authority of the Scriptures, the truth of 
 this declaration in that sense in which it is 
 received by most Christians ; that is, to main- 
 tain the actual assumption of human nature by 
 the Divinity, in the accomplishment of our 
 redemption by the Son of God. We cite the 
 passage, inasmuch as it cannot but remind us 
 that the fact of which the sacred writers prin- 
 cipally treat, and which they were inspired by 
 the Spirit of God to make known, the special 
 object of our faith as Christians, is one which it 
 is not in the province of human reason to judge 
 of; and which it is our duty to receive in 
 implicit reliance upon the testimony of the 
 Scriptures, as strictly matter of divine revela- 
 tion. No reference, indeed, may be made in this 
 passage to the strictly inscrutable nature of the 
 fact which is declared, or its incomprehensible- 
 ness to our faculties ; for, besides that the Scrip- 
 tural import of the term " mystery," as is well 
 
 s 
 
258 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 known, is simply something secret, unrevealed — 
 (for example, that the Gentiles should be intro- 
 duced into the church of God, and form a part 
 of the true spiritual Israel, was a mystery till it 
 was revealed by the Divine Spirit to the Apo- 
 stles, involving, however, in no degree an inex- 
 plicable proposition) — besides this, the inspired 
 teachers of our religion were not accustomed, 
 as is manifest, to contemplate the truths which 
 they delivered in relation to human powers of 
 comprehension. They professed to believe them 
 in virtue of a divine illumination conveyed and 
 made evident to their minds, and demanded the 
 belief of others as messengers from God, accre- 
 dited to be such by especial demonstrations of 
 his power. It follows that the evidence, in our 
 possession, of the reality of the miracles recorded 
 in the New Testament is not only matter for 
 research and examination, in judging of the cre- 
 dibility of our religion in general, but is proposed,, 
 especially, as the ground of our faith in such 
 of its doctrines as are incapable of proof from 
 human reason, or, in their nature, above the 
 comprehension of our faculties. 
 
 The object which filled the first teachers of 
 our religion with amazement, in the accomplish- 
 ment of our redemption by Jesus Christ, was, 
 doubtless, some transcendent act of divine con- 
 descension, supremely calculated to inspire the 
 human race with gratitude and devotion towards 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 2.59 
 
 him ; but what we are remarking is, that we 
 find in their writings palpable and repeated ex- 
 pressions of their own conviction, that the truths 
 which they were especially delegated to unfold 
 were remote from all human intelligence, and 
 the fruit of divine inspiration ; — their own con- 
 viction that prophecy had not been uttered in 
 former ages, or its words fulfilled in the person 
 of Jesus Christ, or men endowed like themselves 
 with miraculous powers, to establish the belief of 
 truths which might have been elicited by man's 
 understanding, or even truths which, though 
 before unknown, would, when revealed, be only 
 kindred or level to the preconceptions of man- 
 kind ; but to spread abroad the knowledge of 
 some fact — some measure on the part of the 
 Deity, that would surpass all human conception, 
 astonish and confound inquiring and meditating 
 minds. What else can be the import of such 
 words as the following ? — " For the preaching of 
 the cross is to them that perish foolishness ; but 
 unto us which are saved it is the power of God. 
 For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of 
 the wise, and will bring to nothing the under- 
 standing of the prudent. Where is the wise ? 
 where is the scribe ? where is the disputer of 
 this world ? hath not God made foolish the 
 wisdom of this world ?" ] 
 
 It follows, that when the advocates of Chris- 
 
 1 1 Cor. i. 18—20. 
 
 s2 
 
260 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 tianity allege a conformity in any of its principles 
 with the dictates of reason, or the presumptions 
 of natural religion, so far from showing any 
 rational ground, or rather any plausible pretext, 
 for resting in the latter, they are raising argu- 
 ments for a special attention to the distin- 
 guishing doctrines of Christianity, and a cordial 
 acquiescence in their truth and authority. For 
 what is the object proposed by such reasoning ? 
 With what view do we, as Christians, assert the 
 original obligations to piety and virtue — assert 
 the authority of conscience, or the probability of 
 a future state ? Not, it is presumed, to exhibit 
 the sufficiency of natural religion, but to infer 
 the credibility of the Scriptures ? And why, but 
 for the same purpose, do we argue the use and 
 necessity of a divine revelation to inform, regu- 
 late, and satisfy the mind of man ; seeing it has 
 ever been his nature to presume the existence 
 of superior and invisible power, whether inherent 
 in one being or in more ; to seek to propitiate 
 that power by worship and obedience ; to own 
 his accountableness to an authority higher than 
 human ; and to entertain hopes and fears of a 
 condition beyond the grave ? And why, more 
 particularly, do we insist on the inestimable 
 worth of a religion, which, like the Christian, 
 enlists the religious principles in the promotion 
 of everv virtue, and associates the idea of God 
 so intimately and absolutely with the love of all 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 261 
 
 rectitude, and the abhorrence of all evil ? Why, 
 as Christians, do we judge such topics to be 
 valuable and important, but to corroborate the 
 claims of the Scripture to be received as a divine 
 revelation ? But the great discovery which is 
 made to us in the Scripture, is that especial 
 manifestation of the Divinity, which was fore- 
 shown in prophecy, presignified in sacrifice, and 
 which is conspicuously set forth by Evangelists 
 and Apostles, as the proper basis of our confidence 
 towards him, and a commanding inducement to 
 the obedience of his will. The topics adverted 
 to are, consequently, so many forcible arguments 
 to prove the reality and importance of that 
 particular display of the holiness and mercy of 
 God ; and to convince us of the duty, and the 
 wisdom, of giving our close and earnest conside- 
 ration to the scheme of human redemption by 
 the mediation and sacrifice of the Son of God. 
 They are so many veins of religious truth, con- 
 ducting us to the heart and wealth of the mine ; 
 conducting us to the peculiar treasures of 
 revealed truth — " the unsearchable riches of 
 Christ." 
 
 Such considerations must convey a rebuke and 
 warning to every professor of the Gospel, who 
 holds in comparative indifference its essentially 
 proper and distinguishing truths, or is satisfied 
 to award them but a secondary and inferior 
 share of his attention. But, in collecting the 
 
262 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 import of the Scripture, and maintaining some 
 particular scheme or modification of Christian 
 doctrine, there is often a manner of appealing to 
 the authority of human reason, which renders it 
 necessary to assert, and to assert repeatedly, that 
 it is the part of a rational piety, as well as a most 
 incumbent duty, in the belief that the Gospel is 
 a divine revelation, to place an implicit reliance 
 on the truth of its statements and representa- 
 tions. In maintaining the reasonableness of this 
 particular duty, we shall at once observe, that 
 there appears an exceeding impropriety, to use 
 a far too lenient term, in that facility with which 
 individuals, as Christians, admit the suggestion, 
 or presume the possibility, that the Scriptures 
 may affirm propositions contradictory to reason. 
 The fact, unhappily, cannot surprise us, for the 
 human mind is continually admitting ideas, 
 entertaining presumptions, dishonourable to the 
 perfections of God, and unfavourable to his do- 
 minion over us. We are chargeable, however, 
 with an exceeding impropriety, if, while we ac- 
 knowledge the Scripture to be an authenticated 
 communication from God, we harbour the sup- 
 position of a contrariety to reason in any of its 
 statements and representations. It would shock 
 our rational faculties to conceive that God would 
 declare by his messengers that which was untrue, 
 and, in the nature of things, incongruous ; and 
 we should almost resent, as an affront to our 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 263 
 
 understanding, the intimation of a caution to 
 beware lest we allowed such a conception to 
 present itself in the shape of a reality. But 
 what signifies the recoil of the whole mind from 
 such an idea, if our conviction of the veracity 
 and faithfulness of God exert no appropriate 
 influence on the tone of our meditations, and 
 the method of our reasoning, concerning him ? 
 What are our abstract conclusions relating to 
 the Deity, be they ever so just and befitting, if 
 they take no substantial shape, in the exercise of 
 a powerful control on the habitual movements 
 of the understanding ; if they fail of a practical 
 efficacy, so to speak, on the conduct of our 
 thoughts, in the business of religious inquiry ? 
 If it were irrational, above expression, to suppose 
 that God would inspire individuals to propound 
 untruths and contradictions, and to call upon us 
 to believe them, and we have concluded the 
 Scriptures to be a revelation from himself, why 
 should we expect untruths and contradictions in 
 them? Why do we prepare to encounter such 
 contradictions ? Why do we allow the notion 
 that they can have found an admission into 
 the word of God ? We hold in our hands 
 writings purporting to bring us intelligence rela- 
 tive to our condition and destiny as accountable 
 beings ; and we have been conducted by the light 
 of reason to the conclusion, that the bearers of 
 this intelligence were messengers sent from God 
 
264 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 to mankind. On the same grounds, then, and 
 with the same confidence, that our reason is com- 
 petent to conclude that Christ and his Apostles 
 were messengers from God, our reason is compe- 
 tent to conclude that whatever we shall find that 
 thev have delivered, is true ; and that it will be 
 our duty to receive it in a perfect reliance on 
 the veracity of God. If we have determined the 
 Scriptures to be the work of divine inspiration, 
 we have virtually determined that they declare 
 no propositions contradictory to reason : we 
 have anticipated and disposed of that suggestion 
 altogether. In allowing a possibility of error 
 and incongruity in the doctrine which they 
 inculcate, we are, in effect, wavering in our 
 belief that they are the writings of inspired men ; 
 we are re-opening the question of their credi- 
 bility ; we are retracting the testimony of our 
 own reason to the divinity of their origin. And 
 as to our imagination, and the movement of our 
 feelings under its influence, so far as these can 
 be accessary to a due sense of our obligations to 
 Almighty God for the gift of the Holy Scriptures, 
 and to a reverential attention in perusing them, 
 we seem to be bereft of such functions of the 
 mind altogether. Imagination, or any vivid 
 conception, in reading the Scriptures — we can 
 have none. The men, whose writings we can 
 thus bear to associate with things repugnant to 
 reason, were endowed with supernatural powers ; 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 265 
 
 invested with authority to suspend the laws of 
 nature ; empowered to dispense with them ; 
 raised far above humanity ; that they might lay 
 deeply and broadly the foundations of the Church 
 of Christ in the midst of idolatry and wicked- 
 ness, and withstand the fiercest hostility of the 
 world. We have the very words of these very 
 men ; — is not that our belief? — yet, in this era 
 of the mind's activity, so slow and feeble are our 
 conceptions of the grandeur of their mission and 
 endowments, that it would seem to be necessary 
 that these illustrious and awful ministers of the 
 Almighty should quit, for a time, their seat of 
 triumph and repose, to which they passed 
 through their fiery path of trial, and resume their 
 powers, and repeat their work upon the earth ; 
 should heal diseases and raise the dead again, lay 
 bare the secrets of the human heart, and inflict 
 the judgments of God upon the sinner ; should 
 appeal to our senses, astonish us by their 
 deeds, and appal us by their presence ; in order 
 that we may yield some befitting reverence to 
 the Deity, in our reception of the words of his 
 messengers. 
 
 But this, it may be said, is all inapplicable to 
 our actual experience. Insist, as you will, on an 
 antecedent conclusion that there can be no 
 propositions repugnant to reason in the Scrip- 
 tures ; yet, in point of fact, if you receive them 
 in the sense which thov at first, and most 
 
266 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 readily, suggest to the reader, or the sense which 
 the bulk of readers, from whatever causes, have 
 annexed to the language of the sacred writers, 
 you will be met by such propositions ; you will 
 be compelled to perceive them and, on the 
 evidence of your own reason, to abandon them. 
 Well, then, if I shall be compelled to perceive 
 them — may every believer of Christianity say — 
 if I shall be compelled to perceive them, let me 
 perceive them because compelled to perceive 
 them. If such be my condition in the endeavour 
 "to have a conscience void of offence towards 
 God" as well as man, that, after having ascer- 
 tained, so far as my reason has enabled me, that, 
 in the publication of the Scriptures, God has 
 vouchsafed mankind a special communication 
 from himself, recorded what he has done in their 
 behalf, made known the conditions of accept- 
 ance with himself, and described the way of 
 peace and life eternal, — I am destined to be 
 disturbed in this persuasion, to be disappointed 
 in the assurance which now possesses me, that 
 I am acquiring knowledge in matters of supreme 
 importance, upon which the world has lain in 
 utter ignorance, or been tasked to endless specu- 
 lation and mere conjecture ; — if after having 
 gained access, as I believe, to the temple of 
 truth, passed its gates and entered within its 
 walls, yet, when about to lift the vail of its inner 
 sanctuary, a mist of confusion and perplexity 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 267 
 
 shall fall upon me, and I shall falter in my 
 purpose, not knowing whether to proceed or 
 retrace my steps ; — if I shall be compelled to 
 choose between the evidence which brought me 
 to the persuasion that the Scriptures were the 
 word of God, and that evidence which convinces 
 me that it affirms impossibilities and contradic- 
 tions, I must submit to such a trial of my sin- 
 cerity towards God. I must bear the burden 
 which, on that supposition, he will have deemed 
 fit to place upon my faculties. I shall not be 
 comfortless : " God knoweth our frame." I 
 shall be solaced with the reflection that he alone 
 has placed it upon me, and he will enable me to 
 bear it : that I approached the volume, which 
 I judged to reveal his will and dispensations, with 
 all humility, and thankfulness, and teachableness 
 of mind. — But the question under consideration 
 is not whether any or what conflicts of mind 
 may lie before us, in our investigation of the 
 Scriptures. We may be as unable to determine 
 whether a particular trial of our religious prin- 
 ciples awaits us in the conduct of the under- 
 standing, as to anticipate the trials which we 
 shall be called to endure in the ordinary regu- 
 lation of our lives. In the former instance, and 
 in the latter, our immediate concern should be 
 to provide ourselves with such principles of 
 thought and action, as are essential to esta- 
 blish, and can alone ensure, consistency and 
 
.1 
 
 68 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 comfort in the faith and practice of a Christian. 
 What, then, is our reasonable duty in the belief 
 that the Scriptures are a divine revelation ? 
 What but to banish, as utterly inconsistent with 
 that belief, as abhorrent to the devotional 
 affections proper to such a belief, the imagina- 
 tion that they assert impossibilities or contra- 
 dictions ? What, but to place undoubting 
 confidence in the truth and perfect reasonable- 
 ness of the Scriptures ? 
 
 It may still be judged by some that this strain 
 of observation is inapplicable to that method of 
 dealing with the import of the Scripture, which 
 we consider thus open to objection and remon- 
 strance. It may be said that when doctrines, 
 alleged to be declared in the Scriptures, are 
 affirmed to be contradictory to reason, it is meant 
 that, inasmuch as a revelation from God cannot 
 declare things unreasonable and contradictory, 
 such doctrines cannot be declared in the Scrip- 
 tures ; and that, consequently, those passages 
 which are commonly alleged to convey them, must 
 demand a construction different from that which 
 is usually placed upon them. Be it so said : we 
 retract not a particle of our opinion of the 
 peculiar impropriety, to use no stronger term, 
 of that facility with which those who believe the 
 Scripture to be a divine revelation admit the 
 possibility — allow the idea, of an unreasonable- 
 ness in its doctrines. For if we cite and urge 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 269 
 
 the independent authority of human reason, in 
 the investigation and exposition of the sense 
 of Scripture, we virtually admit that possibility, 
 we allow that idea. We introduce surmises and 
 notions into a province of inquiry, into an 
 exercise of our faculties, from which such notions 
 ought to be especially excluded. We would ask 
 an individual who should reply to the animad- 
 version we have offered, in the maimer sup- 
 posed, this question — If you are convinced that 
 a divine revelation cannot assert a particular 
 doctrine, why did you not ascertain whether the 
 Scripture actually asserted that proposition or 
 not, before you admitted it to be a divine reve- 
 lation ? Was it reasonable, under such a con- 
 viction, to conclude that the Scriptures were 
 worthy of a title so august, an authority so 
 absolute, before you had certainly learned that 
 they did not contain that proposition ? Was it 
 necessary or advantageous to a correct appre- 
 ciation of that question, as an exception to 
 questions in general, to determine it beforehand, 
 and even so peremptorily to prejudge it ? Was 
 it proper or desirable to set out with a pre- 
 determination, that the Scriptures did not convey 
 such a proposition, in order to form the most 
 accurate and impartial judgment as to whether 
 they did or did not convey it ? The truth is that 
 you concluded the Scriptures to be a divine 
 revelation on the strength of premises which, in 
 
270 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 relation to your understanding, were essentially 
 inadequate. You did not perceive that, in your 
 judgment, there was a particular condition ne- 
 cessary to accredit the Scriptures as a divine 
 revelation — the condition that it should not 
 declare a certain doctrine, touching, we may 
 presume, the person or office of Jesus Christ. 
 Ought you not to have satisfied yourself that 
 that condition was fulfilled before you concluded 
 that the Scriptures were from God ? You would 
 not have assented to its divine authority, had it 
 not accorded with your conception of the moral 
 attributes of the Creator ; had it not enjoined a 
 pure morality ; and if it be competent to human 
 reason to insist on the negation or absence 
 of a particular doctrine, relating to the person 
 and work of Christ, in a divine revelation, why 
 did you not satisfy yourself on this point also, 
 as essential to a rational belief of the divine 
 inspiration of the Scriptures, before you admitted 
 these to be the word of God ? The question as 
 to what is the actual meaning of certain writings 
 — the question whether the men who penned 
 them did or did not intend to convey a particular 
 doctrine, may surely be discussed and settled 
 without implicating us in a controversy, than 
 which there cannot be one more absolutely 
 superfluous, or more repugnant to a rational 
 spirit of religion — namely, whether writings 
 proved and acknowledged to be of divine in- 
 
OF IMPLICIT I5ELIEF. 271 
 
 spiration, can demand our belief of false and 
 incongruous positions. 
 
 You may, it is probable, reply that you are 
 conscientiously convinced, in the first place, that 
 the particular doctrine, or doctrines, in question 
 are in themselves contradictory to reason, and 
 therefore cannot be delivered in a divine reve- 
 lation ; and, secondly, that this conclusion of 
 your reason is realized in the Scriptures, inasmuch 
 as those doctrines are not to be found in them. 
 You may accordingly hold it to be perfectly 
 reasonable to contend for both these positions. 
 We submit, on the contrary, that in disputing 
 with any who receive the Scriptures as a divine 
 revelation, you should limit yourself to the latter 
 position ; namely, that the doctrine which you 
 repudiate is not delivered in the Scriptures. In 
 maintaining the former position, in giving your 
 attention to the question as to what can or 
 cannot be declared in a divine revelation, you 
 not only lay yourself open to an imputation of 
 indecision and vacillation in your own judgment, 
 that the Scriptures are a divine revelation ; but 
 you assert a position which must, of necessity, be 
 entirely lost upon your opponents. In believing 
 the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, they are 
 as firmly convinced as yourself that they cannot 
 convey incongruities and contradictions. By 
 arguing, therefore, that a doctrine, which they 
 are persuaded is delivered in the Scriptures, 
 
272 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 involves a contradiction, you may indeed unsettle 
 and destroy their belief of the divine inspiration 
 of those writings ; but if your purpose be to 
 convince them that they have misunderstood the 
 import of the Scriptures, your argument must 
 be wholly irrelevant and useless. We conclude, 
 then, that in disputes among those who are 
 agreed upon the divine inspiration of the Scrip- 
 tures, to make assertions, and to moot questions, 
 as to what doctrines are repugnant to reason, 
 and cannot therefore be delivered in them, is at 
 once inconsistent with the reverence due to an 
 acknowledged revelation from God, and imperti- 
 nent to the point at issue. 
 
 The qualifications requisite for a right con- 
 struction of the sense of Scripture, or a correct 
 apprehension of its doctrines, form a subject 
 distinct from the purpose of the present dis- 
 course ; and doubtless, in this department of 
 inquiry, there is abundant scope for a cultivated 
 judgment, as well as for the application of various 
 knowledge. But we may observe, that they who 
 favour an opinion that to learn the essential 
 import, or the capital doctrines, of the Scripture, 
 is a difficult attainment, and the privilege only of 
 a few, appear to be rather occupied with their 
 own particular view of the doctrine which it 
 teaches, than impressed with the pretensions of 
 the Scripture itself, as a divine revelation. For 
 the Scripture addresses itself to the understand- 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 273 
 
 ing of mankind in general ; and, to inspire an 
 implicit confidence in its declarations, not only 
 refers us to the miracles which were wrought to 
 attest the divine inspiration of its authors — 
 that is, to the evidence adducible of the reality 
 of those miracles — but appeals to the illustration 
 of the attributes of God in the aspect of the 
 creation, and the frame of our own minds. That 
 a particular construction of the sense of Scripture, 
 in reference to its prominent and characteristic 
 doctrines, should be different from that of its 
 readers in general, so far from raising a preposses- 
 sion in its favour, would rather warrant a presump- 
 tion of its fallacy, or a closer examination of its 
 merits. But the point we are now maintaining is, 
 that, when men have ascertained such a con- 
 formity, in a portion of the doctrines of Chris- 
 tianity, as well as its practical precepts in general, 
 to the deductions of reason, as to take their 
 stand as avowed believers and advocates of that 
 system of religion, they have become rationally 
 subject to the absolute guidance and authority 
 of divine revelation, in matters of faith. In other 
 words, the course which reason points out to them 
 is, simply, to institute a full and impartial inquiry 
 into the language of Scripture ; and by comparing 
 one part with others, and applying their attention 
 to the whole, with whatever help any branch of 
 learning may afford them, to elicit its actual 
 import, the sense intended to be conveyed by its 
 
274 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 authors. If a conformity between a portion of 
 the Gospel and the conclusions of reason, be of 
 any force to establish the credibility of the Gospel 
 itself as a divine communication, it is so to esta- 
 blish the credibility of its declarations in general, 
 and to enforce an implicit assent to the whole 
 substance of its doctrines. And those theolo- 
 gians who, on the contrary, prejudge its purport, 
 and expound its doctrines under the influence of 
 such a prejudgment, are surely imposing a decep- 
 tion on their own understanding, in presuming 
 that they adduce the principles of natural re- 
 ligion to corroborate the claims of the Gospel 
 to be received as a divine revelation — that is, to 
 dispose us to believe the facts which it especially 
 professes to declare. When, for example, they 
 affirm the divinity and incarnation of the Son of 
 God to be repugnant to reason — is this a means 
 of disposing us to believe the declarations of the 
 Gospel, in reference to his person and office in 
 the accomplishment of man's redemption ? — a 
 means, moreover, of preparing us for the dis- 
 closure of a mystery — a great and wonderful 
 secret concerning him ? What, to prepossess us 
 with a persuasion that, if the Gospel declared 
 him to be superhuman and divine, and in reality 
 to have assumed our nature when he appeared 
 as a man, it would declare that which is itself 
 incredible, impossible, — which it is an abuse of 
 reason to believe ! Can such expositors of the 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 275 
 
 Bible be held to enforce its claims as a revelation 
 from God, when they argue the conformity of 
 many of its doctrines with the independent 
 presumptions of reason ? If such a conformity 
 signify anything, as an argument for accepting 
 the Gospel as a divine communication, it is a 
 ground for accepting its decisions on subjects of 
 which we have otherwise no knowledge ; just as the 
 correspondence of a man's words with his actions, 
 so far as these have come within our observation, 
 is a reason for confiding in his professions, under 
 circumstances in which we have no means of 
 ascertaining his integrity. If, under such cir- 
 cumstances, we harbour and abet a notion that, 
 presuming he had acted, or was about to act, in 
 a certain manner, he would betray a dishonesty 
 of purpose, we should deceive ourselves in the 
 supposition that we placed an implicit reliance 
 on his integrity. In truth, there is some diffi- 
 culty in accounting such expositors of the Bible 
 advocates of Christianity as a divine revelation — 
 advocates, strictly speaking, of revealed religion ; 
 and we may well be at a loss to understand in 
 what, manner they can be regarded as commend- 
 ing to our belief, any such wonderful fact as that 
 which the sacred writers profess to make known. 
 Their reasoning in support of Christianity may, 
 it is true, be greatly useful to the general interests 
 of religion and morality. When they show that 
 the doctrines taught by Jesus Christ and his 
 
276 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 Apostles harmonize with the deductions of reason, 
 they do important service to individuals and 
 society. But in what degree do they rest our 
 belief on the authority of the divine revelation ? 
 What scope do they leave for the pure exercise 
 of faith in the word of God, an act of piety 
 unquestionably inculcated in the Scriptures ? 
 
 Those conclusions of reason, those principles 
 of natural religion, which actually corroborate 
 the claims of the Bible as a divine revelation, 
 must themselves possess an inherent claim to 
 our practical acquiescence and submission. They 
 may have been suggested to our own thoughts, 
 they may have been brought more clearly and 
 powerfully into view, by Christianity, but they 
 cannot derive their own evidence and authority 
 from a religion which they are strictly available 
 to support. They must in themselves be true 
 and obligatory upon us ; otherwise it must be 
 idle to allege them in confirmation of Chris- 
 tianitv. Hence, indeed, some have asserted the 
 truth and authority of such principles with a 
 view, not to establish, but to disprove, the 
 necessity and benefits of the Christian religion ; 
 for example, Lord Herbert, of Cherbury, who 
 contended that mankind were capable of a 
 piety, acceptable and pleasing to God, without a 
 divine revelation ; and that the Scriptures had 
 not disclosed any necessary principles which our 
 own reason could not have discovered. Those 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 277 
 
 expositors of the Bible therefore, to whom we 
 refer, are entitled to our acknowledgment for the 
 service which they render to religion, inasmuch 
 as they uphold and inculcate truths which human 
 reason is competent to establish ; but how can 
 we esteem them as advocates of divine revela- 
 tion, if they conduct us no farther in the search 
 of religious knowledge ; but when they have 
 brought us to prophets and apostles, teachers 
 sent from Heaven to enlighten us, they refer us 
 back again for the import of their language, the 
 substance of their doctrines, to the conclusions, 
 negative or positive, of uninspired minds ? 
 
 In maintaining the reasonableness and duty 
 of placing an implicit reliance on the testimony 
 of the Scripture, in the belief of its divine inspi- 
 ration, we are fully aware that the reflecting 
 reader of the Scripture will meet with doctrines 
 which are difficult to be comprehended, and 
 which may even show an appearance of incon- 
 gruity. But if, in the exercise of such a con- 
 fidence in the declarations of Scripture as is due 
 to an acknowledged revelation from God, our 
 attention be called to such doctrines, what will 
 be the result ? A presumption, most assuredly, 
 that the difficulty of comprehending them arises 
 from the limitation of our faculties, and that the 
 appearance of incongruity is nothing more than 
 an appearance. In that presumption we shall 
 either rest at once and finally, or we shall pro- 
 
278 
 
 THE DEMAND IN THE GOSPEL 
 
 ceed to an actual examination, in the certainty 
 that we shall verify that presumption. With 
 such an expectation, we shall not readily con- 
 sent to the superficial aspect of things ; we shall 
 hardly be satisfied with no severer exertion of 
 our faculties, than is necessary to perceive a 
 self-evident contradiction. We shall search, as 
 closely as we are able, the reasoning alleged to 
 demonstrate contradictions in the doctrines of 
 Scripture, and, if possible, sift the whole material 
 of which it is composed. It will be found, we 
 believe, and has been found, that such an impu- 
 tation on the Scripture is deduced from premises 
 assumed without proof, and sustained by analo- 
 gies which fail of application ; that the doctrines 
 impugned relate to questions of a nature — and this 
 it is at least competent to our reason to conclude 
 — which surpass the comprehension of human 
 faculties ; and are, as the Scripture assumes them 
 to be, strictly matter of divine revelation ; that is, 
 entitled to our belief in implicit reliance on the 
 testimony of Him who has declared them. 
 
 We revert, then, to the conclusion which was 
 maintained in the former part of this discourse — 
 one which claims the attention of Christians 
 generally, and is especially pressed upon our 
 consideration as members of a Church, which 
 exhibits so prominently the peculiar and cha- 
 racteristic doctrines of the Gospel — the conclu- 
 sion that, whereas we may be inclined to limit 
 
OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 279 
 
 our conceptions of Christianity to those prin- 
 ciples only, in which it is perceived to be con- 
 formable to human reason, the proper use to be 
 made of such conformity — as indeed of every 
 kind and degree of evidence whereby the Scrip- 
 tures are proved to be of divine authority — is to 
 apply it as an argument for a firm and steadfast 
 belief of that truth, which it is especially the 
 object of the Gospel to make known — the burden 
 of its message to mankind. And may it be ours 
 thus to experience its full efficacy to inspire our 
 devotion towards God, and establish our hope 
 and confidence towards him ! If it be agreeable 
 to our reason to presume his placability towards 
 the penitent, may such a presumption dispose 
 us to appreciate that attribute of his character 
 in the express appointment of a Mediator, by 
 whom at once to effect the vindication of his 
 righteous laws, and to bestow upon us the for- 
 giveness of all our sins ; and thereby operate as 
 a motive to faith in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, 
 whose blood cleanseth from all sin ! If it seem 
 agreeable to our reason to entertain the highest 
 conception of the goodness of God, may this 
 dispose us to believe and contemplate the mani- 
 festation of his love to mankind set forth in the 
 Gospel — the theme of inspiration : — " God so 
 loved the world that he gave his only-begotten 
 Son, that whosoever believeth in him should 
 not perish, but have everlasting life!" May it 
 
280 DEMAND OF IMPLICIT BELIEF. 
 
 dispose us to contemplate the wondrous con- 
 descension of our Redeemer, who clothed himself 
 with our inferior nature, endured a life of suffer- 
 ing, and even the extremity of the cross, to 
 obtain our acceptance with the divine holiness ; 
 to dispel the dread of a future retribution ; and 
 more than satisfy the natural universal desire of 
 a better life ; — " who hath abolished death, and 
 brought life and immortality to light ! " And 
 may the sense of our obligation to so unspeak- 
 able goodness subdue all reluctance to obey the 
 divine commandment, and determine us to "pre- 
 sent our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable 
 unto God, which is our reasonable service ! " 
 
 THE END. 
 
 R. CLAY, PRINTER, BREAD STREET HILL. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Page 54, line 2, for ' conditions ' read ' condition.' 
 
 — 6,^ — 20, at ' passions ' insert ' than in the proper exercise of gra- 
 
 titude.' 
 
 — 146^ — 27, in Note, for ' is prevented' read ' has been prevented ' 
 
 — 149, last line, at ' rectitude ' place a note of interrogation ; and also at 
 
 — 153, line 19, and at 179, line 31. 
 
 — 192, — 30, in Note, for ' where ' read ' when.' 
 
 — 21G, — 7, for * or rather that evidence should be offered,' read ' or 
 
 rather have been accompanied by evidence.' 
 
 — 217, — 27, for 'truth' read * divine authority.' 
 230, — 1 , fur * give ' read ' gave.' 
 
 — 267, — 7, for ' it ' read ' they.' 
 
 — 270, lines 5,6, 7, for ' it' read 'they,' and line 11,/or ' its ' read ' their.' 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 SERMONS 
 
 PREACHED AT THE TEMPLE CHURCH; AND BEFORE 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 
 
 During the Month of January, 1838. 
 Svo. 12.y. 
 
 HULSEAN LECTURES FOR THE YEAR 1839. 
 
 MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 IN REFERENCE TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEF, 
 
 Explained and Applied. 
 
 Svo. 7s. 6d. 
 
Princeton Theological Semmary-Speer Library 
 
 1 1012 
 
 147 0301